ASIA LIBRARY ANNEX 2 QJarneU lUtitoetaita Slibratg atljara, U*«j fork CHARLES WILLIAM WASON COLLECTION CHINA AND THE CHINESE THE GIFT OF CHARLES WrLLlAM WASON CLASS OF 1876 1918 Ti t itp ssTwws when this volume was taken. ■" 1 call "■ " ' a'^d r- Cornell University Library DS 548.N84 Tonkin or, France in the Far E^^^^^^ 3 1924 023 040 581 DATE DUE DBiilii i^fUli GAYLORD PRINTED IN U.S.A. The original of tiiis bool< is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924023040581 TONKIN .M^j^oj^*^^ TONKIN OE FRANCE IN THE FAR EAST C. B. NORMAN, HATE CAPTAIN BENGAL SIAFP CORPS AND 90TH LIGHT INEANIBT, Author of "Armenia wnd the Campwign of 1877." litk Jttajrg. LONDON : CHAPMAN & HALL, Limited, 11, HENRIETTA STREET, COYENT GARDEN. 1884i. V « CHAKIiES DICKESS iND EVANS, OBTSTAL PALACE PBESS. PEEFACE. Within the last few montlis France has been deluged by a shower of books bearing on the Tonkin question. In none of these — and I think I have perused almost every scrap of writing that has appeared on the subject — have I discovered any symptom of astonish- ment, any expression of reprobation, at the course adopted by the Government of the Republic in its political or military policy. The French public and the French press seem to take it for granted that their Foreign Ministers should be guilty of duplicity, and their military commanders of cruelty. No stern rebuke has been meted out to M. Ferry for his garbled telegram relative to the disavowal by the Pekin Government of the Marquis Tseng, nor have Admiral Courbet or General Bouet been reprimanded for the wholesale execution of their prisoners. On the contrary, French writers applaud these excesses. "Pas de quartier pour ces brigands qui ont assassine vi PBEFAOE. les ndtres! Quant aux mandarins qui nous ont trahis, il faut en faire une razzia complete et les fusilier sans pitie ! " Such is the language adopted by a nation which poses as the champion of civilisa- tion and of Christendom. The dispute between France and China concerns us in no small degree ; eventually we must inter- fere either as a mediator or as an ally. For the preservation of the peace of the world and of that entente cordiale which now exists between Western and Eastern civilisation, it would be wiser that our interference should be immediate. When once the dogs of war are loose it will be hard to call them in, and our mediation then will not be so acceptable. All impartial observers are agreed as to the unjusti- fiable course France is pursuing, not only as regards Annam but also as regards Madagascar. Unless the European Powers speak plainly to France, the flames of war she is now kindling in Eastern waters will speedily be borne to the westward, and we shall be involved in a struggle which by judicious firmness at the present moment may well be averted. The Eepublic is playing a braggart's game. She feels that her very existence is dependent on France being fed with glory, and her Ministers indulge in vain hopes that the grievous burden of taxation PBEFAGE. vii will be forgotten in tlie glamour of a successful campaign. But war breeds war, and defeat is the twin to victory. Sedan was the corollary to Mexico ; will Son Tay be avenged in Paris ? In the following pages I have endeavoured to recount the true history of the Tonkin question. I have quoted largely from oJBQcial papers, and in order that I may not be accused of garbled translations I have given the actual text of all my authorities. Out of the mouths of her own Ministers France stands convicted of tyranny, greed, cruelty, and unscrupulousness ; and if I can bring this conviction home to anyone who now believes in the purity and disinterestedness of French Republican ideas, I shall rest satisfied. C. B. NOEMAN. CONTENTS. CHAPTEE I. INTEODUOTION. — THE COLONIAL POLICY OF PBANCB . . 1 Attempts of the JFrencli to ruin British Commerce — Decree of the French Directory in 1798 — Expedition to Denmark — Berlin Decree — Present Feverish Activity of France evidently directed against England — A Frenchman's Opinion of France. CHAPTEE II. THE GEOaEAPHY OP TONKIN,, ITS CUSTOMS AND UNSUITABILITY POR COLONISATION 16 Annam and China — Political Divisions of Annam — Geo- graphical Description of Annam — Its Capital Hue — Tonkin — Its Elvers — Hanoi — Agricultural and Mineral Wealth — Government of Annam — The Mandarins — Its Army — Its Internal Administration — Commerce — TJnsuitability for Colonisation — French Government forbids Colonisation. CHAPTEE III. EARLY RELATIONS OP PRANCE WITH ANNAM : 1787-1872 . 39 Early History of Annam ; Its Separation from China ; Its King expelled in 1785 — Solicits Aid from France — A Missionary CONTENTS. Bishop's Views of the Value of Annam to France — Treaty between France and Annam, 1787 — The Exile King regains his Kingdom with the help of the French-:-Perseoution of the Missionaries by his Successors — French propagate the Gospel by means of Bombardments in 1847, 1856, and 1858, and finally wrest Southern Annam from the King — Treaty of 1862 between the French and Annamites — In 1868 French Annex more Territory — Keconnoitre Tonkin in 1872 with a View of Annexation, and there learn that Chinese Troops occupy the Principal Fortresses — Captain Senez saved by Chinese Commandant of Bac Ninh — ^Arrival of M. Dupuis' Expedition on the Red Eiver. CHAPTEE IV. THE EXPEDITION OP M. DUPUIS IN 1872 .... 73 Monsieur Dupuis — His Land Journeys to Yunnan — Obtains the Authorisation of the Chinese to convey Arms to Yunnan by the Red River — Sails under the Chinese Flag — Opposition of the Authorities in Tonkin — Support aiforded him by Captain Senez — Dupuis reaches Hanoi, and finally ascends the River to Yunnan — Prepares for a Second Journey — Adopts,an aggressive attitude, and threatens the Annamite Authorities— Dupuis appeals to Saigon, the Mandarins to Hu6 — King Tu Due forwards Complaint to French Governor at Saigon. CHAPTEE V. tu duc appeals to saigon against dupuis. admiral dupe:^ and m. gaenieb 92 The liilemma of Admiral Duprd — Is forbidden by the Home Ministry to bring on a Rupture with Annam— Dupr^'s Letter to the French Ministry — Appoints Lieutenant Garnier CONTENTS. xi as Envoy to Hanoi to settle Dispute — M. Henri Gamier — His Early Career — Qualifications for tte Post somewhat vitiated by his Anti-English Bias— His Day-Dreams — Admiral Dupre's Letters to Viceroys of Canton and of Yunnan — His Threats to the Court of Hue— Garnier's Yiews on the Situation— His Letters on.the Subject — His Unfinished Essay on Tonkin. CHAPTER VI. CAPTUBB OF THE DELTA OF THE RED EIVER BY M. GAENIBE, 1873 118 M. Gamier leaves Saigon for Tonkin — Loses one of his Ships — His Letter to M. Dupuis — Eeaches Hanoi by Dupuis' Aid — Bad Effect of this Unpolitic Step on the Mandarins of Hanoi — His Brusque Demands— Opposition of the Tonkin Authorities — Garnier's Injudicious Proclamation — Firm Attitude adopted by the Governor of Hanoi — Garnier's Second Proclamation — His Ultimatum — Storms and captures the Oitadel-^Presh Proclamation — Expeditions to the various Forts on the Delta — Death of Gamier. CHAPTEE VII. PACIFIC NEGOTIATIONS OF M. PHILASTRE . . . .140 Disapproval of Garnier's Measures by Admiral DuprI — M. Philastre appointed Political Officer to Garnier's Force — Philastre's Letter to Gamier — Philastre visits Hue to ascertain the King's Real Wishes — Proceeds to the Red River and leams of Garnier's Death — Has previously determined to evacuate Tonkin — Issues Orders to this Effect— Ratification of the New Treaty— Extracts from it— The Treaty of Commerce. xii CONTENTS. CHAPTEE VIII. PAGE DIPLOMATIO RELATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND CHINA IN THE INTERVAL BETWEEN PHILASTBE'S TREATY AND RIVI^Re'S ACTION ......... 157 French Jealousy of England— France determines on the Annexation of Annam — The Treaty of 1874 an Infringe- ment of that of Tientsin — The Due Decazes counsels Prudence — Extracts from the Duke's Despatch — The Colonial Minister counsels a Protectorate, but the Duke says " Plus tard " — The Caution of the French Ambassador at Pekin — China refuses to open Yunnan to Commerce — Tu Due continues to pay Tribute to China — France determines on enforcing a more clearly-defined Treaty on Annam — Tu Due throws himself into the Arms of China — France consequently declares for War — The Marquis Tseng de- mands Explanations — Discourteous Treatment accorded to his Despatch — M. Le Myre de Vilers endeavours to avoid Hostilities — His Instructions to M. Eiviere. CHAPTER IX. riviere's EXPEDITION TO THE BED RIVER, 1882-83 . . 186 French Explorations in Tonkin — France seeks Pretexts to add the Coimtry to her Colonies— The Riviere Expedition determined on — Text of Instructions given him — Pacific Measures insisted on — Riviere arrives at Hanoi — He at once adopts an aggressive attitude — Demands the Execution of a Fresh Treaty — The Mandarins refuse to treat with him — Riviere assaults and captures Hanoi — The Governor of Saigon disapproves of his Conduct, and orders Restitution of the Citadel, but the Ministry support Riviere — Attack on and capture of Nam Dinh — -French hang their Prisoners — Attack on Hanoi by Annamites — French demonstrate towards Son Tay — Proclamation by the Black Flags, who again attack Hanoi, but are repulsed — Riviere's Final Sortie — He is slain — Defeat of the French. CONTENTS. xiii CHAPTEE X. OPERATIONS SUB3EQUEJTT TO RIVI^RE's DEATH . . . 219 French evacuate Coast Towns and strengthen Hanoi — General Bouet assumes Command in Tonkin, and adopts a Defensive Attitude — Annamite Assaults on Haiphong and Nam Dinh repulsed— Successful Sorties by Colonel Badens — Proclama- tion by the new French Civil Commissioner — Bouet under- takes a Sortie, is defeated on 19th May, 1883, and driven back in disorder on H^noi — They obtain successes, how- ever, in Lower Tonkin — An Ultimatum sent to Hue — Death of Tu Due — Bombardment and Capture of Hue — Execution of Prisoners — Fresh Treaty concluded with the Young King— China formally protests and prepares for War — Bouet undertakes another Sortie on 2nd September and is again checked — Recall of General Bouet — Admiral Oourbet assumes Command — Continues the cautious Policy of Bouet — Colonel Badens' Success at Ninh Binh — Son Tay captured on 14th December, 1883 — Excesses committed by the French Troops — Quarter refused^— Prisoners butchered. CHAPTER XI. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND CHINA DURING 1882-83 246 Fresh Remonstrances by the Marquis Tseng, met with Dis- courteous Reply on the part of the French Ministers — Venue of Negotiations changed to Pekin — France declines to recognise Suzerainty of China over Annam — Copies of Letters from Tu Due to the Emperor of China — M. Bouree, French Ambassador at Pekin, counsels Moderation — His Views opposed by the Ministry, who demand Withdrawal of Chinese Troops from Tonkin and Recognition of French Protectorate over Annam — Tsong-li-Yamen refuse French Demands — ^Attitude of M. Challemel Lacour— His Opposition to M. Bouree, who plainly points out Danger of War — France pushes on her War Preparations, and whilst assuring the Marquis Tseng of her Pacific Intentions towards Annam attacks Hue — M. Ferry endeavours to throw Discredit on the Marquis Tseng — Fresh Reinforcements sent to Tonkin —General Millot named to the Chief Command. xlv CONTENTS. CHAPTEE XII. TASX THE MILITARY POEOES Or FEANCB AND CHINA . . 272 Present Condition of the French Army — Its Unsuitability for Colonial Warfare — Lord Clyde on Volunteering — Composi- tion of French Battalions in Tonkin — The Chinese Army — The Army of Manchuria — The Army of the Centre — The Army of Turkestan— The Territorial Army — The Population of China — Characteristics of Chinese Soldiers — Tartar Horsemen — Lieutenant C. M. MacGregor — Chinese Gordon's Advice to China — -The French Navy — Coal — French and Chinese Sailors — The Chinese Fleet — List of Vessels — The Armed Strength of China. CHAPTEK XIII. FRANCE AS A COLONIAL POWER . . . . . .295 Failure of France to Retain her Colonies — Her fresh Attempts to induce Emigration to Algeria — Bureaucracy in her Colonies — French Views of introducing Civilisation — M. Waldeck Rousseau and M. de Grainville on extending the Colonial System of France — To massacre without pity all who oppose French Views of Civilisation — The French Soldier the Advance Guard of Civilisation ! — Bombardment of Defenceless Villages a means of spreading French Civilisation — France outrages the Feelings of every European Nation — Her Hatred to England now extends to Germany — ^Her Power of injuring our Trade — Internal Ex- penditure and Official Corruption — Aggressive and Cruel Nature of the War in Tonkin— Difference between Algeria and the Punjaub — Security of Life in British Colonies — Comparison between Moral and Physical Force as a Safe- guard in Colonies — Connection between England and Annam — Real Danger to France when she loses Support of her Flotilla — Enormous Expenditure necessary for carrying on the War. CONTENTS. XV CHAPTER XIV. FRANCE AS A COMMKECIAL POWER ..... 329 Ignorance of Frenchmen on General Matters unconnected with, their own Country — Les Droits et rHonneur de la France — Jealousy of England, which must naturally benefit from all extension of the Colonial System of France — ^M. Thureau on French Commerce — M. Ferry and M. de Saint- VaUier on the Same Subject — Mercantile Navy of France — France fails to benefit commercially by her Colonies, which afford Employment to Officials and drain the Pecuniary Kesources of the Mother Country — Tyranny of the Eepublic — Eeal Cause of French Decadence. APPENDIX. ANSWER OF PRINCE KONG TO TREATY OF 1874 . . . 341 TONKIN. CHAPTER I. INTKODUCTION. THE COLONIAL POLICY OF FRANCE, The greatness of England is so intimately bound up •with the safety and development of her distant pos- sessions, and the ramifications of her colonial system are so intricate and extensive, that any movement on the part of a European Power to extend its colonies is, politically as well as commercially, an affair not only of interest but of importance to all Englishmen. Politically, because even now in the event of war many of our colonies would be sources, if not of actual danger, at any rate of very grave anxiety ; the establishment in their vicinity of military settlements belonging to another Power would necessitate the further dislocation of our forces, none too large for the efficient protection of the British Empire. Commercially, because the 6v B 2 TONKIN. annexation of fresh territories by European Powers means the divergence of trade to other markets; and though so long as the carrying power of the world is confided to the Union Jack, there is little danger of England suffering very materially in this respect, yet every new colony created by a rival means a certain loss of power to us. When, therefore, we see a neighbour, enlarging her border by means savouring strongly of aggres- sion, and when these aggressions tend to the absorptioii of small States hitherto friendly towards us, and to the establishment of military dep6ts and naval arsenals in positions threatening the safety of our main arteries of commerce ; when these aggres- sions are openly spoken of as being undertaken for the express purpose of ruining English trade, it becomes a matter of some importance, not merely to our Cabinets but to our Chambers of Commerce, as to whether it is compatible with our national honour and our national security to look uncon- cernedly on the career of conquest France seems to have marked out in tropical countries. Jealousy of England's commercial supremacy is a national trait in the French character. For close upon a century, every effort has been made by successive forms of Government , in France, in times THE COLONIAL POLICY OF FBANOK 3 of peace as well as in time of war, to damage English trade and to ruin English commerce ; we are denounced as a nation of shopkeepers, but French- men have shown themselves not more anxious to ruin the shop than to take the custom into their own hands. The destruction of British commerce was the idea underlying the whole course of the wars of the Revolu- tion and of the Empire. Antwerp as a French sea-port was to have caused the downfall of London as the metropolis of the world, and gallant were the efforts made to convert the Scheldt into the Thames of France. The Decree issued by the French Direc- tory, on the 18th January, 1798, was a malignant stroke towards the destruction of our trade. Not only were all English vessels with their crews lawful prize (the two nations being at war this was fair and just), but all vessels of any nationality found on the high seas with any English goods on board were also declared good and lawful prize ; aU neutral ■sailors found on English ships were to be sentenced to death, and all French harbours closed to vessels which had touched at any English port. On Napoleon assuming the Consulate, he deter- mined still further to prosecute designs against our commerce, which had not suffered as much as was - b2 4 TONKIN. anticipated by the Decree of January, 179S. He was not long in persuading the Northern Powers to aid the fleets of France and Spain in chasing the English from the sea. The strength of the combined squadrons in the Baltic at that time amounted to 123 line-of-battle ships and 68 frigates. The energy of our Government in despatching Hyde Parker and Nelson to prevent the coalition of this armada, and the daring of our admirals — who, with 18 sail of the line and 4 frigates, did not hesitate to embark on a task where they were outnumbered six to one — crushed the maritime league, and for a time damped the ardour of our enemies. After the successful campaign of Jena, Napoleon once more felt himself strong enough to recommence his designs against us, and by the famous Berlin Decree of the 21st November, 1806, European harbours were closed to British ships, British sailors were treated as pirates, and British goods forbidden entry to the Continent. Again did our admirals, disdaining the odds against them, shatter the fleets which were destined to destroy our merchantmen; and the result has been that, for upwards of three-quarters of a century, the British flag has sailed unmolested over the world. The feeling which prompted the ill-judged and futile decree of Directories, Consulates, and Empires THE OOLONIAL POLICY OF FBANOK 5 is still rife in the Eepublic of France, and we have abundant evidence in the public press and in the utterances of public men, that the feverish activity- France is displaying in all quarters of the globe is not for the purpose of colonisation — for colonisation in Tonkin, on the Congo, or in Madagascar is impossible ; not for the purpose of developing trade ■ — for an increased trade with her small merchant fleet is out of the question ; but for the express purpose of interfering with our trade by the intro- duction of her own prohibitive tariffs in these coun- tries in time of peace, and to form bases of attack upon our merchantmen in time of war. So long as her rivalry is fair and above-board, so long as her commerce is developed by peaceful means, England and Englishmen would welcome the regeneration of France and the reappearance of her flag in distant waters ; but when diplomacy is carried on by means of duplicity aided by threats, when treaties of commerce are signed to the accom- paniment of bombardments, and valuable provinces filched by armed mercantile expeditions, it is im- possible to avoid the feeling that the fact of France becoming a neighbour in Asia is not a guarantee for peace. Her colonial enterprises of the last century and her exploits in the East were one 6 TONKIN. and all directed against the power of England; ller recent expeditions are being undertaken evi- dently with the same view. Mauritius was occu- pied to enable French cruisers to prey on our East Indiamen. Louis XVI. volunteered armed aid to Annam, in order 'to cut off Calcutta from Canton. The policy of France in the nineteenth century is framed on the principles which guided her in the eighteenth. The possession of Madagascar would give France a secure base from which to threaten our colonies in Africa, or to make descents on those islands in the possession of which we were confirmed by the Congress of Vienna ; but a French occupation of Tonkin is a far more serious matter, and one to the importance of which England does not seem fully alive. The northernmost province of the Kingdom of Annam, lying conterminous to the southern frontier of China, Tonkin is in itself one of the richest and most valuable districts in the great Indo- Chinese peninsula ; watered by a magnificent stream which is navigable for some hundreds of miles, it forms one of the principal outlets for the wealth of South- Western China, and consequently has been jealously guarded both by the Government of the TEE COLONIAL FOLIOT OF FBANOE. 7 Celestial Empire and by that of lier vassal Annam. Merely as a means towards securing this valuable trade, the possession of Tonkin is much to be desired, but there are other advantages which render it no less desirable. The southern slopes of the mountains which form its northern boundary are clothed with forests, similar to those which constitute so much of the wealth of Burmah ; the districts in the vicinity of the many rivers are among the richest rice-pro- ducing lands of the world ; tea is also found among its exports ; and what makes it of more value to the French, of more danger to us, coal, in appa- rently inexhaustible quantities and of excellent quality, exists in more than one locality within a reasonable distance of the sea. It must not be forgotten that by the Treaty of Frankfort of 1871 the large coal-fields of Western France were, with some unimportant exceptions, wrested from her. French railways and French vessels are now to a very great extent dependent on this country for fuel, and the distant naval stations of France are entirely so. In the event of a European war, the magnificent ironclads of the Kepublic would be paralysed for want of coal, and her distant colonies would fall an easy prey to the nation which possesses supplies of fuel in the 8 TONKIN, East. But though England has rich coal-fields in India, her railways and steamships still depend on the mother-country for • their supplies ; and should a war break out which placed France and England on opposite sides, the endeavours to destroy our commerce which failed in the early days of the nineteenth century would now be put in force with double vigour. French cruisers supplied with coal from the mines of Tonkin would lie in the fairway of our China trade, Burmah and Calcutta would be effectually blockaded, and the safety of our Eastern possessions gravely compromised. French papers have not hesitated to point out that in a naval war between France and England, despite our apparent advantages, we should inevitably be the loser. The truth of this assertion cannot be combated. England ' possesses in round numbers, on the books of the Bureau Veritas, 18,000 sailing ships and 4700 steamers, with an aggregate tonnage of upwards of 11,000,000; France owns 2490 ships, of which 458 are steamers, their aggregate tonnage amounting to 1,000,000. The protection of our merchant fleets would be a matter of impossibility, and one French Alabama in Eastern waters, with the friendly harbours of Tonkin in which to run for refit and supply, might cripple our Eastern trade. True, TEE OOLONIAL POLICY OF FBANCE. 