mi .*i^ 9* ' "M^i CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY FROM Morris Bishop *uiSmS,fi?!S,?.X,',.?.?/.???'se on the con 3 1924 012 940 221 Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924012940221 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY A TREATISE ON THE CONSCIOUS IMPROVEMENT OF SOCIETY BY SOCIETY BY LESTER F. WARD L'application est la pierre de touche de toute doctrine. — Adolphe Coste GINN AND COMPANY BOSTON • NEW YORK • CHICAGO • LONDON ATLANTA • DALLAS • COLUMBUS • SAN FRANCISCO f\>XdttX\ Copyright, 1906 By LESTER F. WARD ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 620.2 GINN AND COMPANY • PRO- PRIETORS ■ BOSTON.' U.S.A. PREFACE This work and its predecessor, Pure Sociology, constitute together a system of sociology, and these, with Dynamic Sociology, The Psychic Factors of Civilization, and the Outlines of Sociology, make up a more comprehensive system of social philosophy. Should any reader acquaint himself with the whole, he will find it not only con- sistent with itself, but progressive in the sense that each successive volume carries the subject a step farther with a minimum of repeti- tion or duplicate treatment. The central thought is that of a true science of society, capable, in the measure that it approaches completeness, of being turned to the profit of mankind. If there is one respect in which it differs more than in others from rival systems of philosophy it is in its practical character of never losing sight of the end or purpose, nor of the possibilities of conscious effort. It is a reaction against the philosophy of despair that has come to dominate even the most enlightened scientific thought. It aims to point out a remedy for the general paralysis that is creeping over the world, and which a too narrow conception of the law of cosmic evolution serves rather to increase than to diminish. It proclaims the efficacy of effort, provided it is guided by intelligence. It would remove the embargo laid upon human activity by a false interpretation of scientific determinism, and, without having recourse to the equally false con- ception of a power to will, it insists upon the power to act. It is this mobilization of the army of achievement which it is sought to express in the title of Part I. Until there is movement there can be no achievement. Movement is the condition to achieve- ment, and achievement is the means to improvement. With a clear conception of the logical relations of these three terms in the argu- ment the entire scheme and scope of applied sociology will unfold, and the reader will be put in position at least to understand the work, whether or not he accepts its general conclusions. iv PREFACE The small claim made for applied sociology at the present stage of the science will probably disappoint many, and it will be said that little advance is made beyond the position taken in Dynamic Sociology ; but the world has made little progress in the past twenty- three years, although they have been years of great social unrest. And every attempt to take a step forward, with its virtual failure to do so, has only confirmed the view there set forth that ends can- not be attained directly, but only through means, — the universal method of science. It has also become more and more apparent that improvement cannot be secured through the increase of knowl- edge, but only through its socialization, and that therefore the real and practical problem of applied sociology still remains the dis- tribution of the intellectual heritage bequeathed to all equally by the genius of mankind. I take great pleasure in acknowledging my indebtedness to M. H. Welter, Librairie Universitaire, 4, Rue Bernard-Palissy, Paris, pub- lisher of M. Odin's great work. La Gen^se des Grands Hommes, for his courtesy in permitting the use of the valuable maps, charts, and tables of Chapter IX, and I sincerely hope' that this may have some effect in making this work known to a larger circle of readers. L. F. W. Washington, March 30, 1906 CONTENTS PART I— MOVEMENT CHAPTER I RELATION OF PURE TO APPLIED SOCIOLOGY Page General remark . . 3 Pure Sociology Answers the questions What, Why, and How. — Stability of social struc- tures. — Applied sociology rests on pure sociology. — Social structures must be understood before they can be modified 3 Applied Sociology Answers the question What for. — Essentially practical. — Relates to improvement. — Subjective. — Anthropocentric. — Egalitarian. — Presup- poses an acquaintance with pure sociology. — Science versus art. — Modi- fication of phenomena. — Utility of science. — Applied sociology versus \ the social art '5 Superiority of the Artificial Illustrations Language as an example. — Justice as an example . .11 CHAPTER n THE EFFICACY OF EFFORT The laissez faire school. — How illogical. — Alleged evils of interfer- ence. — Benefits of interference. — The fundamental fallacy Social initiative. — Social achievement. — Faire marcher 13 CHAPTER III END OR PURPOSE OF SOCIOLOGY Progress versus Evolution Views of Herbert Spencer. — Definitions of progress in earlier works. — Its relation to happiness. — The paradox of hedonism 18 7' vi CONTENTS Weltschmerz Page Pessimism. — Position of Gumplowicz Views of the socialists. — Of Huxley. — No attempt yet made to cure 19 i Achievement versus Improvement Purpose of applied sociology to harmonize achievement with improve- ment. — Theory of natural inequality. — Achievement never duly re- warded 21 Definition of Justice Enforces artificial equality. — Long resisted and denounced A form of social interference. — Wholly artificial .... 22' The Oligocentric World View / . — SociolDffy Confined to the intellectual aspect. — Apotheosis of genius. — Sociology opposes it 23 Social versus Political Justice^ Only civil and political justice thus far attained. — Social justice still to be attained. — This will be simply another step in the same direction . 24 Social Welfare 'Happiness an active state. — Ennui. — Normal exercise of the faculties. — Not a question of intelligence or social worth 25 Social Freedom The three kinds of freedom : national, political, social National free- dom, how attained. — Struggle for political freedom Disappointed hopes. — Social freedom in process of attainment Difficulties of this '\ problem. — It belongs to applied sociology 26 The New Ethics How it differs from the old. — Primitive ethics concerned only with race safety. — Its modern degeneracy. — Aim of the new ethics. — Not philan- thropy. — The luxury of altruism. — T\\t summum bonum 28 The Claims of Feeling Philosophy of license. — Feeling versus function. — Asceticism. — Spiritual pleasures. — Subjective trend of modern philosophy. — Puritan- ism — Utilitarianism. — Greatest good to the greatest number. — Pursuit of happiness. — Eudemonism. — Pain economy. — Cruelty of nature. — The struggle for existence7=^Savages not happy: — Fear of nature Perpetu- ally at war Ethics of function The deficit of life. — Its removal . . 29 CONTENTS vii CHAPTER IV SOCIAL ACHIEVEMENT Page Usually denied. — The parable of Saint-Simon. — The illogical infe r- ^nce»^=The social order. — The ameliorative function of society. — Social integration. — Social intelligence 37 CHAPTER V WORLD VIEWS In what sense ideas rule the world. — World ideas. — Thoug ht, tn U p . effec tffifi^m ust be possessed by societ y 40 Interpretation of History Historical materialism and intellectualism. — Economic interpretation of his tory . — Ideological interpretation of history 40 Reconciliation of the Economic and Ideological Interpretations of History Views of Comte and Spenc gr. — De Greef on the influence of ideas. — Volkergedanken. — Zeitgeist. — Public opinion 41 Idea Forces. — Confusion of ideas on the subject ... .... 44 Beliefs. — Belief versus opinion. — Beliefs rest on interest. — Grow out of desires. — W orld v iews due to eco nomic c onditions. — OrieQtai-and occidental ideas. — The study of mind versus the study of matter ... 45 CHAPTER VI TRUTH AND ERROR Primitive reasoning. — Based on interest. — Dominated by fear ... 50 Anthropomorphic Ideas How the animal mind differs from the rational mind. — The simplest phenomena always regarded as subject to natural laws. — All motion ex- plained as voluntary. — Animism . . 51 Religious Ideas. — Anthropomorphic. — How explained 52 Spiritual Beings. — Tylor's minimum definition of religion. — Causes of belief in spiritual beings. — Shadows. — Reflections. — Echoes. — Dreams. — Delirium. — Insanity Trance. — Death. — Universality of the belief in spirits. — Multiplication of spirits. — Ancestor-worship. — Objective in- fluences. — Fetishism. — iVIetamorphosis. — Idea of cause. ^ Effect of the \ viii CONTENTS Page phenomena of nature. — Continuance theory. — Metempsychosis. — Im- mortality. — Origin of gods. — Theological conceptions. — Polytheism. — Monotheism. — Dualism S3 Religious Structures Ecclesiastical institutions. — The church. — Fear of spiritual beings. — Origin of the priesthood 62 Error May error ever be useful? — Religious ideas and structures exclusively human. — Ignorance versus error. — Error a product of reason. — Para- doxes of nature. — Error necessary. — Reason untrustworthy .... 65 Consequences of Error. — Sacrifices . — Not practised by the lowest races. — Was te of property at funerals . — Costly tombs. — Pyramids of Egypt. — Other examples. — Self-m utilation . — Superstitio n. — Ascetic cism. — Zoolatry. — Witc hcraf t. — j'ersecution.. — Re sistance to truth.— Science explains phenomena and dispels error. — Opposition to science. — Science corrects its own errors. — ■Obscurantism/— QensofsEjpIaOhe press. — Indexes of prohibited books. — Russian and German censor- ship. — The androcentric world view. — False view s of motherhood . . 68 Truth ' Error a kind of contagious disease. — Prevalence of error in civilized communities. — Error more dangerous than ignorance. — The charm of error. — Truth should be made attractive. — World views should embody truth instead of error. — Human progress has consisted in slowly shedding the primitive error 80 CHAPTER VII SOCIAL APPROPRIATION OF TRUTH Truth leads to achievement, but not necessarily to improvement. — Material civilization on the whole progressive. — The real moral progress. — Truth not assimilated 84 Possession of Truth Truth a sure antidote to error. — Mental dualism. — Credulity of great /men. — Evolutionary teleology. — Scientific faith. — The law of causation. ^ Causality. — False causes. — Spiritual beings the principal false causes. — Ij^55tity^j^matter_and_ spirit. — Adequacy of causation. — Imperfect conceptions of adequacy. — Examples 85 CONTENTS ix Relation of Knowledge to Truth Knowledge defined. — Perception. — Error due to conclusions drawn from insufficient knowledge. — Intelligence. — The intelligent and unin- telligent classes of society. — Intelligence rul es. — Reforms emanate from Jhe_lntelUgent— ekss-. — Impotence of the unintelligent class. — Equali- zation of intelli gence the mainjTrohleiTi. — The lower classes victims more of error than of ignorance Dependence of the lower upon the upper classes . — . 9° Intellectual Egalitarianism The lower classes possess the same degree of native intellectual capacity! as the higher. — Difference consists wholly in the equipment. — The social/ heritage. — Social heredity. — The intellectually disinherited. — Prevailing/ sophisms. — False appearances. — The Helvetian doctrine ... -95 Rise of the Proletariat. — The four th estate originally slaves and serfs. — Evolution of the^third-estate. — That-ot-^the_proletariat simply another step. — Intellectual versus emotional development. — Theallege^ " ultra- rational sanction." — The "submerged tenth." — Statement of the egali- tarian doctrine. — Class distinctions wholly artificial ... ... 97 Capacity for Truth. — AH capable of occupying the highest social position. — Truth no greater burden than error. — All important truth within the grasp of all. — Education of nature. — Capacity of theliuinan mind greater than supposed. — All practical truth within the reach oi _all men. — Evils of wrangling. — Mathematics no test of mental capacity. — Abstract reasoning. — The most important knowledge is of concrete facts easily learned even by primitive men. — Intellectual capacity of outlying races. — Race equivalency. — Effect of race mixture. — Race differences ™?-l?bLlL3ii^-tJfiD^ -'?t~?5£J'^^ efficiency -^^AJL races cap a ble of rec eivjnggll truth. — ■Mobilization of society . . loi PART II— ACHIEVEMENT CHAPTER VIII POTENTIAL ACHIEVEMENT Need of increased achievement. — Natural inequalities. — Latent ability. — Difficulties of the subject. — Moral attributes involved in genius . .113 Potential Genius Definition of genius. — Distinguished from ability, intelligence, etc. — Hereditary genius. — Alleged irrepressibility of genius Effect of the environment 115 X CONTENTS Page Nature. — Claims for heredity. — Supposed proofs of the irrepressibility of genius. — Impossibility of proving the contrary. — Fallacy involved. — Use of the statistical method. — Doctrine of hereditary genius not sus- tained by the facts. ^ — -Neglected factors. — Effect of crossing strains. — Stirpiculture or eugenics. — Atavism. — The stirp. — Atavistic explanation of hereditary genius. — • Mutation. — Heredity beyond the reach of human control 1 16 ; Nurture. — The post-efficients of achievement Effect of the environ- Iment. — Represents opposition. — Competition in nature. — Local distri- bution of plants Mutual repulsion. — A|daptation. — Power of nurture in plants. — Examples. — Relative claims of genius and circumstances. — Latent elements. — Genius cannot be increased. — The liberation of genius. — The actual versus the possible 122 CHAPTER IX OPPORTUNITY Gen ius a fixed^ quantity. — A social force to be utilized. — Primary means to achievgment 129 R6le of the Environment Conflicting schools. — Hero-worship versus nature-worship. — Civiliza- tion the product of human action. — The environment passive. — Man transforms it. — Synergy 130 The Agents of Civilization The agents of civilization are men. — They are few in number R6Ie of great men. — Their absence conceivable 1 — Effect of the policy of J -"'/.persecuting great men. — -JThe agents of civilrzati on n ot men of action buj men of thought. — Men of action always present. — High official position no test of greatness. — Public officers a leisure class 132 The Literature of Opportunity Includes that of both heredity and opportunity 135 The Method of Discussion. — The three methods : by thesis, by hypoth- esis, and by synthesis. — The statistical method 135 The Discussion. — Works of Francis Galton. — His primary thesis. — 'His subsidiary thesis. — De CandoUe's History of the Sciences and of Scientific Men. — Ribot's Psychological Heredity. — ■ Galton's English Men of Science. — Papers by William James, John Fiske, and Grant Allen. — Jacoby's Selection in Man. — Joly's Psychology of Great Men. — Ward's Dynamic Sociology. — Works of Lombroso. — Odin's Genesis CONTENTS xi of Great Men. — Cooky's Genius and Fame. — Robertson's Economics of Genius .... 137 Environmental Factors De Candolle on the influence of the environment. — His twenty causes favorable to the development of men of science. — Classification of en- vironmental factors. — The fallacy of statistics. — Scope of Odin's work. — Number of French men of letters. — Merit, talent, and genius . . 145 The Physical Environment. — Climate. — Mesology. — Physical con- ' ditions of France. — Distribution of men of letters according to physical conditions. — Tabular view by departments. — By provinces. — By regions. — Small effec t of the physical environment . 148 The Ethnological Environment. — Race influence on genius. — Races of France. — ^ Gauls, Cimbrians, Iberians, Ligurians, Belgians. — Genius not perceptibly affected by this race distribution. — Races speaking other languages than French. — Basque, Flemish, Breton, German, Italian Result still negative. — Regions outside of France. — Belgium, Alsace- Lorraine. — Genius equal in all races . 156 The Religious Environment. — Effect of different religions on the pro- duction of great men Christianity and. Judaism. — Catholicism and Protestantism. — Effect of religious pers^cution.A — Celibate clergy. — Great men who were sons of Protestant clergymen. — Leisure secured by celibacy. — Effegt of family life. — Statistics of the subject. — Discussion of the statistics" ./?r,,;,-.,v .j-^^a ..Ur.'y i ^'^. .......tj/. -otli^ ■ ' ' -^^ - ii^Xf'l- , ,^ The Local Enviro7iment. — Neglected factors. — Density of popula- tion. — Views of Comte, Spencer, Durkheim, Coste, Jacoby. — Jacoby's J sTaffstics. — Percentage of urban population. — Tabular view. — Com- parison with Odin's table. — Discussion of Jacoby's table His dis- appointment. — His illogical speculations Failure of his theory. — Wide-spread belief that most great men are born in the country. — Odin's tables. — Great prevalence of city-born. — Number born in chateaux. . — ■ Comparisons of city- and country-born. — Number of men of letters per 100,000 inhabitants. — Influence of great cities.,— The real environmental P, / ^3 - — factors. — Discussion of the tables. — Women of letters. — Similar results ^.; ' r ^ '-h**^ e^'^^Bwi-tttA for other countries 169 ""Irj The Economic Environment. — Difficulty of determining the economic factor Most great men of history wealthy. — Tendency of biographers to exaggerate the hardships 'undergone. — Economic condition of great academicians. — Prevalence of the well-to-do. — French men of letters. — Rich and poor compa?e3".— Nuniefrcal""ihsignificance of the latter. — Wealth no bar to genius. — Genius is in things . . . ig8 The Social Environment. — Parallelism of Jhe_econojni£_and social environments. — Classification of occupations Galton's questions and Xll CONTENTS Page answers. — Odin's classification. — Numerical relations of the different classes. — Preponderance o f men o f high social station. — Numerical insignificance of the laboring class. — NumBer relative to population. — Similar results for other countries 204 The Educational Environment. — False views prevailing. — - Influence of cities due to their educational facilities. — All environments favorable in proportion as they are educational. — How the local, economic, and social environments become educational. — False views of Spencer and Ribot Odin's table of educated and uneducated men of letters. — Nu- merical insignificance of the latter. — List of uneducated men of letters. — Shown that other environments were substitutes for the educational. — Similar results for other countries. — Po ssibility of c reating me n of geniu s at_ will dem onstr ated ...211 Prospective Investigations. ■ — Odin's method should be extended to other countries and other kinds of genius. — Especially to scientific inves- tigators. — Suggestions as to procedure. — Defects of biography. — Mer- cenary biographical schemes. — Their pernicious effects. — Society should undertake the work. — Other institutions that might conduct it. — The Carnegie Institution of Washington 221 CHAPTER X THE LOGIC OF OPPORTUNITY The factors recapitulated. — They are all neglected factors .... 224 The Resources of Society f^T <'^<4— Native ability uniformly distributed. — Most of it latent. — Galton's estimate of the number of men of genius in society. — Number as shown by Odin's tables. — Great inequalities of the local environment indicate possibilities. ^ — Compared to mineral resources. — Great range in fecundity. Vr<^ — Paris and the chateaux. — The maximum the test of the possible '&<. .^ , The different environments considered. — Society c annot control the local, economic, and social environments. — It can control the educational envi- ronment. — Proof that the fecundity of society in men ofgenius can be artificially increased a hundredfold. — What wom en may c ontri bute. — T, There are all gradations in human abilities. — Negative effects of environ- p me nts. — Sporadic character of achievement. — The movement should be uniform and universal 224 The Fallacy of History \ y Definition of history. — Ignores causation Appeals to curiosity. — Biography a form of history. — Deals with heroes as exceptional beings. i-O ■ CONTENTS xiii The fallacy of history is the same as that of statistics and of super- stition 234 Relativity of Genius. — Comparison of the mind at birth to a blank^/ .,- . sheet of paper. — R61e of experience. — Comparison with soil. — Abun- dance of native capacity. — Why genius seems to be on the decline, ^fttt '' '/ -' Appearance of transition grades. — This the tendency of all science . . 236 Genius present in all Classes. — Rise of great men from obscurity. — Examples. — These prove that genius exists in all classes. — Other proofs. — The same facts prove that much genius is latent ... 239 , Not Genius but Achievement. — The prevailing point of view false, -p ' ^■''Z.'^.. Routine w ork importan t. — Al l wo rk mental. — All men capable of doing / ."' / ; / good work. — Its value proportional to intelligence. — Number of scien- tific authors Inadequacy of facilities for research. — Serious investiga- tors needed 241 Leisure as Opportunity ;t« 9^/cy_jr^^~^-.j Leisure a means of edu cation . — The leisure class. — How leisure has been attained. — Only a small part of it utilized ... 242 The Instinct of Workmanship. — Mr. Veblen's use of the expression. — The dynamic quality of leisure. — The horrors of ennui. — -A certain amount of leisure will always be devoted to achievement. — Adversity not needed as a' spur to activity . ., 243 Education as Opportunity // J: . < Education essential to a literary career. — For a scientific career it should take the form of training. — Anthology of education. — Views of Galton, Leibnitz, Helvetius, Condorcet, Mazzini, Kant, Comte, Broca, Macaulay, Napoleon, Washington, Jefferson, Kidd 246 Success implies Opportunity All who have attaineg eminence have had their opportunity. — The wide-spread belief that opportunity presents itself once to all. — Not true. — Involves the fallacy of history 251 Alleged Self-made Men The subject greatly exaggerated. — The number small. — Examples : D'Alembert. — Scaliger. — Burns. — Bun- yan. — Haydn. — Opportunity versus accident and luck. — Examples: Shakespeare, Moli^re, Corneille, Rousseau. — The sixteen uneducated French men of letters. — The eighteen indigent French men of letters Shown that some fortuitous circumstance constituted the opportunity of each. — Case of Herbert Spencer .... 252 Privileged Men. — Their relative abundance. -— Typical examples. — Descartes. — Newton. — Darwin. — Adam Smith Galileo. — Hobbes. — Harvey. — Buckle. — Cooley's lists. — Other examples. — They have i/S-«^ty eA*^^6<£.ss^'' — ■_ ■ --t^:-^ r^tt^2.^y^^^ ^"UMy^ -J.J^'^^ XIV CONTENTS Page done the work of the highest grade. — The finest types of genius will not work against opposition. — They require that opportunity be brought to them. — Importance of giving exceptional persons a chance. — The " ex- ceptional man " theory. — Society makes no effort to utilize exceptional talent 261 The Power of Circumstances False popular ideas. — Mind not the same as brain or intellect. — Intel- ~T-^ ^ ligence. — Mind includes its contents. — Metaphorical illustration. — Con- tents of mind. — Mind without experience. — • Wild men. — Language of nature. — Experience infinitely varied. — Circumstances determine the contents of the mind. — Similarity of intellects Views of Adam Smith, Helvetius, de Candolle, Mill. — The factor opportunity Ancients yer- '?, 'Z sus moderns 267 The Mother of Circumstances. — The expression defined. — Effect of raising children of civilized parents among uncivilized peoples. — Of different environments in civilized countries. — An outlook the prime essential 274 Equalization of Opportunity Di fferences in tastes gr eater than in talents. — Adaptability to distaste- 1 ful pursuits — Economy_ in woxking_.in.Jharmpny with one's tastes. -'^''•a .'^ Mediocrity should not be ignored. — The plea for equal opportunity f " *^ '■ usually from the economic standpoint. — Views of Sumner, Topinard, ^ / , ^ "^ Gunton, Kidd. — ^The economic end Haste to deal with ends to the neglect of means. — Ends attainable only through means The series of means to the ultimate end. — The initial means. — Equalization of oppor- tunity a means. — Equalization of intelligence the means to all other equal- izations 276 PART III — IMPROVEMENT CHAPTER XI RECONCILIATION OF ACHIEVEMENT WITH IMPROVEMENT Achieve ment versus improve ment. — Actual achievement belongs to pure, potential to applied sociology. — Does civilization improve society ? — ^Conflicting views. — How society improves Improvement should at least equal achievement. — Society incapable of appreciating achievement. — Science and art in advance of popular knowledge. — The public interested only in the practical advantages of science 285 CONTENTS XV Ethical Character of all Science Page The purpose of science The coldest thinking leads to the warmest feeling — Employment of the indirect method. — Views of Bacon, Des- cartes, Huxley, Adam Smith, Malthus, Cunningham, Comte, Ratzenhofer, Schaeffle, Durkheim, Espinas, Worms, Coste. — Those who achieve intend to improve . — Why soc iety fails to assimilate achievement.. — Altru- ism an unreliable principle. — Power alone effective T't" . 287 Assimilation of Achievement A plausible objection If society cannot assimilate the present output what could it do with a g reater ? — The "exceptional man'' principle would increase the evil. — Social inequalities artificial. — The several environments wholly artificial All objections based on the current false philosophy of genius. — The great need is_a. marketjor achievement. — The case similar to that of economic production Fallacy of overpro- duction. — More consumers_wanted Equal opportunities would secure this^ — Consumption of intellectual as of material products yields satis- faction. — In creased satisfa ction is improvemao L. — This would bring about the recojjciliatiqn of achievement with improvement 292 CHAPTER XII METHOD OF APPLIED SOCIOLOGY Little use to suggest methods They are always subject to trial. — Unreasonable demands for methods Certain to be disappointed. — Treat- ment must be very general. — Subject dealt with in earlier works. — Grant Allen's criticisms. — ^ The word "education." — Restricted meaning given to it Former treatment synthetic. — Present treatment analytic. — Har- mony of the two methods. — Positive education 296 Administration of the Social Estate The problem that of finding the heirs to human achievement. — All entided to share alike. — The share of each is^the whole estate. — Social continuity How the social heritage has been distributed. — Parts which f-, "' ' ';_ are equitably divided. — Parts which are not. — Classification. — The general includes the special. — The latter need not be attended to. — • Minds possessing general truths can dispose of special ones 300 TAe Order of Nature. — The most general knowledge the most practical. — Shouldbe presented in its logical order. — The logical order is that^qf causal connection. — Causality. — ^Pedagogic value of the principle. — The sciences are so many general truths. — They should be taught in their naturnl order The six sciences which embrace all truth. — Natural XVI CONTENTS Page ordeLi!LwhJchJhejr_s.tan.i.^ Should be studied in that order. — Other sciences fall under these. — Neglect of this canon. —r Exceptions. — Mathematics and logic. — The instruments of education. — Reading, writing, calculus 3°2 The Diffusion of Knowledge. — Recapitulation of the method. — Society cannot_be^ expected to increase the amount_DLknavvledge.-3jts.Juc£ilon is to distribute.existiiig^^ knQwkdge. — Value of knowledge progressively greater as universality is approached. — Dangerous in the hands of a few. — Most disputes arise over things known to some Mind essentially altruistic. — How intellectual altruism is manifested. — Private institutions of learning. — False views of education. — Insufficiency of educational institutions The conferring of knowledge not considered a part of education. — Definitions of education • Report of the Committee of Ten. — Vague, meaningless expressions. — Erroneous conceptions. — Educational value of mathematics and history exaggerated. — Value of science Education of the dangerous classes. — Inhabitants of the slums the intellectual equals of the higher classes. — Criminals are the geniuses of the slums. — Difference wholly in the environment. — -Irra- tional methods employed. — Slums unnecessary. — Wild men, like wild animals, must be tamed while young. — The problem simply calls for social ingenuity 307 CHAPTER XIII PROBLEMS OF APPLIED SOCIOLOGY The equalization of intelligence the only live problem It is a practical problem. — If solved all other problems would solve themselves. — Yet^this is not recognized as a problem. — The recognized problems are insoluble If solved they would not stay solved Why then discuss them? — Because this is expected. — Pictures of the future. — Dangers involved in this. — Utopias Danger of underestimating the future. — . Certainty of misinterpreting it. — Moral reforms. — The real moral prog- ress. — Looking backward 314 Ethical Sociology Illogical use of ethics by Comte and Spencer. — Not a science of the hierarchy. — In both their systems ethics is simply applied sociology. — It belongs to the new ethics. — All reformatory schemes based on the supposed permanence of existing intellectual inequalities. — The removal of these inequalities the only remedy that sociology can offer . . . .317 Privative Ethics. — Ethics now chiefly confined to the phenomena of privation The economic struggle for existence. — Current fallacies and their refutation Man'scontrol of physical and of social forces Contrasted. CONTENTS xvii I' • — The compet itivesystem. — Supposed necessity for the motive of gain. — Superficial character of this view Other things to struggle for. — Competition on a higher plane becomes emulation. — Social classes that are now free from the economic struggle. — The biologic law. — Creates a surplus only to destroy it. — Mortality of rich and poor Statistics The surplus appear to die of disease. — Really killed by privation Reproduction in inverse ratio to intelligence. — Statistics Underlying causes. — Efforts to prevent decline in population. — Such decline favors the law of conquest and subjugation. — A low birthrate a mark of civiliza- tion Chiefly due to hard social conditions Removal of these would restore the normal fecundity of the race To what extent society is responsible for privation. — Private altruism no remedy. — • Prevailing idea that the majority of mankind are weaklings. — Their legitimate power the true remedy 318 Positive Ethics. — Little attention paid to it. — Attention chiefly centered on negative and privative ethics. — These both temporary phases. — Posi- . tive ethics a permanent phase. — Society now in a pain economy. — Positive/ ethics represents a pleasure economy. — Dependence of human happiness! upon material conditions. — Demands freedom from restraint. — ThisV largely secured through material goods. — Demand for increased produc- tion. — Inadequacy of existing wealth. — Fallacy of overproduction Extent to which production should be increased Increased consump- tion the real desideratum. — Normal versus ostentatious consumption. — The standard of living requires to be raised. — Consumption is enjoyment. — New wants and their satisfaction Function of the fine arts Greater fullness of life. — No necessary limit to the duration of this higher state. — Youth of the planet Comparison with the planet Mars Geologic time limits Vast possibilities of both human achievement and social improvement 326 The Principle of Attraction Applied so ciology capable of reduction to rigid scientific principles. — The fundamentalprincij^ of physical investigation is attraction. — Metaphysical versus practical uses of the word. — Action at a distance. — Attraction common to all phenomena. — Constitutes the basis of invention Applicable to animal activities. — Psychics. — Social exper- imentation and invention 331 Attractive Labor. — Views of Fourier, Comte, Mill, Spencer. — Cause of the odium of labor. — Normal exercise of the faculties. — Can be secured through social action 334 Attractive Legislation. — Treatment of the subject in earlier works This its systematic place. — Efficiency of social organization. — Auto- cratic and democratic legislation. — Conditions to social inventiveness. xviu CONTENTS Page — Scientific legislation. — Sociological laboratories. — Legislation is properly sociological experimentation and invention. — Removal of social friction. — Avoidance of compulsion Relief of privations. — Increase of social welfare. — Organization of happiness. — Conservation of social energy. — Increased production. — Its equitable distribution. — Enhanced social efficiency. — Social improvement 337 List of Authors and Titles of Works, Articles, and Memoirs, quoted or cited, with critical and explanatory Notes 341 Index 367 LIST OF PLATES Plate I. Map showing the Fecundity of the Departments of France in Men of Letters 151 Plate II. Map showing the Fecundity of the Provinces of France in Men of Letters 153 Plate III. Map showing the Fecundity of the seven recognized Regions of France in Men of Letters 155 Plate IV. Map showing the Relative Fecundity of the Urban and Rural Population of France in Men of Letters 192 Plate V. Chart showing the Relative Fecundity of the Urban and Rural Population of France in Men of Letters 194 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY Part I MOVEMENT Agir par affection et penser pour agir. — AuGUSTE Comte. CHAPTER I RELATION OF PURE TO APPLIED SOCIOLOGY Toute science a deux parties : une partie rationelle, pure, qui dtudie la forme la plus gdn^rale et abstraite des ph&omfenes respectifs, et une partie appliqu^e qui dtudie leur forme concrete et ddtaill^e. La distinction rigoureuse entre ces deux parties, acceptde dans les sciences physiques, tend de plus en plus k s'introduire dans le domaine des sciences sociales. — Leon WiniArsky. The terms "pure" and "applied" should be used in the same sense in social science as in all other sciences. Any apparent differ- ences should be such only as grow out of the nature of social science as the most complex of all sciences, and hence the most difficult to reduce to exact formulas. It is important, therefore, to gain at the outset a clear conception of what is meant by these terms, and espe- cially of the essential distinction between pure and applied sociology. Before proceeding, therefore, to set forth the principles of applied sociology at length, it may be well briefly to define the two branches with the special object of rendering this distinction clear. Pure Sociology Pure sociology is simply a scientific inquiry into the actual con- dition of society. It alone can yield true social self-consciousness. It answers the questions What, Why, and How, by furnishing the facts, the causes, and the principles of sociology. It is a means of self-orientation. When men know what they are, what forces have molded them into their present shape and character, and according to what principles of nature the creative and trans- forming processes have operated, they begin really to understand themselves. Not only is a mantle of charity thrown over every- thing that exists, such as virtually to preclude all blame, but a rational basis is now for the first time furnished for considering to what extent and in what manner things that are not in all respects what they would like to have them may be put in the way of 3 4 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I such modification as will bring them more into harmony with the desired state. At least it thus, and only thus, becomes possible to distinguish between those social conditions which are susceptible of modification through human action and those that are practically unalterable or are beyond the reach of human agency. , In this way an enormous amount of energy otherwise wasted can be saved and concentrated upon the really feasible. But by far the most important effect of the knowledge furnished by pure sociology is that of showing the difficulty of modifying certain conditions which are not absolutely unalterable, but which, without such knowledge, are supposed capable of easy alteration. In most such cases those who imagine themselves to be sufferers from their presence believe that certain others have them under their control and might alter or abolish them if they were willing to do so. This is the source of the greater part of the bitter class animosity in society.. In other words, the most important lesson that pure sociology teaches is that of the great stability of social struc- tures. But it also teaches that few if any social structures are wholly incapable of modification, and the further truth is revealed that in most cases such structures, though they cannot be changed by the direct methods usually applied, may be at least gradually transformed by indirect methods and the adoption of the appropriate means. Applied sociology, therefore, rests upon pure sociology. If it has any scientific character at all, it presupposes it and proceeds entirely from it. In so far as the idea of reform inheres in applied sociology it can bear no fruit except it so proceeds. Reform may be defined as the desirable modification of social structures. Any attempt to do this must be based on a full knowledge of the nature of such structures, otherwise its failure is certain. Such knowl- edge includes an acquaintance with the history of the structures to be affected. This history must go back to a time when the structures were not injurious but useful. It must go back to the period of their development in response to external and internal stimuli. Such a period there must have been in every case, other- wise the structures could never have come into existence. In the prosecution of such a research it will not do to be deceived by names. The names of institutions change, sometimes, after ceasing Ch. I] RELATION OF PURE TO APPLIED SOCIOLOGY 5 to be longer in harmony with social conditions, acquiring forms descriptive of their real or supposed evil character. Applied soci- ology looks beneath all this and learns from pure sociology what was their origin, what has been their complete history, and what is their true nature. With such data the question of their modifi- cation through the conscious action of society can be intelligently considered, and if, as is usually the case, they cannot be immedi- ately abolished or abruptly changed, the way is made plain for the adoption of indirect means that will secure their gradual transfor- mation and the elimination of their anti-social elements. All this would mean a complete change in the whole method of reform. With the idea of reform has always thus far been asso- ciated that of heat rather than light. Reforms are supposed to emanate from the red end of the social spectrum and to be the product of its thermic and not of its luminous rays. But the method of passion and vituperation produces no effect. It is characteristic of the unscientific method to advocate and of the scientific method to investigate. However ardent the desire for reform may be, it can only be satisfied by dispassionate inquiry, and the realization of the warmest sentiments is only possible through the coldest logic. There either is or has been good in everything. No institution is an unmixed evil. Most of those (such as slavery, for example) that many would gladly see abolished entirely, are defended by some. But both the defenders and the assailants of such institutions usually neglect their history and the causes that created them. The hortatory method deals with theses and antitheses, while the scientific method deals with syntheses. Only by the latter method is it possible to arrive at the truth common to both. Only thus can a rational basis be reached for any effective action looking to the amelioration of social conditions. Applied Sociology Just as pure sociology aims to answer the questions What, Why, and How, so applied sociology aims to answer the question What for. The former deals with facts, causes, and principles, the latter with the object, end, or purpose. The one treats the subject-matter of 6 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I sociology, the other its use. However theoretical pure sociology may be in some of its aspects, applied sociology is essentially practical. It appeals directly to interest. It has to do with social ideals, with ethical considerations, with what ought to be. While pure soci- ology treats of the "spontaneous development of society," applied sociology "deals with artificial means of accelerating the sponta- neous processes of nature." ^ The subject-matter of pure sociology is achievement, that of applied sociology is improvement. The for- mer relates to the past and the present, the latter to the future. Achievement is individual, improvement is social. Applied sociology takes account of artificial phenomena consciously and intentionally directed by society to bettering society. Improvement is social achievement. In pure sociology the point of view is wholly objec- tive. It may be said to relate to social function. In applied soci- ology the point of view is subjective. It relates to feeling, — the collective well-being. In pure sociology the desires and wants of men are considered as the motor agencies of society. In applied sociology they are considered as sources of enjoyment through their satisfaction. The distinction is similar to that between production and consumption in economics. Indeed, applied sociology may be said to deal with social utility as measured by the satisfaction of desire. In the analysis of a dynamic action made in Chapter XI of Pure Sociology, the only one of the three effects upon which it was found necessary to dwell was the direct effect of the action in transforming the environment. In applied sociology the only one of these effects considered is the one that was there put first, viz., that of satisfying the desire of the individual. In other words, while in pure sociology the constructive direct effects of human effort only were dealt with, in applied sociology it is the success of such efforts in supplying human wants that is taken into account. /^ All applied science is necessarily anthropocentric. Sociology is especially so. The old anthropocentric theory which taught that the universe was specially planned in the interest of man is not only false but pernicious in discouraging human effort. But true, scientific anthropocentrism is highly progressive, since it teaches that the universe, although very imperfectly adapted to man's 1 Pure Sociology, p. 431. Ch. I] RELATION OF PURE TO APPLIED SOCIOLOGY 7 interests, can be so adapted by man himself. Applied sociology is chiefly concerned with enforcing this truth. Throughout the theo- logical and metaphysical stages of human thought philosophy was absorbed in the contemplation of the alleged author of nature. Pure science produced the first change of front, viz., from God to nature. Applied science constitutes a second change of front, viz., from nature to man. Nature is seen to embody utilities and effort is directed to the practical realization of these. Applied sociology differs from other applied sciences in em- bracing all men instead of a few. Most of the philosophy which claims to be scientific, if it is not actually pessimistic in denying the power of man to ameliorate his condition, is at least oligocentric in concentrating all effort on a few of the supposed dlite of mankind and ignoring or despising the great mass that have not proved their inherent superiority. The question of superiority in general will be considered later, but it may be said here that from the standpoint of applied sociology all men are really equal. Nor is this in the "x Jeffersonian sense precisely, though it is a sense akin to that, viz., that, whatever may be the differences in their faculties, all men have an equal right to the exercise and enjoyment of the faculties that they have. Applied sociology is egahtarian to the extent of aiming to secure this right for all men equally. It is not only anthropocentric but pancentric. With a few such exceptions, growing out of the nature of the science (and in this respect it does not differ from other sciences), applied sociology is entirely analogous to other applied sciences. No science can be applied unless it rests on exact mechanical princi- ples. In Pure Sociology (Chapters IX-XI) it was shown that sociology does rest on such principles. Applied sociology assumes that these principles are true, and this work is therefore based on that one and cannot even be understood by one not acquainted with that. It does not, however, follow that the reader must accept as true all the principles laid down in that work. He may question their validity to any extent. But they may be clearly understood without being accepted, and all that is maintained here is that this work cannot be understood unless the principles set forth in that one are also understood. 8 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I Science is never exactly the same thing as art. Applied science is therefore not the same as art. If it is art it is not science. A science, whether pure or applied, is a discipline that can be taught more or less fully in a class-room, not necessarily from books, but from books, lectures, and object-lessons. In most sciences, even in the pure stage, field studies are of the highest importance, and in their applied stage it becomes almost essential for the student to apply the principles directly to nature, but this is almost always done in miniature, or on a small scale, for practice only, and with- out expectation of any practical result. In this way preparation may be made for all the practical arts. But the applied sciences thus taught are not the arts themselves. Applied mathematics is not mensuration, surveying, or engineering. Applied astronomy is not navigation. Applied physics is not manufacture. Applied chem- istry is not agriculture. Applied biology leads to a great number of arts, some of which are of very recent origin. y- Comte laid down two principles, which, however much they may fall short of universality, are well worthy of attention. One was that the practical applications of the sciences increase with their complexity. This was long rejected with disdain and the superior utility of the physical forces o\'er any of the applications of vital phenomena was pointed to as its conclusive refutation. But are these forces more useful to man than those which have caused the earth to yield its cereals and fruits and have produced domestic animals.? And now, with the modern discoveries in bacteriology and kindred branches bringing their incalculable benefits to man, we may well doubt whether even electricity has proved a greater boon. The other principle was that phenomena grow more susceptible to artificial modification with the increasing complexity of the N phenomena. Comte did not illustrate this as fully as he should have done, but his main conclusion from it was that social phe- nomena are the most susceptible of all to modification. Doubts as to the validity of this principle have been less freely expressed than in case of the one last considered. But it seems to me that they are even more justifiable. Still, it depends here very much upon the point of view. The modification of social phenomena has proved very difficult, while that of physical phenomena seems Ch. I] RELATION OF PURE TO APPLIED SOCIOLOGY 9 comparatively easy. But this is a superficial view. The real reason why attempts to modify social phenomena have so often failed is that the phenomena were not understood. It is equally impossible to modify physical phenomena before they are understood. Comte < did not say that the complex sciences were more easily understood than the simple ones ; on the contrary, he constantly insists on their greater difficulty of comprehension. The principle under considera- tion, fully stated, would be that, assuming them equally well under- stood, the modifiability of phenomena is in direct proportion to their complexity. Thus stated, it may be regarded as open to discussion. No adequate attempt has yet been made either to confirm or to disprove it. I am myself disposed to accept it with certain reserves ; but this is not the place to discuss it in full. But the degree to which the application of a science to human uses becomes possible, desirable, or prominent depends rather on the nature of the science than on its position in the hierarchy. Sidereal astronomy has remained for the most part a science of pure contemplation, but there are great possibilities in astrophysics. Nearly all branches of physics have proved useful, but until the dis- covery of the X-rays spectrum analysis remained a pure science. Chemistry, though applicable to human uses in nearly all its depart- ments, has probably thus far contributed less in this direction than has physics as a whole. Biology has already been mentioned, and its possibilities are immense, but the departments now found to be the most useful are the ones that were unknown a century ago, and long remained fields of mere idle curiosity, regarded as the farthest possible removed from any practical utility. In this respect bac- teriology may be compared to electricity. Psychology is now almost exclusively a pure science, but no one dares to say that it will always remain such. That sociology may become an applied sci- ence no one will dispute who believes that it is a science at all. And although its phenomena are the most complex of all and the most difficult fully to understand, when understood, if they ever are, the results their study promises in the direction of their modifica- tion in the interest of man are beyond calculation. But applied sociology is not government or politics, nor civic or social reform. It does not itself apply sociological principles; lO APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I it seeks only to show how they may be applied. It is a science, not an art. The most that it claims to do is to lay down certain general principles as guides to social and political action. But in this it must be exceedingly cautious. The principles can consist only of the highest generalizations. They can have only the most general bearing on current events and the popular or burning ques- tions of the hour. The sociologist who undertakes to discuss these, especially to take sides on them, abandons his science and becomes a politician. A large part of Herbert Spencer's writ- ings is of this character. Much of it is to be found even in his Syn- thetic Philosophy. It only reflects his prejudices and his feelings, and is not scientific. Moreover, as I have repeatedly shown, it is not in harmony with his system as a whole, but rather in conflict with it. The same may of course be said of nearly the whole social reform movement embraced under the general term " socialism," and including the Utopian schools as well as the practical ones — Fourier as well as Karl Marx. They all seek to bring about modi- fications in social structures. They would change human institu- tions more or less radically and abruptly. While the advocates themselves do not attempt, except in a few cases on a small scale, to produce these changes, they seek to create a public sentiment in favor of such changes sufficiently general to secure them through legislation. In so far as they actually succeed in this they accomplish their end. The changes are voted or decreed and the state strives to realize them. But often the institutions fail to yield even to the power of the state, and a long struggle follows, such as France is now having with the parochial schools. But all know in how few cases the social reform party acquires political control. This is on account of the stability of social structures. In old settled countries with definite class interests, prescriptive rights, and large vested interests, this is more clearly seen than in new countries, and hence it is in these latter that social reform movements are most successful. But the statistics show that the socialist vote is increasing in all countries where it is made a political issue, and the time may arrive when the party will come into power somewhat generally. Ch. I] SUPERIORITY OF THE ARTIFICIAL 1 1 But all this is politics. It is art and not science. The sociolo- | gist has no more quarrel with any of these movements than he has ( with any other political parties, — Whig, Tory, Democrat, Repub- , lican. He observes them all, as he does all social phenomena, but they only constitute data for his science. All that he objects > to is that any of these things be called sociology. Misarchism, i anarchism, and socialism are programs of political action, negative ! or positive, and belong to the social art. They are not scientific theories or principles and do not belong to social science. Superiority of the Artificial Applied sociology proceeds on the assumption of the superiority'^ of the artificial to the natui^al. In this, however, it does not differ from any other applied science. What is the meaning of applied science if it be not that it teaches how natural phenomena may be modified by artificial means so as to render them more useful or less injurious to man ? The wind that blows over the land, though sometimes destructive, may be useful in many ways, but it will not grind corn. By the adoption of the prOper artificial means it may be made to grind corn. As it blows over the sea, though a greater source of danger, it may by artificial devices be made to propel vessels and even to guide them. Water, coming in almost inex- haustible quantities from the, mountains or highlands of the interior of large continents, is useful even within the banks of rivers, but by the use of the proper artificial means its usefulness can be mul- tiplied a thousandfold. The same is true of every other element in nature, — wood, clay, stone, metals, light, heat, electricity. The last-named element represents the most extreme case. Although it pervades all space, it produces no appreciable effect except in its violent manifestations as lightning, where the effect is destructive of everything in its way. The whole of its beneficial influence is due to artificial devices. These have been secured through the prolonged study of both the pure and the applied science. There are some illustrations of the superiority of the artificial outside of the arts proper. One only need be mentioned. Modern languages generally, and the English language in particular; have 12 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I their individual words more arbitrary than those of the ancient lan- guages. They have less intrinsic meaning and consist more com- pletely of mere symbols. On this account they are more plastic and capable of expressing much finer shades of meaning. But an arbitrary word or a symbol is an artificial product. It is a tool of the mind, devised by the genius of man. It may be said that such words, like everything else in language, are unconsciously devel- oped, and are therefore genetic products. This may be admitted, but it forms no entire exception to other arts, such, for example, as pottery. In fact, the conquest of nature as sketched in the nineteenth chapter of Pure Sociology was mainly a genetic proc- ess, but was only possible through the constant exercise of the telic faculty of man. It was the product of individual telesis, and this has always been at work in the formation of language as in all other civihzing processes. A single example may also be adduced in the domain of collective telesis. Society has also made more or less use of the principle of the superiority of the artificial. In the animal world we see con- stant illustrations of what is commonly called natural justice, and jurists, statesmen, and philosophers habitually contrast this with what they call civil justice. But natural or animal justice is of course no justice at all, but the absence of justice. There is no natural justice, and all justice is artificial. This constitutes one of the best illustrations of the principle under consideration, arid it is especially appropriate here as belonging strictly within the field of applied sociology. CHAPTER II THE EFFICACY OF EFFORT / Progress is not automatic, in the sense that if we were all to be cast into a deep slumber for the space of a generation, we should arouse to find ourselves in a greatly improved social state. The world only grows better, even in the moderate degree in which it does grow better, because people wish that it should, and take the right steps to make it better. — John Morley. In the eleventh chapter of Pure Sociology it is shown that the /' most important principle of social dynamics is effort. But its dynamic effect, from the standpoint of pure sociology, is uncon- scious, unintended, and undesired. The social development that results from it is spontaneous. Applied sociology assumes that effort is consciously and intentionally directed to the improvement of social conditions. A certain school maintains that all such effort is ineffectual ; that it is in the nature of interfering with the forces that are causing natural or spontaneous social development, and is therefore detrimental. It is rarely stated in so general a form and is usually narrowed down to the question of interference by the state with the efforts of individuals. It then goes by the name of the doctrine of laissez faire. The usual form of stating this doc- trine is that the interest of the individual is the same as that of the public, and therefore the public interest is only secured by the free activity of the individual. No one has gone to the extreme length, however, of defending criminal action under this rule, and therefore the qualification called the law of "equal freedom" is always made. The defenders of this doctrine have not been content to limit it to the ordinary cases of interference with the activities of individ- uals, which would have little to do with applied sociology, but they i extend it to include all collective action except that which is mani- | festly essential to the protection of society. All initiative on the part of society — or, as they usually say, the State, or the " govern- { ment " — is condemned as involving interference with the activities \ 13 14 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I of individuals. On the part of scientific men the study of evolution in general, and social evolution in particular, has given rise to a sort of scientific pessimism. The prolonged contemplation of purely spontaneous processes evolving highly developed products leads to complete distrust of all claims on the part of man to any power to accomplish similar results. It is so glaringly obvious that no human effort can create even the simplest form of organic life that the conclusion is at once drawn that all attempts to transform nature artificially are vain and visionary. The latest teachings of modern science have thus thrown a sort of pall over the human mind and introduced a new philosophy, — a philosophy of despair, it may be called, because it robs its adherents of all hope in any conscious alteration of the course of nature with respect to man, and denies the efficacy of effort. Those who take the narrower view and condemn the efforts of society to ameliorate its condition do not content themselves with denying all efficacy in such efforts. This would at least be logical and would compel the advocates of social initiative to prove that such efforts may be successful. But the defenders of laissez fcnre almost uniformly take another step, fatal to their fundamental position, and insist that the interference which they condemn is injurious and pernicious in preventing in some way the successful operation of the benign tendencies of spontaneous natural law. This of course involves the admission of the efficacy of effort, and reduces them to demonstrating that the admitted effects must neces- sarily be injurious. The main and really difficult task of proving the efficacy of social effort is therefore already performed by the laissez faire school. It is not difficult to prove that social effort may have beneficial as well as injurious effects. To have simply maintained the futility, i.e., the complete inefficacy, of social action would have been hardly worth the trouble of condemning it. If it were always wholly without effect and things remained precisely the same after as before, the only rational attitude would be to smile at it as simply wasted effort on the part of deluded people, the same as we smile at the man who spends his whole life in try- ing to invent perpetual motion.' But this has never been the atti- tude of the laissez faire school They have always condemned Ch. II] THE EFFICACY OF EFFORT 1 5 social action with warmth and usually denounced it with vehe- mence as something calculated to do great harm. Indeed, a long list of its mischievous effects has been drawn up and is constantly appealed to. No better arguments could be desired by the defend- ers of social action. The fact is that the laissez faire doctrine is an ex parte doctrine. It looks at only one side of a two-sided fact. To a large extent it is arguing without an opponent. Most, though by no means all, of the counts of its indictment are admitted by those who believe in social action. The facts on the other side are almost too familiar to be enumerated and set off against the above- mentioned list. They are far more numerous and important, and their influence for good is immeasurably greater, than the sum total of evil that has resulted from the admittedly frequent mistakes that society has made in its attempts to control social phenomena in its interest. For it is such mistakes that constitute the whole indictment of the laissez faire school. I know of no one who has pointed this out or attempted to show as a part of the argument what the beneficial effects of social action have been. From the great prominence which the individualistic philosophy \ <( has assumed, especially in France and England, since the time of \ the French physiocrats, it is commonly supposed that the general class of ideas upon which it rests has become the prevailing doc- trine in these countries and America. There could be no greater mistake than this. While probably the great majority of intelli-i gent persons either avowedly or tacitly subscribe to the doctrine ini its main aspects, the fundamental, or as it may be called, subcon- scious, opinion is everywhere opposed to it. This is proved by the entire history of legislation during that period. The doctrine was undoubtedly salutary at the outset, and it is more or less useful still. It was primarily directed against the pretensions of a class. The action taken by that class can be called social action only in the sense that under all circumstances "the powers that be" actually represent society. That they do so represent it in one sense must be admitted, although, as everybody knows, in view of the general inertia and conservatism of mankind and of the advan- tage which long tenure and the command of national resources secures to the ruling class, that class may continue in power long 1 6 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I after it has ceased to represent society in a more literal sense. The social action against which the new economy was aimed was largely the action of a relatively few individuals. It was egoistic and not social, and had become well-nigh intolerable. The new economy of laissez faire, laissez passer was much nearer to the social idea of the time, and it succeeded, though not without a violent revolution in France, in ultimately embodying itself in the state. From the date of this triumph of society over a class, state action in these countries and in all those that have grown out of them has approximated true social action as nearly as could well be expected. The fundamental error of the modern laissez faire school has been that of confounding the present state of the world with the state of the world in the eighteenth century. The civilized world, by whatever name its governments may be called, is virtually democratic, and state action, in the long run at least, is social action in a nearly literal sense. Now ever since society thus took the reins into its own hands, and far more than during the previous period when it placed them in the hands of a class, it has steadily been taking the initiative, assuming responsibilities, undertaking various enterprises, and tak- ing over into its own control one after another a great array of industries and functions that had hitherto been intrusted to indi- viduals. Economists who have been studying only the political economy of the close of the eighteenth century are alarmed at this, mistaking it for the usurpations of a ruling class, and over- looking the fact that it is true social action. Every step taken in this direction is in response to a public demand. Indeed, society is naturally, conservative, and no such step is taken until the demand is practically unanimous and irresistible. The very ones who most strongly call for social action would probably admit the laissez faire doctrine in the abstract, but it has no influence on them when it conflicts with their interests. Nor can it be said that all this social initiative has been fruitless. Scarcely a step taken in this direction, from the management of the public finances to the transmission of letters, packages, and messages, has ever been reversed, and the greater part of them Ch. 11] THE EFFICACY OF EFFORT 17 have proved so obviously beneficial that they are looked upon as much in the light of social necessities as is the public administra- tion of criminal law, once also left to "private enterprise." What the laissez faire economists have done is to go over the long series of these social achievements and cull out a relatively small number of relatively unimportant ones which they declare to have been failures or to be doing harm to society. These are held up as the sufficient proof of the evils of social initiative. Some of them are doubtless failures, and one of the supposed fatal blows against the movement is the number of laws that have actually been repealed, as not accomplishing their purpose. Do not these rather show the wisdom of society in promptly correcting its mistakes when they are found to be such ? A full and candid survey of this field, however, shows that society has always been marching forward in the one irreversible direction, and that its achievements are already multitudinous and of the utmost importance. Social achievement has been the con- dition to individual achievement, and all forms of achievement are at once the products and the proofs of the efficacy of effort. I The "miserable laissez-faire"'^ which seeks to check this natural flow of social energy has bee^> appropriately called "moral curare"^ and "social Nirvana."^ jOver against this doctrine of laissez faire, which is now only a doctrine, stands that of faire marcher^ which has always been a policy, and without the recognition of which there could be no science of applied sociology. 1 Herbert Spencer, Justice, p. 44. 2 Alfred Fouillee, L'Evolutionnisme des idees-forces, Paris, 1890, Introduction, p. Ixxix. 'Ludwig Stein, Wesen und Aufgabe der Sociologie, Berlin, 1898, p. 26 (Abdruck a.d. Archiv f. syst. Philosophie, Bd. IV). ■• This expression is probably as old as the laissez faire of De Goumay. I have met with it several times (see Guizot, Histoire generale de la civilisation en Europe, p. 27). not always in precisely the sense in which it is used here. It was' revived in this sense by Dr. B. E. Femow in his address as vice-president of Section I of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Springfield meeting, 1895 (s^^ '^^ Proceedings, Vol. XLIV, pp. 332, 334 ; Science, N.S., Vol. II, August 30,, 189s, pp. 257, 258). CHAPTER III END OR PURPOSE OF SOCIOLOGY I think I do not err in assuming that, however diverse their views on philo- sophical and religious matters, most men are agreed that the proportion of good and evil in life may be very sensibly affected by human action. I never heard anybody doubt that the evil may be thus increased, or diminished; and it would seem to follow that good must be similarly susceptible of addition or subtraction. Finally, to my knowledge, nobody professes to doubt that, so far forth as we possess a power of bettering things, it is our paramount duty to use it and to train all our intellect and energy to this supreme service of our kind. — Huxley. Humanum paucis vivit genus. — Lucanus. Progress versus Evolution We have already seen that while the subject-matter of pure sociology is achievement, the subject-matter of applied sociology is improvement. The word " progress " is ambiguous. Learned dis- sertations have been written to prove that the idea of progress, either organic or social, is a purely objective conception and has no reference to the production of more agreeable states of feeling in the beings considered." This is the burden of the argument of Spencer's well-known essay on Progress, its Law and Cause. He says: Social progress is supposed to consist in the produce of a greater quantity and variety of the articles required for satisfying men's wants ; in the increas- ing security of person and property ; in the widening freedom of action enjoyed : whereas, rightly understood, social progress consists in those changes of structure in the social organism which have entailed these consequences. The current conception is a teleological one. The phenomena are contem- plated solely as bearing on human happiness. Only those changes are held to constitute progress which directly or indirectly tend to heighten human happi- ness. And they are thought to constitute progress simply because they tend to heighten human happiness. But rightly to understand Progress, we must inquire what is the nature of these changes, considered apart from our interests.^ 1 Westminster Review, Vol. LVII (N.S., Vol. XI), April i, 1857, pp. 445-446. 18 Ch.III] WELTSCHMERZ ig He goes on to show that "organic progress consists in a change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous," and says that "this law of organic progress is the law of all progress." If this and not the other be the true definition of progress, then applied sociology does not deal with progress. It belongs to pure sociology. In dealing with that branch I have even gone farther than Spencer, , arid shown that perfection of structure is only a means to the ulterior end of converting the maximum quantity of inorganic into organic matter. ^ It seems to be a question of the proper meaning of the word "progress." I should say that development or evolu- tion would here suit the case better, and social progress may still have as at least one of its definitions the one I gave it in Dynamic Sociology,^ which is practically that to which Mr. Spencer objected. It will be seen that Spencer did not deny that structural progress may be attended by an increase in agreeable states of sentient beings including men, but most other writers of his school do very emphatically deny it. It would be easy to fill a volume with citations 'from Adam Smith, Helvetius, Comte, Schopenhauer, Hartmann, Tolstoi, Durkheim, and others, to the effect that the poor, lowly, and undeveloped classes of society are happier than the rich and intellectually endowed. The " paradox of hedonism," or the formula that to get happiness one must forget it, usually ascribed to John Stuart Mill, but clearly expressed by Kant, belongs to the same class of ideas. Weltschmerz The pessimists (Schopenhauer, Hartmann, etc.) deny that there is any remedy for the woes of the world, and as misery increases with social and intellectual development, which they admit to be taking place, the condition of the world will continue to grow worse indefinitely. Some sociologists even incline to that view. Gumplowicz, for example, while admitting the possibility of some amelioration in the condition of mankind in the remote future, thinks that future so remote as to be outside of all practical considerations, like the speculations relative to the ultimate 1 Pure Sociology, pp. 113, 114- ' Vol. I, p. 67 ; Vol. II, pp. 161, 174. 