President White Library, 
 
 CORNELL UNIVERSITY. 
 
Cornell University Library 
 
 DC 285.B46 
 
 3 1924 028 285 462 
 
The original of this book is in 
 the Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924028285462 
 
STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 

 
 r 4- i 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 f 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 ■£l 
 
 
 
 
 ;: % 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 
 
 ~ ik./" 
 
 
 
 
 w ^^^ 
 
 
 
 
 
 vr-ft^H 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 gUzd- 
 
STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 FROM THE FRENCH 
 
 COUNT BENEDETTI 
 
 % 
 
 FRENCH AMBASSADOR AT THE COURT OF BERLIN 
 
 mitb a portrait 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 MACMILLAN AND CO. 
 
 1896 
 
 [All rights reserved] 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 Preface . . PAG .? 
 
 Vll 
 
 The Triple Aliance . 
 
 7° 
 
 Armed Peace and its Consequences l8o 
 
 My Mission to Ems , 
 267 
 
PREFACE 
 
 When a person has been caught, in the 
 front row, in an immense and painful national 
 catastrophe, when he has issued from it injured 
 by the iniquity of party feeling and the bad faith 
 of the enemies of his couutry, he has lost peace of 
 mind, and to regain it resorts to the study of 
 the events that made him a victim. That fate 
 has been mine. I venture to put together, in this 
 volume, the writings I have been occupied with in 
 silence and retirement ; they are purely diplomatic 
 essays, and have appeared in the Revue des Deux 
 Mondes. 
 
 It seems to me, however, fit and opportune that 
 they should be preceded by a few rapid remarks 
 which cannot be without interest to the reader, 
 whilst they will have particular value for the 
 author of these pages. 
 
 Those who lived through the woeful year have 
 certainly not forgotten the explosions of anger 
 that resounded all over France at the time when 
 the question of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern's 
 
viii PREFACE 
 
 candidature to the Spanish crown sprung up, and 
 which became still more acute after the invasion 
 of our territory. Public opinion, or rather the 
 press, did not confine itself to Prussia's direful 
 underhand dealings, it denounced with equal 
 violence the want of forethought on the part of 
 the Imperial Government, and what it termed the 
 incapacity of its agents. I was personally held 
 up to the indignation of the country. Strange to 
 say, it was a semi-official newspaper, the Consti- 
 tutionnel, that first put me on the rack. At that 
 time I had only just reached Ems, entrusted with 
 a mission fraught with difficulties apparent to 
 every one, and to bring it to a happy issue it was 
 essential I should enjoy, above all that I should 
 appear to enjoy, the entire confidence of my 
 Government. I thought it right to call the Due 
 de Gramont's attention to this unfortunate inci- 
 dent, begging him to dispel the unjustifiable 
 accusations of which I was personally the object, 
 either at the tribune or in the Jotirnal Officiel. 
 He paid no attention to my entreaties. 
 
 They bitterly reproached me with having neither 
 foreseen, nor even had a presentiment of, the 
 agreement come to between Berlin and Madrid to 
 the advantage of Prince Leopold, and made the 
 same charges in regard to the cordial understanding 
 arrived at between Prussia and Russia. But, as a 
 matter of fact, I had fathomed Count Bismarck's 
 
PREFACE ix 
 
 design in the course of the preceding year, as soon 
 as it had been conceived, and without having been 
 incited to do so otherwise than by a sense of duty, 
 and I had called the attention of my Government 
 to the matter, whilst requesting to be authorised 
 to have an explanation on the subject with King 
 William's Prime Minister. My first despatch in 
 regard to this bears the date of March 27th, 
 1869. Acting in accordance with the instructions 
 I had thus invited, I had a long interview with 
 Count Bismarck. I gave an account of it on 
 May nth, and was able to affirm, after having 
 received my interlocutor's avowal, that I had 
 been quite right in my conjectures, namely, that 
 Prince Leopold's candidature had been brought 
 forward and discussed at Berlin. I shall have 
 occasion to return to this subject later on ; but it 
 is of importance to me to establish here, that by 
 having my correspondence of the preceding year 
 placed before him again, M. de Gramont could 
 have safely shielded me, and put an end to the 
 erroneous rumours, reproduced and commented on 
 by the press to the prejudice of the consideration 
 enjoyed by the agent representing him at Ems. 
 He wrote afterwards, but too late, in a book 
 published in 1872 : 1 " Count Benedetti's complaint 
 was justifiable ; but, to have defended him, at that 
 moment, against the newspapers that were attack- 
 
 1 La France el la Prusse avant la guerre, p. 382. 
 
x PREFACE 
 
 ing him, it would have been necessary to divulge 
 the whole exchange of views that took place in 
 1869, and this narration could not have failed to 
 have considerably increased the irritation of the 
 public mind, as it would have shown that Prussia 
 acted with full knowledge of the circumstances, 
 and that the Prussian Government was aware to 
 what point it was wounding French interests and 
 feelings, by raising the question of the Hohen- 
 zollern candidature again. The Government 
 therefore considered it right to keep silent, at least 
 for the moment, and thought Count Benedetti 
 would continue for some time longer to make a 
 sacrifice of his personal feelings, which were justly 
 wounded by the undeserved attacks of a few 
 newspapers." 
 
 This sacrifice was imposed on me, and I sub- 
 mitted to it although it was prejudicial to the 
 task I was performing at Ems. But was I 
 relieved at the proper time ? By no means ; 
 I continued under the weight of those accusa- 
 tions, which should have been refuted at once so 
 as to show the country that the Imperial Govern- 
 ment was right in repelling the audacious com- 
 bination prepared at Berlin, and that its agents 
 had served it well ; to show Europe to what 
 degree of perfidy the policy of the Prussian 
 Government had attained in this affair ; finally, 
 to thoroughly establish that it had conducted 
 
PREFACE xi 
 
 the matter in such a way as to place France 
 in this dilemma : to go to war or accept the 
 accession of a German prince in Spain. Count 
 Bismarck would certainly not have failed to have 
 done so. 
 
 As a matter of fact, what happened ? Finding 
 authority in the blame the Constitutionnel in- 
 flicted on me, its contemporaries of all shades 
 hastened to multiply the reproaches it had been 
 the first to pronounce. According to some, 
 the Government I had kept so ill-informed 
 should recall me from Ems and revoke me 
 by a minute, setting forth the motives for 
 doing so, inserted in the Journal Officiel ; in 
 the opinion of others its duty ordained that it 
 should bring me before a committee of inquiry. 
 These amenities so ill-adapted to uphold me 
 in the negotiations, at once so arduous and 
 so delicate, that I was engaged in with the 
 King of Prussia, reached me each morning 
 with the Paris mail. They continued more 
 ardent and bitter, without being any more justi- 
 fiable, after my return. "If Count Bismarck," 
 wrote M. About in the XIXe Steele, "imagines 
 we are thirty-six million Benedettis in France, 
 he is making a great mistake." 
 
 No one troubled about the justice of these 
 invectives, however cruel they were. As no 
 part of my correspondence had been published, 
 
xii PREFACE 
 
 it was impossible for any one to determine how 
 I had acquitted myself of my functions, and 
 public opinion remained convinced that I had 
 neglected to give the Imperial Government 
 information, that I had failed in all my duties, 
 and that they were therefore authorised to 
 load me with a good share of the responsibility 
 of our disasters. As our defeats became more 
 serious, public feeling was exasperated, and the 
 conviction that I was devoid of all diplomatic 
 understanding, that during my mission to Prussia 
 I had been constantly inferior to my task, 
 gained consistency as it spread, like a fact 
 henceforth beyond discussion. I then noticed 
 persons who, on all occasions, had shown them- 
 selves anxious to give me proof of their esteem, 
 slip away so as to avoid my presence. Sharing 
 the general uneasiness, and anxious for news 
 from the seat of war, I often visited the Corps 
 Legislatif, persuaded that the Government might 
 at any moment give some information to the 
 Chamber. A friend came and found me in 
 the gallery to which I had access, to advise 
 me not to show myself there, as my presence 
 so aroused the anger of certain members of the 
 Assembly. " There is the culprit," they exclaimed 
 forgetting that the real guilty parties were, in the 
 first place, the deputies who had refused the 
 Government, notwithstanding the patriotic efforts 
 
PREFACE xiii 
 
 and eloquent demonstration of Marshal Niel, 
 the means to carry on a war which had been 
 foreseen and had become inevitable since 
 Sadowa. "You want to make France an 
 immense barracks," they said to this brave 
 soldier. "You will make it a huge cemetery," 
 was the rejoinder. One knows, at the present 
 day, on which side was foresight and reason. 
 
 Party spirit leads the best minds so thoroughly 
 astray that, on the occasion of Count Bismarck's 
 last avowals an important journal placed me in 
 presence of this singular dilemma : " Either our 
 Ambassador," it said, "had seen at Ems the 
 despatch addressed, in accordance with the King's 
 commands, by Herrvon Abeken, to the President 
 of the Prussian Cabinet, a despatch which was so 
 fraudulently altered at Berlin, and he communi- 
 cated its terms to the Imperial Government; or 
 else he was unable to get the information and 
 was ignorant of the contents of that document. 
 In the first of these two suppositions, M. de 
 Gramont and his colleagues should alone assume 
 the responsibility of ulterior events ; in the 
 second, on the contrary, the Ambassador failed 
 in the most essential of his duties, that of keep- 
 ing his Government correctly informed. He is 
 the chief culprit." 
 
 How could I know the contents of the despatch 
 sent from Ems to Berlin ? Could I have my eye 
 
PREFACE 
 
 and hand in the Kind's private room, and thus be 
 immediately informed as to the instructions the 
 sovereign sent his Ministers ? The argument is 
 really not worthy of the newspaper, generally 
 more serious and circumspect, that appropriated 
 it, and the tenour of which it found in publications 
 without consistence. Would the writer in the 
 same journal admit, indeed, that it is impossible 
 to pen either a telegram or despatch at the Quai 
 d'Orsay without the diplomatic agents accredited 
 to Paris being in a position to send a copy to their 
 Governments ? But, besides, what did Herr von 
 Abeken say in his despatch to Count Bismarck ? 
 We now possess the exact text of it brought 
 to the tribune of the Reichstag by General 
 Caprivi. Herr von Abeken gave a summary of 
 the incidents that had occurred at Ems during the 
 day of July 13th, and of which I had, having taken 
 part in them, given an account on my side. Now 
 the versions forwarded to Paris and Berlin were 
 absolutely identical. If I had had the despatch I 
 am reproached with having been ignorant of be- 
 fore me, I could not have given the Imperial 
 Government more correct information. It pleased 
 Count Bismarck to alter the communication of his 
 sovereign so as to inform Europe and particularly 
 Germany, contrary to all truth, that an Ambas- 
 sador at Ems had been humiliated by the King. 
 Can I be in any way responsible ? And is it not 
 
PREFACE xv 
 
 singular that, when Count Bismarck boldly lays 
 claim to the initiative of this misdeed, a French 
 newspaper should find a pretext, in this incident, 
 for reverting to the accusations that were dis- 
 avowed even by the man who was the cause of 
 them ! 
 
 I have pointed out before with what unanimity 
 and bitterness they reproached me — apart from 
 the ignorance in which I was accused of having 
 left my Government in regard to the candidature 
 of Prince Leopold — with the ' little care I 
 had taken, as they said, to control the relations 
 between Russia and Prussia, to call attention to 
 the close intimacy established between those two 
 powers to our prejudice. This is what the Journal 
 des Ddbats observed on this subject, adding 
 nothing, for that matter, to what was related, in 
 still more disobliging terms, by other organs of 
 the Parisian press : " Light will be thrown on all 
 these mysteries at the proper time. In the mean- 
 while, let us remember, that our Ambassadors at 
 Berlin and St. Petersburg were ignorant of all, 
 and that this understanding between the two 
 sovereigns, which was to be so disastrous to us, 
 was concluded before their eyes without them 
 noticing anything. M. Benedetti did not have 
 the least suspicion. ..." 
 
 On what basis do such positive statements 
 repose ? We shall see how utterly unfounded 
 
xvi PREFACE 
 
 they were. When my correspondence has been 
 gone into it will be established as a matter of 
 fact that, at every moment since 1866, I noted 
 the incidents that revealed to me the harmony, 
 becoming closer and more cordial, that was being 
 established between the Courts of Prussia and 
 Russia, that from these circumstances I obtained 
 the proof of the existence between them of an under- 
 standing in regard to approaching contingencies. 
 I shall be pardoned if I do not resist the desire 
 to supply here an irrefutable demonstration of it. 
 This is what I wrote on January 5th, 1868 : 
 " What distinguishes Count Bismarck, is not 
 merely the rapidity of his resolutions ; it is 
 also his foresight and activity. He has under- 
 stood that it would not suffice, to put his new 
 plans into execution, to appease all internal 
 dissensions, he has shown himself convinced that 
 it is necessary also (after Sadowa) to protect 
 himself against the discontent of France. For 
 that purpose, and without losing a day, he has 
 set about seeking security and an alliance at 
 St. Petersburg. 
 
 "General von Manteuffel was suddenly recalled 
 from the army and sent on a mission to the 
 Emperor Alexander. What did the King's con- 
 fidant do at St. Petersburg? . . . Nothino- has 
 placed Prussia under the necessity of divulging 
 the arrangements she may have concerted with 
 
PREFACE xvii 
 
 Russia ; but it is certain that General von Man- 
 teuffel resided for several weeks at the Imperial 
 Court, and that since that time, the Russian Govern- 
 ment has not ceased to observe an attitude that 
 has been manifestly friendly in its relations with 
 Prussia. Its representative at Berlin, who was 
 so much alarmed by the success of the Prussian 
 arms, and who did not conceal his anxiety, was, 
 in his turn, summoned to St. Petersburg ; he 
 returned, a few weeks later, entirely reassured and 
 affecting an attitude of satisfaction which was no 
 more departed from. . . . All these events are 
 recorded in my correspondence ; I nevertheless re- 
 call them because coupled with ulterior incidents, 
 they show there exists an understanding between 
 St. Petersburg and Berlin. . . . The English 
 Ambassador here for a long time refused to 
 admit that the agreement between Prussia and 
 Russia should be regarded with uneasiness. 
 For some time past, his views have become 
 considerably modified, and at present he is not 
 less persuaded than other members of the diplo- 
 matic body, that contingent arrangements have 
 been made between the Governments of King 
 William and the Emperor Alexander. For my 
 part, I have discovered the permanent demon- 
 stration, if I may so express myself, in the firm 
 resolution of the Berlin Cabinet to prepare 
 German unity without allowing itself to be turned 
 
 b 
 
xviii PREFACE 
 
 aside for an instant by the possibility of a 
 conflict with France. . . ." 
 
 Apart from producing the written proof of the 
 bonds uniting Russia and Prussia, it seems to me 
 that it would have been difficult to explain myself 
 on this subject with greater care and emphasis. 
 
 The Journal des Debats therefore was as ill- 
 informed as its contemporaries, and its good faith 
 was strangely led astray when it affirmed that 
 I had seen nothing, and learnt nothing of what 
 was passing before my eyes. 
 
 At what moment — it is necessary to note and 
 retain this — did I make it such a constant practice 
 to call attention to the relations springing up be- 
 tween the Cabinets of Berlin and St. Petersburg ? 
 The page you have just read was written by me 
 in January 1868, thirty months before the war, and 
 it will be observed that I refer to previous des- 
 patches written in the same sense and in the same 
 line of thought. 
 
 No one will ever know what I have suffered, 
 the bitterness in which my mind has been so long 
 and so pitilessly steeped, the anguish in which I 
 have lived for several years. My grief was all 
 the more keen as I had the conviction of having 
 shown myself worthy of the confidence that had 
 been placed in me when I was appointed to the 
 Embassy at Berlin, and my hands are full of 
 proofs bearing witness to it. 
 
PREFACE xix 
 
 Unable to endure the torments that encompassed 
 me, and taking my inspiration from my patriotism 
 as much as from feelings of self-esteem, I decided, 
 in the year 1871, to appeal from an opinion 
 deceived by organs that had an interest to lead 
 it astray to an opinion better informed, and I 
 resolved to put together, in a volume, 1 the im- 
 portant despatches I had penned from Berlin, and 
 to add to them the whole of the correspondence 
 I had exchanged with M. de Gramont during my 
 mission to Ems? I nursed the illusion, which, 
 however, was very natural, that by placing all 
 the documents in the case before my readers, 
 I should set public opinion right again and obtain 
 the reparation due to me. 
 
 These documents, in fact, established beyond 
 doubt, not only that I had not been surprised 
 at the candidature of the Prussian Prince, but 
 further that I had not been mistaken, at any 
 time during my long residence at Berlin, as to 
 the real intentions of the Government to which 
 I was accredited, any more than I had been as 
 to the intrigues of Count Bismarck ; that I had 
 on the contrary, observed them with the greatest 
 care ; that, finally, I had given almost a daily 
 account of them. To prove this, it will suffice 
 for me to reproduce here the conclusion of the 
 despatch from which I recently quoted a first 
 
 1 Ma Mission en Prusse. 
 
 b 2 
 
xx PREFACE 
 
 extract. After having grouped together all the 
 elements of information authorising me to be- 
 lieve that they aimed, in Berlin, at the restora- 
 tion of the German Empire, whilst acknowledg- 
 ing to themselves that they could only attain 
 that end after having placed France, by a suc- 
 cessful war, in the impossibility to raise an 
 obstacle to it, I added in concluding : ". . . We 
 must not dissemble : public feeling in Germany, 
 generally, has urged the Prussian Government to 
 enter on the path along which it is now advanc- 
 ing. Union first of all, then liberty, such has 
 been the programme of the National Party, 
 comprising all shades of moderate Liberals, since 
 it has been able to form an idea of the import- 
 ance attendant on the success obtained by the 
 Prussian armies ; and it is with transports of en- 
 thusiasm and hatred that it would second the 
 King's Government in a war against France. 
 There are Particularists 1 in Germany. . . . There 
 exists, in some secondary States, an invincible 
 feeling of aversion for everything connected with 
 the Prussian Government. . . . But at the outset 
 of a national war, the most stubborn of those 
 who share this feeling would be obliged to 
 abstain from indulging in it ; they would have to 
 give way before the masses who would applaud 
 
 1 Adherents to a political party in Germany who wish the dif- 
 ferent States forming the German Empire to maintain their inde- 
 pendence and their own institutions. — Translator. 
 
PREFACE xxi 
 
 at the conflict whilst passionately imposing on 
 themselves the sacrifices that would be imposed 
 on them. The German populations, in general, 
 would regard the struggle, whatever the circum- 
 stances under which it broke out, as a French 
 war of aggression against their country ; and if 
 the fate of arms were favourable to them, their 
 exactions would know no limits ; they would 
 equal those of Prussia, which have always been 
 so difficult to satisfy each time she has been 
 victorious. We should therefore have to keep 
 up a formidable war in which a whole people at 
 the outset would take part against us. I here 
 close this explanatory summary, which I recom- 
 mend rather to your indulgence than to your 
 attention." 
 
 I resumed in these few words : " German union 
 will soon be accomplished ; ought we to accept 
 it ? If so, do not let us conceal the fact that we 
 shall give it a kindly welcome. . . . I n the contrary 
 event, let us prepare for war without respite, and 
 let us form a clear idea as to what assistance 
 Austria is likely to be to us. . . . We shall need all 
 our forces to ensure victory on the Rhine ; the 
 campaign of 1866 has more than amply shown, 
 by the defeat of the Austrian armies, the dangers 
 of a struggle engaged in on either side of the 
 Alps." 
 
 Does not this despatch show that I had long 
 
xxii PREFACE 
 
 since had a presentiment of the conflict, of 
 Prussia's well-determined intention to provoke it, 
 and had pointed out the obligations this contin- 
 gency imposed on us ? Could I have shown 
 greater attention, greater forethought, have 
 pointed out the dangers threatening us at a 
 more seasonable time ? 
 
 To prove that my convictions did not vary, 
 that I persisted up to the last moment in the 
 judgment I had expressed on the policy and 
 calculations of the Prussian Cabinet, I will quote 
 an extract from the last despatch I wrote from 
 Berlin. The Emperor Alexander II. had just 
 reached Ems ; King William, followed by Count 
 Bismarck, had hastened to join his guest. I had 
 on more than one occasion, and notably in my 
 report of January 5th, 1868, noted the efforts 
 made with unswerving steadfastness by the 
 German Chancellor to cause a feeling to prevail 
 at the Russian Court in accordance with his 
 designs. On the occasion of the meeting of the 
 two sovereigns, at which I was not present, this 
 is how I thought I could sum up the views the 
 King and his Prime Minister would give expres- 
 sion to : 
 
 " If I must confide to you," I wrote on June 
 30th, 1870, two weeks before the opening of 
 hostilities, "my personal impressions, I will 
 say that it suffices to remember what was the 
 
PREFACE xxiii 
 
 thought of the Berlin Cabinet in constantly ex- 
 erting itself to strengthen its intimate relations 
 with that of St. Petersburg, to form an idea of 
 the object the King had in view in proceeding 
 to Ems, accompanied by the Chancellor, and of 
 the interviews they have had with the Emperor 
 Alexander. Count Bismarck, being of one frame 
 of mind in this respect with his Sovereign, has 
 invariably sought to ensure the eventual con- 
 currence of Russia in their views. With that 
 aim he has shown himself, on the one hand, 
 favourable to the policy of the St. Petersburg 
 Cabinet in the East ; on the other hand he has 
 not ceased to awaken susceptibilities in regard to 
 questions that agitate national feeling in Russia. 
 I have no fear of being in error in presuming 
 that he has been careful to give his views on the 
 state of affairs in the Principalities, and in all the 
 Levant, so as to please the Emperor ; and he 
 cannot have failed to point out the tendency of 
 the Vienna Cabinet to re-establish autonomy in 
 Polish Galicia. Whilst the Minister will have 
 assumed the task of setting the Emperor at ease 
 on the first of these two points, and of alarming 
 him on the other, the King will have displayed 
 that good grace which he has always known 
 how to turn to such wonderful account, to capti- 
 vate the kindly feelings of his august nephew: 
 and I have no doubt, for my part, that, together, 
 
xxiv PREFACE 
 
 they have produced on his mind the impressions 
 they desired. . . . 
 
 "It must not, however, be supposed that Count 
 Bismarck considers it advisable to bind his policy 
 closely to that of the Russian Cabinet. My views 
 are that he has not contracted and is not disposed 
 to make any engagement likely to cause him diffi- 
 culties or to weaken him on the Rhine. The 
 Chancellor's complacency towards Russia will never 
 be of such a nature as to limit his liberty of action ; 
 he promises, as a matter of fact more than he 
 intends to perform, or in other words he seeks the 
 alliance of the St. Petersburg Cabinet in order to 
 have the benefit of it in the event of a conflict in 
 the West. . . . And so I have always felt per- 
 suaded that no official engagement has ever been 
 made between the two Courts. ..." 
 
 Ulterior events, and particularly the resolutions 
 that the Chancellor caused to prevail at the Berlin 
 Congress, when Russia was pitilessly sacrificed, 
 have entirely justified my conjectures, however 
 premature they may have been at the time I put 
 them in writing. In regard to this matter, again, 
 was I wanting in foresight, and was I mistaken as 
 to Count Bismarck's real intentions ? But what 
 my readers will retain above all, is that, from 1866 
 until the last moment of my stay at Berlin, I have 
 never, at any time, omitted to set forth in my 
 correspondence not merely the calculations I 
 
PREFACE xxv 
 
 felt justified in considering the Prussian Govern- 
 ment was making, but its ceaseless efforts to 
 ensure the neutrality of Russia and eventually its 
 armed co-operation, if Austria determined to give 
 assistance to France in the ensuing war. 
 
 Since Austria had been expelled from Germany, 
 they had had but one object at Berlin, that of 
 uniting the Southern States to the Confederation 
 of the North and of re-establishing the Imperial 
 Crown for the benefit of the House of Hohen- 
 zollern. They would not hesitate at war if re- 
 course to arms became necessary. In the mean- 
 while they were preparing to attain their end 
 in a military sense, by making the armies as 
 powerful as possible ; diplomatically, by display- 
 ing dazzling perspectives at St. Petersburg, 
 which, although fallacious, were sufficient to con- 
 vince the Sovereign he could rely on a kindly 
 attitude, and if occasion offered on active 
 support, particularly in view of keeping a check 
 on Austria. That ,is just what I was con- 
 stantly pointing out, and my volume, Ma Mission 
 en Prusse, is swarming with indications bearing 
 testimony to my vigilance and to my eagerness 
 to collect every kind of information in regard 
 to the frame of mind and aims of the Prussian 
 Government. 
 
 Did I err at Ems ? Did I mistake the King's 
 real intentions and the nature of my instructions ? 
 
xxvi PREFACE 
 
 Did I imprudently create the incidents that per- 
 mitted Count Bismarck to hurl the two countries 
 in arms against one another ? What interest 
 had we in this affair, what could we, what ought 
 we to exact ? First of all, the desistance of 
 Prince Leopold. It was granted us. Was 
 it necessary and advisable to obtain that the 
 King should impose it on him and enter into an 
 engagement with us ? M. de Gramont thought 
 so, and I was not of his opinion. It is not the 
 place here to enumerate the reasons of this 
 disagreement : they are, however, easy to guess. 
 What it is of importance for me to add, is that 
 the King consented to give his personal and 
 sovereign assent to the Prince's determination, 
 and communicate it to us, thus sharing the 
 responsibility of his nephew's declaration. I 
 thought, for my part, that this solution gave us 
 most entire satisfaction, without any prejudice 
 to the dignity of either party, and consequently 
 that it was acceptable on both sides. 
 
 During the whole course of these negotiations 
 nothing occurred to disturb the courtesy with 
 which they were carried on. It is necessary I 
 should repeat here, that at Ems there was neither 
 an insulter nor a person insulted. Questioned at 
 Baden, on this subject, some years later, the King 
 replied : " M. Benedetti performed his duty cor- 
 rectly ; nothing more." 
 
PREFACE xxvii 
 
 There was a change in the aspect of things on 
 July 13th, due to the communication which I 
 received orders to make to the King at the last 
 moment, and also to a despatch from his Ambas- 
 sador at Paris. I was instructed on the night 
 of July 1 2th, to solicit the King's verbal assurance 
 that he would not authorise Prince Leopold to 
 accept the offer he had just declined in case it 
 were made to him again. Baron Werther, on 
 his side, became the intermediary of another 
 desire, which was not communicated to me : it was 
 a question of deciding the King to write the 
 Emperor a letter conceived in such terms as would 
 appease the irritation the incident had provoked 
 in France. The King rejected my last overture, 
 and gave orders to inform Count Bismarck of 
 these final phases of our conferences. The 
 despatch prepared with that view bears the same 
 date, day and hour, as that in which I announced 
 to M. de Gramont that the King gave his ap- 
 probation to Prince Hohenzollern's desistance, 
 whilst authorising me to notify the same to the 
 Emperor's Government. Had it not been for the 
 last wish that I was requested to express to the 
 King and the desire that the Prussian Ambassador 
 at Paris consented to transmit to his sovereign, 
 the despatch destined for Count Bismarck would 
 merely have announced the closure of this dis- 
 cussion, and the text, in that case, would not 
 
xxviii PREFACE 
 
 have undergone the criminal alterations of which 
 the Chancellor has boldly assumed the responsi- 
 bility. My mission would therefore have been 
 happily fulfilled, and war averted. 
 
 Consequently no more at Ems than at Berlin 
 had I in any way betrayed the confidence of my 
 Government. I therefore had reason to think, 
 that my volume would throw a brilliant light on 
 the way in which I had acquitted myself of my 
 professional duties, and cause the most prejudiced 
 to modify their opinions in my favour. Nothing 
 of the kind occurred. I had not made allow- 
 ance for passions, particularly for legend, that 
 occult power which exercises such baleful influ- 
 ence on the credulity of the masses. A few 
 earnest men, desirous of gaining information, 
 were struck with the authority of my revelations 
 and so expressed themselves to me. But the 
 general public, who read little or not at all, 
 who have formed their opinion and abide by 
 it, showed me no consideration. A new trouble 
 was added to the others, that of seeing writers 
 worthy of all esteem abstain, with the exception 
 of Jules Favre, 1 from relieving me of the accusa- 
 tions brought against me. 
 
 I incurred even another reproach. I had, they 
 said, overlooked a duty of the first order in 
 diplomacy, I had failed to maintain professional 
 
 1 See Le Gouvernement de la Defense Nationale, vol. ii., p. 349. 
 
PREFACE xxix 
 
 secrecy. M. de Gramont, in his book, La France 
 et la Prusse avant la Guerre, made himself the 
 authorised mouthpiece of this charge. " An agent 
 or a functionary," he wrote, " should submit to pass 
 as unskilful and thoughtless ; it matters little for 
 his country's future if his reputation as a talented 
 man be eclipsed." x This opinion is at least 
 controvertible ; is it not rather permissible to 
 think that a Minister, conscious of his duty, can 
 always protect a servant placed under his orders 
 against accusations which touch his honour and 
 concern the welfare of the country ? " The 
 Government," he said again, " considered it should 
 preserve silence for the moment," and he recalls 
 the pressing requests I had sent him from Ems to 
 contradict rumours that were injurious to the 
 esteem in which I wished to be held. He there- 
 fore intended to deny them. If he failed to 
 acquit himself of that task, how could he blame 
 me for doing so ? Besides, when did I publish 
 the documents in my possession ? When the 
 Government which I had served, and which could 
 have screened and rehabilitated me in the eyes of 
 the public, had already been overthrown ; when 
 peace had been concluded ; when there was no 
 longer any peril for public interest ; when there 
 was, on the contrary, every advantage in reveal- 
 ing the truth, in making it all known. Were 
 
 1 Page 2. 
 
xxx PREFACE 
 
 the despatches I made use of with this aim in 
 view, still, at that moment, discreetly hidden in 
 the cardboard boxes at the Ministry of Foreign 
 Affairs ? By no means. They had, for the most 
 part, been handed to the Committee appointed by 
 the National Assembly to proceed to an inquiry 
 into the acts of the Provisional Government. 
 M. de Gramont appeared before it as I did ; he 
 could convince himself that our correspondence 
 was no longer a secret or a mystery for any one, 
 that it had become public property. I could 
 therefore decline all responsibility in this respect ; 
 I will do nothing of the kind, considering that 
 real independence of character, that the first of all 
 duties, consists in claiming the share of responsi- 
 bility one has incurred and in appealing to the 
 judgment of one's fellow citizens. 
 
 I took but one step before deciding definitely 
 what I would do. I solicited the Emperor's con- 
 sent, and I carried him the first proof sheets of 
 my book over to England. " I fully authorise 
 you to publish it," he answered me. " The docu- 
 ments it contains will be evidence for future 
 historians of these unhappy times ; they will 
 supply them with indispensable elements to 
 thoroughly establish that our diplomacy, whatever 
 may have been said of it, has never set deceitful 
 snares anywhere. Relying on our own loyalty, 
 we have had confidence in the loyalty of others, 
 
PREFACE xxxi 
 
 and that error has been the origin of all our 
 disasters." 
 
 What results from these circumstances which I 
 have had to recall, in order to respond to the 
 reproach pronounced by M. de GramOnt ? That 
 I have published diplomatic documents which the 
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs had parted with, and 
 that in doing so I was protected by the Sovereign 
 • to whose intentions my acts and conduct had been 
 obedient, as duty commanded. 
 
 Disappointed in my hope of bringing national 
 feeling back to a more healthy and enlightened 
 appreciation of events, I became resigned and 
 waited until time, that includible redresser of 
 public errors, could do so efficaciously. It was 
 during this period that, in my painful anxiety, I 
 penned the pages reproduced in this volume. I 
 was supported and encouraged, in that work, not 
 only by my ardent desire to contribute towards 
 making the truth manifest, but also by new pub- 
 lications, due to the investigations of laborious 
 and sincere writers who threw fresh light on the 
 origin and causes of the events that have been so 
 fatal to us. I was also buoyed up by indiscretions 
 that came from all sides, by those which Count 
 Bismarck considered he could indulge in, in the 
 guest-chamber among his familiar friends, thus 
 revealing his inward strategy and increasing his 
 importance in their eyes. These indiscretions, 
 
xxxii PREFACE 
 
 more or less well combined, were repeated outside 
 and commented on. They were confided to cer- 
 tain organs of publicity. From that moment the 
 veil was rent asunder in the opinion of independ- 
 ent and conscientious persons, and I received con- 
 soling proofs of it. 
 
 The newspapers, especially foreign newspapers, 
 who had had faith in Count Bismarck's word, 
 who had, after and with him, obstinately pre- 
 tended that France had wished for war at any 
 price and provoked the conflict, the whole press 
 in fact, led astray by the Chancellor of the 
 Empire, felt, nevertheless, reluctant to recognise 
 that it had been his dupe, and it persisted in the 
 opinion it had made its readers share. The 
 masses were thus kept in the first error : France, 
 people continued to say, by making herself the 
 aggressor deserved the reverse inflicted on her, 
 and her diplomacy was the first at fault. 
 
 It required the stormy and haughty intervention 
 of Count Bismarck himself, it needed the audacity 
 he displayed in claiming the benefit of an act of 
 treachery, to open all eyes, to implant the con- 
 viction in every conscience that the war was 
 exclusively his personal work, that he had willed 
 it, and that he had had, to use his own expression, 
 the good fortune to impose it on his own 
 Sovereign as well as on the French Government. 
 
 All remember the echo of that unexpected 
 
PREFACE xxxiii 
 
 explosion, that story of three Germans seated 
 round a dinner table mutually elated at the 
 thought of crushing the Gaul, in turn delighted 
 or in dismay accordingly as the struggle appeared 
 imminent or the affair seemed likely to end in 
 smoke. The details of the incident will be found 
 in this volume reproduced from the Chancellor's 
 own version. 
 
 Is there any necessity to recall with what 
 surprise and indignation Europe suddenly heard 
 Count Bismarck claim his due ? The London 
 newspapers, unable any longer to disguise the fact 
 that he had imposed on their good faith, spared him 
 neither invectives nor recriminations. An im- 
 portant organ of the Berlin press declared that 
 it felt the keenest shame in acknowledging 
 that not only it but the whole of Germany, 
 had been impudently deceived by the highest 
 representative of the King and Country. I have 
 nothing to say that is not present to every mind 
 anent the painful and irritable feeling provoked 
 in France by this incident ; but I shall be per- 
 mitted to mention that it was universally ac- 
 knowledged that I had not deserved any of the 
 accusations that had been so obstinately, and so 
 generally laid to my charge. I am thus indebted 
 to Count Bismarck for having recovered, along 
 with public esteem and consideration, the peace 
 of mind which I had lost. 
 
 c 
 
xxxiv PREFACE 
 
 In the history of the events of this period, 
 three points, three questions, have particularly 
 exercised public opinion. Presented, from the 
 commencement, under a deceitful aspect by 
 Count Bismarck, they contributed to form that 
 erroneous opinion which so long prevailed. 
 
 Of these three points, the first in date, that of 
 ascertaining who insisted on and provoked the 
 war, who will have to assume all the responsi- 
 bility of it in the eyes of posterity, has been 
 enlightened by Count Bismarck himself. The 
 matter is settled. 
 
 The second, which is really the corollary of the 
 first, may be resumed in these terms : Did the 
 Prussian Government take an active part in 
 the candidature of Prince Leopold ? Was it 
 their work, and did they conceive it with the 
 idea of aggression, with the design of making 
 the conflict, foreseen and desired, result from it ? 
 Or was the Government a stranger to the inci- 
 dent, as has always been maintained at Berlin, 
 " looking upon the matter as a family affair in 
 which they took no interest " ? 
 
 At present we know the whole truth in respect 
 to this. Last year a book of the utmost interest x 
 
 1 Aus dem Leben Konig Karls von Rumanien, Aufzeichnungen 
 einesAugenzeugen. 2 vols. The work has been epitomized in the 
 Revue des Deux Mondes by M. Valbert, who, with his smart 
 analytic talent, has placed the precious revelations it contains 
 in bright relief. 
 
PREFACE xxxv 
 
 appeared at Stuttgart ; it is the story of the 
 private life of King Charles of Roumania, and is 
 rich in documentary information in the form of 
 the private correspondence of that Prince with his 
 family, and particularly with his father. There is 
 no author's name to the work ; but the person 
 who wrote or published it has been the recipient 
 of all the confidences he could have desired to 
 interest his readers. And yet, although the in- 
 formation which the author divulges to the public 
 is full of family and personal details, although the 
 subjects of general politics on which he touches 
 are very important, and notwithstanding that he 
 often brings forward Count Bismarck and King 
 William, there has been no denial or rectification. 
 Under these circumstances it is permissible to 
 conclude that the exactitude of the historical 
 facts, with which the book is teeming, is beyond 
 doubt. We may, therefore, pause and glean from 
 it the irrefutable evidence by which a point of 
 contemporaneous history that has hitherto given 
 rise to much controversy is enlightened. 
 
 When a fortuitous incident aroused my attention 
 in 1869, and put me on the trace of the underhand 
 dealing they were engaged in at Berlin, I ques- 
 tioned Herr von Thiele, Under Secretary of State 
 for Foreign Affairs, in the absence of Count Bis- 
 marck, on the subject of Prince Hohenzollern's 
 
 candidature. This functionary, who possessed 
 
 c 2 
 
xxxvi PREFACE 
 
 the Chancellor's entire confidence, returned me a 
 clear and categorical answer. " Herr von Thiele," 
 I wrote, " has given me the most formal assurance 
 that he has not, at any time, had knowledge of any 
 sort of indication that could authorise such a con- 
 jecture. The Under Secretary of State, without 
 my having said anything to provoke such a mani- 
 festation, thought proper to engage his word of 
 honour." 1 
 
 I nevertheless considered it necessary to ques- 
 tion Count Bismarck himself, as soon as he 
 returned to Berlin. The Chancellor was not so 
 discreet as the Under Secretary. He made no 
 difficulty about acknowledging that my information 
 was correct : " ' The sovereignty that would be 
 offered to Prince Leopold,' he said to me, ' could 
 only be of ephemeral duration, and would expose 
 him to more dangers than mistakes. The King 
 being convinced of this would certainly advise 
 him to abstain from acquiescing in the vote of the 
 Cortes. The Prince's father shares this view.' 
 Fancying that Count Bismarck had not expressed 
 his whole thought to me, I pointed out to him that 
 as Prince Leopold could not comply with the 
 wish of the Cortes without the King's approval, 
 his Majesty would have to dictate to the Prince 
 the resolution he would, under such circumstances 
 have to take. Count Bismarck acknowledged 
 
 1 Archives of Foreign Affairs. Despatch of March 31st, i860. 
 
PREFACE xxxvii 
 
 this, but instead of assuring me that the King 
 was irrevocably decided to recommend him to 
 abstain, he returned to the question of the perils 
 with which the new sovereign of Spain would be 
 encompassed from the moment he ascended the 
 throne. . . . However it may be," I said in conclu- 
 sion," I cannot, as you see, place implicit confidence 
 in the explanations that were given me by the 
 President of the Council, and if I had not feared 
 to exceed the limit that the Emperor's Govern- 
 ment may be disposed to go to in such a delicate 
 matter, I should have requested Count Bismarck, 
 without failing in any of my duties, to express 
 himself more clearly ; but I thought I ought to 
 await your orders before becoming more pressing 
 and insisting further to be definitely informed as 
 to the eventual resolutions that might be taken at 
 Berlin." 1 
 
 What happens, indeed, shortly afterwards, and 
 what became of the first overtures, the avowal of 
 which I had wrung from the Chancellor of the 
 Northern Confederation ? The correspondence 
 of Prince Anthony with his son, the King of 
 Roumania, reveals it. It tells us a Spanish 
 deputy, Sefior Salazar, had been entrusted with 
 the mission of sounding the Hohenzollern Princes. 
 He was introduced to them at one of their 
 castles, in November, 1869, by Herr von Werther, 
 
 1 Archives of Foreign Affairs. Despatch of May nth, 1869. 
 
xxxviii PREFACE 
 
 then Prussian Minister in Bavaria, who would 
 certainly not have performed such a delicate duty 
 .without a formal order from Count Bismarck, who 
 was thus following out his design. The sugges- 
 tion was unfavourably received by Prince 
 Anthony and his three sons. General Prim's 
 emissary, in his desire to contribute toward giving 
 Spain a sovereign, offered the crown to each of 
 them successively and in vain, even to King 
 Charles himself. 
 
 Sefior Salazar left discouraged. He had, how- 
 ever, acquired the certitude that he would, in case 
 of need, meet with powerful support on the banks 
 of the Spree. After a few weeks' residence at 
 Madrid, he reappeared in Germany; this was in 
 January, 1870. He did not go, as on the 
 occasion of his first visit, to the south where 
 the Hohenzollern Princes reside. Changing his 
 itinerary, he arrived direct at Berlin, with letters 
 from the* Regency for the King of Prussia, for 
 the hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern, and for 
 Count Bismarck. On May 1st following, Prince 
 Anthony announced this new apparition of the 
 Spanish messenger to King Charles. He did 
 better, he came himself to Berlin, accompanied 
 by the eldest of his sons, apparently in answer to 
 an invitation he could not decline. At the same 
 moment, Count Bismarck called his Sovereign's 
 attention to a report tending to show how 
 
PREFACE xxxix 
 
 advantageous it would be to Germany, to place a 
 Hohenzollern prince on the Spanish throne. " It 
 would be an inestimable advantage for her," he 
 said, "to have a friend south of the Pyrenees, in 
 the rear of France." 
 
 Prince Leopold, however, hesitated. The Crown 
 Prince of Prussia, giving proof, on this occasion, 
 of his upright feelings, animated his relative's 
 scruples and encouraged him to persist in his 
 desire to escape from the affair. The King 
 himself dreaded the adventure proposed to him. 
 But he soon gave way to pressure, and left the 
 matter to his nephew's free decision, showing him- 
 self disposed to acquiesce in it, whatever it might 
 be. Vanquished by the persistent arguing of his 
 Prime Minister, he consented to act the part of 
 the worthy head of a family, on condition that his 
 sovereign responsibility would not be pledged. 
 He imagined, or rather they had persuaded him, 
 that by intervening in his quality of first Prince of 
 the house of Hohenzollern, he in no way impli- 
 cated the King of Prussia. That was the thesis 
 on which he was shortly to take a stand at Ems. 
 Here are the terms in which Prince Anthony re- 
 lates these incidents : " Bismarck," he wrote on 
 March 20th, " desires acceptance for dynastic and 
 political reasons ; the King only desires it, if 
 Leopold so decides, of his own free will. On the 
 15th we held a very interesting and important 
 
xl PREFACE 
 
 conference, presided over by the King, and at 
 which the Crown Prince, Bismarck, Roon, Moltke, 
 Schleinitz, Thiele, and Delbriick were present. 
 These gentlemen unanimously decided to recom- 
 mend us to accept, as by doing so we should be 
 performing a patriotic duty to Prussia. After 
 some hard fighting Leopold, for more than one 
 reason, refused. . . ." 
 
 They then conceived the idea of putting for- 
 ward his second brother, Prince Frederick, in his 
 place. " One perceives clearly," M. Valbert 
 justly remarks, " that it was no longer a question, 
 at this juncture, of family interest, of provid- 
 ing for an elder or younger son, but of perform- 
 ing a duty to Prussia, of a political combination 
 that was to have grave and important con- 
 sequences." However, it was not Prince 
 Frederick who definitely became candidate for 
 the Spanish crown, it was Prince Leopold himself, 
 who, circumvented by the King's advisers, and 
 more particularly by Count Bismarck, suddenly 
 changed his mind and consented to the proposal 
 of the Spanish Regency, " the most competent of 
 the judges having made it clear to him that the 
 interest of the State required it." 
 
 Compendious though these rapid indications 
 be, do they not superabundantly prove that the 
 candidature of Prince Leopold was regarded 
 by Count Bismarck as a means of causing 
 
PREFACE xli 
 
 difficulties to France of a political and inter- 
 national order ? — that it was brought forward 
 long in advance and discussed from the point of 
 view of German interests, "with a determined ob- 
 ject (mit einem bestimmten Zweck)," as the Crown 
 Prince observed when arousing his cousin's dis- 
 trust ? — that it was, in a word, looked upon as 
 a fortuitous event, favourable to the ambitious 
 calculations which already, in 1869, haunted 
 statesmen and warriors at Berlin ? Decided on 
 provoking a conflict with France, they required a 
 plausible pretext to force us into it ; the over- 
 tures of the Regency at Madrid supplied them 
 with what was wanting, and they hastened to lay 
 hands on it. We have seen how stubbornly 
 Count Bismarck caused his schemes to be ac- 
 cepted by the King on the one hand, by the 
 Hohenzollern Princes on the other, constraining, 
 with the aid of Generals von Roon and von 
 Moltke, every will to bend to his own. The 
 King of Prussia's Prime Minister was therefore 
 the chief labourer at this underhand machination 
 which concealed an intrigue, a snare set for the 
 good faith of France. He knew very well that 
 the accession of a German Prince to the throne of 
 Charles V. would be an adventure of brief dura- 
 tion ; he had made no difficulty in admitting it in 
 his conversations with me in May, 1869. But 
 his design was not to place the Spanish crown 
 
xlii PREFACE 
 
 on the head of a Hohenzollern whose fate, what- 
 ever it might be, did not interest him beyond all 
 measure ; he had another aim, that of setting 
 France and Germany at each other. Count 
 Bismarck and the chiefs of the army, consistent 
 with their principles, bent on the same object, 
 could not fail, from the moment they were of 
 opinion that war alone could ensure the triumph 
 of the policy of which they were the organs or 
 rather the inspirers, could not fail, I say, to seek 
 an opportunity to bring it about. It was in that 
 line of thought that they showed themselves 
 unanimous in advising acceptance ; but hence- 
 forth, in face of the revelations supplied by 
 Prince Anthony's correspondence, it would be 
 offending public conscience, if any one still dared 
 pretend that the German Government remained 
 a stranger to the negotiations carried on between 
 Madrid and Berlin, and that the candidature 
 offered and accepted was never anything more 
 than a family affair discussed exclusively be- 
 tween the Spanish Regency and the House of 
 Hohenzollern. 
 
 Thus of the three questions to which I called 
 the attention of my readers two are absolutely 
 elucidated. The first, that of learning which of 
 the belligerents of 1870 wished for war and ren- 
 dered it inevitable, has been decided by Count 
 Bismarck himself with such an explosion and 
 
PREFACE xliii 
 
 such evidence, that there can be no longer any 
 doubt on the subject. The second, namely, that 
 which concerns the character and object of 
 Prince Leopold's candidature, is solved in an 
 equally clear and irrefutable manner by Prince 
 Anthony's correspondence with the King of 
 Roumania. One has shown, let us say it with- 
 out fear of repeating ourselves, that the aim of 
 his policy was a violent aggression of Germany 
 against France ; the other that the candidature 
 of his son was, above all, destined to furnish the 
 pretext, having never been considered as anything 
 else than " the accomplishment of a patriotic duty 
 to Prussia." 
 
 There remains the third question ; I refer to 
 the scheme for uniting Belgium to France. 
 From the outbreak of the war Count Bismarck 
 presented it to Europe with a display worthy of 
 his skill. Speaking alone, and in his customary 
 light-hearted fashion, he taxed France with ideas 
 of covetousness that he had in vain endeavoured 
 to drive into her head. In spite of the efforts I 
 have made to place this affair, so insidiously dis- 
 guised, in its real light, it remains obscure and 
 confused to many worthy minds. Still I have 
 published official documents of incontestable im- 
 portance, establishing beyond a doubt that Count 
 Bismarck on many occasions offered us compen- 
 sations everywhere on our frontier where French 
 
xliv PREFACE 
 
 was spoken, and that, conforming to my instruc- 
 tions, I declined to discuss such a subject. He 
 alone has placed this question in the dark ; he 
 alone can throw light on it ; until conscientious 
 writers are in a position to detach the truth from 
 the documents that time will place at their dis- 
 posal. 
 
 Come, Prince von Bismarck, edify us by an 
 honest effort ; make a final avowal, let one sincere 
 word fall from your lips, and this time again there 
 will be an end to all doubt. Instead of speaking 
 of France with unseemly disdain, instead of calling 
 the attention of the deputations who present you 
 their homage, to the copy-books of our elementary 
 schools, to our folly for conquests, instead of ad- 
 vising them to close the ranks and keep shoulder 
 to shoulder, instead of feeding and exalting the 
 hatred of two neighbouring peoples by such lan- 
 guage, examine your own conscience. Who was 
 it, if not Prussia, who in our times pursued and 
 realised vast conquests ? You made three wars 
 in six years, sprinkled the bones of several hun- 
 dreds of thousands of men from the Baltic to the 
 banks of the Danube, from the Danube to the 
 banks of the Loire; you issued triumphant from 
 this triple struggle, loaded with titles, honours, 
 rewards of every kind. History, assuredly, will 
 not relate that you deserved well of humanity ; 
 
PREFACE xlv 
 
 but you will none the less remain the prodigious 
 man of our time. Your prestige was not seriously 
 affected by your first revelations, and you have 
 been able to tell Europe, without prejudice for the 
 regard in which you are held, what use you could 
 make of your pencil to convey to a communication 
 from your Sovereign a feature and a bearing it 
 , did not possess. At each of your anniversaries 
 Germany acclaims you with renewed fervour. 
 Why should you not take the noble resolve to set 
 matters straight in regard to those conversations 
 into which you introduced the words Luxembourg, 
 Belgium, and even the canton of Geneva — that 
 French enclave, as you termed it. It will cost 
 you less than to have assumed the responsibility 
 of the last war, as your overtures produced no 
 result. 
 
 On a recent occasion, replying to a group of 
 notabilities from Leipzig, you freely expressed 
 the opinion that Germany should continue closely 
 united to Austria, " but that she is nevertheless 
 bound to cultivate friendly intercourse with her 
 eastern neighbour Russia," as that is necessary to 
 her security. But this intercourse existed ; it 
 was cordial, intimate, family-like : it was you who 
 upset it at the Berlin Congress ; it was you who 
 stripped Russia of all the advantages she had 
 acquired by the treaty of San Stefano after a 
 glorious war sustained at the cost of the greatest 
 
xlvi PREFACE 
 
 sacrifices ; it was you, again, who tried to 
 give Austria the influence she exercised in the 
 Lower Danube by assigning to that power Bosnia 
 and Herzegovina which you had snatched from 
 Turkey whose defender you had made yourself. 
 If, on that occasion, you had joined your efforts 
 to those of the plenipotentiaries of the Emperor 
 Alexander II., that faithful prince who gave you 
 his most generous co-operation, no one could 
 have compelled him to renounce the concessions 
 the Sultan had made to his conqueror. Russia 
 would have been grateful, and her relations with 
 Germany would have been strengthened and con- 
 solidated for long. But you had contracted a 
 debt with her that it displeased you to discharge, 
 as it displeased you, in 1866, to remember the 
 assurances you had lavished on France, and 
 accord her the compensations you had promised 
 her. Those two powers have not forgotten this, 
 and you cannot now fail to see that Germany is 
 reaping at the present day the fruits of your in- 
 gratitude. How could so powerful a mind as 
 yours, gifted with such lucid foresight, fall into so 
 grave an error, and voluntarily break those 
 precious bonds which, after having facilitated 
 such vast conquests to Germany, would have 
 guaranteed her the peaceful possession of them ? 
 That is for you to say. For my part, I limit my- 
 self to conjuring you to go the whole length, and 
 
PREFACE xlvii 
 
 display your frankness even in regard to the 
 Belgium affair. 
 
 Consider, Prince Bismarck, that truth, though 
 it come sometimes late, like justice, always 
 succeeds in piercing the obscurity devised to 
 hide it. The force of circumstances sometimes 
 constrains even those who have the least appre- 
 ciated its value to assist in divulging it. It 
 is thus that, in your speeches, in your circulars, 
 you have never ceased affirming that the war 
 of 1870 was imposed on Germany by a violent 
 aggression of France. In September of that 
 same year, in a first conference with M. Jules 
 Favre, did you not hold this language to him : 
 " I only want peace. It was not Germany who 
 troubled it. You declared war on us without a 
 motive, with the sole design of taking a portion 
 of our territory . . . " ? That was reversing the 
 parts — acknowledge it. The following day, at 
 the Chateau de Ferrieres, did you not renew to 
 him the same assurances ? "I have no serious 
 reason," you added, "to love Napoleon III. If 
 he had liked, we could have been two sincere 
 allies, and together we would have disposed of 
 Europe, 1 but I would not fight him ; I proved 
 that in 1867, on the occasion of the Luxemburg 
 affair. All those about the King were for war ; 
 
 1 That is to say, if the Emperor had consented to the proposals 
 concerning Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Canton of Geneva. 
 
xlviii PREFACE 
 
 I was the only one to reject it. ... I merely tell 
 you these things to show you that war was not to 
 my taste : / would certainly never have waged tt 
 had it not been declared against us, and even 
 when it was declared I could not believe it would 
 occur. . . . i 
 
 But there came a time when it pleased you to 
 remind your young Emperor that he owed you 
 his Imperial Crown, and, discarding the language 
 you had invariably held for twenty years, you 
 took upon yourself to inform your contemporaries 
 that the reconstruction of the German Empire was 
 your personal work, being the result of a war of 
 which you were the principal author, and which 
 would not have broken out without your inter- 
 vention. 
 
 In the same way you, for a long time, accused 
 France and her agents of having credited you, in 
 regard to the candidature of Prince Leopold, with 
 intentions and intrigues of which you were abso- 
 lutely innocent. You pretended that this affair 
 interested the House of Hohenzollern only, and 
 that the Prussian Government had never at any 
 moment given attention to it. The publication 
 of Prince Anthony's correspondence upsets all 
 your affirmations at a single stroke. You con- 
 sented to, you supported the proposals of the 
 
 1 See Gouvernement de la DSfense Nationale, by Jules Favre, 
 pages 165 and 170. 
 
PREFACE xlix. 
 
 Regency of Madrid ; you imposed them because, 
 in your state of feeling, they were most advan- 
 tageous to your policy, because they could not 
 fail to become the source of most grave difficulties 
 for France. It was from this double point of view 
 that your colleagues, after you, advised accept- 
 ance. This is now a matter so thoroughly 
 established that you have not attempted to con- 
 tradict it. 
 
 Why do you not take the wise resolution to 
 pay the same homage to truth in the Belgium 
 affair ? If you abstain from doing so, light will 
 sooner or later be thrown on it, in spite of you 
 and to the prejudice of your memory. The future 
 historians of our times will multiply their investi- 
 gations, and numerous documents have already 
 appeared which will place them on the way to 
 a sincere and truthful narrative. They will in- 
 quire what was the message you took to Biarritz 
 when you went there ; you certainly made that 
 journey to ensure the neutrality, if not the co- 
 operation, of France in the war you meditated de- 
 claring against Austria. What was the price you 
 intended paying for it ? What advantages did 
 you offer the Emperor in compensation for your 
 future aggrandisement ? You often opened your 
 heart to me at that time on this grave subject, 
 and you did not conceal from me that it would 
 be extremely difficult to persuade King William 
 
 d 
 
1 PREFACE 
 
 to make the sacrifice of any part of German 
 territory. What you offered the Emperor Na- 
 poleon then was what you mentioned to me — 
 territories bordering on our frontiers, the re- 
 union of which to France you proposed to 
 guarantee. You have certainly not forgotten 
 that you held this language to me on more than 
 one occasion, notably on the eve of the war of 
 1866, when you insisted so warmly on the ad- 
 vantage of arranging a threefold understanding, 
 including Italy. 
 
 Do you remember having informed me on 
 May 1 8th, that Major von Burg, who had gone to 
 Paris, the bearer of a letter from the King to the 
 Emperor, had returned to Berlin without having 
 performed his mission, Herr von der Goltz, your 
 ambassador, being of opinion that this communi- 
 cation was not quite opportune at that moment ? 
 Herr von der Goltz, you told me, had himself had 
 an explanation with the Emperor and his Minister 
 of Foreign Affairs, concerning the desire of the 
 Prussian Government to arrange a preliminary 
 understanding with France and Italy ; but if he 
 had been listened to with kindness, it would never- 
 theless have been impossible for him to persuade 
 his Majesty to receive this overture favourably. 
 At that moment, you were very uneasy, and in 
 your anxiety you were lavish in confidences. "If 
 the Emperor abandons us," you said to me, " by 
 
PREFACE ij. 
 
 refusing to concert with us, and if he facilitates 
 the cession of Venice to the Italians, Prussia 
 will stand alone in face of Austria. . . ." You 
 were nevertheless full of hope in the valour and 
 might of your troops, and you added : "If the 
 King listens to me we shall fight; the army is 
 superb ; at no period has it been more num- 
 erous, more solidly organised, or better armed. 
 I feel confident it will triumph over our 
 enemies. . . ." 1 
 
 Not many days afterwards war became im- 
 minent, Austria having declined the proposal of 
 the Powers to assemble in Congress. You 
 counted on attending this reunion of plenipoten- 
 tiaries in person, and I wrote to M. Drouyn de 
 Lhuys : " Count Bismarck will regret losing the 
 opportunity it would have offered of showing 
 himself at Paris. He would have desired to 
 confer again with the Emperor and yourself. 
 He mentioned to me yesterday, whilst express- 
 ing his anxiety as to our intentions, that he 
 would have been very pleased to sound you 
 before the opening of hostilities, especially in 
 view of Prussia attaining great success, as he feels 
 confident she will do. I gathered from what he 
 said that the King still refuses to admit he 
 could be led to cede a portion of the territory he 
 actually holds to France. According to his 
 
 1 Archives of Foreign Affairs. Despatch of May 19th, 1866. 
 
 d 2 
 
tii PREFACE 
 
 Majesty, at least so Count Bismarck states, the 
 compensations there might be occasion to offer to 
 France, would have to be taken anywhere where 
 French is spoken on her frontiers. The President 
 of the Council had himself pointed out to his 
 Sovereign that to dispose of this territory it would 
 first of all be necessary to conquer it. It, how- 
 ever, escaped the President of the Council to say 
 that if France claimed Cologne, Bonn, and even 
 Mainz, he would prefer to disappear from the 
 political stage rather than consent to the cession. 
 Without my having pressed him, in any way, to 
 explain himself further, he mentioned that he did 
 not think it impossible to decide the King to 
 hand us over the banks of the Upper Moselle 
 which, with Luxemburg, would correct our 
 frontier so as to give us entire satisfaction. I 
 limited myself to answering him that Luxemburg 
 was no more a property without a master than 
 Belgium and certain cantons of Switzerland. 
 Not wishing, however, to discuss these contin- 
 gencies (being absolutely forbidden by my in- 
 structions to do so), nor to allow him to suppose 
 that such arrangements would have any chance of 
 being looked into at Paris, I broke up the con- 
 versation on this subject so as to let him under- 
 stand that I did not wish to continue it. I cannot 
 say whether Count Bismarck, in unbosoming him- 
 self to me in this matter, without having any 
 
PREFACE Hit 
 
 pretext for doing so, wished to sound me or to 
 let you know from now, through my intermediary, 
 what were the compensations he could offer us 
 and what were those we should abstain from 
 asking him for ; but I should not be surprised if 
 it were so, these sorts of expedients being very 
 common with him." l 
 
 Have I reported your words incorrectly, and 
 have I mistaken your real intentions ? My belief 
 that I have not done so finds additional strength 
 in the fact of my being able to corroborate my 
 own language by that of an auricular witness, 
 whose sincerity is above suspicion, and who was 
 at Berlin for the purpose of concerting with you 
 and of associating the policy of his Government 
 with yours. I refer to General Govone. He 
 negotiated the Prusso- Italian treaty, and after its 
 conclusion remained near you as the confidential 
 agent of the Cabinet of Florence, touching upon 
 all diplomatic and military questions in the inter- 
 views you had together and those he had with 
 General von Moltke. His correspondence has 
 been published by the Minister to whom it was 
 addressed, General La Marmora, President of the 
 Council. At the time when it appeared, you dis- 
 played the most lively, I might say, the most 
 violent resentment. No one was surprised, for 
 the letters of the Italian Emissary, like those of 
 
 1 Archives of Foreign Affairs. Despatch of June 4th, 1866. 
 
liv PREFACE 
 
 Prince Anthony, contained revelations calculated 
 to annoy you. 
 
 In a report of May 7th, General Govone was 
 already writing : " Count Bismarck desires to 
 know the Emperor's intentions and wishes ; he 
 has spoken on the subject to Count Barral (the 
 Italian Minister accredited to Berlin); he asked 
 him to try and learn something through Com- 
 mander Nigra. . . ." And the 22nd of the 
 same month, three weeks before the outbreak of 
 hostilities, you again said to him, as you had been 
 continually repeating to me : " Six months ago, 
 when I spoke to the Emperor of what is now 
 taking place, he appeared satisfied at certain 
 arrangements which also suited Prussia ; now 
 that we are on the eve of the event, and it is the 
 moment to conclude more positive conventions, 
 he absolutely refuses to have any explanation." 
 " I then resumed," adds General Govone : " ' But 
 the whole of Europe says openly what the 
 wishes of France are ; perhaps those of the 
 Emperor are the same.' Count Bismarck re- 
 plied : 'In all this affair it is a question of 
 Prussia acquiring preponderance in a part of 
 Germany and of attaching this latter to her by 
 certain bonds. To obtain such advantages, can 
 Prussia and the King cede to France these vast 
 provinces which are of German blood ? It would 
 be much more satisfactory for the Emperor to 
 
PREFACE W 
 
 obtain the . . .' " For the name that certainly 
 follows these last words in General Govone's 
 report, they have placed dots instead of publish- 
 ing it ; but every one has understood that this 
 name was that of the Kingdom of Belgium. The 
 answer your interlocutor gave you allows of no 
 doubt in that respect ; he replied, indeed, that 
 the . . . (here dots again appear) had "such a 
 vigorous vitality of its own and such a pro- 
 nounced sentiment of autonomy, that the matter 
 might be sufficiently difficult for the Emperor 
 not to be tempted by it. . . ." Can these obser- 
 vations apply to Luxemburg ? Does there exist 
 on the French eastern or northern frontier, 
 another country, apart from Belgium, having 
 such a vigorous vitality of its own, and such a 
 pronounced sentiment of autonomy ? 
 