9 our merchant skippers in olden days never hesitated to engage French ships of war, and more often than not were victorious — to wit, the gallant action which has given a succession of Glattons to our navy. There would be a poor chance for a French cruiser when opposed to a well-found and well-armed Peninsular and Oriental steamer ; but just as the old East Indiamen were shunned, and weaker craft singled out for attack in the wars of the Consulate and the Empire, so in a future campaign would our smaller steamers fall the more ready prey. If the possession of the coal-fields of the Ked Eiver is debarred to France, and she permitted to remain in undisputed possession of her present colonies of Cochin-China, we may look with equanimity on her efforts to harm us in the East. The whole history of the French in Annam is indissolubly bound up with the history of their efforts to destroy our Eastern supremacy. The memorandum of Bishop Pigneau de B^haine of 1787, the letters of Garnier and Admiral Duprd in 1873, those of Eivifere ten years later, and the journals of the present day, all breathe the same spirit. When the worthy bishop a hundred years ago persuaded his sovereign to put King Gi^ Long on the throne of Annam, in dwelling on the advantages a footing in that country would 10 TONKIN. give France, he wrote : " On suppose que le moyen le plus sifiir de combat tre les Anglais dans I'lnde est de ruiner ou d'affaiblir leilr commerce." In 1873 the enthusiast Gamier, who lost his life in endeavouring to force a commercial treaty on the mandarins of Hanoi, wrote: "J'y veux un arsenal frangais et le commencement d'une voie ferrde reliant le fleuve du Tonkin a Yunnan, les Anglais ne se rel^veront pas de celle-la." The Soleil, in its issue of the 1st December, 1883, when discussing the Tonkin question went still further. It called to the memories of the readers the glorious projects of Dupleix, the visions of a French empire in the East, and the loss of those stations in Egypt, the Mediterranean, and the Eed Sea, which once barred England's road to India : " Avant de songer a avoir un grand empire dans I'Extreme-Orient, la France aurait dA s'assurer des stations dans la Mdditerrande et dans la mer Eouge et veUler a I'inddpendance du canal de Suez. — H. de Keeohant." Those who have studied the temper of the French people or the language of the French press during the last few years, have noticed a very marked change in their bearing towards the English. There seems to be a general feeling abroad in France, THE COLONIAL POLICY OF FBANOE. 11 that the next war in which she is engaged will be one against us ; and the strengthening of her fleets, and completion of harbours of refuge in the Channel, are openly stated to be precautionary- measures of defence. The Madagascar incident met with the warmest approval of the country ; journals of all shades loudly applauded the conduct of Admiral Pierre, and denounced the Ministry which sanctioned the compensation to the missionary ; some even going so far as to assert that, as the indemnity to Consul Pritchard had never been paid, so would it be advisable to neglect to recoup Mr. Shaw. M. Waddington, with that spirit of patriotism which so well became him, boldly announced at the Mansion House that France was a peace-loving nation ; but history goes far to disprove his words, even if the recent action of the Eepublic in Asia and Africa did not belie them. The Comte de Gasparini wrote in 1881 : " La guerre nous amuse ; fils des anciens Gaulois, qui ne connaissaient d'autre plaisir que de se battre, qui brlllaient le Capitole et laissaient leur nom k la Galatie. Nous avons besoin de remuer beaucoup. " Nous sommes passes a I'dtat d'enfants terribles. On nous redoute comme une sorte de danger public. Que fera la France, que prepare-t-elle. 12 TONKIN. qui attaquera-t-elle, que va-t-elle convoiter? II n'y a pas un quart d'heure de tranquillity pour qui que ce soit. Tant6t c'est la guerre, et I'Europe arme a I'outrance, se demandant chaque matin si la France ne va pas donner le signal. Tant6t c'est la revolution, et I'Europe, troubl^e, se demande si I'anarchie ne va pas commencer chez nous, pour I'envaliir apr^s. Quand un de nos Gouvernements a dur^ une quinzaine d'ann^es, on sait que ses jours sont compt^s, que le feu va ^clater dans Paris, et que I'incendie s'^tendra partout. J'ai entendu des gens graves proposer sdrieusement que I'Europe fatigu^e mit une bonne fois la France en r^gie pour en finir avec ces perils incessants. " La France rdvolutionnaire inquiete encore plus que la France guerrifere. Non-seulement la France subit la revolution, mais elle la pratique en grand ; le peuple entier y met la main, et, sous pretexte de liberty, volontiers elle en secouerait les torches aux quatre coins de I'horizon. Ne nous y trompons pas, le voisinage des volcans ne plait a personne." In fact, war seems the only means French Govern- ments can devise to turn the attention of the populace from the grievances they suffer at home. A successful campaign may enable a Ministry to impose an additional tax, or to prop up its tottering THE COLONIAL POLICY OF FBANOB. 13 foundations. A little glory has ever been a panacea for all French ills, but France forgets that its glories have never been lasting. It is difficult to see in what direction fresh imposts could be levied, even if a successful campaign strengthened the hands of the present Government. The taxation of the country appears to have reached its furthest limits ; each year shows an ever-increasing deficit, and yet the colonial policy France is now pursuing necessitates large expenditure, shows no return, and promises to involve the country in a war which can only bring a modicum of glory, and may involve her in financial ruin. The last war, which the Parisians fondly imagined would be a nailitary promenade to Berlin, added £350,000,000 to the National Debt of France, and since 1875 upwards of £40,000,000 has been spent in replacing material lost in that campaign. The credits demanded by the Chamber for the prosecution of the Tonkin Expedition in 1878 show either that the Executive altogether underrates the gravity of the task before it, or that it dares not appeal to the country for sufficient money to conduct the war on a scale commensurate with its importance. Already the strength of the forces in the field, or under orders for service, exceed those we sent either to Abyssinia in 1868 or to South Africa in 1879, 14 TONKIN. yet the Ministry imagine that the operations will be brought to a successful termination for something under a couple of millions sterling. The deadlock which exists in Tonkin is solely due to the fact that France commenced the struggle with inefficient means and with commanders ignorant of Oriental tactics. Garnier, in 1873, with 180 seamen and marines, fancied he could conquer and hold the Delta. Eivifere, with a force of 230 men (according to M, Le Myre de Villers' letter to M. Ferry of the 2nd December, 1883), seized Hanoi, and thus applied the match to a conflagration which Admiral Courbet, with close on 10,000 troops and a strong flotilla, dares not attempt to cope with. The difficulties which now beset France are not of recent creation ; for close on a hundred years she has had relations with the Kingdom of Annam, and a history of these relations redounds to the credit of neither party. Crass superstition and barbaric pride on the one side have been pitted against Western arrogance and the unscrupulous use of civilised force on the other. The result has been that the Kingdom of Annam, shorn of its southern provinces by the expedition of 1862, now finds her northern districts in the grasp of the invader. The king may well liken himself to the earthen pot between two iron vessels. THU GOLONML POLICY OF FBANOE. 15 The following chapters recount the story of the French dealings in the Indo-Chinese peninsula. I lay- claim to the advancement of no original views, but after a careful perusal of very many French works on the subject, and close study of all published oflficial documents and recent periodical literature, I cannot avoid arriving at the conclusion which many thou- sands of Frenchmen of all shades of political opinions have arrived at — viz., that the history of the French in Tonkin is but a record of crimes. It is a record of these crimes that I now publish, with a view of calling public attention in England to the colonial policy of France, and to show what the real end and aim of that colonial policy is. CHAPTER II. THE GEOGRAPHY OP TONKIN, ITS CUSTOMS AND UNSUITABILITY FOE COLONISATION. That great peninsula lying to the east of Hindostan, and known to us by the name of Further India, to the French by that of Indo-Chine, was, up to the commencement of the fifteenth century, an integral portion of the Celestial Empire. One by one the various tribes threw off the Chinese yoke, and grouped themselves in the three separate kingdoms of Burmah, Siam, and Annam, but though the bonds between China and its distant provinces were loosened, they were by no means cast off; it was to their mutual benefit that connection between them should still continue, and though the sovereigns of the new king- doms are virtually independent, they forward from time to time tribute to Pekin, and monarchs on ascending the throne demand recognition of their rights. THE OEOaEAPHY OF TONKIN. 17 The Kingdom of Annam forms the eastern fringe of this great peninsula, and Tonkin, as its name implies, is the northern portion of the realm. Prior to the campaign of 1862, when the lower provinces were conquered and annexed by the French, the Kingdom of Annam consisted of thirty-one provinces, these forming three distinct groups, which for convenience may here be divided. The First or Southern Division, sometimes styled Lower Cochin-China, consisted of the provinces of Saigon, Bien Hoa, Mytho, Kulong, Chandoc, and Ha-tien. Of these, the three first were annexed by France under the terms of the Treaty of 1862, which the king was compelled to sign after the bombard- ment and capture of Saigon. The three latter pro- vinces were occupied and annexed some years later, but main force only sanctioned their appropriation until the very loosely-worded Treaty of 1874 con- firmed them to France. The Second or Central Division, now known as Annam. This comprises the twelve narrow coast- line provinces of Binh Thuan, Khan Hoa, Phu Yen, Bin Dinh, Quang Ngai, Quang Nam, Quang Due, Quang Tai, Quang Binh, Ha-Tinh, Ngean,and Tan Hoa. Until 1883, these remained in undisputed possession of the king ; but in August of that year, the 18 TONKIN. bombardment and occupation of Hud as a means of opening the Eed Eiver to trade jeopardised even their claim to independence, the Government of the French Eepublic assuming a protectorate over the whole kingdom by virtue of a paragraph in the Treaty of 1874, the text of which is given on page 148. The Third or Northern Division is known as Tonkin ; it consists of the thirteen provinces of Cao Ban, Langson, Thai Nguyen, Tuyen Quang, Quangyen, Hung Hoa, Bac Ninh, Son Tay, Hanoi, Haid Zuong, Hung Yen, Nam Dinh, and Ninh Binh ; in other words. Tonkin comprises all those provinces which are watered by the Eed Eiver and its tributaries. Not only is its protectorate claimed by the Frenchj but it would seem as if they intended to occupy it as permanently as they have done the southern group of Annamite provinces. Including Lower Cochin-China, which of course may now be considered a French possession, the Kingdom of Annam embraces in round numbers about 115,000 square miles. It comprises a narrow band of territory running parallel to the sea, some twenty-five or thirty miles in depth, until the mouth of the Eed Eiver is reached, where the province of Tonkin assumes the shape of a V. The coast-line commences THE QEOGEAFEY OF TONKIN. 19 from the French frontier, runs to the north-east for a distance of about 200 miles to Cape Padaran, it then tends due north to the fifteenth parallel of latitude, when it bears north-west as far as the town of Vinh ; it now tends off to the north-east and keeps this direction until the Chinese frontier is reached, the total sea-board being a little more than a thousand miles. A chain of mountains runs parallel to the coast at a distance seldom exceeding forty miles, bearing away to the north-west after passing the province of Tan Hoa, thus forming the water-shed of the southern tributaries of the Eed River. The coast of the southernmost province of Annam, viz. Binh Thuan, is cut up into a number of shallow bays, none of which are of value as affording harbours of refuge for shipping. The ■capital of this province was fortified towards the •end of the last century by Colonel Ollivier, a French •officer who accompanied the mission of M. Pigneau de B^haine to Annam in 1788. Just to the north of Cape Padaran, the frontier- line of the province of Khan Hoa is reached ; this, with Phu Yen and Binh Dinh, form the eastern- most districts of the country. The coast-line is deeply indented by a number of bays, offering excellent harbours. The most important of these is c 2 20 TONKIN. Qui Non, in the province of Bin Dinh, one of the ports opened to commerce by the Treaty of 1874. The length of this bay is about five miles, with a breadth of about two, and a mean depth of twenty- six feet. The port is the residence of a French consul, who has an escort of a hundred men. These three provinces are, for the most part, level, well watered, and richly cultivated ; rice and silk forming the principal exports. Off the province of Quang Nam lies the island of Culao Cham, with an excellent roadstead sheltered from all northerly breezes. The next most important point met with on the coast is , the Bay of Tourane. Sheltered to the north by the peninsula of the same name, it is protected by two forts which were bombarded in 1859, prior to the French temporary occupation of the promontory — an occupation which lasted eight months, and which cost the Empire, it is said, over a thousand men, whose bones now bleachen on the sands of this fever- stricken coast. The bay is about nine mUes in extreme length and seven in breadth, with a depth, at low water, of sixteen feet. North of Tourane we meet Cape Choumaie, and beyond that again the promontory of Thuan Ane, below which the Truong Tien, or river of Hu^, runs into the sea; Hu^, the capital, is situated TEE GEOOBAPHY OF TONKIN. 21 at a distance of about fifteen miles from tlie coast. The entrance to the river is protected naturally by a sandy bar, which only admits of the passage of vessels drawing under twelve feet. Larger ships are forced to lie in the harbour of Thuan An, The course of the Truong Tien from Hue to the sea is studded on either bank with forts, and here and there, under fire of the forts, obstructions have been raised to render the approach to the capital more difficult. Hud, on the left bank of the Truong Tien, con- tains, it is said, 100,000 inhabitants. It is surrounded by a masonry wall and ditch ; the ramparts are in the form of a square, with sides of about 2000 yards ; they are constructed of brick and have a relief of thirty-four feet, the ditch being fifteen feet deep and capable of being flooded at pleasure. An inner enceinte gives cover to the garrison ; whilst a third work, or citadel, is the royal residence. The fortress was constructed on its present lines by French officers at the end of the last century, and, possessing as it does excellent flank defences, was in those days a very formidable work ; the great range of modern firearms has, however, diminished its value, for some hills about 1500 yards to the south-east completely command the city, and so render it from a military point of view of little 22 TONKIN. importance, whilst tlie formidable bar at the mouth of the Truong Tien prevents it ever obtaining a position as a commercial port. Tonl^in — which, as we said before, comprises the thirteen northern provinces of the Kingdom of Annam — is bounded on the west by the north-eastern dis- tricts of Siam and Burmah, on the north by the Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Quang Si, and on the east by the sea. It lies between the- 18th and 22nd degrees of north latitude and the 104th and 106th of east longitude, and con- tains a superficial area of about 70,000 square miles, with an estimated population of 12,000,000. The northern and western frontiers of the country are formed by lofty mountain ranges, clothed with magnificent forests of teak and other valuable wood. From these ranges spring innumerable rivers, which traverse the central plains in every direction, ren- dering them marvellously fertile. In addition to these natural means of irrigation, the Tonkinois have constructed a vast network of canals connecting the streams, thus enabling them to flood the rice- fields which cover these fertile plains ; and though the agricultural wealth of their country is enhanced, and the means of water communication in flat- bottomed boats of slight draught rendered facile,. THE GEOGBAPEY OF TONKIN. 23 the general health of the inhabitants is sapped by fever, and land routes are practically unknown. These minor streams, whether from the mountains on the Siamese or the Chinese border, all find their way to the Red Eiver, adding their mite to that gigantic volume of water on which the French hope to find a ready access to the southern pro- vinces of China. On entering the low-lying alluvial lands in the east of Tonkin the Red River opens out into four great branches, each of which has its own outlet ; all are navigable to the point they leave the parent stream, but the most frequented channel is that known as the Cua Thai Binh ; even this, though a noble-looking river, is not navigable for boats of any size, owing to the silting up of its mouth, and the neglect of the Annamite Government to improve the entrance by dredging. The two principal tributaries of the Red River are the Giango Ho and the Tsin Ho. The former, rising on the frontier of Siam, flows into the main stream below Huang Ho ; it is navigable to Pho Yen, a considerable town some 80 miles up the river. At this point navigation is impeded by a dangerous rapid, which, it is said, could easily be removed. The country in the neighbourhood of the Giango Ho is amongst the most fertile in Tonkin. 24 TONKIN. The Tsin Ho, or Claire Eiver of the French, is formed of two branches, the westernmost rising near Yunnan, the easterly one in the Chinese province of Quang Si. As far as Doanghong, their point of junction, the Tsin Ho is navigable ; both tributaries traverse mountainous regions, which are little cultivated, but which are supposed to contain much mineral wealth ; as far north as Doanghong the country is devoted to rice cultivation. Parallel to the Red Eiver runs another large stream, known as the Thai Binh ; it also discharges itself into the sea by several branches, which fertilise the rice-growing districts to the north of the embou- chures of the Eed Eiver. Many lateral canals connect these main streams, the most important being the Canal of the Eapids, which runs from Hanoi to Bin Ninh. Owing to the immense deposits of alluvial matter at the mouth of the Eed Eiver, the main com- munication between Hanoi and the sea is by means of the Thai Binh and the lateral canals which connect the two. The capital of Tonkin is Hanoi ; it is, indeed, little inferior in any way to Hu^, the chief town of the kingdom. Before the northern province fell under the sway of the kings of Annam, Hanoi was the capital of a kingdom ; and though, since the absorption of THE OEOGBAPHY OF TONKIN. 25 Tonkin by Annam, it has become merely tbe capital of a province, it still remains one of the largest and most important cities in the country. Its population is estimated at 100,000 souls, a large number of whom are employed in the manufacture of silks. The prin- cipal university of the kingdom, which is said to boast of upwards of 3000 pupils, is also situated at Hanoi, The town is one of many which were fortified by French officers at the commencement of the cen- tury, and though its defences are of little worth in the present day, when Colonel OUivier surrounded it with Vauban's bastion trace it may well have been con- sidered one of the strongest towns in Further India. The geographical situation of Hanoi assures it a great future, if only that future is entrusted to enlightened and liberal minds. The Eed Eiver is at all times navigable to this point, even in the dry season by vessels drawing six, and, in the wet season, by those drawing eight and a half feet of water, and for a further distance of 150 miles by flat-bottomed craft drawing three and a half feet. The Eed Eiver con- nects the rich province of Yunnan, in the south of China, by a short navigable route, with the sea, and if opened up to commerce, must naturally result in attracting trade and civilisation to provinces where both are practically unknown. 26 TONKIN. The climate of Tonkin is extremely unhealthy ; the excess of irrigation renders it damp and feverish, and this added to the extreme heat proves most trying to Europeans. In the rainy .season, which lasts from May to August, epidemics are often rife ; and the small French garrisons which from 1870 have occupied some of the principal towns, have had a death-rate as high as twelve per cent. The natural products are rice, which forms the principal export and the staple food of the country, the sweet potato, cotton, cinnamon, castor-oil berries, sugar-cane, indigo, and mulberries. All these are largely exported, as also are tea, the betel and areca nut, but in lesser quantities. The forests are magnificent, and consist of teak, satinwood, walnut, and other scented trees much valued by the Buddhists for their temples. Of the mineral wealth little is really known, though great expectations have been raised on this point. It is certain that tin and copper mines exist in the mountains through which the Tsin Ho flows, and it is rumoured that gold and silver abound also in the same regions. Coal has been discovered in more than one quarter, and the experiments made with it prove it to be of a description well suited for steam purposes. As some beds of this invaluable adjunct THU GWGRAPET OF TONKIN. 27 to maritime warfare have been found near the sea, the French in this discovery alone will derive a recompense far above that which all the precious metals in the land can give them. They will be placed beyond the necessity of depending on the precarious supply from the mines of Great Britain, which in the event of war could, by an enterprising power, be wholly forbidden to them. To France, situated as she is, the coal-fields of Tonkin are a prize worth striving for. The inhabitants of Tonkin are for the most part slight and below the middle height, resembling the Chinese in their features though of darker com- plexion ; their figures are more lithe and elegant, in this respect they are more like the Malays. They are possessed of much intelligence, and in diplomacy are more than a match for their Western conquerors ; though in the field, their ignorance of modern tactics and the fact that they do not possess arms of precision render their defeat, when opposed to equal numbers of well-armed and well-led troops, a matter of certainty. They are by no means destitute of courage, and, though defeated and driven out of positions, will return to the charge the next day with equal determination and sang-froid. Being entirely destitute of artillery, the Tonkino s 28 TONKIN. deserve mucli credit for the way in which, armed mainly with bows and arrows, they have never hesitated to face the heavy cannon of the French gunboats or the repeating rifles of the French blue- jackets. Although followers of Buddha, the Tonkinois are not very bigoted in their religion. Women amongst them occupy a very inferior place, and polygamy is rife, especially in the northern districts. The houses of the poorer and middle classes are generally built of wood ; the majority are thatched, but some few are seen with roofs neatly covered with tiles. It is rare to see a solitary house ; they are generally grouped together, surrounded by bamboo hedges, which not only serve as a protection from the efi"ects of the deadly tornadoes which devastate the country, but also as a very effective obstacle against the advance of human foes. The Government of Annam is that of an absolute monarchy, the king having practically unlimited power ; but, as in the case of all despotic sovereigns, the power is often wielded by less scrupulous per- sons, who, having gained an ascendancy over the sovereign, rule in his stead ; and, as in the case of countries not so remote from our shores, this despotic power is often wielded through the instru- mentality of some female favourite. Nominally THE QWQEAPEY OF TONKIN. 