BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME FROM THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND THE GIFT OF '-X J-'" Henrg W. Sage 189X . /\''3^t» t BX»°S. > \Iil\\-?^ ■357 Cornell University Library arV14140 A short history of ethics Greel( and mod 3 1924 031 215 365 olin.anx The original of tliis bool< is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31 924031 21 5365 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS §^^m. MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited LONDON • BOMBAY CALCUTTA MELBOURNE THE MACMILLAN COMPANY NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO ATLANTA. ■ SAN FRANCISCO THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. TORONTO A SHOET HISTOEY OP ETHICS GREEK AND MODERN BY EEGINALD A. P. ROGERS FELLOW AND TUTOR OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN' MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON 19H fs PKEFACE This book is mainly descriptive but also critical. My primary object has been to provide a brief and accurate description of the leading Greek ethical systems, and of those systems which appear to represent the best types of modern philosophic Ethics, from Hobbes to the end of the nineteenth century ; systems which may be regarded as contemporary are ex- cluded. My secondary object has been to show, by criticism and comparison, the connecting links between systems and the movements of thought by which new systems arise — movements which express both reaction and expansion. Scholastic doctrines receive little attention, because, as the title indicates, they do not come within the scope of the work ; the omission is not intended to suggest that the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas is antiquated or wanting in depth — from what I know of it I conclude that it is remarkably profound and subtle, — but as his system, in its non- theological features, is largely a vi A SHORT HISTOEY OF ETHICS commentary on, and expansion of, Aristotelianism, its omission in an elementary history is, I think, justified. Some other familiar names are omitted, because I have sought to give types of thought rather than names of thinkers. Eeid's ethical doctrines, for example, are, in my opinion, represented by Butler's, and those of the French empiricists by Hume. J. J. Eousseau, though his influence was wide, is not mentioned, because his teaching was an appeal to the feelings rather than a systematic philosophy. More recent systems like those of Wundt, Paulsen, Nietzsche, and the Pragmatists are also omitted. This book is, as I have said, mainly descriptive, but I wish to emphasise the importance of recognising that a critical history of philosophy may be used as a method of positive philosophical construction, and that its results need not be negative or sceptical. The history of thought shows that the idea of objective human good contains, in some of its forms, a con- tradiction, or an irrational element, which it is the business of Pure Ethics to expose and, if possible, to remove. The method of historical criticism examines the different attempts that have been made to remove this irrational element, and selects provisionally that system which appears, on the whole, the most satis- factory from a logical and practical point of view. PEEFACE vii The history of Ethics shows that the irrational element is due to a conflict between two opposite tendencies. The first is to lay undue stress on the emotional con- stituents of the Good ; I believe the only logical issue of this is Exclusive Egoism (Cyrenaics, Epicurus, Hobbes), which solves the difficulty only at the cost of admit- ting that objective social good is a self- contradictory conception. The second tendency is represented by Moral Purism (Cynics, Stoics, Kant), which uses the principle that the satisfaction of particular feelings or of the feelings of particular individuals cannot be the right guides to conduct ; by a strained use of this true principle it is inferred that pleasure has no ethical worth. The eighteenth -century intuition- ists recognised the difficulty, but they took the wrong way of escape ; they endeavoured by various artifices to prove that conscience and the desire for happiness lead, or ultimately will lead, to the same result, namely, a general harmony between the pleasures of all persons. But assuming that such a social harmony could result, it would be merely external, • not inward and spiritual ; the irrational element cannot be abolished in this artificial way. Evolutional Naturalism has shown that different forms of life are not independent, and that the idea of an organism is not that of a single isolated body, h viii A SHORT HISTOEY OF ETHICS but a form connecting the individual with the past of living Nature. But the Eational Idealists have effected what is more important for Pure Ethics in leading us to the notion of the inward unity between the individual manifestations of the higher forms of consciousness ; this is the unity of self-conscious Reason. Without this notion the irrational element in Ethics cannot be removed. It is through this unity that individuality is transcended without being abolished. The reality of " common good " depends on this trans- cendence, the recognition of which alone makes it possible for a person to identify social good with his own. As this book is of an elementary character, I have avoided metaphysical arguments as far as possible. But the preceding remarks illustrate the truth, which should never be forgotten, that a complete philosophy of Ethics involves some very profound metaphysical problems. For some writers the practical and specu- lative views are almost inseparable, e.g. Plato and Hegel : in others, e.g. Kant and Aristotle, the two can be