w 
 

 BERNARD ALBERT SINN 
 
 COLLECTION 
 
 NAVAL HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY 
 
 THE GIFT OF 
 
 BERNARD A. SINN, 97 
 
 1919 
 
VA573 .Sm""' """""»V Lrbrary 
 
 oiin 3 ^924 030 756 898 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of this book is in 
 the Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924030756898 
 
RUSSIA'S SEA-POWER 
 
RUSSIA'S SEA-POWER 
 
 PAST AND PRESENT 
 
 OR THE 
 
 RISE OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY 
 
 BY COLONEL 
 
 SIR GEORGE SYDENHAM CLARKE 
 
 K.C.M.G., F.R.S. 
 AUTHOR OF " FORTIFICATION," " IMFERIAL DEFENCE," ETC. 
 
 WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 LONDON 
 
 JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET 
 
Printed by Hazell, Watson, & Viney, Ld, London and Aylesbury. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 Four years ago it occurred to me that 
 a historical sketch of the rise of the 
 Russian Navy might be useful, in view 
 of the growing interest displayed in 
 what the authors of the Address of the 
 House of Lords to Queen Anne in 1 708 
 aptly termed " the sea affair." Pressure 
 of other work then prevented me from 
 doing more than accumulate notes 
 bearing upon the subject. Now that 
 public attention is directed to the great 
 naval efforts being made in Russia, and 
 to their connection with the recent 
 supremely important step taken in the 
 
vi PREFACE. 
 
 Far East, I trust that the publication 
 of this little book will be deemed 
 opportune. 
 
 I cannot claim to have exhaustively 
 treated a large and somewhat intricate 
 subject. I have, however, endeavoured 
 to set forth clearly the main facts 
 connected with the history of the 
 Russian Navy since its inception by 
 Peter the Great, as well as their 
 bearing upon the affairs of Europe 
 during nearly two hundred years. This 
 has involved reference to military opera- 
 tions, and has entailed a degree of 
 condensation by which some of the 
 following pages may seem to be over- 
 weighted. History is not a strong 
 point with the British people ; and 
 although many able writers are now 
 seeking to elucidate the wonderful story 
 of the British Navy, few among us are 
 
PREFACE. vii 
 
 familiar with the bare outline of the 
 events which have raised the semi- 
 civilised and practically inland State 
 governed by Peter the Great to a 
 dominant position in the afifairs of 
 Europe. 
 
 In this remarkable development, sea- 
 power has inevitably played a great 
 part ; but the process has differed 
 essentially from that which has accom- 
 plished the building up of the British 
 Empire. 
 
 In the one case, maritime instincts 
 and aptitudes, inherited from seafaring 
 races, combined with almost unrivalled 
 geographical advantages, made the 
 British Islands into a veritable centre 
 of sea-power. The maritime history 
 of England covers a period of nineteen 
 hundred years, and the differentiation 
 of the Royal Navy into a regularised 
 
viii PREFACE. 
 
 force, apart from a population constantly 
 exercising its natural instincts of fighting 
 on the sea, dates back for four hundred 
 years. That Navy, built up from and 
 supported by national maritime resources 
 in the widest sense of the word, and 
 trained in successive contests with the 
 naval strength of Spain, Holland, and 
 France, succeeded in long years of 
 struggle in establishing its supremacy. 
 Partly by direct conquest, partly by 
 reason of the security which the com- 
 mand of the sea conferred upon a people 
 naturally tending to expand, and wholly 
 by the brilliant achievements of the 
 Royal Navy, the British Empire, as 
 we now understand the phrase, was 
 created. 
 
 In the other case, an inland people, 
 as they attained national consolidation, 
 instinctively felt the need of maritime 
 
PREFACE. ix 
 
 communications, and forced their way 
 to the sea, which could be reached only 
 in the half-frozen Baltic, the doubly 
 land-locked Black Sea, and the remote 
 North Pacific. Territorial conquests 
 from Sweden and from Turkey, to- 
 gether with the subjugation of sparse 
 tribes owning nominal allegiance to 
 China, procured for Russia a seaboard 
 in all respects inferior to that possessed 
 by other great Powers. Having attained 
 that seaboard, it was necessary to build 
 up a navy, which, unlike that of Great 
 Britain, was thus an artificial creation. 
 In the Baltic, the new Russian fleet 
 found itself in conflict with the wasted 
 navy of Sweden, and later in the South 
 with the moderately effective forces of 
 Turkey, already supposed to be tottering 
 to a fall. Naval experience of some 
 sort could thus be derived, but such 
 
X PREFACE. 
 
 experience was not comparable to that 
 gained by the British Navy in the 
 stubborn conflict with Holland and the 
 prolonged contest with France and her 
 various allies. In warfare on the 
 high seas, the Russian Navy has as 
 yet played no part ; nor has it in the 
 past directly helped to build up the 
 Empire. 
 
 The fundamental difference in the 
 conditions of the development of Great 
 Britain and Russia seems to account, 
 in some measure, for the mutual an- 
 tagonism which has grown up during 
 the last half of this century. To us, 
 the exercise of all that is implied by 
 maritime power has during hundreds of 
 years been bound up with our national 
 existence. We accept it as a matter 
 of course, and we are, on that account, 
 perhaps unable to realise that another 
 
PREFACE. xi 
 
 great nation, in proportion to its 
 advance in civilisation and material de- 
 velopment, experiences needs precisely- 
 similar to those which in our case are 
 abundantly satisfied. In obedience to 
 the dictates of a universal law, the 
 Russian people have sought to obtain 
 an open seaboard. This inevitable 
 movement — the basis of Russian policy 
 for two hundred years — has profoundly 
 influenced the course of events. At 
 the present moment, it is hardly too 
 much to say that the antagonism 
 between Great Britain and Russia is 
 the principal factor in the European 
 situation, supplanting the vendetta 
 assumed to exist between France and 
 Germany. 
 
 When two nations are mutually 
 estranged, it is generally possible to 
 assign a definite and a sufficient cause. 
 
xii PREFACE. 
 
 In the case of Great Britain and Russia, 
 however, the task is by no means easy. 
 Neither commercial nor colonising 
 rivalry at present exists. Nor has 
 there been hitherto any sufficient cause 
 for the antagonism which has frequently 
 threatened to assume an acute form. I 
 have attempted to explain the possible 
 reasons of this antagonism ; but I am 
 well aware that the explanation is not 
 wholly satisfactory, since some British 
 sentiment in regard to Russia seems to 
 partake of the nature of that inspired 
 by the personality of Doctor Fell. 
 Sentiment, now as always, plays a far 
 more important part in the affairs of 
 men and nations than reason. It 
 should, however, at least have a basis 
 of fact, and imagination unchecked by 
 a study of events is not a safe guide. 
 The expansion of Russia has conformed 
 
PREFACE. xiii 
 
 to a universal law, and up to the 
 present time it is impossible to discover 
 any violation of territory which Great 
 Britain has ever desired to possess or 
 over which we have any conceivable 
 claim. No substantial grievance against 
 Russia exists at this moment. 
 
 There has always been a body of 
 opinion in this country in favour of 
 seeking a direct agreement with Russia, 
 and the present Prime Minister has 
 explicitly stated that our policy in 
 1854-55 ^"d in 1878 w as founded jjpop 
 a fallac y. There is, however, no clear 
 sign of a definite change. Russia has, 
 in the past, been frequently our ally, 
 and has proved more satisfactory in 
 that capacity than some other Powers. 
 The Russian Navy has been largely 
 the creation of British seamen. Early 
 in the present century, a strong sym- 
 
xiv PREFACE. 
 
 pathy with the Russian people was 
 manifested in this country. In these 
 circumstances, it is not easy to believe 
 that, with Russia alone of all great 
 Powers, a direct understanding is 
 unattainable. 
 
 One thing at least is certain. The 
 policy of seeking to stem the advance 
 of Russia by diplomatic notes and by 
 exhibitions of irritability has absolutely 
 failed. Territory in regard to which 
 we are prepared to accept no respon- 
 sibilities cannot reasonably be denied 
 to the occupation of another Power. 
 Undefined spheres of influence have 
 no sanctity. In the Far East, there- 
 fore, our course is plain. We have, 
 while there is yet time, to define in 
 the clearest terms the territory in which 
 we intend no other influence to be 
 established — the territory the violation 
 
PREFACE. XV 
 
 of which we should resist with the 
 whole strength of the Empire. Russia 
 and other Powers would then know 
 where they stand, and war, if it should 
 be forced upon us, would be waged 
 in a cause which every member of the 
 British family could comprehend. Fate 
 has, however, ordained that Asiatic 
 dominion should be shared mainly by 
 two great nations. There is ample 
 room for both, and could they attain to 
 a reasonable measure of mutual under- 
 standing, fairer hopes of peace and of 
 progress would dawn upon the world. 
 
 London, June 1898. 
 
 Note. — My best thanks are due to the Hon. 
 T. A. Brassey for permitting the reproduction from 
 the Naval Annual of the diagrams of the Rurik, 
 Sissoi Veliky, and Tria Sviatitelia. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PAGE 
 EARLY HISTORY — WARS OF PETER THE GREAT I 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 OPERATIONS IN THE BALTIC — FALL OF PEREKOP — 
 WAR OF AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION — SEVEN YEARS' 
 WAR l8 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 CATHARINE H. — FLEET IN MEDITERRANEAN — FIRE- 
 SHIPS AT TCHESME — BRITISH OFFICERS IN 
 RUSSIAN NAVY — PEACE OF KAINARDJI . . 28 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE "ARMED NEUTRALITY" — NAVY IN BALTIC 
 AND MEDITERRANEAN — RUSSO-TURKISH WAR 
 — RUSSO-BRITISH ALLIANCE — ^ALIENATION OF 
 THE TZAR PAUL — NELSON IN THE BALTIC . 38 
 xvii 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 PAGE 
 RUSSIAN FLEET IN MEDITERRANEAN AFTER PEACE 
 OF TILSIT — ^ACTIONS IN THE BALTIC — ^WAR WITH 
 NAPOLEON — NAVARINO — MOVEMENTS IN ASIA . 59 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE CHANGE TO STEAM — THE CRIMEAN WAR — 
 
 ARMOURCLADS — PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF'S NOTE . 80 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 RUSSO-TURKISH war OF 1877-78 — CONGRESS OF 
 BERLIN — SKOBELEFF'S SCHEME — CREATION OF 
 THE MODERN FLEET IO3 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 RUSSIAN EXPANSION — LINES OF ADVANCE — THE 
 
 FAR EAST THE LATEST STEP — THE RUSSIAN 
 
 NAVAL POSITION I36 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS 168 
 
 INDEX 
 
 189 
 
CONTENTS. xix 
 
 FIGURES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 1. SINOPE 119 
 
 2. ADMIRAL NAKHIMOFF 121 
 
 3. PAMYAT AZOVA I23 
 
 4. RURIK 125 
 
 5. SISSOI VELIKY 127 
 
 6. TRIA SVIATITELIA 1 29 
 
 MAPS. 
 
 I. THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE . . At end of book 
 
 II. MANCHURIA ... n 11 
 
RUSSIA'S SEA-POWER 
 
 PAST AND PRESENT ; 
 
 OR, 
 
 THE RISE OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 EARLY HISTORY — WARS OF PETER 
 THE GREAT. 
 
 LESS than two hundred years ago 
 Archangel was the '^one seaport 
 of Russia, and thither large fleets of 
 British and Dutch merchantmen annually 
 found their way. When Peter the 
 Great ascended the throne in 1689, 
 the Baltic was almost a Swedish lake, 
 the Black Sea Turkish, the Caspian 
 
2 EARLY HISTORY. [Ch. 
 
 Persian. The struggle for a seaboard 
 which then began has since been the 
 ruling motive of Russian policy, and 
 has already graven deep marks upon 
 the history of nations. "We work," 
 wrote Peter, when on his western travels, 
 to the patriarch Adrian, "to effectually 
 conquer the art of the sea, in order 
 that, on our return to Russia, being 
 completely instructed, we may be vic- 
 torious over the enemies of Christ." 
 Behind the movement inaugurated by 
 Peter lay irresistible natural forces, 
 which sooner or later must have come 
 into play. 
 
 The national consolidation which 
 began under Jaroslaf in the eleventh 
 century was first checked by civil 
 wars, and then shattered by the wave 
 of Tartar invasion, which, engulfing 
 all Russia except Novgorod and the 
 territories of the North-west, extended 
 
I] MOSCOW. 3 
 
 into Moravia and Silesia. Before the 
 end of the fifteenth century, the heavy 
 yoke of the Tartars had been broken, 
 and Ivan III. had formed a new group- 
 ing of the Russian States. Henceforth 
 Moscow, which since the conquest of 
 Constantinople by Mahomet II. had been 
 the metropolis of the Eastern Church, 
 became also the capital of a great 
 Muscovite principality. Wars with 
 Lithuania, Poland, and the Tartar 
 khanates added territory to the domains 
 of the Grand Dukes of Moscow, and 
 in 1547 Ivan IV. assumed the title of 
 Tzar. The important conquests of 
 Kazan and Astrachan followed, pointing 
 out the way into Asia; but in 1572 
 Moscow was burned by the Tartars of 
 the Crimea, and the western wars of 
 Ivan IV. were generally unsuccessful. 
 
 The Muscovite dynasty ended with 
 Feodor Ivanovitch in 1598, and the 
 
4 EARLY HISTORY. [Ch. 
 
 death of the Boyar Tzar, Boris Godonofif, 
 in 1605, was followed by a period of 
 acute civil dissension, which led to 
 a Polish occupation of Moscow. A 
 national movement — the first worthy of 
 the name which Russian history records 
 ^-saved the situation, Minin and 
 Pojarski, whose names are commemo- 
 rated in armoured cruisers, obtained the 
 capitulation of the Polish garrison, and 
 in 161 3 a national assembly elected 
 Michael Romanoff to the vacant throne. 
 A war with Sweden, several Polish 
 wars, and a serious Cossack revolt 
 marked the remainder of the seventeenth 
 century ; but the organisation of the 
 Empire progressed, and under the 
 Romanoffs Western influences began 
 to assert themselves. 
 
 During centuries the ships of Eng- 
 land, France, Spain, Holland, and 
 Portugal had carried the commerce 
 
I-] INFLUENCE OF SEA-TRAINING. 5 
 
 of their countries across the world. 
 In far earlier days, Phoenicians, Greeks, 
 Romans, Carthaginians, and Norsemen 
 had scoured the seas. Great sea fights 
 had been lost and won ; the art of 
 naval warfare had made striking pro- 
 gress, and maritime operations had 
 powerfully influenced the development 
 of nations. The training, political and 
 moral, which a people derives from 
 contact with the sea — a training which, 
 far more than any other, impresses 
 itself upon national character — was 
 wholly wanting to Russia in the days 
 of her youth. If the United States 
 had been developed from the interior, 
 the original germ having arisen out 
 of a grouping of Indian tribes roaming 
 the plains of Nebraska, a parallel to 
 Russian expansion might be found. 
 But the races which have peopled 
 North America, like those which created 
 
6 WARS OF PETER THE GREAT. [Ch. 
 
 England, moved inwards from the coasts, 
 carrying with them the instincts of the 
 sea. The difference of conditions is 
 supremely important, and goes far to 
 explain the relatively slow progress 
 of Russian civilisation. 
 
 A great inland State, growing con- 
 scious of its power, must inevitably 
 seek outlets to the sea, and to a natural 
 movement the peculiar genius of Peter 
 the Great supplied a sudden impulse. 
 He clearly saw that, in order to become 
 a great Power, Russia needed seaports 
 and a fleet. Turning his attention first 
 to the South, he attempted the siege of 
 Azof, and failed, since the Turks, in 
 command of the sea, were able to keep 
 open communications. Nothing daunted, 
 Peter imported artillery officers from 
 Austria and Holland, engineers from 
 Prussia, an admiral from Venice, and, 
 collecting twenty-six thousand workmen. 
 
I] CAPTURE OF AZOF. 7 
 
 he set about building a fleet of galleys 
 and boats on the banks of the Don. 
 Blockaded by land and sea, Azof fell 
 in 1696. It was a small beginning, 
 and in 1711 the place was restored 
 to Turkey ; but this success, mainly 
 due to the impromptu flotilla, gave an 
 impetus to Peter's naval aspirations. 
 
 The capture of Azof was the dawn 
 of a new era in Russian history, and the 
 opening move of a new national policy, 
 which soon brought the inland Empire 
 into contact with the maritime Powers. 
 Azof, situated at the inner extremity of 
 a narrow gulf of a trebly land-locked 
 sea, was not a favourable outlet for 
 maritime expansion, and the Russian 
 flotilla could not hope to contend with 
 the Turkish fleet. Peter's thoughts 
 were, therefore, soon drawn to the 
 Baltic, and primarily to the head of 
 the Gulf of Finland. 
 
8 WARS OF PETER THE GREAT. [Ch. 
 
 The end of the seventeenth century 
 had its Holstein question, which served 
 as a pretext for a coalition against the 
 young King of Sweden. In 1698, an 
 alliance was concluded between Den- 
 mark and Saxony, which was joined 
 by Poland and Russia. England and 
 Holland ranged themselves on the side 
 of Sweden, and by an accident of 
 international politics Peter's nascent 
 ambitions were thus early opposed by 
 this country. By Oxenstiern, the Chan- 
 cellor of Sweden, these ambitions were 
 clearly realised. "If once the Tzar 
 obtains a port on the Baltic," he wrote 
 to Charles XII., "he will hold it come 
 what will." In June 1700, a fleet of 
 twelve line-of-battle ships, under Sir 
 George Rooke, with thirteen Dutch 
 vessels, arrived at Gothenburg, and, 
 being joined by the Swedes, neutralised 
 the Danish squadron, enabling Charles 
 
I.] NARVA. 9 
 
 to land an army on the shores of 
 Zealand and to threaten Copenhagen. 
 The Holstein difficulty having been 
 composed, the British admiral had no 
 further orders, and, driven to abandon 
 the idea of attacking the Danish capital, 
 Charles concluded peace with Denmark, 
 and determined to carry on single-handed 
 the war against Russia, Saxony, and 
 Poland. Peter had already invaded 
 Ingria, and was besieging Narva when 
 Charles landed. Collecting his force 
 at Wesenburg, the King attacked the 
 Russian lines of contravallation on 
 November 20th, 1699, winning a brilliant 
 victory over greatly superior forces. 
 This was the first considerable battle 
 between the Swedes and the Russians, 
 whose troops, deserted by their Tzar 
 on the eve of the action, showed to 
 little advantage. In 1701, Charles had 
 more than sixty thousand men on the 
 
lo WARS OF PETER THE GREAT. [Ch. 
 
 southern coasts of the Baltic. On July 
 8th, he defeated a Saxon- Russian army 
 at Riga, and occupied Courland. The 
 kingdom of Poland, shrunk from its 
 former dimensions, was already totter- 
 ing to a fall, when Charles XII. started 
 on the astounding series of adventures 
 which ended in disaster at Pultowa. 
 Utilising the Swedish command of the 
 Baltic, he might have effectually checked 
 the designs of the Tzar, in which lay 
 real danger to his country. Swedish 
 statesmen viewed with alarm the pro- 
 ceedings of the impracticable hero, and 
 urged peace with Poland and Saxony. 
 William III. of England, who had 
 organised a grand alliance of neutral 
 Powers to curb the ambitions of Louis 
 XIV., sent wise counsels ; but Charles 
 was unmoved, and the practical result 
 of his wonderful campaigns in the heart 
 of Europe was to drain the strength of 
 
I-] ST. PETERSBURG. ii 
 
 Sweden and to further the projects of 
 the Tzar. Left to their own resources, 
 the Baltic provinces of Sweden were 
 unable to defend their long frontier 
 against invasion, and in 1702 the 
 Russians overran Ingria and Livonia, 
 and captu ed Noteburg, now Schlussel- 
 burg. Nyen, at the head of the Gulf 
 of Finland, fell the following year ; the 
 Neva became a Russian stream, and 
 St. Petersburg was founded. In 1704, 
 Dorpat and Narva were taken. In 
 every case Peter instantly turned to 
 account the waters rendered available, 
 and on Lake Ladoga, the Neva, and 
 Lake Peipus ships were rapidly built. 
 In 1702, he had paid a flying visit 
 to Archangel, launched two small 
 frigates, and laid the keel of a 26-gun 
 vessel. In August, a large fleet of 
 English and Dutch ships arrived at 
 this port under convoy. In the same 
 
12 WARS OF PETER THE GREAT. [Ch. 
 
 year, a Swedish vessel was taken on Lake 
 Peipus, and in 1703 two others were 
 captured in the Neva, while on Lake La- 
 doga the new navy successfully asserted 
 itself. By the end of 1710, the Baltic 
 provinces of Sweden were in the hands 
 of the Russians, and Riga had fallen. 
 
 While the naval projects of the 
 Tzar thus prospered in the North, a 
 severe check was administered in the 
 South. The brief Russo-Turkish war 
 of 171 1, which Charles XII. had striven 
 to promote, ended ignominiously on 
 the banks of the Pruth, where the 
 Russian army was surrounded and 
 might easily have been destroyed by 
 the Grand Vizier. Peter, acting on the 
 advice of the Tzarina, saved himself 
 by offering terms — and money. Azof 
 was restored to the Sultan, and the 
 Russian fleet was destroyed. The 
 Turko- Venetian war, which began in 
 
I-] FIRST NAVAL ACTION. 13 
 
 the following year, gave a fresh stimulus 
 to the Turkish navy. The Swedish 
 cause was now visibly declining, and 
 Charles lingered in the South till Sep- 
 tember 17 1 4, attempting to govern 
 his distracted country from the neigh- 
 bourhood of Adrianople ! Meanwhile, 
 in May 1713, a combined Russian 
 expedition, under Admiral Apraxine, 
 with Peter as second in command, took 
 Helsingfors and Abo, on the northern 
 shore of the Gulf of Finland, and 
 routed a force of raw Swedish and 
 Finnish levies under Armfeldt at Stor- 
 kyro. This was the first over-sea 
 operation of Russia, and the following 
 year witnessed her first real naval action, 
 when Peter, with thirty ships of the 
 line, defeated a greatly inferior Swedish 
 force off the island of Aland, capturing 
 four ships of the line, four frigates, and 
 six galleys. The anniversary of the 
 
14 WARS OF PETER THE GREAT. [Ch. 
 
 action, known as that of Hango Udd, 
 was celebrated by Peter on board a 
 British flagship in the following year. 
 Thus rapidly had the development of 
 the Russian Baltic fleet progressed. 
 
 In 1 7 15, Denmark and Prussia joined 
 Russia, Saxony, and Poland against the 
 Swedes. Stralsund fell in December, 
 and Charles XII., narrowly escaping 
 capture by the Danish cruisers, returned 
 to his kingdom after an absence of 
 fifteen years. 
 
 Great Britain, either acting in accord- 
 ance with a policy recently imported by 
 George I., or genuinely aggrieved by 
 the action of Swedish cruisers, had in 
 June sent a squadron of eighteen sail 
 of the line under Sir John N orris into 
 the Baltic. A combined fleet — British, 
 Dutch, Russian, and Danish — cruised 
 under the personal command of the 
 Tzar, whose naval aspirations must have 
 
I.] SIR JOHN NORRIS. 15 
 
 been supremely gratified by this unique 
 honour. In 171 7, Sir John Norris, for 
 whom Peter had conceived a great 
 admiration, returned to the Baltic, pre- 
 venting any action on the part of the 
 Swedish navy. In the following year, 
 Charles XII., who had invaded Norway, 
 was killed in the trenches before 
 Frederickshald. British policy in the 
 Baltic now underwent a marked change, 
 and an Anglo-Swedish alliance was 
 concluded. In 17 19, Sir John Norris 
 again sailed for the Baltic, joining the 
 Swedish squadron in September, and 
 the Russians, who were harrying the 
 coasts of Sweden, retired to Revel. In 
 the following year, a similar demonstra- 
 tion was made, and Sir John Norris suc- 
 ceeded in negotiating a treaty between 
 Sweden and Denmark, while Prussia 
 also made peace. No naval hostilities oc- 
 curred, since the Russian fleet declined 
 
i6 WARS OF PETER THE GREAT. [Ch. 
 
 action, while difificulties of navigation 
 hampered the Allies. 
 
 In 1720, the northern war, which had 
 lasted twenty-two years, came to an end, 
 and its main result was the firm estab- 
 lishment of Russia on the Baltic. The 
 continental campaigns of Charles XII., 
 however glorious to the Swedish arms, 
 had proved ruinous to the nation. 
 The population decreased more than 
 eleven per cent. ; the mercantile marine 
 sank from seven hundred and seventy- 
 five to two hundred and nine vessels ; 
 the powerful navy, which might have 
 successfully opposed the projects of the 
 Tzar and effectually aided the defence 
 of the Baltic provinces, was reduced to 
 dependence upon allies. Russia had 
 obtained a seaboard extending from 
 Viborg on the north of the Gulf of 
 Finland to the head of the Gulf of 
 Riga, and had built a new capital on the 
 
I] END OF FIRST PERIOD. 17 
 
 Neva, guarded by the fortifications of 
 Cronstadt. In the South, the expan- 
 sion had so far been less successful. 
 The coast-line of the Caspian for three 
 hundred and fifty miles, from the Ural 
 to the South-west, including Astrachan 
 and the estuary of the Volga, was now 
 Russian ; but a belt of Turkish territory 
 surrounded the Sea of Azof and em- 
 braced the mouth of the Dnieper. 
 
