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^'^^'•'^>:M, 
 
 PAMPH LETS 
 
 Constitution of the United States, 
 
 Published during 
 
 Its Discussion by the People 
 
 1787-1788. 
 
 EpLTED 
 
 WITH NOTES and' A BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 BY 
 
 PAUL LEICESTER FORD. 
 
 BROOKLYN, N. Y. 
 
 1888. 
 
 
 
—rj^fZT'i S 
 
 A. 
 
 %Z^%i^ 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The English speaking people have been a race of pam- 
 phleteers. Whenever a question — religious, political, mili- 
 tary or personal — has interested the general public, it has 
 occasioned a war of pamphlets, which, however partisan and 
 transitory, were in a manner photographs of the public 
 opinion, and as such have been used and valued by students 
 and publicists. 
 
 The rarity and consequent difficulty of reaching this class 
 of literature has been, however, a great obstacle to its use as 
 sources of history. The name of pamphlet tells the purpose 
 of these little publications. Written hurriedly, to effect a 
 purpose for which there is not enough time or matter for a 
 more elaborate volume, they are thrown by after a brief cir- 
 culation and before a decade has passed, the edition has dis- 
 appeared, and if any are still in existence, they are only to be 
 found in the few public and private libraries which have taken 
 the trouble to secure these fugitive leaflets. 
 
 The recognized value of these tractates in England has 
 led to very extensive republications ; and the Harleian Mis- 
 cellany, the Soniers Tracts, the issues of the Roxburghe, Ban- 
 natyne, Maitland, Chetham, Camden and Percy societies and 
 the reprints of Halliwell, Collier, and M'CuIloch, not to men- 
 tion many minor collections, have placed several thousand of 
 them within the reach of every one. But in America few 
 attempts have been made to collect this kind of literature — 
 Peter Force reprinted a series of pamphlets on the early set- 
 tlement of the United States and a work of similar scope on 
 Canada,* containing reprints of the so called " Jesuit Rela- 
 tions " was printed under the patronage of the Canadian gov- 
 
VI. 
 
 ernment. John Wingate Thornton and Frank Moore have 
 collected a number of the patriotic sermons preached before 
 and during the Revolutionary war. Franklin B. Hough repub- 
 lished a series of the funeral sermons and eulogies on the 
 death of Washington, and James Spear Loring did the same 
 for the orations delivered in Boston from 1770 to 1852. 
 Samuel G. Drake reprinted a collection of tracts relating to 
 King Philip's war, Joseph Sabin issued a series relating to 
 the propagation of the gospel among the New England 
 Indians, and William H. Whitmore edited, for the Prince 
 Society, a number relating to the governorship of Sir Edmund 
 Andros — but these are the only attempts worth mentioning 
 to systematically gather these leaflets of our history, and 
 which have singularly neglected those bearing on politics and 
 government, in which we have so largely originated the true 
 theories and methods. 
 
 When the student or historian comes to examine the 
 earlier pamphlet literature of our country he encounters the 
 greatest difficulty in their use. The lack of communication 
 between the colonies or states, with its consequent localiza- 
 tion of the pamphlet ; the small edition caused by the high 
 price of paper, which at that time was the costly element in 
 the production of books ; the little value attached by each 
 generation to the pamphlets of its own time ; the subsequent 
 wars, with the destruction and high price of old paper that 
 came with them, and the general disregard of historical 
 material that existed for many years after the stirring times 
 that occasioned these arguments, have all tended to make 
 these tracts almost impossible to consult ; and any one desir- 
 ing to examine the original editions of the thirteen pamphlets 
 contained in this volume would be compelled to visit the 
 public libraries in the cities of Washington, Philadelphia, 
 New York, Albany and Boston, while it would take a life 
 time of patient searching and waiting to collect them from 
 the second-hand booksellers and auction-rooms, at prices that 
 few would care to pay. 
 
 As the rarity of these pamphlets has caused their neglect, 
 so also has their anonymous publication. It was a time of 
 
vu. 
 
 literary masks, and we often find, like the knights of old, that 
 when their masks were removed, they had concealed our ablest 
 statesmen, one of whom wrote of his anonymous pamphlet, 
 " If the reasoning in the pamphlet you allude to is just, it 
 will have its effect on candid and discerning minds; — if weak 
 and inconclusive, my name cannot render it otherwise," but it 
 is certain, whatever the effect at the moment, that more atten- 
 tion and care would have been given these works by succeed- 
 ing generations had they borne the name of one of the makers 
 of our nation, rather than the pseudonymous mask which gave 
 no clue to its authorship. 
 
 In America, we are too apt to forget the losing side of a 
 question. Few to-day know of the intense struggle that took 
 place over the ratification of our constitution, or realize that 
 the adoption of a government which has worked so success- 
 fully, met with the strongest opposition from such men as 
 Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee, George Mason, George 
 Clinton, Samuel Chase, Elbridge Gerry, Albert Gallatin, James 
 Monroe and others, while many equally famous were either 
 neutral or gave it but lukewarm support. If the great fear 
 ^and prediction of these men — that the general government 
 would entirely subvert the state governments, with a conse- 
 quent loss of personal freedom — has not been realized, it will 
 nevertheless be seen in the following pages that many of their 
 objections were embodied in the future amendments, and the 
 disregard of others has occasioned some of our most serious 
 national questions. If this collection presents a greater num- 
 ber of federal than anti-federal arguments, it is only in the 
 proportion in which the latter was overborne by the former, 
 both in men and writings. 
 
 Of all these partisan writings The Federalist has hitherto 
 been almost the only known argument of those which for nine 
 months kept the printers busy and the people in a turmoil, 
 though the twenty-nine editions of that work attest the value 
 and interest of that class of writings. That these essays 
 equal that great series is not claimed, but I believe, neverthe- 
 less, that they, by their simpler and more popular treatment 
 of the question, exerted quite as much influence as that 
 
^'"''^^ vin. ^ 
 
 "judicious and ingenious writer," who was "not well calcu- 
 lated for the common people," and therefore deserve in this 
 centennial year a place on the shelf of the publicist or 
 student, with that " political classic " of Hamilton, , Madison 
 and Jay. 
 
 PAUL LEICESTER FORD. 
 
 97 Clark Street, 
 
 Brooklyn, New York. 
 
ERRATA. 
 
 Page 274, line i, for mine read mind. 
 
 " 275, 
 
 " 14, • 
 
 " 277, 
 
 " 8, • 
 
 " 396, 
 
 " 28, ' 
 
 " 407. 
 
 " 38, ■ 
 
 " 409. 
 
 " 31. ' 
 
 " 409. 
 
 " 36, ' 
 
 " 412, 
 
 " 21, ' 
 
 " 424. 
 
 " 21, in 
 
 " 434. 
 
 " 37, fo 
 
 cause read clause. 
 
 Richard Harry Lee read Richard Henry Lee. 
 la substitute / 
 , substitute / 
 
 propounded read proposed. 
 Pilsner read Pelsue. 
 J. Lloyd read T. Lloyd, 
 insert / Philadelphia: after "A Citizen of Philadelphia." 
 37, for McClung read McClurg. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Page. 
 'Gerry, Elbridge. Observations on the New Constitution, and on the 
 
 Federal and State Conventions. By a Columbian Patriot . i 
 
 Webster, Noah. An Examination into the leading principles of the , 
 Federal Constitution. By a Citizen of America .... 25 
 
 Jay, John. An Address to the People of the State of New York, on the 
 
 subject of the Constitution. By a Citizen of New York ... 67 
 
 Smith, Melancthon. Address to the People of the State of New York. 
 
 By a Plebeian 88 
 
 Webster, Pelatiah. The Weakness of Brutus exposed: or some 
 remarks in vindication of the Constitution. By a Citizen of Phila- 
 delphia 117 
 
 CoxE, Tench. An Examination of the Constitution of the United States 
 
 of America. By an American Citizen 134 
 
 Wilson, James. Speech on the Federal Constitution, delivered in Phila- 
 delphia .... 155 
 
 Dickinson, John. Letters of Fabius on the Federal Constitution . 163 
 
 Hanson, Alexander Contee. Remarks on the Proposed Plan of a 
 
 Federal Government. By Aristides ' 217 
 
 ■^ Randolph, Edmund. Letter on the Federal Constitution . . . 259 
 
 ^ Lee, Richard Henry. Observations of the System of Government 
 
 proposed by the late Convention. By a Federal Farmer . . . 277 
 
 /Mason, George. Objections to the Federal Constitution . . . 327 1 
 
 Iredell, James. Observations on George Mason's Objections to the 
 
 Federal Constitution. By Marcus 333 
 
 Ramsay, David. An Address to the Freemen of South Carolina on the 
 
 Federal Constitution. By Civis". 371 
 
 Bibliography of the Constitution, 1787-1788 381 
 
 Reference List to the history and literature of the Constitution, 1787-88. 427 
 
 Index 443 
 
Observations / On the new Constitution, and on the 
 Federal / and State Conventions. / By a Columbian 
 Patriot. / Sic transit gloria Americana. / [Boston: 1788.] 
 
 12 mo., pp. 19. 
 
 Written by Elbridge Gerry, member of the Philadelphia 
 Convention from Massachusetts, and one of the number who 
 refused to sign the Constitution, for reasons given in his 
 letter to the presiding officers of the Massachusetts legislature 
 (Elliot I, 494). Gerry made himself conspicuous in the con- 
 test in Massachusetts over the ratification, and though not 
 elected to the State Convention, was requested by th'em to 
 attend and answer questions. His life, by James T. Austin, 
 (Boston, 1828), makes no mention of this pamphlet. 
 
 " E. G. has come out as a Columbian Patriot — a pitiful per- 
 formance. The author sinks daily in public esteem, and his 
 bantling goes unnoticed." — Rufus King to John Alsop, March 
 3d, 1788. 
 
 The first edition of this pamphlet was printed without a 
 title page, or imprint, and an examination of the Massachu- 
 setts newspapers shows it was never for sale ; making it prob- 
 able that it was printed for Gerry, and not for general circula- 
 tion. Greenleaf reprinted^ it in New York, for the [AntiJ 
 Federal Committee, who'\ distributed sixteen hundred and 
 thirty copies to the local county committees of that State. 
 
 " We have received yours by a- Columbian Patriot — a well 
 composed piece but in a style too sublime and florid for the 
 common people in this part of the country." — Albany Com- 
 mittee to N. Y. Committee, April 12th, 1788. 
 
 p. L. F. 
 
TVyTANKIND may amuse themselves with theoretick systems 
 of liberty, and trace its social and moral effects on 
 ficiences, virtue, industry and every improvement of which the 
 human mind is capable ; but we can only discern its true value 
 by the practical and wretched effects of slavery ; and thus 
 dreadfully will they be realized, when the inhabitants of the 
 Eastern States are draggmg out a miserable existence, only on 
 the gleanings of their fields ; and the Southern, blessed with a 
 softer and more fertile climate, are languishing in hopeless 
 poverty ; and when asked, what is become of the flower of 
 their crop, and the rich produce of their farms — they may 
 answer in the hapless stile of the Man of La Mancha, — "The 
 
 " steward of my Lord has seized and sent it to Madrid." 
 
 Or, in the more literal language of truth, The exigencies of 
 government require that the collectors of the revenue should 
 transmit it to the Federal City. 
 
 Animated with the firmest zeal for the interest of this 
 country, the peace and union of the American States, and the 
 freedom and happiness of a people who have made the most 
 costly sacrifices in the cause of liberty, — who have braved the 
 power of Britain, weathered the convulsions of war, and waded 
 thro' the blood of friends and foes to establish their indepen- 
 dence and to support the freedom of the human mind ; I can- 
 liot silently [2] witness this degradation without calling on 
 them, before they are compelled to blush at their own servi- 
 tude, and to turn back their languid eyes on their lost liberties 
 — to consider, that the character of nations generally changes 
 at the moment of revolution. And when patriotism is dis- 
 countenanced and publick virtue becomes the ridicule of the 
 sycophant — when every man of liberality, firmness and pene- 
 tration who cannot lick the hand stretched out to oppress, is 
 deemed an enemy to the State — then is the gulph of despot- 
 ism set open, and the grades to slavery, though rapid, are 
 scarce perceptible — then genius drags heavily its iron chain 
 
4 OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 
 
 — science is neglected, and real merit flies to the shades for 
 security from reproach — the mind becomes enervated, and the 
 national character sinks to a kind of apathy with only energy 
 sufficient to curse the breast that gave it milk, and as an ele- 
 gant writer observes, " To bewail every new birth as an 
 " increase of misery, under a government where the mind is 
 " necessarily debased, and talents are seduced to become the 
 " panegyrists of usurpation and tyranny." He adds, " that 
 " even sedition is not the most indubitable enemy to the pub- 
 " lick welfare ; but that its- most dreadful foe is despotism 
 " which always changes the character of nations for the worse, 
 " and is productive of nothing but vice, that the tyrant no 
 " longer excites to the pursuits of glory or virtue ; it is not 
 " talents, it is baseness and servility that he cherishes, and the 
 "weight of arbitrary power destroys the spring of emulation."* 
 If such is the influence of government on the character and 
 manners, and undoubtedly the observation is just, must we 
 not subscribe to the opinion of the celebrated Abbi Mabl^ ? 
 "That there are disagreeable seasons in the unhappy situation 
 " of human affairs, when policy requires both the intention 
 " and the power of doing mischief to be punished ; and when 
 " the senate proscribed the memory of C<zsar they ought to 
 "have put Anthony to death, and extinguished the hopes of 
 " Octavius." Self defence is a primary law of nature, which 
 no subsequent law of society can abolish ; this primaeval prin- 
 ciple, the immediate gift of the Creator, obliges every one to 
 remonstrate against the strides of ambition, and a wanton lust 
 of domination, and to resist the first approaches of tyranny, 
 which at this day threaten to sweep away the rights for which 
 the brave sons of America have fought with an heroism 
 scarcely paralleled even in ancient republicks. [3] It may be 
 repeated, they have purchased it with their blood, and have 
 gloried in their independence with a dignity of spirit, which 
 has made them the admiration of philosophy, the pride of 
 America, and the wonder of Europe. It has been observed, 
 with great propriety, that " the virtues and vices of a people 
 "when a revolution happens in their government, are the, 
 " measure of the liberty or slavery they ought to expect — An. 
 * Helvitius. 
 
OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 5 
 
 " heroic love for the publick good, a profound reverence for 
 " the laws, a contempt of riches, and a noble haughtiness of 
 " soul, are the only foundations of a free government."* Do 
 not their dignified principles still exist among us? Or are 
 they extinguished in the breasts of Americans, whose fields 
 have been so recently crimsoned to repel the potent arm of a 
 foreign Monarch, who had planted his engines of slavery in 
 every city, with design to erase the vestiges of freedom in this 
 his last asylum. It is yet to be hoped, for the honour of 
 human nature, that no combinations either foreign or domestick 
 have thus darkned this Western hemisphere. — On these shores 
 freedom has planted her standard, diped in the purple tide 
 that flowed from the veins of her martyred heroes ; and here 
 every uncorrupted American yet hopes to see it supported by 
 the vigour, the justice, the wisdom and unanimity of the peo- 
 ple, in spite of the deep-laid plots, the secret intrigues, or the 
 bold effrontery of those interested and avaricious adventurers 
 for place, who intoxicated with the ideas of distinction and 
 preferment have prostrated every worthy principle beneath the 
 shrine of ambition. Yet these are the men who tell us repub- 
 licanism is dwindled into theory — that we are incapable of 
 
 enjoying our liberties — and that we must have a master. 
 
 Let us retrospect the days of our adversity, and recollect who 
 were then our friends ; do we find them among the sticklers 
 for aristocratick authority ? No, they were generally the same 
 men who now wish to save us from the distractions of anarchy 
 on the one hand, and the jaws of tyranny on the other ; where 
 then were the class who now come forth importunately urging 
 that our political salvation depends on the adoption of a sys- 
 tem at which freedom spurns ? — Were not some of them hidden 
 in the corners of obscurity, and others wrapping themselves in 
 the bosom of our enemies for safety? Some of them were in 
 the arms of infancy ; and others speculating for fortune, by 
 sporting with public money ; while a few, a very few of them 
 [4] were magnanimously defending their country, and raising a 
 character, which I pray heaven may never be sullied by aiding 
 measures derogatory to their former exertions. But the rev- 
 olutions in principle which time produces among mankind, 
 * Abbe Mable. 
 
6 OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 
 
 frequently exhibits the most mortifying instances of human 
 weakness ; and this alone can account for the extraordinary 
 appearance of a few names, once distinguished in the honour- 
 able walks of patriotism, but now found in the list of the Mas- 
 sachusetts assent to the ratification of a Constitution, which, by 
 the undefined meaning of some parts, and the ambiguities of 
 expression in others, is dangerously adapted to the purposes of 
 an immediate aristocratic tyranny; that from the difficulty, if 
 not impracticability of its operation, must soon terminate in 
 the most uncontrouled despotism. 
 
 All writers on government agree, and the feelings of the 
 human mind witness the truth of these political axioms, that 
 man is born free and possessed of certain unalienable rights — 
 that government is instituted for the protection, safety and 
 happiness of the people, and not for the profit, honour, or 
 
 private interest of any man, family, or class of men That 
 
 the origin of all power is in the people, and that they have an 
 incontestible right to check the creatures of their own creation, 
 vested with certain powers to guard the life, liberty and prop- 
 erty of the community : And if certain selected bodies of men, 
 deputed on these principles, determine contrary to the wishes 
 and expectations of their constituents, the people have an 
 undoubted rjglit to reject their decisions, to call for a revision 
 of their conduct, to depute others in their room, or if they 
 think proper, to demand further time for deliberation on mat- 
 ters of the greatest moment : it therefore is an unwarrantable 
 stretch of authority or influence, if any methods are taken to 
 preclude this peaceful and reasonable mode of enquiry and 
 decision. And it is with inexpressible anxiety, that many of 
 the best friends of the Union of the States — to the peaceable 
 and equal participation of the rights of nature, and to the glory 
 and dignity of this country, behold the insiduous arts, and the 
 strenuous efforts of the partisans of arbitrary power, by their 
 vague definitions of the best established truths, endeavoring 
 to envelope the mind in darkness the concomitant of slavery, 
 and to lock the strong chains of domestic despotism on a 
 country, which by the most glorious and successful struggles 
 is but newly emancipated from the spectre of foreign do- 
 
OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. / 
 
 minion. [5] But there are certain seasons in the course of 
 
 human affairs, when Genius, Virtue, and Patriotism, seems to 
 nod over the vices of the times, and perhaps never more 
 remarkably, than at the present period ; or we should not see 
 such a passive disposition prevail in some, who we must can- 
 didly suppose, have liberal and enlarged sentiments ; while a 
 supple multitude are paying a blind and idolatrous homage to 
 the opinions of those who by the most precipitate steps are 
 treading down their dear bought privileges; and who are 
 endeavouring by all the arts of insinuation, and influence, to 
 betray the people of the United States, into an acceptance of 
 a most complicated system of government ; marked on the v 
 one side with the dark, secret and profound intrigues, of the / 
 statesman, long practised in the purlieus of despotism ; and on 
 the other, with the ideal projects oi young ambition, with its \ 
 wings just expanded to soar to a summit, which imagination '' 
 has painted in such gawdy colours as to intoxicate the inex- 
 perienced votary, and to send him rambling from State to State, 
 to collect materials to construct the ladder of preferment. 
 
 But as a variety of objections \.o^^ heterogeneous phantom, 
 have been repeatedly laid before the public, by men of the 
 best abilities and intentions ; I will not expatiate long on a 
 Republican yi3r»« of government, founded on the principles of \ 
 monarchy — a democratick branch with the features of artistoc- ' ^ 
 racy — and the extravagance of nobility pervading the minds ; 
 of many of the candidates for office, with the poverty of pea- 
 santry hanging heavily on them, and insurmountable, from 
 their taste for expence, unless a general provision should be 
 made in the arrangement of the civil list, which may enable 
 them with the champions of their cause to " sail down the new 
 pactolean channel." Some gentlemen, with laboured zeal, have\ 
 spent much time in urging the necessity of government, from \ 
 the embarrassments of trade — the want of respectability abroad / 
 and confidence of the public engagements at home : — These 
 are obvious truths which no one denies ; and there are few who 
 do not unite in the general wish for the restoration of public 
 faith, the revival of commerce, arts, agriculture, and industry, 
 under a lenient, peaceable and energetick government : But 
 
8 OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 
 
 the most sagacious advocates for the party have not by- 
 fair discusion, and rational argumentation, evinced the neces' 
 sity of adopting this many headed monster; of such motley 
 mixture, that its enemies cannot trace a feature of Democratick 
 or Republican [6] extract ; nor have its friends the courage to 
 denominate a Monarchy, an Aristocracy, or an Oligarchy, and 
 the favoured bantling must have passed through the short 
 period of its existence without a name, had not Mr. Wilson, in 
 the fertility of his genius, suggested the happy epithet of a 
 Federal Republic. — But I leave the field of general censure on 
 the secresy of its birth, the rapidity of its growth, and the fatal 
 consequences of suffering it to live to the age of maturity, and 
 will particularize some of the most weighty objections to its 
 passing through this continent in a gigantic size. — It will be 
 allowed by every one that the fundamental principle of a free 
 
 government is the equal representation of a free people 
 
 And I will first observe with a justly celebrated writer, "That 
 " the principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the 
 " absolute rights which were vested in them by the immediate 
 " laws of nature, but which could not be preserved in peace, 
 " without the mutual intercourse which is gained by the insti- 
 '' tution of friendly and social communities." And when soci- 
 ety has thus deputed a certain number of their equals to take 
 care of their personal rights, and the interest of the whole com- 
 munity, it must be considered that responsibility is the great 
 security of integrity and honour ; and that annual election is 
 the basis of responsibility, — Man is not immediately corrupted, 
 but power without limitation, or amenability, may endanger 
 the brightest virtue — whereas a frequent return to the bar 
 of their Constituents is the strongest check against the cor- 
 ruptions to which men are liable, either from the intrigues of 
 others of more subtle genius, or the propensities of their own 
 hearts, — and the gentlemen who have so warmly advocated in 
 the late Convention of the Massachusetts, the change from 
 annual to biennial elections ; may have been in the same predic- 
 ament, and perhaps with the same views that Mr. Hutchinson 
 once acknowledged himself, when in a letter to Lord Hillsbor. 
 ough, he observed, "that the grand difficulty of making a 
 
OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 9 
 
 " change in government against the general bent of the people 
 " had caused him to turn his thoughts to a variety of plans, in 
 " order to find one that might be executed in spite of opposi- 
 " tion," and the first he proposed was that, " instead of annual, 
 "the elections should be only once in three years: " but the 
 Minister had not the hardiness to attempt such an innovation, 
 even in the revision of colonial charters : nor has any one ever 
 defended Biennial, Triennial or Septennial Elections, either in 
 the [7} British House of Commons, or in the debates of Pro- 
 vincial assemblies, on general and free principles : but it is 
 unnecessary to dwell long on this article, as the best political 
 writers have supported the principles of annual elections with 
 a precision, that cannot be confuted, though they may be 
 darkned, by the sophistical arguments that have been thrown 
 out with design, to undermine all the barriers of freedom. 
 
 2. There is no security in the profered system, either forX^ 
 the rights of conscience or the liberty of the Press : Despotism -^ 
 usually while it is gaining ground, will suffer men to think, say, 
 or write what they please ; but when once established, if it is 
 thought necessary to subserve the purposes, of arbitrary power, 
 the most unjust restrictions may take place in the first instance, 
 and an imprimator on the Press in the next, may silence the 
 complaints, and forbid the most decent remonstrances of an 
 injured and oppressed people. 
 
 3. There; are no well defined limits of the Judiciary Powers^^ 
 they seem to be left as a boundless ocean, that has broken over / 
 the chart of the Supreme Lawgiver, " thus far shalt thou go 
 and no further " and as they cannot be comprehended by the 
 clearest capacity, or the most sagacious mind, it would be an 
 Herculean labour to attempt to describe the dangers with which 
 they are replete. 
 
 /(. The Executive and the Legislative are so dangerously 
 blended as to give just cause of alarm, and everything relative 
 thereto, is couched in such ambiguous terms — in such vague 
 and indefinite expression, as is a suiificient ground without any 
 objection, for the reprobation of a system, that the authors 
 dare not hazard to a clear investigation. 
 
 5. The abolition of trial by jury in civil causes. — This mode 
 
lO OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 
 
 of trial the learned Judge Blackstone observes, "has been 
 " coeval with the first rudiments of civil government, that 
 " property, liberty and life, depend on maintaining in its legal 
 " force the constitutional trial by jury." He bids his readers 
 pauze, and with Sir Matthew Hale observes, how admirably 
 this mode is adapted to the investigation of truth beyond any 
 other the world can produce. Even the party who have been 
 disposed to swallow, without examination, the proposals of 
 the secret conclave, have started on a discovery that this essen- 
 tial right was curtailed ; and shall a privilege, the origin of 
 which may be traced to our Saxon ancestors — that has been a 
 part of the law of nations, even in the fewdatory systems of 
 France, [8] Germany and Italy — and from the earliest records 
 has been held so sacred, both in ancient and modern Britain, 
 that it could never be shaken by the introduction of Norman 
 
 customs, or any other conquests or change of government 
 
 shall this inestimable privilege be relinquished in America — 
 either thro' the fear of inquisition for unaccounted thousands 
 . of public monies in the hands of some who have been officious 
 in the fabrication of the consolidated system, or from the appre- 
 hension that some future delinquent possessed of more power 
 than integrity, may be called to a trial by his peers in the hour 
 of investigation. 
 
 6. Though it has been said by Mr. Wilson and many others, 
 that a Standing-Army is necessary for the dignity and safety 
 of America, yet freedom revolts at the idea, when the Divan, 
 or the Despot, may draw out his dragoons to suppress the 
 murmurs of a few, who may yet cherish those sublime princi- 
 ples which call forth the exertions, and lead to the best 
 improvements of the human mind. It is hoped this country 
 may yet be governed by milder methods than are usually dis- 
 / played beneath the bannerets of military law.— Standing arm- 
 / ies have been the nursery of vice and the bane of liberty from 
 \ the Roman legions to the establishment of the artful Ximenes, 
 \ and from the ruin of the Cortes of Spain, to the planting of 
 the British cohorts in the capitals of America :— By the edicts 
 of an authority vested in the sovereign power by the proposed 
 constitution, the militia of the country, the bulwark of defence. 
 
OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. II 
 
 and the security of national liberty if no longer under the con- 
 troul of civil authority ; but at the rescript of the Monarch, or 
 the aristocracy, they may either be employed to extort the 
 enormous sums that will be necessary to support the civil list 
 — to maintain the regalia of power — and the splendour of the 
 most useless part of the community, or they may be sent into 
 foreign countries for the fulfilment of treaties, stipulated by 
 the President and two-thirds of the Senate. 
 
 7. Notwithstanding the delusory promise to guarantee a 
 Republican form of government to every State in the Union 
 — If the most discerning eye could discoverany meaning at all 
 in the engagement, there are no resources left for the support 
 of internal government, or the liquidation of the debts of the 
 State. Every source of revenue is in the monopoly of Congress, 
 and if the several legislatures in their enfeebled state, should 
 against their own feelings be necessitated to attempt a dry tax 
 [9] for the payment of their debts, and the support of internal 
 police, even this may be required for the purposes of the gen- 
 eral government. 
 
 8. As the new Congress are empowered to determine their 
 own salaries, the requisitions for this purpose may not be very 
 moderate, and the drain for public moneys will probably rise 
 past all calculation : and it is to be feared when America has 
 consolidated its despotism, the world will witness the truth of 
 the assertion — " that the pomp of an Eastern monarch may 
 " impose on the vulgar who may estimate the force of a nation 
 " by the magnificence of its palaces ; but the wise man judges 
 " differently, it is by that very magnificence he estimates its 
 "weakness. He sees nothing more in the midst of this impos- 
 " ing pomp, where the tyrant sets enthroned, than a sumptuous 
 " and mournful decoration of the dead ; the apparatus of a 
 " fastuous funeral, in the centre of which is a cold and lifeless 
 "lump of unanimated earth, a phantom of power ready to 
 " disappear before the enemy, by whom it is despised ! " 
 
 9. There is no provision for a rotation, nor anything to^, 
 prevent the perpetuity of office in the same hands for life ; ' 
 which by a little well timed bribery, will probably be done, to 
 the exclusion of men of the best abilities from their share in 
 
12 OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 
 
 the offices of government. — By this neglect we lose the advan- 
 tages of that check to the overbearing insolence of ofifice, 
 which by rendering him ineligible at certain periods, keeps 
 the mind of man in equiHbrio, and teaches him the feelings of 
 the governed, and better qualifies him to govern in his turn. 
 
 10. The inhabitants of the United States, are liable to be 
 draged from the vicinity of their own country, or state, to 
 answer the litigious or unjust suit of an adversary, on the most 
 distant borders of the Continent : in short the appelate juris- 
 diction of the Supreme Federal Court, includes an unwarrant- 
 able stretch of power over the liberty, life, and property of the 
 subject, through the wide Continent of America. 
 
 11. One Representative to thirty thousand inhabitants is a 
 very inadequate representation; and every man who is not lost 
 to all sense of freedom to his country, must reprobate the idea 
 of Congress altering by law, or on any pretence whatever, 
 interfering with any regulations for time, places, and manner 
 of choosing our own Representatives. 
 
 12. If the sovereignty of America is designed to be elective, 
 the surcumscribing the votes to only ten electors in this State, 
 [lo] and the same proportion in all the others, is nearly tanta- 
 mount to the exclusion of the voice of the people in the choice 
 
 j' of their first magistrate. It is vesting the choice solely in an 
 <i aristocratic junto, who may easily combine in each State to 
 '\ place at the head of the Union the most convenient instrument 
 for despotic sway. 
 
 13. A Senate chosen for six years will, in most instances, 
 be an appointment for life, as the influence of such a body 
 over the minds of the people will be coequal to the extensive 
 powers with which they are vested, and they will not only for- 
 get, but be forgotten by their constituents— a branch of the 
 Supreme Legislature thus set beyond all responsibility is 
 totally repugnant to every principle of a free government. 
 
 14. There is no provision by a bill of rights to guard against 
 the dangerous encroachments of power in too many instances 
 to be named : but I cannot pass over in silence the insecurity 
 in which we are left with regard to warrants unsupported by 
 evidence— the daring experiment of ^rsxyXXn^writs of assistance 
 
OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 1 3 
 
 in a former arbitrary administration is not yet forgotten in the 
 Massachusetts ; nor can we be so ungrateful to the memory of 
 the patriots who counteracted their operation, as so soon after 
 their manly exertions to save us from such a detestable instru- 
 ment of arbitrary power, to subject ourselves to the insolence 
 of any petty revenue officer to enter our houses, search, insult, 
 and seize at pleasure. We are told by a gentleman of too 
 much virtue and real probity to suspect he has a design to 
 deceive — " that the whole constitution is a declaration of 
 rights," — but mankind must think for themselves, and to many 
 very judicious and discerning characters, the whole constitution 
 with very few exceptions appears a perversion of the rights of 
 
 particular states, and of private citizens. But the gentleman 
 
 goes on to tell us, " that the primary object is the general gov- 
 " ernment, and that the rights of individuals are only incident- 
 " ally mentioned, and that there was a clear impropriety in 
 " being very particular about them." But, asking pardon for 
 dissenting from such respectable authority, who has been led 
 into several mistakes, more from his prediliction in favour of 
 certain modes of government, than from a want of understand- 
 ing or veracity. The rights of individuals ought to be the 
 primary object of all government, and cannot be too securely 
 guarded by the most explicit declarations in their favor. This 
 has been the opinion of the Hampdens, the Pyms, and [11] 
 many other illustrious names, that have stood forth in defence 
 of English liberties ; and even the Italian master in politicks, 
 the subtle and renouned Machiavel acknowledges, that no 
 republic ever yet stood on a stable foundation without satisfy- 
 ing the common people. 
 
 15. The difficulty, if not impracticability, of exercising the 
 equal and equitable powers of government by a single legisla- 
 ture over an extent of territory that reaches from the Missis- 
 sippi to the Western lakes, and from them to the Atlantic 
 Ocean, is an insuperable objection to the adoption of the new 
 system. — Mr. Hutchinson, the great champion for arbitrary 
 power, in the multitude of his machinations to subvert the lib- 
 erties in this country, was obliged to acknowledge in one of 
 his letters, that, " from the extent of country from north to 
 
14 OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 
 
 " south, the scheme of one government was impracticable." 
 But if the authors of the present visionary project, can by the 
 arts of deception, precipitation and address, obtain a majority 
 of suffrages in the conventions of the states to try the haz- 
 ardous experiment, they may then make the same inglorious 
 boast with this insidious politician, who may perhaps be their 
 model, that " the union of the colonies was pretty well broken, 
 " and that he hoped to never see it revewed." 
 
 1 6. It is an undisputed fact that not one legislature in the 
 United States had the most distant idea when they first 
 appointed members for a convention, entirely commercial, or 
 when they afterwards authorized them to consider on some 
 amendments of the Federal union, that they would without any 
 warrant from their constituents, presume on so bold and daring 
 a stride, as ultimately to destroy the state governments, and 
 offer a consolidated system, irreversible but on conditions that 
 the smallest degree of penetration must discover to be imprac- 
 ticable. 
 
 17. The first appearance of the article which declares the 
 ratification of nine states sufficient for the establishment of the 
 new system, wears the face of dissension, is a subversion of the 
 union of Confederated States, and tends to the introduction 
 of 'anarchy and civil convulsions, and may be a means of 
 involving the whole country in blood. 
 
 18. The mode in which this constitution is recommended 
 to the people to judge without either the advice of Congress, 
 or the legislatures of the several states is very reprehensible — 
 it is an attempt to force it upon them before it could be tho- 
 [12] roughly understood, and may leave us in that situation, 
 that in the first moments of slavery in the minds of the people 
 agitated by the remembrance of their lost liberties, will be like 
 the sea in a tempest, that sweeps down every mound of secur- 
 ity. 
 
 But it is needless to enumerate other instances, in which the 
 proposed constitution appears contradictory to the first princi- 
 ples which ought to govern mankind ; and it is equally so to 
 enquire into the motives that induced to so bold a step as the 
 annihilation of the independence and sovereignty of the thir- 
 
OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 1 5 
 
 teen distinct states. They are but too obvious through 
 
 the whole progress of the business, from the first shutting up 
 the doors of the federal convention and resolving that no 
 member should correspond with gentlemen in the different 
 states on the subject under discussion ; till the trivial proposi- 
 tion of recommending a few amendments was artfully ushered 
 into the convention of the Massachusetts. The questions that 
 were then before that honorable assembly were profound 
 and important, they were of such magnitude and extent, that 
 the consequences may run parallel with the existence of the 
 country ; and to see them waved and hastily terminated by 
 a measure too absurd to require a serious refutation, raises the 
 honest indignation of every true lover of his country. Nor 
 are they less grieved that the ill policy and arbitrary disposi- 
 tion of some of the sons of America has thus precipitated 
 to the contemplation and discussion of questions that no one 
 could rationally suppose would have been agitated among us, 
 till time had blotted out the principles on which the late revo- 
 lution was grounded ; or till the last traits of the many political 
 tracts, which defended the separation from Britain, and the 
 rights of men were consigned to everlasting oblivion. After 
 the severe conflicts this country has suffered, it is presumed 
 that they are disposed to make every reasonable sacrifice 
 
 before the altar of peace. But when we contemplate the 
 
 nature of men and consider them originally on an equal foot- 
 ing, subject to the same feelings, stimulated by the same pas- 
 sions, and recollecting the struggles they have recently made, 
 for the security of their civil rights ; it cannot be expected 
 that the inhabitants of the Massachusetts, can be easily lulled 
 into a fatal security, by the declamatory effusions of gentle- 
 men, who, contrary to the experience of all ages would per- 
 swade them there is no danger to be apprehended, from vesting 
 discretionary powers in the hands of man, which he may, or 
 may not abuse. The very suggestion, that [13] we ought to 
 trust to the precarious hope of amendments and redress, after 
 we have voluntarily fixed the shackles on our own necks 
 should have awakened to a double degree of caution. — This 
 people have not forgotten the artful insinuations of a former 
 
l6 OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 
 
 Governor, when pleading the unlimited authority of parliament 
 before the legislature of the Massachusetts ; nor that his argu- 
 ments were very similar to some lately urged by gentlemen 
 who boast of opposing his measures, " with halters about their 
 " necks." 
 
 We were then told by him, in all the soft language of insin- 
 uation, that no form of government, of human construction 
 can be perfect — that we had nothing to fear — that we had no 
 reason to complain — that we had only to acquiesce in their 
 illegal claims, and to submit to the requisition of parliament, 
 and doubtless the lenient hand of government would redress 
 all grievances, and remove the oppressions of the people : — 
 Yet we soon saw armies of mercenaries encamped on our plains 
 — our commerce ruined — our harbours blockaded — and our 
 cities burnt. It maybe replied that this was in consequence of 
 an obstinate defence of our privileges ; this may be true ; and 
 when the " ultima ratio" is called to aid, the weakest must fall. 
 But let the best informed historian produce an instance when 
 bodies of men were entrusted with power, and the proper 
 checks relinquished, if they were ever found destitute of inge- 
 nuity sulificient to furnish pretences to abuse it. And the 
 people at large are already sensible, that the liberties which 
 America has claimed, which reason has justified, and which 
 have been so gloriously defended by the swords of the brave ; 
 are not about to fall before the tyranny of foreign conquest : 
 it is native usurpation that is shaking the foundations of peace, 
 and spreading the sable curtain of despotism over the United 
 States. The banners of freedom were erected in the wilds of 
 America by our ancestors, while the wolf prowled for his prey 
 on the one hand, and more savage man on the other ; they 
 have been since rescued from the invading hand of foreign 
 power, by the valor and blood of their posterity ; and there 
 was reason to hope they would continue for ages to illumine 
 a quarter of the globe, by nature kindly separated from the 
 proud monarchies of Europe, and the infernal darkness of 
 
 Asiatic slavery. And it is to be feared we shall soon see 
 
 this country rushing into the extremes of confusion and vio- 
 lence, in consequence of the proceeding of a set of gentlemen,, 
 
OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 1 7 
 
 who disregard-[i4] ingthe purposes of their appointment, have 
 assumed powers unauthorized by anycommission, have unne- 
 cessarily rejected the confederation of the United States, and 
 annihilated the sovereignty and independence of the individ- 
 ual governments. — The causes which have inspired a few men 
 to assemble for very different purposes with such a degree of 
 temerity us to break with a single stroke the union of America, 
 and disseminate the seeds of discord through the land may be 
 easily investigated, when we survey the partizans of monarchy 
 in the state conventions, urging the adoption of a mode of 
 government that militates with the former professions and 
 exertions of this country, and with all ideas of republicanism, 
 and the equal rights of men. 
 
 Passion, prejudice, and error, are characteristics of human 
 nature ; and as it cannot be accounted for on any principles of 
 philosophy, religion, or good policy ; to these shades in the 
 human character must be attributed the mad zeal of some, to 
 precipitate to a blind adoption of the measures of the late fed- 
 eral convention, without giving opportunity for better infor- 
 mation to those who are misled by influence or ignorance into 
 
 erroneous opinions. Litterary talents may be prostituted, 
 
 and the powers of genius debased to subserve the purposes of 
 ambition or avarice ; but the feelings of the heart will dictate 
 the language of truth, and the simplicity of her accents will 
 proclaim the infamy of those, who betray the rights of the 
 people, under the specious, and popular pretence of justice, 
 consolidation, and dignity. 
 
 It is presumed the great body of the people unite in senti- 
 ment with the writer of these observations, who most devoutly 
 prays that public credit may rear her declining head, and 
 remunerative justice pervade the land; nor is there a doubt if 
 a free government is continued, that time and industry will 
 enable both the public and private debtor to liquidate their 
 arrearages in the most equitable manner. They wish to see 
 the Confederated States bound together by the most indis- 
 soluble union, but without renouncing their separate sovereign- 
 ties and independence, and becoming tributaries to a consoli- 
 dated fabrick of aristocratick tyranny. ^They wish to see 
 
^. 
 
 1 8 OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 
 
 government established, and peaceably holding the reins with 
 honour, energy, and dignity; but they wish for no federal city 
 whose '' cloud cap' t towers " may screen the state culprit from 
 the hand of justice; while its exclusive jurisdiction may [15] 
 protect the riot of armies encamped within its limits. — They 
 deprecate discord and civil convulsions, but they are not yet 
 generally prepared with the ungrateful Israelites to ask a King, 
 nor are their spirits sufficiently broken to yield the best of 
 their olive grounds to his servants, and to see their sons 
 appointed to run before his chariots — It has been observed by 
 a zealous advocate for the new system, that most governments 
 are the result of fraud or violence, and this with design to 
 
 recommend its acceptance — but has not almost every step 
 .towards its fabrication been fraudulent in the extreme ? Did 
 not the prohibition strictly enjoined by the general Conven- 
 
 / tion, that no member should make any communication to his 
 Constituents, or to gentlemen of consideration and abilities in 
 the other States, bear evident marks of fraudulent designs ? — 
 This circumstance is regretted in strong terms by Mr. Martin, 
 a member from Maryland, who acknowedges " He had no 
 " idea that all the wisdom, integrity, and virtue of the States 
 " was contained in that Convention, and that he wished to 
 " have corresponded with gentlemen of eminent political char- 
 " acters abroad, and to give their sentiments due weight" — 
 he adds, " so extremely solicitous were they, that their pro- 
 " ceedings should not transpire, that the members were pro- 
 " hibited from taking copies of their resolutions, or extracts 
 
 "from the Journals, without express permission, by vote." 
 
 And the hurry with which it has been urged to the accept- 
 ance of the people, without giving time, by adjournments, for 
 better information, and more unanimity has a deceptive 
 appearance ; and if finally driven to resistance, as the only 
 alternative between that and servitude, till in the confusion of 
 discord, the reins should be seized by the violence of some 
 enterprizing genius, that may sweep down the last barrier of 
 liberty, it must be added to the score of criminality with which 
 the fraudulent usurpation at Philadelphia, may be chargeable. 
 Heaven avert such a tremendous scence ! and let us still 
 
OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 19 
 
 hope a more happy termination of the present ferment : — may 
 the people be calm and wait a legal redress ; may the mad 
 transport of some of our infatuated capitals subside ; and every 
 influential character through the States, make the most pru- 
 dent exertions for a new general Convention, who may vest 
 adequate powers in Congress, for all national purposes, with- 
 out annihilating the individual governments, and drawing 
 blood from every pore by taxes, impositions and illegal restric- 
 tions. — This step might [16] again re-establish the Union, 
 restore tranquility to the ruffled mind of the inhabitants, 
 and save America from the distresses, dreadful even in con- 
 templation. "The great art of governing is to lay aside 
 
 all prejudices and attachments to particular opinions, classes 
 or individual characters to consult the spirit of the people; 
 to give way to it ; and in so doing, to give it a turn capable 
 of inspiring those sentiments, which may induce them to relish 
 a change, which an alteration of circumstances may hereafter 
 make necessary." The education of the advocates for mon- 
 archy should have taught them, and their memory should 
 have suggested that " monarchy is a species of government 
 fit only for a people too much corrupted by luxury, avarice, 
 and a passion for pleasure, to have any love for their coun- 
 try, and whose vices the fear of punishment alone is able 
 to restrain ; but by no means calculated for a nation that is 
 poor, and at the same time tenacious of their liberty — ani- 
 mated with a disgust to tyranny — and inspired with the 
 generous feeling of patriotism and liberty, and at the same 
 time, like the ancient Spartans have been hardened by tem- 
 perance and manly exertions, and equally despising the fatigues 
 
 of the field, and the fear of enemies," and while they 
 
 change their ground they should recollect, that Aristocracy is 
 a still more formidable foe to public virtue, and the prosperity 
 of a nation — that under such a government her patriots become 
 
 mercenaries — her soldiers cowards, and the people slaves. 
 
 Though several State Conventions have assented to, and rati- 
 fied, yet the voice of the people appears at present strong 
 
 against the adoption of the Constitution. By the chicanery, 
 
 intrigue, and false colouring of those who plume themselves. 
 
\J 
 
 20 OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 
 
 more on their education and abilities, than their political, 
 patriotic, or private virtues — by the imbecility of some, and 
 the duplicity of others, a majority of the Convention of Mas- 
 sachusetts have been flattered with the ideas of amendments, 
 when it will be too late to complain While several very- 
 worthy characters, too timid for their situation, magnified the 
 hopeless alternative, between the dissolution of the bands of 
 all government, and receiving the proferred system in toto, 
 after long endeavouring to reconcile it to their consciences, 
 swallowed the indegestible panacea, and in a kind of sudden 
 desperation lent their signature to the dereliction of the hon- 
 ourable station they held in the Union, and have broken over 
 the solemn'compact, by which they were bound to support 
 their own excellent constitution till the period [17] of revision. 
 Yet Virginia, equally large and respectable, and who have done 
 honour to themselves, by their vigorous exertions from the 
 first dawn of independence, have not yet acted upon the ques- 
 tion ; they have wisely taken time to consider before they 
 
 introduce innovations of a most dangerous nature : her 
 
 inhabitants are brave, her burgesses are free, and they have a 
 Governor who dares to think for himself, and to speak his 
 opinion (without first pouring libations on the altar of popular- 
 ity) though it should militate with some of the most accom- 
 plished and illustrious characters. 
 
 Maryland, who has no local interest to lead her to adopt, 
 
 will doubtless reject the system 1 hope the same characters 
 
 still live, and that the same spirit which dictated to them a 
 wise and cautious care, against sudden revolutions in govern- 
 ment, and made them the last State that acceded to the inde- 
 pendence of America, will lead them to support what they so 
 
 deliberately claimed. Georgia apprehensive of a war with 
 
 the Savages, has acceded in order to insure protection. 
 
 Pennsylvania has struggled through much in the same manner, 
 as the Massachusetts, against the manly feelings, and the mas- 
 terly reasonings of a very respectable part of the Convention : 
 They have adopted the system, and seen some of its authors 
 burnt in effigy— their towns thrown into riot and confusion, and 
 the minds of the people agitated by apprehension and discord. 
 
OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 21 
 
 New-Jersey and Delaware have united in the measure, from 
 the locah'ty of their situation, and the selfish motives which 
 too generally govern mankind ; the Federal City, and the seat of 
 government, will naturally attract the intercourse of strangers 
 — the youth of enterprize, and the wealth of the nation to the 
 to the central States. 
 
 Connecticut has pushed it through with the precipitation of 
 her neighbour, with few dissentient voices ; — but more from 
 irritation and resentment to a sister State, perhaps partiality 
 to herself in her commercial regulatidns, than from a compre- 
 hensive view of the system, as a regard to the welfare of all. 
 
 But New York has motives, that will undoubtedly lead her 
 
 to rejection, without being afraid to appeal to the understand- 
 ing of mankind, to justify the grounds of their refusal to adopt 
 a Constitution, that even the framers dare not to risque to the 
 hazard of revision, amendment, or reconsideration, least the 
 whole superstructure should be demolished by more skilful and 
 
 discreet architects. 1 know not what part the Carolinas 
 
 [i8] will take ; but I hope their determinations will comport 
 with the dignity and freedom of this country — their decisions 
 
 will have great weight in the scale. But equally important 
 
 are the small States of New Hampshire and Rhode Island : — 
 New York, the Carolinas, Virginia, Maryland, and these two 
 lesser States may yet support the liberties of the Continent ; if 
 they refuse a ratification, or postpone their proceedings till the 
 spirits of the community have time to cool, there is little 
 doubt but the wise measure of another federal convention will 
 be adopted, when the members would have the advantage of 
 viewing, at large, through the medium of truth, the objections 
 that have been made from various quarters ; such a measure 
 might be attended with the most salutary effects, and prevent 
 
 the dread consequences of civil feuds. But even if some of 
 
 those large states should hastily accede, yet we have frequently 
 seen in the story of revolution, relief spring from a quarter 
 least expected. 
 
 Though the virtues of a Cato could not save Rome, nor the 
 abilities of a Padilla defend the citizens of Castile from falling 
 under the yoke of Charles ; yet a Tell once suddenly rose from 
 
22 OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 
 
 a little obscure city, and boldly rescued the liberties of his 
 
 country. Every age has its Bruti and its Decci, as well 
 
 as its Caesars and Sejani : — The happiness of mankind depends 
 much on the modes of government, and the virtues of the gov- 
 ernors ; and America may yet produce characters who have 
 genius and capacity sufificient to form the manners and correct 
 the morals of the people, and virtue enough to lead their 
 country to freedom. Since their dismemberment from the 
 British empire, America has, in many instances, resembled the 
 conduct of a restless, vigorous, luxurious youth, prematurely 
 emancipated from the authority of a parent, but without the 
 experience necessary to direct him to act with dignity or dis- 
 cretion. Thus we have seen her break the shackles of foreign 
 dominion, and all the blessings of peace restored on the most 
 honourable terms : She acquired the liberty of framing her 
 own laws, choosing her own magistrates, and adopting man- 
 ners and modes of government the most favourable to the 
 freedom and happiness of society. But how little have we 
 availed ourselves of these superior advantages : The glorious 
 fabric of liberty successfully reared with so much labor and 
 assiduity totters to the foundation, and may be blown away as 
 the bubble of fancy by the rude breath of military combina- 
 tions, and politicians of yesterday. 
 
 [ig] It is true this country lately armed in opposition to regal 
 despotism — impoverished by the expences of a long war, and 
 unable immediately to fulfil their public or private engage- 
 ments that appeared in some instances, with a boldness of spirit 
 that seemed to set at defiance all authority, government, or 
 order, on the one hand ; while on the other, there has been, 
 not only a secret wish, but an open avowal of the necessity of 
 drawing the reins of government much too taught, not only 
 
 for a republicanism, but for a wise and limited monarchy. 
 
 - But the character of this people is not averse to a degree of 
 subordination, the truth of this appears from the easy restora- 
 tion of tranquility, after a dangerous insurrection in one of the 
 states ; this also evinces a little necessity of a complete revplu- 
 ti3 of governmentlhroughout thejinion. But it is a repub- 
 lican principle that the majority should rule ; and if a spirit of 
 
OBSERVATIONS BY ELBRIDGE GERRY. 23 
 
 moderation should be cultivated on both sides, till the voice of 
 the people at large Could be fairly heard it should be held 
 sacred. — And if, on such a scrutiny, the proposed constitution 
 should appear repugnant to their character and wishes ; if 
 they, in the language of a late elegant pen, should acknowl- 
 edge that " no confusion in my mind, is more terrible to them 
 " than the stern disciplined regularity and vaunted police of 
 " arbitrary governments, where every heart is depraved by 
 " fear, where mankind dare not assume their natural characters, 
 " where the free spirit must crouch to the slave in ofifice, where 
 " genius must repress her effusions, or like the Egyptian wor- 
 " shippers, offer them in sacrifice to the calves in power, and 
 " where the human mind, always in shackles, shrinks from every 
 "generous effort." Who would then have the effrontery to 
 say, it ought not to be thrown out with indignation, however 
 
 some respectable names have appeared to support it. -But 
 
 if after all, on a dispassionate and fair discussion, the people 
 generally give their voices for a voluntary dereliction of their 
 privileges, let every individual who chooses the active scenes 
 of life strive to support the peace and unanimity of his country, 
 though every other blessing may expire — And while the states- 
 man is plodding for power, and the courtier practising the arts 
 of dissimulation without check — while the rapacious are grow- 
 ing rich by oppression, and fortune throwing her gifts into the 
 lap of fools, let the sublimer characters, the philosophic lovers 
 of freedom who have wept over her exit, retire to the calm 
 shades of contemplation, there they may look down with pity 
 on the inconsistency of human nature, the revolutions of states, 
 the rise of kingdoms, and the fall of empires. 
 
An / Examination / into the / leading principles / of 
 the / Federal Constitution / proposed by the late / Con- 
 vention / held at Philadelphia. / With / Answers to the 
 principal objections / that have been raised against the 
 system. / By a Citizen of America. / — Ut patria sua 
 felicitate caeteris praestaret, efificit. / Xenoph. Lacedaem. 
 Resp. / Philadelphia : / Printed and sold by Prichard & 
 Hall, in Market Street, / the second door above Laetitia 
 
 Court. / M.DCC.LXXXVII. 
 
 8vo., pp. 55. 
 
 Written by Noah Webster. This is reprinted from his own 
 copy of the pamphlet, and the foot notes in brakets show his 
 corrections and additions. 
 
 "This is a hasty production, written at the request of 
 Mr. Fitzsimmons, of Philadelphia, a member of the Conven- 
 tion." — Indorsement by Noah Webster. 
 
 P. L. F. 
 
TO 
 HIS EXCELLENCY 
 
 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, Esq.. 
 
 PRESIDENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
 PENNSYLVANIA, 
 
 AND 
 
 MEMBER OF THE LATE CONVENTION, 
 
 HELD AT PHILADELPHIA FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
 
 DEVISING A CONSTITUTION FOR THE 
 
 GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 
 THE FOLLOWING REMARKS UPON THE SYSTEM 
 RECOMMENDED BY THAT CONVENTION, 
 
 ARE MOST HUMBLY INSCRIBED 
 
 BY 
 
 HIS EXCELLENCY'S 
 
 MOST OBEDIENT 
 
 HUMBLE SERVANT, 
 
 THE AUTHOR. 
 
 Philadelphia, ) 
 
 October jo, 1787. ) 
 
/^F all the memorable aeras that have marked the progress 
 ^"^ of men from the savage state to the refinements of lux- 
 ury, that which has combined them into society, under a wise 
 system of government, and given form to a nation, has ever 
 been recorded and celebrated as the most important. Legis- 
 lators have ever been deemed the greatest benefactors pf man- 
 kind — respected when living, and often deified after their 
 death. Hence the fame of Fohi and Confucius — of Moses, 
 Solon and Lycurgus — of Romulus and Numa — of Alfred, 
 Peter the Great, and Mango Capac ; whose names will be cel- 
 ebrated through all ages, for framing and improving constitu- 
 tions of government, which introduced order into society and 
 secured the benefits of law to millions of the human race. 
 
 This western world now beholds an sera important beyond 
 conception, and which posterity will number with the age of 
 Czar of Muscovy, and with the promulgation of the Jewish 
 laws at Mount Sinai, The names of those men who have 
 digested a system of constitutions for the American empire, 
 will be enrolled with those of Zamolxis and Odin, and cele- 
 brated by posterity with the honors which less enlightened 
 nations have paid to the fabled demi-gods of antiquity. 
 
 [6] But the origin of the AMERICAN REPUBLIC is distin- 
 guished by peculiar circumstances. Other nations have been 
 driven together by fear and necessity — the governments have 
 generally been the result of a single man's observations ; or 
 the offspring of particular interests. In the formation of our 
 constitution, the wisdom of all ages is collected — the legisla- 
 tors of antiquity are consulted — as well as the opinidns and 
 interests of the millions who are concerned. In short, it is an 
 empire of reason. 
 
 In the formation of such a government, it is not only the 
 right, but the indispensable duty of every citizen to examine 
 the principles of it, to compare them with the principles of 
 other governments, with a constant eye to our particular situ- 
 
 \'^ 
 
30 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 
 
 ation and circumstances, and thus endeavor to foresee the 
 future operations of our own system, and its effects upon 
 human happiness. 
 
 Convinced of this truth, I have no apology to offer for the 
 following remarks, but an earnest desire to be useful to my 
 country. 
 
 In attending to the proposed Federal Constitution, the 
 first thing that presents itself to our consideration, is the 
 jdivision of the legislative into two branches. This article has 
 so many advocates in America, that it needs not any vindi- 
 cation.* — But it has its opposers, among whom are some 
 respectable characters, especially in Pennsylvania ; for which 
 reason, I will state [7] some /of the arguments and facts which 
 incline me to favor the proposed division. 
 
 On the first view of men in society, we should suppose 
 that no man would be bound by a law to which he had not 
 given his consent. Such would be our first idea of political 
 obligation. But experience, from time immemorial, has proved 
 it to be impossible to unite the opinions of all the members of 
 a community, in every case ; and hence the doctrine, that the 
 opinions of a majority must give law to the whole State : a 
 doctrine as universally received, as any intuitive truth. 
 
 Another idea that naturally presents itself to our minds, 
 on a slight consideration of the subject, is, that in a perfect 
 government, all the members of a society should be present, 
 and each give his suffrage in acts of legislation, by which he 
 is to be bound. This is impracticable in large states ; and 
 even were it not, it is very questionable whether it would be 
 the best mode of legislation. It was however practised in the 
 free states of antiquity ; and was the cause of innumerable 
 evils. To avoid these evils, the moderns have invented the 
 doctrine of representation, which seems to be the perfection of 
 human government. 
 
 Another idea, which is very natural, is, that to complete 
 the mode of legislation, all the representatives should be col- 
 lected into one body, for the purpose of debating questions 
 and enacting laws. Speculation would suggest the ideal 
 
 * A division of the legislature has been adopted in the new constitution of 
 every state except Pennsylvania and Georgia. 
 
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 3I 
 
 [8] and the desire of improving upon the systems of govern- 
 ment in the old world, would operate powerfully in its favor. 
 
 But men are ever running into extremes. The passions, 
 after a violent constraint, are apt to run into licentiousness ; 
 and even the reason of men, who have experienced evils from 
 th« defects of a government, will sometimes coolly condemn 
 the whole system. 
 
 Every person, moderately acquainted with human nature, 
 knows that public bodies, as well as individuals, are liable to 
 the influence of sudden and violent passions, under the oper- 
 ation of which, the voice of reason is silenced. Instances of 
 such influence are not so frequent, as in individuals ; but its 
 effects are extensive in proportion to the numbers that com- 
 pose the public body. This fact suggests the expediency of 
 dividing the powers of legislation between the two bodies of 
 men, whose debates shall be separate and not dependent on 
 each other ; that, if at any time, one part should appear to be 
 under any undue influence, either from passion, obstinacy, 
 jealousy of particular men, attachment to a popular speaker, 
 or other extraordinary causes, there might be a power in the 
 legislature sufficient to check every pernicious measure. Even 
 in a small republic, composed of men, equal in property and 
 abilities, and all meeting for the purpose of making laws, like 
 the old Romans in the field of Mars, a division of the body 
 into two independent branches, would be a necessary step to 
 ■prevent the disorders, which arise from [9] the pride, irritability 
 and stubborness of mankind. This will ever be the case, 
 while men possess passions, easily inflamed, which may bias 
 their reason and lead them to erroneous conclusions. 
 
 Another consideration has weight : A single body of men 
 may be led astray by one person of abilities and address, 
 who, on the first starting a proposition, may throw a plausible 
 appearance on one side of the question, and give a lead to the 
 whole debate. To prevent any ill consequence from such a 
 circumstance, a separate discussion, before a different body of 
 men, and taken up on new grounds, is a very eligible expedient. 
 
 Besides, the design of a senate is not merely to check the 
 legislative assembly, but to collect wisdom and experience. 
 
32 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 
 
 In most of our constitutions, and particularly in the proposed 
 federal system, greater age and longer residence are required 
 to qualify for the senate, than for the house of representa- 
 tives. This is a wise provision. The house of representatives 
 may be composed of new and unexperienced members — 
 strangers to the forms of proceeding, and the science of legis- 
 lation. But either positive institutions, or customs, which 
 may supply their place, fill the senate with men venerable for 
 age and respectability, experienced in the ways of men, and 
 in the art of governing, and who are not liable to the bias of 
 passions that govern the young. If the senate of Rhode 
 Island is an exception to this observation, it is a proof that 
 the mass of the people are corrupted, and that the senate 
 should be elected [lo] less frequently than the other house : 
 Had the old senate in Rhode Island held their seats for three 
 years ; had they not been chosen, amidst a popular rage for 
 paper money, the honor of that state would probably have 
 been saved. The old senate would have stopped the measure 
 for a year or two, till the people could have had time to 
 deliberate upon its consequences. I consider it as a capital 
 excellence of the proposed constitution, that the senate can 
 be wholly renewed but once in six years. 
 
 Experience is the best instructor — it is better than a thou- 
 sand theories. The history of every government on earth 
 affords proof of the utility of different branches in a legisla- 
 ture. But I appeal only to our own experience in America. 
 To what cause can we ascribe the absurd measures of Con- 
 gress, in times past, and the speedy recision of whole meas- 
 ures, but to the want of some check? I feel the most 
 profound deference for that honorable body, and perfect 
 respect for their opinions ; but some of their steps betray a 
 great want of consideration— a defect, which perhaps nothing 
 can remedy, but a division of their deliberations. I will in- 
 stance only their resolution to build a Federal Town. When 
 we were involved in a debt, of which we could hardly pay the 
 interest, and when Congress could not command a shilling, 
 the very proposition was extremely absurd. Congress them- 
 selves became ashamed of the resolution, and rescinded it 
 
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 33 
 
 with as much silence as possible. Many other acts of that 
 body are equally reprehensible — but respect forbids me to 
 mention them. 
 
 [i i] Several states, since the war, have experienced the 
 necessity of a division of the legislature. Maryland was saved 
 from a most pernicious measure, by her senate. A rage for 
 paper money, bordering on madness, prevailed in their house 
 of delegates — an emission of ;£■. 500,000 was proposed ; a sum 
 equal to the circulating medium of the State. Had the sum 
 been emitted, every shilling of specie would have been driven 
 from circulation, and most of it from the state. Such a loss 
 would not have been repaired in seven years — not to mention 
 the whole catalogue of frauds which would have followed the 
 measure. The senate, like honest, judicious men, and the 
 protectors of the interests of the state, firmly resisted the 
 rage, and gave the people time to cool and to think. Their 
 resistance was effectual — the people acquiesced, and the honor 
 and interest of the state were secured. 
 
 The house of representatives in Connecticut, soon after the 
 war, had taken offence at a certain act of Congress. The 
 upper house, who understood the necessity and expediency of 
 the measure, better than the people, refused to concur in a 
 remonstrance to Congress. Several other circumstances gave 
 umbrage to the lower house ; and to weaken or destroy the 
 influence of the senate, the representatives, among other vio- 
 lent proceedings, resolved, not merely to remove the seat of 
 government, but to make every county town in the state the 
 seat of government, by rotation. This foolish resolution 
 would have disgraced school-boys — the senate saved the 
 honor of the state, by rejecting it with disdain — [12] and within 
 two months, every representative was ashamed of the conduct 
 of the house. All public bodies have these fits of passion, 
 when their conduct seems to be perfectly boyish ; and in these 
 paroxisms, a check is highly necessary. 
 
 Pennsylvania exhibits many instances of this hasty con- 
 duct. At one session of the legislature, an armed force is 
 ordered, by a precipitate resolution, to expel the settlers at 
 Wioming from their possessions — at a succeeding session, the 
 
34 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 
 
 same people are confirmed in their possessions. At one ses- 
 sion, a charter is wrested from a corporation — at another, 
 restored. The whole state is split into parties — everything is 
 decided by party — any proposition from one side of the house, 
 is sure to be damned by the other — and when one party per- 
 ceives the other has the advantage, they play truant — and an 
 officer or a mob hunt the absconding members in all the 
 streets and alleys in town. Such farces have been repeated 
 in Philadelphia — and there alone. Had the legislature been 
 framed with some check upon rash proceedings, the honor of 
 the state would have been saved — the party spirit would have 
 died with the measures proposed in the legislature. But now, 
 any measure may be carried by party in the house; it then 
 becomes a law, and sows the seeds of dissension throughout 
 the state.* 
 
 £i 3] A Ihousaaid examples similar to the foregoing may 
 be produced, both in ancient and modern history. Many 
 plausible things may be said in favor of pure democracy — 
 many in favor of uniting the representatives of the people in 
 one single house — but uniform experience proves both to be 
 inconsistent with the peace of society, and the rights of free- 
 men. 
 
 The state of Georgia has already discovered such incon- 
 veniences in its constitution, that a proposition has been made 
 for altering it ; and there is a prospect that a revisal will take 
 place. 
 
 People who have heard and read of the European govern- 
 ments, founded on the different ranks of monarch, nobility and 
 people, seem to view the senate in America, where there is no 
 difference of ranks and titles, as a useless branch — or as a ser- 
 vile imitation of foreign constitutions of governmeut, without 
 the same reasons. This is a capital mistake. Our senates, it 
 
 * I cannot help remarking the singular jealousy of the constitution of 
 Pennsylvania, which requires that a bill shall be published for the considera- 
 tion of the people, before it is enacted into a law, except in extraordinary 
 cases. This annihilates^ the legislature, and reduces it to an advisory body. 
 It almost wholly supersedes the uses of representation, the most excellent im- 
 provement in modern governments. Besides the absurdity of constituting a 
 legislature, without supreme power, such a system will keep the state perpetu- 
 
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 35 
 
 is true, are not composed of a different order of men ; but the 
 same reasons, the same necessity for distinct branches of the 
 legislature exists in all governments. But in most of our 
 American constitutions, we have all the advantages of checks 
 and balance, without the danger which may arise [14] from a 
 superior and independent order of men. 
 
 It is worth our while to institute a brief comparison be- 
 tween our American forms of government, and the two best 
 constitutions that ever existed in Europe, the Roman and the 
 British. 
 
 In England, the king or supreme executive officer, is 
 hereditary. In America, the president of the United States, 
 is elective. That this is an advantage will hardly be dis-. 
 puted. 
 
 In ancient Rome, the king was elective, and so were the 
 consuls, who were the executive officers in the republic. But 
 they were elected by the body of the people, in their public 
 assemblies ; and this circumstance paved the way for such ex- 
 cessive bribery and corruption as are wholly unknown in 
 modern times. The president of the United States is also 
 elective ; but by a few men chosen by the several legisla- 
 tures under their inspection separated at a' vast dis- 
 tance and holding no office under the United States. 
 
 Such a mode of election almost precludes the possibility of 
 corruption. Besides, no state however large, has the power 
 of chusing a president in that state ; for each elector must 
 choose at least one man, who is not an inhabitant of that State 
 to which he belongs. 
 
 The crown of England is hereditary — the consuls of Rome 
 were chosen annually — both these extremes are guarded 
 against in our proposed constitution. The president is not 
 
 ally embroiled. It carries the spirit of discussion into all quarters, without 
 the means of reconciling the opinions of men, who are not assembled to hear 
 each others' arguments. They debate with themselves — form their own opin- 
 ions, without the reasons which influence others, and without the means of 
 information. Thus the warmth of different opinions, which, in other states, 
 dies in the legislature, is diffused through the state of Pennsylvania, and be- 
 comes personal and permanent. The seeds of dissension are sown in the con- 
 stitution, and no state, except Rhode Island, is so distracted by factions. 
 
36 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 
 
 dis- [15] missed from his office, as soon as he is acquainted 
 with business— he continues four years, and is re-eligible, if 
 the people approve his conduct. Nor can he canvass for his 
 office, by reason of the distance of the electors ; and the pride 
 and jealousy of the states will prevent his continuing too long 
 in office. 
 
 The age requisite to qualify for this office is thirty-five 
 years.* The age requisite for admittance to the Roman con- 
 sulship was forty-three years. For this difference, good rea- 
 sons may be assigned — the improvements in science, and 
 particularly in government, render it practicable for a man to 
 qualify himself for an important office, much earlier in Hfe^ 
 than he could among the Romans ; especially in the early 
 part of their commonwealth, when the office was instituted. 
 Besides it is very questionable whether any inconvenience 
 would have attended admission to the consulship at an earlier 
 age. [f] 
 
 The powers vested in the president resemble the powers 
 of the supreme magistrates in Rome. They are not so exten- 
 sive as those of the British king; but in one instance, the 
 president, with concurrence of the senate, has powers exceed- 
 ing those of the Roman consuls ; I mean in the appointment 
 of judges and other subordinate executive officers. The prae- 
 tors or judges in Rome were chosen annually by the people. 
 This was a defect in the Roman government. [16] One half 
 the evils in a state arise from a lax execution of the laws ; and 
 it is impossible that an executive officer can act with vigor 
 and impartiality, when his office depends on the popular voice. 
 An annual popular election of executive officers is the sure 
 source of a negligent, partial and corrupt administration. The 
 independence of the judges in England has produced a cours^ 
 of the most just, impartial and energetic judicial decisions, for 
 many centuries, that can be exhibited in any nation on earth. 
 In this point therefore I conceive the plan proposed in Amer- 
 ica to be an improvement on the Roman constitution. In all 
 
 * In the decline of the republic, bribery or military force obtained this 
 office for persons who had not attained this age — Augustus was chosen at the 
 age of twenty; or rather obtained it with his sword. 
 
 [t "Query."] 
 
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER, 37 
 
 free governments, that is, in all countries, where laws govern, 
 and not men, the supreme magistrate should have it in his 
 power to execute any law, however unpopular, without haz- 
 arding his person or office. The laws are the sole guardians 
 of right, and when the magistrate dares not act, every person 
 is insecure. 
 
 Let us now attend to the constitution and the powers of 
 the senate. 
 
 The house of lords in England is wholly independent on [f] 
 the people. The lords spiritual hold their seats by office; and 
 the people at large have no voice in disposing of the ecclesias- 
 tical dignities. The temporal lords hold their seats by heredi- 
 tary right or by grant from the king : And it is a branch of 
 the king's prerogative to make what peers he pleases. 
 
 [17] The senate in Rome was elective ; but a senator held 
 his seat for life.* 
 
 [fof] 
 
 * I say the senate was elective — but this must be understood with some 
 exceptions; or rather qualifications. The constitution of the Roman senate has 
 been a subject of enquiry, with the first men in modern ages. Lord Chester- 
 field requested the opinion of the learned Vertot, upon the manner of chusing 
 senators in Rome; and it was a subject of discussion between Lord Harvey and 
 Dr. Middleton. The most probable account of the manner of forming the se- 
 nate, and filling up vacancies, which I have collected from the best writers on 
 this subject, is here abridged for the consideration of the reader. 
 
 Romulus chose one hundred persons, from the principal families in Rome, 
 to form a council or senate; and reserved to himself the right of nominating 
 their successors ; that is of filling vacancies. "Mais comme Romulus avoit lui 
 " mfime choisi les premiers senateurs il se reserva le droit de nommer a son 
 " gr§, leurs successeurs." — Mably, sur les Romains. Other well informed his- 
 torians intimate that Romulus retained the right of nominating the president 
 only. After the union of the Sabines with the Romans, Romulus added an- 
 other hundred members to the senate, but by consent of the people. Tarquin, 
 the ancient, added another hundred; but historians are silent as to the manner. 
 
 On the destruction of Alba by Hostilius, some of the principal Alban fam- 
 ilies were added to the senate, by consent of the senate and people. 
 
 After the demolition of the monarchy, Appius Claudius was admitted into 
 the senate by order of the people. 
 
 Cicero testifies that, from the extinction of the monarchy, all the members 
 of the senate were admitted by command of the people. 
 
 It is observable that the first creation of the senators was the act ot the 
 monarch; and the first patrician families claimed the sole right of admission 
 
38 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 
 
 [1 8] The proposed senate in America is constituted on prin- 
 ples more favorable to liberty : The members are elective, and 
 by the separate legislatures : They hold their seats for six 
 years — they are thus rendered suflSciently dependent on their 
 constituents ; and yet are not dismissed from their ofifice as 
 soon as they become acquainted with the forms of proceeding. 
 
 It may be objected by the larger states, that the represen- 
 tation is not equal ; the smallest states having the privilege of 
 sending the same number of senators as the largest. To obvi- 
 ate this objection, I would suggest but two or three ideas. 
 
 I. If each state had a representation and a right in deciding 
 questions, proportional to its property, three states would 
 almost command the whole. Such a constitution would grad- 
 ually annihilate the small states ; and finally melt down the 
 whole United States into one undivided sovereignty. The 
 free states of Spain and the heptarchy in England, afford strik. 
 ing examples of this. 
 
 [19] Should it be said that such an event is desirable, I answer; 
 the states are all entitled to their respective sovereignties, 
 and while they claim independence in international jurisdic- 
 tion, the federal constitution ought to guarantee their sover- 
 eignty. 
 
 into the senate. " Les families qui descendoient des deux cent senateurs que 
 " Romulus avoit crees, — se crurent seules en droit d'entrer dans le senat." — 
 Mably 
 
 This right however was not granted in its utmost extent ; for many of the 
 senators in the Roman commonwealth, were taken from plebian families. For 
 sixty years before the institution of the censorship, which was A. U. C. 311, we 
 are not informed how vacancies in the senate were supplied. The most proba- 
 ble method was this ; to enrol, in the list of senators, the different magistrates; 
 viz., the consuls, praetors, the two quaetors of patrician families, the five tri- 
 bunes (afterwards ten) and the two sediles of plebian families: The office of 
 quaestor gave an immediate admission into the senate. The tribunes were ad- 
 mitted two years after their creation. This enrollment seems to have been a. 
 matter of course; and likewise their confirmation by the people in their comitia 
 or assemblies. 
 
 On extraordinary occasions, when the vacancies of the senate were numer- 
 ous, the consuls used to nominate some of the most respectable of the eques- 
 trian order, to be chosen by the people. 
 
 On the institution of the censorship, the censors were invested with full 
 powers to inspect the manners of the citizens, — enrol them in their proper 
 
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 39 
 
 Another consideration has weight — There is, in all nations^ 
 a tendency toward an accumulation of power in some point. 
 It is the business of the legislator to establish some barriers 
 to check the tendency. In small societies, a man worth 
 ;^. 100,000 has but one vote, when his neighbors, who are 
 worth but fifty pounds, have each one vote likewise. To make 
 property the sole basis of authority, would expose many of the 
 best citizens to violence and oppression. To make the num- 
 ber of inhabitants [*] in a state, the rule of apportioning 
 powfer, is more epuitable ; and were the United States one 
 indivisible interest, would be a perfect rule for representation. 
 But the detached situation of the states has created some sep- 
 arate interests — some local institutions, which they will not 
 resign nor throw into the hands of other states. For these 
 peculiar interests, the states have an equal attachment — for the 
 preservation and enjoyment of these, an equal sovereignty is 
 necessary ; and the sovereignty of each state would not be 
 secure, had each state, in both branches of the legislature an 
 authority in passing laws, proportioned to its inhabitants. 
 
 3. But the senate should be considered as representing the 
 
 ranks according to their property, — make out lists of the senators and leave 
 out the names of such as had rendered themselves unworthy of their dignity 
 by any scandalous vices. This power they several times exercised ; but the 
 disgraced senators had an appeal to the people. 
 
 After the senate had lost half its members in the war with Hannibal, the 
 dictator, M. Fabius Buteo. filled up the number with the magistrates, with those 
 who had been honored with a civic crown, or others who were respectable for 
 age and character. One hundred and seventy new members were added at 
 once, with the approbation of the people. The vacancies occasioned by Sylla's 
 proscriptions amounted to three hundred, which were supplied by persons nom- 
 inated by Sylla and chosen by the people. 
 
 Before the time of the Gracchi, the number of senators did not exceed three 
 hundred. But in Sylla's time, so far as we can collect from direct testimonies, 
 it amounted to about five hundred. The age necessary to qualify for a seat in 
 the senate is not exactly ascertained ; but several circumstances prove it to 
 have been about thirty years. 
 
 See Vertot, Mably, and Middleton on this subject. 
 
 In the last ages of Roman splendor, the property requisite to qualify a 
 person for a senator, was settled by Augustus at eight hundred sestertia — more 
 than six thousand pounds sterling. 
 [* "Between states, and excluding negroes," added in author's copy.— p. l. f.} 
 
40 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 
 
 confederacy in a body. It is a [20] false principle in the vulgar 
 idea of representation, that a man delegated by a particular 
 district in a state, is the representative of that district only ; 
 whereas in truth a member of the legislature from any town 
 or county, is the representative of the whole state. In pass- 
 ing laws, he is to view the whole collective interest of the 
 state, and act from that view ; not from a partial regard to the 
 interest of the town or county where he is chosen. 
 
 The same principle extends to the Congress of the United 
 States. A delegate is bound to represent the true local inter, 
 est of his constituents — to state in its true light to the whole 
 body — but when each provincial interest is thus stated, every 
 member should act for the aggregate interest of the whole 
 confederacy. The design of representation is to bring the 
 collective interest into view — a delegate is not the legislator 
 of a single state — he is as much the legislator of the whole 
 confederacy as of the particular state where he is chosen ; and 
 if he gives his vote for a law which he believes to be beneficial 
 to his own state only, and pernicious to the rest, he betrays 
 his trust and violates his oath. It is indeed difficult for a man 
 to divest himself of local attachments and act from an impar- 
 tial regard to the general good ; but he who cannot for the 
 most part do this, is not a good legislator. 
 
 These considerations suggest the propriety of continuing 
 the senators in office, for a longer period, than the representa- 
 tives. They gradually lose their partiality, generalize their 
 views, [21] and consider themselves as acting for the whole 
 confederacy. Hence in the senate we may expect union and 
 firmness — here we may find '^^ general good ikio. object of leg- 
 islation, and a check upon the more partial and interested acts 
 of the other branch. 
 
 These considerations obviate the complaint, that the repre- 
 sentation in the senate is not equal ; for the senators represent 
 the whole confederacy ; and all that is wanted of the members 
 is information of the true situation and interest of each state. 
 As they act under the direction of the several legislatures, 
 two men may as fully and completely represent a state, as 
 twenty ; and when the true interest of each state is known, if 
 
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 41 
 
 the senators perform the part of good legislators, and act im- 
 partially for the whole collective body of the United States, 
 it is totally immaterial where they are chosen.* 
 
 [22] The house of representatives is the more immediate 
 voice of the separate states — here the states are represented 
 in proportion to their number of inhabitants — here the separ- 
 ate interests will operate with their full force, and the violence 
 of parties and the jealousies produced by interfering interests, 
 can be restrained and quieted only by a body of men, less 
 local and dependent. 
 
 It may be objected that no separate interests should exist 
 in a state ; and a division of the legislature has a tendency to 
 create them. But this objection is founded on mere jealousy, 
 or a very imperfect comparison of the Roman and British gov- 
 ernments, with the proposed federal constitution. 
 
 * It is a, capital defect of most of the state-constitutions, that the senators, 
 like the representatives, are chosen in particular districts, They are thus in- 
 spired with local views, and however wrong it may be to entertain them, yet 
 such is the constitution of human nature, that men are almost involuntarily 
 attached to the interest of the district which has reposed confidence in their 
 abilities and integrity. Some partiality therefore for constituents is always 
 expectable. To destroy it as much as possible, a political constitution should 
 remove the grounds of local attachment. Connecticut and Maryland have 
 wisely destroyed this attachment in their senates, by ordaining that the members 
 shall be chosen in the state at large. The senators hold their seats by the suf- 
 frages of the state, not of a district; hence they have no particular number of 
 men to fear or to oblige. — They represent the state; hence that union and firm- 
 ness which the senates of those states have manifested on the most trying occa- 
 sions, and by which they have prevented the most rash and iniquitous measures. 
 
 It may be objected, that when the election of senators is vested in the peo- 
 ple, they must choose men in their own neighborhood, or else those with whom 
 they are unacquainted. With respect to representatives, this objection does 
 not lie ; for they are chosen in small districts ; and as to senators, there is, in 
 every state, a small number of men, whose reputation for abilities, integrity 
 and good conduct will lead the people to a very just choice. Old experienced 
 statesmen should compose the senate ; and people are generally, in this free 
 country, acquainted with their characters. Were it possible, as it is in small 
 states, it would be an improvement in the doctrine of representation, to give 
 every freeman the right of voting for every member of the legislature, and the 
 privilege of choosing the men in any part of the state. This would totally 
 exclude bribery and undue influence ; for no man can bribe a state ; and it 
 would almost annihilate partial views in legislation. But in large states it may 
 be impracticable. 
 
42 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 
 
 The house of peers in England is a body originally and 
 totally independent on [*] the people — the senate in Rome 
 was mostly composed of patrician or noble families, and after 
 the first election of a senator, he was no longer dependent on 
 the people — he held his seat for life. But the senate of the 
 United States can have no separate interests from the body of 
 the people ; for they live among them — they are chosen by 
 them — they must be dismissed from their place once in six 
 years and may at any time be impeached for mal-practices — 
 — their property is si- [23] tuated among the people, and with 
 their persons, subject to the same laws. No title can be 
 granted, but the temporary titles of ofifice, bestowed by the 
 voluntary election of the people ; and no pre-eminence can be 
 acquired but by the same means. 
 
 The separation of the legislature divides the power — checks 
 — restrains — amends the proceedings — at the same time, it 
 creates no division of interest, that can tempt either branch to 
 encroach upon the other, or upon the people. In turbulent 
 times, such restraint is our greatest safety — in calm times, and 
 in measures obviously calculated for the general good, both 
 branches must always be unanimous. 
 
 A man must be thirty years of age before he can be admit- 
 ted into the senate — which was likewise a requisite in the 
 Roman government. What property was requisite for a sen- 
 ator in the early ages of Rome, I cannot inform myself ; but 
 Augustus fixed it at six hundred sestertia — between six and 
 seven thousand pounds sterling. In the federal constitution, 
 money is not made a requisite — the places of senators are 
 wisely left open to all persons of suitable age and merit, and 
 who have been citizens of the United States for nine years ; a 
 _ term in which foreigners may acquire the feelings and acquaint 
 themselves with the interests, of the native Americans. 
 
 The house of representatives is formed on very equitable 
 principles; and is calculated to guard the privileges of the 
 people. The English [24] house of commons is chosen by a 
 small part of the people of England, and continues for seven 
 years. The Romans never discovered the secret of represen- 
 tation — the whole body of citizens assembled for the purposes 
 
 [»of] 
 
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 43 
 
 of legislation — a circumstance that exposed their government 
 to frequent convulsions, and to capricious measures. The 
 federal house of representatives is chosen by the people qual- 
 ified to vote for state representatives,* and continues two 
 years. 
 
 [25] Some may object to their continuance in power two 
 years. But I cannot see any danger arising from this quarter. 
 On the contrary, it creates less trouble for the representatives, 
 who by such choice are taken from their professions and 
 obliged to attend Congress, some of them at the distance of 
 at least seven hundred miles. While men are chosen by the 
 people, and responsible to them, there is but little danger 
 from ambition or corruption. 
 
 If it should be said that Congress may in time become tri- 
 ennial, and even septennial, like the English parliaments, I 
 answer, this is not in their power. The English parliament 
 had power to prolong the period' of their existence — but Con- 
 gress will be restrained by the different legislatures, without 
 
 * It is said by some, that no property should be required as a qualification 
 for an elector. I shall not enter into a discussion of the subject; but remark 
 that in most free governments, some property has been thought requisite, to 
 prevent corruption and secure government from the influence of an unprinci. 
 pled multitude. 
 
 In ancient Rome none but the free citizens had the right of a suffrage in the 
 comitia or legislative assemblies. But in Sylla's time the Italian cities demanded 
 the rights of the Roman citizens; alledging that they furnished two-thirds of the 
 armies, in all their wars, and yet were despised as foreigners. Veil Paterc. 
 lib. 2. cap. 15. This produced the Marsic or social war, which lasted two 
 years, and caried off 300,000 men. Ibm. It was conducted and concluded by 
 Pompey, father of Pompey the Great, with his lieutenants Sylla and Marius. 
 But most of the cities eventually obtained the freedom of Rome; and were of 
 course entitled to the rights of suffrage in the comitia. "Paulatim deinde recip- 
 "iendo in civitatem, qui arma aut non ceperant aut deposuerant maturi&s, 
 "vires refectae sunt." Veil. Paterc. 2. 16. 
 
 But Rome had cause to deplore this event, for however reasonable it might 
 appear to admit the allies to a participation of the rights of citizens, yet the 
 concession destroyed all freedom of election. It enabled an ambitious dema- 
 gogue to engage and bring into the assemblies, whole towns of people, slaves 
 and foreigners ; — and everything was decided by faction and violence. This 
 Montesquieu numbers among the causes of the decline of the Roman greatness. 
 De la grandeur des Romains, t. 9. 
 
 Representation would have, in some measure, prevented the consequences; 
 
44 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 
 
 whose constitutional concurrence, no alteration can be made 
 in the proposed system. 
 
 The fourth section, article i, of the new constitution 
 declares that "The times, places, and manner of holding elec- 
 " tions for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in 
 " each state by the legislature thereof ; but the Congress may 
 " at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to 
 
 " the places of chusing senators." Here let us pause What 
 
 did the convention mean by giving Congress power to make 
 regulations, prescribed by the legislatures ? Is this expression 
 accurate or intelligible ? But the word alter is very intelligi- 
 ble, and the clause puts the election of representatives wholly, 
 and [26] the senators almost wholly, in the power of Congress. 
 
 The views of the convention I believe to be perfectly 
 upright — They might mean to place the election of representa- 
 tives and senators beyond the reach of faction — They doubtless 
 had good reasons, in their minds, for the clause — But I see no 
 occasion for any power in Congress to interfere with the 
 choice of their own body — They will have power to suppress 
 insurrections, as they ought to have ; but the clause in Italics 
 gives needless and dangerous powers — I hope the states will 
 reject it with decency, and adopt the whole system, without 
 altering another syllable. [*] 
 
 The method of passing laws in Congress is much preferable 
 to that of ancient Rome or modern Britain. Not to mention 
 other defects in Rome, it lay in the power of a single tribune 
 
 but the admission of every man to a suffrage will ever open the door to corrup- 
 tion. In such a state as Connecticut, where there is no conflux of foreigners, no 
 introduction of seamen, servants, &c., and scarcely an hundred persons in the 
 state who are not natives, and very few whose education and connexions do 
 not attach them to the government ; at the same time few men have property 
 to furnish the means of corruption, very little danger could spring from admit- 
 ting every man of age and discretion to the privilege of voting for rulers But 
 in the large towns of America there is more danger. A master of a vessel may 
 put votes in the hands of his crew, for the purpose of carrying an election for a 
 party. Such things have actually taken place in America. Besides, the mid- 
 dle states are receiving emigrations of poor people, who are not at once judges 
 of the characters of men, and who cannot be safely trusted with the choice of 
 legislators. 
 
 [* These two paragraphs struck out in author's copy. — p. l. f.] 
 
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 45 
 
 to obstruct the passing of a law. As the tribunes were popu- 
 lar magistrates, the right was often exercised in favor of lib- 
 erty ; but it was also abused, and the best regulations were 
 prevented, to gratify the spleen, the ambition, or the resent- 
 ment of an individual. 
 
 The king of Great-Britain has the same power, but seldom 
 exercises it. It is however a dangerous power — it is absurd 
 and hazardous to lodge in one man the right of controlling the 
 will of a state. 
 
 Every bill that passes a majority of both houses of Con- 
 gress, must be sent to the president for [27] his approbation ; 
 but it must be returned in ten days, whether approved by him 
 or not ; and the concurrence of two thirds of both houses passes 
 the bill into a law, notwithstanding any objections of the presi- 
 dent. The constitution therefore gives the supreme executive 
 a check but no negative, upon the sense of Congress. 
 
 The powers lodged in Congress are extensive ; but it is 
 presumed that they are not too extensive. The first object of 
 the constitution is to unite the states into one compact society, 
 for the purpose of government. If such union must exist, or 
 the states be exposed to foreign invasions, internal discord, 
 reciprocal encroachments upon each others property — to 
 weakness and infamy, which no person will dispute ; what 
 powers must be collected and lodged in the supreme head or 
 legislature of these states. The answer is easy : This legisla- 
 ture must have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters in which 
 the states have a mutual interest. There are some regulations 
 in which all the states are equally concerned — there are others, 
 which in their operation, are limited to one state. The first 
 belongs to Congress — the last to the respective legislatures. No 
 one state has a right to supreme control, in any a.ffair in which 
 the other states have an interest, nor should Congress interfere 
 in any affair which respects one state only. This is the gen- 
 eral line of division, which the convention have endeavored to 
 draw, between the powers of Congress and the rights of the 
 individual states. The only question therefore is, whether 
 the new constitution delegates to Congress any powers which 
 [28] do not respect the general interest and welfare of the 
 
4.6 RXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 
 
 United States. If these powers intrench upon the present 
 sovereignty of any state, without having for an object the col- 
 lective interest of the whole, the powers are too extensive. But 
 if they do not extend to all concerns, in which the states have 
 a mutual interest, they are too ;iimited. If in any instance^ 
 the powers necessary for protecting the general interest, inter- 
 fere with the constitutional rights of an individual state, such 
 state has assumed powers that are inconsistent with the safety 
 of the United States, and which ought instantly to be resigned. 
 Considering the states as individuals, on equal terms, entering 
 into a social compact, no state has a right to any power which 
 may prejudice its neighbors. If therefore the federal constitu- 
 tion has collected into the federal legislature no more power 
 than is necessary for the common defence and interest, it should 
 be recognized by the states, however particular clauses may 
 supersede the exercise of certain powers by the individual 
 states. 
 
 This question is of vast magnitude. The states have very 
 high ideas of their separate sovereignty; altho' it is certain, 
 that while each exists in its full latitude, we can have no Fed- 
 eral sovereignty. However flattered each state may be by its 
 independent sovereignty, we can have no union, no respecta- 
 bility, no national character, and what is more, no national 
 justice, till the states resign to one supreme head the exclusive 
 power of legislating, judging and executing, in all matters of a 
 general nature. Every thing of [29] a private or provincial 
 nature, must still rest on the ground of the respective state^ 
 constitutions. 
 
 After examining the limits of the proposed congressional 
 powers, I confess I do not think them too extensive — I firmly 
 believe that the life, liberty and property of every man, and 
 the peace and independence of each state, will be more fully 
 secured under such a constitution of federal government, than 
 they will under a constitution with more limited powers ; and 
 infinitely more safe than under our boasted distinct sovereign- 
 ties. It appears to me that Congress will have no more power 
 than will be necessary for our union and general welfare ; and 
 such power they must have or we are in a wretched state. On 
 
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 47 
 
 the adoption of this constitution, I should value real estate 
 twenty per cent, higher than I do at this moment. 
 
 I will not examine into the extent of the powers proposed 
 to be lodged in the supreme federal head ; the subject would 
 be extensive and require more time than I could bestow upon 
 it. But I will take up some objections, that have been made 
 to particular points of the new constitution. 
 
 Most of the objections I have yet heard to the constitution, 
 consist in mere insinuations unsupported by reasoning or fact. 
 They are thrown out to instil groundless jealousies into the 
 minds of the people, and probably with a view to prevent all 
 government ; for there are, in every society, some turbulent 
 geniuses whose importance [30] depends solely on faction. 
 To seek the insidious and detestable nature of these insinua- 
 tions, it is necessary to mention, and to remark on a few par- 
 ticulars. 
 
 1. The first objection against the constitution is, that the 
 legislature will be more expensive than our present confedera- 
 tion. This is so far from being true, that the money we actually 
 lose by our present weakness, disunion and want of government 
 would support the civil government of every state in the con- 
 federacy. Our public poverty does not proceed from the 
 expensiveness of Congress, nor of the civil list ; but from want 
 of power to command our own advantages. We pay more 
 money to foreign nations, in the course of business, and merely 
 for want of governtnent, than would, under an efficient govern- 
 ment, pay the annual interest of our domestic debt. Every 
 man in business knows this to be truth; and the objection can 
 be designed only to delude the ignorant. 
 
 2. Another objection to the constitution, is the division of 
 the legislature into two branches. Luckily this objection has 
 no advocates but in Pennsylvania ; and even here their num- 
 ber is dwindling. The factions that reign in this state, the 
 internal discord and passions that disturb the government and 
 the peace of the inhabitants, have detected the errors of the 
 constitution, and will some time or other produce a reforma- 
 tion. The division of the legislature has been the subject of 
 discussion in the beginning of this essay ; and will be deemed, 
 
48 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 
 
 by nineteen-twentieths of [31] the Americans, one of the prin- 
 cipal excellencies of the constitution. 
 
 3. A third insinuation, is that the proposed federal gov- 
 ernment will annihilate the several legislatures. This is ex- 
 tremely disingenuous. Every person, capable of reading, 
 must discover, that the convention have labored to draw the 
 line between the federal 'and provincial powers — to define the 
 powers of Congress, and limit them to those general concerns 
 which must come under federal jurisdiction, and which cannot 
 be managed in the separate legislatures — that in all internal 
 regulations, whether of civil or criminal nature, the states 
 retain their sovereignty, and have it guaranteed to them by 
 this very constitution. Such a groundless insinuation, or 
 rather mere surmise, must proceed from dark designs or 
 extreme ignorance, and deserves the severest reprobation. 
 
 4. It is alledged that the liberty of the press is not guar- 
 anteed by the new constitution. But this objection is wholly 
 unfounded. The liberty of the press does not come within 
 the jurisdiction of federal government. It is firmly established 
 in all the states either by law, or positive declarations in bills 
 of right ; and not being mentioned in the federal constitution, 
 is not — and cannot be abridged by Congress. It stands on the 
 basis of the respective state-constitutions. Should any state 
 resign to Congress the exclusive jurisdiction of a certain dis- 
 trict, which should include any town where presses are already 
 established, it is in the power of the state to reserve [32] the 
 liberty of the press, or any other fundamental privilege, and 
 make it an immutable condition of the grant, that such rights 
 shall never be violated. All objections therefore on this score 
 are " baseless visions." 
 
 5. It is insinuated that the constitution gives Congress the 
 power of levying internal taxes at pleasure. This insinuation 
 seems founded on the eighth section of the first article, which 
 declares, that " Congress shall have power to lay and collect 
 " taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and pro- 
 " vide for the common defence and general welfare of the 
 " United States." 
 
 That Congress should have power to collect duties, imposts 
 
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 49 
 
 and excises, in order to render them uniform throughout the 
 United States will hardly be controverted. The whole objec- 
 tion is to the right of levying internal taxes. 
 
 But it will be conceded that the supreme head of the states 
 must have power, competent to the purposes of our union, or 
 it will be, as it now is, a useless body, a mere expense, without 
 any advantage. To pay our public debt, to support foreign 
 ministers and our own civil government, money must be 
 raised ; and if the duties and imposts are not adequate to 
 these purposes, where shall the money be obtained ? It will 
 be answered, let Congress apportion the sum to be raised, and 
 leave the legislatures to collect the money. Well this is all 
 that is intended by the clause under consideration ; with the 
 addition of a fe- [33] deral power that shall be sufiScient to 
 oblige a delinquent state to comply with the requisition. [*] 
 Such power must exist somewhere, or the debts of the United 
 States can never be paid. For want of such power, our credit 
 is lost and our national faith is a bye-word. 
 
 For want of such power, one state now complies fully with 
 a requisition, another partially, and a third absolutely refuses 
 or neglects to grant a shilling. Thus the honest and punctual 
 are doubly loaded — and the knave triumphs in his negligence. 
 In short, no honest man will dread a power that shall enforce 
 an equitable system of taxation. The dis-honest are ever 
 apprehensive of a power that shall oblige them to do what 
 honest men are ready to do voluntarily. 
 
 Permit me to ask those who object to this power of taxa- 
 tion, how shall money be raised to discharge our honest debts 
 which are universally acknowledged to be just? jHave we 
 not already experienced the inefificacy of a system without 
 power? Has it not been proved to demonstration, that a vol. 
 untary compliance with the demands of the union can never 
 be expected ? To what expedient shall we have recourse ? 
 What is the resort of all governments in cases of delinquency? 
 Do not the states vest in the legislature, or even in the gov- 
 ernor and council, a power to enforce laws, even with the mil- 
 itia of the states ? And how rarely does there exist the neces- 
 sity of exerting such a power ? Why should such a power be 
 
 [* Last two sentences struck out in author's copy. — P. L. F.] 
 
50 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 
 
 more dangerous in Congress than in a legislature? Why 
 should [34] more confidence be reposed in a member of one 
 legislature than of another? Why should we choose the best 
 men in the state to represent us in Congress, and the moment 
 they are elected arm ourselves against them as against tyrants 
 and robbers ? Do we not, in this conduct, act the part of a 
 man, who, as soon as he has married a woman of unsuspected 
 chastity, locks her up in a dungeon ? Is there any spell or 
 charm, that instantly changes a delegate to Congress from an 
 honest man into a knave — a tyrant ? I confess freely that I 
 am willing to trust Congress with any powers that I should 
 dare lodge in a state-legislature. I believe life, liberty, and 
 property is as safe in the hands of a federal legislature, organ- 
 ized in the manner proposed by the convention, as in the 
 hands of any legislature, that has ever been or ever will be 
 chosen in any particular state. 
 
 But the idea that Congress can levy taxes at pleasure is 
 false, and the suggestion wholly unsupported. The preamble 
 to the constitution is declaratory of the purposes of our union." 
 and the assumption of any powers not necessary to establish 
 justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common 
 defence, promote the general welfare, and to secure the blessings 
 of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, will be unconstitutional, 
 and endanger the existence of Congress. Besides, in the very 
 clause which gives the power of levying duties and taxes, the 
 purposes to which the money shall be appropriated are speci- 
 fied, viz. to pay the debts and provide for the comm.on de- [35] 
 fence and general welfare of the United States* For these 
 purposes money must be collected, and the power of collection 
 must be lodged, sooner or later, in a federal head ; or the com- 
 mon defence and general welfare must be neglected. 
 
 The states in their separate capacity, cannot provide for 
 
 * The clause may at first appear ambiguous. It may be uncertain whether 
 we should read and understand it thus — " The Congress shall have power to 
 "lay and collect taxes, Iduties, imposts and excises in order to pay the debts," kc. 
 or whether the meaning is— "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect 
 " taxes, duties, imposts and excises, and shall have power to pay the debts," &c. 
 On considering the construction of the clause, and comparing it with the pre- 
 amble, the last sense seems to be improbable and absurd. But it is not very 
 
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 5 1 
 
 the common defence ; nay in case of a civil w^r, a state cannot 
 secure its own existence. The only question therefore is, 
 whether it is necessary to unite, and provide for our common 
 defence and general welfare. For this question being once 
 decided in the affirmative, leaves no room to controvert the 
 propriety of constituting a power over the whole United 
 States, adequate to these general purposes. 
 
 The states, by granting such power, do not throw it out 
 of their own hands — they only throw, each its proportion, into 
 a common stock — they merely combine the powers of the sev- 
 eral states into one point, where they must be collected, before 
 they can be exerted. But the powers are still in their own 
 hands ; and cannot be alienated, till they create a body inde- 
 pendent of them- [36] selves, with a force at their command, 
 superior to the whole yeomanry of the country. 
 
 6. It is said there is no provision made in the new consti- 
 tution against a standing army in time of peace. Why do not 
 people object that no provision is made against the introduc- 
 tion of a body of Turkish Janizaries ; or against making the 
 Alcoran the rule of faith and practice, instead of the Bible ? 
 The answer to such objections is simply this — no such provision 
 is necessary. The people in this country cannot forget their 
 apprehensions from a British standing army, quartered in 
 America ; and they turn their fears and jealousies against them- 
 selves. Why do not the people of most of the states apprehend 
 danger from standing armies from their own legislatures? 
 Pennsylvania and North Carolina, I believe, are the only states 
 that have provided against this danger at all events. Other 
 states have declared that " no standing armies shall be kept up 
 without the consent of the legislature." But this leaves the 
 power entirely in the hands of the legislature. Many of the 
 states however have made no provision against this evil. What 
 
 material; for no powers are vested in Congress but what are included under 
 the general expressions, oi providing for the common defence and general welfare 
 of the United States. Any powers not promotive of these purposes, will be 
 unconstitutional; — consequently any appropriations of money to any other pur- 
 pose will expose the Congress to the resentment of the states, and the members 
 to impeachment and loss of their seats. 
 
52 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 
 
 hazards these states suffer ! Why does not a man pass a law 
 in his family, that no armed soldier shall be quartered in his 
 house by his consent ? The reason is very plain : no man will 
 suffer his liberty to be abridged, or endangered — his disposi- 
 tion and his power are uniformly opposed to any infringement 
 of his rights. In the same manner, the principles and habits, 
 as well as the power of the Americans are directly opposed to 
 standing armies ; and there is as little [37J necessity to guard 
 against them by positive constitutions, as to prohibit the 
 establishment of the Mahometan religion. But the constitu- 
 tion provides for our safety ; and while it gives Congress 
 power to raise armies, it declares that no appropriation of 
 money to their support shall be for a longer term than two 
 years. 
 
 Congress likewise are to have power to provide for organ- 
 izing, arming and disciplining the militia, but have no other 
 command of them, except when in actual service. Nor are 
 they at liberty to call out the militia at pleasure — but only, to 
 execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections, and 
 repel invasions. For these purposes, government must always 
 be armed with a military force, if the occasion should require 
 it ; otherwise laws are nugatory, and life and property inse- 
 cure. 
 
 7. Some persons have ventured to publish an intimation, 
 that by the proposed constitution, the trial by jury is abolished 
 in all civil cases. Others very modestly insinuate, that it is in 
 some cases only. The fact is, that trial by jury is not affected 
 in any case, by the constitution ; except in cases of impeach- 
 ment, which are to be tried by the senate. None but persons 
 in office in or under Congress can be impeached ; and even 
 after a judgment upon an impeachment, the offender is liable 
 to a prosecution, before a common jury, in a regular course of 
 law. The insinuation therefore that trials by jury are to be 
 abolished, is groundless, and beyond conception, wicked. It 
 must be wicked, because the circu- [38] lation of a barefaced 
 falsehood, respecting a privilege, dear to freemen, can proceed 
 only from a depraved heart and the worst intentions. 
 
 8. It is also intimated as a probable event, that the federal 
 
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 53 
 
 courts will absorb the judiciaries of the federal states. This is 
 a mere suspicion, without the least foundation. The jurisdic- 
 tion of the federal states is very accurately defined and easily 
 understood. It extends to the cases mentioned in the consti- 
 tution, and to the execution of the laws of Congress, respect- 
 ing commerce, revenue, and other general concerns. 
 