separated for a time, but not when the final problems are faced ; Aristotle's ideal life, theoria, is the union of speculative and practical wisdom, and connects his Ethics with his Metaphysics; Kant, though teaching that the practical and speculative PREFACE ix spheres are distinct for human experience, often implies that the distinction is not final, being due to the present limitation of our faculties. The two apparently opposite schools of Eational Idealism and Pragmatism agree at least on this point that our practical and speculative Eeason have a common root. The Ethics of the " moral sense " school is the least dependent on metaphysics, but this is not in its favour, being merely the result of superficiality. I have written a comparatively long " Introduction," in the hope that it will be useful to those who are beginning the subject ; it is intended chiefly to define the scope of Ethics, and to give an idea of the nature of the problems that arise. Fixed meanings are given to some words for the sake of definiteness, but it wiU be found that few systems have a precise terminology, and that the terminologies of those which are precise differ inter se. This inexactness is partly due to the fact that writers on Ethics, often treat the subject as a branch of popular literature rather than as an exact science, partly to the fact that the ideas of Ethics are so complex and so liable to change and develop- ment, even in the individual mind, that it becomes exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to combine philosophic breadth with precision in the use of terms. Spinoza, in his Ethica, was able to overcome X A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS this diiSculty, but it is a curious fact that no one else uses his terminology and definitions, and that his admirers have found it necessary to explain his thoughts in language less precise than his own. Besides the works of the writers themselves — where this was possible — I have used various histories of philosophy, especially Eitter and Preller's Historia Philosophiae Graecae, the histories of Ueberweg and Windelband, and Hoffding's History of Modern Philosophy. In dealing with Hegel, I have made use of the language of Wallace's translations. I desire to express my gratitude to Dr. Mahaffy for reading the proof-sheets and giving me the benefit of his wide experience, and to Professor J. I. Beare and Mr. G. W. Mooney for many useful criticisms and suggestions. CONTENTS INTRODUCTION PAOE Subject-matter of Ethics . . . . 1 Ultimate Ends ... ... 3 Good and Moral Good . .... 6 Ethical Judgments, Virtue and Vice, Right and Wrong, Good and Bad .... . 9 Moral Obligation, Duty, Free-wiU . 11 Motive and Effect .... 12 The Ethical Scale. Idealism and Realism . 14 Good and Knowledge . . . . . . .15 Moral Virtues and Special Virtues . . 17 Will, Character, Person, and Self . . .21 Goodness and Utility . ... .22 Happiness, Pleasure, and Well-being . 23 Subjective and Objective Good . . .24 General Problems . . . . . , .26 xi Xll A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS PART I GEEEK ETHICAL SYSTEMS The Sophists, Socrates, Schools . A. The Sophists B. SOCKATES C. The Cynics . D. The Otrenaics CHAPTER I AND THE SOCRATIC 31 31 34 37 39 CHAPTER II ro 41 A. The Idea of Justice . 43 Method .... 43 The Cardinal Virtues . 44 Justice in the Individual . 46 Its Worth for the Individual. 47 Social and Private Good . 47 The Ideal State . 47 The Ideal Ruler . 48 Education of the Rulers . 50 B. The Theory of Ideas . 52 The Absolute Good 55 The Ideal and the Actual 57 C. Pleasure, Good, and Rational RDER . . 59 Is Pleasure the Good '! . 60 CONTENTS xui C. Pleasure, Good, and Rational Order (contd.) — ■ The Harmonious Life .... 61 Reason in the Universe . ... 62 CHAPTEE III Aristotle 64 The Separation of the Sciences 64 The Highest Science 65 Method . . . . 65 Criticism of some Ethical Theories . 66 General Conception of Well- being . 67 Division of Virtue ..... 68 Characteristics of Moral Virtue 69 The Doctrine of the Mean 70 Voluntary Actions and Responsibility- 72 73 Courage 74 Justice . ..... 75 Friendship ....... 76 Self-Love and the Love of Others . 76 Pleasure, Pain, and the Good . 77 Knowledge and Virtue 78 The Ideal Life 79 General View of the Ethics op Plato and Aristotle . ..... 82 CHAPTER IV Epicurus Theory of Knowledge . Physics 85 86 86 A SHOET HISTORY OF ETHICS Ethics Virtue . Social Virtues Criticism of Egoistic Hedonism PAGE 87 89 90 CHAPTER V The Stoics Knowledge and Well-being Theory of Knowledge . Physics Ethics Virtue and the Good Virtue and Knowledge Resignation . Pleasure and Emotion Modifications The Ideal Man Social Ethics Summary Criticism . 93 93 94 94 95 96 98 98 98 100 100 101 102 103 CHAPTER VI General Survey of Greek Ethics 105 CONTENTS XV PAET II MODEEN ETHICAL SYSTEMS INTRODUCTION Intervening Systems ..... PAGE . 113 Influence of Greek on Modern Ethics . . 115 Moral Obligation ...... . 118 Naturalism and Intuitionism 119 Other Types of Ethical Thought . 123 CHAPTEE I Earlier Naturalism .... . 125 A. Egoistic Naturalism — Hobbes 126 Philosophy and its Worth 126 Division of Philosophy . . 127 Materialism ..... . 127 Psychology ..... . 128 Action, Pleasure, Pain, Good, Evil . 129 Will . 130 130 Exclusive Egoism .... 132 The Warfare of Man with Man . 132 Articles of Peace ; the Laws of Nature . 133 Civil Government the Guardian of the Laws of Nature ..... . 135 Summary of Hobbes' Ethics . 136 xvi A SHOET HISTORY OF ETHICS PAGE A. Egoistic Natdralism — ^Hobbbs (contd.) — Criticism ...... 137 Criticism of Hobbes' Ethics . . .137 Inconsistencies in Hobbes' General Philo- sopliy .... 140 B. Rationalistic Naturalism — Spinoza . .143 CHAPTEE II English Intuitionism 147 A. Rational iNiniTiONiSM Cudwortli — Immutable Morality, Reason . 