20 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I withdrawal of the sun's heat and the secular destruction of all life, — a sort of geological, astronomical, or cosmical speculation about events that may happen millions of years hence. ^ Even this, as private letters from him state, is only his public declaration. Esoterically he goes almost as far as Hartmann, but declines to utter his whole thought to the world, for the reason, as he says, that it might do harm, and also because he admits the possibility that he may be wrong, — noble motives, as all must freely confess. The socialists admit the most that is claimed by the pessimists, but differ from them chiefly in believing that the bad state of things can be remedied by their various specifics. Unfortunately there are many of these, and each school claims that its own par- ticular specific is not only a certain cure but the only cure. It is not probable that any or all of them would have the desired effect if tried, and society does not seem to be ready to give any of them a trial, at least at present. That, however, is no argument against them, and it would be well if a few sincere trials of them could be made to enable scientific sociologists to watch the result. Just as the speculative philosophers tell us that with refinement of phys- ical and mental constitutions the capacity for pain is increased more rapidly than the capacity for pleasure, while the unfavorable social conditions remain the same, so that the pain element con- stantly gains upon the pleasure element and the world grows worse, so the socialists tell us that the increase of wealth is attended by the increase of poverty ; the rich grow richer and the poor poorer, and the number who have diminishes, while the number who have nothing increases, whereby, also, the world grows worse. I am familiar with all the arguments of both of these classes of people, and I admit the force of them, and while there are many other considerations which greatly diminish the effects ascribed to these causes, and while the case is by no means as bad as it is repre- sented by either class, still it must be candidly admitted to be bad enough, and I can almost agree with Huxley that if there really is no remedy, it would be better if some "kindly comet " could pass by and sweep the entire phantasmagoria out of existence. But 1 Die Wage, V. Jahrgang, Nos. i6 and i8, April 13 and 27, 1902, pp. 248-249, 282-284. Ch. Ill] ACHIEVEMENT VERSUS IMPROVEMENT 21 while I do not think that any or all of the social panaceas proposed would really remedy the evil, I do not agree with the pessimists that there is no remedy. I deny that society has ever tried to cure itself of the disease called Weltschmerz. It has not arrived at that state of self-consciousness at which it has ever seriously considered the question. It is in the same state as a race of animals relative to its true condition. Some savage races are scarcely more ad- vanced. Civilized races are waking up to these purely physical matters. They are in a state of absolute lethargy with regard to social matters. V^hat the human race requires is to be awakened to a realization of its condition. It will then find the remedy for its woes. This must be something more than the feeble plaints of a few individuals. It must amount to complete race consciousness. If this is ever brought about it must be by the same instrumental- ity that produced all other steps in human progress, viz., science. Achievement versus Improvement I would never have taken any interest in sociology if I had not conceived that it had this mission. Pure sociology gives man- kind the means of self-orientation. It teaches man what he is and how he came to be so. With this information to start with he is in position to consider his future. With a clear comprehension of what constitutes achievement he is able to see what will constitute improvement. The purpose of applied sociology is to harmonize! achievement with improvement. If all this achievement which con- stitutes civilization has really been wrought without producing any ■ improvement in the condition of the human race, it is time that the reason for this was investigated. Applied sociology includes among its main purposes the investigation of this question. The difficulty lies in the fact that achievement is not socialized. The problem therefore is that of the socialization of achievement. • We are told that no scheme for the equalization of men can suc- ceed ; that at first it was physical strength that determined the inequalities ; that this at length gave way to the power of cunning, and that still l^ter it became intelligence in general that determined the place of individuals in society. This last, it is maintained, is 22 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I now, in the long run, in the most civiHzed races and the most en- lightened communities, the true reason why some occupy lower and others higher positions in the natural strata of society. This, it is said, is the natural state, and is as it should be. It is moreover affirmed that being natural there is no possibility of altering it. Of course all this falls to the ground on the least analysis. For example, starting from the standpoint of achievement, it would nat- urally be held that there would be great injustice in robbing those who by their superior wisdom had achieved the great results upon which civilization rests and distributing the natural rewards among inferior persons who had achieved nothing. All would assent to this. And yet this is in fact practically what has been done. The whole history of the world shows that those who have achieved have received no reward. The rewards for their achievement have fallen to persons who have achieved nothing. They have simply for the most part profited by some accident of position in a com- plex, badly organized society, whereby they have been permitted to claim and appropriate the fruits of the achievement of others. But no one would insist that these fruits should all go to those who had made them possible. The fruits of achievement are incalculable in amount and endure forever. Their authors are few in number and soon pass away. They would be the last to claim an undue share. They work for all mankind and for all time, and all they ask is that all mankind shall forever benefit by their work. Definition of Justice Those who maintain that existing social inequalities are natural and proper and the result of the recognition by society that intelli- gence, or abilities, or superiority of any kind, deserves to be thus rewarded, are, if they only knew it, going back to natural justice, to the law of the strongest, that prevails in the animal world. The existence of civil justice in human society has already been alluded to as an illustration of the superiority of the artificial over the nat- ural. As its importance is admitted by all, it comes in here as a proof of the inconsistency of all the popular reasoning about social inequalities. After all that has been said about justice, I have Ch. Ill] THE OLIGOCENTRIC WORLD VIEW 23 never yet seen a statement of the real principle that underlies it, nor a truly philosophical or fundamental definition of justice. The true definition of justice is that it is the enforcement by society of an artificial equality in social conditions which are naturally unequal. By it the strong are forcibly shorn of their power to exploit the weak. The same reasoning which defends existing social inequal- ities would logically condemn all civil justice. As a matter of fact and of history, the enforcement of justice by society has always been resisted by the strong and denounced as an outrage upon their right to reap the fruits of their superior physical or intellec- tual power. It is no longer so denounced, at least in the abstract, simply because it has become the fixed and settled policy of all civilized nations. Whenever any institution becomes thus settled it is accepted as a matter of course. It is forgotten that its adop- tion was the result of a prolonged struggle. The principle under- lying it is lost sight of, and other policies involving the same principle are attacked as the first was attacked, the same principle being invoked against them. Thus the claim that the superior intelligence of certain members of society justifies the social in- equalities that make up most of the misery of the world does not differ in any respect from the claim of the physically strongest men in a barbaric race to seize and possess the handsomest women and the finest oxen. With the progress of civilization society inter- fered in this policy and set up in its place what is known as civil, legal, or political justice, which is a reversal of the law of nature and a wholly artificial institution. The Oligocentric World View All reasoning on such questions is also always permeated by another vice. It confounds two totally different things. It lays the whole stress on the intellectual aspect and ignores the moral aspect. I use the word "moral" in a somewhat unusual sense, but nevertheless in its true sense, for no word has been so thor- oughly perverted as the word " moral." In modern times social inequalities are always looked upon as essentially intellectual in- equalities. The words "superior" and "inferior" always mean 24 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I intellectual superiority and inferiority. The entire philosophy of the present age revolves about these distinctions as their pivot. /All science, art, literature centers on the intellectual. There is an apotheosis of genius, of ability, of talent, of mental brilliancy. So steeped is the public mind in this world view that all who do not display these qualities are wholly lost sight of. The worst is that such only are considered as deserving of anything. All attention is concentrated upon a few exceptions. The effect is to limit the number even of these, because potential ability is given no chance to assert itself. This oligocentric philosophy, which, for the rea- sons given, has no right to call itself aristocentric, is exceedingly mischievous, and threatens to end in wide intellectual and social demoralization. It is the out-Nietzscheing of Nietzsche. There is only one science that does not breathe this spirit, and that is sociology. Its point of view is precisely the opposite. It is true that pure sociology takes account of human achievement, but it looks upon it as only a means to the end improvement. All other sciences may be regarded as objective. Sociology is sub- jective. It recognizes the intellect as the most effective of all agencies, but the intellect was created by the will as a servant of the will, and sociology proposes to hold it to its primary purpose as a means to its primary end, — the well-being of its possessors. Social versus Political Justice Now the justice of which we have been speaking, vast as its influence has been in securing man's moral advance, is after all only civil and political justice. It is a very different thing from social justice. The civil and political inequalities of men have been fairly well removed by it. Person and property are tolerably safe under its rule. It was a great step in social achievement. But society must take another step in the same direction. It must establish social justice. The present social inequalities exist for the same reason that civil and political inequalities once existed. They can be removed by an extension of the same policy by which the former were removed. The attempt to do this will be attacked and denounced, as was the other, but the principle involved is the same. Ch. Ill] SOCIAL WELFARE 25 And after social justice shall have been attained and shall become the settled policy of society, no one will any more dare to question it than to question civil justice. Social Welfare Let us look more closely into the nature of social justice. The welfare or happiness of mankind consists entirely in the freedom to exercise the natural faculties. The old idea that happiness is a negative state — a state of rest or repose — is completely exploded. It may have grown out of the enslaved and overworked condition of the mass of mankind during such a prolonged period of human history. But everybody knows that a state of inactivity, beyond that needed to recuperate from the effect of previous fatigue, becomes ennui, a state more intolerable than fatigue, which drives the sufferer to some form of activity, no matter what. The physi- ology of it is that the only source of pleasure is the exercise of some faculty. Conversely, the normal exercise of any faculty is always and necessarily attended with pleasure. Every desire is at bottom the result of some cause that temporarily prevents the nor- mal exercise of a faculty. All want is deprivation, i.e., the with- holding of whatever is necessary to set the system into healthy operation. Hunger is the deprivation of the stomach of the food upon which it expends its energy. Love, so long as unsatisfied, is the deprivation of the entire reproductive system of its normal functioning. These are the types of the whole list, and the same is true of all. Taking all the faculties together, physical, mental, spiritual, so far as these can be separated, and their joint normal exercise is what constitutes happiness, while the deprivation of such normal exercise is what constitutes misery. Complete depri- vation would of course be immediately fatal, and the real misery of the world is due to the partial deprivation of the power of men to exercise the faculties by which nature has endowed them. On the other hand, whatever degree of happiness men enjoy is due to the power to exercise their faculties and to no other source. The problem therefore manifestly is how to secure to the mem- bers of society the maximum power of exercising their natural 26 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I faculties. It is a purely subjective problem and has nothing to do with the relative superiority or inferiority of men. It is wholly independent of the question of their intelligence or ability or social value. It is even independent of their capacity to enjoy or to suffer. It matters not how much satisfaction they are capable of -deriving from the exercise of their faculties ; it aims only to enable them to enjoy such faculties as they may happen to have. Social Freedom From this subjective side the whole upward movement of society has been in the direction of acquiring freedom. If we look over the history of this movement, we shall see that it exhibits three somewhat distinct stages, which may be called in their historical order national freedom, political freedom, and social freedom. The first and prime requisite during the early efforts at nation forming, as set forth in the tenth chapter of Pure Sociology, fol- lowing upon conquest and subjugation, was the consolidation of the amalgamating group into a national unit capable of withstanding the encroachments and attacks of other outside groups. Until this is attained none of the subsequent steps can be taken. But it involves the elaboration of the crude and antagonistic materials into the only kind of order or organization of which they are capa- ble, viz., the politico-military organization. The salient features of such an organization, as was shown in that chapter, are extreme inequality, caste, slavery, and stern military domination. It is dur- ing this stage that the industrial system is sketched on the broad lines of social cleavage, resulting in the three great fundamental social tissues, — the ruling class or ectoderm, the proletariat or endo- derm, and the business class or mesoderm of the primitive state. These form a strong bulwark and enable the inchoate state to defend itself against hostile elements from without during the sub- sequent stages in social assimilation. They secure the first great prerequisite, — national freedom. But individual liberty is at its minimum. The conquered race, which always far outnumbers all other elements, is chiefly in bond- age, and the struggle for political freedom begins. Ultimately, as Ch. Ill] SOCIAL FREEDOM 27 the history of the world shows, this is in large measure attained. Throughout antiquity, the Middle Ages, and down to the middle of the nineteenth century, this was the great, all-absorbing issue. One after another the bulwarks of oppression — slavery, serfdom, feudahsm, despotism, monarchy in its true sense, nobility and priestly rule — fell ; the middle or business class, otherwise called bourgeoisie and third estate, gained the ascendant, which it still holds, and political freedom was attained. So all important did this issue seem that throughout the eigh- teenth century and down to near our own time it was confidently believed that, with the overthrow of political oppression and the attainment of political freedom, the world would enter upon the great millennium of universal prosperity, well-being, and happi- ness. But this was far from being the case. As sages predicted, events have proved that there remains another step to be taken. Another stage must be reached before any considerable degree of the hopes that were entertained can be realized. This stage is that of social freedom. The world is to-day in the throes of this third struggle. Military and royal oppression have been overthrown. Slavery, serfdom, feudalism, have disappeared. The power of the nobility and the priesthood has been broken. The civilized world is democratic, no matter by what name its governments are called. The people rule themselves by their sovereign votes. And yet never in the history of the world was there manifested greater unrest or greater dissatisfaction with the state of things. National freedom and political freedom have been achieved. Social freedom remains to be achieved. But the problem of social freedom is much more difficult and subtle than either of the others. It was a comparatively simple matter to deal with the state and the ruling class. These were always conspicuous and locally circumscribed. The forces that prevent social freedom, on the contrary, are hidden and universally diffused through the social fabric. They are largely economic forces guided by the acute sagacity of individual interest, and they escape detection and elude pursuit. They give rise to questions so recondite and obscure that the clearest thinkers differ as to their solution. These questions cannot come into the political 28 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I \ arena until there is a certain harmony or consensus of opinion con- cerning them. In short, they are the proper subjects of scientific investigation. The only science that can deal with them is sociol- ogy. Their study and solution belong to applied sociology. The New Ethics I was once invited to attend a meeting of the Ethical Association. I went expecting to hear all about right and wrong, especially wrong, about duty and " the ought," about conscience and the categorical imperative. I was agreeably disappointed. Every paper, as I re- member, breathed the spirit of the new ethics. Dr. Felix Adler unfolded the new doctrine in a masterly way, making a wide de- parture from the conventional ethics, and the other speakers with one accord dealt with different methods of relieving human suffering and promoting human welfare. It was a great relief and a hopeful sign of the times. In fact, as unconsciously as M. Jourdain talked prose, this congress from first to last talked applied sociology. Primitive ethics, as I have shown,^ was simply race morality. It had, as the word "moral" implies, to do with custom, i.e., with those social restraints to conduct which the group sentiment of race safety had established for the preservation of the existence of the race. It had nothing to do with sympathy or feeling, happiness or misery, and was confined exclusively to considerations of safety or salvation. And even throughout the widening circles of ethical dualism 2 there was no essential change in its character. The con- ventional ethics upon which we are all brought up, although its expounders know nothing of these things, is derived from primitive ethics, but is a degenerate corruption of it in which all connection with its original matrix has been lost sight of, and in its place has been set up the false dogma of abstract right. It has enjoined restraint and curtailed human liberty, and has proved one of the chief props to exploitation and cloaks to hypocrisy from which mankind has had to suffer. The new ethics has for its aim the minimization of pain and the maximization of pleasure. For the present it is obliged to devote; 1 Pure Sociology, p. 419. 2 jaj^^ p ^3^ Ch. Ill] THE CLAIMS OF FEELING 29 itself chiefly to the former of these objects. The amount of suffer- ing in the world is so great that it must necessarily receive the chief attention. By this it is not meant to imply that the new ethics is the same as philanthropy. Most philanthropy belongs rather to the old conventional ethics of which it is a sort of annex. According to that there are two kinds of conduct : ordinary moral conduct, which does not go beyond the performance of duty ; and conduct of a superior order, which does more than duty requires and confers benefits upon others for which no equivalent is ren- dered. This last, which is called benevolence, has its egoistic return in the form of a high moral satisfaction, which has been described as among the most exalted of sentiments. In other words, it is a great pleasure, and this pleasure is the motive from which the action proceeds. It is not less egoistic from being altruistic, and may be called the luxury of altruism. It is apt to beget egotism and give the doer of good deeds an exalted opinion of himself, and a pharisaical idea that he is better than other men. Most philanthropy is also mere temporary patchwork which has to be done ov^r and over again. It does not aim or desire to do that kind of good that will prevent the recurrence of the conditions that have made it necessary. It is static, not dynamic. The new ethics, on the contrary, goes to the root and deals with conditions and causes of evil. It inquires into social conditions and seeks to introduce modifications that will prevent existing evils and render their recurrence impossible. It is dynamic. As already said, it is applied sociology. It recognizes that the sinnmum bonum ( is the social weal, and aims, as light is vouchsafed, to labor for that end. The Claims of Feeling The origin and true nature of feeling were fully treated in Pure Sociology, and something was said of feeling as an end.^ It is just here that applied sociology takes up the subject and seeks to show its full significance for the future of mankind. Although the orthodox thought of all ages and races has clung to the doctrine of restraint and sought to hush every whisper that feeling has any 1 Page 126. 30 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Fart I rights whatever in its own name, still, as shown, it has always been breaking through these barriers and spontaneously realizing itself. As the rational faculty matured it began to be applied to this problem. Over against the philosophy of restraint in which func- tion is everything there has dared to arise a philosophy of license in which the claims of feeling are allowed. \ In the treatment of feeling in its relations to function it was (shown that the two things are in and of themselves utterly unlike.^ They bear no resemblance to each other, are in no sense opposites, or in any way antagonistic. But the fact that the satisfaction of feeling, though normally securing the performance of function, may and often does defeat such performance, gave rise to a false conception of the nature of feeling. In cases where function normally follows the satisfaction of feeling, attention is concen- trated on the former and the satisfaction is not attended to. But in the contrary cases, where the gratification of desire endangers or prevents the functional effects, attention is specially directed to feeling, and the evil effects are intimately associated with it. The frequent recurrence of such aberrations and wayward tenden- cies makes this association of pleasure with evil permanent, and the idea becomes general that all pleasure is bad. This is the true explanation and origin of all asceticism. It rests on the false assumption of the necessarily antagonistic character of feeling and function. Rational analysis shows that there is no such necessary relation, and that there are thousands of pleasures which, while they do not lead to the performance of any function, still do not in any way interfere with any of the operations of existence. It is also seen that this class increases with the psychic development of man. They are chiefly those pleasures that I have characterized as "spiritual," without giving that word any occult or mystic implications. They constitute in the main the sociogenetic forces or attributes of the soul, and were treated in the fifteenth chapter of Pure Sociology. To the gradual recognition of this truth is due the fact that since the origin of human records there has been going on a slow movement in human thought looking more and more to the ^ Pure Sociology, p. 126. Ch. Ill] THE CLAIMS OF FEELING 31 recognition of the claims of feeling, — a movement which I have characterized as "the subjective trend of modern philosophy." ^ Descartes declared that the passions "are all essentially good,"^ and Spinoza ^ echoed this sentiment. Sir Thomas More in describ- ing his Utopians says that "they thinke no kinde of pleasure forbydden whereof cometh no harme."* Other passages might doubtless be found scattered at rare intervals through the literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to the effect that pleasure is not bad in itself, but the predominating sentiment was a gloomy asceticism, typified by such writers as Pascal, and this continued to prevail far into the nineteenth century. All know what a strong hold it had. on the minds of the early settlers of America, fittingly described by our word "puritanism." It is still very strong everywhere, and it is only within recent years that business and professional men have considered it proper deliber- ately to set apart any portion of their time for pleasure and recre- ation. This they have been practically driven to by the alarming prevalence of brain exhaustion and nervous breakdowns. The way to a new philosophy from the moral side was opened by Francis Hutcheson, who said, " That action is best which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers."^ The same sentiment is embodied in the saying of Beccaria, — "la tnas- sima felicita divisa nel maggior numero."^ Jeremy Bentham crys- tallized the maxim into the form, " The greatest happiness of the greatest number." '' He is usually credited with the maxim, but he expressly attributes it to Priestley and Beccaria. Bentham is com- monly regarded as the founder of utilitarianism, an ethical doc- trine, which, though liable to be both misunderstood and abused, sums up, when logically defined, the general result toward which all these influences are tending. 1 American Journal of Sociology, Vol. Ill, No. 4, January, 1898, p. 535. Compare also an earlier statement in the Political Science Quarterly, Vol. X, No. 2, June, 1895, p. 220, and the Annales de I'Institut international de sociologie. Tome IV, Paris, 189S, p. III. 2 Les passions de I'ame, Art. 211 (CEuvres, p. 592). 3 Ethics, Prop. XLI (Opera, 1882, p. 219). * Utopia (Robinson's translation), English Reprints, London, 1869, No. 14, p. 95. 6 Concerning Moral Good and Evil, 1720. 6 Cesare Beccaria, Dei Delitti e delle Pene, 1764. ' Works, 1843, Vol. X, p. 142. 32 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I The maxim above considered, still further shortened to the form, "The greatest good to the greatest number," has passed into a political phrase much used in the United States as embodying the true policy of democracy. Our Declaration of Independence posits "the pursuit of happiness" as one of the "inalienable rights" of mankind. The entire utilitarian philosophy is stigma- tized by the moral philosophers as " hedonism." If we allow popular usage to restrict this term to the satisfaction of the coarser, more physical, and more essential desires, and follow Epicurus in apply- ing the term " eudemonism " to the whole range of pleasures, in- cluding the moral, esthetic, and intellectual ones, we have in this last term the true basis of the subjective movement in philosophy. The animal world lives in a pain economy. Function is every- thing and feeling nothing. The apparent peace in nature is an illusion. Behind and below it is the ever-present "struggle for existence." I am not disposed to exaggerate the meaning of this phrase. I admit that animals are largely unconscious of any struggle, and that it may not greatly lessen their enjoyment of life. They do not suffer from imaginary evils, they do not anticipate those of the future, and they may not vividly remember the pains previously experienced. In fact, as is well known, they fear the ones they have never experienced as much as those they have actually suffered. Their mental states are chiefly controlled by instincts made up of the inherited experiences of their ancestors. But turn it as you may, the fact remains that in nearly every natural race of creatures, in order to hold their own against the buffets of the world, somewhere from ten to a thousand individ- uals have to be born for every one that lives out its normal period of existence. In every case the great majority succumb, before the age of reproduction, to enemies, to disease, to starvation, or to the elements, and the survivors, throughout their entire lives, are incessantly threatened with the same fate. It is, therefore, no wonder that animals are " wild." They resort to every conceiv- able device to escape these dangers, and nature through innumer- able instincts aids them in their efforts. Some are fleet of foot or swift of wing; others have delicate senses of hearing, sight, or smell; others have wonderful powers of concealment; and still Ch. Ill] THE CLAIMS OF FEELING 33 others are endowed with numberless arts of imitation, feigning, and deception. All this is independent of the countless organic devices for protection, — shells, armors, spines, bristles, musk-sacs, ink-bags, and all the forms of imitative coloring. Nearly all animals are always on the alert; some, as hares, sleep with their eyes open. Thousands are nocturnal in order to evade diurnal enemies, and are thus denied all the enjoyments of a life in the open daylight and sunshine. All are constantly ready to fly at the least sign of danger, and even those that prey upon others must themselves watch lest stronger or more cunning ones deprive them of their spoils. Even if there were no other animal to fear, there would remain the fear of men, " ces monstres, nos ^ternels ennetnis." ^ This fact that one half of the animal world lives by devouring the other half, has perhaps been too frequently dwelt upon, but it still stands in all its sullen hideousness before the defenders of a moral order. In the human race the case is not so much better as many suppose. It is a great mistake to imagine that savages are happy in their wild state of nature. The most deluded people in the world are the sentimental poets who paint the " poor Indian " and the native races of countries where civilized man has displaced them as having been robbed of a paradise of freedom and joy. All savage races are abject slaves to a thousand delusions and superstitions, and are prohibited by a vast network of ceremonials and prescriptions from any true liberty of movement or action. These multitudinous prohibitions and restraints are enforced by the severest penalties, and no one dares to infract the laws of a remorseless custom that hedges in all the members of primitive society. Bagehot well says: Dryden had a dream of an early age " when wild in woods the noble savage ran," but « when lone in woods the cringing savage crept " would have been more like all we know of that early, bare, painful period. Not only had they no comfort, no convenience, not the very beginnings of an epicurean life, but their mind within was as painful to them as the world without. It was full of fear. So far as the vestiges inform us, they were afraid of everything ; they were afraid of animals, of certain attacks by near tribes, and of possible inroads from far tribes. But, above all things, they were frightened of " the 1 Voltaire, Le Chapon et la Poularde (Dialogues, etc., p. 100). 34 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I world"; the spectacle of nature filled them with awe and dread. They fan- cied there were powers behind it which must be pleased, soothed, flattered, and this very often in a number of hideous ways.^ To the same effect Sir John Lubbock said : " No savage is free. All over the world his daily life is regulated by a complicated and apparently most inconvenient set of customs (as forcible as laws)."^ As in the animal world, so in primitive man, fear is the perpetual nightmare of existence. The author last quoted, in an earlier work, says, " It is not too much to say that the horrible dread of un- known evil hangs like a thick cloud over savage life, and embitters every pleasure."* "It is impossible," says Reade, "to describe, or even to imagine, the tremulous condition of the savage mind ; yet the traveler can see from their aspect and manners that they dwell in a state of never-ceasing dread." * This dread of nature was described by Humboldt in an eloquent passage which I have reproduced more than once.^ Dr. Bucke has accurately expressed this truth in the following words : The aspects of nature have no moral significance for him [the savage] except in a bad sense. Storm, tempest, night, earthquakes, eclipses, and all the darker phenomena of earth and air fill him with vague fear, which is often intense. On the other hand, the brighter aspects of nature, from which we derive such a large proportion of our happiness, awaken in him no enthusiasm. Sunshine, flowers, glancing rivers, lake expanses, and all that to us in nature is so beautiful, is not beautiful to him. If the aspects of nature are favorable to his pursuit of food, he is satisfied, no more. If they are adverse to him, he is cast down. If they are unusual, he is terrified. Terror, indeed, is the most prominent of the moral functions in the mind of the savage. " Primitive man, too, is almost always at war. We know very few races in a stage so idyllic that the era of conquest and subjugation has not already been ushered in. Every tribe is thirsting for the blood of other tribes. A state of peace is almost unknown. The 1 Physics and Politics, New York, 1877, p. 55. ^ The Origin of Civilisation and the Primitive Condition of Man, New York, 1871, P- 303- ' Prehistoric Times, by Sir John Lubbock, Bart, (the Right Hon. Lord Avebury). Sixth edition revised (edition de luxe), New York, 1904, p. 449. * Winwood Reade, Martyrdom of Man, second edition, New York, 1876, p. 284. ^ Dynamic Sociology, Vol. I, p. 684; Pure Sociology, p. 109. " Dr. Richard Maurice Bucke, Man's Moral Nature: An Essay, New York, 1879, p. 152. Ch. Ill] THE CLAIMS OF FEELING 35 gates of Janus are always open. No matter how sparse the pop- ulation, there is no spot so remote and sequestered that it may not at any moment become the scene of a sanguinary battle. It was doubtless the sense of this truth that prompted Kipling to speak of "the desert where there is always war." All through the various stages of barbarism that follow those of true savagery, war is the prevailing condition, and mankind has been perpetually rent by every form of strife, external and internal. When it is not open warfare it is internecine strife, the clash of clans and the feuds of families. There is always turmoil and trouble, and peace and com- fort are unknown. Even after the advent of an industrial stage of society the exploitation of the weak by the strong causes a " strug- gle for existence " on the part of the great mass of mankind, which is not masked, as in the animal world, by any semblance of peace. Excessive toil, poverty, squalor, and misery stare the observer in the face in every corner of the earth. Throughout all these stages and conditions of pain economy,; animal and human, the claims of function are the only ones recog- \ nized. Those of feeling are either totally ignored or vehemently ' denied. Fear and terror are instrutnents for the preservation od/ the race. All wars are holy wars waged to save a chosen race or people from outcast races and peoples. Codes of custom and oppressive ceremonials are the means of prohibiting deviations from the path of race safety. The powers that be are ordained of God and political oppression is defended as the decree of the nation. Social and economic inequalities are declared to be natural and hence necessary to be endured in the interest of social order. Toil and poverty are the consequences of population, and population must be kept up or the race is endangered. Everywhere and always it is function that is appealed to. Moral and religious teach- ers preach resignation to all the woes of life, the reason, expressed or implied, always being that otherwise existence is jeopardized, and if existence is lost all is lost. There is only one way of meeting this argument. In a pain economy, by the terms of the definition, the pains exceed the pleasures. If we give the pains the minus and the pleasures the plus sign, the algebraic sum is minus. If a man in his business 36 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I finds that the debits regularly exceed the credits, he concludes that he is conducting his business at a loss. Existence may be looked upon as a business. If its debits exceed its credits, it is beiag con- ducted at a loss. WTiat value then has existence in a pain econom}^ that such strenuous efforts should be made to presen'e it .' It is a great struggle, not simply for a zero, a nothing, but for a worse than nothing, a minus quantity, a perpetual and hopeless deficit. Consciously or unconsciously, this is the reasoning of the whole pessimistic world, who see no remedy for the state of things. In the absence of all hope that a remedy can ever be found, this logic is faultless. The kernel of the whole question therefore is. Can a remedy be found, a way out of pessimism ? For one, I beUeve that there is a remedy, and that it consists in the recognition of the claims of feeling. Without a surplus of agreeable over disagreeable feel- ing existence is worthless or worse than worthless. With such a siuplus it has a value exactly proportional to the amount of that surplus. The purpose of applied sociology is to point out a way of first getting rid of this long-standing deficit, and then of accumulating the maximum possible surplus. CHAPTER IV SOCIAL ACHIEVEMENT I have never yet had the good fortune to hear any valid reason alleged why that corporation of individuals we call the State may not do what voluntary effort fails in doing, either from want of intelligence or lack of will. — Huxley. \ Civilization is to all external appearances almost exclusively the result of individual achievement. Almost every great advance can be directly referred to some one or more individuals whose genius and industry have made it possible, and although each step can in nearly every case be shown to proceed from an earUer step without which it would have been impossible, stiU this particular step, how- ever short, was actually taken by somebody, and his name, the date, and all the circumstances are in most cases definitely known. In view of this, it is the common attitude of scientific men to deny that there has been any social achievement at all, and any allusion to social action of a useful or progressive character is apt to pro- voke a smile. The extreme presentation of this \-iew found its expression in the celebrated "parable of Saint -Simon."* Nearly everybody subscribes to the sentiment embodied in that document, and I for one certainly do. But the great majority supplement their assent to its letter by an inference which is wholly unwar- ranted. It is possible that Saint-Simon intended and expected this inference to be drawn and made a part of the case he was present- ing. This inference is that because all the public officers that he names might be suddenly blotted out of existence without materi- ally affecting the march of civilization, therefore the offices held 1 Si la France perdait subitement ses cinqaante premiers savants, ses cinqnante premiers artistes, ses cinquante premiers fabricants, ses crnquante premiers cuMva- teuis, la nation deviendrait un corps sans ame, eUe seiait decapitee. Si eUe venait aa contraire a perdre tout son personnel officiel, cette evenement affligerait les Fran- 5ais parce qa'ils sent bons. mais il n'en resulterait pour le pays qu'un faible dommage. — Saint-Simon, Lettres de Henri Saint-Simon a MM. les jures, " La Paiabole," pp. i-8 (CEuvres de Saint-Simon). 37 38 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I by them and the duties they involved have no value or significance for civilization. This inference is false, and carried to its logical conclusion it amounts to saying that the whole social order is use- less. The reason why the particular men at any moment holding these offices and performing these public functions can be spared without serious loss is that their places can be filled without diffi- culty and the social operations which are under their direction will go on as before. This is not the_cas_e to the same extenL with the men of science, art, and letters that he sets over against_therr^_ They are the original geniuses who are building up the civilization of the world, and their loss as individuals could not in one sense be supplied. The difference is clear and the contrast is striking. But it must not be forgot ten that a ll__thesejrnen labor within the social order, and that without the help of the social order they could do nothing. Social achieveiriehT has consisted in the estab- lishment of a social order under a.nd within which individual achieve- ment can go on and civilization is made possible. It belonged to pure sociology to point out certain of the great typical steps in social achievement, and this was attempted, mainly with reference to the past. It was shown that, over and above the establishment and maintenance of the social order as a condition to all individual achievement, society had done considerable original work looking to its own betterment. This is as far as pure sociol- ogy can go in this direction. It is the task of applied sociology to indicate as fully as the data of the science will permit how much farther society can and should go. Society, considered as an active agent, can have no other object than its own preservation and advancement. Its functions are reduced to two, the protective and the ameliorative. The current philosophy limits it to the first and denies to it the second. But society must be looked upon in the light of a conscious individual. In so far as it is conscious and in proportion to the completeness of its consciousness, it does not differ from an individual. No individual ever limits his activities to the simple sphere of self- preservation. Every individual is always seeking besides to benefit himself in every possible way. Society should do the same, and, in fact, has always sought to do so in the measure of its power to Ch. IV] SOCIAL ACHIEVEMENT 39 understand itself. The extent to which it will do this will depend upon the collective intelligence. This is to society what brain power is to the individual. Brain power is a product of organic integration. The brain itself, even of the lowest creatures possess- ing it, is a measure of the degree of integration that has taken place in the nervous system. From this to the most highly devel- oped human brains there are only differences of degree. It is all so much progress in the integration of the nervous system. Now, without dealing in any fanciful analogies, society has un- dergone and is undergoing a series of steps in integration corre- sponding to those of the nervous system of animals. Evolution takes place in the social world according to the same laws as in the organic world. And just as increasing brain development has been accompanied by increasing individual consciousness and intelligence, so social integration has been and will continue to be attended with increasing social consciousness and intelligence. If we con- ceive social intelligence to have reached the stage at which it can grasp this truth, we may suppose society seriously to ask itself the question whether it may not by its own efforts contribute some- what to increasing its own intelligence. This is what individuals do. When they find that the objects they have set out to attain require a higher intelligence than they possess they proceed to inform themselves and put themselves in possession of the requisite intelligence. Intelligence is a compound of capacity for knowledge and knowledge. An individual at this stage necessarily possesses the requisite capacity for knowledge, so that the act of acquiring intelligence is reduced to that of acquiring knowledge. It is not otherwise with society. That degree of social consciousness which enables society to perceive that it needs greater intelligence in order to further its own interests is the homologue of native capacity in the individual, and the problem of increasing social intelligence is reduced, as in the individual, to that of acquiring knowledge.- CHAPTER V WORLD VIEWS C'est I'esprit qui gouverne, et I'homme agit selon sa pens^e bien plus souvent qu'il ne le croit lui-meme. — GuizoT. It is often said that ideas rule the world, but this, is true only of world ideas. The highest and brightest ideas, the most profound and important thoughts of any age or people, have scarcely any influence upon the world. This is because such ideas are always confined to a very few of the most developed minds and are not shared by the mass of mankind. They do not belong to the world. There is supposed to be no way by which they can be conveyed to mankind at large. No thought has any appreciable social effect except it be actually possessed by society. The whole of society, i.e., all sane persons of mature minds, must themselves think it, otherwise it is socially ineffective. But any idea that permeates the whole mass and becomes the thought of society itself sways the mass and shapes the action of society in its entirety. Interpretation of History Two distinct modes have been adopted of interpreting human history, — the material and the intellectual. The first has been un- happily called "historical materialism." As the antithesis of this the other has been called " historical intellectualism." ^ The proper name for the first is " the economic interpretation of history," used in 1888 by Thorold Rogers as the title of a course of lectures, and by De Greef at the congress of the Institut International de Sociologie in ^ Rene Worms, Philosophie des sciences sociales, I, 1903, p. 135. Tarda had previously designated it as tiie '■^thise intellectualiste" (Revue intemationale de sociologie, 9" annee, aoiit-septembre, 1901, p. 664). Dr. Edward A. Ross appears to have been the first to use the term "intellectualism" in this sense in English (American Journal of Sociology, Vol. IX, January, 1904, p. 548). 40 Ch. V] INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 41 1900, and published in the Annales.i It was also made the title of the address of Dr. E. R. A. Seligman as president of the American Economic Association, dehvered at Washington, Decem- ber 30, 1901, since expanded into a book by that title. The proper name for the opposite doctrine, corresponding in form to this, is the ideological interpretation of history. These two views, when thought of together at all, have usually been regarded as wholly opposed, the defenders of the one denying all weight to the other ; but they have for the most part constituted two schools of thought so different that neither has seemed to have any knowledge of the other. Only to a very few has it occurred that, like so many other apparently conflicting doctrines, they may both be true, and that a full analysis of both might show that there exists some common ground upon which both may stand. Reconciliation of the Economic and Ideological Interpretations of History Although it is possible to carry back the general proposition that ideas make or rule the world as far at least as Plato, and although Virgil uttered the words, "mens agitat molem" "^ still sociologists are usually content to quote the well-known passage in Comte's Positive Philosophy.^ Herbert Spencer, though far from being a historical materialist, was one of those who opposed this view. In his " Reasons for dissenting from the Philosophy of Comte " he quotes this passage and sets over against it in the parallel column his own view, as follows: Ideas do not govern and overthrow the world : the world is governed or overthrown by feelings, to which ideas serve only as guides. The social mech- anism does not rest finally upon opinions ; but almost wholly upon character.* 1 Tome VIII, Paris, 1902, p. 165. '^ .(Eneid, Lib. VI, line 727. < ^ Vol. I, 1830, pp. 40-41. " Ce n'est pas aux lecteurs de cat ouvrage que je croiiai jamais devoir prouver que les idees gouvement et bouleversent le monde, ou, en d'autres termes, que tout le mecanisme social repose finalement sur des opinions." Harriet Martineau translated this as follows : " It cannot be necessary to prove to anybody who reads this work that Ideas govern the world, or throw it into cKaos ; in other words, that all social mechanism rests upon opinions" (London edition, 1896, Vol. I, p. 15). * Essays, etc., London, 1874, p. 69. 42 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I He did not know till he was afterwards told that Comte had expressed a view practically identical with his own as quoted above, and he then supposed that this must have been in his Positive Polity, and inferred that Comte had later abandoned his original position. In both he was mistaken. One at least of his clearest expressions of this view is to be found in the Positive Philosophy. It is as follows : Psychology, or ideology, . . . presents to us at the outset a fundamental aberration . . by a false appreciation of the relations between the affective and the intellectual faculties. Although the preponderance of the latter has been maintained, of course from widely divergent points of view, all the differ- ent metaphysicians have nevertheless been agreed to proclaim it as their princi- pal point of departure. The tjiind (esprit) has become the almost exclusive subject of their speculations, and the various affective faculties have been almost entirely neglected by them, and always subordinated to the intellect. Now such a conception represents precisely the reverse of the reality, not only for animals but also for man. For daily experience shows, on the contrary, in the most unequivocal manner, that the affections, the inclinations, the passions, constitute the principal motor forces (iiiobiles') of human life.^ That Comte did not consider this as inconsistent with, or as an abandonment of, the view expressed in the first volume is shown by the fact that he virtually reasserts the latter in the fourth volume (p. 460), published in 1839. The apparent inconsistency is due to a confusion of ideas on the part of the critic, and a failure to grasp the spirit and meaning of Comte' s philosophy. The passage first quoted occurs in his opening lecture, in which he first sets forth his celebrated law of the three stages (trois etats) in the development of human thought, and the "ideas" or "opinions" to which he refers are the theological, metaphysical, and positive ideas respec- tively that constitute the thought of the world during each of these stages. They are world ideas or world views, and they do govern the world and have governed it throughout the history of these stages, What appeared to Spencer, and has appeared to others to be the opposite view, viz., that the feelings and passions of man- kind have constituted the motor forces of society, is also true, and does riot in any way conflict with the other. This view, which Comte entertained from the first, and which constitutes the foundation of 1 Philosophie positive, Vol. Ill, 1838, pp. 542-543. ch.v] interpretation of history 43 his Politique Positive, is the same that I have always defended, and i is neither more nor less than the theory of social forces underlying my entire philosophy. It represents the dynamic agent. Theological ide as especially, and to a less extent metaphysical ideas, in Comte's sense, represent true world conceptions, and their power to govern mankind was just what Comte so clearly saw. But positive ideas, especially in his day, and scarcely more in our time, do not answer to this description. They are entertained by only a small fraction of mankind and they have but a feeble influ- ence in controlling human action. In Comte's mind to make them do so was the supreme desideratum. His final scheme, and what he regarded as his greatest achievement, — the Politique Positive, — was aimed at the accomplishment of this end. It might have been named: A Plan for the Conversion of Positive Ideas into World Ideas, or, in more popular language, A Plan for making Scientific Thought as Universal as Religious Thought has been. But Comte is not the only one who has conceived this idea, and whatever the practical difficulties in the way of its realization, only superficial minds will deny its ultimate possibility. Dr. De Greef is another writer who affects to repudiate the con- trolling influence of ideas, and he has placed himself on record as a defender of historical materialism, with certain reserves. He has recently said : " We do not belong to that ancient school which maintains that ideas (or the Idea) govern the world . . . feelings and emotions exert an effect more intense and more general than ideasT~r7~ideas, and still more, theories, usually lag far behind facts." 1 Here the fallacy is clear, made especially so by the last remark. By ideas he means advanced ideas, or, as he says " theo- ries," while the ideas that rule the world are universal ideas, the , very opposite of theories. I do not know what he means by their lagging behind the facts. They are always far in advance of real- ization. The effective ideas are the Volkergedanken of Bastian, Post, and the historical school. Ratzenhof er calls them social ideas, and correctly says that " the successful heroes of history are only the personification of political and social ideas that have sprung 1 Revue intemationale de sociologie, iie annee, decembre, 1903, pp. 882, 883; La Sociologie economique, Paris, 1904, p. 53. / 44 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I from the political and social needs of a people." ^ The sum of such ideas in any country at any given time constitutes the Zeitgeist. It is that part of human thought which lies below all doubt, question, schism, or discussion. This is true of even the most advanced countries, and therefore the phrase " public opinion " does not express the idea. Public opinion means the sum total rather of the questions which are under discussion. In the United States, for example, public opinion is concerned with all the questions dividing political parties and religious sects, but such ideas as those of democracy in government, of the separation of church and state, of monogamy, etc., are hors conconrs. They are settled, and any suggestion to the contrary is social heresy, not to be discussed but to be exterminated. Idea Forces. — If intellect is not a force but only a guide, it may be asked how ideas can move anything. This is the second stum- bling-block in the present discussion. The question was definitively answered in Pure Sociology,^ and all that was said there may be considered as if inserted at this point. If the reader is not familiar with it, he may fail to understand what follows. M. Fouillee, author of the phrase " idea forces " (id^es-forces), has not, so far as I am aware, made the analysis of them which I give in that section, but many passages in his works show that he conceives them some- what in that sense. Discussing Comte's statements and Spencer's criticism, he says : " Comte, they say, went back to the idealistic philosophy when he said that ideas and opinions governed the world. . . . But it is not a question of pure and abstract ideas, but of ideas that embody feelings (enveloppant des sentiments). It is these that constitute true idea forces."^ And again, in his report on the Bordin prize, published as an appendix to the work above quoted, he says : There is no moral sentiment, no human art, industry, or science without intelligence ; it is, then, intelligence which is the superior and directing element of human society ; the history of society is controlled {rdglie') by the history of thought. . . . The author of the memoir has not seen to what extent this '■ Gustav Ratzenhofer, Die sociologische Erkenntnis, Leipzig, 1898, pp. 173-174. 2 Pages 472-474- ' Alfred Fouillee, Le Mouvement positiviste et la conception sociologique du monde, Paris, 1896, p. 244. Ch. V] BELIEFS 45 question of the social value of intelligence is essential. He has not examined, as he should have done, the objections of the contemporary naturalist school. No, says this school, Mr. Spencer at the head, it is not ideas that lead the world, it is feelings. But no one imagines that pure ideas act upon the march of mankind ; it is clear that the ideas must become feelings in order to be efiective ; light, become heat, is transformed into motion.^ All this is very fine, and no one can say it is not true, but it is in- tuitive truth, not analytic. To say that an idea envelops an emotion is to indulge in poetry. It leaves only a vague sense of truth in the mind. But to say that ideas give rise to feelings, or prompt, cause, or occasion emotions, is to say what everybody can verify in his personal experience. The idea forces, then, are simply feelings prompted by ideas instead of by external stimuli. The resultant actions are ideo- motor actions as distinguished from sensori-motor actions. Beliefs. — \1 may be said that the universal world ideas which are said to lead or rule the world are simply beliefs. This is very nearly true, and therefore we need to inquire specially into the nature of beliefs. The difference between belief and opinion is slight, at least in popular usage. Belief might be defined as fixed or settled opinion, but there is also embraced in it a certain disre- gard of the evidence upon which it rests, while in opinion a certain amount of evidence is implied. Opinions admit of comparison as regards their strength depending upon the evidence, and may be very feebly held, the " weight " of evidence in their favor being nearly balanced by that against them. This cannot be said of beliefs. In these the evidence is not thought of. They are abso- lute and independent of all proof. Upon what, then, do they rest .'' Here we reach the kernel of our problem. Beliefs rest on interest. But what is interest } It is feeling. World views grow out of feel- ings. They are the bulwarks of race safety. You cannot argue men out of them. They are the conditions to group as well as to individual salvation. Now it is just this element of interest that links beliefs to de- sires and reconciles the ideological and economic interpretations of history ; for economics, by its very definition of value, is based on desires and their satisfaction. Every belief embodies a desire, or 1 Ibid., p. 364. 46 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I rather a great mass of desires. In this Hes the secret of its power to produce effects. The behef or idea, considered as a purely intel- lectual phenomenon, is not a force. The force lies in the desire. And here we must be careful not to invert the terms. The belief does not cause the desire. The reverse is much nearer the truth. Desires are economic demands arising out of the nature of man and the conditions of existence. They are demands for satisfaction, and the sum total of the influences, internal and external, acting upon a group or an individual, leads to the conclusion, belief, or idea that a certain proposition is true. That proposition, though always reducible to the indicative form, is essentially an imperative, and prompts certain actions regarded as essential to the preservation of the individual or the group. The fact that the interests involved are sometimes transcendental interests and become increasingly so with the intellectual development of the race, does not affect the truth of all this. All interest is essentially economic, and seen in their true light religious interests are as completely economic as the so-called material interests. All conduct enjoined by religion — not only the most primitive but also the most highly developed religions — aims at the satisfaction of desire, of which the avoidance of pun- ishment is only a form, for economic considerations are always both positive and negative in this sense. And if in the higher religions the positive interests come to predominate over the negative ones, this only renders them more typically economic in their character. This view of the question has not been wholly overlooked. Dr. De Greef himself has written a clever book on Political Beliefs and Doctrines, in which he ascribes to them an important role in human history. But Tarde has perhaps more fully illustrated the relations of belief to desire than any other author. Laying the usual stress on imitation and invention, he finally asks : " But what is the substance or the social force by which this act is done .? . . . What is invented or imitated is always an idea or a wish, a judgment or a design, in which is expressed a certain amount of belief z.nd of desire. . . . Belief and desire, then, are the substance and the force. "^ 1 G. Tarde, Les Lois de I'imitation, 2' edition, Paris, 1895, p. 157; cf. also pp. 159, 160. Ch. V] BELIEFS 47 M. Tarde developed his ideas on this subject before any of his principal sociological works appeared and published them in two articles in 1880.^ He returns to them frequently, however, in these works.2 It is significant that the Germans translate Tarde' s word croyance by their Weltanschauung, ^ but this is practically the idea conveyed by it in Tarde's philosophy. Ratzenhofer, though he uses the composite or mixed expression "intellectual force" (intellectueller Trieb), comparable to Fouill^e's id^es-forces, takes pains to explain its meaning. He says : It is necessary to explain at the outset the meaning of the intellectual impulse in the social process, all the more as it was the great error of the period of scientific culture just passed through to believe in a power of ideas in themselves, and to give to knowledge and reason in social development a meaning which they cannot possess.* What we are dealing with, therefore, is those ideas, opinions, or beliefs which have been created by the economic conditions of exis- tence, using the term " economic " in its widest sense, and which, being regarded as essential to the safety or existence of the group or of society, are entertained by all its members without any attempt to inquire into their objective truth. They become social forces by embodying the feelings that created them, and it is immaterial, provided we understand their nature, whether we say that they govern the world or whether we ascribe this power to the underlying feelings, or even, with the historical materialists, to the economic conditions themselves. The true order of the phe- nomena is that the conditions arouse the feelings and the feelings create the ideas or beliefs. These last are the final form into which the whole is crystallized in the human mind, constituting the thought of the age and people in which they prevail, and in har- mony with which all activity takes place. This may seem to be the reverse of the case of true idea forces as defined, in which the ' " La Croyance et le Desir et la Probabilite de leur mesure," Revue philosophique, aoCit et septembre, 1880 ; " La Croyance et le Desir," Essais et Melanges sociologiques, par G. Tarde, Lyon-Paris, 1895, pp. 235-308. 2 See especially La Logique sociale, Paris, 1895, pp. 5, 12, 13, 15, 24, 281 ; Les Lois sociales, Paris, 1898, p. 31. ' Paul Earth, Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie, Leipzig, 1897, p. 212. * Die sociologische Erkenntnis, p. 256. 48 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I idea produces the feeling which prompts the action, then called an ideo-motor action. But while it is true as stated that the eco- nomic conditions create the feelings which in turn determine the character of the thought of a group or a people, when it comes to the stage of action it is these fixed and settled ideas that dictate that action. And as no action can be performed without a motive, i.e.,, a feeling, a desire, as its immediate cause, so these world ideas must and do suggest and thus create the particular impulses that constitute the immediate motor forces of every act. These are, therefore, true idea forces. _NW jhhoughjhe economio^impulses 7^2^§ij!^l> wantSjJ eelmgs — necessarily precede the ideas — opinions, beliefs, world concepti ons, — still it is the latter that determine ,action,_ and the pu rely eco- nomic interpretation of history is utterly inadequate. There are many ways by which this might be illustrated. A single example, however, will suffice. This is the well-understood difference between oriental and occidental civilization.- Here are two great classes of people conducting themselves in almost diametrically opposite ways, with the result with which all are familiar. Half a century ago this difference was popularly explained by saying that Asiatic peoples were intellectually inferior to European peoples. A few of course knew better even then, but now every intelligent or well- read person knows better. In the exercise of the pure intellect, what is called abstract reasoning but is really much more truly philosophic generalization, and which is the faculty most vaunted as indicating the superiority of the human race to the brute creation and also the superiority of man over woman, — in this faculty the Orientals have always proved themselves the superiors of the European races. In every other intellectual faculty that we might compare they are at least fully equal to the best minds of the west- ern world. The difference in the two civilizations is wholly due to the difference in their -world views. Asia has pinned its faith exclusively to mind and exists in an atmosphere of pure thought. Europe has to a large extent during the last three or four centu- ries been acting upon a belief in matter. But, as I have shown in Pure Sociology,! matter is dynamic, and this alone explains the 1 Pages 20, 32, 254, 255. Ch. V] BELIEFS 49 difference between oriental and occidental civilization. Until lately we had no experimental proof that a change in the world views would produce a change in the civilization, but now we have such a proof. One Asiatic race has awakened to the truth that the eternal study of mind does not yield national strength and that the study of matter does yield it, and has acted upon the changed belief with the most astonishing results. I do not refer merely to the military power thus acquired, which, whatever views we may entertain with regard to war, has always been the first requisite to national greatness, but there is not a department of science in which this race does not now excel and is not march- ing abreast of the rest of the scientific world. Ten years ago two members of this race made discoveries that revolutionized the classification of plants and opened up new vistas in botany,^ and I understand they are doing splendid work in every other depart- ment, especially in the practical sciences and their application to the arts. If this had happened in India it would have been ascribed to Aryan blood, but this is a Mongolian race, and there is nothing to which the result can be attributed but simply and solely a change in their world views. No better example is needed to show that ideas do really make, lead, and move the world, and that if mankind can only be put into the right mental attitude economic conditions and all else can be safely left to take care of themselves. 1 I called attention to this in Pure Sociology, p. 319. CHAPTER VI TRUTH AND ERROR Es gibt nothwendige Irrthumer, durch die der Weg zur Wahrheit geht. — Weismann. In seinen Gottern malt sich der Mensch. — Schiller. All religions are false, although all are probably useful. — Averroes. Any one living in the twentieth century and possessing the best part of the knowledge of nature, man, and society that has thus far been brought to light, is in a favorable position for picturing to himself the natural course that the human mind must pursue in its development out of an original state of complete non-rationality through- all the stages of rationality up to that of such a degree of intelligence as he himself possesses. Before the state of ration- ality was reached all the other faculties were well developed. The senses were quite as keen as they are now, perhaps more so. The non-rational being from which man descended could see, hear, feel, taste, and smell as well as the most enlightened person in the world to-day. All the phenomena of nature were therefore appealing to him as strongly as they appeal to civilized men. We can suppose him to take the same notice of them and no more, as do the animals with which we are familiar. But the germ of reason at last gradually- sprouts and there arise dim ideas of the meaning of phenomena. What a dog thinks when he bays the moon we do not know, or whether he really thinks at all. But inchoate man certainly did at length reach the stage at which he could think, however feeble his thinking may have been. It is difficult to conceive of the slowness of this dawning of the rational faculty and of the effect of this slowness itself in shaping ideas. It was a differential process, like all the other genetic processes of nature, and the kinetographic picture of it which we form necessarily leaves long intervals un- represented. But at last we have in view a rational being in the 5° Ch. VI] ANTHROPOMORPHIC IDEAS c,t full presence of nature. It must not be supposed that this being begins at once to philosophize or even really to contemplate nature. The animal considers nature solely in relation to its wants and their satisfaction. The prehuman creature did the same, and the earliest man could only take a short step beyond this. He still considered nature solely from the standpoint of his interests. It was even then, and then much more than at later stages, the ■economic conditions that shaped his thought. But, just emerging from the animal stage, like animals in general, he was wild. Living in a pain economy, as all wild animals do, his chief business was self-preservation, and the ruling motive was fear. His primary attitude toward nature, therefore, was fear of it. Anthropomorphic Ideas It is difficult for one with such an acquaintance as nearly every- body now has of the causes of the ordinary natural phenomena to form an idea of a human being or race of men utterly devoid of all such knowledge. The study of animals does not help much in conceiving of this because they are not rational beings in the Sense of even the most primitive men. Animals act naturally in the presence of phenomena. They are controlled entirely by their wants and fears and do about what is naturally expected of them in each case. A horse has the same fear of a railroad train when standing beside the track as when standing on the track, while a human being will stand beside the track as the train passes wholly without fear. The difference is due to the presence in the latter of a rational faculty and its absence in the former. A fact as simple as that a train cannot well leave the rail would probably be within the comprehension of primitive man, and there are thou- sands of natural phenomena coming within that class, and about which the savage reasons with sufficient clearness to avoid danger in most cases. Comte remarked that "for all orders of phenomena whatever, the simplest and commonest facts have always been regarded as essentially subject to natural laws, instead of being attributed to the arbitrary will of supernatural agents." ^ 1 Philosophie positive, Vol. IV, p. 491. 