29 the king is assisted by a secret council consisting of six ministers : The Minister of Eeligion (Le bo tliuong then). The Minister of Finance (Ho bo thuong then). The Minister of War (Bin bo thuong then). The Minister of Justice (Hin bo thuong then). The Minister of the Interior (Thai bo thuong then). The Minister of Public Works (Cong bo thuong then). These ministers are almost invariably selected from amongst the mandarins, though occasionally some ignoble favourite has filled one of the chief offices of state. The king corresponds directly with none of his ministers ; he lives entirely surrounded by his wives and concubines, who rival in number those of King Solomon. When once a woman is admitted to this charmed circle she abandons all direct communication with the outer world, but being surrounded by a crowd of servants, who act as intermediaries, she finds no difficulty in carrying on clandestine correspondence, and doubtless clandestine interviews. The position of these women is as humiliating and degrading as that of the favourites of a Turkish Sultan. In matters of State business, the king never grants an audience to his ministers. All questions are sub- mitted to him in writing, and answered by some female amanuensis who has learnt the Chinese 30 TONKIN. characters. The woman who possesses a smattering of education occupies an important position in the royal seraglio — a position Annamite ladies are not slow to turn to account. On certain rare occasions of State ceremonial, such as the arrival of a foreign ambassador, or the despatch of the triennial tribute- bearing embassy to China, the Council of Six are admitted to the royal presence, and then receive the royal commands on the question immediately at issue, but no other business is ever touched upon. It wUl thus readily be seen that though nominally an absolute monarch, the king possesses but little real power, and that if the secret council were in league against him, he might easily be kept in ignorance of all matters connected with the govern- ment of his kingdom. The Mandarins form two distinct classes. First, the Civilian class (Quan Van). These are selected from amongst the graduates of universities who have passed the most satisfactory literary exa- minations. To these are confided all the adminis- trative posts, and occasionally they are entrusted with the direction of military affairs. The second or Military class (Quan Vo) are chosen from amongst the most distinguished soldiers, who have not only acquired a reputation for profes- TEE GEOGBAPHY OF TONKIN. 31 sional ability, but who have also passed a university test. In fact, Annam, like China, is the home of competitive examinations. Mandarins, whether of the civil or military pro- fession, are divided into nine great classes, each class containing members of both the army or civil service. First Degree First Class Lord Chief Justice. Comiaander- in-Chief. Second Class... Chief Justices. Marshals of the Army. Commander of the Fleet. Second Degree... First Class Presidents of the Chief Courts. Governors-General of Provinces. Generals in the Army. Ad- mirals. Military Governor of Hu6. Second Class... Vice-Presidents of the Chief Courts. Local Governors of Provinces. Eear-Admirals of the Fleet. Third Degree First Class Civil Governor of Hu6. Colonels of Eegiments. Commandant of Provincial Militia. Chief of Provincial Courts of Justice. Second Class... Ministerial Secretaries. Lieutenant- Governors of Hue. Lieutenant- Colonels of Eegiments. Fourth Degree... First Class Proviacial Judges. Under-Secre- taries to Ministers. Second Class... King's Chaplains. Fifth Degree First Class Provincial Directors of Studies. Second Class... Commissioners of Districts. Mandarins of the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth degrees include all officials in the Judicial, 32 TONKIN. Administrative, and Educational Departments, and all officers of the Army and Navy ; these latter are under the command of an official of the First Degree, styled the Grand Marshal; he is personally charged with the defence of the citadel of Hu^ and is always in immediate attendance on the sovereign. The army, an organisation for which exists on paper, consists nominally of eighty battalions of 500 men each. There is also a provincial militia (Jinh heu), the men of which can only be called upon for the defence of their own districts. It is generally supposed that, in an invasion of the country, the most determined resistance would be met with when facing the linh heu. As regards drill, discipline, and armament, the Annam forces are on a par with other Eastern nations who have not adopted Western ideas. Their navy consists of five wooden gunboats, presented by the French in 1874, and now again in the custody of their original owners. Nominally, every male of the age of twenty-one years is liable to military service ; but, as a rule, the annual contingents do not exceed seven per cent. of those inscribed on the rolls of the village elders. The period of service is fixed at ten years, but men are permitted to prolong their service indefinitely; ITS INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION. 33 desertions are rare, as villages are held responsible for any loss incurred, and not only are compelled to furnish a substitute but not unfrequently are mulcted of a very considerable sum, should the colonel of the regiment be an influential man at Court, The internal administration of the country is far in advance of its military administration. Each of the twenty-five provinces is ruled over by a governor- general or Tong Doc, who has under him a certain number of lieutenant-governors {Tuan Phu), according to the size and importance of the province. These officials are in charge of departments,, which are again subdivided into districts and sub-districts, the latter comprising in rural parts a group of several villages. Every male inhabitant at the age of twenty- one years, provided he is either possessed of a certain amount of property, or in pursuit of a profession, is entitled to a vote in the election of the village elders, who in their turn nominate certain of their own members as representatives in the adminis- trative council of the sub-district. This council is presided over by an unpaid official : though elected by his confreres, he must be approved of by the lieutenant-governors of the district. He possesses the seals of authority, and, though he has no judicial power, is a very important personage both within 34 TONKIN. and without the borders of his government. These sub-district councils are self-governing, and have well- defined powers of very considerable extent ; any act of theirs can be vetoed by the lieutenant-governor, but it rarely happens that this prerogative is exercised. They are responsible for the execution and repair of all public works : roads, canals, and bridges are under the care of one committee ; a second ■ is entrusted with the management of the police ; a third with financial arrangements, levying taxes not only for their own but also for Government purposes; a fourth supervises public education ; a fifth regulates aU commercial and agricultural disputes ; in fact, the internal administration of the kingdom is carried on almost in its entirety by these little parliaments. The roll of electors is annually revised by the village elders, and submitted by them to the district council, who arrange local and imperial taxation, the draughts for military service, and other such-lik& duties. The chief imperial imposts consist of a land and a poll tax, but a considerable revenue is also- derived from the concession of fishery and mining rights, licenses for ocean-going and river. craft, which all come under the supervision of the district councils. The customs dues on exports and imports are collected by imperial officials having no connection TEE COMMERCE OF TONKIN. 35 with the local governments. Every male inscribed on the roll of electors has to furnish to the State annually forty-eight days' labour ; by this means public roads, bridges, and buildings are maintained in excellent Condition, The land-tax, is a variable quantity. The Council of State of Hud forward annually to the Governors of provinces a statement of the amount each is requested to furnish, and he in turn submits a demand to the district council, who again furnish requisitions to the village elders. The tax is accepted partly in money, partly in kind as regards land under rice cultivation, but all other lands are compelled to pay in specie. As regards the commerce of the country, accurate statistics are unattainable ; but it is anticipated by the French that the opening of the Eed Eiver will immediately produce a trade of from one to three millions sterling a year, but as these calculations are based on hypothesis, not on any ascertained data, they must be received with caution. It is, however, an open question whether France would greatly benefit by the trade, for in the year 1881, of the 253 European vessels which found their way to the port of Haiphong on the Eed Eiver, only eleven carried the tricolour. UntU the steam mercantile fleet of France is very largely increased, it is D 2 36 TONKIN. improbable that sbe will be able to compete with. England and Germany in Eastern waters ; thus even for commercial purposes, it is doubtful whether France will benefit directly or indirectly by the possession of Annam. For colonisation, the country is valueless ; even were the French possessed with the qualities necessary to make good settlers, the climate would absolutely forbid any attempt in this direction being successful. For two- and-twenty years the Tricolour has waved over the walls of Saigon, yet the non-official French community in the whole of Cochin-China at the last census was, according to M. P. Delafosse, less than 700 souls, and these for the most part were merchants, shopkeepers, ship-chandlers, and clerks. Of colonists, as we understand the term, there were none. Even in Algeria, where the climate is more healthy and equable, colonists are rare, the few settlers being men who hope to make sufficient money by trade to enable them to live in comfort and to die in peace in their own native village. A Frenchman rarely cuts himself adrift from his native commune; indeed the present laws forbid his doing so. I know of a case where a man, thinking he could better himself as a small contractor in Algeria, was arrested in Marseilles and sent back TEE FBENOE AS G0L0NI8EB8. 37 under police supervision to his village, because he had not completed the twenty years' military service demanded of him by his country. Similar instances are not rare. Not long since one of the firemen on a St. Malo steamer was sentenced to a month's imprisonment and a lengthened police supervision for proceeding on a voyage to South America in search of employment when his term of conscription was approaching. On his return from Pernambuco, he was arrested at Havre and condemned without power of appeal. I have known several cases of skilled workmen who have expressed a wish to proceed to Canada or America, where skilled labour is at a premium — not with the object of becoming settlers, for no Frenchman thinks of that, but of amassing a competence more rapidly than is possible in France — but the knowledge of their certain arrest and imprisonment at the port of embarka- tion has deterred them from putting their designs into execution.. The statement that the present feverish policy of France is dictated with a view of providing homes for her surplus population is absurd. In the first place, these new homes are being provided in climates deadly to the European constitution ; in the second place, the French Government render penal 38 TONKIN. all attempts at colonisation by men under forty. With, a home policy which forbids emigration, and a foreign policy equally subversive . of justice, if not destitute of honour, France is nursing discontent within and engendering distrust without her frontier. CHAPTER III. EARLY RELATIONS OF PRANCE WITH ANNAM : 1787-1872. The early history of Ann am is involved in some obscurity ; there is, however, abundant evidence that until the year 1427' it was an outlying province of the Chinese Empire, when, availing themselves of the distance from the Imperial armies, the people rose in rebellion, massacred the Chinese forces, and proclaimed one Le Loi ruler of the newly founded kingdom. The Celestial Empire is not one which really acquiesces in the loss of territory, nor does it readily forgive the assumption of independence on the part of distant pro- vinces. Armies were accordingly despatched toward the revolted districts, and, after years of undecided warfare, both parties were glad to arrive at a peaceable solution of the difficult question raging between them. Annam was to retain its independence, but its Kings were to pay triennial tribute to the Emperor, and all 40 TONKIN. new sovereigns were required to demand recognition of these rights by the Court of Pekin on ascending the throne. Little by little the Kings of Annam, des- cendants of the Le Loi who had succeeded in gaining independence for the country, increased their terri- tories, but they still remained tributaries of China, and each sovereign still paid homage to the Emperor. Early in the sixteenth century, the dynasty of Le was nearly overthrown by a rebellion which for years ravaged the kingdom, and when this was quelled, the grateful sovereign bestowed on the successful general (one Nguyen Dzo) who had restored peace, the title of Chua or hereditary viceroy of the country. On Nguyen Dzo's death, his eldest son succeeded him in the office of Chua ; his younger son, an able general and skilful diplomat, being appointed governor of the newly conquered provinces of Chiampa, which formed the southernmost possession of the kingdom. At the commencement of the seventeenth century, the governors of Chiampa asserted their independence, and though recognising the nominal supremacy of the L6 dynasty, refused to acknowledge subservience to the Chuas. During the whole of the seventeenth and the greater part of the eighteenth century, the northern and southern portions of Annam fprmed virtually distinct kingdoms; the one ruled over by repre- RELATIONS OF FRANCE WITH ANN AM. 41 sentatives of the L^, the other by the Nguyen family. The enervating influence of the viceregents over the Kings of Annam had long been felt, and for many years all real power had passed into the hands of the detested Chuas. Towards the end of the eighteenth ceutury a formidable insurrection arose in the northern provinces of Tonkin ; it was fostered and fed by the mountaineers of Southern • China, and, sweeping all before them, the rebels demanded the execution of the viceregent and the annulment of his commission. The rebel leader now became virtual ruler of Annam, though for two years Chien Tong, the last of the L^'s, reigned as a puppet monarch by his side, when, finding his position in- supportable, he fled to China and vainly sought the armed assistance of the Emperor. All-powerful now in Northern Annam, the ex-rebel, now king, turned ' bis attention to the rich southern provinces, which for more than a century had claimed their independence ; aided by the hardy mountaineers of Taking, to whose prowess he virtually owed his kingdom, the attempt to reconquer this valuable district was completely suc- cessful ; the king, Gia Long, was driven from his throne and, barely escaping with his life, tookr refuge with the Court of Siam. The Emperor of Siam was by no means inclined to run the risk of a collision with the 42 TONKIN. all-powerful usurper in Annam, and though willing to afford hospitality to Gia Long, declined to aid him in regaining his kingdom. Bankok in those days was the site of an important mission station, and the Jesuits, who have ever looked on themselves as political agents as well as preachers of the Gospel, saw in the arrival of the destitute king an opportunity for increasing French influence in the East. Gia Long readily consented to his eldest son, Canh Dzue, accom- panying the Catholic bishop to Paris, with a view of soliciting the aid of the French King towards the expul- sion of his foes. Thus, in 1787, French interference was first solicited in Annam by an exile king ; to quote the words of Francis Gamier, used a century later, little did Gia Long realise that he was introducing a wolf into his fold. Louis XYL received the prince with much empressement, but, before embarking on such a distant enterprise, demanded full particulars of the country and the probable value of such interference from the clerical ambassador. In submitting to Louis a project for supporting the claims of the fugitive King of Lower Annam, Bishop Pigneaux de Bdhaine, the chief of the -Jesuit mission at Bankok, advanced the following arguments, which, though broached in 1787, are still considered by a large section of our neighbours applicable in 1883, RELATIONS OF FBANOE WITH ANNAM. 43 " The balance of political power in India appears at the present moment to be largely in favour of the English, and one may be justified in looking upon it as a matter of no little difficulty to restore the equi- librium. In my opinion the establishment of a French colony in Cochin-China will be the surest and most efficacious means to the end. In fact, if the productions of the country and the situation of its ports are taken into consideration, it will easily be seen that the greatest advantages, both in peace and in war, will be derived from its occupation. "First Advantage. The most certain way of damaging the English in India is to ruin or at any rate to weaken her commerce. In time of peace, being situated nearer to China, we should undoubt- edly absorb much of her trade; the voyage being shorter and the expense of transit cheaper than to India, Chinese merchants would naturally prefer the French ports in Cochin-China to the more distant ones of Calcutta and Madras. " Second Advantage. In time of war it would be still more easy to stop all commerce between China and any hostile nations ; the situation of our harbours would enable us to forbid the entry or departure of any vessel from Chinese ports. " Third Advantage. The harbours of Cochin-China 44 TONKIN. afford excellent refuges in which our merchant vessels could refit, and the forests would permit us to construct new ships on the spot. "Fourth Advantage. In Cochin- China we should find all necessaries of life for the revictualling of our squadrons in the extreme East, and for the supply of our distant colonies. "Fifth Advantage. From such a coign of van- tage it would be easy to interfere with the designs which the English evidently have of extending their frontier more to the East. "Other advantages also present themselves, more important in the future though perhaps not so pressing in the present, and these are the immense benefits to be derived from the natural wealth of the country, and from establishing a commercial highway into Central China, which shall open to us the riches of that unknown country." The young monarch was not slow in realising the advantages to be gained by a prosecution of the scheme thus unfolded by the Bishop, and a treaty was entered into, in virtue of which France found herself virtually the protector of Annam. FIB8T TREATY BETWEEN FRANCE 8f ANNAM. 45 TERMS OP A TREATY SIGNEO AT VERSAILLES ON THE 20TH KOVBMBBR, 1787, BT THE COMTB DK VBRGENNES AND THE COMTB DE MONT- MORIN, ON BEHALF OF LOUIS XVI. OP FRANCE, AND BY THE PRINCE CANH DZUB ON BEHALF OF HIS FATHER, THE KING GIA LONG OP COCHIN-CHINA. "1. II y aura une alliance offensive et defensive entre les deux rois de France et de Cochin-Chine ; ils devront se preter mutuellement secours et assist- ance contre tous les ennemis de I'un ou de I'autre des parties contractantes. "2. En consequence, il sera equipe et mis sous les ordres du Eoi de Cochin- Chine, un escadre de vingt b^timents de guerre frangais de telle force que les demand es pour son service feront juger convenable. "3. Cinq regiments europeens et deux regiments de troupes coloniales du pays seront embarques sans delai pour la Cochin-Chine. " 4. S. M. Louis XVI. s'engage -X fournir, dans quelques mois, la somme d'un million de dollars, dont 500,000 en espbces, le reste en salpetre, canons, mousquets, et autres armements militaires. " 5. Du moment que les troupes frangaises seront entries sur la territoire de Cochin-Chine, eUes et leurs g^n^raux recevront les ordres du Roi de Cochin-Chine. " De I'autre part : "1, Le Roi de Cochin-Chine s'engage a fournir, aussit6t que la tranquillity sera rdtablie dans ses 46 TONKIN. ^tats, et sur la simple requisition de I'ambassadeur du Eoi de France, tout ce qui sera ndcessaire en Equipments, agr^s et provisions, pour mettre en mer, sans aucun ddlai, quatorze vaisseaux de ligne, et pour la parfaite exdcution de cet article, il sera envoys d'Europe un corps d'officiers et. de sous ofl&ciers de marine qui formeront un Etablissement permanent en Cochin- Chine. " 2. S. M. Louis XVI. aura des consuls residents dans toutes les parties de la Cote de Cochin-Chine, partout oil elle le jugera convenable. Ces consuls seront autorisEs "k construire ou faire construire des vaisseaux, frigates, et autre bdtiments, sans qu'ils puissent etre troubles sous aucun pretexte par le Gouvernement de Cochin-Chine. " 3. L'ambassadeur de S. M. Louis XVI. k la cour de Cochin-Chine aura le droit de faire du bois pour la construction des vaisseaux, frigates, et autre b4timents dans toutes les forets oh. il en trouvera de convenable. " 4. Le Eoi de Cochin-Chine et son Conseil d'Etat c^deront ^ perpetuity k Sa Majestd Trfes-Chretienne, ^es h^ritiers et ses successeurs, le port et le territoire de Han San (Baie de Tourane et la p^ninsule) et les lies adjacentes de Fai-far au midi et de Hai-Wen au nord et de Poulo Condore au Sud. FIB8T TREATY BETWEEN FRANCE ^ ANNAM. 47 " 5. Le Eoi de CocHn-Chine s'engage k fournir les hommes et les materiaux n^cessaires pour la con- struction des forts, ponts, grandes routes, fontaines, etc., qui seront jugds necessaires pour la surete et defense des cessions faites h. son fidMe alli^, le Eoi de France. " 6. Au cas 0x1 les naturels du pays en quelque temps que ce soit, repugneraient a rester sur le territoire cede, ils auront la liberte d'en sortir ; la valeur des proprietes qu'ils y laisseront leur sera remboursee ; la jurisprudence tant civile que criminelle ne sera pas changee ; toutes les opinions religieuses seront libres ; les taxes seront pergues par les Frangais, suivant les usages du pays ; et les collecteurs seront nomm6s d'un commun accord, par I'ambassadeur de France et le Eoi de Cochin- Chine'; mais le Eoi ne reclamera aucune part de ces taxes, qui appartiendront en propre a Sa Majeste Tr^s-Chretienne pour subvenir aux frais que I'entretien exigera. " 7. Dans le cas oh. Sa Majesty Tr^s-Chretienne se d^terminerait a faire la guerre dans quelque partie de I'lnde, il sera permis au commandant en chef des troupes de France, de faire une levee de 14,000 hommes qu'il fera exercer de la meme maniere qu'en France, et qu'on formera a la discipline frangaise. 48 TONKIN. " 8. Dans le cas oil quelques puissances attaque- raient les Frangais sur le territoire de Cocliin-Chine, le Eoi de Cochin-Chine fournira au moins 60,000 hommes de troupes de terre qu'il habillera, et entretiendra "k ses frais." Unfortunately for the projects of the militant bishop, times were troublous in France. The king, though desirous of extending his conquests abroad, was compelled to turn his attention to the consolida- tion of his power at home, and before His Most Christian Majesty could dispatch the promised aid to the East, he himself was involved in the meshes of a revolution, and, less fortunate than his new ally, who had found refuge and safety with a neighbouring sovereign, Louis XVI. fell a victim in those dark days " Wlieii France got drunk with blood to vomit crime." But though deprived of the assistance of regular troops, Pigneau de B^haine succeeded in inducing a number of soldiers of fortune to accompany him on his return to the East, and, being well provided with funds, he was enabled, through the assistance of Count Montmorin, to purchase arms, freight ships, and finally to land in Cochin-China in 1789, at the head of a well-armed and fairly-disciplined force. mn8T FBENOE SETTLERS IN ANNAM. 