 With respect to other civil and criminal actions, the powers 
 and jurisdiction of the several judiciaries of each state, remain 
 unimpaired. Nor is there anything novel in allowing appeals 
 to the supreme court. Actions are mostly to be tried in the 
 state where the crimes are committed — But appeals are al- 
 lowed under our present confederation, and no person com- 
 plains ; nay, were there no appeal, every man would have 
 I'eason to complain, especially when a final judgement, in an 
 inferior court, should affect property to a large amount. But 
 why is an objection raised against an appellate jurisdiction in 
 the supreme court, respecting /aci as well as /aw f Is it less 
 safe to have the opinions of two juries than of one ? I sus- 
 pect many people will think this is no defect in the constitu- 
 tion. But perhaps it will destroy a material requisite of a 
 good jury, viz. their vicinity to the cause of action. I have no 
 doubt, that when causes were tried, in periods prior to the 
 Christian sera, before [39] twelve men, seated upon twelve 
 stones, arranged in a circular form, under a huge oak, there 
 was great propriety in submitting causes to men tn the vicinity. 
 The difficulty of collecting evidence, in those rude times, ren- 
 dered it necessary that juries should judge mostly from their 
 own knowledge of facts or from information obtained out of 
 court. But in these polished ages, when juries depend almost 
 wholly on the testimony of witnesses ; and when a complica- 
 tion of interests, introduced by commerce and other causes, 
 renders it almost impossible to collect men, in the vicinity 
 of the parties, who are wholly disinterested, it is no disadvan- 
 tage to have a cause tried by a jury of strangers. Indeed the 
 latter is generally the most eligible. \ 
 
 But the truth is, the creation of all inferior courts is in the 1 
 power of Congress ; and the constitution provides that Con- 
 gress may make such exceptions from the right of appeals asy 
 
54 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 
 
 they shall judge proper. When these courts are erected, their 
 jurisdictions will be ascertained, and in small actions. Congress 
 will doubtless direct that a sentence in a subordinate court 
 shall, to a certain amount, be definite and final. All objec- 
 tions therefore to the judicial powers of the federal courts 
 appear to me as trifling as any of the preceding. 
 
 9. But, say the enemies of slavery, negroes may be imported 
 for twenty-one years. This exception is addressed to the 
 quakers ; and a very pitiful exception it is. 
 
 [40] The truth is, Congress cannot prohibit the importation 
 of slaves during that period ; but the laws against the import- 
 ation into particular states, stand unrepealed. An immediate 
 abolition of slavery would bring ruin upon the whites, and 
 misery upon the blacks, in the southern states. The constitu- 
 tion has therefore wisely left each state to pursue its own 
 measures, with respect to this article of legislation, during the 
 period of twenty-one years. 
 
 Such are the principal objections that have yet been made 
 by the enemies of the new constitution. They are mostly 
 frivolous, or founded on false constructions, and a misrepre- 
 sentation of the true state of facts. They are evidently 
 designed to raise groundless jealousies in the minds of well 
 meaning people, who have little leisure and opportunity to 
 examine into the principles of government. But a little time 
 and reflection will enable most people to detect such mischiev- 
 ous intentions ; and the spirit and firmness which have distin- 
 guished the conduct of the Americans, during the conflict for 
 independence, will eventually triumph over the enemies of 
 union, and bury them in disgrace or oblivion. 
 
 But I cannot quit this subject without attempting to correct 
 some of the erroneous opinions respecting freedom and tyranny, 
 and the principles by which they are supported. Many people 
 seem to entertain an idea, that liberty consists in a power to 
 act without any control. This is more liberty than even the 
 savages enjoy. But in civil society, political liberty consists in 
 [41] acting conformably to a sense of a majority of the society. In 
 a free government every man binds himself to obey the public 
 voice, or the opinions of a majority ; and the whole society 
 
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 55 
 
 engages to protect each individual. In such a government a 
 man is free and safe. But reverse the case ; suppose every 
 man to act without control or fear of punishment — every man 
 would be free, but no man would be sure of his freedom one 
 moment. Each would have the power of taking his neighbor's 
 life, liberty, or property ; and no man would command more 
 than his own strength to repel the invasion. The case is the 
 same with states. If the states should not unite into one 
 compact society, every state may trespass upon its neighbor, 
 and the injured state has no means of redress but its own 
 military force. 
 
 The present situation of our American states is very little 
 better than a state of nature — Our boasted state sovereignties 
 are so far from securing our liberty and property, that they, 
 every moment, expose us to the loss of both. That state 
 which commands the heaviest purse and longest sword, may at 
 any moment, lay its weaker neighbor under tribute ; and there 
 is no superior power now existing, that can regularly oppose 
 the invasion or redress the injury. From such liberty, O 
 *Lord, deliver us ! 
 
 But what is tyranny ? Or how can a free people be de- 
 prived of their liberties? Tyranny is the exercise of some 
 power over a man, which is not warranted by law, or necessary 
 for the public safety. A people can never be deprived of 
 [42] their liberties, while they retain in their own hands, a 
 power sufficient to any other power in the state. This posi- 
 tion leads me directly to enquire, in what consists the power 
 of a nation or of an order of men ? 
 
 In some nations, legislators have derived much of their 
 power from the influence of religion, or from that implicit 
 belief which an ignorant and superstitious people entertain of 
 the gods, and their interposition in every transaction of life. 
 The Roman senate sometimes availed themselves of this 
 engine to carry their decrees and maintain their authority. 
 This was particularly the case, under the aristocracy which 
 succeeded the abolition of the monarchy. The augurs and 
 
 [» " O " changed to " good " in author's copy p. l. f.] 
 
56 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 
 
 priests were taken wholly from patrician families* They 
 constituted a distinct order of men— had power to negative 
 any law of the people, by declaring that it was passed during 
 the taking of the auspices.f [1] This influence derived from 
 the authority of opinion, was less perceptible, but as tyranni- 
 cal as a military force. The same influence constitutes, at 
 this day, a principal support of federal governments on the 
 Eastern continent, and perhaps in South America. But in 
 North America, by a singular concurrence of circumstances, 
 the possibility of establishing this influence, as a pillar of gov- 
 ernment, is totally precluded. 
 
 [43] Another source of power in government is a military 
 force. But this, to be efficient, must be superior to any force 
 that exists among the people, or which they can command : 
 for otherwise this force would be annihilated, on the first 
 exercise of acts of oppression. Before a standing army can 
 rule, the people must be disarmed ; as they are in almost 
 every kingdom in Europe. The supreme power in America 
 cannot enforce unjust laws by the sword ; because the whole 
 body of the people are armed, and constitute a force superior 
 to any band of regular troops that can be, on any pretence, 
 raised in the United States. A military force, at the com- 
 mand of Congress, can execute no laws, but such as the people 
 perceive to be just and constitutional ; for they will possess 
 the power, and jealousy will instantly inspire the inclination, 
 to resist the execution of a law which appears to them unjust 
 and oppressive. In spite of all the nominal powers, vested in 
 Congress by the constitution, were the system once adopted 
 in its fullest latitude, still the actual exercise of them would 
 be frequently interrupted by popular jealousy. I am bold to 
 say, that ten just and constitutional measures would be re- 
 sisted, where one unjust or oppressive law would be enforced. 
 
 * " Quod nemo plebeius auspicia haberet, ideoque decemviros connubium 
 diremisse, ne incerta prole auspicia turbarentur. " Tit. Liv. lib. 4. cap. 6. 
 
 f Auguriis certe sacerdotisque augurum tantus honos accessit, ut nihil belli 
 domique postea, nisi auspicato, gereretur : concilia populi, exercitus vocati, 
 summa rerum, ubi aves non admisissent, dirimerentur. Liv. lib. i. cap. 37. 
 
 [Tf " The " and " of " struck out — " without " substituted in author's copy — 
 p. L. F.] 
 
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 5/ 
 
 The powers vested in Congress are little more than nominal ; 
 nay real power cannot be vested in them, nor in any body, but 
 in the people. The source of power is in the people of this 
 country, and cannot for ages, and probably never will, be re- 
 moved, [f]. 
 
 In what then does real power consist? The answer is 
 short and plain — in property. Could [44] we want any proofs 
 of this, which are not exhibited in this country, the uniform 
 testimony of history will furnish us with multitudes. But I 
 will go no farther for proof, than the two governments already 
 mentioned, the Roman and the British. 
 
 Rome exhibited a demonstrative proof of the inseparable 
 connexion between property and dominion. The first form 
 of its government was an elective monarchy — its second, an 
 aristocracy; but these forms could not be permanent, because 
 they were not supported by property. The kings at first and 
 afterwards the patricians had nominally most of the power ; 
 but the people, possessing most of the lands, never ceased to 
 assert their privileges, till they established a commonwealth. 
 And the king^ and senate could not have held the reigns of 
 government in their hands so long as they did, had they not 
 artfully contrived to manage the established religion, and play 
 off the superstitious credulity of the people against their own 
 power. "Thus this weak constitution of government," says 
 the ingenious Mr. Moyle, speaking of the aristocracy of Rome, 
 " not founded on the true center of dominion, land, nor on any 
 " standing foundation of authority, nor rivetted in the esteem 
 " and affections of the people; and being attacked by strong 
 " passion, general interest and the joint forces of the people, 
 " mouldered away of course, and pined of a lingering con- 
 " sumption, till it was totally swallowed up by the prevailing 
 " faction, and the nobility were moulded into the mass of the 
 " people." * The people, notwithstanding [45] the nominal 
 authority of the patricians, proceeded regularly in enlarging 
 their own powers. They first extorted from the senate, the 
 right of electing tribunes, with a negative upon the proceed- 
 
 [t Last two sentences struck out in author's copy.— P. L. F.] 
 * Essay on the Roman government. 
 
58 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 
 
 ings of the senate.* They obtained the right of proposing 
 and debating laws ; which before had been vested in the senate ; 
 and finally advanced to the power of enacting laws, without 
 the authority of the senate. f They regained the rights of 
 election in their comitia, of which they had been deprived by 
 Servius Tullius.:|: They procured a permanent body of laws, 
 collected from the Grecian institutions. They destroyed the 
 influence of augurs, or diviners, by establishing the tributa 
 comitia, in which they were not allowed to consult the gods. 
 They increased their power by large accessions of conquered 
 lands. They procured a repeal of the law which prohibited 
 marriages between the patricians and plebians.§ The Licinian 
 law limited all possessions to five hundred acres of land; 
 which, had it been fully executed, would have secured the 
 commonwealth. || 
 
 The Romans proceeded thus step by step to triumph over 
 the aristocracy, and to crown their privileges, they procured 
 the right of being elected to the highest offices of the state. 
 By acquiring the property of the plebians, the nobility, several 
 times, held most of the power of the state ; but the people, by 
 reducing the interest of money, abolishing debts, or by forcing 
 [46] other advantages from the patricians, generally held the 
 power of governing in their own hands. 
 
 In America, we begin our empire with more popular priv- 
 ileges than the Romans ever enjoyed. We have not to 
 struggle against a monarch or an aristocracy — power is lodged 
 in the mass of the people. 
 
 On reviewing the English history, we observe a progress 
 similar to that in Rome — an incessant struggle for liberty from 
 the date of Magna Charta, in John's reign, to the revolution. 
 The struggle has been successful, by abridging the enormous 
 power of the nobility. But we observe that the power of 'the 
 people has increased in an exact proportion to their acquisi- 
 tions of property. Wherever the right of primogeniture is 
 established, property must accumulate and remain in families. 
 Thus the landed property in England will never be sufficiently 
 
 *Livy, 2. 33. fLivy, 3. 54- i Livy, 3. 33. §Livy, 4. 6, || Livy, 
 
 6. 35. 42. " Ne quis plus quingenta jugera agri possideret." 
 
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. , 59 
 
 distributed, to give the powers of government wholly into the 
 hands of the people. But to assist the struggle for liberty, 
 commerce has interposed, and in conjunction with manufac- 
 turers, thrown a vast weight of property into the democratic 
 scale. Wherever we cast our eyes, we see this truth, that 
 property is the basis of power ; and this, being established as a 
 cardinal point, directs us to the means of preserving our 
 freedom. Make laws, irrevocable laws in every state, destroy- 
 ing and barring entailments ; leave real estates to revolve from 
 hand to hand, as time and accident may direct ; and no family 
 influence can be acquired and established for a series of 
 genera- [47] tions — no man can obtain dominion over a large 
 territory — the laborious and saving, who are generally the best 
 citizens, will possess each his share of property and power, and 
 thus the balance of wealth and power will continue where it 
 is, in the body of the people. 
 
 A general and tolerably equal distribution of landed prop- 
 erty is the whole basis of national freedom : The system of 
 the great Montesquieu will ever be erroneous, till the words 
 property or lands in fee simple are substituted for virtue, 
 throughout his Spirit of Laws. 
 
 Virtue, patriotism, or love of country, never was and never 
 will be, till mens' natures are changed, a fixed, permanent 
 principle and support of government. But in an agricultural 
 country, a general possession of land in fee simple, may be 
 rendered perpetual, and the inequalities introduced by com- 
 merce, are too fluctuating to endanger government. An 
 equality of property, with a necessity of alienation, constantly 
 operating to destroy" combinations of powerful families, is the 
 very soul of a republic — While this continues, the people will 
 inevitably possess both power and freedom; when this is lost, 
 power departs, liberty expires, and a commonwealth will 
 inevitably assume some other form. 
 
 The liberty of the press, trial by jury, the Habeas Corpus 
 writ, even Magna Charta itself, although justly deemed the 
 palladia of freedom, are all inferior considerations, when com- 
 pared with a general distribution of real property among 
 
6o EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 
 
 [48] every class of people.* The power of entailing estates is 
 more dangerous to liberty and republican government, than 
 all the constitutions that can be written on paper, or even 
 than a standing army. Let the people have property, and 
 they will have power — a power that will for ever be exerted 
 to prevent a restriction of the press, and abolition of trial by 
 jury, or the abridgement of any other privilege. The liber- 
 ties of America, therefore, and her forms of government, 
 stand on the broadest basis. Removed from the fears of a 
 foreign invasion and conquest, they are [49] not exposed to 
 the convulsions that shake other governments ; and the prin- 
 ciples of freedom are so general and energetic, as to exclude 
 the possibility of a change in our republican constitutions. 
 
 But while property is considered as the basis of the free- 
 dom of the American yeomanry, there are other auxiliary sup- 
 ports ; among which is the information of the people. In no 
 -country, is education so general — in no country, have the body 
 of the people such a knowledge of the rights of men and the 
 
 * Montesquieu supposed virtue to be the principle of a republic. He de- 
 rived his notions of this form of government, from the astonishing firmness, 
 -courage and patriotism which distinguished the republics of Greece and Rome. 
 But this virtue consisted in pride, contempt of strangers and a martial enthusi- 
 asm which sometimes displayed itself in defence of their country. These 
 principles are neverfpermanent — they decay with refinement, intercourse with 
 other nations and increase of wealth. No wonder then that these republics 
 declined, for they were not founded on fixed principles ; and hence authors 
 imagine that republics cannot be durable. None of the celebrated writers 
 •on government seems to have laid sufficient stress on a general possession of 
 Teal property in fee-simple. Even the authors of the Political Sketches, in the 
 Museum for the month of September, seems to have passed it over in silence ; 
 although he combats Montesquieu's system, and to prove it false, enumerates 
 ■some of the principles which distina:uish our governments from others, and 
 which he supposes constitutes the support of republics. 
 
 The English writers on law arid government consider Magna Charta, trial 
 ■by juries, the Habeas Corpus act, and the liberty of the press, as the bulwarks 
 of freedom. All this is well. But in no government of consequence in Europe, 
 is freedom established on its true and immoveable foundation. The property 
 is too much accumulated, and the accumulations too well guarded, to admit 
 the true principle of republics. But few centuries have elapsed, since the body 
 of the people were vassals. To such men, the smallest extension of popular 
 privileges, was deemed an invaluable blessing. Hence the encomiums upon 
 trial by juries, and the articles just mentioned. But these people have never 
 
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 6 1 
 
 principles of government. This knowledge, joined with a 
 keen sense of liberty and a watchful jealousy, will guard our 
 constitutions, and awaken the people to an instantaneous 
 resistance of encroachments. 
 
 But a principal bulwark of freedom is the right of election. 
 An equal distribution of property is the foundation of a repub- 
 lic ; hut popular elections form the great barrier, which, defends 
 it from assault, and guards it from the slow and imperceptible 
 approaches of corruption. Americans ! never resign that 
 right. It is not very material whether your representatives 
 are elected for one year or two — but the right is the Magna 
 Charta of your governments. For this reason, expunge that 
 clause of the new constitution before mentioned, which gives 
 Congress an influence in the election of their own body. The 
 time, place and manner of chusing senators or representatives 
 are of little or no consequence to Congress. The number of 
 members and time of meeting in Congress are fixed ; but the 
 choice should rest with the several states. [50] I repeat it — 
 reject the clause with decency, but with unanimity and firm- 
 ness. [*] 
 
 Excepting that clause the constitution is good [f] — it guar- 
 antees the fundamental principles of our several constitutions 
 — it guards our rights — and while it vests extensive powers in 
 Congress, it vests no more than are necessary for our union. 
 Without powers lodged somewhere in a single body, fully 
 competent to lay and collect equal taxes and duties — to adjust 
 
 been able to mount to the source of liberty, estates in fee, or at least but par- 
 tially ; they are yet obliged to drink at the streams. Hence the English jealousy 
 of certain rights, which are guaranteed by acts of parliament. But in America, 
 and here alone, we have gone at once to the fountain of liberty, and raised the 
 people to their true dignity. Let the lands be possessed by the people in fee- 
 simple, let the fountain be kept pure, and the streams will be pure of course. 
 Our jealousy of trial by jury, the liberty of the press, &c., is totally groundless. 
 Such rights are inseparably connected with \!ae. power and dignity of the people, 
 which rest on their property. They cannot be abridged. All other [free] 
 nations have wrested property and freedom from barons and tyrants ; we begin 
 our empire with full possession of property and all its attending rights. 
 
 [*Last three sentences struck out in author's copy.— P. L. F.] 
 r+ Revise to " The constitution is generally good.— p. l. p.] 
 
62 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 
 
 controversies between different states — to silence contending 
 interests — to suppress insurrections — to regulate commerce — 
 to treat with foreign nations, our confederation is a cobweb — 
 liable to be blown asunder by every blast of faction that is 
 raised in the remotest corner of the United States. 
 
 Every motive that can possibly influence men ever to unite 
 under civil government, now urges the unanimous adoption of 
 the new constitution. But in America we are urged to it by a 
 singular necessity. By the local situation of the several states 
 a few command all the advantages of commerce. Those states 
 which have no advantages, made equal exertions for indepen- 
 dence, loaded themselves with immense debts, and now are 
 utterly W\ unable to discharge them ; while their richer neigh- 
 bors are taxing them for their own benefit, merely because they 
 can. I can prove to a demonstration that Connecticut, which 
 has the heaviest internal or state debt, in proportion to its 
 number of inhabitants, of any in the union, cannot discharge 
 its debt, on any principles of taxation ever yet practised. Yet 
 [51] the state pays in duties, at least '100,000 dollars annually, 
 on goods consumed by its own people, but imported by New 
 York. This sum, could it be saved to the state by an equal 
 system of revenue, would enable that state to gradually sink 
 its debt.* [f] 
 
 New Jersey and some other states are in the same situa- 
 tion, except that their debts are not so large, in proportion to 
 their wealth and population. 
 
 The boundaries of the several states were not drawn with 
 a view to independence ; and while this country was subject to 
 Great Britain, they produced no commercial or political incon- 
 veniences. But the revolution has placed things on a differ- 
 ent footing. The advantages of some states, and the disad- 
 vantages of others are so great — and so materially affect the 
 business and interest of each, that nothing but an equalizing 
 
 [T[ "utterly " struck out. — p. L p.] 
 
 *The state debt of Connecticut is about 3,500,000 dollars, its proportion 
 of the federal debt about the same sum. The annual interest of the whole 
 420,000 dollars. 
 
 [f Last three sentences, the following paragraph and foot note struck out 
 in author's copy. — p. l. f.] 
 
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 63 
 
 system of revenue, that shall reduce the advantages to some 
 equitable proportion, can prevent a civil war and save the 
 national debt. Such a system of revenue is the sine qua non 
 of public justice and tranquillity. 
 
 It is absurd for a man to oppose the adoption of the con- 
 stitution, because he thinks some part of it defective or excep- 
 tionable. Let every man be at liberty to expunge what he 
 judges to be exceptionable, and not a syllable of the constitu- 
 tion [52] will survive the scrutiny. A painter, after executing 
 a masterly piece, requested every spectator to draw a pencil 
 mark over the part that did not please him ; but to his sur- 
 prise, he soon found the whole piece defaced. Let every man 
 examine the most perfect building by his own taste, and like 
 some microscopic critics, condemn the whole for small devia- 
 tions from the rules of architecture, and not a part of the best 
 constructed fabric would escape. But let any man take a com- 
 prehensive view of the whole, and he will be pleased with the 
 general beauty and proportions, and admire the structure. 
 The same remarks apply to the new constitution. I have 
 no doubt that every member of the late convention has 
 exceptions to some part of the system proposed. Their 
 constituents have the same, and if every objection must be 
 removed, before we have a national government, the Lord 
 have mercy on us. 
 
 Perfection is not the lot of humanity. Instead of censur- 
 ing the small faults of the constitution, I am astonished that 
 so many clashing interests have been reconciled — and so many 
 sacrifices made to the general interest ! The mutual conces- 
 sions made by the gentlemen of the convention, reflect the 
 highest honor on their candor and liberality ; at the same time, 
 they prove that their minds were deeply impressed with a con- 
 viction, that such mutual sacrifices are essential to our union. 
 They must be made sooner or later by every state ; or jealous- 
 ies, local interests and prejudices will unsheath the sword, and 
 some Caesar or Cromwell will avail himself [53] of our divisions, 
 and wade to a throne through streams of blood. 
 
 It. is not our duty as freemen, to receive the opinions of 
 any men however great and respectable, without an examina- 
 
64 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 
 
 tion. But when we reflect that [*] some of the greatest men 
 in America, with the venerable Franklin and the illustrious 
 Washington at their head ; some of them the fathers and 
 saviors of their country, men who have labored at the helm 
 during a long and violent tempest, and guided us to the haven 
 of peace — and all of them distinguished for their abilities 
 their acquaintance with ancient and modern governments, as 
 well as with the temper, the passions, the interests and the 
 wishes of the Americans ; — when we reflect on these circum- 
 stances, it is impossible to resist impressions of respect, and 
 we are almost impelled to suspect our own judgements, when 
 we call in question any part of the system, which they have 
 recommended for adoption. Not having the same means of 
 information, we are more liable to mistake the nature and ten- 
 dency of particular articles of the constitution, or the reasons 
 on which they were admitted. Great confidence therefore 
 should be reposed in the abilities, the zeal and integrity of 
 that respectable body. But after all, if the constitution 
 should, in its future operation, be found defective or inconve- 
 nient, two-thirds of both houses of Congress or the application 
 of two-thirds of the legislatures, may open the door for 
 amendments. Such improvements may then be made, as 
 experience shall dictate. 
 
 [54] Let us then consider the New Federal Constitution, as 
 it really is, an improvement on the best constitutions that the 
 world ever saw. In the house of representatives, the people 
 of America have an equal voice and suffrage. The choice of 
 men is placed in the freemen or electors at large ; and the 
 frequency of elections, and the responsibility of the members, 
 will render them sufficiently dependent on their constituents. 
 The senate will be composed of older men ; arid while their 
 regular dismission from office, once in six years, will preserve 
 their dependence on their constituents, the duration of their 
 existence will give firmness to their decisions, and temper the 
 factions which must necessarily prevail in the other branch. 
 The president of the United States is elective, and what is 
 a capital improvement on the best governments, the mode 
 
 [*"The convention was composed of," added after " that, " by author. — 
 p. L. F.] 
 
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER. 65 
 
 of chusing him excludes the danger of faction and corrup- 
 tion. [*] As the supreme executive, he is invested with power 
 to enforce the laws of the union and give energy to the fed- 
 eral •government. 
 
 The constitution defines the powers of Congress ; and every 
 power not expressly delegated to that body, remains in the 
 several state-legislatures. The sovereignty and the republican 
 form of government of each state is guaranteed by the consti- 
 tution ; and the bounds of jurisdiction between the federal 
 and respective state governments, are marked with precision. 
 In theory, it has all the energy and freedom of the British 
 and Roman governments, without their defects. In short, the 
 privilges of freemen are [55] interwoven into the feelings and 
 habits of the Americans ; liberty stands on the immoveable 
 basis of a general distribution of property and diffusion of 
 knowledge ; but the Americans must cease to contend, to fear, 
 and to hate, before they can realize the benefits of indepen- 
 dence and government, or enjoy the blessings, which heaven 
 has lavished, in rich profusion, upon this western world. 
 
 [* " This proves how little dependence can be placed on theory Twelve 
 years experience, or four elections demonstrates the contrary." — Note in 
 author's copy. — P. L. F.] 
 
An / Address / to the / People / of the / State of 
 New- York / On the Subject of the / Constitution, / 
 Agreed upon at Philadelphia, / The 17th of September, 
 1787. / New-York: / Printed by Samuel Loudon, / Prin- 
 ter to the State. [1788]. 
 
 Sm. 4to., pp. ig. 
 
 By John Jay, member of the New York State Convention. 
 The pamphlet has been partially reprinted in Elliot, I, 496. 
 
 " The good sense, forcible observations, temper and mod- 
 eration with which the pamphlet is written, cannot fail, I 
 should think, of making a serious impression upon the anti- 
 federal mind, where it is not under the influence of such local 
 views as will yield to no argument, no proof." — George Wash- 
 ington. 
 
 " I likewise send you a small pamphlet written by John 
 Jay about ten days since, and which has had a most astonishing 
 influence in converting anti-federalism to a knowledge and 
 belief that the new Constitution was their only political salva- 
 tion."— S. B. Webb, 27 April, 1788. 
 
 " This pamphlet contains a brief recapitulation of the most 
 striking arguments in favor of adopting the proposed Federal 
 Constitution. Several of the observations are new, and all are 
 penned with such moderation of temper, and sound judg- 
 ment, that they cannot fail to make an impression favorable 
 to the Constitution on minds which are open to conviction. 
 It is wished that every friend to good order and government 
 might ' receive this address with the same candor with which 
 it is written,' as it is believed the author's arguments against 
 appointing a new general Convention, for the purpose of 
 altering and amending the constitution, are altogether 
 unanswerable." [Noah Webster] in American Magazine for 
 April, 1788. 
 
 See Jay's Life of Jay, I, 362 ; The Federalist, LXXXV; and 
 the " Postcript " oi An Address to the People of the State of 
 New York. — By a Plebian, infra. 
 
 P. L. F. 
 
Friends and Fellow Citizens : 
 
 'TpHERE are times and seasons, when general evils spread 
 general alarm and uneasiness, and yet arise from 
 causes too complicated, and too little understood by many, to 
 produce an unanimity of opinions respecting their remedies. 
 Hence it is, that on such occasions, the conflict of arguments 
 too often excites a conflict of passions, and introduces a 
 degree of discord and animosity, which, by agitating the public 
 mind dispose it to precipitation and extravagance. They who 
 on the ocean have been unexpectedly enveloped with tempests, 
 or suddenly entangled among rocks and shoals, know the 
 value of that serene, self-possession and presence of mind, to 
 which in such cases they owed their preservation ; nor will the 
 heroes who have given us victory and peace, hesitate to 
 acknowledge that we are as much indebted for those blessings 
 to the calm prevision, and cool intrepidity which planned and 
 conducted our military measures, as to the glowing animation 
 with which they were executed. 
 
 While reason retains her rule, while men are as ready to 
 receive as to give advice, and as willing to be convinced 
 themselves, as to convince others, there are few political evils 
 from which a free and enlightened people cannot deliver 
 themselves. It is unquestionably true, that the great body 
 of the people love their country, and wish it prosperity; and 
 this observation is particularly applicable to the people of a 
 free country, for they have more and stronger reasons for 
 loving it than others. It is not therefore to vicious motives 
 that the unhappy divisions which sometimes prevail among 
 them are to be imputed ; the people at large always mean well, 
 and although they may on certain oc- [4] casions be misled 
 by the counsels, or injured by the efforts of the few who ex- 
 pect more advantage from the wreck, than from the preserva- 
 tion of national prosperity, yet the motives of these few, are 
 
70 ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY. 
 
 by no means to be confounded with those of the community 
 in general. 
 
 That such seeds of discord and danger have been dissem- 
 inated and begin to take root in America, as unless eradicated 
 will soon poison our gardens and our fields, is a truth much to 
 be lamented ; and the more so, as their growth rapidly 
 increases, while we are wasting the season in honestly but 
 imprudently disputing, not whether they shall be pulled up, 
 but by whom, in what manner, and with what instruments, the 
 work shall be done. 
 
 When the king of Great Britain, misguided by men who 
 did not merit his confidence, asserted the unjust claim of binding 
 us in all cases whatsoever, and prepared to obtain our submis- 
 sion by force, the object which engrossed our attention, 
 however important, was nevertheless plain and simple, "What 
 shall we do ?" was the question — the people answered, let us 
 unite, our counsels and our arms. They sent Delegates to 
 Congress, and soldiers to the field. Confiding in the probity 
 and wisdom of Congress, they received their recommendations 
 as if they had been laws ; and that ready acquiesence in their 
 advice enabled those patriots to save their country. Then 
 there was little leisure or disposition for controversy respecting 
 the expediency of measures — hostile fleets soon filled our ports, 
 and hostile armies spread desolation on our shores. Union 
 was then considered as the most essential of human means 
 and we almost worshipped it with as much fervor, as pagans ' 
 in distress formerly implored the protection of their tutelar 
 deities. That union was the child of wisdom — heaven blessed 
 it, and it wrought out our political salvation. 
 
 That glorious war was succeeded by an advantageous peace. 
 When danger disappeared, ease'^ tranquility, and a sense of 
 security loosened the bands of union ; and Congress and soldiers 
 and good faith depreciated with their apparent importance. 
 Recommendations lost their influence, and requisitions were 
 rendered nugatory, not by their want of propriety, but by 
 their want of power. The spirit of private gain expelled the 
 spirit of public good, and men became more intent on the 
 means of enriching and aggrandizing themselves, than of en* 
 
ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY. 7 1 
 
 riching and aggrandizing their country. Hence the war-worn 
 veteran, whose re- [5] ward for toils and wounds existed in 
 written promises, found Congress without the means, and too 
 many of the States without the disposition, to do him justice. 
 Hard necessity compelled him, and others under similar cir- 
 cumstances, to sell their honest claims on the public for a 
 little bread; and thus unmerited misfortunes and patriotic 
 distresses became articles of speculation and commerce. 
 
 These and many other evils, too well known to require 
 enumeration, imperceptibly stole in upon us, and acquired an 
 unhappy influence on our public affairs. But such evils, Hke 
 the worst of weeds, will naturally spring up in so rich a soil; 
 and a good Government is as necessary to subdue the one, as 
 an attentive gardner or husbandman is to destroy the other — 
 Even the garden of Paradise required to be dressed, and while 
 men continue to be constantly impelled to error and to wrong 
 by innumerable circumstances and temptations, so long will 
 society experience the unceasing necessity of government. 
 
 It is a pity that the expectations which actuated the 
 authors of the existing confederation, neither have nor can be 
 realized: — accustomed to see and admire the glorious spirit 
 which moved all ranks of people in the most gloomy moments 
 of the war, observing their steadfast attachment to Union, 
 and the wisdom they so often manifested both in choosing 
 and confiding in their rulers, those gentlemen were led to 
 ' flatter themselves that the people of America only required 
 to know what ought to be done, to do it. This amiable mis- 
 take induced them to institute a national government in such 
 a manner, as though very fit to give advice, was yet destitute 
 of power, and so constructed as to be very unfit to be trusted 
 with it. They seem not to have been sensible that mere 
 advice is a sad substitute for laws ; nor to have recollected that 
 the advice even of the allwise and best of Beings, has been 
 always disregarded by a great majority of all the men that 
 ^ ever lived. 
 
 Experience iS a severe preceptor, but it teaches useful 
 ] truths, and however harsh, is always honest — Be calm and 
 dispassionate, and listen to what it tells us. 
 
72 ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY. 
 
 Prior to the revolution we had little occasion to inquire or 
 know much about national affairs, for although they existed 
 and were managed, yet they were managed for us, but not by 
 us. Intent on our domestic concerns, our internal legislative 
 business, our agriculture, and our buying and selling, we were 
 seldom anxious about what passed or was [6] doing in foreign 
 Courts. As we had nothing to do with that department of 
 policy, so the affairs of it were not detailed to us, and we took 
 as little pains to inform ourselves, as others did to inform us 
 of them. War, and peace, alliances, and treaties, and com- 
 merce, and navigation, were conducted and regulated without 
 our advice or controul. While we had liberty and justice, 
 and in security enjoyed the fruits of our "vine and fig tree," 
 we were in general too content and too much occupied, to be 
 at the trouble of investigating the various political combina- 
 tions in this department, or to examine and perceive how 
 exceedingly important they often were to the advancement 
 and protection of our prosperity. This habit and turn of 
 thinking affords one reason why so much more care was taken, 
 and so much more wisdom displayed, in forming our State 
 Governments, than in forming our Federal or national one. 
 
 By the Confederation as it now stands, the direction of 
 general and national affairs is committed to a single body of 
 men, viz. the Congress. They may make war, but are not 
 empowered to raise men or money to carry it on. They may 
 make peace, but without power to see the terms of it observed 
 — They may form alliances, but without ability to comply with 
 the stipulations on their part — They may enter into treaties 
 of commerce, but without power to enforce them at home or 
 abroad — They may borrow money, but without having the 
 means of repayment — They may partly regulate commerce, 
 but without authority to execute their ordinances — They may 
 appoint ministers and other officers of trust, but without power 
 to try or punish them for misdemeanors — They may resolve, 
 but cannot execute either with dispatch or with secrecy — In 
 short, they may consult, and deliberate, and recommend, and 
 make requisitions, and they who please, may regard them. 
 
 From this new and wonderful system of Government, it 
 
ADDRESS BY. JOHN JAY. 73 
 
 has come to pass, that almost every national object of every 
 kind, is at this day unprovided for ; and other nations taking 
 the advantage of its imbecility, are daily multiplying commer- 
 cial restraints upon us. Our fur trade is gone to Canada, and 
 British garrisons keep the keys of it. Our shipyards have 
 almost ceased to disturb the repose of the neighborhood by 
 the noise of the axe and hammer; and while foreign flags fly 
 triumphantly above our highest houses, the American Stars 
 seldom do more than shed a few feeble rays about the humble 
 masts of river sloops and coasting schooners. The greater 
 part of our hardy seamen, are [7] plowing the ocean in foreign 
 pay; and not a few of our ingenious shipwrights are now build- 
 ing vessels on alien shores. Although our increasing agriculture 
 and industry extend and multiply our productions, yet they 
 constantly diminish in value; and although we permit all 
 nations to fill our country with their merchandises, yet their 
 best markets are shut against us. Is there an English, or a 
 French, or a Spanish island or port in the West-Indies, t« 
 which an American vessel ca-n carry a cargo of flour for sale ? 
 Not one. The Algerines exclude us from the Mediterranean, 
 and adjacent countries ; and we are neither able to purchase, 
 nor to command the free use of those seas. Can our little 
 towns or larger cities consume the immense productions of 
 our fertile country? or will they without trade be able to pay 
 a good price for the proportion which they do consume ? The 
 last season gave a very unequivocal answer to these questions 
 — What numbers of fine cattle have returned from this city to 
 the country for want of buyers ? What great quantities of 
 salted and other provisions still lie useless in the stores ? To 
 how much below the former price, is our corn, and wheat and 
 flour and lumber rapidly falling? Our debts remain undimin- 
 ished, and the interest on them accumulating — our credit 
 abroad is nearly extinguished, and at home unrestored — they 
 who had money have sent it beyond the reach of our laws, 
 and scarcely any man can borrow of his neighbor. Nay, does 
 not experience also tell us, that it is as difficult to pay as to 
 borrow ? That even our houses and lands cannot command 
 money — that law suits and usurious contracts abound — that 
 
74 ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY. 
 
 our farms sell on executions for less than half their value, and 
 that distress in various forms, and in various ways, is approach- 
 ing fast to the doors of our best citizens. 
 
 These things have been gradually coming upon us ever 
 since the peace — they have been perceived and proclaimed, 
 but the universal rage and pursuit of private gain conspired 
 with other causes, to prevent any proper efforts being made 
 to ineliorate our condition by due attention to our national 
 affairs, until the late Convention was convened for that purpose. 
 From the result of their deliberations, the States expected to 
 derive much good, and should they be disappointed, it will 
 probably be not less their misfortune than their fault. That 
 Convention was in general composed of excellent and tried 
 men — men who had become conspicuous for their wisdom and 
 public services, and whose names [8] and characters will be 
 venerated by posterity. Generous and candid minds cannot 
 perceive without pain, the illiberal manner in which some have 
 taken the liberty to treat them ; nor forbear to impute it to 
 impure and improper motives, zeal for public good, like zeal 
 for religion, may sometimes carry men beyond the bounds of 
 reason, but it is not conceivable, that on this occasion, it 
 should find means so to inebriate any candid American, as to 
 make him forget what he owed to truth and to decency, or 
 induce him either to believe or to say, that the almost unani- 
 mous advice of the Convention, proceeded from a wicked 
 combination and conspiracy against the liberties of their 
 country. This is not the temper with which we should receive 
 and consider their recommendations, nor the treatment that 
 would be worthy either of us or them. Let us continue 
 careful therefore that facts do not warrant historians to tell 
 future generations, that envy, malice and uncharitableness 
 pursued our patriotic benefactors to their graves, and that not 
 even pre-eminence in virtue, nor lives devoted to the public, 
 could shield them from obloquy and detraction. On the 
 contrary, let our bosoms always retain a sufficient degree of 
 honest indignation to disappoint and discourage those who 
 expect our thanks or applause for calumniating our most 
 faithful and meritorious friends. 
 
ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY. 75 
 
 The Convention concurred in opinion with the people, that 
 a national government, competent to every national object, was 
 indispensibly necessary; and it was as plain to them, as it now 
 is to all America, that the present confederation does not 
 provide for such a government. These points being agreed, 
 they proceeded to consider how and in what manner such a 
 government could be formed, as on the one hand, should be 
 sufficiently energetic to raise us from our prostrate and dis- 
 tressed situation, and on the other be perfectly consistent with 
 the liberties of the people of every State. Like men to whom 
 the experience of other ages and countries had taught wisdom, 
 they not only determined that it should be erected by, and 
 depend on the people ; but remembering the many instances 
 in which governments vested solely in one man, or one body 
 of men, had degenerated into tyrannies, they judged it most 
 prudent that the three great branches of power should be 
 committed to different hands, and therefore that the executive 
 should be separated from the legislative, and the judicial from 
 both. Thus far the propriety of their work is easily seen and 
 understood, and therefore is thus far almost uni- [9] versally 
 approved — for no one man or thing under the sun ever yet 
 pleased every body. 
 
 ^ The next question was, what particular powers should be 
 given to these three branches ? Here the different views and 
 interests of the different states, as well as the different abstract 
 opinions of their members on such points, interposed many 
 difficulties. Here the business became complicated, and pre- 
 sented a wide field for investigation ; too wide for every eye to 
 take a quick and comprehensive view of it. 
 
 It is said that "in a multitude of counsellors there is 
 safety," because in the first place, there is greater security for 
 probity ; and in the next, if every member cast in only his. mite 
 of information and argument, their joint stock of both will 
 thereby become greater than the stock possessed by any one 
 single man out of doors. Gentlemen out of doors therefore 
 should not be hasty in condemning a system, which probably 
 rests on more good reasons than they are aware of, especially 
 when formed under such advantages, and recommended ' by 
 so many men of distinguished worth and abilities. 
 
76 ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY. 
 
 The difficulties before mentioned occupied the Convention 
 a long time and it was not without mutual concessions that 
 they were at last surmounted. These concessions serve to 
 explain to us the reason why some parts of the system please 
 in some states, which displease in others ; and why many of the 
 objections which have been made to it, are so contradictory 
 and inconsistent with one another. -'It does great credit to 
 the temper and talents of the Convention, that they were able 
 so to reconcile the different views and interests of the different 
 States, and the clashing opinions of their members as to unite 
 with such singular and almost perfect unanimity in any plan 
 whatever, on a subject so intricate and perplexed. It shews 
 that it must have been thoroughly discussed and understood; 
 and probably if the community at large had the same lights 
 and reasons before them, they would, if equally candid and 
 uninfluenced, be equally unanimous. 
 
 It would be arduous, and indeed impossible, to comprise 
 within>the limits of this address, a full discussion of every 
 part of the plan. Such a task would require a volume, and 
 few men have leisure or inclination to read volumes on any 
 subject. The objections made to it are almost without 
 number, and many of them without reason — some of them 
 are real and honest, and others merely ostensible. There are 
 friends to [lo] Union and a national Government who have 
 serious doubts, who wish to be informed, and to be convinced; 
 and there are others who, neither wishing for union, nor any 
 national Government at all, will oppose and object to any 
 plan that can be contrived. 
 
 ^^^We are told, among other strange things, that the liberty 
 of the press is left insecure by the proposed Constitution, and 
 yet that Constitution says neither more nor less about it, than 
 the Constitution of the State of New York does. We are told 
 that it deprives us of trial by jury, whereas the fact is, that it 
 expressly secures it in certain cases, and takes it away in none 
 — it is absurd to construe the silence of this, or of our own 
 constitution, relative to a great number of our rights, into a 
 total extinction of them — silence and blank paper neither 
 grant nor take away anything. Complaints are also made that 
 
ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY. 77 
 
 the proposed constitution is not accompanied by a bill of 
 rights ; and yet they who would make these complaints, know 
 and are content that no bill of rights accompanied the Consti- 
 tution of this State. In days and countries, where Monarchy 
 and their subjects were frequently disputing about prerogative 
 and privileges, the latter often found it necessary, as it were 
 to run out the line between them, and oblige the former to. 
 admit by solemn acts, called bills of rights, that certain enum- 
 erated rights belonged to the people, and were not compre- 
 hended in the royal prerogative. But thank God we have no^ 
 such disputes — we have ' no Monarchs to contend with, or 
 demand admission from — the proposed Government is to be 
 the government of the people — all its officers are to be their 
 officers, and to exercise no rights but such as the people com- 
 mit to them. The Constitution only serves to point out that 
 part of the people's business, which they think proper by it to 
 refer to the management of the persons therein designated — 
 those persons are to receive that business to manage, not for 
 themselves and as their own, but as agents and overseers for 
 the people to whom they are constantly responsible, and by 
 whom only they are to be appointed. 
 
 ""^^^But the design of this address is not to investigate the 
 merits of the plan, nor of the objections to it. They who 
 seriously contemplate the present state of our affairs will be 
 convinced that other considerations of at least equal import- 
 ance demand their attention. Let it be admitted that this 
 plan, like everything else devised by man, has its imperfec- 
 tions : That it does not please every body is certain and ^ 
 there is little [ii] reason to expect one that will. It is a 
 question of great moment to you, whether the probability of 
 your being able seasonably to obtain a better, is such as to. 
 render it prudent and advisable to reject this, and run the 
 risque. Candidly to consider this question is the design of .^ 
 
 ^this address. 
 
 ^^As the importance of this question must be obvious to- 
 every man, whatever his private opinions respecting it may 
 be, it becomes us all to treat it in that calm and temperate 
 manner, which a subject so deeply interesting to the future 
 
78 ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY. 
 
 welfare of our country and prosperity requires. Let us there- 
 fore as much as possible repress and compose that irritation 
 in our minds, which toewarm disputes about it may have 
 excited. Let us endeavour to forget that this or that man, is 
 on this or that side ; and that we ourselves, perhaps without 
 sufificient reflection, have classed ourselves with one or the 
 other party. Let us remember that this is not a matter to be 
 regarded as a matter that only touches our local parties, but 
 as one so great, so general, and so extensive in its future con- 
 sequences to America, that for our deciding upon it according 
 to the best of our unbiassed judgment, we must be highly 
 responsible both here and hereafter. 
 
 The question now before us now naturally leads to three 
 enquiries : , 
 
 1. Whether it is probable that a better plan can be ob- 
 tained ? 
 
 2. Whether, if attainable, it is likely to be in season ? 
 
 3. What would be our situation, if after rejecting this, all 
 our efforts to obtain a better should prove fruitless? 
 
 The men, who formed this plan are Americans, who had 
 long deserved and enjoyed our confidence, and who are as 
 much interested in having a good government as any of us 
 are, or can be. They were appointed to that business at a 
 time when the States had become very sensible of the derange- 
 ment of our national affairs, and of the impossibility of 
 retrieving them under the existing Confederation. Although 
 well persuaded that nothing but a good national government 
 could oppose and divert the tide of evils that was flowing in 
 upon us, yet those gentlemen met in Convention with minds 
 perfectly unprejudiced in favour of any particular plan. The 
 minds of their Constituents were at that time equally unbiased, 
 cool and dispassionate. All agreed in the necessity of doing 
 something, but no one ventured to say decidedly what pre- 
 cisely ought to be done — opinions were then fluctuating and 
 unfixed, and whatever might have been the wishes of a few 
 individuals, yet while the Convention deliberated, the people 
 remained in [12] silent suspence. Neither wedded to favourite 
 systems of their own, nor influenced by popular ones abroad, 
 
ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY. 79 
 
 the members were more desirous to receive light from, than 
 to impress their private sentiments on, one another. These 
 circumstances naturally opened the door to that spirit of 
 candour, of calm enquiry, of mutual accommodation, and 
 mutual respect, which entered into the Convention with them, 
 and regulated their debates and proceedings. 
 
 The impossibility of agreeing upon any plan that would 
 exactly quadrate with the local policy and objects of every 
 State, soon became evident; and they wisely thought it better 
 mutually to concede, and accommodate, and in that way to 
 fashion their system as much as possible by the circumstances 
 and wishes of different States, than by pertinaciously adhering, 
 each to his own ideas, oblige the Convention to rise without 
 doing anything. They were sensible that obstacles arising 
 from local circumstances, would not cease while those circum- 
 stances continued to exist; and so far as those circumstances 
 depended on differences of climate, productions, and commerce, 
 that no change was to be expected. They were likewise 
 sensible that on a subject so comprehensive, and involving 
 such a variety of points and questions, the most able, the most 
 candid, and the most honest men will differ in opinion. The 
 same proposition seldom strikes many minds exactly in the 
 same point of light ; different habits of thinking, different 
 degrees and modes of education, different prejudices and 
 opinions early formed and long entertained, conspire with a 
 multitude of other circumstances, to produce among men a 
 diversity and contrariety of opinions on questions of difificulty. 
 Liberality therefore as well as prudence, induced them to 
 treat each other's opinions with tenderness, to argue without 
 asperity, and to endeavor to convince the judgment without 
 hurting the feelings of each other. Although many weeks 
 were passed in these discussions, some points remained, on 
 which a unison of opinions could not be effected. Here 
 again that same happy disposition to unite and conciliate, 
 induced them to meet each other ; and enabled them, by 
 mutual concessions, finally to complete and agree to the plan 
 they have recommended, and that too with a degree of 
 unanimity which, considering the variety of discordant 
 
8o ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY. 
 
 ^ views and ideas, they had to reconcile, is really astonishing. 
 
 Jhey tell us very honestly that this plan is the result of 
 
 accommodation — they do not hold it up as the best of all 
 possible ones, but only as [13] the best which they could unite 
 in, and agree to. If such men, appointed and meeting under 
 such auspicious circumstances, and so sincerely disposed to 
 conciliation, could go no further in their endeavors to please 
 every State, and every body, what reason have we at present 
 to expect any system that would give more general satis- 
 faction ? 
 
 ^^uppose this plan to be rejected, what measures would 
 you propose for obtaining a better ? Some will answer, let us 
 appoint another Convention, and as everything has been said 
 and written that can well be said and written on the subject, 
 they w,ill be better informed than the former one was, and 
 consequently be better able to make and agree upon a more 
 eligible one. 
 
 ■ This reasoning is fair, and as far as it goes has weight; but 
 it nevertheless takes one thing for granted, which appears very 
 doubtful; for although the new Convention might have more 
 information, and perhaps equal abilities, yet it does not from 
 thence follow that they would be equally disposed t.o agree. 
 The contrary of this position is the most probable. You must 
 have observed that the same temper and equanimity which 
 prevailed among the people on the former occasion, no longer 
 exists. We have unhappily become divided into parties; and 
 this important subject has been handled with such indiscreet 
 and offensive acrimony, and with so many little unhandsome 
 artifices and misrepresentations, that pernicious heats and 
 animosities have been kindled, and spread their flames far and 
 wide among us. When therefore it becomes a question who 
 shall be deputed to the new Convention; we cannot flatter 
 ourselves that the talents and integrity of the candidates will 
 determine who shall be elected. Federal electors will vote for 
 Fcederal deputies, and anti-Foederal electors for anti-Foederal 
 ones. Nor will either party prefer the most moderate of their 
 adherents, for as the most staunch and active partizans will be 
 the most popular, so the men most willing and able to carry 
 
ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY. 8 1 
 
 points, to oppose, and divide, and embarrass their opponents, 
 will be chosen. A Convention formed at such a season, and 
 of such men, would be but too exact an epitome of the 
 great body that named them. The same party views, the 
 same propensity to opposition, the same distrusts and jealous- 
 ies, and the same unaccommodating spirit which prevail 
 without, would be concentred and ferment with still greater 
 violence within. Each deputy would recollect who sent [14] 
 him, and why he was sent; and be too apt to consider himself 
 bound in honor, to contend and act vigorously under the 
 standard of his party, and not hazard their displeasure by 
 prefering compromise to victory. As vice does not sow the 
 seeds of virtue, so neither does passion cultivate the fruits of) 
 reason. Suspicions and resentments create no disposition to 
 conciliate, nor do they infuse a desire of making partial and 
 personal objects bend to general union and the common good. 
 The utmost efforts of that excellent disposition were necessary 
 to enable the late Convention to perform their task; and 
 although contrary causes sometimes operate similar effects, 
 yet to expect that discord and animosity should produce the 
 fruits of confidence and agreement, is to expect "grapes from 
 thorns, and figs from thistles." y 
 ~"--^ The States of Georgia, Delaware, Jersey, and Connecticut, ^ 
 have adopted the present plan with unexampled unanimity; 
 they are content with it as it is, and consequently their depu- 
 ties, being apprized of the sentiments of their Constituents, 
 will be little inclined to make alterations, and cannot be other- 
 wise than averse to changes which they have no reason to think 
 would be agreeable to their people — some other States, tho' 
 less unanimous, have nevertheless adopted it by very respect- 
 able majorities ; and for reasons so evidently cogent, that even 
 the minority in one of them, have nobly pledged themselves 
 for its promotion and support. From these circumstances, the 
 new Convention would derive and experience difificulties 
 'unknown to the former. Nor are these the only additional 
 difificulties they would have to encounter. Few are ignorant 
 that there has lately sprung up a sect of politicians who teach 
 and profess to believe that the extent of our nation is too 
 
82 ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY. 
 
 , /great for the superintendance of one national Government, 
 ' and on that principle argue that it ought to be divided into 
 two or three. This doctrine, however mischievous in its 
 tendency and consequences, has its advocates; and, should any 
 of them be sent to the Convention, it will naturally be their 
 poHcy rather to cherish than to prevent divisions ; for well 
 knowing that the institution of any national Government, 
 would blast their favourite system, no measures that lead to 
 it can meet with their aid or approbation. 
 
 Nor can we be certain whether or not any and what foreign 
 influence would, on such an occasion, be indirectly exerted, 
 nor for what purposes — delicacy forbids an ample discussion 
 of this question. Thus much [15] may be said, without error 
 or offence, viz. That such foreign nations as desire the pros- 
 perity of America, and would rejoice to see her become great 
 and powerful, under the auspices of a Government wisely 
 calculated to extend her commerce, to encourage her navigation 
 and marine, and to direct the whole weight of her power and 
 resources as her interest and honour may require, will doubt- 
 less be friendly to the Union of the States, and to the estab- 
 lishment of a Government able to perpetuate, protect and 
 dignify it. Such other foreign nation?, if any such their be, 
 who, jealous of our growing importance, and fearful that our 
 commerce and navigation should impair their own — ^who 
 behold our rapid population with regret, and apprehend that 
 the enterprising spirit of our people, when seconded by power 
 and probabihty of success, may be directed to objects not 
 consistent with their policy or interests, cannot fail to wish 
 that we may continue a weak and a divided people. 
 ~^<rhese considerations merit much attention, and candid 
 men will judge how far they render it probable that a new 
 Convention would be able either to agree in a better plan, or 
 with tolerable unanimity, in any plan at all. Any plan forcibly 
 carried by a slender majority, must expect numerous oppon- 
 ents among the people, who, especially in their present temper, 
 would be more inclined to reject than adopt any system so 
 made and carried. We should in such case again see the press 
 teeming with publications for and against it ; for as the minority 
 
ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY. 83 
 
 would take pains to justify their dissent, so would the majority- 
 be industrious to display the wisdom of their proceedings. 
 Hence new divisions, new parties, and new distractions would 
 ensue, and no one can foresee or conjecture when or how they 
 would terminate. 
 
 Let those who are sanguine in their expectations of a 
 better plan from a new Convention, also reflect on the delays 
 and risque to which it would expose us. Let them consider 
 whether we ought, by continuing much longer in our present 
 humiliated condition, to give other nations further time to per- 
 fect their restrictive systems of commerce, to reconcile their own 
 people to them, and to fence and guard and strengthen them 
 by all those regulations and contrivances in which a jealous 
 policy is ever fruitful. Let them consider whether we ought 
 to give further opportunities to discord to alienate the hearts 
 of our citizens from one another, and thereby encourage new 
 Cromwells to bold exploits. Are we cer- [16] tain that our 
 foreign creditors will continue patient, and ready to proportion 
 their forbearance to our delays? Are we sure that our 
 distresses, dissentions and weakness will neither invite hostility 
 nor insult ? If they should, how ill prepared shall we be for 
 defence! without Union, without Government, without money, 
 and without credit ! 
 
 It seems necessary to remind you, that some time must 
 yet elapse, before all the States will have decided on the 
 present plan. If they reject it, some time must also pass 
 before the measure of a new Convention, can be brought 
 about and generally agreed to. A further space of time will 
 then be requisite to elect their deputies, and send them on to 
 Convention. What time they may expend when met, cannot 
 be divined, and it is equally uncertain how much time the 
 several States may take to deliberate and decide on any plan 
 they may recommend — if adopted, still a further space of 
 time will be necessary to organize and set it in motion: — In 
 the mean time our affairs are daily going on from bad to 
 worse, and it is not rash to say that our distresses are accum- 
 ulating like compound interest. 
 
 But if for the reasons already mentioned, and others that 
 
84 ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY. 
 
 we cannot now perceive, the new Convention, instead of 
 producing a better plan, should give us only a history of their 
 disputes, or should offer us one still less pleasing than the 
 present, where should we be then ? The old Confederation 
 has done its best, and cannot help us ; and is now so relaxed 
 and feeble, that in all probability it would not survive so violent 
 a shock. Then "to your tents Oh Israel !" would be the word- 
 Then every band of union would be severed. Then every 
 State would be a little nation, jealous of its neighbors, and 
 anxious to strengthen itself by foreign alliances, against its 
 former friends. Then farewell to fraternal affection, unsus- 
 pecting intercourse; and mutual participation in commerce, 
 navigation and citizenship. Then would arise mutual restric- 
 tions and fears, mutual garrisons, — and standing armies, and 
 all those dreadful evils which for so many ages plagued England, 
 Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, while they continued disunited, 
 and were played off against each other. 
 
 Consider my fellow citizens what you are about, before it 
 is too late — consider what in such an event would be your 
 particular case. You know the geography of your State, and 
 the consequences of your local position. Jersey and Connec- 
 ticut, to whom your impost laws have been [i 7] unkind — Jersey 
 and Connecticut, who have adopted the present plan, and 
 expect much good from it — will impute its miscarriage and all 
 the consequent evils to you. They now consider your opposi- 
 tion as dictated more by your fondness for your impost, than 
 for those rights to which they have never been behind you in 
 attachment. They cannot, they will not love you — they 
 border upon you, and are your neighbors; but you will soon 
 cease to regard their neighborhood as a blessing. You have 
 but one port and outlet to your commerce, and how you are 
 to keep that outlet free and uninterrupted, merits considera- 
 tion. — What advantage Vermont in combination with others, 
 might take of you, may easily be conjectured ; nor will you be 
 at a loss to perceive how much reason the people of Long 
 Island, whom you cannot protect, have to deprecate being 
 constantly exposed to the depredations of every invader. 
 
 These are short hints — they ought not to be more 
 
ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY. 85 
 
 developed — you can easily in your own mind dilate and trace 
 them through all their relative circumstances and connections. 
 — Pause then for a moment, and reflect whether the matters 
 you are disputing about, are of suiificient moment to justify 
 your running such extravagant risques. Reflect that the 
 present plan comes recommended to you by men and fellow 
 citizens who have given you the highest proofs that men can 
 give, of their justice, their love for liberty and their country 
 of their prudence, of their application, and of their talents. 
 They tell you it is the best that they could form; and that in 
 their opinion, it is necessary to redeem you from those calam- 
 ities which already begin to be heavy upon us all. You find 
 that not only those men, but others of similar characters, and 
 of whom you have also had very ample experience, advise you 
 to adopt it. You find that whole States concur in the 
 sentiment, and among them are your next neighbors; both 
 whom have shed much blood in the cause of liberty, and have 
 manifested as strong and constant a predilection for a free 
 Republican Government as any State in the Union, and 
 perhaps in the world. They perceive not those latent 
 mischiefs in it, with which some double-sighted politicians 
 endeavor to alarm you. You cannot but be sensible that this, 
 plan or constitution will always be in the hands and power of 
 the people, and that [18] if on experiment, it should be found 
 defective or incompetent, they may either remedy its defects, 
 or substitute another in its room. The objectionable parts of 
 it are certainly very questionable, for otherwise there would 
 not be such a contrariety of opinions about them. Experience 
 will better determine such questions than theoretical argu- 
 ments, and so far as the danger of abuses is urged against the 
 institution of a Government, remember that a power to do 
 good, always involves a power to do harm. We must in the 
 business of Government as well as in all other business, have 
 some degree of confidence, as well as a great degree of caution. 
 Who on a sick bed would refuse medicines from a physician, 
 merely because it is as much in his power to administer deadly 
 poisons, as salutary remedies. 
 
 You cannot be certain, that by rejecting the proposed plan 
 
86 ADDRESS BY JOHN JAY. 
 
 you would not place yourself in a very awkward situation- 
 Suppose nine States should nevertheless adopt it, would you 
 not in that case be obliged either to separate from the Union, 
 or rescind your dissent ? The first would not be eligible, nor 
 could the latter be pleasant — ^A mere hint is sufficient on this 
 topic — You cannot but be aware of the consequences. 
 
 Consider then, how weighty and how many considerations 
 advise and persuade the people of America to remain in the 
 safe and easy path of Union; to continue to move and act as 
 they hitherto have done, as a band of brothers; to have confi- 
 dence in themselves and in one another ; and since all cannot 
 see with the same eyes, at least to give the proposed Consti- 
 tution a fair trial, and to mend it as time, occasion and 
 experience may dictate. It would little become us to verify 
 the predictions of those who ventured to prophecy, that /^ac^.- 
 instead of blessing us with happiness and tranquility, would 
 serve only as the signal for factions, discords and civil con- 
 tentions to rage in our land, and overwhelm it with misery and 
 distress. 
 
 Let us also be mindful that the cause of freedom greatly 
 depends on the use we make of the singular opportunities we 
 enjoy of governing ourselves wisely ; for if the event should 
 prove, that the people of this [19] country either cannot or 
 will not govern themselves, who will hereafter be advocates 
 for systems, which however charming in theory and prospect, 
 are not reducible to practice. If the people of our nation, 
 instead of consenting to be governed by laws of their own 
 making, and rulers of their own choosing, should let licentious- 
 ness, disorder, and confusion reign over them, the minds of 
 men every where, will insensibly become alienated from 
 republican forms, and prepared to prefer and acquiesce in 
 Governments, which, though less friendly to liberty, afford 
 more peace and security. 
 
 Receive this Address with the same candor with which it is 
 written; and may the spirit of wisdom and patriotism direct and 
 distinguish your councils and your conduct. 
 
 A citizen of New York. 
 
Missing Page 
 
Missing Page 
 
An / Address / to the / People / of the / State of 
 New- York: / Showing the necessity of making / Amend- 
 ments / to the / Constitution, proposed for the United 
 Stages, / previous to its Adoption. / By a Plebeian. / 
 Printed in the State of New York ; / m.dcc.lxxx.viii. 
 
 8vo., pp. 26. 
 
 Written by Melancthon Smith of New York, a member 
 of the Continental Congress, (1785-88), and of the New York 
 State Convention, in which he opposed, but ultimately voted 
 for the ratification of the new Constitution. 
 
 "This address begins with several assertions that are 
 not fully proved. It declares that ' the advocates for the pro- 
 posed constitution, having been beaten off the field of argu- 
 ment, on its merits, have taken new ground — admit that it is 
 liable to well founded objections — that a number of its articles 
 ought to be amended — that if alterations do not take place a 
 door will be left open for an undue administration, and 
 encroachments on the liberties of the people — and many of 
 them go so far as to say, if it should continue for any 
 considersble period, in its present form, it will lead to a sub- 
 version of our equal republican forms of government.' 
 
 " These assertions, it is presumed are too general to be 
 true. Some friends (upon the whole) to the proposed govern- 
 ment, may have acknowledged all this ; but the -most enlight- 
 ened ones declare that, in their opinion, the constitution is as 
 little defective as can ever be obtained — that it is not liable to 
 well founded objections — that it will preserve our equal repub- 
 lican forms of government ; nay, that it is their only firm sup- 
 port, and the guarantee of .their existence — and if they con- 
 sent to the additions and alterations proposed by the Massa- 
 chusetts Convention, it is not so much because they think the 
 constitution will be better for them ; but because they think 
 these additions will reconcile the opposition and unite all par- 
 ties in a desirable harmony, without making the constitution 
 worse. 
 
 " The writer, to show the happy situation of the citizens of 
 
this State, enquires, ' Does not every man sit under his own vine 
 and his own fig tree ? ' Yes, it may be answered, and under 
 the rich vines and fig trees of his neighbors too, ' having none 
 to make him afraid ? ' This was probably written before the 
 late riot : And if the inhabitants of this State are not afraid 
 of their neighbors, whose vines and fig trees they are enjoying, 
 they must be very ignorant or very insensible. 
 
 " ' Does not every one follow his own calling without impedi- 
 ment and receive the reward of his well earned industry f 
 The farmer and mechanic reap the fruits of their labor. The 
 merchant drives his commerce and none can deprive him of 
 the gain he honestly acquires.' Had the last assertion been 
 mere queries, the writer might have saved his reputation. 
 While the war-worn veteran is paid for his services, at a 
 fourth or fifth of their value ; while numbers of mechanics 
 have no employment ; whi^e commerce is restricted abroad, 
 and tender laws and depreciated paper money exist at home, 
 the public will not be disposed to believe themselves very 
 happy — no, not even in this State. In other States, where 
 riots and rebellion have violated private property, disturbed 
 government and end in bloodshed, the inhabitants will be 
 more incredulous, and wish for the adoption of the proposed 
 constitution." — [Noah Webster] in American Magazine for 
 April, 1788. 
 
 P. L. F. 
 
Friends and Fellow Citizens, 
 
 nPHE advocates for the proposed new constitution, having 
 been beaten off the field of argument, on its merits, 
 have now taken new ground. They admit it is liable to well- 
 founded objections — that a number of its articles ought to be 
 amended ; that if alterations do not take place, a door will be 
 left open for an undue administration, and encroachments on 
 the liberties of the people ; and many of them go so far as to 
 say, if it should continue for any considerable period, in its 
 present form, it will lead to a subversion of our equal republican 
 
 forms of government. But still, although they admit this, 
 
 they urge that it ought to be adopted, and that we should 
 confide in procuring the necessary alterations after we have 
 received it. Most of the leading characters, who advocate its 
 reception, now profess their readiness to concur with those 
 who oppose, in bringing about the most material amendments 
 contended for, provided they will first agree to accept the 
 proffered system as it is. These concessions afford strong 
 evidence, that the opposers of the constitution have reason 
 on their side, and that they have not been influenced, in the 
 part they have taken, by the mean and unworthy motives of 
 selfish and private interests with which they have been illiberal- 
 ly charged. — As the favourers of the constitution seem, if their 
 professions are sincere, to be in a situation similiar to that of 
 Agrippa, when he cried out upon Paul's preaching — " almost 
 thou persuadest me to be a christian," I cannot help indulging 
 myself in expressing the same wish which St. Paul uttered on 
 that occasion, " Would to God you were not only almost, but 
 altogether such an one as I am." But alas, as we hear no 
 more of Agrippa's Christianity after this interview with Paul, 
 so it is much to [4] be feared, that we shall hear nothing of 
 amendments from most of the warm advocates for adopting 
 the new government, after it gets into operation. When the 
 government is once organized, and all the ofifices under it 
 
92 ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. 
 
 filled, the inducements which our great men will have to 
 support it, will be much stronger than they are now to urge 
 its reception. Many of them will then hold places of great 
 honour and emolument, and others will then be candidates for 
 such places. It is much harder to relinquish honours or 
 emoluments, which we have in possession, than to abandon 
 the pursuit of them, while the attainment is held in a state of 
 uncertainty. — The amendments contended for as necessary to 
 be made, are of such a nature, as will tend to limit and abridge 
 a number of the powers of the government. And is it prob- 
 able, that those who enjoy these powers will be so likely to 
 surrender them after they have them in possession, as to 
 consent to have them restricted in the act of granting them ? 
 Common sense says — they will not. 
 
 When we consider the nature and operation of government, 
 the idea of receiving a form radically defective, under the 
 notion of making the necessary amendments, is evidently 
 absurd. ' 
 
 Government is a compact entered into by mankind, in a 
 state of society, for the promotion of their happiness. In 
 forming this compact, common sense dictates, that no articles 
 should be admitted that tend to defeat the end of its institu- 
 tion. If any such are proposed, they should be rejected. 
 When the compact is once formed and put into operation, it 
 is too late for individuals to object. The deed is executed — 
 the conveyance is made — and the power of reassuming the 
 
 right is gone, without the consent of the parties. Besides, 
 
 when a government is once in operation, it acquires strength 
 by habit, and stability by exercise. If it is tolerably mild in 
 its administration, the people sit down easy under it, be its 
 principles and forms ever so repugnant to the maxims of 
 
 liberty. It steals, by insensible degrees, one right from the 
 
 people after another, until it rivets its powers so as to put it 
 beyond the ability of the community to restrict or limit it. 
 The history of the world furnishes many instances of a people's 
 increasing the powers of their rulers by persuasion, but I 
 believe it would be difficult to produce one in which the rulers 
 have been persuaded to relinquish their powers to [5] the 
 
ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. 93 
 
 people. Wherever this has taken place, it has always been 
 the effect of compulsion. These observations are so well- 
 founded, that they are become a kind of axioms in politics ; 
 and the inference to be drawn from them is equally evident, 
 which is this, — that, in forming a government, care should be 
 taken not to confer powers whfch it will be necessary to take 
 back ; but if you err at all, let it be on the contrary side, 
 because it is much easier, as well as safer, to enlarge the 
 powers of your rulers, if they should prove not sufficiently 
 extensive, than it is too abridge them if they should be too 
 great. 
 
 It is agreed, the plan is defective — that some of the powers 
 granted, are dangerous — others not well defined — and amend- 
 ments are necessary. Why then not amend it ? why not 
 remove the cause of danger, and, if possible, even the appre- 
 hension of it? The instrument is yet in the hands of the 
 people ; it is not signed, sealed, and dehvered, and they have 
 power to give it any form they please. 
 
 But it is contended, adopt it first, and then amend it. I 
 ask, why not amend, and then adopt it ? Most certainly the 
 latter mode of proceeding is more consistent with our ideas 
 of prudence in the ordinary concerns of life. If men were 
 about entering into a contract respecting their private concerns, 
 it would be highly absurd in them to sign and seal an instru- 
 ment containing stipulations which are contrary to their 
 interests and wishes, under the expectation, that the parties, 
 after its execution, would agree to make alterations agreeable 
 
 to their desire. They would insist upon the exceptionable 
 
 clauses being altered before they would ratify the contract. 
 And is a compact for the government of ourselves and our 
 posterity of less moment than contracts between individuals ? 
 certainly not. But to this reasoning, which at first view 
 would appear to admit of no reply, a variety of objections are 
 made, and a number of reasons urged for adopting the system, 
 and afterwards proposing amendments. — Such as have come 
 •under my observation, I shall state, and remark upon. 
 
 I. It is insisted, that the present situation of our country 
 is such, as not to admit of a delay in forming a new govern- 
 
94 ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. 
 
 ment, or of time sufficient to deliberate and agree upon the 
 amendments which are proper, without involving ourselves in 
 a state of anarchy and confusion. 
 
 [6] On this head, all the powers of rhetoric, and arts of de- 
 scription, are employed to paint the condition of this country, 
 in the most hideous and frightful colors. We are told, that 
 agriculture is without encouragement ; trade is languishing ; 
 private faith and credit are disregarded, and public credit is 
 prostrate ; that the laws and magistrates are contemned and 
 set at naught ; that a spirit of licentiousness is rampant, and 
 ready to break over every bound set to it by the governpient ; 
 that private embarrassments and distresses invade the house 
 of every man of middling property, and insecurity threatens 
 every man in affluent circumstances : in short, that we are in 
 a state of the most grievous calamity at home, and that we 
 are contemptible abroad, the scorn of foreign nations, and the 
 ridicule of the world. From this high-wrought picture, one 
 would suppose that we were in a condition the most deplorable 
 of any people upon earth. But suffer me, my countrymen, 
 to call your attention to a serious and sober estimate of the 
 situation in which you are placed, while I trace the embarrass- 
 ments under which you labor, to their true sources. What is 
 your condition ? Does not every man sit under his own vine 
 and under his own fig-tree, having none to make him afraid ? 
 Does not every one follow his calling without impediments 
 and receive the reward of his well-earned industry? The 
 farmer cultivates his land, and reaps the fruit which the 
 bounty of heaven bestows on his honest toil. The mechanic 
 is exercised in his art, and receives the reward of his labour. 
 The merchant drives his commerce, and none can deprive him 
 of the gain he honestly acquires ; all classes and callings of 
 men amongst us are protected in their various pursuits, and 
 secured by the laws in the possession and enjoyment of the 
 property obtained in those pursuits. The laws are as well 
 executed as they ever were, in this or any other country. 
 Neither the hand of private violence, nor the more to be 
 dreaded hand of legal oppression, are reached out to distress 
 us. 
 
ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. 95 
 
 It is true, many individuals labour under embarrassments, 
 but these are to be imputed to the unavoidable circumstances 
 of things, rather than to any defect in our governments. We 
 have just emerged from a long and expensive war. During 
 its existence few people were in a situation to increase their 
 fortunes, but many to diminish them. Debts contracted 
 before the war were left unpaid [7] while it existed, and these 
 were left a burden too heavy to be borne at the commence- 
 ment of peace. Add to these, that when the war was over, 
 too many of us, instead of reassuming our old habits of frugal- 
 ity, and industry, by which alone every country must be 
 placed in a prosperous condition, took up the profuse use of 
 foreign commodities. The country was deluged with articles 
 imported from abroad, and the cash of the country has been 
 sent to pay for them, and still left us labouring under the 
 weight of a huge debt to persons abroad. These are the true 
 sources to which we are to trace all the private difficulties of 
 individuals: But will a new government relieve you from 
 these ? The advocates for it have not yet told you how it 
 will do it — And I will venture to pronounce, that there is but 
 one way in which it can be effected, and that is by industry 
 and economy ; limit your expences within your earnings ; sell 
 more than you buy, and everything will be well on this score. 
 Your present condition is such as is common to take place 
 after the conclusion of a war. Those who can remember our 
 situation after the termination of the war preceding the last, 
 will recollect that our condition was similar to the present, but 
 time and industry soon recovered us from it. Money was 
 scare, the produce of the country much lower than it has been 
 since the peace, and many individuals were extremely embar- 
 rassed with debts ; and this happened although we did not 
 experience the ravages, desolations, and loss of property, that 
 were suffered during the late war. 
 
 With regard to our public and national concerns, what is 
 there in our condition that threatens us with any immediate 
 danger ? We are at peace with all the world ; no nation men- 
 aces us with war ; nor are we called upon by any cause of suf- 
 ficient importance to attack any nation. The state govern- 
 
96 ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. 
 
 ments answer the purposes of preserving the peace, and pro- 
 viding for present exigencies. Our condition as a nation is in 
 no respect worse than it has been for several years past. Our 
 pubhc debt has been lessened in various ways, and the west- 
 ern territory, which has been relied upon as a productive fund 
 to discharge the national debt has at length been brought to 
 market, and a considerable part actually applied to its reduc- 
 tion. I mention these things to shew, that there is nothing 
 special, in our present situation, as it respects our national 
 affairs, that should induce us to accept the prof- [8] fered sys- 
 tem, without taking sufficient time to consider and amend it. 
 I do not mean by this, to insinuate, that our government does 
 not stand in need of a reform. It is admitted by all parties, 
 that alterations are necessary in our federal constitution, but 
 the circumstances of our case do by no means oblige us to pre- 
 cipitate this business, or require that we should adopt a system 
 materially defective. We may safely take time to deliberate 
 and amend, without in the meantime hazarding a condition, in 
 any considerable degree, worse than the present. 
 
 But it is said that if we postpone the ratification of this 
 system until the necessary amendments are first incorporated, 
 the consequence will be a civil war among the states. On 
 this head weak minds are alarmed with being told, that the 
 militia of Connecticut and Massachusetts, on the one side, 
 and of New Jersey and Pennsylvania on the other, will attack 
 us with hostile fury ; and either destroy us from the face of 
 the earth, or at best divide us between the two states adjoin- 
 ing on either side. The apprehension of danger is one of 
 the most powerful incentives to human action, and is therefore 
 generally excited on political questions : But still, a prudent 
 man, though he foreseeth the evil and avoideth it, yet he 
 will not be terrified by imaginary dangers. We ought there- 
 fore to enquire what ground there is to fear such an event ? — 
 There can be no reason to apprehend, that the other states 
 will make war with us for not receiving the constitution pro- 
 posed, until it is amended, but from one of the following 
 causes : either that they will have just cause to do it, or that 
 they have a disposition to do it. We will examine each of 
 
ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. 97 
 
 these : — That they will have no just cause to quarrel with us 
 for not acceding, is evident, because we are under no obliga- 
 tion to do it, arising from any existing compact or previous 
 stipulation. The confederation is the only compact now 
 existing between the states : By the terms of it, it cannot be 
 changed without the consent of every one of the parties to it. 
 Nothing therefore can be more unreasonable than for part of 
 the states to claim of the others, as matter of right, an acces- 
 sion to a system to which they have material objections. 
 No war can therefore arise from this principle, but on the 
 contrary, it is to be presumed, it will operate strongly the 
 opposite way. — The states will reason on the subject in the 
 following manner : On this momentuous question, every state 
 has an in- [9] dubitable right to judge for itself : This is 
 secured to it by solemn compact, and if any of our sister states 
 disagree with us upon the question, we ought to attend to 
 their objections, and accommodate ourselves as far as possible 
 to the amendments they propose. 
 
 As to the inclination of the states to make war with us, 
 for declining to accede, until it is amended, this is highly 
 improbable, not only because such a procedure would be most 
 unjust and unreasonable in itself, but for various other reasons. 
 
 The idea of a civil war among the states is abhorrent to the 
 principles and feelings of almost every man of every rank in the 
 union. It is so obvious to every one of the least reflection, that 
 in such an event we should hazard the loss of all things, without 
 the hope of gaining anything, that the man who should entertain 
 a thought of this kind, would be justly deemed more fit to be 
 shut up in Bedlam, than to be reasoned with. But the idea of 
 one or more states attacking another, for insisting upon alter- 
 ations upon the system, before it is adopted, is more extrava- 
 gent still ; it is contradicting every principle of liberty which 
 has been entertained by the states, violating the most solemn 
 compact, and taking from the state the right of deliberation. 
 Indeed to suppose, that a people, entertaining such refined 
 ideas of the rights of human nature as to be induced to wage 
 war with the most powerful nation on earth, upon a specula- 
 tive point, and from the mere apprehension of danger only, 
 
98 ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. 
 
 should be so far lost to their own feelings and principles as to 
 deny to their brethren, who were associated with them in the 
 arduous conflict, the right of deliberation on a question of the 
 first importance to their political happiness and safety, is 
 equally an insult to the character of the people of America, 
 and to common sense, and could only be suggested by a vic- 
 ious heart and a corrupt mind. 
 
 The idea of being attacked by the other states, Vill appear 
 visionary and chimerical, if we consider that tho' several of 
 them have adopted the new constitution, yet the opposition 
 to it has been numerous and formidable. The eastern states 
 from whom we are told we have most to fear, should a civil 
 war be blown up, would have full employ to keep in awe those 
 who are opposed to it in their own governments. Massachu- 
 setts, after a long and dubious contest [lo] in their conven- 
 tion, has adopted it by an inconsiderable majority, and in the 
 very act has marked it with a stigma in its present form. No 
 man of candour, judging from their public proceedings, will 
 undertake to say on which side the majority of the people are. 
 Connecticut, it is true, have acceded to it, by a large majority 
 of their convention ; but it is a fact well known, that a large 
 proportion of the yeomanry of the country are against it : — 
 And it is equally true, that a considerable part of those 
 who voted for it in the convention, wish to see it altered. In 
 both these states the body of the common people, who always 
 do the fighting of a country, would be more likely to fight 
 against than for it : Can it then be presumed, that a country 
 divided among themselves, upon a question where even the 
 advocates for it, admit the system they contend for needs 
 amendments, would make war upon a sister state, who only 
 insist that that should be done before they receive it, which it 
 is granted ought to be done after, and where it is confessed 
 no obligation lies upon them by compact to do it. Can it, I 
 say, be imagined, that in such a case, they would make war on 
 a sister state ? The idea is preposterous and chimerical. 
 
 It is further urged we must adopt this plan because we 
 have no chance of getting a better. This idea is inconsistent 
 with the principles of those who advance it. They say, it 
 
ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. 99 
 
 must be altered, but it should be left until after it is put in 
 operation. But if this objection is valid, the proposal of alter- 
 ing, after it is received, is mere delusion. 
 
 It is granted, that amendments ought to be made ; that the 
 exceptions taken to the constitution, are grounded on just 
 principles, but it is still insisted, that alterations are not to be 
 attempted until after it is received: But why not? Because 
 it is said, there is no probability of agreeing in amendments 
 previous to the adoption, but they may be easily made after it. 
 I wish to be informed what there is in our situation or circum- 
 stances that renders it more probable that we shall agree in 
 amendments better after, than before submitting to it ? No 
 good reason has as yet been given ; it is evident none can be 
 given : On the contrary, there are several considerations which 
 induce a belief, that alterations may be obtained with more ease 
 before than after its reception, and if so, every one must agree 
 [11] it is much the safest. The importance of preserving an 
 union, and of establishing a government equal to the purpose 
 of maintaining that union, is a sentiment deeply impressed on 
 the mind of every citizen of America. Vlt is now no longer 
 doubted, that the confederation, in its present form, is inade- 
 quate to that end : Some reform in our government must take 
 place : In this, all parties agree : It is therefore to be pre- 
 sumed, that this object will be pursued with ardour and perse- 
 verance, until it is attained by all parties. But when a govern- 
 ment is adopted that promises to effect this, we are to expect 
 the ardour of many, yea, of most people, will be abated ; — 
 their exertions will cease or be languid, and they will sit down 
 easy, although they may see that the constitution which pro. 
 vides for this, does not sufificiently guard the rights of the 
 people, or secure them against the encroachments of their 
 rulers. The great end they had in view, the security of the 
 union, they will consider effected, and this will divert their 
 attention from that which is equally interesting, safety to their 
 liberties. Besides, the human mind cannot continue intensely 
 engaged for any great length of time upon one object. As 
 after a storm, a calm generally succeeds, so after the minds of 
 a people have been ardently employed upon a subject, espec- 
 
lOO ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. 
 
 ially upon that of government, we commonly find that they 
 become cool and inattentive : Add to this that those in the 
 community who urge the adoption of this system, because 
 they hope to be raised above the common level of their fellow 
 citizens ; because they expect to be among the number of the 
 few who will be benefitted by it, will more easily be induced 
 to consent to the amendments before it is received than after- 
 wards. Before its reception they will be inclined to be pliant 
 and condescending ; if they cannot obtain all they wish, they 
 will consent to take less. They will yield part to obtain the 
 rest. But when the plan is once agreed to, they will be tena- 
 cious of every power, they will strenuously contend to retain 
 all they have got ; this is natural to human nature, and it is 
 consonant to the experience of mankind. For history affords 
 us no examples of persons once possessed of power resigning 
 4 it willingly. 
 
 The reasonings made use of to persuade us, that no altera- 
 tions can be agreed upon previous to the adoption of the sys- 
 tem, are as curious as they are futile. It is alledg- [12] ed, 
 that there was great diversity of sentiments in forming the 
 proposed constitution ; that it was the effect of mutual con- 
 cessions and a spirit of accommodation, and from hence it is 
 inferred, that farther changes cannot be hoped for. I should 
 suppose that the contrary inference was the fair one. If the 
 convention, who framed this plan, were possessed of such a 
 spirit of moderation and condescension, as to be induced to 
 yield to each other certain points, and to accommodate them- 
 selves to each other's opinions, and even prejudices, there is 
 reason to expect, that this same spirit will continue and prevail 
 in a future convention, and produce an union of sentiments on 
 the points objected to. There is more reason to hope for this, 
 because the subject has received a full discussion, and the 
 minds of the people much better known than they were when 
 the convention sat. Previous to the meeting of the conven- 
 tion, the subject of a new form of government had been little 
 thought of, and scarcely written upon at all. It is true, it was 
 the general opinion, that some alterations were requisite in 
 the federal system. This subject had been contemplated by 
 
ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. lOI 
 
 almost every thinking man in the union. It had been the sub- 
 ject of many well-written essays, and it was the anxious wish 
 of every true friend to America. But it was never in the con- 
 templation of one in a thousand of those who had reflected 
 on the matter, to have an entire change in the nature of our 
 federal government — to alter it from a confederation of states, 
 to that of one entire government, which will swallow up that 
 of the individual states. I will venture to say, that the idea 
 of a government similar to the one proposed, never efttered 
 the minds of the legislatures who appointed the convention, 
 and of but very few of the members who composed it, until 
 they had assembled and heard it proposed in that body : much 
 less had the people any conception of such a plan until after 
 it was promulgated. While it was agitated, the debates of the 
 convention were kept an impenetrable secret, and no Opportu- 
 nity was given for well informed men to offer their sentiments 
 upon the subject. The system was therefore never publicly 
 discussed, nor indeed could be, because it was not known to 
 the people until after it was proposed. Since that, it has been 
 the object of universal attention — it has been thought of by 
 every reflecting man — been discussed in a public and private 
 manner, in conversation and in print; [13] its defects have 
 been pointed out, and every objection to it stated ; able advo- 
 cates have written in its favour, and able opponents have writ- 
 ten against it. And what is the result ? It cannot be denied but 
 that the general opinion is, that it contains material errors, 
 and requires important amendments. This then being the 
 general sentiment, both of the friends and foes of the system, 
 can it be doubted, that another convention would concur in 
 such amendments as would quiet the fears of the opposers, 
 and effect a great degree of union on the subject ? — An event 
 most devoutly to be wished. But it is farther said, that there 
 can be no prospect of procuring alterations before it is acceded 
 to, because those who oppose it do not agree among them- 
 selves with respect to the amendments that are necessary. To 
 this I reply, that this may be urged against attempting alter- 
 ations after it is received, with as much force as before ; and 
 therefore, if it concludes anything, it is that we must receive 
 
I02 ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. 
 
 any system of government proposed to us, because those who 
 object to it do not entirely concur in their objections. But the 
 assertion is not true to any considerable extent. There is a 
 remarkable uniformity in the objections made to the constitu- 
 tion, on the most important points. It is also worthy of 
 notice, that very few of the matters found fault with in it, are 
 of a local nature, or such as affect any particular state ; on the 
 contrary, they are such as concern the principles of general 
 liberty, in which the people of New Hampshire, New York 
 and Georgia are equally interested. 
 
 It would be easy to shew, that in the leading and most 
 important objections that have been made to the plan, there 
 has been and is an entire concurrence of opinion among writ- 
 ers, and in public bodies throughout the United States. 
 
 I have not time to fully illustrate this by a minute narra- 
 tion of particulars ; but to prove that this is the case, I shall 
 \ adduce a number of important instances. 
 \ It has been objected to that the new system, that it is cal- 
 
 culated to, and will effect such a consolidation of the States, 
 as to supplant and overturn the state governments. In this 
 the minority of Pennsylvania, the opposition in Massachusetts, 
 and all the writers of any ability or note in Philadelphia, New 
 York, and Boston concur. It may be added, that this appears 
 to have been the opinion of the Massachusetts convention, 
 and gave rise to that article in [14] the amendments proposed, 
 which confines the general government to the exercise only 
 of powers expressly given. 
 
 It has been said that the representation in the general leg- 
 islature is too small to secure liberty, or to answer the inten- 
 tion of representation. In this there is an union of sentiments 
 in the opposers. 
 
 The constitution has been opposed, because it gives to 
 the legislature an unlimited power of taxation both with 
 respect to direct and indirect taxes, a right to lay and collect 
 taxes, duties, imposts and excises of every kind and descrip. 
 tion, and to any amount. In this there has been as general a 
 concurrence of opinion as in the former. 
 
 The opposers to the constitution have said that it is dan- 
 
ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. IO3 
 
 gerous, because the judicial power may extend to many cases -^ 
 which ought to be reserved to the decision of the State courts, 
 and because the right of trial by jury is not secured in the 
 judicial courts of the general government, in civil cases. All 
 the opposers are agreed in this objection. 
 
 The power of the general legislature to alter and regulate 
 the time, place and manner of holding elections, has been 
 stated as an argument against the adoption of the system. It 
 has been argued that this power will place in the hands of the 
 general government, the authority, whenever they shall be 
 disposed, and a favorable opportunity offers, to deprive the 
 body of the people in effect, of all share in the government. 
 The opposers to the constitution universally agree in this' 
 objection, and of such force is it, that most of its ardent advo- 
 cates admit its validity, anci those who have made attempts 
 to vindicate it, have been reduced to the necessity of using 
 the most trifling arguipents to justify it. 
 
 The mixture of legislative, judicial, and executive powers 
 , in the senate ; the little degree of responsibility under which 
 the great ofificers of government will be held ; and the liberty 
 granted by the system to establish and maintain a standing 
 army without any limitation or restriction, are also objected 
 to the constitution ; and in these there is a great degree of 
 unanimity of sentiment in the opposers. 
 
 ''From these remarks it appears, that the opponents to the 
 system accord in the great and material points on which they 
 wish amendments. For the truth of the as- [15] sertion, I 
 appeal to the protest of the minority of the convention of 
 of Pennsylvania, to all the publications against the constitu- 
 tion, and to the debates of the convention of Massachusetts- 
 As a higher authority than these, I appeal to the amendments 
 proposed by the Massachusetts ; these are to be considered 
 as the sense of that body upon the defects of the system, 
 i^nd it is a fact, which I will venture to assert, that a large 
 majority of the convention were of opinion, that a number of 
 additional alterations ought to be made. Upon reading the 
 articles which they propose as amendments, it will appear 
 that they object to indefinite powers in the legislature — to 
 
I04 ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. 
 
 the power of laying direct taxes — to the authority of regulat- 
 ing elections — to the extent of the judicial powers, both a!s it 
 respects the inferior court and the appellate jurisdiction — to 
 the smallness of the representation, &c. — It is adn:iitted that 
 some writers have advanced objections that others have not 
 noticed — that exceptions have been taken by some, that have 
 not been insisted upon by others, and it is probable, that some 
 of the opponents may approve what others will reject. But 
 still these difference are on matters of small importance, and of 
 such a nature as the persons who hold different opinions will 
 not be tenacious of. Perfect uniformity of sentiment on so 
 great a political subject is not to be expected. Every sensible 
 man is impressed with this idea, and is therefore prepared to 
 make concessions and accommodate on matters of small im- 
 portance. It is sufiScient that we agree in the great leading 
 principles, which relate to the preservation of public liberty 
 and private security. And on^ these I will venture to afifirm 
 we are as well agreed, as any people ever were on a question 
 of this nature. I dare pronounce that were the principal 
 advocates for the proposed plan to write comments upon it, 
 they would differ more in the sense they would give the consti- 
 tution, than those who oppose it do, in the amendments they 
 would wish. I am justified in this opinion, by the sentiments 
 advanced by the different writers in favour of the constitution. 
 
 It is farther insisted, that six states have already adopted 
 the constitution ; that probably nine will agree to it ; in which 
 case it will be put in operation. That it is unreasonable to 
 expect that those states which have acceded [i6] to it will 
 reconsider the subject in compliance with the wishes of a 
 minority. 
 
 To perceive the force of this objection it is proper to 
 review the conduct and circumstances of the states which have 
 acceded it. It cannot be controverted, that Connecticut and 
 New Jersey were very much influenced in their determinations 
 on the questions, by local considerations. The duty of impost 
 laid by this state, has been a subject of complaint by those 
 states. The new constitution transfers the power of imposing 
 these duties from the state to the general government, and car- 
 
ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. 105 
 
 ries the proceeds to the use of the union, instead of that of 
 those state. This is a popular matter with the people of those 
 states, and at the same time, is not advanced by the sensible 
 opposers to the system in this state as an objection to it.— To 
 excite in the minds of the people of these states an attachment 
 to the new system, the amount of the revenue arising from 
 our impost has been magnified to a much larger sum than it 
 produces; it has been stated to amount to from sixty to eighty 
 thousand pounds lawful money ; and a gentleman of high emi- 
 nence in Connecticut has lent the authority of his name to 
 support it. It has been said, that Connecticut pays a third of 
 this sum annually for impost, and Jersey nearly as much. It 
 has farther been asserted, that the avails of the impost were 
 applied to the separate use of the state of New York. By 
 these assertions the people have been grossly imposed upon, 
 for neither of them are true. 
 
 The amount of the revenue from impost for two years past, 
 has not exceeded fifty thousands pounds currency, per annum, 
 and a drawback of duties is allowed by law, upon all goods 
 exported to the beforementioned states, in casks or packages 
 unbroken. 
 
 The whole of this sum, and more, has been paid into the 
 federal treasury for the support of the government of the 
 union. All the states therefore have actually derived equal 
 benefit with the state of New York, from the impost. It may 
 be said, I know, that this state has obtained credit for the 
 amount, upon the requisitions of Congress : It is admitted, 
 but still it is a fact, that other states, and especially those who 
 complain, have paid no part of the monies required of them, 
 and have scarcely made an effort to do it. The fact therefore 
 is, that they have re- [17] ceived as much advantage from the 
 impost of this state as we ourselves have. The proposed consti- 
 tution directs to no mode, in which the deficiencies of states on 
 former requisitions, are to be collected, but seems to hold out 
 the idea, that we are to start out anew, and all past payments 
 be forgotten. It' is natural to expect, that selfish motives will 
 have too powerful an influence on men's minds, and that too 
 often, they will shut the eyes of a people to their best and 
 
Io6 ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. 
 
 true interest. The people of those states have been persuaded 
 to believe, that this new constitution will relieve them from 
 the burden of taxes, by providing for all the exigencies of the 
 union, by duties which can be raised only in the neighbouring 
 states. When they come to be convinced, that this promise 
 is a mere delusion, as they assuredly will, by finding the con- 
 tinental tax-gatherer knocking at their doors, if not before, 
 they will be among the first to urge amendments, and perhaps 
 the most violent to obtain them. But notwithstanding the 
 local prejudices which operate upon the people of these states, 
 a considerable part of them wish for amendments. It is not 
 to be doubted that a considerable majority of the people of 
 Connecticut wish for them, and many in Jersey have the same 
 desires, and their numbers are increasing. It cannot be dis- 
 puted, that amendments would accord with the sentiments 
 of a great majority in Massachusetts, or that they would be 
 agreeable to the greater part of the people of Pennsylvania : 
 There is no reason to doubt but that they would be agreeable 
 to Delaware and Georgia — If then, the states who have already 
 ratified the constitution, are desirous to have alterations made 
 in it, what reason can be assigned why they should not cor- 
 dially meet with overtures for that purpose from any state, 
 and concur in appointing a convention to effect it ? Mankind 
 are easily induced to fall into measures to obtain an object 
 agreeable to them. In this case, the states would not only be 
 moved by this universal principle of human nature, but by the 
 strong and powerful motive of uniting all the states under a 
 form of government agreeable to them. 
 
 I shall now dismiss the consideration of objections made to 
 attempting alterations previous to the adoption of the plan, 
 but before I close, I beg your indulgence, while I make some 
 remarks on the splendid advantages which the advocates of 
 this system say are to be derived from it. — Hope and fear are 
 two of the most active principles of [i8] our nature : We have 
 considered how the latter is addressed on this occasion, and 
 with how little reason : It will appear that the promises it 
 makes, are as little to be relied upon as its threatenings. We 
 are amused with the fair prospects that are to open, when this 
 
ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. 107 
 
 government is put into operation — Agriculture is to flourish, 
 and our fields to yield an hundred fold — Commerce is to 
 expand her wings, and bear our productions to all the ports in 
 the world — Money is to pour into our country through every 
 channel — Arts and manufactures are to rear their heads, and 
 every mecanic find full employ— Those who are in debt, are 
 to find easy means to procure money to pay them — Public 
 burdens and taxes are to be lightened, and yet all our public 
 debts are soon to be discharged. — With such vain and delusive 
 hopes are the minds of many honest and well meaning people 
 fed, and by th,ese means are they led inconsiderately to con- 
 tend for a government, which is made to promise what it can- 
 not perform ; while their minds are diverted from contemplat- 
 ing its true nature, or considering whether it" will not endanger 
 their liberties, and work oppression. 
 
 Far be it from me to object to granting the general govern- 
 ment the power of regulating trade, and of laying imposts and 
 duties for that purpose, as well as for raising a revenue : 'But 
 it is as far from me to flatter people with hopes of benefits to 
 be derived from such a change in our government which can 
 never be realized. Some advantages may accrue from vest- 
 ing in one general government, the right to regulate commerce, 
 but it is a vain delusion to expect anything like what is prom- 
 ised. The truth is, this country buys more than it sells : It 
 imports more than it exports. There are too many merchants 
 in proportion to the farmers and manufacturers. Until these 
 defects are remedied, no government can relieve us. Common 
 sense dictates, that if a man buys more than he sells, he will 
 remain in debt ; the same is true of a country. — And as long 
 
 as this country imports more goods than the exports 
 
 the overplus must be paid for in money or not paid at all. 
 These few remarks may convince us, that the radical remedy 
 for the scarcity of cash is frugality and industry. Earn much 
 and spend little, and you will be enabled to pay your debts, 
 and have money in your pockets ; and if you do not follow 
 [19] this advice, no government that can be framed, will relieve 
 you. 
 
 As to the idea of being relieved from taxes by this govern- 
 
I08 ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. 
 
 ment, it is an affront to common sense, to advance it. There 
 is no complaint made against the present confederation more 
 justly founded than this, that it is incompetent to provide the 
 means to discharge our national debt, and to support the 
 national government. Its inefficacy to these purposes, which 
 was early seen and felt, was the first thing that suggested the 
 necessity of changing the government ; other things, it is truci 
 were afterwards found to require alterations ; but this was the 
 most important, and accordingly we find, that while in some 
 other things the powers of this government seem to be in some 
 measure limited, on the subject of raising money, no bounds 
 are set to it. It is authorised to raise money to any amount, 
 and in any way it pleases. If then, the capital embarrassment 
 in our present government arises from the want of money, and 
 this constitution effectually authorises the raising of it, how 
 are the taxes to be lessened by it ? Certainly money can only 
 be raised by taxes of some kind or other; it must be got either 
 by additional impositions on trade, by excise, or by direct 
 taxes, or what is more probable, by all together. In either 
 way, it amounts to the same thing, and the position is clear, 
 that as the necessities of the nation require more money than 
 is now raised, the taxes must be enhanced. This you ought 
 to know, and prepare yourselves to submit to. — Besides, how 
 is it possible that the taxes can be decreased when the 
 expences of your government will be greatly advanced ? It 
 does not require any great skill in politics, or ability at calcu- 
 lation to shew, that the new government will cost more 
 money to administer it, than the present. I shall not descend 
 to an estimate of the cost of a federal town, the salaries of 
 the president, vice-president, judges, and other great officers 
 of state, nor calculate the amount of the pay the legislature 
 will vote themselves, or the salaries that will be paid the innum- 
 erable and subordinate officers. The bare mention of these 
 things is sufficient to convince you, that the new government 
 will be vastly more expensive than the old : And how is the 
 money to answer these purposes to be obtained ? It is obvious, 
 it must be taken out of the pockets of the people, by taxes, 
 in some mode or other, 
 
ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. IO9 
 
 [20] Having remarked upon the arguments which have been 
 advanced, to induce you to accede to this government, with- 
 out amendments, and I trust refuted them, suffer me to close 
 with an address dedicated by the affection of a brother, and 
 the honest zeal of a lover of his country. 
 
 Friends, countrymen, and fellow-citizens. 
 
 The present is the most important crisis at which you 
 ever have arrived. You have before you a question big with 
 consequences, unutterably important to yourselves, to your 
 children, to generations yet unborn, to the cause of liberty 
 and of mankind ; every motive of religion and virtue, of private 
 happiness and public good, of honour and dignity, should urge 
 you to consider cooly and determine wisely. 
 
 Almost all the governments that have arisen among man- 
 kind, have sprung from force and violence. The records of \c 
 history inform us of none that have been the result of cool 
 and dispassionate reason and reflection : It is reserved for this 
 favoured country to exhibit to mankind the first example. 
 
 This opportunity is now given us, and we are to 
 
 exercise our rights in the choice of persons to represent us in 
 convention, to deliberate and determine upon the constitution 
 proposed : It will be to our everlasting disgrace to be indiffer- 
 ent on such a subject; for it is impossible, we can contemplate 
 anything that relates to the affairs of this life of half the 
 importance. 
 
 You have heard that both sides on this great question, 
 agree, that there are in it great defects ; yet the one side tell 
 
 you, choose such men .as will adopt it, and then amend it 
 
 while the other say, amend previous to its adoption. 
 
 I have stated to you my reasons for the latter, and I think 
 they are unanswerable. — Consider you the common people 
 the yeomanry of the country, for to such I principally address 
 myself, you are to be the principal losers, if the constitution 
 should prove oppressive ; When a tyranny is established, 
 there are always masters as well as slaves ; the great and 
 well-born are generally the former, and the middhng class the 
 latter — Attempts have been made, and will be repeated, to 
 
no ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. 
 
 alarm you with the fear of consequences; but reflect there are 
 consequences on both sides, and none can be apprehended 
 more dreadful, than entailing on ourselves and poste-[2i] rity 
 a government which will raise a.few to the height of human 
 greatness and wealth, while it will depress the many to the 
 extreme of poverty and wretchedness. Consequences are 
 under the controul of that ^1-wise and ykll-powerful ybeing, 
 whose providence conducts the affairs of all men : Our part is 
 to act right, and we may then have confidence that the conse- 
 quences will be favourable. The path in which you should 
 walk is plain and open before you ; be united as one man, and 
 direct your choice to such men as have been uniform in theif 
 opposition to the proposed system in its present form, or 
 without proper alterations : In men of this description you 
 have reason to place confidence, while on the other hand, you 
 have just cause to distrust those who urge the adoption of a 
 bad constitution, under the delusive expectation of making 
 amendments after it is acceded to. Your jealousy of such 
 characters should be the more excited, when you consider that 
 the advocates for the constitution have shifted their ground. 
 When men are uniform in their opinions, it affords evidence 
 that they are sincere : When they are shifting, it gives reason 
 to believe, they do not change from conviction. It must be 
 recollected, that when this plan was first announced to the 
 public, its supporters cried it up as the most perfect produc- 
 tion of human wisdom ; It was represented either as having no 
 defects, or if it had, they were so trifling and inconsiderable, 
 that they served only, as the shades in a fine picture, to set 
 off the piece to the greater advantage. One gentleman in 
 Philadelphia went so far in the ardour of his enthusiasm in its 
 favour, as to pronounce, that the men who formed it were as 
 really under the guidance of Divine Revelation, as was Moses, 
 the Jewish lawgiver. Their language is now changed; the 
 question has been discussed ; the objections to the plan ably 
 stated, and they are admitted to be unanswerable. The same 
 men who held it almost perfect, now admit it is very imper- 
 fect ; that it is necessary it should be amended. The only 
 question between us, is simply this : Shall we accede to a bad 
 
ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. Ill 
 
 constitution, under the uncertain prospect of getting it 
 amended, after we have received it, or shall we amend it 
 before we adopt it ? Common sense will point out which is 
 the most rational, which is the most secure line of conduct. 
 May heaven inspire you with wisdom, union, moderation and 
 firni- [22] ness, and give you hearts to make a proper estimate 
 of your invaluable privileges, and preserve them to you, to be 
 transmitted to your posterity unimpaired, and may they be 
 maintained in this our country, while Sun and Moon endure. 
 
 A Plebeian. 
 
 POSTCRIPT. 
 
 Since the foregoing pages have been put to the press, a 
 pamphlet has appeared, entitled, " An addresss to the people 
 of the state of New York, on the subject of the new iconstitu- 
 tion, &c." Upon a cursory examination of this performance 
 (for I have not had time to give it more than a cursory exam- 
 ination) it appears to contain little more than declamation and 
 observations that have been often repeated by the advocates 
 of the new constitution. 
 
 An attentive reader will readily perceive, that almost every- 
 thing deserving the name of an argument in this publication, 
 has received consideration, and, I trust, a satisfactory answer 
 in the preceding remarks, so far as they apply to prove the 
 necessity of an immediate adoption of the plan, without 
 amendments. 
 
 I shall therefore only beg the patience of my readers, 
 while I make a few very brief remarks on this piece. 
 
 The author introduces his observations with a short history 
 of the revolution, and of the establishment of the present 
 existing federal government. He draws a frightful picture of 
 our condition under the present confederation. The whole 
 of what he says on that head, stripped of its artificial colouring, 
 amounts to this, that the existing system is rather commend- 
 atory than coercive, or that Congress have not in most cases, 
 
112 ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. 
 
 the power of enforcing their own resolves. This he calls " a 
 new and wonderful system." However " wonderful " it may 
 seem, it certainly is not " new." For most of \}ae. federal gov- 
 ernments that have been in the world, have been of the same 
 
 nature. The united Netherlands are governed on the same 
 
 plan. There are other governments also now existing, which 
 are in a similar condition with our's, with regard to several 
 particulars, on account of which this author denominates it 
 
 "new and wonderful." The king of Great Britain "may 
 
 make war, but has not power to raise money to carry it on." 
 He may borrow money, but it is without the means of repay- 
 ment, &c. For these he is dependent on his parliament. 
 But it is needless to add on [24] this head, because it is 
 admitted that the powers of the general government ought to 
 be increased in several of the particulars this author instances. 
 But these things are mentioned to shew, that the outcry 
 made against the confederation, as being a system new, 
 unheard of, and absurd, is really without foundation. 
 