 The first period of Russia's march to 
 the sea had brought her into direct 
 conflict with Sweden and Turkey, Powers 
 separated by the breadth of a continent, 
 but confronted by a common danger, 
 which had sent Swedish troops to the 
 banks of the Danube. At the same 
 time, by reason of the exigencies of the 
 Elector of Hanover, rather than from 
 any prescience of a later policy. Great 
 Britain had been brought into opposition 
 to the rising naval Power of the North. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 OPERATIONS IN THE BALTIC — FALL OF 
 PEREKOP — WAR OF AUSTRIAN SUC- 
 CESSION — SEVEN years' war. 
 
 In 1725, Peter the Great died, and was 
 succeeded by the Tzarina, Catharine I. 
 Russia, now thoroughly established as 
 a European State, was suspected of 
 intrigues with the courts of Vienna and 
 Madrid. A second quadruple alliance 
 — Great Britain, France, Prussia, and 
 Denmark — having been arranged, Sir 
 Charles Wager, with twenty ships of 
 the line, one frigate, two fireships, 
 and a hospital-ship, was sent into the 
 Baltic in 1726. A Danish squadron 
 joined the British admiral off Bornholm, 
 
 i8 
 
Ch.ll.] BRITISH NAVY IN BALTIC. 19 
 
 and a Russian force of sixteen sail, 
 under Admirals Apraxine, Gordon, 
 and Saunders, was reported to be 
 at Cronstadt. Vice-Admiral Gordon, 
 however, informed the Tzarina that 
 his fleet was unable to risk an action, 
 and civilities were exchanged, the 
 British squadron returning home in 
 October, while the Russians began to 
 fortify themselves at Revel, In 1727, 
 Sir John Norris sailed for the Baltic, and 
 anchored at Copenhagen on May 12th, 
 causing " dejection to the Russians." 
 With the death of George I. the long 
 series of naval demonstrations ended, 
 and for many years no British fleet 
 seems to have entered the Baltic. 
 
 The death of Augustus II. of Poland 
 in 1733 involved a new European war. 
 A Russian army under Lacy marched 
 on Warsaw, and Stanislaus, the son-in- 
 law of Louis XV., fled to Danzig, which 
 
20 FALL OF PEREKOP. [Ch- 
 
 was besieged by sixty thousand Russians, 
 Saxons, and Poles under Munnich. A 
 French fleet of sixteen sail entered the 
 Baltic, and in May disembarked three 
 regiments at Danzig. A further rein- 
 forcement of fifteen hundred men arrived 
 in the following year under convoy of 
 two ships of war, but could not be 
 admitted on account of the dearth of 
 provisions. The Russian fleet under 
 Admiral Gordon at length appeared on 
 the scene, and Danzig surrendered. 
 
 The year 1736 saw the outbreak of 
 a new Russo- Turkish war in prosecu- 
 tion of the aims of Peter the Great. 
 The famous lines of Perekop were 
 forced by Munnich at the end of May, 
 and Azof fell to Lacy on June 29th. 
 Oczakoff, at the mouth of the Dnieper, 
 was taken by the Russians on July 
 13th, 1737, and unsuccessfully besieged 
 by the Turks during October and 
 
n.] PEACE OF BELGRADE. 21 
 
 November. On August 9th and 
 loth, actions were fought between the 
 Russian Don flotilla under Admiral 
 Bredal and the Turkish Azof squadron. 
 The Russian vessels were drawn close 
 in shore under the protection of an 
 extemporised battery, and the Turks 
 suffered some loss. In the vain belief 
 that the end of the Ottoman Empire 
 was at hand, Austria entered into the 
 war, and after failing completely in 
 three campaigns made peace with the 
 Sultan. The Russians were, however, 
 generally successful, and after inflicting 
 a severe defeat on the Turks, Miinnich 
 occupied the fortress of Choczin, on the 
 Dniester, on August 30th, 1739. The 
 Empress Anne, weary of the war, re- 
 jected an offer of aid from Nadir Shah, 
 just returned from his march to Delhi, 
 and concluded peace at Belgrade in 
 October. The Russian Empire gained 
 
22 WAR OF AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION. [Ch. 
 
 an increase of territory on the side of 
 the Ukraine ; Azof and Taganrog were 
 demolished ; but the results of the war 
 were inconsiderable, and the Euxine 
 was still a Turkish lake. 
 
 The deaths of the Emperor Charles 
 VI., of Frederick William of Prussia, 
 and of the Empress Anne in 1740 
 led to the War of the Austrian Succes- 
 sion. On January ist, 1741, Frede- 
 rick II. entered Breslau, the capital of 
 Silesia, and the European Powers re- 
 grouped themselves. France, opposing 
 Maria Theresa, who was supported 
 by Russia, found means to embroil 
 Frederick of Sweden, who declared war 
 on July 1 2th. A fleet was equipped to 
 blockade the Russian ports in Livonia, 
 and eleven thousand Swedes advanced 
 against Wilmanstrand, where they were 
 defeated by a superior Russian force 
 under Lacy. In December, Count 
 
n] TWEERMUNDE. 23 
 
 Lowenhaupt, with the main Swedish 
 army, moved on Viborg. A revolution 
 at the Russian Court, directed against 
 German influence, placed Elizabeth, the 
 daughter of Peter the Great, on the 
 throne ; but, after a short armistice, 
 the war was renewed, and Lowenhaupt 
 surrendered to Lacy near Helsingfors. 
 On May 18th, 1743, a combined 
 expedition under Lacy sailed from 
 Cronstadt for Helsingfors, and pro- 
 ceeded to seek the Swedish fleet at 
 Tweermunde. The Russian squadron 
 of seventeen sail of the line, with six 
 frigates and a large galley force, was 
 ordered by Lacy to attack ; but no 
 anxiety for action was manifested on 
 either side, and after the exchange of 
 a few shots the fleets separated. In 
 August, peace was concluded. In 1746, 
 the British Government undertook to 
 subsidise Russia, who was to place 
 
24 SEVEN YEARS' WAR. [Ch. 
 
 thirty-seven thousand men and forty- 
 galleys at the disposal of the Allies. 
 These troops might apparently have 
 been transported by sea, and enabled 
 to take part in the campaign in Holland ; 
 but the arrangement led to nothing, and 
 after a march of seven hundred miles 
 the Russians wintered in Moravia, re- 
 turning home when the war ended with 
 the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle in 1 748. 
 
 The outbreak of the Seven Years' 
 War brought about a conflict between 
 Russia and Prussia. The Tzarina 
 Elizabeth sent a squadron of fifteen sail 
 to blockade the Prussian ports and to 
 bombard Memel, which surrendered to 
 a land force under Fermor ; but after 
 defeating Lewald at Gross Jagersdorf, 
 the Russians recrossed thfe Niemen.* 
 In 1758, Fermor again invaded Prussia, 
 
 * An illness of Elizabeth is said to have been 
 the cause of the retirement. 
 
"■] COLBERG. 
 
 25 
 
 occupied Konigsberg, and laid siege to 
 Custrin on the Oder, which was relieved 
 by Frederick the Great in August. 
 Defeated at Zorndorf, Fermor marched 
 into Pomerania, where he failed to take 
 Colberg, which was needed as a port 
 of supply. In 1758, the Russians won 
 the battles of Ziillichau and Kunersdorf, 
 subsequently retiring to Poland for want 
 of provisions. In 1760, a Russian fleet 
 of twenty -seven vessels, under Admiral 
 MishukofT, with a land force of fifteen 
 thousand men, failed in an attempt on 
 Colberg; but in October Berlin was 
 bombarded and occupied for four days 
 by a Russo- Austrian army, which retired 
 on the approach of Frederick. In the 
 following year, a Russian fleet of forty 
 sail, subsequently joined by a Swedish 
 squadron, blockaded and bombarded 
 Colberg, which was at the same time 
 besieged by land. On December i6th, 
 
26 SEVEN YEARS' WAR. [Ch. 
 
 Colberg fell, and a new line of supply- 
 was opened to the Russian armies. 
 
 The death of Elizabeth on January 
 5th, 1762, saved Frederick the Great. 
 Peter III. at once ceased hostilities, and 
 joined his forces with those of the King 
 of Prussia. On July 9th, a revolution 
 at St. Petersburg placed the Tzarina 
 Catharine on the throne ; but, although 
 Russian policy was again temporarily 
 reversed, no active measures were taken, 
 and the last battle of the Seven Years' 
 War was a Prussian victory over the 
 Austrian s at Freyberg. 
 
 The great European conflicts of 
 1740-48 and 1756-63 involved naval 
 operations in many seas. Great Britain 
 and France, preoccupied with the 
 struggle for colonial dominion, did not 
 employ their ships in the Baltic, and the 
 Russian fleet at the outbreak of the War 
 of the Austrian Succession numbered 
 
n.] RUSSIA IN BALTIC. 27 
 
 at least fifty vessels, subsequently in 
 creased. By reason of the decadence 
 of Sweden there was no force capable 
 of contesting the command of the sea, 
 but the results obtained were inconsider- 
 able. The Russian squadron appeared 
 on the coasts of Prussia, but did not 
 materially aid the land campaigns, and 
 the possible uses of a navy do not seem 
 to have been realised. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 CATHARINE II. — FLEET IN MEDITERRANEAN 
 — FIRESHIPS AT TCHESME — BRITISH 
 OFFICERS IN RUSSIAN NAVY — PEACE 
 OF KAINARDJI. 
 
 With the accession of Catharine II. a 
 new period of expansion began. On 
 the death of Augustus III. in 1764 
 Russian influence placed Poniatowski on 
 the throne of Poland, and on the out- 
 break of the insurrection in 1768 Russian 
 troops stormed Cracow. In October 
 of the same year Catharine declared 
 war with Turkey, and in 1 769 a Russian 
 squadron under Alexis OrlofTwcis sent 
 from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. 
 This was a somewhat risky experiment, 
 
 28 
 
Ch. III.] ORLOFF IN MEDITERRANEAN. 29 
 
 and the ships, aftpr many mishaps, arrived 
 in the Channel in bad condition, " not- 
 withstanding the assistance of some 
 English officers and pilots." * After 
 refitting at Portsmouth the squadron 
 proceeded to Port Mahon, where it 
 arrived " shattered and sickly. The 
 same kind offices being, however, re- 
 peated, and the same powerful and 
 masterly assistance which characterises 
 the English nation in everything relating 
 to maritime affairs being again freely 
 given, the ships were put in as good 
 condition as the state they were in 
 could admit of, and the men ... re- 
 covered their health very fast." f 
 
 The new Russian departure was 
 differently viewed by the Mediterranean 
 Powers, who placed restrictions on the 
 use of their ports, while Venice 
 altogether excluded the new arrivals 
 * Annual Register, 1769. t Ibid. 
 
30 FLEET IN MEDITERRANEAN. [Ch. 
 
 and fitted out a fleet to guard the 
 Adriatic. In February 1770, the 
 Russian squadron moved on to the 
 Levant, where Orloff succeeded, by 
 issuing manifestoes, in arousing a revolt 
 in the Morea, occupied Navarino, and 
 attacked Patras, Modon, and other 
 places on the coast-line. The inter- 
 vention of Russia proved disastrous to 
 the Greeks, whom she compromised. 
 The available landing force was too 
 small to obtain any permanent success, 
 and on the arrival of Turkish and 
 Albanian troops the revolt was crushed 
 with great bloodshed, the Russians 
 retiring to Navarino and soon abandon- 
 ing the Morea altogether. " The fleet," 
 wrote Orloff" to Catharine, is " not worth 
 a pinch of salt. . . . My hair stands 
 on end as I think of these things. If 
 we had to do with any but Turks, there 
 would soon be an end of the fleet." In 
 
III.] ACTION OFF CHIO. 31 
 
 April, Rear-Admiral Elphinston arrived 
 from Cronstadt with reinforcements, 
 after refitting at Portsmouth, and in 
 May the Turkish fleet appeared in the 
 Levant. After " some engagements of 
 no great consequence," the Russian 
 squadron of ten ships of the line, with 
 five frigates, under Admiral SpiridofiC 
 encountered fifteen Turkish ships of the 
 line, with galleys and small craft, at 
 anchor between the island of Chio and 
 the mainland. Here an indecisive 
 action was fought on July 5th, in which 
 the two flagships were laid alongside, 
 and, taking fire, blew up. " The com- 
 manders and principal officers on both 
 sides were mostly saved, but the crews 
 were nearly totally lost." * At nightfall 
 the Turks cut their cables, and in 
 opposition to the wishes of the more 
 experienced officers ran into the Bay of 
 * Annual Register, 1770. 
 
32 FIRESHIPS AT TCHESME. [Ch. 
 
 Tchesm6, where, " huddled together like 
 birds in a net," * they were blockaded 
 by the Russians. On the 6th at mid- 
 night, four fireships prepared by Admiral 
 Elphinston were taken into the bay by 
 Lieutenants Dugdale and Mackenzie, the 
 operation being covered by Commodore 
 Greig with four ships of the line and 
 two frigates. The Russians, who were 
 unaccustomed to service of this nature, 
 " showed great backwardness " f ; but 
 Dugdale, though deserted by his crew, 
 succeeded in grappling a Turkish vessel, 
 and set fire to his ship. In five hours 
 the whole fleet, except one 62-gun vessel 
 and a few galleys, was destroyed. 
 
 The Russians, now masters of the 
 Levant, blockaded the Dardanelles, 
 interrupted Turkish trade, and besieged 
 the Castle of Lemnos, where they were 
 defeated by Hassan Bey. The Greek 
 * Annual Register, 1770. t Ibid. 
 
I".] CATHARINE'S ENTERPRISE. 33 
 
 insurrection had miserably failed, and 
 the revolt of Ali Bey in Egypt, also 
 promoted by the appearance of the 
 Russians, was suppressed in 1773. The 
 Turkish navy made no attempt to 
 retrieve the disaster of Tchesme, and 
 the Russians, whose ships were in bad 
 order, and whose small force of troops 
 was nearly exhausted, could effect 
 nothing except occasional descents upon 
 unimportant places on the seaboard. 
 The war practically degenerated into 
 piracy. 
 
 The great naval enterprise of Catha- 
 rine II. had spent itself, and such 
 success as it had obtained was entirely 
 due to Great Britain. By the aid of 
 British ports and British officers the 
 Russian squadron reached the Levant. 
 To British officers was due the de- 
 struction of the Turkish fleet. The 
 name of Tchesme is now borne by a 
 
 3 
 
34 BRITISH OFFICERS. [Ch. 
 
 Russian battle-ship ; but the fact that 
 the victory thus commemorated was 
 due to Elphinston, Greig, Dugdale, 
 and Mackenzie is altogether forgotten. 
 Whether originating in the friendship 
 of Peter the Great with Sir John Norris, 
 or suggested by the prestige of the 
 British navy, the practice of obtaining 
 officers from this country had steadily 
 grown. Under Catharine II. the num- 
 ber of such officers, largely of Scotch 
 descent, was considerable ; and when, in 
 1788, Paul Jones was appointed a rear- 
 admiral in the Russian service, sixty 
 are said to have resigned their com- 
 missions. Among the earliest importa- 
 tions was Lord Duffiis, who in the 
 Advice frigate fought a gallant action 
 with eight French privateers off Yar- 
 mouth in June 171 1. Carried to Dun- 
 kirk as a prisoner, he became involved 
 in the rebellion of 171 5, was attainted, 
 
in.] THE GREIG FAMILY. 35 
 
 and after being released from the 
 Tower was made an admiral by Peter 
 the Great. Sir Samuel Greig, after 
 seeing service at Quiberon Bay, before 
 Brest, and at Goree, joined the Russian 
 navy as a lieutenant, became rear-admiral 
 after the action at Tchesm^, and was 
 afterwards governor of Cronstadt. His 
 son, Alexis Samuelovich, was made a 
 midshipman at birth in 1775, and won 
 great distinction in the Turkish war of 
 1827-29, afterwards devoting himself to 
 the organisation of the navy and the 
 development of the Black Sea fleet. A 
 grandson showed great gallantry during 
 the siege of Sebastopol. Elphinston 
 joined as a rear-admiral in 1769, and 
 afterwards returning to England com- 
 manded the Magnificent in Byron's 
 action off Granada in July 1779, and 
 in the battle between Rodney and 
 de Guichen in April 1780. In 1788, 
 
36 BRITISH OFFICERS. [Ch. 
 
 Captain Sir Frederick Thesiger became 
 a Russian officer, and won laurels in 
 fighting the Swedes, who were assisted 
 by Sir Sidney Smith. The roll is a 
 long one, and the Russian navy may 
 almost be said to be the creation of 
 British seamen.* 
 
 On land, except in Bulgaria, the 
 Turkish war was an almost unbroken 
 success for the Russian arms. Bender 
 was taken in September 1770, and the 
 Crimea was overrun in the following year. 
 Balaclava alone holding out. In 1773, 
 the first partition of Poland, originated 
 by Frederick the Great, was accom- 
 plished. In the same year, the Russians 
 took Turtukai, and advanced to Y^'^'^^' 
 where they were repulsed, and failing 
 
 * The close connection between the British and 
 Russian navies seems to have existed to a later 
 date, and a Russian lieutenant was wounded on 
 board H.M.S. Conqueror at Trafalgar. 
 
III.] PEACE OF KAINARDJI. 37 
 
 before Silistria they recrossed the 
 Danube, The war ended with the 
 Peace of Kainardji, signed on July 21st, 
 1784, which gave to Russia Kinburn, 
 Kertch, Yenikale, and the district 
 between the Dnieper and the Bug, 
 confirmed her possession of Azof and 
 Taganrog, opened the Bosphorus and 
 Dardanelles to her mercantile marine, 
 and prepared the way for the formal 
 annexation of the Crimea nine years 
 later. As the general result of the 
 war, Catharine, following in the steps 
 of Peter the Great, firmly established 
 herself on the shores of the Black Sea 
 and the Sea of Azof The Russian 
 navy, under British auspices, had found 
 the way to the Mediterranean, and 
 Russian frigates had anchored before 
 Constantinople. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE " ARMED NEUTRALITY " NAVY IN 
 
 BALTIC AND MEDITERRANEAN — RUSSO- 
 TURKISH WAR — RUSSO-BRITISH ALLI- 
 ANCE ALIENATION OF THE TZAR 
 
 PAUL NELSON IN THE BALTIC. 
 
 In 1775, the War of American In- 
 dependence began, involving Great 
 Britain successively with France, Spain, 
 and Holland. The British navy, the 
 state of which had evoked severe 
 censures in Parliament in 1771, was 
 overtaxed, with the necessary result of 
 general unsuccess. In 1780, Catharine 
 abandoned the " northern system," and 
 
 drew closer to Austria, and afterwards 
 
 38 
 
Ch. IV.] THE "ARMED NEUTRALITY." 39 
 
 to France. The " Armed Neutrality " — 
 Russia, Prussia, Austria, Sweden, and 
 Portugal — was formed for the protection 
 of neutral rights ; but, on account of 
 the great infusion of British officers, 
 the Russian navy was not in a position 
 to undertake hostilities against this 
 country, and the outbreak of a new 
 Russo-Turkish war in 1787 led to a 
 fresh grouping of the Powers. Catha- 
 rine made naval preparations on a great 
 scale. A fleet of eighteen ships of the 
 line, with numerous frigates and small 
 craft, was fitted out under Admiral Greig 
 for the Mediterranean, and in the Black 
 Sea the Prince of Nassau commanded 
 a powerful flotilla. The Mediterranean 
 expedition was coldly regarded by the 
 Powers ; Genoa alone offered the ser- 
 vices of her ports, and the undertaking 
 of certain British merchants to provide 
 eighteen vessels for the transport of 
 
40 NAVY IN BALTIC. [Ch. 
 
 Stores was frustrated by the action of 
 the British Government. Meanwhile, 
 Catharine concluded an alliance with 
 Austria and Denitiark, and declared war 
 with Gustavus III. of Sweden. Thus 
 the Baltic again became the scene of 
 tiaval conflicts. On July 17th, 1788, 
 Greig, with seventeen ships of the line, 
 engaged the Duke of Sudermania, with 
 fifteen ships of the line and four 4b-gun 
 frigates, off the island of Hoogland. 
 The action was indecisive, and some of 
 the Ru&sian captains appear to have 
 behaved badly ; but Greig, quickly re- 
 fitting and being reinforced, attacked 
 the Swedes at Sveaborg, and captured 
 a ship of the line. In 1789, Gustavus, 
 secured by British intervention against 
 Denmark; made new naval efforts. 
 The Prince of Nassau, who succeeded to 
 the command of the Baltic fleet on the 
 death of Admiral Greig, defeated an 
 
v.] ACTIONS IN BALTIC. 41 
 
 inferior Swedish squadron near Rogens- 
 alm on August 25th. On May 13th, 
 1790, the Duke of Sudermania made 
 a gallant but ill-advised attack upon the 
 Riissian squadron in the fortified port 
 of Revel, and was repulsed with the 
 loss of two vessels. On the 15th, the 
 King of Sweden attacked Fredericks- 
 ham with his galley fleet, destroying 
 a number of small craft, together with 
 docks and large quantities of naval 
 stores. The Swedish navy was, how- 
 ever, no match for the Russians. On 
 June 3rd, the Duke of Sudermania 
 fought an indecisive engagement with 
 the Cronstadt division, and the Revel 
 squadron of thirteen ships of the line 
 under Admiral Tchitchagoff arriving on 
 the following day, the situation appeared 
 desperate. The Duke, however, suc- 
 ceeded in extricating his command, and 
 reached the island of Bjorno, where he 
 
42 NAVY IN BALTIC. [Ch. 
 
 was joined by the King with the galley 
 fleet. The Swedes now undertook a 
 hopeless attack on Viborg, where they 
 were caught by Tchitchagoff, and 
 heavily defeated on July 3rd and 4th, 
 losing three ships of the line, a frigate, 
 and sixty-six galleys and small craft, 
 and seven thousand men. On July 
 9th and loth, further actions were 
 fought in Svenska Sound, the Russians 
 being defeated with some loss. Many 
 British officers were engaged on both 
 sides ; Sir Sidney Smith rendered great 
 service to the Swedes, and saved the 
 King from imminent capture by Captain 
 Dennison, commanding the Venus frigate. 
 
 The resources of Sweden were, how- 
 ever, nearly exhausted ; on August 
 14th peace was signed, and Catharine 
 was able to bring her undivided energies 
 to bear against Turkey. 
 
 The naval operations in the South 
 
IV.] ACTIONS IN BLACK SEA. 43 
 
 were of small importance. The Russians 
 were not yet able to contest the com- 
 mand of the Black Sea, and the Turks 
 were not well provided for fighting in 
 shoal waters. In the Liman estuary 
 several engagements occurred, and on 
 June 7th, 1788, the Russian flotilla, under 
 the Prince of Nassau, covered by the 
 guns of Kinburn, inflicted a severe 
 repulse upon a Turkish force of light 
 vessels, galleys, and ships' boats. " Rear- 
 Admiral" Paul Jones was present, but 
 took no part in the fighting. The 
 Prince of Nassau afterwards co-operated 
 in the siege of Oczakofif, which was 
 captured by Potemkin on November 
 17th. In the following year, the 
 Austrians gained a victory on the 
 Sereth ; Loudon occupied Gradisca on 
 June 20th, and Belgrade on Septem- 
 ber 1 2th; while on July 31st the 
 Prince of Coburg and Suwarroff defeated 
 
44 RUSSO-TURKISH WAR. [Ch. 
 
 the Seraskier near Focsani. On Sep- 
 tember 22nd, the Russo- Austrian forces 
 routed the Grand Vizier's army at 
 Rimerik in Wallachia ; and Potemkin, 
 defeating Hassan Pasha near Bender, 
 occupied Ackerman at the outlet of the 
 Dniester, and KiHa at the northern 
 mouth of the Danube. In 1790, the 
 Austrians were defeated near Giurgevo, 
 and concluded a separate peace on 
 July 27th. Suwarroff, supported by a 
 squadron of galleys sent up the Danube, 
 attacked Ismail, which was stormed on 
 December 25th, and the Russian troops 
 advanced to the Balkans. Further 
 fighting occurred in Bulgaria in 1791, 
 and the Russians invaded the Kuban, 
 and defeated a Turko-Circassian force 
 near Anapa. At Galatz on August i ith 
 were signed the preliminaries of a peace 
 which was concluded at J assy on 
 January 9th, 1792. Russia retained 
 
IV.] CONFERENCE OF REICHENBACH. 45 
 
 Oczakoff and the country between the 
 Bug and the Dnieper ; but Potemkin 
 had died on October 15th, 1791, and 
 Catharine's project of creating for him 
 a kingdom out of Moldavia, Wallachia, 
 and Bessarabia was thus unrealised. 
 
