■ *4i '^^^^^ _^^H CORNEl LL LAW LIBRARY Qlortt^Il Slam ^rljonl Slibratg Cornell University Library KF1187.A5V21 3 1924 019 368 285 Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924019368285 READY REFERENCE DIGEST OF ACCIDENT AND HEALTH INSURANCE LAW BY MYRON W. yAN AUKEN Of the UacaTS. Y., Bar General Counsel. The Commercial Travelers' Mutual Accident Association of America, Utica, N. Y. WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY WILLIAM BROSMITH General Counsel and Vice-President of The Travelers' Insurance Co., Hartford Conn. ACCIDENT DEFINED DISEASE DISTINGUISHED TABLE OF CASES TOPICAL INDEX ALBANY, N. Y. MATTHEW BENDER & COMPANY Incorporated 1922 Copyright, 1922, By MYRON W. VAN AUKEN Earle Printing Corporation Albany, N. Y. FOREWORD The basic requirements of any claim against an Accident Insurance Company are (1) an injury, fatal or non-fatal and ,(2) that the injury was caused by accident or accidental means. The definitions found in the dictionaries of accident and accidental means indicate a general and fundamental meaning but they do not furnish an accurate and sufficient guide for those who Imust ascertain th^ir, meaning when they appear in a contract of accident insurance. The Courts, and not the dictionaries, furnish the only controlling and binding guide as to the meaning of these words when used in a contract of accident insurance, and the only authority that can be safely followed. For such guidance and authority the reported decisions, upon this subject, from every Federal Court in the United States, of the State Courts of every State of the United States, of many local courts, and many of the important decisions of the Courts of Canada and England have been collated and, for the first time, are here brought together and published in a single volume. A complete table of the cases cited and arranged in alphabetical order, is appended. The book includes a topical index also arranged in alphabetical order, containing the common- place names applied to injuries, the location of (lii) IV FOREWORD them, as arm, head, foot, etc., and an amplitude of cross-references, which will instantly point to the page where the case may be found. In every case cited a statement of the facts as well as the deci- sion of it, appears. This book, with its table of cases and topical index, has been in the maldng for the last 35 years, during which its compiler has held the position of General Counsel of The Commercial Travelers' Mutual Accident Association of America, of Utica, N. Y. It was begun and has been continued by him for his own professional use and his own convenience. Its publication is in response to a formal re- quest made to him at a meeting of the General Counsels' Association of Accident and Health Companies held at West Baden, Indiana, in August, 1921, and to the requests of members of the bar throughout the country who have become familiar with it and have recognized its con- venience. The " scratch-book " in which it was started was christened a " Eeady Eeference Digest." It is still a real " Ready Eeference Digest," readier than ever because of its increased growth and age. Such merit as may be claimed for it consists in the fact that it includes all the cases, within its scope, and any of them can be found by any per- son at the very time they are needed. M. W. Van Auken. Utica, N. Y., June 6, 1922. INTRODUCTION BY WILLIAM BROSMITH General Counsel and Vice-President of The Travelers' Insurance Co., Hartford, Conn. Everyone who is related in any way to the right adjustment of claims for indemnity under policies of accident and health insurance will find the Ready Reference Insurance Digest just what it purports to be — a helpful and dependable compilation of what the courts have declared to be the rights and obligations of the parties to such insurance contracts. What has been held to be the law with regard to any .particular casualty or cause of disability or the interrelation of cause and effect will be found to be stated with a terse- ness and directness that will appeal to the mind of the layman and should be useful in the way of suggestion, in these respects, to the mind of the lawyer. Perhaps in no way will this compilation serve a bet- ter purpose than by the prevention of controversies and litigations as to the merits of claims for losses. Insurance companies as well as policyholders and bene- ficiaries are vitally interested in the speedy and right adjustment of indemnity claims and should therefore welcome this Digest as an office assistant in this direction. (v) VI INTEODUCTION. The story told in the eases cited is one of serious and expensive mistakes for which the policyholders and beneficiaries at times and the insurance companies at other times were to blame. In the early days of accident and health insurance — and a very large per- centage of these cases date back to these early days — ^it was natural that the companies on the one hand and the claimants on the other should differ as to the appli- cation of a policy to a given state of facts or as to the relation between a so-called accident and subsequent disability or death. But time and the courts, although obviously, as the pages of this work will indicate, the courts were not always in agreement and therefore could not have been right id all cases, have developed certain rules which tend to lessen the number of such differences and as a consequence the amount of litiga- tion. It is a fact not sufficiently known or appreciated that, although the growth and development of accident and sickness insurance in this country during the last half century have been phenomenal, the ratio of dis- puted or controverted claims has been materially reduced. WILLIAM BROSMITH. Hartford, Connecticut, July 24, 1922. ARRANGEMENT Page Foreword iii Introduction by William Brosmith, General Coun- sel of the Travelers' Insurance Co. of Hartford, Conn V « Ready Reference Insurance Digest; Accident Defined, Disease Distinguished 1-250 Table of Cases 251-273 Topical Index 274-357 (vii) READY REFERENCE INSURANCE DIGEST Exertion, restraining runaway horse — Fright or strain — Death. While one insured against accident was driving along a public street, his horse became frightened at an unsightly object and ran away, without up- setting the carriage or coming in contact with anything ; but the insured was apparently greatly endangered at the time, and suffered so severely, either from fright, or strain caused by his physi- cal exertion in restraining the horse, that he died wdthin an hour afterward. Held, that death en- sued from bodily injuries effected through exter- nal, violent and accidental means. McGlinchy et al. v. Fidelity and Casualty Company (Me. S. J. C), 80 Me. 251; 14 Atl. Eep. 13; 6 Am. St. Eep. 190. Fall — Slipped on inclined platform at freight house — Leg injured — Septic or pyemic symptoms developed Infection. Insured on April 30, 1906, while walking up an incline leading to the platform of a freight house, 2 READY REFERENCE INSURANCE DIGEST slipped and fell, seriously injuring his leg below the knee, and the disability continued to August 17th following. A physician who attended in- sured testified that he was called and dressed the wound, and in about a week or ten days, possibly less, insured developed septic or pyemic symp- toms, which are about the same, and very decided symptoms and swelling of the leg, and that con- tinued for some little time, and the wound was a long time healing, as such wounds usually are. That the injury to the bone caused the infectious condition, which occurred in about ten days, and which was the natural and expected result of the accident. Held, that the company is liable; the fact that infection resulted did not bring the same within the terms of the limitation; the words "injury or disability" being referable to the time of the accident. Garvey v. Phoenix Preferred Accident Insurance Company (N. T. S. C), 123 App. Div. 106; 108 N. Y. Supp. 186. Sunstroke — ^Accident. An accident policy insuring against bodily in- jury from accidental means, provided that sun- stroke, suffered through accidental means, should be deemed bodily injuries. Insured, after being exposed to the sun's rays in the necessary conduct of his business, suffered a "sunstroke," which is defined as an inflammatory disease of the brain, brought on by exposure to the too intense heat of the sun's rays, or to over-heated air. Held, that, ACCIDENT, defi ned; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 3 as insured, while intending to be in the sun, did not intend to produce a sunstroke, the sunstroke was an "accident," which is an event that takes place without one's foresight or expectation, and hence was within the policy, being produced by "accidental means," which are agencies that pro- duce effects that are not their natural and prob- able consequences; the requirement that the sun- stroke be produced by accidental means not re- quiring an accident to precede the sunstroke. Gallagher v. Fidelity and Casualty Com- pany of New York (N. Y. S. C), 163 App. Div. 556; 148 N. Y. Supp. 1016;44Ins.L. Jour. 448. Affirmed: 221 N. Y. 664; 117 N. E. Rep. 1067. Leg injured in striking against truck — ^Abrasion — In- fection — Blood poisoning — Septicaemia — Death. Where the accident occurred by the insured striking her leg against a truck in the department store where she worked, causing an abrasion of the skin, which became infected by the germ called staphyloccus, from which developed acute general , septicaemia,, or blood poisoning, which was the cause of her death eight days after the accident, it was held that the clause in the policy limiting insurer's previously expressed liability, where the injury or loss "resulted from or was contributed to by any poison, disease, infection," etc., such limitation applies to a disease or infection which 4 READY BEFEREBTCE INSURANCE DIGEST the deceased was suffering prior to or^at the time of the accident. Finucane v. Standard Accident Insur- ance Company (N. Y, S. C.) 184 App. Div. 280; 171 N. Y. Supp. 1018;52Ins.L. Jour. 603. Fall in plunge bath. Deceased, who was subject to epileptic fits, was found dead in a plunge bath in an almost standing position, the water having a temperature of about 100 degrees. There was an abrasion between his eyes, and a bruise on one side of his head. His physician testified that the entrance into the bath of one in his condition would be likely to result in an epileptic attack, and that the fall or blow which caused the abrasion or bruise, was not sufficient to have caused death. Held, upon the evidence that the deceased came to his death through other causes "than external, violent and accidental means," within the intent and meaning of the policy in suit. Tennant v. Travelers' Insurance Com- pany (U. S. C. C), 31 Fed. Eep. 322. Hernia — Groin injured in running against door knob. Where the policy indemnified against death resulting from " external, violent and accidental means," but stipulated that the insurer was not to be liable when death resulted " wholly or par- tially, directly or indirectly, from hernia," and the insured, in running against a door knob so injured his groin that hernia resulted, and he afterwards died, the insurer is nevertheless liable. Miner v. Travelers' Insurance Company (Ohio C. P.), 3 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 289; 2 Ohio N. P. 103. Fall against dashboard of buggy — ^Abdomen injured — Appendicitis — Septic peritonitis — Surgical operation — Prior attacks of appendicitis. Where assured was driving in a buggy when the front wheel ran off and caused him to be thrown against the dashboard, striking his abdomen ; and soon thereafter he was seized with pain in his bowels, especially on the right side, and later suffered severe cramping pains in the abdomen, nausea, high fever and rapid pulse, which trouble the doctors diagnosed on the third day as "acute appendicitis," and two days thereafter an opera- tion was performed which disclosed that the trouble was "acute appendicitis, septic periton- itis and locked bowels," and on the seventh day after the injury assured died, his doctors stating that his death was caused by these diseases and that they were the direct results of the accidental injury. However, about ten or twelve years before assured suffered two different attacks of appen- dicitis, and three prominent surgeons testified as 6 READY EEFEKENCE ISTSUKANCE DIGEST experts that the injury could not have caused the third attack of appendicitis, but that the immedi- ate cause of death was septic peritonitis, the result of chronic, recurrent appen,dicitis. The question of cause of death was submitted to the jury, and it rendered a verdict for plaintiff. In the opinion, the Circuit Court of Appeals gave the following rule: " If the insured recovered from his former attacks of this disease, so that it no longer existed in his body, and there was only a susceptibility to have it in case a proper exciting cause should arise, and in this case the faU against the dash- board proved to be such exciting cause, the case would be one for recovery under the policy; but if because of former attacks there was not merely a susceptibility to a further attack, but the actual disease itself existed, liable to be rendered active and virulent by an injury such as that suffered by the insured, in that event the active disease which resulted in death would not be regarded as the result of the fall and the latent diseases, and hence there could be no recovery under the policy." Judgment affirmed against company. New Amsterdam Casualty Company v. Shields (U. S. C. C. A., 6th Cir., Tenn.), 155 Fed. Eep. 54; 85 C. C. A. 122; 36 Ins. L. Jour. 1046. ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 7 Bicycle riding' — ^Inflammation of appendix — Septic peritonitis. Under a policy providing that, if the insured's death resulted solely from bodily injuries effected through external, violent, and accidental means, a certain sum shall be paid; that, if such death result from such means, while riding a bicycle, double that sum shall be paid; but that if death result from other causes, the insurer shall not be liable on the death of the insured from septic peritonitis resulting from an inflammation of the appendix, caused by the regular movement of the psoas muscle while the insured was riding his bicycle. Appel V. Aetna Life Insurance Com- pany (N. Y. S. C), 86 App. Div. 83; 83 N. Y. Supp. 238. Affirmed: 86 N. Y. Supp. 1128; 180 N. Y. 514; 72 N. E. 1139. Pneumonia — Traumatic form — ^No accident. In an action on an accident insurance policy which insured against " bodily injuries effected though evternal, violent and accidental means," it appeared that assured died of pneumonia, with symptoms of the traumatic form. Assured was a miner, and was taken sick while at work; but there was no evidence of any accident at the ihine and assured made no complaint of any injury at the time. Held, that evidence of a statement relating to an injury, made by assured to his phy- sician thirty-six hours after the physician was 8 READY REFERENCE INSURANCE DIGEST first called, was not admissible as part of the res gestae, where such statement did not purport to have been made in connection with the profes- sional treatment. Equitable Mutual Accident Assciation v. McCluskey (Colo. S. C), 1 Colo. App. 473, 29 Pac. Eep. 383 ; 21 Ins. Law Jour. 540. Fall — Peritonitis — ^prior attacks of peritonitis of liver. Where assured died of perionitis locahzed in the region of the liver, and induced by a f aU, and having previously had peritonitis in the same part, and the disease having produced effects which rendered him liable to its recurrence, and the policy insuring against death from external, violent and accidental means, but conditioned not to extend to any case in which death or disability occurs in consequence of disease . . . nor to any case except where the injury is the proximate cause of the disability or death, the presiding Justice stated in his instructions to the jury, the following rule : The quesion as to whether peritonitis, if that caused his death, is to be deemed a disease within the meaning of this policy, and the proximate cause of death . . . so as to prevent recovery, depends upon the question whether or not before the time of the fall, and at the time of the fall, he had then the disease — ^was then suffering with the disease. If he was then— although aggravated and made fatal by the fall, he can not recover. ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 9 But, if owing to existing lesions caused by that disease, but not having the disease at the time, the same kind of malady — that is, peritonitis — was started up, the company was to be answerable, although, if there had been a normal state of things the fall would not have occasioned such a result. It was held that this ruling gave an interpreta- tion to the language of the policy which was in accordance with the apparent purpose and inten- tion of the parties, and which made the contract a beneficent provision for the beneficiaries named in it. Freeman v. Mercantile Mutual Accident Association (Mass. S. J. C), 156 Mass. 351; 30 N. E. 1013; 17 L. R. A. 752; 21 Ins. L. Jour. 663; 46 Al- bany L. Jour. 77. Jumped from platform — Internal organs injured — Stricture of duodenum — Duodenitis. It appeared that deceased jumped voluntarily from a platform four or five feet from the ground, alighting heavily; that shortly afterwards he vomited; from that time on retained nothing on his stomach; passed nothing but decomposed blood and mucus, and died nine days afterwards from a stricture of the duodenum, duodenitis, pro- duced by the accident, the complaint alleging. Held, that it was proper to charge that the jump was the means by which the injury, if any was sustained, was caused, and that the question 10 READY EEFEEENCE INSURANCE DIGEST was whether there was anything accidental in the act of jumping from the time deceased left the platform to the time he alighted on the ground. Where two of his companions jumped from the same platform just before deceased, and alighted safely, it will be presumed that deceased intended to and thought thsit he would alight safely, and a verdict that it was an accident that he did not so alight was warranted. In the general charge the Court laid before the jury the issue as to the constriction or occlusion of the duodenum, and charged that the jury must weigh the conflicting claims in regard thereto, and that if deceased received an injury which directly produced duodenitis and thereby caused death, the injury was the proximate cause of death. United States Mutual Accident Company V. Barry (U. S. C. C.) 131 U. S. 100; 9 Sup. Ct. 755; 33 L. Ed. 60 ; 40 Albany Law Jour. 35. Affirming 21 Fed. 712. Fall down flight of stairs — Rupture of large aneurism on aorta — Faintness cause of fall. While going down a flight of stairs insured fell. At the time he was with his daughter. As soon as assistance arrived the daughter stated that her father had fainted. The father himself had stated, as testified by a witness, that: "When he was going down the stairway everything before him got blank and he felt a faintness coming over ACCIDENT, def ined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 11 him and he must have fallen." There were no obstructions on the stairway which could have tripped him. There were no bruises on his body. The immediate cause of death, which occurred eleven days after the fall, was the rupture of a large aneurism on the ascending part of the aorta. There was expert evidence to the effect that an aneurism of the size found was a condition of long standing and of slow growth. Held, that the verdict in favor of the plaintiff was against the weight of the evidence. The lia- bility of the defendant does not extend to a death which results from, or in consequence of, any disease, nor to any death, uiiless caused by bodily injury which is external, accidental, and is the proximate, sole and only cause of death. Plain- tiff was bound to show that her decedent's death came strictly within the terms of the contract. Sasse V. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America (N. Y. S. C), 168 App. Div. 746; 154 N. Y. Supp. 558; 172 App. Div. 952; 157 N. Y. Supp. 1144; 179 App. Div. 927; 166 N. Y. Supp. 1113 ; 180 App. Div. 887 ; 166 N. Y. Supp. 1113. Affirmed, 226 N. Y. 669. See, also, Sasse v. Travelers' Insurance Company (N. Y. App. Div.), 154 N. Y. Supp, 569 ; 169 App. Div. 187. 12 EEADY REFERENCE INSURANCE DIGEST Fever — Hernia — Blow on head from falling plaster. A clause in a policy excepting from the opera- tion thereof an injury resulting from disease does not fall within the exception where a policy holder had a long and serious illness, such as a fever, and while recovering therefrom received a blow on the head from falling plaster, from which death re- sulted ultimately, though not immediately, the proximate cause of death would be, not the fever, but the blow from the plaster, although death might not have resulted but for the debilitated condition of the injured person, resulting from the fever. In such a case the immediate cause of the death was the blow on the head, though the consequences might be the result of the disease from which he suffered. In order to prevent a recovery under such a clause in the policy, it must be shown that the disease was the substantial cause of the injury; and the mere fact that the disease may aggravate the consequences of the injury and make them more serious than would have been otherwise, does not bring the case with- in the exception stated in the policy. Where an accident insurance company seeks to avoid liability under a clause in its policy provid- ing that it shall not be liable for any injuries or death resulting wholly or in part from hernia, and the insured at the time of the injury had an exist- ing hernia in his system, it is incumbent for the company, after it has shown that an injury re- sulted from an accident, to show that the hernia was the contributing cause which brought about ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 13 the injury resulting from the accident, and it is sufficient to show that the existence of the hernia rendered the consequences more serious. Thornton v. Travelers' Insurance Corn- Company (Ga. S. C) 116 Ga. 121; 42 S. E. 287; 94 Am. St. Eep. 99 ; 32 Ins. Law Jour. 38. See following : This case was tried in accordance with the for- mer ruling, reported in 116 Ga. 121, 42 S. E. 287, 94 Am. St. Eep. 99. The evidence was conflicting, but sufficient to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff for eight weeks' disability. None of the assign- ments of error present grounds requiring the sec- ond grant of a new trial. Judgment for plaintiff below ; here affirmed against company. Travelers' Insurance Company v. Thorn- ton (Ga. S. C), 119 Ga. 455; 46 S. E. 678; 33 Ins. Law Jour. 443. Falling of scalding water in ear — Disease and low vi- tality. The complaint alleged that the injury which re- sulted in the death of the insured was caused by the accidental falling of scalding water into his ear. In an action on a policy the Court say: "We think the only reasonable interpretation to be placed upon this clause (insurer should be liable 14 BEADY BErEEENCE INSUEANCE DIGEST for the death of the insured if it resulted solely from accidental injuries) is to say that the injury must stand out as the predominant factor in the production of the result, and not that it must have been so virulent in character as necessarily «nd inevitably to have produced that result re- gardless of all other conditions and circum- stances. People differ so widely in health, vital- ity and ability to resist disease and injury, that what may mean death to one man would be com- paratively harmless to another, and therefore the fact that a given injury may not generally be lethal does not prevent it from becoming so under certain circumstances or conditions ; and if under the peculiar temperament or condition of health an individual upon whom it is inflicted, such in- jury appears as the active, efficient cause that sets in motion agencies that result in death, without the intervention of any other independent force, then it should be regarded as the sole and proxi- mate cause of death. The fact that physical in- firmities of the victim may be a necessary condi- tion to the result does not deprive the injury of its distinction as the sole producing cause. In such case disease or low vitality do not arise to the dignity of concurring causes, but, in having deprived nature of her normal power of resist- ance to attack, appear rather as the passive allies of the agencies set in motion by the injury. Driskell v. United States Health and Ac- cident Insurance Company, 117 Mo. App. 363; 93 S. W. 880. ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 15 Fall — ^Ruptured kidney — Cancerous kidney. Death from a rupture of a kidney produced by an accidental fall, is the result of an accident, "independent of all other causes," within the pro- visions of the policy — this meaning direct or prox- imate causes — though a cancerous condition of the kidney made the rupture possible. Fetter v. Fidelity and Casualty Company, 174 Mo. 256; 73 S. W. 592; 97 Am. St. Rep. 560; 61 L. R. A. 459. Fall on sidewalk — Shock caused cerebral hemorrhage — Tumor of brain. Death of the insured resulted from his stumbl- ing over an obstruction on the sidewalk, whereby he was thrown violently to the ground, the shock of the fall causing cerebral hemorrhage. There was evidence the insured was afflicted with a tu- mor of the brain, which, at its stage of growth, would not probably have been an independent cause of death for many years, but which created such conditions that when an accidental fall rup- tured the inner lining of an artery cerebral hem- orrhage ensued, causing death. It was held the jury was justified in finding that the fall was the proximate cause of death, even though it would not have produced death but for the diseased con- dition of one of the arteries of the brain. Continental Insurance Company v. Lloyd, 165 Ind. 52; 73 N. E. 824; 34 Ins. Law Jour. 461. 16 READY REFEEENCE INSURANCE DIGEST Strain — Diseased condition. A strain received in the ordinary course of the insured's business is an accident within the mean- ing of an accident insurance policy insuring against accidental bodily injuries caused solely by external, violent, and accidental means, and recovery on the t)olicy for the death of the insured is not precluded because of the diseased condition of the body existing when the accident occurred, when the accidental injury was the inciting, effi- cient and predominant cause of his death. Patterson v. Ocean Accident and Guar- anteee Company (D. C), 25 D. C. App. 46. Struck by automobile, across stomach, thrown to pave- ment, head injured, concussion of brain — ^Appendi- citis — Heart disease. "Since it appears from all the evidence of plaintiff's witnesses that the death of the insured was due to a concurrence of three causes, to wit, the injury, the appendicitis and the heart jiisease ; and that no one of these causes without the other two, and no two without the-remaining one, would have produced the death," the company not liable under clause in policy which provided that the company would not be liable for any loss caused or contributed to by illness or disease. Clarke v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company, 26 Calif. App. Decisions, 1225 (Civil No. 2382, 1st App. Dist. June 15, 1918). ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 17 See following: Under such a policy, if disease plays a part in the death of the insured person after an accident, it is essential to a recovery that such disease was due to the accident; if death was caused in part by heart disease, and such disease was not in fact caused by the accident, there could be no re- covery. If an accidental injury produces morbid changes in the exercise of the vital functions, which in turn results in death, the injury and not the morbid change is held to be the cause of death. There was testimony to the effect that the in- sured was struck across the stomach by the fender of an automobile and was thrown so that his head struck the pavement; there was a concussion of the brain which caused unconsciousness for sev- eral hours, and for several days thereafter he was so disturbed mentally that he was unable to un- derstand his surroundings or his condition; he had previously been in extraordinarily good health and bodily vigor ; about a month after the accident he complained of a pain in his side and an operation was performed upon him and the appendix removed ; he died a few days later. Im- mediately after the accident his heart was exam- ined but no indication of heart trouble was ap- parent; but just before the operation a slight heart murmur was noticed; an autopsy revealed no abnormal condition of the lungs or liver indi- cative of any chronic heart condition; there was medical testimony to the effect that the condition of the heart "was due to the appendieial abscess, aided by the lowered resistance caused by the con- 18 READY EEFBRENCE INSURANCE DIGEST cussion of the brain." Another physician testi- fied that the appendix would not have been in- fected from the bacilli in the large intestine had it not been for the accident. Held, that this evi- dence was sufficient to sustain the finding that the accident was the proximate cause of death. Clarke v. New Amsterdam Casualty Com- pany (Cal. S. C), 179 Pac. Eep. 195; 53 Ins. Law Jour. 605. Foot injured in railroad yards — ^Recovered — Became ill on day he resumed work, and died next day. A locomotive fireman injured his foot while at work in the railroad yards. He was treated therefor and presumably so far recovered as to resume work about two weeks thereafter, but be- came ill the same day and died the following day. The question in issue was whether death resulted solely from bodily injuries effected through ex- ternal, violent and accidental means. To determine the cause of death of a person in- sured against sudden death by accident, all mor- bid changes of the vital functions or the texture of bodily organs which result from such injury should be regarded as the effect thereof and not the cause, and when death results from such mor- bid changes, it is caused by such accident within the meaning of the policy. Where a person, after recovery from an acci- dental injury, succumbs to a disease which would not have been fatal but for the lowered vitality 19 following such injury, the disease, and not the lowered vitality, is the cause of death. Ward V. Aetna Life Insurance Company (Neb. S. C), 82 Neb. 499 ; 118 N. W. 70 ; 38 Ins. I-aw Jour. 14. See following: The policy insured against death resulting from bodily injuries effected through external, violent and accidental means, which, independent of all other causes, produced death. The Court in- structed the jury that there could be a recovery under the policy if the accident was the proximate cause of death, even though "there were other causes that accelerated, or even being added, re- sulted in death." Held, that the instruction was erroneous. And where the jury, after considering the ques- tion for some time, requested the Court to instruct them further as to whether they could return a verdict for the plaintiff if they found that the death was the result of "the sum of two causes", and the Court refused to give them any further instructions. Held, that the refusal of the Court to answer the request of the jury in the negative was reversible error. Held, that the defendant was not liable if the sum of two causes for only one of which defend- ant is liable caused the death. Here sickness and injury combined. Ward V. Aetna Life Insurance Com- pany (Neb. S. C), 85 Neb. 471; 123 N. W. 456; 39 Ins. Law Jour. 277. 20 READY EEFEEE KCE INSUEANCE DIGEST See following : In an action on a policy of accident insurance, the conjectural opinion of an expert, based solely on a hypothetical question, not submitting all the material facts, is insufficient to sustain a verdict. (Judgment for plaintiff in trial court. Here re- versed in, favor of company.) Ward V. Aetna Life Insurance Company (Neb. S. C), 135 N. W. 220. Fall on icy sidewalk — ^Appendicitis — Peritonitis. There was testimony that insured fell on an icy sidewalk with his arm doubled up under him across the right side of the abdomen. He suf- fered much pain during that day, ate little and re- tired early. The pain increased during the next day, when a physician was called. The physi- cians agreed that death was due to peritonitis or inflammation of the appendix. One of the physi- cians testified that the cause of the appendicitis was due to the fall on the sidewalk. If appendicitis was produced by a fall upon the sidewalk, there could be a recovery under the policy insuring against death resulting solely through accidental means. (Judgment affirmed against insurer.) Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Wicker (U. S. C. C. A., 2nd Cir., New York), 240 Fed. 398; 153 C. C. A. 324; 49 Ins. Law Jour. 811, ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 21 Arm broken — Pain in chest and lungs — Embolism or thrombus — Pneumonia. The policy provided that it should not apply to any case "except where the injury is the proxi- mate and sole cause of the disability or death." It appeared that the insured had his arm broken on March 24. The fracture was reduced. A few days later he was taken suddenly with severe pains in his chest and lungs, from which he was relieved, and was convalescent for a week or ten days, when he was again attacked in a manner similar to the first, and from that time he grew gradually worse, until April 12, 1887, when he died. The evidence introduced by the plaintiff tended to show the cause of his death was embol- ism or thrombus, which was the direct result of his arm being broken, while the evidence of the defendant tended to show that his death was caused by pneumonia, and that the brealdng of the arm was not the cause of his death. Held, that a finding that his death was caused solely and proximately by his breaking his arm was war- ranted by the evidence. Peck V. Equitable Accident Association of Binghamton (N. Y. S. C), 5 N. Y. Supp. 215; 52 Hun, 255. Fall from cart — Kidney disease accelerated by accident. A person insured his life for 1,000 pounds with an accident insurance company. The policy pro- vided that, to recover under it, an accident must 22 BEADY BEFBRENCB INSURANCE DIGEST be the direct cause of the death, and that within three months, and provided that the company would not be liable for death arising from natural disease, althougji accelerated by accident. The insured was thiwn from a cart and died within three months, ^fter proof, from which it ap- peared that the insured had for years suffered from kidney disease, that he was free from active symptoms of that disease when he met with the accident. Held, that death was caused by kidney disease accelerated by the accident, and, there- fore, the company is not liable. Anderson et al. v. Scottish Accident In- surance Company, 27 Scottish Law Eep. 20. Fall from veranda — Leg injured — ^Eyrsipelas. Where a; person was accidentally injured in the leg by falling from a veranda, and the wound caused thereby, which at first seemed slight, was within four or five days aggravated by erysipelas, from which death ensued twenty-three days after the accident, the external injury was the "proxi- mate or sole cause" of the death, within the meaning of those words in an accident policy. Young v. Accident Insurance Company, Montreal Law Eep., 6 Super. Ct. 3. Accident Insurance Company of North America v. Young (Can. S. C.), 12 Canadian Law Times, 217; 20 Can. S. C. 280; 28 Can. L. J. (N. S.), 246. ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 23 Putrid animal matter containing poisonous "bacillus anthrax"— lips infected— Malignant pustule— Car- buncle. The plaintiff's testimony tended to show that death was caused by a malignant pustule upon the lip ; that such pustule is not strictly a disease, but a pathological condition of the system, caused by the accidental infliction of diseased or putrid ani- mal matter infested with bacilli anthrax upon the thin skin of the lip of insured, whence the bacilli multiplied, and were diffused through the system. The defences were, death by poison, death from infectious disease, and death by facial carbuncle, an enlarged boil or a large cluster of small boils. Held, on appeal, where the evidence tends to con- firm either of the two theories as to the cause of death of the assured, on only one of which the plaintiff is entitled to recover, a judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff will not be disturbed. Bacon v. United States Mutual Accident Association (N. T. S. C), 3 N. Y. Supp. 237 ; 50 Hun 605. Affirming: 44 Hun, 599. Reversed, as follows : Held, that death resulting from a malignant pustule, caused by the infliction upon the body of putrid animal matter containing poisonous "ba- cillus anthrax" is death from disease, and not from accidental cause, within the terms of the policy insuring against "bodily injuries, effected through external, violent and accidental means", 24 READY REFERENCE INSXTRANCE DIGEST and not extending "to any death or disability which may have been caused wholly or in part by bodily infirmities, or disease existing prior or sub- sequent to the date" of the policy, "nor to any case except where the injury is the proximate or sole cause of the disability or death." Bacon v. United States Mutual Accident Association (N. T. Ct. of App.), 123 N. Y. 304; 25 N. E. Eep. 399; 9 L. E. A. 617 ; 20 Ins. Law Jour. 3 ; 42 Albany Law Jour. 493 ; 33 N. Y. St. Eep. 591 ; 20 Am. St. Eep. 748. Accident — Hernia — Surgical operation — Peritonitis. An accident insurance policy, insuring against death "from bodily injuries effected through ex- ternal, violent and accidental means", but except- ing death from hernia, does not relieve the in- surer from liability where a person, injured in an accident, resulting in a hernia, dies after a dan- gerous and unsuccessful surgical operation result- ing in peritonitis, performed when death seemed inevitable without it, the accident is the proxi- mate cause of his death. Travelers' Insurance Company v. Mur- ray (Colo. S. C), 16 Colo. 296; 26 Pac. Eep. 774; 25 Am. St. Eep. 267. Sunstroke or heat prostration — Disease. "Sunstroke or heat prostration", contracted by decedent in the ordinary course of his duty as a ACCIDE NT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 25 supervising architect, is a disease, and does not come within the terms of a policy of insurance against bodily injuries sustained through exter- nal, violent and accidental means, but expressly excepting "any disease or bodily infirmity." The Court will take judicial notice of the fact that sunstroke is a "serious disease" within the meaning of the policy. Dozier v. Fidelity and Casualty Company (U. S. C. C), 46 Fed. Rep. 446; 13 L. R. A. 114; 20 Ins. Law Jour. 794 ; 33 Central Law. Jour. 161 ; 44 Albany Law Jour. 110. Sunstroke. Sunstroke is a disease. Sinclair v. The Maritime Pas. Ass. Co., 9 W. R. 342; 2 Bigelow's Life & Ace. Cas. 596; 30 L. J. Q. B. 77; 7 Jur. (N. S.), 367; 3 E. & E. 478; 4 L. T. 15. Exposure to sun, etc. — Sunstroke. The policy provided that "if sunstroke, due to external, violent and accidental means," shall re- sult in loss, the company would pay the principal sum promised therein. Assured 's death was caused by sunstroke, resulting from exposure to the sun and humid atmosphere on a hot day. Held, that such death was not within the risks insured by the policy. Bryant et al. v. Continental Casualty Company (Texas C. C. A), 145 S. W. Rep. 636; 41 Ins. Law Jour. 1086. 26 READY REFEEEKCE INSURANCE DIGEST Reversed as follows: The policy insured against bodily injury "which is effected directly and independently of all other causes from external, violent and purely accidental means." Under the title "special ac- cident indemnities" the policy contained the fol- lowing provision: "If sunstroke, freezing or hydrophobia due in either case to external, violent and accidental means, shall result," etc. Held, that under the terms of the contract sunstroke should be considered as an accident rather than as a disease. To hold that sunstroke is a disease under the contract would contradict the express terms of the sunstroke provision. Insured died from a sunstroke suffered while walking upon the streets in the ordinary course of his business as collector. Held, that the word "means" is employed in the sense of "cause." The sunstroke having occurred without any human agency and in a sudden, unexpected and unusual way it has all the elements of an accident both in its occurrence and result, just as clearly so as would a stroke of lightning. An unforeseen result following not naturally from an act, but in an unusual and unexpected way is from accidental means. Bryant et al. v. Continental Casualty Company (Texas S. C), 107 Tex. 582; 182 S. W. Eep. 673; L. E. A., 1916-E, 945; Ann. Cas. 1918-a, 517. ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 27 J Sunstroke. ^ Under an accident policy Held that no recovery can be had for a death by sunstroke, unless the sunstroke was brought about by some concurring accident. Semancik v. Continental Casualty Co. (Pa. Super. Ct.), 56 Pa. Super. Ct. 392; 45 Ins. Law Jour. 215. The death of a person by sunstroke, caused by his exposure to the sun on a hot day while pursu- ing his usual occupation as a laborer on a railroad track, in his ordinary way, is not caused by sun- stroke due to "external, violent and accidental means," within an accident policy insuring against death by "sunstroke" due to "external, violent and accidental means." Semancik v. Continental Casualty Co. (Northampton C. P.), 43 Penna. Co. Ct. Eep. 498. Exposure to sun and heat of engfine — Sunstroke. A policy, insuring against death from bodily injuries caused from external, violent and acci- dental means, provided: "If sunstroke, freezing or hydrophobia due in either case to external, violent and accidental means shall result indepen- dently of all other causes in the death of the assured within ninety days from the date of exposure or infection the company will pay said principal sum." Insured was a railroad fireman. He suffered a sunstroke following exposure to the 28 EEADY EE.FE RENCE INSURANCE DIGEST ^ sun and to the heat of his engine while in pursu- ance of his duties. Held, that there was nothing in the evidence to show that death was caused under such circumstances as to render the com- pany liable. Continental Casualty Company v. Pitt- man (Ga. S. C), 145 Ga. 641 ; 89 S. E. Rep. 716; 48 Ins. Law Jour. 573. Sunstroke. Disability of a traffic policeman due to sun- stroke while he was performing his duties in the usual way, was a "bodily injury sustained solely through accidental means." Higgins v. Midland Casualty Company (111. S. C), 281 111. 431; 118 N. E. Rep. 11; 51 Ins. Law Jour. 289. Sunstroke — Pneumonia. The policy provided: "If sunstroke caused by the direct effect of the sun's rays * * * acci- dentally suffered by the insured shall result directly and independently and exclusively of all other causes in the death of the insured within ninety days from the date of exposure or infec- tion, the company will pay beneficiary hereinbe- fore named the principal sum of this policy." Held, that where insured suffered a sunstroke while pursuing his regular occupation in the usual way, the insurer was liable, and it was not neces- ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 29 sary that the sunstroke be preceded by or caused by an accident. Sunstroke, suffered by insured in pursuance of his regular occupation, is an accident, being an unexpected and unusual occurrence. Where insured died several days after an alleged sunstroke from pneumonia, and there was no evidence to show any connection between the alleged sunstroke and the pneumonia, it was proper to direct a verdict for the insurer. Pack V. Prudential Casualty Company (Ky. C. A.), 170 Ky. 47; 185 S. W. Eep. 496; L. E. A. 1916-E, 952; 48 Ins. Law Jour. 115. Sunstroke. In an accident insurance policy, which provides, "If sunstroke, freezing, or hydrophobia, due in either case to external, violent or accidental means, shall result, independently of all other causes, in the death of the insured within ninety days from the date of the exposure or infection, the company wiU pay said principal sum as indemnity for loss of life. Held, that ' ' accidental means" is used to denote "accidental cause," and in case of sunstroke, if the same was suffered while the insured was engaged in his usual avoca- tion or going about his affairs in an ordinary maimer as any other person might have been under like or similar circumstances, and did not intentionally and voluntarily subject himself to an intense heat calculated to produce sunstroke, with 30 READY REFERENCE INSURANCE DIGEST the knowledge that it would probably occur, then the sunstroke was suffered from "accidental means" or "accidental cause," within the mean- ing of the policy. Continental Casualty Company v. Clark (Okla. S. C), 173 Pac. Rep. 453; 52 Ins. Law Jour. 405. Sunstroke. Insured, while on his way to work, immediately after stepping from the street car oh which he was riding, suffered a sunstroke, ffeld, that the resulting disability was not accidental within the meaning of the policy. The policy provided that "anyone of the follow- ing, namely, — sunstroke, freezing, hydrophobia — suffered through accidental means" should be deemed a bodily injury. Elsey V. Fidelity S Casualty Company (Ind. App.), 109 N. E. Rep. 413; 46 Ins. Law Jour. 359. Reversed, as follows: The policy insured "against bodily injuries sustained through accidental means." It pro- vided " sunstroke * * * suffered through acci- dental means shall be deemed an injury." The insured while riding in a street car was subjected to the direct and indirect rays of the sun. When ACCIDENT, defined; DISEAS E DISTINGUISHED 31 he was about to alight he suffered sunstroke. Held, that the injury so suffered was caused by ' ' accidental means. " If in the act which precedes the injury, though an intentional act, something unusual, unforeseen and unexpected occurs which produces the injury, it is accidental. Elsey V. Fidelity <& Casualty Company (Ind. S. C), 120 N. E. Rep. 42; 52 Ins. Law Jour. 394. Heat stroke from furnace — Sunstroke — Disease. In an action on an insurance policy, providing for loss of time due to sunstroke should be deemed to be due to external, violent and purely acci- dental means entitling insured to full benefits according to the terms of the policy, where plain- tiff's claim is based on a loss which he alleges was due to sunstroke, he is not precluded from recov- ery by the fact that his disability was occasioned by exposure to the heat of a furnace. Continental Casualty Company v. John- son (Kans. S. C), 74 Kans. 129 ; 85 Pac. Rep. 545 ; 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 609 ; 118 Am. St. Rep. 308 ; 35 Ins. Law Jour. 68. Sunstroke — Heat stroke. Where in an action on an accident policy, it appeared that at assured's request the word "sunstroke" was stricken from a provision that 32 READY EEFEKENCB INSURANCE DIGEST the policy should not cover casualties resulting from certain causes, the Court could not hold, as a matter of law, that sunstroke is a disease, and not such a casualty as was covered by the policy. Sunstroke and heat stroke are synonymous terms and mean a sudden prostration resulting from exposure to excessive heat, regardless of the source from which the heat emanates. Mather et al. v. London Guarantee & Accident Company, Ltd., 125 Minn. 186; 145 N. W. Eep. 963; 43 Ins. Law Jour. 656. Sunstroke. An accident policy provided that it should extend only to injury or death from "external, violent and accidental means, ' ' and not to injuries or death caused or contributed to by disease. The policy also expressly provided that the company should be liable for only one-fourth of the amount of the policy where the disability or death was caused or contributed to by sunstroke while not in the line of duty as railroad employe. The in- sured died from sunstroke received in the line of his duty as railroad employe. Held, that the com- pany was liable for the full amount of the policy. Railway Officials and Employes' Acci- dent Ass'n V. Johnson, 109 Ky. 261; 22 Ky. L. R. 759; 58 S. W. Rep. 694; 30 Ins. Law Jour. 259; 52 L. R. A. 401 ; 95 Am. St. Rep. 270. ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 33 Fall — Side bruise — Fever — ^Typhoid fever. It was shown in evidence that the deceased had a fall, of whose effects he complained several days and then fell sick. From this sickness he never recovered, and throughout its continuance he complained of the hurt, and bore the bruise. His attending physicians testified that he died of ty- phoid fever, and that this disease was never pro- duced by a bruise ; his nurse, a competent one, of long experience, testified that he did not have typhoid fever, and it was admitted that bruises might produce other forms of fever. Held, that the evidence preponderates so decidedly that the insured did die of typhoid fever not brought on by the accident, the Court should have set aside a verdict in favor of plaintiff. Standard Life and Accident Insurance Company v. Thomas (Ky. Super. Ct.), 12 Ky. Law Eep. 715. Reversed, as follows : Held, that the jury had the right to believe that the physicians' theory was a mistake, and that the wound that the deceased received produced his death, and was the result of an accident. Standard Life and Accident Insurance Company v. Thomas (Ky. C. A.), 13 Ky. Law Rep. 593; 17 S. W. Rep. 275. 