 The author proceeds to depicture our present condition 
 
 in the high-wrought strains common to his party. 1 shall 
 
 add nothing to what I have said on this subject in the former 
 part of this pamphlet, but will only observe, that his imputing 
 our being kept out of the possession of the western posts, and 
 our want of peace with the Algerines, to the defects in our 
 present government, is much easier said than proved. The 
 British keep possession of these posts, because it subserves 
 their interest, and probably will do so, until they perceive 
 that we have gathered strength and resources sufficient to 
 assert our rights with the sword. Let our government be 
 what it will, this cannot be done without time and patience. 
 In the present exhausted situation of the country, it would be 
 madness in us, had we ever so perfect a government, to com- 
 mence a war for the recovery of these posts. With regard 
 
 to the Algerines, there are but two ways in which their rav- 
 ages can be prevented. The one is, by a successful war against 
 them, and the other is by treaty. The powers of Congress 
 under the confederation are completely competent either to 
 declare war against them, or to form treaties. Money, it is 
 
ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. II3 
 
 true, is necessary to do both these. This only brings us to this 
 conclusion, that the great defect in our present government, is 
 the want of powers to provide money for the public exigen- 
 cies. I am willing to grant reasonable powers, on this score, but 
 not unlimited ones ; commercial treaties may be made under 
 the present powers of Congress. I am persuaded we flatter 
 ourselves with advantages which will result from them, that 
 will never be realized. I know of no benefits that we receive 
 from any that have yet been formed. 
 
 This author tells us, " it is not his design to investigate 
 merits of the plan, nor of the objections made to it." It is 
 well he did not undertake it, for if he had, from the specimen 
 he has given, the cause he assumes would not have probably 
 gained much strength by it. 
 
 He however takes notice of two or three of the many 
 objections brought against the plan. 
 
 " We are told, (says he) among other strange things, that 
 " the liberty of the press is left insecure by the proposed con- 
 " stitution, and yet that constitution says neither more nor 
 "less [25] about it, than the constitution of the state of New 
 " York does. We are told it deprives us of trial by jury, 
 "whereas the fact is, that it expressly secures it in certain 
 " cases, and takes it away in none, &c. it is absurd to construe 
 " the silence of this, or of our own constitution relative to a 
 " great number of our rights into a total extinction of them ; 
 " silence and a blank paper neither grant nor take away any- 
 " thing." 
 
 It may be a strange thing to this author to hear the people 
 of America anxious for the preservation of their rights, but 
 those who understand the true principles of liberty, are no 
 strangers to their importance. The man who supposes the 
 constitution, in any part of it, is like a blank piece of paper, 
 has very erroneous ideas of it. He may be assured every 
 clause has a meaning, and many of them such extensive 
 meaning, as would take a volume to unfold. The suggestion, 
 that the liberty of the press is secure, because it is not in 
 express words spoken of in the constitution, and that the trial 
 by jury is not taken away, because it is not said in so many 
 
114 ADDRESS BY MTELANCTHON SMITH. 
 
 words and letters it is so, is puerile and unworthy of a mair 
 who pretends to reason. We contend, that by the indefinite 
 powers granted to the general government, the liberty of the 
 press may be restricted by duties, &c. and therefore the con- 
 stitution ought to have stipulated for its freedom. The trial 
 by jury, in all civil cases, is left at the discretion of the gen- 
 eral government, except in the supreme court on the appelate 
 Jurisdiction, and in this I affirm ft is taken away, not by express, 
 words, but by fair and legitimate construction and inference ;; 
 for the supreme court have expressly given them an appelate 
 jurisdiction, in every case to which their powers extend (with 
 two or three exceptions) both as to law and fact. The court- 
 are the judges ; every man in the country, who has served as 
 a juror, knows, that there is a difference between the court 
 and the jury, and: that the lawyers in their pleadings make the 
 distinction, 'if the court, upon appeals, are to determine both' 
 the law and the fact,, there is no room for a jury,^nd the right 
 of trial in this mode is taken away. 
 
 The author manifests levity in referring to the constitution, 
 of this state, to shew that it was useless to stipulate for the 
 liberty of the press, or to insert a bill of rights in the constitu- 
 tion. With regjard to the first, ft is perhaps an inxperfection- 
 in our constitution that the liberty of the press is not 
 expressly reserved ; but still there was not equal necessity of 
 making this reservation in our State as |in the general Consti- 
 tution, for the common and statute law of England, and the 
 laws of the '[26] colony are established, in which this privflege- 
 is fully defined and secured. It is true, a bill of rights is not 
 prefixed to our constitution, as it is in that of some of the 
 states ; but still this author knaws, that marry essential right» 
 are reserved in the body of it - and I will promise, that every 
 opposer of this system will be satisfied,,if the stipulations that 
 they contend for are agreed to, whether they are prefixed^, 
 affixed, or inserted in the body of the constitution, and that 
 they will not contend which way this is done; if it be but 
 done. I shall add but one remark, and that is upon the hack- 
 neyed argument introduced by the author, drawn from the 
 character and ability of the framers of the new constitution. 
 
5- 
 
 ADDRESS BY MELANCTHON SMITH. II^,^ 
 
 The favourers of this system are not very prudent in bringing 
 this forward. It provokes to an investigation of characters, 
 which is an inviduous task. I do not wish to detract frbm 
 their merits, but I will venture to affirm, that twenty assem- 
 blies of equal number might be collected, equally respectable 
 both in _point of ability, integrity, and patriotism. Some of 
 the characters which compose- it I revere ; others I consider as 
 of small consequence, and a number are suspected of being 
 great public defaulters, and to have been guilty of notorious 
 peculation and fraud, with regard to public property in the 
 hour of our distress. I will not descend to personalities, nor 
 would I have said so much on the subject, had it not been in 
 self defence. Let the constitution stand on its own merits^ 
 If it be, good, it stands not in need of great men's names to 
 support it. If it be bad, their names ought not to sanction it. 
 
 FINIS, 
 
The Weakness of Brutus exposed : / or, some / 
 Remarks / in / Vindication of the Constitution / proposed 
 by the late / Federal Convention, / against the / Objec- 
 tions and gloomy Fears of that Writer / Humbly offered 
 to the Public, / By / a Citizen of Philadelphia. / Phila- 
 delphia, / Printed for, and to be had of John Sparhawk, in 
 Market- Street^ / near the Court House / m.dcc.lxxxvii. 
 
 i2mo., pp. 23. 
 
 Written by Pelatiah Webster, a Philadelphia merchant, and 
 author of a number of pamphlets on the finances and govern- 
 ment of the United States, most of which he reprinted in his 
 " Political Essays " in Philadelphia in 1791. 
 
 Brutus was the signature (of Thomas Treadwell, of Suf- 
 folk County, N. Y.?) to a series of sixteen newspaper essays in 
 the New York Journal, which were extensively copied through- 
 out the country. This is an answer to the first essay only, 
 and was published November 4th, 1787. 
 
 p. L. F. 
 
nnHE long piece signed Brutus, (which was first published 
 in a New-York paper, and was afterwards copied into the 
 Pennsylvania Packet of the 26th instant) is wrote in a very 
 good stile ; the language is easy, and. the address is polite and 
 insinuating : but the sentiments, I conceive, are not only 
 unsound, but wild and chimerical ; the dreary fears and 
 apprehensions, altogether groundless ; and the whole tendency 
 of the piece, in this important crisis of our politics, very 
 hurtful. I have therefore thought it my duty to make some 
 animadversions on it ; which I here offer, with all due deference, 
 to the Author and to the Public. 
 
 His first question is. Whether a confederated government is 
 best for the United States f 
 
 I answer. If Brutus, or any body else, cannot find any 
 benefit resulting from the union of the Thirteen States ; if 
 they can do without as well as with the respectability, the 
 protection, and the security, which the States might derive 
 from that union, I have nothing further to say : but if that 
 union is to be supported in any such manner as to afford 
 [4] respectability, protection, or security to the States, I say it 
 must be done by an adequate government, and cannot be 
 otherwise done. 
 
 This government must have a supreme power, superior to 
 and able to controul each and all of its parts. 'Tis essential to 
 all governments, that such a power be somewhere existing in 
 it ; and if the place where the proposed Constitution has fixed 
 it, does not suit Brutus and his friends, I will give him leave 
 to stow it away in any other place that is better : but I will 
 not consent to have it annihilated ; neither will I agree to 
 have it cramped and pinched for room, so as to lessen its 
 energy ; for that will destroy both its nature and use. 
 
 The supreme power of government ought to be full, 
 definite, established, and acknowledged. Powers of government 
 too limited, or uncertain and disputed, have ever proved, like 
 
I20 REPLY TO BRUTUS BY PELATIAH WEBSTER. 
 
 Pandora's box, a most fruitful source of quarrels, animosities, 
 wars, devastation, and ruin, in all shapes and degrees, in all 
 communities, states and kingdoms on earth. 
 
 Nothing tends more to the honour, establishment, and 
 peace of society, than public decisions, grounded on principles 
 of right, natural fitness and prudence ; but when the powers 
 of government are too limited, such decisions can't be made 
 and enforced ; so the mischief goes without a remedy : dreadful 
 examples of which we have felt, in instances more than enough, 
 for seven years past. 
 
 [5] Further, where the powers of government are not definite 
 but disputed, the administration dare not make decisions on 
 the footing of impartial justice and right ; but must temporize 
 with the parties, lest they lose friends or make enemies-: and 
 of course the righteous go off injured and disgusted, and the 
 wicked go grumbling to ; for 'tis rare that any sacrifices of a 
 court can satisfy a prevailing party in the state. 
 
 'Tis necessary in States, as well as in private families, that 
 controversies should have a just, J/^^d^;', and effectual decision, 
 that right may be done before the contention has time to grow 
 up into habits of malignity, resentment, ill nature, and ill 
 ofifices. If a controversy happens between two states, must 
 it continue undecided, and daily increase, and be more and 
 more aggravated, by the repeated insults and injuries of the 
 contending parties, 'till they are ripe for the decision of the 
 sword? or must the weaker states suffer, without remedy, the 
 groundless demands and oppressions of their stronger neigh- 
 bours, because they have no avenger, or umpire of their 
 disputes ? 
 
 Or shall we institute a supreme power with full and effectual 
 authority to controul the animosities, and decide the disputes 
 of these strong contending bodies ? In the one proposed to 
 to us, we have perhaps every chance of a righteous judgment, 
 that we have any reason [6] to hope for ; but I am clearly of 
 opinion, that even a wrongful decision, would, in most cases, 
 be preferable to the continuance of such destructive contro- 
 versies. 
 
 I suppose that neither Brutus nor any of his friends would 
 
REPLY TO BRUTUS BY PELATIAH WEBSTER. 121 
 
 wish to see our government embroiled abroad ; and therefore 
 will admit it necessary to institute some federal authority, 
 sufificient to punish any individual or State, who shall violate 
 our treaties with foreign nations, insult their dignity, or abuse 
 their citizens, and compel due reparation in all such cases. 
 
 I further apprehend, that Brutus is willing to have the 
 general interest and welfare of the States well provided for 
 and supported, and therefore will consent that there shall 
 exist in the states, an authority to do all this effectually ; but 
 he seems grieved that Congress should be the judges of this 
 general welfare ol the states. If he will be kind enough to 
 point out any other more suitable and proper judges, I will 
 consent to have them admitted. 
 
 Indeed I begin to have hopes of Brutus, and think he may 
 come right at last ; for I observe (after all his fear and tremb- 
 lings about the new government) the constitution he defines 
 and adopts, is the very same as that which the federal conven- 
 tion have proposed to us, viz. "that the Thirteen States 
 should continue thirteen confederated republics under the 
 direction and controul of a supreme [7] federal head, for 
 certain defined national purposes, only." Where we may 
 observe, 
 
 1. That the new Constitution leaves all the Thirteen States, 
 complete republics, as it found them, but all confederated 
 under the direction and controul of a federal head, for certain 
 defined national purposes only, i. e. it leaves all the dignities, 
 authorities, and internal police of each State in free, full, and 
 perfect condition ; unless when national purposes make the 
 controul of them by the federal head, or authority, necessary 
 to the general benefit. 
 
 2. These powers of controul by the federal head or author- 
 ity, are defined in the new constitution, as minutely as may 
 be, in their principle ; and any detail of them which may be- 
 come necessary, is committed to the wisdom of Congress. 
 
 3. It extends the controuling power of the federal head to 
 no one case, to which the jurisdiction or power of definitive 
 decision of any one state, can be competent. And, 
 
 4. In every such case, the controuling power of the federal 
 
122 REPLY TO BRt/tUS BY PELATIAH WEBSTER. 
 
 head, is absolutely necessary to the support, dignity, and 
 benefit of the national government, and the safety of individ- 
 uals ; neither of which can, by any possibility, be secured 
 without it. 
 
 All this falls in pretty well with Brutus's sentiments; for 
 he does not think that the new Constitution in its present 
 state so very bad, [8] but fears that it will not preserve its 
 purity of institution ; but if adopted, will immediately verge 
 to, and terminate in a consolidation, i. e. a destruction of the 
 state governments. For argument, he suggests the avidity of 
 power natural to rulers ; and the eager grasp with which they 
 hold it when obtained ; and their strong propensity to abuse 
 their power, and encroach on the liberties of the people. 
 
 He dwells on the vast powers vested in Congress by the 
 new Constitution, i. e. of levying taxes, raising armies, ap- 
 pointing federal courts, &c.; takes it for granted, that all these 
 powers will be abused, and carried to an oppressive excess ; 
 and then harangues on the dreadful case we shall be in, when 
 our wealth is all devoured by taxes, our liberty destroyed by 
 the power of the army, and our civil rights all sacrificed by 
 the unbounded power of the federal courts, &c. 
 
 And when he has run himself out of breath with this dreary 
 declamation, he comes to the conclusion he set out with, viz. 
 That the Thirteen States are too big for a republican govern- 
 ment, which requires small territory, and can't be supported 
 in more extensive nations ; that in large states liberty will soon 
 be swallowed up, and lost in the magnitude of power requisite 
 in the government, &c. 
 
 [9] If any conclusion at all can be drawn from this baseless 
 assemblage of gloomy thoughts, I think it must be against any 
 union at all ; against any kind of federal government. For 
 nothing can be plainer than this, viz. that the union can't by 
 any possibility be supported with success, without adequate and 
 effectual powers of government ? 
 
 We must have money to support the union, and therefore 
 the power of raising it must be lodged somewhere ; we must 
 have a military force, and of consequence the power of raising 
 and directing it must exist ; civil and criminal causes of na- 
 
REPLY TO BRUTUS BY PELATIAH WEBSTER. 1 23 
 
 tional concern will arise, therefore there must be somewhere a 
 power of appointing courts to hear and determine them. 
 
 These powers must be vested in Congress ; for nobody pre-^ 
 tends to wish to have them vested in any other body of men. 
 
 The Thirteen States have a territory very extensive, and 
 inhabitants very numerous, and every day rapidly increasing ; 
 therefore the powers of government necessary to support their 
 union must be great in proportion. If the ship is large the 
 mast must be proportionately great, or it will be impossible 
 to make her sail well. The federal powers must extend to 
 every part of the federal territory, i. e. to the utmost limits of 
 the Thirteen States, and to every part of them ; and must 
 carry with them, sufficient [10] authority to secure the ex- 
 ecution of them ; and these powers must be vested in Con- 
 gress, and the execution of them must be under their direction 
 and controul. 
 
 These powers are vast, I know, and the trust is of the 
 most weighty kind that can be committed to human direction ; 
 and the execution and administration of it will require the 
 greatest wisdom, knowledge, firmness, and integrity in that 
 august body ; and I hope they will have all the abilities and 
 virtues necessary to that important station, and will perform 
 their duty well ; but if they fail, the fault is in them, not in 
 the constitution. The best constitution possible, even a di- 
 vine one, badly administered, will make a bad government. 
 
 The members of Congress will be the best we can get ; 
 they will all of them derive their appointment from the 
 States, and if the States are not wise enough to send good and 
 suitable men, great blame, great sin will lie at their door. But 
 I suppose nobody would wish to mend this fault by taking 
 away the election of the people, and directing the appoint- 
 ment of Congress to be made in any other way. 
 
 When we have got the best that can be obtained, we ought 
 to be quiet and cease complaining. 'Tis not in the power of 
 human wisdom to do more ; 'tis the fate of human nature to 
 be imperfect and to err ; and [11] no doubt but Congress, with 
 all their dignity of station and character, with all their oppor- 
 tunities to gain wisdom and information, with all their induce- 
 
124 REPLY TO BRUTUS BY PELATIAH WEBSTER. 
 
 ments to virtue and integrity, will err, and abuse or misapply 
 their powers in more or less instances. I have no expectation 
 that they will make a court of angels, or be anything more 
 than men : 'tis probable many of them will be insufficient 
 men, and some of them may be bad men. 
 
 The greatest wisdom, care, and caution, has been used in 
 the mode of their appointment ; in the restraints and checks 
 under which they must act ; in the numerous discussions and 
 deliberations which all their acts must pass through, before 
 they can receive the stamp of authority; in the terrors of 
 punishment if they misbehave. I say, in all these ways the 
 greatest care has been used to procure and form a good Con- 
 gress. 
 
 The dignity and importance of their station and character 
 will afford all the inducements to virtue and effort, which can 
 influence a mind capable of their force. 
 
 Their own personal reputation, with the eyes of all the 
 world on them, — the approbation of their fellow citizens, 
 which every man in public station naturally wishes to enjoy, 
 — and the dread of censure and shame, all contribute very 
 forceable and strong inducements to noble, upright and 
 worthy behavior. 
 
 [12] The particular interest which every member of Congress 
 has in every public order and resolution, is another strong 
 mo live to right action. For every act to which any member 
 gives his sanction, if it be raising an army, levying a tax, in- 
 stituting a court, or any other act to bind the States, — such 
 act will equally bind himself, his nearest connections, and his 
 posterity. 
 
 Another mighty influence to the noblest principle of action 
 will be the fear of God before their eyes ; for while they %\\ in 
 the place of God, to give law, justice, and right to the States, 
 they must be monsters indeed if they do not regard his law, 
 and imitate his character. 
 
 If all this will not produce a Congress fit to be trusted, 
 and worthy of the public confidence, I think we may give the 
 matter up as impracticable. But still we must make ourselves 
 as easy as we can, under a mischief which admits no remedy^ 
 
REPLY TO BRUTUS BY PELATIAH WEBSTER. 125 
 
 and bear with patience an evil which can't be cured: for a 
 government we must have ; there is no safety without it ^ 
 though we know it will be imperfect, we still must prefer it tcy 
 anarchy or no government at all. 'Tis the height of folly and 
 madness to reject a necessary convenience, because it is not a 
 perfect good. 
 
 Upon this statement of facts and principles, (for the truth 
 and reality of which, I appeal [13] to every candid man,) I beg 
 leave to remark, 
 
 1. That the federal Convention, in the constitution pro- 
 posed to us, have exerted their utmost to produce a Congress 
 worthy of the public confidence, who shall have abilities ade- 
 quate to their important duty, and shall act under every pos- 
 sible inducement to execute it faithfully. 
 
 2. That this affords every chance which the nature of the 
 thing will admit, of a wise and upright administration. 
 
 3. Yet all this notwithstanding, 'tis very possible that Con- 
 gress may err, may abuse, or misapply their powers, which no 
 precaution of human wisdom can prevent. 
 
 4. 'Tis vain, 'tisxhildish, 'tis contentious to object to a con- 
 stitution thus framed and guarded, on pretence that the com- 
 monwealth may suffer by a bad administration of it ; or to 
 withhold the necessary powers of government, from the su- 
 preme rulers of it, least they should abuse or misapply those 
 powers. This is an objection which will operate with equal 
 force against every institution that can be made in this world, 
 whether of policy, religion, commerce, or any other human 
 concern, which can require regulations : for 'tis not possible 
 to form any institution however necessary, wise and good, 
 whose uses may not be lessened or destroyed by bad man- 
 agement. 1 
 
 If Brutus, or any body else, can point out [14] any checks, 
 cautions, or regulations, which have been hitherto omitted, 
 which will make Congress more wise, more capable, moje dili- 
 gent, or more faithful, I am willing to attend to them. But 
 to set Congress at the head of the government, and object tO' 
 their being vested with full and sufficient power to manage all 
 the great departments of it, appears to me absurd, quite wild^ 
 
126 REPLY TO BRUTUS BY PELATIAH WEBSTER. 
 
 and chimerical : it would produce a plan which would destroy 
 itself as it went along, would be a sort of counter position of 
 contrary parts, and render it impossible for rulers to render 
 those services, and secure those benefits to the States, which 
 are the only great ends of their appointment. 
 
 The constitution under Brutus's corrections would stand 
 thus, viz. Congress would have power to raise money, but must 
 not direct the quanity, or mode of levying it ; they might raise 
 armies, but must not judge to ^t. number oi soldiers necessary, 
 or direct their destination ; they ought to provide for the gen- 
 eral welfare, but must not be judges of what that welfare con- 
 sists in, or in what manner 'tis to be provided for ; they might 
 controul the several States, for defined national purposes, but 
 must not be judges of what purposes would come within that 
 definition, &c. 
 
 Any body with half an eye, may see what sort of adminis- 
 tration the constitution, thus corrected, would produce, e. g. 
 it would [15] require much greater trouble to leave the work 
 undone, than would be necessary to get it well done, under a 
 constitution of sufificient powers. If any one wishes to view 
 more minutely this blessed operation, he may see a lively 
 sample of it, in the last seven years practice of our federal 
 government. 
 
 5. Brutus all along sounds his objections, and fears on ex- 
 treme cases of abuse or misapplication of supreme powers, 
 which raay possibly happen, under the administration of a wild, 
 weak, or wicked Congress ; but 'tis easy to observe that all in- 
 stitutions are liable to extremes, but ought not to be fudged by 
 them ; they do not often appear, and perhaps never may ; but 
 if they should happen in the cases supposed, (which God 
 forbid) there is a remedy pointed out, in the Constitution itself. 
 
 'Tis not supposeable that such abuses could arise to any 
 ruinous height, before they would affect the States so much, 
 that at least two-thirds of them would unite in pursuing a 
 remedy in the mode prescribed by the Constitution, which 
 will always be liable to amendment, whenever any mischiefs 
 or abuses appear in the government, which the Constitution 
 in its present state, can't reach and correct. 
 
REPLY TO BRUTUS BY PELATIAH WEBSTER. 1 27 
 
 6. Brutus thinks we can never be too much afraid of the 
 encroaching avidity of rulers ; but 'tis pretty plain, that how- 
 ever great the natural lust of power in rulers may be, the 
 jealousy of the people in giving it, is about [16] equal ; these 
 two opposite passions, will always operate in opposite directions 
 to each other, and like action and reaction in natural bodies, 
 will ever tend to a good ballance. 
 
 At any rate, the Congress can never get more power than 
 the people will give, nor hold it any longer than they will 
 permit ; for should they assume tyrannical powers, and make 
 incroachments on liberty without the consent of the people, 
 they would soon attone for their temerity, with shame and 
 disgrace, and probably with their heads. 
 
 But 'tis here to be noted, that all the danger does not arise 
 from the extreme of power in the rulers ; for when the ballance 
 verges to the contrary extreme, and the power of the rulers 
 becomes too much limited and cramped, all the nerves of 
 government are weakened, and the administration must una- 
 voidably sicken, and lose that energy which is absolutely 
 necessary for the support of the State, and the security of the 
 people. For 'tis a truth worthy of great attention, that laws 
 are not made so much for the righteous as for the wicked ; 
 who never fail to shelter themselves from punishment, when- 
 ever they can, under the defetts of the law, and the weakness 
 of government. 
 
 I now come to consider the grand proposition which 
 Brutus sets out with, concludes with, and interlards all along, 
 and which [17] seems to be the great gift of his performance, 
 viz. That a confederation of the Thirteen States into one 
 great republic is not best for them : and goes on to prove by 
 a variety of arguments, that a republican form of government 
 is not compatible, and cannot be convenient to so extensive a 
 territory as the said States possess. He begins by taking one 
 assumption for granted (for I can't see that his arguments 
 prove it at all) viz. That the Constitution proposed will 
 melt down and destroy the jurisdiction of the particular States, 
 and consolidate them all into one great republic. 
 
 I can't see the least reason for this sentiment ; nor the 
 
128 REPLY TO BRUTUS BY PELATIAH WEBSTER. 
 
 least tendency in the new Constitution to produce this effect. 
 For the Constitution does not suffer the federal powers to 
 controul in the least, or so much as to interfere in the internal 
 policy, jurisdiction, or municipal rights of any particular State: 
 except where great and manifest national purposes and inter- 
 ests make that controul necessary. It appears very evident 
 to me, that the Constitution gives an establishment, support, 
 and protection to the internal and separate police of each 
 State, under the superintendency of the federal powers, which 
 it could not possibly enjoy in an independent state. Under 
 the confederation each State derives strength, iirmness and 
 permanency from its compact with the other States. Like 
 a stave in a cask well bound with hoops, it [i8] stands firmer, 
 is not so easily shaken, bent, or broken, as it would be 
 were it set up by itself alone, without any connection with its 
 neighbours. 
 
 There can be no doubt that each State will receive from 
 the union great support and protection against the invasions 
 and inroads of foreign enemies, as well as against riots and 
 insurrections of their own citizens ; and of consequence, the 
 course of their internal administration will be secured by this 
 means against any interruption or embarrassment from either 
 of these causes. 
 
 They will also derive their share of benefit from the re- 
 spectability of the union abroad, from the treaties and alliances , 
 which may be made with foreign nations, &c. 
 
 Another benefit they will receive from the controul of the 
 supreme power of the union is this, viz. they w'ill be restrained 
 from making angry, oppressive, and destructive laws, from 
 declaring ruinous wars with their neighbours, from fomenting 
 quarrels and controversies, &c. all which ever weaken a state, 
 tend to its fatal disorder, and often end in its dissolution. 
 Righteousness exalts and strengthens a nation ; but sin is a 
 reproach and weakening of any people. 
 
 They will indeed have the privilege of oppressing their 
 own citizens by bad laws or bad administration ; but the mo- 
 ment the mischief extends beyond their own State, and 
 [19] begins to affect the citizens of other States strangers. 
 
REPLY TO BRUTUS BY PELATIAH WEBSTER. I29 
 
 or the national welfare, — the salutary controul of the supreme 
 power will check the evil, and restore strength and security, 
 as well as honesty and right, to the offending state. 
 
 It appears then very plain, that the natural effect and 
 tendency of the supreme powers of the union is to give 
 strength, establishment, and permanency to the internal 
 police and jurisdiction of each of the particular States ; not to 
 melt down and destroy, but to support and comfirm them all. 
 
 By what sort of assurance, then, can Brutus tell us that 
 the new Constitution, if executed, must certainly and infalli- 
 bly terminate in a consolidation of the whole, into one great 
 republic, subverting all the State authorities. His only argu- 
 ment is, that the federal powers may be corrupted, abused, 
 and misapplied, 'till this effect shall be produced. 'Tis true 
 that the constitution, like every other on earth, committed to 
 human management, may be corrupted by a bad administra- 
 tion, and be made to operate to the destruction of the very 
 capital benefits and uses, which were the great end of its in- 
 stitution. The same argument will prove with equal cogency, 
 that the constitution of each particular State, may be cor- 
 rupted in practice, become tyranical and inimical to liberty. 
 In short the argument proves too much, and therefore proves 
 nothing : [20] 'tis empty, childish, and futile, and a serious 
 proposal of it, is, I conceive, an affront to the human under- 
 standing. 
 
 But after all, supposing this event should take place, and 
 by some strange fatality, the several states should be melted 
 down, and merged in the great commonwealth, in the form 
 of counties, or districts ; I don't see why a commonwealth 
 mode of government, would not be as suitable and convenient 
 for the great State, as any other form whatever ; I cannot see 
 any sufficient ground or reason, for the position pretty often 
 and boldly advanced, that a republican form of government 
 can never be suitable for any nation of extensive territory, 
 and numerous population : for if Congress can be chosen by 
 the several States, though under the form and name of 
 counties, or election districts, and be in every respect, insti- 
 tuted as directed by the new constitution, I don't see but we 
 
I30 REPLY TO BRUTUS BY PELATIAH WEBSTER. 
 
 shall have as suitable a national council, as wise a legislative, 
 and as strong and safe an executive power, as can be obtained 
 under any form of government whatever ; let our territory be 
 ever so extensive or populous. 
 
 The most despotic monarch that can exist, must have his 
 councils, and officers of state ; and I can't see any one circum- 
 stance of their being appointed under a monarchy, that can 
 afford any chance of their being any wiser or better, than ours 
 may be. 'Tis true indeed, [21] the despot may, if he pleases, 
 act without any advice at all ; but when he does so, I conceive 
 it will be very rare that the nation will receive greater advan- 
 tages from his unadvised edicts, than may be drawed from 
 the deliberate acts and orders of our supreme powers. All 
 that can be said in favour of those, is, that they will have less 
 chance of delay, and more of secrecy, than these ; but I think 
 it probable, that the latter will be grounded on better infor- 
 ■ mation, and greater wisdom ; will carry more weights and be 
 better supported. 
 
 The Romans rose, from small beginnings, to a very great 
 extent of territory, population, and wisdom ; I don't think 
 their constitution of government, was near so good as the one 
 proposed to us, yet we find their power, strength, and estab- 
 lishment, were raised to their utmost height, under a republi- 
 can form of government. Their State received very little 
 acquisition of territory, strength, or wealth, after their govern- 
 ment became imperial ; but soon began to weaken and 
 decay. 
 
 The Carthagenians acquired an amazing degree of strength, 
 wealth, and extent of dominion, under a republican form of 
 of government. Neither they or the Romans, owed their 
 dissolution to any causes arising from that kind of govern- 
 ment : 'twas the party rage, animosity, and violence of their 
 citizens, which destroyed them both ; it weakened them, 'till 
 the [22] one fell under the power of their enemy, and was 
 thereby reduced to ruin ; the other changed their form of 
 government, to a monarchy, which proved in the end, equally 
 fatal to them. 
 
 The same causes, if they can't be restrained, will weaken 
 
REPLY TO BRUTUS BY PELATIAH WEBSTER. 
 
 or destroy any nation on earth, let their form of government 
 be what it will ; witness the division and dissolution of the 
 Roman empire ; the late dismemberment of Poland ; the 
 intestine divisions, rage, and wars of Italy, of France, of 
 Spain, and of England. 
 
 No form of government can preserve a nation which can't 
 controul the party rage of its own citizens ; when any one citi- 
 zen can rise above the controul of the laws, ruin draws near. 
 'Tis not possible for any nation on earth, to hold their 
 strength and establishment, when the dignity of their gov- 
 ernment is lost, and this dignity will forever depend on the 
 wisdom and firmness of the officers of government, aided and 
 supported by the virtue and patriotism of their citizens. 
 
 On the whole, I don't see but that any form of govern- 
 ment may be safe and practicable, where the controuling 
 authority of the supreme powers, is strong enough to effect 
 the ends of its appointment, and at the same time, sufficiently 
 checked to keep it within due bounds, and limit it to the 
 objects of its duty ; and I think it appears, that the consti- 
 tution proposed to us, has all these qualities [23] in as great 
 perfection, as any form we can devise. 
 
 But after all, the grand secret of forming a good gov- 
 ernment, is, to put good men into the administration : for 
 wild, vicious, or idle men, will ever make a bad govern- 
 ment, let its principles be ever so good ; but grave, wise, 
 and faithful men, acting under a good constitution, will afford 
 the best chances of security, peace, and prosperity, to the 
 the citizens, which can be derived from civil police, under the 
 present disorders, and uncertainty of all earthly things. 
 
 Philadelphia, Nov. 4, 1787. 
 
 FINIS. 
 
An / Examination / of the / Constitution / for the / 
 United States / of / America, / Submitted to the People / 
 by the / General Convention, / At Philadelphia, the 1 7th 
 Day of September, 1787, /and since adopted and rati- 
 fied/by the / Conventions of Eleven States, / chosen for 
 the purpose of considering it, being all / that have yet 
 decided on the subject. / By an American Citizen. / To 
 which is added, / A Speech / of the / Honorable James 
 Wilson, Esquire, / on the same subject. / Philadelphia : / 
 Printed by Zachariah Poulson, Junr. in Fourth- / Street, 
 between Market and Arch-Street./M.DCC.LXXXviii. 
 
 8vo., pp. 33. 
 
 " An American Citizen " was the pseudonym of Tench 
 Coxe, of Pennsylvania, a member of the Annapolis Conven- 
 tion and the Continental Congress, and author of a number of 
 pamphlets on the finances and commerce of the United States. 
 The four letters written over that signature were among the 
 first to appear in favor of the Constitution, and were re- 
 printed in many of the newspapers of the day. 
 
 I have seen three copies with "Tench Coxe, Esq.," inter- 
 lined on the title page in his own handwriting below " By an 
 American Citizen." P. L. F. 
 
TO THE 
 
 CANDID READER 
 
 in^VERY person, who desires to know the true situation of 
 the United States of America, in regard to the freedom 
 and powers of their governments, must carefully consider 
 together the constitution of the state in which he lives and the 
 new constitution of fcederal or general government. The 
 latter alone is treated of in the following pages. The former, 
 it is presumed, are sufficiently understood by the citizens who 
 live under them. 
 
NUMBER I. 
 
 On the Federal Government, and first on the safety of the 
 people, from the restraints imposed on the President. 
 
 TT is impossible for an honest and feeling mind, of any 
 nation or country whatever, to be insensible to the pres- 
 ent circumstances of America. Were I an East Indian, or a 
 Turk, I should consider this singular situation of a part of my 
 fellow creatures as the most curious and interesting. Inti- 
 mately connected with the country, as a citizen of the union, 
 I confess it entirely engrosses my mind and feelings. 
 
 To take a proper view of the ground on which we stand, it 
 may be necessary to recollect the manner in which the United 
 States were originally settled and [4] established. Want of 
 charity in the religious systems of Europe, and of justice in 
 their political governments, were the principal moving causes, 
 which drove the emigrants of various countries to the Amer- 
 ican continent. The Congregationalists, Quakers, Presby- 
 terians and other British dissenters, the Catholics of England 
 and Ireland, the Hugonots of France, the German Lutherans, 
 Calvinists and Moravians, with several other societies, estab- 
 lished themselves in the different colonies, thereby laying the 
 ground of that liberality in ecclesiastical affairs, which has 
 been observable since the late revolution. Religious liberty 
 naturally promotes corresponding dispositions in matters of 
 government. The constitution of England as it stood on paper, 
 was one of the freest, at that time, in the world, and the 
 American colonies considered themselves as entitled to the 
 fullest enjoyment of it. Thus, when the ill-judged discussions 
 of late times in England brought into question the rights of 
 this country, as it stood connected with the British crown, 
 we were found more strongly impressed with their import- 
 ance, and accurately acquainted with their extent, than the 
 wisest and most learned of our brethren beyond the Atlantic. 
 
136 AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 
 
 When the greatest names in parliament insisted on the power 
 of that body over the commerce of the colonies, and even the 
 right to bind us in all cases whatsoever, America, seeing that 
 it was only another form of tyranny, insisted upon the im- 
 mutable truth, that taxation and representation are insepara- 
 ble ; and, while a desire of harmony and other considerations 
 induced her into an acquiescence in the commercial relations 
 of Great Britain, it was done from the declared necessity of 
 the case, and with a cautious, full, and absolute saving of our 
 voluntarily-suspended rights. The parliament was persever- 
 ing, and America continued firm, till hostilities and open war 
 commenced, and finally the late revolution closed the contest 
 forever. 
 
 [5] It is evident, from this short detail, and the reflections 
 which arise from it, that the quarrel between the United 
 -States and the parliament of Great Britain did not arise so 
 much from objections to the form of government, though 
 ^undoubtedly a better one by far is now within our reach, as 
 from a difference concerning certain important rights, result- 
 ing from the essential principles of liberty, which their consti- 
 tution actually preserved to all the subjects residing within the 
 realm. It was not asserted by America, that the people of 
 the island of Great Britain were slaves, but that we, though 
 possessed absolutely of the same rights, were not admitted to 
 >enjoy an equal degree of freedom. 
 
 When the declaration of independence compleated the 
 ■separation between the two countries, new governments were 
 •necessarily established. Many circumstances led to the adop- 
 tion of the republican form, among which was the predilection 
 fof the people. In devising the frames of government, it may 
 have been difficult to avoid extremes opposite to the vices of 
 -that we had just rejected ; nevertheless, many of the state 
 constitutions we have chosen are truly excellent. Our mis- 
 fortunes have been, that in the first instance we adopted no 
 national government at all ; but were kept together by com- 
 mon danger only ; and that in the confusions of a civil war, 
 ■we framed a fcederal constitution, now universally admitted to 
 (be inadequate to the preservation of liberty, property, and the 
 
AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 137- 
 
 union. The question is not, then, how far our state constitu- 
 tions are good, or otherwise — the object of our wishes is, to- 
 amend and supply the evident and allowed errors and defects- 
 of the foederal government. Let us consider awhile, that 
 which is now proposed to us — let us compare it with the so' 
 much boasted British form of government, and see how much 
 more it favours the people, and how completely it secures their 
 rights, remembering, at the same time, that we did not dis- 
 solve our connection [6] with that country so much on ac- 
 count of its constitution, as the perversion and mal-adminis- 
 tration of it. 
 
 In the first place, let us look at the nature and powers of 
 the head of that country, and those of the ostensible head of 
 ours. 
 
 The British king is the great bishop or supreme head of an 
 established church, with an immense patronage annexed. In 
 this capacity he commands a number of votes in the house of 
 lords, by creating bishops, who, besides their great incomes, 
 have votes in that assembly, and are judges in the last resort. 
 These prelates have also many honorable and lucrative places 
 to bestow, and thus from their wealth, learning, dignities,, 
 powers, and patronage, give a great lustre and an enormous 
 influence to the crown. 
 
 In America, our president will not only be without these 
 influencing advantages, but they will be in the possession of 
 the people at large, to strengthen their hands in the event of 
 a contest with him. All religious funds, honors and powers,, 
 are in the gift of numberless unconnected, disunited and con- 
 tending corporations, wherein the principle of perfect equal- 
 ity universally prevails. In short, danger from ecclesiastical 
 tyranny, that long standing and still remaining curse of the 
 people — that sacreligious engine of royal power in some 
 countries — can be feared by no man in the United States. In 
 Britain their king is for life — in America, our President will 
 always be one of the people at the end of four years. In that 
 country, the king is hereditary, and may be an ideot, a knave„ 
 or a tyrant by nature, or ignorant from neglect of his educa- 
 tion, yet cannot be removed, for " he can do no wrong." This 
 
138 AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 
 
 is a favorite maxim of their constitution. In America, as the 
 President is to be one of the people at the end of his short 
 term, so will he and his fellow citizens remember, that he was 
 originally one of the people ; and he is created by their breath. 
 Further, he cannot be [7] an ideot, probably not a knave or 
 tyrant, for those whom nature makes so discover it before the 
 age of thirty-five, until which period he cannot be elected. It 
 appears, we have not admitted that he can do no wrong, but 
 have rather pre-supposed he may, and sometimes will do 
 wrong, by providing for his impeachment, his trial, and his 
 peaceable and complete removal. 
 
 In England the king has a power to create members of the 
 upper house, who are judges in the highest court, as well as 
 legislators. Our President not only cannot make members 
 of the Senate, but their creation, like his own, is by the people, 
 through their representatives : and a member of Assembly 
 may and will be as certainly dismissed at the end of his year, 
 for electing a weak or wicked Senator, as for any other blunder 
 or misconduct. 
 
 The king of England has complete legislative power, while 
 our President can only use it when the other servants of the 
 people are divided. But in all great cases affecting the na- 
 tional interests or safety, his modified and restrained power 
 must give way to the sense of two-thirds of the legislature. 
 In fact it amounts to no more, than a serious duty imposed 
 upon him to request both houses to re-consider any matter on 
 which he entertains doubts or feels apprehensions ; and here 
 the people have a strong hold upon him from his sole and 
 personal responsibility. 
 
 The President of the upper-ho.use (or the chancellor) in 
 in England, is appointed by their king, while our Vice-Presi- 
 dent, who is chosen by the people, through the electors and 
 the Senate, is not at all dependant on the President, but may 
 exercise equal powers on some occasions. In all royal govern- 
 ments, an helpless infant or an inexperienced youth may wear 
 the crown. Our President must be matured by the experi- 
 ence of years, and being born among us, his character at 
 thirty-five must be fully understood. Wisdom, virtue and 
 
AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 1 39 
 
 ac-[8] tive qualities of mind and body can alone make him the 
 first servant of a free and enlightened people. 
 
 Our President will fall very much short indeed of any 
 prince in his annual income, which will not be hereditary, but 
 the absolute allowance of the people, passing through the 
 hands of their other servants from year to year, as it becomes 
 necessary. There will be no burdens on the nation, to pro- 
 vide for his heir, or other branches of his family. It is prob- 
 able, from the state of property in America, and other 
 circumstances, that many citizens will exceed him in show 
 and expense, — those dazzling trappings of kingly rank and 
 power. He will have no authority to make a treaty, without 
 two-thirds of the senate, nor can he appoint ambassadors or 
 other great officers without their approbation, which will 
 remove the idea of patronage and influence, and of personal 
 obligation and dependence. The appointment of even the 
 inferior officers may be taken out of his hands by an act of 
 congress at any time ; he can create no nobility or titles of 
 honor, nor take away offices during good behaviour. His 
 person is not so much protected as that of a member of the 
 house of representatives ; for he may be proceeded against 
 like any other man in the ordinary course of law. He ap- 
 points no officer of the separate states. He will have no 
 influence from placemen in the legislature, nor can he pro- 
 rogue or dissolve it. He will have no power over the treas- 
 ures of the state ; and, lastly, as he is created through the 
 electors, by the people at large, he must ever look up to the 
 support of his creators. From such a servant, with powers so 
 limited and transitory, there can be no danger, especially 
 when we consider the solid foundations on which our national 
 liberties are immoveably fixed, by the other provisions of this 
 excellent constitution. Whatever of dignity or authority he 
 possesses, is a delegated part of their majesty and their 
 political omnipotence, transiently vested in him by the people 
 themselves, for their own happiness. 
 
I40 AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 
 
 [9] NUMBER II. 
 
 On the safety of the people, from the restraints imposed upon 
 
 the Senate. 
 
 We have seen that the late honorable convention, in des- 
 ignating the nature of the chief executive ofifice of the 
 United States, having deprived it of all the dangerous ap- 
 pendages of royalty, and provided for the frequent expiration 
 of its limited powers — As our president bears no resemblance 
 to a king, so we shall see the senate have no similitude to 
 nobles. 
 
 First, then, not being hereditary, their collective know- 
 ledge, wisdom, and virtue are not precarious, for by these 
 qualities alone they are to obtain their offices ; and they will 
 have none of the peculiar follies and vices of those men, who 
 possess power merely because their fathers held it before them, 
 for they will be educated (under equal advantages, and with 
 equal prospects) among and on a footing with the other sons 
 of a free people. If we recollect the characters, who have, at 
 various periods, filled the seats of congress, we shall find this 
 expectation perfectly reasonable. Many young men of 
 genius, and many characters of more matured abilities with- 
 out fortunes, have been honored with that trust. Wealth 
 has had but few representatives there, and those have been 
 generally possessed of respectable personal qualifications. 
 There have also been many instances of persons not emi- 
 nently endowed with mental qualities, who have been sent 
 thither from a reliance on their virtues, public and private — 
 As the senators are still to be elected by the legislatures of 
 the^states, there can be no doubt of equal safety and pro 
 priety in their future appointment, especially as no further 
 pecuniary qualification is required by the constitution. 
 
 [10] They can hold no other office civil or military under the 
 United States, nor can they join in making provision for 
 themselves, either by creating new places, or encreasing the 
 emoluments of old ones. As their sons are not to succeed 
 them, they will not be induced to aim at an increase or per- 
 
AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 141 
 
 petuity of their powers, at the expence of the liberties of the 
 people, of which those sons will be a part. They possess a 
 much smaller share of the judicial power than the upper house 
 in Britain, for they are not, as there, the highest court in civil 
 affairs. Impeachments alone are the cases cognizable before 
 them, and in what other place could matters of that nature 
 be so properly and safely determined ? The judges of the 
 fcederal courts will owe their appointments to the president 
 and senate, therefore may not feel so perfectly free from 
 favour, affection and influence, as the upper house who re- 
 ceive the power from the people, through their state repre- 
 sentatives, and are immediately responsible to those assem- 
 blies, and finally to the nation at large — Thus we see, when a 
 daring or dangerous offender is brought to the bar of public 
 justice, the people, who alone can impeach him by their im- 
 mediate representatives, will cause him to be tried, not by 
 judges appointed in the heat of the occasion, but by two-thirds 
 of a select body, chosen a long tirrie before, for various pur- 
 poses, by the collective wisdom of their State legislatures. 
 From a pretence or affectation of extraordinary purity and 
 excellence of character, their word of honour is the sanction 
 under which these high courts, in other countries, have given 
 their sentence — But with us, like the other judges of the 
 union, like the rest of the people, of which they are never to 
 forget they are a part, it is required that they be on oath. 
 
 No ambitious, undeserving or inexperienced youth can 
 acquire a seat in this house by means of the most enormous 
 wealth, or most powerful connections, till [11 J thirty years 
 have ripened his abilities, and fully discovered his merits to 
 his country — a more rational ground of preference surely than 
 mere property. 
 
 The senate, though more independent of the people, as to 
 the free exercise of their judgment and abilities, than the 
 house of representatives, by the longer term of their office, 
 must be older and more experienced men, and are vested 
 with less effective power ; for the public treasures, the sinews 
 of the state, cannot be called forth by their original motion. 
 They may indeed restrain the profusion or errors of the house 
 
142 AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 
 
 of representatives, but they cannot take any of the necessary 
 measures to raise a national revenue. 
 
 The people, through the electors, prescribe them such a 
 president as shall be best qualified to controul them. 
 
 They can only, by conviction or impeachment, remove and 
 incapacitate a dangerous ofificer, but the punishment of him 
 as a criminal remains within the province of the courts of law, 
 to be conducted under all the ordinary forms and precautions, 
 which exceedingly diminishes the importance of their judicial 
 powers. They are detached, as much as possible, from local 
 prejudices in favor of their respective states, by having a sep- 
 arate and independent vote, for the sensible and conscientious 
 use of which every member will find his person, honor and 
 character seriously bound — He cannot shelter himself, under 
 a vote in behalf of his state, among his immediate colleagues. 
 As there are only two, he cannot be voluntarily or involun- 
 tarily governed by the majority of the deputation — He will 
 be obliged, by wholesome provisions, to attend his public duty, 
 and thus in great national questions must give a vote, of the 
 honesty of which he will find it is necessary to convince his 
 constituents. 
 
 The senate must always receive the exceptions of the 
 president against, any of their legislative acts, which, without 
 {12] serious deliberation and sufficient reasons, they will sel- 
 dom disregard. They will also feel a considerable check from 
 the constitutional powers of the state legislatures, whose rights 
 they will not be disposed to infringe, since they are the bodies 
 to which they owe their existence, and are moreover to re- 
 main the immediate guardians of the people. 
 
 And lastly, the Senate will feel the mighty check of the 
 House of Representatives — a body so truly popular and 
 pure in its election, so intimately connected, by its interests 
 and feelings, with the people at large, so guarded against cor- 
 .ruption and influence — so much, from its nature, above all 
 apprehensions, that it must ever be able to maintain the high 
 ground assigned to it by the foederal constitution. 
 
AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 143 
 
 NUMBER III. 
 
 On the safety of the people, from the nature of the House 
 
 of Representatives. 
 
 In pursuing the consideration of the new fcederal consti- 
 tution, it remains now to examine the nature and powers of 
 the House of Representatives— the immediate delegates of 
 the people. 
 
 Each member of this truly popular assembly will be 
 chosen by about six thousand electors, by the poor as well as 
 the rich. No decayed or venal borough will have an un- 
 just share in their determinations — no old Sarum will send 
 thither a representative by the voice of a single elector*. 
 As we shall have no royal ministers to purchase votes, so 
 we shall have no votes for sale; for the suffrages of six 
 thousand enlightened and independent freemen are above 
 all price. When the increasing population of the 
 country shall render the body too [13] large at the 
 rate of one member for every thirty thousand persons, 
 they will be returned at the greater rate of one for 
 every forty or fifty thousand, which will render the electors 
 still more incorruptible. For this regulation is only designed 
 to prevent a smaller number than thirty thousand from hav- 
 ing a representative. Thus we see a provision follows, that 
 no state shall have less than one member, for if a new and 
 greater number than thirty thousand should hereafter be fixed 
 on, which should exceed the whole of the inhabitants of any 
 state, such state, without this wholesome provision, would 
 lose its voice in the House of Representatives — a circumstance 
 which the constitution renders impossible. 
 
 The people of England, whose House of commons is filled 
 with military and civil officers and pensioners, say their liber- 
 ties would be perfectly secured by triennial Parliaments. 
 With us no placeman can sit among the representatives of the 
 people, and two years are the constitutional term of their 
 existence. Here, again, lest wealth, powerful connections, or 
 
 n *This is the case with that British Borough. 
 /; I 
 
144 AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 
 
 even the unwariness of the people should place in this import- 
 ant trust an undeserving, unqualified or inexperienced youth, 
 the wisdom of the Convention has proposed an absolute inca- 
 pacity till the age of twenty-five. At twenty-one a young 
 man is made the guardian of his own interest, but he cannot, 
 for a few years more be intrusted with the affairs of the 
 nation. He must be an inhabitant of the state that elects 
 him, that he may be intimately acquainted with their partic- 
 ular circumstances — The house of Representatives is not, as 
 the senate, to have a President chosen for them from without 
 their body, but are to elect their speaker from their own 
 number — They will also appoint all their other ofificers. In 
 great state cases, they will be the grand inquest of the nation^ 
 for they possess the sole and uncontroulable power of impeach- 
 ment. They are neither to wait the call, nor abide the proroga- 
 tions and dis- [14] solutions of a perverse or ambitious Prince> 
 for they are to meet at least once in every year, and to sit on 
 adjournments to be agreed on between themselves and the 
 other servants of the people. Should they differ in opinion, 
 the President, who is a temporary fellow-servant, and not 
 their hereditary master, has a mediatorial power to adjust it 
 for them, but cannot prevent their constitutional meeting 
 within the year. They can compel the attendance of their 
 members, that their public duty may not be evaded in times 
 of difificulty or danger — The vote of each representative can 
 be always known, as well as the proceedings of the house, that 
 so the people may be acquainted with the conduct of those in 
 whom they repose so important a trust. As was observed of 
 the Senators, they cannot make new offices for themselves, 
 nor increase, for their own benefit, the emoluments of old 
 ones, by which the people will be exempted from needless 
 additions to the public expences, on such sordid and mercen- 
 ary principles — ^They are not to be restrained from the firm 
 and plain language, which becomes the independent repre- 
 sentatives of freedom, for there is to be a perfect liberty of 
 speech. Without their consent, no monies can be obtained, 
 no armies raised, no navies provided. They, alone, can 
 originate bills for drawing forth the revenues of the union, 
 
AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. I4S 
 
 and they will have a negative upon every legislative act of 
 the other house. — So far, in short, as the sphere of fcederal 
 jurisdiction extends, they will be controulable only by the 
 people, and, in contentions with the other branch, so far as 
 they shall be right, they must ever finally prevail. 
 
 Such, my Countrymen, are some of the cautionary pro- 
 visions of the frame of government your faithful convention 
 have submitted to your consideration — such the foundations 
 of peace, liberty and safety, which have been laid by their 
 unwearied labors — They have guarded you against all ser- 
 vants but those "whom choice and common good ordain," 
 against all masters, " save preserving Heaven." 
 
 [15] NUMBER IV. 
 
 The security for national safety and happiness, resulting 
 from other parts of the fcederal Government. 
 
 In considering the respective powers of the President, 
 the Senate and the House of Representatives, under the- 
 fcederal constitution, we have seen a part of the wholesome 
 precautions, which are contained in the new system. Let us 
 examine what further securities for the safety and happiness of 
 the people are contained in the general stipulations and 
 provisions. 
 
 The United States guarantee to every state in the union 
 a separate republican form of government. From thence it 
 follows, that any man or body of men, however rich or pow- 
 erful, who shall make an alteration in the form of government 
 of any state, whereby the powers thereof shall be attempted 
 to be taken out of the hands of the people at large, will stand 
 guilty of high treason ; or should a foreign power seduce or 
 over-awe the people of any state, so as to cause them to vest 
 in the families of any ambitious citizens or foreigners the 
 powers of hereditary governors, whether as Kings or Nobles, 
 that such investment of powers would be void in itself, and 
 
146 AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 
 
 every person attempting ' to execute them would also be 
 guilty of treason. 
 
 No religious test is ever to be required of any officer or 
 servant of the United States. The people may employ any 
 wise or good citizen in the execution of the various duties of 
 the government. In Italy, Spain, and Portugal, no protestant 
 can hold a public trust. In England every Presbyterian, and 
 other person not of their established church, is incapable of 
 holding an office. No such impious deprivation of the rights of 
 men can take place under the new foederal constitution. The 
 con- [16] vention has the honour of proposing the first public 
 act, by which any nation has ever divested itself of a power, 
 every exercise of which is a trespass on the Majesty of Heaven. 
 No qualification in monied or landed property is required 
 by the proposed plan ; nor does it admit any preference from 
 the preposterous distinctions of birth and rank. The office 
 of the President, a Senator, and a Representative, and every 
 other place of power or profit, are therefore open to the whole 
 body of the people. Any wise, informed and upright man, be 
 his property what it may, can exercise the trusts and powers 
 of the state, provided he possesses the moral, religious and 
 political virtues which are necessary to secure the confidence 
 of his fellow citizens. 
 
 The importation of slaves from any foreign country is, 
 by a clear implication, held up to the world as equally incon- 
 sistent with the dispositions and the duties of the people of 
 America. A solid foundation is laid for exploding the prin- 
 ciples of negro slavery, in which many good men of all parties 
 in Pennsylvania, and throughout the union, have already con- 
 curred. The temporary reservation of any particular matter 
 must ever be deemed an admission that it should be done 
 away. This appears to have been well understood. In ad- 
 dition to the arguments drawn from liberty, justice and re- 
 ligion, opinions against this practice, founded in sound policy, 
 have no doubt been urged. Regard was necessarily paid to 
 the peculiar situation of our southern fellow-citizens ; but they, 
 on the other hand, have not been insensible of the delicate 
 situation of our national character on this subject. 
 
AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 147 
 
 The people will remain, under the proposed constitution, 
 the fountain of power and public honour. The President, the 
 Senate, and the House of Representatives, will be the chan- 
 nels through which the stream [17] will flow— but it will flow 
 from the people, and from them only. Every office, religious, 
 civil and military will be either their immediate gift, or it will 
 come from them through the hands of their servants. And 
 this, as observed before, will be guaranteed to them under 
 the state constitution which they respectively approve ; for 
 they cannot be royal forms, cannot be aristocratical, but must 
 be republican. 
 
 The people of those states which have faithfully discharged 
 their duty to the union will be no longer subjected alone to 
 the weight of the public debts. Proper arrangements will 
 call forth the just proportion of their sister states, and our 
 national character will again be as unstained as it was once 
 exalted. Elevation to independence, with the loss of our 
 good name, is only to be conspicuous in disgrace. The liber- 
 ties of a people involved in debt are as uncertain as the liberty 
 of an individual in the same situation. Their virtue is more 
 precarious. The unfortunate citizen must yield to the opera- 
 tion of the laws, while a bankrupt nation too easy annihilates 
 the sacred obligations of gratitude and honour, and becomes 
 execrable and infamous. I cannot refrain from reminding my 
 fellow-citizens of our near approach to that deplorable situa- 
 tion, which must be our miserable condition, if the defects of 
 the old confederation remain without amendment. The pro- 
 posed constitution will cure the evil, and restore us to our 
 rank among mankind. 
 
 Laws, made after the commission of the fact, have been a 
 dreadful engine in the hands of tyrannical governors. Some 
 of the most virtuous and shining characters in the world have 
 been put to death, by laws formed to render them punisha- 
 ble, for parts of their conduct which innocence permitted, and 
 to which patriotism impelled them. These have been called 
 ex post facto laws, and are exploded by the new system. If 
 a time of public contention shall hereafter arrive, [18] the 
 firm and ardent friends to liberty may know the length to 
 
148 AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 
 
 which they can push their noble opposition, on the founda- 
 tion of the laws. Should their country's cause impel them 
 further, they will be acquainted with the hazard, and using 
 those arms which Providence has put into their hands, will 
 make a solemn appeal to " the power above." 
 
 The destruction of the ancient republics was occasioned in 
 every instance by their being ignorant of a great political 
 position, which was left for America to discover and and es- 
 tabhsh. Self-evident as the truth appears, we find no friend 
 to liberty in ancient Greece or Rome asserting, that taxation 
 and representation were inseparable. The Roman citizens, 
 proud of their own liberty, imposed, in the freest times of the 
 •commonwealth, the most grievous burdens on their wretched 
 provinces. At other times we find thousands of their citizens, 
 though residing within the walls of Rome, deprived of legis- 
 lative representatives. When America asserted the novel 
 truth, Great Britain, though boasting herself as alone free 
 among the modern nations, denied it by her legislature, and 
 endeavoured to refute it by her arms — the reasoning of 
 tyrants. But the attempt was vain, for the voice of truth was 
 heard above the thunders of the war, and reached the ears of 
 all nations. Henceforth the people of the earth will consider 
 this position as the only rock on which they can found the 
 temple of liberty, that taxation and representation are in- 
 separable. Our new constitution carries it into execution on 
 the most enlarged and liberal scale, for a Representative will 
 be chosen by six thousand of his fellow-citizens, a Senator by 
 half a sovereign state, a President by a whole nation. 
 
 The old foederal constitution contained many of the same 
 things, which from error or disingenousness are urged against 
 the new ones. Neither of them have a bill of rights, nor does 
 either notice the liberty of the press, because they are already 
 provided for by the [19] state constitutions ; and relating 
 only to personal rights, they could not be mentioned in a con- 
 tract among foreign states. 
 
 Both the old and new foederal constitutions, and indeed the 
 constitution of Pennsylvania, admit of courts in which no use 
 is made of a jury. The board of property, the court of ad- 
 
AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 149 
 
 miralty, and the high court of errors and appeals, in the state 
 of Pennsylvania, as also the court of appeals under the old 
 confederation, exclude juries. Trial by jury will therefore be 
 in the express words of the Pennsylvania constitution, " as 
 heretofore," — almost always used, though sometimes omitted. 
 Trials for lands lying in any state between persons residing in 
 such state, for bonds, notes, book debts, contracts, trespasses, 
 assumptions, and all other matters between two or more 
 citizens of any state, will be held in the state courts by juries, 
 as now. In these case the foederal courts cannot interfere.* 
 But when a dispute arises between the citizens of any state 
 about lands lying out of the bounds thereof, or when a trial is 
 to be had between the citizens of any state and those 
 of another, or the government of another, the private 
 citizen will not be obliged to go into a court con- 
 stituted by the state, with which, or with the citizens 
 of which, his dispute is. He can appeal to a disinter- 
 ested foederal court. This is surely a great advantage, 
 and promises a fair trial, and an impartial judgment. The trial 
 by jury is not excluded in these foederal courts. In all crimi- 
 nal cases, where the property, liberty or life of the citizen is at 
 stake, he has the benefit of a jury. If convicted on impeach- 
 ment, which is never done by a jury in any country, he cannot 
 be fined, imprisoned or punished, but only maybe disqualified 
 from doing public mischief by losing his office, [20] and 
 his capacity to hold another. If the nature of his offence, 
 besides its danger to his country, should be criminal in itself — 
 should involve a charge of fraud, murder or treason — he may be 
 tried for such crime, but cannot be convicted without a jury. 
 In trials about property in the foederal courts, which 
 can only be as above stated, there is nothing in the 
 new constitution to prevent a trial by jury. No doubt 
 it will be the mode in every case, wherein it is practi- 
 cable. This will be adjusted by law, and it could not be 
 
 * Trials between a state and its own Citizens, • and between Citizens of 
 the same state, involving questions concerning state laws that infringe this 
 constitution, may be carried by appeal, it is presumed, into a foederal 
 court. 
 
I50 AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 
 
 done otherwise. In short, the sphere of jurisdiction for the 
 foederal courts is limited, and that sphere pnly is subject to 
 the regulations of our foederal government. The known prin- 
 ciples of justice, the attachment to trial by jury whenever it 
 can be used, the instructions of the state legislatures, the in- 
 structions of the people at large, the operation of the foederal 
 regulations on the property of a president, a senator, a repre- 
 sentative, a judge, as well as on that of a private citizen, will 
 certainly render those regulations as favorable as possible to 
 property ; for life and liberty are put more than ever into the 
 hands of the juries. Under the present constitution of all 
 the states, a public ofificer may be condemned to imprisonment 
 or death on impeachment, without a jury; but the new foed- 
 eral constitution protects the accused, till he shall be con- 
 victed, from the hands of power, by rendering a jury the in- 
 dispensible judges of all crimes. 
 
 The influence which foreign powers may attempt to ex- 
 ercise in our affairs was foreseen, and a wholesome provision 
 has been made against it ; for no person holding an ofifiice 
 under the United States is permitted to enjoy any foreign 
 honours, powers or emoluments. 
 
 The apprehensions of the people have been excited, per- 
 haps by persons with good intentions, about the powers 
 of the new government to raise an army. Let us con- 
 sider this point with moderation and candour. As enemies 
 will sometimes insult us, invade our coun- [21] try and 
 capture our property, it is clear a power in our gov- 
 ernment to oppose, restrain or destroy them, is necessary 
 to our honor, safety and existence. The military should, 
 however, be regarded with a watchful eye ; for it is a profes- 
 sion that is liable to dangerous perversion. But the pow- 
 ers vested in the fcederal government do not go the length 
 which has been said. A standing army is not granted or in- 
 tended, for there can be no provision for its continuing three 
 years, much less for its permanent establishment. Two years 
 are the utmost time for which the money can be given. It 
 will be under all the restrictions which wisdom and jealousy 
 can suggest, and the original grant of the supplies must be 
 
AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 151 
 
 made by the House of representatives, the immediate dele- 
 gates of the people. The Senate and President, who also de- 
 rive their power from the people, appoint the officers ; and the 
 heads of the departments, who must submit their accounts to 
 the whole legislatiire, are to pay and provide them, as shall be 
 directed by the laws that shall contain the conditions of the 
 grant. The militia, who are in fact the effective part of the 
 people at large, will render many troops quite' unnecessary. 
 They will form a powerful check upoii the regular troops, and 
 will generally be sufficient to over-awe them— for our detached 
 situation will seldom give occasion to raise an army, though a 
 few scattered companies may often be necessary. But when- 
 ever, even on the most obvious reasons, an army shall be 
 raised, the several states will be called, by the nature of things, 
 to attend to the 'condition of the militia. Republican jeal- 
 ousy, the guardian angel of these states, will watch the 
 motions of our military citizens, even though they will be the 
 soldiers of a free people. There is a wide difference however 
 between the troops of such commonwealths as ours, founded 
 on equal and unalterable principles, and those of a regal gov- 
 ernment, where ambition and oppression are the profession of 
 the king.- In the first case, a military officer is the occasional 
 servant of the people, employed for their defence; in [22] the 
 secbnd, he is the ever ready instrument to execute the 
 schemes of conquest or oppression, with which the mind of 
 his royal master may be disturbed. 
 
 Observations have been made on the power given to the 
 foederal Government in regard to the elections of Represent- 
 tiveS'^ii'd Senators. The regulations of these elections are, by 
 the first part of the clause, to be prescribed by the "state legis- 
 latures, who are certainly the proper bodies, if they will always 
 execute the duty. But in case the union or the public safety 
 , should be endangered by an omission of this duty, as in the 
 case' of Rhode-Island, then the legislature of the United States 
 can name for the people a convenient time, and do other mat- 
 ters necessary to insure the free exercise of their right of elec- 
 tion. The exception, in regard to the places of chusing Sen- 
 ators, was made from due respect to the sovereignty of the 
 
152 AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 
 
 State legislatures, who are to elect the senators, and whose 
 place of meeting ought not to be prescribed to them by any 
 authority, except, indeed, as we always must, by the authority 
 of the people. This power given to the fcederal legislature is 
 no more than what is possessed by the governments of all the 
 states. The constitution of Pennsylvania permits two-thirds 
 of such cities and counties, as shall elect representatives, to 
 exercise all the powers of the General Assembly, " as fully 
 and amply as if the whole were present," should any part of 
 the state neglect or refuse to perform their duty in this par- 
 ticular. In short, it is a power necessary to preserve the social 
 compact of each state and the confederation of the United 
 States. 
 
 Besides the securities for the liberties of the people arising 
 out of the fcederal government, they are guarded by their 
 state constitutions, and by the nature of things in the separate 
 states. The Governor or President in each commonwealth, 
 the Councils, Senates, Assemblies, Judges, Sheriffs, Grand and 
 Pettit Juries, Officers of Militia, Clergy and Lay Ofificers of all 
 churches, state and county Treasurer, Prothonotaries, Regis- 
 ters, [23] Presidents and other officers of Universities, Colleges 
 and Academies, Wardens of ports and cities, Burgesses of 
 towns, Commissioners of counties. County Lieutenants, and 
 many other ofificers of power and influence, will still be chosen 
 within each state, without any possible interference of the 
 fcederal Government. The separate states will also choose all 
 the members of the legislative and executive branches of the 
 United States. The people at large in each state will choose 
 their fcederal representative, and, unless ordered otherwise by 
 state legislatures, may choose the electors of the President 
 and Vice-President of the Union. And lastly, the legislature 
 of the state will have the election of the senate, as they have 
 heretofore had of the Members of Congress. Let us then, 
 with a candor worthy of the subject, ask ourselves, whether 
 it can he feared, that a majority of the Representatives, each 
 of whom will be chosen by six thousand enlightened freemen, 
 can betray their country? — Whether a majority of the 
 Senate, each of whom will be chosen by the legislature of a 
 
AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 153 
 
 free, sovereign and independent state, without any stip- 
 ulations in favour of wealth or the contemptible dis- 
 tinctions of birth or rank, and who will be closely observed by 
 the state legislatures, can destroy our liberties, controuled as 
 they are too by the house of representatives ? or whether a 
 temporary, limited, executive ofificer, watched by the fcederal 
 Representatives, by the Senate, by the state legislatures, by 
 his personal enemies among the people of his own state, by 
 the jealousy of the people of rival states, and by the whole of 
 the people of the Union, can ever endanger our Freedom.* 
 
 [24] Permit me, my fellow-citizens, to close these observa- 
 tions by remarking, that there is no spirit of arrogance in the 
 new fcederal constitution. It addresses you with becoming 
 modesty, admitting that it may contain errors. Let us give 
 it a trial ; and when experience has taught its mistakes, the 
 
 * There is one grand operation of the new fcederal constitution, favor- 
 able to general liberty, which I do not remember to have heard from any 
 of its friends. It is well known, that in most of the states the members of 
 their Houses of Representatives are chosen in equal numbers from each 
 county, and in the eastern states, in equal numbers from each town, without 
 any regard to the number of taxable inhabitants, or the number of souls. 
 Hence it is very frequent for a county, with ten thousaud souls, to send only 
 the same number of members to the state house of representatives, as a county 
 with two thousand souls, by which each person in the least populous county 
 has five times as great a voice in electing representatives, as his fellow 
 citizen of the most populous county. This is clearly a departure from the 
 principles of equal liberty, and ought to be altered in the several states. I 
 speak the more plainly because our state constitution is free from that fault in 
 the formation of our house of Assembly. Now the new constitution expressly 
 declares, that the fcederal Representatives shall be in the proportion of one to 
 every thirty thousand, which accords with reason and the true principles of 
 liberty. This house, therefore, so far as national matters go, will remedy the 
 evil spoken of in the several states, and is one more great step towards the 
 perfection of equal liberty and genuine republicanism in America. It must 
 strongly recommend the fcederal constitution to the serious reflecting patriot, 
 even though he may formerly have had doubts, and it will suggest to the 
 several states the propriety of reconsidering that point in their respective con- 
 stitutions. Pennsylvania, though right in the principles on which her legislative 
 elections are and will be held, is less safe from the existence of this fault in the 
 adjoining sister states of Virginia, Maryland, Jersey, Delaware and New York, 
 and in others more remote. 
 
154 AN EXAMINATION BY TENCH COXE. 
 
 people, whom it preserves absolutely all powerful, can reforrri 
 and amend them. That I may be perfectly understood, I 
 will acknowledge its acceptance by all the states, without 
 delay, is the second wish of my heart. The first is, that ouf 
 ^^country may be virtuous and free. 
 
 An American Citizen. 
 
SUBSTANCE OF AN ADDRESS 
 
 TO A 
 
 MEETING OF THE CITIZENS OF PHILADELPHIA, 
 
 DELIVERED, OCTOBER SIXTH, MDCCLXXXVJI, 
 
 BY THE HONORABLE 
 
 JAMES WILSON, Esquire, 
 
 ONE OF THE DE EGATES FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA TO THE 
 LATE CONTINENTAL CONVENTION. 
 
 Mr. Chairman and Fellow Citizens^ 
 
 "tTAVING received the honour of an appointment to repre- 
 sent you in the late convention, it is, perhaps, my duty 
 to comply with the request of many gentlemen, whose char- 
 acters and judgments I sincerely respect, and who have urged 
 that this would be a proper occasion to lay before you any 
 information, which will serve to elucidate and explain the 
 principles and arrangements of the con- [26] stitution that 
 has been submitted to the consideration of the United States. 
 I confess that I am unprepared for so extensive and so im- 
 portant a disquisition : but the insidious attempts, which are 
 clandestinely and industriously made to pervert and destroy 
 the new plan, induce me the more readily to engage in its de- 
 fence : and the impressions of four months constant attend- 
 ance to the subject, have not been so easily effaced, as to 
 leave me without an answer to the objections which have 
 been raised. 
 
 It will be proper, however, before I enter into the refuta- 
 tion of the charges that are alleged, to mark the leading dis- 
 crimination between the state constitutions, and the constitu- 
 tion of the United States. When the people established the 
 powers of legislation under their separate governments, they 
 
IS6 SPEECH BY JAMES WILSOK. 
 
 invested their representatives with every right and authority 
 which they did not in explicit terms reserve : and therefore 
 upon every question, respecting the jurisdiction of the house 
 of assembly, if the frame of government is silent, the juris- 
 diction is efficient and complete. But in delegating fcederal 
 powers, another criterion was necessarily introduced; and the 
 congressional authority is to be collected, not from tacit im- 
 plication, but from the positive grant, expressed in the in- 
 strument of union. Hence, it is evident, that in the former 
 case, everything which is not reserved, is given : but in the 
 latter, the reverse of the proposition prevails, and every thing 
 which is not given, is reserved. This distinction being recog- 
 nized, will furnish an answer to those who think the omission 
 of a bill of rights, a defect* in the proposed constitution : for 
 it would have been superfluous and absurd, to have stipulated 
 with a foederal body of our own creation, that we should en- 
 joy those privileges, of which we are not divested either by 
 the intention or the act that has brought that body into 
 existence. For instance, the liberty of the [27J press, which 
 has been a copious subject of declamation and opposition ; 
 what controul can proceed from the foederal government, to 
 shackle or destroy that sacred palladium of national freedom? 
 If, indeed, a power similar to that which has been granted for 
 the regulation of commerce, had been granted to regulate 
 literary publications, it would have been as necessary to stip- 
 ulate that the liberty of the press should be preserved invio- 
 late, as that the impost should be general in its operation. 
 With respect, likewise, to the particular district of ten miles, 
 wliich is to be the seat of government, it will undoubtedly be 
 proper to observe this salutary precaution, as there the legis- 
 lative power will be vested in the president, senate, and house 
 of representatives of the United States. But this could not 
 be an object with the convention : for it must naturally de- 
 pend upon a future compact ; to which the citizens imme- 
 diately interested, will, and ought to be parties : and there is 
 no reason to suspect, that so popular a privilege will in that 
 case be neglected. In truth, then, the proposed system pos- 
 sesses no influence whatever upon the press ; and it would 
 
SPEECH BY JAMES WILSON. IS7 
 
 have been merely nugatory, to have introduced a formal dec- 
 laration upon the subject ; nay, that very declaration might 
 have been construed to imply that some degree of power was 
 given, since we undertook to define its extent. 
 
 Another objection that has been fabricated against the 
 new constitution, is expressed in this disingenuous form — " the 
 trial by jury is abolished in civil cases." I must be excused, 
 my fellow citizens, if, upon this point, I take advantage of my 
 professional experience, ^o detect the futility of the assertion. 
 Let it be remembered, then, that the business of the fcederal 
 constitution was not local, but general— not limited to the 
 views and establishments of a single state, but co-extensive 
 with the continent, and comprehending the [28] views and 
 establishments of thirteen independent sovereignties. When, 
 therefore, this subject was in discussion, we were involved in 
 difficulties, which pressed on all sides, and no precedent could 
 be discovered to direct our course. The cases open to a jury, 
 differed in the different states ; it was therefore impracticable, 
 on that ground, to have made a general rule. The want of 
 uniformity would have rendered any reference to the practice 
 of the states idle and useless: and it could not, with any 
 propriety, be said, that " the trial by jury shall be as hereto- 
 fore :" since there has never existed any fcederal system of 
 jurisprudence, to which the declaration could relate. Besides, 
 it is not in all cases that the trial by jury is adopted in civil 
 questions : for causes depending in courts of admiralty, such 
 as relate to maritime captures, and such as are agitaited in the 
 courts of equity, do not require the intervention of that tri- 
 bunal. How, then, was the line of discrimination to be 
 drawn ? The convention found the task too difficult for them : 
 and they left the business as it stands — in the fullest confi- 
 dence, that no danger could possibly ensue, since the proceed- 
 ings of the supreme court are to be regulated by the congress, 
 which is a faithful representation of the people : and the op- 
 pression of government is effectually barred, by declaring that 
 in all criminal cases, the trial by jury shall be preserved. 
 
 This constitution, it has been further urged, is of a per- 
 nicious tendency, because it tolerates a standing army in the 
 
158 SPEECH BY JAMES WILSON. 
 
 time of peace. Yhis has always been a popular topic of decla- 
 « mation: and yet I do not know a nation in the world, which 
 has not found it necessary and useful to maintain the appear- 
 ance of strength in a season of the most profound tranquility. 
 Nor is it a novelty with us ; for under the present articles 
 of confederation, congress certainly possesses this reprobated 
 power : and the exercise of it is proved at this [29] moment 
 by the cantonments along the banks of the Ohio. But what 
 would be our national situation, wh^re it otherwise? Every 
 principle of policy must be subverted, and the government 
 must declare war before they are prepared to carry it on. 
 Whatever may be the provocation, however important the 
 object in view, and however necessary dispatch and secrecy 
 may be, still the declaration must precede the preparation, 
 and the enemy will be informed of your intention, not only 
 before you are equipped for an attack, but even before you are 
 fortified for a defence. The consequence is too obvious to 
 require any further delineation ; and no man, who regards the 
 dignity and safety of his country, can deny the necessity of a 
 military force, under the controul, and with the restrictions 
 which the new constitution provides. 
 
 Perhaps there never was a charge made with less reason, 
 than that which predicts the institution of a baneful aris- 
 tocracy in the fcederal senate. This body branches into two 
 characters, the one legislative, and the other executive. In 
 its legislative character, it can effect no purpose without the 
 co-operation of the house of representatives : and in its ex- 
 ecutive character, it can accomplish no object, without the 
 concurrence of the president. Thus fettered, I do not know 
 any act which the senate can of itself perform : and such de- 
 pendence necessarily precludes every idea of influence and 
 superiority. But I will confess, that in the organization of 
 this body, a compromise between contending interests is dis- 
 cernible : and when we reflect how various are the laws, com- 
 merce, habits, population, and extent of the confederated 
 states, this evidence of mutual concession and accommodation 
 ought rather to command a generous applause, than to excite 
 jealousy and reproach. For my part, my admiration can only 
 
SPEECH BY JAMES WILSON. 1 59 
 
 be equalled by my astonishment, in beholding so perfect a 
 system formed from such heterogenous materials. 
 
 [30] The next accusation I shall consider, is that which rep- 
 resents the foederal constitution as not only calculated, but de- 
 signedly framed, to reduce the state governments to mere 
 corporations, and eventually to annihilate them. Those who 
 have employed the term corporation, upon this occasion, are 
 not perhaps aware of its extent. In common parlance, in- 
 deed, it is generally applied to petty associations for the ease 
 and conveniency of a few individuals; but in its enlarged 
 sense, it will comprehend the government of Pennsylvania, 
 the existing union of the states, and even this projected sys- 
 tem is nothing more than a formal act of incorporation. But 
 upon what pretence can it be alleged that it was designed to 
 annihilate the state governments? For, I will undertake to 
 prove that upon their existence depends the existence of the 
 foederal plan. For this purpose, permit me to call your at- 
 tention to the manner in which the president, senate, and 
 house of representatives, are proposed to be appointed. The 
 president is to be chosen by electors, nominated in such man- 
 ner as the legislature of each state may direct ; so that if there 
 is no legislature, there can be no senate. The house of repre- 
 sentatives is to be composed of members chosen every second 
 year by the people of the several states, and the electors in 
 each state shall have the qualifications requisite to electors of 
 the most numerous branch of the state legislature — unless, 
 therefore, there is a state legislaturCj that qualification can- 
 not be ascertained, and the popular branch of the foederal 
 constitution must likewise be extinct. From this view, then, 
 it is evidently absurd to suppose, that the annihilation of the 
 seaprate governments will result from their union ; or, that, 
 having that intention, the authors of the new system would 
 have bound their connection with such indissoluble ties. Let 
 me here advert to an arrangement highly advantageous ; for 
 you will perceive, with- [31] out prejudice to the powers of 
 the legislature in the election of senators, the people at large- 
 will acquire an additional privilege in returning members to 
 the house of representatives — whereas, by the present cooc- 
 
l6o SPEECH BY JAMES WILSON. 
 
 federation, it is the legislature alone that appoints the dele- 
 gates to congress. ^ 
 
 The power of direct taxation has likewise been treated as 
 an improper delegation to the fcederal government ; but when 
 we consider it as the duty of that body to provide for the 
 national safety, to support the dignity of the union, and to 
 discharge the debts contracted upon the collective ^aith of the 
 states, for their common benefit, it must be acknowledged that 
 those, upon whom such important obligations are imposed, 
 ought, in justice and in policy, to possess every means requi- 
 site for a faithful performance of their trust. But why should 
 we be alarmed with visionary evils ? I will venture to pre- 
 I diet, that the great revenue of the United States must, and 
 \ always will, be raised by impost ; for, being at once less ob- 
 noxious, and more productive, the interest of the government 
 will be best promoted by the accommodation of the people. 
 • Still, however, the object of direct taxation should be within 
 reach in all cases of emergency ; and there is no more reason 
 to apprehend oppression in the mode of collecting a revenue 
 from this resource, than in the form of impost, which, by uni- 
 versal assent, is left to the authority of the fcederal govern- 
 ment. In either case, the force of civil constitutions will be 
 adequate to the purpose; and the dread of military violence, 
 which has been assiduously disseminated, must eventually 
 prove the mere effusion of a wild imagination, or a factious 
 spirit. But the salutary consequences that must flow from 
 thus enabling the government to relieve and support the 
 credit of the union, will afford another answer to the objec- 
 tions upon this ground. The state of Pennsylvania, particu- 
 larly, [32] which has encumbered itself with the assumption 
 of a great proportion of the public debt, will derive consider- 
 able rehef and advantage ; for, as it was the imbecility of the 
 present confederation, which gave rise to the funding law, that 
 law must naturally expire, when a complete and energetic 
 fcederal system shall be substituted — the state will then be 
 discharged from an extraordinary burden, and the national 
 creditor will find it to be to his interest to return to his orig- 
 inal security. 
 
SPEECH BY JAMES WILSON. l6l 
 
 After all, my fellow-citizens, it is neither extraordinary 
 nor unexpected, that the constitution offered to your consid- 
 eration, should meet with opposition. It is the nature of man . 
 to pursue his own interest, in preference to the public g^ood ; 
 and I do not mean to make any personal reflection, when I 
 add, that it is the interest of a very numerous, powerful, and 
 respectable body, to counteract and destroy the excellent 
 work produced by the late convention. All the officers of 
 government, and all the appointments for the administration 
 of justice and the collection of the public revenue, which are 
 transferred from the individual to the aggregate sovereignty 
 of the states, will necessarily turn the stream of influence and 
 emolument into a new channel. Every person, therefore, 
 who either enjoys, or expects to enjoy a place of profit under 
 the present establishment, will object to the proposed inno- 
 vation? not, in truth, because it is injurious to the liberties of 
 his country, but because it effects his schemes of wealth and 
 consequence. I will confess, indeed, that I am not a blind 
 admirer of this plan of government, and that there are some 
 parts of it, which, if my wish had prevailed, would certainly 
 have been altered. But, when I reflect how widely men differ 
 in their opinions, and that every man (and the] observation 
 applies likewise to every state) has an equal pretension to 
 assert his own, I am satisfied that [33] any thing nearer to 
 perfection could not have been accomplished. If there are 
 errors, it should be remembered, that the seeds of reformation 
 are sown in the work itself, and the concurrence of two thirds 
 of the congress may at any time introduce alterations and 
 amendments. Regarding it, then, in every point of view, with 
 a candid and disinterested mind, I am bold to assert, that it is 
 the BEST FORM OF GOVERNMENT WHICH HAS EVER BEEN 
 OFFERED TO THE WORLD.* 
 
 * The candid Reader will suppose Mr. Wilson here means, that it is the 
 best form of foederal government, which has ever been offered to the world — 
 and it is surely true that the fcederal constitution, considered in due connexion 
 with the state constitutions, is the best form of government that has ever been 
 communicated to mankind. 
 
 FINIS. 
 
The / Letters / of / Fabius, / in 1788, / on the Fed- 
 eral Constitution ; / . . . » / Copy-Right Secured. / From 
 the office of the Delaware / Gazette, Wilmington, / By 
 W. C. Smith. /1 797. / 
 
 8vo. pp. iv., 202 (l). 
 
 Written by John Dickinson, the " Pennsylvania Farmer," 
 and member of the Annapolis and Philadelphia Conventions. 
 The Letters of Fabius were originally pubHshed in a Delaware 
 newspaper in 1788, and were not issued in pamphlet form till 
 1797, when they were reprinted as above, together with a 
 second series of letters " on the present situation of public 
 affairs," which are omited in this reprint. They were also in- 
 cluded in " The Political Writings of John Dickinson," 
 
 printed in 1801. 
 
 P. L. F. 
 
THE EDITOR TO THE PUBLIC. 
 
 'TpHE First Nine Letters in this Collection, published in 
 the beginning of the Year 1788, were occasioned by an 
 alarming hesitation of some States to ratify the Constitution 
 proposed by the Federal Convention in 1787. 
 
 They appeared separately in News-papers ; and have never 
 been published together, before the present Edition. 
 
 Some Notes are added of Extracts from " The Rights of 
 Man" published about three years after these Letters, contain- 
 ing similar sentiments, expressed with a remarkable resemblance 
 of Language, especially on the two great subject — the organi- 
 zation of a constitution from original rights, and the formation 
 of government from contributed rights, both of so much im- 
 portance in laying regular foundations of Civil Society, and 
 consequently in securing the advancement of human happi- 
 ness. 
 
LETTER I. 
 
 *TPHE Constitution proposed by the Federal Convention 
 now engages the fixed attention of America. 
 
 Every person appears to be affected. Those who wish the 
 adoption of the plan, consider its rejection as the source of 
 endless contests, confusions, and misfortunes ; and they also 
 consider a resolution to alter, without previously adopting it, 
 as a rejection. 
 
 Those who oppose the plan, are influenced by different 
 views. Some of them are friends, others of them are enemies, 
 to The United States. [2] The latter are of two classes ; 
 either men without principles or fortunes, who think they 
 may have a chance to mend their circumstances, with im- 
 punity, under a weak government, or in public convulsions, 
 but cannot make them worse even by the last — or men who 
 have been always averse to the revolution ; and though at 
 first confounded by that event, yet, their hopes reviving with 
 the declension of our affairs, have since persuaded themselves, 
 that at length the people, tired out with their continued dis- 
 tresses, will return to their former connection with Great 
 Britain. To argue with these opposers, would be vain — The 
 tother opposers of the plan deserve the highest respect. 
 
 What concerns all, should be considered by all ; and indi- 
 viduals may injure a whole society, by not declaring their sen- 
 timents. It is therefore not only their right, but their duty,' 
 to declare them. Weak advocates of a good cause or artful 
 advocates of a bad one, may endeavour to stop such com- 
 munications, or to discredit them by clamour and calumny. 
 This, however, is not the age for such tricks of controversy. 
 Men have suffered so severely by being deceived upon sub- 
 jects of the highest import, those of religion and freedom, 
 that truth becomes infinitely valuable to them, not as a mat- 
 ter of curious speculation, but of beneficial practice — A spirit 
 
1 66 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 of inquiry is excited, information diffused, judgment strength- 
 ened. 
 
 Before this tribunal of the people, let every one freely 
 speak, what he really thinks, [3] but with so sincere a rever- 
 ence for the cause he ventures to discuss, as to use the utmost 
 caution, lest he should lead any into errors, upon a point of 
 such sacred concern as the public happiness. 
 
 It is not the design of this address, to describe the present 
 derangement of our affairs, the mischiefs that must ensue 
 from its continuance, the horrors, of a total dissolution of the 
 union, or of the division of it into partial confederacies. Nor 
 is it intended to describe the evils that will result from pur- 
 suing the plan of another Federal Convention ; as if a better 
 temper of conciliation, or a more satisfactory harmony of de- 
 cisions, could be expected from men, after their minds are 
 agitated with disgusts and disappointments, than before they 
 were thus disturbed ; though from an uncontradicted asser- 
 tion it appears, that without such provocations, the difficulty 
 of reconciling the interests of the several states was so near 
 to insuperable, in the late convention, that after many weeks 
 spent in the most faithful labours to promote concord, the 
 members were upon the very point of dispersing in the utmost 
 disorder, jealousy and resentment, and leaving the states ex- 
 posed to all the tempests of passions, that have been so fatal 
 to confederacies of republics. 
 
 All these things, with observations on particular articles of 
 the constitution, have been laid before the public, and the 
 writer of this address means not to repeat what has been 
 already said. What he wishes, is to simplify [4] the subject, 
 so as to facilitate the inquiries of his fellow citizens. 
 
 Many are the objections made to the system proposed. 
 They should be distinguished. Some may be called local, be- 
 cause they spring from the supposed interests of individual 
 states. Thus, for instance, some inhabitants of large states 
 may desire the system to be so altered, that they may possess 
 more authority in the decisions of the government ; or some 
 inhabitants of commercial states may desire it to be so al- 
 tered, that the advantages of trade may center almost wholly 
 
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 1 67 
 
 among themselves ; and this predilection they may think com- 
 patible with the common welfare. Their judgment being thus 
 warp'd, at the beginning of their deliberations, objections are 
 accumulated as very important, that, without this preposses- 
 sion, would never have obtained their approbation. Certain 
 it is, that strong understandings may be so influenced by this 
 insulated patriotism, as to doubt — whether general benefits 
 can be communicated by a general government.* 
 
 Probably nothing would operate so much for the correc- 
 tion of these errors, as the perusal of the accounts transmit- 
 ted to us by the ancients, of the calamities occasioned in 
 Greece by a conduct founded on similar mistakes. They are 
 expressly ascribed to this cause — that each city meditated a 
 
 part on its own profit and ends insomuch that those who 
 
 seemed to contend for union, could never relinquish their own 
 in- [5] terests and advancement, while they deliberated for the 
 public. 
 
 Heaven grant ! that our countrymen may pause in time — 
 duly estimate the present moment — and solemnly reflect — 
 whether their measures may not tend to draw down the same 
 distractions upon us, that desolated Greece. 
 
 They may now tolerably judge from the proceedings of 
 the Federal Convention and of other conventions, what are 
 the sentiments of America upon her present and future pros- 
 pects. Let the voice of her distress be venerated — and ad- 
 hering to the generous Virginian declaration, let them resolve 
 to " cling to Union as the political Rock of our Salvation." 
 
 FABIUS. 
 Philadelphia, ) 
 April 10, 1788. j 
 
 • See some late publications. 
 
1 68 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 [6] LETTER II. 
 
 But besides the objections originating from the before men- 
 tioned cause, that have been called local, there are other 
 objections that are supposed to arise from maxims of liberty 
 and policy. — 
 
 Hence it is inferred, that the proposed system has such 
 inherent vices, as must necessarily produce a bad administra- 
 tion, and at length the oppression of a monarchy and aris- 
 tocracy in the federal officers. 
 
 The writer of this address being convinced by as exact an 
 investigation as he could make, that such mistakes may lead 
 to the perdition of his country, esteems it his indispensable 
 duty, strenuously to contend, that — the power of the people 
 pervading the proposed system, together with the strong con- 
 federation of the states, forms an adequate security against 
 every danger that has been apprehended. 
 
 If this single assertion can be supported by facts and argu- 
 ments, there will be reason to hope, that anxieties will be 
 removed from the minds of some citizens, who are truly 
 devoted to the interests of America, and who have been 
 thrown into perplexities, by the mazes of multiplied and 
 intricate disquisitions. 
 
 The objectors agree, that the confederation of the states 
 will be strong, according to the system proposed, and so 
 strong, that many of them loudly complain of that strength. 
 On this part of the assertion, there is no dispute : But some 
 of the objections that have been published, [7] strike at an- 
 other part of the principle assumed, and deny, that the sys- 
 tem is sufficiently founded on the power of the people. 
 
 The course of regular inquiry demands, that these objec- 
 tions should be considered in the first place. If they are 
 removed, then all the rest of the objections, concerning un- 
 necessary taxations, standing armies, the abolishment of trial 
 by jury, the liberty of the press, the freedom of commerce, 
 the judicial, executive, and legislative authorities of the sev- 
 eral states, and the rights of citizens, and the other abuses of 
 
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 169 
 
 federal government, must, of consequence, be rejected, if the 
 principle contains the salutary, purifying, and preserving quali- 
 ties attributed to it. The question then will be — not what 
 may be done, when the government shall be turned into a 
 tyranny ; but how the government can be so turned ? 
 
 Thus unembarrassed by subordinate discussions, we may 
 come fairly to the contemplation of that superior point, and 
 be better enabled to discover, whether our attention to it will 
 afford any lights, whereby we may be conducted to peace, 
 liberty, and safety. 
 
 The objections, denying that the system proposed is suffi- 
 ciently founded on the power of the people, state, that the 
 number of the federal trustees or officers, is too small, and 
 that they are to hold their offices too long, 
 
 One would really have supposed, that smallness of number 
 could not be termed a cause of danger, as influence must in- 
 crease with enlargement. If this is a fault, it will soon be 
 cor- [8] rected, as an addition will be often made to the num- 
 ber of the senators, and a much greater and more frequently, 
 to that of the representatives; and in all probability much 
 sooner, than we shall be able and willing to bear the expence 
 of the addition. 
 
 As to the senate, it never can be, and it never ought to be 
 large, if it is to possess the powers which almost all the ob- 
 jectors seem inclined to allot to it, as will be evident to every 
 intelligent person, who considers those powers. 
 
 Though small, let it be remembered, that it is to be created 
 by the sovereignties of the several states ; that is, by the per- 
 sons, whom the people of each state shall judge to be most 
 worthy, and who, surely, will be religiously attentive to mak- 
 ing a selection, in which the interest and honour of their state 
 will be so deeply concerned. It should be remembered too, 
 that this is the same manner, in which the members of Con- 
 gress are now appointed ; and that herein, the sovereignties 
 of the states are so intimately involved, that however a re- 
 nunciation of part of these powers may be desired by some 
 of the states, it never will be obtained from the rest of them. 
 Peaceable, fraternal, and benevolent as these are, they think, 
 the concessions they have made, ought to satisfy all. 
 
I TO LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 That the senate may always be kept full, without the in- 
 terference of Congress, it is provided in the system, that if 
 vacancies happen by resignation or otherwise, during the re- 
 cess of the legislature of the state, the executive thereof may 
 make temporary appointments, until the [9] next meeting of 
 the legislature, which shall then fill up such vacancies. 
 
 As to the house of representatives, it is to consist of a num- 
 ber of persons, not exceeding one for every thirty thousand : 
 But each state shall have at least one representative. The 
 electors will reside, widely dispersed, over an extensive coun- 
 try. Cabal and corruption will be as impracticable, as, on 
 such occasions, human institutions, can render them. The will 
 of freemen, thus circumstanced, will give the fiat. The purity 
 of election thus obtained, will amply compensate for the sup- 
 posed defect of representation ; and the members, thus chosen, 
 will be most apt to harmonize in their proceedings, with the gen- 
 eral interests, feelings, and sentiments of the people. 
 
 Allowing such an increase of population as, from experi- 
 ence and a variety of causes, may be expected, the represent- 
 atives, in a short period, will amount to several hundreds, and 
 most probably long before any change of manners for the 
 worse, that might tempt or encourage our ruler to mal-admin- 
 istration, will take place on this continent. 
 
 That this house may always be kept full, without the in- 
 terference of Congress, it is provided in the system, that when 
 vacancies happen in any state, the executive authority thereof 
 shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies. 
 
 But, it seems, the number of the federal ofificers is not 
 only too small : They are to hold their offices too long. 
 
 [10] This objection surely applies not to the house of repre- 
 sentatives, who are to be chosen every two years, especially if 
 the extent of empire, and the vast variety and importance of 
 their deliberations, be considered. In that view, they and 
 the senate will actually be not only legislative but also diplo- 
 matic bodies, perpetually engaged in the arduous talk of 
 reconciling, in their determinations, the interests of several 
 sovereign states, not to insist on the necessity of a compe- 
 tent knowledge of foreign affairs, relative to the states. 
 
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 17I 
 
 They who desire the representatives to be chosen every 
 year, should exceed Newton in calculations, if they attempt 
 to evince, that the public business would, in that case, be bet- 
 ter transacted, than when they are chosen every two years. 
 The idea, however, should be excused for the zeal that 
 prompted it. 
 
 Is monarchy or aristocracy to be produced, without the 
 consent of the people, by a house of representatives, thus 
 constituted ? 
 
 It has been unanimously agreed by the friends of liberty, 
 that frequent elections of the representatives of the people, are 
 the sovereign remedy of all grievances in a free government. — 
 Let us pass on to the senate. 
 
 At the end of two years after the first election, one third 
 is to be elected for six years ; and at the end of four years, 
 another third. Thus one third will constantly have but four 
 years, and another but two years to continue in office. The 
 whole number at first will amount to [11] twenty-six, will be 
 regularly renovated by the biennial election of one third, and 
 will be overlooked, and overawed by the house of representa- 
 tives, nearly three times more numerous at the beginning, 
 rapidly and vastly augmenting, and more enabled to overlook 
 and overawe them, by holding their offices for two years, as 
 thereby they will acquire better information, respecting na- 
 tional affairs. These representatives will also command the 
 public purse, as all bills for raising revenue, must originate in 
 their house. 
 
 As in the Roman armies, when the Principes and Hastati 
 had failed, there were still the Triarii, who generally put 
 things to rights, so we shall be supplied with another re- 
 source. 
 
 We are to have a president, to superintend, and if he 
 thinks the public weal requires it, to controul any act of the 
 representatives and senate. 
 
 This president is to be chosen, not by the people at large, 
 because it may not be possible, that all the freemen of the 
 empire should always have the necessary information, for 
 directing their choice of such an officer; nor by Congress, 
 
172 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 lest it should disturb the national councils ; nor by any one 
 standing body whatever, for fear of undue influence. 
 
 He is to be chosen in the following manner. Each state 
 shall appoint, as the legislature thereof may direct, a number 
 of electors, equal to the whole number of senators and repre- 
 sentatives, to which the state shall be entitled in Congress : 
 but no senator or representative, or person holding an office 
 of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed 
 an elector. As these elec- [12] tors are to be appointed, as the 
 legislature of each state may direct, the fairest, freest opening 
 is given, for each state to chuse such electors for this purpose, 
 as shall be most signally qualified to fulfil the trust. 
 
 To guard against undue influence these electors, thus 
 chosen, are to meet in their respective states, and vote by bal- 
 lot ; and still further to guard against it. Congress may de- 
 termine the time of chusing the electors, and the days on 
 which they shall give their votes — which day shall be the 
 same throughout the United States. All the votes from the 
 several states are to be transmitted to Congress, and therein 
 counted. The president is to hold his office for four years. 
 
 When these electors meet in their respective states, utterly 
 vain will be the unreasonable suggestions derived for partial- 
 ity. The electors may throw away their votes, mark, with 
 public disappointment, some person improperly favored by 
 them, or justly revering the duties of their office, dedicate 
 their votes to the best interests of their country. 
 
 This president will be no dictator. Two thirds of the re- 
 presentatives and the senate may pass any law, notwithstand- 
 ing his dissent ; and he is removable and punishable for mis- 
 behaviour. 
 
 Can this limited, fluctuating senate, placed amidst such 
 powers, if it should become willing, ever become able, to 
 make America pass under its yoke ? The senators will gener- 
 ally be inhabitants of places very distant one from another. 
 They can scarcely be acquainted till [13] they meet. Few of 
 them can ever act together for any length of time, unless 
 their good conduct recommends them to a re-election ; and 
 then there will be frequent changes in a body dependant upon 
 
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 1 73 
 
 the acts of other bodies, the legislatures of the several states, 
 that are altering every year. Machiavel and Caesar Borgia 
 together could not form a conspiracy in such a senate, de-. 
 structive to any but themselves and their accomplices. 
 
 It is essential to every good government, that there should 
 be some council, permanent enough to get a due knowledge 
 of affairs internal and external ; so constituted, that by some 
 deaths or removals, the current of information should not be 
 impeded or disturbed ; and so regulated, as to be responsible 
 to, and controulable by the people. Where can the authority 
 for combining these advantages, be more safely, beneficially, 
 or satisfactorily lodged, than in the senate, to be formed ac- 
 cording to the plan proposed ? Shall parts of the trust be 
 committed to the president, with counsellors who shall sub- 
 scribe their advices ?* If assaults upon liberty are to be ' 
 guarded against, and surely they ought to be with sleepless 
 vigilance, why should we depend more on the commander in 
 chief of the army and navy of The United States, and of the 
 militia of the several states, and on his counsellors, whom he 
 may secretly influence, than of the senate to be appointed by 
 the persons exercising the sovereign authority of the several 
 states? In truth, the [14] objections against the powers of 
 the senate originated from a desire to have them, or at least 
 some of them, vested in a body, in which the several states 
 should be represented, in proportion to the number of inhabr 
 itants, as in the house of representatives. This method is un- 
 attainable, and the wish for it should be dismissed from every 
 mind, that desires the existence of a confederation. 
 
 What assurance can be given, or what probability be as- 
 signed, that a board of counsellors would continue honest, 
 longer than the senate ? Or, that they would possess more 
 useful information, respecting all the states, than the senators 
 of all the states? It appears needless to pursue this argu- 
 ment any further. 
 
 How varied, balanced, concordant, and benign, is the sys- 
 tem proposed to us ? To secure the freedom, and promote 
 the happiness of these and future states, by giving the will of 
 the people a decisive influence over the whole, and over all the 
 • See late publications. 
 
J 74 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 parts, with what a comprehensive arrangement does it em- 
 brace different modes of representation, from an election by a 
 county to an election by an empire ? What are the compli- 
 cated ballot, and all the refined devices of Venice for main- 
 taining her aristocracy, when compared with this plain-dealing 
 work for diffusing the blessings of equal liberty and common 
 prosperity over myriads of the human race ? 
 
 All the foundations before mentioned, of the federal gov- 
 ernment, are by the proposed system to be established, in the 
 most clear, strong, [15] positive, unequivocal expressions, of 
 which our language is capable. Magna charta, or any other 
 law, never contained clauses more decisive and emphatic. 
 While the people of these states have sense, they^ will under- 
 stand them ; and while they have spirit, they will make them 
 to be observed. 
 
 FABIUS. 
 
 [16] LETTER III. 
 
 The writer of this address hopes, that he will now be 
 thought so disengaged from the objections against the princi- 
 ple assumed, that he may be excused for recurring to his as- 
 sertion, that — the power of the people pervading the proposed 
 system, together with the strong confederation of the states, 
 will form an adequate security against every danger that has 
 been apprehended. 
 
 It is a mournful, but may be a useful truth, that the liberty 
 of single republics has generally been destroyed by some of 
 the citizens, and of confederated republics, by some of the 
 associated states. 
 
 It is more pleasing, and may be more profitable to reflect, 
 that, their tranquility and prosperity have commonly been 
 promoted, in proportion to the strength of their governinent 
 for protecting the worthy against the licentious. 
 
 As in forming a political society, each individual contrib- 
 utes some of his rights, in order that he may, from a common 
 stock of rights, derive greater benefits, than he could from 
 
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 17S 
 
 merely his own ; so, in forming a confederation, each political 
 society should contribute such a share of their rights, as will, 
 from a common stock of these rights, produce the largest quan- 
 tity of benefits for them. 
 
 But, what is that share ? and, how to be managed ? Mo- 
 mentous questions ! Here, flattery is treason ; and error, 
 destruction. 
 
 [17] Are they unanswerable? No. Our most gracious 
 Creator does not condemn us to sigh for unattainable blessed- 
 ness : But one thing he demands — that we should seek for 
 happiness in his way, and not in our own. 
 
 Humility and benevolence must take place of pride and 
 overweening selfishness. Reason, rising above these mists, 
 will then discover to us, that we cannot be true to ourselves, 
 without being true to others — that to love our neighbours as 
 ourselves, is to love ourselves in the best manner — that to give, 
 is to gain — and, that we never consult our own happiness 
 more effectually, than when we most endeavour to correspond 
 with the divine designs, by communicating happiness, as much 
 as we can, to our fellow-creatures. Inestimable truth ! suffi- 
 cient, if they do not barely ask what it is, to melt tyrants into 
 men, and to soothe the inflamed minds of a multitude into 
 mildness — Inestimable truth ! which our Maker in his provi- 
 dence, enables us, not only to talk and write about, but to 
 adopt in practice of vast extent, and of instructive example. 
 