 The Russian successes in this war 
 gave rise to apprehension in England, 
 and in June 1790 a conference was 
 assembled at Reichenbach under the 
 auspices of Pitt, with a view to media- 
 tion between Russia and Turkey. 
 Catharine, however, refused to perpiit 
 any interference, and for the first time 
 the progress of Russia formed the sub- 
 ject of warm debates in the House 
 of Commons. Pitt's proposals for an 
 increase of naval armaments, as a check 
 to the ambitions of the Tzarina, were 
 strongly opposed. Fox considered an 
 alliance with Russia " the most natural 
 and advantageous that we could possibly 
 
46 RUSSO-BRITISH ALLIANCE. [Ch. 
 
 form." Burke stated that " the attempt 
 to bring the Turkish Empire into con- 
 sideration of the balance of Europe 
 was extremely new, impolitic, and dan- 
 gerous." He therefore protested against 
 incurring "an immoderate expense in 
 order to bring Christian nations under 
 the yoke of severe and inhuman infidels." 
 The idea of hostilities with Russia 
 proved unpopular in the country, and 
 the ministerial proposals were dropped 
 and quickly forgotten on the outbreak 
 of the war of the French Revolution. 
 
 The armies of Prussia and Austria 
 being drawn towards the Rhine, 
 Catharine invaded Poland in May 1792. 
 In the following year the second parti- 
 tion of Poland was effected, and in 1795 
 the final dismemberment, by which the 
 Baltic coast-line of Russia was extended 
 from the head of the Gulf of Riga to 
 its present limit, about fifteen miles 
 
IV.] BLOCKADE OF THE TEXEL. 47 
 
 north of Memel. Prussia and Spain 
 withdrew in this year from the alliance 
 against France ; Holland was overrun 
 by the revolutionary armies ; the brunt 
 of the war fell upon Great Britain ; 
 and Russian co-operation was at first 
 limited to the provision of a squadron 
 to assist in watching the Dutch ports. 
 The last year of the reign of the great 
 Empress thus brought the Russian and 
 British fleets into active alliance. On 
 July 29th, 1795, Vice-Admiral Hanic- 
 koff, with twelve ships of the line and 
 six frigates, joined the flag of Admiral 
 Duncan, then entrusted with the impor- 
 tant blockade of the Texel. During 
 four years, with intermissions, this 
 arrangement lasted, and its success was 
 due to the great tact of the British 
 admiral, which won for him the regard 
 of his Russian subordinates. The allied 
 squadron, however, proved deficient in 
 
48 RUSSO-BRITISH ALLIANCE. [Ch. 
 
 sea-keeping qualities, and was generally 
 withdrawn in the winter months. It 
 sailed for the Baltic on June 23rd, 1797, 
 when Admiral Duncan's force had been 
 rendered inadequate for the duties of 
 the blockade by the great mutiny at 
 the Nore. It was not present at the 
 battle of Camper down ; but two ships, 
 the Mistisloff and Ratvisan, under 
 Vice-Admiral Mitchell, entered the 
 Texel on August 30th, 1799, when 
 the Dutch fleet finally surrendered. 
 
 In November 1796, Catharine the 
 Great died. Her land campaigns had 
 been marked by almost unbroken suc- 
 cess, and had advanced the boundaries 
 of the Empire to the Niemen, the 
 Dniester, the Black Sea, and the Sea 
 of Azof. Peter had obtained a foot- 
 ing on the Baltic and built a fleet in 
 its ports. Catharine widely extended 
 the northern seaboard and won another 
 
IV.] ACHIEVMENTS OF CATHARINE II. 49 
 
 in the South. The Russian navy, 
 trained by British officers, had grown 
 to formidable dimensions ; and although 
 in the conduct of the Swedish and 
 the two Turkish wars no marked apti- 
 tude for naval affairs was disclosed, 
 the experience gained was consider- 
 able. The dream of a sea-going fleet 
 in the Euxine approached realisation, 
 and after the Peace of J assy ships 
 were soon built in the southern ports. 
 For some years, however, Turkey 
 remained the dominant naval Power 
 in these waters. Thus in a hundred 
 years a semi-civilised inland people 
 became firmly established on two seas ; 
 and while the army which Charles XII. 
 was accustomed to defeat grew into 
 that which nearly overcame Frederick 
 the Great and afterwards ruined 
 Napoleon, a new navy came into 
 existence, and claimed at the death of 
 
 4 
 
so RUSSO-BRITISH ALLIANCE. [Ch. 
 
 Catharine to be numerically the second 
 in Europe. Meanwhile, during this 
 reign the population increased from 
 twenty-five to thirty-six millions. Un- 
 questionably the uprising of Russia 
 is one of the most striking develop- 
 ments of the eighteenth century. 
 
 During the short reign of the Tzar 
 Paul, Russian hostility to the French 
 Revolution at first gathered strength. 
 A decree of January 1798, issued by the 
 Directory, making lawful prize of neutral 
 ships containing any article of British 
 origin, aroused deep resentment in 
 Russia, and in May a squadron of twenty- 
 two ships of the line and fifty galleys was 
 ordered to the Sound for the protection 
 of commerce. The second coalition — 
 Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Turkey, 
 Naples, and Portugal — owed its exist- 
 ence to an opportune naval victory, 
 and as a result of the battle of the Nile 
 
IV.] NELSON'S VIEWS. 51 
 
 Russian armies fought in the plains of 
 Northern Italy and among the moun- 
 tains of Switzerland. A Russo-Turkish 
 squadron, in unwonted alliance, entered 
 the Mediterranean in September 1798, 
 and obtained the surrender of the Ionian 
 Islands; while in May 1799 a Russian 
 admiral ineffectually bombarded Ancona. 
 Admiralty orders sent to Lord St. 
 Vincent in 1798 enjoined on the 
 Mediterranean fleet co-operation " with 
 the Turkish and Russian squadrons, 
 which are to be sent into the Archi- 
 pelago," and Nelson was thus brought 
 into contact with the youngest of 
 European navies. From the first he 
 seems to have formed an unfavourable 
 opinion alike of the motives and of 
 the efficiency of his allies. " The 
 Russians," he wrote to Lord Spencer 
 on November 29th, "seem to me to 
 be more bent on taking ports in the 
 
52 RUSSO-BRITISH ALLIANCE. [Ch. 
 
 Mediterranean than destroying Bona- 
 parte in Egypt." On September 5th, 
 1799, he wrote to Captain Ball: "The 
 Russians are anxious to get to Malta, 
 and care for nothing else " ; and to 
 General Fox on December 14th: "The 
 Austrians are calling out for a naval 
 co-operation on the coast of Genoa. 
 They complain that the Russian ships 
 never come near them. Our Govern- 
 ment think naturally that eleven sail 
 of the line, frigates, etc., should do some- 
 thing : I find they do nothing." After 
 complaining several times of a want of 
 co-operation, Nelson wrote to Lord 
 Spencer on December 23rd: "The 
 Russians, even if at sea, of which I see 
 no prospect, cannot sail, or be of the 
 least service. I have wrote to the 
 Russian Minister that in my opinion 
 the Emperor will not be well pleased 
 with Admiral Ouschakoff" 
 
IV.] HELDER EXPEDITION. 53 
 
 Meanwhile, in July Sir Home Popham 
 sailed for the Baltic to bring over a 
 Russian contingent of seventeen thou- 
 sand men, intended to co-operate in the 
 reconquest of Holland. The H elder 
 expedition, however, after obtaining the 
 surrender of the Dutch fleet and some 
 small military advantages, ended in 
 failure. Concluding a convention with 
 Marshal Brune, the Duke of York 
 evacuated the country, and the Russian 
 contingent was temporarily landed in 
 Jersey and Guernsey. 
 
 Several causes combined to bring 
 about the alienation of the Tzar Paul. 
 The French projects in Egypt and in 
 Syria, which he resented, had been 
 thwarted by the assertion of British 
 sea-power, and the French Mediter- 
 ranean fleet had ceased to exist. Two 
 actions, arising out of the assertion of 
 the right of search, had been fought 
 
54 RUSSO-BRITISH ALLIANCE. [Ch. 
 
 between British and Danish vessels. 
 To want of the support of Austria 
 Paul attributed the disastrous retreat 
 of Suwarroff from Switzerland. The 
 Anglo- Russian alliance in the Mediter- 
 ranean had not been marked by cor- 
 diality, and had disclosed a divergence 
 of interests. " I am persuaded," wrote 
 Comptroller Poussielgue from Egypt to 
 the Directory in 1799, "that the 
 English cannot see without some un- 
 easiness, and without a secret kind of 
 jealousy, the progress of the Russians 
 — a progress much more dangerous for 
 them than our continental power, now 
 that our navy is destroyed and we 
 have lost our maritime conquests." 
 
 Meanwhile, Bonaparte, then First 
 Consul, had laboured to detach Russia 
 from the coalition. In September 1800, 
 Malta, in which island the Tzar took a 
 special interest, surrendered to Great 
 
IV.] COPENHAGEN. 55 
 
 Britain, and on December i6th the 
 " Armed Neutrality " was revived by 
 a treaty between Russia and Sweden, 
 to which Denmark and Prussia imme- 
 diately acceded. On January 14th, Sir 
 Hyde Parker, with a fleet of fifty-three 
 sail, including eighteen ships of the line, 
 sailed for the Baltic. Nelson, with 
 the directness of purpose which was 
 characteristic of his genius, wished to 
 strike straight at the Russian squadron, 
 but was overruled, and the blow fell 
 upon Denmark. After the battle of 
 Copenhagen, the Swedish fleet retired 
 to Carlscrona and the Russians to Revel, 
 whither Nelson sailed the moment he 
 was left in command. Thence on 
 May 19th he wrote to Lord St. Vincent : 
 " On April i8th, we had eighteen sail 
 of the line and a fair wind. The 
 Russian fleet here was, I decidedly say, 
 at our mercy. Nothing, if it had been 
 
S6 NELSON IN THE BALTIC. [Ch. 
 
 right to make the attack, would have 
 saved one ship of theirs in two hours 
 after our entering the bay." Paul had, 
 however, been murdered on March 24th, 
 and the young Tzar, Alexander I., was, 
 in Nelson's opinion, anxious for peace, 
 provided that an arrangement could 
 be made which did not have the appear- 
 ance of compulsion. The interesting 
 letters which passed between the British 
 admiral and Count Pahlen support this 
 view. The former desired to take a 
 squadron to Revel or Cronstadt, " to 
 mark the friendship which, I trust in 
 God, will ever subsist between our two 
 gracious sovereigns, and it will likewise 
 be of great service in assisting to 
 navigate to England many of the 
 English vessels who have remained all 
 the winter in Russia. I have taken 
 care in the squadron which I bring up 
 with me that there shall be neither 
 
IV.] ALEXANDER I. AND NELSON. 57 
 
 bomb-ship, fire-ship, nor any of the flo- 
 tilla, in order to mark the more strongly 
 that I wish it to be considered as a 
 mark of the greatest personal respect 
 to his Imperial Majesty." The appear- 
 ance of a British squadron in a Russian 
 port at this juncture was evidently 
 capable of another interpretation, and 
 Count Pahlen firmly opposed the pro- 
 ject. On May i8th, however, he 
 notified the removal of the embargo 
 on British shipping, and stated that 
 the Tzar particularly wished to make 
 the acquaintance of " the hero of the 
 Nile," if he would come with a single 
 vessel. Replying on May 26th, Nelson 
 deferred acceptance of this invitation, 
 adding : "I have now only to pray 
 that a permanent (which must be 
 honourable) peace may be established 
 between our gracious sovereigns." On 
 June 5th, a treaty was signed involving 
 
58 NELSON IN THE BALTIC. [Ch. IV. 
 
 mutual concessions, and it is significant 
 that, at a time when, in the words of 
 Captain Mahan, " the British navy was 
 superior to the combined forces of 
 Europe," the right to trade between 
 the ports of a belligerent was accorded 
 to Russia. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 RUSSIAN FLEET IN MEDITERRANEAN AFTER 
 
 PEACE OF TILSIT ACTIONS IN THE 
 
 BALTIC — WAR WITH NAPOLEON — 
 NAVARINO — MOVEMENTS IN ASIA. 
 
 Until 1805 Alexander took no part 
 in the great European war which re- 
 commenced on the rupture of the brief 
 Peace of Amiens; but in 1803 a 
 Russian army under Prince Zizianoff de- 
 feated the Persians near the Araxes, and 
 completed the subjugation of Georgia, 
 which had been formally annexed to 
 the empire in September 1801. The 
 speech from the throne on January 
 15th, 1805, indicated the approaching 
 conclusion of an anti-French alliance. 
 
 59 
 
6o FLEET IN MEDITERRANEAN. [Ch. 
 
 " I am engaged in confidential inter- 
 course and connexion with the Emperor 
 of Russia, who has given the strongest 
 proofs of the wise and dignified senti- 
 ments by which he is animated, and 
 of the warm interest he has taken in 
 the safe independence of Europe." A 
 treaty of offensive alliance, to which 
 Austria and Sweden acceded, was 
 signed on April loth. By Nelson, in the 
 Mediterranean, the prospects of a fresh 
 period of Russian co-operation were 
 not viewed with enthusiasm. He had 
 previously formed a low estimate of 
 the efficiency of the Russian navy, q.nd 
 he doubted the sincerity of the Russian 
 policy. "If Russia goes to war with 
 France," he wrote to Sir H. Elliott 
 on July 8th, 1804, " I hope it will be 
 her own war, and not joined with us. 
 Such alliances have never benefited 
 our country. ... No ; Russia will take 
 
v.] ALEXANDER I. AND ALLIANCE. 6i 
 
 care of the Ionian Republic, the Morea, 
 and in the end Constantinople. The 
 views of Russia are perfectly clear." 
 Again on August 3rd he emphasised 
 his suspicions in a letter to Sir A. J. 
 Ball : " My opinion of the views of 
 Russia has long been formed, and to 
 this moment I see everything she does 
 works to the same end — the possession 
 of all European Turkey." Nelson's 
 misgivings were not at this time justi- 
 fied. Alexander I. loyally upheld the 
 alliance, and put one hundred and forty- 
 six thousand men into the field. Owing 
 mainly to the opposition of the Prussian 
 Court to the passage of the northern 
 army through part of Prussia, Kutusoff 
 did not arrive in time to succour Mack 
 at Ulm ; but Bagration made a gallant 
 attempt to stem the advance of Murat 
 towards Moravia, and at Austerlitz the 
 Russian army displayed great fighting 
 
62 FLEET IN MEDITERRANEAN. [Ch 
 
 qualities. When Austria, concluding 
 the separate Treaty of Pressburg, with- 
 drew from the coalition, Alexander 
 proved staunch, and at once ofifered to 
 give practical effect to the treaty of 
 amity which he had made with Prussia 
 on November 3rd. Hesitating when 
 her intervention might have saved 
 Germany, Prussia was at length goaded 
 into ill-timed hostility nine months after 
 Austerlitz had been lost, and her collapse 
 after Jena left Russia face to face with 
 Napoleon. 
 
 Meanwhile, the defeat of Austerlitz, 
 followed by the defection of Austria, 
 wrecked the projects of the Allies. The 
 King's German Legion re-embarked 
 for England ; the Swedes retired to 
 Stralsund ; and a combined Russo- 
 British expedition to Naples was with- 
 drawn. The Russian contingent, sub- 
 sequently transported to Corfu, made a 
 
v.] NAPOLEON'S POLICY. 63 
 
 descent upon the Dalmatian coast, and 
 occupied Cattaro on March 3rd, 1806. 
 In September, the Russian squadron 
 unsuccessfully blockaded Ragusa, which 
 was held by Lauriston. 
 
 In view of the coming campaign 
 against Russia, Napoleon dispatched 
 General Sebastiani to "Constantinople. 
 " Le but constant de ma policie" he wrote 
 to Talleyrand on June 9th, 1806, ''est 
 de /aire une triple alliance de moi, de la 
 Porte et de la Perse, dirig^e indirectement 
 ou implicitement contre la Russie. . . . 
 Le but de toutes les ndgociations doit Hre 
 la fermeture du Bosphore aux Russes, et 
 r interdiction du passage de la Medi- 
 terrande a tous leurs bdtiments armds ou 
 non armds." In anticipation of Turkish 
 hostility, Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas 
 Louis was sent to the Dardanelles, and 
 on October 28th, 1806, the Canopus 
 anchored off Seraglio Point, where on 
 
64 FLEET IN MEDITERRANEAN. [Ch. 
 
 December 25th the Russian ambassador 
 was embarked. On February 19th, 
 1807, Sir John Duckworth, with eight 
 ships of the line, two frigates, and two 
 bomb-vessels, forced the passage of the 
 Dardanelles. The Russian Admiral 
 Seniavin, who had been brought up in 
 the British navy, received orders to 
 send four ships of the line to join 
 Duckworth's squadron ; but this con- 
 tingent failed to arrive in time to take 
 part in the operation. After Duck- 
 worth's retreat, Seniavin, with eight 
 ships of the line, joined the British 
 squadron off Cape Janizarry, and is said 
 to have urged in vain the return of the 
 combined fleet to Constantinople. 
 
 During the abortive and discreditable 
 British expedition to Egypt, Seniavin's 
 squadron blockaded the Dardanelles, 
 while another Russian force watched 
 the eastern outlet of the Bosphorus. 
 
v.] THE DARDANELLES. 65 
 
 Encouraged by Duckworth's retreat, 
 the Turks fitted out a considerable 
 squadron, which passed through the 
 Dardanelles on May 19th, and was 
 chased back by the Russians on the 
 22nd, with the loss of three ships by 
 stranding. On June 22 nd, the Turkish 
 squadron again passed the Dardanelles, 
 and troops were disembarked to occupy 
 Tenedos. On the same day an action was 
 fought off Lemnos, in which the Turks 
 lost one ship captured and five driven 
 on shore. As a result of this action, 
 Seniavin obtained, on July 20th, the 
 surrender of the Turkish force of 
 four thousand six hundred men holding 
 Tenedos. 
 
 Meanwhile, the land campaign had 
 ended unfavourably for the Russian 
 arms. Eylau, fought on February 7th, 
 was barely a victory to Napoleon ; 
 but Kamenskoi's attempt to relieve 
 
 S 
 
66 FLEET IN MEDITERRANEAN. [Ch. 
 
 Danzig by disembarking twelve thousand 
 men at Weichselmunde proved a failure, 
 and the fortress surrendered to Lefebre 
 on May 27th. Friedland followed on 
 June 14th ; and although Barclay de 
 Tolly urged further resistance, Alex- 
 ander I. concluded the Peace of Tilsit 
 on the 25th. 
 
 The French alliance, hastily arranged 
 on the raft in the Niemen, was from 
 the first unpopular in Russia. It in- 
 volved wars with Great Britain, Austria, 
 and Sweden, and it lasted for less than 
 five years amid increasing signs of 
 estrangement. 
 
 As a result of the Peace of Tilsit, the 
 the naval situation in the Mediter- 
 ranean underwent a curious transfor- 
 mation. The Russian squadron, which 
 had been acting in full concert with 
 the British fleet, was suddenly placed 
 in a position of quasi-belligerency, and 
 
v.] NAPOLEON'S ANXIETY. 67 
 
 alarm for its safety was at once mani- 
 fested. Napoleon, who less than two 
 years previously had issued futile in- 
 structions to Decres to capture the 
 Russian squadron believed to be about 
 to enter the Mediterranean — " Si Fon 
 pent les prendre, donnez ordres quon 
 ne les manque pas " — was now gravely 
 concerned for his new friends. Prince 
 Eugene was directed to send a " brig 
 or a frigate " to carry the orders of 
 the Tzar to his admiral. A series of 
 letters followed, giving anxious direc- 
 tions that the Russian ships were to 
 be received and supplied in French 
 ports, "pour quils soient d Vabri de 
 toute crainte des Anglais." Meanwhile, 
 Seniavin, dispatching Rear-Admiral 
 Greig with two ships of the line and 
 some small craft to take possession of 
 the Ionian Islands, sailed out of the 
 Mediterranean with nine ships of the 
 
68 FLEET IN MEDITERRANEAN. [Ch. 
 
 line, and, entering the Tagus, was there 
 blockaded. When the Convention of 
 Cintra was signed on August 31st, 
 1808, these ships were handed over to 
 Great Britain under a separate arrange- 
 ment concluded between Admiral 
 Seniavin and Sir Charles Cotton. The 
 officers and crews were sent to Russia, 
 and the ships were restored at the end 
 of the war. The vessels left in the 
 Mediterranean seem to have eventually 
 fallen into the hands of the Austrians, 
 and after the capture of Trieste in May 
 1809 Napoleon in a Bulletin of the 
 Army of Germany recorded " la di- 
 livrance de Pescadre russe " as a cir- 
 cumstance "^res agriable a fEmpereur." 
 While the Russian fleet in the Medi- 
 terranean was not assailed after Tilsit, 
 and war was not declared, a great 
 British expedition, with seventeen ships 
 of the line, twenty-one frigates, and 
 
v.] NEW COALITION. 69 
 
 transports carrying twenty thousand 
 troops, descended upon Zealand, and 
 after bombardment Copenhagen capitu- 
 lated on September 7th, 1807. Seventy- 
 six vessels, together with large quanti- 
 ties of naval stores, were carried off, and 
 the Danish navy was obliterated. 
 
 Russia, Prussia, and Denmark now 
 formed a new coalition, to which 
 Sweden, after Admiral Gambler's fleet 
 had returned to England, was tempo- 
 rarily compelled to accede. At this 
 period Russia is stated to have had 
 twenty effective ships of the line with 
 fifteen hundred and eighty-eight guns, 
 and fourteen frigates with four hundred 
 and twenty-six guns, in the Baltic ; 
 while Sweden disposed of eleven ships 
 of the line and six or seven frigates. 
 Russia was now formally at war with 
 Great Britain, and at the end of May 
 1808 Sir James Saumarez, with eleven 
 
70 ACTIONS IN THE BALTIC. [Ch. 
 
 ships of the line, and two hundred trans- 
 ports conveying twelve thousand troops 
 under Sir John Moore, sailed for the 
 Baltic. This great expedition seems to 
 have started without any clear idea as to 
 what was to be attempted, and after in- 
 effectual negotiations with Gustavus IV. 
 the military force was withdrawn and 
 dispatched to the Peninsula. 
 
 Early in August, a Russian squadron 
 of twelve ships of the line with eight 
 frigates, under Vice- Admiral Hanickoff, 
 sailed from Cronstadt, arriving in Hango 
 Bay on the 19th. On August 20th, 
 Sir Samuel Hood, with the Centaur and 
 Implacable, joined the Swedes in Oro 
 Sound, where on the following day the 
 Russians arrived. On the 22nd, the 
 Swedes received a reinforcement of four 
 ships, and the Anglo-Swedish force then 
 amounted to twelve sail of the line and 
 five frigates, of which only two vessels 
 
V] THE "SEVOLOD." 71 
 
 were British. The Russian squadron, 
 which contained three 50-gun ships, 
 and was slightly inferior in numerical 
 strength, stood away for Rogerswick, and 
 was chased by the allied fleet. Much 
 straggling occurred, and the Implacable, 
 outsailing her consorts, succeeded in 
 bringing the Sevolod to action, but was 
 called off when the Russians bore down to 
 the rescue. Later the Sevolod was again 
 engaged by the Centaur when entering 
 the port, and was surrendered and 
 burned. On the 30th, Sir James Sau- 
 marez, with four sail of the line, joined 
 the force blockading Rogerswick. The 
 Russians were anchored close inshore, and 
 protected by batteries ; a boom served 
 to keep off fireships ; and a bombard- 
 ment effected nothing. In October, 
 the blockading force withdrew, and 
 Hanickoff returned to Cronstadt. The 
 Sevolod had been well fought, losing 
 
72 ACTIONS IN THE BALTIC. [Ch. 
 
 three hundred and three men ; but 
 the Russian fleet had declined action, 
 and in these circumstances Sir J. Sau- 
 marez, unprovided with a military force, 
 could not obtain any definite results. 
 The conditions were somewhat similar 
 to those which arose nearly fifty years 
 later. Unsupported in Finland, the 
 Swedish cause was lost, and in Novem- 
 ber the province was ceded to the 
 Tzar. 
 
 In 1809, several boat attacks were 
 made in the Baltic. On the night of 
 July 7th a Russian flotilla, lying under 
 Porcola Point in the Gulf of Finland, 
 was attacked by seventeen boats under 
 Lieutenant Hawkey of the Implacable, 
 who was killed. Of eight Russian gun- 
 boats only one escaped, and twelve 
 coasting craft containing stores for the 
 army were taken. On July 25th, three 
 gunboats and an armed brig were sue- 
 
v.] RUPTURE WITH FRANCE. 73 
 
 cessfully cut out in Aspo Roads. Naval 
 operations subsequently languished ; 
 British merchantmen seem to have found 
 their way into Russian ports, and this 
 irregular trade soon aroused the sus- 
 ceptibilities of Napoleon. On October 
 13th, 1 8 10, he wrote to de Champagny, 
 directing remonstrances on the growing 
 violations of the " Continental System " 
 to be addressed to Kourakine. The 
 unnatural alliance patched together at 
 Tilsit was near the breaking-point, 
 and on April 8th, 181 1, Napoleon wrote 
 to Decr^s asking for information as to 
 the Russian and Swedish fleets in the 
 Baltic, and adding : " Je viendrai a fixer 
 mes id^es Id-dessus." French writers 
 were employed to proclaim that Russia 
 was a menace to Europe, and Lesur 
 published his book containing the 
 apocryphal will of Peter the Great. 
 On June 24th, the Grand Army crossed 
 
74 WAR WITH NAPOLEON. [Ch 
 
 * 
 
 the Niemen, and Russia became the 
 faithful ally of Great Britain in a great 
 war which brought the troops of both 
 nations to Paris in 1814 and again in 
 18 1 5. The sympathy aroused in this 
 country towards the Russian people is 
 shown by the fact that, in addition to 
 a Parliamentary grant, about half a 
 million sterling was collected by private 
 subscription for the relief of the sufferers 
 from the burning of Moscow. 
 