34 READY REFEKENCE INSURANCE DIGEST Thumb injured — Finger injured later— Virus from first injury in second — Blood poisoning. Policy insured against death effected througk external, violent and accidental means, but pro- vided that the insurance should not extend to any * * * death which may have been caused wholly or in part by bodily infirmities or disease existing prior or subsequent to the date of the certificate, nor to any case except where the injury is the sole and proximate cause of death. On April 8, 1889, the insured received an injury to his thumb, and on the 27th day of April received another injury to one of his fingers. The first wound had been lanced about ten days after the injury and con- tinued to discharge matter to the time of the sec- ond injury, and that virus from the first wound may have communicated to the second injury, causing blood poisoning. Held, that if the inocu- lation occurred at the time the wound was made, and was a part of the accident, such accident was the sole and proximate cause of the death, though blood poisoning ensued. Martin v. Equitable Accident Association (N. Y.S. C), 16 N. Y. Supp. 279; 41 N. Y. St. Eep. 77; 61 Hun 467. Martin v. Manufacturers' Accident In- demnity Company, (N. Y. C. A.), 151 N. Y. 94; 45 N. E. Eep. 377. Affirming, 24 N. Y. Supp. 1147; 71 Hun, 614. ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 35 Fall into stream — Drowned — ^Heart defective, causing dizziness— :Fainting caused by indigestion — ^Tempo- rary illness — ^Excepted causes. The insured with companions, was fishing, hav- ing established a camp upon the banks of a trout stream. The insured wa^ found dead in the mid- dle of the stream, lying face downward, in about six inches of water. There was a large bruise upon his forehead. He was seen near where he was found, some twenty minutes before, plajang a trout. The bank was about eighteen inches above the water, and there were in the water stones, egg-size and smaller, upon which he might have struck his head. There was some little froth, of a yellowish color, about his mouth, and his face was purple. His tongue was somewhat inflamed. An autopsy was held on the evening of the day following his death. The blood in the corpse at the autopsy was rather fluid and not coagulated. The brain, the heart, and other vital organs were found in a normal and healthy con- dition. Evidence was introduced by the defend- ant tending to show that deceased had suffered from defective action of the heart in its aortic valve. The autopsy failed to reveal any such structural defect, but all the tests were not applied. There was also some evidence tending to show that deceased suffered from dizziness caused by defective action of the heart. Held, that a verdict for plaintiff would not be disturbed. A drowning caused by a temporary trouble to which the assured was not subject, but which was 36 BEADY KEFEEENCE INSURANCE DIGEST entirely unusual and uncommon, whereby he fell into the water, is "accidental" within the mean- ing of an accident insurance policy. Under a provision of the policy that the insur- ance shall not extend "to any case except when the accidental injury shaU be the proximate and sole cause of the disability or death," if the in- sured suffer death by drowning, the drowning is the proximate and sole cause of death, no matter what the cause of falling into the water, unless death would have been the result without the presence of the water. Under a provision of such a policy that the risk shall not extend to "accidental injuries or death resulting from or caused, directly or indirectly," by fits, vertigo, or other diseases, an accidental death by drowning results from and is caused indirectly by fits, vertigo, or disease if the fall into the water, from which drowning ensues, is caused by such disease. A provision in such a policy that the risk shall not extend to death caused by bodily infirmity or disease does not exempt the company from lia- bility in case of fainting produced by indigestion or a lack of proper food, or any other cause which would show a mere temporary disturbance or enfeeblement. Manufacturers Ace. Indemnity Company V. Dorgan (U. S. C. C. A.), 58 Fed. Rep. 945; 7 C. C. A. 581; 16 U. S. App. 290 ; 22 L. R. A. 620. ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 37 Fall — Contusion of cerebellum — ^Apoplexy — Degenera- tion of cerebrum, etc. In an action on an accident insurance policy, the jury were warranted in finding that a fall was the sole cause of death of insured, where there was testimony that deceased was usually in good health till the time of the fall, and had shown no signs of degeneracy of the brain. Dr. P., who attended deceased daily after his fall, and Dr. E., testified that the post-mortem showed contusion of the cerebellum, which culminated in an effusion of blood on the brain, producing apoplexy and death, and that in their opinion the contusion was produced by the fall. Dr. H., who also assisted at the post-mortem, testified to the existence of de- generation of the cerebum and to a diseased con- dition of certain arteries, which in his opinion were of long standing, caused death independent- ly of the fall ; and Dr. O., who was called for de- fendant, agreed with Dr. H., as to the cause of death, if the latter 's diagnosis was correct. A special verdict, containing an affirmative answer to the question : "Was such injury the sole cause of death?" is equivalent to a finding that the injury was the sole and proximate cause of the apoplexy which was the immediate cause of death. Hall V. American Masonic Accident As- sociation (Wis. S. C), 86 Wis. 518; 57 N. W. Rep. 336. 38 READY EEFEEENCE INSURANCE DIGEST Fall — Head injured — Death — Fatty degeneration of the brain and heart. Where the assured, while pursuing his business as a traveling salesman, sustained a heavy fall, striking and injuring his forehead, and the evi- dence disclosed no cause for the fall, but the as- sured while standing threw up his hands and fell to the floor, and an autopsy revealed an advanced stage of fatty degeneration of the brain and heart, it was Held, that the cause of death was not an accident insured against, and that there could be no recovery under a policy whereby insurance was expressly withheld for any "bodily injury hap- pening directly or indrectly in consequence of any disease," etc. Sharpe v. Commercial Travelers' Mutual Accident Association of America (Ind. S. C), 139 Ind. 92; 37 N. E. Eep. 353; 23 Ins. Law Jour. 757 ; 27 Ch. L. N. 14. Fall — Fits or vertigo — Bodily infirmity and disease. In an action on an accident policy, evidence that insured, who was free from disease so far as his family or physician could discover, directly before the fall which caused his death was seen to stag- ger, does not conclusively prove that the fall was caused by "fits or vertigo," so as to avoid the policy under a condition avoiding the same in such event, physicians testifying that insured's con- duct might have been due to other causes. The words "disease" and "bodily infirmity," as used in a provision in an accident policy ex- ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 39 empting insurer from liability for injuries caused thereby, mean practically the same thing, and only include an ailment or disorder of a some- what established or settled character, and not merely a temporary disorder, arising from some sudden and unexpected derangement of the sys- tem, though it produces unconsciousness. Injuries caused by a fall due to a temporary and unexpected physical disorder are "violent," "external," and "accidental," within the mean- ing of such words ifi an accident insurance policy. Meyer v. Fidelity and Casualty Company (Iowa S. C), 96 Iowa, 378; 65 N. W. Rep. 328; 59 Am. St. Eep. 374 ; 25 Ins. Law Jour. 346. Fright and excitement — Nervous shock. The plaintiff was a signal man in the employ of the defendant, a railway company, who entered into a contract of insurance with him, ,by which they agreed to pay a weekly amount in case of his being incapacitated from employment by reason of accident sustained in the discharge of his duties in the company's employ, such insurance to be absolute for all accidents, however caused, occurring to the insured in the fair and ordinary discharge of his duty. Plaintiff, in the discharge of his duty, endeavored to prevent an accident 'to a train, by signaling to the engineer, and the excitement and fright arising from the danger to the train produced a nervous shock which inca- pacitated him from employment for more than 40 READY EEFEEENCE INSURANCE DIGEST fifty-two weeks. Held, that the plaintiff had been incapacitated by accident within the meaning of the policy. Pugh V. London, B. S 8. C. By. (Eng. C. A.), 2 Queen's Bench, "The Law Reports," 248. Exertion running up hill — Head pains — ^Apoplexy — Bodily infirmity, etc. An accident policy was issued by the company to the assured, insuring him against death result- ing through external, violent and accidental means, but not covering bodily infirmities or voluntary overexertion. Insured was a man fifty- three years of age, and while engaged in work which required stooping, and shortly after run- ning rapidly up a hillside to get an article needed in his work, was attacked with pains in his head, and shortly after died. On the trial of an action on the policy, two physicians, called by the plain- tiff, testified that insured died of apoplexy, which is a bodily infirmity or disease, and that there was nothing in the circumstances to have caused death if there had been no bodily infirmity or predis- position to apoplexy. Held, that it was error to refuse to direct a verdict for the insurance com- pany. Travelers' Insurance Company v. Selden (U. S. C. C. A., 4th Cir., Va.), 78 Fed. Rep 285; 24 C. C. A. 92; 42 U. S. App. 253 ; 44 Central Law Jour. 300; 26 Ins. Law Jour. 704. ACCIPBNT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 41 Pall — Struck water spout — Head and face injured — Heart disease. In an action to recover on an accident policy, the evidence showed that insured suddenly fell, striking on a water spout, which left external marks on his face and head, and that he died a iew minutes thereafter. It appeared that de- ceased was troubled with disease of the heart. Certain physicians testified that the phenomena attending deceased's death were charactertistic rather of an injury to the brain, than heart dis- ease ; and one expert testified that the injuries to the head and brain described by the evidence would have been sufficient to cause death even in the case of a healthy heart. Under the policy of accident insurance which provides that it shall not extend to nor cover accidental injuries or death "resulting from or caused, directly or indirectly, wholly or in part, by disease in any form," there can be no recovery for the death of the insured if he had a disease but for which death would not have resulted from the accident; and where the insured had a dis- eased heart, it was error to give an instruction allowing the jury to find for the plaintiffs if they believed the accident was sufficient to cause the death of a man with a diseased heart, although insufficient to kill one with a normally healthy heart. (Judgment here reversed in favor of company.) Commercial Travelers' Mutual Accident Association of America v. Fulton (U. S. C. C. A., New York), 42 EEADY REFERESrCE HJJ-SUBANCE DIGEST 79 Fed. Eep. 423; 24 C. C. A. 654; 45 U. S. App. 578; 26 Ins. Law Jour. 565. Judgment affirmed against company: 93 Fed. Rep. 621 ; 35 C. C. A. 493. Sting of insect — Blood poisoning. Death caused by the sting of an insect is effected through "external, violent and acci- dental" means, within the meaning of an accident policy, and the proximate cause of death, result- ing from blood poisoning caused by the sting, is the sting of an insect. Omherg v. United States Mutual Acci- dent Association (Ky. C. A.), 101 Ky. 303 ; 40 S. W. Kep. 909 ; 27 Ins. Law Jour. 68 ; 19 Ky. Law Eep. 462 ; 72 Am. St. Rep. 413. Reached to close shutter — Ruptured artery — Hemor- rhage — Consumption — No accident. Insured, who was suffering from consumption, was with his two brothers in their office. Pre- paratory to leaving the office insured went to a window to close the shutters. A chair stood in front of the window, and he stood on his toes and reached over the chair toward the shutters, and, as he did so, blood began to flow from his mouth. He was placed on a lounge and died within a few minutes. The cause of his death was hemorrhage from a ruptured artery. There was no evidence ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 43 that he fell, slipped, lost his balance, failed to catch tlie shutter when he reached for it, or that it moved at his touch more or less readily than he had expected it would, or that anything was done or occurred which he had not foreseen and planned, excepting the rupture of the artery and the consequences which resulted from it. Held, that his death did not result from an accidental cause. Feder et al. v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Association (Iowa S. C), 107 Iowa, 538; 78 N. W. Eep. 252; 70 Am. St. Rep. 212; 43 L. R. A. 693; 28 Ins. Law Jour. 276; 48 Central Law Jour. 248. Stumbled — Fall — Side injured on rail— Lungs weak. The deceased was sent to take mail from the freight house to the passenger depot. In going, he ran to avoid a severe storm, and, when he had run a considerable distance along the tracks, he was seen to stumble, throw up his hands, fall, and strike his side against one of the rails, and then roll over on the ground. His dead body was found almost immediately after he fell, lying across the rails, blood oozing freely from his mouth and nose. Although the deceased had been suffer- ing from weak lungs for some time before his death, yet he was strong and sound enough to dis- charge satisfactorily the duties of flagman and freight handler for the railroad for more than two years immediately preceding his death. Held, that it was for the jury to decide whether the 44 READY REFERENCE INSURANCE DIGEST death of deceased was caused solely from the fall, &o as to be accidental within the meaning of the accident policy. Company liable. Railway Officials & Employes' Accident Association v. Coady (111. A. C), 80 111. App. 563. Drowning accidental — Epilepsy. Evidence that deceased, a man fifty-three years old, left his office in New York about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, in good spirits ; that he said he was going to Staten Island to make some calls, and invited a friend to go with him ; and that his body was found eight days afterwards floating in the water of New York bay, with no marks of vio- lence upon it, and with a frothy mucus in the mouth, such as is found where a person has been in the water and struggling, getting water into his lungs, and of a character which excluded the idea of epilepsy, is sufficient to sustain a verdict of death resulting proximately and solely from accidental causes. Landon v. Preferred Accident Insurance Company (N. Y. S. C, App. Div.), 60 N. Y. Supp. 188; 43 App. Div. 487. Affirmed: 167 N. Y. 577; 60 N. E. Rep. 1114. Fall on polished floor — Head hits fender — Bruise at base of neck — Concussion of brain — Dizziness — Bright 's disease. To prove that the death of the insured was c-aused by a fall not induced by any disease or ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 45 bodily infirmity, the insurance company claiming the fall was caused by vertigo (which the policy did not cover), it was shown that he came home and told a servant he had a dizzy headache, and would lie down ; that later he was found dead on the floor, his head resting on the bar of the fender, and his body straight out ; and that the floor was polished hard wood, and a rug pushed away from Ids feet. There was some evidence that he was in general good health, and that he had never fallen from dizziness, and no actual proof that this fall was caused by dizziness. The family physician for twelve years had never attended him for ver- tigo or chronic disease of any kind. He saw blood about the nose of deceased, and he and three other physicians performed an autopsy. He found de- ceased healthy throughout, and could not state the cause of death. The second physician found a bruise above the large vertebrae at the base of the neck, with hemorrhage, and, in his opinion, death was caused by a fall and concussion of the brain and shock, A third physician corroborated this opinion. The son of the deceased, also a physician, saw a depression in the muscles at the back of the neck, and a bruise under the collar button, which was dented on both sides and bent together. He saw blood on the fender. The fourth physician thought deceased died from natu- ral causes, and not from accident, and he said he found indication of Bright 's disease sufficient to have caused death. Deceased's son testified that he had made the usual tests several times, and found deceased did not have Bright 's disease. 