 Let us now enquire, if there be not some principle, simple 
 as the laws of nature in other instances, from which, as from 
 a source, the many benefits of society are deduced. 
 
 We may with' reverence say, that our Creator designed 
 men for society, because otherwise they cannot be happy. 
 They cannot be happy without freedom ; nor free without se- 
 curity ; that is, without the absence of fear ; nor thus secure, 
 without society. The con- [18] elusion is strictly syllogistic — 
 that men cannot be free without society. Of course, they 
 cannot be equally free without society, which freedom pro- 
 duces the greatest happiness. 
 
 As these premises are invincible, we have advanced a con- 
 siderable way in our enquiry upon this deeply interesting sub- 
 
176 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 ject. If we can determine, what share of his rights, every in- 
 dividual must contribute to the eommon stock of rights in form- 
 ing a society, for obtaining equal freedom, we determine at 
 the same time, what share of their rights each political society 
 must contribute to the common stock or rights in forming a 
 confederation, which is only a larger society, for obtaining 
 equal freedom : For, if the deposite be not proportioned to 
 the magnitude of the association in the latter case, it will 
 generate the same mischief among the component parts of it, 
 from their inequality, that would result from a defective con- 
 tribution to association in the former case, among the com- 
 ponent parts of it, from their inequality. 
 
 Each individual then must contribute such a share of his 
 rights, as is necessary for attaining that security that is essen- 
 tial to freedom ; and he is bound to make this contribution 
 by the law of his nature, which prompts him to a participated 
 happiness ; that is, by the command of his creator ; therefore, 
 he must submit his will, in what concerns all, to the will of all, 
 that is of the whole society. What does he lose by this sub- 
 mission ; The power of doing [19] injuries to others — and the 
 dread of suffering injuries from them. What does he gain by 
 it ? The aid of those associated with him, for his relief from 
 the incommodities of mental or bodily weakness — the plea- 
 sure for which his heart is formed — of doing good — protection 
 against injuries — a capacity of enjoying his undelegated rights 
 to the best advantage — a repeal of his fears — and tranquility 
 of mind — or, in other words, that perfect liberty better de- 
 scribed in the Holy Scriptures, than any where else, in these 
 expressions — " When every man shall sit under his vine, and 
 under his fig-tree, and none shall make him afraid." 
 
 The like submission, with a correspondent expansion and 
 accommodation, must be made between states, for obtaining 
 the like benefits in a confederation. Men are the materials of 
 both. As the largest number is but a junction of units — a 
 confederation is but an assemblage of individuals. The aus- 
 picious influence of the law of his nature, upon which the 
 happiness of man depends in society, must attend him in con- 
 federation, or he becomes unhappy ; for confederation should 
 
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. \^^ 
 
 promote the happiness of individuals, or it does not answer 
 the intended purpose. Herein there is a progression, not a 
 contradiction. As man, he becomes a citizen ; as a citizen, he 
 becomes a federalist. The generation of one, is not the de- 
 struction of the other. He carries into society his naked 
 rights : These thereby improved, he carries still forward into 
 confederation. If that sacred law before mentioned, is not 
 here [20] observed, the confederation would not be real, but 
 pretended. He would confide, and be deceived.* 
 
 * " The error of those who reason by precedent, drawn from antiquity, 
 respecting the rights of man, is, that they do not go far enough into antiquity. 
 They do not go the whole way. They stop in some of the intermediate stages 
 of an hundred or u. thousand years, and produce what was then done, as a 
 rule for the present day. This is no authority at all. If we travel still further 
 into antiquity, we shall find a direct contrary opinion and practice prevailing ; 
 and if antiquity is to be authority, a thousand such authorities may be pro- 
 duced, successively contradicting each other : but if we proceed on, at last we 
 shall come out right : We shall then come to the time when man came from 
 the hand of his Maker. What was he then ? Man. Man was his high and 
 
 only title, and a higher cannot be given him We are now got at the 
 
 origin of man, and at the origin of his rights. Every history of the crea- 
 tion, and every traditionary account, whether from the lettered or unlettered 
 world, however they may vary in their opinion or belief of certain particulars, 
 all agree in establishing one point, the unity of man ; by which I mean that 
 man is all of one degree, and consequently that all men are born equal, and 
 with equal natural rights. By considering man in this light, it places him in a 
 close connection with all his duties, whether to his Creator, or to the creation, 
 of which he is a part ; and it is only where he forgets his origin, or, to use a 
 more fashionable phrase, his birth and family, that he becomes dissolute. 
 
 " Hitherto we have spoken only (and that but in part) of the natural rights of 
 man. We have now to consider the civil rights of man, and to shew how the 
 one originates out of the other. — Man did not enter into society, to become 
 worse than he was before, nor to have less rights than he had before, but to 
 have those rights better secured. His natural rights are the foundation of all 
 his civil rights. But in order to pursue this distinction with more precision, it 
 will be necessary to mark the different qualities of natural and civil rights. 
 
 " A few words will explain this. Natural rights are those which appertain 
 to man in the right of his existence— civil rights are those which appertain to 
 man in right of his being a member of society. Every civil right has for its 
 foundation some natural right pre-existing in the individual, but to unite his in- 
 dividual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently competent. Of this kind are all 
 those which relate to security and protection. 
 
 " From this short review it will be easy to distinguish between that class of 
 natural rights which man retains after entering into society, and those which 
 
178 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 [21] The dilemma is inevitable. There must either be one 
 will, or several wills. If but one will, all the people are con- 
 cerned : if several wills, few comparatively are concerned. Sur- 
 prizing ! that this doctrine should be contended for by those, 
 who declare, that the constitution is not founded on a bottom 
 broad enough ; and, though the whole people of the United 
 States are to be ^r^^/j/ represented in it in three different modes 
 of representation, and their servants will have the most ad- 
 vantageous situations and opportunities of acquiring all re- 
 quisite information for the welfare of the [22] whole union, 
 yet insist for a privilege of opposing, obstructing, and con- 
 founding all their measures taken with common consent for 
 the general weal, by the delays, negligences, rivalries, or other 
 selfish views of parts of the union. 
 
 Thus, while one state should be relied upon by the union 
 for giving aid, upon a recommendation of Congress, to an- 
 other in distress, the latter might be ruined ; and the state re 
 lied upon, might suppose, it would gain by such an event. 
 
 When any persons speak of a consideration, do they, or do 
 they not acknowledge, that the whole is interested in the 
 safety of every part — in the agreement of parts — in the rela- 
 tion of parts [23] to one another — to the whole — or, to other 
 societies ? If they do — then, the authority of the whole, must 
 be co-extensive with its interests — and if it is, the will of the 
 whole must and ought in such cases to govern ; or else the 
 whole would have interests without an authority to manage 
 them — a position which prejudice itself cannot digest. 
 
 If they do not acknowledge, that the whole is thus inter- 
 ested, the conversation should cease. Such persons mean not 
 a confederation, but something else. 
 
 he throws into common stock as a member of society. The natural rights which 
 he retains, are all those in which the power to execute is as perfect in the indi- 
 vidual as the right itself. — The natural rights which are not retained, are all 
 those in which, though the right is perfect in the individual, the power to exe- 
 cute them is defective : they answer not his purpose — those he deposits in the com- 
 mon stock of society, and takes the arm of society, of which he is a part, in 
 preference and in addition to his own. Society grants him nothing. Every 
 man is a proprietor in society, and draws on the capital as a matter of right." — 
 " Rights of Man," 1791, page 30, 31. 
 
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 1 79 
 
 As to the idea, that this superintending sovereign will must 
 of consequence destroy the subordinate sovereignties of the 
 several states, it is begging a concession of the question, by 
 inferring, that a manifest and great usefulness must necessarily 
 end in abuse ; and not only so, but it requires an extinction 
 of the principle of all society: for the subordinate sovereign- 
 ties, or, in other words, the undelegated rights of the several 
 states, in a confederation, stand upon the very same founda- 
 tion with the undelegated rights of individuals in a society, 
 the federal sovereign will being composed of the subordinate 
 sovereign wills of the several confederated states. As some 
 persons seem to think, a bill of rights is the best security of 
 rights, the sovereignties of the several states have this best 
 security by the proposed constitution, and more than this best 
 security, for they are not barely declared to be rights, but are 
 taken into it as component parts for their perpetual preserva- 
 tion — by themselves. In short, the government of each state 
 is, and is to be, [24] sovereign and supreme in all matters that 
 relate to each state only. It is to be subordinate barely in 
 those matters that relate to the whole ; and it will be their 
 own faults if the several states suffer the federal sovereignty 
 to interfere in things of their respective jurisdictions. An in- 
 stance of such interference with regard to any single state, 
 will be a dangerous precedent as to all, and therefore will be 
 guarded against by all, as the trustees or servants of the sev- 
 eral states will not dare, if they retain their senses, so to vio- 
 late the independent sovereignty of their respective states, 
 that justly darling object of American affections, to which they 
 are responsible, besides being endeared by all the charities of 
 life. 
 
 The common sense of mankind agrees to the devolutions 
 of individual wills in society ; and if it has not been as uni- 
 versally assented to in confederation, the reasons are evident, 
 and worthy of being retained in remembrance by Americans. 
 They were want of opportunities, or the loss of them, through 
 defects of knowledge and virtue. The principle, however, 
 has been sufficiently vindicated in imperfect combinations, as 
 their prosperity has generally been commensurate to its opera- 
 tion. 
 
l8o LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 How beautifully and forcibly does the inspired Apostle 
 Paul, argue upon a sublimer subject, with a train of reasoning 
 strictly applicable to the present ? His words are — " If the 
 foot shall say, because I am not the hand, I am not of the 
 body ; is it therefore not of the body ? and if the ear shall 
 say, because I am [25] not the eye, I am not of the body; is 
 it therefore not of the body?" As plainly inferring, as could 
 be done in that allegorical manner, the strongest censure of 
 such partial discontents and dissentions, especially, as his 
 meaning is enforced by his description of the benefits of union 
 in these expressions — " But, now they are many members, 
 yet but one body : and the eye cannot say to the hand, I have 
 no need of thee." 
 
 When the commons of Rome upon a rupture with the 
 Senate, seceded in arms at the Mons sacer, Menemius Agrip- 
 pa used the like allusion to the human body, in his famous 
 apologue of a quarrel among some of the members. The un- 
 polished but honest-hearted Romans of that day, understood 
 him, and were appeased. 
 
 Another comparison has been made by the learned, between 
 a natural and a political body ; and no wonder indeed, when 
 the title of the latter was borrowed from the resemblance. It 
 has therefore been justly observed, that if a mortification 
 takes place in one or some of the limbs, and the rest of the 
 body is sound, remedies may be applied, and not only the 
 contagion prevented from spreading, but the diseased part or 
 parts saved by the connection with the body, and restored to 
 former usefulness. When general putrefaction prevails, death 
 is to be expected. History sacred and profane tells us, that, 
 corruption of manners sinks nations into slavery. 
 
 FABIUS. 
 
LETTi;jlS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. l8l 
 
 [26] LETTER IV. 
 
 Another question remains. How are the contributed 
 rights to be managed? The resolution has been in great 
 measure anticipated, by what has been said concerning the 
 system proposed. Some few reflections may perhaps finish 
 it. 
 
 If it be considered separately, a constitution is the organiza- 
 tion of the contributed rights in society. Government is the 
 exercise of them. It is intended for the benefit of the gov- 
 erned ; of course can have no just powers but what conduce 
 to that end : and the awfulness of the trust is demonstrated 
 in this — that it is founded on the nature of man, that is, on 
 the will of his Maker, and is therefore sacred. It is then an 
 offence against Heaven, to violate that trust.* 
 
 [27] If the organization of a constitution be defective, it may 
 be amended, 
 
 A good constitution promotes, but not always produces a 
 good administration. 
 
 * " We have now traced Man from a natural individual to a member of 
 society Civil power, properly considered as such is made up of the aggre- 
 gate of that class of the natural rights, which become defective in the indi- 
 vidual in point of power, and answers not his purpose ; but when collected into 
 
 a focus, becomes competent to the purpose of every one. Let us now apply 
 
 those principles to government, 
 
 "Individuals themselves, each in his own personal and sovereign right, en- 
 tered into a compact with each other, to produce a government ; and this is the 
 only mode in which governments have a right to arise, and the only principle 
 on which they have a right to exist. 
 
 " A constitution is not a thing in name only, but in fact. — It has not an ideal 
 but a real existence, and wherever it cannot be produced in a visible form, 
 there is none. A constitution is a thing antecedent to a government ; and a 
 government is only the creature of a constitution. — A constitution of a country 
 is not the act of its government, but of the people constituting a government. 
 It is the body of elements to which you can refer, and quote article by article ; 
 and which contains the principles on which the goverriment shall be established, 
 the manner in which it shall be organized, the powers it shall have, the mode 
 of election, the duration of parliaments, or by what other name such bodies 
 may be called, the powers which the executive part of the government shall 
 have ; and, in fine, every thing that relates to the complete organization of a 
 civil government, and the principles on which it shall act, and by which it shall 
 be bound."—" Rights of Man," page 35, 36. 
 
1 82 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 The government must never be lodged in a single body. 
 From such an one, with an unlucky composition of its parts, 
 rash, partial, illegal, and when intoxicated with success, even 
 cruel, insolent and contemptible edits, may at times be ex- 
 pected. By these, if other mischiefs do not follow, the na- 
 tional dignity may be impaired. 
 
 [28] Several inconveniences might attend a division of the 
 government into two bodies, that probably would be avoided 
 in another arrangement. 
 
 The judgment of the most enlightened among mankind, 
 confirmed by multiplied experiments, points out the propriety 
 of government being committed to such a number of great 
 departments, as can be introduced without confusion, distinct 
 in ofifice, and yet connected in operation. It seems to be 
 agreed, that three or four of these departments are a compe- 
 tent number. 
 
 [29] Such a repartition appears well calculated to express 
 the sense of the people, and to encrease the safety and repose 
 of the governed, which with the advancement of their happi- 
 ness in other respects, are the objects of government ; as there- 
 by there will be more obstructions interposed ; against errors, 
 feuds, and frauds, in the administration, and the extraordi- 
 nary interference of the people need be less frequent. Thus, 
 wars, tumults, and uneasinesses, are avoided. The depart- 
 ments so constituted, may therefore be said to be balanced. 
 But, notwithstanding, it must be granted, that a bad admin- 
 
 "What is a constitution? it is tlie form of government, delineated by the 
 mighty hand of the people, in which certain first principles or fundamental 
 laws are established. The constitution is certain and fixed ; it contains the 
 permanent will of the people, and is the supreme law of the land ; it is para- 
 mount to the power of the legislature, and can be revoked or altered only by 
 the authority that made it. — What are legislatures ? creatures of the constitu- 
 tion, they owe their existence to the constitution — they derive their powers 
 from the constitution. — It is their commission, and therefore all their acts must 
 be conformable to it, or else void. The constitution is the work or will of the 
 people themselves, in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity. Law is 
 the work or will of the legislature in their derivative capacity." 
 
 Judge Patterson's charge to the Jury in the Wioming case of Vanhorne's 
 lessee against Dorrance ; tried at the circuit-court for the United States, held 
 at Philadelphia, April term, 1795. 
 
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 1 83 
 
 istration may take place.— What is then to be done ? The 
 answer is instantly found — Let the Fasces be lowered before 
 — the supreme sovereignty of the people. // is their duty to 
 watch, and their right to take care, that the constitution be pre- 
 served ; or in the Roman phrase on perilous occasions — to pro- 
 vide, that the republic receive no damage. 
 
 Political bodies are properly said to be balanced, with re- 
 spect to this primary origination and ultimate destination, not 
 to any intrinsic or constitutional properties.* It [30] is the 
 power from which they proceed, and which they serve, that 
 truly and of right balances them.f 
 
 But, as a good constitution not always produces a good 
 administration, a defective one not always excludes it. Thus 
 in governments very different from those of United America, 
 general manners and customs, improvement in knowledge, 
 and the education and disposition of princes, not unfre- 
 quently soften the features, [31] and qualify the defects. 
 Jewels of value are substituted, in the place of the rare 
 and genuine orient of higest price and brightest lustre : 
 and though the sovereigns cannot even in their ministers, be 
 brought to account by the governed, yet there are instances 
 of their conduct indicating a veneration for the rights of the 
 
 * Constitutional properties are only, as has been observed at the beginning 
 of this letter, parts in the organization of the contributed rights. As long as 
 those parts preserve the orders assigned to them respectively by the constitu- 
 tion, they may so far be said to be balanced : but, when one part, without 
 being sufficiently checked by the rest, abuses its power to the manifest 
 danger of public happiness, or when the several parts abuse their respective 
 powers so as to involve the commonwealth in the like peril, the people must 
 restore things to that order, from which their functionaries have departed. If 
 the people suffer this living principle of watchfulness and controul to be extin- 
 guished among them, they will assuredly not long afterwards experience that 
 of their "temple," "there shall not be left one stone upon another, that shall 
 not be thrown down." 
 
 f When the controuling power is in a constitution, it has the nation for its 
 support, and the natural and the political controuling powers are together. 
 The laws which are enacted by the governments, controul men only as 
 individuals, but the nation, thro' its constitution controuls the whole govern- 
 ment, and has a natural ability to do so. The final controuling power, there- 
 fore, and the original constituting power, are one and the same power. — " Rights 
 of Man," 1792. part 2d, b. 4. page 42. 
 
1 84 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 people, and an internal conviction of the guilt that attends 
 their violation. Some of them appear to be fathers of their 
 countries. Revered princes ! Friends of mankind ! May- 
 peace be in their lives — and in their deaths — Hope. 
 
 By this superior will of the people, is meant a reasonable, 
 not a distracted will. When frenzy seizes the mass, it would 
 be equal madness to think of their happiness, that is, of their 
 freedom. They will infallibly have a Philip or a Caesar, to 
 bleed them into soberness of mind. At present we are cool ; 
 and let us attend to our business. 
 
 Our goverment under the proposed confederation, will be 
 guarded by a repetition of the strongest cautions against ex- 
 cesses. In the senate the sovereignties of the several states 
 will be equally represented ; in the house of representatives, 
 the people of the whole union will be equally represented ; 
 and, in the president, and the federal independent judges, so 
 much concerned in the execution of the laws, and in the de- 
 termination of their constitutionality, the sovereignties of the 
 several states and the people of the whole union, may be con- 
 sidered as conjointly represented. 
 
 [32] Where was there ever and where is there now upon 
 the face of the earth, a government so diversified and at- 
 tempered ? If a work formed with so much deliberation, so 
 respectful and affectionate an attention to the interests, feel- 
 ings, and sentiments of all United America, will not satisfy, 
 what would satisfy all United America ? 
 
 It seems highly probable, that those who would reject this 
 labour of public love, would also have rejected the Heaven- 
 taught institution of trial by jury, had they been consulted 
 upon its establishment. Would they not have cried out, that 
 there never was framed so detestable, so paltry, and so tyran- 
 nical a device for extinguishing freedom, and throwing un- 
 bounded domination into the hands of the king and barons, 
 under a contemptible pretence of preserving it ? " What ! 
 Can freedom be preserved by imprisoning its guardians ? Can 
 freedom be preserved, by keeping twelve men closely confined 
 without meat, drink, fire, or candle, until they unanimously 
 agree, and this to be innumerably repeated ? Can freedom be 
 
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 1 85 
 
 preserved, by thus delivering up a number of freemen to a 
 monarch and an aristocracy, fortified by dependant and obe- 
 dient judges and officers, to be shut up, until under duress 
 they speak as they are ordered ? Why cannot the twelve 
 jurors separate,* after hearing the evidence, return to their 
 respective homes, and there take time,* and think of the mat- 
 ter at their ease ?* Is there not a variety of [33] ways, in which 
 causes have been, and can be tried, without this tremendous, 
 unprecedented inquisition ? Why then is it insisted on ; but 
 because the fabricators of it know that it will, and intend that 
 it shall reduce the people to slavery ? Away with it — Free- 
 men will never be enthralled by so insolent, so execrable, so 
 pitiful a contrivance." 
 
 Happily for us our ancestors thought otherwise. They 
 were not so over-nice and curious, as to refuse blessings, be- 
 cause, they might possibly be abused. 
 
 They perceived, that the uses included were great and mani- 
 fest. Perhaps they did not foresee, that from this acorn, as it 
 were, of their planting, would be produced a perpetual vegeta- 
 tion of political energies, that " would secure the just liberties 
 of the nation for a long succession of ages,* and elevate it to 
 the distinguished rank it has for several centuries held. As to 
 abuses, they trusted to their own spirit for preventing or cor- 
 recting them :. And worthy is it of deep consideration by 
 every friend of freedom, that abuses that seem to be but 
 " trifles,"f may be attended by fatal consequences. What can 
 be " trifling," that diminishes or detracts from the only defence, 
 that ever was found against " open attacks and secret machina- 
 tions T'X This establishment originates from a knowledge of 
 human nature. With a superior force, wisdom, and benevo- 
 lence uni- [34] ted, it rives the difficulties concerning adminis- 
 tration of justice, that have distressed, or destroyed the rest of 
 mankind. It reconciles contradictions — vastness of power, 
 with safety of private station. It is ever new, and always the 
 same. 
 
 * See late publications against the Federal Constitution. 
 
 * Blackstone, III. 279 f Idem, IV. 350. % Idem, III. 381. 
 
I86 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 Trial by jury and the dependence of taxation upon reprer 
 sentation, those corner stones of Hberty, were not obtained by 
 a bill of rights, or any other records, and have not been and 
 cannot be preserved by them. They and all other rights must 
 be preserved, by soundness of se^ise and honesty of heart. Com- 
 pared with these, what are a bill of rights, or any characters 
 drawn upon paper or parchment, those frail remembrances ? 
 Do we want to be reminded, that the sun enlightens, warms, 
 invigorates, and cheers ? or how horrid it would be, to have his 
 blessed beams intercepted, by our being thrust into mines or 
 dungeons? Liberty is the sun of society. Rights are the 
 beams.* 
 
 [35] " It is the duty which every man owes to his country, 
 his friends, his posterity, and himself, to maintain to the utmost 
 of his power this valuable palladium in all its rights ; to restore 
 to its its ancient dignity, if at all impaired by the different 
 value of property, or otherwise deviated from its first institu- 
 tion ; to amend it, wherever it is defective ;* and above all to 
 guard with the most jealous circumspection against the new 
 and arbitrary methods of trial, which, under a variety of plausi- 
 ble pretences, may in time imperceptibly undermine this best 
 preservative of liberty. "f Trial by Jury is our birth-right ; and 
 tempted to his own ruin, by some seducing spirit, must be the 
 man, who in opposition to the genius of United America, shall 
 dare to attempt its subversion. 
 
 In the proposed confederation, it is preserved inviolable in 
 criminal cases, and cannot be altered in other respects, but when 
 United America demands it. 
 There seems to be a disposition in men to find fault, no dif^ 
 
 * Instead of referring to musty records and mouldy parchments to prove 
 that the rights of the living are lost, " renounced, and abdicated for ever," by 
 
 those who are now no more. M. de la Fayette, in his address to the national 
 
 assembly, applies to the living world, and says — " Call to mind the sentiments 
 which nature has engraved in the heart of every citizen, and which take a new 
 face when they are solemnly recognized by all. For a nation to love liberty, 
 it is sufficient that she knows it ; and to be free, it is sufficient that she wills 
 it," — "Rights of Man" page 11. 
 
 *See an enumeration of defects in trials by jury. Blackstone, III. 381. 
 fidem, IV. 350. 
 
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 187 
 
 ficult matter, rather than to act as they ought. The works of 
 creation itself have been objected to : and one learned prince 
 declared, that if he had been consulted, they would have been 
 improved. With what book has so much fault been found, as 
 with the Bible ? Perhaps, principally, because it so clearly and 
 strongly enjoins men to do right. How many, how plausible 
 objections have been [36] made against it, with how much ar- 
 dor, with how much pains ? Yet, the book has done more good 
 than all the books in the world ; would do much more, if duly 
 regarded ; and might lead the objectors against it to happiness, 
 if they would value it as they should. 
 
 When objections are made to a system of high import, 
 should they not be weighed against the benefits ? Are these 
 great, positive, immediate ? Is there a chance of endangering 
 them by rejection or delay ? May they not be attained without 
 admitting the objections at present, supposing the objections to 
 be well founded? If the objections are well founded, may 
 they nbt be hereafter admitted, without danger, disgust, or in- 
 convenience ? Is the system so formed, that they may be thus 
 admitted ? May they not be of less efficiency, than they are 
 thought to be by their authors ? are they not designed to hin- 
 der evils, which are generally deemed to be sufficiently pro- 
 vided against ? May not the admission of them prevent bene- 
 fits, that might otherwise be obtained ? In political affairs, is 
 it not more safe and advantageous, for all to agree in measures 
 that may not be best, than to quarrel among themselves, what 
 are best ? 
 
 When questions of this kind with regard to the plan pro- 
 posed, are calmly considered, it seems reasonable to hope, that 
 every faithful citizen of United America, will make up his 
 mind, with much satisfaction to himself, and advantage to his 
 country. 
 
 FABIUS. 
 
1 88 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 LETTER V. 
 
 [37] It has been considered, what are the rights to be con- 
 tributed, and how they are to be managed ; and it has been 
 said, that republican tranquility and prosperity have com- 
 monly been promoted, in proportion to the strength of gov- 
 ernnment for protecting the worthy against the licentious. 
 
 The protection herein mentioned, refers to cases between 
 citizens and citizens, or states and states : But there is also a 
 protection to be afforded to all the citizens, or states, against 
 foreigners. It has been asserted, that this protection never 
 can be afforded, but under an appropriation, collection, and 
 application, of the general force, by the will of the whole com- 
 bination. This protection is in a degree dependent on the 
 former, as it may be weakened by internal discords and espec- 
 ially where the worst party prevails. Hence it is evident, that 
 such establishments as tend most to protect the worthy against 
 the licentious, tends most to protect all against foreigners. 
 This position is found to be verified by indisputable facts, 
 from which it appears, that when nations have been, as it 
 were, condemned for their crimes, unless they first became 
 suicides, foreigners have acted as executioners. 
 
 This is not all. As government is intended for the happi- 
 ness of the people, the protection of the worthy against those 
 of contrary characters, is calculated to promote the end of 
 legitimate government, that is the general welfare ; [38] for 
 the government will partake of the qualities of those whose 
 authority is prevalent. If it be asked, who are the worthy, 
 we may be informed by a heathen poet — 
 
 " Vir bonus est quis? 
 " Qui consulta patrum, qui leges juraque servat."* 
 
 The best foundations of this protection, that can be laid 
 by man, are a constitution and government secured, as well as 
 can be, from the undue influence of passions either in the 
 people or their servants. Then in a contest between citizens 
 and citizens, or states and states, the standard of laws may be 
 displayed, explained and strengthened by the well-remembered 
 
 * He who reverses the constitution, liberties and laws of his country. 
 
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 1 89 
 
 sentiments and examples of our fore-fathers, which will give 
 it a sanctity far superior to that of their eagles so venerated 
 by the former masters of the world. This circumstance will 
 carry powerful aids to the true friends of their country, and 
 unless counteracted by the follies of Pharsalia, or the acci- 
 dents of Philippi, may secure the blessings of freedom to 
 succeeding ages. 
 
 It has been contended that the plan proposed to us, ade- 
 quately secures us against the influence of passions in the 
 federal servants. Whether it as adequately secures us against 
 the influence of passions in the people, or in particular states, 
 time will determine, and -may the determination be propituous. 
 
 [39] Let us now consider the tragical play of the passions 
 in similar cases ; or, in other words, the consequences of their 
 irregularities. Duly governed, they produce happiness. 
 
 Here the reader, is respectfully [requested, to assist the 
 intentions of the writer, by keeping in mind, the ideas of a 
 single republic with one democratic branch in its government, 
 and of a confederation of republics with one or several demo- 
 cratic branches in the government of the confederation, or in 
 the government of its parts, so that as he proceeds, a com- 
 parison may easily run along, between any of these and the 
 proposed plan. 
 
 History is entertaining and instructive ; but if admired 
 chiefly for amusement, it may yield little profit. If read for 
 improvement, it is apprehended, a slight attention only will 
 be paid to the vast variety of particular incidents, unless they 
 be such as may meliorate the heart. A knowledge of the 
 distinguishing features of nations, the principles of their gov- 
 ernments, the advantages and disadvantages of their situations, 
 the methods employed to avail themselves of the first, and to 
 alleviate the last, their manners, customs, and institutions, the 
 sources of events, their progresses, and determining causes, 
 may be eminently useful, tho' obscurity may rest upon a 
 multitude of attending circumstances. Thus one nation may 
 become prudent and happy, not only by the wisdom and suc- 
 cess, but even by the errors and misfortunes of another. 
 
 [40] In Carthage and Rome, there was a very numerous 
 
igo LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 senate, strengthened by prodigious attachments, and in a great 
 degree independent of the people. In Athens, there was a 
 senate strongly supported by the powerful court of Areopagus. 
 In each of these republics, their affairs at length became con- 
 vulsed, and their liberty was subverted. What cause produced 
 these effects? Encroachments of the senate upon the autho- 
 rity of the people ? No ! but directly the reverse, according 
 so the unanimous voice of historians ; that is, encroachments 
 of the people upon the authority of the senate. The people 
 of these republics absolutely laboured for their own destruc- 
 tion; and never thought themselves so free, as when they were 
 promoting their own subjugation. Though even after these 
 encroachments had been made, and ruin was spreading around, 
 yet the remnants of senatorial authority delayed the final cat- 
 astrophe.* 
 
 [41] In more modern times, the Florentines exhibited a 
 memorable example. They were divided into violent parties ; 
 and the prevailing one vested exorbitant powers in the house 
 of Medici, then possessed, as it was judged, of more money 
 than any crowned head in Europe. Though that house en- 
 gaged and persevered in the attempt, yet the people were 
 never despoiled of their liberty, until they were overwhelmed 
 by the armies of foreign princes, to whose enterprizes their 
 situation exposed them. 
 
 Republics of later date and various form have appeared. 
 Their institutions consist of old errors tissued with hasty 
 inventions, somewhat excusable, as the wills of the Romans, 
 made with arms in their hands. Some of them were con- 
 densedf, by dangers. They are still compressed by them into 
 
 * The great Bacon, in enumerating the art by which Csesar enslaved his 
 country, says — " His first artifice was to break the strength of the senate, for 
 while that remained safe, there was no opening for any person to immoderate 
 
 or extraordinary power. ' Nam initio sibi erani frangendce senatus opes et au- 
 
 Uritas qua salva nemini ad, immodica et extra ordinaria imperia aditus erat.' 
 BoEsuet, bishop of Meaux, takes notice in his universal history, that the in- 
 famous Herod, to engross authority, attacked the Sanhedrim, which was in a. 
 manner the senate, where the supreme jurisdiction was exercised." 
 
 f " If we consider what the principles are that first condense man into 
 society, and what the motive is that regulates their mutual intercourse after- 
 wards, we shall find, by the time we arrive at what is called government, that 
 nearly the whole of the business is performed by the natural operation of the 
 parts upon each other." — Rights of Man. 
 
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 191 
 
 a sort of union. Their well-known transactions witness, that 
 their connection is not enough compact and arranged. They 
 have all suffered, or are suffering through that defect. Their 
 existence seems to depend more upon others, than upon them- 
 selves. There might be an impropriety in saying more, con- 
 sidering the peculiarity of their circumstances at this time. 
 
 [42] The wretched mistake of the great men who were 
 leaders in the long parliament of England, in attempting, by 
 not filling up vacancies, to extend their power over a brave 
 and sensible people, accustomed to popular representation, and 
 their downfal, when their victories and puissance by sea and 
 land had thrown all Europe into astonishment and awe, shew, 
 how difficult it is for rulers to usurp over a people who are 
 not wanting to themselves. 
 
 Let the fortunes of confederated republics be now consid- 
 ered. 
 
 " The Amphictionic council," or "general court of Greece," 
 claims the first regard. Its authority was very great : But, 
 the parts were not sufficiently combined, to guard against the 
 ambitious, avaricious, and selfish projects of some of them ; or, 
 if they had the power, they.dared not to employ it, as the 
 turbulent states were very sturdy, and made a sort of partial 
 confederacies.* 
 
 [43] " The Achaean league " seems to be the next in dignity. 
 It was at first, small, consisting of few states : afterwards, very 
 
 * When Xerxes invaded Greece with the largest host and the greatest fleet 
 that ever were collected, events occurred, which being preserved in history, 
 convey to us a very affecting and instructive information. 
 
 While the danger was at some distance, the states of Greece looked to re- 
 mote friends for assistance. Disappointed in these speculations, tho' the vast 
 armaments of their enemies were constantly rolling towards them, still there 
 was no firmness in their union, no vigor in their resolutions. 
 
 The Persian army passed the Hellespont, and directed its march westward. 
 It was then decided, that Thessaly was the frontier to be first attacked. 
 
 The Thessalians, than whom no people had been more forward in the com- 
 mon cause, hastened a remonstrance to Corinth, urging that unless they were 
 immediately and powerfully supported, necessity would oblige them to make 
 terms with the invaders. 
 
 This reasonable remonstrance roused the sluggish and hesitating councils 
 
192 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICINSON. 
 
 extensive, constituting of many. In their diet or Congress, 
 they enacted laws, disposed of vacant employments, declared 
 war, made peace, entered into alliances, compelled every state 
 of the union to [44] obey its ordinances, and managed other 
 affairs. Not only their laws, but their magistrates, council, 
 judges, money, weights and measures, were the same. So 
 uniform were they, that all seemed to be but one state. Their 
 chief officer called Strategos, was chosen in the Congress by a 
 majority of votes. He presided in [45] the Congress, com- 
 manded the forces, and was vested with great powers, espec- 
 ially in time of war : but was liable to be called to an account 
 by the Congress, and punished, if convicted of misbehaviour. 
 
 The states have been oppressed by the kings of Macedon, 
 and insulted by tyrants. " From their incorporation," says 
 Polybius, "may be dated the birth of that greatness, that by a 
 constant augmentation, at length arrived to a marvellous 
 height of prosperity. The same of their wise laws and mild 
 government reached the Greek colonies in Italy, where the 
 Grotoniates, the Sybarites, and the Cauloniates, agreed to 
 adopt them, and to govern their states conformably." 
 
 Did the delegates to the Amphictionic council, or to the 
 Congress of the Achaean league destroy the liberty of their 
 country, by establishing a monarchy or an aristocracy among 
 themselves ? Quite the contrary. While the several states con- 
 
 of the confederacy. A body of foot was dispatched who soon occupied the 
 valley of Tempe, the only pass from Lower Macedonia, into Thessaly. 
 
 In a few days, these troops being informed that there was another pass 
 from Upper Macedonia, returned to the Corinthian Isthmus. 
 
 The Thessalians thus deserted made their submission. 
 
 " This retreat from Tempe appears to have been a precipate measure, 
 rendered necessary by nothing so much as by the want of some powers of 
 government extending over the several states which composed the confeder- 
 acy." — Mitford's History of Greece. 
 
 With diminished forces, the defence of the confederates was now to be 
 contracted. But in the conduct even of this business daily becoming more ur- 
 gent, we find them laboring under the defects of their confederation. 
 
 " Destitute of any sufficient power extending over the whole, no part could 
 confide in the protection of the whole, while the naval superiority of their enemy 
 put it in his choice, where, when, and how to make his attacks ; and therefore 
 
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 193 
 
 tinned faithful to the union, they prospered. Their affairs were 
 shattered by dissensions, emulations, and civil wars, artfully 
 and diligently fomented by princes who thought it their inter- 
 est ; and in the case of the Achsean league, partly, by the folly 
 and wickedness of Greeks not of the league, particularly the 
 iEtolians, who repined at the glories, that constantly attended 
 the banner of freedom, supported by virtue and conducted by 
 prudence. Thus weakened, they all sunk together, the envied 
 and the envying, under the domination, first of Macedon, and 
 then of Rome. 
 
 [46] Let any man of common sense peruse the gloomy but 
 instructive pages of their mournful story, and he will be con- 
 vinced, that if any nation could successfuly have resisted those 
 conquerors of the world, the illustrious deed had been achieved 
 by Greece ; that cradle of republics, if the several states had 
 been cemented by some such league as the Achaean, and had 
 honestly fulfilled its obligations. 
 
 It is not pretended, that the Achaean league was perfect, 
 or that they were not monarchical and aristocratical factions 
 among the people of it. Every concession of that sort, that 
 can be asked, shall be made. It had many defects ; every one 
 of which, however, has been avoided in the plan proposed to 
 
 us. 
 
 With all its defects, with all its disorders, yet such was the 
 life and vigor communicated through the whole, by the popu- 
 lar representation of each part, and the close combination of 
 
 each republic seems to have been anxious to reserve its own strength for future 
 contingencies. 
 
 Their generous hearts all beat at the call of freedom ; but their efforts 
 were embarrassed and enfeebled by the vices of their political constitution, to 
 their prodigious detriment, and almost to their total destruction. For these 
 vices, the ardor of heroism united with love of country could not compensate. 
 These very vices therefore, may truly be said to have wasted the blood of pa- 
 triots, and to have betrayed their country into the severest calamities. 
 
 \iwe shall hereafter by experience discover any vices in our conslHution, 
 let us hasten with prudence and a fraternal affection for each other, to correct 
 them. We are all embarked in the same vessel, and equally concerned in re- 
 pairing any defects. 
 
194 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 all, that the true spirit of republicanism predominated, and 
 thereby advanced the happiness and glory of the people to so 
 pre-eminent a state that our ideas upon the pleasing theme 
 cannot be too elevated. Here is the proof of this assertion. 
 When the Romans had laid Carthage in ashes ; had reduced 
 the kingdom of Macedon to a province ; had conquered Anti- 
 ochus the great, and got the better of all their enemies in the 
 East ; these Romans, masters of so much of the then known 
 world, determined to humble the Achaean league, because as 
 history expressly informs us, "their great power began to raise 
 no small jealousy at Rome." — Polybius. 
 
 [47] What a vast weight of argument do these facts and 
 circumstances add to the maintenance of the principle con- 
 tended for by the writer of this address ? 
 
 FABIUS. 
 
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. I95 
 
 [48] LETTER VI. 
 
 Some of our fellow-citizens have ventured to predict tbe 
 future state of United America, if the system proposed to us, 
 shall be adopted. 
 
 Though every branch of the constitution and government 
 is to be popular, and guarded by the strongest provisions, that 
 until this day have occurred to mankind, yet the system will 
 end, they say, in the oppressions of a monarchy or aristocracy 
 by the federal servants or some of them. 
 
 Such a conclusion seems not in any manner suited to the 
 premises. It startles, yet, not so much from its novelty, as 
 from the respectability of the characters by which it is drawn. 
 
 We must not be too much influenced by our esteem for 
 those characters : But, should recollect, that when the fancy is 
 warmed, and the judgment inchned, by the proximity or pres- 
 sure of particular objects, very extraordinary declarations are 
 not unfrequently made. Such are the frailties of our nature, 
 that genius and integrity sometimes afford no protection 
 against them. 
 
 Probably, there never was, and never will be, such an 
 instance of dreadful denunciation, concerning the fate of a 
 country, as was published while the union was in agitation 
 between England and Scotland. The English were for a joint 
 legislature, many of the Scots for separate legislatures, and 
 urged, that they should be in [49] a manner swallowed up and 
 lost in the other, as then they would not possess one eleventh 
 part in it. 
 
 Upon that occasion lord Belhaven, one of the most distin- 
 guished orators of the age, made in the Scottish parliament a 
 famous speech, of which the following extract is part : 
 " My lord Chancellor, 
 
 " When I consider this affair of an union between the two 
 nations, as it is expressed in the several articles thereof, and 
 now the subject of our deliberation at this time, I find my 
 mind crowded with a variety of very melancholy thoughts, 
 and I think it my duty to disburthen myself of some of them, 
 
196 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 by laying them before and exposing them to the serious con- 
 sideration of this honourable house. 
 
 "I think, I see a free and independent kingdom delivering 
 Hp that, which all the world hath been fighting for since the 
 days of Nimrod ; yea, that, for which most of all the empires, 
 kingdoms, states, principalities, and dukedoms of Europe, are 
 at this very time engaged in the most bloody and cruel wars 
 that ever were ; to wit, a power to manage their own affairs 
 by themselves, without the assistance aud council of any other. 
 
 " I think I see a National Church, founded upon a rock, 
 secured by a claim of right, hedged and fenced about by the 
 strictest and pointedest legal sanctions that sovereignty could 
 contrive, voluntarily descending into a plain upon an equal 
 level with Jews, Paptists, Soci- [50] nians, Armenians, and 
 Anabaptists, and other Sectaries, &c. 
 
 " I think I see the noble and honorable peerage of Scotland, 
 whose valiant predecessors led against their enemies upon 
 their own proper charges and expences, now divested of their 
 followers and vassalages, and put upon such an equal foot 
 with their vassals, that I think, I see a petty English excise- 
 man receive more homage and respect, than what was paid 
 formerly to their quondam Mackallamors. 
 
 " I think, I see tht present peers of Scotland, whose noble 
 ancestors, conquered provinces, over-run countries, reduced 
 and subjected towns and fortified places, exacted tribute 
 through the greatest part of England, now walking in the 
 court of requests, like so many English Attornies, laying aside 
 their walking swords when in company with the English Peers, 
 lest their self-defence should be found murder. 
 
 " I think, I see the honorable Estate of Barons, the bold 
 assertors of the nations rights and liberties in the worst of 
 times, now setting a watch upon their lips and a guard upon 
 their tongues, lest they be found guilty of scandalum magna- 
 tum. 
 
 "I think I see the royal State of Boroughs, walking their 
 desolate streets, hanging down their heads under disappoint- 
 ments ; worm'd out of all the branches of their old trade, uncer- 
 tain what hand to turn to, necessitated to become [5 1] appren- 
 
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. I97 
 
 tices to their unkind neighbors, and yet after all finding their 
 trade so fortified by companies and secured by . prescriptions, 
 that they despair of any success therein. 
 
 " I think, I see our learned Judges laying aside their prac- 
 tiques and decisions, studying the common law of England, 
 gravelled with certioraries, nisi priuses, writs of error, ejectiones 
 Jirmce, injunctions, demurrers, &c. and frighted with appeals 
 and avocations, because of the new regulations, and rectifications 
 they meet with. 
 
 " I think, I see the valiant and gallant soldiery, either sent 
 to learn the plantation trade abroad, or at home petitioning 
 for a small subsistence, as the reward of their honourable ex- 
 ploits, while their old corps are broken, the common soldiers 
 left to beg, and the youngest English corps kept standing. 
 
 " I think, I see the honest industrious tradesman loaded 
 with new taxes and impositions, disappointed of the equiva- 
 lents, drinking water in place of ale, eating his saltless pottage, 
 petitioning for encouragement to his manufactories, and an- 
 swered by counter petitions. 
 
 " In short, I think I see the laborious ploughman, with his 
 corn spoiling upon his hands /(?r want of sale, cursing the day 
 of his birth ; dreading the expence of his burial, and uncertain 
 whether to marry or do worse. 
 
 "I think I see the incurable difficulties of landing men, 
 fettered under the golden chain of equivalents, their pretty 
 daughters petition- [52] ing for want of husbands, and their 
 sons for want of employments. 
 
 " I think I see our mariners delivering up their ships to 
 their Dutch partners, and what through presses and necessity 
 earning their bread as underlings in the English navy. But 
 above all, my lord, I think, I see our ancient mother Caledonia, 
 like Csesar, sitting in the midst of our senate, ruefully looking 
 round about her, covering herself with her royal garment, 
 attending the fatal blows and breathing out her last with a 
 Et tu quoque mi fili. 
 
 " Are not these, my lord, very afflicting thoughts ? And 
 yet they are the least part suggested to me by these dishonor- 
 able articles. Should not the considerations of these things 
 
198 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 vivify these dry bones of ours? Should not the memory of 
 our noble predecessors' valor and constancy rouse up our 
 drooping spirits ? Are our noble predecessors' souls got so far 
 into the English cabbage-stalks and cauliflowers, that we 
 should shew the least inclination that way ? Are our eyes so 
 blinded ? Are our ears so deafened ? Are our hearts so hard- 
 ened ? Are our tongues so faultered ? Are our hands so fet- 
 tered ? that in this our day, I say, my lord, that in this our 
 day, we should not mind the things that concern the very 
 being and well being of our ancient kingdom, before the day 
 be hid from our eyes. 
 
 "When I consider this treaty as it hath been explained, 
 and spoke to, before us these three weeks by past; I see the 
 English constitution remaining firm, the same two houses of 
 Par- [53] liament, the same taxes, the same customs, the same 
 excises, the same trading companies, the same municipal laws 
 and courts of judicature ; and all ours either subject to regula- 
 tions or annihilations, only we are to have the honor to pay 
 their old debts, and to have some few persons present for wit- 
 nesses, to the validity of the deed, when they are pleased to 
 contract more."* 
 
 Let any candid American deliberately compare that trans- 
 action with the present, and laying his hand upon his heart, 
 solemnly answer this question to himself — Whether, he does 
 not verily believe the eloquent Peer before mentioned, had 
 ten-fold more cause to apprehend evils from such an unequal 
 match between the two kingdoms, that any citizen of these 
 states has to apprehend them from the system proposed? 
 Indeed not only that Peer, but other persons of distinction^ 
 and large numbers of the people of Scotland were filled with 
 the utmost aversion to the union ; and if the greatest diligence 
 and prudence had not been employed by its friends in remov- 
 ing misapprehensions and refuting misrepresentations, and by 
 the then subsisting government for preserving the public 
 peace, there would certainly have been a rebellion. 
 
 Yet, what were the consequences to Scotland of that dreaded 
 
 *See objections against the Federal constitution, very similar to those 
 made in Scotland. 
 
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 1 99 
 
 union with England ? The cultivation of her virtues and the 
 correction of her errors — The emancipation of one [54] class 
 of her citizens from the yoke of her superiors — A relief of 
 other classes from the injuries and insults of the great — Im- 
 provements in agriculture, science, arts, trade, and manufac- 
 tures — The profits of industry and ingenuity enjoyed under 
 the protection of laws- — peace and security at home, and 
 encrease of respectability abroad. Her Church is still eminent 
 — Her laws and courts of judicature are safe — Her boroughs 
 grown into cities — Her mariners and soldiery possessing a 
 larger subsistence than she could have afforded them, and her 
 tradesmen, ploughmen, landed men, and her people of every 
 rank, in a more flourishing condition, not only than they ever 
 were, but in a more flourishing condition, than the clearest 
 understanding could, at the time, have thought it possible for 
 them to attain in so short a period, or even in many ages. 
 England participated in the blessings. The stock of their 
 union or ingraftment, as perhaps it may be called, being 
 strong and capable of drawing better nutriment and in greater 
 abundance, than they could ever have done apart, 
 
 " Ere long, to Heaven the soaring branches shoot, 
 
 "And wonder at their height, and more than native fruit." 
 
 FABIUS. 
 
200 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 [55] LETTER VII. 
 
 Thus happily mistaken was the ingenious, learned, and 
 patriotic lord Belhaven, in his prediction concerning the fate of 
 his country ; and thus happily mistaken, it is hoped, some of 
 our fellow-citizens will be, in their prediction concerning the 
 fate of their country. 
 
 Had they taken large scope, and assumed in their proposition 
 the vicissitude of human affairs, and the passions that so often 
 confound them, their prediction might have been a tolerably 
 good guess. Amidst the mutabilities of terrestrial things, the 
 liberty of United America may be destroyed. As to that 
 point, it is our duty, humbly, constantly, fervently, to implore 
 the protection of our most gracious maker, " who doth not 
 afflict willingly nor grieve the children of men," and inces- 
 santly to strive, as we are commanded, to recommend our- 
 selves to that protection, by " doing his will," diligently exer- 
 cising our reason in fulfilling the purposes for which that and 
 our existence were given to us. 
 
 How the liberty of this country is to be destroyed, is an- 
 other question. Here, the gentlemen assign a cause, in no 
 manner proportioned, as it is apprehended, to the effect. 
 
 The uniform tenor of history is against them. That holds 
 up the licentiousness of the people, and turbulent temper of 
 some of the states, as the only causes to be dreaded, not the 
 conspiracies of federal ofificers. There-[56] fore, it is highly pro- 
 bable, that, if our liberty is ever subverted, it will be by one 
 of the two causes first mentioned. Our tragedy will then have 
 the same acts, with those of the nations that have gone before 
 us ; and we shall add one more example to the number already 
 too great, of people that would not take warning, not, " know 
 the things which belong to their peace." But, we ought not to 
 pass such a sentence against our country, and the interests of 
 freedom : Though, no sentence whatever can be equal to the 
 atrocity of our guilt, if through enormity of obstinacy or base- 
 ness, we betray the cause of our posterity and of mankind, by 
 providence committed to our parental and fraternal care. 
 
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 20I 
 
 There is reason to believe, that the calamities of nations are 
 the punishments of their sins. 
 
 As to the first mentioned cause, it seems unnecssary to say 
 any more upon it. 
 
 As to the second, we find, that the misbehaviour of the 
 constituent parts acting separately, or in partial confederacies, 
 debihtated the Greeks under The Amphictionic Council, and 
 under The Achaean League. As to the former, it was not 
 entirely an assembly of strictly democratical repubHcs. Be- 
 sides, it wanted a suiificiently close connection of its parts. 
 After these observations, we may call our attention from it. 
 
 'Tis true. The Achaean League was disturbed by the mis. 
 conduct of some parts, but it is as true, that it surmounted 
 these difificulties, and wonderfully prospered, until it was dis- 
 solved in the manner that has been described. 
 
 [57] The glorious operations of its principles bear the 
 clearest testimony to this distant age and people, that the wit 
 of man never invented such an antidote against monarchical 
 and aristocratical projects, as a strong combination of truly 
 democratical republics. By strictly or truly democratical re- 
 publics, the writer means republics in which all the principal 
 officers, except the judicial, are from time to time chosen by 
 the people. 
 
 The reason is plain. As liberty and equality, or as well 
 termed by Polybius, benignity, were the foundations of their 
 institutions, and the energy of the government pervaded all 
 the parts in things relating to the whole, it counteracted for 
 the common welfare, the designs hatched by selfishness in 
 separate councils. 
 
 If folly or wickedness prevailed in any parts, friendly 
 offices and salutary measures restored tranquiHty. Thus the 
 pubhc good was maintained. In its very formation, tyrannies 
 and aristocracies submitted, by consent or compulsion. Thus, 
 the Ceraunians, Trezenians, Epidaurians, Megalopolitans, Ar- 
 gives, Hermionians, and Phlyayzrians were received into the 
 league. A happy exchange ! For history informs us, that so 
 true were they to their noble and benevolent principles, that, 
 in their diet, " no resolutions were taken, but what were equally 
 
202 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 advantageous to the whole confederacy, and the interest of each 
 part so consulted, as to leave no room for complaints /" 
 
 [58] How degrading would be the thought to a citizen of 
 United America, that the people of these states, with institu- 
 tions beyond comparison preferable to those of The Achaean 
 league, and so vast a superiority in other respects, should not 
 have wisdom and virtue enough, to manage their affairs, with 
 as much prudence and affection of one for another as these 
 ancients did. 
 
 Would this be doing justice to our country ? The com- 
 position of her temper is excellent, and seems to be acknowl- 
 edged equal to that of any nation in the world. Her prudence 
 will guard its warmth against two faults, to which it may be 
 exposed — The one, an imitation of foreign fashions, which 
 from small things may lead to great. May her citizens aspire 
 at a national dignity in every part of conduct, private as well 
 as public. This will be influenced by the former. May sim- 
 plicity be the characteristic feature of their manners, which, 
 inlaid with their other virtues and their forms of government, 
 may then indeed be compared, in the Eastern stile, to " apples 
 of gold in pictures of silver." Thus will they long, and may 
 they, while their rivers run, escape the contagion of luxury — 
 that motley issue of innocence debauched by folly, and the 
 lineal predecessor of tyranny, prolific of guilt and wretched- 
 ness. The other fault, of which, as yet, there are no symptoms 
 among us, is the thirst of empire. This is a vice, that ever has 
 been, and from the nature of things, ever must be, fatal to re- 
 publican [59] forms of government. Our wants, are sources 
 of happiness : our irregular desires, of misery. The abuse of 
 prosperity, is rebellion against Heaven ; and succeeds accord- 
 ingly. 
 
 Do the propositions of gentlemen who object, offer to our 
 view, any of the great points upon which, the fate, fame, or 
 freedom of nations has turned, excepting what some of them 
 have said about trial by jury ; and which has been frequently 
 and fully answered ? Is there one of them calculated to regu- 
 late, and if needful, to controul those tempers and measures of 
 constituent parts of an union, that have been so baneful to the 
 
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 203 
 
 weal of every confederacy that has existed ? Do not some of 
 them tend to enervate the authority evidently designed thus 
 to regulate and controul? Do not others of them discover a 
 bias in their advocates to particular connections, that if in- 
 dulged to them, would enable persons of less understanding 
 and virtue, to repeat the disorders, that have so often violated 
 public peace and honor? Taking them altogether, would they 
 afford as strong a security to our liberty, as the frequent elec- 
 tion of the federal officers by the people, and the repartition 
 of power among those officers, according to the proposed 
 system ? 
 
 It may be answered, that, they would be an additional se- 
 curity. In reply, let the writer be permitted at present to re- 
 fer to what has been said. 
 
 The principal argument of gentlemen who object, involves 
 a direct proof of the point contended for by the writer of this 
 address, and as [60] far as it may be supposed to be founded, 
 a plain confirmation of Historic evidence. 
 
 They generally agree, that the great danger of a monarchy 
 or aristocracy among us, will arise from the federal senate. 
 
 The members of this senate, are to be chosen by men exercis- 
 ing the sovereignty of their respective states. These men there- 
 fore must be monarchically or aristocratically disposed, before 
 they will chuse federal senators thus disposed ; and what merits 
 particular attention, is, that these men must have otjtained an 
 overbearing influence in their respective states, before they 
 could with such disposition arrive at the exercise of the sover- 
 eignty in them : or else, the like disposition must be prevalent 
 among the people of such states. 
 
 Taking the case either way, is not this a disorder in parts of 
 the union, and ought it not to be rectified by the rest ? Is it 
 reasonable to expect, that the disease will seize all at the same 
 time ? If it is not, ought not the sound to possess a right and 
 power, by which they may prevent the infection from spread- 
 ing? And will not the extent of our territory, and the number 
 of states within it, vastly increase the difficulty of any politi- 
 cal disorder diffusing its contagion, and the probability of its 
 being repressed ? 
 
204 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 From the annals of mankind, these conclusions are dedu- 
 cible — that confederated states may act prudently and hon- 
 estly, and apart foolishly and knavishly ; but, that it is a defi- 
 ance [6i] of all probability, to suppose, that states conjointly 
 shall act with folly and wickedness, and yet separately with 
 wisdom and virtue. / 
 
 FABIUS. 
 
 [62] LETTER VIII. 
 
 The proposed confederation offers to us a system of diver- 
 sified representation in the legislative, executive, and judicial 
 departments, as essentially necessary to the good government 
 of an extensive republican empire. Every argument to re- 
 commend it, receives new force, by contemplating events, 
 that must take place. The number of states in America will 
 increase. If not united to the present, the consequences are 
 evident. If united, it must be by a plan that will communi- 
 cate equal liberty and assure just protection to them. These 
 ends can never be attained, but by a close combination of the 
 several states. 
 
 It has been asserted, that a very extensive territory cannot 
 be ruled by a government of republican form. What is meant 
 by this proposition ? Is it intended to abolish all ideas of 
 connection, and to precipitate us into the miseries of division, 
 either as single states, or partial confederacies ? To stupify 
 us into despondence, that destruction may certainly seize us ? 
 The fancy of poets never feigned so dire a Metamorphosis, as 
 is now held up to us. The .^Egis of their Minerva was only 
 said to turn men into stones. This spell is to turn " a band of 
 brethren," into a monster, preying on itself, and preyed upon 
 by all its enemies. 
 
 If hope is not to be abandoned, common sense teaches us 
 to attempt the best means of preservation. This is all that 
 men can do, and [63] this they ought to do. Will it be said. 
 
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 205 
 
 that any kind of disunion, or a connection tending to it, is 
 preferable to a firm union ? Or, is there any charm in that 
 despotism, which is said, to be alone competent to the rule of 
 such an empire ? There is no evidence of fact, nor any de- 
 duction of reason, that justifies the assertion. It is true, that 
 extensive territory has in general been arbitrarily governed ; 
 and it is as true, that a number of republics, in such territory, 
 loosely connected, must inevitably rot into despotism. 
 
 It is said — Such territory has never been governed by a 
 confederacy of republics. Granted. But, where was there 
 ever a confederacy of republics, in such territory, united, as 
 these states are to be by the proposed constitution ? Where 
 was there ever a confederacy, in which, the sovereignty of each 
 state was equally represented in one legislative body, the peo- 
 ple of each state equally represented in another, and the sov- 
 ereignties and people of all the states conjointly represented, 
 possessed such a qualified and temperating authority in mak- 
 ing laws ? Or, in which the appointment to federal offices 
 was vested in a chief magistrate chosen as our president is to 
 be ? Or, in which, the acts of the executive department were 
 regulated, as they are to be with us ? Or, in which, the federal 
 judges were to hold their offices independently and during 
 good behaviour? Or, in which, the authority over the militia 
 and troops was so distributed and controuled, as it is to be 
 with us ? Or, in which, the people were so drawn together by 
 religion, blood, language, manners and [64] customs, undis- 
 turbed by former feuds or prejudices ? Or, in which, the 
 affairs relating to the whole union, were to be managed by an 
 assembly of several representative bodies, invested with differ- 
 ent powers that became efficient only in concert, without their 
 being embarrassed by attention to other business? Or, in 
 which, a provision was made for the federal revenue, without 
 recurring to coercion against states, the miserable expedient, 
 of every other confederacy that has existed, an expedient 
 always attended with odium, and often with a delay produc- 
 tive of irreparable damage ? Where was there ever a confed- 
 eracy, that thus adhered to the first principle in civil society ; 
 obliging by its direct authority every individual, to contribute. 
 
2o6 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 when the public good necessarily required it, a just proportion 
 of aid to the support of the commonwealth protecting him — 
 without disturbing him in the discharge of the duties owing 
 by him to the state of which he is an inhabitant ; and at the 
 same time, so amply, so anxiously provided, for bringing the 
 interests, and even the wishes of every sovereignty and of 
 every person of the union, under all their various modifica- 
 tions and impressions, into their full operation and efficacy 
 in the national councils ? The instance never existed. The 
 conclusion ought not to be made. It is without premises. So 
 far is the assertion from being true, that " a very extensive 
 territory cannot be ruled by a government of a republican 
 form," that such a territory cannot be well-ruled by a govern- 
 ment of any other form. 
 
 [65] The assertion has probably been suggested by reflec- 
 tions on the democracies of antiquity, without making a 
 proper distinction between them and the democracy of The 
 United States. 
 
 In the democracies of antiquity, the people assembled 
 together and governed personally. This mode was incom- 
 patible with greatness of number and dispersion of habitation. 
 
 In the democracy of The United States, the people act by 
 their representatives. This improvement collects the will of 
 millions upon points concerning their welfare, with more ad- 
 vantage, than the will of hundreds could be collected under 
 the ancient form. 
 
 There is another improvement equally deserving regard, 
 and that is, the varied representation of sovereignties and 
 people in the constitution now proposed. 
 
 It has been said, that this representation was a mere com- 
 promise. 
 
 It was not a mere compromise. The equal representation of 
 each state in one branch of the legislature, was an original sub- 
 stantive proposition, made in convention, very soon after the 
 draft offered by Virginia, to which last mentioned state Uni- 
 ted America is much indebted not only in other respects, but 
 for her merit in the origination and prosecution of this mo- 
 mentous business. 
 
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 20/ 
 
 The proposition was expressly made upon this principle, 
 that a territory of such extent as that of United America, 
 could not be safely and advantageously governed, but by a 
 combination of republics, each retaining all the rights of su- 
 preme [66] sovereignty, excepting such as ought to be con- 
 tributed to the union ; that for the securer preservation of 
 these sovereignties, they ought to be represented in a body 
 by themselves, and with equal suffrage ; and that they would 
 be annihilated, if both branches of the legislature were to be 
 formed of representatives of the people, in proportion to the 
 number of inhabitants in each state.* 
 
 The principle appears to be well founded in reason. Why 
 cannot a very extensive territory be ruled by a government of 
 republican form? They answered, because its power must 
 languish through distance of parts. Granted, if it be not a 
 " body by joints and bands having nourishment ministered 
 and knit together." If it be such a body, the objection is re- 
 moved. Instead of such a perfect body, framed upon the 
 principle that commands men to associate, and societies to 
 confederate ; that, which by communicating and extending 
 happiness, corresponds with the gracious intentions of our 
 maker towards us his creatures ? what is proposed ? Truly, 
 that the natural legs and arms of this body should be cut off. 
 because they are too weak, and their places supplied by 
 strongest limbs of wood and metal. 
 
 [67] Monarchs, it is said, are enabled to rule extensive ter- 
 ritories, because they send viceroys to govern certain districts ; 
 and thus the reigning authority is transmitted over the whole 
 empire. Be it so : But what are the consequences ? Tyranny, 
 while the viceroys continue in submission to their masters, and 
 the distraction of civil war besides, when they revolt, to which 
 they are frequently tempted by the very circumstances of their 
 situation, as the history of such governments indisputably 
 proves. 
 
 ^Justice Blackstone argues in like manner, after admitting the "expedi- 
 ency" of titles of nobility. "It is also expedient that their owners should 
 form an independent and separate branch of the legislature "—otherwise 
 "their privileges would soon be borne down and overwhelmed." — Comment. 
 2. 157- 
 
208 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 America is, and will be, divided into several sovereign 
 states, each possessing every power proper for governing 
 within its own limits for its own purposes, and also for acting 
 as a member of the union. 
 
 They will be civil and military stations, conveniently 
 planted throughout the empire, with lively and regular com- 
 munications. A stroke, a touch upon any part, will be im- 
 mediately felt by the whole. Rome famed for imperial arts, 
 had a glimpse of this great truth ; and endeavoured, as well as 
 her hard-hearted policy would permit, to realize it in her col- 
 ■onies. They were miniatures of the capital : But wanted the 
 vital principal of sovereignty, and were too small. They were 
 melted down into, or oyerwhelmed by the nations around them. 
 Were they now existing, they might be called curious automa- 
 tons — something like to our living originals. These, will bear 
 a remarkable resemblance to the mild features of patriarchal 
 government, in which each son ruled his own household, and 
 in other matters the whole family was directed by the common 
 ancestor. 
 
 [68] Will a people thus happily situated, ever desire to ex- 
 change their condition, for subjection to an absolute ruler; or 
 can they ever look but with veneration, or act but with defer- 
 ence to that union, that alone can, under providence, preserve 
 them from such subjugation ? 
 
 Can any government be devised, that will be more suited 
 to citizens, who wish for equal freedom and common prosper- 
 ity; better calculated for preventing corruption of manners ; 
 for advancing the improvements that endear or adorn life ; or 
 that can be more conformed to the understanding, to the best 
 affections, to the very nature of man ? What harvests of hap- 
 piness may grow from the seeds of liberty that are now sow- 
 ing? The cultivation will indeed demand continual attention, 
 unceasing diligence, and frequent conflict with difficulties: 
 but, to object against the benefits offered to us by our Creator, 
 by excepting to the terms annexed, is a crime to be equalled 
 only by its folly. 
 
 Delightful are the prospects that will open to the view of 
 United America — her sons well prepared to defend their own 
 
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 209 
 
 happiness, and ready to relieve the misery of others— her fleets 
 formidable, but only to the unjust — her revenue sufficient, yet 
 unoppressive— her commerce affluent, but not debasing— peace 
 and plenty within her borders — and the glory that arises from 
 a proper use of power, encircling them. 
 
 Whatever regions may be destined for servitude, let us 
 hope, that some portions of this land may be blessed with 
 liberty; let us be con- [69] vinced, that nothing short of such an 
 union as has been proposed, can preserve the blessing ; and 
 therefore let us be resolved to adopt it. 
 
 As to alterations, a little experience will cast more light 
 upon the subject, than a multitude of debates. Whatever 
 qualities are possessed by those who object, they will have 
 the candor to confess, that they will be encountered by op- 
 ponents, not in any respect inferior, and yet differing from 
 them in judgment, upon every point they have mentioned. 
 
 Such untired industry to serve their country, did the dele- 
 gates to the federal convention exert, that they not only 
 laboured to form [the best plan they could, but, provided for 
 making at any time amendments on the authority of the people, 
 without shaking the stability of the government. For this 
 end, the Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall 
 deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to the constitu- 
 tion, or, on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of 
 the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amend- 
 ments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and 
 purposes, as part of the constitution, when ratified by the 
 legislatures of three-fourths of the several' states, or by con- 
 ventions in three-fourths thereof, as one or the other mode of 
 ratification may be proposed by Congress. 
 
 Thus, by a gradual progress, we may from time to time 
 introduce every improvement in our constitution, that shall be 
 [70] suitable to our situation. For this purpose, it may perhaps 
 be advisable, for every state, as it sees occasion, to form with 
 the utmost deliberation, drafts of alterations respectively 
 required by them, and to enjoin their representatives, to 
 employ every proper method to obtain a ratification. 
 
 In this way of proceeding, the undoubted sense of every 
 
2IO LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 state, collected in the coolest manner, not the sense of indi- 
 viduals, will be laid before the whole union in congress, and 
 that body will be enabled with the clearest light that can be 
 afforded by every part of it, and with the least occasion of 
 irritation, to compare and weigh the sentiments of all United 
 America ; forthwith to adopt such alterations as are recom- 
 mended by general unanimity ; by degrees to devise modes of 
 conciliation upon contradictory propositions ; and to give the 
 revered advice of our common country, upon those, if any 
 such there should be, that in her judgment are inadmissible, 
 because they are incompatible with the happiness of these 
 states. 
 
 It cannot be with reason apprehended, that Congress will 
 refuse to act upon any articles calculated to promote the com- 
 mon welfare, though they may be unwilling to act upon such 
 as are designed to advance partial interests : but, whatever 
 their sentiments may be, they must call a convention for pro- 
 posing amendents, on applications of two-thirds of the legis- 
 latures of the several states. 
 
 May those good citizens, who have sometimes turned their 
 thoughts towards a second [71] convention, be pleased to con- 
 sider, that there are men who speak as they do, yet do not 
 mean as they do. These borrow the sanction of their re- 
 spected names, to conceal desperate designs. May they also 
 consider, whether persisting in the suggested plan, in prefer- 
 ence to the constitutional provision, may not kindle flames of 
 jealousy and discord, which all their abilities and virtues can 
 never extinguish. 
 
 FABIUS. 
 
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 2X1 
 
 [;2] LETTER IX. 
 
 When the sentiments of some objectors, concerning the 
 British constitution, are considered, it is surprising, that they 
 should apprehend so much danger to United America, as, they 
 say, will attend the ratification of the plan proposed to us, by 
 the late federal convention. 
 
 These gentlemen will acknowledge, that Britain has sus- 
 tained many internal convulsions, and many foreign wars, with 
 a gradual advancement in freedom, power, and prosperity. 
 They will acknowledge, that no nation has existed that ever 
 so perfectly united those distant extremes, private security of 
 life, liberty, and property, with exertion of public force — so 
 advantageously combined the various powers of militia, troops, 
 and fleets — or so happily blended together arms, arts, science, 
 commerce, and agriculture. From what spring has flowed this 
 stream of happiness? The gentlemen will acknowledge, that 
 these advantages are derived from a single democratical branch 
 in her legislature. They will also acknowledge, that in this 
 branch, called the house of commons, only one hundred and 
 thirty-one are members for counties : that nearly one half of 
 the whole house is chosen by abouf five thousand seven hun- 
 dred persons, mostly of no property ; that fifty-six members 
 are elected by about three hundred and seventy [73] persons, 
 and the rest in an enormous disproportion* to the numbers of 
 inhabitants who ought to vote.f 
 
 Thus are all the miUions of people in that kingdom, said 
 to be represented in the house of commons. 
 
 Let the gentlemen be so good, on a subject so familiar to 
 them, as to make a comparison between the British constitu- 
 tion, and that proposed to us. Questions like these will then 
 
 *No member of parliament ought to be elected by fewer than the 
 majority of 800, upon the most moderate calculation, according to Doctor 
 Price. 
 
 f By the constitution proposed to us, a majority of the house of repre- 
 sentatives, and of the senate, makes a quorum to do business : but, if the 
 writer fs not mistaken, about a fourteenth part of the members of the house 
 <sf commons, makes a quorum for Ihat purpose. 
 
212 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 probably present themselves : Is there more danger to our 
 liberty, from such a president as we are to have, than to that 
 of Britons from an hereditary monarch with a vast revenue — 
 absolute in the erection and disposal of offices, and in the ex- 
 ercise of the whole executive power — in the command of the 
 militia, fleets, and armies, and the direction of their operations 
 ■ — in the establishments of fairs and markets, the regulation of 
 weights and measures, and coining of money — who can call 
 parliaments with a breath, and dissolve them with a nod — who 
 can, at his will, make war, peace, and treaties irrevocably bind- 
 ing the nation — and who can [74] grant pardons and titles of 
 nobility, as it pleases him ? Is there more danger to us, from 
 twenty-six senators, or double the number, than to Britons, 
 from an hereditary aristocratic body, consisting of many hun- 
 dreds, possessed of enormous wealth in lands and money — 
 strengthened by a host of dependants — and who, availing 
 themselves of defects in the constitution, send many of these 
 into the house of commons — who hold a third part of the 
 legislative power in their own hands — and who form the 
 highest court of judicature in the nation ? Is there more dan- 
 ger to us, from a house of representatives, to be chosen by all 
 the freemen of the union, every two years, than to Britons, 
 from such a sort of representation as they have in the house 
 of commons, the members of which, too, are chosen but every 
 seven years ? Is there more danger to us, from the intended 
 federal officers, than to Britons, from such a monarch, aristo- 
 cracy, and house of commons together? What bodies are 
 there in Britain, vested with such capacities for enquiring into, 
 checking, and regulating the conduct of national affairs, as our 
 sovereign states ? What proportion does the number of free 
 holders in Britain bear to the number of people ? And what 
 is the proportion in United America ? 
 
 If any person, after considering such questions, shall say, 
 there will be more danger to our freedom under the proposed 
 plan, than to that of Britons under their constitution, he must 
 mean, that Americans are, or will be, beyond all comparison, 
 inferior to Britons in under- [75] standing and virtue ; other- 
 wise, with a constitution and government, every branch of 
 
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 21 3 
 
 which is so extremely popular, they certainly might guard 
 their rights, at least at well, as Britons can guard theirs, under 
 such political institutions as they have ; unless the person has 
 some inclination to an opinion, that monarchy and aristocracy 
 are favourable to the preservation of their rights. If he has, 
 he cannot too soon recover himself. If ever monarchy or 
 aristocracy appears in this country, in must be in the hideous 
 form of despotism. 
 
 What an infatuated, depraved people must Americans be- 
 come, if, with such unequalled advantages, committed to their 
 trust in a manner almost miraculous, they lose their liberty ? 
 Through a single organ of representation, in the legislature 
 only, of the kingdom just mentioned, though that organ is 
 diseased, such portions of popular sense and integrity have 
 been conveyed into the national councils, as have purified 
 other parts, and preserved the whole in its present state of 
 healthfulness. To their own vigour and attention, therefore, 
 is that people, under providence, indebted for the blessings 
 they enjoy. They have held, and now hold the true balance in 
 their government. While they retain their enlightened spirit, 
 they will continue to hold it; and if they regard what they 
 owe to others, as well as what they owe to themselves, they 
 will, most probably, continue to be happy.* 
 
 [76] They know, that there are powefs that cannot be ex- 
 pressly limited, without injury to themselves ; and their mag- 
 
 * If to the union of England and Scotland, a just connection with Ireland 
 be added, ecclesiastical establishments duly amended ; additions to the peer- 
 age regulated, and representation of the commons properly improved, it is to 
 be expected, that the tranquility, strength, reputation, and prosperity of the 
 empire will be greatly promoted, the monarchy will probably change into a 
 republic, if representation in the house of commons is not encreased by 
 additions from the counties and great trading cities and towns, without this 
 precaution, an increase of the peerage seems likely to accelerate an altera- 
 tion. These two measures should have, it is apprehended, in such a govern- 
 ment and in such a progress of human affairs, a well-tempered co-operation. 
 The power of the crown might thereby become more dignified, moderated, 
 and secured. 
 
 The discussion of this subject would embrace a very great number of 
 considerations ; but the conclusion seems to approach as near to demon- 
 stration, as an investigation of this kind can do. 
 
214 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 nanimity scorns any fear of such powers. This magnanimity 
 taught Charles the first, that he was but a royal servant ; and 
 this magnanimity caused James the second's army, raised, 
 paid, and kept up by himself, to confound him with huzzas for 
 liberty. 
 
 They ask not for compacts, of which the national welfare, 
 and, in some cases, its existence, may demand violations. 
 They despise such dangerous provisions against danger. 
 
 They know, that all powers whatever, even those that, 
 according to the forms of the con- [jy] stitution, are irresisti- 
 ble and absolute, of which there are many, ought to be exer- 
 cised for the public good ; and that when they are used to the 
 public detriment, they are unconstitutionally exerted. 
 
 This plain text, commented upon by their experienced in- 
 telligence, has led them safe through hazards of every kind : 
 and they now are, what we see them. Upon the review, one 
 is almost tempted to believe, that their insular situation, soil, 
 climate, and some other circumstances, have compounded a 
 peculiarity of temperature, uncommonly favourable to the 
 union of reason and passion. 
 
 Certainly, 'tis very memorable, with what life, impartiality, 
 and prudence, they have interposed on great occasions ; have 
 by their patriotism communicated temporary soundness to 
 their disordered i"epresentation ; and have bid public confu- 
 sions to cease. Two instances out of many may suffice. The 
 excellent William the third was distressed by a house of com- 
 mons. He dissolved the parliament, and appealed to the peo- 
 ple. They relieved him. His successor, the present king, in 
 the like distress, made the same appeal ; and received equal 
 relief. 
 
 Thus they have acted : but Americans, who have the same 
 blood in their veins, have, it seems, very different heads and 
 hearts. We shall be enslaved by a president, sen^itors, and 
 representatives, chosen by ourselves, and continually rotating 
 within the period of time assigned for the continuance in 
 office of members inthe house of commons? 'Tis strange : 
 but, we are told, 'tis true. It may be so. As we [78J have 
 our all at stake, let us enquire, in what way this event is to 
 
LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 215 
 
 be brought about. Is it to be before or after a general cor- 
 ruption of manners ? If after, it is not worth attention. The 
 loss of happiness then follows of course. If before, how is it 
 to be accomplished ? Will a virtuous and sensible people 
 choose villains or fools for their ofificers ? Or, if they should 
 choose men of wisdom and integrity, will these lose both or 
 either, by taking their seats ? If they should.will not their places 
 be quickly supplied by another choice ? Is the like derange- 
 ment again, and again, and again, to be expected ? Can any 
 man believe, that such astonishing phaenomena are to be looked 
 for? Was there ever an instance, where rulers, thus selected 
 by the people from their own body, have, in the manner ap- 
 prehended, outraged their own tender connexions, and the in- 
 terests, feelings, and sentiments of their affectionate and con- 
 fiding countrymen ? Is such a conduct more likely to prevail 
 in this age of mankind, than in the darker periods that have 
 preceded ? Are men more disposed now than formerly, 
 to prefer uncertainties to certainties, things perilous and in- 
 famous to those that are safe and honorable ? Can all the 
 mysteries of such iniquity, be so wonderfully managed by 
 treacherous rulers, that none of their enlightened constitu- 
 ents, nor any of their honest associates, acting with them in 
 public bodies, shall ever be able to discover the conspiracy, 
 till at last it shall burst with destruction to the whole federal 
 constitution ? Is it not ten thousand times less probable, that 
 such [79] transactions will happen, than it is, that we shall be 
 exposed to innumerable calamities, by rejecting the plan pro- 
 posed, or even by delaying to accept it ? 
 
 Let us consider our affairs in another light. Our differ- 
 ence of government, participation in commerce, improvement 
 in policy, and magnitude of power, can be no favourite objects 
 of attention to the Monarchies and Sovereignties of Europe. 
 Our loss will be their gain — our fall, their rise — our shame, 
 their triumph. Divided, they may distract, dictate, and 
 destroy. United, their efforts will be waves dashing them- 
 selves into foam against a rock. May pur national character 
 be— an animated moderation, that seeks only its own, and will 
 not be satisfied with less. 
 
2l6 LETTERS OF FABIUS BY JOHN DICKINSON. 
 
 To his beloved fellow-citizens of United America, the 
 writer dedicates this imperfect testimony of his affection, with 
 fervent prayers, for a perpetuity of freedom, virtue, piety, and 
 felicity, to them and their posterity. 
 
 FABIUS. 
 
Remarks / on the / Proposed Plan / of a / Federal 
 Government, / Addressed to the Citizens of the / United 
 States of America, / And Particularly to the People of 
 Maryland, / By Aristides. / " As a confederated govern- 
 ment is composed of petty re- / " publics, it enjoys the 
 internal happiness of each ; and with / " regard to its 
 external situation, by means of the associa- / " tion, it 
 possesses all the advantages of extensive monarchies." / 
 Mont. Sp. of Laws, B. 9, Ch. i. / Annapolis ; / Printed 
 by Frederick Green, Printer to the State. 
 
 8vo., pp. 42. 
 
 Written by Alexander Contee Hanson, a member of the 
 Maryland State Convention, and Chancellor of Maryland from 
 1789 till his death in 1806. Both Drake and Lanman have 
 confused Hanson and his son in their sketches of him, and the 
 best account is given in Hanson's Old Kent. 
 
 " These remarks are not all original, but they are very 
 judicious, calculated to remove objections to the proposed plan 
 of government." [Noah Webster.] in American Magazine. 
 
 P. L. F. 
 
To GEORGE WASHINGTON, Esquire. 
 
 Not as a Tribute to the Worth, which no Acknowledge^ 
 meat, or Distinctions, can reward ; but to do himself an 
 Honour, which, by labouring in the same Common Cause, he 
 flatters himself, in some Degree, he hath deserved ; the Author 
 begs Leave to inscribe the following imperfect Essay. 
 
TT is my intention, with all possible plainness, to examine 
 
 the proposed plan of a Federal Government. Its enemies 
 and its advocates have laid particular stress on the names, 
 wherewith it is subscribed. As one side would obtain your 
 implicit assent, by a reference to characters, and as the other 
 would defeat measures by exciting your jealousy of men, per- 
 mit me, in the first place, to make some general observations 
 on the persons who composed the late memorable convention. 
 
 In general, they had been distinguished by their talents 
 and services. They were not principally the men to whom 
 the idea of the convention first suggested itself, and it is 
 notorious that, in general, they accepted their appointments 
 with reluctance. It would seem, however, according to some- 
 vague insinuations, that, no sooner did they find themselves 
 convened, than their natures changed; and fatally have they 
 combined for the destruction of your liberties. Now this alto- 
 gether shocks my faith. I should sooner imagine that the 
 sacredness of the trust, the unparalleled grandeur of the occa- 
 sion, and the fellowhip of the great and good, might have 
 elevated the soul of the most abandoned wretch, had it been 
 possible for such to obtain a seat in that illustrious assemblage. 
 
 If those, who would inspire suspicion and distrust, can sug- 
 gest any precise idea, it must be this, that the members of the 
 convention will be elected into the first federal congress, and 
 there combining again will compose a body capable of bearing 
 down all opposition to their own aggrandisement. 
 
 By their scheme, however, thus deeply concerted, the house 
 of representatives is to be chosen by the people once in [6] two 
 years ; and if they have acted so as to warrant any reasonable 
 apprehension of their designs, it will be easy at any time, to 
 prevent their election. The truth is, that very few of them 
 either wish to be elected, or would consent to serve, either in 
 that house, or in the senate. I have exercised my imagination 
 to devise in what manner they or any other men, supposing 
 
Missing Page 
 
Missing Page 
 
222 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 
 
 them to bear full sway in both houses, could erect this imagin- 
 ary fabric of power. T request any person to point out any 
 law, or system of laws, that could be possibly contrived for 
 that purpose, obtain the final assent of each branch, and be 
 carried into effect, contrary to the interests and wishes of a 
 free, intelligent, prying people, accustomed to the most un- 
 bounded freedom of inquiry. To begin by an attempt to 
 restrain the press, instead of promoting their designs, would be 
 the most effectual thing to prevent them. 
 
 I am apprized of the almost universal disposition for the 
 increase and abuse of authority. But if we 'are to withhold 
 power because there is a possibility of its perversion, we must 
 abolish government, and submit to those evils, which it was 
 intended to prevent. The perfection of political science con- 
 sists chiefly in providing mutual checks amongst the several 
 departments of power, preserving at the same time, the depend- 
 ance of the greatest on the people. I speak with reference to a 
 single government. The necessity of another species of gov- 
 ernment, for the mutual defence and protection of these 
 American states, no man of sense and honesty, that I know of, 
 has ever yet denied. 
 
 The convention had the above principle constantly in their 
 view. They have contrived, that it shall be extremely difficult, 
 if not altogether impracticable, for any person to exceed or 
 abuse his lawful authority. There is nothing in their plan like 
 the cloathing of individuals with power, for their own gratifica- 
 tion. Every delegation, and every advantage that may be 
 derived to individuals, has a strict reference to the general 
 good. 
 
 To examine their constitution, by article and section, 
 would be a painful and needless undertaking. I shall endeavor 
 to answer such objections, as I have already heard, to antici- 
 pate others ; to point out some advantages not general- [7] ly 
 known ; and to correct certain errors, with respect to construc- 
 tion. When the convention was appointed, I much feared 
 that the numerous seeds, and principles of discord amongst the 
 states, would, for ever, prevent them from agreeing to any 
 efficient system whatever. I apprehended, in particular, that 
 
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 223 
 
 the dispute about representation would be the rock, on which 
 the vessel containing all our hopes would be dashed. When, 
 therefore, I discerned that equitable compromise between the 
 larger and lesser states, my anxiety was instantly removed, 
 and my soul enlightened by a sudden ray. 
 
 How then was I, some months after, disgusted at the repeti- 
 tion, of the arguments respecting the inequality of representa- 
 tives in the first branch. We were told, that the minority in 
 convention reasoned on first principles, that, as all men, in a 
 state of nature, are equal with respect to rights, so also are 
 equal all separate and distinct states ; — that, when individuals 
 form a free government, they must all have equal suffrage, 
 either in framing laws by themselves, or in choosing represent- 
 atives, although one man be ten times stronger, richer, or wiser 
 than another ; so also, when several states unite, for common 
 convenience, they must meet on terms of perfect equality, 
 although one be ten times more wealthy, expensive and popu- 
 lous than another; — that, under our present compact, the states 
 are equal, and that no injury has resulted from the equality. 
 
 To these arguments, we may imagine, was opposed some- 
 thing like the following : " You talk of first principles, and, at 
 the same time, would let 180,000 free inhabitants of Maryland 
 have no more to do in the choice of representatives than only 
 30,000 inhabitants of Delaware. Do you propose, that these 
 30,000 shall bear an equal part of burthens and impositions ? 
 As to no injury having resulted from the equality, as you call 
 it, under the articles of confederation, we think the reverse ; 
 and that this pretended * equality was a poison, which per- 
 va-ded all our affairs." [8] 
 
 The anticipation of arguments like these had raised those 
 apprehensions of an irreconcilable difference. It were needless 
 
 * Against what is called equality in representation, the great Montesquieu 
 seems to have declared by the strongest implication. In his Spirit of Laws, b. 
 eh. 2, he says, that the confederate republic of Lycia contained twenty-three 
 associated towns : that, in the common council, the larger towns had three 
 votes, the middling towns two, and the lesser only one ; that they contributed 
 to the common expence according to the proportion of suffrages ; and, that 
 were he to give the model of an excellent confederate republic, it should be 
 that of Lycia. Could the immortal spirit of Montesquieu revisit the earth, and 
 
224 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 
 
 to repeat more. Had an angel been the umpire, he could pro- 
 pose no expedient more equitable and more politic, not only as 
 a compromise, but to establish such a decided difference be- 
 tween the two branches of congress, as will make them, indeed, 
 two distinct bodies, operating by way of mutual balance and 
 check. 
 
 By this expedient, is safety secured to the lesser states, as 
 completely as if the senate were the only legislative body. It 
 is possible (if such a thing can be devised) that, from the in- 
 equality in the iirst branch, propositions will be made to give 
 the larger states some advantage over the lesser ; but the equal- 
 ity in the senate will, for ever, preclude its adoption. It is 
 well worthy of remark, that not more than three of the thir- 
 teen are, at present, deemed larger states, in the peculiar sense 
 of the word. There is no reason for supposing, in the federal, 
 like a state, legislature, the senate will be intimidated or overawed, 
 by the more numerous branch. A demagogue may declaim, 
 rave, menace and foam, with as little impression as the roaring 
 billows produce upon the solid [9] beach. Were it not for this 
 equality in one, and inequality in the other, a jealousy might 
 be entertained of too perfect a coincidence of sentiment. 
 
 The convention has been censured for an excess of its 
 authority. But with no other power was it invested, than is 
 possessed by every free citizen of the states. Its office was to 
 advise, and no further has it proceeded. Had it been even 
 invested with full powers to amend the present compact, their 
 proposed plan would not have exceeded their trust. Amend- 
 ment, in parliamentary language, means either addition, or 
 diminution, or striking out the whole, and substituting some- 
 thing in its room. The convention were not limited. The 
 states did not tell them, this article must stand, this must be 
 
 behold the model now offered to America, how quickly would his favorite 
 republic sink in his estimation. In a new quarter of the globe scarcely heard 
 of by the greatS part of Europeans in his day, and since the commencement 
 of the present century, he would see men who have attained a perfection in the 
 science most conducive to human happiness, in that study which was the 
 principal occupation of his life, in which his predecessors had acquired only a 
 few glimmering lights, and of which it was reserved for him to develope most 
 of the true iirst principles. 
 
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 22$ 
 
 Struck out, and this may be altered. The avowed object of a 
 convention was to consult on the additional power necessary 
 to be vested in congress. But the members of this convention 
 perceiving, from the experience of these states, from the his- 
 tory of ancient and modern states, and, I may add, from the 
 principles of human nature, that the same body of men ought 
 not to make and execute laws ; and that one body alone ought 
 not to do the first, have separated the executive, so far as was 
 proper, from the legislative ; and this last they have divided 
 into two branches, composed of different materials, distinct 
 from, and totally independent of, each other. 
 
 The house of representatives* is to be the immediate choice 
 of the people, and one man is to represent 30,000 souls. In an 
 affair of so much importance, and in districts containing so 
 many suffrages, it is not to be supposed, that a worthless char- 
 acter will succeed by those arts, which have, sometimes, pre- 
 vailed in county elections. It is to be expected, that, in gen- 
 eral, the people will choose men of talents and character. 
 Were they even so inclined, they can choose none but of ripe 
 age, who have been, at least, seven [10] years citizens of the 
 United States, and, at the time of election, residents of the 
 respective state. Whatever laws shall be proposed, or assented 
 to by these men, are to bind themselves, their' children, and 
 their connections. If a single man, or a party, shall propose a 
 measure, calculated to promote private interest, at the expense 
 of public good, is it conceivable, that the whole house will be 
 brought into the measure ? Suppose it should. The measure 
 cannot be adopted into a law, without the concurrence of an- 
 other house, consisting of men still more select, possessing 
 superior qualifications of residence and age, and equally bound 
 by the laws. After gaining the assent of the senate, the bill 
 must be submitted to the objections of the president. He is 
 not in any manner dependent on the legislature, which can, in 
 no manner, punish him, except for some crime known to the 
 
 * Whether the state of Maryland shall be divided into six districts, for 
 each to choose one man, or the people at large give their suffrage for the whole 
 six, is hereafter to be settled by the assembly. The latter mode, on a variety 
 of occasions, would be preferable. 
 
226 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 
 
 laws. He is elected by persons chosen for that special pur- 
 pose. He receives a compensation, which cannot be diminished 
 or increased, during his continuance in office. The term of his 
 commission is limited to four years, unless he shall have acted 
 so as to merit the people's favour. From the mode of his 
 election, it is impossible he can intrigue to advantage; and, 
 from the nature of other things, he will never succeed by 
 bribery and corruption. Like any other individual, he is liable 
 to punishment. Finally, at the expiration of his office, he 
 returns into the mass of the people. 
 
 In spite of all these circumstances, an idea is gone forth 
 amongst the enemies of the plan, and they labour to impress 
 it on your minds, that whatever power may be exercised by 
 these delegates of the people, will be used contrary to the in- 
 terests of their constituents. This is a supposition, so repul- 
 sive to my mind, that I wonder any man of the least gener- 
 osity, or reflection, can possibly adopt it. The assembly of 
 Maryland, with respect to internal regulations, is almost om- 
 nipotent. And yet, is there a man who supposes the assembly 
 would, intentionally, pass laws injurious to the people? Why 
 then should we distrust the federal assembly, chosen for a 
 short term, bound by the same ties, and selected on account of 
 their talents and patriotism ? 
 
 But, say the objectors, although we might probably con- 
 fide with safety in congress, it is not consistent with pru- [ii] 
 dence, without a manifest necessity, to empower any men to 
 do us an injury. 
 
 Whenever the proposed plan delegates authority, which 
 you imagine might safely be denied, be assured, that a little 
 reflection will suggest abundant reason for granting it. At the 
 same time you may be convinced, that, as some powers were not 
 intended to be exercised, so they never will be exercised, with- 
 out absolute necessity. 
 
 I have been amused by the writings of an avowed friend to 
 the plan. "Let no man," says he, "think of proposing 
 amendments. Should each person object, and should his 
 objections prevail, not a title of the system will be left. You 
 are to accept the whole, or reject the whole." After speaking 
 
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 22/ 
 
 in this very sensible way, he advises the states to reject, with 
 unanimity and firmness, the following provision. 
 
 " Art. I, sect. 4. The times, places, and manner of holding 
 " elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed 
 " in each state, by the legislature thereof ; but the, congress may, 
 " at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as 
 "to the places of choosing senators." 
 
 Can this writer imagine, that congress will presume to use 
 this power, without the occurrence of some one or more of the 
 cases, the contemplation whereof induced the convention to 
 create it. These are the cases of invasion by a foreign power; 
 of neglect, or obstinate refusal, in a state legislature; of the 
 prevalance of a party, prescribing so as to suit a sinister 
 purpose, or injure the general government. Others might 
 perhaps occur in the convention. But these may suffice to 
 evince the propriety of such a power in the federal head. It 
 was never meant, that congress should at any time interfere, 
 unless on the failure of a state lagislature, or to alter such 
 regulations as may be obviously improper. The exercise of 
 this power must at all times be so very invidious, that congress, 
 will not venture upon it without some very cogent and 
 substantial reason. Let congress, even officiously, exert every 
 power given by this clause, the representatives must still be 
 chosen by the people, and the senate by the state legislatures. 
 The provision cannot by any possibility admit of a different 
 construction. [12] 
 
 Should the bare appointment to congress have the magic 
 to pervert the tempers and principles of men, I perceive not 
 the temptation for abusing this, or any other of their powers. 
 There are bad men to be found at times, in every numerous 
 assembly. But, under all circumstances, I predict, that, in 
 congress, their party will be small. Should there be thither 
 sent the most prostituted character, that ever acted, like a 
 pest, to his own state; should he possess talents superior to the 
 rest, I should have little dread of his influence, unless I could 
 suppose, that a majority of like characters may be chosen. 
 Even then, I repeat it — they will be under no temptation 
 sufficient to influence a sensible mind; and no man of ripe age 
 was ever yet wicked for the sake of wickedness alone. 
 
228 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 
 
 You have heard, that, by the privilege of nominating 
 persons to office, the president will find the congress obse- 
 quious enough to pass any laws, he shall think fit to propose. 
 It is incumbent on the authors of this suggestion to show some 
 interest in the president, inducing him to propose prejudicial 
 measures. I have remarked, that under the constitution, his 
 salary can be neither augumented nor curtailed, during his 
 commission; and, to change the constitution, is not in the 
 power of congress. Should he, however, devise, and endeavour 
 to procure, some dangerous act of the body, can we conceive, 
 that this lure will be powerful enough to corrupt a majority in 
 each house. No member can be appointed to an office, 
 created, or of which the profits shall be increased, during the 
 time for which he was elected. And the expectation of such, 
 as may fall vacant, within four years, will hardly corrupt even 
 the smallest number, that can, in any possible case, be a 
 majority, in the two houses. To make the members of each 
 house ineligible to any other office whatever, would be even 
 impolitic, on account of its precluding these states from the 
 services perhaps of its best men. And it would be unjust to 
 deny men the possibility of benefits, which might be attained 
 by others less deserving. 
 
 In ascertaining and defining this obvious principle, the con- 
 vention evidently pursued this obvious principle, that all [13] 
 things, which concern the union in general, should be regu- 
 lated by the federal head ; and that each state legislature 
 should regulate those things, which concern only its own inter- 
 nal government, together with the separate interests of its 
 citizens. The enemies of the proposed constitution have 
 deemed it material to shew, that such a one never existed be- 
 fore. It dees not indeed agree with definitions in books, taken 
 from the Amphyctyonic council, the United Netherlands, or 
 the Helvetic body. They would therefore infer, that it is 
 wrong. This mode of reasoning deserves not a serious refuta- 
 tion. The convention examined those several constitutions, if 
 such a thing they can be called. It found them either woefully 
 defective, as to their own particular object, or inapplicable to 
 ours. Peradventure, our own articles of confederation, in 
 
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 229 
 
 theory, appear more perfect than any of them. These articles 
 were made according to rule; the legislative and executive 
 authorities being vested in one assembly. The extreme caution 
 of its framers to secure the independence of the several states, 
 on account of its principle, was much to be commended. But 
 experience having fully demonstrated this constitution to be 
 inadequate to the purposes for which it was framed, and a 
 general conviction of its defects having occasioned the conven- 
 tion, it is astonishing, that attempts are now made to prefer 
 still a theory, not founded on the nature of things, but derived 
 merely from a few deplorable examples. If two branches in a 
 state legislature be proper, why, in the name of common sense, 
 are they not so in a confederate legislature ? — Many instances 
 of hasty unadvised proceedings of congress, as a legislature, 
 have by other writers been adduced ; and so long as mankind 
 shall remain under the influence of passion or interest, there 
 will be such proceedings in every numerous assembly of men. 
 It is universally, by good writers, agreed, that where any 
 one political body possesses full powers, legislative and execu- 
 tive, whether it be a single man, or a select few, or a numerous 
 assembly, it matters not ; — the government must, in a short 
 time, become despotic. That in a free government, therefore, 
 the legislative and executive ought to be ever distinct and sep- 
 arate, is a position in the Maryland de- [14] claration of rights. 
 This hackneyed principle, has been urged, with great confidence, 
 against constituting the senate a council to the president. It 
 has been urged too, even by the men who would have the 
 whole power of the federal government centred in a single 
 assembly. I mean the men who insist that the convention 
 ought to have done no more than advise in what manner the 
 powers of the present congress should be increased. Let us 
 understand the principle in its proper extent. It does not fol- 
 low, that a body, whose assent is required, in making laws, but 
 who cannot, by themselves, do any legislative act, may not be 
 a fit council to the supreme executive magistrate, deriving his 
 authority, like them, from the people, in no manner dependent 
 on them, or the immediate of the people, for any private 
 advantage, and possessed of no share in legislation, except 
 that of offering his advice. 
 
230 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 
 
 The objection to this part of the constitution, I confess, at 
 first, appeared formidable. The reasons which I now conjec- 
 ture to have influenced the convention, did not then occur. 
 But I have long adhered to a maxim, which , I warmly recom- 
 mend to others — never to condemn, absolutely, even within 
 myself, any one kind, until I can hit upon some other kind 
 which I conceive better. As no human institution can possess 
 absolute perfection, it is an easy matter to espy some fault or 
 defect in almost everything, which the wit of man can contrive, 
 or at least, to reason plausibly against it. But this faculty of 
 finding faults is by no means sufificient to constitute the politi- 
 cian or statesman. I deliberated what kind of council might 
 be preferable, under all circumstances, to the senate. The 
 plainest thing in nature ! Exclaims he, who solves all difficul- 
 ties at once. Why not appoint a body to act as council and 
 nothing else ? 
 
 One reason, and that not very unpopular, is the great addi- 
 tional expence. However, this reason I deem the lightest of 
 all ; and the general proposition involves a great variety of 
 ■other considerations. 
 
 It' is essential to a council, that the members be free, as 
 possible, from all bias, or improper influence. This separate 
 and distinct council must be elected by the people, or [15] by 
 special electors ; by the legislature, or by one of its branches ; 
 or by some department ; or by the president. 
 
 That the people should either make laws to bind them- 
 selves, or elect persons, without whose consent, no laws shall 
 be made, is essential to their freeedom. But universal experi- 
 ence forbids, that they should immediately choose persons for 
 the execution of the laws. Shall the legislature then, or the 
 senate, or the house of representatives, have this appointment? 
 A council thus chosen would be dependent on its electors ; 
 and it would be the same thing in many respects, as if the leg- 
 islature should execute its own laws. Can you believe, that a 
 council, chosen annually, or once in two or three years, would 
 dare to pursue, in all cases, the dictates of its own judgment, 
 contrary to the known will of those, who will soon have an 
 opportunity of removing them ? Would they not be emulous 
 
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 23 1 
 
 to please leading men ; and there not be opened, at every 
 period of election, a fine field for intrigue and cabal ? There 
 would be one way only of rendering a council, thus chosen, 
 independent of their electors ; and that is, the choosing them 
 for life, with salaries, not to be augmented or diminished. 
 
 Against choosing an executive for life the reasons are 
 weighty indeed. Should they then hold their commissions 
 during good behaviour, there must be some tribunal to deter- 
 mine on that good behaviour ; and what body it can be, except 
 the congress, would be difficult to decide. Besides good 
 behaviour in a member of council is not determinable, like 
 that of a judge, which has relation to the laws, and things 
 universally known. In the office of the former, there is much 
 left to discretion, that I cannot conceive with what propriety 
 he can hold it on the condition of good behaviour. There can 
 be no sure criterion, and the~ decision must therefore unavoid- 
 ably depend on the discretion or mere opinion of his judges, 
 founded on no established principles whatever. 
 
 A council, chosen by the president himself, would probably 
 consist of creatures devoted to his will. I can discern no rea- 
 son, wherefore any officer of the government [16] should 
 make the appointment. There remains then only the people's 
 choosing electors, and placing the council of the president on 
 the same footing with himself. Here occurs the objection of 
 expence ; and here again would arise the controversy respect- 
 ing equality of representation. 
 
 The senate, will, in all human likelihood, consist of the 
 most important characters, men of enlightened minds, mature 
 in judgment, independent in their circumstances, and not de- 
 riving their principal subsistence from their pay, as probably 
 would the members of a board, distinct and separate from all 
 other public employments. 
 
 I am not, therefore, barely reconciled to the article in ques- 
 tion. It commands my warmest admiration, and entire ap- 
 plause. 
 
 Is there any power improperly trusted to that select assem- 
 bly, in which all the states have equal interest, and to which 
 they will assuredly make a determined point of sending their 
 
232 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 
 
 best men ? It is this equality, almost as much as any other 
 circumstance, which recommends it as an executive council. 
 The senate are to try impeachments. By their advice only, 
 may the president make treaties, appoint ambassadors, minis- 
 ters, counsels, judges of the supreme court, and officers, not 
 otherwise provided for in the constitution. Let us reflect, 
 whether these things could be better done, by any other body, 
 and whether it be proper for any one man (suppose even the 
 saviour of his country to be immo/tal) to have the appoint- 
 ment of all those important officers. It has always appeared 
 to me, that neither one man, nor many men, should possess this 
 transcendant authority, in a repubhc. A single man, in high 
 power, if he always means right, can with difficulty discern the 
 true characters of men. Continual efforts are made to impose 
 on his judgment. But, indeed, a single vs\2L'n generally confers by 
 favour. In a large assembly there is perhaps equal partiality ; 
 and elections are conducted by intrigue and cabal. A select 
 assembly is open to direct application ; and although each may 
 be supposed to entertain his partialities, he cannot recommend 
 his favourites, without pointing out their essential qualifica- 
 tions and becoming, in some measure, responsible for their 
 conduct. It is here, that characters are most fairly [17] inves- 
 tigated, and appointments are most deliberately made. I appeal 
 to universal experience, whether these remarks be not founded 
 on fact, and whether the most judicious appointments have not 
 been made by small select assemblies. I confess, that the num- 
 ber of the senators for this purpose only is excessive. But I 
 can confidently rely on the extraordinary selection to compen- 
 sate for the excess. 
 
 The power of the president is alarming peculiarly to that 
 class, who cannot bear to view others in possession of that 
 fancied blessing, to which, alas ! they must themselves aspire in 
 vain. They tell you, this supreme magistrate, although he be 
 called the modest name of president, and elected for only four 
 years, will, in every essential, be an emperor, king, or stadt- 
 holder at least ; and that his dignity in a few years, will become 
 hereditary. Let us examine the foundation of this alarming 
 prediction. 
 
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 233 
 
 Before this appointment can be entailed, and before even 
 the term can be enlarged, the constitution must be changed, 
 by consent of the people. By what method, then, shall the 
 president effect this alteration ? Every citizen in the union 
 will be a censor on his conduct. Not even his person is par- 
 ticularly protected; and the means of oppression are little 
 in his power. Let the jealousy of the people once take the 
 alarm, and, at the expiration of his term, he is dismissed, as 
 inevitably as light succeeds to darkness. The election of a 
 president is not carried on in a single assembly, where the sev- 
 eral arts of corruption may be essayed. He is elected by per- 
 sons chosen on the same day, in thirteen different assemblies, 
 in thirteen different states. An elective monarchy has long 
 been severely reprobated. But had the countries, where it 
 prevailed, enjoyed regulations like these, they would perhaps, 
 at this time, be preferred to the rules of hereditary succession, 
 which have so often placed fools and tyrants on the throne. 
 
 It seems, however, that the president may possibly be con- 
 tinued for life. He may so, provided he deserve it. If [18] 
 not, he retires to obscurity, without even the consolation of 
 having produced any of the convulsions, attendant usually on 
 grand revolutions. Should he be wicked or frantic enough to 
 make the attempt, he atones for it, with the certain loss of 
 wealth, liberty or life. 
 
