CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY Digitized by Microsoft® JV 10113417907™™''''''''"^^ iiHm?MiS°!°I?,i?.!..P.?''''y' 1754-1765 / 3 1924 021 048 354 This book was digitized by Microsoft Corporation in cooperation witli Cornell University Libraries, 2007. You may use and print this copy in limited quantity for your personal purposes, but may not distribute or provide access to it (or modified or partial versions of it) for revenue-generating or other commercial purposes. Digitized by Microsoft® The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924021048354 ' DigitizWd by Microsoft® Digitized by Microsoft® BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY 1754-1765 Digitized by Microsoft® THE MACMILLAN COMPANY NEW VOKK • BOSTON - CHICAGO ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO MACMILLAN & CO., Limited LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA MELBOURNE THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA. Ltd. TORONTO Digitized by Microsoft® BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY 1764-1765 Nam quis nescit, primam esse historiae legem, ne quid falsi dicere audeatf deinde ne quid veri non audeat. — Cicero, De Oratore, lib. ii, ch. xv. BY GEORGE LOUIS BEER SOMETIME LECTUREIt IN HISTOST AT COLUMBIA DHIYERSITT Neto gotk THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 1907 All rtghtt rtiervtd Digitized by Microsoft® COPTEIGHT, 1907, bt the macmillan company. Set up and electrotyped. Published September, 1907. Norisoiill ]Pt(2g J. S. Cnshing Co. — Berwick & Smith Co. Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. Digitized by Microsoft® PREFACE The matter contained in this essay was collected in the course of an extensive study of the old British colonial system. At the outset of the investigation, more atten- tion was paid to the development of the eighteenth, than to that of the preceding century ; but as the work pro- gressed, the necessity of treating the origins and estab- lishment of the system on a larger scale became patent. Consequently, although the material for the eighteenth century was to a great extent elaborated, it appeared advisable to defer its publication until the preceding age could be more carefully investigated. As, however, it was decided at the same time to treat the entire subject apart from the controversies of the American Revolution, there exists no valid reason to refrain from publishing the results of the study of the transitional years from 1 754 to 1765. The subject of the work, its exact scope and limits, are clearly indicated by the title. It is a study of British policy during the critical period of the old Empire. Thus the essay belongs distinctly to the domain of Brit- ish history ; but to the extent that English and American development were then inseparable, it also, but more indirectly, falls within the field occupied by American history. The focus of interest is, however, the British Empire, and not the rise of the American Nation. On its positive side the book is a portrayal of British policy, a study in imperial history ; on its negative side it is an Digitized by Microsoft® vi PREFACE account of the preliminaries of the American Revolution. Hence necessarily, if viewed as a study in American history, the essay is incomplete. The material upon which the book is based is some- what diverse in nature. To a preponderant extent it is composed of the official British state papers, deposited in the Public Record Office in London. Of these docu- ments a very large proportion remains still unpublished, and many of them have been virtually undisturbed since they were filed away a century and a half ago in the course of departmental routine. Secondly, the large contempo- rary pamphlet literature has been intensively studied. Thirdly, the British statutes have to a great extent fur- nished the framework of the essay. In addition, use has been made of the parliamentary journals, of various manu- script collections, of the reports of the Historical Manu- scripts Commission, of contemporary newspapers, of the published papers of English and American statesmen, and of the printed records of the various colonies. It should be noted, that of the British Museum manuscripts, the transcripts in the Library of Congress at Washington, not the originals, were examined. The nature and extent of this material are clearly indi- cated in the book, as the authority for every statement is given in the foot-notes. Furthermore, there has been relegated to this place a large mass of details, and in addition considerable illustrative material which, it was thought, would make the text more complete for the professional, as distinct from the lay reader. To have incorporated this matter in the body of the book, without at the same time sacrificing the readability of the text, would have unduly expanded the essay. It is hoped that Digitized by Microsoft® PREFACE vii the compromise adopted will be satisfactory in meeting the wants both of the scholarly world and of the general reading public. It would be ungracious not to acknowledge the unfail- ing courtesy of the officials of the Public Record Office, especially of Mr. Hubert Hall, whose unrivalled knowledge of the archives in his charge is placed unsparingly at the disposal of students. Similar acknowledgment is due to the officials of the Privy Council Office, to Mr. V. H. Paltsits of the Lenox Library, to Mr. Erb of the Colum- bia University Library, and to Mr. W. C. Ford of the Library of Congress. Professor E. R. A. Seligman has not only generously allowed unrestricted access to his invaluable collection of eighteenth-century economic pamphlets, but has in addition assisted in the drudgery of reading the proof. To Professor H. L. Osgood thanks are due for uniform encouragement, but more especially because he first directed the writer's attention to this field of research, and initiated him into the scientific study of history. There has been no conscious violation of the tenets of modern science, whose methods demand an exhaustive and critical study of the most reliable sources of information, and whose spirit is one of strict- est objectivity and impartiality. It has been the aim of the writer to follow the principle, which according to Cicero is the primary law of historical writing, namely, to refrain from accepting anything that is false, and not to ignore anything that is true. GEORGE LOUIS BEER, Upper Saranac Lake, July 26, 1907. Digitized by Microsoft® Digitized by Microsoft® CONTENTS FACE Introduction ....... . . . i CHAPTER I Theory and Practice of Imperial Defence, Prior to 1754 .( 6 CHAPTER II Plans for a Union of the Continental Colonies in 1754 .— ~T^ CHAPTER III Proposed Taxation of the Colonies, 1754-1756 . . . .31 CHAPTER IV The Requisition System during the War, 1756-1763 ... 52 CHAPTER V The Regulation of Trade during War 72 CHAPTER yi Colonial Trade with THE Enemy, 1756-1763 86' CHAPTER VII Means adopted to check this Intercourse with the Enemy /C ii4~" CHAPTER VIII Tropical and Continental Colonization 132 CHAPTER IX The Peace of Paris and the Empire 160 ix Digitized by Microsoft® X CONTENTS PAGB CHAPTER X Readjustment of the Laws of Trade, i 763-1 765 . . ^ -(fg? CHAPTER XI 'Reforms in the Administration of the Laws of Trade, 1763- ^1765 ^ .^|2H CHAPTER Xn Indian Policy and Colonial Defence, 1763-1765 .... 252 CHAPTER XIII The Revenue Acts of 1764 and 1765 274 CHAPTER XIV Colonial Opposition Index 317 vQ!L Digitized by Microsoft® BKITISH COLONIAL POLICY 1754-1765 Digitized by Microsoft® Digitized by Microsoft® BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY i754-i76 5_ INTRODUCTION The comparatively short period of time embraced within the dates of 1754 and 1765 was filled with events of momen- tous importance in the history of the British Empire. These few years witnessed both a vast extension of the Empire, and also the organized beginnings of a movement tending toward its disruption. In so far as any war can decide so fundamental an event apart from the underlying condi- tions predetermining its issue, the success of British arms in America decided that the civilization of North America was to be Anglo-Saxon, not Latin in character. In India a signal, though not a final, check was given to French ambi- tions, and a firm foundation was laid for future British politi- cal supremacy. In West Africa also a policy of territorial acquisition was definitely adopted. It is not the purpose of this essay to describe these well-known events. The prospects of future imperial expansion, disclosed by the victories in India and in Africa, will be disregarded, and attention will be paid solely to the Empire in America. Nor, except to the extent that it may be necessary in order to understand the effects of British policy, is it the intention B I Digitized by Microsoft® 2 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 to analyze the deeply seated causes that led to the secession of the North American colonies from the Empire. Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas. To acquire such a state of happiness would necessitate an exhaustive exami- nation of the Empire's development from its very origins. The tendency toward independence was present at the outset. It was in part due to the extreme individualism of the settlers, a characteristic which, while possessing distinct advantages, is not conducive to the creation of large political entities. In part also this tendency was due to the fact that the movement of colonization was largely the result of private enterprise. The mother country sanctioned the movement, supervised and aided it, and thus incurred definite responsibilities. But the colonies were not incor- porated as organic parts of the English body politic. They were expected to provide the funds for their own local public affairs, and, to a great extent with this object in view, large powers of self-government were granted to them. Under these conditions, each colony, whether in the Antilles or on the continent, had developed a vigorous political life of its own, in which the popular branch of the local legislature, through its control of the purse, had become the most important factor. Each colony had its own historical tradi- tions and institutions, its own peculiar customs and usages, to which the home government adapted itself, thus giving to the British imperial administrative system a t)^ically flexible character, though an unsymmetrical aspect. To a great extent, pride of race had disappeared in the colonies and patriotism was bounded by the physical limits of each Digitized by Microsoft® INTRODUCTION 3 province. The colonist, in general, regarded himself not as an Englishman, nor even as an American, but as a Bar- badian, a Virginian, and so on throughout the entire list of British colonies. Thus the Empire was a loosely organized political structure, composed of a number of heterogeneous colonies with different economic institutions and with varying degrees of local self-government, all tending, how- ever, toward virtual autonomy. ^■ In an empire of this nature, one of the most difficult prob- lems is to create an effective system of defence which shall neither bear inequitably on the taxpayer in the mother country, nor offend the political principles of the colonists. It is a problem for which as yet no solution has been found, and which at the present day is one of the most serious of British imperial questions. Modern English statesmen have not solved the difficulty ; they have merely cut the knot. Great Britain is to-day chafing at a decision which forces her to provide for virtually the entire naval defence of the Empire. Imperial defence was the rock upon which the old Empire shattered itself, and toward which similar dis- ruptive currents in the modem Empire again tend to draw the ship of state. The unfortunate experience in the past has, however, clearly located the point of danger, though other uncharted reefs may still be encountered. In the years 1754 to 1765 this question of defence became of supreme importance because of the struggle with France. Simultaneously, the looseness of the Empire's organization was emphasized by the trade of the colonies with the enemy, which led to reforms tending to increase the efficiency of Digitized by Microsoft® 4 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 the imperial administrative system. These were the chief colonial questions of the time, and it was to them that British statesmen devoted their especial attention. It is the object of this essay to describe the main features of English policy during this decade. At the outset, an attempt was made to solve the problem of defence by a voluntary union of the continental colonies for this purpose. This failed, and shortly thereafter war with France was formally declared. The chief questions during the war were to secure the necessary support from the colonies in America, and also to force them to subordinate their local interests to those of the Empire as a whole by stopping their trade with the enemy. The universal success of British arms in J all comers of the world, under the inspiring genius of Pitt, to a certain extent allowed Great Britain a choice as to the direction of the Empire's future expansion in America. The discussions on this subject, and the final decision reached to retain Canada and not the tropical French islands in the West Indies, revealed the fact that a distinct change had taken place in the economic theory of colonization. This change resulted in some modifications of the laws of trade, while at the same time the return of the rich West Indian islands to France led to a counter-movement designed to increase the importance of the British colonies in the same region. The old colonial system also required some read- justment in view of the territory acquired by the treaty of peace of 1763. At the same time, the successes of the war produced in England increased interest in colonial affairs generally, and led to a desire to reform patent abuses in Digitized by Microsoft® INTRODUCTION 5 their administration. As a consequence there ensued not only an attempt, based on the experience gained in break- ing up the colonial trade with the enemy, to stop all illegal trade, but also to some extent the determination to reform the colonial system of defence and to impose parliamentary taxes for this purpose. Digitized by Microsoft® CHAPTER I THEORY AND PRACTICE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE, PRIOR TO 1754 The general formula which summed up the reciprocal duties of mother country and colony was that the former owed protection, the latter obedience.* Neither protection nor obedience was a clearly defined term, yet theory and cus- tom had bestowed upon each a fairly distinct meaning. By obedience, in general, was meant submission to acts of Parliament affecting the Empire as a whole. As the aim of British statesmen had been directed more toward creating; a commercial than a closely welded political empire, obe- dience had come to mean, more specifically, conformity with the complex system of laws regulating the trade of the Empire. The duty of Great Britain as regards protection : was also somewhat vague, yet there had developed a well- defined theory of imperial defence, and with it a general j agreement as to the equitable apportionment of the burden thereof among the component parts of the Empire. English statesmen fully understood the doctrine of "sea power," and recognized that the safety of the Empire de- pended primarily upon British naval strength. Thus in 'Thus in 1766 Grenville said: "Protection and obedience are reciprocal. Great Britain protects America; America is bound to yield obedience." Pari, i Hist. 16, p. 102. 6 Digitized by Microsoft® THEORY AND PRACTICE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE 7 1764 the Earl of Halifax, when secretary of state, wrote: "It is upon the Superiority of the Fleets of Great Britain, that the Defence & Security of Her Colonies ever have, & ever must principally depend." ' In time of war, the fleet was used for the general purposes of naval strategy, for the protection of the coasts of the colonies, and for the security of the trade between them and the mother country. In time of peace the navy was used to protect English and colonial commerce. The ocean in those days was not the peaceful highway of the twentieth century. British vessels trading to the West Indies were not infrequently in time of peace seized by the Spaniards and even by the French. The security of this trade depended on the strength of the royal navy. Then piracy was the great scourge of the eighteenth century, and it was only the naval power of Great Britain that forced upon the Barbary corsairs a series of treaties removing British and colonial ships from the range of their depredations. The important trade carried on from the American continental colonies to Madeira and to South- ern Europe in fish, lumber, and grain depended on such im- munity.^ This entire burden fell upon the British taxpayer. ' Col. Corr. Bahama I, Halifax to Shirley, Oct. 30, 1 764. The reference is to a series of colonial state papers in the English Record Office called Colonial Correspondence. Future references to this series will be made in the above abbreviated form. In their report to the House of Commons, Feb. 5, 1702, the Board of Trade said: "The Safety of his Maj'' Dominions in America Depending chiefly on the Naval force to be sent thither at proper Seasons." B. T. Trade Papers 15, p. 302. This reference is to the Board of Trade Papers in the English Public Record Office. All future references to this series will be made in the above abbreviated form. ' Colonial vessels engaged in this trade were furnished with passes by the Digitized by Microsoft® 8 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-^7^5 In the general formula expressing the reciprocal duties of colony and mother country, protection meant primarily naval defence. There was, however, also a military side to the scheme of imperial defence, and on this side the apportionment of the respective shares of the burden to be borne by mother coun- try and colony was not so simple a matter. During war between Great Britain and a European power, the military forces of the colonies were often used in conjunction with those of Great Britain for operations outside the limits of the colonies. In 1 710 and 1711, during the War of the Span- ish Succession, the colonies cooperated with the British forces in the campaigns against Nova Scotia and Canada. In the following war, a considerable body of troops was raised in North America for the unfortunate attack on the Spanish colonies in 1740-1741;* and it was intended also Admiralty. These passes entitled the ship to a free passage unmolested by the Barbary pirates. Full details concerning the working of this system in the colonies can be found in the Admiralty Records in the English Public Record Office. See especially Admiralty Secretary, Out-Letters 1319 to 1322, and Admiralty Secretary, In-Letters 3817 to 3819. A letter of the Lieutenant-Gov- ernor of Virginia to the Admiralty may be quoted to indicate the importance of this system. There had been some delay in sending the requested passes to Virginia, and on June 22, 1764, Francis Fauquier wrote: "The Merchants in this Colony who are concerned in the Com and Madeira Trade are in great Distress, and are daily applying to me for them." Adm. Sec. In-Letters 3819. Future references to these documents will be made in the above abbreviated form. ' Thirty-six hundred men. Am. and W.I. 669. The reference is to the State Papers, Colonial, America and West Indies, in the English Public Record Office. All future references to this series will be made in the above abbreviated form. Digitized by Microsoft® THEORY AND PRACTICE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE 9 to use colonial troops in the abortive Canada expedition toward the end of the war. In addition, the colonies on their own account engaged in military enterprises against the French. Such were the expeditions of New England against Nova Scotia and Canada at the end of the seven- teenth and at the beginning of the following century. In this category also belongs the successful attack of the New Eng- land military forces, assisted by the royal navy, on the French fortress of Louisburg in 1745. The extent of this co- operation depended on the willingness of the colonies to assist and on the ability of the English government to recruit soldiers within them, for it was recognized that the Crown had no right to command the inhabitants of any British colony to march or sail on any expedition beyond its own limits.^ Naturally, each colony was expected to do its ut- most in resisting the attacks of a European power in time of war. But the earnest eflforts of the English government to bring about systematic cooperation among the colonies for their joint defence, especially for the protection of the most exposed colony upon whose security their common safety depended, had ended in complete failure.^ Thus there was nojdistinct theory nor any well-defined ' Am. and W.I. 602 : Some Considerations upon the Assistance that may be expected from the Continent of North America in an Expedition against the Spanish West Indies. ' Thus in 1694 the EngUsh government fixed the quotas to be furnished by the colonies for the defence of New York, but the colonies refused to obey these instructions. Calendar Colonial, 1693-1696, nos. 1253, 1790, 1791, 1816, 1870, 1881, 2054, et passim; N.J. Col. Doc. VIII, Part I, pp. 194-196; N.Y. Col. Doc. VI, p. 790. See especially the report of the Board of Trade to the House of Lords, Feb. 16, 1702. B. T. Commercial Series II, 641, pp. 362-382. Digitized by Microsoft® 10 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 practice regarding the military activities^ and duties of^the colonies in time of war with a European power. On the other hand, it was a fundamental principle of British colonial administration that during peace in Europe the defence of each colony against any local enemy should devolve pri- marily on the colony itself, and that assistance should be given by the mother country only if the situation were so serious as to endanger the Empire as a whole. Thus, while the brunt of the Indian wars had fallen on the colonies. Great Britain, in response to their insistent requests, frequently sent them arms and ammunition. This was done despite the protests of the Ordnance Board, which objected to these extraordinary outlays for which Parliament had made no provision. Great Britain also spent annually large sums on presents for the Indians with the object of securing their friendship.* In addition, the mother country supported garrisons in a number of the colonies. The largest forces were kept in the West Indian colonies which, on account of their position in the midst of Europe's "cock-pit," were exposed to sudden attacks.^ Owing to the large numerical preponderance of the slave population in these colonies, their military strength was small ; Jamaica unaided was not even able to cope with the negro insurrections. Similarly, ' B. T. So. Ca. 16 K s ; 17 K 87. ' Part of the expense of these garrisons was indirectly defrayed by the West Indian colonies. Thus Jamaica provided the quarters for the soldiers located there. Cf. B. T. Jam. 58, p. 336; 59, pp. 60, 82 and 11 K 44. This was also true in the Windward and Leeward Islands, owing to the fact that the four and one-half per cent export duty produced a considerable revenue which the British government had promised to devote to the defence of the islands. Digitized by Microsoft® THEORY AND PRACTICE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE II small garrisons were kept in the Bahamas and the Bermudas, as their strategic value was important owing to their location on much frequented trade-routes. Then, mainly to protect the fisheries, of both old and new England, garrisons were placed in Newfoundland and in Nova Scotia. Finally, owing to the refusal of the continental colonies to cooperate for defence against the Indians, the mother country was forced also to keep small garrisons in the two most exposed colonies. New York and South Carolina.' It was recognized that this was a departure from the accepted theory of defence ; for prior to the great wars in the middle of the century the Indian danger was considered primarily a matter of colonial interest, and one well within the limits of the military strength of the continental colonies. In these cases the mother coun- try assumed a burden which the colonies as a whole were un- willing to bear and which was deemed too heavy for either of the two colonies most directly concerned. After the es- tablishment of Georgia, the South Carolina garrison was temporarily removed to the more exposed colony, and was subsequently considerably increased.^ The charge on the British exchequer on account of these permanent forces in the colonies was not large. In 1737 it was only ;^53,ooo, and in 1743 it was about ;^75,ooo. But of these respective amounts, only a small part was spent ' New York supplied the provisions for these regular troops. B. T. N. Y. 29 Hh 126. South Carolina, after the removal of the independent companies to Georgia, offered to give additional pay to these regular soldiers if they were again placed in the colony. This was done in 1 746-1 748. Wm. Roy Smith, South Carolina, pp. 193-195. " Col. Rec. of Ga. I, p. 520. Digitized by Microsoft® 12 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 in the continental colonies that ultimately seceded from the Empire. In 1737 only ;^io,ooo was thus spent; in 1743 ;^25,ooo, the increase being due to the larger force established in Georgia.* In addition to this purely military expense, Parliament appropriated also large sums for the settlement of Georgia, which was to a great extent a military enter- ' Annual appropriations were made by Parliament for the forces in the colonies, and in Minorca anH Gibraltar. In 1732 the grant was £160,214 (S Geo. II, c. 17) ; in 1733, £164,835 (6 Geo. II, c. 25, § xii) ; in 1734, £203,996 (7 Geo. II, c. 12); in 1736, £216,228 (9 Geo. II, c. 34); in 1737, £215,710 (10 Geo. II, c. 17); in 1739, £228,062 (12 Geo. II, c. 19). Of these grants the larger portion was for the garrisons in Minorca and Gibraltar. Thus the grant of 1737 was distributed as follows: — Leeward Islands One regiment £9,776 Jamaica Eight companies _ 15,367 Bahamas One company 2,466 Bermudas One company 1,004 New York Four companies _7,i4« Georgia One company 3,07? Nova Scotia and Newfoundland One regiment '^, t.y^ ^ 9,830 Nova Scotia and Newfoundland Garrisons and provisions 4,098 Total for the above colonies £S2,7S4 Minorca and Gibraltar 162,956 Total grant of 1737 £215,71° These figures are derived from the War Office estimate for 1737 to the House of Commons. Commons Journal 22, p. 740. Cf. also Dinwiddle's Memorial, 1738, in B. T. Bermuda 14 M 17. At this time the force in Georgia was con- siderably increased, and at the same time, owing to the war, the parliamentary appropriations for the garrisons in the colonies, and in Gibraltar and in Mi- norca, grew larger. In 1740 they were £266,203 (^3 Geo. II, c. 23); in 1741 they were £266,512 (14 Geo. II, c. 41). In 1743 the annual expense of the forces in America was £73,833, of which £7,141 was spent on the forces in New York, and £17,881 on those in Georgia. Am. and W. I. 670: A State of the annual Expense of the Forces in America, 1743. Digitized by Microsoft® THEORY AND PRACTICE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE 13 prise designed for the protection of the Southern colonies. Prior to the outbreak of the war in 1739, the annual grants for this purpose averaged about £20,000/ After the re- storation of peace in 1748, there was only a slight increase in the cost of the colonial garrisons, about ;^8o,ooo being expended yearly for this purpose.^ The regiment in Georgia was disbanded at that time, as the small force in South Carolina was deemed sufl&cient for the protection of the Southern colonies.^ The annual outlay for these "inde- pendent companies" in New York and South Carolina was in 1752, 1753, and 1754 only £13,000.* On the other hand, large sums were spent on settling and fortifying Nova Scotia, the total parliamentary grants for this military colony aggregating £543,625 in the eight years from 1750 to 1757 inclusive.* Reviewing these facts, it becomes ap- '8 Geo. n, c. 23; 9 Geo. II, c. 34, § xxiii; 10 Geo. II, c. 17; 12 Geo. n, c. 19. ' The grants for the forces in the plantations and for those in Minorca and in Gibraltar were, in 1751, 1753, and 1754, ;£236,42o (24 Geo. II, c. 47; 26 Geo. II, c. 25; 27 Geo. II, c. 10). In 1752 they were £229,943 (25 Geo. II, c. 25), of which ;£isi,io4 was for Minorca and Gibraltar, and £78,839 for the colonies (Commons Journal 26, p. 308). In the other years these respective amounts were £155,360 and £81,060 (ibid., 26, pp. 528, 850). These amounts would be increased by about £20,000 if the expenditure of the Ordnance Board were taken into account. ' Col. Rec. of Ga., pp. 520, 522, 523, 527. Detachments of the three independent companies in South Carolina were placed in Georgia. Ibid., P- 525- ' Commons Journal 26, pp. 308, 528, 850. At this time £36,000 was spent yearly for the forces in Nova Scotia. • 23 Geo. II, c. 21; 24 Geo. II, c. 47; 25 Geo. II, c. 25; 26 Geo. II, c. 23; 27 Geo. II, c. 10; 28 Geo. II, c. 22; 29 Geo. II, c. 29; 30 Geo. II, c. 26. The parliamentary grants for this purpose decreased from this date on, being Digitized by Microsoft® 14 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 parent that Great Britain was willing to spend large sums upon the defence of the outlying frontiers of the Empire, and that she was likewise willing when necessary to estab- lish garrisons in the most exposed colonies. In general, however, the colonies were expected to assume the burden of local defence in time of peace. Until the outbreak of hostilities with France in the sixth decade of the century, the cost of the permanent garrisons in all the colonies was unimportant, and in the case of those that ultimately formed the United States it was trifling. It was universally recognized at the time that the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was merely a truce, and that the conflict would soon be resumed. The phrase then current in Paris, "bete comme la paix," expressed the dissatisfaction of the governing classes with a treaty that gratified no one of their ambitions. The fundamental questions at issue between France and England in America had not been settled. The boundary line of Nova Scotia was still in dispute ; and, in order to strengthen their position, the French erected forts in the disputed area and stirred up the Nova Scotian Indians to attack the English. Similarly in the Southwest of North America, a definite boundary line had not been agreed upon. Moreover, France was building a series of forts in the " hinter-land " of the North American colonies, connecting Louisiana and Canada, and thus confining the £16,528 in 1758 (31 Geo. II, c. 33), £10,595 in 1761 (i Geo. Ill, c. 19), and £5,684 in 1762 (2 Geo. Ill, c. 34). Oglethorpe criticised this heavy expen- diture very severely, claiming that the money could have been used much more advantageously. See James Oglethorpe to Field Marshal Keith, May 3 1756. Hist. MSS. Com. IX, 2, p. 229b. Digitized by Microsoft® THEORY AND PRACTICE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE 15 English to a narrow fringe of land along the coast/ Finally, in the West Indies, France on various pretexts delayed the evacuation and retained possession of the four "neutral islands," St. Lucia, Dominica, St. Vincent, and Tobago, in direct violation of the agreement made shortly after the peace of 1748.^ The prospect of an early renewal of hostilities directed the attention of the English government to the system of imperial defence, especially in North America, where France was forcing the issue. » C/. Am. and W.I. 604. ^Am. and W.I. 604. See especially the despatches of Henry Grenville, governor of Barbados, to Bedford and Holdemesse in 1750 and 1751. Am. and W.I. 40, nos. 63, 106, 109, 125, 133, 141, 147. Digitized by Microsoft® CHAPTER II PLANS FOR A UNION OF THE CONTINENTAL COLONIES IN 1754 The English government was loath to renew the struggle. Great Britain was in one of her frequent pessimistic moods, belittling her own strength and magnifying that of the enemy. It was feared that France would acquire not only political but also complete commercial supremacy, and that Great Britain would be absolutely at the mercy of her rival. The aggressions of the French in the Ohio Valley, however, forced the government to take some action. On August 28, 1753, Holdernesse, the secretary of state in charge of colonial affairs, addressed a circular despatch to the governors au- thorizing them to repel, by force if necessary, any invasion of his Majesty's unquestioned dominions, but cautioning them not to be the aggressors.* At the same time, in view of the great emergency, the home government sent ;^io,ooo to Dinwiddie, the lieutenant-governor of Virginia, that colony being the one most affected by the French advance, and allowed him to draw ;£io,ooo in addition for the defence of ' Am. and W.I. 74. 16 Digitized by Microsoft® PLANS FOR A UNION OF THE COLONIES 17 North America.* This departure from the regular practice was fully justified by the existing abnormal condition, for not only was an Indian war, aided and abetted by the French, in sight, but in addition a war with France was imminent.^ Then on September 18, 1753, the Board of Trade instructed the governors of New York, Virginia, Maryland, Pennsyl- vania, New Jersey, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts to hold a joint meeting with the Iroquois Indians in order to secure their wavering friendship. According to these in- structions, all the colonies were, if practicable, to be "com- prized in one general Treaty to be made in his Majesty's name." ' The idea of cooperation contained in these instruc- tions was a most fertile one, and it rapidly gained ground with the ablest men in the colonies. Outnumbering the French, approximately in the ratio of fifteen to one, the English colonies would, if united, have been fully able to cope with the enemy. But unfortunately for them, as Governor Glen said, they were but "a Rope of Sand . . . loose and in- connected." * France was encouraged in her aggressions by this lack of union among the English colonies." Thus ' Brit. Mus. Addit. MSS. 33029 (Newcastle Papers CCCXLIV); Am. and W.I. 604: Braddock's Instructions. ' It was, however, intended that until the outbreak of formal war with France the colonies should, in the main, defend themselves in America. ' N.Y. Col. Doc. VI, pp. 799, 800. * Am. and W.I. 67: James Glen to Dinwiddle, March 14, 1754. ° On May 8, 1754, Franklin wrote to Partridge: "The confidence of the French in this Undertaking seems well-grounded on the present disunited State of the British Colonies, & the extreme Difficulty of bringing so many different Governments and Assemblies to agree in any speedy & effectual c Digitized by Microsoft® l8 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 Robert Dinwiddie wrote to the secretary of state: "The French, too justly observe the want of Connection in the Colonies & from them conclude (as they declare without Reserve) that although we are vastly superior to them in Numbers, yet they can take & secure the Country before we can agree to hinder them." ^ The problem was to overcome the jealousies of the various colonies and to get them to unite for purposes of defence. During the early months of 1754, such plans were being formulated in America by Shirley,' Franklin, and others. The Albany Congress of 1754 assembled as a result of the Board of Trade's instructions ^ of September 18, 1753, which contemplated only a joint treaty with the Indians. The course of events had, however, demonstrated that some more or less comprehensive scheme of defence was necessary, and hence the subject for deliberation was enlarged.* Of the Measures for our common Defence and Security, while our Enemies have the very great Advantage of being under one Direction, with one Council & one Purse." Am. and W.I. 67. ^ Ibid. 67: Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas Robinson, June 18, 1754. 'N.Y. Col. Doc. VI, p. 822: Shirley to Holdemesse, Jan. 7, 1754. 'Ibid. VI, pp. 853-856; Hutchinson, Mass. Ill, p. 20. * Hutchinson, who was present, says: "The king in his instructions for this convention, proposed that a quota should be settled, and that, by acts of the respective assemblies, this should be established as the rule for raising men and monies." Hutchinson, Mass. Ill, p. 21. Cf. DeLancey to Board of Trade, April 22, 1754, N.Y. Col. Doc. VI, p. 833, from which it may be inferred that no such instructions were sent. I have not been able to find the instructions to which Hutchinson refers, and there is no mention of them in the proceeding|; of the congress. Frothingham ("Rise of the Republic of the United States," p. 132) also says that the colonies were to "enter into articles of union and confederation with each other for the mutual defence of his majesty's subjects and interests in North America, as well in time of peace as war." The for- Digitized by Microsoft® PLANS FOR A UNION OF THE COLONIES 19 colonies instructed to send representatives, two — Virginia and New Jersey — failed to comply, though Virginia was represented by DeLancey, the lieutenant-governor of New York. On the other hand, the two charter colonies — Rhode Island and Connecticut ,— though not named in the instruc- tions, sent representatives.* At the meeting of these com- missioners, held on June 24, 1754, a motion to the effect that a union of all the colonies was absolutely necessary for their security and defence was unanimously adopted, and a com- mittee was appointed to prepare such a plan.^ The reasons that led the congress to reach this decision are embodied in a document evidently drawn up by Franklin. It describes in a comprehensive manner the disheartening particularism of the colonies : The commissioners from a number of the northern colonies, being met at Albany, and considering the difficulties that have always attended the most necessary general measures for the common defence, or for the annoyance of the enemy, when they were to be carried through the several particular Assemblies of all the colonies; some Assemblies being before at variance with their governors or councils, and the sev- eral branches of the government not on terms of doing business with each other; others taking the opportunity, when their concurrence is wanted, to push for favourite laws, powers, or points, that they think could not at other times be obtained, and so creating disputes and quarrels; one Assembly waiting to see what another will do, being afraid of doing more than its share, or desirous of doing less, or refusing to do anything because its country is not at present so much exposed as others, mation of such a union, however, unquestionably had the sanction of the British government. N.Y. Col. Doc. VI, p. 846. CJ. R.I. Hist. Tracts, 9, pp. 41, 42. • N.Y. Col. Doc. VI, p. 853; Hutchinson, Mass. Ill, p. 20. ' lUi. VI, p. 859. Digitized by Microsoft® 20 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 or because another will reap more immediate advantage; from one or other of which causes, the Assemblies of six out of seven colonies applied to, had granted no assistance to Virginia, when lately invaded by the French, though purposely convened, and the importance of the occasion earnestly urged upon them; — considering moreover, that one principal encouragement to the French, in invading and insulting the British American dominions, was their knowledge of our disunited state, and of our weakness arising from such want of union ; . . . for these reasons the commissioners unanimously decided that "a union of the colonies is absolutely necessary for their preservation." ^ These difficulties had existed through- out the entire history of the colonies,^ but at no previous time was the situation so critical. The committee appointed by the colonial commissioners accordingly drafted a plan of union,* and this plan, chiefly the work of Franklin, was in due course unanimously adopted. It provided for an executive and a legislature; the former — the president-general — to be appointed and supported by the Crown, the latter — the Grand Council — to be elected by the various assemblies in the eleven * colonies. This legislature was to consist of forty-eight members, the ' Franklin, Writings (ed. Smyth) III, pp. 203, 204. In 1754 New Jersey refused to raise supplies for the common defence, or to send commissioners to Albany. N.J. Col. Doc. VIII, Part I, pp. 287, 292, 294-296. C/. B. T. Journals 62, July 2, 1^54. 'The most exposed colonies naturally resented the apathy of the other colonies. Thus, in 1710, Governor Dudley wrote that New England was dissatisfied at having to bear the brunt of the war, while the Southern colonies, though protected by those in the North, did nothing. Am. and W.I. vol. I, no. 20 B. Cf. also Ihii. 5, no. 139. ' N.Y. Col. Doc. VI, p. 889. * Nova Scotia was not included in the union. Digitized by Microsoft® PLANS FOR A UNION OF THE COLONIES 21 colonies being represented roughly according to population and wealth. To this Grand Council was given jurisdiction over Indian aflEairs, both political and commercial. It was to raise and pay soldiers, to build forts for the defence of the colonies, and to "Equip Vessels of Force to Guard the Coasts and protect the Trade on the Ocean, Lakes or Great Rivers." In order to raise the requisite funds for these pur- poses, the Grand Council was given power to make laws and to impose general duties and taxes. All acts of the Grand Council, however, required the consent of the president- general and, in addition, all laws were to be submitted to the king in council for approbation.* This plan, it is apparent, implied an assumption by the colonies of a far greater share of the cost of defence than had hitherto been customary. This proposal for a political union of the colonies under one general government in America was ultimately to be brought into effect by an act of the Parliament of Great Britain. With the exception of those from Massachusetts, the colonial commissioners did not, however, have full pow- ers,^ and accordingly it was provided that the plan should be first submitted to the colonies. With the same unanimity with which their representatives had adopted the plan, the colonial assemblies either rejected or failed to ratify it.' The reasons for this failure were, on the one hand, the particu- larism of the colonies, and on the other, their underlying con- • Am. and W.L 604. ' N.Y. Col. Doc. VI, p. 930. For the instructions from Connecticut, see Col. Rec. of Conn. X, p. 268. ' Hutchinson, Mass. Ill, p. 23 ; Franlclin, Writings (ed. Smyth) III, pp. 226, 227 n.; R.I. Hist. Tracts, 9; Col. Rec. of Conn. X, p. 293. Digitized by Microsoft® 22 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 viction that Great Britain, if left no other choice, would ulti- mately have to assume the task of defending them. Accord- ing to Shirley, the commissioners at Albany "had no expecta- tion" that the colonies would adopt the plan ; and he added, "nor could any proper plan be form'd, as I apprehend, in w""" the several Gov'^ would unite." ^ Franklin was not more sanguine. On December 29, 1754, he wrote to CoUinson : — All the Assemblies in the Colonies have, I suppose,, had the Union Plan laid before them, but it is not likely, in my Opinion, that any of them will act upon it so as to agree to it, or to propose any Amendments to it. Every Body cries, a Union is absolutely necessary, but when they come to the Manner and Form of the Union, their weak Noddles are perfectly distracted.' The action of the colonies in rejecting the Albany plan was decisive, for it was the understanding of the British govern- ment and of the colonies, that the plan should be submitted to Parliament only after its consideration and adoption by the colonial legislatures.* In fact, the congress had made especial provision that no copy should be sent to England.* ' N.Y. Col. Doc. VI, pp. 930, 931. ' Franklin, Writings (ed. Sm3^h) III, p. 242. ' Report of Board of Trade to King, Oct. 29, 1754. Am. and W.I. 604. * One of the Rhode Island commissioners, Stephen Hopkins, in defending his conduct, said that the Congress "did not, as is falsely asserted, order it to be sent home. . . . They did not leave it in the Power of any one to obtain a Copy of it, and send it Home ; but strictly forbid their Secretary to give any Copy, except to the Colonies. Nor did they ever agree to any Thing more, than to carry it to their respective Governments, and lay it before their Constituents." Hopkins, A True Representation of the Plan Formed at Albany (Providence, 1 7SS). R-I- Hist. Tracts, 9, pp. 42, 43. Cf. p. 39. As the colonies had failed to ratify the plan, it never really came before the British government. In fact surprise was expressed that an account of the proceedings had been for- Digitized by Microsoft® PLANS FOR A UNION OF THE COLONIES 23 However, to the surprise of the colonies, a full account of the proceedings of the Albany Congress was forwarded to Eng- land by DeLancey, and on October 29, 1754, the Board of Trade sent to Sir Thomas Robinson, the secretary of state, a detailed report thereon.' The Albany Congress had not succeeded in conciliating the Indians, nor had it provided for the joint management of Indian affairs nor for the strengthening of the frontiers, which were the chief objects desired by the British government. The Board of Trade severely criticised the failure to regulate these matters, pointing out that the situation was a serious one owing to the present mismanagement of Indian affairs, and that the commissioners at Albany had themselves unani- mously agreed that Indian affairs "should be under one General Administration directed to the general Interest and supported at the general Expence" of all the colonies. As to the Albany articles of federation, the Board of Trade re- frained from expressing any opinion, evidently awaiting the further action of the colonies. While the failure of this plan rests primarily on the colonies, it is exceedingly doubtful whether the English government would have ratified it, even if the colonies by their previous warded to England. Ibid. p. 59; Sharpe Correspondence I, p. 79. In 1789 Franklin wrote the following about the fate of the Albany plan: "The Crown disapproved it, as having placed too much Weight in the Democratic Part of the Constitution ; and every Assembly as having allowed too much to Pre- rogative. So it was totally rejected." Franklin, Writings III, p. 227 n. It is worth while calling attention to this gross misrepresentation, as nearly every subsequent writer has repeated Franklin's misleading words. ' Am. and W.I. 604. Digitized by Microsoft® 24 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-^7^5 confirmation had allowed it to come to the consideration of Parliament. The home authorities desired a union of the colonies for military purposes, not a political federation; their aim was military efficiency, which unquestionably would have been impaired by the liberal powers bestowed on the Grand Council. This will become apparent from a consideration of the scheme of union elaborated by the Board of Trade. In the early months of 1754, it came to be recognized in England, as in America, that a union of the colonies was necessary. On January 7, 1754, Shirley wrote to the secre- tary of state that the old requisition system of relying on each colony to furnish men for the defence of all was impracticable, unless the Crown could find some method of obliging the colonies to contribute their quotas.' On June 14, 1754, some days before the meeting of the colonial commissioners at Albany, the secretary of state. Sir Thomas Robinson, di- rected the Board of Trade to prepare and lay before the king "a plan of general concert to be entered into by the American colonies for their mutual defence, and to prevent and remove any encroachments on the British dominions." ' Accordingly, on August 9, 1754, the Board of Trade sent its plan of union to Sir Thomas Robinson.' Herein it was suggested that circular letters be sent to the governors in the continental colonies, pointing out the danger to which they ' Shirley to Holdemesse, January 7, 1754. Am. and W.L 67. ' B. T. Plantations General 15, O 125. The letter was read at the meeting of the Board of Trade on June 18, 1754. B. T. Journals 62. ' Am. and W.I. 604; B. T. Plant. Gen. 43, pp. 368-397. Digitized by Microsoft® PLANS FOR A UNION OF THE COLONIES 25 were exposed from the encroachments of France, and stating "the urgent necessity there is of an immediate union of the several Colonies" in order to maintain forts, to raise soldiers, to defray the expense of presents for the Indians and to place "Indian affairs under one general direction." The colonial assemblies were each to appoint a commissioner, subject to the approval of the governor, and these commissioners were to meet and agree upon the necessary military establish- ment of the colonies in time of peace, and to apportion the expense thereof among the various colonies according to their population, trade, wealth, and revenue. Provision was also made for reconvening this inter-colonial assembly whenever a sudden emergency, such as actual invasion, should require greater military exertions. The Crown was to appoint a commander-in-chief ^ of all the colonial forces, and of all troops sent to the colonies from Great Britain "upon any emergency." This officer was also to act as commissary general for Indian affairs. He was to be empowered to draw upon the proper authorities in each colony for such an amount of money as had been previously determined upon as the colo- ny's share of the whole. The convention drawn up on these lines by the colonial commissioners was to be sent to England for approbation, and in order to enable a convention to be agreed upon, it was provided -that any seven colonies were to constitute a quorum, and that the decision of a majority was' to be binding. The object of this plan was to increase the military ' Provision was to "be made in the Estimate for the ordinary established service for a proper Salary for such Commander in chief." Digitized by Microsoft® 26 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 Strength of the colonies and to make them provide for the additional forts on the frontier and presents to the Indians, which the threatening condition of affairs rendered necessary. It was not intended that the Crown should lessen its former expenditures for these purposes, nor that it should refuse to aid the colonies in extraordinary emergencies, such as the actual outbreak of war with France. It was distinctly stated that : His Majesty does not intend to withdraw that part of the expence which the Crown has been usually at, for the Security and Protection of the Colonies, but that he will be graciously pleased to continue to maintain & subsist such a number of his Troops as shall appear to be necessary to be stationed in America, & does also consent that whatever sums of money have been usually given by His Majesty for Indian Ser- vices, shall be deducted from the general Estimate as the share His Majesty is willing to bear of the ordinary Establishment for this ser- vice, & that upon any great Emergency they shall receive such support from His Majesty, as shall be thought reasonable upon a due Considera- tion of the Nature of the Case, & of what the circumstances & condi- tions of the Colonies shall seem to require.' This plan of the Board of Trade differed radically from that devised at Albany; it contemplated only a military union, while Franklin and his associates planned a political union as well. Both the Board of Trade and the Albany Congress, however, started from the premise that the colonies should in equity provide for their own regularly established military system. The failure of the colonies to adopt a plan of union in 1754 forced the English to take some action for their defence. In • B. T. Plant. Gen. 43, p. 380. Digitized by Microsoft® PLANS FOR A UNION OF THE COLONIES 27 transmitting its plan in 1754, the Board of Trade remarked "that from the delay which must necessarily attend the execu- tion of any new Plan for an Union of the Colonies, it cannot be made to answer the purpose of a present exigency," and that whatever danger exists at present must be guarded against "by an Application of such means of strength & force, as can be procured in the most expeditious & most eflfectual manner." The Board therefore suggested the appointment of a commander-in-chief over all colonial and British forces in America, and likewise the appointment of a commis- sary general for Indian affairs.* In its report on the Al- bany plan, the Board of Trade also proposed that "untill a Plan of Union can be settled, by which a proper provision may be made for those Services at the general Expence of the Colonies," William Johnson should be appointed colonel of the Six Nations, and be given the management of Indian affairs in the same manner and with the same allowance as when the expedition against Canada was intended during the last war.^ Virginia was clamoring for assistance, and the other colo- nies showed little or no disposition to respond to her appeal. Consequently, the English government adopted the sugges- tion of the Board of Trade, and sent Edward Braddock as commander-in-chief to America and with him two regiments. Parliament provided funds for this force and, in addition, for two regiments to be raised in America for service in 1755.* The English government, however, was loath to defray the ' B. T. Plant. Gen. 43, pp. 368-397. ' Am. and W.I. 604. » 28 Geo. II, c. 22. Digitized by Microsoft® 28 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, I7S4-'76S entire cost of these troops, and accordingly the colonies were instructed to provide victuals and quarters for them.^ In conformity with the suggestion of the Board of Trade, Braddock placed William Johnson in charge of Indian affairs. Meanwhile the plans for union were not abandoned either in England or in America. In fact, the inadequate support given by some of the colonies to Braddock emphasized the necessity of such a union, unless the mother country were willing to assume a disproportionate share of the burden of imperial defence. The unanimity of the colonies in rejecting the Albany plan showed conclusively that of their own accord they would never form a union. It meant that the Board of Trade's plan, which was to be brought into effect by a colonial convention, had absolutely no chance of success. Hence inevitably it was suggested that recourse be taken to the sovereign legislature of the Empire, and that Parliament ' On Oct. 26, 1754, the secretary of state, Sir Thomas Robinson, wrote to the colonial governors to provide fresh provisions for the troops on their arrival from Europe, to furnish the officers with means of travel by land, and to obey the commander-in-chief's orders about quartering the troops, impressing car- riages, etc. As these expenses were "of a Local & Peculiar nature," the colony was to meet them. Other expienses of a more general nature, such as the levying of troops, were to be defrayed out of a common fund to be established in the colonies until a general plan of union could be perfected. N.J. Col. Doc. Vm, Part II, pp. 17-19; N.Y. Col. Doc. VI, pp. 915, 916; Col. Rec. of No.Ca. V, pp. 144 i-f. Cf. N.J. Col. Doc. VIII, Part II, pp. 92, 93 ; N.Y. Col. Doc. VI, p. 934. See also Braddock's instructions. From long expe- rience, the English government was fully acquainted with the parsimony of the colonies; and accordingly, in order not to hamper military operations, Braddock was advised, in his private and secret instructions, that if necessary this point should be waived. Am. and W.I. 604. See also Brit. Mus. Addit. MSS. 35909 (Hardwicke Papers DLXI). Digitized by Microsoft® PLANS FOR A UNION OF THE COLONIES 29 create such a union. In submitting its plan in 1754, the Board of Trade had pointed out that, in case one or more of the colonies refused to concur in the union, either by failing to send representatives, or, after its enactment, by refusing to raise the required money, then "no other method can be taken, but that of an application for an interposition of the Authority of Parliament." * In America the two great cham- pions of such a parliamentary union were Benjamin Frank- lin and William Shirley.^ '"Till it is done," the former wrote, "never expect to see an American War carried on as it ought to be, nor Indian Affairs properly managed." * The imposition of such a union was legally within the power of Parliament,* but as such a step was in direct opposition to the expressed wish of all the colonies, it would have de- feated its own purpose,* which was to secure the hearty ' Am. and W.I. 604; B. T. Plant. Gen. 43, pp. 368-397. ' Their Ideas as to the nature of the desired union differed radically. See Shirley to Robinson, Dec. 24, 1754- N.Y. Col. Doc. VI, pp. 930, 931. On Oct. 21, 1754, Shirley wrote to Governor Morris of Pennsylvania that the best advice he could give was to promote the establishment of a colonial union by act of Parliament, adding: "I am labouring this point, Mis viribus." Pa. Arch. Hazard Series II, p. 181. On Dec. 3, 1754, Governor Morris of Pennsylvania wrote to Governor Sharpe of Maryland, to the effect that if a union is brought about by act of Parliament something may be done next summer, "but hardly if we are to depend upon supplys to be granted by American Assemblys.'' Sharpe Correspondence I, pp. 127, 128; Pa. Arch. Hazard Series II, pp. 187, i83. ' Franklin to Collinson, June 26, 1755. Franklin, Writings (ed. Smyth) III, 267. Cf. also Ibid. Ill, p. 276. ' A statute of this nature would, however, have been in direct violation of the colonial charters and of the proprietary grants. 'However, on Aug. 30, 17S4, Franklin wrote to Colden: "Our Assembly were not inclined to show any approbation of the plan of union ; yet I suppose Digitized by Microsoft® 30 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 cooperation of the colonies in the impending conflict with France. The suggestion of a parliamentary union of the colonies, especially one of a purely military nature, contained within it the idea of parliamentary taxation of the colonies.' To many in 1754 and 1755 this seemed the only way to compel the colonies to provide for their own defence in an adequate manner. they will take no steps to oppose its being established by the government at home." Franklin, Writings (ed. Smyth) III, p. 228. Connecticut and Rhode Island did take such steps. Col. Rec. of Conn. X, p. 293 ; R.I. Hist. Tracts, 9, pp. S9 et seq. ' See especially Shirley to the Board of Trade, Jan. 5, 1756. B. T. Mass. 74 Hh68. Digitized by Microsoft® CHAPTER III PROPOPOSED TAXATION OF THE COLONIES, 1754-17S6 The failure of the schemes for union in 1754, and the disinclination of the colonies not only to assist one another, but even to provide each for its own defence in an adequate manner, brought up the question of parliamentary taxation. Legally, Parliament could impose such a tax, though hitherto it had, in general, refrained from so doing. It had, however, passed several statutes regulating colonial matters, which were in the form of revenue bills. In 1673,* Parliament had imposed small duties on a num- ber of colonial products, chiefly tobacco, sugar, cotton, and ginger, when exported from one English colony to another. The chief purpose of this act was to prevent the evasion of the "enumeration" provision of a previous statute prohibiting the direct exportation of these commodities to foreign coun- tries, but it was intended also to raise some revenue.^ A small ' 25 Ch. II, c. 7, § II. ' The act of 1673 refers to the navigation act of 1660, which allowed these products to be shipped from one English colony to another free of duty, "while the subjects of this your kingdom of England have paid great customs and im- positions for what of them have been spent here." It refers likewise to the fact that taking advantage of this immunity, the colonies have shipped these "enumerated" commodities direct to Europe. It was thus apparently the purpose of the act to put the colonial consumer on the same footing as the English consumer, and to prevent the illegal trader, who shipped these prod- Digitized by Microsoft® 32 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, i7S4-i76S revenue was, in fact, derived from this law.* So far as the continental colonies were concerned, they were chiefly affected by this act in that it imposed duties on tobacco exported from Maryland or from Virginia to another English settlement. But toward the end of the seventeenth century, the income derived from this source was granted to William and Mary College in Virginia, and was not thereafter re- mitted to England. As a result, virtually the entire small revenue accruing to Great Britain from this statute came from the West Indian colonies. During the course of the war of the Spanish Succession, the question came up, whether or not European and other goods seized from the enemy and condemned as lawful prize in the colonies were subject to duties. A statute of 1707 provided that such goods should pay the same duties in the colonies as they would have paid in England, if first ucts directly to Europe, from having any advantage over the law-abiding trader who shipped them via England. The revenue feature of the act was, however, the unimportant part. On June 30, 1692, the Commissioners of the Customs reported that the act was not intended for raising a revenue, but to enforce the "enumeration" policy. Treas. Misc. Various, 37 (Blathwayt's Journal I, pp. 3S3-355). The reference is to the Treasury Papers in the English Public Record Office. All future references will be given in the above abbreviated form. ' Amounts paid into the British exchequer under 25 Ch. II, c. 7 : 1748 £1366 1 754 3^1164 1749 2713 175s 1207 1750 861 1756 2618 1751 164s 1757 1832 1752 1472 1758 978 1753 1012 1759 1849 Treas. , Ace. Rev. Misc. (England), vols. 50 and Digitized by Microsoft® 1760 £"65 1761 381 1762 704 1763 1322 1764 1027 PROPOSED TAXATION OF THE COLONIES 33 imported there and then reexported.' In other words, the duties made payable in the colonies were equal to the Eng- lish duties less the drawback. Though somewhat modified subsequently, owing to the strenuous opposition of Jamaica,' this law imposed an import duty payable in the colonies. During the war, the act produced some revenue,^ mainly in the West Indies ; but in the continental colonies also some was collected.* In and about 1730, during the troubles with Spain, a very small sum was received on account of these prize duties, but in the subsequent war, 1 739-1 748, nothing was paid on this account into the British exchequer.® In 1733, another act in the form of a revenue bill was passed.* This was the famous "Molasses Act" which im- posed customs duties on foreign rum, sugar, and molasses imported into the English colonies. The object of this law was not to raise a revenue, but to hamper the development of the French colonies, and to prevent the importation of their produce into the English possessions. Hence the duties ' 6 Anne, c. 37, § 11. ' Am. and W.I. 4, nos. 62, 69, 70, 103. ' Payments into the exchequer for prize duties in the colonies: 1 711 £2066 1713 ;£iSi 1 715 ;Si292 1712 1724 1714 2267 1716 600 Treas. Ace. Rev. Misc. (England), 50. • Thus, on Nov. 10, 1710, Robert Hunter, governor of New York, wrote to England suggesting that his salary for the year might be paid out of the "Dutys arising from Cocoa imported here by my Incouragement in a Prize taken by two Jamaica Privateers, the Customs whereof will amount to a very consid- erable Sum." Am. and W.I. 6, no. 44; cf. B. T. N.Y. 59, pp. 227, 228. <• Treas. Ace. Rev. Misc. (England), 50. ' 6 Geo. II, c. 13. D Digitized by Microsoft® 34 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 were made so high as to be virtually prohibitive.* About £800 yearly was collected under this law.'' The establishment by Parliament of a colonial postal sys- tem early in the eighteenth century * cannot be considered a measure of taxation, although at the outset it was objected to on this ground, and although it was incidentally designed to produce some revenue.* There was, however, another method by means of which Great Britain derived a revenue from parliamentary statutes aflfecting the colonies. In accordance with two fundamental principles of the old colonial system, the colonies could im- port European goods, with some noteworthy exceptions, from Great Britain only, and were prohibited from exporting ' Cf. B. T. Journals (Opinions of Council, 1 736-1 738), p. 140. ^ The total amount collected from the date of the enactment of the law to Christmas, 1749, was: On these products imported as merchandise g£s6o3 4?. /^i. On these products imported as prize goods 7616 4^. 2 d. £13,219 %s. t\i. Am. and W.I. 687: Hearing of 1750-1751, appendices 4, 5. ' 9 Anne, c. 10. * On June 24, 1718, Spotswood wrote to the Board of Trade describing the opposition in Virginia to the establishment of a postal system. He said that "the People were made to believe that the Parliament could not lay any Tax (for so they call the Rates of Postage) on them without the consent of the General Assembly." B. T. Va. 15 P 169. At the time of the controversies over the Stamp Act, in 1765 and 1766, its supporters endeavored to use the establishment of a postal system in the colonies as a precedent for a parlia- mentary tax. It was available for this purpose on purely technical grounds only, though it furnished an excellent instance of the exercise of parliamentary authority over the colonies. See Franklin's Examination before the House of Commons [Franklin, Writings (ed. Smyth) IV, pp. 442, 443, 448], and The Regulations Lately Made (London, 1765), p. 105. Digitized by Microsoft® PROPOSED TAXATION OF THE COLONIES 35 some specifically enumerated products directly to any Euro- pean country but Great Britain. Thus, non-British goods consumed in the colonies, and colonial products shipped via Great Britain to European markets, came within the reach of the English fiscal system. This system was, however, so arranged that but small duties were paid on these products,* it being roughly estimated that the duties thus collected about equalled the cost of managing and controlling the trade.