 During these years the Russian arms 
 prospered in the South. Silistria and 
 Turtukai were taken in 18 10, and 
 Kamenskoi reconquered Bulgaria up 
 to the Balkans. A flotilla, brought from 
 the Black Sea, co-operated in the 
 blockade of Rustchuk, but otherwise 
 the operations were purely military. 
 Peace was concluded with the Sultan 
 in 18 1 2, Moldavia and Wallachia being 
 restored, and Bessarabia, together with 
 
v.] TREATY OF BUCHAREST. 75 
 
 the fortresses of Khotin and Bender, 
 retained by Russia. Alexander I. died 
 in 1825, after a reign which contributed 
 largely to the expansion of the Empire. 
 Mingrelia in 1802, and Bessarabia by 
 the Treaty of Bucharest in 181 2, were 
 annexed, and the Treaty of Gulistan 
 in 18 14 stripped Persia of a great tract 
 of her northern territory. Meanwhile, 
 the Russian population rose to fifty-six 
 millions. 
 
 In 1826, the year following the acces- 
 sion of the Tzar Nicholas, a new Persian 
 war began, which ended in February 
 1828 by the advancement of the Russian 
 frontier to the Araxes. The long 
 struggle of the Greeks for independence, 
 commencing in 1821, led at length to 
 the Treaty of June 1827, by which 
 France, Russia, and Great Britain 
 agreed to take joint action in certain 
 contingencies. Whether by accident 
 
^6 NAVARINO. [Ch. 
 
 or design, this Concert of Powers took 
 practical shape in Navarino Bay on 
 October 20th. The Russian squadron, 
 under Rear- Admiral Count de Heyden, 
 which formed the lee line, did not take 
 a prominent part in the action, and its 
 proceedings were not mentioned in Sir 
 Edward Codrington's dispatch. The 
 destruction of the Turkish fleet, how- 
 ever, conferred an extremely important 
 advantage on Russia in the Turkish war 
 which immediately followed. For the 
 first time the Russian navy played a 
 dominant rSle in the Black Sea. 
 Kustendji in the first campaign, and 
 Varna in the second, could consequently 
 be made the sea bases of the Russian 
 armies. Anapa fell to an expeditionary 
 force dispatched from the Crimea, and 
 Poti, captured by Paskievich, became 
 a port of supply for the operations in 
 Asia Minor. When peace was signed 
 
v.] PERSIAN WAR. 77 
 
 at Adrianople in September 1829, the 
 success of the Russian arms was com- 
 plete, and that success was largely due 
 to the naval command of the Black Sea 
 projected by Peter the Great and at 
 last attained. As successful was the 
 short Persian war which ended with 
 the Treaty of Turkomanchai of Feb- 
 ruary 2ist, 1828, and added the 
 provinces of Erivan and Naktchivan 
 to the territory of the Tzars, while 
 conferring on them the sole right of 
 maintaining ships of war on the 
 Caspian. 
 
 For twenty-four years Russia and 
 Turkey remained at peace, and Russian 
 naval enterprise received no direct im- 
 pulse. During these years Russian 
 troops were employed in suppressing 
 the Polish insurrection of 1831 and the 
 Hungarian revolution of 1848. Mean- 
 while, in Central Asia and the Far 
 
78 MOVEMENTS IN ASIA. [Ch. 
 
 East, Russian projects began to assume 
 definite shape. As early as 1822 
 Count Mouraviefif reported to his Gov- 
 ernment that " Khiva is at this moment 
 an advanced post which impedes our 
 commerce with Bokhara and Northern 
 India " ; but successive expeditions in 
 this direction failed, and the occupation 
 of Khiva was delayed till 1873. The 
 Persian attacks on Herat in 1837-38, 
 directed by Russian officers, provoked 
 a British demonstration in the Persian 
 Gulf, which led to the Shah's with- 
 drawal from Afghan territory. The 
 disaster of 1842, due mainly to military 
 incompetence, put an end to the dream 
 of a British advance into Central Asia, 
 and left the way open to Russia. In 
 1 84 1, the important island of Ashurada 
 in the south-eastern corner of the 
 Caspian was occupied; in 1847, the 
 formation of a flotilla on the Sea of 
 
v.] THE FAR EAST. 79 
 
 Aral was commenced, and in 1853 
 two steamers were launched upon the 
 Syr Daria. An advantageous com- 
 mercial treaty between Russia and 
 China was one of the causes of the 
 war of 1840-41, during which Great 
 Britain occupied, abandoned, and retook 
 Chusan, reached Nan-king, and obtained 
 permanent possession of Hong-kong. 
 In the Far East, Russia displayed fresh 
 activity, encroaching upon Chinese 
 territory, concluding a second treaty 
 of commerce in 1851,* and strengthen- 
 ing her position on the Lower 
 Amur. 
 
 * The Treaty of Kuldja, August 25th. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE CHANGE TO STEAM — THE CRIMEAN 
 
 WAR — ARMOURCLADS PRINCE GOR- 
 
 TCHAKOFF's NOTE. 
 
 During the long European peace 
 which followed the settlement of 1815, 
 the Russian fleet was well main- 
 tained. Lord Clarence Paget, who 
 visited Cronstadt in 1839, stated that 
 the Baltic squadron numbered " twenty- 
 seven sail of the line, with a respect- 
 able number of frigates and small 
 craft." He described the ships as " re- 
 markably well found, and all that I 
 saw peculiarly good in gun-exercise." 
 Simple manoeuvres in smooth water were 
 
 " creditably " performed, " if not quite 
 
 80 
 
Ch.VI.] ACRE. 8 1 
 
 so quick as might be." Cronstadt had 
 been made into a strong naval base, and 
 Sebastopol, founded by Catharine II. 
 in 1784, was after 1830 provided with 
 docks and defences designed by an 
 English engineer. The revolt of 
 Mehemet Ali in 1840 led to a con- 
 vention by which Russia, Austria, 
 Prussia, and Great Britain undertook 
 to support the Ottoman Empire. No 
 Russian vessel, however, took part in 
 the bombardment of Acre on November 
 3rd, in which three Austrian vessels 
 and the Turkish flagship co-operated. 
 
 The change to steam propulsion had 
 already begun, and four paddle steamers 
 were present at Acre. Six years later 
 the Terrible, of eighteen hundred and 
 fifty tons burthen, the most formidable 
 steam warship of the day, was com- 
 missioned, while the success of the 
 Archimedes, of eighteen hundred and 
 
 6 
 
82 THE CRIMEAN WAR. [Ch. 
 
 5 
 
 forty tons, the first screw vessel of the 
 
 Royal Navy, was soon followed by the 
 application of Ericsson's i nvention to 
 line-of-battle ships. This great change, 
 destined to revolutionise the conditions 
 of naval war, was naturally disadvan- 
 tageous to Russia, whose industrial 
 development was far behind that of the 
 Western nations. The outbreak of the 
 Crimean War brought her for the first 
 time into conflict with two great naval 
 Powers, and her fleet was totally in- 
 adequate to the occasion, even if her 
 geographical disadvantages had been 
 less marked. No war has ever arisen 
 out of causes so complex or so obscure. 
 It is certain that the Tzar Nicholas, 
 at least up to February 1853, was 
 sincerely anxious for a full under- 
 standing with Great Britain. The 
 Russian invasion of the Principalities 
 ended with the raising of the siege 
 
VI.] SEBASTOPOL. 83 
 
 of Silistria on June 26th, 1854, and 
 so far as Turkey, the protdgd of the 
 Western Powers, was concerned, all 
 danger was at an end. The allied 
 troops, within the sound of the guns 
 of the old Danube fortress, had made no 
 attempt to aid the Turkish cause ; but 
 the intervention of Austria had proved 
 decisive, and the Concert of Europe 
 appeared to be solidly established. 
 This was the moment chosen by France 
 and Great Britain to enter upon an 
 adventure for which neither was pre- 
 pared, and of the military requirements 
 of which both were absolutely ignorant.* 
 
 * On July 19th, 1854, Lord Raglan wrote as 
 follows to the Duke of Newcastle: "The fact 
 must not be concealed that neither the EngHsh 
 nor the French admirals have been able to obtain 
 any information on which they can rely with 
 respect to the army which the Russians may des- 
 tine for operations in the field, or of the number 
 of men allotted for the defence of Sebastopolj 
 and Marshal St. Arnaud and myself are equally 
 
84 THE CRIMEAN WAR. [Ch. 
 
 Time has stripped the amazing diplo- 
 matic proceedings of 1853-54 of their 
 many technical fictions ; and looking back 
 with vision undisturbed by the passions 
 of the moment, it is difficult to resist 
 the conclusion that Great Britain was 
 impelled for the first time to wage direct 
 war with Russia for reasons mainly 
 naval. The policy of Peter the Great, 
 long regarded with equanimity, had at 
 length come to be viewed with real 
 apprehension, and the prophetic insight 
 of Poussielgue * proved to be correct. 
 As early as 1828 Count Pozzo di Borgo 
 had pointed out to his Government that, 
 " although it may not be probable 
 that we shall see an English fleet in 
 the Black Sea, it will be prudent to 
 
 deficient in information on these all-important ques- 
 tions, and there would seem to be no chance of 
 acquiring it." 
 * See p. 54. 
 
VI.] SEBASTOPOL. 85 
 
 make Sebastopol very secure against 
 attacks from the sea. If ever England 
 were to come to a rupture with us, this 
 is the point to which she could direct 
 her attacks, if only she believed them 
 possible." The assumed menace of 
 Sebastopol and of the fleet it harboured, 
 together with the tradition that the 
 possession of Constantinople implied the 
 dominion of the world, was unquestion- 
 ably a principal factor in determining 
 the British people to engage in the 
 Crimean expedition.* As certainly the 
 popularity of the war in this country 
 was mainly decided by the action of 
 November 30th, 1853, at Sinope. 
 Ordinary prudence would have sug- 
 
 * " In no event," said Lord Lyndhurst in 
 June 1854, " except that of extreme necessity, 
 ought we to make peace without previously de- 
 stroying the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, and 
 laying prostrate the fortifications by which it is 
 defended." 
 
86 THE CRIMEAN WAR. [Ch. 
 
 gested the withdrawal of the light 
 Turkish squadron of seven frigates, 
 three corvettes, and two small craft 
 from this exposed position, and ample 
 warning of the impending danger was 
 given.* The Russian attacking squadron 
 under Admiral Nakhimoff consisted of 
 six ships of the line, and in conditions 
 so hopelessly unequal the issue was pre- 
 determined ; but the so-called " mas- 
 sacre of Sinope " was a perfectly fair act 
 of war, more justifiable and less de- 
 structive than the battle of Navarino.f 
 In England, however, where the facts 
 were not understood, the action of 
 
 * The Russian squadron was known to be in the 
 neighbourhood ten days before the action, and 
 the Turkish commander had pointed out that 
 "it may well happen that the Imperial fleet may 
 incur disaster." 
 
 t War was actually in progress on the lower 
 Danube, and the Turks had taken the Russian 
 fort of St. Nicholas on the eastern shore of the 
 Black Sea. 
 
VI.] FRENCH OBJECTS. 87 
 
 Russia was regarded as a national 
 affront especially afifecting British naval 
 prestige, and the invasion of the Crimea, 
 with the obliteration of the Russian 
 Black Sea squadron and its base, be- 
 came a popular object. The motives 
 which induced France to assume the 
 leading rSle in the proceedings which 
 directly tended to war are much less 
 clear. Even if Mr. Kinglake is in- 
 correct in attributing these proceedings 
 entirely to the personal aims of Louis 
 Napoleon, it is certain that there was 
 no solidarity of interests between the 
 Allies. With the French people the 
 war was never widely popular, and 
 the Emperor showed much eagerness 
 to bring it to a close as soon as 
 the requirements of military prestige 
 were satisfied by the fall of Sebastopol. 
 By a fortuitous combination of cir- 
 cumstances, therefore, rather than in 
 
88 THE CRIMEAN WAR. [Ch. 
 
 obedience to natural laws, the two great 
 hereditary naval and commercial rivals 
 of the West found themselves in active 
 alliance against a Power which on 
 account of geographical and other con- 
 ditions could be the naval rival of 
 neither. 
 
 To Russia the war necessarily in- 
 volved naval humiliation. She was 
 not only numerically overmatched, but 
 her fleet was far behind those of her 
 antagonists, and that of Great Britain 
 especially, in the application of steam 
 propulsion. In the Black Sea, the 
 Baltic, the White Sea, and the Sea of 
 Okhotsk, the Allies assumed the offen- 
 sive, and the Russian ships sought the 
 shelter of their ports. The Black Sea 
 squadron consisted of fifteen sailing 
 ships of the line, with several frigates 
 and brigs, one powerful steamer, the 
 Vladimir, and eleven small steamers. 
 
VI.] RISK OF THE ALLIES. 89 
 
 One chance only presented itself to the 
 Russian commander. From September 
 5th, when the French put to sea, to the 
 1 8th, when the landing in the Crimea 
 was completed, the expeditionary force 
 of the Allies was exposed to grave 
 risks. 
 
 The fleets, with their transports, 
 numbered nearly two hundred vessels, 
 and the French and Turkish warships 
 were so crowded with troops as to 
 be practically hors de combat. Order 
 could not be rigidly preserved in such 
 a promiscuous assemblage of steamers 
 and sailing craft. Bad weather alone 
 would probably have wrecked the 
 operation. The duty of providing pro- 
 tection to the whole expedition was 
 undertaken by the British force under 
 Vice-Admiral Dundas, consisting of ten 
 line-of-battle ships (including two pro- 
 vided with screws), two 50-gun frigates, 
 
90 THE CRIMEAN WAR. [Ch. 
 
 and thirteen smaller steamers heavily 
 armed. The effect of an attack directed 
 against the non-combatant portion of 
 the convoy cannot be estimated. The 
 force at the disposal of the British 
 admiral could doubtless have defeated 
 the Russian squadron in a fleet action ; 
 but, constituted as it was, it could 
 hardly have prevented damage to the 
 convoy sufficient to have frustrated the 
 invasion of the Crimea. In the cir- 
 cumstances the attempt ought certainly 
 to have been made.* The Russian 
 squadron, however, remained in harbour, 
 and on September 13th, when two line- 
 of-battle ships, with the smoke of a 
 great fleet behind them, could be made 
 out from Sebastopol, the wind was 
 
 * In the present days of fast steamships, it is 
 difficult to see how superior naval force could 
 protect a great fleet of transports against a deter- 
 mined attack in open waters. 
 
VI.] ADMIRAL KORNILOFF. 91 
 
 unfavourable for proceeding to sea. 
 On the 2 1 St, after the battle of the 
 Alma had been lost, Admiral Korniloff 
 assembled his officers and proposed 
 to attack the allied fleets. Prince 
 Mentschikoff had, however, already 
 determined to risk nothing at sea, and 
 the one great opportunity had passed. 
 On the night of the 22nd, the sinking 
 of the Russian ships at the entrance 
 of the harbour began, and Korniloff 
 devoted all the resources at his com- 
 mand to the land defence of Sebastopol. 
 Robbed of their proper rSle, the Russian 
 seamen played a gallant and an ex- 
 tremely important part in creating and 
 holding the improvised fortifications, 
 which withstood all the efforts of the 
 Allies till September 8th, 1855. 
 
 In the Baltic, as in the Black Sea, 
 the Russian navy attempted nothing. 
 The conditions were manifestly un- 
 
92 THE CRIMEAN WAR. [Ch. 
 
 equal ; but a purely defensive attitude 
 is peculiarly unsuited to a naval force, 
 and there were occasions when greater 
 enterprise might have been shown. 
 At the outset of the war Russia had 
 " twenty-five sail of the line which had 
 been with their crews training in the 
 Baltic for years," * together with a 
 number of heavy frigates and small 
 craft. The Allies possessed the great 
 advantage of steam, and Sir Charles 
 Napier's fleet in 1854 had thirteen 
 screw line-of-battle ships ; but of " six- 
 teen sail of the line five or six were 
 at first scarcely fit to go into action " t 
 on account of the want of training of 
 the crews. There seems, at the outset, 
 to have been an impression in the 
 
 * Evidence of Admiral Sir B. J. Sulivan before 
 the Royal Commission on Manning the Navy in 
 T858. 
 
 t Ibid. 
 
VI.] THE BALTIC. 93 
 
 British squadron that the Russians 
 would show some activity ; but their 
 ships remained during 1854 under the 
 protection of the batteries of Sveaborg 
 and Cronstadt. The handling of the 
 allied fleet was characterised by a con- 
 spicuous want of vigour and purpose ; 
 but it is questionable whether more 
 could have been effected with the 
 available resources. Bomarsund fell on 
 August 1 6th to a combined attack, the 
 land operations being, as usual in such 
 cases, the decisive factor. Much de- 
 struction of coasting trade was carried 
 out, which could have little or no result 
 as regarded the main issues of the war. 
 Cronstadt was reconnoitred and reported 
 to contain seventeen sail of the line, and 
 five frigates ready for sea, together with 
 fifteen heavy gunboats. At the end of 
 the short northern summer the sailing 
 ships of the Allies were sent home, and 
 
94 THE CRIMEAN WAR. [Ch. 
 
 plans for attacking Cronstadt were dis- 
 cussed and subsequently abandoned. 
 
 The only achievement of 1855 was 
 the bombardment and destruction of the 
 arsenal and town of Sveaborg in August, 
 the defences remaining nearly intact. 
 A fresh reconnaissance of Cronstadt 
 showed only five ships of the line with 
 sails bent. The rest were apparently 
 moored for use as blockships, the 
 Russians having abandoned all idea of 
 sending a squadron to sea. Meanwhile, 
 however, great efforts had been made 
 for the local floating defence of the 
 fortress, with a view to meet an attack 
 by gun- and mortar-boats. " Twenty- 
 three fine screw gunboats, larger, I 
 think, than ours ; some with three heavy 
 guns each, and with a range equal to 
 that of the heaviest guns we have," * 
 had been prepared. These gunboats 
 * Letter from Admiral Sir B. J. Sulivan. 
 
VI.] THE BALTIC. 95 
 
 were engined from locomotive works, 
 managed chiefly by foreigners ; and their 
 construction, in spite of the poverty of 
 resources, is evidence of the vigour 
 and capacity of the Russian authorities. 
 In 1855, preparations were made in 
 this country for attacking Cronstadt in 
 the following year, but peace super- 
 vened. It is probable that this Baltic 
 stronghold could have been taken in 
 1854, if a suitable flotilla and a large 
 landing force had been then available. 
 The operations in northern waters were, 
 however, begun by the Allies with 
 as little knowledge of the conditions 
 there as in the Crimea, and utterly 
 unwarranted expectations of the per- 
 formance of Sir Charles Napier's fleet 
 were forthcoming in this country. 
 Nevertheless, it must not be assumed 
 that those operations were fruitless. In 
 addition to the loss due to the blockade 
 
96 THE CRIMEAN WAR. [Ch. 
 
 and the destruction effected at Bomar- 
 sund, Sveaborg, and other places, the 
 menace to the Baltic coast-line sufficed 
 for some time to detain a large number 
 of Russian troops in the northern pro- 
 vinces, and thus to indirectly aid the 
 siege of Sebastopol. Whether this 
 detention was wholly justified, in view 
 of the marked want of enterprise shown 
 by the British naval commanders, is 
 another matter. The Russians could 
 not have foretold the extreme nervous- 
 ness which Sir Charles Napier showed, 
 or the reluctance of his successor to 
 take the active measures against Svea- 
 borg which were carried out without 
 loss. 
 
 In the White Sea and the Far East 
 the operations of the Allies were of 
 little importance ; but at Petropaulovski, 
 on the East coast of Kamtschatka, a 
 reverse occurred on August 30th, 1854, 
 
VI.] RESULT DUE TO SEA-POWER. 97 
 
 when a landing party of seven hundred 
 men was repulsed with heavy loss. 
 The port was again visited in May 
 1855, and found deserted; the fortifi- 
 cations were destroyed, but the Russian 
 ships escaped. 
 
 The war, though waged mainly by 
 military force, turned absolutely on sea- 
 power, in which Russia was not only 
 overmatched, but placed at great geo- 
 graphical disadvantage, accentuated by 
 the want of good internal communica- 
 tion, which entailed heavy losses on 
 her troops and enabled the Allies to 
 be ultimately superior at the decisive 
 point. In Great Britain the principal 
 lesson was little understood till recent 
 years. In the later policy of Russia 
 the results of that lesson can certainly 
 be traced. 
 
 The Allies may be said to have 
 attained their apparent objects. For 
 
 7 
 
98 ARMOURCLADS. [Ch. 
 
 twenty- two years Russia and Turkey 
 remained at peace, and the Eastern Ques- 
 tion slumbered. Russian naval activity 
 was for a time crippled, and diplomatists 
 were able to believe that by a paper 
 treaty indefinite restrictions could be 
 imposed upon the actions of a great 
 empire in its own territorial waters. 
 
 With the war of 1854-55 the era of 
 the wooden ship and the smooth-bore 
 gun practically ended. The success of 
 the armourclad floating batteries em- 
 ployed by the French at Kinburn in 
 October 1855 led to the conversion of 
 the Napoleon into La Gloire in 1859, 
 and Great Britain followed in 1861 
 with the Warrior, built entirely in 
 iron.* The American War, and the 
 
 * This was an extremely important departure, 
 considering that the Admiralty had previously dis- 
 couraged iron construction, which had been pressed 
 upon it as early as 1834, and was already firmly 
 established in the mercantile marine. 
 
VI.] ARMOURCLADS. 
 
 99 
 
 memorable action of the Monitor and 
 Merrimac in Hampton Roads, gave a 
 fresh turn to the design of warships, 
 which by a chequered process of evo- 
 lution has led to the 14,900-ton steel 
 battle-ships of the present day. 
 
 This vital change, which conferred 
 immediate potential advantage upon 
 Great Britain,* entailed great difficulties 
 in Russia, Some wooden screw vessels 
 were built after the Crimean War, and 
 the Sebastopol and Petropaulovski were 
 converted into armourclad frigates. 
 Ten monitors were ordered in 1863, 
 when Western intervention on behalf 
 of Poland seemed probable. Between 
 
 * In the design and speed of construction of 
 the wooden ship France had for many years a 
 distinct advantage over this country. The change 
 to iron, and subsequently to steel, reversed this 
 condition, and our neighbours have not at present 
 proved able to rival British shipbuilders either in 
 design or in speed and economy of construction. 
 
100 GORTCHAKOFF'S NOTE. [Ch. 
 
 i860 and 1875 five sea-going armour- 
 clads, the largest being the Peter the 
 Great, of 8,750 tons, and twenty 
 armoured coast-defence vessels, ranging 
 from the Admiral Spiridoff, of 3,740 
 tons, to the Ooragan, of 1,410 tons, were 
 launched for the Baltic fleet. During 
 the same period the Novgorod, of 2,700 
 tons, and the Admiral Popoff, of 3,590 
 tons, were launched at Nicolaiefiffor the 
 Black Sea squadron. The reconstruction 
 of. the Russian fleet thus for a time 
 proceeded slowly, and coast-defence 
 craft predominated. 
 
 On October 29th, 1870, when Ger- 
 many and France were in the throes 
 of a great conflict. Prince Gortchakoff s 
 note demanding the abrogation of 
 Clause II. of the Treaty of Paris was 
 presented to Europe. The Black Sea 
 Conference was assembled, and, as a 
 result of the deliberations concluded on 
 
VI.] GORTCHAKOFFS NOTE. loi 
 
 March 13th, 1871, all restrictions on 
 Russian naval activity in the Black Sea 
 were formally removed. In this country 
 the repudiation of the famous clause 
 was widely regarded as a gross breach 
 of faith, and a blow delivered against 
 the sanctity of all treaties. Russia, 
 said Lord Stratheden and Campbell in 
 the House of Lords, has " openly pro- 
 claimed defiance of international engage- 
 ments." The philosophic historian of 
 the future will probably adopt other 
 views, and will deride the idea of the 
 professional diplomatist that a great 
 nation could be expected to indefinitely 
 acquiesce in the artificial restrictions 
 sought to be imposed by the Treaty 
 of Paris. Russia was not conquered 
 in 1854-55, had during a century 
 and a half made enormous sacrifices 
 in order to secure freedom of action 
 in the Black Sea, and was justified in 
 
I02 GORTCHAKOFFS NOTE. Ch.VI.] 
 
 reasserting that freedom as soon as she 
 felt ready to accept the risk of war.* 
 The whole British nation, in similar 
 circumstances, would have loudly de- 
 manded similar action. 
 
 * Even if France had not been fettered in 1870, 
 it is more than doubtful whether all or any of 
 the co-signatories of the Treaty of Paris — France, 
 Austria, and Great Britain — would have taken up 
 arms in defence of Clause II, 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 RUSSO-TURKISH WAR OF 1 8 77-78 — CON- 
 GRESS OF BERLIN — SKOBELEFF's 
 SCHEME — CREATION OF THE MODERN 
 FLEET. 
 