 Thus the language you held to the representa- 
 tives of Italy does not differ from what you said 
 to me, which proves you were, at that moment, 
 perfectly sincere : the same desire to concert with 
 France, to conclude positive conventions with her \ 
 the same difficulty in inducing the King to make 
 a sacrifice on the Rhine ; the same suggestion to 
 buy us out with French-speaking countries. I 
 could quote other extracts from my own cor- 
 respondence, from that of General Govone, or 
 from that of the official representatives of Italy 
 in France and at Berlin, showing you never 
 
Ivi PREFACE 
 
 varied either in your speech or proceedings. I 
 will limit myself here to reminding you that you 
 persevered in the same views, when the Prussian 
 Army was already at the gates of Vienna. 
 Thanks to our intervention, you opened negotia- 
 tions with the Austrian plenipotentiaries. I had, 
 then, to remind you that, in presence of the 
 aggrandisements of Prussia and in accordance 
 with the assurances you had not ceased to renew 
 at Paris, the moment was approaching when it 
 would be advisable for you to come to an under- 
 standing with the Imperial Government in regard 
 to the compensations due to France, and I did 
 not hide from you that those compensations could 
 not be conceded elsewhere than on the Rhine. 
 What was the objection you made ? The 
 difficulty of inducing the King; and you resumed 
 your favourite theme, that of establishing the new 
 equilibrium by making the sacrifices it necessitated 
 weigh on other States bordering on France. My 
 official correspondence, lying in the Archives of 
 Foreign Affairs bears testimony to this in the most 
 explicit manner, as it reproduces your language. 
 After a first conference which we had at Briinn, I 
 wrote in fact to Paris :".... The President of 
 the Council made no difficulty in owning to me 
 (replying to my observations on the importance 
 of the acquisitions Prussia was aiming at, and 
 which at that moment comprised Saxony) that 
 
PREFACE Ivii 
 
 the instructions sent to Herr von der Goltz on 
 that subject were in no way peremptory ; that 
 their principal object was to combine an under- 
 standing with the Emperors Government ; they 
 authorised him to effect a compromise by regu- 
 lating Prussia's pretensions according to what 
 France might name as the price for concerting 
 with her. . . . Count Bismarck particularly in- 
 sisted on the propriety of the two countries 
 uniting and understanding one another. . . . 
 Following the same order of ideas, and going 
 further still, without any encouragement on my 
 part, he endeavoured to prove to me that the 
 Austrian reverses permitted France and Prussia to 
 modify their territorial position. ... I reminded 
 him of the existence of treaties, and that the war 
 which he desired to avert would be the first result 
 of such a policy. Count Bismarck answered that 
 I was mistaken, that Prussia and France united, 
 and resolved to correct their respective frontiers, 
 by binding one another by formal engagements, 1 
 were in a position to settle these questions 
 together without fear of encountering armed 
 resistance on the part of either England or 
 
 Russia " 2 
 
 Already, at that moment, and I noted it in my 
 
 1 It has been seen on a previous page, that Count Bismarck him- 
 self reminded M. Jules Favre of these offers and combinations at 
 the Chateau de Ferrieres. 
 
 2 Archives of Foreign Affairs. Despatch of July 15th, 1866. 
 
lviii PREFACE 
 
 correspondence, your design was evidently to 
 give me to understand that the success of the 
 Prussian armies became a fresh obstacle to the 
 advantages that might have been conceded to us 
 on the Rhine previous to the war. A few days 
 afterwards, and whilst we were at Nikolsburg, 
 I received orders to sound you on this subject. 
 What did you say to me ? That it would be 
 difficult for you to induce the King, conqueror of 
 Austria, to abandon to us any part of Prussian 
 territory ; that in any case you would have to 
 prepare him for it, and that the compensations we 
 considered it just to obtain might, perhaps, be 
 found in the Palatinate. You were however 
 inclined to think that it would be preferable to 
 concert together on other bases, and for another 
 combination, the one you had often spoken to me 
 of; and in informing my Government of the way 
 in which you had received my communication I 
 concluded my despatch thus : — " I shall be con- 
 veying nothing new to your Excellency in an- 
 nouncing to him that Count Bismarck is of 
 opinion that we should seek it (the compensation) 
 in Belgium, and that he offered to come to an 
 understanding with you!' 1 
 
 You will admit that I have no need to demon- 
 strate at greater length that previous to the war 
 of 1866 but one voice was raised, your own, to 
 
 1 Archives of Foreign Affairs. Despatch of July 26th, 1866. 
 
PREFACE lix 
 
 suggest the annexation of Belgium to France. 
 What was then the Emperor's feeling ? Did he 
 show an inclination to enter into your views, and 
 employ force to shelter the frontiers of France by 
 advancing them towards the north ? The Em- 
 peror certainly desired the solution of the Venetian 
 question, which would have crowned the work of 
 emancipation for which France had fought ; but 
 he dreaded war, and he declined all overtures, 
 yours especially, that would have forced him to 
 participate in it. He ardently desired the main- 
 tenance of peace, and had no other object in 
 negotiating, at Vienna, the cession of Venice, 
 which Austria made to him so that it might be 
 restored to Italy. I can, in this respect, appeal 
 to your own testimony. Did you not say, in fact, 
 on May 29th, to Count Barral with profound 
 dissatisfaction, long before the outbreak of hos- 
 tilities : " The Emperor of the French now wants 
 peace at any price " ? Such was also Commander 
 Nigra's conviction. On May 28th he informed 
 General La Marmora : " The Emperor decides for 
 the Congress ; he now desires it sincerely, and is 
 loyally and conscientiously endeavouring to bring 
 it about . . . ." And on the 31st of the same month 
 he wrote again : " The Emperor decidedly pre- 
 fers a peaceful solution. He formally told me so 
 yesterday evening." x 
 
 1 For all the quotations from the correspondence of the Italian 
 
Ix PREFACE 
 
 I was therefore the organ of my Sovereign's 
 intentions when I declined to follow you on the 
 ground where you insisted on keeping the discus- 
 sion concerning the compensations claimed by 
 France ; and you had no better fortune at Paris 
 than at Berlin in seeking an interlocutor disposed 
 to listen to you. In this respect there is no room 
 for doubt for the period which preceded 1866. 
 Let us see if it was otherwise after the re-estab- 
 lishment of peace with Austria. You have pre- 
 tended that it was so, with a wealth of affirma- 
 tions and transpositions of dates admirably con- 
 ceived to lead public opinion astray. I set your 
 errors right in a volume to which I could refer. 1 
 You will permit me, however, to pause an 
 instant. 
 
 On our arrival at Berlin, returning from 
 Nikolsburg, we resumed our conferences. After 
 having withdrawn the draft of a treaty concerning 
 an important rectification of the Rhenish frontier, 
 the bases of which you had declined to accept, 
 I wished to obtain an exact statement of the 
 proposals you had over and over again put for- 
 ward. It was thus that we came to draw out, in 
 your study, the draft of a convention, for which 
 purpose I held the pen and which disposed con- 
 agents, see General La Marmora's volume : Un fiiu po di luce, 
 Chaps. XIII., XIV., XV. and XVI. 
 1 Ma Mission en Prusse, pp. 147 and following. 
 
PREFACE lxi 
 
 tingently of Belgium. 1 I forwarded it to Paris 
 as your work, as a very precise indication of the 
 arrangements which, according to you, might be 
 concluded between France and Prussia, and thus 
 unite the two countries in lasting harmony by the 
 aid of formal engagements. How was it received ? 
 A letter from the Emperor, discovered among 
 the papers at the Tuileries and published by the 
 
 1 How, it will be asked, could I lend myself to this discussion, 
 so far as to fix, with Count Bismarck, the essential points of an 
 understanding, despite the recommendations of,' my Government? 
 I have no difficulty at present in giving the reason. Having been 
 a witness of the ambitious views that were manifested each day 
 more clearly, I was very soon convinced, particularly after the 
 defeats of Austria, that the Prussian Government would actively 
 apply itself to subjugate the whole of the German States without 
 distinction, those of the south like those of the north, to the 
 hegemony of Prussia and thus form the German Empire. My 
 correspondence proves it, as has been seen from the extracts I have 
 given. Already from August 25th, 1866, I had been able to send 
 to Paris the table of the army of the Northern Confederation, the 
 effective of which attained eight hundred thousand men, in official 
 figures, which were in no way fantastical, as was pretended at the 
 Tribune of the Corps Legislatif to combat the proposals of Marshal 
 Niel, who had given attention to the information transmitted by 
 the Embassy and military attache whilst elaborating it. It was 
 evident to me that Prussia, so powerfully armed, pushing forward her 
 aggrandisements to their utmost limits, was about to become the 
 preponderant power on the European continent. The acquisitions 
 she had already realised, and those she was preparing to make, 
 brought before my mind the troubled vision of coming events. 
 From that moment I was persuaded that France would find 
 herself relatively deprived of her rank and that her security would 
 be in peril, unless she obtained equivalent compensations. On 
 June 8th, before the outbreak of the war of 1866, I had written to 
 M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who had questioned me on this subject : 
 "I know only of Count Bismarck who is familiarised with the 
 thought that it might be to Prussia's interest to make us a territorial 
 
kii PREFACE 
 
 Government of National Defence— a document 
 which is consequently irrefutable — settles the 
 matter completely. I cannot do better than place 
 it before your eyes. Here it is : — 
 
 " August 26th, 1866. 
 
 " My dear Monsieur Rouher, 
 
 " I send you the draft treaty with my 
 remarks on the margin. It is necessary to add, 
 in the form of conversation, that the Germanic 
 Confederation having ceased to exist, the federal 
 
 concession, and then he would only consent to correct the frontiers 
 common to both countries. But the King, like the most humble of 
 his subjects, would not tolerate, at this moment, the least suggestion 
 of the possibility of a sacrifice of this nature." After Sadowa, 
 I felt even more convinced that King William would not agree to 
 grant us any important advantage on the banks of the Rhine. In 
 accordance with fresh instructions, I nevertheless, at the com- 
 mencement of August, proposed a rectification of frontier in that 
 direction. Count Bismarck rejected my communication without 
 allowing me an opportunity to resume it. 
 
 Therefore, to my mind, the equilibrium of power, upset by the 
 acquisitions of Prussia, could only be re-established by the aid 
 of the union to France of adjoining countries. It was under the 
 influence of that conviction that I took upon myself to confer with 
 Count Bismarck on the bases of his own constant overtures. I 
 admitted that Luxemburg could be acquired without delay, by aid 
 of an understanding with the King of Holland, and that we should 
 be justified in proceeding, later on, with Prussia's co-operation, to 
 the reunion of France and Belgium. I of course reserved to the 
 Imperial Government the right to examine the idea and form an 
 opinion in respect to it. It was thus that I was led to engage in 
 this negotiation. If my patriotic feelings were misled, I cannot, 
 even now, attach to myself any blame. The thought that guided 
 me, the legitimate apprehensions in which I found my inspiration 
 and which were only too well founded, absolve me entirely, if I 
 am not mistaken, in the eyes of my fellow countrymen. 
 
PREFACE lxi 
 
 fortresses erected against France should no longer 
 belong to the Confederation, but to each state 
 that has them in its territory. Thus Luxemburg 
 to France, Mainz and Saarlouis to Prussia, 
 Landau to Bavaria, Rastadt to Baden, Ulm to 
 Wurtemburg. 
 
 "In regard to another matter, I think Prussia 
 is raising a good many quibbles with Saxony. 
 Would it not be better for Prussia to annex 
 Saxony, which is a Protestant country, and place 
 the King of Saxony on the left bank of the Rhine, 
 a Catholic country ? 
 
 " But all this should only be insinuated ami- 
 cably. The treaty must remain secret. The 
 question of Luxemburg will come out of itself 
 as soon as the negotiations begin. That is the 
 most pressing. 
 
 " Believe, my dear Rouher, in my sincere 
 friendship, 
 
 " Napoleon. 
 
 " P.S. — Benedetti can therefore, apart from a 
 few slight alterations, accept in principle." 
 
 The Emperor, as you see, alters our wording. 
 Preserving silence in regard to Belgium, which, 
 besides, we had only mentioned in view of ulterior 
 and eventual combinations, he fixes his attention 
 on the acquisition of Luxemburg, which is to be 
 obtained by the aid of an understanding with the 
 
lxiv PREFACE 
 
 King of Holland and without having recourse 
 to violent measures. But what displeased you 
 was the Emperor meddling in the arrangements 
 you meant to impose on the whole of Germany, 
 so as to ensure exclusive hegemony to Prussia ; 
 that he dared stipulate that each State should be 
 the custodian of its territorial fortresses, formerly 
 entrusted to the care of the Confederation which 
 you henceforth dissolved. From that moment 
 you took the firm resolution to substitute your 
 own personal authority to that of the Federal 
 Assembly, to possess yourself, not only of the 
 fortresses, but of the direction and free disposal 
 of the active forces of all the German States 
 without distinction. 
 
 What did the Emperor say further ? " Bene- 
 detti can therefore, apart from a few slight altera- 
 tions, accept in principle." Accept what ? It 
 could not be a proposal of which, with or without 
 orders, 1 had taken the initiative at Berlin, 
 as I had written it. One does not accept 
 what one proposes. It was therefore a combina- 
 tion that was offered to us. Who could have 
 done this ? You, evidently. And what could 
 have been the object of it, if it were not the 
 arrangement you had always considered as the 
 only way of forming between France and Prussia 
 a durable and sufficiently powerful alliance to 
 permit of them settling everything in Europe 
 
PREFACE Ixv 
 
 together, without fear of meeting with armed 
 resistance on the part of either England or 
 Russia ? 
 
 How was it that these conferences had no con- 
 tinuation and were abandoned ? The observa- 
 tions the Emperor had placed on the margin of 
 the draft convention tended to limit our immediate 
 aggrandisements to the acquisition of Luxem- 
 burg and the re-establishment of our frontier of 
 1 8 14, combined, in a fair measure, with the main- 
 tenance of the sovereignty of the Southern 
 German States, stipulated at Nikolsburg on our 
 representations, which were to remain in ex- 
 clusive possession of their respective strongholds. 
 But you desired to have your hands free in Ger- 
 many to crown your work, and you rebelled at 
 the idea of France having authority to exercise 
 any control there. Obedient to this feeling you 
 had already despatched General von Manteuffel 
 on a mission to St. Petersburg, and he assured 
 you that you could certainly rely on the 
 best intentions of the Emperor Alexander. 
 Events have shown that was so. By the aid 
 of what concessions did you succeed in binding 
 Russia to your policy ? That is your own secret, 
 and I have not the childish pretension to seek to 
 penetrate it. I may, however, be permitted to 
 recall the fact that when in the month of October, 
 1870, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg denounced 
 
lxvi PREFACE 
 
 the convention limiting the Russian forces in the 
 Black Sea without any previous understanding 
 with the other Powers who signed this inter- 
 national act, the favourable view you took of the 
 proceeding ensured its success. Prussia had not- 
 withstanding subscribed to all the stipulations of 
 the Paris Congress, and it was her duty to 
 uphold them and see they were respected. The 
 opinion prevailed then that you had entered into 
 an engagement at St. Petersburg to disavow the 
 one which your Government had contracted in 
 1856. Whatever may be thought of this conjec- 
 ture, you will certainly not contest the fact that 
 from the moment you were able to rely in all 
 contingencies on the goodwill of Russia, you put 
 an end to our interviews by slipping away, 
 thoroughly convinced that you need no longer 
 show any regard for the French Government, 
 and that you could without detriment forget all 
 the engagements made with it. 
 
 I do not ask you to admit this, but I conjure 
 you, in the interest of your own renown, to 
 acknowledge that you were the originator of the 
 combination concerning Belgium. Your glorv 
 cannot suffer from doing so. You had conceived 
 vast designs ; you could not, on the one hand 
 follow them up and realise them without having 
 laid Austria low and expelled her from Germany 
 on the other without having come to terms with 
 
PREFACE Ixvii 
 
 France. Being unable to obtain the King's con- 
 sent to sacrifices that were repugnant to his 
 pride, the idea occurred to you of disinteresting 
 us everywhere where French was spoken, and 
 you applied yourself to that end with all the 
 strength of your intellect so long as the co-opera- 
 tion or the neutrality of France appeared to 
 you to be a condition- essential to your success. 
 When that moment was over, you changed your 
 mind. 
 
 You were no longer compelled to abide by 
 your proposals, and you repudiated them. The 
 history of diplomacy offers examples that absolve 
 you. Victory, moreover, by crowning your efforts, 
 has so exalted you as to place you beyond 
 censure. 
 
 You will permit me, however, Prince Bis- 
 marck, to point out to you that your policy has 
 engendered militarism ; that it has placed Europe 
 in the necessity of arming, of arming unceas- 
 ingly and beyond all measure, that nations live in 
 terror of immense, of frightful catastrophes which 
 some fortuitous event may suddenly cause to ex- 
 plode notwithstanding the prudence of the various 
 Governments. To maintain this sad state of things 
 the people stagger beneath the burden of taxation 
 which is out of all proportion with the economic 
 resources of each country. This situation has 
 favoured the development of socialistic doctrines, 
 
 e 2 
 
xviii PREFACE 
 
 and you know whether they constitute a grave peril 
 for social order. You are the generator of this 
 double evolution ; posterity will hold you responsi- 
 ble and call you to account for it. Cease then in 
 your retirement to excite human passions, to irri- 
 tate feelings of self-esteem. Apply yourself, on 
 the contrary, to attenuating your errors, either by 
 confessing them, or by appealing to the necessities 
 that compelled you to have recourse to them. 
 
 By abstaining to do so you will not free your- 
 self from the responsibility you have incurred 
 in the eyes of public morality. However modest, 
 however feeble my own personal efforts may be, 
 I feel confident they will not pass unperceived. 
 Others will come, persons more competent, sup- 
 plied with fresh documents, who will make truth 
 evident. New voices will issue from silence to 
 acclaim it. Future historians of our times will have 
 that task to perform, and it will not be a difficult 
 one for them to accomplish. If you then be still of 
 this world, you will regret having failed to provide 
 for this contingency yourself in the nightfall of 
 your existence. If it be too late, you will turn 
 in your grave at a contradiction that would have 
 wounded your feelings. Speak, speak then, 
 whilst it is still time ! 
 
 " Prince Bismarck," you have said, if Herr 
 Maximilian Harden is to be credited, "cannot 
 disappear as a lamp that flares up and goes 
 
PREFACE lxix 
 
 out. He must go down like a planet." To do 
 this, he must, first of all, pay homage to truth. 1 
 
 Cte. Benedetti. 
 
 1 At the end of the following essays is an account of the mission 
 I performed at Ems. The reader, if I am not mistaken, will find 
 therein, new elements which will enable him to form a better 
 judgment on the events to which the essays refer, events that have 
 been so diversely viewed, especially in Germany, up to recent 
 times, and particularly on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anni- 
 versary of the war of 1 870. 
 
STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY. 
 
 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM I. AND PRINCE 
 BISMARCK. 1 
 
 The retirement of Prince Bismarck will have 
 marked a date in present times that history will 
 retain. After the death of the Emperor William, 
 the Chancellor of the Empire still looked like 
 the continuer and most solid pillar of the policy- 
 he had so gloriously served. On relinquishing 
 power, he seemed to have himself closed the long 
 period during which he had exercised it. The 
 scene remains the same. The actors change. 
 The moment strikes us as favourable to cast a 
 glance over this past, recent though it be. Let 
 us hasten to say that he who would now under- 
 take to give an account of such an undertaking 
 
 1 These papers also deal in a general way with the circumstances 
 which led to the Franco-German War and the situation it created 
 in Europe. They were written successively at long intervals, with 
 the result that they contain repetitions which I should have liked 
 to have avoided in placing them together in a volume. But these 
 mutilations would have rendered the statement of facts less clear and 
 intelligible. The reader will therefore kindly bear this explanation 
 in mind when meeting with similar remarks on different pages. 
 
 B 
 
2 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 and express an opinion on it, would assuredly be 
 rash. That task belongs to writers of the future 
 generation. Those who have attempted it in 
 our days must have done so under the influence 
 of feelings that all who are contemporary with 
 their subject endeavour in vain to avoid. And so 
 we have no intention of touching upon events. 
 But it seems to us that it will not be out of place, 
 just now, to take one of their particular features, 
 in regard to which we believe opinion has been 
 absolutely misled, in order to put it to the test 
 of facts. 
 
 It is generally thought that Prince Bismarck 
 was the originator of the policy to which Prussia 
 owes all her success, and that he had to force it 
 on his Sovereign, which, it is added, he only did 
 with difficulty.. Is this judgment a correct one, 
 is it just? Is Prince Bismarck the real, sole 
 founder of the new German Empire ? was King 
 William merely the beneficiary ? That is what 
 we desire to elucidate, simply in the interest of 
 historical truth. 
 
 Before approaching this task, it will be ad- 
 vantageous to show the character and aptitudes 
 of Sovereign and Minister ; to recall the position 
 of the kingdom at the accession of King William 
 and the idea he had formed of it ; to ascertain, 
 on the other hand, what Prince Bismarck thought 
 on the same subject, and what was his judgment. 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 3 
 
 The predecessor of the future Emperor, 
 Frederick William IV., possessed none of the 
 qualities of his race. Mystical, irresolute, and 
 yet authoritative, he constantly deviated from 
 the line traced out by his ancestors. He was 
 never the same man two days together, and his 
 ministers exhausted their efforts in rectifying or 
 rather concealing his inconsistencies. If fortune 
 smiled on him, he avoided it. But in face of a 
 complication he had the pluck to brave it out. 
 Two events of equal importance suffice to deter- 
 mine the character of the prince and the aspect 
 of the reign. He declined the Imperial crown 
 offered him by the Frankfort Parliament, and he 
 bore the humiliation Austria inflicted on him, 
 at Olmutz, by the hand of Prince Schwarzen- 
 berg. He could not make up his mind to side 
 either with Russia or the Western Powers during 
 the Crimean War, as he would not or dared 
 not support or combat the policy of the Vienna 
 Cabinet, which had associated itself, in a certain 
 measure, with France and England. Democracy 
 and the Holy Alliance inspired him with equal 
 distrust and plunged him into the same state of 
 irresolution. He was nevertheless jealous of his 
 authority, and carefully avoided allowing his 
 brother, the Prince Royal, to have any share in 
 the Government. The latter was able to meditate 
 for many years on the errors he silently and 
 
 b 2 
 
4 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 powerlessly witnessed. It was assuredly during 
 this long period that he conceived and cherished 
 the ambitious schemes that were to illustrate his 
 reign. 
 
 This Prince had faith. He ascended the throne 
 with the deep, resolute feeling that he was destined 
 to accomplish great things : he gave a clear indica- 
 tion of this at Kcenigsberg, on the day of his 
 coronation. He thought he held his sovereign 
 rights from God, and owed no account of them 
 but to Him and his own ancestors. At the time 
 when his brother granted the first constitutional 
 reforms, in 1847, he made reservations in his 
 quality of heir to the throne : according to his 
 ideas the elective assemblies should never know 
 anything of the budget or foreign policy. It was 
 with these convictions that, from the commence- 
 ment of his reign, he decided on his programme, 
 finding inspiration for that purpose in the tradi- 
 tional policy of his house, so strangely disregarded 
 by his predecessor. The difficulties he had to 
 overcome required extreme caution ; they indicated 
 a necessity for reserve : he therefore was and 
 remained taciturn. He hid his thoughts beneath 
 studied and never-failing courtesy. By his gentle 
 and affable good grace, he exercised an ever 
 powerful charm on the other sovereigns of Europe. 
 It was thus that he won over the Emperor 
 Alexander, his nephew ; we know what con- 
 
THE EMPEROR AND, PRINCE BISMARCK 5 
 
 cessions, so unfortunate for the most precious 
 interests of Russia herself, he obtained from him 
 in 1866 and in 1870. He came to Paris, at the 
 time of the Exhibition of 1867, shortly after the 
 Luxemburg affair, preceded by a natural feeling 
 of resentment of which he might have had cause 
 to fear an open expression. He went away 
 leaving impressions behind him that bore testi- 
 mony to his skill, to the marvellous art which he 
 so well knew how to employ to disarm the most 
 prejudiced minds. The charmer did not inherit 
 this precious virtue from his ancestors, who 
 had been distinguished rather by the coarse- 
 ness of their manners. But he had taken 
 from them all the gifts and all the aptitudes 
 that have so prodigiously assisted the Hohen- 
 zollerns in attaining greatness: firmness in 
 their designs, opportuneness in forming resolu- 
 tions, unlimited prudence, distrustfulness always 
 on the alert, and when necessary dissimulation. 
 " If it be a matter of duping, let us be knaves," 
 wrote Frederick the Great. King William, having 
 signed the treaty with Italy, forgot its existence ; 
 and he authorised the dowager Queen, sister of 
 the mother of the Emperor of Austria, to convey 
 to Vienna the assurance that his engagements had 
 not the character attributed to them. 
 
 Fearing neither trouble nor work, he displayed 
 incessant and untiring activity. No department 
 
6 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 of the public service escaped his supervision. 
 Bearing in mind that good polity necessitates 
 good finances, his anxiety for the prudent ad- 
 ministration of the resources of the State never 
 on any occasion relapsed. Not one single outlay 
 of an extravagant nature was incurred during his 
 reign. But his first thought was for the army. 
 He knew that diplomacy was fatally powerless, 
 however able its agents might be, if it were not 
 supported by a soundly organised military force, 
 ever ready to second it. He brought into play 
 all the resources of his mind to ensure the 
 development of such a force and maintain it on a 
 proper footing. His foresight served him well, 
 for there is no disguising the fact, that all Prince 
 Bismarck's skill would have led Prussia to ruin 
 without the victories of Sadowa and Sedan. 
 
 During the long time he remained Prince 
 Royal, he had as commander of a Rhenish Army 
 Corps, made Coblenz his chief residence. He 
 lived there surrounded by a few devoted friends, 
 men of enlightened intellect, who deplored the 
 failings of his brother as he did, and meditated 
 with him on the destiny of Prussia, so seriously 
 exposed by a sovereign and advisers who were 
 both opposed to the sound and brilliant traditions 
 of his family. 
 
 On his accession, he dismissed every one. He 
 formed a Ministry composed of those same men 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 7 
 
 who had participated, more or less assiduously, in 
 the confabulations of the little court at Coblenz ; 
 men of liberal aspirations whose advent to power 
 could not fail to be welcomed by the majority in 
 the Chamber of Deputies at Berlin, who were 
 imbued with the same principles, or rather the 
 same velleity. It was, as it was qualified at its 
 •origin, the Cabinet of the New Era. But the 
 King, Prince by Divine Right, issue of a family 
 that had formed the kingdom by conquest and 
 without restraint, meant to retain the supreme, if 
 not the exclusive direction of State affairs in his 
 own hands. 1 Feeling that, to raise Prussia from 
 the abasement into which it had fallen during the 
 previous reign, he must, first of all, increase the 
 military strength of the country, he announced at 
 the opening of Parliament, that his first duty com- 
 manded him to re-model the army, and the new 
 Cabinet introduced a bill according the Govern- 
 ment considerable additional supplies. This 
 
 1 " If we have been allowed," William II. recently said at Bremen, 
 ■" to do what has been done, it is, above all, because there is a tradition 
 in our house in virtue of which we consider ourselves appointed by 
 God to preserve and direct the people over whom we reign for their 
 .good, and to protect our moral and material interests. It was by- 
 following this tradition that my grandfather accomplished the 
 great deeds he did and succeeded in establishing the unity of the 
 Empire. . . ." The young Emperor correctly expressed the ruling 
 thought of his race, and he shows himself no less disposed than his 
 grandsire to allow obstacles to be placed in the way of it, or his 
 personal action to be interfered with. Prince Bismarck, as a case 
 in point, has just had the experience of this. 
 
8 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 proposal caused a first disagreement to break 
 out between the Sovereign and the representa- 
 tives of the country. The principles and ideas 
 sown in Germany by France had germinated. 
 They had exploded in 1 848 ; they had met with 
 adherents everywhere, especially in Prussia ; the 
 Chamber of Deputies at Berlin did not conceal 
 its intention to insist on the chief of the State 
 granting a reform in the Constitution and giving 
 guarantees that it should participate more directly 
 and efficaciously in the government of the king- 
 dom. The King's advisers, inclining themselves 
 towards parliamentary doctrines, considered that 
 the moment had come to associate the Chamber 
 more intimately with sovereign authority. These 
 views shocked the King's dynastic feelings, the 
 idea he had formed of the power and rights 
 inherent in the crown ; they threatened the work 
 he wished to prepare and the success of which 
 could only be ensured, he thought, by unity in 
 its direction and by clever and particularly cau- 
 tious guidance. He soon came to a decision. 
 This sovereign, reputed devoid of initiative and 
 firmness, dismissed his first Ministry, which was 
 nevertheless formed of tried statesmen who were 
 devoted to him. 
 
 Among the most frequent defenders of the 
 throne and altar, amongst those who had battled 
 so valiantly during the storm of 1848, a country 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 9 
 
 squire, Herr von Bismarck, 1 had shown himself 
 the firmest and most vehement. His audacious 
 language and the absoluteness of his doctrines 
 had won his name a renown that placed him in 
 the first rank. All has been said that could be 
 said regarding his entrance into public life. His 
 correspondence, including his most intimate 
 letters written at that time, has been published 
 with his consent ; one would be tempted to think 
 that he did not wish posterity to be left in 
 ignorance of any of the political errors of his 
 youth. It is therefore superfluous for us to pause 
 at that. Let us note, however, that his feudal 
 fervour won him the goodwill of King Frederick 
 William, who appointed him Prussian delegate 
 to the Frankfort Diet. This was the turning 
 point in his career. A mind like his, enlight- 
 ened by ardent patriotism, could not waste time 
 in the wrangling of parties and castes. He 
 understood, from the first day at the Federal 
 Assembly, that he was on his right ground ; that 
 he was in presence of Prussia's most redoubtable 
 adversaries ; that there was the obstacle to her 
 aggrandisement, to the influence her German 
 quintessence gave her the right to claim in 
 Germany. The attitude of the Austrian repre- 
 
 1 Otto von Bismarck Schoenhausen, created Count Bismarck 
 16th September, 1865, and Prince on the 21st March, 1871.— 
 Translator's Note. 
 
io STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 sentative, the privilege he enjoyed of presiding 
 over the Diet to the exclusion of all the other 
 delegates, even him of the Prussian Government, 
 the tendencies of the representatives of second- 
 rate Courts, who had nothing to fear from 
 Vienna and everything to apprehend from 
 Berlin, revealed to him that the pact of 1815 
 condemned the Government of his country to 
 impotence, and he felt convinced that this 
 pact must be rent asunder if Prussia wished 
 to resume her interrupted ascent. From that 
 moment he regarded the doctrines he had so 
 violently opposed with less repugnance. He had 
 bitterly blamed what he termed the heresies of 
 the Court at Coblenz ; he now showed himself 
 disposed to accept them in a certain measure. 
 He slipped among the little congregation without 
 having been invited. As deputy at the Berlin 
 Chamber he had defended the alliance with 
 Austria before and after Olmiitz ; as the King's 
 representative at Frankfort he opposed it with all 
 the violence of his nature. He had no hope ot 
 influencing Frederick William and his advisers, 
 whom it would have been impossible to persuade 
 to modify their views ; but he had the presenti- 
 ment that a new reign would shortly permit of a 
 new policy being introduced. He looked upon 
 the Diet as a hot-bed of dissimulation ; he caused 
 profound uneasiness in it by his outbursts of 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK n 
 
 frankness. He pronounced aloud, and in no 
 measured terms, what his colleagues thought and 
 did in the dark. This Assembly was in reality 
 a, gathering of adversaries in disguise. Austria 
 and Prussia were like two china dogs. To the 
 secondary States this threatening attitude was a 
 precious guarantee of independence and security ; 
 they supported first one, then the other, of the 
 two great Powers in accordance with their private 
 interests, paralysing alternately the action of the 
 Vienna Cabinet and the Berlin Cabinet when either 
 displayed a tendency to become dangerously pre- 
 ponderant. Count Bismarck tore away the masks. 
 With an inexhaustible flow of spirits he turned 
 into ridicule the complicated, tumble-down organ- 
 ism of the Confederation, elaborated with foreign 
 aid to render Germany powerless, and all for 
 want of one sole, manly management. With 
 the same unreserve and equal daring, after 
 having pointed out the complaint, he prescribed 
 the remedy. " The Austrian Empire," he said, 
 in his private conversations, " is not a German 
 State it is cosmopolitan ; without the arch- 
 duchy it would be a stranger in Germany, it has 
 no right to a seat in the Diet; it should retire," 
 he added in intimacy. " Every Prussian is a 
 German," he said again, forgetting the Poles ; 
 " Prussia is the real Great German Power." 
 This singular talk, so undiplomatic, so rarely heard 
 
12 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 at the seat of the Diet, disturbed the tranquillity 
 of no one because it was so strange. No one 
 suspected Count Bismarck of being a prophet. 
 
 What he said at Frankfort, he wrote to Berlin, 
 arranging his remarks to suit the King's tempera- 
 ment and that of his Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
 Herr Von Manteuffel. This attitude, rash though 
 it were, did not cause displeasure. The bold lan- 
 guage of the representative of the monarchy 
 flattered the monarch's pride. The sovereign 
 knew his emissary : he had seen him at Berlin 
 displaying a warmth sometimes unruly, but always 
 devoted to his service, to the interests of the 
 dynasty. He had, however, hesitated in dele- 
 gating him to the Confederation. " Let his 
 Majesty make the trial," Count Bismarck had said 
 to him ; " and if it does not do, he will recall me." 
 The trial was to his advantage ; he was main- 
 tained at his post in spite of his errors, in spite 
 of the representations of the Courts of the Con- 
 federation and the efforts of the Prussian nobility, 
 who solicited his recall, as he writes himself to his 
 sister, Frau von Arnim. 1 Appointed to Frankfort 
 in 1 85 1, he was still there as Prussian representa- 
 tive in 1857, when the King's health compelled 
 him to retire in favour of the Prince Royal, who 
 became Regent. The new reign was imminent. 
 Count Bismarck did not lose a moment in taking 
 
 1 Letter of November 12th, 1858. 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 13 
 
 up his position. He published a pamphlet in 
 which, ceasing to conceal his conversion, he 
 publicly paid homage to the patriotic efforts of 
 the National Parliament of 1848. One read 
 therein notably as follows : " Prussia should no 
 longer remain with Austria in the German Con- 
 federation, such as the Federal Act of 181 5 and 
 the final act of 1820 have made it; she should 
 never have tolerated its reconstruction in 1850, 
 and her interest is to urge dissolution." 
 
 The new Government had been hardly formed 
 when Count Bismarck, in November, 1858, was 
 despatched to St. Petersburg as Ambassador. 
 What was the Prince Regent's idea on this oc- 
 casion ? Did he remove him from Frankfort 
 under the impression that his presence there 
 might endanger Prussia's relations with Austria, 
 and with no other thought? He certainly did 
 not consider it expedient to alarm the Vienna 
 Cabinet ; he wished on the contrary to give a 
 pledge of his desire to act in all loyalty as a 
 member of the Confederation ; he wanted the 
 displacement of the disturber of the sittings of 
 the Federal Assembly to be understood in that 
 sense by the Austrian Government. But he had 
 other views in accrediting him to a family Court, 
 to the Emperor Alexander, whose kindly feelings 
 it was necessary to captivate. He thus gave him 
 a mark of his confidence, foreseeing, no doubt, 
 
H STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 that he would need before long, and in a more 
 direct way, to have recourse to his services. 
 Every one at Berlin felt this, from the particular 
 kindness the Emperor showed him. If Count 
 Bismarck had not received the assurance, he had 
 the presentiment of what was to happen, as his 
 correspondence shows. 
 
 Be that as it may, his mission to Russia was to 
 him an exile. He took his opinions along with 
 him, disavowing none of them. The remembrance 
 of Austria's attitude during the Crimean War 
 encouraged feelings of resentment in Russia that 
 have not entirely died out even at the present 
 day : Count Bismarck met with sympathizers 
 who were disposed to listen to him. Prince 
 Gortchakoff, who had become Chancellor of the 
 Empire, after having represented his sovereign 
 at the Diet, shared all his hostile views : he had 
 encouraged them at Frankfort, he did not oppose 
 them at St. Petersburg. The Prince Regent's 
 ambassador, on his side, exerted himself to 
 animate and above all to irritate those feelings, 
 from which he was to reap such precious ad- 
 vantages later on. He did not, however, want 
 them to forget him at Berlin, and he devoted 
 his spare moments to converting his new Minister 
 of Foreign Affairs, Baron Schleinitz ; to proving 
 to him that the policy of Prussia should have 
 but one aim, the transformation of Germany 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK ij 
 
 to her advantage. It was thus that, on May 1 2th, 
 1859, on the eve of the Italian campaign, fearing 
 a reconciliation with Austria, he entreated him to 
 take advantage of this propitious opportunity to 
 break off all connection with her and boldly 
 repudiate a solidarity disastrous to the interests 
 of the King and country. The letters he wrote 
 from St. Petersburg are known, like those which 
 he sent to his family from Frankfort ; they have 
 been printed on several occasions. We will 
 only cull from them one thought which resumes 
 them all : "I see in our federal situation," he 
 says, "a flaw from which Prussia suffers, and 
 which must, sooner or later, be extirpated ferro 
 et igne." " In a word, all this," he writes again, 
 in that flowery language peculiar to him, this 
 diplomatist doubled occasionally with a poet, 
 "is but a question of time; nations and indi- 
 viduals, folly and wisdom, peace and war, all 
 come and go, like a wave, and the sea remains 
 . . ." It was at that moment that this ardent 
 champion of absolutism revealed himself as an 
 apologist of the Frankfort parliament, of universal 
 suffrage, of all the principles which he had, until 
 then, so disdainfully outraged. The future will 
 show whether he was wisely advised by his genius 
 on every point : universal suffrage has already 
 contributed, not a little, towards hurling him from 
 that lofty position whence, in the enjoyment of his 
 
l6 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 immense power, he considered himself inexpug- 
 nable. But, however this may be, we can already 
 examine Prince Bismarck's long career from the 
 day he left Berlin to represent King Frederick 
 William at Frankfort. 
 
 The letters he wrote to Baron Schleinitz were 
 certainly placed before King William who had 
 succeeded his brother. They were penned with 
 that idea, and to flatter the master whose thoughts 
 the future Minister had penetrated. And so the 
 new Sovereign, far from taking offence, recalled 
 him from St. Petersburg to despatch him to 
 Paris : after having placed him in a position to 
 approach the Emperor Alexander, he accredited 
 him to the Emperor Napoleon. He thus pre- 
 pared him for the task he was to perform and 
 which it became urgent to entrust to him. At 
 this moment, indeed, the conflict between the 
 Government and the Chamber of Deputies had 
 become more pronounced. The majority had 
 refused the supplies for the reorganisation of the 
 army and the Cabinet was divided as to the best 
 course to follow ; some of its members were 
 disposed to advise that certain concessions should 
 be granted. The King felt convinced that he 
 was placed in the alternative of renouncino- his 
 plans or of placing power in firmer hands, in those 
 of a statesman resolved to second his policy in 
 face of all the difficulties which would spring up 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 17 
 
 from the commencement and which it would be 
 necessary to overcome at any cost. He resolved, 
 as we have said, to accept the resignation of the 
 Ministry of the New Era, or rather he brought it 
 about. To whom was the duty of forming the 
 new Cabinet entrusted? To Count Bismarck. 
 Still the King knew his opinions thoroughly, 
 the policy he had not ceased to advise, his 
 hostility to Austria, to the Diet, his ardent desire 
 to break up the federal pact and to embark on a 
 diplomatic campaign, a military one if necessary, 
 to place Prussian power in Germany on a new 
 footing. What conclusion must one draw ? 
 That the Sovereign's views were evidently those 
 that the representative of Prussia at Frankfort, 
 St. Petersburg, and Paris had not ceased to 
 suggest and uphold. 
 
 The characters, however, of Sovereign and 
 Minister bore no resemblance to each other. 
 Count Bismarck, with his stubborn mind, must 
 have displayed both his qualities and defects in the 
 performance of his new duties : resolution, rash- 
 ness, want of due restraint. His energetic and 
 passionate nature made him refractory to the laws 
 of prudence. Diplomatic and professional secrecy 
 appeared to him no longer efficacious in this age 
 of universal publicity. Disguise seemed neither 
 useful nor profitable. Afcting as at Frankfort, he 
 dissembled neither his plans nor hopes. He un- 
 
 c 
 
18 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 bosomed himself to the Austrian representative 
 in person, Count Karolyi, at one of their first 
 interviews. Was this skill or weakness? Was 
 he acting in accordance with wise calculation 
 or involuntary impulse ? People had become 
 familiar with the diplomatist's liberty of speech, 
 they were bewildered at the Minister's effusive- 
 ness. There was the King's will, however, 
 always on the alert, always imperious, which had 
 to be taken into account, and which had asserted 
 itself on many occasions. We shall see the 
 Sovereign authorising things to be done, giving 
 assurances in contradiction to the declarations and 
 confidences of Prince Bismarck. We shall see 
 these masters, both equally well advised, often 
 contradicting one another, but always faithful to 
 the thought that was common to both of them. 
 It was at once a peculiar and exceedingly 
 interesting sight to watch these two gladiators 
 both pursuing the same end by very different 
 roads. 
 
 What was the share of each of them in the 
 glorious result that has crowned their mutual 
 efforts ? The legend exists : Prince Bismarck 
 directed Prussia's policy alone, with his iron 
 hand ; he caused all its evolutions. Thanks to 
 his vehement firmness, he vanquished at Berlin 
 as well as at Vienna and Paris ; he dispelled the 
 King's weakness and triumphed over his hesita- 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 19 
 
 tion. Future historians will have much to do to 
 alter this judgment. It is nevertheless erroneous. 
 It would assuredly be childish to deny or even 
 to contest, in any measure, Prince Bismarck's 
 political genius. He gave many striking proofs 
 of it previous to the two wars that produced 
 the German Empire ; he has given more mar- 
 vellous examples of it still, since the re-establish- 
 ment of peace. Whilst the Army General Staff 
 was busy with the consolidation and development 
 of the military strength of the new Empire, he 
 devoted all the resources of his intellect to 
 guarantee the work accomplished against every 
 contingency. He has concluded alliances that 
 no one else would have foreseen or attempted. 
 He has riveted to the fortunes of his country 
 the two Powers whom recent events would have 
 seemed to have destined to other arrangements. 
 Austria, resigned, has driven the remembrance of 
 her defeats and her resentment from her mind ; 
 forgetful Italy has ruptured all the bonds binding 
 her to France ; both have accepted the yoke of 
 Germany and are at her mercy. After having 
 secured the neutrality of the Emperor Napoleon 
 in 1866, the friendly abstention of the Emperor 
 Alexander in 1870, Prince Bismarck, with the aid 
 of England, was able, at the Berlin Congress, to 
 tear to shreds the treaty of San Stefano and 
 vanquish Russia without having recourse to arms, 
 
 c 2 
 
20 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 by snatching from her the concessions she had 
 wrung from Turkey, after a sanguinary but 
 glorious war. He did more ; by means of a 
 subterfuge he placed Austria in possession of two 
 provinces of the Ottoman Empire, Bosnia and Her- 
 zegovina, and gave a proper tone to the policy of 
 the Austro- Hungarian Cabinet on the Bosphorus. 
 He has thus succeeded not only in sheltering the 
 past, the advantages already acquired, so far as 
 human foresight can do, but also in preparing for 
 his successors the task of the future, the crowning 
 of the work he has so potently contributed towards 
 building-up. At the same time he has rendered 
 the hostility, which was already so profound in 
 the Balkan Peninsula between Russia and 
 Austria, less curable and perhaps more bitter. 
 By what means has he won over Italy, persuaded 
 her to renounce her national and patriotic tradi- 
 tions, and follow him along a path where, hitherto 
 at least, she has encountered naught but dis- 
 appointments and painful trials ? We will not 
 attempt to penetrate this mystery. What we 
 wished to establish was that Prince Bismarck's 
 foresight and skill have secured Germany a 
 treaty which places at her disposal the united 
 forces of Austria and Italy, under relative con- 
 ditions that guarantee neither of these Powers 
 absolute reciprocity. What we also desired to 
 establish was, that Austria has accepted or sub- 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 21 
 
 mitted to a situation that will be a lasting obstacle 
 to any reconciliation with Russia; that Italy will 
 not for long be able to renew entirely cordial 
 relations with France. And this is in some 
 measure Prince Bismarck's personal work. In 
 peace as in war, he has thus marked his place in 
 history at an altitude unattainable by his contem- 
 poraries. Germany rightly pays him the same 
 homage as France has been doing to Richelieu 
 for nearly three centuries. But it would be an 
 injustice if, in giving the Minister his due, the 
 King were refused what belongs to him. It would 
 be iniquitous if, obedient to a popular idea, one 
 were to couple William I. with Louis XIII., who, 
 indeed, was an eminent prince in the measure 
 and with the aptitude of his character. The 
 future German Emperor, like the son of Henri 
 IV., possessed, but in a higher degree, a merit that 
 is always precious in a ruler, that of giving his 
 confidence to none but men worthy of it. The 
 Generals von Moltke and von Roon, previous to his 
 time, were distinguished officers, but were in the 
 ranks, if we may so express it : the King, under- 
 standing the immense value of their respective 
 qualities, of his own personal initiative and pre- 
 vious to having summoned Count Bismarck, 
 placed one at the head of the Great General Staff 
 and made the other Minister of War. We are 
 all familiar with the glorious services they have 
 
22 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 rendered. These selections show more posi- 
 tively than we could do, with what marvellous 
 penetration the Sovereign was gifted. 
 
 We have seen when and under the empire with 
 what anxiety the King entrusted Count Bismarck 
 with the presidency of the Council. We have 
 expressed the opinion that this step should be 
 attributed to the existence of absolute concordance 
 in the views of King and Minister, and to their 
 perfect understanding as to the best way to ensure 
 the triumph of them. The King, in fact, did not 
 abdicate into the hands of his new adviser, as is 
 generally thought, and it would be out of all 
 reason to claim exclusively for Count Bismarck 
 the glory of the success that has been attained. 
 Diplomatists who followed the events of this 
 period on the spot are aware that the King never 
 ceased, at any moment, to direct the acts of his 
 Government. Never was a resolution taken, never 
 was a diplomatic communication made, without his 
 order and without his supervision. Important 
 despatches were never sent away without being 
 submitted to him, and it often happened that they 
 only left after he had amended them. Count 
 Bismarck, one may say, was the originator of 
 hardy resolutions, the King was always the 
 modifier of them. One trusted in his darinsf, the 
 other sought counsel in prudence. These differ- 
 ences of opinion continued until the war of 1866, 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 23 
 
 and during that long period Europe heard naught 
 but the voice of Count Bismarck. The break, 
 which the King put on, when needful, profoundly- 
 irritated the Minister, and his anger found relief 
 in violent explosions. He expounded his schemes, 
 and explained the reasons that commanded prompt 
 and rapid action, without troubling to confine him- 
 self to the limits of an intimate circle ; he dis- 
 played entire confidence in a success that Europe 
 would submit to as soon as it had been achieved. 
 He did not spare his master, reproaching him 
 with timidness, which was in reality but wise and 
 skilful cautiousness, and distinctly a matter of 
 policy. The King, in fact, lent himself to all the 
 stratagems destined to make war with Austria 
 inevitable ; but he wished hostilities to break out 
 at the right time and when he would be able to 
 cast the responsibility, if not the initiative of 
 them, on the Court of Vienna, when he would no 
 longer have to fear the ill-will of the Powers and 
 the expression of public opinion. Consequently 
 he took care to keep in the background, to detach 
 his personality from all the complications of which 
 his Minister willingly assumed the responsibility. 
 He preserved impenetrable silence. When he 
 broke it, in his rare interviews with the diplo- 
 matists accredited to his Court, he repudiated, 
 with his gentle affability, all warlike thought, any 
 intention of troubling European peace. 
 
24 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 Thus, whilst the Sovereign affected to have 
 horror of a rupture, making nevertheless no con- 
 cession to avert it, authorising, on the contrary, 
 his Minister to multiply his efforts to bring it on, 
 Count Bismarck concealed from no one that he 
 wished to engage in the armed struggle without 
 any other thought than that of fighting and con- 
 quering, without troubling about the attitude of 
 the Powers or public opinion. The rumour thus 
 gained credit that the King was peacefully dis- 
 posed, whilst the Minister, only, was warlike. 
 This belief, propagated by the press, which 
 gathered all its information from Count Bismarck, 
 and none from the King, was spread all over 
 Europe, and when the events occurred the hand 
 of the Minister, only, was seen in connection with 
 them ; the Sovereign, clothed in his apparent 
 moderation, appeared to have acted merely an in- 
 voluntary part. We ought to add that William I. 
 never once showed himself jealous at the renown 
 clinging to the President of the Council. It 
 suited his nature and was part of his calculations 
 to leave the initiative and responsibility of violent 
 resolutions to his Minister ; he could thus dis- 
 approve if circumstances required it ; he was 
 contented at having the certitude that the advan- 
 tages derived from what occurred belonged to his 
 reign and dynasty. But let us examine the facts 
 and see what they teach. 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 25 
 
 We have said that the King whilst as yet 
 exercising the power of Prince Regent, on open- 
 ing the parliamentary session on January 12th, 
 1859, had announced it to be his firm will, that 
 the army should be reorganised, or rather its 
 strength increased. In the! same speech, he ex- 
 pressed his sympathy for the German population 
 in the duchies of the Elbe, and his words were 
 greeted with the applause of the whole Assembly. 
 From that moment he conveyed an idea of the 
 principle and tendency of the policy that dis- 
 tinguished his reign. Therefore, when Count 
 Bismarck came to power in 1862, he had neither 
 to submit a line of conduct, nor new views, to his 
 Sovereign's approbation. The master's thoughts 
 were exactly the same as those which haunted 
 the mind of the minister. An understanding 
 already existed between them, both in regard to 
 the object to be attained, and the means to be 
 employed to reach it. The King could have no 
 doubt on that point, and the conviction he had 
 formed influenced him in his choice of the new 
 President of the Council. Are we to suppose then, 
 that at that period they had, in their mutual 
 ambition, perceived the final limit of the horizon 
 which was opening radiant before them ? There 
 is nothing to authorise such a presumption. To 
 men whom fate has singled out for mighty 
 destinies, one willingly attributes, when great 
 
26 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 deeds are accomplished, a boundless prescience, 
 and schemes that embrace, with absolute certainty, 
 the future of nations during a long period. This 
 is attributing too much to human genius. Prince 
 Bismarck himself has never claimed such glory. 
 No statesman has ever taken such little care to 
 conceal his inner mind ; and when one studies his 
 correspondence, when one evokes the confidences 
 of which he was so prodigal during the early 
 years of his long ministry, one is easily convinced 
 that his prevision, like his hopes, extended neither 
 so far, nor so high as has been imagined. In 
 diplomacy as in warfare, as in all things in this 
 world, the errors of your adversaries are more 
 profitable to you than the best strategy. They 
 are what is commonly called good luck. Prussia 
 has been overwhelmed by the caprice of fortune. 
 Let us be just, however, and hasten to say that 
 it was to a prince and advisers worthy of all his 
 favour, that the interests of Prussia were confided 
 during the period anent which we are rapidly 
 jotting down a few details history will retain. 
 Morality, in truth, has not always been respected ; 
 but in the conflicts of nations, morality and politics 
 rarely go hand in hand. 
 
 Two questions occupied more particularly the 
 attention of the diplomatic world at the time when 
 Count Bismarck, in response to his sovereign's 
 call, formed his first Ministry. Poland had taken 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 27 
 
 up arms again, and claimed the autonomy which 
 had been guaranteed to her by the treaties of 
 181 5; she had engaged in a supreme and san- 
 guinary struggle which provoked the diplomatic 
 intervention of the Powers. On the other hand 
 the German States, yielding to the pressure of 
 public feeling, had resumed, through the inter- 
 mediary of the Diet, the iniquitous quarrel thrust 
 on Denmark in regard to Schleswig-Holstein, and 
 threatened her with another execution. At the 
 commencement of the outbreak in Poland, King 
 William had entreated his nephew, the Emperor 
 Alexander, not to make any concessions to his 
 revolted subjects, to neglect nothing, on the 
 contrary, to repress the rebellion, declaring him- 
 self, in his quality of co-divider, jointly responsible 
 with Russia in the present as his predecessors had 
 been in the past Count Bismarck, sharing the 
 views and feelings of his sovereign, was no sooner 
 in power, than he offered the St. Petersburg 
 Cabinet Prussia's armed co-operation. This was 
 his commencement, his first diplomatic step. 
 Russia declined the offer ; it would have wounded 
 her dignity had it been supposed that she needed 
 the assistance of a neighbouring State to struggle 
 victoriously with the Polish insurrection. Count 
 Bismarck, however, insisted and succeeded in 
 persuading Russia to consent to a convention, or 
 what is termed a cartel to lessen its importance, in 
 
28 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 virtue of which Prussia was to hand over any 
 insurgents, who might seek refuge on her territory, 
 to the Russian authorities. The aim of the 
 President of the Council at Berlin was to place 
 Russia under an obligation, foreseeing that he 
 would soon have to ask her for the value of his 
 services in the matter of the duchies. It was, 
 indeed, in the duchies of the Elbe that the new- 
 monarch proposed to strike his first blow, as he 
 had foreshadowed in his maiden speech to the 
 Chamber of Deputies. We know how fearlessly 
 Count Bismarck seized upon this question. He 
 rapidly succeeded in solving it by war. Austria, 
 aware of Prussia's real intentions, was obliged, in 
 order to oppose them, to take part in the aggression 
 directed against the Danish possessions. In spite of 
 the treaty signed at London in 1852, guaranteeing 
 Denmark the integrity of her frontiers, and thanks 
 to the abstention, if not to the connivance of 
 Russia, Holstein and Schleswig were succes- 
 sively invaded and occupied. The other Powers 
 were alarmed, and made repeated representations 
 at Berlin. Writers deserving of consideration a 
 aroused the attention of the press and public 
 opinion, by denouncing the Prussian Government 
 as the sole disturber of European peace. In 
 
 1 See particularly two volumes by M. Deschamps, Belgian 
 Minister of State and formerly Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 Brussels, 1865. 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 29 
 
 presence of these manifestations, and contrary to 
 the advice of his Prime Minister, the King con- 
 sidered he would be exposing Prussia to perilous 
 isolation by giving any further indication of his 
 ambitious views. Count Bismarck had to resign 
 himself to negotiating, in concert with the Austrian 
 Cabinet, and they signed at Vienna the conven- 
 tion of October 30th, 1864, by which Denmark 
 ceded the duchies to Prussia and Austria, who 
 jointly became the legitimate possessors of them. 
 Community of possession, a fruitful source of 
 conflicts easy to produce, suited Count Bismarck, 
 who had suggested the idea. The danger was 
 soon perceived at Vienna, and further negotiations 
 resulted in the conclusion of the treaty of Gastein 
 on August 4th, 1865. This act did not seriously 
 modify the respective positions of the two Powers ; 
 it merely stipulated that Austria should occupy 
 Holstein exclusively, and Prussia Schleswig. The 
 sovereignty remained undivided. King William 
 and Count Bismarck held the Viennese Court at 
 their mercy. It only remained for them to be 
 patient, or rather to cause circumstances more 
 suitable to the accomplishment of their designs 
 to occur at the right time. 
 
 With these intentions, and so as to be ready 
 at the supreme moment, the King pushed on the 
 reorganisation of the army, without paying any 
 attention to the protestations, noisy and persistent 
 
30 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 though they were, that arose in the Chamber of 
 Deputies. Count Bismarck seconded him with all 
 his energy ; he did not hesitate to make himself 
 the firm champion of the prerogatives claimed by 
 the sovereign. Assailed by the entire Assembly, 
 he resisted the onslaught, often provoking it, 
 without ever giving way. They had recourse to 
 dissolution, and the country, several times con- 
 sulted, maintained its confidence in its repre- 
 sentatives. This conflict lasted for nearly four 
 years, until the war of 1866. During that long 
 period no budget ever obtained the sanction of 
 the Assembly. This peculiar situation in no way 
 embarrassed the President of the Council ; he 
 became quite accustomed to it. Interpreting one 
 of the clauses of the Constitution in his own way, 
 notwithstanding the most lively protestations, he 
 pointed out that as there was no budget, he was 
 justified in conforming to the last financial vote 
 recorded previous to his coming into office. He 
 thus ensured, as was his duty, he said, the working 
 of all the departments of the State in perfect ac- 
 cordance with the law. The receipts of each 
 financial year exceeded the outlay ; he devoted 
 the surplus to the additional expenditure at the 
 War Office in virtue of the sovereign's decrees. 
 The King's will was respected, the object in view 
 attained, and the Minister rose in the monarch's 
 confidence. 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 3 r 
 
 But the Liberal party, having an immense 
 majority in the Chamber, protested against the 
 expedients resorted to by the Prime Minister. 
 United to the Progressists, the National Liberals, 
 Schwerin, Benningsen, Sybel, Virchow, Richter, 
 all the leaders of those two great parties de- 
 nounced the measure both in their speeches and 
 in the press, as a permanent violation of the 
 constitutional pact, and, whilst claiming the right 
 of the Assembly to control the outlay of the 
 revenue, contested the legality of any unauthorised 
 expenditure. Vain efforts : Count Bismarck made 
 no concession ; the struggle continued, assuming 
 every day a more bitter character. The arbitrary 
 form of government that the Minister so obstin- 
 ately maintained, wounded the feelings of the 
 middle classes. It became evident, moreover, 
 that the King and his adviser intended to settle 
 the destinies of Prussia without the assistance of 
 her representatives. The country became alarmed, 
 and newspapers of every shade of liberal opinion 
 kept up a violently impassioned agitation which, 
 on the eve of war, led to an attempt on the Prime 
 Minister's life. 
 
 Whilst men of enlightened intellect, politicians 
 particularly, struggled for parliamentary institu- 
 tions, supported by the unanimous feeling of the 
 country, the aristocratic class, without concealing 
 its anxiety, apprehended a conflict with Austria. 
 
32 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 The union of the two great German Powers, 
 founded by their victories over the hereditary foe, 
 and dating back to 1815, was regarded in the 
 ranks of the nobility as a most precious guarantee 
 for the whole of Germany. It preserved her 
 from all invasion, whether of new ideas and the 
 revolution, or an attempt on the part of some 
 ambitious neighbour coveting the banks of the 
 Rhine. They were convinced that war with 
 Austria would be the opening of an era of all 
 kinds of peril. 
 
 Under the influence of these different con- 
 victions, a sort of involuntary alliance was 
 established among people of all opinions, between 
 all parties, at court as in the city, in the press as 
 in the drawing-room, to avert the misfortunes 
 they imagined they perceived threatening them. 
 Count Bismarck was reviled everywhere, in 
 society and at the palace as well as in parliament. 
 People did not confine themselves to denouncing 
 him as a public danger, to looking upon a 
 struggle with Austria as a fratricidal war that 
 would place all German countries at the 
 foreigner's mercy, the King was besieged in the 
 view of persuading him to part with a Minister 
 who was leading the Kingdom to certain ruin. 
 He was assailed with the most urgent suggestions 
 on all sides ; he found an echo of them in the 
 bosom of his family. Most of the Princes, the 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 33 
 
 Queen herself, became the mouthpiece of the 
 alarm that resounded everywhere : at Berlin, in 
 the provinces, at all the German Courts. 
 
 A spirit less firm, an ambition less sound, would 
 have yielded to the general uproar. The King 
 remained unmoved. Neither internal danger, 
 nor the peril far more serious to which it 
 was imagined he was exposing the integrity of 
 the kingdom, affected him. He paid no attention 
 either to the terror displayed by the population, or 
 to the incriminations that were the result, how- 
 ever lively or general they might be. He 
 imposed silence around him ; 1 he exerted himself 
 to tranquillize some, to charm others, never 
 acknowledging that his policy could or must lead 
 to an armed struggle. Count Bismarck served 
 him to his satisfaction with the vigour and 
 ingenuity the task he had confided to him re- 
 quired, personally assuming the responsibility of 
 all the complications. If, during this long and 
 anxious struggle, destiny had forced King William 
 to renounce his maturely premeditated schemes, he 
 would have dismissed Count Bismarck and have 
 issued from this difficult position with the renown 
 of a sovereign wisely advised at the proper 
 
 1 Notably on the Queen, who ostensibly avoided meeting Count 
 Bismarck, and above all conversing with him, had to modify her 
 demeanour and to refrain henceforth from expressing her private 
 opinions. 
 
 D 
 
34 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 moment. The Minister alone would have carried 
 along with him into retirement the severe judg- 
 ment of his contemporaries. But such a thought 
 never entered the King's mind. Appreciating 
 events with defiant perspicacity, he refused to 
 listen to advice of any kind, no matter whence it 
 came or the competency of the persons offering it, 
 and firmly left the reins of his government in 
 Count Bismarck's hands. 
 