* It is evident that this system was one designed more for the regulation of trade than for purposes of revenue; but it is equally evident that the revenue would be the main considera- tion, if an enumerated commodity were allowed to be ex- ported directly from the colony to a foreign market on pay- ment of a sum equivalent to the duties that would have been paid had it first been shipped to Great Britain and reexported thence. This happened in the case of rice. Shortly after the introduction of rice as a staple in South Carolina, Par- liament placed it among the list of enumerated commodi- ties.' As the quantity of rice produced rapidly increased, the colony sought a broader market, especially direct access to that of Portugal. In this, the colony was supported by the English merchants trading to that country. These in 1 7 1 5 suggested that it be permitted to ship rice direct from America to Portugal on payment in the colonies of the English duties.* ' In the case of the two most important of the enumerated products, tobacco and sugar, no duty whatsoever was collected on shipments via Great Britain to the continent of Europe. ^ This subject will be more fully discussed in connection with the legislation'^ of 1764. ° 2 and 3 Anne, c. 5, § xii. * B. T. Journals 24, p. 465. Digitized by Microsoft® 36 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 In 1 72 1 the agent for South Carolina made the same pro- posal to the English government, suggesting that the equiva- lent of the English duties ' be levied in the colony, in that case as an export duty.* Similar suggestions were made by the colony in subsequent years ; ^ and accordingly, shortly thereafter, Parliament passed a law allowing the direct exportation of Carolina rice to those parts of Europe south of Cape Finisterre, subject to the payment in Great Britain on the rice thus shipped of an amount equivalent to the English duties less the drawback.* Though this duty was made payable in Great Britain, it was in its essence a colonial export tax imposed by Parliament. It furnishes a unique and remarkable instance of colonial taxation by the mother country at the suggestion of the colony itself. This tax produced some revenue, about ;^i2oo yearly for the first seven years,® increasing gradually until in 1763 it yielded somewhat more than double this amount.' Though these various measures were from a legal stand- point revenue bills, still (with the exception of the rice act, which was an isolated instance) they were, in general, de- signed to regulate trade, not to yield a revenue. Even the ' The English duties less the drawbacks amounted approximately to 7 • Digitized by Microsoft® j6 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 despatch, the Lords of Trade again reverted to this inter- pretation of the treaty of 1686, but as they were in doubt, the opinion of William Murray,® the attorney-general, was asked. He correctly said, that "it was not the Intent of the Treaty to provide, nor could it be provided, that either of the Contracting Powers should seize the Ships or Goods of their own Subjects for contravening the said articles," and that consequently the trade in question was not illegal and could not be stopped except by some positive law.^ Hence, until the outbreak of formal war with France, when the prohibition of all trade with the enemy would automati- cally take effect, or until Parliament had passed some law governing the matter, nothing could be done to prevent a patently injurious commerce, unless the colonies of their own accord legislated against it, or unless recourse were had to arbitrary military authority. Already toward the end of 1754, the naval and military commanders had been instructed to put a stop to "the illegal correspondence" between the French and English colonies, to prevent such "dangerous Practices," which supplied the French with provisions and warlike stores.* These instruc- tions were enforced,* and were renewed the following year a few days after Murray had given his opinion that the trade ' Better known as XfOrd M ansfield.,. 'B. T. Journals 63, April 11, 1755. 'Commodore Keppel's Instructions, Nov. 26, 1754, and Art. 10 of Brad- dock's Instructions. Am. and W.I. 74. ' B. T. Nova Scotia 15 H 257 gives a detailed and interesting account of the seizure of a Boston vessel by a man-of-war for illicit trade with the French at Louisburg in 1754. Digitized by Microsoft® THE REGULATION OF TRADE DURING WAR "JJ was not illegal. Boscawen received orders to prevent this trade/ and the secretary of state wrote toBraddock to observe particularly this clause in his instructions, especially as re- gards the inhabitants of Pennsylvania and New York who were reported to be "most notoriously guilty of supplying the French with Provisions." ^ The illegality of these instruc- tions is obvious, as no formal war existed and as no British law prohibited this trade. This step, however, aroused no oppb-^l sition, since nearly all the colonies, largely on their own initia-j tive, had themselves adopted measures to prevent the French from being supplied with provisions. \ ^ A cessation of trade with the French unquestionably meant a great sacrifice on the part of the colonies, but on the other hand they recognized that France hemmed them in, and that their expansion westward was contingent on the^ expulsion of this power from America. It was patent that while the sale of provisions to Canada enriched some indi- viduals and the colonies as a whole, it tended in the end to their destruction. If on the one hand the sacrifice demanded was great, on the other still greater was the danger in strength- ening to any degree whatsoever the position of France. Ac- cordingly, the colonies, to a large extent on their own initiaV tive, adopted measures to prevent the exportation of suppliesi and warlike stores to the French. In 1755, Dinwiddle laid an embargo on provisions in Virginia, solely as an example to the other colonies, no supplies being exported from that ' Art. 8 of the secret instructions to Boscawen, April 16, 1755. Am. and W.I. 74. ' Sir Thomas Robinson to Braddock, April 16, 1755. Ibid. Digitized by Microsoft® 78 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 colony to the French.^ Similarly, in the same year, Pennsyl- vania prohibited the sailing of any vessel with provisions unless bond had been given to carry them to a British port.^ Massachusetts likewise passed several acts of this nature.' In 1755, New York interdicted the exportation of provisions, naval or warlike stores to Cape Breton or to any other French possession,* and Maryland passed a law forbidding all trade with the French and their allies.^ These and other colonial laws, together with the embargo that was laid in Ireland, Shirley wrote, "have greatly distress'd the French at Louis- bourg, & the Effects must be soon felt in all their Settlements in North America." * .'In the following year, on the declaration of war with> France, all trade with the French colonies became by this (very fact illegal, and ships engaged therein were, together/ t'with their cargoes, liable to seizure and confiscation. In June, 1756, full instructions to this effect were sent to the colonies.'' As pointed out, a number of them had already passed laws forbidding this trade ; these laws were continued and strengthened, and in general similar measures were adopted by the other colonies.* By a perpetual law. New ' B. T. Va. 25 W 170. ' B. T. Proprieties 19 V 155. ' Mass. Laws, 18 Geo. II, c. 3, c. 4, and c. 8 in B. T. Mass. 74. See also Mass. Acts and Resolves. 1 1 .r.j * B. T. N.Y. 32 Kk 62. ' ' * • V , ' Sharpe to Henry Fox, July 17, 1756. Am. and W.I. 70. •Shirley to Robinson, June 20, 1755. Am. and W.I. 68. This is con- firmed by DeLancey. B. T. N.Y. 32 Kk 62. See also Shirley to Robinson, Aug. IS, 1755. Am. and W.I. 82. ' B. T. Journals 64, May 20 and June i, 1756; B. T. Plant. Gen. 15 O 146. "B. T. Journals 64, Aug. 5, 1756; Dobbs to Henry Fox, July 12, 1756. Digitized by Microsoft® THE REGULATION OF TRADE DURING WAR 79 Hampshirejmposed a^death penalty on all guilty of. trading with the French,^ The prohibition of all direct trade with the French could not, however, give Great Britain any marked advantage over the enemy, as provisions could still be legally shipped from Ireland and from the American colonies to the islands of the neutral powers in the West Indies, whence they could be transported to the French colonies. This trade centred in the Dutch commercial emporia, Curafoa and St. Eustatius, and tended to neutralize the advantage derived from the control of the sources of supply in Ireland and America. Connecticut officially informed the secretary of state that it was probable the French would be supplied from Ireland by way of St. Eustatius.^ The governor of New York, Sir Charles Hardy, gave more specific information regarding this trade,^ and at the same time sought to induce the neighboring colonies to desist from engaging therein. He took measures to prevent the direct or indirect exportation of provisions and warlike stores from New York to the French, but he was Am. and W.I. 70; Fitch to Henry Fox, Sept. 29, 1756. Ihid.; B. T. Jour- nals 67, p. 86. On March 13, 1756, Henry Fox addressed a circular letter to the colonial governors stating that "the King would have you recommend it in the strongest manner to your Council and Assembly, to pass effectual Laws for prohibiting all Trade and Commerce with the French, and for preventing the Exportation of Provisions of all kinds to any of their Islands or Colonies." N.J. Col. Doc. VIII, Part II, pp. 211, 212; N.Y. Col. Doc. VII, p. 76. ' B. T. New Hampshire 4 C 3. Cy. WentworthtoFox, Sept. 2, 1756. Am. and W.I. 70 and B. T. New Hampshire 3 B 86. ' Fitch to Fox, Sept. 29, 1756. Am. and W.I. 70. ' B. T. Journals 64, Aug. 5, 1756. Digitized by Microsoft® 8o BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 unable to persuade the governors of the other colonies to adopt the same expedients. This, as he pointed out, was fatal to his purpose, for it was useless to enforce such a pro- hibition in New York if its neighbors were not placed under the same restrictions/ This vitally important question seriously engaged the attention of the British government,^ On receipt of the information, the Board of Trade imparted it to the secretary of state.^ The Lords of the Admiralty also wrote to Fox that preparations were being made to ship large quantities of supplies from Ireland to France in neutral ships in order to provision her navy and the French West Indies, and they suggested as a remedy that an embargo be laid in Ireland/ The military situation was a most critical one, and the government could not afford to abandon any ad- vantage that Great Britain had in the struggle with France. The expressed intention of the government was to distress- "the French, particularly in North America by a Want of •Hardy, Oct. 13, 1756. B. T. N.Y. 33 LI SS- Cf. also Fox to Hardy, Aug. 14, 1756. Am. and W.I. 75. »B. T. N.Y. 33LI5S. ' Board of Trade to Henry Fox, Aug. 5, 1756. B. T. Plant. Gen. 15 O 143. On Aug. 14, 1756, Henry Fox wrote to Hardy that the shipping of provisions from Ireland to the Dutch West Indies, to which Hardy had called attention, would be looked into, and would be discouraged as much as was possible, but that it would be difficult to act in this particular, "and perhaps be found im- practicable." Am. and W.I. 75. * Admiralty to Henry Fox, Sept. 15, 1 756 : In order that this measure may be attended with as little inconvenience as is possible, "we humbly propose that the king will allow us to direct the commissioners for victualling to contract in Ireland for provisions for victualling the fleet in the Mediterranean.'' B. T. Plant. Gen. 15 O 143. Digitized by Microsoft® THE REGULATION OF TRADE DURING WAR 8 1 (Provisions";* in order to attain this end, the exportation of provisions from Ireland and the American colonies to the Dutch possessions in the West Indies had to be stopped. Accordingly, Fox instructed the Duke of Devonshire, then' Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, to lay an embargo on all ships and vessels bound with provisions from Ireland to neutral ports, and at the same time he forwarded to the Com- missioners of Trade the king's commands that they should send similar instructions to the colonial governors in Amer- ica.^ On October 9, 1756, the Board of Trade sent a cir- jtular letter to the colonial governors instructing them I to lay an embargo on all ships and vessels clearing with provisions from any place in the colonies, unless they were bound for some British colony. In that case bonds were to be demanded obligating these vessels to go to the desti- nation indicated in their papers.^ This action supplemented that of the commander-in-chief in America, Loudoun, who had already, on August 20, 1756, written to the colonial governors requiring them "in Consequence of his Majesty's Positive Orders" to prohibit the exportation of provisions, because the French might be supplied thereby, and because, in addition, the possibly ensuing scarcity on the continent might hamper British military operations.* These instructions received the cordial support of a number of the colonies. Connecticut had, even before the ■ Henry Fox to the Board of Trade, Oct. 2, 1756. B. T. Plant. Gen. IS O 144. ' B. T. Plant. Gen. 15 O 143; B. T. Journals 64, Oct. i and 8, 1756. » B. T. Plant. Gen. 44, P- 12.^- ' Am. and W.I. 83. G Digitized by Microsoft® 82 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 receipt of the Board of Trade's letter, passed an act obliging all masters of vessels to give bond not to land provisions except in a British port, and had in addition laid an embargo on all shipping in that province.^ The colonies were, however, not a unit in obeying these orders. Thus, despite the protest of the governor, the Pennsylvania legislature adhered to a bill "confining the Restraint & Prohibition to America only, leaving Vessels at Liberty to sail to any Neutral Ports in Europe." "^ Violations of the instructions were frequent, and as in addition the embargo in Ireland was not effective,^ the French continued to be supplied with| food-stuffs. Thus, in the summer of 1757, there was ascar-j city of provisions in the Leeward Islands due, on the on'e hand to the embargo in the continental colonies, and on the other to the fact that these colonies had sold their supplies to the French by way of St. Eustatius.* Hardy reported that a cargo of flour and provisions was shipped from Antigua to Curafoa, the flour being concealed in claret casks. ^ Such ' B. T. Prop. 20 W 2. For the attitude of Maryland, see B. T. Prop. 19 V 19s ; for New York, B. T. N.Y. 33 LI 83, and B. T. Journals 65, Feb. 15, 1757; for New Hampshire, B. T. N.H. 3 B 86; for Massachusetts, Spencer Phips to Henry Fox, Dec. 21, 1756. Am. and W.I. 70. 'William Denny to Thomas Penn, April 8, 1757. Am. and W.I. 71. See also B. T. Prop. 20 W 3. The assembly claimed that a cessation of this trade would ruin Pennsylvania. ' On July 20, 1757, Admiral Frankland wrote to Governor Thomas of the Leeward Islands : "It is Notorious that in the last Cork Fleet Eight Vessels Laden with Provisions dropped the Convoy and went into that Island (St. Eustatius) for the French Market." B. T. Leeward Isles 32 Co 6. *Ibid. ' Sir Charles Hardy to Pitt, March 11, 1757. Am. and W.I. 71. See also B. T. Journals 65, April 20, 1757, and B. T. N.Y. 33 LI 97. Digitized by Microsoft® THE REGULATION OF TRADE DURING WAR 83 violations were, however, more frequent in the continental colonies.^ Rhode Island especially paid no respect to the orders from England.^ Loudoun wrote to Pitt that the traders in this colony were "a, lawless set of smuglers, who continually Suply the Enemy with what Provisions they want, and bring back their Goods in Barter for them." ^ The Board of Trade had evidently anticipated that these instructions, even though issued expressly on the authority of the Crown, would not be sufficient. At their meeting on January 12, 1757, the Commissioners discussed this matter, and agreed on the necessity of an act of Parliament that should prohibit the exportation of all food-stuflfs (except fish and rice) from the British colonies in America.* James Oswald, a member of the Board and also of Parliament, was instructed to bring this matter to the attention of the House of Commons.* The suggestion met with the approval of ' Hardy to Board of Trade, June 14, 1757. B. T. N.Y. 34 Mm 8. See also affidavits, Ibid. Mm g-12. 'DeLancey to Board of Trade, June 3, 1757. Ibid. Mm 3. "May 30, 1757. Am. and W.I. 85. ■* The subject was naturally considered of utmost importance. Thus, on Feb. 4, 1757, the Board of Trade wrote to Charles Pinfold, the governor of Barbados: "The opportunity, which the Enemy has had in time of War in supplying themselves with Provisions by means of the Trade carried on in that Article from Ireland and our Colonys to the Dutch, and other neutral set- tlements, has long been the subject of much complaint and the source of great Mischief and Inconvenience, to remedy which a Bill is now under the Consideration of Parliament, which We hope will prove effectual." B. T. Barbados 55, p. 311. The various military commanders were carefully in- structed to carry out this policy. See, e.g., § 5 of draft instructions to James Abercromby, Dec. 30, 1757. Am. and W.I. 75. " B. T. Journals 65, Jan. 12, 1757. Digitized by Microsoft® ■ 84 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 Parliament, which in 1757 passed an act prohibiting, during the war with France, the exportation of all provisions (except fish and roots, and rice under the already existing restrictions)* from the colonies to any place but Great Britain, Ireland,' or some British colony. The penalties for violating this law were confiscation of the ship and cargo, heavy fines, and also possible imprisonment for the master of the ship.^ In order to make this policy of distressing the French more effective, Parliament in the same session also prohibited for a limited time the exportation of grain ^ and its manu- factured products from Great Britain and Ireland except to the British colonies.* This restraint on the English producer did not, however, imply the same economic sac- rifice as did that laid on the colonies, because England was becoming a less and less important factor in the grain export trade. In fact. Parliament ^ at this very time sought even ' Rice could be exported directly only to Great Britain and her colonies and to ports in Europe south of Cape Finisterre. ' A fine of twenty shillings for every bushel of grain and every pound of beef, pork, and other victual, "which said penalties and forfeitures shall be re- covered in the high court of admiralty, or any other chief court of civil or criminal jurisdiction, in such respective colonies or plantations." The master knowingly guilty could be imprisoned for three months. Bonds had to be given, in treble the value of the cargo, that it would be taken to its declared destination. 30 Geo. II, c. 9. As England was anxious to secure the neu- trality of Spain during the war, on Aug. 9, 1757, an order in council was issued allowing the inhabitants of New York, during the Crown's pleasure, to export provisions to St. Augustine. B. T. Journals 66, Nov. 3, 1758. ' CoiBj malt, meat, flour, bread, biscuit, and starch. * 30 Geo. II, c. I, continued to Dec. 24, 1758 by 31 Geo. II, c. i. "30 Geo. II, c. 7, continued to Dec. 24, 1758 by 31 Geo. II, c. i. See also 30 Geo. II, c. 14. The import duties on com and flour were discontinued for a limited time ; in addition the Navigation Act was relaxed, allowing com Digitized by Microsoft® THE REGULATION OF TRADE DURING WAR 85 to encourage the importation of food-stuflfs into Great Britain. In addition to the general rule forbidding all trade with the enemy and the act of Parliament of 1757 forbidding the exportation of food-stuffs from the colonies to foreign ports, temporary general embargoes were at various times laid in the colonies, partly with the object of preventing the French from being supplied, and partly for military purposes. In 1757 Loudoun laid such an embargo, which, however, had to be raised on account of the failure of the crops in Great Britain and Ireland, and the consequent need of provisions there.^ The following year also, Abercromby, acting on in- structions from Pitt, adopted the same expedient, prepara- tory to the Louisburg expedition.^ As the act of Parliament of 1757 did not prohibit the ex- portation of beef and pork from Ireland to neutral ports, and as these were the chief food-stuffs in that kingdom, at various times also recourse was taken to embargoes there.* to be imported in neutral ships. 30 Geo. II, c. 9, §xiv; B. T. Plant. Gen. 44, p. 130; B. T. Journals 65, March 2, 1757. ' Holdemesse to Loudoun and to colonial governors, both May 2, 1757. Am. and W.I. 75; N.J. Col. Doc. VIII, Part II, p. 248. In future such em- bargoes were not to apply to ships bound for Great Britain and Ireland. Eight ships of Snell & Co. had been held at New York and Philadelphia, and were not allowed to proceed to Ireland with their cargoes of wheat and flour. B. T. Plant. Gen. 44, p. 134 and Ibid. 15 O 153. This embargo was laid by Loudoun mainly with the object of obtaining sufficient transports to move his troops to Halifax. Sir Charles Hardy to John Clevland, May 3, 1757. Adm. Sec. In-Letters, Bundle 481. 'Pitt to Abercromby, Jan. 11, 1758. Am. and W.I. 76. Abercromby to Pitt, May 27, 1758. Ibid. 87. See also Ibid. 71 passim, and B. T. Mass. 76 li 47. ' Bedford Correspondence II, p. 369; Pitt Correspondence II, p. 79; Cal- endar Home Office Papers, 1760-1765, nos. 484, 493, 522, 526, 552, 559, 579. Digitized by Microsoft® CHAPTER VI COLONIAL TRADE WITH THE ENEMY, 1756-1763 r These various measures to prevent France from getting (Irish and American provisions were by no means fully ef-/ ifective. In 1757, a number of vessels that had sailed from Ireland with provisions for the West Indies parted from the convoy, and took a large quantity of beef to St. Eustatius. This was immediately sent to the French in Martinique and Santo Domingo, and enabled them to fit out their vessels.' In 1758 it was stated that no less than fifty to sixty thousand barrels of provisions had gone or were going from Ireland to this Dutch colony,^ their ultimate destina- tion being the French West Indies.^ ' William Wood (Commissioners of Customs) to John Clevland (Lords of Admiralty), Oct. 28, 1757. Adm. Sec. In-Letters, Bundle 3866. These were 14 ships with 20,000 barrels of beef. ^ An intercepted letter from Waterford, Ireland, dated Jan. 26, 1 758. B. T. Leeward Isles 32 Cc 24. 'Governor Thomas to Board of Trade, May 18, 1758. B. T. Leeward Isles 32 Cc 22. On Jan. 7, 1758, Governor Pinfold of Barbados wrote to the Board of Trade, that the French obtained provisions from Ireland and St. Eustatius. He also added : " I have good Intelligence that in Cork Numbers of Dutch Vessels lade with Beef & publickly declare it is to be carried to the West Indies, all of which is destined for the French Islands.'' B. T. Barba- dos 35 Ee 16. 86 Digitized by Microsoft® COLONIAL TRADE WITH THE ENEMY 87 In the British colonies, both in the West Indies and on the continent, similar practices prevailed. The tempta- tion to engage in this trade was very great. In time of peace the foreign West Indies furnished a large market for the surplus agricultural products of the British continental colonies, and also provided them with cheap molasses, which, when converted into rum, was a most important factor in the fisheries, in the slave trade, and in the fur trade with the Indians. In time of war this normally profitable trade became even more lucrative. The French West Indies suflFered from a scarcity of provisions, and hence were willing to pay high prices for them.' On the other hand, owing to the war, they had great difficulty in marketing their produce, such as sugar and molasses, and hence were forced to sell them at moderate prices.* These conditions were the direct results of British sea power, which seriously interfered with the communications be- tween the metropolis and the colony. France could not send provisions to the West Indies, and they, in turn, could not send 4heir produce to the European markets. To a large extent, the colonies neutralized the advantages arising from British naval activity, both supplying the French colonies with the 'From St. Eustatius, May 12, 1757, Samuel Wells wrote to his father, Francis Wells, at Boston, that "the voyages from America now to these Islands must be very profitable to those that voyage in (them.) at present every kind of Northern produce bear a great rate." B. T. N.Y. 34 Mm 14. 'Extract from a letter dated Philadelphia, December, 1759, showing that the price of French sugar was very low, muscovado at 8s. to los. a hundred- weight, white at 15^. to 25^. a hundredweight. B. T. Plant. Gen. 16 P 20. Cf. also B. T. Jam. 37 Cc 19. Digitiied by Microsoft® 88 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 i sorely needed provisions,* and also furnishing a market for/: 'their produce In the opening years of the war the colonies carried on this trade in two ways, either directly with the French, or indirectly with them through some neutral port in the West Indies.^ The direct trade was carried on with the connivance of the French officials, as it furnished them with otherwise unobtainable supplies. The colonial ships en- gaged in it were not seized by the French cruisers and priva- teers, because in general, they had " Lycences from the French Governors who refused them to none that applied for them." ' 'A letter from the French West Indies in 1758, which had been taken in a French prize, clearly shows this: "Nous sommes tons les jours k la veille de manquer, sans le secours de nos Ennemis nous serons obligez de vivre comma vous nous I'annoncez avec ce que nous foumit la colonic. La Condition est dure, et Ton n'y resisteroit pas; nous sfavons bien qu'il est impossible au Com- merce de France de nous secourir, tout est abandonn^ et La Cour ne pense pas k nous." B. T. Va. 26 X 41. * On April 18, 1757, Governor William Popple of the Bermudas wrote to the Board of Trade, that a great many sloops built in the Bermudas were sold to the Dutch West Indies, and that the British register was transferred with the vessel. Thus the Dutch would be able to get provisions in the British colonies for the French. "Even now, th6 Bond is given to Land Provisions at some English Settlement, the Dutch can go to Each English Settlement for once, give in Bond, and never return there again." B. T. Bermuda 19 O 51. An act of Parliament, 15 Geo. II, c. 31, § i, was directed against such practices, yet there may have been some evasion of this law, with the result pointed out by Popple as probable. ' Sharpe to Pitt, Feb. 27, 1761. Am. and W.I. 73. Also in Sharpe Cor- respondence II, pp. 490, 491, and Pitt Correspondence II, p. 401. In 1759 Admiral Cotes pointed out that there was some danger in this trade, as a French frigate, newly arrived from Europe and unacquainted with its nature, had burnt nine North American vessels. The captain of this frigate was cen- sured by the governor of Cape Franfois for stopping the only channel by which they were regularly supplied with provisions. B. T. Plant. Gen. 16 P 20. Digitized by Microsoft® COLONIAL TRADE WITH THE ENEMY 89 In addition, a large number of British colonial vessels engaged in this trade were protected by passes from the gov- ernors, authorizing them to go to the French colonies, os- tensibly for the purpose of effecting an exchange of prisoners. Such vessels were popularly known as "flags of truce." The British West Indian colonies participated ' in this trade, though naturally to a less extent than did the conti- nental colonies, where the provisions were originally pro- duced. In 1757, Barbados passed a law making it high treason to trade with the French,^ and in the following year the Governor of the colony wrote to the Board of Trade, that every care and precaution had been taken to prevent the enemy from being supplied.^ Despite these measures, Commodore Moore discovered, in 1759, that St. Vincent, one of the neutral islands, which had become completely French, was constantly supplied with provisions from Barbados, and that this trade helped to support the other French Islands.* A number of ships engaged in this trade were seized by the navy, and measures were also taken to punish those guilty of violating the law.* These vigorous step^ seem to have been effective in checking such practices in the West Indian colonies.' ■ Wentworth, New Hampshire, Nov. 13, 1757, to Board of Trade. B. T. Plant. Gen. 49. CJ. B. T. Leeward Isles 32 Cc 6; B. T. N.Y. 34 Mm 13. » B. T. Barbados 35 Ee 5, 6. ■ Ibid. 35 Ee 16. Pinfold to Board of Trade, Jan. 7, 1758. * Moore to Pitt, October, 1759. Am. and W.I. 100. 'Crump, Guadeloupe, Dec. 26, 1759, to Pitt. Ibid. Pinfold to Board of Trade, May 29, 1760. B. T. Barbados 36 Ff i. • The trade was also not unknown in Jamaica. In 1758 a "flag of truce" of that island, loaded up to the hatches, was seized by a privateer. B. T. Digitized by Microsoft® 90 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 In the continental colonies, this direct trade with the enemy was extensively carried on, especially by Rhode Island and Pennsylvania, though it was by no means con- fined to them. In many instances the colonial vessels were protected from seizure by commissions or other docu- ments in the nature of passes issued by the governors, con- stituting them "flags of truce," for the ostensible purpose of effecting an exchange of prisoners. Although at the be- ginning these passes may have been used for the legitimate purpose of exchanging prisoners,* their issue soon became a crying evil. All pretence of legitimacy was abandoned, and, as in the previous war, colonial merchants eagerly sought to obtain from the governors these documents, under cover of which, with one or two French prisoners on board, they could with safety to themselves carry on a lucrative trade with the enemy. The Lieutenant-Governor of Virginia reported that he was offered four hundred guineas, if he "would license a Flag of Truce." ^ The most scandalous conditions prevailed in Pennsylvania, where Governor Denny openly sold such passes. When bringing these facts Va. 26 X 41. See also the first memorial enclosed in Holmes to Pitt, Jan. 4, 1 761, which states that Jamaica sent money to the enemy, while the Northern colonies sent provisions, and that the navy had entirely stopped this flag of truce trade from Jamaica. Col. Corr. Jam. XL Robert Melvill, the Lieutenant- Governor of Guadeloupe, wrote to Pitt, Dec. 15, 1760, that he had made two seizures in frustrating attempts to send provisions from that island to Mar- tinique. Am. and W.I. 100. ' Cf. Hopkins, governor of Rhode Island, to Pitt, Dec. 20, 1760. Am. and W.L 73- * Fauquier to Pitt, Oct. 28, 1760. Am. and W.L 72. Cf. also Bumaby, Travels (ed. R. R. Wilson), p. 129 n. Digitized by Microsoft® COLONIAL TRADE WITH THE ENEMY 91 to Pitt's attention in 1759, Thomas Penn * said that the Delaware River at Philadelphia swarmed "with shallops unloading these illegal cargoes, brought at their return, and cheating the King of his dutys,'' besides carrying provisions and ready money to the Enemy." At first Denny sold these licenses in small numbers, and under the pretence of trans- porting French prisoners, though all such prisoners could have been embarked in one or two vessels at the most. At the outset also the governor received large sums for these passes, but as the number issued increased their value fell ; and finally "he scrupled not to set his name to, & dis- pose of great numbers of blank flags of Truce, at the low price of twenty pounds sterling or under, some of which," as his successor James Hamilton, wrote, were sold in 1759 "from hand to hand at advanced prices." In 1759 and J 760, "a very great part of the principal Merchants" of Philadelphia were engaged in this trade with the French West Indies.* In a number of the colonies, the governors refused to issue flags of truce. Fauquier in Virginia * and Wentworth in New Hampshire * did not issue any, and though Pownall in Massachusetts granted two, they were ' Sept. 12, 1759. Am. and W.I. 72. ' The duties were those imposed by the Molasses Act of 1733. ' Hamilton to Pitt, Nov. i, 1760. Am. and W.I. 72. In a private letter from Philadelphia, December, 17S9, the writer said of this trade, 'there are among us some who think it illegal, while others of larger consciences practise it profitably.' B. T. Plant. Gen. 16 P 20. * Fauquier to Pitt, Oct. 28, 1760. Am. and W.I. 72. Cf. also B. T. Va. 27 Y 14. 'Wentworth to Pitt, Dec. 9, 1760. Am. and W.I. 73. Wentworth wrote that he probably could have made a good deal of money by issuing them. Digitized by Microsoft® 92 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 for the legitimate exchange of prisoners.' Connecticut also asserted its freedom from participation in such practices.^ Rhode Island, on the other hand, was deeply implicated. In 1757 Rhode Island traded directly with the French in Santo Domingo,^ and in the following year it was asserted that a regular trade in provisions was carried on from that colony to the French West Indies by means of "cartel ships," carrying a few prisoners and protected by flags of truce.* Stephen Hopkins,^ the colonial governor, in the course of a detailed exculpatory despatch to Pitt, said that in the first four years of the war thirty-two Rhode Island vessels had fsailed to the French colonies for the purpose of exchang- ing prisoners. A colonial law authorized the governor to issue commissions for this purpose, but expressly forbade the exportation of provisions and warlike stores. Hopkins asserted that the colonial officials had not connived at any violations of this law, but he frankly admitted that these Rhode Island "flags of truce" took lumber and "Dry Goods of British Manufacture" to the French colonies, bringing back molasses and some sugar. Hopkins finally added : "It must be confessed 'tis highly probable, that some Vessels from this Colony as well as from others, have taken in Cargoes under Pretence of being bound to Jamaica," and have then ' Bernard to Pitt, Nov. 8, 1 760. Am. and W.I. 72. ' Thomas Fitch to Pitt, Nov. 26, 1760, and April 25, 1761. Am. and W.I. 73- 'B. T. N.Y. 34 Mm 14. ^ * Fauquier to Board of Trade, Sept. 23, 1758. B. T. Va. 26 X 41; B. T. Journals 66, Dec. 12, 1758. •Dec. 20, 1760. Am. and W.I. 73. Digitized by Microsoft® COLONIAL TRADE WITH THE ENEMY 93 sold them to the French in Santo Domingo. At the time, it was generally asserted that this direct trade with the enemy was openly carried on by Rhode Island.^ In addition to this direct trade with the enemy, carried on under cover of flags of truce or with the connivance of the French authorities, the colonies, and Ireland as well, exported large quantities of provisions to the neutral ports in the West Indies. St. Eustatius was the chief centre of this trade and became an important source of supply for the French.^ According to British law, provisions were in general deemed contraband of war, and especially so in a case like this, because they enabled the French to fit out their fleets and privateers, and because, in addition, they relieved settlements which were in continual danger of being forced to surrender through starvation.* Besides, in a number of ' Sharpe to Pitt, Feb. 27, 1 761. Am. and W.L 73. On May 9, 1 761, Francis Bernard wrote to the Board of Trade : "These practises will never be put an End to, till Rhode Island is reduced to the subjection of the British Empire; of which at present it is no more a part than the Bahama Islands were when they were inhabited by the Buccanneers." B. T. Mass. 78 LI 16. ' The Dutch purchasers of these provisions in St. Eustatius furnished the colonial vessels with forged or fraudulent landing certificates, which were used to cancel the bonds given in the British colonies not to take their cargoes to a foreign port. B. T. N.Y. 34 Mm 14. ' » ' - ' In 1746 the British High Court of Admiralty declared that "provisions are and always have been esteemed contraband." F. T. Pratt, Law of Contraband of War (London, 1856), p. 93. Cf. also the judgment of Sir William Scott in the " Jonge Margaretha," 1799. C. Robinson, Reports of Cases in the High Court of Admiralty (Philadelphia, 1800), I, p. 163. Holland did not admit this definition of contraband, which was opposed to the treaties she had concluded with England. See Am. and W.I. 54, no. 124. Digitized by Microsoft® 94 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 instances, the Dutch vessels went to the French colonies under convoy of French men-of-war. Thus on November 30, 1758, Governor Thomas of the Leeward Islands wrote to the Board of Trade, that three fleets of Dutch vessels had in the last four months gone in this manner to Marti- nique, and he claimed, that without them the French would have been reduced to great distress and could not have fitted out their privateers.^ Furthermore, in return for provisions, the Dutch took French produce which they carried to Europe.'' In normal times, France did not as a rule allow foreign- ers to trade with her colonies. During the war, French colonial trade was for the time being opened to Dutch vessels, owing to the supremacy of Great Britain at sea. This measure was not one "of French councils, but of British force." The British prize courts proceeded to con- demn all such vessels engaged in this trade, contending that a neutral power could not engage in a trade which was opened to them only by "the pressure of war." This general doc- j trine is known as the "Rule of 1756." ' Proceeding on these' ' B. T. Leeward Islands 32 Cc 35. In an intercepted letter from the Gov- ernor of St. Eustatius to the Governor of Martinique, March 14, 1758, we read: "Je me flatte d'ailleurs, Messieurs, que dans un cas un peu douteux, vous voudrds bien avoir Egard S. la fajon dont je me suis portd a foumir des vivres &, Vos Colonies, dans le terns meme ou les Anglois insultoient le plus notre pavilion." Ibid. Cc 23. See Commodore Moore's despatch to Pitt from Guadeloupe, March 6, 1759, to the effect that, as the Dutch were very assid- uous in assisting the enemy, he had sent ships to cruise off St. Eustatius to prevent provisions being sent thence to Guadeloupe, whose complete con- quest had not yet been effected. Am. and W.I. 100. *Ibid. Cc. 6. 'This rule was based on legitimate considerations, which are admirably expounded in a judgment of the famous jurist, Sir William Scott, in the case Digitized by Microsoft® COLONIAL TRADE WITH THE ENEMY 95 general principles, the British navy in the West Indies seized Dutch vessels carrying provisions to the French colonies, and also Dutch vessels taking produce away from them.' These seizures created a great deal of friction between the English and the Dutch.'' Their general effect, however, was to break up the Dutch trade with the French colonies, of the "Immanuel," 1799: "It cannot be contended to be a right of neutrals, to intrude into a commerce which had been uniformly shut against them and which is now forced open merely by the pressure of war; for when the enemy, under an entire inability to supply his Colonies and to export their products, afiFects to open them to neutrals, it is not his will but his necessity that changes his system; that change is the direct and unavoidable consequence of the compulsion of war, it is a measure not of French councils, but of British force." Robinson (Am. ed.) II, pp. 167, 168. >. " ' 'c : . '~- ' The general contention of the British government was that, "in the pres- ent War between England and France, the Subjects of Holland have no Right to cover the Property of the Enemy of England, going to, or coming from the Colonies of that Enemy, directly, nor indirectly to do it, thro' the Medium of the Dutch Colonies; nor to carry to the Colonies of France directly, nor indirectly, any Commodities, altho' Neutral Property, which have a Tendency to sup- port the Enemy." James Marriott, The Case of the Dutch Ships Considered (3d ed. London, 1759), p. i. Marriott was at a later date judge of the ad- miralty coiut. See also The Annual Register for 1759 (sth ed. Condon, 1769), p. 5; A Letter to the Dutch Merchants in England (London, 1759), pp. 4, 18 (this pamphlet is attributed to Marriott) ; Authentic Memoirs of Chatham (London, 1778), pp. 19, 20. ' To the frequent complaints of the Governor of St. Eustatius that the cap- ture and condemnation of Dutch vessels bound with provisions to the French islands was contrary to the treaties subsisting between Great Britain and Holland, Governor Thomas of the Leeward Islands replied, that if the con- demnations were deemed unjust, an appeal could be taken to his Majesty in Council. B. T. Leeward Islands 32 Cc 22. The documents regarding this matter were sent to Pitt by the Board of Trade, July 26, 1758. Ibid. 57, pp. 124, 125, 130. For the activity of the British fleet, see ibid. Cc 35. Cu- rafoa was less concerned in this trade than was St. Eustatius. Up to a short time before the end of the war, only seven vessels from Curafoa had been Digitized by Microsoft® 96 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 and with it the exportation of provisions from Ireland and the British colonies to Dutch ports. Being deprived of their Dutch market/ the continental colonies sought access to the French by other means, and in the years 1759 and 1760 there developed an important trade with Monte Cristi, a Spanish settlement in the island of Hispaniola or Santo Domingo.^ Both France and Spain had colonies in this island. Monte Cristi is situated on its north shore in the Spanish part, contiguous to the French boundary. Prior to the war, this commercially insignificant place had been closed to foreign- ers, but subsequently it was made a free port,^ for the purpose condemned in Jamaica for trading with the French West Indies. Col. Corr. Jam. II, May 10, 1762. For the decisions on appeal in England in these cases, see Grenville Papers I, pp. 270, 283, 284, 296. ' On March 28, 1759, Lieutenant-Governor Henry Moore of Jamaica wrote to the Board of Trade that the squadron had put an end to the commerce between the French and the Dutch, and that this branch of trade was then taken up by the Northern colonies. B. T. Jam. 34 Z 43. The trade through the Dutch channel, however, did not cease entirely. See Bradley to Amherst, Dec. 5, 1760. Am. and W.I. 73 and 95. ' The first mention of this trade is in DeLancey's despatch to the Board 'of Trade, June 3, 1757. B. T. N.Y. 34 Mm 3. Nothing further was heard until two years later, when the Board of Trade said that its first information regarding this trade came from a despatch from the Lieutenant-Governor of Jamaica, March 28, 1759. B. T. Journals 67, p. 231. See also B. T. Plant. Gen. 44, p. 179; B. T. Jam. 34 Z 43. Colebrooke's report of Feb. 18, 1760, says that this trade had been carried on since the beginning of the war, but in no proportion to what it was in 1759 and 1760. B. T. Plant. Gen. 16 P 17. • Shirley, in his despatch to the Board of Trade, March 29, 1760, says it was a new Spanish settlement. Am. and W.I. 454. The second memorial enclosed in Holmes to Pitt, Jan. 4, 1761, says: "There is here No City, No Town, No Port," only a few huts; the place has no trade of its own, and "the Newly established free Port of Monto Christi . . . exists no where, but in the Digitized by Microsoft® COLONIAL TRADE WITH THE ENEMY 97 of facilitating the trade between the British and French colonies. Nothing was produced here that the English colonies wanted,' nor did the few Spaniards residing at the place afford a market for provisions. The exports from Monte Cristi were all French produce,^ and its imports all went immediately to the adjoining French colony. The Spanish governor collected fees from the vessels, gave them clearances, and charged duties on the sugar and molasses exported.' But the trade was essentially a direct one with the French.* In many instances the French produce was not even landed in Spanish territory, but was transferred from small French boats directly to the British vessels in the harbor.* The products brought to Monte Cristi were provisions, warlike stores, British manufactures and money.* airy Regions of Imagination." Col. Corr. Jam. IL It should, however, be noted that already in 1562 John Hawkins sailed " to Monte Christi another port on the North side of Hispaniola." Hakluyt X, p. 8. ' The only Spanish produce that could be obtained here was tobacco and hides. Hinxman'sreportin HolmestoPittjMay 31, 1761. Col.Corr.Jam.il. 'B. T. Jam. 34ZS9. ' B. T. Bahamas 7 E 3; Hinxman's report in Holmes to Pitt, May 31, 1761. Col. Corr. Jam. II. * See Memorial of Edward Long, Dec. 3, 1760. Col. Corr. Jam. II. Long was Judge of the Vice-Admiralty Court of Jamaica, and is the author of the well-known history of that island. ' B. T. Jam. 34 Z 59. CJ. also second Memorial in Holmes to Pitt, Jan^ 1761, in Col. Corr. Jam. II, and Holmes to Pitt, May 31, 1761, ibid. Holmes's despatch to the admiralty regarding this subject was likewise sent to Pitt. Cal. Home Office Papers, 1760-1765, p. 4. • B. T. Bahama 6 D 87, 7 E i ; B. T. Plant. Gen. 16 P r7. It was said that the colonies were drained of money by this trade, as a cargo of sugar was more valuable than a cargo of provisions. B. T. Plant. Gen.'i6 P 20. The North American vessels also brought horses, lumber, and fish. B. T. Jam. 34 Z 59. H Digitized by Microsoft® 98 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 The commodities exported were chiefly sugar and mo- lasses.^ This trade at Monte' Cristi was carried on mainly by the New England and Middle colonies,^ but it was by no means The average annual value of the importations from the North American colo- nies into Jamaica during the five years 1758 to 1762 was £200,000 Jamaica currency. The exports from Jamaica to these colonies amounted to only ;£so,ooo yearly, the balance being paid in money or in bills of exchange, which the continental colonies used to purchase French produce at Monte Cristi. B. T. Jam. 37 Cc 19. In 1761 £10,000 Jamaica currency was equivalent to £7141 sterling. Ibid. Bb 41. ' B. T. Jam. 34 Z 44 and 59. ''According to a list of ships spoken by H. M.'s sloop Viper in Monte Cristi harbor, Feb. 5, 1759, 28 of the 29 ships there, ranging from 30 to 150 tons in burden, belonged to the North American colonies, and had cleared from them. They belonged to the following colonies : New York, 7 ; Rhode Island, 8; Connecticut, 4; Massachusetts, 8; Virginia, i; and Bermuda, i. The Virginia ship had put in on account of stress of weather. B. T. Jam. 34 Z 44. The success of the trade attracted others. On Oct. 25, 1760, H.M.S. Defiance anchored at Monte Cristi and remained there eight or nine days. The commander reported that there were always fifty vessels in the harbor, and that every day some left and some arrived. These vessels belonged to Eng- land, Ireland, Gibraltar, and the colonies, and in addition, mention is made of three vessels under the Danish flag. Second Memorial in Holmes to Pitt, Jan.ig; 1761. Col. Corr. Jam. II. The trial of a North American vessel en- gaged in this trade showed that Messrs. Greg and Cunningham of New York and Messrs. Hugh White and Co. of Dublin were heavily interested in it. Holmes to Pitt, no date but marked as received May 13, 1761. Ibid. Captain Hinxman, who had been sent by Holmes to investigate, reported that on his arrival at Monte Cristi he found in the port 42 British vessels and that 8 had arrived subsequent to his anchoring. Of these 50 vessels, 36 belonged to the North American colonies: Massachusetts, 15; Rhode Island, 10; New York, 9; Connecticut, i; North Carolina, i. The balance belonged to the West Indian colonies and to various places, such as London, 5 ; Edinburgh, i ; Ire- land, I ; Gibraltar, i. The colonial vessels brought provisions, the British manufactures; both took in return French products such as sugar and indigo. Holmes to Pitt, May 31, 1761. Ibid. For Danish ships carrying French colonial products to market, see Cal. Home Office Papers, 1760-1765, pp. 69, 77. 78. Digitized by Microsoft® COLONIAL TRADE WITH THE ENEMY 99 unknown in Virginia * and in the West Indies.* In addition, British subjects in England, Scotland, and Ireland were implicated in it, though to a minor extent.^ The trade assumed large proportions in 1759 and 1760. At times during these two years, over one hundred North American vessels were at this port.* In 1760 it was estimated that in that one year four to five hundred vessels had taken in cargoes of French sugar and molasses.® In order to facili- tate the trade. North American subjects of the Crown resided at Monte Cristi." 'Fauquier to Pitt, Oct. 28, 1760. Am. and W.I. 72. Cf. B. T. Va. 27 Y 14 and in. Maryland, on the other hand, seems to have obeyed the act of 1757. B. T. Prop. 21 X 8. Cf. ibid. 20 W 26 and 27. ' One Allen Popham of St. Kitts was extensively engaged in this trade of sending provisions from Ireland and New York to St. Eustatius, St. Croix, St. Thomas, and Hispaniola. Bradley to Amherst, Dec. 5, 1760. Am. and W.L 73 and 95. ' Colebrooke's report of 1760 says: "Policies of Insurance have been opened publickly in London to cover their risque, and at such high praemiums as imply consciousness of great hazard attending illegal adventures." B. T. Plant. Gen. 16 P 17. See also Sharpe to Pitt, Feb. 27, 1761. Am. and W.I. 73. Colden to Pitt, Dec. 27, 1760. Ibid. Report of the New York Council, Dec. 24, 1760. Ibid. In 1761 a small quantity of merchandise was entered for export direct from London to Monte Cristi. Customs Records (in Public Record Office), Ledgers of Imports and Exports, vol. 61. * Governor George Haldane of Jamaica to Board of Trade, June 9, 1759, with affidavits to the effect that at times 100 to 120 North American vessels were at Monte Cristi. B. T. Jam. 34 Z S9- In 1760 it was said that as many as a hundred such vessels had been seen at one time there. B. T. Plant. Gen. 16 P 17. Cf. also Shirley to B. T., March 29, 1760, in Am. and W.I. 454; B. T. Bahamas 6 D 87; B. T. Journals 68 p. 175. R t:. R^i. ir, .«h ' B. T. Bahamas 7 E i and 3. Admiral Cotes said that more than 200 vessels had taken cargoes from Monte Cristi in 1759. B. T. Plant. Gen. 16 P20. "r.% v"^^. ft„_,,,XK. jx9, C^JC* t, ^ 7a^ Ic^ ,i .^^^ ' B. T. Jam. 34 Z 59. Digitized by Microsoft® lOO BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 In New York, where this trade to Monte Cristi was exten- sively^ carried on, it monopoHzed much of the time of the Commander-in-Chief, as it interfered with the vict- ualling of the forces.^ The lieutenant-governor of this colony, James DeLancey, was very active in suppressing the illegal exportation of provisions. " Quantities of Flour," he wrote, "were clandestinely Exported to foreign Markets, particularly to Monti Christi, thence to Supply the French." Some of the offenders were discovered ; whereupon Amherst wrote that this was "a secret Satisfaction" to him, and that he hoped they would be punished as they deserved. Despite DeLancey's efforts and the detection of some of those con- cerned "in this shamefuU abuse," Amherst again received complaints of its being carried on to a very great extent; so much so that he feared that nothing but an embargo would put a stop to it. He was, however, opposed to such a step if it could possibly be avoided without making the army suffer from want of flour, and he urged the Governor to punish all delinquents most severely. While his efforts to do so were at least in part frustrated,' DeLancey's en- ' George Spencer to Amherst, Dec. 17, 1760, with a list of 46 New York vessels that had taken provisions to Monte Cristi and other foreign ports, and had returned to New York with French sugar which was entered on ficti- tious clearances. Augustus Bradley to Amherst, Dec. 18, 1760, with a similar list of 39 vessels. Am. and W.L 95. T B ?..fAA,„ eJi*5>ti, ^l.'. . \'\" ''' 'See DeLancey to Amherst, Aug. 24, Oct. 22, Nov. 5, 1759; and Amherst^ to DeLancey, Oct. 2, 7, 29, 1759. Am. and W.I. 91 and 92. In New York, the fraudulent flag of truce trade was not practised, as neither Hardy nor De Lancey would countenance it. ' DeLancey to Amherst, Nov. 5, 1759 : "My Proclamation against Heysham, I believe, gave some Check to the Exportation of Provisions ; but De Peyster Digitized by Microsoft® COLONIAL TRADE WITH THE ENEMY lOI ergetic action succeeded in checking the trade, though not in stopping it, and he was able to assure Amherst that at all events there would be in New York no scarcity of so essential an article as flour. DeLancey's fears as to the continuance of this trade were, however, justified. On his death in 1760, Cadwallader Colden, as president of the Council, became the acting governor. He frankly admitted that tlie New York merchants had been too generally con- cerned in this illicit intercourse, but added that the Phila- delphia merchants were even more guilty.' By these means British subjects, of whom an overwhelming majority lived in the North American colonies, supplied the French with provisions and afforded them a market for their and Folliott have connections, the former with two of the Judges, and the Latter in the Custom house." Therefore he does not think that they will be made examples of; they have prevailed upon the witnesses to absent them- selves; and he fears that this trade will continue. ' Colden to Pitt, Oct. 27, 1760. Am. and W.I. 72. The method of carry- ing on this trade in New York was to ship provisions in large quantities to the New England governments, "for which the Merchants give bond," as the act of Parliament directed. These bonds were in turn cancelled by landing cer- tificates from New England. The provisions were then exported to the French, and French sugars were brought back to New England or to New Jer- sey, whence in turn they were imported into New York, with "cockets" to the effect that they had been legally imported. In addition, Colden said that he had no doubt that provisions were exported from places where there were no customs officers. See also Colden to Pitt, Nov. 11, 1760 (Ibid.), enclosing the custom-house accounts, illustrating the nature and method of this trade. This method implied great frauds in the customs service, which Colden laid at the door of the officers in New Jersey and New England. One Bradley sent him a copy of a letter from a firm in Norwalk, which had procured "numbers of fictitious clearances for Different Persons as Also their method & Price for doing it." Bradley to Amherst, Dec. 18, 1760. Am. and W.I. 95. In addition, Colden admitted that provisions were shipped from New York to the Digitized by Microsoft® 102 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 produce/ thus to a great extent frustrating the policy of the mother country. In fact, according to Shirley, who had been transferred from Massachusetts to the Bahamas, provisions were more plentiful and cheaper in the French settlements than in the English West Indies, and in addition, the prices for French sugars rose violently on account of the broad market offered at Monte Cristi.^ Not only did I the enemy secure an otherwise unobtainable market for' his produce, but in addition, the sugars purchased at Monte! Cristi were shipped from the North American colonies to; London and entered there as British sugars,' thus vitiating' \the preferential system which gave the products of the Brit- / /jsh West Indies a monopoly of the home market. Further- Spanish and Portuguese wine islands off Southern Europe and Africa. This, though illegal, he contended did no harm, as all provisions thus exported were purely for local consumption in these islands. Golden to Pitt, Dec. 27, 1760. Cf. also B. T. Va. 27 Y 14. New Jersey, whose foreign trade was un- important, apparently did not engage directly in this trade, at least not to a marked degree. Boone to Pitt, Aug. 23, 1760. Am. and W.I. 72. ' B. T. Jam. 34 Z 44. ' White sugar had risen from 18 J. to 26^. a cwt., muscovado from iii. to 175. 6i. a cwt. Shirley to Board of Trade, Aug. i, 1760. B. T. Bahamas 7 E I. Governor Lyttelton said that on account of this trade provisions during the war were scarce and dear in Jamaica. B. T. Jam. 37 Cc 19. However, on Jan. 7, 1758, Governor Pinfold wrote to the Board of Trade that Barba- dos was plentifully supplied with provisions, the trade with the Northern colonies being kept open by the activity of the privateers. B. T. Barbados 35 Ee 16. ' These sugars were "entered as the produce of the island of Guardaloup," which had been captured in 1759. B. T. Plant. Gen. 16 P 17. French sugars were imported into New York under "the denomination of prize sugars & British Sugars from Guardaloup." Golden to Pitt, Nov. 11, 1760. Am. and W.I. 72. Shirley pointed out that in addition to the other advantages result- ing from this trade, France derived a revenue from the export duties in Santo Digitized by Microsoft® COLONIAL TRADE WITH THE ENEMY 103 more, as a result of this trade, the price of provisions rose rapidly in the North American colonies, especially in New York, so that at times it would have been cheaper to purchase in England the flour and bread needed for the troops em- ployed in the colonies.^ Of minor importance, but by no means insignificant, was another branch of this illegal trade : that carried on with the French in Florida and Louisiana. New York and Penn- sylvania did not, apparently, engage in this commerce, which, to a great extent, centred in New England.^ A small number of colonial sloops constantly traded with New Orleans.' In addition, some trade, especially in Indian goods, was carried on by means of the Spanish with the French to the west of Florida. South Carolina was some- what involved therein, but the chief offender was Rhode Island.* According to William Bull, the lieutenant-gov- Domingo, while the duties that were imposed by the Act of 1733 on these prod- ucts when imported into the English colonies were not paid. B. T. Bahamas 6 D 87. On June 13, 1760, the Board of Trade sent a copy of this despatch to Pitt. Ibid. 12, pp. 187-188. *B. T. Plant. Gen. 16 P 17. Cf. also correspondence of DeLancey and Amherst. Am. and W.I. 91 and 92. 'Golden to Pitt, Oct. 27, 1760. Am. and W.L 72. Hamilton to Pitt, Nov. I, 1760. Ihid. ' In 1 761 a sloop was seized at Boston for trading at New Orleans. The examination of the crew of this vessel brought out the fact that in addition to this, two other colonial sloops, one from Rhode Island, the other from Jamaica, traded regularly at New Orleans. Bernard to Pitt, May 5, 1761. Am. and W.L 73; B. T. Mass. 78 LI 14 and 19. * On May 29, 1760, Bull wrote to the Board of Trade that the French were enabled to take advantage of the rupture with the Cherokees by the plenty of Indian goods with which they had been supplied by the Northern colo- nies, especially by the Rhode Island traders, who, being interrupted in their Digitized by Microsoft® 104 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 ernor of that colony, it was the Indian goods thus ac- quired that enabled the French to keep their promises to the Indians, which, in turn, tended to encourage the Cherokees to keep up their war with the English and almost brought the Creeks to an open rupture.^ The military and naval commanders were naturally in- dignant at a trade which they considered "traiterous," and which interfered with the success of their operations. Toward the end of 1759 General Crump wrote to Pitt that the French islands subsisted entirely by this trade and by the prizes which they took, and that, during the last eight months, not a single vessel had arrived from Europe with pro- visions for them. If these practices were stopped, he added, it would facilitate any military designs on the colonies of the enemy.^ Admiral Cotes called the trade iniquitous,^ and Commodore Moore stigmatized those engaged in it as "Traitors to their Country." * It was claimed by those in the best position to judge of such matters, that this trade enabled the French to equip privateers, which inflicted much suffering, and that it prevented the capture of the French West Indies.^ traffic at Monte Cristi, "have found out a new, and more pernicious Channel for the Industry, by carrying Goods proper for Indians to Pensacola, or other parts, where the French at Louisiana can get them." B. T. So.Ca. 20 M 7. ' Bull to Pitt, Feb. 18, 1761. Am. and W.I. 73. With a view to obviating this result, Bull induced South Carolina to pass a temporary law regulating the exportation of goods needed for the Indian trade. ' Byam Crump, Guadeloupe, Dec. 26, 1759, to Pitt. Am. and W.I. 100. ' B. T. Plant. Gen. 16 P 20. * Moore to Pitt, October, 1759. Am. and W.I. 100. ' B. T. Jam. 34 Z 43. Henry Moore, March 28, 1759. Digitized by Microsoft® COLONIAL TRADE WITH THE ENEMY 105 Full reports were forwarded to Pitt, who characteristi- cally expressed his sentiments in no uncertain terms. On August 23, 1760,^ he addressed a circular despatch to the colonial governors, stating that he had received repeated and certain information "of an illegal and most perni- cious Trade, carried on by the King's Subjects, in North America, and the West Indies, as well to the French Islands, as to the French Settlements" on the continent of America, by means of which the enemy is supplied with provisions and other necessaries, in consequence of which France is "principally, if not alone, enabled to sustain, and protract, this long and expensive War." Pitt instructed the governors to make strict inquiries into "the State of this dangerous and ignominious Trade," to bring "all such heinous Offenders ... to the most exemplary and condign Punishment," and in general to put a stop to "such flagi- tious Practices." Pitt was unquestionably indignant, and this feeling was intensified by the fact that, as a result of the victories of Hawke and Boscawen, French sea power had been utterly shattered. The French West Indies were absolutely helpless, and relief from France was impossible. Guadeloupe had already fallen into English hands, and Martinique, Dominica, and the other "neutral islands" would inevitably fall when wanted, unless aided directly or indirectly by the English colonies. (The chief instrument used to break up this trade with the 'Am. and W.I. 78. On Nov. i, 1760, Governor Hamilton of Pennsyl- vania wrote to Pitt that trading with the enemy must "from the very nature of War, be a very high offence." Am. and W.I. 72. Digitized by Microsoft® I06 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 fenemy was the royal navy.* Frequent seizures virtually put an end to the fraudulent flag of truce trade ^ and to the direct trade with the enemy.^ The indirect intercourse by means of the Dutch colonies was also checked by the con- demnation of the Dutch vessels engaged in trading with the French colonies. This indirect trade was then diverted to Monte Cristi. As this was a Spanish port, some legal diffi- culties were encountered in seizing vessels trading there. It was practically impossible to condemn colonial vessels carry- ing provisions to a foreign port in violation of the act of 1757, because their papers were always in order and indi- cated as their destination some British port. Nor, according to a strict interpretation of the "Rule of 1756," could colonial vessels trading at a neutral port, such as Monte Cristi, be condemned. At the outset, in 1759, the navy proceeded to seize ships engaged in the Monte Cristi trade, but was deterred in this activity by the legal difficulties encountered in procuring their condemnation.* The Admiralty Court in England ' In 1757, Sir Charles Hardy, who was both governor of New York and a Rear- Admiral, advised the emploj^nent of cruisers to "intercept any Smug- gling Trade that might attempt going to the Neutral Islands" with provisions. Hardy to Pitt, April 10, 1757. Am. and W.I. 71. At that time he seized a Salem vessel returning from St. Eustatius, and took it to Halifax where it was condemned in the Admiralty Court. B. T. N.Y. 34 Mm 13. ^ B. T. Va. 26 X 41 ; Second Memorial enclosed in Holmes to Pitt, Jan. 4, 1 761. Col. Corr. Jam. II. ' Hamilton to Pitt, Nov. i, 1760. Am. and W.I. 72. Sharpe to Pitt, Feb. 27, 1761. Ibid. 73. First Memorial enclosed in Holmes to Pitt, Jan. 4, 1 761. CoLCorr.Jam.il. Bernard to Pitt, Nov. 8, 1760. Am. and W.I. 72. * B. T. Plant. Gen. 16 P 20; B. T. Jam. 34 Z 59 and 60. Digitized by Microsoft® COLONIAL TRADE WITH THE ENEMY 1 07 held that "British Subjects have no Undoubted right of Trading at Monte Christi, provided they carry on their Trade Bond Fide with the Spaniards only." ^ The Judge of the Vice-Admiralty court of Jamaica contended, how- ever, that the trade was not bona fide, that the Spaniards produced no sugar, molasses or rum; that the trade was virtually a direct one with the French ; and that it certainly violated the spirit of the law.^ The naval authorities sup- ported this view. On January 4, 1761, Rear- Admiral Charles Holmes,^ the commander at the Jamaica station, wrote to Pitt, that on his arrival he had instructed the ships of his squadron to break up this trade, as well as that carried on by flags of truce, but that he now found that many doubts had arisen in England concerning the legality of seizing and condemning the ships coming from Monte Cristi. "Shall others," he asked Pitt, "the subjects of Great Britain, concerned in this Trade, and Swearing with Halters about their Necks, if they bear witness to the Truth and Declare, that they keep Correspondence with the Enemy and not only Nourish and Support his Subjects in their Wants, but cover and carry on their Trade in a most prosperous and Successful Manner; Compeat with, or be opposed and Overthrow, the Certain Knowledge of His Majesty's Squad- ron, that there is Neither Port nor Commerce belonging to Spain, at Monte Christi, that the Commerce is wholly French ; and that the Spaniards are only the Porters of this Trade, not into a Port, but into an open Bay and bare Road- ' Edward Long, Dec. 3, 1760. Col. Corr. Jam. 11. ^ ' 'Ibid. ' Col. Corr. Jam. II. Digitized by Microsoft® I08 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 Stead?" Holmes added that he would obey whatever in- structions he might receive, but he pointed out that "the Enemy Cannot be hurt here, if the Trade of Monte Christi, under any Colour or pretext whatever, be sustained as Legal ' ' ; that this trade was even worse than the flag of truce trade, for if British subjects were, by other means, forced to aban- don it, the Dutch would take it up. He therefore hoped that his action in seizing the enemy's produce, wherever he could lay hold of it, would be approved. These argu- ments lead to the extension of the "Rule of 1756" to the Monte Cristi trade.