 Von Moltke, in his memorable study 
 
 of the war of 1828-29, foretold that, in 
 
 the next Russo-Turkish conflict, Russian 
 
 naval supremacy in the Black Sea would 
 
 be strongly cisserted. This prophecy was 
 
 not fulfilled. Whether taught by history 
 
 or inspired by caprice, the Sultan Abdul 
 
 Aziz conceived the idea of creating an 
 
 armourclad fleet, and between the years 
 
 1864 and 1875 fifteen armoured ships, 
 
 ranging from the Mesoodiyeh, of 8,990 
 
 tons, to the Idjlaliyeh, of 2,240 tons, and 
 103 
 
I04 RUSSO-TURKISH WAR OF 1877-78. [Ch. 
 
 three gunboats of 400 to 330 tons, were 
 launched for the Turkish Government.* 
 When war was declared in April 1877, 
 the Russians had no naval force with 
 which to oppose the fleet of Abdul 
 Aziz, and the Turkish command of the 
 Black 3ea was practically as complete as 
 that asserted by the Allies in 1854-55.! 
 The difficulties of the campaign were 
 thus materially enhanced, and the in- 
 vading army was compelled to force 
 the passage of the Danube and the 
 Balkans, and to depend for the whole 
 
 * Two of these vessels were built at Constan- 
 tinople, all the rest in Great Britain or France. 
 In addition, the Turkish Navy List of 1876 included 
 five steam frigates, eleven corvettes, and some 
 river gunboats. The nominal total personnel of 
 the navy exceeded eighteen thousand men. 
 
 t The total of the armoured ships of Russia in 
 1876 is given by Lord Brassey as twenty-nine, 
 including fourteen coast-defence monitors. Only 
 two sea-going vessels carrying more than seven 
 inches of armour were then completed. 
 
VII.] TURKISH FAILURE ON DANUBE. 105 
 
 of its supplies upon a lengthening line 
 of difficult land communications. Russian 
 naval activity was limited to unimpor- 
 tant raids on coasting craft and some 
 torpedo-boat work,* of which the only 
 result was the sinking of the Turkish 
 gunboat Seif4 in the Matchin channel 
 of the Danube. On the other hand, 
 the Turks made no use of their com- 
 mand of the sea for offensive purposes, 
 and the handling of their gunboats on 
 the Danube at the beginning of the 
 campaign showed a total lack of vigour, 
 by which many opportunities were lost. 
 Thus the war took the form of two 
 mutually independent land campaigns 
 in Europe and Asia respectively ; and 
 although the Russians suffered severely 
 for want of the sea-power which mate- 
 rially contributed to their success in the 
 
 * In the Danube the Russians had only small 
 steam-launches. 
 
io6 RUSSO-TURKISH WAR OF 1877-78. [Ch. 
 
 campaigns of 1828-29, there were certain 
 mitigations of their difficulties. In the 
 European theatre of war, road com- 
 munications north and to a less extent 
 south of the Danube had greatly im- 
 proved, and railways facilitated the 
 primary concentration of the invading 
 army. In the Asiatic campaign, the 
 complete subjugation of Georgia and 
 the Caucasus, and the advance of the 
 frontier to Alexandropol, accomplished 
 after the Crimean War, proved a great 
 advantage. Moreover, a railway leading 
 to Vladikavkas, one hundred miles from 
 Tiflis, which had already become a 
 great military centre, rendered the loss 
 of sea communications far less serious 
 than in 1854-55. 
 
 In this country there was a wide- 
 spread belief, fostered by the negative 
 successes at Plevna, that the Turkish 
 resistance would prove effective and 
 
VII.] THE VOTE OF CREDIT. 107 
 
 prolonged. The rapid advance of 
 Skobeleff on Adrianople in January 
 1878 shattered this belief and gave rise 
 to uneasiness. On the 28th, the Chan- 
 cellor of the Exchequer (Sir Stafford 
 Northcote) moved for a vote of 
 ;^6,ooo,ooo for measures of prepara- 
 tion, and at the same time announced 
 the proposed terms of peace which had 
 been communicated by Count Schou- 
 valofif. On the night of the 31st, an 
 armistice was concluded which gave 
 the Russians possession of the lines of 
 Boyuk-Tchekmedji, and on February 
 13th the British fleet passed the Darda- 
 nelles, the Russians replying by a prompt 
 advance to San Stefano, six miles from 
 Constantinople, where peace was signed 
 on March 3rd. 
 
 Judged by the standard supplied to 
 Europe by Germany at the end of 
 January 1871, the terms which were 
 
io8 CONGRESS OF BERLIN. [Ch. 
 
 offered to Turkey appear excessively 
 moderate ; but strong antagonism to 
 the Russian proposals was manifested 
 in Great Britain, and after a period 
 during which war hung in the balance, 
 the Treaty of San Stefano was referred 
 to a European Congress assembled at 
 Berlin. The naval weakness of Russia, 
 which had hampered the operations of 
 the campaign, rendered the position of 
 the army before Constantinople in- 
 secure, and without any effective ally in 
 Europe she was naturally unwilling to 
 force an issae. 
 
 Whether Great Britain or Turkey 
 gained any substantial advantage by 
 the Treaty of Berlin may fairly be 
 doubted. Speaking on January 28th, 
 1878, Sir Stafford Northcote's principal 
 charge against the original Russian 
 proposals was that "they would com- 
 pletely separate Constantinople and the 
 
VII.] TREATY OF SAN STEFANO. 109 
 
 Balkan territory from the European 
 possessions of Turkey." The division 
 of Bulgaria into two portions and a 
 stipulation that Turkey should have the 
 right to garrison the Balkan passes 
 were, therefore, the principal achieve- 
 ments of the Congress of Berlin. Bul- 
 garia and Roumelia were united seven 
 years later, and during those years no 
 Turkish soldier ever set his foot on 
 the Balkans. On the other hand, Lord 
 Beaconsfield laid special stress on the 
 fact that the Treaty of San Stefano 
 would render the Black Sea a Russian 
 lake, as has long been the case. Great 
 Britain obtained Cyprus, which could 
 add no strength to the Empire, giving 
 in exchange a separate undertaking to 
 defend the Asiatic frontier of Turkey 
 in certain contingencies, and Austria 
 gained in Bosnia and Herzegovina pos- 
 sessions of some value. 
 
no CONGRESS OF BERLIN. [Ch. 
 
 To Russia the net result of the 
 Congress of Berlin was a diplomatic 
 rebuff entailing no practical disadvantage. 
 Bessarabia was added to her European 
 possessions, and the Asiatic frontier 
 was advanced so as to include Kars 
 and the port of Batoum. It was pro- 
 vided that the latter should remain open 
 and unfortified, but within a few years 
 this provision was set aside.* The 
 principal political effect of the proceed- 
 ings of 1878 was to embitter Anglo- 
 Russian relations by creating mutual 
 
 * This was a period of secret understandings, 
 and there is reason to believe that liberty to fortify 
 Batoum was privately conceded, although this pro- 
 ceeding has since been a popular ground for accusa- 
 tions of bad faith against Russia. Meanwhile, the 
 result of the Russian occupation of this port has 
 been to immensely increase the British tonnage 
 annually entering and clearing. The figures lately 
 given by Mr. W. S. Caine are : i88i, 14 ships, 
 with 16,000 tonnage ; 1896, 308 ships, with 544,000 
 tonnage. For 1893 the figures are 529 and 806,000, 
 so that there has been a recent decline. 
 
VII.] SKOBELEFFS SCHEME. iii 
 
 suspicions, while at the same time Great 
 Britain gained no increase of influence 
 at Constantinople. It naturally followed 
 that measures would be taken to pro- 
 mote difficulties on the Indian frontier, 
 and at the end of May General 
 Stolietoff left Tashkent on a mission to 
 Kabul, which led to the Afghan War, 
 entailing an expenditure of twenty-two 
 millions sterling upon the people of 
 India. Meanwhile, Skobeleff, the hero 
 of the Turkish War, formulated a 
 visionary scheme of invasion by or- 
 ganised " hordes of Asiatic horsemen, 
 who, to a cry of blood and plunder, 
 might be launched against India as the 
 vanguard, thus reviving the days of 
 Timur." This project had no military 
 value, since "the days of Timur" 
 happily cannot be revived, and large 
 masses of cavalry could not subsist 
 among the wild mountains of the frontier 
 
112 SKOBELEFF'S SCHEME. [Ch. 
 
 which SkobelefT never saw ; but the 
 existence of such impracticable schemes 
 has exercised a powerful influence upon 
 Indian polity.* 
 
 The lessons of the war of 1877-78 
 were taken to heart in Russia. Many 
 reforms were introduced into the army, 
 and steps were taken to increase the 
 navy, and especially to create a Black 
 Sea squadron. With the year 1882, 
 a fresh period of naval development 
 
 * It is interesting to note that SkobelefF himself 
 seems to have recognised that his plan involved 
 something of the nature of a forlorn hope. " I 
 do think," he wrote, " and we must not shut our 
 eyes to the fact, that the undertaking would in- 
 deed be a risky one. . . . We should expect from 
 the troops who were so fortunate as to be selected 
 for this campaign something more than self-sacri- 
 fice in its highest sense. . . . On crossing the 
 Hindu-Kush, the column should, in my opinion, 
 be so handled that every man might feel that 
 he had come to conquer or to die — that each man 
 might understand that the Tzar required even his 
 death." 
 
VII.] 
 
 FLEET IN 1896. 
 
 "3 
 
 began. In 1886, the Tchesmd and the 
 Catharine II., and in 1887 the Sinope 
 (Fig. i), battle-ships of 10,180 tons, 
 were launched, forming the nucleus of 
 the present powerful Black Sea fleet. 
 At the same time the construction of 
 a large torpedo-boat flotilla was com- 
 menced. Naval progress has since 
 steadily proceeded, and in 1896 
 the following vessels were built or 
 building * : — 
 
 Class. 
 
 No. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 Battle-ships 
 
 .. 19 
 
 179,000 
 
 Armoured cruisers 
 
 .. 11 
 
 82,273 
 
 Coast-defence armourclads 
 
 .. 16 
 
 48,738 
 
 Protected cruisers 
 
 •• 5 
 
 25.038 
 
 Unprotected cruisers . . . 
 
 ■• 3 
 
 8,400 
 
 Torpedo gun-vessels . . . 
 
 • 17 
 
 13.776 
 
 Destroyers 
 
 •• 5 
 
 — 
 
 Torpedo-boats over 100 feet 
 
 •• 74 
 
 ■ 
 
 * Taken from an Admiralty 
 
 Return 
 
 of August 
 
 1896. 
 
 
 8 
 
114 CREATION OF MODERN FLEET. [Ch. 
 
 The corresponding figures for the 
 present year are * : — 
 
 Class. No. Tons. 
 
 Battle-ships ... ... ... 20 215,341 
 
 Armoured cruisers ... ... 11 82,223 
 
 Coast-defence armourclads ... 22 60,300 
 
 Protected cruisers ... ... 9 5IjS7i 
 
 Unprotected cruisers (3rd class) 20 321S19 
 
 Torpedo gun-vessels 9 4,270 
 
 Destroyers ... ... ... 5 1,200 
 
 Torpedo-boats over 100 feet ... 75 — 
 
 In addition there are twenty-seven 
 auxiliary cruisers, of which thirteen, 
 forming the so-called " Volunteer 
 Fleet," are always prepared to receive 
 an armament in war. 
 
 The Black Sea squadron now num- 
 bers seven battle-ships t (exclusive of 
 three building), seven cruisers, and nine 
 
 * The Naval Pocket Book, 1898. 
 
 t Sinope{¥\%. i), Catharine II., Tchesmi (\o,\%o 
 tons); Dvienadyat Apostoloff (Zt^oo tons); Georgi 
 Podbiedonosetz (10,280 tons); Tria Sviatitelia 
 (12,480 tons) (Fig. 6); Postilaf {ifioo tons). 
 
VII.] BALTIC SQUADRON. 115 
 
 auxiliaries, together with armoured 
 coast-defence craft and a strong torpedo- 
 boat flotilla. The personnel numbers 
 about 11,600 men of all ranks. 
 
 The Baltic squadron numbers eight 
 battle-ships * (exclusive of two nearly 
 ready for launching), with cruisers, coast- 
 defence vessels, and a torpedo-boat 
 flotilla. The personnel numbers about 
 28,900 officers and men. 
 
 The official classification given by 
 Lieut. A. Stroumillo in the Naval 
 Annual {or 1898 is as follows : — 
 
 First rate: Imperial yachts, battle-ships, coast- 
 defence ironclads, first-class cruisers ; total, 
 45 vessels. 
 
 Second rate : Coast-defiance ironclads of smaller 
 
 * Poltava, Petropaulovsk, Sebastopol (10,950 
 tons) ; Alexander II. (9,930 tons) ; Nicolai I. 
 (9,670 tons); Navarin (\o,ioo tons); Sissoi Veliky 
 (8,800 tons) (Fig. s) ; and Peter Veliky (4,890 tons). 
 The Peresviet and Osliabia (12,475 tons) are to be 
 launched this year. 
 
ii6 CREATION OF MODERN FLEET. [Ch. 
 
 dimensions, sea-going gunboats, training- 
 ships, second-class cruisers, torpedo-cruisers, 
 steamers, transports ; total, 67 vessels. 
 
 Tliird rate: Coast-defence gunboats, sea-going 
 torpedo-boats, coastguard-ships, light-ships ; 
 total, 145 vessels. 
 
 Fourth rate : Small torpedo-craft and other small 
 vessels; total, 125 vessels. 
 
 The ships now building or completing 
 
 are 
 
 First-class battle-ships 
 
 Second-class battle-ship 
 
 Coast-defence armourclad 
 
 6 
 
 I 
 I 
 
 Armoured cruiser 
 
 Protected cruisers 
 
 Destroyers 
 
 Gunboats 
 
 I 
 
 4 
 
 17 
 
 3 
 
 The latest programme contemplates 
 laying down three battle-ships of 12,675 
 tons on the Neva this summer, and 
 three more as soon as building-slips 
 become available. In addition, one 
 
 * Times, May 4th. 
 
VII.] 
 
 EXPENDITURE. 
 
 117 
 
 battle-ship and one cruiser will be or- 
 dered from Messrs. Cramp of Phila- 
 delphia, and fifteen- or twenty destroyers 
 will also be put out to foreign contract.* 
 During the five years 1880-84, the 
 expenditure on the Russian navy in- 
 creased from ;^3, 140,000 to ;^3, 730,000, 
 and amounted in all to ^16,445,700. 
 Between 1890 and 1897 the growth was 
 as follows t : — 
 
 Year. 
 
 I 
 
 1890 
 
 4.3">35o 
 
 1891 
 
 4,813,600 
 
 1892 
 
 S.267,000 
 
 1893 
 
 S>488,25o 
 
 1894 
 
 ... 5.635,400 
 
 1895 
 
 6,042,650 
 
 1896 
 
 6,376,250 
 
 1897 
 
 6,589,250 
 
 1898 
 
 ■«i _ • 1 
 
 7,000,000 
 
 The special appropriation for new 
 
 * Times, May 4th and 14th. 
 t These figures are taken from Die Ausgaben 
 fiir Flotte und Landheer, compiled by the German 
 Admiralty, 1898. 
 
1 18 CREATION OF MODERN FLEET. [Ch. VII 
 
 construction to be spread over the 
 next seven years amounts to nearly 
 ;^20,ooo,ooo. The total personnel now 
 actively employed afloat and ashore 
 numbers about 44,000 men. 
 
 The above figures imply a remarkable 
 development. Russia, as a naval power, 
 now stands third among the great States 
 of the world ; and although, judged by 
 the number of her ships, she stood 
 second at the end of the reign of 
 Catharine II., the creation of the modern 
 fleet since the Turkish war of 1877-78 
 must be regarded as an achievement 
 unparalleled in her history. All the sea- 
 going war-ships of this fleet have been 
 built in Russia, and foreign assistance, 
 freely sought at first, is every year 
 becoming less necessary.* In gun con- 
 
 * All the ships of the so-called Volunteer Fleet, 
 as well as many vessels employed on the Caspian 
 and the Siberian rivers, were built in Great Britain. 
 
'tis 
 
 ■S 
 
 5 
 
 a -3 
 
 
 °a S 
 
 
 S^ 
 
 
 
 
 '=>S8. 
 
 t-i 
 
 ■M q - 
 
 bb 
 
 2 « 
 ^1 
 
 s 
 
 ■s.- ^ 
 
 
 Ul lo 
 
 
 Q. a- 
 
 
 o 
 
 
 3 ■ 
 
 
 03 
 
 
 Q- 
 
 
120 CREATION OF MODERN FLEET. [Ch. VII. 
 
 struction the advance has been equally 
 marked. The great works at Abuhoff 
 on the Neva, under the Ministry of 
 Marine, can now make excellent ordnance 
 of all sizes, and the latest 1 2-inch gun of 
 nearly 56 tons is fully equal to any weapon 
 of similar calibre elsewhere produced. 
 
 Considering the general backward- 
 ness of Russia in industrial science only 
 twenty-five years ago, the rapid growth 
 of the modern fleet is a most significant 
 sign of national progress. Russia has 
 accomplished a task which might have 
 been deemed impossible. 
 
 In design, the Russian Ministry of 
 Marine has shown both originality and 
 initiative. The pear-shaped redoubts of 
 the three battle-ships of the Sinope 
 class (see Fig. i), enabling six heavy 
 guns to be mounted in pairs, are peculiar 
 to the Russian navy. No battle-ship of 
 13,000 tons has yet been built, and the 
 
122 CREATION OF MODERN FLEET. [Ch. VII. 
 
 temporary craze for monster guns which 
 we borrowed from Italy * never reached 
 Russia, where the 12-inch gun is the 
 largest afloat. 
 
 The armoured cruiser Nfikhimoff 
 (Fig. 2), of 7,780 tons, launched in 
 1885, is peculiar in her powerful arma- 
 ment of eight 8-inch guns placed in 
 pairs in armoured barbettes. 
 
 In the R uriky (see Fig. 4), of 10,940 
 tons and 18 knots speed, launched in 
 1894, a lead was given to the navies of 
 the world in the construction of large 
 armoured cruisers. The Rossia , of 
 12,130 tons and 20 knots, was launched 
 in 1896 J; and the Gro moboy, of 14,000 
 
 * This craze inflicted upon the British navy the 
 Sanspareil and Victoria, which must be reckoned 
 among the worst armourclads ever built. 
 
 t Developed from the Pamyat Azova (Fig. 3), 
 launched at St. Petersburg in 1888. 
 
 t The Rossia was present at Spithead at the 
 Jubilee review of 1897. 
 
124 CREATION OF MODERN FLEET. [Ch. VII. 
 
 tons, was laid down in 1897. The effect 
 of the appearance of the Rurik was 
 quickly seen in the launch of our Power- 
 ful and Terrible, of 14,200 tons and 
 21 knots (nominal), launched in 1895, 
 and in the Diadem class, of 11 ,000 tons 
 and 20"5 knots, of which the first vessel 
 was launched in 1896. The design of the 
 great Russian cruisers is open to criti- 
 cism, but they unquestionably marked a 
 new departure by surpassing in tonnage 
 and speed our Blake and Blenheim, 
 launched in 1889 and 1891 respectively. 
 The later Russian battle-ships, such as 
 the Tria Sviatitelia (see Fig. 6), conform 
 nearly to our Canopus type, but are 
 more heavily armoured. 
 
 The relative fighting value of navies 
 is generally more difficult to determine 
 than that of armies. The elements of 
 strength of different ships are matters 
 •of dispute. War is the only real test of 
 
126 CREATION OF MODERN FLEET. [Ch.VII. 
 
 their efficiency, and rough usage of their 
 seaworthiness, and of the competence of 
 their technical staffs. There is evidence 
 that grave structural defects have ap- 
 peared in vessels built in Russian dock- 
 yards,* and administrative scandals have 
 occurred. Russian naval prestige, as 
 has been shown, rests wholly upon her 
 wars with Sweden and Turkey in the 
 last century. If the ambitions of 
 Charles XII. had taken a naval rather 
 than a military shape, the far wiser aspira- 
 tions of Peter the Great would have been 
 less quickly realised. It was a Sweden 
 in her decadence that Russia success- 
 fully opposed at sea, and the seamen 
 by whom Russian victories were won 
 were largely drawn from the population 
 of Swedish provinces. Moreover, the 
 
 * The loss of the Gangut off Viborg on 
 June 24th, 1897, has been attributed to such 
 defects. 
 
„ > 
 
 
128 CREATION OF MODERN FLEET. [Ch.VII. 
 
 Russian navy of the eighteenth century 
 owed its fighting efficiency mainly to 
 British officers. The Turks were never 
 a great naval nation, and the fighting in 
 the Black Sea resolved itself principally 
 into affairs of flotillas, while the victory 
 of Tchesmd was wholly due to the 
 skill and gallantry of Scotchmen. At 
 Navarino no serious demand was made 
 upon the Russian squadron, and at 
 Sinope the conditions were so unequal 
 as to preclude deductions. In the past 
 the Russian navy has not shown 
 marked enterprise, produced great naval 
 commanders, or proved conspicuous in 
 seamanlike ability. Nelson's aphorism, 
 " Close with a Frenchman and out- 
 manoeuvre a Russian," expressively 
 sums up the opinion of the greatest of 
 admirals. Ancient traditions and in- 
 herited aptitudes are wanting to the 
 Russian Empire, which has been built 
 
I30 CREATION OF MODERN FLEET. [Ch. 
 
 up from an inland centre by a people 
 who with set purpose extended their 
 dominion outwards to the sea. Sea- 
 borne commerce, which has been alike 
 the support and the educating force 
 of other nations, has played little 
 or no part in the development of 
 Russia. 
 
 The total value of the sea-borne com- 
 merce of the Russian Empire is stated 
 in an Admiralty Return of 1895 to 
 be ;^69,665,220, including bullion and 
 specie, and excluding all except " im- 
 ports for home consumption and exports 
 of domestic produce." The aggregate 
 tonnage of the mercantile marine is 
 given as 487,681 in the same Return, 
 only vessels of 100 tons gross and up- 
 wards being included. 
 
 Even now, therefore, the maritime 
 interests of Russia are small relatively to 
 those of Great Britain, the United States, 
 
VII.] PERSONNEL. 131 
 
 and Germany.* Russia is a naval but 
 not a great maritime State, and is con- 
 sequently deprived of one of the prime 
 elements of sea-power. Unique geo- 
 graphical disabilities and a tardy evolu- 
 tion sufficiently explain the fact that 
 the Russian navy is an artificial rather 
 than a national product. 
 
 On the other hand, the great fighting 
 qualities of the Russian people have 
 been abundantly attested, and Nelson's 
 words imply a well-deserved tribute to 
 their powers of stubborn endurance. 
 Now and for many years to come 
 poverty of technical resources and the 
 low standard of intelligence of the 
 Russian conscript sailor t must militate 
 
 * Spain in the same Return shows an aggregate 
 sea-borne trade of .;£^5S, 105,000, and a mercantile 
 tonnage of 554,238. 
 
 t The contrast in the appearance of the Russian 
 sailors and British, or French Breton and Norman 
 bluejackets, is most striking, and the results of 
 education in quickening the intelligence are evident. 
 
132 CREATION OF MODERN FLEET. [Ch, 
 
 against naval efficiency ; but the great 
 fleet built and building must neverthe- 
 less be regarded as a formidable force. 
 Only the test of war can show whether 
 the Russian people have been fully able, 
 in the words of Peter the Great, " to 
 conquer the art of the sea." 
 
 Politically the efifects of the naval re- 
 naissance of Russia have already been 
 significantly manifested. The fact that 
 navies are powerful agents for the inter- 
 change of national sentiment is little 
 recognised, although the influence of the 
 presence of British squadrons in the ports 
 of our great colonies is one of the princi- 
 pal factors in promoting and maintaining 
 the unity of the Empire. Out of the 
 visits of Russian and French squadrons 
 to each other's ports sprang an alliance 
 which has already borne fruits of im- 
 portance. The Russian and French 
 people know nothing of each other, and 
 
VII.] POLITICAL RESULTS. 133 
 
 are unlike in most essential respects. 
 The visits of the respective squadrons 
 touched the imagination of the masses as 
 no diplomatic correspondence could have 
 done. It was something which those 
 masses could understand. Throughout 
 the complicated performances of the so- 
 called " Concert of Europe," the strong 
 position asserted by Russia was due 
 mainly to her powerful " fleet in being " 
 in the Black Sea. Turkey, for whose 
 sake we made immense sacrifices in 
 1854-55, ^^'^ o" whose behalf we were 
 nearly led into making even greater 
 sacrifices in 1878, is now almost the 
 vassal of Russia ; and the strategists, 
 who found occupation in planning great 
 campaigns in which Turkish armies, led 
 by British officers, were to perform 
 military prodigies in the Caucasus, have 
 of late preserved a significant silence. 
 The great stride in the Far East which 
 
134 CREATION OF MODERN FLEET. [Ch. 
 
 has carried Russia from the banks of 
 the Amur to the Gulf of Pe-chi-li was 
 brought within the scope of practical 
 politics by the creation of the fleet. 
 The policy is precisely that of P.eter the 
 Great ; only the method differs somewhat 
 with the changed circumstances of the 
 times. It was necessary for Peter from 
 his inland State to conquer a seaboard 
 on the Baltic and the Euxine, and when 
 there established to build up a navy. 
 Vladivostock, the Russian station in the 
 Far East, has for years been supported 
 from the sea ; and when the German 
 descent upon the province of Shan-tung 
 was accomplished, and the practical dis- 
 memberment of China began, it was the 
 possession of a powerful fleet which 
 enabled the advisers of the Tzar to 
 ante-date their plans by the occupation 
 of Ta-lien-wan and Port Arthur. In 
 1702-3, Peter's troops overran Ingria 
 
VII.] 1898. I3S 
 
 and Livonia, and captured Noteburg 
 and Nyen, enabling a fleet to be built 
 in the Gulf of Finland. In 1898, the 
 navy of Nicholas II., built in Europe, 
 establishes itself in the ports of the Liao- 
 tong Peninsula, and land forces are pre- 
 pared to move to the support of the 
 navy. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 RUSSIAN EXPANSION LINES OF ADVANCE 
 
 — THE FAR EAST — THE LATEST 
 STEP THE RUSSIAN NAVAL POSI- 
 TION. 
 