 These facts are beyond discussion. They refute 
 the legend. The obstinacy displayed by the King 
 in repelling the importunity he was beset with, is 
 not characteristic of a prince who would have 
 obeyed a minister's impulsion with blind and un- 
 conscious submission. We have shown how the 
 King understood the exercise of his rights, how 
 he insisted on having the tacit, but always vigilant 
 direction of everything. He did not cease doing 
 so after the Empire was established. Count 
 Bismarck bears testimony to this himself: "I 
 have great respect for," he says, in that proud and 
 haughty language which has given such powerful 
 relief to his personality, " I am very much at- 
 tached to the Emperor William, and I think 
 I have given him proof of my devotedness 
 more frequently than he has shown me his grati- 
 tude ; but I must say that if I have expended my 
 strength, my health, my life in his service, he does 
 not spare me shocks and causes for irritation. My 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 35 
 
 health would be much better without the little 
 letters with which his hand honours me." If it 
 were thus when Count Bismarck had shown his 
 precious aptitude, when success had responded to 
 the mutual efforts of the King and himself in a 
 measure beyond all prevision, when the Minister 
 could justly claim a considerable share in the 
 achievement and greater liberty of action, how 
 can one hesitate to recognise that royal super- 
 vision must have been exercised much more 
 rigorously, actively, and imperiously, during the 
 period of preparation, when the destinies of the 
 country were about to be left to the fate of arms 
 and the caprice of fortune? The King was 
 risking the glory, if not the existence, of his 
 dynasty, Count Bismarck his reputation as a 
 statesman and his own future. One stake was 
 infinitely more precious than the other, and it is ■ 
 easy to understand that the Sovereign should 
 have applied himself to watching over and often 
 restraining the impetuous action of his Minister, 
 with whose temperament he was familiar. 
 
 Thus the two wars, that of 1866 like that of 
 1870, both desired, both prepared a long time^- 
 in advance by staff-officers and diplomacy, only 
 actually broke out at the date fixed by the King. 
 The generals told him from the commencement 
 of 1866, that the reorganisation of the Prussian 
 army was complete ; that every measure had 
 
 d 2 
 
36 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 been taken to ensure prompt mobilisation, whereas 
 the Austrian forces were still in course of form- 
 ation ; and that a prompt resolution would 
 ensure victory. Count Bismarck, on his side, 
 seconded General von Moltke's solicitations with 
 all possible warmth ; and urged the King to 
 authorise him to hasten the rupture. His Majesty 
 would not be influenced by these preconcerted 
 entreaties. He displayed as much firmness in his 
 resistance, in his determination to await the 
 favourable moment, as he had done when the 
 friends of peace implored him to renounce a policy 
 which they considered fatal to his house and 
 country. He wished it to appear that war was 
 forced on him by circumstances and was in no 
 way due to his own initiative. Was this pusillan- 
 imity or wisdom ? Was it a timid calculation 
 or a happy inspiration ? Events have shown 
 him right in contradiction to all his advisers. 
 Indeed, Austria's mistakes, particularly her deter- 
 mination to decline the Congress, which the 
 Powers had suggested and to which Prussia, 
 by the King's commands, had hastened to adhere, 
 created a new situation. "In face of Austria's 
 answer," Commander Nigra telegraphed from 
 Paris to General La Marmora, " Prince Gortcha- 
 koff and Lord Clarendon have pronounced the 
 Congress impossible. M. Drouyn de Lhuys has 
 just done the same . . . He renders justice to the 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 37 
 
 spirit of conciliation and earnestness of the other 
 Powers (Prussia and Italy) ..." This was exactly 
 what the King was waiting for — the precise mo- 
 ment to strike, the opportunity so much desired. 
 War became inevitable by the action of the Vienna 
 Cabinet, and it was permissible to saddle it with 
 a good share of the wrongs the Berlin Govern- 
 ment had at the origin, exclusively assumed. And 
 so William I., on setting out to take command of 
 his armies, was able to say to the Italian Minister : 
 "They have long accused me of wishing for war 
 to satisfy ambitious aims, but now, after Austria's 
 refusal to attend the Congress, her unworthy 
 violation of the treaty of Gastein . . . the whole 
 world knows who is the aggressor." x Thus the 
 Emperor Francis Joseph, so outrageously pro- 
 voked, with a display of dissimulation and per- 
 severance that nothing had discouraged, became 
 the originator of the war. The King of Prussia 
 had attained his end, that which he had been 
 pursuing, personally, contrary to the liking and 
 contrary to the reiterated advice of his generals 
 and his Prime Minister. He threw his armies 
 into Saxony and Bohemia, at a propitious and 
 opportune moment, whilst declining the responsi- 
 
 1 The King, on his return to Berlin, in his speech at the com- 
 mencement of the parliamentary session, thought he could openly 
 thank Providence, without departing from truth, "for the grace 
 that had assisted Prussia in diverting a hostile invasion from 
 her frontiers . . ." 
 
38 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 bility of this redoubtable conflict. He was no 
 longer the sole disturber of peace ; he could, under 
 such circumstances, face the disapprobation of 
 other Courts and the discontent of public opinion. 
 We shall find him following this same line of 
 conduct, with the same anxiety, the same calcula- 
 tions, during the period preceding the war of 
 1870. The conquest of the countries united to 
 his kingdom in 1866 had not satisfied his ambition. 
 The easy and brilliant achievements against 
 Austria had, on the contrary, considerably sharp- 
 ened it. The Confederation of Northern Germany, 
 the outcome of the treaty of Prague, was already 
 nothing more than a pledge of what was to follow ; 
 it must be completed by the addition of the 
 Southern States, and the German Empire must be 
 re-established to the advantage of the House of 
 Hohenzollern. The obstacle to this was not on 
 the Main, that artificial and manifestly temporary 
 limit ; it was at Paris. It did not take long to 
 understand this, and to become convinced that 
 another war must be undertaken to complete the 
 the edifice. The King looked on this from the 
 commencement as an inevitable contingency, and 
 with greater resolution than Count Bismarck him- 
 self. 1 Different incidents that we could recall 
 
 1 Notwithstanding the King's never-failing guardedness, he more 
 than once, at the opening of parliamentary sessions, let fall allusions, 
 addressed to Germany, to the fraternal nations, to the land bounded 
 by the Alps and Baltic, which according to the semi-official news- 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 39 
 
 justify us in thinking so. Limiting ourselves, for 
 the moment, to determining the part of two men 
 in the preparation of the great things they accom- 
 plished, we will merely remind our readers here, 
 that under the King's personal impulse, and before 
 peace with Austria was definitely concluded, the 
 reorganisation of the army was commenced and 
 persevered in without pause ; in future it was to 
 comprise the effectives of the annexed countries 
 and of those States recently confederated with 
 Prussia. The number of army corps was increased 
 from nine to twelve, and it was established by 
 official documents that the Confederation of 
 Northern Germany could place more than a 
 million soldiers in the field. The King intended 
 taking the supreme command of these forces and 
 doing what he pleased with them. 
 
 It was necessary, however, to concert with the 
 Confederate States, to stipulate the clauses of the 
 new association with them. Resolutely unyielding, 
 always rebellious to any intervention of the 
 legislative power in the domain which he 
 reserved exclusively to his sovereign authority, 
 the King consented to no sacrifice in the elabora- 
 tion of the federal pact. He would not grant 
 Parliament any rights likely to limit his personal 
 action, as he had understood and practised it 
 
 papers made the hearts of all patriots leap in expectation of coming 
 events. 
 
40 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 during his reign. Parliament, sprung from uni- 
 versal suffrage, became, on its side, exacting 
 and refractory. The conflict between regal power 
 and the Prussian Chamber of Deputies threatened 
 to be renewed with the representatives of the 
 Northern Confederation ; Count Bismarck wished 
 to prevent it. He advised a conciliative attitude ; 
 the little letters, with which the master's hand 
 too frequently honoured him, were an obstacle to 
 his views. These letters exasperated him ; he 
 nevertheless exerted all his skill to protect and 
 impose the monarch's claims. The task was 
 difficult and often painful. He succeeded, how- 
 ever, after long and laborious efforts, in satisfying 
 the King without discontenting Parliament beyond 
 measure, so that the Constitution was voted and 
 objectionable discussions avoided. In the mean- 
 while his health was put to a severe test, and it 
 was from that time that he often, as we know, 
 pleaded his enervated condition, from which he 
 has sometimes seriously suffered, to escape, by 
 absenting himself, from the difficulties of his 
 position and more particularly from the exactions 
 of his Sovereign. It must be admitted that again, 
 on this occasion, the will stated to be vacillating 
 and submissive, far from showing restraint or a 
 disposition to yield, was firmly asserted, and 
 triumphed over all obstacles. Count Bismarck 
 did not regret this himself, later on, in the dis- 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 41 
 
 cussions he had to engage in before Parliament : 
 he made large use of the immense power that had 
 devolved on him thanks to the King's invincible 
 resistance. 
 
 We know what authority the federal pact con- 
 ferred on the President of the Northern Con- 
 federation and his Chancellor. In regard to 
 military matters, the King of Prussia was invested 
 with absolute power ; and so that no obstacle 
 might be thrown in his way for a long time, it was 
 required, by an innovation that seems strange in 
 our age, that the arrangements connected with the 
 war department, both respecting levies of men 
 and expenditure, should be voted for several 
 years. He could also declare war and make 
 peace without having recourse to Parliament. In 
 a political sense the Chancellor, who alone ex- 
 ercised executive power, was amenable to the 
 President of the Confederation — now German 
 Emperor — only; and, by an inversion of all the 
 principles in like matter, he presided over the 
 Bundesratk, the second Chamber of the federal 
 association, which shared the legislative power 
 with Parliament, and was an Assembly composed 
 entirely of revocable functionaries delegated by 
 the Confederate States. Thus whilst the Chan- 
 cellor alone grasped the reins of the Federal 
 Government, he participated at the same time, in 
 legislation, not as a simple member of one of the 
 
42 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 two Chambers, but as President of that which, by 
 its organisation, was dependent on his all-powerful 
 direction. These arrangements have been taken 
 as a pattern by the German Empire. 
 
 The foregoing brief indications suffice to ex- 
 plain in what spirit the federal institutions were 
 conceived and drafted, and in what aim they were 
 imposed. The King remained the independent 
 master of his own resolutions, and was more 
 powerful and better armed for future contingencies. 
 Not having conceded to the Parliament of the 
 North any right to supervise or circumscribe his 
 action, he had full liberty to make his preparations 
 for the new war he had in contemplation. He 
 gave this matter all his care, devoting his attention 
 particularly to the army, whilst leaving the choice 
 and arrangement of the expedients destined to 
 provoke the conflict, to the skill and fertile imagi- 
 nation of his Minister. But he was thoroughly 
 determined not to engage in hostilities prematurely, 
 and there was again witnessed between the Sove- 
 reign on the one hand and the Generals x and 
 Count Bismarck on the other, the same dissent as 
 had marked the preparation of war with Austria. 
 
 1 A work, attributed to a superior officer, which has just appeared 
 at Cassel, and from which the Berliner Tageblatt has published 
 long extracts, reveals all the efforts made by the military party 
 to prevail on the King to go to war at this time. General Count 
 Waldersee, according to the author, particularly exerted himself in 
 that direction. 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 43 
 
 On this occasion again, they in vain called the 
 King's attention to the military measures the Im- 
 perial Government was taking, and the activity 
 displayed by Marshal Niel ; they pointed out to 
 him in vain that time was to the advantage of 
 France and to the prejudice of Prussia, and that 
 at this moment they could surprise the French 
 army which was in course of reorganisation both 
 in regard to its effective and its appliances. At 
 the commencement of 1869, Count Bismarck put 
 forward the candidature of Prince Leopold of 
 Hohenzollern to the Spanish crown. The King first 
 of all considered this combination ill-timed ; he re- 
 fused his assent. He thought on the one hand, that 
 his new troops and those of his German allies did not 
 yet possess the necessary coherence and solidity. 
 He had, on the other, a moral reason for not 
 hurrying ; it was always the same and was always 
 present in his mind : he took into consideration, 
 as matters of first importance, the feeling of the 
 Great Powers and the state of public opinion in 
 Europe. He desired, as in 1866, to await events, 
 the faults or errors of his adversary, the propi- 
 tious moment when he could repudiate all idea of 
 aggression on his own part, and attribute the 
 initiative of it to him. He knew that his own 
 pacific declarations deceived neither the Govern- 
 ments nor the public mind, that since Sadowa he 
 was the object of legitimate and general suspicion : 
 
44 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 there was, in fact, no longer the least doubt for 
 any one, that the aim of his ambition was the 
 Imperial Crown, and he did not conceal from 
 himself that he would only be able to grasp it 
 after a new victory and the defeat of France. 
 " The more I observe the line of conduct of the 
 Prussian Government," wrote our Ambassador on 
 January 5th, 1868, "the more I am persuaded 
 that all its efforts tend to establish its power over 
 the whole of Germany, and each day I receive fresh 
 proof that it pursues this aim with the conviction 
 that it will not be able to attain it without placing 
 France in the impossiblity of putting an obstacle 
 in its way. ..." And after having examined 
 the whole position he concludes thus : " It is. con- 
 sequently a formidable war that we shall have 
 to carry on, in which a whole people will take 
 part against us. The Emperor's Government 
 cannot, therefore, weigh all the chances before- 
 hand with too great care, or too maturely re- 
 flect, before coming to the decision they may 
 consider best for the interests and salvation of 
 the country." 
 
 The French Government, however, carefully 
 avoided supplying the Berlin Cabinet with any 
 subject for serious discontent. France had offered 
 the belligerents the preliminaries of peace at 
 Nikolsburg ; she had inserted a provision in them 
 stipulating that the population of Northern Schles- 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 45 
 
 wig should be consulted before being annexed to 
 Prussia. After the conclusion of peace, Count 
 Bismarck informed our Ambassador that he firmly 
 intended to conform to this ; but, questioned on 
 the subject in 1867, he declared at the tribune of 
 the Parliament, in terms that might have caused 
 excitement at Paris, that the two Powers who 
 signed the treaty of Prague were alone qualified 
 to watch over its execution. The French Govern 
 ment did not accept this first challenge. On the 
 contrary, it took advantage of every opportunity 
 that occurred to establish loyal and sincere inter- 
 course with the Berlin Cabinet. It proposed a 
 good and disinterested understanding, in regard 
 to both the Eastern and Italian questions with a 
 view to solving them peacefully. It could suit 
 neither the King nor Count Bismarck, who were 
 bent on other solutions, to assist us in effecting a 
 reconciliation between the Italian Government 
 and the Pope, and help us to put an end to a 
 state of things in the peninsula that impeded 
 our freedom of action. Nor did it suit them any 
 better to associate themselves with France in the 
 discussions that were being renewed without end 
 on the Bosphorus. If they had not entered into 
 formal engagements, they had at all events en- 
 couraged hopes at St. Petersburg, and they were 
 particularly careful to keep on the right side of 
 Russia, in order to oppose her to Austria, at the 
 
46 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 price it might be necessary to give, when the 
 time came to fight on the Rhine. Influenced by 
 this twofold anxiety, the Cabinet of Berlin accepted 
 none of the suggestions made by that of Paris ; 
 it was courteous, but resolved not to form amicable 
 and intimate relations with France ; on the con- 
 trary, it exerted all its credit with other Powers 
 to dissuade them from joining in the views of the 
 Imperial Government ; sometimes using influence 
 with the Pontifical Court, sometimes with that of 
 Florence, to prevent a reconciliation ; finally, ex- 
 changing communications with Garibaldi himself, 
 in order to provoke manifestations or encourage 
 attempts destined to more completely divide Italy 
 and France at the proper moment. 1 In January, 
 1870, the French Government made a last and 
 supreme effort. Desiring to give striking proof 
 of its pacific intentions, it raised the question of 
 disarmament. So as not to expose itself to a 
 direct refusal, which might have caused offence, 
 it solicited the assistance of Great Britain. At 
 its request, the English Cabinet consented to 
 become the intermediary between France and 
 Prussia; Lord Clarendon, the principal Secretary 
 of State, instructed the English Ambassador at 
 Berlin to ascertain the views of Count Bismarck. 
 
 1 See Ma Mission en Prusse. See also the Correspondance de 
 Mazzini avec M. de Bismarck en 1868 et 1869, published since the 
 death of the Italian agitator, proposing to overthrow Victor 
 Emmanuel if he formed an alliance with Napoleon III. 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 47 
 
 This measure was not attended by any good 
 result. The Chancellor, after taking the King's 
 commands, declared that Prussia could not 
 acquiesce in such a proposal, he considered it 
 useless to discuss the principle and the issues it 
 might raise. 
 
 These various incidents placed the Berlin Cab- 
 inet in a delicate position. They brought the 
 respective views of France and Prussia into evi- 
 dence and opposition. It therefore became every 
 day more urgent for the King and Count Bismarck 
 to come to a decision. They knew, besides, that 
 the armament in France was proceeding ; she had 
 made her new rifle, renewed her artillery, increased 
 her effective ; they thought her better equipped 
 and more redoubtable than she was, unfortunately, 
 in reality. They persuaded themselves that her 
 strength would be greater before long ; and they 
 saw increasing peril in further adjournment of the 
 conflict for which both were making ready. Pre- 
 parations at Berlin had reached their height : they 
 were in a position to face the struggle, and could 
 not hope to be in a better one at any other mo- 
 ment. The Great General Staff called attention 
 to the state of matters in its daily reports, which 
 were supported by Count Bismarck ; the King 
 permitted in 1870 what he had forbidden in the 
 preceding year : he authorised Prince Leopold 
 of Hohenzollern to accept the Spanish crown. 
 
48 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 Regardless of diplomatic decorum and of the sound 
 traditions always observed among the Powers, the 
 Berlin Cabinet abstained from communicating what 
 had taken place to the Imperial Government, not- 
 withstanding that the latter had officially requested 
 information from Count Bismarck as to the King's 
 real intentions when the subject was under con- 
 sideration at Berlin on the first occasion, whilst at 
 the same time expressing the natural anxiety that 
 was felt in regard to it. Everything had been 
 arranged so that the surprise should be keen and 
 penetrating, so that it might be deeply felt. They 
 were in hopes France would bound at the insult, 
 and that war would break out without having been 
 declared. This conjecture met with disappoint- 
 ment. The excitement was intense and general ; 
 the Imperial Government became its mouthpiece 
 in language that was dignified and firm, but in no 
 way offensive ; it confined itself to stating that it 
 would ask for an explanation, and in fact instructed 
 our Charge d' Affaires to do so. At Berlin they 
 had recourse to the system that has always been 
 in practice at the Prussian Court : our represent- 
 ative ad interim could only see an Under Secretary 
 of State ; Count Bismarck had sought rest in the 
 shade of the trees at Varzin, where he awaited 
 events ; the King had left for Ems. The Under 
 Secretary of State affirmed that "the Prussian 
 Government was an absolute stranger to this affair, 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 49 
 
 and had nothing whatever to do with it. 1 The 
 King might have been associated with the matter 
 as head of the Hohenzollern family, but he had in no 
 way intervened in his quality of King of Prussia." 
 The representatives of the Berlin Cabinet 
 abroad, in accordance with their instructions, 
 held the same language: The Government of 
 Northern Germany, said the Prussian Ambassador 
 to Lord Granville, has no intention of meddling 
 in this matter ; the French are at liberty to do as 
 they please. My colleague at Paris, he added, 
 has received instructions to avoid the subject, and 
 to consent to no discussion in regard to it. . . . 
 Moreover, he continued, it would be premature 
 to discuss this question before the Cortes have 
 ratified the choice of Prince Leopold. 2 The blow 
 had been struck and the hand that had dealt it 
 withdrawn. King and Minister were equally inno- 
 cent, and free of any insidious thought. When 
 this position had been taken up, they awaited the 
 assembling of the Cortes ; they expected Prince 
 Leopold to be elected by acclamation. They 
 relied on Spanish pride to cause the French 
 Government fresh difficulties, which they hoped 
 
 1 In the preceding year, the French Ambassador, in the absence 
 of Count Bismarck, and previous to having an explanation with 
 him, had had an interview with this same functionary, who assured 
 him, on his word of honour, that he had received no information 
 on this subject. The Chancellor, as will have been seen, was less 
 discreet a few days later. 
 
 2 See the Blue-Book of 1870, p. 13. 
 
 E 
 
5 o STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 would lead it to extreme measures. It was in this 
 view that the King gave his consent to his 
 nephew's candidature. But as there was no possi- 
 bility of having an explanation with the Berlin 
 Cabinet, that of Paris, to which every other channel 
 had been closed, gave orders to its Ambassador to 
 repair to Ems, to lay the matter before the King 
 himself and to submit to him the reasons that 
 made it a duty for him to be opposed to the 
 accession of a German Prince to the throne of 
 Charles V. 
 
 From this moment, we see the King, and after 
 him Count Bismarck, during the few days that 
 preceded the outbreak of war, each displaying 
 more distinctly and with greater emphasis, their re- 
 spective qualities and personalities. The occasion 
 is a solemn one, and we have all the more reason 
 for pausing at it, as by doing so we shall be able 
 to express an opinion on the parts played by the 
 Sovereign and Minister respectively. 
 
 What was the aim in raising the Spanish 
 question ? It was certainly not to enthrone a 
 Hohenzollern at Madrid. "The sovereignty 
 offered to Prince Leopold," said Count Bismarck 
 to the French Ambassador on May nth, 1869, 
 when he questioned him on the subject, "could 
 only be of ephemeral duration and would expose 
 him to more personal danger than mistakes." 
 There was therefore another object, that of caus- 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 51 
 
 ing a disagreement with France. This, indeed, 
 was the general feeling in Europe. The Powers 
 and public opinion did not take any other view of 
 the matter. In fact, as soon as the candidature 
 of Prince Leopold was avowed and became 
 imminent, the various Cabinets and even the 
 Sovereigns themselves interposed without seeking 
 to dissemble their surprise and alarm. The Queen 
 of England, and more particularly the Emperor 
 of Russia, sent conciliatory messages to Ems, 
 advising moderation and urging the King to lend 
 himself to an arrangement. 1 The press in all 
 parts, that of London especially, protested against 
 an enterprise that it commented on with extreme 
 severity. " The transaction," said the Times, 
 "has the air of a vulgar and impudent coup 
 d'itat of a kind that is sure not to be successful. 
 The election of a sovereign to such a throne as 
 that of Spain should be a solemn and dignified 
 proceeding, conducted openly in the face of the 
 world, and accompanied by a frank communica- 
 tion with friendly Powers. ... If there was 
 nothing hostile to France in this negotiation, 
 why conceal it from her ? Thus will argue 
 thousands of Frenchmen, and it will not be 
 easy to dispel the prejudice thus produced. . . . 
 It is not in human nature to avoid feeling some 
 
 1 See particularly a despatch from Lord Lyons to Lord Granville 
 of July 13th. {Slue-Book, 1870.) 
 
 E 2 
 
52 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 resentment at being tricked ; and the present 
 arrangement has to Frenchmen a most un- 
 pleasant look of trickery." x 
 
 The King, in presence of this universal re- 
 probation, was not long in arriving at the con- 
 clusion that by persisting in the line of conduct 
 he had been led to follow, war would certainly 
 be the result, but that it would be difficult for 
 him to decline the responsibility of having 
 brought it on. The attitude of France was not 
 what he had anticipated ; she had felt the injury, 
 she had intimated what her intentions were ; but 
 she had stated them without resorting to any 
 extreme measures or wounding Prussia, and her 
 attitude had been approved by the various 
 Governments. The provocation not having given 
 the results expected, the King altered his mind. 
 He received the French Ambassador, and contrary 
 to his usual habit, contrary to all the traditions of 
 his house, consented to come to an explanation, 
 and to endeavour, with him, to find the means of 
 putting an end to this serious difference. He 
 consulted no one but himself, and was only 
 influenced by the warnings that had been sent to 
 him in a friendly way from London, and particu- 
 larly from St. Petersburg. Count Bismarck had 
 hastened from Varzin to Berlin and wished to 
 come to Ems ; he was not authorised to do so. 
 
 1 The Times, July 8th, 1870. — Translator. 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 53 
 
 The King feared his interference at this juncture ; 
 he kept him at a distance from the scene of the 
 negotiations, wishing to have them in his own 
 hands, and feeling, no doubt, that he had been ill- 
 advised in bringing matters to a climax, or had 
 done so prematurely. 
 
 However, he did not despair of setting things 
 right again, by causing difficulties and complica- 
 tions to arise from the discussions in which he 
 was about to engage, that would produce what 
 he desired. He conceded Prince Leopold's de- 
 sistance, or rather he promised to approve of it 
 as soon as it was made known, but he refused to 
 undertake to exact it. He arranged with Prince 
 Anthony for his son's renunciation to take place 
 in a way and under circumstances that would be 
 disobliging to France. Whilst sacrificing the prin- 
 ciple, he applied himself with immense skill, we 
 should say with monstrous treachery, to discover- 
 ing a way to entangle the Imperial Government in 
 the form. We know how well he succeeded. 
 
 Prince Leopold's desistance was signified by his 
 father to General Prim, by an unciphered telegram 
 sent through Paris, and conceived in terms calcu- 
 lated to irritate the French Cabinet ; and this was 
 done before the King had communicated the 
 information to the French Ambassador. It was 
 thus established to the satisfaction of persons of no 
 very great discernment, that the concession had 
 
54 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 been spontaneously made by the candidate to the 
 Spanish crown without the King having had any- 
 thing to do with it, and that he, on his side, had 
 made no concession to France. Every one, how- 
 ever, was aware that the Hohenzollern Princes 
 could not come to a decision of such serious im- 
 portance, of such great interest at that particular 
 moment, without the consent of the head of their 
 family, and the expedient could deceive nobody. 
 But it was known that the feeling of exasperation 
 at Paris was keen and general, and it was hoped 
 that this would lead both Government and popu- 
 lation astray. Did these calculations enter into the 
 King's mind ? Everything tends to give one that 
 impression ; what, unfortunately, is only too cer- 
 tain, is that Prince Leopold's renunciation, which 
 was made public before having been notified to 
 the French Cabinet, was not considered by the 
 latter to be sufficient satisfaction. It was thought 
 necessary, the past being over, to obtain assur- 
 ances for the future, and the King was asked to 
 promise, through the intermediary of the French 
 Ambassador, that he would not, on any other 
 ^occasion, authorise a prince of his house to be- 
 come a candidate to the throne of Spain. The 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs esteemed it, moreover, 
 opportune and proper to request the King to 
 write a letter to the Emperor, for publication, in 
 which he would repudiate any evil intention. He 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 55 
 
 expressed that desire to the Prussian Ambassador 
 at Paris, who was obliged to transmit it to Ems. 1 
 
 Prince Leopold's retirement was welcomed by 
 the foreign Cabinets and press as a guarantee for 
 the maintenance of peace : they believed this 
 henceforth ensured. Without troubling about the 
 question of form, they accorded the conqueror of 
 Sadowa credit for the proof he had given, under 
 difficult circumstances, of his personal feelings. 
 The new departure of the French Cabinet was, 
 on the contrary, regarded as a fresh and un- 
 fortunate obstacle to the resumption of a good 
 understanding between France and Prussia. The 
 King perceived the parts were reversed : he broke 
 off the negotiations, feeling convinced that he 
 could now accuse the Imperial Government of 
 having obstinately desired war ; he authorised 
 Count Bismarck to neglect nothing to make it 
 inevitable at an early date. This happened on 
 the morning of July 13th ; on the 14th, he left for 
 Berlin, where he went to preside over the mobili- 
 sation of the army in person. 
 
 We have described what the King did in this 
 great crisis ; let us see how the Minister acted. 
 The details will not be out of place here : it is, 
 indeed, indispensable to sketch the most essential 
 of them, in order to throw light on events and give 
 them their proper colour. Count Bismarck; reduced 
 
 1 See Baron Werther's despatch, dated Jtily 12th, 1870. 
 
56 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 to abstention and silence, was fuming at Berlin. In 
 his familiar circle, he had naught but bitter words 
 for his master. He reproached him with en- 
 dangering the dignity and interests of Germany 
 by his attitude and concessions. He obeyed, 
 however, observing a reserve that weighed upon 
 him cruelly. As soon as he received orders to 
 bestir himself, as soon as he was placed in pos- 
 session of his freedom of action again, he appeared 
 like a bomb upon the scene ; and before that 1 3th 
 of July was over, there remained not a vestige 
 of the hopes the friends of peace had been 
 nursing on the previous eve. It was particularly 
 on this occasion that Count Bismarck displayed 
 all the resources of his brain and his marvellous 
 activity : he instantly finds more expedients than 
 he requires to hurry on a rupture, and he uses 
 them with equal precision and rapidity. He re- 
 calls the Prussian Ambassador accredited to the 
 French Government, by telegraph ; he enjoins 
 him to leave Paris within forty-eight hours, re- 
 proaching him with having listened to, without 
 protestation, and with having transmitted a pro- 
 posal to Ems that was an outrage for the King. 
 He does not break off relations with France — he 
 wishes to force the Imperial Government to make 
 the rupture — but he declares it to be his de- 
 termined intention not to renew any negotiations, 
 and not to lend himself to any conciliatory measure 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 57 
 
 or any agreement. At the same instant he in- 
 forms the various European Governments, by- 
 means of a circular-despatch sent by telegraph to 
 all his diplomatic agents, of the incidents of the 
 morning at Ems, giving an inexact and perfidious 
 account of them. "The French Ambassador, 
 having insisted," he says, "on guarantees for the 
 future, after Prince Leopold's desistance, his 
 Majesty refused to receive him any more, and 
 sent word to him, by the aide-de-camp on duty, 
 that he had nothing further to communicate to 
 him." 1 
 
 This was announcing to Europe, contrary to 
 truth, that the King had forbidden the Ambas- 
 sador to present himself at his residence. It is 
 not our intention to dwell on the significance and 
 bearing of such treatment inflicted on a diplomatist 
 invested with a dignity which, by a fiction accepted 
 in all times, makes him the representative of his 
 sovereign in person. Count Bismarck affirmed 
 therefore simultaneously, that whilst at Paris the 
 King's majesty had been offended, at Ems the 
 French Ambassador had been shown the door. 
 After having done what was necessary abroad, he 
 turns his attention to public opinion in Germany, 
 with a view to exciting and embittering it. The 
 
 1 The assertion was entirely inexact. The Ambassador had seen 
 the King and had communicated the proposal to him. The King 
 had declined to accede to it, but only after having discussed it with 
 him. 
 
58 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 famous department of the public mind whispers 
 arrogant and offensive language to all the news- 
 papers. "The King and nation," they say, "have 
 been outraged ; the whole country must rise and 
 wreak vengeance for such a grave offence." All 
 through the evening the boys who cry out the 
 newspapers sell sheets containing pretended tele- 
 grams giving accounts of the insult to the King 
 and the insult to the Ambassador ; whereas, in 
 reality, the Ambassador is taking leave of the 
 Prussian monarch, who welcomes him at this last 
 meeting as at the others, with his usual courtesy, 
 from which he has never had any reason to depart. 
 Count Bismarck thus closes — and he has no other 
 aim — all channels to any possible arrangement. 
 
 He did not, indeed, attempt to conceal his real 
 intentions. Since his return from Varzin, his door 
 had not opened to a single diplomatist : he was 
 fretting and fuming, and did not wish to make an 
 exhibition of himself. On the 1 3th, he received the 
 British Ambassador. According to the Chancellor, 
 there was only one guilty party in the whole affair : 
 France. She was not satisfied with the solution 
 of the Spanish question, he said to Lord Augustus 
 Loftus ; other demands were made ; it was evident 
 that she was seeking her revenge for Koniggratz. 
 Public feeling in Prussia, in Germany, would not 
 submit to humiliation ; he disapproved of the 
 King's conciliatory attitude at Ems : Count 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 59 
 
 Bismarck, continues the British Ambassador in 
 reporting this interview, then declared that unless 
 France gave assurances, made an official declar- 
 ation to the European Powers, recognising that 
 the existing solution of the Spanish question satis- 
 fied her and that no other contention would be 
 raised later on ; and that if, moreover, she did not 
 retract or explain the Due de Gramont's threat- 
 ening language, the Prussian Government would 
 be compelled to demand satisfaction. It is impos- 
 sible for Prussia to keep quiet and peaceful after 
 the affront given to the King and country by the 
 menacing tone of the French Government. And 
 the Ambassador concluded his despatch by ex- 
 pressing the conviction, after listening to Count 
 Bismarck, that unless some mediating influence 
 succeeded in exercising pressure on the French 
 Government, in appeasing the feeling of irritation 
 against Prussia and in causing moderation to pre- 
 vail, war was inevitable. 
 
 Count Bismarck was of the same opinion as his 
 master ; he thought as did the latter that the parts 
 were reversed. Henceforth it was France that 
 owed satisfaction to Prussia, and Prussia meant to 
 have it, or she would be neither quiet nor peaceful. 
 It must, however, be pointed out that the Imperial 
 Government, in answer to an interpellation from 
 the Left, had given explanations on Prince 
 Leopold's candidature in the sitting of July 
 
60 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 6th. Up to the 13th, neither the King nor 
 his Government saw any outrage in the state- 
 ment made on that occasion, by the Due de 
 Gramont ; negotiations were opened at Ems, they 
 were pursued, without any intention being ex- 
 pressed of demanding redress. On the 13th 
 there is a complete change : the offence exists ; it 
 has attained the King and country, and satisfaction 
 is loudly called for ; it must be exemplary, public, 
 submitted to all the Powers. France must form- 
 ally retract, and in language that has not hitherto 
 been used in similar circumstances, or else 
 Germany will be under the necessity of consider- 
 ing what steps she must take. Count Bismarck 
 correctly presumed that France would not bend to 
 such humiliation, that she would prefer appealing 
 to arms, and he would have been greatly dis- 
 appointed, as would also the King, had she con- 
 sented to the expiation he contemplated imposing 
 on her for her so-called misdeeds. Events were 
 not in accordance with his previsions. France, in 
 answer to the Prussian insults and pretensions, 
 declared war without waiting, like Austria in 1866, 
 for her territory to be invaded by the German 
 armies which were being mobilised with all speed. 
 But it is beyond argument that Prussia rendered 
 war inevitable, and that her resolution to engage 
 in it was at this moment irrevocably formed. We 
 shall find conclusive proof of this in the diplomatic 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 61 
 
 despatches published in London at the time. On 
 July 14th England made a proposal which would 
 have been perfectly satisfactory to Prussia. The 
 King, it was suggested, having authorised Prince 
 Leopold to accept the Spanish crown, had made 
 himself in a certain sense a party to the arrange- 
 ment ; he could in the same way and with perfect 
 dignity, communicate to the French Government 
 his consent to the withdrawal of the acceptance, 
 and France would renounce her demand for 
 an undertaking guaranteeing the future. 1 How 
 did Count Bismarck receive this overture, which 
 was certainly of a nature to settle everything? 
 His reply was haughty and laconic. He tele- 
 graphed to the Prussian Ambassador at London to 
 express his regret that the Government of her 
 Britannic Majesty had thought proper to make a 
 sugrerestion which he could not recommend the 
 King to adopt. 2 He had assuredly already 
 regretted not having been authorised to sever all 
 connection with France as far back as July 6th, 
 by taking as a pretext the language used by the 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Corps Legis- 
 latif. He had endeavoured to persuade the King 
 to adopt that course ; everything tends to show it. 
 But the King, influenced by the solicitations 
 
 1 Despatch from Lord Granville to Lord Augustus Loftus, at 
 Berlin, dated July 14th. {Blue Book, 1870.) 
 
 2 Despatch from Lord Granville to Lord Lyons, at Paris, dated 
 July 15th. (Id.) 
 
62 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 addressed direct to him at Ems, by the feeling 
 of irritation displayed on all sides, and of which 
 the press became the mouthpiece in unmeasured 
 terms, had absolutely refused. This opportunity 
 being lost, the Chancellor discovered another, that 
 which the King had so skilfully prepared for him ; 
 and we have just shown how eagerly he grasped 
 it, and the use he made of the liberty of action 
 restored to him. 
 
 It has been asserted that the candidature of 
 Prince Leopold was never, in the minds of those 
 who prepared it, aught but a snare set for our 
 pride and national susceptibility, ever ready to 
 be led astray. This conjecture is certainly not 
 without foundation. What Count Bismarck said 
 on the subject of that candidature to the French 
 Ambassador in 1869, the habit they had at 
 Berlin of resorting to expedients that cannot be 
 qualified as diplomatic measures, gives one 
 authority to think so. But if the trap was set 
 by the Minister with his sovereign's consent, who 
 was it held the string at the decisive moment ? 
 Who adroitly concealed the snare ? Who had the 
 wit to entice France into it ? The King, the King 
 only, and without his Minister's assistance. 
 
 Could so firm a will, such lucid foresight, such 
 patient perseverance have been the inheritance of 
 a prince who had ever been irresolute and timid ? 
 There is not a writer, who, in giving an account 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 63 
 
 of these events which are so near at hand, has 
 not attributed the initiative and direction in all 
 things and on all occasions to Count Bismarck ; 
 who has not shown himself convinced, and sought 
 to persuade his readers, that the Minister con- 
 ceived all and did all ; who has not affirmed that 
 he made greater efforts to obtain his master's 
 adhesion to his policy, than he took trouble to 
 ensure its success. It is true that the irascible 
 President of the Council's complaints, or rather 
 lamentations, have been noted by diplomacy as 
 well as by the press. The correspondence of 
 agents residing at Berlin at that period, which has 
 been published and can be consulted, 1 forms in a 
 measure their daily echo. It reveals the mon- 
 arch's resistance to the minister, the difficulties 
 the latter encountered in leading him on, in over- 
 coming his scruples and superstitions. These 
 complaints, these affirmations of Count Bismarck, 
 exact in the sense that the King refused to hurry, 
 erroneous in reality, which are met with in all the 
 official documents, have certainly contributed not 
 a little to lead public opinion astray, and along 
 with it the publicists who, in all conscientiousness, 
 have engaged in the task of sketching out the 
 history of our times. 
 
 1 See particularly the reports of General Govone, who negotiated 
 the Prusso-Italian Treaty in Un po piic di luce, by General La 
 Marmora. 
 
64 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 The King assuredly wished to be led on, but by 
 the occasional factitious force of circumstances, 
 and not by pressure on the part of his advisers. 
 He desired to show that he had not forgotten 
 either his ideas or scruples ; he wished to keep 
 his aureola of prince by divine right intact and 
 pure from all stain ; he aimed especially at appear- 
 ing respectful of the sovereign rights of the princes 
 confederated with him ; whilst he premeditated 
 stripping them ; and all Count Bismarck's art, let us, 
 if you will, say all his artifices, could not make him 
 go to war until he considered hostilities authorised 
 by circumstances. William I. wished to affirm 
 openly in 1870, as he had done in 1866, that he 
 was not the aggressor, that he took up arms for 
 the purpose only of defending his country against 
 foreign invasion ; and we have just seen that, by 
 his personal action, he succeeded better on the 
 second occasion than on the first. 
 
 How is it possible that this King, who resisted, 
 without ever yielding, the entreaties of his family, 
 of his most devoted servants, of all the German 
 princes, how could this monarch who had heard 
 the principal cities of his kingdom, Parliament, the 
 press, the whole country, protest against a policy 
 which was denounced as perilous and senseless, 
 how could this sovereign, so tenacious and obsti- 
 nate, have submitted blindly and with such great 
 servility to the direction of an imperious minister ? 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 65 
 
 Had it been so, history would have to deal with a 
 psychological problem which modern science, not- 
 withstanding all its investigations, would have 
 difficulty in explaining. The King denied the 
 existence of the treaty with Italy, and we have 
 mentioned with what object ; but he signed it, he 
 ratified it with a perfect knowledge of what he was 
 doing ; and it would really be imposing on the 
 credulity of the public to pretend that he failed to 
 perceive all its importance, that he was persuaded 
 or deceived by Count Bismarck, who had ex- 
 plained to him that its sole purport was to make 
 Austria reflect. He had no more hope than had 
 the man of iron of expelling Austria from Ger- 
 many by intimidation and without having recourse 
 to force ; and this monarch, who is represented as 
 wavering and uncertain, ignoring to what ex- 
 tremities he was being led, was nevertheless 
 preparing for those extremities without pause, 
 notwithstanding the efforts made on every side to 
 stop him in the line of conduct he was pursuing. 
 He knew the connection Count Bismarck had 
 formed in Italy, at Bucharest, at Pesth, with the 
 revolutionary party and all the enemies of Austria 
 — General La Marmora's work is edifying in that 
 respect — and he permitted it, Count Bismarck had 
 all his confidence. We iterate that he affirmed on 
 every occasion that he had no aggressive or war- 
 like thoughts. He even repeatedly employed 
 
66 ■ STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 confidential agents to negotiate, or at least to 
 prepare, an arrangement with the Cabinet of 
 Vienna without Count Bismarck's knowledge ; x but 
 nothing turned him from the path he had traced 
 out for himself, nor did he make the least effort to 
 turn his Minister away from it, and yet he could 
 have revoked him, to the general satisfaction of his 
 subjects and the whole of Europe. His conscience 
 was quite at ease, and all these contradictory acts 
 were reconciled by his idea of political morality. 
 
 It is therefore permissible to say that William I., 
 from the commencement of his reign, when he 
 dismissed the Ministry of the New Era, until the 
 woeful year, followed a policy of his own without 
 ever departing from it ; that he had marked out 
 and denned its aim before Count Bismarck ever 
 came to power ; that, finally, he took an active and 
 always preponderant part in the direction that was 
 given to it. He retired into the background, cer- 
 tainly, when he considered such a step would 
 be advantageous to State affairs, and he fre- 
 quently acted thus to avoid pledging himself 
 personally or compromising the dignity of his 
 crown ; he had recourse to practices that were 
 only justifiable by the aim he had in view. To 
 that end he did homage himself to the capacity of 
 the men he had gathered round him, and to the 
 services they rendered him. Count Moltke com- 
 
 1 See Un fio piii di luce, p. 288. 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 67 
 
 manded his armies, Count Bismarck appeared to 
 direct his policy with absolute independence ; both 
 distinguished themselves without his ever having 
 shown the least jealousy, without his ever having 
 attempted to turn any part of the glory they con- 
 quered to his own account. But he was constantly 
 interfering, and when necessary imposed his will. 
 He never divested himself of any part of his 
 authority, and great resolutions were never taken 
 but when he considered them well conceived, well 
 prepared, and the moment favourable for them to 
 be put into action. 
 
 Assuredly, war could have been engaged in 
 against either Austria or France at times that 
 were particularly advantageous, from a strictly 
 military point of view, as the generals wished ; 
 but it would have been necessary to have had the 
 audacity to acknowledge that he was actuated by 
 a thirst for conquest, as Frederick II. did when 
 he invaded Silesia. Such temerity is not suit- 
 able to our age, and the King acted as a skilful 
 politician in waiting for the opportunity when he 
 could make war without too openly offending the 
 public sense of right, without exposing himself to 
 an understanding, if not a coalition, of the Powers. 
 He was therefore well advised in restraining 
 Count Bismarck's impatience, and there was all 
 the more merit in his having done so, as he alone 
 was of that opinion in the Council. One cannot 
 
 F 2 
 
68 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 say at the present day what would have happened, 
 to what complications and dangers Prussia might 
 have been exposed, had she taken up arms pre- 
 maturely and without having a plausible pretext, 
 whereas, thanks to the invincible prudence of her 
 monarch, she was able to engage in the struggle, 
 on both occasions, without placing her relations 
 with other Courts in jeopardy, without submitting 
 to their mediation, without dreading their resent- 
 ment. All was over before it was perceived what 
 a preponderant influence the House of Hohen- 
 zollern would exert in Europe ; and this, in truth, 
 is personally due to the King. 
 
 What must be recognised is, that these two 
 prodigious labourers at Germany's greatness, King- 
 William and Prince Bismarck, were gifted with 
 various and mighty qualities, and that one was 
 the complement to the other. The first had pru- 
 dence and, let us say it, duplicity ; the second, 
 daring and resolution. What was excessive in 
 these very contrary dispositions was neutralised 
 in an even measure by the action of one upon the 
 other ; let us add this providential amendment, 
 that the master, who could impose his will always, 
 displayed as much reserve as skill in doing so. 
 What must also be noted, is that the Kino- 
 assumed an open air of non-interference that was 
 deceiving; he affected to aspire to "moral con- 
 quests " only, whilst never ceasing to lay claim to 
 
THE EMPEROR AND PRINCE BISMARCK 69 
 
 such as were of a more substantial nature, and, 
 when necessary, upheld his pretensions sword in 
 hand ; the^Trnister, on the contrary, tired out all 
 the echoes in Europe with his plans of aggression 
 and threats. " Every one sees what you appear 
 to be ; few know what you really are," said the 
 Florentine master ; 1 and it is thus that Prince 
 Bismarck has been acclaimed as the restorer of 
 the German Empire, whilst the King seems to 
 have been only the beneficiary. Have not con- 
 temporaries been deceived by the clangorous 
 clatter of the one, by the impenetrable silence of 
 the other, and will not impartial history reform 
 their judgment by meting out to each of these 
 two great figures the justice which is due to him ? 
 Will it not give the Sovereign a share equal to 
 that of the Chancellor, if not greater ? We ven- 
 ture to think so, and express our opinion without 
 fear, however paradoxical such a conjecture may 
 seem at this time. 
 
 1 The Prince, ch. xvii 
 
 July \z,th, 1890. 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE. 
 
 Germany in 1879 concluded a treaty of defen- 
 sive alliance with Austria ; Italy joined this 
 alliance in 1882. Is this three-fold agreement 
 a pact of peace, as is affirmed, a diplomatic notion, 
 having no other object than to guarantee this 
 blessing to Europe, which assuredly desires to 
 preserve it ? Will not this praiseworthy idea, and 
 the arrangements it has given rise to, be followed 
 by unforeseen consequences far different to those 
 hoped for ? This question is forced on all who 
 desire the public weal : it troubles them and, we 
 might add, causes them anxiety. We will en- 
 deavour to inquire into it without pretending to 
 solve it. We will do our best to discover under 
 the influence of what circumstances, in view of 
 what necessities, and by what foresight the three 
 Powers entered into this agreement. We will 
 investigate the situation they have produced, and 
 the obligations it imposes on them and on the 
 other Powers, in order to show, in addition to 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 71 
 
 what is generally known, the true character of 
 the conventions which unite them, as well as to 
 forecast ultimate results. The task is a difficult 
 one ; we are well aware that it is rash to 
 attempt it. We undertake it, however, with 
 no other design than to assist in elucidating 
 a state of affairs that has its perils.; perils 
 that can be easily perceived if one chooses to 
 be sincere. It is, in fact, armed peace that the 
 three Powers have organised, and can peace under 
 arms be lasting ? Are not the treaties that were 
 signed at Vienna and Berlin rather a portent of 
 war ? Will they preserve the Continent from fresh 
 calamities ? It is particularly from this point of 
 view that we propose to consider them. 
 
 All shows that Count Bismarck was the origin- 
 ator of these conventional stipulations. They 
 were conceived and drawn up to the advantage 
 of the German Empire, which reaps the most 
 benefit from them. One can easily see that the 
 German Chancellor was the first to entertain the 
 idea of this agreement, and that he bestowed all 
 his care on its realisation. But at what time and 
 under what circumstances did his active mind 
 conceive this scheme ? how is it that he came to 
 suggest it to Austria ? It is known now that 
 during the negotiations opened at Nikolsburg in 
 1866, there arose a serious difference of opinion 
 between King William and his Prime Minister. 
 
72 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 The monarch sought to impose sacrifices on 
 Austria which Count Bismarck considered too 
 heavy and also impolitic. When the Minister left 
 the ground clear of any insurmountable obstacle to 
 an ulterior agreement between the Courts of 
 Berlin and Vienna, was he influenced by the 
 necessity of coming rapidly to an understanding 
 with the enemy of yesterday in order to have a 
 free hand to fight the foe of to-morrow? His 
 flatterers accord him all these calculations, all 
 these previsions, the wisdom of which a near 
 future was to demonstrate to the world. If one 
 is to credit them, his sagacious foresight led him 
 to embody in the treaty of peace the germ of the 
 agreement which now secures Austria's armed 
 co-operation to Germany. To men to whom fate 
 has predestined great achievements, it is easy to 
 attribute the virtue of foreseeing events and of 
 being prepared for them in advance. Genius 
 certainly has, at times, these visions of the re- 
 mote hereafter. But, be that as it may, it is 
 unquestionable that the founder of the future 
 German Empire overcame the King's cupidity at 
 Nikolsburg. In spite of the efforts of the Great 
 General Staff he persuaded the sovereign to 
 forego his intention of wresting territory from 
 the Emperor Francis Joseph. Peace concluded 
 under these conditions respected the integrity of 
 the Empire of the Habsburgs, and did not leave 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 73 
 
 any incurable wound behind it. The future remained 
 open for a reconciliation, for any arrangements 
 that new and mutual interests might dictate. 
 
 Similar thoughts, it would appear, filled Count 
 Bismarck's mind at Versailles. He is understood 
 to have had the same visions. He has himself 
 stated that, after the first successes of the German 
 arms, he considered the double mutilation in- 
 flicted on France at the conclusion of peace an 
 ill-advised exaction full of peril for the future. 
 Strassburg is the door of our house, he is reported 
 to have said, and we are bound to claim Alsace, 
 which is German land. But, if his opinion had 
 prevailed, France would have retained Lorraine. 
 After succeeding at Nikolsburg, Count Bismarck, 
 in his turn, appears to have succumbed at Ver- 
 sailles. Twenty years have come and gone since 
 then, and events have not yet shown that he 
 was not on each occasion the wisest and most 
 circumspect of King William's counsellors. 
 
 It may therefore be admitted that, whilst 
 negotiating peace at Nikolsburg, Count Bismarck 
 had a presentiment that it would one day be 
 possible, and even expedient, to renew friendly 
 relations with Austria by reconstituting the 
 solidarity of former times ; and it is permissible 
 to believe that, with this object in view, he wisely 
 curbed his master's ambition. In fact it has come 
 to pass that Germany, under the influence of 
 
74 STUDIES' IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 fresh complications, has found it necessary to 
 change her line of policy, and to seek at Vienna 
 the co-operation, the sympathies, and, in a word, 
 the support which she had hitherto always found 
 at St. Petersburg. To fully appreciate this 
 serious evolution, to determine its causes and 
 character, it is necessary to go back to the 
 origin of the events that have made Prussia's 
 greatness, to the genesis of the work undertaken 
 by the King and his Prime Minister. 
 
 I. 
 
 The result of the Crimean war was not only 
 the disarmament of Russia in the East ; it had 
 another and far more durable consequence, that 
 of destroying the union of the three Northern 
 powers — the Holy Alliance. When Herr von 
 Bismarck made his commencement at Frankfort, 
 he must have been convinced that Prussia was 
 isolated in Europe, and that in Germany she had 
 to resign herself to submitting to the humiliating 
 domination of Austria who "alone," according to 
 Count Buol, her Prime Minister, " had a right to an 
 independent policy in the Confederation." Herr 
 von Bismarck's patriotism was roused. Anxious 
 and vigilant, he carefully observed the attitude of 
 the Powers from the post in which he had been 
 placed. He drew attention to the rumours of a 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 75 
 
 reconciliation, of an understanding between the 
 Emperor Alexander and the Emperor Napoleon, 
 and of an interview which was shortly to unite 
 these two Sovereigns at Stuttgart. He entreated 
 his Government to act. And what was it that this 
 bold man suggested ? To join France in an 
 intimate alliance. 1 
 
 When one glances back to that year 1857, 
 when one recalls how long they hesitated at 
 Berlin before recognising the restoration of the 
 Empire with the third Napoleon, and when one 
 considers that Herr von Bismarck himself was 
 only just emerging from the sacred phalanx of the 
 most obdurate feudalism, all the errors of which 
 he had shared, one is amazed at the boldness and 
 the novelty of the conception. And indeed it 
 
 1 In two reports of the months of May and June 1857, wherein 
 he enters fully into his reasons for the conclusion he has arrived at. 
 " Russia is drawing visibly closer to France," he wrote ; " we must 
 be beforehand with her. If we are late in joining this league, 
 Prussia will only occupy a secondary position in it." But to enter 
 into an alliance wifh France, would it not be compounding with the 
 revolution ? Herr von Bismarck foresees the objection, and reso- 
 lutely combats it. " If the Bonapartes," he said, " are the result 
 of the revolution, they have bridled it. The Bourbon dynasty, 
 even without Philippe Egalite, has done more for the revolution 
 than the Bonapartes." And, invoking all the interests, all the pre- 
 cedents which justified Prussia in forgetting the past, and thinking 
 only of the future, he added : " ' Your shirt is nearer to you than 
 your doublet,' and it is urgent, if one has the least ambition, to come 
 to an understanding with Paris so as to secure a suitable place in a 
 Franco-Russian alliance and guarantees against the domination of 
 Austria." (Lettres Politiques de M. de Bismarck, pp. 279 and 
 following. Ollendorff Paris.) 
 
76 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 deeply offended the Court of Sans-Souci. Censured 
 by General von Gerlach, the confidant and in- 
 timate adviser of Frederick William IV., Herr 
 von Bismarck reserved himself for the new reign. 
 
 We know with what plans William I. ascended 
 the throne. " Before engaging in a war to the 
 south or the east of the kingdom," had written 
 Frederick the Great, " every Prussian Prince 
 should secure the neutrality of Russia, cost what 
 it might, if he were unable to obtain her 
 support." The future Emperor remembered his 
 glorious ancestor's warning, and, soon after his 
 accession, he entrusted to Herr von Bismarck the 
 task of assisting him in carrying out this first 
 part of his programme. Thoroughly appreciating 
 this underrated servant's devotedness and the 
 merit of this quarrelsome and decried diplomatist, 
 he appointed him his ambassador at the Court of 
 the Emperor Alexander. 
 
 People were acquainted, at that time, with but 
 one feature of Herr von Bismarck's character, the 
 most prominent one, that which made him con- 
 spicuous the moment he entered public life : smart 
 activity in fault-finding, dissembling neither the 
 object in view nor the means by which it was to 
 be attained, notorious examples of which he had 
 given both at Berlin and Frankfort. The warmth 
 of his constant verbosity, the intemperance of his 
 language, did not seem to have designated him 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 77 
 
 for a delicate mission which required, above all, 
 moderation, discretion, tact in speech as well as 
 in acts and manner, in short, all those acquirements 
 which Herr von Bismarck seemed to lack. He 
 was, nevertheless, able to justify his Sovereign's 
 confidence. This violent, imperious personage 
 became converted ; he revealed himself at St. 
 Petersburg a gentle charmer, an alluring dreamer ; 
 he found favour with the Emperor Alexander. 
 This monarch, who was of an unconfiding and 
 thoughtful mind, could only be won over slowly, 
 by the aid of patient insinuations : Herr von 
 Bismarck took the necessary time and succeeded. 
 
 At St. Petersburg he met Prince Gortchakoff 
 again, then recently appointed Chancellor of the 
 Empire. He had known him and studied him at 
 Frankfort. The same ideas and a deep animosity 
 towards Austria had drawn them together. The 
 one did not forgive that country the share it had 
 taken in humbling Russia in the East ; the other 
 was already meditating its expulsion from Germany. 
 The understanding between them arose as much 
 from their respective dispositions as from the inter- 
 ests entrusted to their charge. Herr von Bismarck 
 nursed it assiduously. He knew that the Russian 
 Chancellor had a great idea of his own personal 
 value ; he nattered him, and dazzled him with the 
 glory that would be attached to his name, the 
 brilliant services he would be rendering his country 
 
78 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 by undertaking to efface the trace of its recent 
 disasters. The obstacle was at Vienna ; in the 
 ambition of Austria who, dreading Russian influ- 
 ence on the Danube and in the Balkans, would 
 never cease to make every effort to impede it. 
 She had had no other object during the Eastern 
 war; as had been amply shown by the hostile and 
 cavilling attitude of her representatives at the 
 Paris Congress. Herr von Bismarck pointed out 
 to him that this was the policy he had to resist, 
 whilst offering him Prussia's co-operation whenever 
 it might be needed. 
 
 Varying his words and displaying equal ability, 
 at one time with the sovereign, at another 
 with the minister, he succeeded in dispelling the 
 mistrust which the ambiguous behaviour of the 
 Berlin Cabinet and its illogical abstention during 
 the Eastern war had created in their minds. King 
 William, moreover, seconded his efforts by repu- 
 diating a policy with which he personally had had 
 nothing to do and which he entirely disavowed. 
 He brought into play that gentle and insinuating 
 amenity of which he possessed the secret, and 
 which enabled him to exercise over his nephew, at 
 the most solemn and decisive moments of his 
 reign, an influence which has proved so disastrous 
 to Russia. When Herr von Bismarck was recalled 
 from St. Petersburg in the spring of 1862 his task 
 had been performed : he left the Russian Court in 
 
THE TRIPLE, ALLIANCE 79 
 
 a cordial and kindly mood, which he and his 
 Sovereign intended to take good advantage of 
 at the first opportunity. 
 
 This opportunity was not long in coming 
 forward. Herr von Bismarck, despatched from St. 
 Petersburg to Paris in 1862, only remained a short 
 time in France. A few months after his arrival, 
 he was recalled to Berlin, and, in September of 
 the same year, the King appointed him President 
 of his Council with the portfolio for Foreign Affairs. 
 At that moment Poland was stirring ; she demanded 
 the national institutions confirmed by the treaties of 
 1815. Disturbances soon broke out, and the Prus- 
 sian Government, faithful to the promises of which 
 Herr von Bismarck had been so prodigal during 
 his stay at St. Petersburg and anxious to secure the 
 sympathies of the Emperor Alexander, offered 
 Russia its armed assistance. On February 8th 
 1863, the two Powers signed a secret treaty having 
 for object the prompt suppression of the Polish 
 movement. This first negotiation was Herr von 
 Bismarck's initial success ; he consolidated the 
 interests of the two Powers both for the time being 
 and in the future. He had set all the more value 
 on this achievement as Austria was following a 
 very different line of conduct. She had, in fact, 
 allowed one of her provinces, Galicia, to become 
 the arsenal of the revolution. This understanding 
 which had been so much desired and the founda- 
 
80 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 tions of which Herr von Bismarck had been en- 
 trusted to lay at St. Petersburg, was now secured 
 and firmly established. Prussia had resumed her in- 
 timate relations with Russia. Austria, on the other 
 hand, had added to her errors, and had more deeply 
 displeased the Court of St. Petersburg. This was 
 soon seen in the matter of the Duchies, and later 
 on during the war which the Berlin Cabinet 
 was already planning against the Empire of the 
 Habsburgs. 
 
 II. 
 
 Prussia, taking advantage of the disturbances 
 which convulsed Europe in 1848, and of the diffi- 
 culties into which the revolution plunged Austria, 
 had occupied Holstein and invaded Schleswig. 
 The Emperor Nicholas, allied to the house of Hol- 
 stein-Gottorp, after overcoming the Hungarian in- 
 surrection, and possessing contingent rights to a 
 portion of the Danish territory, summoned his 
 brother-in-law Frederick William IV. to recall his 
 troops ; and a treaty guaranteeing the King of 
 Denmark the integrity of his dominions was signed 
 in London in 1852. But the spirit of conquest, far 
 from disarming at Berlin, was destined, on the con- 
 trary, to become more firmly established with the 
 new reign. William I., on ascending the throne, 
 gave startling testimony, at the opening of the 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 81 
 
 Chambers, of his sympathy with the Germans of 
 the Duchies. The Danish question, in spite of the 
 treaty of 1852, was still under consideration by the 
 Diet. Count Bismarck, certain now of meeting 
 with no hostility from Russia, seized upon it. We 
 ■know how he dealt with it. The history of the 
 negotiations which preceded the conquest of the 
 Elbe provinces is a most strange but scarcely an 
 edifying one. It has been written x and deserves to 
 be pondered over by whosoever is desirous of 
 learning how the destinies of nations are accom- 
 plished. Therein we behold Count Bismarck in- 
 augurating his work with all the audacity of a daring 
 statesman. We will only avail ourselves here of 
 the part bearing on our subject. 
 
 Russia, grateful for the military and diplomatic 2 
 assistance Prussia had rendered her in regard to 
 Poland, whilst England, France, and Austria were 
 
 1 ittude de Diplomatic contemftoraiiie, by M. L. Klaczko. Paris : 
 Furne, Jouvet, and Co. 
 
 2 In the month of October 1863, the British Government deter- 
 mined to declare that Russia had forfeited her rights over Poland, 
 rights which had been conceded to her in 181 5 upon conditions 
 which, so the English Government claimed, she had ceased to fulfil. 
 The Berlin Cabinet intervened and caused its Ambassador at 
 London to represent to the authorities that, if they desired the 
 maintenance of European peace, they must abandon an attitude 
 which, attributing impliedly to Poland the quality of a belligerent 
 State, would be considered by the King's Government as an " aggres- 
 sion against the rights of Prussia." This was tantamount to a 
 threat of war. The messenger bearing the English communication 
 was on the road to St. Petersburg : Lord John Russell recalled him 
 by telegraph. 
 
 G 
 
82 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 seeking to unite together — in vain by the way — so 
 as to fetter her liberty, yielded to all the covetous- 
 ness of the Berlin Cabinet. To please Prussia, she 
 consented to forget the contingent rights of the 
 Romanoffs, at one time so forcibly laid claim to by 
 the Emperor Nicholas. She went further than 
 mere abstention ; she supported all the claims 
 Prussia put forward, first to occupy Holstein and 
 then to invade Schleswig, thereby neutralising the 
 efforts of the Cabinets of Paris and London in 
 defence of Denmark. 
 