 I return to the powers of congress. They are almost uni- 
 versally admitted to be proper for a federal head, except only 
 the sweeping clause, and the power of raising fleets and armies, 
 without any stint or limitation, in time of peace. The clause 
 runs thus : — 
 
 Art. I, sec. 8, par. the last. " To make all laws, which 
 shall be necessary and be proper for carrying into execution 
 the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this con- 
 stitution, in the government of the United States, or in any 
 department or officer thereof." 
 
 It is apprehended, that this sweeping clause will afford pre- 
 text, for freeing congress from all constitutional restraints. 
 
 I will not here again insist on the pledge we enjoy, in the 
 common interest, and sure attachment of the representatives 
 
234 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 
 
 and senate ; setting aside the little probability of a majority in 
 each branch lying under the same temptation. Consider the 
 import of the words. 
 
 I take the construction of these words to be precisely the 
 same, as if the clause had preceded further and said, " No act 
 " of congress shall be valid, unless it have relation to the fore- 
 " going powers, and be necessary and proper for carrying them 
 " into execution." But say the objectors, " The congress, being 
 " itself to judge of the necessity and propriety, may pass any 
 " act, which it may deem expedient, for any other purpose." 
 This objection applies with equal force to each particular 
 power, defined by the constitution ; and, if there were a bill of 
 rights, congress might be said to be the judge of that also. 
 They may reflect however, that every judge in the union, 
 whether of federal or state appointment, (and some persons 
 would say every jury) will have a right to reject any act, 
 handed to him as a law, which he may conceive repugnant to 
 the constitution. 
 
 It may nevertheless strike you at first view, that a pro- 
 vision, so obviously apt to excite distrust, might have well 
 [19] been omitted. So indeed it might, were there a possibil- 
 ity of providing every thing, necessary and proper, for carry- 
 ing into effect the various powers, intended to be conferred. 
 Without this general clause, it were easy to suppose cases, 
 wherein a particular clause might be incompetent to its own 
 purpose. 
 
 For want of some plain and obvious distinctions, there has 
 been vented so much senseless clamour against standing 
 armies, that they are become a political bugbear. A limited 
 monarch, with the means of maintaining, at all times, an army 
 devoted to his will, might soon trample on the natural and 
 civil rights of his subjects. Could the present congress find 
 means of augmenting the force, which it now maintains, 
 which of you, on that account, would experience the slightest 
 anxiety ? Which of all the European powers is destitute of 
 an army ? Which of them if they were free, could be secure 
 of remaining so without a standing force ? I might go fur- 
 ther, and demand, whether any of them have lost their liber- 
 
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 235 
 
 ties, by means of a standing army? The troops, continually 
 kept up in Great Britain, are formidable to its neighbors, and 
 yet no rational Englishman apprehends the destruction of his 
 rights. It is true, that he knows, these troops cannot be 
 maintained, without the consent of his representatives, annu- 
 ally obtained. But the necessity of an army he readily con- 
 ceives ; and the number he leaves to the discretion of parlia- 
 ment. Ought then an American to have greater fears of a 
 president, than an Englishman has of his king ? Or may he 
 not trust his representatives and the senate, with as much con- 
 fidence, as the Englishman reposes in the commons and 
 lords ? 
 
 Let the federal head be constituted as it may, there can be 
 no perfect security, without both a land force, and naval arma- 
 ment. It is impossible to say how much will, at all times of 
 peace, be sufficient. We have the same security against the 
 abuse of this, as of any other authority. The expenses of an 
 army might indeed raise fears of a different kind, — that we 
 shall not be able to maintain force enough for the most proper 
 occasion. 
 
 Suppose a limitation in time of peace. What then is to be 
 done on the prospect of a war? Should you make the [20] 
 distinction between profound peace and a threatened war, who 
 is there, but congress, to determine on the exigency ? If you 
 make no distinction, then it will be expedient to declare war, 
 at the instant in which the danger shall be conceived, in order 
 that it may be lawful to prepare for only a just defence. In 
 fine, I consider this grand objection, as a mere pretext for ter- 
 rifying you, like children, with spectres and hobgoblins. It 
 may be material here to remark, that although a well regulated 
 mihtia has ever been considered as the true defence of a free 
 republic, there are always honest purposes, which are not to be 
 answered by a militia. If they were, the burthen of the militia 
 would be so great, that a free people would, by no means, be 
 willing to sustain it. If indeed it be possible in the nature of 
 things, that congress shall, at any future period, alarm us by an 
 improper augmentation of troops, could we not, in that case, 
 depend on the militia, which is ourselves. In such a case it 
 
236 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 
 
 would be ridiculous to urge that the federal government, is 
 invested with a power over the whole militia of the union. 
 Even when congress shall exercise this power, on the most 
 proper occasions, it is provided in the constitution, that each 
 state shall ofificer and train its own militia. 
 
 The objections against the judiciary are probably more sin- 
 cere. The article has been generally misconceived, or misrep- 
 resented ; and after bestowing much attention, I am not certain 
 that I fully comprehend it. I am, however, at length satisfied, 
 that no rational construction can be given to this part of the 
 proposed plan, either to warrant a rejection of the whole, or to 
 place matters on a worse footing, than they are at present. 
 
 The judiciary power is to be vested in one supreme court, 
 fixed at the seat of government, with the ease and convenience 
 of the people, the congress may hereafter appoint inferior 
 courts in each of the states. The jurisdiction of this supreme 
 court is to be partly original, and partly appellate. With 
 respect to the extent of either, there can be no possible doubt, 
 as there is neither ambiguity nor uncertainty in the relative 
 expressions. [21]. 
 
 The original jurisdiction of the supreme court extends: — 
 
 1. To all cases, in which may be concerned an ambassador, 
 any public minister, or a consul. 
 
 2. To all cases whatever, in which a state may be a party. 
 — This second division maybe branched into i. Cases between 
 the United States, and one or more of the individual states. 
 3. Cases between two or more states. 3. Cases between a 
 state and its own citizens. 4. Cases between a state, and the 
 citizens of another state. 5. Cases between a state, and a for- 
 eign state. 6. Cases between a state, and the citizens, or sub- 
 jects of a foreign state. 
 
 The appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court extends: — 
 
 I. To all cases whatever between parties of every kind, in 
 
 law and equity, arising under this constitution, and the laws of 
 
 congress, passed agreeably thereto, and to treaties already, or 
 
 hereafter to be, made. 
 
 2. To all cases of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction. 
 
 3. To all cases, in which the United States shall be a party. 
 
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 237 
 
 4. To all cases between citizens of different states. 
 ' 5. To all cases between citizens of the same state, claiming 
 lands under the grants of different states. 
 
 6. To all cases between citizens of a state, and foreign 
 states, or their citizens or subjects. 
 
 One doubt arising on the judiciary article is, whether in 
 these cases of appellate jurisdiction, the appeal lies both from 
 the state courts, and the inferior federal courts, or only from 
 the former, or only from the latter. 
 
 Another doubt is, whether the inferior courts are to be 
 branches of the supreme court, constituted for convenience, 
 and having equal jurisdiction, both original and appellate, 
 with the supreme court, or whether the inferior courts are to 
 be confined to an original jurisdiction in those cases, wherein 
 the supreme court has appellate jurisdiction. 
 
 I shall not presume to decide absolutely on the genuine 
 construction of an article, which is said to have caused much 
 private debate and perplexity. I am however fully persuaded, 
 that, as the article speaks of an original and appellate jurisdic- 
 tion, of a supreme court, and inferior courts ; and, as there is 
 no intimation of appeals from the several [22] state tribunals, 
 the inferior federal courts are intended to have original juris- 
 diction in all cases, wherein the supreme court has appellate 
 jurisdiction ; and the appeal lies only from them. I can, 
 almost, with confidence, maintain, that, as there is no express 
 clause, or necessary implication, to oust the jurisdiction of 
 state courts, an action, after the adoption of the plan, may be 
 instituted in any court, having, at this time, a jurisdiction. 
 And if an action be brought in a state court, I do not, at pre- 
 sent, perceive, that it can, in any manner, be transferred to the 
 supreme or inferior federal court. 
 
 According then to the best of my judgment the affair 
 stands thus. The supreme federal court will have an exclu- 
 sive original jurisdiction in all cases relative to the rights of 
 ambassadors, other ministers, and consuls; because, as I 
 humbly conceive, the several state governments have at this 
 time nothing to do with these cases. With respect to the 
 cases, in which a state may be party, the supreme federal 
 
238 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 
 
 court, and the several state courts, will have, I conceive, con- 
 current original jurisdiction, provided a state may, at this time, 
 institute an action in its own name, in the courts of another 
 state. The inferior federal courts, and the state courts, will, I 
 conceive, have concurrent original jurisdiction in all the enu- 
 merated cases wherein an appeal lies to the supreme court, 
 except only the cases created by or under the proposed constitu- 
 tion, in which, as they do not now exist, the inferior federal 
 courts will have exclusive jurisdiction. From the state inferior 
 courts, I further apprehend, that an appeal will lie, in all cases, 
 to their own high courts of appeal, as heretofore. 
 
 A choice of jurisdictions has been ever esteemed a valuable 
 right, even where there are both of the same kind. The pur- 
 pose of extending so far the jurisdiction of the federal judi- 
 ciary, is to give every assurance to the general government, of 
 a faithful execution of its laws, and to give citizens, states, 
 and foreigners, an assurance of the impartial administration of 
 justice. Without the salutary institution, the federal govern- 
 ment might frequently be obstructed, and its servants want 
 protection. It is calculated not as an engine of oppression,, 
 but to secure the blessings of peace and good [23] order. 
 The provisions respecting different states, their citizens, and 
 foreigners, if not absolutely necessary, are much to be ap- 
 plauded. The human mind is so framed, that the slightest 
 circumstance may prevent the most upright and well known 
 tribunal from giving complete satisfaction ; and there may 
 happen a variety of cases, where the distrust and suspicion 
 may not be altogether destitute of a just foundation. 
 
 On these principles, an appeal as to fact is no less proper, 
 than the appeal from judges of law. A jury, whose legal 
 qualifications are only property and ripe age, may more proba- 
 bly incur the imputation of weakness, partiality, or undue in- 
 fluence. But in regard to appeals, it is very material to re- 
 mark, that congress is to make such regulations and excep- 
 tions, as upon mature deliberation, it shall think proper. And 
 indeed, before such regulations and exceptions shall be made, 
 the manner of appeal will not be ascertained, Is it then to be 
 presumed, that, in making regulations and exceptions, this 
 
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 239 
 
 appellate jurisdiction shall be calculated as an engine of 
 oppression, or to serve only the purpose of vexation and 
 delay. 
 
 As the rod of Aaron once swallowed up the rods of the 
 Egyptian magi, so also is it feared, that these federal courts, 
 will, at length, swallow up the state tribunals. A miracle, in 
 one case, is as necessary, as in the other. 
 
 But let not the officers of state courts be overmuch 
 alarmed ! The causes, which, by possibility, may be* insti- 
 tuted in the federal courts bear no comparison to the rest. 
 [24] In the course of ten years, not one action, that I know 
 of, in Maryland, has concerned either another state, or an am- 
 bassador, consul, or other minister. It is hoped, that actions 
 by foreigners, will, in a few years, become much rarer than at 
 any time heretofore, and these may still be determined in the 
 state courts. [25] 
 
 A gentleman, as it is conjectured, in the law department of 
 a neighboring state, has been pleased to infer, that fictions, 
 similar to those in the king's bench and exchequer of Eng- 
 land, will be contrived, to draw causes into the federal courts. 
 He seems not aware, that, even in England, the established 
 fictions of law are not of modern date. They were ingenious 
 devices, to remedy defects in the common law, without the aid 
 
 * The importance of having the western territory determined a common 
 stock, needs only to be mentioned, to excite attention. 
 
 As the articles of confederation contain no provision, for adjusting the dis- 
 pute between the United States, and particular states, Maryland, for a long 
 time, refused her ratification. An adequate provision is made by the proposed 
 plan. That the United States will assuredly institute actions against two of 
 the states, setting up claims equally wild and extensive, may appear from the 
 following statement. 
 
 New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland, 
 have been always interested in making good the common claim ; as they never 
 laid any particular claim to the territory in question. 
 
 Massachusetts, if the province of Maine be separate, is likewise become in- 
 terested in the common claim. 
 
 Connecticut, and New York, have both made cessions, which congress has 
 accepted. These two are therefore become interested. 
 
 Pennsylvania, although very extensive, has her limits ascertained. She 
 likewise is interested. 
 
240 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 
 
 of parliament. The fundamental principle however, with re- 
 spect to their adoption, was, that they consist with equity, and 
 be requisite for the advancement of justice. Now every man, 
 who would establish over his cause a jurisdiction in a fed- 
 eral court, must shew, that such cause comes under the de- 
 scription of the constitution. If he do not, there will be 
 wanting that equity, which is the support of legal fiction. 
 But can any man seriously imagine, that fiction will be per- 
 niitted, to give the judges a power of legislation, denied to 
 congress itself? Wherefore should the judges, holding their 
 commissions during good behaviour, be guilty of such gross 
 falsehood, perjury, and breach of trust ? Would there not be 
 a general revolt against such barefaced impudent innovations. 
 Away then with your trumpery of fictions ! Accuse not the 
 illustrious members of the convention of having in their con- 
 templation such sophistry, pettifogging and chicane ! But 
 another fear is, that whatever actions may be instituted in the 
 federal courts will there seek an admission, on account of a 
 more speedy decision. That man alone, " on whose brow 
 shame is ashamed to sit," will avow his opposition to a more 
 speedy administration of justice. 
 
 The institution of the trial by jury has been sanctified by 
 the experience of ages. It has been recognised by the consti- 
 
 Virginia, having made a cession to congress, has since relinquished a part 
 of the reserved lands, or at least offered independence, to Kentucky. 
 
 North Carolina, having once made a cession, thought proper, in the om- 
 nipotence of her destined sovereignty, to repeal the act. Will not the cession 
 be determined valid, and the repeal void ? 
 
 South Carolina also, it is said, has ceded part of that territory, which 
 lately she disputed with Georgia. In this case the United States have their 
 claim fortified. 
 
 But Georgia, the weakest of all, lays claim to an immense tract of country. 
 In this territory there are warlike and independent tribes of the aborigines, 
 now carrying terror and desolation towards the heart of the country occupied 
 by the whites. It is expected, that this circumstance, with a consciousness of 
 the weak foundation of her claims, will dispose Georgia to give up without a 
 suit, and consent to be circumscribed within narrower limits, so soon as a 
 proper tribunal shall have power to enter upon a rational investigation. 
 
 N. B. — For the above statement I am principally indebted to a member of 
 the late continental convention, and who for a considerable time, was a mem- 
 ber of congress, a gentleman of established honour and accuracy. 
 
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 241 
 
 tution of every state in the union. It is deemed the birthright 
 of Americans ; and it is imagined, that liberty cannot subsist 
 without it. The proposed plan expressly adopts it, for the 
 decision of all criminal accusations, except impeachment ; and 
 is silent with respect to the determination of facts in civil 
 causes. 
 
 The inference, hence drawn by many, is not warranted by 
 the premises. By recognising the jury trial in criminal cases, 
 the constitution effectually provides, that it shall pre- [26] vail, 
 so long as the constitution itself shall remain unimpaired and 
 unchanged. But, from the great variety of civil cases, arising 
 under this plan of government, it would be unwise and impoli- 
 tic to say aught about it, in regard to these. Is there not a 
 great variety of cases, in which this trial is taken away in each 
 of the states? Are there not many more cases, where it is 
 denied in England ? For the convention to ascertain in what 
 cases it shall prevail, and in what others it may be expedient 
 to prefer other modes was impracticable. On this subject a 
 future congress is to decide ; and I see no foundation under 
 Heaven for the opinion that congress will despise the known 
 prejudices and inclination of their countrymen. A very in- 
 genious writer of Philadelphia has mentioned the objections 
 without deigning to refute that, which he conceives to have 
 originated in " sheer malice." 
 
 I proceed to attack the whole body of anti-federalists in 
 their strong hold. The proposed constitution contains no bill 
 of rights. 
 
 Consider again the nature and intent of a federal republic. 
 It consists of an assemblage of distinct states, each completely 
 organized for the protection of its own citizens, and the whole 
 consolidated, by express compact, under one head, for the gen- 
 eral welfare and common defence. 
 
 Should the compact authorize the sovereign, or head to do 
 all things it may think necessary and proper, then there is no 
 limitation to its authority ; and the liberty of each citizen in 
 the union has no other security, than the. sound policy, good 
 faith, virtue, and perhaps proper interests, of the head. 
 
 When the compact confers the aforesaid general power, 
 
242 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 
 
 making nevertheless some special reservations and exceptions, 
 then is the citizen protected further, so far as these reserva- 
 tions and exceptions shall extend. 
 
 But, when the compact ascertains and defines the power 
 delegated to the federal head, then cannot this government, 
 without manifest usurpation, exert any power not expressly, 
 or by necessary implication, conferred by the compact. 
 
 This doctrine is so obvious and plain, that I am amazed 
 any good man should deplore the omission of a bill of rights. 
 
 [27] When we were told, that the celebrated Mr. Wilson 
 had advanced this doctrine 'in effect, it was said, Mr. Wilson 
 would not dare to speak thus to a CONSTITUTIONALIST. With 
 talents inferior to that gentleman's, I will maintain the doc- 
 trine against any CONSTITUTIONALIST who will condescend to 
 enter the lists, and behave like a gentleman. 
 
 It is, however, the idea of another most respectable charac- 
 ter, that, as a bill of rights could do no harm, and might quiet 
 the minds of many good people, the convention would have 
 done well to indulge them. With all due deference, I appre- 
 hend, that a bill of rights might not be this innocent quieting 
 instrument. Had the convention entered on the work, they 
 must have comprehended within it everything, which the citi- 
 zens of the United States claim as a natural or a civil right. 
 An omission of a single article would have caused more dis- 
 content, than is either felt or pretended, on the present 
 occasion. A multitude of articles might be the source of 
 infinite controversy, by clashing with the powers intended to 
 be given. To be full and certain, a bill of rights might have 
 cost the convention more time, than was expended on their 
 other work. The very appearance of it might raise more 
 clamour than its omission, — I mean from those who study 
 pretexts for condemning the whole fabric of the constitution. 
 ■ — "What ! (might they say) did these exalted spirits imagine, 
 " that the natural rights of mankind depend on their gracious 
 " concession. If indeed they possessed that tyrannic sway, 
 " which, the kings of England had once usurped, we might hum- 
 " bly thank them for their magna charta, defective as it is. As 
 " that is not the case, we will not suffer it to be understood^ 
 
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 245 
 
 " that their new-fangled federal head shall domineer with the 
 "powers not excepted by their precious bill of rights. What ! 
 " if the owner of 1,000 acres of land thinks proper to fell one 
 " half, is it necessary to take a release from the vendee of the 
 "other half? Just as necessary is it for.^the people to have a 
 "grant of their natural rights from a government which derives 
 " everything it has, from the grant of the people." [28] 
 
 The restraints laid on the state legislatures will tend to 
 secure domestic tranquiUty, more than all the bills, or declara- 
 tions, of rights, which human policy could devise. It is very 
 justly asserted, that the plan contains an avowal of many 
 rights. It provides that no man, shall suffer by expost facto 
 laws or bills of attainder. It declares, that gold and silver 
 only shall be a tender for specie debts ; and that no law shall 
 impair the obligation of a contract. 
 
 I have here^perhaps touched a string, which secretly draws 
 together many of the foes to the plan. Too long have we 
 sustained evils, resulting from injudicious emissions of paper, 
 and from the operation of tender laws. To bills of credit as 
 they are now falsely called, may we impute the entire loss of 
 confidence between men. Hence it is, that specie has, in a 
 great degree, ceased its proper ofifice, and been confined to 
 speculations, baneful to the public, and enriching a few enter- 
 prising sharp-sighted men, at the expence not only of the 
 ignorant, slothful, and needy, but of their country's best 
 benefactors. Hence chiefly are the bankruptcies throughout 
 America, and the disreputable ruinous state of our commerce. 
 Hence is it principally, that America hath lost its credit abroad, 
 and American faith become a proverb. The convention plainly 
 saw, that nothing short of a renunciation of the right to emit 
 bills of credit could produce that grand consummation of pol- 
 icy, the RESTORATION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FAITH. 
 
 Were it possible for the nations abroad to suppose Great 
 Britain would emit bills on the terms whereon they have 
 issued in America, how soon would the wide arch of that 
 mighty empire tumble into ruins ? In no other country in the 
 universe has prevailed Ithe idea of supplying, by promissory 
 notes, the want of coin, for commerce and taxes. In America, 
 
244 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 
 
 indeed, they have heretofore served many valuable purposes. 
 It is this consideration, which has so powerfully attached to 
 them many well meaning honest citizens ; and they talk of 
 gratitude to paper money, as if it were a sensible benefactor, 
 entitled to the highest rank and distinction ; and as if, to 
 abandon it, would be a deadly sin. But when everything 
 demonstrates the season to be past ; when the credit of Amer- 
 ica, in all places, depends on the security she shall give to [29] 
 contracts, it would be madness in the states to be tenacious 
 of their right. So long as Europe shall believe we regard not 
 justice, gratitude and honour, so long will America labour 
 under the disadvantages of an individual, who attempts to 
 make good his way through the world with a blasted reputa- 
 tion. To the man, who shall say, " it is of no consequence to 
 "consult national honour," I only answer thus, — "If thy soul 
 " be so narrow and depraved, as to believe this, it were a need- 
 " less attempt to cure thee of thy error." 
 
 On this subject there is no necessity for enlarging, to the 
 people of my native state ; their conduct on a recent occasion 
 having acquired them great and deserved applause. Is it nec- 
 essary to enlarge on the propriety of giving more efficient 
 powers to a federal head ? At this moment, congress is little 
 more than a name, without power to effect a single thing, 
 which is the object of a confederate republic. Reflect on the 
 recent period, when, in a sister state, a numerous body of her 
 frantic citizens appeared armed for the destruction of a govern- 
 ment, framed by the people. When that unhappy state was 
 devoted to the miseries of a civil war, did congress even dare 
 to interpose ? Conscious of its inability to protect, it could 
 only await the result, in silence and in terror. It indeed ven- 
 tured to make application to the states for a small body of 
 troops, under the poor pretext of another, and a necessary, 
 destination. But, notwithstanding the universal contagion of 
 the alarm, did the states, on that occasion, comply with the 
 requisition ? Suppose even an invasion by a foreign power, — 
 in what manner could congress provide for its own defence ? 
 In the contemptible light in which America has lately stood, 
 is it reasonable to expect she will be suffered to remain long in 
 
REMARICS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 245 
 
 peace ? The distance between the two continents is the only 
 circumstance on which we can rely. All Europe is now in sus- 
 pence ; and the result of your deliberations will instruct her in 
 the part she shall act. 
 
 With amazement, her nations contemplate a scene, of 
 which the world is too young to furnish a parallel. We as- 
 sembled our sages, patriots, and statesmen, to consult what 
 mode of government is capable of producing the greatest 
 sum [30] of general good, with the least mixture of general, 
 and partial evil. Not that each individual in this august as- 
 sembly was expected to offer a system ; but that the product 
 of their joint wisdom should be referred to the several states, 
 to be adopted, or rejected, as the great body of the people 
 shall determine on a free and full deliberation. 
 
 As the occasion was unparalleled so also is the plan, which, 
 after many months of painful investigation, is submitted, with 
 an unanimity, also unparalleled. 
 
 If there be any man, who approves the great outlines of the 
 plan, and, at the same time, would reject it, because he views 
 some of the minute parts as imperfect, he should reflect, that, 
 if the states think as he does, an alteration may be hereafter 
 effected, at leisure. When the convention determined, that 
 the whole should be received, or the whole fail, they did not 
 on an arrogant conceit of their own infallibility, but on the 
 soundest principles of policy and common sense. Were each 
 state legislature, or convention, to take it up, article by article, 
 and section by section, with the liberty of adopting some, and 
 rejecting the rest, in all probability, so small a part would be 
 approved by nine states, on the narrow view which each has 
 of the subject, and attached as each is to its own supposed 
 interest, that, in its mutilated condition, it would be worse 
 than the present confederation. For thirteen different assem- 
 blies, in that way, to approve so much of any plan whatever, 
 as might merit the name of system, the convention well knew 
 to be impossible. Were there any one body oi men, invested 
 with full power, in behalf of the whole United States, to con- 
 sider, and amend the plan, then would it be proper to debate 
 it by sections, in the same manner as it was originally debated. 
 
246 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 
 
 With a view to defeat totally the plan, another general 
 convention is proposed ; not with the power of giving a fin- 
 ishing hand to a constitution ; but again to consider objec- 
 tions, to strike out, to add, and again to make their report to 
 the several states. 
 
 In this way, there can never be an end. We must at last 
 return to this, — that whatever is agreed on, by the assembly 
 appointed to propose, must be either adopted in the whole, or 
 in the whole rejected. [31] 
 
 The idea of a new convention is started by some men, 
 with the vain expectation of having amendments made to 
 suit a particular state, or to advance their own selfish views. 
 Were this fatal idea adopted, I should bid a last adieu to that 
 elevated hope, which now inspires me, of living under the 
 happiest form of government which the sun ever beheld. 
 Recollect again and again, that almost every state in the 
 union made a determined point of delegating its first charac- 
 ters to this grand convention. Reflect upon the time spent 
 in the arduous work, and the sacrifices which those distin- 
 guished persons made to their country. Should the same 
 men be deputed again, would they not, think you, with the 
 same unanimity, subscribe and recommend the same plan ? 
 So far as I have been informed, those members, who, in the 
 progression of the plan, had opposed certain parts, and yet 
 afterwards subscribed cheerfully to the whole, have, with the 
 candour which becomes them, acknowledged their errors in 
 debate. Even an illustrious character, who was of the minor- 
 ity, consisting only of three, I have been told, has since 
 regretted his refusal. 
 
 Suppose then a second convention, with a different choice 
 of delegates. These too would either speedily subscribe, or 
 they might propose some other system, to be debated, para- 
 graph by paragraph, in thirteen different assembhes ; and then 
 there would be the same probability of a mutilated plan ; or 
 they would propose something, to be adopted or rejected in the 
 whole ; and there would be the same necessity of another con- 
 vention. Besides, as the second convention, if it consist of 
 different men, must inevitably be inferior to the first, there is 
 
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON.. 24/ 
 
 little probability that their work will be superior. Never 
 again, in an assembly constituted as that was, will there be 
 found the same liberality of sentiment, " the same spirit of 
 amity, and the same mutual deference and concession." 
 
 If it be contended, that the second, being possessed of the 
 various objections from the several states, must be better able 
 to determine, I would ask, what conduct this second conven- 
 tion should adopt ? Are they to take the proposed plan, and 
 strike out every thing objected to by nine states ? Or may 
 they likewise adopt and recommend the entire plan? In 
 short, to [32] appoint a second convention, merely to consult 
 and propose, would be the most absurd expedient, that ever, 
 in a matter of this amazing magnitude, was proposed. Does 
 any man then entertain the thought of another kind of con- 
 vention, invested with full powers to consult, amend, adopt, 
 and confirm? A scheme like this was never yet, I trust, in 
 agitation. But, if it were, I would propose this single ques- 
 tion. Whether is it better to amend, before it be tried, that 
 plan, which may be termed the result of the wisdom of Amer- 
 ica, or leave it to be amended, at leisure, as mature experi- 
 ence shall direct ? 
 
 Although a very great variety of ostensible objections have 
 been publicly offered, the real and sincere objections are hardly 
 ever disclosed in private. There is a class, opposed to the 
 union of thirteen different states, and the reason they assign, is 
 the vast extent of our territory. Let us consider well their 
 objection. 
 
 To consolidate the whole thirteen states into a single 
 organization, was out of the convention's contemplation, — for 
 two unanswerable reasons. In the first place, they were satis- 
 fied, that not one of the states would renounce its sovereignty. 
 In the next place, they considered, that, in a single govern- 
 ment, with a great extent of territory, the advantages are 
 most unequally diffused. As the extreme parts are scarcely 
 sensible of its protection, so are they scarcely under its domi- 
 nation. It is generally agreed, that a great extended nation 
 can long continue under no single form of government, except 
 a despotism into which, either a republic, or a limited mon- 
 
248 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 
 
 archy, will be certain to degenerate. And hence, if I under- 
 stand the man who styles himself a Centinel, he insinuates, 
 that, if these states will persist in remaining under one head, 
 they must soon fall under the dominion of a despot. But, my 
 fellow-citizens, in a confederate republic, consisting of distinct 
 states, completely organized within themselves, and each of no 
 greater extent than is proper for a republican form, almost all 
 the blessings of government are equally diffused. Its protec- 
 tion extends to the remotest corner, and there every man is 
 under restraint of laws. [33] 
 
 A true federal republic is always capable of accession by 
 the peaceable and friendly admission of new single states. Its 
 true size is neither greater nor less than that, which may com- 
 prehend all the states, which, by their contiguitv, may become 
 enemies, unless united under one common head, capable of recon- 
 ciling all their differences. Such a government as this, excels 
 any single government, extending over the same territory, as 
 a band of brothers is superior to a band of slaves, or as thir- 
 teen common men, for the purposes of agriculture, would be 
 superior to a giant, enjoying strength of body equal to them all. 
 
 The idea of a balance has long influenced the politics of 
 Europe. But how much superior to this almost impracticable 
 balance would be a general league, constituting a kind of fed- 
 eral republic, consisting of all the independent powers of 
 Europe, for preventing the impositions and encroachments of 
 one upon another ! A true and perfect confederate government, 
 however, in her situation, is not to be attained ; although the 
 great soul of Henry T)HE Fourth is said to have conceived 
 the idea. 
 
 Shall America the|i form one grand federal republic ? Or 
 shall she, after experiencing the benefits of even an imperfect 
 union, and when a uni[on the most perfect is requisite for her 
 permanent safety ; — shall she, in this situation, divide into thir- 
 teen contemptible single governments, exposed to every insult 
 and wrong from abroad, and watching each other's motions, 
 with all the captiousness of jealous rivals ? Or shall she divide 
 into two or more federal republics, actuated, by the same ma- 
 lignant dispositions ? In either of these cases, after struggling 
 
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 249 
 
 through infinite toils, difficulty, and danger, should the thirteen 
 single states be, at last, delivered from foreign foes, they will 
 fall upon each other ; and no man can predict, what forms of 
 
 government, or division of territory, shall finally obtain . 
 
 Two or three federal republics might possibly retain their in- 
 dependence. But they would be in the same situation, with 
 respect to each other, as France, England, and Spain, scarcely 
 ever free from war ; practicing the arts of dissimulation and 
 intrigue ; in vain striving to impose, by endless negotiation ; 
 and, after all, relying only on the immense naval and land 
 forces, which they continually maintain. [34] 
 
 Let us then, my countrymen, embrace those blessings 
 which Providence is ready to shower on us. Open and extend 
 your views ! Let the prospect comprehend the present and 
 future generations, yourselves, your children, your relatives, 
 your fellow-citizens, dwellers on the same continent, and in- 
 habitants of the whole terraqueous globe. 
 
 With the prospect of my country's future glory, presented 
 to my glowing imagination, it is difficult to resist the strong 
 impulse of enthusiasm. But it is neither my talent, nor desire, 
 to mislead. I wish only to impress the genuine advantages 
 of the proposed plan ; and, if possible, to rouse every man 
 from that supineness, into which he is lulled by the present 
 deceitful calm. To acquit themselves, like men, when visible 
 danger assails ; and, when it is repelled, to sink like savages, 
 into indolence, is said to he characteristic of Americans. I 
 am not, however, one of those, who imagine a necessity for 
 embracing almost any scheme, which the convention might 
 have devised, for giving to the union more efficient powers. 
 Had the plan, they have proposed, contained the seeds of 
 much, though distant, evil, perhaps a faithful patriot might 
 address you thus : 
 
 " Let us not, my friends, in a fit of unmanly apprehension, 
 " betray that immense charge, with which Americans, at this 
 " day are entrusted ! Let us confide in the wisdom of our great 
 " men, with the assistance of Heaven, to establish yet our 
 " safety and happiness ! Let us, in the meantime, sustain all 
 " our evils, with resignation and firmness. Let us hope, that 
 
250 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 
 
 " no foreign power, or lawless internal combinations, shall do 
 " us a mighty injury ! Let us be frugal, economical, industri- 
 '■ ous ! Let us suspend the cruel collection of debts ! Let 
 " commerce continue to droop ! Let us awhile submit even to 
 " infamy ; and turn a callous ear to the indignant reproaches 
 '• of our late faithful and affectionate servants, friends and 
 " benefactors." 
 
 To this purpose might a man plausibly declaim ; provided 
 the proposed plan contained many and great faults ; provided 
 it were not calculated to promote the general good, without 
 violating the just rights of a single individual ; and provided it 
 were not the best, which, under all circumstances, could be 
 reasonably expected. It was the parting declaration of [35] 
 the American NESTOR, to his exalted fellow-labourers, that 
 "he would subscribe, because he thought it good, and because 
 " he did not know, but it was the best that could be contrived." 
 My own declaration, which would be the same, were I now 
 standing on the verge of eternity, is, that if the whole matter 
 were left to my discretion, I would not change a single part. 
 On reflection, I was pleased with the conduct of the Virginia 
 and Maryland assemblies, in appointing distant days for the 
 meeting of their state conventions. Not that I greatly ad- 
 mired the supposed motive ; but because I sincerely wished 
 every man might have time to comprehend and weigh the 
 plan, before the ultimate decision of these two states should 
 be pronounced. The longer it is contemplated, after it is 
 understood, the greater, I am persuaded, will be the approba- 
 tion of those, who wish the public good, and to whose private 
 views and expectations, nothing, which tends to promote that 
 good, can be greatly detrimental. 
 
 But alas ! My fellow citizens, on the adoption of this fatal 
 plan, and when every part of the great complicated machine 
 shall be put in motion, the lustre of our state assemblies will 
 be diminished by the superior splendour of the federal head. 
 This single consideration, although many hesitate to avow it, 
 will cause more opposition, than all the rest united. Weigh 
 well the objection. If ever it be material to inquire, by whom 
 reasons are adduced, it is on this peculiar occasion. 
 
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 251 
 
 From the objection itself, may perhaps be discerned the 
 danger we are opposed to, from the secret views and selfish 
 considerations of the objector. 
 
 What at this moment to the nations abroad is the state of 
 Maryland ? The poor member of a defenceless system of 
 petty republics. In what light is she viewed by her sister 
 states ? Whatever rank she now possesses, will remain after 
 the great alteration of the system. They will all rise or fall in 
 the proportion which now exists. What then are the powers 
 an individual state will lose ? She will no longer be able to 
 deny congress that, which congress, at this moment, has a 
 right to demand. She will have no power to enter into a 
 treaty, alliance, or confederation. She shall, in time of war, 
 grant no letters of marque and reprisal. She shall [36] coin 
 no money, emit no bills of credit, nor make any thing but 
 gold and silver a tender in payment of debts. She shall pass 
 no bill of attainder, or ex post facto law, or law impairing the 
 obligation of a contract. She shall grant no title of nobility. 
 She shall not, without consent of congress, lay any duty on im- 
 ports or exports, except what may be necessary for executing 
 her inspection laws. She shall not, without consent of congress, 
 lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or* ships of war, in 
 time of peace ; enter into any agreement, or compact, with 
 another state, or with a foreign power; or engage in war, 
 unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger, as will 
 not admit of delay. 
 
 Of the several powers, from which an individual state is thus 
 restrained, some are improper to be used at all ; others belong 
 not even now to the individual states ; and the rest are strictly 
 proper for only the federal head. The aversion from ceding 
 them to congress, is just as reasonable as in a state of nature 
 would be the reluctance of an individual to relinquish any of 
 his natural rights, upon entering into a state of society. The 
 principle, on which, at length, he surrenders, is the necessity 
 of every one's making a cession of some rights, to enable the 
 
 * The advantage derived from this to the southern states, is easily per- 
 ceived. Have not serious apprehensions been entertained on account of the 
 vast superiority of the eastern states by sea ? 
 
252 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 
 
 sovereign to protect the rest. Each state is fully sensible, 
 that she cannot protect herself ; and yet she would enjoy the 
 advantages of an union, without making the necessary contri- 
 butions. To discern how preposterous is the idea, requires 
 not more than a moment's reflection. 
 
 For the honour of my countrymen, I hope this extreme 
 reluctance to surrender power is confined to those, whose am- 
 bition, or private interest, would have all things subservient to 
 the omnipotence of assembly. In the few years that the 
 state constitutions have endured, has not everyone seen preg- 
 nant proofs of the vain love of domination ? Has he not also 
 seen decisive marks of overbearing secret influence ? Where 
 are the instances 'of exalted patriotism? But I forbear. [37] 
 Far from me is the wish to cast wantonly one stinging or disa- 
 greeable reflection. The subject naturally required the gen- 
 eral remark, and I hope, this short hint may be excused. 
 
 Is there a possible advantage to be derived to the public, 
 from a single state's exercising powers proper only for the 
 federal head ; suppose even each state should use them pro- 
 perly and alike ; which, in the nature of things, is not to be 
 expected ? If there be men, who delight in parliamentary 
 warfare ; who choose a fair wide field for displaying their 
 talents ; who wish to see every servant of the public prostrate 
 before them ; whose ears soothed by humble supplication ; 
 they may still enjoy rich sources of gratification. Are not the 
 regulations of property, the regulations of the penal law, the 
 protection of the weak, the promotion of useful arts, the whole 
 internal government of their respective republics ; are not 
 these the main objects of every wise and honest legislature ? 
 Are not these things still in their power ; and, whilst free from 
 invasion or injuries abroad, are not these almost the only 
 things, in which sovereignty is exercised ? 
 
 That the state legislatures will soon " drop out of sight," 
 is an idea most extravagant and absurd ; because, in addition 
 to the importance of their duties, the very existence of the 
 congress depends upon them. That they will; at least, dwin- 
 dle into something like city corporations, is an apprehension, 
 founded on no better principle. May the Ruler of the uni- 
 
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 253 
 
 verse inspire them with wisdom to discharge those numerous 
 and extensive duties, which they will find remaining. To do 
 this, as they ought, will be far preferable to the* breaking all 
 useful national measures, and marring the concerns of a con- 
 tinent. To do this, as they ought, will afford more true pleas- 
 ure to a good mind, than the carrying, by consummate eloquence 
 and address, the most interesting federal measure, which can- 
 not be contrived by an enlightened honest politician, in a state 
 assembly, possessing all its darling sovereignties ! 
 
 You have been assured, that, soon as this fatal plan shall 
 [38] succeed, an host of rapacious collectors will invade the 
 land ; that they will wrest from you the hard product of your 
 industry, turn out your children from their dwellings, perhaps 
 commit your bodies to a jail ; and your own immediate repre. 
 sentatives will have no power to relieve you. This is the mere 
 phrenzy of declamation, the ridiculous conjuration of spectres 
 and hobgobblins ! 
 
 To the five per cent, impost most of the states have more 
 than once given their assent. This is the only tax which con- 
 gress wishes immediately to impose. Of the imposition of 
 assessment, capitation, or direct taxes of any kind, the con- 
 gress entertains no idea at present ; and although it be proper 
 for the federal head to possess this power in reserve, nothing 
 but some unforeseen disaster will ever drive them to such in- 
 eligible expedients. Setting aside the immediate advantages 
 of revived credit and trade, and the increased value of your 
 property and labour, you will be delivered, in a great measure, 
 from that load of direct taxation, which has been so unequally 
 borne, and produced so little substantial good. 
 
 Permit me to demand, what mighty benefit has resulted 
 from the exercise of those sovereign rights, that, in general, 
 you should be loth to resign them ? Has not a perpetual 
 clamour been kept up (it matters not whether justly or other- 
 wise) concerning the enormous impositions on the people? 
 And what are the advantages derived to the people of the 
 respective states, to the union, or to meritorious individuals ? 
 
 * Is it possible to reflect, witbput indignation, on the fate of the five per 
 cent, impost scheme ? 
 
254 REMARKS BV ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 
 
 Has not the far greater part of a state's internal expences been 
 owing to the extreme length of sessions? Have not these 
 sessions been consumed in disgusting altercation, and in pass- 
 ing laws, serving to little better purpose, than to swell the 
 statute book, encourage a negligence of duty, and obstruct 
 the administration of justice ? 
 
 To trace each real and ostensible objection up to its proper 
 course, would be a task equally invidious, irksome and unnec- 
 essary. The characters of the principal advocates and oppo- 
 nents are well known. To him who declines not a public 
 avowal of his sentiments, some credit is due, for his candour; 
 and he is entitled to your patient attention. But, he that pre- 
 fers a secret corner, for dealing forth his ob- [^9] jections, and 
 expositions, should be heard with caution and distrust. It is 
 in a land of slavery alone, where truth shuns the open day. — 
 Each side has imputed to the other illiberal and selfish motives. 
 Consider then the particular interests of each ; and bear this in 
 your minds, that an interest may be either honourable and 
 praiseworthy, or directly the reverse. 
 
 You have been told that the proposed plan was calculated 
 peculiarly for the rich. In all governments, not merely des- 
 potic, the wedthy must, in most things, find an advantage, 
 from the possession of that, which is too much the end and 
 aim of mankind. In the proposed plan, there is nothing 
 like a discrimination in their favour. How this amazing ob- 
 jection is to be supported, I am at a loss to conjecture. Is it 
 a just cause of reproach, that the constitution effectually se- 
 cures property ? Or would the objectors introduce a general 
 scramble ? In eligibility to office, in suffrage, and in every 
 other civil right, men are all on terms of perfect equality. 
 And yet, notwithstanding this just equality, each man is to 
 pay taxes in proportion to his ability, or his expences. 
 
 A still more surpassing objection remains to be considered. 
 "This new constitution, so much bepraised, and admired, will 
 " commence in a moderate aristocracy. To a corrupt and op- 
 " pressive one the transition is easy, and inevitable, unless 
 " some Caesar, or a Cromwell, in their stead, shall make a seiz- 
 " ure of their liberties. As to the house of representatives, 
 
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 255 
 
 " they will either be insignificant spectators of the contest 
 "between the president and the senate, or their weight will be 
 "thrown in to one of the scales." 
 
 No man, indeed, has exactly used these words ; but they 
 contain the sum and scope of several recent publications. 
 
 In the course of my remarks, I have already said enough 
 to expose the futility of certain objections, which are ushered 
 to the world, under the auspices of a pair of honourable names. 
 Notwithstanding the care and pomposity, with which they are 
 circulated, it is not worth while to draw invidious comparison. 
 One gentleman, whose name is thus freely used, I think, calls 
 the house of representatives a mere [40] shred, or rag of rep- 
 resentation. Does he consider the distinction between the 
 objects of a confederate republic, and of a single government? 
 It is a poor return for that singular respect which the conven- 
 tion paid to the majesty of the people, in contriving, that con- 
 gress shall not only be a representation of states, as heretofore, 
 but also an immediate representation of- the people. Were 5, 
 10, or even 20,000, the ratio proposed, then peradventure the 
 honourable objector might clamour about the expence of a 
 mobbish legislature. 
 
 The fact is, that the new government, constructed on the 
 broad- basis of equality, mutual benefits, and national good,. is 
 not calculated to secure a single state all her natural advan- 
 tages at the expence of the natural and acquired advantages 
 of her respectable brethren of New England. 
 
 His real objection against constituting the senate an exec- 
 utive council arises, I conceive, from the equality of represen- 
 tation. As to the trite maxim, that the legislative and exec- 
 utive ought ever to be distinct and separate, I would, in 
 addition to my foregoing observations on this head, refer him 
 to Montesquieu's chapter on the English government. I could 
 wish, the writings of that great man, and of Judge Blackstone, 
 so often either copied, or cited for conclusive authority, were 
 better understood. Should a second, or a third convention, 
 be obtained, the aforesaid honourable gentlemen can never be 
 fully indulged in their main object of a proportionate repre- 
 sentation. 
 
256 REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 
 
 The examples of a genuine aristocracy are rare. They 
 were founded in times of profound ignorance, and when the 
 mass of property was in the hands of a few, whilst the rest 
 pined in want and wretchedness. One European aristocratic 
 government, if such it can be called, has grown out of the orig- 
 inal defective form, the offspring of necessity, and commenced 
 amidst the horrors of a civil war. Although the people of 
 that country fought, and intended, to be free, their compact 
 of government never was complete ; they did not attend to 
 the principle of rotation, and checks ; and a genuine represen- 
 tation did never there prevail. 
 
 An aristocracy can perhaps subsist with only a moderate 
 extent of territory and population, But it is a farce to talk 
 of an aristocracy ; when there are two branches, so dif- [41] 
 ferently formed ; when the members of each are chosen for a 
 reasonable term ; and when their reappointment depends on 
 the good opinion of their countrymen. It is not in nature, that 
 a man with the least portion of common sense can believe the 
 people of America will consent to such a deplorable change in 
 their constitution, as shall confine all power to a few noble 
 families, or that, without their consent, the change will be 
 effected, by internal policy, or force. 
 
 Whilst mankind shall believe freedom to be better than 
 slavery ; whilst our lands shall be generally distributed, and 
 not held by a few insolent barons, on the debasing terms of 
 vassalage ; whilst we shall teach our children to read and write ; 
 whilst the liberty of the press, that grand palladium, which 
 tyrants are compelled to respect, shall remain ; whilst a spark 
 of public love shall animate even a small part of the people ; 
 whilst even self-love shall be the general ruling principle ; so 
 long will it be impossible for an aristocracy to arise from the 
 proposed plan. — Should Heaven, in its wrath, inflict blindness 
 on the people of America ; should they reject this fair offer of 
 permanent safety and happiness ; to predict what species of 
 government shall at last spring from disorder, is beyond the 
 short reach of poHtical foresight. 
 
 Believe me, my fellow citizens, that no overweening self 
 conceit, no vain ambition, no restless meddling spirit, has pro- 
 
REMARKS BY ALEXANDER CONTEE HANSON. 257 
 
 duced this address. Long had I waited to see this vast ques- 
 tion treated, as it deserves ; and the publication disseminated 
 in my native state. Many judicious observations had appeared 
 in newspapers and handbills. But no publication, that I have 
 seen, has gone fully into the merits, considered the objections, 
 and explained that, which is doubtful and obscure. On this 
 account I, at length, made the attempt. That my performance 
 is equal to my wishes, I can by no means believe. I have, 
 however, a consolation in reflecting, that it will be difficult for 
 any man to demonstrate, that, in this business, I have a partic- 
 ular interest. In many of my remarks, I have been anticipated 
 by writings, which I have seen ; and I have collected ma- [42] 
 terials, wherever I could find them. Could I be convinced, 
 that I have said nothing, which had not before been said or 
 thought by thousands, the reflection would yield far less mor- 
 tification than pleasure. 
 
 ARISTIDES. 
 Annapolis, January ist, 1788. 
 
Letter on the Federal Constitution, October i6, 1787, 
 By Edmund Randolph [Richmond: Printed by Augustin 
 Davis, 1787.] 
 
 16 mo. pp. 16. 
 
 Edmund Randolph was a member of the Annapolis, Phila- 
 delphia, and Virginia Conventions, in all of which he took a 
 prominent though equivocal position. His letter on the Con- 
 stitution was widely circulated in the newspapers, and was 
 printed in pamphlet form as above, a copy of which is in the 
 Library of Congress, but cannot be found, so I am compelled 
 to give the title from Sabin's Dictionary of Books relating to 
 America. 
 
 " I do not know what impression the letter may make.in 
 Virginia. It is generally understood here that the arguments 
 contained in it in favor of the Constitution are much stronger 
 than the objections which prevent his assent. His arguments 
 are forcible in all places, and with all persons. His objections 
 are connected with his particular way of thinking on the sub- 
 ject, in which many of the adversaries to the Constitution do 
 not concur." Madison to Washington, Jan. 25, 1788. 
 
 P. L. F. 
 
Richmond, Oct. lo, 1787. 
 
 The Honorable the Speaker of the House of 
 Delegates : 
 
 Sir, — 
 The constitution which I enclosed to the general assembly 
 in a late official letter, appears without my signature. This 
 circumstance, although trivial in its own nature, has been ren- 
 dered rather important to myself at least by being misunder- 
 stood by some, and misrepresented by others. — As I disdain 
 to conceal the reasons for withholding my subscription, I have 
 always been, still am, and ever shall be, ready to proclaim 
 them to the world. To the legislature, therefore, by whom I 
 was deputed to the federal convention, I beg leave now to ad- 
 dress them ; affecting no indifference to public opinion, but 
 resolved not to court it by an unmanly sacrifice of my own 
 judgment. 
 
 As this explanation will involve a summary, but general 
 review of our federal situation, you will pardon me, I trust, 
 although I should transgress the usual bounds of a letter. 
 
 Before my departure for the convention, I believed, that 
 the confederation was not so eminently defective, as it had 
 been supposed. But after I had entered into a free communi- 
 cation with those who were best informed of the condition 
 and interest of each State ; after I had compared the intelli- 
 gence derived from them with the properties which ought to 
 characterize the government of our union, I became persuaded, 
 that the confederation was destitute of every energy, which 
 a constitution of the United States ought to possess. 
 
 For the objects proposed by its institution were, that it 
 should be a shield against foreign hostility, and a firm resort 
 against domestic commotion ; that it should cherish trade, and 
 promote the prosperity of the States under its care. 
 
 But these are not among the attributes of our present 
 
262 LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH. 
 
 union. Severe experience under the pressure of war — a ruin- 
 ous weakness manifested since the return of peace ; and the 
 contemplation of those dangers, which darken the future pros- 
 pect, have condemned the hope of grandeur and of safety 
 under the auspices of the confederation. ^ 
 
 In the exigencies of war, indeed, the history of its effects 
 is but short ; the final ratification having been delayed until 
 the year 1781. But however short, this period is distinguished 
 by melancholy testimonies of its inability to maintain in har- 
 mony, the social intercourse of the States, to defend congress 
 against encroachments on their rights, and to obtain by requis- 
 itions, supplies to the federal treasury, or recruits to the federal 
 armies. I shall not attempt an enumeration of the particular 
 instances ; but leave to your own remembrance and the records 
 •of congress the support of the assertions. 
 
 In the season of peace too, not many years have elapsed ; 
 and yet each of them has produced fatal examples of delin- 
 quency, and sometimes of pointed opposition to federal duties. 
 To the various remonstrances of congress, I appeal, for a 
 gloomy, but unexaggerated narrative of the injuries which our 
 faith, honor and happiness, have sustained by the failure of 
 the States. 
 
 But these evils are past ; and some may be led by an 
 honest zeal to conclude that they cannot be repeated. Yes, 
 sir, they will be repeated as long as the confederation exists, 
 and will bring with them other mischiefs springing from the 
 same source, which cannot yet be foreseen in their full array 
 ^of terror. 
 
 If we examine the constitution and laws of the several 
 States, it is immediately discovered that the law of nations is 
 unprovided with sanctions in many cases, which deeply affect 
 public dignity and public justice. The letter however of the 
 confederation does not permit congress to remedy these 
 defects, and such an authority, although evidently deducible 
 from its spirit, cannot without violation of the second article, - 
 be assumed. Is it not a political phenomenon, that the head 
 of the confederacy should be doomed to be plunged into war, 
 from its wretched impotency to check offences against this 
 
LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH. 263 
 
 law ; and sentenced to witness in unavailing anguish the in- 
 fraction of their engagements to foreign sovereigns ? 
 
 And yet this is not the only grevious point of weakness. 
 After a war shall be inevitable, the requisitions of congress for 
 quotas of men or money, will again prove unproductive and 
 fallacious. , Two causes will always conspire to this baneful 
 consequence. 
 
 I. No government can be stable, which hangs on human j a 
 inclination alone, unbiassed by the coercion ; and 2, from the ■' 
 very connection between States bound to proportionate con- 
 tributions, jealousies and suspicions naturally arise, which at 
 least chill the ardor, if they do not excite the murmurs of the 
 whole. I do not forget indeed, that by one sudden impulse 
 our part of the American continent has been thrown into a 
 military posture, and that in the earlier annals of the war, our 
 armies marched to the field on the mere recommendations of 
 congress. But ought we to argue from a contest, thus signal- 
 ized by the magnitude of its stake, that as often as a flame 
 shall be hereafter kindled, the same enthusiasm will fill our 
 legions, or renew them, as they may be filled by losses ? 
 
 If not, where shall we find protection ? Impressions, like 
 those, which prevent a compliance with requisitions of regular 
 forces, will deprive the American republic of the services of 
 militia. But let us suppose that they are attainable, and ac- 
 knowledge as I always shall, that they are the natural support 
 of a free government. When it is remembered, that in 
 their absence agriculture must languish ; that they are not 
 habituated to military exposures and the rigour of military 
 discipline, and that the necessity of holding in readiness suc- 
 cessive detachments, carries the expense far beyond that of 
 enlistments — This resource ought to be adopted with caution. 
 
 As strongly too, am I persuaded, that the requisitions for ' 
 money will not be more cordially received. For besides the 
 distrust, which would prevail with respect to them also ; be- 
 sides the opinion, entertained by each state of its own liberal- 
 ity and unsatisfied demands against the United States; there 
 is another consideration not less worth of attention — the first 
 rule for determining each quota of the value of all lands 
 
264 LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH. 
 
 granted or surveyed, and of the buildings and improvements 
 thereon. It is no longer doubted that an equitable, uniform 
 mode of estimating that value is impracticable ; and therefore 
 twelve States have substituted the number of inhabitants 
 under certain limitations, as the standard according to which 
 money is to be furnished. But under the subsisting articles of 
 the union, the assent of the thirteenth State is necessary, and 
 has not yet been given. This does of itself lessen the hope of 
 procuring a revenue for federal uses ; and the miscarriage of 
 the impost almost rivets our despondency. 
 
 Amidst these disappointments, it would afford some con- 
 solation, if when rebellion shall threaten any State, an ultimate 
 asylum could be found under the wing of congress. But it is 
 at least equivocal whether they can intrude forces into a State, 
 rent asunder by civil discord, even with the purest solicitude 
 for our federal welfare, and on the most urgent entreaties of 
 the State itself. Nay the very allowance of this power would 
 be pageantry alone, from the want of money and men. 
 
 ' To these defect of congressional power, the history of man 
 has subjoined others not less alarming. I earnestly pray 
 that the recollection of common sufferings, which termi- 
 nated in common glory, may check the sallies of violence, and 
 perpetuate mutual friendship between the States. But I can- 
 not presume, that we are superior to those unsocial passions, 
 which under like circumstances have infested more ancient 
 nations. I cannot presume, that through all time, in the 
 daily mixture of American citizens with each other, in the 
 conflicts for commercial advantages, in the discontents which 
 the neighborhood of territory has been seen to engender in 
 other quarters of the globe, and in the efforts of faction and 
 intrigue — thirteen distinct communities under no effective 
 superintending control, (as the United States confessedly now 
 are, notwithstanding the bold terms of the confederation) will 
 avoid a hatred to each other deep and deadly. 
 
 In the prosecution of this enquiry, we shall find the general 
 prosperity to decline under a system thus unnerved. No 
 sooner is the merchant prepared for foreign ports, with the 
 treasures which this new world kindly offers to his acceptance, 
 
LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH. 265 
 
 than it is aunounced to him, that they are shut against Amer- 
 ican shipping, or opened under oppressive regulations. He 
 urges congress to a counter-poHcy, and is answered only by a 
 condolence on the general misfortune. He is immediately 
 struck with the conviction, that until exclusion shall be op- 
 posed to exclusion, and restriction to restriction, the American 
 flag will be disgraced. For who can conceive, that thirteen 
 legislatures, viewing commerce under different regulations, 
 and fancying themselves discharged from every obligation to 
 concede the smallest of their commercial advantages for the 
 benefit of the whole, will be wrought into a concert of action 
 and defiance of every prejudice ? Nor is this all : Let the 
 great improvements be recounted, which have enriched and 
 illustrated Europe : Let it be noted, how few those are, which 
 will be absolutely denied to the United States, comprehending 
 within their boundaries, , the choicest blessings of climate, 
 soil and navigable waters ; then let the most sanguine patriot 
 banish, if he can, the mortifying belief that all these must 
 sleep, until they shall be roused by the vigor of a national 
 government. 
 
 I have not exemplified the preceding remarks by minute 
 details ; because they are evidently fortified by truth, and the 
 consciousness of the United States of America. I shall, there- 
 fore, no longer deplore the unfitness of the confederation to 
 secure our peace ; but proceed with a truly unaffected distrust 
 of my own opinions to examine what order of powers the gov- 
 ernment of the United States ought to enjoy ? How they 
 ought to be defended against encroachments ? Whether they 
 can be interwoven in the confederation, without an alteration 
 of its very essence, or must be lodged in new hands ? Show- 
 ing, at the same time, the convulsions which seem to await us, 
 from a dissolution of the union or partial confederacies. 
 
 To mark the kind and degree of authority which ought to 
 be confided to the government of the United States, is no 
 more than to reverse the description which I have already 
 given, of the defects of the confederation. 
 
 From thence it will follow, that the operations of peace and 
 war will be clogged without regular advances of money, and 
 
266 LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH. 
 
 that these will be slow indeed, if dependent on supplication 
 alone. For what better name do requisitions deserve, which 
 may be evaded or opposed without the fear of coercion ? But 
 although coercion is an indispensable ingredient, it ought not 
 to be directed against a State, as a State ; it being impossible 
 to attempt it except by bldckading the trade of the delinquent, 
 or carrying war into its bowels. Even if these violent schemes 
 were eligible, in other respects, both of them might, perhaps, 
 be defeated by the scantiness of the public chest ; would 
 be tardy in their complete effect, as the expense of the 
 land and naval equipments must be first reimbursed ; and 
 might drive the proscibed State into the desperate resolve of 
 inviting foreign alliances. Against each of them lie separate 
 unconquerable objections. A blockade is not equally applica- 
 ble to all the States, they being differently circumstanced in 
 commerce and in ports ; nay an excommunication from the 
 privilege of the union would be vain, because every regulation 
 or prohibition may be easily eluded under the rights of Amer- 
 ican citizenship, or of foreign nations. But how shall we speak 
 of the intrusion of troops ? Shall we arm citizens against citi- 
 zens, and habituate them to shed kindred blood ? Shall we 
 risk the inflicting of wounds which will generate a rancour 
 never to be subdued? Would there be no room to fear, that 
 an army accustomed to fight for the establishment of authority, 
 would salute an emperor of their own ? Let us not bring these 
 things into jeopardy. Let us rather substitute the same pro- 
 cess by which individuals are compelled to contribute to the 
 government of their own States. Instead of making requisi- 
 tions to the legislatures, it would appear more proper that 
 taxes should be imposed 'by the federal head, under due modi- 
 fications and guards ; that the collectors should demand from 
 the citizens their respective quotas, and be supported as in the 
 collection of ordinary taxes. 
 
 It follows, too, that, as the general government will be re- 
 sponsible to foreign nations, it ought to be able to annul any 
 offensive measure, or enforce any public right. Perhaps among 
 the topics on which they may be aggrieved or complain, the 
 commercial intercourse, and the manner in which contracts 
 
LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH. 267 
 
 are discharged, may constitute the principal articles of 
 clamor. 
 
 It follows, too, that the general government ought to be 
 the supreme arbiter for adjusting every contention among the 
 States In all their connections, therefore, with each other, 
 and particularly in commerce, which will probably create the 
 greatest discord, it ought to hold the reins. 
 
 It follows, too, that the general government ought to pro- 
 tect each State against domestic as well as external violence. 
 
 And lastly, it follows, that through the general government 
 alone, can we ever assume the rank to which we are entitled 
 by our resources and situation. 
 
 Should the people of America surrender these powers, they 
 can be paramount to the constitutions and ordinary acts of 
 legislation, only by being delegated by them. I do not pre- 
 tend to affirm, but I venture to believe, that if the confedera- 
 tion had been solemnly questioned in opposition to our con- 
 stitution, or even to one of our laws, posterior to it, it must 
 have given away. For never did it obtain a higher ratification, 
 than a resolution of assembly in the daily form. 
 
 This will be one security against encroachment. But an- 
 other not less effectual is, to exclude the individual States 
 from any agency in the national government, as far as it may 
 be safe, and their interposition may not be absolutely neces- 
 sary. 
 
 But now, sir, permit me to declare, that in my humble 
 judgment, the powers by which alone the blessings of a gen- 
 eral government can be accomplished, cannot be interwoven 
 in the confederation, without a change in its very essence, 
 or, in other words, that the confederation must be thrown 
 aside. This is almost dernonstrable from the inefficacy of 
 requisitions, and from the necessity of converting them into 
 acts of authority. My suffrage, as a citizen, is also for addi- 
 tional powers. But to whom shall we commit those acts of 
 authority, these additional powers ? To congress ? When I 
 formerly lamented the defects in the jurisdiction of congress, 
 I had no view to indicate any other opinion, than that the 
 federal head ought not to be so circumscribed. For free 
 
268 LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH. 
 
 as I am at all times to profess my reverence for that body, 
 and the individuals who compose it, I am yet equally 
 free to make known my aversion to repose such a trust in a 
 tribunal so constituted. My objections are not the visions of 
 theory, but the results of my own observations in America, 
 and of the experience of others abroad, i. The legislative 
 and executive are concentred in the same persons. This, 
 where real power exists, must eventuate in tyranny. 2. 
 The representation of the States bears no proportion to their 
 importance. This is an unreasonable subjection of the will of 
 the majority to that of the minority. 2. The mode of election 
 and the liability of being recalled, may too often render the 
 delegates rather partizans of their own States than representa- 
 tives of the union. 4. Cabal and intrigue must consequently 
 gain an ascendancy in a course of years. 5. A single house of 
 legislation will sometimes be precipitate, perhaps passionate. 
 6. As long as seven States are required for the smallest, and 
 nine for the greatest votes, may not foreign influence at some 
 future day insinuate itself, so as to interrupt every active ex- 
 ertion ? 7. To crown the whole, it is scarce within the verge 
 of possibility, that so numerous an assembly should acquire 
 that secrecy, dispatch, and vigour, which are the test of excel- 
 lence in the executive department. 
 
 My inference from these facts and principles, is, that the 
 new powers must be deposited in a new body, growing out of 
 a consolidation of the union, as far as the circumstances of the 
 State will allow. Perhaps, however, some may meditate its dis- 
 solution, and others partial confederacies. 
 
 The first is an idea awful indeed, and irreconcilable with a 
 very early, and hitherto uniform conviction, that without union, 
 we must be undone. For, before the voice of war was heard, 
 the pulse of the then colonies was tried, and found to beat 
 in unison. The unremitted labor of our enemies was to 
 divide, and the policy of every congress to bind us together. 
 But in no example was this truth more clearly displayed, than 
 in the prudence with which independence was unfolded to the 
 sight, and in the forbearance to declare it, until America 
 almost unanimously called for it. After we had thus launched 
 
LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH. 269 
 
 into troubles, never before explored, and the hour of heavy- 
 distress, the remembrance of our social strength not only for- 
 bade despair, but drew from congress the most illustrious rep- 
 etition of their settled purpose to depise all terms, short of in- 
 dependence. 
 
 Behold, then, how successful and glorious we have been, 
 while we acted in fraternal concord. But let us discard the 
 illusion, that by this success, and this glory, the crest of dan- 
 ger has irrecoverably fallen. Our governments are yet too 
 youthful to have acquired stability from habit. Our very 
 quiet depends upon the duration of the union. Among the 
 upright and intelligent, few can read without emotion the 
 future fate of the States, if severed from each other. Then 
 shall we learn the full weight of foreign intrigue. Then shall 
 we hear of partitions of our country. If a prince, inflamed by 
 the lust of conquest, should use one State as the instrument 
 of enslaving others — if every State is to be wearied by perpet- 
 ual alarms, and compelled to maintain large military establish- 
 ments — if all questions are to be decided by an appeal to arms, 
 where a difference of opinion cannot be removed by negocia- 
 tion — in a word, if all the direful misfortunes which haunt the 
 peace of rival nations, are to triumph over the land, for what 
 have we to contend? why have we exhausted our wealth? 
 why have we basely betrayed the heroic martyrs of the federal 
 cause. 
 
 But dreadful as the total dissolution of the union is to my 
 mind, I entertain no less horror at the thought of partial con- 
 federacies. I have not the least ground for supposing that an 
 overture of this kind would be listened to by a single 
 State, and the presumption is, that the politics of the greater 
 part of the States, flow from the warmest attachment to an 
 union of the whole. If, however, a lesser confederacy could be 
 obtained by Virginia, let me conjure my countrymen well to 
 weigh the probable consequences, before they attempt to form it. 
 
 On such an event, the strength of the union would be 
 divided in two, or perhaps three parts. Has it so increased 
 since the war as to be divisible — and yet remain sufificient for 
 our happiness ? 
 
270 LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH. 
 
 The utmost limit of any partial confederacy, which Virginia 
 could expect to form, would comprehend the three southern 
 States, and her nearest northern neighbour. But they, like 
 ourselves, are diminished in their real force, by the mixture of 
 of an unhappy species of population. 
 
 Again, may I ask, whether the opulence of the United 
 States has been augmented since the war? This is answered 
 in the negative, by a load of debt, and the declension of trade. 
 
 At all times must a southern confederacy support ships of 
 war, and soldiery? As soon would a navy move from the for- 
 est, and a army from the earth, as such a confederacy, indebted, 
 impoverished in its commerce, and destitute of men, could, for 
 some years at least, provide an ample defence for itself. 
 
 Let it not be forgotten, that nations which can enforce 
 their rights, have large claims against the United States, and 
 that the creditor may insist on payment from any of them. 
 Which of them would probably be the victim ? The most 
 productive and the most exposed . When vexed by reprisals 
 of war, the southern States will sue for alliance on this contin- 
 ent or beyond sea. If for the former, the necessity of an union 
 of the whole is decided ; if for the latter, America will, I fear, 
 re-act the scenes of confusion and bloodshed, exhibited among 
 most of those nations, which have, too late, repented the 
 folly of relying on auxiliaries. 
 
 Two or more confederacies cannot but be competitors for 
 power. The ancient friendship between the citizens of Amer- 
 ica, being thus cut off, bitterness and hostility will succeed in 
 its place ; in order to prepare against surrounding danger, we 
 shall be compelled to vest some where or other, power ap- 
 proaching near to military government. 
 
 The annals of the world have abounded so much with 
 instances of a divided people being a prey to foreign influence, 
 that I shall not restrain my apprehensions of it, should our 
 union be torn asunder. The opportunity of insinuating it, will 
 be multiplied in proportion to the parts into which we may be 
 broken. 
 
 In short, sir, I am fatigued with summoning up to my im- 
 agination the miseries which will harass the United States, if 
 
LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH. 2/1 
 
 torn from each other, and which will not end until they are 
 superseded by fresh mischiefs under the yoke of a tyrant. 
 
 I come, therefore, to the last, and perhaps only refuge in 
 our difficulties, a consolidation of the union, as far as circum- 
 stances will permit. To fulfil this desirable object, the consti- 
 tution was framed by the federal convention. A quorum of 
 eleven States, and the only member from a twelfth have sub- 
 scribed it ; Mr. Mason, of Virginia, Mr. Gerry, of Massachu- 
 setts, and myself having refused to subscribe. 
 
 Why I refused, will, I hope, be solved to the satisfaction 
 of those who know me, by saying, that a sense of duty com- 
 manded me thus to act. It commanded me, sir, for believe 
 me, that no event of my life ever occupied more of my reflec- 
 tion. To subscribe, seemed to offer no inconsiderable gratifi- 
 cation, since it would have presented me to the world as a fel- 
 low laborer with the learned and zealous statesmen of America. 
 
 But it was far more interesting to my feelings, that I 
 was about to differ from three of my colleagues, one of whom 
 is, to the honor of the country which he has saved, embosomed 
 in their affections, and can receive no praise from the highest 
 lustre of language ; the other two of whom have been long 
 enrolled among the wisest and best lovets of the common- 
 wealth ; and the unshaken and intimate friendship of all of 
 whom I have ever prized, and still do prize, as among the 
 happiest of all acquisitions. — I was no stranger to the reigning 
 partiality for the members who composed the convention, and 
 had not the smallest doubt, that from this cause, and from the 
 ardor of a reform of government, the first applauses at least 
 would be loud and profuse. I suspected, too, that there was 
 something in the human breast which for a time would be apt 
 to construe a temperateness in politics, into an enmity to the 
 union. Nay, I plainly foresaw, that in the dissensions of par- 
 ties, a middle line would probaby be [interpreted into a want 
 of enterprise and decision. — But these considerations, how 
 seducing soever, were feeble opponents to the suggestions of 
 my conscience. I was sent to exercise my judgment,, and to 
 exercise it was my fixed determination ; being instructed by 
 even an imperfect acquaintance with mankind, that self appro- 
 
272 LETTER. BY EDMUND RANDOLPH. 
 
 bation is the only true reward which a political career can be- 
 stow, and that popularity would have been but another name 
 for perfidy, if to secure it, I had given up the freedom of 
 thinking for myself. 
 
 It would have been a peculiar pleasure to me to have as- 
 certained before I left Virginia, the temper and genius of my 
 fellow citizens, considered relatively to a government, so sub- 
 stantially differing from the confederation as that which is 
 now submitted. But this was, for many obvious reasons, im- 
 possible ; and I was thereby deprived of what I thought the 
 necessary guides. 
 
 I saw, however, that the confederation was tottering 
 from its own weakness, and that the sitting of a convention 
 was a signal of its total insufficiency. I was therefore ready 
 to assent to a scheme of government, which was proposed, and 
 which went beyond the limits of the confederation, believing, 
 that without being too extensive it would have preserved our 
 tranquility, until that temper and that genius should be col- 
 lected. 
 
 But when the plan which is now before the general assem- 
 bly, was on its passage through the convention, I .moved, that 
 the State conventions should be at liberty to amend, and that 
 a second general convention should be holden, to discuss the 
 amendments, which should be suggested by them. This mo- 
 tion was in some measure justified by the manner in which the 
 confederation was forwarded originally, by congress to the 
 State legislatures, in many of which amendments were pro- 
 posed, and those amendments were afterwards examined in 
 congress. Such a motion was doubly expedient here, as the 
 delegation of so much power was sought for. But it was neg- 
 atived. I then expressed my unwillingness to sign. My rea- 
 sons were the following : 
 
 I. It is said in the resolutions which accompany the con- 
 stitution, that it is to be submitted to a convention of dele- 
 gates chosen is each State by the people thereof, for their 
 assent and ratification. The meaning of these terms is allowed 
 universally to be, that the convention must either adopt the 
 constitution in the whole, or reject it in the whole, and is pos- 
 
LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH. 273 
 
 itively forbidden to amend. If therefore, I had signed, I 
 should have felt myself bound to be silent as to amendments, 
 and to endeavor to support the constitution without the cor- 
 rection of a letter. With this consequence before my eyes, 
 and with a determination to attempt an amendment, I was 
 taught by a regard for consistency not to sign. 
 
 2. My opinion always was, and still is, that every citi- 
 zen of America, let the crisis be what it may, ought to have a 
 full opportunity to propose, through his representatives, any 
 amendment which in his apprehension, tends to the public wel- 
 fare. By signing, I should have contradicted this sentiment. 
 
 3. A constitution ought to have the hearts of the people on' 
 its side. But if at a future day it should be burdensome after 
 having been adopted in the whole, and they should insinuate 
 that it was in some measure forced upon them, by being con- 
 fined to the single alternative of taking or rejecting it alto- 
 gether, under my impressions, and with my opinions, I should 
 not be able to justify myself had I signed. 
 
 4. I was always satisfied, as I have now experienced, that 
 this great subject would be placed in new lights and attitudes 
 by the criticism of the world, and that no man can assure hini- 
 self how a constitution will work for a course of years, until at 
 least he shall have heard the observations of the people at 
 large. I also fear more from inaccuracies in a constitution, 
 than from gross errors in any other composition ; because our 
 dearest interests are to be regulated by it ; and power, if loosely 
 given, especially where it will be interpreted with great 
 latitude, may bring sorrow in its execution. Had I signed 
 with these ideas, I should have virtually shut my ears against 
 the information which I ardently desired. 
 
 5. I was afraid that if the constitution was to be submitted 
 to the people, to be wholly adopted or wholly rejected by 
 them, they would not only reject it, but bid a lasting farewell 
 to the union. This formidable event I wished to avert, by 
 keeping myself free topropose amendments, and thus, if possi- 
 ble, to remove the obstacles to an effectual government. But 
 it will be asked, whether all these arguments, were not be well 
 weighed in convention. They were, sir, with great candor. 
 
274 LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH. 
 
 Nay, when I called to mine the respectability of those, with 
 whom I was associated, I almost lost confidence in these 
 principles. On other occasions, I should cheerfully have 
 yielded to a majority ; on this the fate of thousands yet un- 
 born, enjoined me not to yield until I was convinced. 
 
 Again, may I be asked, why the mode pointed out in 
 the constitution for its amendment, may not be a sufficient 
 security against its imperfections, without now arresting it in 
 its progress? My answers are — i. That it is better to amend, 
 while we have the constitution in our power, while the pas- 
 sions of designing men are not yet enlisted, and while a bare 
 majority of the States may amend than to wait for the uncer- 
 tain assent of three fourths of the States. 2. That a bad feat- 
 ure in government, becomes more and more fixed every day. 
 
 3. That frequent changes of a constitution, even if practicable, 
 ought not to be wished, but avoided as much as possible. And 
 
 4. That in the present case, it may be questionable, whether, 
 after the particular advantages of its operation shall be dis- 
 cerned, three fourths of the States can be induced to amend. 
 
 I confess, that it is no easy task, to devise a scheme which 
 shall be suitable to the views of all. Many expedients have 
 occurred to me, but none -of them appear less exceptionable 
 than this ; that if our convention should choose to amend, 
 another federal convention be recommended : that in that 
 federal convention the amendments proposed by this or any 
 other State be discussed ; and if incorporated in the constitu- 
 tion or rejected, or if a proper number of the other States 
 should be unwilling to accede to a second convention, the con- 
 stitution be again laid before the same State conventions, which 
 shall again assemble on the summons of the executives, and it 
 shall be either wholly adopted, or wholly rejected, without a 
 further power of amendment. I count such a delay as nothing 
 in comparison with so grand an object ; especially too as the 
 privilege of amending must terminate after the use of it once. 
 
 I should now conclude this letter, which is already too 
 long, were it not incumbent on me, from having contended 
 for ainendments, to set forth the particulars, which I conceive 
 to require correction. I undertake this with reluctance : because 
 
LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH. 275 
 
 it is remote from my intentions to catch the prejudices or pre- 
 possessions of any man But as I mean only to manifest that I 
 have not been actuated by caprice, and now to explain every 
 objection at full length would be an immense labour, I shall 
 content myself with enumerating certain heads, in which the 
 constitution is most repugnant to my wishes. 
 
 The two first points are the equality of suffrage in the senate, 
 and the submission of commerce to a mere majority in the 
 legislature, with no other check than the revision of the presi- 
 dent. I conjecture that neither of these things can be corrected; 
 and particularly the former, without which we must have risen 
 perhaps in disorder. 
 
 But I am sanguine in hoping that in every other justly 
 obnoxious cause, Virginia will be seconded by a majority of 
 the States. I hope that she will be seconded, i. In causing 
 all ambiguities of expression to be precisely explained. 2. Tn 
 rendering the president ineligible after a given number of 
 years. 3. In taking from him the power of nominating to the 
 judiciary offices, or of filling up vacancies which may there 
 happen during the recess of the senate, by granting commis- 
 sions which shall expire at the end of their next sessions. 4. 
 In taking from him the power of pardoning for treason at least 
 before conviction. 5. In drawing a line between the powers 
 of congress and individual States; and in defining the former, 
 so as to leave no clashing of jurisdictions nor dangerous dis- 
 putes ; and to prevent the one from being swallowed up by 
 the other, under cover of general words, and implication. 6. 
 In abridging the power of the senate to make treaties supreme 
 laws of the land. 7. In incapacitating the congress to deter- 
 mine their own salaries. And 8. In limiting and defining the 
 judicial power. 
 
 The proper remedy must be consigned to the wis- 
 dom of the convention ; and the final step which Virginia 
 shall pursue, if her overtures shall be discarded, must also rest 
 with them. 
 
 You will excuse me, sir, for having been thus tedious. My 
 feelings and duty demanded this exposition ; for through no 
 other channel could I rescue my omission to sign from mis- 
 
2/6 LETTER BY EDMUND RANDOLPH. 
 
 representation, and no more effectual way could I exhibit to 
 the general assembly an unreserved history of my conduct. 
 
 I have the honor, sir, to be with great respect, your most 
 obedient servant, 
 
 EDMUND RANDOLPH. 
 
Observation / leading to a fair examination / of the / 
 system of government, / proposed by the late / Con- 
 vention; / and to several essential and neces- / sary alter- 
 ations in it. / In a number of / Letters / from the / 
 Federal Farmer to the Republican. [New York:] Printed 
 [by Thomas Greenleaf ] in the year M,dcc,lxxxvii. 
 
 8vo. pp. 40. 
 
 Written by Richard IlaiTy . Lee, who was appointed a 
 member of the Philadelphia Convention, but declined to serve. 
 He was one of the foremost in opposition to the Constitution, 
 both in the Continental Congress and before the people, and 
 was the subject of numerous attacks in the press. 
 
 The " Letters of the Federal Farmer " was one of the 
 most popular of arguments against the new government, "four 
 editions (and several thousands) of the pamphlet. . .being in a 
 few months printed and sold in the several states," which 
 induced Lee to write "an additional number of Letters," but 
 it is largely repetitions of the first, and I have therefore 
 omitted its republication. A short review will be found in the 
 American Magazine for May, 1788, and an elaborate reply by 
 Timothy Pickering in Pickering's Life of Pickering, II, 352. 
 
 P. L. F. 
 
Dear Sir, 
 
 LETTER I. 
 
 October 8th, 1787. 
 
 TV/TY letters to you last winter, on the subject of a well bal- 
 anced national government for the United States, were 
 the result of a free enquiry ; when I passed from that subject 
 to enquiries relative to our commerce, revenues, past adminis- 
 tration, &c. I anticipated the anxieties I feel, on carefully 
 examining the plan of government proposed by the conven- 
 tion. It appears to be a plan retaining some federal features ; 
 but to be the first important step, and to aim strongly at one 
 consolidated government of the United States. It leaves the 
 powers of government, and the representation of the people, 
 so unnaturally divided between the general and state govern- 
 ments, that the operations of our system must be very uncer- 
 tain. My uniform federal attachments, and the interest I have 
 in the protection of property, and a steady execution of the 
 laws, will convince you, that, if I am under any bias at all, it is 
 in favor of any general system which shall promise those ad- 
 vantages. The instability of our laws increases my wishes for 
 firm and steady government ; but then, I can consent to no 
 government, which, in my opinion, is not calculated equally to 
 preserve the rights of all orders of men in the community. 
 My object has been to join with those who have endeavoured 
 to supply the defects in the forms of our governments by a 
 steady and proper administration of them. Though I have 
 long apprehended that fraudalent debtors, and embarrassed 
 men, on the one hand, and men, on the other, unfriendly to 
 republican equality, would produce an uneasiness among the 
 people, and prepare the way, not for cool and deliberate reforms 
 in the governments, but for changes calculated to promote the 
 interests of particular orders of men. Acquit me, sir, of any 
 agency in the formation of the new system ; I shall be satisfied 
 
280 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 
 
 with seeing, if it shall be adopted with a prudent administra- 
 tion. Indeed I am so much convinced of the truth of Pope s 
 maxim, that " That which is best [4] administered is best," 
 that I am much inclined to subscribe to it from experience. I 
 am not disposed to unreasonably contend about forms. I 
 know our situation is critical, and it behoves us to make the 
 best of it. A federal government of some sort is necessary. 
 We have suffered the present to languish ; and whether the 
 confederation was capable or not originally of answering any 
 valuable purposes, it is now but of little importance. I will 
 pass by the men, and states, who have been particularly instru- 
 mental in preparing the way for a change, and perhaps, for 
 governments not very favourable to the people at large. A 
 constitution is now presented which we may reject, or which 
 we may accept with or without amendments, and to which 
 point we ought to direct our exertions is the question. To 
 determine this question with propriety; we must attentively 
 examine the system itself, and the probable consequences of 
 either step. This I shall endeavour to do, so far as I am able, 
 with candor and fairness ; and leave you to decide upon the 
 propriety of my opinions, the weight of my reasons, and how 
 far my conclusions are well drawn. Whatever may be the 
 conduct of others, on the present occasion, 1 do not mean 
 hastily and positively to decide on the merits of the constitu- 
 tion proposed. I shall be open to conviction and always dis- 
 posed to adopt that which, all things considered, shall appear 
 to me to be most for the happiness of the community. It 
 must be granted, that if men hastily and blindly adopt a sys- 
 tem of government,'they will as hastily and as blindly be led to 
 alter or abolish it ; and changes must ensue, one after another, 
 till the peaceable and better part of the community will grow 
 weary with changes, tumults and disorders, and be disposed to 
 accept any government however despotic, that shall promise 
 stability and firmness. 
 
 The first principal question that occurs, is. Whether, con- 
 sidering our situation, we ought to precipitate the adoption of 
 the proposed constitution ? If we remain cooi and temperate, 
 we are in no immediate danger of any commotions ; we are in 
 
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H.LEE. 28 1 
 
 a state of perfect peace, and in no danger of invasions ; the 
 state governments are in the full exercise of their powers ; and 
 our governments answer all present exigencies, except the reg- 
 ulation of trade, securing credit, in some cases, and providing 
 for the interest, in some instances, of the public debts ; and 
 whether we adopt a. change three or nine months hence, can 
 make but little odds with the privatecircumstances of individ- 
 uals ; their happiness and prosperity, after all, depend princip- 
 ally upon their own exertions. We are hardly recovered from 
 a long and distressing war : The farmers, fishmen, &c. have not 
 fully repaired the waste made by it. Industry [5] and frugal- 
 ity are again assuming their proper station. Private debts are 
 lessened, and public debts incurred by the war have been, by 
 various ways, diminished ; and the public lands have now be- 
 come a productive source for diminishing them much more. I 
 know uneasy men, who with very much to precipitate, do not 
 admit all these facts ; but they are facts well known to all men 
 who are thoroughly informed in the affairs of this country. It 
 must, however, be admitted, that our federal system is defec- 
 tive, and that some of the state governments are not well ad- 
 ministered ; but, then, we impute to the defects in our govern- 
 ments many evils and embarrassments which are most clearly 
 the result of the late war. We must allow men to conduct on 
 the present occasion, as on all similar one's. They will urge a 
 thousand pretences to answer their purposes on both sides. 
 When we want a man to change his condition, we describe it 
 as wretched, miserable, and despised ; and draw a pleasing pic- 
 ture of that which we would have him assume. And when we 
 wish the contrary, we reverse our descriptions. Whenever a 
 clamor is raised, and idle men get to work, it is highly neces- 
 sary to examine facts carefully, and without unreasonably sus- 
 pecting men of falshood, to examine, and enquire attentively, 
 under what impressions they act. It is too often the case in 
 political concerns that men state facts not as they are, but as 
 they wish them to be ; and almost every man, by calling to 
 mind past scenes, will find this to be true. 
 
 Nothing but the passions of ambitious, impatient, or dis- 
 orderly men, I conceive, will plunge us into commotions, if 
 
282 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE» 
 
 time should be taken fully to examine and consider the sys- 
 tem proposed. Men who feel easy in their circumstances, and 
 such as are not sanguine in their expectations relative to the 
 consequences of the proposed change, will remain quiet under 
 the existing governments. Many commercial and monied 
 men, who are uneasy, not without just cause, ought to be re- 
 spected ; and by no means, unreasonably disappointed in their 
 expectations and hopes ; but as to those who expect employ- 
 ments under the new constitution ; as to those weak and 
 ardent men who always expect to be gainers by revolutions, 
 and whose lot it generally is to get out of one difficulty into 
 another, they are very little to be regarded ; and as to those 
 who designedly avail themselves of this weakness and ardor, 
 they are to be despised. It is natural for men, who wish to 
 hasten the adoption of a measure, to tell us, now is the crisis 
 — now is the critical moment which must be seized or all will 
 be lost ; and to shut the door against free enquiry, whenever 
 conscious the thing presented has defects in it, which time and 
 investigation will probably discover. This has been the cus- 
 tom of tyrants, [6] and their dependants in all ages. If it is 
 true, what has been so often said, that the people of this 
 country cannot change their condition for the worse, I pre- 
 sume it still behoves them to endeavour deliberately to change 
 it for the better. The fickle and ardent, in any community are 
 the proper tools for establishing despotic government. But it 
 is deliberate and thinking men, who must establish and se- 
 cure governments on free principles. Before they decide on 
 the plan proposed, they will enquire whether it will probably 
 be a blessing or a curse to this people. 
 
 The present moment discovers a new face in our affairs. 
 Our object has been all along, to reform our federal system,, 
 and to strengthen our governments — to establish peace, order 
 and justice in the community — but a new object now presents. 
 The plan of government now proposed is evidently calculated 
 totally to change, in time, our condition as a people. Instead 
 of being thirteen republics, under a federal head, it is clearly 
 designed to make us one consolidated government. Of this, I 
 think, I shall fully convince you, in my following letters on 
 
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 283 
 
 this subject. This consolidation of the states has been the ob- 
 ject of several men in this country for some time past. Whether 
 such a change can ever be effected, in any manner ; whether 
 it can be effected without convulsions and civil wars ; whether 
 such a change will not totally destroy the liberties of this 
 country — time only can determine. 
 
 To have a just idea of the government before us, and to 
 shew that a consolidated one is the object in view, it is neces- 
 sary not only to examine the plan, but also its history, and 
 the politics of its particular friends. 
 
 The confederation was formed when great confidence was 
 placed in the voluntary exertions of individuals, and of the 
 respective states ; and the framers of it, to guard against usurp- 
 ation, so limited, and checked the powers, that, in many re- 
 spects, they are inadequate to the exigencies of the union. 
 We find, therefore, members of congress urging alterations in 
 the federal system almost as soon as it was adopted. It was 
 early proposed to vest congress with powers to levy an im- 
 post, to regulate trade, &c. but such was known to be the cau- 
 tion of the states in parting with power, that the vestment 
 even of these, was proposed to be under several checks and 
 limitations. During the war, the general confusion, and the 
 introduction of paper money, infused in the minds of people 
 vague ideas respecting government and credit. We expected 
 too much from the return of peace, and of course we have 
 been disappointed. Our governments have been new and un- 
 settled ; and several legislatures, by making tender, suspension, 
 and paper money laws, [7] have given just cause of uneasiness 
 to creditors. By these and other causes, several orders of men 
 in the community have been prepared, by degrees, for a change 
 of government ; and this very abuse of power in the legisla- 
 tures, which in some cases has been charged upon the demo- 
 cratic part of the community, has furnished aristocratical 
 men with those very weapons, and those very means, with 
 which, in great measure, they are rapidly effecting their 
 favourite object. And should an oppressive government 
 be the consequence of the proposed change, prosperity 
 may reproach not only a few overbearing, unprincipled 
 
284 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 
 
 men, but those parties in the states which have misused their 
 powers. 
 
 The conduct of several legislatures, touching paper money, 
 and tender laws, has prepared many honest men for changes in 
 government, which otherwise they would not have thought of 
 — when by the evils, on the one hand, and by the secret insti- 
 gations of artful men, on the other, the minds of men were be- 
 come sufificiently uneasy, a bold step was taken, which is 
 usually followed by a revolution, or a civil war. A general 
 convention for mere commercial purposes was moved for — the 
 authors of this measure saw that the people's attention was 
 turned solely to the amendment of the federal system ; and 
 that, had the idea of a total change been started, probably no 
 state would have appointed members to the convention. The 
 idea of destroying ultimately, the state government, and form- 
 ing one consolidated system, could not have been admitted 
 
 a convention, therefore, merely for vesting in congress 
 
 power to regulate trade was proposed. This was pleasing to 
 the commercial towns ; and the landed people had little or no 
 concern about it. September, 1786, a few men from the mid- 
 dle states met at Annapolis, and hastily proposed a convention 
 to be held in May, 1787, for the purpose, generally, of amend- 
 ing the confederation this was done before the delegates 
 
 of Massachusetts, and of the other states arrived still not 
 
 a word was said about destroying the old constitution, and 
 making a new one — The states still unsuspecting, and not 
 aware that they were passing the Rubicon, appointed mem- 
 bers to the new convention, for the sole and express purpose 
 
 of revising and amending the confederation and, probably, 
 
 not one man in ten thousand in the United States, till within 
 these ten or twelve days, had an idea that the old ship was to 
 be destroyed, and he put to the alternative of embarking in the 
 new ship presented, or of being left in danger of sinking — The 
 States, I believe, universally supposed the convention would 
 report alterations in the confederation, which would pass an 
 examination in congress, and after being agreed to there, 
 would be confirmed by all the legislatures, [8] or be rejected, 
 Virginia made a very respectable appointment, and placed at 
 
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 28$ 
 
 the head of it the first man in America. In this appointment 
 there was a mixture of political characters ; but Pennsylvania 
 appointed principally those men who are esteemed aristocrat- 
 ical. Here the favourite moment for changing the government 
 was evidently discerned by a few men, who seized it with ad- 
 dress. Ten other states appointed, and tho' they chose men 
 principally connected with commerce and the judicial depart- 
 ment yet they appointed many good republican characters — 
 had they all attended we should now see, I am persuaded, a 
 better system presented. The non-attendance of eight or 
 nine men, who were appointed members of the convention, I 
 shall ever consider as a very unfortunate event to the United 
 States. Had they attended, I am pretty clear that the re- 
 sult of the convention would not have had that strong ten- 
 dency to aristocracy now discernable in every part of the plan. 
 There would not have been so great an accumulation of pow- 
 ers, especially as to the internal police of this country in a 
 few hands as the constitution reported proposes to vest in 
 them — the young visionary men, and the consolidating aris- 
 tocracy, would have been more restrained than they have 
 been. Eleven states met in the convention, and after four 
 months close attention presented the new constitution, to be 
 adopted or rejected by the people. The uneasy and fickle 
 part of the community may be prepa.red to receive any form 
 of government ; but I presume the enlightened and substantial 
 part will give any constitution presented for their adoption a 
 candid and thorough examination ; and silence those designing 
 or empty men, who weakly and rashly attempt to precipitate 
 the adoption of a system of so much importance — We shall 
 
 view the convention with proper respect and, at the same 
 
 time, that we reflect there were men of abilities and integrity 
 in it, we must recollect how disproportionately the democratic 
 
 and aristocratic parts of the community were represented 
 
 Perhaps the judicious friends and opposers of the new consti- 
 tution will agree, that it is best to let it rely solely on its own 
 merits, or be condemed for its own defects. 
 
 In the first place, I shall premise, that the plan proposed is 
 a plan of accommodation — and that it is in this way only, and 
 
286 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 
 
 by giving up apart of our opinions, that we can ever expect to 
 obtain a government founded in freedom and compact. This 
 circumstance candid men will always keep in view, in the dis- 
 cussion of this subject. 
 
 The plan proposed appears to be partly federal, but prin- 
 cipally however, calculated ultimately to make the states one 
 consolidated government. 
 
 The first interesting question, therefore suggested, is, how 
 [9] far the states can be consolidated into one entire govern- 
 ment on free principles. In considering this question exten- 
 sive objects are to be taken into view, and important changes 
 in the forms of government to be carefully attended to in all 
 their consequences, The happiness of the people at large 
 must be the great object with every honest statesman, and he 
 will direct every movement to this point. If we are so situated 
 as a people, as not to be able to enjoy equal happiness and 
 advantages under one government, the consolidation of the 
 states cannot be admitted. 
 
 There are three different forms of free government under 
 which the United States may exist as one nation ; and now is, 
 perhaps, the time to determine to which we will direct our 
 views. I. Distinct republics connected under a federal head. 
 In this case the respective state governments must be the 
 principal guardians of the peoples rights, and exclusively 
 r:gulate their internal police; in them must rest the balance 
 of government. The congress of the states, or federal head, 
 must consist of delegates amenable to, and removable by the 
 respective states : This congress must have general directing 
 powers ; powers to require men and monies of the states ; to 
 make treaties ; peace and war ; to direct the operations of 
 armies, &c. Under this federal modification of government, 
 the powers of congress would be rather advisary or recom- 
 mendatory than coercive. 2. We may do away the federal 
 state governments, and form or consolidate all the states into 
 one entire government, with one executive, one judiciary, and 
 one legislature, consisting of senators and representatives col- 
 lected from all parts of the union : In this case there would 
 be a compleat consolidation of the states. 3. We may con- 
 
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER, BY R. H. LEE. 287 
 
 soldate the states as to certain national objects, and leave them 
 severally distinct independent republics, as to internal police 
 generally. Let the general government consist of an execu- 
 tive, a judiciary, and balanced legislature, and its powers ex- 
 tend exclusively to all foreign concerns, causes arising on the 
 seas to commerce, imports, armies, navies, Indian affairs, peace 
 and war, and to a few internal concerns of the community; to 
 the coin, post-ofRces, weights and measures, a general plan for 
 the militia, to naturalization, and, perhaps to bankruptcies, leav- 
 ing the internal police of the community, in other respects, 
 exclusively to the state governments ; as the administration 
 of justice in all causes arising internally, the laying and col- 
 lecting of internal taxes, and the forming of the militia accord- 
 ing to a general plan prescribed. In this case there would be 
 a compleat consolidation, quoad certain objects only. 
 
 Touching the first, or federal plan, I do not think much 
 can be said in its favor : The sovereignity of the nation, 
 without [10] coercive and efficient powers to collect the strength 
 of it, cannot always be depended on to answer the purposes of 
 government ; and in a congress of representatives of foreign 
 states, there must necessarily be an unreasonable mixture of 
 powers in the same hands. 
 
 As to the second, or compleat consolidating plan, it de- 
 serves to be carefully considered at this time by every Ameri- 
 can : If it be impracticable, it is a fatal error to model our 
 governments, directing our views ultimately to it. 
 
 The third plan, or partial consolidation, is, in my opinion, 
 the only one that can secure the freedom and happiness of this 
 people. I once had some general ideas that the second plan 
 was practicable, but from long attention, and the proceedings 
 of the convention, I am fully satisfied, that this third plan is 
 the only one we can with safety and propriety proceed upon. 
 Making this the - standard to point out, with candor and fair- 
 ness, the parts of the new constitution which appear to be im- 
 proper, is my object. The convention appears to have pro- 
 posed the partial consolidation evidently with a view to collect 
 all powers ultimately, in the United States into one entire 
 government ; and from its views in this respect, and from the 
 
288 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 
 
 tenacity of the small states to have an equal vote in the sen- 
 ate, probably originated the greatest defects in the proposed 
 plan. 
 
 Independent of the opinions of many great authors, that 
 a free elective government cannot be extended over large ter- 
 ritories, a few reflections must evince, that one government 
 and general legislation alone never can extend equal benefits 
 to all parts of the United States: Different laws, customs, 
 and opinions exist in the different states, which by a uniform 
 system of laws would be unreasonably invaded. The United 
 States contain about a million of square miles, and in half a 
 century will, probably, contain ten millions of people ; and 
 from the center to the extremes is about 800 miles. 
 
 Before we do away the state governments or adopt meas- 
 ures that will tend to abolish them, and to consolidate the 
 states into one entire government several principles should be 
 considered and facts ascertained : These, and my examina- 
 tion into the essential parts of the proposed plan, I shall pur- 
 sue in my next. 
 
 Your's, &c. 
 
 THE FEDERAL FARMER. 
 
 [II] LETTER IL 
 
 October 9, 1787. 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 The essential parts of a free and good government are a 
 full and equal representation of the people in the legislature, 
 and the jury trial of the vicinage in the administration of 
 justice — a full and equal representation, is that which pos- 
 sesses the same interests, feelings, opinions, and views the peo- 
 ple themselves would were they all assembled — a fair represen- 
 tation, therefore, should be so regulated, that every order of 
 men in the community, according to the common course of 
 elections, can have a share in it — in order to allow professional 
 men, merchants, traders, farmers, mechanics, &c. to bring a 
 just proportion of their best informed men respectively into 
 
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 289 
 
 the legislature, the representation must be considerably num- 
 erous — We have about 200 state senators in the United States. 
 and a less number than that of federal representatives cannot,, 
 clearly, be a full representation of this people, in the affairs of 
 internal taxation and police, were there but one legislature for 
 the whole union. The representation cannot be equal, or the 
 situation of the people proper for one government only — if 
 the extreme parts of the society cannot be represented as fully 
 as the central — It is apparently impracticable that this should 
 be the case in this extensive country it would be impossi- 
 ble to collect a representation of the parts of the country five, 
 six, and seven hundred miles from the seat of government. 
 
 Under one general government alone, there could be but 
 one judiciary, one supreme and a proper number of inferior 
 courts. I think it would be totally impracticable in this case 
 to preserve a due administration of justice, and the real bene- 
 fits of the jury trial of the vicinage there are now supreme 
 
 courts in each state in the union, and a great number of county 
 
 and other courts subordinate to each supreme court most 
 
 of these supreme and inferior courts are itinerant, and hold 
 their sessions in different parts every year of their respective 
 states, counties and districts — with all these moving courts, 
 our citizens, from the vast extent of the country, must travel 
 very considerable distances from home to find the place where 
 justice is administered. I am not for bringing justice so near 
 to individuals as to afford them any temptation to engage in 
 law suits ; though I think it one of the greatest benefits in a 
 good government, that each citizen should find a court of jus- 
 tice within a reasonable distance, perhaps, within a day's travel 
 of his [12] home; so that, without great inconveniences and 
 enormous expense, he may have the advantages of his wit- 
 nesses and jury — it would be impracticable to derive these ad- 
 vantages from one judiciary the one supreme court at most 
 
 could only set in the centre of the union, and move once a 
 year into the centre of the eastern and southern extremes of 
 it — and, in this case, each citizen, on an average, would travel 
 
 150 or 200 miles to find this court that, however, inferior 
 
 courts might be properly placed in the different counties, and 
 
290 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 
 
 districts of the union, the appellate jurisdiction would be in- 
 tolerable and expensive. 
 
 If it were possible to consolidate the states, and preserve 
 the features of a free government, still it is evident that the 
 middle states, the parts of the union, about the seat of govern- 
 ment, would enjoy great advantages, while the remote states 
 would experience the many inconveniences of remote prov- 
 inces. Wealth, ofifices, and the benefits of government would 
 collect in the centre : and the extreme states ; and their prin- 
 cipal towns, become much less important. 
 
 There are other considerations which tend to prove that 
 the idea of one consolidated whole, on free principles, is ill- 
 founded the laws of a free government rest on the confi- 
 dence of the people, and operate gently — and never can ex- 
 tend the influence very far if they are executed on free 
 
 principles, about the centre, where the benefits of the govern- 
 ment induce the people to support it voluntarily ; yet they 
 must be executed on the principles of fear and force in the 
 extremes This has been the case with every extensive re- 
 public of which we have any accurate account. 
 
 There are certain unalienable and fundamental rights, 
 which in forming the social compact, ought to be explicitly 
 ascertained and fixed — a free and enlightened people, in form- 
 ing this compact, will not resign all their rights to those who 
 govern, and they will fix limits to their legislators and rulers, 
 which will soon be plainly seen by those who are governed, as 
 well as by those who govern : and the latter will know they 
 cannot be passed unperceived by the former, and without giv. 
 
 ing a general alarm These rights should be made the basis 
 
 of every constitution ; and if a people be so situated, or have 
 such different opinions that they cannot agree in ascertaining 
 and fixing them, it is a very strong argument against their at- 
 tempting to form one entire society, to live under one system 
 
 of laws only. 1 confess, I never thought the people of these 
 
 states differed essentially in these respects ; they having de- 
 rived all these rights from one common source, the British 
 systems ; and having in the formation of their state constitu- 
 tions, discovered that their ideas [13] relative to these rights 
 
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 29I 
 
 are very similar. However, it is now said that the states differ 
 so essentially in these respects, and even in the important arti- 
 cle of the trial by jury, that when assembled in convention, 
 they can agree to no words by which to establish that trial, or 
 by which to ascertain and establish many other of these rights^ 
 as fundamental articles in the social compact. If so, we pro- 
 ceed to consoHdate the states on no solid basis whatever. 
 
 But I do not pay much regard to the reasons given for not 
 bottoming the new constitution on a better bill of rights. I 
 still believe a complete federal bill of rights to be very practi- 
 cable. Nevertheless I acknowledge the proceedings of the 
 convention furnish my mind with many new and strong rea- 
 sons, against a complete consolidation of the states. They 
 tend to convince me, that it cannot be carried with propriety 
 very far — that the convention have gone much farther in one 
 respect than they found it practicable to go in another ; that 
 is, they propose to lodge in the general government very ex- 
 tensive powers — powers nearly, if not altogether, complete and 
 unlimited, over the purseVand the sword. But, in its organiza- 
 tion, they furnish the strongest proof that the proper limbs, 
 or parts of a governmrent, to support and execute those powers 
 on proper principles (or in which they can be safely lodged) 
 cannot be formed. These powers must be lodged somewhere 
 in every society ; but then they should be lodged where the 
 strength and guardians of the people are collected. They can 
 be wielded, or safely used, in a free country only by an able 
 executive and judiciary, a respectable senate, and a secure, full, 
 and equal representation of the people. I think the principles 
 I have premised or brought into view, are well founded — I 
 think they will not be denied by any fair reasoner. It is in 
 connection with these, and other solid principles, we are to 
 examine the constitution. It is not a few democratic phrases, 
 or a few well formed features, that will prove its merits ; or a 
 few small omissions that will produce its rejection among men of 
 sense ; they will enquire what are the essential powers in a 
 community, and what are nominal ones ; where and how the 
 essential powers shall be lodged to secure government, and to 
 secure true liberty. 
 
292 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 
 
 In examining the proposed constitution carefully, we must 
 clearly perceive an unnatural separation of these powers from 
 the substantial representation of the people. The state gov- 
 ernment will exist, with all their governors, senators, represen- 
 tatives, officers and expences ; in these will be nineteen twen- 
 tieths of the representatives of the people ; they will have a 
 near connection, and their members an immediate intercourse 
 with the people ; and the probability is, that the state govern- 
 ments will possess the [14] confidence of the people, and be 
 ■considered generally as their immediate guardians. 
 