148 Clarke — The Rules of Righteousness . 149 Criticism .... . 151 B. Aesthetic Intuitionism . . . .152 Shaftesbury — Virtue and Happiness 153 Criticism . . . . • , ■ 156 Hutcheson — The three " Calm Determinations" 156 Criticism of " Moral Sense " . . . .158 C. Sympathetic Intuitionism Adam Smith — The "Impartial Spectator" 160 CHAPTEE III English Intuitionism {cmtinued) . . 163 D. Autonomic Intuitionism — Bdtleh . 163 Method . 163 The Social Nature of Man 164 The Moral Nature of Man 166 Man is a Law to Himself 167 Human Nature a System 167 The System of Active Principles . 168 CONTENTS xvii Applications ..... PAOE 170 Conscience and Reasonable Self-Love . 172 Criticism 172 Relation of Butler to the Greeks . 174 Individualism and Responsibility . . 175 CHAPTER IV Sympathetic Naturalism — Hume . Impressionism Morals a Science . Reason and Passion Moral Sense and Virtue Motive and Moral Approbation Natural and Artificial Virtues Obligation .... Motive to Justice . Origin of Justice . Pleasure, Sympathy, Utility . Criticism . Impressionism Psychological Hedonism . Defect in Naturalistic Methods Influence of Hume 177 178 178 178 180 181 182 183 183 184 185 185 185 188 188 189 CHAPTER V Moral Purism — Kant . Relation to Preceding Systems The Goodwill; Motive and Effect; Inclination Duty and 191 191 193 xviii A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS PAGE The Categorical Imperative . . 194 Illustrations . . .195 Humanity an End in Itself ... .196 Autonomy and the Kingdom of Ends . . .197 Autonomy ..... . . 198 Connection between the Three Forms of the Categorical Imperative . • . . . 199 Free- will and the Laws of Nature . . 199 Happiness and Virtue ; the Three Postulates of Morality . . . . < 200 Good and Moral Law . . 202 Particular Duties . . . . 202 Criticism . . 202 Formalism . . 202 Virtue and Happiness . 203 Motive and Effect . . .204 Nature and Freedom . . 206 Permanent Influence of Kant . . .207 Links between Kant and Subsequent Systems . 209 CHAPTER VI German Rational Idealism . 211 A. FiCHTE ... . . . 211 B. Schellino . . . . 213 C. Hegel Introductory . . . 215 1. Logic . 216 2. The Philosophy of Nature . 217 3. The Philosophy of Mind . . 217 CONTENTS PAOE The Philosophy of Mind . .217 I. Subjective Mind (The Soul, Conscious- ness, Reason) . . . 218 II. Objective Mind . 221 (a) Legal Right 222 (b) Morality . . 223 (c) Social Ethics . 224 III. Absolute Mind . . . 227 D. Remarks on the Ethics of German Rational Idealism ...... 227 Relation to Naturalism and Intuitionism . 229 Relation to Positivism and Subsequent Systems 230 CHAPTER VII Utilitarianism . 234 A. Egoistic Utilitarianism — Jerbmt Bentham . 235 Virtue, Motive, Punishment ... 236 B. Sympathetic Utilitarianism — J. S. Mill 237 Proof of Utilitarianism ..... 237 Sanctions . . .237 Quality of Pleasures . 238 Self-Sacriiice and Conventional Morality. 239 Virtue as an End . 240 Criticism of Bentham and Mill . . 240 C. Intuitional Utilitarianism — Henet Sidgwick 242 Problem and Methods of Ethics . . . 242 Criticism of Common-Sense and Dogmatic Intuitionism . . . . . .244 And of other Methods . ... 244 A SHOET HISTORY OF ETHICS p>nv. PhilosopMc Intuitionism 245 The Rational Axioms 245 Proof of Utilitarianism . . .246 Utilitarianism and Common-sense . . 247 Applications, Positive Morality . . 248 Egoism and Altruism . . .248 D. General Criticism of Utilitarianism . . 249 Ethical Hedonism 250 Quantification of Happiness . 253 Logical Defect in Utilitarian Idea of Good 25'4 The Unity of Good 256 OHAPTEE Vm Evolutional Naturalism Historical Position Evolution . . . . . A. Charles Darwin . . . . B. Herbert Spencer The End imposed by Nature — Life The Subject of Ethics . Good and Bad 257 257 258 259 261 261 261 262 The Ethical End — Pleasure . . 262 Spencer on the Evolution of Conduct The Four " Views " . . . .263 Feeling and Function .... 263 The Sense of Duty . . . 264 The Individual and the Type . . 265 CONTENTS xxi PAOR Limit of Social Evolution . . . 266 Egoism and Altruism . . . 266 Compromise . . . 269 Spencer's Theory of Justice " Sub-Human " Justice . . 269 Human Justice. The Formula . .271 The Sentiment and the Idea of Justice . 271 Error of Communism . . . 272 Authority of the Formula of Justice . 273 Applications . . . . .273 Griticism of Spencerian Ethics Are the Fittest to Survive the Ethically- Best? . .... 274 Ethical Judgment Free, not Mechanical . 274 Confusion between Naturalism and In- tuitionism . . . . .275 Hedonism and the Limit of Evolution . 278 C. The Different Types op Evolution . . 279 CHAPTEE IX English Eational Idealism 282 T. H. Green 282 Relation to Predecessors. . . 282 Metaphysic .... . 282 Will, Eeason, and Freedom of Will . 283 The Good Will — Criticism of Hedonists and Kant 284 Moral Good . . . . 285 xxii A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS PAGE Character of the Moral Ideal . . . 285 Origin of the Ideal . 286 Development of the Ideal . . . 287 Concluding Eemarks . . 288 Applied Ethics .... 290 INDEX . ... .293 INTEODUCTION The following questions will serve to give the reader a general idea of the nature of the problems which Ethics ^ attempts to solve : — Is happiness the ultimate end of action ? Is virtue preferable to pleasure ? How do pleasure and happiness differ ? What is meant by saying that I ought to perform some particular action, or to respect some general precept such as the keeping of promises ? Am I under any obligation to seek the welfare of other persons, as well as my own ? If so, what is the right proportion between the two welfares ? What is meant by " freedom of the will " ? Is feeling or reason the right guide to conduct ? What do the terms " good," " right," " obligation," " duty," " conscience " signify, practically and theoretically ? These problems and others associated with them form the subject-matter of Ethics, which may be described as the science which investigates the general principles for determining the true worth of the ultimate ends of human conduct. These principles, if they could be discovered and exactly formulated, so ^ The word "ethics" was originally a plural (jh. ■fjBi.Ki., the science of morals), but it is now generally used as a singular. The same applies to "mathematics," "physics," "metaphysics," and other words of like termination. 