49 As was usual ia those days, the Eastern hordes went down like grass before the Western troops, and ere Pigneau's death in 1799, Gia Long had recovered his lost kingdom. He was not ungrateful to the French officers to whom he owed his restora- tion ; he gave them munificent presents, entrusted them with the reorganisation of his army and with the construction of fortifications, and finally, by their aid, in the year I8OI reconquered the province of Tonkin, which had become separated from the crown of Annam during a preceding revolution. Little did the early pioneers of French civilisation in Annam dream that the many forts with which they studded the country, forts built on Vauban's earlier principles, should, ere the close of the cen- tury, thunder forth defiance to their country's flag, and that the best blood of France would be spilt in wresting these carefully-constructed works from the successor of Gia Long. So long as Gia Long felt the necessity of the services of the French officers,, to whom, indeed, he owed his restoration, they enjoyed the most perfect freedom, and the Catholic missionaries, who for now more than two centuries had been settled in Cochin-China, pursued their career with fervour, success, and uninterruption"; but in 1820 Gia Long 50 TONKIN. died, having named as his successor, in pursuance of his undoubted right, his younger son, Minh Mang, to the exclusion of the children of his eldest son, Prince Canh Dzue, who, in 1787, had been his envoy to France. It does not often happen in Oriental countries that the crown passes peaceably from successor to successor, and Annam has proved itself no exception to the general rule. The friends and adherents of Canh Dzue rose in rebellion, not only in Cochin-China and Annam, but also in Tonkin. King Minh Mang with difficulty suppressed these various revolts, and chose to consider that they had been the work of Canh Dzue's foreign friends the French. The missionaries were treated with uncompromising rigour, and many w^ere sus- pected of meeting a violent death through royal instigation. In 1833 his hatred towards the French showed itself more openly than in secret persecution of the missionaries. He, by a royal edict, forbade them coming into the country, and those who refused to withdraw were put to death. Missionaries of the Holy Society of Jesus have never been wanting in courage ; they have ever looked upon a martj^'s death as their highest glory, and even those who differ from them in religion must have been struck FEB8E0UTI0N OF OATEOLIO MISSIONARIES. 51 by the different mode of life pursued by Catholic and Protestant missionaries. Too many of the gentlemen sent out by our societies seem to adopt the sacred calling of missionary as a profession ; too few remember the instruction given to the first pioneers of the Gospel, "Take nothing for your journey, neither staves nor scrip, neither bread, neither money ; " and in India certainly, in the hot season, more missionaries are found revelling in the cool breezes of Murree than in the fever-stricken plains of Peshawur, more in the sanatorium of Sheikh Budeen than in the deserts of the Derajat. The Jesuit missionaries in Cochin-China braved the fever of the Delta as well as the sword of the king. In 1833 M. Francis Gagelm was strangled; in 1834 M. Odorico was beheaded, and in the following year M. Marchand was torn to pieces, having been previously tortured with hot irons ; for three years we can trace no cruelties, but in 1838, as if to atone for the clemency of the preceding years, six mis- sionaries were beheaded and one strangled, and in 1839 a solitary execution took place. In 1840 Minh Mang died, being succeeded by his eldest son, Thie«i- Tri, who at once commenced the same system of persecution that his father had for so many years carried on. In 1841 and 1842, three B 2 52 TONKIN. missionaries were killed and several others thrown into prison ; but the sufferings of his fellow-country- men had reached the ears of an officer commanding a French ship of war in Eastern waters, and in January, 1843, a frigate anchored off Tourane, and demanded the release of the captive missionaries. There were men still living in Hue who were old enough to remember that Gia Long, Thiea Tri's grandfather, owed his kingdom to French intervention, and these now warned the king of the folly of refusing a demand which he was not strong enough to resist. The missionaries were released, and conducted by their weeping converts to the French vessel. Baulked of his prey on this occasion, the Oriental monarch was not one to allow further opportunities for satiating his love of blood to escape him, and no sooner had the white flag of France sunk below the horizon than Thien Tri recommenced his persecu- tions. The French admiral in Chinese waters, however, had orders to visit the ports of' Cochin- China and to insist on the missionaries being treated with justice; and in 1847 Admiral Lapierre, hearing^ of the continued persecutions of Thien Tri, appeared before Tourane with two frigates, and demanded free- liberty, not only for the missionaries to prosecute their calling, but for the converts to follow their new BOMBARDMENT OF TOUBANE IN 1847. 53 faith unmolested. But the royal palace at Hue is some distance from the port of Tourane, and the French force was altogether too small to attempt a march upon the capital. The admiral, indeed, had no means at hand to compel the king to accede to his demands. " Thien Tri was not inclined to submit, except at the sword's point ; in fact, wholly mis- calculating the strength of his opponents, he made a feeble attempt to destroy the squadron of five ships, and when that had failed and the fortifications of Tourane had been dismantled by the French artillery, he ordered the mandarin in command to be beheaded. No sooner had the squadron sailed away, unable, owing to weakness, to compel any compliance with their demands, than Thien Tri recommenced his persecutions ; these continued until his death, which occurred in 1848. He was succeeded by his younger son, Tu Due, who was named heir to the exclusion of his elder brother, Nu-phong. Tu Due was not permitted to commence his reign without a violent attempt on the part of his brother to wrest the kingdom from him. For three years the struggle lasted, and when, in 1851, the rebellion had .been put down and the new king's power consoli- dated, he found time to turn his attention to the punishment of the missionaries. Sending for the 54 TONKIN. bishops of the Jesuits and of the Dominican order, he commanded them to abstain from all attempts to spread their religion, and threatened them with death in case of refusal ; indeed, his speech may well be likened to Eehoboam's : "My father did lade you with a heavy yoke, and I will add to your yoke. My father also chastised you with whips, but I will chastise you with scorpions." Firmly convinced, from the result of Admiral Lapierre's mission, that he had nothing to fear in Hue from French resentment, he commenced a war of extermination against the Christians ; large sums were offered for the heads of European priests, lesser sums for Christian converts. This cruelty, however, soon came to the ears of the French Government, and in 1856 the Imperial minister in Siam despatched a vessel of war, the Catinat, to impress upon Tu Due the necessity of shaping his conduct on lines some- what different to his father's. On reaching Tourane, the captain handed his letter to the mandarin, with a request that it should be forwarded to Hue. The Annamite officer not only absolutely declined to comply with the request, but manned his guns and refused all communication between the ship and the shore. The commandant promptly opened fire on the SECOND BOMBARDMENT OF TOUBANE IN 1856. 55 fort, landed as strong a party of marines and blue- jackets as his crew would permit, spiked the guns, destroyed the powder, and threatened to blow up the fort unless his letter was immediately despatched to the king. The application of force is potent in shaping Oriental diplomacy, and the mandarin now readily agreed to have the letter conveyed to Hue. Owing to heavy weather and other more pressing duties, the commander of the Catinat was unable to remain on the coast to ascertain if the minister's letter had the effect of ameliorating the treatment of the missionaries ; but he warned the mandarin that a large French force would shortly arrive, which would compel Tu Due to listen to its demands. Before the close of 1856 one more attempt was made by the French minister at Bankok to open negotiations with Tu Due ; but he, in the meantime, had received orders from China to resist the bar- barians to the uttermost, and though he made a pretence of treating, it was evident, both from the rank of the officer sent to confer with the captain of the Capricieuse and from the bearing that official displayed towards the French officer, that there was no real intention of submitting to M. de Montigny's demands. 66 TONKIN. No sooner had the French frigate left Tourane than Tu Due redoubled his persecutions. He felt that he risked nothing by such conduct. France might be able to sink a junk or two, or to bom- bard a fort ; but he remained safe in the interior of his kingdom, and was free to vent his rage on the many Christians scattered throughout his dominions. Between 1851 and 1858 ten French missionaries were beheaded, and though their fate must excite pity and their noble heroism admiration, yet in dying for their faith they were but obeying the Master who sent them forth ; and it certainly seems scarcely consonant with the tenets of the Christian faith, that it should be promulgated by means of gunboats and bayonets. The French, however, look upon it that Christianity was intro- duced, not to bring peace into the world, but a sword; and on the 31st August, 1858, an expedition, despatched by the Emperor Napoleon with a view of enforcing freedom of religion throughout Annam, cast anchor off Tourane. An ultimatum despatched to Hu6 was unanswered. A cannonade was opened on the forts, which made no reply, and on the landing party reaching the works, they found the gates open and the places deserted. Owing to deficient means of transport, it was impossible to EXPEDITION AGAINST SAIGON. 57 march at once on Hu^, and, witli the opening of the rainy season, all hope of seizing the capital that year vanished. The small force was decimated by sickness and worn out by fatigue ; they were never actually engaged ; the enemy were masters in the art of false alarms, and, fearing attack, the commander had judged it advisable to surround his camp with defensive works, which necessitated much labour and told heavily on the enfeebled constitution of his men. In February, 1859, Admiral Eigault de Genouilly, feeling that the prolonged inactivity was not only hurtful to his men, who were fast losing their morale, but was also having the effect of forti- fying Tu- Due in his opposition, determined to embark his troops and attack Saigon, an important port in the South of Annam, and now the capital of French Cochin-China. On the 9th of February the admiral reached Cape St. Jacques, and then learnt that the town was some miles up a river difficult of navi- gation and well defended with powerful forts. On the 10th the squadron cleared for action and steamed up the river, silencing and destroying the works as they passed; on the 17th five vessels found themselves in front of Saigon, which, after a bombardment of some hours, was reduced to ruins and forced to surrender. 58 TONKIN. The booty was considerable ; over 400 cannon — ^most of them, however, old and unserviceable — 6000 rifles of modern manufacture, 160,000 lbs. of gunpowder, 500,000 dollars in specie, and large quantities of pro- visions fell into the hands of the French. Their losses, however, were considerable, amounting to over 200 killed and wounded. But, as at Tourane, no sooner had they landed and occupied the town than the enemy commenced a series of the most harassing night attacks; these were invariably repulsed, but generally with some loss. The capture and occu- pation of such an important post as Saigon was a severe blow to Tu Due, who at first appeared willing to treat, but the terms demanded by Admiral Rigault de Genouilly were too onerous to be accepted without a further struggle ; the demands were thus formulated : 1. Liberty of religion throughout An nam. 2. All ports to be open to European commerce. 3. Saigon to be ceded to France. 4. Recognition by Annam of the ancient rights of France over Tourane. These terms were indignantly rejected, and the king's troops once more assumed a defensive attitude. An attack on the Annamite entrenchments, though successful, cost the French 24 killed and 70 wounded. The terrible heat of the summer and approach of THE FRENCH IN OOGHIN-OHINA. 59 the rainy season rendered further active operations impossible, so the . French were compelled to rest satisfied with their first successes, and to strengthen themselves as much as possible in Saigon. The outbreak of the war in China in 1860 neces- sitated the reduction of the French force at Saigon, upwards of a thousand men being withdrawn to strengthen the Anglo-French expeditionary force. Whilst thus weakened, the little garrison was exposed to constant attacks, and was never able to assume the offensive. On the signature of the Treaty of Pekin, Admiral Charnier appeared before Saigon with strong reinforcements, and in February, 1861, drove the Annamites out of their entrenchments at Kihoa, then moving south to Mitho, captured that province, and in the month of May occupied Bien Hoa. Tu Due was able to ofi"er but a very slight opposition to the French arms in the South. A pretender to the throne, in the person of a French Catholic convert, had suddenly appeared in Tonkin, giving himself out to be the only representative of the Le dynasty ; although opposed by Tu Due's best generals, Le Phung was very suc- cessful, and captured the town of Haid Zuong on the Eed Eiver. "Wishing to mass all Jiis troops to destroy this pretender, or perhaps feeling that further opposi- tion to the "French was really bootless, Tu Due sent 60 TONKIN. ambassadors to Saigon, and on the 5tli June, 1862, a second treaty of peace was signed between France and Annam. " TKAIT^ DU 5 JUIX, 1862, CONCLU A. SAIGON, ENTRB LA FRANCE ET l'eSPAGNE d'UNB part ET l' ANNAM DE l' AUTRE.* "Article 1. II y aura dorenavant paix perpetuelle entre I'Empereur des Frangais et la Eeine d'Espagne d'une part et le Roi d' Annam de I'autre : I'amitie sera complete et egalement perpetuelle entre les sujets des trois nations en quelque lieu qu'ils se trouvent. "Article 2. Les sujets des deux nations de France et d'Espagne pourront exercer le culte cbretien dans le royaume d' Annam, et les sujets de ce royaume, sans distinction, qui desireront embrasser et suivre la religion chr^tienne le pourront librement et sans contrainte ; mais on ne forcera pas a se faire Chretiens ceux qui n'en auront pas le desir, "Articles. Les trois provinces completes de Bien Hoa, de Gia Dinh et de Mytho, ainsi que I'lle de Poulo Condore, sont cedees entierement par ce traite en toute souverainet^ a Sa Majeste I'Empereur des Frangais. "En outre les commergants frangais pourront librement commercer et circuler sur des b4timents * This treaty was signed Toy Eear-Admiral Bouard for France, Colonel Palanga Guttierez for Spain, and Phau Than Giang and Lam Gien Thiep, Minister of War, for Annam. 8E00ND TREATY— FBANOE AND ANN AM 61 quels qu'ils soient dans le grand fleuve de Cambodge, et dans tous les bras de ce fleuve ; il en sera de meme pour les bsitiments de guerre fran9ais envoyes en surveillance dans ce m^me fleuve ou dans ses affluents. "Article 4. La paix etant faite, si une nation etrangfere voulait, soit en usant de provocation, soit par un traite, se faire donner une partie du territoire annamite, le Roi d'Annam previendra par un envoye I'Empereur des Prangais afin de lui soumettre le cas qui se pr^sente, en laissant k I'Empereur pleine liberte de venir en aide ou non au royaume d'Annam; mais si dans le dit traite avec la nation etrangfere il est question de cession de territoire, cette cession ne pourra etre sanctionn^e qu'avec le consentement de I'Empereur des Frangais. "Article 5. Les sujets de I'empire de France et du royaume d'Espagne pourront librement commercer dans les trois ports de Tourane, de Balat et de Quang-au. "Les sujets annamites pourront egalement libre- ment commercer dans les ports de France et d'Espagne, en se conformant toutefois k la rfegle des droits etablis. "Si un pays etranger fait du commerce avec le royaume d'Annam, les sujets de ce pays stranger 62 TONKIN. ne pourront pas jouir d'une protection plus grande que ceux de France ou d'Espagne ; et si ce dit pays etranger obtient un avantage dans le royaume d'Annam, ce ne pourra jamais etre un avantage plus considerable que ceux accordes k la France ou ^ I'Espagne. " Article 6. La paix etant faite, s'il yak traiter quelque affaire importante, les trois souverains pourront envoyer des representants pour traiter ces affaires dans une des trois capitales. " Si sans affaire importante, I'un des trois souve- rains ddsirait envoyer des felicitations aux autres, il pourra egalement envoyer un representant. - "Le b^timent de I'envoye frangais ou espagnol mouillera dans le port de Tourane et I'envoye ira de Ik k Hue par terre, oil il sera regu par le Koi d'Annam. " Article 7. La paix etant faite, I'inimitie disparalt entiferement, c'est pourquoi I'Empereur des Frangais accorde une amnistie generale aux sujets, soit militaires soit civils, du royaume d'Annam com- promis dans la guerre, et leurs propriet^s sequestrees leurs seront rendues. Le Eoi d'Annam accorde egalement une amnistie g^n^rale k ceux de ses sujets que se sont soumis k I'autorit^ frangaise, et son amnistie s'^tend sur eux et sur leur families. SECOND TREATY— FRANCE AND ANNAM. 63 "Article 8. Le Roi d'Annam devra donner comme indemnity une somme de quatre millions de dollars, qui seront remis au repr^sentant de TEmpereur des Frangais k Saigon, Cet argent a pour but d'indemniser les depenses de guerre de la France. " Article 9. Si quelque brigand, pirate ou fauteur de troubles annamites commet quelque brigandage ou d^sordre sur le territoire frangais, ou si quelque sujet europden coupable de quelque d^Iit s'enfuit sur le territoire annamite, aussit6t que I'autoritd frangaise en aura donn6 connaissance 'k I'autorite annamite, celle-ci devra faire ses efforts pour s'emparer du coupable afin de le livrer £i I'autoritd frangaise. "Article 10. Les habitants des trois provinces de Vinb-luong, Nugian. et Ha-tien pourront librement commercer dans les trois provinces frangaises en se soumettant aux droits en vigueur ; mais les convois de troupes, d'armes, de munitions, ou de vivres entre les trois susdites provinces et la Cochin-Chine devront se faire exclusivement par mer. " Cependant I'Empereur des Frangais accorde pour I'entr^e de ces convois dans le Cambodge la passe de Mytho dite Cua-tien, k la condition toutefois que les autorit^s annamites en prdviendront h I'avance le repr^sentant de I'Empereur, qui leur fera d^livrer un laissez passer. Si cette formality ^tait ndglig^e 64 TONKIN. et qu'un convoi pareil entr^t sans un permis, le dit convoi et ce qui le compose seront de bonne prise et les objets seront d^truits. "Article 11, La citadelle de Vinb-luong sera gardde jusqu'a nouvel ordre par les troupes frangaises, sans emp^cher pourtant en aucune sorte Taction des mandarins annamites. EUe sera rendue au Eoi d'Annam aussit6t quil aura fait cesser la rebellion qui existe aujourd'hui par ses ordres dans les provinces de Gid-Dinh. et de Dinh-Tuong, et lorsque les chefs de ces rebellions seront partis et le pays tranquille et soumis comme il convient k un pays en paix. "Article 12. Ce traite etant conclu entre les trois nations et les ministres pl^nipotentiaires des dites trois nations I'ayant signe et rev^tu de leurs sceaux, ils en rendront compte cbacun a leur souverain,, et k partir d'aujourd'hui, jour de la signature dans I'intervalle d'un an, les trois souverains ayant examind et ratifie le dit traite, I'dchange des ratification's aura lieu dans la capitale de I'Annam, en foi de quoi les plenipotentiaires respectifs susnommes ont signe le present traite et y ont appos^ leurs cachets." Tu Due, however, did not show much more con- sideration for Christians than formerly, treaty rights notwithstanding ; and though all persecution ceased. FUBTHEB AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE. 65 missionaries were forbidden to build churches or schools, or to preach religion in open places ; converts, also, were excluded from public appointments. In fact, the King concluded peace more with the object of massing his men to put down Le Phung's rebellion than from any real fear of the French ; and when fortune favoured him in the north, and Tonkin became peaceful, he was shrewdly suspected of stirring up his southern provinces against their new neighbours. Although Tu Due's complicity was never proved, nor a shadow of evidence advanced in support of it, the French Government accused him of originating the disturbances ; and to put an end to the annoyance of having to retain a force on the frontier, Admiral Grandier, in 1867, occupied the provinces of Vinh- luong, Chan-Doc, and Han-Tien. Naturally, this action exasperated Tu Due, who again appealed to his suzerain, the Emperor of China, for assistance to drive the barbarians beyond the sea, China, however, was occupied with a rebellion in her own western states, and could spare no help to her vassal; and as Tu Duo himself was suffering from incursions of rebel Chinese in Northern Tonkin, he was perforce compelled to accept this fresh loss of territory without being able to retaliate on the French. 66 TONKIN. No sooner was Le Phung's rebellion thoroughly- subdued, than Tu Due found himself face to face with fresh complications. Strong bodies of Taepings, forced over the Chinese frontier by the "victorious armies of the Celestial Empire, took refuge in the mountainous regions lying to the north of Tonkin. Pouring down the tributary valleys of the Eed Eiver, they ravaged the whole country, and driving out the Annamite troops, established themselves firmly throughout the district extending from Langson to Son Tay, and for some time threatened Hanoi itself. Tu Due's armies met with no success against these new foes, and he once more turned to the Celestial Empire for help, and now help was accorded him. The Black Flags, or Taeping rebels, were split up into two parties, some being driven up the river towards Laokai, where they were hemmed in by the imperialist troops in Yunnan and the Yellow Flags, or the con- tingent despatched by the Governor of Canton. A second section of Black Flags spread eastwards, and interfered considerably with the commerce of the Eed Eiver between Hai Dzuong and the sea, joining them- selves to the Chinese pirates, who for centuries had made the navigation of the open sea between the Bay of Alung and Canton so perilous. As the persecution of missionaries had been put FRANCE 0A8T8 EEB EYES ON TONKIN 67 forward as the pretext for French, interference in Southern Annam, so was piracy advanced as a reason for the introduction of a force into Tu Due's northern provinces. In 1868 Admiral Grandier, when annexing Vinh-luong, Chan-Doc, and Han-Tien, had strongly urged the necessity of a joint Franco-Annamite expe- dition to suppress piracy, and on this being cour- teously declined, threatened to undertake the mission without Tu Due's aid. The outbreak of the war of 1870 interfered with this design ; but no sooner were the boulevards of Paris cleared of the pirates of the Commune, than the French commander in Cochin- China was instructed to act against those of Tonkin. In January, 1872, Captain Senez, of the frigate Bourayne, appeared before Tourane as the bearer of a letter to Tu Due ; and then sailing northwards, he visited all the most important Christian settlements on the coast, reconnoitred and surveyed the various mouths of the Eed Eiver, and on his return to Saigon submitted a plan for the more ejffectual suppression of the armed bands and flotillas which ravaged the Bay of Tonkin. The approach of the hot season prevented further steps being then taken ; but in October, .Senez again appeared before Tourane, this time armed with a letter announcing the intention of visiting Tonkin, and demanding the F 2 68 TONKIN. assistance of two Court officials to assist liim in sup- pressing the piracy. On the voyage to the mouth of the Red River, Senez destroyed several junks, which being armed were assumed to be pirates, though the owners vainly protested that their armaments were for purposes of defence, not offence. However, Senez's instructions were to destroy piratical junks; and as, according to French law, an accused person is guilty until he proves himself innocent, so these junks, being unable to produce satisfactory proof of their peaceable intentions beyond mere verbal assurances, were sent to the bottom. Anchoring at Cat Ba, off the mouth of the Thai Binh branch of the Red River, Senez found there a Chinese envoy, who, in obedience to orders from Pekin, had visited Tonkin for the same purpose as the French mandataire; in fact, China had assumed, in virtue of an application from Tu Due, a sort of protectorate over the whole eastern sea-board of Tonkin. This was by no means what Senez wanted, and, declining to enter into any negotia- tions with the Chinese mandarin, the French commander steamed up the river and anchored off Haiphong. Here he was received with cold civility by the Annamite authorities, who lodged formal objections to the appearance of the French flag in Tonkin waters. At Haiphong, as at Cua Cam, Senez EXPLORATION OF THE BED BIVEB. 