 The general government' will consist of a new species of 
 executive, a small senate, and a very small house of represen- 
 tatives. As many citizens will be more than three hundred 
 tniles from the seat of this government as will be nearer to it, 
 its judges and officers cannot be very numerous, without mak- 
 ing our governments very expensive. Thus will stand the 
 state and the general governments, should the constitution be 
 adopted without any alterations in their organization ; but as 
 to powers, the general government will possess all essential 
 ■ones, at least on paper, and those of the states a mere shadow 
 of power. And therefore, unless the people shall make some 
 ■great exertions to restore to the state governments their 
 powers in matters of internal police ; as the powers to lay and 
 collect, exclusively, internal taxes, to govern the militia, and 
 to hold the decisions of their own judicial courts upon their 
 own laws final, the balance cannot possibly continue long ; but 
 the state governments must be annihilated, or continue to 
 exist for no purpose. 
 
 It is however to be observed, that many of the essential 
 powers given the national government are not exclusively 
 given ; and the general government may have prudence enough 
 to forbear the exercise of those which may still be exercised 
 .by the respective states. But this cannot justify the impro- 
 priety of giving powers, the exercise of which prudent men 
 will not attempt, and imprudent men will, or probably can, 
 exercise only in a manner destructive of free government. 
 The general government, organized as it is, may be adequate 
 to many valuable objects, and be able to carry its laws into 
 
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 293 
 
 execution on proper principles in several cases ; but I think 
 its warmest friends will not contend, that it can carry all the 
 powers proposed to be lodged in it into effect, without calling 
 to its aid a military force, which must very soon destroy all 
 elective governments in the country, produce anarchy, or es- 
 tablish despotism. Though we cannot have now a complete 
 idea of what will be the operations of the proposed system, 
 we may, allowing things to have their common course, have a 
 very tolerable one. The powers lodged in the general gov- 
 ernment, if exercised by it, must intimately effect the internal 
 police of the states, as well as external concerns ; and there is 
 no reason to expect the numerous state governments, and 
 their connections, will be very friendly to the execution of 
 federal laws in those internal affairs, which hitherto have been 
 under their own immediate management. There is more rea- 
 son to believe, that the general government, far removed from 
 the people, and none of its members elected oftenerthan once 
 in two years, will be forgot [15] or neglected, and its laws in 
 many cases disregarded, unless a multitude of officers and 
 military force be continually kept in view, and employed to 
 enforce the execution of the laws, and to make the govern- 
 ment feared and respected. No position can be truer than 
 this. That in this country either neglected laws, or a military 
 execution of them, must lead to a revolution, and to the 
 destruction of freedom. Neglected laws must first lead to 
 anarchy and confusion ; and a military execution of laws is 
 only a shorter way to the same point — despotic government. 
 
 Your's, &c. 
 
 THE FEDERAL FARMER. 
 
294 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 
 
 LETTER III. 
 
 October loth, 1787. 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 The great object of a free people must be so to form their 
 government and laws, and so to administer them, as to create 
 a confidence in, and respect for the laws ; and thereby induce 
 the sensible and virtuous part of the community to declare in 
 favor of the laws, and to support them without an expensive 
 military force. I wish, though I confess I have not much 
 hope, that this may be the case with the laws of congress 
 under the new constitution. I am fully convinced that we 
 must organize the national government on different principals, 
 and make the parts of it more efficient, and secure in it more 
 effectually the different interests in the community ; or else 
 Leave in the state governments some powers proposed to be 
 lodged in it — at least till such an organization shall be found 
 to be practicable. Not sanguine in my expectations of a good 
 federal administration, and satisfied, as I am, of the impracti- 
 cability of consolidating the states, and at the same time of 
 preserving the rights of the people at large, I believe we ought 
 still to leave some of those powers in the state governments, 
 in which the people, in fact, will still be represented — to define 
 some other powers proposed to be vested in the general gov- 
 ernment, more carefully, and to establish a few principles to 
 secure a proper exercise of the powers given it. It is not my 
 object to multiply objections, or to contend about inconsidera- 
 ble powers or amendments. I wish the system adopted with 
 a few alterations ; but those, in my mind, are essential ones ; 
 if adopted without, [16] every good citizen will acquiesce, 
 though I shall consider the duration of our governments, and 
 the Hberties of this people, very much dependant on the 
 administration of the general government. A wise and honest 
 administration, may make the people happy under any gov- 
 ernment ; but necessity only can justify even our leaving open 
 avenues to the abuse of power, by wicked, unthinking, or am- 
 bitious men, I will examine, first, the organization of the pro- 
 posed government, in order to judge; 2d, with propriety. 
 
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 29S 
 
 what powers are improperly, at least prematurely lodged in it. 
 I shall examine, 3d, the undefined powers; and 4th, those 
 powers, the exercise of which is not secured on safe and proper 
 ground. 
 
 First. As to the organization the house of representa- 
 tives, the democrative branch, as it is called, is to consist of 65 
 members : that is, about one representative for fifty thousand 
 
 inhabitants, to be chosen biennially the federal legislature 
 
 may increase this number to one for each thirty thousand in- 
 habitants, abating fractional numbers in each state. Thirty- 
 three representatives will make a quorum for doing business, 
 and a majority of those present determine the sense of the 
 house. 1 have no idea that the interests, feelings, and opi- 
 nions of three or four millions of people, especially touching 
 
 internal taxation, can be collected in such a house. In the 
 
 nature of things, nine times in ten, men of the elevated classes 
 in the community only can be chosen Connecticut, for in- 
 stance, will have five representatives not one man in a 
 
 hundred of those who form the democrative branch in the 
 state legislature, will, on a fair computation, be one of the 
 five. — The people of this country, in one sense, may all be 
 democratic ; but if we make the proper distinction between 
 the few men of wealth and abilities, and consider them, as we 
 ought, as the natural aristocracy of the country, and the great 
 body of the people, the middle and lower classes, as the demo- 
 cracy, this federal representative branch will have but very lit- 
 tle democracy in it, even this small representation is not 
 secured on proper principles. The branches of the legisla- 
 ture are essential parts of the fundamental compact, and ought 
 to be so fixed by the people, that the legislature cannot alter 
 itself by modifying the elections of its own members. This, 
 by a part of Art. i, Sect. 4, the general legislature may do, it 
 may evidently so regulate elections as to secure the choice of 
 
 any particular description of men. It may make the whole 
 
 state one district — make the capital, or any places in the state, 
 the place or places of election — it may declare that the five 
 men (or whatever the number may be the state may chuse) 
 who shall have the most votes shall be considered as chosen. 
 
296 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H, LEE. 
 
 -In this [17] case it is easy to perceive how the people who 
 
 live scattered in the inland towns will bestow their votes on 
 different men— and how a few men in a city, in any order or 
 profession, may unite and place any five men they please 
 
 highest among those that may be voted for and all this 
 
 may be done constitutionally, and by those silent operations, 
 which are not immediately perceived by the people in general. 
 1 know it is urged, that the general legislature will be dis- 
 posed to regulate elections on fair and just principles : This 
 
 may be true — good men will generally govern well with almost 
 any constitution : but why in laying the foundation of the 
 social system, need we unnecessarily leave a door open to im- 
 proper regulations? — This is a very general and unguarded 
 clause, and many evils may flow from that part which author- 
 ises the congress to regulate elections. Were it omitted, 
 
 the regulations of elections would be solely in the respective 
 states, where the people are substantially represented ; and 
 where the elections ought to be regulated, otherwise to secure 
 a representation from all parts of the community, in making the 
 constitutions, we ought to provide for dividing each state into 
 a proper number of districts, and for confining the electors in 
 each district to the choice of some men, who shall have a per- 
 manent interest and residence in it ; and also for this essential 
 object, that the representative elected shall have a majority of 
 the votes of those electors who shall attend and give their 
 votes. 
 
 In considering the practicability of having a full and equal 
 representation of the people from all parts of the union, not 
 only distances and different opinions, customs and views, com- 
 mon in extensive tracts of country, are to be taken into view 
 but many differences peculiar to Eastern, Middle, and Southern 
 States. These differences are not so perceivable among the 
 members of congress, and men of general information in the 
 states, as among the men who would properly form the demo- 
 cratic branch. The Eastern states are very democratic, and 
 composed chiefly of moderate freeholders ; they have but few 
 rich men and no slaves; the Southern states are composed 
 chiefly of rich planters and slaves ; they have but few 
 
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 297 
 
 moderate freeholders, and the prevailing influence, in them is 
 generally a dissipated aristocracy: The Middle states partake 
 partly of the Eastern and partly of the Southern character. 
 
 Perhaps, nothing could be more disjointed, unweildly and 
 incompetent to doing business with harmony and dispatch, 
 than a federal house of representatives properly numerous for 
 the great objects of taxation, &c. collected from the federal 
 states ; whether such men would ever act in concert ; whether 
 they would not worry along a few years, and then be the 
 means of [18] separating the parts of the union, is very prob- 
 lematical? View this system in whatever form we can, 
 
 propriety brings us. still to this point, a federal government 
 possessed of general and complete powers, as to those national 
 objects which cannot well come under the cognizance of the 
 internal laws of the respective states, and this federal govern- 
 ment, accordingly, consisting of branches not very numerous. 
 
 The house of representatives is on the plan of consolidation, 
 but the senate is entirely on the federal plan ; and Delaware 
 will have as much constitutional influence in the senate, as the 
 largest state in the union : and in this senate are lodged legis- 
 lative, executive and judicial powers : Ten states in this 
 union urge that they are small states, nine of which were pres- 
 ent in the convention. — They were interested in collecting 
 large powers into the hands of the senate, in which each state 
 still will have its equal share of power. I suppose it was im- 
 practicable for the three large states, as they were called, to 
 get the senate formed on any other principles : But this only 
 proves, that we cannot form one general government on equal 
 and just principles — and proves, that we ought not to lodge 
 in it such extensive powers before we are convinced of the 
 practicability of organizing it on just and equal principles. 
 The senate will consist of two members from each state, 
 chosen by the state legislatures, every sixth year. The clause 
 referred to, respecting the elections of representatives, em- 
 powers the general legislature to regulate the elections of sena- 
 tors also, " except as to the places of chusing senators." — There 
 is, therefore, but little more security in the elections than in 
 those of representatives : Fourteen senators make a quorum 
 
298 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 
 
 for business, and a majority of the senators present give the 
 vote of the senate, except in giving judgment upon an im- 
 peachment, or in making treaties, or in expelling a member, 
 when two-thirds of the senators present must agree — The 
 members of the legislature are not excluded from being 
 elected to any military ofifices, or any civil ofifices, except 
 those created, or the emoluments of which shall be increased 
 by themselves : two-thirds of the members present, of either 
 house, may expel a member at pleasure. The senate is an 
 independant branch of the legislature, a court for trying im- 
 peachments, and also a part of the executive, having a nega- 
 tive in the making of all treaties, and in appointing almost all 
 officers. 
 
 The vice president is not a very important, if not an 
 unnecessary part of the system — he may be a part of the sen- 
 ate at one period, and act as the supreme executive magistrate 
 
 at another The election of this officer, as well as of the 
 
 president of the United States seems to be properly secured ; 
 but [19] when we examine the powers of the president, and 
 the forms of the executive, we shall perceive that the general 
 government, in this part, will have a strong tendency to aris- 
 tocracy, or the government of the few. The executive is, in 
 fact, the president and senate in all transactions of any import- 
 ance ; the president is connected with, or tied to the senate ; 
 he may always act with the senate, but never can effectually 
 counteract its views : The president can appoint no officer, 
 civil or military, who shall not be agreeable to the senate; and 
 the presumption is, that the will of so important a body will 
 not be very easily controuled, and that it will exercise its 
 powers with great address. 
 
 In the judicial department, powers ever kept distinct in well 
 balanced governments, are no less improperly blended in the 
 hands of the same men — in the judges of the supreme court 
 is lodged the law, the equity and the fact. It is not necessary 
 to pursue the minute organical parts of the general govern- 
 ment proposed. — There were various interests in the conven- 
 tion, to be reconciled, especially of large and small states ; of 
 carrying and non-carrying states ; and of states more and 
 
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. i^EE. 299 
 
 states less democratic — vast labour and attention were by the 
 convention bestowed on the organization of the parts of the 
 constitution offered ; still it is acknowledged there are many- 
 things radically wrong in the essential parts of this constitution 
 — but it is said that these are the result of our situation : On 
 a full examination of the subject, I believe it ; but what do the 
 laborious inquiries and determination of the convention prove ? 
 If they prove any thing, they prove that we cannot consolidate 
 the states on proper principles : The organization of ,the 
 government presented proves, that we cannot form a general 
 government in which all power can be safely lodged ; and a 
 little attention to the parts of the one proposed will make it 
 appear very evident, that all the powers proposed to be 
 lodged in it, will not be then well deposited, either for the 
 purposes of government, or the preservation of liberty. I will 
 suppose no abuse of power in those cases, in which the abuse 
 of it is not well guarded against — I will suppose the words 
 authorizing the general government to regulate the elections 
 of its own members struck out of the plan, or free district 
 elections, in each state, amply secured. — That the small repre- 
 sentation provided for shall be as fair and equal as it is 
 capable of being made — I will suppose the judicial department 
 regulated on pure principles, by future laws, as far as it can be 
 by the constitution, and consist with the situation of the 
 country — still there will be an unreasonable accumulation of 
 powers in the general government if all be granted, enumer- 
 ated in the plan proposed. The plan does not present a 
 well balanced government : The senatorial [20] branch of the 
 legislative and the executive are substantially united, and the 
 president, or the state executive magistrate, may aid the sen- 
 atorial interest when weakest, but never can effectually support 
 the democratic, however it may be opposed ; — the excellency, 
 in my mind, of a well-balanced government is that it consists 
 of distinct branches, each sufficiently strong and independant 
 to keep its own station, and to aid either of the other branches 
 which may occasionally want aid. 
 
 The convention found that any but a small house of repre- 
 sentatives would be expensive, and that it would be impractic- 
 
300 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 
 
 able to assemble a large number of representatives. Not only 
 the determination of the convention in this case, but the situ- 
 ation of the states, proves the impracticability of collecting, in 
 any one point, a proper representation. 
 
 The formation of the senate, and the smallness of the house, 
 being, therefore, the result of our situation, and the actual 
 state of things, the evils which may attend the exercise of 
 many powers in this national government may be considered 
 as without a remedy. 
 
 All officers are impeachable before the senate only — before 
 the men by whom they are appointed, or who are consenting 
 to the appointment of these officers. No judgment of convic- 
 tion, on an impeachment, can be given unless two thirds of 
 the senators agree. Under these circumstances the right of im- 
 peachment, in the house, can be of but little importance ; the 
 house cannot expect often to convict the offender ; and, 
 therefore, probably, will but seldom or never exercise the 
 right. In addition to the insecurity and inconveniences at- 
 tending this organization beforementioned, it may be observed, 
 that it is extremely difficult to secure the people against the 
 fatal effects of corruption and influence. The power of mak- 
 ing any law will be in the president, eight senators, and seven- 
 teen representatives, relative to the important objects enum- 
 erated in the constitution. Where there is a small representa- 
 tion a sufficient number to carry any measure, may, with ease, 
 be influenced by bribes, offices and civilities ; they easily form 
 private juntoes, and out-door meetings, agree on measures, 
 and carry them by silent votes. 
 
 Impressed, as I am, with a sense of the difficulties there are 
 in the way of forming the parts of a federal government on 
 proper principles, and seeing a government so unsubstantially 
 organized, after so arduous an attempt has been made, I am 
 led to believe, that powers ought to be given to it with great 
 care and caution. 
 
 In the second place it is necessary, therefore, to examine the 
 extent, and the probable operations of sonie of those ex- [21] 
 tensive powers proposed to be vested in this government. 
 These powers, legislative, executive, and judicial, respect 
 
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. Joi 
 
 internal as well as external objects. Those respecting exter- 
 nal objects, as all foreign concerns, commerce, impost's, all 
 causes arising on the seas, peace and war, and Indian affairs, 
 can be lodged no where else, with any propriety, but in this 
 government. Many powers that respect internal objects 
 ought clearly to be lodged in it ; as those to regulate trade 
 between the states, weights and measures, the coin or current 
 monies, post-offices, naturalization, &c. These powers may be 
 exercised without essentially effecting the internal police of 
 the respective states : But powers to lay and collect internal 
 taxes, to form the militia, to make bankrupt laws, and to 
 decide on appeals, questions arising on the internal laws of 
 the respective states, are of a very serious nature, and carry 
 with them almost all other powers. These taken in connec- 
 tion with the others, and powers to raise armies and build 
 navies, proposed to be lodged in this government, appear to 
 me to comprehend all the essential powers in this community, 
 and those which will be left to the states will be of no great 
 importance. 
 
 A power to lay and collect taxes at discretion, is, in itself, 
 of very great importance. By means of taxes, the govern- 
 ment may command, the whole or any part of the subject's 
 property. Taxes may be of various kinds ; but there is a 
 strong distinction between external and internal taxes. Ex- 
 ternal taxes are import duties, which are laid on imported 
 goods ; they may usually be collected in a few seaport towns, 
 and of a few individuals, though ultimately paid by the con- 
 sumer; a few officers can collect them, and they can be carried 
 no higher than trade will bear, or smuggling permit — that in 
 the very nature of commerce, bounds are set to them. But 
 internal taxes, as poll and land taxes, excises, duties on all 
 written instruments, &c. may fix themselves on every person 
 and species of property in the community ; they may be car- 
 ried to any lengths, and in proportion as they are extended, 
 numerous officers must be employed to assess them, and to 
 enforce the collection of them. In the United Netherlands 
 the general government has compleat powers, as to external 
 taxation ; but as to internal taxes, it makes req^uisitions on the 
 
302 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 
 
 provinces. Internal taxation in this country is more import- 
 ant, as the country is so very extensive. As many assessors 
 and collectors of federal taxes will be above three hundred 
 miles from the seat of the federal government as will be less. 
 Besides, to lay and collect taxes, in this extensive country,, 
 must require a great number of congressional ordinances, im- 
 mediately operating upon the body of the people ; these must 
 continually interfere with the state laws, [22] and thereby pro- 
 duce disorder and general dissatisfaction, till the one system of 
 laws or the other, operating on the same subjects, shall be 
 abolished. These ordinances alone, to say nothing of those 
 respecting the milita, coin, commerce, federal judiciary, &c. &c. 
 will probably soon defeat the operations of the state laws and 
 governments. 
 
 Should the general government think it politic, as some ad- 
 ministration (if not all) probably will, to look for a support in 
 a system of influence, the government will take every occasion 
 to multiply laws, and ofhcers to execute them, considering 
 these as so many necessary props for its own support. Should 
 this system of policy be adopted, taxes more productive than 
 the impost duties will, probably, be wanted to support the 
 government, and to discharge foreign demands, without leav- 
 ing any thing for the domestic creditors. The internal sources 
 of taxation then must be called into operation, and internal 
 tax laws and federal assessors and collectors spread over this 
 immense country. All these circumstances considered, is it 
 wise, prudent, or safe, to vest the powers of laying and collect- 
 ing internal taxes in the general government, while imperfectly 
 organized and inadequate ; and to trust to amending it here- 
 after, and making it adequate to this purpose? It is not only 
 unsafe but absurd to lodge power in a government before it is 
 fitted to receive it ? It is confessed that this power and 
 representation ought to go together. Why give the power 
 first ? Why give the power to the few, who, when possessed 
 of it, may have address enough to prevent the increase of repre- 
 sentation ? Why not keep the power, and, when necessary, 
 amend the constitution, and add to its other parts this 
 power, and a proper increase of representation at the same 
 
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 303 
 
 time ? Then men who may want the power will be under 
 strong inducements to let in the people, by their represent- 
 atives, into the government, to hold their due proportion of 
 tWIs power. If a proper representation be impracticable, then 
 we shall see this power resting in the states, where it at 
 present ought to be, and not inconsiderately given up. 
 
 When I recollect how lately congress, conventions, legisla- 
 tures, and people contended in the cause of liberty, and care- 
 fully weighed the importance of taxation, I can scarcely 
 believe we are serious in proposing to vest the powers of lay- 
 ing and collecting internal taxes in a government so imper- 
 fectly organized for such purposes. Should the United States 
 be taxed by a house of representatives of two hundred 
 members, which would be about fifteen members for Con- 
 necticut, twenty-five for Massachusetts, &c. still the middle 
 and lower classes of people could have no great share, in fact, 
 in taxation. I am aware it is said, that the representation 
 proposed by the new [23] constitution is sufficiently numer- 
 ous ; it may be for many purposes ; but to suppose that this 
 branch is sufficiently numerous to guard the rights of the 
 people in the administration of the government, in which the' 
 purse and sword is placed, seems to argue that we have forgot 
 what the true meaning of representation is. I am sensible 
 also, that it is said that congress will not attempt to lay and 
 collect internal taxes ; that it is necessary for them to have 
 
 the power, though it cannot probably be exercised. 1 
 
 admit that it is not probable that any prudent congress will 
 attempt to lay and collect internal taxes, especially direct 
 taxes : but this only proves, that the power would be improp- 
 erly lodged in congress, and that it might be abused by 
 imprudent and designing men. 
 
 I have heard several gentlemen, to get rid of objections to 
 this part of the constitution, attempt to construe the powers " 
 relative to direct taxes, as those who object to it would have 
 them ; as to these, it is said, that congress will only have 
 power to make requisitions, leaving it to the states to lay aud 
 collect them. I see but very little colour for this construction, 
 and the attempt only proves that this part of the plan cannot 
 
304 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 
 
 be defended. By this plan there can be no doubt, but that 
 the powers of congress will be complete as to all kinds of 
 taxes whatever — Further, as to internal taxes, the state 
 governments will have concurrent powers with the genefal 
 government, and both may tax the same objects in the same 
 year ; and the objection that the general government may 
 suspend a state tax, as a necessary measure for the promoting 
 
 the collection of a federal tax, is not without foundation. 
 
 As the states owe large debts, and have large demands upon 
 them individually, there clearly will be a propriety in leaving 
 in their possession exclusively, some of the internal sources 
 of taxation, at least until the federal representation shall be 
 properly encreased : The power in the general government to 
 lay and collect internal taxes, will render its powers respecting 
 armies, navies and the militia, the more exceptionable. By 
 the constitution it is proposed that congress shall have power 
 " to raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money 
 to that use shall be for a longer term than two years ; to pro- 
 vide and maintain a navy ; to provide for calling forth the 
 militia to execute the laws of the union ; suppress insurrec- 
 tions, and repel invasions : to provide for organizing, arming, 
 and disciplining the militia ; " reserving to the states the right 
 to appoint the officers, and to train the militia according to the 
 discipline prescribed by congress ; congress will have unlimited 
 power to raise armies, and to engage officers and men for any 
 number of years ; but a legislative act applying money for 
 their support can have operation for no longer term than two 
 years, and if a subsequent congress do [24] not within the two 
 years renew the appropriation, or further appropriate monies 
 for the use of the army, the army will be left to take care of 
 itself. When an army shall once be raised for a number of 
 years, it is not probable that it will find much difficulty in get- 
 ting congress to pass laws for applying monies to its support. I 
 see so many men in America fond of a standing army, and 
 especially among those who probably will have a large share in 
 administering the federal system; it is very evident to me, that 
 we shall have a large standing army as soon as the monies to 
 support them can be possibly found. An army is not a very 
 
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 305 
 
 agreeable place of employment for the young gentlemen of 
 many families. A power to raise armies must be lodged some 
 where ; still this will not justify the lodging this power in a 
 bare majority of so few men without any checks ; or in the 
 government in which the great body of the people, in the 
 nature of things, will be only nominally represented. In the 
 state governments the great body of the people, the yeomanry, 
 &c. of the country, are represented : It is true they will 
 chuse the members of congress, and may now and then chuse 
 a man of their own way of thinking ; but it is not impossible 
 for forty, or thirty thousand people in this country, one time 
 in ten to find a man who can possess similar feelings, views, and 
 interests with themselves : Powers to lay and collect taxes and 
 to raise_ armies are of the greatest moment ; for carrying them 
 into effect, laws need not be frequently made, and the yeomanry, 
 &c. of the country ought substantially to have a check upon 
 the passing of these laws ; this check ought to be placed in the 
 legislatures, or at least, in the few men the common people of 
 the country, will, probably, have in congress, in the true sense 
 of the word, " from among themselves." It is true, the yeo- 
 manry of the country possess the lands, the weight of property, 
 possess arms, and are too strong a body of men to be openly 
 offended — and, therefore, it is urged, they will take care of 
 themselves, that men who shall govern will not dare pay any 
 disrespect to their opinions. It is easily perceived, that if they 
 have not their proper negative upon passing laws in congress, 
 or on the passage of laws relative to taxes and armies, they 
 may in twenty or thirty years be by means imperceptible to 
 them, totally deprived of that boasted weight and strength : 
 This may be done in a great measure by congress, if disposed 
 to do it, by modelling the militia. Should one fifth or one 
 eighth part of the men capable of bearing arms, be made a select 
 militia, as has been proposed, and those the young and ardent 
 part of the community, possessed of but little or no property, 
 and all the others put upon a plan that will render them of no 
 importance, the former will answer all the purposes of an [25] 
 army, while the latter will be defenceless. The state must 
 train the militia in such form and according to such systems 
 
306 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 
 
 and rules as congress shall prescribe : and the only actual influ- 
 ence the respective states will have respecting the militia will 
 be in appointing the officers. I see no provision made for call- 
 ing out theposse comitatus for executing the laws of the union, 
 but provision is made for congress to call forth the militia for 
 the execution of them — and the militia in general, or any- 
 select part of it, may be called out under military officers, in- 
 stead of the sheriff to enforce an execution of federal laws, in 
 the first instance, and thereby introduce an entire military ex- 
 ecution of the laws. I know that powers to raise taxes, to 
 regulate the military strength of the community on some uni- 
 form plan, to provide for its defence and internal order, and 
 for duly executing the laws, must be lodged somewhere ; but 
 still we ought not so to lodge them, as evidently to give one 
 order of men in the community, undue advantages over others; 
 or commit the many to the mercy, prudence, and moderation 
 of the few. And so far as it may be necessary to lodge 
 any of the peculiar powers in the general government, a more 
 safe exercise of them ought to be secured, by requiring the 
 consent of two-thirds or three-fourths of congress thereto — 
 until the federal representation can be increased, so that the 
 democratic members in congress may stand some tolerable 
 chance of a reasonable negative, in behalf of the numerous, 
 important, and democratic part of the community. 
 
 I am not sufficiently acquainted with the laws and internal 
 police of all the states to discern fully, how general bankrupt 
 laws, made by the union, would effect them, or promote the 
 public good. I believe the property of debtors, in the several 
 states, is held responsible for their debts in modes and forms 
 very different. If uniform bankrupt laws can be made without 
 producing real and substantial inconveniences, I wish them to 
 be made by congress. 
 
 There are some powers proposed to be lodged in the gen- 
 eral government .in the judicial department, I think very un- 
 necessarily, I mean powers respecting questions arising upon 
 the internal laws of the respective states. It is proper the fed- 
 eral judiciary should have powers co-extensive with the federal 
 legislature— that is, the power of deciding finally on the laws 
 
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 30/ 
 
 of the union. By Art. 3, Sec. 2. the powers of the federal 
 judiciary are extended (among other things) to all cases be- 
 tween a state and citizens of another state — between citizens 
 of different states — between a state or the citizens thereof, and 
 foreign states, citizens or subjects. Actions in all these cases, 
 except against a state government, are now brought and fin- 
 ally [26] determined in the law courts of the states respectively 
 and as there are no words to exclude these courts of their juris- 
 diction in these cases, they will have concurrent jurisdiction 
 with the inferior federal courts in them ; and, therefore, if the 
 new constitution be adopted without any amendment in this 
 respect, all those numerous actions, now brought in the state 
 courts between our citizens and foreigners, between citizens of 
 different states, by state governments against foreigners, and 
 by state governments against citizens of other states, may also 
 be brought in the federal courts ; and an appeal will lay in 
 them from the state courts or federal inferior courts to the 
 supreme judicial court of the union. In almost all these cases, 
 either party may have the trial by jury in the state courts ; 
 except paper money and tender laws, which are wisely guarded 
 against in the proposed constitution ; justice may be obtained 
 in these courts on reasonable terms ; they must be more com- 
 petent to proper decisions on the laws of their respective 
 states, than the federal states can possibly be. I do not, in 
 any point of view, see the need of opening a new jurisdiction 
 in these causes — of opening a new scene of expensive law suits, 
 of suffering foreigners, and citizens of different states, to drag 
 each other many hundred miles into the federal courts. It is 
 true, those courts may be so organized by a wise and prudent 
 legislature, as to make the obtaining of justice in them tolera- 
 bly easy ; they may in general be organized on the common law 
 principles of the country : But this benefit is by no means se- 
 cured by the constitution. The trial by jury is secured only 
 in those few criminal cases, to which the federal laws will ex- 
 tend — as crimes committed on the seas, against the laws of 
 nations, treason and counterfeiting the federal securities and 
 coin : But even in these cases, the jury trial of the vicinage is 
 not secured — particularly in the large states, a citizen may be 
 
308 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 
 
 tried for a crime committed in the state, and yet tried in some 
 states 500 miles from the place where it was committed ; but 
 the jury trial is not secured at all in civil causes. Though the 
 convention have not established this trial, it is to be hoped 
 that congress, in putting the new system into execution, will 
 do it by a legislative act, in all cases in which it can be done 
 with propriety. Whether the jury trial is not excluded the 
 supreme judicial court is an important question. By Art. 3, 
 Sec. 2, all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, 
 and consuls, and in those cases in which a state shall be party, 
 the supreme court shall have jurisdiction. In all the other 
 cases beforementioned, the supreme court shall have appellate 
 jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exception, and 
 under such regulations as the congress shall make. By court 
 is understood a court consisting of judges ; and the [37] idea 
 of a jury is excluded. This court, or the judges, are to have 
 jurisdiction on appeals, in all the cases enumerated, as to law 
 and fact ; the judges are to decide the law and try the fact, 
 / and the trial of the fact being assigned to the judges by the 
 j constitution, a jury for trying the fact is excluded ; however, 
 under the exceptions and powers to make regulations, congress 
 I may, perhaps, introduce the jury, to try the fact in most nec- 
 essary cases. 
 
 There can be but one supreme court in which the final juris- 
 diction will centre in all federal causes — except in cases where 
 appeals by law shall not be allowed : The judicial powers of 
 the federal courts extend in law and equity to certain cases : 
 and, therefore, the powers to determine on the law, in equity, 
 and as to the fact, all will concentrate in the supreme court: — 
 These powers, which by this constitution are blended in the 
 same hands, the same judges, are in Great-Britain deposited in 
 different hands — to wit, the decision of the law in the law 
 judges, the decision in equity in the chancellor, and the trial 
 of the fact in the jury. It is a very dangerous thing to vest in 
 the same judge power to decide on the law, and also general 
 powers in equity ; for if the law restrain him, he is only to step 
 into his shoes of equity, and give what judgment his reason or 
 opinion may dictate ; we have no precedents in this country, 
 
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 309 
 
 as yet, to regulate the divisions in equity as in Great Britain ;, 
 equity, therefore, in the supreme court for many years will be 
 mere discretion. I confess in the constitution of this supreme 
 court, as left by the constitution, I do not see a spark of free- 
 dom or a shadow of our own or the British common law. 
 
 This court is to have appellate jurisdiction in all the other 
 cases before mentioned : Many sensible men suppose that 
 cases before mentioned respect, as well the criminal cases as 
 the civil ones mentioned antecedently in the constitution, if 
 so an appeal is allowed in criminal cases — contrary to the 
 usual sense of law. How far it may be proper to admit a for- 
 eigner or the citizen of another state to bring actions against 
 state governments, which have "failed in performing so many, 
 promises made during the war is doubtful : How far it may be 
 proper so to humble a state, as to oblige it to answer to an in- 
 dividual in a court of law, is worthy of consideration ; the 
 states are now subject to no such actions ; and this new juris- 
 diction will subject the states, and many defendants to actions, 
 and processes, which were not in the contemplation of the par- 
 ties, when the contract was made ; all engagements existing 
 between citizens of different states, citizens and foreigners, 
 states and foreigners ; and states and citizens of other states 
 were made the parties contemplating the remedies then exist- 
 ing on the laws of the states [28] and the new remedy pro- 
 posed to be given in the federal courts, can be founded on no 
 principle whatever. 
 
 Your's, &c, 
 
 THE FEDERAL FARMER. 
 
3IO LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 
 
 LETTER IV. 
 
 October 12th, 1787. 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 It will not be possible to establish in the federal courts the 
 jury trial of the vicinage so well as in the state courts. 
 
 Third, there appears to me to be not only a premature de- 
 posit of some important powers in the general government — 
 but many of those deposited there are undefined, and may 
 be used to good or bad purposes as honest or designing men 
 shall prevail. By Art. i, Sec. 2, representatives and direct 
 
 taxes shall be apportioned among the several states, &c. 
 
 same art. sect. 8, the congress shall have powers to lay and 
 collect taxes, duties, &c. for the common defence and general 
 welfare, but all duties, imposts and excises, shall be uni- 
 form throughout the United States : By the first recited clause, 
 direct taxes shall be apportioned on the states. This seems 
 to favour the idea suggested by some sensible men and writers 
 that congress, as to direct taxes, will only have power to make 
 requisitions ; but the latter clause, power to lay and collect 
 taxes, &c. seems clearly to favour the contrary opinion, and, 
 in my mind, the true one, the congress shall have power to tax 
 immediately individuals, without the intervention of the state 
 legislatures, in fact the first clause appears to me only to pro- 
 vide that each state shall pay a certain portion of the tax, and 
 the latter to provide that congress shall have power to lay and 
 collect taxes, that is to assess upon, and to collect of the indi- 
 viduals in the state, the states quota ; but these still I consider 
 as undefined powers, because judicious men understand them 
 differently. 
 
 It is doubtful whether the vice-president is to have any 
 qualifications ; none are mentioned ; but he may serve as pres- 
 ident, and it may be inferred, he ought to be qualified there- 
 fore as the president ; but the qualifications of the president 
 are required only of the person to be elected president. By 
 art. 2, sect. 2, " But the congress may by law vest the appoint- 
 ment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the 
 
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 31I 
 
 president alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of the 
 departments:" Who are inferior officers? May not a congress 
 disposed to vest the appointment of all ofificers in the presi- 
 dent, [29] under this clause, vest the appointment of almost 
 every officer in the president alone, and destroy the check 
 mentioned in the first part of the clause, and lodged in the 
 seriate. It is true, this check is badly lodged, but then some 
 check upon the first magistrate in appointing officers, ought it 
 appears by the opinion of the convention, and by the general 
 opinion, to be established in the constitution. By art. 3, sect. 
 2, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction as to law 
 and facts with such exceptions, &c. to what extent is it in- 
 tended the exceptions shall be carried Congress may carry 
 
 them so far as to annihilate substantially the appellate juris- 
 diction, and the clause be rendered of very little importance. 
 
 4th. There are certain rights which we have always held 
 sacred in the United States, and recognized in all our consti- 
 tutions, and which, by the adoption of the new constitution in 
 its present form, will be left unsecured. By article 6, the pro- 
 posed constitution, and the laws of the United States, which 
 shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or 
 which shall be made under the authority of the United States, 
 shall be the supreme law of the land ; and the judges in every 
 state shall be bound thereby ; anything in the constitution or 
 laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. 
 
 It is to be observed that when the people shall adopt the 
 proposed constitution it will be their last and supreme act ; it 
 will be adopted not by the people of New Hampshire, Massa- 
 chusetts, &c., but by the people of the United States ; and 
 wherever this constitution, or any part of it, shall be incompati- 
 ble with the ancient customs, rights, the laws or the constitutions 
 heretofore established in the United States, it will entirely 
 abolish them and do them away : And not only this, but the 
 laws of the United States which shall be ; made in pursuance 
 of the federal constitution will be also supreme laws, and 
 wherever they shall be incompatible with those customs, 
 rights, laws or constitutions heretofore established, they will 
 also entirely abolish them and do them away. 
 
312 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 
 
 By the article before recited, treaties also made under the 
 authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law : It 
 is not said that these treaties shall be made in pursuance of 
 the constitution — nor are there any constitutional bounds set 
 to those who shall make them : The president and two-thirds 
 of the senate will be empowered to make treaties indefinitely, 
 and when these treaties shall be made, they will also abolish all 
 laws and state constitutions incompatible with them. This 
 power in the president and senate is absolute, and the judges 
 will be bound to allow full force to whatever rule, article or 
 thing the president and senate shall establish by treaty, whether 
 it be [30] practicable to set any bounds to those who make 
 treaties, I am not able to say ; if not,it proves that this power 
 ought to be more safely lodged. 
 
 The federal constitution, the laws of congress made in pur- 
 suance of the constitution, and all treaties must have full force 
 and effect in all parts of the United States ; and all other laws, 
 rights and constitutions which stand in their way must yield : 
 It is proper the national laws should be supreme, and superior 
 to state or district laws ; but then the national laws ought to 
 
 yield to unalienable or fundamental rights and national 
 
 laws, made by a, few men, should extend only to a few national 
 objects. This will not be the case with the laws of congress: 
 To have any proper idea of their extent, we must carefully 
 examine the legislative, executive and judicial powers proposed 
 to be lodged in the general government, and consider them in 
 connection with a general clause in art. i, sect. 8, in these 
 words (after enumerating a number of powers) " To make all 
 laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into ex- 
 ecution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by 
 this constitution in the government of the United States, or 
 
 in any department or officer thereof." The powers of this 
 
 government as has been observed, extend to internal as well 
 as external objects, and to those objects to which all others 
 are subordinate ; it is almost impossible to have a just concep- 
 tion of their powers, or of the extent and number of the laws 
 which may be deemed necessary and proper to carry them into 
 effect, till we shall come to exercise those powers and make 
 
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 313 
 
 the laws. In making laws to carry those powers into effect, it 
 is to be expected, that a wise and prudent congress will pay- 
 respect to the opinions of a free people, and bottom their laws 
 on those principles which have been considered as essential 
 and fundament.al in the British, and in our government : But a 
 congress of a different character will not be bound by the con- 
 stitution to pay respect to those principles. 
 
 It is said that when people make a constitution, and dele- 
 gate powers, that all powers are not delegated by them to 
 those who govern, is reserved in the people ; and that the peo- 
 ple, in the present case, have reserved in themselves, and in 
 their state governments, every right and power not expressly 
 given by the federal constitution to those who shall administer 
 the national governnrient. It is said, on the other hand, that 
 the people, when they make a constitution, yield all power not 
 expressly reserved to themselves. The truth is, in either case, 
 it is mere matter of opinion, and men usually take either side 
 of the argument, as will best answer their purposes : But the 
 general [31] presumption being, that men who govern, will in 
 doubtful cases, construe laws and constitutions most favourably 
 for increasing their own powers ; all wise and prudent people, 
 in forming constitutions, have drawn the line, and carefully 
 described the powers parted with and the powers reserved. 
 By the state constitutions, certain rights have been reserved in 
 ;the people ; or rather, they have been recognized and estab- 
 lished in such a manner, that state legislatures are bound to 
 respect them, and to make no laws infringing upon them. The 
 state legislatures are obliged to take notice of the bills of 
 rights of their respective states. The bills of rights, and the 
 state constitutions, are fundamental compacts only between 
 those who govern, and the people of the same state. 
 
 In the year 1788 the people of the United States made a 
 federal constitution, which is a fundamental compact between 
 them and their federal rulers ; these rulers, in the nature of 
 things, cannot be bound to take notice of any other compact. 
 It would be absurd for them, in making laws, to look over 
 thirteen, fifteen, or twenty state constitutions, to see what 
 rights are established as fundamental, and must not be in- 
 
3 14 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R.' H. LEE. 
 
 fringed upon, in making laws in the society. It is true, they 
 would be bound to do it if the people, in their federal com- 
 pact, should refer to the state constitutions, recognize all parts 
 not inconsistent with the federal constitution, and direct their 
 federal rulers to take notice of them accordingly ; but this is 
 not the case, as the plan stands proposed at present ; and it is 
 absurd, to suppose so unnatural an idea is intended or implied. 
 I think my opinion is not only founded in reason, but I think 
 it is supported by the report of the convention itself. If there 
 are a number of rights established by the state constitutions, 
 and which will remain sacred, and the general government is 
 bound to take notice of them — it must take notice of one as 
 well as another ; and if unnecessary to recognize or establish 
 one by the federal constitution, it would be unnecessary to 
 recognize or establish another by it. If the federal constitu- 
 tion is to be construed so far in connection with the state con- 
 stitution, as to leave the trial by jury in civil causes, for in- 
 stance, secured ; on the same principles it would have left the 
 trial by jury in criminal causes, the benefits of the writ of 
 habeas corpus, &c. secured ; they all stand on the same foot- 
 ing ; they are the conimon rights of Americans, and have been 
 recognized by the state constitutions : But the convention 
 found it necessary to recognize or re-establish the benefits of 
 that writ, and the jury trial in criminal cases. As to expost 
 facto laws, the convention has done the same in one case, and 
 gone further in another, It is a part of the com- [32] pact 
 between the people of each state and their rulers, that no 
 expost facto laws shall be made. But the convention, by Art. 
 I, Sect. 10, have put a sanction upon this part even of the 
 state compacts. In fact, the 9th and loth Sections in Art. i, 
 in the proposed constitution, are no more nor less, than a par- 
 tial bill of rights ; they establish certain principles as part of 
 the compact upon which the federal legislators and ofiScers can 
 never infringe. It is here wisely stipulated, that the federal 
 legislature shall never pass a bill of attainder, or expost facto 
 law ; that no tax shall be laid on articles exported, &c. The 
 establishing of one right implies the necessity of establishing 
 another and similar one. 
 
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 315 
 
 On the whole, the position appears to me to be undeniable, 
 that this bill of rights ought to be carried farther, and some 
 other principles established, as a part of this fundamental 
 compact between the people of the United States and their 
 federal rulers. 
 
 It is true, we are not disposed to differ much, at present, 
 about religion ; but when we are making a constitution, it is to 
 be hoped, for ages and millions yet unborn, why not establish 
 the free exercise of religion, as a part of the national compact. 
 There are other essential rights, which we have justly under- 
 stood to be the rights of freemen ; as freedom from hasty and 
 unreasonable search warrants, warrants not founded on oath, 
 and not issued with due caution, for searching and seizing 
 men's papers, property, and persons. The trials by jury in 
 ,civil causes, it is said, varies so much in the several states, that 
 no words could be found for the uniform establishment of it. 
 If so, the federal legislation will not be able to establish it by 
 any general laws. I confess I am of opinion it may be estab- 
 lished, but not in that beneficial manner in which we may 
 enjoy it, for the reasons beforementioned. When I speak of 
 the jury trial of the vicinage, or the trial of the fact in the 
 neighborhood, I do not lay so much stress upon the circum- 
 stance of our being tried by our neighbours : in this enlightened 
 country men may be probably impartially tried by those who 
 do not live very near them : but the trial of facts in the neigh- 
 bourhood is of great importance in other respects. Nothing 
 can be more essential than the cross examining witnesses, and 
 generally before the triers of the facts in question. The com- 
 mon people can establish facts with much more ease with oral 
 than written evidence ; when trials of facts are removed to a 
 distance from the homes of the parties and witnesses, oral evi- 
 dence becomes intolerably expensive, and the parties must 
 depend on written evidence, which to the common people is 
 expensive and almost [33J useless; it must be frequently taken 
 ex porte, and but very seldom leads to the proper discovery of 
 truth. 
 
 The trial by jury is very important in another point of 
 view. It is essential in every free country, that common. 
 
3l6 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 
 
 people should have a part and share of influence, in the judi- 
 cial as well as in the legislative department. To hold open to 
 them the offices of senators, judges, and offices to fill which an 
 expensive education is required, cannot answer any valuable 
 purposes for them ; they are not in a situation to be brought 
 forward and to fill those offices ; these, and most other offices 
 of any considerable importance, will be occupied by the few. 
 The few, the well born, &c. as Mr. Adams calls them, in judi- 
 cial decisions as well as in legislation, are generally disposed, 
 and very- naturally too, to favour those of their own descrip- 
 tion. 
 
 The trial by jury in the judicial department, and the col- 
 lection of the people by their representatives in the legislature, 
 are those fortunate inventions which have procured for them, 
 in this country, their true proportion of influence, and the wis- 
 est and most fit means of protecting themselves in the com- 
 munity. Their situation, as jurors and representatives, enables 
 them to acquire information Hnd knowledge in the affairs and 
 government of the society ; and to come forward, in turn, as 
 the centinels and guardians of each other. I am very sorry 
 that even a few of our countrymen should consider jurors and 
 representatives in a different point of view, as ignorant, trouble- 
 some bodies, which ought not to have any share in the con- 
 cerns of government. 
 
 I confess I do not see in what cases the congress can, with 
 any pretence of right, make a law to suppress the freedom of 
 the press ; though I am not clear, that congress is restrained 
 from laying any duties whatever on printing, and from laying 
 duties particularly heavy on certain pieces printed, and perhaps 
 congress may require large bonds for the payment of these 
 duties. Should the printer say, the freedom of the press was 
 secured by the constitution of the state in which he lived, con- 
 gress might, and perhaps, with great propriety, answer, that 
 the federal constitution is the only compact existing between 
 them and the people ; in this compact the people have named 
 no others, and therefore congress, in exercising the powers 
 assigned them, and in making laws to carry them into execu- 
 tion, are restrained by nothing beside the federal constitution, 
 
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 317 
 
 any more than a state legislature is restrained by a compact 
 between the magistrates and people of a county, city, or town 
 of which the people, in forming the state constitution, have 
 taken no notice. 
 
 It is not my object to enumerate rights of inconsiderable 
 [34] importance ; but there are others, no doubt, which ought 
 to be established as a fundamental part of the national system. 
 
 It is worthy of observation, that all treaties are made by 
 foreign nations with a confederacy of thirteen states — that the 
 western country is attached to thirteen states — thirteen states 
 have jointly and severally engaged to pay the public debts. — 
 Should a new government be formed of nine, ten, eleven, or 
 twelve states, those treaties could not be considered as binding 
 on the foreign nations who made them. However, I believe 
 the probability to be, that if nine states adopt the constitution, 
 the others will. 
 
 It may also be worthy our examination, how far the pro- 
 vision for amending this plan, when it shall be adopted, is of 
 any importance. No measures can be taken towards amend- 
 ments, unless two-thirds of the congress, or two-thirds of the 
 legislature of the several states shall agree. — While power is in 
 the hands of the people, or democratic part of the community, 
 more especially as at present, it is easy, according to the gen- 
 eral course of human affairs, for the few influential men in the 
 community, to obtain conventions, alterations in government, 
 and to persuade the common people that they may change for 
 the better, and to get from them a part of the power : But 
 when power is once transferred from the many to the few, all 
 changes become extremely difficult ; the government, is this 
 case, being beneficial to the few, they will be exceedingly 
 artful and adroit in preventing any measures which may lead 
 to a change; and nothing will produce it, but great exertions 
 and severe struggles on the part of the common people. 
 Every man of reflection must see, that the change now pro- 
 posed, is a transfer of power from the many to the few, and 
 the probability is, the artful and ever active aristocracy, will 
 prevent all peaceful measures for changes, unless when they 
 shall discover some favorable moment to increase their own 
 
3l8 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H, LEE. 
 
 influence. I am sensible, thousands of men in the United 
 States, are disposed to adopt the proposed constitution,, 
 though they perceive it to be essentially defective, under an 
 idea that amendments of it, may be obtained when necessary. 
 This is a pernicious idea, it argues a servility of character 
 totally unfit for the support of free government .; it is very re- 
 pugnant to that perpetual jealousy respecting liberty, so abso- 
 lutely necessary in all free states, spoken of by Mr. Dickinson. — 
 However, if our countrymen are so soon changed, and the 
 language of 1774, is become odious to them, it will be in vain, 
 to use the language of freedom, or to attempt to rouse them 
 to free enquiries : But 1 shall never believe this \s the case 
 with them, whatever present appearances may be, till I shall 
 have very strong evidence indeed of it. 
 Your's, &c. 
 
 THE FEDERAL FARMER. 
 
 [35] LETTER V. 
 
 October isth, 1787. 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 Thus I have examined the federal constitution as far as a 
 few days leisure would permit. It opens to my mind a new 
 scene ; instead of seeing powers cautiously lodged in the 
 hands of numerous legislators, and many magistrates, we see 
 all important powers collecting in one centre, where a few 
 men will possess them almost at discretion. And instead of 
 checks in the formation of the government, to secure the 
 rights of the people against the usurpations of those they 
 appoint to govern, we are to understand the equal division of 
 lands among our people, and the strong arm furnished them 
 by nature and situation, are to secure them against those 
 usurpations. If there are advantages in the equal division of 
 our lands, and the strong and manly habits of our people, we 
 ought to establish governments calculated to give duration to 
 them, and not governments which never can work naturally^ 
 
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 319 
 
 till that equality of property, and those free and manly habits 
 shall be destroyed ; these evidently are not the natural basis, 
 of the proposed constitution. No man of reflection, and 
 skilled in the science of goverment, can suppose these will 
 move on harmoniously together for ages, or even for fifty 
 years. As to the little circumstances commented upon, by 
 some writers, with applause — as the age of a representative, of 
 the president, &c. — they have, in my mind, no weight in the 
 general tendency of the system. 
 
 There are, however, in my opinion, many good things in 
 the proposed system. It is founded on elective principles,, 
 and the deposits of powers in different hands, is essentially 
 right. The guards against those evils we have experienced in 
 some states in legislation are valuable indeed ; but the value 
 of every feature in this syste^n is vastly lessened for the want 
 of that one important feature in a free government, a repre- 
 sentation of the people. Because we have sometimes abused 
 democracy, I am not among those men who think a democratic 
 branch a nuisance ; which branch shall be sufficiently numer- 
 ous to admit some of the best informed men of each order in, 
 the community into the administration of government. 
 
 While the radical defects in the proposed system are not so 
 soon discovered, some temptations to each state, and to many 
 classes of men to adopt it, are very visible. It uses the demo- 
 cratic language of several of the state constitutions, particularly 
 that of Massachusetts ; the eastern states will receive advan- 
 tages so far as the regulation of trade, by a bare majority, is 
 committed to it: Connecticut and New Jersey will receive 
 their share of a [36] general impost ; The middle states will 
 receive the advantages surrounding the seat of government ;. 
 The southern states will receive protection, and have their 
 negroes represented in the legislature, and large back coun- 
 tries will soon have a majority in it. This system promises a 
 large field of employment to military gentlemen, and gentle- 
 men of the law ; and in case the government shall be executed 
 without convulsions, it will afford security to creditors, to the 
 clergy, salary-men and others depending on money payments. 
 So far as the system promises justice and reasonable ad- 
 
320 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 
 
 vantages, in these respects, it ought to be supported by all 
 honest men ; but whenever it promises unequal and improper 
 advantages to any particular states, or orders of men, it ought 
 to be opposed. 
 
 I have, in the course of these letters observed, that there 
 are many good things in the proposed constitution, and I have 
 endeavored to point out many important defects in it. I have 
 admitted that we want a federal system — that we have a 
 system presented, which, with several alterations may be 
 made a tolerable good one — I have admitted there is a well 
 founded uneasiness among creditors and mercantile men. In 
 this situation of things, you ask me what I think ought to be 
 done ? My opinion in this case is only the opinion of an indi- 
 vidual, and so far only as it corresponds with the opinions of 
 the honest and substantial part of the community, is it en- 
 titled to consideration. Though I am fully satisfied that the 
 state conventions ought most seriously to direct their exer- 
 tions to altering and amending the system proposed before 
 they shall adopt it — yet I have not sufiSciently examined the 
 subject, or formed an opinion, how far it will be practicable 
 for those conventions to carry their amendments. As to the 
 idea, that, it will be in vain for those conventions to attempt 
 amendments, it cannot be admitted ; it is impossible to say 
 whether they can or not until the attempt shall be made ; and 
 when it shall be determined, by experience, that the conven- 
 tions cannot agree in amendments, it will then be an import- 
 ant question before the people of the United States, whether 
 they will adopt or not the system proposed in its present 
 form. This subject of consolidating the states is new: and 
 because forty or fifty men have agreed in a system, to suppose 
 the good sense of this country, an enlightened nation, must 
 adopt it without examination, and though in a state of pro- 
 found peace, without endeavouring to amend those parts they 
 perceive are defective, dangerous to freedom, and destructive 
 of the valuable principles of republican government — is truly 
 humiliating. It is true there may be danger in delay ; but 
 there is danger in adopting the system in its present form ; 
 •and I see the danger in either case will arise principally from 
 
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R.H.LEE. 321 
 
 the conduct and views of [37] two very unprincipled parties 
 in the United States — two fires, between which the honest 
 and substantial people have long found themselves situated. 
 One party is composed of little insurgents, men in debt, who • 
 want no law, and who want a share of the property of others ; 
 these are called levellers, Shayites, &c. The other party is 
 composed of a few, but more dangerous men, with their servile, 
 dependents ; these avariciously grasp at all power and prop- • 
 erty ; you may discover in all the actions of these men, an 
 evident dislike to free and equal government, and they will go 
 systematically to work to change, essentially, the forms of 
 government in this country ; these are called aristocrats, 
 
 m ites, &c. &c. Between these two parties is the weight 
 
 of the community ; the men of middling property, men not in 
 debt on the one hand, and men, on the other, content with 
 republican governments, and not aiming at immense fortunes, 
 offices, and power. In 1786, the little insurgents, the levellers, 
 came forth, invaded the rights of others, and attempted to 
 establish governments according to their wills. Their move- 
 ments evidently gave encouragement to the other party, 
 which, in 1787, has taken the political field, and with its 
 fashionable dependants, and the tongue and the pen, is en- ■ 
 deavoring to establish in a great haste, a politer kind of gov- 
 ernment. These two parties, which will probably be opposed 
 or united as it may suit their interests and views, are really 
 insignificant, compared with the solid, free, and independent 
 part of the community. It is not my intention to suggest, 
 that either of these parties, and the real friends of the pro- 
 posed constitution, are the same men. The fact is, these 
 aristocrats support and hasten the adoption of the proposed 
 constitution, merely because they think it is a stepping stone 
 to their favorite object. I think I am well founded in this 
 idea ; I think the general politics of these men support it, as 
 well as the common observation among them, That the 
 proffered plan is the best that can be got at present, it will do 
 for a few years, and lead to something better. The sensible 
 and judicious part of the community will carefully weigh all 
 these circumstances ; they will view the late convention as 
 
322 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 
 
 a respectable body of men — America probably never will see 
 an assembly of men, of a like number, more respectable. But 
 the members of the convention met without knowing the 
 sentiments of one man in ten thousand in these states respect- 
 ing the new ground taken. Their doings are but the first 
 attempts in the most important scene ever opened. Though 
 each individual in the state conventions will not, probably, be 
 so respectable as each individual in the federal eonvention, 
 yet as the state conventions will probably consist of fifteen 
 hundred or two thousand men of abilities, and versed in the 
 science of government, [38] collected from all parts of the 
 community and from all orders of men, it must be acknowl- 
 edged that the wetght of respectability will be in them — In 
 them will be collected the solid sense and the real political 
 character of the country. Being revisers of the subject, they 
 will possess peculiar advantages. To say that these conven- 
 tions ought not to attempt, coolly and deliberately, the re- 
 vision of the system, or that they cannot amend it, is very 
 foolish or very assuming. If these conventions, after examin- 
 ing the system, adopt it, I shall be perfectly satisfied, and 
 wish to see men make the administration of the government 
 an equal blessing to all orders of men. I believe the great 
 body of our people to be virtuous and friendly to good gov- 
 ernment, to the protection of liberty and property; and it is 
 the duty of all good men, especially of those who are placed 
 as sentinels to guard their rights — it is their duty to examine 
 into the prevailing politics of parties, and to disclose them — 
 while they avoid exciting undue suspicions, to lay facts before 
 the people, which will enable them to form a proper judg- 
 ment. Men who wish the people of this country to determine 
 for themselves, and deliberately to fit the government to their 
 situation, must feel some degree of indignation at those 
 . attempts to hurry the adoption of a system, and to shut the 
 door against examination. The very attempts create suspi- 
 cions, that those who make them have secret views, or see 
 some defects in the system, which, in the hurry of affairs, they 
 expect will escape the eye of a free people. 
 
 What can be the views of those gentlemen in Pennsylvania, 
 
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 323 
 
 who precipitated decisions on this subject ? What can be the 
 views of those gentlemen in Boston, who countenanced the 
 Printers in shutting up the press against a fair and free investi- 
 gation of this important system in the usual way. The mem- 
 bers of the convention have done their duty why should 
 
 some of them fly to their states — almost forget a propriety of 
 behaviour, and precipitate measures for the adoption of a 
 system of their own making? I confess candidly, when I 
 consider these circumstances in connection with the un- 
 guarded parts of the system I have mentioned, I feel disposed 
 to proceed with very great caution, and to pay more attention 
 than usual to the conduct of particular characters. If the 
 constitution presented be a good one, it will stand the test 
 with a well informed people : all are agreed that there shall 
 be state conventions to examine it ; and we must believe it 
 will be adopted, unless we suppose it is a bad one, or that 
 those conventions will make false divisions respecting it. I 
 admit improper measures are taken against the adoption of 
 •the system as well for it all who object to the plan pro- 
 posed ought to point out the defects [39] objected to, and to 
 propose those amendments with which they can accept it, or 
 to propose some other system of government, that the public 
 mind may be known, and that we may be brought to agree 
 in some system of government, to strengthen and execute 
 the present, or to provide a substitute. I consider the field 
 of enquiry just opened, and that we are to look to the state 
 conventions for ultimate decisions on the subject before us; it 
 is not to be presumed, that they will differ about small amend- 
 ments, and lose a system when they shall have made it sub- 
 stantially good ; but touching the essential amendments, it is 
 to be presumed the several conventions will pursue the most 
 rational measures to agree in and obtain them ; and such de- 
 iects as they shall discover and not remove, they will probably 
 notice, keep them in view as the ground work of future 
 amendments, and in the firm and manly language which every 
 free people ought to use, will suggest to those who may here- 
 after administer the government, that it is their expectation, 
 ►that the system will be so organized by legislative acts, and the 
 
324 LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 
 
 government so administered, as to render those defects as 
 little injurious as possible. Our countrymen are entitled to 
 an honest and faithful government ; to a government of laws 
 and not of men ; and also to one of their chusing — as a citizen 
 of the country, I wish to see these objects secured, and 
 licentious, assuming, and overbearing men restrained ; if the 
 constitution or social compact be vague and unguarded, then 
 we depend wholly upon the prudence, wisdom and moder- 
 ation of those who manage the affairs of government ; or 
 on what, probably, is equally uncertain and precarious, the 
 success of the people oppressed by the abuse of government, 
 in receiving it from the hands of those who abuse it, and 
 placing it in the hands of those who will use it well. 
 
 In every point of view, therefore, in which I have been 
 able, as yet, to contemplate this subject, I can discern but one 
 rational mode of proceeding relative to it : and that is to ex- 
 amine it with freedom and candour, to have state conventions 
 some months hence, which shall examine coolly every article, 
 clause, and word in the system proposed, and to adopt it with 
 such amendments as they shall think fit. How far the state 
 conventions ought to pursue the mode prescribed by the 
 federal convention of adopting or rejecting the plan in toto, I 
 leave it to them to determine. Our examination of the sub- 
 ject hitherto has been rather of a general nature. The re- 
 publican characters in the several states, who wish to make 
 this plan more adequate to security of liberty and property, 
 and to the duration of the principles of a free government, 
 will, no doubt, collect their opinions to certain points, and 
 accurately define those [40] alterations and amendments they 
 wish ; if it shall be found they essentially disagree in them, 
 the conventions will then be able to determine whether to 
 adopt the plan as it is, or what will be proper to be done. 
 
 Under these impressions, and keeping in view the improper 
 and unadvisable lodgment of powers in the general govern- 
 ment, organized as it at present is, touching internal taxes, 
 armies and militia, the elections of its own members, causes 
 between citizens of different states, &c. and the want of a 
 more perfect bill of rights, &c. I drop the subject for the 
 
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER BY R. H. LEE. 325 
 
 present, and when I shall have leisure to revise and correct 
 my ideas respecting it, and to collect into points the opinions 
 of those who wish to make the system more secure and safe, 
 perhaps I may proceed to point out particularly for your 
 consideration, the amendments which ought to be ingrafted 
 into this system, not only in conformity to my own, but the 
 deliberate opinions of others — you will with me perceive, that 
 the objections to the plan proposed may, by a more leisure 
 examination be set in a stronger point of view, especially the 
 important one, that there is no substantial representation of 
 the people provided for in a government in which the most 
 essential powers, even as to the internal police of the country, 
 is proposed to be lodged. 
 
 I think the honest and substantial part of the community 
 will wish to see this system altered, permanency and consist- 
 ency given to the constitution we shall adopt ; and therefore 
 they will be anxious to apportion the powers to the features 
 and organizations of the government, and to see abuse in the 
 exercise of power more effectually guarded against. It is 
 suggested, that state officers, from interested motives will 
 
 oppose the constitution presented 1 see no reason for this, 
 
 their places in general will not be effected, but new openings 
 to offices and places of profit must evidently be made by the 
 adoption of the constitution in its present form. 
 
 Your's, &c. 
 
 THE FEDERAL FARMER. 
 
 To the Republican. 
 
The Objections of the / Hon. George Mason, / to 
 the proposed Foederal Constitution. / Addressed to the 
 
 Citizens of Virginia. / / Printed by Thomas 
 
 Nicholas. 
 
 Folio, Broadside. 
 
 George Mason was a member of the Federal Convention, 
 but refused to sign the Constitution, and was a leader of the 
 opposition to its ratification in the Virginia Convention. 
 
 " I take the liberty to enclose to you my objections to the 
 new Constitution of government, which a little moderation 
 and temper at the end of the convention might have re- 
 moved.... You will readily observe, that my objections are 
 not numerous (the greater part of the enclosed paper contain- 
 ing reasonings upon the probable effects of the exceptionable 
 parts), though in my mind some of them are capital ones." 
 Mason to Washington, October 7th, 1787. 
 
 Madison's letter to Washington of October i8th, 1787, 
 contains a cursory answer to Mason's "Objections," and a 
 more elaborate one by James Iredell is printed in this volume. 
 
 P. L. F. 
 
npHERE is no declaration of rights: and the laws of the 
 ■*■ general government being paramount to the. laws and 
 constitutions of the several states, the declarations of rights, ,' 
 in the separate states, are no security. Nor are the people 
 secured even in the enjoyment of the benefit of the common 
 law, which stands here upon no other foundation than its 
 Jiaving been adopted by the respective acts forming the con- 
 stitutions of the several states. 
 
 In the House of Representatives there is not the sub- 
 stance, but the shadow only of representation; which can 
 never produce proper information in the legislature, or inspire 
 confidence in the people. — The laws will, therefore, be gener- 
 ally made by men little concerned in, and unacquainted with 
 their effects and consequences.* 
 
 The Senate have the. power of altering all money-bills, and 
 of originating appropriations of money, and the salaries of 
 the officers of their appointment, in conjunction with the 
 President of the United States — Although they are not the 
 representatives of the people, or amenable to them. These, 
 with their other great powers, (viz. their powers in the appoint- 
 ment of ambassadors, and all public officers, in making trea- 
 ties, and in trying all impeachments) their influence upon, and 
 connection with, the supreme executive from these causes, 
 their duration of office, and their being a constant existing 
 body, almost continually sitting, joined with their being one 
 complete branch of the legislature, will destroy any balance in 
 the government, and enable them to accomplish what usurpa- 
 tions they please, upon the rights and hberties of the people. 
 
 The judiciary of the United States is so constructed and 
 extended, as to absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the sev- / 
 
 * This objection has been in some degree lessened, by an amendment, often 
 before refused, and at last made by an erasure, after the engrossment upon 
 parchment, of the word forty, and inserting thirty, in the third clause of the 
 second section of the first article. 
 
33 O OBJECTIONS OF GEORGE MASON. 
 
 eral states ; thereby rendering laws as tedious, intricate, and 
 expensive, and justice as unattainable' by a great part of the 
 community, as in England ; and enabling the rich to oppress 
 and ruin the poor. 
 
 The President of the United States has no constitutional 
 council (a thing unknown in any safe and regular government.) 
 he will therefore be unsupported by proper information and 
 advice ; and will generally be directed by minions and favor- 
 ites — or he will become a tool to the Senate — or a council of 
 state will grow out of the principal ofificers of the great depart- 
 ments — the worst and most dangerous of all ingredients for 
 such a council, in a free country ; for they may be induced to 
 join in any dangerous or oppressive measures, to shelter them- 
 selves, and prevent an inquiry into their own misconduct in 
 office. Whereas, had a constitutional council been formed (as 
 was proposed) of six members, viz., two from the eastern, two 
 from the middle, and two from the southern states, to be ap- 
 pointed by vote of the states in the House of Representatives, 
 with the same duration and rotation of ofifice as the SenatCj 
 the executive would always have had safe and proper informa- 
 tion and advice ; the president of such a council might have 
 acted as Vice-President of the United StdXes; pro tempore, upon 
 any vacancy or disability of the chief magistrate ; and long 
 continued sessions of the Senate, would in a great measure 
 have been prevented. From this fatal defect of a constitutional 
 council, has arisen the improper power of the Senate, in the 
 appointment of the public officers, and the alarming depend- 
 ence and connexion between that 'branch of the legislature 
 and the supreme executive. Hence, also, sprung that un- 
 necessary officer, the Vice-President, who, for want of other 
 employment, is made President of the Senate ; thereby 
 dangerously blending the executive and legislative powers ; 
 besides always giving to some one of the states an unnecessary 
 and unjust pre-eminence over the others. 
 
 The President of the United States has the unrestrained 
 power of granting pardon for treason ; which may be some- 
 times exercised to screen from punishment those whom he 
 had secretly instigated to commit the crime, and thereby pre- 
 
OBJECTIONS OF GEORGE MASON. 33 1 
 
 vent a discovery of his own guilt. By declaring all treaties 
 supreme laws of the land, the executive and the Senate have, in 
 many cases, an exclusive power of legislation, which might 
 have been avoided, by proper distinctions with respect to 
 treaties, and requiring the assent of the House of Represen- 
 tatives, where it could be done with safety. 
 
 By requiring only a majority to make all commercial and 
 navigation laws, the five southern states (whose produce and 
 circumstances are totally different from those of the eight 
 northern and eastern states) will be ruined : for such rigid and 
 premature regulations may be made, as will enable the mer- 
 chants of the northern and eastern states not only to demand 
 an exorbitant freight, but to monopolize the purchase of the 
 commodities, at their own price, for many years, to the great 
 injury of the landed interest, and the impoverishment of the 
 people : and the danger is the greater, as the gain on one side 
 will be in proportion to the loss on the other. Whereas, re- 
 quiring two-thirds of the members present in both houses, 
 would have produced mutual moderation, promoted the gen- 
 eral interest, and removed an insuperable objection to the 
 adoption of the government. 
 
 Under their own construction of the general clause at the 
 end of the enumerated powers, the Congress may grant 
 monopolies in trade and commerce, constitute new crimes, 
 inflict unusual and severe punishments, and extend their 
 power as far as they shall think proper; so that the state 
 legislatures have no security for the powers now presumed to 
 remain to them ; or the people for their rights. There is no 
 declaration of any kind for preserving the liberty of the press, 
 the trial by jury in civil cases, nor against the danger of 
 standing armies in time of peace. 
 
 The state legislatures are restrained from laying export 
 duties on their own produce — the general legislature is re- 
 strained from prohibiting the further importation of slaves for 
 twenty odd years, though such importations render the United 
 States weaker, more vulnerable, and less capable of defence. 
 Both the general legislature, and the state legislatures are 
 expressly prohibited making ex post facto laws, though there 
 
332 OBJECTIONS BY GEORGE MASON. 
 
 never was, nor can be, a legislature, but must and will make 
 such laws, when necessity and the public safety require them, 
 which will hereafter be a breach of all the constitutions in the 
 union; and afford precedents for other innovations. 
 
 This government will commence in a moderate aristocracy ; 
 it is at present impossible to foresee whether it will, in its 
 operation, produce a monarchy, or a corrupt oppressive 
 aristocracy ; it will most probably vibrate some years between 
 •the two, and then terminate in the one or the other. 
 
 GEO. MASON. 
 
[Answers to Mr. Mason's objections to the new Con- 
 stitution, recommended by the late Convention. By 
 Marcus. Newbern : Printed by Hodge and Wills, 
 1788.] 
 
 By James Iredell, member of the first North Carolina 
 Convention. This argument was originally published in the 
 State Gazette of North Carolina, and was republished in 
 pamphlet form, together with pieces by Archibald Maclaine 
 and William R. Davie. The most careful search has not 
 enabled me to find the pamphlet, so I am forced to reprint 
 the "answers " from McRee's Life of James Iredell, a work 
 of considerable rarity; and in consequence the above title is 
 certainly not that of the pamphlet. 
 
 " I have read with great pleasure your answer to Mr. 
 Mason's objections ; and surely every man who read them, 
 and on whom Mr. Mason's observations, or indeed the argu- 
 ments of those in opposition in general have had any effect, 
 must be convinced that the objections to the constitution are 
 without foundation." Wither spoon to Iredell, April 3, 1788. 
 
 p. L. F. 
 
I. Objection. 
 
 " There is no declaration of rights, and the laws of the gene- 
 ral government being paramount to the laws and constitutions 
 of the several States, the declarations of rights in the separate 
 States are no security. Nor are the people secured even in the 
 enjoyment of the benefit of the common law, which stands here 
 upon no other foundation than its having been adopted by the 
 respective acts forming the Constitutions of the several States." 
 
 Answer. 
 
 I. As to the want of a declaration of rights. The introduc- 
 tion of these in England, from which the idea was originally 
 taken, was in consequence of usurpations of the Crown, con- 
 trary, as was conceived, to the principles of their government. 
 But there no original constitution is to be found, and the 
 only meaning of a declaration of rights in that country is, that 
 in certain particulars specified, the Crown had no authority to 
 act. Could this have been necessary had there been a consti- 
 tution in being by which it could have been clearly discerned 
 whether the Crown had such authority or not? Had the 
 people, by a solemn instrument, delegated particular powers 
 to the Crown at the formation of their government, surely the 
 Crown, which in that case could claim under that instrument 
 only, could not have contended for more power than was con- 
 veyed by it. So it is in regard to the new Constitution here : 
 the future government which may be formed under that 
 authority certainly cannot act beyond the warrant of that 
 authority. As well might they attempt to impose a King 
 upon America, as go one step in any other respect beyond 
 the terms of their institution. The question then only is, 
 whether more power will be vested in the future government 
 than is necessary for the general purposes of the union. This 
 may occasion a ground of dispute— but after expressly de- 
 
336 ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 
 
 fining the powers that are to be exercised, to say that they 
 :shall exercise no other powers (either by a general or particular 
 ■enumeration) would seem to me both nugatory and ridiculous. 
 As well might a Judge when he condemns a man to be 
 iianged, give strong injunctions to the Sheriff that he should 
 /not be beheaded.* 
 
 2, As to the common law, it is diiificult to know what is 
 uneant by that part of the objection. So far as the people are 
 now entitled to the benefit of the common law, they certainly 
 iwill have a right to enjoy it under the new Constitution until 
 ^altered by the general legislature, which even in this point has 
 .5ome cardinal limits assigned to it. What are most acts of 
 Assembly but a deviation in some degree from the principles 
 ■of the common law? The people are expressly secured (con- 
 -trary to Mr. Mason's wishes) against ex post facto laws ; so 
 ithat th£ tenure of any property at any time held under the 
 principles of the common law, cannot be altered by any 
 future act of the general legislature. The principles of the 
 •common Jaw, as they now apply, must surely always hereafter 
 .apply, except in those particulars in which express authority 
 as given iby this constitution ; in no other particulars can the 
 Congress have authority to change it, and I believe it cannot 
 be shown that any one power of this kind given is unneces- 
 sarily given, or that the power would answer its proper purpose 
 if the legislature was restricted from any innovations on the 
 principles of the common law, which would not in all cases 
 suit the vast variety of incidents that might arise out it. 
 
 II. Objection. 
 
 " In the House of Representatives there is not the sub- 
 stance, but the shadow only of representation ; which can 
 never produce proper information in the legislature, or inspire 
 
 * It appears to me a very just remark of Mr. Wilson's, in his celebrated 
 ■speech, that a bill of rights would have been dangerous, as implying that with- 
 out such a reservation the Congress would have had authority in the cases 
 ^enumerated, so that if any had been omitted (and who would undertake to 
 recite all the State and individual rights not relinquished by the new Constitu- 
 <tion?).they might have been considered at the mercy of the general legislature. 
 
ANSWER TO MASON S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 337 
 
 confidence in the people ; the laws will therefore generally be 
 made by men little concerned in, and unacquainted with their 
 effects and consequences." 
 
 Answer. 
 
 This is a mere matter of calculation. It is said the weight 
 of this objection was in a great measure removed by altering 
 the number of 40,000 to 30,000 constituents. To show the 
 discontented nature of man, some have objected to the number 
 of representatives as being too large. I leave to every man's 
 judgment whether the number is not sufificiently respectable, 
 and whether, if that number be sufificient, it would have been 
 right, in the very infancy of this government, to burthen the 
 people with a great additional expense to answer no good 
 purpose.* 
 
 III. Objection. 
 
 " The Senate have the power of altering all money bills, 
 and of originating appropriations of money, and the salaries 
 of the officers of their own appointment, in conjunction with 
 the President of the United States ; although they are not the 
 representatives of the people or amenable to them. — These, 
 with their other great powers (viz. their powers in the appoint- 
 ment of Ambassadors, and all public officers, in making trea- 
 ties and trying all impeachments) their influence upon and 
 connection with the supreme Executive, from these causes, 
 their duration of office, and their being a constant existing 
 body almost continually sitting, joined with their being one 
 complete branch of the legislature, will destroy any balance in 
 the government, and enable them to accomplish what usurpa- 
 tions they please upon the rights and liberties of the people." 
 
 * I have understood it was considered at the Convention, that the propor- 
 tion of one Representative to 30,000 constituents, would produce at the very 
 first nearly the number that would be satisfactory to Mr. Mason. So that I 
 presume this reason was wrote before the material alteration was made from 
 40,000 to 30,000, which is said to have taken place the very last day just before 
 the signature. 
 
338 ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 
 
 Answer. 
 This objection, respecting the dangerous power of the 
 Senate, is one of that kind which may give rise to a great deal 
 of gloomy prediction, without any solid foundation : An 
 imagination indulging itself in chimerical fears, upon the dis- 
 appointment of a favorite plan, may point out danger arising 
 from any system of government whatever, even if angels were 
 to have the administration of it ; since I presume none but 
 the Supreme Being himself is altogether perfect, and of course 
 every other species of beings may abuse any delegated por- 
 tion of power. This sort of visionary scepticism therefore will 
 lead us to this alternative, either to have no government at all, 
 or to form the best system we can, making allowance for 
 human imperfection. In my opinion the fears as to the 
 power of the Senate are altogether groundless, as to any 
 probability of their being either able or willing to do any im- 
 portant mischief. My reasons are, 
 
 1. Because, though they are not immediately to represent 
 the people, yet they are to represent the representatives of the 
 people who are annually chosen, and it is therefore probable 
 the most popular, or confidential, persons in each State, will 
 be elected members of the Senate. 
 
 2. Because one-third of the Senate are to be chosen as 
 often as the immediate representatives of the people, and as 
 the President can act in no case from which any great danger 
 can be apprehended without the concurrence of two-thirds, let 
 us think ever so ill of the designs of the President, and the 
 danger of a combination of power among a standing body 
 generally associated with him, unless we suppose every one of 
 them to be base and infamous (a supposition, thank God, bad 
 as human nature is, not within the verge of the slightest 
 probability), we have reason to believe that the one-third 
 newly intro.duced every second year, will bring with them 
 from the immediate body of the people, a sufficient portion of 
 patriotism and independence to check any exorbitant designs 
 of the rest. 
 
 3. Because in their legislative capacity they can do nothing 
 
ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 339 
 
 without the concurrence of the House of Representatives, and 
 we need look no farther than England for a clear proof of the 
 amazing consequence which representatives of the people 
 bear in a free government. There the King (who is heredi- 
 tary, and therefore not so immediately interested, according 
 to narrow views of interest which commonly govern Kings, to 
 consult the welfare of his people) has the appointment to 
 almost every ofifice in the government, many of which are of 
 high dignity and great pecuniary value, has the creation of 
 as many Peers as he pleases, is not restricted from bestowing 
 places on the members of both houses of Parliament, and has 
 a direct negative on all bills, besides the power of dissolving 
 the Parliament at his pleasure. In theory would not any one 
 say this power was enormous enough to destroy any balance 
 in the constitution? Yet what does the history of that 
 country tell us ? — that so great is the natural power of the 
 House of Commons (though a very imperfect representation 
 of the people, and a large proportion of them actually pur- 
 chasing their seats) that ever since the revolution the Crown 
 has continually aimed to corrupt them by the disposal of places 
 and pensions ; that without their hearty concurrence it found 
 all the wheels of government perpetually clogged ; and that 
 notwithstanding this, in great critical emergencies, the mem- 
 bers have broke through the trammels of power and interest, 
 and by speaking the sense of the people (though so imper- 
 fectly representing them) either forced an alteration of meas- 
 ures, or made it necesary for the Crown to dissolve them. If 
 their power, under these circumstancrs, is so great, what 
 would it be if their representation was perfect, and their 
 members could hold no appointments, and at the same time 
 had a security for their seats ? The danger of a destruction 
 of the balance would be perhaps on the popular side, notwith- 
 standing the hereditary tenure and weighty prerogatives of the 
 Crown, and the permanent station and great wealth and 
 consequence of the Lords. Our representatives therefore 
 being an adequate and fair representation of the people, and 
 they being expressly excluded from the possession of any 
 places, and not holding their existence upon any precarious 
 
340 ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 
 
 tenure, must have vast influence, and considering that in every 
 popular government the danger of faction is often very seri- 
 ous and alarming, if such a danger could not be checked in its 
 instant operation by some other power more independent of 
 the immediate passions of the people, and capable therefore of 
 thinking with more coolness, the government might be de- 
 stroyed by a momentary impulse of passion, which the very 
 members who indulged it might for ever afterwards in vain 
 deplore. The institution of the Senate seems well calculated 
 to answer this salutary purpose. Excluded as they are from 
 places themselves, they appear to be as much above the 
 danger of personal temptation as men can be. They have no 
 permanent interest as a body to detach them from the general 
 welfare, since six years is the utmost period of their existence, 
 unless their respective legislatures are sufficiently pleased 
 with their conduct to re-elect them. This power of re-election 
 is itself a great check upon abuse, because if they have ambi- 
 tion to continue members of the Senate they can only gratify 
 this ambition by acting agreeably to the opinion of their con- 
 stituents. The House of Representatives, as immediately 
 representing the people, are to originate all money bills. This- 
 I think extremely right, and it is certainly a very capital 
 acquisition to the popular representative. But what harm can 
 arise from the Senate, who are nearly a popular representative 
 also, proposing amendments, when those amendments must 
 be concurred with by the original proposers ? The wisdom of 
 the Senate may sometimes point out amendments, the pro- 
 priety of which the other House may be very sensible of, 
 though they had not occurred to themselves. There is no 
 great danger of any body of men suffering by too eager an 
 adoption of any amendment proposed to any system of their 
 own. The probability is stronger of their being too tenacious 
 of their original opinion, however erroneous, than of their 
 profiting by the wise information of any other persons what- 
 ever. Human nature is so constituted, and therefore I think 
 we may safely confide in the free admission of an intercourse 
 of opinion on the detail of business, as well as to taxation as^ 
 to other points. Our House of Representatives surely could 
 
ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 341 
 
 not have such reason to dread the power of a Senate circum- 
 stanced as ours must be, as the House of Commons in Eng- 
 land the permanent authority of the Peers, and therefore a 
 jealousy, which may be well grounded in the one case would 
 be entirely ill-directed in the other. For similar reasons I 
 dread not any power of originating appropriations of money 
 as mentioned in the objection. While the concurrence of the 
 other House must be had, and as that must necessarily be the 
 most weighty in the government, I think no danger is to he-. 
 apprehended. The Senate has no such authority as to awe or- 
 influence the House of Representatives, and it will be as neces- 
 sary for the one as for the other that proper active measures-, 
 should be pursued : And in regard to appropriations of 
 money, occasions for such appropriations may, on account of 
 their concurrence with the executive power, occur to the- 
 Senate, which would not to the House of Representatives, and. 
 therefore if the Senate were precluded from laying any sucht 
 proposals before the House of Representatives, the govern- 
 ment might be embarrassed ; and it ought ever to be remem- 
 bered, that in our views of distant and chimerical dangers we 
 ought not to hazard our very existence as a people, by pro- 
 posing such restrictions as may prevent the exertion of any 
 necessary power. The power of the Senate in the appoint- 
 ment of Ambassadors, &c., is designed as a check upon the 
 President. They must be appointed in some manner. If the 
 appointment was by the President alone, or by the Presi- 
 dent and a Privy Council (Mr. Mason's favorite plan), an 
 objection to such a system would have appeared much 
 more plausible. It would have been said that this was ap- 
 proaching too much towards monarchical power, and if this 
 new Privy Council had been like all I have ever heard of, it 
 would have afforded little security against an abuse of power 
 in the President. It ought to be shown by reason and proba- 
 bility (not bold assertion) how this concurrence of power with 
 the President can make the Senate so dangerous. It is as 
 good an argument to say that it will not as that it will.* The 
 
 * If seems by the letter which has been published of Mr. Elsworth and Mr. 
 Sherman, as if one reason of giving a share in these appointments to the Senate 
 ■was, that persons in what are called the lesser States might have an equal 
 
342 ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 
 
 power of making treaties is so important that it would have 
 been highly dangerous to vest it in the Executive alone, and 
 would have been the subject of much greater clamor. From 
 the nature of the thing, it could not be vested in the popular 
 representative. It must therefore have been provided for 
 with the Senate's concurrence, or the concurrence of a Privy 
 Council (a thing which I believe nobody has been mad enough 
 to propose), or the power, the greatest monarchical power that 
 can be exercised, must have been vested in a manner that 
 would have excited universal indignation in the President 
 alone. — As to the power of trying impeachments: — Let Mr. 
 Mason show where this power could more properly have 
 been placed. It is a necessary power in every free govern- 
 ment, since even the Judges of the Supreme Court of Judica- 
 ture themselves may require a trial, and other public officers 
 might have too much influence before an ordinary and common 
 court. And what probability is there that such a court, act- 
 ing in so solemn a manner, should abuse its power (especially 
 as it is wisely provided that the sentences shall extend only 
 to removal from office and incapacitation) more than any other 
 court ? The argument as to the possible abuse of power, as I 
 have before suggested, will reach all delegation of power, since 
 all power may be abused when fallible beings are to execute 
 it ; but we must take as much caution as we can, being careful 
 at the same time not to be too wise to do any thing at all. — 
 The bold assertions at the end of this objection are mere 
 declamation, and till some reason is assigned for them, I shall 
 take the liberty to rely upon the reasons I have stated above, 
 as affording a belief that the popular representative must for 
 ever be the most weighty in this government, and of course 
 that apprehensions of danger from such a Senate are altogether 
 ill-founded. 
 
 IV. Objection. 
 
 " The judiciary of the United States is so constructed and 
 extended, as to absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the sev- 
 
 chance for such appointments, in proportion to their merit, with those in the 
 larger, an advantage that could only be expected from a body in which the 
 States were equally represented. 
 
ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 343 
 
 eral States ; thereby rendering law as tedious, intricate and 
 expensive and justice as unattainable by a great part of the 
 community, as in England ; and enabling the rich to oppress 
 and ruin the poor." 
 
 Answer. 
 
 Mr. Mason has here asserted, " That the judiciary of the 
 United States is so constructed and extended, as to absorb 
 and destroy the judiciaries of the several States." How is 
 this the case? Are not the State judiciaries left uncontrolled 
 as to the affairs of that State only ? In this, as in all other 
 cases, where there is a wise distribution, power is commensur- 
 ate to its object. With the mere internal concerns of a State') 
 Congress are to have nothing to do : In no case but where the 
 Union is in some measure concerned, are the federal courts to 
 have any jurisdiction. The State Judiciary will be a satellite 
 waiting upon its proper planet : That of the Union, like the 
 sun, cherishing and preserving a whole planetary system. 
 
 In regard to a possible ill construction of this authority, we 
 must depend upon our future legislature in this case as well 
 as others, in respect to which it is impracticable to define every 
 thing, that it will be provided for so as to occasion as little / 
 expense and distress to individuals as can be. In parting 
 with the coercive authority over the States as States, there must 
 be a coercion allowed as to individuals. The former power no 
 man of common sense can any longer seriously contend for ; the 
 latter is the only alternative. Suppose an objection should be 
 made that the future legislature should not ascertain salaries, 
 because they might divide among themselves and their officers 
 all the revenue of the Union.* Will not every man see how 
 
 * When I wrote the above, I had not seen Governor Randolph's letter. 
 Otherwise, I have so great a respect for that gentleman's character I should 
 have treated with more deference an idea in some measure countenanced by 
 him. One of his objections relates to the Congress fixing their own salaries. 
 I am persuaded, upon a little reflection, that gentleman must think this is one 
 of those cases where a trust must unavoidably be reposed. No salaries could 
 certainly be fix6d now so as to answer the various changes in the value of 
 money that in the course of time must take place. And in what condition 
 would the supreme authority be if their very existence depended on an inferior 
 power ! An abuse in this case too would be so gross that it is very unlikely 
 to happen, but if it should it would probably prove much more fatal to the 
 authors than injurious to the people. 
 
344 ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 
 
 irrational it is to expect that any government can exist which 
 is to be fettered in its most necessary operations for fear of 
 abuse ? 
 
 V. Objection. 
 " The President of the United States has no constitutional 
 Council (a thing unknown in any safe and regular govern- 
 ment), he will therefore be unsupported by proper informa- 
 tion and advice, and will generally be directed by minions and 
 favorites — or he will become a tool to the Senate — or a 
 Council of State will grow out of the principal officers of the 
 great departments ; the worst and most dangerous of all 
 ingredients for such a Council in a free country, for they may 
 be induced to join in any dangerous or oppressive measures, 
 to shelter themselves, and prevent an inquiry into their own 
 misconduct in ofifice : Whereas, had a constitutional Council 
 been formed (as was proposed) of six members, viz., two from 
 the eastern, two from the middle, and two from the southern 
 States, to be appointed by a vote of the States in the House 
 of Representatives, with the same duration and rotation of 
 ofifice as the Senate, the Executive would always have had 
 safe and proper information and advice : The President of such 
 a Council might have acted as Vice-President of the United 
 States, pro tempore, upon any vacancy or disability of the 
 Chief Magistrate, and long-continued sessions of the Senate 
 would in a great measure have been prevented. From this 
 fatal defect of a constitutional Council has arisen the improper 
 power of the Senate, in the appointment of public officers, 
 and the alarming dependence and connection between that 
 branch of the legislature and the Supreme Executive. Hence 
 also sprung that unnecessary and dangerous officer, the Vice- 
 President, who for want of other employment, is made 
 President of the Senate ; thereby dangerously blending the 
 Executive and Legislative powers ; besides always giving to 
 some one of the States an unnecessary and unjust pre-emin- 
 ence over the others." 
 
 Answer. 
 Mr. Mason here reprobates the omission of a particular 
 
ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 345 
 
 Council for the President, as a thing contrary to the example 
 of all safe and regular governments. Perhaps there are very 
 few governments now in being deserving of that character, if 
 under the idea of safety he means to include safety for a 
 proper share of personal freedom, without which their safety 
 and regularity in other respects would be of little consequence 
 to a people so justly jealous of liberty as I hope the people in 
 America ever will be. Since however Mr. Mason refers us to 
 such authority, I think I cannot do better than to select for 
 the subject of our inquiry in this particular, a government 
 which must be universally acknowledged to be the most safe 
 and regular of any considerable government now in being 
 (though I hope America will soon be able to dispute that pre- 
 eminence). Every body must know I speak of Great Britain, 
 and in this I think I give Mr. Mason all possible advantage, 
 since in my opinion it is most probable he had Great Britain 
 principally in his eye when he made this remark, and in the 
 very height of our quarrel with that country, so wbdded were 
 our ideas to the institution of a Council, that the practice was 
 generally if not universally followed at the formation of our 
 governments, though we instituted Councils of a quite differ- 
 ent nature, and so far as the little experience of the writer 
 goes, have very little benefited by it. My inquiry into this 
 subject shall not be confined to the actual present practice of 
 Great Britain ; I shall take the liberty to state the Constitu- 
 tional ideas of Councils in England, as derived from their 
 ancient law subsisting long before the Union,, not omitting 
 however to show what the present practice really is. By the 
 laws of England * the King is said to have four Councils, — 
 I, The High Court of Parliament ; 2, The Peers of the realm ; 
 3, His Judges ; 4, His Privy Council. By the first, I presume 
 is meant, in regard to the making of laws ; because the usual 
 introductory expressions in most acts of Parliament, viz., " By 
 the King's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and 
 consent of the Lords spiritual and temporal, and Commons," 
 &c., show that in a constitutional sense, they are deemed the 
 
 *See Coke's Commentary upon' Littleton, no. i. Blackstone's Commen- 
 tary, 227 and seq. 
 
346 ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 
 
 King's laws, after a ratification in Parliament. The Peers of 
 the realm are by their birth hereditary Counsellors of the 
 Crown, and may be called upon for their advice, either in time 
 of Parliament, or when no Parliament is in being : They are 
 called in some law books Magnum Concilium Regis (the King's 
 Great Council). It is also considered the privilege of every 
 particular Peer to demand an audience of the King, and to lay 
 before him anything he may deem of public importance. The 
 Judges, I presume, are called " Council of the King," upon the 
 same principle as the Parliament is, because the administration 
 of justice is in his name, and the Judges are considered as his 
 instruments in the distribution of it. We come now to the 
 Privy Council, which I imagine, if Mr. Mason had any particular 
 view towards England when he made this objection, was the 
 one he intended as an example of a Constitutional Council in 
 that kingdom. The Privy Council in that country is undoubt- 
 edly of very ancient institution, but it has one fixed property 
 invariably annexed to it, that it is a mere creature of the 
 Crown, dependent on its will both for number and duration, 
 since the King may, whenever he thinks proper, discharge any 
 member, or the whole of it, and appoint another.* If this 
 precedent is of moment to us, merely as a precedent, it should 
 be followed in all its parts, and then what would there be in 
 the regulation to prevent the President being governed by 
 " minions and favorites ? " It would only be the means of riv- 
 eting them on constitutional ground. So far as the precedents 
 in England apply, the Peers being constitutionally the Great 
 Council of the King, though also a part of the legislature, 
 we have reason to hope that there is by no means such a 
 gross impropriety as has been suggested in giving the Senate, 
 though a branch of the legislature, a strong control over the 
 Executive. The only difference in the two cases is, that the 
 Crown in England may or may not give this consequence to 
 the Peers at its own pleasure, and accordingly we find that for 
 a long time past this great Council has been very seldom con- 
 sulted ; under our constitution the President is allowed no 
 option in respect to certain points wherein he cannot act with- 
 
 * I. Blackstone's Commentaries, 232. 
 
ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 347 
 
 out the Senate's concurrence. But we cannot infer from any 
 example in England, that a concurrence between the Ex- 
 ecutive and a part of the legislative is contrary to the maxims 
 of their government, since their government allows of such a 
 concurrence whenever the Executive pleases. The rule, there- 
 fore, from the example of the freest government in Europe, 
 that the Legislative and Executive powers must be altogether 
 distinct, is liable to exceptions ; it does not mean that the 
 Executive shall not form a part of the Legislative (for the 
 King, who has the whole Executive authority, is one entire 
 branch of the legislature, and this Montesquieu, who recognizes 
 the general principle, declares is necessary) ; neither can it 
 mean (as the example above evinces) that the Crown must 
 consult neither House as to any exercise of the Executive 
 power. But its meaning must be, that one power shall not 
 include both authorities. The King, for instance, shall not 
 have the sole Executive and sole Legislative authority also. 
 He may have the former, but must participate the latter with 
 the two Houses of Parliament. The rule lalso would be in- 
 fringed were the three branches of the legislature to share 
 jointly the Executive power. But so long as the people's rep- 
 resentatives are altogether distinct from the Executive autho- 
 rity, the liberties of the people may be deemed secure. And 
 in. this point surely, there can be no manner of comparison 
 between the provisions by which the independence of our 
 House of Representatives is guarded, and the condition in 
 which the British House of Commons is left exposed to every 
 species of corruption. But Mr. Mason says, for want of a 
 Council, the President may become "a tool of the Senate." 
 Why ? Because he cannot act without their concurrence. 
 Would not the same reason hold for his being "a tool to the 
 Council," if he could not act without their concurrence, sup- 
 posing a Council was to be imposed upon him without his own 
 nomination (according to Mr. Mason's plan)? As great care 
 is taken to make him independent of the Senate as I believe 
 human precaution can provide. Whether the President will 
 be a tool to any persons will depend upon the man, and the 
 same weakness of mind which would make him pliable to one 
 
348 ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 
 
 body of control, would certainly attend him with another. But 
 Mr. Mason objects, if he is not directed by minions and favorites, 
 nor becomes a tool of the Senate," a Council of State will grow 
 out of the principal officers of the great departments ; the 
 worst and most dangerous of all ingredients for such a Coun- 
 cil in a free country ; for they may be induced to join in any 
 dangerous or oppressive measures, to shelter themselves, and 
 prevent an inquiry into their own misconduct in ofifice." I beg 
 leave to carry him again to my old authority, England, and 
 ask him, what efficient Council they have there but one formed 
 of their great officers. Notwithstanding their important Con- 
 stittitional Council, everybody knows that the whole move- 
 ments of their Government, where a Council is consulted at 
 all, are directed by their Cabinet Council, composed entirely of 
 the principal officers of the great departments ; that when a 
 Privy Council is called, it is scarcely ever for any other purpose 
 than to give a formal sanction to the previous determinations 
 of the other, so much so that it is notorious that not one time in 
 a thousand one member of the Privy Council, except a known 
 adherent of administration, is summoned to it. But though 
 the President under our constitution may have the aid of the 
 ^'principal officers of the great departments," he is to have 
 this aid, I think, in the most unexceptionable manner possible. 
 He is not to be assisted by a Council summoned to a jovial 
 dinner perhaps, and giving their opinions according to the nod 
 of the President ; but the opinion is to be given with the ut- 
 most solemnity in writing. No after equivocation can explain 
 it away. It must for ever afterwards speak for itself, and 
 commit the character of the writer, in lasting colors, either 
 of fame or infamy, or neutral insignificance, to future ages, as 
 well as the present. From those written reasons, weighed 
 with care, surely the President can form as good a judgment, 
 as if they had been given by a dozen formal characters, care- 
 lessly met together on a slight appointment ; and this further 
 advantage would be derived from the proposed system (which 
 would be wanting if he had constitutional advice to screen 
 him), that the President must be personally responsible for 
 •everything — for though an ingenious gentleman has proposed, 
 
ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 349 
 
 that a Council should be responsible for their opinions, and the 
 same sentiment of justice might be applied to these opinions 
 of the great officers, I am persuaded it will in general be 
 thought infinitely more safe, as well as more just, that the 
 President who acts should be responsible for his conduct, fol- 
 lowing advice at his peril, than that there should be a danger 
 of punishing any man for an erroneous opinion which might 
 possibly be sincere. Besides the morality of this scheme, 
 which may well be questioned, its inexpediency is glaring, 
 since it would be so plausible an excuse and the insincerity 
 of it so difficult to detect, the hopes of impunity this avenue 
 to escape would afford would nearly take away all dread of 
 punishment. As to the temptation mentioned to the officers 
 joining in dangerous or oppresssve measures to shelter them- 
 selves, and prevent an inquiry into their own misconduct in 
 office, this proceeds upon a supposition that the President and 
 the great officers may form a very wicked combination to in- 
 jure their country, a combination that in the first place it is 
 utterly improbable, in a strong respectable government should 
 be formed for that purpose, and in the next, with such a gov- 
 ernment as this constitution would give us, could have little 
 chance of being successful, on account of the great superior 
 strength and natural and jealous vigilance of one at least, if 
 not both the weighty branches of legislation. This evil, how- 
 ever, of the possible depravity of all public officers, is one that 
 can admit of no cure, since in every institution of government 
 the same danger in some degree or other must be risked ; it 
 can only be guarded against by strong checks, and I believe 
 it be difficult for the objectors to our new Constitution 
 to provide stronger ones against any abuse of the Exec- 
 utive authority then will exist in that. As to the Vice 
 President, it appears to me very proper he should be chosen 
 ;much in the same manner as the President, in order that the 
 : States may be secure, upon any accidental loss by death or 
 'Otherwise of the President's service, of the services in the 
 same important station of the man in whom they repose their 
 second confidence. The complicated manner of election 
 -wisely prescribed would necessarily occasion a considerable 
 
350 ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 
 
 delay in the choice of another, and in the mean time the 
 President of the Council, though very fit for the purpose of 
 advising, might be very ill qualified, especially in a critical 
 period, for an active Executive department. I am concerned 
 to see, among Mr. Mason's other reasons, so trivial a one as 
 the little advantage one State might accidentally gain by a 
 Vice President of their country having a seat, with merely a 
 casting vote, in the Senate. Such a reason is utterly un- 
 worthy of that spirit of amity, , and rejection of local views, 
 which can alone save us from destruction. It was the glory of 
 the late Convention, that by discarding such they formed a 
 general government upon principles that did as much honor to 
 their hearts as to their understandings. God grant, that in all 
 our deliberations, we may consider America as one body, and 
 not divert our attention from so able a prospect to small con- 
 siderations of partial jealousy and distrust. It is in vain to 
 expect upon any system to secure an exact equilibrium of 
 power for all the States. Some will occasionally have an 
 advantage from the superior abilities of its members ; the field 
 of emulation is however open to all. Suppose any one should ' 
 now object to the superior influence of Virginia (and the 
 writer of this is not a citizen of that State), on account of the 
 high character of General Washington, confessedly the great- 
 est man of the present age, and perhaps equal to any that has 
 existed in any period of time ; would this be a reason for 
 refusing a union with her, though the other States can scarcely 
 hope for the consolation of ever producing his equal ? 
 
 VI. Objection. 
 
 " The President of the United States has the unrestrained 
 power of granting pardons for treason ; which may be some- 
 times exercised to screen from punishment those whom he had 
 secretly instigated to commit the crime, and thereby prevent 
 a discovery of his own guilt." 
 
 Answer. 
 
 Nobody can contend upon any rational principles, that a 
 power of pardoning should not exist somewhere in every gov- 
 
ANSWER TO MASONS OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 35 1 
 
 ernment, because it will often happen in every country that 
 men are obnoxious to a lawful conviction, who yet are entitled, 
 from some favorable circumstances in their case, to a merciful 
 interposition in their favor. The advocates of monarchy have 
 accordingly boasted of this, as one of the advantages of that 
 form of government, in preference to a republican ; neverthe- 
 less this authority is vested in the Stadtholder in Holland, and 
 I believe is vested in every Executive power in America. It 
 seems to have been wisely the aim of the late Convention, in 
 forming a general government for America, to combine the 
 acknowledged advantages of the British constitution with 
 proper republican checks to guard as much as possible against 
 abuses, and it would have been very strange if they had omit- 
 ted this, which has the sanction of such great antiquity in that 
 country, and if I am not mistaken, a universal adoption in 
 America.* Those gentlemen who object to other parts of the 
 constitution as introducing innovations, contrary to long ex- 
 perience, with a very ill grace attempt to reject an experience 
 so unexceptionable as this, to introduce an innovation (per- 
 haps the first ever suggested) of their own. When a power is 
 acknowledged to be necessary, it is a very dangerous thing to 
 
 * I have since found that in the constitutions of some of the States there are 
 much stronger restrictions on the Executive authority in this particular than I 
 was aware of. In others the restriction only extends to prosecutions carried 
 on by the General Assembly, or the most numerous branch of legislature, or a 
 contrary provision by law; Virginia is in the latter class. But when we con- 
 sider how necessary it is in many cases to make use of accomplices to convict 
 their associates, and what little regard ought in general to be paid to a guilty 
 man swearing to save his own life, we shall probably think that the jealousies 
 which (by prohibiting pardons before convictions) even disabled the Executive 
 authority from procuring unexceptionable testimony of this sort, may more 
 fairly be ascribed to the natural irritation of the public mind at the time when 
 the constitutions were formed, than to an enlarged and full consideration of 
 the subject. Indeed, it could scarcely be avoided, that when arms were first 
 taken up in the cause of liberty, to save us from the immediate crush of arbi- 
 trary power, we should lean too much rather to the extreme of weakening than 
 of strengthening the Executive power in our own government. In England, 
 the only restriction upon this power in the King, in case of Crown prosecutions 
 (one or two slight cases excepted) is, that his pardon is not pleadable in bar of 
 an impeachment. But he may pardon after conviction, even on an impeach- 
 ment; which is an authority not given to our President, who in case of impeach- 
 ments has no power either of pardoning or reprieving. 
 