* The West Indian Vice-Admiralty courts proceeded to condemn these vessels, and ultimately their action was up- held in England. The question of the legitimacy of such seizures once settled, great zeal was displayed in breaking up the trade. Toward the end of 1760, the governor of New Jersey informed Pitt that the activity of the cruisers in the West Indies and "the Kind of Civil War that has been waged by Privateers on these Traders belong- ing to different Provinces" had made this intercourse so hazardous that it cannot be pursued "so universally or suc- cessfully as formerly." ^ Early in 1761, Admiral Holmes was able to inform Pitt that he had broken up this trade.' '•i^' Robinson (Am. ed.) II, pp. 121, 122. ' 7 ^h ^ 'Boone to Pitt, Oct 23, 1760. Am. and W.L 72. Cf. Golden to Pitt, N. Y., Oct 27, 1760, to effect that the navy had stopped this trade. Ibid.; Wentworth to Pitt, Dec. 9, 1760. Ibid.; Hopkins to Pitt, Dec. 20, 1760. Ibid. ' Col. Corr. Jam. II. Not dated but marked received May 13, 1761. Holmes added that an attempt was then made to carry French produce to mar- ket in Spanish ships from Spanish Hispaniola. The action of Holmes in seizing these Spanish vessels within gunshot of their ports was not approved Digitized by Microsoft® COLONIAL TRADE WITH THE ENEMY 109 His report was, however, too sanguine if taken literally. The navy seriously interfered with this trade and greatly di- minished it, but at no time succeeded in entirely eradicating it. Many and tortuous were the methods employed to escape the vigilance of the men-of-war. Thus in 1761 vessels from Jamaica and the continental colonies used Spanish crews and sailed under the Spanish flag from Santo Domingo with French produce.* The navy was able to fathom this sub- terfuge,^ but there were apparently other devices, which taken in connection with the fact that the navy was not ubiquitous, account for the continuance of this trade, though on a greatly diminished scale. At no subsequent time did it attain the large proportions that it had in 1759 and 1760. In 1762, after Spain had joined forces with France, there was, however, a revival on so extensive a scale, that even the normally imperturbable Commander-in-Chief was roused to indignation. On May 10, 1762, Amherst wrote to the Earl of Egremont, that he had lately discovered a most iniquitous trade, by by the British government, whose chief aim, after Pitt's resignation in 1761, was to keep peace with Spain. Cal. Home Office Papers, 1760-1765, nos. 397, 401. On March 29, 1760, Shirley wrote to the Board of Trade that recently the Vice-Admiralty Court of New Providence had condemned the cargoes of eight Spanish vessels belonging to Monte Cristi. These vessels had been captured by a privateer from the Bahamas, and were laden with French sugars and molasses. Am. and W.I. 454. 'Holmes to Pitt, June 16, 1 761. Col. Corr. Jam. IL See also Cal. Home Office Papers, 1 760-1 765, pp. 60, 61, for some further details about the trade between the French and Spanish in Santo Domingo. 'The attack of Holmes on this trade led to considerable ill-feeling in Jamaica. See complaint against Holmes, Oct. i, 1761. Col. Corr. Jam. II; and Holmes to Pitt, Oct. 27, 1761. Ibid. III. Cf. passim this volume. Digitized by Microsoft® no BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 means of which the enemy was supplied with provisions and stores from many ports on the continent of America, the colonial vessels sailing directly to the French colonies ; and that he had written to the governors and customs officials to put a stop "to this pernicious and destructive Trade." ' In his circular letter to the colonial governors,'' Amherst stated that he had unquestionable proof that the enemy was being supplied with provisions from almost every port in the con- tinental colonies, and that it was absolutely necessary to stop the trade as the army needed these supplies. In his letters to the Surveyors-General of the Customs,^ Amherst showed that colonial vessels, which had cleared for British ports and had instead gone to the enemy's colonies, were yet able to procure landing certificates from the alleged British portJDf destination. Such certificates, he pointed out, could be obtained only by the dishonest connivance of the custom- house officials. He enclosed a list of such vessels that had gone directly to the enemy's ports, though clearing for Con- necticut, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina. To the colonies most implicated, Amherst wrote separately and in great detail. To Colden,* the lieutenant-governor of New York, he sent complete evidence of the colony's ' Am. and W.L 97. ' Dated April 15, 1 762. The governors of Nova Scotia and of Georgia were not included. Am. and W.I. 97. To put "a stop to such infamous practices, particularly at a time when there is the greatest demand for provisions to supply the King's troops." Col. Rec. of R.I. VI, pp. 311, 312. ' To Peter Randolph, Southern district, and John Temple, Northern dis- trict, dated April 24, 1762. Am. and W.I. 97. * Amherst to Colden, April 16, and May 6, 1762. Ibid. Digitized by Microsoft® COLONIAL TRADE WITH THE ENEMY III participation in this trade, such as : a French passport found on board a New York vessel, allowing it to trade in French ports ; an invoice of sugar shipped on a New York vessel in French Hispaniola, with an account of the cargo sold there by this ship. Among the number of instances mentioned by Am- herst, one deserves citation. A New York vessel met a French ship that concealed its nationality by hoisting the British colors. Thereupon the colonial captain hid his French pass. On the New York vessel being seized, the true nationality of the capturing vessel was made evident, and the hidden passport was produced.* It is not surprising that Amherst wrote that "such Infamous practices at any time ought to be suppressed," but especially then, when Great Britain was at war with Spain as well as with France, and when "there is the greatest Reason imaginable, to think that without Supplys from this Continent the Enemy could not Subsist their Fleets in the West Indies." Colden fully admitted the truth of these charges, and said that the New York traders "consider nothing but their private profit," and that he would try to punish those engaged in this "most pernicious trade."'' * Amherst's letter of April i6, 1762, shows that families like the Livingstons and the De Peysters were engaged in this trade. This trade even extended to French Guiana. On Nov. 3, 1762, William Popple, Governor of the Ber- mudas, wrote to the Lords of the Admiralty regarding a New York vessel that had been seized for trading at Cayenne. Her outward cargo from New York was lumber, provisions, and horses, and the return cargo was cocoa. According to the custom-house papers from New York, her destination should have been Barbados. Adm. Sec. In -Letters 3819. » B. T. N.Y. 36 Oo 67: Colden to B. T., May 11, 1762. Digitized by Microsoft® 112 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 Connecticut and Rhode Island also called forth Amherst's indignation. On May 5, 1762, he wrote to Fitch, the gov- ernor of the former colony, complaining that this trade was still continued in Connecticut, and that vessels daily left the colony with provisions destined for the enemy. ^ Rhode Island also was actively engaged in this commerce, which centred in Newport.* In this entire correspondence, Amherst emphasized two points : first, that the trade helped the enemy ; second, that it interfered with military operations by depriving the army of the necessary provisions. Despite the fact that the colonies produced a large surplus of food-stuffs, the troops had in part to be supplied from Europe.' This was to a * Am. and W.I. 97. ' Amherst to Hopkins, May 7, 1762. Am. and W.I. 97, and Col. Rec. of R.I. VI, pp. 317, 318. For the seizure of a Rhode Island schooner, which had gone to Hispaniola with a cargo of flour, see Peter Blake to Egremont, Charleston, Nov. 27, 1762. Am. and W.I. 223. . ' Even under normal conditions, it is probable that some provisions for the army would have been sent from Ireland. See Pitt Correspondence II, pp. 79, 109, 110. Cf. also Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 35909 (Hardwicke Papers DLXI). In the opening years of the war, wheat was sent to England from the colonies, while in the closing years the movement was reversed. Among the imports of wheat and flour into England in the year from Michaelmas, 1756, to the same date 1757 are the following items: from New York, 7 quarters; from Pennsylvania, 1988 quarters; from Virginia and Maryland, 4827 quarters. For the subsequent year the corresponding figures are 688, 1275, and 2855. Among the exports of wheat from England in 1762 are the following items: — To the West Indian colonies 7435 quarters To Quebec 6602 quarters To Newfoundland 720 quarters To New York 1557 quarters Treas. Ace. Rev. Misc. (England), Bundle 80. Digitized by Microsoft® COLONIAL TRADE WITH THE ENEMY II3 great extent due to the trade in question, which enhanced to an abnormal degree the cost of provisions in the colonies. In consequence of the ensuing scarcity, the Commander-in-Chief at this time was forced to order an embargo laid in the Mid- dle and Northern colonies.* "I see no other way," he wrote, "of preventing those whose Sole Views seem to be to get Money without the least regard for the good of their Country from accomplishing their Designs." * Amherst took this step most reluctantly, as it punished both the innocent and the guilty ; ^ consequently on receipt of advices that a quantity of provisions for the army was coming from England, he allowed the embargo to be raised, at the same time express- ing the hope that no more attempts would be made to supply the enemy.* For his activity in breaking up this trade, Amherst was duly praised by the government.* ' B. T. N.Y. 36 Oo 67. Amherst, May 5, 1762, to Fitch; May 7, 1762, to Hamilton; same date to Hopkins; etc. Am. and W.I. 97. 'Amherst to Governor Hamilton of Pennsylvania, May 7, 1762. Ibid. ' Governor Bernard of Massachusetts complained that the embargo entailed some suffering in that colony, as fish could not be sent to the British West Indies, nor provisions to Quebec and Nova Scotia. On May 6, 1762, Amherst in reply wrote to Bernard, that this illegal trade had been carried on in a most systematic and wholesale manner, and that its suppression was a matter of the highest importance. He would allow Bernard to relax the embargo as far as Nova Scotia was concerned provided that satisfactory bonds were given. Ibid. 'Amherst, June 13, 1762, to governors of Rhode Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Massachusetts. Ibid. ' On July 10, 1762, Egremont wrote to him, that "the indefatigable Pains You have taken to discover & trace out all the Arts used to cover the most scandalous illicit Trade, carried on with the Enemy, have justly met" with high approbation. Am. and W.I. 77. Digitized by Microsoft® CHAPTER VII MEANS ADOPTED TO CHECK THIS INTERCOURSE WITH THE ENEMY The chief instrument used to put a stop to this intercourse with the enemy was the royal navy. There was, however, at hand another effective weapon. It has already been pointed out, that in 1733 Parliament had imposed virtually prohibi- tive duties on foreign rum, sugar, and molasses imported into the British colonies. This law, generally known as the Molasses Act, had never been enforced,^ but as these com- modities, predominantly the two last, constituted the chief returns from the enemy, it was obvious that the duties thereon could be used as a potent check on this trade. Thus, William Bull, the popular lieutenant-governor of South Carolina, a colonial by birth and education, wrote to Pitt: "I humbly offer it as my Opinion that, until some new Laws are made by the Wisdom of our Mother Country to remedy this Evil, If the Duties upon Foreign Spirits, panels (sugar) and Molasses by 6 G II were rigorously exacted by the Officers of His Majesty's Customs, and the Clandestine Landing of them discouraged," the effect would be to stop this intercourse ' The fact that this law was virtually a dead letter was brought out clearly at the detailed hearing before the Board of Trade in 1750-1751. B. T. Journals, 58, Oct. 18, Nov. 13, 20; Dec. 6, 7, 10, in 1750. Ibid. 59, pp. 6, 22, 57. Also in Am. and W.I. 687. 114 Digitized by Microsoft® MEANS ADOPTED TO CHECK THIS INTERCOURSE 115 with the French.* This conclusion was also reached by others,^ and consequently during the war, the Molasses-\ ^^Act was enforced to an extent unknown theretofore. '^ The more effectual enforcement of the Molasses Act can be seen best in the returns of the revenue derived therefrom. The aggregate amount of duties paid on molasses in the years from 1734 to 1764 was ;^i3,702, of which only ;£s686 was collected in the twenty-two years from 1734 to 1755; that is, at the average rate of ;^259. In the seven years ' Feb. 18, 1 761. Am. and W.I. 73. Bull pointed out that a large quantity of molasses was smuggled into the Northern colonies, and that this fact would become apparent if the official importations of molasses were compared with the exportations of rum from those colonies. In view of the generally current thesis that the laws of trade were the underlying cause of the American Revolu- tion, the recommendation is interesting as coming from this source. The Molasses Act, while not an integral part of the old colonial system, was probably the only trade law whose enforcement at this time would have seriously inter- fered with the economic prosperity of the continental colonies. The historian of South Carolina, McCrady, accepts the statement in Joseph Johnson's Tra- ditions and Reminiscences, that had Bull been invested with supreme power as governor, there might have been no revolution in that colony. Thus we reach the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that the cause of a movement was the enforcement of a law, while the bestowal of further honors on the man recommending this action might have averted the movement in South Carolina. McCrady, South Carolina under the Royal Government, pp. 345, 795, 796. ' On Dec. 28, 1760, Henry Moore, the lieutenant-governor of Jamaica, wrote to the secretary of state enclosing a letter that he had received from James DeLancey, the lieutenant-governor of New York. DeLancey wrote that he had consulted with Kennedy, the New York collector of the customs, as to the Monte Cristi trade. Kennedy said that he could not legally refuse to g^ve clearances for that port, though it was known that the Spanish grew no sugar there, and that the trade there was directly with the French; but that he would try to stop this trade, and with such end in view "he would make them pay the duties imposed by Law on foreign Sugars." Col. Corr. Jam. II. Digitized by Microsoft® Il6 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 1756 to 1762, £4375 was collected, the average being ;^625. In 1760 and 1761, when especial efforts were made to stop the trade with the enemy, the respective amounts were ;^ii7o and ;^ii89.^ This partial enforcement of the Molasses Act led to ' An account of the duties collected on Molasses under 6 Geo. II: — 1756 £235 I4J- od. 1 761 £1189 i6s. od. 1757 95 1762 717 18 1758 519 8 1763 1541 S 6 1759 1760 446 16 6 6 1764 2100 2 1 1 70 2 Total £8016 25. 6d. Treas. Ace. Rev. Misc. (England), Bundle 80. The same results can be obtained from an examination of the revenue from all the duties under this act. The total payments for the sixteen years from 1733 to 1749 were £13,219, of which £4013 was collected in the Bahamas and the Bermudas, and the bal- ance in the continental colonies. Only £1166 of this total amount was col- lected in the five years preceding the war of 1739. During the war, 1739 to 1748, the amount rose rapidly for the same reasons as in the following war. The average yearly amount collected for the entire period was £826. Am. and W.I. 687. Appendices 4 and 5 to hearing of 1 750-1 751. No accounts of the exact amount collected in the following years are avail- able. The treasury books, however, give the net and gross produce of all branches of the revenue under the management of the Commissioners of the Customs. The payments into the exchequer on account of the act of 1733 indicate clearly the great increase in revenue from this source during the war 1758 £10,742 1759 2729 1760 6298 1761 1452 1762 £ 430 1763 3979 1764 4169 Treas. Ace. Rev. Misc. (England), 50 and 59. These amounts are all net payments into the exchequer, and do not corre- spond with either the gross amounts or the dates of the actual collection. It should also be noted that in these accounts there appears no item on account of the Molasses Act, prior to 1 758, indicating either that the customs officials in the colonies had not fully accounted for the amounts collected, or that the Digitized by Microsoft® MEANS ADOPTED TO CHECK THIS INTERCOURSE 1 17 considerable friction, especially in New York and Massa- chusetts. The West Indian trade was mainly carried on in small sloops, which brought the French products to the British continental colonies. There they were in part con- sumed, but in the case of sugar the bulk was again reex- ported in larger vessels better adapted to the European voyage. In New York, the officers of the customs adhered strictly to the letter of the law, and insisted on the payment of the duties on the sugars thus trans-shipped. Their object in so doing was to break up the trade with the enemy, but as the officials in the neighboring colonies pursued a dif- ferent course, some ill-feeling resulted.* Massachusetts was not seriously implicated in the direct trade with the enemy,^ but was deeply interested in the Monte Cristi trade.* Large quantities of French West Indian products were imported into Massachusetts, where the customs officials tried to collect the duties imposed by the act of 1733.* In the neighboring charter colonies, revenue was used for their salaries. It would seem, however, that in 1758 a considerable portion, if not the whole, of such arrears was remitted to England, as the amount paid into the exchequer in that year is disproportionately large. See also Brit. Mus. Addit. MSS. 33030 (Newcastle Papers CCCXLV, p. 15). ' Golden to Pitt. Dec. 27, 1760, and enclosures, George Spencer to Am- herst, Nov. 29, 1760; Augustus Bradley to Amherst, Dec. s, 1760; Report of Council of New York, Dec. 24, 1760. Am. and W.I. 73. See also Will- iam Smith's History of New York (ed. 1829), II, pp. 286, 287. 'Bernard to Pitt, Nov. 8, 1760, and May 5, 1761. Am. and W.I. 71 and 72. ' B. T. Mass. 78 LI 67, 68. *West Indian products imported into Massachusetts: (B. T. Mass. 78 LI 56. This account. was prepared for Governor Bernard by the provincial revenue officer, who, however, did not distinguish between British and foreign Digitized by Microsoft® liS BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, I7S4-176S Connecticut and Rhode Island, the custom-house officials had but little authority, and did virtually nothing to enforce ,the law. In especial, the profitable trade carried on with the enemy by Rhode Island produced ill-feeling and jealousy in Massachusetts, and in 1761 led to the attempt to declare "writs of assistance" illegal, and to the attacks on the Vice- Admiralty Court by means of the common law courts. This was an organized movement on the part of some Boston merchants to engage in this trade as freely as did their fellows in the neighboring colony.* One of the men sup- porting these suits told Governor Bernard that they would keep up the agitation until the Ministry was forced to change or to repeal the Molasses Act, and until Rhode Island and Connecticut were placed under the same restraints as was Massachusetts.^ products. It is to be presumed that a good part was foreign in origin. See Ibid. 78 LI 38 and 55.) YlEAK Rcu Sugar Molasses Hogsheads Tierces Barrels Hogsheads Tierces Barrels Hogsheads Tierces Barrels r.TSS ■ ! 1030 19 @ 428 329 "54 8505 197 59 T7S6 .| 1056 42 10 617 146 613 9708 199 102 T7S7 • 1965 39 18 897 389 500 9273 119 10 1758 . 670 52 S6 554 317 346 6172 85 93 r7S9 • II43 33 89 1075 281 302 6633 249 12 1760 . 1035 29 33 983 114 201 7614 127 96 1761 . 2187 49 16 1329 I2IO 268 9918 266 32 1762 . 1242 49 45 2298 207 28s 11,062 488 59 ' Bernard to Halifax, Oct. 25 and Dec. 24, 1763. Am. and W.I. 167. ' B. T. Mass. 78 LI 21. Bernard wrote: "In regard to both these points, if they were soUicited in another Manner, there would be much to be said on Digitized by Microsoft® MEANS ADOPTED TO CHECK THIS INTERCOURSE I ig In this attempt there were instituted frequent actions at common law concerning business determined in the Vice-Admiralty Court, and by the custom-house oflEicials. In 1 76 1, when Bernard sent this information to the Board of Trade, there were five suits of this nature before the courts.* Three of these actions were instituted by Barons, the collector at Boston, who had been sus- pended by the Surveyor-General of the Customs. Obviously /the entire imperial administrative system was threat- ened, if the provincial courts, in which the juries were ex-, tremely prejudiced, admitted actions for damages brought by a dismissed official against his superior.^ These three' actions, however, were ultimately not brought to trial.' Another case arose from the fact that the Molasses Act provided that the Crown's share of all forfeitures under this statute should go to the colony in which the seizure was con- demned. The expenses of these trials were very heavy, and in a number of instances they were charged by the Vice-Admiralty Court on the colony's share, because if charged on those of the governor and of the customs officials, their behalf." According to Bernard, this agitation was confined to Boston, the Assembly as a whole not approving of it. ' Ibid. ' Barons had Lechmeie, the Surveyor-General of the Northern district, ar- rested in an action for £7500 damages, and the court held Lechriiere on bail. Ibid, and LI 22. Barons also sued Cradock, who had been appointed to the former's position during his suspension, pending the decision of the Com- missioners of the Customs. Ibid, and LI 23. He likewise brought an action against another customs ofiScial, Paxton, whose complaints to Lechmere had led to his suspension. Ibid, and LI 24. ' Quincy, op. cit. p. 425. Digitized by Microsoft® I20 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 SO little would remain to them, that there would be but slight encouragement to make seizures. Massachusetts sued in the provincial courts for the recovery of these charges, but was unsuccessful.' Of these cases, the most important was that of Erwing^ vs. Cradock. The latter, one of the custom- house officials, had seized a vessel belonging to Erwing on the ground of contraband trade. Erwing admitted the truth of the charge, and prayed for leave to compound, that is, for the release of the seizure on payment of one-half of its . value. The Vice- Admiralty Court assented to his petition, 1 and, on payment of ;^5oo, Erwing secured his vessel. He/ then brought suit against Cradock in the common law courts,\ and was awarded nearly ;£6oo damages. An appeal was j naturally taken from this verdict. If upheld, Bernard wrote to the Board of Trade: "It will be concluded that whatever / Sum a Man pays into the Court of Admiralty, tho' decreed ' Bernard pointed out that if this suit were successful, it followed that money paid in pursuance of a decree of the Admiralty Court, from which no appeal had been taken, could be recovered in a court of common law by per- sons not parties to the suit. B. T. Mass. 78 LI 21. There were two suits, of this nature, Gray vs. Paxton, and Province of Massachusetts vs. Paxton. Bernard referred to the former. In both cases, the Superior Court of Massa- chusetts, on appeal, reversed the decision of the inferior court in favor of the plaintiff. Quincy, op. cit. pp. 541 to 552. At the same time, a similar suit was pending in Rhode Island, where one of the common law judges issued a writ of prohibition against a decree of the Admiralty Court. John Andrews, the Vice-Admiralty Judge in that colony, declared that, as a result of this in- terference, "all proceedings of said vice admiralty court, not only in this, but in all other causes, have been stopped, although there are now causes of great consequence pending before said vice admiralty court, unfinished." Col. Rec. of R.I. VL p. 371. ' Or Erving. He was closely related by marriage to Shirley. Nova Scotia Arch. (Halifax, 1869), p. 399. Digitized by Microsoft® MEANS ADOPTED TO CHECK THIS INTERCOURSE 121 in pursuance of his own petition, may be recovered again at common Law with damages. The Consequences of this in regard to the Execution of the Laws of Trade are obvious." If Erwing were successful, Bernard added, a large number of similar actions would be brought, and their general effect would be to destroy the Vice-Admiralty Court.' On appeal, this case came before the Massachu- setts Superior Court. In summing up, the judges were all of the opinion that while Cradock, by means of some irregularity, might have been guilty of trespass, yet it was wholly purged by the composition confirmed by the Court of Admiralty, "the decrees of which were of equal force with a Judgement at Common Law. It was urged by the Chief Justice that the Court of Admiralty was part of the Constitution of the Province, it being expressly provided for by the Charter." Consequently, the jury was strongly charged by the court to find for the defendant, yet they brought in a verdict of over ;^55o for Erwing.^ As Bernard said in this connection, a custom-house official had no chance with a jury. From this judgment an appeal was taken to England; before it was decided, however, the matter was settled in the colony itself in a manner upholding the au- thority of the Vice-Admiralty Court.* • B. T. Mass. 78 LI 21. * Ibid. LI 25. £740 Massachusetts currency, which was equal to about £555 sterling. Quincy, op. cit. pp. SS3-5S6- ' Bernard advised the British government to assume the expense of these suits. B. T. Mass. 78 LI 21. This was done in the case of this appeal. Ihid. LI. 67 and Quincy, op. cit. p. S57- On March 25, 1762, Erwing acknowl- edged on the record of the Superior Court that he had received "full satis- Digitized by Microsoft® 122 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 Closely connected with this attack on the Vice-Admiralty Court/ and proceeding from similar motives, was the at- , tempt made at the same time to have "writs of assistance" (declared illegal. These writs were used by the officers of the customs chiefly to prevent the illegal importation of French products, the returns of the intercourse with the enemy. The English statutes regarding frauds in the customs gave the revenue officers extensive powers of search,^ which were subsequently extended to the officers in the colonies.' On the strength of their commissions, these officers were ac- customed to enter, by force if necessary, warehouses and other places on information that contraband goods were concealed therein.* Massachusetts was also accustomed to grant similar extensive powers of search to the provincial revenue officers.^ Some opposition to this broad right of search developed, for the system was unquestionably open to legitimate criticism. Accordingly, in 1756, Massachusetts limited the powers of the provincial officers.' On the other faction of this Judgment." Ibid. pp. 553-556. It appears, however, from Bernard's letter to Lord Barrington, Feb. 27, 1762, that Erwing discharged this judgment to prevent his answering the appeal, so that, as Bernard wrote, "the King's authority is now triumphant in every instance." Ibid. p. 557. ' The same people supported this movement and the action Gray vs. Paxton. Quincy, op. cit. pp. 541-547. ' 12 Ch. II, c. 19; 13 and 14 Ch. II, c. 11 § v; 1 Anne stat. i, c. 13 § ii; 9 Anne c. 6, § ii; 3 Geo. I, c. 7. ' 7 and 8 Will. Ill, c. 22 § vi. * Hutchinson, Mass. Ill, p. 92. ' Such officers were empowered to search in all suspected places for goods on which the Massachusetts duties had not been paid. B. T. Mass. 73 Gg 37. See Mass. Acts and Resolves, III, pp. 471, 522, 581, 622, 701, 762, 845. " Application had to be made to a justice of the peace for a special search warrant. Ibid. Ill, p. 1006. For subsequent years, see IV, pp. 186, 303, 411. Digitized by Microsoft® MEANS ADOPTED TO CHECK THIS INTERCOURSE 123 hand, the British customs officials began, at about the same time, to apply to the governor for general warrants further to strengthen the authority derived from their com- missions. These warrants were technically known as "writs of assistance," and had not been used in the colonies prior to this/ Shirley used such warrants in 1755 to prevent the exportation of provisions to the French in Cape Breton and Canada.^ They were subsequently during the war, and to a great extent as a war-measure, issued quite frequently by the Superior Court of Massachusetts.^ In 1761 the legality of these writs was questioned, but the justices of this court "were unanimously of Opinion that this Writ might be granted." * The serious friction between the British custom-house officials in the colony and Massachusetts dates from this period, and was a direct result of the stricter enforcement of the Molasses Act with the object of checking the trade with the enemy. This trade of the colonies called attention to illegal trade in general, with which it was intimately associated. Thus, in his circular despatch of August 23, 1760, Pitt wrote that it further appears that large sums of money are sent to the enemy, in return for which commodities are taken that interfere with "the Produce of the British Colonies themselves, in open Contempt of the Authority of the Mother Country, as well as to the most manifest Prejudice of the Manufactures and trade of Great Britain." * The • Quincy, op. cit. pp. 51, 52. ' Ihid. pp. 401-406. ' Ihid. p. 401. ' Paxton's Case. Ibid. p. 57. 'Am. and W.I. 78. Digitized by Microsoft® 124 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 instructions to break up this trade led necessarily to a stricter enforcement of the entire commercial system.' There was a tendency to bulk together in one category all violations of these laws, and to include therein those pertaining to trading with the enemy.^ The chief evasions were connected with the Molasses Act ; but in addition it became apparent that the trade with the enemy was also to some extent connected with the direct importation of European goods from foreign countries. During the war, colonial ships frequently carried French colonial products to European markets, whence there was some temptation to import prohibited goods.^ One of the Massachusetts law-suits in 1761 arose directly from a violation of the act making Great Britain the colonial staple for European goods.* Information was also received that this law was not strictly obeyed in other colonies, especially in New York.^ It naturally followed that the method found ' C/. B. T. So. Ca. 20 M 103. ' See Governor Dalrymple to Pitt, July 15, 1761, in answer to the circular despatch of August 23, 1760, with details of illegal trade between Guadeloupe and Martinique. Am. and W.I. 100. C/. also same to Egremont, Feb. 16, 1762. Ibid. loi. On Nov. 9, 1758, and Jan. 17, 1759, the Board of Trade considered the entire subject of illegal trade in the colonies, and prepared a letter to the customs board on this subject. B. T. Journals 66, 67. " Cf. N. J. Col. Doc. IX, pp. 300-302. * Erwing vs. Craddock. Quincy, op. cit. p. 554. The statute that was violated was 15 Ch. II, c. 7. "In 1757 such a complaint was lodged with the Board of Trade. B. T. Journals, April 27, 1757. The information was contained in a letter from Ireland to the Earl of Halifax, and was to the effect that in Philadelphia "there was a very Considerable Import & Export of Goods to & from Europe & all other European Settlements in America." The informant gave spe- cific details about two vessels owned in Ireland, which were accustomed to sail to France where they took in cargoes of sugar, and of French and East Digitized by Microsoft® MEANS ADOPTED TO CHECK THIS INTERCOURSE 125 successful in checking one branch of this trade would be used to cope with the other as well. The comparative success of the navy in preventing trade with the enemy naturally suggested the use of the same instrument to check smuggling in general. After the peace of 1763 this became a marked feature of the administrative reforms inaugurated at that time. But as early as 1757 DeLancey suggested the em- ployment of ships to prevent the direct importation of foreign European and Asiatic products into New York/ and in the following year a vessel engaged in this illegal trade was seized by a ship of the royal navy.^ Thus the intercourse with the enemy directed the attention of the British government to the broader subject of illegal trade in general, and led to a stricter enforcement of the laws of trade, especially of the Molasses Act, which was the statute chiefly violated. The experience gained in breaking up this trade also suggested the use of the navy as a normal instrument in the administration of the commercial system. At the same time it revealed radical defects in the adminis- trative methods. As has already been pointed out, this trade Indian goods for Philadelphia. The sugar, which was evidently the main cargo, was repacked after being smuggled into the colony, and was then reshipped to England as British sugar. B. T. Com. Series I, 45 Ff 44. In the same year, Sir Charles Hardy informed the Board of Trade that tea, can- vas, gunpowder, as well as other articles were imported in New York directly from Holland. On his breaking up this trade, it was carried on via Connec- ' ticut. B. T. N.Y. 34 Mm 13. Similar information came from DeLancey in this and in the following year. Ibid. 34 Mm 14, 40. ^■ ' B. T. N.Y. 34 Mm 14. : ' ; -■ ' -'-''-i ' Ibid. 42. The officers of the customs agreed to give up their share of the seizure. Digitized by Microsoft® 126 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 was to some extent carried on with the connivance of British officials, who provided fraudulent papers for the colonial vessels. At the same time these officials were deterred from doing their duty by the damage suits instituted against them in hostile courts. The necessity of a reform of the customs service in the colonies was thus made patent. Similarly, defects were revealed in the system of vice-admiralty courts. Some of these courts were strongly influenced by local feeling and refused to condemn vessels for trading with the enemy. Thus the Vice-Admiralty Court in South Caro- lina, it was said in 1762, would not condemn a vessel for trading with the enemy, though the evidence was clear on the point at issue.^ Furthermore it was claimed that both the common law and admiralty courts at New York were prejudiced in favor of this trade.^ The Vice-Admiralty Court at New York, on a pure technicality, dismissed a suit arising out of a violation of the act of 1757, claiming that it had no jurisdiction.^ In addition James Hamilton, the gov- ernor of Pennsylvania, reported to Pitt in 1760 * that the most eminent lawyers in his government were retained in favor ' Peter Blake to Egremont, Charleston, Nov. 27, 1762. Am. and W.I. 223. William Bull wrote to Pitt, Feb. 18, 1761, that the courts would not condemn vessels coming from Spanish ports with French produce. Am. and W.I. 73. ' George Spencer to Amherst, Nov. 29, 1760. Am. and W.I. 73 and 95. 'George Spencer to Amherst, Dec. 17, 1760. Am. and W.I. 95. The act o^ i7S7j 3° Geo. II, c. 9, says that the penalties shall be recovered "in the high court of admiralty, or any chief court of civil or criminal juridisction, in such respective colonies or plantations." The judge dismissed the case on the ground that the New York court was one of vice-admiralty and not a high court of admiralty. * Nov. 1, 1760. Am. and W.I. 72. Digitized by Microsoft® MEANS ADOPTED TO CHECK THIS INTERCOURSE 127 of this "unjustifiable Commerce," that the Admiralty Judge had decreed in its favor in two instances, the Court holding that the title of the goods had passed from the French before their seizure, and that no act of Parliament existed making such goods lawful prize. As a result of these decisions, several "flags of truce," laden with French prod- uce, taken by British cruisers and brought to Philadelphia, were liberated by the captors, as they saw that it was im- possible to procure their condemnation. , In the Bahamas, Shirley was forced to remove Samuel Gambler — his own appointee during a vacancy — from the position of Judge of the Vice- Admiralty Court. Gambler encouraged the trade, was himself engaged in it, and had in fact originally come to New Providence under a retainer from some Philadelphia merchants to aid in securing the release of such vessels as might be brought there as prizes. He maintained that the trade was legal until Parliament had leg- islated against it, and that the Crown's declaration of war was not sufficient for this purpose.' It was inevitable that on the return of peace, the British government would try to remedy some of these patent evils. This trade of the colonies revealed the loose character of the Empire's organization and the inadequacy of the organs of imperial control. The intercourse with the enemy was never entirely suppressed. To a great extent it frustrated the policy of the British government, and ' B. T. Bahamas 7 E 5 and 8 to 27. In addition, Gambier claimed that the act of 1757, regulating the exportation of food-stu£Fs from the colonies, did not give men-of-war or privateers any authority to make seizures. Digitized by Microsoft® 128 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 prolonged the war; it aroused intense indignation and was unquestionably a potent factor in the subsequent alienation. British statesmen, administrators, admirals, and generals condemned these practices in unqualified terms.' William Bull, a South Carolinian by birth and education, who en- joyed to the full the confidence of his native colony, went further and thought those engaged in this trade guilty of treason.^ In the colonies, on the other hand, the wholesale seizure of the vessels trading with the enemy was bitterly resented. It was said that some merchants in New York had been entirely ruined in consequence.^ The West Indian trade was to a great extent the basis 0^ industry in the northern continental colonies. These colo- nies produced a large surplus quantity of lumber, fish, and provisions, which greatly exceeded the requirements of the British West Indies. At the same time, those British colo- nies could not furnish an adequate supply of molasses. Molasses, especially when distilled into rum, was absolutely ' On May 30, 1761, Joseph Sherwood, the agent of Rhode Island, wrote to Governor Hopkins: "Some of our Leading Men have taken great Disgust at the Trade with the French ment*. in thy Letter and said to be carried on by the Northern Colonies." Correspondence of the Colonial Governors of Rhode Island (ed. G. S. Kimball), II, p. 320. ^ On Feb. 18, 1761, Bull wrote to Pitt to the effect that a vessel had been seized for trading at Monte Cristi, but that the evidence was not sufficient to convict "either of High Treason or any illicit Trade; For I had determined if there had been sufficient Evidence of their having supplied His Majesty's Ennemies with any Aid within the Statute of the 2Sth. of Edward the 3'?, to have sent them Prisoners to Great Britain, in order to receive their Tryal for that Offence in Westminster Hall." Am. and W.I. 73 ; Pitt Correspondence II, p. 395. The reference is to the Statute of Treasons of 1352. ' Colden to Pitt, Oct. 27, 1760. Am. and W.I. 72. Digitized by Microsoft® MEANS ADOPTED TO CHECK THIS INTERCOURSE 129 essential for the fisheries, the Indian trade, and the Rhode Island slave-trade, on which in varying degrees the pros- perity of North America depended. In ultimate analysis, it was the West Indian trade that enabled the continental colonies to pay for the British manufactures that they imported.* As Governor Stephen Hopkins of Rhode Island wrote,^ a cessation of this trade would revolutionize in- dustry in the colonies; "compelled by Necessity, (they) must set about making those Things they cannot live with- out." In normal times it was undoubtedly a wise policy to leave this West Indian trade free and unrestricted. Such it had virtually been prior to the war, as the Molasses Act was all but a dead letter. Obviously the total cessation of this trade on the outbreak of war would have created some distress in the North Ameri- can colonies. Though the French colonies were dependent upon them for their food-stuffs, they in turn relied on this market for their surplus produce. Economic dependence is usually mutual ; the seller is, as a rule, as much distressed by the want of a market as is the purchaser by a lack of supplies.^ On the other hand, conditions were created by the war itself, which to a great extent would have compen- • Colden to Pitt, Dec. 27, 1760. Am. and W.I. 73. ' Dec. 20, 1760 to Pitt. Ibid. ' It would appear that the current popular notion about the military weakness of agriculturally non-selfsupporting nations should be somewhat modified by the experiences during these years. Though Great Britain was supreme at sea, the French still managed to get provisions, and though at times there was a scarcity, this economic dependence does not seem to have been a decisive mili- tary factor. K Digitized by Microsoft® I30 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 sated for this deprivation of the normal market. The large body of troops collected in America, and the presence of the ships of the navy created an unusually heavy demand for the products of the continental colonies. In addition, Guade- loupe, one of the richest of the French colonies, was captured in 1759, and afforded a valuable and rapidly growing mar- ket. Thus during the war access to the French West Indies was by no means so essential as in normal times. An absolutely rigid enforcement of British law would have pro- duced some hardship, possibly even to an extent out of propor- tion to the resultant advantages. There is, however, a mean between absolute non-intercourse and the systematic and wholesale supply of the enemy with stores. It was the ex- tensive nature of the trade that aroused indignation. While the French West Indies were well supplied, there was at times scarcity in the neighboring British colonies. It was especially galling to the Commander-in-Chief to find that the colonies, which he was sent to protect, were selling to the enemy provisions that his army needed, and for which in consequence exorbitant prices had to be paid. Similarly, the naval commanders were bitter against a trade which prolonged the resistance of the French and enabled them to fit out their ships. The trade was carried on so immod- erately that it brought considerable wealth to the colonial merchants engaged in it. Burnaby, an English traveller who was in America during the war, reported that New York had "acquired great riches" in this manner.* The immoderate extent of this trade was due to the temp- ' Burnaby, Travels (ed. R. R. Wilson), p. 118; cj. pp. 128, 129 n. Digitized by Microsoft® MEANS ADOPTED TO CHECK THIS INTERCOURSE i^i tations ofifered by the large profits, together with the absence of a strong imperial sentiment to counteract the promptings of self-interest. As was said at the time,' in connection with these practices in Jamaica and in the North American colonies: "Here it is an Island Interest, There it is the Interest of the Colonies; What opposes this Interest is, of aU other Things the most obnoxious to them. For the Public or National Interest is out of the Question with both." At the outset the continental colonies supported this policy of non-intercourse, as their own immediate . interests were concretely involved in repelling the French advance. In 1758 the tide turned, and in the following year, with the fall of Quebec, the power of France on the continent was broken. It is significant that this trade with the enemy reached its high mark in 1760, when France was no longer a source of danger to the continental colonies,- In the eyes of the British government, then under the guidance of the great imperialist Pitt, France was the enemy, whether in India, Africa, Germany, North America, or the West Indies. It would seem, that to many in the colonies, France on the continent of America was the preeminent source of danger, but that France in the West Indies was merely an unfailing source of wealth. The marked provincialism of the colonies blinded them to the fact that any support given to France in the Caribbean strength- ened her in Canada. What was in its essence a world-wide struggle between Great Britain and France — between two distinct types of civilization — contracted in the narrow vision of the colonies to the dimensions of a local conflict. ' First Memorial in Holmes to Pitt, Jan. 4, 1761. Coll. Corr. Jam. II. Digitized by Microsoft® CHAPTER VIII TROPICAL AND CONTINENTAL COLONIZATION The course of events during the Seven Years' War, and the terms of the treaty that restored peace in 1763 are typi- cally characteristic of Great Britain, whose wars, as a rule, are marked at the outset by unreadiness, and at the conclu- sion by an inadequate treaty/ Toward the end of the con- flict, British arms were successful in all parts of the world. Canada and all the French West Indies, except Santo Do- mingo, the richest of French colonies, were in English hands. Havana, the key of the West Indies, had been taken, and so had Manila in the Far East. In East India, the power of France had been crushed ; and in West Africa, Senegal and Goree were under the British flag. Under these conditions, England had to some extent a choice as to the direction of her future expansion in America. In 1762 seemingly any terms could have been exacted, but George III and Bute were anxious to have the war off their hands in order to break the power of the great Whig houses, and conse- quently the treaty of peace was inadequate in many points. In 1 761, when Pitt was still at the helm, and was nego- tiating terms of peace with France, the position of England ' "It is an old Observation, that we have generally lost by our Heads what we acquired by our'Swords." The Advantages of the Difinitive Treaty (Lon- don, 1749), p. 3 132 Digitized by Microsoft® TROPICAL AND CONTINENTAL COLONIZATION 133 was not so ' strong. Spain was then only an unfriendly neutral, not a belligerent, and though Guadeloupe and Dominica had been taken, Martinique was still in French hands. Pitt recognized that he could not retain all the English conquests, and the question then came up for de- cision, whether England should retain all Canada, or should keep Guadeloupe instead. On this point there was a most active and interesting discussion, which revealed an impor- tant change in the economic theory of colonization. Theory and policy are~tEe"direct result ofTundamental social conditions. The present colonial policy of Great Britain is largely based on the avowed desirability of find- ing homes within the Empire for British subjects, — " breath- ing spaces" for an expanding population, whose offshoots would otherwise be lost to the flag. This idea was alien to the spirit of the old Empire. The eighteenth century colo- nies were not looked upon as homes for a surplus population, simply because England was not overpopulated. The small population of Great Britain in comparison with that of her riyal, France, emphasized the need for an increase in num- bers. Hence, emigration was not encouraged, and there was no surer way to condemn a colony than to show that it tended to diminish the population of the mother country.* 'See, e.g., Political Considerations (2d ed. London, 1762), p. 52. This pamphlet is attributed to James Marriott. In the cases of Georgia and Nova Scotia, military expediency outweighed this opposition, though in both in- stances the philanthropic motive was also a factor, naturally more so, however, on the part of the individuals interested, such as Oglethorpe and Coram, than on the part of the government. In the case of both these colonies, as also in general in all the colonies, special efforts were made to build up their population Digitized by Microsoft® 134 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 Consequently colonies were esteemed in the main for commercial purposes. The ideal colony was that which furnished commodities which Great Britain could not her- self produce, and which did not in any way compete with the industry of the mother country.* In their economic pursuits, mother country and colony were to be mutually complementary; the aim was to create self-sufficient com- mercial Empire, which, while independent of competing European powers, would be able to make them economically dependent on it. To this idealjype of colony, the West Indies conformed more closely than did the continental colonies, wjth the exception of Georgia, South Carolina, Virginia, and Maryland. Newfoundland was merely a fishing estaraishment, and was highly esteemed on account of the fishery, 'which was a nursery of seamen, and hence a source of naval strength. The North American colonies between Maryland and Nova Scotia were not looked upon with favor, as they competed with the metropolis in a num- ber of industries, especially in the production of food-stuffs, by encouraging immigration from continental Europe. See 6 Geo. II, c. 25 § vii, and Declared Accounts, Audit Office, Bundle 2131, Roll 2: Sir J. Dick for transporting foreign Protestants from Holland to Nova Scotia. ' Josiah Tucker, in one of his earlier books, "A Brief Essay on the Advan- tages and Disadvantages which respectively attend France and Great Britain with regard to Trade" (2d ed. London, 1750), pp. 92-95, supported this view. To divert the colonies from manufacturing, he favored the policy of encourag- ing them to produce iron, naval stores, hemp, flax, silk, indigo, etc. See also The Laws and Policy of England Relating to Trade (London, 1765), pp. 33) 34> wherein it was held that colonies should produce commodities that England could not raise, such as silk, hemp, pitch, tar, rosin, turpentine, masts, sugar, tobacco, cotton, rice, and indigo. Digitized by Microsoft® TROPICAL AND CONTINENTAL COLONIZATION 135 in the fisheries, in the ship-building and carrying-trades. At the same time, they had but little to export to the mother country, which was still largely agricultural. According to this theory of colonization, the essential thing was that the colony produced commodities that the mother country would otherwise have tcT buy from foreigners. Hence greater stress was laid on colonies as sources of supply, than as markets for British manufactures. The importance of the colony as a market was not entirely ignored, but was regarded as the natural corollary to the more vital fact that the colony furnished the mother country with raw ma- terials not produced in Great Britain or with tropical products. Thjswas the^general standard by which the value of colo- nies was gauged until about 1745. According to it, the New England and Middle colonies were found wanting, while those in the West Indies stood the test best. Hence far more attention was paid to the island colonies than to those on the mainland. The former were considered preeminently the valuable colonies. The sugar trade occupied in foreign commerce a somewhat similar position to the woollen trade, being popularly considered a pivotal industry. In addition, the West Indian interest was strongly represented in England, many of the governing classes having estates in those- colonies.' ' In connection with an attempt made in 1744 to increase the sugar duties in England, it was said that many in the House of Commons "were either by themselves or their friends, deeply concerned in one part or other of the Sugar trade, and that the cause itself was always popular in the House of Commons." The wife of the chief member of the Board of Trade, Martin Bladen, had an Digitized by Microsoft® 136 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 There was, however, some oggosition to this method of estimating the value of colonies primarily by the products with which they supplied the mother country. This objec- tion gained ground, as England was becoming less and less an agricultural country, and more and more an industrial one. At the time of the peace of Paris, England was ceasing to be a regular exporter of wheat. The manufacturer was becom- ing of ever increasing importance, and he emphasized the more modem view that colonies jhould primanly.iuniiah-a, market for the mother country's manufactures.* It was ob- vious that the West Indies, whose population was necessarily estate in the West Indies. Pari. Hist. 13, p. 639. In 1760 it was said that, "Many Gentlemen of the West Indies have Seats in the British House of Com- mons." Remarks on the Letter Address'd to Two Great Men (London, 1760), pp. 46, 47. ' The author of a pamphlet criticising the peace of 1748, especially the failure to acquire Canada, exclaims: "Good God! what an immense Profit would it have been to us to have supply'd all North America with British Manufactures, and in return to have received their rich Furs?" The Advantages of the Difinitive Treaty (London, 1749), p. 27. This transition is well illustrated in Sir William Keith's thought. Occasionally, he said, the balance of trade may turn against a nation, and workmen being out of employment are forced to seek it elsewhere. Then the wisdom of states has found it advisable to send such of their people as could be spared to settle in various climates where some new species of products might be raised and sent home to revive commerce and to assist in restoring the lost balance of trade. This was the original intention, "and the only justifiable Reason" for founding colonies. "The Design of those Settlements (was) to raise new and Different kinds of Merchandize for the Eu- ropean Market," in return for which British manufactures were exported. The History of the British Plantations in America, Part I, Virginia (London, 1738), pp. 10, II. "To support Navigation, and to provide a continual and sufficient Supply of Materials for carrying on a general Commerce to and from all Parts of the World, make Colonies in America equally useful and necessary to every Maritime State. But they are of a further and special advantage to Digitized by Microsoft® TROPICAL AND CONTINENTAL COLONIZATION 137 increasing slowly, would not afford so large a market for British manufactures as the continental colonies with their rapidly expanding numbers. Up to nearly the middle of the eighteenth century, the exports from England to the continental colonies and the West Indies were about equal. A great change then set in.^ The exports to the West Indies increased but slowly, from £704,000 in 1751-1752 to £'m,ooo in 1 756-1 757, and to ;£i,o6o,coo a decade Great-Britain, by securing a certain and constant Vent to the Pome Product and Manufactures of that Country, independent of the Conduct and Practice of other Nations." Ibid. p. 34. Thomas Pownall in "The Administration of the Colonies" (2d ed. London, 1765, pp. 25, 26), laid especial stress on the value of the colonies as customers of the mother country. ' Exports from England to : NORTHEEN COLONIES WEST INDIES 1744-1748, 5 years' total ;^3,486,268 £3.363,337 1754-1758. 5 years' total £7.414,057 £3.767.841 These figures are given by Franklin in his pamphlet "The Interest of Great Britain Considered" (London, 1760), p. 57. They were frequently copied in the controversial literature of the following years: Writings of John Dickinson (ed. P. L. Ford) I, p. 222 ; An Essay on the Trade of the Northern Colonies (London, 1764), pp. 36, 37. Franklin correctly pointed out that this increase in the exports to the continental colonies was in part due to the presence of the army and the navy in North America. Colden also pointed this out, and, in addition, that the increase was also partly due to the colonial trade with the enemy, as the colonies sent some British manufactures to the French islands. Colden to Pitt, Dec. 27, 1760. Am. and W.I. 73. Colden made the same statement in 1765. N.Y. Col. Doc. VII, p. 799. On this exportation of manu- factures from the British colonies to the French, see also Sharpe Correspondence II, p. 442. It should be noted that the exports from England to the continental colonies fell off to a marked extent in the latter years of the war. Sir Charles Whitworth, State of the Trade of England (London, 1776), gives full details. It should also be mentioned that among the entries for the West Indies in gen- eralwere items exported to the continental colonies and also commodities destined for Spanish America. Digitized by Microsoft® 138 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 later/ On the other hand, the exports to the continental colonies increased rapidly. In 1 746-1 747 they were only £783,000; in 1751-1752 they had reached;;^!, 218,000. In 1761-1762 they were ;£i,44i,ooo, and in 1766-1 767 £2,016,000.^ ' Exports from England from Christmas to the same date the following year to : 1746-1747 1751-1752 1756-1757 1761-1762 1766-1767 Antigua . . . Barbados . . . Bermudas . . Jamaica . . . Montserrat . . Nevis .... New Providence St. Christopher . West Indies in general . . Dominica ^44,487 95,107 3,891 215,283 1,650 583 27,743 345,348 ^68,185 172,822 11,767 351,475 5,307 10,442 83,917 ;£ 113,308 156,932 2,890 352,797 18,069 15,420 1,013 ii6,S49 £^25,323 213,177 7,786 460,631 23,895 9,066 102,627 ■£119,740 145,083 12,133 467,681 23,071 11,875 14,986 106,162 763 30,863 27,010 14,822 89,767 Tortola . . . St. Vincent . . • • ■ . . . 304 2,052 Grenada . 119 170,226 116,777 166,196 Guadeloupe . . Havana . . . . • • • • • • Martinique . * ;£ 734,092 ;£ 703,915 ;£776,882 j£i,397,87S j£ 1,059,956 B. T. Com. Series II, 414. ' Exports from England from Christmas to the same date the following year to: 1746-1747 1761-1752 1756-1757 1761-1762 1766-1767 Newfoundland Carolina . . Hudson's Bay New England New York . Pennsylvania Virginia and Maryland Georgia . . Nova Scotia . Florida . . £49,021 95,529 2,994 210,640 137,984 82,404 200,088 24 4,408 ;£46,995 150,777 3,380 273,340 194,030 201,666 325,151 3,163 19,310 ;£23,S37 213,949 4,033 363,404 ,353,311 268,426 426,687 2,571 70,600 £34,3^7 194,170 4,122 247,385 288,046 206,199 417,599 23,761 25,071 ;£53,5SO 244,093 4,981 406,081 417,957 371,830 437,628 23,334 25,094 30,963 ;£ 783,092 ;£l,217i«I2 ;£i,726,5i8 ;£ 1,440,740 ;£2,oi5,Sii Digitized by Microsoft® TROPICAL AND CONTINENTAL COLONIZATION 139 This rapid increase in the ^jports to the continen tal colonie s provided a powerful argument to those who looked upon colonies mainly as a market for the surplus manu- factures of Great Britain. This view was also strengthened by the fact that the European outlet for English woollens, the most important of the mother country's manufacturing industries, was threatened by the endeavors of nearly every European state to supply itself with these products.* On account of its climate. North America furnished a much larger market for woollens than did the tropical West Indies, and in addition a market that was rapidly expand- ing. In that age of keen international commercial rivalry, the value of such an outlet for England's chief industry was especially patent.* The landed classes were in general greatly interested in the woollen industry, and hence were in alliance with the manufacturers as opposed to the trading and commercial interests. They were able to impress this view in the terms of the Treaty of Peace of 1 763. This treaty marks a turning-point in British colonial policy in so far that thereafter greater stress was laid on colonies as markets for British produce than on colonies as sources of supply. B. T. Com. Series II, 414; Whitworth, op. cU. pp. 51, 56, 61, 66, 71. Part II of this latter work gives the exports to New York in 1 766-1 767 as j£482,930 and not as £417,957- 'Proposals for Carrying on the War with Vigour (London, 1757), PP- 49^54- ' The State of Trade in the Northern Colonies, by Otis Little (London, 1748), pp. 25, 40, 41, emphasizes the fact that the Northern colonies consumed so large a quantity of British manufactures, of which a large proportion was woollens. His estimate of their per capita consumption in New England and New York is, however, grossly exaggerated. Digitized by Microsoft® I40 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 This change in viewpoint was of extreme importance. ^ To the extent that the matter depended solely on Great Britain's volition, and not on the desires of France and Spain, it led directly to the choice of Canada and Florida, instead of the French West Indies and Porto Rico,^ as that portion of the English conquests in America to be retained as parts of the Empire. It is interesting to follow some of the contempo- rary thought leading up to this changed attitude. The broader political arguments in favor of colonization on the continent, as well as the narrower economic ones, are expounded with great ability by William Shirley, a statesman whose influence on the history of the Empire has been most inadequately recognized. In 1745, when Governor of Massachusetts, he wrote to the Duke of Newcastle strongly advising the reduction of all Canada.' Among the resultant economic advantages would be the control of the fur trade and of the fisheries. Shirley then adds : "From the Health- fullness of the Climates on this Continent and the Surprizing Growth of it's Inhabitants within the last Century it may ' The following passage emphasizes the essential difference in standpoint tow- ard the West Indies and North America: "The Benefit which accrues to the Mother-Country from a Colony on the Continent, principally depends on the Number of its Inhabitants ; that of a Plantation in the Islands arises from the Richness of its Commodities : We rely on the former chiefly for the Consumption of our Manufactures : We expect more from the Produce of the latter, for our own Consumption and for Exportation." The Regulations Lately Made (Lon- don, 1765), pp. 5-6. ' On Porto Rico, see Bedford Correspondence III, pp. 96, 119, 139; J. Almon, Biographical, Literary, and Political Anecdotes (London, 1797) II, pp. 72, 73. Porto Rico had not been conquered, but there was some talk of exchanging it for Cuba. " Am. and W.I. 3, no. 255. Digitized by Microsoft® TROPICAL AND CONTINENTAL COLONIZATION 141 be expected that in one or two more Centuries there will be such an addition from hence to the Subjects of the Crown of Great Britain, as may make 'em vye for Numbers with the Subjects of France, and lay a foundation for a Superiority of British Power\ipon the Continent of Europe, at the Same time that it Secures that which the Royal Navy of Great Britain has already at Sea." * He then claimed that the West Indian colonies diminished the population of the mother country, while the contrary was true of the continental colonies ; ^ and that the increase in population on the main- land meant a large outlet for British woollens and other Euro- pean commodities. Shirley's ardent desire for the conquest of Canada ^ was not gratified at the time. At the opening of the following war, ten years later, he again wrote to the secretary of state, then Sir Thomas Robinson, urging at length and with great ability the necessity of driving France out of America.* Among the benefits, besides those of a political and military nature, would be the increase of the fur trade and the fisheries, and the enlarged consumption of ' The same idea is also present in a memorial of the Canadian governor, Galissonifere. He pointed out that France must retain Canada as a barrier against English ambition, even though it had always proven a burden; "for if we suffer our enemies to become masters in America, their trade and naval power will grow to vast proportions, and they will draw from their colonies a wealth that will make them preponderant in Europe.'' Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe I, p. 37. ' This was frequently asserted, and was apparently based on the fact that a large number of colonial ships were sold in England, the crews remaining with the vessels. 'V. H. Paltsits, Scheme for the Conquest of Canada in 1746. American Antiquarian Society, April, 1905. * Shirley to Robinson, Aug. 15, 1755. Am. and W.I. 82. Digitized by Microsoft® 142 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 British manufactures. In addition Shirley wrote: "The growing Advantages, w^^ would accrue to the Nation must be immense; The State of Security, which the Settlers in North America would be put into, by the Removal of the French ; The extensive Trade with the Indians, the Increase of the Fishery, the Rich vacant Country for new Settlements, and the quick Growth of their Estates would make the Inhab- itants increase if not in a Duplicate proportion to what they have hitherto done, yet in a much greater degree." He pointed out that the population of these colonies doubled every twenty years, even under existing conditions, and that the increase of exports from England to North America corresponded with the growth of population. Consequently it followed inevitably that the conquest of Canada would result in a large increase in British exports.^ In 1 760, in connection with some talk of peace, the question arose whether Great Britain should retain Canada or Guade- loupe, both of which had been conquered. The subject aroused keen interest. Pitt said in the House of Commons : "Some are for keeping Canada; some Guadeloupe; who will tell me which I shall be hanged for not keeping?" ^ At the time there appeared a number of pamphlets, in which this matter was discussed with both warmth and ability. The first pamphlet of importance is supposed by many to be the work of the aged Earl of Bath, better known as ' Shirley estimated the white population of the continental colonies at 1,200,000, and the exports from England to those colonies at one million sterling, of which 70 per cent consisted of British manufactures, and 30 per cent of for- eign goods reexported from England. ' Walpole, Memoirs of George III, vol. I, p. 26. Digitized by Microsoft® TROPICAL AND CONTINENTAL COLONIZATION 143 Pulteney, — the famous leader of the Opposition against Walpole.