FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 
 
 OF THE 
 
 MSmPHYSlC OF ETHICS 
 
 EMMANUEL iK ANT 
 
 T.K. ABBOTT. 
 
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FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 
 
 THE METAPHYSIC OF ETHICS, 
 
 ,,,ji/'.A«,\JV>,.^j_^ 
 
 
BY THE SAME AUTHOR. 
 
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FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 
 
 lETAPHYSIC OF ETHICS. 
 
 BY 
 
 IMMANUEL KANT. 
 
 TRANSLATED BY 
 
 THOMAS KINGSMILL ABBOTT, B.D., Litt.D., 
 
 FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN. 
 
 [EXTRACTED FROM "KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND 
 OTHER WORKS ON THE THEORY OF ETHICS."'\ 
 
 LONDON: 
 LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 
 
 AND NEW YORK: 15, EAST iS" STREET. 
 1895. 
 

 KANT'S CRITIQ^M OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER 
 WORKS ON THE THEORY OF ETHICS. 
 
 First Edition^ 1813, 
 Second Edition [enlarged), iSfq. 
 Third Edition {further enlarged) ^ i8t 
 Fourth Edition, z88g. 
 
 Note. — The numbers in the text are those of the pages in Rosenkranz 
 and Schubert's Edition of the original. Notes in square brackets are by 
 the Translator. 
 
 Printed at THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, Dublin. 
 
PREFACE, 
 
 Ancient Greek Philosophy was divided into three 
 sciences : Physics, Ethics, and Logic. This division 
 is perfectly suitable to the nature of the thing, and 
 the only improvement that can be made in it is to 
 add the principle on which it is based, so that we may 
 both satisfy ourselves of its completeness, and also be 
 able to determine correctly the necessary subdivisions. 
 
 All rational knowledge is either material or formal : 
 the former considers some object, the latter is con- 
 cerned only with the form of the understanding and 
 of the reason itself, and with the universal laws of 
 thought in general without distinction of its objects. 
 Formal philosophy is called Logic. Material philo- 
 sophy, however, which has to do with determinate 
 objects and the laws to which they are subject, is again 
 two-fold ; for these laws are either laws of nature or of 
 freedom. The science of the former is Physics, that of 
 the latter, Ethics ; they are also called natural philosophy 
 and moral philosophy respectively. 
 
 Logic cannot have any empirical part; that is, a 
 part in which the universal and necessary laws of 
 thought should rest on grounds taken from experience ; 
 
2 PREFACE TO THE FUNDAMENTAL [4] 
 
 Otherwise it would not be logic, i.e. a canon for the 
 understanding or the reason, valid for all thought, 
 and capable of demonstration (4). Natural and moral 
 philosophy, on the contrary, can each have their empi- 
 rical part, since the former has to determine the laws 
 of nature as an object of experience ; the latter the 
 laws of the human will, so far as it is affected by 
 nature: the former, however, being laws according 
 to which everything does happen ; the latter, laws' 
 according to which everything ought to happen. 
 Ethics, however, must also consider the conditions 
 under which what ought to happen frequently does 
 not. 
 
 We may call all philosophy empirical, so far as it is 
 based on grounds of experience : on the other hand, 
 that which delivers its doctrines from a /non principles 
 alone we may call pure philosophy. When the latter is 
 merely formal it is logic ; if it is restricted to definite 
 objects of the understanding it is metaphysic. 
 
 In this way there arises the id^a of a two-fold 
 metaphysic — a metaphysic of nature and a metaphysic of 
 morals. Physics will thus have an empirical and also 
 a rational part. It is the same with Ethics ; but her^ 
 the empirical part might have the special name of 
 practical anthropology, the name morality being appro- 
 priated to the rational part. 
 
 All trades, arts, and handiworks have gained by 
 diwsion of labour, namely, when, instead of one man 
 
 1 [The word ' law ' is here used in two different senses, on whiclP 
 see Whatelj''s Logic, Appendix, Art. ' Law.'] 
 
[S] PRINCIPLES— METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 3 
 
 doing everything, ^ach confines himself to a certain 
 kind of work distinct from others in the treatment it 
 requires, so as to be able to perform it with greater 
 facility and in the greatest perfection. Where the 
 different kinds of work are not so distinguished and 
 divided, where everyone is a jack-of-all-trades, there 
 manufactures remain still in the greatest barbarism. It 
 might deserve to be considered whether pure philo- 
 sophy in all its parts does not require a man specially 
 devoted to it, and whether it would not be better for 
 the whole business of science if those who, to please 
 the tastes of the public, are ^/wont to blend the rational 
 and empirical elements together, mixed in all sorts of 
 proportions unknown to themselves (5), and who call 
 themselves independent thinkers, giving the name of 
 minute philosophers to those who apply themselves to 
 the rational part only — if these, I say, were warned not 
 to carry on two employments together which differ 
 widely in the treatment they demand, for each of which 
 perhaps a special talent is required, and the combination 
 of which in one person only produces bunglers. But 1 
 only ask here whether the nature of science does not 
 require that we should always carefully separate the 
 empirical from the rational part, and prefix to Physics 
 proper (or empirical physics) a metaphysic of nature, 
 and to practical anthropology a metaphysic of morals, 
 which must be carefully cleared of everything empirical, 
 so that we may know how much can be accomplished 
 '''by pure reason in both cases, and from what sources it 
 draws this its a priori teaching, and that whether the 
 
4 PREFACE TO THE FUNDAMENTAL [6] 
 
 latter inquiry is conducted by all moralists (whose name 
 is legion), or only by some who feel a calling thereto. 
 
 As my concern here is with moral philosophy, I limit 
 the question suggested to this : Whether it is not of t h£ 
 utmost necessity to construct aj^rejngr^ philosophy, 
 perfectjyqieared of everything vchichjs only empirical,_ 
 and which belongs to anthropology ? for that such a 
 philosophy must be possible is evident from the 
 common idea of duty and of the moral laws. Every- 
 one must admit that ifa law is to have moral force, 
 I.e. to be the basis of an obligation, it must carry with 
 jt absolute necessity : that, for example, the precept, 
 ' Thou shalt not lie,' is not valid for men alone, as if 
 other rational beings had no need to observe it ; and so 
 with all the other moral laws properly so called ; that, 
 therefore, the basis of obligation must not be sought 
 in the nature of man, or in the circumstances in the 
 world in which he is placed, but a priori simply in the 
 conceptions of (6) pure reason ; and although any 
 other precept which is founded on principles of mere 
 experience may be in certain respects universal, yet, in 
 as far as it rest/even in the least degree on an 
 empirical basis, perhaps only as to a motive, such a: 
 precept, while it may be a practical rule, can never be 
 called^jmoraljavs:. ~ " 
 
 Thus not only are moral laws with their principles es- 
 sentially distinguished from every other kind of practical 
 knowledge in which there is anything empirical, but all 
 moral philosophy rests wholly on its pure part. When 
 applied to man, it dotes not borrow the least thing from 
 
[7] PRINCIPLES— METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 5 
 
 the knowledge of man himself (anthropology), but 
 gives laws a priori to him as a rational being. No 
 doubt these laws require a judgment sharpened by 
 experience, in ordev on the one hand to distinguish in 
 what cases they are applicable, and on the other to 
 procure for them access to the will of the man, and 
 effectual influence on conduct ; since man is acted on 
 by so many inclinations that, though capable of the 
 idea of a practical pure reason, he is .not so easily able 
 to make it effective in concreto in his life. 
 
 A metaphysic of morals is therefore indispensably 
 necessary, not merely for speculative reasons, in order 
 to investigate the sources of the practical principles 
 which are to be found a priori in our reason, but also 
 because morals themselves are liable to all sorts of 
 corruption, as long as we are without that clue and 
 supreme canon by which to estimate them correctly. 
 For, in order that an action should be morally good, it 
 is not enough that it conform to the moral law, but it 
 must also be dione for the sake of the law, otherwise that 
 conformity is only very contingent and uncertain ; since 
 a principle which is not moral, although it may now 
 and then produce actions conformable to the law, will 
 also often produce actions which contradict it (7). 
 Now it is only in a pure philosophy that we can look 
 for the moral law in its purity and genuineness (and, in 
 a practical matter, this is of the utmost consequence) : 
 we must, therefore, begin with pure philosophy (meta- 
 physic), and without it there cannot be any moral 
 philosophy at all. That which mingles these pure 
 
6 PREFACE TO THE FUNDAMENTAL [7] 
 
 principles with the empirical does not deserve the 
 name of philosophy (for what distinguishes philosophy 
 from common rational knowledge is, that it treats in 
 separate sciences what the latter only comprehends 
 confusedly) ; much less does it deserve that of moral 
 philosophy, since by this confusion it even spoils the 
 purity of morals themselves, and counteracts its own 
 end. 
 
 Let it not be thought, however, that what is here 
 demanded is already extant in the propaedeutic prefixed 
 by the celebrated WolP to his moral philosophy, namely, 
 his so-called general practical philosophy, and that, 
 therefore, we have not to strike into an entirely new 
 field. Just because it was to be a general practical 
 philosophy, it has not taken into consideration a will 
 of any particular kind — say one which should be 
 determined solely from a priori principles without any 
 empirical motives, and which we might call a pure will, 
 but volition in general, with all the actions and condi- 
 tions which belong to it in this general signification. 
 By this it is distinguished from a metaphysic of morals, 
 just as general logic, which treats of the acts an4 
 canons of thought in general, is distinguished from 
 transcendental philosophy, which treats of the parti- 
 cular acts and canons of pure thought, i.e. that whose 
 cognitions are altogether a priori. For the metaphysic 
 
 1 [Johann Christian Von Wolf (1679-1728) was the author of 
 treatises on philosophy, mathematics, &c., which were for a long 
 time the standard text -books in the German Universities. His 
 philosophy was founded on that of Leibnitz.] 
 
[8] PRIJTCIPLES— METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 7 
 
 of morals has to examine the idea and the principles 
 of a possible pure will, and not the acts and conditions 
 of human volition generally, which for the most part 
 are drawn from psychology (8). It is true that moral 
 laws and duty are spoken of in the general practical 
 philosophy (contrary indeed to all fitness). But this is 
 no objection, for in this respect also the authors of 
 that science remain true to their idea of it ; they do not 
 distinguish the motives which are prescribed as such by 
 reason alone altogether a priori, and which are properly 
 moral, from the empirical motives which the under- 
 standing raises to general conceptions merely by com- 
 parison of experiences ; but without noticing the 
 difference of their sources, and looking on them all 
 as homogeneous, they consider only their greater or 
 less amount. It is in this way they frame their notion 
 of obligation, which, though anything but moral, is all 
 that can be asked for in a philosophy which passes no 
 judgment at all on the origin of all possible practical 
 concepts, whether they are a. priori, or only a poste- 
 riori. 
 
 Jntending to publish hereafter a metaphysic of morals, 
 I issue in the first instance these fundamental principles. 
 Indeed there is properly no other foundation for it than 
 the critical examination of a pure practical reason ; just as 
 that of metaphysics is the critical examination of the 
 pure speculative reason, already published. But in the 
 first place the former is not so absolutely necessary as 
 the latter, because in moral concerns human reason can 
 easily be brought to a high degree of correctness and 
 
8 PREFACE TO THE FUNDAMENTAL [9] 
 
 completeness, even in the commonest understanding, 
 while on the contrary in its theoretic but pure use it is 
 wholly dialectical ; and in the second place if the cri- 
 tique of a pure practical reason is to be complete, it 
 must be possible at the same time to show its identity 
 with the speculative reason in a common principle, for 
 it can ultimately be only one and the same reason which 
 has to be distinguished merely in its application. I 
 could not, however, bring it to such ccfmpleteness here, 
 without introducing considerations of a wholly different 
 kind, which would be perplexing to the reader (9). On 
 this account I have adopted the title of Fundamental 
 Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, instead of that of a 
 Critical Examination of the pure practical Reason. 
 
 But in the third place, since a metaphysic of morals, 
 in spite of the discouraging title, is yet capable of being 
 presented in a popular form, and one adapted to the 
 common understanding, I find it useful to separate 
 from it this preliminary treatise on its fundamental 
 principles, in order that I may not hereafter have need 
 to introduce these necessarily subtle discussions into a 
 book of a. more simple character. 
 
 The present treatise is, however, nothing more than 
 the investigation and establishment oi the supreme prin- 
 ciple of morality, and this alone constitutes a study com- 
 plete in itself,' and one which ought to be kept apart 
 from every other moral investigation. No doubt my con- 
 clusions on this weighty question, which has hitherto 
 been very unsatisfactorily examined, would receive 
 much light from the application of the same principle 
 
[lo] PRINCIPLES— METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 9 
 
 to the whole system, and would be greatly confirmed by 
 the adequacy which it exhibits throughout ; but I must 
 forego this advantage, which indeed would be after all 
 more gratifying than useful, since the easy applicability 
 of a principle and its apparent adequacy give no very 
 certain proof of its soundness, but rather inspire a 
 certain partiality, which prevents us from examining 
 and estimating it strictly in itself, and without regard 
 to consequences. 
 
 I have adopted in this work the method which I think 
 most suitable, proceeding analytically from common 
 knowledge to the determination of its ultimate principle, 
 and again descending synthetically from the examination 
 of this principle and its sources to the common know- 
 ledge in which we find it employed. The division will, 
 therefore, be as follows (lo) : — 
 
 1 . First section. — Transition from the common rational 
 
 knowledge of morality to the philosophical, f 
 
 2. Second section, — Transition from popular moral 
 
 philosophy to the metaphysic of morals. 
 
 3. Third section. — Final step from the metaphysic of 
 
 morals to the critique of the pure practical 
 
10 P'UNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [12] 
 
 FIRST SECTION. 
 
 TRANSITION FROM THE COMMON RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
 OF MORALITY TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL. 
 
 Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or 
 even out of it, which can be called good without^ 
 qualification, except a Good Will. Intelligence, wif, 
 judgment, and the other talents of the mind, however 
 they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseve- 
 rance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly 
 good and desirable in many respects ; but these gifts 
 of nature may also become extremely bad and mischie-- 
 vous if the will which is to make use of them, and 
 which, therefore, constitutes what is called character, is 
 not good. y It is the same with the gifts of fortune. 
 Power, riches, honour, even health, and the general 
 well-being and contentment with one's condition which 
 is called happiness, inspire pride, and often presumption, 
 if there is not a good will to correct the influence of 
 these on the mind, and with this also to rectify the 
 whole principle of acting, . and adapt it to its end. 
 The sight of a being who is not adorned with a single 
 feature of 'a pure and good will, enjoying unbroken 
 prosperity, can never give' pleasure to an impartial 
 rational spectator (12). Thus a good^wdll_ appears to 
 constitute J^he indispensabl£_condition_even_oflbeiii^ 
 worthy of hap^pmess. ~ 
 
 There are even some qualities which are of service 
 to this good will itself, and may facilitate its action, yet 
 
[13] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. U 
 
 which have no int rinsic unconditional value , but always 
 presuppose a good will, and this qualifies the esteem 
 that we justly have for them, and does not permit us to 
 regard them as ' absolutely good . Moderation in the 
 affections and passions, self-control and calm delibera- 
 tion are not only good in many respects, but even 
 seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth "of the 
 person ; but they are far from deserving to be called 
 good without qual ification , although they have been so 
 unconditionally praised by the ancients. For without 
 the principles of a good will, they may become ex- 
 tremely bad, and the coolness of a villain not only 
 makes him f^r more dangerous, but also directly makes 
 him more abominable in our eyes than he would have 
 been without it. 
 
 A good will is good not because of what it performs 
 or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some 
 proposed end, but sijapJ^by xirtu£_QLthe_iQlition, that ~ 
 is, it is good in itself , and considered by itself is to be 
 esteemed much higher than all that can be brought 
 about by it in favour of any inclination, nay, even of 
 the sum total of all inclinations. Even if it should 
 happen that, owing to special disfavour of fortune, or 
 the niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature, this 
 will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, 
 if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing, 
 and there should remain only the good will (not, to be 
 sure, a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in 
 our power), then, like a jewel, it would still shine by 
 its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in 
 itself (13)- Its usefulness or fruitlessness can neither 
 add to nor take away anything from this value. It 
 would be, as it were, only the setting to enable us to 
 handle it the more conveniently in common commerce. 
 
12 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [14] 
 
 or to attract to it the attention of those who are not 
 yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to true 
 connoisseurs, or to determine its value. 
 
 There is, however, something so strange in this idea 
 of the "absolute value of the mere will , in which no 
 account is taken of its utility, that notwithstanding the 
 thorough assent of even common reason to the idea, 
 yet a suspicion must arise that it may perhaps really be 
 the product of mere high-flown fancy, and that we may 
 have misunderstood the purpose of nature in assigning 
 reason as the governor of our will. Therefore we will 
 examine this idea from this point of view. 
 
 In the physical constitution of an organized being, 
 that is, a being adapted suitably to the purposes of life, 
 we assume it as a fundamental principle that no organ 
 for any purpose will be found but what is also the 
 fittest and best adapted for that purpose. Now in a 
 being which has reason and a will, if the proper object 
 of nature were its conservation, its welfare, in a word, its 
 happiness, then nature would have hit upon a very, bad 
 arrangement in selecting the reason of the creature to 
 carry out this purpose. For all the actions which the 
 creature has to perform with a view to this purpose, and 
 the whole rule of its conduct, would be far more surely 
 prescribed to it by instinct, and that end would have 
 been attained thereby much more certainly than it ever 
 can be by reason. Should reason have been communi- 
 cated to this favoured creature over and above, it must 
 only have served it to contemplate the happy constitu- 
 tion of its nature (14), to admire it, to congratulate 
 itself thereon, and to feel thankful for it to the bene- 
 ficent cause, but not that it should Subject its desires 
 to that weak and delusive guidance, and meddle 
 bunglingly with the purpose of nature. In a word, 
 
[15] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 13 
 
 nature would have taken care that reason should not 
 break forth into practical exercise, nor have the presump- 
 tion, with its weak insight, to think out for itself the 
 plan of happiness, and of the means of attaining it. 
 Nature would not only have taken on herself the choice 
 of the ends, but also of the means, and with wise fore- 
 sight would have entrusted both to instinct. 
 
 And, in fact, we find that the more a cultivated 
 reason applies itself with deliberate purpose to the 
 enjoyment of life and happiness, so much the more 
 does the man fail of true sa.tisfaction. And from this 
 circumstance there arises in many, if they are candid 
 enough to confess it, a certain degree of misology, that 
 is, hatred of reason, especially in the case of those who 
 are most experienced in the use of it, because after 
 calculating all the advantages they derive, I do not say 
 from the invention of all the arts of common luxury, 
 but even from the sciences (which seem to them to be 
 after all only a luxury of the understanding), they find 
 that they have, in fact, only trought more trouble on."" 
 their shoulders, rather than gained in happiness ; and 
 they end by envying, rather than despising, the more 
 common stamp of men who keep closer to the guidance 
 of mere instinct, and do not allow their reason much 
 influence on their conduct. And this we must admit, 
 that the judgment of those who would very much lower ' 
 the lofty eulogies of the advantages which reason gives t' 
 us in regard to the happiness and satisfaction of life, or _ 
 who would even reduce" them below zero, is by no 
 means morose or ungrateful to the goodness with' 
 which the world is governed, but that there lies at the 
 root of these judgments the idea (15) that our existence"^ 
 has a different and tar nobler end, for which, and not 
 for happiness, reason is properly intended, and which 
 
14 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [i6] 
 
 must, therefore, be regarded as the supreme condition 
 to which the private ends of man must, for the most 
 part, be postponed. 
 