52 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part! But this is true only of simple phenomena, such, for example, as the effects of gravitation on stones loosened on a hillside, branches torn from trees, or water in brooks. As regards all the more obscure phenomena, such as wind, night and day, the sun, moon, and stars, instead of ignoring them, or simply adapting them- selves to them, as animals seem to do, the primitive man could not avoid reasoning about them, trying to explain them. It is here that religion and science are said to have a common base in the effort to explain the phenomena of nature. The fact first to appeal to the mind was that of movement, or activity. While most objects seemed to be at rest, there were many that were in motion at least a part of the time. It was easy to move a small object with the hand, to roll or throw a stone, to swing a branch or a club. Men and animals were constantly moving their own limbs and going from place to place. All this seemed perfectly intelligible, as it was clearly within the power and experience of every living thing. But this was the only kind of activity that could be explained by the primitive mind. It is therefore natural, and was in fact unavoid- able, that all motion should be explained on the same principle as animal movement. In short, it was inevitable that all nature should be regarded as animated. This is the basis of the universal animism of savage philosophy. Ideas of this class are called anthropomorphic ideas. The expression is quite correct, because, although inorganic movements are assimilated to animal move- ments, still the latter are as much inferences from human move- ments as are the former. The reasoning in both cases proceeds from observation of self, but in the one case the inference is true and in the other it is false. Religious Ideas. — Most early religious ideas are anthropomor- phic. Reason begins to work upon surrounding phenomena and to interpret them in terms of self. The leaves and grass tremble and quake in the wind, but the wind is invisible. The waves dash upon the shore, but the power behind them is unseen. The river rolls on forever past the camp, but nothing is there to make it do so. The clouds fly across the sky, changing their form at every movement and assuming fantastic shapes. Ever and anon lines of fire streak the horizon accompanied by loud detonations and Ch. VI] SPIRITUAL BEINGS 53 a prolonged roar, and occasionally a tree near by is riven into fragments. Every day a round blazing orb rises out of the sea or the plain, describes a great arc above, and plunges back into the earth on the opposite side. The moon and the stars do the same at night, but the moon changes its form and times of appearance, and some of the stars wander. The savage, mostly without a shelter by day and lying out under the canopy of heaven by night, sees all this much more vividly than civilized man, and while we know that he does not wonder at it any more than a rustic wonders at a rainbow, still he tries to explain it and has very little difficulty in doing so. All these elements of nature, to be capable of moving and changing their forms, must be alive, i.e., ensouled. They must therefore themselves be living beings, endowed not only with spontaneous activity but with some degree of intelligence similar to his own. This conception is the essence of fetishism, — the earliest form of religion in the sense of a belief. Out of this grew all other religious ideas, — not simply primitive beliefs, but the whole series of theological conceptions and all beliefs respecting soul and spirit. Spiritual Beings. — Tylor's " minimum definition " of religion is the belief in spiritual beings. He and others have traced the origin of such a belief. A very brief sketch is all that is needed here. In its simplest form the problem is to explain the conception of spirit as it exists in the minds of primitive men. We find it in tribes so widely separated as to preclude the possibility of derivation, and it is safe to conclude that it is a conception at which all minds must necessarily arrive under the conditions of existence to which every race of men has been subjected. Given these conditions and an incipient rational faculty and the idea of spiritual existence is a logical necessity. The primary causes of the belief in a spiritual existence and spiritual beings are twofold, or belong to two somewhat different groups. One of these groups of causes may be distinguished as subjective, in the sense of affecting each individual personally in such a manner as to lead him to the conclusion that he possesses an invisible or intangible double or spiritual part, which, for a portion of the time, at least, is detached and separated from his original 54 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I corporeal self. The other group of causes may be called objective, being calculated to lead the primitive man to the conclusion that there are intelligent agencies which are devoid of any material attributes, existing independent of himself and of human beings in general. The phenomena of this latter class have already been alluded to. To the subjective group belong shadows, reflections, echoes, dreams, delirium, insanity, epilepsy, swooning, trance, and death. It is difficult for the well-informed reader to conceive how utterly devoid the savage mind is of all knowledge of the true nature of any of these phenomena. There is no greater mistake than to sup- pose that well-developed mental faculties are any help in under- standing such things. There is no degree of intellectual power conceivable which, unaided by science, would be capable of furnish- ing a correct interpretation of any of them. The enlightened world understands them simply and solely because it has been taught what science, in the face of appearances to the contrary, has labo- riously investigated and explained. In contemplating his shadow the savage has no conception of the nature and effect of light. He simply sees his own form, more or less distorted by perspective, without substance, thickness, or tangibility, moving as he moves, and changing its shape with the altitude of the sun or the angle of the object against which it is cast. I^e readily perceives that he is the cause of it, that it is in some way a product of himself. He can only conclude that there is something in him, or belonging to him, which can go out and occupy another part of space from that occupied by his real original self, — another self, a double, but devoid of flesh and blood, a spir- itual nature. And thus we find throughout all mythology, even that of the cultured Greeks and Romans, the terms "shadow" and " spirit " inextricably confounded. When the savage looks into a pool of still water he sees this other self there, only far more distinctly. Instead of being a mere form it now possesses color and recognizable features. Others who see it inform him that all the hneaments are his own. He sees the images of others, which agree in all respects with the originals. But when he plunges his hand into the pool there is nothing Ch. VI] SPIRITUAL BEINGS 55 there. What he sees must be immaterial, and this conception does not differ in any essential respect from that of spirit. It is true that animals and inanimate objects also cast their shadows and reflect their images ; but every one knows that these, as well as human beings, are endowed by savages with a double existence and a spiritual part. The reasoning is rigidly logical from the prem- ises, far more so than much of the reasoning of the higher races. The lessons from sight are confirmed by those from sound. A chieftain shouts in a mountain gorge and his whoop is repeated from the surrounding hills. It is not an answer ; it is his own voice uttering his own words, but from a distant point. He knows that he is not himself far up on the rocky cliff whence the sound pro- ceeds, and yet he cannot doubt that he is its author. It must be his other self through which he has the power of speaking. The warrior sleeps, and while sleeping he wanders far away, meets other men and other scenes, performs feats of prowess, or enjoys pleasures never before tasted. He awakes, and every cir- cumstance tells him that he has all this time lain quietly in one place. Yet he recollects all these exploits, and he knows that he has himself experienced them. He is obliged to conclude that the immaterial part of himself has actually been absent, has seen the objects, performed the deeds, felt the pleasures, and witnessed the events enacted in his dream. Suppose that disease lays him low, fever racks his brain, and he becomes delirious. Again he wanders, experiences, suffers, but he may not be able to recall these scenes and states. He performs strange actions, which others subsequently describe to him. Both he and his friends know that he would not himself have acted thus, and the conclusion is natural that the spirit of another must have entered into and possessed him. Hence we find that everywhere efforts are made to drive out the evil spirit. Catalepsy, insanity, and all pathologic states affecting the mind fall under this general class, and receive this explanation. And thus it happens, as every one knows, that exorcism practically constitutes the healing art of primitive peoples. In trance the spirit assumes another state, which by practice and fasting may sometimes be voluntarily superinduced, and we thus 56 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I have the widespread phenomenon known as ecstasy. This is ex- plained as the intentional replacing of the one's own spirit by another presumably superior one. Of this we have a survival in modern mediumship. In the complete trance, and in swooning or syncope, in so far as these differ, there is complete temporary aban- donment of the body by the soul. The latter is supposed to go away, and there is usually nothing to indicate where it has gone or what it is doing. The inference is common that it has gone to take possession for the time being of some other body. But swoons, and especially cataleptic trance, may have consider- able duration, and the transition from this to death is, to the savage mind, very easy and natural. Death is simply a permanent swoon. The double has gone, this time never to return. Where has it gone ? This question is variously answered, but in most tribes of low rank the idea of any distant abode for these departed spirits is entirely wanting. They are usually supposed to remain near the spot where they left the body or where the body is finally placed, and an immense number and variety of mortuary and burial cus- toms attest the universality of this general belief. These all point to one notion common to all races, namely, that of the continued existence after death of the incorporeal part of man. The above constitutes the genesis of the universal belief in a spiritual existence and a satisfactory explanation of its universality. It is the necessary conclusion which the primitive man must draw, as soon as he can reason at all, from the phenomena which nature always presents. The belief of an after-life in general is due to the simple fact that from identical phenomena the reasoning faculty which is everywhere the same, will uniformly deduce the same conclusion. The idea of the survival of the spirits of individuals that die could not fail to exert a profound iniluence upon the living. Con- ceiving, as savages do, that the spirit remains near the scene of its career during life, they could not stop short of peopling every spot with innumerable spirits. With few exceptions these spirits are regarded as evil disposed, and to them are attributed most of the misfortunes that befall the living. All space thus becomes filled with myriads of spiritual beings, the manes of departed men, and Ch. VI] SPIRITUAL BEINGS 57 these have been feared, worshiped, implored, and propitiated under a variety of names. A still more important consequence of this behef is that which follows on the death of great chieftains or mighty rulers. They, too, linger round the places of their glorious achievements, and are the invisible spectators of the doings of their former subjects. For a while elaborate ceremonies are performed over the tomb of the dead hero. His weapons are usually buried with him to arm him in the next life. His possessions are frequently placed in his grave to be used again ; too often slaves and wives are sacrificed to accompany him and minister to his wants. As time goes on his earthly exploits are more and more exaggerated, until they become marvels and miracles. Complete apotheosis is the ultimate result. This takes the form of ancestor-worship, regarded by some as the basis and beginning of all theological conceptions. The above are fair samples of the subjective influences which have led the primitive man to a belief in the existence of spirit, of a spiritual part in man, and of spiritual beings in general. They might in themselves seem adequate to account for such a belief and for its universality ; but to them we have now to add the causes which I have distinguished as objective, strengthening and confirming the subjective causes, and swelling the stream of evi- dence poured into the receptive mind of untutored man. Under the head of anthropomorphic ideas last treated a few of these influences were enumerated. We saw that early man, unac- quainted with the operation of natural forces, accounted for all movements in the inanimate world on the principle of an indwell- ing consciousness. The subjective influences that we have now passed in review were in perfect harmony with this belief, since now, with the vast accumulating hosts of liberated human doubles, there was no lack of material for animating every object in nature. We thus have a rational basis for fetishism as well as for animal- worship. As we have already seen, early ideas are necessarily anthropo- morphic. They are based on the individual's experience of his own powers. The most fundamental of all such experiences are those connected with the power of spontaneous movement. The savage's 58 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I. idea of life is ability to move, and whatever moves without being visibly moved by some living creature is supposed to be itself alive. Hence one of the first results of human reasoning is to . attribute life to certain inanimate objects. The activities of inani- mate things are, moreover, generally conceived as conscious and intentional, — as manifestations of will and intelligence. Akin to this conception is that of the presumed power of meta- morphosis which a certain class of phenomena led primitive man to ascribe to almost every object in nature. Not only can material objects move, but they can also change, become other things, van- ish and dissolve entirely, ceasing longer to exist, or they can reappear at will in the same or in some altered form or guise. When we say that early man reasons logically, it must not be inferred that this involves a recognition of the laws of causation as understood by scientific men. He indeed requires and insists upon a cause, but it is rarely a true cause or causa efficiens. It is usu- ally a final cause or causa finalis, and this serves his purpose equally well. He always demands a reason, but it is rarely or never what is technically called a " sufficient reason " {ratio stcffi- ciens). Yet the efficient cause is the only cause and the sufficient reason is the only reason that modern science recognizes ; and this is now so well understood that it has become customary to call that a logical mind which insists upon a strictly mechanical ante- cedent for the explanation of every phenomenon. This is not the primitive sense of either the term "logical" or "rational," and it is not the sense in which it can be applied to the aboriginal mind of man. The recognition of a will to move or a will to change is all that most minds, even among somewhat advanced races, require ; and the great weft of mythology and folk-lore of such races — • the Arabian Nights' Entertainments, the Homeric and Ossianic poems, and the mass of mythic lore and legend that makes up the early literature of every cultured nation, with its diluted and degen- erate remains that are taught to our children in the nursery, and the ease and interest with which it is all absorbed by the latter — amply attests the adequacy of what may be distinguished as the logic of magic for all minds not thoroughly trained in the logic of law. ■Ch. VI] SPIRITUAL BEINGS 59 The power of natural objects to change their form at will is ■constantly forced upon the mind of early man. The formation and dissipation of clouds ; the succession of daylight, darkness, and the seasons ; the changes of the moon ; the movements of the planets ; the apparent revolutions of the sun, moon, and stars ; the appear- ance of comets, meteors, auroras, rainbows, halos, lightning flashes ; the slower processes of vegetable and animal growth and decay ; the emerging of birds from eggs, of moths from chrysalids ; indeed, the phenomena of reproduction in general, as well as of life and death, — all these must have rendered the conception of indefinite transmutability at will throughout all nature a familiar one to the savage mind. The manifestations of power inherent in nature through earth- quakes, tornadoes, and thunderbolts forced these ideas home with a terrible sanction. The most typical of all these influences is that of wind. It is the embodiment of power without visible cause. The savage never thinks of air as a material substance. To him it is simply a manifestation of will, — the expression of a purpose or wish by a spiritual agent. Hence the frequent identification of the terms "wind" and "spirit" (irvevna). The' savage knows nothing of causes except as they are exem- plified in his own muscular actions. With this narrow induction he can only reason that all effects are produced by such causes. His reasoning is in all cases teleological. Not a leaf trembles in the breeze, not a wave washes the shore, but that in his mind it is the result of will. JEolns and Neptune are but the refined embodi- ments, in a more civiHzed people, of these crude primitive concep- tions. All the imaginary beings conceived as exerting this will power are highly anthropomorphic in their character, and differ from the spiritual part of man only in being detached from the animal body. There exists, therefore, overwhelming evidence, both of the sub- jective and objective kind, to show that a rational being placed in a world like this must necessarily conclude that there is such a thing as spirit, — an invisible, intangible, conscious power, not ■occupying space, and wholly independent of the conditions that restrict the actions of embodied beings. Not less irresistible are 6o APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I the proofs that the conscious, intelligent motive power of bodily action in each individual is in fact such a spirit, and is capable under certain circumstances of quitting the body for a longer or shorter period, of entering another body temporarily or perma- nently, or of abandoning the body altogether. The facts above enumerated constitute the basis of all religious ideas. They developed naturally along two somewhat different lines. From a notion of the temporary continuance of the spiritual life to that of its permanent continuance is but a step, since the spiritual part is naturally conceived as indestructible. The ideas that grew up with regard to metamorphosis in nature, coupled with the belief that animals, too, have spirits, and that spirits may pass from one body into another, led unavoidably to the idea that the spirits of men might have previously occupied the bodies of animals. Most of the wide-spread animal totemism is probably due to this belief. At a higher stage in intellectual development this gradually passed into the well-known doctrine of the transmigration of souls, or metempsychosis. Thus far the reasoning was faultless, considering the premises, from the standpoint of logicality. It lost this char- acter only when, in the two great religions latest to develop, Christianity and Mohammedanism, the possibility of the origination of a spirit at some given point of time was coupled with the notion of its infinite continuance after that point of time. I confine this to the two religions named not without being fully aware that learned men maintain that the doctrine was taught by Plato and accepted by many Greeks and Romans prior to the Christian era. A careful study of this question shows that it was never taught in this crude form by the ancients. Plato's statement of it, most fully elaborated in his Phasdon, is distinctly tinged with the Pythagorean element borrowed from India, and spirit is conceived by Plato as something wholly independent of time. The anomalous absence of a belief in a continued personal existence among the Hebrews has been explained on the theory that it was regarded by them as barbaric, and was rejected largely because it formed a part of the religion of the Babylonians and Chaldeans, with whom they were at war and whom they took pains not to imitate in any respect. Ch. VI] SPIRITUAL BEINGS 6 1 The other, or objective, line along which the early religious ideas developed took the form of creating a great number of powerful spiritual beings, or gods. The general direction was that of dimin- ishing their number and increasing their power. Mr. Spencer has argued that the basis of the whole is to be found in ancestor- worship. This, in so far as true, links the objective closely to the subjective movement, since the gods are then simply the disem- bodied spirits of the great chieftains and heroes of each race of men. It is impossible to disentangle such intricate threads of evidence, and while there is much to be said for this view, it is probable that in the total absence of ancestor-worship there would still be no lack of all manner of deities in any race of men. The more striking inanimate objects are early personified and deified. The most striking of all objects in nature is the sun, and sun- worship is one of the most widely diffused rehgions of the world. But animals, plants, stocks, and stones are also worshiped, and scarcely anything can be named that has not at some time and place been the subject of adoration. These fetishistic religions were followed in more developed races by those in which a great multitude of deities presided over the different objects of nature and finally over all the varied fields of human activity. Such was polytheism, of which the Greek theogony presents us with the most elaborate example. But here and everywhere there is seen a tendency toward the establishment of a hierarchy of superior and subordinate deities. Attempts have been made to trace this tendency through successive stages in which the inferior deities were gradually eliminated until only one supreme being remained. With all the vicissitudes of human history this cannot be success- fully done, and it can only be regarded as indicating the theoretical course of the progress of theological conceptions. That there was, however, an intermediate stage of dualism, in which the spiritual power was somewhat evenly divided between two great antago- nistic deities, one of good or light, and the other of evil or dark- ness, is attested by the Persian religion; and the Christian Satan seems to be a mere modification of Ahriman. 62 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I Religious Structures I prefer this expression to that of "ecclesiastical institutions," because the meaning of the latter phrase requires to be so greatly stretched in order to make it include the earliest forms. It implies the existence of something that can be properly called a church, and nothing to which this term will apply occurs either in any primitive race of men, nor, indeed, in any of the great more or less civilized Asiatic peoples. I do not mean that a church neces- sarily implies a building such as those to which the name is now applied, for it has also quite as often meant worship in the open air beneath the shade of the oak. Early worship was of course in the open air, because men worshiped long before they learned to construct even the simplest forms of shelter. And not only among rude peoples but among some far advanced temples of worship preceded domestic habitations and far outstripped them in size, beauty, and elaborate design. But it is also true that religious organization, taking the whole world and all time into the account, deserves the appellation " ecclesiastical " only within restricted areas and during a comparatively brief period. The term "priesthood,'' used objectively and historically, and stripped of that depreciatory tincture that a single sect has sought to give it, properly applies to the entire religious organization of the world, from the simplest to the most complex and elaborate. This is therefore the proper substitute for the word "church " in any work that seeks to portray the religious movement of the world, and " sacerdotal institutions " is a phrase that possesses the requisite breadth for embracing this vast field. These are true religious structures, the origin and nature of which we have now to consider. We have already seen that primitive man, living, as he must, in a pain economy, is and always has been a prey to innumerable fears. Fear of nature at large and the elements, fear of wild animals, and fear of other men make him wild like the wild beasts, which are so for like reasons, and cause him perpetually to cringe and watch and fly, or fight if brought to bay. A com- plete slave to these fears, he scarce ever enjoys a moment of peace. Ch. VI] RELIGIOUS STRUCTURES 63 or rest, or true happiness. But all these sources of fear combined, which are common to him and the animal world, are as nothing compared to. another source, unknown to animals, — the fear of spiritual beings. This great overshadowing awe he has created for himself by the exercise of his reason. No creature devoid of reason 1 can become the victim of it. Religion is a product of reason./ From the other sources of fear there are modes of escape. From' the elements he can protect himself to some degree by finding or digging holes in the earth, or, as the inventive faculty develops, by constructing rude habitations and the simplest forms of cloth- ing. Wild animals he can learn to destroy by contriving weapons and snares. The assaults of men he can meet with counter-assaults, and the most powerful or best equipped can escape. But from spiritual powers there is no escape. Though ever present, they are invisible, intangible, and inscrutable. Their acts are arbitrary, capricious, and unpredictable. Their will is unknown, and there is no conceivable way of averting their wrath if once it is directed against a hopeless mortal. In such a dire predicament it is easy to see that anything in any way promising relief would be eagerly seized upon. But from what source could relief be conceived to come.' The only possible hope is some means of learning the wishes of spirits, gods, deities, and adapting conduct to such wishes. But how can those wishes be made known.? Only by some mediator who is endowed with the gift or power of communicating with them. This mediator must be a man, otherwise he could not also communicate with men. Is it possible that there are any men who differ from the rest of men in possessing this gift or power.? Under such circumstances the slenderest claim to such a prerogative would be eagerly listened to. When we reflect that even in the most enlightened countries in the twentieth century divine healers and self-styled prophets readily attract multitudes of adherents and behevers, we can imagine the credulity of primitive men in constant terror of dire visitations from malignant spirits. It amounted almost to a case of economic demand and supply. The demand for a mediator was intense and incessant. Such a demand could scarcely remain unsupplied. Some one would surely have the wit, from purely egoistic motives if from 64 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I no other, to claim the power of communicating with the invisible world. But when we remember that all were alike under the spell we can well imagine that the egoistic motive was not the only one. It is doubtful whether any one claiming divine inspiration ever did so in pure fraud. There is at bottom an unqualified belief in the existence of supernatural beings, and such is the nature of the human mind that it can and does create within itself a conviction that it actually is in communication with such beings. But whatever the motives, the fact is that there always have been men in every group, tribe, or race who insist that they have relations with the spiritual world, that they know or can learn the will of spirits or gods, and that with these gifts they can warn men against acts that excite the divine wrath. The more respectable of those putting forth such claims are recognized by the group. It is just at this stage that the group most needs help. The growing reason of its members is leading them more and more astray from the path of race safety. This faculty was created as a guide to the better satisfaction of desire, which at the outset meant the more complete performance of function and the greater certainty of self- preservation. But it soon overstepped the narrow limits of this primordial duty, and began to guide men to the satisfaction of desires which were disconnected with function and even destruc- tive of it. The group sentiment of race safety rose against this, but was powerless to arrest it. It established customs calculated to preserve the existence of the group, but how could the obser- vance of these customs be enforced.? It is clear that at that stage neither moral suasion nor argument could avail. The only motive to which there was any use of appealing was fear. But the politi- cal organization was weak or scarcely existed, and the number of transgressors was large. Penalties more terrible than the group could inflict must be threatened against those who would disrupt society. But there was one source of fear sufficiently terrible to be effective, and that was the fear of the gods. If there was any one capable of assuring the wayward that their course would bring down upon them the wrath of offended deities or disembodied spirits, this would be listened to. Those therefore claiming to possess the divine favor and who were willing to use their power Ch. VI] ERROR 65 in the interest of group safety, were welcomed and given every opportunity to exert their influence in the most effective manner. In short they were erected into a priesthood and enabled to coop- erate with the political power, whatever it might be, in preserving the social order. Such was the origin of sacerdotal institutions or religious structures, which have existed in all societies at all developed, and which still continue to exert an influence at least equal to that of any other class of social structures. Error As the religious ideas thus far considered consist entirely of error, there being no objective truth corresponding to spiritual beings, and as religious structures are based directly and exclusively upon religious ideas, if the latter really served the useful purpose above described, it seems to follow that error may be useful. This may be a shock to some minds, but it serves to show the futility of most abstract theories, such as that truth is always necessarily use- ful and error necessarily injurious. Until we rid oiurselves of these and are content to rest our case upon observed facts, we have no real standing in court. What the course of human evolution would have been had there been no religious ideas and no religious struc- tures, it is perhaps idle to speculate, because there are no facts to support any theory, the existence of both being, as we have seen, a necessity in the nature of things. We cannot even conceive of the development of a race of rational beings in a world like ours without having to pass through the whole religious stage as described. Religious ideas and structures are an exclusively human because an exclusively rational condition. The whole animal world is with- out either. Animals, including the prehuman ancestor of man, are as completely devoid of all knowledge of the laws and principles of nature as was the most primitive human being, or, if possible, more so. But this is only ignorance; it is not error. Error is a pure product of reason. It arises from an effort on the part of a rational 1 being to interpret phenomena. It consists in a false interpretation ' of phenomena due to insufficient knowledge. It could not be avoided because appearances in nature are always different from the reality 66 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I and usually nearly or quite the opposite of it. I dealt with this truth in Dynamic Sociology ^ under the head of the " paradoxes of nature," and need not go again over that ground. But in consequence of the facts there enumerated and innumerable others that might be set down, it is absolutely impossible for a race of beings to emerge out of the non-rational and pass into the rational state without accumu- lating a vast load of error. That reasoning from inadequate data is always misleading has been seen by the greatest logicians. Thus Kant says: There have been so many unfounded assumptions of the possibility of extend- ing our knowledge through pure reason that it has to be made a general rule thoroughly to distrust it and to believe or accept nothing, even if proved by the clearest reasoning, without documentary evidence capable of fully supporting the deduction.^ Lamarck saw the same truth when he said : I could show that while man derives great advantages from his well-developed intellectual faculties, the human species generally considered experiences at the same time great inconveniences from them.^ In an earlier work he wrote : Were it not for the picture that so many celebrated men have drawn of the weakness and lack of human reason ; were it not that, independently of all the freaks into which the passions of man almost constantly allure him, the igno- rance whicli makes him the opinionated slave of custom and the continual dupe of those who wish to deceive him; were it not that his reason has led him into the most revolting errors, since we actually see him so debase himself as to worship animals, even the meanest, addressing to them his prayers, and implor- ing their aid; were it not, I say, for these considerations, should we feel author- ized to raise any doubts as to the excellence of this special light which is the attribute of man ? * That these errors of the reason are due to the attempt to phi- losophize about nature is well stated by Condorcet. All errors in politics or in morals have philosophical errors as their basis, and these in turn are founded on physical errors. There does not exist a reli- gious system nor a supernatural extravagance which is not based on ignorance of the laws of nature. The inventors and defenders of these absurdities could not foresee the future development of the human mind. Persuaded that men 1 Vol. I, pp. 47-53. 2 Kritik der reinen Vemunft, ed. Hartenstein, Leipzig, 1868, p. 186. s Philosophie zoologique, Paris, 1873, Vol. 11, pp. 315-316. Original edition, 1809. * Recherches sur I'organisation des corps vivans, etc., Paris, 1802, pp. 124-125. Ch. VI] ERROR 67 knew at their time all that they could ever know, and would always believe what they then believed, they confidently rested their illusions upon the general ideas of their country and their age.^ Sir John Lubbock (Lord Avebury), on the same page as that last cited, speaking of the dread of sorcerers or wizards, says: Savages never know but what they may be placing themselves in the power of these terrible enemies. . . . The mental sufferings which they thus undergo, the horrible tortures which they sometimes inflict on themselves, and the crimes which they are led to commit, are melancholy in the extreme.^ Coste, in a charming httle book written in his leisure hours, truly said : False ideas in a healthy brain which has no opportunity to correct them, dis- proportionate ideas in a weak brain incapable of experimentation, may engender sophisms of action, may lead to blind, foolhardy conduct and to fanaticism approaching insanity.^ As further distinguishing ignorance from error Kant says: "the senses do not err, not because they always reason {urtheilen) correctly, but because they do not reason at all." ■» And Spencer, speaking of these misleading beliefs, remarks: These cannot be primary beliefs, but must be secondary beliefs into which the primitive man is betrayed during his early attempts to understand the sur- rounding world. The incipiently speculative stage must come after a stage in which there is no speculation — a stage in which there yet exists no sufficient language for carrying on speculation. During this stage the primitive man no more tends to confound animate and inanimate than inferior creatures do. If in his first efforts at interpretation, he forms conceptions inconsistent with this preestablished distinction between animate and inanimate, it must be that some striking experience misleads him — introduces a germ of error which develops into an erroneous set of interpretations.^ In explanation of the demonstrated fact that "fetichism arises only when a certain stage of mental and social evolution has been reached," the same author says that "in proportion as the reasoning faculty is good will be the number of erroneous conclusions drawn from erroneous premises." ^ 1 Tableau historique des progres de 1' esprit humain, Paris, 1900, p. 152. 2 Prehistoric Times, New York, 1904, p. 449. 3 Dieu et I'Ame, 2e ed., Paris,- 1903, p. 68. * Kritik der reinen Vemunf t, p. 244. 6 Principles of Sociology, Vol. I, p. 146, § 67. 6 Ibid., p. 342, § 162. 68 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I Bacon beautifully expressed the hopeless condition of the primi- tive intellect in this vast maze of nature, ^ and no attitude is more unphilosophical in dealing with the subject of primitive error than the attitude of censure or condemnation. Cofiseqiienccs of Error. — Only a brief and partial enumeration of the consequences of the universal belief in spiritual beings can be attempted here, but in most cases they are already so familiar to all well-read persons that a mere mention of them is sufficient. The important point is to show that the greater part of the evils from which the human race has suffered, evils unknown to animal races, are really due to error, i.e., to false conclusions drawn from inade- quate premises. The most shocking of all these consequences un- questionably is the wide-spread custom of sacrificing human victims at the funerals of chieftains. I dealt with this general as well as with this special subject in Dynamic Sociology,^ and referred to some of the sources of information relative to the latter, but many works have appeared since that time, and the reader with a penchant in that direction can now follow it to almost any desired length. The works of Letourneau alone furnish an almost inexhaustible store- house of this class of facts. A survey of this field shows that this horrid practice is compara- tively rare among the very lowest races, and reaches its maximum in races quite well advanced toward or fairly into the status called barbarism. Spencer says: This practice develops as society advances through its earlier stages, and the theory of another life becomes more definite. Among the Fuegians, the Andamanese, the Australians, the Tasmanians, with their rudimentary social organizations, the sacrifice of wives to accompany dead husbands, if it occurs at all, is not general enough to be specified in the accounts given of them. But it is a practice shown us by more advanced peoples: in Polynesia, by the New Caledonians, by the Fijians, and occasionally by the less barbarous Tongans — in America, by the Chinooks, the Caribs, the Dakotahs — in Africa, by the Congo people, the Inland Negroes, the Coast Negroes, and most extensively by the Dahomans. . . . It was, however, in the considerably-advanced societies of ancient America that arrangements for the future convenience of the dead 1 iEdificium autem hujus universi structura sua, intellectui humane contemplanti, instar labyrinthi est ; ubi tot ambigua vianim, tam fallaces rerum et signorum simili- tudines, tam obliquae et implexa; naturaram spirae et nodi, undequaque se ostendunt (Instauratio Magna, Prsfatio. Works, 1869, Vol. I, p. 205). 2 Vol. II, pp. 287-292. ch.vi] consequences of error 69 were carried out with tlie greatest care. ... By the Mexicans " the number of the victims was proportioned to the grandeur of the funeral, and amounted sometimes, as several historians affirm, to 200 " ; and in Peru, when an Ynca died, " his attendants and favorite concubines, amounting sometimes, it is said, to a thousand, were immolated on his tomb." ^ Speaking of these same ancient Mexicans, Letourneau says : The favorite god, the great god of the Mexicans, was the god of war, the ferocious Huitzilopochtli. Almost all the religious festivals of Mexico required human sacrifices; never was religious madness more bloody than in that country. . At every great event it was necessary to murder many thousand slaves, sufficient to form a little lake of human blood capable of floating a boat. . . On the occasion of the dedication of the great temple to that divinity [Huitzilopochtli], at Mexico, not less than 80,000 human victims were sacrificed.^ Letourneau speaks of this as taking place " in spite of the ad- vanced state of Mexican civilization." It really took place in con- sequence of that advanced state, i.e., in consequence of the fully developed reasoning powers of that people, by means of which they were capable of elaborating a systematic doctrine relative to the spirits of the dead. This body of doctrine is crystallized into a universal belief that these spirits exist and will follow their master into the next world and there minister to his wants. As Spencer says: The intensity of the faith prompting such customs, we shall the better con- ceive on finding proof that the victims are of ten willing, and occasionally anxious, to die. . . . Garcilasso says that a dead Ynca's wives "volunteered-to be killed, and their number was often such that the officers were obliged to interfere, say- ing that enough had gone at present." * This belief is a typical world view. It is universal not only in the sense that it exists in all human races at the proper stage in the development of the rational faculty, but also in the sense that it is shared by every member of the group without exception. Some one has well said that there are no dissenters among savages. Comte has been criticized for saying that fetishism represents " the most intense theological state," * but it is perfectly true from our present ' Principles of Sociology, Vol. I, pp. 204-205, § 104. 2 La Sociologie d'apres rEthnographie, par Charles Letourneau, 3^ ed., Paris, 1892, p. 291. ' Spencer, iitd., p. 205, § 104. * Philosophie positive, Vol. V, p. 39. 70 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I point of view, which is that from which Comte viewed it, as the context shows. Such ideas are an integral part of the mental existence of a people; they permeate the society and sway the entire mass. Every act, public or private, is determined by them, and no act is too shocking or terrible to be shrunk from if dictated by the logic of the dominant idea. The practice of placing the belongings of a dead person in his grave for his use in the next world is a simple corollary from the general reasoning of primitive peoples relative to the nature of the soul. Like everything else in savage life, it was carried to the greatest extremes and ultimately resulted in some tribes in an enormous destruction of property. The few examples that I culled in 1883 ^ from the great mass that had been collected at that date, and which have gone on accumulating to the present time, will suffice for the present purpose, which is simply to illustrate the legitimate consequences of universally accepted errors. But, as I then stated, it is in fact a more serious evil than the sacrifice of human victims, because it is practised by persons of all classes, whereas sacrifices are mainly confined to royal funerals. In many cases all that a man has is either buried with him or destroyed in one way or another, it often being regarded as sacrilegious to make any further use of a man's property after he has passed away. This practice also lasted much longer in the history of the mental development of a people than that of sacrificing. Long after the latter has been discontinued the former is kept up, partly as a substitute, and we find it persist- ing among half-civilized peoples down almost to our own time. In some parts of China, for example, a wealthy family is sometimes completely ruined by a costly funeral. Indeed, the funerals among civilized peoples are often extravagantly expensive, and this waste of property may be regarded as a survival of the barbaric practice of burying or destroying all the property of a dead person. Another direction which this same class of primitive logic took was that of the erection of costly tombs for the remains of great warriors and rulers. This has also been an almost universal practice, and one that extended far down into the latest stages of barbarism. These tombs are scattered all over the world and are often about 1 Dynamic Sociology, Vol. II, pp. 293-296. CH.VI] CONSEQUENCES OF ERROR 7 1 all that remains of an extinct civilization. An enormous amount of labor has been expended upon them, — labor thus withdrawn from productive industry and of course involving a corresponding amount of misery among the people. The pyramids of Egypt represent the highest point to which this practice was ever carried, for they are neither more nor less than the tombs of the great kings of that country. Those who \isit them are usually profoundly impressed with them as achievements of human art at so early a period, and rarely reflect upon their significance from the economic and socio- logical standpoint. There has been, however, one exception to this in the case of Mr. Herbert Spencer, who, as we might expect of him, reflected upon the conditions that could have brought such remarkable objects into existence. In his autobiograph}- he describes his visit to them, and says : With the one memorial is associated the name of Cheops, or, as he is now called, Shufu or Koofoo — a king who, if we maj- believe Herodotus, kept a hundred thousand men at work for twenty years building his tomb ; and who, whether these figures are or are not correct, must have imposed forced labor on enormous numbers of men for periods during which tens of thousands had to bear great pains, and thousands upon thousands died of their sufferings. If the amounts of misery and mortality inflicted are used as measures, this king, held in such detestation by later generations that statues of him were defaced by them, ought to be numbered among the few most accursed of men.^ Under the head of Consequences of Error I had planned to treat in this work somewhat at length some dozen other illustrations, for all of which I have been collecting materials for many years; but I realize that this would unduly expand this chapter, while most of the data are accessible to the reading pubUc, and I have decided that it will be sufficient simply to enumerate the principal heads. This I shall do in something like the order in which the practices occur in the course of the general development of the reasoning powers and intelligence of mankind. This chronological order is also the logical order; but I would not wish to imply that it relates to historical chronology, but simply to the successive stages attained by peoples, irrespective of the absolute times at which such stages were reached. Comte has been severely attacked by persons who, if they had read his works at all, had read them 1 An Autobiography. By Herbert Spencer, New York, 1904, Vol II, pp. 403-404. 72 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I carelessly, and who accused him of maintaining that the "three stages" followed one another in strict chronological order. He made no such claims, and repeatedly explained that two or more of the great leading world conceptions always coexisted, not only in different parts of the world but also among the same people and even in the same mind. In all such discussions it is necessary to abstract the conditions or states of mind and consider them by them- selves and independent of dates and other human events. In the following enumeration this is all that is meant by the order in which the practices or customs are arranged. 1. Self-mutilation. This is a wide-spread custom, performed chiefly at funerals, or often prolonged for days as a token of grief, and believed in some way to please the departed spirit or appease angry gods. It takes a variety of forms, but usually consists in the mourners cutting and gashing themselves with whatever sharp instruments they may possess. 2. Superstition. This term is much too general for convenient use. It really embraces all the forms of error that have been or are to be enumerated. But by its use here it is meant to group under it a great mass of customs and practices which do not usually involve the destruction of human life, but which have for their principal effect to restrict the liberty of action and fill the minds of men with a thousand ungrounded fears and terrors. It also serves as an effective bar to all intellectual or material progress, and as it continues on through all the stages of barbarism into that of civil- ization, this latter aspect becomes more serious. As an example niay be mentioned the fact, alleged at least, and probably real, that the chief objection to the construction of railroads in China was that the noise and jar of the trains would disturb the dead. 3. Asceticism. This is unknown in savagery and is scarcely possible in any stage of true barbarism. It was reserved for a high state of intellectual development, but it is based, as truly as human sacrifice, upon the belief in spiritual beings and a future spiritual existence. Though based like the rest mainly on fear, it contains an element of hope. As Sir Thomas More admitted, the real end sought by it is pleasure to self,i and Hartmann declares that it is 1 Utopia (1516). Murray's English reprints, London, 1869, No. 14, p. 116. ch.vi] consequences of error 73 thoroughly egoistic.i The horrible self-tortures that have been practised by thousands of people in all ages under this delusion have been vividly portrayed, and it would be easy to fill a volume with their recital. The milder forms that have long prevailed in the leading civilized countries, called puritanism in America, are danger- ous to health and destructive of happiness and of progress. 4. Zoolatry. Animal totemism among savage and barbarous tribes, which is itself a form of animal-worship, but is compara- tively harmless, becomes a serious matter when in more civilized peoples like those of India it makes vermin, serpents, and danger- ous wild beasts sacred and interdicts their destruction. The logic of these practices grows out of the behef in the transmigration of souls through the bodies of these animals into those of men and back from men to animals. Reference was made to this in Dynamic Sociology (Vol. II, p. 271), but it still continues, and the high rewards offered by the British government seem scarcely to tempt the superstitious natives of that country. Statistics of mortality from these sources are annually collected, but they must fall far short of the true figures. In 1899, 24,621 persons died in India from snake bite alone, while in 1901 the number was 23,166. Tigers, leopards, bears, wolves, and hyenas destroy between 2000 and 3000 more each year. The cobra, the tiger, the leopard, and other dangerous snakes and animals are sacred and occupied by the souls of men. 5 . Witchcraft. The belief in the power of certain persons to pro- ject their spirits into other persons and "possess" them is almost universal among all but the most enlightened peoples. Some form of sorcery is believed to be practised by all savage and barbaric races. Both sexes have this power, but the tendency was to limit it more and more to women. In the Middle Ages it took the form of witchcraft and lasted until into the eighteenth century. Indeed, it is not over now, and is still practised in Mexico, a witch having been burned at Camargo in i860. A suit was brought in 1902 at Chicago against a woman for bewitching another and causing her hair to fall out.^ Witchcraft was fully believed in by Luther, 1 Philosophie des Unbewussten, Bd. II, pp. 366, 373. 2 See the newspapers of about July 29, 1902. 74 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I Melanchthon, John Wesley, and Lafitau, and was declared to be a fact by Blackstone.i It is now completely discountenanced by all enlightened persons regardless of their creed, and they all agree that there never was any such thing as the bewitching of one per- son by another. The thousands of witches who have been put to death, often burned at the stake or horribly tortured, must there- fore have all been innocent victims of this hideous error that seized and held fast the minds of men through so many centuries. One would suppose that a fact hke this would cause everybody to doubt every opinion held without the most convincing proof, but in the face of it the world still clings to hundreds of scarcely less absurd ideas, though most of them are incapable of leading to such shock- ing consequences. 6. Persecution. I confine this for the present to religious perse- cution, i.e., to the persecution of so-called heretics. A heretic is a person who has a somewhat, often only slightly, different religious belief from a larger body of persons in the country in which he lives, and who have acquired power over the lives and liberties of citizens. This is confined to what are called civilized countries, because, as we have just seen, there are no differences in the belief of savages. A difference of belief is a mark of civilization; and it has always happened that the dissenters were the more civilized. Their perse- cution, therefore, and wholesale destruction, as in the case of the Inquisition, means the slaughter of the elite of mankind. Those who can escape fly to other lands, and the persecuting country is emasculated of all its vigorous and virile elements. The object is to make belief absolutely uniform, i.e., to reduce a civilized to the condition of a savage people. This has been repeatedly done, nota- bly in Spain, and history has recorded the consequences. A people that tolerates no differences of opinion is degenerate and must take a second or lower place. 7. Resistance to Truth. More serious probably for mankind at large than any other one of the consequences of error, or perhaps than all of them combined, is the opposition that error always offers to the advance of truth. In the earliest stages there was no possi- bility for the truth to emerge at all from the mass of error. The ^ Commentaries, Book IV, p. 60. Ch. VI] CONSEQUENCES OF ERROR 75 error was accepted by all without any single one ever so much as thinking of questioning it. All the steps toward truth were taken at later stages, chiefly in peoples that ethnologists class as civilized. Every heresy, however slightly the belief may differ from the domi- nant or orthodox belief, is a step toward the truth, a greater or less reduction in the amount of error in the belief. Persecution for heresy, therefore, which was considered under the last head, was the first form that resistance to truth assumed. The present head is meant to include other forms, most of which involved persecution, but some of which were somewhat independent of persons. The most of them may be included under the general designation of opposition to science. We saw that the whole mass of primitive error was the result of a false interpretation of natural phenomena. The true interpretation of the same phenomena was the work of thousands of patient investi- gators continued through centuries, and was usually practically the reverse of the prevailing false interpretation. Thus shadows and reflections were found to be due to the nature of light and the laws of radiation after the science of optics had been founded; echoes were explained on the now familiar principles of acoustics ; dreams, delirium, insanity, epilepsy, trance, and even death are explainable on natural principles contained in the sciences of psychology, physi- ology, pathology, and psychiatry ; and although many things are still obscure in relation to them, no specialist in any of those sciences ever thinks of calling in the aid of indwelling spirits to account for any of the facts. All the anthropomorphic ideas upon which primitive error rests are dispelled by science. Astronomy has taught the nature of the heavenly bodies and the laws of their motions. Air is understood, and is nothing like the primitive idea of spirit, but is a mixture of gases in nearly uniform proportions. Lightning is as well under- stood as are any of the manifestations of electricity. And so with the whole series of physical phenomena upon which primitive man built his superstructure of life, will, and intelligence in inorganic nature. All this truth that science revealed had to struggle against the dense mass of primitive error which it was destined to overthrow, 76 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I and the resistance was enormous. The discoverers of truth have been the victims of all forms of persecution, and the truth revealed has been formally condemned and anathematized. Truth has never been welcome, and its utterance was for ages fraught with per- sonal danger. Fontenelle advised those who possessed new truths to hold on to them, because the world would only punish them for their utterance. Nearly everybody acted upon this principle, and either refrained from investigating or from promulgating new ideas. Descartes wrote his Traite du Monde, but suppressed it for these reasons. ^ The chief effect was that of deterring tal- ented men from trying to discover truth, and the greater part of all intellectual energy has been diverted into safer but compara- tively useless channels. The history of the later phases of this opposition to the progress of science has been so ably presented by numerous writers that it would be superfluous to enter into it here, even if space would permit. I scarcely need draw special attention to the contributions of two Americans to this subject, so familiar are their works .^ This opposition to science may be supposed to have some value in rendering it necessary that the discoverers of truth assure them- selves beyond a peradventure of the correctness of their position before venturing to promulgate their ideas. Some have partially excused it on this ground. But for this to be true it would be neces- sary to suppose that anything that was absolutely demonstrated would be accepted. This has never been the case. There has never been any attempt to verify discovery. The opposition has always been dogmatic. It cannot be true because opposed to the current world view. No amolint of demonstration would avail. Those who believe things because they are impossible are not going to believe anything because it is proved. But there is no need of this kind of illegitimate opposition to the discovery of truth. There is always an abundance of legitimate opposition to it. This was shown in Pure Sociology under the head 1 CEuvres de Descartes, Paris, 1844, pp. 38, 47. 2 Histof7 of the Conflict between Religion and Science, by John William Draper, fifth edition, New York, 1875 (International Scientific Series, No. 12). A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom, by Andrew Dickson White, in two volumes, New York, 1897. Ch. VI] CONSEQUENCES OF ERROR ']'] of " How Science Advances." ^ There is no danger of any error in science gaining a permanent foothold. Every proposition is immedi- ately doubted and attacked, but it is attacked with the legitimate weapons of scientific experimentation and not with the rack and thumb-screw. In other words, it is reinvestigated by others and either confirmed or rejected. Usually a part is confirmed and a part re- jected, but at any rate the opposition is always compelled to admit all that is true and the original discoverer is compelled to abandon all that is not true. The difference is the amount of established truth contained in the discovery. In the kind of opposition to science that we have been considering it is all loss and no gain. 8. Obscurantism. This is another form of persecution, only a little more subtle than the form last considered. Indeed, it is only a case of this latter, and might have been treated under the general head of resistance to truth. But by it is meant certain refined phases of this resistance practised by nations claiming to be civil- ized. Its principal method consists in the prohibition or suppression of books and writings and the general censorship of the press. This has been chiefly practised by the Christian church, both the Catho- lic Church and the Greek Church. It is still practised by both these churches, but so far as the former is concerned it is now chiefly a matter pour rire. Still, within the church itself it is somewhat effective. With the Greek Church it is more serious because sanc- tioned by the government of the nation of which that is the state church. But for several centuries it was effective in the Catholic Church, and most of the progressive literature of that period was rendered inaccessible to the general public. For it is with books as with men ; those that dissent from the current world views are the ones that contain truth. As Helvetius said in a book that he refused to pubhsh during his lifetime, "it is only in the prohibited books that the truth is found." ^ It is interesting to glance over the papal Index Librorum Prohibitorum. There are to be found the majority of the works that the world recognizes as great or epoch-making. This Index 1 Pages 8-12. 2 " Ce n'est plus maintenant que dans les Livres defendus qu'on trouve la verity : on ment dans les autres. . . . Le bon livre est presque partout le livre defendu " (De I'Homme, etc., London, 1773, Vol. I, pp. iv, 6. Cf. p. 62). 78 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I continues to be issued periodically, and I have recently amused myself in scanning the pages of the latest volume. The Russian government publishes a similar Index. One of its numbers has lately appeared containing the books condemned between 1872 and 1891. It contains works by Herbert Spencer, Ernst Haeckel, Lecky, Zola, Ribot, etc.^ The prohibition is made effective by not allowing Russian translations to appear at all. The great mass of the people are thus effectually prevented from ever reading a book. I have never doubted that many of the books condemned by the Russian censors were so treated on account of other than religious senti- ments contained in them. If it is feared that they may tend to render the people discontented with their lot or dissatisfied with the government, it is easy to find passages that can be objected to on religious grounds, and to allege these as the reasons for prohibit- ing a work. In the light of prevailing political opinion the ministers would scarcely dare to assign political reasons. This was attempted in Germany at the time of the publication of Frederick's diary with rather unsatisfactory results. The numbers of the Deutsche Rund- schau containing the article came to America with the pages cut out. I went to a bookstore and bought for ten cents a small duo- decimo pamphlet containing the English translation. Probably thou- sands read it that never would have done so if it had not been prohibited, at least in other countries than Germany. In a free country any such attempt at obscurantism is in the nature of an advertisement, and it is to be hoped that the time will soon come when it will be no longer possible to dam up the stream of truth. Nevertheless, in the darker ages of the world, and still at pres- ent, in the darker lands, where political liberty has not yet been achieved, it cannot be doubted that human progress has been and is being greatly retarded by cutting off the light and not allowing it to penetrate into places where it would be seen and welcomed if it could be admitted. There are certain forms of falsehood which 1 I am indebted to Mr. George Kennan for these facts, he having obtained a copy of the work. He informs me that Dynamic Sociology is No. 86 in the list, and that the reason assigned is as follows : " Condemned and publication forbidden by the Committee of Ministers, March 26, 1891 [Old Style]. The book is saturated with the rankest materialism." The reader may remember the account given in the preface to the second edition of the seizure of the Russian translation. Ch. VI] CONSEQUENCES OF ERROR 79 are justified on grounds not widely different from the Jesuitical doctrine that the end sanctifies the means. There is an old proverb which in its French form says : Calomniez, il en restera quelque chose} It is a kind of obscurantism. A slander or a false- hood, as Oliver Wendell Holmes said, " makes a great deal of lee- way in proportion to its headway." The official reports of the Russian generals in the war that has just been waged between Japan and Russia seemed to embody the proverb above quoted. The bad news was not given out. The driving in of pickets pre- ceding a battle was loudly proclaimed as a Russian victory, but the defeat that followed was suppressed and the world did not learn the truth until the Japanese generals were ready to make their report. This could always be depended upon, never exaggerating the gains and often seeming to exaggerate the losses. On the Russian re- ports no dependence whatever could be placed. This enumeration of the consequences of error growing out of religious ideas might of course be greatly prolonged, but the examples given are sufficient to indicate its character. There are, however, other consequences of error which do not come exactly under this head, but which are often equally serious. They consist of erroneous world views which cannot be directly, or at least can only be partially, ascribed to the belief in spiritual beings. Among these I would put first, as having exerted the most baneful influence on the human race, that which I have described in Pure Sociology as the Androcentric World View.^ It is. not so much the terrible suffer- ings that womankind has had to endure in consequence of this gigantic error as it is the dwarfing and stunting influence that it has exerted throughout such a prolonged period. We can scarcely form any idea of what the human race would have been if a true and just conception of both man and woman had always prevailed. And as this false world view still prevails so universally as to ren- der it a veritable world view still even to-day, we can realize that there is something for applied sociology to do. 1 For a full history of this proverb, see King's Classical and Foreign Quotations, third edition, London, 1904, No. 241, p. 33. 2 The theory is stated on pages 291-296, and the influence exerted by it is shown on pages 341-377. 8o APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I As growing directly out of the androcentric world view and the institutions founded upon it may be mentioned the prevailing error with regard to motherhood. The bringing of a new human being into the world is universally recognized as among the noblest and holiest of duties, but there is the proviso which is agreed to with equal unanimity that unless it takes place imder the sanction of civil or ecclesiastical law it is not a duty but a crime, to be punished with the severest penalties that society can devise. The amount of misery that this false theory of life entails upon humanity is beyond all calculation. A young woman has a child outside of wedlock ; it may have been the consequence of love as pure as ever animated the human breast. She is disgraced and drowns her off- spring in a pool. The maternal instinct haunts her, and she goes back and frantically recovers and embraces the body of her dead child. The officers of the law discover her and she is seized, imprisoned, tried, condemned, and hung.^ What a series of horrors growing out of the most innocent, natural, and noble of all human actions ! All due to a false world view, to a great human error hanging over the civilized world. Truth Mr. Robert G. IngersoU, when asked if he could suggest any way by which, if he had the power, he could improve the universe, replied that he would first make health " catching " instead of disease. All this error of which we have been speaking may be looked upon as so much social disease, which, under the laws of imitation so ably worked out by M. Tarde, is contagious, and is passed on from mind to mind and from age to age. And just as the mission of medical science is to do away with disease and replace it by health, so the mission of social science is to do away with error and replace it by truth. It may be said that this is the mission of all science, and so it is. But all the science in the world has failed to remove any of the great world errors. They still stand in the face of it and are shared by the mass of mankind. The false ideas have, indeed, been disproved, and the true explanations of natural 1 This assumed case has been nearly paralleled by a recorded fact. See J. Novi- cow, L'Affranchissement de la femme, Paris, 1903, p. i. Ch. VI] TRUTH 8 1 phenomena have been furnished, but all this has little social value. The "number who know the truth is relatively insignificant even in the most enlightened countries. The business world takes up the scien- tific discoveries and utilizes them, and the mass avail themselves of the resultant advantages, but they have no idea of the true significance of scientific discovery. The great bulk of every population on the globe is steeped in error. A wholly emancipated person finds him- self almost completely alone in the world. There is not one perhaps in a whole city in which he lives with whom he can converse five minutes, because the moment any one begins to talk he reveals the fact that his mind is a bundle of errors, of false conceits, of super- stitions, and of prejudices that render him utterly uninteresting. The great majority are running off after some popular fad. Of course the most have already abrogated their reasoning powers entirely by accepting some creed. The few that have begun to doubt their creed are looking for another. They may think they are progressing, but their credulity is as complete as ever, and they are utterly devoid of any knowledge by which to test the credibility of their beliefs. And yet these may be what pass for "educated " persons, for, as a matter of fact, the education that is afforded by the systems of the world not only does not furnish any knowledge but expressly disclaims doing this, and aims only to " draw out " some supposed inherent powers or talents. But, as we have already seen, these native powers, deprived of all the materials upon which to exert themselves, are not merely useless but are in a high degree dangerous and pernicious. Ignorance is comparatively safe. It is error that does the mischief, and the stronger the reasoning facul- ties working upon meager materials the more misleading and dis- astrous the erroneous conclusions thus drawn are for mankind. Of course the great desideratum is to supply the data for think- ing, and to supply them to all mankind and not merely to a hand- ful of the ilite, but the problem is how to do this. Truth is unattractive. Error charms. It holds out all manner of false hopes. It is a siren song that lures frail mariners upon desert isles, where with nothing to nourish the soul they perish and leave their bones to bleach upon the barren strand. All the shores of the great ocean of time are strewn with these whitened skeletons of misguided 82 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I thought. Truth furnishes the only real hope. It is truth that should be made attractive, alluring, contagious, to such a degree that it shall penetrate the whole mass of mankind, crowding out and replacing the error that now fills the world. It is recognized by all who accept the ideological interpretation of history, which, as we have seen, does not conflict with the economic interpretation, that world ideas are what determine and control human action ; that action therefore depends upon the nature of these ideas. The principal quality of ideas as affecting action is the relative amount of truth and error that they embody. As we have seen, early ideas consist chiefly of error, and we have enumerated some of the consequences of this error. All progress in ideas has consisted in the gradual elimination of the error and substitution of truth. The several steps in rehgious ideas, from fetishism to monotheism, have been in this direction. All heresies have been attempts to get rid of some small part of the error of the orthodox type of beliefs. The Protestant Reformation was another such a step. The deism of Voltaire and Thomas Paine was still another. Although these steps may seem small to the fully emancipated, still they represent progress. It is character- istic of the human mind to take short steps. Few are capable of throwing off all error at once as a snake casts its skin. A part must be clung to and cherished a while longer. In this respect, speaking generally, the peoples of the north of Europe differ from those of the south. The former are satisfied with the surrender of a part, while the latter cling to the whole until they can hold it no longer and pass by a single leap from complete orthodoxy to com- plete freedom of religious thought. This is the true reason why the Reformation never could gain a foothold among the Latin races, and not, as some suppose, because the latter are naturally more superstitious. There are many liberal minds among the Latin races, but there are few Protestants. Error believed with sufficient force to determine action is retro- gressive in its effects. The progressive character of any age depends upon the amount of truth embodied in its philosophy, i.e., in its world views. The natural tendency of truth is to cause pro- gressive action. In other words, the dynamic quality of human Ch. VI] TRUTH 83 ideas is strictly proportional to the degree to which they harmonize with objective reality. It follows that all the progress that has taken place in the world as the result of human thought has been due to the truth that has been brought to light. This accounts for the relatively small amount of human progress that is due to this cause. The greater part, as shown in Pure Sociology, Chapter XI, has been of the purely unconscious, genetic sort, with which ideas have nothing to do. But most of the progress due to ideas is of that superficial kind which merely produces material civiliza- tion through the conquest of nature, and does not penetrate to the lower strata of society at all. This is because the truth is pos- sessed by only a minute fraction of society. It therefore has great eiconomic value but very little social value. What the progress of the world would be if all this truth were socially appropriated no one can foresee, but its effect would probably be proportional to the number possessing it. CHAPTER VII SOCIAL APPROPRIATION OF TRUTH The totality of human actions is governed by the totality of human knowledge. — Buckle. That which the best human nature is capable of is within the reach of human nature at large. — Herbert Spencer. Assis soit sur le trdne, soit sur un escabeau, on n'est jaBiais assis' que sur son cul. — Montaigne. Nostra vero inveniendi scientias ea est ratio, ut non multum ingenioruhi acumini et robori relinquatur ; sed quae ingenia et intellectus fere exsequet Bacon. The discovery of truth leads to achievement ; it does not neces- sarily lead to improvement. John Stuart Mill has well remarked: The words Progress and Progressiveness are not here to be understood as synonymous with improvement. 'It is conceivable that the laws of human nature might determine, and even necessitate, a certain ^ries of changes in man and society, which might not in every case, or which might not on the whole, be improvements. It is my belief, indeed, that the general tendency is, and will con- tinue to be, one of improvement ; a tendency toward a better and happier state.^ I, too, have argued in favor of the general proposition that material civilization is on the whole progressive, using the term "progressive" in the sense of tending toward improvement.^ The survey made in the fifteenth chapter of Pure Sociology of the sociogenetic forces showed clearly enough that the human race is improving along many lines, while the last section of that chapter, devoted to the sociological perspective, points out in what the real moral progress of mankind has consisted. Moreover, the section of Chapter III of the present work entitled "The New Ethics," shows that the trend of things is in the direction of abandoning the old ethics of restraint and sacrifice and adopting an ethics of liberation and social betterment. 1 A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, etc., eighth edition. New York, 1900, p. 632. '^ Dynamic Sociology, Vol. II, pp. 175, 206. 84 Ch. VII] POSSESSION OF TRUTH 85 The view is therefore not at all pessimistic. It is melioristic, one of the maxims of which is that le plus grand enne^ni du mieux, cest le bien. But the spontaneous improvement of society, even when aided by science, is very slow. No one would disparage this discovery of new truth, but enough has already been discovered to dispel the greater part of the error in the world. It is not that the truth is not in the world, too, but that it is not assimilated by society at large. Nothing can check the discovery of new truth, but with this the sociologist has nothing to do. He is only con- 1 cerned with the social appropriation of the truth already discovered. I The new truth being discovered leads to the further conquest of / nature, which belongs to pure sociology. Applied sociology aims ' at the complete social transformation which will follow the assimi- lation of discovered truth. Possession of Truth None of the great errors of the world which are so effective in holding civilization back could stand for a moment if those who now entertain them were really in possession of the truth which is their natural antidote. It is said that many well-informed persons never- theless entertain these errors. There is what has been called " dualism " of the human mind which enables some to hold at one and the same time wholly incompatible opinions. Kepler, for example, could believe that there existed in each planet a spirit that unerringly guided it to revolve around the sun in an ellipse, its radius vector describing equal areas in equal times. Cuvier, Richard Owen, and Louis Agassiz, with their profound knowledge of the laws of life, still believed in special creation and a divine I plan. Kant, while forced to admit determinism in history and in I society at large, taught free will for the individual. Dana said that/ "the evolution of the system of life went forward through the derivation of species from species, according to natural methods not yet clearly understood, and with few occasions for supernatural intervention." ^ Faraday is reported as saying that he kept his 1 Manual of .Geojogy, by J. D. Dana, second edition, New York, 1874, pp. 603- 604. Compare also Atft. Joum. of Science, third series. Vol. XII, October, 1876, pp. 250-251. 86 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I science in one pocket and his religion in the other. Descartes, with aU his wisdom, was credulous in the extreme. In his Princi- ples of Philosophy he said : I do not doubt that the world was created in the beginning with as great perfection as it now has, so that the sun, the earth, the moon, the stars, were already there; and that the earth not only had within it the seeds of plants, but that the plants themselves covered a part of it, that Adam and Eve were not created children but with the age of perfect men, etc.^ His whole philosophy is based on the assumption that the uni- verse is wholly a product of the divine wiU, and that it might have been anything else than it is if it had been willed to be so. What Dr. Asa Gray called "evolutionary teleology "^ was clearly out- lined by Descartes,^ and has been the refuge of many truly great minds that clearly conceived the invariability of nature's laws but could not wholly give up their supernatural beliefs. But the true motives underlying all these inconsistencies are much entangled and difficult to understand. In so far as they are honest and not due to fear of persecution (in which case they are not opinions at all but false statements of opinion), they are chiefly due to the mental atmosphere in which men live. In other words, they are due to the prevailing world views of the time. The half -discovered truth is at variance with the world view. This is an error, but it cannot be given up. The truth must be reconciled with it, or at least some modus vivendi must be devised that will enable them to exist together. Persons holding truths under such conditions can scarcely be said to possess them. Their tenure is so feeble that they can produce very little effect. They have no vital force, and the slightest objection or opposition causes them to be abandoned. What is needed as a guide to action and a condition to progress as well as to happiness is complete possession of truth, absolute faith in the laws of nature. The admission of the possibility of an exception is fatal to all the calculations that can be made looking to improvement. If an engineer were to suppose that the laws of stress and strain were arbitrary and might change at any moment, ^ Prlnclpes de la philosophic, Paris, 1724, p. 168. 2 Darwiniana, Art. XIII. 3 Discours de la methode, CEuvres de Descartes, Paris, 1844, pp. 28, 29. Ch. VII] POSSESSION OF TRUTH 87 he would never dare to build a bridge or a tower. But he has absolute faith in those laws, and he builds with confidence. So it must ultimately be with every act of life. The laws of nature and of life must first be learned as are those of stress and strain, and then each step in conformity with those laws is certain. The most fundamental and important of all the laws of the universe is the law of causation. As has already been said in this work, this law is acted upon by animals. By the lowest races of men it is also chiefly acted upon, and neither animals nor the lowest sa\-ages err except under a changed environment which they no longer understand. Philosophy, i.e., the exercise of the reason, seems to ignore this law and leads to all the error that we have been considering. But really it does not ignore the law of causation ; it only invents false causes. Causes it must have, and if the true causes are beyond its power to perceive, false causes are devised. The later philosophers have also recognized the law of causation. They called it simply the "sufficient reason." This they finally contrasted with causation through will or design and made the dis- tinction the same as that between efficient and final causes. But in all cases causation was recognized, and it is in fact a condition of all thought. One modern writer, who rejects the doctrine of innate ideas in general, considers the idea of causation as innate.^ This is virtually Schopenhauer's position, as set forth in his first work devoted to the subject.^ In one of his latest works he says : My philosophy began with the proposition that there is nothing in the world but causes and effects, and that the sufficient reason in its four aspects is simply the most general form of the intellect.' What is thus universal, therefore, is the facult}' of causality, and] there is no occasion for trying to strengthen that facult}'. What it is needful to enforce is the distinction between true causes and > false causes. The stronger the facult)- of causalit}-, the greater will be the error in the absence of adequate data for exercising it. Most of the false causes invented to explain phenomena grow out 1 Gustav Ratzenhofer, Kritik des Intellects, Leipzig, 1902, II, III. 2 Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde, Rudolstadt, 1813. See p. 107. s Parerga and Paralipomena, seventh edition, Leipzig, 1891, Vol. I, p. 141. 