12 US 
 
 CORNELL 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
Cornell University Library 
 JL58 1865 .C37 1865 
 
 The union of the provinces of British No 
 
 olin 
 
 3 1924 030 501 443 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of this book is in 
 the Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924030501443 
 
THE 
 
 UNION OF THE PROVINCES 
 
 BRITISH NORTH AMERICA. 
 
 BT 
 
 THE HONORABLE JOSEPH CAUCHON, 
 
 MEMBER OF TBI! CANADIAN PARLIAMENT, AND EDITOR- IN-CHIEF 07 
 " IE JOURNAL DE QUEBEC." 
 
 TRANSLATED BT 
 
 GEORGE HENRY MAOAULAY. 
 
 QUEBEC : 
 
 PRINTED BY HUNTER, ROSE & CO., ST. URSU&E ST. 
 
 1865. 
 
JL 
 
 5% 
 
 
 
 1 J'ic 
 
 A 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Chaptee. Page - 
 
 Preface v 
 
 I. — Introduction 1 
 
 II. — The Coalition and the Conference 6 
 
 III.— The Issue 13 
 
 IV. — The Canadian Union 15 
 
 y. Changes in our Constitution ... 18 
 
 VI. The Canadian Union and the Future 22 
 
 VII.— Necessity for Union of all the Provinces 28 
 
 VIII. — Federal or Legislative Union 34 
 
 IX. — Protection to Peculiar Institutions 39 
 
 X.— The Solution of the Problem 46 
 
 XL— Sovereignty 5i 
 
 XII.— The Federal Legislative Council 57 
 
 XIII.— Property Qualification 66 
 
 XIV.— Legislative Councillors 68 
 
 XV. — Representation by Population 72 
 
 XVI.— Re-adjustment of Representation 75 
 
 XVII. Proportion of Decrease in Representation 79 
 
 XVIII. Division of Provinces for Representation 83 
 
 XIX. — Increase of Representation 84 
 
 XX.— Parliaments and their Privileges, &c 87 
 
 XXI.— Attributes of General Government 89 
 
 XXII.— Divorce "* 
 
 XXIII— Marriage ^ 
 
 XXIV.— Criminal Law.- 
 
 XXV —Federal Court of Appeals lu ^ 
 
 XXVI.— Uniformity of Civil Law 10 % 
 
 XXVIL— Emigration and Agriculture..- 
 
IV CONTENTS. 
 
 Chapter. Page 
 
 XXVIII. — Appointment and Salaries of Judges 112 
 
 XXIX. — Lieutenant Governors 114 
 
 XXX. — Looal Legislatures 117 
 
 XXXI.— Education 119 
 
 XXXII.— Right of Pardon and Eeprieve 125 
 
 XXXIII.— Conflict of Laws 127 
 
 XXXIV. — French and English Languages 129 
 
 XXXV.— Money and other bills, and Eight of Veto 130 
 
 XXXVI.— Mines and Minerals, &c, &c 134 
 
 XXXVII.— Finance 140 
 
 XXXVIII-The Tariff. 148 
 
 XXXIX.— The Intercolonial Railway 151 
 
 XL. — Conclusion 154 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 A Work entitled L' Union de L'Amerique Britannique du Nord, 
 par I' Hon. Joseph Cauchon, Membre du Parlement Canadien, 
 et Ridacteur-en-chef du ' Journal de Quihec,' has recently made its 
 appearance. The well known abilities of the author, as a legisla- 
 tor and as a journalist, and his long acquaintance with public 
 affairs, together with the importance of the subject, have been the 
 motives which have induced me to translate this work, for the bene- 
 fit of those who may not be versed in the French language. The sub- 
 ject of a Union of the British North American Provinces is treated, in 
 all its bearings, from a French Canadian point of view, having refer- 
 ence, not only to the continuance of British connection, but to the 
 preservation of those peculiar institutions of Lower Canada em- 
 braced in the words, ' Nbs institutions, notre langue, et nos 
 his.' There is, however, no narrow-mindedness of thought or 
 expression. The advantages to all the provinces, politically and 
 commercially, are clearly shewn, and, while facts and figures are 
 interesting, the writing is vigorous and convincing. The trans- 
 lator feels assured that the labor of translation will not have been 
 altogether lost upon the thinking and intelligent portion of the 
 English-speaking population of the province. He lays it before 
 them, convinced that Mr. Cauchon's views will be appreciated, and 
 his style of conveying ideas generally admired. 
 
 G. H. MACAULAY, 
 
 Translator. 
 Quebec, 15th February, 1865. 
 
THE NEW CONSTITUTION 
 
 QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 
 
 gnirobttrfion. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 AT the present moment, after having seriously studied the pro- 
 ject of Confederation (which we had the good fortune to lay 
 for the first time before the country), from every point of view, and ' 
 estimating all probable results, as well as we have been enabled to 
 appreciate them, and after an attentive hearing of the intercolonial 
 delegates in their explanations of the motives by which they were, 
 actuated, and the meaning of the several articles of the project as 
 so submitted, we confess that we still approach this subject with 
 trepidation. The question of Confederation is undoubtedly the 
 most important which has ever been brought before the statesmen 
 and journalists of Canada. Who would not feel really anxious 
 when the responsibility of grappling with such a question is to be 
 undertaken ? That which is going on at the present moment 
 before our eyes is neither more nor less than a revolution, a blood- 
 less one, if you will, but as complete a revolution in ideas and 
 things as if we had reached it by the spilling of blood ; it is the 
 transformation, nay, the very transmutation of our political and 
 social institutions. The elements are the same, or nearly the same 
 it is true, but they are under new relations, and with new condi- 
 
 B 
 
2 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 tions of equilibrium. A new association is to be formed, on a new 
 basis, and with new principles of vitality. A large association will 
 be created out of small communities which have hitherto been 
 isolated, separated from each other, as it were, by differences of 
 language, habits and the very nature of peculiar institutions. For 
 divers reasons, an attempt is made to bring these into a group, 
 with the view of forming a nation. The question is therefore a 
 grave one, if ever we had one to consider, and imperiously demands 
 patriotism, study and serious consideration. In 1840, after the 
 temporary suspension of the Act of 1791, England granted to us a 
 new constitution. The anguish and painful apprehensions of our 
 population at that memorable period will long be remembered. 
 But at that time we French Canadians had no deliberative voice 
 in the councils of the sovereign, and consequently we were per- 
 fectly free from responsibility with regard to this act, which was 
 conceived in injustice; under any circumstance, however, we 
 could only be considered responsible to a certain extent, in so much 
 as historical antecedents had brought us to that issue. At the 
 present day matters are completely changed. Not only are we 
 possessed of a deliberative voice, but Great Britain grants to us 
 (the parties interested) full and complete liberty to construct, 
 demolish or reconstruct our system of government. This power, 
 Which is almost unlimited, has imposed upon us corresponding 
 duties and responsibilities, and we are thus bound to speak and 
 act with prudence, wisdom and calculation. In the midst of our 
 debates and internal discussions for the upper hand, let us not 
 forget that there exists the responsibility of condemning as well as 
 that of approving, and that the man, who, with the desire to op- 
 pose the project, might judge from his particular party point of 
 view, is as liable to condemnation as another who might start from 
 the same stand point to approve of the project. The writings of 
 the press should become refined by duty, responsibility and the 
 gravity of public affairs. The press should control party spirit, 
 and should freely soar above all favoritism as well as personal 
 antipathy, because, while political men and parties may perish, the 
 nation will remain with the destiny which we have created for it, 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 3 
 
 and our names will be judged by posterity, gratefully or malevo- 
 lently, according to the effect of our present acts. We must not 
 forget, that while the history of the country at this period is 
 created by us, we do not record that history, and therefore we 
 should be wrong were we to depart from those principles of wisdom, 
 truth and justice, which constitute the happiness of a nation, to 
 satisfy any strong predilection, to gratify a feeling of hatred, or to 
 obtain a temporary triumph. Let us reflect for a moment on the 
 immense progress towards political liberty which we have accom- 
 plished between the years 1840 and 1864. Have we not obtained 
 a signal victory over the despotism and oligarchy of the former 
 date, which had given rise, a short time previous, to the bloody 
 and disastrous events that seemed, at that time, to reserve for us 
 another fate? How does it happen then, that we have thus 
 transformed those ancient instruments of punishment and servi- 
 tude into a vital political principle ? We answer, by our wisdom, 
 our moderation, the justice and generosity of our principles ! We 
 have, therefore, every reason to return thanks to Providence for the 
 past, and should not despair of the future, because, if we ever have 
 had a period in our history calculated to discourage us, it must 
 certainly have been that during which irritated and uncontrollable 
 feelings were the means of raising scaffolds and of immolating 
 victims, and when despotism, with the intention of oppressing, 
 established an equality of representation with a numerical in- 
 equality. 
 
 We alluded in a former part of this article to our fears — tttey 
 are not of modern date. On the 2nd of July last, we wrote with 
 views which could scarcely be misunderstood : — 
 
 ' From the commencement of the last ministerial crisis, two 
 ' thunderbolts have fallen on our political planet, and their fulmi- 
 ' nating effect is still felt in the most remote regions of some con- 
 ' sciences ! The men who possess these consciences are in doubt, 
 ' hesitate and ask for light, when perfect obscurity reigns. They 
 ' are in ignorance at this moment of the probable result of such 
 ' conduct, and they do not know whether the dark and rugged 
 ' path which they now follow, will lead them to an abyss or to 
 
4 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 ' success. Are these violent shocks merely the precursors of 
 ' greater commotions, or will the atmosphere be thereby purified 
 ' and cleared up ? This is in reality the question now predomi- 
 'nant in every man's mind. * * * * * * 
 
 ' Political alliances may be severed without any danger, but 
 ' constitutions are not destroyed as easily and with such impunity, 
 ' and God knows what may be reserved for us in the future, 
 ' in the shape of happiness or ruin.' 
 
 Before going any further, not with a view of recrimination, but 
 simply to write historically, and trace out the course which we 
 propose to follow, let us pass rapidly in review the events which 
 brought on the Quebec Conference. We shall merely recapitulate 
 what we have written during the past few months. 
 
 In 1858, when the Macdonald-Cartier Administration resigned 
 on the Seat of Government question, Mr. Brown was called upon 
 by His Excellency to construct a Cabinet, which lasted as it is well 
 known only two days, but which lasted long enough to sow the 
 seeds of misfortune in the political soil in existence at that period. 
 Hon. A. A. Dorion actually admitted to Hon. Geo. Brown the 
 correctness of the principle of Eepresentation by Population ! At 
 the present stage we shall certainly not attribute any personal 
 motive to Mr. Dorion in this unfortunate concession, and we shall 
 be satisfied with a quotation from his own words duly published. 
 In the Legislative Assembly, on the 6th day of July, 1858, he 
 spoke as follows : — > 
 
 ' The hon. member for Brockville, the Postmaster General 
 ' and the Speaker, and other members representing Eastern eon- 
 ' stituencies in the present Parliament, had heretofore voted in 
 ' favor of Eepresentation by Population,— it would be seen how 
 'they voted when on the subject on the present occasion. It would 
 ' soon be impossible to resist the claim of Upper Canada in this 
 'respect, and if it were not conceded at once, it would be carried 
 ' without any safeguards being given to protect the French 
 ' Canadians. A dissolution of the Union, a Federal Union 
 ' and Representation by Population are before us, and we should see 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 5 
 
 ' if it could not be granted, surrounded by proper safeguards for the 
 'protection of the religion, language, and laws of Lower Canada.' 
 He spoke again on the 3rd May, 1860, to the following effect :— 
 ' I warn the members representing Lower Canada, that when 
 ' the time comes, the whole of the Upper Canada members will 
 ' unite, and with the assistance of the Eastern Township members, 
 ' will obtain Kepresentation by Population. I look upon the Federal 
 ' Union of Upper and Lower Canada as the nucleus of a grand 
 ' Confederation of the British North American Provinces which I 
 ' strongly desire to see. In conclusion, I must state that I shall 
 ' vote for the resolution, as it is the only way by which the diffi- 
 ' culties existing between the two sections of the Province can be 
 ' settled. I believe that time will accomplish a union of all the 
 ' Provinces.' 
 
 The defeat of the Brown-Dorion Cabinet was the means of 
 "bringing into power Hon. A. T. Gait, who, in 1857, had made a 
 speech in favor of the Confederation of the Provinces. In order 
 to obtain the services of this eminent financier, it was found neces- 
 sary to make concessions which would have the effect of saving 
 his antecedents and his personal dignity. To this circumstance 
 must be attributed the Dispatch of 1858, which served as the basis 
 of the formation of Mr. Brown's Constitutional Committee, and, 
 as it were, of the generation of the Tachd-Macdonald Cabinet. 
 To this dispatch the Imperial Government made no reply ; but the 
 germ of Confederation was cast upon the soil by the same hand, 
 side by side with that of Kepresentation based upon population. 
 Both germs were developed in that same soil with different chances 
 of success, until the former, favored by causes which cannot be 
 detailed in this article, at length stifled or choked the latter with 
 its more vigorous stems. Thus, Mr. Dorion became the father 
 of Confederation, as he had already been the parent of Ke- 
 presentation by Population. History has already recorded this 
 fact, and will again record it. If we measure the ground gone 
 over since 1851, it will be found that the Lower Canadian majority 
 has nobly performed its duty. We can find no precedent for a 
 
 more bitter contest between the partisans and adversaries of a cause. 
 b2 
 
6 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 In order to bring us to our senses, threats and terrorism were freely 
 used. Civil war, foreign invasion, and England's interference 
 were thrown down to us with the gauntlet. We were divided 
 among ourselves, tearing each other to pieces as enemies, and the 
 relics of strength remaining with us were not homogeneous, 
 whether taken on the ground of origin, language, manners, religion, 
 sentiment, or interest. And, with all these disadvantages, all these 
 formidable obstacles arrayed against us, we have, up to the present 
 date held our own against every storm — we have, in fact, lulled the 
 impending tempest. How heavy then must be the responsibility 
 which rests on the heads of those who, with some motive (which 
 we do not desire to impugn in the examination of such a serious 
 and uncertain question), have divided, to a certain extent, our na- 
 tional phalanx and have brought us to our present position ? How 
 can we appreciate the danger in store for us? It is by concluding 
 that it is not caused by the opposition or antagonism of Upper 
 Canada, but solely by our own internal dissensions, and by that 
 unfortunate party spirit, which causes us to forget the gravest and 
 holiest matters, in our regard for persons. 
 
 %\t Coalition anb \\t Contact 
 
 CHAPTEE II. 
 
 TTJE have now reached the decisive period. — The Tach6-Mac- 
 ' » donald cabinet, which had scarcely been in existence for six 
 weeks, was defeated on the 14th day of June, under circumstances 
 well known to the country, and the following day the cabinet re- 
 spectfully asked the Governor General to dissolve Parliament and 
 to appeal to the constituencies. 
 
 Hon. J. A. Macdonald (leader of the Upper Canada section of 
 the Government) explained in the following words the position in 
 which the Cabinet was placed by the vote of the 14th, and the 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 7 
 
 result of the advice given to Lord Monck by the Ministers of the 
 Crown : — 
 
 ' And, considering the state of parties in this House, the equality 
 ' in numbers of those who support and those who are opposed to 
 ' the Government, and the great improbability of our being able 
 ' to form, out of the present House, a Government that would com- 
 ' mand a majority, they thought it their duty to advise that there 
 ' should be an appeal to the people ; and that, after the necessary 
 ' business was gone through, there should be a dissolution. His 
 ' Excellency gave his assent, this morning, to this, stating that he 
 ' has accepted the advice, and has authorized us to dissolve — has 
 ' given us the carte blanche in that respect. The Government have 
 ' had, from the time of that vote till this moment before them, the 
 ' consideration of the very grave questions that divide parties in this 
 ' country, and the expediency, if possible, of avoiding the extreme 
 ' measure of proceeding to a dissolution. (Hear, hear.) And with 
 ' that view, for the purpose of seeing whether there is any means 
 ' of solving the difficulties which have arisen in the country, espe- 
 ' cially those between Upper and Lower Canada, we considered it 
 ' our duty to confer with leading members of the Opposition, to- 
 ' day, to see if we could not agree on some plan by which a Gov- 
 < eminent could be formed, possessing a majority from both sections 
 ' of the Province. We were not in a position to do so before 
 ' to-day. We have had that conference with hon. gentlemen on 
 ' the Opposition side, and have made such progress that I see the 
 1 way to a solution of the difficulties without the necessity of a dis- 
 ' solution of Parliament. (Hear, hear, and cheers.) This, of 
 ' course, is a very grave step. The considerations are very grave 
 ' in themselves, and require careful deliberation ; and the House 
 ' will, therefore, not be surprised that I should ask them to adjourn 
 ' till Monday, in order that there may be a full conference between 
 ' leading parties on both sides. I may say that the hon. gentleman 
 ' with whom I conferred is the hon. member for South Oxford.' 
 
 Since the defeat of the Cartier-Macdonald administration, which 
 occurred in the spring of 1862, we have witnessed the defeat of 
 three successive administrations without promising to their sue- 
 
8 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 cessors a happier lot. These were the Sanfield Macdonald-Siootte, 
 the Sanfield Macdonald-Dorion, and the John A. Macdonald-Tache" 
 administrations. After a general election, the strength of both 
 parties appeared to be equal. The majority (consisting of one or 
 two votes), which seemed to alternate between the right and left 
 sides of the House, decidedly paralysed the efforts of the Govern- 
 ment, and rendered legislation impracticable. 
 
 The system was, to raise public men for a day to the level of 
 Ministers, and the next day to hurl them from power, on the prin- 
 ciple adopted by the Romans when the empire was in the decline. 
 The natural result was, the advent of a fatal period, at which the 
 whole governmental system was brought to a stand-still. 
 
 The attempt made by Sir Etienne Paschal Tach6 to obtain 
 assistance among the Members forming the Upper Canadian ma- 
 jority, had failed; and no alternative was left but a second disso- 
 lution within ten months of the first. This, it was contended; 
 might accomplish the destruction of that deplorable equilibrium 
 which existed in the relative strength of both parties. 
 
 If that extreme measure had been resorted to, could it have 
 succeeded ? We are in doubt on this point. It might certainly 
 have been anticipated that the numerical strength of the Liberal- 
 Conservative party in Lower Canada WDuld have been increased, 
 but it is by no means certain that a proportionate diminution 
 might not have been the result in the upper section of the Prov- 
 ince, and it is quite probable that subsequent to such an election, 
 we might have witnessed the sad spectacle of one section of the 
 Province arrayed in deadly strife against the other ! 
 
 In any case it so happened that the chiefs of both parties were 
 fearful of the result, and after several adjournments and lengthy 
 consultations, they arrived at the conclusion which is well known 
 to us all. 
 
 On the 18th June, 1864, we offered the following opinion : — 
 ' This coalition, (and at that time it was nothing more than a 
 4 coalition) is preferable to an election, provided that the moral 
 
 * oharacter of our public men does not suffer, and that the confi- 
 
 * dence of the people in our statesmen be not thereby shaken. 
 ■* In fact, if the political crisis between the two sections of the 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. if 
 
 ' Province had reached that grave position, in which a duty may 
 ' be imposed upon the representatives of the people to appease 
 ' the storm, and in so doing to procure the silence of personal and 
 ' antipathetic opinions, it would be much better that the doctrine 
 ' should prevail ; Salus populi suprema lex. This, at least, is the 
 ' opinion of Hon. George Brown, the constant enemy of Lower 
 : Canada, to whose principles we have offered every opposition, on 
 ' the ground, it is well known, that he exhibited hatred, antipathy 
 ' and prejudices against us, while above all, he labored to subject 
 
 ' Lower Canada to Upper Canada influence. 
 
 ******* 
 
 ' Whatever may have been the motives and the causes of this 
 ' singular reconciliation, and although we could scarcely have en- 
 tered into such an "arrangement oursslves without fear, we frank- 
 ' ly and cordially state our intention to await the moment when 
 ' our friends shall have been tried, before condemning them, aad 
 ' our sympathies are with them, because we appreciate their pat- 
 ' riotism and we know that their task is a difficult one. At any 
 ' rate, let us await the development of negociations in order to 
 ' judge them with more certainty.' 
 And we concluded our article in the following words ; — 
 ' We write freely on the present occasion, because, nothing in 
 ' this strange chaos of events and personal positions, can affect us 
 ' individually. 
 
 ' Should the result be favorable, we will certainly congratulate 
 ' our friends seriously and cordially ; should the reverse be the 
 ' result, we will give them our feeble assistance to ward off any 
 ' danger that may ensue.' 
 
 Since that date we have conscientiously kept our word, in spite 
 of provocation. We have abstained from condemning, as well as 
 from approving, without being well informed.' We cannot wait 
 any longer. In the matter of Confederation our antecedents and 
 our convictions, as enunciated in 1858, are still in existence. Let 
 it not be supposed that we are desirous of consigning to oblivion 
 opinions which were conscientiously offered and carefully pre- 
 pared ! On the contrary, we desire to have them remembered, in 
 
10 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 order that by a comparison of reasoning and circumstances, it may 
 be found why we have modified those opinions, if we have modi- 
 fied them, and why we still maintain their correctness should we 
 think proper to do so. We hold to our own dignity as journalists, 
 against which no accusation of personal interest can be brought ; 
 but, as error is possible and really of frequent occurrence in every 
 case, such a feeliDg of personal dignity would be absurd if placed j 
 as an obstacle to a discovery of the truth. 
 
 The greatest minds have often paid the penalty of weakness, and 
 as infallibility is far from being an essential element of the human 
 intellect, it would certainly be a lack of dignity and probity should j 
 we persist in error, fearing that by so doing we should be guilty of 
 contradiction and avow our fallibility. If we write thus, it is not 
 because we desire in any manner to abandon profound and sincere 
 convictions without due examination; on the contrary, we continue ; 
 to hold these convictions until proof of error be adduced. How- 
 ever, when we are asked to reconsider a question of such gravity? 
 as that of Confederation, would we be justified in answering with 
 the Indian, ' I have said it.' 
 
 Six years ago we wrote on hypotheses, but at the present mo- 
 ment we are compelled to give our opinion on a reality, and that,! 
 under circumstances by far more serious. At that time we couldi 
 have been silent, now, duty compels us to speak. 
 
 In 1858, as wc then stated, ' We had no tangible fact before 
 ' us, no matured project which could serve as a basis for discus- 
 ' sion, and we were inevitably compelled to form our opinions from 
 ' hypotheses.' In a consideration of these hypotheses, we reached 
 the number of twenty-seven, including the Union as a unit, also a 
 Federal Union. 
 
 We imagined that ' the whole question was considered in those 
 ' twenty-seven hypotheses, and that the solution of the problem 
 'could be found in them.' But, after the labors of Mr. Brown's 
 Constitutional Committee, after study, experience, thought, and 
 finally, after a perusal of the Kesolutions of the Quebec Conference, 
 we came to the conclusion that our twenty-seven hypotheses of 
 1858 did not by any means contain the only practicable constitu- 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 11 
 
 tional forms of Government suitable for Confederation. Should 
 we, therefore, in the face of such an important error, fearing to be 
 guilty of contradiction in our opinions, stubbornly persist in the 
 error we had committed ? At the present moment, we possess for 
 our guidance, a project which is tangible and available, and should 
 we commit any errors, they can only occur in our style of apprecia- 
 tion, because the details of the project are designated by land 
 marks which cannot mislead us in our examination. Were we not, 
 therefore, justified in warning those who seemed inclined to con- 
 demn summarily ? ' Do not pronounce your opinion now. Reserve 
 'your judgment! ' Among the principles which we then enunci- 
 ated so positively, there are some that now fall to the ground be- 
 cause they do not agree with facts of the present day, and we 
 established rules which would have had the effect of rendering our 
 public men too unyielding and narrow-minded. Other principles 
 must give way before imperious circumstances, and they should 
 not be considered absolute but subject to those circumstances. 
 The doctrine of 'pSrisse la patrie plutdt qu'un principe,' enunci- 
 ated by Les Girondins when they ascended the scaffold, is simply 
 absurd, and in direct opposition to the fundamental principle of 
 public law, ' Salus populi swprema lex.' In the government of 
 nations the destructive principle is neither understood nor practised. 
 Moreover, there are other principles which do not hail from any 
 particular date, but which are inflexible and immutable in their 
 nature, because they are based upon facts, and their essential ele- 
 ment is that of truth. 
 
 We shall now explain. We stated, in 1858, " That the Maritime 
 ' Provinces had raised the cry of Confederation, because they had 
 ' nothing to lose, were utterly valueless as allies, and that they 
 ' desired to make up their budgets out of the revenue of Ganada.' 
 Now, the bases of the Coalition formed, in June last, distinctly 
 disprove our assertion of 1858, and it is a fact well known to 
 the public, that the cry of Confederation has been first raised by 
 Canada, and not by the Maritime Provinces. It has also been 
 proved that the financial resources of those Provinces are, in 
 proportion to the respective figures of population of all the Pro- 
 
12 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 vinces of the proposed Confederation, at least in as healthy a 
 condition as ours. 
 
 We stated also, in 1858 : ' By the adoption of the Federal 
 1 principle, the provinces, both small and large, will have equal 
 
 * weight or power in the General Federal Legislature, in fact the 
 
 * population of the small Island of Prince Edward will be equivalent 
 
 * in power to the one million two hundred and fifty thousand 
 
 * inhabitants of Lower Canada.' 
 
 In the project of Confederation which we are now examining, 
 three of these provinces are grouped as it were into one, and these 
 three together, in the Upper Chamber will only have (as thus 
 united J the same number of members as Lower Canada. The 
 small Island of Prince Edward will have only four members out of 
 the twenty-four representing the group. We also stated, in 1858, 
 
 * That direct taxation by the local legislatures would become 
 ' actually necessary, should Federation be accomplished under 
 
 * Colonial rule.' Now, the project is clearly against this peremp- 
 tory condition, inasmuch as it not only permits the local legisla- 
 tures to raise the revenue required for local purposes, without 
 having recourse to direct taxation ; but it also grants a bonus to 
 these legislatures which will enable them to liquidate their unim- 
 portant debts within a stated time, and to accomplish those public 
 improvements which, although subj ect to being termed local, are 
 nevertheless the source and essential principle of our national 
 prosperity. Thus, if in spite of our antipathy in regard of any 
 system of Confederation, the plan now proposed has been imposed 
 upon us by the force of circumstances ; if for instance, we were 
 offered the choice of annexation to the United States, and a Con- 
 federation of the Provinces; or even between the latter and 
 Representation by Population in a union purely Federal with 
 Upper Canada ; if in fact this Confederation were proved to be 
 necessary for our common protection, and had we the power to do 
 so, we could not remain in an isolated position. Why, therefore, 
 should we be held to stand inflexibly or uncompromisingly to an • 
 opinion formed years ago upon hypotheses and published under 
 circumstances entirely different. 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. IS 
 
 With regard to the third category, that of absolute principles, 
 we need not enter into proof, it explains itself. We shall find a 
 large number of such principles in the course of the work we have 
 undertaken. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 IN our opinion, the question at issue may be divided into the 
 following propositions : — 
 
 Is*. By accepting, in an alliance with Hon. George Brown, a 
 Confederation — whether, of all the British North American 
 Provinces, or of both sections of the Province of Canada : were 
 the ministers of this Province actuated by a sense of duty, or by a 
 sole desire to remain in power ? 
 
 2nd. Could the existing Union between Upper and Lower 
 Canada have been maintained under the present system ? 
 
 3rd. If not, had we reached the propitious moment at which 
 our Constitution should be amended in order to establish it on a 
 new basis ? 
 
 4:th. Admitting that it were possible to maintain the existing 
 union intact, should we persist in so maintaining it, or should we 
 seek a greater destiny in a different order of things ? 
 
 5th. If the moment had arrived at which it became proper to 
 amend our Constitution, have our statesmen who have undertaken 
 this important work solved the difficulties presented by the question 
 in the best possible manner under the circumstances ? 
 
 When the Government annonnced that they had communicated 
 with Mr. Brown, and when later, they informed the House that an 
 alliance had been formed with him on the basis of Confederation, 
 we certainly feared and hesitated, and we reserved our judgment. 
 
14 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 After having described all the difficult circumstances in which 
 the Cabinet was placed, and all the motives which could justify 
 them in a reconciliation with an old enemy under the conditions 
 proposed, we added, < Certainly, in the position occupied by our 
 ' political friends, we should have feared such a test/ But, it was 
 not from want of confidence in those political friends, it was doubt 
 of the result of the test to which they were subjecting themselves ; 
 because, we stated in our article of 2nd July, in writing which 
 we laboured under the same painfu 1 impression : — 
 
 'The Cabinet, after several interviews with Mr. Brown, has agreed 
 < to submit to Parliament a Constitutional project which will be 
 ' based on State reasons, as regards the composition of the Federal 
 ' Parliament. " L'Etat en Tiaut, le ' nombre en Bas." — " The State 
 4 at the head, the people under it." 
 
 ' This complex system, which the Government do not yet com- 
 ' prehend better than we do as regards general land marks and 
 1 essential details, the relative positions of the several Legislatures, 
 ' and, in a word, everything that may effect in any manner our 
 'social Qr political position; this project, (which may fairly be 
 ' so called), will be carefully, prudently, and patriotically prepared 
 ' for the interests of all, and will then be submitted to the 
 ' most rigorous test of discussion both in Parliament and in the 
 ' press.' 
 
 Our language would have been very different, had we not been 
 confident that our public men were patriotic and disinterested, 
 because, in addition to our fears, our antecedents on this question 
 were entirely opposed to this new idea which had suddenly been 
 created by a political crisis. Nevertheless, as we have already 
 stated frequently, this faith in our public men conld only with us 
 be delayed until they had undergone a fair test, because, as regards 
 this test, we had reserved the privilege of forming our opinion 
 upon the merits with perfect independance without looking to 
 right or left, above or below us. 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 15 
 
 f% Canadian Inion. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 ' Could the existing Union between Upper and Lower Canada have been 
 maintained under tba present system ?' 
 
 WEEB we to accept Hon. A. A.Dorion's opinion, we could easily 
 answer in the negative. But, as we have always energeti- 
 cally protested against any change, and that, as it were from 
 superstitious fear, as we had always driven the idea from our mind : 
 when we are now called upon to look that proposed change fairly 
 in the face, we are compelled to glance calmly and carefully around 
 us to seek the solution which we require. We opposed constitu- 
 tional changes when offered to us by Lower Canadians, under the 
 guise of Eepresentation by Population, in 1848 ; we resisted them 
 through annexation, when offered to us by Republicans and bank- 
 rupt merchants, in 1849 ; we opposed them when offered to us by 
 the Radicals of Upper Canada in 1851 and 1854; we refused them 
 in 1857, at the hands of Hon. Mr. Gait, our present Finance Min- 
 ister; we rejected them with indignation, in 1858, when Messrs. 
 Brown and Dorion wished to impose Representation by Population 
 on Lower Canada; and we refused them with the same disdain 
 when offered to us by the same men in 1859, '60, '61, '62 and '63. 
 We then said to the Upper Canadians, in the powerful words of 
 Shakespeare, ' To be or not to be V Eor us it is a question ef 
 life or death ! Tou say, ' You shall not be ;' we reply, ' We shall 
 be !' We desire to be inoffensive, just, tolerant and generous, but 
 our existence must be maintained ! Do not ask us for Representa- 
 tion by Population, because it is our death-knell, and we wish to 
 live ; or, in other words, we are not prepared for political extinction ! 
 When we spoke thus, we were united in a solid phalanx, with 
 well closed ranks. Back to back with the members of English 
 origin representing counties in Lower Canada, we had to protect 
 us, on all sides, powerful auxiliaries in Upper Canada. As for 
 ^Jower Canada, it was a struggle for life or death, and in Upper 
 
16 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Canada a struggle in which party feeling was the motor. While 
 the Lower Canadian phalanx remained intact, that of our Upper 
 Canada friends gradually diminished in number, while working for 
 our interests, under the accusation that they were working for 
 interests which were opposed to those of Upper Canada. During 
 this period, the population of Upper Canada, favored by the natural 
 emigration from Europe and the United States, increased in a 
 proportion calculated to render the demand for a proportionate 
 representation reasonable. This cry, which was at last one of 
 antipathy, and even of hostility against us, became so popular that 
 the greater number of our faithful Upper Canadian friends were 
 compelled, from the force of public opinion, to abandon us, and 
 Upper Canada was apparently constituted into a camp hostile to 
 our interests. On the other hand, the Lower Canadian representa- 
 tives of English origin, who could not be supposed to have a sym- 
 pathetic regard for our institutions, our language and our nation- 
 ality, entertained different opinions on the subject of Representation 
 by Population, and, fatigued with these incessant and systematic 
 contests between the two sections of the Province, threatened to 
 abandon their position. During late crises, they neither concealed 
 their opinions in private circles nor in publie speeches. These 
 same men held the balance of power between Upper Canada and 
 the French Canadian element, and, at a moment's notice, could 
 change the equilibrium between the representation of Upper and 
 that of Lower Canada, if not by a Legislative Act, at any rate by 
 an appeal to the Imperial Government. This could be felt and 
 seen every day, in the impotency of the Administration and the 
 paralyzed condition of legislation. The equilibrium existing be- 
 tween the antipathies on both sides of the Legislature was so 
 closely balanced, that a' change in the vote of one member might 
 frequently defeat the Ministry of the day, and stop the working of 
 the parliamentary system, to the great injury of the public interests. 
 This deplorable state of affairs brought into play ambition, as 
 well as animosities, both from small and great, and throughout our 
 Legislature unjust claims or exactions of a very absurd nature. — 
 As these exactions were numerous, and could not all be satisfied, 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 17 
 
 they reacted on a weak Government, and frequently crushed it 
 under their weight. 
 
 Thus we find that two ministerial crises occurred in 1854, one 
 in 1856, one in 1857, two in 1858, one in 1862, one in 1863, and 
 two in 1864. 
 
 Labouring under the strong impression created by such a state 
 of affairs, and under the immediate effect produced upon us by the 
 last ministerial crisis, and the explanations given in the House, 
 which enabled us to foresee the Coalition and its consequences, we 
 wrote, on the 18th of June, under very strong feeling, the follow- 
 ing words : — ' There are so many grave and severe lessons given in 
 ' these few explanations to individuals, without heart and without 
 ' patriotism ; there are so many exaggerated hopes suddenly and 
 ' forever dashed to the ground ; so many disappointed calculations, 
 ' so many intrigues and manoeuvres proved to be unprofitable, so 
 • many sudden and unexpected reverses of fortune and strange 
 ' transformations, that Members of Parliament and the public were 
 ' equally astounded. 
 
 ' And still it was evident that this was in reality the' desirable 
 ' and necessary solution, because it was received with enthusiasm 
 « by a large majority of the House, who received the announce- 
 ' ment with stirring applause, and by crowded galleries, the oceu- 
 ' pants of which gave their assent in as noisy a manner as the rules 
 ' of the House would permit.' 
 
 Could we then persist in perpetuating a state of affairs which 
 has lasted for ten years, with an annual increase of difficulties, 
 and which could only end in an unfortunate collision, in which 
 with inadequate forces, we could scarcely hope for victory. 
 
 With such facts before us, with such a prospect, and an abso- 
 lute and imperious necessity commanding us, would we have been 
 justified in saying as we had hitherto said — ' Never.' And, if we 
 have felt the necessity as we have felt it to be our duty always to 
 refuse our sanction to the constitutional changes that were offered 
 to us by Messrs. Brown and Dorion, could we conscientiously re- 
 fuse to seek some other constitutional means of assuring the safety 
 
18 THE NEW CONSTITUTION, 
 
 of our institutions, our language and our laws, 3£fc W; evidently 
 could not maintain the existing constitutional plaR. 
 