 For as reason is not competent to guide the will with 
 certainty in regard to its objects and the satisfaction of 
 all our wants (which it to some extent even multiplies), 
 this being an end to which an implanted instinct 
 would have led with much greater certainty ; and since, 
 nevertheless, reason is imparted to us as a practical 
 faculty, i. e. as one which is to have influence on the > 
 ■will, therefore, admitting that nature generally in the 
 i distribution of her capacities has adapted the means to 
 the end, its true destination must be to produce a will, 
 not mer ely good as a means to something els e, b ut good 
 in i tself, for which reason was absolutely necessary. 
 This will then, though not indeed the sole and 
 complete good, must be the supreme good and the 
 condition of every other, even of the desire of happi- 
 ness. Under these circumstances, there is nothing 
 inconsistent with the wisdom of nature in the fact that 
 the cultivation of the reason, which is requisite for the 
 first and unconditional purpose, does in many ways 
 interfere, at least in this life, with the attainment of the 
 second, which is always conditional, namely, happiness. 
 Nay, it may even reduce it to nothing, without nature 
 thereby failing of her purpose. For reason recognises 
 the establishment of a good will as its highest practical 
 destination, .and in attaining this purpose is capable 
 only of a satisfaction of its own proper kind, namely, 
 that from the attainment of an end, -which end again is 
 determined by reason only, notwithstanding that this 
 may involve many a disappointment to the ends of 
 inclination (i6). 
 We have then to develop the notion of a will which 
 
[i6] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 15 
 
 deserves to be highly esteemed for itself, and is good 
 without a view to anything further, a notion whk ib 
 exists already i n the soundjaturaLjmderstaiiiiag, 
 requiring rather ivo be cleared ji^thgn to be taught, 
 and which in estimating the value of our actions always 
 takes the first place, and constitutes the condition of 
 all the rest. In order to do this we will take the 
 notion of duty, which includes that of a good will, 
 although implying certain subjective restrictions and 
 hindrances. These, however, far from concealing it, 
 or rendering it unrecognisable, rather bring it out by 
 contrast, and make it shine forth so much the brighter. 
 I omit here all actions which are already recognised 
 as inconsistent with duty, although they may be useful 
 for this or that purpose, for with these the question 
 whether they are done from duty cannot arise at all, 
 since they even conflict with it. I also set aside those 
 actions which really conform to duty, but to which men 
 have no direct z«c/z«a/zb«, performing them because they 
 are impelled thereto by some other inclination. For in 
 this case we can readily distinguish whether the action 
 which agrees with duty is done from duty, or from a 
 selfish view. It is much harder to make this distinction 
 when the action accords with duty, and the subject has 
 besides a direct inclination to it. For example, it is 
 always a matter of duty that a dealer should not over- 
 charge an inexperienced purchaser, and wherever there 
 is much commerce the prudent tradesman does not 
 overcharge, but keeps a fixed price for everyone, so that 
 a child buys of him as well as any other. Men are thus 
 honestly served ; but this is not enough to make us 
 believe that the tradesman has so acted from duty and 
 from principles of honesty : his own advantage required 
 it ; it is out of the question in this case to suppose that 
 
16 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [17] 
 
 he might besides have a direct inclination in favour of 
 the buyers, so that (17), as it were, from love he should 
 give no advantage to one over another. Accordingly 
 the action was done neither from duty nor from direct 
 inclination, but merely with a selfish view. 
 
 On the other hand, it is a duty to maintain- one's life ; 
 and, in addition, every one has also a direct inclination 
 to do so. But on this account the often anxious care 
 which most men take for it has no intrinsic worth, and 
 their maxim has no moral import. They preserve their 
 life as duty requires, no doubt, but not because duty 
 requires. On the other hand, if adversity and hopeless 
 sorrow have completely taken away the relish for life ; 
 if the unfortunate one, strong in mind, indignant at 
 his fate rather than desponding or dejected, wishes for 
 death, and yet preserves his life without loving it — not 
 from inclination or fear, but from duty — then his maxim 
 has a moral worth. 
 
 To be beneficent when we can is a duty ; and besides 
 this, there are many minds so sympathetically constituted 
 that, without any other motive of vanity or self-interest, 
 they find a pleasure in spreading joy around them, and 
 can take delight in the satisfaction of others so far as it 
 is their own work. But I maintain that in such a case 
 an action of this kind, however proper, however amiable 
 it may be, has nevertheless no true moral worth, but is 
 on a level with other inclinations, e.g. the inclination to 
 honour, which, if it is happily directed to that which is 
 in fact of public utility and accordant with duty, and 
 consequently honourable, deserves praise and encou- 
 ragement, but not esteem. For the maxim lacks the 
 moral import, namely, that such actions be done from 
 duty, not from inclination. Put the case that the mind 
 of that philanthropist were clouded by sorrow of his 
 
■[18] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 17 
 
 own (18), extinguishing all sympathy with the lot of 
 others, and that while he still has the power to benefit 
 others in distress, he is not touched by their trouble 
 because he is absorbed with his own; and now suppose 
 that he tears himself out of this dead insensibility, and 
 performs the action without any inclination to it, but 
 simply from duty, then first has his action its, genuine 
 moral worth. Further Still; if nature has put little 
 sympathy in the heart of this or that man ; if he, 
 supposed to be an upright man, is by temperament 
 cold and indifferent to the sufferings of others, perhaps 
 because in respect of his own he is provided with the 
 special gift of patience and fortitude, and supposes, or 
 even requires, that others should have the same — and 
 such a man would certainly not be the meanest product 
 of nature — but if nature had not specially framed him 
 for a philanthropist, would he not still find in himself a 
 source from whence to give himself a far higher worth 
 than that of a good-natured temperament could be } 
 Unquestionably. It is just in this that the moral worth 
 of the character is brought out which is incomparably 
 the highest of all, namely, that he is beneficent, not 
 from inclination, but from duty. 
 
 To secure one's own happiness is a duty, at least 
 indirectly; for discontent with one's condition, under 
 a pressure of many anxieties and amidst unsatisfied 
 wants, might easily become a great temptation to trans- 
 gression of duty. But here again, without looking to 
 duty, all men have already the strongest and most inti- 
 mate inclination to happiness, because it is just in this 
 idea that all inclinations are combined in one total. 
 But the precept of happiness is often of such a sort that 
 it greatly interferes with some inclinations, and yet a 
 man cannot form any definite and certain conception 
 
 c 
 
18 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [19} 
 
 of the sum of satisfaction of all of them which is called 
 happiness (19). It is not then to be wondered at that a 
 single inclination, definite both as to what it promises 
 and as to the time within which it can be gratified, is 
 often able to overcome such a fluctuating idea, and that 
 a gouty patient, for instance, can choose to enjoy what 
 he likes, and to suffer what he may, since, according to 
 his calculation, on this occasion at least, he has [only] 
 not sacrificed the enjoyment of the present moment to 
 a possibly mistaken expectation of a happiness which is 
 supposed to be found in health. But even in this case, 
 if the general desire for happiness did not influence his 
 will, and supposing that in his particular case health 
 was not a necessary element in this calculation, there 
 yet remains in this, as in all other cases, this law, 
 namely, that he should proniote his happiness not from 
 inclination but from duty, and byTKirwouid his conduct 
 iSrst acquire true moral worths 
 
 It is in this manner, undoubtedly, that we are to 
 understand those passages of Scripture also in which 
 we are commanded to love our neighbour, even our 
 enemy. For love, as an aff'ection, cannot be com- 
 manded, but beneficence for duty's sake may ; even 
 though we are not impelled to it by any inclination — nay, 
 are even repelled by a natural and unconquerable aver- 
 sion. This \s practical love, and not/aMo/o^zfgfc^a^love 
 which is seated m the will, and not in the propensions 
 of sense — in principles oi action and not oF tender 
 sympathy ; and it is this love alone which can be com- 
 manded. 
 
 TKe¥econd' proposition is : That an action done from 
 duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which 
 
 ' [The first proposition was that, to have moral worth, an action 
 must be done from duty.] 
 
[2o] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 19 
 
 is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it 
 is determined, and therefore does not depend on the 
 realization of the dbject of the action, but merely on the 
 principle of volition by which the action has taken place, 
 without regard to any object of desire (20). It is clear 
 from what precedes that the purposes „which we rnay 
 have in view in our actions, or their effects regarded- as 
 ends andTpringT^the will, cannpt give to actions any 
 uncon ditional or moral worth. In what, then, can their 
 worth lie, it it is not to consist in the will and in refe- 
 rence to its expected effect '^ It cannot lie anywhere 
 but in ih^ principle of the z£jz7/ without regard to the ends 
 which can be attained by the action. For the will stands 
 between its a /n'orf principle, which is formal, and its 
 a posteriori spring, which is material, as between two 
 roads, and as it must be determined by something, it 
 follows that it must be determined by the formal prin- 
 Iciple of volition when an action is done from duty, in 
 which case every material principle has been withdrawn 
 from it. 
 
 The third proposition, which is a consequence of the 
 two preceding, I would express thus : Duty is the 
 necessity of acting from respect for the law. I may have 
 inclination for an object as the effect of my proposed 
 action, but I cannot have respect for it, just for this reason, 
 that it is an effect and not an energy of will. Similarly, 
 I cannot have respect for inclination, whether my own 
 or another's; I can at most, if my own, approve it; if 
 another's, sometimes even love it ; i. e. look on it as 
 favourable to my own interest. It is only what is con- 
 nected with my will as a principle, by no means as an 
 effect — what does not subserve my inclination, but over- 
 powers it, or at least in case of choice excludes it from 
 its calculation — in other words, simply the law of itself, 
 c 2 
 
20 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [22] 
 
 which can be an object of respect, and hence a command. 
 Now an action done from duty must wholly exclude the 
 influence of inclination, and with it every object of the 
 will, so that nothing remains which can determine the 
 will except objectively the law, and subjectively pure 
 respect (21) for this practical law, and consequently the 
 maxim^ that I should follow this law even to the thwart- 
 ing of all my inclinations. 
 
 Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the 
 effect expected from it, nor in any principle of action 
 which requires to borrow its motive from this expected 
 effect. For all these effects — agreeableness of one's 
 condition, and even the promotion of the happiness of 
 others — could have been also brought about by other 
 causes, so that for this there would have been no need 
 of the vdlUof..a,. rational _being_; whereas it is in this 
 a[one tha.t the supreme an d unc onditional good.ca a.bfi 
 fouixd.. The pre-eminent good which we call moral can 
 therefore consist in nothing else than the conception of 
 law in itself, which certainly is only possible in a rational 
 being, in so far as this conception, and not the expected 
 effect, determines the will. This is a good which is 
 already present in the person who acts accordingly, 
 and we have not to wait for it to appear first in the 
 result (22). 
 
 ' A maxim is the subjective principle of volition. The objective 
 principle (i.e. that which would also serve subjectively as a practical 
 principle to all rational beings if reason had full power over the 
 faculty of desire) is the practical law. 
 
 ' It might be here objected to me that I take refuge behind the 
 word respect in an obscure feeling, instead of giving a distinct solu- 
 tion of the question by a concept of fhe reason. But although 
 respect is a feeling, it is not a feeling received through influence, 
 but is self-wrought by a rational concept, and, therefore, is speci- 
 fically distinct from all feelings of the former kind, which may be 
 referred either to inclination or fear. What I recognise immediatelv 
 
[22] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 21 
 
 But what sort of law can that be, the conception of 
 which must determine the will, even without paying 
 any regard to the effect expected from it, in order that 
 this will may be called good absolutely and without 
 qualification ? As I have deprived the will of every im- 
 pulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law, 
 there remains nothing but the universal conformity 
 of its actions to law in general, which alone is to serve 
 the will as a principle, i, e. I am never to act otherwise 
 than so that I could also will that my maxim should become 
 a universal law. Here now, it is the simple conformity 
 to law in general, without assuming any particular law 
 applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its 
 principle, and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a 
 vain delusion and a chimerical notion. The common 
 reason of men in its practical judgments perfectly 
 coincides with this, and always has in view the principle 
 here suggested. Let the question be, for example : May 
 
 as a law for itie, I recognise with respect. This merely signifies 
 the consciousness that my will is subordinate to a law, without the 
 intervention of other influences on my sense. The immediate 
 determination of the will by the law, and the consciousness of 
 this is called respect, so that this is regarded as an effect of the law 
 on the subject, and not as the cause of it. Respect is properly 
 the (22) conception of a worth which thwarts my splf-love. 
 Accordingly it is something which is considered neither as an 
 object of inclination nor of fear, although it has something analo- 
 gous to both. The object of respect is the law only, and that, the 
 law which we impose on ourselves, and yet recognise as necessary 
 in itself. As a law, we are subjected to it without consulting self- 
 love ; as imposed by us on ourselves, it is a result of our will. In 
 the former aspect it has an analogy to fear, in the latter to incli- 
 nation. Respect for a person is properly only respect for the law 
 (of honesty, &c.), of which he gives us an example. Since we also 
 look on the improvement of our talents as a duty, we consider that 
 we see in a person of talents, as it were, the example of a law (viz. 
 to become hlie him in this by exercise), and this constitutes our 
 respect. AU so-called moral interest consists simply in respect for 
 the law. 
 
22 
 
 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [23] 
 
 I when in distress make a promise with the intention 
 not to keep it? I readily distinguish here between 
 the two significations which the question may have : 
 Whether it is prudent (23), or whether it is right, to 
 make a false promise. The former may undoubtedly 
 often be the case. I see clearly indeed that it is not 
 enough to extricate myself from a present difficulty by 
 means of this subterfuge, but it must be well considered 
 whether there may not hereafter spring from this lie 
 much greater inconvenience than that from which I now 
 free myself, and as, with all my supposed cunning, the 
 consequences cannot be so easily foreseen but that credit 
 once lost may be much more injurious to me than any 
 mischief which I seek to avoid at present, it should be 
 considered whether it would not be more prudent to act 
 herein according to a universal maxim, and to make it a 
 habit to promise nothing except with the intention of 
 keeping it. But it is soon clear to me that such a 
 maxim will still only be based on the fear of conse- 
 quences. Now it is a wholly different thing to be truth- 
 ful from duty, and to be so from apprehension of in- 
 jurious consequences. In the first case, the very notion 
 of the action already implies a law for me ; in the second 
 case, I must first look about elsewhere to see what results 
 may be combined with it which would affect myself. 
 For to deviate from the principle of duty is beyond all 
 doubt wicked; but to be unfaithful to my maxim of 
 prudence may often be very advantageous to me, al- 
 though to abide by it is certainly safer. The shortest 
 way, however, and an unerring one, to discover the 
 answer to this question whether a lying promise is consis- 
 tent with duty, is to ask myself. Should I be content that 
 my maxim (to extricate myself from difficulty by a false 
 promise) should hold good as a universal law, for myself 
 
[24] METAPHrSSIC OF MORALS. 23 
 
 as well as for others ? and should I be able to say to 
 myself, "Every one may make a deceitful promise 
 when he finds himself in a difficulty from which he can- - 
 not otherwise extricate himself" ? (24) Then I presently 
 become aware that while I can will the lie, I can by no 
 means will that lying should be a universal law. For 
 with such a law there would be no promises at all, 
 since it would be in vain to allege my intention in 
 regard to my future actions to those who would not 
 believe this allegation,- or if they over-hastily did so 
 would pay me back in my own coin. Hence my maxim, 
 as soon as it should be made a universal law, would 
 necessarily destroy itself. 
 
 I do not, therefore, need any far-reaching penetration 
 to discern what I have to do in order that my will may 
 be morally good. Inexperienced in the course of the 
 world, incapable of being prepared for all its contin- 
 gencies, I only ask myself: Canst thou also will that 
 thy maxim should be a universal law 7 If not, then it 
 must be rejected, and that not because of a disad- 
 vantage accruing from it to myself or even to others, 
 but because it cannot enter as a principle into a 
 possible universal legislation, and reason extorts from 
 me immediate respect for such legislation. I do not 
 indeed as yet discern on what this respect is based (this| 
 the philosopher may inquire), but at least I understand 
 this, that it is an estimation of the worth which far 
 outweighs all worth of what is recommended by incli 
 nation, and that_Uie_jnecessity of acting from /«r« 
 respect for Jhe. practical law is what constitutes duty, 
 to~which every other motive must give place, because it 
 is the condition of a will being good in itself, and the] 
 worth of such a will is above everything. 
 
 Thus, then, without quilting the moral knowledge of 
 
24 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [25) 
 
 common human reason, we have arrived at its principle. 
 And although, no doubt, common men do not conceive 
 it in such an abstract and universal form, yet they 
 always have it really before their eyes, and use it as the 
 standard of their decision. Here it would be easy t& 
 show how, with this compass in hand (25), men are 
 well able to distinguish, in every case that occurs, what 
 is good, what bad, conformably to duty or inconsistent 
 with it, if, without in the least teaching them anything 
 new, we only, like Socrates, direct their attention to the 
 principle they themselves employ ; and that therefore 
 we do not need science and philosophy to know what 
 we should do -to be honest and good, yea, even wise 
 and virtuous. Indeed we might well have conjectured 
 beforehand that the knowledge of what every man is 
 bound to do, and therefore also to know, would be 
 within the reach of every man, even the commonest."- 
 Here we cannot forbear admiration when we see how 
 great an advantage the practical judgment has over the 
 theoretical in the common understanding of men. In 
 the latter, if common reason ventures to depart from 
 the laws of experience and from tKe perceptions of the 
 senses it falls into mere inconceivabilities and self- 
 contradictions, at least into a chaos of uncertainty, 
 obscurity, and instability. But in the practical sphere 
 it is just when the common understanding excludes all 
 sensible springs from practical laws that its power of 
 judgment begins to show itself to advantage. It then 
 becomes even subtle, whether it be that it chicanes 
 with its own conscience or with other claims respecting 
 
 1 [Compare the note to the Preface to the Critique of the Practical 
 Reason in I'heory of Ethics, p. III. A specimen of Kant's pro- 
 posed application of the Socratic method may be found in Mr. 
 Semple's translation of the Metaphysic of Ethics^ p. 290.] 
 
[26] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 25 
 
 what is to be called right, or whether it desires for its 
 own instruction to determine honestly the worth of 
 actions; and, in the latter case, it may even have as good 
 a hope of hitting the mark as any philosopher what- 
 ever can promise himself. Nay, it is almost more sure 
 of doing so, because the philosopher cannot have any 
 other principle, while he may easily perplex his judg- 
 ment by a multitude of considerations foreign to the 
 matter, and so turn aside from the right way. Would 
 it not therefore be wiser in moral concerns to acquiesce 
 in the judgment of common reason (26), or at most 
 only to call in philosophy for the purpose of rendering 
 the system of morals more complete and intelligible, 
 and its rules more convenient for use (especially for 
 disputation), but not so as to draw off the common 
 understanding from its happy simplicity, or to bring it 
 by means of philosophy into a new path of inquiry and 
 instruction ? 
 
 Innocence is indeed a glorious thing, only, on the 
 other hand, it is very sad that it cannot well maintain 
 itself, and is easily seduced. On this account even 
 wisdom — -which otherwise consists more in conduct 
 than in knowledge — yet has need of science, not in 
 order to learn from it, but to secure for its 'precepts 
 admission and permanence. Against all the commands 
 of duty which reason represents to man as so deserving 
 of respect, he feels in himself a powerful counterpoise 
 in his wants and inclinations, the entire satisfaction 
 of which he sums up under the name of happiness. 
 Now reason issues its commands unyieldingly, without 
 promising anything to the inclinations, and, as it were, 
 with disregard and contempt for these claims, which 
 are so impetuous, and at the same time so plausible, 
 and which will not allow themselves to be suppressed 
 
26 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [27] 
 
 by any command. Hence there arises a natural dialectic, 
 i. e. a disposition to argue against these strict laws of 
 duty and to question their validity, or at least their 
 purity and strictness ; and, if possible, to make them 
 more accordant with our wishes and inclinations, that 
 is to say, to corrupt them at their very source, and 
 entirely to destroy" their worth — a thing which even 
 common practical reason cannot ultimately call good. 
 Thus is the common reason of man compelled to go out 
 of its sphere, and to take a step into the field of 
 a practical philosophy, not to satisfy any speculative 
 want (which never occurs to it as long as it is content 
 to be mere sound reason), but even on practical 
 grounds (27), in order to attain in it information and 
 clear instruction respecting the source of its principle, 
 and the correct determination of it in opposition to the 
 maxims which are based on wants and inclinations, so 
 that it may escape from the perplexity of opposite 
 claims, and not run the risk of losing all genuine moral 
 principles through the equivocation into which it easily 
 falls. Thus, when practical reason cultivates itself, 
 there insensibly arises in it a dialectic which forces it 
 to seek aid in philosophy, just as happens to it in its 
 theoretic use ; and in this case, therefore, as well as in 
 the other, it will find rest nowhere but in a thorough 
 critical examination of our reason. 
 
[29] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 27 
 
 SECOND SECTION. 
 