88 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part 1 i of the belief in spiritual beings. Even those believed in by civilized i peoples and by some of the most highly cultured among these are ' easily traceable to this source. All superstition rests on this basis, I for the events are alleged to take place without any natural cause ; I therefore the cause is supernatural, for a cause of some kind is always assumed. And what is a supernatural cause but the agency I of spiritual beings ? The case is not altered when the spiritual beings / are reduced to one, and it is assumed that nature is presided over by a supreme intelligence directing all movements and events. That intelligence must have the character of spirit precisely as conceived by the savage. Needless to say that if such were the case there could be no science, or that under such a world view, if fully believed in, there would be no attempt to control phenomena. If it be said that all the science we have has grown up under this world view, the answer is that this is because, as a matter of fact, it has not been believed in. Since the scientific era began there has been no such faith in the supernatural as exists among savages. Science was made possible by the diminution of this kind of faith and the concomitant increase of faith in natural causes. The history of science shows that those who still possessed a large amount of the faith of primitive man opposed science and stubbornly resisted its advance. The history of the Middle Ages is that of a period during which faith in spiritual causes was almost as great as it is among primitive peoples. During that period there was practically no science. The world emerged from that condition through the growth of heresy. As already remarked, heresy is a step out of error into truth. It is a form of doubt. As Buckle said, " until doubt began progress was impossible." Descartes, with all his credulity, made doubt the condition to the discovery of truth. But he excepted from doubt the very thing that he should have doubted most, viz., the supernatural. Science became possible when doubt of the supernatural had become somewhat general, sufficiently so to check the persecuting spirit. It has advanced exactly in proportion to the spread of this class of doubt, which was in turn directly propor- tional to the spread of faith in natural causes. Both these move- ments went.ion in a geometrical ratio. Science proved itself so Ch. VII] POSSESSION OF TRUTH 89 useful to man that it was its own vindication. Its superiority made it the object of imitation, and the faith in matter and force rapidly spread. It gave rise to industry and the use of mechanical appli- ances. These obey exact and invariable laws, and familiarity with them accustoms the mind to expect like effects from like causes. This has no doubt been a powerful influence in the progress of rationalism, and the fact has been recognized by more than one writer .1 It is not, then, denied that the .world has already come a long way out of the night of error into the light of truth. It is only claimed that it still has a long journey before it on this same road. The idea of -causation which it is necessary to entertain in order to secure progressive action on the part of man is first, that the cause of any phenomenon is a true cause, and second, that it is an adequate cause. A true cause is an efficient cause. It is a force, and force must be conceived as impact or as pressure. If the wind tears the branches from trees, unroofs houses, or fills the sails of vessels, it must be realized that air is a material substance that is set in violent motion by meteorological conditions and acts directly upon other substances producing the observed effects. If we can- not see this so plainly in the forces of heat, light, electricity, and gravitation, our faith in them as true forces must not be diminished thereby. This does not preclude us from speculating as to the true nature of these subtle agencies, only it must not carry us so far as to invest them with supernatural attributes. We may even go so far as to maintain that matter is spirit, but not in the sense that it is endowed with intelligence and will. The view that matter and spirit are the same is true monism and I believe it is true science, but it means only that the material world contains all the elements \ of intelligence and will, and can and does take that form when organized in the appointed way and to the required degree. But I will and intelligence themselves are subject to law and are in fact as rigidly determined as are the winds or the'electricicurrents.^- 1 Adolphe Coste, L'Experience des peuples et les previsions qu'elle autorise, Paris, .1900, pp. 366, 395 ff. ; Thorstein Veblen, The Theory oi Business Enterprise, New York, 1904, Chap. IX. 2 See the section Psychics in Pure Sociology, Chap. IX, pp. 150-159. go APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I With regard to the adequacy of causes, I cannot better illustrate it than by a personal experience. When collecting around Fish Lake, Utah, in the Wasatch Range in 1875, a party of Pai-Ute Indians were encamped at the outlet of the lake. The chief was sick, and supposing me to be a "medicine-man," they appealed to- me to cure him. I promised to send him some medicine, gathered some of the juniper berries abundant there, roasted and pulverized them, put the powder in a- cap box and sent it to the chief, knowing- that it would be practically inert and certainly harmless. It was returned from fear that it might be poison. I told the messenger that I would throw it into the lake. The next morning the Indian camp was in an uproar from fear that I had thrown the medicine into the lake and poisoned all the water of the lake. Fortunately I had not yet destroyed it, and calmed their fears by letting them see me burn it up in the camp-fire. This little incident showed that those Indians had no conception of the quantitative relations of cause and effect. A single gram of poison in a whole lake would have alarmed them as much as the half-ounce that I had prepared. I have often met people that showed the same inability to see that quantity had any relation to effect in the matter of poisons. This is very largely true in other matters in undisciplined minds, and a large part of the error and consequent misguided action of mankind is the result of a lack of power to perceive the inadequacy of many causes to produce the effects ascribed to them. The world must learn not only to distinguish a true from a false cause but also to judge of the adequacy of a cause to produce an effect. Relation of Knowledge to Truth Both error and truth are in the nature of ideas, i.e., they are con- clusions drawn from facts. They are deductions. Error is false deduction, truth is correct deduction. Now in both cases the facts are in a sense known and therefore constitute knowledge. Phenom- ena are directly perceived by the senses, and the sensations they produce are at least real. The term "perception" in psychology should be so restricted that all perceptions would also be real, but the psychologists habitually expand the meaning of that term so as Ch. VII] RELATION OF KNOWLEDGE TO TRUTH 91 to include considerable true reasoning, and then they prove that the faculty of perception is unreliable and leads to a great number of errors, such as 'optical illusions. This is simply bad terminology. They have ruined the word " perception " and have no term for the simple fact. With the same reasoning power the truth or falsity of the con- clusions will depend upon the amount of knowledge. But, as we have seen, for the simplest phenomena a small amount of knowledge is sufficient to insure correct conclusions and consequent safe actions. The more complex and obscure the phenomena, the greater the amount of knowledge required for this. But mankind has never waited for more knowledge. False conclusions are always drawn from little knowledge and error has been the sole guide to action. This is not confined to primitive man, and the mountain of error involved in the belief in spiritual beings is not the only error. While that form of error still permeates the most advanced societies, it is supplemented by a mass of error of other forms, all due to the same cause, viz., that of drawing false conclusions from insufficient knowledge. In general this is called ignorance or lack of intelligence. To realize the social import of this, it is only necessary to contrast the ; condition of the members of society classed as intelligent with that \ of the members classed as unintelligent or ignorant. In even the ' most advanced societies the latter always exceed the former numer- ically, usually constituting at least three fourths or four fifths of the population. They are as a rule very poor, often indigent, but in- dustrious and overworked. The others are as a rule well-to-do, and if they work at all, as most of them do, it is at the lighter kinds of labor, mostly intellectual. This is considered by many as a natural, proper, and advantageous spontaneous classification of the popu- lation. The control of society is also entirely in the hands of the intelligent few, and the ignorant mass can only submit to whatever regulations their superiors choose to impose. Of course these regu- lations are always in the interest of the intelligent class, and the ignorant mass is made to bear the chief burdens. In democratic communities where the uninformed have votes it is found easy to deceive them and cause them to vote against their own interests 92 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I and for the interests of the well-informed, so that this vaunted right does them quite as much harm as good. If any one protests against any of these things, the answer is that it is a law of nature that intelhgence shall rule, and this usually closes the argument. It is to be specially noted that all this is habitually looked upon as a natural and necessary condition of things. The iminformed class is regarded as an inferior class. It is assumed that their ignorance is a natural condition and something that could not be otherwise. Their stupidity, gullibility, and susceptibility to decep- tion and exploitation are supposed to be attributes inherent in their indi\-idual natures, which render them the natural dupes, tools, and servants of the intelligent class. Among aU the writers on social questions with whom I am acquainted, however sympathetic or humanitarian they ma}' be and often are, I have never met with but one who took a different xdew of the subject, and that writer is almost wholly unknown, and expressed his Nnews in a book the publication of which during his lifetime he expressly prohibited. I have seen a number of attacks upon his doctrines, probably in all cases from persons who had never read the book, and who did so simply because this has become somewhat fashionable. Mr. Benja- min Kidd, who has perhaps the clearest insight of any living author into social conditions, who believes that the elite of modem society is intellectually inferior to that of antiquity and scarcely superior to that of the native Maoris of New Zealand, not only regards con- temporary social inequalities as normal and unavoidable but sees the only possible mitigation of the attendant evils of them in the stUl more complete submission and resignation of the masses to " ultra-rational sanctions." The intelligent classes of modem society possess a certain amount of knowledge of a highly practical character, which ser\-es them as a guide to conduct looking to their personal advantage. It is for the most part superficial knowledge, it is true, but this is all that is required for the purpose. They have the tools necessarj' to keep familiar with current events, to look after their business interests, and to forecast such future prospects as are needful in determining their action from day to day. They know enough of human nature to see how the iminformed class can be utilized in promoting their Ch. VII] RELATION OF KNOWLEDGE TO TRUTH 93 interests. They care nothing for reform except in their own affairs and are usually quite satisfied with the existing condition of things. They have complete control of the machinery of society and easily thrive on the productive labor of the much larger unintelligent classes. But they are not all alike, and there are always exceptional spirits among them who would change these relations and bring about a more equitable state of society. In fact nearly all the real amelioration, and it is considerable, that has taken place in the condition of the lower classes has been due to this disinterested sympathy on the part of members of the upper classes who have more to lose than to gain by it. The lower classes are so unintelli- gent, maladroit, unorganized, and generally inefficient that they cannot formulate a rational demand, and have no idea how to pro- ceed in the effort to secure what they want.^ All attempts, therefore, on their part to bring about an amelioration of their condition usually do them more harm than good. Their recent attempts to organize, while emphasizing this fact, have not been wholly fruitless, and should have the hearty support of all truly sympathetic persons; but it is painful to see them constantly resorting to violence and injustice, which alienate thousands who are naturally friendly to them. For these and other reasons I have never cherished much hope for any permanent social reform so long as society consists of the two classes described in this section — an intelligent or well-informed class and an ignorant or uninformed class. There is too much truth in the dictum that intelligence wUl rule. Inequality of intelligence necessarily results in the cleavage of society into an exploiting and an exploited class. If there is no way of equahzing intelligence, social reform in this direction seems out of the question. The unhappy condition of the lower classes of society is due as much to error as to ignorance. When any one talks with them he finds that their minds are full of false ideas. They are nearly all superstitious and are slaves to a creed and to the priesthood whom they are supporting out of their hard earnings in the condition of a leisure class. This is true for all religious sects, in some of which the terms in use are different from these. From this source they 1 Compare Sombart, Socialism, etc., New York, 1898, pp. 37, 38. 94 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I are haunted and oppressed by nearly the same fears and terrors as the savage. Indeed, in some respects by worse ones, for the later, more ingenious priesthoods have invented at least one more terrible punishment than any savage priesthood has ever devised, viz., that known as "eternal damnation," or a future state of endless pain. This diabolical doctrine has been the cause of more suffering than all other religious errors combined, but it has been the main depend- ence in keeping the masses under complete spiritual subjection. But the false ideas of the lower classes are by no means all religious errors. Among others may be specially mentioned undue faith in men, usually in the men that are chiefly exploiting them. Great loyalty to some particular man of the upper class is the characteristic of nearly all the members of the lower class. It is probably best that this should be so, beckuse in the benighted state of their minds they are really dependent upon individuals of the upper class. They could not take care of themselves without the help of a sort of master, and although they may be in a country which does not allow slavery they are \'irtually slaves. Their out- look over the world is so narrow that they would not know where to go or what to do. They must stay where they are and do what they are bidden. On the other hand, Ihe exploiter has scarcely any other course before him. He may be and often is sympathetic, and tries to make those below him as comfortable and happy as pos- sible. But he cannot cause them to rise because they have nothing to hold them up if they should be lifted up. This of course is an exaggeration of the average condition of the lower classes in most civilized communities, but probably every one knows cases of which it is no exaggeration, and between these and those in which the line between the upper and lower classes is nearly obliterated there are all gradations. But after all possible allowance is made for exceptional cases and enlightened communities, the general fact remains that in the world at large a few dominate society and make it, if not an "aristocracy of brains," at least an oligarchy of intelligence. These false and narrow ideas which make the mass of mankind dependent upon a few enlightened citizens and keep them in sub- jectiori, in poverty, toil, and misery, are of course the result of the Ch. VII] INTELLECTUAL EGALITARIANISM 95 emptiness of their minds — in a word, to the limited amount and poor quaUty of the knowledge they possess. They reason as well as they can with the materials they have. Their conclusions are, as in the case of the savage, either false or practically useless as guides to action. These conclusions constitute their stock of ideas and determine their social condition. Intellectual Egalitarianism The proposition that the lower classes of society are the intellect- ual equals of the upper classes will probably shock most minds. At least it will be almost unanimously rejected as altogether false. Yet I do not hesitate to maintain and defend it as an abstract propo- sition. But of course we must understand what is meant by intel- lectual equality. I have taken some pains to show that the difference in the intelligence of the two classes is immense. What I insist upon is that this difference in intelligence is not due to any difference in intellect. It is due entirely to difference in mental/ equipment. It is chiefly due to difference in knowledge, if wel include in knowledge a familiarity with the tools of the mind and an acquired ability to utilize the products of human achievement, as I have defined this term in Pure Sociology (Chapter III). It was there shown that each age of the world's history stands on a platform erected by all past ages. It is true that all the mem- bers of society have the use to a certain extent of the products of past achievement, but in no other sense do those members stand on the elevated platform who do not actually possess the heritage of the past. Now, as a matter of fact, it is only what I have called the intelligent class who really possess this heritage. They of course possess it in varying degrees, but most of them possess enough of it to give them dominion over those who do not possess it. I have shown in the same work (p. 573) that social heredity is not a process of organic transmission, that no part of the social germ-plasm passes from one individual to another, but that all knowledge must be separately acquired by every individual. The social organization must be such as to infuse it into the members 96 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I of society as fast as they are capable of receiving it. This infu- sion of it is social transmission, and unless it is infused it is not transmitted. The only way in which products of past achievement have been preserved has been through such a degree of social organization as is sufficient to infuse them into a certain number of the members of society. This number has always, in the his- torical races, been large enough to prevent their being lost, and most or all human achievement has been preserved. But it is easy to imagine this great social duty to be neglected and all human achievement lost. There are parts of the world in which this has virtually happened, and this is the way in which races degenerate. But society has never and nowhere been so organized as to transmit the products of achievement to more than a small frac- tion of its members. These constitute the intelligent class. The rest are all intellectually disinherited, and while the intellectually disinherited always include and are nearly coextensive with the materially disinherited, the former is much the more serious con- dition. For the intellectual inheritance would bring with it the material inheritance and all the other advantages that are enjoyed by the intelligent class. Of all the problems of applied sociology that which towers above all others is the problem of the organiza- tion of society so that the heritage of the past shall be transmitted to all its members alike. Until this problem is solved there is scarcely any use in trying to solve other problems. Not only are most of them otherwise incapable of solution, but this primary problem once solved all others will solve themselves. But here we encounter the great sullen, stubborn error, so uni- versal and ingrained as to constitute a world view, that the differ- ence between the upper and lower classes of society is due to a difference in their intellectual capacity, something existing in the nature of things, something preordained and inherently inevitable. Every form of sophistry is employed to uphold this view. We are told that there must be social classes, that they are a necessary part of the social order. There must be laborers and unskilled work- men to do the drudgery work of the world. There must be menial servants to wait upon us What would society do without the Ch. VII] RISE OF THE PROLETARIAT 97 scavenger? 1 All of which, while clearly showing that the persons who thus argue not only fear but believe that the lower classes are capable of being raised to their own level, reveals a lack of reflec- tion and an incapacity for logical reasoning scarcely to be met with elsewhere. It recalls the remark of the Scotch engineer whom some fortune transported to the plains of Kansas before the days of Pacific railroads, that there could be no railroads in that country, for " where are the hills to put the tunnels through ? " As just remarked, only one man among all the thinkers of the world has ever thought or dared to combat this universal error. His position was stated and briefly discussed in Pure Sociology,^ and certain qualifications of it were made, to which I would still adhere ; but with these qualifications the doctrine of the equal intellectual capacity of all men is a perfectly sound doctrine, and is the doctrine upon which the applied sociologist must stand. It is true that this view has appearances against it, but, as I have often shown, there is no great truth in any department of science that did not at first have appearances against it. The whole march of truth has consisted in substituting the hidden and obscure reality for the falsely apparent. With this uniform trend of history before us, we ought by this time to have learned to suspect everything that seems on the face of it to be true. Let us glance at some of the evidence in favor of the Helvetian doctrine and against the current belief. Rise of the Proletariat. — The history of social classes furnishes to the philosophical student of society the most convincing proof that the lower grades of mankind have never occupied those positions 1 I can scarcely refrain from quoting the following from a little book that it would harm no one to read : " I have seldom heard an argument or read an adverse letter or speech against the claims of justice in social matters, but our friend the scavenger played a prominent part therein. Truly this scavenger is a most important person. Yet one would not suppose that the whole cosmic scheme revolved on him as on an axis ; one would not imagine him to be the keystone of European society — at least his appearance and his wages would not j ustif y such an assumption. But I begin to believe that the fear of the scavenger is really the source and fountain head, the life and blood and breath of all conservatism. Good old scavenger. His ash-pan is the bulwark of capitalism, and his besom the standard around which rally the pride and the cultura and the Qpulence of British society" (Mewie England, by Robert Blatchford (Nunquam), People's edition, London, 1894, pp. 187-188). 2 Pages 447-448. 98 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I on account of any inherent incapacity to occupy higher ones. Throughout antiquity and well down through the Middle Ages the great mass of mankind were slaves. A little later they were serfs bound to the soil. Finally, with the abolition of slavery, the fall of the feudal system, and the establishment of the industrial system, this great mass took the form of a proletariat, the fourth estate, considered of so little consequence that they are seldom mentioned by the great historians of Europe. Even at the close of the eigh- teenth century, when the greatest of all political revolutions occurred, it was only the third estate that was at all in evidence — - the busi- ness class, bourgeoisie, or social mesoderm. This class had been looked down upon and considered inferior, and only the lords spir- itual and temporal were regarded as capable of controlling social and national affairs. This class is now at the top. It has furnished the world's brains for two centuries, and if there is any intellectual inferiority it is to be found in the poor remnant that still calls itself the nobility in some countries. The movement that is now agitating society is differei";t from any of the previous movements, but it differs from them onl}'\as they differed from one another. It is nothing less than the coning to consciousness of the proletariat. The class who for ages were s?^ves or serfs are now voters in enlightened states. They have riseri J;o where they can begin to see out, and they are rising still highw. When a new truth begins to dawn and replace an old error ^t is always found that the weightiest facts in support of the truth Wve been furnished by the defenders of the error. The best argumients for organic evolution were supplied by such anti-evolutionists^, as Baer, Agassiz, and Virchow. Nearly all the facts needed to esltab- lish the gynaecocentric theory were drawn from writings specifVUy designed to support the androcentric theory. And now we find cine of the strongest believers in the essential distinction between soc ial classes unconsciously arguing for intellectual egalitarianism. Sa ys Mr. Benjamin Kidd : One of the most striking and significant signs of the times is the spectacle of Demos, with these new battle-cries ringing in his ears, gradually emergi:ng from the long silence of social and political serfdom. Not now does- he conW with the violence of revolution foredoomed to failure, but with the slow arjcT Ch. VII] RISE OF THE PROLETARIAT 99 majestic progress which marks a natural evolution. He is no longer unwashed and illiterate, for we have universal education. He is no longer muzzled and without political power, for we have universal suffrage. . . . The advance towards more equal conditions of life has been so great, that amongst the more progressive nations such terms as lower orders, common people, and working classes are losing much of their old meaning, the masses of the people are being slowly raised, and the barriers of birth, class, and privilege are everywhere being broken through. But, on the other hand, the pulses of life have not slackened amongst us ; the rivalry is keener, the stress severer, and the pace quicker than ever before. . . . The power-holding classes are in full conscious retreat before the incoming people.-' All this is true, though somewhat overdrawn, but Kidd is so blinded by the current world view that he will not attribute it to the slowly growing intelligence of the masses. He attributes it to the rise and spread of humanitarianism, which by an obvious bid for the applause of the religious world he falsely calls religion, and repeats Comte's saying that man is becoming more and more religious.^ He dimly perceives the fact that there has been emo- tional development as well as brain development, and properly enough emphasizes the truth that this growth of sympathy on the part of the upper classes has greatly accelerated the rise of the lower classes. But he attributes it all to such agencies and strangely confounds the ethical with the religious and super- natural, virtually arguing that the less rational the people are the faster they will rise, and ascribing all human progress to the influence of "ultra-rational sanctions," i.e., to superstition. He flatly denies that intelligence has anything to do with the matter, saying : Another explanation, currently offered, is that the result is caused by the growing strength and intelligence of the people's party which render the attack irresistible. But we may readily perceive that the increasing strength and intelligence of the lower classes of the community is the result of the change which is in progress, and that it cannot, therefore, be by itself the cause.* / I ought perhaps to apologize for giving so prominent a place to a book which is so obviously written for applause; but Mr. Kidd has a really keen insight into social questions and has contributed much to their elucidation, still, by trimming his sails to catch every 1 Social Evolution, pp. 10, 55, 300. ^ Social Evolution, p. 176. " Testament d'Auguste Comte, Paris, 1884, p. 90. lOO APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I breeze, he has made his book a tissue of inconsistencies. It has had a wide influence for both good and evil, and it is doing much to prop up and perpetuate the error we are here combating and to postpone the acceptance of the truth that is destined ultimately to replace it. But he has not himself been able to shut his eyes entirely to the native capacity of the lower classes for education, and in at least one passage he practically admits their substantial equality with the upper classes in this respect : It is not yet clearly perceived by the people that there is not any more natural and lasting distinction hetwesn the educated a,nd the uneducated classes of which we hear so much nowadays, than there has been between the other classes in the past. Citizen and slave, patrician and plebeian, feudal lord and serf, privileged classes and common people, leisured classes and working masses, have been steps in a process of development.^ What has actually taken place in the history of the world has been a gradual upward movement of the mass from the condition of mere slaves to that of more or less skilled laborers with some general ideas about the land they live in and the world at large, until from a state in which at least nine tenths were submerged there is now in enlightened countries only a completely "sub- merged tenth." But there nevertheless exists in fact only a com- pletely emerged tenth. The essential fact, however, is that there is no valid reason why not only the other partially emerged eight tenths but the completely submerged tenth should not all com- pletely emerge. They are all equally capable of it. This does not at all imply that all men are equal intellectually. It only insists that intellectual inequality is common to all classes, and is as great among the members of the completely emerged tenth as it is between that class and the completely submerged tenth. Or, to state it more clearly, if the same individuals who constitute the intelligent class at any time or place had been surrounded from their birth by exactly the same conditions that have surrounded the lowest stratum of society, they would have inevitably found themselves in that stratum ; and if an equal number taken at ran- dom of the lowest stratum of society had been surrounded from their birth by exactly the same conditions by which the intelligent 1 Social Evolution, pp. 234-235. Ch. VII] CAPACITY FOR TRUTH lOl class have been surrounded, they would in fact have constituted the intelligent class instead of the particular individuals who happen actually to constitute it. In other words, class distinctions in society are wholly artificial, depend entirely on environing condi- tions, and are in no sense due to differences in native capacity. Differences in native capacity exist and are as great as they have ever been pictured, but they exist in all classes alike. Capacity for Truth. — This brings us to the most important of all the considerations involved in this problem, viz., the fact that the difference in the native capacity of individuals is never suffi- cient to exclude any person from the highest social class. Nothing short of congenital mental imbecility, feeble-mindedness, or idiocy can take an individual out of the social class to which his conditions of existence have assigned him, and this, as we all know, does not remand him to a lower social class, but only to the class of depen- dents or wards of society; all of which proves that it does not require any great or towering native abilities to enable an individ- ual to maintain his place in the vanguard of society. The minimum natural abilities above the stage of pathological imbecility suffice for this. Herein lies the hope of the world, because it shows that the social heritage is no such burden as to require an Atlas to hold it up, but is readily adjusted to the feeblest shoulders and easily borne by all. It consists simply in the possession of the truth that has been brought into the world through the prolonged labors of thousands of zealous investigators, and which when possessed neces- sarily drives out the error which it replaces. The truth is no harder to carry than was the error ; in many ways it is the lighter load. This has been perceived, dimly for the most part, sometimes clearly, but never in such a broad and vital connection as to indicate that its utterers at all grasped its momentous import. A few of these adumbrations may not be out of place. Bacon saw it, at least for his own peculiar method.^ Speaking of positive ideas as con- trasted with theological and metaphysical ideas, which is almost the same as the contrast between truth and error, Comte said : At any given point in this slow, spontaneous preparation, if a happy external circumstance succeeds in introducing positive conceptions before their time, the 1 Novum Organum, Part II, Aph. LXI; Works, 1869, Vol. I, p. 264. I02 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I eager haste with which they are everywhere welcomed sufficiently shows that the primitive attachment of our intelligence to theological and metaphysical explanations was due solely to the evident impossibility of any better nourish- ment, and had not at all changed the inherent character of our true cerebral appetites, as daily experience both individual and collective shows.' Condorcet remarks that " the truths whose discovery has cost the greatest effort, which were only understood at first by men capable of profound meditation, are soon after developed and proved by methods which are no longer above an ordinary intelligence." ^ And even at the end of the eighteenth century he could say : To-day a young man on leaving our schools knows more about mathematics than Newton had learned by his profound studies or discovered by his genius; he knows how to handle the calculus with a facility then unknown. The same observation may be applied to all the sciences.' How much more true is this in our day ! The absurd idea of Herbert Spencer that education should " be a repetition of civiliza- tion in little," * which is only a modification of Rousseau's education of nature, was combated by Comte in the following terms : It is clear that, although it is infinitely easier and shorter to learn than to discover, it would certainly be impossible to attain the end proposed if we were to require each individual mind to pass successively through the same stages that the collective genius of the human race has been obliged to follow.^ John Stuart Mill in one place exclaimed: "I am amazed at the limited conception which many educational reformers have formed to themselves of a human being's power of acquisition."^ Almost always this power of acquisition is confounded with the power which it required to discover the truth to be acquired, as though the one bore any fixed relation to the other. On this point Professdr Ernst Mach says: We are astounded often to note that it required the combined labors of many eminent thinkers for a full century to reach a truth which it takes us only a few hours to master, and which, once acquired, seems extremely easy to reach under the right sort of circumstances.' 1 Philosophie positive, Vol. VI, p. 629. 2 Tableau, etc., p. 173. 8 JUd,^ p. jg^. * Education, Intellectual, Moral, and Physical, New York, 1866, p. 153. ' Philosophie positive, Vol. I, pp. 62-63. ' Inaugural Address delivered to the University of St. Andrews, February i, 1867, by John Stuart Mill, Rector of the University, London, 1867, p. 13. ' The Monist, Vol. VI, p. 175. Ch. VII] CAPACITY FOR TRUTH 103 But Professor Martin was of the opinion that even original research and discovery in science do not require talents above the average. He says: One hears a good deal talked nowadays of scientific research, and among it a good deal of what I cannot but think mischievous nonsense about the peculiar powers required by scientific investigators. To listen to many, one would suppose that the faculty of adding anything whatever to natural knowl- edge was one possessed by extremely few persons. I believe, on the contrary, that any man possessed of average ability and somewhat more than average perseverance, is capable, if he will, of doing good original scientific work.^ Helvetius maintained that all truth is within the reach of all men. This is certainly true for all practical truth. Any truth that is so subtle or involved that it cannot be grasped not only by the average mind but by minds of the minimum power, provided their interest and attention can be concentrated upon it, is likely to be of little practical value as a guide to conduct and an aid to success in life. This is all that can concern the sociologist. Most of this^ 'cf ;. so-called knowledge so difficult to acquire is not in fact knowledge or truth at all, but fine-spun theory, hair-splitting metaphysical , disquisition, and mere mental gymnastic, by which the mind is violently exercised over problems without objective content. It is largely "abstract reasoning," by which is meant reasoning without anything to reason about. This is and ought to be difificultjDecause it is useless. But as soon as a real something (it need not neces- sarily be material or concrete) is furnished to the mind it is not only readily perceived but easily reasoned about by all sane minds. And such knowledge and truth are always useful. The study of the so-called "humanities" is much more difficult than the study of nature, and yet the latter is much the more important. Capacity is often falsely judged by testing the mind with classical and gram- matical subtleties. Professor Joseph Leidy once said : The information possessed by a country boy, gained by intelligent observa- tion of the birds or plants of his neighborhood, is viewed by the so-called educated community as insignificant in comparison with that of the college boy who can relate stories from classical history of persons who never existed and events that never occurred.^ 1 Popular Science Monthly, Vol. X, p. 300. 2 Ibid., Vol. XVI, pp. 612-613. I04 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I It is probable that all the university wrangling, which is supposed to test the relative abilities of students, does far more harm than good, even to the successful, and it certainly tends powerfully to discourage not only the unsuccessful competitors but all the non- competitors, and to deter them from trying to do anything. Yet few senior wranglers have ever attained to eminence, while many who were rated quite low have so attained, not to speak of those who never had an opportunity to wrangle. The chief laurels that have been won by wranglers have been in the field of mathematics, i.e., in that of " abstract reasoning '' about what has no concrete existence. Most of Mr. Galton's illustrations are drawn from this department. A writer of Galton's school, Mr. Grant Allen, in a review of Dynamic Sociology, in which this subject was discussed, made this remark : In a class of fifteen boys of fifteen years old, taken from the exceptionally intelligent English upper and middle classes, it may be safely asserted that only three on an average can ever be taught really to understand, we do not say the fifth, but the first, proposition of the first book of Euclid. Of the remaining twelve, some six might be taught it so far by rote that they could repeat it correctly even if the letters in the figure were transposed ; three could probably learn it by heart, but without being able to repeat it with variations in the letters ; and three more would be incapable of repeating it at all in any way. When this is the case even in congenitally intelligent classes (relatively speaking), what can we expect that education will do with the less developed intellects of the ignorant masses ? ^ Though, as Mr. Allen rightly inferred, I had "had no practical personal experience in the work of teaching" geometry, still I was so much surprised at this statement that I copied it and sent it to Mr. J. Ormond Wilson, then superintendent of the public schools of Washington, D.C., with the request that he inform me whether it was true of the pupils of this city. Mr. Wilson turned it over to Mr. E. A. Paul, principal of the high school, who had been actively engaged in teaching geometry for several years. Mr. Paul's reply was as follows : Mr. J. Ormond Wilson, Superintendent of Public Schools. Dear Sir : I have carefully read the letter you have referred to me, of Professor Lester F. Ward, in which he quotes the opinion of Professor Grant Allen relative to the ability of a number of boys of a given age, in a 1 Mind, London, Vol. IX, April, 1884, pp. 309-310. Ch. VII] CAPACITY FOR TRUTH 105 class, to understand the demonstrations of geometry ; and as you request my views on the subject, I beg leave to say that my own experience as a student, and as a teacher for a period of seven years of both geometry and trigonometry, does not enable me to concur in the opinion of Professor Allen. The pupils under my instruction in these branches answer the description of those in the class cited by Professor Allen, and were I to divide up a class of fifteen as he does, I should say that twelve could be taught " really to understand " any ordinary proposition of Euclid, and that the remaining three could all be taught it so far as to be able to " repeat it correctly even if the letters in the figure were transposed," and that there would be none in the class " incapable of repeating it at all in any way." During the school year just closed there have been one hundred and forty- five pupils — sixty boys, eighty-five girls — of an average age somewhat under sixteen, in our classes in geometry. All of those who have continued in school have pursued the study to the end, not one even making request to give the study up, though requests to drop certain other studies have been made fre- quently. This fact would seem to show that pupils have met with no special discouragements in the pursuit of the study. Another evidence of the ability of our pupils to understand the truths of geometry and to follow the reasoning of a proposition is the uniformity with which they have worked out original demonstrations of theorems entirely new to them. Only the brighter pupils, to be sure, have succeeded with the more difficult theorems, but there have been numerous instances where demonstrations, some of course more satisfactory than others, have been obtained by all of the class. Very truly yours, Washington, D.C. E. A. Paul, Principal. June 23, 1884. Mr. Wilson sent me the above letter with the following note : Mr. Lester F. Ward. Dear Sir : Your favor of the 12th instant was duly received. J thought it advisable to refer it to Mr. Paul, the principal of our high school, who is and has been actively engaged in teaching geometry for several years past. I inclose herewith a statement of his views, with which my own experience and observation lead me fully to coincide. Very truly yours, Washington, D.C. J- Ormond Wilson. June 23, 1884. It is not probable that there is any such difference as this would imply between English and American pupils, and the only conclu- sion possible seems to be that Mr. Grant Allen was wholly mistaken with regard to the former, and that the truths of geometry are within the easy grasp of all normally developed minds irrespective of social station. I vividly recall- that when myself a pupil in the I06 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I public schools of my own village there were some boys in attendance who belonged to the lowest classes. They were poorly clad and their parents were day laborers living in remote, little frequented quarters of the town. There were also in attendance some of the sons of the wealthy men of the place. All were placed on a common level in the school, and the only test of merit was ability to recite the lessons given out. And I remember the genuine satisfaction that it afforded me frequently to see the poor boys "beat " the rich ones and "go to the head." And I began to see, even at that tender age, that all was not gold that glittered. But the abstract sciences are not the proper test. They of course require a higher mental power. Many minds possess very little talent for abstract thinking, but all minds are capable of acquiring knowledge. This comes from the observation of concrete facts. Everybody can see an object when it is placed before him. All can observe phenomena, i.e., objects in motion or in relation. The knowledge of most worth is knowledge of the environment, and this is also the knowledge most easily acquired. The things most essential to know are precisely the things that the primitive man sees, and out of which he elaborates all the error of the world. The reasoning powers of the savage are much too keen for his good. They are, however, abundantly ample to understand the true meaning of facts when it is properly presented to him. If any one says that the savage cannot be made to accept the true mean- ing of facts, this is because the false meaning has taken the form of a belief in his mind, and the difficulty is not to explain the fact but to dislodge the belief. If he could be taken before the forma- tion of the belief, there would be no difficulty in explaining the facts. Still easier is it to explain the facts and phenomena of nature to the child in an advanced social state. There is nothing in any of them that transcends the powers of a child to grasp. Civilization has been brought about through human achievement, and human achievement consists almost entirely in knowledge. This knowledge is that of the surrounding world, chiefly of famil- iar things, at least of things that are within the range of the facul- ties of all men. All the important part of it is of easy acquisition, but very little of it is such that it can be acquired by simple, unaided Ch. VII] CAPACITY FOR TRUTH 107 observation. Most of it is contrary to appearances, and has had to be learned by systematic research in the face of false appearances. Hence it must be acquired by each separate individual. Social heredity differs from organic heredity chiefly in this fact. The difference between social classes is a difference only in the extent to which the social heritage has been transmitted, not at all in the capacity to inherit. Society at present is organized under a sort of law of primogeniture. Only the first-born, i.e., the specially favored, receive the legacy ; the rest are disinherited, although they may embrace the flower of the family. In defending the average intellectual equality of all men with the necessary qualifications, or rather explanations, of the meaning of the phrase, only the civilized peoples of the world have been con- templated, and chiefly the so-called historical races, or that great stream of mankind that has swept from southern and western Asia and northern Africa across the whole breadth of Europe, and thence in comparatively recent times to America and Australasia. This great swarm of men, whether Aryan or Semitic, and chiefly with a white skin, has held closely enough together for all to profit by the achievement of any, so that it forms a continuous and un- broken line of social heredity and has maintained the continuity of the social germ-plasm. Of this entire race at least it has been shown that intellectual equality in the sense explained can with safety be predicated. What, then, can be said, from this point of view, of the other races of men lying outside of this great current of culture, chiefly of a different color from the other, — yellow, red, black, or some shade between these, — and who have not to any marked degree received the social heritage of achievement which constitutes western civilization ? Doubtless within each such race, r for there are many, intellectual equality, in the same sense as it exists in the white race, can be safely affirmed, but the question is ■ whether it can also be posited as between the colored races and the white race. Most persons will, of course, unhesitatingly reject such a proposition. It not only appears to be false for any of them, but there seem to be great differences among these races them- selves. Only occasionally has any one ventured to express a different view. I08 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I Except from the purely oligocentric standpoint, namely that of intellect-worship, or noolatry, this question is not the same as that of the relative worth of different races. Comte maintained the equivalency of races from this point of view. Classifying them roughly into white, black, and yellow, he said that " the blacks are as much superior to the whites in feeling {sentiment) as they are below them in intelligence," and that "the yellow race seems as superior to the two others in activity as these are in intelligence and feeling." ^ " Some anthropologists, as, for example, Quatrefages, have seriously proposed the mixture of races as a means of utilizing .the intellectual gifts of a superior race in countries and in employ- ments better suited to inferior races." ^ I have maintained that in the great final blending of all races into one "the less forceful ele- ments will enter into it as modifiers. They represent qualities that in moderate proportions will improve and enrich the whole. The final great united world-race will be comparable to a composite photograph in which certain strong faces dominate the group, but in which may also be detected the softening influence of faces characterized by those refining moral qualities which reflect the soul rather than the intellect." ^ But Mr. Kidd has called in question even the intellectual superi- ority of the white race. He argues with much force that the great apparent difference in the intellectual capacity of civilized and sav- age races can mostly be explained as a simple difference in mental equipment. He says : Even those races which are melting away at the mere contact of European civilisation supply evidence which appears quite irreconcilable with the prevail- ing view as to their great intellectual inferiority. The Maoris in New Zealand, though they are slowly disappearing before the race of higher social efficiency with which they have come into contact, do not appear to show any intellectual incapacity for assimilating European ideas, or for acquiring proficiency and dis- tinction in any branch of European learning.* His discussion of this whole question (Chapter IX) is by far the ablest part of his book. The question is worthy of thorough scientific 1 Politique positive, Vol. II, pp. 461, 462. ' Daniel Folkmar, Le9ons d'Anthropologie philosophique, Paris, igoo, p. 152. ' Annales de I'Institut international de sociologie, Tome IX, Paris, 1903, p. 67; American Journal of Sociology, Vol. VIII, May, 1903, p. 733. * Social Evolution, p. 273. Ch. VII] CAPACITY FOR TRUTH 1 09 treatment based chiefly on the practical experience of education- aHsts who have devoted their Uves to the education of the lower races. The results would, of course, be found to vary greatly with different races, and different teachers would have contrary opinions on many points. The general investigator must therefore take very broad ground. Not only must he generalize all the facts, but he must go farther and recognize that mere school study cannot cover all points. The assimilation of an alien civilization involves much more and cannot be accomplished in a single generation, no matter how favorable the conditions may be. Indeed, nothing short of the practical absorption of a race into another during a long series of generations, during which all primitive influences and tendencies are definitively eliminated, can be expected fully to prepare such a race for a comparison of its intellectual capacities with those of civilized races. No one now doubts that the Japanese at least are intellectually equal to the peoples of the West. But the Japanese used to consider themselves inferior to the Chinese, whose civiliza- tion they introduced in the seventh century of our era. They are superior to the Chinese now only in the sense that having adopted western methods they have acquired greater social efficiency. It is clearly here a simple question of equipment and not of mental capacity. What other races would be capable of, if they were to introduce western civilization, cannot be told until after trial. But the question is a complex one, and while there is no doubt that repeated social assimilations, as explained in Pure Sociology,^ tend really to strengthen the intellect, still this is such a small factor compared to the increased social efficiency gained thereby, that it may almost be neglected. And yet this prime factor is the one that is really neglected, as shown by the following, which is a fair sample of the current reasoning on this questioh : It is sometimes said that we ought not to assert that the lower races have not the capacity for social evolution, because we do not know what they could do if they had opportunity. They have been in existence, however, much longer than the European races, and have accomplished immeasurably less. We are, therefore, warranted in saying that they have not the same inherent abilities.'' 1 Pages 212-215. '' F. H. Giddings, Principles of Sociology, New York, 1896, p. 328. no APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part I It is not therefore proved that intellectual equality, which can be safely predicated of all classes in the white race, in the yellow race, or in the black race, each taken by itself, cannot also be predicated of all races taken together, and it is still more clear that there is no race and no class of human beings who are incapable of assimilating the social achievement of mankind and of profitably employing the social heritage. The seven chapters now completed aim at scarcely more than an enumeration of the principal conditions to social motion. In the present state of the world the wheels of human progress are in a large measure clogged by the various impediments and obstruc- tions that have been described. These consist mainly in error in one or other of its many forms and in those repressive social struc- tures which are its natural product. Only through the removal of the greater part of both the error and its resultant institutions can that degree of liberation be attained which shall render possible the mobilization of society, or social movement. Part II ACHIEVEMENT Multum adhuc restat operis, multumque restabit ; nee uUi nato post mille ssecula praecludetur occasio aliquid adhuc ad- jiciendi. — Seneca. CHAPTER VIII POTENTIAL ACHIEVEMENT Perhaps in this neglected spot is laid Some heart once pregnant with celestial fire ; Hands that the rod of empire might have sway'd. Or waked to ecstasy the living lyre. But Knowledge to their eyes her ample page, Rich with the spoils of time, did ne'er unroll ; Chill Penury repress'd their noble rage, And froze the genial current of the soul. Some village Hampden, that with dauntles-*; breast The little tyraat of his fields withstood Some mute inglorious Milton here may rest. Some Cromwell, guiltless of his countr)''s blood. Gray. While applied sociology has to do with improvement rather than achievement, still it is evident that improvement must largely come through a great extension of achievement, and especially through the multiplication of those who take part in the work of achieve- ment. It is therefore of the utmost importance to inquire whether this is possible, and if so, to what extent. Along with the intel- lectual equality recognized and demonstrated in the last chapter must go the frank acknowledgment of the great individual inequal- ity existing in the mental attributes and capacities of the mem- bers of every class and group. Indeed, it must be admitted that mediocrity is the normal condition, and working efficiency compara- tively rare. The question therefore is whether society has ever had or has now its maximum working efficiency. There is a school of philosophers who maintain that such is the case, and the mass of mankind entertain this view without ever suspecting that there can be any other. Appearances all favor it and it scarcely needs to be defended. Most of the paradoxes of nature, i.e., the truths of science, are of such a character that they never enter the minds of "3 / 114 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II the average man or of mankind in general, and are only suspected by exceptional, ingenious, inquiring minds. The existence of latent ability in society belongs to this class. It requires no great inge- nuity to descant upon feats of genius and the achievements of those who have had both ability and opportunity, for such are the only ones who have achieved or who by any possibility can achieve. But to look behind and below all this and discover latent energies, i.e., ability for which there is no corresponding opportunity, requires penetration, the spirit of scientific inquiry, and emancipation from the current conventional beliefs on the subject. As achievement is the work of individuals, potential achievement implies potential ability on the part of individuals, and the investiga- tion takes the form of an inquiry into the conditions under which men work. As the potential geniuses, if there be such, are wholly unknown, lost in the great mass of mediocre people who merely imitate and carry on the static operations of society, it would be hopeless to search for them. The investigator is therefore at a great disadvantage, since he must restrict the inquiry to those who have actually achieved, and from the conditions under which they have worked draw inferences with regard both to what they would have accomplished under different conditions and also \v;ith regard to what other men would have accomplished under similar condi- tions. But both character and conditions are so complex that safe conclusions are very difificult to draw. Conditions that would effectually debar certain characters from achievement would be easily surmounted by other types, so that what would be oppor- tunity to one would not be opportunity to another, and a classi- fication either of types of character or of conditions is next to impossible. Genius, talent, ability, efficiency, are all highly com- plex qualities. They all involve something more than the simple intellectual capacity for a given work. Moral qualities must be present, — will, resolution, application, prolonged attention, perse- verance, clear conceptions of the end and purpose. For the in- tellectual capacity there is absolutely no substitute, but for many of the moral qualities exceptional opportunities may often be substituted. This problem will form the subject of the next chapter. Ch. VIII] POTENTIAL GENIUS Potential Genius 115 I use the word " genius '' in the same sense in which Gallon used it in his work, Hereditary Genius, viz., in the sense of " mental power or facult ies ; disposition of nature by which any one is qualified for some peculiar employment," as defined in Johnson's Dictionary, not agreeing with Galton that there is anything to be gained by substi- tuting "ability" 1 for it merely because some captious critic objects to the use of genius in this broad sense. Indeed, genius is much the better word, for the very reason that he gives, viz., that it excludes the effects of education, which ability does not, and there- fore is ■ hereditary, i.e., congenital, while a large part of ability is acquired and not transmissible. Genius is the sum of intellect and 1 character, while ability implies in addition knowledge and experi-, ence. Intellect has been called the coefficient of intelligence. But genius is something more than intelligence. Intelligence is intel- lect plus knowledge. Genius is intellect plus character. Ability is) intelligence plus character. The difference between ^nius_aiid ability is the unknown quantit y that w e ,are seeking . In all considerations of human efficiency it has always been so obvious that the first thing to be determined is this inherent sub- stratum that the search for it has enlisted a considerable number of able investigators, until there now exists quite a literature of the subject. Of course each investigator has had a theory, i.e., a work- ing hypothesis, to guide him in his labors. That of Galton is that genius is hereditary. Notwithstanding the difficulty of the subject and the consequent defects in the evidence, he has, as I believe, sufficiently pro\'ed his thesis. The weak point in his argument is not in this main issue, but in another collateral thesis, if it can be so designated, which he seems to think essentially bound up with the first, viz., that the actual genius is tfie only genius. I do not regard this as at all essential to the other, and I challenge the truth of it. It is only apparently true, but really false. It is the current popular belief, almost a world view, and he did not need to defend it so strenuously, as in doing so he is practically arguing without 1 Hereditary Genius, London, 1892, Prefatory Chapter, p. ix. Il6 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II an opponent. His defense of it, however, has had a salutary effect. It has stimulated others who would have otherwise probably never thought of questioning it to think deeply about it, and has led a few to investigate it by his own statistical methods. Such investiga- tions have not sustained it, but have in fact disproved it, and have led to the discovery of another recondite scientific truth, opposed, as are all scientific truths in their infancy, to the appearances, the truth of the existence of potential genius. This conclusion has been reached by directing the attention to another factor than simple heredity, viz., to that of the environment. It has been shown that we know really very little about genius ; that fame,- success, achieve- ment, furnish no adequate index to it ; and that the only true test of it is trial. But unless the conditions for_trial_axe_ pre sent there can be n o trial, and without trial under favorable conditions Jthere is no basis for iudging, no rneans of determining whet her there be genius or no. The two factors in achievement, then, are first, genius itself, i.e., intellectual capacity plus moral character (the term " moral " not being taken in the sense of goodness, but of those elements of efficiency that were enumerated on page 1 14), and second, opportunity, that is, an envirorjment, favorable to the exer- cise of native powers and adapted in any given case to the particu- lar quality, shade, or timbre that those powers may possess. Nature. — We will consider first the claims that have been made for heredity pure and simple as the sole and all-sufficient factor in achievement. We waive the whole question of transmissibility, because it does not concern us here, and use the word " heredity " rather for the purpose of emphasizing the idea that those qualities only are implied that have been implanted in the agent before his birth and belong to his nature. This is the sense in which Gallon uses the word " nature," over against which he has happily set the word "nurture," as designating all other influences. Now he and those of his school maintain that this factor of heredity, or nature, is the only one that need be considered, because all other factors or influences are merely apparent, being simply the creations of this one ; in other words, that genius creates its opportunities, and that the apparent opportunities are only the necessary consequences of genius. Thus Galton says : Ch. VIII] NATURE 117 I believe, and shall do my best to show, that if the "eminent" men of any period had been changelings when babies, a very fair proportion of those who survived and retained their health up to fifty years of age would, notwithstand- ing their altered circumstances, have equally risen to eminence.' On the next page he says : If a man is gifted with vast intellectual ability, eagerness to work, and power of working, I cannot comprehend how such a man should be repressed. He instances a considerable number of men, notably Scaliger, Lord Hardwicke, Lord Eldon, Lord Tenterden, etc., who had risen from humble antecedents to considerable fame, and everybody knows that such cases are common, much more so in America than in England. Of course it would be easy to fill pages with expressions of this general theory by hundreds of writers, because it is, and in fact always has been, the general mental attitude on the subject. All the appearances are in favor of it, and the only examples possible to collect are those that support it. There cannot in the nature of things be an example on the other side. It would be useless, for example, to assert that any particular person who never did attain to eminence possessed all the "pre-efificients," as Galton calls them,^ for doing so. It would be impossible to prove that such was the case. And no matter how many such there may be, the fact could not be established in a single case. We are confronted by the same condition of things that is described in the story told of Diogenes the Cynic by Diogenes Laertius, that when shown in a temple the votive tablets suspended by such as had escaped the peril of shipwreck because they had made their vows, as a proof of the power of the gods, he inquired, " Where are the portraits of those who perished in spite of their vows." And the fallacy involved in this faith in heredity is precisely the same as that involved in the faith in the gods. As Bacon said, " Men mark when they hit, but never mark when they miss." "Men of mark" are simply "hits." Galton lays great stress on the superiority of nature over nurture, and 'virtually denies all influence whatever to the latter, going so far as to say in one of his articles devoted to the subject of twins : 1 Hereditary Genius, London, 1892, p. 34. 2 English Men of Science, London, 1874, Preface, p. vi Il8 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II " The impression that all this evidence leaves on the mind is one of some wonder whether nurture can do anything at all." ^ He seems to have much of the time an imaginary opponent in his mind who maintains that under favorable conditions men who possess no genius at all may rise to eminence. It certainly is true that cir- cumstances of birth and social position do often enough put such men into high places, but all they can do is to hold such places. Most high places require no genius to fill them. If this is " emi- nence," then is it quite unnecessary that it be accompanied by any special powers. The great stress that he lays on the judges of England, bom for the most part to their profession and requiring only mediocre talents in its practice, seems to show that he enter- tains some such idea. But, so far as I am aware, no one seriously maintains that true eminence is attainable without special natural gifts, whatever may be the other elements of success. This is not therefore the question at all, and is a point on which all are agreed. The only serious question is whether there are not many possessing such natural gifts who are not eminent. Galton uses the statistical method. He gives long lists of emi- nent men in various fields of achievement, accompanied by some account in each case of their antecedents and successors in lineal re- lationship, — fathers, grandfathers, mothers, grandmothers, uncles, aunts, brothers, sisters, sons, daughters, grandsons, granddaughters, and sometimes cousins. From the standpoint of heredity of course this is the proper method. But is it altogether satisfactory.? The central figure must always naturally be the particular eminent man selected for the illustration. If genius were hereditary, as he main- tains, there would always be an ascending series increasing in emi- nence until the maximum was reached, and then an indefinite line of persons maintaining this maximum and never falling below it. That would be an entirely different world from what we have or from the one his tables represent. In a few cases — the Jussieus, the Herschels, the Adamses, etc. — the maximum is maintained during two or three generations, but it then either declines slowly or is cut off abruptly. But in the great majority of cases the emi- nent man stands wholly alone, neither his parents nor his children 1 Eraser's Magazine, Vol. XCII (N. S., Vol. XII), November, 1875, pp. 575-576. Ch.viii] nature 119 attaining to any eminence at all. I do not think this wholly dis- proves the transmissibility of talents, but it shows that some impor- tant factors have been neglected in Galton's scheme. The most important of these omitted factors is that of the cross- ing of stirps. The children of an eminent man are only half his. Half of every one of them belongs to his wife. And who is his wife ? A person from an entirely different stock. As geniuses are rare at best, the chances are enormously against her being a genius too. But there is a law of nature that partners choose their oppo- sites. Galton is not ignorant of this law, but he questions it. In his English Men of Science (pp. 27—33) he gives some statistics bearing on this point, based on less than a hundred cases, which seem to show " that the love of contrast does not prevail over that of harmony." The qualities considered are physical with the excep- tion of that of "temperament." The results are not striking and the induction is too narrow to be at all conclusive. Statistics are akin to mathematics, and the alleged proofs from them are often worse than no proof at all. Their use in cases where they are in- adequate is simply pedantic. That there are forces of nature, too subtle for our clumsy methods, working to prevent one-sidedness in all organic beings, there can be little doubt. ^ It is much safer to trust these forces than any art of " stirpiculture " or "eugenics "| that man is as yet able to apply. Genius is not the only useful gift, and if Galton's devices could be applied there would be danger of producing a race, or at least a class, such as that described by Mr. Wells, all head and no body. This is the tendency of the oligocentric world view, which happily cannot realize itself. In his Hereditary Genius and English Men of Science Galton says very little about atavism, although he was one of the earliest writers to call special attention to it. In a paper presented by him on June 13, 1872, to the Royal Society of London, " On Blood Relationship," he laid special stress on what he called the " latent " elements in heredity, and argued from the facts of reversion and atavism that the greater part of the parental elements are latent in the germ, but prepared to express themselves in more or less remote descendants. In another paper, entitled "A Theory of Heredity," 1 Cf. Pure Sociology, pp. 397, 398. I20 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II read before the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain on November 9, 1875, and which appeared in the Journal of the Insti- tute (Vol. V, p. 329), and in an abridged form in the Contemporary Review for December, 1875, he expands the views previously expressed, and says : The facts for which a complete theory of heredity must account may con- veniently be divided into two groups ; the one refers to those inborn or congeni- tal peculiarities that were also congenital in one or more ancestors, the other to tho^e that wei-e not congenital in the ancestors, but were acquired for the first time by one or more of them during their lifetime, owing to some change in the conditions of their life. The first of these two groups is of predominant impor- tance, in respect to the number of well-ascertained facts that it contains, many of which it is possible to explain, in a broad and general way, by more than one theory based on the hypothesis of organic units. He employs the term " stirp " in a special sense, " to express the sum-total of the germs, gemmules, or whatever they may be called, which are to be found, according to every theory of organic units, in the newly fertilized ovum — that is, in its earliest preembryonic stage." The paper is an exceedingly luminous contribution to the ; subject, and the theory advanced may be designated in genetal terms as the doctrine of natural selection or survival of the fittest among the organic units constituting the stirp, to determine which shall become manifest in the offspring and which shall lie latent to appear or not in later generations. As the stirp contains organic units that have lain latent in previous generations and may become patent in the generation in question, the theory accounts for reversion, atavism, and the whole train of facts in heredity that have so long puzzled the scientific investigator. Galton lays much more -stress on these latent elements than on the patent ones, or supposed acquired char- acters, which he believes to be only "faintly heritable," and thus he anticipated by some eight years the principal theories of Weis- mann, as he also anticipated Roux's doctrine of the struggle among the parts. In an address 1 as president of the Biological Society of Washington, delivered January 24, 1891, I drew attention to these papers of Galton, which Weismann had overlooked. He appears to have learned of them only through this address which I took pains 1 Neo-Darwinism and Neo-Lamarckism, Proc. Biol. Soc. of Washdngton, Vol. VI, pp. 11-71 (see pp. 29-33). Ch. VIII] NATURE 1 2 1 to place in his hands, and in his Germ-Plasm i he acknowledged Galton's services and also mentioned my address (p. 536 of the German, p. 408 of the English edition). It has appeared to me that Galton might have presented the subject of hereditary genius in a much more satisfactory way if he had based his argument on the conclusions reached in these papers instead of trying to prove that talents are always directly trans- mitted. The facts given in his books prove conclusively that this is not the case, and leave the reader disappointed with his argu- ment. But if he had explained that the examples of towering talents here and there presenting themselves in a single generation, some- times extending through two, rarely through three generations, but always ceasing to do so very early in the same line, were due to atavism, as he so clearly defined that phenomenon, there would have been no disappointment and the results would have been about what would be naturally expected. In the light of subsequent investiga- tions, and especially of the researches of Hugo de Vries into the behavior of plants, on which he bases his theory of " mutation," the whole philosophy of heredity is receiving a new impetus., What- ever de Vries may believe to be the fundamental principle under- lying mutation, the thinking world is becoming convinced that atavism lies at the foundation of it, and is applying it to other and broader fields. If the bearers of heredity are truly "immortal," as Weismann says, they are not lost by every cross, but persist somewhere and are liable to reappear at any time. It is natural that the latest combinations due to such crosses should usually be so prepotent that the offspring generally resemble their parents more closely than any of their more remote ancestors, but it is to be expected that oc- casionally some of the antecedent stirps, holding over from the earlier stages of one or the other of the two lines that blend at each new union, should gain the ascendant and dominate the product. We should thus have "new species" of plants and animals, and in human life we should sometimes have divergent types of both body and mind. As the product of every union is a combination of the 1 Das Keimplasma. Eine Theorie der Vererbung, Jena, 1892. Kap. VI. English translation, New York, 1893. 