 We therefore conclude by asserting that it, had become im- 
 possible to maintain the present union under the present system.. 
 
 Changes in our Constitution. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 '' Had the most favorable moment been reached to remodel the con? titution, 
 and to place it on other bases ?' 
 
 IF it be true, as we think we have proved in our last article, that 
 a period was approaching at which all government and all 
 legislation would have become impossible, we could fairly say that 
 if it were not the most favorable moment, at least, action at that 
 moment had become necessary. But there are other reasons which 
 induced us to decide that the favorable moment had been reached, 
 and that by any delay in the solution of a problem of such import- 
 ance, we would have run a serious risk, and accepted the conse- 
 quences of grave responsibility. The public men of both parties 
 had become exhausted in the struggle, and were discouraged at 
 the sad prospect of continued difficulties. During leisure, they 
 sought ardently for some solution of the problem. They were 
 averse to admitting that they were altogether exhausted and con- 
 quered, or that they had steered an erroneous course : but they 
 offered to meet each other half way in order to save their pergonal 
 dignity, and to escape the humiliating avowal of incapacity to deal 
 with the crisis. 
 
 They were therefore prepared for compromises, 'and ready to 
 enter fully into the path of those concessions which, at other times 
 they would have rejected with disdain, and even with indignation. 
 
 In order to convince ourselves of this fact, let us refer to the 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 19 
 
 circumstances under which the Tach6-Brown-Macdonald Govern- 
 ment was formed. After the vote of the fourteenth of June, the 
 Ministerial crisis was prolonged without any apparent i»sue. The 
 Cabinet had, on the morning of the 15th, asked for power to 
 dissolve Parliament ; but the tardy reply of the Governor General 
 caused great anxiety, and was the means of creating numerous 
 conjectures. 
 
 The hopes of the chiefs, or of those who had the ambition to 
 reach that position, rose and fell from hour to hour, as the quota- 
 tions on the stock-market. Aspirations, rising from every point, 
 seemed to be curbed and loosed, they fretted like race horses 
 impatient for the start, and every thing appeared to tend inevitably 
 towards a dissolution, uncertain for all, and desired by none. 
 
 A costly general election, which had not been decisive in its 
 character had but lately taken place, and a second trial more diffi- 
 cult and more costly perhaps than that which had preceded it, was 
 scarcely more decisive than the first. 
 
 It was under these circumstances that Mr. Brown, frankly 
 addressing two friends of the Cabinet, stated that he was prepared 
 to assist the latter in the crisis, provided that certain constitutional 
 changes should be promised. 
 
 ' I shall,' said he ' decline insisting upon Representation by 
 ' Population, and shall be content with the promise, that a sincere 
 ' attempt will be made to accomplish a Confederation of the Pro- 
 ' vinces of British North America.' 
 
 Ministers who could neither foresee the actual result of the 
 advice tendered to the Governor General two days previous, nor 
 that of the general election which would necessarily follow, and 
 who could not see in the future any solution of existing difficulties, 
 freely accepted these offers of conciliation and agreement, and 
 immediately entered upon their task. 
 
 We have already quoted the words of the Hon. John A. Mac- 
 donald, in which he explained the nature of the political situation, 
 and the motives which prompted the latest ministerial aotion. 
 We shall now quote from Mr. Brown, when he spoke, on the occa- 
 sion of his accepting the alliance which he had himself sought. 
 
•20 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 On the seventeenth of June last, he addressed the House as 
 follows : — 
 
 ' I am sure the House will acquit me of all intention of aiding 
 
 1 hon. gentlemen opposite, in usiDg a threat of dissolution to 
 
 ■* coerce members of this House. (Hear, hear.) I am sure, every 
 
 ' member of this House will comprehend, that hon. gentlemen 
 
 1 opposite, to whom I have been opposed for so many years so 
 
 ' strongly, could not have approached me in any way, to ask me 
 
 ' to join with them in the construction of an Administration, 
 
 ~ l unless under the force of very extreme circumstances. And hon. 
 
 ' gentlemen will also feel, that I could not, by any possibility, 
 
 -' have met these gentlemen on the Treasury benches, except under 
 
 ' such circumstances; that nothing else, except the position in 
 
 ■* which this House stands, and the consideration of the repeated 
 
 ' endeavors made for years, to form a strong government, as also 
 
 ' the consideration of the strong political feeling existing between 
 
 ' Upper and Lower-Canada; and, that in ease of a dissolution, we 
 
 ' are not likely to bring about a satisfactory change of that condi- 
 
 -* tion of affairs — could have induced me to enter into communication 
 
 ' with those hon. gentlemen. (Hear, hear.) I am bound to say, 
 
 ' that the hon. gentlemen opposite, are approaching this question, 
 
 ■' as far as I can understand, with a candor and frankness worthy | 
 
 ' of any set of men. (Hear, hear, and loud cheers.) Their 
 
 ' approach has been made to me in a way that members on both 
 
 ' sides of the House ought to be glad to find was the case. I do 
 
 ' hope then that, instead ■■ of any unpleasant feeling arising with 
 
 •' regard to it, or with respect to past political affairs, we shall feel 
 
 4 that this is a matter that ought to be approached with the great- 
 
 ' est possible gravity ; that, we have to consider the interests of 
 
 ■* both sections of the Province, and to endeavor to find that settle- 
 
 ' ment of existing difficulties, which will be satisfactory to both, 
 
 < and that we shall reach a termination of those constant scenes of 
 
 -' discord that have only been too frequent in past years.' 
 
 When there seemed to be a universal desire in the public mind 
 to settle our difficulties, who would dare to maintain, that the 
 favorable moment for remodelling our Constitution had not been 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 21 
 
 reached ? It was stated at the time, that many members of the 
 Opposition were seeking eagerly for power, and that Mr. Brown, 
 finding himself abandoned by those whose political position he had 
 created, desired by this extraordinary and unexpected proceeding 
 to recover his lost position, and to punish his ungrateful followers. 
 Let us suppose that this is true, and that the ambition of one man- 
 was the cause of bringing on the constitutional crisis, — is it less- 
 true — is it not on the contrary more evident, that the moment to 
 settle this question had been reached, inasmuch as this ambition, 
 in order to frustuate that of others, felt the necessity of arrange- 
 ments, and the want of conciliations, 
 
 After having admitted the possibility of a perpetual statu quo r 
 and the necessity of remodelling some day our constitutional com- 
 pact, would it have been wise to retreat at this solemn moment* 
 and thereby still further irritate passions by an obstinate resistance, 
 and to place the future of this country in the category of eventual- 
 ities ? 
 
 Mr. Dorion stated in a speech, from which we have already 
 quoted in this series, that, ' Upper Canada would eventually obtain. 
 ' Eepresentation by Population, with the assistance of the members* 
 ' representing the Eastern Townships,' and we have already seem 
 thai the latter, exhausted and worried, commenced to murmur/ 
 threatened to give way, and asked in any possible solution, 
 that an end might be put to this prolonged struggle, which hacl 
 become so unprofitable to the country. If we were already too> 
 weak to resist, if our only chance of remaining masters of the posi- 
 tion was by alliances which threatened to be lost to us from day 
 to day; aad, if by the secession of some, and the progressive 
 increase in the numbers of others, we were naturally to become- 
 more and more isolated; did not reason, j wisdom and patriotisms 
 command us to act energetically and spontaneously, and were we- 
 'not bound to save such great interests from the chances of the. 
 future ? 
 
22 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 %\t Canabratt Inion anb % $nhxt 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 ' Admitting that it were possible to maintain the present Union intact, 
 should we persist in so maintaining it, or seek greater destinies in a 
 different order of things ?' 
 
 ALL the nations of the world naturally aspire' to great destinies, 
 and to an important position in the human family, because, in 
 addition to the legitimate feeling of pride which actuates them in 
 seeking to reach the highest rank, they know that there is more 
 chance of their being respected favored and prosperous, in pro- 
 portion to the power which they can show. 
 
 All agree on this point. All seem to understand, as it were by 
 intuition, that the Colonial condition is nothing more than a state 
 of transition — a mere step from the infancy to the virility of a 
 people. In order to be convinced of the actuality of this social law at 
 every period of the world's existence, it is but necessary to refer to 
 the history of the ancient colonies of Phenicia, Greece and Asia, and 
 the colonies established in modern times by Europe, on the continent 
 of America, particularly those of the United States, Mexico, Brazil, 
 %nd all the Spanish and Portuguese Republics of Central aad 
 Southern America. This social law, against which England fought > ; 
 during seven years, with all the power of her fleets and armies, 
 seems still to be universally recognized. 
 
 At the present moment, this law has become an axiom of political 
 economy, as well as the profession of faith of all the statesmen of 
 Great Britain, who continually warn us to prepare ourselves, by a 
 strong political and military organization, for the emancipation 
 which is at hand. 
 
 We are certainly happy colonists — free as the fish that swim in 
 the ocean or the birds that fly through space, and this because we , 
 are under the protection of the British flag ; and still we ask, Eng- 
 lishmen, Scotchmen, Irishmen, Canadians, all — are you not desir- 
 ous, if you can, of becoming a great nationality? The only 
 obstacle to the success of these aspirations can be found in our 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 23 
 
 local difficulties, in tie fear of losing, by any change of system, 
 those privileges which are very dear to us, and which we would 
 not sacrifice even to greatness, power, glory, or the title of nation- 
 ality. 
 
 Is there one individual among us who would consent to remain 
 as he is, if he were certain that none of these privileges could be 
 lost in the new order of things ; and if the colonies of British 
 North America were on an equal footing with regard to institu- 
 tions, laws, manors, language and religion, would we nut all ex- 
 claim with one voice, at the period of maturity of our colonial 
 existence, 'Let us be a Nation ?' 
 
 The title of colonist implies nothing criminal or dishonorable 
 in itself, but nevertheless we feel that it humiliates us, because it 
 means infancy, subjection, guardianship. The citizen of the 
 Mother Country speaks of us as 'our colonists,' < our colonies,' ' our 
 ' dependencies,' in the same manner that he speaks of ' our fleets ' 
 ' our arsenals,' ' our implements of war' ; while as eitizens of an inde- 
 pendent nation we would be ourselves, in fact our own masters. 
 The colonist has no history of his own, and were he as great a 
 genius as Shakespeare, Bossuet, Liebnitz, or Pascal — were he as 
 great a statesman as Kichelieu, Pitt, Fox, Colbert,* Carnot, or 
 Guizot, he would scarcely be mentioned in the world of intellect. 
 We do not here express our individual opinion — we allude to 
 something greater and more noble, a national aspiration — some- 
 thing which reigns in every mind, and has its place in every heart. 
 Now, if we leave this class of ideas, let us not forget that if 
 we do possess our autonomy of manners, religion, laws and lan- 
 guage, we do not possess in the same degree in the true sense of 
 the word, our political autonomy. In the present condition of 
 our existence we scarcely count more than one-third of the whole 
 population ; and in Lower Canada, one-quarter of the population is 
 composed of a different nationality, distinct from ours in language, 
 predilictions and prejudices. 
 
 When, therefore, we say that we wish to remain as we are, we 
 merely wish to speak as Lower Canadians, and if we so speak, 
 the voices of a quarter of a million in Lower Canada reply : 
 
•24 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 ' Recollect that we also are inhabitants of Lower Canada, and 
 'that we also aspire to other and greater destinies. In this we 
 < join with Upper Canada and men of our own origin who are to 
 ' be found in every part of the proposed Confederation. With 
 ' them we offer protection to your religion, to your institutions, as 
 ' well at to your civil laws, which we have ourselves adopted, be- 
 
 * cause, in spite of the prejudices which we may have brought 
 • s with us from the Mother Country, we find in those laws full 
 
 * protection to our property ; and if everything that you held 
 ' dear be preserved from danger in this step towards a future, why 
 
 * should you place obstacles in our way, and yi your oWfc way, 
 1 when everything seems to induce us to march forward hand in 
 ' hand to take our place and rant in the family of nations ? ' 
 
 There is another motive which should impel us. Every man 
 who reflects seriously must perceive, that if we are to progress, 
 there are but two paths in our exceptional position that we can 
 possibly tread — Confederation or Annexation. If we have been 
 enabled to sleep in peace until the latest events of our time have 
 •come upon us, certainly the gigantic struggle between the Northern 
 and Southern States of America during the past three years and 
 & half must have brought us to reflection on the reality of our 
 position, and at the present moment we are compelled to feel that, 
 anless we hasten to sail our bark towards Confederation, the current 
 will inevitably draw us towards Annexation. Annexation is 
 -not now approved of by us more than in 1849, and again in 1858, 
 when we wrote : — 
 
 ' In the union of the provinces we might find combinations, 
 
 * some less fatal to our interests than others ; while in annexation 
 1 no choice would be left to us, as we should have to accept it and 
 ' its conditions without power of modifying them. Under the best 
 •* possible terms of union we would be at least one to three, while 
 
 * in annexation we would scarcely be one to thirty. Under. 
 ' colonial unicn we might perhaps obtain a share of the actual 
 ' revenue in the shape of general improvements ; in annexation 
 x to the United States our revenue, to the last cent, would be paid 
 •* into the Federal Treasury, out of whioh it would only be taken 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. §5 
 
 ' to pay the expenses of the army and navy. In colonial union, 
 * as French or as Catholics, although weakened, we still could, on 
 ' an emergency, present a bold front ; in annexation, we would 
 ' find ourselves surrounded at every point, and, like our brothers 
 ' of Louisiana, we would disappear. They soon, who like our- 
 ' selves speak a foreign language, will humbly call upon history 
 ' for their origin and the names of their ancestors now forgotten. 
 ( And they, like ourselves, are the descendants of a few heroes 
 ' who fought during a century and a half against the influence of 
 ' a powerful race in the unsettled parts of the new world. 
 
 ( If our national identity eould not be maintained in colonial 
 ' union, how could it be maintained in annexation ? The same 
 1 feelings, the same prejudices, the same institutions, the same 
 ' languages, the same religious and social ingredients, would be 
 ' found in the latter under relations more disproportionate and 
 1 much more dangerous for us. Therefore, if we are at some 
 ' period to take our place among nations, colonial union would, in 
 ' our opinion, be preferable. 
 
 ' It remained with France at the time of the conquest to decide 
 ' whether our population of French origin should or should not 
 ' now number eight millions on the banks of St. Lawrence ; and 
 ' to prove this, it is only necessary to take the census of 1850. 
 ' But France did not so decide it ; and when we shall feel our 
 ' colonial fabric falling to pieces around us, too weak to establish 
 1 an empire of our own, and fearing invasion and destruction, we 
 ' shall seek for new alliances. 
 
 ' It is true that no alliance could give a complete guarantee of 
 ' our autonomy, but we must not forget, that placed as we are in 
 ' America, in an exceptional position, governed by force and 
 ' circumscribed within the narrow limits of fatality, we must make 
 ' a choice among alliances more or less dangerous to us. 
 
 1 No alliance could secure us perfectly from danger, but that 
 ' least to be feared would be a union of the provinces, because, 
 ' while it would be strong enough for protection from outside 
 ' aggression, it would be weaker for purposes of oppression.' 
 
 These remarks, owing to events and the state of the times, seem 
 D 
 
26 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 almost to have acquired a prophetic character. Annexation at the 
 present moment, would involve the enrolment of our farmers and 
 mechanics to carry on a war to the knife, which would probably 
 bring them to destruction in the fetid marshes of the South. It 
 would involve taxation on landed property, trade and manufac- 
 tures ; it would impose a tax of five hundred millions of dollars, 
 out of which we would have to pay annually more than the twen- 
 tieth part ; it would capitalize a debt against us of three billions 
 of dollars, the interest of which, each year, we would have to pay, 
 with the prospect of a still heavier debt and additional taxation. 
 
 But, supposing that this frightful picture did not alarm us, in 
 what position would we French Canadians find ourselves in an 
 alliance with a nation of thirty millions of Republicans so different 
 from us, not only in language, but in feelings and manners, be- 
 cause we are conservatives and monarchists, both in our instincts 
 and in our aspirations. Far be the thought from us to doubt the 
 fidelity of the British population of Canada to the Crown of Great 
 Britain, but if, as ourselves, that section of our population aspires 
 to become a nation at some future day, we may fairly state, taking 
 our opinion from reasonable sources, that they might favor annex- 
 ion more than ourselves, because they speak the same language, 
 are of the same religious persuasion, and essentially possess the 
 same social institutions as the inhabitants of the American Union. 
 The only point for them to consider in making a selection would be, 
 the material question of profit or loss; more or less of trade, more 
 or less of taxes. The truth of this is clearly shown by the project 
 of Confederation itself, in which it will be seen that the exceptions 
 affect only Lower Canada, and in the speeches made by Mr.Tilley, 
 in New Brunswick, in which he states frankly and unequivocally, 
 that with that Province there can be but one paramount question 
 in the discussion of the scheme, namely, that of pecuniary 
 interest ; will New Brunswick, under the union, pay more or less, 
 receive more or less — will the taxes imposed, under the union, be 
 more or less than they now are ? The question has been thus 
 received by the press and public men of that Province, and they 
 have so discussed it, with a view to accept or reject it. 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 27 
 
 But for us — what a difference ! If we already feel ill at ease in 
 an alliance in which we only count for one-third, in what position 
 would we find ourselves in the midst of a people numbering thirty 
 millions ? Of course, we are speaking throughout from the point 
 of view of our national autonomy, and everything that constitutes 
 it. We again ask, what would he our position ? The annexation- 
 ists of 1849 have never answered us, although they could do so ; 
 hut the reply could easily be given. That compact was composed 
 in a great measure of bankrupt merchants and republicans. The 
 word autonomy had no signification. The former wanted annex- 
 ation because they desired to recover the commercial prosperity 
 they had lost, and the latter hoped to obtain democratic institu- 
 tions under a republican form. The former abandoned the idea 
 and almost the recollection of it in the prosperity of the years that 
 followed their declaration ; and the latter, without having aband- 
 oned their position of '49, and without paying any attention to 
 the conservative idea which preoccupies the thoughts of one mil- 
 lion of their fellow countrymen, nevertheless seek by political 
 tactics to alarm us with regard to the lot which awaits French 
 Canadians in a Confederation of the Provinces of British North 
 America. 
 
 With ourselves, they were aware of the position of Louisiana in 
 the American Union, a state which was founded by our ancestors ; 
 and they well knew that the first act of the masters of the position 
 was to abolish the French language in Parliament, in the Courts 
 of Justice, and in the composition of public documents ! This did 
 not occur such a long time ago. It is but a short time since this 
 state, which was a French colony, entered into the American 
 Union, and still the French language is rapidly disappearing, and 
 it is well known that families bearing French names can no longer 
 speak the language of their ancestors. Now, change, invasion, 
 and absorption were much more difficult there than they would 
 he here, because in that state the climate alarms and prevents 
 immigration, while in the North the current of population flows 
 towards us from all European sources. Under such a condition of 
 things, how long would we remain French ? How long would 
 
28 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 we preserve that autonomy which is so precious to us, and how 
 long could we continue to say as Frenchmen, ' Our institutions, 
 ' our language, and our laws/ inscribed on pages, some times 
 glorious, some times bloody and mournful, but always visible on 
 the frontispiece of our history ? 
 
 No ! we cannot always remain in the Colonial condition. We 
 desire some day to be a nation, and if this be our manifest destiny, 
 and the object of our aspirations, we much prefer a political condi- 
 tion,^ which we shall be a vital and indestructible element, to 
 being thrown as a drop of water into the ocean, to form part of a 
 large nation, in which we would lose in a few years, not only our 
 language and our laws, but even the recollection of our glorious 
 origin. 
 
 Stwsaifg for Union of all % Brookes. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 ' Why should we provide for a Federal or Legislative Union of the 
 Provinces of British North America ?' 
 
 AS we have already shewn that our local difficulties completely 
 hampered the working of our political machinery, and neces- 
 sitated constitutional changes ; that a superior power of circumstances 
 compelled us to select between annexation and the union of the 
 provinces ; that our interests, our tastes, our habits, the character 
 of our institutions, and a conservative instinct induced us to lean 
 towards the latter solution, and that soon, in order to follow that 
 universal law which, from the beginning of the world had directed 
 the destinies of these colonies, we must, whether willing or not, 
 prepare to assume our position in the family of nations. But we 
 have not yet shewn why it is that as a colony of a great empire, 
 we had so soon to abandon the protection of the Mother Country, 
 and direct our course towards an unknown future, and why the 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 29 
 
 • Union of the Provinces of British North America is the com- 
 bination most likely to conduct us towards the desired end; in a 
 word, how it happens that in this union, the geographical, maritime 
 and commercial elements of a great people and a great country 
 seem to be clearly proved to exist. This is the complex question 
 with which we have to deal in this article. 
 
 In 1858, we pronounced our opinion against every species of 
 union — Federal as well as Legislative — because at that time 
 powerful in the Parliament of the day, in which we had destroyed 
 all opposition, and caused to cease, for a certain time at least, the 
 demand of Upper Canada for [Representation by Population, we 
 supposed that we might perpetually remain in the political condi- 
 tion then existing ; because we hoped that by immigration, the 
 equilibrium might be re-established between the two sections of 
 the Province of Canada ; because we believed that the Maritime 
 Provinces, poor and without resources, would seek for this union 
 in order to re-habilitate the impoverished state of their exchequer ; 
 because we did not believe that the protection of the Imperial 
 Government would so soon or ever be withdrawn from us ; because 
 we had no reason to appreciate, before the breaking out of the 
 American war, the danger that we incurred by remaining isolated ; 
 because we never dreamt that at a future day Great Britain, seeing 
 the approach of our independence, and beginning to feel the 
 heavy weight imposed by our guardianship, should instruct us to 
 prepare for that solemn change ; because we could not perceive in 
 a union, the prospect of commercial advantages which we did not 
 already possess; and finally, because we feared the effect of that 
 union upon our religious and national interests, and the preserva- 
 tion of our peculiar institutions. However, as we have already 
 stated in our last article, if called upon to make a choice between 
 a union of the provinces and annexation, we then offered our 
 opinion most positively, as we do now, in favor of the former. 
 
 As it is wise to make provision for a surprise, to organize and 
 
 to constitute the elements of a nation, amply and solidly, in case 
 
 the day may come when the Mother Country might give us notice 
 
 to rely upon our own resources ; it would be too late to commence 
 
 D2 
 
30 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 the consideration of that important question in the midst of a crisis. 
 We are far from desiring the separation, and we wish to avoid 
 it as long as possible, because the yoke of the Mother Country has 
 for many years been excessively easy, and we require some time, 
 much reflection and labor, to prepare us for sueh a separation ; 
 but since it is providentially reserved for us, when it does come 
 may we not be proud to be able to number six to eight millions as 
 a people, and to show to the astonished world a commercial status 
 valued at two hundred and fifty to three hundred millions of 
 dollars as our title of admission to the family of nations. 
 
 We shall occupy the same position in the North as Mexico in 
 the South, and we shall be in a position to act as a counterpoise in 
 the balance in which will be weighed the destinies of British 
 North America, and thus we shall acquire the good will, and, in 
 case of necessity, the protection and even the material support of 
 the great European powers. 
 
 Let us not forget that the conquerors of the world have invari- 
 ably hailed from the North ; the whole of China, India and Asia 
 has been conquered by the invading hordes of the North ; even 
 the Roman Empire was gradually broken up and extinguished by 
 the robust people of the North. But any such strength can only 
 exist, even national existence is only possible, when the people are 
 strongly organized in virtue of a compact union of all the elements 
 of greatness and future success. Separated from each other, each 
 isolated portion would inevitably be invaded and finally crushed. 
 
 We are not prone to assist those who are too weak to help them- 
 selves, because we have no desire to perish with them; this is 
 equally true in the history of individuals and of nations. 
 
 We are convinced, at the present moment, that our internal dis- 
 sensions compelled us, necessarily, to adopt a new order of things ; 
 that, after prolonged resistance, we should have met with a less 
 happier lot; that we had to choose between annexation to the 
 United States and the Union of the Provinces ; that the latter is 
 preferable to the former; that the Maritime Provinces are quite as ' 
 prosperous as we are, and that an alliance with them would neither 
 be a tax on our budget, nor a gnawing canker-worm on our revenue; 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 31 
 
 that the protective segis of the empire would certainly he wanting 
 at a future day, and, therefore, the time had arrived for us to prepare 
 for national emancipation. But we have not yet examined this 
 question in one of its most important phases — that of commerce • 
 the great, and some^may say, the all-important source of fortune 
 and public prosperity, inasmuch as it comprises, in its gigantic 
 folds, agriculture, arts and manufactures. 
 
 We wrote in 1858 : ' What would be the advantage to Canada 
 ' derivable from either a Legislative or a Federal Union of all the 
 ' Provinces of British North America ? It is as much the interest 
 ' of the Maritime Provinces to seek for our channels of trade, as it 
 ' is our interest to seek for theirs. We know that a political union 
 ' would, in no respect, change the present condition of things, and 
 { in any case, those provinces could not inflict more injury upon us 
 ' than could the United States, our only rivals in their limited 
 markets. 
 
 ' When communication by sea and land shall have been 
 ' established between us, we will be in a very favorable position to 
 ' furnish our produce in defiance of all possible rivalry, If the 
 ' obj eot of those provinces, in soliciting a union, be solely in a 
 ' commercial sense (and they do not now solicit it), it cannot in any 
 ■' case in our colonial condition be solicited on any other ground. 
 ' Why should we not rather have recourse to free-trade, which 
 ' could be obtained without organic constitutional changes, — with- 
 ' out the intervention of the Imperial Parliament, with the mere 
 ' consent, in fact, of our existing Legislatures ? 
 
 ' Free-trade, from a commercial point of view, is equivalent to 
 ' an absolute political fusion ; it produces precisely the same 
 ' effect without entailing the same inconvenience and danger, and 
 ' without necessitating the same sacrifices.' 
 
 We still hold the same opinion as regards the effect of union 
 on our intercolonial trade. Free-trade would still be for us, 
 from a commercial point of view, equivalent to political fusion ; 
 but the latter as it is now proved by figures, (the correctness of 
 which cannot be questioned,) would not now require the sacrifices 
 which we then feared. Six years of thought and hard experience 
 
32 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 in the midst of social discord, passion, hatred and difficulties of 
 every nature, have taught us many things which we could not then 
 iknow. An experience of six years in the life of the people of 
 the New World, is greater than that of a century in the life of the 
 ■people of the Old World. 
 
 If we are dashing forward on the path of manifest and imperious 
 destiny, as it were, like a charger on the course, impatiently 
 -champing the bit, should not wisdom guide us towards that path 
 ■which leads to safety ? And if this political union be not 
 more costly than free-trade, why should we hesitate and continue 
 to persist in an opinion, the causes and motives of which have 
 disappeared ? 
 
 The united budgets of all the Provinces may not be of great 
 assistance to each other, but they will not interfere with each 
 other. A political union will not accomplish more for our internal 
 commerce than free-trade, but is it necessary to the development 
 of our external commerce. Therefore, if we are desirous of occu- 
 pying a respectable position among nations, we should seek such 
 an union. What constitutes, in fact, the elements of a great 
 people ? We find them in an internal territory, suitable for agri- 
 cultural purposes, and otherwise rich by its mineral and other re- 
 sources ; in ample interior navigation, which facilitates the means 
 of exporting our products to, and importing what we requirej 
 from, foreign countries ; in an extensive sea coast with numerous 
 deep harbors that can be used at all seasons of the year, that per- 
 mit of trade on a large scale, and the development of a powerful 
 navy, without which moral and material influence cannot be ex- 
 ereised, and commercial communications cannot be safely protected. 
 Can it be said that Upper and Lower Canada possess all these 
 varied elements within their own limits ? We do possess a fertile 
 soil of great extent, capable of supporting a large population. 
 We already number three millions of souls, with the prospect of 
 doubling our population in twenty-five years. We have an ex- 
 tensive system of internal navigation, canals and railways on a 
 large scale. We enjoy a trade that commands the astonishment : 
 and admiration of foreign countries. But, our inland seas, oanala, 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 33 
 
 and harbors are sealed with ice during five months of the year. 
 We never could succeed alone in becoming a maritime and com- 
 mercial power. It therefore becomes necessary to extend our 
 territory, in order to possess posts on the sea-side that may assist 
 commerce and furnish sailors to our fleets. It consequently be- 
 comes expedient to form an alliance with the Lower Provinces, in 
 the form of a compact based upon equity arid strength, for mutual 
 protection. We have our copper and iron mines, but we have no 
 coal. The area of the coal fields of New Brunswick and Nova 
 Scotia is greater than that of all Britain; and without coal, how 
 can we keep our manufactories employed, and how can we provide 
 for our fleets when we have them ? Nova Scotia and Newfoundland 
 are favored with harbors sufficiently vast and deep to bear on their 
 bosoms the fleets of the whole world. Newfoundland is the great- 
 est fishing station in the world, and the nearest port to Europe. 
 That point on the confines of the ocean could serve us at all seasons 
 of the year as our most advanced military station, our best mari- 
 time arsenal, in fact, our bulwark of defence. On this account 
 it became essentially important to bring Newfoundland into the 
 projected union, even at a pecuniary sacrifice. With Newfound- 
 land, Cape Breton, Halifax and the small islands in the St. Paul's 
 Narrows, and at the entrance to the Straits of Belleisle, with the 
 harbors to be formed among them, we could, at every season of 
 the year, command the entrance to the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and 
 shut out all other nations. 
 
 Nature seemed to have specially prepared for the nation to be 
 called into existence, all these means of defence, prosperity and 
 greatness. 
 
 If we were accused of wandering in the atmosphere of theory 
 and exaggeration of hope, we would reply : — 
 
 Are we not already a people numbering four millions, with a 
 foreign trade amounting to $137,500,000, with ships on the sea 
 valued at five millions, and a coasting-trade at six millions ? Point 
 out to us the nations that have started with such resources, and 
 with two or three exceptions, where are those now in existence 
 who can show an equally satisfactory statement, and similar guar- 
 antees of power and vitality ? 
 
34 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 " JtatI or Jegislstifre Iraon." 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 'Which should we prefer, a Federal or a Legislative Union?' 
 
 THIS is a difficult problem to solve. If we could make a consti- 
 tution as we write a book, if practice were as easy as theory, it 
 would not be so difficult of solution. When we wish to establish 
 a great nation, we have to work with elements already in existence, 
 we have to deal with manners, predilections, social and political 
 institutions, full of life and vigor, and strong in the determination 
 to perpetuate those qualities ; and as, for these reasons, all written 
 constitutions must be formed of compromises, that is to say, of reci- 
 procal concessions made by all parties concerned, and the first ques- 
 tion to be considered would not be, whether a perfect Legislative 
 Union could be accomplished, but whether any compact could be 
 formed in which the different elements could be placed in juxtapo- 
 sition to each other, without mutual interference, injury or de- 
 struction, and in which the differences of opinion of all parties 
 could be allowed to exist. 
 
 "We have before us, as evidence of this difficulty of solution, the 
 experience of Austria, Hungary, a portion of Italy, Russia, Poland! 
 and ^Circassia, Holland and Belgium, the Northern and Southern 
 States of America, England and Ireland, and, in fact, our own his- 
 tory. Poland, unable to exist as a nation, is a frightful scar on 
 the side of the Muscovite giant ; perhaps, at some future period, 
 when her days of oppression shall have been weighed in the scales 
 of God's unerring justice, Poland may punish the oppressor. 
 Austria now understands, although rather late, that the instincts, 
 language and institutions of a people cannot be consigned to de- 
 struction by sovereign edicts, and that it is more prudent and wise 
 to offer a protective and paternal hand. By its new policy, whiot 
 is liberal and intelligent, it may save Hungary; bat what will 
 become of Venetia, boiling, as she is, with rage and hatred under 
 the curb and restraint of a state of revolution ? Holland, by neg- 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 35 
 
 lecting to study the lessons of wisdom, and by ignoring toleration, 
 lost, with Belgium, in one day, the four-sevenths of its population 
 and its territory; and the future reserved for the Northern States 
 of the American Union, a nation created in the midst of great 
 difficulties, and out of elements which could, with difficulty, be 
 brought to harmonize with each other, in order to establish a com- 
 pact whole, cannot now be predicted. 
 
 If a Legislative Union had been possible, that is to say, had we 
 found in such a union all the protection required for our insffltu- 
 tions, and if all the other provinces, to form part of the projected 
 alliance, had consented to such a constitutional form of govern- 
 ment, we should certainly have preferred it, because the greater 
 the cohesion in a nation, the better do its component elements be- 
 come harmonized and unified, and the greater is the prospect of 
 its life, prosperity and greatness. 
 
 On this subject, we have never ehanged^our opinion, and we 
 wrote in 1858 : ' Union, with a provision for Legislative Union, 
 ' regarded in some aspects would certainly be the most logical, and 
 ' that for several reasons : 1st — The budget ; 2nd — Our Colonial 
 ' system ; 3rd — American counterpoise and equilibrium ; 4th — The 
 ' immediate results of a union under its different aspects. 
 
 ' With regard to the budget, that species of union would be 
 ' more suitable, because it is more than probable that a Government 
 ' and Legislature for all these provinces would scarcely be more 
 ' expensive than the present Government and Legislature of Canada 
 ' alone ; while Confederation would necessitate the maintenance of 
 ' seven Governments and seven distinct Legislatures. 
 
 ' It would be so with regard to the Colonial system, because 
 ' there is nothing which could be accomplished by the Federal 
 ' Legislature which might not be done by each of the existing 
 ' Legislatures ; and nothing could give to this Congress of the dif- 
 ferent provinces the imprescriptible attributes of the Imperial 
 ' Parliament. 
 
 ' It would be so with regard to the counterpoise and the cqui- 
 
 < librium of the United States, because in unity we find centraliza- 
 
 < tion and indissolubility ; because centralization and indissolubility 
 
36 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 <are two powerful elements— two great principles of national 
 1 existence ; one of initiation, the other of resistance ; one of 
 ' action, the other of cohesion. It is unity alone, initiation and 
 ' resistance, when combined with unity, which can possibly save us 
 1 in the future from the clutches of the American eagle. France 
 <■ exhibited that extraordinary faculty of strengthening herself by 
 ' disasters, and recovered from those gigantic combats for 
 ' supremacy, iu which she was engaged with all Europe, by her 
 4 centralizing policy and by the principle of national unity and indis* 
 'solubility. Any state constituted on the principle of the United 
 1 States of America would, in Europe, be annihilated more easily 
 
 * than Poland, or would be, as the states of the Germanic Con- 
 1 federation now are, alternately the property of one or the other of 
 ' the G-reat Powers in which that principle of unity forms an 
 1 essential component element. The Constitution of Poland con- 
 1 tained a weak and dissolvent principle, and as we know, 
 
 * Poland has been absorbed. The Constitution of the United 
 
 * States contains the same weak element, but they will not be 
 ' absorbed on one condition only, that of proving their position to 
 c be the most powerful and best constituted of all the nations 
 ' having a footing in the New World.' 
 
 But some of the Provinces, and Lower Canada is not alone in 
 that opinion, reject a Legislative Union because they desire 
 to exist on local principles ; and any Legislature in such a union, 
 whatever its existence might be, would not protect those sectional 
 interests which cannot be allowed to perish, and which would thus 
 foe delivered to the caprice or ill-will of foreign majorities. 
 