69 found Chinese mandarins working side by side with their confreres of Annam in the regulation of the river commerce. Leaving the Bourayne at Haiphong, Captain Senez proceeded in his steam launch to Kemo, the head-quarters of the Spanish Mission iu Tonkin, and finally reached Hanoi on the 6th November. Here, as at Haiphong, the governor entered a formal protest against Senez's appearance — " Votre voyage ne m'a nullement ^t6 annonce, vous etes v'enu en dehors des conditions du traitd. Vos canots n'ont pas le droit de pdnetrer dans ce fleuve " — and declined to receive any visit from the French officer. Senez's reply was curt, and sufficiently explicit to open the eyes of the Government of Tu Due to the real purport of the visit. " J'y suis et je ne souffrirai pas la moindre inconvenance ^ mon ^gard." In spite, however, of M. Senez's threat to attack the citadel with his boat's crew of fifteen men, the governor held firm, and the French officer was compelled to leave the town without gaining the required interview. On his return voyage to Haiphong, M. Senez passed by Bac Ninh, which he found occupied by Chinese troops, some 300 of them being quartered in the citadel. These men formed part of the force sent by the Pekin Govern- ment to repel the Taeping incursions, and it was 70 TONKIN. mainly due to tlieir supervision that Chinese com- merce passed comparatively unmolested on this branch of the Eed River. The irritation of the Chinese soldiery at the sight of the small armed party of French seamen was very great, and it needed all the firmness of their ofiicers to pre- vent an Smeute. The governor declared himself powerless unless M. Senez would consent to enter the citadel — a citadel which, seventy years pre- viously, had been constructed by French emigrants, and which, now ten years later, has defied French armies. In reporting on the defences of these places, M. Senez says : " Cette citadelle, b^tie comme toutes les autres, est une assez vaste quadrilat^re h. bastions, n'ayant sur les murailles que quelques vieux blocs de fonte oxydes en guise de canons. Comme forteresse elle n'a aucune valeur, ^tant compl^tement dominee par plusieurs coUines distant de huit a quinze cents metres. Ces coUines, h, peu tr^s douces, sont entiere- ment depourvues de vegetation ; y faire monter de I'artillerie serait aussi facile que de la trainer sur une grande route." Whilst the French commander and his small escort were immured in the citadel of Bac Ninh, and whilst the Chinese ofiicers and Annamite mandarins were EXPLORATION OF TEE BED BIVEB. 71 endeavouring to calm the soldiery, news reached the Governor of the arrival of a small French flotilla at the mouth of the Eed Eiver. Fearing that this might betoken a force which should undertake the relief of Senez, the officials of Bac Ninh deemed it expedient to facilitate the departure of the French officer ; and thus, to the appearance of what was in reality a mercan- tile expedition, the captain of the French frigate owed his safety. FJscaping from his humiliating confinement, Senez dropped rapidly down stream, and on the 16th November, after passing Hai Dzuong, reached Quang Yen, where he rejoined the Bourayne, and at once opened negotiations for the free passage of M, Dupuis up the Red Eiver. Although the visit of the Bourayne was ostensibly to suppress piracy, there is no doubt that it was more intimately connected than French authorities would have us believe with the opening of the Eed Eiver to commerce ; and Senez, it is now per- fectly well known, had instructions to remain on the spot until the arrival of a M. Dupuis, who was armed with credentials from the Governor of Canton to the Governor of Yunnan, and who was, at the moment of Senez's departure from Saigon, fitting out at that port an expedition, half mercantile, 72 TONKIN. half filibustering, witli which he meant to force French trade down the throats of the people of Tonkin, much in the same way as Admiral Lapierre had supported the missionaries by the bombshells of his squadron. CHAPTER IV. THE EXPEDITION OF M. DUPUIS IN 1872. Amongst the many foreigners attracted to Shanghai during the Anglo-French expedition of 1860 was M. Dupuis, a Frenchman who combined the calling of a merchant with the profession of an adventurer. The prospect of commerce being extended by a new treaty between China and the Western Powers, opened out to this gentleman vistas of untold wealth to be extracted from those far-off provinces where no barbarian foot had trod. The first years of his residence were spent in acquiring a knowledge of the language, so that when in 1868, on the arrival of M. Garni er in Hankow after the adventurous over- land journey from Cochin-China through Yunnan, it was rumoured that cargoes of arms would be acceptable to the Celestial troops engaged in crushing the Mohammedan rebellion in Western China, the 74 TONKIN. adventurous Frenchman felt an opening had arrived. To transport arms by land from China to Yunnan was out of the question ; but Garnier had established beyond a doubt that the Eed Eiver of Tonkin had its source on the southern slopes of the mountains of Yunnan, and that it was navigable for some dis- tance beyond Hanoi. The jealousy of the Annamite authorities forbade any hope of a Frenchman, or indeed any foreigner, being permitted practically to test this question by an ascent from the sea. Dupuis therefore determined to place the matter beyond doubt by a descent from Yunnan. In the summer of 1868 a first attempt was made ; but the insurgents had too strong a hold on Yunnan to enable Dupuis to- carry out his project. Two years later, however, he received a hint that a second attempt might be more successful ; and after a journey, the vicissitudes of which are graphically and not too modestly de- scribed in an entertaining work entitled " L'Ouverture du Fleuve Eouge," * he crossed over the mountain range which separates Yunnan from Annam, struck the Eed Eiver at Manghao on the twenty-third parallel of latitude, and, working down the stream^ * "L'Ouverture du Keuve Eouge au Commerce et les Evene- ments du Tonkin, 1872-73." Par T. Dupuis. ChaUamel ^diteur, 5, Eue Jacob, Paris. TEE EXPEDITION OF M. DUFUI8 IN 1870. 75 to Baoha (Touen Hia in Chinese), about 100 miles to the south-west, satisfied himself that at least 200 miles of the country between Hanoi and Yunnan could be traversed in boats of light draught. The journey also was of value in enabling him to visit districts rich in precious metals. The existence of these deposits was well known ; but the secret of their locality had been strictly guarded with that jealousy with which a Chinaman naturally surrounds the resources of his own land. Fortified by this valuable information, Dupuis retraced his steps to Yunnan, there entered into contracts with the gover- nor for the delivery of cargoes of modern weapons, and, armed with letters to the Chinese authorities at Hankow and Canton, he returned to Shanghai. His own resources were not sufficient to enable him to carry out his proposed expedition unaided, and he had at this time, most undoubtedly, visions of support from his own Government. In order the more thoroughly to carry out his views, Dupuis proceeded to France, and endeavoured, but unsuccessfully, to obtain an official recognition of his mission. The country had only just been evacuated by the German army ; the onerous terms of the Treaty of Frankfort necessitated the most rigid economy ; and the Ministry were far from wishing to 76 TONKIN. indulge in exploits whicli might plunge them into difficulties, even with such an insignificant foe as Annam. But though deprived of official support, Dupuis succeeded in gaining the co-operation of some wealthy speculators. He also received the sanction of the Minister of War for the purchase of the war material promised to the Marshal of Yunnan ; and finally, through some influential friends, obtained the authorisation of the Minister of Marine to his pro- ceeding to Hue in a French ship of war, thinking that the Tricolour would be a sort of moral support to his petition, and that the King, of Annam would be more likely, under such circumstances, to afi'ord his assistance to the expedition. On reaching Saigon, the Governor of Cochin-China advised Dupuis to rely merely on the passports of the Canton authorities, and to sail under the Chinese flag. By the Treaty of 1862, the Red Eiver was closed to French vessels ; and the Governor of Saigon deemed it unlikely that Tu Due would view Dupuis' scheme with favour, but rather look on it as the thin end of a wedge which, when driven home by the French Government, would end in placing the commerce of the country in the hands of foreigners, and in eventually transferring to the French the northern provinces of Annam. Dupuis therefore proceeded to Hong Kong and DUPUIS GAIN'S THE SUPPORT OF OHINA. 77 commenced the organisation of his expedition. That he anticipated some resistance is certain, for he busied himself more particularly in the selection of his personnel, which consisted of nearly 200 men of all nations, whom he drilled and armed with chassep6ts and revolvers. The Eed Eiver was open to Chinese vessels, and for many years the principal towns on its banks had been occupied by Chinese troops. Dupuis therefore knew that so long as he sailed under the Yellow flag, and conformed to the instructions and acted within the permission of the Governor of Canton, he had nothing to fear from the authorities of Tonkin. He knew, however, their jealous disposition — knew that trade of any sort when conducted by a foreigner, more especially by a thrice -hated Frenchman, would be rigidly forbidden, and that when he had carried out his original mission he would receive no aid from Annam, no support from China. His eyes were rivetted on the gold mines of Sing-Lai, and he was determined to be the pioneer by which the wealth of Cathay should be transferred to the boule- vards of Paris. If the Court of Annam forbade legitimate trade, Dupuis, who had thoroughly gauged the strength of the opposition he might- expect to meet, was prepared to carry on his 78 ' TONKIN. business illegitimately; in fact, it is impossible to blink our eyes to the fact that this first intro- duction of the French flag to Tonkin waters was not far short of a piratical expedition, and that whilst the Ministry in Paris declined to aid it officially, the colonial authorities at Saigon, in obe- dience to instructions from the Minister of the Colonies, assisted Dupuis with advice, encourage- ment, and moral support. Whilst Dupuis was organising his expedition. Captain Senez was paving the way for its success by reconnoitring the various streams of the Red River between the sea and Hanoi, in order to lessen the difficulties which it was anticipated would be met with during the first part of the journey. Two main trade routes ran from Hanoi to the sea; the one by the Bod^ River, passing Nam Dinh ; the other and better known one by the Thai Binh, passing Haiphong, Hai Dzuong, the mission station of Kemo, and then skirting the walls of Bac Ninh, joining the main stream ■ by a canal named "The Rapids." The first route was throughout in Annamite, the latter in Chinese hands; and it was deemed advisable for Senez to explore the last-named route thoroughly, as Dupuis sailed under Chinese colours. We have seen in the preceding chapter, that Senez TEE EXPEDITION OF M. DUPUI8 IN 1872. 79 was shut up in Bac Ninh when he heard of Dupuis, arrival at the embouchure of the Eed Eiver, During his passage from Cat Ba to Hanoi he had never alluded to the real purport of his mission, and he owed his liberation from th,e citadel of Bac Ninh to the fact that the Governor believed Dupuis' flotilla to be a French squadron, on whose help Senez was relying. On the 16th November the Bourayne, the command of which had been resumed by Senez, arrived off' Quang Yen, and Dupuis anchored his small fleet under the guns of the French corvette. The Governor of the province, whose chief duties in concert with his Chinese colleagues were the suppres- sion of piracy, received M. Senez with studied courtesy, but regretted that, as Dupuis had no authority from the Government of Pekin, but was only furnished with papers from the Viceroys of Yunnan and Canton, he would be unable to accord him any aid. Such a step as permitting the ascent of the Eed Eiver by an armed flotilla could only be granted by the King himself or his suzerain, the Emperor of China ; and until such authority arrived, he himself was powerless in the matter. Oriental- like, he fully acquiesced with his Western guests in the immense advantage that must necessarily accrue to the country from the flow of European commerce ; 80 TONKIN. but — he was but a servant, bound to obey orders, and lie had no alternative in the matter. The Governor further pointed out that Dupuis was furnished with no authorisation from the French Government, and he feared that, in the absence of such recommendation, King Tu Due would not be inclined to look favourably on his enterprise. He should be happy to submit the case to his sovereign, but unless he was able to assure His Majesty that M. Dupuis had the support of the President of the Eepublic, he was not very sanguine as to the success of his application. M. Senez, who was in possession apparently of ample instructions, at once furnished the Governor with the following letter : "k MONSIEUR l'iNSPECTEUR-g£n£rAL Dth^Gvi DU ROI ADX ARMi;ES DU NORD. "Cua Cam, le 19 iVby., 1872. " Monsieur L'lNSPECTEUR-GENiiRAL, "Monsieur Dupuis, qui vient d'arriver dans le Cua Cam avec deux vapeurs, une jonque et une chaloupe k vapeur, se reclame de moi et me prie de I'assister aupres de votre Excellence, afin d'obtenir du Gouvernement d'Annam I'autorisation de traverser son territoire, fleuves, rivieres et canaux, pour se rendre au Yunnan, dans le but d'y nouer des relations TEE EXPEDITION OF M. DUPUIS IN 1872. 81 commerciales, et d'ouvrir ainsi une voie nouvelle qui ne peut qu'etre avantageuse aux intdrets de ce pays, comme au progres de la civilisation. "Dans ces conditions, je declare a votre Excel- lence que je suis autoris^ par le Gouverneur de Saigon h, lui dire que le Gouvernement frangais verrait, avec la plus grande satisfaction, celui de I'Annam accorder k M. Dupuis I'autorisation de se rendre au Yunnan en passant par son territoire, afin d'y nouer et d'y ^tablir des relations commerciales nouvelles. "Je suis, avec un profound respect, Monsieur rinspecteur-Gdndral, " Votre tres obdissant serviteur, "Le capitaine de fregate, commandant le Bourayne, "E. Senez." Furnished with this letter, the Governor of Quang Yen promised that he would endeavour to procure from Hu6 the necessary authorisation, but at the same time he pointed out to Captain Senez that, as Dupuis had ventured thus far in defiance of treaty rights, he feared that there was little hope of the permission being accorded. In the meantime, Dupuis' little flotilla lay off Quang Yen, the Annamite authorities furnishing it with fresh provisions and water with the same 82 TONKIN. facility and courtesy they extended to the French frigate; and, finally, the Governor permitted Dupuis to make excursions in the neighbourhood with his steam- launch. The enterprising merchant was thus enabled to ascertain the best route to Hanoi, and to verify Captain Senez' survey of the Delta. Furnished with this information, he felt that, even should Tu Due refuse the required leave, he was to a certain extent independent of local pilots, and was prepared, should the necessity arise, to force his way to Manghao, in virtue of his Chinese passports ; knowing that the Annam forts dared not, and the Chinese forts would not, fire on the Yellow flag under which he now- proposed to sail. This determination of M. Dupuis was somewhat bluntly put before the Governor of Quang Yen by Captain Senez : "Mieux que nul autre votre Gouvernement sait quel prix colitent des bateaux tels que ceux de M. Dupuis, comment done pourrait-il supposer qu'un . homme qui a tant ddpensd en vue de la realisation d'une idee va I'abandonner sans une vive resistance ? En refusant cette autoris^tion, le roi commettrait une de ces fautes dont il est impossible de prevoir les consequences. Dfes lors la nationality de M. Dupuis disparaltrait devant ce refus, qui en sa personne THE EXPEDITION' OF M. DUPUIS IN 1872. 83 frapperait nn des plus hardis propagateurs du commerce et de I'industrie. Le Gouvernement de Hu^ doit enfin se bien persuader que sa persistance k s'isoler du monde civilis^ ne peut durer plus longtemps. Le redoutable probleme du progres vient de se poser devaat lui, et il appartient aux hommes intelligents comma vous, de I'dclairer et de le guidier dans cette voie, s'ils ne veulent pas le voir pdrir. C'est aujourd'hui M. Dupuis, demain ce sera un autre, qui tous et toujours au nom du progres et de la civilisation viendront vous demander la liberty de circuler et de commercer. Croyez-le bien, toute resistance est vaine. Forts, canons, barrages sont desormais impuissants k resister au courant envabisseur de la civilisation qui se dirige vers I'Annam." Even tbis piece of rude reasoning was not sufficient to procure tbe required authorisation. Kings of Annam are irresponsible monarcbs, and the Governor, fearing for his head, absolutely declined to permit Dupuis to ascend the Eed Eiver without Tu Due's special sanction. As there appeared no probability of the sanction arriving, Senez unwillingly turned his back on his countryman, not, however, without giving him strong hints that it would be unadvisable to incur further delay, and that he might count on G 2 84 TONKIN. assistance from Saigon should anything more serious than a dead-lock arrive. This was all that Dupuis was really anxious about ; no sooner had the masts of the Bourayne disappeared from view, than, getting up his own steam, Dupuis pushed up the river with his small flotilla. The guns it carried, and the groups of well-armed men on the decks, added to the suggestive paragraph in Senez's de- spatch that the French merchant would oppose force to force, were any attempt made to stop him, induced the mandarins to let him enter the river unmolested, and on the 22nd of December he reached Hanoi. Here the Annamite authorities, without showing active opposition, took all the means in their power, by declining to furnish the flotilla with supplies, to compel M. Dupuis to retrace his steps. The arrival of the flotilla was naturally reported to the commandant of the Chinese forces in the neio-h- bourhood, and shortly after reaching Hanoi, Dupuis received a visit from Colonel Tsai, who was in charge of the Celestial troops at Bac Ninh. Through the intervention of this officer, who learnt that Dupuis' mission was to carry supplies of arms and munitions of war to Yunnan, some Chinese merchants in Hanoi, braving the dangers of Annamite resentment, under- took to furnish the French adventurer with junks of THJE EXPEDITION OF M. DUPUI8 IN 1872. 85 light draught, which were capable of ascending to Manghao, and also with supplies for his crews. Thus relieved of all fears for the success of his enterprise, Dupuis transferred his cargo to the new vessels, and taking with him fifty of his own men, including ten Europeans, and two rifled cannon, started on the 18 th of January on the third and final stage of his adventurous voyage. The steamers, under the com- mand of M. Millot, with 150 men, were left moored off Hanoi. French money proved more potent than mandarin commands, and, though thwarted at every step, Dupuis overcame all obstacles, dispersing armed opposition by the accuracy of his fire, and at last on the 4th of March, after a most exciting voyage, reached Manghao, the highest navigable point on the Ked Eiver, and within a few days' land journey of Yunnan. Although the Governor of Yunnan had succeeded in quelling the rebellion without the aid of chassep6ts, he was none the less cordial in the welcome he accorded the daring merchant, whose account of the obstacles thrust in his way by the Annamite authorities roused the ire of the marshal ; and in order that M. Dupuis' further voyages might be free from the annoyances which retarded his first one, letters from the Marshal of Yunnan and from the Viceroy of Canton were given 86 TONKIN. him, and he was also provided with a personal escort of 150 Chinese soldiers under the command of a mandarin. These men were clothed in the regulation uniform of orange with black facings, and had em- broidered on their tunics the words, " Soldat de la garde du MarSchal du Yunnan." Instructions were also sent to General Fang, who commanded the Chinese garrison at Son Tay, to afford all the assist- ance in his power, should Dupuis call upon him for aid. On the 30th April, loading his junks with copper and tin, the produce of local mines, many of which he personally visited, Dupuis commenced his return journey, and a week later, owing to the rapidity of the current, reached Hanoi ; he there found the authorities more hostile than ever; the merchants who, during his absence, had supplied the vessels with food had been seized and imprisoned. The first act of M. Dupuis was to demand their release, threatening, in the event of a refusal, to seize them even in the citadel itself. The Governor replied that he was acting in compliance with orders received from Hu6, whereupon Dupuis landed his little force, now amounting to 350 men, and with two field-pieces advanced against the citadel, whilst his gunboats moved up stream to open fire on it from the east. This determined attitude THU EXPEDITION OF M. DUPUI8 IN 1872. 87 cowed the Annamite general, who sent the imprisoned merchants to the river-bank. M. Dupuis now determined to occupy a position on shore. His men were cooped and confined on the gunboats, and there were many reasons why he considered he would be safer with a portion of his force in some strong commanding post, within easy reach of his vessels. The search for provisions could be more easily carried out, more efficient protection afibrded to the merchants who ventured to aid him, and he better able to act vigorously against hostile attempts. His quarrel was with the Annamite officials, not with the people, who were far from slow in perceiving the advantages of an increased trade ; and though it is difficult to realise how official support was ever extended to a man who carried out his mercantile ventures with such a high hand, it is impossible to withhold admiration for his pluck and daring. Early in May, Dupuis, now in the position of a general in a conquered country, issued the following proclamation : " Au Peuple Tonkinois. " J'annonce que I'affaire des prisonniers n'est pas assez grave pour me decider h, agir par la force centre les mandarins, et que j'espfere que ceux-ci 88 TONKIN. finiront par comprendre leur propre intdret, en me laissant librement circuler sur leur territoire pour le compte des autoritds du Yunnan et dans I'intdret des populations du Tonkin. Je recommande au peuple de s'occuper paisiblement de ses travaux et de ne point s'inquidter de ce que les mandarins peuvent dire de nous. Nous ne lui voulons aucun mal, nous sommes des amis." For some few weeks matters remained quiet, but the enterprising merchant was only seeking some means for commencing another profitable voyage, and the mandarins were not disposed to interfere so long as his vessels did not engage in commerce. As in all Eastern countries, Ann am derives a great part of her revenue from the customs on salt. At the frontier stations of each province transit dues are levied, varying from five to ten per cent, on the value of the cargo ; and even with these exor- bitant charges, which vie with our own iniquitous imposts in India, large fortunes are cleared by salt merchants. Dupuis, strong in his own strength and further fortified by the letters from the Governors of Yunnan and Canton, determined to send a flotilla of junks laden with salt to Manghao, and to send it free of all dues. Any interference with the salt TEE EXPEDITION OF M. DUPUI8 IN 1872. 