 These facts are henceforth a matter of history, 
 and they show that King William owed the first 
 successes of his arms and diplomacy to the good- 
 will of the St. Petersburg Cabinet. It was the 
 duty of England and France to see that the Court 
 of Berlin respected the Treaty of London : it was 
 equally Russia's duty to do so. The interests of 
 the three Powers were identical. Their union, a 
 loyal understanding, would have sufficed to stay 
 Prussia's ambition in its first flight. But the 
 Cabinets of London and Paris did not succeed in 
 devising measures, in adopting a common policy, 
 separated as they were by disagreements that had 
 arisen out of the Italian war and by the cession 
 of Savoy and Nice to France. Russia, on her 
 side, deluded by misleading assurances, borne 
 away by the resentment she entertained against 
 Austria, offended at the intimations of France 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 83, 
 
 and England, and at the agreement they were 
 negotiating between themselves and the Court of 
 Vienna in order to extort from her certain con- 
 cessions in Poland which wounded her pride, 
 Russia, we say, only intervened in the matter of 
 the Duchies for the purpose of facilitating the task 
 undertaken by Count Bismarck and his Sovereign. 
 
 In truth, Count Bismarck was reaping the 
 harvest of the marvellous ability he had displayed 
 at the time of his mission to St. Petersburg and 
 of the wise resolution with which he had directed 
 Prussia's attitude at the time of the Polish in- 
 surrection. Under the reign of the Emperor 
 Nicholas, and with his faithful Chancellor Count 
 Nesselrode, would the Government of the King 
 of Prussia have been so well favoured ? In 1832 
 Russia had overcome, on the banks of the Vistula, 
 a far more serious revolt than that of 1863 with- 
 out the assistance of her neighbour ; and we 
 have seen with what haughtiness the Muscovite 
 Emperor, determined to restrain German covetous- 
 ness and to protect the interests of his empire on 
 the Baltic, forced the Prussians to evacuate the 
 Duchies which they had seized whilst his armies 
 were preserving the Habsburg monarchy on the 
 plains of Hungary. 
 
 But how was it, one may ask, that Austria sub- 
 mitted to the pressure of Berlin ? Her docility 
 may be easily explained and understood. The 
 
 G 2 
 
84 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 Austrian statesman who had forced the act of peni- 
 tence from Prussia which her Prime Minister had 
 performed at Olmiitz, Prince Schwarzenberg, was 
 dead. He had had several successors, but had 
 never been replaced. He alone could have 
 measured swords with the Brandenburg squire, 
 and it would have been an interesting spectacle 
 to have seen these two valiant gladiators, equally- 
 energetic, equally audacious, and fired by the 
 same patriotism, struggling for supremacy in 
 Germany. But, since the restorer of the Austrian 
 monarchy had quitted the scene, the Emperor 
 Francis Joseph had lost Lombardy, and he was 
 full of anxiety with reference to Venetia, which 
 was claimed by the Italians. Under these con- 
 ditions Russia's hostility compelled him to nurse 
 the sympathies of his confederates, his allies in a 
 fresh conflict. The whole of Germany, princes 
 and people alike, had passionately espoused the 
 cause of the Duchies. Austria could not therefore 
 desert it. She was forced to follow Prussia in the 
 campaign undertaken against Denmark. She 
 imagined, moreover, that her participation would 
 enable her to direct, to restrain, the plans of the 
 Court of Berlin. She was mistaken. She had 
 to follow Prussia even to the dismemberment of 
 Denmark. Declaring valueless the titles of the 
 pretenders, whom nevertheless they had professed 
 to defend, and without troubling about the 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 85 
 
 autonomy of the Duchies, which was originally the 
 bone of contention between the Danish Govern- 
 ment and Germany, the two Powers forced King 
 Christian IX. to abandon to them his rights over 
 Schleswig and Holstein by threatening Jutland. 
 They despoiled him. 
 
 The joint sovereignty over these territories, and 
 their simultaneous occupation by the troops of the 
 two nations, upset Count Bismarck's calculations. 
 In 1865, he arranged with, or rather forced upon, 
 the Vienna Cabinet an agreement which was 
 drawn up and signed at Gastein, in virtue of 
 which each of the two Powers should separately 
 administer one of the Duchies without prejudice 
 to their respective and sovereign rights over the 
 whole of the conquered territory. This under- 
 standing was severely judged at London and 
 Paris. " On what principles," inquired M. Drouyn 
 de Lhuys, in a circular that has been made public, 
 " does the Austro- Prussian combination rest ? 
 We regret to find no other foundation than force, 
 no other justification than the reciprocal con- 
 venience of the two copartners." Prince Gor- 
 tchakoff showed no sign. This silence on the 
 part of the St. Petersburg Cabinet was signi- 
 ficant. France and England had assuredly a 
 manifest interest in the maintenance of the in- 
 tegrity of the Danish Kingdom, but Russia's in- 
 terest was paramount to theirs ; it was directly 
 
86 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 connected with the security of the Empire, and at 
 present she no doubt regrets having sacrificed it, 
 having surrendered the port of Kiel to Germany. 
 We have dwelt perhaps overlong on this initial 
 exploit of Prussian policy. But it was the first 
 link in the chain that bound Russia to Prussia 
 until it broke, when the friends became adversaries 
 to such a point that Prince Bismarck conceived 
 the triple alliance which is the subject of our study. 
 It was necessary, therefore, in order to deduce 
 effects from their causes, to recall precisely the 
 circumstances which united the two Courts. 
 
 III. 
 
 In the plans of the Prussian Government the 
 affair of the Duchies was merely the prologue of 
 the drama brought to a climax in Germany. The 
 moment was drawing nigh for engaging on the 
 supreme solution imagined at Berlin, of dispos- 
 sessing Austria of the ancient influence she ex- 
 ercised over her confederates. The King under- 
 took to sharpen the sword that was to secure 
 victory, the Minister to bring about the occasion 
 for a conflict. The Gastein agreement had been 
 scarcely signed when they entered a kind of suit 
 against the Cabinet of Vienna. Finding fault 
 with all its acts in Holstein which it was admin- 
 istering, with the attitude and even the words of 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 87 
 
 its agents, Count Bismarck accused it of com- 
 pounding now with the inhabitants, now with the 
 pretenders, to the detriment of the rights secured 
 to Prussia. He originated a diplomatic corre- 
 spondence calculated to irritate Austria and provoke 
 a quarrel. To render her the more uneasy he did 
 not disguise his intentions. The Emperor Francis 
 Joseph's Government was warned, and it opposed 
 prudent reserve to the vehemence of the Prussian 
 Minister's reproaches. "Austria does not wish 
 for war," said a diplomatist to Count Bismarck, 
 ■"and she will be careful not to give you a pretext 
 for it." " I have a whole bagful of pretexts," 
 replied the future Chancellor, " and even of plau- 
 sible reasons. When the time comes war will break 
 out without even surprising any one." This was 
 the state of affairs in the early part of 1866. The 
 rifles failing to go off in the Duchies, notwith- 
 standing a great desire to create some incident, 
 Count Bismarck raised the question of Federal 
 reform at Frankfort. Of all the pretexts that he 
 had in reserve, he selected the one which was the 
 most certain to bring the two Powers to a prompt 
 rupture, and war, as he had predicted, followed as 
 an inevitable result. 
 
 One must not imagine, however, that William I. 
 and his Minister entered upon such a formidable 
 struggle without having weighed its chances and 
 guarded against its perils. " God is never with 
 
88 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 the aggressor," was the utterance of the Emperor 
 Alexander in 1812, at the moment when Napoleon 
 was about to invade Russia. The King, recalling 
 those words which he had learnt in his early- 
 youth and deeply pondered over, had embodied 
 their principle in his programme. He desired war 
 as ardently as his counsellors, he had prepared for 
 it by devoting all his time and all his care to the 
 powerful organisation of his army, but he was un- 
 willing either to openly take the initiative or 
 assume the responsibility : he declined to appear 
 aggressor. His Minister neglected no means by 
 which to appease his alarmed conscience, and 
 Austria herself assisted thereat by declining a 
 Congress. And when, after Sadowa, the King 
 victoriously re-entered his Capital, he considered 
 himself justified, at the opening of the Chambers,, 
 in returning thanks to Providence for the grace 
 which had enabled Prussia to ward off a hostile 
 invasion from the frontiers. 
 
 Was it really to Providence that he should have 
 expressed his gratitude ? Was it not rather to 
 France and Russia ? Either of these Powers 
 might equally well, and without drawing the sword 
 from the scabbard, have placed obstacles in the 
 way of the realisation of the plans conceived at 
 Berlin. The concentration of an army corps on 
 the Rhine or on the Vistula would have disarmed 
 Prussia and averted hostilities. 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 89 
 
 All has been said upon French policy at that 
 period, and we could neither examine it nor de- 
 fend it here without wandering from our subject. 
 What can we say regarding the policy of the 
 Russian Empire? The Prussian Government had 
 given her precious assistance in the Polish matter ; 
 but she had more than discharged the debt in the 
 affair of the Duchies ; she had in a great measure 
 sacrificed her interests in the Baltic to Prussia. 
 How is it, therefore, that she tolerated the un- 
 justifiable aggression against Austria ? Why did 
 she permit Prussia to upset for her own benefit 
 an order of things established by the unanimous 
 agreement of the Powers at the Vienna Con- 
 gress, thanks to which the St. Petersburg 
 Cabinet was enabled to exercise a preponderat- 
 ing influence in the affairs of Germany for half 
 a century ? We must believe that nothing could 
 turn the Russian Government from the course it 
 had adopted since the Western Powers, in agree- 
 ment with Austria, had threatened to declare the 
 Czar deprived of his sovereign rights in Poland : 
 his attitude at the outbreak of the war was the 
 guarantee of the approaching success of the Prus- 
 sian arms. When fortune had loaded King William 
 and Count Bismarck with her favours did they re- 
 member this ? Did they in their turn show them- 
 selves as grateful as the Emperor Alexander and 
 Prince Gortchakoff were after the suppression of 
 
90 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 the Polish insurrection? We shall inquire into 
 this later on. For the moment we will bear in 
 mind that it was owing to Russia's goodwill that 
 Prussia was enabled to contend with Austria for 
 the sceptre of absolutism over the Teutonic lands 
 and secure it. 
 
 In truth the guns at Sadowa resounded at 
 St. Petersburg as at Paris. It was well under- 
 stood at both Capitals that the monarchy of the 
 Habsburgs, driven from Germany, would leave 
 an immense void to be filled by Prussia's insati- 
 able ambition. Public opinion was ■ nowhere de- 
 ceived. France and Russia had been overcome, 
 the same as Austria in the plains of Bohemia. 
 The Government of the Emperor Napoleon 
 sought, but too late, to obtain the compensations 
 promised it. On the other hand, the Govern- 
 ment of the Emperor Alexander proposed to 
 have the conditions of peace settled by a Con- 
 gress. We shall see Prince Bismarck, in presence 
 of the treaty of San Stefano, availing himself of 
 this diplomatic expedient to curtail the con- 
 cessions which victorious Russia had wrested 
 from the Government of the Sultan. But if it 
 suited him to invoke it in 1877, he had every 
 interest to decline it in 1866. The peril however 
 was great. Austria had been laid low, but she 
 could still furnish allies with a powerful contingent 
 formed of the victors of Custozza. France, uneasy 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 91 
 
 and anxious, was inclined to be exacting. If 
 Russia, undeceived, became hostile, Prussia might 
 have to face a formidable coalition ; she might be 
 forced, under any circumstances, to appear before 
 a gathering of the Powers, who would have kept 
 her pretensions within the bounds dictated by the 
 requirements of their own safety. What were the 
 steps taken by the Cabinet of Berlin to avoid such 
 serious difficulties? It manoeuvred to prevent the 
 Powers coming to an understanding, and whilst, 
 in order to gain time, Count Bismarck was 
 dilatorily negotiating with France, as he himself 
 has stated, it made every effort to disarm Russia, 
 to win back her goodwill, and strengthen rela- 
 tions which threatened to be severed. Russia 
 once regained, Prussia, it was thought, would 
 have not a single competitor left worth fearing. 
 
 General von Manteuffel, the man of confidential 
 missions, was despatched to St. Petersburg. This 
 breast-plated pietist, who possessed a shrewd and 
 insinuating mind, a sympathetic and honourable 
 character, had never stooped to an unworthy 
 action. Though he had never publicly disavowed 
 the systems resorted to by the Berlin Cabinet 
 since Prince Bismarck had presided over it, he 
 had never compounded with them. His upright 
 nature had indeed made him the Prime Minister's 
 rival. He had deserved and won his Sovereign's 
 confidence and the esteem of the Emperor 
 
92 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 Alexander, whom he had often had opportunities 
 of approaching. It would have been impossible 
 to have selected an emissary better prepared and 
 more apt to win over and appease the Russian 
 Court. Little inclined as Count Bismarck has 
 invariably been to master his personal animosities, 
 he himself suggested the General to the King for 
 this extra delicate and highly momentous under- 
 taking. So General von Manteuffel, handing over 
 his command of an army in the field to resume 
 his diplomatic career, set out furnished with an 
 autograph letter from the King and the instruc- 
 tions of the President of the Council. 
 
 It is known that he acquitted himself to his 
 master's entire satisfaction. Indeed, before his 
 return to Berlin, Russia had withdrawn her pro- 
 posal to unite the Powers in a Congress, and the 
 diplomatic world perceived that the relations be- 
 tween the two Courts had resumed their character 
 of complete intimacy. It was particularly observed 
 that the Czar's representative at Berlin, alarmed 
 by the success of the Prussian arms, was hastily 
 summoned to St. Petersburg, and that he returned 
 to his post completely reassured, and professing a 
 peace of mind which neither the reverses of the 
 German Princes allied to the Russian dynasty nor 
 the development which Prussia, after the conclu- 
 sion of hostilities, hastened to give to her military 
 power, have since succeeded in disturbing. All 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 93 
 
 these circumstances showed even those the least 
 gifted with discernment that a complete under- 
 standing was again established between the two 
 Governments. Moreover, from this period they 
 were seen to indicate their policy more plainly, 
 Prussia in Germany and Russia in the East. " I 
 never read the correspondence of the King's 
 Minister at Constantinople," Count Bismarck 
 would say, whenever his attention was called to 
 any impending contingency in Turkey. 
 
 It was a fatal and decisive moment when Gen- 
 •eral von Manteuffel overcame Russia's hesitation. 
 A quarter of a century has since elapsed, and now, 
 as on the first day, Europe is perturbed and ever 
 ■dreading the most serious complications. How is 
 it that the Emperor Alexander and Prince Gor- 
 tchakoff, having for a time had a clear impression 
 •of the dangers to which exalted Prussia was already 
 exposing the peace and equilibrium of Europe — 
 how is it that they decided to resume and continue 
 .a policy that was none the less regrettable for 
 Russia herself than for the other Continental 
 States ? Had not Prussia shown the measure 
 of her military power and her ambition ? Must 
 one suppose that General von Manteuffel was au- 
 thorised to open up fresh horizons, to promise 
 ■compensations, to renew more precisely the assur- 
 ances of a mutual understanding in the East? 
 Has not Prince Bismarck shown himself on many 
 
94 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 occasions profuse in aleatory promises ? How is- 
 it possible, moreover, to understand and justify 
 Russia's behaviour otherwise ? What is certain is 
 that from that time, the Prussian Government was- 
 able to follow the course of its success in all se- 
 curity. Very soon, indeed, it ceased to disguise 
 its intentions. The treaty of Prague had brought 
 it many important annexations ; it had also enabled 
 it to extend its influence over all the North German 
 States, and to add their military contingents to its 
 armies. It wanted still more ; it was scheming to 
 place the Southern States under its control, and 
 to hold the whole of Germany from the Alps to 
 the Baltic in its power. 
 
 The King and his Prime Minister, however, did 
 not conceal from themselves that by crossing the 
 Main in defiance of the preliminaries of Nikolsburg, 
 Prussia would come into collision with France ;. 
 that, to crown the work begun, another war would 
 be inevitable. They took the necessary steps for 
 waging it, and when they were fully prepared, 
 when the opportune moment appeared to have 
 arrived, they brought it about very cleverly, cer- 
 tain that Russia would keep Austria in check and 
 maintain a friendly attitude. 
 
 In 1870, as in 1866, the Emperor Alexander 
 was arbiter between peace and war. He desired 
 peace ; we owe this testimony to the monarch's 
 memory. He sought to preserve it with complete 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 95 
 
 loyalty at the commencement of the negotiations 
 occasioned by the candidature of a Hohenzollern 
 Prince to the throne of Spain. The corre- 
 spondence of General Fleury, our Ambassador at 
 St. Petersburg, leaves no doubt on that point. 
 We must admit, however, that the Czar, deceived 
 by the subtleties of the King, his uncle, and 
 bewildered by Prince Gortchakoff's counsels, did 
 not persevere in this feeling. " Russia could not 
 feel the slightest alarm at Prussia's power," the 
 Russian Chancellor had said to the English repre- 
 sentative before the outbreak of hostilities. That 
 was his programme throughout the war, and he 
 obtained his sovereign's approval of it. War 
 therefore broke out, and Prussia was able to 
 engage in it and carry it through, in full possession 
 of Russia's sympathies. Either before or during 
 the siege of Paris, Prince Gortchakoff might 
 have called a Congress. He was timidly invited 
 to do so by England, and more firmly by Austria, 
 who suggested to him the idea Of converting the 
 neutrals into mediators. He repelled these over- 
 tures. By a contradiction familiar to the human 
 mind, he nevertheless had a presentiment of the 
 pitfalls to which his policy was exposing his 
 master's interests. He sought to obtain guaran- 
 tees. Russia and the Porte, in a convention joined 
 to the treaty concluded at Paris in 1856, had under- 
 taken, under the supervision of the other Powers, 
 
96 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 to maintain only a limited number of vessels of 
 war on the Black Sea. After the first reverses 
 of the French arms, the Russian Chancellor de- 
 clared, without previous understanding and in 
 contempt of public rights, that Russia was 
 exempted from this obligation and free to re- 
 store her maritime power in those waters. 
 
 Prussia supported and upheld Prince Gortcha- 
 koffs decision. Her armies were engaged in 
 fighting from the Rhine to the Loire. It was 
 the moment when Russia's sympathetic abstention 
 was the most needful. Prince Bismarck would 
 have purchased it with far more important con- 
 cessions. Had Count Nesselrode's successor been 
 endowed with more audacity and foresight he 
 would have exacted other compensations and 
 other pledges. He would have been seconded 
 by the various Governments, and, in concert with 
 them, he might, without violence, without over- 
 riding treaties, have relieved Russia from all 
 restrictions placed upon her development in the 
 East, and have obtained more precious advantages 
 still, by compelling Prussia to sign a peace accept- 
 able to France, compatible with the independence 
 of Austria, and without danger for the legitimate 
 influence of her Court in Europe. He had given 
 all his confidence to his colleague at Berlin ; he 
 preferred to continue it and secure signal claims 
 •on his gratitude. From all this, in order to keep 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 97 
 
 within the scope of our inquiry, we propose for 
 the time being to draw only one conclusion, 
 which is that, without .the moral and diplomatic 
 support of Russia, Prussia, during the reign of a 
 prince whose prudence was stronger than his 
 ambition, would not have dared embark on 
 three wars with the confidence of overcoming her 
 enemies ; that it is therefore to Russia that she 
 owes all her successes. King William himself 
 recognised this. The preliminaries of peace were 
 signed at Versailles on February 27th, 1871, and 
 on the same day he acquainted the Emperor 
 Alexander with the fact in a letter which ended 
 with these words : — " Prussia will never forget 
 that it is to you she owes the fact that the war 
 was not allowed to assume greater proportions. 
 May God take this into account and bless you. 
 Your ever grateful, William." 
 
 We shall see if Prussia, whilst William was still 
 reigning, was mindful of the services she had 
 received. 
 
 IV. 
 
 It was at this time that the long period of unity 
 which had bound the Court of St. Petersburg to 
 that of Berlin came to an end. Prussia had 
 vanquished France ; she had deprived her of two 
 provinces and five milliards, and she imagined she 
 
 H 
 
98 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 had crippled her resources for long and rendered 
 her renovation distant and difficult. On the other 
 hand she held sway over the whole of Germany, 
 now freed from the domination of the Czars. She 
 felt herself capable, if necessary, of restraining 
 Russia. This double result was sufficient for 
 the patriotism of Bismarck and his sovereign, 
 and for the consolidation of the scheme they had 
 at heart. Neither Chancellor nor master had any 
 intention of exposing it by assisting the plans of 
 the Russian Cabinet which the former had fre- 
 quently encouraged, both during his embassy 
 to St. Petersburg and at the time of General von 
 Manteuffel's mission there. He had gfiven ex- 
 pression to his whole thought, in his own way, 
 on his return to Germany from France. " The 
 preliminaries signed at Versailles," he said, 
 "guarantee us fifty years' quietude." It was as 
 much as to say that, Prussia being triumphant and 
 satisfied, the peace of the world should not be 
 disturbed, that Russia's assistance was no longer 
 necessary, and that their friendship having become 
 a burden it was time to put it to an end. This 
 was the King's new programme, and he relied for 
 its execution on his Chancellor's genius. Did the 
 latter fulfil his task according to his master's 
 wishes and to the advantage of his country ? 
 All we can say here is that the actual state of 
 Europe is the result. History will pronounce 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 99 
 
 judgment on the work and workman. We will 
 insist no further on this point. We should be 
 anticipating events. 
 
 Yet what were the respective positions of Prussia 
 and Russia at that time ? The campaign in the 
 Duchies had given the Hohenzollerns Holstein and 
 Schleswig. Together with these provinces, the 
 port of Kiel, the key to the Baltic, passed from 
 the hands of a friendly or neutral Nation into 
 those of an encroaching Power, faithful to her 
 principle, that of all her ancestors : Ubi bene, ibi 
 patria, who would be enabled in future to make a 
 northern Bosphorus of the Sound and close the 
 Atlantic to the Russian navy. The war against 
 Austria had brought her other and more notable 
 advantages ; she had annexed kingdoms, duchies, 
 and free-towns. Leaving a semblance of autonomy 
 and independence to the other States of North 
 Germany, she had forced a federative position on 
 them, reserving the lion's share to herself. Under 
 threat of her anger she had extorted treaties from 
 the Southern States which placed them at her 
 mercy. Then came the war with France, and 
 Germany added Alsace and Lorraine to her 
 possessions. To crown the work so well com- 
 pleted, the German Empire was restored the 
 better to ensure the dominion of the de- 
 scendants of Frederick the Great, and care was 
 taken to impose a war indemnity on the con- 
 
 h 2 
 
ioo STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 quered nation beneath the weight of which she 
 might succumb. Such was Prussia's share. What 
 advantages did Russia reap ? Prince Gortchakoff s 
 wish was gratified. Austria had been vanquished 
 and humbled. He had had the satisfaction of 
 drawing his pen through the treaty clause, sub- 
 mitted to in 1856, which purported to make the 
 Black Sea neutral, but which in reality neutralised 
 nothing, as he has stated himself. Vain and 
 barren successes, which brought neither satisfaction 
 nor guarantees. What was thought of them on 
 the banks of the Neva ? Whilst Prince Bismarck 
 judged the moment opportune for closing the era 
 of conquests, the Russians, on the contrary, con- 
 sidered the time had come for settling accounts 
 and balancing up the profits. What did Prussia 
 do ? She held aloof with honeyed words and 
 dilatory methods, in order to delay any fresh 
 resolution or agreement. The fidelity of the 
 Russian Government to the policy that had so long 
 united it to Prussia, the communications publicly 
 exchanged, the toasts drunk at the banquets 
 had misled public opinion throughout the Musco- 
 vite Empire. Every one was persuaded that the 
 Emperor Alexander would receive the price of the 
 assistance he had rendered King William, and it 
 was thought that Russia, with the aid of this 
 grateful sovereign, would find legitimate com- 
 pensation on the Danube and Bosphorus. The 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 101 
 
 public, in their enthusiasm, sincerely believed 
 that the time had arrived to give effect to the 
 testament of Peter the Great. This conviction 
 was universal. The surprise therefore was pain- 
 ful and the discontent great, when it was felt that 
 Russia would be victimised at Berlin just as France 
 had been in 1866, and that the European equi- 
 librium would remain upset to the exclusive 
 benefit of Prussia. By the light of accomplished 
 facts, Germany was thus beheld to rise up like 
 a colossus with nothing to counterbalance her 
 power, France and Austria being reduced for 
 a long time to come to dressing their wounds. 
 The illusions that had been so universally nursed 
 were dispelled, and Prince Gortchakoff, sick at 
 heart, had to admit to himself that his policy 
 had been wanting in shrewdness. He collected 
 himself again, this time to meditate on the 
 faults committed and the means of averting the 
 consequences. 
 
 The two parties were content to observe one an- 
 other for some time after the restoration of peace. 
 The one showed itself reserved, the other caressing 
 and even obsequious. Their relations remained 
 courteous, but were ever pervaded with intense 
 mistrust. To dispel this feeling, now become general 
 and even tangible throughout the whole Russian 
 Empire, King William visited St. Petersburg in 
 April, 1873, anxious to express to his august 
 
io2 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 nephew, in his own capital, the gratitude with 
 which his heart was so profoundly penetrated, at 
 least so he said. He remained there two weeks, 
 and was brilliantly welcomed and feted. But he 
 returned to Berlin convinced that, this time, he 
 had hoodwinked nobody, and that he had left be- 
 hind him a feeling of resentment that was not to be 
 overcome. He soon had a positive proof of it. 
 
 France had discharged her debt, had paid five 
 milliards with an ease that upset all calculations, 
 and disconcerted Prince Bismarck himself. The 
 first attempts of the Republic to adjust the budget 
 and restore the country's military strength had, 
 indeed, yielded unhoped-for results. The Govern- 
 ment at Berlin took alarm, and soon, in 1875, it 
 was asking itself if the interest and security of the 
 new Empire did not necessitate an obstacle being 
 placed in the way of the revival of the hereditary 
 enemy who, it was thought, had been crushed for 
 years to come, by an appeal to arms. This was 
 Count Moltke's opinion even more than the Chan- 
 cellor's. " We cannot better our means of attack," 
 the celebrated marshal is reported to have said, 
 "and France is every day improving her system 
 of defence. The decisive moment has arrived. 
 Later on, war will cost the two nations a hundred 
 thousand men more. To prevent its becoming a 
 war of extermination we must have it at once. It is 
 not only as a commander and a German that I say 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 103 
 
 this, it is also as a man and a Christian." This 
 relentless warrior requires war to excess when he 
 directs it. He showed as much at Sedan. He 
 demands it with no less violence when peace has 
 intervened and nations breathe again ; x he advises 
 it as a believer, and in a feeling of solicitude for 
 two countries whose blood he has caused to flow 
 in torrents. A strange nature his, recalling that 
 of the invaders, his ancestors. His contempor- 
 aries will not only owe past wars to him ; they will 
 also be his debtors for future campaigns. We have 
 mentioned the struggles Count Bismarck had to 
 engage in with him at Nikolsburg and Versailles. 
 However, it may be, the French Government was 
 warned by the St. Petersburg Cabinet of the fresh 
 peril threatening it. Russia, undeceived and 
 anxious, was, on this occasion, firmly resolved not 
 to permit another invasion of France. The 
 Emperor Alexander himself so assured our Am- 
 bassador, General Le F16. 2 Prussia brought face 
 to face with this attitude of the Czar and his 
 Government, relinquished her aggressive schemes. 
 Whosoever has studied the history of these recent 
 times will not be surprised at this result. William I., 
 
 1 In 1867, a year after the war against Austria, Count Moltke 
 wished to direct Prussia's victorious arms against France, urging, 
 with all the authority he had acquired, that a pretext should be 
 found in the Luxemburg question. — M. Henri des Houx chez M. de 
 Bismarck. 
 
 2 See, in the newspapers of May, 1887, the account of this incident 
 published by General Le F16 himself. 
 
104 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 who was then approaching the last limits of old 
 age, could not bring himself to undertake a war in 
 the course of which he would have had to reckon 
 with Russia's hostility. Any attempt to lead him 
 into it would have been in vain. Prince Bismarck 
 hastened to disavow the intentions attributed to 
 Prussia. He did so haughtily and with emphasis, 
 like a statesman whose secrets have been revealed, 
 and in a manner calculated to wound the feelings 
 of Prince Gortchakoff, who wished, he pretended, 
 to assume the merit of having saved France from 
 great danger. " I have never turned aside from 
 Russia," he said; " it was she who repelled me 
 and at times placed me in such a position that I 
 was forced to modify my attitude to preserve my 
 own dignity and that of Germany. This began in 
 1875, when Prince Gortchakoff gave me to under- 
 stand how much his pride was nettled at the posi- 
 tion I had attained to, in the political^world." 
 
 It is certain that these regrettable sentiments, 
 which statesmen should ever be careful to avoid, 
 have played a lamentable part in the struggles 
 which, in our time, have devastated Europe. But 
 it must be recognised that Russia was not acting 
 at that moment under the influence of any such 
 feelings as these. She had other matters in view, 
 other anxieties, caused by Prussia's aggrandise- 
 ment, by the fixed intention of the Berlin Cabinet 
 not to assist her to any compensation nor to give 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 105 
 
 her any pledges. Prince Bismarck, nevertheless, 
 deeply felt the denunciation of which he had 
 been made the object. His heart has never been 
 open to the forgiveness of offences ; genius itself 
 has to pay its tribute to human weakness, we 
 have seen this in the trial of Count Arnim, in 
 that of Doctor Geffcken ; but we have seen it 
 more clearly still since he has been deposed from 
 power, and one has been able to form an opinion 
 on the subject by the vivacity and intemperance 
 of his language, which has been such as to 
 surprise even his adversaries and distress his 
 most enthusiastic admirers. Did his irritation, in 
 1875, conform to the requirements of the object 
 he had in view ? Was it useful or opportune to 
 break with Russia? It is impossible to say as 
 yet. What is certain is that he showed he felt 
 the wound inflicted on his vanity, and resolved to 
 seek friendships elsewhere. The two Chancellors, 
 repudiating the long past during which they had 
 conspired together, thus ended in severing the 
 ties that had united them, and henceforth we 
 find them in a constant state of hostility. Prussia 
 indeed, from the date of this incident, modified 
 her policy, followed fresh combinations, and, after 
 long efforts, succeeded in founding the Triple 
 Alliance. The idea of this agreement took root 
 in Prince Bismarck's mind in 1875. Its realiza- 
 tion was difficult ; Austria, under the weight of her 
 
106 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 disasters, rebelled against her conqueror's smooth- 
 tongued suggestions. The resistance Prince 
 Bismarck met with at Vienna did not turn him 
 from his purpose ; he waited and found the means 
 of overcoming it. Let us see how he proceeded. 
 
 V. 
 
 In the course of this same year an insurrection 
 broke out in Herzegovina. The movement soon 
 spread to Bosnia and from there, later on, to 
 Bulgaria. It has been pretended that the agita- 
 tion was supported if not provoked by the secret 
 service funds of the " reptiles " ; nothing has proved 
 this, and we only mention the rumour as an 
 indication of the proclivities attributed to Prince 
 Bismarck, who delighted, so it was believed, to 
 create difficulties in the East for his colleague at 
 St. Petersburg. The Turkish Government vainly 
 endeavoured to restore order in its revolted 
 provinces. Its troops not succeeding, it had 
 recourse to a pitiless repression which raised a 
 feeling of indignation among the populations and 
 Cabinets of Europe. The Powers were roused. 
 Long and laborious negotiations ensued, which 
 brought Russia and England face to face, the 
 one following ancient traditions which bade her 
 defend her co-religionists, the other alarmed at 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 107 
 
 the dangers which again menaced the integrity of 
 the Ottoman Empire. 
 
 Whilst they thus took up positions in presence 
 of these fresh complications, Prussia kept in the 
 background. In December, 1876, a Conference 
 assembled at Constantinople. Its deliberations 
 came to naught owing to the refusal of the Porte 
 to permit the participation of the Powers in 
 carrying out the measures destined to secure 
 solid guarantees to the Christians. In March, 
 1877, a protocol, which remained a dead letter, 
 was signed at London ; the Turkish Government, 
 not having been invited to participate in framing 
 it, refused to accept its provisions. Yet matters 
 were going from bad to worse : Montenegro and 
 Servia had intervened in the struggle by allying 
 themselves to the insurgents. In this state of 
 affairs Russia took up arms. In the month of 
 April her troops invaded Turkish territory. It is 
 not our purpose to relate the struggle between the 
 two Empires ; we will merely recall that it ended 
 in the treaty signed at San Stefano in the presence 
 of the English fleet which had hastened to Con- 
 stantinople and was at anchor in the Sea of 
 Marmora. Prussia was more reserved ; she 
 indulged in no manifestation. Prince Bismarck 
 knew that Great Britain had interests in the East 
 identical with those of Turkey, so he willingly left 
 it to her to give the first warnings which he 
 
108 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 considered it needful Russia should receive. He 
 knew above all, that nothing could be definitively 
 accomplished, either in the Ottoman Empire or 
 elsewhere, without the co-operation or adhesion of 
 powerful Germany, especially if allied to England. 
 In this double belief, he placed no obstacle in the 
 way of either war or peace. He, of all Prime 
 Ministers, was the one who maintained the most 
 absolute reserve. Prussia, appealed to by the 
 Porte, as it had appealed to the other Powers, when 
 the struggle was at its height, to intervene as 
 mediator, hastened to reject the Sultan's entreaties. 
 England alone, showing day by day greater and 
 greater solicitude for Turkey, ventured to offer her 
 good services, thus assuming the part the German 
 Chancellor had assigned her in his designs. 
 
 What were the terms of the treaty of San 
 Stefano? It stipulated for new and precious 
 advantages on behalf of all the Christian races of 
 the Ottoman Empire : the independence of some 
 and autonomy or solemn guarantees for the others. 
 Besides a double rectification of frontiers, Russia 
 obtained, in addition to a war indemnity, the right 
 to superintend the execution of the concessions 
 granted to her co-religionists. By these arrange- 
 ments she recovered her freedon of action and 
 influence which had been curtailed by the treaty 
 of 1856, after the Crimean war. The English 
 Government hastened to point out that these 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 109 
 
 advantages were inconsistent with the engage- 
 ments which Russia had accepted at the Congress 
 of Paris ; it declared therefore that it could only 
 recognise the terms agreed to at San Stefano on 
 the conditions that they were submitted, without a 
 single exception, to the examination and approval 
 of all the Powers concerned therein. The moment 
 had arrived for Germany to side either with or 
 against the Court of St. Petersburg, to renew the 
 cordiality of their relations now seriously com- 
 promised, to strengthen afresh their respective 
 interests, or to definitively adopt another course 
 and form other agreements. Russia, with the 
 assistance of King William and his able Chancellor, 
 might have refused to appear before the Powers 
 assembled in congress, and have claimed in her turn 
 the integrity of the concessions she had obtained 
 from the Porte at the cost of most grievous 
 sacrifices and after a long and ruthless war, just as 
 Prussia had done on two occasions thanks to the 
 Emperor Alexander and Prince Gortchakoff. 
 The German Empire on its side allied to that of 
 the Czars would have had no occasion to fear the 
 wrath of Great Britain ; but resolutions had been 
 formed at Berlin, and they remained immutable. 
 The King had forgotten the debt he owed his 
 august nephew and which was still undischarged ; 
 the Chancellor thought only of the recent attitude 
 and behaviour of his colleague at St. Petersburg. 
 
no STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 They preferred the Congress, being perfectly well 
 aware of the claims England would make there. 
 Russia had to submit and accept the proposal. 
 Forsaken by Prussia, she could not set the 
 hostility of the British Cabinet at defiance, in face 
 of Austria laid low, and Italy disposed to submit 
 to the impulse it would receive either from London 
 or Berlin. 
 
 The Congress assembled under the presidency 
 of Prince Bismarck. The Chancellor performed 
 his task like an honest broker, as he has himself 
 stated, giving each Power a share to the prejudice 
 of Russia, and without forgetting France, in a 
 design useful to the evolution he had given to his 
 policy, and to which we will return later on. The 
 stipulations of the treaty of San Stefano were 
 altered as a whole, whilst others were added which 
 Upset the position guaranteed to the St. Peters- 
 burg Cabinet by the arrangements it had directly 
 concluded with the Porte. To the superintend- 
 ence it had reserved to itself over the execution 
 of the concessions granted to the Christians, was 
 especially substituted that of Europe. Commis- 
 sions were formed which assumed these duties, 
 thus dispossessing Russia of the position of guar- 
 dian power she thought she had regained by her 
 victory. The better to attain this result, the 
 speedy evacuation of the Turkish provinces occu- 
 pied by the armies of the Czar was insisted upon. 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE in 
 
 But the chief and unexpected clause, which 
 nothing authorised nor anticipated, the one it is 
 important to dwell upon because it has given rise 
 to difficulties which will for a long time greatly 
 trouble the political state of Europe, was a clause 
 drawn up in a couple of lines and thus worded : 
 " The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina will 
 be occupied and administered by Austria- Hun- 
 gary." (Art. 25.) The form of this arrangement 
 was nothing but an astute euphemism. In reality, 
 the Sultan was divested by his friends of these 
 provinces which had certainly taken up arms to 
 win their autonomy but in nowise to change their 
 master. Austria- Hungary, on the other hand, 
 without having drawn the sword or made the 
 slightest sacrifice, was placed in possession of 
 territories destined to give a new prominence to 
 her influence in the East. This scheme con- 
 ceived by Prince Bismarck, ever fertile in unfore- 
 seen and ingenious expedients, was proposed to 
 the Assembly by Lord Salisbury, one of the 
 British Plenipotentiaries. 
 
 Nothing could show the understanding arrived 
 at between the Cabinets of Berlin and London 
 more clearly. No further illusion was now possible 
 to the Emperor Alexander's representatives. It 
 was, indeed, with the sole object of striking 
 a blow at every interest Russia possessed, that 
 the pretended protectors of Turkey conceived 
 
112 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 the notion of inflicting this mutilation upon 
 her for the benefit of Austria, the real com- 
 petitor of the Russian Empire in the Balkan 
 peninsula. This measure promised England a 
 more powerful and efficacious co-operation against 
 any fresh attempt on the part of the St. Peters- 
 burg Government in the East. It guaranteed 
 to Germany the free passage of the Danube, her 
 most direct route for her trade with the Black Sea 
 and Asia. But Prince Bismarck had other views 
 besides : he wished to render service to the Power 
 vanquished at Sadowa, to cause her to forget her 
 disasters by making up for them in part, and also 
 to force her to ally herself closely to Germany. 
 He was making the movement which would re- 
 move the foundation and support of his policy 
 from St. Petersburg to Vienna. The stipulation 
 which had emanated from him procured him the 
 most certain and most rapid means of accomplish- 
 ing this. He placed Austria- Hungary at his 
 mercy. This Power, in possession of Bosnia, 
 became the neighbour of Bulgaria ; she was 
 already in a similar situation as regards Servia 
 and Montenegro : she was therefore in a position 
 to exercise a preponderant influence over all the 
 new States created out of the partition of the 
 Ottoman Empire between the Danube and the 
 ALgean Sea. She was henceforth the advance 
 guard of Germany and England ; but, by that 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 113 
 
 very fact, she agreed to constitute herself Russia's 
 irreconcilable adversary. The state of affairs at 
 the moment of writing, proves how well founded 
 were the German Chancellor's previsions and 
 with what sagacity he made use of England and 
 Austria herself in the course of the negotiations 
 over which he presided at Berlin. 
 
 Prince Bismarck, therefore, at the* conclusion of 
 the Congress, found himself absolute and in- 
 dependent master of the situation he had created. 
 He could, as he willed, either become reconciled 
 to Russia by means of concessions which his 
 ingenuity would easily have discovered if neces- 
 sary, 1 or he could enfeoff Austria- Hungary to his 
 policy. One knows the course he adopted. To 
 disguise nothing let us also mention that England, 
 in her mistrust, had been careful, before proceeding 
 to Berlin and in the intention of not returning 
 empty-handed, to take the security that most 
 suited her interests. She had extorted from the 
 Porte the cession of Cyprus, which gave her on 
 the one side access to Syria, and, on the other, to 
 the entrance of the Suez Canal in the Mediter- 
 ranean. The fact of this acquisition was dis- 
 sembled in a treaty of defensive alliance which 
 
 1 The St. Petersburg Cabinet gave him an opportunity. Count 
 Schouvaloff invited him to conclude a formal treaty of alliance. 
 He declined the proposal. At least, that is what he himself revealed 
 to one of the numerous interviewers whom he received at Fried- 
 richsruh. 
 
 I 
 
114 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 deceived no one. Great Britain promised, and it 
 was really an illusory obligation, to guarantee to 
 Turkey her Asiatic possessions, and, in order to 
 place her in a position to ensure the necessary 
 means for the execution of this engagement, the 
 Sultan assigned this island to be occupied and 
 administered by her. It was in a similar way, as 
 one has seen,' that Austria acquired Herzegovina 
 and Bosnia. Diplomacy possesses formulas which 
 enable it to disguise, under the appearance of a 
 temporary occupation, definitive and unjustifiable 
 acts of spoliation. The British Government had 
 not ventured on this negotiation without having 
 taken the Cabinet at Berlin, who alone was aware 
 of it, into its confidence. So soon as the matter 
 began to be talked of, Prince Bismarck, not wish- 
 ing it to be thought that he had been caught 
 napping, caused his official organ, the Nord- 
 deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung to say that: "one 
 is constrained to consent to this measure from the 
 point of view of progress and general civilisation. 
 We do not think we are mistaken in admitting that 
 our Government was informed beforehand of the 
 agreement, though without being asked to express 
 an opinion on it." It was sufficient for the 
 Prussian statesman to establish the fact that his 
 vigilance had not been at fault. He considered 
 it superfluous to acknowledge that he had 
 authorised everything. It remained none the 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 115 
 
 less certain that the Plenipotentiaries of Queen 
 Victoria and those of the Emperor William ar- 
 rived at the Congress, after having come to a 
 decision respecting the weighty problems it was 
 their mission to solve. Russia had been con- 
 demned before she had been heard. 
 
 The relentless German Chancellor, who had not 
 ceased to be, nor ever will cease to be, the resolute 
 and vehement lordling of his early years, took 'a 
 signal revenge for the suspicious position in which 
 the temerity of the St. Petersburg Cabinet had 
 placed him in 1875. He has vanquished Russia 
 without fighting her, has humiliated Prince 
 Gortchakoff before an European areopagus, has 
 tasted the pleasure of the gods, ever so dear to his 
 ardent and impassioned soul ; sweet and supreme 
 satisfaction which he has constantly sought for 
 during his long and glorious career. But did he 
 on this occasion, render good service to his King 
 and country ? One is justified in expressing doubt 
 on the subject in the presence of the incessant 
 efforts attempted by the new Emperor, on the very 
 morrow of his accession, to appease Russia and 
 arrange a reconciliation between the two Courts, 
 so nearly related. Besides, it does not appear 
 to be the general opinion in Germany that he 
 did. Under the government, we might say the 
 reign, of Prince Bismarck, if there were still law- 
 courts at Berlin, there were no longer any judges 
 
 1 2 
 
n6 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 in a certain sense. Whoever dared blame his 
 foreign policy risked being prosecuted for offences 
 against his person or for the crime of high treason. 
 Writers who attempted it found themselves in 
 prison and sometimes confined in a fortress. He 
 succeeded, thus, in inculcating prudence, if not 
 absolute silence. Since his fall, tongues and pens 
 have been more free ; his underlings on the press 
 have themselves forsaken him, and one knows 
 how haughtily he has loaded them with his con- 
 tempt. A pamphlet which appeared at Leipsic 
 expressed the feelings of the malcontents in no 
 measured terms. 1 " Prince Bismarck," it says, 
 " tries in vain to impose on the public ; ... he 
 is the author of an irremediable rupture between 
 Russia and Germany. ... It was Russia that 
 made Prussia's greatness. ... In 1870, whilst 
 under arms on the Vistula, she protected the 
 frontier of the Rhine. ... By the treaty of San 
 Stefano, Russia flattered herself she would reap 
 the advantages which a sanguinary and successful 
 war gave her the right to claim : the Berlin treaty 
 annulled its provisions almost entirely. ... If, at 
 the time of the Congress, Gortchakoff asked but 
 little, if he resigned himself to seeing Austria- 
 Hungary, Russia's adversary, take the leading 
 
 1 It bears the title " How the Duke of Lauenburg (Prince Bis- 
 marck) brought about the understanding between the Russian 
 Empire and the French Republic." 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 117 
 
 position in the Balkan Peninsula, it was because 
 he found himself contending against a coalition 
 whilst the only powerful friend upon whom he 
 thought he could rely kept out of the way. . . . 
 She (Russia) is peaceful, but she commands our 
 respect. . . . She knows that in the hour of 
 danger she can rely on a friendly power whose 
 alliance has no need to be ratified by a written 
 convention. . . . Russia, moreover, will never 
 again play the part she did in 1870; she will 
 not assist at the dismemberment of France with 
 folded arms. . . ." That is what is thought and 
 written to-day in Germany. We have said the 
 same. Was this publication, which created con- 
 siderable stir in public opinion and in the press, 
 inspired ? Nothing goes to prove it ; but its 
 circulation was not prohibited, and most of the 
 newspapers gave long extracts from it. This 
 twofold circumstance displays a symptom that one 
 may certainly make note of by the way. 
 
 These same truths that are now being so 
 lavishly bestowed, from the banks of the Spree, 
 on the restorer of the German Empire in retire- 
 ment at his country seat, the Russian press, 
 interpreting the national feeling, had imparted to 
 him during the last years of his government. He 
 had their exactitude disputed by the powerful 
 organs of publicity in his pay. He has taken 
 advantage of every opportunity to deny or correct 
 
n8 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 them himself, to show that he had on every 
 occasion been Russia's best friend, and notably at 
 the Berlin Congress. He has averred everything ; 
 he has proved nothing. The established facts 
 did not allow of his doing so. Indeed, with the 
 exception of Montenegro, who, in spite of every- 
 thing, has remained faithful to the Czars her 
 benefactors, the provinces watered by the Danube 
 — two of which have been raised into independent 
 kingdoms, whilst the third has been made an 
 autonomous principality — these provinces, we can 
 say, which owed everything for years to the blood 
 of Russian armies, shed in abundance to release 
 them from bondage, were already, through the 
 resistless result of the resolutions formed at the 
 Berlin Congress, the one, Servia, under the yoke 
 of Austria, and the other, Roumania, manifestly 
 rebellious to all connection with the St. Petersburg 
 Cabinet : as for the third, Bulgaria, which has 
 been loaded with benefits of every description, 
 she employs, or rather her rulers do not cease to 
 employ, every means to avoid recognising them. 
 And thus it is that Russia, their emancipator, is 
 to-day robbed of all influence in those countries 
 to the advantage of Austria, or, as would be more 
 correct to say, of Germany. If things are thus — 
 and we venture to think nobody will contradict us 
 —is Prince Bismarck entitled to claim the benefit of 
 his watchfulness over the interests of the Russian 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 119 
 
 Empire ? Is this not adding mockery to hostility ? 
 But a statesman of his stamp, who has attained 
 the zenith of power, may give utterance to rash 
 words with impunity ; public credulity listens to 
 them unmoved, when it does not applaud them. 
 
 VI. 
 
 There is one acknowledgment due to Prince 
 Bismarck which costs us nothing to render him. 
 The work formed by his hands established with 
 mathematical precision, we may say, the respec- 
 tive positions of the contracting parties. It was 
 thus that matters were judged at St. Petersburg 
 and elsewhere. It was thus that he understood 
 them himself. Each power knew who were and 
 who might eventually become its friends or 
 adversaries, as well as the line of action to be 
 followed henceforth. By a strange freak of fate, 
 Russia after her victories, the same as France 
 after her defeats, had to fortify herself in her 
 isolation, and, like the conquered nation, provide 
 for her security by reorganising her military forces, 
 by giving them all the development they were 
 capable of. Her confidence having been de- 
 stroyed, she hastened to guard her frontiers 
 against surprise by covering them with strong 
 contingents of troops drawn from the armies then 
 evacuating Turkey. It was sought to show, 
 
120 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 especially at Vienna, that this proceeding was 
 far from being a peaceful demonstration. One 
 can -recall the recriminations of the Austrian 
 press, and, if we mention them, it is because 
 they show the origin of the armaments which 
 became, from that time, the general law of all 
 European States. Germany herself took the 
 first step under the pretext that her neighbours 
 on the north and west of the Empire were arming 
 beyond measure. 
 
 Whilst the military authorities were bestirring 
 themselves, the Chancellor was not dozing. He 
 was hastening to put his projects of alliance 
 into execution. At the time when he made an 
 understanding between the Russian Empire and 
 the French Republic inevitable, he had, as we 
 have said, thought of and prepared for this con- 
 tingency. Skilful and far-seeing as he was, he 
 had irremissibly parted Austria and Russia, and 
 placed the first-named of these Powers in the 
 urgent necessity of uniting herself to Germany 
 and in a measure belonging to her. He de- 
 manded at Vienna the price of the acquisitions 
 that was his due, and offered the Austro- Hun- 
 garian Government to arrange a defensive alliance. 
 The Vienna Cabinet was not in a position to 
 decline. It is probable also that it welcomed 
 the offer in order to shield itself behind Germany 
 from the wrath of Russia. The clauses of this 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 121 
 
 agreement were, however, under discussion for 
 a long time. At Berlin, they required an under- 
 standing binding the parties for every contin- 
 gency, both as regards Russia and France. Any 
 conflict between Germany or Austria and one or 
 the other of these two Powers was to be con- 
 sidered as creating the casus foederis. We had 
 in our mind, the Vienna Cabinet replied, a state 
 of affairs which bound us to protect ourselves 
 against an aggression on the part of Russia. 
 Public opinion throughout the Austro- Hungarian 
 Empire would understand, as would all the Cabi- 
 nets of Europe, that we were joining Germany with 
 this object, and no one would consider it more 
 than a purely defensive measure. The treaty 
 would, in that case have every appearance of 
 a pacific arrangement. On the other hand, there 
 is nothing to place us at variance with France ; 
 we have no plausible reason for adopting a 
 distrustful attitude towards her ; by pointing her 
 out, we should be rendering ourselves guilty of 
 an unjustifiable act of ill-will, if not of hostility. 
 Prince Bismarck went to Vienna, intervening 
 in person to overcome the resistance opposed 
 to him. Count Andrassy maintained his point 
 of view, and offered to, resign. The German 
 Chancellor had to be satisfied with making the 
 treaty dated October 7, 1879. 1 
 
 1 See a recent article in the German Review, Nord tend Siid. 
 
122 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 What does it covenant ? The name of France 
 is not mentioned. The first clause says that, if 
 one of the two Empires is attacked by Russia, they 
 will owe reciprocally to each other the assistance 
 of the whole of their military forces. If it is 
 attacked by some other Power (clause 2), the other 
 contracting party undertakes to observe a friendly 
 neutrality. If the attacking Power were supported 
 by Russia (clause 3), the obligation to render 
 reciprocal assistance, dealt with in the first clause, 
 would immediately come into force. The treaty 
 as it is seen, is explicitly conceived and framed 
 against Russia ; she is named in it twice, whilst 
 France is never mentioned. Russia is provided 
 against ; and the two Empires of Germany and 
 Austria are to take up arms and fight her, whether 
 she becomes the aggressor or whether she assists 
 in no matter what degree the efforts of another 
 Power. Nothing indicates this Power ; it was un- 
 necessary to do so. But this voluntary omission, 
 undoubtedly insisted on by the Vienna Cabinet, is 
 none the less worthy of remark. What is even 
 more so, what it is important to bear in mind, is 
 the distinction drawn between the contingency of 
 war with Russia and that of the outbreak of hos- 
 tilities with France. In the first, the two allies 
 owe each other reciprocal and absolute assistance, 
 no matter which may be attacked. In the second, 
 the contracting party who is not directly engaged 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 123 
 
 in the struggle at the outbreak, would not have to 
 join in it so long as Russia abstained from doing 
 so. Its sole duty would consist in adopting and 
 maintaining a friendly attitude. Does this mean 
 that if a fresh struggle arose between France and 
 Germany, we might reckon on Austria's neu- 
 trality ? Such is not our feeling. The spirit and 
 bearing of conventional clauses, no matter what 
 their terms, become modified by circumstances, 
 and no one is ignorant of the fact that, in our 
 times, they are susceptible of every interpretation. 
 The faith of treaties, that highly respectable prin- 
 ciple of the soundness of international relations, of 
 the security of nations and general peace, has 
 received some very serious onslaughts since might 
 dispossessed right, and the Government that would 
 now make it the invariable rule of its conduct and 
 decisions would find itself exposed to most 
 terrible disappointments. 1 
 
 1 The preamble of the Austro-German treaty says : " Consider- 
 ing that the two monarchs will be able, by a firm alliance of the two 
 Empires similar to that which existed before, to accomplish this 
 undertaking " (that of watching over the security of their States). 
 Did this firm alliance, which existed before, deter Prussia from 
 declaring war against Austria without cause and without provo- 
 cation, and solely to gratify her cupidity ? " The two Sovereigns," 
 the preamble adds, " promising solemnly never to give the slightest 
 aggressive character to their purely defensive agreement, have 
 resolved to conclude a treaty of peace and reciprocal protection." 
 Whilst Count Bismarck was Prime Minister, Prussia violated the 
 treaty of 1852 which guaranteed the integrity of the Danish domin- 
 ions ; the treaty of 1856, by encouraging (he has admitted it) 
 
124 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 The treaty signed at Vienna, in 1879, remained 
 secret in this sense, that, whilst its object was 
 known, its purport and conditions were ignored. 
 On February 4th, 1888, it is suddenly made 
 public. It had been renewed in 1883 and 1887 ; 
 it had received the adhesion of Italy. But the 
 text revealed is the early one, drawn up by Prince 
 Bismarck and Count Andrassy, the only one we 
 know at present, without any mention of the sig- 
 natures exchanged since its date either with the 
 Cabinet of Vienna or that of Rome. What was 
 the necessity for this? What was the German 
 Chancellor's motive ? Only one explanation has 
 been forthcoming. It is this : At the opening of 
 the session of the Reichstag he had introduced a 
 bill providing for a supplementary credit of 280 
 million marks for the military department. Public 
 opinion and the Federal Assembly alike received 
 
 Russia in ignoring the clause which made the Black Sea neutral ; 
 the Prusso-Italian treaty of 1866, by concluding peace with Austria 
 at Nikolsburg without the participation and in spite of the protests 
 of his ally ; the treaty of Prague of the same year, by imposing on 
 the States of Southern Germany, to which he had promised &free 
 and independent position, by imposing on them, we say, conventions 
 which placed all their military forces, without distinction, under the 
 direct and absolute command of the King. Who henceforth would 
 guarantee to Europe that Prussia would abstain from forcing 
 Austria, if it were her interest to do so and she judged the moment 
 opportune, to change their peaceful understanding into an offensive 
 alliance ? After having witnessed the violence used, the engage- 
 ments ignored, might we not, on the contrary, say with Hamlet : 
 " Words ! Words ! Words ! " if such things, thus written, did not 
 command respect, even when they inspire mistrust ? 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 125 
 
 this demand with feelings of surprise and mistrust. 
 The German army, it was said, is the most power- 
 ful of all European armies, as much by numbers 
 and armament as by organisation ; it must, 
 therefore, be war that is foreseen, and which will 
 be brought on at an early date ! The Chancellor 
 would not have' been believed if, after our 
 disasters, he had again evoked the spectre of the 
 hereditary enemy. He decided to show the 
 country and its representatives that what he 
 wished for was peace and not war, and he placed 
 the treaty concluded with Austria before them. 
 But to ensure peace, he intended to put Germany 
 in such a position that she would not have to fear 
 war, and to neglect nothing, should it occur, to 
 render it disastrous to her adversaries. A few 
 days afterwards, February 6th, the bill came on 
 for discussion, and he spoke with the view of 
 unfolding this double theme. He was courteous 
 towards the Czar : "I have been able to convince 
 myself," he said at the outset, "that the Emperor 
 Alexander has no bellicose feeling towards us, no 
 intention of attacking us, nor any leaning towards 
 aggresive wars in general. I have no faith in 
 the press. I rely on, and believe in, the Czar's 
 
 word Prussia owes a debt of gratitude to 
 
 Russia since 181 3. A great deal was made of 
 this during the reign of the Emperor Nicholas, 
 and I may say that the debt was wiped out at 
 
126 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 Olmutz ; but we have continued our friendship 
 to Russia and we are grateful to her for her 
 attitude in 1866 and 1870. On this last occasion, 
 we were again able to render her a service by 
 procuring for her, through our victories, a free 
 
 hand in the Black Sea We endeavour to 
 
 respect the rights which Russia obtains by treaties. 
 .... and if she asks us to support her applications 
 to the Sultan to bring the Bulgarians to the 
 position arranged by the understanding of the 
 
 Powers, I should not hesitate to do so " 
 
 Parallel to this thesis, and entangling the two 
 together, the Chancellor dwelt at length on that 
 of peace : ". . . .We desire its continuance," he 
 declared. " We wish to preserve it with all our 
 
 neighbours, especially with Russia We are 
 
 not obtruding ourselves ; we are merely seeking 
 
 to renew the former friendly relations If 
 
 war breaks out, the powder will have to be fared 
 
 by others ; we shall not set it alight " But, 
 
 according to him, there is an imperious necessity 
 which Germany cannot shirk ; she must be as 
 strong as her interest demands and her power 
 admits of, ever ready and prepared to defend the 
 Empire on all sides at the same moment. " The 
 bill," he added, "brings us a considerable increase 
 of trained troops ; it strengthens the league of 
 peace the same as if a fourth Power, with 700,000 
 men, had joined it. Public opinion will become 
 
THE TRIPLE' ALLIANCE 127 
 
 easy when it considers that, if we are simul- 
 taneously attacked on two sides, we shall be able 
 to march a million men to each frontier whilst 
 
 keeping a third million in reserve If we 
 
 have no need of them, so much the better. We 
 shall do our best that this may be the case. We 
 Germans," he said, in conclusion, "fear God, but 
 nothing else in the world, and this fear of the 
 Almighty causes us to love and cultivate peace. 
 Whosoever violates it will be able to convince 
 himself that the whole German nation is animated 
 by that same fondness for the fatherland as, in 
 181 3, called the entire population of diminished 
 and enfeebled Prussia to arms ; and he who 
 attacks her will find her united and armed, and 
 will see that every warrior carries in his heart 
 the firm belief that God is with us." Proud and 
 noble words, with a Christian and patriotic accent 
 that it is impossible not to recognise, but which 
 nevertheless cause great surprise when one re- 
 members that the statesman who uttered them 
 desired and brought about three wars in six years, 
 that he set Europe ablaze from the Baltic to the 
 Danube and from the Danube to the Loire : the 
 language of a neophyte, will be the verdict of 
 history, of a neophyte converted to God and 
 peace after having gathered a rich harvest of 
 success and glory on the battlefield. 
 
 The Chancellor's speech so impressed the As- 
 
128 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 sembly that it put an end to the discussion ; the 
 bill was carried by acclamation. He had triumphed 
 over the hesitation of parliament and obtained 
 the grants asked for by the Minister of War. Was 
 this the sole object he had in view ? Did he not 
 also aim at endeavouring to improve his relations 
 with Russia, and at the same time warn his allies 
 that there were still contingencies which would 
 enable him to become reconciled with the 
 Northern Empire, if they, on their part, did not 
 make the sacrifices necessitated by common 
 interest as Germany was doing? With such 
 a fertile mind, everything is possible. It is to be 
 remarked further that Italy's most serious efforts 
 to improve the condition of her military power 
 date from this time, as does also the obtrusion of 
 the German Great General Staff in the important 
 measures adopted at Rome. 
 
 But if the German Chancellor's declarations, 
 pacific and arrogant in turn, were heard and un- 
 derstood in Italy, and even in Austria, what was 
 thought of them, what value was set on them at St. 
 Petersburg ? Did they move public opinion, did 
 they change the attitude of the Russian Cabinet ? 
 Not in the slightest degree. The press, in a 
 certain measure under the control of the ad- 
 ministrative authority, persisted in the judgment 
 it had passed on the conduct of the former and 
 ungrateful ally at the Berlin Congress. The Czar's 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 129 
 
 Government did not change its programme in the 
 least. Clothing itself in its dignity, it noiselessly 
 and unostentatiously increased its efforts to place 
 its frontiers in a state of defence and improve its 
 military appliances. The publication of the treaty 
 of alliance, the trouble Prince Bismarck gave him- 
 self to bring out its pacific character, did not 
 modify the state of affairs, nor alter the position 
 taken up by each of the interested Powers in the 
 least. 
 
 VII. 
 
 We have mentioned under what circumstances 
 and by the force of what necessities the Vienna 
 Cabinet came to sign the treaty of alliance. 
 Repulsed, as one knows, by Russia, who could not 
 forget her ingratitude, vanquished by Prussia, 
 shorn of the high position she had so long 
 occupied in Germany, Austria was dispossessed 
 of her sphere of action in the West. She was 
 therefore necessarily obliged to direct her policy 
 and her efforts to the East of her dominions 
 in order to strengthen and extend her influence 
 over the Slavs of her Empire and the adjacent 
 countries. Prince Bismarck furnished her the 
 means of doing so by inviting her to occupy two 
 provinces of the Turkish Empire. She could not 
 decline a proposal which, in a certain measure, 
 
 K 
 
130 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 was calculated to repair her recent disasters. 
 The difficulties of her position, therefore, explain 
 and justify, if one will, both her behaviour and 
 the agreement she entered into with Germany. 
 But Prince Bismarck had no intention of being - 
 satisfied with her co-operation only ; he wished 
 also to ensure that of a Power whose every 
 interest made her the foe of Austria and ally of 
 France. We have named Italy. 
 