122 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II Anlagen of both parents it is liable to embody high qualities from either or both. In most cases such qualities come from only one side and are diluted by mediocre qualities from the other, but in rare cases exceptional qualities may happen to converge from both, thus heightening those of the product. In very exceptional cases of this class the result may be something extraordinary, and we should -have true geniuses. The high qualities thus converging from the two lines need not be the same. There are many different ele- ments which might combine and produce a greater result than that which the combination of identical ones would secure. If, for example, high intellectual powers coming from one of the lines, no matter how far back in its history, should chance to coincide with great power of will, sterling traits of character, and moral balance, the product would be much more efficient than if it consisted of doubled intellectual elements. In this way, considering the almost infinite possibilities of these combinations and permutations, it is not difficult to account for all the genius the world has produced and for the immense range in the qualities of great minds. If this is the true explanation of genius, although it is clearly a phenomenon of heredity, we should not expect long lines of geniuses. We should expect just what we in fact have, occasional and apparently sporadic examples, shooting up like rockets in a single generation and dis- appearing almost immediately. This view also has its hopeful or optimistic side, for, as we have seen, nothing is ever wholly lost, and the accumulations of lui- numbered generations continue to exist, albeit long latent, but liable, and perhaps in fact destined, ultimately to come forth and exert their due influence upon the world. Another corollary from this theory of hereditary genius seems to be that we need not concern ourselves as to the result, as it will come to the same thing in the end however we may shape events. Galton seems to labor under a condition of chronic alarm lest the race degenerate unless some artificial method of human propagation be adopted to prevent it. It may turn out that all his labors to this end will prove to have been vain. Nurture. — This term will of course be employed in Gallon's sense of all the elements of success not belonging to "nature," because, <^H. VIII] NURTURE 123 separated from his phrase "nature and nurture," which he char- acterizes as a " convenient jingle of words," ^ its meaning would be much too narrow. And just as he makes the first of these words embrace all the "pre-efficients," so we may make the second em- brace all \!ti& post-efficients of achievement. As the first represents heredity, so the second represents the environment. There are no biologists who ascribe all effects to heredity. All recognize the role of the environment, and life itself is an adjustment of internal to external relations. And so it is with man in his intellectual and social development. In M, Tarde's system the social homologue of heredity is imitation, while that of the environment is opposition. That the environment represents opposition in the organic world also I have always believed and have made several attempts to prove it. In my early botanical field studies the subject that most strongly attracted my attention was the habitat of plants. As everybody knows, particular kinds of plants are to be found in particular habitats and not elsewhere. Some grow in swamps, some in dry ground, some along streams, some on hills, some in shady places, some in sunshine, etc., etc. They are habitually described as "loving" these special situations, or at least as being specially adapted to them. That any one should doubt this seems strange, and yet there were indications that led me to doubt it. I was par- ticularly interested in weeds, and I noticed that besides the well- known Old World weeds that constitute the pests of the farmer and gardener there are many indigenous plants that assume the r61e of weeds and overrun cultivated fields. Comparing these with the same plants in their native habitats I found that they flourished much more luxuriantly as weeds than as wild plants. In other words they "love" their new, or, as we may say, artificial habitat better than their old natural ones. It required no very strong reasoning to perceive that this was because in 'cultivated fields they were largely removed from the competition which exists in nature. Introduced plants formed another subject for special study. I observed that certain exotics would not only overrun the waste places, but would often invade the pristine regions, crowd out the native vegetation, and monopolize large areas. I was greatly ^ English Men of Science, p. 12. 124 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II interested in the account given by Darwin of the manner in which the cardoon had invaded great tracts of country in South America and almost completely replaced the native flora.i I brought in all kinds of wild plants and planted them in my garden (a very unfavor- able place because much shaded by buildings and having a poor clayey soil), and I always put the earth that clung to the roots of my specimens on the garden soil to see what species would come up the next year from the contained seeds. These represented plants from nearly every kind of habitat, and I observed that many different kinds of plants did well under these circumstances, which were certainly very different from those to which they were accustomed. After a number of years of such observations I felt justified in formulating something like a general law, and my first serious contribution to botanical philosophy was devoted to the state- ment of this law supported by a few of the principal facts.^ If the reader is interested in the facts he can consult that paper, but I have continued to accumulate them ever since and could now easily fill a volume with them. The principle, however, it is important to state, because it is a comprehensive principle that applies not only to the whole organic world but also to man and human society. Notwith- standing the early date of that now wholly forgotten essay, I do not see that I can better formulate the principle than by quoting from it : The modification of the adaptation theory, or rather the substitute for it which, in the light of these facts, I would propose, might be called the law of mutual repulsion, by which every individual, to the extent of its influence, repels the approach of every other and seeks the sole possession of the inorganic conditions surrounding it. This mutual repulsion results at length in a statical condition which is always brought about through the action of the vital forces themselves, and which, as soon as reached, determines absolutely the exact place and degree of development of each species and each individual. It is this statical condition which is apt to be lost sight of in the modern philos- ophy of evolution. . . . Yet, without a clear recognition of this statical law, it is impossible to account for the facts presented by the distribution of plants, and it will doubtless be found equally essential to the full comprehension of many other phenomena of nature. But when we recognize this law, the whole aspect of our question is changed. Plants appear to be no longer in a state of 1 Journal of Researches, New York, 1871, p. 119. 2 " The Local Distribution of Plants and the Theory of Adaptation," Popular Science Monthly,, Vol. IX, October, 1876, pp. 676-684. Ch. VIII] * NURTURE 1 25 perfect adaptation to their surroundings. There is no longer a necessary cor- respondence and correlation between organism and habitat, no longer necessary that rhythmical (almost preestablished) harmony between species and environ- ment. This need only exist so far as is necessary to render the life of the species possible. Beyond this the greatest inharmony and inadaptation may be conceived to reign in nature. Each plant may be regarded as a reservoir of vital force, as containing within it a potential energy far beyond and wholly out of consonance with the contracted conditions imposed upon it by its environ- ment, and by which it is compelled to possess the comparatively imperfect organization with which we find it endowed. Each individual is where it is and what it is by reason of the combined forces which hedge it in and determine its very form. ... It stands in its fixed position, locked in the embrace of forces which permit it neither to advance nor retreat. Such is the state of equilibrium which is always and rlecessarily reached in a state of nature, and in which man first finds each newly discovered flora. But let these statical conditions be once changed, whether by the advent of man or from whatever cause, and this equilibrium is immediately disturbed. The chained forces are set free ; a general swarming begins ; some individuals are destroyed, others are liberated ; each pushes its advantage to the utmost, and all move for- ward in the direction of least resistance, till at length they again mutually neu- tralize each other, and again come, under new conditions and modified forms, into the former state of quiescence. The most frequent and prominent cause of these disturbances of the natural fixity of vegetation is the influence of man. . . The fruit trees, the cereals, and the roses reach those wonderful heights of development under man's care, because he not only proves their friend, but wards off their enemies. ... It is not the special adaptation of a plant for the spot on which it grows, so much as the hostile attitude of other plants around it, which restricts and determines its range. The elements which decide where plants shall grow are to be found in vegetation itself, and not in inorganic conditions. The power of self-adaptation which they possess is suflScient to habituate almost any species to almost any inorganic conditions. Each species, therefore, keeps within its own restricted limits, not because it cannot live in other soils, but because prior occupants for- bid it to come. The law of adaptation may therefore be reduced to this -. that every plant possesses the power of self-adaptation to such a degree that, no matter under what conditions it may be compelled, by the higher law of mutual repulsion, to live, it will mold its own organism into harmony with those conditions, and thus continue its existence ; and this, whether it is required to adopt a more perfect or a less perfect form. But what it actually is, is no criterion of what it is capable of becoming, and the locality in which it is found is no evidence that it is best adapted to such a locality. These data only prove that in the final balance of forces to which it is subjected it was assigned such a degree of development and such a habitat. Galton in his English Men of Science (Preface, p. ix) quotes approvingly a passage from Carlyle's Sartor Resartus which has 126 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY* [Part II some bearing on the theory above stated, and which it seems appropriate to reproduce at this point : It is maintained by Helvetius and liis set, that an infant of genius is quite the same as any other infant, only that certain surprisingly favorable influences accompany him through life, especially through childhood, and expand him, while others lie close folded and continue dunces. ..." With which opinion," cries Teufelsdrockh, " I should as soon agree as with this other, that an acorn might, by favorable or unfavorable influences of soil and climate, be nursed into a cabbage, or the cabbage-seed into an oak. Nevertheless," continues he, " I too acknowledge the all but omnipotence of early culture and nurture : hereby we have either a doddered dwarf bush, or a high-towering, wide-shadowing tree ; either a sick yellow cabbage, or an edible luxuriant green one. Of a truth, it is the duty of all men, especially of all philosophers, to note down with accuracy the characteristic circumstances of their Education, what furthered, what hin- dered, what in any way modified it."^ In a lecture on "Nature and Nurture," which I have many times dehvered to American audiences, I give two illustrations of the power of " nurture " that are appropriate here, but I must ask the reader to make the proper allowance for the rostrum style in which they are presented : There is a certain rather large monoecious grass native of the warmer parts of America, attaining a height of about two feet and bearing at its summit a handsome panicle of male flowers, and on the culm below one or two fertile spikes three inches long and half an inch in diameter, having the seeds arranged around the elongated rachis. Its botanical name is Zea Mays, and the abo- rigines of tropical America used these seeds for food and cultivated the plant in their imperfect way. The Europeans after the discovery of America carried this process of cultivation much farther, accustomed the plant to more northern regions, to which it readily adapted itself, and at length, on the principle which I have been explaining, enabled it to develop into our maize, or Indian corn. The grass I have described represented all that nature could do. The vast cornfields of the West, the stalks fifteen feet in height loaded with three or four ears each nearly r foot in length and two or three inches in diameter, represent what nurture has done, and this is a fair example of the relative influence of nature and nurture in all departments of life. Many years ago when I was an enthusiastic amateur botanist I was out on one of my rambles herborizing in a rather solitary and neglected spot not many miles from the National Capital, and I passed over a little area that was made green and striking by the presence of a peculiar and to me wholly unfamiliar grass. I examined it attentively, and though tolerably well acquainted with the native grasses of that vicinity, I was altogether puzzled with this little stranger. It was very green and well in flower and fruit, but it had a certain unnatural and 1 Sartor Resartus, Book Second, Chap. II. Ch. VIII] NURTURE 127 disheveled appearance indicative of hard times and a severe struggle for exist- ence. I gathered a goodly quantity of it, carefully placed it in my portfolio, and carried it home with my other trophies. At my leisure, and with all needful appliances, 1 proceeded to analyze it. I was then skilled in plant dissection, and in a moment 1 compelled my little grass to reveal its name. To my astonish- ment it announced itself as Triticum sstivum. As most of you know, Triticum. CBstivum is that noble cereal that furnishes the larger part of the breadstiiff of the world. Can this be wheat? I said, half doubting my accuracy. Again I put it to the test, and again the answer was : Triticu?n astivum. Yet a third time I interrogated it, but like some stubborn spirit-rapping it still spelled out the same words : TriticuTn cestivmn. There was no mistake. This poor depau- perate little grass had sprung from grains of wheat that had by some unexplained accident been sown or spilled on this wild deserted spot in the midst of the native vegetation. There it had sprouted and grown and soughtto rise into that majesty and beauty that is seen in a field of waving grain. But alas ! it could not. At every step it felt the combined resistance of an environment no longer regulated by intelligence. It missed the fostering care of man who removes competition, destroys enemies, and creates conditions favorable to the highest development. Man gives to the cultivated plant an opportunity to progress, and the difference between my little starveling grass and the wheat of the well- tilled field is a differ- ence of cultivation only and not at all of native capacity. In short it is the difference between nature and nurture. The lecture from which I make the above extract is devoted to the defense of the general doctrine of potential achievement. It was written before I had read any of Galton's works, and its origi- nal title was "Heredity and Opportunity." The title "Nature and Nurture' was given to it at a later date, after I had read Hereditary Genius, when the lecture was entirely rewritten, but the illustrations from botany were contained in the original draft. The central idea is one that dates back farther in my personal history than any other of the leading ideas of my general philosophy. In the debating societies of which I had been a member in my academic days the question of the relative claims of genius and circumstances, as the zealous young students with whom I associated usually preferred to express it, was frequently discussed, and I always volunteered to take the weak side, partly because it was found difficult to secure disputants willing to combat the claims of genius, and partly because I instinctively felt that these claims were usually exaggerated and those of the environment underestimated. In writing the article, however, in which I formulated the law of biological statics and the universal growth force of nature, I only faintly perceived the 128 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II connection between the principle there laid down and that which I had always defended on the human plane. And yet the substantial identity of the two ideas is clear. The essential thing in both is latent power, suppressed energy, lost labor, waste caused by ob- structions to normal activities. The forces of nature are, as it were, chained. The channels of energy are everywhere choked. The new gospel, therefore, to which I found myself committed was a gospel of liberation. Nurture does not consist in the mere coddling of the weak. It consists in freeing the strong. It is emancipation. It becomes a practical question and not a futile speculation. The important thing is not genius itself but the products of genius, and it becomes evident that these will depend upon the degree of free- dom with which genius is allowed to act. If genius is innate and a constant quantity, no effort expended upon it can affect the result. The only way in which effort can be profitably expended is upon the environment. This is plastic. It can be indefinitely modified or completely transformed. Genius corresponds to the natural forces of the physical world. It can be neither increased nor diminished. Invention and art do not consist in extolling the forces of nature. They make no attempt to increase them. They deal exclusively with the environment. They remove the obstructions to their full and free action. They direct them into prescribed chan- nels and prevent them from doing harm or uselessly expending themselves. But if they are to accomplish any result they must be freed. It is the same with the forces of mind. They are ever pressing and only need to be freed in order to achieve. But that from which they must be freed is the environment. Tarde was right. The environment represents opposition. The material sur- roundings are perpetually checking and repressing the spontaneous efforts of mind. We have seen that in the world of plant life the degree of development actually attained is far below that which is attained whenever the opposition of the environment is removed. We have seen what the possibilities of plant life are when the natural growth force is once liberated. And it is the same with all forces. It is so with the human mind. We must not be content with the actual. We must imag;ine the possible and strive to attain it. Actual achievement, however great, is small compared to poten- tial achieveme"t. CHAPTER IX OPPORTUNITY Si nous laissons de c6t6 les causes indirectes . . imagindes par les philo- sophes, il ne nous reste plus comme agents imm^diats du ddveloppement histo- rique que les homines eux-memes. — Alfred Odin. Nescio quomodo, nihil tam absurde dici potest, quod non dicatur ab aliquo philosophorum. — Cicero. La nature fait le mdrite et la fortune le met en ceuvre. — La Rochefoucauld. Lex urbis lex orbis. — Roman Proverb. Le gdnie est dans les choses et non dans I'homme. L'homme n'est que I'accident qui permet au gdnie de se ddgager. — Alfred Odin. We have seen that genius, i.e., the intellectual and moral nature of man in so far as it relates to human achievement, is to all intents and purposes a fixed quantity which cannot be affected by any artificial devices that man can adopt. With it, therefore, the sociologist has no more to do than has the electrician with the supply of electricity. And just as the electrician concentrates his attention exclusively upon the most effective means of utilizing the constant quantity of that element or force that exists in the universe, so the sociologist should concentrate his attention exclusively upon the most effective means of utilizing those constants of nature which consist in the intellectual and moral elements of society. This can be done in the one case as in the other only by appropriate adjustments in the surrounding conditions. These conditions are not fixed and immov- able but plastic and adjustable. We may consider genius as a force, because it consists, as has been shown, of intellect and will. Will is a true natural force, and we have in this combination both the dynamic and the directive agents of society, as these terms were defined in Pure Sociology. The intellect guides the will to the extent of the individual's power, and nearly all human achievement has been the result of the cooperation of these two agents in indi- vidual minds. Considering genius as a force guided by intelligence, 129 I30 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II we may treat the above parallel as practically complete. The environment in both cases represents opposition, and the problem is to remove the opposition and permit the force to operate freely along lines which intelligence perceives to be advantageous. Phys- ical forces thus freed and directed accomplish the grand results which we call art or the arts, including the great industries. The means through which this is all brought about are variously desig- nated as apparatus, tools, mechanisms, machinery, factories, etc. These are much more obviously material than the means by which the human will is liberated and directed, but the principle is the same. In a certain sense all these mechanical adjustments may be regarded as furnishing opportunities for the forces of nature to do useful work which they could not and do not do under the unregu- lated conditions of the physical environment. This conception fur- nishes the key to the problem in both fields, and in that of psychic forces it becomes obvious that the generalized form under which they are liberated and enabled to work in the interest of society is opportunity. Using that term in this broad sense of every form of social adjustment that sets free and sets to work the psychic forces of man, we may now attempt a somewhat closer analysis of this primary means of achievement. Role of the Environment The tendency of thinking men to divide up into opposing schools is well known. In philosophy as in politics there is rarely any middle ground. It is a part of the universal polarization in nature that was treated in the tenth chapter of Pure Sociology. But the truth is always a synthesis of the contending views. It is so in the great dispute as to the relative claims of men and the environment. One school, the hero-worshipers, claims that men do it all, and that the environment is merely the raw material with which they work. The other school insists that men are only the instruments with which nature works. With all their zeal, energy, activity, and effort, they are merely marionettes. Great unperceived but irresisti- ble laws are what accomplish the results. What is the synthesis of these two antinomies .? Ch. IX] ROLE OF THE ENVIRONMENT 131 We are really here confronted with the same problem that we encountered in Chapter II, the problem of the efficacy of effort. It is the same "fool's puzzle," and if it was solved at that stage it remains solved for our present purpose. When we speak of civili- zation we refer to the human inhabitants of this planet. We do not mean the land and sea, the hills and valleys, the mountains and streams, the climate and seasons. These were here before man came, and however much they may have affected man, it is not these effects that constitute civilization. It is man's combined influence on his environment and on himself that chiefly consti- tutes civilization. In other words, it is his action, and without such action on his part there could be no civilization. To use Mr. Morley's illustration, if all men were to fall into a deep sleep for ages, and then awake, they would find that the environment had done nothing for them during that time. Whatever might have been the civilizing movements in process when they ceased action these would cease when their action ceased and could not be resumed until their action was resumed. The role of the environment then is not to produce or to deter- 1 mine civilization. It is not an active agent but a passive condition. \ Indeed, as has already been said, it represents opposition. Thislj opposition is not an active antagonism. It is in the nature of a passive obstruction to man's activities.. It is man that is active. His will guided by his intellect is ever pressing against the environ- ment. In proportion to the development of the guiding faculty man removes the obstruction presented by the environment. In the more advanced stages he transforms it, utilizes it, subjects it to his service, and compels the very powers that at first opposed his progress to serve his interests and supplement his own powers. It is this that constitutes civilization, and to the original natural envi- ronment there is now added an artificial environment of his own creation. This, as we shall soon see, is of far greater vital impor- tance to him than his natural environment, the physical world into which he is born. Yet to this human action the environment opposes its reaction, and it is this interaction of man and his envi- ronment, or synerg 2} that accomplishes the results. 1 See Pure Sociology, pp. 171-184. 132 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II The Agents of Civilization Civilization is something that is produced by some kind of agency, and we have seen that that agency is not to be found in the phys- ical surroundings of man, which are passive and inert. And as the only elements in existence are men and things the agents of civili- zation must be men. The idea that they consist in things, although it passes in some quarters for the scientific view par excellence, is really a metaphysical conception worthy of medieval times. It arose as a reaction against that form of hero-worship which deified a few individuals and ignored the mass of mankind and their most essential activities. Civilization is the result of the activities of all men during all time, struggling against the environment and slowly conquering nature. While therefore the oligocentric world view that has pre- vailed throughout the past and still prevails is false, the mesocentric theory that claims to correct it is equally false, and the truth is to be sought elsewhere. This much is certainly true, that the agents of civilization are men, and the question is narrowed down to that of determining what men, and in what manner they have brought it about. Even a cursory glance at human history reveals the fact that there are immense differences among men in this respect. It was shown in Pure Sociology that human achievement has been the work of a very small number of individuals. Whatever the great mass may have done in the way of preserving, perpetuating, and multi- plying copies — in a word, through imitation — the number who originate and invent, who investigate and discover, is surpassing small. And yet it is these that are the proper agents of civilization. If we combine all departments of achievement and embrace all time, the aggregate number of these agents is of course considerable, yet it forms a very small fraction of the entire human race. But the social value of these few agents must not be underestimated. If it is foolish to worship them as heroes, it is equally unwise to ignore their true significance in the history of the world. We are confronted by the old question of the r61e of great men. We have seen that by certain subtle and obscure processes of nature such rare combinations of ancestral qualities are occasionally formed Ch. IX] THE AGENTS OF CIVILIZATION 133 in the process of generation in the human race as to produce extraor- dinary minds. It is such minds when afforded the proper oppor- tunity that have produced all the results that the world values. How many such minds there may be at any given time it is impossible to determine, because those that are known to exist are only such as have been permitted by the environment to assert themselves. Great men, then, are the mentally endowed who have had a chance to use their talents. There is reason to believe that this is only a small percentage of those who possess talents. Oppor- tunity alone can show what the true number of mentally endowed individuals is in human society. But the few that we have and have had constitute the real living force of human society. Human achievement is due to them, and but for them there would have been no achievement. It is absurd to talk about civilization as the product of blind natural forces and general environmental conditions unless the men who have chiefly produced it are included among such forces and conditions. We can readily conceive of their absence, but we cannot conceive of the same results being accom- plished in their absence. Without them there would be no results. If by any force of circumstances the Mte of any country were to be removed, that country would be left in a state of intellectual stagna- tion. Indeed, history has demonstrated this on more than one occasion. When Spain killed off and drove out its Mite it fell into decadence and never has recovered its vigor. Italy suffered immensely from the same cause and is to-day far behind the lead- ing nations of the world. And these are not the only instances. On the other hand, the brilliant r61e played by Switzerland in the history of science is chiefly due to the rich recruits which that country received from the persecutions carried on in other coun- tries, as de Candolle has so fully shown. There is a still broader aspect to the subject. National degeneracy, while it might be pro- duced by the actual sacrifice of the entire dite of any country, is usually due much more to the more or less voluntary abandonment of such countries by their great men, or. by men who subsequently become great in the land of their adoption. This need not necessarily ■ be due to oppression. It may be due to other causes. But whatever the cause may be, the country which cannot retain its progressive 134 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II spirits is doomed to decay. All of which shows in the most con- vincing manner that the agents of civilization are the great men and the strong and brilliant minds in the world, and not any vague, impersonal environmental conditions. The hero-worshipers have greatly weakened their case by taking for their heroes for the most part men of action, as they are called, — military chieftains, diplomatists, statesmen, etc. These are not the true agents of civilization. The most they have done is to pro- duce certain alterations in the political map of the world, changes in the position of certain imaginary lines. Such men do not achieve in the proper sense of the word, and it is a question whether civili- zation is any more advanced than it would have been if they had not existed. Moreover, of therniUs largely true, as it is not o f really great men, thaTThey arejthe produc ts of their time and_ the mere instruments of society in the accomplishment 4>f-4t-s ends. Their success is due to the fact that society wishes to have done the things that they do. If society does not wish this their efforts are futile, they are failures and not heroes. And it can never be known how many men there may be at any given time who could have done as well as the particular ones whom society happens to commission, as it were, to do its work. The above is true of all public functionaries. Their high position is mistaken for superior ability. Like coins, they are taken at their stamped and not at their intrinsic value. ^ I have already commented on the impropriety on this account of studying the judges of England as Galton has done in his Hereditary Genius. Their " greatness " is due almost wholly to their position. There were doubtless barristers who pleaded before them that would have as signally graced the bench if they had been placed there. It often happens that a states- man is regarded as absolutely indispensable and as the savior of his country, when in fact he has only ordinary abilities, but happens to hold a high place at a critical period. Sometimes there is afforded proof that he was not really needed, as in the case of Bismarck. After he steps down the country goes on as before.^ The superiority 1 Les rois font des hommes comme des pieces de monnaie ; ils les font valoir ce qu'ils veulent, et I'on est force de les recevoir selon leur cours, et non pas selon leur veritable prix. — La Rochefoucauld, Maxim No. 165 of ed. 1665. 2 Cf. A. Odin, Gen^se des grands hommes, Paris, 1895, Vol. I, pp. 130-131. Ch. IX] THE LITERATURE OF OPPORTUNITY 135 even of military officers is usually exaggerated. In my own com- pany in the Civil War the captain, who was regarded as indispen- sable, was wounded and the first lieutenant was called elsewhere, but the remaining officers led us to victory just the same. In many cases non-commissioned officers had to command the companies, even corporals. Many a private, no doubt, would have acquitted himself with honor if chance had laid upon him the responsibility of command. Unless ^ public officer does something besides per- f ormin g the duties of his office there is no evidence that he is supe- rior to other men. It is the peculiarity of official service in all departments that it does not require extraordinary abilities. It is also a blessing that this is so, for it is necessary that the offices be filled, and if the state were compelled to find men of talent or genius to fill vacant places, it would usually be impossible to fill them at all. The keeping of all responsible places filled by competent men is essential to the social order, and it is social order and not the feats of public officers which is the essential thing. Incidentally, however, as we shall see, public service becomes an element in civilization. Some public officers are men of genius, and although they perform their official duties, their assured positions and surplus energy constitute their opportunity to achieve in fields quite independent of their routine and usually simple duties. Aside, therefore, from sinecurism, which is not always an unmixed evil, and from the influence of Maecenases, the governmental environment is a factor in the production of the agents of civilization. The Literature of Opportunity As in the discussion of the general problem it will be necessary to refer to the literature, it may be well to preface the discussion by a brief survey of it. And as all the authors compare or contrast the influence of nature or heredity with that of nurture or oppor- tunity it will be impossible to separate these two subjects. Indeed, the movement began as a discussion of heredity and gradually shaded off into a discussion of the environment. The Method of Discussion. — Three different methods have been employed in this discussion, all of which are scientific if logically 136 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II applied. To vary slightly the Hegelian formula, they may be called respectively the methods of discussion by theses, by hypotheses, and by syntheses. The old method of formal logic taught to academic students, and employed by them in their debates and dissertations, is first to state the thesis and then to defend and prove it. In scien- tific reasoning, the thesis is more modestly called a hypothesis, and the object is to examine all the facts to see whether they do or do not sustain the hypothesis. The third method, also regarded as highly scientific, is to set out without any definite proposition to be proved or disproved, with a more or less skeptical attitude toward all theories, and simply to study the facts and let them lead where they will. The first may be called the theoretical or deductive method, or method of demonstration ; the second is more of an inductive method, or method of exclusion; the third is a strictly heuristic method, or method of investigation. Perhaps all the authors have employed all these methods more or less, but the first of them is specially characteristic of some and the third of others, while in this particular field at least the second has been little used. In passing in review the different authors and their contributions, these peculiarities of method will be noted as bearing on the relative force of the respective arguments. It is important to note that, subordinate to this general method, most of the authors have used the statistical method. This is peculiarly well adapted to the investigation of questions of this class. There is almost no other way by which such questions can be scientifically discussed. General observation and experience are wholly unreliable, and in dealing with human beings nearly all the facilities for experimentation and laboratory research that are supplied to the student of organic and physical nature are wanting. The investigation of man in all these hidden aspects becomes a sort of social physics in the sense to which Quetelet applied that phrase, and its study is satisfactory or successful Only through the use of his method, viz., the method of statistics. It is unnecessary to com- ment at this point upon the great caution with which this method must be employed. The frequent neglect of such caution will be noted as v^e proceed. Indeed, we shall find that there is a fallacy specially characteristic of statistics. Ch. IX] THE LITERATURE OF OPPORTUNITY 137 The Discussion. — This dates back to the year 1865, when Mr. Francis Galton published his first essay on hereditary talent. ^ This was doubtless largely inspired by the researches of his great kins- man, Charles Darwin, and proceeds from the distinctly expressed " thesis " that " talent is transmitted by inheritance in a very remark- able degree" (p. 15X). He had already adopted the statistical method, and he gives a list of forty-one notabilities who had eminent relatives as near as father, son, or brother. As, however, he does not in this essay distinctly say that the distinguished men of any age or country are the only ones who could have distinguished them- selves under any circumstances, it has no special bearing on our present subject. This essay was the preliminary outcome of extensive researches which Mr. Galton had undertaken, and which took their final form in his now celebrated work. Hereditary Genius.^ This work has already been so frequently referred to, and will be dealt with so much more at length hereafter, that it need not be specially analyzed here. It is interesting, however, to note how completely he follows the first of the three methods described above. He states his thesis in the first sentence of the book, as follows : " I propose to show in this book that a man's natural abilities are derived by inheritance, under exactly the same limitations as are the form and ph)sical features of the whole organic world." But in it he also states his other subsidiary thesis, which has already been quoted (supra, p. 1 1 7), and which brings the work fairly within the purview of the present discussion. Indeed, it is this subsidiary thesis, and not the primary one, that has given rise to the whole movement. Nearly all admit that mental qualities are hereditary, but that they are all-power- ful and will prevail over all obstacles was a claim that was soon challenged. The first to do this was M. Alphonse de CandoUe, the eminent Swiss botanist, son of an equally eminent father, and therefore him- self an example of hereditary genius, which he does not deny in 1 " Hereditary Talent and Character," Macmillan's Magazine, Part I, June, 1865 ; Second Paper, August, 1865 (Vol. XII, pp. 157-166; 318-327). 2 Hereditary Genius. An Inquiry into its Laws and Consequences, London, 1869 ; new and revised edition with an American preface, New York, 1870 ; second edition, London and New York, 1892. 138 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II principle. In 1873 appeared his great work on the history of the sciences and scientific men/ in which he discusses these and so many other vital questions. De Candolle's method is rather to be classed in the third group above described than in either the first or second. His position is one of doubt on all points not adequately established, and especially on Galton's subsidiary thesis. He also employs the statistical method and keeps it well under control, but the numerical basis of his inductions, viz., the membership of the three great academies of science (Paris, Berlin, London) was much too narrow to secure reliable results. As in the case of Galton's leading work, this one will come in for so much more special treat- ment that any analysis of it here would involve repetition. In the same year (1873) appeared 'the work of M. Th. Ribot on psychological heredity,^ which is to be classed with Galton's Heredi- tary Genius, out of which it doubtless grew, and which, instead of being a criticism and a challenge, like that of de Candolle, is rather a continuation and extension of Galton's views from the standpoint of an eminent physiological psychologist. In many respects Ribot goes even farther than Galton, and he seems to share with him that unHmited faith in the omnipotence of heredity. His method is distinctively theoretical and to some extent statistical. Galton replied almost immediately in a magazine article^ to de Candolle's criticisms of his own work, accusing him of using his name "as a foil to set off his own conclusions," and of mixing hereditary influences with others, so as really to become his "ally against his will." But he admits that "the most valuable part of the investigation is this: What are the social conditions most likely to produce scientific investigators, irrespective of their natural ability ? " ' Histoire des sciences et des savants depuis deux slides, pr^cedee et suivie d'autres etudes sur des sujets scientifiques, en particulier sur I'heredite et la selection dans I'esp^ce humaine, par Alphonse de Candolle, Geneve, Bale, Lyon, 1873. Deuxifeme edition considerablement augmentee, Geneve, B£le, 1885. 2 L'Heredite psychologique, Paris, 1873; 2e ed., 1882; 3^ ed., 1887. Heredity: A Psychological Study of its Phenomena, Laws, Causes, and Consequences. From the French of Th. Ribot, London, 1875 (this edition is considerably abridged and generally inferior). 8 " On the Causes which operate to create Scientific Men," Fortnightly Review, Vol. XIX (N.S., Vol. XIII), March, 1873, PP- 345-351- Ch. IX] THE LITERATURE OF OPPORTUNITY 139 But Galton evidently felt too hard hit to be content with an answer seven pages long. He instituted an entirely new statistical inquiry which resulted in another book.i which is almost as well known as his Hereditary Genius. He drew up and sent out an elab- orate questionnaire to over one hundred eminent men of science in England and compiled their answers in this book. He admits (PP- 35-36) that the greater frequency with which elder sons attain eminence may be due to their better nurture under the pre- vailing laws of primogeniture. The enumeration of great families in the first chapter follows the lines of his earlier work and has the same defects. Chapter H deals with the answers to his questions, largely in the language of the writers. There is nothing in them that can be called striking. Chapter HI is a continuation of this, and while professing to deal with "pre-efficients," in fact deals mostly with post-efficients. Chapter IV relates to education. There is considerable difference of opinion expressed, and the result seems to indicate that few persons are good judges as to the influ- ence of their own education. A number of essays and magazine articles ^ appeared in 1880 and 1 88 1, bearing more or less directly upon our subject, that of Pro- fessor James being quite an onslaught upon the general theory that great men are produced by their environment and must have been. He also deals somewhat with Galton's views, at least in a footnote (p. 453). The replies of Fiske and Allen, both avowed disciples of Herbert Spencer, emphasize the influence of "general conditions " and of heredity. In 1 88 1 also appeared an important work by Jacoby^ to which frequent reference will be made. The Royal Academy of Medicine 1 English Men of Science : tlieir Nature and Nurture, by Francis Galton, London, 1874. 2 " Great Men, Great Thoughts, and the Environment," by William James, Atlantic Monthly, Vol. XLVI, October, 1880, pp. 441-459 ; " Great Men and their Environment," in: The Will to believe and other Essays in Popular Philosophy, London, 1897, pp. 216-254. " Sociology and Hero-Worship. An Evolutionist's Reply to Dr. James," by John Fiske, Atlantic Monthly, Vol. XLVII, January, 1881, pp. 75-84. " The Genesis of Genius," by Grant Allen, op. cit.. Vol. XLVII, March, 1881, PP- 37I-38I- ^ Etudes sur la selection dans ses rapports avec I'h^redite chez I'homme, par Paul Jacoby, Paris, 1881 ; 2e ed., Paris, 1904. 140 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II of Madrid discussed in 1874 the question of selection in man in its relations to heredity, and M. Jacoby worked out the subject in great detail and was rewarded by being elected a corresponding member of that body. This book was the result. It is divided into two very unequal parts, the first treating at great length of "power," and the second in a much less extended manner of "talent." It is only this second part that concerns the present discussion. It will come in for full treatment at the proper time. The fourth chapter con- sists entirely of an extended list of remarkable personages arranged according to their places of birth, as a basis for his thesis that density of population is the leading factor in the production of talent. In the second edition of this work, after so long an interval, we are surprised to find that scarcely any changes have been made. Although this edition claims to be revised and enlarged, it contains only ten more pages than the first and is uniform with it until we reach the last chapter, where some additional statistics of insanity are inserted. It has a special preface, in which we learn that the work has received favorable attention and some criticism from various sources, but the author who has most fully studied it, or, at least, the second part, and who has pointed out the fundamental defects in M. Jacoby's method, viz., M. A. Odin, is not mentioned. If he had acquainted himself with M. Odin's work and followed his method he might have rendered the excellent data which he has so laboriously collected of much greater value to all concerned. In view of these defects, which will be pointed out later on, it is almost a surprise to find the work commended by such a man as Gabriel Tarde, who contributed the avant-propos . In 1883 appeared a little book by M. Henri Joly on the psychol- ogy of great men,^ in which from its title we should expect to find much that bears upon the subject in hand. Especially in the chapter (V) on "the great man and the contemporary environment," we should look for a plunge into the very center of the controversy. In this we are somewhat disappointed, as attention is chiefly directed to the cognate question discussed by Professor James and his critics as to whether the great man is simply a spontaneous and necessary product of his environment or a special product reacting upon it, 1 Psychologic des grands hommes, par Henri Joly, Paris, 1883; 2^ ^d., 1891. Ch. IX] THE LITERATURE OF OPPORTUNITY 141 and which we can conceive not to exist though all things else remain precisely as they are. Of the effect of the environment in creating him little is said. I am constrained to put my own humble contributions into this series in their chronological place, which is here, because, although I was wholly unacquainted with the foregoing literature when I wrote Dynamic Sociology (1883), still, as I have intimated before, the subject was one that had engaged my attention from my earliest recollection, and in that work I went deeply into it, the whole of the second volume being practically devoted to it. That work was written for a definite purpose. It was clear to me from the first that the great desideratum was to increase the efficiency of mankind. I saw that the number that contributed to civilization was very limited (see p. 175 of that volume). The problem was how this number could be increased. In maintaining that " there is such a thing as latent intellect'' (p. 611), I may be said to have had a thesis, and I do not deny that this was the case. At the same time the whole argument of " dynamic sociology," by which, as the subtitle of the work shows, I meant "applied social science," which is the same as applied sociology, was highly synthetic and rigidly logical (see pp. 106-110). In this idea of increasing the efficiency of the human race I was at one with Galton. In the initial paper of his cited above he argues that the human race can be improved by the same general method by which the best breeds of animals have been secured, and all his works, including his latest studies in " eugenics,' ' have constituted one prolonged argument and appeal for the arti- ficial improvement of the human race. But he set out with the assumption that the few de facto agents of civilization represent its entire present working force. He did not recognize, and, indeed, denied the existence of a latent or potential element. Therefore his method of increasing either the number or the efficiency of the agents of civilization must be purely physiological. I, on the con- trary, convinced of the existence of a large latent contingent, pro- ceeded by a method which was strictly sociological. I did not overlook his method (see p. 463), but I had and still have little faith in it, while that of bringing out the latent power of society seemed and still seems to be a thoroughly practical and feasible 142 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II one. The great difficulty was then and still is to bring about a gen- eral recognition on the part of society of the existence of such a latent power. When such men as Galton deny its existence, surely the first and all-important step is to demonstrate it. This therefore becomes the primary problem of applied sociology. Conditions are much more favorable for its solution now than they were in 1883, and justify a renewed effort. In the interest of completeness it may be mentioned that not- withstanding my efforts to keep the lecture on Heredity and Opportunity, or Nature and Nurture, to which allusion was made (supra, p. 126), out of print, I was indiscreet enough in 1886 to publish an abridgment of it under a title given to it by the editor, in The Forum for December of that year,^ and this completes my own contributions to the literature of opportunity. No man has written more about genius than Lombroso, and his great work on the man of genius^ should certainly be introduced here, although, still less than Galton, does he recognize the role of the environment in producing men of genius. Indeed, he is a con- firmed pessimist on the whole subject, and looks upon genius as a pathological phenomenon and only an aspect of mental degeneracy and insanity. He began by publishing six years earlier his work on genius and insanity,^ of which he regarded his Man of Genius as the fifth revised edition, " completamente mutata." His works have aroused an immense interest and he has many followers, but it is novelty and audacity rather than logic that furnish the charm. For from the standpoint of logicality and of fidelity to fact his doctrine and its exposition seem to me to be faulty in the extreme. He is dogmatic, and many of his unsupported statements are in flagrant opposition to well-established facts. Some of these defects will be noted. 1 " Broadening the Way to Success," The Forum, New York, Vol. II, December, 1886, pp. 340-350. 2 L' Uomo di genio in rapporto alia psichiatria, alia storia ed all' estetica, Torino, 1888. L'Homme de g^nie. Trad, par F. C. Istria et pr^ced^ d'une preface de C. Richet, Paris, 1889. The Man of Genius, London and New York, 1891. 8 Genio e foUia in rapporto alia medicina legale, alia critica ed alia storia, Roma e Torino, 1882. Ch. IX] THE LITERATURE OF OPPORTUNITY 143 This work of Lombroso was followed two years later by another ^ in which another person was associated with him. It breathes the same spirit as the rest, but touches more closely the topic in hand. It is interesting reading, and the doctrine of misoneism and philo- neism is a novel way of presenting an old question, viz., the question of order and progress in society. But the whole work is dominated by the one fundamental idea that underlies all of Lombroso's writ- ings, the idea of physical and mental degeneracy as the necessary concomitant of civilization. We now come to a work about which little need be said here be- cause so much must be said hereafter, but which is the most central to our theme of all that have been considered or will be considered. It is a work on the genesis of great men by Alfred Odin,^ professor in the University of Sofia. This work is a perfect example of the heuristic method. No bias ox parti pris can be detected in the author. Nevertheless he is perfectly familiar with the entire movement and its literature. With all the theories and facts put forward by all other authors at his command, and apparently willing to accept any- thing that can be proved, he seems to have found himself in a state of doubt and bewilderment, and to have seriously asked himself: What is the truth } But he was not satisfied with merely asking this question. Profoundly dissatisfied with the evidence and with most of the methods adopted, he set himself the task of devising a new and adequate method and of applying it rigorously in the single search for truth. How well he succeeded we shall try to show, and need only say here that in this work we seem to have a model which if fol- lowed in other departments, even as fully as the author has followed it in the one chosen by him, can scarcely fail to lead to the whole truth. That it should be extended to other departments and to all civilized countries there can be no doubt. 1 II delitto politico e le rivoluzioni in rapporto al diritto, all' antropologia criminale ed alia scienza di govemo, da Cesare Lombroso e R. Laschi, Torino, 1890. Le Crime politique at les revolutions par rapport au droit, a I'anthropologie cri- minelle at i la science du gouvemement. Traduit de I'italien par A. Bouchard, 2 vols., Paris, 1892. 2 Gan^se des grands hommes, gens de lettres fran9ais modemes, par A. Odin, Tome premier, Paris, 1895 ; Tome second, tableau chronologique de la litterature fran9aise, liste de 6382 gens de lettres fran9ais, accompagnee de 33 tableaux et de 24 planches hors texte, Lausanne, 1895. 144 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II It only remains to mention two articles published in America, both of which deal with the subject in an enlightened spirit and con- stitute real contributions to it. The first of these is by Professor Charles H. Cooley.^ It is in the nature of a reply to Galton's Hereditary Genius, and especially to his doctrine of the irrepressi- bility of genius. But it deals with facts and to a considerable extent with statistics, and is the most consistent and satisfactory answer to that doctrine that I have met with. As no more appropriate occasion may present itself for introducing one of Professor Cooley's characteristic illustrations, I venture to give it here. He says : Suppose one were following a river through a valley, and from time to time measuring its breadth, depth, and current with a view to finding out how much water passed through its channel. Suppose he found that while in some places the river flowed with a swift and ample current, in others it dwindled to a mere brook and even disappeared altogether, only to break out in full volume lower down. Would he not be led to conclude that where little or no water appeared upon the surface the bulk of it must find its way through underground channels, or percolate invisibly through the sand ? Would not this supposition amount almost to certainty if it could be shown that the nature of the rock was such as to make the existence of underground channels extremely probable, and if in some cases they were positively known to exist ? I do not see that the infer- ence is any less inevitable in the case before us. We know that a race has once produced a large amount of natural genius in a short time, just as we know that the river has a large volume in some places. We sfee, also, that the number of eminent men seems to dwindle and disappear; but we have good reason to think that social conditions can cause genius to remain hidden, just as we have good reason to think that a river may find its way through an underground chan- nel. Must we not conclude, in the one case as in the other, that what is not seen does not cease to be, that genius is present though fame is not? ^ The other article is by Mr. John M. Robertson,^ written while he was in this country after reading Professor Cooley's article to which I had directed his attention. Professor Cooley, as he informed me in a letter, was not acquainted with the work of de CandoUe, but Mr. Robertson wrote in full cognizance of this work, as also of the views of Professor James. As a sample of Mr. Robertson's general method of dealing with the problem the following charac- teristic passage may be cited : 1 " Genius, Fame, and the Comparison of Races," by Charles H. Cooley, Annals of the Am. Acad. Pol. and See. Sci., Philadelphia, Vol. IX, May, 1897, pp. 317-358. 2 Ibid., p. 349. 3 " The Economics of Genius," by John Mackinnon Robertson, The Forum, New York, Vol. XXV, April, 1898, pp. 178-190. Ch. IX] ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 145 When all is said, the researches of M. de Candolle yield the outstanding result that, of all social grades, the numerically small upper class has in the past yielded the largest proportion of eminent men of science, from the days when, in Britain, Napier and Bacon, Newton and Boyle were contemporaries till at least the last generation ; the middle class yielding proportionally fewer, and the poor class by far the least of all. And as the principle of hereditv entirely fails to explain the facts, we are driven back once more to the conclu- sion that potential genius is probably about as frequent in one class as in the other^ and that it emerges in the ratio of its total opportunities.^ In the above sketch of the literature of opportunity I do not pretend to have included all the works bearing upon the subject. I have recorded in the course of my reading scores of passages in other works (devoted mainly to other matters) that bear directly upon the essential points, and these I shall freely use as occasion may require, but the body of literature here passed in review con- stitutes the chief source from which I shall draw. It shows that the attention of mankind has in recent times been powerfully turned in this direction. Environmental Factors What are, then, the real environmental factors that have con- tributed to the production of the agents of civilization ? This is the essential problem, and we may as well attack it at once. The iirst step is to classify these factors, and after that each factor or alleged factor must be searchingly investigated. Most authors have selected some one factor and largely neglected all others. De Candolle, however, recognized a large number of such factors. It was my great pleasure to have been in correspondence with him during the last few years of his life, and I possess a number of letters from him, relating chiefly to botanical subjects, but in some of them the problems of heredity and environmental influences are discussed. In one of them, dated July 7, 1891, he says : " My researches show ( that nurture is more important than nature. There are nineteen ; causes that favor the production of men of science in any country, and heredity is only one of these causes." Of course he referred to his well-known enumeration in his work (second edition, pp. 410-41 1). Although this enumeration has been copied into several of the other works that have been mentioned 1 Ibid., p. 185. 146 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II above, its importance to our purpose justifies its introduction here also. The hst really includes twenty "causes," as follows: 1. A considerable proportion of persons belonging to the rich or well-to-do (aisles) classes of the population, relatively to those who are obliged to work constantly for a living, and especially to work with their hands. 2. An important proportion, in the wealthy or well-to-do classes, who know how to be satisfied with their incomes, with fortunes easy to administer, and consequently disposed to occupy themselves with intellectual matters that are only slightly or not at all lucrative. 3. Old-time habits of thought and feeling, directed for many generations to real things and true ideas (the effect of heredity). 4. The introduction of cultured and virtuous foreign families having a taste for non-lucrative intellectual pursuits. 5. The existence of numerous families having traditions favorable to the sciences and to intellectual occupations of all kinds. 6. Primary, and especially secondary and higher education, well organized and independent of political parties and religious sects, tending to stimulate research and to encourage young persons and professors to devote themselves to science. 7. Abundant and well-organized material facilities for scientific research (libraries, observatories, laboratories, collections). 8. A public interested in the truth and in real things rather than in things imaginary or fictitious. 9. Freedom to express and to publish any opinion, at least on scientific sub- jects, without its being attended with any serious inconvenience. 10. Public opinion favorable to science and to those who pursue it. 1 1 . Freedom to follow any profession, to follow none at all', to travel, to avoid all personal service other than that upon which one voluntarily enters. 12. A religious belief which makes little use of the principle of authority. 13. A clergy friendly to education both within its own body and for the public at large. 14. A clergy not restricted to celibacy. 15. The habitual use of the three principal languages, English, German, and French. Knowledge of these languages generally diffused throughout the educated classes. 16. A small independent country or a confederation of small independent countries. 17. A geographical position under a temperate or northern climate. 18. Proximity to civilized countries. 19. A large number of scientific societies or academies. 20. The habit of traveling and especially of sojourning abroad. In this list of favorable conditions de Candolle is obviously describing his own surroundings to a considerable extent, and they would probably have been somewhat different if he had lived in England, Germany, or France. The fact that quite as great men Ch. IX] ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 1 47 are developed in other countries as in Switzerland shows that many of the conditions are unnecessary. It may, indeed, be questioned whether the classification upon the whole is a logical one. Still, it is difficult to suppose that the same person would develop equally well in the absence of most or all of them. A much more general classification is necessary to form a basis for the analysis of environ- mental conditions, and it will be necessary to take up the principal factors, some of which are regarded by many as the only factors worth considering, and subject each to special treatment. These principal conditions constitute so many classes or kinds of environ- ment, and they may be reduced to the following groups or heads : (i) the physical environment; (2) the ethnological environment; (3) the religious environment ; (4) the local environment ; (5) the economic environment ; (6) the social environment ; (7) the edu- cational environment. These will be treated in this order, which is slightly different from that of M. Odin, whom I am obliged to follow in most respects, because he is the only one among the numerous authors who has adopted a rigidly logical system and supported it by an adequate number of facts. All other systems or modes of treating this question are fragmentary, incoherent, and generally unsatisfactory. They usually prove nothing. They abound in unsupported asser- tions, most of which are false, and when statistics are used they are either too limited to have any force of conviction, or they deal with absolute numbers, which mean nothing until they can be confronted with those on the opposite side or compared with those from other like sources. The usual fallacy consists in enumerating a more or less respectable array of facts in support of a theory and ignoring all the facts that would stand opposed to it. I have already referred to this fallacy (supra, p. 117), and shown that it is the fallacy of all superstition, but it might with equal propriety be called the fal- lacy of statistics. By its so frequent use statistics become not merely valueless but highly misleading. They either intentionally or unintentionally deceive the reader, and constitute a form of sophistry. M. Odin is never open to this charge. He has accu- mulated an ample number of facts and he controls them with the most rigid scrutiny, always bringing forward all the facts regardless 148 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II of their import, and setting opposing facts over against each other to bring out the whole truth. It is perhaps to be regretted that M. Odin did not deal with men of science as well as with men of letters, but he gives his reasons for not doing so. In dealing with periods so remote as the fourteenth century, it is evident that men of science in the modern sense would have played no part. In order to obtain a large homogeneous mass of facts to which statistics would properly apply, it was necessary to select a single class that had played an important role during a period of five centuries. There was no class to which this would apply except men of letters. But he gives a wide meaning to this phrase and includes all who have written extensively on any subject whatever. Many scientific men have done this and their names are to be found in his list. We find there accordingly the names of Ampere, Arago, Lagrange, Laplace, Lamarck, Cuvier, etc., so that although he calls them men of letters, they are also men of science, and the list embraces practically all the great men of France. His reasons for confining himself to France are also excellent, and his work, as he confesses, is only a model for oth^Vs to follow in treat- ing the same subject for other countries and for other classes. As the subtitle of his second volume shows, he was able by this method to collect together one vast homogeneous group of no less than 6382 great men and to subject them to a searching analysis from a great many different points of view. This number was obtained by successive eliminations from a list oi between 12,000 and 13,000 and the retention of none but such as were more or less distinguished, or, as he expresses it, persons of recognized merit. He makes a further classification of these and finds 1 1 36 whom he designates as persons of talent. Even this last number he examines and finds 144 whom he entitles persons of genius. In the second volume he gives the complete list in the chronological order of their birth, and it is upon such a basis that he proceeds with his detailed analyses. Any one discussing the subject is therefore obliged to make this work his pikce de rhistance. I shall make free use of it without neglecting any other data that I find available. The Physical Environment. — No doctrine- 'has played a more important r61e in the philosophy of history than that of the influence Ch. IX] THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 149 of the physical environment on human civilization. It is much older than Montesquieu, but he was one of its ablest exponents. Buckle has been charged with making it the basis of his entire system, but only by those who have only read the introductory part of his History of Civilization. Those who are acquainted with the whole of that work (or rather with the small part of it that he was permitted to give us) know that he was the apostle of intellectual development. But he laid great stress on the influence of the physical environment, which Montesquieu expressed by the word "climate." This has been regarded as the scientific attitude, and it has usually been maintained, and justly, against "the great man theory," as Mr. Spencer called it, or the crass hero-worship of the traditional historians and the philosophers of the school of Carlyle. But it is remarkable to how large an extent all this has consisted in mere assertion, or in proof of the most vague and general character. For the events of history in general there has as yet been discovered no definite form of evi- dence that can be so presented as to amount to demonstration. We are therefore still obliged to accept it in large measure on faith, faith in the uniform workings of the laws of nature in human affairs and in the environment of man. But, as we have seen, civilization is the work of men. They are its agents, and the problem before us is that of determining how these agents of civilization have been produced. Galton and his school claim that it is due to heredity, and that if we want more civilization we must proceed to breed a higher race of men on the same principles that we breed superior races of animals. But there must be an answer made to the mesologists who ascribe everything to the physical environment. And here M. Odin is the only author known to me who has attempted to furnish such an answer by the statistical or any exact method. The birthplaces of nearly all French men of letters are known. France is a country of considerable diversity of climate and geograph- ical conditions. It has a great extent of sea-coast and a large inland territory. It has mountainous districts and level areas, and there are great differences in the fertility of the soil in different parts. If these conditions are really potent factors ii^the production of men of genius, accurate statistics of the talented persons coming from all 150 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II these various regions during five centuries of their history would surely show the influence of these physical factors. With his cus- tomary caution, M. Odin felt obliged in this analysis to eliminate from his entire list certain elements that might somewhat unduly modify the results, and to deal with a slightly smaller number, viz., 5620 authors. The area, as in all his calculations, includes the strictly French portions of Switzerland, Belgium, and Alsace- Lorraine. He first divides this area up into "departments," such as those into which France is now divided. He then gives a table of the number born in each department. This table has four columns, the first showing the absolute number, the second the number for each 100,000 population. The other two columns show the same for those classed as persons of talent. As the essential point is the ratio to population, he arranges the depart- ments in the order of the number so produced from the highest to the lowest, or from 196 per 100,000 to i per 100,000. The mean was found to be 18 to 100,000, and of the 57 departments that pro- duced a considerable number only 13 varied in any marked degree from that mean. The highest ratio was reached by Geneva, which has always been an asylum for the victims of reUgious persecution, with 196 per 100,000, and next to that came the department of the Seine, or practically Paris, with 123 per 100,000. If the mesologists should prefer to attribute the enormous ratio of Geneva to its mountainous position, how would they explain the scarcely less phenomenal ratio of Paris in the tame valley of the Seine.' The department third in rank is that of Bouches-du-Rh6ne, with Mar- seilles for its chef -lieu. But the drop is immense, viz., to 42 per 100,000. Between the mean (18) and this last ratio we have eighteen departments. They are scattered throughout the coun- try, some maritime, but mostly inland. As the chief cities are better known than the names of the departments, we may say that the cities of Dijon, Avignon, Lyon, Orleans, Metz, Besan^on, Versailles, Montpellier, Caen, Tours, Lausanne, Chartres, Troyes, Toulouse, Chaumont, Rouen, Nimes, and Beauvais form the nuclei of these departments. In order to bring out the facts in the clearest possible manner, M. Odin presents a colored map of France, the Belgian provinces, Number of Men of Letters per 100.000 inhabitants 4 or less from 5 to " 12 5 ■■ 19 ■■ 20 ■■ 42 43 and Lipw^lrdS Vi \Ti': 1, i\I;ip showing the Fecundi ■.: I)cpannifiU> uL Fraiu c in Men ol Lettc Ch. IX] THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 151 and the Swiss cantons, i.e., of the entire area that has contributed to French Uterature, showing the relative fecundity of each depart- ment. This map shows six grades of fecundity in men of letters by as many progressively deepening colors, viz., those yielding for every 100,000 inhabitants : 4 or less, s to 8, 9 to 12, 12.5 to 19, 20 to 42, and 43 and upwards. Unfortunately, M. Odin does not give the names of the departments on the map, but only the principal city in each, which makes it difficult to correlate it with the table which it is intended to illustrate. In reproducing this map, there- fore, as Plate I, I have supplied the deficiency and caused the name of each department, as well as its chief city, to be plainly printed. To bring the map and the table into exact harmony, I have, in reproducing the latter, preserved the column of relative fecundity only. Thus simpHfied it is shown on the following page. A casual examination of the map and the table is sufficient to show that the results cannot be explained by the physical con- ditions. We have already considered the most important depart- ments that rise considerably above the mean in their fecundity in men of letters. If we pass to the other end of the scale, or the departments of least fecundity, this truth will be still more clear. The mountainous Swiss canton of Valois has never produced a man of letters of merit, while the equally rugged cantons of Vaud and Neuchatel have yielded the first 22 and the second 18 to each 100,000 of population, and the French portion of Alsace-Lorraine 29. Among the very poor departments are to be found Ariege and Hautes-Pyrendes at the foot of the Pyrenees, Landes on the Bay of Biscay, C6tes-du-Nord on the English Channel, and Creuse near the center of France. None of these has produced over 3 per 100,000. Others falling far below the mean are located in all parts, some on the west coast, some along the eastern border, and some in the interior. One of these latter is Nievre, which joins the high-grade department of Orleans on the southeast. Corsica also falls into this category, having produced only 5 men of letters, or 3 per 100,000. Several other grades are distinguished on the map, but each grade is widely scattered, and it is doubtful whether the most exhaustive study of them in their relations to topography, climate, soil, etc., would reveal any real connection. For the smaller class of 152 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II Departments Geneva. . . . Seine .... Bouches-du-Rh6ne Cote-d'Or . Vauduse . . . Rhone .... Loiret .... Als.