 TRANSITION FROM POPULAR MORAL PHILOSOPHY T0 THE 
 METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 
 
 If we have hitherto drawn our notion of duty from the 
 common use of our practical reason, it is by no means 
 to be inferred that we have treated it as an empirical 
 notion. On the contrary, if we attend to the experience 
 of men's conduct, we meet frequent and, as we ourselves 
 allow, just complaints that one cannot find a single 
 certain example of the disposition to act from pure 
 duty. Although many things are done in conformity with 
 what duty prescribes, it is nevertheless always doubtful 
 whether they are done strictly /rom duty, so as to have 
 a moral worth. Hence there have, at all times, been 
 philosophers who have altogether denied that this dis- 
 position actually exists at all in human actions, and have 
 ascribed everything to a more or less refined self-love. 
 Not that they have on that account questioned the 
 soundness of the conception of morality ; on the con- 
 trary, they spoke with sincere regret of the frailty and 
 corruption of human nature, which though noble enough 
 to take as its rule an idea so worthy of respect, is yet too 
 weak to follow it, and employs reason, which ought to 
 give it the" law (29) only for the purpose of providing for 
 the interest of the inclinations, whether singly or at the 
 best in the greatest possible harmony with one another^ 
 In fact, it is absolutely impossible to make out by 
 experience with complete certainty a single case in which 
 
23 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [30] 
 
 the maxim of an action, however right in itself, rested 
 simply on moral grounds and on the conception of duty. 
 .Sometimes it happens that with the sharpest self-exami- 
 ' nation we can find nothing beside the moral principlel 
 . of duty which could have been powerful enough to move 
 us to this or that action and to so great a sacrifice ; yet| 
 we cannot from this infer with certainty that it was not 
 really some secret impulse ..of self-love, under the false 
 appearance of duty, that was the actual determining 
 cause of the will. We like then to flatter ourselves by 
 falsely taking credit for a more noble motive ; whereas 
 in fact we can never, even by the strictest examination, 
 get completely behind the secret springs of action ; 
 since when the question is of moral worth, it is not with 
 the actions which we see that we are concerned, but with 
 those inward principles of them which we do not see. 
 
 Moreover, we cannot better serve the wishes of those' 
 who ridicule all morality as a mer e chimera of human 
 imagination overstepping itself from vanity, than by 
 conceding to them that notions of duty must be drawn 
 only from experience (as, from indolence, people are 
 ready to think is also the case with all other notions) ; for 
 this is to prepare for them a certain triumph. I am 
 willing to admit out of love of humanity that even most 
 of our actions are correct, but if we look closer at them 
 we everywhere come upon the dear self which is always 
 prominent, and it is this they have in view, and not the 
 strict command of duty which would often require self- 
 denial (30). Without being an enemy of virtue, a cool 
 observer, one that does not mistake the wish for good, 
 however lively, for its reality, may sometimes doubt 
 whether true virtue is actually found anywhere in the 
 world, and this especially as years increase and the 
 judgment is partly made wiser by experience, and partly 
 
[31] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 29 
 
 also more acute in observation. This being so, nothing 
 can secure us from falling away altogether from our ideas 
 of duty, or maintain in the soul a well-grounded respect 
 for its law, but the clear conviction that although there 
 should never have been actions which really sprang from 
 such pure sources, yet whether this or that takes place 
 is not at all the question ; but that reason of itself, inde- 
 pendent on all experience,, ordains what ought to take 
 place, that accordingly actions of which perhaps the 
 world has hitherto never given an example, the feasi- 
 bility even of which might be very much doubted by one i 
 who founds everything on experience, are nevertheless 
 inflexibly commanded by reason ; that, ex. gr. even ' 
 though there might never yet have been a sincere friend,'' 
 yet not a whit the less is pure sincerity in friendship 
 required of every man, because, prior to all experience, 
 this duty is involved as duty in the idea of a reason 
 determining the will by a /mn principles. 
 
 When we add further that, unless we deny that the' 
 notion of morality has any truth or reference to any 
 possible object, we must admit that its law must be valid, 
 not merely for men, but for all rational creatures generally, 
 not merely under certain contingent conditions or with 
 exceptions, \ivXwithalsolute necessity, i^^Tiit is clear that 
 no experience could enable us to infer even the possi- 
 bility of such apodictic laws (31)- For with what right 
 could we bring into unbounded respect as a universal 
 precept for every rational nature that which perhaps 
 holds only under the contingent conditions of humanity ?, 
 Or how could laws of the determination of our will be 
 regarded as laws of the determination of the will of 
 rational beings generally, and for us only as such, if 
 they were merely empirical, and did not take their origin 
 wholly a priori from pure but practical reason } 
 
30 FXJNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [32] 
 
 Nor could anything be more fatal to morality than 
 that we should wish to derive it from examples. For 
 every example of it that is set before me must be first 
 itself tested by principles of morality, whether it is 
 worthy to serve as an original example, i.e. as a pattern, 
 but by no means can it authoritatively furnish the con- 
 ception of morality. Even the Holy One of the Gospels 
 must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfec- 
 tion before we can recognise Him as such ; and so He 
 says of Himself, " Why call ye Me (whom you see) 
 good ; none is good (the model of good) but God only 
 (whom ye do not see) ? " But whence have we the 
 conception of God as the supreme good } Simply 
 from the idea of moral perfection, which reason frames 
 a priori, and connects inseparably with the notion of a 
 free-will. Imitation finds no place at all in morality, 
 and examples serve only for encouragement, i. e. they 
 put beyond doubt the feasibility of what the law com- 
 mands, they make visible that which the practical rule 
 expresses more generally, but they can never authorize 
 us to set aside the true original which lies in reason, 
 and to guide ourselves by examples. 
 
 If then there is no genuine supreme principle of 
 morality but what must rest simply on pure reason, 
 independent on all experience, I think it is not neces- 
 sary even to put the question, whether it is good (32) 
 to exhibit these concepts in their generality {in abstracto) 
 as they are established a /mn along with the principles 
 belonging to them, if our knowledge is to be distin- 
 guished from the vulgar, and to be called philosophical. 
 In our times indeed this might perhaps be necessary ; 
 for if we collected votes, whether pure rational know- 
 ledge separated from everything empirical, that is to 
 say, metaphysic of morals, or whether popular practical 
 
[33] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 31 
 
 philosophy is to be preferred, it is easy to guess which 
 side would preponderate. 
 
 This descending to popular notions is certainly very 
 commendable, if the ascent to the principles of pure 
 reason has first taken place and been satisfactorily 
 accomplished. This implies that we first found Ethics 
 on Metaphysics, and then, when it is firmly established, 
 procure a hearing for it by giving it a popular character. 
 But it is quite absurd to try to be popular in the first 
 inquiry, on which the soundness of the principles 
 depends. It is not only that this proceeding can 
 never lay claim to the very rare merit of a true philo- 
 sophical popularity, since there is no art in being intelli- 
 gible if one renounces all thoroughness of insight ; but 
 also it produces a disgusting medley of compiled obser- 
 vations and half-reasoned principles. Shallow pates 
 enjoy this because it can be used for every-day chat, but 
 the sagacious find in it only confusion, and beingv 
 unsatisfied and unable to help themselves, they turn 
 away their eyes, while philosophers, who see quite well ' 
 through this delusion, are little listened to when they( 
 call men off for a time from this pretended popularity, \ 
 in order that they might be rightfully popular after they 
 have attained a definite insight. 
 
 We need only look at the attempts of moralists in 
 that favourite fashion, and we shall find at one time the 
 special constitution of human nature (33) (including, 
 however, the idea of a rational nature generally), at one 
 time perfection, at another happiness, here moral sense, 
 there fear of God, a little of this, and a little of that, 
 in marvellous mixture without its occurring to them to 
 ask whether the principles of morality are to be sought 
 in the knowledge of human nature at all (which we can 
 have only from experience) ; and, if this is not so, if 
 
32 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [34] 
 
 these principles are to be found altogether a priori free 
 from everything empirical, in pure rational concepts 
 only, and nowhere else, not even in the smallest 
 degree ; then rather to adopt the method of making 
 this a separate inquiry, as pure practical philosophy, or 
 (if one may use a name so decried) as metaphysic of 
 morals,! to bring it by itself to completeness, and to 
 require the public, which wishes for popular treatment, 
 to await the issue of this undertaking. 
 
 Such a metaphysic of morals, completely isolated, 
 not mixed with any anthropology, theology, physics, or 
 hyperphysics, and still less with occult qualities (which 
 we might call hypophysical), is not only an indispens- 
 able substratum of all sound theoretical knowledge of 
 duties, but is at the same time a desideratum of the 
 highest importance to the actual fulfilment of their 
 precepts. For the pure conception of duty, unmixed 
 with any foreign addition of empirical attractions (34), 
 and, in a word, the conception of the moral law, 
 exercises on the human heart, by way of reason alone 
 (which first becomes aware with this that it can of 
 itself be practical), an influence so much more powerful 
 than all other springs'' which may be derived from the 
 
 ' Just as pure mathematics are distinguished from applied, pure 
 logic from applied, so if we choose we may also distinguish pure 
 philosophy of morals (metaphysic) from applied (viz. applied to 
 human nature). By this designation we are also at once reminded 
 that moral principles are not based on properties of human nature, 
 but must subsist a /nbrz' of themselves, whil^from such principles 
 practical rules must be capable of being deduced for every rational 
 nature, and accordingly for that of man. 
 
 2 1 have a letter from the late excellent Sulzer, in which he 
 asks me what can be the reason that moral instruction, although 
 containing much that is convincing for the reason, yet accom- 
 plishes so little .' My answer was postponed in order that I might 
 make it complete. But it is simply this, that the teachers them- 
 
[35] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 33 
 
 field of experience, that in the consciou'sness of its 
 worth, it despises the latter, and can by degrees become 
 their master ; whereas a mixed ethics, compounded 
 partly of motives drawn from feelings and inclinations, 
 and partly also of conceptions of reason, must make^ 
 the mind waver between motives which cannot be 
 brought under any principle, which lead to good only 
 by mere accident, and very often also to evil. 
 
 From what has been said, it is clear that all moral 
 conceptions ha yg__their seat and QrigirL£Qffi2letel£,J_ 
 p riori \t\. th e reason, and that, moreover, in the com- 
 rnonest reason just as truly as in that which is in the 
 highest degree speculative ; that they canno t be ob- 
 Jainedby abstraction Jrom_anj^empirical, and therefore 
 merely contingent kaQBd_edj;e ; tha t it is just this purit y^ 
 ofjifiir origin that makes thgin worthy jtjD.jerve as, our 
 suprerne pract ical principle (ii;\ and that just iii_EEa- 
 por tion as we add anything empirical, we detract from 
 their genuine influence, anJTrmn tlie absolu te va lue of 
 actions"; that it is not' only of the greatest necessity, 
 in a_gurely speculative point of view, but is also of the 
 greatest practical importance to derive these notions 
 and laws from pure reason, to present them pure and 
 
 selves have not got their own notions clear, and when they en- 
 deavour to make up for this by raking up motives of moral good- 
 ness from every quarter, trying to make their physic right strong, 
 they spoil it. For the commonest understanding shows that if we 
 imagine, on the one hand, an act of honesty done with steadfast 
 mind, apart from every *iew to advantage of any kind in this world 
 or another, and even under the greatest temptations of necessity 
 or allurement, and, on the other hand, a similar act which was 
 affected, in however low a degree, by a foreign motive, the former 
 leaves far behind and eclipses the second; it elevates the soul, 
 and inspires the wish to be able to act in like manner oneself. 
 Even moderately young children feel this impression, and one 
 should never represent duties to them in any other light. 
 
34 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [36] 
 
 unmixed, and even to determine the compass of this 
 practical or pure rational knowledge, i.e. to determine 
 the whole faculty of pure practical reason ; and, in doing 
 so, we must not make its principles dependent on the 
 particular nature of human reason, though in speculative 
 philosophy this may be permitted, or may even at times 
 be necessary ; but ^nce moral laws ought to hold good 
 for every rational creature, we must derive them from 
 the general concept of a^ratipnal^being. In this way, 
 aTEKoiigFTor Its'Sppltcation to man morality has need of 1 
 anthropology, yet, in the first instance, we must treat it 
 independently as pure philosophy, i.e. as metaphysic, 
 complete in itself (a thing which in such distinct 
 branches of science is easily done) ; knowing well that 
 unless we are in possession of this, it would not only be 
 vain to determine the moral element of duty in right 
 actions for purposes of speculative criticism, but it 
 would be impossible to base morals on their genuine 
 principles, even for common practical purposes, espe- 
 cially of moral instruction, so as to produce pure moral 
 dispositions, and to engraft them on men's minds to 
 the promotion of the greatest possible good in the 
 world. 
 
 But in order that in this study we may not merely 
 advance by the natural steps from the common moral 
 judgment (in this case very worthy of respect) to the 
 philosophical, as has been already done, but also from 
 a popular philosophy, which goes no further than it can 
 reach by groping with the help of examples, to meta- 
 physic (which does not allow itself to be checked by 
 anything empirical (36), and as it must measure the 
 whole extent of this kind of rational knowledge, goes 
 as far as ideal conceptions, where even examples fail 
 us), we must follow and clearly describe the practical 
 
[37] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 36 
 
 faculty of reason, from the general rules of its deter- 
 mination to the point where the notion of duty springs 
 from it. 
 
 Everything in nature works according to laws. Ra- 
 tional beings alone. have .the facultyof_acting according 
 to the conception oi laws,, that _ia-_a.ccording_to^_priiiciples, 
 i.e. have_ a will. Since the deduction of actions from 
 principles requires reason fX\i& will is nothing but prac-l 
 ..tical ..reason. If reason infallibly determines the will, 
 then the actions of such a being which are recognised 
 as objectively necessary are subjectively necessary also, 
 i.e. t he will is a facul ty-to choose that only which reason 
 independent on inclination recognises as practically 
 necessary, i.e. as good. But if reason of itself does not 
 sufficiently determine the will, if the latter is subject 
 also to subjective conditions (particular impulses) which 
 do not always coincide with the objective conditions V 
 in a word, if t he will_does hot in z'^ JZaaaplfitely^accord 
 with reason (which is actually the case with iiien), then/ 
 the actions which objectively are recognised as neces- 
 sary are subjectively contingent, and tlie determination 
 of such a will according to objective Javsrs is obligation^ , 
 that is to say, the relation of the objective laws to a 
 will that is not thoroughly good is conceived as the 
 determination of the "will of a rational being by prin- 
 ciples of reason-, but which the will from its nature does 
 not of necessity follow. 
 
 The conception of an objective principle, in so far 
 as it is obligatory for a will, is called a command (of 
 reason), and the formula of the command is called an 
 Imperative. 
 
 All imperatives are expressed by the word ought [or 
 shall], and thereby indicate the relation of an objective 
 law (37) of reason to a will, which from its subjective 
 
 D2 
 
36 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [38] 
 
 constitution is not necessarily determined by it (an obli- 
 gation). They say that something would be good to 
 do or to forbear, but they say it to a will which does 
 not always do a thing because it is conceived to be 
 good to do it. That is practically ^ot(^, however, which 
 determines the will by means of the conceptions of 
 reason, and consequently not from subjective causes, 
 but objectively, that is on principles which are valid for 
 every rational being as such. It is distinguished from 
 the pleasant, as that which influences the will only by 
 means of sensation from merely subjective causes, valid 
 only for the sense of this or that one, and not as a 
 principle of reason, which holds for every one.^ 
 
 A perfectly good will would therefore be equally 
 subject to objective laws (viz. laws of good), but could not 
 be conceived as obliged thereby to act lawfully, because 
 of itself from its subjective constitution it can only be 
 determined by the conception of good (38). Therefore 
 no imperatives hold for the Divine will, or in general 
 for a holy will ; ought is here out of place, because the 
 
 1 The dependence of the desires on sensations is called inclination, 
 and this accordingly always indicates a want. The dependence of 
 a contingently determinable will on principles of reason is called an 
 interest. This therefore is found only in the case of a dependent 
 ■will, which does not always of itself conform to reason ; in the 
 Divine will we cannot conceive any interest. But the human will 
 can also take an interest in a thing without therefore acting from 
 z}iierest. The former signifies the practical interest in the action, 
 the latter ihe pathological in the object of the action. The former 
 indicates only dependence of the will on principles of reason in 
 themselves ; the second, dependence on principles of reason for the 
 sake of inclination, reason supplying only the practical rules how 
 the requirement of the inclination may be satisfied. In the first 
 case the action interests me ; in the second the object of the action 
 (because it is pleasant to me). We have seen in the first section 
 that in an action done from duty we must look not to the interest 
 in the object, but only to that in the action itself, and in its 
 rational principle (viz. the law). 
 
[39] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 37 
 
 volition is alreadyof itself necessarily in unison with the 
 law. Therefore i mperative s are only formulae to express^ 
 the relati on of objective laws of all volition to the sub- 
 jective imperfeclion of the will "oT this "or that rational^ 
 being", e.g. the human will. 
 
 Now all imperatives command either hypallisticallx. 
 or j£ategorical^. The former represent the practical 
 necessity of a possible action ^smeans_to. something 
 else that is willed (or at least "wBich one might possibly 
 willj. The categorical imperative would be that which 
 represented an action as necessar;^of itself_without refe- 
 rence to another end, i.e. as objectively necessary. 
 
 Since every practical law represents a possible action 
 as good, and on this account, for a subject who is practi- 
 cally determinable by reason, necessary, all imperatives 
 are formulae determining an action which is necessary 
 according to the principle ofa will good in some respects. 
 If now the action is good only as a means _/o something 
 else, then the imperative is Ay^o/^g/z"fa/; if jt is conceived 
 . as good in itself aiid. c on sequently a s_being necessarily 
 the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, 
 then i t is categorical { 
 
 Thus the imperative declares what action possible 
 by me would be good, and presents the practical rule in 
 relation to a will which does not forthwith perform an 
 action simply because it is good, whether because the 
 subject does not always know that it is good, or because, 
 even if it know this, yet its maxims might be opposed to 
 the objective principles of practical reason. 
 
 Accordingly the hypothetical imperative only says that 
 the action is good for some purpose, possible or actual 
 (39). In the first case it is a Problematical, in the 
 second an Assertorial practical principle. The categori- 
 cal imperative which declares an action to be objectively 
 
38 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [40] 
 
 necessary in itself without reference to any purpose, i.e. 
 without any other end, is valid as a (practical) Apodictic 
 principle. 
 
 Whatever is possible only by the power of some 
 rational being may also be conceived as a possible 
 purpose of some will ; and therefore the principles of 
 action as regards the means necessary to attain some 
 possible purpose are in fact infinitely numerous. All 
 sciences have a practical part, consisting of problems 
 expressing that some end is possible for us, and of 
 imperatives directing how it niay be attained'. These 
 may, therefore, be called in general imperatives of skill. 
 Here there is no question whether the end is rational and 
 godd, but only what one must do in order to attain it. 
 The precepts for the physician to make his patient 
 thoroughly healthy, and for a poisoner to ensure certain 
 death, are of equal value in this respect, that each serves 
 to effect its purpose perfectly. Since in early youth it 
 cannot be known what ends are likely to occur to us in 
 the course of life, parents seek to have their children 
 taught a great many things, and provide for their skill in 
 the use of means for all sorts of arbitrary ends, of none 
 of which can they determine whether it may not perhaps 
 hereafter be an object to their pupil, but which it is at 
 all events possible that he might aim at ; and this anxiety 
 is so great that they comrrionly neglect to form and 
 correct their judgment on the value of the things which 
 may be chosen as ends (40). 
 
 There is one end, hewsvety which may be assumed to 
 be actually such to all rational beings (so far as impera- 
 tives apply to them, viz. as dependent beings), and 
 therefore, one purpose which they not merely may have, 
 but which we may with certainty assume that they all 
 actually have by a natural necessity, and this is happiness. 
 
[41] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 39 
 
 The hypothetical imperative which expresses the practi- 
 cal necessity of an action as means totheadvancemsjll; 
 _oniap2ifless_is .4aS£rtQ£Lal. We are notto"present it as 
 necessary for an uncertain and merely possible purpose, 
 but for a purpose which we may presuppose with 
 certainty and a priori in every man, because it belongs ' 
 to his being. Now skill in the choice of means to his 
 own great well-bemg may be called prudence,'^ in the 
 narrowest sense. And thus the imperative which refers 
 to the choice of means to one's own happiness, i. e. the 
 precept of prudence, is still always hypothetical; the 
 action is not commanded absolutely, but only as means 
 to another purpose. 
 