 Events of immense import had seriously troubled 
 the harmony of four of the greatest Powers of the 
 Continent, and had imposed on them the obligation 
 of keeping watch over their security. The war 
 had not only mutilated France ; it had left her 
 defenceless. The first duty of her Government 
 was to reorganise her army, and to place it on a 
 firm footing in order to avert fresh perils. Russia, 
 though issuing victorious from the war against 
 Turkey, abandoned by her friends of Berlin, was 
 herself obliged to provide for her own defence. 
 We have exposed the difficulties of Austria, placed 
 between the animosity of the St. Petersburg 
 Cabinet and the exactions of the Government of 
 the German Empire. Germany, on her side, 
 meant to preserve the preponderating position 
 she had conquered after two great wars from all 
 attack, and to fortify its stability at any cost. 
 These Powers had all equally, though in diverse 
 degrees, an important interest in protecting them- 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE i 3I 
 
 selves against any contingencies for which the 
 new balance of power in Europe did not offer 
 them sufficient guarantees. Was Italy troubled 
 by similar necessities ? Was her unity threatened ? 
 Had she even any adversaries who might be 
 nursing the design of imperilling her independence, 
 of refusing her the legitimate share of influence 
 she had henceforth the right to claim in the 
 councils of the Powers ? One can understand 
 Prince Bismarck's policy ; it is simple and clear ; 
 one can see its idea and aim. One can also 
 conceive and easily interpret the policy of the 
 Vienna Cabinet. But one cannot conceive, and 
 one seeks in vain to discover the motives or con- 
 siderations that sufficed to determine Italy to 
 abandon her liberty of action. Yet she has 
 allied herself to Germany and Austria, who are 
 themselves united against France and Russia. 
 Let us examine under what circumstances she 
 came to take so serious a step. 
 
 We have seen in the course of the foregoing 
 remarks that gratitude weighs heavily on the 
 consciences of nations as well as of Governments. 1 
 The recollection of the services rendered by France 
 worried the Italians. The prestige of the victories 
 gained over the Austrians by the united armies 
 
 1 One remembers Prince Schwarzenberg's prophetic words. 
 Rebellious Hungary had been subdued, thanks to Russia's armed 
 assistance : " Austria," said he, " will astound the world by her 
 ingratitude." 
 
 K 2 
 
T32 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 was ours. There was, on this account, through- 
 out the peninsula, a feeling of humiliation which 
 wounded the national pride. This state of mind 
 was intensified by other causes. It was not suffi- 
 cient for the Italians to have formed a united 
 kingdom ; they had a final ambition, that of 
 making Rome their capital. France, until the fall 
 of the Empire, placed an obstacle in their way, 
 and so yesterday's ally became the adversary of 
 the morrow. The French press dwelt only the 
 more strongly and in less measured terms on the 
 debt incurred by Italy, and, without consideration 
 for the vanity of a young and susceptible nation, 
 spared it neither remonstrances nor warnings. 
 Then came the war of 1866, and the Italians, 
 wounded in their pride by the defeat of Custozza, 
 had, besides, to resign themselves, after barren 
 negotiations, to receive Venetia from the hands of 
 France, to whom Austria had ceded it before the 
 outbreak of hostilities. Under the influence of 
 these various incidents, Italy came to forget her 
 most precious interests and her true friends. 
 Taking advantage of our reverses, she seized upon 
 Rome, and, convinced that she owed this to the 
 victories of the German armies, she was the 
 originator, in 1870, of the league of neutrals, which 
 isolated France in Europe throughout the whole 
 war. She had thus rid herself of the burden of 
 her gratitude and misplaced her sympathies. One 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 133; 
 
 then beheld political men, who had hitherto known 
 only the road to Paris, journeying to Berlin. 
 
 It was not long before other plans were formed. 
 It was considered that Italy, having reached the 
 rank of Great Power, ought to support all the 
 burden of her position and partake of all its ambi- 
 tions. To acquit herself of her new duties, she 
 was bound to place her military power on a firmer 
 footing, to possess a strong naval armament which 
 would give her the standing and enable her to 
 exercise the power which were her right in the 
 Mediterranean. She was to extend her efforts 
 abroad, to protect her commerce and navigation, 
 to secure for them fresh openings, and to found 
 colonies. Venice, Genoa, Pisa, Florence had, in 
 turn, possessed the monopoly of trading with the 
 ports of the Levant ; they had established houses 
 there and ruled as sovereigns. This glorious past, 
 justly recalled, opened unexpected horizons to the 
 minds of the people. They wished to do great 
 things like all nations awaking from a long sleep, 
 the result of years of servitude. 
 
 Such were the desires expressed by public 
 opinion and the feelings of the Italian Govern- 
 ment when the Congress assembled at Berlin. 
 Prince Bismarck, on opening the proceedings, 
 was not only imbued with the fixed intention of' 
 altering the treaty of San Stefano, and endowing 
 Austria, his necessary ally, with two provinces ; 
 
i 3 4 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 he also wished to win over Italy and separate her 
 for ever from F ranee by offering her Tunis. Herr 
 von Biilow, the Foreign Minister at that period, 
 was instructed to sound Count Corti, the principal 
 Italian plenipotentiary. This step did not meet 
 with the success anticipated. The representative 
 from Rome, after taking the instructions of his 
 Government, declined to consider the suggestion. 
 "You must be very anxious to embroil us with 
 France," he said to the Chancellor's mouthpiece on 
 closing the interview. Cairoli, that sagacious and 
 indomitable patriot, was then President of the 
 Council. It was repugnant to all his past life to 
 serve the views of Germany, against whom he 
 had always so nobly contended. He saw the 
 snare and avoided it. 1 This repulse was not 
 sufficient to rebuff such a strong will as Prince 
 Bismarck's. And in fact he was not disheartened. 
 Receiving the cold shoulder from Italy, he turned 
 to France. What did he tell our plenipotentiaries ? 
 We cannot say, but it is known that our resolution 
 to occupy the regency met with the Chancellor's 
 
 1 During the course of the preliminary negotiations which pre- 
 ceded the meeting of the Congress at Berlin, Baron Haymerle, 
 representing the Vienna Cabinet at Rome, was instructed to propose 
 to Cairoli that they should concert together with the view to enable 
 Italy and Austria to mutually secure certain advantages, and he 
 made an allusion to Tunis. " Italy," he was told in reply, " will 
 enter the Congress with free hands, intending to retire from it with 
 them clean." This diplomatic incident clearly proves that an 
 understanding already existed between Vienna and Berlin, and 
 that they sought the adhesion of Italy to the detriment of France. 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 135 
 
 adhesion and encouragement. The treaty signed at 
 the Bardo raised the liveliest irritation throughout 
 Italy. Had we seized on a portion of Italian 
 territory we could not have been the object of 
 harsher recriminations. No account was taken of 
 a single one of the considerations which made it 
 our duty to prevent all contiguity with a Euro- 
 pean Power on our Algerian frontiers, which would 
 have been a source of perpetual conflicts. Insti- 
 gated by the Italian colony in Tunis, which was 
 deceived in its hopes and injured in its interests, 
 this agitation was kept up and envenomed by the 
 adversaries of the Cabinet. Cairoli had to retire 
 from office, and Depretis was entrusted with the 
 duty of forming a new Ministry. The circum- , 
 stances which had brought about the fall of the 
 former Cabinet, and the accession of the new one, 
 were created by Prince Bismarck, and procured 
 him the opportunity and means of accomplish- 
 ing the object he had been aiming at. Italy 
 acceded to the treaty of Vienna in 1882. The 
 triple alliance was accomplished. What the Chan- 
 cellor had been unable to obtain by exciting 
 Italian covetousness, he secured by rousing its 
 jealousy. This was not accomplished, however, 
 without raising a few but energetic protests. Some 
 officers broke their swords ; voices were raised in 
 the midst of Parliament to denounce to the country 
 an agreement so contrary to its interests, Signor 
 
136 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 Crispi's voice was especially heard, the pleasures 
 of office not having then been tasted by him. 
 
 If Italy's accession to the treaty of alliance did 
 not constitute an act of hostility it was never- 
 theless an act inspired by mistrust and manifestly 
 directed against France. Depretis did not dis- 
 guise this, but, desirous of palliating its full scope, 
 he adopted and maintained a reserved and concili- 
 atory attitude. He even showed some eagerness 
 to loudly repudiate all thought of ill-will and 
 especially of aggression. During his long ministry 
 he was able to give the relations between the two 
 countries a character of constant courtesy. Mean- 
 while his adversaries were moving. Signor Crispi 
 was at their head, and attracted notice by his 
 violent accusations. At Parma, in 1884, he 
 declared that " Italy would have no repose until 
 she had avenged the murder of Oberdank." In 
 Parliament he remained the implacable enemy of 
 the new policy, the first initiators of which had 
 been moreover the men of the Right, against whom 
 he had always contended. In the course of a 
 memorable sitting he launched this most offensive 
 insult against the head of the Government : " You 
 have made yourself Germany's gendarme ! " he 
 said. In concert with his friends, desirous 
 like himself of attaining to power, he prepared a 
 pamphlet, a kind of appeal to the country or 
 indictment against the Ministry. Depretis was 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 137 
 
 moved, and he averted the danger by offering 
 Signer Crispi the portfolio for Home Affairs. This 
 is how the last President of the Council has himself 
 related this incident: "When in March, 1887," 
 said he to the Chamber, " Depretis invited me to 
 join his Ministry, I demanded to read the treaty of 
 1882 which had just been renewed, so as to set 
 my conscience at rest. Having come to the 
 conclusion that it was defensive and not offensive, 
 I was fully satisfied and I accepted." His con- 
 version, as one sees, was in a measure instantane- 
 ous. This stubborn Irredentist, this uncompro- 
 mising patriot considered the treaty of alliance one 
 day an accursed piece of work ; on the morrow 
 he was fully satisfied with it. Power has seduc- 
 tions against which the strongest minds are not 
 always proof. Signor Crispi, once a member of the 
 Cabinet, secured the very first day that authority 
 which an audacious and enterprising spirit is en- 
 titled to. The health of Depretis was grievously 
 shattered ; he soon succumbed. Signor Crispi 
 rallied to his policy, besides being an influential 
 orator having the ear of the Chamber, was already 
 marked out for forming a new Ministry. The 
 King entrusted him with the task. 
 
 Brought up in the Mazzini and Garibaldi school, 
 the new President of the Council had long been 
 one of its most constant adherents. Ever an 
 ardent and faithful disciple, he had rejoined the 
 
138 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 one in London and followed the other to Sicily. 
 Like them, he had always had a taste for temerity, 
 and he does not seem to have lost it. On every 
 occasion he has boldly tackled the difficulties he 
 has encountered in his path. Placed suddenly at 
 the head of the Government of his country, after 
 a long life passed in opposition, with sentiments 
 and antecedents which had not prepared him for 
 his new mission, he found himself confronted by a 
 situation beset by, to him, contradictory exigencies. 
 Yet he had to come to a decision, to fix a policy. 
 This obstinate republican, this irreconcilable enemy 
 of the former rulers of Italy, breaking with his 
 past, without a care for the opinion of his 
 brothers in arms, hoists the flag of the Triple 
 Alliance, relying on the dominant feeling in Italy, 
 every day more hostile to France and more 
 sympathetic to Germany. Power was only to be 
 held at this price, and he wished to keep it. 
 With equal boldness he adapted his conduct and 
 acts to his resolve. Anxious to make himself 
 agreeable at Berlin, he assumed a haughty de- 
 meanour towards France. The chief aim of 
 Depretis, in terminating the treaty of commerce, 
 was to alter its terms. In accordance with the 
 assurances he had given, he appointed negotiators 
 for that purpose. They arrived at Paris, and the 
 conferences had commenced when Signor Crispi, 
 having succeeded to the Presidency of the Council 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 139 
 
 in August, took in September the road to Fried- 
 richsruh, which not one of his predecessors had 
 ever passed along or known, and from the very 
 home of the German Chancellor he instructed the 
 Italian commissioners to stop the negotiations and 
 return to Rome. He thus paid for the favour he 
 was soliciting before even having received it. What 
 was it he required ? He wished to enter person- 
 ally into the great man's confidence, to raise 
 himself to the height of Count Kalnoky, who had 
 preceded him a few days before, and to share 
 with him the privilege of those secret and at the 
 same time invariably noised abroad conversations ; 
 to ape, as some one has said, a Chancellor ; to 
 take a front rank among statesmen and thereby 
 firmly establish his position in Italy. He received 
 a welcome which responded to his hopes. The 
 semi-official press of Berlin enthusiastically greeted 
 the great patriot, the true successor of Cavour. 
 He returned to Rome in triumph, his organs in 
 the press re-echoing the praises of the Berlin 
 newspapers, and stating that, thanks to him, 
 Italy had conquered for all time the position 
 Russia had deserted in the Councils of the 
 Empires. National pride was immensely flattered ; 
 and Signor Crispi was able, with head erect, to 
 ascend to the Capitol. 
 
 He had certainly not left Friedrichsruh with- 
 out entering into some engagements. He had to 
 
140 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 give pledges as a guarantee of good faith. He 
 gave them. At the earnest request of the French 
 Government, the treaty of commerce which ex- 
 pired December 31st, 1887, was prolonged for two 
 months. 1 France, in its desire to avert a solution 
 that would be equally regrettable for the two 
 interested countries, sought to turn this last and 
 final delay to account ; it therefore despatched 
 M. Teisserenc de Bort to Rome, entrusting him 
 with the mission of renewing negotiations. Our 
 commissioner endeavoured in vain to accomplish 
 his task. His efforts encountered an irrevocable 
 decision, and he was, in a measure, politely dis- 
 missed. Signor Crispi has pretended that the atti- 
 tude of the Italian Government in this affair was 
 forced upon it, by the conviction that France was 
 dissembling her intention of not renewing the 
 treaty. Upon what information was this convic- 
 tion founded ? It has never been known, and the 
 incident we have just related proves the contrary. 
 We can mention another none the less convinc- 
 ing. On December 15th, 1886, the very day on 
 which the treaty was terminated by Italy, the 
 French Senate, in agreement with the Govern- 
 ment, rejected a motion introduced by one of its 
 members which sought the same result. Signor 
 
 1 France had asked for an extension of six months with an 
 evidently conciliatory intention. Signor Crispi refused. (See, in 
 the Green Book for commercial affairs, the despatches addressed 
 to General Menabrea, Nos. 52 and 54.) 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 141 
 
 Crispi has also alleged that the general tariff, 
 soon followed by a differential one, and both 
 promulgated at Rome, were the one and the 
 other of a purely defensive character. Yet what 
 was their consequence ? They notably closed 
 the Italian markets to our goods. Which of the 
 two Governments was the first to adopt such 
 deplorably rigorous measures ? " The differential 
 tariff," said Signor Crispi in the Chamber, "was 
 established by us, only in answer to a similar 
 tariff previously put into force by France against 
 Italian produce." The President of the Italian 
 Council forgets the general tariff, the dispositions 
 of which were only made more unbearable by the 
 differential one. At what date was the first of 
 these two tariffs inserted in the Gazzetta Ujficiale, 
 at Rome? In July, 1887, six months before the 
 expiration of the treaty. At what date did our 
 Chambers, on their side, vote a general tariff? 
 Was it before this, as Signor Crispi would have it 
 believed by means of a play upon words ? It 
 was on December 15 th of the same year, nearly 
 six months after the publication of the Italian 
 general tariff and only fifteen days before the 
 stipulated expiration of the commercial treaty. 
 The initiative of prohibitive measures was there- 
 fore adopted at Rome long in advance. The 
 responsibility of the strange position in which 
 two nations, equally interested in continuing their 
 
142 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 peaceful transactions, find themselves, devolves 
 exclusively on the Italian Government. 
 
 Has Signor Crispi manifested a more conciliatory- 
 disposition on other occasions ? Has he shown 
 a desire to maintain political relations with France 
 on the footing of a real and sincere friendship ? 
 The semi-official press of Rome and Turin has 
 credited the Government of the Republic with 
 the most underhand schemes. It has stated, and 
 still repeats, that we are meditating a descent 
 now on Tripoli, now on Spezzia itself; it has 
 pretended that we were making preparations in 
 Tunis to seize upon Sicily. It never ceases to 
 attribute to us what it considers a still blacker 
 design : we are menacing, it asserts, Italian unity 
 and independence by encouraging the illusions of 
 the Holy See, whose temporal power France 
 seeks to restore. 1 One does not refute such 
 inanities. But we may be permitted to state that 
 they are unceasingly repeated in Italy, and that 
 public feeling is becoming more and more affected 
 by them. Has Signor Crispi taken the trouble to 
 deny these rumours, to point out their absurdity ? 
 Is it not a statesman's duty to set public opinion 
 right when it has been misled, and to acknow- 
 
 1 In connection with the recent utterances of Cardinal Lavigerie 
 a ministerial journal, the Capitan Fracassa, published an article 
 pretending to show that the understanding between the French 
 Republic and the Papacy was an accomplished fact, and that the 
 time for dealing with it by the Italian Government had arrived. 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 143 
 
 ledge the loyal intentions of a neighbouring 
 country which has been so often and so obsti- 
 nately accused by semi-official organs of pre- 
 meditating acts of violence ? What would he 
 think, if every morning and every night our 
 most respectable journals were to state that a 
 descent upon Nice or the coasts of Corsica was 
 in course of preparation at Spezzia ; that Italy was 
 intriguing with different parties in France for the 
 overthrow of the Republic, without the French 
 Government taking the slightest step to put an 
 end to such false allegations ? Would he suffer 
 Italy's political probity to be thus daily suspected 
 and called into question ? Has he the considera- 
 tion for the probity of France which sound inter- 
 national traditions would inspire ? He has not 
 only, by his inaction, encouraged his most zealous 
 supporters in Italy to rouse national susceptibilities 
 in both countries, he has also himself contributed 
 to this end, by his acrimonious language and his 
 overbearing attitude on every occasion when, in 
 the ordinary course of events, some misunder- 
 standing has arisen between Paris and Rome. 
 We all remember the incident of Massowah to 
 give only one example. France ventured to 
 make some observations in the interest of some 
 Greek merchants residing in the island under the 
 protection of our Consul, and whose trade had 
 been saddled with duties they had never paid. 
 
144 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 It was a matter of no importance, and could give 
 rise to no serious disagreement. It was easy 
 to settle it rapidly and quietly ; all that was 
 necessary was to exchange a few friendly ex- 
 planations. Signor Crispi chose to see in the atti- 
 tude of the Government of the Republic an attack 
 on the sovereignty of Italy. He addressed 
 communications to all the Cabinets of Europe 
 couched in language that surprised the Ministries, 
 accustomed to less acrimony and greater circum- 
 spection, far more than the subject that had given 
 rise to it. According to him, " France would like 
 to make believe that the peaceful progress of the 
 Italian nation showed a diminution of her power 
 and authority." A phrase which has no sense, 
 or else means that France, jealous of Italy's 
 influence and conquests, was wickedly endeavour- 
 ing to place obstacles in her way. Our inter- 
 vention in favour of the subjects of the King of 
 Greece, which was justified from the point of 
 view of international right, was not sufficiently 
 important to provoke such a noisy manifestation. 
 But Signor Crispi wished to please Berlin and 
 flatter the national pride of the Italians. He was, 
 moreover, encouraged by Prince Bismarck, who 
 sought every day to envenom the relations be- 
 tween France and Italy more and more. 1 The 
 
 1 In a report of the Italian Ambassador to Germany, published 
 in the Green Book, it is stated that : " In accordance with Prince 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 145 
 
 Paris Cabinet wisely refrained from retaliating - , 
 leaving the Italian Minister the full benefit of his 
 diplomatic amenities, and so the affair ended. 
 
 What was Signor Crispi's idea when he entered 
 on this course, what was his object ? As a deep 
 and practical thinker, did he foresee that by falling" 
 asleep in an expensive peace, Italy was risking a 
 terrible awakening? that a day would come when 
 her strength would no longer be equal to her 
 sacrifices ? Persuaded of this did he wish, as has 
 been pretended, to hasten events, and, by means 
 of some far-fetched complication, to stir up a war 
 which would have brought matters to a head and 
 just when he wished ? There is nothing to justify 
 such a conjecture. The statesman who would set 
 one half of Europe against the other, both formid- 
 ably armed, without being imperiously constrained 
 to do so for the salvation of his own country, would 
 be a criminal whom the nations would have a right 
 to hold up to the execration of present and future 
 generations. Such is certainly, we have no doubt, 
 Signor Crispi's own feeling. If it be so, why does 
 he not imitate his predecessor ? Depretis advised 
 his Sovereign to join the alliance of the Emperors of 
 
 Bismarck's orders, Count Minister has received instructions, in 
 the event of M. Goblet speaking to him of the incident of 
 Massowah, to let him understand that it would be prudent, on his 
 part, not to embitter matters, for if Italy found herself beset by- 
 serious complications, she would not be left in an isolated 
 position." 
 
 L 
 
146 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 Austria and Germany, but he never ceased to act 
 most correctly in his intercourse with the French 
 Government. He terminated the treaty of com- 
 merce, but with the sole idea of forcing France to re- 
 vise it. Signor Crispi has pursued the same policy, 
 but with this difference. With Depretis there was 
 a show of being conciliatory without being friendly ; 
 his successor has been combative when not aggres- 
 sive. Let us hasten, however, to make this 
 admission : Signor Crispi has latterly seemed to 
 wish to attenuate the rigour of his ways. In his 
 conversations, as in his more recent speeches, one 
 meets with none of those allusions he ventured to 
 make on other occasions. He loves France, he 
 said at Naples ; " France, that sympathetic smile of 
 modern civilisation," he added at Florence. To 
 what causes can we attribute this return to less 
 hostile, if not more cordial language ? x Is it to the 
 financial and economic embarrassments which are 
 disturbing the country and tormenting the Govern- 
 ment, or has Signor Crispi become convinced 
 that the Sovereigns allied to Italy, sincerely desire 
 to preserve the blessings of peace to their subjects, 
 and that it would be useless and even dangerous 
 to tempt fortune at this time? Has not Prince 
 Bismarck's retirement also had a salutary effect on 
 
 1 It is, however, to be observed that the organs of the Italian 
 press which support him, have in nowise, up to the present, lessened 
 either the warmth or the malignity of their polemics. 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 147 
 
 the Italian Premier's state of mind ? All these 
 •circumstances have, perhaps, contributed to an 
 appeasement which will be lasting, if loyally de- 
 sired at Rome, notwithstanding the engagements 
 into which Italy has entered. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 What are these engagements, what advantage 
 ■are they likely to yield, what are their obligations 
 and their perils ? By what arguments, in short, 
 has Italy's participation in the Triple Alliance been 
 justified ? We know only one treaty or rather 
 one text, as we have said ; the one Germany 
 signed with Austria in 1879. Did Italy simply 
 accede to it, or have fresh and special stipulations 
 been added thereto ? This is the secret of the 
 ■contracting parties, and we do not profess to pene- 
 trate it. 1 Let us then keep to the hypothesis that 
 the Government has entered into no other obliga- 
 tions than those which were fixed by the two 
 Empires in the first instance. 
 
 We have related the circumstances under which 
 
 1 On comparing the terms of the treaty of 1879, with the declara- 
 tion Count Miinster had been instructed to make, under certain 
 circumstances, to M. Goblet with reference to the Massowah 
 incident, one might perhaps form the conclusion that Italy had 
 obtained pledges which Germany had not stipulated for with 
 Austria, at least in so far as France is concerned. See note on pp. 
 144, 145. 
 
 L 2 
 
148 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 Germany and Austria became allied. Germany, 
 we must here repeat, after mutilating France, had 
 deprived Russia of most of the advantages her 
 victories should have secured to her. Austria, on 
 her side, had reaped the benefits of a war she 
 had not waged, and, without its costing her either 
 a man or a florin, she had been placed in posses- 
 sion of the influence which the Court of St. 
 Petersburg exercised in the Balkans. The 
 Empires of Central Europe, the two accomplices, 
 we might say, had a common interest in maintain- 
 ing this state of affairs, and one can understand 
 their uniting together in order to shield the new 
 balance of power they had formed to the detri- 
 ment of France in the West and Russia in the 
 East, from all attack. Was Italy, on her part, 
 obliged to look to her position ? Had she new 
 acquisitions to protect, perils to foresee and avert ? 
 In the explanations the Italian Government has 
 given on this subject, it has always adopted sober 
 and laconic language which does not permit one 
 to clearly elucidate either the cause or the aim of 
 its determination. Signor Crispi, when questioned, 
 has said as follows : " The policy we intend to 
 follow is one of peace and not war ; it can only 
 be opposed by those who are of opinion that 
 Italy would be better off if she were isolated. .... 
 The treaty of alliance is not the cause of our 
 armaments Their sole object is the defence 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 149 
 
 of our rights and frontiers." (Sitting of May 15th, 
 1890.) 
 
 Italy, therefore, according to her Prime Minister, 
 had allied herself to Austria and Germany, not in 
 the interest of her greatness, but to safeguard the 
 integrity of her dominions ; and, to leave no doubt 
 as to the dreaded enemy, he incidentally alluded 
 to the treaty of Campo-Formio which delivered 
 over the Venetian Republic to the vanquished of 
 Rivoli and Montenotte. How could France, just 
 recovering from her terrible disasters, incapable of 
 any thought but that of devoting all her efforts 
 and all her resources to repairing her discomfiture, 
 have had the idea of picking a quarrel with Italy, 
 whilst the victorious and powerful enemy of yester- 
 day was on the watch ? And why too should she 
 have conceived such a chimerical and at the same 
 time guilty design ? Was it in order to make up 
 for her losses on the Rhine ? But in 1882, when 
 Italy gave her signature to the treaty, our army 
 was only being formed, its ranks were as in- 
 complete as its appliances. Could we, moreover, 
 have crossed the Alps without Germany's consent, 
 and would she have given it us ? Would we have 
 combined with the Holy See for the dismember- 
 ment of the Kingdom we had helped to establish, 
 and would we have wished, do we wish now 
 as is so frequently stated, to restore the Pope's 
 temporal power? Is it not in Germany that there 
 
150 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 exists a powerfully organised Catholic party, with 
 which the authorities have to reckon, which 
 demands the return of the Jesuits and openly 
 declares its intention of assisting to replace the 
 Holy Father in possession of Rome and its 
 territory. To attribute such intentions to the 
 French Republic, to a Government of secularisa- 
 tion, is to strangely impose on the credulity of 
 the public. In alluding to the treaty of Campo 
 Formio, Signor Crispi ventured on a sort of inter- 
 national anachronism which deceived nobody ; 
 he confounded two epochs which had no analogy 
 between them, suppressed a whole century in the 
 history of France and Italy, during which the 
 First Empire laid the foundations of Italian unity 
 by setting up a national Kingdom in the north of 
 the peninsula, and the second won the battle of 
 Solferino, which permitted that unity to be defini- 
 tively constituted. One is justly surprised to hear 
 the head of a representative Government use 
 such language, and one is tempted to say with 
 Mr. Gladstone, that master of parliamentary 
 government, "It would be grotesque if it were 
 not fatal." 1 
 
 Indeed, with Signor Crispi's doctrine as to 
 alliances, no State could feel secure if it confined 
 itself to maintaining amicable relations equally with 
 all its neighbours. The defence of his frontiers 
 
 1 Contemporary Review. 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 151 
 
 necessitates that he should ensure the assistance 
 of some Powers to protect him against the greedi- 
 ness of others. This is a principle of public 
 right founded on mistrust which masters of science 
 had not taught down to our time. If it were 
 universally observed, it would divide Europe into 
 two or more groups, armed against one another 
 and ever ready to come to blows. Would the 
 conception be a happy one, or the result praise- 
 worthy ? Alliances have been formed in all 
 times ; they were offensive when the contracting 
 Powers had an immediate combination in view, 
 advantages that were foreseen and definite. 
 Prussia united with Austria in order to invade 
 Denmark and despoil her. Alliances have been 
 defensive under the presentiment of a danger it was 
 urgent to avert or encounter. That is the case, 
 in a certain measure, with the Austro-German 
 union. But, again, who was menacing Italy ? to 
 what perils were her unity and independence 
 exposed ? She was living in perfect harmony 
 with all her neighbours, no necessity forced her 
 to alienate her liberty of action, to take a place 
 at once in coming struggles if such are to break 
 out. What other Power has thought of under- 
 taking obligations, of binding itself for contingencies 
 which are fortunately not imminent ? The present 
 was in no way exposed, why did she engage 
 herself for the future ? Can she tell what it has 
 
152 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 in store for her, and would she not have been 
 better advised in awaiting events so as to act 
 according to circumstances and to the best of her 
 interests ? Without cause, without urgency, why 
 has Italy engaged herself, even contingently, to 
 draw the sword against France, to guarantee 
 Germany the peaceful possession of Alsace and 
 Lorraine, and Austria the integrity of her dominions 
 including Trieste and Trent ? Ah ! if Silvio 
 Pellico, if Confalonieri and all the martyrs who 
 have left their bones in the Spielberg dungeons, 
 if Cavour and all the illustrious pioneers of Italy's 
 deliverance, could leave their graves, how indig- 
 nantly they would condemn a policy which has 
 resoldered the chains of their days of mourning ! 
 
 But if the two arguments, the only ones brought 
 forward so far, do not support the discussion, if 
 Italy has nothing to fear from France, if isolation 
 with its pretended dangers is a sophism more 
 captious than diplomatic, what were and what are 
 still the advantages the Italian Government has 
 in view ? Did it ally itself to the powerful for 
 the purpose of participating in the spoils ? Signor 
 Crispi protests against such an injurious imputation. 
 Yet the treaty stipulates for duties and liabilities. 
 What will be the compensations for them, and are 
 they sure to be forthcoming ? 
 
 Count Bismarck in 1866, by means of expedients 
 analogous to those he employed to catch Italy in 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 153 
 
 his diplomatic net, Count Bismarck signed treaties 
 of defensive alliance with the South German States, 
 consequently implying, above all, that their 
 sovereign independence should not be assailed. 
 Four years afterwards, at Versailles, the Princes 
 of these States, who had faithfully placed their 
 armies at the disposal of the King of Prussia, 
 although they had not engaged to do so, had to 
 take rank among the vassals of this same sovereign, 
 hailed Emperor of Germany. By recalling this 
 historical and undeniable fact, we do not mean to 
 say that such will be the fate of the King of Italy. 
 It is absolutely far from our mind to suggest such 
 an offensive thing. We merely wish to show, 
 by a striking example, what becomes of the most 
 solemn engagements between two Powers of 
 unequal strength, and how imprudent it is for the 
 weaker to ally itself to the stronger. If the 
 Italians chose to recall their good and bad treat- 
 ment, they might themselves teach us this lesson. 
 One of them, a lucid and far-seeing patriot he, 
 showed them, last year, in a publication they 
 should make their national breviary, 1 how care- 
 fully they should mistrust Prussia. They would 
 see therein that King William, among all the 
 Sovereigns of Europe, was the last to recognise 
 the new Kingdom, that he did so at France's 
 
 1 The Italia, attributed to M. Visconti-Venosta, who has not 
 however, so far as we know, admitted the authorship. 
 
154 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 solicitation and in order not to separate himself 
 from the Emperor of Russia ; they would see 
 that the Berlin Cabinet took up the defence of 
 the fallen Princes whose subjects had gone over 
 to the Piedmontese, in some official communica- 
 tions that were arrogant and insulting for King 
 Victor Emmanuel's dignity. They would know 
 that, in order to obtain Austria's participation in 
 Denmark in 1865, Count Bismarck had promised 
 her the assistance of the Prussian army in Venetia 
 in the event of France intervening to support an 
 aggression on the part of Italy, thus reviving, on 
 his own account, the clause of the Treaty of Campo 
 Formio which Signor Crispi so lightly recalled. 
 But what more particularly deserves their con- 
 sideration is the Prusso- Italian treaty, a treaty 
 of defensive and offensive alliance entered into 
 at Berlin in 1866. 1 This document had only been 
 signed a few days when Count Bismarck, suddenly 
 assuming that he had reason for mistrusting the 
 Cabinet at Florence, declared to the negotiators 
 that, in King William's opinion, it only bound 
 King Victor Emmanuel. Should Austria, said 
 he to them, confine herself to attacking Italy, 
 Prussia will not owe you any assistance ; if she 
 directs her aggression against our frontiers, Italy 
 will owe us the immediate assistance of the whole 
 
 1 It is described besides on the authority of official documents, 
 in General La Marmora's work : Un pd piu di luce. 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 155 
 
 of her military stength. This interpretation of 
 the treaty was not only leonine, it was an insult 
 offered to the good faith of the Italian Govern- 
 ment, in the face of a text which admitted of no 
 ambiguity. However, the war broke out, and 
 after Sadowa, negotiations were opened for an 
 armistice. The treaty of alliance stipulated that 
 neither armistice nor peace should be concluded 
 except by the consent of both parties. Count 
 Bismarck received the Austrian plenipotentiaries 
 at Nikolsburg, and negotiated and signed with 
 them an armistice and preliminaries of peace, 
 which omitted nothing of what was ultimately 
 contained in the definitive Treaty of Prague, 
 without the participation and in defiance of the 
 protests of Count Barral, the Italian representative 
 at the Prussian headquarters. What a bitter 
 mockery ! The first clause of the preliminaries 
 was thus worded : " The King of Prussia under- 
 takes to induce his ally, the King of Italy, to give 
 his approval to the preliminaries of peace and the 
 armistice as soon as the Venetian Kingdom has 
 been placed at the King of Italy's disposal by a 
 declaration of the Emperor of the French." The 
 work from which we take these facts, which are, 
 moreover, notoriously distressful for the Italian 
 Government, adds : " Of King William we will 
 say but a word : Italy's loyal assistance 1 had en- 
 
 1 Austria, previous to the outbreak of hostilities, had offered Italy, 
 
156 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 abled him to become the most powerful Sovereign 
 in Europe, and he was so discourteously ungrateful 
 as to not even mention his ally's name in the 
 speech he read to the Prussian Parliament on 
 the 5th of August following." The King dis- 
 played no more deference for Italy's Sovereign 
 than Count Bismarck had shown to her Ambas- 
 sador. Has France ever treated her ally of 1859 
 in this manner ? She looked after her personal 
 interests in North Africa, she protected those of 
 her commerce and industry ; she has never broken 
 faith. She united with Italy to assist her in 
 throwing off the foreign yoke. Has she ever 
 thought of forming an alliance against her with 
 some other Power ? 
 
 Will the treaty of the Triple Alliance be more 
 loyally observed ? We leave it to the Italians 
 to answer this question. If they take note of the 
 teachings of history, if the past is any criterion 
 of the future, they will recognise with us that, in 
 this respect, they will do better to pray than 
 hope. In any case, if war breaks out and favours 
 the allies, the Italians would be foolish to doubt 
 that Germany would take the lion's share. The 
 
 through the intermediary of France, to give up Venetia to her, if 
 she consented to withdraw from the alliance. In spite of the most 
 urgent representations of the Cabinet at Paris, the Florence 
 Cabinet declined the proposal, considering that loyalty demanded 
 it should keep to its engagements. Count Bismarck and his 
 Sovereign were aware of this. Did they remember it at Nikols- 
 burg? 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 157 
 
 Adriatic would certainly become a German lake. 
 Great Britain, who is never caught napping, she 
 proved it again at the Berlin Congress, would 
 turn the Mediterranean into an English lake. 
 Whatever advantages might be attributed to 
 Italy, they would not compensate for those her 
 partners would be sure to reserve to themselves, 
 the profits having to be in proportion, so it 
 would be said, to the forces employed by each 
 of them. Signor Crispi has spoken of Campo 
 Formio ; why does he not think of the treaties 
 of Vienna ? They are of more recent date ; in 
 them Italy was looked upon as a geographical 
 expression and pulled to pieces, the better to 
 dispose of her easily. The next meeting will 
 be at Berlin, and there the domineering spirit 
 will preside over the deliberations of this new 
 Congress, more energetically still than in 1815. 
 Italy may perhaps emerge from it increased in 
 size, but relatively diminished, without a counter- 
 poise to defend herself against the colossus she 
 will have helped to raise in the centre of Europe, 
 without France, rendered powerless, who never- 
 theless smiled on her both in good and evil 
 fortune. If the fate of arms were against the 
 allies, would vanquished Germany have more 
 consideration for Italy than victorious Prussia 
 showed her at Nikolsburg ? Would she not 
 willingly and promptly sacrifice her to obtain 
 
158 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 peace on less onerous conditions ? Has it not 
 ever been so when the vanquished have been of 
 unequal strength ? 
 
 IX. 
 
 But without considering such grave contin- 
 gencies any further, let us see with what weight 
 the Triple Alliance already presses upon Italy, 
 what it costs her in times of peace. She had 
 to make the heaviest sacrifices during the period 
 of her emancipation, in order to meet what we 
 will call her preliminary expenses. She issued 
 loans to the extent of ten milliards of lire which 
 were negotiated at Paris. Her Budget of the 
 first ten years showed an annual mean deficit of 
 334 millions. In 1871 it had dropped down to 
 47 millions. It disappeared entirely in 1875, to 
 give place to a permanent surplus which amounted 
 to 51 millions in 1882, the anno d'oro as this same 
 year was called, in spite too, let it be remarked, 
 of a decrease in taxation of about 100 millions. 
 This state of constant prosperity allowed of the 
 abolition of forced currency. 
 
 In this same year of 1882, the Treaty of 
 Alliance made its appearance with its train of 
 extraordinary expenses, the commixtion of the 
 German Great General Staff, the obligation of 
 increasing the strength of the army and navy, 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 159 
 
 of forming Alpine battalions, and of constructing 
 strategical railways. The deficit immediately re- 
 appeared in the Italian Budget ; and clung to 
 it to remain there henceforth as master. Such 
 was the first consequence of the Triple Alliance. 
 It soon produced another : the termination of 
 the treaty of commerce with France when, in 
 spite of the tariff, the receipts of the customs 
 suffered considerable reduction, and have con- 
 tinued falling off notwithstanding all the efforts 
 of the Government to stay their downward 
 tendency. 1 Thus the policy inaugurated by 
 Depretis and continued in a more pronounced 
 manner by Signor Crispi, has had, from the outset, 
 the double result of increasing the expenditure 
 and reducing the resources of the treasury. 
 This can clearly be seen from all the statistical 
 papers published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale, and 
 has been moreover shown to the world by the 
 statement of the Finance Minister in the Chamber 
 on January 27th, 1890. Signor Perazzi admitted 
 a total deficit of 461 millions for the ordinary and 
 extraordinary budgets together. 2 During the 
 
 1 Exports during 1887 (including precious metals) 1,109 millions. 
 
 „ 1888 „ „ „ J67 „ 
 
 Decrease 142 millions 
 We have seen that the treaty expired on March 3U/, 1888. This 
 decrease, therefore, is only for the last ten months of the financial 
 year. 
 
 2 Signor Gianpietro, a deputy, and a highly distinguished 
 
160 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 first ten months of 1890, according to the latest 
 documents we have been able to consult, the 
 exports, without having ever ceased to diminish, 
 have still further decreased to the extent of 
 76 millions. But this does not embarrass 
 the President of the Council. What do you 
 mean, he said, by speaking of the burdens 
 that weigh upon the country ? What, after all, 
 does Italy spend on the support of a military 
 position which makes her "Austria's and Ger- 
 many's equal ? Scarcely 1 8 francs per inhabit- 
 ant, whilst Germany pays 19 and France 35." 
 Signor Crispi has a singular way of understanding 
 and dealing with economic questions. Without 
 checking these figures, the exactitude of which 
 seems to us, at first sight, controvertible, we 
 will take the liberty of pointing out to him that 
 the tax-paying capacity of each inhabitant, when 
 compared to that of an inhabitant of another 
 country, should be valued according to the 
 direct rate of the general wealth of each of the 
 two, and a good economist might perhaps prove 
 to him that the 35 francs paid by a Frenchman 
 are less burdensome to him than the 18 francs 
 which weigh down an Italian. If he chooses 
 to consult the lists of the value of labour on 
 either side of the Alps, he will obtain a first 
 
 economist, who was the reporter of the bill on contracts, estimates 
 the combined deficits of the last three years at a milliard. 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 161 
 
 insight which will sufficiently enlighten him. 
 However this may be, one has seen the result 
 of the repeal of the commercial treaty in Italy ; 
 in France, on the contrary, the receipts and 
 exports have continued to increase notwithstand- 
 ing the injury our transactions have suffered 
 with the peninsula. France could, if necessary, 
 bear further burdens ; could Italy do so ? One 
 must doubt it after the declarations Signor Crispi 
 made to embellish his recent speech at Turin 
 which can be resumed in a few words : no more 
 loans, no increase in taxation. It is right to 
 mention that he was speaking on the eve of 
 the elections. 
 
 Why, after all, be alarmed ? say the Allies 
 to us. We have united to preserve peace, to 
 ensure it if necessary, and we earnestly repudi- 
 ate all thought of aggression. It would be im- 
 possible to be more affirmative than Prince 
 Bismarck has shown himself, in this respect, on 
 every occasion ; and little accustomed though we 
 are to feel that confidence in a Prime Minister's 
 word which it should always inspire, we prefer 
 to believe that he has expressed his thought 
 entirely. We are equally persuaded that his suc- 
 cessor, the faithful interpreter of his Sovereign's 
 intentions, is devoting himself to the same policy. 
 Is not Germany's ambition amply satisfied ? 
 What interest could lead her into fresh con- 
 
 M 
 
162 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 flicts ? In the state in which things are at pres- 
 ent, who would dare tempt fortune ? Is not 
 war as formidable to the nations to whom it 
 brings victory as to those who suffer defeat ? 
 It is assuredly not Austria who would care to 
 risk such a perilous adventure. As for Italy, 
 we have said what we think of her intentions ; 
 it is not we who charge her with unavowable 
 desires ; it is Signor Crispi's adversaries of the 
 Right and Left who attribute to him " bellicose 
 designs that were stopped by the great Chan- 
 cellor's fall." 1 
 
 It is therefore peace that is desired — we do 
 not gainsay it — but an armed peace with bur- 
 dens that irritate and crush the various countries. 
 And who is held responsible for it ? France. 
 What has been said? France is arming, she 
 is nursing the thought of revenge ; she obliges 
 us to multiply our efforts in order to maintain 
 
 1 At the Radical congress presided over by Count Pauciani. On 
 the other hand one reads in the Italia, the work of a Conservative : 
 "The sombre genius who directs German policy wanted Italy to do 
 more than ruin herself in her public finances ; he required that she 
 should also feel ruined in her private fortune, and that, per fas et 
 nefas, she might attribute this ruin to a neighbouring Power with 
 whom, in Germany's military interest, he wished to see her for ever 
 mortally embroiled. 
 
 " And in order to work out this abominable design, he has found 
 an Italian statesman who is devoted to his secret schemes, a 
 minister whose personal vanity he has roused to the point 
 of rendering him completely blind, by making him bring about 
 the rupture of commercial relations which were the means of 
 livelihood to several million Italian families." 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 163 
 
 our superiority and be prepared to repel any 
 aggression. What a derisive way of rendering 
 homage to truth. France at the end of the 
 last war had only the wreck of her armies left 
 to her ; she was without weapons and supplies ; 
 the victor had carried away all, besides the 
 milliards. She went courageously to work to 
 reconstruct everything, as the care of her 
 defence, her dignity, her legitimate ambition to 
 regain her place among the Great Powers, re- 
 quired. She entered on this immense task 
 without boasting, in the silence of her grief, and 
 submitting without complaint to the heavy sacri- 
 fices that had to be made. She had committed 
 no other crime : who dare blame her for what 
 she has done ? Did she owe it to her enemies 
 of yesterday to remain at their mercy, and leave 
 her future to their generosity, which had already 
 been put to the test? Disappointed as they 
 were in Germany at seeing France rapidly re- 
 pair the ruins caused by the war, they did not 
 consider it opportune, during the first years 
 following the conclusion of peace, to increase 
 the military forces of the new Empire. The 
 necessity arose out of the policy inaugurated 
 by Prince Bismarck at the Berlin Congress, 
 and it is to Germany that we owe the responsi- 
 bility for the actual state of affairs in Europe. 
 It cannot be laid at France's door. 
 
 M 2 
 
1 64 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 What is this state of affairs, and what is it 
 leading- to ? We have no need to relate the 
 
 o 
 
 story of Germany's armaments. The Reichstag- 
 has often re-echoed with it. Every one knows, 
 moreover, that fresh Army Corps have been 
 formed, and that the troops mustered in Alsace 
 and Lorraine have been several times reinforced. 
 The object of Prince Bismarck's last parlia- 
 mentary campaign, after so many others, was 
 to increase the term of service to seven years, 
 and give an additional 40,000 men to the stand- 
 ing army. His successor fought his first battle 
 to obtain some extraordinary credits from the 
 parliament for the Ministry of War. It is an- 
 nounced that Count Caprivi will ask for a further 
 measure in the coming session. The Austro- 
 Hungarian Empire has done its best to extend 
 and strengthen its military power. Italy has 
 emulated her Allies. We have seen in what 
 penury she has plunged her finances ; yet her 
 Government does not seem in the least disposed 
 to moderate her desire to imitate the other two 
 Powers. Some economy may perhaps be realised 
 on public works, on expenditure beneficial to the 
 wealth of the country ; but the grants asked for 
 by the Ministers of War and Marine will not be 
 perceptibly reduced. 1 This ruinous fever has 
 
 1 If the new recruiting law is voted, it will add 150,000 men to 
 the standing army, 200,000 to the movable militia, and 300,000 to 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 165 
 
 attacked all European States, both great and 
 small, like an epidemic calamity. England 
 herself has decided to devote 500 millions to the 
 development of her maritime power. 
 
 When will this come to an end ? There is 
 nothing to assist us in forming an opinion. May 
 we hope that a moment will arrive when dis- 
 armament by mutual consent will be forced by 
 the course of events on all the Powers ? "A 
 dream," Prince Bismarck erewhile replied to one 
 of his visitors ; "every one will be mistrustful, no 
 one will ever believe in his neighbour's loyalty. 
 Stipulate for a control, and the casus belli will 
 be perpetually at hand." Europe is therefore 
 doomed to large armies ever increasing in num- 
 bers, weighing more and more on the taxpayers, 
 becoming more and more harmful to industry 
 and agriculture, and exhausting all the sources 
 of general prosperity. "It is another form of 
 war," the ex-Chancellor admitted to his inter- 
 viewer, who was a Frenchman, " a war of golden 
 guineas. What have you to complain of? Your 
 wealthy nation is able to support it longer than 
 others, and victory will be for the one who can 
 hold out the longest." Has not the recluse of 
 Friedrichsruh admitted by using such language 
 
 the territorial army, that is to say, 650,000 men, who will have to be 
 provided with the necessary arms and equipments, which will entail 
 an expense of 150 millions without counting the proportionate 
 victualling. 
 
166 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 the imperfections, we will say more, the dangers- 
 of his work ? Far removed from power, has his 
 genius revealed to him that he has launched his 
 country, and Europe with her, along a road that 
 has no peaceful outlet, or which, in his own mind, 
 leads to ruin if not to war? Golden guineas 
 become exhausted in time, and there is a limit 
 to the patient resignation of populations, as of 
 Governments. What will happen when the sacri- 
 fices are in excess of the resources? And that 
 day will fatally arrive, for the organisation of 
 fighting masses, with their armament, is now an 
 operation dependent on science, whose duty it 
 is to constantly improve them. The rifle, the 
 cannon, the vessel, the ammunition, with the ex- 
 plosives, invented, manufactured, built, or pre- 
 pared yesterday at great cost, become insufficient 
 means of destruction to-morrow, and have to be 
 replaced by fresh appliances in order that one 
 Power may continue as strongly armed as its 
 neighbour. It is a struggle without end or 
 truce, which in each country devours the fruit of 
 national labour, to the prejudice of all classes of 
 the population. How can one be surprised, then, 
 if the less fortunate are roused, if Socialists in 
 spite of Draconian laws come in greater num- 
 bers to the Reichstag at each election ? Germany 
 is perhaps, of all countries, the one in which 
 this state of affairs gives rise to the greatest 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 167 
 
 anger and the most vehement polemics. 1 Did 
 not Prince Bismarck forget himself, did he utter 
 language worthy of him, of a statesman desirous 
 of exercising a salutary influence over misled 
 public opinion, when he said in his last speech : 
 " One does not wage war through hatred, other- 
 wise France would be permanently at war, not 
 only with us, but also with England and Italy, 
 for she hates them both." Prince Bismarck is 
 mistaken, hatred is not a feeling which easily 
 obtains access into France. What other country 
 has given her neighbours more brilliant proofs 
 of sympathy and disinterestedness ? The French 
 flag has been seen in all parts where a noble 
 cause has stood in need of defence. Has 
 Prussia's been visible there ? What has she done, 
 moreover, to disarm our resentment? Has she 
 shown any consideration for the dignity of the 
 vanquished of the woeful year? Has she acted 
 any better towards Russia, so long her docile 
 Ally ? A prey to the feeling she attributes to us, 
 she has. seen secret agents, an organised system 
 
 1 Last April there appeared in Germany a work entitled, Videant 
 Consules, and which is attributed to a General, an ex-Minister of 
 Marine. Its object is to show that war must necessarily break out 
 before long with France, but especially with Russia, " that veritable 
 national enemy who oppresses everything German, who unduly 
 holds the Baltic provinces, those countries won over to German 
 influence at the price of German blood .... that bulwark of 
 Germany .... where Russian barbarism, with its corruption and 
 degenerate officials, takes the place of ancient equity and civilisa- 
 tion " 
 
1 68 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 of espionage everywhere ; she has expelled, under 
 divers pretexts, thousands of Russian subjects 
 from the German Empire. Russia has not com- 
 plained of the rigour of this measure, she has 
 resorted to reprisals. They then attacked Russian 
 stocks at Berlin and hampered their negotiation ; 
 these sought refuge at Paris, and one knows how 
 they were received on our financial market. 
 Other steps were taken on both sides, all equally 
 actuated by animosity, and uneasy Europe assists 
 at the spectacle provided for her by Germany 
 and Russia in the north, and France and Italy 
 in the south, adjacent Powers in a permanent 
 state of administrative and economic hostility, 
 applying themselves to a war of tariffs which has 
 never been an omen of pacific relations. 
 
 And this is the peace which the Triple Alliance 
 offers us and intends to enforce. A peace which 
 leads Governments to excessive and irritating 
 measures, a peace which exasperates and crushes 
 the people, "a heavy and ruinous peace," accord- 
 ing to Prince Bismarck's own avowal, "prefer- 
 able," he added, " to the ruin which follows a war, 
 even a successful one." Why did he not speak 
 thus before inflicting the evils of war on Den- 
 mark, Austria, and France ? At what price, be- 
 sides, is this ruinous peace obtained ? The agree- 
 ment of the three Courts, by consolidating the 
 interests of the contracting parties, has consoli- 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 169 
 
 dated the respective interests of other Powers. 
 France and Russia have concluded no treaty ; they 
 are, nevertheless, strongly united by feelings of 
 mutual security, surely a more solid bond than the 
 kind of sympathy that has brought Italy and Austria 
 together. The Triple Alliance has thus divided the 
 Continent into two camps constantly under arms, 
 and ready on either side to come to blows. Is this 
 a peace that is well guaranteed, a peace inspiring 
 confidence, encouraging work and mutual dealings, 
 bringing nations into closer intercourse and partici- 
 pating in their well-being ? In short, is it durable ? 
 Can Europe continue paying the cost of it for 
 ever ? With the burdens it entails, is it not lead- 
 ing to war, to a struggle the more slaughterous 
 since the combatants will be more numerous and 
 more formidably armed? Yet it is to these 
 frightful calamities, unless one succeeds in averting 
 them, that the Triple Alliance has destined the 
 civilised world. Such is the sad thought which 
 the work elaborated by the three Courts brings to 
 one's mind, whatever one may think or wish. 
 A sense of the general interest of Europe causes 
 every one to disavow and condemn it. 
 
i;o STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 X. 
 
 When one has followed Prince Bismarck step 
 by step through his long career, it is impossible 
 not to admire the powerful and marvellous faculties 
 he placed at the service of his King and country 
 during the first fifteen years of his ministry. He 
 began at Frankfort, and from the first day he 
 penetrated the future as the present, and evolved 
 from it the programme he has so brilliantly carried 
 out. Called upon to direct Prussia's policy, he 
 approached each question successively with a con- 
 fidence which neither the virulent opposition of 
 the Elective Chamber nor the attitude of the other 
 Cabinets could shake. In the Polish matter he 
 won over Russia and caused England to draw 
 back. Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell, 
 those two proud champions, fade away in presence 
 of his audacity. Without lingering over the nebu- 
 lous doctrines of German professors, or the claims 
 of the pretenders, he solves the everlasting ques- 
 tion of the Duchies to his master's advantage by 
 force of arms, and dismembers Denmark whose 
 integrity Prussia had nevertheless guaranteed. 
 After having led Austria into this first campaign, 
 he turns on her, isolates her, fights her, and 
 triumphs at Sadowa, thanks to the neutrality of 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 171 
 
 Russia and France, which he had been skilful 
 enough to secure. He had still one adversary- 
 left to conquer, namely, France. He prepared 
 himself for the task by obtaining the co-operation 
 of the States of Southern Germany, whilst the Great 
 General Staff was forging the weapons for the com- 
 bat. When the moment for using force seemed to 
 him to have arrived, he conceived the candidature 
 of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, and, in the 
 face of astonished Europe, led the French Govern- 
 ment to take the initiative of the war. Victory 
 rewarded his far-sighted duplicity. Sic itur ad 
 astra. Morality was in tears, but he was enabled to 
 restore the ancient German Empire. Without a 
 doubt the blunders of his adversaries contributed 
 to his success ; he himself committed none up to 
 the crowning of his work ; and if at that moment 
 he had relinquished power to go, like a wise man, 
 and meditate on the great things he had achieved, 
 he would have remained not only comparable, but 
 in some respects superior, to those who have left 
 their ineffaceable trace in the history of nations. 
 
 To have been all and to be nothing was to 
 abdicate ; heroic effort incompatible alike with 
 his temperament and the nature of his mind. He 
 had a thought of it, however, it is said ; but 
 either he did not know how to, or else could not 
 bring himself to make the sacrifice. He must 
 regret not having done so. He preferred, without 
 
172 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 any other ambition perhaps, to dedicate the 
 remainder of his life to consolidating the edifice 
 his hands had raised. But fickle fortune imposed 
 on him the obligation of resigning and of sub- 
 mitting to the desertion, we will not say insulting, 
 of the press which had so slavishly obeyed him. 
 The fact is that, with the Empire restored, there 
 began what we may - be permitted to call his 
 second manner, the period of his ministry during 
 which his genius went astray. At home he 
 raises the Kulturkampf and does not show to 
 his advantage. He sets the most formidable 
 economic problems by making himself the pioneer 
 of state socialism, become a subject of grave 
 anxiety for some and of blind aspirations for the 
 others. He has not in reality solved a single 
 question ; he has left the country a prey to an 
 agitation which gave the new Sovereign matter for 
 thought. Abroad, he has not spared France ; he 
 has threatened her with the idea of keeping her 
 in a state of constant inferiority. He did not 
 foresee, on this occasion, that Russia, alarmed in 
 her turn, would no longer leave him a free hand. 
 When he had convinced himself of this, his 
 anger was aroused. He regarded the companion, 
 so devoted, so constant, of former days, with 
 suspicion. He forsook her to fly to other friend- 
 ships. He was thus led to disserve Russia and 
 load Austria with his favours. He entered 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 173 
 
 passionately into this scheme at the Berlin 
 Congress. But, from that moment, it no longer 
 sufficed for Germany to mount guard on her 
 western frontier, she had also to reckon with the 
 powerful Empire of the North. Instead of one 
 adversary she had two. And we have seen the 
 Chancellor seeking support, applying himself 
 eagerly to isolating France, uniting with Austria, 
 then with Italy, organising in short, in all respects, 
 the Triple Alliance. Unfortunate combination 
 for the present generation, fraught with peril for 
 generations to come. He has thus more deeply dug 
 the abyss which separates the, German Empire 
 from the two rival Powers ; he has sown hatred, 
 to borrow one of his own words of which he 
 made such regrettable use, between Austria and 
 Russia, between France and Italy. What will 
 Germany reap from it ? The future will show ; 
 but the future is not less gloomy and full of 
 menace for her than for her neighbours. Such 
 is Prince Bismarck's last work. 
 
 How immense and brilliant would be the glory 
 of the Prince who would undertake to save 
 Europe from the perils to which she is exposed ! 
 The Man of Iron has laid down the burden which 
 he has borne too long for himself as for his 
 contemporaries. Will there not arise a new man, 
 a genius, that of peace, of* true peace, who would 
 restore repose and security to the Nations ? Is 
 
174 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 it then impossible for the Powers to assemble 
 together in a spirit of cordiality and sacrifice ? 
 Diplomacy has unravelled more complicated situa- 
 tions than this. It possesses formidable resources, 
 as we have seen at the Berlin Congress, which 
 was the triumph of egotism and cupidity ; but it 
 has also precious ones, and it would repair the 
 harm it has done by entering into transactions 
 for re-establishing harmony on the Continent and 
 placing the European balance of power on an 
 equitable basis, by appeasing legitimate regrets 
 and indestructible expectations. Is this but a 
 dream ? Who will blame us for indulging in it ? 
 
 These pages were written, when suddenly came 
 Signor Crispi's fall. Is the retirement of the Italian 
 statesman more voluntary than the great Chan- 
 cellor's? It is neither more nor less so, but has 
 other causes. Prince Bismarck was too power- 
 ful for a young Sovereign proud of the glories 
 of his ancestors, passionately smitten with the 
 traditions of his house. The one or the other 
 had to consent to the mutilation of his authority, 
 or to abdicate. The master insisting on the full 
 exercise of all his rights, the servant bowed before 
 him and resigned all his offices. Signor Crispi with- 
 drew, in his turn, from the part he had assumed. 
 It was certainly not the crown that forced this 
 determination on him. No disagreement existed 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 175 
 
 between the President of the Council and the 
 Sovereign. It is also to be observed that at the 
 time Prince Bismarck relinquished power nothing 
 in the internal or external affairs of the Empire 
 demanded it. His credit in Europe, like his 
 prestige, was immense : he possessed moreover 
 the entire confidence of Germany. At every 
 opportunity, he had exerted himself to convince 
 the different Governments and public opinion of 
 his love of peace, and of his firm resolve to main- 
 tain it. One has seen in what resounding terms 
 he affirmed this in the last speech he pronounced 
 in the Reichstag. Was Signor Crispi in as brilliant 
 a situation? His policy rested on a pretended 
 danger which, threatening the Kingdom's frontiers, 
 imposed on the Government the duty of placing 
 itself in a position to avert it. The accession of 
 Italy to the Triple Alliance, said he, never had 
 any other aim. It was thus that he justified the 
 armaments to which he devoted all the resources 
 of his country without fear of involving it in debt. 
 Yet the danger was an imaginary one. No one 
 could have been more convinced of this than 
 himself. Was he cherishing high and culpable 
 ambitions under a false exterior ? Was he dream- 
 ing of placing Italy in the front rank of Latin 
 Nations ? Did he meet with encouragement in 
 this during the confidential conversations at 
 Friedrichsruh ? He may perhaps tell us himself 
 
176 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 some day ; but we have observed and we re- 
 member that his interpretation of the treaty of 
 alliance, which is not that of his predecessor, dates 
 from the first visit he paid to the German 
 Chancellor. He could not however have con- 
 cealed from himself for a moment that Italy would 
 not be able to continue bearing burdens out of all 
 proportion to her financial and economic power. 
 He therefore considered armed peace a chimera 
 and the conflict imminent. His attitude towards 
 France, from the first to the last day of his 
 ministry, justifies us in this opinion. In any 
 case, he did not sufficiently bear this one con- 
 sideration in mind, that between three allies the 
 last word, the mighty resolutions, never belong 
 to the weakest, who, once bound, is dependent 
 on the will of the strongest. He has certainly 
 at times agitated Europe and alarmed public 
 opinion by his turbulent diplomacy. But at what 
 price ? Italy knows, and, from North to South, 
 she demands the curtailment of expenses, a lessen- 
 ing of the heavy sacrifices his policy imposed on 
 her. From that moment, the hour for the retire- 
 ment of this Minister, yesterday still in posses- 
 sion of an uncontested authority, had struck. He 
 submitted in his own way by a parliamentary 
 rumpus. It was not thus that Prince Bismarck, 
 whose glory visibly disturbed him, relinquished 
 the reins of power. The one succumbed beneath 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 177 
 
 the weight of his faults, the other beneath 
 the excess of his power and of the services he had 
 rendered. 
 
 What will be the consequences of this event, 
 which is assuredly of great importance ? Will 
 the system disappear with the minister who 
 was its incarnation ? We have shown under 
 what circumstances and under the influence 
 of what incidents the Italian people, misled by 
 a wrongly inspired press, had themselves entered 
 upon new ways. Proud of their recent eman- 
 cipation, all investigation into their affairs, all 
 appearance of tutelage irritated them. The 
 recollection of services received galled them. 
 France had assisted to cast off their chains, they 
 drew away from her. But if they are susceptible 
 and jealous, easily excited like all southern Nations, 
 they are gifted with a deep-rooted and penetrating 
 political understanding. When they make a mis- 
 take they repair it. Will the crisis they are 
 traversing reveal to them the extent of the faults 
 committed, will it show them that, in the actual 
 state of affairs in Europe, they have naught to fear 
 from their neighbours and should no longer sus- 
 pect their intentions ? We wish to believe so. 
 Italy can indeed prosper and consolidate her power 
 without committing herself in respect to disagree- 
 ments in the face of which it is, on the contrary, to 
 her interest, to preserve her entire liberty of action. 
 