89 trade would have been jealously viewed by the mandarins, but to carry on contraband trade, defy- ing their traditional customs, was an act they were not prepared to allow to pass unnoticed. The mandarins, therefore, massed a considerable force in the neighbourhood of Hanoi, and, as Dupuis' junks endeavoured to ascend the stream, opened a heavy fire on them and compelled them to descend, seeking the shelter of the gunboats. Dupuis retaliated by threatening to destroy all Annamite junks which came within reach of his guns. This was tantamount to open war. On the one hand the mandarins of Annam, acting within the orders of their own king ; on the other hand an irresponsible tradej, acting in virtue of his breechloaders and rifled guns. The Governor of Hanoi now commenced to act with vigour. The following proclamation was issued : " Les mandarins du Yunnan ont donnd h, un Fran- gais mission de transporter un materiel de guerre, mais cela ne I'autorise pas k faire un commerce do sel ; ceux qui en vendront, ou qui fourniront barques ou bateliers, seront punis comme conspirateurs contre r^tat, et leurs families exterminde jusqu'k la racine ; " and an urgent request transmitted to Hu^, demanding instructions as to the course to be followed with regard 90 TONKIN. to the intruder. Sheltered under the Chinese flag, bearer of letters of recommendation from the Viceroys of Yunnan and Canton, Dupuis was a power against whom the Grovernor of Hanoi feared to act precipi- tately. The conduct of the Frenchman appeard to the mandarins that of a madman, but there was method, too, in his madness. Tu Due referred the matter to Pekin, and Dupuis' later actions were disavowed. China, jealous of her own trade, was willing, in order to relieve her hard-pressed armies, to permit a barbarian to transport arms by a highway hitherto sealed ; but she was by no means prepared to open up the interior of Tonkin to European commerce. The Annam Government now saw its course clear; a mandarin of high rank, who had distinguished himself in the defence of Cochin-China, was despatched to Hanoi with orders to drive Dupuis out of the country. The position of the French merchant was now a perilous one ; he was disavowed by China, under whose flag he was sailing, and he had no oflBcial papers proving his French nationality. From all sides, large bodies of armed men were converged on Hanoi, barriers were constructed above and below stream to cut off the retreat of the squadron, and it was clear that only audacity could save the French. Dupuis, whose courage throughout the conflict never KING TU DUO APPEALS TO THE FBENOE. 91 flinched, was equal to the emergency ; he ran up the Tricolour, and despatched his second in command to Saigon for the assistance of the French admiral. Nguyen-tri-phuong, the new Governor of Hanoi, a cousin of the King of Annam, had seen the power of that flag, and before venturing to incur its displeasure, thought it would be advisable to resort to negotia- tions ; he accordingly advised the Court of the new departure Dupuis had taken, suggested a reference to the Governor of Saigon, and contented himself with adopting a purely defensive attitude towards the French flotilla. The King, anxious to avoid further complications ■with the Eepublic, adopted the views of the Viceroy of Tonkin, and ordering him to abstain from all acts of aggression towards M. Dupuis, unless forced to act in self-defence, despatched an embassy to Saigon, demanding the assistance of the French admiral in ■compelling M. Dupuis to withdraw ; urging that the presence of vessels in the Eed Eiver under the Tri- colour was a distinct infringement of treaty rights. CHAPTER V. TU DUG APPEALS TO SAIGON AGAINST DUPUIS. ADMIRAL DUPE6 AND M. GARNIBR. The position of M. Dupuis at Hanoi necessitated the prompt intervention of the French admiral in Eastern waters. The first voyage of that enter- prising merchant had been conducted, as we have seen, with the express sanction of the Viceroy of Canton, and for the express purpose of conveying munitions of war by the most expeditious route to the Chinese forces in Yunnan. M. Dupuis had on that occasion availed himself of the shelter of the Chinese flag, and had thus tacitly admitted the claim of Chinese sovereignty over the waters of the Red River ; but the refusal of the authorities of Canton to grant him permission to carry on a contraband trade in salt was in itself sufficient justification (as M. Dupuis himself had ap- pealed to Canton) of the conduct of the Hanoi ADMIRAL DUPBE'8 VIEWS ON DUPUIS. 9'6 officials in refusing a right of way to his flotilla in the second attempt to ascend towards Yunnan. Availing himself of his status as a French citizen, the Tricolour, as we explained in the last chapter, was hoisted over the flotilla, and mutual complaints were made by both parties to Saigon. The admiral found himself in an awkward dilemma. The terms of the treaty entered into in June, 1862, between Tu Due as Emperor of Cochin- China and the French Government, expressly restricted European commerce to the three ports of Tourane, Balat, and Quang-au. It was, therefore, impossible for the French commander to offer any justification for the presence of a French flotilla in the Eed Eiver. On the other hand, M. Dupuis' first appearance had been due to the authorisation of the Chinese Govern- ment, and the authorities at Hanoi had grudgingly acquiesced in it. Admiral Duprd felt that the dash and enterprise of one of his countrymen had opened up to France a grand commercial undertaking, and he was nothing loth to support such designs, although the views of the Ministry of the Duke of Broglie were plainly set forth in a despatch dated 17th July, 1873, which contained the following words : " Sous aucun pr^texte, pour quelque raison que ce soit n'engagez la France au Tonkin." 94 TONKW. The admiral, however, found it impossible to allow matters to remain in the present impasse. On the one hand, the Annamite authorities were requesting him to demand the recall of the French merchant ; threatening, in the event of the non- intervention of the French Government, to expel M. Dupuis forcibly. On the other hand, M. Dupuis was preferring the most preposterous claims against the Government of Hud, for damages incurred by the refusal of the Hanoi mandarins to permit him to trade with Yunnan. It became necessary to act with vigour, the more so as the Court of Hu6 were suspected of having applied for advice, if not assist- ance, to Hong-Kong. Admiral Duprd accordingly offered to despatch a gunboat to Hanoi to inquire into the Annamite claims. Tu Due, however, objected to this course, urging, " Comme les relations avec la Chine sont amicales, Femploi de la force n'aurait-il pas un inconvenient ? " In reply to this letter. Admiral Duprd re- proached the King with having solicited English intervention : " Cette d-marche change profonddment la situa- tion. Je ne puis attendre pour agir au Tonkin les rdsultats de vos pourparlers avec d'autres, je ne saurais souffrir que des strangers se m^lent d'une THE NEGOTIATIONS GABBIED ON. 95 affaire qui ne regards que vous et nous. J'envoie done un officier. Si cet officier est directement ou in- directement entrave dans Tex^cution de sa mission par le fait des autoritds annamites, je serai force de rendre votre Gouvernement responsable, et il faudra renoncer k mon grand regret h I'espoir d'une amiti^ prochaine." To this document, the Government of Tu Due, anxious to avoid war, replied that the admiral was at liberty to send a French officer to Hanoi to inquire into the disputes between M. Dupuis and the local authorities, and to arrange for the with- drawal of the flotilla now anchored at that town. On receipt of this permission. Admiral Dupre for- warded a despatch to Paris, stating that French intervention in the Dupuis aiFair had been solicited by Annam, and the Ministry accordingly yielded. It may be of interest, having regard to the manner in which the Chinese have been accused of duplicity throughout the Tonkin affair, to give extracts of Admiral Dupr^'s letter to the French Government during this crisis. "Saigon, 28 Juillet, 1873. "La question vient de faire un pas nouveau et d^cisif par suite de I'expedition tent^e par MM. Dupuis 96 TONKIN. et Millot. Vous n'igaorez pas que le Gouverne- ment annamite s'est adress^ a moi &, deux reprises diffdrentes pour me demander de decider par mon intervention, M. Dupuis k se retirer du Tonkin. Sa presence dans le pays est, en effet, contraire aux stipulations du Traits de Juin, 1862. " Ignorant d'ailleurs k cette dpoque la duplicity dont les mandarins avaient fait preuve dans tous leurs rapports avec M. Dupuis, j'ai adressd a celui-ci une invitation d'abandonner un point oti il n'a pas le droit de rdsider. Que va-t-il en rdsulter ? Fort to o o o in m o o o o o o o o o o CO CO CO 05 05 i-H i-H o o ^ ^ ■* ^ '^ ^ '^l '^ -^ I— ) i-H CO CO -* ■* ^ -* -* "* -* ^ o t- t- Ir- H • : : :.::.::. : .-^ : : ; 60 a a o o CD ,„ iS g . . . . -s „ - m "S F? : : : ^ g ro : : : : 1 - PI -2 Pi o +3 t3 'a? CM ^-2 g2 = Pl o ^ 1 1 02 • -1 ■ O tl-H K o^ pq CS fi 1 C3 « N c3 -i 1 ^ (n" CO -* in CO t-^ 00 o> o 1-H cq CO -*■ in 1-H I-H I-H I-H I-H I-H 290 TONKIN. S: O I-H o -*3 -t^ 1— 1 e• :; « j: " •4-3 •43 -♦^ Ph ^ g ■s o o d, Pi > O o y a o b o o 3 r-H fi CJ TiJ 03 O 1 =^ li « g :; o o ;; = :: = g " -■ ■^ 02 M ^ fl i o o o o o O o o o o o o o o O CO H^ o " "2 t Pi > s = = s S R &( n o tc o ?^ fl 'S m ■tJ .-3 «fl o d "* « •* -x •^ "* " 9 n n g 1—1 §0 ^ h^ i O o o o o o o o o o o U3 m in m lo >o lO lO in lO >0 lO m !£> CO o o o t- t~ t^ t^ CO CO CO o I— ( i-H I— ( f— ( »— I T-H I-H I-H T-H •3» "go (N (M (M C<) o o o o o o o o O O ^ ra lO lo irj lo lO ao 00 o o o o o o O (M (M • , 1 . . ■ . ao . . 1^ f a 1=^ a B g S S o a W) &o£ W«.^J s -» ? CO n 1 1 - o t- ^ I-H !>. -^ t- -* t- T-i 50 T-H (M (M I-H -* T-H 1 1 Yuan Kai Kang Tsi "Wei Yuan 'a 1 1 1 a* ■a m Tinghai ChenTo B f^M O o M ^g ^M T-H (N « -* irj CO t^ 00 03- o T-^ ci CO 'rf id CD t-^ 00 CO eo eo OT CO CO CO CO CO ^ -* ^ 'Sh -* •-* -* ^ ^ D 2 292 TONKIN. In addition to the above, the Chinese possess twenty screw corvettes of various sizes, carrying rifled guns of a lighter calibre, — chiefly Armstrong's forty-pounders — besides fifteen paddle-steamers, which are borne on the Navy List as transports, and which may be usefully employed in transporting troops from the northern ports during the ensuing rainy season, when operations in Tonkin will be forbidden to the French. Eecent purchases in Germany and in Eng- land of twenty-five torpedo boats have also strength- ened China's defensive resources ; so that at sea, France, or indeed any European Power, would find her far from being "un pouvoir negligeable." Our own experience of Chinese seamen, especially of late years, proves them to be made of stern stuff; in the Penin- sular and Oriental service they are . especially useful, and, no doubt, many thousands could be found who have mastered their profession in the practical school of British seamanship. It is in oflicers that China would find herself deficient, but just as Bishop Pigneau de B^haine found French gentlemen willing to undertake the command of the forces of King Gia Long one hundred years ago, so the Marquis Tseng would find no difficulty in providing efficient leaders for the magnificent fleet China has at her disposal. In fact, at sea, as well as on land, France must THE ARMED STRENGTH OF CHINA. 293 prepare herself for an obstinate resistance by forces in which the European element is not wholly wanting. A march on Pekin would be by no means the holiday campaign of 1860 ; the forts at the mouth of the Peiho have been considerably strengthened, and are now defended by very heavy Krupp guns. The Chinese, thanks to their own mechanical powers and the initiation of their European employes, possess arsenals at Nankin, Shanghai, Lianchow, Foochow, Tientsin, and Canton, where repairs of all sorts can be executed, rifled cannon cast, cartridges manufactured ; and they have a powder factory capable of turning out SOOOlbs. of excellent powder per day. Eecent purchases in America and Europe have, however, so filled her magazines that no strain would be felt by the home factories, unless a campaign of prolonged duration was waged. In having stores at hand, and ample means for replenishing them, China possesses one great advantage over France, and though, finally, France must emerge triumphant from the struggle, if she values her political existence, a comparison of the resources of the two countries shows us that if China will but follow the advice of her old leader, there is every chance of her prolonging the war until, in the interests of commerce, other 294 TONKIN, European Powers interfere and compel France to accept terms which wUl be but a just reward for the policy devoid (as the Marquis Tseng wrote) of "all honour and justice," which she has so syste- matically pursued. CHAPTER XIII. FBANCE AS A COLONIAL POWER. Any efforts made by the French towards the re- establishment of a colonial empire must of necessity be of interest to Englishmen. We are unable to forget the desperate attempts made by our neighbours at the end of the last and commencement of this century to destroy our colonial supremacy and to ruin our commerce ; whilst every glance at a map serves to remind them that many of the most flourishing colonies of the British Crown were once dependencies of the Fleur-de-Lys. But as the lilies of France have withered and faded so have the colonies of France dropped away from the parent tree, and with the esception of Algeria and some few distant possessions which add vastly to the expenditure without adding to its glory, the Eepublic can boast of no colonial territories. It is difficult to realise 296 TONKIN. what gave birth to this new craze for colonial ex- pansion in the brains of French Ministers. It is not as if the experiments of the last century had been crowned with success ; it is not as if there had been no humiliating treaties by which her colonies had passed into other hands ; it is not as if the administration of her few colonies had been marked by any pecuniary advantages ; nor as if her surplus population showed any inclination to flock to a New France in Oriental seas. The whole colonial history of France is simply the recital of one gigantic failure. No greater condemnation of the present policy could be found than in the rejec- tion by the Chamber on the 29th December, 1883, of M. Waldeck Eousseau's bill for a loan of 2,000,000 francs to encourage emigration to Algeria, or than in the publication of the fact that the annual number of emigrants from France does not exceed 4000, none of whom (with the exception of about 300, who visit Algeria) proceed to French colonies. Indeed, the bureaucracy, the petty tyrannies of subordinate officials, which is so marked in the mother country, are reproduced in an aggravated form in French colonies ; and the freedom for which the expatriated man sighs is denied him if he merely translates his lares and penates to a dependency of the Eepublic. FRENOE COLONIES. 297 Prefets and sous-pr^fets, maires and their adjoints, precepteurs of contributions direct es and indirectes, bureaux of enregistremeut, bureaux of octroi, bureaux of police, bureaux of douanes, juges de paix, juges of the tribunal civil and of the tribunal correctionnel, grefliers and huissiers, and all the hundred and one tyrants who tend to make life insupportable to the man who longs for freedom, all flourish with tropical profusion and with more than their native vigour in the colonies of France. When the emigrant leaves Havre or Marseilles he flatters himself that he is now leaving a land where one half the population is taxed in order that the other half may wear a uniform ; but when he lands in his new home he finds the propor- tion of oflBcials to private Frenchmen as ten is to one, and he then realises that his only hope of escaping vexatious and inquisitorial supervision is to accept some subordinate post himself, don the kepi, and abandon all hope of a free life. That this is well understood in France may be gleaned from the fact that over ninety per cent, of French emigrants eschew their own and migrate to British colonies. Even men of business who go abroad, not to colonise but to develop their own trade and to create new branches for their home establishments, flock to the free cities of Calcutta and Bombay, rather than to Chander- 298 TONKIN. nagore and Pondicherry, to Britisti rather than French Guiana, to Singapore and Eangoon rather than Saigon. Conscious of their own failure as colonisers, but ignorant of the true causes why they have been, unsuccessful, the French, every now and again, make fresh efforts to found new colonies. Every now and again, the French press bursts forth with some new impracticable scheme for the foundation of a Nouvelle France in some tropical jungle. Climatic considera- tions are of naught to a French Minister ; the broiling- banks of the Congo, the malarious marshes of Tonkin, the rocky ravines of Madagascar, each and all offer outlets for French ambition, and present fields of emigration for the able-bodied youth of France. The editor in his easy-chair, and the Minister in the tribune, appear to have but one idea as to the method by which colonisation can be carried out, by which civilisation can be introduced, and this method is — conquest. M. Waldeck Rousseau, as- Minister of the Interior, brings forward a Bill by which loans are to be made to intending emigrants, in order to assist them in driving the indigenous Algerians from the soil of their fathers. M, de Grainville, with equal naivete, writes : "Pour introduire la civilisation k Madagascar, *il faut commencer par faire la conquete de I'lle, chose FBENOH VIEWS OF COLONISATION, 299 beaucoup plus facile qu'on ne pense, et qui serait loin, bien loin de coAter aussi cher en bommes et en argent qu'on en a ddpens^ pour prendre Alger. Je suis convaincu qu'il ne faudrait pas plus de quatorze mille de nos troupes et de six mille nfegres enr^gimentes et disciplines, pour faire et conserver cette conqu^te. Si plus tard on sentait le besoin d'augmenter les troupes noires, la cote d'Afrique nous fournirait autant d'bommes que nous en pourrions desirer. Ce suppose done que le Gouvernement rassur^ sur la paix du monde, veuille entreprendre la conquete de Madagascar, et que pour former le plan de ses operations, il fasse un appel aux renseignements que pourraient lui oflfrir ceux qui ont des notions sur ce pays, j'y reponds en exposant ce que ma connaissance des lieux et mon experience me font juger propre a assurer le succes de Fentreprise. " II faudrait se prendre longtemps d'avance pour la preparer, commencer par engager k la c6te occi- dentale d'Afrique pour douze ou quinze ans au moins, six mille bommes dont on formerait six regiments, les transporter imm^diatement a Mayotte et k Bourbon, oil Ton s'occuperait de leur instruction, mititaire. Pour officiers jusqu'au grade de capitaine inclusivement, d'abord, leur donner des muMtres de nos colonies ou de jeunes esclaves ^mancipes que leur 300 . TONKIN. conduite rendrait dignes de cette faveur. II s'en presenterait un si grand© nombre que Ton n'aurait que I'embarras du choix. Je propose des mulitres ou des noirs parce que I'experience a prouv^ que le climat de Madagascar n'est pas h redouter pour eux, que, pendant que I'instruction de ces regiments aurait lieu k Bourbon ou a Mayotte, on transporterait de France dans ces dep6ts les approvisionnements de tons genres necessaires a I'expedition. A Mayotte, on s'occuperait k dresser deux ou trois cents boeufs pour le service de Tartillerie, on confeetionnerait un millier de bats pour ceux qu'en debarquant on emploierait aux transports des vivres et du bagage indispensable de Texp^dition. Des que le temps necessaire pour completer ces pr^paratifs serait h. peu pres ^coul^, vingt vaisseaux de ligne embarqueraient chacun sept cents bommes et, accompagn^s de huit ou dix grands b^timents a vapeur, se rendraient a Bourbon et h, Mayotte, pour prendre les regiments noirs et une partie des approvisionnements qui y auraient ^te ddposes. Je demande des vaisseaux de ligne afin de n'avoir que le moins de navires possible. Une flotte de trente voiles eprouve moins de pertes de. temps en route qu'une autre de cinquante. " L'expedition rdunie se rendrait dans la bale de Bombetoque pour faire son debarquement. Une FEENOH VIEWS ON COLONISATION. 301 premiere division des troupes blanches serait d'abord mise a terre, ensuite les regiments noirs, et enfin le reste des troupes blanches. Aussit6t les regiments noirs a terre, la premiere division devra se porter quelques lieues en avant et ^tre suivie le lendemain de la seconde division, afin d'etre le plus promptement possible a une vingtaine de lieues de la mer et en pays sain. Les noirs resteraient sur la cote, pour recevoir et garder tout ce que I'escadre aurait a d^barquer. " On pensera avec raison que la longueur des pr^paratifs aura donne le temps aux Hovas d'en etre instruits et d'en faire de leur c6te ; c'est ce qu'il y aura de plus heureux pour nous. Dans les premiers mois ils seront pleins d'ardeur, et reuniront tout ce qu'ils pourront d'hommes pour nous re- pousser. II serait a desirer qu'ils fussent bien fixes sur le lieu du debarquement afin d'y concentrer toutes leurs forces. Comme il est impossible qu'ils r^sistent au choc de nos troupes, le combat sera d'autant plus ddsastreux pour eux qu'ils seront plus nombreux. Dhs le moment qu'ils reculeront, leur d^route sera com- plete et leur extermination commencera en meme temps. Les Sakalaves et les Benimtsaras qu'ils auront forces ^ grossir leurs rangs se tourneront contre eux et les massacreront sans pitiS. Apres la premiere 302 TONKIN. bataille, nos troupes arriveront k la capitals, sans recevoir, sans tirer un coup de fusil. Les auxiliaires Sakalaves et Bdnimtsaras qui marcheront en avant et sur nos flancs ne nous permettront plus de voir I'ennemi. " Une fois dtabli h. Tananarive, le chef n'aurait plus qu'a faire marcher des troupes en petit nombre vers quelques points principaux de I'lle, en les faisant tenir toujours dans I'int^rieur tandis que les regi- ments noirs garderaient les c6tes et empecheraient toute tentative de soul^vement. " II ne resterait plus qu'k envoyer des Emigrants blancs dans ce pays ; c'est h, cela que le Gouverne- ment devrait apporter le plus grand soin et faire, sans parcimonie, quoiqu'avec I'^conomie possible, les frais considerables et cependant n^cessaires pour le trans- port de families europ^ennes. Le gouverneur gdneral ferait h, chacune des concessions de terre, d'abord dans un rayon un peu court afin de les prot^ger et aussi pour que leurs rapports entre elles soient plus appr^- ciables pour les naturels. Ce sera le grand moyen d'introduire la civilisation." " Ce sera le grand moyen d'introduire la civilisa- tion" — to massacre without pity the defenders of their own country, people who have shown no dis- position to interfere with peaceable settlers, and FBENOH VIEWS OF CIVILISATION. 