3E 1 B 2 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS that the rules of conduct could be deduced from them, would constitute Ideal Morality. Positive Morality is the body of laws (the ethical code) accepted by an age or community as correct principles for determining the true worth of actions, and expressed in the form of judgments of approval and disapproval. For example, the Positive Morality of our age approves of industry, temperance, honesty, and a regard for human life, while it condemns their opposites. It must not be taken for granted that Positive Morality and Ideal Morality coincide, since the former is partly based on unreflecting traditions, conventions, and customs ; it is often inconsistent with itself, and varies in different times and countries. The burning of so - called witches and the torture of persons suspected of crime or heresy were once regarded as justifiable. At the present time vivisection is con- demned by some, whereas others, equally humane and intelligent, hold that, if properly restricted, it is a justifiable method of seeking for the cures of diseases. The divergence between the moral customs of civilised and of savage nations is well known ; cannibalism, polygamy, the destruction of infants and of old persons, — these and other extraordinary customs have been justified by the Positive Morality of certain savage tribes. But since Ethics cannot detach itself completely from the accepted morality of the community, and since it must start from some kind of data, ethical writers — as the sequel will show — usually assume provisionally that the Positive Morality to which they are accustomed contains valuable truth. They endeavour to exhibit the general principles underlying INTRODUCTION 3 this Positive Morality, to criticise or justify them, and possibly to extend them beyond their commonly recognised limits. The origin, in the individual and the race, of common moral judgments is also much discussed in modern Ethics, in the belief that light .will thereby be thrown on the validity of those judgments. Ultimate Ends. — The end of a deliberate action is that for the sake of which it is performed ; it is something which the agent wishes to realise. Some ends are pursued chiefly, or altogether, as means to the realisation of other ends ; wealth, for example, though an end of many actions, is sought — except peihaps by misers — as a means of acquiring power or happiness. An ultimate end, however, is one that is desired for its own sake, quite apart from its utility in helping towards the attainment of other ends. Ethics deals with the ultimate ends of human con- duct. This characteristic distinguishes it from every other science and brings it into close connection with Metaphysics, which, as understood by Aristotle, investigates the ultimate principles underlying all reality. That the ethical problem arises quite naturally may be seen by inquiring into the reasons for under- taking any inquiry, or for performing any deliberate action. If we ask, for instance, why Geometry is studied, three answers may be given. First, because there exists in some minds a free spontaneous interest ^ ^ An interest may be described as anything that attracts or tends to attract attention, so that a person is led to think, act, or feel in a particular way, and finds some degree of satisfaction in such thoughts, actions, or feelings. Desire is a movement of the mind towards an object or end that interests. Thus desire and interest are inseparable. But they are not 4 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS in geometrical knowledge, and the pursuit and capture of such knowledge gives direct satisfaction. This is an ethical answer, for it means that Geometry is good for those whom it interests ; and as we shall see, that which interests and satisfies desire is good, when con- sidered by itself alone. But no human occupation is quite isolated ; we must therefore pursue the question further, and inquire whether the external effects of a study of Geometry are also good. Secondly, then, we find that Geometry is studied because it is useful for other sciences, such as Astronomy, Statics, Engineering, and Architecture. This, however, is not an ethical answer ; we must next inquire what are the reasons for studying Astronomy and the other sciences. Besides the answer that they gratify a spontaneous interest, and are so far good, we may reply that Astronomy (say) is useful for navigation, and navigation is useful for commerce, war, and travelling. If we followed such trains of reasoning to their conclusions we should find that the ultimate justification — over and above the constantly operating spontaneous interest — for engaging in these pursuits, is that they help men to achieve objects which are desired, at least partly, for their own sakes. It is the function of Ethics to provide general principles for estimating the real worth of these ultimate ends, or to criticise the general principles that are used for this synonymous ; a desire is a particular conscious state, but an interest may be permanent — e.g. a man may take a permanent interest in football, but he has not a permanent desire to watch or play the game. Again, a