 What therefore remains to be done ? In our opinion, we should 
 ase our position to the best advantage ; we should strive to 
 establish as perfect a constitution as we possibly can by har- 
 monizing the elements which we now possess, instead of trying 
 to re-model, or perhaps to annihilate them ; and while paying due 
 respect to them, to approach as nearly as possible to unity, centrali- 
 zation and indissolubility; in a word, to avoid the fatal errors 
 which have been the means of bringing on the present crisis in the 
 United States. 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 37 
 
 When we thus wrote on the subject of the United States in 
 1858, when we said that their constitution contained a weak and 
 ' dissolvent principle,' we little thought that scarcely two years 
 and a half would pass away before we should be witnesses of the 
 terrible and sanguinary consequences of that fatal dissolvent 
 principle. 
 
 They are already severed into two separate bodies, and for the 
 past three years and a half have been engaged in a war of mutual 
 extermination. Admitting that after this cruel contest, in which 
 two millions of men may have perished, while devastation and ruin 
 have been carried over avast territory, once so happy, that the South 
 maybe conquered — we ask — can the North succeed in holding the 
 South ? It may be occupied perhaps, but with more difficulty 
 than Kussia now holds Puland by the throat in the clutches of its 
 two sanguinary eagles. Already in other parts of the Union we 
 can perceive the presence of that spirit of independence which will 
 produce its fruits, let us rest assured, when the armies which now 
 march over the surface of that immense republic shall have 
 returned to their firesides. 
 
 The Constitution of the United States is of a mixed nature ; it 
 was formed on the basis of a compromise between the partizans of 
 National Unity and those of State Sovereignty. The framers^of 
 that Constitution made every effort to establish it on other bases ; 
 but the principle of State Sovereignty was an insurmountable 
 obstacle, and consequently the organization of the nation was 
 decided upon by its framers, in a manner which established land- 
 marks, and inoculated it with that poison, the disastrous effects of 
 which now astonish and afflict the world. 
 
 If therefore we have the power, let us abstain frcm imitating 
 that example, and although we also are obliged to abandon the idea 
 of framing a Constitution perfectly unitarian in its principle, let it 
 by all means be as unitarian as possible, provided always, that 
 under the aegis of this unity we caD obtain protection for those 
 institutions which we wish to preserve. According to the 
 projected Constitution, the delegation of legislative and adminis- 
 trative powers can neither be brought from the Federal 
 
 E 
 
38 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. | 
 
 Government nor from the people. But the attributes of the 
 several legislatures and governments are to be distinct one 
 from the other, and must be concurrently given by the same power, 
 the Imperial Parliament, in order that, when the time has come 
 for us to take up our position in the family of nations, we shall 
 find ourselves in a position perfectly justifiable. 
 
 We accept Confederation instead of a Legislative Union, not 
 ftom choice, but from necessity, because we find it to be in oar 
 interest. This solves another problem framed by us in 1858 : — 
 ' What can be the object of a Federal Government in our colonial 
 1 condition, subject as we are in legislative matters to the Imperial 
 ' Parliament V 
 
 We put this question, because we did not then feel that irresisti- 
 ble force which seemed to lead us towards constitutional changes, 
 and because we did not then reflect upon the probability of the 
 arrival of a period of colonial emancipation, at which this general 
 government, which in our present state of dependence is not now 
 necessary, would take the place for us, now occupied by the Mother 
 Country. If we had the privilege of waiting and reflecting, even 
 for a certain time, we know that we are not working only for the 
 . present but for a future, and perhaps for a future close at hand, 
 and for this reason the establishment of a Federal Parliament and 
 Government can be fully justified. Nothing but such circum- 
 stances could possibly justify us ; there is evidently a power of 
 cirumstances which compels us, in a limited time, to make a 
 selection to-day among two or three modes of colonial, and perhaps 
 to-morrow, between two principles of national existence. 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 39 
 
 4 protection to jjwnliar $nstitaiions.' 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 1 How would we find the greatest protection for Roman Catholi- 
 cism, a French nationality, the institutions and the general ma- 
 terial interests of Lower Canada? By adopting the plan pro- 
 posed by thd Quebec Conference? By a Federal Union of both 
 Canadas ? Or by maintaining the existing Union ? ' 
 
 IN 1858, we wrote : 'In a Legislative or Federal Union of all 
 ' the Provinces, what part would be taken by the religious 
 * element ? 
 
 ' If we submit the question in this form, it is not only because it 
 ' has thus been put elsewhere, but because we deem it to be neces- 
 ' sary to regard it that light, the least approachable and the most 
 ' perilous of all. 
 
 ' The religious element is the most volcanic of all the social 
 ' elements ; an eruption may take place at any moment, at a time 
 ' when you least expect it, and its burning lava is only cooled by 
 1 the blood of its own victims. 
 
 ' The part to be assumed by the religious element in the Union, 
 ' may, therefore, be very considerable or almost mill, according to 
 ' circumstances, and the causes which may exercise influence upon 
 ' it. We are peaceful, ,we are friends, we are brothers, we are 
 ' Christians, we are in faet a sometimes inert ; but at an unforseen 
 ' moment, a spark carelessly thrown into our social edifice, which 
 ' is always combustible, might ' cause a conflagration which could 
 t not be extinguished. Thus we must look around us, not with 
 1 the view of demolishing (God forbid !), but to take measures 
 ' to prevent our annihilation by a destructive element. 
 
 ' It is therefore evident that in the interests of society, the 
 ! religious element, owing to the dangers to which it may give rise? 
 ' should on no account be allowed to assume, a political part. Of 
 ' course we speak of those passions and religious" animosities as op- 
 ' posed to the Constitution from motives of triumph and domina- 
 1 tion, and not of faith. Without the latter, the people would be 
 
40 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 ' in an unfortunate position, because deprived of hope, that onl; 
 ' fortifying consolation for the being gifted with thought, he coul< 
 < only expect when his miseries are oyer, darkness and unexplorei 
 ' space. 
 
 'But in addition to that which is desirable, side by side witl 
 ' that reason which would seem to advise that the religious elemen 
 ' should have no place in the Constitution, we know that there an 
 ' societies which exist with their indestructible ingredients an< 
 ' constituent parts, with their passions, their dogmas, their pre 
 ' judices, and with opinions as varied as the stars in the sky. 
 
 ' Reason asserts one thing, practice another ; and we have ex 
 ' perience in those gloomy teachings, from which no country has beei 
 ' spared ; therefore, we now understand that it becomes necessari 
 ' to examine this Union of the Provinces from a religious point o: 
 ' view. 
 
 ' The religious element will not be comprised in the letter, bu 
 ' it will be in the spirit of the Constitution. It will become mixed 
 ' in spite of every precaution, with the legislation and the ad 
 ' ministration of the day, and in the same manner as in chemica 
 ' combinations, the stronger ingredient will surely prevail, what 
 ' ever may be done to paralize its effect. 
 
 ' The Constitution of the United States distinctly provides tha 
 ' no religious test will be a condition of elegibility for public em 
 ' ployment, and nevertheless the whole machinery seems to be oilec 
 1 with Protestantism, 
 
 ' A short time after the conquest of Canada, the English coloniei 
 ' of America, now the United States, presented a petition to th< 
 ' Mother Country praying that the French Canadians might be de 
 ' prived of the enjoyment of the religion of their fathers. Franklii 
 * himself signed this document, replete as it was with fanaticism ant 
 ' intolerance ; but, when these colonies revolted and invited Canadi 
 ' to join them, as an encouragement, they offered us religious liberty 
 
 ' They adopted the principle in their Constitution, as they stipu 
 ' lated for the right of Canada to form part of their Confederation 
 ' These two ideas formed a corollary one of the other • but ex 
 i perience has proved that this generous provision has not effaced 
 ' in practice the feeling which prompted Franklin. 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 41 
 
 ' Thus the religious element must, in any case, play its part in a 
 ' Constitution, and no one should be surprised who observes the 
 ' bitterness with which our religious and Catholic institutions are 
 ' systematically attacked in our present Legislature, that we should 
 ' ask, actuated by a feeling of alarm : What will be in the Union 
 ' of all the Provinces, the respective numerical strength of Catho- 
 ' licism and of Protestantism ? ' 
 
 These are still our opinions, bocause they are based upon the 
 experience of every age and of every country. 
 
 No one can deny the importance of the part taken by the religi- 
 ous element in sacred history, dating from the Egyptian era ; in 
 Borne, where paganism and Christianity fought against each other 
 during three centuries and a half; in the seventh century, under 
 the terrible and designing Mahomet ; in the eighth century, in that 
 vast empire governed by Charlemagne ; in the twelfth and thir- 
 teenth in France, in the wars waged against the Albigenses, and 
 in the European crusades against Islamism; in the sixteenth, 
 when the reformation, taking its rise in Germany, spread over 
 Scandinavia, a portion of Switzerland, England and Scotland ; and 
 in our days, the influence of the element is still felt in China, 
 India, a portion of Turkey, Russia, Poland, England and Ireland. 
 
 We thus find that the history of the whole human race justifies 
 our opinion, and to put aside this important aspect of the question 
 from a false sense of delicacy, would be to neglect, in a culpable 
 manner, the obligations and the responsibility of the publicist and 
 the statesman. 
 
 Moreover, the idea which now creates anxiety with us, as Catho- 
 lics, also engages the attention of Protestants in an equal degree. 
 We are all aware of the important part assumed by the religious 
 element in the formation of a constitution, and each creed claims 
 from another the greatest possible share of protection. Therefore 
 no religious sect can be accused of egotism and intolerance, when 
 instinctively compelled, for the purposes of preservation, to seek, 
 under the roof of a constitutional edifice, a shelter from all possible 
 storms. 
 
 The same instinct actuates nationalities, who, anxious for the 
 
 e2 
 
42 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 future, seek to know whether they can be at ease, can live and be- 
 come freely developed, in a new state of political existence. The 
 text of our article presents itself to us under two different aspects; 
 that of general organization and that of local organization. We 
 must therefore consider the measure of protection that would be 
 afforded to our religion and our nationality, as French Canadians, 
 how these important interests would be protected under local 
 organizations, and what would be the legislative and governmental 
 forms which would thus protect them. 
 
 Have we under our present constitution more protection for 
 Catholicism and our French nationality than we wouldhave inaCon- 
 federation of the Provinces, or in that of the two sections of the 
 Province of Canada ? This is a complex question which deserves 
 our serious consideration. 
 
 With our present mixture of Catholics and Protestants through- 
 out the Provinces, Catholicism, far from being the stronger, does 
 not even exercise in our Legislature aa influence in proportion to 
 its numerical force. Thus Catholicism, which counts 1,200,865 
 souls in the union, is only represented by 52 members in the 
 Lower House, while Protestantism, which counts 1,305,890, ie 
 represented by 78 members. If the two religions were represented 
 in equal proportion, there should be a proportion of 621 Catholic to 
 67f Protestant Representation. Upper Canada, which, according 
 to the Census of 1861, contained 258,051 Catholics, only sends 
 to Parliament 2 Catholic members. 
 
 With regard to origins, there is a still greater disproportion : 
 French, 883,568 ; English-speaking population and others, 1,623,' 
 187. We thus find that the French race is not much protected bj 
 the Constitutional Act of 1840, and that it cannot be blamed foi 
 seeking a new state of existence which will further guarantet 
 it against the possibility of future contests. 
 
 The Confederation of the two sections of this province, or tha 
 of all the provinces, by giving us a local government which wouli 
 protect these privileges, the rights and the institutions of the minoi 
 ity, would certainly offer a measure of protection to us, as Catholic 
 and Frenchmen, much greater than the present union; because, fror 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 43 
 
 our present position, as a religious minority, we would become, and 
 always remain, a national and religious majority. But we would 
 not accept a system which would not protect, in the same ratio, 
 both majorities and minorities : nothing can be enduring that is 
 not founded on justice. 
 
 We stated in the beginning of this article that in this question 
 two aspects were presented to us for consideration : that of general, 
 and that of local organization. We have treated the question of 
 local Organization, and it now only remains for us to shew how our 
 religion and nationality would be protected under a general 
 government. 
 
 It is evident that as a local constitution is given to Lower 
 Canada in order to protect our peculiar institutions, and as the 
 general government cannot therefore exercise any influence over 
 them, Confederation cannot possibly endanger them. And, more- 
 over, the French language, the only subject of alarm, has by the 
 project of the Conference obtained the same protection, the same 
 rights, as it now possesses under the union of the Canadas. 
 
 With regard to this protection, a Confederation of the two sections 
 of the Province of Canada might have been as favorable as a 
 Confederation of all the Provinces of British North America ; but 
 it could not be more favorable. At the same time, it would not 
 have offered the same advantages in every other respect, and that 
 with the former we should not have been as advantageously situated 
 when the proper time had been reached to enter into the family or 
 nations. 
 
 If we insist so strongly upo^i the consideration of these delicate 
 questions, it is because there are doubts and fears in the public 
 mind with regard to them, and because the success of the principle 
 of unity in British North America depends upon a close examina- 
 tion of them. Our intentions must not be misunderstood: we 
 neither ask for the exclusion of other origins and other religions, 
 nor do we seek for any privileges in our own favor. All that we 
 demand is that our institutions may not be annihilated. 
 
 It does seem to us that, for a nation that has bequeathed so much 
 blood and liberty to the new world, we are not asking for too much, 
 
44 THE NEW CONSTITUTIOM. 
 
 •and it is scarcely right that in some quarters we should be inter- 
 preted in a spirit of bitterness and anxiety. Therefore we say, 
 that the Quebec Conference, practical in its object, just and liberal 
 in its intentions, clearly understood the duty imposed upon it, and 
 decided the question without hesitation, without opposition, and 
 without murmuring. 
 
 Now, if we approach the question of material interests, and if, 
 as we think we have shewn more than once in this series of articles, 
 that we were compelled to make a choice between two alternatives, 
 apart from annexation to the United States' — the Confederation of 
 the two sections of the province, and that of all the colonies of 
 British North America — nothing now remains but to ascertain' 
 under which of these two conditions of political existence we would 
 find the greater protection for those interests which are now the 
 subject of discussion in Upper Canada, New Brunswick, Nova 
 Scotia, Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island. In Lower 
 Canada we are less anxious, because the material question is 
 equally interesting to all the races that inhabit this section of the 
 Province. 
 
 Until lately, we admit that we were more favorable to a Con- 
 federation of the two sections of our province than to the larger 
 confederation, because, up to that time, we had no ambition for a 
 separate nationality, and we imagined that in the former plan we 
 would find more protection for the interests of Lower Canada. 
 We acted as if we were opposed to actual enemies, and, with good 
 tactics, we desired to have the least possible number of enemies 
 arrayed against us ; but since then, our relations with the eminent 
 political men of the Maritime Provinces have convinced us that 
 many apprehensions and many motives of resistance are no longer 
 justifiable. 
 
 A feeling of equity undoubtedly guided all the proceedings of 
 that Conference. There appeared to be sympathy for Lower 
 Canada, although justice was meted out to all. Can it be that 
 because we were numerically in a minority, and that the instinot 
 of self-preservation kept the weaker in a solid phalanx with a view 
 to protection against a large majority, that we were thus dealt 
 with? 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 45 
 
 Let it be understood, there can only be the question of material 
 interests at stake in this matter, because all others are protected 
 by the system of local governments. Now, in the project of the 
 Conference, as regards those interests, we hold the balance of power 
 between the contracting parties. An Upper Canada newspaper so 
 well understood this, that a calculation was published in its columns! 
 tending to prove, that in thirty years that province would contain 
 a larger population than the whole of the rest of the Confederation, 
 and thus would be in command of the position. 
 
 The compiler forgot'one very important item. Let us suppose 
 (and of course history does not justify the supposition) that the 
 population of Upper Canada should double every twenty years, and! 
 that the number of its members in the Lower Chamber of the Union 
 in 1894 would be greater than that of all the other provinces 
 united, it is not the less true that our representation in the upper 
 house, possessing equal powers, in fact a counterpoise of the other, 
 will have a deliberative voice, and will possess the same power in 
 the National Parliament. Thus, in the Upper Chamber, Upper 
 Canada can never have more than 24 votes, and we shall have 24, 
 while all the Provinces, minus Upper Canada, will have 52 votes. 
 If Upper Canada therefore, may at some future day possess 
 numerical preponderance in the Lower House, it must always be 
 our equal in the Upper House, and the question of number will 
 always remain intact, according to the Constitution. 
 
 It is therefore evident, that in a material point of view, we 
 would be in a better position in a Confederation of all the Pro- 
 vinces, than in a Federal Union of the two Canadas, because, in the 
 latter we would be 24 to 24, and a change of one vote might place 
 the majority of the Legislative Council on the side of the majority 
 of the Lower House, and thus give preponderance to Upper Ca- 
 nada. In a Confederation of all the Provinces, it will require a 
 change of 28 votes to give that preponderance. Thus, we have 
 nothing to fear from the adoption of the latter alternative. 
 
 Moreover, no circumstance and no cause could unite iu a com- 
 pact body all the representatives of Upper Canada, either in the 
 Upper or Lower Chamber, because experience teaches us, by 
 
46 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 reading the pages of history, that political parties will always 
 exist, and will pay but little attention to territorial distinctions. 
 Material interests do not always recognize territorial divisions, and 
 the avenues of commerce are rarely confounded with geographical 
 limits. We observe this in Central Canada and the Ottawa 
 District, the commercial and industrial interests of which are 
 almost identical with those of Lower Canada. Who will contend, 
 with a map of North America in his hand, that the material 
 interests of the Maritime Provinces are not more with us than 
 with Upper Canada ? We can therefore conclude, without 
 hesitation, that a Confederation of all the Provinces would be 
 more advantageous to us than that of the two sections of Canada - 
 
 For all these reasons, we can fairly conclude, that this peculiarity 
 of the situation will produce a feeling of mutual justice among the 
 weak and strong elements of the new political combination. 
 
 With this article, we terminate our general observations, and 
 we shall now enter upon the question of details. 
 
 Solution of % problem. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 'If the favorable moment had been reached to remodel the Constitution, 
 have the men who undertook the taBk arrived at the best possible 
 solution under the circumstances ?' 
 
 rjlHIS question comprises the whole project of the Quebec Con- 
 -1- ference; it becomes therefore necessary to subdivide it into 
 as many heads as there are important points to consider in that 
 project. 
 
 The Delegates lay down the following principles: — 
 ' 1. That the best interests and present and future prosperity of 
 ' British North America will be promoted by a Federal Union 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 47 
 
 1 under the Crown of Great Britain, provided such Union can be 
 4 effected on principles just to the several Provinces. 
 
 ' 2. In the Federation of the British North American Prev- 
 ' inces, the system of Government beet adapted under existing 
 ■* circumstances to protect the diversified interest of the several 
 
 * provinces, and secure efficiency, harmony and permanency in the 
 ' -working of the union, would be a general Government, charged 
 ' with matters of common interest to the whole country ; and lotal 
 ' governments for each of the Canadas, and for the Provinces of 
 
 * Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, charged 
 1 with the control of local matters in their respective sections. 
 
 ' 3. In framing a Constitution for the General Government, the 
 ' Conference, with a view to the perpetuation of our connection 
 ' with the Mother Country, and to the promotion of the best in- 
 
 * terests of the people of these provinces, desire to follow the 
 ' model of the British Constitution, so far as our circumstances 
 
 * will permit.' 
 
 After having discussed several plans of union, with their differ- 
 ent conditions of existence, we have proved that Federation was 
 undoubtedly the system most likely, in our position, to protect us 
 and to secure our prosperity. We have established, that either a 
 Legislative or Federal Union of all the Provinces had become a 
 political necessity required by our circumstances, and a wise 
 measure to adopt, preparatory to our passing from a state of colo- 
 nial subjection to that of national emancipation. Nothing new 
 remains but to consider whether this union can be justly accom- 
 plished with so many different elements and distinct interests. 
 
 But it may seem that the words ' under the British Crown! 
 should suddenly put a stop to our national aspirations, because 
 they establish imperatively, a perpetuity of the colonial condition. 
 
 In order that we may be understood, let us state, that we do not 
 lay much stress on our aspirations, because nothing would be more 
 agreeable to us than to see a perpetuation of a state of things 
 which has hitherto secured to us so much happiness, protection 
 and liberty ; and the longer we enjoy the privilege of the guar- 
 dianship of the Mother Country, the better shall we be prepared, 
 
48 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 for a time which must necessarily come; again we say, we do not 
 speak of aspirations, but write in anticipation of our future, accord- 
 ing to the opinions offered on that subject by the statesmen the most 
 eminent and the best authorized to speak on the part of the Mother 
 Country. 
 
 If the Federal principle is the best adapted to our circumstances 
 and our wants, has the system of Confederation proposed by the 
 Conference been wisely selected and carefully considered ? 
 
 Is the preponderance of the unitarian principle which is therein 
 found a sound one ? Is it better adapted to our interests, judging 
 by experience, than the principle of State Sovereignty? Is 
 it preferable to a delegation of power from the people to the 
 rulers, a division and a scattering of our national forces, 
 — and are our local interests in danger ? Is the British system of 
 parliamentary government in our present social condition, and under 
 circumstances that may lead to Confederation, better for us, than a 
 Republican] form of "government, which has been tried elsewhere 
 during the past seventy-five years, and the experience of which we 
 all possess ? 
 
 We reply to this question in the affirmative. The project of 
 the Quebec Convention, as a whole, has been wisely prepared. The 
 principle adopted, that unity shall be the preponderating element 
 in the Constitution, with certain stipulated conditions, is preferable 
 in every respect to State Sovereignty and a delegation of power by 
 the people to the rulers. "We repeat, most positively, that the 
 British system of parliamentary government is far preferable to the 
 ■radical republican form of government adopted in the United 
 .States. 
 
 What do we find in this project of the Quebec Conference which 
 we propose examining at every point, and of which we shall give 
 a general description before entering into details? We find a 
 government and a parliament that exist within their own attributes, 
 and which, without having the power to delegate, possess never- 
 theless without obstacles and without foreign control, an absolute 
 ■sovereignty over the vast circle of those peculiar attributes, Inde- 
 ipendent of control, they command or direct — public order, the 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 49 
 
 national debt, the budget, trade, tariffs, internal and external taxa- 
 tion, national loans, postal service, the census, our defences, the 
 fisheries, navigation, coinage and currency, banking, interest, the 
 criminal law, and with some exceptions the civil code. 
 
 In this system we find something approaching national unity, 
 but we also find organizations independent of the general compact, 
 which hold their attributes perfectly independent of the general 
 government, having obtained them from the same source as the 
 general government and parliament ; local organizations quite able 
 to take charge of local matters, vsith an allowance of public funds 
 distributed among the provinces for local objects, quite sufficient 
 for our purposes,if economy and wisdom preside over the adminis- 
 tration of our sectional governments. 
 
 In our present position, and with our present wants, we require 
 a general organization, with a power of cohesion which will assure 
 protection for us in the future against foreign aggression or a dis- 
 solution of the elements which constitute our national strength, 
 similar to that which has broken up the United States of America. 
 We also require perfect security and protection for those local ins- 
 titutions which we have hitherto preserved in the midst of all 
 dangers as something sacred; institutions which have passed intact 
 through the most stormy periods of our history, and that no hatred 
 or ill-will could affect. 
 
 Either we possess this powerful organization in the Constitution 
 offered to us on the principle of unity, or we have it in that 
 security and that protection granted to us in local governments 
 and in local legislation ; we are therefore in a better position than 
 under the existing union. 
 
 To admit State Sovereignty and the privilege of delegating 
 power as the basis of a general Constitution, would be to assert 
 the right of secession ; it would be to introduce into the system a 
 germ of dissolution which would, sooner or later, produce fatal 
 consequences. 
 
 With the principle of State Sovereignty, in a case of danger, 
 
 national unity might be preserved, as the American Union has 
 
 been saved by a military despotism, or, as inl812, the National Gov- 
 s' 
 
50 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 ernment might be paralyzed in its action by the ill-will of the dif- 
 ferent states. 
 
 In the United States, in order to prevent the mutual absorption 
 of the different elements, a Supreme Court was created, superior 
 to the Constitution, whose mission it was to preserve that Con- 
 stitution and to bring back any erring elements ; but the Judges 
 of the Supreme Court of the United States, as public function- 
 aries, feeling in their position the necessity of strengthening the 
 General Government, gradually undermined the Constitution in 
 favor of unity and national strength, as well as the attributes 
 reserved by the different states when they delegated certain 
 definite powers to the Central Government. 
 
 Previous to the war, these judges had not dared to maintain 
 that the President or Congress of the United States could touch 
 the constitutions of the different states, or fundamentally change 
 their local institutions. They now permit the exercise of this 
 power. Is it because no complaint is made, or because they think 
 that Federal interest should overrule a constitution which was 
 freely consented to by a Congress of all the States ? 
 
 We are not prepared to affirm, against the teachings of history, 
 that a civil war is not possible in a country cons tituted on the 
 principle of legislative and administrative unity, because national 
 difficulties may for several reasons be brought into existence, and 
 nothing human can last forever ; but at least, we should, when 
 we have the power to do so, establish a political state of existence, 
 avoiding dissolvent principles, particularly if we wish to live and 
 perpetuate that state of political existence. Now, the dissolvent 
 principle in the American constitution is that of State Sover- 
 eignty, which permits the old Southern Colonies to maintain 
 slavery intact, and which forbids Congress to interfere. 
 
 Slayery is a social question, and consequently one of public 
 order ; it should therefore have been placed under the control of 
 the Federal Government and Parliament. 
 
 A r«ply may certainly be given to us in accordance with an opinion 
 which we have ourselves frequently expressed, that the American 
 Constitution of 1789 was a compromise. In order to accomplish 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 51 
 
 the union of the several states that had but lately gained their in- 
 dependence, and that were guided by instincts and were under the 
 dominion of institutions utterly opposed to each other, it became 
 necessary to make many concessions, even to silence the impor- 
 tant ' term of slavery, and the states, several of which had 
 desired admission into the union, would not have consented to 
 accept it unless the right of State Sovereignty were admitted. 
 
 All this is true ; but because it is true, and that we are differ- 
 ently situated, with the means of avoiding the dangers that are to 
 be found in the American Constitution, we should have the firm 
 will to ward them off, and to constitute our national future on a 
 firmer basis, with more homogeneous elements, and on principles less 
 liable to dissolution. 
 
 If we had not our own experience of the working of public 
 affairs during twenty-three years, under the most difficult circum- 
 stances, to guide us in our appreciation, we might say, with history 
 before our eyes, the monarchical, with an admixture of the de- 
 mocratic principle, — in other words, parliamentary government — is 
 preferable,' in every respect, to the republican form of the govern- 
 ment of the United States. It gives greater guarantees against a 
 despotic exercise of power, with a greater amount of protection and 
 liberty to individuals, while it affords the people a more immediate, 
 spontaneous and certain control over the administration and legis- 
 lation of the hour. 
 
 But in order that this system may be thoroughly efficacious, in 
 order that it may be able to resist those formidable ordeals that 
 have destroyed so- many thrones^and have broken up so many con- 
 stitutions, it must be essentially British in its object, in its spirit 
 and in its operation. The constitutional powers of the state? 
 although perfectly distinct, must possess some elasticity to save 
 them from manifold dangers, and to allow of occasional tension 
 without a chance of being violently broken; the Executive, sur- 
 rounded with the respect and veneration of the people, should 
 have the upper hand, under their responsible control. It becomes 
 also necessary to avoid, both with rulers and people, the existence 
 of permanent obstacles, opposed to the expansion of matured 
 
52 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 national opinion ; in other words, there should be a mutual power 
 to destroy such obstacles, the power of dissolving parliament 
 remaining with the rulers, that of dissolving administrations and 
 of replacing them by men enjoying the confidence of the public, 
 remaining with the people. A system of government for the 
 interests of the people should be essentially conducted by the will 
 of the people. 
 
 In the American system we do not find liberty with order; that 
 necessary elasticity and that constant and spontaneous control by 
 the people over the administration of the day. It is true that the 
 head of the Executive is there elected by the people, but during the 
 period of his presidency he is absolutely independent, and may 
 exercise his power in a despotic manner ; during four years he 
 may defy popular opinion as manifested by the representatives of 
 the nation, under the pretext that he also is elected by the nation, 
 and that he has no account to render to any public power during 
 his occupation of that presidential chair. 
 
 On the other hand, under circumstances of imminent danger, 
 requiring legislation, he may be right and his parliament may be 
 wrong; public opinion may be in his favor, but he may be para- 
 lized in his executive action by the ill-will of the representatives 
 of the people, who have the constitutional right to say, ' Mr. Presi- 
 ' dent, like yourself, we have been directly elected by the people, 
 ' to that power only are we responsible, and we are the best judges 
 ' of our own legislative acts.' 
 
 Under such a system, it is not surprising that serious conflicts 
 should arise in public affairs, and that the machinery of govern- 
 ment should be frequently clogged. The history of the American 
 Republic furnishes many examples of this unfortunate difficulty. 
 
 Let us now cast our eyes towards Great Britain. In that em- 
 pire, the person of the Sovereign isheld sacred, and that Sovereign 
 'can do no wrong.' The men without whom no governmental 
 action can be taken, may err, mal-administrate, and may even be 
 guilty of malversation, but they are subject at any time to the 
 consequences of their double responsibility to the Sovereign and 
 the people, while they can be reached at any moment. Should 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 53 
 
 they give erroneous advice to the Sovereign while in charge of the 
 public affairs of the empire, they are liable to be excluded from 
 the Council, and others are selected who are wiser and more popu- 
 lar ; and the people, through their representatives, have the right, 
 at any time, to address the Sovereign in these words : ' The men 
 ' who surround you in the councils of the nation do not possess 
 ' our confidence.' As a natural consequence, public men so con- 
 demned, must give way to others who enjoy the greater confidence 
 of the people. 
 
 If there be conflicting opinions between the chief of the Execu- 
 tive and the representatives of the people, on tbe subject of se- 
 lecting the advisers of the Crown, the former uses the right of dis- 
 solution in order to appeal directly to the people, but always and 
 solely with the view of learning the will of the latter, and to ac- 
 complish their wishes. The most important events that have 
 occurred during the past few years, as described in the pages of 
 British Constitutional history, fully inform us on this point. If 
 ever England could fairly entertain any fears for its Constitution, 
 it was certainly at the time, when Catholic emancipation and the 
 Reform Bill were subjects of serious agitation; when a mon- 
 arch, imagining, that by conceding the former measure he 
 might violate his oath, and that in accepting the latter he incurred 
 the danger that the democratic element might cause the overthrow 
 of the throne of Great Britain, and he resisted with firmness that 
 principle so daDgerous to the existence of a Monarchical Constitution. 
 But in this Constitution there was a vital and elastic principle 
 which saved it, and the Sovereign, finally convinced that he 
 governed for the people, and that the right of veto was only given 
 in order to enable him to express his will, after mature delibera- 
 tion gave way and thus saved himself and the Constitution. This 
 vitality and elasticity, and the principle of double ministerial re- 
 sponsibility are so well worthy of consideration, that even when a 
 king was beheaded on the scaffold the throne remained with its 
 Monarchical Constitution more stable and better respected than in 
 the days of despotism. 
 
 Should we therefore be blind enough to ignore such examples 
 
54i THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 and such teaching, in order to make trials that have been fruitlessly 
 attempted elsewhere, and that instead of .conducting us to liberty 
 with order, would forcibly bring us either to a despotism in the 
 haads of one man, or the despotism of the masses, — the latter more 
 terrible and more odious than the former. 
 
 Sobueigntj. 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 TT1HE fourth paragraph of the project states, that the Executive 
 J- authority shall be vested in the Sovereign of the United 
 Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and be administered either 
 by him or by his representative according to the well-understood 
 principles of the British Constitution. This paragraph being 
 the corollary of the third, which we considered in our last article, 
 requires no further explanation. The fifth provides, that the 
 Sovereign or representative of the Sovereign, shall be Commander- 
 in-Chief of the land and naval militia forces. The sixth establishes, 
 that there shall be a General Parliament for the Federated Pro- 
 vinces, composed of a Legislative Council and a House of 
 Commons. 
 
 These is nothing worthy of special consideration in the 7th, 8th 
 and 9 th paragraphs, which provide for the division of the repre- 
 sentation in the Legislative Council among the Provinces, and 
 establish the territory to be submitted to the control of the new 
 constitution. "We have elsewhere sufficiently established the equity 
 of the principles upon which this arrangement is based, and the 
 importance for us in every sense, of furnishing to the nation that 
 we are about to create, a vast territory possessing resources con- 
 taining all the elements of power, greatness and prosperity. 
 Mr. Gait, in his speech at Sherbrooke, spoke as follows : — 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 55 
 
 ' In point of population the Provinces of British North America 
 ' would form, if united, a very respectable power in the world. 
 ' Many countries which boasted of kings and emperors were not 
 ' as strong or as great, either in population or territory, in trade 
 ' and commerce, in industry or in] the intelligence of their inhabi- 
 ' tants, as the united Provinces of British North America would 
 ' be, when united under one Confederation. With a population 
 1 numbering now nearly four millions of people, with a territory 
 ' extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific, with a larger coast 
 ' line than that of the United States, with a river, commercially 
 ' speaking the greatest and most important in the world, passing 
 ' through the centre of our country, connecting the east with the 
 ' west, and bearing on its bosom the trade and commerce of the 
 ' whole interior of this great continent. With all these advantages, 
 • we might look forward to a future for this country, which, 
 ' whether we lived to seo it or not, our children would rejoice 
 ' to see, and feel that a power was being established on the north- 
 ' era part of this continent, which would be able to make itself 
 1 respected, and which, he trusted, would furnish hereafter happy 
 e and prosperous homes to many millions of the industrial classes 
 ' from Europe, now struggling for existence.' 
 
 The London Times agrees with Mr. Gait in his appreciation of 
 the greatness in store for us. The following are its words : — 
 
 ' The last mail from Canada has brought us the resolutions 
 ' finally agreed to by the meeting of delegates from five pro- 
 ' vinces of British North America — resolutions destined to lay 
 ' the foundation of a future empire. No public act of our time 
 ' deserves more careful and respectful attention than this re- 
 ' markable and unique proceeding.' 
 
 In order to convince ourselves of the truth of this statement, 
 let us glance attentively at the map of British North America, 
 and measure the extent of territory which, under the project, 
 is to be submitted to the control of the Federal Government. 
 We know that Canada alone possesses a territory of §50,000 
 square miles, — one-third more extensive than Prance, three times 
 larger than Great Britain and Ireland, and three times more ex- 
 
5Q THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 tensive than Prussia. And what is Canada, in extent, compared to 
 the Western prairies, the area and fertility of which can scarcely be 
 appreciated or judged even with reports before us furnished by 
 Mr. Dallas, Governor of the Hudson's Bay Company, and Dr. 
 Eae, an old factor, well known from his reputation as an 
 astronomer and as having discovered the remains of Franklin and 
 his unfortunate companions. The latter, instructed to attempt 
 the discovery of a pass through the Rocky Mountains for 
 the Trans-continental Telegraph Company, states : ' That 
 ' the Eiver Saskalchewan is a great public highway, flowing 
 ' through immense fertile valleys, in which wheat and barley 
 ' might be grown in abundance.' Mr. Dallas alludes to it in the 
 following words : ' The whole country is more or less eminently 
 <■ adapted to colonization. Two years ago, I rode on horseback, in 
 1 the month of August, over the greater part of that country. 
 ' We had to wade, as it were, knee deep through tares and fitch. 
 ' I there saw horses and oxen as fat as any I ever found on the 
 ' best pasturage grounds in England. These animals had passed 
 1 the winter in the open air without a mouthful of hay. This 
 ' will give a better idea of the climate here than if I were to fur- 
 nish the variations of the thermometer. 
 