 From the naval point of view, the 
 crucial phases in the expansion of Russia 
 were those which gave her a seaboard 
 and harbours in the Baltic, the Black 
 Sea, and the Far East. The first was 
 accomplished by Peter the Great, and 
 the Baltic fleet which he inaugurated 
 has never suffered a great reverse, 
 although it was effectually neutralised 
 and confined to its ports by the superior 
 force of the Allies in 1854-55. The 
 
 second was achieved by Catharine II. ; 
 
 136 
 
Ch.VIlI.] RUSSIAN EXPANSION. 137 
 
 but the Russian command of the Black 
 Sea was not actually asserted till the 
 Turkish war of 1827-28, and twenty- 
 seven years later Russian sea-power in 
 these waters was shattered by the 
 Crimean War, not to be fully restored 
 until the great naval movement of 1882 
 began to take effect. The third has 
 just received a fresh development of the 
 most important character. 
 
 For nearly two hundred years the 
 policy of obtaining, maintaining, and 
 increasing a seaboard has been con- 
 sistently followed. If that policy was 
 inaugurated by Peter the Great, it was 
 nevertheless absolutely due to the opera- 
 tion of irresistible natural forces. A 
 great nation must seek a seaboard cor- 
 responding in extent to its needs, and 
 Russia could no more be restrained in 
 her seaward expansion than could the 
 United States in overflowing the Rocky 
 
138 RUSSIAN EXPANSION. [Ch. 
 
 Mountains in their march to the Pacific. 
 The policy thus forced upon Russia by 
 the conditions of her being has involved 
 many wars and great sacrifices. The 
 methods adopted have been various, 
 and, in common with those which have 
 commended themselves to all nations, 
 have not been wholly blameless ; but 
 only the curious inability of the British 
 people to realise the necessities of others 
 can blind us to the fact that Russian 
 expansion was as inevitable as our own. 
 To the fifty millions of Great and 
 Greater Britain free access to the sea 
 is the breath of national life ; by the 
 eighty millions of Russia the same vital 
 need is instinctively felt. 
 
 A glance at the map serves to show 
 that, after nearly two centuries of effort, 
 the conditions of Russia, from the 
 maritime point of view, remain excep- 
 tionally disadvantageous. The British 
 
VIII.] GEOGRAPHICAL CONDITIONS. 139 
 
 Empire has free access to all the oceans 
 and seas of the world, France faces 
 the Atlantic and holds fourteen hundred 
 miles of the shores of the Mediterranean. 
 Spain is admirably placed for the 
 exercise of sea-power. Germany, by 
 means of the North Sea Canal, holds an 
 outlet to blue water in her own hands. 
 The United States front two oceans. 
 Japan is almost as favourably situated 
 as the British Islands. Russia, on the 
 other hand, by a freak of circumstance, 
 unfortunate for herself and other nations, 
 has her sea-communications in Europe 
 land-locked and partially ice-locked, and 
 the effect of these great geographical 
 disadvantages was manifested in the 
 Crimean War. In the Far East, 
 Kamtschatka, annexed in 1697, has its 
 spring, summer, and autumn compressed 
 into four months. Vladivostock, which 
 became a Russian port in i860, is 
 
140 RUSSIAN EXPANSION. [Ch. 
 
 ice-locked for about four months,* and 
 is situated in the almost inland Sea of 
 Japan. Even Port Arthur, the latest 
 acquisition, does not provide such un- 
 impeded access to the ocean as is given 
 by Brest, Cadiz, New York, or San 
 Francisco, and has the additional draw- 
 back of being fully four thousand four 
 hundred miles by the shortest railway 
 route from the Russian capital. A 
 further possible outlet exists in the 
 Persian Gulf, recommended in M. 
 Lesur's version of the will of Peter 
 the Great ; but here also the conditions 
 are evidently unfavourable, since access 
 to the Indian Ocean is throttled by the 
 Straits of Ormuz.f 
 
 * Efforts have for some time been made to 
 keep Vladivostock open in winter by means of 
 steam ice-breakers. 
 
 t Attention has at various times been drawn 
 to another possible outlet. Some years ago a 
 concession was obtained by a British company 
 
VIII.] SIBERIA. 141 
 
 The purely territorial expansion of 
 Russia, arrested in the West since 18 14 
 by Prussia (now Germany) and Austria, 
 and hampered in the South-west by 
 the various international interests which 
 from time to time have rallied to pre- 
 vent the dismemberment of the Ottoman 
 Empire, has steadily progressed along 
 four main lines of advance ; viz. — 
 
 I. Siberia to the Far East, where, 
 
 for the construction of a line from Victoria Havn 
 on the Lofoten Fjord in Norway to the head of 
 the Gulf of Bothnia. This line was made as far 
 as the Swedish frontier, and progress was then 
 stopped. On March 31st, 1898, the Swedish 
 Parliament decided by a small majority to proceed 
 with this railway. Meanwhile, the Russian lines 
 in Finland, on the same gauge, were being pressed 
 on to Torneo, and it has been suggested that 
 Russia wished to obtain an ice-free port on the 
 Norwegian seaboard, which at one point is only 
 twenty miles from the Russian frontier. If such 
 a port were obtained, or if the Finnish railway 
 were prolonged to the Varanger Fjord, the step 
 would possess little naval importance. 
 
142 LINES OF ADVANCE. [Ch. 
 
 when the seaboard was reached 
 in the first half of the seven- 
 teenth century, support could 
 be rendered by maritime com- 
 munications. 
 
 2. From the Sea of Aral along the Syr 
 
 Daria towards Chimkent (1864), 
 Tashkent (1865), Kuldja* 
 (1871), Khokand (1876), and 
 the Pamirs (1890). 
 
 3. Also from the Sea of Aral along 
 
 the Amu Daria towards Khiva 
 (1873) and the southern boun- 
 dary of Bokhara. t 
 
 4. From the Caspian through the 
 
 Tekke Turcoman country and 
 along the Khorassan frontier to 
 Merv (1884) and Penjdeh(i885). 
 
 * Occupied in 187 1, but given back to China 
 by a treaty of February 24th, 1881, in considera- 
 tion of a payment of nine million roubles. 
 
 t The towns of Bokhara and Samarkand were 
 both occupied from the North in 1868. 
 
VIII.] LINES OF ADVANCE. 143, 
 
 It forms no part of the present work 
 to trace the history of the proceedings 
 by which the present gigantic Asiatic 
 dominions of Russia were built up. The 
 processes were those followed by all 
 great Powers in similar circumstances, 
 and notably by Great Britain in India 
 and South Africa. On the second, 
 third, and fourth general lines of advance 
 much fighting occurred, and the natural 
 difficulties arising from the movement 
 of troops over great waterless and 
 sparsely populated districts were neces- 
 sarily considerable. In achieving the 
 conquest of India, Great Britain had 
 the immense advantage of sea-communi- 
 cations and of operating in a relatively 
 rich country. To maintain her grip 
 upon the Khanates, and to turn them 
 to commercial account, it was absolutely 
 necessary for Russia to undertake rail- 
 way construction on a vast scale. The 
 
144 LINES OF ADVANCE. [Ch. 
 
 Central Asian Railway (see Map I.), 
 running from the Caspian to Tashkent, 
 a distance of about nine hundred miles, 
 was, therefore, begun in 1880, and com- 
 pleted in 1896.* Like all other railways, 
 this line is capable, as far as its many 
 defects permit, of employment for purely 
 military purposes. Unlike some rail- 
 ways, it is essential for the commercial 
 development of the regions through 
 which it passes, and if it had not been 
 constructed, the expenses of holding 
 and administering these once lawless 
 territories would be enormous, f 
 
 From the point of view of Russian 
 sea-power and maritime expansion, the 
 proceedings in the Far East assume 
 
 * A prolongation of this line to Kuldja, and 
 thence through the heart of Mongolia to Peking, is 
 said to be contemplated ; but the latter extension 
 must be deferred for many years. 
 
 t Of this our own experience in Uganda gives 
 some indication. 
 
VIII.] THE FAR EAST. 145 
 
 direct importance. Here the purely 
 military difficulties have been compara- 
 tively small ; but the vast distances, the 
 rigorous climate, and the poverty of 
 the country have combined to retard 
 the accomplishment of long-existent 
 ambitions. A great maritime and com- 
 mercial Power, such as Great Britain, 
 if established in the Far East at the 
 end of the seventeenth century, would 
 have expanded its territory Southward 
 at a speed impossible to Russia.* 
 
 The Power now apparently regarded 
 as a modern interloper in Far Eastern 
 affairs established a settlement on the 
 Sea of Okhotsk in 1638, four years 
 before the outbreak of the Civil War 
 in England, and concluded with China 
 the important boundary Treaty of 
 
 * Canada did not become an unquestioned 
 British possession till 1763, and no settlement was 
 formed in Australasia till 1788. 
 
 10 
 
146 THE FAR EAST. [Ch. 
 
 Nerchinsk in 1689, sixty-eight years 
 before the East India Company occupied 
 Bengal as the result of Plassey. The 
 Amur was reached by Cossacks from 
 Yakutsk in 1644 ; but subsequent ex- 
 peditions encountered hostility, and the 
 Chinese, alarmed by the Russian pro- 
 ceedings, sent a considerable force into 
 the territory North of the river. The 
 treaty of 1689, reaffirmed in 1727, fixed 
 a frontier following the Argun and the 
 Stanovai Mountains to the Sea of 
 Okhotsk. This frontier seems to have 
 remained fairly intact for many years ; 
 but the importance of the waterway 
 of the Amur naturally attracted the 
 attention of the Russians, and Count 
 Mouravieff^ when appointed Governor 
 of Eastern Siberia in 1847, initiated 
 further explorations.* In 1851, Niko- 
 
 * The^Russians on the Amur, E. G. Ravenstein, 
 F.R.G.S., 1861. 
 
VIII.] TREATIES WITH CHINA. 147 
 
 laievsk, at the mouth of the river, and 
 Mariinsk " were founded ... to serve as 
 trading posts for the Russo-American 
 company." * 
 
 The ineffective naval operations of the 
 Allies in the North Pacific in 1854-55 
 gave a fresh impulse to Russian ac- 
 tivity. The ports of Kamtschatka and 
 Nikolaievsk on the fifty -fourth parallel 
 of latitude were of little value for naval 
 or commercial purposes, and an exten- 
 sion to the South was inevitable. By a 
 " Treaty of friendship and boundaries," 
 signed on May i6th, 1858, the Amur 
 became the frontier, and the region 
 between the Usuri and the sea was 
 stated to be held in common by Russia 
 and China.f Two years later, by 
 another Treaty signed at Peking on 
 November 14th, i860, the Usuri became 
 
 * The Russians on the Amur, E. G. Ravenstein, 
 F.R.G.S., 1 86 1. 
 
 t China Treaties, Sir E. Hertslet, K.C.B., 1896. 
 
148 THE FAR EAST. [Ch. 
 
 the mutual boundary, and Vladivostoek 
 could be made the naval port of Russia 
 in the Far East. 
 
 The frontier thus established has re- 
 mained practically unchanged till the 
 present year. Partially ice-locked, largely 
 dependent for food on sea-borne supplies, 
 and separated from European Russia by 
 immense distances of land and sea, the 
 former almost impracticable and the 
 latter certain to be cut in any war with 
 a great naval Power, the position of 
 Vladivostoek was eminently unsatis- 
 factory. It was the only vulnerable 
 point of the Russian Empire in the 
 event of a war with Great Britain or 
 France. The opinion of Sir Charles 
 Dilke, expressed in 1890, that "the 
 policy which exhausted Russia in the 
 Crimea " * could be reapplied with equal 
 success at Vladivostoek was evidently 
 * Problems of Greater Britain, 1890. 
 
VIII.] VLADIVOSTOCK. 149 
 
 unfounded, since the difficulties of com- 
 munication which rendered the position 
 insecure would have effectually prevented 
 the exhaustion of her European forces, 
 which could not be brought into play. 
 On the other hand, the perfectly correct 
 view that Russia, if challenged, " must 
 fight at Vladivostock, while she would 
 fight at a great disadvantage,"* had long 
 been understood by Russian soldiers 
 and statesmen. To remove this obvious 
 source of weakness, and to render Vladi- 
 vostock secure against a powerful over- 
 sea attack, one measure alone could 
 suffice. Railway communication with 
 European Russia must be established 
 at all cost, and the gigantic project of 
 the trans-Siberian line was begun in 
 1 89 1, and has since been carried on 
 with vigour and success. (See Map I.) 
 Vladivostock, in railway communication 
 * Problems of Greater Britain^ 1890. 
 
ISO THE FAR EAST. [Ch. 
 
 with the heart of Russia, would cease 
 to be a palpably vulnerable point in her 
 armour, but would retain great disabilities 
 as a naval and commercial harbour. 
 
 A warm-water port in the Far East, 
 such as Great Britain obtained in 1842, 
 was, therefore, essential to Russian de- 
 velopment, long retarded ; and in view of 
 the astonishing naval progress of Japan, 
 such a port became an object of special 
 desire, recognised by British statesmen. 
 The long line of the Siberian railway 
 completely overlaps the north of 
 Manchuria. (See Map II.) Consider- 
 able military forces were concentrated at 
 Vladivostock and echeloned along the 
 Usuri and Amur.* It had long been 
 obvious that, in the event of any 
 
 * The field troops in Eastern Siberia at the 
 beginning of the present year consisted of thirty- 
 eight squadrons, seventeen batteries of artillery, 
 and thirty-seven infantry battalions. These num- 
 bers have since been somewhat increased. 
 
VIII.] THE LIAO-TONG PENINSULA. 151 
 
 symptoms of the break-up of China, 
 Manchuria would at once pass under 
 Russian control, unless any Power was 
 able and willing to offer armed opposi- 
 tion. No study of history or grasp of 
 strategic principles was needed for the 
 clear understanding of the significance 
 of the anxiety displayed by Russia when 
 the Japanese overran the Liao-tong 
 Peninsula in 1895. The French Alli- 
 ance was at once invoked to secure the 
 evacuation of this desirable territory, 
 and Germany, with ulterior objects of 
 her own, joined in bringing direct 
 pressure to bear upon the Government 
 of the Mikado. Henceforth it was 
 patent to the least instructed observer 
 that Manchuria was ear-marked. The 
 assertion of a sphere of influence, pro- 
 tectorate, usufruct, or possession — the 
 terms in some circumstances are synony- 
 mous — was now only a question of time. 
 
152 THE LATEST STEP. [Ch. 
 
 In 1896, a concession was obtained to 
 cut off the great northerly bend of 
 the Siberian railway by carrying a line 
 across Manchuria. (See Maps.) The 
 German occupation of Kiao-chau, ac- 
 companied by hinterland concessions, 
 served as a signal. The sanctity of 
 northern Chinese territory was at length 
 violated by a European Power, and the 
 ports of the Liao-tong Peninsula could 
 at once be occupied by Russia. 
 
 Addressing the Primrose League,* 
 Lord Salisbury said : " I think Russia 
 has made a great mistake in taking 
 Port Arthur. I do not think it is any 
 use to her whatever." There is prob- 1 
 ably no naval or military officer in 
 this or in any other country who would 
 agree with this opinion. Russia is in 
 the habit of taking no step without 
 an exhaustive study of the naval and 
 * Albert Hall, May 4th, 1898. 
 
VIII.] PORT ARTHUR. 155 
 
 military conditions involved. In such 
 matters, Russia does not make mistakes, 
 as her history abundantly proves. For 
 the moment Port Arthur and Ta-lien- 
 wan * are no sources of strength. In 
 less than ten years the Russian position 
 in Manchuria will be unassailable, and 
 Port Arthur, having regard to its geo- 
 graphical position, will be quite as 
 strong as Cronstadt or Sebastopol. In 
 substituting Port Arthur for Vladivos- 
 tock as her principal naval station in 
 the Far East, Russia gains immense 
 advantages. The latter has scanty 
 
 * Judging from the China correspondence, the 
 astonishing illusion that Russia required only a 
 commercial port in the Liao-tong Peninsula seems 
 to have been cherished, and the discovery that a 
 naval station was to be created seems to have come 
 as a surprise. In the British Empire, however, 
 naval and commercial ports are either combined, 
 as at Hong-kong and Singapore, or in close 
 juxtaposition, as at the Cape. 
 
154 THE LATEST STEP. [Ch. 
 
 local resources, and is practically an 
 island dependent on an uncompleted 
 single line of railway four thousand 
 four hundred miles in length for its 
 communications, being thus far less 
 favourably circumstanced than Hong- 
 kong, in the hands of a great naval 
 and maritime Power. The former 
 possesses coal, iron, rich agricultural 
 possibilities, and a hardy population 
 of four millions, capable of furnishing 
 excellent military material. It is also 
 easily defens i ble against naval attac k ; 
 and with a railway and a well-organised 
 army at its back, it will have nothing 
 to fear from operations such as those 
 of the Crimean campaign, undertaken 
 by a European Power at a vast dis- 
 tance from any home base. Finally, 
 when the Manchurian railways are con- 
 structed, great military forces will be 
 within striking distance of Peking. (See 
 
VIII.] THE NAVAL POSITION. 155 
 
 Map II.) No territorial advance of 
 Russia in the present century is com- 
 parable in importance to the step which 
 has just been taken, after long and 
 careful preparation. 
 
 The naval position of Russia is 
 absolutely unique. Throughout the 
 long struggle between France and Great 
 Britain, plans for a combination of the 
 Brest and Toulon fleets formed a 
 dominant feature of French strategy. 
 Brest and Toulon are, however, only 
 eighteen hundred miles apart, and the 
 former projects boldly into the Atlantic. 
 The centres of Russian sea-power are in 
 the Gulf of Finland, the Black Sea, 
 and the Far East. The distance from 
 the Neva to Sebastopol is about four 
 thousand eight hundred miles, and from 
 Sebastopol to Port Arthur about nine 
 thousand miles. Powerful squadrons 
 are maintained in the Baltic and Black 
 
iS6 THE RUSSIAN NAVAL POSITION. [Ch. 
 
 Sea,* and the fleet in the Far East 
 varies in strength according to political 
 exigencies. This fleet at present con- 
 sists of — 
 
 Battle-ships 
 
 2t 
 
 First-class cruisers . . . 
 
 7 
 
 Second-class cruisers 
 
 2 
 
 Gunboats 
 
 6 
 
 Torpedo gunboats . . . 
 
 2 
 
 This is the largest force ever main- 
 tained by Russia in the Pacific, and it 
 will doubtless be increased in the near 
 future. In addition to the above, there 
 is a small squadron in the Mediter- 
 ranean, at present consisting of — 
 
 Battle-ships 
 
 Gunboats 
 
 Torpedo gunboat 
 Sea-going torpedo-boats 
 
 2^ 
 2 
 I 
 2 
 
 * See pp. 114 and 115. 
 
 i Navarin and Sissoi Veliky {Naval Annual., 
 1898). 
 
 X Alexander II. and Nicolai /., belonging to the 
 Baltic squadron (Naval Annual, 1898). 
 
VIII.] NAVAL STATIONS. 157 
 
 The Russian naval stations are as 
 follows : — 
 
 Baltic — First class : Cronstadt, St. Petersburg. 
 Second class : Revel, Sveaborg, Port 
 Alexander III. at Libau.* 
 Black Sea — First class : Nicolaieff. 
 
 Second class : Sebastopol, Batoum. 
 Pacific — Second class : Vladivostock. 
 (Port Arthur, Ta-Hen-wan.) 
 Caspian — Minor: Astrabad, Baku. 
 
 In peace-time, the redistribution of 
 
 naval force can be arranged without 
 
 any difficulty by the aid of foreign ports, 
 
 and the successive reinforcements and 
 
 reliefs of the Russian squadron in the 
 
 Far East have been facilitated by the 
 
 British coaling stations of Aden, Colombo, 
 
 Singapore, and Hong-kong. In war, 
 
 all great movements depend on coal 
 
 available in convenient harbours or 
 
 carried by colliers. By the superior 
 
 naval Power, if its geographical con- 
 
 * New " advanced base " in open waters {Naval 
 Annual, 1898). 
 
iS8 THE RUSSIAN NAVAL POSITION. [Ch. 
 
 ditions are favourable, coaling arrange- 
 ments can generally be made which im- 
 pose no serious restrictions on strategic 
 combinations. In this respect, however, 
 Russia is placed at a manifest disadvan- 
 tage. Not only are the distances which 
 separate her naval stations enormous, 
 but the exits from the Baltic and Black 
 Sea are cramped and easily watched, 
 while the Suez Canal is an additional 
 source of danger. 
 
 The powerful Baltic and Black Sea 
 fleets, backed by the whole of the 
 military resources of Russia, which, by 
 means of railways, can be rapidly brought 
 to bear on any threatened portion of 
 the seaboard, render Russia practically 
 unassailable in these two seas. Adequate 
 naval force would enable a blockade of 
 either to be maintained ; but a hostile 
 squadron could obtain no results of 
 importance, and military operations, 
 
VIII.] VLADIVOSTOCK. 159 
 
 such as those carried on in 1854-55, are 
 now impossible , unless combined with 
 successful invasion across the land fron- 
 tier. The geographical disadvantages 
 of Russia in regard to offensive opera- 
 tions contribute powerfully to her 
 security against sea-borne attacks. In 
 the Far East, her position has hitherto 
 materially differed. Better placed for 
 offensive operations, she has been at 
 the same time more easily assailable. 
 Vladivostock, as has been pointed out, 
 is not only isolated, but extremely poor 
 in local resources, and it may be doubted 
 whether the long Siberian railway could 
 have successfully competed with mari- 
 time communications in the accumulation 
 and the maintenance of the forces by 
 which the issue would be determined. 
 The development of the resources of 
 Manchuria will effect a great consolida- 
 tion of Russian strength in the Far 
 
i6o THE RUSSIAN NAVAL POSITION. [Ch. 
 
 East. Here, as now in the Baltic and 
 the Black Sea, she will in a few years 
 be practically unassailable. 
 
 Russian naval policy from the time of 
 the Crimean War to 1882 appears to 
 have been defensive. The number of 
 coast-defence craft built was large, and 
 the navy was regarded primarily as a 
 guarantee of the security of the sea- 
 board. Partly on account of the strong 
 antagonism shown by British Govern- 
 ments, more especially in 1877-78, and 
 partly as a corollary of the general 
 progress of the nation, this policy has 
 undergone modification. In the great 
 efforts made since 1882, and in the 
 extensive programme recently adopted,* 
 the desire to enable the navy to assume 
 an offensive r$le in war is manifest. 
 The Russian mercantile marine is small, 
 and shows no signs of marked increase ; 
 * See pp. 116 and 117. 
 
VIII.] AN OFFENSIVE r6LE. i6i 
 
 the commercial interests at stake on 
 the high seas are relatively moderate.* 
 The war navy is, however, being 
 steadily developed, and such ships as 
 the Ruri k, Rossia, and Gromoboy, as 
 well as the so-called " Volunteer Fleet, " 
 are clearly intended to attack an enemy's 
 commerce. British writers are never 
 tired of asserting that our splendid 
 Navy cannot possibly be regarded in 
 the light of a menace to other nations, 
 since it is a necessity arising out of 
 the conditions of our imperial existence. 
 Foreign Powers cannot be expected to 
 see the matter in the same light ; and 
 to Russians, remembering 1854-55 ^.nd 
 1878, British sea-power does unques- 
 tionably appear in a threatening aspect. 
 In a war with Great Britain the 
 Russian navy would undoubtedly be 
 neutralised, and reinforcements or com- 
 
 * See p. 130. 
 
 II 
 
i62 THE RUSSIAN NAVAL POSITION. [Ch. 
 
 binations between the naval centres 
 would be impossible. In the Far East, 
 however, it might be practicable, espe- 
 cially at the outset of hostilities, to act 
 with some effect against British com- 
 merce. Here, therefore, the Rossia, 
 Rurik (Fig. 4), Pamyat Azova (Fig. 3), 
 with four other first-class cruisers, are 
 to be found, and it is intended within 
 two years to station six fast ships 
 belonging to the Volunteer Fleet 
 in these waters. An alliance with a 
 European naval Power able to occupy 
 the British squadrons would materially 
 alter the situation, and might provide 
 the Russian battle-ship squadrons with 
 opportunities for offensive action. The 
 French fleet, with its bases in the 
 Atlantic and the Mediterranean, was 
 thus a prize worth playing for, and 
 the Franco-Russian understanding must 
 necessarily be regarded as an attempt 
 
VIII.] GENERAL NAVAL ACTIVITY. 163 
 
 to create a counterpoise to British sea- 
 power, rather than as a combination 
 directed against the Triple Alliance 
 now fallen into decrepitude. The rapid 
 growth of the French and Russian 
 navies has, therefore, stimulated further 
 efforts in this country. It has been 
 laid down as a principle of policy that 
 our fleet must be enabled to meet those 
 of the two greatest naval Powers, and 
 in present circumstances the costly com- 
 petition must apparently proceed. 
 