desire when it is satisfied ceases to occupy consciousness, but the satisfac- tion of an interest consists partly in the fact that it occupies conscious- ness and receives more attention than other things. We do not desire to go to the theatre when we are watching a play, but interest may be present in full vigour. INTEODUCTION 5 purpose. Thirdly, Geometry is studied because of its educational value. It is the business of Ethics to estimate the real worth of the spontaneous interests which education helps to foster and to gratify All of these answers converge to one point, and if we ask the question more generally we shaU be led to the same conclusion ; pursuits and studies are undertaken, and deliberate actions performed because they tend either directly or indirectly, or in both ways, to satisfy one or more human interests. They are valued either as means or as ends, or as both means and ends. We are now confronted with the main problem of Ethics. Are the satisfactions of these interests, the attainment of these desired objects, good in themselves, or is there some ultimate criterion, some principle or set of mutually consistent principles by which we may determine the intrinsic excellence of the satisfaction of these interests ? One might be disposed to think that the mere existence of such interests in human nature would be a sufficient justification for trying to satisfy them. If this were so the science of Ethics might stop at this point. But the answer is not so simple ; the difficulties in Ethics are due to the follow- ing causes, which compel further inquiry. (1) It is not possible for an individual to satisfy all his interests, and he must therefore use some principle of ethical selection, according to which some interests are to be preferred to others. (2) Some interests, if they are allowed to absorb the attention beyond a certain limit, are destructive of their own satisfactions, and interfere with the satisfaction of other interests. This is true, for example, of the interests arising from 6 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS bodily appetites ; these, if indulged too far, lead to sensual cravings, and to bodily and mental ill-health, thereby diminishing the force and vigour of other interests. (3) The interests of one person often con- flict with those of others, and Ethics has to try to find a practical harmony between the interests of the different members of society. The first two causes give rise to Individual Ethics, the third to Social Ethics. Good and Moral Good. — Ethics seeks for a principle that will determine the true worth of the ends of con- duct. That which is apprehended as having true worth is said to be good. Accordingly, Ethics has sometimes been called the Science of the Good, so far as this is attainable by human conduct, i.e. by human actions deliberately aiming at ends. Strictly speaking " good " is a conception that cannot be accurately defined. In a sense the main problem of systems of Pure Ethics is to determine this conception with greater accuracy, and Applied Ethics aims at giving a practical meaning to the conception in concrete life. The following remarks are intended, not to give an exact definition of " good," but to render more intelligible the nature of the problems " What is good ? " and " What is moral good ? " and to show how these problems naturally arise. " Good," " desire,'' and " interest '' are closely con- nected with each other. Though we cannot follow Hobbes in identifying " good " with that which any one desires, — for a person's desires may be misleading or they may conflict with each other, or with those of other persons, — yet it is true that the satisfaction INTEODUCTION 7 of a desire is good, when considered by itself alone, apart from its possible interference with other desires. More generally, that which, whether preceded by desire or not, is consciously approved by a person fw its own sake is good, when considered by itself alone. In this limited sense a pleasurable feeling is good ; or the attainment of any desired end, such as the passing of an examination, or the acquisition of wealth ; or any occupation that interests. In the same limited sense the satisfaction of any interest is good. But this view of good is clearly narrow and incomplete. Some pleasurable feelings, for example, may be followed by injurious consequences ; wealth may yield less satisfaction to the possessor than a moderate competence ; and when we say that wealth is wrongly acquired, we generally mean that it was acquired in a way that interfered with the interests of other persons. Here we reach the difficulty which is the original stimulus to ethical inquiry. When different " goods " or " interests " are practically in- compatible, we require an ethical scale to determine which is to be preferred. In comparing one limited good with another, we may have to consider (as Bentham did in reference to pleasures) the quality, duration, and intensity of the satisfaction yielded by each, as well as the tendency which each may have to help or hinder the attainment of other goods by the agent or by other persons. In this way there arises a natural distinction between immediate and remote good. Immediate good gives a simple momentary satisfaction experienced by a single person. Eemote good, in general, is distinguished from immediate 8 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS good by the fact that the satisfaction it yields is not confined to the present moment or to the experience of one individual. The ends sought by Temperance and Justice, for example, have the characteristics of remote good ; a temperate man refrains from sacrificing his future interests to the pleasure of the moment ; a just man does not prefer his own