* Herein it was urged that the conquests on the continent must be retained as the essential basis of a durable peace.^ " You must keep Canada, otherways you ' lay the Foun dation of an other Wan" ' The restoration of peace should not be made conditional on the retention of the West Indian and African conquests/ for these possessions are insignificant in comparison with the fact that the removal of France from Canada will give security to the continental colonies. These colonies have a large population and consequently afford a desirable market, "mostly supplied with the Manufactures of Great Britain."* On this economic fact the Earl of Bath laid chief stress, though he did not ignore the other advantages arising from the continent of America, such as the important trade carried on with it and the large number of ships engaged therein, the importation thence of iron, indigo and naval stores, and the fact that these colonies fed the West Indies. This pamphlet called forth a reply, which is generally attributed to William Burke, a friend and kinsman of the famous philosophical statesman of the same surname.' Burke advised the return of Canada to France, Great Britain retaining only the "hinterland" of the American colonies and • A Letter Addressed to Two Great Men. London, 1760. John Douglas, later Bishop of Salisbury, is supposed to have collaborated in this publication, and it is even possible that he may have been its main author. See Franklin, Writings (ed. Smyth) I, p. 145. ' Ibid. p. 29. ' Ibid. p. 30. Cf. p. 31. • Ibid. p. 33. ' Ibid. p. 34. • Remarks on the Letter Address'd to Two Great Men. London, 1760. Digitized by Microsoft® 144 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 Nova Scotia with its boundaries determined in accordance with the British claims prior to the war.^ Under such condi- tions, he claimed, the continental colonies would be safe from France. Burke then accused the Earl of Bath of showing little regard to the interests of the West Indies. He said : "Our Carribbee Islands must be ever infinitely in greater Danger from Guadaloupe, than our North American Colonies can be from Canada, circumscribed as it ought, and as it is presumed it will be." ^ "If, as it has been shewn, we may beyond any rational Fear secure ourselves without the intire Possession of Canada,'" then the only question remains, is Guadeloupe or Canada more likely to repay us for the ex- pense of the war ? ^ On this point, Burke decided in favor of Guadeloupe and her dependencies, showing that the British West Indies just produced enough sugar for the mother country's consumption, and that France was sup- plying all Europe with this commodity, as Great Britain had formerly done. Canada, he claimed, would not be a valuable exchange for Guadeloupe, as it "produces no Commodity, except Furs and Skins," which can be exchanged for Euro- pean goods, and as it has "little Returns to make the English Merchant." * Besides, even if Canada is restored, by hold- ing the territory in back of the colonies, England can gain the fur trade.® On the other hand, Guadeloupe makes more sugar than any of the British islands except Jamaica,* ' Remarks on the Letter Address'd to Two Great Men. London, 1760, pp. 20, 38. ' Ibid. p. 28. ' Ihid. p. 29. * Ibid. p. 36. ' Ihid. p. 37. 'Ihid. p. 40. The imports into England, Christmas, 1761, to Christmas, 1762, were from: Digitized by Microsoft® TROPICAL AND CONTINENTAL COLONIZATION 145 and this entire crop will be reexported from the metropolis, "and wiU consequently be so much clear Money to Great Britain." ' Burke then discussed the relative value of the two groups of colonies, those in the Caribbean and those on the mainland, and reached the conclusion that "an Island Colony is always more advantageous than a Continental one for the Mother Country." ^ "The West India Islands lie in a Climate different totally from ours. The natural Produce there- fore interferes in no respect with that of England" and if our colonies there did not supply us "we must purchase from Strangers." ^ On the other hand, the continental colonies produce, in general, the same things as England, and there- fore "except for a few Naval Stores, there is very little Trade from thence directly to England." Besides, in these colonies there is a strong tendency to set up manufactures, "and as they increase daily in People and in Industry, the Necessity of a Connection with England, with which they have no nat- ural Intercourse by a Reciprocation of Wants, will continu- ally diminish." Referring to the much-discussed question of the future independence of these colonies,* Burke added : Guadeloupe :i£Si3i244 Jamaica 852,777 Barbados 254,860 Antigua 249,367 St. Kitts 246,360 B. T. Com. Series 11, 414, p. 26. ' Ibid. pp. 40, 41. In addition to sugar, Guadeloupe produced coffee, indigo, cotton, and ginger. ' Ihid. p. 46. ' Ibid. p. 47. * Otis Little in "The State of Trade in the Northern Colonies" (London, 1748), pp. 13-17, refers to the jealousy frequently exhibited in England at the L Digitized by Microsoft® 146 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 "By eagerly grasping at extensive Territory, we may run the risque, and that perhaps in no very distant Period of losing what we now possess." Canada in French hands binds the North American colonies to Great Britain; it is not necessary to us, and its retention may be dangerous. He added significantly: "A Neighbour that keeps us in some Awe, is not always the worst of Neighbours." ^ This discussion attracted wide attention,^ and called forth a skilful, if not a whoUydisingenuous pamphlet from Benjamin Franklin, who was in London at the time.' Franklin an- swered Burke in detail, maintaining that the removal of France from the continent was absolutely essential to the security of the British colonies.* He pointed out that the growth of the North American colonies, and to the fact that some people also insinuated that "great Care ought to be taken, lest those Colonies grow too powerful, and set up a Government of their,own." Little says that there was no justification for this apprehension. The colonies are not discontented; they are not taxed and are dependent on England for manufactures. ' Remarks on the Letter Address'd to Two Great Men, p. 50. ' On Feb. 16, 1762, Governor Dalrymple of Guadeloupe wrote to Egremont, that he had seen the party pamphlets on this subject, and that both sides had exaggerated. In his opinion, however, Guadeloupe would be a most valuable acquisition, its trade having greatly increased since the English conquest. Am. and W.I. loi. Joseph Massie, a prolific and able economist, referred to this controversy, and said that the return of the West Indies to France and granting that country permission to fish at Newfoundland would be ruinous. Brief Observations Concerning the Management of the War (London, 1761), p. 8. 'The Interest of Great Britain Considered. London, 1760. This pam- phlet is also printed in Smyth's edition of Franklin's Writings, vol. IV. In writing it, Franklin was assisted by Richard Jackson. Ibid. I, p. 138, and P. L. Ford, Franklin Bibliography, p. 117. * Pamphlet, pp. 8, 9; Writings IV, pp. 34, 35. Digitized by Microsoft® TROPICAL AND CONTINENTAL COLONIZATION 147 increased area of the Empire resulting from the conquest of Canada meant cheap land, and that owing to this fact America would necessarily remain a non-manufacturing agri- cultural country.' He then drew attention to the rapidly increasing population of the continental colonies and to the ensuing large exports from England to them, emphasizing the importance of North America as a market for British manufactures.^ Franklin rejected Burke's claim that the retention of Canada meant the independence of the continental colonies, laying stress not so much on their loyalty to the mother country, as on their particularism and on their reciprocal jealousies and enmities. He claimed that they loved the mother country more than they did one another, that a union of the colonies was an impossibility,^ and that without such a union an efifort on the part of some of the colonies to gain independence would be madness. Franklin was, however, not allowed to hold the field un- answered. In 1762, a remarkable pamphlet was published, traversing his arguments and facts, and upholding the value of tropical colonies.* The reputed author of this publication, William Burke, ° started from the premise that purely politi- '■ Pamphlet, pp. 17, 18; Writings IV, p. 49. ' Pamphlet, p. 36; Writings IV, p. 67. The same views were expressed by Franklin in his letters to Lord Blames. Writings IV, pp. 4, 8, 99. On Oct. 19, 1760, Governor Wen tworth of New Hampshire wrote to Pitt, congratulating him on the fall of Montreal, and pointing out that Canada would be of in- estimable value to Great Britain as a market for manufactures, especially for coarse woollens and every species of ironware. Am. and W.I. 72. ' I.e. unless the colonies were driven to it by tyranny. *An Examination of the Commercial Principles of the late Negotiation. London, 1762. "P. L. Ford, FrankUn Bibliography, p. 117. Digitized by Microsoft® 148 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 cal advantages gained by a treaty of peace are illusory. "There is no Situation in which Wealth is not Strength, and in which Commerce is not Wealth. If Commerce is our Object, we know, and in all other Cases we can at best only guess what we acquire." ' The negotiations for peace in 1761, he pointed out, were conducted solely with the idea of retaining Canada; no attempt was made to retain the West Indies, and thus British interests in that region were slighted. Great Britain had entirely lost the foreign market for sugar, while the European sugar trade was the most valuable branch of French commerce. This situation, he in- sisted should have been considered, as by retaining the French islands the conditions could be reversed.* Burke then drew attention to the fact that in 1759 the imports from the West Indies amounted to ;^i,833,648, while those from New England, New York, and Pennsylvania were only ;^7o,o74, and those from all the continental colonies aggregated only about ;^6oo,ooo.' The West Indies need British, Irish, and colonial products, and are thus economi- cally dependent on the Empire. In addition, the lucrative African slave-trade is closely connected with their pros- perity, while in turn, the continental colonies rely on these islands for a market for their surplus products, and hence also for their ability to purchase British goods. He thus reached the conclusion that the African and North American trades both depended upon the West Indies. Burke then proceeded to attack Franklin for omitting to give the statis- tics of colonial imports into England, claiming that the rela- ' An Examination, pp. 3, 4. ' Ibid. pp. 16-18. ' Ibid., p. 20. Digitized by Microsoft® TROPICAL AND CONTINENTAL COLONIZATION 149 tive value of the two groups of colonies could not be estimated solely from the English export statistics. In failing to con- sider the colonial imports into England, he asserted that Franklin was deceiving the ignorant/ because as a matter of fact the total trade of England with the West Indies exceeded that with North America.^ Discussing more particularly the question of Guadeloupe, Burke then pointed out that in 1761 this island's exports to England amounted to ;^6o3,26g, of which two-thirds were sugar, and ;,^i 12,792 cotton,^ the latter an important prod- uct which was not grown extensively in the other British islands.* On the other hand, Canada's exports to England in the same year amounted to only ;;£i4,oi5, consisting princi- pally of furs. Burke thus reached the conclusion that from the viewpoint of British commercial interests the retention of Guadeloupe was of far greater importance than that of Canada.* Continuing the argument, Burke noted that the continental colonies were of two distinct classes. Those north of Mary- land, he said, have very little direct trade with Great Britain, "I mean they have nothing with which they can repay us for the Commodities they draw from hence." They trade only circuitously with us, and they are our competitors in * An Examination, p. 29. 'Year 1758: Exports from England to Continental Colonies £1,832,948 Corresponding Imports 648,683 Exports from England to West Indies £ 877,572 Corresponding Imports 1,834,036 Ibid. p. 27. ' Ibid. p. 36. * Ibid. pp. 38-40. ' Ibid. p. 58. Digitized by Microsoft® ISO BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 foreign markets. We consequently interfere with and hurt one another.^ On the other hand, the southern continental colonies, Maryland, Virginia and South Carolina, bear a close resemblance to the West Indies. They produce com- modities not grown in England, such as rice, tobacco, and indigo, and their exports to England are large.^ Conse- quently he concluded that it would be absurd to think of adding Canada to the Empire, and not of increasing the British interest in the West Indies. The argument advanced by his opponents that the vast inland tracts on the Ohio could produce commodities that are needed in England, he said, may or may not be true ; at all events, if we retain Guadeloupe and not Canada, we shall not sacrifice a present, real, and tangible advantage to a remote contingency.' This view of the relative economic value of the tropical and continental colonies was also supported by a memorial emanating from Barbados.* According to the writer thereof, ^ An Examination, pp. 64, 65. 'Imports into England [ from: 1 757 1 761 1762 ■New England ;£27,SS6 £25,985 £41,733 New York 19,168 21,684 58,882 Pennsylvania 14,190 22,404 38,091 Virginia and Maryland 418,881 357.228 .. 415,709 Carolina 130,889 206,534 181,69s Ibid. p. 66, and Whitworth, op. cit. 61, 66. The preponderance in favor of the Southern colonies would be much more accentuated if the import statistics of Scotland were included. ' Ibid. p. 68. * Reflections on the True Interest of Great Britain. By a planter in Bar- bados. Col. Corr. Barbados I. See also a memorial from St. Christopher, Feb. 27, 1760. Am. and W.I. 73. Digitized by Microsoft® TROPICAL AND CONTINENTAL COLONIZATION 151 colonies "were originally design'd to contribute to her (the mother country's) Wealth and Power, and the continual Protection which they require, and which they receive, renders their Dependence a just and necessary Duty." The West Indies have answered this purpose. They supply what cannot be raised at home, and consume English manu- factures, they support the African trade and create an ex- tensive navigation. Therefore " to settle the Neutral Islands, and to retain aU our Conquests in the Caribbees becomes in this View a Capital Point for the Advantage of the Nation." Shortly before the preliminaries of the Treaty of Paris were signed, there appeared a noteworthy pamphlet in favor of the general terms of the peace.* Its author strongly favored retention of Canada, as against those who said that "one white man in the West Indies is worth, to the Trade of his Mother Country about Eight in North America." * He opposed the view, " that we should make the Increase of our Possessions between the Tropicks the primary and leading Object of our Policy " '; and emphasized this point by show- ing that England exported far more to North America than to the West Indies.* ' The Comparative Importance of our Acquisitions from France in America, London, 1762. See also the memorial of April 13, 1761, in favor of Canada as against Guadeloupe. Brit. Mus. Addit. MSS. 33030 (Newcastle Papers, CCCXLV,' pp. I et seq.). ' Ibid. pp. 20-26. ' Ibid. p. 37. • EXPORTS TO THE WEST INDIES EXPORTS TO NORTH AMERICA 1744 £796,112 £640,114 1758 877,571 1,832,948 Ibid. p. 28. He claimed that a good deal of the former exports went to the Spanish Main. Digitized by Microsoft® 152 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 The general discussion can be summarized briefly. The West Indian interest claimed that the tropical possessions were the ideal colonies, and laid stress on them mainly as sources of supply and as non-competitive economic units. The continental argument was that the removal of France, by giving full security to the North American colonies, would lead to a rapid growth of their population, and consequently to a corresponding increase in the exports of Great Britain. One argument laid stress on colonies as purveyors of tropical prod- ucts and of raw materials for British manufactures, which would otherwise have to be purchased from foreigners. The other argument ignored this factor, and estimated the colonies according to the extent that they furnished a market for British manufactures. The older, and per- haps more typically mercantile, view claimed that the con- tinental colonies would become independent; the newer school asserted that disunion among them would prevent such a contingency. In the abortive peace negotiations with France in 1761,* Pitt adopted the newer view. His chief purpose was to break beyond hope of resuscitation the naval power of France, and with this object in view, he favored the retention of Canada, with the total exclusion of France from the New- ' The chief diplomatic correspondence in connection with these negotiations has been published in Thackeray's Life of Chatham, vol. II, appendix and passim in the text, and in Pari. Hist. 15, pp. 1018-1072. Alfred Bourguet, "Le Due de Choiseul et I'Angleterre" (Revue Historique, vol. 71 aftd in his Etudes sur la Politique ^trangfere du Due de Choiseul), giveS a number of the French documents. For the best modem account, see Ruville, Pitt, vol. U, ch. 15. Digitized by Microsoft® TROPICAL AND CONTINENTAL COLONIZATION 153 foundland fisheries.* On the latter point Pitt was forced to yield, owing to pressure exerted within the ranks of the British government itself.^ In selecting Canada instead of Guadeloupe, which was the crucial point in the nego- tiations,^ Pitt was probably little influenced by the purely economic argument. To his large imagination, the pros- pect of a vast territorial increase of the Empire's area ap- pealed strongly. Although these negotiations of 1761 came to naught, they furnished the basis on which the final treaty of peace was concluded a year later. The Treaty of Paris of 1763 gave Florida, Canada, and all French territory east of the Mississippi, except New Orleans, to Great Britain. Martinique and Guadeloupe were returned, while St. Lucia, then esteemed the most valuable of the neutral islands, was , ' Pitt to Stanley, June 26, 1761. Thackeray, op. cit. I, pp. 545-546. ' Walpole, Memoirs of George III, vol. I, p. 77. ' During the preliminary discussions about the proposed peace, Choiseul told Hans Stanley, the British representative, that there was a diversity of opinion in France as to the relative importance of the territories conquered by England. The French minister said: "Some persons consider Canada as a barren desert, and look on Guadaloupe as a most important source of our national riches : while others as strenuously maintain, that without the former province and without the fisheries, the naval power of France is irretrievably lost for ever." In reply, Stanley pointed out that there were the same differ- ences of opinion in England, as was manifest from the pamphlet literature, and added that he was totally uninstructed on this point. In reporting this prelimi- nary skirmish to Pitt, Stanley said: "The Duke, in holding the discourse above mentioned, upon the preference given by some of his countrymen to Guadaloupe, and by others to Canada, fixed his utmost attention upon my countenance, aiming at the same time by signs, by pauses, by half words, and by every other subtility to penetrate my thoughts upon the alternative : I did not, I am sure, by a single syllable or gesture afford him any foundation for the most remote suspicion." Stanley to Pitt, June 12, 1 761. Thackeray, op. cit. I, pp. 529-531. Digitized by Microsoft® 154 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, I7S4-176S ceded to France. In the West Indies, Great Britain received the comparatively unimportant islands of Grenada, St. Vincent, Dominica, and Tobago. To many in England the peace was not satisfactory, and not a few voiced the opinion of the Earl of Hardwicke that it was inadequate, and that incomplete advantage had been taken of the British victories.* In the House of Commons Pitt led the able, if not numerically strong, opposition to the treaty, claiming that France was chiefly, if not solely, to be dreaded by Great Britain in the light of a maritime and com- mercial power, and that "therefore, by restoring to her all the valuable West-India islands, and by our concessions in the Newfoundland fishery, we had given to her the means of recovering her prodigious losses, and of becoming once more formidable to us at sea." ^ Those who supported the peace in Parliament asserted that the original object of the war had been the security of the continental colonies, and they insisted that this object had been attained. This security from any possible future conflict with the French meant the rapid growth of these colonies, and consequently an enormous market for British manufactures. This party claimed that the value of the North American conquests "ought not to be estimated by the present produce, but by their probable increase." ' Pari. Hist. 15, pp. 1251 el seq. ' Ibid. p. 1266. After the fall of Quebec and Montreal it was said in a cur- rent pamphlet: "Martinico, the most important conquest of all the possessions of France in America, is our own ; by which France is wounded in the lenderest part of her commerce." "Political Considerations," attributed to James Mar- riott (ad ed. London, 1762), p. 47. Digitized by Microsoft® TROPICAL AND CONTINENTAL COLONIZATION 155 "Neither ought the value of any country to be solely tried on its commercial advantages ; that extent of territory and ^ number of subjects are matters of as much Consideration to a state attentive to the sources of real grandeur as the mere advantages of traflSc." * These arguments were no answer to Pitt's contention that the treaty was inadequate, but they were the general basis on which the statesmen of the day justified their choice of territorial acquisitions on the continent in preference to tropical expansion. Unquestion- ably the immediate advantage of British commerce was sacrificed to some future benefits. A broad policy resting on possible future advantages triumphed over a narrow policy of actual and immediate profits. The treaty thus embodied the change in the economic theory of colonization, that had been gradually wrought by the phenomenon of the population of the North American colonies doubling every two decades and hence emphasizing the importance of these colonies to the mother counti^ as markets for her manufactures. This change in attitude inevitably led to the devotion of greater attention and interest to the continental colonies than had hitherto been customary. Naturally as colonies in general were valued chiefly from a commercial standpoint, and as these colo- nies in particular were valuable mainly as consumers of British products, efforts were made in the years after the peace tosecu]:eL,to the mother country t he full benefit of the North American market. This attempt can be traced in the legislation of 1764, and also in the efforts made at the ' Pari. Hist. 15, pp. 1271, 1272. Digitized by Microsoft® 156 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 same time to uproot illegal trading in the colonies. Simul- taneously, the universal success of British arms had created in England a feeling of self-confidence, and a keen interest in the dominions beyond the sea. There arose a strong wave of imperial sentiment, which directed increasing at- tention to colonial affairs and to abuses therein. The years of war were inevitably followed by a period of readjustment and of reform, and the direction of this movement was, to a great extent, conditioned on abuses that had become patent during the war, and on the adoption of the more modern view of the value of colonies. Coincident with the embodiment of this changed theory of colonization in the terms of the Treaty of Paris, there began a counter- niovement in favor of the development of the West Indian colonies. As already pointed out, in restoring the French West Indies, the peace meant an immediate sacrifice on the part of British commercial interests. An extensive and valuable trade with Martinique and Guadeloupe was entirely cut off. In opposing the treaty, Pitt pointed out that the trade to Canada was of little importance in comparison with that to the West Indian islands, which had been restored to the arch-enemy. St. Lucia, he said, should not have been ceded, nor should Guadeloupe and Martinique have been returned to France, for all that England gains by the West Indies "is made four-fold to us by the loss which ensues to France. But our conquests in North America are of very little detriment to the commerce of France." ^ Pitt's views •Pari., Hist. 15, p. 1266. Digitized by Microsoft® TROPICAL AND CONTINENTAL COLONIZATION 157 expressed the opinion generally prevalent in England that the peace had sacrificed British interests, and that the con- tinental colonies were the chief beneficiaries ^ of a war carried on mainly at the expense of the mother country. At the same time it was recognized that the hereditary enemy, France, by receiving back Guadeloupe and Martinique would, in the not distant future, again be in a position to challenge British maritime supremacy. Hence arose an atten ipMo^stiinulate thedeyelopment of the old and the newly acquired West Indian colonies, both in order to make some compensation for the loss inflicted on British trade by the treaty of 1763, and also at the same time in order to injure French commerce. A similar attempt had been made thirty years before this. The Molasses Act of 1 733, which aimed at preventing the continental colonies from buying French West Indian produce, was based on the ideal of a self-sufficient ' For this point, see Remarks on the Letter Address'd to Two Great Men (London, 1760), and Franklin's answer in the same year, The Interest of Great Britain Considered. The general opinion in England is well expressed in a private letter dated Nov. 18, 1768: " It is a most lamentable consideration to this kingdom that there should be almost open war between one part and another. The colonists object to every mode of taxation, without ever propos- ing how much they will raise in their own way towards the millions of debt England is loaded with, and taxed to the very teeth to pay the interest of, and which was actually expended in the sole defence and support of the colonies.'' MSS. of Shrewsbury, etc., Hist. MSS. Com. 1899, p. 95. During the con- troversies in 1764 and 1765, the colonial writers denied vigorously, though not convincingly, that they had reaped the chief advantages from the protracted war. Oxenbridge Thacher, The Sentiments of a British American (Boston, 1764), p. 7; James Otis, The Rights of The British Colonists (Boston, 1764), p. 43; Stephen Hopkins, The Rights of the Colonies (Providence, 1765), p. 21. Digitized by Microsoft® 158 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 Empire, and was a measure of economic warfare against France.* This policy had not been successful ; its revival in 1764 was in part based on the broad grounds just outlined. Incidentally, also, such a measure would be of great advantage to the West Indian planters, who were still very influential in British political circles.'' This interest had opposed the acqui- sition of Guadeloupe,' unless preferential treatment were granted to the old West Indian colonies.* They dreaded the prospect of having to compete with the conquered French islands, which were able to produce sugar more cheaply. The West Indies, however, felt slighted at the insignificance of the acquisitions in the Caribbean after the most successful war in British annals. Thus, the Barbados Assembly showed its dissatisfaction with the terms of the treaty by refusing to join in an address from the Governor and Council to the King congratulating him on the peace.^ This specific and the more general dissatisfaction with the terms of the ' Pari. Hist. 8, pp. 992 et seq. ' Many of the planters resided in England. An Examination of the Com- mercial Principles of the late Negotiations (London, 1762), p. 28. On April 30, 1764, Franklin wrote to Collinson : "For Interest with you we have but lit- tle. The West Indians vastly outweigh us of the Northern Colonies." Frank- lin, Writings (ed. Smyth) IV, p. 243. In 1764 Jasper Mauduit said that the West Indies have "a very formidable number of votes in the House of Com- mons." Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll. Series I, vol. VI, p. 193. 'Thus on July 9, 1761, Bedford wrote to Bute in connection with Pitt's plan to take Martinique: "I suppose the sugar planters will no more desire (it) should be retained by us than they did in relation to GuadaJoupe." Bed- ford Correspondence III, p. 25. * Reflections on the True Interest of Great Britain. Col. Corr. Barba- dos I. ' Charles Pinfold to Egremont July 16, 1763. Ibid. Digitized by Microsoft® TROPICAL AND CONTINENTAL COLONIZATION 159 treaty, combined with the desire to injure French commerce, led_ directl y to the revival of the policy of the " Molasses Act " of 1733, and to the enactment of the " Sugar Bill " of 1764, in so far as it was designed to regulate trade, and not to raise a revenue.* ' In this connection it should be noted that George Grenville, who was the father of the act of 1764, in 1762 opposed the cession of St. Lucia and Guade- loupe to France, and insisted on an equivalent being asked for the return of Havana. Grenville Papers I, p. 450. Digitized by Microsoft® CHAPTER IX THE PEACE OF PARIS AND THE EMPIRE In the history of any state, periods of external activity and growth alternate with periods of internal development and readjustment. The strenuous seven years of war were inevitably followed by a movement of reform. In so far as British colonial policy was concerned, this movement took the shape of an attempt to reform the system of im- perial defence; of efforts to uproot those evils in the ad- ministrative system that had been exposed by the colonial trade with the enemy; of legislation tending to secure to the mother country the full advantages of the North Ameri- can market ; of a revival of the policy of checking the trade of the continental colonies to the foreign West Indies with a view to developing the British interest in the Caribbean Sea at the expense of French commerce; and, finally, of a re- adjustment of the laws of trade to the new conditions that the vast territorial acquisitions secured by the treaty of 1763 had created. In general, this policy meant a tightening of the imperial tie, a stiffening of the imperial structure, which was to this extent ill-timed, in that it coincided with a diametri- cally opposite movement in the continental colonies. To these colonies the removal of France from Canada was of utmost importance. The French danger was the chief 160 Digitized by Microsoft® THE PEACE OF PARIS AND THE EMPIRE l6l utilitarian tie attaching the colonies to the metropolis, and its elimination allowed full play to those marked forces that tended toward a disintegration of the Empire. The movement toward independence dates from the very foundation of the colonies. The settlement of New England was not the result of a normal expansion of the state, but was rather of the nature of a schism therein or of a secession therefrom. This tendency in the direction of political sepa- ration from the mother country was due in great part to the extreme individualism of the immigrants, whether they came from England, Scotland, Ireland, or from continental Europe. This original characteristic was in turn strength- ened by the isolation of the colonists in a remote portion of the world, cut off not only from their fellows in Great Britain, but also from those in the other British colonies by the enormous distances that steam and electricity have since so immeasurably shortened. In part also this lack of cohesion in the Empire was due to the policy of England, which granted to the colonies large powers of local self- government. In this respect the old Empire fell little short of the modern one. The degree of self-government in the charter and even in the proprietary colonies was only some- what less than that now exercised by Canada and Australia. On the other hand, the mother country erected legislatures in all the colonies, even in those supported by the British tax-payer,* and uniformly granted them far greater powers than are enjoyed to-day by a large number of the crown colonies. Thus, in the eighteenth century, Jamaica gov- ' The first Assembly of Nova Scotia met in 1 758. Nova Scotia Arch., p. 728. M Digitized by Microsoft® l62 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 erned itself to a much greater extent than it does at the present time. In the royal colonies, the Crown appointed the governor and the council; the latter also acted as the upper branch of the legislature, the lower house being popularly elected. The system is now known as the "representative" one in contradistinction to the system of "responsible government," that at present prevails in colonies like Canada. The idea was that the governor and council should be a check on the popular branch of the legislature, and should be independent of it. In practice, however, owing to the fact that as a rule the lower house had gained complete control of the local finances, the governor became dependent on the legislature, which was often in a position to withhold his salary in case he refused to comply with its wishes. There was full justifi- cation for Soame Jenyns's contention that the governors could get their salaries from the colonial legislatures only by violating the instructions that they had received from th& home government.^ Thus the course of constitutional development in the colonies proceeded from the presidential system, or that of mere "representative government," in the direction of the parliamentary system, or that of "responsible government." Through its control of the purse, the lower house of the pro- vincial legislatures had become the dominating factor in American political life. This development had taken place in the West Indies as well as on the continent, though in ' Soame Jenyns, The Objections to the Taxation of our American Colonies (2d ed. London, 1765), pp. 13, 14. Digitized by Microsoft® THE PEACE OF PARIS AND THE EMPIRE 163 general to a less marked extent. In 1742 the Governor of Barbados said that some people in the colony have the idea "that the King has no prerogative here, and that Governors should be solely dependent, on the people." ^ In 1753 the Jamaica Assembly passed the following resolution: "That it is the inherent and undoubted Right of the Representa- tives of the People to raise and apply Monies for the Service and Exigencies of Government, and to appoint such Person or Persons for the receiving and issuing thereof, as they shall think proper." This claim of the Jamaica Assembly attracted the attention of the House of Commons, which in 1757 voted that this resolution in "so far as the same imports a Claim of Right in the said Assembly to raise and apply public Money, without the Consent of the Governor and Council, is illegal, repugnant to the Terms of his Majesty's Commission to the Governor of the said island, and derog- atory of the Rights of the Crown and People of Great Britain." ^ 'Am. and W.I. 37, no. 2. Robinson to Newcastle, Aug. 29, 1742. 'May 23, 1757. Commons Journal 27, pp. 910, 911. At this time also the House of Commons passed two other resolutions, one against the claim of the Jamaica Assembly to appoint a person for receiving and issuing money, the other upholding the necessity of the instruction to the colonial governors not to pass laws affecting the Crown's prerogative or the trade of Great Britain, unless their execution were suspended until the Crown's pleasure could be as- certained. The Jamaica Assembly had objected to this instruction. On Oct. 13, 1762, Governor W. H. Lyttelton of Jamaica wrote to the Board of Trade, though "there are strong assurances given by the people of their Loy- alty & dutifuU attachments to His Majesty, there is nevertheless, as far as I am able to judge, such an eager desire to be freed from those restraints, which the Wisdom of His Majesty's Councils have put them vinder in common with the rest of His Colonies in the great point of Legislation, & such an aspiring Digitized by Microsoft® l64 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 These resolutions, though passed in connection with the claims of the Jamaica Assembly, were meant to apply to all the colonial legislatures. They were ineffectual in stopping the trend of constitutional development. Thus the Lieu- tenant-Governor of New Jersey, to whom a copy of these resolutions had been sent, wrote to the Board of Trade that they could be of no avail unless followed by an act of Parlia- ment, and that "under the situation that His Majesty's Governors are at present, the Bringing any of the Crown's Rights into Dispute with the People is the sure Way to lose them." ' The general tendency was toward virtual auton- omy; the imperial tie was continually being loosened, and all political life in the colonies centred in the vigorous local endeavour to acquire in their Assemblies & within the sphere of their activity the same Power and Priveleges as are enjoy'd by a British House of Com- mons, as, I humbly conceive, may well deserve the consideration of His Maj- esty's Ministers." B. T. Jam. 36 Bb 65. A few days later, Lyttelton again wrote, that the Jamaica Assembly has "for some years last past considered the House of Commons of Great Britain as their Model & have assum'd & ex- ercis'd the powers thereof as nearly as the circumstances of this Country cou'd allow of, apprehending themselves to have an inherent Right so to do as Eng- lish subjects, entit'led to the use & benefit of the Laws of England of which the Custom of Parliament makes a part, rather than by virtue of His Majesty's Commission to His Governor; & the pretension of the Council to exercise the power of the House of Lords is built upon the same foundation." Lyttleton added: "And now my Lords I intreat your Lordships to reflect how extremely difficult it is for the King's Governor to support His Majesty's Authority in this Island with a Council assuming the Powers of the House of Lords, & an As- sembly those of the House of Commons of Great Britain. Ibid. Bb 66. On the difficulties of the governor with the Jamaica Assembly in 1764 and 1765, . see Cal. Home Office Papers, 1760-1765, nos. 1650, 1678. 'N.J. Col. Doc. IX, pp. I, 2. Thomas Pownall, Sept. 23, 1757. These resolutions of the House of Commons were sent by the Board of Trade to all the colonial governors. Cf. Pa. Arch., 4th Series II, p. 873. Digitized by Microsoft® THE PEACE OF PARIS AND THE EMPIRE 165 legislatures. Thus there grew up in America a class of men both eager and in general competent to direct the affairs of the communities to which they belonged. The British government had striven in vain against this de- velopment. The Board of Trade knew of no remedy. Rec- ognizing the justice of the complaints of those governors who had objected to the encroachments of the local assemblies, it had repeatedly written to them, asking for suggestions to al- leviate the difficulty. The only remedy that suggested itself was the creation by act of Parliament of a colonial revenue out of which the Crown officials should receive their salaries, and thus become independent of the colonial legislatures. This proposal had not commended itself. Nor was the idea of paying these officials out of British funds seriously en- tertained. This would have done away with the chief purpose for which the local legislatures had been established, and to which they devoted their main attention, namely, to provide for the cost of their own public affairs. The general effect of this constitutional development was to lessen the political dependence ,of the colonies on the Empire and to create a tendency toward political separation. That this would be the ultimate future of the colonies had been pointed out already in 1656 by James Harrington. In his "Oceana," ' this famous and influential thinker said : "That national or independent Empire, of what kind soever, is to be exercis'd by them that have the proper balance of Domin- ion in the Nation ; wherfore provincial or dependent Empire is not to be exercis'd by them that have the balance of Do- ' London ed. of 1747, pp. 42, 43. Digitized by Microsoft® l66 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 minion in the Province, because that would bring the Gov- ernment from Provincial and Dependent, to National and Independent." Starting from this premise, Harrington reached the conclusion that "the Colonys in the Indies, they are yet Babes that cannot live without sucking the breasts of their Mother Citys, but such as I mistake, if when they com of age they do not wean themselves : which causes me to wonder at Princes that delight to be exhausted in that way." ^ Harrington showed keen insight and his conclusion was sound, for under the conditions prevailing prior to the inventions that have so extensively faciUtated the means of communication, it was impossible to create a loosely organized empire with sufficient social solidarity to make its various members one coherent whole. Harrington's theoretical conclusion was borne out by the de- velopment within the Empire.^ Thus in 1 71 1, Robert Hunter, then governor of New York, one of the most public-spirited of colonial administrators, wrote to the secretary of state ' that there prevailed in the colonies a spirit of absolute inde- pendence in the management of their affairs. The New York Assembly, he said, claimed "all ye previledges of a ' London ed. of 1747, p. 44. John Adams quoted this passage in his "No- vanglus.'' Works (ed. C. F. Adams) IV, p. 104. On Harrington's influence on American thought, see T. W. Dwight in Pol. Science' Quar. II, pp. i et scq. ' Filed among the British state papers for 1 733-1 748 is an undated memorial on the colonies, which states that care must be taken "so to regulate them that they may answer the End of Settlements, and deserve the Protection given to them from hence : For unless some Care be taken, the People bom there, are too apt to imbibe Notions of Independency of their Mother Kingdom." Am. and W.I. 603. 'Am. and W.I. 6, nos. 87, 94; Ibid. Bundle 582, Sept. 12, 1711. Digitized by Microsoft® THE PEACE OF PARIS AND THE EMPIRE 167 House of Commons, and Stretching them even beyond what they were ever Imagined to be there, should the Counsill by ye same Rule lay Claime to ye rights and priviledges of a house of Peers, here is a body politik Coordinate with (& claiming equal powers) and Consequently Independant of ye Great Counsill of the Realme." Hunter then quoted with approval, as "a Reflexion that deserves some Considera- tion," Harrington's remarks and prediction about the future destiny of the colonies.^ In fact, the entire governmental machinery worked with so much friction ^ at every point where the local and imperial authorities came into contact, that it was apparent to many that the Empire was in a posi- tion of most unstable political equilibrium. The Crown ofl&cials were continually writing to the government about this tendency toward independence. In 1709, one of the admiralty judges informed the Earl of Nottingham that Rhode Island behaved as if it were an independent state, and that in Massachusetts " some of the leading men already begin to talke of shaking oflf their subjection to the Crown of ' At this time the New York Assembly claimed an "inherent right" of legislating apart from the Crown's instructions to the governor to call together the legislature. This claim was subsequently generally advanced by the colonies. ' On Jan. i, 171 2, Robert Hunter wrote to the secretary of state : "In the Infancy of the Colonies the Crown was lavish of priviledges as necessary for their nurseing, but a full grown boy makes commonly but Indifferent use of that Indulgence requisite toward a Child;" in New York the Council is "vilified and Insulted and the officers of Government Look'd upon as the Common Enemy's and marks of their Malice and all this without the least provocation or Colour of Reason." Am. and W.I. 583. Digitized by Microsoft® l68 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 England." ' Twenty years later, another official informed the British government that in New England there were fre- quent instances of people disowning the King's sovereignty; "I have heard one say in publique Company that he was a Subject of this Country, & not to the King." ^ Then again, some decades later, the proprietary governor of Pennsylvania, a colonial in interests, wrote of the people whose executive head he was: "I cannot indeed accuse them of disaffection to the Royal Family now upon the Throne, but they are Cer- tainly disaffected to Government itself, and Consequently to his Majesty's Office and Authority tho' not to his Person i or Family." ^ William Knox, who at a later date was prominent in British official life, came to the colonies in 'Am. and W.I. 6, no. 12. Roger Mompesson, July 4, 1709. ^ Am. and W.I. i, no. 177. David Dunbar. ' Robert Hunter Morris to Penn, Oct. 27, 1755. Am. and W.I. 69. At a hearing before the Board of Trade in 1760 concerning some laws passed in Pennsylvania, the Attorney-General opened the case, "stating the general Tendency and Disposition of the House of Assembly of the Province at all times to encroach upon the Rights of the Proprietaries, the Prerogative of the Crown, and the sovereign Government of the Mother Country, by their-as- serting that the Lieutenant Governor was not the Governor of the Crown; — by their almost rebellious Declarations with respect to the Instruction con- cerning Paper Currency founded upon an Address of Parliament; — by denying the Right of the Proprietaries to instruct their Gov' and other Acts of avowed Democracy." B. T. Journals 68, p. 139. In 1723, a somewhat intemperate and partisan writer wrote concerning Boston: "Speaking of treason, of which I have heard more here in one day, than in all my life before, such as his Ma'.^ has no business in this country, he is our nominal king, but has not one foot of ground among us, neither he or his Deputys or Govemours have anything to doe here, the country is ours not his, weel try his title by Law . . . as we have nothing to do with their country so they have nothing to doe with ours, & weel have a fair tryal for it. . . ." Am. and W.I. i, no. 87. Digitized by Microsoft® THE PEACE OF PARIS AND THE EMPIRE 169 1757, and found that "a general disposition to independence of this country prevailed throughout the whole." ^ If loyalty be conceived as a sentiment implying duties and sacrifices, and not merely utilitarian allegiance, there was in the colonies, broadly speaking, little loyalty ^o G reat Britain. Colonial public spirit was predominantly provincial. Except in so far as the mother country was a shield against France or Spain, she represented in general merely an outside force that interfered with their attaining complete self- government. Nor, on the other hand, was there anynational or Am erican spiri t in th e continental colonies. Reciprocal jealousies culminating in discriminatory legislation, boun- dary disputes, quarrels over the Indian trade, show as clearly as did the failure of the plan of union of 1754 that the crea- tion of a united nation was still in the distant future.^ Thus each colony stood by itself, intent on its own political disputes, and in turn each colony relied on the mother country for protection. These two factors, especially the latter, counteracted the disintegrating tendencies within the Empire. That under such conditions independencejwas a political impossibility was recognized at the very beginning of the Empire's history. At that time, and virtually until the con- quest of Canada, independence from Great Britain would have meant only conquest and absorption by^some other of the European colonizing powers. Thus in 1633, Downing, the brother-in-law of John Winthrop, wrote to Secretary ' Knox, Extra Official State Papers (London, 1789) II, p. 11. ' CJ. Burnaby, Travels, pp. 152, 153. Digitized by Microsoft® 170 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 17S4-I76S Coke, "it is a causeless fear without precedent that a colony planted in a strange land was ever so foolishly besotted as to reject the protection of their natural prince. ... It is not an easy thing to force or compel a colony planted in a strange land to forsake their allegiance and protection of their natural prince, or to leave their commerce with their friends and allies in their native country, whom they may safely trust, and so rest upon strangers for protection and commerce, in whom they can put no confidence. Surely they would be counted a foolish and mad people that should, without constraint, take their stocks out of their friends' and kinsmens' hands to venture and hazard the same in mens' hands in whom they have had no experience." * The entire course of English colonial history up to 1763 shows that the closeness or looseness of the i mperial tie depended up on the extent of the danger^frpm Spain or JF.raacfi. The fact that Great Britain protected the colonies in peace and in war was the main bond securing the colonies to the mother country. So apparent was this that a Swedish scientist, who toward the middle of the eighteenth century travelled extensively in the colonies, questioned whether England had ever seriously intended to conquer Canada, as the proximity of the French deterred the colonies from seceding.^ Similarly it was recognized that the disunion of the col- onies was a potent factor in retaining them within the ' Coke MSS., owned by Lord Walter T. Kerr, and located at Melbourne Hall, Derbyshire, England. The spelling and punctuation of the extract have been modernized. ' Peter Kalm, En Resa Til Norra America (Stockholm, 1756) 11, pp. 371 ct seq.; English translation (Warrington, 1770) II, p. 264. Digitized by Microsoft® THE PEACE OF PARIS AND THE EMPIRE 171 imperial fold.* Shirley thought that their clashing interests would prevent a union without which independence was impossible.'' In the discussions during the war as to the advisability of retaining Canada, it was pointed out that the removal of the French would lead to a movement for independence on the part of the continental colo- ' Both ideas are contained in an address of the New York Assembly of 1741 answering the Governor's speech in which he said that some in England thought the colonies were anxious for independence: "We dare Vouch That not one single Person in it has any such Thoughts or Desire, for under what Govern- ment can we be better Protected, or our Liberties and Properties so well secured?" Am. and W.I. 9, no. 93. ' Shirley was ardently in favor of conquering Canada, and hence tended to belittle the effect of such an event on the unity of the Empire. In 1745, he wrote to Newcastle urging his favorite scheme, and pointing out that if the colonies became restless and wanted independence, Louisburg would be a very important check to such a movement. He also added, this contingency "seems to me from the observation I have been able to make upon the Spot, at the Dis- tance of some Centuries farther off than, I have heard, it does to Some Gentle- men at home." Am. and W.I. 3, no. 197. In 1755, also, Shirley wrote to Sir Thomas Robinson advising the conquest of Canada and adding: "Apprehen- sions have been entertain' d, that they (the colonies) will in time unite to throw off their Dependency upon their Mother Coimtry, & set up one General Gov- ernment among themselves; But if it is consider' d. Sir, how different the pres- ent Constitutions of their respective Governments are from each other; how much the Interests of some of them clash, & how opposite their Tempers are ; such a Coalition among them will seem highly improbable, at all Events, they could not maintain such an Independency, without a Strong Naval Force, which it must forever be in the Power of Great Britain to hinder them from having." Am. and W.I. 82. Jeremiah Dummer in his "Defence of the New England Charters" (London, 1721), Ukewise maintained that the colonies were "so distinct from one another in their Forms of Government, in their Religious Rites, in their Emtilation of Trade, and consequently in their Affec- tions, that they can never be suppos'd to unite in so dangerous an Enterprize," as trying to gain independence. Pownall (op. cit., pp. 28, 63, 64) also advanced the same argiunent. Digitized by Microsoft® 172 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 nies/ Such unquestionably was the result. The conquest of Canada severed the chief material bond attaching these colonies to Great Britain, and made their independence a ' In 1777 there were published by J, Almon some letters purporting to have been written by Montcalm in the years 1757, 1758, and 1759. (Lettres de M. le Marquis de Montcalm, London, 1777.) At the very time of publica- tion, their authenticity was questioned, Shelbume aflBrming that they were forgeries and Lord Mansfield insisting that they w^ere not spurious. (Almon, Parliamentary Register, House of Lords, VII, pp. 122, 126, 127.) Their pub- lisher was himself in doubt as to their authenticity. (Almon, Biographical Anecdotes II, p. 99.) Since then this question has been frequently discussed, e.g., by: Parkman in Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc. 1869-1870, pp. 118 et seq. and in Montcalm and Wolfe II, pp. 325, 326 ; Justin Winsor in Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc. 1886-1887, p. 202; Henry Stevens, Bibliotheca Historica, 1870, pp. 114-117. Subsequent to these discussions, manuscript copies of the letters have come to light in the Dartmouth collection and in that of the Marquess of Lothian. It also appears that other manuscript copies of these and other letters of Montcalm are in the Cheltenham Collection (Doughty, Siege of Quebec VT, pp. 243, 257), as well as in the Montcalm papers and in the Public Record OflSce (Am. and W.I. 48s). Obviously the dispute as to their authenticity cannot be deter- mined without a careful comparative examination of these manuscripts. These letters were handed to the British government by one Roubaud, a renegade Jesuit missionary, who after the conquest of Canada went over to the English. His own testimony is contradictory, and is to a great extent worthless on ac- count of his unreliable character. Yet it unquestionably throws a serious doubt on the genuineness of the letters. One point is, however, beyond question, that Roubaud handed copies of these letters to Grenville at the very beginning of the American troubles, when there could be virtually no inducement to misrepre- sent conditions in the colonies. ("Mr. Roubaud's Deplorable Case" in His- torical Magazine, Series II, VIII, p. 283; Brymner, Report on Can. Arch., 1885, p. cxxxviii ; Almon, Biographical Anecdotes II, p. 99; Verreau in Report of the Minister of Agriculture of Canada, 1874, p. 182.) Apart from the question of their authorship by Montcalm, these letters in general describe accurately conditions in the colonies. In one of them it is said that the colo- nists "en g€n^ral ne se soucient gufere du Roi ni du Parlement d'Angleterre— aussi auraient-ils dfes longtemps secou6 le joug, si la crainte de la France n'eut €t6 un frein pour les retenir, chaque Province serait devenue une petite Digitized by Microsoft® THE PEACE OF PARIS AND THE EMPIRE 173 political possibility.* It was a most fundamental fact in the history of the Empire ; it destroyed the equilibrium of the unstable structure and allowed full scope to the centrifugal forces within it. It had little effect upon the West Indian colonies ; they remained as heretofore dependent on the naval power of the mother country. At the same time the long years of joint military service by the provincial soldiers tended to bring the continental colonies closer together, and to emphasize their common characteristics, especially when con- trasted with the regular soldiers from Europe.* While thus the conquest of Canada broke the main link attaching the colonies to Great Britain, the cooperation of the \ provincial and regular forces during the war did not produce Republique." MSS. of Marquess of Lothian (Hist. MSS. Com. 1905), p. 240. In the various forms in which these letters are extant, there are a number of verbal differences due evidently to carelessness on the part of Roubaud, who made a number of copies either from a French original or, as some suppose, from an English one. On Roubaud, see especially Brymner, Report on Cana- dian Archives for 1885, and also Cal. Home OflSce Papers, 1760-1765, nos. 2021, 2097. 'Already, in 1710-1711, a Frenchman had pointed out this connection, Parkman, Half Century of Conflict I, p. 155. ' In the Montcalm letters mentioned above (Lettres de Montcalm, pp. 2-10; Lothian MSS., p. 239) is a letter purporting to have been written to Montcalm from Boston and subsequently translated by Bougainville, which describes this development. " Pendant plus d'un si&de nos diverses Colonies ont eu trfes peu de correspondence entre elles; occupp&s h. se former et s'^tablir, elles ne visaient qu'a, elles-mtoes. Les Gouvemements d'ailleurs sont differents, les loix, la Religion souvent, & le commerce y contrastent. De Ik leur peu d'union ; elles subsistaient I'une k c6te de I'autre sans presque se connaitre. Mais depuis cette guerre les colons se sont rapprochfe de moeurs, d'interfits & de sentiments; obligfe de foumir leurs contingents, ils se sont trouvds rangfe sous le mSme pavilion ; des liaisons, des correspondences se sont form&s." Digitized by Microsoft® 174 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 a cordial feeling, but rather served to accentuate the differ- ences between the two branches of the race. It emphasized what were to a great extent temporary divergencies created by a radically different social and economic environment, and it led to many misunderstandings. Washington's scathing criticism of the regular troops under Braddock' was not conducive to harmony, nor was Wolfe's even more severe condemnation of the colonial levies.^ The prod- ucts of a more highly developed and complex civilization were prone to look upon the rude and primitive culture of America with a feeling sometimes bordering on contempt.* British officers were apt to assert a superiority which was 'Washington, Writings (ed. W. C. Ford) I, pp. 173-175. Dinwiddie sent a copy of this letter to England. ' In 1758, on hearing of the defeat of Abercromby at Ticonderoga, Wolfe wrote to Lord George Sackville: "The Americans are in general the dirtiest most contemptible cowardly dogs, that you can conceive. There is no depend- ing upon 'em in action. They fall down dead in their own dirt and desert by battalions, officers and all. Such rascals as those are rather an incumbrance than any real strength to an army." Hist. MSB. Com. 9, III, p. 77 \ Aber- cromby's despatch to Pitt, July 12, 1758, gives no indication that there was any misbehavior on the part of the provincial troops. Am. and W.I. 87. On Aug. 22, 1758, Pitt himself wrote to Granville, "the troops deserve all applause: the provincials share the honour." Grenville Papers I, p. 262. Coming from a. man of such lofty character as was Wolfe's, these criticisms are significant indications of the alienation between the mother country and colonies. Equally significant are the criticisms of Forbes, who is deservedly recognized as one of the heroes of the war. These have been quoted elsewhere in this essay. For further expressions of Forbes's opinions, see Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe II, p. 137. ' In connection with the handful of colonial troops that participated in the reduction of Louisburg, Wolfe wrote to Lord George Sackville, May 12, 1758: "About 500 Rangers are come, which to appearance are little better than la canaille." Doughty, op. cit. VI, p. 74. Digitized by Microsoft® THE PEACE OF PARIS AND THE EMPIRE 175 galling to the pride of many a colonial. In a number of instances this feeling was justified by the character of the colonial levies. Thus a cordial friend of America frankly admitted that the two regiments enlisted in the colonies for service in 1755 consisted of "the very scum of the People, Who will be of as little service planted in any Colony as they are in the Defence of it." * The provincial soldier was also unaccustomed to military discipline and routine, and was of far less value in open operations ^ than in backwoods fighting. On the other hand, however, the regular troops and their ofiicers did not readily adapt themselves to the condi- tions requisite for the successful conduct of a war in America, and, especially in the first few years of the war, committed many disastrous blunders.' Partly for this reason the pro- vincial soldiers were loath to serve under British oflScers. ' This critidsm refers to the two regiments, Shirley's and Pepperrell's, raised in America at the expense of the mother country. N.J. Col. Doc. VIII, Part II, p. 17; Sharpe Correspondence I, pp. 107, 108. The critic quoted above is Dennys (Dennis) de Berdt, a London merchant with extensive com- mercial connections in America. At a later date he was agent in England for the Massachusetts Assembly. Appleton, Cyclopaedia of American Biography n, p. 118. In 1757 de Berdt prepared a scheme for carrying on the war which he intended for the consideration of Lord Walpole, but on that statesman being incapacitated by illness, he sent it to Pitt, Feb. 12, 1757. Pringle (Chatham) MSS. in Public Record Office, vol. XIX. The criticism occurs in this memorial. ' De Berdt said that a large number of regular troops was necessary "or else in an open Field or the attacks of Forts we can never successfully oppose the Power of France whose Regular Troops are exceeding numerous." 'Thus, on Dec. i, 1758, James Wolfe wrote to his friend Rickson, blaming Abercromby for his ''precipitate attack of Ticonderago," disparaging the con- duct of the operations against Louisburg, sajring we "blundered from the beginning to the end of the campaign." Doughty, op. cit. VI, p. 27. On May 24, 1 758, Wolfe wrote to Sackville, criticising Loudoim for adhering to Euro- Digitized by Microsoft® 176 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 As De Berdt pointed out in 1757, in order to obtain the best men in the colonies they must be commanded by "ofl&cers of their own country." ' The Americans were prone to attribute the disasters of the years 1755, 1756, and 1757 to the inefl&ciency of the British mihtary commanders/ and these in turn blamed the colonies for their backwardness in pro- viding troops. One of the most troublesome and irritating problems demanding a settlement was the relative rank of officers appointed by the Crown and of those commissioned by the colonial authorities. This led to many disputes and dis- agreements.* As Great Britain undertook the responsibility of the war, it was obviously impossible to allow the regular to be outranked by the colonial officers, as in this way the control of affairs might pass from the hands of the mother country. But the regulations adopted at the outset were needlessly stringent. In 1754 it was ordered that all troops serving by commission from the Crown or the Commander-in- Chief should outrank all colonial troops ; that all provincial pean methods of fighting. "Hitherto there has been the most profound ig- norance of the nature of the war upon this continent," a condition which he hoped Lord Howe would remedy, provided he outlived the campaign. Ibid. P-77- ' Pringle MSS. XIX, Feb. 12, 1757. 'Ibid. Dennys de Berdt to Pitt, Jan. 16, 1758. The writer added: "Nor can the Provision that may be made for the Nephews or youngest Sons of Hon- ourable Families by giving them Command in America, Compensate for hazard- ing the loss of a Country which acquired by our Enemies will be such an accession to their Power as will enable them to inslave all Europe." See also Collections of Connecticut Historical Society III, pp. 334-336. 'Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe I, pp. 152, 254, 390, 399, 400; II, p. 118. Digitized by Microsoft® THE PEACE OF PARIS AND THE EMPIRE 177 general and field ofiicers should have no rank when serving with similar officers appointed by the Crown ; and that all captains and other inferior officers serving under commissions from the Crown should outrank provincial officers of like grade regardless of the date of their commissions.' In 1756 these regulations were altered in so far that provincial gen- eral and field officers were given the rank of eldest captains "on aU Detachments, Courts Martial or other Duty" wherein they may be employed in conjunction with the regu- lar troops.^ Finally in 1757, Pitt adopted a regulation which, in general, proved satisfactory. It provided that all colonial officers, from the rank of colonel up, should, on aU duties in conjunction with the regulars, take rank after all colonels serving by commission from the Crown, and that all inferior • N.J. Col. Doc. VIII, Part II, pp. 29, 30 ; Col. Rec. of No. Ca. V, p. 152. Sir Thomas Robinson, Nov. 12, 17S4. ' Henry Fox, May 12, 1756. N. J. Col. Doc. IX, pp. 19, 20, and Sharpe Cor- respondence I, p. 413. Some of the difficulties are clearly brought out in a letter that Governor Charles Lawrence wrote to Colonel Monckton in connection with the troops raised in New England for the Nova Scotia campaign of 1755. On March 28, 1 755, he wrote : " The Rank of a Provincial or Irregular Commission, which is no more than Imaginary, whither of a Major or whatever else it may be, can never come in Competition with the Rank of a Commission granted by His Majesty how inferior soever that may be : Nevertheless if the Provincial Officers of the Irregulars should be so vainly idle as to Contend with the other Officers upon a point that appears so plainly against them, I should hope that the Kings Officers will even acquiesce for the sake of His Majesties Service in an affair that can never afterward affect their Rank as Officers in the Army. I Should recommend it strongly at the same time to seperate as much as may be the Regular from the Provincial Troops in order to pre- vent if possible, such Ridiculous differences, as some vain people may have a propensity to Create." Chalmers's MSS. (Len6x Library) Nova Scotia, 1745-1817, pp. 8, 9. N Digitized by Microsoft® 178 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1734-1765 colonial officers should take rank after the regular officers of the like grade.' _ In the later and successful years of the war, after Pitt had inaugurated the compensation system,'' the relations between the colonial and regular forces were more harmoni- ous. Throughout the entire war, however, it was realized that the colonies as a whole were not exerting themselves to the utmost, and that they were inclined to shift the burden of the war upon the shoulders of the British tax-payer. In their dealings with the provincial authorities, the Commander- in-Chief often encountered annoying difficulties.