-Lorr. fran9. Doubs . . Seine-et-Oise . . Herault . . . Calvados . . . Indre-et-Loire . Vaud .... Eure-et-Loir . . Aube .... Haute-Garonne . Haute-Marne Seine-Inferieure . Gard .... Oise Neuchatel . . . Marne .... Meurthe-et-Moselle Loir-et-Cher . . Ardennes . . . Yonne . . . Somme. . . . Jura Basses-Alpes . . 'Vienne .... Gironde . . Ille-et-Vilaine Per 100,000 196 123 42 32 32 31 30 29 27 24 24 23 23 22 21 21 21 21 20 20 19 18 18 18 17 17 17 15 15 14 14 14 13 Departments Maine-et-Loire Meuse . . . Aisne . . . Haute- Vienne Ain .... Fribourg . . Tarn . . Sa6ne-et-Loire Cher . . . Pas-de-Calais Var. . . . Seine-et-Marne Isire . . . Charente-Inferieure Indre . . . Nord . . . Sarthe . . . Lot-et-Garonne Puy-de-Dome DrSme . . . Manche . . Aude . . . Corr^ze . . AUier . . . Eure . . . Ome . . . Mayenne . . Tarn-et-Garonne Loz^re . . . H^ailtes-Alpes Nifevre . . . Lot .... Basses-Pyrenees Per 100,000 13 13 12.5 12 12 12 12 12 II II II II 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 Depart^ients Loire-Inferieure Charente . . . Aveyron . . Nice .... Finistere . . . Haute-Sa6ne Vosges . . . Liege ... Savoie ... Dordogne Loire ... Ardeche . . Pyre n ees-Orien tales Cantal . . . Deux-Sfevres . Hainaut . . Namur . . Gers . . . Morbihan . . Vendee . . Ari^ge . . . Luxembourg beige. C6tes-du-Nord Corsica Creuse . . Haute-Loire Landes Belfort . . Hautes-Pyrenees Jura Bernois Brabant wallon Valois . . Per 100,000 specially talented persons almost exactly the same holds true. The mean is 5.3 per 100,000, and arranged in the descending order from highest to lowest the departments receive nearly the same numbers as for the whole. Still there are some differences, due perhaps in part to the diminished reliability of statistics based on small numbers. M. Odin next treats the same area by provinces instead of by departments. The 98 departments are combined in 24 provinces of correspondingly increased dirnerisions. The data are arranged in Number of Men of Letters per 100,000 inhabitants rorr, 4.6 to 8.5 R 6 " 12,3 '■ 12 5 ■■ ly 3 '■ 19,5 ■■ 42 4:^ and up.'.a'ds }'L.\i I II. M-ip sho'.viiiL; t If FL-cunditv ol the TruvincLS of i- r.-inre in Men (u" Letlc Ch. IX] THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 153 the same way as before except that the ratios are given per 1,000,000 instead of 100,000. This table has six columns, the first four being the same as in the previous one, and the fifth and sixth showing the same facts for the highest grade, or men of genius, the much greater number of facts justifying their treatment by this method. In the last column, however, the ratios are small and mostly expressed in fractions. This need not be given, as the two other columns of ratios are sufficient for our purpose. Provinces Ile-de-France . . French Switzerland Provence . . Orleanais . . Burgundy Lyonnais . Champagne . South Languedoc Lorraine . . Normandy . . Franche-Comte Touraine . . Merit Talent 699 344 254 233 207 194 186 166 161 150 143 130 144 80 44 49 36 34 32 28 20 28 25 22 Picardy East Guyenne . . . . Berry, Nivemais, Bourbonnais. West Guyenne Saintonge, Poitou . . . . Auvergne, Limousin, Marche Savoy-Dauphine . . . . Brittany French Belgium North Languedoc ... Gascony Corsica . . . . Merit Talent 122 120 96 93 87 86 8S 72 56 53 47 26 22 20 ■9 17 14 17 21 IS 2 8 II 5 M. Odin, for some unexplained reason, did not arrange these provinces in any systematic order, which renders it difficult to grasp the significance of his table. In reproducing it with the above- mentioned modifications I have further modified it by rearranging the provinces in their order from highest to lowest fecundity in men of letters. M. Odin has also furnished a corresponding map of the provinces. This shows five grades of fecundity, those namely from 4.6 to 8.5, from 8.6 to 12.5, from 12.6 to 19.5, from 19.6 to 42, and from 43 upwards, for -each 100,000 inhabitants. This map I have reproduced substantially unchanged in Plate II. Here we find a much greater uniformity than that shown by the departments. The Isle of France continues to be dominated by the brilliant French capital, but the low condition of the cantons sur- -rounding Geneva brings French'Switzerland down toward the'l'evel of the other high-grade provinces. There are only three of these . 154 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II latter, viz., Orl6anais, Burgundy, and Provence. No twro of these are contiguous, although the first is adjacent to the Isle of France. Provence alone is maritime, and neither of the other two is mountain- ous. Provinces of the third grade, yielding from 126 to 195 to the million, show a somewhat greater compactness. They stretch across the center of France from east to west, somewhat north of the middle, from the Swiss and German border to the English Channel, with the exception of South Languedoc, which lies on the Gulf of Lyons and the Mediterranean, but Champagne is separated from Touraine and Normandy by the two great central provinces of higher grade. Of the provinces of the fourth grade, yielding from 86 to 125 to the million, the greater number lie to the southwest, occupying also most of the center of France. This great area is wholly, separated from the only northern province of this grade, Picardy-Artois. The provinces of the fifth grade, yielding the smallest number of men of letters, viz., 46 to 85 per million inhabi- tants, are, like those of the second, widely scattered; Gascony in the extreme southwest, Brittany at the west with the largest amount of sea-coast, North Languedoc in the interior, Savoy-Dauphine on the Swiss border, and French Belgium at the extreme north. Could any ingenuity work out a theory that would explain the distribution of any of these classes according to their physical conditions } M. Odin has presented the subject in still a third form, viz., by what he calls regions. These are the North, Northeast, Southeast, Southwest, Northwest, North Center, and South Center. In his map he uses only three colors representing three grades, or those regions whose fecundity is 8.6 to 12.5, 12.6 to 19.5, and 43 or upwards to each 100,000 inhabitants. Arranged in the order of their fecundity in men of letters these regions are as follows : Regions North Center Northeast . Southeast . North . . South Center Northwest . Southwest . Merit Talent 483 99 12.9 185 32 4-3 143 26 3-S 120 20 • 2.8 "S 22 I.I 92 16 2-,5 89 i6 2.2 Genius Ji'l' I- O'lin Number of Men of Letters per 100.000 infiabitants fioni 8.6 to 12,5 " 12 6 '• 19.5 43 and ijp^--ard£ L.\i I. "III. Mali ^lldwi the l''cOunilit\- iif tllu '.L-w Men Lil 1.l'Ul-in i/t-a if Fi aiKc ill Ch. IX] THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 155 The corresponding map is reproduced in Plate III. It will be seen that the order for men of talent is the same as for all men of letters of merit, and that for men of genius it is the same with one exception, viz., that of the South Center. The North Center is still dominated by Paris. Otherwise there is somewhat more method in the distribution by regions, especially with so few grades, than in that by either provinces or departments. The regions of the second grade lie wholly on the east and Mediterranean border, while those of the third grade lie on the west and north and also occupy the center of France. One might maintain that the Alps and the Mediterranean were favorable, and the Atlantic and the English Channel were unfavorable to the production of men of letters, and that while the valley of the Seine (or part of it) is highly favorable, the valleys of the Loire and Garonne are unfavorable ! It is only by that kind of reasoning that a case can be made out for the influ- ence of physical conditions in determining the fecundity of the differ- ent regions in men of letters. No entirely sane person will of course resort to such arguments, and it may as well be admitted that what- ever the influence of the physical environment may be (and its influ- ence is not denied) it is so slight and so subtle in the case before us that it cannot be determined by the statistical method. The general result of this investigation cannot be better stated than in the words of M. Odin himself. He says: On the one hand the resemblances present a very different character accord- ing to the character of the circumscriptions compared. The colors group them- selves very differently for departments than for provinces or regions. Each map thus appears to indicate a different kind of action of the geographical environment from the other two, which leads to the suspicion that beneath the apparent geographical influence there lies hidden some other more powerful End of miluence. On the other hand, the probability of an influence on the part of the geo- graphical environment diminishes precisely in proportion as the number of circumscriptions increases. In the map by regions France is found to be divided in an extremely simple way apparently conforming to geographical conditions. In that of the provinces we find a grouping already much more complex, and in that of the departments there remains almost nothing of the primitive simplicity. Now this increasing differentiation, far from bringing out clearly the influence of the geographical medium, tends on the contrary to obscure it more and more. If in the map of the regions it seems somewhat probable, if in that of the provinces it can still be found if one wants to find it, 156 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II when it comes to that of the departments it is impossible to discover it without doing violence to the facts. We there find, in fact, a mass of departments which, while presenting analogous geographical conditions, differ entirely from one another in their respective fecundity in men of letters. Let any one com- pare the departments of Var, of Haute-Garonne, of Gironde, of Creuse, of the RhSne, of Seine-et-Marne with their neighboring departments ! On the other hand, many departments very unlike from the geographical point of view are exactly similar in their fecundity in men of letters. It is sufficient to point to the following series: French Alsace-Lorraine, Haute-Garonne, and Seine-Inf^- rieure ; — Var, Lot-et-Garonne, and Nord ; — Landes, Haute-Loire, and Belgian Luxemburg. From all this it would be an exaggeration to conclude that the action of the geographical environment has been nil or only insignificant. It may in reality have been considerable. But what we are in condition to state is that this action, whatever may have been its rSle in each particular case, has never been preponderant. There is evidently no geographical reason, entitled to be called such, why the department of Doubs should have produced a large number of men of letters, while the Bernese Jura has produced only a single one. It remains to inquire what has been the real cause of all the differences of this kind.i The Ethnological Environment. — It is generally believed that the races of men differ even more in their psychic than in their physical qualities. They are known to differ greatly in intelligence, but this is attributed largely to inherent mental differences. Not only are some races regarded as much inferior to others in their intellectual powers, but they are believed to lack those moral attri- butes which must accompany those powers in order to render true genius possible. There is scarcely any difference of opinion on this point so far as concerns races so unlike as to be of a different color, but most ethnologists and the public generally make it apply to those varieties of the white race that have been long enough segre- gated and locally cantoned to have acquired the designation of races. This factor should therefore strongly affect the production of men of genius in the areas occupied by such races. M. Odin's statistics, for example, ought to show the influence of race, and he suspected that this might be one of the prime influences in raising or lower- ing the fecundity of the different parts of France in men of letters. It is true that France is no longer divided into localized races. All the former race elements have become inextricably mixed. Still it 1 Odin, op. cit., pp. 448-449. Ch. IX] THE ETHNOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT 157 is to be supposed that the regions once occupied by distinct peoples will retain such a groundwork of their primitive ethnic character as to make itself felt in large masses of statistics. It is generally believed that France is inhabited by five principal races, each occupying a somewhat distinct region. The Gaulois, or true Gauls, occupy the central portion, covering an area of triangular shape, with its apex a little north of Paris and its base forming a nearly east and west line most of the way across the country near the latitude of Valence and Montauban. The northwest of France is the land of the Cimbrians, the southwest that of the Iberians, the southeast that of the Ligurians, and the northeast that of the Belgians.^ The maps used in the preceding investigation will serve sufficiently well in the present one. On comparing them M. Odin was disappointed in not finding that they indicate any marked differ- ence ascribable to these race influences. He says : If we compare this ethnographic division with the geographical distribution of French men of letters, we will seek in vain to discover the least connection between ra ce and the fecundity in men of letters. Let any one take the map of the regions, that of the provinces, or that of the departments, and he will find everywhere that the distribution of men of letters differs entirely from that of the races. He will see that the Ligurian, Iberian, Gallic, Cimbrian, and Belgian areas prove indifferently a high, mean, or low fecundity. There is no single race in which we do not meet all grades of fecundity, while on the other hand a great many districts inhabited by different races show the same degree of fecundity. This absence of any complete correlation between the ethnologic distribution and literary "geniality" is so evident that even the most biased mind would not deny it. Nevertheless it does not necessarily disprove the action of the ethnological environment, since it may simply be due to our ignorance of the true distribution of races.^ But M. Odin was not satisfied to rest the case here. There are in France at least five localities where a language other than French is spoken, viz., (i) Corsica ; (2) the eastern Pyrenees, where a Cata- lan dialect prevails ; (3) a portion of the department of Basses- Pyrenees, which is Basque ; (4) a considerable part of Brittany ; (5) the Flemish part of the department of Nord, e.g., at Dunkerque. Moreover, the area from which French men of letters have come, according to M. Odin's definitions, embraces part of Belgiimi, some 1 These regions are roughly shown by the broken lines on the first map, Plate I. ^ Op. cit., pp. 465-466. 158 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II of Luxemburg, and most of Alsace-Lorraine. Although French is the prevailing language in all these places, still the inhabitants belong rather to other races. If race was an important factor in the development of genius, all these localities should show this in the statistics. With regard to the first of these classes, viz., localities in France, politically speaking, but inhabited by races not properly French and speaking other languages, it is to be noticed that with the exception of the department of Nord, in which, as may be seen from its shape, only a portion belongs to this class, they are all considerably below the mean in their fecundity in men of letters. At first sight it might seem that this was a proof of the superiority of the French in this respect. But this would involve the fallacy of statistics, because these are by no means the only departments of which the same is true. There are more than twenty strictly French depart- ments whose ratio is 8 or less to the 100,000, including that of Nievre which is contiguous to the rich departments of Loiret and C6te-d'Or. Renouncing this criterion, therefore, the only one remaining is that of comparing the foreign departments with the ones that lie next to them. For Corsica, which occupies a very low position, this of course is not possible, but there are three strictly French departments, Creuse, Haute-Loire, and Landes, which have the same ratio as Corsica, viz., 3 to the 100,000. The East Pyre- nees, with a ratio of 6, may be compared with Aude (9) and Ariege (4), leaving a negative result. The Basses-Pyr^ndes contain two of the foreign races, the Catalans and the Basques. It also has a French portion, and M. Odin's data enable him to inform us that the Basque portion, furnishing a little more than a third of the popula- tion, has produced 16 men of letters, while the much more popu- lous French portion has produced only 14. As his total for that department is only 30, it follows that the .Catalan portion has not produced any. Commenting on these facts he says : We here find, therefore, that the fact of belonging to a more civilized nationality and to a hterature infinitely richer has exerted no favorable influence on the fecundity of the population in men of letters, but that, on the contrary, if is the inferior nationality that has been the more fruitful in this respect.'^ 1 Op. cit., p. 468. Ch. IX] THE ETHNOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT 159 Three departments lie against the Basses-Pyrdndes on the east and north, viz., Hautes-Pyren6es, Gers, and Landes. All these have a lower productivity in men of letters. If all this proves the supe- riority of the Basques over the French of the southwest corner of France, this weighs little against the fact that, relatively to the whole of France, the Basses-Pyr6n6es are far below the mean in the production of men of letters. The only reasonable conclusion, as M. Odin remarks, must be that the ethnological element has had little or nothing to do with the result, and that we must look else- where than to considerations of race for the true explanation of facts of this kind. In treating of Brittany, more perhaps than elsewhere, it must be borne in mind that M. Odin's statistics cover a period of five cen- turies, and the results must not be judged by present conditions. Of the five departments that make up Brittany, only one, Finist^re, is now exclusively Breton, but nearly all of them were so during the earlier part of the period to which the facts relate. In the production of men of letters, all the departments are below the mean (18), but one, Ille-et-Vilaine, has a ratio of 13. C6tes-du-Nord, which is more French than Finist^re, has a lower ratio, viz,, 3. Morbihan comes next with 5, though lying between Loire-Inferieure and Finistere, in both of which the ratio is 7. These facts certainly say little for or against the influence of race. But the strictly political boundaries more or less obscure the true condition of things. The fact is that the Breton population extends much farther east than the boundary of Finistere, making C6tes-du-Nord and Morbihan half Breton and half French. This race boundary is sufificiently definite to enable M. Odin to give us the facts for the two races separately. These show that whereas in C6tes-du-Nord the French portion has pro- duced 14 and the Breton portion only 4 men of letters, in Morbihan the French part has produced only i and the foreign part 19. Again, therefore, as before, the result is wholly negative so far as the ethnological factor is concerned. It remains to consider the Flemish race. So far as France is con- cerned these are found only in the department of Nord and only in a limited portion of that department lying on the Manche. M. Odin states that the Flemish population is only one ninth of that of the l6o APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II department. But it happens that these have produced ii of the 97 men of letters, or, we may say, exactly their quota. If the productiv- ity of the whole department in men of letters is compared with that of the ones adjacent to it, we have the following result : Nord, 10 ; Pas-de-Calais on the west, 11 ; Aisne on the south, 12.5 ; Somme on the southwest, 15 ; Hainaut on the east and northeast, 6. Commenting upon all the facts of this class, M. Odin remarks : The study of the various cases in which wholly different nationalities in France can be directly compared leads with a rare uniformity in the evidence to the surprising result that the ethnological element exerts no appreciable influence upon literary productivity. . . . The simple fact of being born and living in a French medium evidently ofEers so many advantages that we should expect in all necessity to see the regions that are not French furnish many less men of letters than the strictly French regions. If this is not the case, if we see on the contrary that the fact of belonging or not to the French nationality nowhere implies in itself a greater or less fecundity in men of letters, we must necessarily admit that some other circumstance than nationality, and one supe- rior in its effects, has determined the degree of literary productivity.^ M. Odin's treatment of the regions wholly outside of France is somewhat less satisfactory, as he is obliged to deal with facts col- lected by him but not included in his tables and with areas not shown on his maps, but the results are practically the same as those for the regions already considered. He compares French Belgium (Belgique wallone) with Flemish Belgium (Belgique flammande), the former of which, as shown in his table and map of the provinces, has produced 84 men of letters, or at the rate of 56 to a million inhabitants. The latter, he says, has produced 73, but the ratio is not stated. He thinks it would be much more just to let the com- parison begin with the eighteenth century, or rather with the year 1725, because prior to that date there was scarcely any literary activity in Flemish Belgium. Since that time it has produced 57 men of letters, while French Belgium has produced only 40, and whereas the former has produced 8 men of talent, the latter has pro- duced only 3. What he calls German Belgium, i.e., the German section of Belgian Luxemburg, has furnished no less than 8 men of letters who belong properly to French literature, and all within the period from 1801 to 1830. This it has done in the face of the 1 Op. cit., p. 470. Ch. IX] THE RELIGIOUS ENVIRONMENT i6l dominant German language of that region, a strong confirmation of de Candolle's statement that in any fair competition French will triumph over German .^ The same fact is also exemplified in Alsace- Lorraine. Notwithstanding the strong influence of the German city of Strasburg with its great university, it has furnished a large con- tingent to French literature. This entire contribution was made in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Between 1801 and 1830 it produced no less than 26 men of letters of this class, 5 of whom were men of talent. The fact was due to the superiority of the French language coupled with the influence of French administra- tion during that period. As a final conclusion from this study of the ethnological factor M. Odin remarks (p. 475) : Thus then, outside of France as well as within it, we see everywhere that a common language does not at all imply a common literature, and any people may distinguish itself in an entirely foreign literature, provided the circumstances are favorable. This analysis of the ethnological environment seems to prove that so far as the different so-called races of Europe are concerned they are all about equally capable of literary work. It is probable that they would show no very marked differences in their capacity for scientific work under the same circumstances. A mass of evidence seems to be accumulating everywhere to show that social efficiency does not depend to any considerable degree upon race differences, certainly not when only civilized races are compared, and that it does depend almost entirely on differences in their equipment. TJie Religious Environment. — We have next to consider the effect of religion upon the production of great men. This is a legitimate inquiry because, as a matter of fact, nearly all men except within a very short period have been adherents of one or other religious sect. For a century past there have been a few truly eminent men who have had no special attachment to any religion, and the time has already come when it is a sort of pious fraud to classify the whole population of an enlightened country by religions. There are many thousands now who do not belong to any religion, and these always embrace the best minds. Most of 1 De CandoUe, Histoire des sciences et des savants, 2^ ed., 1885, p. 543. 1 62 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II them have great respect for all religions, but regard them as social phenomena to be studied and compared. Kidd's pretense that such persons are unconsciously influenced by the religions of the world ^^ is a mere begging of the question. But in considering the history of civihzation this element is so small that it may be neglected, and it is convenient to assume that all men belong to some of the great religions. The effect of religious ideas upon human progress has already been treated in the earlier part of this work (see Chapter VI), but this is not the question before us. It is rather the relative influence of different religions upon the production of great men, and in the literature and discussion of the present sub- ject it has been practically narrowed down first to the relative influ- ence of Christianity and Judaism and then more especially to the relative influence of Catholicism and Protestantism. This is because nearly all the great men considered have been either Christians or Jews, and the great majority of them, as well as of the peoples from which they have issued, have been either Catholics or Protestants. Three of de Candolle's " favorable causes " relate to religion, viz. : 12. A religion making little use of the principle of authority. 13. A clergy friendly to education among its own members and for the public at large. 14. A clergy not restricted to celibacy. The effect of persecution by the church has no doubt been very injurious in this direction. This is mentioned by Galton, who says: The extent to which, persecution must have affected European races is easily measured by a few well-known statistical facts. Thus, as regards martyr- dom and imprisonment, the Spanish nation was drained of free-thinkers at the rate of 1000 persons annually, for the three centuries between 147 1 and 1781 ; an average of 100 persons having been executed and 900 imprisoned every year during that period. The actual data during those three hundred years are 32,000 burnt, 17,000 burnt in effigy (I presume they mostly died in prison or escaped from Spain), and 291,000 condemned to various terras of imprison- ment and other penalties. It is impossible that any nation could stand a policy like this, without paying a heavy penalty in the deterioration of its breed, as has notably been the result in the formation of the superstitious, unintelligent Spanish race of the present day. Italy was also frightfully persecuted at an earlier date. In the diocese of Como alone more than 1000 were tried annually by the inquisitors for many years, and 300 were burnt in the single year 141 6. The French persecutions, by which the English have been large gainers, ' Social Evolution, p. 189. Ch. IX] THE RELIGIOUS ENVIRONMENT 163 through receiving their industrial refugees, were on a nearly similar scale. In the seventeenth century three or four hundred thousand Protestants perished in prison, at the galleys, in their attempts to escape, or on the scaffold, and an equal number emigrated. Mr. Smiles, in his admirable book on the Huguenots, has traced the influence of these and of the Flemish emigrants on England, and shows clearly that she owes to them almost all her industrial arts and very much of the most valuable life-blood of her modern race.^ All this has been so frequently written up that it need not be further dwelt upon, and it is evident that a religion that is intolerant must be highly unfavorable to the production of genius. Although the Protestants have done some persecuting, still they have never done it on any such scale, and therefore from this point of \'iew Protestantism must be regarded as more favorable to genius than Catholicism. But in the comparison of these two religious sects the point upon which the greatest stress has been laid in the discussion of the conditions favorable to genius has been the effect of a celibate clergy. On this there is room for a difference of opinion. That institution has been strongly defended by others than Catholics, especially by Auguste Comte.^ But most of the authors named in the literature of the present discussion have regarded it as very unfavorable to the production of men of genius. Thus Galton says: The long period of the dark ages under which Europe has lain is due, I believe, in a very considerable degree, to the celibacy enjoined by religious orders on their votaries. Whenever a man or woman was possessed of a gentle nature that fitted him or her to deeds of charity, to meditation, to literature, or to art, the social condition of the time was such that they had no refuge else- where than in the bosom of the Church. But the Church chose to preach and exact celibacy. The consequence was that these gentle natures had no con- tinuance, and thus, by a policy so singularly unwise and suicidal that I am hardly able to speak of it without impatience, the Church brutalized the breed of our forefathers. She acted precisely as if she had aimed at selecting the rudest portion of the community to be, alone, the parents of future generations. She practised the arts which breeders would use, who aimed at creating fero- cious, currish, and stupid natures. No wonder that club law prevailed for centu- ries over Europe; the wonder rather is that enough good remained in the veins of Europeans to enable their race to rise to its present very moderate level of natural morality.' ' Hereditary Genius, second edition, London, 1892, pp. 345-346. 2 Philosophie positive,'3e ed., 1869, Vol. V, p. 253. " Hereditary Genius, pp. 343-344. 1 64 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II The moral effects of celibacy have been frequently dwelt upon. As they concern us here only indirectly, I will content myself with quoting a passage from Draper: The population of England at the Norman conquest was about two million. In five hundred years it had scarcely doubled. It may be supposed that this stationary condition was to some extent induced by the papal policy of the en- forcement of celibacy in the clergy. The " legal generative force " was doubtless affected by that policy, the " actual generative force " was not. For those who have made this subject their study have long ago been satisfied that public celibacy is private wickedness. This mainly determined the laity, as well as the government in England, to suppress the monasteries. It was openly asserted that there were one hundred thousand women in England made dissolute by the clergy.^ De Candolle was the first to bring any considerable number of facts to bear on the question of the influence of celibacy on the production of men of genius. He says: It is not a matter of indifference that certain categories of the educated, inteUigent, and virtuous public should or should not be restricted to celibacy. Aside from all dogma and from the discipline of the clergy, the result is not the same for a country, from the standpoint of education, when there are, for example, forty or fifty thousand celibate ecclesiastics or an equal number of ecclesiastics who are fathers of families. Even in reducing the inheritance of things intellectual to the minimum, the simple existence in Protestant countries of married pastors assures the development from year to year of a certain number of educated or upright persons who exert a favorable influence on society. ... I will mention in support of my opinion a few men of unques- tioned merit who would not have been born if Protestant ecclesiastics had been restricted to cehbacy, or who would have taken a different course if their educa- tion had been bad. They are all sons of Protestant ministers, deans, or pastors : Mathematical, physical, or natural sciences Agassiz, naturalist Jenner, physician Berzelius, chemist Linnaeus, naturalist Boerhaave, physician, naturalist Mitscherlich, mineralogist Brown (Robert), botanist Olbers, astronomer Camper, anatomist Rudbeck (Olaus), botanist Clausius (Rud. M.), physicist Schimper (W. Phil.), botanist Encke, astronomer Schweizer, physicist Euler, mathematician Studer (Bernard), geologist Fabricius, astronomer Wallis (John), mathematician Grew, anatomist, botanist Wargentin, astronomer Hanstein (L. J.), botanist Wollaston, chemist Hartsoeker, physicist Wurtz, chemist Heer (Oswald), naturalist Young (Arthur), agriculturist ' History of the Conflict between Religion and Science, by John William Draper, fifth edition, New York, 1875, PP- 262-263. Ch. IX] THE RELIGIOUS ENVIRONMENT 165 Moral, historical, political, or philo- Poets and literary men logical sciences . , ,. * Addison Abbot, 1st lord Colchester, statesman Gessner (Jean) Ancillon (Ch.), historian Jonson (Ben) Ancillon (Fred.), historian Lessing Bochart, orientalist Richter (Jean Paul) Emerson (Ralph Waldo) Swift Hallam (H.), historian Thomson Hase (Ch. Benoit), Hellenist Wieland Hobbes (Thomas), philosopher Young Miiller (Jean de), historian PufEendorff (Sam.), jurisconsult Artists Schweighaeuser, Hellenist Wren (Christopher) Sismondi, historian Wilkie (David) I could have tripled or quintupled these lists indicating men of recognized distinction but less known to the general public. This would be useless as a demonstration, for the names enumerated are sufBcient to show to what extent science, medicine, l^ers would have been impeded during two centuries if celibacy had been imposed upon the ecclesiastics of all cults, or if, being married, their habits of domestic education had been bad.^ This is certainly a remarkable showing, and very little attempt has been made to answer the argument. We can barely imagine what science would have been without Agassiz, Berzelius, Euler, Jenner, Linnasus, Wollaston. We can think of history without a Hallam, philosophy without a Hobbes or an Emerson. We can conceive of poetry without Addison, Thomson, and Young, and of literature without Ben Jonson, Lessing, and Dean Swift, or art with- out Sir Christopher Wren. But all, I think, must admit that the absence of these names would enormously dwarf all these branches of human achievement. The world could do without all its great men, but what kind of a world would it be .■* To say that the environment would have evolved their practical substitutes would be an assertion for which there does not seem to be an atom of proof. One answer is that all these men would have been born just the same, only they would have been illegitimate, and according to Galton's subsidiary thesis of the irrepressibility of genius, this would have constituted no barrier to their success. They would have accomplished exactly the same. I know of no better example 1 De CandoUe, op. cit., pp. 149-152. 1 66 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [PartII of the reductio ad absurdum. Illegitimacy, except under the most unusual circumstances, is a bar to all aspirations. Perhaps it should not be, but as a matter of fact it is. M. Odin, however, has a somewhat different answer, upon which, it is true, he does not stoutly insist, but which is at least worth our attention. Admitting that the Catholic clergy can leave no posterity that has any chance to distinguish itself, he nevertheless points out that the rearing of a family, as by the Protestant clergy, involves a large sacrifice of time and energy which a celibate clergy can devote to genial pursuits, and therefore, while Protestant clergymen can transmit their predisposition to culture, they cannot, as a rule, apply themselves to literary, scientific, or artistic studies. On the other hand, many Catholic priests, and especially the higher orders with ample emoluments and much leisure, can and do achieve in various lines. He says further on this general head : As a matter of fact Catholic ecclesiastics have more formalities connected with the cult to go through than their Protestant confreres. But, on the other hand, they are relatively more numerous, which facilitates many duties that cost much time and fatigue to Protestant pastors, such as preaching, teaching novitiates, visiting the poor and the sick, etc. I do not speak of the numerous Catholic ecclesiastics who for one reason or another have dispensed with the greater part of these duties. It may be said in general that, all things con- sidered, the tinle devoted to the special requirements of the calling is practically the same, and that the Catholic ecclesiastics have as much more time than the pastors as the latter devote to their families. We should therefore expect to see the Catholic clergy furnish a larger proportion of men of letters than the Protestant clergy.^ M. Odin neglects one factor which I have reason to believe has considerable importance. This is the quieting effect of family life. There are many persons who cannot work under the goad of unsat- isfied affection, and find themselves in such an uneasy and unsettled frame of mind that prolonged application, such as is always necessary to the production of any great work, is impossible. And there is even a worse aspect of the case. If their chastity is complete, as there is reason to believe it rarely is, they are in danger of falling under the spell of mysticism, which, while it may be accompanied by genius, is certain to deprive their labors of the sane stability and ' Odin, op. cit., p. 487. Ch. IX] THE RELIGIOUS ENVIRONMENT 167 fidelity to truth that are essential to the highest productions of the human mind.-' M. Odin has made an effort to apply statistics to this question, but the results are not very satisfactory on account of the limited information supplied by the biographical dictionaries. As France has been mainly Catholic throughout modern times, it seems to have been assumed that the subject of a sketch must be a Catholic unless the contrary is specially stated. As the attempt to handle the entire number of literary men seemed hopeless, M. Odin has confined himself to the smaller class that he designates as men of letters of talent, of whom, as already stated, he found 1 136. Of these 105 are known to have been Protestants. Twenty-five others became Prot- estants some time in the course of their lives, making a total of 130. Of the 105 who were born Protestants he gives a table by twenty-five-year periods, which shows the absolute number for each period and the per cent that this number is of the whole number of men of talent for the same period. This is chiefly interesting as showing that while the absolute number increased during modern times the relative number diminished. The average for the whole period is only i o per cent, but during the earlier parts of it it amounted to 25 per cent, and at the very outset (1539-1550) to 33 per cent. Upon the whole this table cannot be said to possess very great value for the problem at large. His other table is much more to the point. Of the Protestants he found that 47 were clergymen, which is 36 per cent of the whole. Assuming that all the rest were Catholics, a basis of comparison was found. At any rate he made this his basis. Scrutinizing his list he discovered that 282 modern French men of letters of talent were Catholic ecclesiastics. This is 26 per cent of the Catholics of this grade on that basis. It should be said that there were five Israelites whom he neglects except to deduct them from the non- Protestant total. He divides the Catholics into high clergy, low clergy, and Jesuits. His table shows the result by fifty-year periods from 1300 to 1825, except that the first line gives them for the first two centuries from 1300 to 1500, and the last line for twenty- five years, 1801-1825. Besides the numerical table he gives, as is 1 This subject was more fully discussed in Pure Sociology. See pp. 388, 389. 1 68 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II his custom throughout, a graphic representation, the curves showing the several classes and the percentages of both Catholics and Prot- estants. The following is the table : Chronological Table of Men of Letters of Talent who were Ecclesiastics (Catholics and Protestants) Catholics Total 1113- Eccle- High Low Jesuits Total TANTS siastics Clergy Clergy Periods 3 ,. 3 c u b 2 3 J ° 2 K s s D Si g S D II 2 Oh -J a a S D E D A. ;. < D 21 < 1300-1500. . . . 6 II 18 32 — . 24 43 3 50 27 44 1 501-1550 3 5 4 7 I " 8 14 7 29 15 18 1551-1600 7 12.5 10 18 8 14 25 45 8 44 33 45 1601-1650 7 5 38 28 15 II 60 44 9 56 69 46 1651-1700 3 2 30 25 13 II 46 38 II 58 57 41 1701-1750 6 3 36 20 12 7 54 30 2 12.5 56 29 1751-1800 3 I 9 4 I 0.4 13 6 3 18 16 7 1801-1825 I ' 3 2 I I 5 4 4 29 9 6 Total . . 36 4 148 '5 51 5 235 24 47 36 2S2 26 No better commentary on these results could be offered than in the words of M. Odin himself. He says : As will be seen, the Catholic ecclesiastics, far from furnishing a particularly remarkable contingent of men of letters of talent, remain on the contrary for almost all the periods behind the Protestant clergy. Their inferiority is espe- cially evident in the two last periods, during which the pastors furnished rela- tively three and seven times more men of letters of talent than the Catholic priests. This confirms what I have just said relative to the different composi- tion of the two clergies. It seems certain that the Catholics who had literary tastes embrace the ecclesiastical career less willingly than the Protestants. The celibacy of the priests cannot have had as bad effects on literature as the large number of men of letters who had had clergymen for fathers seemed to indicate. A second remark that our table calls forth is that the Jesuits and the high clergy have furnished an exceptionally large number of men of letters of talent. We shall see later on that the literary fecundity of these two classes of eccle- siastics is easily explained. Ch. IX] THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT 169 If finally we consider the table from the chronological point of view we shall be struck first of all by the fact that the absolute and relative number of eccle- siastics who have been men of letters drops suddenly in the last century, in the first half of the century for the Protestants, in.the second half for the Catholics. In the following periods the number of Protestants shows a tendency to rise again, but that of the Catholics continues to fall. This fact may furnish material for interesting special researches. We need only remark here that it weakens the supposition of M. de CandoUe, according to which " the abandonment of science by the greater part of the Catholic ecclesiastics " is explained by " the increasing specialization of scientific men." The example of men of letters shows that this abandonment must be due to more general causes. To sum up, we have seen that four circumstances independent of one another tend to make us consider Protestantism more favorable than Catholicism to the culture of letters, at least for the period that we are studying. Each of these circumstances, we repeat, is less conclusive than is generally supposed. But taken together they constitute a combination of evidence to which it is impossible to deny all value. We will admit then that religion has exerted a perceptible action upon the quality (richesse) of literature, without being able, however, to determine exactly what this action has been.^ Perhaps we should not leave this subject without remarking that it is the one in which the greatest differences between literature and science would occur, and therefore the points of view of M. Odin and M. de Candolle are not the same. What would be true of the one would not always be true of the other. The Local Environment. — In his tentative groping after truth for its own sake, trawling with his great statistical net over the whole sea bottom of modern history, M. Odin had frequently had his suspicions aroused that there was some great neglected factor which must be discovered before the real meaning of his facts could be gjasped. He faithfully tested all three of the prevailing hypoth- eses, viz., those of the efficacy of the physical, the ethnological, and the religious environment, and found comparatively little to reward the search. But his charts and his maps and his graphic represen- tations gave out constant hints of this undiscovered factor. Jacoby's theory that the density of population is the chief influence attracted his attention. Jacoby is not the only writer who has laid stress on this aspect of the question. In fact it is a kind of popular belief that the friction of mind upon mind produced by the close contact of men in populous centers constitutes a powerful stimulus to 1 Odin, op. cit , pp. 487-489. lyo APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part 11 intellectual activity. Nor is this idea so very new, for do we not read in Proverbs (xxvii. 17) : "Iron sharpeneth iron; so a man sharpeneth the countenance of his friend/' ? which Professor Giddings says "was the earliest and the greatest discovery ever made in sociology." ^ Similar expressions are to be found throughout antiquity, medieval and early modern times, but these are only the adumbrations that go before every important idea. Sociologists, however, have gener- ally recognized this principle as a part of their science, and some recent ones have laid great stress upon it. As usual we find that Comte had anticipated them and not left them very much that was new to add. We should therefore first hear him : I will merely point at present to the progressive condensation of our species as a last general element serving to regulate the actual rapidity of the social movement. It may be easily perceived at a glance that this influence contrib- utes much, especially at the outset, to bring about a more and more special division in the totality of human labor, necessarily incompatible wfith a too small number of cooperators. Moreover, by reason of a more inherent and less known quality, although even more important, this condensation stimulates directly and in a very powerful way the more rapid progress of social evolution, either by spurring individuals on to make fresh efforts to secure for themselves through more refined means an existence which would otherwise thus become more difficult, or else by compelling society to react with more stubborn and better concerted energy in order adequately to resist the. more powerful tend- encies toward special deviations. In either case we see that it is not a question here of the absolute increase in the number of individuals, but rather of their more intense competition {concours) on a given space, conformably to the special expression of which I have made use, and which is peculiarly applicable to the great centers of population, where, at all times, the chief progress of man- kind has in fact first taken shape. In creating new wants and new difficulties, this gradual agglomeration also spontaneously develops new means, not only to the attainment of progress, but also of order itself, by neutralizing more and more the various physical inequalities, and also by giving an increasing ascend- ancy to the intellectual and moral forces, which are necessarily held in their low primitive condition in every too limited population. Such is, in brief, the real influence of such a continuous condensation, irrespective of the actual dura- tion of the process of its formation. If now we consider it also in relation to this greater or less rapidity it will be easy to discover a new cause of the general acceleration of the social movement through the direct disturbance which the fundamental antagonism between the instinct of preservation and the instinct of innovation must thus undergo, the latter being evidently destined henceforth to acquire a notable increase of energy.^ 1 The Principles of Sociology, by Franklin Henry Giddings, New York, 1896, p. 39. 2 Auguste Comte, Philosophie positive. Vol. IV, pp. 455-456. Ch. IX] THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT 1 7 1 Mr. Spencer also laid great stress on the pressure of population, regarding it as the main incentive to progress in past times as well as in the present, and as likely to remain such far into the future. But he has not, to my knowledge, discussed the special question of the effect of density in developing the intellectual faculties. He considered rather its effect upon fertility, maintaining that this is to diminish fertility, thus automatically regulating population. These questions do not concern us here. M. Durkheim first approached this question from the standpoint of the division of labor, from which Comte also considered it, and he laid down the following proposition : The division of labor varies in direct ratio to the volume and the density of societies, and, if it progresses continuously in the course of social development, it is because the societies are becoming constantly more dense and usually more voluminous.^ In a later Wbrk he discusses the subject more fully and makes an important distinction between what he calls the "dynamic density" and the "material density." He says: The primary origin of any social process of importance must be sought in the constitution of the internal social medium. . . . Thus far we have found two series of characters which answer in a special way to this condition ; these are the number of social units, or, as we have also said, the volume of society, and the degree of concentration of the mass, or, what we have called the dynamic density. By this latter phrase must be understood not the purely mate- rial compression (resserrement) of the aggregate, which can have no effect if the individuals, or rather the groups of individuals, remain separated by moral voids, but the moral contact, of which the preceding is only the auxiliary, and, commonly enough, the consequence. The dynamic density may be defined as, for an equal volume, a function of the number of the individuals who are in relations not merely commercial but moral; that is, who not only exchange services or compete, but who live a common life. For as purely economic relations leave men detached from one another they may be in very close con- tact without on this account sharing the same collective existence. . . . Life in common can only be affected by the number of those who effectively work together in it. This is why that which best expresses the dynamic density of a people is the degree of coalescence of the social segments. For if each partial aggregate forms a whole, a distinct individual, separated from the rest by a barrier, it is because the action of its members in general remains localized ; if, on the contrary, these partial societies are all blended in the mass of the whole society, it is because, to the same extent, the circle of social life is extended. ' De la division du travail social, par firaile Durkheim, Paris, 1893, P- 289. 172 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II As regards the material density — if, at least, we understand by this not only the number of inhabitants per unit of surface, but the development of the means of communication and of transmission — it usually advances at the same rate as the dynamic density, and, in general, may serve as a measure of it. For if the different parts of the population tend to approach each other it is inevitable that they should break the way that allows such an approach, and, on the other hand, relations can only be established between distant points of the social mass if this distance is not an obstacle, i.e., if it is, in fact, suppressed. Nevertheless there are exceptions, and we should expose ourselves to serious errors if we were always to judge of the moral concentration of a society by the degree of material concentration which it presents.^ I might go on and expand this discussion by citing other authors, and especially M. Adolphe Coste,^ but perhaps enough has been said relative to this particular aspect of our subject. There can be no doubt that it represents one of the approaches toward the solution of the vexed problem as to what is the true cause of the develop- ment of talented individuals. But, as we shall see, it is far from being the solution of that problem. M. Jacoby set out, in the work mentioned in the section on the literature (supra, p. 1 39), to ascertain the effect of the accumulation of inhabitants upon a more or less restricted territory. He drew up a list of 331 1 names of eminent Frenchmen of the eighteenth century with the places of their birth, and based his calculations on the census of France of the year 1836. As was remarked, Chapter IV of Part II of his book consists entirely of an enumeration by name of all these persons arranged in the alphabetical order of the departments in which they were born, and also giving the cities, arrondissements, or more exact places of their birth. This is an exceedingly interesting list, and the number of names is large enough to eliminate statistical defects in rhost cases. The next chapter considers the relative fecundity of the departments in remarkable personages, which he discusses statistically, but he prefaces his long table by the following remarks : We have arrived ... at the conclusion that civilization, taken in its broad and general sense, i.e., as a multiform complex of intellectual and moral qualities 1 Les Regies de la methode sociologique, par fimile Durkheim, 2e ed., revue et aug- mentee, Paris, 1901, pp. 138-141. 2 Nouvel Expose d'economie politique et de physiologie sociale, Paris, 1889; " Le facteur Population dans devolution sociale," Revue Internationale de sociologie, ge annee, 1901, aout-septembre, pp. 569-612. Ch. IX] THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT 173 of the population, of certain conditions of life, social, political, scientific, etc., is the result of the accumulation of inhabitants upon a more or less re- stricted territory. It appears as a natural consequence of the constantly more and more increasing complication of the conditions of social life, of the neces- sity of a more and more intense intellectual activity, and finally of the attractive force which the centers already formed exert upon mobile, active, and intelli- gent natures, which causes them to abandon the rural districts and go and settle in the cities. These influences grow with the increase in the number of the centers of population, and with this civilization also advances. We shall therefore perceive a direct causal connection between civilization on the one hand and the density of population and number of populous centers on the other; these two conditions must therefore furnish the positive indications of the degree of civilization, and they may thus serve as a criterion for determin- ing the relative civilization of the various localities of a country. But if between the number and the population of the cities on the one hand, and the density of population of the country on the other, there exists, as a general fact, a more or less constant direct relation, this relation is far from holding true in each particular case. The same density of population, i.e., the same number of inhabitants per kilometer, for the whole country taken together, does not at all imply an identical distribution of the population. Certain prov- inces have a very dense population, but uniformly distributed over the whole territory, and not only not presenting any great centers, but not even having any cities of considerable magnitude, as we see in the department of Cote-d'Or, Other regions present the converse relations ; large commercial or industrial cities are here separated by large thinly peopled and almost uncultivated spaces, as occurs in the department of Bouches-du-Rhone. Which of the two factors has a bearing on the question under discussion ? We have no data for deciding between the two. There are very grave reasons for thinking that these conditions — density of population and number and population of cities, in other words, the percentage of the urban population to the total population of the country — both have a positive influence, although it is impossible to determine their relative action. We therefore place the figures for these two factors in parallel columns with the figures for the relative fecundity of the present departments in remarkable personages during the eighteenth century .1 His table consists of four columns. The first contains the names of all the departments of France arranged in alphabetical order. The second gives the relative number of remarkable personages born during the eighteenth century in each of the departments. This number is obtained by dividing the absolute number by the population, and is always expressed in decimal fractions carried out to the eighth place. As the fractions are always less than a thou- sandth, and generally less than a ten thousandth, it results that ' Jacoby, op. cit., pp. 535-536. 174 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II there are always three and usually four zeros before any digits are reached, which makes a very awkward showing and difficult to grasp. The third column gives the density of population, i.e., the number of inhabitants per square kilometer, carried to two decimal places. The fourth column shows the percentage that the urban population is to the total population of each department. Thus arranged the table conveys no instructive lesson, and he was obliged to supplement it with a graphic representation. The table can, however, be made clear by arranging the departments in the descending order of their fecundity and stating this in the number per 100,000 of inhabitants. It will then take the form shown on the opposite page. It will be observed that this table has the same form as the one by departments taken from M. Odin's work (supra, p. 152), and therefore the figures of the first column admit of direct comparison with those of that table. It needs only to be borne in mind that M. Jacoby includes so much as belonged to France in the eighteenth century, and no more. This includes more of Alsace-Lorraine, but excludes Savoy and the Maritime Alps, as well as Corsica, and no part of Switzerland or Belgium was taken. It must also be remem- bered that while M. Odin confined himself to men of letters, M. Jacoby includes all persons of distinction. But as he confined him- self to the eighteenth century while M. Odin's table covers five centuries, the whole number included in the latter is nearly twice as large as that in the former. Wherever, therefore, the figure in the first column is approximately half as large in M. Jacoby' s table as in M. Odin's there is substantial harmony between them. The order should also be nearly the same, but exact correspondence in this respect could not of course be expected. Wide deviations only require explanation. Seine and Bouches-du-Rh6ne have the same position, and the former shows the proper numerical relations. Doubs has about twice as many remarkable personages as it would be expected to have from M. Odin's table. The same is true of Jura, Var, and Aisne, while the high position of Meurthe is prob- ably to be explained by the fact that M. Odin combines Meurthe- et-Moselle according to the present usage. On the other hand, Calvados, Indre-et-Loire, Aube, Oise, Loir-et-Cher, and some other THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT 175 Departments ■zt ?: a -J Departments r ; K ' t- z ,- 5 5. E = = < Seine Bouches-du-Rh8ne Doubs . . Cote-d'Or . Rh8ne . . Seine-et-Oise Meurthe . . Vaucluse Herault . . Jura . . . Loiret . . Gard . . . Marne Var . . . Haute-Marne Seine-Inferieure Calvados . . Haute-Garonne Aisne . . . Moselle . . Eure-et-Loir Basses-Alpes Somme . . Ille-et-Vilaine Bas-Rhin Ardennes . Yonne . . Indre-et-Loire Ain . . . Gironde . . Aube . . . Isere . . . Seine-et-Marne Meuse Oise . . , Aude . . , Tarn-et-Garonne Pas-de-Calais Haut-Rhin . Haute-Saone Finistire Manche . . C h aren te-Inf^rieure 69 31 26 25 24 19 17 15 IS 14 13 13 II II II 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 2327 71 54 44 173 80 70 69 58 63 47 63 42 44 41 119 91 72 72 80 49 21 90 81 123 59 48 50 60 57 42 69 57 51 68 45 65 1 01 109 64 81 100 66 81 23 22 63 31 25 50 57 19 27 45 32 58 17 43 25 35 21 25 16 16 25 20 40 20 17 21 13 39 24 19 20 17 19 25 26 3° 41 13 24 21 24 Orne . . . Aveyron . . Vosges . . . Drome . Lot-et-Garonne Haute- Vienna Maine-et-Loire Hautes-Alpes Correze . . Puy-de-D6me Sa6ne-et-Loire Eure . . . Cantal . . . Loir-et-Cher . Pyr^nees-Orientales Ard^che . . Xievre Vienne . . . Basses-Pyr^n^es Deux-Sivres . Indre Lot Nord Tarn Loire Gers . Loire-Inferieure Haute-Loire Dordogne . . Hautes-Pyrenees Sarthe . Allier . Vendee . Mayenne Loz^re Landes . Morbihan Ari^ge . C6tes-du-Nord Cher Creuse . Charente 73 42 68 47 65 53 67 23 52 74 63 71 46 38 40 64 44 41 59 51 38 55 181 60 87 50 68 60 53 54 75 42 51 70 27 31 66 53 88 38 SO 61 1 Where several departments have the same number they are arranged in the descending order of the decimals of M. Jacoby's table. 1/6 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II departments fall below their quota. But most of the other high- grade departments correspond as nearly in the two tables as could reasonably be expected. At the other end of the scale, Charente, Cher, Loz^re, Mayenne, -AUier, and a few others fall far below in M. Jacoby's table, while the Hautes-Pyr6n6es and Haute-Loire are in excess. Some of these differences may be explainable, but this would require special researches. These comparisons, though interesting in themselves, do not di- rectly bear upon M. Jacoby's contention. This can be tested only by a comparison of the figures in the three columns of his table with one another. He does not specially claim that density of population alone determines the degree of fecundity, but only that it does so when taken in connection with the proportion of urban population. If we consider the first of these factors by itself we shall see how far it falls short of doing so. If we take the case of the department of the Seine, 98 per cent of which is concentrated in the city of Paris, we see how enormously greater this density is than the relative fecundity, great as that also is. If the mean per 100,000 is about 9 eminent personages, its fecundity is between eight and nine times that of the mean. Its density is 2327 and that of Rh6ne is 173. The former is therefore nearly thirteen times greater than that.' But the average density is less than 100, and exclusive of Paris it is much less ; therefore the density of this one department is anywhere from three to five times as great as the theory would require, and it ought to have produced 200 or 300 distinguished personages instead of 69 per 100,000 inhabitants. But perhaps this is not a fair illustration. The failure of the theory, however, is equally clear if we consider departments of low fecundity. As we go down the scale we see the fecundity gradually diminishing until it almost disappears. If we scan the second column we do not find this to be the case. Yet the theory would require it to be the case. But we find Nord, with a fecundity of only 4, occupying the second place in point of density. This is the most extreme case, but those of Pas-de-Calais, Manche, Orne, and especially C6tes-du-Nord, Loire, and Sarthe, are almost as striking. Instances of the opposite class, viz., where high fecundity goes along with low density, are also abun- dant, as in C6te-d'0r, Doubs, Loiret, Marne, and Basses-Alpes. In fact, the figures for the density scarcely diminish at all in passing Ch. IX] THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT 177 from higher to lower fecundity. They even seem to increase toward the bottom of the scale. Let us next examine the percentage of urban population. Here we do see some diminution parallel with that of the fecundity. Paris is 98 per cent of the Seine and has much the largest fecundity. Bouches-du-Rh6ne with Marseilles and other cities making up 8 1 per cent comes second in point of productivity in great men. But here we meet a counter-fact in Doubs and C6te-d'0r with 23 and 22 per cent of urban population holding the third and fourth places in point of fertility of talent. Rh6ne, again, with Lyons to swell the percentage of urban population in a comparatively small department, restores the balance for a moment, but it is soon lost again, and the whole series becomes so irregular and fitful that all that can be said is that many of the departments of a low fecundity also have a small urban population. Still, Haut-Rhin, with a fecundity of 7, has a percentage of urban population of 4 1 ; Loire, with 4, a percentage of 40; and Cher, with only 2, a percentage of 27. But more remark- able still, and as puzzling in this case as in the preceding, is Nord, which, notwithstanding its great density of population, amounting to 18 1 inhabitants to the square kilometer, and notwithstanding its 54 per cent of urban population, produced only 4 men of talent for each 100,000 inhabitants during the entire eighteenth century ! M. Jacoby did not shut his eyes to these facts. His graphic dia- gram brought them out too plainly, but not more forcibly than does the table as I have rearranged it. His general comment upon the whole result is as follows : The reader perceives that the graphic view already proves, up to a certain point, the correctness of our idea and of the conclusions at which we arrived a priori. But, on the other hand, we must not allow ourselves to be deceived nor shut our eyes to the evidence. The agreement in the lines which express the conditions which we are analyzing ax^felt, it is true, more or less in their general direction, but these lines present at the same time a long series of devia- tions not in the least doubtful in particular cases. Evidently it could not be expected that questions as complex as that of the intensity of the energy of intellectual activity in its relation to conditions as multiplied as those that con- stitute civilization, could be expressed by a graphic figure so simple and exact that it would admit of neither deviation nor exception. But it must be admitted nevertheless that the graphic representation scarcely enables us Xo feel, to guess the relation between the conditions which form the object of our search, with- out giving out any positive indication with regard to it ; at least the exceptions 178 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II are so numerous, the deviations so great, that they render the general harmony of the lines completely illusory. Moreover these exceptions, these deviations also have their raison d'Sire, and therefore must have their meaning and their explanation. To say that they mask the general direction of the lines and hence the law that governs them, would be an error. These deviations break in the most positive and indubitable manner the parallelism of the lines, and thus constitute in the particular cases a direct refutation of the law that we have laid down.^ One might have supposed that M. Jacoby would have been con- tent to rest his case here, having shown by statistics that density of population doupled with the proportion of persons living in cities has some unknown relation to the amount of talent in a country, al- though he had scarcely advanced the subject beyond the popular intuitions with regard to it. But his faith in his theory, which he now admits to have been only a hypothesis, was too strong to permit him to abandon it, and he proceeds to discuss a great variety of as- pects of the question, especially the ethnological and the physical or climatological and even geological causes of the various deviations that his table and graphic . scheme present. He proceeds to make what he calls an ethnological grouping of the departments, which, he claims, satisfies the hypothesis. But it is not an ethnological group- ing at all. It seems to be nothing else than a wholly arbitrary grouping made with the express intention of satisfying it. By suc- cessive trials he was able to put together certain departments in such a way that the five groups thus formed would show a nearly parallel diminution in all three of the columns. The first group, for example, consists of the following departments : Seine, Bouches-du- Rhone, Doubs, Rh6ne, Cote-d'Or, Seine-et-Oise, Meurthe, Vaucluse, H^rault. Will any one claim that the inhabitants of Paris, Mar- seilles, Besan5on, Lyons, Dijon, Versailles, Nancy, Avignon, and Montpellier belong in any proper sense to any particular race.? But the departments in the other four groups, though more numer- ous, are even more widely scattered. The third group, for example, contains departments as different ethnologically as Finist^re and Haut-Rhin, while the fourth group contains the Pyrdndes-Orientales and Basses-Pyr^n^es in the extreme south and southwest, with a considerable Basque population, and Nord, with its Flemish admix- ture. This, surely, is forcing statistics with a vengeance. 1 Jacoby, op. cit., p. 539. Ch. IX] THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT 179 In Chapter IX of his book, while still insisting that the frequency of remarkable personages is in direct ratio to the density of popula- tion and to the proportion of urban population, he says that these two conditions are in direct relation with each other, and asks the question whether we may not conclude that they should be regarded the one as a function of the other, which would then be the inde- pendent variable, and he adds : Since the frequency of remarkable persons is in direct relation with both the conditions of population, it should be in direct relation with their product, and, designating the density of population by x, the percentage of urban population hy y, and the frequency of remarkable personages by u, we shall have for the expression of our law, no longer u =f{x,y), but u =f{xy'). He then proceeds to apply this formula to certain selected prov- inces, not wholly the recognized provinces of France, but corre- sponding in part to these, and finds that they conform to his alleged law. That this would not be true of all the provinces is evident, and it is difficult to see what real value all this has for those who simply want to know the truth. M. Odin, in discussing this singular proceeding, remarks : I will confine myself to pointing out the strange blunder {bivue) that the author commits when he multiplies the density of the population by the per- centage of urban population. It is not enough to discover an operation which permits us to attain a given result. It is also essential that its application be legitimate. But it evidently is not so in the present case. If we take a depart- ment with a total dense population but with a small urban population, by what right can we make the first compensate the second? What meaning has the density by itself in the theory of our author? None at all. It has no influence except as it comes from urban agglomerations. A very dense population living only in hamlets could not equal a less dense one grouped around an important center, although the product of the density by the percentage of population might be practically the same in the two cases. But if the density means noth- ing by itself how could it serve to correct the proportion of urban population? One fact makes it unnecessary to insist on the strangeness of supposing that when neither the density of population nor the amount of urban population furnishes the desired result, the combination of these two elements will do so. This is that, even admitting this arbitrary multiplication, it is impossible to dis- cover a general agreement between the definite figures obtained by the author and the number of remarkable men. It is, on the contrary, easy to show by numerous and striking examples taken at random that the law laid down by him is purely imaginary. In the first place, here is a series of departments which, although their population is distributed in a wholly different way, never- theless present almost the same fecundity in remarkable personages : i8o APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II Departments Density OF Population Percentage OF Urban Population Definite Index OF Civilization Relative Number of Remarkable Personages Hautes-Alpes Deux-S^vres Tarn . . . 23-47 50.70 60.36 86.67 180.68 lO.I I2.I 24-7 39-5 53-7 2.4 6.1 14.9 34.2 97.0 s-337 4-275 4-039 3-875 4-092 Nord Now, on the contrary here are other departments which, with an almost iden- tical distribution of population, differ entirely in their fecundity in men of mark : Departments Density OF Population Percentage OF Urban Population Definite Index OF Civilization Relative Number of Remarkable Personages Charente . . Basses-Pyrenees Eure-et-Loir Loiret 61-44 58.56 48-53 46-696 44.02 14-15 18.8 16.2 27.0 22.3 8-7 11-2 7-9 12.6 9.8 1.369 4-480 9-472 13.916 24.636 C6te-d'Or - . It would be easy to multiply examples. Those that I have given will suffice to astonish the reader as it does me that any one should have been able to maintain a theory so in contradiction to the facts. Even if these examples were the only ones that could be cited, they would be sufficient to refute the theory. A law that admits of such monstrous exceptions evidently cannot be true.^ It follows from all this that density of population, while doubtless a potent influence in civilization, is not in and of itself the real factor of the local environment that we are seeking — the true generator of men of genius. That factor is still to be found, but M. Odin has actually found it, and we have only to follow him to learn what it is. The true local environment is something much closer and more directly associated with the man of genius. It is also a much simpler phenomenon than any of those that have been so long and patiently sought for. This is another among numerous examples in which the truth is missed for no other reason than that it is so plain and patent that it is overlooked, despised, as it were. The human mind wants obscure, remote, recondite .solutions.^ Simple, 1 Odin, op. cit., pp. 246-248. Ch. IX] THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT i8l commonplace explanations do not satisfy it. As M. Odin says in the paragraph that immediately follows the one last quoted: In fact, M. Jacoby had a much more simple and effective means of determin- ing the relation that may exist between the distribution of the population and the fecundity in great men, a means so simple in reality that we can scarcely conceive of his not thinking of it. Instead of resorting to such subtle oper- ations, he would have needed only to inquire how many remarkable personages were born in the large cities, how many in the small cities, and how many in the country. The enigma would have been solved at one stroke, and without any possible dispute. There is a wide-spread belief that great men are nearly all born in the country. Bagehot is claimed to have said: "Very few great men have issued from the exhausted soil of a metropolis," •* and Richter declared that "no poet is ever born in a capital."^ Gid- dings says: " Genius is rarely born in the town."^ I have myself shared this view, based on a considerable number of examples that have come under my personal observation. Lombroso and Laschi claim to have " demonstrated that the greater number of geniuses, though they die in the cities, are born in the country." * One might cite a large number of statements to the same or similar effect,^ and M. Jacoby seems to be thoroughly imbued with it, notwithstanding the facts of his own compilation to the contrary. It would be easy, though somewhat laborious, to compile from his fourth chapter a series of tables that would bring out the true facts on this point. On account of the differences above pointed out between his facts and those compiled by M. Odin, they might reward this labor, but such comparisons as have already been made between them show such a general agreement that we naturally expect it to hold also in the present case. As a preparation for this most important part of his entire work, M. Odin drew up an elaborate table showing chiefly by half-century 1 Cf. Lombroso and Laschi, Le Crime politique, p. 158. See also Lombroso, L'Homme de genie, pp. 199 f£. ■^ So says Lombroso, but I find only this to justify it: " Let no poet suffer him- self to be bom or educated in a metropolis, but if possible, in a hamlet, at the highest in a village " (Life of Jean Paul F. Richter together with his Autobiography. Trans- lated from the German, London, 1845, Vol. I, p. 22, i.e., in the Autobiography). 