interests to those of other persons. Eemote good, however, for beings whose conscious- ness is in Time, is dependent on immediate goods, since its fruition is in moments of Time, and cannot be postponed for ever ; and since society consists of persons with distinct experiences, a social remote good must be realised in the experiences of individuals. Thus Temperance is not a purely negative abstinence from the satisfaction of particular desires, nor is Justice a merely negative impartiality in the distribu- tion of benefits ; the former virtue requires that healthy desires and interests should be positively satisfied in due degree, the latter that benefits should be actually received by individuals. Immediate good, then, is relatively simple, being either momentary or confined to a single person ; but remote good is a complex whole consisting of inter- related parts, which are either immediate goods, or useful in the production of immediate goods. The fundamental difficulty which we have described as the original stimulus to ethical inquiry, may now be expressed as follows : Immediate goods often have to be surrendered in order to secure remote good, which seems, therefore, in such cases, to contain an injurious element ; why should we sacrifice the interests of the present to those of the future, or our INTRODUCTION 9 own interests for those of other persons? It will be seen that various attempts have been made to overcome this difficulty. The results are often one- sided ; the Cynics, for example, tend to underrate the worth of immediate good, and the Cyrenaics overrate its worth, identifying the highest good with the pleasure of the moment. The problem presents itself inevitably to every thinking person ; and the answer to it means formulating, more or less definitely, some kind of ethical scale, by reference to which the relative worths of different forms of satisfaction are to be estimated. Moral good is defined by the ethical scale which is used to compare immediate and remote goods with each other. A morally good end is the best that it is in the power of the agent to attain by deliberate action, under the circumstances in which he is placed ; it is in every case at the highest point of the scale. " Moral rectitude " and " moral virtue " are similarly defined.^ The systems hereafter described are to some extent attempts to formulate the structure of the ethical scale — true or accepted — and to determine the source of our knowledge or beliefs concerning it. Ethical Judgments, Virtue and Vice, Right and Wrong, Good and Bad. — Ethical Judgments may be regarded as being judgments about deliberate actions, about the persons performing those actions, or about the ends at which the actions aim. In such judgments, as made in ordinary life, the adjectives " good," " virtuous," and " right," and their opposites, are applied indiscriminately to persons, actions, and ends ; but it would be better to apply " good " and " bad " to 1 See p. 18. 10 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS ends, " virtuous " and " vicious " to persons or types of personal character, and " right " and " wrong " to deliberate actions. The ethical principle which deter- mines the worth of ends determines also the judgments about actions and personal characters. To give an example we must anticipate. According to the Utili- tarians the greatest happiness of the greatest possible number is the best of all ends, and the statement of this provides a principle of ethical judgment by which actions, ends, and characters are to be judged. It may be taken as proved that the health of the community tends towards the attainment of this end. If, there- fore, a person who is recovering from a contagious disease deliberately enters a crowded assembly, his action is wrong, his end (perhaps amusement) is bad in so far as it conflicts with the higher end, and his character, if such actions are habitual with him, is so far vicious. " Eight " as applied to actions is, however, more definite than " good " as applied to ends. One attainable end may be better than another, and yet both may be relatively good ; in such cases only the action that tends to realise the best attainable end is right ; we do not say that one action is " more right " than another, but that one action is right and another is wrong. Practically we must distinguish between actions objectively and actions subjectively right. An objec- tively right action, under given circumstances, is the one that truly realises the best end ; a subjectively right action is one that the agent believes will realise the best end. These two actions do not prima facie coincide. INTEODUGTIOlSr 11 Moral Obligation, Duty, Free Will. — Moral obliga- tion expresses the conscious relation of an agent to a law which he believes is the best to obey under the given circumstances, and which it is possible for him to obey. We say that the agent " ought " to obey such a law, and this is equivalent to saying that it is his " duty " to obey it. " Duty " and " moral obligation " commonly (though not necessarily) imply the existence of temptations to go wrong. To do one's duty is to prefer the higher good to the lower, as determined by the ethical scale ; it means action in accordance with what is best, in so far as this is possible and can be ascertained by the agent. Tf we agree to define elementary freedom of the will as the power normally possessed in some degree by human beings of subordinating impulses and lower goods to higher goods, then every system of Ethics presupposes freedom in this elementary sense, since conduct or deliberate action would be impossible without it. It was remarked that actions subjectively right and actions objectively right do not prima facie coincide. There are