^ In vary- ing degrees all these matters produced friction. In addi- tion there was some suspicion of the loyalty of the colonies.^ ' Dec. 13, 1757. N.J. Col. Doc. IX, p. 20. 'In 1757 De Berdt advised Pitt that the enlisting of colonial troops for a particular service "under the pay of Great Brittain " would produce satisfactory results. Pringle MSS. XIX. ' Thus on May 21,1 759, Amherst wrote to Wolfe, in reply for the latter's re- quest for three hundred pioneers, colonials whom he needed for the attack on Quebec: "If my demands on this occasion have not the weight that I hope they will have, I can't help it; the difficulties of prevailing on any of the Govern- ments to the Westward of Halifax, to go out of the common road, are great." He hopes that the government will act "without waiting for provincial Authori- ties & Ceremonies, by which half the Campaign would be over before they are resolved." Doughty, op. cit. VI, p. 54. * See Secret and Miscellaneous Papers, 1756-1761 : Am. and W.I. 81. The question raised in these papers as to Shirley's loyalty is ridiculous. Cf. also Dartmouth MSS., Hist. MSS. Com. XIV, 10, p. 7. One of the Mont- calm letters quoted above (Lettres de Montcalm, pp. i et seq.; Lothian MSS., p. 239 ; Dartmouth MSS., p. 545) states that the writer was in continuous corre- spondence with the English colonies, and that some of them were willing to become neutral during the war. See also Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe I, P- 435- Digitized by Microsoft® THE PEACE OF PARIS AND THE EMPIRE 179 As far as overt treason was concerned, there seems to have been little basis for such accusations. To many, however, the colonial trade with the enemy appeared closely akin to -treason, and led to a strong feeling of resentment in Great Britain. On the other hand, the wholesale seizure of colo- nial ships engaged in this trade and the enforcement of the Molasses Act produced considerable ill-feeling in a number of the colonies. During the wa,r also there arose two questions, one pri- marily affecting Virginia, the other New York, both of which led to steps on the part of the British government which tended still further to increase the mutual feeling of annoyance. In Virginia the question concerned the most fundamental imperial relations, and brought to an issue the right of the colonial legislature to pass acts which, how- ever free they may have been of such an intent, had the di- rect result of scaling down debts due to merchants residing in the mother country. In 1748 the Virginia Assembly passed a law that judg- ments for sterling debts could be settled in currency at 25 per cent advance. As exchange fluctuated and was at times as high as 40 per cent, some London, Liverpool, and Bristol merchants complained about this act.' In the meanwhile, partly owing to the carelessness of the Board of Trade and its legal advisers, and partly because of the remissness of the British merchants in not complaining in time, this law had been confirmed by an order in council. It thus obtained the legal validity of an act of Parliament, and could not be • B. T. Va. 25 W 146. 1751. Digitized by Microsoft® l80 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 repealed either by the colonial legislature or by the Crown separately, but only by the joint action of both/ In 1752, at the suggestion of the Governor, the colonial legislature was seemingly about to repeal the act when word was re- ceived of the royal confirmation, and consequently the matter was dropped.^ In 1754, however, the British govern- ment sent instructions to the Lieutenant-Governor to induce the Assembly to modify the law.' This was done in 1755, when the Virginia legislature provided that in actions for the recovery of sterling debts the courts should fix the rate of exchange at which the amount due could be paid in cur- rency.* This arrangement was not satisfactory to the British merchants, and their dissatisfaction was intensified by the fact that at about this time Virginia began to issue paper money, making it a legal tender for debts. In 1755, owing to the scarcity of money in the colony and the necessity of providing funds for purposes of defence, Vir- ginia began to issue paper money.^ The amount issued in- creased rapidly, and despite the legal tender clause and the provisions made for their redemption, these notes steadily ' In 1 761 the Virginia Committee of Correspondence said of such a law that "no power on Earth can alter the Force of it less than our Assembly with his Majesty's Assent." This statement ignores the power of the British Parlia- ment. Proceedings of the Virginia Committee of Correspondence, 1759- 1767, in the Virginia Magazine of History and Biography XI, p. 20. Future references to these proceedings will be given in the following abbreviated form: Va. Mag. ' B. T. Va. 24 W 77. » Ibid. 25 W 166. ♦ Hening VI, pp. 478, 479. 1755 Ch. VII, §§ i, ii; Va. Mag. X, p. 345- ' B. T. Va. 25 W 198, 200. Digitized by Microsoft® THE PEACE OF PARIS AND THE EMPIRE i8l depreciated in value. In 1757 exchange was at 35 per cent, in 1762 at 65 per cent/ In 1758, the London and Bristol merchants presented memorials * against these issues of legal tender paper, whose effect was to scale down the large outstanding amounts that the Virginia planters owed them. Accordingly, instructions were sent to the colony to stop such practices.* These instractions were, however, not obeyed.* The Governor was forced to yield to the wishes of the Assembly, as otherwise funds for carrying on the war could not be secured. Francis Fauquier, then governor of Virginia, an economist of no mean ability,' said that Virginia could not help herself in any other way, and that the English merchants having sterling debts had no cause for alarm, as paper money could not be tendered for such accounts.® Unfortunately for the British merchants, there was a serious doubt as to the validity of the repeal of the law of 1748 which had fixed the rate of exchange at 25 per cent,^ and in addition, they claimed that the determina- •Va. Mag. XII, pp. 1-4. ' B. T. Va. 26 X 31, 32; B. T. Journals 66, June 21, 1758. ' B. T. Va. 26 X 44. *Ibid. 27 Yso, 51. '' See his remarkable pamphlet, "An Essay on Ways and Means of raising Money," London, 1756. ° B. T. Va. 26 X 49. In 1763 the Virginia burgesses stoutly asserted that they had no intention of defrauding their creditors, and that the merchants had no cause for complaint, as in the case of sterling debts the courts had always fixed the rate of exchange fairly. Ibid. 27 Y 92. ' The English merchants claimed that the law of 1748 could not be legally repealed by the law of 1755 until the latter had received the Crown's confirma- tion, and that consequently they could be paid in depreciated money. B. T. Va. 27 Y 51, 1762. For a similar protest from the Glasgow merchants, see Digitized by Microsoft® lS2 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 tion of the rate of exchange by the courts under the law of 1755 was unsatisfactory, as in some instances exchange had risen 5, 10, and even 15 per cent between the time of the orders of the court and the possibility of obtaining a remittance. Moreover, the Glasgow merchants claimed that most of the debts of the British merchants were in currency, and had been contracted on the strength of the former low exchange.* As far as these debts were concerned, the action of Virginia unquestionably amounted to partial repudiation. But in contradistinction to a, number of the other colonies, Virginia was to a great extent innocent of any such intention. The initial step once taken, however, the inevitable results followed, as in similar instances in the other colonies, — depreciation and an outflow and disap- pearance of coin,^ — which in turn rendered the further issue of paper money seemingly imperative. It was a vicious circle into which was drawn not only the colony but also the ibid. Y 55; and from the Liverpool merchants, see ibid. Y 56. In 1763 the burgesses answered that their law of 1755 repealed that of 1748, even though it had not yet received the royal approbation, and that if the merchants thought otherwise they should not present petitions, but should get the law of 1755 con- firmed by the Crown. Ibid. Y 1)1. For Virginia's defence in 1759 and 1763, see Va. Mag. XI, p. 2; pp. 345-349- 'B. T. Va. 27Y113, 114. ' These Virginia treasury notes were legal tender in payment of all debts, ex- cept the Crown's quit-rents. Hening VII, pp. 336, 351. The Deputy Receiver- General of Virginia, however, pointed out to the Lords of the Treasury that owing to the large emissions, gold and silver had left the country, and that consequently he was forced to take this depreciated money in payment of the quit-rents, which resulted in a loss to the Crown of 35 per cent. B. T. Va. 27 Y 51 ; B. T. Journals 70, p. 312. Bumaby (Travels, pp. 60, 6i) pointed out that "the use of paper currency in this colony has entirely banished from it gold and silver." Digitized by Microsoft® THE PEACE OF PARIS AND THE EMPIRE 183 British merchant. The latter was naturally incensed at what, as far as he was concerned, amounted to a scaling down of debts owing to him/ In addition to these issues of paper money, Virginia at this time also embarked on another policy, which had similar results. Tobacco had, ever since the origin of the colony, been used as an alternative standard of value. During the war tobacco rose violently in price, due partly to the planting" of smaller crops, and partly to the depreciated paper money. Already in 1755,^ Virginia passed an act giving to those owing tobacco, whether on debts, contracts, or for any other reason, the alternative of discharging their obligations dur- ing the following ten months in money at the rate of twopence a pound. In 1758, owing to the scarcity of tobacco, a similar act was passed, which was to be in force for a year.^ This law, familiarly known as the "Two-Penny Act,"* aroused intense opposition, both on the part of the clergy," as well as ' In 1762 the merchants trading to Virginia asserted that they had suffered large losses as they "have at all times large Sumes of money due to them there." B. T. Va. 27 Y SI. ' Hening VI, pp. 568, 569. 1755 Ch. 5. ' 76W. VII, pp. 240, 241. 1758 Ch. 6. * Moses Coit Tyler, who merely considered this law in so far as it affected the clergy, wrote somewhat emphatically: "Such, then, in all its fresh and un- adorned rascality, was the famous 'option law,' or 'two-penny act,' of 1758: an act firmly opposed, on its first appearance in the legislature, by a noble minority of honorable men ; an act clearly indicating among a portion of the people of Virginia a survival of the old robber instincts of our Norse ancestors; an act having there the sort of frantic popularity that all laws are likely to have which give a dishonest advantage to the debtor class." Patrick Henry, PP- 37. 38- ' B. T. Va. 26 X 49; 26 Y 22; Va. Mag. X, p. 347; Bumaby, Travels, pp. 49-52. Digitized by Microsoft® 1 84 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 on that of the British merchant. The salaries of the Vir- ginia clergy had been fixed in 1748 by a colonial law at six- teen thousand pounds of tobacco yearly.* As tobacco in 1758 was worth considerably more than twopence a pound, the "parsons" felt that they had been defrauded and com- plained bitterly. As far as the clergy was concerned, the mat- ter was to some extent merely a local one, but as far as the British merchants were affected, this legislation involved fun- damental imperial relations. In 1759 the merchants of Lon- don trading to Virginia presented a memorial against the act of 1 758,^ pointing out that they had large quantities of tobacco owing to them by Virginians, and that under this law, in- stead of delivering the merchandise, the planters could re- turn the money paid for it. They said that when these con- tracts were made, the price was only twopence a pound, as there was then a large crop of tobacco on hand. Tobacco had, however, in the meanwhile risen from 165. 8d. a hun- dred pounds to 27^. and as a result of the law, many of those signing the memorial had to repurchase at the higher price in order to load their vessels.' In other words, this act, whatever its intent may have been, had the direct result of rescinding contracts which had turned out unfavorably » Hening VI, p. 88. ' B. T. Va. 26 X 67. ' In the "Parson's Cause" testimony was introduced showing that the price of tobacco in 1759 was 50s. a hundred. Maury, Memoirs of a Huguenot Family, pp. 418-420. See also Va. Mag. X, p. 350. This was in currency. Exchange at the time was 45 per cent. Va. Mag. XII, p. 2. Hence if figured in sterling, the price would be considerably less, and would approximate to that mentioned by the British merchants. Digitized by Microsoft® THE PEACE OF PARIS AND THE EMPIRE l§5 to Virginians. The British government, which was spend- ing large sums on the defence of the colonies, naturally could not allow those who bore the main brunt of the war to be thus treated. Consequently, on August lo, 1759, an order in council was issued, disallowing this Virginia act, as well as those of a similar nature passed prior to 1758.* This action aroused considerable ill-feeling in the colony. The clergy proceeded to bring suits to recover the difference between the market price of tobacco in 1 758-1 759, and two- pence a pound. In one of these cases, in which the legal point at issue had already been decided in favor of the plaintiff and in which there remained to the jury only the duty of assess- ing the amount of the verdict, a young Virginia lawyer, Patrick Henry, appeared for the defendant. In his address to the jury, Henry contended "that the act of 1758 had every char- acteristic of a good law ; that it was a law of general utility, and could not, consistently with what he called the original compact between King and people, stipulating protection on the one hand and obedience on the other, be annulled." From this he inferred "that a King, by disallowing Acts of this salutaiy nature, from being the father of his people, de- generated into a Tyrant, and forfeits all right to his subjects' obedience." This appeal was successful with the jury, which returned a verdict of nominal damages.^ This fact and the ' B. T. Va. 26 X 103. It should be noted that the act of 1748 regulating the salaries of the clergy had been confirmed by the Crown, thus acquiring the va- lidity of an act of Parliament. Consequently, on this ground, the legality of the "two-penny act" of 1758 was in itself open to serious question. Va. Mag. X, pp. 349> 354- ' Maury, op. cit. pp. 419-423. Digitized by Microsoft® l86 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 subsequent popularity of Henry — he frankly admitted that his sole aim in speaking thus was to make himself popu- lar — show how greatly the imperial tie was strained and how unwilling the colonies were to submit to any restraint interfering with their complete freedom of action. Throughout the entire history of the Empire, the mother country had difficulty with the colonies over questions of this nature. Thus at this very time, objections were raised to bankruptcy laws that had been enacted both in Virginia * and in Massachusetts,^ on the ground that they gave inadequate protection to British creditors. Similarly, in these years, Ja- maica ^ also sought to raise unduly the value of its currency. The experience with Virginia paper money during the war and the justifiable complaints of the British merchants * in- duced the imperial government to take steps to prevent such evils in the future. At various times prior to this, similar diffi- culties in other colonies had already brought this entire mat- ' B. T. Va. 27 Y 81. In 1763 the Glasgow merchants complained about this law. Ibid. Y 84. For other complaints, see Ibid. Y. 85, 86. In 1763 Vir- ginia repealed this law. Ibid. Y 95. On the other hand, in 1761 the Virginia Committee of Correspondence asserted that the English bankruptcy law was not fair to the colonists. Va. Mag. XI, p. 19. Daniel Dulany also claimed that, if on the one hand the colonial bankruptcy laws were unjust to British merchants, so on the other were the British laws to colonial creditors. Con- siderations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes (2d ed., Annapolis, 1765), p. 37. Obviously as the colonists were heavily in debt to the British merchants, the defects in the colonial laws had by far the more serious results. ' B. T. Journals 66, June 13, 1758; B. T. Mass. 77 li, no. i. ' At a hearing before the Board of Trade, Feb. 29, 1760, Alderman Beck- ford, supported by others, contended that this Jamaica act of 1758 would greatly injure creditors. B. T. Journals 68, p. 59. Cf. p. 72. * B. T. Journals 71, p. 41. Digitized by Microsoft® THE PEACE OF PARIS AND THE EMPIRE 187 ter to the attention of the British government. The former immoderate issues of paper money by New England had had the result "that many fair Creditors and other persons not in debt lost half or three fourths of what was due to them, and of their personal Estate." ' So great had the evil become that in 1740 the House of Commons passed a resolution condemn- ing such practices. This resolution had little efifect, espe- cially as the war then being waged gave occasion for many fresh issues. In 1751, however, Parliament passed an act regulating the issue of paper money, and absolutely forbidding the New England governments — where this evil was worst — from adding a legal tender clause thereto.^ This was in the nature of an act of censure, and consequently Parliament did not include in it those colonies that had not offended. In 1764, however, largely owing to the experience with Virginia, the Board of Trade reported that the principle of this bill was applicable to the other colonies as well, for " this measure of declaring paper bills of Credit to be Legal Tender was false in it's principles, unjust in it's foundation, and manifestly fraudulent in it's operation ; " ' and advised the passage of a comprehensive bill affecting all the colonies. Parliament, accordingly, in 1764, forbade the issue of legal tender paper money in the colonies.* This measure was absolutely essen- tial in view of the bitter experiences of the British merchants.* • B. T. Plant. Gen. 45, pp. 343-366- ' 24 Geo. II, c. 53. » B. T. Plant. Gen. 45, pp. 343-366. • 4 Geo. in, c. 34. • Thomas Pownall fully recognized the intricate nature of the currency problem in the colonies, and favored the issue of paper money, but without the Digitized by Microsoft® 1 88 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 Yet it was one of the factors in the subsequent separation,' for it caused some of the suffering that inevitably follows in the wake of an unsound monetary policy whose onward course is suddenly checked.^ In New York a question of fundamentally different nature led to similar consequences. One of the important results of the English constitutional struggles of the seventeenth century was the independence of the judiciary, which was secured both by appointing the judges during good behavior and also by attaching fixed salaries to their offices. The British bench was thus free from undue influences, both on the part of the Crown and on that of Parliament ; its inde- pendence was contingent upon one condition as much as upon the other. In the colonics, -on the other hand, neither condi- tion obtained. The judges were appointed during the pleas- ure of the Crown, but careful provisions were made to prevent their arbitrary removal from office by the governors. On the other hand, the judges were dependent for their salaries on the local legislatures, which customarily made only annual legal tender clause. He approved of this act of Parliament, and condemned "the outrageous abuses practised by some of those legislatures who have dealt in the manufacture of this depreciating currency." The Administration of the Colonies (2d ed., London, 1765), pp. 112, 113, 152, 153. ' In his examination before the House of Commons in 1 766, Franklin men- tioned this as one of the four causes of the change in American sentiment toward Parliament. Pari. Hist. 16, pp. 141, 142. Cf. also the "Late Regulations respecting the British Colonies" in Dickinson's Writings (ed. P. L. Ford) I, pp. 218, 227, 228. ' On June 14, 1765, Francis Fauquier wrote to the British government that currency had grown very scarce in Virginia because the Treasury notes were burnt as they came in for taxes; "this private Distress encreases the general Dissatisfaction at the Stamp Duties." Am. and W.L 388. Digitized by Microsoft® THE PEACE OF PARIS AND THE EMPIRE 189 provisions for them. This general rule had been departed from in New York by Governor Clinton, who appointed DeLancey to the position of Chief Justice during his good behavior, and also the inferior judges ; DeLancey, in turn, when lieutenant-governor, had adopted this precedent.* This was in direct violation of the instructions issued to all the governors, but the British government not only made no objection, but even gave its approval to Clinton's action.^ On the accession of George III, in 1760, the commissions of the New York judges had to be renewed. Colden, then the executive head of the colony, refused to issue them on the old terms, unless the legislature grani^d the judges fixed compensations. This the Assembly refused to do, thus frustra^Tng ' Colden's object of obtaining an independent bench.' It was unquestionably" advis^le to free the judges from their dependence on. tlie .45sembly4 During the war they had shown a distinct partiality to those engaged in illegal trade with the enemy; ^nd in 1761 Colden reported to the Board of Trade tliat the dependence of the judges on annual salary grants "may be highly prejudicial to the just rights of the Crown & the Acts of Trade." ^ The re- •N.Y. Col. Doc. VI, p. 792; VII, pp. 70s, 796; William Smith, Hist of N. Y. II, pp. 289 et seq. » N.Y. Col. Doc. VII, pp. 467, 468. ' A. M. Keys, Cadwallader Colden, pp. 272, 273. * Pownall {op. cit. p. 79) called attention to this necessity. Soame Jen3ms's statement that permanent salaries were needed for the judges because they were so dependent on the assemblies "that they can obtain a Livelihood no longer than quam diu se male gessermt" is somewhat overdrawn. The Objec- tions to the Taxation of our American Colonies (2d ed., London, 1765), p. 14. » N.Y. Col. Doc. VII, p. 467. Digitized by Microsoft® IQO BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 fusal of the Assembly to grant permanent salaries, according to Colden, meant "undue influence, not only in cases where the King's rights may be disputed, but likewise in private suits, where a leading man in an Assembly may be a party." ^ This matter was thus brought to the attention of the Commissioners of Trade, who on November 11, 1761, re- ported thereon.^ They correctly pointed out that the situa- tion in Great Britain was quite distinct from that in the col- onies, and remarked that of late years the colonial judges had become too frequently "the Partizans of a factious Assembly upon whom they have been dependent for their support, and who have withheld or enlarged that support according as the conduct of the Judges was more or less favourable to their Interests." Therefore the Board of Trade concluded that to appoint judges quam diu se bene gesserint, unless permanent salaries were granted, would be dangerous. This report was approved, and additional in- structions to appoint judges only at the pleasure of the Crown were sent to the colonial governors.* In New York these instructions led to a temporary cessation of the work of the courts. The old judges refused to serve on such a tenure,* and the Assembly refused to grant a salary to Benja- min Pratt whom the Crown had appointed Chief Justice.* Accordingly, the Crown granted him a salary out of the royal quit-rent revenue, which was at this time beginning to yield » N.Y. Col. Doc. VII, p. 470. 'Ibid: pp. 474, 475; B. T. Plant. Gen. 17 Q 21. ' N.Y. Col. Doc. VII, pp. 476, 479; N.J. Col. Doc. IX, pp. 329, 330. ♦N.Y. Col. Doc. VII, p. 797. >Ibid. pp. 483, 484; cf. pp. 500-505. Digitized by Microsoft® THE PEACE OF PARIS AND THE EMPIRE 191 a fair surplus.' Shortly after this the other judges also sub- mitted, and according to Colden, "the administrat" went on in its usual tranquility." ^ Subordinate in importance to this dispute in New York, but essentially similar in nature, was that in New Jersey. The governors in this colony had naturally also been in- structed to appoint judges only during the pleasure of the Crown.' Governor Lewis Morris had, however, disregarded this instruction, and had appointed Robert Hunter Morris as Chief Justice of New Jersey during his "good behaviour," * and a similar tenure had been bestowed on the judges of the inferior courts. On the arrival of Governor Josiah Hardy in New Jersey in 1761, he found that there was a total stop- page of justice, as the commissions had not been renewed on the death of George II. Hardy renewed these commis- sions in their existing forms, as otherwise the Assembly re- fused to grant any salaries.^ In doing this, he violated not only his general instructions, but also the specific ones sent by the Board of Trade in 1761. His action incensed these Commissioners, especially as they feared its possible effect in New York, where the dispute was of a more serious nature; and accordingly, they immediately recommended Hardy's removal from office.' William Franklin, the son of the famous scientist and statesman, was appointed gov- ' Am. and W.I. 387, folio 8. ' N.Y. Col. Doc. VII, p. 797. » N.J. Col. Doc. IX, pp. 39, s8. *Ibid. IX, pp. 207-209, 231, 264. March 17, 1738. • Ibid. pp. 345-349- ' Ibid. pp. 361, 362. Digitized by Microsoft® 192 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 emor in his place, and as in New York, so in New Jersey, the judges were compelled by the firmness of the govern- ment to accept commissions during the pleasure of the Crown.* This dispute ^ served still further to increase the alienation between the two branches of the English people. In New York, especially, it aroused considerable iU-feeling.' Here, as elsewhere, an impasse had been created. The British government was certainly as sincere as was the colony in its efforts to preserve the purity of the bench. Yet the only way by which this desirable result could be fully obtained was cut off by mutual lack of confidence. •N.J. Col. Docs, rx., pp. 364, 368. ' A few years later a great deal of friction was also created in New York by a question closely akin to this, involving the right of appeal to the governor from verdicts given by a jury. See A. M. Keys, op. cit. pp. 300-308. William Smith, writing to George Whitfield, Dec. 6, 1765, places this instruction about appeals among the three acts of the British government that caused the troubles in America. Dartmouth MSS., Hist. MSS. Com. XI, 5, p. 331. ' Cf. William Smith, Hist, of N.Y. (ed. 1829) II, pp. 289 et seq. Digitized by Microsoft® CHAPTER X READJUSTMENT OF THE LAWS OF TRADE, 1763-176S Under these conditions, when the imperial tie was already severely strained by a number of important controversies, and when, above all, the political equilibrium of the Empire had been destroyed by the removal of the French menace, the British government embarked upon a policy of vigorous reform. This movement naturally included within it a readjustment of the laws of trade and navigation to the new conditions created by the territorial gains in America. The old English colonial system — by which is generally meant the various provisions regulating the trade of the Empire — was one of great complexity and intricacy. It was embodied in an unwieldy series of parliamentary statutes, about one hundred in all.' Extensive governmental control over commerce and industry was the current practice, and was based on the theory that the economic activity of the individual should be wholly subordinated to the welfare of the community. The^primary object of the colonial system was to develop the wealth and power of the Empire. It was considered that this could best be accomplished by making ' On their appointment, in addition to the commissions and general instruc- tions, the governors received a special set of detailed trade instructions, enu- merating the various statutes with which they had to be conversant. See e.g. Trade Instructions to John Reynolds, governor of Georgia, Aug. 6, 1754. B. T. Ga. 14, pp. 233-318. o J93 Digitized by Microsoft® 194 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 it a self-sufi&cient economic unit, independent as far as was possible of competing national groups. As Pownall ex- pressed it, the aim was to create "one great commercial dominion." ' In this commercial Empire, mother country and dependency were to be mutually complementary, one supplying, as far as was possible, the manufactured products consumed in the colony, and the other the tropical products and the raw materials not produced by Great Britain. All trade within the Empire was to be carried on exclusively in British and colonial shipping, with the object of increasing the Empire's naval strength. Great stress was laid on this side of the system, for the statesmen of the day recognized to its fullest extent the importance of "sea power." In accordance with this system, a large number of colonial products received especial advantages in the British market by a system of preferential duties, by direct bounties, or by a combination of both, with the result that in a number of instances they acquired a monopoly thereof at the expense of foreign goods, with which under normal conditions they could not compete. On the other hand European and Asiatic products could be imported into the colonies only from Great Britain. There were important exceptions to this general rule, and in addition the British fiscal system was so arranged that on the payment of slight duties, foreign products could be, and in fact were, reexported in large quan- tities from Great Britain to the colonies.'' In the case of ' Pownall, op. cit. pp. 35, 202. ' The total exports from England to Pennsylvania for the twenty-five years from Christmas, 1722, to Christmas, 1749, amounted to £1,312,838, of which Digitized by Microsoft® READJUSTMENT OF THE LAWS OF TRADE 195 some foreign products, however, such as manufactured iron and steel,* cordage,^ sail-cloth,' and paper,* no part of the British duties was paid back on their reexportation, and consequently in the case of these exceptional instances the system tended to give British manufactures a mo- nopoly of the colonial market. In this connection, how- ever, it should be noted that Great Britain paid bounties on a number of manufactures when exported to the colonies, thus decreasing their cost to the colonial consumer.® The ' system as a whole was thus based on the idea of the mutual reciprocity of the economic interests of mother country and colony. Its predominant characteristic is well emphasized in the French term describing it, — "le pacte colonial." The complex system erected on this basis naturally bene- fited some interests at the expense of others. This is inevitable whenever the government seeks to control the course of economic development and restrains the free £343,789 consisted of foreign goods reexported from England. Peter Kalm, Travels into North America (Warrington, 1770) I, p. 52. ' • 2 and 3 Anne c. 9 § xii.- C/l B. T. Journals 25, p. 370. ' 6 Anne c. 19. ' 4 Geo. II, c. 27 § ill. ■; * 10 Geo. II, c. 37 § iv. ' Such manufactures were especially gunpowder, sail-cloth, and British and Irish linens. For details, see Treas. Ace. Rev. Misc. (England), Bundles 79 and 80. Certain classes of foreign manufactured silks, technically known as "lustrings or alamodes, " were not entitled to any drawback. 8 and 9 William III, c. 36, § V. On the other hand, it must be remembered that Great Britain was trying to induce the colonies to produce silk and was spending considerable money on this scheme. Besides, bounties, about equivalent to the import du- ties on raw silk, were allowed on the exportation of British manufactured silks. Under these conditions, "respectable quantities" of British silks were sold in Digitized by Microsoft® 196 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 play of competition. Some of the interests sacrificed for the good of the Empire were British, some colonial. Thus the Navigation Act proper, which gave British and colonial shipping a monopoly of the carrying trade of the Empire, while unquestionably protecting the ship-building and carry-, ing trades of both old and New England, and also of some of the other colonies, was equally unquestionably at the outset burdensome to the plantation colonies, such as Barbados and Virginia. Then in so far as British legislation and policy discouraged manufacturing in the colonies, the manufacturer in the mother country benefited. On the other hand, the British consumer was prevented from obtaining foreign products and was forced to smoke colonial tobacco, to eat colonial sugar, and to use colonial tar, all of which enjoyed a monopoly of the home market. Furthermore, in the interest of the colonial planter, though also partly for the sake of revenue, the British and the Irish farmers were prohibited from growing tobacco. There is no doubt that this prohibition, which in England met with violent and protracted opposition throughout a period of over fifty years,* entailed far greater sacrifice than did the British restrictions on colonial manufacturing.^ These re- foreign and open markets. J. Massie, Reasons . . . against . . . further British Duties on Wrought Silks (London, 1758), p. 13. ' On the difficulty of enforcing the law and the use of troops for this purpose during the reign of Charles II, see Privy Council Register, Charles II, 4, p. 117; S. P- 377; 6, pp. 62, 507, 527, 528, S30, 532, 539, 547, 550, 552, 561, 563. These volumes are in the Privy Council Office, Downing St., London. ' The author of a proposal to prevent the colonies from manufacturing iron said: "The Restraining of our Colonys whom we protect by such Penalties Digitized by Microsoft® READJUSTMENT OF THE LAWS OF TRADE 197 strictions were to a great extent superfluous, as under exist- ing conditions, with land cheap and plentiful, the colonies had no inducement to manufacture extensively on a commer- cial scale.* From the economic standpoint, this phase of British policy in itself aroused little or no opposition in the colonies, not only because it did not in general run counter to their interests, but also because the laws were to a great extent necessarily ignored, as the imperial authorities had no adequate machinery to enforce them.^ As far as there was any opposition at all, it centred on the Iron Act of 1750. The main object and primary from Manufacturing Iron to the prejudice of their Mother Country will not be a greater hardship upon them than the Prohibition of the Planting of To- bacco in Great Britain is to us." Brit. Mus. Lansdowne MSS. 846 f. 246. 'In 1751, in his "Observations concerning the Increase of Mankind," Franklin said that, on account of the vast quantity of unoccupied land in America, the danger "of these Colonies interfering with their Mother Country in Trades that depend on Labour, Manufactures, &c., is too remote to require the attention of Great-Britain." He therefore concluded that the mother country "should not too much restrain Manufactures in her Colonies," such legislation not being necessary. Franklin, Writings (ed. Smyth) III, pp. 65, 66. Nine years later, in his "Canada Pamphlet," Franklin said: "Manufactures are founded in poverty. It is the multitude without land in a country, and who must work for others at low wages or starve, that enables undertakers to carry on a manufacture." Such conditions, he added, did not prevail in America. Ibid. IV, p. 49. ' The despatches and reports of the colonial governors, though full of details about the development of colonial manufacturing, contain scarcely any refer- ences to the acts regulating the woollen, hat, and iron industries. In 1774 John Adams said that the hat act had not been regarded, and that the iron act had not been executed in Massachusetts. Novanglus, in Works (ed. C. F. Adams) IV, p. 49. The contemporary newspapers contain frequent advertisements of hat-makers. Bumaby (Travels, pp. 93, 115, 136) speaks of the manufacture of hats in Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts. Digitized by Microsoft® 198 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 purpose of this law was to encourage the production of bar and pig iron in the colonies, by removing the British customs duties thereon, thus enabling them to com- pete with Swedish iron on which these duties were retained. There was great opposition to this measure on the part of influential interests in England,* and it was seem- ingly in order to overcome this opposition and at the same time to give the mother country some compensation for the loss in revenue involved in this policy, that the further exten- sion in the colonies of the iron and steel manufacture in cer- tain of its more highly developed grades was forbidden. Thus this act had a tendency to benefit some colonies and to restrict industry in others. In neither phase was it very effective ; but if the benefits and disadvantages did not bal- ance one another, it was certainly not due to the greater weight of the latter.^ ■ Keith, Virginia (London, 1738), p. 182; Fleming MSS., Hist. MSS. Com. XII, 7, P- 357- * According to the act, the governors were required to send to Great Britain certificates giving details as to the industry in each colony. These certificates show that it was still in a very rudimentary stage, and in some colonies in a declining condition. The certificate of Governor Hamilton states that in Pennsylvania and Delaware there were in all four such manufactories, of which one had not been in use for nine months. B. T. Prop. 18 V 73. The certifi- cate of the Governor of New York is to the effect that in that colony there was only one such establishment, and this apparently an insignificant one. B. T. N.Y. 29 Hh 132. It is difficult to reconcile these facts with Bumaby's state- ment that both of these colonies, more specifically New York, were "exceed- ingly dissatisfied" with this act. Travels, p. 115. In Massachusetts there were in 1750 only three such plants, of which one was not in use. B. T. Mass. 73 Gg 34. In 1758 there were only two. There were in this colony, however, a large number of iron factories of a nature not affected by the act of 1750,— Digitized by Microsoft® READJUSTMENT OF THE LAWS OF TRADE 199 In addition, some colonial products could be shipped only to Great Britain or to some other British colony. Such commodities were those not produced in the mother country, and which either were needed for consumption there or which, when reexported from Great Britain to other European countries,* served to rectify a possible ad- verse balance of trade. This policy, technically known as that of "enumeration," in the case of some commodities, probably resulted in a lowering of the price to the colonial producer. But the corollary to this policy was preferential treatment to the enumerated product in the British markets. The system of indirect bounties by preferential duties in conjunction with the direct bounties paid on colonial prod- ucts probably more than offset the restrictions of the enumeration policy. In the case of naval stores, these bounties alone enabled colonial pitch and tar to hold the British markets, and amounted to large sums, judged from the standpoint of the day.'' 41 forges and 14 furnaces. Ibid. 76 H 59. Stephen Hopkins (The Rights of the Colonies Examined, Providence, 1765, p. 24) said that the colonies had carefully avoided "every interdicted manufacture." It should be noted that Rhode Island, of which Hopkins was especially writing, was not at all affected by this act of 1750, as there was no mill or engine for slitting or rolling iron, or any plating forge to work with a tilt-hammer, or any furnace for making steel in the colony. B. T. Prop. 18 V 75; Col. Rec. of R.I. V, p. 314. ' See Keith's Memorial, 1728. Am. and W.I. 602; B. T. Plant. Gen. 10 L 105. 'In 1722 ;^62,i44 was paid; in 1735 ;£29,358. Admiralty, Accountant General, Treas. Ledgers, vols. 139 and 168. In 1766 the navy's debt in- cluded £45,591 for such bounties. Treas. Misc. Various, Bundle 197 (Treas. Book of Payments, 1760-1769, p. 31). See also Admiralty, Accountant Gen- eral Misc. Various 47, and Commons Journal 29, p. 418. Digitized by Microsoft® 200 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 The imperial character of the system was strongly em- phasized/ It followed, however, from the very fact that Great Britain was the heart of the Empire, on whose well- being the prosperity of the whole primarily depended, — because upon the mother country fell virtually the entire heavy burden of imperial defence, — that any industrial development in the colonies which tended to weaken the mother country was discouraged. Hence the economic life of the colonies was subordinated to that of the mother country, and was directed into channels that did not run counter to the welfare of Great Britain.'' Any other policy would have been deemed suicidal. Such subordination did not, however, imply a sacrifice of the colonies, for their ' Thus we read in a pamphlet published in 1765, that the Parliament of Great Britain alone can "execute such Measures, as equally relate to all. This Power it has at all time exercised with impartial Sway, and has extended its parental Care to every part of the British Dominions; as each has on difiEer- ent Occasions particularly called for its Attention. No Preference, no Privi- lege, no Exemption is allowed to any, not even to Great Britain, when her particular Interests seem incompatible with this greater system." The Regu- lations Lately Made (London, 1765), pp. 43, 44. ' In 1728 Keith wrote that "all advantageous Projects, or Commercial Gains in any Colony, which are truly prejudicial to, and inconsistent with, the In- terest of the Mother State; must be understood to be illegal, and the Practice of them unwarrantable, because they contradict the End for which the Colony had a Being, and are Incompatible with the Terms on which the People Claim, both privilege and Protection." When a colony is thus regulated, it "ought to be carefully Nourish'd and it's just Interests well guarded; No little Partial Project or Party Gain shou'd be suffer'd to affect it, but rather it ought to be consider'd & weigh'd in the General Ballance of the whole State, as an usefuU and profitable Member; For such is the End of all Colonies, and if this use cannot be made of them, it wou'd be much better for the State to be without them." Am. and W.I. 602; B. T. Plant. Gen. 10 L 105. Digitized by Microsoft® READJUSTMENT OF THE LAWS OF TRADE 20I i economic development was in general not deflected from its ■ normal course. Nor, on the other hand, did it mean absolute predominance of British interests. As has been pointed out, these had been obliged, in a number of instances, to yield to the welfare of the Empire. It is significant that Great Britain denied the insistent requests of English ship-builders for pro- tection against the colonial industry, because such a measure would have interfered with the expansion of British sea power as a whole. In fact, it would be difficult to estimate whether colony or metropolis was called upon to bear a greater pro- portion of the sacrifice demanded by the prevailing ideal of a self-sufficient commercial Empire. History, however, is to a great extent based on social psychology, and in studying the dynamic effects of any policy on the relations of two social groups, it is frequently far more important to know what people at the time thought were the results, rather than what these actually were. Naturally, those interests, whether British or colonial, that were called upon to bear the sacrifices inevitably involved in so complex a system of commercial regulation felt aggrieved. A promi- nent British complaint was that nearly all the duties on foreign products shipped from Great Britain to the colonies were repaid, and that consequently the colonial consumer obtained these commodities at a lower price than did his (^ fellow-subject in Great Britain, on whom fell the chief bur- den of imperial defence.' Then, the British consumer • The well-known economic writer, Joshua Gee, in a very interesting me- morial to the Board of Trade, endorsed as received on Oct. 27, 1721, opposed this system, saying, "I could never See a reason why the Subjects of Great Digitized by Microsoft® 202 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1763 opposed the monopoly accorded to many colonial products. Similarly, there was some objection to the colonial planter receiving bounties, while the British farmer was not entitled to them though he paid the taxes that they necessitated.' Joseph Massie, one of the best informed of contemporary publicists, claimed that the British West Indies had robbed the nation of ten million pounds sterling through the exorbi- tant price of sugar.^ This price was a direct result of the preferential duties. On the other hand, the colonies recog- nized that, in consequence of the system, they paid more Brittain, who have all along paid very great taxes to support the Government, and have been at the expense of convoys to protect the Plantation Trade, should bear So much, and the Plantations who have never paid any taxes, Should not pay the Comon duties of Linnens &c. worn in England." B. T. Plant. Gen. 10 L 24. This memorial was the basis of Gee's well-known book, " The Trade and Navigation of Great Britain Considered," pubhshed eight years thereafter. Then, in 1732, the philanthropist, Thomas Coram, in a memorial addressed to the Board of Trade, advised the abolition of these drawbacks, because in consequence of them the colonies "have such goods much Cheaper than the Inhabitants of this Kingdom who ever bear the Burden & Charge of Protecting the Plantations." B. T. Plant. Gen. II M 31. ' An English writer in 1766 commented on the lot of the British consumer, who had to buy British colonial sugar, tobacco, rice, pitch, tar, turpentine, indigo, which were all favored by heavy duties on foreign products; and on the fact that the British taxpayer paid bounties on many colonial products, though the producer of the same commodities in the mother country would not be entitled to them. A Letter from a Merchant in London . . . relative to the Present Posture of Affairs in the Colonies (London, 1766), pp. 23-25. ' J. Massie, Brief Observations concerning the Management of the War (London, 1761), pp. 8-9. In 1753 a petition against the high price of sugar was presented to the House of Commons. The British West Indies contended at the time that "allowing foreign sugar to be imported" would entirely ruin them. B. T. Journals 61, April 3, 1753. In 1757 Josiah Tucker said that Digitized by Microsoft® READJUSTMENT OF THE LAWS OF TRADE 203 for some European manufactures and likewise that they received for some of their products less than would have been the case under unrestricted conditions.^ Thus there were complaints from both interests affected ; in the main, however, it was considered that the system favored the mother country. In the first place, by virtue of it Great Britain enjoyed a monopoly of the colonial trade, foreigners being entirely excluded therefrom. This was of course not an absolute monopoly, but one in which the colonial traders, especially those of New England, par- ticipated. Then, while the mother country levied import duties on colonial products, the colonies were forbidden to impose similar taxes on commodities brought from Great Britain.* At the time there prevailed only vague and indefi- nite ideas as to the real incidence of such taxes, and many in the colonies thought that they, and not the British consumer, paid the British customs duties.^ On the other hand, the French sugars "are almost Cent per Cent cheaper "than the British West Indian product. Instructions for Travellers (London, 1757), p. 31. ' Franklin to Shirley, Dec. 18, 1754. Franklin, Writings III, pp. 232-237. See also Lettres de Montcalm (London, 1777), pp. 2-10. ' See Order in Council, Aug. 22, 1724, that instructions to this effect be sent to the governors. B. T. Plant. Gen. 10 L 53. Cf. also Am. and W.I. i, no. 267; B. T. Journals 34, pp. 126, 127. ' In so far as these taxes diminished consumption in Great Britain, they de- creased the demand for, and consequently the price of the colonial product In 1759 Parliament granted an extra subsidy, which added one penny a pound to the British duties on tobacco. 32 Geo. II, c. 10 § i. To this increase there was great opposition in Virginia. The Virginia Committee of Correspondence instructed the colony's agent in London to oppose this step, which they called "a great grievance to the people." The new duty had, however, already been passed. Va. Mag. X, pp. 339, 340, 342, 343. An Englishman travelling in Digitized by Microsoft® 204 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 inability to impose duties on imports from the mother coun- try limited the colony's complete freedom of action.* It was in this respect that the system was least satisfactory to men of marked individualism, such as were the colonists. With their keen desire for complete self-government, they naturally to some extent objected to a system by which their foreign trade, and in a few instances even industry within the colonies themselves, was regulated by a legislative body over which they had no control, and whose power was unlimited.^ Thus neither British nor colonial interests were fully satis- fied with the system, and on the whole it was considered more favorable to the metropolis than to the colony. This system, however, did not stand by itself, but was integrally connected with that of irnperial defence. What Patrick Henry called the "original compact between King and peo- ple, stipulating protection on the one hand and obedience on the other," was not a mere empty formula. The right of Virginia at this time, said: "They consider the duties upon their staple as injurious only to themselves; and it is utterly impossible to persuade them that they affect the consumer also." Bumaby, Travels, pp. 56, 57. ' In 1754 Franklin wrote: "We are not suffered to regulate our trade, and restrain the importation and consumption of British superfluities (as Britain can the consumption of foreign superfluities)." Writings (ed. Smyth) HI, p. 236. For a similar statement, made by Franklin in 1766, see Ibid. IV, p. 402. ' Hence there was some objection to all inquiries into economic conditions within the colonies, becatise the scope of the possibly ensuing legislation could not be foreseen or controlled. In 1758 the British government instructed the colonial governors to furnish it with details as to the iron industry in the colo- nies. In sending the desired information, Governor Pownall of Massachusetts wrote: "The People since the late Act restraining the Number of Slitting Mills are extreamly jealous of these kind of Inquiries." B. T. Mass. 76 li 59. Digitized by Microsoft® READJUSTMENT OF THE LAWS OF TRADE 205 the mother country to regulate imperial trade, and the general manner in which this right was exercised, were jus- tified in the eyes of nearly all, whether British or colonial, by the fact that through her nayy Great Britain protected the colonies in peace and in war. Thus, in 1756, in connec- tion with a Massachusetts law for encouraging the manu- facture of linen in that colony, the Board of Trade wrote to Shirley: "The passing of Laws in the Plantations for en- couraging Manufactures, which any ways interfere with the manufacture of this Kingdom, has always been thought improper, & has ever been discouraged. The great Ex- pence, which this Country has been and is still at, for the defence and Protection of the Colonies, while they on the other hand contribute little or nothing to the Taxes with which it is burthen'd, gives it a just Claim to restrain them in such Attempts." ^ The same idea is also clearly ex- pressed by Arthur Dobbs, when writing to the Earl of Hali- fax that he would do his utmost to stop "all such pernicious Illicite Trade Carryed on with foreigners to the prejudice of the British Trade with these Colonies after the Immense Expence and Debt incurred in defence of our Civil and Reli- gious Rights and Liberties and future Safety of the Exten- sive British Empire on this Continent and Islands: and therefore the Confinement of our Trade for the benefit of Britain against foreigners is a Tribute we ought to pay to our protectors." ^ As Dobbs was an able student of eco- nomic conditions, and as such had freely criticisedon a some- » B. T. Mass. 84, p. 328. 'Jan. 14, 1764. Am. and W.I. 214. Digitized by Microsoft® 206 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 what comprehensive scale certain features of the system, his statement is all the more significant. Thus the fact that the mother country afforded protection / gave an equitable basis to the colonial system, and justified! it in the eyes of those to whom otherwise it would have ap- peared unfair to the colonies. During the eighteenth cea'^ tury, up to the controversies at the beginning of the revolu- tionary movement in 1764 and 1765, the colonies made no complaint against the trade laws as a whole. During these two generations there were many acute political controver- sies, but this system did not figure in them at all.' The colonial attitude is well represented by Franklin, who, in 1754, after enumerating solely those regulations that restricted colo- nial trade, said : "These kind of secondary taxes, however, we do not complain of, though we have no share in the lay- ing, or disposing of them." ^ As Franklin had an intellectual tendency toward those laissez faire ideas that two decades later were embodied in Adam Smith's monumental work, this is certainly not a prejudiced statement. Similarly, in 1764, James Otis, the leader of the revolutionary movement in its earlier phases, after calling attention to the fact that the colonies were "confined in their imports and exports, to the good of the metropolis," wrote: "Very well, we have submitted to this. The act of navigation is a good act, so are all that exclude foreign manufactures from the planta- tions, and every honest man will readily subscribe to them." ' • Naturally, the Molasses Act, as in no sense an integral part of the system, is excepted from this statement. ' Franklin, Writings III, p. 236. • James Otis, The Rights of the British Colonists Asserted and Proved (Boston, 1764), pp. 54, 55. Cf. also pp. 58, 76. Digitized by Microsoft® READJUSTMENT OF THE LAWS OF TRADE 207 It should be noted, however, that a Swedish scientist who had travelled extensively in America, and had care- fully observed many matters of interest, stated that as a result of the pressure of this system, the colonies were less warm to the mother country/ This in itself would not be surprising, as communities have always shown a tendency to dwell on the disadvantages and to ignore the benefits involved in a system of this nature. The accuracy of this observation is, however, open to question. The validity of the general doctrine that the mother country and not foreigners should supply the colonies, "provided the Mother Country can & does supply her Plantations with as much as they want" was admitted in 1762 by the Vir- ginia Committee of Correspondence in a letter to the colony's agent in London.^ Furthermore, men enjoying to the full the confidence of the colonies, even favored a more restric- '"Genom et sadant tryckande sker, at Angelska Inwanarena uti Nona America aro mindre warme mot sit Moderland." Kalm, En Resa Til Nona America (Stockholm, 1756) II, p. 371. As this passage, together with the unhistorical habit of regarding past events from the viewpoint of a later age, has furnished the basis for the current thesis that the old colonial system, as it existed prior to 1763, was the fundamental cause of the American Revolution, it is advisable to give the context. After the above statement, Kalm says: "This coldness is kept up by the many foreigners such as Germans, Dutch, and French settled here, and living among the English, who commonly have no particular attachment to Old England; add to this likewise that many people can never be contented with their possessions, though they be ever so great, and will always be desirous of getting more, and of enjoying the pleasure which arises from changing; and their over great liberty, and their luxury often lead them to licentiousness.'' Travels into North America (Warrington, 1770), n, pp. 264, 265. ' Va. Mag. XI, p. 137. Digitized by Microsoft® 208 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 tive system than was the prevailing one. In 1723, Francis Yonge, then the agent for South Carolina, and four years prior thereto one of the leaders of the revolution in that colony, presented a memorial to the Board of Trade, in which he advocated a more stringent regulation of colonial trade.' Similarly, in 1755, William BoUan, when agent for Massa- chusetts, presented to the Board of Trade a detailed memorial on the legal defects in the acts of trade, with a view to their remedy, and consequently a better enforcement of the system as a whole. At the same time he advised the placing of all kinds of colonial naval stores in the "enumerated list." ^ It is also not without some significance that BoUan was ap- pointed agent, though he had been the prosecuting officer in the colonial Vice-Admiralty Court, and, as such, had for years been engaged in punishing violations of these laws.' Similarly, James Otis resigned from this position only at as late a date as 1761, in order to attack the use of "writs of assistance." There seems to be no adequate reason for re- jecting Burke's view that during the eighteenth century, prior to 1764, the attitude of the colonies toward the system was one of acquiescence. " The act of navigation," he said, "attended the colonies from their infancy, grew with their growth, and strengthened with their strength. They were confirmed in obedience to it, even more by usage than by law." * • B. T. So. Ca. I A 86. ' B. T. Mass. 74 Hh 51, 52; John Chamberlayne, Magnae Britanniae Notitia, part II, p. 59- ' Lords of the Admiralty to Sir Henry Penrice, April 19, 1742, ordering the appointment of BoUan as advocate of the Vice-Admiralty Court in Massachu- setts. Adm. Sec. Out-Letters, 1054. ' Burke's Speeches (ed. 1816) I, p. 202. Digitized by Microsoft® READJUSTMENT OF THE LAWS OF TRADE 209 It would even appear that instead of being a disintegrating factor, the system of trade regulation tended to give greater cohesion to the Empire. As has been pointed out,^ British policy had never been consistently directed toward creating a closely knit political empire. The aim was rather to create a self-sufficient economic empire, and, in the main, this result had been attained. The West Indian colonies were absolutely dependent on the monopoly of the British markets that had been accorded to them. Similarly, the prosperity of the continental colonies depended, in varying degrees, on the one hand on the British markets, or on the other hand on British colonial markets. The least dependent colonies were those producing tobacco ; for through the long period during which it had enjoyed a monopoly, American tobacco had gained a firm hold on the British consumer. Hence it is not surprising to find that at this time there was some ob- jection in Virginia to the "enumeration" of its staple crop.* South Carolina, though absolutely independent in so far as rice was concerned, relied upon the British bounties on naval stores and indigo. North Carolina was similarly affected by the premiums on tar and pitch. The middle colonies and those of New England were especially dependent on those other British colonies that in the event of political independence would probably not throw in their lot with North America. The fisheries, the lumber industry, the provision trade, de- manded free access to the British West Indies as well as to those of foreign nations. Then, only because they were British colonies, was the large trade to Newfoundland open ' Bumaby, op. cit. p. 56. p Digitized by Microsoft® 210 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 to them. To some degree also these colonies relied on the naval-store bounties. In addition, the prosperity of their ship-building industry depended to a great extent on the sale of vessels to Great Britain, and on the large carrying-trade between various parts of the Empire. Once politically separated, the Navigation Acts would automatically shut off the sale of these ships and also a considerable portion of the carrying-trade. Thus, while on the one hand political sepa- ration meant some economic advantages, on the other it meant both the assumption of the burden of naval defence, hitherto borne by the mother country, as well as the entire cost of purely military defence, — and also important and concrete economic disadvantages. To those in the colo- nies contemplating such a contingency, the risks must have appeared sufficiently formidable "to give them pause." Hence, as far as this was realized, the system tended in the direction of greater imperial cohesion, and ran counter to the strongly marked tendency toward political disintegration. P rior to^ j^ the general at titude of the col onies toward^ the laws of trade^and^imvigationjras^ne^fj,cqui^scen It should not, however, be inferred from this that complaints were not made against specific features of the system,' ' The chief alteration desired at this time was permission to import salt into the Southern colonies directly from Europe. The Northern colonies were al- lowed to do this in the interest of the fishery, and the Southern colonies claimed that Portuguese salt was better adapted to preserving provisions than that of England or that of the West Indies. In estimating the importance of this complaint, it should be noted that such salt could easily be shipped to these colonies via those north of Maryland. Parliament refused to grant this re- quest, fearing that it would lead to the direct importation of other goods from Digitized by Microsoft® READJUSTMENT OF THE LAWS OF TRADE 211 Such complaints were carefully, though rather deliberately, examined/ and if found compatible with imperial interests, were then rectified. In addition, the system was also criti- cised, in certain of its broader features, by men who had no immediate personal interest in the changes that they advo- cated, but who recognized that some provisions could be altered to the advantage of the Empire as a whole. Such a critic was Arthur Dobbs, the governor of North Carolina, who had written with ability on the trade and industry of Ireland, and who had opposed with vigor the monopoly of the Hudson's Bay Company.^ In 1755 he wrote to the Board of Trade advising a number of changes in the commercial system. As an Irishman, he especially favored the relaxa- tion of the laws so as to allow closer commercial relations between Ireland and America, but in addition he proposed that it be permitted to import salt directly from Europe into all the colonies, and also wines from Spain and Portugal.' Apart from the merits of Dobbs's specific proposals, Europe. Va. Mag. XI, pp. 137-143 ; Ibid. XII, pp. 6, 8 ; B. T. Va. 27 Y 108 ; B. T. No. Ca. 12 C SS, 86; Ihid. 14 E 77; B. T. Prop. 19V 133; B. T. So. Ca. 15 1 50, 57; Ibid. 27, pp. 245, 246; Am. and W.I. 20, nos. 9, 151. ' Thus Keith said that whenever the regulation of colonial trade was con- sidered, it was customary for Parliament or the Privy Council to send both for those representing the colonies and for the London merchants, "with Intent, no Dotibt, to do equal Justice between them." Keith, Virginia, p. 179. The Board of Trade Journals contain full' accounts of a large number of such hearings. 