46 KEADY REFERENCE INSURANCE DIGEST ^eld, that a verdict that death resulted from "ex- ternal, violent and accidental means," was justi- fied. . Larkin v. Interstate Casualty Company (N. Y. S. C. App. Div.), 60 N. Y. Supp. 205 ; 43 App. Div. 365. Sudden faintness — Pall — Temporary disorder — Pits or vertigo. Injuries caused by a force due to a temporary and unexpected physical disorder, are violent, ex- ternal and accidental, within the meaning of such words in an accident insurance policy. Evidence of a sudden faintness, immediately preceding a fall and injury, does not conclusively prove that the faU was caused by fits or vertigo so as to avoid the policy, under a policy avoiding the same for these causes, where physicians testi- fied that insured's condition might have been due to other causes. Interstate Casualty Company v. Bird (Hamilton Co., Ohio C. C), 18 Ohio Cir. Eep. 488; 10 0. C. D. 211. Fall on slippery pavement — Heart raptured by fall and disease. Under an accident policy which expressly stipu- lates against liability for death from accident un- less the accident is the proximate and sole cause, there can be no recovery where the death of the insured resulted from a rupture of the heart ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 47 caused in part by its diseased condition, and in part from a fall on a slippery pavement, neither cause in itself being sufficient to cause death. Huhhard v. Mutual Accident Association, (U. S. C. C, E. D. Pa.), 98 Fed. Rep. 930. See following case : The policy insured against death only when re- sulting from bodily injuries received through "ex- ternal, violent and accidental means, independent- ly of all other causes," and provided that the insurance did not cover death "resulting wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, from any of the following causes ; * * * disease or bodily infirm- ity, hernia, fits, vertigo, sleepwalking." Held, that the phrase, "all other causes" and "disease or bodily infirmity" were not limited by the sub- sequent enumeration of specific disease or infirmi- ties and that the policy did not cover death re- sulting from a rupture of the heart caused in part by its diseased condition, and in part by a fall on a slippery pavement. Huhhard v. Traveler's Insurance Com- pany (U. S. C. C, E. D. Pa.), 98 Fed. Rep. 932. Pall in car — Back hurt — Strain — Typhoid fever previ- ously. In an action on an accident insurance policy, it appeared that the insured had been sick, with symptoms of typhoid fever; that, contrary to the advice of his physician, he took a railroad trip, t8 BEADY REFERENCE INSURANCE DIGEST md that, while at the water cooler, the car gave I sudden lurch, causing him to fall, and "hurt lis back." The following day he suffered from nternal troubles, which could only be accounted :or by the presumption of a severe strain, his ibdominal temperature became very high, he romited blood, and on the second day died. Two jhysicians testified that there were no symptoms )f typhoid fever subsequent to the accident, and hat death was caused wholly by the injuries. leld, that the evidence was sufficient to support I finding that death was caused through external md violent means, independent of insured's dis- sased condition. A condition in the policy preventing recovery or death from disease, voluntary over-exertion or 'oluntary exposure to unnecessary danger did not lefeat the right of recovery for death occurring ^'hile insured was ill, and unnecessarily taking a rip by rail, contrary to the advice of his physi- ian, but which was caused by an accident entirely adependent of insured's weak condition, and i'hich might have occurred to a man in good lealth. Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Hicks, et al, (Texas C. C. A.), 23 Tex. C. C. App. 74; 56 S. W. Rep. 87. 'all— Shock— Weakened heart causing deficient circu- lation. While in an action upon an accident policy the sstimony of medical experts as to the cause of ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 49 death as derived from the result of the autopsy is entitled to great respect, a mere hypothesis that the death, which occurred a month subsequently to a given accident, was indirectly caused thereby through shock, is sufficient to carry the case to the jury, where it does not appear that the de- ceased ever complained of shock or of the injury for some time prior to death, and other medical testimony is contradictory. (Judgment here reversed in favor of company.) Thurher v. Commercial Travelers' Mu- tual Accident Association of America (N. Y. S. C, App. Div.), 52 N. Y. Supp. 1071; 32 App. Div. 636. Reversed, see following : In an action on an accident policy, the uncon- tradicted testimony of five medical experts showed that the insured, while in apparently perfect health, sustained an injury by a violent fall suf- ficient to cause death by deficient circulation through weakening of the heart, occasioned by the shock and the local injury. After a month's treatment, during which period his physician found him twice in an apparently dying condition, he started, in an unhealed condition, on a consid- erable journey and, without any other known cause or illness, died four days later. The post- mortem examination revealed no cause of death except such as was directly traceable to the injury, the evidence of which was distinctly visible. Held, that the testimony was sufficient to submit to a 50 READY KEFEBESrCE INSUBANCE DIGEST jury the question whether death of the insured was the result of the injury. (Judgment here re- versed against company.) Thurher v. Commercial Travelers' Mu- tual Accident Association of America (N. Y. S. C, App. Div.), 64 N. T. Supp. 174 ; 51 App. Div. 608. Blow on head — ^Abrasion — Heart disease. In an action upon a policy of accident insur- ance by which the defendant promised that it would pay the plaintiff the siun of $2,000 in the event of the death of her husband resulting from "bodily injuries sustained through external, vio- lent and accidental means," it appeared that the insured and his son, seventeen years of age, were in a boat towed by a launch, which turned shortly, causing the boat to capsize. The boy was in the center of the boat, and decedent in the stern. The boat made a complete turn and, when it came right about, decedent lay in the bottom, uncon- scious, and died soon after being taken ashore. The coroner's inquest resulted in a verdict of death from disease of the heart. Medical testi- mony was conflicting as to the condition of the heart, and whether its condition was the cause of death. The son testified that, as the boat turned over, his father reached to save him, and was then struck a blow on the head. Two abrasions of the skin on the head were found. Experts testified that death could be caused by a blow of that char- ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 51 acter. Held, that the evidence supported a ver- dict of accidental death. Stout V. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company (Cal. S. C), 130 Cal. 471 ; 62 Pac. Eep. 732. Thrown down by team — ^Apoplexy caused by blow — Wheel passed over neck — ^Apoplexy caused fall. An accident policy did not insure against death occasioned wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, by disease or bodily infirmity. The insured was found dead near his team, a wheel having passed over his neck. The autopsy showed that death resulted from apoplexy. Defendant claimed that the apoplexy preceded and caused the fall, while plaintiff claimed he was cast or thrown down by his team, the blow producing apoplexy. Held, that the court should have granted defendant's request to charge that the plaintiff could not re- cover, even if death was caused by accident, if dis- ease or bodily infirmity contributed thereto. (Judgment here reversed in favor of company.) Clark V. Employers' Liability Assurance Company (Vt. S. C), 72 Vt. 458; 48 Atl. Rep. 639; 30 Ins. Law Jour. 514. Chloroform administered' for surgical operation — Appendicitis — Blood poisoning— Septic poisoning. In an action on an accident policy for death from an anaesthetic, it appeared that the insured died during an operation for appendicitis. A 52 READY REFERENCE INSURANCE DIGEST witness for plaintiff testified that chloroform was the immediate and determining cause; that insured was suffering from blood poison, which was a contributory cause, and would be a dangerous present agent, and liable to produce death under the operation. A witness for de- fendant testified that at the time of the operation the insured was suffering from the absorption of septic material into the circulation; that his ex- tremities were cold, his respiration difficult, his pulse 140 to 150; that witness stated at the time that insured would probably die under the oper- ation, and would surely die without it. Held, that the evidence showed that death did not result from chloroform alone, and plaintiff could not recover. Maryland Casualty Company v. Glass (Texas C. C. A.), 29 Tex. C. C. A. 159; 67 S. W. Eep. 1062. Sickness — Voluntary exertion — Ruptured blood vessel. Where one recovering from a sickness was ly- ing down asleep, partly dressed, and being sud- denly awakened, with the direction to dress quick- ly, arose, appearing somewhat dazed and con- fused, and hurriedly attempted to remove, his nightshirt over his head, and, while his arms were raised, became entangled therein, and putting forth exertions broke a blood vessel, his move- ments can not be held to have been involuntary, as was necessary to sustain the verdict for plain- ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 53 tiff in an action for an accident benefit in the event of death from accidental causes. Smouse v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Association (Iowa S. C.)> 118 Iowa, 436; 92 N. W. Rep. 53; 32 Ins. Law Jour. 173. Rheumatism caused by accidental injury. Recovery can be had on an accident policy for death where the accidental injury causes rheuma- tism, and this produces death. Travelers' Insurance Company v. Hunter (Texas C. C. A.), 30 Tex. C. C. A. 489 ; 70 S. W. Rep. 798. Leg injured by thumb nail — Leg inflamed — Erysipelas — Septicaemia. A person insured himself with the defendants under a policy whereby the defendants agreed to pay him a certain sum in case he should be in- jured by accidental violence and should die within three months of its occurrence, if the injury should be the "direct and sole cause" of his death. The policy was subject to the condition that it should not apply to "death * * * caused by or arising wholly or in part from 'any' inter- vening cause. ' ' The assured, on July 2, accident- ally inflicted a wound on his leg with his thumb nail. The leg became inflamed, and on July 9 erysipelas had set in. This was followed on July 12 by septicaemia, and on July 16 by septic pneu- monia, of which complaint he died on July 22. It was conceded by the defendants that the septic 54 EEADY EEFERENCE INSURANCE DIGEST germs, the development of which resulted in the man's death, were introduced into his body at the time of the infliction of the wound. Held, that the erysipelas, septicaemia and septic pneu- monia were not "intervening causes" within the meaning of the policy, but merely different stages in the development of the septic condition which was immediately brought about by the introduc- tion of the poison, and that the man's death was directly and solely caused by the accidental injury to his leg, Mardorf v. Accident Insurance Company (Eng.K.B.), 1 King's Bench (Law Eep. May 1, 1903), 584. Delirium — Pall from window. Where one holding an accident policy falls from a window in delirium, the delirium is the proxi- mate cause of the injury. Under an accident policy providing that the in- surance does not cover injuries received in con- sequence of being or having been under the influ- ence of, or affected by, or resulting directly or in- directly, in whole or in part, from disease or bodily infirmity, recovery can not be had for a fall from a window while delirious, whether the delirium be regarded as the proximate or remote cause of injury. Carr v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company of California (Kansas City C. A.), 100 Mo. App. 602; 75 S. W. Rep. 180. ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 55 Scufliing — ^Finger cut wit^ steel eraser — Finger in- flamed — ^Erysipelas — Blood poisoning. The policy provided that the death of the in- sured must result "solely from accidental injur- ies." The undisputed facts are that, in a friendly scuffle, insured received a slight cut on his little finger from the point of a steel eraser which stuck out of the other person's pocket; that inflamma- tion of the finger followed this cut, which devel- oped into erysipelas, and blood poisoning, causing insured's death. The question argued is whether death was solely due to the cut on the finger or whether it was due to erysipelas, and the conse- quent blood poisoning, as an independent cause. Held, that the disease was not concurrent with the injuries, but was a natural consequence of it, and the death resulting therefrom ' was, therefore, solely due to the injuries, and not due to any in- dependent cause. Delaney v. Modern Accident Club (Iowa S. C), 121 Iowa, 528 ; 97 N. W. Eep. 91 ; 63 L. E. A. 603. Temporary sickness — Fall from train. Insured, while riding as a passenger on a rail- way train, became sick, with desire to vomit, and, to relieve himself, attempted to get into the closet inside the car, and, it being locked, went out on the platform, from which he fell or was thrown by a lurch of the car and was killed. The train at the time was running from fifty to sixty miles an 56 READY REFERENCE INSURANCE DIGEST hour. The policy provided that it should not cover death "resulting wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, from disease in any form, either as a cause or effect. ' ' Held, that the term * ' disease ' ' as here used, was not intended to cover and does not apply to a temporary derangement of the functions of some organ, such as insured experi- enced. Preferred Accident Insurance Company V. Muir (U. S. C. C. A., 3rd Cir., Pennsylvania), 126 Fed. Rep. 926; 61 C. C A. 456; 33 Ins. L. Jour. 639. Fall from bicycle — ^Bight femur fractured — Heart spasms — Angina pectoris. The proof shows that Crosby fell from a bicycle on Irving Place, Buffalo, on June 20, 1902, frac- turing his right femur and, it is claimed, sustain- ing other injuries, which culminated in his death on August 10th, following. At the time of the ac- cident he was 51 years of age, of robust health, vigorous in his mode of life, temperate in his habit and careful of his diet. Immediately after the accident his face was pallid, and he became emaci- ated, and complained constantly of intense pain in his back, between the shoulder blades, and in his chest. These anginal pains increased in intensity, and the spasms were intermittent and prostrating to the time of his death. From the evening of the injury he was unable to lie down, but was com- pelled to sit up by reason of the severity of the ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 57 heart spams. The fractured femur recovered, and this injury did not necessitate his sitting up. The physicians in response to a hypothetical question fairly containing the facts proven, attributed the death to angina pectoris, caused by the accident in falling from his bicycle. Held, that the jury were justified from the evidence in finding that the death of insured was due to the injury received in the fall from the bicycle. Root V. London Guarantee and Accident