indeed many cases which seem to prove that the moral judgments of individuals are mistaken. Eeligious and political fanatics — to take extreme instances — are often prepared to sacrifice their own lives and those of others in order to attain ends of which the morality is doubtful. The ultimate ends pursued by sincere fanatics are no doubt usually good ; as the salvation of souls or the improvement of social conditions. But in such cases common sense condemns the means either as bad in themselves or as being unlikely to secure the good ends. The question 12 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS therefore arises, whether moral obligation remains even if the moral judgment is erroneous. Those who hold that moral obligation is merely a subjective feeling, as distinct from an intuition of objective truth, have no difficulty in answering this question. But the sceptical solution should not be accepted if we can find another. According to Kant the consciousness of moral obligation is moral obligation, and the consequent action is objectively right. And this view is the most satisfactory if we take it to mean only that each agent should sincerely endeavour to realise his own convictions as to what is right ; if this be not admitted moral obligation is meaningless, since the individual can have no inward guide except his own convictions. It does not follow, however, that it is objectively good that each agent should realise his own convictions, for these may be mis- taken. Anarchists and other fanatics ought bravely to follow their own moral convictions, but the rest of society ought to prevent these from being realised. Here the moral judgment of society corrects the isolated judgment of individuals. There is therefore no absurdity in assuming that an action which an agent believes he ought to do coincides with the action which he objectively ought to do. On the other hand, if we deny this, " ought " and " obligation " cease to have any meaning. Motive and Effect. — Conduct is equivalent to deliberate action or action done '" on purpose," and is distinguished from instinctive action by the fact that one of its co-operating causes is the pre-conception of an end desired by the agent. This pre-conception (in so far as the end is desired) we may agree to call INTRODUCTION 13 the motive of the action. The actiou, in so far as it contains an effect agreeing with the motive, may be said to be " free " in the elementary sense just mentioned ; the agent secures the end he has willed. But all the 'effects cannot possibly be contained in the motive, for every single action starts a causal series far too complicated to be pre-conceived by men. For instance, the motive for introducing gas into a house is to give light, not to suffocate its inmates, though this may be one of the effects. While motives are often very complex, it is a common mistake to fix upon one prominent feature and call it the motive. Thus the motive for playing football may be described as a liking for the game, though a great many other motives may co-operate — a liking for the society of other players, personal ambition, or ambition for the success of a club. The intention is sometimes distinguished ' from the motive, and then signifies the agent's pre-conception of all the ethical effects which he believes will follow. Thus the motive for committing murder may be to obtain money or to gratify some passion ; but the intention includes also the conception of various other effects which the agent knows are likely to follow, — destruction of human happiness, the violation of the right to live, etc. Since motives undoubtedly co-operate in the realisation of ends at which they aim, the motive must be indirectly a partial test of the rectitude of an action; a good motive is good because of its tendency, if for no other reason. This is one reason why much ethical philosophy is concerned with the 1 E.g. by Bentham. 14 A SHOKT HISTOKY OF ETHICS motives of actions. Another reason (connected with the former) is that popular ethical judgments refer chiefly to the motives and intentions of acts. An act, however, cannot be said to be objectively right unless its effects are good, and its badness partly depends on the badness of its effects.-' But since every one's power and leisure for tracing consequences is practically limited, the judgment, in so far as it is passed on a person regarded as a cause of good or bad effects, is properly passed on the intention ; the person is rightly condemned or approved for those ethical effects which he believes will follow his deliberate action. The Mhical Scale. Idealism and Realism. — Ethics presupposes that there is a real distinction between good and bad ends, and strives to express it theoretically. Idealists, like Plato and Green, assume further that there is some perfectly satisfying end, the Absolute Good, which each individual can ap- propriate by right action. But even if it cannot be proved that there is an Absolute Good, an end complete in itself, and superior in worth to anything else actual or conceivable, it will still be quite logical to seek for a standard by which the relative worth of actions is determinable. We may not be able to find a supreme end, but we may be able to say why one end, action, or character is better than another. There may even be a best possible, and yet this best be ideally imperfect. This truth is important to remember, and gives Ethics a practical value which ' To reconcile this with what was said on p. 12, we must assume as a postulate that conscientiousness always leads to the best results in the long run. But this is one of the difficulties which ethical systems have to consider. INTEODUCTION 15 it could not have if it refused to admit that anything