8 Principles of Sociology, p. 347. * Le Crime politique, etc., p. 157. 5 Cf. de Candolle, op. cit., p. 380; Coste, La Sociologie objective, Paris, 1899, p. 13 ; Dallemagrie, Degenerescence individuelle et D^generescence collective, Bru- xelles, 1897, p. 7. I82 APiPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II periods the exact places of birth of all the modern French men of letters. The periods are shown in columns and the departments are arranged in alphabetical order, the cities in each department standing over them. The lists of cities are always terminated by the chiteaux, where any are born in the chliteaux of any department, as is very frequently the case. The entry "other localities " which concludes the enumeration of the cities usually includes all bom in the rural districts or in very small villages. Wherever any of the men of letters are men of talent the figure for these is put in paren- theses by the side of the figure for the whole number. The last column gives the total for the entire period (1300-1825). This table enables any skeptical person to verify the general results of future tables. The next table shows the results by periods and provinces, distinguishing those born in cities from those born in other localities. Omitting the periods this table is as follows: Cities Merit Talent Country Merit Talent Normandy Picardy, Artois Provence Lyonnais Lorraine South Languedoc Orleanais Brittany ... West Guyenne Touraine, Anjou, Maine . . . Burgundy . . French Switzerland East Guyenne Champagne I.sle of France, exclusive of Paris Auvergne, Limousin, Marche Saintonge, Poitou Franche-Comte Berry, Nivernais, Bourbonnais . Savoy, Dauphin^ French Belgium Gascony . . North Languedoc 259 238 203 148 145 140 137 134 121 120 120 119 117 116 112 98 98 94 71 68 56 32 II 46 32 28 26 19 19 28 30 18 22 20 27 15 17 23 19 16 21 17 19 2 7 I I2S 125 8S 23 89 44 47 40 41 69 S9 35 45 52 106 32 38 87 28 51 24 23 26 24 33 22 4 10 II 12 S 7 10 9 9 II 12 II 8 4 12 3 12 I 7 4 Ch. IX] THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT 183 This table shows how much truth there is in the popular belief that great men are usually born in the country. With a single exception, and that the one that yielded the smallest number, the cities of every province yielded a larger number of men of letters than the country. In most cases it is more than double. In two provinces, Franche-Comte and Isle of France, the difference is not very great. For the first of these the reason is not clear, but for the second it is obviously due to the influence of the metropolis, the principal city being Versailles, and a great part of the region consisting of suburbs, which were counted as country, although to all intents and purposes they are parts of Paris. It is clear then that it is not so much the general density of the population of a province as some peculiar influence which a city exerts that raises the productivity in great men, while life in rural districts and in small villages tends strongly to diminish this productivity. The same truth is brought out with equal force when the facts are shown by regions instead of provinces, as in the following table : North. Northeast Southeast North Center, exclusive of Paris Northwest South Center Southwest .... . . . Cities Merit Talent 553 478 422 365 352 317 270 80 87 67 68 68 62 40 Country Merit Talent 274 270 206 205 147 83 109 58 40 49 35 19 15 25 Here there is no region in which the country-born at all approach the city-born. In four of them the latter are more than double the number of the former, and in one, the South Center, they are nearly four times as many. In the other three they are somewhat less than double. As in all previous cases the results for the larger areas are more uniform, ahd the larger irregularities are smoothed off. M. Odin next gives a curious table of the men of letters born in chateaux. The importance of this to our subject will become more 1 84 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II apparent as we proceed, and I will reproduce the table here. As the periods form an essential feature in this case, they will be shown as he has drawn them up. Merit Talent Fbriods Number Annual AVERAGE Per Cent OF Total Number Annual Average Per Cent OF Total 1 300-1 500. I50I-I550. 1 551-1600 . I60I-I650 . I65I-I700. I70I-I725. 1 726-1 750 . I75I-I776. I777-I800 . I80I-I825 . 15 17 18 '5 14 7 4 14 9 4 0.075 0.34 0.36 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.16 0.56 0.36 0.16 4.1 3-6 2-3 2.2 1-7 0.7 2.1 1.4 0.4 3 6 8 S 7 3 2 3 2 I 0.015 0.12 0.16 O.IO 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.04 5-2 7-4 II.O 3-3 51 3-8 2.0 2-3 2.0 0.7 Total . "7 2.0 40 3-8 It is certainly surprising that 117 persons of distinction from a literary point of view, or two per' cent of all the men of letters of France, should have been born in chateaux. Forty of these were men of talent, forming nearly four per cent of all of that grade. Both these facts will find their explanation at a later stage in the discussion. In the tables by provinces and by regions only the actual number born in cities and in the country are shown. The results are suffi- ciently remarkable, but they do not by any means afford a fair test of the real effect of city life in the development of genius. This is because for any considerable area the city population falls much below that of the country. This is true even for departments, and M. Odin has prepared a table of these, showing in addition to the facts shown in the other tables the number per 100,000 inhabitants. This brings out the real difference between urban and rural fecun- dity in men of letters. The following is the table : Ch. IX] THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT 185 Comparative Table by Departments of France of City and Country in Men of Letters Departments Cities Country Number Number Number PER 100,000 Number PER 100,000 Inhabitants Inhabitants 1344 243 12 15 90 243 33 II 28 187 24 II 39 156 34 10 55 145 18 10 71 142 20 8 51 '34 26 17 78 132 13 5 27 123 4 2 38 119 19 8 135 118 13 7 66 118 5 I 36 II2>^ 23 10 42 III 13 3 65 108 17 8 28 108 8 4 80 107 45 12 34 106 30 8 50 104 45 12 49 102 15 7 47 102 12 5 35 100 17 9 30 97 14 4 22 96 28 12 125 93 26 6 28 93 4 2 34 92 23 8 32 89 8 4 40 87 18 5 30 86 26 6 59 85 23 6 48 84 20 8 15 83 23 8 5' 82 21 5 122 80 26 20 18 78 27 10 14 78 II 5 18 - 75 6 3 17 74 5 2 18 72 22 9 Seine C6te-d'Or. . . . Haute-Mame . . Oise . . . . Doubs Loiret Vaucluse . . . . Haute-Garonne . . Cher Eure-et-Loir . . . Rhone lUe-et-Vilaine . . Indre-et-Loire . . Isire H^rault . . . . Loir-et-Cher . . . Calvados . . . . Aisne Seine-et-Oise . . Meurthe-et-Moselle Maine Aube Sarthe Ardennes . . . . Seine-Inferieure Haute-Vienne . . Yonne Vienne Maine-et-Loire . . Sa&ne-et-Loire . . Somme . . . . Gard Ain Pas-de-Calais . . Bouches-du-Rh6ne Jura Corrize . . . . Allier . . . Charente .... Mense 1 86 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II Departments Cities COUNTRV Number Number PER 100,000 Inhabitants Number PER 100,000 Inhabitants Seine-et-Marne . . Puy-de-D6me . Indre Tarn Ardeche .... Manche .... Lot-et-Garonne Charente-Inferieure Gironde .... Basses-Pyrenees . Lot Ome Mayenne .... Creuse Dr6me Nord Eure Aude Finistere . . . Deux-Sevres . . . Cantal Basses-Alpes . . Pyrenees-Orientales Loire . . . . Var Aveyron . . . Haute-Sa6ne . . Vosges .... Tam-et-Garonne . Morbihan .... Niivre Hautes-Pyren^es . Loire-Inferieure Ari^ge Savoie C8tes-du-Nord . . Hautes-Alpes . . Lozere Corsica . . . . Nice Haute-Loire . . . Gers 20 41 17 24 5 25 16 32 63 20 12 14 14 5 II 72 15 20 25 10 10 8 7 13 19 12 s 10 16 13 9 4 23 3 12 7 3 2 4 3 4 3 71 69 68 65 62 >^ 61 59 58 57 57 57 56 56 55>^ 55 54 50 54 51 5° 50 47 47 46 43 43 42 42 41 36 32 31 27 27 26 26 21 20 20 16 15 '3 15 9 6 13 16 28 II 10 II 7 6 20 14 3 15 23 21 4 10 7 5 12 3 10 19 13 19 18 4 6 12 I 9 6 16 10 5' 6 I 2 4 6 2 3 6 6 6 4 3 3 2 2 5 5 I 7 4 6 2 3 3 2>^ 10 3 4 8 4 7 7 2 2 6 I 3 3 3 2 5 5 I 5 z S Ch. IX] THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT 187 M. Odin in his table arranged the departments simply in geo- graphical order. This makes it difficult to study. I have rearranged them in the descending order of the number per 100,000 inhabitants born in cities, and where this number is the same for two or more departments, then in the same order for those born in the country. By letting the eye run down the second column and comparing it with the fourth a clear idea is gained of the relations between the two. The result of comparing the first and third columns giving the absolute number of each class born in each department is less significant, but important lessons can be drawn from its irregu- larity. But the great lesson is derived from a comparison of the second and fourth columns. The two tables (pp. 182 and 183) giving the absolute number by provinces and by regions showed that the fecundity of cities was about twice as great as that of the country. We now see how misleading this is, and what a mis- take it would be to infer from it that the influence of the city is only about twice as favorable as that of the country in the pro- duction of men of eminence. The merest inspection shows that it is generally many times as great. To arrive at the average we have only to foot the two columns and divide the sum of the second column by that of the fourth. Or we may divide these sums by 8 2, the number of departments, which gives the average in each case per 100,000 of population, and then divide the average for the cities by that for the country. The result is of course the same, i.e., nearly 13 (exactly 12.77). This means that on an average the cities of France have produced nearly thirteen times as many eminent authors for the same number of inhabitants as the rural districts. The average of the former is TJ and of the latter. 6 for all depart- ments per 100,000 population. This result is contrary to all theories and to the popular view,- and it could only have been reached by such a prolonged and exhaustive investigation as that which M. Odin has conducted. It now begins to be apparent what the local environment is and how it operates in the production of great men. This is still more clearly brought out by a special study of Paris in comparison with other cities and with the country. M. Odin has drawn up a table by twenty-five-year periods to show this. The whole number of men l88 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II of letters, as shown in his extended list, that were bom in Paris is 1 341. The number born in other chief cities is 2757. The number born in all other localities exclusive of chiteaux is 1294, or less than the number for Paris alone. He gives a column for the num- ber relative to the population for each of these classes, i.e., what the whole number in France would have been if the whole country had produced the same number for the same population as each class actually produced. The result is that if all France had the same relative fecundity in men of letters as Paris, it would have pro- duced 53,640 instead of 6382 ; if it had the same fecundity as the other chief cities, it would have produced 22,060 ; but if it had only the same fecundity as the rural districts, the total output would have been 1522. Fecundity in eminent persons seems then to be intimately con- nected with cities, and we have made one step toward its full explanation. It will be remembered that in all cases it is the place of birth that is considered, irrespective of all movements from place to place during life. At first sight this may seem to be an inadequate criterion. The case would obviously be greatly strengthened if the place where men did their chief work were taken instead of merely the place of their birth. Lombroso is undoubtedly right when he says that great numbers born in the country repair to the city, do their life-work there, and die there .^ But Lombroso, like so many others, was led by this into the error that most great geniuses are born in the country. He says that their appearance in so great numbers in the cities leads to the belief that they are all born there. This is exactly the opposite of the truth. There is no popular belief that great men are mostly born in cities, but there is, as he himself shows, a wide-spread belief that they are mostly born in the coun- try and find their way to the cities. The comparatively small num- ber who really do this produces a strong impression on the minds of persons acquainted with such facts. A few examples, as I know from my own experience, suffice to create this impression. We have no way of controlling our judgments in such matters. The much larger number born in cities are not brought to our attention. When this is the case the biographies are silent with regard to it. 1 Lombroso and Laschi, Le Crime politique, etc., pp. 157-158. Ch. IX] THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT 189 It is the It is the old fallacy that we are constantly meeting with exceptions that strike us and we ignore the rule. The question narrows down then, at least for the present, to a study of cities. Departments, provinces, regions, are vague desig- nations, and their study fails to afford a clear grasp of the condi- tions. The following table of the chief cities of France and their fecundity in men of letters will instruct us in this respect : Cities of France that have produced Three or More Men of Letters of Merit or of Talent Cities Merit Talent Cities Merit Talent Paris 1341 129 28s 22 Langres 23 21 2 Lyon . . Arras . 5 Rouen . 99 18 Beauvais 21 5 Geneva . 91 21 Li^ge . 21 Toulouse 76 73 10 15 Nantes Blois . 21 20 6 Dijon 4 Marseille 67 12 Poitiers 20 3 Bordeaux 63 4 Saint-Malo . . 20 5 Orleans . 62 II Auxerre . . 19 3 Montpellier SI 6 La Rochelle . . 18 3 Caen . . 5° 9 Lausanne . . 18 4 Aix 45 6 Mons .... 18 2 Rennes . 41 10 Riom .... 18 3 Besan9on 40 12 Clermont-Ferrand 17 6 Metz . . 40 8 Douai . . . 15 2 Nancy 35 6 Moulins . . 15 3 Nimes . 35 5 Saint-Quentin . 15 3 Versailles 35 7 Valenciennes . 15 3 Avignon . 33 6 Le Havre . . 14 6 Reims 33 8 Angouleme . . I3I 41 Amiens . 31 6 Beziers 13 2 Angers . 30 6 Laval .... 13 2 Tours 30 5 Sedan .... 13 — Chartres . 29 9 Vienne . . 13 I Grenoble 28 8 Boulogne-sur-Mer 12 3 Troyes . 28 3 Castres . . . 12 2 LUle . . 27 4 Issoudun . . 12 2 Limoges . 26 5 Abbeville . . II I Bourges . 25 6 Bayeux . . II 3 Le Mans 24 4 Quimper . . . II 2 1 Including one born in the chateau. I go APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II Cities Toulon . Agen Alen9on Aries Bayonne Bourg-en-Bresse Brive-la-Gaillarde Cambrai Chalon-sur-Saone Dieppe . Lorient . Loudun Saumur Sens Vire . Albi . Brest Cahors Carpentras Compiegne Laon . . Macon . . Namur . Uzes Verdun-sur-Meuse Autun Carcassonne . Castelnaudary Chalons-sur-Marne Chambery . Niort . . Pontoise Salnt-Omer Soissons . Bar-le-duc Coutances . Montbrison Montdidier Perpignan . Saintes . . Toul . . Apt . . . Baume-les-Dames II 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 lO lO 10 10 10 10 10 9 9. 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 Talent Cities Beaune .... ChStillon-sur-Seine Fontainebleau . Fontenay-le-Comte Lun^ville . . . Montbeliard . . Neuchatel Nevers . Pau Perigueux Peronne Rodez . Vend&me Villefranche-sur-Sa6ne Aurillac B(^thune Chaumont Clermont-en-Beauvoisis Cognac Dole . Etampes Evreux . Lisieux . Mezi^res Millau . Montargis , Pont-Audemer Saint-Claude . Saint-fitienne Semur Tournay Valence Alais Aubusson Bar-sur-Aube . Bergerac . . Chateauroux . Cherbourg Digne . . . DouUens . . Dreux . . . Dunkerque Fribourg . . Merit 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 61 6 6 6 6 6 S S 5 5 Si 5 S S S S 5 5 5 5 5 S S S 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 Including one born in the chtlteau. Ch. IX] THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT 191 Cities Merit Talent Cities Le Puy . . . Loches . . . Lons-le-Saunier Meaux . . . Melun . . . Mont^limar . Poligny . . . Provins Saint-Brieuc . Saint-Flour Saint-L& . . Sarlat . . . Senlls . ■ . Tulle . . . Valognes . . Villeneuve-sur-Lot Vitre . . . Ajaccio . . Avallon . , Avranches Berney . . . Cliateaudun , Condom Dax . . Dinan Dinant Draguinan Falaise . Figeac . Grasse . Gray . . La Fl^che Mauleon Mirecourt Montreuil-sur-Mer Narbonne . Neuf chateau Orange . Pithlviers Pontarlier Rethel . . Rochefort . Saint-Denis St.-Jean-d'Angely Toumon Vitry-le-Franyois 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 ,3 3 This list does not of course include all the larger cities of France. Quite as large a number, some of them larger places than certain of these, have produced less than three men of letters. On the other hand, no less than thirty-seven places so small that they have not been included among the' cities, but figure in the preceding tables as " country," a term used merely for brevity and convenience, have produced three or more men of letters. These small towns and villages all of course have names, and some of them, as Saint- Germain-en-Laye, Saint-Cloud, Tarascon, etc., are more or less celebrated. On the next page is the table of these in the same form as the last : Four of those born at Saint-Germain-en-Laye were born in the chateau, two of whom were men of talent, and one of those born at Saint-Cloud was born in the chateau. In order to bring ouf the general result in the clearest possible manner M. Odin has introduced a map of France by departments, 192 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II Smaller Towns of France that have produced Three or More Men of Letters of Merit or of Talent Towns Merit Talent Towns Merit Talent Salins . . . II 4 Ham . . 3 2 Noyon ... Amboise ... 8 7 2 2 Hennebont . . Hesdin . 3 3 I Saint-Germain-en-Laye Granville ... 7 5 3 2 Le Bignon . . Montbard . . 3 3 I I Guise . . . 5 I Pesmes . . . 3 — Saint-Remy . . . . Villeneuve-de-Berg . Cavaillon . . 5 5 4 I 3 Pezenas . . . Riez . . . Saint-Cloud 3 3 3 I I Landerneau . . Meulan 4 4 — Saint-Fargeau Saint-Geniez . 3 3 — Romans . . . . 4 I Saint-Mihiel 3 I Saulieu 4 — Saint-Nicolas . 3 — Arnay-le-Duc . . . Bagnols Calais 3 3 3 I I I Tarascon . . Torigni . . . . Tournus . 3 3 3 I I Charleville . . 3 I Triancourt . . . . 3 Frejus . . . . . Grenade ... 3 3 2 I Varennes .... 3 using as before different colors to indicate degrees of fecundity per 100,000 inhabitants, but distinguishing the fecundity of the cities from that of the rest of the area of the departments. This he has accomphshed by placing a circular spot in the center of each depart- ment having the color required for the fecundity of the cities. As this always stands upon the general color for the rest of the depart- ment it contrasts sharply with the latter and affords a clear graphic view of the difference. Nothing could be simpler or more effective., A comparison of this map with the other one by departments, but in which the fecundity is shown for the whole population, irrespec- tive of the cities and their superiority to the country, is in the high- est degree instructive. Curiously enough, jn this map, the sole purpose of which is to show 'the influence of cities in the production of men of letters, M. Odin has omitted to give the chief city of each department.' In reproducing it, therefore, as Plate IV, I have introduced this feature, which I think all will admit to be a great improvement. This map. Uur.'cuT o! NIsn of Letters per ICO. COO inhatitants 4 or leos fron to u 9 " 12 " 13" 19 " 20" -^2 ^J ■■ 43"lO0 100 and upwards OTH LOCALITIES Platk 1\'. I^I'M"' showin- t ■■iindit\- (il tlif Irlian and Rural I'opiilatiiin \Icii ul Letters Ch. IX] THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT 193 therefore, and the first one, Plate I, now agree except in the one leading respect for which this one is introduced, and they may be profitably compared. In fact, such a comparison is needed to bring out in the fullest light the true influence of centers of population in the production of talented writers. I also reproduce as Plate V the graphic representation of the results of this table as furnished by M. Odin, which may be studied to advantage in connection with the map. Any one at all acquainted with the cities of France, or who will take the trouble to look up their population, will perceive that their fecundity does not by any means depend upon their size. The first two, Paris and Lyons, do, indeed, lead in both population and fecundity, but Rouen with 112,000 inhabitants greatly exceeds Marseilles with 404,000, and Toulouse with 150,000 and even Dijon with only 65,000 outrank the metropolis of the Midi in literary productivity. And what shall we say of Saint-fitienne with 133,000 population which has produced only five men of letters per 100,000.'' Then there are large cities like Roubaix with 115,000 and Nice with 88,000, which, from their absence in the table, appear to have produced less than three to the 100,000. Look again at the position in the table of such cities as Reims, Lille, Lifege, Nantes, Toulon, and Havre, all with over 100,000 inhabitants. Compare these with that of Dijon, Orleans, Mont- pellier, Caen, Aix, the last with only 28,000 population. It is evi- dent that the dynamic density is something very different from the material density, something more than M. Durkheim contemplated in defining these terms. The dynamic influence is not density at all. It is not the friction of mind upon mind. _It is rather the co n- tact of mind with things, with the kind of__things_t_h^^^ Sharpen it, such as some citks afford and others do not. M. Odin in discussing this table says : If now we examine more closely the cities that figure in our table, especially those that are distinguished by an especially high fecundity, we recognize that they are for the most part localities which differ from the others less by their size than by a group of properties of which the following appear to be the chief : I. Usually these cities have been centers of pohtical, ecclesiastical, or judi- ciary administration, which confirms what we have previously stated relative to the influence exerted by the political and administrative environment. 194 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II 2. These cities have furnished particularly numerous opportunities for culti- vating the acquaintance of intelligent and scholarly men, owing to the presence of writers, savants, distinguished artists, a numerous educated clergy, a wealthy nobility devoted to letters, etc. 3. They have afforded important public intellectual resources, such as higher institutions of learning, libraries, museums, book-stores, publishing houses, etc. 4. Finally they have presented, relatively to the other cities, a larger amount of wealth, or at least a greater proportion of wealthy or well-to-do f amilies.i These conditions remind us of a number of da Candolle's " favor- able causes," and although M. Odin accuses de Candolle of "glori- fying privilege," they really amount, taken together, to a series of special privileges. What they are at bottom is simply so many special opportunities. We can now better interpret the facts that have been brought out relative to the fecundity of chateaux. We may look upon a chiteau as a diminutive city containing most of the dynamic qualities of those cities most favorable to the production of literary men. The " density " is very small. The whole number of persons, including the retinue of servants, the mechanics, and the laborers, to be found in a chateau and the buildings attached to it, although it might amount in some cases to several hundred or even a thousand, would certainly make a small city. But the num- ber of persons of culture, including instructors, living in any chiteau is very much less. The one at Saint-Germain-en-Laye has pro- duced three men of merit and two of talent. This would probably be at the rate of 200 or 300, perhaps 1000 per 100,000. This astonishing result is due to the fact that a chateau, especially one in the suburbs of Paris, affords nearly every conceivable opportunity for its inmates to distinguish themselves. Its productivity is limited only by the conditions of heredity, i.e., by the actual amount of genius possessed by its occupants. This would realize Galton's idea that the only geniuses in the world are those who have actually attained eminence, i.e., of the identity of fame and genius. Where all possible opportunity accompanies genius this theory is true, and the number of eminent persons is a just measure of the amount of genius actually existing. But the present case clearly shows how enormously this would exceed the actual condition of things. It simply indicates what the factor opportunity is. 1 Odin, op. cit., pp. 511-512. 245 240 235 230 225 220 215 210 205 200 193 190 185 180 175 170 165 160 155 ISO 145 140 135 130 • 125 120 I 15 110 105 100 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 ~ — ' — — — — — — J -4 -<— ~-~~Men of letters born in chief cities " " other localities Average of the men of letters born in the departments After Odin "J ~ 1 ~ ~ ^p "" t~ ^ L ' ~ r ' T ~ T J ~ Y " — \ i \ 1 ^ t ~ ^■ 1 t t " t I " J \ I- ^ - J^ , V i T J / \ V i 2 u- / A T / \ \ \ / L " « n I " / y\ \ 7" \- t / T f ' T f \ / ^ t i ~ / ' r , ^\ / V t T ^ / \ w -< T \l A / i / / \ \ \ r tiic / , V / ii / \ / \ V L. -/ V / H / \ \ , \ 1/ V T \ / — ^ 1 y \, u / ir 1 i \ / ^ / 1 V / ^ 7 lZj _/ , I / ^ \ \, y ix T 1 ' .-.J / \ \ jf w T-+ T / , / 1 1 ^y , / \ t /i 1 / / \l-\ f A '\ ^i !- — — — A f- L /- — — — — — — — — — — z" — 1 ' M — — — — — \ \ — — — — — — — = = — — ^ ^^ — y . -^v/^ E= = =: ~. — — ' ■^^ -- " '*x^ i^ ^. ^^' -^ ^^ — --- --' 'f "^ :^ "^ ^ ^v ?^ i ,,' '..'■•' v ^,- __i: ^ / \ ^' ' \/ — 245 240 235 230 225 220 215 210 205 200 195 190 185 180 175 170 165 160 155 150 145 140 135 130 125 120 115 no 105 100 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 I' - s ? " 5- I I ° s i' '3 s i- ? 2; 5- I 5- E^ s J !■ ; i § 2. 5 9 c . Plate V. Chart showing the Relative Fecundity of the Urban and Rural Population of France in Men of Letters Ch. IX] THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT 195 Another illustration of the same class is furnished by the statis- tics of women of letters. M. Odin's tables always include women, but of course the number is small. With his accustomed thorough- ness, he has drawn up a comparative table of men and women, showing the number of each born in Paris, in other chief cities, in all other localities except chateaux, and in chateaux, with the per- centage that each of these items is of the total of each sex. This table is as follows : Men Women Place of Birth Number Per Cent OF Men Number Per Cent OF Women Paris 1229 2646 1265 93 23-5 50.6 24.2 1.8 112 III 29 14 42.1 41.7 10.9 5-3 Other large cities Rural districts, etc Chateaux Total 1 5233 266 We perceive first of all that nearly twice as large a proportion of women as of men are born in Paris. This is because in Paris as nowhere else there are opportunities for women to distinguish them- selves. In the rural districts and small towns the proportion of women is much less than half that of men, and for the converse reason that there are almost no opportunities in these for women to display their talents. For the chateaux, on the contrary, the number of women of letters born there relatively to the whole number is just three times as great as the number of men of letters relatively to the whole number. The explanation is the same in all three cases, viz., presence or absence of opportunities, or as M. Odin expresses it: The proportion of women of letters coming from each class of localities corresponds exactly to the chances that the women had to acquire a higher education. It is evident that the chances were relatively great in the chateaux, and to a less degree in Paris, while they vary greatly in other cities, and are practically nil at other localities.^ 1 This is the whole number born in Frenck territory to the year 1825 whose exact places of birth are known. 2 Odin, op. cit., pp. 519-520- 196 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II While on the subject of women of letters perhaps it is as well to give M. Odin's table of them by periods throughout modern times, as follows: Periods Number Merit Annual Average Per Cent OF Total 1 300-1 500 1501-1550 1551-1600 1601-1650 1 65 1 -1 700 170I-1725 1726-1750 1751-1775 I776-1800 180I-1830 Total 9 9 16 47 33 28 36 45 47 64 2 I 3 13 12 7 5 12 9 7 0.045 0.18 0.32 0.94 0.66 1. 12 1.44 1.80 1.88 213 2.9 2.1 31 7.0 5-1 6-5 5-7 6-3 6.8 4.8 334 71 5.2 1 Although, on account of the number whose exact place of birth was not known, the total in this table is considerably larger than in the preceding one, still M.Odin characterizes it as "derisoire," being only about one twentieth that of the men. Nevertheless, he does not agree with de CandoUe ^ that this inferiority is due to any essential deficiency- in the female mind. Another table which he gives, but which we need not reproduce, shows the different fields of literary activity in which women have engaged. As already re- marked, he includes the histrionic art among the different branches, and here he finds that they have furnished 29 per cent of the per- sons eminent in that branch. About one fourth of these were of the second grade, or women of talent. He might have added that in this one art at least women have actually excelled men. Women have also furnished 20 per cent of the prose writers of distinction. In other lines they fall much below. But M. Odin attributes this entirely to circumstances independent of their natural abilities, and he says that "other things equal there is no reason to suppose a priori that woman is naturally inferior to man in any branch of literature."^ 1 For women of talent the percentage of all persons of talent was 6.25. 2 De Candolle. op. cit., pp. 270-272. ' Odin, op. cit., p. 432. Ch. IX] THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT 197 It may be said that much that is true for French men of letters would not be true for other countries, and would be still less true for other kinds of genius, as, for example, art and science. It must be admitted that such statements cannot be disproved in the present state of the investigation of these questions, but neither can they be proved. This is because there has been no study of the facts at all comparable to that of M. Odin for French men of letters. Galton and de CandoUe confined themselves to men of science. Although they both estimate the whole number of scientific men to have been from 5000 to 16,000, they each deal with a comparatively small number, less than 200. In his Hereditary Genius the former pays very little attention to the birthplace of such men, often not giving it in his accounts of the different men of science. De CandoUe introduces a column for it in his table of the foreign members of the Paris Academy, but not for those of the Royal Society of London nor for those of the Berlin Academy. In running down the list it is easy to see that most of them were born in cities. Galton in his English Men of Science gives the birthplaces of the 100 savants that he deals with in that work. Of these 21 were born in London or its suburbs, 18 in other large cities, 21 in smaller towns, and 40 "elsewhere." He seems to think their geographical distribution important, and makes a kind of map plotting it over the country (pp. 19, 20). M. Jacoby's enumeration might be tabu- lated from this point of view, and this is what he ought to have done in the revised edition. A glance through it shows that great numbers were born in cities, but it would be unsafe to draw con- clusions from mere inspection. It seems probable that his "remark- able personages " do not widely differ in this respect from men of letters. We are obliged therefore to fall back again upon M. Odin's investigations. Although he was compelled to limit his chief re- searches to France and to literary men, still he made wide excur- sions into other fields and countries, and in an appendiK he has told us what he had been able to learn about men of letters of Italy, Spain, England, and Germany. In this he confines himself wholly to the highest class, viz., cases of acknowledged genius. Studying the birthplaces of this class, he finds a total for Italy of 55, 23 of 1 98 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II whom were born in seven cities, all of which are intellectual centers, as follows : Florence, 7 ; Venice, 4 ; Ferrara, 3 ; Naples, 3 ; Arezzo, 2 ; Pistoia, 2 ; Verona, 2. Many of the others were born at Bergamo, Mantua, Milan, Modena, Padua, Pavia, Reggio, etc. "We find here," he says, "that the theory according to which the rural districts are particularly adapted to the production of great men is a pure hypothesis devoid of any serious foundation." Of the 60 men of letters of genius in Spanish literature, 29 were born in the six cities of Madrid (i6), Seville (5), Alcala de Henares (2), Cordova (2), Grenada (2), Toledo (2), all of which except Cor- dova possess a university. The rest were in part born in the uni- versity towns of Barcelona, Lisbon, Salamanca, Saragossa, Valencia, and Valladolid. Of the 70 English literary geniuses of the highest order, 1 5 were born in London, 4 in Dublin, and 2 in Edinburgh. Others were born in Bristol, Cambridge, Glasgow, Liverpool, etc. In Germany the 71 highest had a somewhat different origin. Three were not born in Germany. One was born in a chateau. Of one the place of birth could not be determined. Most of the lead- ing cities have produced one or more, but none more than three. Berlin, Breslau, and Hannover count three each, Hanau and K5nigs- berg two each. Seventeen others produced one each. There would still remain to be accounted for a large number of whom M. Odin gives no details. Doubtless some of them were born in the country or in very obscure villages. At least the sources of the great authors of Germany are much more scattered than is the case for any other country, but the general law of the fecundity of great cities is not thereby invalidated. The Economic Environment. — It is very difficult to ascertain the economic standing of eminent men. The idea that those who have achieved great things have done so by virtue of inherent quali- ties that defy all external conditions is so ingrained in the human mind that biographers neglect to record certain of the most im- portant facts connected with their lives. If a great discoverer or inventor works ten years uninterruptedly and at last succeeds and astonishes the world, all this will be told in minutest detail without a word as to how he was fed, housed, and clothed during all this Ch. IX] THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 199 time that he was earning nothing. If a great author writes a book that costs him many years of patient unremunerative research, noth- ing will be said about how he was enabled to devote all these years to such a subject. The fact is that in every such case there must have been some kind of a fortune behind it all, or something equiva- lent to a fortune, such as a state annuity, emoluments granted to the nobility or the clergy, or some sinecure ofificial position, or at least a well-paid position that did not exhaust all of the man's energies. When we read of the great characters of antiquity we are apt to imagine that they were ordinary citizens of Greece or Rome, and ■ that any such who possessed the talent might be poets, sculptors, orators, philosophers, and writers. Nothing could be more false. The heroes of Homer were all men of immense wealth. They owned whole states and oxen (the circulating medium) and slaves unnumbered. A study of the economic condition of the philoso- phers, from Thales to Aristotle, would probably show that they were all men of wealth or else were in some way attached to kings and courts so as to be wholly above want. It was the same with the poets and artists. The sculptors were hired by the state to decorate the temples, and all were put in one way or another beyond the reach of want or of the necessity of earning a livelihood otherwise than by their art. ^schylus and Sophocles were gen- erals in the Athenian army and alternated between fighting and writing plays. Aristotle was the adviser of Philip and teacher of Alexander. It is scarcely told how Socrates and Plato could devote their lives to philosophy, but it is certain that they did not teach for a living. And so it was with all the sophists and stoics, one of the latter of whom was an emperor. Of the two great Sicilians, Archimedes and Empedocles, the former was attached to the court, and the latter was immensely rich. In medieval and more modern times it was not otherwise, but we are generally left in ignorance as to economic conditions. The older ones were all in the church, even Roger Bacon and Coper- nicus, and thus freed from material concerns. After universities were established most great discoverers were professors and carried on their investigations in connection with their professional duties. 200 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II Many, like Bacon, were of the nobility, others were high public officers, and still others belonged to the wealthy bourgeoisie. But if any one happened to be in limited circumstances, and still, owing to great talents and the favor of wealthy friends, happened to attain eminence, the biographical dictionaries record the fact of their indigence with great emphasis, but omit the series of happy accidents that really enabled them to succeed. It has therefore been found almost impossible to arrive at the facts of an economic char- acter in a sufficient number of cases to form a safe basis for statis- tical inquiry. M. Odin says : Whoever has had occasion to read a large number of biographies of men of letters, and of celebrated persons in general, has been able to convince himself that . . . every time that a remarkable man has sprung from a humble family — from what are called the working classes — the biographers take extra pains to acquaint us with the fact.^ It is, therefore, only in the case of men of the highest order, men of genius and fame, about whom a great deal has to be said, that details of this class can be found, and these are thrown in inci- dentally, being regarded as of no particular importance. De CandoUe was able to gather some information on this head with regard to the members of the great academies. Thus, of the lOO foreign associates of the Paris Academy he could make the following classification : Belonging to the nobility, English gentlemen, or of aristo- cratic families of old free cities or rich families . -41 Of the middle class 52 Of the working class .... .... . 7 Total .... 100 For a much smaller number of French savants he found the following proportions : Of noble or wealthy families 10, or 28 per cent Of the middle class 17, " 47 " " Of the working class 9, " 25 " " Total . 36, or 100 per cent He enumerates all these by name, and among them are Buffon, Antoine and Laurent Jussieu, Ampere, and Cuvier. 1 Odin, op. cit., pp. 536-537. Ch. IX] THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 201 In another list exclusively of the eighteenth century, containing 24 names, the following are the proportions : Of the wealthy or noble class 1 1 , or 46 per cent Of the middle class 8, " 33 " " Of the working class .... . . 5, " 21 " " Total ... ... 24, or 1 00 per cent Combining the last two lists we have : Of the wealthy or noble class . . . . 21, or 35 per cent Of the middle class 25, " 42 " " Of the working class .... . . . 14, " 23 " " Total 60, or 100 per cent' Galton in his English Men of Science (p. 22) gives some similar statistics, but they will be more in place in the next subsection. What he says of primogeniture (p. 33), however, properly belongs here. This is, that out of 99 eminent men of science, 22 were only sons and 26 were eldest sons, making 48, or practically half, who would inherit the fortunes of their parents. He says " that the elder sons have, on the whole, decided advantages of nurture over the younger sons. They are more likely to become possessed of inde- pendent means, and therefore able to follow the pursuits that ha\e most attracted their tastes." In de Candolle's statistics it may be assumed that the savants belonging to the middle class or bourgeoisie were at least well to do and exempt from the necessity of gaining a livelihood either by their science or by any other kind of occupation. From our present point of view, therefore, it becomes a comparison of the first two categories with the third. Or rather, we have only to consider the third cate- gory in its relation to the whole. In the first list it is 7 per cent, in the second 25, in the third 21, and in the last two combined 23. If we take into consideration the proportion which each of these categories forms of the total population of the world, we can readily see that the first yields by far the greatest proportion, being a com- paratively small class. The second is a much larger class, and therefore, while it has yielded a larger number of savants, its fecundity is much less than that of the first. As to the third, it represents the great bulk of the population, and as it has always 1 De Candolle, op. cit., pp. 272-279. 202 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part 11 yielded a much smaller absolute number of men of science, its relative fecundity is almost a negligible quantity. For those who hold that native genius is as frequent in one class as in another, these differences become a simple measure of the influence of the economic factor. For the reasons already given, M. Odin was compelled, in study- ing: the economic environment from his extensive tables, to confine himself to men of letters of talent. If the economic condition' of all the literary men of France throughout modern times could have been learned, their statistical presentation would have been a most interesting chapter. As it is, he has given us much food for reflec- tion. It will be. remembered that one of the four principal elements enumerated by him in the fecundity of cities was the greater wealth of some cities, or at least a higher proportion of wealthy or well-to- do families. This has a direct bearing on the present aspect of the question, and is no doubt a potent factor, but he does not follow it up and show to which of the cities it most especially applies. In making a special examination of the economic environment he con- fines himself to bringing out such facts as his data afford relative to the economic condition of the men of letters themselves. The difficulties that he encountered in this investigation he sets forth as follows : I have had great difficulty in determining in what economic conditions the youth of our men of letters was spent. The biographers, historians, and literary critics manifest in general only a very slight interest in questions of this class, and they usually do not even suspect that they can have any real importance. Just as people love to believe that genius has no need of instruction, so they devoutly imagine that it can develop, with more or less difficulty perhaps, under no matter what material conditions. How often, alas, the sad reality belies these naive theories ! ^ He was, however, able to ascertain with exactness the economic environment of 619 men of letters of talent. He divides them into two classes : (i) Those whose youth was spent in the absence of all material concern. This class may be designated by the term "rich," without thereby implying that there were not great differences in the degree of wealth and in social conditions generally. (2) Those whose youth was spent in poverty or economic insecurity. This 1 Odin, op. cit., p. 528. Ch. IX] THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 203 Periods Rich Poor I 300-1 500 1501-1550 1551-1600 1601-1650 1651-1700 1701-1725 1726-1750 i75i-'775 1 776-1800 1801-1S25 24 39 42 84 73 36 53 86 52 73 I 4 5 4 3 9 8 12 II Total 562 57 class may be designated by the term "poor," although, as in the other class, there were many degrees and kinds of poverty. The table by periods is then as follows : This table shows that what was true for men of science, as seen in de Can- dolle's tables, holds true for men of letters and for the entire history of literature. The column designated "poor" fairly represents the working class, and it will be ob- served that the fecundity of that class has been gradually increasing. In de Candolle's tables it amounted in most cases to over 20 per cent. For men of letters it is generally less, much so in the earlier periods, but in the last quarter of the eight- eenth century it was nearly 19 per cent, but this seems to have been an exceptional period. The average for the entire time is slightly more than 9 per cent, or about, one eleventh of the whole number of men of letters. It is, of course, very difficult to determine the proportion of the population in any country who would answer to the above designa- tion of "poor," and this has certainly diminished during modern times. De Candolle estimates that when France had a population of 36 million, which was in 1856, the working classes numbered 18 or 20 million. This estimate is probably much too low. The middle class, he says, is much less numerous, but he does not estimate it. As regards the wealthy class, he says that at the time of the French Revolution the nobility was estimated at 100,000. He thinks that the number of wealthy bourgeoisie would not exceed that. But these estimates do not include the families of such persons, and he counts about four dependent persons (women and children) to each noble or wealthy business man. This would make 500,000 of each class, or one' million, as belonging to the wealthy or well-to-do popu- lation. This would be less than 3 -per cent of the total*population. Commenting upon this he remarks : 204 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II If natural talent, if a pronounced taste for scientific research, were the sole causes that determine the career and success of men of science, there would have been infinitely more scientific men issuing from poor famihes than from other sources — certainly the number of savants from rich families would have been very small relative to the others — which has not been the case.^ M. Odin makes the following commentary upon his table : As we see, only the eleventh part of the men of letters of talent passed their youth under difficult economic conditions. This proportion, small as it is in itself, appears much more striking still when we try to represent to ourselves the numerical relation that must have existed for the entire population between well-to-do families and those who were not so. It is impossible of course to say exactly what the average proportion was for the whole modern epoch. But it is clear that we shall still remain far below the reality if we assume that the families of the second class were three or four times more numerous than those of the first. This means that by the sole fact of the economic conditions in the midst of which they grew up the children of families in easy circumstances had at least forty to fifty more chances of making themselves a name in letters than those who belonged to poor families or to families of insecure economic position ! ^ He has more to say under this head, but much of it applies so well to one or other of the environments that remain to be con- sidered that its introduction here would be an anticipation. One remark I cannot pass over. Cold and objective as is at all times his style and his treatise as a whole, he seems for once to have felt a touch of the fire that kindles in most minds when they find them- selves in the presence of a great hitherto undiscovered truth, and he half exclaims, " Genius is in things, not in man." ^ Here surely is historical materialism. Will those who defend that particular ism listen to it ? By the side of it all the other claims that have been made for that doctrine sink into insignificance. Tke Social Environment. — It was almost impossible to treat of the economic environment without working in facts that properly belong to the social environment. This is not because the two are not generically distinct, but because they so largely run parallel. It was, for example, more convenient for de Candolle to use the nobility, a social class, for his first category than to call it persons receiving large Hfe emoluments from the state, which was what he meant. But there are, especially in France during recent times, 1 De Candolle, op. cit., pp. 280-281. " Odin, op. cit., p. 529. ' Odin, op. cit., p. 560. Ch. IX] THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 205 many persons belonging to the nobility who receive scarcely any or no emoluments. It is so to a slight extent in other countries and has always been so in all countries. Still, for the earlier periods, this is a negligible quantity, and it is safe to assume that the no- bility is entirely exempt from material concerns. For other classes the social environment practically amounts to a classification of occupations. In Gallon's list of 96 persons to whom he addressed his questions in 1873 and discussed the answers in his English Men of Science, the social positions, professions, occupations, etc., are classified by him (p. 22) as follows : Noblemen and private gentlemen ... . . 9 Army and navy . . 6 Civil service 9 Subordinate officers . . . 3 Total government officials 18 Law .... ..II Medical . . 9 Clergy and ministers 6 Teachers 6 Architect .... I Secretary to an insurance office I Total professional men 34 Bankers 7 Merchants 21 Manufacturers . .... 15 Total business men 43 Farmers 2 Others I This makes a total showing of 107, but, as he explains, the same name recurs in 1 1 cases. It must be remembered that he addressed his inquiries only to persons whom he knew to have attained distinction in some branch of scientific research, so that all these men had pursued such scien- tific investigations in connection with and more or less independ- ently of their business, whatever that was. If he had not allowed the duplications of which he speaks, but had assigned each man to the position which seemed the characteristic one, we should be able to arrive at the percentages for the different occupations. As it is we can now only base it upon the whole number, 107, and this will 206 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II probably be sufficiently correct. The nobility would then appear to furnish 8.4 per cent, the public officers 16.8, the learned professions 3.2, the bourgeoisie 40, the farmers 1.9. Unless the person classed as " others " was a laboring man that class furnished none of these 96 men of science. The discussion that follows shows that Galton did not see the question at all as it presents itself in the light of the facts now under consideration. We must therefore again have recourse to M. Odin's investiga- tions, because he alone has grasped the full import of the problem and striven methodically to discover its solution. The first of the influences enumerated by him that affect the fecundity of cities in men of letters was, as will be remembered, that certain of them have long been centers of political, ecclesiastical, or judiciary administra- tion. This gives a certain social standing to a large number of persons, enabling them to achieve in lines distinct from their admin- istrative duties. In his special study of the social en\ironment (Chapter VIII) he confined himself, as in that of the economic environment, and probabl}' for similar reasons, to men of letters of talent. Of these he was able to determine in 636 cases the Social position and occupation of their parents. He gives a list of 328 different occupations arranged in the descending order of the num- ber in each. Where the same person had two occupations he counts each as J. More than half the occupations show only one person as following it. Many show only two, three, or four. Only fifteen occupations were followed by ten or more persons, and only seven by more than twenty. These last being the most important may be profitably reproduced here: Magistrates .... goj Lawyers 25!^ Noblemen .... 69^ Administrators ... 25 Merchants .... 40J Physicians . . .23 Gentlemen .... 32 Some of the lower ones are rather amusing. For example, there are four kings, i.e., the sons or daughters of these kings were talented writers. By the side of these stand equally four coopers and four jewelers, also' four engineers. One was a valet de chambre of a prince, another of a dauphin, and a third of a king. The reader is at a loss to -understand why the kings and dukes and viscounts Ch. IX] THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 207 and barons scattered through the list were not put with the nobles. Much of the classification seems arbitrary and duplicated. M. Odin says of this list : As will be seen, men of letters have issued from local environments that are very unlike, but in very different proportions. In order to be able to appreci- ate exactly the action which these environments have exerted, it is indispensable first of all to bring the multitude of occupations enumerated within certain natural categories. This will be almost always very easy ; the few cases in which one might hesitate are not of a kind sensibly to modify the general rela- tion among the categories. He proceeds to describe the five groups to which he reduces them, as follows : 1 . Nobles and officers : Nobility. 2. Magistrates and pubUc functionaries, " nobles de robe " and " notaires " who lived in a very similar social medium : Officials {tnagistrature). 3. Artists, lawyers, litterateurs, engineers, physicians, clergymen, etc.: Lib- eral professions. 4. Merchants, bankers, citizens (bourgeois'), proprietors, subordinate func- tionaries. For want of a more precise term he designates all these occupations by the general term Bourgeoisie. 5. Industrials, artisans, tillersof the soil {cultivateurs, laboureurs), concierges, servants, etc.: Manual laborers {maiii-d'ceuvre'). He was able to obtain all requisite data for 623 cases coming under these five heads, and he gives an interesting table by periods, showing the number of each class and the per cent that each class forms of the whole number. As the historical aspect is not as vital as the other aspects, we may omit it and give only the general results. These will take the following form : These figures speak for themselves. They show that considerably more than three quarters of the talented men of France have sprung from the no- bility, the government officials, and the liberal professions. The business class furnished less than 12 per cent and the laboring class less than 10. The differences in these and other respects between these results and those of Galton's table may be Social Classes Number Per Cent Nobility .... Government officials . . Liberal professions . Bourgeoisie . .... Manual laborers . . . 159.0 187.0 143-5 72.5 61.0 25-5 30.0 23.0 II.6 9.8 Total . 623.0 20S APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II explained by the fact that the latter deals with the eminent men themselves and not with their parents or families. Gallon's men were all living in 1873, while Odin's table only comes down to 1825, and there was great progress during that half century in the con- dition and character of the bourgeoisie. But the number dealt with by Galton is too small to form a reliable basis for a statistical investigation. But M. Odin was not content to stop here. In the social as in the economic environment the actual number that each class furnishes, or even the per cent that this number is of the whole number, gives a very misleading idea of the true relative fecundity of each class. This can be arrived at only when the proportion that each class forms of the population is taken into the account. This proportion for the five classes of the table is in the exact reverse order of their absolute fecundity. What then is their fecundity relative to population .'' This he shows in the last column of the next table, in which he also gives the number of men of letters of genius distinct from those of talent only. Social Classes Talen r ONLY Genius Number Relative Number Per Cent Number Per Cent TO Population Nobility Government officials Liberal professions . . . Bourgeoisie . . . Manual laborers 125.0 157-5 1 16.5 62.0 50.0 24-5 30.8 22.8 12. 1 9.8 34-0 29.5 27.0 10.5 II.O 26.3 24.1 9.4 9.8 159-0 62.0 24.0 7.0 0.8 Total 511.0 112. We perceive that the nobility, which furnished only 24.5 per cent of the men of talent, furnished 30.4 of the men of genius, while the public officers, who furnished 30.8 per cent of the men of talent, furnished only 26.3 per cent of the men of genius. The liberal pro- fessions yielded slightly more of the higher grade, the bourgeoisie somewhat less-, and the working-class exactly the same. These facts may not have great significance, though the superiority of the nobility was doubtless due to their more complete leisure. The last column is the one that should chiefly arrest our attention. The first Ch. IX] THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 209 question is how M. Odin arrived at the figures contained in it. Like de Candolle, he tries to estimate the relative number of each class. He says the estimates of the number of nobles have varied from one half of one per cent to two per cent. He considers the first too low and the last too high, and adopts as a basis of his calcu- lations the mean of these, or one per cent of the population. By the census of 1801 the population of France was over twenty-seven million, which would give the nobility two hundred and seventy thousand. Without professing to be exact, M. Odin estimates the number belonging to the working-classes at 80 per cent, the bourgeoisie at 10 per cent, the liberal professions at 6 per cent, and the public officials at 3 per cent. If then we divide the number furnished by each class by its percentage of the population, we have the relative fecundity of each class as expressed in the last column. The dis- proportions are so enormous that it makes very little difference whether the respective ratios to population are correct or not. They are approximately correct, and even if the percentage of the nobility were much greater or that of the laboring class much less, the results would be sufficiently striking. Assuming them to be correct, these figures show the relative chances that genius has in the several classes of making itself known. For example, a person born of the nobility has nearly two hundred times the chance to become eminent that one bom in the working-class has, assuming that the native genius is the same. For the bourgeoisie the chances are only one to twenty-three. The son of a noble has six and one half times the chance of the son of a physician or lawyer and two and one half times that of the son of a judge or procureur. Again we are brought back to the fundamental truth that is taught by all the facts, that the manifestation of genius is wholly a question of opportunity. Or as M. Odin himself expresses it : As regards the social environment, we have seen that certain strata of the population have been much more fruitful than others in remarkable literary men. Confining ourselves to the five social strata — nobility, administration, liberal professions, bourgeoisie, working-men — we have ascertained that the literary fecundity of each of them was in inverse ratio to its numerical impor- tance. What is specially striking is the prodigious superiority of the first three classes over the last two, and especially of the nobility over the hand workmen, 2IO APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II the first having had at least two hundred times as many chances as the second to give birth to men of letters of talent.^ In order to satisfy himself that France was not exceptional in this respect, M. Odin made extensive investigations into the conditions existing in other countries. Confining himself to men of genius, he obtained data for 39 cases in Italy, 28 in Spain, 61 in England, and 52 in Germany, and presented the results in the following table : Countries Nobility Public Officials Liberal Profes- sions Bourgeoi- sie Laboring Class Total Italy Spain England . . . Germany . . 22 16 7 4 9 9 6 17 22^ 6 7 2>^ 2>^ 6^ 39 28 61 52 Total . . . 59^ 24;^ 49 27 20 180 Per cent of total 33 14 27 15 II 100 In some respects these figures differ from those for France, especially in the case of England, where the liberal professions and the business men produced a much larger proportion, also to some extent in the case of Germany, the tendency being in the same direction. Taking all these countries together, however, and com- paring the percentages with those for men of genius in France, as shown in the fourth column of the last table, we find that the dif- ferences are not very great. For the nobility it is about the same : France, 30.4; other countries, 33. For public ofificers the differ- ence is large : France, 26.3 ; other countries, 14. For the liberal professions the deviation is the other way but much less : France, 24.1 ; other countries, 27. For the bourgeoisie the difference is considerable: France, 9.4; other countries, 15. For the working- class it is less : France, 9.8 ; other countries, 11. Allowance must also be made for the paucity of the data for other countries. But taking the first three classes together as constituting the leisure class or the class with the greatest intellectual stimulus and oppor- tunity, and the last two together as constituting the busy or toil- ing class with little time or opportunity, and comparing these two 1 Odin, op. cit., pp. 546-547. Ch. IX] THE EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 2 1 1 classes in connection with their numerical relations, we have the same general result — the enormous influence of the factor oppor- tunity. The local environment and the economic environment combine with the social environment in the production of this result. The Educational Environment. — The prevailing idea is that for the display of genius where it exists education is entirely unnecessary. Or rather it is maintained that a true genius will always educate himself as much as he needs, which is not thought to be very much, because genius is a substitute for education. Most geniuses seem to have little idea of the effect that their education has exerted on them. This is true of great discoverers and scientific men, as any one can see by reading the answers made by such men as recorded in Galton's English Men of Science. De Candolle, however, realized the value of education, and among the conditions to success that he enumerated is the following : 6. Primary and especially secondary and higher education well organized, independent of political parties or religious sects, tending to encourage research and to aid young men and professors in the pursuit of science. In considering the qualities possessed by certain cities of France tending to stimulate genius and in part explaining their literary fecundity, M. Odin says that "they have afforded important public intellectual resources, such as higher institutions of learning, libra- ries, museums, book-stores, and publishing houses." And compar- ing this with the other three conditions enumerated, he considers these as the ones that have exerted by far the most powerful immediate effect, and adds : We see that all the cities that have presented in a special degree influences of this class have also distinguished themselves by a remarkable fecundity in men of letters, while cities that have presented the other conditions and not these . . . have been relatively less fruitful in men of letters. But this is not all. We may go further and affirm that it is especially the cities possessing higher schools, and in particular universities or equivalent institutions, that have produced the most men of letters in proportion to their population. . It is impossible not to be struck by the rank occupied in this respect by such cities as Geneva, Orleans, Montpellier, Caen, Aix, to cite only a few of the most salient examples.* 1 Odin, op. cit., p. 513. 212 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II He should certainly have added Dijon and Besan5on. The fifteen university cities of France all show a high rate of literary produc- tivity, and stand near the head of the table on pages 1 89-191. They are: Paris, Lyons, Toulouse, Dijon, Marseilles-Aix, Bordeaux, Mont- pellier, Caen, Rennes, Besan9on, Nancy, Grenoble, Lille, Poitiers, Clermont-Ferrand. But these do not by any means represent the whole of the educational activity of France. There are all kinds of minor institutions, many of them highly active and efficient, and a thorough investigation of the French educational system would probably fully bear out M. Odin's statement. He further says : If we take all this into consideration, far from insisting upon unavoidable exceptions, we shall be astonished at the extraordinary fecundity which those cities show that have been during the last centuries the seat of higher educa- tional institutions.^ Such are some of the reflections which M. Odin could not sup- press in discussing the influence of the local environment. So obvious is it that this is the chief factor, and that the influence of centers of population, of cities, etc., in stimulating genius is great precisely in proportion as it is educational, using that term in its broadest sense. Indeed, we must go further and say the same for all the different environments that we have considered. Even the physical, ethnological, and religious environments come under this law in so far as they are factors at all. We considered them at some length because it is upon them that so great stress has been laid as alleged factors of civilization. The result in each case was chiefly negative, at least as regards any supposed influence that they exert upon the production of men of genius and agents in human achievement. It was about the same for the chief claim made for the local environment, viz., density of population. It was therefore necessary to narrow that term down to something much simpler and wholly different in character from any of the influences that had been so confidently assigned. The local environment does, indeed, narrow itself down chiefly to the influence of large cities, but only because it is these that furnish opportunity to genius to unfold. It need not necessarily be cities, as we have seen in the case of chdteaux, and the cities, need 1 Odin, op. cit., p. 516. Ch. IX] THE EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 213 not necessarily be great, provided they furnish these opportunities. The quantity of population has nothing to do with it, but the qual- ity of the population is a factor. The great factor, however, is the material, social, and educational conditions that make it possible for the man of genius surrounded by them to realize his ideals. As M. Odin says : We have thus arrived, by a series of careful approaches and eliminations, at the conclusion that the fecundity of the respective localities in remarkable men of letters rests essentially upon the educational resources that they place within the reach of their occupants. The conclusion is unexpected, for if many thinkers have been able heretofore to proclaim a priori and without giving good reasons the absolute influence of education, positive science, by a very natural reaction has rather tended to support the contrary thesis, so much so that in our day scientific men are almost unanimous in rejecting all influence of this character. Thus it is not surprising that none of the authors who have thus far undertaken seriously to study the genesis of great men have recognized the immense role that education plays. The most of them have not even suspected that it could exert any appreciable effect. Lombroso, who discusses at length the most improbable eventualities, devotes just one half page to the influence of educa- tion.^ Galton and Jacoby speak of it only to combat it a priori by entirely general arguments, contradicted in part by their own data. De Candolle alone sought to estabhsh positively the influence that higher institutions of learning might have exerted, but he almost always contents himself with his personal experiences, and when he has recourse to statistics his data are found to be much too slender to permit any serious calculation. Nevertheless, as we have just seen, the facts show in the most obvious way that higher education has exerted a decisive influence on the development of men of letters. . . . A still more striking proof of the influence that higher edu- cation has exerted is furnished by women of letters. We have seen how very small the number of women was relative to the total of literary persons. But nothing is more completely established than the extreme inferiority of the instruc- tion that women in general receive. It is difficult to comprehend the full extent of this inferiority. The similarity in the names that the schools for persons of the two sexes bear often gives rise to illusion in this respect. In reaUty, the secondary and higher instruction reserved for women is, in almost all cases, extremely inferior to that which men receive, and it is very rare that a woman has really made any solid studies, in spite of all the diplomas that have been conferred upon her. But if this is true even in our day, when we imagine that so much is being done for the emancipation of woman, how much greater must have been the difference between the two sexes in the past ! Nothing could more clearly confirm the singular influence that higher education has had upon the development of French men of letters. This influence is especially seen in the manner in which the women are dis- tributed among the '.different classes of localities. We learn that, preserving all 1 Lombroso, L' Homme de genie, p. 200. 214 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II the proportions, women have come much more frequently than men from Paris, and especially from the chiteaux, while they come much less frequently from other large cities, and still less from other localities.^ The study we have made of the economic environment was also found to lead directly to the same general conclusion. We found that it was the classes that were economically independent that yielded the greater part of the men of eminence. Surely it was not simply wealth, money, goods, that caused this. What then was the real influence .■" It may be said that it was leisure. Very true. But leisure might be and often is spent in idleness. Leisure is only a means, but it is an effective means. It enables its possessor to apply himself undisturbed for prolonged periods to preparation for usefulness. But this preparation is education. Aside entirely, then, from the greatly superior facilities that the children of wealthy parents almost always have for receiving the preliminary instruction necessary to a literary career, ample means serve to enable them to carry on that preliminary and preparatory work and fit them- selves in a thorough manner for that higher work which will yield them fame and make their names immortal. The economic environ- ment is, then, for the true genius, highly educational, in the sense that it affords him an opportunity to labor for all time and not from hand to mouth, and to achieve to the limit of his native powers. When we come to the social environment we find this even more manifestly true. We have already noted the intimate connection between the economic and the social environment. It is the higher social classes, as it is the higher economic classes, that have pro- duced most of the great men of the world, and to a large extent they are the same classes and the same persons. In both classes it is chiefly leisure that develops genius, but in both, too, the youth of the higher classes are liberally instructed so that they can profit by their leisure in later life. The nobility is economically an inde- pendent class and socially a leisure class. High public oflficials, usu- ally holding their places by a life tenure with ample salaries, become a leisure class to the extent that they possess energies in excess of those demanded by their official duties. In the great majority of cases this excess is large, few of them being hard-worked, and ' Odin, op. cit., pp. 516-519. Ch. IX] THE EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 2 1 5 most of them being able to delegate all heavy duties to subordinates. If genius happens to coincide with these conditions, something is likely to be produced. At least this class can and usually do give their children all the education that the country and the times will permit. Professional men often have both leisure and literary tastes, sometimes great talent in various directions, and find time to pre- pare themselves for a life of achievement. In fact, the educational preparation necessary to their profession constitutes a basis for such work, and it requires only leisure in a man of genius thus pre- pared and circumstanced to put him on the high road to fame. It is for these reasons that I have treated the educational environ- ment last in the series, or in an order different from that adopted by M.Odin. It is the end t oward which the others all lead. In one sf-nse, the. Inral, ernnnmjr, and social environments are all educational environments, anji their influence on the production of men of letters, of science, of art, and of distinction generally depends entirely on the extent to which they are educational.^ The}' all combine and converge to this end, and practically constitute the educational environment. There is, however, a sense in which the educational environment may be regarded as distinct from all the others, and in this sense it is susceptible to a limited extent of being treated by the statisti- cal method. The question may always be asked whether a person of distinction received an education in his youth or whether his education was neglected. Unfortunately the biographies of great men are very deficient in this kind of information. Probably it is difficult to procure, but another reason for its omission is that, as already remarked, there is an almost universal belief that education has no influence in the production of genius or even of success. Galton seems to share this view, and Herbert Spencer, though, as his autobiography shows, almost overeducated, repeatedly echoes it and never tires of belittling the value of educational institutions. Ribot belongs to the same school, but qualifies the doctrine as follows : We think it is restricting the influence of education to its just limits to say : it is never absolute and has a decided influence only on average natures. Sup- pose the various degrees of human intelligence to be arranged in such a way that they should form one immense linear series extending from idiocy at one 2l6 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II extreme to genius at the other. In our opinion, the influence of education at the two ends of the series is at its minimum. Upon the idiot it has almost no effect : extraordinary efforts, marvels of patience and skill, often end in insig- nificant and ephemeral results. But as we rise toward the medium grades this influence increases. It attains its maxim-um in those average natures who, being neither good nor bad, are about what chance makes them. Then, if we rise toward the higher forms of intelligence we see it again diminish, and as the highest genius is approached, it tends toward its minimum.' It is evident that all the men of letters of merit constituting M. Odin's entire list of 6382 persons would stand so high in Ribot's series that according to his theory education would have no effect upon them. During the most fruitful period, viz., from 1801 to 1830, the list contains 1344 names. This would be one to each 25,000 or 30,000. For men of talent as he rates them the proportion would be one to 200,000, and for men of genius one to 1,500,000. All these would of course be far out of the reach of" all educational influences, according to Ribot's scheme. He found it necessary, for want of data, to confine himself to men of talent. Of these, in 827 cases he was able to find sufficient information relative to their early education. He divided these into two groups, in one of which he could safely say: "education good," i.e., their education was shown to be at least equal to that afforded by the French lycee or the German gymnasium. This would correspond to an average college education in the United States. Of course in many cases it was much better. The persons of the other group were shown to have received an education less than this, and in many cases very little or practically none at all. These two groups he classifies by periods in his usual way and presents the results in the accompanying table. 