 1 1 look upon this conntry as well adapted to settlement, and 
 ' extraordinarily healthy. Everything seems to thrive here ; the 
 
 * wheat crop is of course rather uncertain, but all other cereals 
 ' and vegetables attain the same perfection that they do in 
 ' England. Towards the north we find an area of timber land 
 1 and undulating prairies, which extends over the whole country. 
 
 * The lakes and rivers abound with fish, and the prairies with 
 every species of game, &c, &c.' 
 
 The distance between the two extreme points of this territory 
 between the two oceans, is four thousand miles, and a superficies 
 of four million square miles is comprised within that area ; the 
 country is irrigated in every direction by large and navigable rivers 
 and inland seas. 
 
 Mr. Gralt has been blamed for stating that it is an advantage 
 for a country to possess an extensive sea-coast and ample means of 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 57 
 
 internal water communication. The maritime nations of the old 
 and new world do not concur in this opinion ; on the contrary, they 
 believe that the development of the resources of the sea-coast 
 favors foreign and domestic commerce — the coasting trade, on the 
 one hand, favoring our domestic commerce, while our shipping, in 
 their voyages from port to port, favor our relations and exchanges 
 with foreign nations. 
 
 The Provinces of British North America have an extensive sea- 
 coast, and internal means of water communication of great length, 
 with foreign trade valued at $137,447,567, and tonnage, including 
 the coasting trade, at $11,859,934. 
 
 If the river Thames has created the City of London, and if the 
 sea-coast of England has been the means of making it a maritime 
 and commercial country, what may we not expect from the 
 magnificent coast and harbors of the Atlantic and Pacific Provinces, 
 the Gulf and Eiver St. Lawrence, the Saguenay, the Ottawa, the 
 St. Maurice, the Lakes Ontario, Erie, Huron, Superior and Win- 
 nepeg with the two branches of the Eiver Saskatchewan (the two 
 latter offering navigable waters 1800 miles in length), with other 
 rivers and lakes which irrigate and fertilize the different parts of this 
 colossal territory? 
 
 It is therefore evident that a mistake has been made in 
 confounding the extent of our sea-coast with that of our frontier, 
 the latter being" an inconvenience, but one common to all countries. 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 ' The Members of the Legislative Council shall be appointed by the Crown, 
 and shall hold office during life, &c, &c; their appointment shall take 
 place on the recommendation of the General Executive Government, 
 upon the nomination of the respective Local Governments.' 
 
 ON. Me. Brown stated, in Toronto, that this return to the 
 old principle of nomination by the Crown, and the consequent 
 
 H 
 
58 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 abandonment of the elective principle, was a coneession made to 
 the Maritime Provinces. The Member for South Oxford belonged 
 to a minority which, in 1856, combatted and voted against the elec- 
 tive principle. He does not tell us whether the experience of the 
 working of the new system has in any manner modified his ideas, 
 and we are therefore compelled to believe that his opinions of 
 1864 are similar to those held by him in 1856. Those who have 
 been identified with the stormy periods of the parliamentary his- 
 tory of Lower Canada, will recollect under what circumstances the 
 agitation commenced, to substitute the elective principle for 
 nomination by the Crown in the Upper House. 
 
 In 1820, Mr. L. J. Papineau spoke admiringly of the justice 
 and generosity of the British Government. In 1826, he spoke in 
 terms of praise respecting Sir Francis Bnrton, the representative 
 of the Sovereign. In 1827 however, he commenced a series of 
 attacks against the same executive power, which were destined to 
 be concluded by devastation, incendiarism, human hetacombs and 
 the destruction of that glorious constitution justly given to us by 
 Pitt in 1791, in spite of the opinions of the oligarchy, who were 
 desirous of governing and legislating for us. 
 
 In order to avoid direct conflicts, the Imperial Government 
 placed the Legislative Council, which was completely under its 
 control, between the popular branch and tie executive. The 
 greater number of Legislative Councillors were selected from 
 among the members fof the Executive, and thus the Legislative 
 Council was but a mere counterpart of the Government. It be- 
 came almost impossible to legislate, because the Legislative Coun- 
 cil systematically rejected every measure sent up by the popular 
 branch. 
 
 In 1828, the Legislative Assembly sent Messrs. Cuvillier* Viger 
 and JSTeilson to London as delegates. Mr. Neilson was asked, 
 when he appeared before a Committee of the House of Commons, to 
 describe the evil, and to suggest a remedy. He very naturally 
 replied, that the evil was to be found in the obstacles placed by 
 
 * On referring to Journals of House of 1828, we find that the Dame of 
 Cuvillier must be substituted for that of Papineau. 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 59 
 
 the Legislative Council in the way of all legislation, and that he 
 believed that the sole means of abolishing the evil was to intro- 
 duce the elective principle into that body. He, however, gave 
 that opinion as his own, prudently remarking that the population 
 which he represented did not agree with him on that point. 
 
 In 1832, an Elective Legislative Council had become a panacea 
 throughout the country, and the prudence of its adoption was 
 agitated in the press, at public meetings, and on the floor of the 
 House. It was again asked for in the 92 resolutions of 1834, 
 and it was centinued to be regarded as the saving plank in our 
 constitutional platform until the latter was broken by the shock of 
 rebellion and the brutal despotism of the day. 
 
 In 1840, a new constitution was given to us. It was conceived 
 in injustice, and was intended by its authors to keep in a perpetual 
 state of subjection men who certainly had committed errors owing 
 to the want of some constitutional light to direct them in their 
 path, but who, after all, were only guilty of desiring to possess the 
 immunities of British subjects, and with them, the privileges of 
 self-government. 
 
 Lord Sydenham, who had handed over the elections of Lower 
 Canada to his hired minions, having, as it were, spread terror 
 throughout the land, no doubt relied upon the stability of a con- 
 dition of affairs laboriously and astutely devised ; but the session 
 of Parliameut had scarcely opened, before that feeling of constitu- 
 tional liberty which laid dormant under the ruins of 1837 and 
 1838, became once more vivified by incompressible energy, and 
 the Governor General was forced to recognize, in the celebrated 
 resolution of 1841, parliamentary government with all its conse- 
 quences. 
 
 Lord Sydenham was soon gathered to his fathers. His successor 
 was Sir Charles Bagot, of cherished memory, who, accepting the 
 consequences of the Harrison resolution, offered the reins of power 
 to Messrs. Lafontaine and Baldwin. 
 
 If, after the death of this venerable man, we find hinderanees 
 in the way of our constitutional progress and in the working of 
 parliamentary government, it is because Sir Charles Metcalfe, no 
 
60 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 doubt a remarkable and honest man, bad just arrived from India, 
 where he had resided from his boyhood — far from a constitutional 
 atmosphere — with inveterate notions of arbitrary government, with 
 strong prejudices against the Executive Councillors given to him by 
 a parliamentary majority, and whom, with sincere conviction, he 
 looked upon as the enemies of the British Crown. 
 
 But these difficulties proved, in a still more forcible manner, the 
 power of the principle that had been conceded. Lord Metcalfe 
 was compelled to bend before that pewer in spite of his despotic 
 instincts and the prejudices imbibed in his education. He was 
 compelled to admit the control of Parliament over the administra- 
 tion of public afiairs. Under no other condition would Mr. Draper 
 consent to undertake the formation of his cabinet, and the last 
 replies of the Governor General to the addresses that were pre- 
 sented by the people, are full of constitutional soundness. 
 
 Since tbe Union, the Legislative Council has never proved itself 
 to be an obstacle in the way of legislation, and we have never felt 
 the want of changing its character in order to place it more in 
 harmony with public opinion. If any reproach could be offered, 
 it would rather be because the Council had been too much in- 
 fluenced by the popular branch, and sometimes legislation has been 
 hurried without the necessary thought and reflection. 
 
 Let us suppose that we had obtained an elective Legislative 
 Council previous to 1840, would the desired end have been 
 attained ? No, the effect would merely have been to change the 
 ground of the contest, and give to the Government two adversaries 
 instead of one. These could only be overcome by the strong arm 
 of the Constitution, the right of ' veto ' and the Imperial sanction, 
 which could always be relied upon. 
 
 Our statesmen of that day, whatever may have been their merit 
 and ability, do not seem to have had any idea of parliamentary 
 government, because, no doubt owing to a prejudice instilled by 
 the experience of the past, men who accepted seats in the Executive 
 Council were looked upon as traitors to the popular cause, and the 
 House of Assembly considered any apparent intention, on the part 
 of its members, ot furnishing the opinions of the Executive, as a 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 61 
 
 violation of its privileges, and as rendering them liable to ostracism. 
 At the present day, what a prodigious change do we find in 
 public opinion ! Now, members of the Ministry in the House, never 
 can be sufficiently communicative, and they are accused of want of 
 respect to the Legislature and the country, even if state reasons 
 compel them to be silent. 
 
 Since 1841, there could be no serious contest between the two 
 fefanches of the Legislature, because the people, through their 
 representatives, exercised a direct influence over the admistration, 
 and therefore, through that administration, over the Legislative 
 Council appointed by the Crown. There could consequently be 
 no motive to continue the agitation in favor of an elective Council, 
 but certain public men, who had been identified with former 
 constitutional agitations, feared to be accused of inconsistency and 
 infidelity to their former opinions, if they did not continue to desire 
 that which they had asked for in times gone by. 
 
 ' Tempora mu tantur et mutamur in illis.' This great truth 
 is more applicable in the government of nations than in other 
 mundane affairs. And inconsistency does not depend upon refusing 
 to change our opinion when everything around us becomes changed, 
 and when every thing encourages that change, but on the contrary, 
 in holding to those opinions when they can no longer be justified. 
 In order to be consistent, we do not eat when we are no longer 
 hungry, under the pretext that we were hungry before we ate, and 
 we certainly do not have our coat cut according to a fashion for 
 years in desuetude, because it happened to be the fashion in the 
 days of our youth. It could, therefore, only be in politics that we 
 could consistently eat without being hungry, and that we could be 
 compelled, at the risk of our honor, to perpetuate fashions which 
 have long been superseded. 
 
 The introduction of the elective principle into the Legislative 
 
 Couneil has not produced the desired results, because it is evident 
 
 that the selection made by the people has not, upon the whole, 
 
 been a happy one. The same zeal has not been shown in these 
 
 elections as we find in those for the Legislative Assembly, while, 
 
 as a general rule, the most able men have remained in the Lower 
 G 
 
G2 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 House. Perhaps it may be, that materials are wanting to form 
 two popular branches in an efficient manner, and that in any case, 
 the best share of talent would remain with that branch in which 
 originates everything relating to our great material interests. 
 Perhaps also, it may be, that the electoral divisions are on twe 
 large a scale, and candidates are alarmed at the labor and expendi- 
 ture rendered necessary ; or again, the difficulty may perhaps be 
 found in the restrictions placed by the Constitution itself on the 
 ehoice of the eleetors. We merely state the fact as true, but we 
 believe that all these causes combine to produce present results. 
 
 In obedience to the dictates of public opinion, the writer of 
 these lines in 1856, composed with hi3 own hand the Constitution 
 of the Elective Legislative Council ; and it is now with heartfelt 
 satisfaction and true conviction that he hails the return to the old 
 principle of nomination by the Crown under circumstances far 
 more favorable than in the past. 
 
 If there be any reason for the existence of a Legislative Council, 
 it is because it acts as a conservative element, — a counterpoise and 
 check on the hasty legislation of the people. All statesmen of 
 forethought of every country, instructed to perform the duty of 
 framing constitutions, have always provided for the protection of 
 the people against their own sudden fits of passion ; moreover, 
 democratic predilections possess too much power in the United 
 States for us to deny the wisdom of checking them, in the interest 
 of that nation whioh we are about to create. 
 
 In the Legislative Council of the Federal Parliament will be 
 found the nominative principle with that of election ; the conser- 
 vative element, which is absolutely essential, being included by 
 the wish of the people, and in which no obstacle can be found to 
 public feeling, matured by evidence, time and reflection. 
 
 In critical times the Members of the Council will recollect their 
 origin, and in their resistance to outward pressure will only act 
 according to their own wisdom, and the dictates of public interest. 
 
 If, in the projected Constitution, there be found a guarantee of 
 stability against popular outbursts, there will also be found a 
 guarantee of perfect independence against the servility of the 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 63 
 
 administration of the day, in the first place, because of its popular 
 origin, and also, as it were still more efficiently, by the provision 
 made for a limit to the number of Councillors. 
 
 Everything therefore, proves that the Conference, in thus fram- 
 ing the project, have wisely reflected, while they have acted with 
 patriotism. Moreover, elections have in our day been of such 
 frequent occurrence, that the moral sense of the people has 
 become as it were deadened, and they now ask for elections of a 
 more reasonable nature, better suited to their feelings and wants. 
 
 There should be no misunderstanding with regard to the import 
 of certain facts.- In abandoning the elective principle in the 
 Legislative Council, the people do not give up an inherent right, 
 because the elective principle in that body is of no more value in 
 that respect than the nominative principle. They are merely two 
 different conditions in the formation of one branch of the Legisla- 
 ture, and a selection is to be freely made from the two, through 
 the representatives of the people. The duty or right of the people 
 is to control the Administration of the day through their represen- 
 tatives, and to choose the mode by which the greatest wisdom and 
 reflection may be secured, without permitting the existence of a 
 power which may, at any time, stop the operation of the constitu- 
 tional machinery. 
 
 The motive which caused difficulty during the last years of the 
 existence of the Constitution of the year 1791, with regard to the 
 principle of election in the Legislative Council, no longer exists 
 and, at the present moment, the republican idea is to be found 
 prevalent only in the minds of our democrats, who would like to 
 see it perpetuated. 
 
 The Minister for the Colonies is evidently opposed to the elec- 
 tive principle. He lears, however, that in case of difficulty between 
 the two branches of the Legislature, the proposed system would 
 preclude the possibility of increasing the number of Legislative 
 Councillors. 
 
 The reason adduced for this limitation of the number of Coun- 
 cillors can be easily understood ; and without it, who would sanction 
 Confederation ? But the question of danger, as foreshadowed by 
 Mr. Cardwell, deserves close consideration. 
 
64 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Can it be established, that real danger can exist, because it might 
 happen that one branch of the Legislature would, and the other 
 would not, be elective ? Does it follow, that because the Legisla- 
 tive Council would be unchangeable in its will, as in its number, 
 that it could, at any time, completely interfere with Legislative 
 action, and absolutely defy public opinion or the public desire, 
 after a close and careful examination of circumstances by the 
 people of the country ? 
 
 There are two powerful reasons which lead us to a contrary opin- 
 ion ; the first is, that there are no interests in America foreign to 
 those of the mass of the people, and we have no castes to be dealt 
 with ; the second reason is, that even if the latter did exist, no 
 resistance could be possibly offered to the expressed will of the 
 people ; and the Legislative Council, if it were to abandon its role 
 of moderation and counterpoise, in order to obstruct the working 
 of our constitutional machinery, would inevitably be carried away 
 by a tempest similar to that which has destroyed so many thrones, 
 and has broken up so many dynasties. 
 
 Our Legislative Councillors will be selected from the mass of the 
 people ; they will live among us, and form part of us ; they will 
 know and appreciate the wants, desires and predilections common 
 to us all, with this difference, that, having been spared the ordeal 
 of election, and exempted from a feeling of constant fear of the 
 electors, they will not have to undergo the dangerous, and some- 
 times unreasonable exactions of popular demonstrations. They 
 will thus be enabled to decide calmly, maturely and with reflection, 
 upon the merits of those legislative questions which may be sent 
 up from the popular branch, replete with the evidence of hasty 
 legislation. 
 
 We find that in England where castes exist, where a powerful 
 nobility enjoying privileges, posts of honor, fortune, and, in a word, 
 the greater portion of the landed property of the empire, live, as 
 it were, beyond and above the people ; those difficulties so mueh 
 feared by us cannot last, because public opinion instantly causes 
 them to cease by threatening to overturn the whole system; 
 
 If such conflicts were there persisted in, they would inevitably 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 65 
 
 produce revolution, because it is well understood that the House of 
 Lords merely moderates political affairs, and if the safety valve of 
 the people's security were obstinately closed by that body, an 
 explosion would inevitably be the result. 
 
 It may be said in reply that the number of peers is not limited, 
 and that the Sovereign may at pleasure increase that number. 
 
 This is certainly true in theory, but not in practice. The Sover- 
 eign creates peers when public men have rendered important 
 services to the nation, or, in exceptional cases, when exceptional 
 rewards have been deserved, but never with the intention of sub- 
 merging the will of the majority, of paralyzing free action, and of 
 weakening the dignity and usefulness of a body so important and 
 so necessary in the Constitution. 
 
 The constitutional history of Great Britain offers but few ex- 
 amples of conflict between the two branches ; the most celebrated 
 and most obstinate of these, was that which arose upon the subject 
 of the Reform Bill in 1831 and 1832. The people became so 
 irritated at the stubborn resistance offered by the nobility to a re- 
 form in the system of parliamentary representation, that they at 
 last refused to listen to the advice of the most powerful political 
 men who had hitherto enjoyed their confidence in electoral con- 
 tests. They even rejected candidates whom they had for a length 
 of time persisted in sending to the House of Commons, with the 
 promise, however, that they would be re-elected after the passing 
 of the Reform Bill. On several occasions the House of Commons 
 had, by its vote, manifested the public opinion of the country ; 
 but the House of Lords persistently refused to sanction the bill. 
 It was supposed by that House that if a certain number of rotten 
 boroughs were disfranchised, and if the representation of several 
 of the great commercial centres Were increased, there would be 
 an end to the privileges and separate existence of the nobility. 
 
 The popular anger increased in proportion to the resistance of 
 
 the House of Lords, and the Sovereign — who felt the approach of 
 
 the storm from the direction of Manchester, who distinctly heard 
 
 the sounds of rebellion rumbling in the distance, clamoring, as in 
 
 1660, for the head of a king to gratify their vengeance — at last 
 G2 
 
66 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 gave way to the urgent advice of Sir Charles Grey, who, armed 
 with the terrible power of swamping the majority of the House 
 of Lords, obtained the creation of a sufficient number of new 
 peers to effect that purpose, and thereby saved the realm. 
 
 The House of Lords gave way, and its annihilation was thereby 
 averted. 
 
 All constitutional writers agree that this creation of a hundred 
 peers would have been a revolution as great as that which threat- 
 ened to overthrow the throne of William IV., had it not been that 
 the monarch believed that between a revolution which threatened 
 to demolish his throne, and the one which attacked the independ- 
 ence of the House of Lords, it became his duty, for self-preserva- 
 tion, to chocse the latter alternative. 
 
 Thus the principle of limiting the number of Legislative 
 Councillors is not as dangerous as at first sight it may appear. 
 
 Jjriprijj Qualification, 
 
 CHAPTEE XIII. 
 
 ' The Msmbera of the Legislative Council shall possess a, continuous real 
 property qualification of four thousand dollars, over and above all in- 
 cumbrances, and shall be and continue worth that sum over and above 
 their debts and liabilities, but in the case of the Island of Prince Ed- 
 ward, the property may be either real or personal.' 
 
 THUS, the amount of property required to secure eligibility by 
 the Constitutional Act of 1856 for a Canadian Legislative 
 Councillor is $8,000, while $4,000 will now suffice for a Federal 
 Legislative Councillor. 
 
 Thi3 is a concession to the Maritime Provinces, because in that 
 portion of the proposed Corfederation, wealth is not developed in 
 the same ratio as in Canada. 
 
 In order to meet the circumstances of Newfoundland and Prince 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 67 
 
 Edward Island, even greater concessions hare been made, by ren- 
 dering candidates eligible either on real or personal property. 
 
 It will be a difficult matter to establish the possession of personal 
 property or even the net value of real property, after deducting 
 mortgages, and debts that are not secured by mortgage. This can- 
 not be established, but it will be necessary that the Federal Legis- 
 lative Councillor shall, on the day of his appointment, as well as 
 subsequently, possess, really and truly, over and above all debts 
 and mortgages whatever, property valued at $4,000. 
 
 For instance, promissory notes are debts or obligations. How can 
 the amount of these be established when a variation may occur from 
 one moment to another ? How can the amount of other personal 
 debts, such as balances of accounts current that may reach a large 
 amount, be established ? In other words — how can the actual 
 value of personal property be ascertained ? 
 
 Necessity has compelled us to adopt this principle, and we must 
 now put it in practice in the best possible manner. It has been 
 suggested thafrthe Councillor should take the oath of eligibility at 
 the opening of each session of the Legislature. This would at 
 least be a moral confirmation which would be avoided by scrupulous 
 and honest men, if that qualification were not possessed. 
 
 In any case, the improbability of establishing with precision the 
 amount of wealth possessed by any Legislative Councillor cannot 
 affect, in a serious manner, the working of the great political ma- 
 chine which it is proposed to create. The important point is, that 
 the men who may be called upon to form part of that conservative 
 body, shall possess something which it will be their interest to pro- 
 tect, and that they will understand from theory, as well as their own 
 personal experience, that they are solemnly bound to take an im- 
 portant part in the working of the Constitution. It is necessary 
 that they should be to the constitutional fabric that which the 
 corner-stone is to masonry — -the strength and stability of the 
 edifice ; they must possess social weight, and that guarantee of 
 prudence which possession of property gives them. 
 
68 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Jfgislatik CmmoIIors. 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 ' The first selection of the Members of the Legislative Council shall be 
 made, except as regards Prince Edward Island, from the Legislative 
 Councils of the various Provinces. If a sufficient number be not found 
 in the existing Councils qualified, and willing to serve, the comple- 
 ment must necessarily be filled up elsewhere.' 
 
 ' In these appointments, due regard shall be had to the claims of the 
 members of the Legislative Council of the Opposition in each Pro- 
 vince, so that all political parties may as nearly a3 possible be fairly 
 represented in the Federal Council.' 
 
 * Each of the twenty-four Legislative Councillors representing Lower 
 Canada in the Legislative Council of the General Legislature, shall 
 be appointed to represent one of the twenty-four Electoral Divisions 
 mentioned in Schedule A of Chapter First of the Consolidated Statutes 
 of Canada, and such Councillor shall reside or possess his qualifica- 
 tion, in the Division he is appointed to represent.' (14th and 16th 
 paragraphs.) 
 
 THUS, according to Article 14, the Federal Legislative Councillors 
 shall be selected from the Councils of the different Provinces of 
 the proposed union, provided always, that a sufficient number may 
 be found who are eligible to accept ; but at the same time, Article 
 16 provides that in Lower Canada, the Federal Councillors shall 
 represent the Electoral Divisions established by the Consolidated 
 Statutes, and shall reside or possess the property upon which they 
 qualify in the Divisions thus assigned to them. 
 
 These two provisions seem, at first sight, incompatible with each 
 other, and require some explanation. 
 
 There would be no necessity for such explanation, if we had to 
 select our Federal Councillors from the number of those elected 
 for Lower Canada. In such a case, it would merely have been 
 necessary to say, that our twenty-four Legislative Councillors-elect 
 Would be the twenty-four Councillors to represent us in the Federal 
 Parliament; but in such a case, we must necessarily exclude the 
 life members of the Council for this section, at a moment when we 
 are desirous of establishing that body on the nominative principle^ 
 and we can fairly infer that such was the thought of the Conference 
 if we read literally the words pronounced by Mr. Gait at the 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 6£ 
 
 Sherbrooke banquet ; ' It was intended that the first selection of 
 ' Legislative Councillors should be made from the present Legisla- 
 ' tive Councils of the several provinces, and without referring to 
 ' the reasons which actuated gentlemen from the Lower Provinces 
 ' in regard to this matter, he thought it might be sufficient to 
 ' point out that in Canada, where we had forty-eight gentlemen. 
 ' sitting in the Upper House by the right of election, it would have 
 ' been doing a wrong, not merely to them individually, but to their 
 ' constituents too, if they had from any cause been attempted to 
 ' be overlooked. It was quite evident, even if no such clause had 
 ' been inserted, that no attempt would have been made to pass over 
 ' those gentlemen who had been selected by the people themselves 
 ' as the most fit and proper persons to represent them in the Legis- 
 ' lative Council.' 
 
 But such cannot have been the intention of either the Conference 
 or of Mr. G-alt himself, because the latter adds to his former remarks 
 the following words : — ' However, the arrangement was that they 
 ' should be chosen, regard being held in that selection to the relative 
 ' position of political parties. If the power of nomination were 
 ' entrusted to the Government without restriction, they might be 
 ' inclined to appoint their own political friends to the exclusion of 
 ' the others. But it was intended that the nomination should be so 
 ' made, that not only the Members composing the Government, but 
 ' also the Opposition to the Government, should be fairly represented 
 ' in the Legislative Council.' 
 
 Mr. Gait's views sufficiently indicate that a choice will be made, 
 otherwise, as we stated in a former part of this article, it might 
 have been easier to decide that our 24 Councillors under the elective 
 system, should be the 24 Councillors in the Federal Government. 
 But the 16th Besolution, as it is written in the project, would seem 
 to interfere with the operation of the 14th Besolution, inasmuch as 
 the Federal Councillors are to be selected indiscriminately from 
 among the elected and the nominated members of our Legislative 
 Council, because Besolution No. 16 requires that the Federal 
 Councillors for Canada shall reside or possess their qualifications in 
 the divisions to be assigned to them. 
 
70 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Now, Lower Canada has at the present moment 34 Legislative 
 Councillors, 10 of whom are life-members. If, therefore, the latter 
 are not to be entirely excluded, and have a right to hope that the 
 Federal Councillors will be indiscriminately selected from all the 
 members of our present Council ; by compelling these to reside or 
 possess their property qualification in any of the existing Electoral 
 Divisions, it is quite clear that the choice will be restricted to the 
 disadvantage of a large number of life members, who may fairly be 
 considered as eligible in every other respect. 
 
 There is still another motive which is against the literal inter- 
 pretation, both of Mr. Gait's speech, and of the 16th Resolution of 
 the project; it is, that such an interpretation would render an 
 equitable distribution among political parties utterly impracticable 
 
 We must therefore conclude that the Conference intended, that 
 the first Federal Councillors should be selected indiscriminately 
 from amongst both life members and elected councillors of Lower 
 Canada, and that residence, or the situation of property qualification? 
 would only be brought into operation in future appointments by 
 the Crown. Eesolution 14 can be clearly interpreted in this 
 manner, and the Conference could never have entertained the 
 absurd idea of abrogating it by Eesolution 16. 
 
 The motive which actuated the Conference in stipulating 
 residence or its substitute, property qualification within the Division, 
 is the same as that which obtained in the Elective Law of 1856. It 
 was framed in order to secure, in a vote upon the project, the 
 concurrence of those Councillors who might fear that without these 
 restrictions, local candidates might be sacrificed for others com- 
 paratively strangers to an Electoral Division. But there is another 
 motive, which is explained by Mr. Gait in the following words : — 
 ' He might say it here, because it was said by everybody outside, 
 ' that in the event of anything like injustice being attempted 
 towards the British population of Lower Canada by their French 
 ' Canadian fellow-subjects, they would most unquestionably look 
 ' for remedy and redress at the hands of the General Government, 
 ' who would have the power of causing their interests to be repre- 
 ' sented in the Upper House of the General Legislature. So far 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 7l 
 
 ' as regarded the interests of the French Canadian population, on 
 ' the other hand ; he thought there could be no question whatever 
 ' that they might safely enough trust to their representatives in the 
 ' Upper House being taken from amongst their best men, and in 
 ( fair proportion to their numbers also. It was proposed that, in 
 ' the case of Lower Canada, the selection should be made from the 
 ' electoral limits which now existed. And he thought wisely so, 
 ' because certain sections of the Province were more particularly 
 ' inhabited by French Canadians, and others by those of British 
 ' origin. Consequently, there was a greater certainty that fairness 
 ' would be meted out to both parties, if the representatives in the 
 ' Upper House were to be chosen from the electoral limits which 
 ' now existed.' 
 
 We have no objection to this local provision, which was 
 insisted upon in 1856, when the Legislative Council passed the 
 Bill, although it may frequently hamper both local and Federal 
 Governments in their selection, and frequently prevent them 
 from nominating the most able and the best deserving men. If, 
 as Mr. Gait stated, the English-speaking and Protestant po pula- 
 tion of Lower Canada desires this for its own protection and in 
 order that it may be represented according to numbers in the 
 Upper Federal Chamber, the same rule would hold good when 
 applied to those portions of the country inhabited by the French 
 race, and we would find precisely the same relations of equi- 
 librium between different origins, as those established by our 
 present elective Legislative Council. 
 
 These small details of calculation are excessively unpleasant, 
 and but too clearly shew the multiplicity and diversity of the 
 elements of which our social and political community is com- 
 posed. 
 
 But as we are in this position, and as it would be impossible to 
 change or modify them, even were we to desire it, nothing remains 
 but to arrange them wisely and prudently in the construction of 
 our new constitutional edifice, and to give to each suitable space 
 therein. 
 
72 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 It is only by such an arrangement that we can hope to construct 
 with strength and durability. 
 
 CHAPTEE XV. 
 
 17. " Representation in the House of Commons shall be based upon popu- 
 lation, and the number shall be determined by the official census taken 
 every ten years, and the number of representatives at the commence- 
 ment will be 194, distributed as follows : 
 
 Upper Canada, 
 
 82 
 
 Lower Canada, - 
 
 - 65 
 
 Nova Scotia, - 
 
 19 
 
 New Brunswick, - 
 
 - 15 
 
 Newfoundland, 
 
 8 
 
 Priace Edward's Island. 
 
 - 5. 
 
 18. ' There will be no change in the number- of representatives apportioned 
 to the different Provinces, until the taking of the census of 1871.' 
 
 19. ' Immediately after the taking of the census, in 1871, and at the taking 
 of each decennial census, the representation of each province will be 
 re-distributed on the basis of population.' 
 
 TTTE explained in our article, chapter 4, the powerful reasons 
 ' ' which determined our statesmen to concede the principle laid 
 down in paragraph No. 17 of the project of the Constitution, and 
 which we have re-written at the head of this article. The distri- 
 bution of the representation is there based upon the population of 
 the different provinces, determined according to the census of 
 1861. By that census, Upper Canada contains a population of 
 1,396,091 souls ; Lower Canada, 1,110,664; Nova Scotia, 330,857; 
 JSTew Brunswick, 252,047; Newfoundland, 130,000; and Prince 
 Edwards Island, 80,757. 
 
 The principle of representation in the Lower House has been 
 conceded by the Maritime Provinces, the populations of which are 
 comparatively small, and whose progressive increase is less rapid 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 7$ 
 
 than ours. They no doubt believed, that they would find a suffi- 
 cient protection against the populations of the larger provinces 
 in the Upper House, where they are upon a footing of representa- 
 tive equality with them. 
 
 If the population continues to increase in Canada in the same 
 proportion as in the decennial period from 1851 to 1861, we shall 
 have, in 1871, a population of 3,398,070, and 4,606,305 in 1881. 
 
 "We have no data to enable us to establish the average progression 
 of the collective population of the Maritime Provinces, but Mr. 
 Gait has stated that it is much slower than with us. 
 
 From the moment that Confederation was proposed as a substi- 
 tute for our present Constitution, it became, of necessity, a question 
 of numbers in the formation of the Federal Legislature ; for what 
 purpose would it serve to replace a single parliament by thrae 
 legislatures, necessarily more costly, in order to arrive precisely at 
 the same constitutional mode, and to meet exactly the same diffi- 
 culties ? 
 
 Every Confederation is a compromise; but where would be the 
 compromise if nothing were ceded either on the one hand or the 
 Other ? The compromise on the part of Lower Canada is the con- 
 cession of Representation by Population in the Lower House, and 
 the compromise on the part of Upper Canada is the concession of 
 equality in the Upper House, in exchange for representation based 
 upon population, in the Lower House. The same compromise has 
 been effected between the two Canadas and the Atlantic Provinces, 
 and it was the same motive which prompted it. 
 
 Previous to the introduction of the elective principle in the 
 Legislative Council, representative equality had no existence, and 
 Upper Canada has only succeeded, even up to this day, in pre- 
 serving its numerical preponderance by means of its life Councillors. 
 
 The Constitution of 1840 only stipulated for equality in the 
 Lower House. Let us suppose that the majority of the Legisla- 
 tive Council had chosen to adopt a project of law which would 
 have been hostile to the interests' of Lower Canada ; as Upper and 
 Lower Canada were equally represented in the Lower House, the 
 bill adopted by the Upper House would have been certainly thrown 
 
74 THE NEW CONSTITUTIOM. 
 
 out, and it is by the Lower House alone that we have, up to this 
 time, been able to protect and save our institutions, taking into 
 account also the good will shown to us by Lower Canadian repre- 
 sentatives of English descent. 
 
 Why has the Legislative Assembly always been the battle field 
 with respect to the struggle that has been going on for the last 
 fourteen years between Upper and Lower Canada on the question 
 of Kepresentation by Population ? It is because there alone 
 equality has existed, and there alone could be found the means of 
 solving the constitutional problem ; if then, instead of the present 
 Constitution, we substitute Local Legislatures, and over them the 
 Federal Parliament, we shall see in that case precisely the inverse 
 of that which we have always observed in our present Legislature, 
 that is to say : that on the occurrence of any local misunderstanding, 
 the struggle will be carried from the Lower House to the Legisla- 
 tive Council, and precisely for the reasons that we have adduced. 
 
 We are speaking here on the hypothesis of the perpetual antag- 
 onism and antipathies which exist between races and provinces, and 
 it is in consequence of this, that we cannot surround sectional 
 interests with too much protection against the chances of the 
 future. But, by enlarging the ground, and in creating, by the 
 Union of the whole of British America, other interests, as distinct 
 as those which are in antagonism with each other to-day, we may 
 hope to soften the asperities of the struggle by turning them aside 
 from their object, by dispersing them, and by directing them upon 
 other points less fraught with danger and evil consequences. 
 
 It is in the counterpoise of interests freely established by the 
 parties to the contract, that we may hope with reason to find the 
 safe working of the new constitutional machinery. We have said, 
 that it was equality in the Lower House that turned that place, 
 since the Union, into the enclosed battle-ground of all our struggles 
 with Upper Canada. 
 
 But there was another cause added to that, which claims public 
 attention almost exclusively: that is, the power of initiating 
 money measures — the great, and, so to say, the only sinew of 
 politics in the normal period of society. It was probably that 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. ^5 
 
 consideration that influenced the Imperial Government to recom- 
 mend the principle of equality of representation at the period of 
 the union. 
 
 In extraordinary times, social questions govern to the fullest 
 extent material interests ; they are pursued with more animation 
 and bitterness through sacrifices, and often produce ruin and 
 desolation. It was representative equality, and the interests of 
 which it was the signification, which gave to the Senate its im- 
 portance and its moral preponderance in the American Congress, 
 and in the eyes of foreign nations. 
 
 And yet it had not the power of initiating money measures, 
 like the House of Kepresentatives ; it had only the privilege of 
 modifying them. 
 
 But it was the battle field of social questions, and of territorial 
 interests, just as our Legislative Assembly has been up to the 
 present day. 
 
 This was the cause of its importance, the reason why the American 
 people sent the most eminent men to that body, and the cause 
 of its triple saperiority, intellectually, morally, and politically. 
 