 Finally, there is an imperative which commands a 
 certain conduct immediately, without having as its 
 condition any other purpose to be attained by^it. This 
 imperative is Categorical. It concerns not the matter 
 of the action, or its intended result, but its form and the 
 principle of which it is itself a result (41) ; and what is 
 essentially good in it consists in the mental disposition, 
 let the consequence be what it may. This imperative 
 may be called that of Morality./ 
 
 There is a marked distinction also between the 
 volitions on these three* sorts of principles in the 
 dissimilarity of the obligation of the will. In order to 
 
 ^ The word prudence is taken in two senses : in the one it may 
 bear the name of knowledge of the world, in the other that of 
 private prudence. The former is a man's ability to influence others 
 so as to use them for his own purposes. The latter is the sagacity 
 to combine all these purposes for his own lasting benefit. This 
 latter is properly that to which the value even of the former is re- 
 duced, and when a man is prudent in t"he former sense, but not in 
 the latter, we might better say of him that he is clever and cunning, 
 but, on the whole, imprudent. [Compare on the diflference between 
 klug axt-Agescheu here alluded to, Anthropologie, § 45, ed. Schubert, 
 p. no.] 
 
40 FUNDAMENTAL- PRINCIPLES OF THE [42] 
 
 mark this difference more clearly, I think they would be 
 most suitably named in their order if we said they are 
 either rules of skill, or counsels of prudence, or commands 
 {laws) of morality. For it is law only that involves the 
 conception of an unconditional and objective necessity, 
 which is consequently universally valid ; and commands 
 are laws which must be obeyed, that is, must be followed, 
 even in opposition to inclination. Counsels, indeed, 
 involve necessity, but one which can only hold under a 
 contingent subjective condition, viz. they depend on 
 "whether this or that man reckons this or that as part of 
 his happiness ; the categorical imperative, on the con- 
 trary, is not limited by any condition, and as being 
 absolutely, although practically, necessary, may be quite 
 properly called a command. We might also call the 
 first kind of imperatives technical (belonging to art), 
 the second pragmatic^ (to welfare), the third moral 
 (belonging to free conduct generally, that is, to 
 morals). 
 
 Now arises the question, how are all these imperatives 
 possible } This question' does not seek to know how we 
 can conceive the accomplishment of the action which 
 the imperative ordains, but merely how we can conceive 
 the obligation of the will (42) which the imperative ex- 
 presses. No special explanation is needed to show how 
 an imperative of skill is possible. Whoever wills the end, 
 wills also (so far as reason decides his conduct) the 
 
 ' It seems to me that the proper signification of the yt or A fragmaiic 
 may be most accurately defined in this way. For sanctions [see Cr. 
 ofPract. iSifflu-., p. 271] are called pragmatic which flow properly 
 not from the law of the states as necessary enactments, but from 
 precaution for the general welfare. A history is composed prag- 
 matically when it teaches prudence, i.e. instructs the world how it 
 can provide for its interests better, or at least as well, as the men 
 of former time. 
 
[43] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 41 
 
 means in his power which are indispensably necessary 
 thereto. This proposition is, as regards the voKtion, 
 analytical ; for, in willing an object as my effect, there" 
 is already thought the causality of myself as an acting 
 cause, that is to say, the use of the means ; aiji-tbe 
 imperative educes from the conception of volition of a n 
 end ttie conception of actions- necessary to this end. 
 Synthetical propositions must no dojibt be employed in 
 defining the means to a proposed end ; but they do not 
 concern the principle, the act of the will, but the object 
 and its realization. Ex. gr., that in order to bisect a 
 line on an unerring principle I must draw from its 
 extremities two intersecting arcs ; this no doubt is 
 taught by mathematics only in synthetical propositions ; 
 but if I know that it is only by this process that the 
 intended operation can be performed, then to say that 
 if I fully will the operation, I also will the action 
 required for it, is an analytical proposition ; for it is 
 one and the same thing to conceive something as an 
 effect which I can produce in a certain way, and to 
 conceive myself as acting in this way. 
 
 If it were only equally easy to give a definite concep- 
 tion of happiness, the imperatives of prudence would 
 correspond exactly with those of skill, and would like- 
 wise be analytical. For in this case as in that, it could 
 be said, whoever wills the end, wills also (according tO' 
 the dictate of reason necessarily) the indispensable 
 means thereto which are in :his power. But, unfortu- 
 nately, the notion of happiness is so indefinite that' 
 although every man wishes to attain it, yet he never can 
 say definitely and consistently what it is that he really 
 wishes and wills (43). The reason of this is that all 
 the elements which belong to the notion of happiness 
 are altogether empirical, i. e. they must be borrowed 
 
42 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [44] 
 
 'from experience, and nevertheless the idea of happiness 
 requires an absolute whole, a maximum of welfare in 
 my present and all future circumstances. Now it is 
 impossible that the most clear-sighted, and at the same 
 time most powerful being (supposed finite) should 
 frame to himself a definite conception of what he 
 really wills in this. Does he will riches, how much 
 anxiety, envy, and snares might he not thereby draw 
 upon his shoulders ? Does he will knowledge and 
 discernment, perhaps it might prove to be only an eye 
 ,so much the sharper to show him so much the more 
 fearfully the evils that are now concealed from him 
 and that cannot be avoided, or to impose more 
 wants on his desires, which already give him concern 
 enough. Would he have long life, who guarantees to 
 him that it would not be a long misery ? Would he at 
 least have health .'' how often has uneasiness of the 
 body restrained from excesses into which perfect health 
 would have allowed one to fall ? and so on. In short he 
 is unable, on any principle, to determine with certainty^ 
 what would make him truly happy ; because to do so 
 he would need to be omniscient. We cannot therefore 
 act_jon_ai}y dafijyte^grinciples to secure_ happiness, but 
 only on emjurical ^counsels, exTgr. of regimen, fruga- 
 lity, courtesy, reserve, &c., which experience teaches 
 do, on the average, most promote well-being. Hence 
 it follows that the jjnj^rativjes^of -prudence do not, 
 strictly speaking, command at all, that is, they cannot 
 present actions objectively as practically necessary ; that 
 they are ratlier,tg_be regarded as counsels {consilia) than 
 precepts {pmcepta) of reason, that the probleji to 
 determine^jcertainly and universally (44) what aption 
 would promote the hap_piness of a rational being.Js, 
 •completely insolublej_and consequently no imperative 
 
[45] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 43 
 
 respecting it is possible which should, in the strict 
 sense, command to do what makes happy ; because 
 Jiappiness is_not an ideal of reason but of imagination, 
 £estingsolely_on^ empirical grounds, and it is vain to 
 ^expecFthat these should define an action by which one i 
 could attain the totality of a series of consequences 
 which is really endless. This imperative of prudence^ 
 would however be an analytical proposition if we 
 [ ass ume that the means to happiness could_be' certainly 
 assigned/; for it is distinguished from the imperative 
 of skill only by this, that in the latter the end is merely 
 possible, in the former it is given ; as howeve r/^^otR ) 
 only ^ordain the means to that which we suppose to be 
 willed as an endj it follows that the i mperative which 
 ordains the willing of the means to hinj who wills the 
 end is in both cases analytical. Thus there is nol 
 difficulty in~Fegafd"td the possibility of an imperative of 
 this kind either. p 
 
 On the other hand the questio n, how the imperative 
 of morality is possible, is undoubtedly one, the only one, 
 demanding a solution, as this is not at all hypothetical, 
 and the objective necessity which it presents cannot 
 rest on any hypothesis, as is the case with the hypothe- 
 tical imperatives. Only here we must never leave out 
 of consideration that we cannot make out ly any example, 
 in 5ther words empirically, whether there is such an 
 imperative at all ; but it is rather to be feared that all 
 those which seem to be categorical may yet be at 
 bottom hypothetical. For instance, when the precept 
 is : Thou shalt not promise deceitfully ; and it is 
 assumed that the necessity of this is not a mere counsel 
 to avoid some other evil, so that it should mean : thou 
 shalt not make a lying promise, lest if it become known 
 thou shouldst destroy thy credit (45), but that an action 
 
44 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [46] 
 
 of this kind must be regarded as evil in itself, so that 
 the imperative of the prohibition is categorical ; then 
 we cannot show with certainty in any example that the 
 will was determined merely by the law, without any 
 other spring of action, although it may appear to be so. 
 For it is always possible that fear of disgrace, perhaps 
 also obscure dread of other dangers, may have a secret 
 influence on the will. Who can prove by experience 
 the non-existence of a cause when all that experience 
 tells us is that we do not perceive it .'' But in such a 
 case the so-called moral imperative, which as such 
 appears to be categorical and unconditional, would in 
 reality be only a pragmatic precept, drawing our atten- 
 tion to our own interests, and merely teaching us to 
 take these into consideration. 
 
 We shall therefore have to investigate a priori the 
 possibility of a categorical imperative, as we have not 
 in this case the advantage of its reality being given in 
 experience, so that [the elucidation of] its possibility 
 should be requisite only for its explanation, not for its 
 establishment. In the meantime it may be discerned 
 beforehand that the categorical imperative alone has the 
 purport of a practical law : all the rest may indeed be 
 called principles of the will but not laws, since whatever 
 is only necessary for the attainment of some arbitrary 
 purpose may be considered as in itself contingent, and 
 we can at any time be free from the precept if we give 
 up the purpose : on the contrary, the unconditional 
 command leaves the will no liberty to choose the 
 opposite; consequently it alone carries with it that"" 
 necessity which we require in a law. 
 
 Secondly, in the case of this categorical imperative 
 or law of morality, the difficulty (of discerning its 
 possibility) is a very profound one (46). It is an a 
 
[46] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 45 
 
 priori synthetical practical proposition ;' and as there 
 is so much difficulty in discerning the possibility of 
 speculative propositions of this kind, it may readily 
 be supposed that the difficulty will be no less with the 
 practical. 
 
 In this problem we will first inquire whether the mere 
 conception of a categorical imperative may not perhaps 
 supply us also with the formula of it, containing the 
 proposition which alone can be a categorical imperative ; 
 for even if we know the tenor of such an absolute 
 command, yet how it is possible will require further 
 special and laborious study, which we postpone to the 
 last section. 
 
 When I conceive a hypothetical imperative in general 
 I do not know beforehand what it will contain until I 
 am given the condition. But when I conceive a cate- 
 gorical imperative I know at once what it contains.^ 
 For as the imperative contains besides the law only the 
 necessity that the maxims^ shall conform to this law, 
 while the law contains no conditions restricting it, 
 there remains nothing but the general statement that 
 the maxim of the action should conform to a universal 
 
 ' I connect the act with the will without presupposing any con- 
 dition resulting from any inclination, but ^ priori, and therefore 
 necessarily (though only objectively, i. e. assuming the idea of a 
 reason possessing full power over all subjective motives). This is 
 accordingly a practical proposition which does not deduce the will- 
 ing of an action by mere analysis from another already presupposed 
 (for we have not such a perfect will), but connects it immediately 
 with the conception of the wiU of a rationar being, as something 
 not contained in it. 
 
 2 A MAXIM is a subjective principle of action, and must be distin- 
 guished from the objective principle, namely, practical law. The 
 former contains the practical rule set by reason according to the 
 conditions of the subject (often its ignorance or its inclinations), so 
 that it is the principle on which the subject acts ; but the law is the 
 objective principle valid for every rational being, and is the principle 
 on which it ought to act, that is, an imperative. 
 
46 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [48] 
 
 law (47), and it is this conformity alone that the impe- 
 rative properly represents as necessary.^ 
 
 There is therefore but one categorical imperative, 
 namely this : Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst 
 at the same time will that it should become a universal law. 
 
 Now if all imperatives of duty can be deduced from 
 this one imperative as from their principle, then, 
 although it should remain undecided whether what is 
 called duty is not merely a vain notion, yet at least we 
 shall be able to show what we understand by it and 
 what this notion means. 
 
 Since the universality of the law according to which 
 effects are produced constitutes what is properly called 
 nature in the most general sense (as to form), that is, the 
 existence of things so far as it is determined by general 
 laws, the imperative of duty may be expressed thus : 
 Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will 
 a Universal Law of Nature. 
 
 We will now enumerate a few duties, adopting the 
 usual division of them into duties to ourselves and to 
 others, and into perfect and imperfect duties'* (48). 
 
 ' [I have no doubt that ' den' in the original before 'Imperativ' 
 is a misprint for ' der,' and have translated accordingly. Mr. 
 Semple has done the same. The editions that I have seen agree in 
 reading ' den,' and M. Barni so translates. With this reacSng, it 
 is the conformity that presents the imperative as necessary.] 
 
 ^ It must be noted here that I reserve the division of duties for a 
 future metaphysic of morals ; so that I give it here only as an arbi- 
 trary one (in order to arrange my examples). For the rest, I under- 
 stand by a perfect duty one that admits no exception in favour of 
 inclination, and then I have not merely external, but also internal 
 perfect duties. This is contrary to the use of the word adopted in 
 the schools ; but I do not intend to justify it here, as it is all one 
 for my purpose whether it is admitted or not. [Perfect duties are 
 usually understood to be those which can be enforced by external 
 law ; imperfect, those which cannot be enforced. They are also 
 called respectively determinate and indeterminate, officio juris and 
 officia virtutis."] 
 
[48] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 4T 
 
 T/< A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes 
 feels wearied of life, but is still so far in possession of 
 his reason that he can ask himself whether it would not 
 be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life^ 
 Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could 
 become a universal law of nature. His maxim is : From- 
 self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life 
 when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than- 
 satisfaction. It is asked then simply whether this 
 principle founded on self-love can become a universal 
 law of nature. Now we see at once that a system of 
 nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by 
 means of the very feeling whose special nature it is to- 
 impel to the improvement of life would contradict itself, 
 and therefore could not exist as a system of nature ;. 
 hence that maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal 
 law of nature, and consequently would be wholly incon- 
 sistent with the supreme principle of all duty.' 
 
 zXAnother finds himself forced by necessity to borrow 
 money. He knows that he will not be able to repay it, 
 but sees also that nothing will be lent to him, unless he- 
 promises stoutly to repay it in a definite time. He 
 desires to make this promise, but he has still so much 
 conscience as to ask himself: Is it not unlawful and 
 inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this 
 way ? Suppose however that he resolves to do sp, then 
 the maxim of his action would be expressed thus: When 
 I think myself in want of money, I will borrow money 
 and promise to repay it, although I know that I never 
 can do so. Now this principle of self-love or of one's 
 own advantage may perhaps be consistent with my 
 whole future welfare; but the question now is, is it 
 
 [On suicide cf. further Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 274.] 
 
48 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [49] 
 
 right ? I change then the suggestion of self-love into a 
 universal law, and state the question thus (49) : How 
 would it be if my maxim were a universal law ? Then I 
 see at once that it could never hold as a universal law 
 of nature but would necessarily contradict itself. For 
 supposing it to be a universal law that everyone when 
 he thinks himself in a difficulty should be able to promise 
 whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping 
 his promise, the promise itself would become impossible, 
 as well as the end that one might have in view in it, 
 since no one would consider that anything was promised 
 to him, but would ridicule all such statements as vain 
 pretences. 
 
 wA third finds in himself a talent which with the 
 help of some culture might make him a useful man in 
 many respects. But he finds himself in comfortable 
 circumstances, and prefers to indulge in pleasure rather 
 than to take pains in enlarging and improving his happy 
 natural capacities. He asks, however, whether his 
 maxim of neglect of his natural gifts, besides agreeing 
 with his inclination to indulgence, agrees also with 
 what is called duty. He sees then that a system of 
 nature could indeed subsist with such a universal law 
 although men (like the South Sea islanders) should let 
 their talents rust, and resolve to devote their lives 
 merely to idleness, amusement, and propagation of 
 their species — in a word, to enjoyment; but he cannot 
 possibly wt'll that this should be a universal law of nature, 
 or be implanted in us as such by a natural instinct. For, 
 as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his faculties 
 be developed, since they serve him, and have been given 
 him, for all sorts of possible purposes, 
 
 4^A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that 
 others have to contend with great wretchedness and that 
 
[so] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 49 
 
 he could help them, thinks : What concern is it of mine ? 
 Let everyone be as happy (50) as heaven pleases, or as ' 
 he can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor 
 even envy him, only I do not wish to contribute anything 
 to his welfare or to his assistance in distress ! Now no 
 doubt if such a mode of thinking were a universal law, 
 the human race might very well subsist, and doubtless 
 even better than in a state in which every one talks of 
 sympathy and good-will, or even takes care occasionally 
 to put it into practice, but on the other side, also cheats 
 when he can, betrays the rights of men, or otherwise 
 violates them. But although it is possible that a univer- 
 sal law of nature might exist in accordance with that 
 maxim, it is impossible to jwill that such a principle 
 should have the universal validity of a law of nature. 
 For a will which resolved this would contradict itself,' 
 inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would 
 have need of the love and sympathy of others, and in 
 which, by such a law of nature, sprung from his own 
 will, he would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he 
 desires. 
 
 These are a few of the many actual duties, or at 
 least what we regard as such, which obviously fall into 
 two classes on the one principle that we have laid down. 
 We rnngt ViP nhu fQfmU thaf a maxim of our action should 
 be a unirorsal law. This is the canon of the moral 
 appreciation of the action generally. Q Some actions are 
 of such a character that their maxim cannot without 
 contradiction be^ ^v^" rqp.reiypd as a universal law of 
 nature, far from it being possible that we should will that 
 it should be so. In others this intrinsic impossibility ig_ 
 not found, but still it is impossible to will that their 
 maxim should be raised to the universality of a law of 
 nature, since , such a_ ffiilIjEQ]]ld contradict_itsglf. It is 
 
 E 
 
so FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [51] 
 
 easily seen that, the former violate strict or rigorous 
 (inflexible) duty (51); the latter only laxer (meritorious) 
 duty. Thus it has been completely shown by these 
 examples ho w all_duties ^p&nd-asj£gaiiis.tho.. nature nf 
 e-th£_obligatiQn (not the object of the^actiqn) o n the s ame 
 principle. 
 
 IFnow we attend to ourselves on occasion of any 
 transgression of duty, we shall fi nd that we in fact do 
 not will that our maxim should^ be a universal law, for 
 that is impossible for us; on the contrary we will that 
 the opposite should remain a unjyersal law, only we 
 assume the liberty of making an exception^. ia our own 
 favour or (just for this time only) in Javour-of our incli- 
 nation. Consequently if we considered all cases from 
 one and the same point of view, namely, that of reason, 
 we should find a contradiction in our own will, namely, 
 that a certain principle should be objectively necessary 
 as a universal law, and yet subjectively should not be 
 I universal, but admit of exceptions. As however we at 
 one moment regard our action from the point of view 
 of a will wholly conformed to reason, and then again 
 look at the same action from the point of view of a will 
 afi"ected by inclination, there is not really any contradic- 
 tion, but an antagonism of inclination to the precept 
 of reason, whereby the universality of the principle is 
 changed into a mere generality, so that the practical 
 principle of reason shall meet the maxim half way. 
 Now, although this cannot be justified in our own 
 impartial judgment, yet it proves that we do really 
 recognise the validity of the categorical imperative and 
 (with all respect for it) only allow ourselves a few 
 exceptions, which we think unimportant and forced 
 from us. 
 We have thus established at least this much, that if 
 
[52] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 
 
 SI 
 
 duty i s a conception which is to have any import and 
 real legislative authority for our actions (52), i t can only 
 be expresagji in;categprica,l, and not at all in hypothiatj- 
 _cal imperatiyes. We have also, which is of great impor- 
 tance, exhibited clearly and definitely for every practical 
 application the content of the categorical imperative, 1 
 which must contain the principle of all duty if there is 
 such a thing at all. We have not yet, however, advanced 
 so far as to prove a priori that there actually is such an 
 imperative, that there is a practical law which commands ' 
 absolutely of itself, and without any other impulse, and 
 that the following of this law is duty. 
 