'Dictionary of National Biography XV, p. 132; Palgrave, Dictionary of Political Economy I, p. 610; Cunningham, Growth of English Industry and Commerce, II, p. 283. ' B. T. No. Ca. 12 C 54, 69, 86. Dobbs repeated this advice in 1764, but at the same time he upheld the justice of the system as a whole. Dobbs to Hali- Digitized by Microsoft® 212 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 it is obvious that so complex a system required continual readjustment to the changing conditions. It is equally patent, however, that there was great difficulty and even grave danger in amending it in part. Consequently there was a tendency to leave the broader features of the system untouched, so long as it answered its main purposes. There is a peculiarly modem ring in the Board of Trade's answer to Dobbs. The Commissioners freely admitted that the proposed alterations appeared advisable in the light in which Dobbs put them, but pointed out that "there is such a variety of Cir- cumstances necessary to be attended to in the consideration of a Question of this kind, that We dare not venture to give an Opinion upon it, without a very precise and thorough Ex- amination of the Effect and Operation of the Laws of Trade in every light and view of them. We are sensible of a great many Errors and Defects both in the policy and frame of those Laws, and that they do not properly consist and corre- spond with each other, but We cannot but think, that it fax, Jan. 14, 1764. Am. and W.I. 214. Similarly, in the same year, Thomas Pownall, though fully approving of the basic principles of the old colonial system, suggested some radical changes. He proposed that all colonial products, except such as were raw materials for British manufactures, should be allowed to be exported directly to any foreign market on payment of the British duties; and likewise that all foreign products, except such as interfered with British manufactures, should be allowed to be imported directly into the colonies on pajTnent of the British duties. Such direct trade with foreign countries, how- ever, Pownall said should be confined to ports where British merchants were permanently established. What Pownall objected to, and what he primarily wished to abolish, was the roundabout voyage via Great Britain in such in- stances where it subserved no useful purpose. "It can never be right policy," he wrote, "to suffer labour in vain in a community." Pownall, The Admin- istration of the Colonies (2d ed. London, 1765), pp. 27, 181-190. Digitized by Microsoft® READJUSTMENT OF THE LAWS OF TRADE 213 would be dangerous to enter into an Examination of them with a View to one Inconveniency only ; and therefore when- ever the Circumstances of the Times will admit of a Consid- eration of this Matter, the whole must be entered into together." ^ The conditions created by the peace of Paris, especially the territorial acquisitions on the continent and in the Caribbean, necessitated such a readjustment. One of the chief commer- cial advantages accruing to Great Britain, as a result of the cession of Canada, was a monopoly of the fur trade. Hitherto this trade had been almost entirely in the hands of the French,^ except in so far as it was carried on by the Hudson's Bay Company, and to "a very inconsiderable Quantity thro' the province of New York." ' Of these furs, by far the most important was beaver. In 1752 only 63,651 beaver ' B. T. No. Ca. 22, pp. 194, 195. '^It was said that furs to the value of ;£i 35,000 were yearly imported into France from Canada. B. T. Plant. Gen. 17 Q 37, 39, 40. On June 5, 1762, Governor Murray reported from Quebec that the exports of fur, according to the Canadian custom-house books, fell short of this amount because a good deal was smuggled out. He added that there was "a strong Presumption, that in this, as indeed in every other Branch, the Publick was ill served." Ibid. 17 Q 42. ' As a result of this monopoly. Great Britain was also in a position to supply the Indians with all the manufactures they needed. Even before the con- quest of Canada, a comparatively large quantity of British manufactures had been sold to the Indians, mainly, however, indirectly by means of the French traders. Board of Trade's Report, 1763, in B. T. Plant. Gen. 45, pp. 212-262. Among other advantages resulting from the war, the Board of Trade called attention to the great increase in the available supply of masts and of lumber, to the prospects of getting silk and indigo from Florida and Georgia, and to the probability of an increase in the supply of sugar owing to the gains in the West Indies. Though not germane to this essay, it may be mentioned that Digitized by Microsoft® 214 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 skins were imported into England, of which 33,830 came from Hudson's Bay and 27,451 from New York.' In 1762 the total imports had risen to 173,586 skins, of which 93,630 came from Quebec, 50,499 from Husdon's Bay, and only 14,912 from New York.^ Beaver was an enumerated commodity, and, as such, could not be shipped directly from the colonies to foreign countries. On importation into Great Britain, it paid duties which, however, were in part drawn back on reexportation.^ A large proportion of the beaver thus imported into England was again reexported,* and consequently the foreign manu- the acquisition of Senegal in West Africa broke France's monopoly of the gum trade. ' B. T. Com. Series II, 626 B 6. 'Ibid. B 7. • Duty, 7 pence A, I ; drawback, 4 pence ^, ff. B. T. Plant. Gen. 45, PP- 380-386. * Beaver Skins Imported into and Exported from England from Christmas, 1749, to Christmas, 1763 Imports Exports 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 62,043 54,204 63,651 74,952 43,023 46,348 36,070 36,759 31,604 27,876 46,49s 101,011 173,586 128,492 926,114 35,393 32,540 33,499 21,502 25,53s 16,373 14,921 9,670 10,479 27,610 19,505 39,893 43,944 129,801 406,665 Duty, £27,710. B. T. Com. Series II, 626 B 11. Digitized by Microsoft® Drawback, £S,33i. READJUSTMENT OF THE LAWS OF TRADE 21$ facturer of hats obtained this raw material as cheaply as, if not more so than, his British competitor. The English hat-makers naturally complained of this disadvantage, and urged that instead of repaying part of the duty on beaver reexported from Great Britain, an export duty should be imposed thereon/ In this connection, the Board of Trade reported that the existing conditions gave an advantage to -foreign manufactures, "that ought in Justice and Policy to be thrown into the other Scale, if it can be done without prejudice to the Trade in general." ^ The Hudson's Bay Company, however, opposed the suggested export duties, as they would have a distinct tendency to lower the price that could be obtained by the company for its beaver skins. Accordingly, the Board of Trade decided on a compromise, and recom- mended the abolition of the British import duties on beaver,^ it being a raw material, and in lieu thereof the imposition of an export duty of seven pence a skin.* In 1764 Parlia ment a dopted this suggestion, abolishing the old duties, and subs tituting therefor a nominaljmport duty of one pence a skin, and an export duty of seven^penc.e.^ The increased area of the Empire on the continent of America likewise brought up again the question of producing hemp in the colonies, England imported large quantities ' B. T. Com. Series, I, 49 li 33-35. 'B. T. Plant. Gen. 45, pp. 380-386. ' Except only a small duty to insure regular entries. * And IS. 6d. a pound on beaver wool. B. T. Plant. Gen. 45, pp. 380-386. ' 4 Geo. Ill, c. 9, § ii. The import duty could not be drawn back. Ibid. §iv. Digitized by Microsoft® 2l6 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 of hemp, the chief source of supply being Russia,* and in turn reexported some to the colonies.^ Naturally, from the viewpoint of pure mercantilism, and also in conformity with the ideal of a self-sufl&cient Empire, it would be highly desirable if freedom from this dependence on Russia could be attained. In addition, as hemp was extensively used in the navy, an adequate British supply would result in greater national security.* Accordingly, early in the eighteenth century. Parliament had offered large bounties to encourage the production of hemp in the colonies. This policy had been a complete failure,* and hence had been allowed to lapse. In 1763, however, a number of London merchants ' Imports of hemp into England from Christmas, 1758, to Christmas, 1762: 1759 544,286 cwt. 1760 220,861 1761 285,610 cwt. 1762 272,820 Of this none came from the colonies except 36 cwt. from Pennsylvania in 1760. B. T. Com. Series II, 626 B 1. 'Foreign hemp reexported from England: CHRISTMAS, I CHKISIMAS, 762, 10 1763 CHRISTMAS, 1763, TO CHRISTMAS, 1764 New York 1,512 cwt. New England 12,900 cwt. 20,967 Pennsylvania 460 520 Montserrat "3 B. T. Com. Series II, 626, Go 29. 'In 1763 a pamphlet was written to urge the colonists to raise hemp and flax, with a view to strengthening British naval power against "those sulky Bar- barians, who no doubt in a little time will feel their own Power, and from the same Inducement (tho' with greater Rapidity), like Goths and Vandals, over- run all Europe." Considerations on the Present State of our Northern Colo- nies (London, 1763), p. 12. 'During the period from Christmas, 1712, to Christmas, 1728, the entire quantity of hemp imported into England from the American colonies was only 316 cwt., 2 quarters. B. T. Plant. Gen. 15 P 14. Digitized by Microsoft® READJUSTMENT OF THE LAWS OF TRADE 217 trading to North America petitioned for a revival of these bounties.* On February 9, 1764, the Board of Trade re- ported in detail on this suggestion,^ and attributed the for- mer failure of this policy, on the one hand to the fact that those parts of America best suited to the growing of hemp had hitherto remained uninhabited, and on the other hand to the fact that other commodities had yielded a more certain profit. The Board of Trade added that at this time different condi- tions obtained, especially as tobacco and rice had been pushed to their utmost limits. This report then pointed out that the chief obstacles to be overcome were the deamess of labor in the colonies and the high freight rates from them. In 1756 the price of Russian hemp in England was £,21 to £22 a ton, while American hemp could not be supplied for less than £29. To counteract this difference the commissioners suggested that colonial hemp receive a bounty of £8 a ton for the first seven years, of £6 for the subsequent seven years, and of £^ during a third period of the same length. In 1764 Parliament adopted this recommendation, and by statute ordered the payment of the bounties proposed by the Board of Trade on hemp and undressed flax imported into Great Britain from the American colonies.' Though these bounties did not accomplish the desired result,* they, as well as other measures passed at the time, » B. T. Plant. Gen. 19 R 18; 45, p. 322. ' B. T. Plant. Gen. 45, pp. 366-379. ' 4 Geo. m, c. 26. ' SheflSeld, Observations on the Commerce of the American States (London^ 1784), p. 48. During the year from Jan. 5, 1768, to Jan. 5, 1769, the follow- ing quantities of hemp were exported from America to Great Britain : from Digitized by Microsoft® 2l8 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 show the desire of the British government to further the economic development of the colonies, and its willingness to devote British funds to such purposes with the object of increasing the self-sufficiency of the Empire. Thus in 1763 the bounty on colonial indigo imported into Great Britain was continued, but was reduced to an amount suffi- cient to keep the industry well established.* Under this system, South Carolina had acquired a new and valuable crop, and even in their reduced form the bounties constituted a not inconsiderable charge on the British exchequer.'' The conquest of Canada and its subsequent cession to Great Britain led to the discovery and the rapid develop- ment of the whale fishery in the Gulf of St. Lawrence.* Parliament had passed a number of laws with the design to encourage this industry in the waters of Greenland and Davis's Straits.* Thus whale-fins caught in that region were freed from all duties,* and in addition, in 1733 bounties were granted to British ships proceeding from any port in Great Britain to those waters for the purpose of catching whales." Subsequently, these bounties were extended to colonial shipping.'' The aim of this policy was to increase Maryland, 9 tons 13 cwt. ; from Virginia, 388 tons 14 cwt. ; from North Caro- lina, 9 tons s cwt. Brit. Mus. Addit. MSS. 15485. • 3 Geo. Ill, c. 25 §§ i, ii; B. T. So. Ca. 20 M 49; B. T. Journals 70, p. 257. 'These bounties amounted to £9030 in 1764, £7484 in 1765, and £6808 in 1766. B. T. Com. Series II, 626, Pp 44. ' B. T. Mass. 78 LI 67, 68. • 9 and 10 Wm. Ill, c. 45 § iii ; i Anne stat. i, c. 16. • 10 Geo. I, c. 17; 12 Cxeo. I, c. 26 § vii. ' 6 Geo. II, c. 33. ' 22 Geo. II, c. 45, §§ V, vi. Digitized by Microsoft® READJUSTMENT OF THE LAWS OF TRADE 219 the supply of seamen for the navy, and to free Great Britain from her dependence on the Dutch whalers. This end had been partially attained. But under this system, whale-fins from other parts of America not only had to, pay duties in Great Britain, but in addition had to compete against the bounties given to the Greenland ships. In the preceding two decades, it is true, virtually no whale-fins had been im- ported from America ; ' the discovery of the fishery in the St. Lawrence, however, altered matters materially. Massa- chusetts engaged extensively in this industry, and her agent set about securing a more favorable treatment for the Ameri- can product.^ A petition was presented,^ stating that in ' Whale-fins imported into England from America: Average of 7 years 1725-1732 3846 cwt. Average of 7 years 1 732-1 739 433 Average of 9 years 1739-1748 36 Average of 7 years 1748-1755 15 Average of 7 years 1 755-1 762 65 Average of 7 years 1762-1769 1078 B. T. Com. Series 11, 626 Q 9. For the statistics for 1704 and 1705, see B. T. Plant. Gen. 37, p. 125. These figures dispose of the assertion made in 1765 that at the time of the removal of the duties on the product of the Greenland fishery, the American industry was "too inconsiderable an object to attract the publick Notice." The Regulations Lately Made (London, 1 765), p. 48. In this connection also, it should be noted that, in 1732, Thomas Coram advised the Board of Trade to place American whale-fins on the same footing as those from Greenland. B. T. Plant. Gen. 11 M 31. ' On Jan. 25, 1764, Thomas Whately, Secretary to the Lords of the Treasury, sent this petition to the Board of Trade. B. T. Com. Series I, 49, 1131. ' On Dec. 30, 1763, Jasper Mauduit wrote from London to the Speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, that his brother Israel had undertaken this matter, and that after having talked with Grenville and the Secretary of the Treasury, he had drawn up a petition which had been approved Digitized by Microsoft® 220 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 1763 Massachusetts had fitted out eighty vessels for this St. Lawrence whale fishery ; that a large quantity of whale-fins had already been imported thence to London ; and that on them a duty of £si, 10s. a ton was demanded, which was very high, especially as the value of whale-fins had fallen from i^55o to £2^0 a ton Since the opening of this trade. After referring to the bounties given to the Greenland fish- ery, the petitioners said that they did not ask for similar favors, but only that the duties be abolished.* The Board of Trade passed favorably on this petition, pointing out that whale-fins were a raw material, for which in great measure England depended on foreign nations, and recommended to Parliament the removal of the duties complained of.^ Par- liament adopted this suggestion, and in 1764 repealed these duties, with the exception of the insignificant ones that had been imposed in 1673.' The immediate effect of this preferential treatment in by the Treasury department and by the Board of Trade. Coll. Mass. Hist. Soc. Series I, vol. VI, p. 195. ' Ibid. li 32, 48. ' B. T. Plant Gen. 45, pp. 386, 387. ° 4 Geo. Ill, c. 30. The duties that still had to be paid amounted to less than one per cent. In 1673, '1 order to encourage the whaUng industry, especially to Greenland, Parliament imposed comparatively high duties on oil and whale-fins caught by foreigners, respectively £g and £18 a ton. If imported and caught in colonial vessels, these respective duties were 6s. and 50^. ; if caught in colonial vessels, but imported in English vessels, 3s. and 25^. ; if caught and imported in English vessels, no duty had to be paid. 25 Car. II, c. 7. For the working of this law in 1729, see B. T. Newfoundland 10, O 46. This is one of the very few cases of discrimination against colonial shipping. Similar cases, but of more serious discrimination against British shipping, were not infrequent in colonial legislation. Digitized by Microsoft® READJUSTMENT OF THE LAWS OF TRADE 221 favor of the colonial product was to drive Dutch whale- fins completely from the British market.* The attitude of the British government in making this change is clearly expressed in a pamphlet which was certainly written under the guidance of George Grenville, if it was not, as some suppose it to have been, the work of his pen. This writer says that these duties were removed with the full knowledge that the result would be the ruin of the Greenland industry, and he adds: "Tho' we resign a valuable Branch of Trade in their (the colonies') Favour ... yet the Prefer- ence is given upon truly national Considerations, when the (British) Inhabitants of America and of Europe are looked upon as one People." ^ In addition to these regulations, the list of enumerated commodities was considerably enlarged in 1764.' Thus coffee, pimento, and cocoanuts, which were being produced in the newly acquired West Indian islands, were added to the list. Of these the most important was coffee, which was ' An account of the quantity of whale-fins imported into England: FROM NORTH : AMERICA TROM HOLLAND 1 759 7 cwt. 1562 cwU 1760 18 1696 1761 27 2500 1762 335 804 1763 1546 922 1764 1550 73 176s ? I Treas. Ace. Rev. Misc. (England), Bundle 80. According to the memorial of the committee of American merchants, July 22, 1783, colonial whale-fins paid only 47*. 6d. a ton, while foreign whale-fins paid ;g96-i4S. Am. and W.I. 448. ' The Regulations Lately Made (London, 1765), pp. 49, 50. ' 4 Geo. Ill, c. 15 § xxvii. Digitized by Microsoft® 222 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 extensively grown in Grenada.* British colonial coffee had for some time been given preferential treatment in the mar- kets of the mother country,^ but this policy had not succeeded in stimulating its production. In 1765, the year after its enumeration, this preferential treatment of coffee was further accentuated by means of still greater differential duties.' Such treatment, it was held, justified the restraints imposed on the exportation of any colonial product by the enumera- tion policy. For not only did it result in a loss to the Brit- ish revenue that the taxpayer in the mother country had to make good in some other way, but in addition it increased the price that the colonial planter received for his product. At this time also hides and skins were put in the enumerated list. Large quantities of deerskins were exported from the colonies, especially from South Carolina.* These skins, though hitherto not enumerated, were yet sent to England, whence in greater part they were reshipped to other countries, especially to Germany.* Consequently, their enumeration was of slight economic importance. Of the products of the continental colonies, besides hides, those enumerated in 1764 were whale-fins, raw silk, potashes and pearlashes, all prod- • In 1 765 it was said tliat this island produced 10,000 hogsheads of sugar and 3,500,000 lbs. of coffee. The Regulations Lately Made, p. 37. '5 Geo. II, c. 24; 25 Geo. II, c. 35; 32 Geo. II, c. 23 § v. ' 5 Geo. Ill, c. 45 § xi. * B. T. So. Ca. 15 1 46, 60; 16 K 31, 37; Am. and W.L 21 no. 105; B. T. Plant. Gen. 19 R 74. ' A vessel could not with safety be loaded with so heavy a commodity as rice. Consequently, in order to be able to fill their vessels, ship-owners were willing to take indigo and deerskins to England at low rates. William Knox, Extra Official State Papers (London, 1789), II, appendix, p. 40. Digitized by Microsoft® READJUSTMENT OF THE LAWS OF TRADE 223 ucts receiving encouragement at the expense of the mother country. The treatment of whale-fins has already been discussed. On the experimental production of silk and potash in the colonies, Great Britain was spending con- siderable sums, and naturally took measures to prevent for- eign nations from being the beneficiaries of these attempts. In 1764, also, c olonial iron and lum ber were enumerated, but by a special provision their direct exportation from the colonies to any place in America, Africa, or Asia was allowed.* The addition of these products to the enumerated list was by far the most important change made therein at this time, and was quickly shown to have been ill-advised. Colonial lumber had for a long time enjoyed preferential treatment in the British market,^ and in 1722 all the duties thereon were removed, while those on foreign lumber were retained.^ It was only in consequence of this system that colonial lum- ber could at all compete in Great Britain with that from the Baltic. The provision of 1764 regarding colonial lumber immediately called forth some well-directed criticisms. A British consular official * pointed out that Portugal had been accustomed to import large quantities of colonial staves for pipes, hogsheads, and barrels, but that in consequence of the act of 1764, these were sent to the Azores and to Madeira, ' 4 Geo. rn, c. IS § xxviii. ' 2 William and Mary, sess. 2, c. 4. »8 Geo. I, c. 12 § ii; 16 Geo. II, c. 26; 24 Geo. II, c. 57; 31 Geo. II, c. 35. Cf. Charles Carkesse, The Act of Tonnage and Poundage (London, 1726), pp. vi, viii. * Fr. Ibbetson, Deputy Consul General at Lisbon to the Board of Trade, 1765. B. T. Com. Series 11, 579. Digitized by Microsoft® 224 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1763 which were considered parts of Africa. Thence they were sent in foreign bottoms to Portugal, and thus the result of the new regulation was to discourage British shipping, and also to benefit those islands which had already acquired great wealth by the monopoly of the American wine trade. Similarly, some Cork merchants complained that the enu- meration of lumber would be highly prejudicial to Ireland, as the casks in which they packed their provisions had, as a rule, been made out of staves imported directlyfrom America.^ As a result of these criticisms, Parliament took immediate action, and in 1765 allowed colonial lumber to be shipped directly to Ireland and to any part of Europe south of Cape Finisterre.* In addition, Parliament at the same time granted bounties ^ on lumber imported from the North American colonies into Great Britain, which resulted in a considerable trade,* and in the payment of not insignificant sums by the British treasury.^ Colonial iron also enjoyed preferential treatment in the British market. Its enumeration in 1764 aroused some ' B. T. Com. Series I, 49 li 114. ' S Geo. Ill, c. 4S. 'Ibid. * B. T. Com. Series II, 626 Qq 54. ' Account of bounties paid on colonial timber, etc., from Christmas, 1765, to Christmas, 1771; 1766 £1922 1767 6556 1768 6386 1769 6SS7 1770 5525 1 771 4513 Ibid. Qq 55. Digitized by Microsoft® READJUSTMENT OF THE LAWS OF TRADE 22$ legitimate opposition.' Some Cork merchants pointed out that this regulation would hurt the Irish linen industry which, in part, relied on colonial flaxseed, because the seed had to be kept absolutely dry, and consequently could be shipped with security only on top of iron and lumber.* In 1765 Parliament took this into consideration, and permitted the colonies to export their iron directly to Ireland.^ At the same time, the production of bar iron in the colonies was further encouraged.* During the war, the temporary possession by Great Britain of a number of the French West Indies had led to the ex- portation of large quantities of rice from South Carolina to those islands.^ As rice was an enumerated commodity, this trade became illegal in 1763, on the return of Martinique and Guadeloupe to France. Georgia and South Carolina, the colonies chiefly interested, were naturally loath to lose these markets. Accordingly they petitioned Parliament for per- mission to export rice to the foreign colonies.' The northern ' John Dickinson said that this restriction Vfas "thought particularly severe," and that mixed cargoes of iron, lumber and provisions had yielded satis- factory results in the Portuguese and other markets. The Late Regulations respecting the British Colonies Considered, 1765, in Dickinson, Writings (ed. P. L. Ford) I, p. 226. ' B. T. Com. Series I, 49 li 114. Stephen Hopkins, The Rights of the Col- onies Examined (Providence, 1765), p. 14, also called attention to the bad effect that the enumeration of lumber would have on the Irish linen indiistry, as cargoes were usually composed of lumber and flaxseed. ' s Geo. Ill, c. 45 § xxii. * Ibid. § xxiii. ' B. T. Plant. Gen. 19 R 47; The Regulations Lately Made (London, 1765), P-53- • Commons Journal 29, pp. 606, 982. Q Digitized by Microsoft® 226 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 British continental colonies opposed such a measure, as it would enable rice to compete with their food-stuffs in the French and Spanish colonial markets/ In 1764, however, Parliament allowed rice to be exported directly from Georgia and South Carolina to any part of America south of those colonies,^ and in the following year extended this permis- sion to the North Carolina product as well.' At the same time, a new regulation was adopted which removed one of the chief disadvantages involved in the enumeration of rice, and greatly facilitated its reexportation from Great Britain to foreign markets.* Reviewing these purely commercial regulations^of the years 1764 and 1765, it is apparent that their aim was to encourage and not to restrict colonial industry. The efforts of the government to secure the expanding North American market for British manufacturers,* and to promote the devel- 'B.T.Plant. Gen. 19R47. '4 Geo. Ill, c. 27. ' S Geo. Ill, c. 45, § xix. Rice thus exported from the colonies had to pay one-half of the old subsidy of 1660, i.e. about "jd. a cwt. Cf. Carkesse, op. cit., p. bcxx. But the duties thus paid were to be devoted to defraying the cost of defending the colonies. 5 Geo. Ill, c. 45, § xx. * Rice could be shipped directly to European ports south of Cape Finisterre, but if destined ultimately for the Dutch or German markets, it had to be shipped via Great Britain. In 1 765 it was provided that, as rice was frequently brought to British ports only in order to be immediately exported, and whereas in such instances the necessity of paying the full British duties was burdensome, there- fore in future, on the declaration of an intention to reexport immediately the entire cargo in the same vessel, only one-half of the old subsidy had to be paid. 4 Geo. Ill, c. 45, § xxi. 'Thus in 1765 the importation of foreign silk stockings, gloves, and mitts into Great Britain or its dominions was prohibited. S Geo. Ill, c. 48. Digitized by Microsoft® READJUSTMENT OF THE LAWS OF TRADE 227 opment of the British West Indies at the expense of French commerce can be described more conveniently in connection with the reforms in the administration of the laws of trade and with the attempts to create a colonial revenue in order to defray a part of the cost of defending the colonies. Digitized by Microsoft® CHAPTER XI REFORMS m THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE LAWS OF TRADE, 1763-1765 The i llegal tr ade of the colonies with the enemy during the war gave a vital interest to the entire question of contra- band trade, and directed the attention of the British govern- ment to the system as a whole. The ex periences during the war formed to a great extent the basis for those r eforms in the administrative machinery that were carried into effect after the peace of 1763. The navy's success in partially breaking up the intercourse with the enemy led naturally to a proposal for its use in checking smuggling after the war. Contraband trade was a chronic evil in Great Britain and in the Empire as a whole, and was a natural phenomenon in that age of poor communi- cations, and hence necessarily of lax administrative control. In the colonies it included not only violations of the imperial laws of trade, but also of the provincial revenue laws.' That section of the Navigation Act of 1660 which confined all trade within the Empire to British and colonial shipping gave to officers of the royal navy authority to seize vessels that violated this regulation.* As, except sporadically,' there ' Cf., e.g., Sharpe Correspondence III, p. 99. ' 12 Ch. II, c. 18, § i. 'For some apparent violations, see B. T. Com. Series II, 579, no. i?.- 228 Digitized by Microsoft® ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 229 were virtually no such violations, and as only custom-house ofl&cials were authorized to seize vessels offending against the numerous other provisions of the acts of trade/ the activity of the navy in enforcing the colonial system had been insignificant.^ At various times, however, special vessels had been em- ployed in the colonies to stop smuggling ; and during a long course of years, the governors had regularly and persistently urged that this would be the most effective way to uproot all illegal trade. Accordingly, in 1763, profiting by the expe- rience gained during the recently concluded war, Parliament passed an act authorizing the emplo)mient of the navy in pre- venting contraband trade on the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland, and in the colonies as well.' At the same iime, the authority over vessels hovering on the coasts, which years before this had been granted to British custom-house offi- cials,* was extended to those in Ireland and in the colonies.® Ships of the navy were thereupon immediately employed for these purposes in the colonies, where this expedient was. decidedly unpopular.' The minister responsible for this measure was George Grenville, who at the time of its introduction was First Lord ' 13 and 14 Ch. 11, c. 11, § xv. ' Under Charles I, however, the navy had been regularly used to prevent the colonies from sending their produce to foreign countries. - ' 3 Geo. Ill, c. 22, § iv. For the use of such vessels in Great Britain, see "The State of the Nation" (London, 1765), pp. 16-17. * S Geo. I, c. II. » 3 Geo. ni, c. 22, § viii. ' B. T.,Mass. 78 LI 67, 73. Digitized by Microsoft® 230 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 of the Admiralty, and at the time of its passage, head of the Ministry in which he occupied the positions of First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer.* Gren- ville's chief interest centred on internal policy, and the motto of his administration was economy and reform. The war had left the British exchequer in a depleted condition, and this fact led to an investigation of all the possible ways of increasing the revenue.'' The two statutes affecting the colonies, from which an increased revenue might possibly be secured, were first, that of 1673 imposing certain moderate duties on inter- polonial trade; and secondly, the Molasses Act of 1733. The latter law had been to a great extent ignored, but during the war an attempt had been made to enforce it with a view to checking the trade with the French. These efforts had aroused considerable opposition in the colonies, and had been considerably relaxed on the approach of peace and its final conclusion.' The revenue derived from both of these statutes had been insignificant, amounting to only about one quarter of the cost of collection.* ' Commons Journal 29, pp. 620, 630; Cal. Home Office Papers, 1760-1765, p. 236. ' Cf. Granville Papers 11, pp. 113, 114. ' This can be seen in the revenue statistics already given. On Sept. 17, 1763, Hutchinson wrote to Richard Jackson: "Such indulgence has been shown of late to that branch of illicit trade that nobody has considered it as such; vessels arriving and making their entries for some small acknowledgements as openly as from our own Islands without paying the duties." Quincy, 0^. cit. p. 430. *The average yearly revenue from these two statutes for thirty years was: in the continental colonies, ;£7oo to £800 ; in the West Indies, £1100 to £1200. The establishment of the custom-house officials in all the colonies amounted to Digitized by Microsoft® ^ ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 23 1 The Molasses Act was diametrically opposed to the most fundamental interests of the northern continental colonies, and consequently could not easily be enforced. But in addi' tion, the British customs service in the colonies was in part both inefficient and venal. The trade with the enemy had been in some degree carried on with the corrupt connivance of these officials. By law they had extensive discretionary powers, of which the chief was authority to accept in full pa)maent amounts less than the lawful duties.* Thus, in- stead of exacting the full duties under the law of 1733, the officers of the customs frequently allowed the importation of foreign West Indian products on the payment of small sums of money which, it appears in some instances, they retained for their own uses.^ In 1763, in consequence of this abuse, such compositions for duties were absolutely forbidden.^ In addition, in some instances, the actual appointees to the positions in the customs service Remained in England, and delegated their functions to deputies. The Board of Trade had in vain striven against this vicious sys- tem. As the salaries of the customs officers were in them- selves small, and as they were still further reduced by this practice, some of them yielded to the temptation of aug- ;g 76(30 yearly. The Regulations Lately Made (London, 1 765), p. S 7 ; Granville Papers II, pp. 113, 114. For details regarding the officers of the customs in the colonies, see John Chaniberla)Tie, Magnae Britanniae Notitia (London, 1755), part n, pp. 96-98. ' 13 and 14 Ch. II, c. 11, §§ rvii, xviii. 'N.J. Col. Doc. ix, pp. 402-404. Cf. Quincy, op. cit., p. 430. 'Order of the Commissioners of the Customs, Nov. 15, 1763, printed in Hugh Gaine's "New-York Mercury," no. 649 for April 2, 1764. Digitized by Microsoft® 232 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 menting their income by corrupt means.* Thus a number of posts in the service had become sinecures. The Com- missioners of the Customs reported that this was one reason for the small revenue arising in the colonies. To Grenville, as the embodiment of administrative efficiency, such a system was particularly obnoxious. Shortly after the formation of his ministry, he ordered all colonial customs officials residing in England to pr oceed immediately to the ir posts in the colonies.^ In addition to these steps, on July 9, 1763, special jnstruc,- ' On Sept. 17, 1763, Hutchinson wrote to Richard Jackson: "The real cause of the illicit trade in this province has been the indulgence of the officers of the customs, and we are told that the cause of their indulgence has been that they are quartered upon for more than their legal fees, and that without bribery and corruption they must starve." Quincy, op. cit. p.*430. Similarly, in 1764, James Otis wrote: "With regard to a few Dutch imports that have made such a noise, the truth is, very little has been or could be run, before the appara- tus of guardships; for the officers of some ports did their duty, while others may have made a monopoly of smuggling, for a few of their friends, who prob- ably paid them large contributions ; for it has been observed, that a very small office in the customs in America has raised a man a fortune sooner than a Gov- ernment. The truth is, the acts of trade have been too often evaded; but by whom? Not by the American merchants in general, but by some former custom-house officers, their friends and partizans." The Rights of the British Colonists Asserted and Proved (Boston, 1764), p. 58. In estimating the value of this statement, the controversial character of the pamphlet should be taken into account. Similarly, in 1764, an anon)Tnous pamphleteer said that the Molasses Act had demoralized the custom-house officials, who "made a very lucrative jobb of shutting their eyes, or at least of opening them no farther than their own private interest required." An Essay on the Trade of the Northern Colonies (London, 1764), p. 20. See also Howard, A Letter from a Gentleman at Halifax, Newport, 1765. ' Grenville to Horace Walpole, Sept. 8, 1763. Grenville Papers II, pp. 113, 114. Cf. also Correspondence of Colonial Governors of Rhode Island, II, p. 3SS- Digitized by Microsoft® ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 233 tions were sent to thecolonial governors to take all possible measures to prevent illegal trade, especially the fraudulent and clandestine importation of foreign products and manu- factures into the colonies/ In the meanwhile, the Treasury- Department, over which Grenville especially presided, was carefully investigating the subject as a whole, and on Octo- ber 4, 1763, reported thereon. This report pointed out that the income derived from the customs in America was very small and had not increased with the growth of commerce ; and that, "thro' Neglect Connivance and Fraud," the reve- nue was impaired, and in addition the commerce of the col- onies diverted from its natural course, in not being confined to the metropolis. The Lords of the Treasury remarked that this was a question of great importance, especially be- cause the military establishments in the colonies necessitated a large revenue, and because the increased territory rendered the regulation of colonial trade a matter of immediate neces- sity. Furthermore they added that they had endeavored to remove the causes of "the Deficiency of this Revenue and the Contraband Trade with other European Nations," and had, with this object in view, ordered all the oflScials under them to be fully instructed in their duties, to repair to their respective stations and to execute the law. In addi- tion, as contraband trade had "hitherto been carried on with too much Impunity," they recommended that strict instruc- ' These instructions were sent by the Secretary of State, Egremont. Sharpe Correspondence III, pp. 102, 103. See also Wentworth to Egremont, Oct. 20, 1763. Am. and W.I. 161. Egremont laid chief stress on the loss in revenue due to the evasion of the duties. Digitized by Microsoft® 234 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 tions to enforce the laws be sent to the governors.' This report was immediately approved, and a short time there- after, the Board of Trade sent the desired instructions to the governors.^ It will be noticed that this report emanated from the Treas- ury Department, and not from the Board of Trade, which was the body especially intrusted with the management of colonial affairs. This fact is significant. It indicates that the chief object in view was to improve the revenue, and in this respect, it sounds a new note, but one not altogether foreign to the old colonial system. It marks a reversion to the policy of the Stuarts, in whose regulations of colonial trade can be traced a fixed intention to improve the British customs revenue. During the eighteenth century this fiscal motive had, however, been distinctly subordinated to the broader economic one. A rigid execution of the Molasses Act might materially increase the revenue, and consequently it was on this law that the colonial customs officials to a great extent concentrated their attention.' Furthermore, as small duties were paid on foreign goods shipped from Great Britain to the colonies, a strict enforcement of the laws 'B. T. Plant. Gen. 18 Q 74; Am. and W.I. 387, folio 76. See also the report of the Commissioners of the Customs to the Lords of the Treasury, Sept. 16, 1763. Brit. Mus. Addit. MSS. 8133, C folio 85. ^B. T. Journals 71, p. 241 ; B. T. Plant. Gen. 45, pp. 306-309; Col. Rec. of Rhode Island VI, p. 375. The commander-in-chief, Amherst, was also instructed to give his support to the enforcement of the laws. Halifax to Amherst, Oct. 11, 1763. Am. and W.I. 77. ' See, e.g., advertisement in the "Pennsylvania Gazette," no. 1836, March i, 1 764, dated at the custom house, Salem, N. J., Dec. 26, 1 763, enjoining obedience to the Molasses Act. B. T. N.J. 9 K 42. Digitized by Microsoft® ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 23$ would also in this respect somewhat increase the British revenue. Besides, this policy would give the mother country a firmer hold on the North American market, and would thus add to her prosperity and concomitantly to the produc- tivity of the British fiscal system. A more rigid execution of the law and a reform in the cus- toms service would not, however, do away with all those administrative defects that had been exposed by the trade with the enemy. But GrenviUe was painstaking and methodical and, prior to legislating, wished to hear further from the colonial governors. Though they had continually sent in reports as to the nature and extent of contraband tradt, little of an exact nature was known about it. The instructions of 1763 brought forth detailed replies from the colonies,^ which enabled the government to legislate during the parliamentary session of 1764. For the purpose of considering the extent of illegal trade, the American colonizes may be roughly divided into three groups, those in the West Indies, the plantation j;olonies on the continent, and the Northern provinces. In the important older colonies of the first group, especially in Barbados and 'A convenient list of these reports may be found in Cal. Home Office Papers, r 760-1765, p. 655. Cf. ako nos. 1555, 1603. The predominance of the financial note in the regulations of 1764 and 1765 is indicated by the fact that the Secretary of State sent these reports to the Treasury oifice, and not to the Board of Trade. On July 9, 1763, the Earl of Egremont wrote to the colonial governors about illegal trade, and on Aug. 11, 1764, the Earl of Hali- fax did likewise. Both of these despatches eUcited detailed replies, which it is advisable to consider together. See Wentworth's despatches of Oct. 20, 1763, and Nov. 18, 1764, in Am. and W.I. 161. Digitized by Microsoft® 236 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 Jamaica/ there was comparatively little or no violation of the law. Thus the Governor of Barbados was able to write to the secretary of state: "I have the pleasure to inform you that I apprehend very little Illicit Trade is attempted in this Colony." ^ On the other hand, in the comparatively unim- portant newly acquired colonies, and in the Virgin Islands where the government was not fully organized, there was considerable contraband trade. . Almost the entire produce of Dominica and St. Vincent, whose inhabitants were in the main French, was carried to St. Lucia, a French island.' Similarly, the former French colony Grenada sought to retain its accustomed trade relations, and shipped a consider- able quantity of cocoa and coffee to the French West Indies, . importing thence in turn the manufactures of France.* These unsatisfactory conditions were, to a great extent, a direct result of the dislocation produced by the transfer of these islands from the French to the British flag, — from one commercial empire to a similarly organized, but different one. In the Southern colonies on the continent, the situation was different and far more satisfactory. Dobbs reported that illicit trade was scarcely known in North Carolina, and that ' Lyttelton's Answers to Queries for 1763: B. T. Jam. 37 Cc 19; Lyttelton to Halifax, Jan. 12, 1764: Col. Cor. Jam. III. ' Charles Pinfold to Halifax, Nov. 17, 1764. Col. Corr. Barbados L ' This produce consisted of coffee, cocoa, and tobacco, all enumerated com- modities. This trade was stopped in 1765. * Lords of the Admiralty to Halifax, July 7, 1765, transmitting extracts from the despatches of Rear- Admiral Tyrrel. Cal. Home OflSce Papers, 1760- 1765, P- 573. no. 1825. Digitized by Microsoft® ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 237 during the nine years of his tenure of office, only one seizure had been made, and that even in this instance no fraud had been intended.^ Likewise, in Maryland, there was little or no violation of the law, except that a small quantity of tobacco was exported to the neighboring provinces, without paying the duties that the Crown had granted for the support of William and Mary College in Virginia.^ In the latter province, also, there was virtually no illegal trade. In 1764, Fauquier wrote to Halifax that he believed Virginia stood "as clear of illicit practices in Trade as any country that trades at all," so much so that the men-of-war did not find it worth their while to watch at all. As in Maryland, some tobacco was sent to the other British colonies without paying the duties which in part supported the local college, and in addition, some small quantities of fruit and wine were im- ported directly from Portugal.' In South Carolina, accord- ing to William Bull, there had been " few Suspicions, & fewer Instances of Persons" having broken the laws of trade. Bull also added that he had never heard of any vessel coming to the province contrary to the Act of Navigation, and that 'Arthur Dobbs to Halifax, Jan. 14, 1764. Am. and W.I. 214. Cf. B. T. No. Ca., 14 E ii, 76. 'Horatio Sharpe to Egremont, Oct. 4, 1763; Same to Halifax, Oct. 20, 1764. Am. and W.I. 197. 'Fauquier to Halifax, Nov. 20, 1764. Am. and W.I. 205. "The Chief Fraud I have been apprized of has been the shipping off Tobacco to his Maj- esty's other Colonies without paying the Duty appropriated to the Support of William and Mary College ; but a late Seizure of some New England Vessels, has I beheve pretty well put a Stop to that practice." In addition, Fauquier wrote, that the ships coming from Lisbon brought some chests of fruit, which were generally given as presents to the shippers of tobacco, and also sometimes Digitized by Microsoft® 238 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 while some illicit trade might be carried on, it was "in a very inconsiderable degree." ' The conditions prevailing in the Northern colonies were more complicated, and require a more exhaustive analysis. New Hampshire, with its small coast-line and single port, was apparently not implicated in contraband trade. In 1 765, Wentworth, who had been its governor for twenty-one years, wrote to the secretary of state: "I have made it my first care to Prevent the evils now Complained of, and which have given so much Trouble ... I have both the Pleasure and Satisfaction to assert with truth, that not one Cargoe of Prohibited Goods has been Landed within the Limits of My Government since my Arrival in it." ^ From the neighboring colony of Massachusetts, Governor Francis Bernard reported on October 25, 1763, that he be- lieved the laws of trade to be "no where better supported than they are in this province;" and that since the failure some liquor of wine, but he added : " This is rather a small Venture of the Captain, and by no means a general Cargo of the Ship." ' Bull to Halifax, Nov. 28, 1764. Am. and W.I. 223. On Nov. 23, 1763, Governor Thomas Boone also wrote to the secretary of state on the same subject, without giving any precise information, but saying that eleven years' acquaintance with nearly every province of America had convinced him of the necessity of the steps taken to prevent illegal trade. As far as South Carolina was concerned, he said that he had been very diligent in seeing that the laws of trade were enforced. Ibid. ^Wentworth toEgremont, Oct. 20, 1763. Am. and W.L 161. The follow- ing year, Nov. 18, 1764, Wentworth wrote to Halifax that upon strict inquiry he finds that since 1741 only one vessel has been suspected of being engaged in contraband trade. This case concerned only 30 to 40 hhds. of foreign molasses, and nothing positive could be learned about it. Ibid. Cf. also Wentworth to the Board of Trade, March 4, 1764. B. T. New Hampshire S D 14. Digitized by Microsoft® ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 239 in 1 761 of the attack on the Vice- Admiralty Court and the custom-house officials, "the Merchants here in general have acted in such a manner as to intitle themselves to all proper favour." Bernard admitted, as did Fauquier of Virginia, that there had been an indulgence "time out of mind al- lowed" in a trifling but necessary matter, in that small quan- tities of fruit and wine were allowed to be imported directly from Lisbon. But this, he correctly pointed out, was in itself of but slight importance, and besides, did not run counter to the spirit of the old colonial system.* Bernard likewise added that he did not pretend that Massachusetts was entirely free from all breaches of the law, but that the offenders, if discovered, were severely punished.^ This report did not discuss the "Molasses Act, " which was extensively and even openly violated in Massachusetts, such evasions constituting unquestionably the bulk of the illegal trade of that province.^ ' Am. and W.I. 167. Cf. also Bernard's answers to the Queries, Sept. 5, 1763. B. T. Mass. 78 LI 67, 68. * At this time a vessel with its cargo was condemned without any defence for loading rice without giving the necessary bond. In 1763, also, a ship, the Freemason, was condemned with its cargo for coming to Boston with wine from Bordeaux. As the wine had not been actually landed, there was some doubt as to the technical legality of this condemnation, and an appeal was taken to the High Court of Admiralty. Bernard to Halifax, Dec. 24, 1763: Am. and W.I. 167; B. T. Mass. 78 LI 67; Quincy, op. cU. pp. 387-392. ^ Bernard strongly opposed the policy of this act, and on Sept. 5, '1763, wrote to the Board of Trade, recommending that the important trade in mo- lasses from the West Indies be not touched, either by executing the old law or by passing a new one. B. T. Mass. 78 LI 67-68. In 1764 Bernard freely admitted that "if conniving at foreign sugar & molasses, & Portugal wines & fruit, is to be reckoned Corruption, there was never, I believe, an uncor- rupt Custom House Officer in America till within twelve months." Quincy, Digitized by Microsoft® 240 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 In Rhode Island the conditions were peculiar ; the colony was virtually a petty independent republic, and opposed the custom-house ofl&cials as the representatives of an outside authority.^ The colony, however, produced no enumerated commodities, and hence was necessarily free from any important violations of this phase of the colo- nial system; nor, on the other hand, does it appear that there was any extensive* illegal importation of foreign manufactures.^ The Molasses Act, however, was flagrantly and openly ignored. Of the fourteen thousand hogsheads of molasses imported into the colony, all but twenty-five op. cit. pp. 423, 424. It should be noted that Bernard was suspected of adding to his income by countenancing these evasions. 'Halifax to Rhode Island, June 9, 1764. Am. and W.I. 197. See also Bernard to Halifax, Dec. 14, 1764. Ibid. In this despatch Bernard said that it was difficult even in a royal colony to guard the smaller ports, and that "it would be too much to require an elective governor to be earnest in discovering & prosecuting frauds of trade." ' This statement is to some extent based on " An Essay on the Trade of the Northern Colonies " (London, 1764), pp. 9, 10. A good outline of this pam- phlet may be found in the " Monthly Review " (London, 1764), XXX, pp. 464- 466. The title-page conveys the impression that it was a reprint from a Philadelphia edition. Hildebum (Issues of the Press in Pennsylvania, II, p. 12) gives it among the Philadelphia imprints of 1764, but he does not state that he actually saw the pamphlet. M. C. Tyler (Literary History of the American Revolution, I, p. 56), saw only the London edition, but on the strength of its title-page, used this pamphlet as an expression of the sentiment of the Middle colonies. The essay appeared in a Rhode Island newspaper, " The Providence Gazette " for Jan. 14 and 21,1 764, and hence could not have been reprinted from a Philadelphia edition of that year. It is signed with the initial P., as was Stephen Hopkin's anonymous pamphlet, "The Rights of the Colonies Exam- ined," Providence, 1765. It should also be noted that Hugh Gaine's "New- York Mercury," no. 641 for Feb. 6, 1764, in reprinting this essay, acknowledged its indebtedness to the "Providence Gazette." Digitized by Microsoft® ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 241 hundred were foreign in origin, yet virtually no duties were collected thereon.^ Connecticut's foreign commerce was in itself small, and consequently this colony's participation in illegal trade could not be of serious importance. When pointing this out in 1763, Governor Fitch also wrote he had used his utmost en- deavors to enforce the law, and that, possibly in consequence thereof, all violations had ceased.^ The following year he likewise stated that the officials of the customs were very careful and diligent, and that no illicit trade was carried on.* The Sound was, however, a convenient place for smugglers,* and, despite Fitch's assertions, it appears that some foreign goods were smuggled into Massachusetts * and into New York* from Connecticut. New Jersey, like Connecticut, had but little foreign trade, and its waters also furnished a convenient means for smuggling into New York.'' In 1764, ' Memorial of Rhode Island against the Molasses Act in B. T. Prop. 21X57; Col. Rec. of R.I.VI, pp. 378-383 ; "New-York Mercury," Nov. 12, 1 764, no. 681. ' Fitch to Egremont, Sept. 14, 1763. Am. and W.I. 197. 'FitchtoHaUfax, Nov. 13, 1764. Ibid. (y. also B. T. Prop. 2r X 33, 1762. * Cf. B. T. Prop. 13 S I. 'In 1764 Bernard reported that some foreign goods, especially teas, had been smuggled into Boston, but as that port was particularly well watched, they could not have been imported there. Soon thereafter, he learned that two Dutch vessels had been able to get into two of the smaller ports of Connec- ticut, and he surmised that these goods came thence. Bernard to Halifax, Dec. 14, 1764. Am. and W.I. 167. • Colden to Halifax, Oct. 9, 1764: Am. and W.I. 176. Colden to Board of Trade, Dec. 7, 1763: N.Y. Col. Doc. VII, p. 584. Cf. also B. T. N.Y. 34 Mm 13, 14. 'Colden to Halifax, Oct. 9, 1764: Am. and W.I. 176; N.Y. Col. Doc. Vn, p. 584. Cf. B. T. N.J. 9 K 17. K Digitized by Microsoft® 242 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 17S4-I76S however, Governor Franklin was able to assure the secre- tary of state that since his arrival in New Jersey, two years prior to this, he had had no information regarding any con- traband trade, and that the officers of the customs had efiEectually stopped the greatest part, if not all, of such vio- lations of the law in his government.* Like Rhode Island, Pennsylvania was virtually an inde- pendent community, having but slight political connection with the mother country, and consequently little exact in- formation about conditions in the colony was forwarded to England. It was generally believed that the traders in Philadelphia, New York, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts were the chief violators of the laws of trade, including therein the Molasses Act.^ In 1763, the governor of the colony, James Hamilton, wrote rather ambiguously that he had always endeavored to stop contraband trade, but that he had not met with the success he should have liked.® His successor, John Penn, however, wrote in the following year that, whatever irregularities may theretofore have occurred in Pennsylvania, at that time no illegal trade seemed to be practised.* In contrast to this meagre information from Pennsylvania, fairly complete evidence is available regarding New York. • Franklin to Halifax, Nov. 8, 1764. Am. and W.I. 190. ' Wentworth to Egremont, Oct. 20, 1763. Am. and W.I. 161. ' James Hamilton to Egremont, Oct. 8, 1763. Am. and W.I. 197. Ham- ilton wrote that he approved of the use of the navy to stop illegal trade, and that he would do his utmost with the same end in view. ' John Penn to Halifax, Dec. 10, 1764. Am. and W.I. 197. He added that the stationary ships of war on the coast of America had been very effective, and that the officers of the navy and of the customs were vigilant in per- forming their dutv. Digitized by Microsoft® ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 243 Colden was the executive head of this colony, and forwarded to the government detailed reports,* which throw considerable light not alone on conditions prevailing in New York, but also on those in the other colonies. In the first place, Colden wrote to the Earl of Egremont: "Your Lordship cannot easily conceive how weak the hands of Government are in this province, & how much the Governor is disabled in secur- ing the King's Right, & in putting the laws of trade in execu- tion." This arose in part, as he pointed out, from the fact that the judges were closely allied to the leading families, and in all cases of importance were apt to decide against the Crown, and in favor of their relatives. As to the extent of such violations, Colden reported that "without doubt much illicit Trade is carried on in this place, and, tho' more of it has been detected and punished in this Port, than in any of the other Colonies, I am persuaded there is not less among them, in proportion to the Trade." He asserted also that New York customs officials were more careful than those of the neighboring colonies.^ The chief infraction of the colonial system described by Colden consisted of a direct trade from Holland to the colo- nies. This was carried on in'two^ ways. BritisE~vessels bound from Holland for America touched at some port in the mother country, where they entered and paid duties * Colden to Egremont, Sept. 14, 1763: Am. and W.I. 176; Same to Board of Trade, Dec. 7, 1763: N.Y. Col. Doc. VII, p. 584; Same to Halifax, Oct. 9, 1764: Am. and W.I. 176. ' The smuggling of foreign goods into New York from Connecticut and New- Jersey, Colden wrote, had been stopped by the navy's "puting Hands on Board suspected vessells before they got into any Port." Digitized by Microsoft® 244 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 on only a portion of their lading, and then, protected by the custom-house documents which they had received in Great Britain, landed their entire cargoes in the colonies. The other method was to sail from Holland with papers indicating the Dutch colonies as the point of destination, but with leave to stop at some British colony. This, Golden pointed out, "saves them from the ofl&cers in case the land- ing of the goods be not discovered." ^ The chief com- modities thus illegally imported were tea and gunpowder.^ From this summary analysis of the governors' reports, it will be apparent that, while there were numerous in- fractions of the colonial system, its effectiveness as a whole was not seriously impaired. The Molasses Act, which was not an integral part of the system, was, however, largely ignored, so much so that in a number of instances the gov- ernors treated it as an obsolete law, and did not trouble themselves with giving any information about its evasion. Of the three fundamental principles of the system, two were apparently almost completely intact. Colonial trade was, if 1 not whoUy, at all events to an overwhelmingly preponderant' extent, confined to British and colonial shipping, and the, enumerated commodities were as a general rule shipped to'^ Great Britain. Of the third fundamental principle, — that ' These methods had already been called to the attention of the British government by Hardy in 1757, and by DeLancey in 1758. B. T. Journals 65, Nov. 3, 1757; B. T. N.Y. 34 Mm 13, 14, 40, 42. Golden said that an act of Parliament would be necessary to cope with such practices. ' This trade was carried on from Hamburg as well as from Holland. In 1 764 Golden reported that the navy had put an end to this trade. The follow- ing year he wrote to Halifax that "no illicite trade has been discovered of late." N.Y. Gol. Doc. VII, p. 710. Digitized by Microsoft® ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 245 of making the mother country the staple of the European and Asiatic goods consumed in the colonies, — the violations were more serious. It is impossible to estimate their ex- tent in quantitative terras/ Fruits and wines were imported directly from Portugal, but this practice was commercially unimportant and, though violating the letter of the law, did not seriously affect the principle underlying it. Then, foreign European and Asiatic products were to a certain extent im- ported directly into the colonies, and in other instances they were imported through Great Britain without paying the British duties. The chief articles thus smuggled were tea^ and gunpowder. In this connection it should also be noted that in the main ' The author of The Regulations Lately Made (London, 1765), pp. 92, 93, correctly says that the extent of illegal trade, "as it is in its Nature private, cannot be certainly known," but he adds the vague generalization, "that it is carried to a dangerous Excess, is an indisputable Fact." He maintained that vessels continually traded from Hamburg, Holland, and ports in the German Ocean, and from the foreign colonies to those of Britain; and that "the Con- currence of all these several Modes of evading the Acts of Navigation, can alone account for the Demands of the Colonies upon their Mother Country, being vastly disproportioned to their Consumption." He sought further to strengthen this conclusion by pointing out that very small quantities of the finer grades of foreign linens, of wines, and of tea were exported from Great Britain to Amer- ica. But these facts can be otherwise explained. Thus wines reexported from Great Britain could not compete with Madeira and similar wines that could legally be imported directly into the colonies. This pamphleteer then hazards the estimate that foreign merchandise to the value of £700,000 was yearly smuggled into the colonies, an amount considerably in excess of the foreign goods imported from Great Britain. These statements are to a large extent pure guess-work, and are far less reliable evidence than are the official reports of the governors. ' In 1765 it was estimated that the yearly consumption of tea in the colonies was 1,500,000 lbs., while they imported from Great Britain only 150,000 lbs. Digitized by Microsoft® 246 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 there was little inducement to violate the laws prohibiting the colonies from importing European and Asiatic goods from any place but Great Britain, as this regulation did not to a marked extent increase the cost of foreign goods. Thus in 1762, the Virginia Committee of Correspondence, after referring to the fact that most European goods reex- ported from Great Britain to the colonies received a draw- back of all the duties paid with the exception of 2J per cent, said: "This can be no temptation to any man in his Senses to run the risque of smuggling."* This regulation, however, did somewhat increase the price of such foreign goods in the colonies, and consequently they must have encountered some difficulty in competing with similar goods illegally imported. Hence the very fact that large and in- creasing quantities of foreign goods were reexported from Great Britain to the colonies indicates in some measure that their illegal importation into the colonies was not in general extensively carried on.^ (The Regulations Lately Made, pp. 92, 93.) This statement is largely a haphazard one, and seems to be based on the fact that the statistics showed a much smaller per capita consumption of tea in the colonies than in Great Britain. During the ten years ending April, 1763, 1,674,000 lbs. of tea were exported from Great Britain to the colonies, while during the same period the mother country consumed 38,760,000 lbs., and Ireland 1,808,000 lbs. (The State of the Nation, London, 1765, p. 18.) It is, however, a well-established fact that the consumption of tea was not so wide-spread in the colonies as it was in England, and consequently, even allowing for the smuggling of tea into Great Britain, the disparity is not so remarkable. Hence it would appear that the estimate of an American consumption of 1,500,000 lbs. is far too large. Cf. also Pownall, op. cit. pp. 190-192. ' Va. Mag. XI, p. 142. ' Thus of the total exports from London to New York during the six years Digitized by Microsoft® ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 247 These reports of the governors and the experience gained during the war enabled Parliament to legislate in 1764. Under the prevailing system, British West Indian products received preferential treatment in the mother country's market. During the war foreign sugars had been imported from the continental colonies as British sugars, thus evading the high differential duties and vitiating the preferential system. As the ensuing illegitimate profits were large, such frauds were also subsequently prevalent in some of the West Indian colonies.* Accordingly, in ^764, the preferential system was safeguarded by requiring adequate certificates and afl&davits as to the origin of the commodities.^ It had been pointed out by one of the colonial governors that some violations arose from the fact that vessels engaged in the colonial coasting trade did not have to make entries at the custom-house.^ Accordingly, Parliament ordered that no vessel could sail from one colony to another without clearing with the oflScers of the customs.* Then, on the strength of Colden's reports, and those of his predecessors from Christmas, 1758, to Christmas, 1764, somewhat over one-fifth consisted of such foreign goods. Customs Records in Public Record Office, Ledgers Imports and Exports, vols. S9-64. 'Cal. Home Office Papers, 1760-1765, p. 573. ' 4 Geo. ni, c. IS, § XX. In 1766 it was further provided that all foreign sugars imported into Great Britain from the continental colonies "shall be deemed and taken to be French sugars." 6 Geo. Ill, c. 52, § xxiii. The clause in the act of 1764 was suggested by the West India planters. Mauduit, Feb. II, 1764, in Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll. Series I, vol. VI, p. 195. 'Thomas Boone, Nov. 23, 1763. Am. and W.I. 223. * 4 Geo. Ill, c. 15, § xxix. Small open vessels, under twenty tons in bur- den, not laden with dutiable and prohibited goods were exempted by 5 Geo. III, c. 45, § XXV. Digitized by Microsoft® 248 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 during the war, it was also provided in 1764 that in future no ship could clear from Great Britain for any colony unless the entire cargo had been laden and shipped there.^ In addition, foreign vessels at anchor or hovering on the coasts of the colonies, and not departing when warned, were, unless in distress, declared forfeited.^ Similarly, in order to pre- vent illegal trade with the French, all commercial intercourse with St. Pierre and Miquelon was forbidden.' As a result of the fact that the colonial customs ofl&cials had been interfered with in the execution of their duties by damage suits, it was furthermore provided that in cases where the court, while releasing the seizure, still held that there had been a probable cause for making it, these officers should not be liable for damages. In such cases also the owner of the seized goods or vessel was not entitled to re- cover the costs of the suit.* In addition, the owner of the seizure, not the officer, had to prove his case,^ and all persons claiming seized goods had to deposit security to cover the costs of the suit.