 Meanwhile, other States are develop- 
 ing marked naval activity. Germany 
 has recently decided upon great aug- 
 mentations to her fleet, which is to be 
 enabled to operate as a powerful com- 
 pact force in the Baltic and North Sea, 
 and to afford protection to her rapidly 
 growing commerce. The formidable 
 fleet of Japan, based upon its home 
 ports, may be said to hold the balance 
 
1 64 THE RUSSIAN NAVAL POSITION. [Ch. 
 
 of naval power in the Far East. The 
 war now in progress will inevitably lead 
 to a great development of the navy of 
 the United States. There is every sign 
 that sea-power will play an even greater 
 part in the future than it has in the 
 past, while the complexity of the naval 
 situation has never been so great as 
 now. In the case of Russia, however, 
 geographical disadvantages must ap- 
 parently remain, and her fleet, even if 
 greatly increased, cannot hope to play 
 the great rSle on the high seas which 
 is possible to the forces of Great Britain, 
 of France, and of the United States. 
 
 All the European squadrons — British, 
 French, Russian, and German — in the 
 Far East would in the event of war 
 suffer from the great distance of their 
 primary bases. Great Britain, holding 
 an unrivalled chain of stations on the 
 routes to the China Seas, and having 
 
VIII.] JAPAN. i6s 
 
 in Hong-kong an important source of 
 supply and means of refitting, possesses 
 evident advantages; but, now as always, 
 the difficulties of carrying on naval war 
 increase with the distance from the 
 central sources of national strength. 
 On the other hand, Japan, with well- 
 equipped dockyards and a powerful and 
 highly organised army, is on the spot. 
 Between Russia and Japan there is an 
 evident divergence of interests and a 
 clashing of ambitions, which sooner or 
 later r nay lead to w ar. 
 
 The Japanese fleet, built and building, 
 consists of* : — 
 
 No. Tonnage, 
 
 Battle-ships 8 101,630 
 
 Armoured cruisers ... 11 68,696 
 
 Protected cruisers ... 23 81,670 
 
 together with 16 unprotected cruisers 
 and torpedo gunboats, 11 destroyers, 
 and 150 torpedo-boats. 
 
 * The Naval Pocket Book, 1898. 
 
i66 THE RUSSIAN NAVAL POSITION. [Ch. 
 
 This, in the hands of an eminently 
 fighting people possessing great naval 
 aptitudes, is an extremely formidable 
 force, and the readiness of Russia to 
 come to an understanding with Japan 
 in regard to Korea is easily understood. 
 The Japanese menace in the Far East, 
 apart from any fear of the action of 
 Great Britain, would suffice to induce 
 Russia to seek a strong naval alliance, 
 and to strain every effort to increase 
 her power in the China Seas. It must, 
 therefore, be her policy tp render her 
 Pacific squadron self-supporting as far 
 as possible, and this was impracticable 
 while Vladivostock remained the naval 
 base. In possession of the Liao-tong 
 Peninsula, with the large resources 
 of Manchuria and railway communica- 
 tion at its back, Russia may be able 
 to render her squadron in the Far 
 East independent of the support of 
 
VIII.] THE FAR EAST. 167 
 
 European bases in war. The task will 
 require time and great expenditure ; 
 but we may be certain that it will be 
 undertaken with energy and ability. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS. 
 
 During the last half of the present 
 century, the relations between Russia 
 and Great Britain have profoundly 
 influenced international politics. Those 
 relations will present a perplexirig 
 problem to future historians. When 
 the territories of two great Powers are 
 separated by a vast tract of country 
 offering no marked physical barriers, 
 and sparsely populated by nomad tribes 
 or uncivilised states mutually hostile, 
 stability of frontier is impossible. One 
 or both of the great Powers must 
 inevitably advance, absorbing the inter- 
 
 I6S 
 
Ch.IX.] LAW OF EXPANSION. 169 
 
 vening territory, until the two Powers 
 come into contact at some boundary- 
 established by treaty and formally 
 delimitated. The history of the world 
 shows that a strong and a progressive 
 Power, unrestrained by any great 
 natural boundary, will always expand 
 into the territory of uncivilised and 
 unhomogeneous neighbours. The great 
 empires of the Old and of the Modern 
 World have been thus created. The 
 force of inevitable natural expansion is 
 something quite apart from, and slower 
 but more certain in its action than, such 
 great waves of invasion as that of the 
 Tartars which almost engulfed Russia 
 in the thirteenth century. To the 
 operation of this force, the consolidation 
 of the United States, of our Indian 
 Empire, and of Canada is due. In 
 Africa, the process is still going on ; 
 but the end is near at hand, since the 
 
170 ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS. [Ch. 
 
 expanding Powers are now nearly in 
 contact at all points. 
 
 At the beginning of this century, when 
 Russia was pressing back the Persian 
 frontier and aiming at the command 
 of the Caspian Sea, Great Britain had 
 absorbed Bengal and moved westward 
 along the line of the Ganges beyond 
 Delhi. Central and Western India 
 were still independent. Henceforth the 
 spheres of influence of the two great 
 Powers steadily and inevitably tended 
 to approach, the expansion of Great 
 Britain proceeding at much greater 
 speed than that of her rival. The 
 annexation of the Punjab by Lord 
 Dalhousie in 1849 "carried our terri- 
 torial frontier across the Indus right up 
 to the base of the Afghan hills, finally 
 extinguished the long rivalry of the 
 native Indian powers, and absorbed 
 under our sovereignty the last kingdom 
 
IX.] AFGHANISTAN. 171 
 
 that remained outside the pale of British 
 Empire in India." * By this time Russia 
 had subdued the Southern Kirghiz and 
 founded Kopal, near the frontier of the 
 Chinese province of Kuldja ; but the 
 advance from the Caspian through 
 the Tekke country towards Herat had 
 scarcely commenced, and Khiva, only 
 two hundred miles from the Sea of Aral, 
 was not taken till 1873, Lord Auck- 
 land's ill-judged interference in the aflfairs 
 of Afghanistan in 1838 had, however, 
 been inspired by the dawning fear of 
 Russian progress, and was the outward 
 and visible sign of a new departure in 
 British policy. " What did this new de- 
 parture imply ? Not that we had any 
 quarrel with the Afghans, from whom 
 we were separated by the five rivers 
 whose floods unite in the Indus. It 
 
 * Rise of the British Dominion in India, Sir 
 Alfred Lyall, K.C.B. 
 
172 ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS. [Ch. 
 
 meant that, after half a century's respite, 
 the English were again coming into 
 contact with a rival European influence 
 on Asiatic ground."* 
 
 Whether, if Lord Auckland's schemes 
 had not ended in disastrous failure. 
 Great Britain would have over-stepped 
 the gigantic natural boundary of the 
 Hindu-Kush to meet her rival on the 
 banks of the Oxus, or strayed onwards 
 from Herat to the sparse oases of 
 Southern Turkestan, we cannot now 
 know. Such movements would have 
 been unwise to the last degree, and 
 could have resulted only in weakening 
 our position. The "forward policy" 
 of 1838 was, however, checked by 
 military failure attended with grave loss 
 of prestige, and could not be revived 
 till a later date. Meanwhile, Great 
 Britain had reached, recognised, and 
 * Rise of the British Dominion in India. 
 
IX.] INVASION OF INDIA. 173 
 
 been compelled to recoil from a great 
 natural boundary from which Russia 
 was still distant. 
 
 From this period two main ideas 
 seem to have possessed British imagina- 
 tion and inspired British policy.* In 
 the first place, the visionary schemes 
 of the invasion of India which were 
 suggested to Peter the Great and 
 to Catharine, and resubmitted by 
 Napoleon, for purposes of his own, to 
 Paul and to Alexander I., came to be 
 seriously regarded, and the British 
 people were led to believe that the 
 conquest of India was the main object 
 of Russian ambition. In the second 
 place, it seems to have been thought 
 that the inevitable expiansion of a great 
 Power, regarded as inconvenient, could 
 be arrested by diplomatic activity in 
 
 * Both have been ineffectually combated by 
 individual writers at various times. 
 
174 ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS. [Ch. 
 
 regions where Great Britain had no 
 locus standi of any kind — regions which 
 we did not desire to occupy, but 
 which were to be kept in a state of 
 perpetual barbarism by a copious use 
 of paper. 
 
 The spurious will of Peter the Great 
 may have played a part in misguiding 
 public opinion, for which purpose it 
 was intended. It is probable that the 
 majority of Englishmen believe that 
 the main object of this document was 
 to enjoin upon Russia the invasion of 
 Indja. As a matter of fact India is 
 mentioned only in Clause VIII., which 
 runs as follows : — 
 
 Bear in mind that the commerce of India is 
 the commerce of the world, and that he who 
 controls it is the dictator of Europe ; no occasion 
 should therefore be lost to provoke war with 
 Persia, to hasten her decay, to advance to the 
 Persian Gulf, and then to endeavour to re-establish 
 the ancient trade of the Levant through Syria. 
 
IX.] WILL OF PETER THE GREAT. 175 
 
 The preceding clause inculcates close 
 alliance with this country : — 
 
 Enter into a close alliance with England, and 
 maintain direct relations with her by means of a 
 good commercial treaty ; allow her even to exercise 
 a certain monopoly in the interior of the State, 
 so that a good understanding may by degrees be 
 estabhshed between the English merchants and 
 sailors and ours, who on their part are in favour 
 of everything which tends to perfect and increase 
 the Russian navy. 
 
 As this will was written to Napoleon's 
 order at a time when he was preparing 
 to invade Russia with a promiscuous 
 army of four hundred and fifty thousand 
 men composed of most European nation- 
 alities, it is natural that the main object 
 should have been to excite fears of 
 Russian aggression among the Con- 
 tinental peoples. Accordingly the so- 
 called will urges Russia to push " her 
 regular troops to the Rhine," and " fol- 
 low them up with the hordes of Asia." 
 
176 ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS. [Ch. 
 
 Other hordes were to embark in the Sea 
 of Azof and at Archangel to " inundate 
 Italy, Spain, and France," to " plunder 
 a portion of the inhabitants, carry off 
 others into slavery to re-people the 
 deserts of Siberia, and render the re- 
 mainder incapable of escaping our yoke." 
 Clearly it might be expected that M. 
 Lesur's ingenious fabrication would have 
 powerfully impressed the imaginations 
 of Germans, Frenchmen, Italians, and 
 Spaniards. By a curious freak of cir- 
 cumstance, Great Britain — who is not 
 threatened — has alone been impressed, 
 and Napoleon's scheme has succeeded 
 as he could not have expected. 
 
 The early projects for the invasion of 
 India were framed in days when geo- 
 graphy was in its infancy, and when 
 fabulous stories of the wealth of Hindu- 
 stan gained easy credence — in days also 
 when British power was limited to a 
 
IX.] BRITISH INDIA. 177 
 
 footing on the seaboard. All is now 
 changed, and British power in Asia has 
 attained to a degree of consolidation 
 permanently denied to that of Russia. 
 Large numbers of able books and 
 official memoranda have been written 
 on the defence of the Indian frontier, 
 but no one has yet attempted to make 
 a reasoned study of the means and the 
 methods by which invasion could be 
 attempted. So long as the command of 
 the sea can be held, and the loyalty 
 of the native army and of the mass 
 of the peoples of India can be counted 
 upon, invasion is out of the question ; 
 but our extreme anxiety in regard to the 
 security of the strongest frontier in the 
 world has supplied Russia with a lever 
 the use of which she well understands. 
 
 The policy — persistently followed — 
 of attempting to stem the Russian ad- 
 vance in Central Asia by diplomatic 
 
 12 
 
178 ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS. [Ch. 
 
 notes baffles explanation. An island 
 people, unaccustomed to the idea of 
 sharing a frontier with a great Power, 
 may have caught at the fallacy that 
 the operations of natural forces can be 
 arrested by mere protests ; but in our 
 dealings with France in regard to African 
 territory there is no parallel to the 
 treatment accorded to Russia. In the 
 one case, the claim to exclude a rival 
 from regions which we had no intention 
 of ever occupying has never been set up ; 
 in the other case, this claim has for many 
 years been the dominant note of our 
 foreign policy. The literature dealing 
 with this subject is various, extensive, 
 and amazing. There is no record of 
 any Russian remonstrance against the 
 British annexation of the Punjab ; but 
 when, in 1869, Russia occupied Kras- 
 novodsk, a port on the eastern shore of 
 the Caspian about twelve hundred miles 
 
IX.] POLICY OF PROTEST. 179 
 
 in a direct line from Peschawur, we 
 are told that " the British Ambassador 
 at St. Petersburg at once demanded 
 explanations,"* and this instance is 
 typical of the long series of diplomatic 
 proceedings which culminate in the 
 China papers recently published. Re- 
 monstrance against each successive step 
 taken by Russia in regions where we 
 have no substantial interests present or 
 prospective appears to have grown into 
 an established tradition. A habit once 
 acquired escapes self-criticism, and even 
 its humorous side may elude observa- 
 tion. While continuously protesting 
 against the Russian occupation of terri- 
 tories which we do not desire, we have, 
 since 1884 only, annexed or brought 
 under our influence no less than 
 2,600,000 square miles f of the earth's 
 
 * Russia's March towards India, 1894. 
 
 t Lord Rosebery, Edinburgh, October 9th, 1896. 
 
i8o ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS. [Ch. 
 
 surface, increasing the sum-total of 
 British territory by about one-third. 
 Moreover, the diplomatic campaign 
 waged against Russia has no parallel 
 in our dealings with other Powers, 
 which have meanwhile annexed territory 
 in which we had direct interests. While 
 Russia could not occupy the remote 
 oasis of Merv without arousing great 
 irritation, France might annex Tunis 
 and Madagascar without even exciting 
 mild surprise. 
 
 On the other hand, the Russian policy 
 has been almost equally inexplicable. 
 Each British protest has been met by an 
 explanation or an assurance a;like abso- 
 lutely and obviously valueless, so long as 
 the natural forces of expansion were still 
 in full operation and the mutual frontier 
 remained to be reached. A weakness 
 {or finesse may perhaps have led Russian 
 statesmen to a course from which they 
 
IX.] ANTAGONISM. i8i 
 
 could reap no real advantage. France 
 or Germany in similar circumstances 
 would have politely but firmly declined 
 to entertain any protest in relation to 
 territory to which Great Britain could 
 show no claim. If Russia had fi-om 
 the first taken this line, both nations 
 would have benefited, and the charges 
 of faithlessness which have been brought 
 against her would have been averted. 
 
 When once the idea took root that it 
 was the principal object of British policy 
 to thwart Russian aspirations in every 
 way open to diplomacy, counter-moves 
 at all parts of the international chess- 
 board were certain to be made. It is 
 impossible to justify the action of 
 Russia in Bulgaria in 1885-86, her 
 attitude in regard to the Armenian 
 atrocities, or her behaviour during and 
 after the Greek crisis ; but, with 
 governments, as with individuals, the 
 
1 82 ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS. [Ch. 
 
 moral sense is apt to be blunted by 
 ill-temper. 
 
 Other results have followed from the 
 antagonism which our policy has directly 
 provoked. Since 1878 there has been 
 a marked diminution of Russian trade 
 with Great Britain. The figures, as 
 nearly as they can be obtained, are : — 
 
 Year. Imports. Exports.* Total. 
 
 1878 ;^i6,i57,ooo 19,111,000 35,268,000 
 
 1896 11,131,000 16,090,000 27,221,000 
 
 The fall is greatest in imports, and 
 it is probably not unconnected with 
 political sentiment, which in the ship- 
 building trade especially has operated 
 to the disadvantage of British industry. 
 Whether the plain lessons of the past 
 have even now been taken to heart 
 in this country is doubtful. The policy 
 of free ports in the Far East, which 
 
 * Of Russian exports to Great Britain, wheat 
 and other grain account for the greater part. 
 
IX.] CHINA. 183 
 
 we have proclaimed solely because it 
 is believed to promise us the maximum 
 of advantage with the minimum of 
 responsibility, seems already to be re- 
 garded as invested with divine sanctions. 
 This policy is practicable only by agree- 
 ment with other Powers, or by our 
 assumption of a protectorate over the 
 whole of China. Such agreement is 
 impossible, because other Powers are 
 the interpreters of their individual in- 
 terests, which, rightly or wrongly, they 
 regard as different from our own. 
 Great Britain is not prepared to assert 
 a protectorate over China, and to accept 
 the immense responsibilities entailed. 
 She has, however, an absolute right 
 to define her sphere of influence, to 
 secure within it the application of the 
 doctrine of free ports, to treat violation 
 of this sphere as a casus belli, and to 
 prepare to defend it if the need arises. 
 
i84 ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS. [Ch. 
 
 This is a practical and an intelligible 
 policy which awaits realisation. Natural 
 laws will continue to fulfil themselves 
 in spite of Foreign Offices, and in 
 China, as in Central Asia, Russia 
 will continue to advance till she is 
 stopped by a delimitated frontier mark- 
 ing the territory in the occupation or 
 under the direct protectorate of a great 
 Power able and ready to assert its just 
 rights, if necessary, by war. Till this 
 condition is reached, equilibrium will 
 not be established. If the British 
 people can be made to understand that 
 the frontiers of a world-wide empire 
 must sooner of later march with those 
 of rivals, and that " buffer States " can- 
 not be maintained except by mutual 
 agreement between the Powers whose 
 territories they separate, our inter- 
 national relations will be placed on a 
 sounder and a more dignified footing. 
 
IX.] EFFECT OF ANTAGONISM. 185 
 
 In political questions of this nature 
 views must differ ; but there are certain 
 pregnant facts which no sophistry can 
 obscure and no thoughtful student of 
 recent history can deny. From first 
 to last the policy of hostility to Russia 
 has proved an absolute failure. It 
 has not in the slightest degree re- 
 tarded her Asiatic expansion. It has 
 bred and maintained misunderstanding 
 and ill-feeling between two great 
 nations. It has directly provoked 
 measures of reprisal, which have en- 
 tailed commercial and other loss upon 
 the people of Great Britain and of 
 India. It has not conduced to our 
 national dignity. Its drift is towards 
 war upon some minor issue, such as 
 that of Penjdeh, which experts alone 
 could pretend to understand — war from 
 which no national advantage could be 
 obtained. If it could be finally buried 
 
i86 ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS. [Ch. 
 
 in oblivion, Europe, as well as Great 
 Britain, would be a gainer. 
 
 Reflection will show that, even after 
 two centuries of expansion, Russia has 
 not occupied a square yard of terri- 
 tory which is now or has ever been 
 desired by Great Britain. This cannot 
 be said of France, of Germany, or of 
 the United States. In such circum- 
 stances, it is specially difficult to believe 
 that a direct understanding with Russia 
 in Asia — such an understanding as was 
 reached with Germany in East Africa 
 and in New Guinea, and as we are 
 patiently seeking to obtain with France 
 in West Africa — is impossible. Until 
 Russia advances into a defined sphere 
 of British influence, we have no grievance 
 against her ; until such a sphere is defined, 
 we have no claim to arrest her advance. 
 No policy is so dangerous as that of 
 drift ; no assumption is so gratuitous as 
 
IX.] DIRECT AGREEMENT. 187 
 
 that Russia is "our great enemy." * To 
 remove the long-standing antagonism 
 between the two nations, and to substi- 
 tute direct agreements between London 
 and St. Petersburg for competitive 
 manipulations of the dummy Govern- 
 ment at Peking, would be a task worthy 
 of a great statesman, and a powerful 
 guarantee of the peace of the world. 
 
 * The Balance of Power, 1888. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Abdul Aziz, Sultan, 103, 
 
 104 
 Abo, capture of, 13 
 Abuhoff, naval works at, 
 
 120 
 Ackerman, occupied by 
 
 Potemkin, 44 
 Acre, bombardment of, 
 
 81 
 Aden, 157 
 
 Admiral Popoff, the, 100 
 Admiral Spiridoff, the, 
 
 100 
 Adrianople, Charles XII. 
 
 at, 13; Treaty of, 77 ; 
 
 SkobelefTs advance on, 
 
 107 
 Adriatic, the, 30 
 Advice frigate, the, 34 
 Afghanistan, 171 
 Aix la Chapelle, Treaty of, 
 
 24 
 Aland, Russian naval vic- 
 tory off, 13 
 
 Alexander I., the Tzar, 
 
 56, 62, 173 ; concludes 
 
 the Peace of Tilsit, 66 ; 
 
 death of, 75. 
 Alexander II., the, 115 
 
 (note), 156 (note) 
 Ali Bey, revolt of, 33 
 Alma, battle of the, 91 
 American Independence, 
 
 War of, 38 
 Amiens, Peace of, 59 ^ 
 Amur, the, 79, 134, 146, 
 
 147, 150 
 Anapa, defeat of Turko- 
 
 Circassian force at, 44 ; 
 
 in Russian hands, 76 
 Ancona, bombardment of, 
 
 51 
 Anglo-Russian alliance, 
 
 47,54 
 Anglo-Russian relations, 
 
 168 to 187 
 Anglo-Swedish alliance, 
 
 IS 
 
 189 
 
I go 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Anne, the Empress, 21 ; 
 death of, 22 
 
 Apraxine, Admiral, 13, 19 
 
 Aral, Sea of, 78, 79, 171 
 
 Araxes, defeat of the Per- 
 sians near the, 59 ; 
 advance of the Russian 
 frontier to, 75 
 
 Archangel, i, 176 ; ship- 
 building at, 1 1 
 
 Archimedes, the, 81 
 
 Argun, the, 146 
 
 Armed Neutrality, the, 39, 
 
 55 
 Armenian atrocities, 181 
 Armfeldt, General, 13 
 Armourclad floating bat- 
 teries, 98 
 Ashurada, island of, 78 
 Aspo Roads, 73 
 ,Astrabad, naval station at, 
 
 157 
 Astrachan, conquest of, 3, 
 
 17 
 Auckland, Lord, 171, 172 
 Augustus II. of Poland, 
 
 19 
 
 Augustus III. of Poland, 
 28 
 
 Austerlitz, 61, 62 
 
 Austrian Succession, War 
 of the, 22 
 
 Azof, siege of, 6, 7 ; re- 
 stored to the Sultan, 
 
 12 ; captured by General 
 Lacy, 20 ; demolished, 
 22 ; Russia confirmed 
 in her possession of, 37 
 Azof, the Sea of, 17, 37, 
 48, 176 
 
 Bagration, 61 
 
 Baku, naval station at, 
 
 157 
 Balkans, Russian advance 
 
 on, 44 ; passage of the, 
 
 104 ; right of Turkey to 
 
 garrison, 109 
 Ball, Captain (afterwards 
 
 Sir A. J.), 52, 61 
 Baltic, the — a Swedish 
 
 lake, I ; Peter the 
 
 Great's designs on, 7, 
 
 8 ; British policy in, 14, 
 
 15; Russia established 
 
 on, 16, 48 ; French fleet 
 
 in, 20 
 Baltic fleet, growth of the, 
 
 14; 80, 100, 115, 136, 
 
 158 
 Batoum, 1 10 ; naval station 
 
 at, 157 
 Beaconsfield, Lord, 109 
 Belgrade, peace concluded 
 
 at, 21 ; 43 
 Bender, 75 ; capture of, 
 
 36 ; battle at, 44 
 Berlin, occupied by a 
 
INDEX. 
 
 igi 
 
 Russo-Austrian army, 
 
 35 ; Congress of, 108, 
 
 109, no 
 Bessarabia, 74, 75, no 
 Bjorno, island of, 41 
 Black Sea, the — a Turkish 
 
 lake, I, 22 ; Russia 
 
 established on, 37, 48, 
 
 109 ; supremacy in, 76, 
 
 137 ; Russian fleet in, 
 
 88, loi 
 Black Sea Conference, the, 
 
 100 
 Black Sea fleet, the, 88, 
 
 100, 112, 113, 114, 158 
 Blake, H.M.S., 124 
 Blenheim, H.M.S., 124 
 Bokhara, 78 
 Bomarsund, 93, 96 
 Bonaparte — see Napoleon 
 Bornholm, Danish and 
 
 British squadrons off, 
 
 18 
 Bosnia, 109 
 Bosphorus, the, opened 
 
 to Russian mercantile 
 
 marine, 37 
 Boyuk-Tchekmedji, 107 
 Brassey, Lord, 104 (note) 
 Bredal, Admiral, 21 
 Breslau, entered by Frede- 
 rick II., 22. 
 Brest, 155 
 British and Russian fleets. 
 
 active alliance between, 
 
 47 
 British officers, practice of 
 
 employing, by Russia, 
 
 34 to 36, 49, 128 
 Brune, Marshal, 53 
 Bucharest, Treaty of, 75 
 Bug, the, 37, 45 
 Bulgaria, fighting in, 44, 
 
 74 ; division of, 109 ; 
 
 Russian action in, 181 
 Burke, 46 
 Byron, Admiral, 35 
 
 Caine, Mr. W. S., no 
 (note) 
 
 Camperdown, battle of, 
 48 
 
 Canopus, the, 63 
 
 Canopus type of ship, the, 
 124 
 
 Carlscrona, withdrawal of 
 Swedish fleet to, 55 
 
 Caspian Sea, the, 170 ; a 
 Persian lake, i, 2 ;, 
 Russian coast-line on, 
 17; in hands of Russia, 
 77 ; railway from, 144 
 
 Catharine I., accession of, 
 18 
 
 Catharine II., 173 ; acces- 
 sion of, 26 ; Russian 
 expansion under, 28, 
 33. 37; her alliances. 
 