 With the view of attaining to this it is of extreme 
 importance to remember that we niust not allow pur- 
 selves to think of_deducing the reality of this principle: 
 from the particMlat attribuMs m/ human nature. For duty 
 is to be a practical, unconditional necessity of action ; 
 it must therefore hold ^or all rational beings (to whom 
 an imperative can apply at all) and for this reason only 
 be also a law for all human wills. On the contrary, 
 whatever is deduced from the particular natural charac- 
 .teristics of humanity, from certain feelings and propen- 
 sions,' nay even, if possible, from any particular 
 tendepcy proper to human reason, and which need not 
 necessarily hold for the will of every rational being ; 
 this may indeed supply us with a maxim, but not with a 
 law ; with a subjective principle on which we may have 
 
 [^ Kant distinguishes ' Hang (^ropensio) ' from ' Neigung 
 {fncUnatioY as follows : — "'Hang' is a predisposition to the 
 desire of some enjoyment; in other words, it is the subjective 
 possibility of excitement of a certain desire, which precedes the 
 conception of its object. When the enjoyment has been experienced, 
 it produces a ' Neigung ' (inclination) to it, which accordingly is 
 defined ' habitual sensible desire.' " — Anthropologie, §§ 72, 79 ; 
 Religion, p. 31.] 
 
 E 2 
 
52 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [S3] 
 
 a propension and inclination to act, but not with an 
 objective principle on which we should be enjoined to 
 act, even though all our propensions, inclinations, and 
 natural dispositions were opposed to it. In fact the 
 sublimity and intrinsic dignity of the command in duty 
 are so much the more evident, the less the subjective 
 impulses favour it and the more they oppose it, without 
 being able in the slightest degree to weaken the obliga- 
 tion of the law or to diminish its validity (53). 
 
 Here then we see philosophy brought to a critical 
 position, since it has to be firmly fixed, notwithstanding 
 that it has nothing to support it either in heaven or 
 earth. Here it must show its purity as absolute dictator 
 of its own laws, not the herald of those which are 
 whispered to it by an implanted sense or who knows 
 what tutelary nature. Although these may be better 
 than nothing, yet they can never afford principles dic- 
 tated by reason, which must have their source wholly d 
 priori, and thence their commanding authority, expect- 
 ing everything from the supremacy of the law and the due 
 respect for it, nothing from inclination, or else condemn- 
 ing the man to self-contempt and inward abhorrence. 
 
 Thus every em£irical_elemeiit_is. not only quite in- 
 capable of being an aid to t he principle of mora lity, 
 but is even highly prejudicial to the purity of morals, 
 for the p roper and i nestimable worth of an absolutely 
 good will consists just in this, that the principle of 
 action is tree fr^ m all influence of cnntinfypnt g-rniinTs7 
 which alone experience can furni sh. We cannot too 
 much or tod often repeat our warning against this lax 
 and even mean habit of thought which seeks for its 
 principle amongst empirical motives and laws ; for 
 human reason in its weariness is glad to rest on this 
 pillow, and in a dream of sweet illusions (in which. 
 
[54] MEI:aPHYSIC of morals. S3 
 
 instead of Juno, it embraces a cloud) it substitutes for 
 morality a bastard patched up from limbs of various 
 derivation, which looks like anything one chooses to 
 see in it ; only not like virtue to one who has once 
 beheld her in her true form.' 
 
 (S4) The question then is this : Is it a necessary law 
 for all rational beings that they should always judge of 
 their actions by maxims of which they can themselves 
 will that they should serve as universal laws ? If it is 
 so, then it must be connected (altogether a priori) with 
 the very conception of the will of a rational beingi 
 generally. But in order to discover this connexion we 
 must, however reluctantly, take a step into metaphysic, 
 although into a domain of it which is distinct from 
 speculative philosophy, namely, the metaphysic of 
 morals. In a practical philosophy, where it is not the 
 reasons of what happens that we have to ascertain, but 
 the laws, of what OK^A/ /o happen^&iGa. although it never 
 does, i. e. objective practical laws, there it is not neces- 
 sary to inquire into the reasons why anything pleases or 
 displeases, how the pleasure of mere sensation differs 
 from taste, and whether the latter is distinct from a 
 general satisfaction of reason ; on what the feeling of 
 pleasure or pain rests, and how from it desires and 
 inclinations arise, and from these again maxims by the 
 co-operation of reason : for all this belongs to an empi- 
 rical psychology, which would constitute the second 
 part of physics, if we regard physics as the philosophy 
 
 1 To behold virtue in her proper form is nothing else but t6 
 contemplate morality stripped of all admixture "^I'^Jgi^l^ thingSi 
 (54) and of every spurious ornament of reward or sen-love. How 
 much she then eclipses everything else that appears charming to 
 the affections, every one may readily perceive with the least exer- 
 tion of his reason, if it be not wholly spoiled for abstraction. 
 
54 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [SS] 
 
 of nature, so far as it is based on empirical laws. But 
 here we are concerned with objective practical laws, 
 and consequently with the relation of the will to itself 
 so far as it is determined by reason alone, in which 
 case whatever has reference to anything empirical is 
 necessarily excluded ; siQce_2f__J22^2^ °f ^^^^V olone 
 determmes _t_he_conduct (55) (and it is the possibility of 
 thS~that we are now investigating), it must necessjrily 
 ^o so a priori. 
 
 The will is conceived as a faculty of determining 
 oneself to action in accordance with the conception of 
 certain laws. And such a faculty can be found only in 
 rational beings. Now that which serves the will as the 
 objective ground of its self-determination is the end^ 
 and if this is as signed by reason al one, it must hold for 
 all rational beings. On the other hand, that which 
 merely contains the ground of possibility of the action 
 of which the effect is the end, this is called the means. 
 The subjective ground of the desire is the spring, the 
 objective ground of the volition is the motive ; hence 
 the distinction between subjective ends wHiclr rest on 
 springs, and objective ends which depend on motives 
 valid for every rational being. Practical principles are 
 formal when they abstract from all subjective ends, they 
 are material when they assume these, and therefore 
 ^particular springs of action. The ends which a rational 
 being proposes to himself at pleasure as effects of his 
 actions (material ends) are all only relative, for it is 
 only their relation to the particular desires of the 
 'subject that gives them their worth, which therefore 
 cannot furnish_£rinciples universal and necessary for all 
 rational beings and for every volition, that is to say 
 practicar Taws. Hence all these relative ends can give 
 rise only to hypothetical imperatives. 
 
£56] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 55 
 
 Supposing, however, that there were something whose 
 existence has in itself an absolute worth, something 
 which, being an end in itself , could be a source of 
 dgfinite laws, theri'in this and this alone would lie the 
 source of a possible categorical imperative, i.e. a prac- 
 
 Now I say: man and generally any rational being 
 ■£^SiLS-!LS^,.^F^ in himself, not merely as a means to be 
 arbitrarilyusedTytKiTof that will, but in all his actions, 
 whether they concern himself or other rational beings, 
 must be always regarded at the same time as an end. 
 All objects of the inclinations have only a conditional 
 worth, for if the inclinations and the wants founded on 
 them did not exist, then their object would be without!' 
 value. But the inclinations themselves being sources 
 of want, are so far from having an absolute worth for 
 which they should be desired, that on the contrary it 
 must be the universal wish of every rational being to be 
 wholly free from them. Thus the worth of any object- 
 which is to he acquired by our action is always condi- 
 tional. Beings whose existence depends not on our 
 will bi?t on nature's, have nevertheless, if they are irra- 
 tional beings, only a relative value as means, and are^ 
 therefore called things ; rational beings, on the contrary, 
 are called persons, because their very nature points them 
 out as, endsin-tljemselves, that is as something which 
 must not be used merely as means, and so far therefore 
 restricts freedom of action (and is an object of respect). 
 These, therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose 
 existence has a worth for us as an effect of our action, 
 but objective ends, that is things whose existence is an 
 end in itself: an end moreover for which no other can 
 be substituted, which they should subserve merely as 
 means, for otherwise nothing whatever would possess 
 
S6 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [57] 
 
 absolute worth ; but if all worth were conditioned and 
 therefore contingent, then there would be no supreme 
 practical principle of reason whatever. 
 
 If then there is a supreme practical principle or, in 
 respect of the human will, a categorical imperative, it 
 must be one which (57), being drawn from the concep- 
 tion of that which is necessarily an end for every one 
 because it is an end in itself, constitutes an objective 
 principle of will, and can therefore serve as a universal 
 practical law. The foundation of this principle is : ra- 
 tional nature exists as an end in itself. Man necessarily 
 ; conceives his own existence as being so : so far then this 
 'is a subjective principle of human actions. But every 
 other rational being regards its existence similarly, just 
 ;Qn the same rational principle that holds for me ■} so that 
 Ht is at the same time an objective principle, from which 
 as a supreme practical law all laws of the will must be 
 .-eapable^oT being deduced. Accordingly the practical 
 imperative will be as follows : So act ai to treat humanity, 
 , whether^ in thine own person or in that of any qther^ in 
 . every case as an end withal, never as means only. We will 
 now inquire whether this can be practically carried out. 
 
 To abide by the previous examples : 
 
 Firstly, under the head of necessary duty to oneself: 
 He who contemplates suicide should ask himself 
 whether his action can be consistent with the idea of 
 humanity as an end in itself. If he destroys himself in 
 order to escape from painful circumstances, he uses a 
 person merely as a mean to maintain a tolerable con- 
 dition up to the end of life. But a man is not a thing, 
 that is to say, something which can be used merely as 
 
 ' This proposition is here stated as a postulate. The grounds of 
 it will be found in the concluding section. 
 
[S8] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 
 
 57 
 
 means, but must in all his actions be always considered 
 as an end in himself. I cannot, therefore, dispose in 
 any way of a man in my own person so as to mutilate 
 him, to damage or kill him (58). (It belongs to 
 ethics proper to define this principle more precisely so 
 as to avoid all misunderstanding, e. g. as to the ampu- 
 tation of the limbs in order to preserve myself ; as to 
 exposing my life to danger with a view to preserve it, 
 &c. This question is therefore omitted here.) 
 
 Secondly, as regards necessary duties, or those of 
 strict obligation, towards others ; he who is thinking of 
 making a lying promise to others will see at once that 
 he would be using another man merely as a mean, 
 without the latter containing at the same time the end 
 in himself. For he whom I propose by such a promise 
 to use for my own purposes cannot possibly assent to 
 my mode of acting towards him, and therefore cannot 
 himself contain the end of this action. This violation 
 of the principle of humanity in other men is more 
 obvious if we take in examples of attacks on the 
 freedom and property of others. For then it is clear 
 that he who trangresses the rights of men, intends to 
 use the person of others merely as means, without 
 considering that as rational beings they ought always 
 to be esteemed also as ends, that is, as beings who 
 must be capable of containing in themselves the end 
 of the very same action.^ 
 
 Thirdly, as regards contingent (meritorious) duties to 
 oneself; is not enough that the action does not violate 
 
 1 Let it not be thought that the common : quod tibi non vis fieri, 
 &"€., could serve' here as the rule or principle. For it is only a 
 deduction from the former, though with several limitations ; it 
 cannot be a universal law, for it does not contain the principle of 
 duties to oneself, nor of the duties of benevolence to others (for 
 
58 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [59] 
 
 humanity in our own person as an end in itself, it must 
 also harmonize wzVA itXS9)- Now there are in humanity 
 capacities of "greater perfection, which belong to the 
 end that nature has in view in regard to humanity in 
 ourselves as the subject : to neglect these might per- 
 haps be consistent with the maintenance of humanity 
 as an end in itself, but not with the advancement of 
 this end. 
 
 Fourthly, as regards meritorious duties towards others : 
 the natural end which all men have is their own happi- 
 ness. Now humanity might indeed subsist, although 
 no one should contribute anything to the happiness of 
 others, provided he did not intentionally withdraw any- 
 thing from it ; but after all this would only harmonise 
 negatively not positively with humanity as an end in 
 itself, if every one does not also endeavour, as far as in 
 him lies, to forward the ends of others. For the ends of 
 any subject which is an end in himself, ought as far as 
 possible to be my ends also, if that conception is to 
 have lis full effect with me. 
 
 This principle, that humanity and generally every 
 rational nature is an end in itself {yihich. is the supreme 
 limiting condition of every man's freedom of action), 
 is not borrowed from experience, firstly, because it is 
 universal, applying as it does to all rational beings 
 whatever, and experience is not capable of determining 
 anything about them; secondly, because it does not 
 present humanity as an end to men (subjectively), that 
 is as an object which men do of themselves actually 
 
 many a one would gladly consent that others should not benefit him, 
 provided only that he might be excused from showing benevolence 
 to them), norsfinaUy that of duties of strict obligation to one another, 
 for on this prmciple the criminal might' argue against the judge 
 . who punishes him, and so on. 
 
[6o] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. S9 
 
 adopt as an end ; but as an objective end, which must 
 as a law constitute the supreme limiting condition of all 
 our subjective ends, let themlje what we will ; itjnusjf 
 
 _therefore spring^ from ^ure reaso n. In fact the objec- 
 tive pniiicTple of all practical legislation lies (according 
 to the first principle) in the rule and its form of univer- 
 sality which makes it capable of being a law (say e. g., 
 a law of nature) ; but the subjective principle is in the 
 end; now by the second principle the subject of all 
 ends is each rational being (60), inasmuch as it is 
 an end in itself. Hence follows the third practical 
 principle of the will, which is the ultimate condition 
 of its harmony with the universal practical reason, viz. : 
 the idea of the will of every rational being as a^ univer- 
 sally legislative will._. 
 
 y~ On this principle all maxims are rejected which are 
 inconsistent with the will b eing itself universal legis 
 
 latoj . Thus the will is riot subject simply to the law 
 but so subject that it must be regarded as itself giving 
 the law, and on this ground only, subject tomelaw~('a - 
 whichlt can regard itself as the author). 
 
 In the previous imperatives, namely, that based on 
 the conception of the conformity of actions to general 
 laws, as in ^. physical system of nature, and that based on * 
 the universal prerogative of rational beings as ends in 
 themselves- ^these imperatives just because they were 
 conceived as categmkal,.excluded from,.ajQ.y„aiiare .in 
 their ajith,Qrity_all admixture of any interest as a spring 
 of action ; they were however only assumed to be cate- 
 gorical, because such an assumption was necessary to 
 explain the conception of duty. But we could not 
 prove independently that there are practical proposi- 
 tions which command categorically, nor can it be 
 proved in this section; one thing howevsr could be 
 
6o FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [6i] 
 
 done, namely, to indicate in the imperative itself by 
 some determinate expression, that in the case of 
 volition from duty all interest is renounced, which is~ 
 the specific criterion of categorical as distinguished 
 from hypothetical imperatives. This is done in the 
 present (third) formula of the principle, namely, in the 
 idea of the will of every rational being as a uitiver- 
 .salty legislating will'. 
 
 (6i) For although a will which is subject to laws may 
 be attached to this law by means of an interest, yet a 
 will which is itself a supreme lawgiver so far as it is 
 such cannot possibly depend on any interest, since a 
 will so dependent would itself still need another law 
 restricting the interest of its self-love by the condition 
 that it should be valid as universal law. 
 
 Thus the principle that every human will is a wilt 
 which in all its maxims gives universal laws,''- provided 
 it be otherwise justified, would be very well adapted to 
 be the categorical imperative, in this respect, namely, 
 that just because of the idea of universal legislation it 
 is not based on any interest, and therefore it alone among 
 all possible imperatives can be unconditional. Or still 
 better, converting the proposition, if there is a cate- 
 gorical imperative (?'. e., a law for the will of every 
 rational being), it can only command that everything 
 be done from maxims of one's will regarded as a will 
 which could at the same time will that it should itself 
 give universal laws, for in that case only the practical 
 principle and the imperative which it obeys are uncon- 
 ditional, since they cannot be based on any interest. 
 
 ' I may be excused from adducing examples to elucidate this 
 principle, as those which have already been used to elucidate the 
 categorical imperative and its formula would all serve for the like 
 purpose here. 
 
[62] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 6i 
 
 Looking back now on all previous attempts to discover 
 the principle of morality, we need not wonder why they 
 all failed. It was seen that man was bound to laws by 
 duty, but it was not observed that the laws to which he is 
 subject are only those of his own giving, though at the 
 same time they are universal (6z), and that he is only 
 bound to act in conformity with his own will ; a will, 
 however, which is designed by nature to give universal 
 laws. For when one has conceived man only as subject 
 to a law (no matter what), then this law required some 
 interest, either by way of attraction or constraint, since 
 it did not originate as a law from his own will, but this 
 will was according to a law obliged by something else to 
 act in a certain manner. Now by this necessary conse- 
 quence all the labour spent in finding a supreme prin- 
 ciple oiduty was irrevocably lost. For men never elicited 
 duty, but only a necessity of acting from a certain 
 interest. Whether this interest was private or otherwise, 
 in any case the imperative must be conditional, and 
 could not by any means be capable of being a moral 
 command. I will therefore call this the principle of 
 Autonomy of the will, in contrast with every other which 
 I accordingly reckon as Heteronomy> 
 
 The conception of every rational being as one which 
 must consider itself as giving in all the maxims of its 
 will universal laws, so as to judge itself and its actions 
 from this point of view — this conception leads to another 
 which depends on it and is very fruitful, namely, tljat of 
 a kingdom of ends. " P^«Jih- - ^-^^ ^^---A J '-^• 
 
 By a kingdom- I understand the union of different 
 rational beings in a system by common laws. Now since 
 it is by laws that ends are determined as regards their 
 
 ^ [Cp. Critical Exa?nination of Practical Reason, p. 184.] 
 
62 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [63] 
 
 universal validity, hence, if we abstract from the perso- 
 nal differences of rational beings, and likewise from all 
 the content of their p;:ivate ends, we shall be able to 
 conceive all ends combined in a systematic whole 
 (including both rational beings as ends in themselves, 
 and also the special ends which each may propose to 
 himself), that is to say, we can conceive a kingdom of 
 ends, which on the preceding principles is possible. 
 
 (63) For all rational beings come under the law 
 that each of them must treat itself and all others never 
 merely as means, but in every case at the same time 
 as ends in themselves. Hence results a systematic union 
 of rational beings by common objective laws, i.e., a 
 kingdom which may be called a kingdom of ends, since 
 what these laws have in view is just the relation of these 
 beings to one another as ends and means. It is certainly 
 only an ideal. 
 
 A rational being belongs as a member to the kingdom 
 of ends when, although giving universal laws in it, he is 
 also himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it as 
 sovereign when, while giving laws, he is not subject to 
 the will of any other. 
 
 A rational being must always regard himself as 
 giving laws either as member or as sovereign in a king- 
 dom of ends which is rendered possible by the freedom 
 of will. He cannot, however, maintain the latter 
 position merely by the maxims of his will, but only in 
 case he is a completely independent being without wants 
 and with unrestricted power adequate to -his will. 
 
 Morality consists then in the reference of all action 
 to the legislation which alone can render a kingdom of 
 ends possible. This legislation must be capable of 
 existing in every rational being, and of emanating from 
 his will, so that the principle of this will is, never to act 
 
[64] METAPHYSIC OF ll^ALS. 63 
 
 j'on any maxim which could not without contradiction be 
 I also a universal law, and accordingly always so to act 
 that the will could at the same time regard itself as giving in 
 its maxims universal laws. If now the maxims of rational 
 beings are not by their own nature coincident with this 
 objective principle, then the necessity of acting on it is 
 called practical necessitation (64), i.e., duty. Duty does 
 not apply to the sovereign in the kingdom of ends, but 
 it does to every member of it and to all in the same 
 degree. 
 
 ,_The practical necessity of acting on this principle, i.e., 
 duty, does not rest at all on feelings, impulses, or incli- 
 nations, but solely on the rejation of rational beings, ta 
 one another, a relation in which the will of a rational 
 being must always be regarded as legislative, since other- 
 wise it could not be conceived as an end in itself. 
 Reason then refers every maxim of the will, regarding 
 it as legislating universally, to every other will and alsa 
 to every action towards oneself ; and this not on account 
 of any other practical motive or any future advantage, 
 but from the idea of the dignity of a rational being, obey- 
 ing no law but that which he himself also gives. 
 
 In the kingdom of ends everything has either Value 
 or Dignity... Whatever has a value can be replaced by 
 something else which is^iguivalent; whatever, on the 
 other hand, is above all value, and therefore admits of 
 no equivalent, has,a .dignity. 
 