 Jjka&jnsimmt of $kpraenia&rn. 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 1 For tha purpose of such readjustments, Lower Canada shall always be 
 assigned sixty-fire members, and each of the other sections shall at 
 each readjustment receive, for the ten years next succeeding, the 
 number of Members to which it will be entitled on the same ratio of 
 representation to population as Lower Canada will enjoy according to 
 the Census last taken by having sixty-fire Members.' 
 
 THIS clause of the project was at first misunderstood and mis- 
 interpreted. It was asked, why must Lower Canada remain 
 stationary, while others provinces have the privilege of progressing ? 
 
76 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Let us in the first place hear Mr. Gait, he who of all the Ministers 
 has the most completely explained and rendered the thought of the 
 Quebec Convention in his speech at Sherbrooke : — 
 
 ' Population was made the basis, and to prevent any undue aug- 
 ' mentation in the numbers of the Lower House as population 
 ' increased, it was settled that there should be a fixed standard, on 
 ' which the numbers of the House should be calculated, and Lower 
 ' Canada was selected as affording the proper basis. Although, 
 ' Lower Canada had not the largest, still it had a very large popu- 
 ' lation, which was more equable in its increase than any of the 
 ' others, not increasing on the one hand so fast as Upper Canada, 
 ' or on the other hand so slowly as the Lower Provinces, and the 
 ' numbers of the House of Commons (for that was the name 
 ' selected) would not be subject to such irregular variations as if 
 ' the population of any of the other provinces were taken as the 
 ' basis.' 
 
 The Minister of Finance, however, has not given us the whole. 
 This arrangement is entirely to the advantage of the provinces, 
 whose populations, already less numerous, will only increase in the 
 smallest proportion. The Toronto Globe has perfectly under- 
 stood this, and has perfectly explained the operation of this clause. 
 
 The principle of representation based on numbers is established 
 by the project of the Conference; by the very conditions of its 
 existence, it is moderated in its consequences ; its work of expan- 
 sion is wisely compressed by checks and considerably delayed in its 
 progress. 
 
 To enable us to understand this, let us take an example : suppose 
 that the project of Constitution were to stipulate as follows, the 
 House of Commons shall be composed of three members ; as you 
 would only count for a third of the whole population, you will be 
 represented there by one vote, and we shall have the other two 
 because we are the two-thirds. — Here, the principle of population 
 is perfectly recognized and perfectly practicable ; but the majoritj 
 against us would be but one vote; and, displacing that single vott 
 we would have the majority ! 
 
 Now, let us suppose another case ; and let us say that the repre 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 
 
 sentation instead of being three, should be three hundred members 
 in the House of Commons, — our third would then be one hundred, 
 and the two other thirds, two hundred. The same proportions 
 would be perfectly preserved with the principle of representation 
 based upon population as in the first case, and yet the majority 
 against us here, would be one hundred ! Now, it will be conceded, 
 that it is easier to displace one vote than one hundred. 
 
 Then, while preserving population as a basis, we may consider- 
 ably modify it in its progression and its results ; it is evident, from 
 what we have said, that the lower the number that constitutes the 
 pivot of the system is, the better it will be for us, and for the Atlantic 
 Provinces. 
 
 Now, let us lay hypotheses aside, and work with reality to guide 
 us. Lower Canada, having a population of 1,110,664 souls, and a 
 representation of 65 members, each of these must represent an 
 average of 17,087 souls. That is the basis adopted by the Con- 
 vention at the outset. 
 
 If 17,087 should continue to be the permanent average of the 
 population to each member, and that the total population of Lower 
 Canada should become doubled in thirty years, reckoning from 
 1861 to 1891, Lower Canada would then have a population of 
 2,221,328 and a representation of 130 members. 
 
 If Upper Canada at the end of the same period, should have, 
 (and it is quite possible) a population double the amount of ours — 
 that is to say 4,442,656, it would possess a representation of 260 
 members, and a majority over us of 130 members. 
 
 But if on the contrary, the figure (35 of our representation, should 
 remain stationary at the same period, the average of the population 
 to each member, through the whole extent of the Confederation, 
 would be 34,174, and Upper Canada would have a right to 130 
 members. Thus, in the first case, Upper Canada would have 
 a majority of 130 votes over Lower Canada, while in the second 
 case, that majority would only be 65 votes ! 
 
 It is then, evidently important that the figure of our representa- 
 tion should remain as it is. 
 
 The result would be still more fatal to us, if a lower figure than 
 
78 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 the present one were taken as a basis for representation— let us saj 
 15,000, and that it were declared that in future there would b< 
 one representative for every fifteen thousand souls. That propor 
 tion would give us immediately 74 members, and Upper Canada 
 111, — that is to say a majority for the latter of 37 votes, while w( 
 only find, 17 in the present project. In 1891, we should have i 
 representation of 128 members, and Upper Canada would have 296 
 and a majority over us of 148 votes ! 
 
 The principle whieh we have just analyzed is certainly the mos' 
 important one; it is in fact all important; but Mr. Gait has giver 
 it its proper value ; for in adopting a fixed number, or a mecha 
 nism which enables us to see the possibility of a diminution of th< 
 figures of representation, and which in every case moderates 
 its development, we may be brought in a given time to a represen 
 tation by far too large. 
 
 The Parliament of Lower Canada under the Constitution of 1791 
 had adopted the number of 2,000 as a basis for local representation 
 and in 1836 the number of members in the Lower Chamber wai 
 reckoned at 88. With our population to-day, supposing the sami 
 basis to have been persisted in, our representation would be 555. 
 
 This proves, that if at the outset we ought to give the larges 
 possible share to the popular representation, so that every part o: 
 the soil should be represented, and be able to make its wants im 
 mediately and directly known — on the other hand, when the deve 
 lopment of public prosperity has improved the means of communi 
 cation and has thus made all local wants as patent as the genera 
 wants, it then becomes possible, even useful, from an economic; 
 point of view to give to that same representation a narrower basis 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 79 
 
 IJropriioK of §ttxmt m ^xmuktm. 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 21. *No reduction, shall be made in the number of Members returned by 
 
 any section, unless its population shall have decreased, relatively to 
 the population of the whole Union, to the extent of five per centum.' 1 
 
 22. 'In computing [at each decennial period the number of Members to 
 
 which each section is entitled, no fractional parts shall be consider- 
 ed, unless when exceeding one-half the number entitling to a Mem- 
 ber, in which case a Member shall be given for each such fractional 
 part.' 
 
 WE have been asked, how Resolution No. 21 would operate, and 
 how it should be interpreted ? "We think we can explain in a 
 clear and distinct manner its significancy, and the mode in which 
 its stipulations will be carried out. In the first place, we may 
 state, that this clause was inspired by interested parties, and it was 
 a happy thought, because it is exclusively favorable to those pro- 
 vinces whose population may increase in the smallest ratio, and in 
 the same manner as the resolution preceding it, to which we gave 
 our attention in our last articlej.it may be a means of modifying, 
 and in some cases of nullifying the consequences to be expected 
 from the adoption of the principle of Representation by Population. 
 
 When this clause provides, that no reduction shall be made in 
 the number of members returned by any section, unless its popula- 
 tion shall have decreased, relatively to the population of the whole 
 union, to the extent of five per cent, or more ; it is meant by the 
 word decreased, that an absolute proportionate decrease or increase 
 of five per cent. , more or less, of the whole population of the Con- 
 federation shall have taken place. 
 
 At the starting point, in 1861, the populations of the different 
 sections start from precisely the same point, to dash forward on 
 their career of progress, in the same manner as race horses start- 
 ing for the Derby- The average number represented by each mem- 
 ber over the whole extent of the Confederation is fixed at 17,087. 
 The question is, what sections will first reach the goal in 1871, and 
 what will be the relative distance between each of them ? We 
 mean this to apply to relative increase, and not to an absolute in- 
 
80 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 crease of the population. The census of 1861 is an established 
 fact, the figure of the total population of the whole Confederation 
 and that of the populations of the different provinces separately 
 taken, ia also known. It becomes necessary now to establish, in 
 the first place, the proportion in which the collective populations 
 -of the Confederation during the period between 1801 and 1871 
 have increased; then to ascertain the proportionate increase of 
 ■population in each of the provinces, which, by the 20th Eesolution 
 -are to be submitted to the effects of a rise and fall in the represen- 
 tative thermometer. 
 
 The figure of the population of Lower Canada, which is to be 
 the basis of all calculations being known, by dividing it by the 
 number 65, the actual number of its members, we will obtain a 
 -quotient or result that will be the figure on which shall be com- 
 muted the representation of all the provinces. 
 
 If the numerical increase in the population of Lower Canada, 
 ■during the decennial term, is equal to that of tbe population of ' 
 Upper Canada, not only will the latter be deprived of any increase, 
 but its representation will be diminished. In order to prove this, 
 let us give some figures, based of course on hypotheses, because it 
 is impossible to ascertain what will be the real increase. Let us 
 suppose that the increase during tbe decennial period is 300,000 
 for Lower Canada, and 300,000 for Upper Canada, the population 
 •of Lower Canada would then be 1,410,664, and that of Upper 
 Canada 1,696,091. By dividing the first number by 65, the num- 
 ber of members for Lower Canada, the quotient will be 21,702, 
 "which shall be the average number represented by each member 
 over tbe whole extent of the Confederation ; and by dividing the 
 .figure of population of Upper Canada by tbe same number, 
 Upper Canada, according to the plan of Confederation, will be only 
 •entitled to 74 members. 
 
 Now, if instead of numerical increase, we take a proportionate 
 increase of the population of Lower Canada to that of Upper 
 Canada, the two provinces will remain with their respective 
 representation of 65 to 82. Let us suppose the increase in the 
 ifcwo Canadas to be, during the ten years from 1861 to 1871, thirty 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 81 
 
 per cent, on the population, we stall number in Lower Canada 
 1,443,863, which divided by 65 will give 22,213 as the average- 
 number represented by each member. A similar increase of 30 
 per cent in Upper Canada would give 1,814,918, which number 
 divided by 22,213, would furnish a result of 82, the exact figures 
 of Upper Canadian representation as established by the Conference* 
 If the proportion of increase be greater in Upper than in 
 Lower Canada, the former will have a right to an increased represen- 
 tation, proportionate to that difference of proportionate increase. 
 This difference will create changes very slowly, as we propose to 
 establish by a calculation made for one of these provinces. Before 
 entering, however, upon the consideration of that subject, we 
 purpose correcting an error which has found its way into Mr. 
 Gait's printed speech, because it is evidently in direct opposition 
 to his opinions. He makes use of the following words : — ■ The 
 ' House would never have less than 194 members, but it would 
 ' increase at a very slow rate, as it would only be the greater 
 
 ■ increase of any province over that of Lower Canada, which 
 ' would entitle to additional representation ; while, if the agricultural 
 ' resources of Lower Canada became developed and its mineral 
 • wealth explored, so that it increased faster than Upper Canada, 
 
 ■ then the number of representatives for Upper Canada would be 
 
 ■ diminished, not those for Lower Canada increased.' 
 
 It is quite evident that if the population of Lower Canada 
 should increase with greater rapidity than that of Upper Canada, 
 in a manner to decrease the representation of the latter, and if 
 the former should increase more rapidly than that of the other 
 provinces, the number of members in the Lower House of the 
 Federal Legislature will eventually become less than 194. This is. 
 not very probable, and a condition of statu quo, or a slow increase 
 in the representation of any one of the provinces is still less- 
 probable. 
 
 The Maritime Provinces will be subject to the same fluctuations' 
 in this respect as Upper Canada, the representation of Lower 
 Canada being the pivot. They will remain stationary, will progress- 
 or become reduced in the number of their representatives, according 
 
82 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 to the increase or decrease in their population, considered pro- 
 portionately to Lower Canada. But, admitting the possibility of 
 their so diminishing as compared with Lower Canada, to effect a 
 reduction, it will b© necessary that the loss be at least five per 
 cent, as compared with the total increase of the population of the 
 Confederation, or in other words, that the population of those 
 provinces should have increased proportionably five per cent, 
 less than the total population of the Confederation. 
 
 Now, if the population of Lower Canada should increase in 
 a smaller rate than that of Upper Canada, the general average will be 
 immediately reduced ; and that reduction will be still greater if 
 there be a decline in the Lower Provinces, as compared with 
 Lower Canada; thus such a result would have the effect of 
 changing the proportion of increase of those Provinces taken 
 separately, and to render a lessening of the number of represen- 
 tatives very difiicult, for the disproportion between the general 
 and partial increase must be at least five per centum. 
 
 It is impossible to foresee what may be the increase, or even the 
 relative increase, during the present decennial period, but we shall 
 recur to our figures. Thus, in 1861, the total population of the 
 Provinces was 3,300,446, while that of Nova Scotia, for instance, 
 was 330,887. If we can anticipate that the total population of 
 the Confederation may increase 25 per cent, from 1861 to 1871, 
 the increase will be 825,111, and that of the population of Nova 
 Scotia at 20 per cent., would produce 66,177. In such a case 
 Nova Scotia may be subjected to a reduction in its representation 
 in a proportion which shall be computed on the basis of the 
 population of Lower Canada as divided by the actual figure of 
 its present representation. 
 
 We purpose establishing this proportion by assuming a hypo- 
 thetical proportion for Lower Canada. Let us suppose that the 
 population of Lower Canada shall have increased during the ten 
 years 23 per cent. ; such an increase would give us 255,452, which 
 added to the population of 1861, would be l,366,116,which, divided 
 by 65 (the actual figure of our present representation), would furnish 
 21,017, the number represented at that time by each member over 
 the whole extent of the Confederation. 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 83 
 
 Now the population of Nova Scotia, according to our hypothe- 
 sis, including the increase of 66,177, would be at the same date 
 397,064, which should be divided, as that of Lower Canada by 
 21,017. In such a division, that province would lose one vote, it 
 would only have eighteen, while the project of the Conference 
 grants nineteen. But in this case, the 22nd Resolution protects 
 that province, because its terms are, that each province shall have 
 a right to a member tor the fraction of population which may re- 
 main after a general computation, provided that such fraction be 
 over the half of the average of the population to be represented 
 by each member. 
 
 Now, this average of population is 21,017, and the fraction re- 
 maining, to Nova Scotia, after dividing the population by the said 
 figure, 21,017, would be stated at 18,757; therefore that province 
 would still be entitled to its nineteen members. 
 
 If the disproportions were greater, the result might be that 
 there would be a change in the proportion of representatives in 
 some part of the Confederation ; but the explanations given in 
 this article, we think, establish clearly, that such changes, such 
 difficult decrease or increase in the representation, will be very 
 dfficult and of rare occurrence. 
 
 fltbwon of Jjro&mces for Representation. 
 chapter xvm. 
 
 23. ' The Legislature of each Province shall divide such Province into the 
 proper number of constituencies, and define the boundaries of each of 
 them.' 
 
 24. ' The Local Legislature of each Province may, from time to time, alter 
 the Electoral Districts for the purposes of Representation in such Local 
 Legislature, and distribute the Representatives to which the Province 
 is entitled in such Local Legislature, in any manner such Legislature 
 may see fit.' 
 
 THESE two clauses explain themselves sufficiently. The 23rd 
 tells us that it will be the Local Legislature in each province, 
 and not the Federal Parliament, which will fix the limits of the 
 
84r THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 counties for representation in the Federal Parliament. It is 
 well understood that it is a question of the limits, and not 
 of the number of counties, which will be regulated in the way that 
 we explained in the two preoeding articles. 
 
 Thus, under the Constitutional Act, there will be required a 
 mechanism for enabling the provinces to re-distribute their own 
 representation according to the census. It will doubtless be the 
 ■Gemeral Government whose duty it will be to communicate to them, 
 through their own Governments, the result of the census, and the 
 share of representation apportioned to each of them. 
 
 As to the local representation, it will be regulated according to 
 the views of the legislatures of each province, who will fix the 
 limits of the local counties, and will determine the number of its 
 representatives. 
 
 Increase of Jtgmetiiafiort. 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 25. ' The number of Members may at any time be increased by the' general 
 Parliament — regard being had to tho proportionate rights then exist- 
 ing.' 
 
 THIS clause is in direct contradiction with the 20th clause, 
 which states that ' Lower Canada shall never have more, nor 
 ■* less, than sixty-five representatives,' and we cannot understand 
 why, after haviDg surrounded this question of representation with 
 eo many precautions and so many modifications to arrest or soften 
 the consequences ; why, after having pronounced the word 'never,' 
 they should have written, some lines below, 'may when they please.' 
 Let us hear Mr. Gait on this subject : 
 
 ' Of course to provide for the settlement of the remote portions 
 * of the country which might be brought in from time to time, power 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 85 
 
 ' was reserved to increase the number of members, but such num- 
 ' ber could only be increased preserving the relative proportions.' 
 If Mr. Gait means by ' settlement of the remote portions of 
 ' the country which might be brought in from time to time/ those 
 portions of country which are still in forest, and which may at a 
 later period be brought under cultivation, it seems to us that to 
 keep true to the word ' never ' of the 20th clause, it would be 
 easy, without increasing the representation, to re-distribute the 
 representative divisions in such a manner as to satisfy all rights, 
 all wants, and all aspirations. 
 
 If the question were, the entrance of other provinces, such as 
 the North-West Territory, Columbia and the Island of Vancouver, 
 into the Confederation, that would be another thing ; for it would 
 be necessary to give these a representation in the two branches of 
 the Federal Parliament, a permanent one in the Legislative Coun- 
 cil, and another, subject to the fluctuations in the Honse of Com- 
 mons, as provided in all the other federated provinces. The project 
 of convention provides for this latter case. 
 
 Whatever we may do, if we increase the representation, we must 
 adhere strictly to the same proportions, but we shall never arrive 
 at the same relative numerical results. 
 
 We can prove this at once by figures j let us suppose that the 
 representation of Lower Canada (for Lower Canada must always 
 be the basis of our calculations) be one hundred members instead of 
 being sixty-five as it is to-day, the average population to each member 
 will be 11,106, and dividing the population of Upper Canada, 
 say 1,396,094, by 11,106, we shall have for that latter province 
 a representation of 126 members. 
 
 The proportions may have been preserved, but that would not 
 prevent Upper Canada from gaining 9 votes over us, since, with 
 6'5 the present number of Lower Canadian representatives as a 
 basis for representative calculation, Upper Canada ought to have 
 had only 17 votes more than us ; while, in substituting 100 for 65 
 as the representation for Lower Canada, Upper Canada would, in 
 that case, have 26 over Lower Canada. Here are the numbers as 
 they stand at present in the project of Confederation : 
 
86 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Lower Canada, 65 ; Upper Canada, 82 ; difference in favor of 
 Upper Canada, 17 votes. 
 
 Here is the way they would stand in the hypothesis which we 
 have submitted : 
 
 Lower Canada, 100 ; Upper Canada, 126 ; difference in favor of 
 Upper Canada, 26. 
 
 Either the word " never" should be struck out in clause 20 ; or, 
 clauFe 25, which is so diametrically opposed to the former, should 
 be taken out of the scheme. 
 
 After having given such positive limits to representation, and 
 having placed such a strong check to its expansion, why then 
 ■declare, almost immediately afterwards, that all this can be blown 
 •away by the breath of a simple parliamentary majority ? We 
 Tiave in the Legislative Council 76 representatives ; which is more 
 "than they have in the Senate of the United States, with a popula- 
 tion of 30,000,000. We have 194 in the House of Commons, 
 for a population, let us say, of 4,000,000 ; while in the House 
 of Kepresentatives they have only about 300 members to a popu- 
 tion of 30,000,000. 
 
 Our representation, on the other hand, may increase under the 
 •conditions laid down for it by the 20th clause of the project; it 
 will be sufficient to accomplish this, that the population of several 
 provinces, or any single one, shall increase more rapidly than that 
 of Lower Canada. If, for example, the population of Upper 
 Canada followed indefinitely its progressive increase for the last 
 25 years, there would be no limits to the increase of representation. 
 
 Still we might establish an average for putting clause 20 and 
 clause 25 in harmony with each other ; this could be effected by 
 modifying the 25th clause in this manner : 
 
 The Federal Parliament may increase the representation when 
 it deems it proper ; but it must have the consent of two-thirds of 
 the members present and absent in both branches of the Legisla. 
 ture ; that is to say, 130 votes in the House of Commons and 51 
 Totes in the Legislative Council. 
 
 In this way clause 20 would only be touched by Parliament in a 
 
 ase of actual necessity, and clause 25 would become an ample 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 87 
 
 guarantee for the stability of clause 20. We ought to consent to 
 this restriction, or something similar to it, the more readily, because 
 in placing the word " never " in the 20th clause, it has at least 
 been intended to give it stability and durability. 
 
 laments attfo tjmr JjrMtges, tit. 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 
 26. • Until provisions are made by the General Parliament, all the laws 
 which, at the date of the Proclamation constituting the Union, are in 
 force in the provinces respectively, relating to the qualification and 
 disqualification of any persoD to be elected, or to sit or vote as a Mem- 
 ber of the Assembly in the said provinces respectively ; and relating to 
 the qualification or disqualification of voters and to the oaths to be 
 taken by voters, and to Returning Officers and their powers and duties 
 — and relating to the proceedings at Elections, — and to the period 
 during which such elections may be continued, — and relating to the 
 Trial of Controverted Elections, and the proceedings incident thereto, 
 — and relating: to the vacating- of seats ot Members, and to the issuing 
 and execution of new Writs, in case of any seat being vacated other- 
 wise than by a dissolution — shall respectively apply to Elections of 
 Members to serve in the House sf Commons, for places situate in those 
 provin»es respectively.' 
 
 27. 'Every House of Commons shall continue for five years from the day 
 of the return of the writs choosing the same, and no longer ; subject, 
 nevertheless, to be sooner prorogued or dissolved by the Governor-' 
 
 CLAUSE 26 requires no explanation ; but clause 27 will proba- 
 bly give rise to some debate. The advocates of annual Parlia- 
 ments, who are not very numerous among us to-day, will say, that 
 we wish to restrict the control of the people over their representa- 
 tives. But when we consider that, though the maximum of the 
 duration of our Parliament has been fixed at a period of four years, 
 we have had nine general elections in 24 years, as follows : 1841, 
 '44, '48, '51, '54, '57, '59, '61 and '63, and that consequently tbe 
 average of each Parliament has been but two years and two-thirds, 
 therefore five years will not be found an exaggerated figure for the 
 maximum period of a Federal Parliament, which will give us 
 
88 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 three years and a third for the average duration of Parliaments. 
 That is surely little enough. 
 
 We are informed that an effort was made to establish it at seven 
 years, as in England, but that a great majority of the delegates 
 pronounced for five years, as being the most acceptable to the 
 people. This decision of the question has not called forth any 
 objection in the different provinces. How could it possibly do so, 
 when the population of our provinces are literally worried and tired 
 out by the elections which succeed each other, as it were, without 
 interruption, from the 1st of January to the last of December in 
 each year ? Election to the Legislative Council, election to the 
 Legislative Assembly, elections of municipal councillors, of com- 
 missioners of schools (in Lower Canada), of church wardens, as 
 well as many others. 
 
 If Confederation be accomplished, we shall be rid of the elections 
 for the Legislative Council, which now take place every eight 
 years ; but we shall have instead the Federal elections, which will 
 take place nearly every three years and a half ; elections to the local 
 Legislative Assemblies, which will probably be for periods still 
 shorter, and perhaps those of Legislative Councillors for the local 
 governments. 
 
 Those who have been in the habit of seeing these elections, know 
 their demoralizing effect upon the people, and should not conse- 
 quently desire them, except in that degree necessary to liberty and 
 to the salutary control of the people over their representatives. 
 
 For our part we would prefer six years for a maximum, which 
 would give us parliaments averaging about four years in duration. 
 
 Still we willingly accept five years, which is an improvement 
 upon four years, because it tends to lengthen the electoral periods, 
 and because it is more in accordance with the almost universal 
 feeling of the whole of the provinces. 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 89 
 
 Iprikte of % §tmml §akmmmi 
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 TTfE have reached that part of the ^Resolutions which relates 
 ' ' to the attributes of the General Parliament. These comprise 
 all questions of public order, minus those reserved for the action 
 of the Local Governments : — 
 
 ' The Public Debt and Property. 
 ' The Regulation of Trade and Commerce. 
 
 ' The imposition or regulation of Duties of Customs oh Imports and Exports, 
 —except on Exports of Timber, Logs, Masts, Spars, Deals and Sawn 
 Lumber from New Brunswick, and of Coal and other minerals from 
 Nora Scotia. 
 ' The imposition or regulation of Excise Duties. 
 ' The raising of money by all or any other systems of Taxation. 
 ' The borrowing of Money on the Public Credit. 
 ' Postal Service. 
 
 ' Lines of Steam or any other Ships, Railways, Canals and other works, 
 connecting any two or more of the Provinces together or extending 
 beyond the limits of any Province. 
 ' Lines of Steamships between the Federated Provinces and other countries. 
 ' Telegraphic Communication and the Incorporation of Telegraph Com- 
 panies. 
 ' The Census. 
 
 ' Militia — Military and Naval^Service and Defence. 
 ' Quarantine. 
 
 ' Sea Coast and Inland Fisheries. 
 1 Currency and Coinage, 
 
 ' Banking — Incorporation of Banks and the issue of paper money. 
 ' Savings Banks. 
 ' Weights and Measures. 
 ' Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes. 
 ' Bankruptcy and Insolvency. 
 ' Patents of Invention and Discovery. 
 ' Copy Rights, 
 
 ' Indians and Lands reserved for the Indians. 
 ' Naturalization and Aliens. 
 ' The Criminal Law, excepting the Constitution of Courts of Criminal 
 
 jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Criminal matters. 
 ' Rendering uniform all or any of the laws relative to property and civil 
 rights in Upper Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland 
 and Prince Edward Island, and rendering uniform the procedure of 
 all or of any of the Courts in these Provinces ; but any Statute for 
 this purpose shall have no force or authority in any Province until 
 sanctioned by the Legislature thereof, 
 'The establishment of a General Court of Appeal for the Federated 
 
 Provinces. ' 
 
 ' Immigration. 
 ' Agriculture.' 
 
 12 
 
90 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Whenever exceptional causes do not interfere with, the general 
 rule, the attributes above alluded to shall belong to the Federal 
 Parliament, because by so deciding, we shall obtain unity in 
 action, rapidity of execution, with uniformity and efficacy in the 
 result. For this reason, we shall only allude to those objections 
 which may furnish matter for discussion on account of the 
 exceptional position occupied by Lower Canada. 
 
 The first exceptional question is to be found in the 31st para- 
 graph of the 29th Resolution of the Conference. 
 
 MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE. 
 
 If Lower Canada had not existed, it is more than probable that 
 the Civil Code would have been universalized, and would have 
 been made one of the absolute attributes of the General Parlia- 
 ment. We are led to believe this because the Criminal Code is 
 by the same clause, 82nd Section, made an attribute ; also in the 
 -33rd Section of the same clause, it seems to be foreseen that the 
 system of civil law will be the same over all the provinces of the 
 Confederation, Lower Canada being specially excepted. The Civil 
 Law of Lower Canada essentially belongs to that section, and 
 nothing on earth could induce Lower Canadians to abandon it, 
 because it is based upon reason, and above all, on the Roman Law, 
 perhaps the greatest effort of human wisdom; because it is 
 appreciated by us, it agrees with our manners and predelictions, 
 and because we find in its provisions greater protection for our 
 property and our families than under any other system. Marrriage 
 and divorce are essentially component parts of the Civil Code. . 
 They involve two great social questions, in other words, they 
 involve the position of society itself, taken either in its normal 
 condition or in a state of dissolution. 
 
 Keason leads us to believe that on no account whatever should 
 the marriage tie be dissolved, and the Parliament of France after 
 having replaced in the Civil Code the principle of the indissolubility 
 of that tie in 1816, under the civilizing inspiration of Chateau- 
 briand, has constantly maintained it as part of the Code from that 
 date, in spite of the thrice repeated efforts of the Representative 
 Chamber to have it erased, and even with the consent of the 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 91 
 
 immense majority of the popular body after the Kevolution of 
 July. It was not Catholic feelings that actuated these men, their 
 opinions were based upon simple reason, and the desire to preserve 
 their families intact, in order that society might not be affected or 
 broken up. 
 
 What is society, considered out of the limits of that Christian 
 sanction which elevates it, and protects its inviolability 1 It is 
 composed of a mixture of human beings, living without re- 
 lations one with the other, without an object, without laws and 
 without clearly defined duties. If this be the case, why should 
 we have civil laws which impose obligations and attributions, 
 duties, rights and reciprocal claims? Why, -again, should we 
 have criminal laws that protect civil law in its operation, that 
 protect persons and property against the violators of those rights 
 ■created for the former, and the duties created for the latter ? In 
 a word, what is the pivot around which circulate these wisely- 
 conceived civil laws, — these complicated and elaborate provisions of 
 the human intellect ? They all rest upon the rights of property. 
 
 It is therefore only with regard to property, that rights and 
 duties exist in our social system ; in a system of religious order, 
 we find society seeking to attain its object, while in the other, we 
 fied society in its working and mechanical operation. 
 
 But if the rights of property be surrounded by so much protec- 
 tion and respect, and we might even say, religious veneration , 
 it must be because the meum and the tuum, which are the basis of 
 the civil code, exist otherwise than in the roughness of ma- 
 terialism; it must be, that its origin is divine in its nature, 
 because otherwise the meum and tuum would be of no value 
 would signify nothing, and the laws that establish them would be 
 mere absurdities and criminal violations of liberty. 
 
 Property constitutes the fundamental basis of society, orrather } 
 it is society itself, because without it the word society would have 
 no meaning. Why is it that marriage occupies such a prominent 
 position in the history of the whole world, and in the civil code ? 
 It is because property is to society what the form is to the human 
 body ; one cannot exist without the other, and if right of property 
 
92 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 be sacred and of divine origin, the formula inherent to it must 
 necessarily be of equal importance. 
 
 Marriage furnishes the natural means by which property can be 
 -transmitted. It is for this reason that it exists, under different 
 forms, it is true, but has existed at every period of the world's 
 history, even amongst the most barbarous nations from which 
 civilization had been completely excluded. 
 
 Our laws do not establish the right of property, but they 
 form, regulate, and determine the mode to be adopted in its 
 transmission. Laws do not establish marriage. It was in exis- 
 tence before the laws. It comes immediately after property 
 the latter as well as society being unable to subsist without it, 
 and the laws operate upon the institution of marriage by 
 guiding its effects and by providing for the transmission of .pro- 
 perty. Why do we find Holy writ filled with maledictions and 
 terrible punishment for adultery, if it is not because the latter 
 brings strangers into the family, and thus deprives the legitimate 
 heirs of their rights of property ? Thus, marriage should be held 
 sacred and inviolable, since property is so, and this could not be 
 -if it were not so held; and the errors of individuals should no 
 more affect it than they do the principles involved in rights of 
 property. 
 
 We know that Protestant nations differ from us on the subject 
 ■ of marriage ; they admit that reasons for divorce may exist. From 
 the moment that this principle is admitted, the institution of mar- 
 riage is fatally attacked, and a means is furnished by which social 
 bonds are dissolved, because family rights are no longer inviolate. 
 
 How can they say, ' Thus far shalt thou go and no further,' be- 
 cause, if they admit that marriage is a question of public order, 
 ithe laws concerning' it will be formed according to the manners of 
 the day which are at all times liable to variation. This is the his- 
 ■tory of every nation, and it is unfortunately the history of Eng- 
 land at the present day. 
 
 Protestantism, when it admits divorce on account of adultery, 
 "4>ases its action on the words of our Saviour : ' He who puts away 
 1 his wife except it be for adultery, and marries another, is himself 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 93 
 
 1 guilty of adultery, and he who marries her who has been so put 
 ' away is also guilty of adultery.' 
 
 It is certainly difficult to misinterpret the sense of these divine 
 words, because th_e Founder of Christianity, while prohibiting 
 divorce except for adultery, refused to permit even a simple separa- 
 tion on the ground of incompatibility of temper, and only allowed 
 that separation on the ground of adultery. 
 
 His thought is still more clearly explained, when the act of 
 marrying her who has been so put away is also termed adultery. 
 If the matrimonial bond could be severed by reason of adultery, 
 he who may have married the woman after a divorce could not be 
 considered an adulterer, because reason teaches us that you cannot 
 sever and bind at the same time. 
 
 While maintaining the inviolability of the conjugal tie, and con- 
 sequently of the social form, the Saviour of the world permitted 
 the casting away of the adulterous wife, and her expulsion from 
 the rights of marriage ; and this principle has been embodied in 
 the civil code by Christian legislators under the title of Separa- 
 tion de corps. 
 
 Whatever may be said on the subject of principles and duty, 
 parliaments have an equal power to regulate the questions of mar- 
 riage and divorce, as they have with regard to the rights of persons, 
 the possession of goods and chattels, and the transmission of pro- 
 perty. Our Legislature has frequently exercised tMis power, be- 
 cause the Protestants are in a majority, and the question we have 
 now to enter upon is the following : — Should marriage and divorce 
 form part of the attributes of the Federal Parliament or of the 
 local Legislatures ? 
 
 We shall consider in the first place that which relates to divorce. 
 
94 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 gifrorce. 
 
 CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 FOE our part, we believe that since the question of divorce must 
 necessarily be submitted to a certain control, it should be 
 placed under the direction of the Federal Parliament, instead of 
 being an attribute of the Local Legislatures. 
 
 Catholie opinion urged that a question of such social importance 
 should be left to the Local Governments, but, let it be understood, 
 that in leaving it as regards Lower Canada to a Protestant majority, 
 we only maintain the present condition of that important question. 
 By so referring it to the Federal Government, we avoid many 
 causes of contention and many violent complaints which might 
 eventually be listened to by the Mother Country, where divorce is 
 legalized and operates as a social institution. 
 
 Who can say that the Protestants — who are in great majority in 
 our present Parliament, and who will constitute the two-thirds of 
 the Confederation, — would ever have consented to localize legisla- 
 tion on the subject of divorce ; and even had they consented to 
 this, would it have been wise to establish a rule which, although 
 apparently favorable to one province, might have fatally interfered 
 with five other provinces, in all of which Protestants are in 
 majority ? 
 
 By submiting divorce to the control of the Local Legislatures, it 
 would have been rendered too easy, and might have become of as 
 frequent occurrence as in certain states of the American Union. 
 
 The higher the position of the tribunal before which interested 
 parties must appear to demand the dissolution of the marriage tie> 
 the smaller will be the number of divorce cases. From 1841 until 
 the present day, we only know of four such' applications. Divorce 
 is always costly, and the public proof of dishonor is so hideous and 
 so solemn, that in almost every case the accuser falters before the 
 terrible ordeal. 
 
 But if legislation on the subject of divorce were left to each 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 95 
 
 province, there might be a great difference, because the cheapness 
 of the procedure and the comparative lessening of the solemnity 
 would be the means of multiplying cases ad infinitum, as in certain 
 portions of the United States, where divorce is an institution whieh 
 regulates marriage, and has a greater hold on the manners and 
 customs of the people. If at a future day, and we sincerely hope 
 that it may not be so, the Federal Legislature were to establish 
 general enactments on the subject of divorce, let us hope that we 
 shall at least be able to secure the privilege, that they shall only 
 apply to Protestants. 
 