Company, Ltd. (N. Y. S. C; App. Div.), 86 N. Y. Supp.1055; 92 App. Div. 578; Affirmed: 180 N. Y. 527; 72 N. E. Rep. 1150. Fall on stone steps — ^Arm broken, face cut and bruised — Hemorrhages. The policy provided that the widow should re- ceive $5,000 upon the death of the insured, pro- vided death was the result of injuries received and "caused solely and exclusively by external, vio- lent and accidental means, and not directly or in- directly * * * from disease in any form, either as cause or effect." The evidence showed thai; insured fell while going up four stone steps to his office; that he was found lying at the bottom of the steps, with his left arm broken and his face cut and bruised; that the keys to the office were discovered on the doorstep; that insured, in answer to the question put him, said that he did not know how he came to 58 EEADY REFERENCE INSURANCE DIGEST fall, and that after walking, with the assistance of another person, a distance of about three hundred and seventy-five feet to his house, he fainted, and within two hours was taken with hemorrhages, from which, after a lapse of four days, he died. It was shown by the evidence of attending physi- cians that insured suffered no other disorder that could have caused his fall or death. Held, that the verdict for the plaintiff is sustained by the evidence, and that the fall was accidental. Taylor v. General Accident Assurance Corporation, Ltd. (Pa. S. C), • 208 Pa. 439; 57 Atl. Ilep. 830; 33 Ins. Law. Jour. 627. Side, colon and intestine injured — ^Endocarditis — Septicaemia — Gangrene. A post-mortem examination disclosed the fact that insured was afflicted with endocarditis at the time of his death. The physicians who made the post-mortem examination found the diseased condition of the heart to which we have already referred, and also discovered spots upon the right foot, which were caused by the complete plugging of the femoral artery near the knee by clotted blood and vegetation from the diseased heart, carried to the point in the artery by the blood flowing therefrom. The insured's side was in- jured by the accident, and the autopsy disclosed that the colon, or large intestine, immediately beneath the place of the injury, was affected with gangrene, which was undoubtedly the immediate ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 59 cause of insured's death, and that an obstruction had lodged in one of the small branches of an artery which furnished blood for the portion of the colon which was found diseased. It was the contention of the company in the court below, as well as here, that the endocarditis ante-dated the injury, and that the obstacle found in the artery carrying blood to the colon was caused by the dis- eased condition of the heart, and was the cause of the gangrenous condition of the colon. The plain- tiff's theory was, and is, that the endocarditis was either caused by septicaemia, produced by the in- jury, or, if not so caused, that it was not a factor in causing the death of the insured. There was evidence supporting both theories. Held, that the question as to whether the death of insured was caused by the accident independently of the disease, or by the disease, was properly left to the determination of the jury. (Judgment affirmed against company.) Morrow v. National Masonic Accident Association (Iowa S. C), 125 Iowa 633; 101 N. W. Eep. 468; 34 Ins. Law Jour. 227. Pall — Blow — ^Artery ruptured — Apoplexy — Paralysis. The by-laws of the company provided that there should be no liability "for any death or disability happening directly or indirectly, wholly or in part, accidentally or otherwise, because of, or re- sulting in, or from any disease or bodily or mental infirmity." The testimony showed a diseased 60 EEADY EEFEEENCE INSUEANCE DIGEST condition of the arteries at the time of insured's death, and physicians of skill and reputation tes- tified that the condition probably existed at, and prior to, the time of the alleged accident; that this condition greatly weakened the arteries ; and that because thereof a blow or some other exciting cause might produce apoplexy or paralysis when in a healthy condition these results would not follow. The Court below instructed the jury that if the insured sustained a fall, and if the bursting of the artery was caused thereby, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover, even though it was found that the artery was in a weakened condition by reason of disease. Held, that this instruction was erron- eous; that as long as parties who are capable of so doing shall be permitted to make their own contracts, it is the plain duty of the Court to en- force them as they are written, unless fraud or public policy shall intervene ; and if it be true, as the jury might have found under the evidence, that the diseased condition of the arteries aggra- vated the effect of the accident, if there was one, and contributed to the disability occasioned there- by, then, under the express terms of the contract, there was no liability on the part of the asso- ciation. Binder v. National Masonic Accident As- sociation, 127 Iowa, 25; 102 N. W. Kep. 190. ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 61 Heart weak — Strain of heart by physical exertion — Dilation of heart. A policy of insurance provided for the payment in case assured should "sustain any bodily injury caused by violent, accidental, external and visible means," and the injury so sustained should be "the sole and immediate cause of death of the insured," within three months of the occurrence of the accident. The assured died on January 25, 1904, while the policy was in force, the follow- ing circumstances having led up to his death : On the morning of December 26, 1903, he was in the apparent enjoyment of good health and able to discharge the duties of his employment, which were duties requiring some bodily activity. In fact, however, on that day and for some consider- able time prior thereto his heart was in a weak and unhealthy condition, although he did not know that fact. During the morning of December 26, being apparently in his usual good health, he attempted to eject a drunken man from his mas- ter's premises, using some physicial exertion for that purpose by pushing or pulling in order to OA'^ercome the man's passive resistance. The effect of this physicial exertion was to cause a strain on the assured 's heart, and the increased A\ork of the heart under this strain rendered it, owing to its weakened and unhealthy state, incap- able of recovering its ordinary condition when the immediate strain ceased, the consequence being that the heart began to dilate, and the dilation so set up was the cause of death. But for this exer- 62 READY REF EBENCE INSTTRANCE DIGEST tion in attenipting to eject the drunken man the assured might have lived a considerable time longer. Held, that the injury which resulted in the death of the assured was not caused by "acci- dental means" within the meaning of the policy, and the insurers were, therefore, not liable. Scarr v. General Accident Assurance Cor- poration, Ltd. (England C. A.), 1 King's Bench, 387; 1 Ann. Cas. 787 and note. Accidental injury — Diabetes — Co-operating causes. An accident insurance policy provided that the company should be liable for injuries or death caused solely by accidental means, and expressly ^•xempted the company from liability if death re- sulted wholly or in part, directly or indirectly, from any bodily disease or infirmity of the in- sured. The evidence in this case shows that at the time the policy was issued, and at the time of the insured's death, which was claimed to have been the proximate result of an accidental injury, he was affected with diabetes, and the evidence is conclusive that such disease directly co-operated with the injury in causing death. Held, that the company was not liable. White V. Standard Life and Accident In- surance Company (Minn. S. C), 95 Minn. 77; 103 N. W. Rep. 735; 5 Ann. Cas. 83 and note. Judgment modified on re-hearing: 95 Minn. 77; 103 N. W. Rep, 884. DISEASE DISTIISTGUISHED 63 Accidental injury — Typhoid fever developed later. The insured received an injury June 12, and as a result thereof was confined to his bed from the date of the injury until about July 1. From July 1 to 18 insured was up and about, making no com- plaint on account of the injury. July 18 and 19 he went to the office of a physician complaining of a headache and other symptoms; and was ad- vised by the physician that he was threatened with typhoid fever and to go home and go to bed, which he did. Insured died of the fever August 3 6. The Court instructed the jury that if by rea- son of the injuries received by insurel some dis- ease was caused to be set up in his body which would not have happened or existed but for said injuries, and, from which disease so caused, the insured died, "that in such case the said injuries established the proximate cause of the death." Held, that, conceding the evidence tended to prove that insured, by reason of said injuries, might have contracted the disease more readily than he would otherwise have done, the instruction ig- nored the plain provision of the policy sued on — that it covers only injuries which "solely and in- dependently of aU other causes" necessarily end in death, and erroneously assumed that the in- juries alone caused the disease. Continental Casualty Company v. Peltier (Va. S. C. A.), 104 Va. 222; 51 S. E. Eep. 219; 34 Ins. Law Jour. 760. 64 READY REFERENCE INSURANCE DIGEST Insured struck another in mouth — Cut hand with teeth — Blood poisoning — ^Arm amputated — Death. The policy insured against "disability or death resulting directly and independently of all other causes, from bodily injuries sustained through external, violent and accidental means." The in- sured becoming engaged in an altercation with another person, struck such person in the mouth, cutting his hand by coming in contact with the teeth of such person. In a few days blood poison- ing set in ; the arm was amputated ; and death of the insured followed. Held, that the death of in- sured was due to external, violent and accidental means within the terms of an accident policy, Carroll et al. v. Fidelity and Casualty Company (U. S. C. C, South Car.), 137 Fed. Rep. 1012; 34 Ins. Law Jour. 966. Reversed as follows : A holder of a policy, insuring him against dis- ability or death "resulting directly and independ- ently of all other causes, from bodily injuries sus- tained through external, violent and accidental means," committed an assault and battery on a person who made no resistance, and, in striking such person in the face, injured his hand, and a few days later died from the effects of blood poisoning which developed in the wound. Held, that such injury, which was the direct means of causing death of the insured, being the natural result of a voluntary act committed when he was in full possession of his mental faculties, was not ACCIDENT, defined; D ISEASE DISTINGUISHED 65 "accidental," within the meaning of the policy, and did not give a right of action thereon to re- cover for the resulting disability and death. Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Stacey's Executors (U. S. C. C. A., 4th Cir., South Car.), 143 Fed. Rep. 271 ; 74 C. C. A. 409 ; 5 L. E. A. (N. S.) 657; 6 Ann. Cas. 995. Foot gave way, causing fall on station platform — Hit by train and injured. Insured, a man of 75 years of age, was walking on a station platform while the train was ap- proaching, and his foot gave way, and he fell and was injured by the approaching train. In an ac- tion on an accident policy it can not be said as a matter of law that such disorder as the sudden giving away of the foot without apparent cause was a disease wiihin the meaning of the contract, such that the insured is precluded from recovery for this reason. Noyes v. Commercial Travelers' Eastern Accident Association (Mass. S. J. C.) 190 Mass. 171; 76 N. E. Rep. 665; 35 Ins. Law Jour. 193. Hand injured by pressure on it while asleep — ^Inflam- mation of metacarpal bones. A policy of accident insurance covering "against loss of business time * * * result- 66 READ Y REFERENCE IKSXJRANCE DIGEST iiig from bodily injuries effected during the term of this insurance through external, violent and accidental means," covers loss of business time by disease, provided the disability was proximately caused by bodily injury occasioned through exter- nal, violent and accidental means. It appears from the testimony that on July 31, 1902, insured, being much fatigued from an ex- tended trip, retired about 8 P. M. As he was somewhat restless, he placed his left hand between the pillow and his head, in order to raise it higher. The hand was placed on edge, with the thumb next the head, and he fell asleep in that position. Some time during the night, while asleep, he moved so that his hand, with his head continuing upon it as before, rested upon the edge of the bed rail, and he continued to sleep in that posture until 4 A. M., when he awoke. He found that his hand was wholly numb, and it continued in that condition for the space of half an hour. There was a black mark upon it, where it had rested upon the rail, and this mark existed for some time thereafter. The hand pained him a great deal during the fol- lowing day, and during the next night he was com- pelled to call a physician. The testimony of the latter, as well as that of the family physician, who took charge of the case upon returning from his vacation, shows that the pressure on the hand A\'hile upon the bed rail resulted in an inflamma- tion of the periosteuni of the metacarpal bones lying back of the third and fourth fingers, a con- dition which made an operation necessary and ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 67 caused a protracted illness. Held, that the injury was due to external, violent and accidental means. Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Fitz- gerald (Ind. S. C), 165 Ind. 317; 75 N. E. Rep. 262; 1 L. E. A. (N. S.) 422; 112 Am. St. Rep. 232; 6 Ann. Cas. 551; 35 Ins. Law Jour. 55. Scratch on hand — Blood poisoning — ^Arm amputated. Where a health policy insured against certain named diseases, including blood poisoning, and a proviso declared that the policy should not apply to any disease which was the result of an injury, the proviso was inoperative as to blood poisoning, which always results from an injury. The policy provided that it should not cover "any disease or illness which results from in- jury." The insured received a small scratch on the hand, which resulted in blood poisoning, ne- cessitating the amputation of the arm. Held, that the provision of the policy did not exclude disability by blood poisoning resulting from an accidental injury. Jones V. Pennsylvania Casualty Com- pany (N. C. S. C), 140 N. C. 262; 52 S. E. Rep. 578; 35 Ins. L. Jour. 312; 111 Am. St. Rep. 843;5L. R. A. (N. S.) 932. Fall — ^Abrasion of skin on leg — Inflammation — ^Blood poisoning — Bacterial infection. The insured accidentally fell and sustained an abrasion of the skin of his right leg, which wound 68 READY REFERENCE INSURANCE DIGEST appeared somewhat red and inflamed on the sec- ond day. On the eighth day a physician first saw the wound and then found insured to be suffering from blood poisoning, and two days thereafter in- sured died. The evidence showed that the abra- sion of the skin furnished the port of entry through which bacterial infection entered the sys- tem of insured and caused the blood poisoning which was the immediate cause of his death. Held, that the jury was warranted in their conclu- sion that the death of insured resulted proxi- laately and solely from his accidental fall. The policy provided that the company should not be liable for death resulting from "bodily in- firmity or disease of any kind." Held, that this exemption in the policy can n6t be made to apply to bodily infirmity or disease resulting from an accidental injury. Gary v. Preferred Accident Insurance Company (Wis. S. C), 127 Wis. 67; 106 N. W. Rep. 1055; 115 Am. St. Rep. 997 and note; 7 Ann. Cas. 484; 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 926 and note; 35 Ins. Law Jour. 481. Patty degeneration of heart— Over-exertion— Pall- Heart ruptured. Insured was engaged in carrying one end of a door weighing about 86 pounds along a level street. When he had proceeded about 800 yards, insured looked at the other party carrying the door and said, "I am tired," fell down and sud- denly expired. An autopsy was made and it was ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 69 found the right auricle of the heart was ruptured ; such a rupture as would and did in this case cause immediate death. The autopsy further disclosed that the heart was badly diseased and that in- sured was suffering from what is known as fatty degeneration of the heart. Held, that death was not due to accidental injury within the meaning of the policy, and there can be no recovery there- on, there being in fact nothing of an accidental nature, and no external cause not fully antici- pated by the insured. Shanberg v. Fidelity and Casualty Com- pany (U. S. C. C, Mo.), 143 Fed. Eep. 651 ; 35 Ins. Law Jour. 649. Affirmed as follows : Company not liable for the death of the insured from ruptured heart, the walls of which had been weakened by what is known as "fatty degenera- tion," the immediate and inciting cause of the rupture being either over-exertion in assisting to carry a burden, or deep breathing following such exertion, neither of which was accidental. Shanberg v. Fidelity and Casualty Com- pany (U. S. C. C. A., 8th Cir., Mo.), 158 Fed. Eep. 1; 85 C. C. A. 343; 19 L. E. A. (N. S.) 1206; 37 Ins. Law Jour. 296. Feet burned in hot air bath — Gangrene — Toes ampu- tated — Leg amputated — ^Diabetes. The policy provided that it "shall not cover accident, injury, death, loss of limb * * * from 70 READY REFERENCE INSURANCE DIGEST disease in any form." Insured met with an acci- dent in a hot air hath, by which his feet were burned. The burn was not at first considered ser- ious. His physician treated the injury, but gan- grene soon developed, rendering it necessary to first amputate two toes and finally to amputate one leg about half way between the knee and ankle. The company contended that at the time of the accident insured was afflicted with diabetes, and that the gangrene and amputation necessi- tated thereby was the result of the disease and not of the accident. Insured was afflicted with diabetes in a curable form previous to the time of his application, but was pronounced cured by his physician before his application was made. After the amputation and analysis of the urine, it showed the presence of sugar. There was evi- dence tending to show that a shock such as that suffered by the plaintiff was liable to cause dia- betes. The company's own physician diagnosed the gangrene as being caused by the wound. Beld, that the evidence was ample to justify the finding of the jury that the plaintiff was not afflicted with diabetes when he applied for and received his policy, and that the disease which de- veloped subsequent to the accident was attribut- able to it. Jiroch V. Travelers' Insurance Company (Mich. S. C), 145 Mich. 375; 13 Detroit Leg. N. 461; 108 N. W. Eep. 728; 35 Ins. Law Jour. 936. ACCIDENT, DEPINED; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 71 Appendicitis — Surgical operation — Septicaemia. The policy covered death "through external, violent and accidental means independent of all other causes," subject to certain conditions, among which was the Mowing: "This policy * * * subject to its conditions, covers death or disability resulting from septicaemia," etc. The insured died of septicaemia after an operation for appen- dicitis. Held, that the purpose and effect of the condition was to cover death from septicaemia only when resulting from an accident; and that the death of the insured from septicaemia result- ing from an operation for appendicitis was not within its terms. Herdic v. Maryland Casualty Company (U. S. C. C, Pa.), 146 Fed. Rep. 396 ; 36 Ins. Law Jour. 83. Affirmed: (U. S. C. C. A.; 3rd Cir.) 149 Fed. Rep. 198; 79 C. C. A., 156; 36 Ins. Law Jour. 277. Fall — Head injured and contusion under shoulder blade — ^Unconscious— Traumatic pneumonia — Cere- bral hemorrhage. Insured met with a fall in his house on April 29, 1904, and died two weeks later. According to the testimony of the witnesses who saw the accident, deceased had gone from one room of his home to the other to get a drink, and, as he went back, fell against a dresser having a marble top and from thence to the floor. The marble slab of the dresser was whole prior to the fall, but was 72 READY REFERENCE INSURANCE DIGEST found to have been broken in two either by the force with which deceased's head struck it, or by falling on the floor. Persons rushed at once to the relief of deceased and found him unconscious, a lump on his head under the right ear and a con- tusion under his shoulder blade an inch or more long. He was lying on his back with his head against the wall of the room. He was lifted from the floor and carried to a bed, which he never left, dying, as said, on May 13th. He seemed to be in pain until the time of his death. The at- tending physician testified that the death would be due to one of two conditions: traumatic pneu- monia — that is, pneumonia resulting from violent injury — or cerebral hemorrhage. On cross-exam- ination the physician stated that the insured, while in bed, might have contracted some other disease and have died from that. Held, that the question whether the death of insured was due to the fall and injuries received thereby was prop- erly submitted to the jury. If either truamatic pneumonia or cerebral hena- orrhage ensued as the result of the fall, and de- ceased died in consequence of the disease, his death was caused proximately and solely by acci- dental violence within the meaning of the policy. (Judgment reversed against company.) Johnson v. Continental Casualty Com- pany (St. Louis C. A.), 122 Mo. App. 369; 99 S. W. Eep. 473. ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 73 Fall on icy sidewalk — ^Ankle injured — Fibula fractured — Death from injury, shock, encephalo meningitis and lung congestion — ^Arterio sclerosis. The policy insured against disability or death resulting directly and independently of all other causes, from bodily injuries sustained through external, violent and accidental means. The in- sured, while waUdng upon the street, slipped and fell upon the pavement and injured his ankle. There was snow and ice upon the pavement at the place of the accident, and his fall is alleged to be due to the condition of the street. He returned shortly after the fall to his club, where he had left a number of friends, and complained of suffering considerable pain in his right leg. A physician subsequently diagnosed the injury as a fracture of the fibula, the small outer bone of the ankle. He died about six months after the injury. At the time of the injury insured was 64 years of age, and at the time of his death the fracture of his ankle had completely healed. The physician who treated him continuously from the date of the ac- cident until his death, in the proofs of death, sub- mitted to the company, gave cause of death as fol- lows: "The primary cause due to the injury and consequent shock, due to the fall; contributory, encephalo meningitis ; immediate cause, lung con- gestion." He testified that encephalo meningitis was a dis- ease. It is an old form or some form of change in the meninges that cover the brain ; changes go- ing on in the brain surface. It is an affection of the brain covering. It means a degeneration. The 74 KBADY KEFEEENCE INSURANCE DIGEST proof further shows that at time of the accident the insured was suffering from a disease called "arterio sclerosis," which is a diseased condition of the arteries. The physician further testified that the injury to insured would not have pro- duced arterio sclerosis in a man who did not have it ; and that if the arteries of insured had been perfectly good, the injury to the ankle would have been trifling, but as it was the arterio sclerosis was a very strong contributing factor to his death. But for the accident insured would not have suc- cumbed to his physical ailments in so short a time as he did. Held, that the death of insured was not the result directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injuries sustained from external, violent and accidental means. Thomas v. Fidelity and Casualty Company (Md. C. A.), 106 Md. 299; 67 Atl. Eep. 259; 36 Ins. Law Jour. 830. Liver, heart, lungs, kidneys and appendix diseased- Bruise on left shin. The policy of insurance sued on provided for indemnity if insured shall receive bodily in- juries "through external, violent and accidental means," and "if death shall result from such injuries alone within 120 days, the association will pay not exceeding $3,000 to the beneficiary named. ]t was shown that the insured had been in bad health for a number of years prior to his death, and had been treated repeatedly and by different physicians for congestion of the liver and palpi- ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 75 tation of the heart, and the autopsy showed that both lungs were in a state of congestion indicating pneumonia; that he had a diseased heart; that the liver was engorged with bile; that both kidneys were diseased, as was also the appendix. The au- topsy did not disclose any marks of violence upon the body, and the only evidence of this fact was that of the plaintiff and a physician who examined him shortly before his death, to the effect that there was a bruise on the left shin five or six inches long and two' or three inches wide. Held, that under the evidence there could be no recovery under the policy. National Association of Railway Postal Clerks v. Scott (U. S. C. C, 2nd Cir., N. Y.), 155 Fed. Rep. 92 ; 83 C. C. A. 652. Injured operating a mower — Traumatic neuritis. Where plaintiff, while operating a mower, suf- fered a personal bodily injury, which left an ex- ternal mark visible to the eye and developed into traumatic neuritis, such affection was not- a dis- ease within an accident policy providing a lesser liability in case of claims for indemnity for in- juries of which there was no external mark visible to the eye or accidental injuries resulting from disease in any form. Kenny v. Bankers Accident Insurance Company (Iowa S. C), 136 Iowa 140; 113 N. W. Rep. 566,; 37, Ins. Law Jour. 59. 76 READY REFERESrCE I KSURAKCE DIGEST Thumb bitten by dog— Dog bite— Blood poisoning- Infection. While the insured was sitting in front of his hotel holding a little dog on his lap, some one came behind and pinched the dog's tail, where- upon the dog snapped and bit the insured on his thumb, from the effects of which, two weeks there- after, he died. The policy under which the bene- ficiary sought to recover provided for loss through personal bodily injuries caused solely through accidents, due wholly to violent means, external to the body, etc. The defendant com- pany contended that the loss came under the health provision in said policy which included "inter alia, contact with poison or with poisonous or infectious substances. ' ' Held, that the innocu- lation with a poison generating germ from a dog's saliva or from its tooth, or from insured's thumb, did not present a case, within the usual and ordi- nary meaning of such words, of contact with poison or with poisonous or infectious substances, and- that the claim came within the provisions of the policy relating thereto. And a claim cannot be excluded from the acci- dent provisions of a policy if the injury is one of character described therein, and is the proxi- mate cause of the death, merely because the injury is accompanied by a disease or sickness mentioned in the health provisions of the policy. Farner v. Massachusetts Mutual Acci- dent Insurance Association (Dau- phin County C. P.), ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 77 32 Penna. County Court Eep. (May 26, 1904), 204. Affirmed: (Pa. S. C.) 219 Pa. 71; 67 Atl. Eep. 927; 123 Am. St. Eep. 621; 37 Ins. Law Jour. 82. Blow on temple — Hemorrhage — Raving maniac — Insanity. The evidence showed that the insured, a loco- motive engineer, while at work on his engine, re- ceived an accidental blow on the temple, which laiocked him down and caused the blood to flow freely; that the insured was assisted to his feet by the engineer and another person who was in the cab of the engine ; that these two washed the blood from the wound and rendered assistance until insured arrived at the end of his run; that insured went to his boarding house, where he re- mained all night; but apparently did not sleep; that he acted strangely next morning and left his boarding house without stating where he was go- ing; that he went to a physician's office, where his wound was treated, after which he left the office. There was no testimony introduced showing the conduct of insured and his actions from the time he left this physician's office until he arrived in C, and then he was a raving maniac. In three or four days after insured arrived at C, he was sent to the state insane asylum, where he died about ten days afterwards. Held, that whether the death of insured was due to the accidental injury 78 READY EEFEEENCE INSURANCE DIGEST w as a question for the jury. (Judgment affirmed against company.) Travelers' Insurance Company v. Bing- ham (Ky. C. A.), 32 Ky. Law Rep. 233; 105 S. W. Rep. 894. Cut or scratch on finger — Infection — Blood poisoning. The policy contained the provision that it was issued and accepted on certain conditions, one of which is, that "this insurance does not cover, in event of accident or death, loss of limb or sight, or disability, resulting wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, from bodily or mental infirmity, or disease in any form, proximate or contributory, as a primary, secondary or final cause of accident, injury or death." While the policy was in full force, and the insured was not afflicted with any known physical or mental infirmity, he unin- tentionally and accidentally sustained a cut or scratch on the index finger of his left hand, from which blood at once issued, through which wound and coincident therewith it became so in- fected that blood poisoning was at once intro- duced into the circulatory system of the insured, from the effects of which he died within five days of the accidental injury. Held, that the death was not within said exception, and the insurance company is liable. Rheinheimer v. Aetna Life Insurance Company (Ohio S. C), 77 Ohio St. 360 ; 83 N. E. Rep. 491 ; 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 245. ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 79 Leg injured — ^Abrasion — Infection — Blood poisoning. The insured received an accidental injury to his leg, causing an abrasion of the skin. An infec- tion started at that place, and he died fifteen days later from blood poisoning. Held, that the death was the result of bodily injuries, independently of all other causes. Where death results from disease which follows as a natural, though not a necessary, consequence of an accidental physical injury, the death is with- in the terms of an accident policy insuring one against bodily injuries sustained through external means, independently of all other causes; the death being the proximate result of the injury, and not of the disease as an independent cause. Bodily infirmity means a settled disease, an ail- ment that will probably result to some degree in the general impairment of physical health and vigor, and the words "bodily infirmity," as used in an accident policy exempting the insurer from liability, only includes an ailment of a somewhat established or settled character, and not merely a temporary disorder arising from a sudden and unexpected derangement of the system. French v. Fidelity and Casualty Com- pany (Wis. S. C), 135 Wis. 259 ; 115 N. W. Rep. 869 ; 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1011 ; 37 Ins. Law Jour. 385. 