 Whatever has reference to the general inclinations 
 and wants of mankind has a. market value; whatever, 
 without presupposing a want, corresponds to a certain 
 taste, that is to a satisfaction in the mere puvposebss 
 play of our faculties, has a. fancy value; but tfiat'whicn- 
 constitutes the condition under which alone anytEng 
 caii'be an end in TtselfV this has not merely a relative 
 
64 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [65] 
 
 worth, t. e., value, but an intrinsic worth, th at is 
 
 Now morality is the condition under which alone a 
 rational being can be an end in himself, since by this 
 alone is it possible that he should be a legislating 
 member in the kingdom of ends. 'j^Thus morality, and 
 humanity as capable of it, is that which alone has 
 dignity (65). Skill and diligence in labour have a 
 markef'value ; wit, lively imagination, and humour, 
 have fancy value ; on the other hand, fidelity_Jo 
 promises, benevolence from principle (not from_ in- 
 stinct), have an intrinsic worth. Neither nature nor 
 art contains anything which in default of these it could 
 put in their place, for their worth consists not in the 
 effects which spring from them, not in the use and 
 advantage which they secure, but in thet .disposition o f 
 mind, Jjiat. is, thejnaxims of the will, which are ready 
 to manifest themselves in such actions, even though 
 they should not have the desired effect. These actions 
 also need no recommendation from any subjective taste 
 or sentiment, that they may be looked on with imme- 
 diate favour and satisfaction : they need no immediate 
 ■ propension or feeling for them ; they exhibit the will 
 that performs them as an object of an immediate 
 respect, and nothing but reason is required to impose 
 them on the will ; not to flatter it into them, which, in 
 the case of duties, would be a contradiction. This 
 estimation therefore shows that the worth of such a 
 disposition is dignity, and places it infinitely above all 
 value, with which it cannot for a moment be brought 
 into comparison or competition without as it were 
 violating its sanctity. 
 
 What then is it which justifies virtue or the morally 
 good disposition, in making such lofty claims ? It is 
 
[66] JIETAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 65 
 
 nothing less than the privilege it secures to the rational 
 being of participating in the giving of universal laws, 
 by which it qualifies him to be a member of a possible 
 kingdom of ends, a privilege to which he was already 
 destined by his own nature as being an end in himself, 
 ■and on that account legislating in the kingdom of ends; 
 free as regards all laws of physical nature, and_obe£ing. 
 those only_whicli he himself_gives, and by which his 
 ^maxims can belong~f6~a' system of universal law, to 
 which at the same time he submits himself. For 
 nothing has any worth except (66) what the law assigns 
 it. Now the legislation itself which assigns the worth 
 of everything, must for that very reason possess dignity, 
 that is an unconditional incomparable worth, and the 
 word respect alone supplies a becoming expression for 
 the esteem which a rational being must have for it. 
 Au/a namv- then is the basis of the .dignity of human 
 and of every rational nature. 
 
 The three modes of presenting the principle of 
 morality that have been adduced are at bottom only so 
 many formulae of the verj- same law, and each of itself 
 involves the other two. There is, however, a difference 
 in them, but it is rather subjectively than objectively 
 practical, intended namely to bring an idea of the 
 reason nearer to intuition (by means of a certain 
 analogy), and thereby nearer to feeling. All maxims, 
 in fact, have — 
 
 1 . A form, consisting in universality ; and in this 
 view the formula of the moral imperative is expressed 
 thus, that the maxims must be so chosen as if they 
 were to serve as universal laws of nature. 
 
 2. A matter^ namely, an end, and here the formula 
 
 1 [The reading ' Maxime,' which is that both of Rosenkranz and 
 Hartenstein, is obviously an error for ' Materie.'] 
 
 F 
 
66 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [67] 
 
 says that the rational being, as it is an end by its own 
 nature and therefore an end in itself, must in every 
 maxim serve as the condition limiting all merely relative 
 and arbitrary ends. 
 
 3. A complete characterisation of all maxims by means 
 of that formula, namely, that all maxims ought by their 
 own legislation to harmonise with a possible kingdom 
 of ends as with a kingdom of nature' (67). There is a 
 progress here in the order of the categories of unity of 
 the form of the will (its universality), plurality of the 
 matter (the objects, i.e., the ends), and totality of the 
 system of these. In forming our moral judgment of 
 actions it is better to proceed always on the strict 
 method, and start from the general formula of the cate- 
 gorical imperative : Act according to a maxim which can 
 at the same time make itself a universal law. If, however, 
 we wish to gain an entrance for the moral law, it is very 
 useful to bring one and the same action under the three 
 specified conceptions, and thereby as far as possible to 
 bring it nearer to intuition. 
 
 We can now end where we started at the beginning, 
 namely, with the conception of a will unconditionally 
 good. That will is absolutely good which cannot be evil, 
 in other words, whose maxim, if made a universal law, 
 xould_never contradict itself. This principle then is its 
 supreme lawT~SS always on such a maxim as thou canst 
 at the same time will to be a universal law ; this is the 
 sole condition under which a will can never contradict 
 itself; and such an imperative is categorical. Since 
 
 ' Teleology considers nature as a kingdom of ends; Ethics regards 
 a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature. In the first 
 case, the kingdom of ends is a theoretical idea, adopted to explain 
 what actually is. In the latter it is a practical idea, adopted to 
 bring about that which is not yet, but which can be realised by our 
 conduct, namely, if it conforms to this idea. 
 
[68] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 67 
 
 the validity of the will as a universal law for possible 
 actions is analogous to the universal connexion of the 
 existence of things by general laws, which is the formal 
 notion of nature in general, the categorical imperative 
 can also be expressed thus : Act on maxims which can at 
 the same time have for their object themselves as universal laws 
 of nature. Such then is the formula of an absolutely 
 good will. 
 
 Rational nature is distinguished from the^estpl nature 
 by^this, that jLa£ts_befor e itself an end. This end would 
 be the matter of every good will (SK). BuTsiilCie-i-n the 
 idea of a will that is absolutely' good without being 
 limited by any condition (of attaining this or that end) 
 we must abstract wholly froiij' every end to be effected (since 
 this would make every will only relatively good), it 
 follows that in this case the end must be conceived, 
 not as an end to be effected, but as an independently 
 existing end. Consequently it is conceived only nega- 
 tively, i.e., as that which we must never act against, and 
 ~which, therefore, must never be regarded merely as 
 means, but must in every volition be esteemed as an 
 end likewise. Now this end can be nothing but the sub- 
 ject of all possible ends, since this is also the subject 
 of a possible absolutely good will ; for such a will can- 
 not without contradiction be postponed to any other 
 object. The principle : So act in regard to every ra- 
 tional being (thyself and others), that he may always 
 have place in thy maxim as an end in himself, is accord- 
 ingly essentially identical with this other : Act upon a 
 maxim which, at the same time, involves its own universal 
 validity for every rational being. For that in using 
 means for every end I should limit my maxim by the 
 condition of its holding good as a law for every subject, 
 this comes to the same thing as that the fundamental 
 F 2 
 
68 FXJNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [69] 
 
 principle of all maxims of action must be that the 
 subject of all ends, i.e., the rational being himself, be 
 never employed merely as means, but as the supreme 
 condition restricting the use of all means, that is in 
 every case as an end likewise. 
 
 It follows incontestably that, to whatever laws any 
 rational being may be subject, he being an end in 
 himself must be able to regard himself as also legislat- 
 ing universally in respect of these same laws, §ince^it is 
 jugLlJaJ^-fitMss oif^h^jiiax^^ universal legislation 
 that distinguishes him as a n end in himseliT; also it 
 follows that this implies his dignity (prerogative) above 
 all mere physical beings, that he must always take his 
 (6g) maxims from the point of view which regards him- 
 self, and likewise every other rational being, as law- 
 giving beings (on which account they are called persons). 
 In this way a world of rational beings {mundus intelK- 
 gibilis) is possible as a kingdom of ends, and this by 
 virtue of the legislation proper to all persons as mem- 
 bers. Therefore every rational being must so act as if 
 he were by his maxims in every case a legislating mem- 
 ber in the universal kingdom of ends. The formal 
 principle of these maxims is : So act as if thy maxim 
 were to serve likewise as the universal law (of all rational 
 beings). A kingdom of ends is thus only possible on 
 the analogy of a kingdom of nature, the former how- 
 ever only by maxims, that is self-imposed rules, the 
 latter only by the laws of efScient causes acting under 
 necessitation from without. Nevertheless, although the 
 system of nature is looked upon as a machine, yet so 
 far as it has reference to rational beings as its ends, 
 it is given on this account the name of a kingdom 
 of nature. Now such a kingdom of ends would be 
 actually realised by means of maxims conforming to 
 
[7o] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 69 
 
 the canon which the categorical imperative prescribes 
 to all rational beings, if they were universally followed. 
 But although a rational being, even if he punctually 
 follows this maxim himself, cannot reckon upon all 
 others being therefore true to the same, nor expect that 
 the kingdom of nature and its orderly arrangements 
 shall be in harmony with him as a fitting member, 
 so as to form a kingdom of ends to which he himself 
 contributes, that is to say, that it shall favour his expec- 
 tation of happiness, still that law : Act according to the 
 smaxims of a member of a merely possible kingdom of 
 ends legislating in it universally, remains in its full 
 . force, inasmuch as it commands categorically. And it is 
 just in this that the paradox lies ; that the mere dignity 
 of man as a rational creature (70), without any other 
 end or advantage to be attained thereby, in other words, 
 respect for a mere idea, should yet serve as an inflexible 
 precept of the will, and that it is precisely in this inde- 
 pendence of the maxim on all such springs of action 
 that its sublimity consists ; and it is this that makes 
 every rational subject worthy to be a legislative member 
 in the kingdom of ends : for otherwise he would have to 
 be conceived only as subject to the physical law of his 
 wants. And although we should suppose the kingdom 
 of nature and the kingdom of ends to be united under 
 one sovereign, so that the latter kingdom thereby ceased 
 to be a mere idea and acquired true reality, then it 
 would no doubt gain the accession of a strong spring, 
 but by no means any increase of its intrinsic worth. 
 For this sole absolute lawgiver must, notwithstanding 
 this, be always conceived as estimating the worth of 
 rational beings only by their disinterested ..behaviour, 
 ^ag-prefTcTibed to"themselves .from J;hat idea [the dignity 
 of man]'alone. The essence of things is not altered by 
 
70 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [71] 
 
 their external relations, and that which abstracting from 
 these, alone constitutes the absolute worth of man, is 
 also that by which he must be judged, whoever the 
 judge may be, and even by the Supreme Being. Mor- 
 ality then is the relation of actions to the autonomy of 
 the will, that is, to the potential universal legislation 
 by its maxims. An action that is consistent with the 
 autonomy of the will is permitted ; one that does not 
 agree therewith is forhidden. A will whose maxims} 
 necessarily coincide with the laws of autonomy is a holy I 
 will, good absolutely. The dependence of a will not ' 
 absolutely good on the principle of autonomy (moral 
 necessitation) is obligation. This then cannot be ap- 
 plied to a holy being. The objective necessity of actions 
 from obligation is called.^^^. 
 
 (71) From what has just been said, it is easy to see 
 how it happens that although the conception of duty 
 implies subjection to the law, we yet ascribe a certain 
 dignity and sublimity to the person who fulfils all his 
 duties. There is not, indeed^_any sublimity in him, 
 so far as ^he, is subject io the moral law; but inasmuch 
 as in regard to that very law he is likewise a legislator, 
 and oh that account alone subject to it, he has sublimity. 
 We have also shown above that neither fear nor incli- 
 nation, but simply respect for the law, is the spring 
 which can give actions a moral worth. Our own will, 
 so far as we suppose it to act only under the condition 
 that its maxims are potentially universal laws, this ideal 
 will which is possible to us is the proper object of 
 respect, and the dignity of humanity consists just in 
 this capacity of being universally legislative, though 
 with the condition that it is itself subject to this same 
 legislation. 
 
[72] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 71 
 
 The Autonomy of the Will as the Supreme Principle of 
 Morality. 
 
 AjitQQpm^jj of the will is that property of it by which 
 J±_js a law to itself, (independently on any property of 
 the objects of volition). The principle of autonomyi 
 then is : Always so to choose that the same volition 
 shall comprehend the maxims of our choice as a uni- 
 versal law. We cannot prove thiat this practical rule is 
 an imperative, i.e., that the will of every rational being 
 is necessarily bound to it as a condition, by a mere 
 analysis of the conceptions which occur in it, since it 
 is a synthetical proposition (72) ; we must advance 
 beyond tie cognition of the objects to a critical exami- 
 nation of the subject, that is of the pure practical 
 reason, for this synthetic proposition which commands 
 apodictically must be capable of being cognised wholly 
 A priori. This matter, however, does not belong 
 to the present section. But that the principle of auto- 
 nomy in question is the sole principle of morals can be 
 readily shown by mere analysis of the conceptions of 
 morality. For by this analysis we find that its principle 
 must be a categorical imperative, and that what this 
 commands is neither more nor less than this very 
 autonomy. 
 
 Heteronomy of the Will as the Source of all spurious Prin- 
 ciples of Morality. 
 
 If the will seeks the law which is to determine it 
 anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims to be 
 universal laws of its own dictation, consequently if it 
 goes out of itself and seeks this law in the character of 
 a'iiy~of 'its" objects, there always results heteronomy. 
 TKe"wi]T''rirtTtiat case does not give itself the law, buf 
 
72 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [73] 
 
 it is given by the object through its relation to the 
 will. This relation whether it rests on inclination or 
 on conceptions of reason only admits of hypothetical 
 imperatives: I ought to do something because I wish for 
 something else. On the contrary, the moral, and there- 
 fore categorical, imperative says : I ought to do so and 
 so, even though I should not wish for anything else. 
 Ex. gr., the former says : I ought not to lie if I would 
 retain my reputation ; the latter says : I ought not to 
 lie although it should not bring me the least discredit. 
 The latter therefore must so far abstract from all 
 objects that they shall have no influence on the will, in 
 ■order that practical reason (will) may not be restricted* 
 to administering an interest not belonging to it (73), 
 but may simply show its own commanding authority as 
 the supreme legislation. Thus, ex. gr., I ought to 
 endeavour to promote the happiness of others, not as 
 if its realization involved any concern of mine (whether 
 by immediate inclination or by any satisfaction indi- 
 rectly gained through reason), but simply because a 
 maxim which excludes it cannot be comprehended as a 
 universal law' in one and the same volition. 
 
 CLASSIFICATION 
 
 Of all Principles of Morality which can be founded on the 
 Conception of Heteronomy. 
 
 Here as' elsewhere human reason in its pure use, so 
 long as it was not critically examined, has first tried all 
 possible wrong ways before it succeeded in finding the 
 one true way. 
 
 All principles which can be taken from this point of 
 view are either empirical or rational. The former, drawn 
 
 ' [I read allgemeines instead of allgemeinem.'] 
 
[74] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 73 
 
 from the principle of happiness, are built on physical or 
 moral feelings ; the latter, drawn from the principle of 
 perfection, are built either on the rational conception of 
 perfection as a possible effect, or on that of an inde- 
 pendent perfection (the will of God) as the determining 
 cause of our will. 
 
 Empirical principks are wholly incapable of serving 
 as a foundation for moral laws. For the^uniYargality.- 
 with which these should hold for all rational beings 
 without distinction, the unconditional practical neces- 
 sity which is thereby imposed on the m is los.t whenlheir, 
 foundation is Jaken hom the particular constitution of 
 human- nature^ or~the accidental (74) circumstances in 
 wBtcTi'iris placed. The principle of private happiness, 
 however, is the most objectionable, not merely because 
 it is false, and experience contradicts the supposition 
 that prosperity is always proportioned to good conduct, 
 nor yet merely because it contributes nothing to the 
 establishment of morality — since it is quite a different v 
 thing to make a prosperous man and a good man, or to ' 
 make one prudent and sharp-sighted for his own 
 interests, and to make him virtuous — but because the 
 springs it provides for morality are such as rather 
 I undermine it and destroy its sublimity, since they put 
 jthe motives to virtue and to vice in the same class, and 
 only teach us to make a better calculation, the specific |- 
 diflference between virtue and vice being entirely extin- 
 guished. On the other hand, as to moral feeling, this | 
 supposed special sense,' the appeal to it is indeed > 
 
 1 I class the principle of moral feeling under that of happiness, 
 because every empirical interest promises to contribute to our well- 
 being by the agreeableness that a thing aflFords, whether it be 
 immediately and without a view to profit, or whether profit be 
 regarded. We must likewise, with Hutcheson, class the principle of 
 sympathy with the happiness of others under his assiimed moral sense. 
 
74 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [75] 
 
 superficial when those who cannot thinh believe that 
 feeling will help them out, even in what concerns 
 "general laws : and besides, feelings whi ch nrjUira lly 
 differ infinitely i" rlpgrpp nnnnt furnish a uniform 
 standa rd of Rood and evil, nor h as any one a right to 
 I form^ judgments^ for others by his own feel injfs : never- 
 jtheless this moral feeling is nearer to morality and its 
 dignity in this respect, that it pays virtue the honour of 
 ascribing to her immediately the satisfaction and esteem 
 we have for her, and does not, as it were, tell her to her 
 face that we are not attached to her by her beauty but 
 by profit. 
 
 (7s) Amongst the ra/zb«a/ principles of morality, the 
 ontological conception ol perfection, notwithstanding its 
 defects, is better than the theological conception which 
 derives morality from a Divine absolutely perfect will. 
 The former is, no doubt, empty and indefinite, and 
 consequently useless for finding in the boundless field 
 of possible reality the greatest amount suitable for us ; 
 moreover, in attempting to distinguish specifically the 
 reality of which we are now speaking from every other, 
 it inevitably tends to turn in a circle, and cannot avoid 
 tacitly presupposing the morality which it is to explain; 
 it is nevertheless preferable to the theological view, 
 first, because we have no intuition of the Divine perfec- 
 tion, and can only deduce it from our own conceptions, 
 the most important of which is that of morality, and 
 our explanation would thus be involved in a gross 
 circle ; and, in the next place, if we avoid this, the 
 only notion of the Divine will remaining to us is a 
 conception made up of the attributes of desire of glory 
 and dominion, combined with the awful conceptions of 
 might and vengeance, and any system of morals erected 
 on this foundation would be directly opposed to morality. 
 
[76] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 75 
 
 However, if I had to choose between the notion of 
 the moral sense and that of perfection in general (two 
 systems which at least do not weaken morality, al- 
 though they are totally incapable of serving as its 
 foundation), then I should decide for the latter, because 
 it at least withdraws the decision of the question from 
 the sensibility and brings it to the court of pure reason; 
 and although even here it decides nothing, it at all 
 events preserves the indefinite idea (of a will good in 
 itself) free from corruption," until Tt shall be more 
 precisely defined. 
 
 For the rest I think I may be excused here from a 
 detailed refutation of all these doctrines ; that would 
 only be superfluous labour, since it is so easy, and is 
 probably so well seen even by those whose office 
 requires them to decide for one of these theories 
 (because their hearers would not tolerate suspension of 
 judgment) (76). But what interests us more here is to 
 know that the prime foundation of morality laid down 
 by all these principles is nothing but heteronomy of the { 
 will, and for this reason they must necessarily miss 
 their aiw- --— -^ • 
 
 In weryx'^e^wnere an object of the will has to be 
 supposed, in order that the rule may be prescribed 
 which is to determine the will, there the rule is simply 
 heteronomy; the imperative is conditional, namely, t'/ 
 or because one wishes for this object, one should act so 
 and so : hence it can never command morally, that is 
 categorically. Whether the object determines the will 
 by means of inclination, as in the principle of private 
 happiness, or by means of reason directed to objects 
 of our possible volition generally, as in the principle of 
 perfection, in either case the will never determines 
 itself immediately by the conception of the action, but 
 
76 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [77] 
 
 only by the influence which the foreseen effect of the 
 action has on the will ; / ought to do something, on this 
 account, because I wish for something else; and here there 
 must be yet another law assumed in me as its subject, 
 by which I necessarily will this other thing, and 
 this law again requires an imperative to restrict this 
 maxim. For the influence which the conception 
 of an object within the reach of our faculties can 
 exercise on the will of the subject in consequence of 
 its natural properties, depends on the nature of the 
 subject, either the sensibility (inclination and taste), or 
 the understanding and reason, the employment of which 
 is by the peculiar constitution of their nature attended 
 with satisfaction. It follows that the law would be, 
 properly speaking, given by nature, and as such, it 
 must be known and proved by experience, and would 
 consequently be contigent, and therefore incapable of 
 being an a.podictic prac tical rule, such as the moral 
 rule must be. Not only so, but it is inevitably only 
 heteronomy (77); the will does nol _gay£-its£l£_thejaw, 
 but it is given by a foreign impulse by means of a 
 particular natural constitution of the subject adapted 
 to receive it. An absolutely good will then, the prin-^ 
 ciple of which must be a categorical imperative, will be 
 indeterminate as regards all objects, and will contain, 
 merely the form of volition generally, and that as auto- 
 nomy, that is to say, the capability of the maxims of 
 every good will to make themselves a universal law, is 
 itself the only law which the will of every rational 
 being imposes on itself, without needing to assume any 
 spring or interest as a foundation. 
 