1 Ribot, L'H^redite psychologiqi^e; 26 ed., Paris, 1882, p. 329. Periods Education Good Education Poor or None I301-1500 . 1 501-1550 . 1551-1600 . 1601-1650 . 1651-1700 . 170I-1725 . 1726-1750 . 1751-1775 . 1 7 76-1800 . 1801-1825 . 33 58 52 lOI 56 89 116 83 132 2 7 I 2 2 2(1?) Total . 811 16(15?) Ch. IX] THE EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 217 It thus appears that 98 per cent of the talented authors of France received a good education in their youth, while only 2 per cent received an inadequate education or none at all. The table includes 73 per cent of the writers of that grade (i 136), and were the facts known for the remainder they would scarcely alter the result. What are we to conclude from this .? Can it be reconciled with the theory that education has no influence on men of genius .'' Can we logically argue that because 16 out of 827 were able to attain emi- nence with very little or no education, the other 8 1 1 would have done so had they received no better education than the 16 ? In order to make it possible to give approximate answers to such ques- tions M. Odin has given us further detailed information relative to these 16 persons. This consists of their names, the year and place of their birth, and the kind of literary work in which they distin- guished themselves. The date is of some interest, and he arranges the names in chronological order. The kind of literary work is not so important, because for most of them their work is known to most readers. The important fact is the locality, because this shows the influence of the local environment, which, as we have seen, may be highly educational. The following is the list with the other data, excepting the kind of literary work : Name Place of Birth Corrozet .... Du Bellay . . . Billaut Conrart .... Dassoucy .... La Rochefoucauld Colbert .... Boursault .... Champmesle (Mme.) Genlis (Mme.) . . Fabre d'figlantine . Cazal^s .... Beranger .... Bouff^ Dumas ? . . . . Anicet-Bourgeols . Paris ChSteau de Lire Nevers Paris Paris Paris Reims Mussy I'Evique Rouen Chateau de Champcery Carcassonne Grenade Paris Paris Villers-Cotterets Paris 2l8 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II Of this table M. Odin remarks : If we consider the place of birth of the men of letters whose education was neglected, we perceive that seven of them were born in Paris, two in a chateau, four in large cities other than Paris, and only three in other localities. They have therefore nearly all issued from localities that we have seen to be specially adapted to the production of remarkable men of letters, from localities, there- fore, where it was comparatively easy to compensate in one way or another for the lack of regular instruction. As regards the three who do not belong to this class, two of them, Cazalfes and Dumas, grew up under circumstances which took the place in large measure of education properly so called. Cazalfes, who distinguished himself solely as an orator, had found in the very bosom of his family all the elements of a higher culture. His father was councilor to the parliament of Toulouse, his mother a distinguished woman of good family, and although his parents had not allowed him to pursue ^'■fortes Etudes" he evi- dently must have sufficiently profited by his intercourse with them to be able to acquire in the end by himself all the positive knowledge that he required. For he did not fail early to remodel his whole intellectual education. . . As much may be said, in an entirely different field of activity, of Alexandre Dumas. As to Boursault, it would be necessary, in order to venture an explanation, to know his biography more exactly than we do. We know at least that he came at the age of thirteen years to Paris, and that he very soon had an opportunity to learn to write French with purity. Now we have seen that Paris offered con- ditions much more favorable than any other place for the class of literature (dramatic poetry) for which Boursault was distinguished. Finally it is to be noted that of these sixteen men of letters of talent, three only, La Rochefoucauld, Bdranger, and Dumas, belong to the class of men of genius. We have, then, here also, the extremely small proportion of 2 per cent. Thus, even for genius, circumstances can take the place of higher education only in very rare cases. Again, it is sufficient to remember what the life and class of literary activity of La Rochefoucauld and B^ranger were in order to recognize that these two personage^ found themselves in fact in very favorable conditions for the development of their talent. Everything therefore forces us to admit that education plays a r61e not only important but vital and decisive in the development of men of letters. It acts not only upon average natures, but also, and with quite as great intensity, on talent and on genius.^ As a further test of the universaUty of this law, M. Odin col- lected considerable information relative to the amount of education received by eminent literary men of other countries, especially Italy, Spain, England, and Germany. It related chiefly to men of the highest grade, or men of genius. He gives it in the following table for 264 persons, apportioned as follows: Italy, 55; Spain, 63; England, 75 ; Germany, 71. ' Odin, op. cit., pp. 526-527. Ch. IX] THE EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 219 Countries Education Good Education Poor or None Education Doubtful or Unknown Total Italy . Spain . England Germany Total 51 44 71 64 3 18 I 6 55 63 75 71 230 28 264 On this table he remarks as follows : These figures are almost identical with those that we had obtained for French literature. Out of a total of 236 men of genius for whom we know more or less exactly the educational environment in which they grew up, not less than 230, or gj'/i per cent, had an opportunity to move during their youth in a favorable intellectual environment. Even if we were to range all the cases in which the educational environment is unknown or doubtful under the head of education poor, — which surely would not correspond to the reality, — there would still remain more than 87 per cent of cases in which the educational environment would have been favorable. '^ It would probably have been better to omit all mention of the 28 cases in which scarcely anything was known of their education, and base the calculations on the 236 cases in which it was fully known. This shows 98^ per cent who received a higher education. The large number (18) from Spain about whose education nothing is known simply shows the difificulty of obtaining information for that country, and probably most of them were well educated ; but even if we give half (14) to one column and half to the other, the number of well educated will be 92.42 per cent of the whole. Turn it as we may, the truth remains that nearly all who make a name for themselves have had a preparation at some seat of learning. No one has ever understood by education the mere conning of lessons, much less simple attendance at school. Education includes any and all influences that react upon the mind, supply it with knowledge and provide it with the means of giving expression to genius, talent, and all the native powers of the individual under its influence. As already remarked, all four of the kinds of environment last considered are essentially educational. The local educational environment is the easiest to realize. The young man of genius 1 Odin, op. cit., pp. 604-605. 2 20 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part 11 born in the rural districts will if possible gravitate to the city. If he does not, it may be safely predicted that his talents will never be known. If statistics of the class we have been considering had been based on the place where men have done their work instead of simply on their place of birth, all would have been shown to belong to the cities. It is impossible for a man of genius to attain eminence and remain all his life in the country. The facilities that the city affords are not only aids to his development, but they are the indis- pensable conditions to any and all progress beyond mediocrity. For a person of genius, too, the local environment often becomes a con- dition to his economic independence. Men without talents may fail in the city, but talented persons are almost certain soon to find some avenue to material success. The same is true of the social environ- ment. The man of talent transplanted to the intellectual atmosphere of a great metropolis, whatever may have primarily been his social position, usually soon finds himself in one of a higher grade. He may engage in successful business, acquire a small fortune, and devote his leisure to his favorite pursuit. Or he may enter the class of liberal professions and gain his end through that means. Or, again, he may find his way into the public service and through his talents secure preferment, until he finds himself in a position to devote a large share of his surplus energy to literary, artistic, or scientific pursuits and thus mount to fame. Cases are not wholly wanting in which, in the older days, such men have even risen to a place in the nobility, as must have been the history of the duke de La Rochefoucauld. Galton shows that many of the judges of England rose thus from the lower ranks of life. The trend of the whole investigation has been in the general direc- tion of showing that great men have been produced by the coopera- tion of two causes, genius and opportunity, and that neither alone can accomplish it. But genius is a constant factor, very abundant in every rank of life, while opportunity is a variable factor and chiefly artificial. As such it is something that can be supplied practically at will. The actual manufacture, therefore, of great men, of the agents of civilization, of the instruments of achievement, is not a Utopian conception but a practical undertaking. It is also com- paratively simple, and consists in nothing but the extension to all Ch. IX] PROSPECTIVE INVESTIGATIONS 221 the members of society of an equal opportunity for the exercise of whatever mental powers each may possess. There are many artifi- cial substitutes for the various kinds of favorable environment, but since, as we have seen, these are effective only to the extent that they constitute an educational environment and are, in fact, only so many aspects of the educational environment, it is obvious that this is the real factor in the development of genius and the progress of civiHzation. If therefore the educational environment can be sup- plied, the rest may be dispensed with, and the real end to be attained is simply and solely the establishment on a gigantic and universal scale of an educational environment. Prospective Investigations. — The thoroughly objective, scientific, and heuristic investigations of M. Odin, limited as they are in their scope, clearly point to the nature of the work that remains to be done. He has stated the problem, which is to discover what the real influences are that have produced the true agents of history. He was compelled, working single-handed and alone, to confine himself to one group of these agents, and practically to one coun- try. What is needed is to extend these researches to all kinds of agents and to all countries. Although there are many groups, still the two principal ones that are largely omitted in his statistics are men of art and men of science. Or perhaps we should reverse this order and say men of science and men of art, but use the latter term in its broad but still legitimate sense, which would then in- clude not merely the so-called fine arts but also the practical arts. No one will deny that painters and sculptors, carvers, engravers, stucco-workers, ceramic decorators, and beautifiers of every kind are agents of civilization, and none of these should be neglected. But, as we saw in the nineteenth chapter of Pure Sociology, the great achievements of the world have been chiefly in two fields, viz., scientific discovery and mechanical invention. It is through these far more than through literature or any of the other arts that the conquest of nature has been brought about. Galton and de Candolle clearly saw this and confined themselves accordingly to men of science. But, as we have seen, their methods were defec- tive and their data so meager that no conclusive results have emerged from their researches. 222 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II Our studies have also taught us, as nothing else could, what is the true task and mission of the biographer. The prevalence of a mass of almost universally accepted popular error has prevented biographers from recording the most important facts connected with the life and career of great men, and for those that have lived and labored in former ages these are probably now for the most part lost forever. The work of the future must therefore begin with the present, which is rapidly becoming the past. There needs to be a serious and widely extended effort to collect the material that is absolutely indispensable to the determination of these vast social influences. At the present time there is a most pernicious practice in vogue which cannot be too severely condemned. It cannot prob- ably be stopped, but something so much better should be set on foot that it will lose its economic stimulus and be completely sup- planted. I refer to the deluge of alleged biographical dictionaries which, under various names, are flooding civilized countries. They are all mercenary schemes, set on foot by shrewd financiers who know much of the weak side of human nature and know how to glut their greed by appealing to the vanity of ambitious men. They need no description, as every one who has in the least attracted the attention of the world has become the victim of them. Those who have no other way to get their names before the public readily fall into the net. They are asked to write their own biographies, and these volumes are filled with the self-praises of charlatans. Truly great men are loath to contribute, and when they do so, either from goodness of heart or to put an end to importunity, it is always some modest note that gives no adequate idea of their true merit or their work. The perspective is thus totally lost, the vain and worthless are made to appear to be the chief figures, and all forms of mediocrity, charlatanry, and quackery are brought into the foreground. Society itself should undertake this most important of all opera- tions. It should conduct a most searching and continuous statistical investigation of the agents of civilization. It should prepare in the most careful manner a series of questions calculated to bring out every important fact and send them out judiciously to all that it would be of use to interrogate. Great men, or men who possess the elements of true greatness, would gladly respond to such inquiries. Ch. IX] PROSPECTIVE INVESTIGATIONS 223 If Galton could obtain answers from the greater part of those to whom he sent his questions, certainly a properly organized bureau would be treated respectfully by all who were really worthy of being included in such an investigation. But this is by no means the only method to adopt. There are hundreds of ways by which the desired information could be obtained. M. Odin's researches furnish a per- fect model from which to proceed. It could and would no doubt be improved upon and great fields covered which he was obliged to leave fallow. No aspect of such a momentous question should be overlooked or neglected, and with time, patience, and ample resources it would be possible ultimately to present to the world such a mass of well-digested statistics as would enable legislators and statesmen to frame measures certain to multiply the workers in every great field of social achievement. In default of such true social action, and in view of the well- known inertia of great states, there are certain institutions which in their extent, resources, and importance constitute true social agents. Such a one is the Carnegie Institution, devoted to the pro- motion of disinterested researches in the interest of human prog- ress. With its vast resources it is able to undertake great works that are wholly beyond the reach of individual enterprise. It claims to prefer such as could not bring pecuniary returns, provided they be really important. The investigations here outlined answer this description. Surely no man who devotes time, energy, and means to them could ever hope for any material returns whatever. Yet what could be more important from the broadest cosmopolitan and humanitarian point of view than to investigate the conditions that underlie the progress of the world.' Could those who control such institutions share in any modest degree the views and vistas of the very few who have long and deeply studied these vast problems, there would be no hesitation in organizing such researches on a grand scale and backing them up with all the resources at their command. CHAPTER X THE LOGIC OF OPPORTUNITY The history of the world is the biography of great men. — Carlyle. AeT 8' ovT(os lucTTrep iv ypa/A/xaTeto) a) fi,iq6iv VTrdp^a, ivreXe^eia yeypaiJ.fJ.evov oirep crv/i/SatVei eirt tov vov. — ARISTOTLE. II n'est de vrais plaisirs qu'avec de vrais besoins. — Voltaire. II n'y a pas d'existence sans activity. — Auguste Comte. Our little lives are driven eddies of the dust of chance in the gust of circum- stance. — George M. Gould. The facts that we have passed in review in the last chapter, and especially under the last five heads, have shown in a wholly unex- pected way what the real enviionmental factors of civilization are, factors for the most part wholly neglected by all the investigators in this field. These factors are (i) centers of population containing special intellectual stimuli and facilities ; (z) ample material means insuring freedom from care, economic security, leisure, and the wherewithal to supply the apparatus of research; (3) a social posi- tion such as is capable of producing a sense of self-respect, dignity, and reserve power which alone can inspire confidence in one's worth and in one's right to enter the lists for the great prizes of life; (4) careful and prolonged intellectual training during youth, whereby all the fields of achievement become familiar and a choice of them •possible in harmony with intellectual proclivities and tastes. The Resources of Society The same facts also place us in a position to form some sort of estimate of the true resources of society in the agents of civiliza- tion. These resources are made up of two elements : the quantity and the quality of talent that exist in the world. But as the ele- ment quality appears to be distributed in about the same proportions everywhere, so that a given number of persons of genius taken at 224 Ch. X] THE RESOURCES OF SOCIETY 225 random from the population of any country at any period would probably present the same qualitative gradations, we may, at least for the present, leave this element out of the account and concen- trate our attention on the element quantity. This of course means the actual number of talented persons in society. We have already had abundant reasons for concluding that this cannot be measured by the number who have succeeded for one cause or another in giving expression to their inherent powers, because in order to do this one or more of the four environmental factors must have coin- cided with the possession of these powers, otherwise they never could find expression. Galton, who proceeded on this erroneous assumption, estimated, probably with approximate accuracy, that there are at all times in England about 850 men of special ability of fifty years of age or upward, and as, according to the latest census at the time he wrote, there were about two million male persons of those ages, this would make 425 to the million. But he does not regard all these as men of genius, and proposes to reduce the number to 500, or 250 to the million. This would be one to every four thousand of that age and sex. This does not give a very clear idea of the fecundity of a country, because few know offhand what proportion the men of fifty and upward bear to the total population. The figures for England are not now readily at my hand, but the proportion would not prob- ably vary greatly in different countries. Taking down the Compen- dium of the Twelfth Census of the United States (1900), I find that the total number of male persons of fifty years of age and upward was 5,182,464. As the population of the United States was 75,793,- 991, this was 6.8 per cent of it, or about one fifteenth. Assuming that this would be approximately true for England, we find that, according to Galton's estimate, there would be one man of genius to every 60,000 of the population. We have been accustomed in dealing with M. Odin's tables and maps to think of the fecundity in men of genius as so many per 100,000 of population, and reducing this to that basis we have for England i| per 100,000 inhabitants. Odin's tables cover a period of five centuries, and therefore the number per 100,000 shown by him cannot be directly compared with 226 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II Galton's figures. M. Jacoby's table covers only one century, which is about three generations of men. A glance at it shows that the great majority of the departments yielded four or more "remark- able personages " per 100,000 inhabitants, only two less than one, sixteen more than ten, five more than twenty, while Seine went up to sixty-nine. The average of the eighty-five departments is 8.5. If we leave out Seine with its exaggerated fecundity, the mean for all the remaining departments is about 7.8. The number of men of genius existing at any given time is practically the same as the number born during one generation. For the two estimates to agree, therefore, the mean for a century should be substantially three times the estimate for a given time. Or conversely, the number existing at a given time multiplied by three should be practically the mean for a century. We see that this number (5) falls considerably short of even the less of the two calculations (7.8), but there are so many elements of uncertainty in both estimates, and even in the method of calculation, that perhaps the discrepancy should not be regarded as serious. But Galton's estimate is also too low as compared with M. Odin's tables. It appears from them that there were born in France 1686 men of letters during the period from 1801 to 1825, or considerably less than a generation. The number of persons of distinction in all branches must have been nearly twice as great, say 3000. The population of France during the same period was jibout thirty million, or practically the same as that of England, where Galton found only 850 at the most, which he reduced to 500. The ratio for France would therefore be 10 per 100,000 inhabitants. If we confined it to men. of letters alone, it would still be between 5 and 6, or more than six times Galton's estimate. These figures give us some idea of what the actual working force of society is either at the present time or at any given date in the past. They are useful in forming an estimate of the resources of society, but they are in themselves no measure of those resources. These may be compared to mineral resources which lie hidden in the earth. The actual workers would then represent the surface indications which the mining prospector sees as he surveys a given region. A few glittering grains and- an occasional nugget lie on The surface, and he knows that if a shaft is sunk at the proper place Ch. X] THE RESOURCES OF SOCIETY 227 rich veins will be revealed. The comparison soon fails, however, for the treasures of the earth are segregated and exist only in rare spots, while the treasures of human genius are somewhat uniformly distributed, and there is no region which, if properly worked, will not yield them. If we go back to Jacoby's table we find that the productivity of the different departments ranges from i to 69 per 100,000. These differences are all due to differences in the environment at different points, and we have already seen what these environmental factors are. The differences are not at all due to the character of the people living in these different departments. The people of Creuse or Charente are the same kind of people as those of Bouches- du-Rh6ne or of Seine. Or, if they differ ethnologically, we have seen that this has no influence on their capacity for achievement. The Basques of the Basses-Pyrdnees, the Bretons of Finist^re, the Germans of Haut-Rhin, have as high a rate of fecundity as many purely French departments. It is, therefore, the maximum fecundity attained that represents the real resources of a country. If the mean is between 2 and 3 per 100,000, the maximum is over 20, and the fact that this is actually reached anywhere shows that it is possible everywhere. A number of Odin's tables show that even this is much less than the maximum range in fecundity. In Jacoby's table the maximum (69) is about eight times the mean (8.5). He dealt with the fecun- dity of each department as a whole. But, as we have seen, this is a wholly false basis for arriving at the influence of the local environ- ment in the production of genius. The great factor is the cities as against the rural districts. We saw that cities exert on an average about thirteen times the influence of the country in this direction. But in our estimate of the resources of society we are not to go by 1 the mean of all the departments. The true resources represent the I absolute maximum attained anywhere. For France we must there- fore judge by Paris, which has by far the greatest fecundity. This J is over thirty-five times that of the rural districts taken together. The total range is of course much greater. But even Paris does not furnish the absolute maximum. To find this we must go to the chateaux, where, as we saw, the rate per 100,000 occupants may 228 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II be as high as 200. If the average rate is about two, this shows that the actual resources of society in effective working power are capable of being increased a hundredfold. Thus far we have considered the influence of the local environ- ment only. The economic environment must also be reckoned with. This may be more or less independent of the local environment. When this is the case it simply adds to the influence of the latter. It was shown that about eleven times as many talented persons belong to the wealthy or well-to-do classes as to the poor or labor- ing classes, although the latter are about five times as numerous, as the former. The chances of success for the same degree of talent are fifty-five for the former class to one of the latter. The extremes, of course, are very much greater, and for absolute poverty or uninter- rupted labor at long hours the chance of success is necessarily zero, no matter how great may be the native talent or even genius. Indi- gence is an effective bar to achievement. On the other hand, the resources of society may be enormously increased by abolishing poverty, by reducing the hours of labor, and by making all its mem- bers comfortable and secure in their economic relations. Any sacri- fice that society might make in securing these ends would be many times repaid by the actual contributions that the few really talented among the hundreds of thousands thus benefited would make to the social welfare. For talent is distributed all through this great mass in the same proportions as it exists in the much smaller well-to-do or wealthy class, and the only reason why the latter contribute more is because their economic condition affords them opportunity. Exactly the same must be said of the social as of the economic environment. It simply adds, in so far as it is distinct, to the influ- ence of place and of means. We saw that more than three fourths of the men of eminence have belonged to the higher social classes, notwithstanding their relative paucity in numbers. When we looked into the relative fecundity of these classes we saw that the differ- ences were enormous. The nobility, the public officers, and the liberal professions all together make up only 10 per cent of the jiopulation, yet these three classes furnished over 78 per cent of the men of renown. The lowest class, which constitutes 80 per cent of the population, furnished less than 10 per cent. The range Ch. X] THE RESOURCES OF SOCIETY 229 in fecundity relative to population was from J-^ of i to 159, which is approximately 200 to i. This again indicates the true resources (the unworked mines) that society possesses. Only 10 per cent of these resources have been developed. Another 10 per cent are somewhat developed. There remain 80 per cent as yet almost wholly undeveloped. The task of applied sociology is to show how this latent four fifths of mankind can be turned to account in the wbrk of civilization. For, as was said of the indigent class — and they are for the most part the same — they possess potential abilities in the same proportion to their numbers as the highest social class. When at last we come to the educational environment, although the data are more defective than for most of the others, the indica- tions are all in the same direction. We saw that 98 per cent of the men of talent of France and only slightly less of those of the four other leading countries of the world were provided in their youth with ample educational facilities. Only 2 or 2^^ per cent suc- ceeded in struggling up to distinction after a limited or wholly neglected early instruction. In all the cases of this last class about whom any, information could be obtained, they were shown to have soon come under the influence of a favorable local environ- ment, which, coupled with their talents, took the place of an edu- cation, indeed actually constituted one, albeit acquired somewhat later in life. It is evident, then, that education is absolutely indis- pensable at least to a literary career, and it is practically so to any career in a civilized community. This means that all who are with- out it are debarred at the outset from all hope of ever joining the forces of civilization. All the achievement of the world has been done by educated persons. Doubtless different kinds of achieve- ment require different kinds and amounts of education, and the term must be given the broad meaning insisted upon from the first. It may, and in many cases does, consist almost wholly of experience, and still the cases of any great distinction having been attained under conditions of actual illiteracy are so rare as to be practically legendary. But really, for all except the rarest cases, something more than the mere "common-school education" is required to insure success. 230 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II A much broader view of the principal branches of learning is neces- sary to enable a person of talent or even of genius to select a career and pursue it successfully. The great men of all time have had this, however and whenever they may have acquired it. But when we consider how small the number is who have this privilege we see from what a limited group the efficient workers of the world have had to be selected. All outside of that group, whatever may be their native talents, are excluded even from candidacy to achieve- ment. And yet, precisely as in the case of the inhabitants of back- ward provinces or districts, precisely as in the case of the poor and disinherited, precisely as in the case of the working-classes and proletariat, talent and genius are distributed throughout the ranks of the uneducated in the same numerical proportion as among the city-born, the opulent, the nobility, and the academicians. But we saw that centers of population, wealth, and social rank were conducive to greatness and achievement only in so far as they were substitutes for an educational environment. They make self- education possible. They furnish the education of experience, of intercourse with bright minds, of access to the treasures of learn- ing stored up in libraries, of facilities for publidation, of numerous readers of books written. It is all education, and it is, it may be admitted, education for much of which there is no substitute. Still, a well-organized system of public instruction in all the higher fields where genius dehghts to revel inay and does constitute a basis for a genial career, and the recipients of such privileges are practically certain to seek out and find their appropriate local environment. They are certainly to a large extent a substitute for the economic and the social ertvironment, and often result in the attainment of both. At least, while it would be regarded as wholly Utopian to propose to provide all with a high economic and social environment, and while it is in many ways undesirable that all should flock to the great educational centers, it is an entirely practical proposition to provide every member of society with such an education as will enable him to select and successfully pursue a career. If society could see this in its full meaning, it would perceive that it would be the most economical of all public measures. Even if there were no Ch. X] THE RESOURCES OF SOCIETY 231 persons of talent or of genius among them, the superior public en- lightenrnent that could not fail to result would repay a thousandfold all the effort and expense. But the certainty that potential genius does exist everywhere in the same proportions as in the most favored ' classes insures the actual production of a great army of high-grade social agents, who without instruction could never make their talents effective and would remain forever unknown. To sum up the general results of this inquiry, it may be safely stated that a well-organized system of universal education, using that term in the sense in which it was used in Dynamic Sociology, as conferring " the maximum amount of the most important extant knowledge upon all the members of society," would increase the average fecundity in dynamic agents of society at least one hun- dred-fold. The fecundity is apparently about 2 to the 100,000 population. It can therefore be made at least 200 to the 100,000, or I to every 500. One great factor, however, has been omitted by nearly all who have discussed these questions. This factor is nothing less than exactly one half of the human race, viz., womankind. Galton's point of view is of course exclusively androcentric. Woman is a wholly negligible factor in all his calculations. De Candolle devotes nearly two of the five hundred and seventy-six pages of his book to "Women and Scientific Progress," but no woman had ever been admitted to any of the great academies of which he treats. Jacoby's list may contain the names of some women. It would be profitless to'Search for them. M. Odin is the only one who has seen that the true cause of the small literary fecundity of women has been their almost complete lack of opportunity. He shows that where they have really enjoyed any opportunity they have done their share. Looking at the subject from the standpoint of the local environment alone, this is clearly brought out by the facts. The great superi- ority of Paris over all other cities in France has been sufficiently emphasized, even in the case of men. Paris produced 23.5 of the men of letters of France, but it produced 42.1 of the women of letters of France. This was because only there did woman find anything like a congenial environment. Only one other condition proved superior to Paris, and this was life iri chiteaux. The 232 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II cMteaux of France produced less than 2 per cent of the men of letters, but they produced over 5 per cent of the talented women. S The universal prevalence of the androcentric world view, shared )by men and women alike, acts as a wet blanket on all the genial /fire of the female sex. Let this be once removed and woman's true relation to society be generally perceived, and all this will be changed. /We have no conception of the real amount of talent or of genius (possessed by women. It is probably not greatly inferior to that of men even now, and a few generations of enlightened opinion on the subject, if shared by both sexes, would perhaps show that the differ- ence is qualitative only. If this is so, the gain in developing it would be greater than that of merely doubling the number of social agents, for women will strike out according to their natural inclinations and Icultivate fields that men would never have cultivated. They will ithus add to the breadth, even if they do not add to the depth, of the world's progress. The estimates hitherto made of the resources of society have taken men only into consideration. We concluded that this amounted to i in every 500 "of the population. How much can we add for women when they shall be fully recognized and taken into the fold .■■ For the transition period it is not claimed that they would double the number of contributors to civilization, but very soon they would raise the proportion to i in 300, and ultimately they would contribute their full moiety. There is, however, a certain crudeness, at least, if not positive error, in all these calculations of the number of geniuses, actual or potential, in the world. The fact is, that genius, like almost every other natural product, is entirely relative. There are gradations in everything, and here as everywhere natiira nonfacitsaltus. There are all conceivable degrees of genius, and the present irregularities among men in this respect are abnormal. They constitute in them- selves a proof that something is preventing the full natural expression of this universally diffused social force. The different environments that we have been considering, local, economic, social, educational, as they actually exist in society, may be looked upon in two dia- metrically opposite ways. We have seemed to be considering them as so many sources of opportunity, and hence as generators of genius. But it is equally legitimate to consider them from their negative Ch. X] THE RESOURCES OF SOCIETY 233 aspect. In_every. Qne_of_them^the repressive infiuencejisjEar greater than the liberative influence^ Over against the metropolis stands the country, and for every Athens there is an Arcadia. The few rich are the antithesis of the many poor. The nobility is opposed to the proletariat. The intelligent class is immersed in the illiterate mass. We are looking only at the exceptions and ignoring the rule. In each environment the upper strata represent only what has succeeded in bursting through. To use the language of geology, they are extru- sive materials. In fact, they are simply privileged classes, and we are, as M. Odin says, merely extolling privilege. Let us listen to the last words of that remarkable book to which and to the true genius of its author we owe so large a part of all that we have been able to bring forward in the present chapter and the one that precedes it : Literature then is not . . in its origin, and hence in its essence, that vague, ethereal, spontaneous thing whose phantom so many historians and literary critics have been pleased to evoke. It is in the full force of the term an artifi- cial creation, since it is derived essentially from causes due to the intentional intervention of man, and has not resulted from the simple natural evolution of mankind. It is a natural phenomenon only as it faithfully reflects the inner mental workings of certain social strata. It possesses nothing national or popu- lar. Literature can only be national when it springs from the very bosom of the people, when it serves to express with equal ardor the interests and the passions of the whole world. French literature does not do this. With rare exceptions it is only the mouthpiece of a few privileged circles. And this explains why, in spite of so many efforts of every kind to spread it among the people, it has remained upon the whole so unattractive and so foreign to the masses. Born in the atmosphere of the hotbed it cannot bear the open air. Not until, from some cause or other, the whole population shall be brought to interest itself actively in intellectual affairs will it be possible for a truly national literature to come forth which shall become the common property of all classes of society.' In the past and present state of the world not only literary but all other achievement has been irregular, sporadic, and spasmodic. The world of thought may be compared to a vast mountainous region with great peaks and domes, chains and sierras, rising with the utmost irregularity as to size, form, and height, in a wild chaos, but not with- out a certain rude grandeur. This is all due to these artificial causes, to influences repressing most of the genius of mankind, coinciding with those of the most highly favorable character, which have caused 1 Odin, op. cit., p. 564. 234 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II genius to burst through in places and throw up and scatter over the surface of society all these towering and fantastic forms. If the movement had been natural and normal, the whole mass would have risen together. It would have been an epeirogenic and not an orogenic movement, and we should have had great continents over whose merely undulating surface all the powers of the human mind would be in harmonious operation. Now the purpose of applied sociology is to point out a way by which these great irregularities may be eliminated, not by lowering the higher but by raising the lower elements, and by a general level- ing of all classes from this purely intellectual point of view. As the higher classes have attained their position solely through superior opportunities, it is evident that the powers of mind that have not found expression can be enabled to find expression only through the e.xtension of opportunities to them also. This points the direction that the movement must take if the object is to be accomplished. That object, as the statistics have shown, is nothing less than the centupling of the present working forces of society. The Fallacy of History History may be defined as a record of exceptional phenomena. Any fact or event to be worthy of such record must stand out as something extraordinary, something quite out of the regular course of things. Such events are supposed to be wholly uncaused. Any- thing for which a natural cause can be assigned immediately loses all its historical interest. If the cause is known in advance it is not recorded. It is too tame. It was so at first with natural history. Attention was paid only to such objects (minerals, plants, animals) as were unusual, bizarre, huge, abnormal, or monstrous. The idea of a museum was simply that of a curiosity shop. Twenty years ago I wrote : Science often has its origin in wonder at unexplained phenomena, and there is no science of which this is more true than of paleontology. Nearly all the early writers openly avow that they have been chiefly spurred on to undertake and carry on their investigations by an " eager curiosity " ^ respecting the objects they were treating, and the first collections of such objects were looked upon 1 Parkinson's Organic Remains of a Former World, 1804, p. v. Ch. X] THE FALLACY OF HISTORY 235 simply as curiosities, while what have since become the greatest scientific insti- tutions in the world sometithes betray their origin by perpetuating the original names expressive of their sense of wonder.^ Biography is only a kind of history, the part of history which deals exclusively with heroes. A hero is a wholly exceptional being. He is not at all like other men. He is regarded as wholly independent of circumstances, at least as in no sense a creature of them. The same is true of all " great men." No wonder then that so little can be learned from biography. But if now we look back over the whole movement that we have been sketching, we see that it partakes in large measure of this spirit of wonder study. The entire effort to find out who the great geniuses of the world have been is of this nature. The works in which this effort has been specially made are written by men claiming to be scientific, and in them we find flings at the historians, and yet they look upon a genius as in many respects an exceptional being, at least as one wholly independent of circum- stances. They suppose that just so many of these human curiosities have been brought into the world, and that it is with this fixed quan- tity that we have to deal. Some do indeed imagine that the quantity could be increased by the adoption of certain rules in the process of breeding men, but they deny that any geniuses exist or ever have existed except the few that have made their way to fame. Now there is no essential difference between this mental attitude and that which I have shown to be the fallacy of superstition (supra, p. 1 17), and later to be also the fallacy of statistics (supra, p. 147). It is the fallacy of history in general and the most serious vice in all human reasoning. M. Odin saw this clearly, and he has adverted to it on numerous occasions. The following passage is one of several that are well worth listening to : The historians are constantly making the mistake of studying only the facts that present a certain peculiarity which has struck them from the first and of setting aside and neglecting the others, perhaps much more important. They proceed exactly as do those persons who seek to justify their belief in presenti- ments. These know how to cite a number of cases in which their presentiments have been realized, simply forgetting all those, much more numerous of course, 1 For example, the great Academia Leopoldino-Carolina Naturae Curiosorum, founded in 1 670 at Frankf ort-on-the-Main (Fifth Annual Report of the United States Geological Survey, 1883-1884, Washington, 1885, p. 385). 236 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II in which their presentiments have played them false. If any one were to press them they would probably admit overlooking cases in which presentiments did not come true. But they look upon these as exceptions which they may neglect as not affecting the general rule.^ He proceeds to give a number of striking examples of the fallacy of history, some of them committed by writers as distinguished as M. Taine. Relativity of Genius. — One of the best illustrations of the fallacy of history is the neglect or refusal to recognize the relativity and universality of genius. The doctrine, usually ascribed to Locke, that the mind of man at birth is comparable to a sheet of paper on which nothing has as yet been written, and that what it is to become will depend entirely on what shall be written upon it, is as old as the Stoics,^ Plato,^ Aristotle,* and Quintilian, and if Helvetius was the only one who ever accepted it to the full extent of asserting the com- plete equality of all minds and the extraneous nature of all intelli- gence, all must admit the paramount influence of experience in the determination of the quantity and quality of intelligence in the adult human being. While few doubt that enormous differences exist among men in the substratum of the intellect, the true extent of the external factor has only recently begun to be understood. The evidence is rapidly accumulating to show that not only between individuals of the same race but also between the races of men the substratum differs far less than was supposed, and the chief differ- ence lies in the equipment. The comparison of the new-born mind to a blank sheet of paper is not, therefore, wholly exact. Like most comparisons, it limps. Still it has been of great service, and the truth it contains constitutes the foundation of modern scientific psychology. Perhaps there is a still better comparison. Suppose we liken the wholly inexperi- enced brain to soil in which no seeds or germs of any kind as yet exist. The quality of this soil then represents heredity or the pre- efficients of mind. It may be very poor, devoid of salts and nitroge- nous constituents, and therefore be incapable of yielding any rich ^ Odin, op. cit., pp. loo-ioi. 2 Plutarch, De Placitis Philosophorum, Lib. IV, C. XI. ^ Thesetetus. Opera, V, iii, p. 268 (ed. Bekker). ' De Anima, III, IV, 14, 1. vii, p. 71 (Tauchnitz) ; T. 4. 430a (ed. Biehl, 1896, p. 85). Ch. X] RELATIVITY OF GENIUS 237 products, or it may have any degree of richness and thus be capable of raising all grades of crops. If very rich, it contains the elements of true genius. Then the character of the seed that is sown upon it may vary in all degrees. That germs or seeds will fall upon it is certain, for the atmosphere is always and everywhere charged with them. This represents experience, and no being can pass a moment after birth without some kind of experience. If left entirely to itself, such a mind will receive only the germs that float about at random, or are borne by the winds or waters or birds, and which these acci- dentally let fall upon it. Under these conditions the mind will be stocked with all manner of germs comparable to molds and algse, and different kinds of weeds that will spring up, struggle together for existence, choke out one another, and leave the mastery to those that possess the greatest vitality, although they may be coarse, noxious, and worthless. Such is the environment of nature. But the seed may be carefully selected and only the most useful kinds allowed to grow. Careful tillage may destroy the low, useless growths and leave the useful plants to flourish without competition and bear rich and abundant fruit. This is nurture and represents a favor- able educational environment. Where careful nurture is applied to a rich soil we have the condition of talent or even of genius. The human race has represented every conceivable combination of all these conditions, and the history of mankind exhibits as a consequence all the great irregularities in its intellectual 'develop- ment that we have been studying. Over the soil itself man has little control. He may artificially enrich it over small areas, but here perhaps the parallel fails more fully than elsewhere, for nothing has as yet been discovered for the mind comparable to the fertiliza- tion of soils. It is on this problem that men of Galton's school have been working, but they have not yet solved the problem. Everything else is completely under the control of man as soon as he learns what to do. He can control the environment to any required extent. He can prepare the soil, select the seed, and carry the tillage to any point he pleases. Over nature he has little power, but over nurture he is complete master. But nature, as we have seen, has not been niggardly in providing the soil or substratum of intelligence. How the human intellect has 238 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part 11 been able to reach the state at which we find it in even the most backward races, and especially in the most forward ones, I have on various occasions essayed to explain. ^ The important fact is that the human intellect everywhere is more vigorous than the ordinary material wants of life require, and is constantly striking out into new, biologically non-advantageous paths. Nothing prevents it from doing so but the environmental restraints that keep it in check. Burst these bonds at any point and the human mind will soar. The arti- ficial classes of society possess no monopoly of the mental powers of man, and they seem to do so only because their economic, social, and educational environment enables them to rise into a freer intellectual atmosphere. No one has seen or expressed this truth more clearly than M. Odin, as in the following paragraphs : Perhaps it would be better never to speak of men of genius, but only of works or achievements of genius. We should thus avoid gratuitous assumptions, which, by force of repetition, ultimately acquire the appearance of evidence. Is it not generally believed that sooner or later genius will burst out, whatever may be the circumstances that oppose it ? And yet this universal belief is founded after all only on simple assumptions whose insufficiency ought to leap to the eyes. 1 1 requires only a little reflection to recognize that by this something is affirmed with a perfect assurance which it is absolutely impossible to know. Of course genius always bursts out — in all the cases in which we see it burst out ! But who shall ever tell us of the others ? Yet we should always consider them as possible, according to the traditional idea of genius as an entity. But if we see genius not in the persons but in the acts, a latent genius would no longer be anything more than a contradiction of terms, a manifest absurdity. It is not otherwise with the opinion so often expressed by contemporary critics, that our civilization is unfavorable to the unfolding of genius, that men of talent will perhaps go on multiplying, but that true genius will become more and more rare. This would be to fall into a very strange optical illusion, to attribute to an assumed modification of the environment the consequences of a simple change in our point of view. In fact, in proportion as our knowledge of great men has increased the difference which separates the man of genius from the man of talent, and the latter from the ordinary man, must diminish. It is clear, moreover, that this difference must appear less striking as education is diffused and strengthened, that is, the nearer we approach to our epoch. Con- temporary geniuses are probably neither less numerous nor less exalted than those of preceding epochs, they are simply less different from the great mass. It is not genius itself that has changed, it is rather the pointof view from which we consider it. The great man appears less great only because other men appear less small. 1 Especially in Dynamic Sociology, Vol. I, Chaps. V and VI ; Vol. II, pp. 477- 480 ; The Psychic Factors of Civilization, Part III ; Pure Sociology, Chap. XVIII. Ch. X] GENIUS PRESENT IN ALL CLASSES 239 Thus therefore everything leads us to admit between the man of genius and the common run of mortals a simple difference of degree and not a generic difEerence. Genius results from a particular combination of qualities which are found in all men, only in varying proportions. All that we know thus far is that it is impossible to separate men into clearly distinct categories according to the nature and amount of their talents. So far as experience and reason enable us to judge, the passage from the one to the other is imperceptible ; they all form, from the most sublime to the most limited, one same and single series, inter- crossing in all directions, and from which we cannot except arbitrarily detach any part. This impossibility, which many deplore, of fixing absolute limits, of establishing a truly natural classification, is common to all orders of phenomena. To have recognized it is the greatest conquest of modern science. It is only by admitting it without reserve that we can attain to a rational conception of the facts.i Those who deplore this state of things belong to the same class as do the naturalists who deplore the inevitable tendency of all the natural sciences to fill in the missing links and diminish the number of distinct species. So long as species are distinct and clearly marked off from one another science is simple and easy, but when interme- diate forms begin to be found the work of classification becomes more difficult. The class of naturalists referred to are incapable of seeing that the gain in the increased knowledge of nature greatly outweighs these merely systematic inconveniences. Genius Present in All Classes. — Attention has already been called to the fact that the advocates of the irrepressibility of genius fre- quently allude to the rise of great men from obscurity to positions of eminence and renown. No one disputes the fact, but while, as we shall see, it does not prove their theory, it does prove a proposi- tion which they are loath to admit. It proves that genius is present in all classes. Among those cited by Galton in this connection are D'Alembert, Watt, Hardwicke and other judges of England, Scaliger, Huss, Luther, Latimer,and many other less known men. Weismann cites Schwanthaler, Defregger, and Lenbach among sculptors and painters, and a long list of musical composers, including Bach and Haydn. But we are perfectly familiar with the mention in this con- nection of the names of Davy; Faraday, Laplace, Leverrier, Claude Bernard, Regnault, etc., in science, and of Robert Burns, John Bun- yan, Alexandre Dumas, B6ranger, Edgar A. Poe, Hawthorne, and even 1 Odin, op. cit., pp. 148-149. 240 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II Shakespeare, in literature. Of statesmen and financiers of this class of course there is no end, and America is the great nursery of " self- made men." That most of these men were really of humble birth and emerged from the lower classes of society is doubtless true, and it teaches a great lesson. Whatever theories different writers may have on the subject they all practically agree that genius exists in all the strata of society. But this whole subject was treated in Chap- ter VII under the title Intellectual Egalitarianism, and this simply forms an additional illustration on that head. The statistical summary that was made in the last chapter con- firms this general view. We saw that 57 or over 9 per cent of modern French men of talent had passed their youth in more or less destitute circumstances, presumably because they belonged to the lower classes of society. This was confirmed by the table showing that 61, or 9.8 per cent, doubtless mainly the same persons, actually belonged to the laboring class. Very nearly the same result appears for the highest class, or men of genius, of the other four greatest nations of the world, Italy, Spain, England, and Germany, all of which together produced 20 of this class, or 1 1 per cent of the whole from the laboring class. Surely nothing more could be needed to prove the existence of talent and genius in the lowest class, and there is nothing to indicate that the amount of these qualities is fairly indicated by these figures. They only indicate the fact of their existence, not the extent of it. On this point M. Odin remarks : Theoretically of course it might be asked whether, along with the personages whose talent we have been able to establish, there really have been others endowed with analogous natural qualities, and who, for want of a favorable environment, have not succeeded in making themselves a name. It would be conceivable in itself that the men of letters whom we know have been the only individuals naturally endowed with literary talent. In this case our researches would evidently not prove much relative to the action exerted by the environ- ment. But as absolutely nothing supports this hypothesis, while, on the con- trary, simple good sense not less than reason and all experience leads us to regard it as absurd, we may, until there is proof to the contrary, boldly afifirm that, besides the men of letters whom we know, there has been a multitude of individ- uals endowed by heredity with equal or superior aptitudes, who, in the absence of an appropriate environment, have not been able, in spite of all their natural talent, to attain even to the most modest repute.' 1 Odin, op. cit., pp. 556-557. Ch. X] NOT GENIUS BUT ACHIEVEMENT 241 Not Genius but Achievement. — Under the influence of the fallacy of history the point of view of the whole discussion is false. The sociologist at least cares nothing about genius. What concerns him is achievement. As we have seen, there is no line of demarcation between genius and talent, between talent and merit, and the minds of most persons are capable, if afforded an opportunity, of accom- plishing some kind of useful work. If it be said that the great bulk of the work of the world is of the routine kind and that there must exist somebody to do this routine work, the answer is, first, that well-stored minds can do routine work at least as well as ill-stored minds, and secondly, that intelligent persons engaged in routine work will invent ways and means of expediting it and of divesting it of much of its character as drudgery. But in the last resort we can fall back upon the doctrine now current, and substantially true, that all work is at bottom mental, and that there is scarcely any form of human action, as distinguished from animal activity, that does not involve a greater or less amount of thought.^ It was shown in the last section of Chapter VII, on man's Capac- ity for Truth, that all sane persons are intellectually qualified to move in the highest class of society, and that all can acquire and utilize all the truth needful for the proper guidance of their conduct in life. Good authority was also adduced for believing that all who can have their interest aroused are capable of performing some useful work. In certain of the arts special aptitudes are of course presupposed, and this is probably true for that great art called literature, but in the various sciences, outside of mathematics, this is not so much the case, and almost any one with the proper train- ing and adequate facilities can prosecute scientific researches. This is the great field of real achievement, because in almost any depart- ment of science fresh discoveries are liable to be made that will advance the material, mental, and moral progress of the world. There is no science of which it would be safe to say that it is neces- sarily infertile from this point of view, and such discoveries are constantly being made in sciences from which we should least expect practical results.^ 1 Compare Pure Sociology, pp. 28-29. 2 For illustrations of this truth, see Dynamic Sociology, Vol. II, pp. 208, 509. 242 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II But all this is now a truism, and the question is how to increase the number of these dynamic agents of society. Of course there are many such workers now. De Candolle estimated that there had been more than sixteen thousand authors of scientific works during the past two centuries. There are probably nearly that number now at any given date. But the majority of investigators, even to-day, enjoy very limited facilities, and what is worse, they have a very inadequate mental equipment for their work. In other words, they are deficient in training, and most of them are inspired by enthusi- asm in some narrow line, and lacking in any broad foundation which would enable them to see their subject in all its relations. The number who are really prepared for their work is not large. The desideratum is, therefore, to prepare a much greater number for scientific work rather than to multiply narrow specialists. None of these require to be geniuses in any special sense. They need to be clear and broad-minded persons, but given sound minds and average talents, 'the proper training will do the rest. Narr.ow and fruitless specialism is rather to be discouraged,' the number of those who are chasing after worthless trifles ^ diminished, and that of the serious investigators greatly increased. Leisure as Opportunity The two principal forms of opportunity^ are leisure and education. Both are furnished by the economic and social environments, but more especially by the first. As we have seen, all environments are favorable to the development of genius only in so far as they secure education, and therefore leisure must be regarded as a means to education. It may be called negative education, and differs from positive education in being a condition to self-education. It was the great school of mankind before there was any such thing as positive education. It began with the priesthood, and to it we owe all we possess of early Indian, Chinese, Chaldean, and Egyptian learning and science. The ruling classes of Greece and Rome possessed it, and but for it they would have accomplished little in art, literature, or philosophy. Throughout the Middle Ages what little was done 1 Compare Dynamic Sociology, Vol. II, p. 504. Ch. X] THE INSTINCT OF WORKMANSHIP 243 in the intellectual world was chiefly the work of high church officers exempt from all material concerns. In more modern times leisure was secured through social position, the nobility and high clergy being all men of leisure. In the present condition of the Old World this is somewhat less the case, but high officials with a life tenure of office and high salaries constitute a sort of leisure class. More and more, too, professional men, where successful in their practice, acquire large leisure. It is only quite recently that business men, the bourgeoisie, by the accumulation of great wealth, have acquired leisure and have begun to devote a portion of it to disinterested pursuits. But it must not be supposed that all the leisure mankind have enjoyed has been devoted to study and contemplation. Only a very small part of it has been so employed, and the most of it, as in the case of our modern multimillionaires, has always been either wasted or worse than wasted. The Instinct of Workmanship. — This phrase, of course, is bor- rowed from Mr. Thorstein Veblen's remarkable book, The Theory of the Leisure Class, and I have used it freely elsewhere.^ It is due to its author that the leading passage in which it occurs should be quoted somewhat fully. He was dealing with the current apolo- gies for sports, many of which have a " predatory " origin, and had already said : " In the most general economic terms, these apologies are an effort to show that, in spite of the logic of the thing, sports do in fact further what may broadly be called workmanship." ^ And after some further discussion he adds : The ulterior norm to which appeal is taken is the instinct of workmanship, which is an instinct more fundamental, of more ancient prescription, than the propensity to predatory emulation. The latter is but a special development of the instinct of workmanship, a variant, relatively late and ephemeral in spite of its great absolute antiquity. The emulative predatory impulse — or the in- stinct of sportsmanship, as it might well be called — is essentially unstable in comparison with the primordial instinct of workmanship out of which it has been developed and differentiated.' 1 Pure Sociology, pp. 129, 245, 513. 2 The Theory of the Leisure Class. An Economic Study in the Evolution of Insti- tutions. By Thorsteifi Veblen. New York, 1899, P- 269. ■ ' Veblen, op. cit., p. 270. The expression first occurs on page 15, where he says that man "is possessed of a taste for effective work and a distaste for futile effort This aptitude or propensity may be called the instinct of workmanship." 244 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II In my review of this book I made the following remark : As has already been seen, the two great social classes are characterized by an assortment of sharply contrasted words and phrases, and not only their occu- pations, but their underlying instincts, are clearly marked off by such expres- sions as the " instinct of sportsmanship " and the " instinct of workmanship " ; " exploit and industry," or " exploit and drudgery " ; " honorific and humilific " occupations, and " perfunctory and proficuous " activities, all forming the pri- mary contrast between " futility and utility." In each of these pairs the first belongs to the leisure class and represents the superior fitness to survive in human society. The leisure class constitutes the biologically fittest, the socially best, the aristocracy.^ The dynamic quality of leisure, as I have frequently shown, lies in the fact that pleasure consists exclusively in the normal exercise of the faculties. Leisure, therefore, does not involve inactivity, but always takes on some form of activity. If this activity is not work it will be sport, so that the two "instincts," as Mr. Veblen says, have a common basis. This basis is the absolute necessity of exercising the faculties. Prolonged inactivity becomes intensely painful. Thus imprisonment becomes a terrible punishment. The pain resulting from inactivity is called ennui. Many leisure-class authors have painted the horrors of ennui. Helvetius indulges in an apotheosis of compulsory labor as a sure escape from ennui, and truly says that the pain of fatigue cannot be compared to that of ennui. It is on this ground more than any other that he and other authors insist that the poor are happier than the rich. Montesquieu says that they ought to have put continual idleness among the pains of hell, and Schopenhauer declares that while want is the scourge of the lower classes, ennui is the scourge of the upper, and that all the hope that is held out for the future is a choice between the torments of hell and the ennui of heaven. ^ Condorcet remarks that "the men who were not obliged to seek their daily nourishment necessarily had intervals of repose ; and immediately the need of experiencing new 1 American Journal of Sociology, Vol. V, May, igoo, p. 836. 2 Sein [des Menschen] Leben schwingt also, gleich einem Pendel, hin und her, zwischen dem Schmerz und der Langenweile, welche beide in der That dessen letzte Bestandtheile slnd. Dieses hat sich sehr seltsam auch dadurch aussprechen miissen, dass, nachdem der Mensch alle Leiden und Quaalen in die Holla versetzt hatte, fiir den Himmel nun nichts iibrig blieb, als eben Langeweile. — Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Vol. I, p. 368. Ch. X] THE INSTINCT OF WORKMANSHIP 245 sensations in the midst of a long and complete inactivity was given the name of ennui." ^ De Greef says: Free or forced inaction is the condition sine qua non of art; in contradis- tinction to the ordinary producer, the artist works irregularly, according to his moods, that is, when repose has made him nervous and irritable ; the genus irritabile vatum has this physiological and economic explanation ; it is in this nervous state that the man of unconscious and truly inspired genius brings forth those creations, in appearance sudden and spontaneous, but in reality issuing forth from a slowly accumulated store of energy.^ De Candolle remarks : They say that idleness is agreeable to men. It is believed that there must be a pressing necessity for any one to work. This is true for manual labor, not for mental. Give a little liberty to young persons of rich families ; let them receive an education proper to direct their curiosity toward things true and elevated, . . let them travel and complete their studies for themselves, and you will see many of them occupying themselves with scientific researches.^ M. Odin, in discussing the economic environment, asks : What is the cause of this extraordinary superiority of well-to-do families, a superiority the more remarkable because rich young persons, having absolutely no need to think of the morrow, are only too much inclined to idleness or-to kinds of activity directly opposed to labors of the mind.'^ He does not answer the question. The facts answer it and give the lie to another popular theory. It is not true that easy circum- stances ptevent men of talent from working. It is not true that men of genius depend upon adversity and dire necessity as a spur to activity. This is all a popular illusion which the entire history of human achievement disproves and should dispel. The instinct of workmanship, if it be in no other form than fear of the hell of ennui, is the great and unremitting spur that drives and goads all men to action. The action that men of leisure engage in is of every conceivable kind, whatever best accomplishes the primary egoistic purpose of driving away ennui and yielding the maximum satisfaction. Far more of the energy is devoted to sport than to work, much of the activity is perverse and injurious, but this is due to human nature and an unorganized social state. The normal percentage, as in all human activities, is devoted to one form or another of achievement. 1 Tableau, etc., p. 244. '^ Introduction \ la sociologie, par Guillaume De Greef, Premiere Partie, Bruxelles, 1886, p. 185. ^ De Candolle, op. cit., p. 274. * Odin, op. cit., pp. 529-530. 246 APPLIED SOCIOLOGY [Part II Education as Opportunity The other principal form of opportunity is education. By this I now mean something a little more restricted than what has hereto- fore been impUed by the term, viz., positive education or instruction, chiefly in youth. It has been shown that nearly all the eminent writers of all the leading nations have received ample instruction in their youth, and the very few who did not soon took steps to com- pensate through self-instruction for the loss. This proves, what scarcely would have needed to be proved, that an education is a sine qua non to a literary career at least. It may be argued that this is not so much the case in other careers, especially in a scien- tific career, because in literature, which is an art, it is essential to be grounded in the rules of grammar and rhetoric, and if one is to be a poet, those of versification, etc., must be added. These things, it is said, are not needed in a scientific career, and especially is all study of the "dead languages" regarded as wholly superfluous. I do not propose to discuss this last question here further than to say that a knowledge of the structure of Latin and Greek words is essential to the correct use of the current vocabulary of nearly every science, and especially of the biological sciences. It may be admitted that an education for a scientific career should be somewhat different from an education for a literary career. Up to a certain point they should be the same, but at a certain point they should very properly diverge. But there is no less need that the person who is to follow a scientific career should be instructed with a view to that career than in the case of a literary career. There is no more pernicious notion afloat than that one is prepared to pursue any branch of science with nothing but the rudiments of an education. The great need in this direction, as all competent judges know, is for a thorough scientific training, largely in the laboratory, and this really involves more time and study than does a preparation for a literary career, which can be gained chiefly from books. After the statistical demonstration of the influence of education made in the last chapter, any collection of antecedent opinions on the subject may seem useless. It will amount at best, it must be Ch. X] EDUCATION AS OPPORTUNITY 247 admitted, to little more than an anthology of the subject. But it may at least be said that it is interesting in any connection, and it becomes doubly so at this juncture, in showing, if nothing else, the far-seeing penetration of certain superior minds. Galton him- self says, " I acknowledge freely the great power of education and social influences in developing the active powers of the mind, just as I acknowledge the effect of use in developing the muscles of a blacksmith's arm, and no further." 1 This certainly is all that any one asks or has claimed. It may, indeed, be questioned whether this is not going too far, for it is doubtful whether education does strengthen the brain in any such physiological way as a blacksmith's arm is strengthened, or at least in any such degree. What it does is to enlighten the mind, and this it can do without in the least altering the texture of the brain. We need not go to the professional educators like Lorenz von Stein, Herbart, Lotze, Horace Mann, and that class, but will cite only philosophers, thinkers, investigators, and statesmen. Thus Leibnitz said, "Education conquers all things."^ The favorite phrase of Helvetius is so near to this that one might suppose he had borrowed it from Leibnitz, but he never mentions him. It was, " Education can do all things." * He bases it squarely on the doc- trine of Locke, and says : The principles of Locke, far from contradicting tliis opinion, confirm it ; they prove that education makes us whatever we are; that men are as much alil