 But if, up to the present day, the Protestant majority have never 
 even thought of general legislation on that subject; if it has 
 reserved the privilege of deciding each case according to its own 
 merits, in order that divorce might be more difficult to obtain, and 
 to prevent it, except under circumstances of an extraordinary 
 nature, by surrounding it with all kinds of difficulties, and by 
 making the procedure very costly : we must believe, that unless 
 the standard of morals becomes lowered (and we Jsee no indication 
 of such a result), the same opinion on this subject will prevail in 
 the Federal Parliament. 
 
 The Local Legislatures, several of which will represent very small 
 provinces, could net give us the same guarantees of conservatism 
 and elevated tone in feelings and ideas that we will find in the 
 Federal Parliament, which will be composed, in a great measure; 
 of the eminent men of all the provinces. ThoBe men, from motives 
 of personal dignity apart from every other important consideration, 
 will, we may rest assured, insist uponjnaintaining "society on a 
 respectable basis. 
 
 Moreover, this proposal does not seem to have raised any opposi- 
 tion on the part of those who possess authority to speak and to 
 judge; with this exception, that it became unpleasant for Catholic 
 ears to hear the word ' divorce 4 so often and so plainly pronounced, 
 and it was still more painful to read it in such distinct letters in 
 the new Constitution. 
 
 If the Constitutional Act of 1840 gave to the Canadian Parlia- 
 ment the absolute power of legislating upon the subject of divorce, 
 
96 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 at least we are spared from seeing it written in the pages of that 
 Act. Therefore (and many complain of this omission), why was 
 it not stated in the project of constitution in general terms, 'that 
 ' the powers not attributed specially to the Local Legislatures should 
 ' belong to the Federal Parliament.' 
 
 We would certainly agree with those who complain, if their 
 suggestion could be realized without producing a result precisely 
 contrary to what we desire. It is provided by one of the clauses of 
 this project of the Conference, that civil legislation will be left to 
 the Legislature of Lower Canada, and as divorce, legally speaking, 
 is nothing more than a dissolution of the civil contract, it follows 
 that, with the question of marriage, it must form part of the 
 category of civil laws, and will thus become a special attribute of 
 our local Legislature. 
 
 Thus, if it is intended that divorce shall be regulated as a Federal 
 question, it should be distinctly and specially laid down that such 
 would be the case ; it is, perhaps, an exaction, but it is a necessary 
 one. 
 
 Storage. 
 
 CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 rpHE same rules do not apply to marriage, because the latter 
 J- cannot lead to the same inconvenient results and produce the 
 same disastrous consequences. Marriage, being a civil contract, 
 belongs to the civil code, in which it occupies a very prominent 
 position, and, under different titles, it takes up the greater part of 
 that code, we mean of course, as regards consequences. If, therefore, 
 as stated in the project of the Conference, Lower Canada is to have 
 the control of its own civil legislation, why should that privilege be 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 97 
 
 surreptitiously taken away, particularly as it is clearly granted in 
 another part -of that same project ? Either the civil code should 
 or should not be under the control of the local Legislature ; if it is 
 to form part of it, let it be really and substantially incorporated in it. 
 If, on the other hand, we are told, and we really believe it, ' that 
 ' there is no intention of interfering with our code and of affecting 
 1 the consequences which may result from the marriage contract/ it 
 would be much better immediately to define what is meant by the 
 word 'marriage' as it occurs in the project. 
 
 If, by connecting the words divorce and marriage, it be intendsd 
 to grant to the divorced husband or wife the privilege of re-marry- 
 ing, we require no explanation ; and again, if the degrees of rela- 
 tionship and the absolute impediments that invalidate marriage are 
 to be included, we also understand the meaning ; but it is essential 
 that explanations and definitions should be given with precision, 
 because otherwise there must inevitably be conflict of opinion be- 
 tween the two legislative authorities, or a complete annihilation or 
 the control to be exercised by our Local Legislatures over the civil 
 code. 
 
 One Legislature might say : 'We have the control of legislation 
 ' on the subject of marriage/ and the other might say : ' Marriage 
 ' is a civil contract j is forms part of our code ; you have therefore 
 ' no right to touch the question. Can you now declare that the 
 ' subject no longer forms part of that code ? Therefore, why are 
 ' we told in the clauses of the constitution that we are to have the 
 ' control of our civil laws ? The 15th section of the 43rd clause of 
 ' the project of the Conference is therefore a deception and a lie.' 
 These conflicts will inevitably be brought before the tribunals, and 
 unless there be an exact and distinct definition, the bench of judges 
 will be divided in opinion. Some will say, 'that marriage in one 
 ' case can only be considered in its relation to divorce and to the 
 ' liberty of the person divorced to re-marry or not ;' others ' that 
 'the word marriage, in its most comprehensive interpretation, 
 ' means all acts of marriage, all the qualities and conditions re- 
 ' quired for the celebration of marriage and the marriage contract, 
 ' all causes of nullity, all its obligations, its dissolution "siparation 
 J 
 
98 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 'de corps," its causes and effects, in a word, all the consequences 
 ' that may possibly result from marriage, with regard to husband 
 'and wife, to the children and to successions. Thus, all these 
 'matters are under the control of the Federal Parliament, and the 
 ' Local Legislature is deprived of all right of legislation on the sub- 
 ' ject of marriage/ 
 
 And again, others may say : ' No ; there is concurrent jurisdic- 
 ' tion, and in any case of conflict of legislation, the federal action 
 ' must prevail, and local legislation, with regard to marriage and 
 ' its consequences, shall only be valid when the Federal Parliament 
 ^ is silent on the subject.' 
 
 And there is a fourth view of the question : ' If divorce is ex- 
 fi clusively under the control of the Federal Government, because it 
 ■'is placed in the category of its attributes, marriage, which is 
 ' mentioned in the same manner, and is, in fact, in juxtaposition to 
 ' it in the project, will have to be submitted to the same rule, be- 
 ' cause divorce, in its nature, also forms an essential part of the 
 ' civil code, and if the thesis of a double jurisdiction can be main- 
 / tained with regard to marriage, it must be equally applicable in 
 ' the case of divorce.' 
 
 This word, thus placed, creates an immense gap in our civil code. 
 "We must not forget that the proj ect of the Conference provides, 
 -that whenever a conflict of legislation shall occur between the two 
 parliaments in cases of concurrent jurisdiction ; the judges shall 
 give the preference to the laws enacted by the Federal Parliament. 
 It becomes therefore essential that clear explanations should be 
 given, in order that there may be neither ambiguity nor misunder- 
 standing, and that if there are certain matters connected with the 
 questions of marriage or divorce which we would prefer to place 
 under the control of the Federal Parliament, they should be so dis- 
 tinctly defined that no possible misinterpretation can arise. 
 
 We are aware that the delegates have acted with irreproachable 
 fair play and sincerity, and while they conceded to us the 
 control of our civil code, they never had any intention either 
 of depriving us of its benefits or of weakening it by federal 
 legislation. But they had so many questions of a paramount 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 99 
 
 political nature to discuss ; they had such a short time to devote 
 to each, that it became impossible to define every question with 
 precision, and to foresee, at the moment, all possible conflicts and 
 difficulties. 
 
 Moreover, they could not pretend to be infallible, and it was im- 
 possible for them, in a first attempt, to record every point in a 
 rigorous and permanent form. They could only indicate in a gen- 
 eral manner the subjects submitted to them, and establish, without 
 absolute detail, the reciprocal attributes of the two legislative 
 authorities. 
 
 It was intended that the project should be submitted to Parlia- 
 ment and the press, leaving to them the duty of pointing out any- 
 thing that may have been forgotten in the examination of such an 
 important work. It could only be after going through such a 
 rigorous ordeal, that the different governments represented by their 
 delegates could correct and define, if such proceeding were neces- 
 sary ; otherwise, the publicity of tht project which we are now 
 discussing, would be deprived of its object. 
 
 Criminal fato. 
 
 CHAPTER XXIV. 
 
 (Resolution 29, clause 32), ' The Criminal Law, excepting the constitu- 
 tion of Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure 
 in Criminal matters.' 
 
 NOTHING can be more reasonable than this proviso, as the 
 proposed object is unity, and it becomes necessary to advance 
 towards that unity whenever local considerations do not place 
 obstacles in our way. 
 
 Our criminal law is nothing more than English criminal law 
 slightly modified by our statutes ; and these modifications are, in a 
 
100 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 great measure, copied from the gradual changes made from time to 
 time in that branch of law, by the Parliament of Great Britain. 
 
 The criminal law of Upper Canada and of the Maritime Pro- 
 vinces, is derived from the criminal law of England, slightly 
 modified by local statutes. English law furnishes in the Courts of 
 all the Provinces (in criminal matters) the requisite precedents. 
 Nothing but English authorities are quoted in such matters. 
 
 If, for the reasons given elsewhere, we are desirous of maintain- 
 ing the operation of our civil code, for the same reasons, we are 
 proud to possess English criminal law, which has governed us 
 since the conquest, and now happily forms part of our institutions. 
 
 If the English civil code be frequently obscure; if it rests more 
 on precedents than on principles ; if matters of form are frequently 
 considered more important than facts : if fiction governs reality • 
 and if the procedure in the courts of England becomes a tortuous 
 labyrinth in which the mind seems to be lost, and in which science 
 even becomes discouraged, we cannot speak in the same terms of 
 the criminal law of England, in which the exercise of absolute 
 power is of itself criminal; in which the accused may find protection 
 and warranty as well against surprises as against tyranny ; in which 
 far from being condemned without a hearing, he is furnished with 
 all possible means of defence, and is warned to beware of his own 
 imprudence and indiscretion. 
 
 If English criminal law really has a fault, it is certainly in an 
 exaggeration of the means provided for individual protection. It 
 seems to have a weakness for individuals, and perhaps does not 
 sufficiently protect society against their aggressions. 
 
 In France, a man's antecedents frequently lead to his condem- 
 nation ; his career is taken as it were from the cradle, and it is 
 traced by the police through every phase; the points at which he 
 has stopped and the motives of his visits are laid before him ; 
 every act of his whole life is recorded with fidelity. He can even 
 be forced to recollect words unintentionally spoken, and the society 
 in which he has moved. He is asked to explain these different 
 acts of his life, in order to make use of his replies. He is com- 
 pelled to make avowals, in order that they may be recorded against 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE* 101 
 
 him. In such a case, it is society against the individual, and in 
 such an unequal contest, a description of which we have just given, 
 the latter inevitably succumbs. 
 
 English criminal law, on the contrary, pays no attention to the 
 past, and fearing that the accused may not be on his guard, 
 he is solemnly warned by the tribunal not to incriminate himself. 
 Doubts are always in his favor, and frequently also the sympathy 
 of the jury. "While the prosecuting counsel is obliged to present 
 direct evidence against the accused, and while the former charac- 
 ter of the latter, whatever may be the accusation against him, can 
 be of no moral weight in the case, he can, on the other hand, pro- 
 duce evidence of general good conduct, and thus soften, as icwere, 
 the harshness and strength of the material evidence adduced 
 against him. 
 
 He possesses the right of challenging a large number of jurymen, 
 and he has, as it were, the selection of his judges, among whom, 
 he frequently finds the means of placing friends and men disposed 
 to acquit him, whatever the evidence may be. Such is the respect 
 for individuals, that the least defect in the form of procedure des- 
 troys the whole accusation, and sometimes even permits of escape 
 from the gallows, after sentence has been recorded against the 
 criminal. 
 
 Although the jury system contains defects and produces incon- 
 venience, by permitting the escape of many guilty parties ; taken 
 with habeas corpus, it is one of the greatest of all guarantees for 
 individual liberty. These two great principles are justly regarded 
 with pride by the people of England. 
 
 That law is ours, as well as it is that of the other provinces, and 
 they perhaps, more than ourselves, insist upon the immunities en- 
 joyed under the English criminal code. Therefore, there can be no 
 danger ; on the contrary, there is wisdom, in trusting this question 
 to the Federal Parliament. 
 
102 THE NEW CONSTITUTION". 
 
 %\t Courts, Jpiitfmmfs antr fokrs of Jeajs- 
 
 lahins. 
 
 CHAPTER XXV. 
 
 THE establishment of a General Court of Appeal for the 
 Federated Provinces. (Section 29, clause 34.) 
 
 31. ' The General Parliament may also, from time to time, establish 
 additional Courts, and the General Government may appoint Judges 
 and Officers thereof, when the same shall appear necessary or for the 
 public advantage, in order to the due execution of the laws of Parlia- 
 ment. 
 
 32. ' All Courts, Judges and officers of the several Provinces shall aid, 
 assist and obey the General Government in the exercise of its rights 
 and powers, and for such purposes shall be held to be Courts, Judges 
 and Officers of the General Government, 
 
 33. 'The General Government shall appoint and pay the Judges of 
 the Superior Courts in each Province, and of the County Courts in 
 Upper Canada, and Parliament shall fix their salaries. 
 
 35. 'The Judges of the Courts of Lower Canada shall be selected fromthe 
 
 Ear of Lower Canada. 
 31. ' The Judges of the Superior Courts shall hold their offices during good 
 
 behaviour, and shall be removeable only on the Address of both 
 
 Houses of Parliament. 
 45. ' In regard to all subjects over which Jurisdiction belongs to both the 
 
 General and Local Legislatures, the laws of the General Parliament 
 
 shall control and supersede those made by the Local Legislature, and 
 
 the latter shall be void so far as they are repugnant to, or inconsistent 
 
 with, the former. 
 
 38. ' For each of the Provinces there shall be an Executive Officer, styled 
 the Lieutenant Governor, who shall be appointed by the Governor 
 General in Council, under the Great Seal of the Federated Pro- 
 vinces, during pleasure : such pleasure not to be exercised before the 
 expiration of the first five years except for cause : such cause to be 
 communicated [in writing to the Lieutenant Governor immediately 
 after the exercise of the pleasure as aforesaid, and also by Message to 
 both Houses of Parliament, within the first week of the first session 
 afterwards. 
 
 39. ' The Lieutenant Governor of each Province shall be paid by the 
 
 General Government. ' 
 
 50, 'Any Bill of the Local Legislatures may be reserved for the considera- 
 tion of the Governor General. 
 
 51. ' Any Bill passed by a Local Legislature shall be subject to dis- 
 allowance by the Governor General within one year after the passing 
 thereof.' 
 
 The. bearing of all these resolutions is to concentrate the legis- 
 lative and judicial power in the hands of the Federal Government 
 and Parliament. Their principle is correct, provided that nothing in 
 
QLUEBEC conference. 103 
 
 it can interfere with the concessions made to the Local Legislatures, 
 or which may absorb their specific attributes. 
 
 We could find neither inconvenience nor danger in such a 
 principle, if our laws and institutions were similar to those of the 
 other provinces ; but, unfortunately, such is not the case. We 
 have special laws and institutions of our own, which really require 
 special protection. 
 
 We freely admit that there were great difficulties to overcome 
 with regard to Lower Canada ; that if on the one hand, French 
 Canadians and Catholics exacted protection for their institutions, 
 Protestants, on the other hand — who should have known better — 
 feared that their own institutions might be sacrificed in a Legisla- 
 ture composed of French Canadians and Catholics. As they 
 could not obtain a Legislative Union which neither the Lower 
 Provinces nor ourselves could accept, they desired at least to obtain, 
 in an indirect manner, a Central Government and Parliament, 
 in which they imagined they would find greater protection for 
 themselves and their property ; and, in a case of emergency, for 
 their prejudices and antipathies. 
 
 We quote from Mr. G-alt's speech : — 
 
 ' It was thought proper to give to the General Government the 
 ' right to establish a general Court of Appeal for the Federated Pro- 
 ' vinces. He thought that while there was no express provision 
 ' for the establishment of such a court, many who had studied the 
 ' question would agree, that it was desirable that the general Legis- 
 
 * lature should have the power of constituting such a court, if it 
 
 * saw fit to do so. At present, appeal lay from our courts ulti- 
 ' mately to the Queen in Privy Council, and it was not intended to 
 'deprive the subject of recourse to this ultimate court; but at the 
 ' same time it was well, in assimilating the present systems of law 
 'for the benefit of all the provinces, that they should have the 
 
 < assembled wisdom of the bench brought together in a general 
 
 < Court of Appeal, to decide ultimate causes which would, before 
 ' long, doubtless supersede the necessity of going to the enormous 
 < expense of carrying appeals to England. It was proposed to ask 
 
 * the Imperial Government to confer upon the General Govern- 
 
104 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 ' ment the power of constituting such a court, not, however, with 
 "the desire to abolish the present right of appeal to England.' 
 
 After having alluded to the importance of giving to the Gene- 
 ral Government the power of selecting the judges in the different 
 provinces, he adds : — 
 
 ' But, in the case of Lower Canada, where we had a different 
 ■* system of law altogether, it was plain that the judges could be 
 ' selected only from among gentlemen conversant with that law, 
 *■ and therefore it was provided that the judges should be selected 
 x from the bars of the respective provinces in which they were to 
 •* act ; but in the case of the consolidation of the laws of the seve- 
 * ral Maritime Provinces and of Upper Canada, the choice would 
 4 extend to the bars of all those provinces.' 
 
 If we have grouped so many resolutions together at the head of 
 this article, it was with the view of giving their general tendency, 
 and because, as regards the judicial question, they may be consi- 
 dered as corollaries of the same proposition. We shall, at another 
 time, examine several of these resolutions under different aspects, 
 and from different points of view. 
 
 With unity as a main object, these tests give additional secu- 
 rity to the Lower Canada minority in the results that may be pro- 
 duced by Confederation. We have no objection to this, provided 
 that the protection granted to one class will not be the means of 
 causing injustice to others, and that privileges given cheerfully 
 may not eventually produce disappointment. 
 
 We purpose showing that everything in the series of resolutions 
 at the head of this article seems to tend towards the same object : 
 
 1st. The courts, the judges, and the public officers of the pro- 
 vinces are to assist the General Government, and in the exercise 
 -of their rights and attributes, they must obey that power, and be- 
 come, to all intents and purposes, the courts, the judges, and the 
 officers of that Government, 
 
 2nd. The Federal Government shall appoint and pay these 
 ^officers. 
 
 3rd. That power alone can deprive them of office. 
 
 &th. When the General Government becomes dissatisfied with 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 105 
 
 any such officers, although the law may establish that they are 
 amenable to that power as it appoints, pays, and may remove them; 
 new judicial tribunals, new judges and new officers may be ap- 
 pointed, who will in reality be subject to that power, and who may 
 be placed over provincial tribunals perfectly independant of them, 
 and in exclusive possession of the attributes above alluded to. 
 Under no other circumstances could their appointment be possibly 
 justified. 
 
 In any question submitted to the concurrent jurisdiction of the- 
 Federal Parliament and local Legislatures, the laws of the former 
 shall prevail over those of the latter. Should a conflict occur, we- 
 can easily foresee what would be the chances of the latter, judge* 
 by men who know nothing of them, and who will be specially ap- 
 pointed for the purpose of giving ascendancy to the laws of the- 
 central Parliament. 
 
 5th. In order to cap the climax to this judicial edifice, the 
 Federal Parliament reserves the privilege of creating, in case of 
 necessity, a general Court of Appeal, which will be superior to the 
 whole judicial hierarchy, and which may at any time annul all 
 decisions. 
 
 How can this provision be reconciled with clause 35th, which 
 declares, ' That the judges of Lower Canada shall be selected from 
 ' the bar of Lower Canada/ because, according to Mr. Gait's words, 
 none but Lower Canada advocates can really understand the laws 
 of Lower Canada ? 
 
 How can this Court of Appeal, composed of a majority of men 
 ignorant of our laws, decide in cases referred to them ? It is in- 
 tended that they will consult judges from Lower Canada, who form> 
 part of the Bench in Appeal, on the model of the House of Lords,, 
 which leaves to the Law Lords the decision of questions of law. 
 In such a case, it would have been more reasonable to leave the 
 decision to the Court of Appeal for Lower Canada, more competent 
 to undertake the judgment of such exceptional cases. 
 
 Either our civil code is left to our Local Legislature, or it is not. 
 If it is, we should not thus surrender the power of handiDg over 
 the privilege of decision to a tribunal composed of men who do 
 
106 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 not understand it, and who would regulate those decisions accord- 
 ing to the principles of laws which we have obstinately refused to 
 accept since the days of the conquest.' 
 
 What seems to us very strange is, that while creating this Su- 
 preme Federal Court, and by placing it above the courts of the six 
 provinces, the Privy Council of Her Majesty still remains as a 
 tribunal which can be finally appealed to. The object then, of 
 creating this court, at great expense, must be merely to establish 
 another degree in the judicial scale, because suitors who may be 
 dissatisfied with the decision of a court (declared by the constitu- 
 tion itself to be incompetent) will invariably appeal to the Privy 
 Council for a final decision. 
 
 If the privilege were granted to appeal directly to the highest 
 tribunal in London, we may rest assured that they would ignore 
 the Federal Supreme Court, and thus save considerable expense, 
 while they would perhaps obtain a better decision. 
 
 The jurists who compose the judicial committee of the Privy 
 Council are profoundly versed in the science of Roman law, which 
 forms the basis of our civil code ; and they are in close proximity 
 to the leading French jurists,' whom they consult in any case of 
 difficulty. They may err sometimes in giving judgment, but, at 
 least, they give as great a guarantee of science and experience as 
 it is possible to obtain among any class of legists, and, in any case, 
 they must be regarded as composing the supreme tribunal of the 
 realm. It is very true, as Mr. G-alt remarked, that we do not im- 
 mediately constitute this Federal Court of Appeal, but we obtain 
 the power to establish it when deemed necessary. We must not 
 forget the popular proverb : — ' As we make our bed so must we lie 
 1 on it.' ' Oomme on fait son lit, on se couche' 
 
 If this tribunal be considered unnecessary, why should we re- 
 serve the right of creating it ? If the reserve is made, it must be 
 because it may have to be used against us at a future day, under 
 influences which we cannot now foresee, and which we may not 
 then be able to control. 
 
 We can easily understand the thought of the Conference, and 
 we have great confidence in Mr. Gait's sincerity, when he states 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 107 
 
 that ' there is a great difference between the possession of power 
 ' and the exercise of it.' This Court of Appeals can scarcely ex- 
 ist under a Colonial Confederation, but might be created in a Con- 
 federation holding the position of an independent nation. With 
 regard to our civil code, it would not be required, but in the ge- 
 neral constitutional questions that may arise in a conflict between 
 the legislation of the federal and that of the local governments, it 
 would be very useful. In such a case it would be much better to 
 state distinctly and clearly what is desired, and to define at the 
 outset the attributes of that great constitutional tribunal, instead 
 of thus trusting vaguely to misapprehensions as to its powers at a 
 future day, and so give rise to difficulty and danger. 
 
 But there are many clauses and judicial provisions placed in 
 the way of suitors, that may interfere with our civil code; and 
 there are others which seem to tend towards the same result : — 
 
 1st. The Lieutenant Governors shall be appointed by the Gene- 
 ral Government. 
 
 2nd. They shall be paid by that Government. 
 
 3rd. They may be removed by the same power. 
 
 4th. These Lieutenant Governors — mere creatures of the General 
 Government — will have the right of veto with respect to all laws 
 passed by the Local Legislatures. 
 
 hth. They may reserve these laws for the consideration of the 
 General Government. 
 
 Qth. As officials of that same Government, they will be com- 
 pelled to act with respect to such laws, on the instructions received 
 from the central power. 
 
 With all these obstacles, how will the Local Legislature be able 
 to be put into operation, should the General Government be in- 
 clined to thwart their legislation ? Of course we mean all this in 
 connection with the operation of our civil code. It may be said, 
 in reply to our objections, that these difficulties may never exist, 
 because they will never be entertained in the General Government 
 more than they have been in the opinions of the members of the 
 Conference. But, if the most eminent statesmen of British North 
 America have met together to write a constitution, and that in 
 
108 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 the constitution so written or composed, they have deemed it pru- 
 dent to make certain stipulations and protect certain rights in the 
 future, it must be that they have considered such precautions ne- 
 cessary, otherwise they would have passed over them in order to 
 teach, with greater certainty, that perfect unity which we also would 
 desire, could it be found practicable. 
 
 In concluding this lengthy article, we may remark, that if we do 
 -object to a federal Court of Appeal so constituted, which would 
 override our civil code, we could have no objection to reserve the 
 power for its creation as a supreme tribunal at a future day, when 
 the circumstances and consequences above described might render 
 it necessary. Neither eould we object to it, if constituted solely 
 for the five other provinces of the Confederation, whose civil laws 
 .are identically similar. 
 
 Krafurmitj! of CM Jafo. 
 
 CHAPTEK XXTI. 
 
 33. ' Rendering uniform all or any of the laws relative to the property and 
 civil rights in Upper Canada, Nova Scotia, NewBrunswick,Newfound- 
 land and Prince Ed ward Island, and rendering uniform the procedure of 
 all or any of the Courts in these Provinces; but any statute for this 
 purpose shall have no force or authority in any Province until sanc- 
 tioned by the Legislature thereof.' 
 
 THIS is an important clause to all the provinces except Lower 
 Canada. We here find what a degree of protection the project 
 gires to these provinces in relation to their civil laws. All their 
 laws are nearly similar, and yet the Federal Parliament is not to be 
 permitted to complete that assimilation without the consent of the 
 Local Legislatures ! 
 
 The veto here, instead of coming from above, will come from 
 below, and it will not be the central Parliament which will control 
 local Legislatures, but it will be the Local Legislatures which will 
 control the Federal Legislation. 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 109 
 
 In this clause the vigilant eye of the representatives of the 
 English Provinces is plainly visible ; these provinces, therefore, 
 should not find it strange if Lower Canada should seek for itself, 
 in the project, an equal measure of protection under different 
 forms ; nor should they find it more strange because we have the 
 assurance of it in the spirit of liberality shown by their representa- 
 tives in the Convention. 
 
 Emigration anft Jgnculture. 
 
 CHAPTER XXVII. 
 
 'Emigration.' Section 35, Clause 29. 
 'Agriculture.' Section 36, Clause 29. 
 
 EMIGRATION and Agriculture are questions of extreme impor- 
 tance to the country ; the Conference so well understood this, 
 that it has established, with respect to these subjects, a concurrence 
 of legislation between the Central Parliament and the Local 
 Legislatures. Thus sections four and five of clause 43, place Agri- 
 culture and Emigration under the head of Local Legislation. 
 
 Here we should have some fear of conflict, if clause 45 did 
 not say : ' In all questions which have been submitted concur- 
 rently to the control of the Federal Parliament and the Local 
 ' Legislatures, and in cases where the Federal Parliament shall have 
 ' carried a measure againsta Local Legislature, the laws of the latter 
 ' will be null and void in all cases, where they might conflict with 
 ' those of the General Parliament.' 
 
 To understand the object of these concurrent attributes, it will 
 be as well to read that part of Mr. Gait's speech which comes 
 under the head of ' Emigration and Lands.' The word 
 ' lands' here, doubtless represents the word agriculture in the 36th 
 section of the 29th clause, and in the fourth section of the 43rd 
 
 K 
 
110 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 clause of the project. Let us listen at this point to the Minister 
 of Finance: 
 
 EMIGRATION AND LANDS. 
 
 ' With regard to the position they would occupy in the Loca] 
 ' Legislature, there were two or three questions in which they must 
 ' feel very great interest, and in which they might fear, that hostile 
 ' action might be taken towards them, if such an unwise course 
 t should be attempted by their French Canadian fellow-subjects. 
 ' He would refer first to the question of Emigration and Lands. 
 ' No doubt here in the Eastern Townships it had been felt by many, 
 t that possibly, in leaving the lands in the hands of the Local 
 t Governments, some rules might be made which would restrict the 
 ' occupation of those lands to their French Canadian friends solely. 
 ' So far as his experience went, we had always been delighted to see 
 1 our wild lands settled by French Canadians, They had, like the 
 ' rest of the people, come in and bought the lands they occupied. 
 4 With regard to the public domain, it was clear that no distinction 
 1 could be drawn by the Local Legislatures. Itwas possible theyniight 
 x adopt the unwise policy of putting on a price which would prevent 
 * any from buying, but, if the land was exposed to sale, it must be 
 ' open to one race as the other. In some respects, he might have 
 ' preferred, not in the interests of Lower Canada, but in the inte. 
 ' rests of the whole country, to have seen them at the disposal of 
 ' the General Government. But circumstances prevented that — 
 • not che , position of Lower Canada, but the great importance 
 ' attached to the public domain by the Upper Canadians, and in 
 ' the case also of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick by their respec_ 
 ' tive governments and people, who were determined to have control 
 1 of their own lands ; though he thought the general interes^. 
 ' might have been promoted, if we could have gone to Europe and 
 ' put one comprehensive scheme of colonization and emigration 
 ' before the world at large. That was prevented now, and all we 
 1 could hope for, was that such wise measures might be adopted by 
 ' the Local Legislatures as would have the same results, while it was 
 ' necessary to leave in the hands of the Local Parliaments and 
 ' Governments the power of determining the rates or terms on 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. Ill 
 
 ' which lands might bs obtained by emigrants when they reached 
 ( us, or when the natural increase of our own population required 
 ' our young men to take up lands in the back country. He did not 
 ' think it should be apprehended that the Local Governments would 
 ' adopt any policy which would check that which was manifestly 
 ' for the interest of the community at large. Whatever policy were 
 ' adopted, whether a wise or a foolish one, must be a policy, apply- 
 ' ing equally to all. No distinction could be drawn, with reference 
 ' to nationality or creed among those who went upon the Crown 
 ' domain to buy lands. Ee did hope and trust that Lower Canada 
 ' would set an example of liberality, in regard to the disposal of her 
 ' lands, which he was satisfied was her true policy — and especially 
 ' in regard to her mineral lands, which were now exciting so much 
 ' attention, — and he hoped it would be the case that Lower Canada,in 
 ' seeking to dispose of her lands, would look rather to the advant- 
 ' age of having an industrious population settled upon them, than 
 ' to the direct pecuniary benefit she might get from their sale.' 
 
 We may be sure that these are not Mr. Gait's own fears that he 
 expressed on that solemn occasion, but rather those of the popula- 
 tion to whom he spoke ; for in all his relations with us, that eminent 
 man must have learnt to know us better. He knows that on every 
 occasion, we have carried toleration and generosity to its utmost 
 limits ; he knows that fanaticism and prejudice have never enjoyed 
 the right of citizenship among us ; if they have been found in our 
 country, and if they have thrust themselves upon the national soil, 
 he may rest assured that they are not indigenous to that soil. 
 Were the French Canadians to be in a majority to-morrow in the 
 Local Legislature, we would not find them adopting the exclusive 
 policy of which they have seen so many sad examples elsewhere. 
 
 In asking to be allowed to develope their own resources, accord- 
 ing to their natural force and expansion, they do not desire to 
 restrain the liberty of others; and as the supreme interest of all. 
 is the settlement of the country, they will never foolishly place 
 taxes on the sale of public lands to such a degree as to force their 
 own people to go and seek their fortune and livelihood in a strange 
 land. 
 
112 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 There is then no danger, as Mr. Gait has observed, that they 
 will, by such a suicidal policy, drive away men of other creeds 
 and other origins ; for a similar erroneous policy would drive away 
 those of their own creed and of their own origin. But Mr. Gait 
 has not said a word of the concurrent Legislation of which the 
 project of the constitution speaks in regard to emigration and 
 agriculture. He only tells us, that it would be desirable that they 
 should organize in Europe an emigration to the British Provinces, 
 on a vast scale. Is it with that object that the Federal Parliament 
 reserves the right of legislating upon emigration and agriculture ? 
 and, in that concurrent power, does it reserve also the right of 
 fixing the price and conditions of the sale of lands ? This is an 
 important point to clear up, for conflicts on this subject would be 
 regrettable, and, in any case, to avoid them, it would be wise to 
 define with care the attributes of the two Legislatures in relation 
 to these same questions. 
 
 Jppouttat ana Satts of ft%*s. 
 
 CHAPTER XXVIII. 
 
 33. ' The General Government shall appoint and pay the Judges of the 
 Superior Courts in the different provinces, and of the County Courts 
 in Upper Canada, and the Federal Parliament shall fix their salaries.' 
 
 IF local legislation is otherwise protected, and if some amend- 
 ments, such as we have indicated in our last articles, might 
 be made in the project of constitution, we could see no incon- 
 venience to Lower Canada arising from the judges being nominated 
 and paid by the Federal Government ; for it is evident, according 
 to that same text of the project, that if any judge be guilty of 
 flagrant dereliction of duty, he may be dismissed ; such derelic- 
 tion as has not been seen since the Union, — though it has been 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 113 
 
 our fate to witness many strange things during these last 25 
 years of social and political existence, — and consequently, nothing 
 would induce the judges to give an undue preference to federal 
 over Local Legislation. 
 
 One of the guarantees for Lower Canada is the obligation 
 upon the Central Government to take the judges from Lower 
 Canada. This is a species of compromise between the two authori- 
 ties — that the one shall pay and the other shall furnish them. If 
 the Local Government had both paid and provided the judges, the 
 Federal Government might perhaps have had some apprehensions 
 in respect to the legislation of the Central Parliament ; the same 
 way as if the Federal Government had both furnished and paid 
 the judges, the Local Legislature would have had some ground for 
 fears in respect to the integrity of their own laws. 
 
 But beyond these considerations, the Conference seems to have 
 wished to establish an equilibrium between the two legislative 
 and governmental authorities. They had another and a higher 
 interest — that was the social and scientific value of the judicial 
 tribunals. They feared that, in leaving the choice of the high 
 functionaries of justice at the disposal of the Local Governments, 
 the intellectual and moral level of our tribunals would have 
 succumbed under theinfluence of intrigue, and they justly thought 
 that the General Government would, on the whole, choose better, 
 and make that choice among the most eminent men of our bar, 
 without being swayed by small local coteries, in fact, without 
 paying any attention to their recommendations. 
 
 k2 
 
114 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Jkittmitf-dotoitors. 
 
 CHAPTER XXIX. 
 
 38. 'Each Province shall have an Executive officer, styled " Lieutenant 
 Governor,", who will be appointed by the Governor General in Council, 
 etc' 
 
 THIS plan will probably be the one most discussed in the debate 
 which is about to open in a few days. Some desire that the 
 LieutenanijGrovernors should be chosen by the Local Legislatures j 
 others, that they be chosen by the Sovereign, as in the case of the 
 present governors of provinces ; others again, that they be elected 
 by the people. 
 
 We may say in the first place, that the election of Lieutenant 
 •Governors by the Legislature is simply absurd; for, if they 
 were elected by the members, they would always be dependent upon 
 them, and would not be sufficiently free to resist the aggressions 
 of those who had elected them. The Governor himself forms one 
 of the three bodies which compose the Legislature ; he is as 
 essential as the other two, for without his concurrence no law can 
 be passed by them. It is then necessary that he should be inde- 
 pendent of them in the same degree that they are independent of 
 him, and that he should be as free to refuse and sanction as them- 
 selves. It is necessary that he should hold the right of veto, a 
 right inherent in the nature of his legislative existence. But if 
 he were to be their creature, he would cease to be their equal, and 
 the utility as the reason for his ' rdle' would no longer exist. 
 
 Thus, the only three rational modes, upon which opinions differ, 
 are : the choice by the G-eneral Government, as the Conference 
 desire it ; by the Sovereign ; and by the election of the people. 
 
 It is easy to understand the object of the nomination of gover- 
 nors by the Sovereign, in the colonial condition of British North 
 America. These men are the immediate representatives and 
 guardians of Imperial sovereignty. But that would rationally 
 cease to be necessary from the moment that, by another political 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 115 
 
 organizatioD, the necessity for looal representation of the Crown 
 oeases, and that we can concentrate in a single person the character 
 and attributes of Imperial sovereignty, from the moment that, by 
 a single representation, the arm of the Sovereign can reach every 
 point of the domain of the empire. 
 