 How-Such _a..synthetical practical h. priori proposition is 
 possible and why it is iiecessary, is a problem whose so- 
 lution does not lie within the bounds of the metaphysic 
 
[77] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 77 
 
 of morals ; and we have not here affirmed its truth, 
 much less professed to have a proof of it in our power. 
 We simply showed by the development of the univer- 
 sally received notion of morality that an autonomy of 
 the will is inevitably connected with it, or rather is its 
 foundation. Whoever then holds morality to be any- 
 thing real, and not a chimerical idea without any truth, 
 must likewise admit the principle of it that is here 
 assigned. This section then, like the first, was merely 
 analytical, ^few t^_Br ove that mo rality is no_creation 
 of the brain, which it cannot be It th'e~categorical 
 imperative and with it the autonomy of the will is true, 
 andasana priori principle absolutely necessary, this 
 sup poses \!\l1& possihility''of'a'syni7retic'use of pure practical 
 reason, which however we cannot venture on without 
 first giving a critical examination of this faculty of 
 reason. In the concluding section we shall give the 
 principal outlines of this critical examination as far as 
 is sufficient for our purpose. 
 
78 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [78] 
 
 [78] THIRD SECTIW- 
 
 TRANSITION FROM THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS TO THE 
 CRITIQUE OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON. 
 
 The Concept of Freedom is the Key that explains the Auto- 
 nomy of the Will. 
 
 The will is a kind of causality belonging to living 
 beings in so far as they are rational, and freedom would 
 be this property of such causality that it can be efiR- 
 cient, independentlj;_afa„fsi£lgB-£a]iSP.s determining it ; 
 just as physical necessity is the property' that the cau- 
 sality of all irrational beings has of being determined 
 to activity by the influence of foreign causes. 
 
 The preceding definition of freedom is negative, -and 
 therefore unfruitful for the discovery of its essence; 
 but it leads to a positive conception which is so much 
 the more full and fruitful. Since the conception of 
 causality involves that of laws, according to which, by 
 something that we call cause, something else, namely, 
 the effect, must be produced [laid down];' hence, 
 although freedom is not a property of the will depend- 
 ing on physical laws, yet it is not for that reason law- 
 less ; on the contrary it must be a causality acting 
 
 1 \Gesetzt. — There is in the original a play' on the etymology of 
 GeseU, wliich does not admit of reproduction in English. It must 
 be confessed that without it the statement is not self-evident.] 
 
[79] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 79 
 
 according to immutable laws, but of a peculiar kind ; 
 otherwise a free will would be an absurdity. Physical 
 necessity (79) is a heteronomy of the efficient causes, 
 for every effect is possible only according to this law, 
 that something else determines the efficient cause to 
 exert its causality. What else then can freedom of thd 
 will be but autonomy, that is the property of the will tq 
 be a law to itself ? But the proposition : The will is irn 
 every action a la w to jtself, only expresses the_principle, 
 to act on no other maxim than that which can alsc 
 have as an .object itself as a universal law. N ow this ii 
 precisely the formula of th e categorical imperative anc 
 is the princi£le_cif morality, so that afreewill_aiid.J£L_ 
 will subject jto^rnoral Ja^s_a^LQneLand-_the--saiBie. 
 
 On' the hypothesis then of freedom of the will, 
 ■ morality together with its principle follows from it by 
 mere' analysis of the conception. However the latter 
 is still a. synthetic proposit ion ; vi z., an ^abaoJutely 
 -good will is that -whose niax im can alwa ys include 
 itself regarded as j^ universal law ; for this property of 
 its rnaxim"cair never be discovered by analysing the 
 conception of an absolutely good will. Now such 
 synthetic propositions are only possible in this way : 
 that the two cognitions are connected together by their 
 union with a third in which they are both to be found. 
 The positive concept of freedom furnishes this third 
 cognation, which cannot, as with physical causes, be the 
 nature of the sensible world (in the concept of which 
 we find conjoined the concept of something in relation 
 as cause- to something else as effect). We cannot now at 
 once show what this third is to which freedom points 
 us, and of which we have an idea a priori, nor can we 
 make intelligible how the concept of freedom is shown 
 to be legitimate from principles of pure practical reason. 
 
8o FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [8i] 
 
 and with it the possibility of a categorical imperative ; 
 but some further preparation is required. 
 
 [80] FREEDOM 
 
 Must he presupposed as a Property of the Will of all 
 Rational Beings. 
 
 It is not enough to predicate freedom of our own 
 will, from whatever reason, if we have not sufficient 
 grounds for predicating the same of all rational beings. 
 For as morality serves as a law for us only because we 
 are rational beings, it must also hold for all rational 
 beings ; and as it must be deduced simply from the 
 property of freedom, it must be shown that freedom 
 also is a property of all rational beings. It is not 
 enough then to prove it from certain supposed experi- 
 ences of human nature (which indeed is quite im- 
 possible, and it can only be shown a priori'), but we 
 must show that it belongs to the activity of all rational 
 beings endowed with a will. Now I say every being 
 that cannot act except under the idea of freedom '\% just 
 for that reasbii in a practical point of view really free, 
 that is to say, all laws which are inseparably connected 
 with freedom have the same force for him as if his will had 
 been shown to be free in itself by a proof theoretically 
 conclusive. • Now I affirm that we must attribute to 
 every rational being (81) which has a will that it has 
 
 1 I adopt this method of assuming freedom merely as an idea 
 which rational beings suppose in their actions, in order to avoid the 
 necessity of proving it in its theoretical aspect also. - The former is 
 sufficient for my purpose ; for even though the speculative ptoof 
 should not be made out, yet a being that cannot act except with 
 the idea of freedom is bound by the same laws that would oblige a 
 being who was actually free. Thus we can escape here from the 
 onus which presses on the theory. [Compare Butler's treatment 
 of the question of liberty in his Analog^^ part I., cli. vi.] 
 
[82] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 81 
 
 also the idea of freedom and acts entirely under this 
 idea. For in such a being we conceive a reason that is 
 practical, that is, has causality in reference to its objects. 
 Now we cannot possibly conceive a reason consciously 
 receiving a bias from any other quarter with respect to 
 its judgments, for then the subject would ascribe th€' 
 determination of its judgment not to its own reason, 
 but to an impulse. It must regard itself as the author 
 of its principles independent on foreign influences. 
 Consequently as practical reason or as the will of a 
 rational being it must regard itself as free, that is to 
 say, the will of such a being cannot be a will of its 
 own except under the idea of freedom. This idea 
 must therefore in a practical point of view be ascribed 
 to every rational being. 
 
 Of the Interest attaching to the Ideas of Morality. 
 
 We have finally reduced the definite conception of 
 n^orality to the idea of freedom. This latter, however, 
 we could not prove to be actually a property of ourselves 
 or of human nature ; only we saw that it must be pre- 
 supposed if we would conceive a being as rational and 
 conscious of its causality in respect of its actions, i.e., 
 as endowed with a will ; and so we find that on just the 
 same grounds we must ascribe to every being endowed 
 with reason and will this attribute of determining itself 
 I to action under the idea of its freedom. 
 
 Now it resulted also from the presupposition of this 
 idea that we became aware of a law that the subjective 
 prin c iples o f action,_ z".g., maxim s, must always be so 
 assumed that they can also hold as objective (82), that 
 is, universal principles, and so serve as universal laws 
 of our own dictation. But why then should I subject 
 myself to this principle and that simply as a rational 
 
 G 
 
82 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [83] 
 
 being, thus also subjecting to it all other beings en- 
 dowed with reason ? I will allow that no interest urges 
 me to this, for that would not give a categorical impera- 
 tive, but I must take an interest in it and discern how 
 this comes to pass ; for this ' I ought ' is properly an 
 ' I would,' valid for every rational being, provided 
 only that reason determined his actions without any 
 hindrance. But for beings that are in addition affected 
 as we are by springs of a different kind, namely, sensi- 
 bility, and in whose case that is not always done which 
 reason alone would do, for these that necessity is ex- 
 pressed only as an ' ought,' and the subjective necessity 
 is diiferent from the objective. 
 
 It seems then as if the moral law, that is, the principle 
 of autonomy of the will, were properly speaking only 
 presupposed in the idea of freedom, and as if we could 
 not prove its reality and objective necessity indepen- 
 dently. In that case we should still have gained some- 
 thing considerable by at lea^ determining the true 
 principle more exactly than had previously been done ; 
 but as regards its vaUdity and the practical necessity of 
 subjecting oneself tout, we should not have advanced a 
 step. For if we werdi asked why the universal validity 
 of our maxim as a lawanust be the condition restricting 
 our actions, and on what we ground the worth which 
 we assign to this manniier of acting — a worth so great 
 that there cannot be any higher interest ; and if we 
 were asked further how it happens that it is by this 
 alone a man believes he f^els his own personal worth, 
 in comparison with which that of an agreeable or 
 disagreeable condition is to 'be regarded as nothing, 
 to these questions we could give no satisfactory 
 answer. 
 
 (83) We iind indeed sometimes that we can take an 
 
 «M 
 
 ^.i' 
 
 
 ^'"^- 
 
[.83] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 83 
 
 interest^ in a persorifll quality which does not involve 
 any interest of exteri^al condition, provided this quality 
 makes us capable of participating in the condition in 
 case reason were to effect the allotment ; that is to say, 
 the mere being worthy of happiness can interest of 
 itself even without tlje motive of participating in this 
 happiness. This judgment, however, is in fact only 
 the effect of the importance of the moral law which we 
 before presupposed (when by the idea of freedom we 
 detach ourselves from every empirical interest) ; but 
 that we ought to detach ourselves from these interests, 
 i.e., to consider ourselves as free in action and yet as 
 subject to certain laws, so as to find a worth simply in 
 our own person which can compensate us for the loss 
 of everything that gives worth to our condition ; this 
 we are not yet able to discern in this way, nor do we 
 see how it is possible so to act — in other words, whence 
 the moral law derives its obligation. 
 
 It must be freely admitted that there is a sort of circle 
 here from which it seems impossible to escape. In the 
 order of efficient causes we assume ourselves free, in 
 order that in the order of ends we may conceive our- 
 selves as subject to moral laws : and we afterwards 
 conceive ourselves as subject to these laws, because we 
 have attributed to ourselves freedom of will ^— for 
 freedora-aniself-legislation of will are both autonomy, 
 and therefore a,re reciprocal conceptioas-, aii3~for'this 
 _yery j:eas.on one must not be used to explain the other 
 or_give— tbe_reason .o£ it,. but. -at. mo5t..i3Jily. for logical 
 purposes to reduce apparently different .jn^otions_of_thfi. 
 .aame_QbJ£ct_tQ-£in£L.singi£^finjcept-4as we reduce diffe- 
 rent fractions of the same value to the lowest terms). / 
 
 ' [' Interest ' means a spring of the will, in so far as this spring 
 is presented by Reason. See note, pp. 96, 97]. 
 G2 
 
84 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [84] 
 
 One resource remains to us, namely, to inquire 
 whether we do not occupy different points of view 
 I when by means of freedom (84) we think ourselves as 
 causes efficient a priort'lsladl'^'^sn we form our concep- 
 tion of ourselves from our actions as effects which we 
 see before our eye^^. 
 
 It is a remark which needs no subtle reflection to 
 make, but which we may assume that even the 
 commonest understanding can make, although it be 
 after its fashion by an obscure discernment of judg- 
 ment which it calls feeling, that all the ' ideas ' ' that 
 come to us involuntarily (as those of the senses) do not 
 enable us to know objects otherwise than as they affect 
 us ; so that what they may be in themselves remains 
 unknown to us, and consequently that as regards 'ideas' 
 of this kind even with the closest attention and clear- 
 ness that the understanding can apply to them, we can 
 by them only attain to the knowledge of appearances, 
 never to that of things in themselves. As soon as this 
 distinction has once been made (perhaps merely in 
 consequence of the difference observed between the 
 ideas given us from without, and in which we are 
 passive, and those that we produce simply from our- 
 selves, and in which we show our own activity), then it 
 follows of itself that we must admit and assume be- 
 hind the apppearance something else that is not an 
 appearance, namely, the things in themselves ; although 
 we must admit that as they can never be known to us 
 except as they affect us, we can come no nearer to 
 them, nor can we, ever know what they are in them- 
 selves. This must furnish a distinction, however crude. 
 
 1 [The common understanding being here spoken of, I use the 
 word ' idea ' in its popular sense.] 
 
[8s] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 85 
 
 between a world of sense and the world of, understanding, 
 of which the former may be different according to the 
 difference of the sensuous impressions in various ob- 
 servers, while the second which is its basis always 
 remains the same. Even as to himself^a-man cannot 
 pretend to know what he is in himself from the know- 
 ledgejie hjs by internal sensation (85). For as he 
 does not as it were create himself, and does not come 
 by the conception of himself a priori but empirically, it 
 naturally follows that he can obtain his knowledge even 
 of himself only by the inner sense, and consequently 
 only through the appearances of his nature and the way 
 in which his consciousness is affected. At the same 
 time beyond these characteristics of his own subject, 
 made up of mere appearances, he must necessarily 
 suppose something else as their basis, namely, hisj|», 
 whatever its characteristics in itself may be. Thus in 
 respect to mere perception and receptivity of sensations 
 he must reckon himself as belonging to the world of 
 sense, but in respect of whatever there may be of purej 
 activity in him (that which reaches consciousness im-l 
 mediately and not through affecting the senses) he must 
 reckon himself as belonging to the intellectual world, of 
 which however he has no further knowledge. To such 
 a conclusion the reflecting man must come with respect 
 to all the things which can be presented to him : it is 
 probably to be met with even in persons of the com- 
 monest understanding, who, as is well known, are very 
 much inclined to suppose behind the objects of the 
 senses something else invisible and acting of itself. 
 They spoil it however by presently sensualizing this ^ 
 invisible again ; that is to say, wanting to make it an ' 
 object of intuition, so that they do not become a whit 
 the wiser. 
 
86 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [86] 
 
 Now man really finds in himself a faculty by which 
 he distinguishes himself from everything else, even 
 from himself as aifected by objects,, and that is Reason. 
 This being pure spontaneity is even elevated above the 
 understanding. For although the latter is a spontaneity 
 and does not, like sense, merely contain intuitions that 
 arise when we are affected by things (and are therefore 
 passive), yet it cannot produce from its activity any 
 other conceptions than those which merely serve to 
 bring the intuitions of sense under rules (86), and thereby 
 to unite them in one consciousness, and without this 
 use of the sensibility it could not think at all ; whereas, 
 on the contrary. Reason, shows so pure a spontaneity in 
 the case of what I call Ideas [Ideal Conceptions"] that 
 it thereby far transcends eVferything that the sensibility 
 can give it, and exhibits its most important function in 
 dijUBgrnshJag-the-wotld—aL sease-ixoia. that-iaf-aode-t- 
 _staiiding, anjL thereby grescribing..JJia.-Iimitsk.o£ the- 
 ■ understandin^itself.. 
 
 : ForThis reason a rational being must regard himself 
 qua intelligence (not from the side of his lower faculties) 
 as belonging not to the world of sense, but to that of 
 understanding ; hence he has two points of view from 
 which he can regard himself, and recognise laws of the 
 exercise of his faculties, and consequently of all his 
 actions : first, so far as he belongs to the world of 
 sense, he iinds himself subject to laws of nature 
 (heteronomy) ; secondly, as belonging to the intelligible 
 world, under laws which being independent on nature 
 have their foundation not in experience but in reason 
 alone. 
 
 I As a rational being, and consequently belonging 
 to the intelligible world, man can never conceive 
 the causality of his own will otherwise than on 
 
[87] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 87 
 
 condition of the idea of freedom, forjndependense 
 _on__Uie _d^ermining_caiiises_^^ sensjble^wQrld (an 
 independence which Reason must always ascribe to 
 itself) is freedom. Now the idea of freedom is insepar- 
 ably connected with the conception of autonomy, and 
 this again with the universal principle of morality 
 which is ideally the foundation of all actions of rational 
 beings, just as the law of nature is of all phenomena. 
 
 Now the suspicion is removed which we raised above, 
 that there was a latent circle involved in our reasoning 
 from freedom to autonomy, and from this to the moral 
 law, viz. : that we lay down the idea of freedom because 
 of the moral law only that we might afterwards in turn 
 infer the latter from freedom (87), and that consequently 
 we could assign no reason at all for this law, but could 
 only [present]^ it as a.petttio principii vihich well disposed 
 minds would gladly concede to us, but which we could 
 never put forward as a provable proposition. For now 
 we see that when we conceive ourselves as free we 
 transfer ourselves into the world of understanding as 
 members of it, and recognise the autonomy of the will 
 with its consequence, morality ; whereas, if we conceive _ 
 ourselves as under obligation we consider .ourselves as 
 belonging to the world of sense, and at the same time 
 to the world of understanding. 
 
 How is a Categorical Imperative Possible ? 
 
 Every rational being reckons himself qua intelligence 
 as belonging to the world of understanding, and it is 
 simply as an efficient cause belonging to that world 
 that he calls his causality a will. On the other side he 
 is also conscious of himself as a part of the world of 
 
 1 [The verb is wanting in the original.] 
 
< 
 
 ^s 
 
 p- 
 
 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE 
 
 [88] 
 
 J 
 
 > 
 
 </■ 
 
 \ 
 
 r 
 
 sense in which his actions which are mere appearances 
 [phenomena] of that causality are displayed ; we can- 
 not however discern how they are possible from this 
 causality which we do not know ; but instead of that, 
 these actions as belonging to the sensible world must 
 be viewed as determined by other phenomena, namely, 
 desires and inclinations. If therefore I were only a 
 member of the world of understanding, then all my 
 actions would perfectly conform to the principle of 
 autonomy of the pure will ; if I were only a part of the 
 world of sense they would necessarily be assumed to 
 conform wholly to the natural law of desires and 
 inclinations, in other words, to the heteronomy of 
 nature. (The former would rest on morality as the 
 supreme principle, the latter on happiness.) Since 
 however ike world of understanding contains the foundation 
 of the world of sense, and consequently of its laws also, 
 and accordingly gives the law to my will (which belongs 
 wholly to the world of understanding) directly (88), 
 and must be conceived as doing so, it follows that, 
 although on the one side I must regard myself as a 
 being belonging to the world of sense, yet on the 
 other side I must recognise myself as subje.ct as an 
 intelligence to the law of the world of understanding, 
 i. e., to reason, which contains this law in the idea of 
 freedom, and therefore as subject to the autonomy of 
 the will : consequently I must regard the laws of the 
 world of understanding as imperatives for me, and the 
 actions which conform to them as duties. 
 
 And thus what makes categorical imperatives possible / 
 is this, that the idea of freedom makes me a Tnemhe rl 
 of g^^] jrit pjligiliilr w"'-14| in consequence of/which if 1 1 
 were nothing else all my actions would aj^rays conform ; 
 to the autonomy of the will ; but as 1,/rit the same time \ 
 
 
 Xe^ 
 
 
[89] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 89 
 
 intuite myself as a member of the world of sense, they 
 ought so to conform, and this categorical ' ought ' 
 implies a synthetic d prion proposition, inasmuch as 
 besides my will as affected by sensible desires there is 
 added further the idea of the same will but as belonging 
 to the world of the understanding, pure and practical of 
 itself, which contains the supreme condition according 
 to Reason of the former will ; precisely as to the 
 intuitions of sense there are added concepts of the 
 understanding which of themselves signify nothing but 
 regular form in general, and in this way synthetic 
 a priori propositions become possible, on which all 
 knowledge of physical nature rests. 
 