 N 
 
178 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 The fears instilled into her for the security of 
 her frontiers, were never aught but a means to 
 conquer and preserve power. Born yesterday, 
 everything bids her employ her energy, all her 
 resources, in establishing a firm position by en- 
 couraging her industries, protecting her commerce, 
 and omitting nothing that would tend to freely 
 open the sources of public prosperity to her 
 national activity. In letters, arts, and politics she 
 possesses a glorious past. Henceforth a Great 
 Power, why should she not live her own life, 
 instead of parting with any portion of her liberty 
 under the conditions of an unequal reciprocity, 
 whatever Signor Crispi may have said of the 
 arrangement ? Why should she not entertain 
 perfectly cordial relations with all the States of 
 Europe without distinction ? Wrong as the con- 
 duct of the fallen Minister has been, France bears 
 no malice. Faithful to her old friendship, obeying 
 moreover her own interests, she will certainly 
 not refuse to renew negotiations, and to arrive at 
 an understanding which would enable the two 
 countries to resume their commercial relations so 
 inopportunely hampered to the detriment of both ; 
 jealous of her own independence and liberty, full 
 of respect for similar feelings in others, she has 
 no ambition for agreements of any different nature. 
 If there is an Italy that has been too much heard, 
 as has been said, there is another that has not 
 
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 179 
 
 "been heard sufficiently and which has retained all 
 its sympathies for France. Whosoever has 
 crossed the Alps has had an opportunity of satisfy- 
 ing himself on that point. The crisis, after all 
 has run its course ; it has been solved by the 
 force of circumstances themselves. It behoves 
 King Humbert's new advisers to right the situa- 
 tion upset by their predecessors, to set the 
 pyramid back again on its foundation, if we may 
 so express ourselves. To cover the deficit, reduce 
 the expenses, place the Budget on a firm footing, 
 diminish taxation, facilitate the access of fresh 
 markets to national produce, that of France par- 
 ticularly, such will no doubt be their programme ; 
 they cannot conceive any other. The task may 
 be laborious, but it is not difficult. The Chambers 
 like the country, too long subjected to undeserved 
 trials, will support a policy both reparative and 
 fruitful in happy results. Count Rudini and his 
 colleagues, by becoming its pioneers, fulfil, with the 
 Sovereign's confidence, the expectations of all 
 Italy's friends. 
 
 February 15, 1891. 
 
 N 2 
 
ARMED PEACE 
 AND ITS CONSEQUENCES. 
 
 The old world is full of activity ; but who is- 
 directing it, and what is the aim in view? It is- 
 high time attention were given to the matter. 
 At what period of history has the universe had 
 more sinister visions or caught a glimpse of a 
 morrow so fraught with painful apprehensions?' 
 It labours however ; and is discouraged by no 
 kind of toil. It is notwithstanding alarmed at the 
 exhausting warlike preparations, and is justified 
 in wondering what fresh catastrophes threaten 
 its near future ? The times are gone when the 
 people were strangers to the acts and enterprises 
 of those governing them. In our days they know 
 what occurs, and form opinions. They take ad- 
 vantage of the facilities for investigation placed 
 within reach of all social classes, and are thereby 
 enlightened ; although they may not possess an 
 exact notion of contingent perils and evils, which 
 if not close at hand may still suddenly burst upon 
 us, they are conscious of them. Universal and 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 181 
 
 "compulsory military service has initiated the 
 most humble, more or less, into all the secrets, 
 all the means of destruction that science is un- 
 remittingly perfecting, and each has the pre- 
 sentiment of disasters unknown until now. No 
 one requires, at present, to question a general 
 or admiral to learn that bodies of troops or 
 whole fleets can disappear in an engagement, 
 at the first shock, and that the conquerors may 
 be decimated as well as the conquered. The 
 preparation of these formidable calamities is of 
 itself a first evil that weighs cruelly on the entire 
 Continent. The policy of progressive armaments 
 on which the various Governments have entered 
 fatally compels them to draw beyond measure 
 from the sources of public wealth at the risk of 
 exhausting them. Taxation, in a few years, has 
 everywhere attained proportions that are beyond 
 the economic power of the different States. These 
 necessities engender misery which is already 
 ruthlessly creeping into more than one country. 
 Distress, in its turn, gives rise to trouble of 
 another and a no less alarming order, and causes 
 ■emigrations that recall a distant age ; and they 
 do not always meet with kindly welcome. We 
 too frequently, indeed, witness the painful sight 
 of large crowds crossing and recrossing the 
 Atlantic, a lamentable odyssey, in fruitless search 
 of a hospitable shore. Should these financial 
 
182 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 and social difficulties, manifestly due to excessive 
 taxation, be and remain the lot of the least 
 favoured nations? When Italy is so seriously 
 menaced by them, will other nations easily bear 
 with similar drawbacks? No Power possesses 
 inexhaustible resources ; so that Europe is 
 threatened with becoming a prey either to war 
 or poverty. This alarming alternative deserves 
 to be examined in all its aspects, and we propose, 
 after having pointed out the causes of it, to sum 
 up the consequences. 
 
 I. 
 
 Europe was in the enjoyment of profound peace, 
 and there was nothing to disturb her repose, when 
 a Prince, already ripened by age, ascended the 
 throne of his ancestors. King William I. of 
 Prussia, who had long been cherishing ambitious 
 views, had at the moment of his accession but one 
 thought : it was for the army, for its reorganisation, 
 for its development. What did he intend doing ? 
 Establishing Prussia's hegemony in Europe. 
 Count Bismarck had foreseen and proclaimed this 
 whilst still only a diplomatic agent at Frankfort. 
 The King secured his co-operation by according 
 him his entire confidence on raising him to 
 power. It was thus that the future Emperor and 
 future Chancellor, henceforth closely united, 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 183. 
 
 resolutely undertook the task they have so glori- 
 ously accomplished for themselves, if unfortunately 
 for Europe. 
 
 Their first victim was a lamb. The lamb, 
 however, offered firm resistance ; he put all his 
 heart into it ; but the wolf had a crony, and the 
 two accomplices compelled Denmark to abandon 
 to them her two best provinces : Schleswig- 
 Holstein, however, had been guaranteed to her 
 by a formal act binding all the Great Powers to 
 ensure her the peaceful possession of them. Un- 
 fortunately, collective guarantees, founded on 
 general interest, have usually been upset when 
 placed in contact with vigorous or daring action. 
 Not one of the contracting parties consented to 
 behave in accordance with his obligations. When 
 you examine the diplomatic documents of that 
 period, you are quite taken aback at the eager- 
 ness with which the principal European Cabinets 
 accepted the fallacious assurances that Count 
 Bismarck unremittingly showered on them, not- 
 withstanding the contradiction offered by events 
 transpiring in the Duchies. He knew how to calm 
 the alarm of some, anticipate the susceptibilities 
 of others, sometimes invoking the honour of the 
 arms engaged on the Elbe, sometimes the duties 
 Prussia was performing, to her great regret, in 
 her capacity of a feudal and conservative Power, 
 promising, guaranteeing that nothing definite 
 
1 84 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 should be done without the assent of the other 
 Governments. Never at any other period of his 
 long career, has he displayed more marvellous 
 dexterity. We insist, by the way, on this point, 
 because his success, in that first diplomatic 
 engagement, certainly impressed on his mind that 
 his convictions were sound, and because he 
 gathered from it the certainty of conducting each 
 of his ulterior enterprises to a happy issue. His 
 patriotic cupidity would henceforth be upheld by 
 unlimited confidence. Sovereign and adviser per- 
 suaded themselves that, thanks to the services 
 rendered to Russia during the Polish insurrection^ 
 the moment, so longed for, had at last arrived to 
 claim for Prussia, the authority and preponder- 
 ance she had conquered under the reign of the 
 Great Frederick and which his successors had so 
 gravely jeopardised. 
 
 The obstacle this time was at Vienna. Prussia, 
 indeed, could only assume a dominant position in 
 Germany, by expelling Austria ; that result could 
 only be attained by force of arms ; they resolved 
 to have recourse to them. Whilst the Sovereign, 
 on every occasion, repudiated all idea of arriving 
 at such an extremity, the Minister made no secret 
 of that being his aim. One tranquillised the 
 Imperial Court at Vienna in his sweetest tones, 
 the other prepared public opinion for coming 
 events. The parts being thus distributed, it 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 185 
 
 required two years for each to perform his task ; 
 and, on the date they had appointed, General von 
 Moltke was able to lead the victorious Prussian 
 army forward. The decrepit Germanic Confeder- 
 ation was dissolved, Austria confined within her 
 hereditary dominions, and Prussia aggrandised 
 placed her heavy hand on the whole of Northern 
 Germany. This time again Europe remained 
 indifferent to the military and diplomatic successes 
 of the House of Hoherizollern. 
 
 It has been asserted that Italian unity must 
 fatally have engendered Germanic unity. We 
 will not absolutely contradict this ; but what is 
 far more irrefutable, is that the preponderance of 
 Prussia in Germany is due to a sort of tacit assent 
 of the other Great Powers, and had it not been for 
 their inaction in 1866, the Italian Kingdom would 
 have been founded without giving birth to the 
 German Empire. How was it possible for all 
 these things to be accomplished ? The thunder- 
 bolt of Sadowa which was in one single day to 
 lay Austria low and ensure Prussia's triumph, was 
 foreseen neither at London, Paris, nor St. Peters- 
 burg. The Powers made no attempt to draw 
 together and agree. They were deterred from 
 doing so by their rivalries. We have just seen 
 with what astute skill Count Bismarck applied 
 himself to encourage their dissensions, speaking 
 a language ever suitable to the centre where he 
 
1 86 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 held it. And this explains how Prussia was able 
 to engage in a war that nothing had provoked, 
 apart from her determined will to take the front 
 seat in Germany ; that is how she obtained from 
 her victories the prodigious advantages she holds, 
 without ever having consented to trouble herself 
 about what Europe thought of them. 
 
 Peace came and was signed at Nikolsburg. 
 In what position did it place the Powers who had 
 not intervened in the war ? France could not fail 
 to see that she would in future have an ambitious 
 and enterprising neighbour on her eastern frontier. 
 Russia, who had not for long known what it was 
 to have a rival in the Baltic, felt herself touched 
 in the very centre of her influence. Prussia, 
 formerly her vassal, now mistress of the Elbe 
 Duchies and all-powerful in Germany, would before 
 long be able to dispute her passage to the North 
 Sea, and isolate her from Western Europe. Great 
 Britain even, always jealous of any preponder- 
 ance, saw a State rising in the heart of the Con- 
 tinent whose power would disturb the equilibrium 
 her traditional policy had so judiciously arranged, 
 a State which was already building fleets, and 
 which would, one day, claim her share in the 
 dominion of the seas. Did France, Russia, and 
 Great Britain profit by the lessons taught by these 
 recently accomplished events ? France wished to 
 ensure her security ; we know what difficulties the 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 187 
 
 efforts of the Imperial Government encountered ; 
 Russia remained friendly to Prussia; England 
 confined herself to looking on. 
 
 In the meanwhile a new conflict was in course 
 of preparation ; the force of circumstances rendered 
 it inevitable, and there was a presentiment on every 
 side that it was coming on. In public as in private 
 life, one finds difficulty in resisting the winning 
 charm, the fascinating allurement of success. All 
 had smiled on Prussia — fortune, on the battle-field 
 as in the lists of diplomacy, had gratified all her 
 wishes, crowned all her efforts. Under the in- 
 fluence of such marvellous results, King William's 
 ambition, encouraged and worked up to a pitch of 
 excitement by Count Bismarck, took a new flight. 
 The monarch and his adviser were no longer 
 satisfied at having advanced the frontiers of the 
 Kingdom, at having united to it, by the annexation 
 of Hanover and Electoral Hesse, the two great 
 parcels of national territory so long separated, of 
 holding in their hands the whole of Germany, 
 much more by the authority of might than of 
 treaties ; they resolved to have this ill-defined 
 state of affairs consecrated by right, to re-establish 
 the Germanic Empire, in fact, to the advantage 
 of the House of Hohenzollern. Since Prince 
 Bismarck has renounced discretion, since he has 
 taken pleasure in talking of his good days, he has 
 owned in more than one interview that such was 
 
1 88 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 his thought on the morrow of Sadowa, that he 
 was the first, as he was the last, workman who 
 forged the Imperial crown. He claims, somewhat 
 too frequently indeed, both the honour and ad- 
 vantage ; and what he says is true. Before he 
 had yet exchanged the ratifications of the Treaty 
 of Prague he was, in fact, already taking measures 
 to avoid paying any attention to it. This treaty 
 stipulated that the Southern States should enjoy 
 a sort of independence, and guaranteed them full 
 autonomy. Prussian authority did not extend 
 beyond the Main. He overthrew this barrier 
 by imposing fresh clauses on these States, which 
 were derogatory to the arrangements concluded 
 with Austria, and made them subordinate to 
 Prussia in a pretended alliance which was both 
 offensive and defensive. 
 
 But if Prussia could, from that moment, dispose 
 of the entire forces of Germany by invoking 
 the authority of written agreements, these agree- 
 ments themselves were contrary to the law of 
 Europe, and could not therefore serve as a 
 basis for the crowning piece of Prussian domin- 
 ation. If Germany were vanquished, prostrate 
 at the feet of King William, Europe had not 
 abdicated a single one of her international ad- 
 vantages. General treaties, that of Vienna 
 particularly, conferred on her the right to 
 decline to allow any other alterations in the 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 189 
 
 state of things existing in 18 15, than those 
 she had ratified. It was thus that Belgium 
 could separate from Holland, and Prussia her- 
 self had always warmly invoked these stipula- 
 tions whenever France had shown a disposition 
 to elude them. It is true that at that period 
 Count Bismarck had not yet appeared on the 
 world's scene, and he consequently had not 
 been able to trouble, by his violence, the re- 
 spect of public right, whose salutary rules were 
 formerly the basis of international intercourse 
 and the best guarantee for the maintenance of 
 peace. 
 
 But at the point we have reached in this 
 rapid statement, King William and Count 
 Bismarck were no longer in the necessity of 
 seeking suitable methods to lead them to the 
 end they had in* view, those employed to dis- 
 member Denmark, to expel Austria from Ger- 
 many, had succeeded admirably ; they decided 
 to have recourse to them again to crush the 
 obstacle that detained them on the Main and 
 prevented German union from the Alps to 
 the Baltic. What Power could have the 
 audacity to hinder their design? No other 
 than France : She must be reduced by war 
 to submission, and war with France, from 
 that time, became the sole thought of 
 the Sovereign and his advisers. They went to 
 
19° STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 work with the energy of men accustomed to 
 triumph. General von Moltke gave all his care 
 to tempering the weapon he had forged and 
 which was to ensure victory ; Count Bismarck 
 sought for the best snare to set for France at 
 the proper time. 1 
 
 It was maintained for many years at Berlin, 
 that Prussia provoked none of the conflicts in 
 which she took part, that she on each occasion 
 sharpened her weapons in defence only ; if 
 Count Bismarck was less affirmative, the King 
 neglected no opportunity to cast the responsi- 
 bility of the hecatombs marking his reign on 
 others. These constantly reiterated affirmations, 
 which have been several times re-edited in 
 speeches from the throne, have hitherto led public 
 credulity astray ; the opinion of persons gener- 
 ally well informed, both in the press and in 
 official circles, has suffered lasting influence 
 from them. In spite of every effort, of the 
 display of documentary evidence, notwithstand- 
 ing the indiscretions of the intimate friends of 
 the master of Friedrichsruh, and his own 
 confessions, the conviction that France, in 1870, 
 wished for and provoked war, has remained 
 unshaken. It has prevailed in spite of the 
 
 1 We are aware that Prince Leopold von Hohenzollern's can- 
 didature to the Spanish throne was thought of and prepared a 
 long time before it was brought forward. 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 191 
 
 opinion and works of conscientious writers, 
 in spite of the Chancellors Dangeau, 1 Herr 
 M. Busch, who divulged everything in a 
 book published in 1884 2 ; in spite of Prince 
 Bismarck himself, who to please his friends, 
 in his rare moments of merry humour, had 
 •confessed the truth. Madame de Sevigne's 
 saying is still true: "They have rhapsodized all, 
 but what is said is said, what is thouoht is 
 thought, what is believed is believed." The 
 legend, that parasite of history, carefully en- 
 couraged by a salaried press, had thrown out 
 such strong roots, had become so firmly im- 
 pressed on people's minds, that it triumphed 
 over all attempts to set it right. It was only 
 dispelled by a revolt at the palace ; it required 
 the new Emperor, tired of the yoke of an im- 
 perious Minister, to come to the determination 
 to cast it from him, and pack his adviser off 
 into retirement, to his intense discontent : it 
 required, moreover, that Prince Bismarck, in 
 one of his angry moods, should enumerate all 
 his claims to the gratitude of the Hohenzollern 
 dynasty, without omitting the responsibility he 
 had assumed by taking the initiative of a per- 
 fidious manoeuvre, in the sinister thought of 
 
 1 The Marquis de Dangeau was a witty courtier in the reign of 
 Louis XIV. and the author of some valuable memoirs.— Translator. 
 
 2 Unser Reichs-Kanzler, vol. ii., p. 65. 
 
192 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 making war inevitable, without fear of thus 
 giving the lie to all his previous affirmations, 
 all the assurances to the contrary that he had 
 served out to Europe whom he had thus made 
 his dupe. We remember the resounding echo 
 of this unexpected thunderclap. We know 
 how the truth escaped, by a return to justice, 
 from the mouth of him who had offended by 
 denying it. Nothing was wanting this time, 
 neither frankness nor details, so that it has 
 been possible to re-establish the scene in all 
 its exactitude as it occurred on a day that will 
 be ever famous. It is meet to" retain it, to 
 evoke it, to place all the circumstances in their 
 real light. If it confound the guilty, it will 
 comfort public conscience : it will be a valuable 
 lesson for future times. 
 
 It was July 13th, 1870. Generals von Moltke 
 and von Roon were dining with Count Bismarck. 
 All three were lamenting the peaceful issue which 
 seemed likely to be the result of the negotiations 
 at Ems. Suddenly a functionary came in with 
 a telegraphic despatch from the King. 1 It related 
 
 1 This despatch was for a long time confused with a report from 
 Prince Radziwill, the King's aide-de-camp. The despatch 
 received by Count Bismarck had been sent by Herr von Abeken,. 
 Counsellor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had accompanied 
 the Sovereign to Ems, for the purpose of keeping the Chancellor 
 informed of events. Count Caprivi, in a speech at the Reichstag in 
 the month of November, 1892, called attention to this error and 
 thoroughly elucidated the matter. 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 193 
 
 the events of the day for the information of the 
 Ministers at Berlin ; it in no way conveyed the 
 notion of complications being imminent, nor of 
 the approaching mobilisation of the army. Count 
 Bismarck read it to his guests. " Roon and 
 Moltke," the Chancellor has since said, in an ac- 
 count attributed to him and which he has not dis- 
 claimed, " dropped their knives and forks together. 
 We were all very low-spirited. We all felt the 
 matter was ending in smoke. I then addressed 
 Moltke and put this question to him : 'Is the 
 instrument we require for war, our army, is it 
 really good enough for us to commence hostilities 
 whilst relying in all probability on success ? ' — 
 ■* We have never had a better instrument than 
 now,' he answered. Roon, in whom, it is true, I 
 had less confidence, fully confirmed what Moltke 
 had said. 
 
 "'Very well, then, quietly continue your 
 dinner,' I observed to my two colleagues. I 
 seated myself at a round marble table placed 
 beside that at which we were eating ; I carefully 
 read the despatch over again, I took my pencil 
 and deliberately obliterated all the passage in 
 which it was said Benedetti had asked for another 
 audience. I only left the commencement and the 
 end of the communication. The despatch, now, 
 had quite a different appearance. I read it to 
 Moltke and Roon in the new form / had given it. 
 
 o 
 
194 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 They both exclaimed : ' Magnificent ! That will 
 produce an effect.' We continued to eat with a 
 capital appetite. You remember what followed." 
 
 One hardly knows what to think, and is quite 
 dumbfounded in presence of these three Germans 
 mutually exulting at a feast over the idea of 
 crushing the Gaul, showing themselves in turn 
 delighted or in dismay accordingly as war seems 
 imminent or the affair likely "to end in smoke."' 
 But it did not suffice to have garbled the despatch 
 so as to alter the exact sense. There remained 
 the use to be made of it in order to produce an 
 effect. The effect anticipated was a double one, 
 rapid and decisive. It must take the form of an 
 outburst of national indignation in Germany as a 
 result of wounded pride, and a cry should be 
 raised for war so as, if necessary, to influence the 
 King's will. At Paris the affair must be regarded 
 in the light of an outrageous insult, so as to 
 force France to take the initiative of hostilities 
 and consequently assume the responsibility of 
 them in the eyes of Europe. One of the 
 principal actors in the scene wrote from the 
 commencement: "At Ems there was neither 
 insulter nor person insulted." Count Bismarck 
 arranged his text in such a way that there were, 
 at the same time, two insulters and two persons 
 insulted. Any one, indeed, reading the despatch 
 after he had revised it, would come to the con- 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 195 
 
 elusion that the Ambassador had been wanting in 
 the respect he owed the King, whilst his Majesty 
 had ignored the prerogatives of the French 
 representative in an offensive way, by forbidding 
 him his residence. Consequently, both of them, 
 at the same time, became insulters and persons 
 insulted. In order that the effect might be pro- 
 duced with this double inference Count Bismarck, 
 before even the meal of the three conspirators 
 was at an end, and whilst they continued eating 
 with " a capital appetite," gave orders for the 
 despatch to be sent round to the evening papers 
 with an intimation to the " reptiles " to sound a 
 flourish, that is to say an appeal to arms, accord- 
 ing to a remark General von Roon attributes in his 
 correspondence to General von Moltke. Before 
 the end of the evening the despatch had been 
 telegraphed to several of Prussia's diplomatic 
 agents with instructions to communicate it to the 
 Governments to which they were accredited. It 
 was foreseen that their French colleagues would in 
 this way be rapidly informed, and that the blow 
 would produce all the more effect at Paris from 
 reaching the capital through the intermediary of 
 various foreign Governments. It must be ac- 
 knowledged that Count Bismarck, on this solemn 
 occasion, did not make the slightest mistake. 
 Everything happened in conformance with the 
 programme he had prepared. Intense excitement 
 
 o 2 
 
196 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 spread throughout Germany, like a train of gun- 
 powder. The King, on his way back from Ems 
 two days later, was welcomed all along the line 
 "by enthusiastic acclamations ; he left the train at 
 Potsdam, and, after a brief council held at the 
 railway station, gave orders to mobilise the army. 
 The insult was felt in France as deeply as Count 
 Bismarck had foreseen, and on July 15th the 
 Minister announced the declaration of war to the 
 Chambers. 
 
 But it is none the less acknowledged now, that 
 this war had been premeditated by Prussia a long 
 time previous, and that it was the outcome of her 
 Chancellor's duplicity. Habemns confttentem reum. 
 He frankly confesses his misdeed now ; he con- 
 siders it his most precious claim to the gratitude 
 of his Sovereign and Fatherland. A newspaper 
 that he inspires, and which is his acknowledged 
 organ, wrote some time ago : " Prince Bismarck by 
 modifying the famous telegram from Ems, by con- 
 straining France to assume the initiative and 
 responsibility of war, deserved well of his country." 
 He has not, however, always held this proud 
 language. He has changed it according to cir- 
 cumstances and his frame of mind. Shortly after 
 peace was re-established, Herr Liebknecht de- 
 nounced, in his newspaper, the forfeiture the 
 Chancellor had been guilty of, and which was 
 already being whispered from ear to ear ; Prince 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 197 
 
 Bismarck had the socialist writer prosecuted, and 
 he was fined. Things are now the reverse of 
 what they were ; and what Prince Bismarck has 
 been contradicting for more than five-and-twenty 
 years with most solemn denials, he now declares 
 to be a positive truth. This truth authorises the 
 suggestion that if Prince Bismarck has a right to 
 reward for his conduct, he cannot refuse the 
 blame it deserves, and history will certainly have 
 something more to say : it will conclude from this 
 fact, now thoroughly established, that the van- 
 quished of 1863 and 1866, the Danes and 
 Austrians, sought for war no more than the 
 French, and that the Prussian Government was 
 on each occasion the aggressor without any 
 righteous cause, but actuated solely by motives of 
 cupidity. The reprobation of this bloodthirsty 
 policy has preceded the judgment of posterity. 
 Prince Bismarck's avowals have, in fact, raised a 
 general outcry of indignation in Europe ; the 
 English, who were so long duped by his man- 
 oeuvres, have been wounded in their pride, and do 
 not conceal their resentment ; the Germans them- 
 selves have felt "the blush of shame rise to their 
 brow" on learning that the country had been 
 infamously deceived. 
 
 However, we wish to emphasize but one essen- 
 tial point in regard to the various matters to which 
 we have just called attention ; namely, that Europe 
 
198 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 would have lived in peace and complete security, 
 had Prussia remained within the limit of her 
 rights, had she performed all her duties as a 
 Continental Power, particularly the one command- 
 ing her respect of treaties ; that by giving way to 
 her ambition she has extended her frontiers, but 
 she has done so by substituting a new arrange- 
 ment, devoid of stability and offering none of the 
 necessary guarantees for maintenance of universal 
 peace, to the old state of things sanctioned by 
 time and by the formal consent of all interested 
 parties. 
 
 II. 
 
 Have King William and Prince Bismarck ever 
 been conscious of this extremely unsettled situa- 
 tion ? Have they exerted themselves to remove 
 its most prominent disadvantages ? There is 
 nothing to indicate such a thing. Peace concluded 
 with the foreigner, Prince Bismarck, ever a prey 
 to his passion for combativeness, engaged in the 
 Kulturkampf struggle at home, with a powerful 
 fraction of the country. He had no serious 
 grievance against the Catholics of the kingdom ; 
 they had fought bravely and shed their blood as 
 subjects of the King ; but they formed a party 
 with which it was necessary to reckon ; the Chan- 
 cellor wished to subjugate, if not to crush, that 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 199 
 
 party. We are aware of the rigorous measures he 
 inflicted on their conscience as Christians. They 
 defended themselves with all the energy of their 
 faith, and, if at the end of this conflict the 
 Chancellor did not go to Canossa, both he and 
 the Emperor Frederick, had to do penance by 
 annulling the draconian laws, one after the other, 
 which he had made Parliament vote. In his 
 dictatorial zeal he engaged in other measures. 
 Until then he had professed free trade opinions ; 
 he made himself the apostle of protectionism, 
 and, advancing his new doctrines to the last 
 -extremity, attempted to inaugurate State Social- 
 ism in the young German Empire. 
 
 It is thus that we shall see him going astray 
 more and more in his erroneous notions. 
 
 Amongst all Prince Bismarck's anxieties France 
 continued to occupy the first place. He never 
 took his defiant glance off her, however intense 
 the hostilities he encountered, or better, that he 
 had himself raised in Germany, might be. At 
 one moment he fancied the institutions our country 
 had bestowed on herself would give him peace, 
 for he considered them a powerful obstacle to her 
 resuscitation. On leaving Versailles he felt con- 
 vinced that it would be long before she could 
 repair her disasters, and that the enormous war 
 indemnity he had inflicted on her, coupled with 
 the necessity of renewing her armament and 
 
20O STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 erecting other lines of defence, would effectually 
 incapacitate her from reassuming the position 
 she had lost among the Great Powers. When 
 he passed through Frankfort on his return to 
 Berlin he had expressed his confidence in peace 
 having been ensured for half a century ; the saying 
 was retained and re-echoed throughout Germany. 
 France is, fortunately, a more wealthy country 
 than he had supposed. The soil is fertile, the 
 inhabitants laborious ; one works, the other pro- 
 duces. Although the Frenchman may be accused 
 of giddiness, he is thrifty and economises. When 
 his Government issues a loan, he produces his. 
 money, convinced by patriotism as much as by 
 interest that there is no better investment for it.. 
 So events soon gave a contradiction to Prince 
 Bismarck's previsions. France paid him his five 
 milliards, not without difficulty, but more promptly 
 than he had expected. Order reigned without 
 any likelihood of its being disturbed ; work had 
 been actively resumed in the factories and fields ; 
 and the Government was proceeding successfully 
 with the reorganisation of our military forces. In 
 1875, when it wanted to form the fourth battalions, 
 alarm was felt at Berlin, and war again haunted 
 the minds of the King's advisers, if not of the 
 Sovereign himself. They imagined they had not 
 sufficiently crushed France, and resolved to con- 
 tinue the work of 1870, being of opinion that: 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 201 
 
 it had not been pushed far enough. The 
 venal press opened the campaign. An article 
 published in a semi-official newspaper, the Post 
 of Berlin, denounced to Germany the schemes 
 attributed to the Republican Government, as 
 well as the ardent desire of the French people 
 to take revenge, and pointed out the imperious, 
 necessity imposed on the German Empire to 
 anticipate these sinister designs. The exportation 
 of horses was forbidden at the same time. This 
 theme soon became that of every accredited organ 
 in Germany ; and the minds of all, even the least 
 timid, were soon filled with apprehensions of an 
 imminent struggle. 
 
 Before hastening the event, they wished to 
 ensure Russia's neutrality. Prince Bismarck and 
 General von Moltke could not conceal from them- 
 selves that it would be impossible for them to lead 
 on the Emperor William until they had obtained 
 this precious guarantee. Herr von Radowitz was 
 despatched to St. Petersburg, but notwithstanding 
 his recognised diplomatic skill, he failed in his mis- 
 sion. He was later on disavowed in a view easy 
 to understand. " Herr von Radowitz," recently re- 
 marked the intemperate hermit of Friedrichsruh, 
 " was never my confidant, for, although he has 
 inherited many qualities from his father, he has 
 also inherited the habit, fatal in a diplomatist, of 
 talking too much, and of letting out everything 
 
202 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 after the third glass ; " an appreciation as devoid 
 of reason as of justice. The truth is that Russia, 
 in her turn, was becoming alarmed at the pre- 
 ponderant part the new Empire, or rather her 
 impetuous Chancellor was arrogating to himself in 
 Europe, and was convinced he would keep no 
 account of the services she had rendered ; she 
 had from that moment a just presentiment that 
 she would only meet with ingratitude at Berlin the 
 first time occasion offered. Herr von Radowitz, 
 in presence of this feeling, had lost the suit he was 
 entrusted with defending, beforehand. The Em- 
 peror Alexander II. had a magnanimous heart; 
 as soon as he was informed of the aggressive 
 views of the German Government he communi- 
 cated them to General Le Flo, assuring him that 
 he would not permit France to be again invaded 
 without just cause and merely to satisfy a brutal 
 feeling of ambition. Shortly afterwards he had an 
 opportunity of passing through Berlin, and, having 
 conferred with the Emperor, his uncle, he was 
 able to telegraph that all danger was over. 
 
 Prince Bismarck has, since then, openly, obsti- 
 nately repudiated the calculations attributed to him. 
 He has, however, acknowledged that the Great 
 General Staff had conceived them, and had ad- 
 vised a second appeal to arms without the least 
 delay. The Man of Iron did not confine himself 
 to repelling the accusations brought against him 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 203 
 
 personally ; he went further, and cast all the respon- 
 sibility of the incident on the chief of the army. 
 " Moltke," he told Herr Blum in the course of inter- 
 views intended for publication, "was the male- 
 factor on that occasion." But when did he use 
 that language ? After the illustrious Marshal's 
 death. Is it not rather Prince Bismarck who 
 deserves this qualification which we have borrowed 
 from him, when he glorifies himself for having 
 constrained two great nations to settle, by arms, a 
 •conflict that could easily have been avoided had it 
 not been for his wily intervention ? 
 
 Prince Bismarck's interested denials, moreover, 
 are daily refuted by documentary evidence which 
 throws a vivid light on the crisis we have just 
 recalled. The notes left by M. Gavard, our 
 Charge d' Affaires at London at this period, have 
 recently been published. 1 These pages are full of 
 valuable information ; they clearly show the 
 British Government, first of all hesitating and 
 even incredulous, then shortly afterwards con- 
 vinced of the imminence of the danger threatening 
 peace, and from that moment joining with Russia 
 to avert it. We can only refer to them. We 
 will nevertheless quote an extract from an inter- 
 view between our representative and the Russian 
 Ambassador on his return from St. Petersburg and 
 having passed through Berlin, because it resumes 
 
 1 See the Correspondant of November 25th, 1894. 
 
204 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 the history of this smart thrill of alarm in a few- 
 words. " The danger," said Count Schouvaloff 
 to M. Gavard, "lies in Prince Bismarck's fixed 
 idea that France is preparing to attack Germany ,-. 
 and unfortunately, what is more grave, it is shared 
 by Count von Moltke. The latter thinks you will 
 be ready in 1876, and that the moment will be all 
 the more favourable to you, as you will still have 
 a class of old soldiers who have been to war ; the 
 Chancellor believes you wish to wait until 1877, 
 but they both agree that you must be forestalled. 
 They pretend you are the aggressors on the 
 theory, new to them, that the real aggressor 
 is not the one who attacks but he who renders 
 war necessary, and they suggest as the result of 
 another campaign an overwhelming indemnity 
 coupled with a prolonged occupation. You know 
 what our Emperor said to General Le Flo. I was 
 instructed to repeat it at Berlin. I saw the old 
 Emperor, who seemed first of all astonished at our 
 anxiety ; he really did not think war imminent, 
 but he was the only person so ill-informed at 
 Berlin. It was, therefore, not difficult to bring 
 him to the point we desired, after he had been 
 told. As to Bismarck, he knows he cannot 
 attack Russia because of you, nor you if Russia 
 is opposed to it. I therefore consider peace 
 ensured." This page of contemporaneous history 
 has been written, moreover, by the aid of docu- 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 205 
 
 ments taken from the archives of the Ministry of 
 Foreign Affairs and recently published by M. 
 Flourens. They comprise Prince Gortchakoff's ex- 
 pressions of regret at the line of conduct adopted 
 by Russia in 1870, the terms of the bargain 
 proposed by Herr von Radowitz, the declarations 
 ■of Alexander II., who brought an interview with 
 ■General Le Flo to an end by saying to him : 
 " I will not permit all the laws of the civilised 
 world to be transgressed and Europe plunged into 
 the horrors of war again." x Such were the lan- 
 guage and sentiments of the Czar himself. We 
 have seen how his Majesty's Ambassador spoke. 
 This is what Lord Derby said at a final interview 
 with our Charge dAffaires, resuming their con- 
 versations : "The old Emperor does not wish for 
 another war, and was ignorant, as we have seen, 
 of the plotting going on around him. Prince 
 Bismarck desires it, and is in a hurry to bring it on 
 during the Emperor William's lifetime." All the 
 denials of the first Chancellor of the new German 
 Empire will not prevail in contradiction to the 
 declarations of two such Governments as Great 
 Britain and Russia. 
 
 Prince Bismarck, caught in the snare he had 
 himself set, and foiled in his attempt to trouble 
 peace, conceived a feeling of resentment which 
 has ever since led him astray, and which was sure, 
 
 1 Alexandre II, sa Vie, son (Euvre. Paris, p. 292 and following. 
 
206 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 before long, to cause him, as we shall shortly see- 
 happened, to make an irreparable blunder. In a 
 memorable speech which he delivered in the 
 Reichstag, with a view to justifying his conduct,, 
 he said : " I have never turned aside from Russia ; 
 it was she who repelled me, and at times placed 
 me in such a position that I was forced to modify 
 my attitude to preserve my own dignity and that 
 of Germany. This began in 1875, when Prince 
 Gortchakoff gave me to understand how much 
 his pride was nettled at the position I had attained 
 to in the political world." Thus by his own 
 avowal, his difference with Russia dates unmis- 
 takably from the year in which the grave incidents- 
 we have just recalled occurred, and this declaration 
 suffices to establish that at that period the Czar's 
 Government could have no doubt respecting the 
 dark designs formed at Berlin. It has pleased 
 Prince Bismarck to attribute the cause of this new 
 departure in Russian policy to childish rivalry. 
 The argument is not serious ; it is even unworthy 
 of so great a mind as his. No one will admit, in- 
 deed, that Russia found her inspiration, on this oc- 
 casion, in the wounded pride of her Chancellor, who 
 was jealous of the laurels gathered by his Prussian 
 colleague. Everything, therefore, tends to show 
 that the disagreement of the two Courts found its 
 origin in the schemes conceived at Berlin in 1875, 
 and that Prince Bismarck has himself given this 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 207- 
 
 dissension a personal character. It is consequently 
 only fair to leave him the responsibility of it, both 
 in regard to its origin and consequences. On this 
 ground, as on many others, his impetuous and 
 haughty nature was fatally certain to lead him to 
 most dangerous resolutions. 
 
 III. 
 
 Before the end of this same year which wit- 
 nessed the severance of the intimate intercourse 
 between Prussia and Russia, an insurrection 
 broke out in Herzegovina ; it soon spread to 
 all the provinces of the Balkan peninsula. It 
 was pretended that Prince Bismarck had lent 
 a hand to the outbreak ; this accusation has 
 never been proved ; it shows, however, the 
 tendency of public opinion at that time to 
 attribute to him a desire to cause the Czar's 
 Government difficulties in the East, where it 
 would be at variance with England. If such a 
 thought ever entered his head it met with all 
 the success he could desire. Russia, after futile 
 negotiations both with the Porte and the other 
 Powers, in the impossibility of repudiating her 
 ancient traditions, compelled to give attention 
 to the religious feeling which was so strong in 
 all classes of the population, had to take up arms 
 
2o8 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 and march to the assistance of her co-religionists of 
 the Ottoman Empire. She declared war against 
 Turkey. We are aware of the sanguinary trials 
 and immense sacrifices this struggle imposed on 
 her. Her armies, notwithstanding, crossed the 
 Balkans and arrived in sight of Constantinople. 
 Turkey, vanquished, signed a treaty at San 
 Stefano, which was above all favourable to the 
 Christian populations, some being totally released 
 from Turkish domination, whilst autonomy, guar- 
 anteeing analogous advantages, was bestowed on 
 others. It was stipulated in this document, by 
 a special clause, that Russia should exercise the 
 right of supervision in the execution and main- 
 tenance of these arrangements. Great Britain 
 saw in this a violation of the engagements the 
 Czar's Government had contracted, in 1856, after 
 the Crimean War, which would prevent her, she 
 said, considering the stipulations of San Stefano 
 as forming part of the law of Europe unless 
 they were submitted to the approval of all the 
 interested parties. 
 
 What were Prince Bismarck's feelings and 
 behaviour on this momentous occasion ? The 
 moment was propitious for dispelling the pre- 
 judices he had implanted in the minds of the 
 Emperor Alexander and his Government. If the 
 Chancellor had acted in that way, Russia united 
 to Germany, having nothing to fear from either 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 209 
 
 Austria or France, who were busy dressing their 
 wounds, could have braved the anger of the 
 British Cabinet and declined her intervention, 
 as Prussia had had the courage to do after the 
 campaigns of 1866 and 1870. King William's 
 Government, or rather his Prime Minister, had 
 on both occasions boldly repelled any inter- 
 meddling of the Powers in the arrangements he 
 had resolved to impose on the vanquished. 
 Prince Bismarck would have remained faithful to 
 his own doctrine by supporting Russia against 
 the pretensions of England, and he could easily 
 have renewed the cordial understanding that had 
 so long united the St. Petersburg Cabinet to that 
 of Berlin. Forgetting the services rendered, 
 Russia's friendly neutrality, without which the 
 Prussian army would have had neither Sadowa 
 nor Sedan to its credit, without which he could 
 neither have expelled Austria from Germany, nor 
 have invaded France, Prince Bismarck, under the 
 influence of a feeling that was a secret for no one, 
 espoused the views of the British Cabinet, and in 
 conjunction with it compelled Russia to give her 
 assent to the meeting of a Congress which at the 
 suggestion of England, anxious to show her 
 gratitude, assembled at Berlin. 
 
 They therefore met, under the presidency of 
 Prince Bismarck, at the capital of the new 
 Empire, to which such an honour had never yet 
 
 p 
 
210 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 fallen. The Chancellor acquitted himself of his 
 duties as honest broker, according to his own 
 expression, which admirably reflected what was 
 passing in his mind. What happened indeed? 
 The stipulations of San Stefano were revised, 
 notably in regard to the relations of the two 
 contracting parties. For the control Russia had 
 reserved to herself, was substituted that of all the 
 Cabinets assembled ; they thus modified the 
 position she imagined she had reconquered in 
 the East. And whilst England made the Porte 
 abandon the island of Cyprus to her, it was 
 decided at Berlin that Austria should occupy 
 Herzegovina and Bosnia, which she still retains 
 and is preparing to annex definitely. So that 
 conqueror and conquered were both sacrificed to 
 the passions and covetousness that ruled this 
 areopagus. The treaty of San Stefano was thus 
 torn to shreds ; Russia retained none of the 
 essential advantages she had exacted as the 
 price of spilt blood ; and Turkey, convinced, not- 
 withstanding, that she had nothing but champions 
 at Berlin, lost an island and two provinces there. 
 Such was the result of the concerted understanding 
 between Germany and Great Britain, which 
 Austria joined, an understanding that owed all 
 its strength and influence to Prince Bismarck's 
 participation. The Chancellor was avenging 
 himself for the rebuff of 1875 ; his pride was 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 211 
 
 satisfied ; he had humiliated his rival Prince 
 Gortchakoff, first Russian plenipotentiary at the 
 Berlin Congress, in the face of Europe. But, it 
 will be inquired, what was the Emperor William's 
 attitude on this occasion ? Did he not, in a 
 great measure, owe his Imperial crown to the 
 affectionate condescension of his nephew the 
 Emperor Alexander? Had he not written to 
 him on the eve of quitting Versailles : " Prussia 
 will never forget that it is to you she owes the 
 fact that the war was not allowed to assume 
 greater proportions " ? The Emperor William at 
 the commencement of his reign never failed to 
 control all the acts of his Government when he 
 did not actually inspire them himself. History 
 will record what part he took and to what extent 
 he exercised his sovereign function, although it 
 was cast in the background by the rackety 
 activity of his Prime Minister ; but at the period 
 with which we are occupied fatigue and years 
 had weakened his will ; he rarely imposed it, and 
 the Chancellor easily triumphed. 1 It is, there- 
 fore, established that Prince Bismarck, in 1875, 
 as in 1878, at the Berlin Congress, conformed to 
 
 1 We have seen from the notes left by M. Gavard, that Prince 
 Bismarck, already in 1875, took upon himself to direct German 
 policy without submitting his resolutions to the Sovereign's assent. 
 We may therefore presume that three years later, taking advantage 
 of the Emperor William's age, he proceeded with more absolute 
 independence. 
 
 P 2 
 
212 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 his own personal views, and he is consequently 
 answerable to his country for the difficulties he 
 has created for it, and which at the present day 
 are apparent to all. He is certainly conscious of 
 them, and since he has been away from power he 
 has made a point at the numerous interviews 
 to which he has complacently lent himself, of 
 declining the responsibility and casting it on his 
 successor. Vain efforts that have convinced no 
 one, and have only served to place his failings in 
 a brighter light and pain his warmest admirers. 
 This opinion is current in Germany. In a 
 pamphlet that appeared at Leipsic, and which 
 has been attributed to a person in a high 
 position, Prince Bismarck is denounced as "the 
 sole author of the irretrievable rupture that 
 has occurred between Russia and the German 
 Empire." 
 
 Whilst still master of the destinies of Germany, 
 he was, moreover, himself alarmed at the situa- 
 tion, the result of his personal policy, and con- 
 sidered it urgent to guard against it by means of 
 a diplomatic combination. In 1879, the year 
 following that in which the Congress assembled, 
 he offered Austria a treaty of alliance. Unable 
 any longer to look for support from the Empire 
 of the Czars, he solicited the assistance of 
 the Empire of the Habsburgs. The Vienna 
 Cabinet, accomplice and beneficiary of the 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 213 
 
 German Chancellor, having been formally asked 
 to consent to this agreement had to do so ; and 
 the pact was concluded. That was the origin 
 of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. Prince 
 Bismarck chose, for a long time, to lead public 
 opinion astray in regard to the origin of this 
 arrangement. This is no longer a secret for 
 any one, and he has contributed himself, both 
 before and since his retirement, to edify us on 
 this important point of contemporaneous history. 
 The treaty was signed at Vienna on October 7th, 
 1879, and was shrouded in profound mystery. 
 All the German Chancellor desired was that its 
 object should be known, and that the St. Peters- 
 burg Cabinet should be thoroughly convinced 
 that he had found what he wanted elsewhere. 
 The reconciliation between Austria and Germany 
 was looked upon at first without uneasiness ; but 
 it became matter for alarm in the Reichstag in 
 1888, when the Government solicited a further 
 extraordinary credit for the requirements of the 
 army. "So it is the war foreseen in connection 
 with the arrangements made at Vienna ? " said the 
 members of Parliament. " No," replied Prince 
 Bismarck, "the aim of the Treaty of Alliance is 
 peace, but to place it beyond the possibility of 
 being disturbed we must be in a position to 
 impose it." He could see, however, that there 
 would be violent resistance, and to avoid this 
 
214 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 he decided to publish the Treaty uniting the two 
 empires. 1 
 
 In a work which is in course of publication 
 as we write, The German Empire in Bismarck 's 
 Time, by Hans Blum, from whom we have al- 
 ready quoted, the author, relying on the confi- 
 dences that have been bountifully poured out 
 to him at Friedrichsruh, undertakes to give 
 us a new version of the causes that separated 
 Russia from Germany and gave rise to an under- 
 standing between the latter and Austria. He 
 relates that by the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, 
 an international commission was to assemble at 
 Novi- Bazar to fix the boundaries of the frontiers 
 of Turkey and the emancipated provinces. The 
 Czar, in three successive letters, asked the Em- 
 peror William to authorise the German delegate to 
 concert with his Russian colleague. "The assent 
 of Berlin," the Emperor Alexander is stated to 
 have said, "is the condition of the maintenance 
 of peace between the two peoples." When Prince 
 Bismarck was informed of these applications, 
 he pointed out to his Sovereign that if those 
 words had been in an official document, he would 
 
 1 The Treaty signed in 1879 had been renewed in 1883 and 
 1887 ; Italy had acceded to it ; but Prince Bismarck only divulged 
 the first in date, that of 1879, m which the signature of the Italian 
 Government does not figure. Up to the present time nothing has 
 transpired to explain how the two-fold understanding was con- 
 verted into a three-fold one. 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 215 
 
 have been compelled to advise his Majesty to 
 mobilise the German army. Unable to indulge 
 in this advice, he left Gastein, where he then 
 was, for Vienna, in order to acquaint the Aus- 
 trian Cabinet of the communications made by 
 the Czar to the Emperor William. Under 
 what aspect did he present the matter, and 
 how did he look at it himself? As the pre- 
 lude or the revelation of an understanding that 
 was imminent or had been concerted between 
 France and Russia. " To the Franco- Russian 
 Alliance," Count Andrassy, Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs to the Emperor Francis Joseph, is stated 
 to have replied, " There is but one counter-balance, 
 it is the Austro-German alliance." 
 
 Thus, according to Prince Bismarck's new 
 apologist, writing so to say, under his dictation, 
 the paternity of the first treaty, which has since 
 become that of the Triple Alliance, must be 
 attributed to the initiative of the Austrian 
 Minister. But Statesmen who seek to pen the 
 history of their own times, however expert they 
 be, are often exposed to rectifying themselves the 
 errors they seek to prove. Habent stia fata 
 libelli. " Count Andrassy," continues Hans Blum, 
 ' ' stated he was ready to put his signature to 
 the Alliance, feeling certain of his Sovereign's 
 consent. Prince Bismarck was not so sure of 
 that of the Emperor William ; they neverthe- 
 
216 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 less drew out a draft, and the German Chancellor 
 returned to Berlin on September 24th. The 
 Treaty could not be signed until October 7th. 
 The delay in concluding it is explained by the 
 fact that the Emperor William would not, first 
 of all, listen to anything on the subject of this 
 Alliance. ... It was only after long explanations 
 that Prince Bismarck succeeded in obtaining his 
 adhesion." 
 
 But what was Prince Bismarck's motive in re- 
 pairing personally to Vienna, he who, since fortune 
 had showered her favours on him, would not con- 
 sent to engage in negotiations elsewhere than at 
 Berlin ? He went there with the intention of 
 concerting with the Austrian Cabinet ; he had 
 announced to Count Andrassy by telegraph that 
 such was his desire. Admitting that the Emperor 
 Francis Joseph's Minister was the originator of 
 the proposal, who suggested it to him ? Who, more- 
 over, imposed it on the German Emperor ? Was 
 it not his Chancellor, as Hans Blum avows, Prince 
 Bismarck himself? Must the Chancellor's frame 
 of mind on this occasion be attributed, as his 
 historian seems to insinuate, to " that considerable 
 nervous excitement which the use of the Gastein 
 waters invariably produces " ? That would be 
 making great things depend on a very miserable 
 circumstance. One understands Prince Bismarck 
 doing all he can to extricate himself from an im- 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 217 
 
 plication which will assuredly be a stain upon his 
 glory, but how can one fail to be surprised when 
 one sees him have recourse to such mean pro- 
 ceedings to effect his object ? He hurried off to 
 Vienna to negotiate the union of Germany with 
 Austria, and this initiative gave birth to the Alli- 
 ance of the two Empires ; he, therefore, is the 
 author of it. Formerly he would have had the 
 audacity to acknowledge this without beating 
 about the bush ; at present, feeling each day the 
 weight of the responsibility he has assumed in- 
 creasing, he tries to slip away. Such an attempt 
 is unworthy of him. What, moreover, was the 
 chief object of these thoughts at this moment ? 
 Against what adversary did he wish to arm and 
 shelter the German Empire ? Against Russia as 
 much as against France. He had mortally 
 wounded the first of these two Powers at the 
 Berlin Congress ; he could not disguise from 
 himself that the injury would remain incurable, 
 unless he acknowledged his faults, which was more 
 than his excessive pride could bend to. And 
 which of the two aggressors does he propose to 
 master before the other? Is it France? She is 
 not mentioned in the treaty of alliance. Russia, 
 on the contrary, is named as the probable enemy 
 of both contracting parties. "If one of the two 
 Powers," it is stipulated in Article 1, "is attacked 
 by Russia, they will reciprocally owe one another 
 
218 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 the assistance of the totality of their military 
 forces." 
 
 Now what had the Emperor Alexander asked 
 his uncle, the Emperor William, who was under 
 obligations to him ? An understanding between 
 their agents, entrusted in Turkey with the execu- 
 tion of certain clauses of the Berlin Treaty, so that 
 the Russian representative, seconded by his Ger- 
 man colleague, might obtain on the spot the 
 attenuation of certain decisions come to at the 
 Congress which were contrary to the interests or 
 traditions of the Empire of the Czars in the East. 
 What a magnificent opportunity Prince Bismarck 
 had again this time of pleasing Russia and renew- 
 ing the relations which were so seriously strained ! 
 Did he hasten to take advantage of it ? He pre- 
 ferred to increase the gravity of a situation that 
 was already extremely delicate ; he rushed off to 
 Vienna, there to forge new arms against the Em- 
 pire that had rendered Germany such striking 
 service in time of peril. Prince Bismarck's great 
 and enlightened intelligence evidently, on this 
 occasion, suffered the influence of his temperament. 
 Morality, like justice, sooner or later recovers all 
 its rights, and the President of the Berlin Congress, 
 who placed his signature at the bottom of the 
 Treaty of Vienna, will not succeed in escaping from 
 the reproaches he has incurred. After having 
 been the ardent instigator of three wars, after 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 219 
 
 having mutilated Denmark and France, blinded 
 by pride, by his spirit of domination, he has hol- 
 lowed out with his own hands an impassable 
 chasm between Germany and Russia, and has 
 caused these two great nations to feel implacable 
 hatred for one another. By straying along this 
 wrong road he has not merely damaged his own 
 renown, he has also bequeathed to Europe a situa- 
 tion fraught with the greatest danger. That is 
 what we shall endeavour to show. 
 
 IV. 
 
 The prominent and visible feature in Prince 
 Bismarck's character, as in his policy, is that his 
 temperament invariably makes him go to extremes 
 in everything, and resort to haughty or disdainful 
 violence according to the occasion, according to 
 the position or the authority enjoyed by the adver- 
 sary in whose presence he may be. His letters 
 dated from Frankfort, when still only a diplomatic 
 agent, are bristling with bitter sarcasms directed 
 against all the Confederate States, without except- 
 ing Austria. He estimated the value of his 
 colleagues at the cost of the gold braid on their 
 uniforms. There was twenty thousand thalers' 
 worth, he writes, at a gala banquet. When he 
 began his first struggle on coming to power, he 
 affected to look with equal contempt on the King 
 
220 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 of Denmark's rights to the Duchies, and the 
 claims of the Pretenders, whose defence had been 
 undertaken by the Frankfort Diet. He never 
 forgave Count Beust for having upheld the sove- 
 reign prerogatives of the Confederate States ; he 
 urged the commander of the Army Corps selected 
 to invade Saxony in 1866 to secure his person 
 either at Dresden or Leipsic. At the conclusion 
 of peace Count Beust had to take refuge in Austria. 
 Prince Bismarck's resentment had survived his 
 political adversary's defeat. Who has forgotten 
 his brutal persecution of Count Arnim ? The 
 Chancellor thought the Republic in France would 
 be a permanent source of trouble and disorder ; 
 the Ambassador, in spite of his chief's remon- 
 strances, remained persuaded that it would be a 
 serious danger to the principle of monarchy in 
 Europe ; he committed no other fault, and even 
 now Prince Bismarck blackens his memory by re- 
 fusing his victim's son to relieve it of a calumny that 
 found origin in the interviews at Friedrichsruh. 
 Herr M. Busch, collecting morning and night 
 the effusions the Chancellor indulged in among 
 his intimate friends during the French war, shows 
 him constantly tormented with the necessity of 
 injuring the invaded provinces. Prince Bismarck 
 reproaches the military with being too lenient 
 towards people and objects. They make too many 
 prisoners, he said, and some of them, like the 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 221 
 
 Franc-Tireurs and Turcos, should have been mer- 
 cilessly shot. The misery of the peasantry seeking 
 refuge in the woods does not affect him in the 
 least. " If the fugitives fell into my hands," he 
 added, " I would take their cows and all they 
 possess, accusing them of having stolen the things." 
 What a strange doctrine on the lips of a States- 
 man ! We could quote a cruel, pitiless expression, 
 which lays the Iron Chancellor's soul bare. We 
 abstain from doing so because he attributes it to 
 Princess Bismarck. We prefer to refer the reader 
 to Herr Busch's curious volume. 1 
 
 His propensities undergo no modification at the 
 conclusion of peace. He anxiously watches France, 
 whose ruin was not sufficiently complete to suit 
 him. We have seen how he was thirsting to 
 spring on her again as soon as he had reason to 
 fear she would soon be herself again. Russia 
 places an obstacle in the way of his schemes, she 
 dares brave him, he at once turns his anger and 
 resentment against her. He humbles her at 
 Berlin, he concludes a treaty at Vienna which 
 is especially aimed at the Northern Empire. 
 
 It is an error, says Prince Bismarck, to regard 
 the alliance of Germany and Austria exclusively 
 in the light of an arrangement in view of war ; 
 it has but one object, the maintenance of peace ; 
 
 1 Le Comte de Bismarck et sa suite pendant la guerre de France \ 
 p. 195. Paris. 
 
222 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 it is to ensure peace to Europe that this union 
 has been concluded and signed. War, he adds 
 at the interviews, that echo at his will, has given 
 us all we could expect ; it could only expose the 
 advantages we have acquired and to strengthen 
 which we require peace. But if the repose of the 
 world, he was answered, were the Chancellor's 
 sole care, why did he not exert all his efforts to 
 tighten certain very old ties from which he had 
 reaped marvellous benefit ? With Russia satisfied, 
 after the war with Turkey, Germany all-powerful 
 in the centre of the Continent, what dangers could 
 there be to threaten universal peace ? Would 
 not an understanding between these two Powers 
 have been the best and firmest guarantee for its 
 preservation ? Prince Bismarck preferred a rupture 
 which was certainly not what his sovereign 
 intended ; he is therefore the responsible author 
 of it, as we cannot too frequently repeat. But he 
 had foreseen the consequences of his action and 
 hastened to provide for the obligations it imposed 
 on Germany. That was the sole object of the 
 reconciliation he forced on the Emperor William 
 as much as on the Emperor Francis Joseph. 
 Consequently it was not the repose of Europe 
 that troubled him and took him to Vienna, it was 
 the security of the German Empire. 
 
 In reality he was taking up a position for 
 conflicts rendered eventual if not imminent in the 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 223 
 
 north of Europe, by the attitude he had himself 
 assumed in regard to Russia, by the duties he 
 forced on that Power when dispossessing her of her 
 influence on the Danube, of the advantages she 
 had conquered, during a sanguinary war, at the 
 cost of the greatest sacrifices. It was thus that 
 he sowed the germs of a permanent misunderstand- 
 ing that have developed more rapidly than he 
 anticipated and the fruits of which he can already 
 judge of from the innermost recesses of his 
 retreat. Competent to form a judicious opinion 
 in such a matter, he was not long in perceiving 
 the difficulties he had created for his country, 
 and he wished to make a display of different 
 feelings to Russia. " I have been able to con- 
 vince myself," he said in the Reichstag, in a 
 speech from which we have already quoted a few 
 words, " that the Emperor Alexander had neither 
 warlike tendencies against us, nor the intention 
 of attacking us, nor a leaning towards aggressive 
 wars in general .... I trust, I believe in the 
 Czar's word .... we shall exert ourselves to 
 respect the rights that Russia takes from treaties 
 .... and if she asks us to support her applications 
 to the Sultan to bring back the Bulgarians to the 
 position created by the understanding of the 
 Powers, I shall not hesitate to do so." He spoke 
 thus in 1888, without fear, in holding this language, 
 to give, an emphatic contradiction himself to all 
 
224 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 his recent acts, notably to his conduct at the 
 Berlin Congress and to the precipitation with 
 which he had concluded the treaty that still 
 unites Germany to Austria. The fact is, he had 
 understood and measured the extent of the two- 
 fold mistake he had made, and felt all the weight 
 of the responsibility he had assumed. This has 
 ever since been present in his mind ; and in his 
 retreat, he has never ceased to pretend that he 
 had left the relations between Germany and 
 Russia in a satisfactory state which permitted of 
 their former cordiality being restored to them. 
 But new and striking incidents have occurred 
 which have proved how unfounded this assurance 
 and prevision were. Russia has drawn nearer 
 to France, and Prince Bismarck, far from accusing 
 himself, attacks his successor. He has allowed 
 the flatterers who visit him to hear the reproaches 
 he addresses to General Caprivi, so that they 
 may repeat them. 
 
 Prince Bismarck has convinced no one, and 
 the judgment of his contemporaries will be that 
 of posterity. Of what, indeed, does the Treaty 
 of Alliance which he concluded at Vienna con- 
 sist? Is it a pledge of peace? No one could 
 suggest such a thing, for it is on the contrary 
 an act drawn up in view of war. What does 
 it provide for ? Fresh hostilities, and the two 
 contracting parties to it stipulate the mutual 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 225 
 
 assistance they shall be under the obligation of 
 lending to one another when it breaks out. 
 Such clauses might, in a certain measure, have 
 been justifiable, had they been drawn out solely 
 in view of aggression on the part of France. 
 The peace signed at Frankfort had left gaping 
 wounds, and it might be presumed that they 
 could only be cicatrised by vengeance. But in 
 1879 Russia had as yet taken no initiative, no 
 step revealing an unkindly attitude or invincible 
 resentment. We have pointed out that Prince 
 Bismarck could on more than one occasion have 
 approached the Russian Government, making a 
 sacrifice of his rancour, and the Emperor Wil- 
 liam would certainly not have placed any obstacle 
 in the way of his doing so ; he preferred on 
 the contrary to keep it definitely at a distance 
 by seeking the co-operation at Vienna which he 
 had so long found at St. Petersburg. The rup- 
 ture between the Northern Empires is therefore 
 his personal work. That is what we desired 
 to show. 
 