* In order still further to protect these officers. Parliament, in 1765, forbade the colonies to reduce their fees.'' ' 4 Geo. Ill, c. IS, § XXX. This naturally did not apply to Madeira wines, to Irish linens, etc., which would be imported directly into the colonies. § xxxi. ' Ibid. § xxxiii. ' Ibid. § XXXV. * Ibid. § xlvi. « Ibid. § xlv. • Ibid. § xliv. Governor Thomas Boone of South Carolina suggested this, Nov. 23, 1763. Am. and W.I. 223. Cf. B. T. So. Ca. 20 M 103. ' 5 Geo. Ill, c. 45, § xxvii. The naval officers were entirely paid by fees, and the collectors in part by fees and also by salaries. These fees were deter- Digitized by Microsoft® ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 249 In 1764, Parliament also made a change in the system of colonial vice-admiralty courts. The Navigation Act of 1660 had given jurisdiction to the admiralty courts in the case of one class of seizures/ and in 1671 this jurisdiction was further extended.^ But in the latter half of the seven- teenth century, while in the West Indies cases arising out of violations of the laws of trade were frequently tried in the ad- miralty courts, in the continental colonies they were tried in the ordinary civil courts acting with a jury. As these juries would rarely give a verdict for the Crown, even if the evidence was indisputable, it was found necessary, toward the end of the seventeenth century,' to give jurisdiction in all cases involving the acts of trade to vice-admiralty courts, which shortly thereafter were erected in all the colonies.* These courts rendered decisions without juries, and on this ground, as well as for the reason that they represented a foreign jurisdiction, they were in general disliked by the colonies. At aU times throughout the eighteenth century there was a latent conflict between these courts and those of the colonies, and on several occasions it became acute. During the war, some of the vice-admiralty courts, influ- mined by the local legislatures. Thus in 1748 Virginia passed a law settling the fees of these officials, but providing that only one-half of these fees was to be paid, if the vessel belonged wholly to the inhabitants of Virginia. Hening VI, 1748, Ch. 36, §§ vii, viii, ix. ' 12 Ch. n, c. 18, § i. ' 22 and 23 Ch. II, c. 26, §§ x, xi. Cf. BoUan's Memorial in B. T. Mass. 74 Hh 52, and B. T. Plant. Gen. 34, pp. 20, 83. ' 7 and 8 Wm. Ill, c. 22, § vii. • Adm. Sec. Out-Letters 1047, pp. 3, 53, 54, 9^, 98, loi. io3i I04, I44. 149, 150. Digitized by Microsoft® 250 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 enced by colonial sentiment, had refused to condemn vessels engaged in illegal trade with the enemy. Likewise, since the statute of 1696 that had established this system, many acts had been passed by Parliament regulating colonial trade, some of which did not clearly and unquestionably give jurisdiction to the colonial vice-admiralty courts.' Hence difficulties arose, and it was deemed advisable to reform the system.^ Consequently, in 1764, Parliament provided that all penalties arising from any violation of the acts of trade should be recovered in any colonial court of record, in any colonial court of admiralty, or in any court of vice-admi- ralty, which may or shall be appointed over all America, at the election of the informer or prosecutor.' In accordance with this act of Parliament, power was given to the Com- missioners of the Admiralty to establish such a general court.* On May 28, 1764, they ordered the appointment of the Earl of Northumberland as Vice- Admiral of all America,' and on the following day that of William Spry as Judge of :the Vice- Admiralty Court of all America, under the style of ' Memorial of Bollan. B. T. Mass. 74 Hh 52. *In their report of Oct. 4, 1763, the Commissioners of the Treasury com- mented on the difficulty of getting seizures condemned, and recommended the establishment of a uniform system in the colonies. B. T. Plant. Gen. 18 Q 74. ' 4 Geo. Ill, c. 15, § xli. The Stamp Act of 1765 gave appellate jurisdic- tion to this general vice-admiralty court, but by its repeal in 1766, this right to hear appeals was also taken away from this court. 5 Geo. Ill, c. 12, § Iviii; 6 Geo. Ill, c. 52. Cf.&n interesting memorial on the colonial admiralty courts in Am. and W.I. 387, folios 68 el seq. See also Whately to Charles Yorke, Feb. 16, 1765, enclosing a memorial on the admiralty jurisdiction in the colo- nies. Brit. Mus. Addit. MSS. 39511 (Hardwicke Papers DLXIII). • Adm. Sec. Original Patents (Vice-Admiralty and Subordinate Offices), 40. ° Adm. Sec. Out-Letters 1057. Admiralty to Sir Thomas Salusbury. Digitized by Microsoft® ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 251 "Commissary Deputy and Surrogate," with powers concur- rent with those of the existing colonial admiralty courts, but with no power to hear appeals from them.' Reviewing these administrative reforms, it is apparent that their eflfect was to strengthen the hands of the imperial government. A strict enforcement of the laws of trade meant also a firmer hold on the North American market, and similarly, the execution of the Molasses Act meant a development of the British West Indies at the expense of the French colonies and hence of French commerce. These clearly defined objects were, however, subordinate to the fiscal motive. The strained condition of the British finances, and the increased expenditure necessitated by the vast territorial accessions to the Empire, emphasized the urgency of the financial problem. The question of colonial defence assumed greater importance, and it was to this question and to securing from the colonies some portion of the enlarged expenditure which it necessitated that the British govern- ment devoted its chief attention. ' Adm. Sec. Out-Letters 1057. Same to Same. His salary of ;£8oo was to be paid out of the King's share of the seizures, or if this were insufficient, by the Treasurer of the Navy. For Spry's commission, see Biit. Mus. Addit. MSS. 35910 (Hardwicke Papers DLXII, folio 225). Digitized by Microsoft® CHAPTER XII INDIAN POLICY AND COLONIAL DEFENCE, 1763-1765 The removal of France from Canada did not diminish the necessity of an adequate system of colonial defence. In England it was recognized at the time, that the peace was only a truce in the prolonged struggle with France, and that it would be highly dangerous not to be prepared for a fresh war at some more or less remote future date.' The pride of France was wounded to the quick by the series of humiliating disasters, and it was unreasonable to expect that this nation, whose predominance but a few years before had seemed in the eyes of all to threaten the balance of European power, would feebly submit to a position of decided inferiority. Immediately after the conclusion of peace, France sought for a means of retrieving her fortunes, and in encouraging the separatistic tendencies of the North American colonies, endeavored to cripple her rival.^ The prospect of renewed hostilities wi^h France was thus always in the background; in the foreground of colonial defence was the Indian ques- tion, which had assumed alarming dimensions. By the terms of the Treaty of Paris, a fringe of land along the coast of America had been enlarged to half a continent, for the ' Cf. Soame Jenjms, op. cU. passim; Sharpe Correspondence III, p. 288. ' Henri Doniol, Histoire de la Participation de la France I, pp. 4, 5. 252 Digitized by Microsoft® INDIAN POLICY AND COLONIAL DEFENCE 253 greater part unoccupied except by Indians, who were, in the main, hostile to the English. In addition, the entire fur trade had come into British hands, and this also necessitated the occupation of the numerous pOsts established by the French in the interior. Thus the ttiilitary question was an important one, and similarly, ako, the closely related prob- lem of regulating the Indian trade demanded a comprehen- sive settlement. Until the rniddle of the eighteenth century, the British government had left the management of Indian affairs to the separate colonies. From their very foundation, the commercial relations with the aborigines had been impor- tant. With the development of Canada, the bulk of this trade had, however, drifted into French hands, yet at all times it constituted a not insignificant feature of the economic life of the British colonies. The success of the French was due in great measure to the centralized form of their government, and similarly the failure of the Eng- ' lish resulted from the fact that each colony sought to secure as great a share of the Indian trade as was possible, and thwarted the endeavors of its competitors. The result of this rivalry had been pernicious, not only in facilitating the success of the French in the fur trade, but also in alienating the Indians. This alienation was further in- creased by the general character of English colonization, which, by the effective occupation of the soil, drove the Indians from their accustomed hunting-grounds. As Pow- nall said, the English, "with an insatiable thirst after landed possessions," forced the Indians away from their Digitized by Microsoft® 254 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 lands/ In contradistinction, the extensive nature of French colonization did not seriously interfere with the ordinary pursuits of the natives The chief object of the British government in calling to- gether the Albany Congress of 1754 had been to place Indian affairs under the joint management of the colonies. On the failure of this plan, the government was forced to under- take the matter itself, and appointed Sir William Johnson ^ and Edmund Atkin ^ as agents, respectively for the North- ern and Southern Indians. These officials were especially intrusted with superintending the political relations with the native tribes. The commercial relations were still left to each separate colony, and the results thereof continued as unsatisfactory as they had been hitherto. Early in 1756 Dinwiddle pointed out the necessity of requiring a license from all traders, and of so regulating the trade that Indians should neither get too much rum nor be cheated in the price 'Memorial in Pownall to Pitt, Jan. 15, 1758. Am. and W.I. 71. This was subsequently printed in Pownall, Administration of the Colonies (2d ed. London, 1765), appendix, pp. 12, 13. Pownall added: "The Indians unable to bear it any longer told Sir William Johnson that they believed soon they shou'd not be able to Hunt a Bear into a Hole in a tree but some English- man wou'd claim a right to the property of it as being his Tree." This story, though ben trovato, is not accurate. At the conference in 1753 between John- son and the Iroquois, one of the Indians made the above statement, but he referred to the French as well, not alone to the English. N.Y. Col. Doc. VI, p. 813, ' Board of Trade to Henry Fox, Feb. 17, 1756. Am. and W.I. 605. Al- ready, in 17SS, Johnson had been appointed by Braddock; in 1756 he and Atkin received commissions from the Crown. " Board of Trade to Henry Fox, May 13, 1756: Am. and W.I. 605; B. T. Plant. Gen. 15 O 138; B. T. Journals 64, June 24, 1756. Digitized by Microsoft® INDIAN POLICY yW^D COLONIAL DEFENCE 255 that they obtained for their furs.* At the same time, Shirley also sent to the Board of Trade a sketch of such a plan, which was based on the Massachusetts scheme of regulating the trade.^ During the war it was impossible to inaugurate a general system, while at the same time the necessity thereof was strongly emphasized by the alienation of the Indians, who in general not only sided with the French when the issue was in doubt, but who, even after the fall of Montreal, were ever on the eve of an organized revolt against British authority. This dissatisfaction of the Indians was due to many causes: to French incitement; to the intrusion of English settlers on their lands ; to the abandonment by the English of the French policy of giving to the natives presents of guns and clothing ; and, above all, to the low moral charac- ter of the English traders.' In 1761 the secretary of state, Egremont, wrote to Amherst, condemning in strong terms the shameful conduct of the colonial traders in taking advantage of the Indians, and pointing out that the French, by pursuing a different course, had deservedly succeeded in gaining the confidence of the native tribes.* ' B. T. Va. 25 W 208. ' This was sent at the request of the Board of Trade. B. T. Mass. 74 Hh 68. ' In 1756 Dinwiddle attributed the Indians' distrust of the English to the traders, "who are the most abandoned Wretches in the World." B. T. Va. 25 W 208. See also Sir William Johnson's despatch of June 28, 1766, in Am. and W.I. 388 ; and his despatch of July i, 1 763 to the Board of Trade in N.Y. Col. Doc. VII, pp. 525-526. *Dec. 12, 1761. Am. and W.I. 77. On April 28, 1761, Francis Bernard wrote to the Board of Trade that the Indians "are suffered to run in debt beyond their abilities & then are allowed to sell their children to pay their debts; Digitized by Microsoft® 256 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 A few months later the Board of Trade wrote to the gov- ernor of South Carolina, approving of his scheme to in- duce the neighboring colonies to unite on a general plan for regulating the Indian trade, and expressing the hope that this would in some degree remove the mischiefs and inconveniences that had resulted from the passage by the different provinces of partial acts, "not only differing from, but frequently obstructing and counteracting each other." In the Board's opinion this was the chief cause of the jeal- ousy and discontent among the Indians, which had led to such disastrous results. At the same time the Board added : "We are inclined to think, that our Interest with respect to the Indians never can be settled with stability, but by the interposition of the Parliament of Great Britain, in making some general Regulations for the management of Indian Affairs, upon some general Plan, under the sole direction of the Crown & its Officers." * This conclusion was reenforced the following year, when the discontent of the natives led to an Indian war of unpar- alleled magnitude, under the able leadership of Pontiac. On October 7, 1763, a proclamation was issued prohibiting the settlement of any lands west of the sources of the rivers flowing into the Atlantic, and requiring all Indian traders to They are suffered to harass one another at Law for trivial disputes, which sometimes end in the ruin of both parties; when they are condemned in crimi- nal prosecutions, they are subjected to Fines instead of corporal punishment, so that where the Criminal only ought to be corrected, his family is ruined; In civil actions, they are charged with exorbitant costs, when it is known they have nothing to pay with." B. T. Mass. 78 LI 14. ' Board to Thomas Boone, June 3, 1762. B. T. So. Ca. 29, p. 171. Digitized by Microsoft® INDIAN POUCY AND COLONIAL DEFENCE 257 take out licenses from the colonial governors.^ This was merely a provisional arrangement^ pending the formulation by the Board of Trade of a comprehensive scheme for regu- lating the trade. The essential thing was to protect the Indians from the traders, as otherwise friendly relations could not be estabhshed.* Accordingly, all trade was to be confined to the various posts, where it could be supervised by the military commanders. All traders were to take out licenses and to give security to obey such regulations "as shall be thought necessary for the effectual Prevention of those fraudulent Practises which have produced so many bad Consequences, and which it appears impossible to prevent by any other Means." * Before inaugurating a definite scheme, the Board of Trade wrote to the Indian agents asking for their well-ma- tured opinions.' In reply to this request, the agent for the Northern Indians, Sir William Johnson, prepared a detailed plan.' He emphasized the necessity of employing a much ' Hening VII, pp. 663-669; Annual Register 1763, pp. 208 et seq.; Pa. Arch., 4tli Series III, pp. 240-248. See also Gal. Home Office Papers, 1760- 1765. P- 303. no- 993- ' N.Y. Col. Doc. Vni, p. 21. Cf. Washington, Writings (ed. W. C. Ford) n, pp. 220, 221. ° On Sept. 29, 1763, the Board of Trade wrote to Sir William Johnson: "We are convinced that nothing but the speedy establishment of some well digested and general plan for the regulation of our Commercial and political concerns with them (the Indians) can effectually reconcile their esteem and affections." N.Y. Col. Doc. VII, p. 567. * Halifax to Amherst, Oct. 19, 1 763. Am. and W.I. 77. ' Board of Trade to John Stuart, Aug. 5, 1763, in B. T. So. Ca. 29, pp. 195-197; Same to Johnson in N.Y. Col. Doc. VII, p. 535. • N.Y. Col. Doc. VII, pp. 572 et seq.; 579 et seq. s Digitized by Microsoft® 258 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 larger force of men in the service, advised the annual giving of presents to the Indians, and in addition recommended that the trade be confined to a number of posts "agreeable to certain regulations for the prices of goods and Furrs." In 1 764, the Board of Trade prepared a tentative plan, according to which Indian affairs were to be divided into two districts under the charge of officers appointed by the Crown. These officers were to have power "to sett aside all local interfering of particular Provinces, which has been one great cause of the distracted state of Indian Affairs in general." As John- son had suggested, the trade was to be confined to certain posts, and those engaged in it were to take out licenses.* It is obvious that such a comprehensive system would entail considerable expense. On this occasion, as on many others in the history of the British Empire, the financial question was the decisive factor. The Ministry had no intention of saddling the already overburdened taxpayer in the mother country with this additional outlay; the colonies not only objected to the extension of imperial authority that this scheme necessitated,^ but in addition they would not voluntarily contribute the necessary funds, nor would they submit to parliamentary taxation; finally, it was difficult to devise a satisfactory system of duties on the trade, by means of which the cost of its management could be defrayed.' 1"^ N. Y. Col. Doc. VII, pp. 634-641 ; Pa. Arch., Hazard Series IV, pp. 182-192. 'Jf.Y. Col. Doc. VIII, p. 655. ' In 1764 Colden wrote that "the most effectual method to raise the duties on the Indian Trade, for defraying the expence of the regulation of that Trade" would be by collecting at the trading posts duties in kind on the fur sold there. Digitized by Microsoft® INDIAN POLICY AND COLONIAL DEFENCE 259 It was mainly on account of the difficulty of the financial question that the Board of Trade did not in 1764 present its plan to Parliament. This difficulty was still further in- creased in the following year by the troubles over the Stamp Act, and by the refusal of the colonies to submit to parlia- mentary taxation. To make the trade self-supporting, and at the same time to "avoid meddling with the Question of the Right to lay Duties in America by Parliament " ' was a problem beset with insuperable obstacles. In 1767 Shel- burne wrote to the Board of Trade, pointing out that the system was not entirely satisfactory from the commercial standpoint, and that the governors did not correspond with the superintendents and obey the rules established by them. He laid especial stress, however, on the "enormous" expense necessitated by the plan, and asked the Commissioners to report on the entire subject.^ Early in 1768 ^ the Board of Trade reported that all relations with the Indians should be in the hands of the Crown, and that the regulation of the trade was important because it affected the political rela- tions with the Indians. They added, however, that their plan of 1764 was defective, and, besides, very expensive. Furthermore they pointed out that the expense might exceed the value of the end in view, "and being greater than the Trade can bear must, if the present Plan should * Franklin, Writings IV, pp. 467-472. The question whether Parliament or the local assemblies should repeal the provindal laws regulating the Indian trade was also one of the chief obstacles. ' N.Y. Col. Doc. VII, p. 981. ' Ibid. VIII, pp. 19-31 ; Pa. Arch., Hazard Series IV, pp. 313-320. Digitized by Microsoft® 26o BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 be permanent, either fall upon the Colonies, in which Case it will be impracticable to settle the proportion each Colony should bear, or become a burthen upon this Country, which we humbly conceive, would be both unreasonable and highly inconvenient." Therefore the Board of Trade advised that the plan of regulating the Indian trade be abandoned, and that its management be again intrusted to the colonies/ This recommendation was shortly thereafter adopted.^ Thus a well-matured plan, which was far in advance of the prevailing system, and one which was highly necessary in order to maintain peaceful relations with the Indians,* had to be abandoned primarily because of the expense and of the virtual impossibility of creating a revenue in America. The inefficient, regulation of the Indian trade by the sepa- rate colonies was an important factor in alienating the natives from the English, and was one of the immediate causes of their organized revolt in 1763, shortly after the conclusion of the treaty of peace. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities with France in 1754, Great Britain had maintained only small garrisons on the continent. In addition, the mother country had provided presents for the Indians. But in the main, the colonies had borne the brunt of the Indian wars. It was, however, recognized that the provincial spirit of the colonies handicapped them in their relations with the natives, and that it would be highly advisable to create a ' "As a means of avoiding much difficulty, and saving much expense both at present and in future." ^ N. Y. Col. Doc. Vni, pp. SS-S8. 1 768. 'Ibid. VII, p. 702. Digitized by Microsoft® INDIAN POLICY AND COLONIAL DEFENCE 261 military union of the colonies for purposes of defence. On the failure of such plans in 1754 and 1755, it became appar- ent that it would be necessary for the mother country to maintain permanently in the colonies a much larger force than had been customary hitherto.^ The experiences during the war had also convinced the government that, on account of their particularism, the colonies could not be trusted to provide adequately for their own defence, and that the safety of the Empire de- manded the permanent establishment of a relatively strong force in the colonies. Besides, as a result of the conquest of Canada, the Indian question had, from the military standpoint, assumed large proportions. For- merly almost aU the land indisputably British had been settled, and the question of defence against the Indians had been a comparatively simple one. Now, the numerous forts in the interior had to be garrisoned, and this necessitated a large increase in the number of troops permanently stationed on the continent. Owing to their lack of union, the colo- nies did not desire, nor were they able, to undertake this clearly indispensable work. Besides, they had a tendency to underrate the military power of the Indians.^ Consequently, 'On March 5, 1755, William Bollan wrote to Josiah Willard that some members of Parliament had told him that it was intended by some persons of consequence to keep a standing force in the colonies with a military chest there. Coll. Mass. Hist. Soc. Series I, vol. 6, p. 129. ' On Nov. 18, 1763, Sir William Johnson wrote to the Board of Trade: "I apprehend from what I have formerly & now wrote on this Subject, it will appear clearly to Your Lordships that the Colonies had all along neglected to cultivate a proper Understanding with the Indians, and from a mistaken notion had greatly despised them, without considering that it is in their power Digitized by Microsoft® 262 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 the British government could not do otherwise than establish a permanent standing army in America. There was no alternative course. Furthermore, apart from the facts that brought about this decision, the return of peace with France would not of itself have allowed the withdrawal of the British troops,* as they were absolutely essential in sup- pressing the formidable Indian rebellion that Pontiac had organized.^ The attitude of the colonies during this war still further proved the necessity of the measure. This insurrection became so serious that on October i8, 1763, Halifax, then secretary of state, wrote to Amherst in- structing him to call if necessary on the colonies for as- sistance.* In this despatch there was no direct intimation that the colonies were not to receive any compensation for their services. The situation was, however, decidedly dif- ferent from that of the preceding years. The French war had been primarily an imperial one; the Indian outbreak affected the colonies much more concretely than it did the Empire. As the war was thus predominantly a colonial one, and one which, according to the well-established theory and custom of imperial defence, should have been in the main borne by the colonies, it is not surprising to find that Gren- ville indorsed this draft despatch of Halifax with the foUow- at pleasure to lay waste and destroy the Frontiers. — this opinion arose from our Confidence in our Scattered Numbers and the Parsimony of our People, who from an error in Politics would not expend five pounds to save twenty." B. T. Plant. Gen. 19 R 51. ■ N.Y. Col. Doc. VIII, p. ao. ' Am. and W.I. 98. " Am. and W.I. 77. Digitized by Microsoft® INDIAN POLICY AND COLONIAL DEFENCE 263 ing words: "It is not intended to empower him (Amherst) to make promises to ye Colonies of any repayment from hence of what they shall expend for their own defence." In accordance with this amendment of the Prime Minister, a few days thereafter Halifax wrote to the Commander-in- Chief that, in case he should have to call on the colonies for assistance, he should not give them the slightest expectation of any reimbursement.* As the situation was a most serious one, Amherst asked New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia to fur- nish some troops, but he refrained from calling on the New England colonies.^ This led to a number of difficulties.* The New York Assembly thought it unreasonable that all the colonies had not been asked, and agreed to contribute their quota only if the New England colonies did likewise.* New Jersey followed the example of New York.* On ac- count of the lack of response to the requisitions, Gage, who toward the end of 1763 succeeded Amherst as commander- in-chief, also asked the New England colonies for aid.* Massachusetts refused to respond to his request, not being willing to submit to any dictation from New York.^ The ' Halifax to Amheist, Oct. 22, 1763. Am. and W.L 77. ' Pa. Arch., 4th Series III, pp. 249-251. Amherst asked Pennsylvania only to raise, clothe, and pay 1000 soldiers. ' Golden, Dec. 8, 1763, to Halifax. Am. and W.I. 176. See also Report on Canadian Archives, 1885, p. 144. * For further details, see N.Y. Col. Doc. VII, pp. 586, 587." ' William Franklin to Halifax, Jan. 12, 1764. Am. and W.I. 190. See also N.J. Col. Doc. IX, pp. 398-402. " R.I. Col. Rec. VI, pp. 376, 377; Canadian Arch., 1885, p. 192. ' Bernard to Halifax, Feb. 6, 1764. Am. and W.I. 167. Digitized by Microsoft® 264 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 New Hampshire Assembly, on the ground that neither Connecticut nor Massachusetts had complied, likewise re- fused, alleging also that they could not support the charge of the two hundred men requested by Gage "at so great a Distance as Niagara." * Similarly, Rhode Island would not raise the troops demanded by the Commander-in-Chief. Some of these difficulties were overcome. Thus Connecticut finally agreed to levy a small body of soldiers.^ But in Pennsylvania, the old dispute between the proprietors and the legislature interfered with the grant of effective support.' Virginia, however, had responded energetically to Amherst's requisition.* New York ultimately raised somewhat over one-half of the number of troops desired, whereupon New Jersey agreed to provide three hundred instead of the six hundred that Amherst had requested.* The general attitude of the colonies is comprehensively described by the governor of New Jersey in a despatch in which he discussed the difficulty of raising troops in the colonies. On March 6, 1764, William Franklin wrote to the Board of Trade: "The Want of Union among the Colonies must ever occasion Delay in their military Operations. The first that happens to be called upon postpones coming to any * Wentworth to Halifax, March 2, 1764. Am. and W.I. 161. ' Fitch to Halifax, March 23, 1764. Am. and W.L 197. 'Gage to Haldimand, Feb. 15, 1764 in Canadian Arch., 1885, pp. 144, 14s; Halifax to John Penn, Oct. 18, 1763 in Am. and W.L 197. Cf. N.Y. Col. Doc. Vn, pp. 529, 530, 570. * Fauquier to Egremont, April 8, 1763, and Halifax to Fauquier, Oct. 19, 1763. Am. and W.I. 205. ' Franklin to Halifax, March 6, 1 764. Am. and W.I. 190. Digitized by Microsoft® INDIAN POLICY AND COLONIAL DEFENCE 265 Determination till 'tis known what the other Colonies will do ; and each of those others think they have an equal Right to act in the same Manner. This procrastinating Conduct, owing to the Jealousies and Apprehensions each Colony has lest it should happen to contribute Somewhat more than its Share, is the Reason why the American Levies are some- times delay'd till the Season for Action is nearly elapsed." * In view of these facts, the following words of Halifax seem somewhat mild. On May 12, 1764, he wrote to Colden: "It were much to be wished that the several Colonies whose assistance was required had chearfuUy exerted themselves to raise the full numbers of Men demanded of them by His Ma'^' Commander-in-Chief." ^ Thus it was again^ demonstrated that the requisition sys- tem was absolutely unworkable. Its inefficacy rendered the establishment of a standing army in America essential. In fact, the failure of the colonies to respond to the requisitions in 1764 forced both Amherst and Gage to disobey their instructions to reduce the regular force in America.* The ' B. T. N.J. 9 K 41. See also Franklin's speech to the New Jersey legis- lature in the " New-York Mercury, " March 5, 1 764, no. 645. Benjamin Frank- lin, the father of this governor, when examined before the House of Commons in 1766, tried rather disingenuously to put the attitude of the colonies in a more favorable light. Pari. Hist. 16, p. 154; Franklin, Writings IV, pp. 440, 441. ' N.Y. Col. Doc. Vn, p. 627. ' Secretary at War, Ellis, to Halifax, June 16, 1764, to the effect that not- withstanding his orders to reduce the army to the peace establishment, Am- herst had ventured to keep two additional regiments. In his letter of April 18, 1764, Gage stated that "from the small assistance given by the colonies" he was obliged to retain these two regiments also. Gal. Home Office Papers, 176&-176S, p. 420. no- 1355- Cf. no. 1356. Digitized by Microsoft® (266 ,' BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 British government was left no choice, and was forced to keep a large force on the continent. This measure was a direct result of existing military conditions. As, however, it was generally recognized in' England that there was in the continental colonies a| marked tendency toward independence, the fact that such a standing army would serve as a counteracting agency was not totally ignored.* At most, however, if at all a motive of this measure, it was a distinctly subordinate one. Until the revolutionary movement was well under way, several years after the adoption of this policy, but very slight, if any, stress was laid on the American army as a weapon of coer- cion. Prior to the French war, only small garrisons had been • On Aug. 15, 1755, Shirley wrote to Robinson urging the conquest of Can- ada, denying the probability of the secession of the North American colonies, and adding: "At all Events, they could not maintain such an Independency, without a Strong Naval Force, which it must forever be in the Power of Great Britain to hinder them from having : And whilst His Majesty hath 7000 Troops kept up within them, & in the Great Lakes upon the back of six of them, with the Indians at Command, it seems very easy, provided the Governors & prin- cipal Civil Officers are Independent of the Assemblies for their Subsistence, & commonly Vigilant, to prevent any Steps of that kind from being taken." Am. and W.I. 82. There is also extant in the British archives an unsigned and undated plan of the forts and garrisons necessary for the security of America. This plan was probably drawn up in 1762. It specifies five reasons for keep- ing an army in America, of which the second is "to retain the Inhabitants of our antient Provinces in a State of Constitutional Dependance upon Great Britain." The fort at Crown Point, it was claimed, would, among other advantages, "be usefuU in guarding against Disobedience, or Defection amongst the Inhabitants of the Maritime Provinces, who already begin to entertain some extraordinary opinions concerning their Relation to, & Dependance on their Mother-Country." B. T. Plant. Gen. 18 Q. Digitized by Microsoft® INDIAN POLICY AND COLONIAL DEFENCE 267 maintained in the American colonies, and the expense in- volved thereby was comparatively insignificant. Exclusive of the expenditure of the Ordnance Board, it amounted to only about ;^8o,ooo yearly. Of this amount only ;£i 3,000 was spent for the forces in those provinces that ultimately formed the United States. The establishment of a standing army of ten thousand men in America after 1763 greatly in- creased this outlay.* The yearly cost of this force was about ;£32o,ooo, and consequently it involved an additional ex- penditure of about £ 220,000.^ These troops were distrib- uted in the West Indies and on the continent, but almost ' In 1764, the expenditure of the War Office for these garrisons in America was £252,093; in 1765, £268,054; in 1766, £272,737. Commons Journal 29, p. 681 ; 30, pp. 21, 470, 471. In 1764 Parliament voted £372,774 for the garri- sons in the plantations, and in Minorca and Gibraltar, of which £120,681 was for Minorca and Gibraltar. 4 Geo. Ill, c. 23. In 1765 and 1766 the respective parliamentary grants were £327,502 and £332,183. 5 Geo. Ill, c. 40; 6 Geo. Ill, c. 41. If from these two latter grants there be deducted the cost of the garrisons in Minorca, Gibraltar, and Africa, it would appear that £60,000 less than the amount given above was spent on the garrisons in America during these two years. This apparent discrepancy arises from the fact that Parliament also appropriated £60,000 from the income that it was expected would be derived from the American revenue acts toward defrajang the cost of these garrisons. Commons Journal 30, pp. 352, 780. Thus the cost of the army was about £260,000 yearly. This, however, does not include the outlay of the Ordnance Board for the American army. In 1764 Parliament granted £225,439 to the Ordnance Board, and in 1765 £230,193, but the estimates of this department do not carefully specify the amounts spent in the colonies. 4 Geo. Ill, c. 23, 5 Geo. Ill, c. 40 §§ 18, 19; Commons Journal 30, pp. 25-27. A considerable sum was, however, thus spent, about £60,000 yearly. Com- mons Journal 29, pp. 686, 687; Am. and W.I. 387 fo. 63; G. B. Hertz, The Old Colonial System (Manchester, 1905), p. 74. Thus the total cost of the Ameri- can army was about £320,000 yearly. See also Treas. Misc. Various, Bundle 197 (Estimate Book, pp. 6, 10). ' In reaching this result, the cost of the garrisons in the colonies prior to Digitized by Microsoft® 268 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 the entire increase in expenditure was due to the necessity of keeping a considerable body of soldiers in North America.' According to the well-recognized theory and practice of imperial defence, this expense should, in part at least, have been defrayed by the colonies. It was generally held that the mother country's duty as regards protection did not include the maintenance of permanent garrisons in the colonies. Thus even James Otis said that it was not "an unreasonable thing" to ask the colonies to contribute to the support of this standing army because "qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus." ^ Great Brkain_owed. the., colonies protection, but by this was meant military assistance during war, and, more especially, naval defence at all times. The failure of the colonies in 1754 to provide for their defence by means of a union, and the subsequent unwillingness of a number of them to cooperate vigorously with the British 1 7SS had been raised to £100,000 by estimating the expense of the Ordnance Board at that time at ;£2o,ooo yearly. ' Am. and W.I. 387, fo. 63. Of the twenty battalions in America, fifteen were located on the continent, and five in the West Indies. Brit. Mus. Addit. MSS. 33030 (Newcastle Papers CCCXLV, p. 19). In addition, Great Britain supported the civil establishments in Nova Scotia, Georgia, and in East and West Florida, and paid the cost of managing Indian affairs. 3 Geo. Ill, c. 17; 4 Geo. Ill, c. 23; 5 Geo. Ill, c. 40; 6 Geo. Ill, c. 41. See Treas. Misc. Various, Bundle 197 (Treas. Book of Payments, 1 760-1 769, pp. 47- 50). These and other minor items would bring the entire charge on the British exchequer on account of the military and civil establishments in the colonies up to about £380,000 yearly. ' Otis, The Rights of the British Colonists Asserted and Proved. (Boston, 1764), pp. 35, 36. In 1765 Stephen Hopkins frankly said: "The protection promised on the part of the crown, with chearfukiess and great gratitude we acknowledge, hath at all times been given to the colonies." The Rights of the Colonies Examined (Providence, 1765), p. 9. Digitized by Microsoft® INDIAN POLICY AND COLONIAL DEFENCE 269 forces, led at the time to numerous proposals that Parlia- ment should impose taxes on the colonies in order to make them bear their equitable share of the burden of defence.' These suggestions were inopportune on account of the im- pending war ; they were not rejected, but merely laid aside. During the war itself the matter was not dropped. A colonial stamp tax was proposed to Pitt.^ The backward- ness of several colonies, notably Maryland and Pennsylvania, led many to the conclusion that parliamentary taxation was the only remedy.* In 1757 Loudoun wrote to Pitt, "that if some Method is not found out of laying on a Tax, for the Support of a War in America, by a Brittish Act of Parliament, it appears to me, that you will continue to have no Assistance from them in Money, and will have very little Assistance in Men." * The difl&culty in securing adequate support from * Sharpe Correspondence I, p. 99. ' Pari. Hist. 16, p. 105. 'In 1757, Governor Sharpe of Maryland wrote that it grieved him to think that we should find such difficulty in raising a paltry sum to support a few hun- dred men to defend our frontiers, when we could afford to support 1000 more for the general service, if Parliament compelled us. "There is scarcely a Per- son of Cormnon Sense among us but laments that no Act of Parliament has been yet made for that purpose, for my own part I am of Opinion that nothing else can effectually preserve these Colonies from Ruin." Sharpe Correspondence II, pp. 85, 86. Cf. also Sharpe to Calvert, Nov. 9, 1757. Ibid. II, p. 100. On Nov. IS, 1757, Sharpe wrote to Loudoun: "Indeed the superiour Class of People in every part of the province are already much dissatisfied at the Assem- bly's proceedings & declare publickly that they should be well pleased if the Legislature of Great Britain, would ease the Assembly of the trouble of framing supply Bills by Compelling us by an Act of Parliament to raise £20,000 an- nually by a Poll Tax as the Quota of this Province towards carrying on the War." Ibid. II, p. 105. *Pitt Correspondence I, p. 44. On Nov. 10, 1757, Brigadier Waldo Digitized by Microsoft® 270 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 the colonies during the war with France, and subsequently thereto during the Pontiac conspiracy, convinced the British government that parliamentary taxation was the sole and only means of obtaining from the colonies their just share of the cost of their own defence.* Thus on March 10, 1764, Calvert wrote to Governor Sharpe of Maryland that he had predicted that colonial taxation would be inevitable on the suggested a comprehensive scheme of colonial taxation. Am. and W.I. 81. ' According to a private letter sent early in 1762 from London to New Jersey, it was reported at that time that Parliament would lay a tax on America. N.J. Col. Doc. IX, p. 339. In the controversial literature of 1764 and 1765, a large number of colonial writers asserted that the colonies had contributed their full proportion during the war. See, e.g., Oxenbridge Thacher, The Sen- timents of a British American (Boston, 1764), p. 6; James Otis, The Rights of the British Colonists (Boston, 1764), pp. 57, 58; Stephen Hopkins, The Rights of the Colonies Examined (Providence, 1765), pp. g, 22. It should be noted that these were New England writers, and that Massachusetts had been exceptionally public-spirited. In addition, this colony had suffered consider- ably from the fact that the expenses of the war were in great part met by taxes and not by loans. In 1766 Franklin made a similar assertion, stating that the colonies had "raised, paid, and clothed near 25,000 men during the last war; a nimiber equal to those sent from Britain, and far beyond their proportion." Franklin, Writings IV, p. 437. Cf. ibid. pp. 402, 405 ; Pari. Hist. 16, p. 139. As far as concerned the campaigns of 1 758 and 1759, this statement is only some- what inaccurate. Cf. Cal. Home Office Papers 1760-1765, p. 24, no. 98. It should be remembered, however, that these soldiers were, as a rule, enlisted only for a few months, and that a large proportion of their cost was paid by Par- liament. As far as concerned the years 1755, 1756, 1757, 1760, 1761, and 1762, Franklin's statement is a gross exaggeration. In 1760 the colonies, exclusive of South Carolina, provided only 15,862 soldiers. Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania IX, p. 48. Then for the campaign of 1761, for which two-thirds of the previous levies were asked, the colonies voted to raise 10,607 men, of which they actually raised only 8796, and of these but 1266 remained in service during the winter. Corr. of Col. Gov. of Rhode Island II, p. 349. These general broad statements were made during a heated controversy, and Digitized by Microsoft® INDIAN POLICY AND COLONIAL DEFENCE 27 1 return of peace because of "the colonies remiss'^ of Duty to the Crown & themselves in defence g' the Enemy the French, who neither at the commence nor during the War in America where our equals, either in Strength or Circum- stances, our Colonies Superiour in all, & with a Little Assist- ance our People of the Colonies might have subdued the French." But an army had to be sent from England which gained the victories which resulted in the peace of 1763. Since then, a "War has broke out upon the Colonies by the Savages, the colonies neglect by their provincial Legislatures not raising subsidies to avert, nor in defence, stand still .& see their Neighbours cruly Butchered by the Savages, squabling ab' framing Assessm* Bills to pass, tho' in Defense bound to his Majesty & themselves, send to the mother country for money aid & assistance of Troops." * '" In consequence of the patent fact that the colonies, as a whole, would not voluntarily contribute their share of the military burden, it was decided to tax them for this purpose.^ This decision was the logical result of events from the year 1754 on. The British government might again have tried to form a union of the colonies as it had done in so far as they imply that the colonies as a whole were zealous in prosecuting the war, are diametrically opposed to the actual facts. ' Sharpe Correspondence III, p. 145. Cf. also Daniel Dulany, Considera- tions on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes (2d ed. Annapolis, 1765), p. 21; Frankhn, Writings IV, p. 427. ^Thus on Feb. 23, 1763, Rigby wrote to the Duke of Bedford: "I under- stand part of the plan of the army is, and which I very much approve, to make North America pay its own army." Bedford Correspondence III, p. 210. CJ. Sharpe Correspondence III, pp. 87, 88. Digitized by Microsoft® 272 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, I7S4-I76S in 1754; but the colonies had shown such an aversion to the scheme that any such attempt was inevitably doomed to failure. On the other hand, the mother country might have borne the whole burden of defence, even though this would have violated the prevailing theory and custom. Such a step was, however, decidedly inadvisable, not only because it might be the entering wedge for still larger future increases in the colonial budget, but also because of the existing strain on British finances. J The war had about doubled the debt,' which stood at the exceedingly large figure of one hundred and thirty million pounds, with an annual interest charge of four and one half million pounds.'' In addition, Great BritaiiT was spending large sums on the navy, which was regarded as the Empire's main bulwark. Even after the conclusion of peace, Parliament granted annually one and a half million pounds for this purpose.* Consequently, British financial resources were severely strained, and the already overburdened taxpayer in the mother country was in no humor to undertake more than his fair share of the expense of defending the colonies.* In the eyes of the colonies, the ' The Regulations Lately Made, p. 56; Dowell, A History of Taxation and Taxes in England II, p. 128. ' Commons Journal 29, pp. 432, 760. 'In 1763, Parliament granted £2,040,661; in 1764, £1,430,568, besides £650,000 on account of the navy's debt; in 1765, £1,439,734. 3 Geo. Ill, c. 17; 4 Geo. Ill, c. 23; 5 Geo. Ill, c. 40. ' The land tax in Great Britain was 4s. in the pound, producing about £1,600,000. 4 Geo. HI, c. 2 ; s Geo. Ill, c. 5. It was hoped that the colonial revenue would in part enable the government to reduce this tax to 3s. Walpole, Memoirs Geo. Ill, vol. II, pp. 298-300; Lothian MSS. (Hist. MSS. Com. 1905), p. 275. Digitized by Microsoft® INDIAN POLICY AND COLONIAL DEFENCE 273 imposition of a parliamentary tax on America would, how- ever, violate the principle of " no taxation without represen- tation." This principle they regarded as the basis of civil and political liberty; and even if its violation could be jus- tified in their eyes, it meant that the colonies were to con- tribute funds toward the support of an army over whose actions they would have no control. The adoption of either alternative of this dilemma * was bound to lead the British government into serious difiiculties. But some decision was imperative, for a policy of inaction would have been suicidal. 'As a possible solution of the difl&culty, it was suggested in 1754 that the colonies should send members to Parliament. (Frankhn, Writings III, p. 238.) James Otis favored this plan. (The Rights of the British Colonists, PP- 3S> 36) S9-) William Knox likewise advanced this proposition, and said that Grenville approved of it. (Knox, Extra Official State Papers II, p. 31.) Soame Jenyns maintained that the idea was impracticable. (The Objections to the Taxation of our American Colonies, pp. 17, 18.) The idea was never seriously considered, and did not commend itself either to the mother country or to the colonies. Cf. John Dickinson, Writings (ed. P. L. Ford) I, p. 185. Among the British State Papers for 1747, but probably of an earlier date, is an elaborate scheme for colonial taxation emanating from one of the Northern colonies. The author thereof wrote: "Whereas it may perhaps be objected that it will be hard for these Countrys to have Laws imposed upon them by the Parliament of Great Brittain where they have none to represent them I begg leave to propose that each Govemm? on this Continent may have Liberty to ellect persons either residing in these Countrys or Great Brittain to sit in Par- liament." Am. and W.I. 603. Digitized by Microsoft® CHAPTER XIII THE REVENUE ACTS OF 1764 AND 1765 Early in the year 1763, it was definitely known that it was the intention of the British government to keep an army of ten thousand men in America, and that the colonies were expected to contribute to its support. The statesman who carried this policy into effect was George GrenviUe. Of a scientific and unimaginative temperament, with a distinctly legal cast of mind, he adopted a policy fraught with disas- trous consequences. The justice of the demand that the colonies should defray in part the cost of their permanent military establishment was clear to all. The old requisition system was patently unworkable. Hence inevitably recourse was taken to parliamentary taxation, of whose formal legality there could be but little doubt. In adopting this policy, GrenviUe met with no opposition in Great Britain, and the attitude of the colonies was such that he had little, if any, reason to foresee the gravity of its results. On March 12, 1763, the agent of Massachusetts officially informed the colony of the contemplated step, yet eleven months later he was still without instructions, and consequently did not work against the measure. "Nor do I find," he wrote, "the least disposi- tion in the other agents to oppose it." ' It remained then to • Jasper Mauduit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives in Massa- chusetts, Feb. II, 1764. Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll. Series I, vol. VI, pp. 194-195. 274 Digitized by Microsoft® THE REVENUE ACTS OF 1764 AND 1765 i2ji decide in what form Parliament should create such a colonial revenue, and to this task Grenville devoted especial care and attention. \Pn May 5, 1763, the Earl of Egremont, as Secretary of State for the Southern department in Grenville's cabinet, instructed the Board of Trade to report "in what Mode, least Burthensome & most palatable to the Colonies, can they, contribute towards the Support of the Additional Expence, which must attend their Civil and Military Establishments," in consequence of the newly acquired territory and the number of forts therein/ j The Board of Trade, over which Shelburne then presided, gave an evasive answer, merely stating that they were as yet powerless to form any opinion.^ [it will be noticed that at this time the intention was, that this revenue should likewise be devoted toward defraying that portion of the regular governmental expenses in the colonies, which was defrayed by the British exchequer. '3 Great Britain paid in part the salaries of a In the instructions of Boston to its representatives, May, 1764, surprise was expressed "that when so early Notice was given by the Agent of the Intentions of the Ministry to burthen us with new Taxes, so little Regard was had to this most interesting Matter, that the Court was not even called together to consult about it till the latter end of y' Year; the Consequence of which was, that In- structions could not be sent to the Agent, tho soUicited by him, till the Evil had got beyond an easy Remedy." Samuel Adams, Writings I, p. 4. • B. T. Plant. Gen. 17 Q 31 ; Ibid. 45, pp. 212-262. ' Ibid. 45, p. 260. ' On Jan. 11, 1764, Dobbs wrote to Halifax: "I apprehend the British parliament may lay Duties upon goods imported into the Several Colo- nies to Support the Troops Necessary to Secure our great acquisitions on this Continent, as also to support the additional officers of revenue." Am. and W.I. 214. Digitized by Microsoft® 276 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 number of the colonial governors, those of North and South Carolina, as well as those of the Bahamas and the Bermudas/ In addition. Parliament annually provided for the governmental expenses of Georgia and Nova Scotia, and, subsequent to the peace,, for those of East and West Florida as well. The idea of devoting the colonial revenue to such purposes was, however, abandoned by Grenville. Nor was it his intention to use this revenue to pay the salaries of the governors, judges, and other Crown oflEicials in the remaining colonies, thus freeing them from their dependence on the provincial assemblies. His object was not to remodel the system of government prevailing in the colonies, but merely to create a revenue which should in part defray the cost of the American army. At the time of the introduction of the Stamp Tax, it was Grenville's intention to use the colonial revenue solely for military pur- poses,^ and the acts of 1764 and 1765 distinctly appropriated these funds to such objects alone. Toward this purpose of creating an American revenue, nothing was done in the parliamentary session of 1763; but in 1764, the "Sugar Bill" was passed. This was a comprehensive measure, whose openly expressed aim was, ' B. T. Barbados 29 Aa 104; Treas. Misc. Various, Bundle 197 (Treasury Book of Pa)Tnents, 1760-1769). ' Knox, Extra Official State Papers II, pp. 24, 25. Cf. also Jasper Mauduit in Mass. Hist. Soc. Series I, vol. VI, pp. 194, 195 ; Israel Mauduit in Almon, Biographical Anecdotes IT, pp. 86, 87. In his answer to Soame Jenyns's pamphlet, James Otis correctly said: "I cannot find any intention of applying any part of the new American revenue to the discharge of the provincial civil list." Considerations on Behalf of the Colonists (2d ed. London, 1765), p. 27. Digitized by Microsoft® THE REVENUE ACTS OF 1764 AND 1765 277 Jn the first place to raise a colonial revenue, and in the second to reform the old colonial system, both in its administrative and in its economic features.") It was the first statute distinctly taxing the colonies, and marked a radically new departure in colonial policy. [The intent of the act is clearly stated in the words of the preamble : "Whereas it is just and necessary, that a revenue be raised in your Majesty's said dominions in America, for defraying the ex- pences of defending, protecting and securing the same," Parliament imposes a series of taxes in the colonies.' The revenue arising from this act, less the charges of collection, was to be paid into the exchequer, "and shall be reserved, to be, from time to time, disposed of by parliament, towards defraying the necessary expences of defending, protecting, and securing, the British colonies and plantations in America." ^ The duties imposed by this act were various in nature. In the first place, GrenviUe availed himself of the existing iMolasses Act of 1733.' iThe law imposed very high duties on foreign sugar, rum, and molasses imported into the colo- nies, but until 1759 it had been virtually ignored. Q[ts aim had been to develop the British West Indies at the expense of the French colonies, and consequently of French commerce.j Owing to the dissatisfaction with the terms of the treaty of peace, this policy was now revived. The Molasses Act was made perpetual,* but at the same time was fundamentally modified. In order to encourage the production of indigo • 4 Geo. ni, c. IS § i. ' Ibid. § xi. ' 6 Geo. II, c. 13. * 4 Geo. Ill, c. 15 § v. Digitized by Microsoft® 278 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 in the British colonies, such as South Carolina, where it had become a firmly established industry, a duty was imposed on foreign indigo imported into the colonies/ , Instead of the old duty on foreign rum, its importation was absolutely forbidden.!3 This prohibition resulted from the fact that Guadeloupe and Martinique, while in British hands, had learned to make rum. As France, in the interests of its brandy industry, prohibited rum, these colonies had no regu- lar outlet.' Consequently this prohibition was designed to hurt French industry, and to benefit the British West Indies and the continental colonies as well, in both of which rum was extensively manufactured. The old duty on raw sugar was maintained, and an additional duty was levied on foreign refined sugar.* The continental colonies were not, however, seriously affected by these duties, as they experienced diffi- culty in procuring foreign sugars.^ |In fact, no one of these ' In addition, a duty of £2 19*. gd. a cwt. was imposed on foreign coffee imported into the colonies from any place but Great Britain. This duty had a similar object in view and was very high, the value of coffee being £3 a cwt. The Regulations Lately Made, p. 76. ' § xviii. ' The Regulations Lately Made, pp. 78, 79. * Foreign white or clayed sugar imported into the British colonies had to pay £1 2s. a cwt. over and above the duty of 5s. a cwt. imposed in 1733. It was claimed that these duties interfered with the carrying trade of the Northern colonies, as French sugars were brought in small vessels from the West Indies to the continental colonies, where they were trans-shipped in larger vessels to Europe. During the war, the question arose whether or not such sugars had to pay the duties. The matter was definitely settled in 1766, when a warehousing system was provided, by means of which sugars, as well as other foreign prod- ucts, could be reshipped from the colonies without paying any duties. 6 Geo. Ill, c. 52 § xvi. Cf. also on this The Regulations, etc., pp. 86, 87. ' In the Rhode Island memorial of 1764 against the renewal of the Molasses Act, it was stated, that as far as concerned their staple, sugar, the British West Digitized by Microsoft® THE REVENUE ACTS OF 1764 AND 1765 279 duties or regulations was important, either from the fiscal or from the commercial standpoint. ,/Xhief interest centred on the molasses duty, which, according to the act of 1733, was sixpence a gallon. This duty was virtually prohibitory, and as foreign molasses was absolutely essential to the Northern colonies, the law could not be enforced. It was recognized, however, that a re- duction of the duty would both yield a revenue and also protect the British West Indies from French competition. In March 1763, Charles Townshend, then first Lord of Trade, proposed to reduce the duty to twopence.* The matter was, however, dropped in Parliament and de- ferred until the next session.^ All in England agreed "that a practicable duty should be laid, and the payment of it enforced . ' ' Some thought the duty should be f ourpence ; GrenviUe was satisfied with twopence; and the agents of the continental colonies endeavored to procure its reduction to but one penny.^ The West Indian interest, however, Indies could receive no prejudice from this trade of the continental colonies with the foreign plantations, "for it is well known that the Policy of both the French and Dutch has confined the Trade of Sugar to themselves so that we never ob- tain any of that Commodity from them save now and then a small Quantity of an ordinary Kind; which is generally procured (not without Hazard) by the Assistance and Address of those Merchants there who help us in the Transaction of our BiKiness.'' B. T. Prop. 21 X 57. ' Mass. Hist. Soc. Series I, vol. VI, p. 193; Cal. Home OflSce Papers, 1760- 1765, p. 266, no. 811. ' Commons Journal 29, p. 617. ' Mass. Hist. Soc. Series I, vol. VI, p. 193. On Aug. 3, 1763, Hutchinson wrote to Jackson: "To reduce the duty to a penny per gallon I find would be generally agreeable to the people here, & the merchants would readily pay it." Quincy, op. cit. p. 435. Digitized by Microsoft® 280 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 was very influential and succeeded in having the duty established at threepence.* In place of a prohibitive tax, a revenue duty was imposed, which could and did yield a fair return. In addition to the Molasses Act, there was in existence prior to 1764 another act of Parliament in the form of a reve- nue biU, whereby the cqlonies were affected. This was the law of 1673, which imposed small export duties on some co- lonial products when shipped to another British colony^ In 1764, coffee and pimento were added to this list of products; these duties were, however, unimportant.^ Then, Grenville made use of the fact that large quantities of wine were consumed in America, The bulk thereof was imported directly from the wine islands off the coasts of northern Africa, especially from the Madeiras, practically none being shipped from Great Britain to the colonies. Com- paratively high import duties were imposed on such wines when imported into the colonies from these islands, while wine imported from Great Britain had to pay only low duties.' ' Mauduit, Feb. 11, 1764, in Mass. Hist. Soc. as ante p. 194. 4 Geo. HI, c. 15 § vi. The author of The Regulations Lately Made, p. 79, estimated the expense of smuggling under the old act at li d. a gallon. This is, however, merely a surmise, and is patently a gross exaggeration. The price of molasses was approximately js. a gallon. Brit. Mus. Addit. MSS. 33030 (Newcastle Papers CCCXLV, folio 137). 'British coffee ^s. a hundredweight; British pimento id. a pound. Ibid. §§ ii, iii. ' Every tun of Portuguese, Spanish or other wine, except French, imported from Great Britain, loj. ; every tun of Madeira or similar wines imported directly, £7. At the same time, however, the British duties on wines thus re- exported to the colonies were reduced from £11 13J. 6d. to £3 10s. Thus there Digitized by Microsoft® THE REVENUE ACTS OF 1764 AND 1765 281 Thus the object of these duties was not only to raise a reve- nue, but also to divert the wine trade of the colonies from the Madeiras to Great Britain. It was one of the measures whose distinct object was to give the mother country a greater command of the colonial market. Furthermore, the act of 1764 imposed import duties in the colonies on certain classes of Oriental and French textiles,* whose use had been absolutely prohibited in Great Britain.* ^renville also adopted another device to increase the reve- nue. As already pointed out, the British fiscal system was so arranged that foreign products could be shipped from the mother country to the colony on the payment of slight duties. The general rule, to which there were some important excep- tions, was that all the duties were repaid on foreign goods reexported from Great Britain except one-half of the "Old Subsidy" of 1660. The amount of duty retained was, roughly speaking, 2^ per cent.' Under this system a con- siderable part of the exports from Great Britain to the was created a differential duty of £3 a tun in favor of wines imported from Great Britain. Ibid. § xii. Cf. The' Regulations, etc., pp. 74, 75, 92, 93. ' Persian, Chinese, and East Indian silks and printed calicoes, as well as foreign cambrics and French lawns. ' II and 12 Wm. Ill, c. 10; 7 Geo. I, sfat. I, c. 7; 18 Geo. II, c. 36. Cf. The Regulations, etc., p. 70. 'In 1761 the total amount thus repaid on foreign goods exported to the colonies was ;£99,oSi. The chief items were £3g,Soo on calicoes, and j^28,ooo on German linens. B. T. Com. Series II, 626 B 31. The drawbacks on foreign linens exported from England to the colonies were in 1752 ;£40,o63, and in 1753 ;g4o,749. Treas. Ace. Rev. Misc. (England), Bundle 77. These drawbacks amounted to nearly 90 per cent, of the entire duties. Thus in 1 743, 120 ells of German linen paid £1 13s. sHd. duty, and the drawback thereon amounted to £t 8s. SUi. B. T. Com. Series I, 40 BB 15. Digitized by Microsoft® 282 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 colonies consisted of foreign goods.* The proportion varied, but was approximately one-quarter of the whole.' In 1764, this system was changed in that thereafter no part of the old subsidy of 1660 was to be repaid of foreign goods exported from Great Britain to the American colonies.' This subsidy amounted to 5 per cent of the value of the commodities as determined by the "Book of Rate^ It is absolutely impossible to figure exactly to what extent this change increased the revenue.* The amount was prob- ably about ;£2o,ooo yearly.^ This increase would naturally appear solely in the British customs-revenue ; f and though virtually a direct tax on the consumer in America and the West Indies, it would not form a direct part of the fund devoted to defraying the cost of defending the colonies. ' During the decade from 1721 to 1730, the average annual exports from Eng- land to the continental colonies were £471,000, of which £136,000 consisted of foreign goods. The corresponding figures for the decade 1739 to 1748 were £748,000 and £224,000. Am. and W.I. 687. ' For full details during the years 1758 to 1763, see Customs Records, Ledg- ers of Imports and Exports, vols. S9-64. ' §§ xiii, xiv. There were certain exceptions, as wine, which has already been noted. Then, white calicoes and muslins, in addition to not drawing back any part of the old subsidy, could not draw back £4 15s. in £100, i.e. one-third of the net duties granted in 1700 and 1704. It should be noted that those textiles, on which this act imposed duties when imported into the colo- nies, still continued to pay only the half subsidy. 11 and 12 Wm. Ill, c. 10; 32 Geo. II, c. 32. * As was said in 1765, "no exact Calculation can be made of the Produce to be expected from this Duty." The Regulations, etc., pp. 59, 60. ' The increase was 2J per cent, but the values as given in the book of rates are to a great extent arbitrary. The total exports of foreign goods from Great Britain to the colonies in the fiVe years 1769 to 1773 were £3,766,924. B. T. Com. Misc. Trade Statistics, vol. 7. Digitized by Microsoft® THE REVENUE ACTS OF 1764 AND 1765 283 This change in the drawback system likewise favored the sale of British manufactures in the colonies, since those of foreign countries were burdened with an additional tax, which, though slight, unquestionably had some effect-Y Apart from the increase in the British revenue by the change in the drawback system, the act of 1764 produced in the short time in which it was in force, ;^2S,ooo yearly.^ Of this amount, about three-quarters was derived from the duties on molasses and wines.' Thus, figuring the increase in in- ' This was important chiefly in connection with foreign coarse linens. The Regulations, etc., pp. 60-70. * Payments into the exchequer under the following acts: ACT OF 1673 ACT OF 1733 ACT OF 1 764 176s £2,954 £6.274 £3,217 1766 7,373 786 21,990 1767 3,905 29,244 Treas. Ace. Rev. Misc. (England), vol. 59. These are net amounts ; the gross amount for the act of 1764 was about £4600 per annum more. See Treas. Misc. Various, Bundle 197 (Estimate Book, p. 38) ; Treas. Ace. Rev. Misc. (England) Bundle 80 : (An account of the produce of 4 Geo. III.). ' An account of the produce of the duties imposed by 4 Geo. III. from Sept. 29, 1764, as far as the accounts have been received. Dated: Custom-House, London, Nov. 12, 1766. Import duties: White sugar £6 Raw sugar 5,389 Indigo 98 Madeira wine 12,835 Porto wine 859 Textiles 3,509 Molasses 17,699 Export duties: Coffee 1,089 Pimento 126 £41,610 Treas. Ace. Rev. Misc. (England), Bundle 80. Digitized by Microsoft® 284 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 come due to the change in the drawback system at £20,000, this act produced a revenue of £45,000, contributed in varying degrees by the West Indian and North American colonies. This revenue would, however, cover only about one-seventh of the cost of the American army, and was con- siderably less than the colonies' just proportion of the mili- tary establishment. That the act of 1764 would not produce an adequate colonial revenue was recognized at the time. When Gren- ville introduced the bill in the House of Commons, he stated that it was his further intention to institute a colonial stamp tax.