80 READY REFERENCE INSURANCE DIGEST Accidental injury — ^Infection. The word "infection," as used in the policy, relates to external injuries, and does not include internal inflammation where pus is formed by the presence of pus germs. In an action on an accident insurance policy to recover for the death of the insured, who died from an accidental injury, the condition that such death must have resulted "necessarily and sole- ly" from such injury will be satisfied by showing that the injury was the predominating and eflSc- ient cause of the insured's death. The fact that other conditions were set in motion by the injury, which may have contributed to such result, is im- material. Continental Casualty Company v. Colvin (Kansas S. C), 77 Kan. 561; 95 Pac. Rep. 565. Leg injured on car — ^Abrasion on leg — Inflammation — Erysipelas. The policy provided for a stipulated sum in case the insured should sustain bodily injuries "effected solely through external, violent and ac- cidental means * * * which injuries shall directly and independently of all other causes, result in loss of life." The insured died of erysipelas. The plaintiff testified that the insured, while get- ting off a street car, suffered an injury to her right leg; that he helped her into the house, where he put liniment and a bandage on her leg; that the third day after receiving the injury, swelling and ACCiDENT, defined; disease distinguished 81 inflammation began in her limb, spreading clear np to her body after a wtile. Another witness testified to seeing a scratch on the right leg of in- sured. A physician testified to the injury and to the erysipelas. In answer to a question he stated, "I don't know what provoked the attack from that germ; if there was an abrasion, that would probably give entrance." Another physician tes- tified to the fact of the erysipelas, and also that "her leg was very much swollen, and it was drop- sical; there was a great deal of water in the tis- sues — serum from the blood. In my opinion she had erysipelas; that is a germ disease, specific poisoning. It most frequently enters the system through an avenue of abrasion, through the sur- face; it frequently appears where there is no abrasion at all." Held, that this evidence did not establish the fact that the erysipelas was the re- sult of the injury. McAuley v. Casualty Company of America (Mont. S. C), 37 Mont. 256; 96 Pac. Rep. 131. Reversed as follows : That an injury to the person causing an abra- sion was the direct and proximate cause of her death, so as to allow recovery under an accident policy, is sufl&eiently shown by evidence that ery- sipelas, from which the person died, manifested itself within the usual time, and that erysipelas can be contracted only by introduction of the germ through an abrasion of the skin, though 82 READY EEFBKENCE INSURANCE DIGEST there is no other evidence as to how or when the germ was coimnunicated. McAuley v. Casualty Company of America (Mont. S. C), 39 Mont. 185; 102 Pac. Eep. 586; 38 Ins. Law Jour. 1022. Strain or exertion in controlling horse — Blood vessel ruptured — Brain ruptured — Hardening of arteries — Arterio sclerosis. Where the evidence showed that insured prev- ious to taking a horseback ride, was in good health; that while riding his horse became un- manageable, and, in his efforts to hold him, rup- tured a blood vessel of the brain, evidence was in- troduced pro and con as to his condition of health by physicians who either had treated him or had taken part in an autopsy over his body. Held, that where the testimony of several physicians was conflicting as to whether or not the arteries of the insured were diseased, and whether or not his struggle with the horse could have caused a rupture of his arteries, it was not error of the court to refuse a peremptory instruction for the company. The defendant alleged that insured died of dis- ease. The court instructed, in effect, that if by reason of the extraordinary exertion to control his horse, or by the movements of the horse and independent of all other causes, a blood vessel in insured's brain was ruptured, and that the injury necessarily and solely caused his death, they ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 83 should find for the plaintiff, though the blood ves- sel had been weakened or hardened by prior dis- ease, and called the jury's attention to the fact that if the disease, if any, he had, had no part in causing the rupture, and the death of the insured, it was not a defense. By another instruction the Court called attention to the fact that if insured was suffering from disease which tended to M'eaken or harden the blood vessels in the brain, and that such disease caused or actively co-oper- ated with any accidental injury to the insured's brain, and that his death resulted from such co- operating, the law was for defendant. Held, that the instructions were not conflicting. (Judgment affirmed against company.) Continental Casualty Company v. Semple (Ky. C. A.), 112 S. W. Eep. 1122. Physical exertion climbing steps — Rarified atmosphere — Climatic conditions — Disease. Where insured, in an accident policy indemni- fying only for injury or death arising from physi- cal bodily injury through external, violent and ac- cidental means, died as a result of physical exer- tions in climbing steps at a hotel, carrying heavy satchels, because of the rarified condition of the atmosphere, he died from doing what he intended to do, though the result was not anticipated, and his death was not the result of accidental means. The word "accident," in accident policies, means an event which takes place without one's 84 BEADY KEFEEENCE INSUKANOE DIGEST foresight or expectation. A result, though unex- pected, is not an accident; the means or cause must be accidental. Death resulting from volun- tary physical exertion or from intentional acts of insured, is not accidental, nor is disease or death caused by the vicissitudes of climate or atmos- phere the result of an accident ; but where, in the act which precedes an injury, something unfore- seen or unusual occurs which produces the injury, the injury results through accident. Schmid v. Indiana Travelers' Accident Association (Ind. C. A.), 42 Ind. App. 483; 85 N. E. Eep. 1032; 38 Ins. Law Jour. 101. Fall on wet ground — Shock of fall and wetting lowered vitality — Pneumonia. By the terms of a policy an accident insurance company undertook, if, at any time during the continuance of the said policy, the insured should sustain any bodily injury caused by violent, acci- dental, external, and visible means, then, in case such injury should, within three months from the occurrence of the accident causing such injury, directly cause the death of the insured, to pay the legal personal representatives of the insured the capital sum of 1,000 pounds. The policy con- tained the folowing proviso: "Provided always, and it is hereby as the essence of the contract agreed as follows: that this policy only insures against death where accident within the meaning of the policy is the direct and proximate cause ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 85 thereof, but not where the direct and proximate cause thereof is disease or other intervening cause, even though the disease or other interven- ing cause may itself have been aggravated by such accident, or have been due to weakness or exhaus- tion consequent thereon, or the death accelerated thereby." The assured, while hunting, had a heavy fall, and, the ground being very wet, he was wetted to the skin. The effect of the shock and the wetting was to lower the vitality of his system, and being obliged to* ride home afterwards, while ■wet, still further lowered his vitality. The effect of this lowering of his vitality was to cause- the subsequent development of pneumonia in his lungs, of which he died. The pneumonia was not septic or traumatic, but arose as a direct and na- tural consequence from the fact that the diminu- tion of vitality caused through the accident, as above mentioned, allowed the germs called "pneu- monicocci," which in small numbers are generally present in the respiratory passages, to multiply greatly and attack the lungs. Held, that the death of the assured was directly caused by accident within the meaning of the policy, and that the ease did not come within the proviso therein, and the company was consequently liable on the poMcy. Ethermgton v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Accident Insurance Company (Eng. C.A.), 1 King's Bench (The Law Reports, Apr. 1, 1909), 591; W. N. 35; 125 L. T. 328; 53 G.J. 266. 86> 5EADY EEFEEENCE INSURANCE DIGEST Ban into door, struck eye on hinge — ^Hemorrhage of eye — Loss of eye — Blindness. The policy insured against the entire and irre- vocable loss of one eye, caused directly and inde- pendently through external, violent and acciden- tal means. The insured ran into a door at night time and was struck in the eye by a hinge which caused the total loss of sight. The experts, who were called to testify, all agree that the loss of sight was total and irrecoverable. The company questions the right of insured to recover on the ground that the diseased condition of the eye at the time of the accident was indirectly the cause of the blindness, and introduced expert testimony to that effect. One of the experts called on be- half of the insured, who had treated the case prior to the time of the accident, testified that from his knowledge of the case the diseased condition of the eye had no effect in producing blindness, and that the hemorrhage, produced by the injury, was sufficient in itself to cause entire blindness. Held, that the evidence warranted a verdict finding that the loss of eye resulted from an injury directly and independently through external, violent and accidental means, and not from a prior diseased condition of the eye. Travelers' Insurance Company v. Mc- Inerney (Ky. C. A.), 119 S. W. Kep. 171; 38 Ins. Law Jour. 589. ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 87 Eye struck with small piece of steel — Inflammation of eye — Inflammation spread to other eye — Loss of sight of both eyes. The company contended that there was no evi- dence showing that insured's loss of sight of both eyes resulted alone from the injury to the right eye. The insured testified that a small piece of steel had struck him in the right eye ; that the eye became inflamed; that then the inflammation spread to the other eye, and that the sight of both eyes was lost. Two medical experts testified that, through sympathy, one eye is often affected by an injury to the other. Held, that the proof was sufficient to sustain a finding that the loss of the sight of both eyes was due to the injury to his right eye, and not as the result of any kind of a disease. Aetna Life Insurance Company of Hart- ford V. Griffin (Texas C. C. A.), 58 Tex. Civ. App. 198; 123 S. W. Rep. 432; 39 Ins. Law Jour. 284. Glanders, an infectious disease, contracted while clean- ing stables. The policy indemnified assured "against loss from the liability imposed by law upon the as- sured for damages on account of bodily injuries or death suffered while this policy is in force, by any employe * * * of the assured while on duty within the factory, shop or yard described in the schedule * * * in and during the operation of the trade or business described in the schedule." While the policy was in force one Jeremiah 88 BEADY KEFERENCE INSURANCE DIGEST Barry, who was employed by the plaintiff as a hostler in its stables, had the care of horses which were afterwards found to have been suffering from the glanders and were killed, and Barry was directed to assist in cleaning up the stalls. No notice was given to him that the horses suffered or had suffered from glanders. The glanders is an infectious disease, and subsequently Barry was attacked by it and brought suit against the plain- tiff for negligently putting him to work on the horses and thereby exposing him to the disease. Held, that the injuries received by the employe were within the meaning of the policy. H. P. Hood £ Sons, Inc., v. Maryland Casualty Company (Mass. S. J. C), 206 Mass. 223 ; 92 N. E. 329 ; 30 L. E. A. (N. S.) 1192; 138 Am. St. Rep. 379; 39 Ins. Law Jour. 1340. Fall from buggy — Head injured — Auto-intoxication — Prior injury and disease. The policy insured against death caused by ac- cidental injuries "independently of all other causes." Insured on April 6 fell from his buggy, striking his head, and on April 23 he died. The cause of his death was auto-intoxication. Several months prior to the fall from his buggy insured had been thrown from a street car, result- ing in the breaking of several of his ribs and the development of auto-intoxication. It was shown that the auto-intoxication was often produced by injuries, or anything lowering the vitality and re- ACCIDKNT, defined ; DISEASE DISTIIiTGUISHED 89 tarding the intestines in performing their func- tions. Held, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict that death was caused by auto- intoxication resulting from injuries sustained in the fall from the buggy "independently of all other causes." Held, that "if the injury or death is due to an accident, without the intervention of any diseased condition of the body, the company is liable. It is not liable where the injury or death happened in consequence of the disease or bodily infirmity, and not of the accident, or where it is due both to the accident and the disease. But where the aci- dent, and not the diseased condition, is the proxi- mate cause of death the company is liable." Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Bethel (Ky. C. A.), 140 Ky. 609; 131 S. W. Rep. 523; 40 Ins. Law Jour. 108. Strain caused by carrying heavy basket — Appendicitis — Surgical operation — Prior attack of appendicitis — Susceptibility to appendicitis. The policy insured against bodily injury, ef- fected directly and independently of all other causes, through external, violent and accidental means. Some three years prior to his death in- sured had suffered an attack of appendicitis, for which no operation was performed. Just a few days prior to his death he strained himself. Phy- sicians were called and they decided he was suf- fering from appendicitis. An operation was per- 90 READY REFERENCE INSURANCE DIGEST formed, and it was found that the appendix was gangrenous, perforated in three places, and ob- tained a calculus of foecal concretion about the size of a small pea. The first attack, because of adhesions and conditions created by it, left the appendix in an abnormal condition, and made it susceptible to other attacks arising from straining of that portion of the body. The second attack arose from the strain caused by carrying the bas- ket of soil described herein. Such attack would not have occurred from such strain, except for the conditions created by the first attack. Held, that there could be no recovery. Where an injury and an existing bodily disease concur and co-ope- rate to cause death, no liability exists. If, how- ever, the disease results from the injury, the com- pany is liable, though both co-operate in causing death. The distinction made in this particular is found in that class of cases where the infirmity or disease existed in the insured at the time of the injury, and, on the other hand, that class of cases where the disease was caused and brought about by the injury. And even in cases where the insured is afidicted at the time of the accident with some bodily disease, if the accidental injury be of such a nature as to cause death solely and inde- pendently of the disease, liability exists. Stanton v. Travelers' Insurance Com- pany (Conn. S. C. E.), 83 Conn. 708 ; 78 Atl. Eep. 317 ; 34 L. E. ; A. (N. S.) 445 ; 40 Ins. Law Jour. 160. ACCIDENT, defined; DISEASE DISTINGUISHED 91 Slid into cement block base while playing baseball — Abdomen bruised — Appendicitis — Surgical operation — Prior attack of appendicitis. While playing baseball, the insured, in sliding for a base, slid into a cement block used for the base, his abdomen going across it. He showed evidence of pain at the time. A few days after- wards he submitted to an operation for appendi- citis, from which he died. At the time of such operation, the doctors found evidence of injuries — ^bruises and discolo'ration — upon his abdomen. The autopsy revealed a gangrenous condition of the appendix. Insured had consulted a physician once or twice somewhat more than a year pre- vious to his death. The physician found some tenderness over the region of the appendix on pressure, and some soreness, and that he was suf- fering from a mild case of appendicitis, catarrhal in nature. The physician prescribed a laxative, and never heard him complain after that. Held, that the evidence was sufficient to justify the find- ing of the jury that insured was injured by acci- dental means (the sliding into the base not being expected or intended), and that the injury so re- ceived was the proximate cause of his death. Held, further, that under the instruction, "If you find that Ludwig had at some previous time suffered from an attack of appendicitis, and he had fully recovered therefrom, so that immedia- tely before the external, accidental injury at the ball game, if you find there was such an injury received by him, there was then no appendicitis present, but because of such previous attacks 92 READY KEFEEENCE INSURANCE DIGEST Ludwig \