 But how was it Austria lent herself to engage- 
 ments which increased the height of the barrier 
 already separating her from Russia ? Austria 
 has interests of the first order on the Danube. 
 Expelled from Germany, where she had exer- 
 cised influence from times immemorial, she had 
 suffered a dethronement which gave a serious 
 
 Q 
 
226 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 blow to her credit among the population in the 
 Balkan peninsula. This position, bad as it was 
 then, was increased in gravity after the Treaty 
 of San Stefano, by the preponderance it gave 
 Russia in the East. The Cabinet of Vienna 
 could not therefore hesitate to join in the views 
 of those of Berlin and London, and become 
 their confederate. They offered her Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina as the price of her participation. 
 These acquisitions compensated Austria for the 
 sacrifices that had been imposed on her in 1866, 
 by giving her a new and larger base of action 
 on her Eastern frontier. Once in possession of 
 these two provinces, the road to Salonica was 
 open to her ; she relies on inheriting that port 
 at the next division of the territory Turkey still 
 possesses in Europe and thus acquiring direct 
 access to the ^Egean Sea. The bait was tempt- 
 ing ; we have already said she took it. But 
 from that time she became the principal instru- 
 ment of Prince Bismarck's policy, and she could 
 not conceal from herself that she would be under 
 the necessity of following him as far as he chose 
 to lead her. The Treaty of Alliance was in germ 
 when the arrangements were made at Berlin, 
 and the Vienna Cabinet was certainly resigned 
 to giving its signature whenever the German 
 Chancellor considered it opportune to conclude. 
 They were aware, besides, at Vienna of the 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 227 
 
 facility with which Prince Bismarck performed 
 evolutions on diplomatic as on parliamentary 
 ground, and they were sure that, if repelled by 
 Austria, he would turn again towards Russia. 
 Count Andrassy was all the more justified in that 
 presumption as the German Chancellor was able 
 to inform him, at their first meeting, of the com- 
 munications the Emperor Alexander had made 
 to the Emperor William and which could have 
 been taken advantage of to renew the relations 
 that had been broken off. Nor was the Minister 
 of the Emperor Francis Joseph unaware that 
 the Emperor William regretted the dissent ex- 
 isting between his Government and that of his 
 imperial nephew, and that it was his desire "to 
 die like the expiring sun," after having shone 
 with such splendid fire. We have seen Prince 
 Bismarck's account of the efforts he had to make 
 to persuade his Sovereign to ratify the treaty of 
 1879. Austria, being responsible with Germany 
 for the mischief done to Russia, had fatally to 
 accept all the consequences ; she had placed 
 herself in the necessity of acquiescing in a treaty 
 which nevertheless presented all the character 
 of an act of defiance and even of hostility against 
 a powerful Empire which had given neither of 
 the contracting parties any cause for alarm. 
 This was a first expiation of the crime she 
 had been guilty of in consenting to receive the 
 
 Q 2 
 
228 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 spoils of Turkey, dismembered by the Powers 
 who should have defended her. Such is the 
 fate of all territory graspers, when their acquisi- 
 tions repose on neither right nor justice ; and 
 for the space of nearly fifteen years since she 
 has in this way lost her liberty of action, she 
 has borne the weight, becoming heavier and 
 heavier each day, of the duties she has had to 
 assume. But, we repeat, that Austria, in 1879, 
 had no choice in coming to a decision ; she 
 acted in obedience to an influence for which she 
 was quite prepared. 
 
 V. 
 
 The Statesman entrusted with the interests of a 
 great country who knows he has served them 
 badly displays uneasiness in proportion to the 
 measure of his faults. That was Prince Bismarck's 
 frame of mind after the Berlin Congress. His 
 penetrating perspicacity, and particularly his sure 
 foresight, which had never deceived him before 
 1870, did not permit of his making any mistake 
 in regard to the dangers of the new line of policy 
 to which the errors of his pride had led him. He 
 therefore had but one thought, that of averting 
 them. He had ensured the alliance of Austria ; 
 he considered it insufficient ; he sought that of 
 Italy; he obtained it by arousing her alarm and 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 229 
 
 flattering her passions. He had applied himself 
 to bringing on a . conflict in connection with our 
 occupation of Tunis, which he had prepared a 
 long time before, and had been careful to foment. 
 After encouraging our enterprise, he pointed it 
 out to Rome as a permanent peril for the young 
 kingdom. No one will be surprised that Prince 
 Bismarck should have thus understood German 
 interests ; but that Italy, a new State, in the 
 midst of organisation, should have consented to 
 divest herself of her liberty of action by assuming 
 obligations that nothing compelled her to contract, 
 was what no one could understand, however care- 
 ful the Italian Government may have been to 
 justify so grave a resolution. To form a correct 
 opinion of her conduct, it would really be necessary 
 to know the terms of the act she signed, that is 
 to say, the extent and nature of the duties it im- 
 poses on her. Germany and Austria have in- 
 formed all Europe of the treaty binding them, 
 notwithstanding that it contains a stipulation pro- 
 viding for an understanding that is directly aimed 
 at Russia, and notwithstanding that she is explicitly 
 named therein. The document devoted to Italy's 
 association in their alliance is and continues a 
 secret which is obstinately preserved. Let us 
 note, by the way, that contrary to all real principles 
 of parliamentary government, the Italian Chambers 
 have never been vouchsafed any knowledge of it, 
 
230 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 although its particular object is to pledge all the 
 forces and resources of the country. Notwithstand- 
 ing the most energetic efforts of certain fractions of 
 Parliament it has been impossible to overcome 
 this obstinate obmutescence ; the crown and 
 Government are covered by the constitution, which 
 is imperfect on this important point. What is not 
 less worthy of remark is that the members of the 
 Chamber, who had warmly protested against this 
 constitutional anomaly, maintained the same 
 silence as their predecessors as soon as they came 
 to power ; this was notably the case with Signor 
 Crispi. Secrecy on this point seems to have been 
 a condition on accepting office. Who imposed it on 
 them ? Evidently the Sovereign. Who exacted 
 that it should be so ? Was it Germany, or was it 
 the character and importance of the clauses binding 
 Italy to the two Empires, that caused this course 
 to be adopted ? 
 
 It would be rash to seek to fathom the import 
 of these stipulations ; we should run the risk of 
 forming conjectures which would in any case be 
 without authority. But it is quite permissible to 
 believe that the fact of Italy entering into the 
 Triple Alliance led the contracting parties to 
 concert in regard to all the contingencies that may 
 compel France to appear upon the scene ; that 
 they have, at least, mutually guaranteed their 
 territorial position ; and that military arrange- 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 231 
 
 ments have been elaborated in that view. If 
 Austria therefore has consented to aid Germany 
 against Russia, Italy, who could only be of relative 
 assistance to them in a conflict with the Northern 
 Empire, has intervened, on her side, to unite with 
 the two allies against France. It is impossible to 
 attribute any other object to this three-fold under- 
 standing. 
 
 What reasons, what requirements, could have 
 influenced Italy in striking out such a novel line 
 of policy and one so contrary to all her traditions ? 
 As a matter of fact, what is the Triple Alliance ? 
 A sort of Holy Alliance renewed, minus Russia 
 and plus Italy, which has been concluded to keep 
 the Alsatians and Lorrains in bondage on the one 
 hand, and on the other the Italians who are still 
 under Austrian rule. King Victor Emmanuel 
 would never have lent his hand to such a com- 
 bination, imitated from that which so long weighed 
 -on the peninsula and from which he had the glory 
 of freeing himself with French aid. Count Cavour 
 must start in his tomb with indignation. We 
 should point out that long before the date of the 
 engagements contracted by Italy, there had been 
 a notable deviation in the policy of the Cabinet of 
 Rome. The contagion of democratic institutions 
 had alarmed the Conservatives who were then in 
 power. The most prominent men among them, who 
 until then had only known the road to Paris, took, 
 
232 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 one after the other, that of Berlin ; it did not 
 suffice for them to separate from a Republic that 
 had adherents on the other side of the Alps, they 
 required the support of powerful monarchies, and 
 it was in their minds that the principle of a hostile 
 alliance to France germinated. It was necessary 
 to justify these tendencies, which were repudiated 
 at the time by all the men who had fought for 
 independence, who had suffered exile and impris- 
 onment. We were credited with the firm intention 
 of exercising an influence in Italy outrageous for 
 her dignity and the rank she henceforth had the 
 right to claim among the Great Powers. Public 
 opinion was irritated by speeches, by the press 
 remunerated in part from the reptilian fund — 
 Minghetti acknowledged it in one of his letters — 
 and by persistent insinuations. The Tunis affair 
 cropped up ; it was a premeditated incident in 
 regard to which a great deal of fuss was made in 
 order to embitter the public mind, the French 
 Government being accused of a vast number of 
 misdeeds of which they had never even thought, 
 and notably that of maintaining too intimate a 
 connection with the Vatican and encouraging its 
 hopes. They thus succeeded in creating an ex- 
 pression of opinion which gradually spread over 
 all the provinces of the peninsula. At the same 
 time Count Robilant, an Italian diplomatist, leader 
 of the Conservatives, prepared the ground at 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 233 
 
 Vienna, where he was accredited as ambassador. 
 He was encouraged by his friends at Rome and 
 adequately supported by Prince Bismarck. 
 
 Victor Emmanuel, with his prudent character 
 and clear foresight, was careful to check the errors 
 and warmth of this agitation from the commence- 
 ment. He was able to restrain the zeal and 
 impatience of such of his advisers as lent an 
 ear to Prince Bismarck's fallacious insinuations. 
 Without forgetting services rendered, without 
 rejecting those that were promised, he wounded 
 neither his friends of yesterday nor those of the 
 morrow ; he, awaiting events, resolved to take 
 counsel from circumstances only. He died in 
 1878, leaving matters in this state, without having 
 contracted any engagement, without having dis- 
 contented either France or Germany. Italy soon 
 acceded to the Austro-German treaty; this was 
 the first important act of the new reign, and 
 it revealed a different and well-defined policy. 
 There can be no doubt that King Humbert I. is 
 a fervent apostle of this attitude of Italy, and in 
 saying so we do not think we are making a state- 
 ment likely to displease him. Nothing, indeed, 
 is further from our thoughts than the intention of 
 giving utterance to any assertion calculated to 
 wound the Sovereign of a country to which we 
 have been, to which we are convinced we shall, 
 before long be, closely united. But when one 
 
234 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 examines such grave events, the first duty is to 
 endeavour to fathom, to define the feelings of 
 those who participated in them, be they Princes 
 or Ministers. We have seen that the Italian 
 constitution gives the Sovereign a large share 
 in directing and controlling the relations of the 
 Kingdom with the other Powers. He can, as 
 we have said, conclude treaties with them in view 
 of war, without being compelled to have his 
 engagements ratified by the Chambers, without 
 being- obliged even to inform them of what he 
 has done. So that the country is actually pledged 
 in certain contingencies to unsheathe the sword 
 without knowing the causes or necessities that 
 have compelled or constrained the King and his 
 Government to take such an important decision, 
 or the extent of the sacrifices it may have to 
 make. 
 
 That is parliamentary government as they 
 understand it in Germany, and not as practised 
 in countries gifted with a Constitution founded on 
 sound principles as in England. However irre- 
 sponsible a Prince may be, he evidently, under 
 such circumstances, assumes a personal respon- 
 sibility both towards his own subjects and 
 towards the countries who will benefit or suffer 
 from the obligations he has contracted. But the 
 Ministers, it will be said, are answerable for the 
 Sovereign's acts in this case as in others. Such 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 235 
 
 is the theory ; reality is different, as shown in the 
 present instance. Ministers come and go, the 
 King remains ; and the treaty, always shrouded 
 in the mystery of secrecy, is renewed. What 
 indicates, moreover, that the King's will is asserted 
 in this matter with exceptional and overbearing 
 authority, that it is impossible to regard its 
 existence in the light of pure fiction, is, that we 
 have seen men of considerable standing in the 
 Italian Parliament, who, after having violently 
 protested against the engagements entered into 
 by the two Empires, have warmly approved of 
 them on becoming Ministers, and have shown 
 themselves their earnest safeguards ; disavowing 
 the opinion they had expressed on the benches 
 of the Opposition, they have adopted that of the 
 King as soon as they have found seats among 
 his advisers. " You have made yourselves 
 the gendarmes of Germany," exclaimed Signor 
 Crispi, when simply deputy, to Depretis and 
 his colleagues, reproaching them with having so 
 criminally implicated Italy's signature. On being 
 appointed Prime Minister he revealed himself 
 the impassioned champion of the acts of his 
 predecessors. When a democrat, an Irreden- 
 tist like himself, performs such a strange evolu- 
 tion, one has a right to think, without wounding 
 any one's dignity, that King Humbert only ac- 
 -cords confidence to and admits into his councils 
 
236 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 men who consent to share his opinion as to the 
 desirability of continuing the relations established 
 with Germany and Austria. When the Marquis 
 Rudini succeeded Signor Crispi his attitude was 
 more circumspect ; a few months after he became 
 President of the Council he renewed the Treaty 
 which had still nearly two years to run. 
 
 The successor of the galantuomo King, on 
 ascending the throne, considered it opportune, 
 in the interest of his country, to deviate from 
 the line traced out by his father ; and, finding 
 inspiration in the traditions of his race, preferred 
 taking King Victor Amadeus II., one of the most 
 illustrious of his ancestors, as model and guide 
 for his conduct. The policy of the house of 
 Savoy has always had two poles, the King and 
 the Emperor, one at Paris, the other at Vienna. 
 The skill this dynasty has displayed has con- 
 sisted in abandoning one for the other without 
 exposure and with profit. Victor Amadeus, from 
 the origin of the war of 1688 to the commence- 
 ment of his reign, had assured Louis XIV. that 
 in " this encounter he could absolutely rely on 
 him." He was not sincere. He was resolved 
 on the contrary to go against France, " reserving 
 the choice of the moment to take action." He, 
 indeed, wrote to the Prince of Orange and opened 
 his heart to him ; he entered into negotiations 
 with the Emperor whilst waiting to accede to 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 237 
 
 the Augsburg League. The King of France, in- 
 formed of these intrigues, demanded guarantees ; 
 his troops were allowed to enter Piedmont. That 
 pledge being subsequently considered insufficient, 
 he required the citadel of Turin to be handed 
 over to him. Victor Amadeus was able to delay 
 this concession by means of dilatory negotia- 
 tions, and by writing an autographic letter to the 
 King by which he declared he placed himself 
 absolutely in his hands, and undertook to give 
 up the citadel as had been demanded. But 
 when he had placed the fortress in a state of 
 defence he threw the gates open to the Spaniards 
 who had come from Milan, where he had signed 
 an offensive and defensive alliance the day before 
 with the Emperor and Spain, thus accomplishing 
 his first plans and his evolution. But this Prince 
 " so keen, so dissembling, and so artful " * was 
 such, that he had hardly entered the coalition, 
 than he was already preparing an exit. Indeed 
 he did leave it, after long discussions and signing 
 new treaties with France, which made him Com- 
 mander-in-chief of the troops of the League in 
 Italy and Commander-in-chief of the Franco- 
 Piedmontese troops. His first allies had pro- 
 mised him Provence and Dauphine ; on becoming 
 reconciled to Louis XIV., he considered it pru- 
 dent to be satisfied with the restitution of 
 
 1 Letter from Catinat to Louvois. 
 
238 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 Pignerol, some territory in the Milanese, and the 
 title of King, honours of crowned heads, as they 
 said in those times. 1 
 
 We will not continue this historical page, in- 
 structive though it be, and though it be illustrated 
 at a later date by the same underhand dealings 
 and the same artfulness. We have paused at it 
 for an instant under the impression that the past 
 always serves to enlighten the future. However, 
 our only object has been to place certain circum- 
 stances and facts side by side ; they are not 
 absolutely devoid of analogy, notwithstanding that 
 the times and positions are different. To our 
 mind they differ particularly in regard to the 
 interests at stake. Victor Amadeus feared the 
 ambition of Louis XIV., and he had reason to do 
 so. France, by possessing Pignerol, had already 
 one foot in Italy, and the King, victorious over 
 the League, might put forward other claims. 
 What danger threatened Italy in 1882, and 
 what had she to fear from France, vanquished 
 and mutilated ? France at that date, at the time 
 when the peninsula became associated with the 
 two Empires, was hardly rising from the prostrate 
 position in which an unfortunate war had placed 
 her ; she had absolute need of peace to reorganise 
 her armament, to equilibriate her finances. What 
 
 1 We have taken this brief summary from U Histoire de Louvois, 
 by Camille Rousset. See chaps, xi. and following. 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 23^ 
 
 had she to claim from Italy, what territory, what 
 concession ? She asked her solely to tighten 
 the economic connection between the two countries, 
 which was profitable alike to the commerce and 
 industry of both. It has never been seriously 
 maintained at Rome that the Republic premeditated 
 restoring the temporal power of the Pope. Such 
 an accusation would have been ridiculous and 
 would have aroused public conscience in Europe. 
 Gambetta, in a rebuke which was perhaps more 
 severe than he intended, had given a pledge 
 which did not allow of suspicion being at- 
 tached to the intentions of the men who had 
 taken over the government of the country with 
 him. Italy, thanks to that luck which had so 
 prodigiously assisted her, was at that time in 
 possession of all the guarantees for her security 
 she could desire. France and Germany's own 
 interests compelled them to watch over the inde- 
 pendence of the peninsula ; King Humbert's 
 Government was certain of the support and 
 co-operation of both Powers in all contingen- 
 cies that could happen. No more advantage- 
 ous international position could have been im- 
 agined for a budding State obliged to look 
 after its prosperity at home and develop all its- 
 resources. 
 
 Therefore, there was no need at Rome to 
 renounce the happy neutrality which the respective 
 
24o STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 positions imposed on the belligerents of 1870 by- 
 peace enabled her to observe. They departed 
 from it notwithstanding, and their resolution to do 
 so had to be justified. What did they pretend ? 
 That the Italian kingdom, being of recent creation, 
 must contract alliances for the defence of her 
 frontiers. The argument was not a serious one ; 
 Signor Crispi, however, has never advanced any 
 other to his adversaries, to the patriots who have 
 remained faithful to the convictions he formerly 
 shared with them. But, they answered him, who 
 is threatening our frontiers ? where is the peril ? 
 Vain efforts ; he showed himself no more disposed 
 to enlighten members of Parliament alarmed at 
 Italy's new friendships than Depretis had been. 
 Signor Crispi on attaining power, had had the 
 Treaty of Alliance placed in his hands : did 
 this mysterious document impose silence on him, 
 against his wish, as it had done on those who 
 concluded it ? It therefore contains certain stipu- 
 lations calculated to bring about the most unlikely 
 conversions. But if its ostensible object is to 
 guarantee the possession of provinces of Italian 
 origin to Austria, those of Alsace-Lorraine to 
 Germany, it must ensure Italy compensative ad- 
 vantages. One can hardly imagine Signor Crispi, 
 in his turn, making himself the gendarme of the 
 former rulers of his country without some future 
 remuneration. He always has had, and certainly 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 241 
 
 still has, the most lofty ambition. What then 
 are the new hopes he is fostering ? Can they be 
 those he conceived as soon as the clauses of the 
 treaty came to his knowledge? As they are 
 concealed must one take them to be inavowable ? 
 And to the prejudice of what neighbour are they 
 to be realised ? It cannot be of Austria, the 
 ■enemy of yesterday, the ally of to-day ; it must 
 therefore be of France, and, renouncing to satisfy 
 Italy's ambition in the Alps or in the Adriatic, 
 they propose to ensure its triumph in the Mediter- 
 ranean. If that be so we were not mistaken in 
 evoking the insidious proceedings of King Victor 
 Amadeus, and in recalling the use he made of them. 
 One can understand that Prince Bismarck, separat- 
 ing in anger from Russia, should have sought the 
 alliance of Austria ; one can also understand that 
 the latter, redoubting a reconciliation that is 
 always possible between the two Empires of the 
 North, should have united with Germany. Neither 
 at Berlin nor at Vienna was there any conceal- 
 ment. Strange though it appeared to inform 
 a Great Power that arrangements had been made 
 to fight it if occasion offered, those who did so, 
 had the courage to own and make the engage- 
 ments they had contracted public. Why does 
 not Italy follow this example which is wanting 
 neither in audacity nor magnanimity ? Is it because 
 cshe cannot confess all without revealing perfidious 
 
242 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 and ambitious views that would justify every kind 
 of suspicion ? 
 
 VI. 
 
 But it is not war, they never cease to repeat, 
 that the Triple Alliance seeks ; it is peace, which 
 they propose to maintain by placing it beyond the 
 possibility of being troubled. Signor Crispi has 
 himself affirmed it ; his behaviour during his first 
 tenure of office was but one long contradiction of 
 his own words. His every act was a provocation, 
 and it was no fault of his if the dissensions he 
 provoked did not degenerate into a rupture or a 
 resort to arms. The prudent and dignified atti- 
 tude of the Government of the Republic frustrated 
 all the Italian Minister's calculations. It must how- 
 ever be acknowledged that Signor Crispi was not 
 supported, and he was perhaps not encouraged, by 
 the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin, and it is easy 
 to understand and explain this first disagreement 
 between the three allied Courts. Signor Crispi, 
 being a sound-minded man, soon formed a correct 
 idea of the consequences the heavy burden 
 imposed on his country by her understanding with 
 her allies would fatally have for her at no 
 distant date ; he understood how urgently 
 necessary was a prompt, an immediate solution. 
 To the shame of financial discomfort, and its 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 243 
 
 consequences, he preferred war, which alone could 
 give Italy the advantages she hoped to obtain for 
 the sacrifices she was obliged to make. But if 
 Italy had entered the Triple Alliance for future 
 and contingent profit, the two Empires had on 
 the contrary already received theirs, and peace 
 ensured them its possession. That was what 
 neither the first negotiators of King Humbert 
 nor the Sovereign himself understood when they 
 entered into engagements at Vienna. All Signor 
 Crispi's efforts have met with failure in presence 
 of the calm attitude of France, and more par- 
 ticularly so in face of the private and distinctly 
 defined interests of the two other allies whose 
 satellite Italy has made herself and continues 
 to be. 
 
 Let us say, then, that peace, with or without 
 Italy's consent, was the sole, the real object the 
 negotiators of the Triple Alliance had in view 
 from the commencement, and let us see if this 
 diplomatic conception offers adequate guarantees 
 for the repose of Europe. Political writers of 
 every order and every country have examined 
 it under all its aspects ; some have blamed, others 
 have applauded it ; the former have denounced it 
 as a permanent danger, the others have con- 
 sidered it a pledge of high value. There is not 
 one at the present day, wishing to be of good 
 faith, who does not concede that the peace of the 
 
 r 2 
 
244 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 Triple Alliance, is armed peace, that it is Europe 
 under arms, ever ready for the struggle, and that 
 this catastrophe may burst out suddenly, through 
 incidents independent of the will of the various 
 Governments. This peril becomes daily more 
 apparent, and no one is any longer in doubt on 
 the subject. Preparations are being made on 
 all sides, and there is no sacrifice one dares recede 
 from. Parliament never reassembles without 
 being asked to vote further credits for the army 
 and to increase the imposts already so heavy for 
 the taxpayers of all countries. Military service, 
 having become everywhere obligatory, is imposed 
 on all, up to the age of forty-five ; some amongst 
 us who are still liable to be called out are grand- 
 fathers. Germany, which possesses the most 
 formidable armament yet known, has just this 
 very year increased her effective in a notable 
 proportion, drawing the meshes of her organisa- 
 tion closer, so that none can escape the duty of 
 assembling round the flag. 
 
 What think they in Germany of the peace 
 Prince Bismarck, on retiring from power, has 
 bequeathed to Europe ? How does the Imperial 
 Government itself regard it? It considers it a 
 truce, and that there is only just time to arrange 
 everything for the next war which will, according 
 to the words of the new Chancellor, be " a battle 
 for life." To convince one's self, it suffices to 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 245 
 
 peruse the speech that General Caprivi 
 delivered to uphold and justify his last Army 
 Bill tending to increase the effectives and grant- 
 ing Government the necessary credits for that 
 purpose. He had to give an explanation, to 
 convince Parliament of the requirements it was 
 urgent to provide for, and he performed his task 
 with absolute frankness. His speech was in a 
 measure a plan of campaign. " When we crossed 
 the frontier of France in 1870," he said, "we 
 did so with seventeen Army Corps. . . . Whereas 
 only eight Army Corps were opposed to us. . . . 
 In the future war," General Caprivi continued, 
 reasoning as if war would break out immediately, 
 " we shall find French Army Corps before us, at 
 least as numerous as those we shall place in line. 
 We shall find, moreover, an Army of Reserve of 
 about the same value as the Army in the first 
 line. But admitting we cross the frontier, that 
 we are victorious, what shall we find in France ? 
 A line of forts ... on the Meuse and Moselle . . . 
 then behind we shall come to the series of great 
 French fortresses : Verdun, Toul, Epinal. We 
 advance, however, and fight the French Army 
 of Reserve ; we proceed to Paris, but it is no 
 longer the Paris of 1870 ; we are before a 
 stronghold such as the world has never seen, 
 surrounded by fifty-six forts." General Caprivi, 
 in speaking thus, did not intend to point out only 
 
246 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 the obstacles that it would be necessary to over- 
 come in the next campaign, obstacles that require 
 new and more powerful means to be employed 
 in dealing with them than were at hand in 1870 ; 
 he at the same time gave a rejoinder to an 
 opinion which is sufficiently popular in Germany 
 for him to consider it necessary to oppose it at 
 the tribune of the Reichstag. What does this 
 opinion want ? It advocates a preventive war, 
 that is to say, an immediate conflict to reduce 
 France to lasting impotence before she has 
 given all the development to her military forces 
 they still require ; the war, in fact, that Prince 
 Bismarck and Count Moltke wished for in 
 1875. The fact is worth noting, and it is 
 beyond denial, because the Chancellor of the 
 Empire himself acknowledged and established it. 
 It was not superfluous to call attention to it, 
 because it shows that on the other side of the 
 frontier, in the German army especially, they 
 incline to the view that the sole solution of 
 present difficulties lies in war at an early date, 
 whilst they loudly accuse France of watching 
 passionately for the opportunity to take revenge. 
 
 What has France done to provoke such war- 
 like impatience ? What has been her attitude ? 
 What line of conduct has she adopted? The 
 Chancellor has indicated this himself in the 
 remarks we have just quoted. France has given 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 247 
 
 all her care to placing herself on a proper footing 
 of defence. But defence, unless one distorts the 
 value of words and the truth of facts, has never 
 been offence, and less still an act of aggression. 
 What has Germany done in the same order of 
 ideas, how have her allies proceeded, what 
 measures have been taken by all the European 
 States, large and small ? They have armed, they 
 have daily given greater extension to their 
 military strength. Prince Bismarck, previous to 
 General von Caprivi, exacted grants of money 
 from the Reichstag, for military purposes which 
 were several times renewed; to obtain these grants 
 both had recourse to the dissolution of Parliament ; 
 the expedient was assuredly constitutional, but it 
 proves the importance of the sacrifices imposed 
 on the country and the pressure the Imperial 
 Government had to exercise on the national 
 vote to get the grants passed. England, even, 
 that land of poised minds, does not escape the 
 general contagion. A few years back, in 1889, 
 Parliament voted an extraordinary credit of five 
 hundred millions of francs, which were to be 
 employed exclusively on new armour-plated 
 vessels, apart from what was provided in the 
 budget. The totality of the sum has not yet 
 been spent, and public opinion is already in 
 alarm on the other side of the Straits because a 
 Russian squadron has entered the Mediterranean, 
 
248 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 and the Government is urged to apply to Parlia- 
 ment for another credit of the same importance. 
 Did France provoke all these armaments ? Could 
 they exact from her that she should leave all 
 her gates open without defence? What they 
 had a right to expect from her was that she 
 would avoid all subjects for quarrel, that she 
 would lend herself to any arrangement to prevent 
 dangerous complications ; she has conformed to- 
 that attitude with a moderation that was not. 
 devoid of dignity ; she has shown this on several 
 occasions, particularly in her intercourse with 
 Italy during Signor Crispi's first ministry. She has 
 been occupied entirely in sheltering her territory 
 from all danger, and has persevered in that task 
 with great prudence, from which she has never 
 departed, and at the cost of a public debt which 
 exceeds that of any other Power, the heaviest 
 that a nation has yet been called upon to support. 
 She has braved no one ; she has reflected, and 
 she has hesitated at no sacrifice her own dignity 
 and the security of the country commanded her 
 to make. Does that convey the meaning that 
 she has ceased to feel the mutilation she has 
 undergone, that all is forgotten? It would be 
 an insult to her to think so. But she, like all 
 other countries, feels the weight of the burdens she 
 has had to be content to bear in order to recover 
 herself, and she considers that peace is still, for 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 24? 
 
 her, the best of all remedies ; she ardently desires 
 to preserve it, leaving the task of curing an ill 
 from which all Europe is suffering, as she is, to 
 time and the wisdom of Governments. 
 
 Have we any need to say that the Triple Alli- 
 ance, which is the cause of this deplorable situation, 
 has been a source of difficulties for the Powers 
 that formed it, such as they had never yet known ? 
 General von Moltke is stated to have observed that 
 the acquisition of Metz was equal to an army of a 
 hundred thousand men to Germany ; and that 
 argument settled the fate of the fortress, it is 
 added. It is well known at the present day that 
 Germany's aggrandisements on the left bank of 
 the Rhine cost the Empire more than they yield 
 her in finances and security. They necessitate 
 continual development of her military forces and a 
 proportional increase in her expenses. The famous 
 Marshal's prediction has turned against him. A 
 member of the Reichstag affirmed some time back, 
 without meeting with contradiction, that in 1879 
 five to six marks a head were paid in indirect 
 taxes ; owing to the growth of taxation the amount 
 is now fourteen marks, that is to say, it has doubled 
 in twelve years. The last military law, following 
 on to so many others, will raise the peace contin- 
 gent by 63,000 men, but it will burden the country 
 with a further outlay of sixty million marks. Let 
 us mention, moreover, that the French war budget 
 
250 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 for the present year 1 has been fixed at six hundred 
 and thirty-three million francs : if the calculations 
 that have been made in this respect, and which we 
 have not been able to check, are correct, 2 the 
 German budget will attain eight hundred and 
 seventy-nine millions. The budget of the Empire 
 comprises revenues of different kinds among its 
 receipts, such as the produce of the customs, the 
 railways, and telegraphs. But Prince Bismarck, 
 foreseeing that these resources would always be 
 insufficient, introduced an ingenious clause into 
 the Constitution, thanks to which the Imperial 
 budget can never be in default. It sets forth, in 
 fact, that in case a deficit occurs it shall be met by 
 all the Confederate States in proportion to their 
 respective populations. No limit is placed to this 
 contribution, termed matriculated, which is thus 
 of boundless elasticity. In 1 879-1 880 it was 
 fixed at ninety million marks ; ten years later, in 
 1 889- 1 890, it rose to two hundred and twenty- 
 eight ; for the current financial year, 1 893-1 894, 
 it is three hundred and eighty-six million marks. 
 
 1 1894. — Translate)}. 
 
 2 See some comparative tables prepared by M. Jules Roche, 
 former minister, and published in the newspaper Le Matin. It is 
 noticeable that our military budget in 1886 exceeded that of 
 Germany by a hundred millions. These figures show what sacri- 
 fices are being constantly made on the other side of the Rhine. 
 According to M. Roche, several items should be deducted from 
 the French budget, such as the Gendarmery which, in Germany, 
 figures in the budget of the Minister of the Interior. 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 251 
 
 It has, therefore, been quadrupled in fourteen 
 years, and this increase is almost entirely due to 
 additional outlay in the War Department. We 
 could quote other figures in this same order of 
 ideas ; those we give abundantly suffice for the 
 purpose of forming an opinion on the result of the 
 policy imposed by Prince Bismarck on Germany. 
 Austria applied herself to the performance of her 
 duties with circumspection worthy of commenda- 
 tion, but in doing so she did not forget her finan- 
 cial position. She followed Germany, but at a 
 slower pace, without displaying an ambition to do 
 things as well or on so large a scale as she did. 
 She does not conceal, however, that she has 
 attained the utmost limit of her resources, and 
 there is a feeling at Vienna that if these efforts 
 have to be continued much longer they will be 
 attended with inevitable embarrassment to the 
 Government of the Emperor Francis Joseph. To 
 this natural uneasiness are joined the differences of 
 the various nationalities forming the Austro- Hun- 
 garian Empire, differences which exaggerated 
 taxation and compulsory military service have 
 worked up into a state of exasperation. But 
 whilst Austria has been strictly performing her 
 duties as an ally of Germany, she has taken par- 
 ticular care to keep up relations which she applied 
 herself to render easy and even cordial with all 
 the Powers, especially Russia. And so she has 
 
252 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 borne the burdens she has imposed on herself 
 without showing visible signs of distress, and no 
 disagreement of a bitter nature separates her from 
 other countries. 
 
 What a pity we cannot say the same of Italy ! 
 That noble country, the cradle of our civilisation, 
 had found a sister nation who, extending her a 
 friendly hand, had assisted her to cast off all 
 foreign yoke, and to put an end to the painful 
 position of being divided into many States, which 
 dated back from centuries. Italy under the 
 guidance of a skilful and clear-headed Prince, 
 aided by enlightened and patriotic advisers, had 
 completed her resuscitation with a success that 
 had surpassed all expectations. The problem 
 was solved. To bring her enfranchisement to a 
 glorious issue, she had been obliged at the com- 
 mencement to contract loans, and in a measure 
 to discount the future ; she had been compelled 
 to have recourse to paper money and obligatory 
 currency. Her budgets in early years showed 
 deficits. By the Sovereign's prudence and the 
 skill of his Ministers all these difficulties had 
 been mastered, the country freed from onerous 
 expedients ; and the liquidation of the financial 
 law at last showed a surplus, when new men 
 having grasped the reins of power embarked 
 the kingdom in the Triple Alliance adventure. 
 We have no need to relate what ensued. No 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 253 
 
 one moreover, can be mistaken, in the painful 
 sight that Italy now presents to astounded 
 Europe. What could we add to Signor Crispi's 
 avowals on returning to power? "Italy's posi- 
 tion is grave," he said, "more grave than it 
 ever has been." What shows him to be tho- 
 roughly sincere, this time, is the proposal, or 
 rather the prayer ad inisericordiam, which he 
 addressed to the representatives of the people 
 to abdicate all authority, all control, in his favour. 
 " The difficulties we have to overcome," he added, 
 "are considerable, and to raise our credit, re- 
 organise the finances, assert the authority of the 
 law, and give the country confidence again, we 
 require the co-operation of the Chamber without 
 distinction of parties. In that view we ask you 
 for the truce of God." That is to say, to vote 
 what Signor Crispi considers the most advantage- 
 ous without inquiring into the subject and without 
 discussion. At no period has the Prime Minister 
 of a constitutionally governed country been heard 
 to hold such strange language. It is not merely 
 a question of the deficit increasing and of those 
 in authority at Rome being in doubt as to the 
 possibility of meeting the requirments of all the 
 departments of State ; the country is also excited 
 and full of anxiety. The association of the fasci 
 in Sicily violently assails the fisc which is obliged 
 to persecute the tax-payers, and this movement 
 
254 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 spreads into the provinces round Naples and 
 Rome, also weighed down by excessive taxa- 
 tion. It is easy to conceive that Signor Crispi 
 has recourse to extraordinary and unconstitutional 
 expedients. 
 
 To whom or what does Italy owe this painful 
 state of things ? Evidently to the Triple Alliance, 
 to Prince Bismarck's work, which has been equally 
 disastrous to all the European continent as well 
 as to present and future generations. To arm is 
 no small matter ; armaments mean outlay ; those 
 who raise the largest contingents, who manufacture 
 new cannon or build armoured ships of greater 
 size, must pay for them ; and this constant pro- 
 gression, with the discoveries of modern science 
 laughing at established security, no longer knows 
 any limit. It drags along with it the progression 
 of the budgets, which already at the present 
 moment exceed the normal resources of all the 
 various States. And not only do these require- 
 ments absorb the revenues, they hinder national 
 labour, the development of industry, of agriculture, 
 and paralyze commerce ; they engender misery 
 and discontent ; they thus trouble order at home 
 and threaten international peace. It would be 
 childish to conceal from one's self that military 
 service, obligatory for all, imposing on the 
 Governments the duty of diverting a large portion 
 of the public revenue to form new battalions and 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 255-. 
 
 new fleets instead of using it for the welfare and 
 relief of the people, has, on the other hand 
 caused or facilitated the propagation of doctrines 
 subversive of all social order. And this calamity 
 of a new kind is becoming more serious and is 
 spreading everywhere. Formerly we only knew 
 of socialists ; we are now in presence of anarchists 
 and the " countryless " are announced. A short 
 time ago these doctrines were followed by only a 
 few adepts ; they now have representatives in all 
 the Assemblies, and the numbers increase each 
 time parliament is renewed. This is an unshaken 
 fact in Germany ; it has just asserted itself in 
 France. Thus the flood rises without end, that 
 of public burdens as that of ideas tending to the 
 destruction of all society. 
 
 There is the peace Prince Bismarck has wished 
 to guarantee to Europe ; there are its bitter fruits. 
 It puts the old world in presence of two alterna- 
 tives — misery or war ; unless it leads it to another 
 catastrophe which is none the less redoubtable — 
 social strife. In presence of facts of which we 
 are all witnesses no one is justified in lulling him- 
 self with the illusion that each country in Europe 
 can indefinitely raise its taxes ; such however, is 
 the obligation which the involuntary hermit of 
 Friedrichsruh has imposed on all of them. This 
 is compulsory ruin at a date more or less distant. 
 Italy's fate bears irrefutable testimony to it, and 
 
256 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 that is what is fatally reserved to all other countries. 
 Each will delay the settling day in proportion to 
 the extent of its national wealth, but none have 
 the certainty of indefinitely escaping it. It will 
 be the war of guineas, as Prince Bismarck re- 
 marked with that humouristic wit which is one of 
 his distinguishing characteristics. But when the 
 store is exhausted, with what reserves will they 
 manufacture this new kind of projectile ? Let us 
 be serious, and acknowledge that science, by a 
 mockery of fate, herself sterilises, so to say, all 
 the sacrifices that are made to place and keep the 
 military forces on a proper footing, by rendering 
 it necessary, through fresh discoveries, to be con- 
 stantly renewing them. By increasing sometimes 
 the resisting power of the armour plates, some- 
 times the penetrating power of the projectiles or 
 else the range of the rifle or field piece, she 
 renders the outlay of yesterday on her own in- 
 dications, useless to-morrow. 1 No one therefore 
 can uphold the theory that the day will come 
 when it will be possible to pull up on this 
 slippery and never-ending slope. Europe is con- 
 
 1 Formerly it did not cost three million francs (,£120,000) to 
 build a large frigate of the line armed with one hundred and 
 twenty cannon. The last ironclads that have been launched 
 have been built at an outlay of twenty-seven million francs. There 
 are some on the stocks that will cost thirty million francs. 
 Formerly we were obliged to keep an armament for an army 
 of 500,000 men in our arsenals ; at the present day we must keep 
 up an armament for four millions of men. 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 257 
 
 demned to drag herself along there until worn 
 out, until the revolt of public conscience which 
 will prefer the supreme struggle, the battle for 
 life as General Caprivi expressed himself, to 
 ruin and misery. That is armed peace, there 
 are the consequences of it, there is where the 
 personal policy of Prince Bismarck has led 
 the whole of Europe, people and Governments 
 alike ! 
 
 This redoubtable calamity is happily not immi- 
 nent. A new and providential occurrence places 
 a barrier in the way, the understanding between 
 France and Russia, the sole benefit we owe to 
 Prince Bismarck. These two Powers, against 
 whom the Triple Alliance was directed, now closely 
 united, guarantee an honourable peace to Europe. 
 No one can suspect the feelings of the Emperor 
 Alexander III. The new Chancellor of the 
 German Empire paid striking homage to their 
 sincerity in one of his recent speeches. With less 
 warmth, but equal good faith, we believe, he 
 recognised that the Republic cherished the same 
 sentiments. The telegrams the Czar and M. 
 Carnot exchanged at the time of the departure of 
 the Russian fleet from Toulon conveyed the 
 same impression to the mind of every one. No 
 aggression to fear on either hand. Let us hasten 
 to add that there is no more desire for war at 
 Berlin or Vienna than at St. Petersburg or Paris. 
 
 s 
 
258 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 We are no longer living in the times when 
 Count Moltke looked on war as a social 
 necessity, as a benefit, pursuing his master with 
 his obtestations to engage in it. Nor are we in 
 those dangerous days when he thought advantage 
 should be taken of the distress of France to crush 
 her for ever. The young Emperor of Germany 
 sometimes holds language to his troops which is 
 certainly not in harmony with the spirit of the 
 times. He says to them : "You must have but 
 one will, mine ; but one law, my law." He showed 
 himself less temperate still when, addressing the 
 4th Army Corps at Erfurt, he pronounced the 
 following words which would always be regret- 
 table on the lips of a sovereign : "It was here 
 that the Corsican parvenu humbled us so pro- 
 foundly ; but it was from here, in 1813, that the 
 flash of revenge started which was to lay him 
 low." This was an imprudent evocation, and were 
 similar remarks heard in France we should be 
 bitterly reproached with them ! Such errors may 
 be attributed to juvenile enthusiasm and to a 
 traditional feeling in the House of Hohenzollern. 
 For it is only right to recognise that the Emperor 
 William has given proofs of his firm desire to 
 preserve peace, and we should not be surprised 
 if we were to learn he had taken care to master 
 warlike inclinations around him. We have quoted 
 a few words from his Chancellor which permit one 
 
ARMED. PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 259 
 
 to think that he has always repudiated all idea 
 of a preventive war. 
 
 Unfortunately, apart from the fatal and inevit- 
 able contingencies we recently pointed out, there 
 remains the mysterious chapter of the unforeseen, 
 that master of the universe, especially since Europe 
 has been divided into two camps as ready to rush 
 on to one another as if we were on the eve of a 
 struggle. I have no liking either for triple or 
 double alliances, wrote Mr. Gladstone ; for in 
 reality the definite aim of these alliances is not 
 pacific. The strength of a nation consists, in the 
 last extremity, in the economy of its forces. The 
 future of Europe, I fear is very black, although 
 with the grace of God, the present pacific situa- 
 tion may still last some time. 1 These remarks, 
 emanating from a Statesman of long experience 
 and gifted with a mind developed in the world 
 of politics, deserve to be retained and meditated 
 on. 
 
 In truth, in the state Europe was then, bristling 
 with cannon, fortresses, swarming with armed 
 men, what an incalculable fund of prudence and 
 discretion would be required to avoid a conflict ! 
 In 1866 while Austria and Prussia were mobilising 
 their armies, some one inquired of Prince Bismarck 
 how it was possible hostilities could break out 
 
 1 Letter addressed to Signor Schilizi, Manager of the Corriere di 
 Napoli. 
 
 S 2 
 
260 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 when there was no lawful reason for war. " Ah r 
 bah ! " he answered, "the cannon will talk without 
 it." That is the redoubtable unknown, the sword 
 of Damocles suspended over the peace of the 
 world. We trust there will not be found a heart 
 sufficiently steeled, so unchristian-like a soul as to 
 hasten the frightful conflagration which may be 
 the result of this situation ; but who can foresee 
 incidents swift and imperious that leave no one 
 any time for reflection ? During the fifty years 
 that followed the wars of the First Empire each 
 State possessed its peace budget, which was, in a 
 way, unalterable ; each had an army of moderate 
 and invariable strength ; no one disturbed his 
 neighbour. Every fresh war required long pre- 
 paration ; there was thus time for explaining 
 matters, and mediators could come forward with 
 offers of assistance. 
 
 The Germans of our times have taken us back 
 to the early days of their ancestors, who were 
 always under arms, ever ready to invade territory 
 bordering on their possessions. It pleased King 
 William I. of Prussia to increase his military 
 power, whilst Count Bismarck chose to advise his 
 master, who lent a willing ear, to embark in war ; 
 and the peaceful condition in which Europe lived 
 until their time, has been so thoroughly upset that 
 there remains no trace of it. After having- re- 
 arranged the map of Europe to their fancy and 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 261 
 
 advantage, they returned victorious and loaded 
 with laurels to Berlin ; but did they take repose 
 and prosperity back to Germany ? The Swabian 
 and, even more so, the Pomeranian peasants emi- 
 grate to escape the benefits of Prince Bismarck's 
 policy. The heavy taxes, the necessity of con- 
 cluding alliances, of remaining under arms, either 
 on the western or northern frontier, show, on the 
 contrary, that the adviser, of one mind with the 
 sovereign, has inaugurated a period of heavy bur- 
 dens and protracted anxiety ; that together they 
 have cast the country on the road to ruin or 
 gigantic struggles ; unless, as we have already 
 said, the menace of another scourge, social warfare, 
 constrains the various Governments to arrive at 
 an understanding guaranteeing a new period of 
 appeasement and concord to the people. 
 
 Is there any necessity to mention the disastrous 
 calamities that another war would inflict on Europe? 
 We all foresee them with feelings of horror. 
 Armies of several millions of men are not de- 
 stroyed in one campaign ; a great number of fort- 
 resses dotting all the lines of defence, and provided 
 with every technical improvement of modern 
 times, are not reduced so easily. The struggle 
 would, therefore, be long, sanguinary, devastating 
 for all the countries that become the theatre of it, 
 on the Rhine, the Alps, the Vistula. The convic- 
 tion of this is so painful that Sovereigns and 
 
262 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY . 
 
 Statesmen, all speaking with equal fervour, advo- 
 cate the preservation of peace, and, by professions 
 of faith reiterated without end, repudiate all ag- 
 gressive intention, and bear witness to their ardent 
 desire to maintain it. But do they conform to 
 this programme by employing their time and 
 efforts in the preparation of war, by persevering in 
 a state of things that must necessarily produce it ? 
 One would search history in vain for a precedent 
 authorising one to think so. You do not arm for 
 peace, you arm for war, particularly when you do 
 so to excess ; when you display such a passion for 
 arming, there is always a time when you come to 
 blows, Count Bismarck well knew this when he 
 assisted King William in developing the Prussian 
 army by battling with the representatives of the 
 country, by governing without a budget, by devot- 
 ing, without credits regularly voted, all the available 
 resources to the military forces of the kingdom 
 during the first and hardest period of his long 
 ministry. 
 
 The Sovereigns and Governments who sincerely 
 desire to dispel the black spots accumulating at the 
 four corners of the horizon should place their 
 solicitude and care in another sphere. We have 
 said, and it is not possible to contradict us, that 
 by maintaining the present situation, a power 
 more imperious than all human determinations 
 together, the force of circumstances, what the 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 263 
 
 ancients termed fatality, will lead us direct, in- 
 evitably either to war or ruin ; it moreover 
 abundantly supplies the most detestable doctrines 
 with powerful material for propagation. Before 
 long, all the causes of some profound trouble, of 
 some perturbation without remedy, will be united : 
 misery, anarchy, a conflagration that is imminent. 
 These dangers must be attended to, and, in pre- 
 sence of that necessity, a Government, formidably 
 armed, draws the sword, convinced of purifying 
 all by the glaive and brand, having, indeed, no 
 other issue from the predicament in which it has 
 placed itself. Is it not the duty of every one to 
 avoid such contingencies whilst it is still possible ? 
 We are, perhaps, in error, but we are inclined tO' 
 think that time, which under such circumstances is 
 of advantage to no one, is less prejudicial to France, 
 as it passes on, than to other Continental powers. 
 The evil it develops is hurtful to the national 
 wealth of each country, and we do not think we 
 shall be expressing a presumptuous opinion in 
 imagining, that our resources permit of our 
 supporting longer than most of our neighbours 
 the international situation that weighs as heavily 
 on them as on ourselves. We believe, neverthe- 
 less, that we shall be faithfully interpreting public 
 feeling in France by entreating any who are able 
 to contribute to such a purpose, to seek the 
 solution ef this redoubtable problem, which appeals 
 
264 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 both to the solicitude and religion of rulers of 
 every order ; to spare the world those hecatombs 
 which, come what may, cannot benefit civilisation, 
 which would be a mortal shame for the present 
 generation, and a lawful ground for the malediction 
 of those to come. 
 
 We have performed a duty in pointing out the 
 evil, and, in order to fulfil our task in all sincerity, 
 we have hidden nothing. It is not within our 
 sphere to give the remedy. It will be found in 
 the consciences of the powerful of the earth ; let 
 them search therein, and they will discover the 
 elements of appeasing solutions. The Triple 
 Alliance is a deed of defiance and hatred ; facts 
 prove this superabundantly at present. It will 
 produce what it has had within it in germ since 
 its origin : ruin or war, perhaps both scourges 
 together. If those who formed it or who have 
 become its guardians are not convinced, it is 
 because Jupiter has turned them silly in order 
 to chastise them the better. Morality would be 
 an idle word if this truth, which the wisdom of 
 centuries has bequeathed to us, were not to triumph 
 in our time. 
 
 But morality, in history, has overcome all abuse 
 of power, and in this instance it will not fail. 
 Certain publicists, acting under the influence of a 
 feeling that is to be commended, have wished to 
 be before the various Governments in the work of 
 
ARMED PEACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 265 
 
 conciliation for which the populations are offering 
 up all their prayers. They have invented arrange- 
 ments founded sometimes on exchanges, some- 
 times on compensations, without ever having been 
 able to conceal from themselves that the great diffi- 
 culty lies in Alsace-Lorraine. We cannot follow 
 them on this ground, where the most warrantable 
 combinations, those even that seem the most im- 
 pressive, are put forward without authority or 
 sanction. If the question belongs to the domain 
 of public opinion in some ways, its solution de- 
 pends exclusively on the initiative and agreement 
 of Governments. It is for them to attend to it ; 
 they are entrusted with the most precious of all 
 missions : that of assuring peace and prosperity to 
 the nations whose destinies are in their hands. 
 The task is that of diplomacy. If the matter is 
 left to her she will sail round this tempestuous 
 cape. How many are the conflicts she has 
 prevented, how many the wars she has stayed ? 
 Were she in presence of a Gordian knot, she 
 would untie it ; our state of civilisation allows of 
 and requires that she should ; or, otherwise, it 
 must be severed, recourse must be had to the 
 sabre, and the first cut that is given will be the pre- 
 lude to disasters that no century has known. Prince 
 Bismarck's work will be completed by the glaive 
 and brand beyond the limits his pride had fixed 
 for it. The responsibility of the originator will 
 
266 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 be shared by his continuators. If they do not 
 wish to incur it, let them hurry, for there is but 
 little time ; let them consider that war will set 
 several millions of formidably armed men fighting. 
 " Peace," the Emperor William is reported to 
 have said, on hearing of the welcome our fleet 
 received at Cronstadt, " no longer rests with me." 
 That is an error. Of all European sovereigns 
 he better than any other can give peace the basis 
 it requires to be durable. Few Princes before 
 him have had the good fortune to meet with a 
 more noble and glorious task. 
 
 February, 1894. 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 I have referred in the preface of this volume 
 to the book I published in 1871, in which I printed 
 the most important of the despatches I sent from 
 Berlin during my residence in Prussia, and in- 
 cluding- the complete correspondence exchanged 
 with the Due de Gramont on the occasion of my 
 mission to Ems. In 1872 M. de Gramont issued 
 a work entitled La France et la Prusse avant la 
 guerre, in which he saw fit to readjust what he 
 termed the inexactness of my comments and to 
 particularly call attention to the results I claimed 
 to have obtained in the course of this last negotia- 
 tion, and which he contested. Feeling it impos- 
 sible for me to submit to these rectifications, I had 
 resolved to reply to them, and with that object 
 had prepared a brief statement of the exchange 
 of views I had had with the King of Prussia and 
 of the account I had given of them to the Imperial 
 Government. I was hesitating, however, to 
 
268 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 engage in a discussion that might in some respects 
 be unfortunate, when M. de Gramont died. 
 Obedient to a feeling that all will understand, 
 I then made up my mind to keep the work 
 in my drawer intending to publish it if new 
 developments made it an imperative duty for 
 me to do so. 
 
 The contradictory versions that have never 
 ceased to be given of my conduct and acts, both 
 in France and abroad, in regard to a matter of 
 eminent interest for the history of our times, have 
 made me decide not to wait until I disappear in 
 my turn without having rectified the reproaches, 
 I might say the accusations, articulated by the 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs who was my last 
 chief. I am sure this resolution will be ratified 
 by public opinion. I give this work here in the 
 form in which it was written at the specified date, 
 adding a few explanatory or complementary notes 
 on incidents that became better known afterwards. 
 The reader, in perusing these pages, should bear 
 in mind that they were penned in 1873, previous 
 to various occurrences that have contributed to 
 throw light on the events to which they refer. 
 
 Great national catastrophes, whilst exasperating 
 the minds of the public, at the same time lead 
 their consciences astray. Under the imperious 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 269 
 
 influence of this irritating trouble, public opinion, 
 maddened by a disaster, eagerly seeks the causes 
 of it, and in its precipitation forms impressions, 
 which, however erroneous they be, soon take root 
 and assume the character of belief. 
 
 This psychological phenomenon is often met 
 with in our history ; it made its appearance in 
 1870 at the time of our first reverses. Public 
 opinion, astounded at the defeat of our armies, 
 accused the Government of knowing nothing and 
 its agents of having supplied untrustworthy in- 
 formation. Having occupied the Embassy at 
 Berlin for several years, these recriminations 
 touched me personally. I was however conscious 
 of not having been wanting in any of my duties. 
 I endeavoured to throw light on matters, and in a 
 book entitled Ma Mission en Prusse I placed 
 the most essential part of my correspondence 
 before the public. I gave the whole of that 
 portion of it which I had exchanged with the 
 Due de Gramont during the mission I had per- 
 formed at Ems, confining myself to briefly 
 connecting the facts together, so as to thoroughly 
 establish, without drawing any other inference 
 from them, that I had faithfully, and not without 
 success, accomplished my task both at Ems and 
 Berlin. 
 
 M. de Gramont, in his turn, published a work 
 called; La France et la Prusse avant la guerre T 
 
270 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 in which he considered himself called upon to 
 enter into long explanations to prove that, con- 
 trary to my assertions, I had not obtained, whilst 
 .carrying out his orders, any sttfficient and timely 
 concession. 
 
 Disavowed by my Chief of the last hour, I 
 found myself obliged, on my own part, to com- 
 ment on our respective participation in the 
 incidents that preceded the war. 
 
 I have no need to refer again to the care I 
 took to justify the confidence the Imperial 
 Government had shown me, in accrediting me 
 as ambassador to the King of Prussia. I proved 
 that I had not neglected .sending the Minister 
 any information it was my duty to transmit to 
 him ; I established particularly that I had pointed 
 out in an explanatory despatch dated January 
 5th, 1868, that it had been firmly resolved at 
 Berlin, to restore the German Empire, even by 
 force of arms if necessary ; I had foreseen that 
 in such a contingency, the whole of Germany, 
 Governments and populations alike, would gather 
 enthusiastically round Prussia ; I neither omitted 
 to mention the armaments that were proceeding 
 before my eyes, nor Count Bismarck's efforts to 
 ^ensure the kindly neutrality of Russia, especially 
 in view of restraining Austria ; finally, I -called 
 attention to the candidature of Prince Leopold 
 of Hohenzollern to the crown of Spain eighteen 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 271 
 
 months before it was avowed at Berlin and 
 Madrid, I pointed it out as a stratagem devised 
 by the Prussian Cabinet so as to cause the 
 Imperial Government difficulties of a diplomatic 
 order which might affect both our security and 
 our relations with Germany. 
 
 On these points, I have not met with any 
 serious contradictions. It therefore only remains 
 for me to set the assertions of M. de Gramont 
 right in regard to the part I took in the negotia- 
 tions he instructed me to open at Ems with King 
 William. I know I am undertaking my own 
 defence ; I am pleading pro domo mea with the 
 knowledge that whosoever seeks to defend him- 
 self is exposed to more criticism than sympathy ; 
 but I am compelled to do so ; and when I have 
 placed my acts and conduct, as well as the judg- 
 ment passed on them by M. de Gramont, in the 
 proper light,, it will be recognised that I could 
 not abstain from following that course. 
 
 I. 
 
 I was at Wildbad when I received orders to 
 repair to Ems, where I was to be joined by a 
 courier bearing the instructions of the Imperial 
 Government. I left without delay and reached 
 my destination on the evening of July 8th. 
 What did the Minister's instructions prescribe 
 
272 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 me ? After having explained the motives that 
 rendered it necessary to intervene in this affair 
 he wrote as follows: — "Be guided by these 
 reasons, impress them on the King, and exert 
 yourself to obtain a promise from him that he 
 will advise Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern to 
 withdraw his acceptance." 1 That was the theme- 
 set forth in the official despatch ; but to this de- 
 spatch was joined a private letter stating more pre- 
 cisely the nature of the resolution I was instructed 
 to obtain from the King, whilst at the same time 
 modifying it ; in this form it read : — " The King's 
 Government does not approve of Prince Leopold 
 of Hohenzollern's acceptance, and gives him orders 
 to reconsider this decision which was arrived at 
 without its permission." The Minister added : " It 
 will then be necessary to inform me whether 
 the Prince, obedient to this injunction, renounces 
 his candidature officially and publicly." 
 
 It was not thus that I understood and per- 
 formed M. de Gramont's orders : I obeyed his 
 official instructions without paying any attention 
 to the recommendations in his private letter. I 
 did not ask the King to^jjvg^-oxtteps to Prince 
 Leopold of Hohenzollern to reconsider his deci- 
 sion, I requested him to advise the Prince to 
 renounce his candidature. 
 
 1 This document, like all those I shall quote later on, will be 
 found in full in my volume Ma Mission en Prusse. 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 273 
 
 Whoever has had anything to do with this kind 
 of diplomatic business knows what gentleness,, 
 what precaution is necessary, in opening an irritat- 
 ing discussion, especially when one enters on it 
 direct with a Sovereign. Had I adopted the tone 
 recommended in the Minister's private letter, I 
 should certainly have taken up an attitude that 
 would have been wounding for the King ; he 
 would have concluded that there was a firm 
 determination to inflict a personal retractation 
 on him, and I should have brought on an im- 
 mediate rupture. I should have reversed the 
 parts from the commencement, loaded ourselves 
 with all the wrongs we were justified in reproach- 
 ing Prussia with ; I should have placed all our 
 advantages in jeopardy especially that resulting 
 from the straightforward manner of our proceed- 
 ings and the duplicity of the Berlin Cabinet. I 
 was all the more constrained to attenuate the form 
 I gave to my communications, as I perceived the 
 irritation aroused by the utterances of M. de Gra- 
 mont at the Corps Legislatif, during the sitting of 
 July 6th vibrating in Germany. It was evident to 
 me that German pride had been deeply wounded. 
 
 In regard to this, here is what our Minister at 
 Stuttgart, a centre, however, where Prussia was 
 regarded with distrust rather than sympathy, 
 wrote to M. de Gramont on July 10th : " I must 
 not conceal from your Excellency the feeling of 
 
274 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 bewilderment and dismay that the declaration 
 of July 6th has caused among the public ; we 
 are considered generally to have justice on our 
 side, on the basis of the incident itself; but it 
 is regretted that the sense of our own sterling 
 right has not prompted us to greater moderation 
 in the form of expression." If for Southern 
 Germany we had been wanting in forbearance, 
 for the North we had been imperious and 
 aggressive. My first duty compelled me to be 
 mindful of these feelings, which newspapers of 
 all shades on the other side of the Rhine had 
 retailed in passionate language. 
 
 But I had a much more powerful reason for 
 advancing with extreme prudence over the ground 
 I was about to approach ; I knew it to be strewn 
 with snares. I had detected Prince Leopold's 
 candidature in the month of March of the pre- 
 ceding year ; I had conferred on the subject with 
 Count Bismarck, who did not contest the accuracy 
 of my information, but who had refused to give 
 me the assurance that the King would refrain, 
 if the contingency occurred, from authorising his 
 nephew to accept the Spanish crown. I felt 
 convinced that he intended to have recourse to 
 this combination whenever he considered it 
 opportune to cause a bitter disagreement be- 
 tween Germany and France. 1 The trap he set 
 
 1 Recent revelations have amply shown with what anxiety, and 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 2^5 
 
 for us in 1870 had been prepared a long time 
 in advance ; at Ems my thoughts were parti- 
 cularly busy with the determination not to fall 
 into it myself and drag the Government of my 
 country along with me. 1 
 
 I was, therefore, very careful at the audience 
 the King granted me the day after my arrival, 
 not to suggest he should give Prince Leopold of 
 Hohenzollern orders to renounce his candidature. 
 I confined myself to expressing the hope that 
 he would advise him to do so, insisting on the 
 reasojis_jhat~Tnade it a duty for us to intervene 
 in this matter. In proceeding thus, I did not 
 overlook my official instructions, I conformed 
 to them, without exposing myself to be wanting 
 in the respect due to the Sovereign of a great 
 country ; without departing from the sound tradi- 
 tions of diplomacy. 
 
 The King, with his customary courtesy, gave 
 me an answer that may be epitomised as follows : 
 " I had no part in the negotiations, which have 
 been carried on between the Spanish Government 
 and the Hohenzollern Princes exclusively. I 
 
 what desire to find a cause for rupture, my attitude and speech 
 were watched. To be convinced of this it will suffice to recall 
 under what circumstances and with what rapidity of resolve Count 
 Bismarck took advantage of the opportunity as soon as we gave it 
 Tiim, and with what an easy conscience he altered the Ems 
 •despatch. 
 
 1 See Ma Mission en Prusse, p. 301 and following. 
 
 T 2 
 
276 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 limited myself to informing Prince Leopold and 
 Prince Anthony, his father, when they solicited 
 my approbation, that I did not consider I could 
 refuse it them. I have just made inquiries as 
 to their present intentions, and I shall wait until 
 I have information on that point, to let you 
 know what resolutions may be adopted." He 
 assured me at the same time, that if Prince 
 Leopold showed himself disposed to withdraw 
 his acceptance, he would hasten to approve 
 that decision. I shall point out, shortly, in 
 what frame of mind, and for what reasons, the 
 King thus assumed an attitude of apparent irre- 
 sponsibility ; but the reader will not forget that 
 if the King refused to take any initiative in 
 the matter, even that of giving advice — and it 
 will be seen that in this respect he showed 
 himself absolutely inflexible — ■ he would have still 
 more resolutely repelled any suggestion to give 
 an order, if perchance I had made one, as M. de 
 Gramont commanded me to do in his private 
 letter. It is clear that I should have placed an 
 insuperable obstacle to any understanding. The 
 King, besides, in announcing to me that he 
 had placed himself in communication with the 
 Princes, gave us a pledge of his participation 
 in the affair, and that was a point gained, and 
 one of extreme importance for the issue of the 
 negotiations. 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 277 
 
 In conveying an account of this first interview 
 to my Government, I was very careful to fathom 
 what was passing in the King's mind; and the 
 conclusion I arrived at was that if he had no evil 
 designs, he proposed arranging matters so as to 
 be able to pretend that Prince Leopold had spon- 
 taneously changed his views in regard to his 
 candidature ; the King would thus avoid the 
 necessity of himself personally making a con- 
 cession calculated to damage his prestige and 
 offend public opinion in Germany, I added that 
 I could not, without incurring the risk of making 
 it thought I had come to Ems solely with the in- 
 tention of bringing about a rupture, abstain from 
 acquiescing in the King's desire that I should 
 await the answer of the Hohenzollern Princes 
 " to resume our conference." 
 