352 ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 
 
 prescribe limits to it, for men must have a greater confidence 
 in their own wisdom than I think any men are entitled to, 
 who imagine they can form such exact ideas of all possible 
 contingencies as to be sure that the restriction they propose 
 will not do more harm than good. The probability of the 
 President of the United States committing an act of treason 
 against his country is very slight ; he is so well guarded by 
 the other powers of government, and the natural strength of 
 the people at large must be so weighty, that in my opinion 
 it is the most chimerical apprehension that can be enter- 
 tained. Such a thing is however possible, and accordingly he 
 is not exempt from a trial, if he should be guilty or supposed 
 guilty, of that or any other offence. I entirely lay out of the 
 consideration of the probability of a man honored in such a 
 manner by his country, risking like General Arnold, the dam- 
 nation of his fame to all future ages, though it is a circum- 
 stance of some weight in considering whether for the sake of 
 such a remote and improbable danger as this, it would be pru- 
 dent to abridge this power of pardoning in a manner alto- 
 gether unexampled, and which might produce mischiefs the full 
 extent of which it is not perhaps easy at present to foresee. 
 In estimating the value of any power it is possible to bestow 
 we have to choose between inconveniences of some sort or 
 other, since no institution of man can be entirely free from all. 
 Let us now therefore consider some of the actual inconve- 
 niences which would attend an abridgment of the power of 
 the President in this respect. One of the great advantages 
 attending a single Executive power is the degree of secrecy 
 and dispatch with which on critical occasions such a power can 
 act. In war this advantage will often counterbalance the want 
 of many others. Now suppose, in the very midst of a war of 
 extreme consequence to our safety or prosperity, the President 
 could prevail on a gentleman of abilities to go into the enemy's 
 country, to serve in the useful, but dishonorable character of a 
 spy. Such are certainly maintained by all vigilant govern- 
 ments, and in proportion to the ignominy of the character, 
 and the danger sustained in the enemy's country, ought to be 
 his protection and security in his own. This man renders very 
 
ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 353 
 
 useful services ; perhaps by timely information, prevents the 
 destruction of his country. Nobody knows of these secret 
 services but the President himself ; his adherence however to 
 the enemy is notorious : he is afterwards intercepted in en- 
 deavoring to return to his own country, and having been per- 
 haps a inan of distinction before, he is proportionably obnox- 
 ious to his country at large for his supposed treason. Would 
 it not be monstrous that the President should not have it in 
 his power to pardon this man ? or that it should depend upon 
 mere solicitation and favor, and perhaps, though the President 
 should state the fact as it really was, some zealous partisan, 
 with his jealousy constantly fixed upon the President, might 
 insinuate that in fact the President and he were secret traitors 
 together, and thus obtain a rejection of the President's appli- 
 cation. It is a consideration also of some moment, that there 
 is scarcely any accusation more apt to excite popular prejudice 
 than the charge of treason. There is perhaps no country in 
 the world where justice is in general more impartially adminis- 
 tered than in England, yet let any man read some of the trials 
 for treason in that country even since the revolution ; he will 
 see sometimes a fury influencing the judges, as well as the 
 jury, that is extremely disgraceful. There may happen a case 
 in our country where a man in reality innocent, but with 
 strong plausible circumstances against him, would be so ob- 
 noxious to popular resentment, that he might be convicted 
 upon very slight and insufKcient proof. In such a case it 
 would certainly be very proper for a cool temperate man of 
 high authority, and who might be supposed uninfluenced by 
 private motives, to interfere and prevent the popular current 
 proving an innocent man's ruin. I know men who write with 
 a view to flatter the people, and not to give them honest in- 
 formation, may misrepresent this account as an invidious im- 
 putation on the usual impartiality of juries. God knows no 
 man more highly reverences that blessed institution than I do ; 
 I consider them the natural safeguard of the personal liberties 
 of a free people, and I believe they would much seldomer err 
 in the administration of justice than any other tribunal what- 
 ever. But no man of experience and candor will deny the 
 
354 ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 
 
 probability of such a case as I have supposed sometimes, 
 though rarely, happening ; and whenever it did happen, surely 
 so safe a remedy as a prerogative of mercy in the Chief Magis- 
 trate of a great country ought to be at hand. There is little 
 danger of an abuse of such a power, when we know how apt 
 most men are in a republican government to court popularity 
 at too great an expense, rather than do a just and beneficient 
 action in opposition to strong prevailing prejudices among the 
 people. But says Mr. Mason, "The President may sometimes 
 exercise this power to screen from punishment those whom he 
 had secretly instigated to commit the crime, and thereby pre- 
 vent a discovery of his own guilt." This is possible, but the 
 probability of it is surely too slight to endanger the conse- 
 quences of abridging a power which seems so generally to 
 have been deemed necessary in every well regulated govern- 
 ment. It may also be questioned, whether supposing such a 
 participation of guilt, the President would not expose himself 
 to greater danger by pardoning, than by suffering the law to 
 have its course. Was it not supposed, by a great number of 
 intelligent men, that Admiral Byng's execution was urged on 
 to satisfy a discontented populace, when the administration, 
 by the weakness of the force he was entrusted with, were per- 
 haps the real cause of the miscarriage before Minorca ? Had 
 he been acquitted, or pardoned, he could have perhaps ex- 
 posed the real fault : as a prisoner under so heavy a charge 
 his recrimination would have been discredited, as merely the 
 effort of a man in despair to save himself from an ignominious 
 punishment. If a President should pardon an accomplice, 
 that accomplice then would be an unexceptionable witness. 
 Before, he would be a witness with a rope about his own neck, 
 struggling to get clear of it at all events. Would any men of 
 understanding, or at least ought they to credit an accusation 
 from a person under such circumstances ? * 
 
 * The evidence of a man confessing himself guiltv of the same crime is 
 undoubtedly admissable, but it is generally, and ought to be always received 
 with great suspicion, and other circumstances should be required to corroborate 
 it. 
 
ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 355 
 
 VII. Objection. 
 
 " By declaring all treaties the supreme law of the land, the 
 Executive and the Senate have, in many cases an exclusive 
 power of legislation ; which might have been avoided by 
 proper distinctions with respect to treaties, and requiring the 
 assent of the House of Representatives, where it could be 
 done with safety." 
 
 Answer. 
 
 Did not Congress very lately unanimously resolve, in adopt- 
 ing the very sensible letter of Mr. Jay, that a treaty when 
 once made pursuant to the sovereign authority, ex vi termini 
 became immediately the law of the land ? It seems to result 
 unavoidably from the nature of the thing, that when the con- 
 stitutional right to make treaties is exercised, the treaty so 
 made should be binding upon those who delegated authority 
 for that purpose. If it was not, what foreign power would 
 trust us ? And if this right was restricted by any such fine 
 checks as Mr. Mason has in his imagination, but has not 
 thought proper to disclose, a critical occasion might arise, 
 when for want of a little rational confidence in our own gov- 
 ernment we might be obliged to submit to a master in an 
 enemy. Mr. Mason wishes the House of Representatives to 
 have some share in this business, but he is immediately sensi- 
 ble of the impropriety of it, and adds " where it can be done 
 with safety." And how is it to be known whether it can be 
 done with safety or not, but during the pendency of a nego- 
 tiation ? Must not the President and Senate judge whether it 
 can be done with safety or not ? If they are of opinion it is 
 unsafe, and the House of Representatives of course not con- 
 sulted, what becomes of this boasted check, since, if it 
 amounts to no more than that the President and Senate may 
 consult the House of Rrepresentatives if they please, they 
 may do this as well without such a provision as with it. 
 Nothing would be more easy than to assign plausible reasons, 
 after the negotiation was over, to show that a communication 
 was unsafe, and therefore surely a precaution that could be so 
 easily eluded, if it was not impolitic to the greatest degree, 
 
356 ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 
 
 must be thought trifling indeed. It is also to be observed, 
 that this authority, so obnoxious in the new Constitution 
 (which is unfortunate in having little power to please some 
 persons, either as containing new things or old), is vested in- 
 definitely and without restriction in our present Congress, who 
 are a body constituted in the same manner as the Senate is to 
 be, but there is this material difference in the two cases, that 
 we shall have an additional check, under the new system of a 
 President of high personal character chosen by the immediate 
 body of the people. 
 
 VIII. Objection. 
 
 " Under their own construction of the general clause at the 
 end of the enumerated powers, the Congress may grant mon- 
 opolies in trade and commerce, constitute new crimes,, inflict 
 unusual and severe punishment, and extend their power as far 
 as they shall think proper; so that the State Legislatures 
 have no security for the powers now presumed to remain to 
 them : or the people for their rights. There is no declaration 
 of any kind for preserving the liberty of the press, the trial by 
 jury in civil causes, nor against the danger of standing armies 
 in time of peace." 
 
 Answer. 
 
 The general clause at the end of the enumerated power is 
 as follows : — 
 
 " To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
 carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other 
 powers vested by this Constitution in the United States, or in 
 any department or office thereof." 
 
 Those powers would be useless, except acts of legislation 
 could be exercised upon them. It was not possible for the Con- 
 vention, nor is it for any human body, to foresee and provide 
 for all contingent cases that may arise. Such cases must there- 
 fore be left to be provided for by the general Legislature as 
 they shall happen to come into existence. If Congress, under 
 pretence of exercising the power delegated to them, should 
 in fact, by the exercise of any other power, usurp upon the 
 rights of the different Legislatures, or of any private citizens. 
 
ANSWER' TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 357 
 
 the people will be exactly in the same situation as if there 
 had been an express provision against such power in partic- 
 ular, and yet they had presumed to exercise it. It would be 
 an act of tyranny, against which no .parchment stipulations 
 can guard ; and the Convention surely can be only answerable 
 for the propriety of the powers given, not for the future vir- 
 tues of all with whom those powers may be intrusted. It does 
 not therefore appear to me that there is any weight in this 
 objection more than in others. But that I may give it every 
 fair advantage, I will take notice of every particular injurious 
 act of power which Mr. Mason points out as exercisable by 
 the authority of Congress under this general clause. 
 
 The first mentioned is, " That the Congress may grant mo- 
 nopolies in trade and commerce." Upon examining the con- 
 stitution I find it expressly provided, " That no preference 
 shall be given to the ports of one State over those of an- 
 other ;" and that " citizens of each State shall be entitled to 
 all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." 
 These provisions appear to me to be calculated for the very 
 purpose Mr. Mason wishes to secure. Can they be consistent 
 with any monoply in trade and commerce ?* I apprehend 
 therefore, under this expression must be intended more than 
 is expressed, and if I may conjecture from another publica- 
 tion of a gentleman of the same State and in the same party 
 of opposition, I should suppose it arose from a jealousy of the 
 eastern States very well known to be often expressed by some 
 gentlemen of Virginia. They fear, that a majority of the 
 States may establish regulations of commerce which will give 
 great advantage to the carrying trade of America, and be a 
 means of encouraging New England vessels rather than Old 
 England. Be it so. No regulations dan give such advantage 
 to New England vessels, which will not be enjoyed by all 
 
 * One of the powers given to Congress is, "To promote tlie progress of 
 science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors 
 the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." I am con- 
 vinced Mr. Mason did not mean to refer to this clause. He is a gentleman of 
 too much taste and knowledge himself to wish to have our government estab- 
 lished upon such principles of barbarism as to be able to afford no encourage- 
 ment to genius. 
 
358 ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 
 
 Other American vessels, and many States can build as well as 
 New England, though not at present perhaps in equal propor- 
 tion* And what could conduce more to the preservation of 
 the Union than allowing to every kind of industry in America 
 a peculiar preference ! Each State exerting itself in its own 
 way, but the exertions of all contributing to the common 
 security, and increasing the rising greatness of our country ! 
 Is it not the aim of every wise country to be as much the car- 
 riers of their own produce as they can be ? And would not 
 this be the means in our own of producing a new source of 
 activity among the people, giving to our fellow-citizens what 
 otherwise must be given to strangers, and laying the founda- 
 tion of an independent trade among ourselves, and of gradu- 
 ally raising a navy in America which, however distant the 
 prospect, ought certainly not to be out of our sight. There is 
 no great probability however that our country is likely soon to 
 enjoy so glorious an advantage. We must have treaties of 
 commerce, because without them we cannot trade to other 
 countries. We already have such with some nations ; we have 
 none with Great Britain, which can be imputed to no other 
 cause but our not having a strong respectable government to 
 bring that haughty nation to terms. And surely no man, who 
 feels for the honor of his country, but must view our present 
 degrading commerce wjth that country with the highest indig- 
 nation, and the most ardent wish to extricate ourselves from 
 so disgraceful a situation. This only can be done by a pow- 
 erful government which can dictate conditions of advantage 
 to ourselves, as an equivalent for advantages to them ; and 
 this could undoubtedly be easily done by such a government, 
 without diminishing the value of any articles of our own pro- 
 duce ; or if there was any diminution it would be too slight to 
 
 * Some might apprehend, that in this case as New England would at first 
 have the greatest share of the carrying trade, the vessels of that country might 
 demand an unreasonable freight. But no attempt could be more injurious to 
 them as it would immediately set the Southern States to building, which they 
 could easily do, and thus a temporary loss would be compensated with a lasting 
 advantage to us ; the very reverse would be the case with them. Besides, that 
 from tliat country alone there would probably be competition enough for freight 
 to keep it on reasonable terms. 
 
ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 359 
 
 be felt by any patriot in competition with the honor and 
 interest of his country. 
 
 As to the constituting of new crimes, and inflicting unusual 
 and severe punishment, certainly the cases enumerated wherein 
 the Congress are empowered either to define offences, or pre- 
 scribe punishments, are such as are proper for the exercise of 
 such authority in the general Legislature of the Union. They 
 only relate to " counterfeiting the securities and current coin 
 of the United States," to "piracies and felonies committed on 
 the high seas, and offences against the law of nations," and to 
 "treason against the United States." These are offences im- 
 mediately affecting the security, the honor or the interest of 
 the United States at large, and of course must come within 
 the sphere of the Legislative authority which is intrusted 
 with their protection. Beyond these authorities. Congress 
 can exercise no other power of this kind, except in the enact- 
 ing of penalties to enforce their acts of legislation in the cases 
 where express authority is delegated to them, and if they 
 could not enforce such acts by the enacting of penalties those 
 powers would be altogether useless, since a legislative regula- 
 tion without some sanction would be an absurd thing indeed. 
 The Congress having, for these reasons, a just right to autho- 
 rity in the above particulars, the question is, whether it is prac- 
 ticable and proper to prescribe limits to its exercise, for fear 
 that they should inflict punishments unusual and severe. It 
 may be observed, in the first place, that a declaration against 
 "cruel and unusual punishments " formed part of an article in 
 the Bill of Rights at the revolution in England in 1688. The 
 prerogative of the Crown having been grossly abused in some 
 preceding reigns, it was thought proper to notice every grievance 
 they had endured, and those declarations went to an abuse of 
 power in the Crown only, but were never intended to limit the 
 authority of Parliament. Many of these articles of the Bill of 
 Rights in England, without a due attention to the difference 
 of the cases, were eagerly adopted when our constitutions 
 were formed, the minds of men then being so warmed with 
 their exertions in the cause of liberty as to lean too much 
 perhaps towards a jealousy of power to repose a proper con- 
 
36d answer to mason's objections by IREDELL. 
 
 fidence in their own government. , From these articles in 
 the State constitutions many things were attempted to be 
 transplanted into our new Constitution, which would either 
 have been nugatory or improper. This is one of them. The 
 expressions " unusual and severe " or " cruel and unusual " 
 surely would have been too vague to have been of any conse- 
 quence, sincethey admit of no clear and precise signification. If 
 to guard against punishments being too severe, the Convention 
 had enumerated a vast variety of cruel punishments, and pro- 
 hibited the use of any of them, let the number have been ever 
 so great, an inexhaustible fund must have been unmentioned, 
 and if our government had been disposed to be cruel their in- 
 vention would only have been put to a little more trouble. If 
 to avoid this difficulty, they had determined, not negatively 
 what punishments should not be exercised, but positively what 
 punishments should, this must have led them into a labyrinth 
 of detail which in the original constitution of a government 
 would have appeared perfectly ridiculous, and not left a room 
 for such changes, according to circumstances, as must be in 
 the power of every Legislature that is rationally formed. 
 Thus when we enter into particulars, we must be convinced 
 that the proposition of such a restriction would have led to 
 nothing useful, or to something dangerous, and therefore that 
 its omission is not chargeable as a fault in the new Constitu- 
 tion. Let us also remember, that as those who are to make 
 those laws must themselves be subject to them, their, own in- 
 terest and feelings will dictate to them not to make them un- 
 necessarily severe ; and that in the case of treason, which usu- 
 ally in every country exposes men most to the avarice and 
 rapacity of government, care is taken that the innocent family 
 of the offender shall not suffer for the treason of their rela- 
 tion. This is the crime with respect to which a jealousy is of 
 the most importance, and accordingly it is defined with great 
 plainness and accuracy, and the temptations to abusive prose- 
 cutions guarded against as much as possible. I now proceed 
 to the three great cases : The liberty of the press, the trial by 
 jury in civil cases, and a standing army in time of peace. 
 
 The liberty of the press is always a grand topic for decla- 
 
ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 361 
 
 mation, but the future Congress will have no other authority 
 over this than to secure to authors for a limited time an ex- 
 clusive privilege of publishing their works. — This authority 
 has been long exercised in England, where the press is as free 
 as among ourselves or in any country in the world ; and surely 
 such an encouragement to genius is no restraint on the liberty 
 of the press, since men are allowed to publish what they 
 please of their own, and so far as this may be deemed a re- 
 straint upon others it is certainly a reasonable one, and can be 
 attended with no danger of copies not being sufficiently 
 multiplied, because the interest of the proprietor will always 
 induce him to publish a quantity fully equal to the demand. 
 Besides, that such encouragement may give birth to many ex- 
 cellent writings which would otherwise have never appeared.* 
 If the Congress should exercise any other power over the 
 press than this, they will do it without any warrant from this 
 constitution, and must answer for it as for any other act of 
 tyranny. 
 
 In respect to the trial by jury in civil cases, it must be 
 observed it is a mistake to suppose that such a trial takes 
 place in all civil cases now. Even in the common law courts, 
 such a trial is only had where facts are disputed between the 
 parties, and there are even some facts triable by other meth_ 
 ods. In the Chancery and Admiralty Courts, in many of the 
 States, I am told they have no juries at all. The States in 
 these particulars differ very much in their practice from each 
 other. A general declaration therefore to preserve the trial by 
 jury in all civil cases would only have produced confusion, so 
 that the courts afterwards in a thousand instances would not 
 have known how to have proceeded. — If they had added, " as 
 heretofore accustomed," that would not have answered the pur- 
 pose, because there has been no uniform custom about it. — If 
 therefore the Convention had interfered, it must have been by 
 entering into a detail highly unsuitable to a fundamental con- 
 stitution of government ; if they had pleased some States they 
 
 * If this provision had not been made in the new constitution no author 
 could have enjoyed such an advantage in all the United States, unless a similar 
 law had constantly subsisted in each of the States separately. 
 
362 ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 
 
 must have displeased others by innovating upon the modes of 
 administering justice perhaps endeared to them by habit, and 
 agreeable to their settled conviction of propriety. As this was 
 the case it appears to me it was infinitely better, rather than 
 endanger everything by attempting too much, to leave this 
 complicated business of detail to the regulation of the future 
 Legislature, where it can be adjusted coolly and at ease, and 
 upon full and exact information. There is no danger of the 
 trial by jury being rejected, when so justly a favorite of the 
 whole people. The representatives of the people surely can 
 have no interest in making themselves odious, for the mere 
 pleasure of being hated, and when a member of the House of 
 Representatives is only sure of being so for two years, but 
 must continue a citizen all his life, his interest as a citizen, if 
 he is a man of common sense, to say nothing of his being a 
 man of common honesty, must ever be uppermost in his mind- 
 We know the great influence of the monarchy in the British 
 government, and upon what a different tenure the Commons 
 there have their seats in Parliament from that prescribed to 
 our representatives. We know also they have a large standing 
 army. It is in the power of the Parliament, if they dare to 
 exercise it, to abolish the trial by jury altogether. But woe be 
 to the man who should dare to attempt it. It would undoubt- 
 edly produce an insurrection, that would hurl every tyrant to 
 the ground who attempted to destroy that great and just favor- 
 ite of the English nation. We certainly shall be always sure 
 of this guard at least upon any such act of folly or insanity in 
 our representatives. They soon would be taught the conse- 
 quence of sporting with the feelings of a free people. But 
 when it is evident that such an attempt cannot be rationally 
 apprehended, we have no reason to anticipate unpleasant 
 amotions of that nature. ■ There is indeed little probabiHty 
 that any degree of tyranny which can be figured to the most 
 discolored imagination as likely to arise out of our government, 
 could find an interest in attacking the trial by jury in civil 
 cases ;— and in criminal ones, where no such difficulties inter- 
 vene as in the other, and where there might be supposed 
 temptations to violate the personal security of a citizen, it is 
 sacredly preserved. 
 
ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 363 
 
 The subject of a standing army has been exhausted in so 
 masterly a manner in two or three numbers of the Federalist 
 (a work which I hope will soon be in every body's hands) that 
 but for the sake of regularity in answering Mr. Mason's objec- 
 tions, I should not venture upon the same topic, and shall 
 only presume to do so, with a reference for fuller satisfaction to 
 that able performance. It is certainly one of the most delicate 
 and proper cases for the consideration of a free people, and so 
 far as a jealousy of this kind leads to any degree of caution not 
 incompatible with the public safety, it is undoubtedly to be 
 commended. Our jealousy of this danger has descended to us 
 from our British ancestors ; in that country they have a Mon- 
 arch, whose power being limited, and at the same time his pre- 
 rogatives very considerable, a constant jealousy of him is both 
 natural and proper. The two last of the Stuarts having kept 
 up a considerable body of standing forces in time of peace for 
 the clear and almost avowed purpose of subduing the liberties 
 of the people, it was made an article of the bill of rights at the 
 revolution, "That the raising or keeping a standing army 
 within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with the con- 
 sent of Parliament, is against law ; " but no attempt was made, 
 or I dare say even thought of, to restrain the Parliame-Ht from 
 exercise of that right. An army has been kept on foot annu- 
 ally by authority of Parliament, and I believe ever since the 
 revolution they have had some standing troops ; disputes have 
 frequently happened about the number, but I don't recollect 
 any objection by the most zealous patriot, to the keeping up 
 of any at all. At the same time, notwithstanding the above 
 practice of an annual vote (arising from a very judicious cau- 
 tion), it is still in the power of Parliament to authorize the 
 keeping up of any number of troops for an indefinite time, 
 and to provide for their subsistence for any number of years. 
 Considerations of prudence, not constitutional limits to their 
 authority, alone restrain such an exercise of it — our Legisla- 
 ture however will be strongly guarded, though that of Great 
 Britain is without any check at all. No appropriations of 
 money for military services can continue longer than two 
 years. Considering the extensive services the general govern- 
 
364 ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 
 
 ment may have to provide for upon this vast continent, no 
 forces with any serious prospect of success could be attempted 
 to be raised for a shorter time. Its being done for so short a 
 period, if there were any appearance of ill designs in the gov- 
 ernment, would afford time enough for the real friends of their 
 country to sound an alarm, and when we know how easy it is 
 to excite jealousy of any government, how diiificult for the 
 people to distinguish from their real friends, those factious 
 men who in every country are ready to disturb its peace for 
 personal gratifications of their own, and those desperate ones 
 to whom every change is welcome, we shall have much more 
 reason to fear that the government may be overawed by 
 groundless discontents, than that it should be able, if contrary 
 to every probability such a government could be supposed 
 willing, to effect any designs for the destruction of their own 
 liberties as well as those of their constituents ; for surely we 
 ought ever to remember, that there will not be a man in the 
 government but who has been either mediately or immediately 
 recently chosen by the people, and that for too limited a time 
 to make any arbitrary designs consistent with common sense, 
 when every two years a new body of representatives with all 
 the energy of popular feelings will come, to carry the strong 
 force of a severe national control into every department of 
 government. To say nothing of the one-third to compose the 
 Senate coming at the same time, warm with popular senti- 
 ments, from their respective assemblies. Men may be sure to 
 suggest dangers from any thing, but it may truly be said that 
 those who can seriously suggest the danger of a premeditated 
 attack on the liberties of the people from such a government 
 as this, could with ease assign reasons equally plausible for 
 mistrusting the integrity of any government formed in any 
 manner whatever ; and really it does seem to me, that all their 
 reasons may be fairly carried to this position, that inasmuch 
 as any confidence in any men would be unwise, as we can give 
 no power but what may be grossly abused, we had better give 
 none at all, but continue as we are, or resolve into total 
 anarchy at once, of which indeed our present condition falls 
 very little short. What sort of a government would that be 
 
ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 365 
 
 which, upon the most certain intelligence that hostilities were 
 meditated against it, could take no method for its defence till 
 after a formal declaration of war, or the enemy's standard was 
 actually fixed upon the shore ? The first has for some time 
 been out of fashion, but if it had not, the restraint these gen- 
 tlemen recommend, would certainly have brought it into dis- 
 use with every power who meant to make war upon America. 
 They would be such fools as to give ustheonly warning we had 
 informed them we would accept of, before we would take any 
 steps to counteract their designs. The absurdity of our being 
 prohibited from preparing to resist an invasion till after it had 
 actually taken place* is so glaring, that no man can consider it 
 for a moment without being struck with astonishment to see 
 how rashly, and with how little consideration gentlemen, whose 
 characters are certainly respectable, have suffered themselves 
 to be led away by so delusive an idea. The example of other 
 countries, so far from warranting any such limitation of power, 
 is directly against it. That of England has already been 
 particularly noticed. In our present articles of confederation 
 there is no such restriction. It has been observed by the Fed- 
 eralist, that Pennsylvania and North Carolina appear to be the 
 only States in the Union which have attempted any restraint 
 of the Legislative authority in this particular, and that their 
 restraint appears rather in the light of a caution than a pro- 
 hibition; but notwithstanding that, Pennsylvania had been 
 obliged to raise forces in the very face of that article of her 
 bill of rights. That great writer from the remoteness of his 
 situation, did not know that North Carolina had equally vio- 
 lated her bill of rights in a similar manner. The Legislature 
 
 * Those gentlemen who gravely tell us that the militia will be sufficient for 
 this purpose, do not recollect that they themselves do not desire we should rely 
 solely on a militia in case of actual war, and therefore in the case I have sup- 
 posed they cannot be deemed sufficient even by themselves, for when the enemy 
 landed it would undoubtedly be a time of war, but the misfortune would be, 
 that they would be prepared ; we not. Certainly all possible encouragement 
 should be given to the training of our militia, but no man can really believe 
 that they will be sufficient, without the aid of any regular troops, in time of 
 foreign hostility. A powerful militia may make fewer regulars necessary, but 
 will not make it safe to dispense with them altogether. 
 
366 ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 
 
 of that State in November, 1785, passed an act for raising 200 
 men for the protection of a county called Davidson county 
 against hostilities from the Indians ; they were to continue 
 for two years from the time of their first rendezvous, unless 
 sooner disbanded by the Assembly, and were to be subject 
 to the same " rules with respect to their government as were 
 established in the time of the late war by the Congress of the 
 United States for the government of the Continental army." 
 These are the very words of the act. Thus, from the exam- 
 ples of the only two countries in the world that I believe ever 
 attempted such a restriction, it appears to be a thing incom- 
 patible ^yith the safety of government. Whether their restric- 
 tion is to be considered as a caution or a prohibition, in less 
 than five years after peace the caution has been disregarded, 
 or the prohibition disobeyed.* Can the most credulous or 
 suspicious men require stronger proof of the weakness and 
 impolicy of such restraints ? 
 
 IX. Objection. 
 
 " The State Legislatures are restrained from laying export 
 duties on their own produce." 
 
 Ansaver. 
 
 Duties upon exports, though they may answer in some 
 particulars a convenience to the country which imposes them, 
 are certainly not things to be contended for, as if the very being 
 of a State was interested in preserving them. Where there is 
 a kind of monopoly they may sometimes be ventured upon, 
 but even there perhaps more is lost by imposing such duties, 
 than is compensated for by any advantage. Where there is 
 not a species of monopoly, no policy can be more absurd. 
 The American States, are so circumstanced that some of the 
 States necessarily export part of the produce of neighboring 
 
 * I presume we are not to be deemed in a, state of war whenever any 
 Indian hostilities are committed on our frontiers. If that is the case I don't 
 suppose we have had six years of peace since the first settlement of the country, 
 or shall have for fifty years to come. A distinction between peace and war 
 would be idle indeed, if it can be frittered away by such pretences as those. 
 
ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 367 
 
 ones. Every duty laid upon such exported produce operates 
 in fact as a tax by the exporting State upon the non-exporting 
 State. In a system expressly formed to produce concord 
 among all, it would have been very unwise to have left such 
 a source of discord open ; and upon the same principle, and to 
 remove as much as possible every ground of discontent, Con- 
 gress itself are prohibited from laying duties on exports, 
 because by that means those States which have a great deal of 
 produce to export would be taxed much more heavily than 
 those which had little or none for exportation. 
 
 X. Objection. 
 
 " The general Legislature is restrained from prohibiting 
 the further importation of slaves for twenty odd years, though 
 such importation renders the United States weaker, more vul- 
 nerable; and less capable of defence." 
 
 Answer. 
 
 If all the States had been willing to adopt this regulation, 
 I should as an individual most heartily have approved of it, 
 because even if the importation of slaves in fact rendered us 
 stronger, less vulnerable and more capable of defence, I should 
 rejoice Jn the prohibition of it, as putting an end to a trade 
 which has already continued too long for the honor and 
 humanity of those concerned in it. But as it was well known 
 that South Carolina and Georgia thought a further contin- 
 uance of such importations useful to them, and would not 
 perhaps otherwise have agreed to the new constitution, those 
 States which had been importing till they were satisfied, could 
 not with decency have insisted upon their relinquishing ad- 
 vantages themselves had already enjoyed. Our situation 
 makes it necessary to bear the evil as it is. It will be left to 
 the future legislatures to allow such importations or not. If 
 any, in violation of their clear conviction of the injustice of 
 this trade, persist in pursuing it, this is a matter between God 
 and their own consciences. The interests of humanity will, 
 however, have gained something by the prohibition of this in- 
 human trade, though at a distance of twenty odd years. 
 
368 ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 
 
 XI. Objection. 
 " Both the general Legislature and the State Legislatures, 
 have expressly prohibited making ex J>osi facto laws, though. 
 there never was, nor can be, a legislature but must and will 
 make such laws, when necessity and the public safety require 
 them ; which will hereafter be a breach of all the constitutions 
 in the Union, and offer precedents for other innovations." 
 
 Answer. 
 My ideas of liberty are so different from those of Mr. 
 Mason, that in my opinion this very prohibition is one of the 
 most valuable parts of the new constitution. Ex post facto 
 laws may sometimes be convenient, but that they are ever ab- 
 solutely necessary I shall take the liberty to doubt, till that 
 necessity can be made apparent. Sure I am, they have been 
 the instrument of some of the grossest acts of tyranny that 
 were ever exercised, and have this never failing consequence, 
 to put the minority in the power of a passionate and unprin- 
 cipled majority, as to the most sacred things, and the plea of 
 necessity is never wanting where it can be of any avail. This 
 very clause, I think, is worth ten thousand declarations of rights, 
 if this, the most essential right of all, was omitted in them. 
 A man may feel some pride in his security, when he knows 
 that what he does innocently and safely to-day in accordance 
 with the laws of his country, cannot be tortured into guilt and 
 danger to-morrow. But if it should happen, that a great and 
 overruling necessity, acknowledged and felt by all, should 
 make a deviation from this prohibition excusable, shall we not 
 be more safe in leaving the excuse for an extraordinary exer- 
 cise of power to rest upon the apparent equity of it alone, 
 than to leave the door open to a tyranny it would be intoler- 
 able to bear ? In the one case, every one must be sensible 
 of its justice, and therefore excuse it ; in the other, whether its 
 exercise was justjfor unjust, its being lawful would be sufficient 
 to command obedience. Nor would a case like that, resting 
 entirely on its own bottom, from a conviction of invincible 
 necessity, warrant an avowed abuse of another authority, 
 where no such necessity existed or could be pretended. 
 
ANSWER TO mason's OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 369 
 
 I have now gone through Mr. Mason's objections ; one thing 
 still remains to be taken notice of, his prediction, which he is 
 pleased to express in these words : " This government will com- 
 mence in a moderate aristocracy ; it is at present impossble to 
 foresee, whether it will in its operation produce a monarchy, 
 or a corrupt, oppressive aristocracy ; it will most probably 
 vibrate some years between the two, and then terminate in the 
 one or the other." From the uncertainty of this prediction, 
 we may hope that Mr. Mason was not divinely inspired when 
 he made it, and of course that it may as fairly be questioned 
 as any of his particular objections. If my answers to his ob- 
 jections are, in general, solid, a very different government will 
 arise from the new constitution, if the several States should 
 adopt it, as I hope they will. It will not probably be too 
 much to flatter ourselves with, that it may present a spectacle 
 of combined strength in government, and genuine liberty in 
 the people, the world has never yet beheld. In the meantime, 
 our situation is critical to the greatest degree. Those gentle- 
 men who think we may at our ease go on from one convention 
 to another, to try if all objections cannot be conquered by 
 perseverance, have much more sanguine expectations than I 
 can presume to form. There are critical periods in the fate of 
 nations, as well as in the life of man, which are not to be neg- 
 lected with impunity. I am much mistaken if this is not such 
 a one with us. When we were at the very brink of despair, 
 the late excellent Convention with a unanimity that none 
 could have hoped for, generously discarding all little consider- 
 ations formed a system of government which I am convinced 
 can stand the nicest examination, if reason and not prejudice 
 is employed in viewing it. With a happiness of thought, 
 which in our present awful situation ought to silence much 
 more powerful objections than any I have heard, they have 
 provided in the very frame of government a safe, easy and 
 unexceptionable method of correcting any errors it may be 
 thought to contain. Those errors may be corrected at leisure; 
 in the mean time the acknowledged advantages likely to flow 
 from this constitution may be enjoyed. We may venture to 
 hold up our head among the other powers of the world. We 
 
370 ANSWER TO MASON'S OBJECTIONS BY IREDELL. 
 
 may talk to them with the confidence of an independent peo- 
 ple, having strength to resent insults ; and avail ourselves of 
 our natural advantages. We may be assured of once more 
 beholding justice, order and dignity taking place of the present 
 anarchical confusion prevailing almost every where, and draw- 
 ing upon us universal disgrace. We may hope, by proper 
 exertions of industry, to recover thoroughly from the shock of 
 the late war, and truly to become an independent, great and 
 prosperous people. But if we continue as we now are, wrang- 
 ling about every trifle, listening to the opinion of a small 
 minority, in preference to a large and most respectable major- 
 ity of the first men in our country, and among them some of 
 the first in the world, if our minds in short are bent rather on 
 indulging a captious discontent, than bestowing a generous 
 and well-placed confidence in those who we have every reason 
 to believe are entirely worthy of it, we shall too probably 
 present a spectacle for malicious exultation to our enemies, 
 and melancholy dejection to our friends ; and the honor, glory 
 and prosperity which were just within our reach, will perhaps 
 be snatched from us for ever. 
 
 MARCUS. 
 
 January, 1788. 
 
An / Address / to the / Freemen / of / South Caro- 
 lina, / on the subject of the / Federal Constitution, / 
 Proposed by the Convention, which met in / Philadelphia, 
 May, 1787. / Charleston, / Printed by Bowen and Co., 
 No. 31, Bay. 
 
 16 mo., pp. 12. 
 
 Written by Dr. David Ramsay, member of the Continen- 
 tal Congress and of the South Carolina State Convention 
 which ratified the Constitution. 
 
Friends, Countrymen, and Fellow Citizens : 
 
 "XTOU have, at this time a' new federal constitution proposed 
 for your consideration. The great importance of the 
 subject demands your most serious attention. To assist you 
 in forming a right judgment on this matter, it will be proper 
 to consider, 
 
 1st. It is the manifest interest of these states to be united. 
 Internal wars among ourselves, would most probably be the 
 consequence of disunion. Our local weakness particularly 
 proves it to be for the advantage of South Carolina to 
 strengthen the federal government ; for we are inadequate to 
 secure ourselves from more powerful neighbours. [4] 
 
 2d. If the thirteen states are to be united in reality, as well 
 as in name, the obvious principle of the union will be, that the 
 congress, or general government, should have power to regu- 
 late all general concerns. In a state of nature, each man is 
 free, and may do what he pleases : but in society, every indi- 
 vidual must sacrifice a part of his natural rights ; the minority 
 must yield to the majority, and the collective interest must 
 controul particular interests. When thirteen persons consti- 
 tute a family, each should forego everything that is injurious 
 to the other twelve. When several families constitute a par- 
 ish, or county, each may adopt what regulations it pleases with 
 regard to its domestic affairs, but must be abridged of that 
 liberty in other cases, where the good of the whole is con- 
 cerned. 
 
 When several parishes, counties, or districts, form a state, 
 the separate interests of each must yield to the collective in- 
 terest of the whole. When several states combine in one 
 government, the same principles must be observed. These 
 relinquishments of natural rights, are not real sacrifices : each 
 person, county, or state, gains more than it loses, for it only 
 gives up a right of injuring others, and obtains in return aid 
 and strength to secure itself in the peaceable enjoyment of all 
 remaining rights. If then we are to be an united people, and 
 
374 ADDRESS BY DAVID RAMSAY. 
 
 the obvious ground of union must be, that all continental con- 
 cerns should be managed by Congress — let us by those princi- 
 ples examine the new constitution. Look over the 8th sec- 
 tion, which enumerates the powers of Congress, and point out 
 one that is not essential on the before recited principles of 
 union. The iirst is a power to lay and collect taxes, duties, 
 imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the [5] 
 common defence and general welfare of the United States. 
 
 When you authorised Congress to borrow money, and to 
 contract debts, for carrying on the late war, you could not in- 
 tend to abridge them of the means of paying their engage- 
 ments, made on your account. You may observe that their 
 future power is confined to provide common defence and general 
 welfare of the United States. If they apply money to any 
 other purposes, they exceed their powers. The people of the 
 United States who pay, are to be judges how far their money 
 is properly applied. It would be tedious to go over all the 
 powers of Congress, but it would be easy to show that they 
 all may be referred to this single principle, " that the general 
 " concerns of the union ought to be managed by the general 
 " government." The opposers of the constitution cannot 
 show a single power delegated to Congress, that could be 
 spared consistently with the welfare of the whole, nor a single 
 one taken from the states, but such as can be more advantage- 
 ously lodged in the general government, than in that of the 
 separate states. 
 
 For instance, the states cannot emit money : This is not 
 intended to prevent the emission of paper money, but only of 
 state paper money. Is not this an advantage ? To have thir- 
 teen paper currencies in thirteen states is embarrassing to 
 commerce, and eminently so to travellers. It is therefore, 
 obviously our interest, either to have no paper, or such as will 
 circulate from Georgia to New Hampshire. Take another in- 
 stance— -the Congress are authorized to provide and maintain 
 a navy. — Our sea-coast, in its whole extent needs the protec- 
 tion thereof; but if this was to be done [6] by the states, they 
 who build ships, would be more secure than they who do not. 
 Again, if the local legislatures might build ships of war at 
 
ADDRESS BY DAVID RAMSAY. 375 
 
 pleasure, the Eastern would have a manifest superiority over 
 the Southern states. Observe, how much better this business 
 is referred to the regulations of Congress. A common navy, 
 paid out of the common treasury, and to be disposed of by the 
 united voice of a majority for the common defence of the 
 weaker as well as of the stronger states, is promised, and will 
 result from the federal constitution. Suffer not yourselves to 
 be imposed on by declamation. Ask the man who objects to 
 the powers of Congress two questions, is it not necessary that 
 the supposed dangerous power should be lodged somewhere ? 
 And secondly, where can it be lodged, consistently with the 
 general good, so well as in the general government ? Decide 
 for yourselves on these obvious principles of union. 
 
 It has been objected, that the eastern states have an 
 advantage in their representation in Congress. Let us exam- 
 ine this objection — the four eastern states send seventeen 
 members to the house of representatives, but Georgia, South- 
 Carolina, North-Carolina and Virginia, send twenty-three. The 
 six northern states send twenty-seven, the six southern thirty- 
 In both cases, we have a superiority ; — but, say the objectors, 
 add Pennsylvania to the northern states, and there is a major- 
 ity against us. It is obvious to reply, add Pennsylvania to the 
 southern states, and they have a majority. The objection 
 amounts to no more than that seven are more than six. It 
 must be known to many of you, that the Southern states, 
 from their vast extent of uncultivated country, are daily re- 
 ceiving new settlers ; but in New England their country is [7] 
 so small, and their land so poor, that their inhabitants are con- 
 stantly emigrating. As the rule of representation in Congress 
 is to vary with the number of inhabitants, our influence in the 
 general government will be constantly increasing. In fifty years, 
 it is probable that the Southern states will have a great ascend- 
 ency over the Eastern. It has been said that thirty-five men, 
 not elected by yourselves, may make laws to bind you. This 
 objection, if it has any force, tends to the destruction of your 
 state government. By our constitution, sixty-nine make a 
 quorum ; of course, thirty-five members may make a law to 
 bind all the people of South-Carolina. — Charleston, and any 
 
27^ ADDRESS BY DAVID RAMSAY. 
 
 one of the neighboring parishes send collectively thirty-six 
 members ; it is therefore possible, in the absence of all others, 
 that three of the lower parishes might legislate for the whole 
 country. Would this be a valid objection against your own 
 constitution ? It certainly would not — neither is it against the 
 proposed federal plan. Learn from it this useful lesson — insist 
 on the constant attendance of your members, both in the state 
 assembly, and Continental Congress ; your representation in 
 the latter, is as numerous in a relative proportion with the 
 other states as it ought to be. You have a thirteenth part in 
 both houses ; and you are not, on principles of equality, en- 
 titled to more. 
 
 It -has been objected, that the president, and two-thirds of 
 the senate, though not of your election, may make treaties 
 binding on the state. Ask these objectors — do you wish to 
 have any treaties ? They will say yes. Ask then who can be 
 more properly trusted with the power of making them, than 
 they to whom the convention have referred it ? Can the state 
 legislature ? They would con- [8] suit their local interests. — 
 Can the Continental House of Representatives ? When sixty- 
 five men can keep a secret, they may. — Observe the cautious 
 guards which are placed round your interests. Neither the 
 senate nor president can make treaties by their separate au- 
 thority. — They must both concur. — This is more in your 
 favour than the footing on which you now stand. The dele- 
 gates in Congress of nine states, without your consent, can 
 now bind you ; by the new constitution there must be two- 
 thirds af the members present, and also the president, in 
 whose election you have a vote. Two-thirds are to the whole, 
 nearly as nine to thirteen. If you are not wanting to your- 
 selves by neglecting to keep up the state's compliment of sen- 
 ators, your situation with regard to preventing the controul of 
 your local interests by the Northern states, will be better under 
 the proposed constitution than it is now under the existing 
 confederation. 
 
 It has been said, we will have a navigation act, and be 
 restricted to American bottoms, and that high freight will be 
 the consequence. We certainly ought to have a navigation 
 
ADDRESS BY DAVID RAMSAY. 377 
 
 act, and we assuredly ought to give a preference, though not a 
 monopoly, to our own shipping. 
 
 If this state is invaded by a maritime force, to whom can 
 we apply for immediate aid ? — To Virginia and North-Caro- 
 lina? Before they can march by land to our assistance, the 
 country may be overrun. The Eastern states, abounding in 
 men and in ships, can sooner relieve us, than our next door 
 neighbours. It is therefore not only our duty, but our interest 
 to encourage their shipping. They have sufficient resources 
 on a few months notice, to furnish tonnage enough to carry off 
 all your exports ; and they can afford, and doubtless will un- 
 dertake [9] to be your carriers on as easy terms as you now 
 pay for freight in foreign bottoms. 
 
 On this subject, let us consider what we have gained, also 
 what they have lost, by the revolution. We have gained a 
 free trade with all the world, and consequently a higher price 
 for our commodities ; it may be said, and so have they. But 
 they who reply in this manner, ought to know, that there is an 
 amazing difference in our favour ; their country affords no 
 valuable exports, and of course the privilege of a free trade 
 is to them of little value, while our staple commodity com- 
 mands a higher price than was usual before the war. We have 
 also gained an exemption from quit-rents, to which the eastern 
 states were not subjected. Connecticut and Rhode Island 
 were nearly as free before the revolution as since. They 
 had no royal governor or councils to controul them, or to legis- 
 late for them. Massachusetts and New Hampshire were much 
 nearer independence in their late constitution than we were. 
 The eastern states, by the revolution, have been deprived of a 
 market for their fish, of their carrying trade, their ship-build- 
 ing, and almost of every thing but their liberties. 
 
 As the war has turned out so much in our favour, and so 
 much against them, ought we to grudge them the carrying of 
 our produce, especially when it is considered, that by encour- 
 aging their shipping, we increase the means of our own de- 
 fence ? Let us examine also the federal constitution, by the 
 principles of reciprocal concession. We have laid a foundation 
 for a navigation act. This will be a general good ; but par- 
 
378 ADDRESS BY DAVID RAMSAY. 
 
 ticularly so to our northern brethren. On the other hand, they 
 have agreed to change the federal rule of paying the conti- 
 nental debt, according to the value of land, as laid down in 
 the confede- [lo] ration, for a new principle of apportionment, 
 to be founded on the numbers of inhabitants in the several 
 states respectively. This is an immense concession in our 
 favour. Their land is poor; cur's rich ; their numbers great ; 
 our's small; labour with them is done by white men, for whom 
 they pay an equal share ; while five of our negroes only count 
 as equal to three of their whites. This will make a difference 
 of many thousands of pounds in settling our continental ac- 
 counts. It is farther objected, that they have stipulated for a 
 right to prohibit the importation of negroes after 21 years. 
 On this subject observe, as they are bound to protect us from 
 domestic- violence, they think we ought not to increase our 
 exposure to that evil, by an unlimited importation of slaves. 
 Though Congress may forbid the importation of negroes after 
 21 years, it does not follow that they will. On the other hand, 
 it is probable that they will not. The more rice we make, the 
 more business will be for their shipping ; their interest will 
 therefore coincide with our's. Besides, we have other sources 
 of supply — the importation of the ensuing 20 years, added to 
 the natural increase of those we already have, and the influx 
 from our northern neighbours, who are desirous of getting rid 
 of their slaves, will afford a sufficient number for cultivating 
 all the lands in this state. 
 
 Let us suppose the union to be dissolved by the rejection 
 of the new constitution, what would be our case ? The united 
 states owe several millions of dollars to France, Spain, and 
 Holland. If an efficient government is not adopted, which 
 will provide for the payment of our debt, especially of that 
 which is due to foreigners — who will be the losers ? Most cer- 
 tainly the southern states. Our ex-[iij ports, as being the 
 most valuable, would be the first objects of capture on the 
 high seas, or descents would be made on our defenceless coasts, 
 till the creditors of the United States had paid themselves at 
 the expense of this weaker part of the union. Let us also 
 compare the present confederation with the proposed constitu- 
 
ADDRESS BY DAVID RAMSAY. 379 
 
 tion. The former can neither protect us at home, nor gain us 
 respect abroad ; it cannot secure the payment of our debts, 
 nor command the resources of our country, in case of danger. 
 Without money, without a navy, or the means of even sup- 
 porting an army of our own citizens in the field, we he at the 
 mercy of every invader ; our sea-port towns may be laid under 
 contribution, and our country ravaged. 
 
 By the new constitution, you will be protected with the 
 force of the union, against domestic violence and foreign in- 
 vasion. You will have a navy to defend your coast. — The re- 
 spectable figure you will make among the nations, will so far 
 command the attention of foreign powers, that it is probable 
 you will soon obtain such commercial treaties, as will open to 
 your vessels the West-India islands, and give life to your ex- 
 piring commerce. 
 
 In a country like our's, abounding with free men all of one 
 rank, where property is equally diffused, where estates are held 
 in fee simple, the press free, and the means of information 
 common, tyranny cannot reasonably find admission under any 
 form of government ; but its admission is next to impossible 
 under one where the people are the source of all power, and 
 elect either mediately by their representatives, or immediately 
 by themselves the whole of their rulers. 
 
 Examine the new constitution with candor and liberality. 
 Indulge no narrow prejudices to the disadvantage of your 
 brethren of the [12] other states ; consider the people of all 
 the thirteen states, as a band of brethren, speaking the same 
 language, professing the same religion, inhabiting one undi- 
 vided country, and designed by heaven to be one people. 
 Content that what regards all the states should be managed by 
 that body which represents all of them ; be on your guard 
 against the misrepresentations of men who are involved in 
 debt ; such may wish to see the constitution rejected, because 
 of the following clause, "no state shall emit bills of credit, 
 make any thing but gold and silver coin, a tender in payment 
 of debts, pass any expost facto law, or law impairing the obli- 
 gation of contracts." This will doubtless bear hard on 
 debtors who wish to defraud their creditors, but it will be real 
 
380 ADDRESS BY DAVID RAMSAY. 
 
 service to the honest part of the community. Examine well 
 the characters and circumstances of men who are averse to 
 the new constitution. Perhaps you will find that the above 
 recited clause is the real ground of the opposition of some of 
 them, though they may artfully cover it with a splendid pro- 
 fession of zeal for state privileges and general liberty. 
 
 On the whole, if the proposed constitution be not calcu- 
 lated to better your country, and to secure to you the bless- 
 ings for which you have so successfully contended, reject it : 
 but if it be an improvement on the present confederation, and 
 contains within itself the principles of farther improvement 
 suited to future circumstances, join the mighty current of fed- 
 eralism, and give it your hearty support. You were among 
 the first states that formed an independent constitution ; be 
 not among the last in accepting and ratifying the proposed 
 plan of federal government ; it is your sheet anchor ; and 
 without it independence may prove a curse. 
 
 CIVIS. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 AND 
 
 REFERENCE LIST 
 
 OF THE 
 
 HISTORY ANiD LITERATURE 
 
 OF THE 
 
 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
 
 1787-1788. 
 
NOTE. 
 
 The titles in the following list are arranged alphabetically, by the authors or 
 ;ditors names if known, or by the first word of the title, omitting participles, 
 urith the exception of the editions of the Constitution, which are brought to- 
 gether under that head, and the debates and journals of the State Conven- 
 iens, which are placed under each State. 
 
 The initials which precede the numbers at the end of the description, indicate 
 :ertain public libraries in which the work may be consulted. 
 
 A. signifies Astor Library. 
 
 A. A. S. " Am. Antiquarian Society Library, 
 Boston Public Library. 
 
 ' Boston Athenaeum Library. 
 
 British Museum Library. 
 
 * Library of Congress. 
 
 ' Library of Harvard University. 
 
 ' Mass. Historical Society Library. 
 
 ' N. Y. Historical Society Library. 
 
 ' Library Company of Philadelphia. 
 
 ' Penn. Historical Society Library. 
 
 ' New York State Library. 
 
 ' Department of State Library. 
 
 ' A line omitted in the title. 
 
 ' Two or more lines omitted in the title. 
 
 -|- ' ' That what is omitted is already sufficiently given in title 
 
 of previous edition. 
 
 The numbers attached to certain titles in the reference list are' cross refer- 
 erences to the same title in the bibliography. 
 
 I am under obligation to Mr. C. A. Cutter, Mr. W Eames, Mr. William 
 Kelby, Mr. E. M. Barton and Mr. Bumford Samuels, for aid in compiling this 
 list. 
 
 B. 
 
 
 B. 
 
 A. 
 
 B. 
 
 M. 
 
 C. 
 
 
 H. 
 
 
 M. 
 
 
 N. 
 
 
 P. 
 
 
 P. 
 
 H. S. 
 
 S. 
 
 
 S. 
 
 D. 
 
 ' - 
 
 • 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 iccount of the Grand Federal Procession. See Nos. 77-8. 
 Additional number of Letters. See No. 90. 
 
 The/ Address and Reasons of Dissent / of the/ Minority of 
 ;he Convention, / Of the State of Pennsylvania, to their Con- 
 stituents. [Colophon] Philadelphia: Printed by E. Oswald, 
 it the Coffee House. 
 
 Folio, pp. (3) A. A. S. I 
 
 Reprinted in Carey's American Museum, ii, 536, and answered by Noah 
 iATebster's "To the Dissenting members of the late Convention of Pennsyl' 
 iz.n\.a.," in his " Collection of Essays. . . . Boston: 1790," page 142. 
 
 Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Con- 
 
 /ention of the State of Pennsylvania, to their Constituents. 
 
 Thiladelphia : 1787. J 
 
 8vo. pp. 22. B. A. 2 
 
 Title from Sabin's Dictionary of Books relating to America. See No. 108. 
 Address / to the / Citizens of Pennsylvania. / Calculated to 
 ihew the Safety, — Advantages — and Necessity of adopting the 
 Droposed Constitution of the / United States. / In which are 
 ncluded answers to the objections that have been made to 
 t./ [Colophon] Philadelphia: Printed by Hall and Sellers. 
 
 Folio, pp. (4) N. 3 
 
 A Federalist compilation, containing 
 
 Reply to the Address of the seceding members of the Pennsylvania 
 Legislature. 
 
 To the Freemen of Pennsylvania [in reply to the Address of the seced- 
 ing members], by Federal Constitution. 
 
 Speech of James Wilson, October 6th, 1787. 
 
 Examination of the Federal Constitution, by An American [Tench 
 Coxe.] 
 
 Circular Letter from the Federal Convention. 
 
 Address to the Freemen of S. C. See Nos. 114-15. 
 Address to the People of N. Y. See Nos. 83-4 and 120-21. 
 American Citizen. See Nos. 3, 21-2. 
 Aristides. See Nos. 74-5. 
 
386 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 Articles. See No. 6. 
 Baldwin {Simeon). 
 
 An / Oration / pronounced before the / Citizens of New- 
 Haven,/ July 4th, 1788;/ in commemoration of the / Declara- 
 tion / of/ Independence / and establishment of the Constitu- 
 tion/ of the / United States of America. / By Simeon Bald- 
 win, Esquire,/ New Haven. / Printed by J. Meigs, / M,DCC,- 
 
 LXXXVIII. 
 
 8vo. pp. 16. 4 
 
 Bancroft {George). 
 
 History/ of the/ Formation of the Constitution/ of the/ 
 United States of America. / By George Bancroft. / In two 
 volumes, / Vol. I./ New York : / D. Appleton and Company, 
 / I, 3, and 5 Bond Street,/ 1882. 
 
 2 Vols., 8vo. pp. xxiv, 520— xiv, 501 (2). 5 
 
 Each volume contains not only Mr. Bancroft's History, but a series of hither- 
 to unpublished "Letters and Papers," adding greatly to the value of the work. 
 In 1885 a one volume edition was published, from the same plates, but omitting 
 these documents — pp. xxii., 495, 
 
 Reviewed by B. F. De Costa, in the Mag. of Am. Hist., viii, 669; and in 
 The Nation, xxxiv, 524 and xxxvi, 127. 
 
 Bryan, Samuel. See No. io8. 
 
 Centinel. See No. io8. 
 
 Childs, Francis. See No. 103". 
 
 Citizen of America. See Nos. 130-31. 
 
 Citizen of New York. See No. 83. 
 
 Citizen of Philadelphia. See Nos. 132-4. 
 
 Civis. See Nos. 82, 1 14-15. 
 
 Columbian Patriot. See Nos. 6g-yi. 
 
 Constitution. 
 
 In the following list of editions, I have only attempted to include such as 
 were published during the discussion of the Constitution, prior to its ratifica- 
 tion, and so conscious am I of its imperfections, that I should omit it altogether, 
 were it not that no such list has ever been attempted, and this may make the 
 task an easier one to some future bibliographer. It is almost certain that the 
 Federal Convention, the Continental Congress, and each of the states printed 
 public official editions, (of which, excepting Massachusetts, New York, and pos- 
 sibly Pennsylvania, I have been unable to trace copies) while the editions 
 printed for the use of the people were undoubtedly numerous. The list includes 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 387 
 
 every edition that I could find, in any bibliographies or library catalogues that 
 I have examined, except the "Portsmouth, N. H. 1787" given in the Library 
 of Congress catalogue, which cannot now be found. 1 have also included the 
 two drafts (Nos. ig and 20) used by the Convention, which, though not prop- 
 erly editions of the Constitution, nevertheless seemed best classed among 
 them. The arrangement is alphabetical, by the first word of the title or caption 
 participles excepted. 
 See also — View of the Proposed Constitution. No. 125. 
 
 Constitution. New York. 1787. 
 
 Articles agreed upon by the Federal Convention of^ the 
 United States of / America, his Excellency, General Washing- 
 ton, Esq., President, /... ./New York: Printed by J. M'Lean, 
 No. 41, Hanover Square [1787]. 
 
 Folio, pp. 4. Ni 6 
 
 Constitution. Albany. 1788. 
 
 De/Constitutie, / eenpariglyk gea ecordeerd by de / Algem 
 eene Conventie,/ gehonden in de / Stad von Philadelphia, / in 
 't Jaar 1787: /en gesubmitteer aan hit/Volk de Vereenigde 
 Staaten / van Noord — Amerika : / Zynde van ses derzelvir 
 Staaten alreede /geadopteerd, namentlyk, / Massachusetts, 
 Connecticut, Nieuw-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware en Georgia 
 / Vertaald door Lambertus de Ronde, V. D. M. / Gedrukt by 
 Ordervan de Federal Committee, in de Stad van Albany,/Door 
 Charles R. Webster, in zyne Vrye Boek- / Druking, No. 36, 
 Staat-Straat, na by de / Engelsehe Kirke in dezelvde Stad, 1788. 
 
 Sq. i2mo. pp. 32, B. 7 
 
 Constitution. Boston. 1787. 
 
 The /Constitution /or Frame of / Government, / For the 
 United States of/ America,/ as reported by the Convention 
 of Delegates, from the / United States, begun and held at Phil- 
 adelphia on the / first Monday of May, 1787, and continued by 
 Adjournments to / the seventeenth Day of September follow- 
 ing — [Colophon at p. 16] Printed by Thomas and John Fleet, 
 
 in Boston. 
 
 ^ 8vo. pp. 20 M. 8 
 
 Includes the resolves of the Continental Congress and the Massachusetts 
 General Court. Sabin gives a copy " i2mo. pp. 16," but it is this edition, 
 lacking the last four leaves, or the " resolves." 
 
 Constitution. Boston. 1787. 
 The / Constitution / or Frame of /Government, /for the/ 
 
388 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 United States/ of/ America. / As reported by the Conven- 
 tion of Delegates, from / the United States, begun and held 
 at Philadel-/phia, on the first Monday of May, 1787, and con- 
 tinued/by adjournments to the seventeenth Day of Septem- 
 ber fol-/ lowing. — Which they resolved should belaid before 
 the /United States in Congress assembled ; and afterwards be 
 / submittted to a Convention of Delegates, chosen in each 
 State, /by the People thereof, under the recommendation of 
 its Le-/ gislature, for their Assent and Ratification / Together 
 with the Resolutions of the General Court of the /Common- 
 wealth of Massachusetts, for calling said Convention, agreea-/ 
 ble to the recommendation of Congress. / Published by order 
 of Government./ Printed at Boston, Massachusetts, By 
 Adams & Nourse, / Printers to the Honourable the General 
 Court. / M,DCC,LXXXVII. 
 
 8vo. pp. 32, C. M., A. A. S. 9 
 
 Constitution. Philadelphia. 1787. 
 
 The /Constitution /proposed for/ The Government of the 
 United States of /America, by the Foederal Conven-/tion, 
 held at Philadelphia, in the /Year One Thousand Seven Hun- 
 dred / and Eighty-seven. / To which is Annexed, / The Ratifi- 
 cations thereof by the Dele- / gates of Pennsylvania in the / 
 State Convention. / Philadelphia: Printed by Hall & Sellers. 
 / M,DCC.LXXXVII. 
 
 8vo. pp. 24. C. 10 
 
 Constitution. Philadelphia. 1787. 
 
 The /Constitution /as formed for the /United States /by 
 the/ FcEderal Convention, / Held at Philadelphia, / In the year 
 1 787, / With the Resolves of / Congress,/ and of the /Assembly 
 of Pennsylvania / thereon. / Philadelphia : / Printed by T. 
 Bradford, / in Front-Street, four doors below the Coffee House 
 /m,dcc,lxxxvii. 
 
 i2mo. pp. 16. C. H. S. II 
 
 Constitution. Richmond. 1787 or 8. 
 
 The /Federal Constitution /for the United States of Amer- 
 ica, &c. [Colophon] Richmond: Printed by Augustin Davis. 
 
 4to. pp. II. 12 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 389 
 
 Constitution. London. 1787. 
 
 Plan / of the / New Constitution / for the / United States 
 of America, /Agreed upon in a /Convention of the States/ 
 with /a Preface by the Editor./ London:/ Printed for J. 
 Debrett, Piccadilly./ M.DCCLXXXVII. 
 
 8vo. pp. (2) 30,8, 13 
 
 Constitution. Boston. 1787. 
 
 (i) Proceedings/ of the /Federal Convention. / [Colophon 
 at p. 16] Printed by Thomas and John Fleet, in Boston. 
 
 Svo. pp. 20. P 14 
 
 The Constitution, with the resolutions, etc., of the Massachusetts General 
 Court. See No. 8. 
 
 Constitution. Philadelphia. 1787. 
 
 Proceedings / of the/ Federal Convention. / Held at/ Phil- 
 adelphia/in the Year 172,7./ And the Twelfth Year /of/ 
 American Independence. / Philadelphia : / Printed by T. Brad- 
 ford, / in Front-street, four doors below the Coffee-House / 
 M,DCC,LXXXVII 
 
 Svo. pp. 15. C. 15 
 
 Constitution. Philadelphia. 1 787. 
 
 Results / of the Deliberations / of the / Federal Convention. 
 /In Convention, Sept. 17, 1787 [Philadelphia :? 1787]. 
 
 8vo. pp. 16. P. H. S. 16 
 
 Constitution. New York. \7%7. 
 
 Supplement to the Independent Journal,, / Saturda-y, Sep- 
 tember 22, 1787. / Copy of the Result of the Dehberations of 
 the /Federal Convention/ In Convention, September 17, 1787, 
 / [New York : J. M'Lean. 1787]. 
 
 Folio, pp. 4. S. L. 16* 
 
 Constitution. Hartford. 1787. 
 
 We the People/ of the United / States, /.•..../... 
 do ordain and esta- / blish this Constitution for the United 
 States of / America. / Hartford : / Printed and sold by 
 Nathaniel Patten. / M,DCC,LXXXVII. 
 
 Sq. i6mo. pp. 16. P. H. S. 17 
 
 Constitution. Poughkeepsie. 1 788. 
 
 We the People of the United States, in order to form a / 
 more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic 
 
390 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 Tran- / quillity, provide for the common Defense, promote 
 the ge- / neral Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty 
 to ourselves / and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this 
 Constitu- / tion for the United States of America. [Pough- 
 keepsie: Nicholas Power, 1788.] 
 
 4to. pp. 20, S. 18 
 
 The official edition printed for the use of the New Yotk Convention. The 
 text is only printed on one side of page, to page 17 — after that on both sides. 
 
 Constitution. Philadelphia. 1 787. 
 
 We, the People of the United States in order to form / a 
 more perfect union, to establish justice, insure domestic tran- 
 quility, provide / for the common defense, promote the gen- 
 eral welfare, and secure the blessings / of liberty to ourselves 
 and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution 
 for the / United States of America. . . . 
 
 Folio, 4 11. S. D., C. M. 19 
 
 The " Report" of the "Committee on style and arrangement" of the Fed- 
 eral Convention, brought in September 13th, 1787. It was printed for the use 
 of the members only and with the utmost secrecy. 
 
 Constitution. Philadelphia. 1787. 
 
 We the People of the States / of New-Hampshire, Massa- 
 chusetts, / Rhode Island and Providence Plan- / tations, Con- 
 necticut, New York, New Jersey, Penn- / sylvania, Delaware, 
 Maryland, Virginia, North-Caro- / lina, South-Carolina, and 
 Georgia, do ordain, declare / and establish the following Con- 
 stitution for the Government of Ourselves and our Posterity. 
 
 Folio, 7 11. S. D., C, M. 20 
 
 The "Report" of the "Committee of five," of the Federal Convention, 
 brought in August 6th, 1787. Printed only for the use of the members, as a 
 basis for a continuation of the discussion. Both these last two editions, it is 
 needless to say, are of the greatest rarity, the number printed being probably 
 not over sixty copies, and as confidential documents, were saved by few of the 
 members. The Department of State possesses Washington's copy of No. 19, 
 and David Brearly's and James Madison's copies of both drafts. The Library 
 of Congress possesses William Samuel Johnson's copies, and the Massa- 
 chusetts Historical Society has those of Elbridge Gerry, All of these contain 
 Mss. alterations by their respective owners, and George Mason's copy of No. 
 19 in the possession of Miss Kate Mason Rowland of Virginia, contains not 
 only alterations, but the objections of Mason to the Constitution, in his own 
 handwriting. What are apparently the original Mss. compilations from which 
 these drafts were printed are in the Wilson Papers, now in the Pennsylvania 
 jHiBtorical Society. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 391 
 
 ICoxe {Tenc/i)]. 
 
 An / Examination / of the/ Constitution / for the / United 
 States / of / America, / Submitted to the People / by the / 
 General Convention, / at Philadelphia, the 17th Day of Sep- 
 tember, 1787, / and since adopted and ratified / by the / Con- 
 ventions of Eleven States, / chosen for the purpose of consid- 
 ering it, being all / that have yet decided on the subject. / 
 By an American Citizen. /To which is added, /a Speech / of 
 the/ Hon. James Wilson, Esquire./ on the same subject. / Phil- 
 adelphia : / Printed by Zachariah Poulson, Junr. in Fourth/ 
 Street, between Market and Arch-Streets. / M.DCC.LXXXVIII. 
 
 8vo. pp. 33. P. 21 
 
 Reprinted in Ford's Pamphlets on the Constitution and in No. 3, and the Let- 
 ters by "An American Citizen " are printed in No. gg, and in Carey's American 
 Museum, ii, pp. 301 and 387. 
 
 Coxe {Tench). 
 
 [An Examination of the Constitution. Reprinted, Brook- 
 lyn, N. Y. : 1887.] 
 
 SVO. pp. 22. 32 
 
 A few copies separately printed from No, 68. 
 Curtis {George Ticknor). 
 
 History / of the / Origin, Formation, and Adoption / of 
 the / Constitution of the United States ; /with /notices of its 
 principal framers. / By / George Ticknor Curtis. / In two 
 volumes. / Volume I. / New York : / Harper and Brothers,/ 
 Franklin Square. / 1854 [-8]. 
 
 2 Tols., 8vo. pp. xxxvi, 518 — xvi, 663. 23 
 
 This work, which is by far the best history of our Constitution, has been for 
 several years out of print, and is difficult to procure in second hand condition. 
 There are issues with different dates. It was reviewed, by C. C. Smith, in The 
 Christian Examiner, Iviii, 75, Ixv, 67 ; in The Methodist Review, xv, 187 ; in 
 The American Quarterly Church Review, xv, 541 ; and in The North American 
 Review, Ixxx, 25g. by A. P. Peabody. 
 
 [Davie {William Richardson and others) ]. 
 
 [An Address to the People of North Carolina, by Publicola, 
 Answer to George Mason's Objections to the new Constitution 
 recommended by the late Convention, by Marcus, etc. New- 
 bern : Printed by Hodge and Wills. 1788.] 
 
 pp. 24 
 
392 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 A hypothetical title of a tract frequently alluded to in McRee's Life of James 
 Iredell, but which I have been able to find no other trace. William R. Davie 
 wrote Publicola, James Iredell wrote Marcus, and Archibald Maclaine appar- 
 ently contributed as well. See No. 8i. 
 
 Debates of the State Conventions {Elliot). See Nos. 27-30. 
 
 Decius's Letters. See Nos. 100 and 105. 
 
 [^Dickinson {John) J. 
 
 The / Letters / of / Fabius, / in 1788, / on the Federal 
 
 Constitution, / and / in 1797, /on the present situation /of/ 
 
 public affairs. / Copy-Right Secured. / From the office of 
 
 the Delaware / Gazette, Wilmington, / by W. C. Smyth. / 
 
 1797. 
 
 8vo. pp. IV, 202 (i). H. 25 
 
 Reprinted in Political Writings of John Dickinson, and the first series is in 
 Ford's Pamphlets on the Constitution. 
 
 See Washington's Writings, xi, 354. 
 
 The first series of Fabius were also printed in The New Hampshire Gazette, 
 from which Mr. Dawson reprinted a single number in the The Historical Maga- 
 zine, xviii, 359 ; apparently under the impression that it was an original New 
 Hampshire essay. 
 
 Dickinson {John). 
 
 [The Letters of Fabius, Brooklyn, N. Y. ; 1888]. 
 
 8vo. pp. 54. 26 
 
 A few copies separately printed from No. 68. 
 Examination into the leading principles. See Nos. 130-1. 
 Examination of the Constitution. See Nos. 21-2. 
 Fabius. See Nos. 25-6. 
 Federal Constitution. See No. 12. 
 Federal Farm.er. See Nos. 86-90. 
 Elliot {Jonathan). First edition. 
 
 The / Debates, / Resolutions, and other Proceedings, / in / 
 Convention,/ on the adoption of the/ Federal Constitution,/ 
 as recommended by the /General Convention at Philadelphia,/ 
 on the 17th of September, 1787:/ With the yeas and nays on 
 the decision of the / main question. / Collected and revised, 
 
 from contemporary publications, / by Jonathan Elliot. / / 
 
 / Washington, / Printed by and for the Editor, / on the 
 
 Pennsylvania Avenue. / 1827 [-30]. 
 
 3 vols., 8vo. 27 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 393 
 
 " Volume I. / Containing the Debates in Massachusetts and New Yorlc." 
 pp. viii, 358, *8. 
 
 " Volume 11. / Containing the Debates in the Commonwealth of Virginia.'' 
 pp. viii, 33-487. 
 
 "Volume III. / Containing the Debates in the States of North Carolina and 
 Pennsylvania." pp, (8), 17-322. 
 
 The star leaves in Volume I. were originally issued in Volume III., and are 
 sometimes found bound in that volume. They are a fragment of the debates 
 in the New York Convention. 
 
 An additional volume was issued in 1830, with the following title: 
 
 Journal / and / Debates of the Federal Convention, / Held at Philadelphia, 
 from Mav 14, to September 17, 1787 / with the / Constitution / of the / United 
 States, / illustrated by the opinions of twenty / successive Congresses, / and 
 a / Digest of Decisions in the Courts of the Union, / involving constitutional 
 principles: / thus shewing / the rise, progress, present condition, and practice / 
 of the Constitution, / in the / National Legislature and Legal Tribunals of the 
 Republic. / With / full indexes on all subjects embraced in the Work. / By 
 Jonathan Elliot. / Volume IV. / (Supplementary to the State Constitutions, in 
 3 Vols, on adopting the Federal Constitution) / Washington, / Printed and sold 
 by the Editor, / on the Pennsylvania Avenue, / 1830. / 
 
 8vo. pp. (8), 272, 404, (4). 28 
 
 Reviewed by Jared Sparks in the North American Review, xxv. 249. 
 
 Elliot {Jonathan). Second Edition. 
 
 The / Debates / in the several / State Conventions, / on 
 the adoption of the / Federal Constitution, / as recommended 
 by the / General Convention at Philadelphia, / in / 1787. / 
 Together with / the Journal of the Federal Convention, 
 Luther / Martin's Letter, Yates' Minutes, Congressional / 
 Opinions, Virgina & Kentucky Resolutions of 'g6-'gg, / and 
 other illustrations of the Constitution. / In four volumes — 
 Volume I. / Second Edition, / with considerable additions, / 
 collected and revised from contemporary publications, / by 
 Jonathan Elliot. / Published under the Sanction of Congress. 
 Washington : / Printed by and for the Editor, / on the Penn- 
 sylvania Avenue. / 1836. 
 
 4 vols. 8vo. 29 
 
 I. pp. vii, (3), xix-xxxii, 33-*79, 73-551- 
 
 II. pp. 
 
 III. pp. 
 
 IV. pp. (4), vii-xvi, 33-662, xvi. 
 
 Elliot {Jonathan). [Third] Edition. 
 
 The / Debates / in the several / State Conventions, / on 
 
394 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 the adoption of the / Federal Constitution, / as recommended 
 by the / General Convention at Philadelphia, in 1787. / 
 together with the / Journal of the Federal Convention, / 
 Luther Martin's Letter, / Yates' Minutes, / Congressional 
 Opinions, / Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 'qS-'qq, / 
 and / other illustrations of the Constitution. / In Four 
 Volumes. / Vol. I. / Second Edition, with considerable 
 additions. / Collected and Revised from contemporary pub- 
 lications, / by Jonathan Elliot. / Published under the sanc- 
 tion of Congress. / Washington : Printed for the Editor. / 
 
 1836. 
 
 4 vols. 8vo. 30 
 
 I. pp. xvi, 508 Ante-Constitutional History, Journal of Convention, Martin's 
 Genuine Information, Yates' Minutes, Ratifications and Amendments, 
 Official letters of Delegates, Partizan arguments, and private letters. 
 
 II. pp. xi, 556. Debates in the Conventions of Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
 (fragmentary). New Hampshire, (fragmentary). New York, and Pennsyl- 
 vania (fragmentary.) Account of Maryland and Harrisburg Conventions. 
 
 III. pp. xi, 663. Debates in the Virginia Convention. 
 
 IV. pp. xii, 639. Debates in the (first) North Carolina Convention and in the 
 
 Legislature and and Convention (fragment) of South Carolina, Opinions 
 on Constitutional questions, 1789-1836. 
 
 In 1845 a supplementary volume was added, with the following title : 
 
 Debates / on the / adoption of the Federal Constitution, / in the Convention 
 held at Philadelphia, / in / 1787; / with a diary of the debates of / the Con- 
 gress of the Confederation; / as reported / By James Madison, / a member, 
 and deputy from Virginia. / Revised and newly arranged / By Johnathan 
 Elliot. / Complete in one volume. Vol. V. / Supplementary to Elliot's 
 Debates. / Published under the sanction of Congress. / Washington: / Printed 
 for the Editor. / 1845. 
 
 8vo. pp. xxii, 641. 31 
 
 Elliot's Debates (especially this edition), in spite of its imperfections, is the 
 great store house of American constitutional history. It is almost impossible 
 to exaggerate its importance, and though Nos. 92 and gg have rendered the por- 
 tion relating to Massachusetts and Pennsylvania of little value, the remaining 
 contents are only to be found in contemporary publications of greater or lesser 
 rarity. 
 
 In 1858 the plates passed into the hands of J. B. Lippincott & Co., who have 
 printed several issues, with change of date only. 
 
 The Fcederalist. No. L To the People of the State of 
 
 New York. . . .[signed] Publius. 
 
 32 
 This is the heading to the first of the series of eighty-five essays, now known 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 395 
 
 as the The Federalist, and was first published October 27, 1787. With occa- 
 sional breaks in its regularity, it continued to be published by at least two New 
 York newspapers until August 16, 1788. 
 
 Nos. 1-7, II, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 26, 31. 33, 35, 37-8, 55, 65, 71, and 76 first 
 appeared in The Independent Journal. Nos. 8, 12, 16, 18, 20, 22, 27, 29, 30,32, 
 56, 64, 70, 72 and 75 first appeared in The New York Packet. Nos. 10 and 
 36 first appeared in The Daily Advertiser, Nos. 9, 14, 23-5, and 34 appeared 
 simultaneously in two or more papers. Nos. 77-85 first appeared in the first 
 edition in book form. The first publication of the remaining essays I have not 
 been able to find. 
 
 Jay wrote Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 64; Madison, Nos. 10, 14, 37 to 48 inclusive; 
 Nos. 18, 19 and 20 are the joint work of Madison and Hamilton; Nos. 49 to 58, 
 62 and 63 are claimed by both Madison and Hamilton; the rest of the numbers 
 are by Hamilton. The authorship of the 12 numbers clamed by both Madison 
 and Hamilton are fully discussed by Mr. Lodge in The Proceedings of the Amer- 
 ican Antiquarian Society for 1882, and Volume ix of The Works of Hamilton; 
 by Mr. Dawson and Mr. J. C. Hamilton in the introductions to their respective 
 editions of The Federalist ; by Mr. Rives in his History of the Life and Times of 
 James Madison; by Mr. Bancroft, in the History of the Formation of the Consti- 
 tution, ii, 236; and in The Historical Magazine, viii, 305. 
 
 "He is certainly a judicious and ingenious writer, though not well calculated 
 for the common people. — Maclaine to Iredell, March 4, 1788. 
 
 " In a series of essays in the New York Gazettes, under title of Fedaralist, it 
 [the Constitution] has been advocated with great ability. Washington to Luzerne, 
 Feb. 7, 1788. 
 
 " The Federalist, as he terms himself, or Publius, puts me in mind of some 
 of the gentlemen of the long robe when hard pressed, in a bad cause, with a 
 rich client. They frequently say a good deal, which does not apply; but yet if 
 it will not convince the judge and jury, may perhaps, help to make them forget 
 some part of the evidence — embarass their opponents, and make the audience 
 stare." N. Y. Journal, Feb. 14, 1788. 
 
 " It would be difficult to find a treatise, which, in so small a compass, con- 
 tains so much valuable political information, or in which the true principles of 
 republican government are unfolded with such precision." American Magazine 
 for March, 1788. 
 
 See also, 
 
 A / List of Editions / of / " The Federalist." / By / Paul Leicester Ford, / 
 Brooklyn, N. Y., / 1886. 8vo, pp. 25. 
 
 The Federalist. New York. 1788. 
 
 The / Federalist : / A Collection / of / Essays, / written in 
 Favour of the / New Constitution, / as agreed upon by the 
 Federal Convention, / September 17, 1787. / In Two Vol- 
 umes. / Vol. I. / New York : / Printed and Sold by J. and 
 A. M'Lean, / No. 41, Hanover-Square. / M,DCC,LXXXVin. 
 
 z.vols. i2mo, pp. vi, 22X^vi, 394. C, P., N., B.A. 33 , 
 
396 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 The first edition in book form. It is difficult to find in uncut condition, or on 
 thick: paper. Ordinary copies were priced by Leon at $30, and Hawkins' copy 
 sold for $48. 
 
 Reviewed in The American Magazine, 1788. 260, 327, 423, 503. 
 
 The Federalist. Paris. 1792. 
 
 Le F6d6raliste, / ou / Collection de quelques Ecrits en 
 faveur de / la Constitution proposee aux Etats-Unis / de / 
 FAm^rique, par la Convention convoqu6e/ en 1787 ; / Publics 
 dans les Etats-Unis de I'Amdrique par / MM. Hamilton, Mad- 
 isson et Gay, / Citoyens de I'fitat de New York. / Tome 
 Premier. / A Paris, / Chez Buisson, Libraire, rue Haute- 
 feuille, / No. 20. / 1792. 
 
 2 vols., Svo. pp. lii, 366 — (4), 511. 34 
 
 2 vols., Svo. pp. (5), xxii-Iii, 366 — (4), 511. S. 
 
 The two variations noted above are identical as to matter and composition, 
 with the exception of the introduction, which is omitted in the second. 
 
 Translated by Trudaine de la Sabliere, who added an Introduction, and 
 Notes, most of which are merely explanatory of such parts of the text as 
 would be unintelligible to the French reader. 
 
 " Both issues of this first French edition are of the utmost rarity. I have 
 heard of but one example of the first issue, the imperfect copy in the library of 
 Harvard College, referred to by Mr. Dawson. The second is almost equally 
 rare. There is one copy in the New York State Library (mentioned by Mr. 
 Dawson), another in the library of Yale College, and a third was sold at auc- 
 tion not long since, in Boston for twenty-five dollars a volume." Mr. Lodge's 
 Introduction to The Federalist. 
 
 The Federalist. Paris. 1795. 
 
 Le F^d^raliste, / ou / Collection de quelques Ecrits en fav- 
 eur / de la Constitution proposee aux Etats-Unis / de la 
 I'Am^rique, par la Convention convoqu^e / en 1788 ;/ Publics 
 dans les Etats-Unis de I'Am^rique par / MM. Hamilton, Mad- 
 isson et Jay. / Citoyens de I'Etat de New York. / Seconde 
 Edition. / Tome Premier, /A Paris, / Chez Buisson, Librarie, 
 rue Hautseuille, No. 20. / An 36. de la Republique. 
 
 2, vols., Svo. pp. (5), xxii-lii, 366 — (4), 511. 35 
 
 A reissue with new titles of the second issue of No. 34. 
 
 The Federalist. New York. I7gg. 
 
 The / Federalist : / A Collection of / Essays, / written in 
 favour of the / new Constitution, / as agreed upon by the / 
 Federal Convention, /September 17, 1787. / In Two Volumes. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 397 
 
 / Vol. I. / New- York : / Printed and sold by John Tiebout, / 
 No. 358 Pearl-Street. / 1799. 
 
 2 vols., i2mo. pp. vi, 227 — vi, 384. 36 
 
 Of the first edition of The Federalist a few copies remain unsold, which passed 
 into the hands of John Tiebout, who reissued it with new titles only. 
 
 " It is said that in the year 1799, a new edition of The Federalist, the fifth in 
 book-form, was published by John Tiebout. . . The most diligent search has 
 been made for a copy of that edition, but without finding it or obtaining any 
 other information concerning it. It is not in any of the principal public libraries, 
 nor. so far as can be learned, is a copy of it in any private library in this part of 
 the country. The newspapers of that period — both Fcederal and Republican — 
 have been carefully examined, with the hope of |finding the Proposals for its 
 publication; personal enquiries have been made of Mr. Tiebout's sons, and of 
 several of the older inhabitants of the city; and those whose intimate knowledge 
 of books entitles them to the respect of every student have been applied to on 
 the suject; yet no trace whatever, beyond the single allusion above referred to, 
 has been obtained from any quarter concerning this or any other edition of The 
 Federalist irom the press of John Tiebout." Mr. Dawson's Introduction to The 
 Federalist, Ixvii 
 
 " Mr. Dawson, after the most exhaustive research, failed to find a copy, and 
 only heard of one, or what appeared to be one, in the collection of Mr. Force, 
 while his own volume was passing through the press, and he was therefore 
 compelled to leave the existence of such an edition largely a matter of conjec- 
 ture. This gap is now filled. There is a copy of this edition, probably unique, 
 for the Force copy has disappeared, in the Long Island Historical Society." 
 Mr. Lodge's Introduction to The Federalist. 
 
 This copy mentioned by Mr. Lodge is however, imperfect, there being but 
 one volume. 
 
 The Federalist. New York. 1802. 
 
 The / Federalist, / on the New Constitution. / By Publius. / 
 
 Written in 1788. / To which is added, / Pacificus, / on the 
 
 Proclamation of Neutrality. / Written in 1793. / Likewise,/ 
 
 The Federal Constitution, / with all the Amendments. / 
 
 Revised and Corrected. / In Two Volumes. / Vol. I. / 
 
 Copy-right secured. / New- York : / Printed and sold by 
 
 George F. Hopkins, / At Washington's Head. / 1802. 
 
 2 vols., 8vo pp. viii, 317, (i) — v, 351. C, H., N. 37 
 
 Mr. Dawson hazards the guess that this edition was edited by William Cole- 
 man, but by Mr. Hopkins statement, he appears in error. 
 
 " Mr. Hopkins informed me to-day that this edition was in the first instance 
 corrected by John Wells, who compared it with the original edition, published 
 by McLean [sic] in 1788, and 'that it was subsequently revised by my father, at 
 whose casual suggestion Pacificus was printed with it." Memoranda by J. C. 
 Hamilton, Feb. 6, 1847. 
 
 From the "prefatory remarks " prefixed to the Washington edition, it would 
 
398 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 appear that Mr. Jay also revised in this edition the numbers contributed by 
 him. See No. 41. 
 
 " In the year 1802, Mr. Hopkins, printer, of this city, intending to publish a 
 new edition of The Federalist, took this opportunity to apply to Gen. Hamil- 
 ton, and solicit him to correct and revise the numbers, and, so far succeeded, 
 as to obtain his consent to assist in the revisal, provided a gentleman of com- 
 petent literary talents would undertake to make the first verbal corrections, for 
 the original idea was to be strictly adhered to : — He then examined the whole 
 with his own eye, previous to its being committed to the press, and saw that it 
 was free from literary blemishes." William A. Coleman in the A'. V. Evening 
 Post, March 25, 1817. 
 
 The Federalist. New York. 1810. 
 
 The / Federalist, / on the New Constitution ; / written in 
 1788, /by Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Jay, and Mr. Madison./ To 
 which is added, / Pacificus, / on the Proclamation of Neutral- 
 ity ; / written in 1793, /by Mr. Hamilton./ A new edition, 
 with the Names and Portraits of the several Writers. / In 
 Two Volumes. / Vol. I. / New- York : / Published by Wil- 
 liams & Whiting, / at their Theological and Classical Book- 
 store, / No. 118, Pearl-Street./ Printed by J. Seymour./ 
 1 8 10. 
 
 2 vols., 8vo. pp. iv, 368, 2 portraits — iv, 368, portrait. 38 
 
 A separate edition of volumes ii. and iii. of the " Works of Hamilton'' as 
 edited by John Wells, in 1810. It is identical in matter with No. 37, with the 
 addition of the names of the authors from "a private memorandum in his 
 (Hamilton's) own handwriting.'' 
 
 The Federalist. Philadelphia, 1817. 
 
 The / Federalist, / on the New Constitution ; / written in 
 1788, /by Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Jay, and Mr. Madison,/ A 
 New Edition, / with the Names and Portraits of the several 
 Writers. / Philadelphia : / Published by Benjamin Warner, 
 No. 147, Market Street. / William Greer. Printer. Harris- 
 burg. / 1 8 17. 
 
 8vo. pp. 477, 3 portraits. 
 
 The first single volume edition. It follows the iSio edition in text. 39 
 
 The Federalist. Philadelphia. 18 18. 
 
 The / Federalist, / on the New Constitution ; / written in 
 1788,/ by Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Jay, and Mr. Madison./ A 
 New Edition, / with the Names and Portraits of the several 
 Writers. / Philadelphia : / Published by Benjamin Warner, 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 399 
 
 No. 147, Market Street, / and sold at his stores, Richmond, 
 Virginia, / and Charleston, South Carolina. / 18 18. 
 
 8vo, pp, 504, 3 portraits. B. 40 
 
 , Printed from the same forms as No. 39, with the addition of an appendix 
 containing the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution. 
 
 The Federalist. Washington. 1818. 
 
 The / Federalist, / on / the New Constitution, / written in / 
 the Year 1788, /by/ Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison, and Mr. 
 Jay, / with / an Appendix, / Containing / the Letters of 
 Pacificus and Helvidius, / on the / Proclamation of Neutrality 
 of 1793;/ Also, the / Original Articles of Confederation, / 
 and / the Constitution of the United States, / with the / 
 Amendments made thereto. / A New Edition. / The Num- 
 bers written by Mr. Madison corrected by Himself. / City of 
 Washington : / Printed and published by Jacob Gideon, 
 Jun. / 1818. 
 
 8vo, pp. 671. 41 
 
 "The present edition of the Federalist contains all the numbersof that work, 
 as revised by their authors, and is the only one to which the remark will apply. 
 Former editions, indeed, it is understood, had the advantage of a revisal from 
 Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Jay, but the numbers written by Mr.- Madison still re- 
 main in the state in which they originally issued from the press, and contain 
 many inaccuracies. The publisher of this volume has been so fortunate as to 
 procure from Mr. Madison the copy of the work which that gentleman had 
 preserved for himself, with corrections of the papers of which he was the 
 author, in his own hand." Prefatory remarks by Jacob Gideon, Jr. 
 
 Mr. Madison claims the authorship, in this edition, of Nos. 18, ig and 20, 
 which Hamilton had given as their joint work; and 49 to 58, 62 and 63, which 
 Mr. Hamilton had claimed for himself. In spite of the research and study 
 devoted to the dispute, it is to-day impossible to give the authorship to either 
 with any certainty. 
 
 The Federalist, Washington, 1821. 
 
 The / Federalist, / on / the New Constitution, / Written in 
 / the Year 1788, / by/Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Jay, 
 / with / an Appendix, / Containing / the Letters of Pacificus 
 and Helvidius,/ on the / Proclamation of Neutrality of 1793 ; 
 / Also, the / Original Articles of Confederation, / and / the 
 Constitution of the United States, / with the / Amendments 
 made thereto. / A New Edition. / The Numbers written by 
 
400 BIBLIOGRAPHY, 
 
 Mr. Madison corrected by Himself. / City of Washington : / 
 Printed and published by Jacob Gideon, Jun. / 1821. 
 
 8vo. pp. 671. 42 
 
 A reissue of No. 41 with new titles only. It is not in Mr. Dawson's list of 
 editions. 
 
 The Federalist. Hallo-well. 1826. 
 
 The / Federalist, / on the New Constitution, / Written in / 
 the Year 1788, / by/ Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Jay :/ 
 With / an Appendix, / Containing / the Letters of Pacificus 
 and Helvidius, / on the / Proclamation of Neutrality of 1793 ; 
 / Also, the / Original Articles of Confederation, / and the / 
 Constitution of the United States, / with the / Amendments 
 made thereto. / A New Edition. / The Numbers written by 
 Mr. Madison corrected by Himself. / Hallowell, (Me.) : / 
 Printed and published by Glazier & Co. / 1826. 
 
 8vo. pp. 582. H. 43 
 
 A reprint of Gideon's edition of 1818. 
 
 The Federalist. Philadelphia. 1826. 
 
 The / Federalist, / on the New Constitution, / written in 
 the year / 1788, / by / Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison and Mr. 
 Jay : / With / an Appendix, / containing / The Letters of 
 Pacificius and Helvidius / on the Proclamation of Neutrality 
 of 1793 ; / Also the / Articles of Confederation, / and the / 
 Constitution of the United States, / with the amendments 
 made thereto. / A New Edition. / The numbers written by 
 Mr. Madison corrected by himself. /Philadelphia : / Published 
 by McCarty and Davis, / 171 Market-street. / 1826. 
 
 8vo. pp. 582. 44 
 
 Identical with No. 43, excepting title page. It is not in Sabin's or Dawson's 
 lists, or in Ford's List of editions of "The Federalist." 
 
 The Federalist. Hallowell. 1831. 
 
 The / Federalist / on / the New Constitution,/ written in 
 the Year 1788, / by / Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison, and Mr. 
 Jay : / With / an Appendix, / Containing / the Letters of 
 Pacificus and Helvidius, / on the / Proclamation of Neutrality 
 of 1793 ; / also, the / Original Articles of Confederation, and 
 the Con- / stitution of the United States, / with the Amend- 
 ments made thereto. / A New Edition. / The Numbers writ- 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 4OI 
 
 ten by Mr. Madison corrected by Himself. / Hallowell : / 
 Printed and published by Glazier, Masters & Co. / 1831. 
 
 8vo. pp. 542. 45 
 
 Not in Mr. Sabin's Dictionary of Books relating to America, and Mr. Dawson, 
 who had heard of such an edition, was unable to find a copy. 
 
 The Federalist. Washington. 1831. 
 
 The / Federalist, / on / The New Constitution, / written 
 in / the Year 1788, / by / Alexander Hamilton, James Madi- 
 son and John Jay, / With an Appendix, / Containing the 
 Original Articles of Confederation ; the / Letter of General 
 Washington, as President of the / Convention, to the Presi- 
 dent of Congress ; the Consti- / tution of the United States, 
 and the Amendments to /the Constitution./ A New Edition, 
 / with a Table of Contents, / and / a copious Alphabetical 
 Index. / The Numbers written by Mr. Madison corrected by 
 Himself. / Washington : / Published by Thompson & 
 Homans. / Way & Gideon, Printers. / 1831. 
 
 i2mo. pp. vii, 3-420. C. 46 
 
 The first edition with an index, prepared by Phillip R. Fendall. 
 
 The Federalist. Hallowell. 1837. 
 
 The / Federalist, / on / the New Constitution, / written in 
 the year 1788, / by / Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison, and Mr. 
 Jay : / with / an Appendix, / Containing / the Letters of 
 Pacificus and Helvidius / on the / Proclamation of Neutrality 
 of 1793 ; / also, / the Original Articles of Confederation, and 
 the / Constitution of the United States, / with the Amend- 
 ments made thereto. / A New Edition. / The Numbers 
 written by Mr. Madison corrected by Himself. / Hallowell : / 
 Glazier, Masters & Smith. / 1837. 
 
 8vo. pp. 500. A., C. 47 
 
 The Federalist. Rio de Janiero. 1840. 
 
 O Federalista, publicado em inglez por Hamilton, Madis- 
 son e Jay, cidadaos de Nova-York, e tradizi^o em portuguez 
 por . . . Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Imperial e Const, de J. Ville- 
 neuve & Ca. 1840. 
 
 3 vols. 8vo. pp. 244 — 285 — 246. 48 
 
 Title from Mr. Sabin's Dictionary of Books relating to America. It is 
 Unknown to Mr. Dawson, and I have been unable to find a copy. From the 
 
402 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 misspelling of Madison's name, it is apparently a translation of the Paris edi- 
 tion, No. 34. 
 
 The Federalist. Hallow ell. 1842. 
 
 The / Federalist, / on / the New Constitution, / Written 
 in 1788, / by / Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Jay: / 
 With / an Appendix, / Containing / the Letters of Pacificus 
 and Helvidius /on the / Proclamation of Neutrality of 1793 ; / 
 also, / the Original Articles of Confederation,/ and the / Con- 
 stitution of the United States. / A New Edition. / The 
 Numbers written by Mr. Madison corrected by Himself. / 
 Hallowell : / Glazier, Masters & Smith. / 1842. 
 
 8vo. pp. 484, 49 
 
 Reviewed by J. Parker, in the North American Review, xciv, 435. 
 The Federalist. Washington. 1845. 
 
 The / Federalist, / on /the New Constitution, /Written in 
 /the Year 1788, /by/ Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, 
 and John Jay, / With an Appendix,/ Containing / the Orig- 
 inal Articles of Confederation ; the Letter of General Wash-/ 
 ington, as President of the Convention, to the President of 
 Con- / gress ; the Constitution of the United States ; the 
 Amend- / ments to the Constitution ; and the Act of Congress 
 in / Relation to the election of President, passed / January 
 23, 1845. / Sixth Edition,/ with / a Copious Alphabetical In- 
 dex. / The numbers written by Mr. Madison corrected by 
 Himself./ Washington: / Printed by J. & G. S. Gideon. / 1845. 
 
 8vo. pp. (2), V, (l), 3gl. 50 
 
 Neither in Mr. Dawson's nor Mr. Sabin's lists of editions. 
 
 The Federalist. Philadelphia. 1847. 
 
 The / Federalist, / on / the New Constitution, / Written in 
 / the Year 1788,/ by /Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, 
 and John Jay. / With an Appendix, / Containing / the Let- 
 ters of Pacificus and Helvidius on the Proclamation of Neu- / 
 trality of 1793; the Original Articles of Confederation; the 
 Let- / ter of General Washington, as President of the Conven- 
 tion, to the President of Congress; the Constitution of the 
 / United States ; the Amendments to the Constitution ; / and 
 the Acts of Congress in Relation to the Elec- / tion of 
 President, passed January 23, 1845. / Sixth edition, / with / a 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 403 
 
 Copious Alphabetical Index. / The Numbers written by Mr. 
 Madison corrected by Himself. / Philadelphia : / R. Wilson 
 Desilver, 18 South Fourth Street, / 1847. 
 
 8vo. pp. (2), V, 392, 102. B. M., 51 
 
 The '■ Letters of Pacificus and Helvidius," has a separate title-page and 
 pagination, and is often found as a separate work. 
 
 The Federalist. Washington. 1847. 
 
 The Federalist, on the New Constitution Washington: 
 
 J. & G. S. Gideon 1847. 
 
 8vo. pp. 52 
 
 Title quoted by Sabin from " Mr. Bartlett's List." 
 
 The Federalist. Hallowell. 1852. 
 
 The / Federalist, / on / the New Constitution, / Written in 
 1788. / hy / Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Jay: / 
 With / an Appendix, / Containing the / Letters of Pacificus 
 and Helvidius / on the/ Proclamation of Neutrality of 1793 ;/ 
 Also, / the Original Articles of Confederation, / and the / 
 Constitution of the United States. / New Edition : / The 
 Numbers written by Mr. Madison corrected by Himself. / 
 Hallowell : / Masters, Smith, & Company. / 1852. 
 
 8vo. pp. 496. 53 
 
 The Federalist. Hallowell. 1857. 
 
 The / Federalist, / on the / New Constitution, / Written 
 in 1788, / by / Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Jay : / 
 With / an Appendix, / Containing Letters of / Pacificus and 
 Helvidius / on the / Proclamation of Neutrality of 1793 ; / 
 Also, / the Original Articles of Confederation, / and the 
 Constitution of the United States. / New Edition : / The 
 Numbers written by Mr. Madison corrected by Himself. / 
 Hallowell : / Masters, Smith, & Co. / 1857. 
 
 Svo. pp. 496. B. 54- 
 
 The Federalist. New York. 1863. 
 
 The Foederalist : / A / Collection of Essays, Written in 
 Favor / of the New Constitution, as / agreed upon by / the 
 Fcederal Convention, / September 17, 1787. / Reprinted 
 from the Original Text. / with an / Historical Introduction 
 and Notes, / By Henry B. Dawson. / In Two Volumes^ / 
 
404 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 Vol. I. / New York: / Charles Scribner, 124 Grand Street, / 
 London : Sampson Low, Son & Co. / 1863. 
 
 8vo. pp. cxlii, (2), 615, portrait. 55 
 
 All ever printed. This volume contains the text of The Federalist, entire, 
 and an Introduction, containing a history of the origin, original publication, 
 the controversy over the disputed numbers, and a bibliographical list of edi- 
 tions, all being treated with great thoroughness. It was Mr. Dawson's inten- 
 tion to give, in the second volume, the alterations which had been made in the 
 text of the various editions, and MSS. notes from copies of the work which had 
 belonged to the authors and other statesmen. The Introduction gave orfense 
 to the Hamilton and Jay families, and occasioned the following pamphlets : 
 Correspondence / between / John Jay and Henry B. Dawson, / and 
 between / James A. Hamilton and Henry B. Dawson, / concerning / The 
 Federalist. / New York :/ Printed by J. M. Bradstreet & Son./ 1864. 
 
 Svo. and 4to. pp. 48, covers. 56 
 
 Of the 4to. edition only 25 copies were printed. The title on the cover reads 
 Current Fictions tested by Uncurrent Facts. Mr. Dawson advertised Current 
 Fictions No. II., but it was never printed. 
 
 New Plottings in Aid of the Rebel Doctrine of / State Sovereignty. / Mr. 
 Jay's Second Letter / on / Dawson's Introduction to the Federalist, / Expos- 
 ing its Falsification of the History of the Constitution ; its / Libels on 
 Duane, Livingston, Jay and Hamilton ; and / its relation to recent efforts 
 by Traitors at home, and / Foes abroad, to maintain the Rebel Doctrine of 
 State / Sovereignty, for the subversion of the Unity of / the Republic and 
 
 the Supreme Sovereignty of / the American People / / New York: / 
 
 A. D. F. Randolph. / 1864. / Svo. pp. 54, viii, covers. 57 
 
 [Same.] New York: / American News Company, 121 Nassau street. / Lon- 
 don:/ Trubner & Company, 60 Patermoster Row. / 1864./ Svo, pp. 54. 
 vii, covers. 58 
 
 [Same.] London: Samson Low . . . 1S64. Svo. pp. 50. 59 
 
 All three editions were suppressed by Mr. Jay, and the bulk of the copies 
 burnt. See Current Fictions, p. 26. 
 
 This edition is reviewed by H. W. Torrey in The North American Review, 
 cxcviii, 586 ; and by Historicus in The New York Times, Feb. 17, 1864. 
 
 The Federalist. New York. 1864. 
 
 The Foederalist : / A / Collection of Essays, Written in 
 Favor / of the New Constitution, as / agreed upon by / the 
 Fcederal Convention, / September 17, 1787. / Reprinted 
 from the Original Text. / With an / Historical Introduction 
 and Notes, / By Henry B. Dawson. / In Two Volumes. / 
 Vol. I. / New York : / Charles Scribner & Co. .../.. . 1864. 
 Svo. pp. cxlii, (2), 615, portrait. 60 
 
 The Federalist. Morrisania. 1 864. 
 
 The Foederalist: / A Collection of Essays, written in 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 40S 
 
 Favor / of the New Constitution, as agreed / upon by the 
 FcEderal Conven- / tion, September 17, 1787. / Reprinted 
 from the Original Text, / with an / Historical Introduction 
 and Notes / By Henry B. Dawson. / In Two Volumes. / 
 Vol. I. / Morrisania, N. Y. : / 1864. 
 
 Royal 8vo. pp. cxlii, (2), 615, portrait. 61 
 
 Printed from the same plates as the New York editions of 1863 and 1864. 
 250 copies printed. 
 
 The Federalist. Philadelphia. 1865. 
 
 The / Federalist : / A Commentary / on the / Constitution 
 of the United States. / A Collection of Essays, / By Alex- 
 ander Hamilton, / Jay, and Madison. / Also, / The Con- 
 tinentalist, and other Papers, / By Hamilton. / Edited by / 
 John C. Hamilton,/ Author of " The History of the Republic 
 of the United States." / Philadelphia : / J. B. Lippincott & 
 Co. / 1864. 
 
 8vo. pp. clxv, (i), 659, vi, portrait. B. A. 62 
 
 Many reissues, with a change of date only. 
 
 Contains an " Historical Notice," which is an endeavor to prove Hamilton 
 the author of the doubtful numbers ; in fact, the whole tendency is to magnify 
 Hamilton's part of the work, even the names of the other authors being printed 
 in much smaller type on the title page. 
 
 The alterations in the text made by the different editions is added, as also the 
 papers signed " Philo-Publius "' by William Duer. 
 Reviewed by Mr. Horace Binney in the following: 
 A Review of Hamilton's Edition of the Federalist. Philadelphia : 1864. 
 Svo. pp. 8. 63 
 
 The Federalist. Philadelphia. 1865. 
 
 The / Federalist : / A Commentary / on the / Constitution 
 of the United States. / A Collection of Essays / By Alex- 
 ander Hamilton, / Jay, and Madison. / Also, / The Contin- 
 entalist, and other Papers, / By Hamilton. / Edited by John 
 C. Hamilton, / Author of " The History of the Republic of 
 the United States." / Vol. I. / Philadelphia : / J.B. Lippincott 
 & Co./ 1865. 
 
 2 vols. Rl. 8vo. pp. clxv, (i), 242. — (2), 243-659, vi, portrait. 64 
 
 From the same plates as No 62, but divided into two volumes, and printed 
 on larger and finer paper. 100 copies only printed. 
 
 The Federalist. New York. 1876. 
 University Edition, / The Federalist : / A / Collection of 
 
406 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 Essays, written in Favor / of the New Constitution, as /agreed 
 upon by / Federal Convention,/ September 17, 1787 /Re- 
 printed from the Original Text / under the Editorial Super- 
 vision of / Henry B. Dawson. / New York : / Scribner, Arm- 
 strong and Co. / 1876. 
 
 8vo. pp. ivi, 615. 65 
 
 Also issues with no date. A cheap edition from the plates of No. 55, with 
 the omission of the Introduction, a short Preface taking its place. 
 
 The Federalist. New York. 1 886. 
 
 The Works / of / Alexander Hamilton / Edited by / Henry 
 
 Cabot Lodge / / Vol. IX. / New York & London / G. 
 
 P. Putnam's Sons/ The Knickerbocker Press/ 1886. 
 
 8vo. pp. xlv, 598. 66 
 
 Federal Republican. See No. iig. 
 Ford {Paul Leicester). 
 
 A List of the Members of the Federal Convention of 1787. 
 
 By Paul Leicester Ford. Brooklyn, N. Y.: 1888. 
 
 67 
 
 100 copies privately printed. 
 