 The only argument against this order of things is, that it tends 
 to diminish the number of chances for the advancement of certain 
 men in the country, but the argument is worth nothing to anybody 
 but them ; the personal interests of individuals can weigh but 
 little against the destinies of a whole people. 
 
 The object of this concentration of the administrative power is 
 sufficiently evident. The Conference desired by that means, to 
 simplify the relations of the Sovereign, with all Her domains 
 situated in North America ; they also wished by this concentration 
 to render the executive action more spontaneous and more effica- 
 cious — on great occasions and where decisive action is necessary — 
 they wished also, for the future, to substitute the sovereignty of the 
 Federal Government for Imperial sovereignty, in order to maintain 
 in the new empire that direct action, but tempered always by 
 those constitutional checks, by means of which the Government of 
 the Mother Country has been able to maintain its sovereignty over 
 the whole extent -of its colonial possessions. 
 
 Some have also spoken of the honor the colonies would derive 
 from being represented by men born within their limits. But this 
 consideration would be personal only, in the case of those who 
 should have the good fortune to be chosen, but would have no 
 value in the consideration of the great question of which we were 
 just speaking ; that is to say, in relation to governors named by 
 the Imperial Government. 
 
 Those who would wish the governors to be elected by the people 
 follow another order of ideas. They are even opposed to monar- 
 chical institutions. 
 
 Kepublicans rather than Democrats, they prefer the elective 
 principle, pushed to its most extreme and exaggerated limits, to 
 the really democratic constitution of Great Britain, which gives to 
 
116 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 that people a more immediate, constant and efficacious control over 
 the Government. 
 
 They want elective governors, because elective governors are a 
 direct step towards the establishment of a republic. But, for those 
 who aspire to another state of things — for those who would escape 
 the demagogical water-spout in the midst of which the Northern 
 Southern and Central American Republics are convulsively strug- 
 gling ; for those who would keep beyond the sphere of influence of 
 the Great Republic which is now, after eighty years' experience, 
 already decrepit and worm-eaten ; for those who are not annexation- 
 ists ; for those who cherish the noble thought of founding a new 
 empire upon bases more stable and upon principles more in har- 
 mony with the institutions, the manners and the sentiments of the 
 Lower Canadian people ; for those who do not wish to see their in- 
 stitutions and their language, of which they are so proud, swallowed 
 up in the immense abyss where everything disappears, and to the 
 surface of which only ascends the fetid scum of material interests and 
 moral corruption ; for those who desire not to be taxed to exhaus- 
 tion, to pay their share of five hundred millions of dollars of annual 
 tax and of the three billions of accumulated debt in the United 
 States ; in short, for those who do not desire to see their children 
 perish by hundreds of thousands in the miasmatic marshes of Vir- 
 ginia and the other Southern States, or spilling their blood in 
 streams in the fratricidal combats which have been going on there 
 for the last four years ; for people who do not desire any part or 
 share in such things as these, the principle of elective governors 
 can have no charm. 
 
 That which they do desire, is, that in the projected institu- 
 tions, there should be established good guarantees for personal 
 liberty, national liberty and the permanent and active control of 
 the people who pay taxes, over the administration of public 
 affairs. 
 
 Now, with regard to this direct, prompt and permanent action 
 ■of the people, we should also have the local representatives and 
 the federal representatives, without whose will, governments, 
 whether local or central, could not expend a single cent of the 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 117 
 
 public money. We should have it further, in the control that 
 these same representatives of the people would exercise over the 
 selection of the Councillors of the Crown. 
 
 Parties are necessary under representative institutions. They 
 only do harm when they go beyond their functions. "What are the 
 political institutions that have existed from the time of the ancient 
 republics of Greece and Rome down to our own day ? Where are 
 the political ^institutions under which parties and ideas of every 
 kind, could move more at their ease than under the constitution 
 of Great Britain, and that which we have borrowed from it ? And 
 after saying this much, we need scarcely add, that we are not for 
 elective governors. 
 
 Jotal legislates. 
 
 CHAPTER XXX. 
 
 41. ' The Local Government and Legislature of each Province shall be 
 constructed in such manner as the existing Legislature of each such 
 Province shall provide.' 
 
 42. ' The Local Legislature shall have power to alter or amend their con- 
 stitution from time to time.' 
 
 THE several provinces will, therefore, establish their respective 
 legislatures and governments on a basis which they may 
 themselves select. In addition to this, they shall have the power, 
 at pleasure, of amending or changing the constitutions thus esta- 
 blished. The only conditions to which they will be submitted, are 
 those laid down by Clauses 48, 49, 50, and 51. We will give our 
 attention to these clauses on another occasion. 
 
 These two clauses involve the consideration of two different ques- 
 tions of order ; that relating to local administrative and legisla- 
 tive organization, and the expenditure to be rendered necessary by 
 
]18 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 the working of the whole system. With regard to the machinery 
 to be employed in the Local Legislatures and Governments, we will 
 immediately lay down the fundamental principle to be established. 
 These local institutions are intended to control the public funds 
 through the representatives of the people; to have the initiation of 
 money measures through the Crown with a double responsibility to 
 the Crown and to the people. If we go beyond this, we must have 
 recourse to hypotheses. Will the provinces agree upon a uniform 
 system of Government and Legislature, and will we decide upon 
 having one or two branches in our Local Legislature ? Will the 
 departmental system be divided into two, three, four, five, or six 
 branches, and how will these branches be styled ? How many 
 members will we have iD each branch of our Legislature, if we 
 have a Legislative Council ? Will the members of the Upper 
 House be elected by the people or nominated by the Crown ? How 
 long will be their term of office, if elected by the people ? Shall 
 they be compelled to show property qualification? and what will 
 that qualification be ? For what term will the members of the Lower 
 House be elected ? Will the length of sessions and the date of 
 their opening be determined upon ? And, finally, will candidates for 
 the lower branch of the Local Legislatures be required to possess 
 property qualification ? 
 
 All these questions can be put without the possibility of a solu- 
 tion, because we do not now know how the different provinces will 
 settle them. 
 
 If economy be aimed at by the provinces of the Confederation, 
 as each will have a stated revenue, and as they will not be much 
 inclined to resort to direct taxation for the purpose of maintaining 
 an expensive Government and Legislature, it is probable that they 
 will decide upon having only one House, composed of a small num- 
 ber of members ; that the term of sessions will be fixed, and of short 
 duration; and that the indemnity to members will be very small in 
 amount. 
 
 A session of 30 to 40 days, under such conditions, would be 
 comparatively inexpensive. Nothing can prevent this limitation to 
 the length of the sessions of the Local Legislature, because very 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 119 
 
 few measures submitted to that body can be supposed to create pro- 
 tracted debates, and it would be easy to regulate the procedure in 
 a manner which would secure the prompt passing of measures ; 
 provided always, that public and private interests would not suffer 
 thereby. 
 
 Another condition might be, that measures still on the roll for 
 consideration should stand over in the same stage till the ensuing 
 session. It would, perhaps, he difficult to reduce the number of 
 members in the Local Legislature below that of the present Legis- 
 lative Assembly of Lower Canada, but thai number would be suffi- 
 cient to satisfy all requirements. If we are well informed, competent 
 judges have estimated the surplus of expenditure over income, in the 
 complicated system of local and general governments and legisla- 
 tures at $400,000. This is a large sam, but if the sacrifice can secure, 
 as we believe it will, for British North America, peace, happiness, 
 harmony, prosperity and national greatness, we are certain that 
 such a sacrifice would be willingly made by the people of the diffe- 
 rent provinces. The only objections will be offered by those who 
 are in favor of a Legislative Union, for the same reasons which in- 
 duce us to reject such a union. 
 
 dskcaiiott. 
 
 CHAPTER XXXI. 
 
 6. ' Education ; saving the rights and privileges which the Protestant or 
 Catholic minority in bothOanadas may possess as to their Denomina- 
 tional Schools at the time when the Union goes into operation.' (43rd 
 paragraph, 6th Section.) 
 
 THE Local Legislatures are thus entrusted with the control of 
 education, certain acquired rights being specially excepted. 
 This is a concession of very great importance, and without it, con- 
 
120 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 federation would be impracticable, because education is society 
 itself in a state of infancy. It comprises in its meaning and import 
 manners, feelings, tendencies, and the works of generations still 
 unborn. In the difficulty which arose in the debates of the Con- 
 ference, with the view of deciding whether the rights of parents to 
 instruct their children should prevail, or whether the child might 
 be taken away forcibly from its father and mother, to be instructed 
 under a radical system, where the name of God and sacred symbols 
 •are not invoked ; the victory, we are happy to say, was gained in 
 the interests of the parents. 
 
 This question of education was considered so important by 
 the delegates, that Mr. Gait considered it to be his duty to allude 
 to it twice in his Sherbrooke speech : 
 
 ' He would now endeavor to speak somewhat fully as to one of 
 1 the most important questions, perhaps the most important, that 
 ' could be confided to the Legislature — the question of education. 
 1 This was a question in which, in Lower Canada, they must all 
 ' feel the greatest interest, and in respect to which more apprehen- 
 e sion might be supposed to exist in the minds, at any rate, of the 
 'Protestant population, than in regard to anything else connected 
 
 * with the whole scheme of federation. It must be clear that a 
 ' measure would not be favorably entertained by the minority of 
 ' Lower Canada, which would place the education of their children 
 ' and the provision for their schools wholly in the hands of a ma- 
 'jority of .a different faith. It was clear that in confiding the 
 1 general subject of education to the Local Legislatures it was abso- 
 ' lutely necessary it should be accompanied with such restrictions 
 ' as would prevent injustice, in any respect, from being done to 
 ' the minority. Now this applied to Lower Canada, but it also 
 
 * applied, with equal force, to Upper Canada and the other pro- 
 ' vinces, for in Lower Canada there was a Protestant minority, and 
 e in the other provinces a Roman Catholic minority. The same 
 ' privileges belonged to the one of right here as belonged to the 
 
 * other of right elsewhere. There oould be no greater injustice to 
 ' a population than to compel them to have their children educated 
 1 in a manner contrary to their own religious belief. It had been 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 121 
 
 ' stipulated that the question was to be made subject to the rights 
 'and privileges which the minorities might have as to their separate 
 'and denominational schools. There had been grave difficulties 
 ' surrounding the separate school question in Upper Canada, but 
 ' they were all settled now, and with regard to the separate school 
 ' system of Lower Canada, he was authorized by his colleagues to 
 ' say, that it was the determination of the Government to bring 
 ' down a measure for the amendment of the school laws before the 
 < Confederation was allowed to go into force. 
 
 ******** 
 ' It was clear that injustice could not be done to an important class 
 ' in the country, such as the Protestants of Lower Canada, or the 
 ' Roman Catholics of Upper Canada, without sowing the seeds of 
 '.discord in the community, to an extent which would bear fatal 
 ' fruit in the course of a very few years. The question of educa- 
 ' tion was put in generally, — the clause covering both superior and 
 ' common school education, although the two were to a certain extent 
 1 distinct.' 
 
 And elsewhere he says : ' He would take this opportunity of 
 ' saying, and it was due to his French Canadian coUeagues in the 
 ' Government that- he should thus publicly make the statement, 
 'that so far as the whole of them were concerned — Sir Etienne 
 ' Tach6, Mr. Cartier, Mr. Chapais and Mr. Langevin — throughout 
 ' the whole of the negotiations, there was not a single instance 
 ' where there was evidence on their part of the slightest disposition 
 ' to withhold from the British of Lower Canada anything that they 
 ' claimed for their French Canadian countrymen. They acted wisely 
 ' in taking the course they did, for certainly it encouraged himself 
 ' and others to stand up for the rights of their French Canadian 
 ' friends. The opponents of the measure had tried to excite ap- 
 ' prehensions in the minds of the British of Lower Canada on the 
 ' one hand, and in the minds of the French Canadians on the 
 ' other, by representing to one and to the other that they were to 
 <be sacrificed. This, in fact, was the best evidence that the 
 ' measure had been wisely framed, and that it was not to give 
 ' power or dominance to one over the other.' 
 
122 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 The publication'of the project of the Conference created a stir 
 among the Protestant population of Lower Canada. Some con- 
 tended that there should be amendments to the law which places 
 that minority as regards the Catholic majority on the same footing 
 as the Catholic minority of Upper Canada with the Protestant 
 majority of that section ; some again claim that a superintendent 
 of public instruction should be appointed for the Protestant minor- 
 ity, while others consider that their superior educational institu- 
 tions are entitled to endowment. If the present school law does 
 not sufficiently protect the Protestant minority of Lower Canada, 
 the Government has performed its duty by promising amendments, 
 which will afford additional protection ; but the establishment of 
 two Bureaus of Public Instruction would be an insult to common 
 sense, and a material impossibility, unless it were intended to 
 expend in salaries and office contingencies a sum which could be 
 more usefully appropriated for the purposes of public instruction. 
 
 We must not forget also, that the concession of this principle in 
 Lower Canada, would necessarily involve its repetition in Upper 
 Canada, because in that section of the province the Catholics are 
 more numerous than the Protestants of Lower Canada, the figures 
 being, — 
 
 Catholics, Upper Canada 358,141 
 
 Protestants, Lower Canada 167,940 
 
 Professor Dawson has publicly admitted that the Hon. Mr- 
 Chauveau, Superintendent of Public Instruction, has always con- 
 ducted himself towards Protestants with the most perfect justice 
 and impartiality ; but, as an argument, he expressed his opinion that 
 possibly in the future, Mr. Chauveau's successor might not act in 
 the same spirit of justice and impartiality. 
 
 He is strangely mistaken. Liberality cannot be exclusively attri- 
 buted to Mr. Chauveau ; it is an inherent element in the character 
 of the race of which he belongs. In order to be convinced of this 
 fact, it is only necessary to read the history of our legislation, from 
 the granting of our Constitution in 1791, to thepresent day. Is 
 it not the case that the Lower Canada House of Assembly, long 
 before the union, granted to Dissenting Protestants the civil rights 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 123 
 
 which, up to that time, had only been enjoyed byKoman Catholics 
 and members of the Church of England ? Is it not equally true 
 that Jewish disabilities were abolished in Lower Canada twenty 
 years before the question was agitated for the first time in the Par- 
 liament of Great Britain ? 
 
 With suoh facts before us, our case is eloquently pleaded, and 
 surely Protestants cannot have any suspicion of our liberality, nor 
 can their apprehensions be justifiable. 
 
 They need not fear; the teachings of the past will guide us in the 
 future, and we shall strive to surpass in that respect, anything that 
 may have been done by our ancestors. We desire that a law should 
 be passed, which neither the Federal nor Local Legislature could 
 control, by which minorities would be universally protected, and 
 that any acts of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, which 
 might be considered unjust in their object, would be properly dealt 
 with, according to their merits, by the judicial tribunals of the 
 country, and such acts would thus be always certain to meet with 
 the punishment they would deserve. 
 
 Moreover, the population of Lower Canada is so distributed in 
 certain districts, that if Protestants are in a minority in some locali- 
 ties, Catholics are in others, and consequently a common interest 
 must necessarily guide the whole population. Experience and the 
 law teach us that the local functionaries in charge of the school 
 system are more powerful for evil and injustice, than the Chief 
 Superintendent of Public Instruction, because they exercise a con- 
 stant and immediate control over education, the teachers, the sup- 
 port and the management of common schools. 
 
 The endowment of Superior Protestant Educational Institutions, 
 is as impracticable as the appointment of two superintendents of 
 public instruction. Such a proceeding would necessitate grants 
 by the State to Catholic Institutions of the same character, and 
 eventually the revenue of the public domain would be totally ab- 
 sorbed by such a system. It is perfectly absurd to pretend at the 
 present day, that the State should endow such institutions, when 
 we find that the Salpicians of Montreal, build churches, support at 
 heavy cost the Catholic religion and give gratuitous instruction 
 
124 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 to upwards of ten thousand children ; when the Seminary of Que- 
 bec gives a classical education to upwards of five hundred pupils, 
 and at considerable sacrifice, maintains on a splendid footing the 
 Laval University, which was constructed twelve years ago on 
 the promontory of Quebec. These institutions were in possession 
 long before the conquest, of property which they do not hold from 
 the Crown. Under the proposed system, claims would be multiplied 
 as often as new institutions would be brought into existence ; for 
 instance, with greater reason the Catholics of Upper Canada might 
 say : ' the comparatively recent endowment of the University of 
 ' Toronto, has been the means of procuring for that institution 
 ' an annual revenue that now exceeds twenty thousand pounds ;* 
 we should have an institution similarly endowed, if equity and 
 justice are to prevail. 
 
 The Protestants of Lower Canada have certainly no reason to 
 complain of the division of public grants for educational purposes, 
 because, they have always had the lion's share, and but a few days 
 ago Mr. Chauveau, in Le Journal de V Instruction Publique, 
 proved by figures, the correctness of which cannot be questioned, 
 that they receive for their superior educational institutions much 
 more in proportion to the number of their pupils, than their fellow- 
 citizens of the Roman Catholic religion. As a proof of the liberal- 
 ity of the latter, they have never even complained of this unjust 
 division. 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 125 
 
 JEigjjf of jjartom win gkprak 
 
 CHAPTER XXXII. 
 
 44. ' Thepowerof respiting, reprieving, and pardoning prisoners convicted 
 of crimes, and of commuting and remitting of sentences in whole or 
 in part, which belongs of right to the Crown, shall be administered 
 by the Lieutenant Governor of each Province in Council, subject to 
 any instructions he may, from time to time, receive from the general 
 Government, and subject to any provisions that may be made ia this 
 behalf by the General Parliament,' 
 
 THIS provision changes the condition of the existing law with 
 regard to the prerogative of granting pardons, commuting 
 punishments and delaying executions. 
 
 This prerogative of mercy, after the judicial tribunals have pro- 
 nounced sentence, belongs naturally to the Sovereign, and is spe- 
 cially delegated to her representatives in those distant parts of the 
 empire, where, without this extension of the arm, the sword of 
 mercy could not reach those about to be struck down by the sword 
 of justice. 
 
 Here it is different. The Conference, while recognizing the 
 source and principle of that power, have set aside the principle of 
 delegation, and have placed the Governors General precisely in the 
 position of the Sovereign Herself, who, then, if we may so speak, 
 loses that prerogative through the whole extent of Her North 
 American colonial empire. 
 
 The Executive Chief of the General Government, called the Go- 
 vernor General or Viceroy, surrounded by his Council, will be, in- 
 stead of the Sovereign, invested with the power of regulating the 
 prerogative of pardon, but cannot delegate it to any one else, be- 
 cause he will not possess it any more than the Sovereign he will 
 represent, and who will have renounced it in granting this new 
 constitution. 
 
 And further, the Federal Parliament will have the power of 
 making the laws which will affect the exercise of that prerogative. 
 That power did not exist either in the Constitutional Act of 1791 
 or in that of 1841 ; and in Canada, as in every other colony of 
 
126 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Great Britain, the representatives of the Sovereign have never, up 
 to this time, exercised the prerogative of pardon, except by a spe- 
 cial delegation, which is cited with its existing conditions in the 
 invariable instructions which are addressed to them by the colo- 
 nial minister, in the name of Her Majesty. 
 
 It is true that the Sovereign may give Her instructions to Her 
 representative in the Federal Government, and that the Ministry 
 would have to conform to them, or resign their offices. But there 
 is little chance of conflicts arising out of that question ; for if the 
 Government of the empire, after mature reflection, should cede 
 the prerogative of pardon to Lieutenant Governors, who at the 
 isame time would cease to hold their positions in virtue of that 
 prerogative, the power of regulating it being given to the General 
 Government of the Confederation, that would be the most con- 
 clusive proof that there is no desire to interfere or to seek any 
 protection for the principle of the Imperial prerogative, except in 
 the veto, which is left to the Sovereign in respect of the whole of 
 the legislation of the General Government. 
 
 The Imperial Government, by the mouth of the Colonial Secre. 
 tary, speaks thus as to the prerogative of pardon : — 
 
 'It appears to her Majesty's Government that this duty belongs 
 to the representative of the Sovereign, and could not with pro- 
 < rvrWy hi devolved upon the Lieutenant Governors, who will, un- 
 ' der the present scheme, be appointed, not directly by the Crown, 
 i but by the Central Government of the United Provinces.' 
 
 To us this question : — From whence shall the pardoning 
 power emanate ? appears one of minor importance ; and if the Im- 
 perial Government should decide that this prerogative must con- 
 tinue to be exercised by delegation in the person of the direct re- 
 presentative of the Sovereign, the integrity and efficacity of the 
 proposed system would not be materially interfered with. But it is 
 as well to indicate how we have understood the idea which pre- 
 vailed in the minds of the delegates while framing this clause. 
 They evidently desired, in the first place, that unity and dispatch 
 should be secured in the exercise of the prerogative cf pardon, and 
 next, the establishing, in the order of things, for all time to come, 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 127 
 
 of a principle that could be found when a colonial system had 
 ceased to exist. 
 
 According to that principle, the Federal Government, whether 
 colonial or national, will not delegate the prerogative of pardon ; 
 but what may be considered almost equivalent, they will nominate 
 the Lieutenant Governors ; and what is practically equal to dele- 
 gation, they will dictate to them the conditions upon which they 
 shall exercise the prerogative of pardon, absolute or limited; 
 as well as that of reprieve. 
 
 Conflict of fates. 
 
 CHAPTEE XXXIII. 
 
 43. ' In regard to all subjects over which jurisdiction belong3 to both the 
 General and Local Legislatures, the laws of the General Parliament 
 shall control and supersede those made by the Local Legislature, and 
 the latter shall be void so far as they are repugnant to, or inconsistent 
 with the former.' 
 
 THE above principle is logical in its application, if we are to have 
 concurrent legislation. 
 
 We have already indicated how it will operate in certain cases. 
 The Imperial Government seems to have foreseen in the following 
 words of the Colonial Minister, the inconveniences which might 
 result from a concurrence of attributes and a possible conflict of 
 legislation. Mr. Cardwell writes : 
 
 ' The point of principal importance to the practical well-working 
 ' of the scheme, is the accurate determination of the limits between 
 ' the authority of the central and that of the local Legislatures, in 
 1 their relation to each other. It has not been possible to exclude 
 1 from the resolutions some provisions whieh appear to be less con- 
 ' sistent than might, perhaps, have been desired with the simplicity 
 
128 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 1 and unity of the system. But, upon the whole, it appears to Her 
 ' Majesty's Government that precautions have been taken which 
 ' are obviously intended to secure to the Central Government the 
 ' means of effective action throughout the several provinces, and 
 1 to guard against those evils which must inevitably arise, if any 
 ' doubt were permitted to exist as to the respective limits of 
 ' central and local authority. They are glad to observe that, 
 1 although large powers of legislation are intended to be vested in 
 ' local bodies, yet the principle of central control has been 
 ' steadily kept in view. The importance of this principle cannot 
 1 be over-rated. Its maintenance is essential to the practical 
 - 1 efficiency of the system and to its harmonious operation, both in 
 * the General Government and the Governments of the severa 
 ' provinces.' 
 
 In reading the above, it is very easy to see that the Imperial 
 Government would have preferred a Legislative Union to a Con- 
 federation, because it would have given more compactness, more 
 unity, more strength, to our political system, and more spon- 
 taneity and simultaneousness in its action. But the statesmen of 
 the Mother Country have understood, as well as ourselves, the 
 difficulty of our position ; the absolute necessity of making im- 
 portant concessions, the one to the other, in our numerous distinct 
 interests ; of recognizing, with a large measure of equity and 
 liberality, the existing social elements, with their divergences, 
 to give full play to local aspirations, and to make allowance for the 
 prejudices of race and religion. To their honor be it spoken, they 
 have recognized the whole extent of the gigantic task to be 
 accomplished, and the full value of the success to be obtained. 
 
 But nevertheless it is clearly evident that concurrent legislation 
 is full of danger for the future ; that is plainly laid down even 
 in the clause that we are now discussing, since, to obviate it, 
 central legislation has invariably been made to predominate over 
 local legislation. Will it be impossible to avoid the points of 
 contact likely to be produced by concurrent legislation, or to 
 define them with such precision that these conflicts would be im- 
 possible or nearly so 1 Without harmony the system would be 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 129 
 
 worth nothing, and would soon destroy itself ; and the harmony 
 of the system cannot be found exclusively in the predominant 
 power of the Government and of the Federal Parliament. It is 
 necessary that this harmony should also exist in the inferior 
 machinery and be felt throughout the whole system. While con- 
 templating with admiration the vast wheels which give motion 
 to those gigantic steamers sailing so proudly over the ocean, 
 rising with such boldness over formidable waves, who can 
 help thinking that the least derangement of some small piece, and 
 in appearance, the least important of the interior machinery, may 
 bring the whole to a stand still, and put the ship and crew in 
 peril? In fact, will not the elements upon which the local 
 institutions will be based, be reproduced in all their vivacity in 
 the Government and in the Federal Parliament, and this local 
 power which it has been their object to compress, will react dan- 
 gerously on the whole system? 
 
 At one time it may be Lower Canada that will be punishing its- 
 Ministry and its members for having wounded Lower Canadian 
 feelings and striking at its interests ; at another time it may be Upper 
 Canada, or, perhaps, the Atlantic Provinces that may make similar 
 complaints. 
 
 This should not be, and to avoid it, our eminent statesmen must- 
 put their heads together to find a better solution to the problem. 
 
 Jmtt|j anb (Smglisjr languages, 
 
 CHAPTER XXXIV. 
 
 46, ' Both the English and French languages may be employed in the 
 General Parliament and in its proceedings, and in the Local Legisla- 
 ture of Lower Canada, and also in the Federal Courts and in the 
 Courts of Lower Canada.' 
 
 NOBODY is ignorant of the fact that the Constitutional Act of 
 1840 banished the French language from the Legislature, and 
 
ISO THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 that it was not till 1845 that it was restored to us by a Special Act 
 of the Imperial Legislature at the request of a Government which, 
 repelled |by Lower Canada, hoped by this concession to acquire 
 public favor. From that time, the two languages, as they ought 
 to be, have been placed precisely upon the same footing, and the 
 French text of our laws has been equally legal with the English 
 text. The project of the Constitution carries out this just policy 
 in the Federal Parliament, where the French Canadians will not 
 be comparatively so numerous, and in this respect, we are infinitely 
 better treated than the men of our origin in the American Union, 
 where Federal and Local Legislation are exclusively English. 
 It is true that we had a right to this privilege, but between the 
 existence of a right and the fact of possessing it, there is often a 
 wide distance, and when the first is cordially and spontaneously 
 conceded to you, without discussion, without obstacle and without 
 reticence, you feel that you have to do with sincere friends and 
 honorable allies. 
 
 tmq anfr o%r Jills, ana ijje pg|t of f tin. 
 
 CHAPTER XXXV. 
 
 48. 'All Bills for appropriating any part of the Public Revenue, or for im- 
 posing any new tax or impost, shall originate in the House of ommons 
 or House of Assembly, as the case may be. 
 
 49. ' The House of Commons or House of Assembly shall not originate or 
 pass any Vote, Resolution, Address or Bill for the appropriation of 
 any part of the Public Revenue, or of any tax or impost to any purpose 
 not first recommended by Message of the Governor General or the 
 Lientenant Governor, as the case may be, daring the Session in which 
 such Vote, Resolution, Address or Bill is passed. 
 
 50. 'Any Bill of the General Parliament may be reserved in the usual 
 manner for Her Majesty's Assent, and any Bill of the Local Legisla- 
 tures may, in like manner, be reserved for the consideration of the 
 Governor General. 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 131 
 
 51. ' Any Bill passed by the General Parliament shall be subject to disal- 
 lowance by Her Majesty within two years, as in the case of Bills passed 
 by the Legislatures of the said Provinces hitherto ; and, in like man- 
 ner, any Bill passed by a Local Legislature shall be subject to disal- 
 lowance by the Governor General within one year after the passing 
 thereof.' 
 
 "I1TE said in a recent article that the provinces should choose for 
 ' ' themselves their mode of local, administrative and legislative 
 existence, and that as to their liberty of action in that respect, there 
 existed only certain conditions, which would be made known at a 
 later period. 
 
 The first of these conditions is, that any project of law relating 
 to taxation and the appropriation of the public revenue, should 
 originate in the Legislative Assembly, whether there be one or 
 two Houses. Doubtless, nobody will complain of such a condition, 
 which is the very essence of the British Constitution, and which 
 is based upon the fundamental principle, that the people cannot 
 be taxed nor their money be expended without their free consent ; 
 and further to establish its prerogative in this respect, it has itself, 
 by its representatives, the initiation of money measures and of 
 taxation. 
 
 The same principle will necessarily prevail in the Federal Par- 
 liament, where the Commons will have exclusively the initiation 
 of money measures and taxes of whatever kind they may be. 
 
 The second condition is, that whether in the Federal Commons 
 or in the Local Legislative Assemblies they shall not vote Resolu- 
 tions, Addresses, or pass Bills without these being preceded by a 
 Message from -the head of the Federal Executive or from the 
 Lieutenant Governors, &c. &c. 
 
 This is another essentially British principle, and which has its 
 right of existence in ministerial responsibility and in common 
 sense. In fact, the ministers are, by virtue Jof the law, the 
 guardians ol the public means. They are the sole administrators 
 of it, and their title Minister signifies nothing else. They only 
 can say whether the state can or should tax itself, or incur 
 the expenditure which is demanded from it. This is a principle 
 of protection for the people themselves, and that they should take 
 
132 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 care not to abandon for another, which, would leave them depend- 
 ent on the caprice of individuals ignorant of the real state of their 
 affairs. 
 
 The Conference have forgotten to speak of the right of veto. 
 Perhaps it is necessarily implied in the project; still it is better 
 that it should be explicitly mentioned, for it is by that point 
 alone, that the Chief of the Executive, whether it be Federal or 
 Provincial, can cause his legislative existence to be felt. 
 
 In order that his sanction may be worth anything, it is neces- 
 sary that he should have the [right of accepting' or refusing at 
 pleasure. 
 
 The veto is not, so to say, much practised in our days by the 
 Sovereign, because it is an extreme measure, the exercise of 
 which demands great prudence and exceptional reasons. But it 
 is precisely to provide for exceptional circumstances, that it exists 
 under a responsible ministry, and has been found necessary ever 
 since its origin, and has been maintained in the British Consti- 
 tution. 
 
 With respect to general legislation, that of ^which the Govern- 
 ment has the initiation, it would amount to little in practice, 
 because this legislation, proceeding from the men who would sur- 
 round the Chief of the State, whom they would constitutionally 
 advise, it would only proceed from the latter, or would be so under- 
 taken with ministerial sanction. 
 
 The times exist no longer when the monarch can intrigue with 
 his legislators against the measures of his ministers, and the 
 ■constitutional anomaly that existed in the reign of George III. is 
 now no longer possible. 
 
 Legislative motion resembles a circular movement round the 
 eircumference of the constitutional circle to arrive precisely at its 
 point of departure j if it does not arrive there, it is because the 
 people do not wish it, or that it has not sufficient maturity to come 
 victorious out of all the trials that it has to submit to on its road. 
 
 Clauses 50 and 51 of the project maintain, in respect to Federal 
 Bills, the powers of reserve and veto to Her Majesty. And we 
 have nothing to say against this, for it is a principle which ha 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 133 
 
 existed at all periods of our constitutional history, and in that of 
 all English Colonies. It is one of the points of contact by which 
 the Chief of a British State makes us feel the exercise of his 
 Imperial sovereignty. Thus nobody protests against it, but objec- 
 tions have been raised, that this right of reserve and veto should 
 be given to the Executive Chief of the Federal Government on 
 bills passed by the local legislatures. 
 
 We can easily understand the motive of the Convention in 
 transferring this power from the hands of Her Majesty to those of 
 Her direct representative. 
 
 That motive is still unity ; it is still the necessity of centraliza- 
 tion, without which it seems to be impossible to found a durable 
 empire by the side of the great neighboring republic. But on 
 the other hand, if by this provision, instead of assisting national 
 unity, we ran a risk of putting it in danger, would it not be 
 better to leave these matters as they are ? 
 
 We know that some direct reasons, apart from those that we have 
 given, have determined the decision of the Convention. It was 
 asked then : What is the practice followed in London, in determin- 
 ing the exercise of the" veto on colonial laws ? It is done by a simple 
 official in the bureau, who examines the bill and decides its fate ; 
 it is on his advice that the Sovereign accepts or rejects it. 
 But when a bill shall have been reserved for the sanction or dis- 
 approval of the Governor General, — as the exercise of that sanction 
 or disapproval could only be made on the advice of the Ministry, — 
 the latter would run no risk, except in extreme cases, of coun- 
 selling the exercise of the veto, because it is evident that public 
 opinion would have been already consulted in the passing of the 
 law by the Local Legislature, and would find itself again repre- 
 sented in the Federal Parliament by a phalanx capable, if it 
 desired to do so, of rendering all government impossible. 
 
 This is true, but precisely because it is true, it is dangerous, 
 and calculated to produce stoppages in the whole mechanism. 
 
 Up to this time, there have been no complaints of this preroga- 
 tive of disapproval being in the hands of the Sovereign, or of 
 the use which has been made of it, probably because it has ever 
 
 M 
 
184 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 been exercised with equity and moderation ; perhaps, also, because 
 it would have been useless to undertake an impossibility, — but 
 from the moment that parties would understand that that power 
 is virtually and practically in the hands of our Federal states- 
 men, cases might arise, when it is desired to succeed with 
 some object, and local feelings might be excited against them, 
 to shake them in their position and bring them down. This 
 will be the inevitable result of the system. This may be the 
 consequence, but it is not the main cause of apprehension in the 
 ipublic mind. 
 
 We have no fear of conflicts, but we fear for the independence 
 -of the legislative action of the provinces in the measure of the 
 attributes which specifically devolve upon them by the terms of 
 the project. It is then urgent that our Ministers should perfectly 
 elucidate this grave question, and we expect that great work a 
 their hands. 
 
 ines, minerals, #c, bwteb in local 
 doirmimenk 
 
 CHAPTER XXXVI. 
 
 57. ' All lands, mines, minerals and royalties vested in Her Majesty in the 
 Provinces of Upper Canada, Lower Canada, Nova Scotia, New Bruns- 
 wick and Prince Edward Island for the use of such Provinces, shall 
 belong to the Local Government of the territory in which the same are 
 so situate ; subject to any trusts that may exist in respeot to any of such 
 lands or to any interest of other persons in reBpect of the same.' 
 
 57. ' All sums due from purchasers or lessees of such lands, mines or 
 minerals at the time of the Union, shall also belong to the Local 
 Governments.' 
 
 5S, ' All assets connected with such portions of the public debt of any 
 Province as are assumed by the Local Governments, shall also belong 
 to those Governments respectively.' 
 
 TO understand the full meaning of these clauses, it is important to 
 have before our eyes the obligations that they impose, with the 
 advantages to be derived from them. 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 135 
 
 The separation of the provincial administration and of the federal 
 administration would naturally create two distinct kinds of revenue, 
 and also two distinct kinds of expenditure. What we have to estab- 
 lish for the moment is, in the first place, the amount of revenue, and 
 the cost of the administration of Lower Canada, as offered to us by 
 the scheme of Confederation, and to ascertain if it should follow that 
 there would be practicable economy without interfering with the 
 developement of our resources, of our local reforms, of our institutions 
 and, generally, of our prosperity, that we are amply protected for the 
 future, and that there is nothing which may cause recourse to be 
 had to anything so extreme as direct taxation. Let us begin by con- 
 sidering the cost of the expenditure. 
 