303 against whom the French have not the shadow of a pretext of a quarrel. This is apparently " le grand moyen d'introduire la civilisation." Many a smile has been called up by Victor Hugo's absurd description, in " L'Histoire d'un Crime," of the mob at the Paris barricade standing spell-bound at the sight of a solitary infantry soldier moving majestically towards them. " Cest I'avant garde de la civilisation," was the hushed whisper that passed from man to man as the baggy-breeched, badly-clothed, abominably set-up, dirty little rufl&an, abandoning his colours, joined the howling mob, who then, as since, have been ever the bitterest foes of law, of order, of any form of govern- ment. M. de Grain ville's publication has given a new meaning to Victor Hugo's words. It is by force that France hopes to spread French civilisation in countries yet too weak to stand up against French, arms, too ignorant even to cope with French tactics. Admiral Courbet's Turcos are the advance guard of the civilisation France designs to bestow on Tonkin. Is civilisation to be introduced into Annam by means of the cowardly butcheries of the fugitives from Hue, for recounting which in the pages of the Figaro a naval officer was removed from the service ? Is Tonkin to be civilised by the wholesale execution of prisoners, as carried out by Captain 304 TONKIN. Eivi^re, in defiance of the strict orders of his im- mediate superior, and by Admiral Courbet, without remonstrance from his Government ? Does France hope that her cause will be improved by the conduct of her troops, who refuse quarter because they recog- nised the bodies of some slain Turcos lying beheaded on the ground ? Turcos have been known to mutilate even European foes, and in meeting the Black Flags they are face to face with an enemy who can and will repay them their cruelties in their own coin. Is Madagascar to be civilised by the bombardment of open villages by the heavy guns of a fleet, of villages which can make no attempt to reply even to rifled small arms, and which had never heard the sound of cannon before they felt the effect of French shell ? If Sedan has been eclipsed by Son Tay, as one French paper hysterically affirmed, surely Bazeilles has been avenged in the burnings of Tamatave and of the environs of Hue. It is a disgrace to the Christian world that a country calling itself civilised should burn and slay, should pillage and massacre, and these not with the definite object of repressing turbulent tribes, of checking wanton aggression, but merely with the view of spreading civilisation. God save the mark ! Europe has more than once remonstrated with Turkey FBANOE A8 A 0IVILI8EB. 305 for cruelties practised oa its own subjects ; it once banded together to teach France a lesson, which, though repeated thirteen years ago by United Germany, seems to have been forgotten ; but surely it is to the interest of mankind to prevent war and devastation' being carried into all quarters of the globe. We have no hesitation, in private life, in apprehending a criminal who sets our neighbour's ricks on fire, and we do so not more on our neigh- bour's account than on our own, fearing that our ricks may be the nest to suffer. France seems determined to alienate every ally, to outrage European feelings, to emulate the days of the First Revolution. The bitter attacks of her semi-oflS.cial press on Germany ; the wanton insult tardily apologised for to the King of Spain ; the outrageous conduct of her Ambassador at Irun ; the persistent annoyances at the Ecrehos Eocks off the coast of Jersey ; the double-faced dealings with regard to Admiral Pierre ; the cruelties of Brazza on the Congo ; the unjustifiable bombardment of the Malagayan towns ; the studied insolence to the Chinese Ambassador; and the unnecessary and barbarously-conducted warfare in Tonkin, all show a disregard of international courtesies, which does not need the ministerial persecution of the clergy and 306 TONKIN. the venomous attacks on all monarchical institutions by a press which is granted licence but denied liberty, to teach us that the spirit of evil is abroad in France, and that it will not be long before Europe will have once more to take measures to suppress the firebrand which so constantly lights the torch of war in her midst. England, with her boundless wealth, her mar- vellous commerce, her enormous colonial empire, is the Mte noir of France. It was England's wealth that at last crushed Napoleon, it is England's wealth that now inspires France with dreams of ambition, and these dreams portend no good to us. One hundred years ago, Louis XVI. offered money and ships and men to put King Gia Long on the throne of Annam, and the principal reason for em- barking on such a distant enterprise, as good Bishop Pigneau de Behaine is careful to tell us, was to weaken England's commerce in time of peace, and to secure a base to attack her Indian possessions in time of war. Ten years ago, Dupuis pushed up the Red Eiver to Yunnan, in order to forestall us in opening a trade route with "Western China, and Garnier's fatal indiscretion was prompted by the same cause. It is idle for France to attempt to cope with us as a maritime Power, but in time of war she can do us. FBANGE AND BNQLAND. 307 incalculable damage so long as the present Treaty of Paris remains in force. In times of peace she does her utmost to ruin our trade by the imposition of heavy duties and of equally onerous bounties. Every fresh conquest made by France, every new Custom- house over which the Tricolour flies, is an injury to the trade of the world ; the heavy duties realised help to reconcile the exiled Frenchman to his new home, but they do France no ultimate good, whilst they inflict on Germany and England — the two trading nations of Europe and the two hereditary foes of France — untold harm. Germany and England are alike secure from invasion by the Kepublic, but their commerce is dangerously open to attack, provided France can secure some fresh territory which shall give her that priceless necessary for modern warfare — coal. With a naval station in Cochin-China drawing its supplies from the immense coal-fields of Quang Yen, our trade with China would be paralysed, our outlying Oriental possessions grievously threatened, and our colonial military budget necessarily increased. It must be remembered that our steam mercantile fleet numbers close on 5000 vessels, with an aggregate tonnage of over 6,000,000, whilst our sailing fleet, with an equal tonnage, exceeds 18,000 ships. The havoc that X 2 308 TONKIN. well-found cruisers could create in such an armada can readily be imagined. Eetaliation is impossible ; France does not possess 500 steamboats and only just 2000 sailing ships, some hundreds of these being the unseaworthy coffins which annually drown a large proportion of the manhood of Brittany off the coasts of Newfoundland. Every additional harbour occupied by France in the fair way of our great trade routes threatens our maritime supremacy, and her occupa- tion of Tonkin and Madagascar menaces us in no small degree. It is no use for us to stand idly by because peace now reigns and to allow France to enlarge her border, trusting to our usual good fortune in war to enable us to transfer more French colonies to the British flag. No doubt, the ease with which we captured the West Indian Islands in 1796, and re- captured them in 1809, have clearly demonstrated the possibility of our performing a like feat whenever opportunity might arise ; but prevention is better than cure, and by adopting a firm attitude now, and by acting cordially with China and Germany, who are both equally interested with ourselves in checking the development of France, we shall save ourselves an immensity of trouble in the future. There are, of course, many who profess to trace the hand of Prince Bismarck in this colonial activity FBANGJE AND GERMANY. 309 of France. It may well be that he would wish to see the Eepublic fruitlessly expending its strength in distant enterprises ; but where those enterprises threaten Germany's new-born commerce, the Prince is not the man to permit them to gather head. No one knows better than Prince Bismarck that the real weakness of France is within her own borders, and that her life-blood is being sapped by her enormous internal expenditure. The millions wasted on useless public works, on armies of worthless func- tionaries, on subsidising venomous prints, on bribing mutinous officials, and in granting douceurs to un- principled Ministers — all these things tend to weaken France far more than a few million francs spent in shelling Tamatave or in equipping Brazza. So long as France pushes her filibustering expedition in regions where German interests will not be affected, the veteran Chancellor will note with satisfaction any and all efforts which will weaken the Eepublic financially; but the war in Tonkin is a different matter. Germany is just developing a valuable trade with China, second only to our own. Her ships have shown the German flag even in the waters of the Red Eiver of Tonkin, and her statesmen and merchants are realising the fact that her future greatness is dependent as much on the extension 310 TONKIN. of her commerce as on the increase of her military glory. This development of wealth has been retarded by the necessity of maintaining those huge standing armies which in 1870 so well avenged the disasters of Jena; but united Germany in 1884 can afford to look with equanimity on the vapourings of exasperated France. An attack on isolated Prussia was a feat within the bounds of possibility — one which France, thirteen years ago, thought was as easy of accomplish- ment as in the year 1806. Imperial Germany is a foe from which even French conceit shrinks from encountering ; and thus secure in her own strength, Germany can now turn her thoughts to those acts of peace which she sees have been the real source of England's strength. Whilst still retaining her proud position as the first military nation, Germany is rapidly assuming a very high position in the maritime world, and at the present moment possesses a mercantile fleet exceeded only by those of England and France. Any action on the part of the Eepublic which would tend to injure German trade would be very warmly resented, and China is fully aware of this. If the war can be localised in Tonkin, the trade of the Treaty Ports not interfered with, and commerce between Europe and China permitted to AGGRESSIVE NATURE OF THE WAR, 311 flow unchecked, Germany may view the operations with unconcern ; but it is unlikely that either France or China wiU consent to such a course. Already the mot d'ordre has gone forth that China must be made to pay the cost of the expedition, and French ministerial journals are demanding excessive war indemnities. General Millot will have considerable difficulty in drawing dollars from Pekin to the Eed Eiver, unless he visits the Summer Palace with a force considerably larger than that which Palikao and Hope Grant commanded three-and- twenty years ago, and it may be, in her mad greed for glory, that France will carry the war into the eastern provinces of China. Disastrous as such a course would be for the sea-port towns, there is no doubt that eventually it would be for the benefit of the Court of Pekin. Europe has already judged between the two Powers. There is not a journal of any weight which has not definitely pronounced against the conduct of France in this uncalled-for war, and which has not denounced both the cruelty with which it is being waged and the wanton spirit of aggression with which it was commenced. The latter might have been overlooked, had there been a prospect that France would have introduced the blessings of peace into 312 - TONKIN. her newly acquired colonies ; but tlie spirit whicli insists on the compulsory use of the French language in all French colonies, which insists on compulsory military service amongst the indigenous races of Cochin-China and Algeria, which insists on the obser- vance of the Code Napoleon by Europeans, Mohamme- dans, and Buddhists alike, which compels the criminals of Annam to undergo their sentences in the prisons of Toulon and Eochelle, is not the spirit by which new colonies are made. Algeria, though conquered fifty years ago, is not yet pacified, and though French garrisons have held the forts on the Eed Eiver for ten years, no European is safe beyond the range of the sentries' rifles, and it may safely be inferred that the cruelties perpetrated by the conquerors have tended not a little to delay the task of pacification. The Sikhs in the Punjab, and the Pathans of our trans-Indus provinces, welcomed the even- handed justice meted out by the Lawrences, Edwardes, and Nicholson. After the tortures and cruelties of the Sikh rulers, and of Avitabile and his French coadjutors, English justice was mercy to them ; and, immediately after the campaign of 1849, we held the trans-Indus provinces from Kohat to Scinde without the aid of a single British soldier. For five-and -twenty years, the ENGLAND'S MORAL POWER. 313 turbulent tribes who inhabit the eastern slopes of the Suliman range have been kept in check by- native troops recruited from those very provinces we conquered after Chillianwalla. Since 1849, upwards of thirty expeditions have been undertaken beyond our border, to punish refractory neighbours, and in twenty of these the strange spectacle has been ' witnessed of Mussulman troops led by British officers coercing their own co-religionists, and this, too, without the support of that thin red line which Dr. Eussell has immortalised in our language. To my mind, one of the most striking monuments of England's greatness is to be found in those pacified provinces on the trans-Indus frontier, which in 1848 Sir Herbert Edwardes described as paradise peopled by devils. To-day, an English lady might ride from Kohat to Kurrachee with as little fear of molestation as if she were riding in the Eow. And all this has been accomplished, not by the indiscriminate hang- ing of prisoners, as by Riviere in Tonkin, nor by the indiscriminate butchery of fugitives, as by Courbet at Hue, nor by the beheading of all captured men, as by Bouet at Hanoi, but by taking into our confidence and into our service those loyal servants of the Lahore Eaj who fought against us in defence of their kingdom, and who have since been equally loyal servants of their new masters. 314 TONKIN. Instead of rigidly applying the law of England to the natives of India, we have grafted their laws on to our own and produced a code remarkable for simplicity, whilst the officers to whom its execution is entrusted show themselves, indeed, too often inclined to temper justice with mercy. It is this, perhaps, which permits us to entrust the protection of our colonies, comprising upwards of 8,000,000 square miles, with over 250,000,000 inhabitants, to a British force amounting in the aggregate to under 70,000 men, composed of 10 regiments of cavalry, 69 battalions of infantry, and 107 batteries, France, with a colonial empire of 380,000 square miles — less than one-twentieth of that of England — employs, not to protect but to overawe the 6,000,000 souls over whom she holds sway, 19 regiments of cavalry, 135 battalions of infantry, and 72 batteries. No more striking contrast could be adduced between the colonial system of Erance and England than a comparison of their foreign armies. India, with a population of 150,000,000, is garrisoned by 50,000 British troops, whilst Tunis and Algeria, with less than 3,000,000 souls, necessitate an army of occupa- tion 75,000 strong ! It is now upwards of fifty years since we acquired permanent rights in the western provinces of the GOMMEBOIAL VALUE OF AJSfNAM. 315 peninsula of Further India, and our own experience of Burmah proves how little suited for colonisation is the neighbouring territory of Annam. "Wealth can indeed be amassed by merchants and small •capitalists who embark in the rice, indigo, or tea trades ; and perhaps, in the mountainous regions, the life of a planter may not be without its enjoyments. But to earn his bread by the sweat of his brow is forbidden to the European in the far East ; and we, recognising this fact, have turned our stream of •emigrants to more temperate climates, and have only sought to develop native industries in Oriental ■countries. It is perhaps for this reason that the Kingdom of Annam has never been looked upon as a field for English enterprise, although, upwards of two centuries ago, some of our fellow-countrymen established a factory in Tonkin. A regular trade was then commenced between the Eed Eiver and Bengal, and English vessels plied between Calcutta and Haiphong ; but the daughters of Tonkin were fair ito look on, and were not endowed with more virtue than their sisters on the banks of the Irawaddy, nor were the morals of the early traders proof to their seductions. But though concubinage in Tonkin was freely accepted by both parties, the Tonkinois did not approve of their daughters being carried away 316 TONKIN. into what they looked upon as hopeless slavery ; so when the supercargo of a British vessel endeavoured to take back to Hindostan one of these ladies, with whom he had carried on a liaison during his sojourn in Tonkin, her friends interfered. The Englishman refused to surrender his mistress, who herself was willing enough to accompany him ; the natives attacked the vessel, determined to release her ; a sharp struggle ensued, in which the British were victorious, and the supercargo carried oflf his fair prize to his factories at Calcutta, The conduct of the Tonkinois now changed towards the English merchants in their midst ; their little fortalices were subject to constant attack ; the natives refused to trade with them ; and finally, being reduced to the condition of besieged persons, and fearing death from starvation more than from the assaults of the enemy, the little band of Englishmen gladly welcomed the next Calcutta packet, in which, in the year 1719, they returned to Bengal. The Dutch and Portuguese then took our place in Annam, and the trade of the country passed entirely into their hands ; missionaries of the latter Power estab- lishing their stations all over the country. At intervals, some English merchantman, trading with China, through stress of weather would run into INDIA AND ANN AM. 317 one of the ports of Annam, and so an irregular communication was maintained between the merchant traders of Bengal and the Annamites. In 1764, the East Indiaman Admiral Pocock put in for shelter to the Bay of ' Tourane, and received much cordial assistance from the King of Hue, who was prompted to these good offices by a Jesuit missionary, Pfere Lorico. Some few years later, in 1778, another Indiaman, the Mumhold, entered Tourane Bay, and the Jesuit father, accompanied by two mandarins of distinction, begged a passage to Calcutta, where they were cordially received by Warren Hastings. Efforts were made to re-establish commercial relations between the East India Company and Cochin-China, and it was determined by the Governor-General to despatch an embassy to Hu4, in order to obtain from the new King those trading privileges which the mandarins led Warren Hastings to believe would readily be granted. A Mr. Chapman was entrusted with the mission, and on the 16th April, 1778, the E.I.C. ship Amazon, with the mission on board, left the Hooghly for Hu^, accompanied by a small trader, the Jenny, which had been freighted by two enter- prising merchants. After a lengthened voyage at the very worst season of the year, and after many 318 :rONKIN. vicissitudes, the little squadron dropped anchor in Tourane Bay in the month of August, and Mr. Chap- man at once demanded an audience of the King. This was accorded him, but the conduct of the sovereign was so decidedly hostile that the Envoy foresaw the failure of his mission. Insult upon insult was heaped upon him, and very shortly he received private information that his life was in danger. Thus warned, he succeeded in embarking in a native boat, and so regaining the Amazon, which was lying at the mouth of the Hue Eiver. On his flight becoming known, the King gave orders for his war-junks to attack the British vessel, which, by reason of adverse winds, was unable to make an offing. For seven days the Amazon withstood the unequal contest; but at last, on the 14th November, having beaten off all attacks, she succeeded in reaching Tourane Bay, where she regained company with the Jenny, and the two vessels returned without further molestation to Calcutta. Despite this failure. Lord Macartney, on his voyage to China in 1792, put into Tourane Bay, and as soon as the usurper king — for Gia Long was now an exile in Bankok — was thoroughly persuaded the British fleet was not the French squadron, the arrival of which he was dreading as the result of INDIA AND ANNAM. 319 Bishop Pigneau de Behaine's mission, he received the embassy very favourably. Lord Macartney was not disposed to oflfer the usurper any material assist- ance against the French, though he was enabled to calm his fears as to the probability of any active asssistance being aflforded to Gia Long by the French Government, who were then struggling with united Europe in the early wars of the Kevolution. In 1821, one more effort was made by the East India Company to renew commercial relations with Annam. During Gia Long's reign all efforts to this end it was known would be fruitless. He was firmly convinced that Lord Macartney's mission had been undertaken with the object of strengthening the usurper on the throne, and the influence his French entourage possessed over him naturally prevented any cordial reception being given to the advances of the enemies of France. On Gia Long's death the Governor-General of India despatched a mission under Mr. John Crawford to the Court of Hud ; but King Minh Mang had a hatred of all Europeans, and he was by no means disposed to welcome an Envoy from a nation which was even then meditating- a war against the neighbourftig kingdom of Burmah. Wrapping himself up in his Oriental pride, he declined to treat with an envoy from a Governor- 320 TONKIN. General, and refused even to see Mr, Crawford. He insisted that any documents addressed to his Ministers should come from the King of England, and not through the intermediary of a Colonial Governor. Crawford, however, was a man used to the Oriental character, and was not to be easily rebuffed ; by means of that golden salve which works such miracles in the East, he established relations with the Foreign Minister at Hue, and before many weeks had elapsed was enabled to return to Calcutta with a treaty which accorded to English merchants the right of trading with any ports in the kingdom of Annam, save only those in Tonkin. By degrees commercial relations were re-estab- lished ; no recurrences of the unfortunate episode of 1719 have served to mar the good feeling existing between British traders and Annam merchants. We have never found it necessary to order our ships of war to bombard villages on the sea-coast in order to support our missionaries, nor have we, under the pretext of spreading the Catholic religion, wrested from the kings of Annam their most fertile provinces. Consequently the British flag is welcomed in Annam ports, and four-fifths o^ the export trade of the country is in the hands of British merchants. In spite of the enormous diflSculties she must in- DANGER OF WAB TO FBANGE. 