 " In i8ig, when John Quincy Adams, by direction of Congress, edited and 
 published the Journal of the Federal Convention, he drew up ... a list of the 
 members . . . This list was accepted and republished by Elliot, ... by Curtis 
 
 and more recently in the Official Programme of the Constitutional Centen- 
 
 ial, and no additions are promised in the forthcoming memorial of that celebra- 
 tion — Thus this list prepared in 1819, has become a fixture . . . There are, how- 
 ever, several omissions and by reference to original documents, acts, etc., I 
 have increased the list to seventy-four. To this I have added, in such cases as 
 I have been able, the reasons of members for declining the appointment, and 
 non-attendance of such as failed to be present in the Convention ; the day of 
 arrival of attending members; the absence of attending members; the date of 
 leaving of those who failed to sign the Constitution, with their reasons, and the 
 part the non-attending and non-signing members took in their own States in 
 support or opposition to the ratification." Extract from preface. 
 
 Ford {Paul Leicester). 
 
 Pamphlets /on the /Constitution of the United States/ 
 Published during /its discussion by the People / 1 787-1 788. / 
 Edited / with notes and a bibliography / by / Paul Leicester 
 Ford./ Brooklyn, N. Y.: / 1888. 
 
 8vo, pp. 68 
 
 Includes reprints of the following pamphlets, and a bibliography and refer- 
 ence list to the literature relating to the formation and adoption of the Consti- 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 407 
 
 [Gerry (Elbridge)]. Observations on the New Constitution, and on the 
 Federal and State Conventions. By a Columbian Patriot. 
 
 [Webster (Noah)]. An Examination into the leading principles of the 
 Federal Constitution. By a Citizen of America. 
 
 [Jay (John)]. An Address to the People of the State of New York. By 
 a Citizen of New York. 
 
 [Smith (Melancthon)]. Address to the People of the State of New York. 
 By a Plebeian. 
 
 [Webster (Pelatiah)]. The Weakness of Brutus exposed: or some re- 
 marks in vindication of the Constitution. By a Citizen of Philadelphia. 
 
 [Coxe (Tench)]. An Examination of the Constitution of the United States 
 of America. By an American Citizen. 
 
 Wilson (James). Speech on the Federal Constitution, delivered in Phila- 
 delphia. 
 
 [Dickinson (John)]. Letters of Fabius on the Federal Constitution. 
 
 [Hanson (Alexander Contee)]. Remarks on the Proposed Plan of a 
 Federal Government. By Aristides. 
 
 Randolph (Edmund). Letter on the Federal Constitution. 
 
 [Lee (Richard Henry)]. Observations on the System of Government 
 proposed by the late Convention. By a Federal Farmer. 
 
 Mason (George). Objections to the Federal Constitution. 
 
 [Iredell (James)]. Observations on George Mason's Objections to the 
 Federal Constitution. By Marcus. 
 
 [Ramsay (David)]. An Address to the Freemen of South Carolina on the 
 Federal Constitution.. By Civis. 
 
 l^Gerry {Elbridge)]. 
 
 Observations / On the new Constitution, and on the Federal / 
 
 and State Conventions. / By a Columbian Patriot. / 
 
 [Boston: 1788.] 
 
 i2mo. pp. 19. C, M., B. A. 6g 
 
 The above title is merely a caption on the first page. It is not advertised in 
 any Massachusetts paper that I have been able to find, and was probably 
 printed for Gerry for limited circulation only. It is reprinted in Ford's 
 Pamphlets on the Constitution, and as below. 
 
 [Gerry {Elbridge.)] 
 
 Observations / on the / New Constitution, / and on the / 
 Foederal and State Conventions. / By a Columbian Patriot / 
 . . ., Boston Printed, New York Re-printed, / M,DCC.LXXXVIII. 
 
 8vo. pp. 22. N., C, S. 70 
 
 Printed by Thomas Greenleaf, in the N. Y. Journal, and reprinted, from the 
 same forms, for the " New York'[Anti] Federal Committee," who distributed 
 1630 copies among the county committees in the State. 
 
408 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 Gerry {Elbridge). 
 
 [Observations on the New Constitution. Brooklyn, N. Y.: 
 
 1887]. 
 
 8vo. pp. 23. 71 
 
 A few copies separately printed from No. 68. 
 Hall, Aaron. 
 
 An / Oration, / delivered at the Request / of the / Inhabit- 
 ants of Keene, June 30, 1788; /To Celebrate the Ratification / 
 of the / Federal Constitution / by the / State of New-Hamp- 
 shire. / By Aaron Hall, M. A. / Member of the late State 
 Convention. / Keene: State of New-Hampshire: / Printed by 
 James D. Griffith. / M,DCC,Lxxxviii. 
 
 Svo. pp. 15. B. A. 72 
 
 Hamilton {Alexander'). See also Nos. 32-66. 
 
 Propositions/ of Col. Hamilton, of New York, / In Conven- 
 tion for Establishing a Consti- /tutional Government for the/ 
 United States. / Also / a Summary of the Political Opinions 
 of/ John Adams,/ / Pittsfield : Printed by Phineas 
 
 Allen. 1802. 
 
 Svo. pp. 32. N. 73 
 
 [Hanson (Alexander Conlee)]. 
 
 Remarks / on the / Proposed Plan / of a / Federal Govern- 
 ment, / Addressed to the Citizens of the / United States 
 of America, / and Particularly to the People of / Maryland, / 
 By Aristides. /.../.../.../.../.../ An- 
 napolis ; / Printed by Frederick Green, / Printer to the State. 
 
 Svo. pp. 42. N., P. H. S., M. 74 
 
 Reprinted in Ford's Pamphlets on the Constitution. 
 
 Hanson (Alexander Contee). 
 
 [Remarks on the Proposed Plan of a Federal Government. 
 Brooklyn, N. Y. : 1888]. 
 
 Svo. pp. 39. 75 
 
 A few copies separately printed from No. 68. 
 
 Hitchcock (Enos). 
 
 An / Oration: / delivered July 4, 1788, / at the request of 
 the Inhabitants / of the / Town of Providence, / in / celebra- 
 tion / of the / Anniversary / of / American Independence, / 
 and of / the accession of nine States / to the / Federal Con- 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 4O9 
 
 stitution. / By Enos Hitchcock, A. M. / Providence : / Printed 
 
 by Bennett Wheeler. 
 
 8vo. pp. 24. 76 
 
 \Hopkinson {Francis) ]. 
 
 Account / of the / Grand Federal / Procession, / Philadel- 
 phia, July 4, 1788. / To which is added, / a / Letter / on the 
 / same Subject. / . . . / [Philadelphia :] M. Carey, Printer. 
 [1788.] 
 
 8vo. pp. (2), 22. 77 
 
 Appeared originally in Carey's American Museum, iv, 57, and the same forms 
 were used to print this edition. Only the "Account" and Wilson's speech are 
 reprinted in Hopkinson's Miscellaneous Essays, ii, 349, showing that the " Let- 
 ter" is not by him. 
 
 \Hopkinson (Francis) ]. 
 
 Account / of the / Grand Federal / Procession, / Philadel- 
 phia, July 4, 1788. / . . . / To which is added, / Mr. Wlson's 
 [Sic] Oration, / and a / Letter / on the / Subject of the Pro- 
 cession. / [Philadelphia: M. Carey. 1788.] 
 
 8vo. pp. (2), 22. 78 
 
 An / Impartial / Address, /to the / Citizens /of the / City 
 and County of Albany : / or, the / 35 Anti-Federal Objec- 
 tions / refuted. / By the Federal Committee / of the City of 
 Albany. / Printed by Charles R. Webster, at / his Free Press, 
 No. 36, State-street, near / the English Church, Albany. 
 
 i2mo, pp. 28 S. 79 
 
 Interesting Documents, / Containing: / An Account of the 
 Federal Procession, &c. July 23, 1788. / Sketch of the Pro- 
 ceedings of the Convention of the State of New York, which 
 adopted the Constitution 2 days after the Procession. / The 
 Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union between Thir- 
 teen United States, as propounded by the Congress of the 
 United States, 17th Nov. 1777, and approved by this State; 
 Feb. 6, 1778. / The Constitution of the U. S. with all its 
 Amendments. / The Constitution of the State of New-York, 
 with its Amendments. /The Declaration of Independence, New 
 York. / Published by John S. Murphy, Southwick & Pilsner, 
 Print. 9 Wall St. 18 19. 
 
 i2mo. pp. 128 N. 80 
 
4IO BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 Introduction. See No loS- 
 
 Iredell {James.) See also No. 24. 
 
 Answers to Mr. Mason's Objections to the New Constitu- 
 tion, recommended by the late Convention at Philadelphia. 
 By Marcus. [Brooklyn, N. Y. : 1888.] 
 
 8vo. pp. 38. 81 
 
 Printed in Ford's Pamphlets on the Constitution, from which a few copies were 
 separately printed as above. The original tract is described in No. 24. 
 
 \Jackson {Jonathan) J. 
 
 Thoughts / upon the / Political Situation / of the / United 
 States of America, / in which that of / Massachusetts / Is more 
 particularly considered. / With some / Observations on the 
 Constitution / for a / Federal Government. / Addressed to 
 the People of the Union. / By a Native of Boston. / . . . / 
 .../.../ Printed at Worcester, Massachusetts, / by Isaiah 
 Thomas. MDCCLXXXViii. 
 
 8vo. pp. 209. M., B. A., S. 82 
 
 Signed at end " Civis." The authorship of this pamphlet is also frequently 
 given to G. R. Minot, but both Sabin and Gushing give it as above. Reviewed 
 in TheAmerican Magazine, 744 and 804. 
 
 [Jay {John)]. See also Nos. 32-66. 
 
 An / Address / to the / People / of the / State of New- 
 York / On the Subject of the Constitution, / Agreed upon at 
 Philadelphia, / the 17th of September, 1787. / New-York: / 
 Printed by Samuel London, Printer to the State. 
 
 4to. pp. 19. ' N., B. A., C. S. 83 
 
 Reprinted in Ford's Pamphlets on the Constitution. 
 
 Jay {John). 
 
 An Address to the People of the State of New York, on 
 the Subject of the Constitution. [Brooklyn, N. Y. : 1887.] 
 
 8vo. pp. 20. 84 
 
 A few copies separately printed from No. 68. 
 
 Journal, / Acts and Proceedings, / of the Convention, / 
 assembled at Philadelphia, Monday, May 14, and dis- / solved 
 Monday, September 17, 1787, /which formed / The Constitu- 
 tion of the United States, / Published under the direction of 
 the President of the United States, conformably to a / Res- 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 4II 
 
 olution of Congress of March 27, 1818. /Boston: /Printed 
 and Published by Thomas B. Wait. / 18 19. 
 
 8vo. pp. 510. N., P., B., H. 85 
 
 Edited by John Quincy Adams. Reviewed in the Southern Review, ii, 432, 
 and in Taylor's New Views of the Constitution. Washington : 1823. See also 
 No. 28. 
 
 [^Lee {Richard Henry) ]. 
 
 Observations / leading to a fair examination / of the / Sys- 
 tem of Government, / proposed by the late / Convention ; / 
 and to several essential and necessary / alterations in it. / In 
 a number of / Letters / from the / Federal Farmer to the 
 Republican. / Printed in the Year M,DCC,LXXVII. 
 
 8vo. pp. 40. A. A. S. 86 
 
 The Letters of a Federal Farmer, was, to the Anti-Federalists, what The Fed- 
 eralist was to the supporters of the Constitution. Reprinted in Ford's Pam- 
 phlets on the Constitution. 
 
 [Lee {Richard Henry) J. 
 
 Observations / leading to a fair examination / of the / Sys- 
 tem of Government, / proposed by the late / Convention ; / 
 and to several essential and neces- / sary alterations in it. / 
 In a number of / Letters / from the / Federal Farmer to the 
 Republican. / Printed [in New York, by Thomas Green- 
 leaf] in the Year M,DCC,LXXXVII. 
 
 8vo. pp. 40. B. A., H., A. A. S., N., C. 87 
 
 \_Lee {Richard Henry) ]. 
 
 Observations / leading to a fair examination / of the / Sys- 
 tem of Government ; / proposed by the late / Convention ; / 
 and to several essential and necessary / alterations in it. / In 
 a number of / Letters / from the / Federal Farmer to the 
 Republiean. / Reprinted [in New York by Thomas Green- 
 leaf] by order of a Society of Gentlemen. / M.DCC.LXXXVII. 
 
 8vo. pp. 40. A. A. S. 88 
 
 Lee {Richard Henry). 
 
 Observations leading to a fair examination of the System of 
 
 Government, Proposed by the late Convention. [Brooklyn, 
 
 N. Y.: 1888.] 
 
 8vo. pp. (2), 47. 89, 
 
 A few copies separately printed from No. 68. 
 
412 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 \_Lee {Richard Henry) ]. 
 
 An / Additional number / of / Letters / from the / Federal 
 Farmer / to the / Republican ; / leading to fair examination / 
 of the / System of Government, / proposed by the late / Con- 
 vention ; / to several essential and neces- / sary alterations in 
 it ; / And calculated to Illustrate and Support the / Principles 
 and Positions / Laid down in the preceding / Letters. / 
 Printed [in New York by Thomas Greenleaf] in the year 
 M,DCC,LXXXVIII. 
 
 8vo. pp. [4i]-j8i. B. a., H., C. go 
 
 Letters of Fabius. See Nos. 25-6. 
 Lloyd, Thomas. See Nos. gi-i 10. 
 Maclaine, Archibald. See No. 24. 
 
 M'Kean {Thomas), and Wilson {James). 
 
 Commentaries / on the / Constitution / of the / United 
 States of America, / with that Constitution prefixed, / In 
 which are unfolded, / the / Principles of Free Government, / 
 and the Superior / Advantages of Republicanism Demon- 
 strated. / By James Wilson, L.L.D. / / and 
 
 Thomas M'Kean, L.L.D. / . . . / The whole extracted 
 from Debates published in Philadelphia by / J. Lloyd. / 
 London:/ Printed for J. Debrett, opposite Burtington-House, 
 Piccadilly ; / J. Johnson's, St. Paul's Church Yard ; and J. S. 
 Jordan, / No. 166 Fleet Street. / 1792. 
 
 8vo. pp. (2), 5—23. 25—147, (i). 91 
 
 This is a reissue of the remainder of the edition of Lloyd's Debates in the 
 Convention of Pennsylvania (No. no) with a new title and pp. 20-23, which 
 were printed in England. 
 
 McMaster (John Bach), and Stone {Frederick D). 
 
 Pennsylvania/ and the/ Federal Constitution/ 1787-1788/ 
 Edited by / John Bach McMaster / and / Frederick D. Stone / 
 Published for the Subscribers by / The Historical Society of 
 Pennsylvania / 1888 
 
 8vo. pp. viii, 803, 15 portraits. 92 
 
 A most valuable volume, including a history of the struggle over the ratifi- 
 cation, the debates in the convention, now for the first time collected, sketches 
 of the Pennsylvania members of the Federal Convention, and of the Pennsyl- 
 vania Convention, and the letters of Centinel. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 413 
 
 Madison {James). See Nos. 31-66. 
 
 . The / Papers / of / James Madison, / purchased by order 
 of Congress ; / being / his Correspondence and Reports of 
 Debates during / the Congress of the Confederation / and / 
 his Reports of Debates / in the / Federal Convention ; / now 
 published from the original manuscripts, depos- / ited in the 
 Department of State, by direction of / the joint library com- 
 mittee of Congress, / under the superintendence / of / Henry 
 D. Gilpin. / Volume I. / Washinton : / Lantree & O'Sullivan. / 
 1840. 
 
 3 vols. 8vo. pp. (2) !x, 580, xxii, (2), xxii, (2), (58i)-l242, (2), xiv, (2), 
 (i243)-i624, ccvlvi, 16 11. 93 
 
 Also issues with change of date in New York and Mobile and Boston. The 
 whole of these three volumes were also embodied in the fifth volume of Elliot 
 (No. 31), but this edition is much preferable from the larger type. 
 
 Reviewed in The Democratic Review, v, 243 ; vi, 140, 337: in The Amer- 
 ican Church Review xv, 541, and by C, F. Adams in The North American 
 Review, liii, 41. 
 
 Marcus. See Nos. 24 and 81. 
 
 Martin {Luther'). 
 
 The / Genuine Information,/ delivered to the/ Legislature 
 of the State of / Maryland, / Relative to the Proceedings / 
 of the / General Convention, / Lately held at Philadelphia ; / 
 By / Luther Martin, Esquire, / Attorney-General of Mary- 
 land, / and / One of the Delegates in the said Convention. / 
 Together with / A Letter to the Hon. Thomas C. Deye / 
 Speaker of the House of Delegates, / An Address to the 
 Citizens of the United / States, / And some Remarks relative 
 to a Standing / Army, and a Bill of Rights. / . . . / Phila. 
 delphia ; / Printed by Eleazer Oswald, at the Coffee-House. / 
 M,DCC,LXXXVin. 
 
 8vo. pp. viii, 93. 94 
 
 By direction of the Legislature of Maryland, Mr. Martin reported the pro. 
 ceedings of the Federal Convention to them. It is a work of the greatest 
 value from the inside light that this member, and opposer of the Constitution, 
 sheds on this secret history of the Convention, but must be taken as a partizan 
 statement. It is reprinted in Elliot and in Nos. 13S-42, 
 
 Mason {George). 
 
 The Objections of the / Hon. George Mason, / to the pro. 
 
414 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 posed Fcederal Constitution. / Addressed to the Citizens of 
 Virginia. / / Printed by Thomas Nicolas [in Rich- 
 mond : 1787 or 8]. 
 
 Folio. Broadside. S. 95 
 
 Reprinted in Ford's Pamphlets on the Constitution and ' ' extracts " are given 
 in Elliot, i. 
 
 Mason {George). 
 
 [The objections of the Hon. George Mason, to the proposed 
 Foederal Constitution. Brooklyn, N. Y. : 1888]. 
 
 8vo. pp. 6. 96 
 
 A few copies separately printed from No. 68. 
 
 Massachusetts Debates. Boston : 1788. 
 
 Debates, / Resolutions and other Proceedings, / of the / 
 Convention / of the / Commonwealth of Massachusetts, / 
 Convened at Boston, on the 9th of January, 1788, / and con- 
 tinued until the 7th of February follow- / ing, for the purpose 
 of assenting to and ratify- / ing the Constitution recom- 
 mended by the / Grand Federal Convention. / Together with 
 / The Yeas and Nays on the / Decision of the Grand Ques- 
 tion. / To which / The Federal Constitution / is prefixed. / 
 Boston : / Printed and sold by Adams and Nourse, in Court- 
 Street ; and / Benjamin Russell, and Edmund Freeman, in 
 State-Street. / M,DCC,LXXXVIII. 
 
 8vo. pp. 219. C, M., B. A. 97 
 
 Reported by Benjamin Russell, printer of The Massachusetts Centiitel. His 
 own account is given in Buckingham's Specimens of Newspaper Literature, ii, 
 49. 
 
 Massachusetts Debates. Boston: 1808. 
 
 Debates, / Resolutions and other proceedings / of the / 
 Convention / of the / Commonwealth of Massachusetts. / 
 Convened at Boston, on the 9th of January, / 1788, and con- 
 tinued until the 7th of Februa- / ry following, for the purpose 
 of assenting / to and ratifying the Constitution recom- / 
 mended by the grand Federal Convention. / Together with 
 the / Yeas and Nays / on / the decision of the grand ques- 
 tion. / To which / The Federal Constitution is prefixed ; / and 
 to which are added, / the Amendments / which have been 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 415 
 
 made therein. / Boston : / Printed and sold by Oliver & 
 Monroe, / and Joshua Gushing, State-Street, / 1808. 
 
 Jzmo. pp. 236. H. 98 
 
 Massachusetts Debates. Boston: 1856. 
 
 Debates and Proceedings / in the / Convention / of the / 
 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, / held in the year / 1788, / 
 and which finally ratified the / Constitution of the United 
 States. / Printed by authority of Resolves of the Legisla- 
 ture, 1856. / Boston : / William White, / Printer to the Com- 
 monwealth. / 1856. 
 
 8vo. pp. (16), 442. g9 
 
 Edited by Bradford K. Pierce and Charles Hale. It contains not only the 
 debates as printed in the two former editions, but the ante and post proceed- 
 ings of the General Court; Gerry's official letter; the Journal of the Conven- 
 tion; Judge Parsons " Minutes " of the debates; an account of the reception of 
 the news of the ratification, and of the procession which followed; the "Let- 
 ters of an American;" Speeches of Franklin in the Federal Convention, and 
 Wilson in the Pa. Convention; 4 " Letters of Brutus," and a series of personal 
 letters relating to the proceedings in Massachusetts, mostly taken from Spark's 
 Writings of Washington. 
 
 It is a most valuable volume for the history of the struggle over ratification 
 in Massachusetts, but it is a little strange that the editors should pass over the 
 essays on the Constitution from Massachusetts pens and select the letters 
 of "An American" and of "Brutus" — the first a Pennsylvania series, by 
 Tench Coxe, and the second by a New York writer. 
 
 Minot, George R. See No. 82. 
 
 Minutes of the Convention. See Nos. 101-2 and 1 1 1. 
 
 [^Montgomery, /antes']. 
 
 Decius's / Letters / on the / Opposition / to the / New 
 Constitution / in / Virginia, / 1789. / Richmond : / Printed 
 by Aug. Davis, 
 
 8vo. pp. 134. C. 100 
 
 " Written by Dr. Montgomery, except the dedication, which was by John 
 Nicholas, of Albemarle. MS. notes by John Nicholas." MS. note by Jeffer- 
 son, in his own copj' now in the Congressional Library. 
 
 This volume includes, not only the Letters signed Decius, contributed to the 
 Virginia Independent Chronicle, between December, 1788 and July, 1789, but 
 also many answers to the same, signed "Juvenal," " Philo Pat. Pat. Patria," 
 " Anti Decius," " Honestus,'' and others. 
 
 It is a most scathing attack on the Anti-Federalists in Virginia, and especially 
 on their leader, Patrick Henry. Perhaps nothing illustrates better the rarity 
 
4l6 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 and diflSculty of finding the pamphlets of this period than the fact that Mr. 
 Tyler, so well read in American literature, has in his Life of Patrick Henry, 
 entirely overlooked this most plain spoken laying bare of the motives and 
 actions of Henry, of which I have been able to discover only a single (imper- 
 fect) copy. 
 
 I have been able to find nothing concerning Dr. Montgomery, except that he 
 was a member of the Virginia Convention. The so called third edition is 
 nnder John Nicholas — No. 105. 
 
 Native of Boston. See No. 82. 
 
 New Jersey Journal. 
 
 Minutes / of the / Convention / of the / State of New- 
 Jersey, / Holden at Trenton the nth Day of December 1787./ 
 Trenton : / Printed by Isaac Collins, Printer to the State. / 
 M,DCCC,LXXXVIII. 
 
 4to. pp. 31. p. H. S. lai 
 
 750 copies printed. 
 
 New Jersey Journal. 
 
 Minutes / of the / Convention / of the / State of New 
 Jersey, / Holden at Trenton the nth Day of December 1787. 
 / Trenton : / Printed by Isaac Collins, Printer to the State. / 
 M,DCC,LXXXVIII. / Trenton — Reprinted by Clayton L. 
 Traver, mdccclxxxviii. 
 
 4to. pp. 31. 102 
 
 New York Debates. 
 
 The /Debates / and / Proceedings / of the / Convention / 
 of the / State of New-York, / Assembled at Poughkeepsie, / 
 on the 17th June, 1788. / To deliberate and decide on the 
 Form of Federal Govern- / ment recommended by the Gen- 
 eral Convention at / Philadelphia, on the 17th September, 
 1787. / Taken in shorthand. / New-York: / Printed and sold 
 by Francis Childs. / M,DCC,LXXXVIII. 
 
 8vo. pp. (2), 144. N. S. 103 
 
 From a letter in the Lamb papers (N. Y. Historical Soc.) it appears probable 
 that at least Hamilton, Jay and Lansing revised their speeches, though Francis 
 Childs, the reporter, virtually, in his preface, says that no such revision took 
 place. It is reprinted in Elliot, ii. 
 
 New York Journal. 
 
 Journal / of the / Convention / of the / State of New- 
 York, / Held at Pougheeepsie, in Dutchess County, the 17th 
 of June, 1788. / Poughkeepsie : / Printed by Nicholas Power, 
 a few rods East from the Court-house. [1788.] 
 
 4to. pp. 86. S. 104 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 417 
 
 \Nicholas {John) ] . 
 
 [i title] Introduction / and Concise View of / Decius's Let- 
 ters, / With the Title-page, and the Substance and contents of 
 the whole work, / Hereafter to be published at full length in a 
 volume / . . . 
 
 Decius's Letters, / on the / opposition to the / Federal 
 Convention, / in Virginia: / Written in 1788 and 1789. / The 
 Third Edition. / With / a new Introduction, / and addi- 
 tional pieces and notes, / on the / Principles and Operation of 
 Party Spirit since. / With an Appendix, / consisting of /. 
 Various Interesting Letters, &c. / from Washington, Jeffer- 
 son, Madison, / and other High Characters, / in support of 
 the last Letters; / Written in 1818. / Richmond: / Published 
 by the Author. / Printed at the office of the Virginia Patriot. 
 
 / 1818 
 
 8vo. pp. 48. B. A. 105 
 
 " Written by John Nicholas, Esqr. formerly a member of Congress (rOm 
 Virginia now resident in the State of New York. Boston 25 Sept i8i8 W. S. 
 Shaw Sec. Bost. Athen." 
 
 Mr. Shaw probably derived his note given above, from John Adams, whose 
 copy this was. 
 
 The first edition (No. 100) is referred by Jefferson, apparently on Nicholas' 
 own authority to Dr. Montgomery, so that we seemingly have Jefferson givihg 
 the authorship to Montgomery, and Adams giving it to Nicholas. They may 
 both be right, however, for the above pamphlet is merely the prospectus of a 
 new edition, and therefore might be written by an entirely different man than 
 the author. 
 
 The prospectus was issued immediately after the appearance of Wirt's Life 
 of Patrick Henry, with the avowed purpose of neutralizing that rose-colored 
 narrative. It was never however, carried further than the prospectus. 
 
 North Carolina Amendments. 
 
 State of North Carolina : / In Convention, August i, 1788. 
 
 Folio. 1 1. S. 106 
 
 The Declaration of Rights, and Amendments, of the first Convention of 
 North Carolina. 
 
 North Carolina Debates. 
 
 Proceedings / and / Debates / of the / Convention / of / 
 North-Carolina, / Convened at Hillsborough on Monday the 
 2ist Day / of July, 1788, for the Purpose of deliberating / 
 and determining on the Constitution recom- / mended by the 
 General Convention at Philadel- / phia the 17th Day of Sep- 
 
418 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 tember 1787. / To which is prefixed / The Federal Constitu- 
 tion. / Edentown : / Printed by Hodge & Wills, Printers to 
 the State. / m,DCC,lxxxix. 
 
 8vo. pp. 280. N., C, S., A. A. S. 107 
 
 Reported by David Robertson. 1000 copies printed at the expense of a few 
 Federalists for distribution among the people. Reprinted in Elliot, iv, i. The 
 debates of the second Convention are only to be found, in fragmentary condi- 
 tion, in the North Carolina paper.s of that date. 
 
 Observations leading to. See Nos. 86-9. 
 
 Observations on the New Constitution. See Nos. 69-71. 
 
 Observations / on the / Proposed / Constitution / for the / 
 United States of America. / clearly shewing it to be a com- 
 plete System / of / Aristocracy and Tyranny, and / Destruc- 
 tfve / of the / Rights and Liberties / of the / People. / 
 Printed in the State of New-York, / M,DCC,LXXXVIII. 
 
 8vo. pp. 126. S., B., B. A. 108 
 
 An Anti-Federal compilation, containing : 
 
 Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of 
 
 Pennsylvania. (No. 2 infra.) 
 Letter of Edmund Randolph (No. 116 infra.) 
 Letters of Centinel. 
 The Constitution. 
 Two hundred and twenty-five copies were distributed by the New York Anti- 
 Federal committee to the local county committees of the State. 
 
 The " Letters of Centinel," were by Samuel Bryan, of Philadelphia, and 
 appeared originally in The Independent Gazetteer of that city. The letters were 
 exceedingly personal, and especially severe on Washington and Franklin, so it 
 is rather amusing to find Bryan writing to George Clinton in 1790 and request- 
 ing that he use his influence with Washington to obtain for his father a judge- 
 ship in the new government, and using his authorship of the letters as the 
 reason for Clinton's furthering his request. 
 
 Order of Procession, / In Honor of the Establishment of 
 
 the Constitution of the United States. / To parade . . . Friday 
 
 the 4th of July, 1788. / Philadelphia : / Printed by 
 
 Hall and Sellers. 
 
 Folio. I 1. 109 
 
 Pennsylvania Debates. 
 
 Debates / of the / Convention, / of the / State of Pennsyl- 
 vania, / on the /Constitution,/ proposed / for the / Govern- 
 ment / of the / United States. / In Two Volumes. / Vol. I / 
 Taken accurately in Short-Hand, by / Thomas Lloyd, / . . . 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 415 
 
 / . . . / Printed by Joseph James, / in Philadelphia, A. D. 
 M.DCC.LXXXVIII. 
 
 8vo. pp. 147. (2II.) no 
 
 All ever published, being only the speeches of M'Kean and Wilson, on the 
 Federal side of the argument. It is reviewed in The American Magazine, 262. 
 See Nos. r-2, and ga. 
 
 Pennsylvania Journal. 
 
 Minutes / of the / Convention / of the / Commonwealth / 
 of / Pennsylvania, / which commenced at Philadelphia, on 
 Tuesday, the / Twentieth Day of November, One Thousand 
 / Seven Hundred and Eighty-Seven, / for the purpose of / 
 Taking mto Consideration the Constitution framed by / the 
 late Foederal Convention for the United States of America. / 
 Philadelphia : / Printed by Hall and Sellers, in Market-street. 
 / M,DCC,LXXXVII. 
 
 Folio, pp. 28. P. H S., H. Ill 
 
 Pennsylvania Resolution. 
 
 [Resolution of the Pennsylvania General Assembly, Septem- 
 ber 29, 1 787. J 
 
 112 
 The resolve for holding a Convention to discuss the Constitution. 3000 
 copies ordered to be printed, 1000 of which were to be in German. 
 
 Pinckney {Charles). 
 
 Observations / on the / Plan of Government / submitted to. 
 / Federal Convention, / In Philadelphia, on the 28th of May, 
 1787. / By the Hon. Charles Pinckney, Esq. L.L.D. / Delegate 
 from the State of South-Carolina. / Delivered at different 
 Times in the course of their Discussions. / New York: — 
 Printed by Francis Childs [1787] 
 
 4to. pp 27. B. A., N., M., A., 113 
 
 This is really the speech of Pinckney, introducing his draft of a constitution 
 in the Convention, May 2g, 1787, which for some reason was omitted by both 
 Yates and Madison in their minutes. Though it does not include the proposed 
 draft, it nevertheless enables one to form a clear idea of what it was, and 
 proves that the draft furnished by Pinckney at the request of J. Q. Adams, 
 for publication in the Journal, and from that generally copied into other 
 places, to be fictitious in both form and substance. 
 
 Plan of the New Constitution. See No. 13. 
 
 Plebeian {A). See Nos. 120-1. 
 
 Proceedings of the Federal Convention. See Nos. 14-5. 
 
420 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 [^Ramsay {David)]. 
 
 An / Address / to the / Freemen / of / South Carolina, / on 
 the Subject of the / Federal Constitution, / Proposed by the 
 Convention, which met in / Philadelphia, May, 1787. / Char- 
 leston, / Printed by Bowen and Co., No. 31, Bay. 
 
 i6mo. pp. 12. C. 114 
 
 Signed Civis. Reprinted in Ford's Pamphlets on the Constitution. 
 
 Ramsay {David). 
 
 [An Address to the Freemen of South Carolina, on the Sub- 
 ject of the Federal Constitution. Brooklyn, N. Y.: 1888]. 
 
 8vo. pp. 10. 115 
 
 A few copies separately printed from No. 68. 
 
 Randolph {Edmund). 
 
 Letter on the Federal Constitution, October 16, 1787. By 
 
 Edmund Randolph. [Richmond : Printed by Augustin Davis. 
 
 1787.J 
 
 i6mo. pp. 16. ti6 
 
 Reprinted in Ford's Pamphlets on the Constitution and in No. 108. 
 
 Randolph {Edmund). 
 
 [Letter on the Federal Constitution, October 16, 1787. By 
 
 Edmund Randolph. Brooklyn, N. Y.; 1888.] 
 
 8vo. pp. 18. 117 
 
 A few copies separately reprinted from No. 68. 
 
 The / Ratifications / of the / New Fcederal Constitution, / 
 
 together with the Amendments, / proposed by the / Several 
 
 States./ . . . / Richmond ; / Printed by Aug. Davis / m,dcc,- 
 
 LXXXVIII. 
 
 i2mo. pp. (4), 32. A. A. S. irS 
 
 Remarks on the Address. See No. 132 
 Remarks on the proposed See Nos. 74-5- 
 Result vf the Debates. See No. 16. 
 
 A Review of the Constitution Proposed by the late Conven- 
 tion, Held at Philadelphia, 1787. By a Federal RepubHcan. 
 
 Philadelphia: Printed by Robert Smith and James 
 
 Prang. 1787. 
 
 8vo. pp. 39. iig 
 
 A copy was sold in the O'Callaghan sale, (lot 668), and a copy is mentioned 
 
 in the Bowdoin College Library Catalogue, which cannot now be found. O'-her- 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 42 1 
 
 wise I have seen no mention of this pamphlet except in the original adver- 
 ments, from which the above title is taken. 
 
 Robertson, David. See Nos. 107 and 127-8. 
 
 Russell, Benjamin. See Nos. 97-8. 
 
 Secret Proceedings. See Nos. 1 58-42. 
 
 \_S'mith (Melancthon)]. 
 
 An / Address / to the / People / of the / State of New-York : 
 / Showing the Necessity of Making / Amendments / to the / 
 Constitution, proposed for the United States,/ previous to its 
 / Adoption. / By a Plebeian, / Printed [by Robert Hodge, in 
 New York] in the State of New York, / M,DCC,LXXXVlii. 
 
 8vo. pp. 26. B. A., A. A. S. 120 
 
 Reprinted in Ford's Pamphlets on the Constitution. 
 Smith {Melancthon). 
 
 [An Address to the People of the State of New York : 
 Shewing the Necessity of making Amendments to the Con- 
 stitution. Brooklyn, N. Y, 18S8}. 
 
 8vo. pp. 27. 12i 
 
 A few copies separately printed from No. 68, 
 
 South Carolina 
 
 Debates / which arose in the / House oi Representatives / 
 
 of South Carolina, / on the Constitution framed for the / 
 
 United States, / by a Convention of Delegates, / Assembled 
 
 at Philadelphia. / Charleston : / Collected by R. Haswell, and 
 
 published at the City Gazette / Printing Office, No. 47, Bay. / 
 
 M,DCC,XXXVIII. 
 
 4to. pp. 55. B. A. 122 
 
 South Carolina. 
 
 Debates / which arose in the / House of Representatives / 
 of / South-Carolina, / on the Constitution framed for the 
 United States, / by a / Convention of Delegates assembled at 
 Philadelphia. /Together with such /notices of the Convention 
 / as could be procured. /.../.../.../.../ Charles- 
 ton : / Printed by A. E. Miller, / No. 4 Broad Street. / 1831. 
 
 8vo. pp. (4), 95- M. 123 
 
 The first edition of Elliot's Debates contained nothing relating to South 
 
 Carolina, and this volume was prepared by some citizen of the State to piece 
 
 out the omission. In the later editions of Elliot, he reprinted this volume 
 
 entire. 
 
422 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 State of North Carolina. See No. io6. 
 
 Stone, Frederick D. See No. 92 
 
 Supplement to the Independent Journal. See No. 16. 
 
 Thoughts upon the Political. See No. 83 
 
 Tucker {John Randolph). 
 
 The History / of the / Federal Convention of 1787 and its 
 Work. / An Address / delivered before the graduating classes 
 / at the / Sixty-third Anniversary / of the / Yale Law School, 
 / on / June 28th, 1887 / by / Hon. John Randolph Tucker, 
 LL.D. / New Haven : / Published by the Law Department of 
 
 Yale College. 1887. 
 
 8vo. pp. 54. H. 124 
 
 A / View / of the / Proposed Constitution / of the / United 
 States, / as agreed to by the / Convention / of Delegates from 
 several States at Philadelphia, the 17th Day of Septem- 
 ber,/ 1787 — Compared with the present Confederation. /With 
 sundry Notes and Observations. / Philadelphia : / Printed by 
 R. Aitken & Son, at Popes Head /in Market Street. / M.DCC- 
 
 LXXXVII. 
 
 8vo. pp. 37. B. A., N., B. 125 
 
 A comparison in parallel columns between the Articles of Confederation, 
 and the proposed Constitution, with anti-federal notes. 
 
 Virginia. Act calling Convention. 
 
 Virginia, to wit: / General Assembly begun and held at the 
 Capitol in the city of / Richmond on Monday the fifth day of 
 October, in the year /of our Lord, one thousand seven hundred 
 and eighty seven / An Act / concerning the convention to be 
 held /in June next./ Passed December 12th, 1787. 
 
 Folio. Broadside. S. 126 
 
 Virginia. Debates. 1 788-9. 
 
 Debates / and other / Proceedings / of the / Convention / 
 of/ Virginia, /Convened at Richmond, on Monday the 2d day 
 of / June, 1788, for the purpose of deliberating on the / Con- 
 stitution recommended by the Grand Federal / Convention. / 
 To which is prefixed, / the / Federal Constitution. / Peters- 
 burg: / Printed by / Hunter and Prentis. / M,DCC,LXXXVni. 
 
 3 vols. 8 vo. pp. 194; 195; 228. N., C, B. A., 127 
 
 The imprints of volumes II. and III. vary slightly from the above, being 4- 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 423 
 
 /Federal Constitution ./ Volume II. [III]. Petersburg: /Printed by William 
 Prentis, / m.dcc.lxxxix. / 
 
 Printed without being proof read. In 1805 it was already described as a 
 rare book, and at present is only equalled in rarity in the state debates, by 
 those of North Carolina. Volumes two and three are of much greater rarity 
 than the first. 
 
 Virginia. Debates. Richmond. 1805. 
 
 Debates / and other / Proceedings / of the / Convention of 
 Uirginia, [sic] convened at Richmond, on Monday the second 
 day of June, / 1787, for the purpose of deliberating on the 
 Con- / stitution recommended by the grand / Federal Conven- 
 tion. / To which is prefixed / the Federal Constitution. / 
 Taken in short hand, / by David Robertson — of Petersburg. / 
 Second Edition. / Richmond : / Printed at the Enquirer-Press 
 / for Ritchie & Worsley and Augustine Davis. / 1805. 
 
 8vo. pp. viii, 477. N., C, A. A. S. 128 
 
 This edition was corrected and compared with a portion of the original sten- 
 ographic notes, by the reporter. 
 
 Virginia Journal. 
 
 Journal / of the / Convention / of / Virginia ; / held in the 
 /City of Richmond, / on the / First Monday in June, /in the 
 Year of our Lord One thousand seven hundred and / eighty- 
 eight. / Richmond : / Printed by Thomas W. White, / Main-st. 
 opposite the Bell Tavern.-/ 1827. 
 
 8vo. pp. 39. B. A., P. 129 
 
 Weakness of Brutus. See No. 112,-4.. 
 
 [ Webster {Noah)]. 
 
 An / Examination / into the / leading principles /of the / 
 Federal Constitution / proposed by the late / Convention / 
 held at Philadelphia. / With / Answers to the principal objec- 
 tions / that have been raised against the system. / By a Citi- 
 zen of America. /.../.../ Philiadelphia : / Printed and 
 sold by Prichard & Hall, in Market Street, / the second door 
 above Laetitia Court. / M.DCC.LXXXVII. 
 
 8vo. pp. 55. C.. B. A., P., H. 130 
 
 Reprinted, from the Author's annotated copy, in Ford's Pamphlets on the 
 Constitution. 
 
 Webster, Noah. 
 
424 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 [An Examination into the leading principles of the Federal 
 Constitution. Brooklyn, N. Y. : 1887.] 
 
 8vo. pp. 41, 131 
 
 A. few copies separately printed from No. 68. 
 [WedsUr {PelatiaK)\. 
 
 Remarks / on the / Address of Sixteen Members / of the / 
 Assembly of Pennsylvania, / to their / Constituents, / Dated 
 September 29, 1787. /With some Strictures on the Objections 
 to the / Constitution, / Recommended by the late Federal 
 Convention, / Humbly offered to the Public / By a Citizen of 
 Philadelphia. /. Philadelphia: / Printed by Eleazer Oswald, at 
 the Coffee-House. / M,DCC,LXXXVli. 
 
 Bvo. pp. 28. B. A., M. 132. 
 
 Also (abridged) in Webster's Political Essays, and (entire) in No. 92. 
 [ Webster {Pelatiah)~\. 
 
 The Weaknesses of Brutus exposed : / or some / Remarks / 
 in / Vindication of the Constitution / proposed by the late / 
 / Federal Convention, / against the / Objections and gloomy 
 Fears of that Writer. / Humbly offered to the Public. / By / 
 A Citizen of Philadelphia. / Printed for and to be had of John 
 Sparhawk, Market-street, / near the Court House / M.DCC- 
 
 LXXXVII. 
 
 Bvo. pp. 23. B. A., A. A. S., M. 133 
 
 Reprinted in Webster's Political Essays, and in Ford's Pamphlets on the Con- 
 stitution. In reprinting this pamphlet I suggested, with a question mark, that 
 Brutus was written by Thomas Tredwell, having found that he used that sig- 
 nature to a newspaper essay published in 1789. I have since concluded that 
 they were from the pen of Robert Yates, member of the Federal Convention 
 from New York. 
 
 Webster {Pelatiak). 
 
 [The Weakness of Brutus exposed : or some Remarks in 
 Vindication of the Constitution proposed by the late Federal 
 Convention. Brooklyn, [N. Y. : 1888.] 
 
 8vo. pp. 15. 134 
 
 A few copies separately printed from No. 68. 
 We the People. See Nos. 1 7-20. 
 Williamson {Hugh). 
 
 Address to the Freemen of Edentown and the County of 
 Chowan, etc. on the New Plan of Government. 
 
 8vo. 135 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 425 
 
 Title from the N. Y. Historical Society Catalogue, but an examination shows 
 it to be merely a newspaper clipping mounted on sheets of writing paper. 
 
 Wilson {James). See No. 91. 
 
 Substance of an Address / to a / meeting of the Citizens of 
 Philadelphia, / delivered, October sixth, mdcclxxxvii, / by 
 the honorable / James Wilson, Esquire, one of the delegates 
 from the State of Pennsylvania to the /late Continental Con- 
 vention. [Brooklyn, N. Y. : 1888.] 
 
 8vo. pp. 7. 136 
 
 A few copies separately printed from No. 68. 
 
 " Mr. Wilson's speech is read with much approbation here by one party; the 
 other party see nothing but nonsense in it. " 
 " It has varnished an iron trap." 
 
 Wilson {James). 
 
 The Substance/ of a/ Speech /delivered by / James Wil- 
 son, Esq. / Explanatory of the general Principles of the pro- 
 posed / Federal Constitution ; / Upon a Motion made by the 
 / Honorable Thomas McKean, / in the Convention of the 
 State of Pennsylvania. / On Saturday the 24th of November, 
 1787./ Philadelphia: /Printed and Sold by Thomas Bradford, 
 in Front-Street, / four Doors below the Coffee-House, MDCC- 
 LXXXVII. 
 
 8vo. pp. 10. 137 
 
 Reported by Alexander J. Dallas, Editor of T/ie Pennsylvania Herald. 
 Thomas Lloyd charged Dallas in a communication to the papers, with misrep- 
 resenting what Wilson had said. 
 Yates {Robert). Secret Proceedings. Albany. 1821 
 
 Secret / Proceedings and Debates / of the / Convention / 
 assembled at Philadelphia, in the Year 1787, for the purpose/ 
 of forming the / Constitution / of / the United States of 
 America. / From the Notes taken by the late Robert Yates, 
 Esq. Chief/ Justice of New-York, and copied by John Lansing, 
 Jun. / Esq. late Chancellor of that State, Members / of that 
 Convention. / Including /" The Genuine Information," laid 
 before the Legislature of / Maryland, by Luther Martin, Esq. 
 then Attorney Gen- / eral of that State, and a member of the 
 same / Convention. / Also, / other Historical Documents rela- 
 tive to the Federal Compact / of the North American Union. 
 / Albany : / Printed by Webster and Skinners, / at their Book- 
 
426 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 Store, in the White House, corner of State and Pearl Streets./ 
 1821. 
 
 8vo. pp. 308. 138 
 
 An outline of Yate's Minutes appeared in Hall's American Law Journal, iv, 
 
 563, 1813. 
 
 Yates was a member of the Federal Convention and though his memoranda 
 
 only is to July 5, at which time he left the Convention, it is only second to 
 
 Madison's Debates in importance. It is noticed in Taylor's New Views of the 
 
 Constitution. 
 This first edition is by no means a common volume. 
 
 Yates {Robert). Secret Proceedings. Washington. 1836. 
 
 Secret / Proceedings and Debates / + / Washington : / 
 Printed for G. Templeman, / Bookseller and Stationer, Penn- 
 sylvania Avenue. / 1839. 
 
 8vo. pp 308. 139 
 
 Yates {Robert). Secret Proceedings. Richmond. 1 839 
 
 Secret / Proceedings and Debates / + / Richmond, Va. / 
 Published by Wilbur Curtiss. / 1839. 
 
 8vo. pp. xi, 335. 
 
 Yates {Robert). Secret Proceedings. Louisville. 1 844 
 
 Secret / Proceedings and Debates / + / Louisville, Ky. / 
 
 Published by Alston Mygatt. / 1844. 
 
 8vo. pp. xi, 335. 140 
 
 Also copies dated 1845. 
 
 Yates {Robert). Secret Proceedings. Cincinnati. 
 
 Secret / Proceedings and Debates, / + / Cincinnati. / Pub- 
 lished by Alston Mygatt. / [184—?] 
 
 8vo. pp. xi, 335. 141 
 
REFERENCE LIST. 
 
 General Works — Histories. 
 
 Allen (T.) Facts ... in the origination of the American 
 
 Union (new Series). Boston : 1870. 
 Bancroft (G.) History of the Constitution. No. 5. 
 Cocke (W. A.) Constitutional History of the U. S. Phila. : 
 
 1858. 
 CofHn (C. C.) Building the Nation. N. Y. : 1883. 
 Curtis (G. T.) History of the Constitution. No. 23. 
 Elliot (J.) Debates in the several State Conventions. No. 
 
 30. 
 
 Frothingham (R.) Rise of the Republic of the United- 
 States. Boston: 1872. 
 
 Hildreth (R.) History of the U. S. (ist series, iii). N. Y. : 
 1852. 
 
 McMaster (J. B.) History of the People of the U. S. (i). 
 N. Y.: 1883. 
 
 McMaster (J. B.) Making a Government, in The [Philadel- 
 phia] Press. Sept. 15, 1887. 
 
 Miller (S. F.) Oration at the 100 Anniversary of the Consti- 
 tution. Phila.: 1887. 
 
 Patton (J. H.) Concise History of the American People. 
 N.Y.: 1882. 
 
 Porter (L. H.) Outlines of the Constitutional History of the 
 U.S. N. Y. : 1883. 
 
 Schouler (J.) History of the U. S. (i). N. Y. : 1881. 
 
 Sterne (S.) Constitutional History ... of the U. S. N. Y. : 
 1883. 
 
 Thorpe (F. N.) Origin of the Constitution, in Mag. of Am. 
 Hist, xviii, 130. 
 
428 REFERENCE LIST. 
 
 Towle (N. C.) History and Analysis of the U. S. Constitu- 
 tion. Boston : v. d. 
 
 Von Hoist (H.) Constitutional and Political History of the 
 U. S. (i). Chicago : 1876. 
 
 Winsor (J.) Narrative and Critical History of America, (vii). 
 Boston: li 
 
 General Works — Printed documentary sources. 
 Ames (F.) Works of . . . Boston: 1809. 
 Ames (F.) Works of . . . edited by S. Ames. Boston : 
 
 1854. 
 Belknap Papers. (Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll. 5th series, ii and 
 
 iii). Boston: 1877. 
 Diplomatic Correspondence of the U. S. 1 783-1 789. Boston : 
 
 1837- 
 Franklin (B.) Works of . . . edited by J. Sparks. Boston : 
 
 1840, 
 
 Franklin (B.) Works of . . . edited by J. Bigelow. N. Y. : 
 1887. 
 
 Hamilton (A.) Works of . . . edited by J. C. Hamilton. N. 
 Y. : 1850. 
 
 Hamilton (A.) Works of . . . edited by H. C. Lodge. N. 
 Y.: 1885. 
 
 J^y (J-) Writings of . . . edited by H. P. Johnson, (in prep- 
 aration). N. Y. : 
 
 Leake (J. Q.) Life and Times of John Lamb. Albany: 
 
 1857- 
 
 Letters and Papers illustrating the formation of the Constitu- 
 tion, in No. 5. 
 
 McRee (G. J.) Life of James Iredell, (ii). N. Y. : 1858. 
 
 Madison (J.) Papers of . . . No. 93. 
 
 Madison (J.) Letters and other writings. Phila. : 1865. 
 
 Morris (G.) Writings of. (in preparation). N. Y. : 
 
 Washington (G.) Writings of . . . edited by J. Sparks. 
 Boston: 1837. 
 
 Washington (G.) Writings of . . . edited by W. C. Ford. 
 N.Y.: \i 
 
REFERENCE LIST. 429 
 
 General Works — Periodicals. 
 
 New Hampshire. 
 Freemans Oracle and N. H. Advertiser, [Exeter], 
 N. H. Gazette and the General Advertiser. [Exeter], 
 N. H. Mercury. [Portsmouth]. 
 N. H. Recorder and Weekly Advertiser. [Keene]. 
 N, H. Spy. [Portsmouth]. 
 
 Massachusetts. 
 American Herald. [Worcester]. 
 Berkshire Chronicle. 
 Boston Gazette. 
 
 Cumberland Gazette. [Portland, Me]. 
 Essex Journal. [Salem]. 
 Hampshire Chronicle. [Springfield]. 
 Hampshire Gazette. [Northampton], 
 Hampshire Herald. [Springfield]. 
 Independent Chronicle. [Boston]. 
 Massachusetts Centinel. [Boston]. 
 Massachusetts Gazette. [Boston]. 
 Massachusetts Spy. [Worcester]. 
 Salem Mercury. 
 Western Star. [Stockbridge]. 
 
 Rhode Island. 
 Newport Herald. 
 Providence Gazette. 
 United States Chronicle. [Providence]. 
 
 Connecticut. 
 American Mercury. [Hartford]. 
 Connecticut Courant. [Hartford]. 
 Connecticut Gazette. [New London]. 
 Connecticut Journal. [New Haven]. 
 Middlesex Gazette. [Middletown]. 
 New Haven Chronicle. 
 New Haven Gazette. 
 Norwich Packet. 
 Weekly Monitor. [Litchfield]. 
 
 New York. 
 Albany Gazette. • 
 
 Albany Register. 
 
 American Magazine. [New York.] 
 Goshen Repository. 
 Hudson Gazette. 
 
 Independent Journal. [New York]. 
 New York Daily Advertiser. [New York], 
 New York Journal. [New York]. 
 
430 REFERENCE LIST. 
 
 New York Museum. [New York]. 
 
 New York Packet. [New York]. 
 
 Northern Centinel or Lansingburg Advertiser. 
 
 Poughkeepsie Journal. 
 
 New Jersey. 
 
 Brunswick Gazette. [New Brunswick]. 
 New Jersey Gazette. [Trenton]. 
 New Jersey Journal. [Elizabethtown], 
 
 Pennsylvania. 
 American Museum. [Philadelphia]. 
 Freemen's Journal. [Philadelphia]. 
 Independent Gazetteer. [Philadelphia]. 
 Pennsylvania Gazette. [Philadelphia]. 
 Pennsylvania Herald. [Philadelphia], 
 Pennsylvania Journal. [Philadelphia]. 
 Pennsylvania Mercury. [Philadelphia]. 
 Pennsylvania Packet. [Philadelphia]. 
 Pittsburg Gazette. 
 
 Delaware. 
 Wilmington Courant. 
 Wilmington Gazette. 
 
 Maryland. 
 Maryland Chronicle. [Frederick]. 
 Maryland Gazette. [Annapolis]. 
 Maryland Gazette. [Baltimore]. 
 Maryland Journal. [Baltimore]. 
 
 Virginia. 
 
 The Norfolk and Portsmouth Chronicle. 
 
 Virginia Gazette. [Winchester], 
 
 Virginia Gazette and Petersburg Advertiser. 
 
 The Virginia Gazette and Weekly Advertiser. [Richmond]. 
 
 The Virginia Herald and Independent Advertiser. 
 
 Virginia Independent Chronicle. [Richmond]. 
 
 The Virginia Journal and Alexandria Advertiser. 
 
 North Carolina. 
 North Carolina Chronicle. [Fayettville]. 
 State Gazette of North Carolina. [Newberne & Edentown], 
 
 South Carolina, 
 The Columbian Herald or the Independent Courier, [Charleston], 
 City Gazette, or Daily Advertiser, [Charleston], 
 State Gazette of South Carolina, [Charleston], 
 South Carolina Weekly Chronicle, 
 
 Georgia. 
 Augusta Chronicle. 
 Georgia Gazette. [Savannah]. 
 
REFERENCE LIST. 43 1 
 
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 See under " Federal Convention — Biographies of attending members " and 
 " Contests in the States." 
 
 Federal Convention — Histories. 
 Anecdotes of the Federal Convention, in Living Age, xxv, 
 
 557- 
 Bledsoe (A. T.) North and South in the Convention of 1787, 
 
 in Southern Review, (new series), ii, 359. 
 Clason (A. W.) The Fallacy of 1787, in Mag. of Am. Hist., 
 
 xiv, 373. 
 Jameson (J. A.) The Constitutional Convention. N. Y. : v. d. 
 McMaster (J. B.) Framers and Framing of the Constitution, 
 
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 Martin (L.) Genuine Information, No. 94. 
 Sparks (J.) Convention of 1787, in North Am. Rev., xxv, 
 
 249. 
 Tucker (J. R.) History of the Federal Convention. No. 
 
 124. 
 
 Federal Convention — Proceedings. 
 Journal, Acts and Proceedings of the Convention, No. 85. 
 King (R.) Minutes of Debates. MS. in possession of family. 
 Madison (J.) Minutes of Debates, No. 93. 
 Martin (L.) Genuine Information, No. 94. 
 Yates (R.) Secret proceedings and Debates, No. 138. 
 
 Federal Convention — Drafts and Plans. 
 Cruger (L. N.) Authorship of the U. S. Constitution, in 
 
 Southern Monthly, x, 635. 
 Hamilton (A.) Proposition in Convention, June 18, 1787, 
 
 No. 71. 
 Hamilton (A.) Plan of Government, (p. 584) of No. 31. 
 New Jersey Resolutions, June 15, 1787, in Nos. 30. 31, 85 
 
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 Pinckney (C.) [Spurious] plan of Government, in Nos. 30, 31, 
 
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 Pinckney (C.) Observations on the Plan of Government, 
 
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432 REFERENCE LIST. 
 
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 Report of the Committee of Detail, Aug. 6, 1787, No. 20. 
 Report of the Committee of Revision, Sept. 12, 1787. 
 
 No. 19. 
 Resolutions as agreed to in Committee of the whole. June 
 
 19, 1787, in Nos. 30, 31, 85 and 138. 
 Resolutions referred to the Committee of Detail, July 26^ 
 
 1787, in Nos. 30, 31, 85 and 138. 
 Virginia Resolutions, May 29, 1787, in Nos. 30, 31, 85 and 
 
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 Federal Convention — Biographies of attending Members. 
 
 General Works. 
 Ford (P. L.) List of the Members of. No. 69. 
 Lamb (M. J.) The Framers of the Constitution, in Mag. of Am. Hist. 
 
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 1887. 
 
 Baldwin, Abraham. 
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 Blair, John. 
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 Grigsby (H. B.) Virginia Convention of 1776, (p. 70). Richmond: 1855. 
 
 Brearly, David. 
 
 Elmer (L. Q. C.) Constitution and Government of N. J., (p. 274). 
 Newark: 1872. 
 
 Butler, Pierce. 
 
 Simpson (H.) Lives of Eminent Philadelphians, (p. 157). Phila.: 1859. 
 Carroll, Daniel. 
 
 Scharf (J. T.) History of Western Maryland. 
 Clymer, George. 
 
 Dickinson (W.) in Mag. of Am. Hist., v, ig6. 
 
 Wain (B.) in Sanderson's Biography of the Signers, iv, 173. 
 
 Simpson (H.) Lives of Eminent Philadelphians, (p. 211). Phila. : 1S59. 
 
 McMaster (J. B.) and Stone (F. D.) p. 704, of No. 92. 
 
REFERENCE LIST. 433 
 
 Davie, William Richardson. 
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 Hubbard (F. M.) in Spark's American Biography, xxv. 
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 Southern Literary Messenger, xiv, 510, 
 
 Dickinson, John. 
 
 Armor (W. C.) Lives of the Governors of Pa., (p. 234). Phila. ^ 1873. 
 
 Budd (T. A.) in Herring's Nat, Portrait Gallery, iii. 
 
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 Ellsworth, Oliver. 
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 American Literary Mag., i, 195. 
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 Miller (S. F.) The Supreme Court. Phila. : 1877. 
 The Portfolio, xxxiv, 185, 
 
 Rowland (H. A.) Eulogy on . . . Hartford: 1808, 
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 Few, William. 
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 McMaster "(J. B.) and Stone (F. D.) p. 706, of No. 92. 
 Simpson (H.) Lives of Eminent Philadelphians, (p. 372). Phila.: 1859. 
 
 Franklin, Benjamin. 
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 ton : 1883. 
 
 Gerry, Elbridge. 
 Austin (J. T.) Life of . . . Boston: 1828. 
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 Oilman, Nicholas. 
 
 Gilman (A.) The Gilman Genealogy, (p. 108). Albany: 1869. 
 
 Gorham, Nathaniel. 
 
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434 REFERENCE LIST. 
 
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 Johnson, William Samuel. 
 
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 Duyckinck (E.) Nat. Portrait Gallery. 
 Herring (J.) in Herring's Nat. Portrait Gallery, iii. 
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 American Annual Register iox 1826-7, P- 34i. 
 
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 1873. 
 Lansing, John. 
 Street (A. B.) Council of Revision of the State of N. Y., (p. 168). Albany: 
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 Livingston, William. 
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 Elmer (L. Q. C) Constitution and Government of N. J., (p. 56). Newark: 
 1872. 
 
 M'Henry, James. " 
 
 Brown (F. J.) Sketch of . . . Baltimore: 1877. 
 Mag. of Am. Hist, vii, 104. 
 
 McClung, James. 
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 Thacher (J.) American Medical Biography. Boston: 1828. 
 
 Madison, James. 
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 Gay (S. H.) American Statesmen, James Madison. Boston: 1884. 
 Stoddard (W. O.) Lives of the Presidents. N. Y.:i885. 
 Curtis (G. T.) History of the Constitution, (i, 420). No. 23. 
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 Martin, Luther. 
 Lanraan (J. H.) in Herring's Nat. Portrait Gallery, iv. 
 American Law Review, i, 273. 
 
 Mason, George. 
 Rowland (K. M.) Life of . . . [in preparation]. 
 
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REFERENCE LIST. 435 
 
 Mercer, John Francis. 
 
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 Mifflin, Thomas. 
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 McMaster ([. B.) and Stone (F. D.) p. 701, of No. 92. 
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 Morris, Gouverneur. 
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 Roosevelt (T.) Life of . . . Boston: 1888. 
 Curtis (G. T.) History of the Constitution, (i, 440), No. 23. 
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 Morris, Robert. 
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 Duyckinck (E.) Nat. Portrait Gallery, i, 240. 
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 Delaplaine's Repositmy, iii, 139. 
 
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 Herring (J.) in Herring's Nat. Portrait Gallery, iv. 
 
 Paterson, William. 
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 1872. 
 Barber (J. W.) and Howe (H.) Histo'rical Collections of N. J., (p. 314). 
 
 N. Y.: 1845. 
 Miller (S.F.) The Supreme Court. Phila.: 1877. 
 
 Pinckney, Charles. 
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 Pinckney, Charles Cotesworth. 
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 Duyckinck (E.) in Nat. Portrait Gallery. 
 
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 Randolph, Edmund. 
 
 [Daniels (P. V.)] Memoir of . . . Richmond: i86g. 
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436 REFERENCE LIST. 
 
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 Read, George. 
 Read (W. T.) Life of . . . Phila.: 1870. 
 
 Read ( ?) in Sanderson's Biography of the Signers, iv, 21. 
 
 [Tilton (J.) ] History of Dionysius, Tyrant of Delaware, [n. p.] 1788. 
 
 Rutledge, John. 
 Gayarre (C.) Life of . . . 
 
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 American Whig Rev., vi, 125, 277. 
 Southern Quarterly, xxvii, 332. 
 
 Sherman, Roger. 
 
 Everett (E.) in Sanderson's Biography of the Signers, iii, 199. 
 Duyckinck (E ) Nat. Portrait Gallery, i, 334. 
 Harper's Mag., iii, 145, vii, 156. 
 Worcester Mag , i, 164. 
 New Englander, i v, I . 
 
 Spaight, Richard Dobbs. 
 
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 Strong, Caleb. 
 
 Bradford (A.) Biography of . . . Boston : 1820. 
 Lyman (J.) Sermon on . . . Northampton : iSiq. 
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 American Quarterly, xii, I. 
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 Washington, George. 
 
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 [Coxe (T.) J Examination of the Constitution, No. 21. 
 [Dickinson (J.) J Letters of Fabius, No. 25. 
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 [Hanson (A. C.) J Remarks on the Constitution, No 74. 
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 [Jackson (J.) J Thoughts upon the Political Situation, 
 
 No. 82. 
 [Jay (J.)] Address to People of N. Y., No. 83. 
 [Ramsay (D.) J Address on the Constitution, No. 1 14. 
 Randolph (E.) Letter on the Constitution, No. 116. 
 [Webster (N.)] Examination of the Constitution, No. 130, 
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 Williamson (H.) Address to the Freemen, No. 135. 
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 [Bryan (S.) ] Letters of Centinel, Nos. 92 and 97. 
 [Gerry (E.) ] Observations on the Constitution, No. 70. 
 [Lee (R. H.)J Letters of a Federal Farmer, No. 88. 
 Letters of Brutus, No. 99. 
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 Contests in the States. 
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438 REFERENCE LIST. 
 
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 Stevens (W. B.) History of Georgia. Phila.:i859. 
 White (G.) Historical Collections of Georgia. N. Y. : 1854. 
 
 Celebrations of Ratifications. 
 
 Baldwin (S.) Oration, July 4th, 1788, No. 5. 
 Hall (A.) Oration June 30, 1788, No. 72. 
 Hitchcock (E.) An Oration, July 4, 1788, No. 76. 
 [Hopkinson (F.)] Account of the Procession, No. JJ. 
 Order of Procession at Philadelphia, No. 109. 
 Procession in Boston, No. 99. 
 
 [Webster (N.)] Account of N. Y. Federal Procession, in No. 
 80. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Adams, Charles Francis, 413. 
 
 Adams, John, cited, 316. 
 
 Adams, J. Q., 406; 411. 
 
 Address to the people of the State of 
 New York, 67; 87; iii. 
 
 Agriculture, diminished values of pro- 
 ducts of, 73. 
 
 Albany, committee of, i; address to the 
 citizens of, 409. 
 
 Algerines, method of obtaining peace 
 with the, 112. 
 
 Amendments, see Constitution. 
 
 American Citizen, An, pseudonym of T. 
 Coxe, 134; 391. 
 
 Appointment, powers of, 311; 339. 
 
 Appointing power, necessity of check 
 on President's, 341. 
 
 Aristides, pseudonym of A. C. Han- 
 son, 217; 408. 
 
 Aristocracy, {see also Monarchy.) 17; 
 285; 332; natural, in the U. S., 295; 
 party of, in the U. S., 321; rarity of, 
 genuine, 256. 
 
 Army, Standing, dangers of, 10; 150; 
 discussion of, 363; impossibility of in 
 America, 56; lack of restrictions on, 
 51; 103; 365; necessity of, 157; 235; 
 powers 01 congress over, 150; 303; 
 restriction of, by North Carolina, 
 365; restriction of, by Pennsylvania, 
 365; unnecessary fear of, 234. 
 
 Arnold, Benedict, 352. 
 
 Articles of Confederation, see Confeder- 
 ation, 
 Attainder, Bills of, forbidden, 314. 
 Austin. James T.. i. 
 
 Baldwin, Abraham, biographies of, 432. 
 Baldwin, Simeon, Oration of, 386. 
 Bancroft, George, History by, 386. 
 Bankrupt laws, necessity of uniform, 
 
 306. 
 Belhaven, Lord, quotation from speech 
 
 of, 195. 
 Bills of Rights, 73; 114; 229; 329; 
 
 adoption of, 359; necessity of, 75; 
 
 315 ; unnecessary in constitution, 
 
 241; 335. 
 
 Blackstone, Judge, cited, 10. 
 Blair, John, biographies of, 432. 
 Brearly, David, 390 ; biographies of, 
 
 432. 
 Brutus, pseudonym to newspaper essay, 
 
 118; 424. 
 Bryan, Samuel, 418, 
 Butler, Pierce, biographies of, 432. 
 Byng, admiral, 354. 
 
 Cabinet, dangers of, 330. 
 Carolinas, the, importance of their de- 
 cision on the constitution, 21. 
 Carroll, Daniel, biographies of, 432. 
 Caucus, dangers from, 300. 
 Centinel, cited, 248 ; pseudonym of 
 
 Samuel Bryan, 418. 
 Citizen of America, pseudonym of N. 
 
 Webster, 25; 423 
 Citizen of New York, pseudonym of 
 
 John Jay, 67; 410. 
 Citizen of Philadelphia, pseudonym of 
 
 P. Webster, 118; 424. 
 Civil list, 7. 
 Civil service, 189; want of rotation in, 
 
 II. 
 Civis, pseudonym of Jonathan Jackson, 
 410; pseudonym of' David Ramsay, 
 380; 420. 
 Clinton, George, 418. 
 Clymer, George, biographies of, 432. 
 Columbian Patriot, pseudonym of E. 
 
 Gerry, i; 407. 
 Commerce, {see also, Navigation, Ship- 
 ping, Treaties.) 73; 265; 357; condi- 
 tion of, 358; control of, by a few 
 states, 62; impositions on, 264; im- 
 proper power to enact laws relating 
 to> 3311 powers of congress over, 357; 
 right of English parliament over col- 
 onial, 136; should not be submitted to 
 a mere majority of congress, 275; 
 wretched condition of, 265. 
 Confederation {see also. Congress, Con- 
 tinental, United States government.) 
 compared with constitution, 148; 379; 
 defective nature of, 136; 228; 261; 
 dissolution of, 268; feebleness of, 272; 
 
444 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 government under the, 72; history of, 
 262; 283; impossibility of suitably 
 amending, 267; necessity of amend- 
 ing, 96; 136; positions of the states 
 under, in reference to the new consti- 
 tution, 97; 267. 
 Confederacies, separate, 120; 127; 204; 
 247; 26g; southern, 270; evils of, 
 278. 
 Congress, Continental {see also Confed- 
 eration, Impost, Paper Money,") 156; ab- 
 surd measures of, 32; bad constitution 
 of, 267; lack of power of, 78; merging 
 of powers in, 268; misrepresentation 
 in, 267; omitted in consideration of 
 new government, 14; origin of, 70; 
 powers of, 70 ; 72; 374: power to 
 amend constitution, 284; proposition 
 to vest with impost, 283; requisitions 
 of, 263; unsuitable to lodge powers 
 in, 267. 
 Congress, (see also. Armies, Commerce, 
 Constitution, Election, Judiciary, Jury, 
 Impost, Paper Money, Press, Represen- 
 tation, Representatives, Senate, Treat- 
 ies, United States government.') 33; 
 107; abuse of powers of, 122; attend- 
 ance in, 376; binding effects of acts 
 of on its own members, 124; checks 
 on, 125 ; definition of necessary 
 powers, 45; delegates to, 40; division 
 into two branches, 30 ; extensive 
 powers of, 45; 122; 233; formed of 
 the best men, 123; great expense of, 
 47; interference of with states, 46; 
 length of term, 170; limited powers 
 of, to deal with common law, 336; 
 members of, remarks on, 123; method 
 of passing laws, 44; necessary powers 
 only given to, 173; 374; necessity of 
 a line between states and, 273; objec- 
 tion to two branches in, 47; powers 
 -conceded by anti-federalists to, 126.; 
 powers of, limited to what the people 
 allow, 127; powers of taxation of 49; 
 303 ; powers over elections, 44 ; 
 powers over printing, 316; powers to 
 define and punish crime, 359; powers 
 to grant monopolies, 357; power to 
 provide for the general interest and 
 welfare, 121; probable misuse of their 
 power, 123; representation in, 12; 
 289; right of the people lo control 
 delegates to, 6; to determine their 
 own salaries, 11; unnecessary power 
 over elections, 61. 
 Connecticut, adopted from local causes, 
 104; adoption of the constitution by, 
 98; and the constitution, 439; con- 
 
 struction of Senate of, 41; disagree- 
 ment in legislature of, 33; hostile 
 feelings towards New York, 84; 96; 
 imports of, from New York, 62; legis- 
 lative action on act of Congress, 33; 
 probable refusal to attend second con- 
 vention, 8l; reasons for her ratifica- 
 tion, 21; representation in House of 
 Representatives, 293. 
 Constitution, (see also Army, Bills of 
 Rights, Congress, Continental Con- 
 gress, Conventions, Elections, Judi- 
 ciary, Jury, Malitia, Navy, Press, 
 Ratif cation. Representation, Represeti- 
 tatives. Senate, United States govern- 
 ment.) 
 
 — Adoption of, danger of delay in, 93; 
 necessity of. 62; should not be pre- 
 cipitate in, 280. 
 
 — Advantages of, 61; 64; 319; control 
 over states clearly defined, 121; di- 
 verse representation in, 204; increase 
 of values if adopted, 47 ; mutual 
 checks in the departments of govern- 
 ment as, 222; no qualification in 
 wealth or birth under, 146; plan of 
 accomodation, 80; 285; security in, 
 from federal servants, l8g. 
 
 — Amendments to, 15; 34; 103; adop- 
 tion before making, 93; agreement 
 in, 102; dangers of, 226; difficulty of 
 agreeing to, prior to adoption, 99 
 245; methods for obtaining, iii; 317 
 necessity of, prior to adoption, 99 
 loi; 274; necessity of, 93; 106; 273 
 324; power of making, 209; state con- 
 ventions should make, 322; unreason- 
 ableness of, 104. ^ 
 
 — Compared with other constitutions, 
 compared with articles of confedera- 
 tion, 14S; 379; compared with Roman 
 and English, 35; compared with Great 
 Britain, 137; difference between the 
 state constitutions and the, 155. 
 
 — Defects of, 318; a consolidated fabric 
 of aristocratic tyranny, 17; agreement 
 in, 93; a heterogeneous phantom, 7; 
 complicated nature of,' 7; contains no 
 feature of democracy or republican- 
 ism, 8; designed for the rich, 254; 
 executive and legislative powers dan- 
 gerously blended in, 9; ignorance of 
 the people in its formation, 284; im- 
 practicable over so vast a territory, 
 13; impossibility of suiting all, 63; 
 lack of declaration of rights in, 73; 
 329; neither federal nor national, 279; 
 unequal advantages enjoyed by differ- 
 ent localities, 298; want of title, 8. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 445 
 
 — Powers of, 156; amount delegated 
 by, 313; divisions of, 75; fundamental 
 rights of, 313; general clauses of, 
 233; 312; 331; general, 356; guaran- 
 tee against ex post facto laws, 147; 
 314; 332; 368. 
 
 — Ratification of, see ratification. 
 
 — Tendencies of; consolidatiner, 14; 
 102; 121; 127; 129; 2S2; 286; 289; 
 294; 299; 320; dangers of corruption 
 of, 129; construction with reference 
 to state constitutions, 159 ; 314; 
 founded on monarchy and aristocracy, 
 7; guarded against excesses, 184; 
 liable to result in monarchy, 195; 
 partly federal but tending towards 
 consolidation, 286; possibility of end- 
 ing in tyranny, 169; probable en- 
 croachments under, 122; will end in 
 monarchy or aristocracy. 254; 2S5. 
 
 — Absurd prospects in case of adop- 
 tion, 106; character of the supporters 
 of, 5; classes interested in. 283; di- 
 vision of legislature into two branches, 
 30; documentary sources of the his- 
 tory of the adoption of, 428; editions 
 of, 386; general histories of the, 427; 
 partizan pamphlets pro and con, 437; 
 possibility of obtaining a better, 78; 
 sources of objections to, 166. 
 
 Conventions, ease in obtaining, 317. 
 
 Convention, Annapolis, 284. 
 
 Convention, Federal, (see also Constitu- 
 tion, States.) 271; 285; biographies of 
 attending members of, 432; charac- 
 ter of members, 114; composition of 
 74; compromises in, 76; 158; dangers 
 of discord in, 222; debates and pro- 
 ceedings of, 431; diverse interests in, 
 166; drafts and plans of constitutions 
 in, 431; histories of, improper se- 
 cresy of, 15; 18; journal of, 410; list 
 of members of, 406; local interest in, 
 75; members of, 221; non-attendance 
 of members, 285; not limited, 224; 
 opinion of, 74; origin of, 284; quality 
 of the delegates of, 285; secrecy in 
 proceedings, loi; unauthorized pow- 
 ers assumed by, 14; 16; 224; want of 
 authority, loi. 
 
 Convention, Second, 21; 210; 272; evils 
 of, 166; great delay in obtaining, 83; 
 impossible to agree upon a better 
 plan, 82; necessity of, 19; 274; possi- 
 bility of a successful, 80; 246; proba- 
 bility that the states which have al- 
 ready ratified will refuse to at- 
 tend, 81. 
 
 Conventions, State, {see also each State 
 
 and Ratification;) 17; 274; ratifications 
 against the wish of the people, 19; 
 should be allowed to amend constitu- 
 tion, 272; 322; value of, 322. 
 
 Council, {see also Executive,) necessity 
 of, 230; objections to, 341. 
 
 Courts, see Judiciary. 
 
 Coxe, Tench, pamphlet by, 134; 391. 
 
 Curtis, G. T., History by, 391. 
 
 Dallas, A J., 425. 
 
 Davie, W. R., biographies of, 433; 
 pamphlet by, 333; 391. 
 
 Dawson, H. B., editor of The Federal- 
 ist, 404; correspondence about The 
 Federalist, 404. 
 
 Debt, federal, change of system for 
 paying, 378, condition of, 95; equal- 
 ization of, 147; failure to meet, 73; 
 probable treatment of, [05; responsi- 
 bility of, 317. 
 
 Decius, pseudonym of J. Montgomery, 
 415; 417. 
 
 Declaration of Rights {see Bill of 
 Rights). 
 
 De Costa. B F. . review by, 386. 
 
 Delaware and the constitution, 433; 
 probable refusal to attend second con- 
 vention, 81; representation of, 223; 
 selfish motives in adopting the consti- 
 tution, 21. 
 
 Democracy, disapproval of, 319. 
 
 Despotism, methods of, 9. 
 
 Dickinson, John, biographies of, 433; 
 cited, 31B; pamphlet by, 163; 392. 
 
 Duties, see Export, Import, Taxation. 
 
 Eastern States, see Stales. Eastern. 
 
 Elections, {see also Constitution, Congress., 
 Representatives, House of. Senate.) 
 biennial found by Massachusetts, 8; 
 control of, by congress, 103; ijiy 
 227; 295; frequency of, 8; 11; 13; 
 great barrier to corruption, 61 ; prob- 
 able misuse of the power granted 
 over, 103. 
 
 Elliot, Jonathan, debates of, 392. 
 
 Ellsworth, Oliver, biographies of, 433; 
 cited, 341. 
 
 English Constitution, see Great Britain. 
 
 Entail, dangerous to liberty,6o. 
 
 Executive, {see also Appointment, Consti- 
 tution, Impeachment, Pardon, Treaty, 
 Vice President.) 
 
 — Council, 230; 330; lack of, 333; ob- 
 jections to, 345; unnecessary, 346; 
 
 — National, 64; advantage of single, 
 352; American compared with Eng- 
 lish, 137; composition of, 225; elec- 
 
446 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 tion of, 35; 171; 298; entailment of, 
 233; exclusion of the people in the 
 choice of, 12; nominating power of, 
 228; pardoning power of, 275; 338; 
 351; powers of, 36; 171; 225; 232; 
 requisite age of, 36; should be ineligi- 
 ble after a certain time, 275; should 
 not |ill vacancies, 275; should not 
 nominate judiciary offices, 275; small 
 probability of treason of, 352; terra 
 of, 231; tool of the Senate, 330; veto 
 power of, 45 
 — State, (see also State,) restrictions on, 
 
 351- 
 
 Export duties, restraint on, 331; restric- 
 tion of states from, 366. 
 
 Ex post facto laws, desirability of re- 
 strictions on. 368 ; guarantee against, 
 147; 314; 336; restraint from, 332. 
 
 Fabius, pseudonym of John Dickinson, 
 163; 392. 
 
 Federal administration, 394. 
 
 Federal city, advantage to middle 
 states, 319; jurisdiction of, improp- 
 erly used, 18; resolution for, by the 
 continental congress, 32. 
 
 Federal convention, see Convention, Fed- 
 eral, 
 
 Federal Constitution, pseudonym, 385. 
 see Constitution, Federal. 
 
 Federal Farmer; pseudonym of Richard 
 Henry Lee, 277; 411. 
 
 Federalist, The, authorship of, 395; 
 list of editions, 394; opinions con- 
 cerning, 395; original publication of, 
 
 395- 
 Federal Republican, A, 420. 
 Federal Republic, title invented by 
 
 James Wilson, 8. 
 Federal requisitions, 105. 
 Few, William, biographies of, 433. 
 Fitzsimons, Thomas, 25; biographies 
 
 of, 433- 
 Ford. P. L., list of editions of The 
 
 Federalist, 395; list of members of 
 
 federal convention, 406. 
 Foreign affairs, indifference to, 72. 
 Foreign goods, excessive importation 
 
 of, 95- 
 Franklin, Benjamin, 27; 64; biographies 
 
 of, 433- 
 Fur trade, loss of, 73. 
 
 Georgia, accession of, to insure protec- 
 tion, 20; amendment of constitution 
 of, 34; and the constitution, 441; 
 probable refusal to attend second 
 <:onvention, 81. 
 
 Gerry, Elbridge. biographies of, 433; 
 failure to sign constitution, 271 ; 
 pamphlet by, x ; 407. 
 
 Gilman, Nicholas, biographies of, 433. 
 
 Gorham, Nathaniel, biographies of, 
 433- 
 
 Greenleaf, T., i. 
 
 Great Britain, House of Commons, 42; 
 143; 211; constitution of, compared 
 with the American, 35; 137; House 
 of Peers of, 42 ; paper money would 
 destroy the credit of, 243; Privy 
 Council of, 345; right of the colonists 
 to constitution of, 135; standing army 
 of, 235; union of, 195; 213. 
 
 Government, {see also under each coun- 
 try,) dangers of all strong, 131; effect 
 on character and manners, 5 ; ele- 
 ments of, 263, instituted for protec- 
 tion and happiness, 6; must not be 
 lodged in a single body, 182; nature 
 of, 92; origin of, 174; primary prin- 
 ciples of, 373 ; the result of fraud or 
 violence, 18. 
 
 Hale, Charles, 415. 
 
 Hale, Sir Mathew, cited, 10. 
 
 Hall, Aaron, 408. 
 
 Hamilton, Alexander, biographies of, 
 433; The Federalist, 395; proposi- 
 tion in convention, 408. 
 
 Hamilton, J. A., correspondence about 
 The Federalist, 404. 
 
 Hamilton, J. C, editor of The Feder- 
 alist, 405. 
 
 Hanson, Alexander Contee, pamphlet 
 by, 217; 408. 
 
 Helvitius, cited, 5. 
 
 Henry, Patrick, attack on, 415; 417. 
 
 Hillsborough, Lord, 8. 
 
 Hitchcock, Enos, 408. 
 
 Hopkinson, Francis, 409. 
 
 Hutchinson, Gov. T., recommends trien- 
 nial elections, 8; 13. 
 
 Impeachment, (see also Constitution, 
 Executive, Senate), 342; improperly 
 lodged with senate, 300. 
 
 Imports, 62; foreign, 95. 
 
 Impost, (see also Congress, Taxation), 
 104; 283; Connecticut and New Jersey 
 share of, 319; general acceptance of 
 the five per cent., 253; the great 
 source of revenue in the U. S., 160. 
 
 Imprimatur, danger of, 9. 
 
 IngersoU, Jared, biographies of, 433. 
 
 Insurgents, party of, in the U. S., 321. 
 
 Iredell, James, pamphlet by, 327; 333; 
 392; 410. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 447 
 
 Jackson, Jonathan, 410. 
 
 Jay, John, pamphlet by, 67; 410; reply 
 to his pamphlet, 11 1; The Federalist, 
 395- 
 
 Jay, John, (Jr.) correspondence about 
 The Federalist, 404. 
 
 Johnson, W. S., 3qo; biographies of, 
 433- 
 
 Judiciary, National {see also Appoint- 
 ment, Executive, Jury, Senate,) 275; 
 analysis of, 343 ; appellate jurisdiction 
 of, 12; 236; 308; 311; coersive powers 
 of, 343; dangers from jurisdiction as 
 to both law and fact, 308 ; discussion 
 of. 236; impossibility of trial by jury 
 in, 310; necessity of national, 122; 
 power to decide law and fact, 114; 
 powers of, 53; 149; 236; 298; 306; 
 want of limitation in, 9; 102. 
 
 Judiciary, State, {see also Jury, State,) 
 289; 307; absorption of by national, 
 53; 329; position under constitution, 
 
 343- 
 Jury, Trial by, absence in state courts, 
 361; discussion of, 157; impracticable 
 in national courts, 289; necessity of, 
 1S4; 315; not altered by constitution, 
 148; not a universal practice, 361; not 
 secured in civil cases, 9; 103; 114; 
 307 ; reply to insinuations concetning, 
 52; should be left to wisdom of con- 
 gress, 362; the birthright of Ameri- 
 cans, 241; under Pennsylvania consti- 
 tution, 148. 
 
 King, Rufus, biographies of, 434; on 
 Elbridge Gerry, i. 
 
 Land, isee also Western Territory), de- 
 cline in the price of, 74. 
 
 Langdon, John, biographies of, 434. 
 
 Lansing, John, 425; biographies of, 4.34. 
 
 Law, {see also Congress, Constitution, 
 
 ' Judiciary, Ex post facto. Treaties), 
 multiplication of, 302; necessity of 
 supreme, 312; people entitled to com- 
 mon, 336. 
 
 Lee, Richard Henry, pamphlet by, 277; 
 .411. 
 
 Legislature, see Congress and State Legis- 
 latures. 
 
 Livingston, William, biographies of, 
 
 434- , „ 
 
 Lloyd, Thomas, 412; 41S. 
 Lodge, H. C, editor of The Federalist, 
 
 406. 
 
 Mable, Able, cited, 4. 
 
 M'Henry, James, biographies of, 434. 
 
 McClurg, James, biographies of, 434. 
 M'Kean, Thomas, speeches of, 412. 
 Maclaine, Archibald, pamphlet by, 333; 
 392; 412; opinion of The Federalist, 
 
 395- 
 
 MacMasler, John Bach, 412. 
 
 Madison, James, 327; 390; biographies 
 of. 434; debate of. 394; 413; quota- 
 tion from, 259; The Federalist, 395. 
 
 Marcus, pseudonym of James Iredell, 
 
 333; 391; 410. 
 Martin, Luther, biographies of, 434; 
 cited, 18; Genuine Information of, 
 
 413; 425. 
 
 Maryland and the constitution, 440; 
 construction of senate of, 41 ; declara- 
 tion of rights, 229: delay in appoint- 
 ing convention, 250; local actions in 
 courts of, 239; method of electing 
 federal representatives, 225; omnipo- 
 tence of legislature of, 226; position 
 toward Europe, 251; position under 
 new constitution, 251; probable rejec- 
 tion of the constitution by, 28; pro- 
 posed emission of paper money, 33; 
 representation of, 223; resistance of 
 the people to paper money, 244. 
 
 Mason, George, 390; biographies of, 
 434 ; failure to sign constitution, 
 271; pamphlet by, 327; 413; reply to, 
 
 2S5; 333: 391- 
 
 Massachusetts, 13; adoption of the con- 
 stitution by, 98; ambiguous express- 
 ions in ratification of, 6; amendments 
 of the convention of, 15; 103; and 
 the constitution, 438; debates in the 
 convention, 414; hostile feeling to- 
 wards New York, 96; means used to 
 obtain ratification of, 19; ratification 
 by, 6. 
 
 'Mediteranean, exclusion of Americans 
 from, 73. 
 
 Mercer, J. F., biographies of^ 435. 
 
 Mifflin, Thomas, biographies of, 435. 
 
 Militia, congressional power over, 52; 
 305 ; necessary general powers over, 
 122; 306; no longer under civil con- 
 trol, 11; subject to president and 
 senate, 11. 
 
 Minot, G. R., 410- 
 
 Monarchy, {see also Aristocracy), 7; ad- 
 vocates for, 19; dangers of, 195; 
 254; 285; partizans of, in the state 
 conventions, 17; spirit of, in Amer- 
 ica, 5. 
 
 Money, (see also Paper Money, Represent- 
 atives, Senate, Taxation), power to 
 raise, necessary to general govern- 
 ment, 122; scarcity of, 73; 113. 
 
448 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Monopolies, congressional power to 
 
 grant, 357- 
 Montesquien, cited, 59. 
 Montgomery, J., pamphlet by, 415; 
 
 417. 
 Morris, Robert, biographies of, 435. 
 Morris, Gouverneur, biographies of, 
 
 435- 
 
 Native of Boston, pseudonym of J. 
 
 Jackson, 410. 
 Navigation laws, necessity of, 377. 
 Navy, power of congress to form, 374; 
 
 will be obtained by constitution, 379. 
 New England, commerce of. 357. 
 New Hampshire and the constitution, 
 
 438. 
 
 New Jersey, adopted from local causes, 
 104; and the constitution, 439; hos- 
 tile feelings towards New York, 84; 
 96, imports of, from New York, 62; 
 journal of the convention of, 416; 
 probable refusal to attend second 
 convention, 81; selfish motives in 
 adopting the constitution, 21. 
 
 New York, address to the people of, 
 67; 87; iii; and the constitution, 439; 
 anti-federal committee of, i; consti- 
 tution of, 114; dangers from contigu- 
 ous states, 96; debates of the conven- 
 tion of, 416; failure to guarantee 
 liberty of the press in constitution of, 
 76; ill feeling towards, of New Jersey 
 and Connecticut, 84; imports for 
 other states, 62; imports, 104; journal 
 of the convention of, 416; lack of 
 bill of rights, 114; position, in case 
 nine states ratify. 86; undoubted re- 
 jection of constitution by, 21. 
 
 North Carolina and the constitution, 
 441; debates in the convention of, 
 417; forbids standing army in time of 
 peace, 51; 365. 
 
 Nicholas, J., 415; 417- 
 
 Paine, Thomas, The Rights of Man, 
 164. 
 
 Paper money, 33; baneful effects oi, 
 243; conduct of the state legislatures 
 concerning, 244; 284; congress not 
 restricted from issuing, 374; only the 
 states restricted in issuing, 374; re- 
 nunciation of the right to issue, 243; 
 the secret reason of opposition to the 
 constitution, 243. 
 
 Pardon, {see also Executive,) power of 
 executive to, 351. 
 
 Parker, I., review of The Federalist, 
 402. 
 
 Paterson, William, biographies of, 
 435- 
 
 Peabody, A. P., review by, 391. 
 
 Pennsylvania, 33; address to the citi- 
 zens of, 385; and the constitution, 
 412; advantages from new constitu- 
 tion, 161; aristocratic delegates in 
 Federal convention from, 285; de- 
 bates in convention of, 418; dissent 
 of minority of convention, 102; 385; 
 forbids standing army in time of 
 peace. 51; 365; general assembly un- 
 der her constitution 152; hasty con- 
 duct due to construction of legisla- 
 ture, 33; hostile feeling towards New 
 York, 96; journal of the convention 
 of, 419; legislature of, 34; opposition 
 to division of congress, 30; ratifica- 
 tion by, 20; trial by jury under con- 
 stitution of, 148. 
 
 People, desire for union of the, 17; 
 equal representation necessary in free 
 government, 168; 288; position in 
 adoption of constitution, 311; real 
 power with the, 6; 57; 147; true in- 
 fluence of, 60; 168; 316. 
 
 Pickering, Timothy, Life of, cited, 277. 
 
 Pierce, B. K., 415. 
 
 Pinckney, Charles, biographies of, 
 435; pamphlet by, 419. 
 
 Pinckney, Charles C, biographies of, 
 435- 
 
 Plebeian, pseudonym of Melancthon 
 Smith, 67; 87; 421. 
 
 Police, internal, 292. 
 
 President, see Executive. 
 
 Press, Liberty of, 9; 76; congress with- 
 out power over, 361; failure to guar- 
 antee liberty of, 9; 48; 76; 113; need- 
 less to guarantee, 156 ; powers of 
 congress over, 316; power to tax, 
 114. 
 
 Printers, refusal of, to print against the 
 constituion, 323. 
 
 Production, difficulty in disposing of 
 surplus, 73. 
 
 Property, equal distribution of, the 
 foundation of a. republic, 61; the 
 basis of freedom, 60; the real power, 
 57-. 
 
 Publicola, pseudonym of W. R. Davie, 
 391. 
 
 Quakers, influenced by slave trade, 54. 
 
 Ramsay, David, pamphlet by, 371; 421. 
 
 Randolph, Edmund, biographies of, 
 435 ; cited, 343; failure to sign con- 
 stitution, 261; 271; independence of, 
 
INDEX. 
 
 449 
 
 20; 271; motion of. 272; pamphlet 
 by, 259; 418; 420. 
 
 Ratification of the constitution, (see also 
 Conventions, and each state,) 420 ; cele- 
 brations of the ratifications of, 441; 
 improperly hurried, 18 ; influences 
 that cause opposition to, 165; methods 
 used to aid acceptance, 7; of nine 
 states improper, 14; probability of, 
 by each state, 20 ; probability of nine 
 states agreeing to, 104; submittal to 
 state legislatures and coventions, 
 272. 
 
 Read, George, biographies of, 436. 
 
 Religion, free exercise of, should be 
 guaranteed, 315. 
 
 Religious sentiment of America, 135, 
 
 Religious test, none required, 146. 
 
 Representation {see also. Congress, Con- 
 stitution,) 8; 12; 289; and taxation 
 inseparable, 148; advantages of east- 
 ern states in, 375; basis for, 263; by 
 wealth or population, 39; direct taxa- 
 tion apportioned by, 310; equality of 
 the states in, 206; inadquacy of, 12; 
 300; 303; inequality in, 223; improve- 
 ment of, in constitution, 206; origin 
 of, 30; possibilities of equal, 296; in 
 the constitution a compromise, 206; 
 superior in state governments, 293; 
 too small to secure liberty, 102; treble 
 method in, 178. 
 
 Representatives, House of {see Congress, 
 Constitution, Representation, Senate, 
 Treaties^ 293; comparison with house 
 of commons, 42; 143; composition 
 and powers of, 143; 170; 225; 295; 
 difficulties in formation of, 297; elec- 
 tion of members of federal conven- 
 tion to, 221; expense of, 299; money 
 bills in, 340 ; no state to have less 
 than one member in, 143; proportion 
 of members to population, 143; quali- 
 fications of, 144; reply to Mason's 
 opinion of, 255; representation in, 
 12; 337; shadow of representation in, 
 329; share in treaties, 355; 376; term 
 of, 43 ; the seat of local interests and 
 parties, 41; the voice of the separate 
 states, 41 . 
 
 Republics, constitution of ancient, 189. 
 
 Revenue {see also Impost, Taxation,) all 
 sources of, subject to general govern- 
 ment, 11; necessity of equalizing, 62. 
 
 Revolutionary war caused by a differ- 
 ence concerning rights, 136. 
 
 Rhode Island and the constitution, 
 438; failure to choose representa- 
 tives, 151; senate of, 32. 
 
 Robertson, David, 418; 422, 
 
 Rome, colonies of, 208 ; constitutior* 
 
 compared with proposed constitution, 
 
 35 ; senate of. 42, 
 Rowland, Kate M., 390. 
 Russell, Benjamin, report of debates, 
 
 414. 
 Rutledge, John, biographies of, 436. 
 
 Sabliere, T. de la, editor of The Feder- 
 alist, 396; 
 
 Sarum, English borough of, 143. 
 
 Senate, (see also Congress, Constitution, 
 Executive, Representation, Treaties^ a 
 compromise between contending in- 
 terests, 158; advantages of, 30; ap- 
 pointing power of, 341 ; a restraint on 
 the House of Representatives, 141 ; 
 aristocratic tendencies in, 158; com- 
 pared with Roman and English sen- 
 ates, 371 J 148; composition and 
 powers of, 37: 140; 297; 338; con- 
 servative nature of, 340; constitution 
 of ancient, 189; dangers frqm, 172; 
 203; dangerous powers of, 173; 297; 
 329; detached from local prejudices, 
 142; equal sufrage in, 38; 40: 207; 
 275; federal formation of, 297; fre- 
 quency of election of, 338; House of 
 Representatives a check on, 338; irres- 
 ponsibility of, 12; length of term, 12; 
 170; mixture of functions in, 103; 229; 
 231: 299; money bills in, 340; neces- 
 sity to be small, 169; power to remove 
 officers, 142; qualifications for, 42; 
 141 ; reply to Mason's objections to, 
 255; representation in the, 40; 206; 
 the representatives of state sovereign- 
 ties, 169; 224; uselessness of the, 34; 
 useless power of impeachment, 300; 
 vacancies in, 170. 
 
 Sherman, Roger, biographies of, 436; 
 cited, 341. 
 
 Shipping, {see also Commerce^ 73; cessa- 
 tion of, 73; decline of, 73; necessities 
 of encouraging, 377. 
 
 Slavery, abolition of, would bring ruin, 
 54; legislation left to the states, 54. 
 
 Slaves, representation of, 319. 
 
 Slave trade, desire of South Carolina 
 and Georgia for continuance of, 367; 
 foundation for prevention of, 146; in- 
 terest of the eastern states to allow, 
 378; lack of restriction on, 54; neces- 
 sity of the evil of, 367; power to pro- 
 hibit after twenty-one years, 378; 
 weakening effect of, 331. 
 
 Smith, C. C, review by, 391. 
 
450 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Smith, Melancthon, pamphlet by, 67; 
 87; 421. 
 
 South Carolina, address to the freemen 
 of, 371; and the constitution, 440; 
 debates of legislature, 421 ; local weak- 
 ness of, 373; protection of, 377. 
 
 Southern confederacy, {see also Confeder- 
 acy^ proposition for, 270. 
 
 Southern states, see States. 
 
 Spraight, R. D.,, biographies of, 436. 
 
 State Conventions, see Conventions, 
 State, 
 
 State Legislatures, (see also Constitution 
 and each stated absorption of, 48; 252; 
 a check on senators, 142; control of 
 commerce, 265; division of, 30; 32; 
 33; misbehaviour of, 254; omitted in 
 consideration of constitution, 14; re- 
 straints on, 243. 
 
 State Sovereignty, see Congress, Consti- 
 tution, States. 
 
 States, (see also Congress, Constitution, 
 Judiciary, Juty, Representation, Sen- 
 ate, United States government, and 
 each state,) a. check on the general 
 government, 126; 152; all necessary 
 for present exigencies, 96; Bills of 
 Rights in constitutions, 359; bound- 
 aries of, 62; cases between citizens 
 and, 3(37; civil war during the, 97; 
 ^64; 373; constitution of, 286; 289; 
 294; 299; 320; constitutional control 
 of, 46; 120; 129; 145; 292; constitu- 
 tions and laws of, 262; contention 
 •between, adjusted by general govern- 
 ment, 120; 267; controversies between 
 the, in the convention, 297; delusory 
 promise to guarantee republican gov- 
 ernment to, 11; differences in the 
 governments of, 291; dissolution of, 
 268; embarrassment of all issuing 
 'paper money, 374; excluded from all 
 agency in national government, 267; 
 failure to seciTre liberty and property, 
 55; interest of, to unite, 373; juris- 
 diction of, as opposed to national, 48; 
 -t)T, 121; 267; 275; 314; necessity of 
 coercive power against, 266; partial 
 confederacies of, 120; 127; 204: 247; 
 269; 270; 278; power over their own 
 citizens, 128; protected from each 
 other, 128; rebellion in, 264; reserva- 
 tions in constitutions of, 313; separate 
 interests of, 39; sovereignty of, 11; 
 14; 38; 46; 179; 207; 379. 
 
 — Eastern, 357; advantages from 
 new constitution, 319; advantages of 
 encouraging the shipping of, 377; 
 future miserable condition of, 3; loss 
 
 of, by revolution, 377; loss of mar- 
 kets by, 377; representation of, 375. 
 
 — Southern, advantages of navy to, 
 374; advantages to, of union, 319; 
 374 ; danger to, from commercial 
 laws, 331; future hopeless poverty of, 
 3; gain of, by revolution, 377; posi- 
 tion of, if constitution is rejected, 
 378; probable ascendency over east- 
 ern, 375; representation of, 375. 
 
 Stone, Frederick D., 412. 
 
 Strong, Caleb, biographies of, 436. 
 
 Taxation, absorption of production by 
 national, 3; and representation in- 
 separable, 148; 186; certainty of in- 
 crease under proposed government, 
 108; direct, 160; 253; 310; internal, 
 48; 302; laws of, interfering with 
 state laws, 302 ; method of collection, 
 49; 253; 310; powers of congress 
 over, 48; I02; 301; 303; relief from, 
 106; 108. 
 
 Tender laws, conduct of the state legis- 
 latures concerning, 284. 
 
 Territories, see Constitution, Western 
 Territory. 
 
 Trade, (see also Commerce, Treaties,) 73; 
 379; balance against the U. S., 107; 
 congressional power over, 107; ne- 
 cessity of government to, 7; regula- 
 tion of, approved by the eastern 
 states, 319. 
 
 Treatieis, (see also Commerce, Congress, 
 Executive, Representatives, Senate,) 
 dangers arising from, 312; dangers 
 of making them the supreme law, 
 311, necessity of commercial, 358; 
 of the confederation not binding un- 
 der, 317; power of Executive and 
 Senate in, 376; powers to make, 356; 
 safer in new government than under 
 the confederation, 376; should not be 
 trusted to House of Representatives, 
 376; the supreme law of the land, 
 355; undue influence of Executive 
 and Senate in, 331. 
 
 Tucker, J. R., History of the Conven- 
 tion, 422. 
 
 Tyler, M. C, 416. 
 
 Union, not possible without adequate 
 power, 122; true friends of opposed 
 to constitution, 7, 
 
 United States, condition of, 94; 281; 
 credit of, 244; extension of, 203; 
 future additions to, 248; future of, 
 208; is it too large for one, 13; 122; 
 127; 204; 247; necessity o£ supreme 
 
INDEX. 
 
 451 
 
 government for, lig; neglect of laws 
 of, 293; opulence of, 270; parties in, 
 321; position if constitution is re- 
 jected, 378; suitable government for, 
 119; 127; 286. 
 
 United States, Government of, a moder- 
 ate aristocracy, 332; checks on, 152; 
 composition of, 292; control over the 
 states, 120; 129; 145; 292; dangers of 
 weak, 119; division of, 228; great in- 
 crease in cost predicted, 108; institu- 
 tion of, after the separation from 
 England, 136; lack of, during the 
 revolution, 136 ; necessary conces- 
 sions in order to form, 265; necessary 
 conditions of, 289; necessary powers 
 of, 120; 129; 287; 301; necessity of, 
 2S0; not restricted from issuing paper 
 money, 374; powers must be equal to 
 territory, 123; responsibility to foreign 
 nations, 266; separate functions of, 
 225; tendency of, 369; unreasonable 
 accumulation of powers in, 299; want 
 of independence in departments of, 
 103; 229. 
 
 Vermont, probable combination with 
 New Jersey and Connecticut in oppo- 
 sition to New York. 84. 
 
 Veto power, see Executive. 
 
 Vice-President, {see also Executive^ 
 method of selection, 330: 349; posi- 
 tion in Senate, 350; qualifications of, 
 310; necessary, 298, 
 
 Virginia, alterations wished by, in con- 
 stitution, 275; and the constitution, 
 441; debates in convention of, 422; 
 delay in appointing convention, 250; 
 delegates to federal convention, 284; 
 hesitation of, to ratify, 20 ; journal of 
 
 convention of, 423; possibility of her 
 obtaining a partial confederacy, 269. 
 
 Warrants, insecurity from, 12; protection 
 from, 315. 
 
 Washington, George, 64; 67; 390; bio- 
 graphies of, 436; dedication to, 218; 
 letters to, 327; opinion of, 350; opinion 
 of The Federalist, 395. 
 
 Webb, S. B., 67. 
 
 Webster, Noah, pamphlet by, 25; 423; 
 reply to minority of Pa. convention, 
 385; review by, 67; 87; 217. 
 
 Webster, Pelatiah, pamphlet by, Ii8; 
 424. 
 
 Wells, John, editor of The Federalist, 
 397. 
 
 Western posts, method of obtaining, 96. 
 
 Western Territory, claims of the states 
 to, 239; question of ownership, 317. 
 
 West Indies, exclusion of American ves- 
 sels from, 73 ; will be opened to trade 
 by new government, 379. 
 
 Williamson, Hugh, 424; biographies of, 
 436. 
 
 Wilson, James, 242 ; 390 ; 412 ; bio- 
 graphies of, 436; cited, 336; invents 
 title of " Federal Republic," 8; speech 
 
 of. 134; 155; 385; 425- 
 Witherspoon, D., quotation from letters 
 
 of. 333- 
 
 Writs of Assistance in Massachusetts, 13. 
 
 Wyoming, action of Pennsylvania legis- 
 lature in reference to, 33. 
 
 Wythe, George, biographies of, 437. 
 
 Yates, Robert, 425; 424; biographies of, 
 
 437- 
 
 FINIS 
 
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