 According to calculations based on information obtained, in nearly 
 every case, from official sources, while those relative to the legisla- 
 ture and the government have been based on probabilities, experi- 
 ence, and on the knowledge of matters and things in general ; we 
 arrive at the following results : — 
 
 EXPENDITURE. 
 
 G overnmen tal Administration and Legislation ... $ 1 50,000 
 
 Administration of Justice 100,000 
 
 Penitentiaries 70,000 
 
 Schools 160,000 
 
 Lunatic Asylums 90,000 
 
 Literary Institutions 5,900 
 
 Hospitals and other Charitable Institutions 27,390 
 
 Arts 3,500 
 
 Agriculture 4,000 
 
 Kepairs of Public Buildings, &c 15,000 
 
 Colonization Roads 50,000 
 
 Other Eoads 15,000 
 
 Culler's Office 35,000 
 
 Public Works 30,000 
 
 Contingency Office 30,000 
 
 Other Contingencies 32,000 
 
 Slides 15,000 
 
 Surveying 30,000 
 
136 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Crown Lands Department 57,000 
 
 Other Expenses, not enumerated 180,000 ; 
 
 Total 81,099,790 
 
 REVENUE. 
 
 Timber, &o $ 105,000 
 
 Lands 146,000 
 
 Other Local Revenues 300,000 
 
 Our part of the Federal Reveuue for local matters 
 
 (80 cents per head) 888,531 
 
 / 
 
 Total $1,439,531 
 
 Expenditure 1,099,790 
 
 Surplus of Revenue over Expenditure $ 339,741 
 
 But the amount of the public debts which the provinces will be> 
 required to remit to the Confederation being ascertained, and the 
 amount being far from covering all the public debt of Canada, it 
 remains to be established what portion of the whole amount of such 
 indebtedness should fall to the share of Lower Canada, and also 
 the means by which the annual interest may be paid. 
 
 Here, so far as debit and credit goes, we have only probabilities, 
 for, notwithstanding all our efforts, we have been unable to obtain 
 the figures with rigorous exactness ; these can only be obtained after 
 the debate on the constitutions of the provinces, and the repartition, 
 between the two Canadas, of their debts and local revenues. 
 
 However, we find in Mr. Gait's remarkable speech tbe amount. 
 of the local debt and revenue, taken collectively, in the two Can- 
 adas ; and from those figures we can deduce, approximatively, our 
 share of that debt and revenue. The Finance Minister has ascer- 
 tained, by official data, that $67,263,994 is the net amount of the 
 debt of Canada, and that $62,500,000 is the portion of that debt 
 which is to be transferred to the Confederation, and the local debt 
 of both Canadas is, consequently, ascertained to be $4,763,994. 
 
 The local expenditure of the two Canadas, taken together, is 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 137 
 
 $2,021,979, and would be $2,260,149, comprising the interest on 
 $4,763,994; for the local revenue, $1,297,043, by which figures we 
 may establish the portion of Federal revenue allowed to the two 
 Canadas, $2,005,403— in all, $3,302,446. 
 
 We have thus a surplus of revenue, over expenditure, of 
 $1,042,297. 
 
 We are not over-estimating, in taking for Lower Canada the half 
 of that debt of $4,763,994, that is to say, $2,381,997. 
 
 By such a division we should have to pay an annual interest on 
 this debt, which would amount to $119,035. This would bring 
 our total expenditure to $1,218,825. 
 
 We would thus have a surplus of $221,096. But we have above 
 estimated th6 revenue of Lower Canada at $551,000, not taking 
 into account the $888,531, our portion of the general revenue. 
 
 As we assume half the debt, we cannot be accused of exaggera- 
 tion if we also take into account half the local revenue, $648,521. 
 
 The difference between the two amounts being $97,521; if we 
 add this to that of $1,439,531, we have for the local revenue of 
 Lower Canada, $1,537,052 ; and for the expenditure, $1,099,790, 
 the amount stated above ; and $119,035, our part of the interest 
 of the debt; in all, $1,218,825. 
 
 The revenue thus exceeds the expenditure by $318,227. 
 
 This a satisfactory result, and is enough to assure us against fears 
 for the future. 
 
 But if it be objected that we have exaggerated the revenue, we 
 simply reply, that we have also very much over-estimated the 
 amount of the debt, and, consequently, the expenditure. 
 
 Let us not forget that if we assume certain special debts, we re- 
 ceive, at the same time, in compensation, by the 58th Clause of the 
 scheme, anything that may be produced by the works for which such 
 debts were contracted. Among these is the Municipal Loan Fund 
 of Lower Canada. We will thus have the amount produced by this 
 fund. 
 
 According to these calculations, Upper Canada has for a local 
 revenue, the half of theaetual local revenue, that is to say, 
 $648,521, and $1,116,872, her part of the general revenue ; in all, 
 
 $1,765,393. 
 
 m2 
 
1S8 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 We are not in possession of the data to establish in detail the 
 amount of the expenditure in that section, but Mr. Gait has 
 proved that the collective local expenditure for the two Canadas, 
 is equal to $2,260,149. The portion of Upper Canada eannot, 
 therefore, be in any case, less than the half of the said sum, of 
 $1,130,074. This will leave her an excess, for public works and 
 other objects, of $635,319. 
 
 But, as the Upper Canadians have other ideas than we have on 
 many subjects, it is impossible to speak correctly of the amount of 
 their local expenses. One thing is certain, that the colonization 
 roads, for example, their hospitals and their other charitable insti- 
 tutions, and at the same time their penitentiaries and lunatic 
 asylums will be self-sustaining by means of local taxes or voluntary 
 subscriptions. 
 
 It is sufficient to know, that the calculation of the Conven- 
 tion amply covers the local matters of all the provinces, if they 
 are guided, as doubtless they will be, by a spirit of wise economy. 
 
 In case the provinces should desire to expend more than their 
 local revenues, they would have to resort to direct taxation, and as 
 direct taxes are unpopular everywhere, but particularly in Lower 
 Canada, we may, as it was well observed by Mr. Gait, leave in this 
 respect the 'surveillance' of the public expenditure to the watchful 
 and jealous eye of the people. 
 
 The Finance Minister has also fixed the local revenues and the 
 federal grants for the local objects of the different provinces which 
 intend to enter into Confederation ; — 
 
 LOCAL REVENUES. 
 
 Canada $1,297,043 
 
 Nova Scotia 107,000 
 
 New Brunswick 89,000 
 
 Island of Prince Edward 32,000 
 
 Newfoundland 5,000 
 
 Total $1,530,043 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 139 
 
 FEDERAL GRANTS EOR LOCAL OBJECTS. 
 
 Canada $2,006,121 
 
 Nova Scotia 264,000 
 
 New Brunswick 246,000 
 
 Island of Prince Edward 153,728 
 
 Newfoundland 367,000 
 
 Total $3,056,849 
 
 AMOUNT OP LOCAL EXPENDITURE. 
 
 Canada $2,260,149 
 
 Nova Scotia 667,000 
 
 New Brunswick 424,047 
 
 Island of Prince Edward 124,016 
 
 Newfoundland 479,000 
 
 Total $3,954,212 
 
 By adding together the local revenues and the federal grants 
 for local purposes, we will have $4,586,892'; from which wa must 
 deduct for expenses $3,954,212; this leaves a surplus for local 
 purposes of $632,680. 
 
 In dividing the two Canadas for the purposes of expenditure 
 and local revenue, we have the following result : — 
 
 REVENUE. 
 
 Upper Canada $1,765,393 
 
 Lower Canada 1,537,052 
 
 Nova Scotia 371,000 
 
 New Brunswick 353,000 
 
 Island of Prince Edward 185,728 
 
 Newfoundland 374,000 
 
 Total $4,586,173 
 
 This last result differs by $719 from that of Mr. Gait, who 
 estimates at $2,006,121 the amount of the federal grants to both 
 Canadas, taken together, for local purposes ; and that taking the 
 numbers of the population for a basis, we fix it at $2,005,4.03. 
 This difference is of little consequence in the general results : 
 
140 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 EXPENDITURE. 
 
 Upper Canada, approximative^ §1,13 0,074 
 
 Lower Canada 1,218,825 
 
 Nova Scotia 667,000 
 
 New Brunswick 424,047 
 
 Island of Prince Edward 124,816 
 
 Newfoundland 479,212 
 
 Total $4,043,974 
 
 At the commencement of this article we established the amount 
 
 ■of the expenditure of Lower Canada, not merely the actual loeal 
 
 .expense for local objects, such as that furnished by Mr. Gait, but 
 
 on our future matters, which would make a difference of something 
 
 approaching to $88,750. 
 
 Not having the data for Upper Canada, as we have already 
 stated, we. had to take for our guidance the half of the amount of 
 the actual collective expenditure of the two Canadas for the same 
 local objects. 
 
 These amounts prove indisputably that the provinces may take 
 action as suits their convenience in their local revenues, and that 
 in this respect there is nothing to cause uneasiness. 
 
 CHAPTER XXXVII. 
 
 <S0. ' The General Government shall assume all the Debts and Liabilities 
 of each Province.' 
 
 ■61. ' The Debt of Canada, not specially assumed by Upper and Lower 
 Canada respectively, shall not exc9ed, at the lime of Union, $62,500,- 
 000 ; Nova Scotia shall enter the Union with a debt not exceeding 
 $8,000,000 ; and New Brunswick with a debt not exceeding $ 7,000,000.' 
 
 <Gi. ' In case Nova Scotia or New Brunswick do not incur liabilities beyond 
 those for which their Governments are now bound, and which shall 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 141 
 
 make their debts at the date of Union less than $8,000,000, and 
 ^.OOOjOOO respectively, they shall be entitled {to interest at five per 
 cent, on the amount not so incurred, in like manner as is hereinafter 
 provided for Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island ; the foregoing 
 resolution being in no respect intended to limit the powers given to 
 the respective Governments of those Provinces, by Legislative 
 authority, but only to limit the maximum amount of charge to be 
 assumed by the General Government; provided always, that the 
 powtrs so conferred by the respective Legislatures shall be exercised 
 within five years from this date, or the same shall then lapse.' 
 63. ' Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, not having incurred Debts 
 equal to those of the other Provinces, shall be entitled to receive, by 
 half-yearly payments, in advance, from the General Government, the 
 Interest at five per cent, on the difference between the actual amount 
 of their respective Debts at the time of the Union, and the average 
 amount of indebtedness per head of the Population of Canada, Nova 
 Scotia and New Brunswick.' 
 
 64. 'In consideration of the transfer to the General Parliament of the- 
 powers of Taxation, an annual grant in aid of each Province shall be 
 made, equal to eighty cents per head of the population, as established 
 by the Census of 1861; the population of Newfoundland, being 
 esimated at 130,000. Such aid shall be in full settlement of all future 
 demands upon the General Government for local purposes, and shall 
 be paid half-yearly in advance to each Province.' 
 
 65. ' The position of New Brunswick being such as to entail large immedi- 
 
 ate charges upon her local revenues, it is agreed that for the period of 
 ten years, from the time when the Union takes effect, an additional 
 allowance of $63,000 per annum shall be made to that Province. But 
 so long aa the liability of that Province remains under $7,000,000, a 
 deduction equal to the interest on such deficiency shall be made from 
 the $63,000.' 
 
 66. ' In consideration of the surrender to the General Government by 
 Newfoundland of all its rights in Mines and Minerals, and of all the 
 ungranted and unoccupied Lands of the Crown, it is agreed that the 
 sum of $150,000 shall each year be paid to that Province, by semi- 
 annual payments ; provided that that Colony shall retain the right of 
 opening, constructing and controlling Roads and Bridges through 
 any of the said Lands ,subject to any Laws which the General Par- 
 liament may pass in respect.of the same.' 
 
 CLAUSE 61 rests on a principle of perfect equity. To be con- 
 vinced of this, it is sufficient to know the motives which led to it. 
 Let us commence with figures. The debts of the different pro- 
 vinces were as follows, on 1st January, 186i : 
 
 Canada $67,263,994 
 
 Nova Scotia 4,858,547 
 
 New Brunswick 5,702,991 
 
 Newfoundland 946,000 
 
 Island of Prince Edward. 240,673 
 
 Total $79,012,205 
 
142 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 AND THE POPULATION : 
 
 Upper Canada 1,396,091 
 
 Lower Canada 1,110,664 
 
 Nova Scotia 330,857 
 
 New Brunswick 252,047 
 
 Newfoundland 130,000 
 
 Island of Prince Edward 80,757 
 
 Total 3,300,416 
 
 These provinces were therefore indebted in the following propor- 
 tions per head of their population : 
 
 Canada $26 38 
 
 Nova Scotia 14 38 
 
 New Brunswick 23 02 
 
 Newfoundland 7 27 
 
 Island of Prince Edward -. 2 97 
 
 Which gives, on an average, for the Confederation. 23 94 
 
 Thus, by adding together the united debts of all the provinces, 
 a flagrant injustice would have been committed as regards the 
 provinces least indebted; Canada, by this arrangement, would 
 have gained $2.89 per head ; Nova Scotia would have lost $9.56 ; 
 New Brunswick, 92 cents ; Newfoundland, $16 . 67 ; and the 
 Island of Prince Edward, $20.97. 
 
 In order to induce all the Maritime Provinces to hand over all 
 their revenue to the General Government, and to accept a propor- 
 tion at so much per head, a sum much greater than they could be 
 called upon to pay at the time when the subject of union was 
 broached, it became absolutely necessary to establish a system of 
 compensation. 
 
 Mr. Gait has undertaken to shew the principle upon which this 
 system is based, and the pivot upon which the whole mechanism 
 will revolve. He gives his opinions and explains these matters in 
 the following words much better than we could : 
 
 ' Now, in the scheme of Confederation, it was proposed that 
 ' there should be a certain fixed rate at which each province should 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 143 
 
 ' have the right of charging its debt against the Confederation, and 
 ' for that purpose the debt of Canada was placed at $62,500,000, 
 ' which was something like five millions less than the nominal 
 ' amount of the debt. The mode in which that reduction was made 
 e was this : There were certain liabilities of Canada contracted for 
 ' local purposes, and certain assets connected with those liabilities. 
 ' He referred more particularly to the Municipal Loan Fund, and 
 ' some similar matters which were more local than general. It had 
 ' not been thought desirable that a transference of those securities 
 ' should be made to the General Government. It was better that 
 ' each province should assume that portion of its debt which was 
 ' particularly local, and take with it those securities which it held 
 ' for its redemption. And in that way there was established for the 
 ' debt of Canada an amount equal per head to the amounts con- 
 ' tributed or about to be contributed by the two provinces of Nova 
 1 Scotia and New Brunswick. If any of these provinces had been 
 ' in debt to an amount largely exceeding that of the others per 
 ' head, the matter would have been in a different position. But it 
 ' was found on examination that, while the debt of Canada might 
 1 be reduced by the mode he had stated to 562,500,000,— as nearly 
 i as possible $25 per head, — Nova Scotia, in addition to her debt, 
 ' had incurred certain liabilities for the completion of the railway 
 
 < system within that province, for which she had undertaken 
 i engagements amounting to three millions or $25 per head also — 
 ' while New Brunswick, for the construction of her railways, had 
 ' engagements incurred and liabilities maturing, which amounted to 
 ' $1,800,000, bringing up her debts to seven millions, a fraction per 
 ' head slightly above that of Nova Scotia and Canada. Thus, by 
 ' assuming the local liabilities and assets, we were enabled to put the 
 ' debt of Canada at the same rate per head as those of Nova Scotia 
 * and New Brunswick, and therefore, as regarded the three larger 
 1 provinces, the assumption of their debts by the General Govern- 
 ' inent did not offer any difficulty whatever. In the case of New- 
 
 < foundland and Prince Edward Island it was different. Those 
 ' provinces, from their insular position, had not been required to 
 ' incur the same large obligations for public works. They possessed, 
 
144< THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 ' fortunately for themselves, easy access to all their settlements by 
 x water, or by very short distances of land carriage, and consequently 
 
 * had not been called on to construct canals, or to introduce a railway 
 ' system. Accordingly, the debts of Newfoundland and Prince 
 ' Edward Island were found to be much less, in proportion to their 
 ' population than those of the others. To place them on a par 
 ' with Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, it therefore became 
 ' necessary to give them an indemnity for the amount of debt which 
 ' they ha4 not incurred ; because, in assuming their revenues, we 
 ' called upon them to contribute to the payment of the interest on 
 e the debt which we had not incurred, and we could not fairly 
 ' expect them to do so, unless they were in some measure indemnified 
 ' for it. And it was found that, in taking this course, we were 
 ' enabled to get over one great difficulty which had met us, which 
 ' was, that those particular provinces possessed no local revenues, 
 J and that in charging them with the administration of their Local 
 ' Governments and taking from them the revenue from customs and 
 ' excise, we should leave the Governments of Newfoundland and 
 x Prince Edward Island without any means whatever of discharging 
 ' their liabilities. With regard to Newfoundland, he might remark 
 4 that the people in that colony being, in regard to agriculture, 
 ' altogether consumers, and not producers; because they were a fish- 
 ' ing and maritime population,the amount of dutiable goods they con- 
 ' sumed was about double per head what it was here. They would, 
 1 therefore, in the shape of customs duties, be contributing to the 
 ■* Confederation a larger proportion than properly belonged to them, 
 
 * and accordingly it was arranged that for the amount of debt which 
 ' they had not incurred, up to $25 per head, they should be allowed 
 ' interest, for the purpose of meeting their local payments, and 
 ' providing for their local wants.' 
 
 These lucid and convincing remarks of the Finance Minister 
 explain the paragraphs 61, 62 and 63 of the scheme. They show 
 us why the debt of Canada is established at $62,500,000, the debt, 
 of Nova Scotia at $8,000,0 CO, and that of New Brunswick at 
 $7,000,000 ; why it will be necessary that the Confederation should 
 pay to the two latter provinces an interest of 5 per cent, on the differ- 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 145 
 
 enoe between their real indebtedness of $8,000,000 and $7,000,000, 
 respectively. They will moreover shew, why we shall have to 
 pay to Newfoundland and the Island of Prince Edward an interest 
 of 5 per cent, on the respective amounts necessary to bring their 
 debts to $25 per head of their populations. 
 
 It is evident, after these explanations given by Mr. Gait, that the 
 debts ot Nova Scotia and New Brunswick will reach respectively the 
 sums of $8,000,000 and $7,000,000 when the Confederation shall 
 have been accomplished, and thus the latter will have nothing to 
 pay for this purpose. 
 
 The population of Newfoundland being 130,000, $25 per head 
 would establish its debt at $3,250,000, and it would thus be placed 
 on a level with the population of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New 
 Brunswick, with regard to their respective figures of population. 
 But as that province owes $946,000, we must deduct this amount 
 from the $3,250,000 j this would give a result of $2,304,000, on 
 which the Federal Government will have to pay to Newfoundland 
 an annual interest of 5 per centum, or $115,200. 
 
 In the same manner as the population of Prince Edward 
 Island is 80,748, by multiplying this number by 25, the amount 
 - of the debt per head of the three larger provinces, we find the 
 result to be 2,018,675, and 1,778,002, after deducting from the for- 
 mer number 240,673, the figure of the actual debt of that province. 
 . The Confederation will thus have to pay annually interest at five 
 per cent, on the latter amount, or $88,900. 
 
 Paragraph 64 is much easier understood, because it provides 
 that each province, taking as a fundamental basis for all future 
 time the Census of 1861, shall receive from the date of the adoption 
 of the scheme 80 cents per head of its population. 
 
 The amounts -to which these provinces will be entitled, in virtue 
 of this clause, will be distributed as follows : 
 
 Upper Canada $1,116,872 
 
 Lower Canada 888,531 
 
 Nova Scotia 264,685 
 
 New Brunswick 201,637 
 
 Newfoundland 104,000 
 
 Prince Edward Island 64,505 
 
 N 
 
146 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 But as Newfoundland gives up to the Confederation all rights 
 of property in its soil, which is neither sold to, nor occupied by 
 settlers, a sum of $150,000 will be paid over annually by the General 
 Government, and that province will therefore receive $369,200 as 
 a consideration for this transfer, divided as follows : $104,000 as 
 interest on the difference between its actual debt and the figure, 
 which would bring it to $25 per head of its population ; $115,206 
 the annual grant at £0 cents per head of its population, and $150,000 
 as a consideration for the annual value of its territory ceded to 
 the Confederation. 
 
 Prince Edward Island will receive annually from Federal 
 sources $153,405, that is to say, $88,900 interest on the difference 
 between its actual debt and the figure, which would establish the 
 rate of $25 per head on its population, and $64,505 representing 
 the grant by the Federal Government of 80 cents per head. 
 
 It is thus evident that the two provinces most favored in the 
 scheme are New Brunswick and Newfoundland, because New 
 Brunswick (clause 65) will receive annually from the Federal 
 revenue $63,000 during ten years, in all $630,000 per annum, and 
 Newfoundland (clause 66) $150,000 annually, in perpetuity, as a 
 compensation for its domain ceded to the General Government. 
 
 Without this concession, New Brunswick, having undertaken 
 extensive public works, could not possibly give up its general reve- 
 nue, and form part of the Confederation. The reason fully explains 
 the motive of the concession. 
 
 Newfoundland, with a local revenue of $5,000, could not possi- 
 bly meet the requirements ot its Local Government and Legislature 
 without the federal grant of $150,000. 
 
 But what are those trifling sacrifices compared with the immense 
 advantages of a Union of all the Provinces of British North Amer- 
 ica, and the indispensable possession of the nearest point on this 
 continent to Europe, of the key of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and 
 the foremost bulwark of the nation about to be created ? 
 
 Moreover, we must not lose sight of the fact that the provinces 
 with which we form an alliance will give up to the general revenue, 
 for local equivalents, more than they will receive ; and, secondly, 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 147 
 
 that their present revenues will more than suffice to meet their 
 local and general requirements, and that by such an arrangement 
 we shall not, by entering into the union, make a pecuniary sacrifice 
 in favor of the contracting parties. We produce the following 
 figures to prove this fact : — 
 
 
 Revenue, 
 1863. 
 
 Expenditure, 
 1868. 
 
 Difference, 
 1863. 
 
 Nova Scotia - - 
 
 $1,185,629 
 
 $1,072,274 
 
 $113,355 
 
 New Brunswick - - 
 
 - 899,991 
 
 884,613 
 
 15,378 
 
 Newfoundland (1862) - 
 
 480,000 
 
 479,420 
 
 1,420 
 
 Prince Edward Island 
 
 - 197,386 
 
 171,718 
 
 25,666 
 
 Maritime Provinces - $2;763,004 $2,608,025 $155,819 
 These figures cover the expenditure, both for local and general 
 purposes, to be undertaken by the Confederation. 
 
 Lower Canada, in 1863, was certainly not in as favorable a posi- 
 tion, because at that date there was a large deficit ; but, in the 
 twelve months of 1864, there has been an increase of revenue of 
 $1,500,000. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have each suc- 
 ceeded in obtaining an increase of $100,000, in all $1,700,000 — 
 from which we must deduct the deficit of 1863, namely $827,512, 
 leaving a surplus of of $872,488, as clearly shown by the following 
 statement submitted by Mr. Gait : — 
 
 1864. 
 
 Total Kevenue of all the Colonies - - - $14,223,320 
 Total Expenditure " " - - - 13,350,832 
 
 Estimated Surplus $ 872,488 
 
 We think we have sufficiently proved that Confederation, in a 
 pecuniary sense, entails no sacrifice upon any of the provinces, but; 
 on the contrary, in every respect, will prove of immense advantage 
 to all those entering upon the proposed union. 
 
148 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 %\z fciff. 
 
 CHAPTEE XXXYIII. 
 
 THE question of the Tariff is one of the most difficult to deal 
 with ; it is, at any rate, one of those upon which the adver- 
 saries of Confederation have most commented, both in Nova Sco- 
 tia and in New Brunswick. 
 
 We give here an average of the Tariffs of the different pro- 
 vinces : — 
 
 Canada 20 percent. 
 
 Nova Scotia 10 " 
 
 New Brunswick 15} " 
 
 Newfoundland 11 " 
 
 Prince Edward Island 10 " 
 
 Mr. Gait thus explains it : 
 
 ' That brought him to a very important point, as to whether 
 ' Confederation would produce increased taxation, of which appre- 
 1 hensions. were entertained. In the first place, the existing tax- 
 ' ation in all the provinces would have provided more than one 
 ' million dollars over and above the public demand ; but at the 
 ' same time it was quite true that in a Confederation they would 
 ' have to incur certain liabilities, such as for the Intercolonial 
 ' Railway, and for the completion of works now in progress in the 
 'Lower Provinces. It must be plain that as the revenue raised 
 ' by the colonies under present tariffs was more than sufficient, if 
 ' we were to raise the tariffs of all the provinces to that of Canada, 
 ' we should have much more revenue than we required. In the 
 ( case of the Lower Provinces, the average tariff was about 12} per 
 'cent.; and where they now collected duties to about two and a 
 ' half million dollars, under a higher tariff like that of Canada, at 
 ' least three million dollars would be raised. 
 
 'Therefore, to make adequate provision for all the wants of the 
 ' country, they need not bring up their tariffs, but we might re- 
 ' duce ours ; and in the raising of duties it would be practicable to 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 149 
 
 ' find a medium of taxation between the averages of 10 and 20 per 
 ' cent., whioh would be sufficient to meet the wants of the country.' 
 
 The question is so much the more easy to regulate, although 
 difficult to determine in its probable results, from the circum- 
 stance, that there is a surplus of revenue over the whole extent of 
 the Confederation, and consequently it will be possible to bring the 
 highest tariffs down to the level of the lowest. If the different 
 provincial tariffs were based upon precisely the same principle ; if 
 the taxed articles were everywhere of the same kind, and if there 
 was even some affinity — if not the same degree of impost between 
 articles of the same nature in all the provincial tariffs, — the task 
 would be comparatively easy. But it is not so. Some articles of 
 importation which are taxed in one province, are not taxed in 
 another ; other articles which are liable here to mixed duties, are 
 there submitted to a fixed duty or to an ad valorem dufy. There 
 are again duties which are liable to deductions between one pro- 
 vince and another, and which would cease altogether under Con- 
 federation. These would be of no importance except among the 
 Maritime Provinces themselves, since our connection with them up 
 to this date has amounted to very little. 
 
 This balance would probably be of little importance to the gen- 
 eral revenue, but must not, however, be omitted in adjusting the 
 tariff of the Confederation. 
 
 We are threatened with the loss of the Reciprocity Treaty. 
 How and up to what point, will this act of the American Congress 
 affect our tariff ? It is impossible to answer this question with 
 any degree of precision, because notwithstanding .the abrogation of 
 the Reciprocity Treaty, there are certain products that for our 
 own interest we should continue to admit free, such as the agri- 
 cultural products of the West, and the raw material necessary for 
 our manufactures. Still it is not less true, that the abrogation of 
 that Treaty, which will oblige us to tax a great number of pro- 
 ducts, will have the effect of considerably augmenting our revenue, 
 and will enable us to lower the average of our tariff. 
 
 The following table, which gives us the value of articles taxable 
 
150 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 and non-taxable imported from the United States, clearly proves 
 what we have advanced : — 
 
 Taxable merchandize. Coin and precious Other merchandize 
 
 Metals. not taxable. 
 
 1861 18,346,636 $ 863,308 $11,859,447 
 
 1862 6,128,783 2,530,297 16,514,077 
 
 1863 3,974,396 4,651,679 14,483,287 
 
 $18,449,812 $8,045,284 $42,856,811 
 
 Thus it appears that in three years there was an importation of 
 },351,907, of which only $18,449,812 worth of taxable articles, 
 and a value of $50,902,095 worth of merchandize was admitted 
 ■free. If we deduct from this last amount $8,045,284 for the sil- 
 ver imported, (coined and not coined, - ) not taxable under any cir- 
 cumstances, there would still remain $42,856,811, or an annual 
 average of $14,285,637 worth of merchandize which could be 
 taxed, but which now are admitted free. 
 
 But besides that, we should feel the necessity of admitting free 
 a certain portion of those articles represented by the figures $14,- 
 285,637, and it is certain that the imposition of duties upon these 
 articles would have the effect of diminishing the importation of 
 them to a certain extent, and consequently it is impossible that 
 we can calculate exactly, in advance, what the American imports 
 would produce under the action of a tariff, or what reduction we 
 might consequently effect in the general tariff, so as to place it on 
 a level with the average of the tariffs of the Maritime Provinces, 
 without diminishing the equilibrium which has been already es- 
 tablished between the total receipts and expenditure of Confedera- 
 tion. 
 
 What we do know, and enough for our present purpose to 
 know, is, that we shall have an increase of revenue by the abroga- 
 tion of the Reciprocity Treaty to a considerable degree, and con- 
 sequently a possibility of lowering our tariff to the level of the 
 average of the tariffs of the Atlantic Provinces, and of making 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 151 
 
 good the slight deficiencies created by the abolition of the inter- 
 colonial tariffs under Confederation. 
 
 But after all, supposing they should execute considerable works 
 in the Lower Provinces, and that to pay for them, it became ne- 
 cessary to raise the average of their tariffs, th'ey could have no 
 reason to complain; for even with that augmentation, they 
 could not possibly have obtained such works without Confedera- 
 tion, and in giving them these works we should give them com- 
 mercial existence and prosperity, which would permit them to pro- 
 gress more easily under a tariff a little heavier than they formerly 
 did under a lighter tariff. 
 
 But let us suppose even that the Reciprocity Treaty be main- 
 tained, whether in its present state or with modifications,, the mar- 
 gin allowed in the budget under the general revenue, after paying 
 all local and federal expenses? as Mr. Gait has established by in- 
 disputable figures ; is sufficient with or without these promises of 
 increase, to enable the General Parliament to lower considerably 
 the average of the collective tariff. 
 
 4 %\t Intercolonial Jktag/ 
 
 CHAPTER XXXIX. 
 
 68. ' The General Government shall secure, -without delay, the completion 
 of the Intercolonial Railway from Riviere du Loup, through New Brans- 
 wick, to Truro in Nova Scotia.' 
 
 IF in the examination which we have made of the projeot of the 
 Conference, and the estimate we have formed of the motives 
 which determined the programme of the present Government in 
 the Session of 1864, we have arrived at the conviction that the 
 Union of all the Provinces of British North America has become 
 a necessity ; we need not undertake to prove the utility of the 
 
152 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Intercolonial Kailway: for on the very threshold of the Con- 
 ference, the construction, and the immediate construction, of that 
 great way of intercommunication was insisted upon as an indis- 
 pensable and inflexible condition of the union. 
 
 They were right ; for without that railroad, the union would 
 have existed only in words, and would have had no existence in 
 •things. It would neither have existed in a political, commercial 
 nor military sense, and what would have been the use of an alliance 
 between people who possessed no interests in common ? This iron 
 iray was then not only the strongest bond of the future union, but 
 it was the strongest one to keep together the parts of the great 
 nation that we are trying to build up. 
 
 But there are other and more immediate considerations which 
 operate in favor of this great enterprise. Lord Durham said, in 
 1839 : ' The establishment of a good way of communication be- 
 ■' tween Halifax and Quebec would produce between the different 
 ' Provinces relations, the effect of which would be to render a 
 ' General Union absolutely necessary.' Several explorations have 
 established the practicability of a railroad over the whole route. 
 
 Lord Durham desired a railroad to render the union neces- 
 sary, and the Convention want it, in order to. make the union pos- 
 sible, because events which have progressed so rapidly, and hav e 
 developed conditions so unforeseen at the period when that states- 
 man presided over the destinies of British North America, have 
 developed the necessity of the union without the stimulant of a 
 railroad, to such a point that it is now the union itself which has 
 determined the necessity of that same road. 
 
 Before the period of the new alliance, that is to say, before all 
 parties in Canada had acquired the conviction that the political 
 union of the whole of the provinces had become indispensable 
 from every point of view, there were to be found none truly de- 
 voted to the project of a railroad between Quebec and Halifax, 
 except the denizens of Quebec and of the Provinces of Nova Scotia 
 and New Brunswick. 
 
 This is easily understood,, for then, we were in close commercial 
 relations with the United States. 
 
QUEBEC CONFERENCE. 153 
 
 Their railroads were our railroads, their seaports were our sea- 
 ports; the natural products of the two .peoples crossed each other 
 in their movements to and fro, without clashing at the custom- 
 houses, and the commercial understanding and harmony that pre" 
 railed on both sides of the frontier was so perfect, that our foreign 
 merchandize came to us through their vast territory with as little- 
 obstacle as their own exportations met with. But the sanguinary 
 battles that have taken place between the North and South, during 
 the last four years, have developed other ideas and other senti- 
 ments among our neighbours, and instead of opening the way 
 more widely to commercial relations between them and us, they 
 are narrowing the space each day and are even preparing to place 
 between us impassable barriers. In a little while the Reciprocity 
 Treaty will probably exist no longer, their railroads and their sea- 
 ports will be no longer our railroads and our seaports, and, per- 
 haps, * * * * But no, let us hope, at least, that pro- 
 vidence has reserved for us another and a better fate. 
 
 It is important, then — nay, indispensable to us, if we would sell 
 our products, and receive in exchange those which we require from 
 foreign countries, that we should be able to communicate directly 
 with the ocean by seaports of our own that would be open every 
 day in the year ! 
 
 We have, indeed, the river St. Lawrence and our great lakes, 
 with our canals, completing the most magnificent system of in- 
 terior navigation which exists in the world ; but nature has sealed 
 them inexorably during five months of the year. And if, for 
 any cause whatever, they close upon us those American outlets 
 which let out our products and by which our supplies arrive, where 
 is the man, whether he dwells on the shores of the Georgian Bay, 
 or the banks of the Ottawa or of the Richelieu, or in the forests of 
 the District of Quebec, who will not say that he is in want of a 
 railroad to Halifax, that that railway is everything to him, and that 
 he ought to contribute something towards' it? 
 
 It is true that it will more immediately benefit the District of 
 Quebec and the Maritime Provinces, but this is the inevitable con- 
 sequenco of their geographical position. 
 
154 THE NEW CONSTITUTION. 
 
 But if this is a reason why other parts of Canada should object 
 to it, no other public undertaking would be possible; wharves and 
 railway stations may attract greater advantages to their localities 
 than places situated at a distance from them, but that does not 
 hinder the latter from concurring in their construction, for without 
 them, how could their products reach a market? These are 
 elementary notions in political economy which have acquired 
 the character of axioms and that it would be absurd to establish by 
 figures. It would, for example, be no use to tell the lumber mer- 
 chant that it would not serve him to fell all the forests in Canada 
 if he could not have his magnificent products conveyed to the 
 ocean. . This is why the Convention decreed so unanimously and 
 so spontaneously the construction of the railroad from Quebec 
 to Halifax. 
 
 Conclusion. 
 
 CHAPTER XL. 
 
 rpHIS article closes our examination of the project of the Quebec 
 -*- Conference. Happy we shall certainly be, if our labor, which 
 has cost us many evenings, may be useful in any way in the impor- 
 tant debate which is soon to open. In any case, the reader may 
 rest assured, that we have kept strictly to the engagement con- 
 tracted by us at the commencement, to keep clear of partizan views, 
 and so discuss the question of our future destinies without passion 
 and perfectly independent of all men of whatever shade of political 
 opinion.