 The practical use of common human reason confirms 
 this reasoning. There is no one, not even the most" 
 consummate villain, provided only that he is otherwise 
 accustomed to the use of reason, who, when we set 
 before him examples of honesty of purpose, of 
 steadfastness in following good maxims, of sympathy 
 and general benevolence (even combined with great 
 sacrifices of advantages and comfort), does not wish 
 that he might also possess these qualities. Only on 
 account of his inclinations and impulses he cannot 
 attain this in himself (89), but at the same time he 
 wishes to be free from such inclinations which are 
 burdensome to himself. He proves by this that he 
 transfers himself in thought with a will free from the 
 impulses of the sensibility into an order of things 
 wholly different from that of his desires in the field of 
 the sensibility ; since he cannot expect to obtain by 
 that wish any gratification of his desires, nor any 
 position which would satisfy any of his actual or 
 supposable inclinations (for this would destroy the 
 pre-eminence of the very idea which wrests that wish 
 
90 FtXNDAMENTAI- PRINCIPLES OF THE [90] 
 
 from him) : he can only expect a greater intrinsic 
 worth of his own person. This better person, however, 
 he imagines himself to be when he transfers himself to 
 the point of view of a member of the world of the 
 understanding, to which he is involuntarily forced by 
 the idea of freedom, i.e., of independence on determining 
 causes of the world of sense ; and from this point of 
 view he is conscious of a good will, which by his own 
 confession constitutes the law for the bad will that he 
 possesses as a member of the world of sense — a law 
 whose authority he recognises while transgressing it. 
 What he morally 'ought' is then what he necessarily 
 ' would ' as a member of the world of the under- 
 standing, and is conceived by him as an ' ought ' 
 ■only inasmuch as he likewise considers himself as a 
 member of the world of sense. 
 
 On the Extreme Limits of all Practical Philosophy. 
 
 I All men attribute to themselves freedom of will. 
 Hence come all judgments upon actions as being such as 
 ought to have been done, although they have not been done. 
 However this freedom is not a conception of experience, 
 nor canir'Be^, since it still remains (90), everi though 
 experience shows the contrary of what on supposition 
 of freedom are conceived as its necessary consequences. 
 On the other side it is equally necessary that everything 
 that takes place should be fixedly determined accord- 
 ing to laws of nature. This necessity of nature is like- 
 wise not an empirical conception, just for this reason, 
 that it involves the motion of necessity and consequently 
 of a priori cognition. But this conception of a system 
 of nature is confirmed by experience, and it must even 
 be inevitably presupposed if experience itself is to be 
 possible, that is, a connected knowledge of the objects 
 
[91] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 91 
 
 of sense resting on general laws. Therefo re freedom i s | 
 ^jy, anj[d£a-41d£a1 Cnnrpptinn] of _Reason,_aii!L its 
 objectiye_realityJjQ.itael£is_daabJ;fuI, while nature is a 
 concept of the understanding which proves, and must 
 riw;es¥arily prove, its reality, in. examples of expedience. 
 
 There arises from this a dialectic of Reason, since the 
 freedom attributed to the will appear to contradict the 
 necessity of nature, and placed between these two ways 
 Reason for speculative purposes finds the road of physical ' 
 necessity much mdre beaten and more appropriate than 
 that of freedom ; yet for practical purposes the narrowf 
 footpath of freedom is the only one on which it is pos-' 
 sible to make use of reason in our conduct ; hence it is 
 just as impossible for the subtlest philosophy as for the 
 commonest reason of men to argue away freedom. 
 Philosophy must then assume that no real contradiction 
 will be found between freedom and physical necessity 
 of the same human actions, for it cannot give up the 
 conception of nature any more than that of freedom. 
 
 Nevertheless, even though we should never be able to 
 comprehend how freedom is possible, we must at least 
 remove this apparent contradiction in a convincing 
 manner. For if the thought of freedom contradicts 
 either itself or nature, which is equally necessary (91), it 
 must in competition with physical necessity be ejitirely 
 given up. 
 
 It would, however, be impossible to escape this con- 
 tradiction if the thinking subject, which seems to itself 
 free, conceived itself in the same sense or in the very same 
 relation when it calls itself free as when in respect of the 
 same action it assumes itself to be subject to the law of 
 nature. Hence it is an indispensable problem of specu- 
 lative philosophy to show that its illusion respecting 
 the contradiction rests on this, that we think of man in 
 
92 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [92] 
 
 a different sense and relation when we call him free, 
 and when we regard him as subject to the laws of nature 
 as being part and parcel of nature. It must therefore 
 /show that not only can both these very well co-exist, 
 but that 'both must be thought as necessarily united in the 
 same subject, since otherwise no reason could be given 
 why we should burden reason with an idea which, 
 though it may possibly without contradiction be reconciled 
 with another that is sufficiently established, yet entangles 
 us in a perplexity which sorely embarrasses Reason in 
 its theoretic employment. This duty, however, belongs 
 only to speculative philosophy, in order that it may clear 
 the way for practical philosophy. The philosopher 
 then has no option whether he will remove the apparent 
 contradiction or leave it untouched ; for in the latter 
 case the theory respecting this would be lonum vacans 
 into the possession of which the fatalist would have a 
 right to enter, and chase all morality out of its supposed 
 domain as occupying it without title. 
 
 We cannot, however, as yet say that we are touching 
 the bounds of practical philosophy. For the settlement 
 of that controversy does not belong to it ; it only 
 demands from speculative reason that it should put 
 an end to the discord in which it entangles itself in 
 theoretical questions, so that practical reason may have 
 rest and security from external attacks (92) which 
 might make the ground debatable on which it desires 
 to build. 
 
 The claims to freedom of will made even by common 
 reason are founded on the consciousness and the ad- 
 mitted supposition that reason is independent on merely 
 subjectively determined causes which together constitute 
 what belongs to sensation only, and which consequently 
 come under the general designation of sensibility. 
 
[92] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 93 
 
 Man considering himself in this way as an intelligence, 
 places himself thereby in a different order of things 
 and in a relation to determining grounds of a wholly 
 different kind when on the one hand he thinks of 
 himself as an intelligence endowed with a will, and 
 consequently with causality, and when on the other he 
 perceives himself as a phenomenon in the world of 
 sense (as he really is also), and affirms that his causality 
 is subject to external determination according to laws 
 of nature.^ Now he soon becomes aware that both can 
 hold good, nay, must hold good at the same time. For 
 there i s^not th£, small£st. contradiction in_saying that a 
 thin g in appearanc e (belonging to the wxirld. of sense) is 
 subject_to_j;ertain Jaws, on which the very sameaj a\ 
 thing gxjb^iig in itself \s independent; and that he; 
 must conceive and think of himself in this two-fold j 
 way, rests as to the first on the conscious nasa-of-iiimafilf _ 
 as an object affected throug h the senses, and as to the 
 second on the consciousness of himself as an intgjli^ 
 gence,. i.e., as independent on sensible impressions in ' 
 the employment of his reason (in other words as 
 belonging to the world of understanding). 
 
 Hence it comes to pass that man claims the posses- 
 sion of a will which takes no account of anything that 
 comes under the head of desires and inclinations, and 
 on the contrary conceives actions as possible to him, 
 nay, even as necessary, which can only be done by 
 disregarding all desires and sensible inclinations. The 
 causality of such actions^ lies in him as an intelligence 
 
 1 [The punctuation of the original gives the following sense : 
 " Submits his causahty, as regards its external determination, to 
 laws of nature." I have ventured to make what appears to be a 
 necessary correction, by simply removing a comma.] 
 
 ^ [M. Barni translates as if he read desselben instead oi derselben, 
 " the causality of this will." So also Mr. Semple.] 
 
94 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [93] 
 
 and in the laws of effects and actions [which depend] 
 on the principles (93) of an intelligible world, of which 
 indeed he knows nothing more than that in it pure 
 reason alone independent on sensibility gives the law ; 
 moreover sin^e- it is . only in that world, as an intelli- 
 gence, that he is...hjs proper self [beingasmaii; only the 
 appearance of himself) those laws apply to him directly 
 and categorically, so tTiat the incitements of inclinations 
 and appetites (in other words the whole nature of the 
 world of sense) cannot impair the laws of his yo-lition 
 a s an intelligen ce. Nay, he does not even hold himself 
 responsible for the former or ascribe them to his proper 
 self, i.e., his will : he only ascribes to his will any 
 indulgence which he might yield them if he allowed 
 them to influence his maxims to the prejudice of the 
 rational laws of the will. 
 
 When practical Reason thinks itself into a world of 
 understanding it does not thereby transcend its own 
 limits, as it would if it tried to enter it by intuition or 
 sensation. The former is only a negative thought in 
 respect of the world of sense, which does not give any 
 laws to reason in determining the will, and is positive 
 only in this single point that this freedom as a negative 
 characteristic is at the same time conjoined with a 
 (positive) faculty and even with a causality of reason, 
 which we designate a will, namely, a faculty of so 
 acting that the principle of the actions shall conform to 
 the essential character of a rational motive, i.e., the 
 condition that the maxim have universal validity as a 
 law. But were it to borrow an olject of will, that is, a 
 motive, from the world of understanding, then it would 
 overstep its bounds and pretend to be acquainted with 
 something of which it knows nothing. Xlia.£onception 
 of a world of the u nderstanding- is _;^ieflLf)^ly j^Jmi^^'f 
 
[94] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 95 
 
 view which Reason find s itself compelled , to tak*? mit- 
 siSeltTre^ap peafanc e s in^rdfr ^'^ '''^n':''i^l^''''^f2^j^"jj2^"h 
 which^w^I^^nxjtlEe-passihle.ifc-thierinff^ of thi 
 
 sensibility _h^^_a__determining:4Ji!5y.eJ!;,.9n_maj^^ but 
 which is necessary unless he is to be denied the con- 
 sciousness of himself as an intelligence, and conse- 
 quently as a rational cause, energizing by reason, that 
 is, operating freely. This thought certainly involves 
 the idea of an order and a system of laws different 
 from that of the mechanism of nature which belongs 
 to the sensible world, and it makes the conception of 
 an intelligible world necessary (that is to say, the whole 
 system of rational beings as things in themselves)^ 
 But it does not in the least authorise us to think of it 
 further than as to its formal condition only, that is, the 
 universality of the maxims of the will as laws, and 
 consequently the autonomy of the latter, which alone 
 is consistent with its freedom ; whereas, on the contrary,. 
 all laws that refer to a definite object give heteronomy, 
 which only belongs to laws of nature, and can only 
 apply to the sensible world. 
 
 But Reason would overstep all its bounds if it under- 
 took to explain hem pure reason can be practical, which 
 would be exactly the same problem as to explain horn 
 freedom is possible. 
 
 f For we can explain nothing but that which we can 
 reduce to laws, the object of which can be given in 
 some possible experience. But freedom is a mere 
 Idea [Ideal Conception], the objective reality of which 
 can in no wise be shown according to laws of nature, 
 and consequently not in any possible experience ; and 
 for this reason it can never be comprehended or under- 
 stood, because we cannot support it by any sort of 
 
96 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [95] 
 
 \ example or analogy. It holds good only as a necessary 
 hypothesis of reason in a being that believes itself 
 conscious of a will, that is, of a faculty distinct from 
 mere desire (namely a faculty of determining itself to 
 action as an intelligence, in other words, by laws of 
 reason independently on natural instincts) (95). Now 
 where determination according to laws of nature ceases, 
 there all explanation ceases also, and nothing remains 
 tut defence, i.e., the removal of the objections of those 
 who pretend to have seen deeper into the nature of 
 things, and thereupon boldly declare freedom im- 
 possible. We can only point out to them that the 
 supposed contradiction that they have discovered in it 
 arises only from this, that in order to be able to apply 
 the law of nature to human actions, they must neces- 
 sarily consider man as an appearance : then when we 
 demand of them that they should also think of him qua 
 intelligence as a thing in itself, they still persist in 
 considering him in this respect also as an appearance. 
 In this view it would no doubt be a contradiction to 
 suppose the causality of the same subject (that is, his 
 will) to be withdrawn from all the natural laws of the 
 sensible world. But this contradiction disappears, if 
 they would only bethink themselves and admit, as is 
 reasonable, that behind the appearances there must also 
 lie at their root (although hidden) the things in them- 
 selves, and that we cannot expect the laws of these to 
 be the same as those that govern their appearances.^ 
 
 The subjective impossibility of explaining the free- 
 dom of the will is identical with the impossibility of 
 discovering and explaining an interest' which (96) man 
 
 1 Interest is that by which reason becomes practical, i.e., a cause 
 determining the will. Hence we say of rational beings only that 
 
[96] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 97 
 
 can take in the moral law. Nevertheless he does 
 actually take an interest in it, the basis of which in us 
 we call the moral feeling, which some have falsely 
 assigned as the standard of our moral judgment, 
 whereas it must rather be viewed as the subjective 
 effect that the law exercises on the will, the objective 
 principle of which is furnished by Reason alone. 
 
 In order indeed that a rational being who is also 
 affected through the senses should will what Reason 
 alone directs such beings that they ought to will, it is 
 no doubt requisite that reason should have a power to 
 infuse a feeling of pleasure or satisfaction in the fulfil- 
 ment of duty, that is to say, that it should have a 
 causality, by which it determines the sensibility accord- 
 ing to its own principles. But it is quite impossible to 
 discern, i.e. to make it intelligible a. priori, how a mere 
 thought, which itself contains nothing sensible, can 
 itself produce a sensation of pleasure or pain ; for this 
 is a particular kind of causality of which as of every 
 other causality we can determine nothing whatever d 
 priori; we must only consult experience about it. But 
 as this cannot supply us with any relation of cause and 
 eiFect except between two objects of experience, where- 
 as in this case, although indeed the effect produced 
 lies within experience, yet the cause is supposed to be 
 
 they take an interest in a thing ; irrational beings only feel sensual 
 appetites. Reason takes a direct interest in action then only 
 when the universal validity of its maxims is alone sufficient to de- 
 termine the will. Such an interest alone is pure. But if it can 
 determine the wiU only by means of another object of desire or on 
 the suggestion of a particular feeling of the subject, then Reason 
 takes only an indirect interest in the action, and as JReason by itself 
 without experience cannot discover either objects of the will or a 
 special feeling actuating it, this latter interest would only be em- 
 pirical, and not a pure rational interest. The logical interest of 
 Reason (namely, to extend its insight) is never direct, but pre- 
 supposes purposes for which reason is employed. 
 
gS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [97] 
 
 pure reason acting through mere ideas which offer no 
 object to experience, it follows that for us men it is 
 quite impossible to explain how and why the universality 
 of the maxim as a law, that is, morality, interests. This 
 only is certain, that it is not because it interests us that it 
 has validity for us (for that would be heteronomy and 
 dependence of practical reason on sensibility, namely, 
 on a feeling as its principle, in which case it could 
 never give moral laws) (97), but that it interests us 
 because it is valid for us as men, inasmuch as it had its 
 source in our will as intelligences, in other words in our 
 proper self, and what behngs to mere appearance is neces- 
 sarily subordinated by reason to the nature of the thing in 
 itself. 
 
 The question then : How a categorical imperative is 
 possible can be answered to this extent that we can 
 assign the only hypothesis on which it is possible, 
 namely, the idea of freedom ; and we can also discern 
 the necessity of this hypothesis, and this is sufficient 
 for the practical exercise of reason, that is, for the con-^ 
 viction of the validity of this imperative, and hence of 
 the moral law ; but how this hypothesis itself is possible 
 can never be discerned by any human reason. On the 
 hypothesis, however, that the will of an intelligence is 
 free, its autonomy, as the essential formal condition of 
 its determination, is a necessary consequence. More- 
 over, this freedom of will is not merely quite possible as 
 a hypothesis (not involving any contradiction to the 
 principle of physical necessity in the connexion of the 
 phenomena of the sensible world) as speculative philo- 
 sophy can show : but further, a rational being who is 
 conscious of a causality' through reason, that is to say, 
 
 ' [Reading ' einer ' for ' seiner.'] 
 
[gS] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 99 
 
 of a will (distinct from desires), must of necessity make 
 it practically, that is, in idea, the condition of all his 
 voluntary actions. But to explain how pure reason 
 can be of itself practical without the aid of any spring 
 of action that could be derived from any other source, 
 i.e. how the mere principle of the universal validity of 
 all its maxims as laws (which would certainly be the 
 form of a pure practical reason) can of itself supply a 
 spring, without any matter (object) of the will in which 
 one could antecedently take any interest (98) ; and how 
 it can produce an interest which would be called purely 
 moral ; or in other words, how pure reason can be prac- 
 tical — to explain this is beyond the power of human! 
 reason, and all the labour and pains of seeking an' 
 explanation of it are lost. 
 
 It is just the same as if I. sought to find out how| 
 freedom itself is possible as the causality of a will. For 
 then I quit the ground of philosophical explanation, 
 and I have no other to go upon. I might indeed revel 
 in the world of intelligences which still remains to me, 
 but although I have an idea of it which is well founded, 
 yet I have not the least knowledge of it, nor can I ever 
 attain to such knowledge with all the efforts of my 
 natural faculty of reason. It signifies only a something 
 that remains over when I have eliminated everything 
 belonging to the world of sense from the actuating 
 principles of my will, serving merely to keep in bounds 
 the principle of motives taken from the field of sensi- 
 bility ; fixing its limits and showing that it does not 
 contain all in all within itself, but that there is more 
 beyond it ; but this something more I know no further. 
 Of pure reason which frames this ideal, there remains 
 after the abstraction of all matter, i.e. knowledge of 
 
100 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE [99] 
 
 objects, nothing but the form, namely, the practical 
 law of the universality of the maxims, and in confor- 
 mity with this the conception of reason in reference to 
 a pure world of understanding as a possible efficient 
 cause, that is a cause determining the will. There 
 must here be a total absence of springs ; unless this 
 idea of an intelligible world is itself the spring, or that 
 in which reason primarily takes an interest ; but to 
 make this intelligible is precisely the problem that we 
 cannot solve. 
 
 Here now is the extreme limit of all moral inquiry 
 (99), and it is of great importance to determine it even 
 on this account, in order that reason may not on the 
 one hand, to the prejudice of morals, seek about in the 
 world of sense for the supreme motive and an interest 
 comprehensible but empirical ; and on the other hand, 
 that it may not impotently flap its wings without being 
 able to move in the (for it) empty space of transcendent 
 concepts which we call the intelligible world, and so 
 lose itself amidst chimeras. For the rest, the idea of 
 a pure world of understanding as a system of all 
 intelligences, and to which we ourselves as rational 
 beings belong (although we are likewise on the other 
 side members of the sensible world), this remains 
 always a useful and legitimate idea for the purposes of 
 rational belief, although all knowledge stops at its 
 threshold, useful, namely, to produce in us a lively 
 interest in the moral law by means of the noble ideal of 
 a universal kingdom of ends in themselves (rational 
 beings), to which we can belong as members then 
 only when we carefully conduct ourselves according 
 to the maxims of freedom as if they were laws of 
 nature. 
 
[loo] METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. loi 
 
 Concluding Remark. 
 
 The speculative employment of reason with respect to 
 nature leads to the absolute necessity of some supreme 
 cause of the world : the practical employment of reason 
 with a view to freedom leads also to absolute necessity, 
 but only of the laws of the actions of a rational being as 
 such. Now it is an essential principle of reason, how- 
 ever employed, to push its knowledge to a conscious- 
 ness of its necessity (without which it would not be 
 rational knowledge). It is however an equally essential 
 restriction of the same reason that it can neither discern 
 the necessity (loo) of what is or what happens, nor of 
 what ought to happen, unless a condition is supposed 
 on which it is or happens or ought to happen. In this 
 way, however, by the constant inquiry for the condition, 
 the satisfaction of reason is only further and further 
 postponed. Hence it unceasingly seeks the uncondi- 
 tionally necessary, and finds itself forced to assume it, 
 although without any means of making it comprehen- 
 sible to itself, happy enough if only it can discover 
 a conception which agrees with this assumption. It is| 
 therefore no fault in our deduction of the supreme 
 principle of morality, but an objection that should be] 
 made to human reason in general, that it cannot enable 
 us to conceive the absolute necessity of an uncondi- 
 tional practical law (such as the categorical imperative 
 must be). It cahnot be blamed for refusing to explain 
 this necessity by a condition, that is to say, by means 
 of some interest assumed as a basis, since the law 
 would then cease to be a moral law, i.e. a supreme law 
 of freedom. And thus while we do not comprehend 
 
102 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, ETC. [lOo] 
 
 the practical unconditional necessity of the moral 
 imperative, we yet comprehend its incomprehensibility, 
 and this is all that can be fairly demanded of a philo- 
 sophy which strives to carry its principles up to the 
 very limit of human reason. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 Printed iy Ponsonby and Weldrick, Dublm. 
 
WORKS BY THE TRANSLATOR. 
 
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