392 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 38, 39, 40; naval pre- 
 parations of, 39; invades 
 Poland, 46 ; death of, 
 48 ; expansion of Russia 
 under, 48, 136 
 
 Catharine II., the, 113, 
 1 14 (note) 
 
 Cattaro, occupation of, 63 
 
 Caucasus, subjugation of 
 the, 106 
 
 Centaur, H.M.S., 76, 71 
 
 Central Asia, Russian ad- 
 vance in, 177 
 
 Champagny, De, 73 
 
 Charles VI., Emperor, 
 death of, 22 
 
 Charles XII. of Sweden, 
 8, 49, 126; victory at 
 Wesenburg, 9; victory 
 at Riga, 10; occupies 
 Courland, 10 ; at Adria- 
 nople, 13 ; death of, 15 ; 
 effect of his continental 
 campaigns, 16 
 
 Choczin, occupied by 
 General Munnich, 21 
 
 Chusan, 79 
 
 Cintra, the Convention of, 
 68 
 
 Coalition, the second, 50, 
 
 54 
 Coburg, the Prince of, 43 
 Codrington, Sir Edward, 
 
 76 
 
 Colberg, 25 ; fall of, 26 , 
 
 Colombo, 157 
 
 Conqueror, H.M.S., 36 
 (note) 
 
 Constantinople,conquered 
 by Mahomet II., 3 ; 
 Russian ships before, 
 37 ; possession of, 85 
 
 Continental System, 73 
 
 Copenhagen, Sir John 
 Norris at, 19 ; battle of, 
 55 ; capitulation of, 69 
 
 Corfu, 62 
 
 Cotton, Sir Charles, 68 
 
 Courland, occupied by 
 Charles XII., 10 
 
 Cracow, storming of, 28 
 
 Cramp, Messrs., 117 
 
 Crimea, annexation of the, 
 37 ; war in the, 82 seq. 
 
 Cronstadt, 17, 35, 70, 71, 
 80, 81,93, 94, 95. 157; 
 Russian fleet at, 19 ; ex- 
 pedition from, 23 
 
 Custrin, siege of, 25 
 
 Cyprus, 109 
 
 Dalhousie, Lord, 170 
 Dalmatian coast, Russian 
 
 descent on the, 63 
 Danube, Russians force 
 
 the passage of the, 
 
 104 
 Danzig, flight of Stanislaus 
 
INDEX. 
 
 193 
 
 to, 19 ; surrender of, to 
 the Russian fleet, 20 ; 
 capture by Lefebre, 66 
 Dardanelles, 65 ; blockaded 
 by Russia, 32, 64 ; open- 
 ing of, to Russian mer- 
 cantilemarine, 37; forced 
 by Sir John Duckworth, 
 64; passed by the British 
 fleet, 107 
 De Guichen, Admiral, 35 
 De Tolly, Barclay, 66 
 Decres, 67, 73 
 Denmark and Saxony, 
 
 alliance between, 8 
 Dennison, Captain, 42 
 Diadem, H.M.S., 124 
 Dilke, Sir Charles, 148 
 Dnieper, the, 17, 37, 45 
 Dniester, the, 21, 48 
 Dorpat, captured by 
 
 Russia, II 
 Duckworth, Sir John, 64, 
 
 65 
 Duffus, Lord, 34, 35 
 Dugdale, Lieutenant, 32, 
 
 34 
 Duncan, Admiral, 47, 48 
 Dundas, Vice-Admiral, 89 
 DvienadyatApostolofffiis, 
 
 114 (note) 
 
 Egypt and Syria, French 
 projects in, 53 
 
 Elizabeth, accession of, 
 23 ; blockades the Prus- 
 sian ports, 23 ; death of, 
 26 
 
 Elliott, Sir H., 60 
 
 Elphinston, Rear-Admiral, 
 
 3r> 32, 34, 35 
 
 England, Holland, and 
 Sweden, alliance be- 
 tween, 8 
 
 Ericsson, 82 
 
 Erivan, province of, 77 
 
 Eugene, Prince, 67 
 
 Europe, the Concert of, 
 
 83. 133 
 Expansion of Russia, its 
 
 direction, 141, 142 
 Eylau, 65 
 
 Far East, Russian sea- 
 board in, 136, 137 ; 
 fleet in, 1 56 
 
 Fermor, General, 24 ; 
 occupies Konigsberg, 
 25 ; lays siege to Cus- 
 trin, 25 ; defeated at 
 Zorndorf, 25 
 
 Finland, ceded to Russia, 
 72 
 
 Focsani, 44 
 
 Fox, General, 52 
 
 Fox, policy of, 45 
 
 Franco-Russian under- 
 standing, the, 162 
 
 13 
 
194 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Frederick William of 
 Prussia, death of, 22 
 
 Frederick II., 25, 49; 
 enters Breslau, 22 
 
 Fredericksham, 41 
 
 Freyberg, battle of, 26 
 
 Friedland, 66 
 
 Galatz, 44 
 
 Gambler, Admiral, 69 
 
 Gangut, the, 126 (note) 
 
 Genoa, 39 
 
 George I., policy of, 14 ; 
 
 death of, 19 
 Georgi Podbiedonosetz, 
 
 the, 114 (note) 
 Georgia, subjugation of, 
 
 59, 106 
 Germany, fleet of, 163 
 Giurgevo, defeat of Aus- 
 
 trians at, 44 
 Gloire, La, 98 
 Godonoff, Boris, death of, 
 
 4 
 Gordon, Admiral, 19, 20 
 Gortchakoff, Prince, 100 
 Gradisca, 43 
 Greek crisis, the, 181 
 Greig, Commodore (Sir 
 
 Samuel), 32, 34, 35, 39, 
 
 40,67 
 Gromoboy, the, 122, 161 
 Gross Jagersdorf, defeat 
 
 of Lewald at, 24 
 
 Gulistan, Treaty of, 75 
 Gustavus III. of Sweden, 
 
 40 
 Gustavus IV., 70 
 
 Hango Bay, 70 
 Hango Udd, 14 
 Hanickoff, Vice-Admiral, 
 
 47i 70, 71 
 Hanover, the Elector of, 
 
 17 
 Hassan Bey defeats the 
 Russians, 32 ; his de- 
 feat at Bender, 44 
 Hawkey, Lieutenant, 72 
 Helder expedition, the, 
 
 S3 
 Helsingfors, capture of, 
 
 13 ; surrender of LSwen- 
 
 haupt at, 23 
 Herat, 78, 171, 172 
 Hertslet, Sir E., K.C.B., 
 
 147 (note) 
 Herzegovina, 109 
 Heyden, Rear-Admiral 
 
 Count de, 76 
 Hindu-Kush, the, 172 
 Holstein question, the, 
 
 8,9 
 Hong-kong, 79. 153 (note), 
 
 154, 157, 165 
 Hood, Sir Samuel, 70 
 Hoogland, action off the 
 
 island of, 40 
 
INDEX. 
 
 195 
 
 Idjlaliyeh, the, 103 
 Implacable, H.M.S., 70, 
 
 71,72 
 India, invasion of, 173 to 
 
 179 
 Ingria, Peter the Great 
 
 invades, 9; 11, 134 
 Ionian Islands, 51, 67 
 Ismail, stormed by Suvvar- 
 
 roir, 44 
 Ivan III., his grouping of 
 
 the Russian States, 3 
 Ivan IV., assumes title of 
 
 Tzar, 3 ; unsuccessful 
 
 wars of, 3 
 Ivanovitch, Feodor, 3 
 
 Janizarry, Cape, 64 
 
 Japan, naval progress of, 
 150, 163, 165 
 
 Jaroslaf, national con- 
 solidation under, 2 
 
 J assy. Peace of, 44, 49 
 
 Jena, 62 
 
 Jones, Paul, a Russian 
 admiral, 34, 43 
 
 Kabul, hi 
 
 Kainardji, Peace of, 37 
 
 Kamenskoi, 65, 74 
 
 Kamtschatka, 96, 139, 147 
 
 Kars, 110 
 
 Kazan, conquest of, 3 
 
 Kertch, 37 
 
 Khiva, 78, 171 
 
 Khotin, 75 
 
 Kiao-chau, German occu- 
 pation of, 152 
 
 Kilia, occupied by Potem- 
 kin, 44 
 
 Kinburn, 37, 43, 98 
 
 Kinglake, Mr., 87 
 
 Konigsberg, occupied by 
 Fermor, 25 
 
 Kopal, 171 
 
 Korea, 166 
 
 Komiloff, Admiral, 91 
 
 Kourakine, 73 
 
 Krasnovodsk, 178 
 
 Kuban, invasion of the, 44 
 
 Kuldja, 171 
 
 Kunersdorf, battle of, 25 
 
 Kustendji, 76 
 
 Kutusoff, General, 61 
 
 Lacy, General, marches 
 on Warsaw, 19; captures 
 Azof, 20 ; victory of, at 
 Wilmanstrand, 22 ; at 
 Helsingfors, 23 
 
 Ladoga, Lake, ship-build- 
 ing on, II, 12 
 
 Lauriston, 63 
 
 Lefebre, captures Danzig, 
 66 
 
 Lemnos Castle, besieged 
 by Russia, 32 ; action 
 off, 65 
 
196 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Lesur, M., 73, 140, 176 
 Levant, Russian squadron 
 
 in the, 30 ; Turkish 
 
 fleet in, '31 
 Lewald, General, 24 
 Liao-tong Peninsula, the, 
 
 135, 151,152, 153 (note), 
 
 166 
 Libau, naval station at, 
 
 157 
 Liman Estuary, actions in 
 
 the, 43 
 Livonia, overrun by Russia, 
 
 11,135; Swedes attempt 
 
 to blockade ports in, 22 
 Loudon, General, 43 
 Louis, Rear-Admiral Sir 
 
 Thomas, 63 
 Lowenhaupt, Count, 23 ; 
 
 surrenders to Lacy, 23 
 Lyall, Sir Alfred, 171 
 
 (note) 
 Lyndhurst, Lord, 85 (note) 
 
 Mack, General, 61 
 Mackenzie, Lieutenant, 
 
 32,34 
 Madagascar, 180 
 Magnificent, the, 35 
 Mahan, Captain, 58 
 Mahomet IL, conquest of 
 
 Constantinople by, 3 
 Malta, I surrender of, to 
 
 Great Britain, 54 
 
 Manchuria, 150, 151, 152, 
 
 153, 159, 166 
 Manchurian railways, the, 
 
 IS4 
 
 Maria Theresa, 22 
 
 Mariinsk, 147 
 
 Mediterranean, Russia in 
 the, 37, 156 
 
 Mehemet Ali, 81 
 
 Memel, surrender of, 24 ; 
 boundary of Russian 
 territory, 47 
 
 Mentschikoff, Prince, 91 
 
 Mercantile marine, 160 
 
 Merrimac, the, 99 
 
 Merv, the oasis of, 180 
 
 Mesoodiyeh, the, 103 
 
 Mingrelia, 75 
 
 Minin, 4 
 
 Mishukoff, Admiral, 25 
 
 Mitchell, Vice-Admiral, 48 
 
 Mitisloff, the, 48 
 
 Modon, attacked by Rus- 
 sia, 30 
 
 Moldavia, 74 
 
 Moltke, General Von, 
 103 
 
 Monitor, the, 99 
 
 Moore, Sir John, 70 
 
 Moravia, 24, 61 
 
 Moscow, the capital of a 
 great Muscovite princi- 
 pality, 3 ; burnt by the 
 Tartars, 3 ; Polish occu- 
 
INDEX. 
 
 197 
 
 pation of, 4 ; burning 
 
 of, 74 
 Mouravieff, Count, 78, 146 
 Miinnich, General, 20, 21 
 Murat, 61 
 Muscovite dynasty, end of 
 
 the, 3 
 
 Nadir Shah, offers aid to 
 
 the Empress Anne, 21 
 Nakhimoff, Admiral, 86 
 Nakhimoff, the, 122 
 Naktchivan, province of, 
 
 n 
 
 Nan-king, 79 
 
 Napier, Sir Charles, 92, 
 
 95-96 
 Naples, 62 
 Napoleon, 49, 54, 63, 67, 
 
 68, 73, 173. I75> 176 
 
 Napoleon III., 87 
 
 Napoleon, the, 98 
 
 Narva, siege of, 9 ; cap- 
 tured by Russia, 1 1 
 
 Nassau, the Prince of, 39 ; 
 in commandof the Baltic 
 fleet, 40, 43 
 
 Naval expenditure, 117 
 
 Naval policy, 160 to 164 
 
 Naval stations, Russian, 
 
 157, 158 
 Navarin, the, 115 (note), 
 
 156 (note) 
 Navarino, occupied by 
 
 Russia, 30; battle of, 
 76, 128 
 
 Nelson, his opinions of 
 the Russian navy, 51, 
 52. 55, 57- 60, 61 ; his 
 aphorism, 128, 131 
 
 Nerchinsk, Treaty of, 146 
 
 Neva, the, 155 ; becomes 
 a Russian stream, 1 1 ; 
 ship-building on, 11, 
 116; capture of Swedish 
 ships in, 12 
 
 Nevycastle, the Duke of, 
 83 (note) 
 
 Nicholas, the Tzar, 75 ; 
 anxiety of, for an under- 
 standing with Great 
 Britain, 82 
 
 Nicholas II., the navy of, 
 
 135 
 Nicolai I., the, 115, 156 
 
 (note) 
 Nicolaieff, naval station 
 
 at, 157 
 Niemen, the, 24, 48, 66 ; 
 
 passage of, by the Grand 
 
 Army, 73, 74 
 Nikolaievsk, 147 
 Nile, result of battle of 
 
 the, 50 
 Nore, mutiny at the, 48 
 Norris, Sir John, in the 
 
 Baltic, 14, 15 ; at Copen- 
 hagen, 19 
 
198 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 North Sea Canal, the, 139 
 
 Northcote, Sir Stafford, 
 107, 108 
 
 Noteburg, now Schlilssel- 
 burg, captured by Rus- 
 sia, II, 135 
 
 Novgorod, 2 
 
 Novgorod, the, 100 
 
 Nyen, captured by Russia, 
 li, 13s 
 
 OczAKOFF, captured by 
 Russia, 20 ; siege of, 43 ; 
 retained by Russia, 45 
 
 Okhotsk, the Sea of, 88, 
 
 145. 146 
 
 Ooragan, the, 100 
 
 Orloff, Admiral Alexis, 28; 
 arouses a revolt in the 
 Morea, 30; his opinion 
 of the Russian fleet, 30 
 
 Ormuz, Straits of, 140 
 
 Oro Sound, 70 
 
 Osliaiia, the, 115 (note) 
 
 Ouschakoflf, Admiral, 52 
 
 Oxenstiern, the Chancellor 
 of Sweden, 8 
 
 Oxus, the, 172 
 
 Paget, Lord Clarence, 80 
 Pahlen, Count, 56, 57 
 Pamyat Azova, the, 122 
 
 (note), 162 
 Parker, Sir Hyde, 55 
 
 Paskievich, 76 
 
 Patras, attacked by Russia, 
 
 30 
 
 Paul, the Tzar, 50, 53, 54, 
 173 ; murder of, 56 
 
 Pe-chi-li, the Gulf of, 134 
 
 Peipus, Lake, ship-build- 
 ing on, 1 1 ; capture of a 
 Swedish vessel on, 12 
 
 Peking, 154, 187 
 
 Peking, Treaty of, 147 
 
 Penjdeh, 185 
 
 Perekop, lines of, forced 
 by Miinnich, 20 
 
 Peresviet, the, 115 (note) 
 
 Peschawur, 179 
 
 Peter the Great, 173 ; as- 
 cent of, to the throne, I ; 
 letter of, to the patriarch 
 Adrian, 2 ; peculiar 
 genius of, 6 ; naval 
 aspirations of, 6, 7, 14, 
 126, 136, 137 ; invades 
 Ingria, 9; naval projects 
 of, II, 12, 77, 84; death 
 of, 18 ; friendship with 
 Sir J. Norris, 15, 34; 
 apocryphal will of, 73, 
 140, 174 
 
 Peter the Great, the, 100 
 
 Peter III., 26 
 
 Peter Veliky, the, 115 
 (note) 
 
 Petropaulovski, 96 
 
INDEX. 
 
 X99 
 
 Peiropaulovski, the, 99, 
 115 (note) 
 
 Pitt, 45 
 
 Plevna, 106 
 
 Pojarski, 4 
 
 Poland, the kingdom of, 
 10 ; first partition of, 36 ; 
 invaded byCatharinell., 
 46 ; dismemberment of, 
 46 
 
 Poltava, the, 115 (note) 
 
 Poniatowski, king of Po- 
 land, 28 
 
 Popham, Sir Home, 53 
 
 Porcola Point, 72 
 
 Port Alexander, in; naval 
 station at, 157 
 
 Port Arthur, 134, 140, 152, 
 
 153. 155, 157 
 Port Mahon, 29 
 Potemkin, 43, 44; death 
 
 of, 45 
 Poti, 76 
 
 Powerful, H.M.S., 124 
 Poussielgue, Comptroller, 
 
 54.84 
 Pozzo di Borgo, Count, 
 
 84 
 Pressburg, Treaty of, 62 
 Prussia, hesitation of, 62 
 Pruth, Russian surrender 
 
 at the, 12 
 Pultowa, 10 
 Punjab, the, 178 
 
 Quadruple alliance, a, 8, 
 18 
 
 Raglan, Lord, 83 (note) 
 
 Ragusa, blockade of, 63 
 
 Ratvisan, the, 48 
 
 Ravenstein, Mr. E. G., 
 146, 147 (notes) 
 
 Reichenbach, conference 
 at, 45 
 
 Revel, Russians retire to, 
 15 ; fortifications at, 19 ; 
 attacked by Duke of 
 Sudermania, 41 ; with- 
 drawal of Russian fleet 
 to, 55 ; naval station at, 
 
 157 
 Riga, Gulf of, 46 
 Riga, victory of Charles 
 
 XII. at, 10; captured 
 
 by Russia, 12 
 Rimerik, battle at, 44 
 Rodney, Admiral, 35 
 Rogensalm, defeat of 
 
 Swedish squadron at, 
 
 41 
 
 Rogerswick, 71 
 
 Romanoff, Michael, elected 
 to the throne, 4 
 
 Romanoffs, Western in- 
 fluences under the,-4 
 
 Rooke, Sir George, 8 
 
 Rosebery, Lord, 179 
 (note) 
 
200 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Rossia, the, 122, 161, 162 
 Rostilaf, the, 114 (note) 
 Roumelia, 109 
 Rurik, the, 122, 124, 161, 
 
 162 
 Russian expansion, 5 ; 
 
 slow progress of, 6 
 Russian fleet, destruction 
 
 of the, 12 
 Russo-Turkish squadron, 
 
 a, SI 
 Russo-Turkish war, 12, 
 
 20,39 
 Rustchuk, 74 
 
 St. Arnaud, Marshal, 83 
 
 (note) 
 St. Nicholas fort, 86 
 
 (note) 
 St. Petersburg, founded, 
 
 1 1 ; revolution at, 26 ; 
 
 naval station at, 157 
 St. Vincent, Lord, 51, 55 
 Salisbury, Lord, 152 
 Samuelovich, Alexis, 35 
 San Stefano, Treaty of, 
 
 107, 108, 109 
 Sanspareil, H.M.S., 122 
 
 (note) 
 Saumarez, Sir James, 69, 
 
 71,72 
 Saunders, Admiral, 19 
 Schouvaloff, Count, 107 
 Sebastiani, General, 63 
 
 Sebastopol, 81, 83 (note), 
 85, 87, 90, 91, 96, 155, 
 
 157 
 Sebastopol, the, 99, 115 
 
 (note) 
 Seniavin, Admiral, 64, 65, 
 
 67,68 
 Seraglio Point, 63 
 Sereth, Austrian victory 
 
 on the, 43 
 Seife, the, 105 
 Seven Years' War, 24 
 Sevolod, the, 71 
 Siberia, troops in Eastern, 
 
 150 (note) 
 Silistria, capture of, 74; 
 
 siege of, 82, 83 
 Singapore, 153 (note), 
 
 157 
 Sinope, 85, 86, 128 
 Sinope, the, 113, 114 
 
 (note) 
 Sinope class, battle-ships 
 
 of the, 120 
 Sissoi Veliky, the, 115 
 
 (note), 156 (note) 
 SkobelefPs advance on 
 Adrianople, 107 ; his 
 scheme, iii, 112 (note) 
 Smith, Sir Sidney, 36, 42 
 Spencer, Lord, 51, 52 
 Spiridoff, Admiral, 31 
 Stanislaus, flees to Dan- 
 zig, 19 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Stanovai Mountains, the, 
 
 146 
 Steam propulsion, the 
 
 change to, 81 
 Stolietoff, General, in 
 Storkyro, rout of the 
 
 Swedes at, 13 
 Stralsund, fall of, 14 ; 
 
 withdrawal of Swedes 
 
 to, 62 
 Stratheden and Campbell, 
 
 Lord, 1 01 
 Stroumillo, Lieutenant A., 
 
 IIS 
 Sudermania, the Duke of, 
 
 40,41 
 Suez Canal, the, 158 
 Sulivan, Admiral SirB. J., 
 
 92, 94 (note) 
 SuwarrofT, 43 ; storms 
 
 Ismail, 44 ; retreat from 
 
 Switzerland, 54 
 Sveaborg, 40, 93, 94, 96, 
 
 157 
 Svenska Sound, actions 
 
 in, 42 
 Sweden, Baltic provinces 
 
 of, II, 12; Coalition w., 
 
 14 ; decadence of, 27 
 Syr Daria, the, 79 
 
 Taganrog, demolished, 
 22 ; Russia confirmed in 
 her possession of, 37 
 
 Tagus, the, 68 
 Ta-lien-wan, 134, 153, 157 
 Talleyrand, 63 
 Tartar invasion, the, 2 
 Tartars, power of, broken, 
 
 3 
 Tashkent, in, 144 
 Tchesm6, Turkish fleet 
 
 blockaded in bay of, 32, 
 
 33 ; the victory of, 128 
 Tchesme, the, 113, 114 
 
 (note) 
 Tchitchagoff, Admiral, 41, 
 
 42 
 Tenedos, surrender of 
 
 Turks at, 65 
 Terrible, H.M.S., 124 
 Terrible, the, 81 
 Texel, blockade of the, 47 ; 
 
 surrender of the Dutch 
 
 fleet in the, 48 
 Thesiger, Captain Sir 
 
 Frederick, 36 
 Tiflis, 106 
 Tilsit, Peace of, 66 
 Torneo, 141 (note) 
 Toulon, 15s 
 Trafalgar, battle of, 36 
 
 (note) 
 Trans-Siberian railway, 
 
 the, 149, 150, 152, 159 
 Tria Sviatitelia, the, 114 
 
 (note), 124 
 Trieste, capture of, 68 
 
202 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Tunis, 1 80 
 
 Turkey, naval power of, 
 
 49 
 Turkomanchai, Treaty of, 
 
 77 
 Turko-Venetian war, 12 
 Turtukai, capture of, 36, 
 
 74 
 Tweermunde, 23 
 
 Ukraine, increase of 
 Russian territory on the 
 side of the, 22 
 
 Ulm, 61 
 
 United States, navy of the, 
 164 
 
 Ural, the, 17 
 
 Usuri, the, 147, 150 
 
 Varna, Russian repulse 
 at, 36; a Russian sea- 
 base, 76 
 
 Venice, 29 
 
 Venus, the frigate, 42 
 
 Viborg, 16 ; Count Lowen- 
 haupt moves on, 23 ; 
 Swedes defeated at, 42 
 
 Victoria, H.M.S., 122 
 (note) 
 
 Victoria Havn, 141 (note) 
 
 Vladikavkas, 106 
 
 Vladimir, the, 88 
 
 Vladivostock, 134, 139, 140 
 
 (note), 148, 149, 150, 
 153,157,159-166 
 Volga, the estuary of the,;,' 
 
 17 
 Volunteer Fleet, the, 114, 
 118 (note), 161, 162 
 
 Wager, Sir Charles, in 
 
 the Baltic, 18 
 Wallachia, 74 
 Warrior, H.M.S., 98 
 Warsaw, 19 
 Weichselmunde, 66 
 Wesenburg, victory of 
 
 Charles XII. at, 9 
 White Sea, the, 88, 96 
 William III. of England, 
 
 advises Charles XII., 
 
 10 
 Wilmanstrand) defeat of 
 
 Swedes at, 22 
 
 Yakutsk, 146 
 Yarmouth, action off, 34 
 Yenikale, 37 
 York, the Duke of, 53 
 
 Zealand, British descent 
 
 upon, 69 
 Zizianoff, Prince, 59 
 Zorndorf, 25 
 Zullichau, battle of, 25 
 
THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE 
 
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