* Action thereon was, however, deferred until 1765, as Grenville desired to give the colonies time to consider it, and also the option of suggesting some other tax that might be more agreeable to them. He told the colonial agents that, if America preferred a different method, he would be content, provided only the money were raised.* This pro- posal aroused intense opposition in the colonies,* but as the - only alternative suggested by them was the hopelessly im- practicable requisition system,* Grenville persisted in his • Commons Journal 29, p. 935 ; The Regulations, etc., p. loi ; N.Y. Col. Doc. VII, p. 646; Sharpe Correspondence III, pp. 108, 109. On Henry McCuUoh's connection with this tax see Grenville Papers II, pp. 373, 374; Brit. Mus. Addit. MSS. 3S910 and 3S911 (Hardwicke Papers DLXII and DLXIII). ' Almon, Biographical Anecdotes II, pp. 86, 87 ; William Knox, The Claim of the Colonies to Exemption from Taxes (London, 1765), pp. 27 e/ seq. ' Va. Mag. of Hist. XII, pp. 6, 9; Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives of Pennsylvania (Phila. 1775), V, pp. 3SS, 35^> 376- * Cf. Soame Jenyns,, The Objections to the Taxation of our American Colo- nies (2d ed. London, 1765), pp. 15, 16. Digitized by Microsoft® THE REVENUE ACTS OF 1764 AND 1765 285 intention. He did not appreciate the gravity of the situation, nor did any one else in England, not even the colonial agents. The British government was used to strenuous popular oppo- sition to new taxes, and realized, as Grenville said, "that all men wished not to be taxed." ^ Only two years before, the imposition of a tax on cider in England had resulted in dis- turbances of so serious a nature that the soldiers had to be called upon to restore order.* Accordingly, in 1765, Grenville introduced the famous Stamp Act, which became a law after meeting with virtually no opposition.' In conformity with its custom not to receive petitions against revenue bills, the House of Commons rejected those from the colonies against this measure. The same action was taken in regard to a petition against the cider tax, that had led to the above- mentioned disturbances in England.* The Stamp Act was passed, as the preamble distinctly states, because a fur- ther revenue was necessary for defraying the expense of protecting the American colonies. According to it,® all legal and commercial documents, pamphlets, newspapers, alma- nacs, cards and dice in the colonies had to have a stamp afl&xed to them. The revenue arising therefrom, less the charges of collection, was to be kept as a separate fund in the exchequer, and was to be disposed of by Parliament for the defence of the colonies. The amount of this revenue was variously estimated at from £60,000 to £100,000, of which a ' Almon, op. cit. II, p. 88. ' Pari. Hist. 16, pp. 34 et seq. ' Walpole, Geo. HI, vol. I, p. 198. * Walpole, Geo. Ill, vol. H, p. 56. ' s Geo. HI, c. 18. Digitized by Microsoft® 286 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 large part, probably about one-half, would have been paid by the West Indian colonies.* Thus the acts of 1764 and 1765 were calculated to produce a total revenue ^ of from about £105,000 to ;^i45,ooo. In other words, these acts would yield an income sufficient to meet from one-third to somewhat less than one-half of the cost of the American army. This revenue was to be derived from all the colonies, though the chief outlay was occasioned by the garrisons on the continent of America. ' Pari. Hist. 16, p. 183; Sharpe Correspondence HI, p. 287; Walpole, Geo. in, vol. II, p. 189; Grenvllle Papers H, pp. 373, 374; Brit. Mus. Addit. MSS. 33030 (Newcastle Papers CCCXLV, folios 95, 197, 334). The gross produce of the stamp taxes in Great Britain, exclusive of those on apprentices which were not extended to America, was £142,000, and the net produce £121,000. Ibid, folio 334. ' This includes the increase in the British customs revenue due to the change in the drawback system. Digitized by Microsoft® CHAPTER XrV COLONIAL OPPOSITION These various measures of the years 1764 and 1765 meant an expansion of the sphere of the imperial govern- ment's activity, and hence necessarily greater control over the colonies. The movement was to a large extent one of increased administrative efficiency, and though not aimed at colonial self-government, inevitably implied some diminu- tion of colonial freedom of action. The use of the navy for administrative purposes, the presence of an army in America, the imperial regulation of Indian trade, and in general the increased number of British officials, all em- phasized in concrete form the fact that the colonies were not independent communities, but parts of a larger political ' system.* J'On these broad grounds, this general policy was ' There was also, on the part of some in England, an intention to extend the Episcopal system to America. This step seemed not improbable in 1763, but it did not actually become a part of British policy. The proposal aroused considerable opposition in New England. In 1764, however, Franklin said that "a Bishop for America has been long talk'd of in England, and probably from the apparent Necessity of the Thing, will sooner or later be appointed; because a Voyage to England for Ordination is extreamly inconvenient and ex- pensive to the young Clergy educated in America; and the Episcopal Churches and Clergy in these Colonies cannot so conveniently be governed and regulated by a Bishop residing in England, as by one residing among those committed to his Care." Franklin, Writings IV, p. 237;. See also N.Y. Col. Doc. VII, pp. 348-349; Charles Chauncy, A Letter to a Friend (Boston, 1767), pp. 45 287 Digitized by Microsoft® 288 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 distasteful to the colonies. It checked, or rather ran counter to, the tendency toward autonomy that had hitherto been a marked feature of the constitutional development of the Empire. The use of the navy as part of the administrative machinery was disliked by the colonies. Governor Bernard wrote that "if these extraordinary Custom house officers, whose Service as it is new, is the more invidious, do not appear to have the public support of the Crown in what they do," a conspiracy et seq.; John Adams, Writings III, p. 464; Samuel Adams, Writings I, p. 149; A. L. Cross, The Anglican Episcopate and the American Colonies, pp. 14S, 146 and passim. The reform movement also manifested itself in other directions. In 1729 Parliament provided that sailors in the colonies should contribute to the support of Greenwich Hospital in the same manner as did those in Great Britain. 2 Geo. II, c. 7. This law had not been executed, but a few years after the peace it was determined to make it efifective. In 1768, Henry Hulton was appointed "Principal Deputy Receiver'' of these dues for America, while in the various colonial ports, subordinate receivers were appointed. Though the fishermen of Salem and Marblehead refused to sub- mit to the law, Hulton's account shows that from July 5 to Oct. 10, 1768, £396 net was collected from New London, Rhode Island, Salem, Marblehead, Philadelphia, and the Southern Potomac district. Considerable opposition was encountered. Thus, in 1768, Hulton wrote: "Great Clamours have arisen against me for the measures I am taking for a more exact Collection of the Duty." See despatches of Henry Hulton, June 29, Sept. 11, Oct. i, Oct, 10, 1768, in Admiralty, Greenwich Hospital, Misc. Various, 131. Another matter which still continued to create friction was the reservation of mast trees in the colonies for the use of the royal navy. This policy was predomi- nantly military in nature, and was adopted in consequence of the difficulty of procuring large masts, and in view also of the desirability, mainly from the standpoint of national security, of not being dependent upon the Baltic countries for anything that was indispensable to the development of British naval strength. The system was in many respects defective, and was but inadequately carried into effect. (B. T. Plant. Gen. 44, pp. 147-156; Pownall, op. cit. pp. 196-198.) In 1758 Wentworth wrote that there was Digitized by Microsoft® COLONIAL OPPOSITION 289 or combination against them will be formed, similar to that in Massachusetts during the war/ Oxenbridge Thacher, one of the leading American controversial writers, gave voice to this dissatisfaction, and likewise complained of the excep- tional powers granted to the custom-house officials.^ The creation of a vice-admiralty court for all America, acting without juries, in especial aroused discontent.^ It was urged that the individual was inadequately protected, as the vice- admiralty judges not only decided both on the law and on the facts, but also had a pecuniary interest in securing con- demnations, since they were entitled to a small percentage thereof. Besides, under the new system a seizure could be "a General Combination among the people to destroy the Ring's timber." (B. T: New Hampshire 4 C 4; B. T. Plant. Gen. 49.) The officers trying to execute the law were frequently sued for trespass, and many other difficulties were encountered. (B. T. New Hampshire 4 C 14; Ibid. 5 D 10; Wentworth to Halifax, Oct. 20, 1763, in Am. and W.I. 161.) This opposition was, however, to a great extent confined to the directly interested localities, and was not supported by the governments of New England. Thus, in 1760, the agent of Connecticut, Jared IngersoU, represented to the Board of Trade the expediency of having a court of admiralty established in Connecticut for the more effectual prosecution of the laws made for preserving the woods. (B. T. Journals 68, p. 176.) It should also be noted that the necessity of this general policy, as far as New England was concerned, was to a great extent removed by the conquest of Canada, where there was an abundance of mast trees. ' B. T. Mass. 78 LI 73. See also Bernard to Jackson, Nov. 26, 1763, in Quincy, op. cit. p. 431, and Lord Colville to Philip Stephens, Halifax, Jan. 22, 1764, with enclosures, in Adm. Sec. In-Letters, Bundle 482. 'The Sentiments of a British American (Boston, 1764), p. 10. Cf. also Stephen Hopkins, op. cit. p. 15. 'Instructions from Braintree to their representatives in 1765. John Adams, Writings IH, pp. 465, et seq. See also John Dickinson, Writings I, pp. 175, 184. u Digitized by Microsoft® 290 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 removed for trial from any colony to Halifax, thus putting the possibly innocent owner to great expense and loss.^ These complaints had unquestionably some justification, because the system was liable to abuse. It was not, how- ever, intended to abuse it, and it is not clear that any of the evils inherent in it actually took eflfect. For, as Moses Coit Tyler has well said, the colonies "made their stand, not against tyranny inflicted, but only against tyranny antici- pated." =* These exceptional powers were granted because other- wise the laws could not be executed. As an eminent Rhode Island lawyer, Martin Howard, said at the time,' "if, my friend,^customs are due to the crown; if illicit com- merce is to be put an end to, as ruinous to the welfare : — If, by reason of the interested views of traders, and the conni- vance of courts and custom-house officers, these ends could not be compassed or obtained in the common and ordinary way; tell me, what could the government do, but to apply a remedy desperate as the disease : There is, I own, a severity in the method of prosecution, in the new established court of admiralty, under Doctor SPRY, here ; but it is a severity we have brought upon ourselves. When every mild expedi- ent, to stop the atrocious and infamous practice of smuggling, has been try'd in vain, the government is justifiable in mak- ing laws against it." It was only by means of such extraor- •Oxenbridge Thacher, op. cit. pp. 7-9; James Otis, The Rights of the British Colonists, p. 53; Stephen Hopkins, op. cit. pp. 9, 14, 15. ' Literary History of the Am. Rev. I, p. 8. 'A Letter from a Gentleman at Halifax (Newport, 1765), in A. B. Hart, Am. Hist, told by Contemporaries II, pp. 396, 397. Digitized by Microsoft® COLONIAL OPPOSITION 291 dinary expedients that the British government could at all execute the existing laws, and carry out its policy. The very animosity that Howard's pamphlet aroused in Rhode Island — he met with personal violence at the hands of the mob ^ — shows to what extent anarchic conditions had crept into the imperial system, and how impossible it was to enforce the law without resorting to exceptional measures. The purpose of these measures was to make effective the laws of trade, and more especially the revenue acts of 1764 and 1765. The stricter enforcement of the old colonial system aroused some opposition. This resulted mainly from the fact that the custom of allowing wines and fruits to be imported directly into the colonies from Spain and Portugal was no longer countenanced.^ It was, however, the execu- tion of the Molasses Act, which was not an integral part ' Cal. Home OflSce Papers, 1760-1765, p. 609, no. 19S9; Brit. Mus. Addit. MSS. 33030 (Newcastle Papers CCCXLV, folios 76 et seq.). ' Thus it was said in 1765 : "I believe the Stamp Act would not have met with so violent an opposition, had not the Colonists in general, previous to that, been greatly chagrined at the rigorous ejiecution of the laws of trade." The New York " New Gazette or The Weekly Post-Boy " no. 1207 for Feb. 20, 1766, in Adm. Sec. In-Letters 3819. In the expression "laws of trade" is evidently included the "Molasses Act" of 1733 and the "Sugar Act" of 1764. In general, the contemporary American writers did not complain of the stricter enforcement of the law, except in so far as it involved the pa3Tnent of duties on foreign West Indian products, and the stoppage of the direct importation of wines and fruits from Spain and Portugal. In 1764 it was claimed that the colonies could not import Spanish and Portuguese fruits via Great Britain, as they were perishable, and that while these articles in them- selves were "of little consequence," still they were profitable and encouraged the colonial fisheries. An Essay on the Trade of the Northern Colonies (London, 1764), pp. 10, 23. For a similar complaint in 1767, made by the Massachusetts agent, de Berdt, see Papers relating to Public Events in Digitized by Microsoft® 292 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 of the colonial system proper, that aroused the chief dissatis- faction. In 1764 Governor Franklin informed the Board of Trade that, as a result of the enforcement of this law, there were "great Murmerings among the Merchants, and others, in North America." ^ The discontent sprang chiefly from the duty on foreign molasses, which, though cut in two in 1764, was still considered burdensome.^ Molasses was imported in large quantities by the Northern colonies, and formed the basis of a considerable part of their commercial life. The British West Indies could not furnish an adequate supply, nor could they con- sume the entire surplus quantity of food-stuffs, fish, and lumber, produced by the continental colonies. Conse- quently the trade to the foreign West Indies was absolutely essential to the prosperity of the North American colonies. Furthermore, it was this trade that in part enabled these colonies to pay for the British manufactures that they consumed. In 1764, Golden correctly asserted that it was "evident to a demonstration that the more Trade the Colonies in North America have with the Foreign Colo- Massachusetts (Phila., 1856), pp. 44 et seq. As already pointed out, this trade was not in itself important, and subsequent to the stricter enforcement of the law, the colonies imported these products via the Madeiras. Ibbetson to Board of Trade, 1765, in B. T. Com. Series 11, 579. ' N.J. Col. Doc. IX, pp. 402-404. Cf. "New-York Mercury " no. 639 for Jan. 23, 1764. ' As already mentioned, Rhode Island officially pointed out the comparative unimportance of the duties on foreign sugar. Cf. also Samuel Adams, Writings I, pp. 31, 32, 62. In 1767, however, Massachusetts, through its agent de Berdt, complained about the sugar duties. Papers relating to Public Events in Mas- sachusetts, pp. 44, 45. Digitized by Microsoft® COLONIAL OPPOSITION ^ 293 nies, the more they consume of the British Manufactures." * Similarly, in 1766, it was claimed, and to a great extent with justice, that "a free Trade with the foreign West-India Islands, is of far more consequence to North America than any other Considerations." ^ These arguments were ad- vanced by all the colonial writers, and to an overwhelming extent, constituted the chief burden of the complaint against the act of 1764.^ But the economic grievance, though by no means insignificant, should not be overestimated. Although opposed to the policy of which this act was an expression, Pownall claimed that a revenue could be collected if a moder- ate duty of twopence a gallon were imposed on molasses; that the three-penny duty of the act of 1 764 was not in any way destructive; and that the "clamour" against it was "groundless." * •N.Y. Col. Doc. VII, p. 612. 'The New York "New Gazette" No. 1207 for Feb. 20, 1766, in Adm. Sec. In-Letters 3819. C/. also Dartmouth MSS. (Hist. MSS. Com. XI, 5) P- 331 ; Quincy, op. cit. p. 445. 'Oxenbridge Thacher, op. cit. p. 14, 15; James Otis, op. cit. pp. 76, 77; John Dickinson, Writings I, pp. 223, 226; Stephen Hopkins, op. cit. pp. ia-14; Dartmouth MSS. (Hist. MSS. Com. XI, 5) p. 331 ; Franklin, Writings IV, pp. 243, 244; Pownall, op. cit. pp. 5, 6; An Essay on the Trade of the Northern Colonies, pp. 4-21 ; "A Few Thoughts on the Method of improving and secur- ing the Advantages which accrue to Great Britain from the Northern Colo- nies," printed in "New-York Mercury," no. 671 for Aug. 27, 1764. See also the same paper for Jan. 23, 1764. The best exposition of the case of the colonies is the official petition of Rhode Island. B.T. Prop. 21 X S7- Herein it was pointed out that molasses formed the basis of Rhode Island's commerce, and that 14,000 hhds. thereof were annually imported, of which only 2500 came from the British colonies. * Pownall, op. cit. pp. 192-195. Rhode Island and Massachusetts were especially affected by this duty. The former colony imported 1,150,000 Digitized by Microsoft® 294 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1734-1765 This law was only in part designed to injure French com- merce by giving British West Indian products preferential treatment in the markets of North America. In addition, its purpose was to create a colonial revenue, and with this object in view, it imposed a number of duties besides those on foreign West Indian products. This was the first act whose main purpose was to tax the colonies, and as such, it aroused some opposition ; * but from the fact that it closely resembled in its outward form several existing laws, whose validity had not been seriously questioned, it was difficult to assail it on this ground.* The discontent of the colonies at the legislation of 1764 burst into a flame on the passage of the Stamp Act of 1765. So universal and so violent was the opposition, that it was found absolutely impossible to execute the law.' gallons of molasses yearly, on which the duty would have been £14,375. Hopkins, op. cit. pp. 12, 13. ' Thacher {op. cit. pp. 5, 7) attacked it on the ground that a tax was laid "without the consent of the representatives of the colonists." Cf. also Va. Mag. XII, pp. 6-9; "New-York Mercury," no. 671 for Aug. 27, 1764; Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives of Pennsylvania (Phila. 1775) V, pp. 3SS. 356; Samuel Adams, Writings I, p. 5. ' Va. Mag. XII, p. 10. James Otis {op. cit. pp. 42, 43), however, pointed out that if Parliament could lay taxes on trade, it could also levy internal taxes. "There is no foundation," he said, "for the distinction some make in England between an internal and an external tax on the colonies." John Dickinson, on the other hand, said: "We should willingly pay a moderate duty upon importations from the French and Spaniards without attempting to run them." Dickinson, Writings I, p. 224. "Pari. Hist. 16, pp. 111-136; Am. and W.I. 388, 586. Brit. Mus. Addit. MSS. 22679; Same 3591 1 (Hardwicke Papers DLXIII); Same 33030 (Newcastle Papers CCCXLV, folios 5° «' seq.). This opposition extended to a number of the insular colonies. B. T. Bermudas 20 P 108; Adm. Digitized by Microsoft® COLONIAL OPPOSITION 295 This opposition in part was due to the tax itself/ and in part resulted from its imposition by Parliament. As already pointed out, the legislation of 1764 and 1765 was designed to produce a colonial revenue of from ;i£io5,ooo to £145,000. Apparently this was a very small sum, but in reality it was a very large one from the colonial view- point. The legislation of the provincial assemblies was exceedingly limited in scope, and consequently the colonists were not accustomed to paying heavy taxes. As Loudoun said in 1757, "the Taxes which the People pay in this Country, are really so trifling, that they do not deserve the Name." ^ Pownall likewise pointed out, that while a low tax in North America would produce ;£99,ooo, this sum was, in fact, more than the colonies themselves actually levied. "The whole charge of the ordinary expence of government in the province of Massachusetts'- Bay, which does, by much more to the support of govern- ment, and other public services than any other province, is, in time of peace, sterling 12,937/. 10s. whereas that of New- York, is not more than about sterling, 4000/. annually." ^ The Board of Trade at this time also prepared Sec. In-Letters 3819; Dartmouth MSS. (Hist. MSS. Com. 14, X) p. 495. Governor Pinfold wrote that Barbados had obeyed the law despite the fact that "their North American correspondents have spared neither Threats, or Entreaties to persuade us to imitate their outragious and Rebellious Conduct." B. T. Barbados 36 Ff 68. ' John Adams, Writings III, p. 465; John Dickinson, Writings I, pp. 229- 233; Dulany , Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes (2d ed. Annapolis, 1765), pp. 24, 25; Va. Mag. XII, p. 9; James Otis, Considerations, etc., p. 20. ' Pitt Correspondence I, p. 44- ' Pownall, op. cU. pp. 98-100. Digitized by Microsoft® 296 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 an account of the colonial civil establishments, according to which the continental colonies paid annually for these pur- poses about £60,000, and the West Indies approximately the same sum.* Though these accounts are not accurate or complete, and though they omit all consideration of the local taxes paid in the colonies, yet they show in an unmis- takable manner that the parliamentary taxes of 1764 and 1765 would have greatly increased the normal burden of taxation in the colonies,^ — tiut by no means, however, to a degree incommensurate with their wealthj In addition, the colonies complained of the method by which the tax was imposed. Thus Washington wrote that the colonists looked "upon this unconstitutional method of taxation as a direful attack upon their liberties." ' In general they claimed that it was a fundamental principle of the British constitution that the subject could be taxed only by his rep- • Am. and W.I. 387, folio 121. ' It was also complained that these taxes would cause an outflow of money to Great Britain. Cf. Hopkins, op. cit. p. 23. It is obvious, however, that the establishment of a standing army in America, of which a large proportion of the cost was to be paid by the mother country, would have a diametrically opposite effect. Furthermore, provision was made that the money arising from the Stamp taxes should not be remitted to Great Britain. Sharpe Corre- spondence ni, pp. 286, 287. The above accounts do not include the extraor- dinary taxes levied by the colonies to extinguish their" own war debts. In 1 766 it was contended in England that the ability of the colonies to pay these parliamentary taxes was amply proven by the fact that of this debt £1,750,000 had been paid in three years, and that the bulk of the balance, £760^000, would be paid in two years more. Ibid. Ill, p. 287. Cf. Almon, Biographical Anecdotes 11, pp. 93, 94. ' Washington, Works (ed. Ford) II, p. 209. CJ. Samuel Adams, Writings I, p. 9. Digitized by Microsoft® COLONIAL OPPOSITION 297 resentatives.* Any other system, according to such colonial publicists as Stephen Hopkins ^ and James Otis,' was tanta- mount to slavery. The doctrine of "no taxation without representation" is one of those vague political principles, which can neither be subjected to scientific analysis, nor carried to their logical conclusion, but which are possibly all the more implicitly believed in because their meaning cannot be explicitly expounded. Both parties held firmly to |fhis doctrine, but each interpreted it diflFerently. According to the British view, the colonies were virtually represented in Parliament, and there was a vahd basis for this con- tention in the historically illogical system of representa- tion prevailing in the mother country. The colonists, ac- customed to a more symmetrical practice, rejected this claim,* and contended that only if their representatives sat ' John Dickinson, Writings I, pp. 17s, 184; Daniel Dulany, op. cit. p. 8. In 1764 the Virginia Committee of Correspondence said that "the most vital Principle of the British Constitution" was that no subject could be made subservient to laws without his consent or that of his representatives. Va. Mag. XII, p. 10. 'Those "whose property may be taken from them by taxes, or otherwise, without their own consent, and against their will, are in the miserable condi- tion of slaves." Hopkins, op: cit. p. 4. Cf. also James Otis, Considerations on Behalf of the Colonists (2d ed. London, 1765), p. n; Votes and Proceed- ings (Phila. 177s) V, p. 376. ^ Otis said that Parliamentary taxation was "absolutely irreconcileable with the rights of the Colonists, as British subjects, and as men. I say men, for in a state of nature, no man can take my property from me, without my consent: If he does, he deprives me of my liberty, and makes me a slave." Otis, The Rights, etc., p. 38. * Dulany, op. cit. pp. 6 et seq.; Samuel Adams, Writings I, p. 30. Digitized by Microsoft® 298 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 at Westminster would this principle remain inviolate.^ In addition, the colonies feared that this colonial revenue would be used to pay the salaries of the colonial governors, thus destroying the great influence of the provincial legislatures.^ This, however, did not form a part of Grenville's policy, and the misunderstanding was one of many, which in that age of poor communications made harmonious relations between mother country and colony virtually impossible. 0wing to the intense opposition of the colonies, the Stamp Act was repealed in 1766.^ The British merchants were to a great extent united in urging this step, fearing not only the loss of the American market,* but also the non-payment of the very large amounts that the colonies owed them.' But in addition, Grenville was no longer in office, and his ' There was also considerable opposition to the Stamp Act on account of the fact that all cases arising under it were to be tried in the admiralty courts. Samuel Adams, Writings I, p. 46. ^ Golden said that this was the chief reason for the opposition to the Stamp taxes. N.Y. Col. Doc. VII, p. 797. ' 6 Geo. Ill, c. II. * Colden ridiculed the idea that the colonies would be able to do without British woollens, and asserted that the New York non-importation agreement was designed solely to influence English opinion. N.Y. Col. Doc. VII, pp. 799, 800. Similarly James Otis said: "However I can never hear American manu- factures seriously talked of, without being disposed to a violent fit of laughter. My contempt is inexpressible, when I perceive statesmen at home amusing the mob they afifect to despise, with the imminent danger, from American manufac- tories." Considerations on Behalf of the Colonists (2d ed. London, 1765), p. 23. ' Pari. Hist. 16, pp. 133 et seq. See also Brit. Mus. Addit. MSS. 33030 (Newcastle Papers CCXLV). In a letter addressed to William Burke, dated Dec. 14, 1765, it was stated that "some thousands of industrious artificers, are suffering in this neighbourhood for the want of remittances from America and from the fear of sending goods there." Cal. Home Office Papers, 1760- Digitized by Microsoft® COLONIAL OPPOSITION 299 successor, Rockingham, was averse to using the coercive measures that were indispensable if the law was to be en- forced. This Ministry also took under consideration the complaints against the "Sugar Act" of 1764,^ and modified it to meet the wishes of the colonies. The opposition hadj been aroused mainly by the duty on foreign molasses. ThiJ was repealed in 1 766, and in its place a very low duty of ona penny a gallon was imposed on all molasses, whether British or foreign, imported into the colonies.^ At the same time, other changes were also made,^ but this was by far the most important. This statute removed the chief economic objec- 1765, p. 638, no. 2064. According to Walpole, "the weapon with which the Colonies armed themselves to most advantage, was the refusal of paying the debts they owed to our merchants at home, for goods and wares exported to the American provinces. These debts involved the merchants of London, Liverpool, Manchester, and other great trading towns, in a cormnon cause with the Americans, who forswore all trafSc with us, unless the obnoxious Stamp Act was repealed." Memoirs Geo. Ill, vol. 11, p. 153. According to the general estimate, these debts amounted to the large sum of four million sterling. Daniel Dulany, op. cit. p. 22 ; "New -York Mercury," no. 636 for Jan. 2, 1764; Dickinson, Writings I, p. 217. Apparently this was even an underesti- mate. For details, see Brit. Mus. Addit. MSS. (Newcastle Papers CCCXLV, folios 104, 204). ' Sharpe Correspondence III, pp. 296, 297. The London merchants were also instrumental in having the duty on molasses lowered. Corr. of Col. Gov. of Rhode Island 11, p. 361. For details as to the reasons of the various changes made in 1766, see Brit. Mus. Addit. MSS. 33030 (Newcastle Papers CCCXLV, folios 243 et seq.). '6 Geo. Ill, c. 52, §§i, iv. ' The duties on foreign sugar were retained, but the cost of British sugars to the continental colonies was reduced by removing the export duties of 1673, amounting to 15. 6d. a hundredweight on brown and muscovado, and 55. a hundredweight on white sugar. The export duties imposed in 1764 on British colonial pimento and cofifee were repealed, but low duties were imposed Digitized by Microsoft® 3CX3 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 tions to the revenue act of 1764. Thus the Rhode Island agent, Joseph Sherwood, wrote to Governor Ward : "Every Grievance of which you Complained is now Absolutely and totally removed, a joyfull and a happy Event for the late Disconsolate Inhabitants of America." ' The repeal of the Stamp Act and the abolition of the objectionable duty on molasses seemed to restore harmo- nious relations.^ The calm was, however, only superficial. The controversies of these two years had raised some fundamental questions, on which there could be little hope of mutual agreement. The imperial administrative system had been successfully defied, and in 'especial the authority of the colonial customs officials had been completely under- mined. Furthermore, the main principles of Grenville's policy had not been discarded by the British government, j The presence of a large standing force in the colonies necessitated the extension of the Mutiny Act to America,* and though this statute was modified to suit colonial condi- tions,* it aroused considerable opposition, especially in New York.* Besides, the plan of creating a colonial revenue had on their importation into the British colonies. Then the import duties on East Indian and French textiles were abolished, and instead foreign cambrics and French lawns had to pay export duties when shipped from Great Britain to the colonies. There were also a number of other regulations in this com- prehensive statute. ' Corr. of Col. Gov. of Rhode Island II, p. 384. ' John Adams, Writings II, pp. 223, 224. ' s Geo. Ill, c. 33. * Cal. Home Office Papers 1760-1765, pp. 529, 534; Corr. of Col. Gov. of Rhode Island II, p. 562; Grenville Papers III, pp. 11-15. ' Cf. Samuel Adams, Writings I, p. no. It was in connection with these Digitized by Microsoft® COLONIAL OPPOSITION 301 not been abandoned/ and there still remained in force a number of colonial customs-duties imposed by Parliament. At first the colonies were not united in opposing such indirect taxes. Franklin admitted that Parliament might have "a natural and equitable right" to levy them.^ But colonial opinion was rapidly advancing, and the opposition to the Stamp Act extended to these indirect taxes as well. Whately, the Secretary of the Treasury, iiiformed Grenville that " the rage of the people seems not to be confined to the Stamp Act ; the Officers of the Customs are also the object of it, and if that should be avowed, then the clear point is, whether the Parliament has a right to impose any taxes at all there." ' In 1764, the Rhode Island legislature forbade the governor to administer the oaths to the British customs officials, and thus prevented the laws from being executed.* As troubles that Chatham, on Feb. 3, 1767, wrote to Shelbume : "America affords a gloomy prospect. A spirit of infatuation has taken possession of New York : their disobedience to the mutiny act will justly create a great ferment here, open a fair field to the arraigners of America, and leave no room to any to say a word in their defence." Chatham Correspondence III, p. 188. ' On Jan. 27, 1767, Grenville wrote to the Earl of Buckinghamshire: "Yes- terday and to-day we have had some debates in the House of Commons on the estimates for the American troops, and the enormous expense attending them, amoimting in the whole to above £400,000, or near a shilling in the pound on the land. This I proposed should be all defrayed by America and the West In- dies, after having reduced it near one half by striking off the unnecessary articles. Mr. Townshend in answer to this, though he refused to consent to it, yet held a very strong language that America ought to pay that expense." Lothian MSS. (Hist. MSS. Com. 1905) p. 275. Cf. Chatham Correspondence III, p. 178. ' Pari. Hist. 16, p. 149. ° Grenville Papers III, p. 100. ♦Bernard to Halifax, Dec. 14, 1764. Am. and W.I. 167. Halifax to the Governor of Rhode Island, June 9, 1764. Ibid. 197. Digitized by Microsoft® 302 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 a result, in 1765, these officials in Rhode Island came to the conclusion that the custom-house could not be carried on.' In 1765, one of the collectors in Maryland complained of an assault made on him while he was executing his duties, which necessitated his being always fully armed.^ Similarly in Massachusetts, these officials did not dare to execute the laws.* The Stamp Act riots had completely under- mined their authority, and had rendered the imperial ad- ministrative system absolutely ineffective. In addition to collecting the duties imposed by the acts of 1673, 1733, 1764, and 1766, it was also the duty of these officials to enforce the laws of trade. Prior to 1763 the gen- eral attitude of the colonies toward the old colonial system had been one of acquiescence. The controversies over the acts of 1764 and 1765, however, brought the laws of trade into the political arena, and led to an examination of their validity. Thus, as late as 1764, James Otis said that the French "can send none of their manufactures here; and it is the wish of every honest British American that they never may ; 'tis best they never should ; we can do better without the manufactures of Europe, save those of Great-Britain, than with them." * Similar statements were made by other ' Cal. Home OflSce Papers, 1760-1765, p. 610. See also Corr. of Col. Gov. of Rhode Island II, 376-381. *Col. Home Office Papers, 1760-1765, p. 552, no. 1748. ' Quincy, op. cit. p. 445. Hutchinson to Pownall, May 11, 1766. 'James Otis, The Rights, etc., p. 76. In another passage he says: "A prodigious revenue arises to the Crown on American exports to Great-Britain, which in general is not murmured at: No Manufacture of Europe besides ^British, can be lawfully bro't here; and no honest man desires they ever should, if the laws were put in execution upon all." Ibid. p. 58. Digitized by Microsoft® COLONIAL OPPOSITION 303 colonial writers also at this time/ In the following year, however, Otis proceeded to question the justice of the system as a whole. "Can any one tell me," he asked, "why trade, commerce, arts, sciences, and manufactures, should not be as free for an American as for a European ? " Though ridi- culing the idea that the colonies could supply themselves with manufactures, he said: "Is there anything in the laws of nature and nations, anything in the nature of our allegiance that forbids a colonist to push the manufacture of iron much beyond the making of a horse-shoe or a hob nail?" Noth- ing, he added, could prove to him "the rectitude" of the entire system of regulating colonial trade. ^ Similarly, a Virginian, Richard Bland, claimed that "these acts, which imposed severer restrictions upon the trade of the colonies, than were imposed upon the trade of England, deprived the colonies, so far as these restrictions extended, of the privileges of English subjects, and constituted an unnatural difference between men under the same allegiance, bom equally free, and entitled to the same civil rights." ' ' In 1764 such a writer said "that whatever business or commerce in any of the Northern Colonies interferes with, or is in any way detrimental to the true in- terest, manufactories, trade, or commerce of Great Britain, we reasonably expect will be totally prohibited." An Essay on the Trade of the Northern Colonies of Great Britain in North -America (London, 1764) p. 9. Similarly, in 1765, after a very partisan analysis of the colonial system, John Dickinson said : "How- ever under all these restraints and some others that have been imposed on us we have not till lately been unhappy." Dickinson, Writings I, p. 217. ' Otis, Considerations, etc., pp. 22-23. Cf. also p. 38. ' Richard Bland, An Enquiry into the Rights of the British Colonies (Lon- don, 1769), p. 18. Bland referred especially to the act of 1673, which had imposed duties on intercolonial trade. Digitized by Microsoft® 304 BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1754-1765 This change in attitude toward the old colonial system was only partially based on economic grounds. The new drawback system and the stricter enforcement of the laws had a tendency to increase the cost of European and Asiatic goods to the colonial consumer. This was clearly recognized for instance by James Otis in 1764, yet at the time he asserted that the system was favored by "every honest British Ameri- can." ' Dickinson went further and claimed that as a result of the system the mother country was expensive to the colonies, and not they to Great Britain.^ Though grossly exaggerating the injurious effects of the laws on the colonies, Dulany did not deny the mother country's right in the prem- ises.* These statements, that the system worked to the disadvantage of the colonies, were in part made in order ' Otis (The Rights, etc., p. 76) asserted that the French could undersell British manufactures. It should be noted that France was also afraid of Great Britain supplying her colonies. Thus, in 1763, Admiral Rodney wrote to Grenville that the French alleged that the English possession of Dominica was dangerous to them, as a clandestine trade would be carried on thence to Martinique and Guadeloupe, "supplying them with India goods, Negroes, and provisions at a much'cheaper rate than the Dutch from Eustatia," — Dominica being much nearer. Grenville Papers II, p. 25. ' Dickinson (Writings I, pp. 238, 239) asserted that as a result of the system, the colonies paid more for their manufactures, and obtained less for their enumerated products than under unrestricted conditions, and that the differ- ence was virtually a tax on them. He claimed likewise that the laws regulat- ing colonial manufactures were in ultimate analysis equivalent to a tax. ' Daniel Dulany, op. cit. pp. 26, 27, 34, 37. In another passage he said: "It is not contended that the Colonies ought to be indulged in a general Liberty of Exporting and Importing every Thing in what Manner they please," but "they have a good Plea against all Rigour and Severity." 76j 54-58. Grenada, exports from England to (1761-67), 138 n. ; becomes British territory, 154; contraband trade in, after Peace of Paris, 236. Grenville, George, quoted on protection and obedience, 6 n. ; opposed to cession of St. Lucia and Guadeloupe, 159 n. ; administration of, 229-230; quoted, 263; carries into effect system of Parliamentary taxation of colonies for military defence, 274 ff. ; Stamp Act introduced by, 285; policy of, leads to inquiry into nature of imperial constitution, 308. Grenville, Henry, cited, 15 n. Guadeloupe, capture of, and effect on colonial trade, 130; exports from England to (1761-62), 138 n.; Canada vs., as a colonial acquisition, 142 ff.; imports to England from (1761-62), 145 u., 149; remains French under Peace of Paris, 153; Pitt on cession of, 156; manufacture of rum in, 278. Guiana, French, colonial trade extends to. III n. Gum trade, French monopoly of, broken, 213 n. Gunpowder, illegal importation of, by American colonies, 244, 245. Haldane, Governor George, 99 n. Halifax, Earl of, quoted, 7. Hamburg, illegal trade with America from, 244 n. Hamilton, Governor James, 91, 105 n., 126; report by, on illegal trade in Pennsylvania, 242. Hardy, Sir Charles, 79, 106, 124 n. Hardy, Governor Josiah, 191. Harrington, James, quoted, 165-166. Hart, A. B., cited, 290. Hats, colonial manufacture of, 197 n. Havana, colonial troops in the attack on, 67-68; exports from England to (1761-62), 138 n. Hawke, Admiral, 105. Digitized by Microsoft® INDEX 321 Hemp, colonial production of, 215-217. Henry, Patrick, on the Two-penny Act, 185; quoted, 204. Holland, Bernard, cited, 310 n. Holmes, Admiral Charles, 107-108. "Hoop," case of the, 72 n. Hopkins, Governor Stephen, 129, 297; quoted, 22 n., 92, 268 n., 310; cited, IS7 n., 199 n., 289 n., 293, 296 n. Howard, Martin, pamphlet by, 290. Hudson's Bay, exports from England to (1746-67), 138 n. Hudson's Bay Company, 211, 213, 214, 215- Hulton, Henry, 288 n. Hunter, Governor Robert, 37, 38; quoted, 33 n., 166-167. Hutchinson, Governor, quoted, 18 n., 230 n., 232 n., 279 n. "Immaniiel," case of the, 94 n. Independence, spirit of, in American colonies, 167-169; in Rhode Island, 167, 240, 264, 29T, 301. Independence of judiciary, 188 ff. Independent companies in New York and South Carolina, 13. Indian affairs, management of, 10, 17, 18, 253 ff.; failure of Albany Congress on point of, 23. Indian insurrection (1763), 256, 262 ff. Indigo, bounty on, 218; protection of, by act of 1764, 277-278. Ingersoll, Jared, 289 n. Ireland, provisions from, sold to French, 74; embargo laid on provisions in, 78, 80; illegal shipments from, 79; embargo ineffective, 82; tobacco- growing in, prohibited, 196. Iron, opposition to enumeration of, 224-225. Iron Act of 1750, 197 ff- ^ Iron industry (1764), 223. v^ Iroquois Indians, attempts to secure friendship of, 17. Jamaica, military protection of, by Parliamentary provision, 10, 12 n. ; illegal trade in, carried on with French, 89 n.; exports from England to (1746-67), 138 n.; imports to Eng- land from (1761-62), 145 n.; self- Y governing powers of, in eighteenth century, 161-162; resolutions of As- sembly of (1757), 163; Act of 1758 relative to currency, 186; absence of illegal trade in (1763), 236. Jenyns, Soame, 162, 189 n., 252, 276 n., 284; quoted, 309. Johnson, Sir William, appointed colonel of Six Nations, 27; in charge of Indian affairs, 28, 254 ; Parliamentary grant to, 54; opinion of, on Indian policy, 257-258, 261 n. Judiciary question, in New York, 188- 191; in New Jersey, 191-192. Kalm, Peter, cited, 170, 207. Keith, Sir William, 40, 200 n. Kennedy, New York collector of cus- toms, 115 u. Keys, A. M., cited, 189, 192. Knowles, Admiral, quoted, 73. Knox, William, quoted, 168-169; cited, 222 n., 273 n., 276 n., 284. Land, proposed taxation of, 40, 45 n. Lawrence, General Charles, quoted, 177 n. Lawsuits, brought against customs offi- cials, 119-125, 248; over "flags of truce," 127. Leeward Islands, military protection of, 12 u. "Lettres de Montcalm," 172-173, 203. Liquors, duties on, 37-38, 42. Little, Otis, cited, 139 n., 145 n. Livingston family, implicated in un- lawful trade with French West Indies, III n. Logwood, duty on, suggested, 39 n. Long Island Sound, smuggling on, 241. Loudoun, General, 58, 59, 81, 85, 269. Louisburg expedition, 9, 60 n., 171 n. ; Wolfe's sneer at American troops in, 174 n. Louisiana, projected attack on, 68; illegal trade with French in, 103-104; ceded to Great Britain, 153. Lumber trade (1764), 223-224. Lyttelton, Governor W. H., quoted, 163 n., 236. Digitized by Microsoft® 322 INDEX' Madeira, colonial trade to, 7. Mansfield, Lord, 76. Jdanufactures, bounties paid on, when exported, 195. Marriott, James, on Dutch trade with French, 95 n.; cited, 133, 154 n. Martinique, exports from England to (1761—62), 138 n. ; remains French under Peace of Paris, 153; Pitt on cession of, 156; manufacture of rum in, 278. Maryland, contribution of, to expedi- tions against Du Quesne, Niagara, and Crown Point, 53 n. ; slight support to Braddock from, 55; takes troops from under King's command, 59 ; failure of, to cooperate in French campaigns (1758-1760), 60-69; "^.w passed by, forbidding trade with French, 78; exports from England to (1746-67), 138 n. ; imports into England from (1757-62), 150 n.; exportation of hemp to England from (1768-69), 218 n. ; freedom from contraband trade in (1764), 236. Massachusetts, boundary dispute with New York, 49-50; contribution of, to expeditions against Du Quesne, Niagara, and Crown Point, 53 n.; public spirit in, 54 n., 58, 60, 64, 68; Parliamentary grant to, 54 n. ; extent of cooperation of, in French cam- paigns, 60-69; 3.cts passed by, to prohibit supplying of provisions to French, 78; friction caused in, by enforcement of Molasses Act, 117 flf. ; attempt in, to have writs of assistance declared illegal, 118, 122-123; early .talk of independence in (1709), 167- ^168; iron and steel factories in, 198 n. ; troubles over bankruptcy laws in, 186; manufacture of linen in, 205; whaling industry in, 219-220; report on state of illegal trade in (1763), 238-239; attitude of, on question of furnishing troops in Pontiac's war, 263 ; authority of customs officials in, undermined, 302. Massie, Joseph, cited, 146 n., 195 n., 202. Mauduit, Israel, 276 u. Mauduit, Jasper, cited, 158 n., 219 n., 276 n. Melvill, Robert, 89 n. Mereness, quoted, 69 n. Middle colonies not of value according to commercial test, 135. Minorca, Parliamentary provision for military force in, 12 n., 13 n. Miquelon, colonial commercial inter- coiu'se with, forbidden, 248. Molasses, import duties on, 38, 42 n.; illicit trade in, 87 ; duty on, by bill of 1764, 279-280; large importations of, into America, 292; modification of duties on, 299. Molasses Act of 1733, 33-34, 4i> iS7. iS9> i79> 206 n., 230; revival of, and partial enforcement, and results, 114 ff. ; enforcement of, by Grenville, 233 ff. ; violation of, in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, 239-241; dis- satisfaction aroused by execution of, 291—293 ; made perpetual but modified by bill of 1764, 277. Montcalm letters, published by J. Almon, 172 n. ; cited, 203, 203 n. Monte Cristi, continental colonial trade with, 96 ff. ; seizure of ships trading with, 106 ff. Montreal, fall of, 66. Montserrat, exports from England to (1746-67), 138 n. ; exportation of hemp from England to (1762-63), 216 n. Moore, Commodore, 89, 104. Moore, Governor Henry, 96 n., 115 n. Morris, Governor Lewis, 29 n., 191. Morris, Robert Hunter, 168 n., 191. Murray, William, attorney-general, 76. Murray, Governor, 213 n. Mutiny Act extended to America, 300. Naval-store bounties, 209, 210. "^ ^ Navigation act of 1660, 31 n., 196, 228./ Navigation laws, readjustment of, 193 ff. Navy, English dependence on, for safety in trade, 6-^; instrumentality of, in stopping unlawful trade with French, 105 ff., 114; use of to check smuggling, 228 ff. ; dislike of use of, by American colonists, 288 ff. Negro insurrections, 10. Digitized by Microsoft® INDEX 323 "Neutral islands," West Indies, 15. Nevis, exports from England to (1746- 67), 138 n. New England, campaigns of, against Nova Scotia and Canada, 8, 9, 60 n., 171 n., I74n.; Parliamentary grant to, 54 n.; trade of, with Monte Cristi, 98-99; colonies in, found wanting according to commercial test, 135; exports from England to (1746-67), 138 n. ; imports into England from (i7S7~62), 150 n. ; issues of paper money in, 187; exportation of hemp from England to (1762-64), 216 n. See Massachusetts, Rhode Island, etc. Newfoundland, garrison in, 11; mili- tary provision for, 12 n.; esteemed as a fishing establishment, 134; exports from England to (1746-67), 138 n. Newfoundland fisheries, 152-153. New Hampshire, contribution of, to expeditions against Du Quesne, Ni- agara, and Crown Point, 53 11. ; Parliamentary grant to, 54 n. ; poverty of, prevents aiding in colonial defence, 59 ; extent of cooperation of, in French campaigns, 60-69; trading with French punishable by death in, 78- 79; freedom of, from illegal trade (1764), 238; refuses troops for war against Pontiac, 264. New Jersey, not represented at Albany Congress, 19; apathetic attitude of (1754), 20 n.; boundary dispute with New York, 50 n. ; contribution of, to expeditions against Du Quesne, Niagara, and Crown Point, 53 n. ; Parliamentary grant to, 54 n. ; atti- tude of, under requisition system, 59; disparity in numbers of troops fvuTiished by, 59, 61, 62; Quaker influence in, 59 ; extent of cooperation of, in French campaigns, 60-69; judiciary question in, 191-192; con- traband trade in (1764), 241; req- uisition of troops from, for Indian insurrection (1763), 263. Newport, centre of Rhode Island trade with French West Indies, 112. New Providence, exports from England to (1756-57). 138 1- New York, lack of colonial cooperation for defence of, under requisition system, 9 n. ; Parliamentary pro- vision for protection of, 11, 12 11.; expenditures for military force in, 13 ; boundary disputes engaged in by, 49-50; contribution of, to expeditions against Du Quesne, Niagara, and Crown Point, 53 n. ; Parliamentary grant to, 54 n.; public spirit shown in, 58, 64, 68; enriched by French and Indian war, 61; extent of co- operation of, in French campaigns, 60-69; supplies from, furnished French forces, 74; exportation of provisions to French prohibited, 78; steps taken to prevent, 79-80; trade to Monte Cristi from, 100; Am- herst's evidence of illicit trade of, 110-112; friction caused in, by enforcement of Molasses Act, 117; exports from England to (1746-67), 138 11.; imports into England from (1757-62), 150 n. ; judiciary question in, 188-191 ; iron and steel manu- facture in, 198 n. ; exportation of hemp from England to (1763-64), 216 n. ; contraband trade in (1763), 242-243; requisition of troops from, for Indian insurrection (1763), 263- 264; opposition in, to Mutiny Act, 300. Niagara, expedition against, 53, 54. North Carolina, boundary disputes of, 50 n.; contribution of, to expeditions against Du Quesne, Niagara, and Crown Point, 53 n. ; Parliamentary grant to, 55; inability to provide for defence, 59; remissness of, in raising troops for French campaigns, 60-69; exportation of hemp to England from (1768-69), 218 n. ; freedom from contraband trade in (1764), 236-237; Parliamentary payment of governor of, 276. > Northumberland, Earl of, Vice-Admiral of America, 250. "No taxation without representation," doctrine of, 297 flf. "Novanglus," Adams's, quoted, 306. Nova Scotia, campaign against, 8, 9, 53, 54 ; garrison in, 11; military Digitized by Microsoft® 324 INDEX protection of, 12 n. ; e3q)enditures in settling and fortifying, 13; not included in Albany Congress plan of union, 20 n.; motives for settle- ment of, 133 n. ; exports from Eng- land to (1746-67), 138 n.; first Assembly of, 161 n. ; governmental expenses of, provided for by Parlia- ment, 276. "Oceana," James Harrington's, 165. Oglethorpe, James, 13 n., 133 n. Ohio Valley, French in, 14, 16. "Old Subsidy" of 1660, 281. Osgood, H. L., quoted, 309. Oswald, James, 83. Otis, James, 208, 268, 273 n., 297, 312; cited, 157 n., 290, 293, 295; quoted, 206, 232 n., 294 n., 297 n., 298 n., 302. 303> 304- Pamphlets, war of, on question of continental and tropical coloniza- tion, 140-151. Paper money, in Virginia, 180-183; in New England, 187 ; Parliamentary regulation of issue of, 187-188. Parliament, competency of, to pass revenue act, 38; dispute as to au- thority of, in colonies, 306-308; present position of, in Empire, 310 n. ; declaratory act passed by, de- fining its powers, 311. Parsons' Cause, the, 184. Partridge, Richard, 41. Passes, for protection of colonial vessels against Barbary pirates, 7 n. ; issued in interests of unlawful trade, 90, 11 1. Penn, Governor John, 242. Penn, Thomas, 91. Pennsylvania, inadequate support given Braddock by, 47 n., 55; contribution of, to expeditions against Crown Point, Du Quesne, and Niagara, 53 n. ; forces raised in, for three campaigns (1758-1760), 60-69; lack of public spirit shown in, during French war, 60-69; supplies from, furnished French forces, 74; steps taken by, to prohibit supplying of provisions to French, 78; trade with enemy carried on by, 90-91; exports from England to (1746-67), 138 n.; im- ports into England from (1757-62), 150 n.; iron and steel factories in, 198 n. ; exportation of hemp from England to (1762-64), 216 n. ; illegal trade in (1763), 242; requisition of troops from, for Indian insurrection, 263. Philadelphia, unlawful trade from, with French, loi ; trials of " flags of truce" in, 127. Phips, S., quoted, 44 n. Pimento, growing of, 221; export duties on, 280. Pinfold, Governor Charles, 83 n., 158 n. ; quoted, 295 n. Piracy, 7. Pitt, William, 4, 55, 56, 59, 92, 131, 132 ; on the illegal trade with French, 105, 123; leads opposition to terms of Treaty of Paris, 154; praise of colo- nial troops by, 174 n. ; on extent of Parliamentary authority over colonies, 307- Plan of union, Albany Congress, 20- 21; rejection of, by colonies, 22-23. Poll-tax, Dinwiddle suggests a, 45 n,; Shirley's suggestion of a, 49. Pontiac, 256, 262. Popham, Allen, 99 n. Popple, Governor William, 88 n., in n. Porto Rico, why not retained by Great Britain in peace of 1763, 140. Portugal, shipment of rice to, 35 ; illegal importations from, into Amerjca, 245, 291. Postal system, colonial, 34, 307. Pownall, Governor Thomas, 60-61, 91, 187 n., 194, 204, 212 n., 253, 293, 29s, 308 n. Pratt, Benjamin, 190. Preferential duties, 194, 199, 247. Prize duties, 32-33, 37. Provisions, attempts to prohibit trade in, with French, 72 ff., 78, 81, 82, 113. See Contraband trade. Pulteney (Earl of Bath), quoted, 143. Quaker influence in New Jersey, 59. ■ Quebec, fall of, 131. ' Quincy, J., cited, 230, 239, 302. 1 *,' Quit-rents, Virginia, 45 n., 182 n. Digitized by Microsoft® INDEX 32s Rebates, 40, 194 B., 209. Requisition system, 52 ff.; failure of, in Pontiac's war, 263-266; suc- ceeded by system of Parliamentary taxation, 274. Revenue, collection of. See Customs. Revenue bills. Parliamentary, 31 ff. Reynolds, Governor John, 47 n., 193 n. Rhode Island, represented at Albany Congress, 19; contribution of, to expeditions against Du Quesne, Ni- agara, and Crown Point, 53 n. ; Parliamentary grant to, 54 n. ; un- willingness of, to aid in common defence, 59; extent of cooperation of, in French campaigns, 60-69; violation in, of embargo on provisions, 83; trade with enemy carried on by, 90, 92; trade of, with French in Florida and Louisiana, 103—104; trade with French West Indies from, 112; independent attitude of (1709), %(rf57; not affected by Iron Act of 1750,^ 199 n. ; spirit of independence in, 240; violations of Molasses Act in, 240-241 ; refuses troops for Pontiac's war, 264; evidences in, of colonial opposition to Grenville's taxation measures, 291 ; molasses the basis of commerce of, 293 n. ; objections in, to customs officials, 301. Rice, duties on, 35-36; colonial trade in, 225-226. Robinson, Sir Thomas, 23, 24, 28 n., 55 n., 141; Dinwiddle's letters to, 43, 44, 45; General Braddock writes to, 45 n. Rockingham, succeeds Grenville, 299. Roubaud, renegade Jesviit, 172 n. Royal colonies, 162. Rule of 1756, 94, 106. Rum, excise on, proposed, 38, 40; illicit trade in, 87; importation of foreign, forbidden, 278. Russia, hemp-production in, 216. St. Eustatius, headquarters of illegal trade with French, 79, 93, 95 n.; beef shipped from Ireland to, 86. St. Kitts, imports to England from (1761-62), 145 n- St. Lucia, 15; ceded to France by Treaty of Paris, 153-154; Pitt on cession of, 156. St. Pierre, commercial intercourse with, forbidden, 248. St. Vincent, 15; provisions from Bar- bados in, 89 ; exports from England to (1766-67), 138 n. ; becomes British under Peace of Paris, 154; contra- band trade in, after Peace of Paris, 236. Salt, importation of, 210 n., 211. Scott, Sir WiUiam, judgments of, 72 n., 93 n., 94 u. Seizures of vessels, 126-128. Senegal, acquisition of, breaks France's monopoly of gum trade, 213 n. Sharpe, Governor, 29 n. ; quoted, 69 n., 269 n. Shepherd, W. R., cited, 69 n. Sherwood, Joseph, 128; quoted, 300. Ship-building, 196, 201. ^ Shirley, Governor William, 18, 29, 102, ' 127, 255; quoted, 78, 266 n. ; Parlia- mentary union and Parliamentary taxation favored by, 46-49; on desirability of taking Canada, 140- 141, 142 ; cannot foresee that conquest of Canada will affect unity of the Empire, 171. Silk duties, 281. Six Nations, Sir William Johnson ap- pointed colonel of, 27. Smith, W. R., cited, 11 n., 192 n. Smuggling, 228 ff. South Carolina, garrisons in, 11; ex- penditures for military force in, 13; exportation of rice from, 35-36; boundary dispute between North Carolina and, 50 n. ; Parliamentary grant to, 55; troops raised in, against Indians, 65 n. ; favorable effect of indigo bounty in, 218; rice trade of, 225-226; absence of contraband trade in (1764), 237; Parliamentary pay- ment of governor of, 276. Southern colonies, condition of illegal trade in, after Peace of Paris, 236- 238- Spain, importation of wine from, pro- hibited, 291. Spanish Succession, War of, 8, 32, 73. Digitized by Microsoft® 326 INDEX J Spotswood, Go-vemor, quoted, 34 n. Spry, William, 250, 290. Stamp Act, 38 n., 41, 259, 276; passage of, 285 ; colonial oppositioii to, 294 S. ; repeal of, 298, Stanley, Hans, IS3 i*- Sugar, duties on, 31, 35 n., 38, 278; exportation of, from Guadeloupe to England, 149. Sugar Bill of 1764, 159; passage of, 276; aim of, 277; duties imposed by, 277-284; modification of, 299. Taxation of colonies for military defence, 271-273, 274 ff. Tea, illegal importation of, by Ameri- can colonies, 244, 243, 246. Thacher, Oxenbridge, cited, 157 n., 289, 290, 293, 294 n. Thomas, Governor, 94, 95 n. Tobacco, duties on, 31, 32, 35 n., 237; "Two-penny Act" concerning, 183 ff.; British and Irish farmers prohibited from growing, 196. Tobago, 15; ceded to Great Britain, 154- Tortola, exports from England to (1756 -67), 138 n. Townshend, Charles, 279. Trade, of colonies, 3-4, 72 ff.; read- justment of laws of, 193 ff., 305; illegal, see Contraband trade. Treaties, British, with Barbary corsairs, 7- Treaty of Neutrality of 1686, 75. Treaty of Peace of 1763, 139; terms of, affecting Canada and West Indies, 153-154; discussion of, by supporters and opponents, 154-159. Tucker, Josiah, cited, 134 n., 202 n. Two-penny Act, 183 ff. Tyler, Moses Coit, on Two-penny Act, 183 n. ; quoted, 240 n., 290. Vice-admiralty courts, 119 ff., 249-251, 289-291. "Viper," the, at Monte Cristi, 98 n. Virginia, money sent for defence of, 16; represented by DeLancey at Albany Congress, 19 ; opposition in, to postal system, 34 n. ; quit-rents in, 45 n., 182 u. ; boundary dispute between North Carolina and, 50 n.; con- tribirtion of, to expeditions against Du Quesne, Niagara, and Crown Point, 53 n.; Parliamentary grant to, 55; attitude of, under requisition system, 59; quota of troops raised in, for French campaigns (1758- 1760), 60-69; Dinwiddle's embargo on provisions in, 77; exports from England to (1746-67), 138 n. ; im- ports into England from (1757-62), 150 n.; question of currency for settlement of debts in, 179-183; issue of paper money in, 180-183; Two-penny Act in, 184 ff.; troubles over bankruptcy laws in, 186; ex- portation of hemp to England from (1768-69), 218 n.; absence of con- traband trade in (1764), 237; req- uisition of troops from, for Indian insurrection (1763), 263.. Virgin Islands, contraband trade in, after Peace of Paris, 236. Walpole, Horace, quoted, 299 n. Walpole, Sir Robert, 40-41. Washington, George, 44, 63 n., 174; on Grenville's taxation measures, 296; quoted, 305 n. Wdls, Francis, 87. Wells, Samuel, quoted, 87 n. Wentworth, Governor, 91, 147 n., 233 n.; report of, concerning illegal trade in New Hampshire, 238. West Indian products, importation of, 39- West Indies, ideal colony commercially considered, 134; exports from Eng- land to (1746-47, 1766-67), 138 n.; Canada vs., as colonial acquisition, 142 ff.; exports from England to (1744, 1758), 151 n. ; slight effect on colonies in, of conquest of Canada, 173. West Indies, French, relations between British continental colonies and, 73" 74; provisions sent to, from Ireland and AmericEi, 86 ff. ; why not retained by Great Britain in peace of 1763, 140; restoration of, by Peace of Paris, 153-154. Whale-fins, importation of, into England, 219 n., 221 n. Digitized by Microsoft® INDEX 327 Whale fisheries, 218-221. Whitworth, Sir Charles, 137 a. William and Mary College^ dtities for support of, 32, 237. Wines, importation of, 39; illegal im- portation of, by Americans, 245; duties on, by bill of 1764, 280-281. Wolfe, General, condemnation of colo- nial troops by, 174; criticism of , military operations by, 1 75 n. Woollen^ colonial maiksA for English, 139- Writs of assistance, attempt to declare illegal, 118, 122-123, ^°^ Yonge, Francis, 208. Digitized by Microsoft® Digitized by Microsoft® The Trade Poliqr of Great Britain and her Colonies since J 860 By CARL JOHANNES FUCHS Professor of Political Economy in the University of Freiburg TrAnsUiei by C. H, M. Archibald WITH A PREFACE BY The Right Hon. J. PARKER SHITH Formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Cambrii^-e An example of a large and valuable body of literature ex- isting in Germany dealing with the trade policy of foreign states, with the scientific object of ascertaining, by the study of the actual facts, the real significance of the history of the past and the chief tendencies of certain forces affecting the present position of trade. Neither accomplished facts nor future possibilities are exaggerated and the objective stand- point is maintained throughout The necessary deficiencies of trade statistics are not overlooked and the comparison of figures is tested in various ways. " Professor Fuchs's book is absolutely immune from the common failings of the party pamphlet. It is a serious scientific study conducted by a skilled and acute investi- gator." — Economic Review. Cloth, 8vo, xxtx + 4Zi pages, $2.^0 net THE MACMILLAN COMPANY FTTBLISHEBS, 64-66 FIFTH AVENUE, HE'W YORK Digitized by Microsoft® Works by PAUL S. REHTSCH Professor of Political Science in the Universify of Wiscomirt WORLD POLITICS At the End of the Nineteenth Century AS Influenced by the Oriental Situation " Dr. Reinsch sketches, in reviewing the world politics, the tran- sition from nationalism to national imperialism in the nineteenth century, the political methods of the new national imperialism, the great Powers as colonizers, the connection between coloniza- tion and imperialism, and the consequences of the newest policy. Among these consequences, Dr. Reinsch places a decay in good government at home, a reaction against the political and social doctrines of liberalism, and a growth of one-man power and an aristocratic reaction in philosophy." — Boston Transcript. COLONIAL GOVERNMENT An Introdaction to the Study of Colonial Institutions " . . .we know of no volume of the same size that conveys so much information as his, in so clear and orderly a manner, or one of greater utility to the general reader. ... If it were possible to require every Senator and Representative to pass a competitive examination in the contents of this little volume as a condition of appointment to committee work having to do with the depend- encies, the prospect for the sane treatment of the tremendous question now confronting the American people would be measur- ably improved, and the greater the number of voters that can be induced to study it, the better it will be for the country." — New York Times. COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION " Dr. Reinsch tells of the varying methods that have been em- ployed by European powers in their dependencies, and of the diverse results that have been secured by them, draws from their experience what he considers the correct conclusions, and leaves the reader to apply these conclusions to the case of the United States. . . . The book is well written, and should have a wide reading by persons who take an earnest interest in the difficult problems left the nation by the war with Spain." — Chicago Tribune. Each is in the Citizen's Library, Half leather, $1.25 net THE MACMILLAN COMPANY PTTBIISHEES, 64 66 Firia AVENUE, NEW TOEK Digitized by Microsoft® Digitized by Microsoft® Digitized by Microsoft® Digitized by Microsoft® Digitized by Microsoft® Digitized by Microsoft®