321 evitably encounter, it cannot be doubted that France will eventually succeed in the war she has so light- heartedly undertaken. No Oriental Power can hope to withstand European arms and European discipline; the magnitude of their forces may enable them to prolong operations, they may gain fitful successes, the ranks of their foes may be decimated by disease, but skill in the long run must overcome brute force, and breechloaders drive the matchlock out of the field. But in thus predicting Erench success, I am by no means sure that the campaign will redound to the glory of France, nor am I sure that she will emerge from it with anything beyond the barren honour of victory; and if China can only interest Europe in her cause, which there is some probability of her doing, France will have to satisfy herself with a serious deficit in her finances and an infini- tesimal acquisition to her colonies. The Court of Pekin is well aware of the uncertain tenure of power French Governments possess. The popularity of the Eepublic may vanish in the battle- clouds of a defeat, and the restoration of a Monarchy may depend on the consummation of peace. The death-blow of the First Empire was struck in the retreat to Moscow ; the Third Eepublic may be 322 TONKIN. shattered in the southern wilds of China. M. Ferry- is playing a dangerous game, one in which the defeat of the Tricolour means the victory of the White flag of France. China knows this full well, and her course is -clear as noon- day. She has full instructions from her old leader Gordon, and she need only follow them to the letter in order to sicken the people of France of a policy which can lead to nothing except a little empty glory, and to a great deal of very real taxation. So long as operations are confined to the delta of the Ked Eiver, and English coal is placed at the disposal of the French Government, General Millot will have little difficulty in carrying out his instruc- tions to open Tonkin to French commerce ; but if the rights of neutrality are strictly observed, and supplies of coal interdicted, the passage of steamers up the Red River will be impossible, and France will then be compelled to organise land-transport trains, in which she has had no experience and for which she has no aptitude. And even should the supply of coal prove plentiful, and steam-launches economise the transport as far as Hung Hoa, when once that place is captured, the Chinese will only have to retire inland and harass the French garrisons from points beyond the range of their river gunboats. The PROBABLE NATURE OF THE WAR. 323 country is not well adapted for military operations when once the neighbourhood of the river is abandoned. Hitherto, all the French successes in 1872, in 1882, and in 1883 have been gleaned when their troops have been fighting under cover of the ships' guns. On every occasion that advances have been made inland — even as much as five or six miles — failure has been the result. Garnier and Eivi^re were both killed and their forces defeated within a couple of mUes of Hanoi; Bouet was entangled in the intricate rice-fields five jniles from the same town, and driven back in disgrace on his entrench- ments. At the capture of Son Tay, when the troops were held back until the enemies' works had been well searched out by the shells from the heavy guns of the flotilla, the French losses were more than half those sustained by them at either the Alma or Inkermann ; and these losses, be it remembered, do not include the casualties in the Annamite tirailleurs. If every petty fortress in the Eed River is to cost France from 300 to 400 in killed and wounded, she will need still heavier reinforcements before embarking on the task of punishing China for what M. Ferry is pleased to call her perfidy. The total French losses in the campaign of 1860 were but 12 killed and 271 wounded; already their Y 2 324 TONKIN. casualties in Tonkin have exceeded 1000 hors-de- combat. France has now a far more formidable foe to encounter than she met twenty years ago — one who realises to the utmost the value of delay in war. For when an enemy is carrying on operations at a distance from his base, heavy losses can be inflicted on him in other ways than in action. Already Admiral Courbet has so gauged the fighting qualities of his opponents, that it is said he has decided not to risk an attack on Bac Ninh until after the arrival of fresh reinforcements, and this delay will bring the French into the third rainy season since Eivi^re occupied Hanoi. The real losses of the French, the real diffi- culties of the campaign, will commence when the tactics of the Chinese compel them to leave the friendly shelter of the Eed Eiver, and to advance into the mountainous regions to its north. If such operations are ever undertaken — and China can never be reached unless they are — an army not of 15,000, but of 50,000 at least, will be necessary ; and to lead such an army into an unknown country will tax indeed the ability of any general on the French Army List, whilst the Intendance Militaire will be fairly puzzled how to arrange for the transport of such a force. The huge unwieldy waggons which accompany French corps during the autumn manoeuvres are little suitable NAVAL 8TBEN0TH OF OHINA. 325 for Oriental warfare ; the equipment of the French soldier, which is only supplemented by a helmet in Tonkin, is equally badly adapted for the service the army is now entering on ; the field-guns, with their heavy iron carriages and limbers, have already been found too cumbersome for the soft marshy roads of the delta ; in fact, the 30,000,000 francs which have already been voted will be all swallowed up in equipping an army corps for Eastern service. It is not only on shore that France must be prepared to fight. China possesses a fleet admirably adapted for coast defence, and more than one cruiser, which should efiectually interfere with the passage of the reinforcements France is now despatching to Tonkin. With an able and energetic man at the head of naval affairs in Pekin, the corvettes Tchao Yung, Jangwei, or Kiangsu, with their heavy guns and high rates of speed, should make no difficulty in capturing the transport Vinhlong, with its pre- cious freight of 1300 French soldiers, or the still more valuable telegraphic cable now en route to Saigon. In fact, it is on the sea that China might reap her first victories, for she possesses ironclads of a type which, if properly handled, the French squadron in Eastern waters dare not face. From her sea-board 326 TONKIN. populations she can draw many thousands of admirable seamen — many trained in English schools — and if she can succeed in enlisting on her side some of the many unemployed British and American naval officers, who in time of war are as the Free Lances of old, there is no reason why a Chinese squadron should not retaliate on Saigon for the injuries inflicted on Tonkin. On sea as on land, China's greatest weakness is in officers j her men fight with undeniable gallantry, they are well armed, and possess military attributes which make them especially valuable for irregular warfare, and no other warfare is possible in the districts to which they will eventually lead the cam- paign. Did she possess a sprinkling of Europeans she might yet prove victorious. But though she can scarcely hope to succeed, she knows full well that Europe, which is fast realising the value of her trade, will not permit her to be crushed by any indemnity France may think fit to impose on her. She possesses a valuable ally in Germany, and she is sure to obtain good military counsel from the German officers in her employ. China can afford to prolong the war ; the loss of a fortress or two in Tonkin is of no moment to her, and even if the whole Kingdom of Annam is wrested from her, she VALUE OF ANNAM TO FRANCE. 327 "will liave the satisfaction of knowing that the opera- tions for its reduction cost the French more than the Crimean War, and that its maintenance will entail an annual loss to the Kepublic which she can ill afford to bear. If France were wise she would withdraw from these foolhardy operations while there is yet time, and would consider her honour satisfied by the cap- ture of Son Tay. It is now too late for M. Ferry to try and- impose on his countrymen the idea that the possession of Tonkin is necessary to ensure the safety of Cochin-China ; a study of maps has been .going on in the country since those words were spoken, and voters are now aware that Annam intervenes between the colony founded in 1862 and the province Garnier tried to conquer ten years later. It is, of course, evident that the intention of the present Ministry is to annex the whole of the western portion of Further India from Saigon to the Chinese frontiers, and by force of arms to compel the trade of Yunnan to pass into Europe by the Eed Eiver, thus check- mating our attempts to reach China from Bhamo. Her past colonial history should teach France that if Annam proves a valuable province, she may rest assured that the next great European war will see it transferred to some other flag ; if, on the other hand, 328 TONKIN. French estimates of its value have been erroneous, and it proves as unhealthy as Senegal and as expen- sive as Cochin- China, she will be hampered with it for eternity. CHAPTER XIV. PKANCE AS A COMMERCIAL POWER. Pew things strike the English resident in France more forcibly than the general ignorance of the mass even of educated French people, not only of the manners and customs of foreign countries, but also of everything outside their own immediate business. The ludicrous mistakes which are of daily occurrence in leading journals, such as the DUbats and the Temps, when discussing our own country, would be considered unpardonable if committed by a third-rate provincial English paper in the treatment of French questions, and would speedily be answered by sheaves of letters to the unfortunate editor ; but in France the gravest errors are permitted to pass unchallenged, and thus the average standard of information pos- sessed by the masses is very low indeed. If the ignorance of the French with regard to other nations 330 TONKIN. is astounding, what can be said of the jealousy they display towards them ? Officially and unofficially, the most glaring falsehoods are circulated with a view of stirring up this feeling, which for many centuries was almost exclusively reserved for the English, but which, since 1870, has been as vehemently directed towards the Germans, whom the French are pleased to style les barhares du Nord. It is this jealousy of foreigners which has given rise to the policy of colonial expansion, and in order to enable the Ministry to gain the support of the " sovereign people" they have traded freely on the national characteristics of ignorance and jealousy. To permit the Country to remain in ignorance of its own colonial history, and to foment jealousy of the peaceful successes of other nations, is the course which is being at present pursued by Ministerial prints. Les droits et I'honneur de la France is the text on which many a recent speech, many a blatant leading article, have been based, both speaker and writer ignoring the fact that these pretended rights have been established by acts repugnant to all civilised nations. The whole history of the French operations in Tonkin shows them to have been actuated simply by jealousy of England. The treaty entered into THU FBENGE A8 00L0NI8I1B8. 331 in 1787, between Louis XVI. and Prince Canh Dzue, was due, as I have pointed out, to the initiative of the combatant prelate. Bishop Pigneau de Behaine, and was solely for the purpose of weakening England's supremacy in the East. Dupuis, Garnier, Admiral Dupre, Eiviere, all acted with the same end in view, as their writings plainly show. Of the many books which have appeared in France on the Tonkin ques- tion, there is not one which does not openly breathe the spirit of hostility to England ; which does not endeavour to point out by that most unreliable of all methods, commercial statistics, that France, with- out much effort, can not only regain her lost colonial greatness, but can also efface other colonial Powers. The successes attendant on her enterprises of the eighteenth century are dwelt on with much com- placency, but the means by which those successes were obliterated are conveniently omitted. French journals, of all shades of political opinion, have been equally blameworthy in their tone, equally untrust- worthy in their statements. The success of France in any colonial undertaking must of necessity benefit England, and no one would welcome such successes more cordially than ourselves. To see a firm Government established in the eastern provinces of Further India, to see 332 TONKIN. the fertile districts of Annam and Tonkin brought under the sway of European civilisation, and to see the markets of Southern China placed in connection with those of Europe would be a consummation of unqualified advantage to English commerce. What we have to dread is that ere the end is accom- plished, if the French Government pursues its present policy of force, falsehood, and fraud, such a tempest will be stirred up in the Far East, such bitter feelings of hostility aroused between the disciples of Eastern and Western civilisation, that the peace of the world will be endangered and we drawn into the struggle. Blind to the past, the French profess to see in each fresh acquisition of territory fresh markets for their produce. M. Thureau writes : " Le commerce frangais traverse une crise terrible, c'est la un fait aussi deplorable qu'inconteste. " L'une des causes principales de cette crise connue de tout le monde c'est la diminution de nos debouches. "Les vastes marches des deux mondes, oil nous n'avions pas autrefois d'autres concurrents que les Anglais, sont inondes depuis quelques annees par les produits de nos anciens tributaires — les Americains, les Autrichiens, les Espagnols, les Italiens, et les AUemands. Nos acheteurs sont peu a peu devenus eux-m^mes producteurs. Partout oil nous avions DEVELOPMENT OF FRENOE OOMMEBOE. 333 naguere des debouches assures, nous ne rencontrons plus aujourd'hui qu'une concurrence redoutable, et cette concurrence a m6me penetre jusqu'au cceur de notre pays. " Le producteur franpais, place entre I'ouvrier qui tous les jours eleve ses pretensions et le commergant etranger qui I'ecrase par le bon marcbe de ses produits, est force d'abandonner la lutte, s'il veut echapper au sort qui I'attend fatalement — la bideuse banqueroute. "Les consequences inevitables de cette situation sont celles-ci : la mine de notre commerce, les boule- yersements sociaux, la decadence de notre pays. "Mais le mal, si grand qu'il soit, n'est pas irre- parable, I'un des principaux remfedes est bien connu : il faut sans plus tarder ouvrir a notre commerce de nouveaux debouches. " Aprfes les preuves de vitalite qu'a donn^es notre pays nous n'avons pas le droit de desespdrer de son avenir. Plus que jamais nous devons dtre presents sur tous les points du globe babite. ^'r ^'t ^E" ^fr ^t" -St " Eh bien ! c'est dans I'extr^me Orient au Tonkin que notre commerce trouvera les plus beaux debouches qu'il puisse ambitionner. Non seulement cette contree habitue par douze millions d'individus 334 TONKIN. recevra nos marchandises, mais elle nous renverra ses riches produits de toutes sortes. ■» * 4fr « « * " Ce n'est pas tout ; cette contree est traverses par un cours d'eau navigable, La Fleuve Eouge, qui met en communication directe avec la mer les plus feelles provinces de la Chine meridionale, et particu- liferement le Yunnan, dont les mines sont les plus xiches du globe. "L'ouverture de cette voie de communication, qui mettra en rapport avec le commerce international cinquante millions d'individus, est attendue avec im- patience par toutes les nations civilisees. " Bient6t la France proclamera la liberte du com- merce et de la navigation dans cette belle et riche contree." M. Ferry, as Foreign Minister, has more than once given expression to the same sentiments, even going so far as to suggest emigration to Cochin- China, where the death rate amongst the troops has for the last five years averaged ninety-seven per thousand! M. de Saint Vallier, without venturing on detail, said in the Senate on the 13th of March, 1883: "II est necessaire, essentiel que la France se h^te de d^velopper, d'etendre, d'agrandir son systeme colonial." But although, as M. Ferry re- MEBOANTILE MARINE OF FRANCE. 335 marked, this is the opinion of all economists, of all men of experience who were not blinded by political passions, it does not appear that French colonies do benefit French commerce. Until France takes a new departure as a maritime Power, it is practically impossible for her to become a commercial one. Her steam tonnage is just one-tenth of that of England, and by far the greater number of her finer vessels belong to companies largely subsidised by Govern- ment and are employed on services totally un- connected with the development of her colonies. The total steam tonnage possessed by France is 66,747, and over one quarter of this is owned by the- Messageries Maritimes and the great Trans- atlantic lines, whilst a certain amount belongs to the coasting trade. For France to compete on the sea with England, whose steam fleet exceeds 6,000,000 tons, is at present a matter of impossibility ; and as a proof that the carrying trade, even of her long- established colonies, is in our hands, I may mention that over sixty per cent, of the tonnage that annually enters Saigon sails under the Union Jack, only four per cent, flying the Tricolour. Just ten years ago, through the peaceable exertions of M. Philastre, the Red Eiver of Tonkin was nominally opened to international commerce. It would not 336 TONKIN. have been a matter of surprise if French trade had been turned to this new d^bouch^. But what has been the result ? The English, Chinese, American, German, even Dutch, ships have far outnumbered those of the French trading with that country. Of all the foreign vessels that entered Haiphong between 1874 and 1882, only four per cent, were Frencli. France, of course, benefits directly and indirectly by every new port she opens. The heavy duties which cripple her home industries are not absent from her colonial Custom-houses, and a considerable number of her sons are provided for in the Customs and other services of her distant colonies. But the trade to these colonies is in other hands, and it is this fact which gives rise to the jealousy of our neighbours. It is English trade which practically supports her large Customs establishments, and English capitalists who benefit so largely from all her colonial enter- prises. If Tonkin, or even Annam, could be annexed and pacified by other means than those suggested by M. de Grainville and M. Thureau, if France could extend her colonies without interfering with inter- national commerce, we should be the first to welcome the revival of that spirit which gave her a Dupleix and a La Bourdonnaye. We are too securely seated EXPENSE OF FREWS COLONIES. 337 in our colonial possessions to dread France as a rival, nor are the blessings that she showers on her newly- acquired provinces of such a nature as to make the advent of the French welcome in the East. The Government of the Eepublic is not a cheap Govern- ment, as the Budget for 1884 showed us ; and the extravagance which is permissible in France, under the eyes of the electors, can be indulged in with greater freedom in a distant colony, the rulers of which are as yet uncurbed by a free press. The Eastern colonies of France give employment to a vast army of officials and to a considerable force of soldiery, but they provide a home for few private individuals. Cochin-China, with a population of one-and-a-half millions, exclusive of its customs, has a taxation exceeding ,21,000,000 francs a year, and, in addition to 4500 French soldiers, it has to support 1862 officials of divers sorts. If such an establishment is necessary for the efficient govern- ment and protection of a small dependency with a large sea-board, it may be well to inquire what force France will consider advisable to locate in Tonkin. There is as much difference between the inhabitants of Tonkin and of Saigon as between those of the Punjab and of Bengal. The population of the northern provinces of Anuam is at any rate five 338 TONKIN. times as numerous as that of the southern, and certainly more than five times as warlike. It is doubtful if an army of occupation of 20,000 men would be sufficient to extract from them taxation amounting to ten shillings per head of population. France has failed to realise that colonies founded by force of arms are not always the most profitable, though her past experiences of Algeria and of Cochin- China should have taught her the lesson. Civilisa- tion can be spread by other means than by exter- mination of the aborigines, and commerce does not always follow in the wake of an ironclad. She went to Coehin-China, according to M. Deschanel of the Debats, to support the missionaries ; she has gone to Tonkin, says M. Ferry, to avenge Henri Eiviere ; she must annex the whole Kingdom of Annam, says M. de Saint Vallier, in order to extend and develop her colonial system. What this system is no man can say ; hitherto under the present Eepublic it has con- sisted in the forcible conquest of lands to which France has no earthly claim, and in which she has by the most unjustifiable means stirred up war and bloodshed. The seizure of Hanoi by Gamier in 1874 and by Riviere in 1882, were acts as indefensible as Admiral Pierre's bombardment of Tamatave, or as Admiral Galibet's subsequent wholesale destruction FBENOH POLICY. 339 of coast towns. The cruel executions which accom- panied the march of military events in Tonkin were far more reprehensible than the brutal conduct of the commander in Madagascar, It is not by such acts as these that colonies are founded or commerce spread, but by the peaceful development of trade. Already Germany, who has vanquished France on what she vainly thought was her great coign of vantage — the battle-field — is defeating her in the arts of peace. Her merchant navy is very little inferior to that of the Eepublic, her Eastern trade is far greater, and what must be more galling still, Haiphong and Saigon are more frequented by German than by French ships. Colonies do not necessarily produce commerce, nor do successful wars always bring peace and plenty in their train. For thirteen years the Government of the Eepublic has been pursuing a policy of stern repression at home, and the result has been disastrous to finance and to trade. Liberty of action and freedom of thought are practically forbidden to the people of France, and yet the Ministry think that all discontent will be removed and that trade will be revived by hoisting the Tricolour over a few mud villages in Eastern lands. It is in France herself that the progress of 340 TONKIN. development must commence ; it is there that civilisation and liberty and freedom are needed. When the Augean stable of official corruption and national impurity is cleansed, when a healthy, pure tone pervades French manhood, when her children are inculcated with principles of candour, of truth, and of virtue, then may French statesmen anticipate a revival of national greatness. Until then she will wallow in the slough of national decadence, a source of danger to the civilised world, so far as her foreign policy is concerned, and the mark of scorn for all who scoff at the freedom of Republican institutions. APPENDIX. LE PEINCE KONG AU COMTE DE ROCHECHOUAKT, CHAKGE d'aPFAIEES DE FRANCE EN CHINE. PiSkin, le 15 Juin, 1875. J'ai regu la lettre que vous m'avez fait I'honneur de m'ecrire a la date du 25 Mai, et dans laquelle vous me faisiez part de la ratification du traite entre TAnnam et la France. En me donnant communica- tion d'une copie de ce traite, vous exprimez le desir de voir le Gouvernement cliinois envoyer des ordres precis aux autorites du Yunnan leur enjoignant d'emp^cher les bandes chinoises d'entrer sur le ter- ritoire annamite, et de rappeler les bandes qui s'y sont introduites. "De cette fa9on," dites-vous, "nos bonnes relations seront maintenues et affermies." Vous m'entretenez egalement de la communication qui existe entre I'Annam et la Chine par le moyen du Song Coi, qui aprfes avoir traverse le Tonkin pen^tre dans le province du Yunnan. Ce point, 342 TONKIN. me dites-vous, ne se trouve pas indique dans le traite, parce qu'on ne pouvait prevoir alors la situation actuelle; mais maintenant que cette question se presente, il importe qu'elle soit reglee dans le plus bref delai. Le Gouvernement frangais vous a charge de vous entendre avec nous sur ces deux questions : 1. L'aneantissement des bandes chinoises qui desolent I'Annam. 2. L'ouverture d'un port du Yunnan oh vos steamers puissent atterrir et se livrer a des transac- tion& commerciales reguliferes. Dans la onzieme lune de la douzieme annee du xhgne de Tong-tcbi, j'ai regu une lettre de M. de Geoffroy, contenant la copie d'une lettre adressee par ce dernier au Gouverneur de Yunnan, dans laquelle il ^tait question des avantages que recueillerait le commerce de l'ouverture de cette province. J'ai repondu h, M. de Geoflfroy que le Yunnan n'etait pas ouvert au commerce etranger, et j'ai ^crit au Gouverneur de cette province de conformer sa conduite aux stipulations du traite. Maintenant que votre Gouvernement reclame l'ouverture d'un port sur le Song Coi, je suis oblige de r^pondre egalement que le Yunnan est ferme au commerce stranger, et que dhs lors dans votre traite ni dans celui d'aucune nation il ne saurait y avoir de stipula- APPENDIX. 343 tion relative h I'ouverture d'un port de commerce dans le Yunnan. L'Annam est la contrde appel^e ^galement Yuenan ; elle a ete depuis longtemps et est encore tributaire de .la Chine, et les habitants de la fronti^re chinoise ont en de tout temps avec les habitants des ^tats tributaires voisins des rapports commerciaux, dont la nature varie suivant les provinces. II est n^cessaire que j'envoie une d^pSche pour ordonner une enqu^te au Yunnan a ce sujet ; dhs que la r^ponse me sera parvenue, nous nous occuperons de delib^rer sur cette affaire. D'un autre c6t^, I'Annam dtait jadis infest^ de' brigands, et son Gouvernement a a plusieurs reprises demande du secours a la Chine. La Chine ne pouvait refuser aide et protection d un pays tributaire ; aussi envoya-t-elle des troupes pour poursuivre ces brigands; les troupes qui se trouvent dans I'Annam y sont done sur la demande du Gouvernement annamite, et dans le but de proteger la frontifere ; ce but une fois atteint, leur presence sur le territoire annamite n'avait plus de raison d'etre et on les a rappelees. THE BKD. OHABLES DICKEirS AKD EVANS, CEY8TAL PAIAOB PBESS.