 What reception did this first communication 
 meet with from the Imperial Government? "The 
 King," M. de Gramont wrote to me, 1 "is hence- 
 forth a party to the affair ; after having made the 
 avowal that he authorised acceptance, he must 
 advise and obtain renunciation." The same day 
 he telegraphed to me: "Write me a despatch I 
 can read at the Chambers and publish, in which 
 you will show that the King was aware of and 
 authorised Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern's 
 acceptance, and mention particularly that he told 
 
 1 Letter dated July 10th. 
 
278 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 you he desired to concert with the Prince before 
 making known to you what he had resolved." 
 
 If the Imperial Government had decided that 
 no arrangement was possible apart from an order 
 given by the King to the Prince to renounce his 
 candidature or a prohibition to maintain it, M. de 
 Gramont would have informed me ; he would 
 have urged me to limit myself to obtaining from 
 the King, without delay, a formal and explicit 
 declaration guaranteeing us Prince Leopold's 
 desistance from that moment. It was certainly 
 not in this sense that I could understand the 
 instructions M. de Gramont sent me, after having 
 received the account of my first interview with 
 the King ; I was, on the contrary, justified in con- 
 cluding that the Imperial Government did not 
 propose placing any obstacle in the way of the 
 understanding the King proposed to arrange with 
 his relatives, and that he thought our efforts, 
 should be directed, especially, to securing Prince 
 Leopold's renunciation with the King's assistance. 
 I therefore had every reason to believe I was on 
 the right ground, and ought to remain there. 
 
 Nevertheless, although I had been only two> 
 days at Ems, M. de Gramont was becoming 
 impatient ; he was certainly afraid that there 
 was a desire to keep us inactive whilst the 
 German army was being mobilised. He was,, 
 however, too familiar with diplomatic affairs to 
 
MY MISSION TO. EMS 279 
 
 be unaware that a negotiation of this importance 
 could not be concluded so rapidly. Notwith- 
 standing, without changing his instructions of the 
 previous day in any way, he telegraphed to me 
 on the evening of the nth: "At the point we 
 reached, I must not disguise from you that your 
 tone no longer responds to the position taken up 
 by the Emperor's Government. You must now 
 emphasize it more." I was able to answer him, 
 no later than the following morning : "I had 
 understood myself that at the point where matters 
 now are I should adopt a firmer tone and become 
 more pressing. I acted so yesterday, at a fresh 
 interview with the King and previous to receiving 
 your last telegrams, as you will see by the de- 
 spatch that will reach you to day. You will no 
 doubt be of opinion that I could not emphasize 
 my language more forcibly without ruining the 
 object of my mission." 
 
 In my desire to hasten the solution so im- 
 patiently awaited at Paris, I had indeed asked for 
 a second audience of the King on the nth, to 
 obtain from him the authorisation to inform my 
 Government of his intention to advise Prince 
 Leopold to renounce the Spanish crown. I made 
 energetic exertions in that view. After this 
 interview I wrote to M. de Gramont : — 
 
 " . . . . The King deigned to receive me this 
 morning, and, in accordance with your directions, I 
 
2 8o STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 sought to prevail on him to consent without further 
 delay to a resolution that was of a nature to fully 
 satisfy us. I therefore asked him to permit me to 
 let you know that he would invite Prince Leopold 
 of Hohenzollern to renounce his candidature. The 
 Prince, I said, being unable to dispense with con- 
 forming to the King's views, we should be at once in 
 a position to calm all apprehensions. To induce his 
 Majesty to favourably entertain the desire I ex- 
 pressed to him, I concealed neither the distrust, nor 
 the irritation of public opinion in France ; I told 
 him of the impatience displayed by the Senate 
 and Corps Legislatif, and of the necessity in which 
 the Emperor's Government found itself of satisfy- 
 ing them, of the peril this state of things occa- 
 sioned, and of the additional danger caused by 
 every day's delay. . . . The King frequently inter- 
 rupted me with objections he had already made at 
 a preceding audience. His Majesty particularly 
 insisted on the capacity in which he had intervened, 
 that of head of the family, which, in his opinion, 
 pledged neither the Sovereign of Prussia nor his 
 Government. I did not confine myself this time 
 to answering that this duality would not be under- 
 stood, I added that it was inadmissible from every 
 point of view ; that the King was chief of the 
 family, because he was the Sovereign, and therefore 
 it was impossible to separate, in the present instance, 
 these two qualities, and that the Hohenzollern 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 281 
 
 Princes owed him absolute obedience simply 
 because he united one and the other in his person ; 
 that the matter could not be viewed in any other 
 light, and that it was, consequently, easy to under- 
 stand why the accession of Prince Leopold was 
 regarded in France in the light of a Restoration 
 of the Empire of Charles V 
 
 " ' I s it not a fact,' I continued, ' that, in case of 
 a, dissent between the Government of your Majesty 
 and that of the Emperor, we should he under th e 
 n ecessity of watching our frontier of the Pyren ees 
 a nd consequently dividing our forces ? No one 
 would deny it. Our conduct is therefore traced 
 out for us by the requirements of our own security, 
 and we cannot, on this occasion, be exposed to the 
 reproach of voluntarily raising a conflict.' 
 
 " According to the King I exaggerated the 
 consequences of a combination which he, for his 
 part, had never desired. He maintained it was 
 impossible for him — and the terms in which he 
 expressed himself lead me to think that he con- 
 sidered it incompatible with his sovereign dignity 
 — to modify his attitude and exact that Prince 
 Leopold should renounce the Spanish crown after 
 having told him he did not forbid him to accept it. 
 Unless I make a mistake, what the King does not 
 wish is, as I wrote to you, to assume the responsi- 
 bility of a retreat or of a concession that would 
 offend public feeling in Germany, and it is his firm 
 
282 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 intention, if he has no other designs, to cast off all 
 responsibility, and let it rest on Prince Leopold and 
 Prince Anthony, the father, exclusively. 
 
 " ' Besides,' resumed the King, ' there is no 
 peril in waiting, and the delay of a day or two> 
 will not make matters worse. . . .' 
 
 " The King, without concealing the impression 
 my remarks had produced on his mind (I had 
 replied to his observations and advanced new 
 arguments), pointed out to me that our persever- 
 ance, when he only asked for a very brief delay 
 to ascertain the intentions of the two Princes, 
 might make him think we aimed at bringing on 
 a conflict. I protested against this supposition, 
 and offered the King a sure means of ascertain- 
 ing our real feelings by begging his Majesty to 
 guarantee us Prince Leopold's renunciation. . . ." 
 
 In concluding this despatch, I said : — 
 
 "The King asked me again, with real per- 
 sistency, to telegraph to you in his name, without 
 losing a moment, that he expected a communica- 
 tion to-night or to-morrow from Prince Leopold, 
 and that he would at once give me a definite 
 answer." J 
 
 To this despatch I added a private letter, in 
 which I wrote to M. de Gramont : 
 
 "The King, notwithstanding all my efforts,, 
 persists in saying Jie__cajm^t^and_jwill not take on 
 
 1 Despatch dated July nth, 1870. 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 283 
 
 .himsel f to order Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern 
 to withdraw the word he has sent the Spanish 
 G overn ment. His Majesty leaves me to surmise, 
 and througTTthose about him gives me to under- 
 stand, as Baron Werther 1 will tell you, that the 
 Prince will spontaneously renounce the Spanish 
 crown which has been offered him, and the King 
 will not hesitate to approve his decision. ..." 
 
 Why was it we asked the King to give us the 
 assurance he would advise Prince Leopold to 
 renounce the Spanish crown? It was certainly 
 not for the purpose of touching him personally ; 
 it was solely with the view of obtaining a 
 guarantee for the Prince's desistance without 
 wandering through long, tedious negotiations. 
 How did the King receive my remarks ? Did 
 he decline to enter into them so as to leave us no 
 hope of a satisfactory solution? In none of our 
 interviews did the King express the thought that 
 Prince Leopold had given his word and should 
 abide by it. What he never would concede to 
 me was to give me an undertaking that he would 
 constrain him, even by the channel of advice, to 
 make a renunciation ; he declined to proceed in 
 that manner ; he did not reject the principal ob- 
 ject of our complaint, the renunciation of Prince 
 
 1 Baron Werther, Prussian Ambassador at Paris, had preceded 
 me at Ems. On the nth, he received orders to return to his post. 
 He left the same afternoon, convinced that the crisis would be 
 settled the following day by the King's declaration. 
 
284 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 Leopold. I had had a clear presentiment of 
 this from the commencement of the negotiations, 
 and had very distinctly pointed it out in my com- 
 munications of July nth. The King, I said, 
 wishes that the Prince's desistance should appear 
 to be the result of a spontaneous expression of 
 his own will. I had communicated this decision 
 of the King to M. de Gramont early on the 
 morning of the 9th, whilst explaining the reasons 
 by which he had been influenced. 
 
 But if I had been unable to persuade the King 
 to consent to the measure that would have most 
 promptly put an end to the affair, I had never- 
 theless brought him to make us the sacrifice of 
 his nephew's candidature, and of the political views 
 of his own advisers. The Kinof would not give 
 way on the matter of form ; but in regard to the 
 broad basis of the question, I had led him to tell 
 me he would put no obstacle in the way of Prince 
 Leopold's renunciation ; he allowed me to con- 
 jecture and even caused me to be informed that 
 the Prince must spontaneously renounce the crown 
 that had been offered him, and that his Majesty 
 would not hesitate to approve his resolution. I had 
 further obtained the King's promise to give me a 
 definite answer within a very brief delay, and it 
 has been seen how persistently he had asked me 
 to telegraph, in that sense and in his name, to M. 
 de Gramont. 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 285 
 
 II. 
 
 My second conference with the King had there- 
 fore taken place on the 1 1 th at noon ; I gave an 
 account of the substance of it by telegraph, and 
 the same day sent a despatch embodying all the 
 explanations that have just been read ; and I, 
 moreover, added a private letter, as I have said. 
 The courier bearing my correspondence reached 
 Paris on the morning of the 1 2th. 
 
 Thus on the morning of the 12th, it is impor- 
 tant to note it, before having had any knowledge 
 of the telegram forwarded by Prince Leopold's 
 father to the Spanish Ambassador at Paris, before 
 receiving Baron Werther, before the interpellation 
 of M. Clement Duvernois — incidents to which I 
 shall return later on — M. de Gramont had been 
 correctly informed of the King's intentions. He 
 was aware that he absolutely refused to enter into 
 an engagement, with zts to give Prince Leopold an 
 order or a counsel, that he desired his nephew's 
 desistance to have all the character of a free and 
 personal resolution, but that he consented to 
 acquiesce in it by a declaration which he author- 
 ised me to transmit to the Imperial Government. 
 M. de Gramont knew finally that this declaration 
 would be made to us within a brief delay. 
 
 Did this arrangement, the form of which was 
 
286 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 approved by the King, whilst it gave us satisfac- 
 tion in regard to the main point, respond to our 
 lawful requirements ? Ought we to be content 
 with the renunciation, reputed voluntary, of Prince 
 Leopold of Hohenzollern with the King's simple ac- 
 quiescence, or did imperative considerations compel 
 us to insist on the King taking the avowed initiative 
 of an order or a counsel addressed to the Prince ? 
 
 These questions must evidently have been sub- 
 mitted to the judgment of the Emperor and his 
 Ministers. What was decided ? What I can 
 affirm, is that the first communications addressed 
 to me on the 12 th, immediately after the arrival 
 of my courier despatched on the previous evening, 
 fully justified me in thinking that the Imperial 
 Government was of opinion that the solution 
 I anticipated was sufficiently satisfactory. 
 
 Here, indeed, is what M. de Gramont tele- 
 graphed to me at forty-five minutes past twelve : 
 
 "You tell us in your despatch, that the King 
 insists with extreme vivacity, on a very brief delay 
 to ascertain the intentions of the two Hohenzollern 
 Princes, and that, immediately he is acquainted with 
 them, he will give us a definite answer. He adds 
 that he would take our refusal for a wish to 
 provoke a conflict. 
 
 "Our object has never been to provoke a 
 conflict, but to protect the legitimate interests 
 of France in a question that we did not raise. 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 287 
 
 So, whilst contesting the accuracy of the King's 
 reasoning, and whilst energetically maintaining our 
 pretensions, we cannot refuse the King of Prussia 
 the delay he asks us for, but we trust this delay 
 will not exceed a day. We approve the language 
 you used in the last instance." 
 
 This first telegram was followed by another 
 despatched at 1.40 and ran as follows : 
 
 " Very confidential. Use all your skill, I would 
 even say your subtleness to establish that Prince 
 Leopold of Hohenzollern's renunciation is an- 
 nounced, communicated, or transmitted to you by the 
 King of Prussia or his Government. This is of the 
 utmost importance to us. The King's participa- 
 tion should, at any price, be consented to by him 
 or result from the facts in a tangible manner." 1 
 
 What results from these two telegrams ? That 
 from the 1 2th at noon, I am no longer urged to insist 
 that the King will forb id Prince Leopold of Hohen- 
 zollern to insist on his candidature nor even that 
 he will advise him to renounce it. This proves, 
 once more, that such was not the sole object of 
 my mission, as has been pretended by M. de 
 Gramont. It is shown, on the contrary, that they 
 had resolved at Paris to accept the desistance on 
 the conditions that were offered us. 
 
 1 The precise date and hour of these two telegrams have been fixed 
 by M. de Gramont himself. See La France et la Prusse avant la 
 guerre, pp. 102 and 103. 
 
288 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 The exact sense of these telegrams is given 
 us, besides, by M. de Gramont ; this is how he ex- 
 presses himself on the subject : " Let us admit 
 that Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, without the 
 King's orders, without the King's advice, alone, of 
 his own free impulse renounced his candidature 
 and informed his Majesty of his having done so ; 
 the King could by becoming the direct medium of 
 his cousin's spontaneous resolution, announce the 
 desistance himself, with the accompaniment of a 
 few kind words. The desistance, transmitted by the 
 King, became an official act, a Prussian act, and 
 the Government would have found a shadow of 
 guarantee in it which, in its love for peace, it 
 would have raised to the proportions of a 
 satisfactory assurance 
 
 " It was under the influence of these im- 
 pressions that the two following telegrams were 
 sent to Count Benedetti. . . . " 1 — those of 
 the 1 2th, 12.45 an d 1.40, which I have just 
 reproduced. 
 
 The Emperor's Government, even according to 
 M. de Gramont, had therefore found the basis of 
 an acceptable arrangement in the information I 
 forwarded on the nth. Did it contain merely the 
 shadow of a guarantee, and is M. de Gramont 
 authorised to pretend that all I had asked had 
 been refused, that on the 12th, I had obtained 
 
 1 La France et la Prusse avant la guerre, pp. 101 and 102. 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 289 
 
 absolutely nothing ? * I shall correct this assertion 
 further on. At present I will resume this first 
 part of the negotiation, and I establish that the 
 King, pressed by my demands, had asked for a 
 short respite to communicate to me the solution 
 he had decided on ; that he allowed me to surmise 
 that Prince Leopold would desist, and that he 
 would join his sovereign approbation to that 
 Prince's renunciation ; that this two-fold declara- 
 tion was announced to me for the following day ; 
 that the Imperial Government was informed of 
 this on the morning of the 1 2th ; that M. de 
 Gramont telegraphed to me that the delay solicited 
 by the King was granted him ; that he urgently 
 told me to establish that the renunciation had 
 been announced, communicated, or simply trans- 
 mitted to me by the King. I moreover show that 
 if nothing had yet been definitely concluded on 
 the 1 2th,- the solution was a fact that was morally 
 certain, that at that time it had been con- 
 sented to by both parties, and that all that was 
 wanting was the King's declaration. As to Prince 
 Leopold's initiative, as to the spontaneity of his 
 determination, we all knew, on either side, that it 
 was a fiction which, in reality, could deceive no one : 
 nobody could have the least doubt in France or 
 Germany, or anywhere else, that the Prussian 
 candidate's conduct would be in accordance with 
 
 1 La France et la Prusse avant la guerre, p. 160. 
 
 U 
 
290 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 the views of his Sovereign. It would therefore 
 become evident for Europe that the King, without 
 ' consenting to enter into an engagement with us, 
 had decided, as we had asked, to advise Prince 
 Leopold to renounce a crown, which at another 
 moment, and without our knowledge, he had 
 advised him to accept. 
 
 Moreover, did the King's declaration come in 
 time, within the delay proposed on the one side 
 and accepted on the other, between Ems and 
 Paris ? Was it in accordance with our expecta- 
 tions ? Certainly, and on all points. 
 
 On the 13th, indeed, I was able to telegraph to 
 M. de Gramont : "The King has received Prince 
 Leopold of Hohenzollern's reply; it is from Prince 
 Anthony, and informs his Majesty that Prince 
 Leopold, his son, has desisted from his candidature 
 to the Spanish crown. The King authorises me to 
 make known to the Emperor's Government that 
 he approves this resolution. The King entrusted 
 one of his aides-de-camp with the duty of making 
 this communication to me, and I reproduce the 
 exact terms of it." 
 
 I will relate further on why the King did not 
 make this declaration to me himself ; but in the 
 form in which it reached me, did it not fulfil the 
 programme of the previous day ? What, indeed, 
 were the conditions of this programme ? M. de 
 Gramont had fixed them himself in the two first 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 291 
 
 telegrams of the 12 th. The delay granted to the: 
 King was not to exceed a day ; Prince de Hohen- 
 zollern was to desist ; the King was to communi- 
 cate this renunciation to me ; the King's participa- 
 tion was, at any price, to be consented to by him 
 or to result from the facts in a tangible manner. 
 Now, it was certainly the day following the 12th, 
 and within the stipulated delay, that I received the 
 King's declaration ; it was to the effect that Prince 
 Leopold had renounced the Spanish crown ; I was 
 able to inform my Government that the King 
 approved of his action. Thus the desistance had 
 been announced, communicated, and transmitted to 
 me by the King, whose participation was also as. 
 manifest, as tangible as M. de Gramont could 
 desire. 
 
 I should like to terminate these remarks here ;. 
 but M. de Gramont has wished, he says, to act the 
 part of a redresser, with the sole object of placing 
 truth in face of voluntary or involuntary error, 1 and 
 he too often puts me on my trial, my assertions are 
 too frequently the object of his rectifications, for 
 me to. abstain from following him. It is not 
 without painful feeling, without lively repugnance, 
 that I make up my mind to do so ; the reserve I 
 observed, in publishing my justificative book, ac- 
 cording to M. de Gramont's expression, super- 
 abundantly proved my sincere desire to avoid a. 
 
 1 La France et la Prusse avant la guerre, p. 6. 
 
 U 2 
 
292 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 regretful controversy, and if I now cast off this 
 reserve it is because I am imperatively bound to 
 do so. 
 
 III. 
 
 I have shown, if I am not mistaken, that on 
 the 1 2th, at the moment when M. de Gramont 
 sent the telegraphic despatches of 12.45 an( ^ 
 1.40, the Imperial Government had resolved 
 to consent to Prince Leopold's renunciation 
 on the conditions, or rather in the form, con- 
 ceded by the King. It is important to bear 
 this fact in mind, because it is from that day that 
 one observes the appearance of fresh complications 
 which led to war. 
 
 It was indeed on that afternoon that the Spanish 
 Ambassador at Paris received a telegraphic de- 
 spatch sent from Sigmaringen by Prince Anthony 
 of Hohenzollern, and announcing that Prince 
 Leopold, his son, had withdrawn his candidature. 
 How did M. de Gramont regard this communi- 
 cation, and what determinations were suggested 
 by it? On the 12th, at three o'clock, he receives 
 the Prussian representative at Paris, Baron von 
 Werther, who had arrived that same morning 
 from Ems. 
 
 "We had," he says, "hardly exchanged a few 
 words when I was interrupted by a message sent me 
 by the Spanish Ambassador He brought 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 293 
 
 me the news of the desistance of Prince Leopold 
 of Hohenzollern and placed before me the tele- 
 gram he had just received from Prince Anthony. 
 M. Olozaga congratulated himself on this solution, 
 for, from the point of view of the Madrid Cabinet, 
 it was all the more complete as it was, in reality, 
 its own work. For my part, I could not conceal 
 from myself that the desistance, coming in this 
 form, far from advancing our business, complicated 
 
 it, on the contrary, in a most serious way 
 
 " Not a word anent France," continues M. de 
 Gramont, " not a word anent Prussia. All was 
 passing between Prince Anthony of Hohenzollern 
 and Spain. Thus the hope we had founded on a 
 participation even indirect of the King in the 
 Prince's desistance faded away. We had thought 
 that if the King had informed us of his cousin's 
 resolution, it would have been possible to find, in 
 this Royal communication, a guarantee, a satis- 
 faction that would have sufficed. Here the King 
 of Prussia not only communicated us nothing, but 
 we heard of the desistance by a public telegram of 
 the Havas Company, forwarded without being in 
 cipher, and the contents of which had consequently 
 become known as it passed along the line to many 
 other persons before reaching us It was im- 
 possible to make any mistake as to the reception 
 the Chambers, the whole country would give to 
 this document, the publication of which was 
 
294 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 already an accomplished fact The Govern- 
 ment was in presence of a new situation. It was 
 evidently necessary to think about new expedi- 
 ents 
 
 "It would be superfluous to describe here the 
 state of people's minds at the time when Prince 
 Anthony's despatch reached the hands of the 
 public. . . . The outburst of indignation that came 
 from every organ of the press, one after the other, 
 and which among the masses took the form of 
 excitement that was almost disquieting. . . . There 
 were only two courses to follow : either to 
 associate one's self in a measure with popular feeling 
 whilst seeking to restrain it, or to brave it openly 
 by declaring that in presence of the refusal of the 
 King of Prussia, it was necessary to renounce all 
 hope of satisfaction, all guarantee against the 
 return of such events, and be contented with the 
 simple desistance of Prince Leopold of Hohen- 
 zollern." 1 
 
 Thus spoke M. de Gramont. But it was 
 not necessary to choose either of these courses. 
 There was a third, which was already traced out 
 by the state of our negotiations with the King on 
 the 1 2 th, and which it was important to firmly 
 keep to. I explain it. 
 
 First of all, it will be well at this point to recall 
 the circumstances that one requires to have 
 
 1 La France et la Prusse avant la guerre, pp. 109 and following. 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 295 
 
 uppermost in one's mind, if one desires to form 
 a correct idea of what occurred on this fatal day. 
 Had the Spanish Ambassador shown Prince 
 Anthony's telegram to other members of the 
 Cabinet before going to M. de Gramont? It has 
 been affirmed that it was divulged shortly before 
 the opening of the sitting of the Corps Legislatif. 
 The President of the Council on reaching the 
 Chamber was able to communicate its contents 
 to several deputies, notably to M. Thiers; who 
 was of opinion that this desistance guaranteed peace 
 and was sufficient. 1 It must, however, beacknow- 
 
 1 " He (M. Emile Ollivier) hastened up to M. Thiers on reaching 
 the chamber : ' You were right ! We have succeeded ! It is 
 peace ! ' — ' Now,' M. Thiers said to him, ' you must keep quiet.' — 
 • * Be at ease,' he replied, ' we have peace, and we will see it is not 
 disturbed.'" (Jules Simon, Souvenirs du 4 Septembre, p. 161.) 
 Such was so thoroughly the President of the Council's feeling that 
 a newspaper, the Constitutionnel, which notoriously received hints 
 from the Ministry, regarded Prince Leopold's desistance as an im- 
 portant success, although it had as yet only been announced by his 
 father and without any participation of the King of Prussia. 
 
 " We are satisfied," it said in its number published on the morn- 
 ing of the 13th. " Prince Leopold had accepted the Spanish Crown. 
 France declared that she could not consent to a political combina- 
 tion or family arrangement that she considered threatened her 
 interests, and the candidature has been withdrawn. Prince Leopold 
 of Hohenzollern will not reign in Spain. We do not ask for any- 
 thing further, and we welcome this pacific solution with pride.^ 
 
 " It is a great victory that costs neither a tear nor a drop of 
 Wood." 
 
 I had pursued no other aim, myself, during my stay at Ems, but 
 I had always wished to attain it with the accompaniment of the 
 King's sanction, which would have conveyed to this result all the 
 aspect of a sound and lasting arrangement. In any case, it is well 
 
296 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 ledged that this was neither the feeling of most 
 of the members of the Assembly, nor particularly 
 that of the journalists who had invaded the rooms 
 at the Palais Bourbon. Their indignation was, 
 on the contrary, sharp and noisy. M. Clement 
 Duvernois ascended the tribune amidst the ex- 
 citement and asked to interpellate the Government 
 "on the guarantees it intended stipulating for to 
 avoid the successive recurrence of complications 
 with Prussia." This was the first suggestion 
 of the baleful thought to provide against a con- 
 tingency that was from every point of view 
 unlikely to occur ; until then, the Government, 
 at all events, had mentioned neither the necessity 
 nor the suitability of it. 
 
 Let us now see what was the character, the 
 value, or the import of the telegram communicated 
 by M. Olozaga. This despatch came from a 
 Prince whom we had ourselves kept apart from 
 our discussions. It came neither from the Berlin 
 nor the Madrid Cabinet. M. Olozaga had not 
 been requested to show it to the French Govern- 
 ment. He had done so, but in a private capacity 
 and on his own responsibility. There was and 
 there could be no mention either of France or 
 Prussia in it. It was entirely unconnected with 
 
 to note that at this solemn moment the President of the Council 
 was far from sharing the feeling of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
 and of regarding Prince Anthony's telegram and the publicity given, 
 to it in the light he did. 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 297 
 
 the negotiations we had opened at Ems. In a 
 word, so far as we were concerned, it did not exist, 
 and we ought to have ignored it or have treated 
 it as a dead letter. That was the Emperor's 
 view. " Prince Anthony's despatch addressed 
 to Prim," 1 he wrote to M. de Gramont on the 
 evening of the 12th, "is an unofficial document, 
 so far as we are concerned, which no one was 
 legally entrusted with the duty of showing to us. . . . 
 So long as we are without an official communication 
 from Ems, we are not supposed to have received 
 any reply to our lawful demands. . . ." 2 
 
 One can understand that the deputies and 
 public, knowing nothing of our negotiations, easily 
 formed the opinion at the news of Prince Leopold's 
 renunciation, announced by the Spanish Ambas- 
 sador, that Prussia, that the King himself meant 
 
 1 By the intermediary of M. Olozaga. 
 
 2 This letter will be found at p. 136 of La France et la Prusse 
 avant la guerre. 
 
 I have also had in my hands the minute of a despatch sent to 
 King Victor Emmanuel by one of his agents on the afternoon of the 
 1 2th, after an interview with the Emperor, and announcing that his 
 Majesty felt lively satisfaction at the desistance of Prince Leopold, 
 although he as yet only knew of it by his father's message, as the 
 pacific issue of the crisis. The King, it was added, could, the 
 Emperor said, return to the Alps and peacefully resume chamois 
 shooting. The King, indeed, had discontinued this pastime, and 
 had returned in all haste to Turin when he heard of the complica- 
 tions that had so suddenly arisen. I am not indebted to M. Nigra 
 for information in regard to this incident, but I think I can invoke 
 his testimony, as he was present at the interview which I think I 
 have been right in referring to here. 
 
298 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 to steal away and give the information that 
 reached us, in an indirect manner, and under cover 
 of a foreign diplomatic agent, for all satisfaction. 
 Deputies and public were justified in considering 
 this proceeding a fresh insult, added to that which 
 the Berlin Cabinet had been guilty of towards 
 France by arranging the threads of an intrigue at 
 Madrid conceived in a hostile and perfidious spirit. 
 This conviction was calculated to cause irritation, 
 and it is not unnatural that a voice was raised in the 
 Corps Legislatif to interpellate the Government. 
 
 /What is not understood is that M. de Gramont, 
 who was thoroughly informed on every point, 
 should have shared this impulse, and have 
 adapted his language and resolutions to it. He 
 knew the value of Prince Anthony's telegram ; he 
 knew the moment was close at hand when the 
 King would answer our demands ; he knew in 
 what terms and under what form the Prussian 
 monarch would come to an explanation with us, 
 and he was all the more bound to await this 
 declaration, as we had granted the King the 
 delay he had asked us for/ Assuredly the trans- 
 mission of Prince Anthony's telegram had been 
 arranged between Ems and Sigmaringen ; it had 
 preceded the King's declaration ; it had no doubt 
 been so arranged to thoroughly establish Prince 
 Leopold's spontaneity. He alone had accepted 
 the Spanish offers, it was pretended, he alone 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 299 
 
 declined them : it was hoped thus to disengage both 
 the Emperor's responsibility and that of his Govern- 
 ment ; but no one could have been deceived by 
 the manoeuvre ; and, besides, would it not have 
 been wise policy to have refrained from noticing 
 these efforts which were directed especially 
 towards diminishing the irritating impression that 
 this incident had produced in Germany? 
 
 If M. de Gramonthad thought, like the Emperor, 
 that Prince Anthony's despatch had no value for 
 us, and that we were therefore understood to have 
 received no answer, what would have happened ? 
 The King notified to us on the following day, in 
 the official form, through the intermediary of the 
 French Ambassador, not only that Prince Leopold 
 had desisted, but that he, the King, gave his entire 
 approval to that renunciation without any reserva- 
 tion. We thus obtained, with every possible 
 guarantee, the satisfaction due to us. 
 
 As to the excitement that was almost disquieting, 
 which had animated public feeling, as soon as Prince 
 Anthony's message became known, that could easily 
 have been appeased. This excitement found 
 its origin in the thought that the communica- 
 tion made to the Spanish Ambassador was the 
 only reparation that would be accorded us ; this 
 was an error ; it should have been set right, 
 a summary statement should have been made to 
 the Chamber from the tribune as to the state of 
 
300 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 our negotiations at that moment. M. de Gramont 
 by giving an explanation would have tranquillised 
 the Assembly and the public mind, and the next 
 day, on learning the step taken by the King, the 
 satisfaction would have been all the more pro- 
 nounced, as on the previous evening every one had 
 experienced humiliating disappointment. It is, 
 therefore, not correct to say that we had either 
 to associate in the national feeling or brave it. 
 
 IV. 
 
 Yet it was under the influence of this mistaken 
 conviction that the Due de Gramont, who had 
 heard at that time of the interpellation of M. Du- 
 vernois, resumed the discussion that had been inter- 
 rupted by M. Olozaga with the Prussian Ambassa- 
 dor. What was its subject ? M. de Gramont has 
 been careful to inform us, and it is well to quote 
 what he says about it. When explaining his 
 Sovereign's real intentions, Baron Werther persist- 
 ently maintained, writes M. de Gramont: "that, 
 by authorising Prince de Hohenzollern's can- 
 didature, the King had never had any intention of 
 being offensive to the Emperor and had never 
 supposed that the matter could have given 
 umbrage to France 
 
 " I therefore pointed out to Baron de Werther," 
 continues M. de Gramont, "that from the moment 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 301 
 
 he assured me that nothing had been farther from 
 his Sovereign's mind than to offend the Emperor 
 or disturb France, such a given assurance would 
 certainly be of a nature to facilitate the understand- 
 ing we were seeking .... and that being so, I 
 submitted to his appreciation whether the proper 
 mode to employ would not be a letter from the 
 King to the Emperor 
 
 " Baron von Werther on his part, without for- 
 mally agreeing to this suggestion, did not oppose 
 its discussion, as his despatch shows. I have 
 found among my papers the minute of a note I 
 wrote there and then, and a copy of which I gave 
 him. Its object was to sum up the assurances 
 that seemed to me likely to facilitate the under- 
 standing we were both in search of. This is how 
 it was worded : 
 
 " ' By authorising Prince Leopold of Hohen- 
 zollern to accept the Spanish crown, the King 
 did not think he was injuring the interests or 
 dignity of the French nation. His Majesty 
 approves of the Prince of Hohenzollern's with- 
 drawal and expresses his desire that all cause of 
 misunderstanding between his Government and 
 that of the Emperor may henceforth disappear.' 
 
 " Such was," M. de Gramont states further on, 
 "the course we had suggested to the Prussian 
 Ambassador, not with the idea of publishing the 
 text of the note, as he has erroneously written, 
 
302 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 but simply with the thought of making known its 
 substance in order to obtain a basis for our con- 
 ciliatory and pacific efforts." 1 
 
 How did the Prussian Ambassador receive this 
 proposal ? The two diplomatists are not absolutely 
 agreed on this point. " I pointed out to the Due de 
 Gramont," M. de Werther has stated in his de- 
 spatch, "that such a course would be rendered 
 extremely difficult by the explanations he had 
 given on the 6th of this month to the Chamber 
 of Deputies ; they contained statements that 
 must have deeply offended his Majesty the 
 King." 
 
 However this may be, the Prussian Ambassador 
 undertook to transmit the suggestion which had 
 been made to him to his Sovereign, but only when 
 he had been given to understand that I should be 
 entrusted with this duty if he refused to perform it 
 himself. 
 
 M. de Gramont went to Saint Cloud, at the 
 conclusion of his interview with the Prussian 
 Ambassador, no doubt to confer with the Emperor. 
 What passed between them ? M. de Gramont does 
 not tell us, neither does he inform us of the 
 Sovereign's opinion of this grave incident ; but we 
 can gather this opinion from the facts, and it is 
 easy to bring it to light thanks to some documents 
 
 1 See La France et la Prusse avatit la guerre, p. 115 and 
 following. 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 303 
 
 M. de Gramont includes in his work. If the 
 Emperor had given his approval to the overture 
 made to' Baron Werther, if he had considered it 
 becoming and opportune, the first duty of his 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs, supported by his 
 acquiescence, would have been to have informed 
 his Plenipotentiary at Ems without delay, and 
 instructed him to spare no effort to obtain the 
 King's assent to the matter. Yet, what did M. 
 de Gramont do ? On returning to his Ministry he 
 telegraphed to me : " Seven p.m. We have re- 
 ceived the renunciation of Prince Anthony, in the 
 name of his son Leopold, of his candidature to 
 the throne of Spain through the intermediary of 
 the Spanish Ambassador ; in order that this with- 
 drawal may have its full effect, it seems necessary 
 that the King of Prussia should associate himself 
 with it and give us an assurance that he will not 
 again authorise this candidature. Be good enough 
 to seek an audience of the King to obtain 
 
 this declaration " 
 
 This telegram left me in ignorance of the 
 proposal made to Baron Werther and of that 
 Ambassador's undertaking to transmit it to his 
 Sovereign. M. de Gramont could not, however, 
 have overlooked that on the following day, on the 
 arrival of the despatch of the Prussian representa- 
 tive at Paris, I should find myself in the strange 
 position of having to present to the King a very 
 
304 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 different basis of agreement to the one which, 
 unknown to me, Baron Werther would have sent 
 him. Is it not already permissible to presume 
 that the Emperor had rejected the compromise 
 suggested by M. de Gramont, considering, as a 
 Sovereign, that the King of Prussia would look 
 upon it as incompatible with his dignity ? It is 
 evidently on this account that, during the inter- 
 view at Saint Cloud, the proposal I was instructed 
 to make was substituted for the one which had 
 been suggested to the Prussian Ambassador. The 
 difference was considerable : I had to ask the 
 King neither for a letter nor the justification of 
 his previous conduct ; I had merely to solicit a 
 verbal declaration guaranteeing us against the 
 repetition of a candidature we could not sub- 
 mit to. 1 
 
 1 There is one point which to me remains absolutely obscure, and 
 which I should not know how to attempt to elucidate. It seems to 
 me that it cannot be doubtful that the instructions given me on the 
 evening of the 12th implied, in the Emperor's mind, the abandon- 
 ment of the proposal made during the day to the Prussian Ambas- 
 sador. But, in this case, what was the duty of the Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs ? To instruct me as to his interview with Baron 
 Werther and to authorise me to declare that it was to be considered 
 null and void. This is what the Emperor certainly presumed. Was 
 it simply an omission on M. de Gramont's part, or did he persuade 
 himself that my silence would suffice to show the King of Prussia 
 that the French Government did not persist in the desire it had 
 expressed to his representative ? This is what I am unable to 
 answer. What is certain is that the two proposals reaching the 
 King on the same day were bound to mutually damage each other 
 and seriously complicate matters, because on presenting the one I 
 was not expressly authorised to withdraw the other. 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 305 
 
 But what more than abundantly proves that the 
 Emperor never for a moment agreed to M. de 
 Gramont's suggestion is that, during the evening, 
 shortly after their interview, he thought it neces- 
 sary, in order to distinctly express his way of 
 thinking, to send him the letter from which I have 
 already quoted, and which I think it well to give 
 in its entirety : — 
 
 " Thinking over our conversations of to-day and 
 reading Prince Anthony's telegram again, I see 
 we must confine ourselves to giving additional 
 emphasis to the despatch you have of course sent 
 to Benedetti, by laying stress on the following 
 points : — 
 
 " 1. We are dealing with Prussia and not with 
 Spain. 
 
 " 2. The telegram sent by Prince Anthony to 
 Prim is a non-official document for us which no- 
 body has been instructed, lawfully, to communi- 
 cate to us. 
 
 " 3. Prince Leopold consented to be a candidate 
 for the throne of Spain, and it is his father 
 who withdraws the candidature. 
 
 " 4. It is therefore necessary that Benedetti 
 should insist, as he has been instructed to do, upon 
 having a reply by which the King would under- 
 take, for the future, not to permit Prince Leopold , 
 who has made no promise, to follow his brother's 
 ■example and start, one fine day, for Spain. 
 
 x 
 
306 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 " 5. So long as we have not received an official 
 communication from Ems, we are not presumed 
 to have received an answer to our lawful demands. 
 
 "6. It is therefore impossible to make a com- 
 munication to the Chambers before being better 
 informed." 
 
 The Emperor had certainly thought with his 
 Minister, and it is to be regretted he did so, that 
 an immediate explanation in the Corps Legislatif 
 would be premature. He was no doubt persuaded 
 that the excitement occasioned by Prince Anthony's 
 telegram would be dispelled by that which I had 
 announced for the following day, embodying the 
 King of Prussia's declaration. What is more 
 certain is that the Emperor did not vary as to the 
 value to be attached to the telegram received by 
 M. Olozaga, and that he never saw anything in it 
 beyond a document that should be ignored. 
 
 M. de Gramont, conforming to the Emperor's 
 intentions, sent me another telegram at 11.45 at 
 night couched in the following terms : " The Em- 
 peror instructs me to point out to you that we 
 cannot consider the renunciation communicated to 
 us by the Spanish Ambassador, and which is not 
 addressed to us direct, as a sufficient answer to 
 the lawful demands we have made to the King of 
 
 Prussia " And he again urged me to insist 
 
 with a view to obtaining a declaration that would 
 be a guarantee for the future. He thus ratified 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 307 
 
 his telegram of seven o'clock in so far as the 
 nature of M. Olozaga's visit was concerned. 1 
 
 The reader will therefore bear in mind that on 
 the 1 2 th, before noon, we considered the desist- 
 ance of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern an accept- 
 able solution if the King notified it to us himself 
 with the accompaniment of his approbation. On 
 the afternoon of the same day, after the arrival of 
 Prince Anthony's telegram, after the interpellation 
 of M. Clement Duvernois, there is a complete 
 change. In the existing state of public opinion, 
 and the attitude of the parliamentary majority, " it 
 was impossible," wrote M. de Gramont, " to accept 
 the desistance without stipulating guarantees ! . . ." 
 Were these guarantees indispensable, and what 
 reasons were there for presuming that the King of 
 
 1 The following day, the 13th, M. de Gramont nevertheless made 
 the following declaration to the Corps Legislatif: " Yesterday the 
 Spanish Ambassador officially announced to us Prince Leopold of 
 Hohenzollern's renunciation of his candidature to the Spanish 
 throne. The negotiations we are engaged in with Prussia, and 
 which have never had any other aim, axe not yet concluded. It is 
 therefore impossible for us to speak of them and to give the 
 Chamber and country a general account of the affair." This was 
 not the view of the Emperor, who attributed no official character to 
 Prince Anthony's telegram, and he had explicitly pointed out this 
 in his letter to M. de Gramont. 
 
 1 could argue from this declaration that if our negotiations never 
 had any other object than the renunciation of Prince Leopold, I had 
 on my side thoroughly understood the character and aim of my 
 mission, and that the way in which I acquitted myself of it deserves 
 none of the reproaches, none of the rectifications M. de Gramont 
 has bestowed. 
 
 2 See La France et la Prusse avant la guerre, p. 130. 
 
 X 2 
 
308 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 Prussia, who had issued from this conflict with 
 some damage to his prestige, would consent to 
 renew it ? Every Cabinet, the press and public 
 opinion in every country had blamed the clandes- 
 tine way in which this affair had been introduced. 
 How, then, could one admit that the King, after 
 having approved his nephew's resolution in a com- 
 munication made to the French Ambassador, 
 could have, would have authorised him to resume 
 his candidature ? There was no need to provide 
 for this contingency : there was no necessity to 
 stipulate for guarantees in the view of preventing it. 
 I have finished with the 12 th, I come to the 
 13th, which completed what the previous day 
 commenced, and left the friends of peace no hope 
 of preserving it. 
 
 V. 
 
 I had received the two telegrams M. de 
 Gramont had sent me on the evening of the 
 previous day, during the night ; obedient to my 
 instructions I solicited another audience of the 
 King in the early morning. 
 
 His Majesty, perceiving me in one of the 
 walks, advanced towards me, and I was able, 
 without further delay, to inform him that Prince 
 Leopold's renunciation was already known at 
 Paris. He expressed great surprise. Assuredly 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 309 
 
 the King could not have had the hope of making 
 me believe that he was still ignorant, at that 
 moment, as to what the son had resolved and 
 the father had done, and that Prince Anthony 
 in telegraphing to Paris, had refrained from 
 telegraphing to Ems, 1 which would have con- 
 stituted a breach of courtesy towards the head 
 of his house ; but the King, who had given out 
 the parts, remained faithful to the one he had 
 reserved to himself. He wished to continue to 
 the end the fiction he had invented to shield 
 himself, personally, from any possible reproach of 
 having made a concession to France derogatory 
 to his dignity. He particularly desired to be 
 able to affirm that he had limited himself to 
 respecting the entire liberty of his relatives, as 
 he pretended he had done at the commencement. 
 
 1 The King had himself told me on the previous day, that he was 
 in telegraphic correspondence with the Princes of Hohenzollern. I 
 had, indeed, been able to telegraph to M. de Gramont on the 12th, 
 at six o'clock in the evening : " The King has just told me he has 
 received a telegram informing him that Prince Leopold's answer 
 will certainly reach him to-morrow. He added that he would send 
 for me as soon as he was in possession of it." This telegram no 
 doubt announced to him the departure of the one Prince Anthony 
 addressed the same day to M. Olozaga, but the King did not tell 
 me so, not desiring to intervene himself until the morrow, as had 
 always been his intention, when the renunciation would be a fact 
 accomplished and made public without his having had anything 
 whatever to do with it, thus adapting each of his acts to the stage 
 effect he had decided on from the commencement. I was not 
 therefore mistaken, and I had not deceived the Imperial Govern- 
 ment, in announcing, immediately after my first audience, how 
 matters were proceeding. 
 
310 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 Nevertheless, I pointed out to the King that as 
 a result of this incident, Prince Leopold's desist- 
 ance would not appease the excitement that had 
 been aroused by his candidature. I added, that 
 to calm all anxiety, to strengthen the good 
 understanding between the two countries, it 
 seemed desirable to guarantee the future as 
 soundly as the past, and in that view I begged 
 him to authorise me to transmit to my Govern- 
 ment the assurance that his Majesty would, if 
 necessary, exert his authority to prevent any 
 attempt to resume the candidature that had been 
 abandoned. 
 
 "You are asking me," answered the King, 
 "for an undertaking without limit and embracing 
 all contingencies ; I could not bind myself to 
 that." He added that he could not alienate 
 his liberty of resolution in that manner, " that 
 he had no hidden design, and that this affair 
 had caused him too much serious thought for 
 him not to desire it to be. irrevocably set aside." 
 I pointed out to him in regard to this, that we 
 could meet on the ground where the King had 
 himself taken up his position, that I was address- 
 ing the head of the family, and that in that capacity 
 he could assuredly accede to the request I was 
 instructed to make him. Vain efforts ; the King 
 absolutely refused to consent, whilst expressing 
 to me his regret at being unable to make "a 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 311 
 
 new and unexpected concession." x The King, 
 moreover, renewed to me the assurance that the 
 courier despatched from Sigmaringen would 
 arrive in the course of the day, and that he 
 would at once send for me to make me the 
 communication he had spoken of at our previous 
 interview. I was therefore justified in thinking 
 that I should have an opportunity, before the 
 day was over, of making another attempt to 
 prevail over the resolution I had been unable 
 to shake in the morning. 
 
 The opportunity did not occur, and matters 
 passed quite differently. The King, instead of 
 inviting me to go to him, entrusted his aide- 
 de-camp, Prince Radziwill with the duty of 
 bringing me his declaration, which was conform- 
 able to the assurances I had received, and, at 
 3.45, I was able to send M. de Gramont the 
 telegraphic despatch I have already quoted. 2 
 
 To what circumstances must this new attitude 
 of the King be attributed? He had up to that 
 moment displayed a conciliatory disposition and 
 the desire to extricate himself from this difficulty, 
 provided that whilst giving France satisfaction, 
 he was himself free from all responsibility to- 
 wards Germany. He had accepted the dis- 
 
 1 All the developments of this interview will be found in my 
 despatch of July 13th. 
 
 2 See p. 290. 
 
312 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 cussion, and this is all the more deserving of 
 remark as, during his whole reign, he had con- 
 stantly avoided entering into any diplomatic 
 question with the foreign representatives ac- 
 credited to him, invariably leaving such matters 
 to his Minister. At ten o'clock in the morning, 
 he opens, himself, our last interview on meeting 
 me ; at three o'clock in the afternoon, notwith- 
 standing his promises to receive me, he will only 
 communicate through the intermediary of one 
 of his officers. He was evidently displeased 
 at the overture I had made to him, and had 
 given me to understand that such was the case 
 when het old me we were requiring a new and 
 unexpected concess i on wViirh J rpade public, w ould 
 expose and humiliate him . It was in this frame 
 of mind and a few minutes after our early 
 morning meeting, that he had received Baron 
 Werther's despatch which had come by the 
 Paris mail. 1 As a matter of fact M. de Gramont 
 had asked him for a still more novel and un- 
 expected concession which for my part I was 
 absolutely ignorant of and could not withdraw. 
 He had evidently made up his mind from that 
 
 1 Baron Werther had declined to accede to the desire that had 
 been expressed to him to make use of the telegraph in transmitting 
 to the King the communication he had consented to submit to him. 
 (See his despatch.) This despatch forwarded from Paris on the 12th, 
 reached Ems on the 13th by the same channel and at the same 
 time as the ordinary letters. 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 313 
 
 moment ; he did not avoid the undertaking he 
 had contracted : he had informed me that Prince 
 Leopold had desisted, and that he acquiesced 
 in the renunciation, but he was thoroughly 
 determined not to proceed with the negotiations 
 any further, considering they came to an end 
 with the communication I had been authorised 
 to transit to my Government. I had to telegraph 
 to Paris: "The King, in answer toareguest 
 for another au di ence, sends me word that h e 
 cannot consent t o resume the discussion resp ect- 
 i ng assurances for the futu re. His Majesty has 
 informed me that he abides by what he said 
 to me this morning ' T he King ,' his mes- 
 senger furthe r said, ^ha s consented to give hi s 
 e'ntirfan d unreserved approbation to the de sist- 
 ance of P rinc e Leopo l d of Hohenzollern. and Jie 
 cannot do more.' " 
 
 It will be remarked that the King did not 
 close his door to me, that he simply declined 
 to discuss our last proposal again. He received 
 me, moreover, before his departure on the follow- 
 ing day. Therefore at Ems there was neither 
 an insulter nor a person insulted, and I cannot 
 too strongly insist on the point, in contradiction 
 to the allegations introduced by Prince Bismarck 
 whilst disguising the real facts. That, indeed, 
 is what he did not hesitate to do, by intervening, 
 at this moment, in a discussion to which he had 
 
314 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 hitherto remained a stranger. How became he 
 a party to it, and by the aid of what expedients 
 did he bring about the complications of the final 
 hour ? I still have this to explain. 
 
 VI. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 13th the King sent 
 Count Bismarck l a telegram, the very same 
 that the latter was to alter. In possession of 
 this document, and considering it gave him 
 authority to take the affair in hand himself, 2 and 
 
 1 See General Caprivi's speech in the Reichstag at the sitting 
 of November 24th, 1892, which contains the text of the King's 
 telegram. In this same speech, the new Chancellor undertakes to 
 set the assertions of his predecessor right. Briefly recalling the 
 incidents that marked the day of the 13th, at Ems, he expresses 
 himself thus : " Count Benedetti made another attempt to approach 
 the King, who caused him to be informed that if he asked for an 
 audience to return again to the question of guarantees, it could not 
 be granted." What the King declined to do, therefore, was to 
 resume the interview of the morning. This is shown or rather is 
 expressly stated in the report of the aide-de-camp on duty, who 
 served as intermediary between the King and Ambassador, and in 
 no way differs from the communications I made to M. de Gramont 
 in the course of the 13th. This is therefore an historical point 
 clearly established by the agreement of all the intervening parties. 
 See Ma Mission en Prusse, pp. 278 and following. 
 
 2 This despatch concluded thus : "His Majesty leaves it to your 
 Excellency to decide whether M. Benedetti's new demand and the 
 refusal it met with should be communicated to our representatives 
 abroad and to the press." Until the evening of the 13th, Count 
 Bismarck had not been called upon to intervene in the negotiation. 
 In any case his participation, whatever it may have been, exercised 
 no perceptible influence on the King's attitude. This is shown by 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 315 
 
 that in future he had freedom of action, Count 
 Bismarck undertook, without losing a moment, 
 to render all conciliation impossible and war in- 
 evitable. After having altered the sense of the 
 King's telegram and given it a meaning it did 
 not possess, he communicated it to all his diplo- 
 matic agents abroad. He informed all Europe, 
 by__this inst'flto iis manoeuvre, that the King ha d 
 s hown the Fre nch Ambassador the door, in- 
 fli cting thereby a humiliation on the Impe rial 
 Government which the jChancellor foresaw w ould 
 c6 mpeTTt to t ake the initiative nf. a rupture^ 
 After speaking to Europe he addressed public 
 feeling in Germany. The newspapers to which 
 he gave a tone, published in the evening, all. 
 gave the same warlike cry in inflammatory and 
 arrogant language : they said the King and 
 nation had been outraged, and that it was the 
 country's duty to rise in a body and wreak 
 vengeance for such a deadly offence. Instead 
 of exercising his authority over the press to 
 appease this popular irritation in regard to which 
 he feigned to be concerned on that selfsame 
 
 his interview with the Generals von Moltke and von Roon during 
 which he mutilated his Sovereign's telegram. The three com- 
 panions were saddened to see the matter fading into smoke instead 
 of ending in a noisy rupture. The King's telegram makes its 
 appearance at six o'clock, and they all set their wits to work to use 
 it as an instrument to bring on war. Count Bismarck's intervention 
 dates therefore from that time. It will be seen, later on, that I was 
 absolutely convinced of this in 1873. 
 
3i6 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 evening whilst conversing with the British Am- 
 bassador, 1 he directed all his efforts towards ex- 
 asperating national susceptibilities. 
 
 VII. 
 
 What must we infer from these facts which 
 I have just briefly recalled ? Either I am very 
 much mistaken, or it is permissible to conclude 
 from them that during the few days I was engaged 
 in following my negotiations with the King whilst 
 conforming to j my official instructions, no incident 
 arose of a nature to endanger their success. I 
 graduated the firmness of my language in my 
 audiences of the 9th and nth, as has been seen, 
 so as to bring the King to explain himself more 
 clearly in regard to his real intentions, to give 
 me more satisfactory assurances concerning the 
 final resolution Prince Leopold would take and 
 his own assent ; but on both occasions I remained 
 within the limits of prudent moderation. No one 
 will blame me for having observed this attitude in 
 such a delicate discussion ; a rash or even an ill- 
 considered utterance might make it deviate and 
 occasion a sanguinary conflict. 
 
 I ventured to remark in a letter written in the 
 month of November, 1870: "Did I succeed in 
 
 1 See the despatch from Lord Augustus Loftus in the Blue 
 Book of July 13th, 1870. 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 317 
 
 my efforts at Ems ? Yes, assuredly ; I had 
 indeed, in four days' negotiations, during which I 
 had been careful of all susceptibilities, performed 
 the mandate with which I had been entrusted." 
 M. de Gramont has vigorously reproached me 
 with this declaration. "On the 12th," he says, 
 "the Ambassador had obtained nothing, nothing. 
 His instructions not only ordered him to secure 
 the Prince's desistance, but to obtain from the 
 King that he would advise him to take that 
 course, which is quite different. But the King had 
 invariably refused to give this assurance." Was 
 this declaration indispensable, and was it wise or 
 advantageous, in any degree, to make the satis- 
 faction which we claimed, and was imminent, 
 subservient to it ? I have never thought so. 
 
 " . . . . On the morning of the 13th," writes 
 M. de Gramont, 1 "when M. Benedetti, furnished 
 with the instructions he had received during the 
 night, waited on the King and asked him to 
 refuse his sanction to a resumption of the 
 Hohenzollern candidature, no concession had at 
 that moment, been accorded by the King to 
 France. 
 
 "All our Ambassador had asked, all, had been 
 refused. He had obtained absolutely nothing." 
 
 The facts answer for me. 
 
 Did Prince Leopold desist ? Yes. Did the 
 
 1 La France et la Prusse avant la guerre, p. 159. 
 
318 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 King notify this renunciation to us and did he 
 approve it? Yes. Was this declaration made 
 to us at an opportune moment, at the right 
 time? Yes, once more. I, therefore, obtained 
 the concessions that were the objects of my 
 mission. 
 
 But how and by what series of new and unfore- 
 seen circumstances, did this entire satisfaction so 
 laboriously won, become the prelude of war ? 
 That has been seen, and I have no need to return 
 to the matter, but there is one point on which I 
 wish to place additional emphasis. Let it be 
 observed that it was on the 13th at forty-five 
 minutes past three that I telegraphed the King's 
 declaration. Now, at that moment Count Bismarck 
 was still a stranger to our negotiations ; he had 
 not intervened in them ; he had been in the im- 
 possibility of placing obstacles in the way of their 
 progress or of raising difficulties of any sort. He 
 was at Berlin, blaming his master, but reduced to 
 inaction and powerless ; he saw, with intense 
 bitterness, the affair turning to our advantage. 
 To understand how it happened that he was called 
 on to interfere, it is necessary to form a very 
 precise idea of the impression produced by the 
 two demands submitted to the King on the 13th, 
 one by me and the other by Baron Werther. 
 That which I was entrusted with the duty of 
 presenting to him — an assurance guaranteeing us 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 319 
 
 against a resumption of the Prussian Prince's 
 candidature — certainly upset him ; it was not 
 however of a nature to raise redoubtable com- 
 plications. We confined ourselves in fact to 
 soliciting a verbal declaration without making it a 
 condition of the understanding we were endeavour- 
 ing to arrange. I had even carefully sought not 
 to give it any other significance in my explanation 
 with the King. And so, on bringing our interview 
 to an end, he assured me he would send for me, 
 in the course of the day, as soon as he had heard 
 from the Princes of Hohenzollern. 1 But Baron 
 Werther's despatch arrived bringing the demand 
 or suggestion, if you will, made to that Ambassador 
 at Paris ; then, the King's frame of mind under- 
 goes a complete change. He will only communi- 
 cate with me through the intermediary of one of 
 his aides-de-camp, and he authorises Count Bis- 
 marck to take the continuation of the negotiation 
 in hand. The visit I receive from the King's 
 messenger terminates at forty-five minutes past 
 three, and at that same hour he has the telegram 
 sent to the Chancellor authorising him to intervene 
 in the discussion. 2 
 
 1 See Ma Mission en Prusse, p. 374. 
 
 2 We know now that this telegram was handed in at the telegraph 
 office at Ems, at forty minutes past three and that it reached Berlin 
 at eight minutes past six. (General Caprivi's speech in the 
 Reichstag on November 24th 1892.) It was therefore at the same 
 hour and simultaneously that the King took the two-fold resolution 
 
320 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 Everything was at once precipitated. On the 
 night of the 13th, the Prussian Ambassador 
 at Paris was recalled; on the 14th he visited 
 M. de Gramont : " Our interview was brief, 
 relates the latter ; he informed me, without 
 making any comments, that his Government 
 had blamed him for the way in which he had 
 received our suggestions at our last interview 
 on the 1 2 th, and that he had orders to go on 
 leave." 1 
 
 At the sitting of the Reichstag on July 20th, 
 Count Bismarck laid several papers on the 
 table, notably Baron Werther's despatch : " The 
 Federal Ambassador," he said, " gives an account 
 in it of an interview he had had at Paris. He 
 brings to our knowledge the unacceptable demand 
 you are aware of. The King was to write a 
 letter of apology, the contents of which were set 
 forth. The only official reply I gave to the Am- 
 bassador in regard to this matter, was to express 
 
 to cease his interviews with me and refer to the Chancellor. There- 
 fore it was not after conferring with me in the morning that he did 
 so, because he then intended receiving me in the afternoon, on the 
 arrival of the mail he was expecting from Sigmaringen ; it was 
 after having read Baron Werther's despatch. Must it not be 
 concluded from this that it was not my communication that made 
 him decide to have recourse to an aide-de-camp to inform me of 
 Prince Leopold's desistance and to telegraph to Count Bismarck ? 
 It seems evident that it was solely the suggestion which came 
 direct from Paris, and was transmitted by his Ambassador, that 
 caused him to take these resolutions. 
 
 1 La France et la Prusse avant la guerre, p. 208. 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 321 
 
 my conviction that he had misunderstood the 
 verbal communications he gave an account of, 
 that it appeared to me absolutely impossible that 
 overtures of this nature could have been made, 
 and that, in any case, I refused to submit the 
 despatch to his Majesty's attention." 1 
 
 It was, therefore, our suggestion at the final 
 moment which permitted Count Bismarck to 
 place the French Government in the alternative 
 of submitting to the most cruel insult or of draw- 
 ing the sword. The Chancellor considered war 
 with France inevitabl e, he wanted that war ; for 
 
 over_ a twelvemonth he had h eld this affair of 
 
 the candidature of a Hohenzollern Prince to the 
 S panish crown i n reserve, as I have said, wi th 
 the_ mtention of turni n g it to accou nt againcr m 
 For that reason he is and remains the principal 
 and responsible author of the war. Still, he 
 would have been unable to bring that war about, 
 but for the unfortunate proposals of July 13th. 
 
 Let us suppose for a moment that at Paris, on 
 July 1 2th, they had strictly confined themselves 
 to the instructions sent to me at forty-five minutes 
 
 1 The King felt this incident quite as keenly. In General de 
 Caprivi's speech from which I have already quoted, one notices the 
 following passage : " I have here an authentic note from King 
 William dated July 13th. It is stated therein : ' It is necessary to 
 declare that I am indignant at the demand of the French Ministers, 
 and that I intend to act in regard to it as I think fit.' " 
 
 Y 
 
322 STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY 
 
 past twelve ; that they had paid no attention to 
 Prince Anthony's telegram, as was the Emperor's 
 desire ; that they had not taken the initiative of 
 any new proposal ; that they had on the contrary, 
 patiently awaited the expiration of the delay 
 solicited by the King and accorded by us, as 
 they had undertaken to do ; what, I ask, on this 
 hypothesis, would have occurred ? The following 
 day, the 13th, the day agreed upon, the King 
 would have made me his declaration, and I 
 should have transmitted it to Paris. What 
 would have been the effect both on the Chamber 
 and on public opinion? It was positively to 
 France, this time, that the desistance would 
 have been notified, and by whom ? By the 
 King of Prussia whom we had addressed direct, 
 and who, by adding his approbation, recognised 
 the lawfulness of our claims and consequently of 
 our intervention. Prince Anthony, the Spanish 
 Ambassador, the communication which had 
 passed between them, all disappeared in pres- 
 ence of the step taken by the Sovereign whom 
 we had made a party to the affair. What more 
 complete satisfaction could we exact, and how 
 could it have failed to meet with the general 
 assent of the country and of its representatives ? 
 Suppress then, hypothetically, the incidents of 
 the last day, and what remains ? What M. de 
 
MY MISSION TO EMS 323 
 
 Gramont has denied in every form, that is to 
 say, that I had fulfilled the mission entrusted 
 to me with complete success. The reader will 
 •decide ; I do not ask for his indulgence, I appeal 
 to his impartiality. 
 
 Count Benedetti. 
 
 Paris, January, 1873. 
 
 THE END 
 
 K1CHAKD CLAY AND bONS, LIMITED, LONDON AND BUNGAY