but perfection is good. We may allow, for example, that the life of a prize-fighter is better than that of an idle tramp or a burglar, but it does not follow that it is the best life conceivable. It is a mistake to suppose that the possibility of having a scale of ethical worth implies an ideal limit at each end of the scale (the Perfect and the Absolutely Bad). Every system of Ethics seeks for the lest ^possible under the conditions of human life. An ethical system which asserts that the Perfect is attainable may be called " idealistic." One which denies that we have sufficient evidence on this point, while recognising that a relative good is attainable, may be termed " realistic." Not all systems can be thus classified; it would be hard, for example, to classify Aristotle, the Stoics, or Spencer. Examples of Idealists are Plato, Kant, Cudworth, Butler, Green, and the iEsthetic Intuitionists ; and of Eealists, Epicurus, Hobbes, Hume, and the Utilitarians.^ Good and Knowledge. — Socrates held that Moral Virtue was a form of knowledge ; the intemperate man, for instance, exceeds through ignorance of the true good, the sensualist is just as stupid as an ox. In one sense Socrates was right ; for virtue, so far as it is expressed in deliberate action, is impossible without some degree of knowledge of the goodness of the ends to be attained ; we must know at least dimly what the good is and how to acquire it, before we can deliberately seek it. Hence the ethical worth of all forms of knowledge, and of a general education, ^ Some writers are idealists owing to their religious convictions (e.g. Butler). 16 A SHORT HISTOEY OF ETHICS which assists the formation of correct judgments about the ends of action. But Socrates was evidently mistaken if he intended to assert that the knowledge of the good is not only essential but also the sufficient condition for right action. Knowledge and reflection undoubtedly provide motives for action in varying degrees of strength, but, as Aristotle pointed out, it cannot take the place of will and habit.-' Moral insight (a form of knowledge) may pronounce a conceived end to be good or bad, and a knowledge of the laws of nature may prescribe the means required for the attainment of the end ; but neither of these forms of knowledge per se can provide the mental and physical energy required for the successful per- formance of the actions indicated. Knowledge in relation to action may be compared with the regulator of a steam engine, which produces the intended effect only if all the machinery is in working order, and if there is a proper supply of fuel." Knowledge, analogously, leads usually to appropriate action, pro- vided that the character has been rendered sensitive to true thoughts by previously cultivated habits of self-control. The preceding discussion considers knowledge chiefly as supplying a motive to action. But we saw that the goodness or badness of an act is partly determined by the goodness or badness of its effects. For this ^ See Aristotle's discussion on thi.s. Socrates may have meant that the knowledge that an end is good contains in itself the desire to realise it, and that without this element of desire the knowledge is imperfect ; but our criticisms are based on the ordinary use of the term knowledge as mainly theoretical. ^ This aualogy should not be pres.sed ton far ; I do not wish to suggest that vice is merely a form of inertia, since it is a, matter of common experience that evil desires are active forces. INTRODUCTION 17 reason knowledge of the probable effects of an action on the agent and on other persons is indispensable for right action ; and we may see from this that organised science is ethically useful apart from the immediate worth which it possesses through the fact that it satisfies the interests of those who love know- ledge for its own sake. Chemistry is useful for medi- cine and surgery, and these for health, which is clearly a good. Geology is useful, because a knowledge of minerals and rocks is applicable in various ways to other sciences {e.g. engineering) which help men in various ways to achieve satisfying ends. Mathematics, again, is applied to such diverse purposes as the con- struction of machinery and bridges, to navigation, architecture, land-surveying, and life-insurance; it has thus ethical utility, because those practical arts which it helps may be directly applied to the pro- duction of goods that can be experienced by many individuals. Of course, scientific knowledge may be wrongly applied, but its good effects seem far to outweigh its bad. Knowledge of every kind, again, is good, in so far as its pursuit and attainment give direct and per- manent satisfaction. The same is true of Art, as well as of Philosophy and Science. Moral Virtues and Special Virtues. — Virtue, we have seen, is a property of character, though in- directly applied to actions and motives. It seems desirable to make a distinction between moral virtues and special virtues. A morally virtuous man, as commonly understood, is one who consistently respects the conventional moral code, which enjoins Industry, Temperance, Honour, Justice, Charity, and so forth. c 18 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS It would be hard to tabulate all the different reasons for calling a man morally virtuous or good, but we may say that he does not deserve the name unless he tries consistently to attain for himself and others those ends that have truer worth than any other ends within his reach. Moral virtue may, therefore, be defined generally as the habitual tendency to pursue, always and with consciousness, the best attainable ends. The nature of these ends depends partly on the natural talents of the individual, and partly on his desires and tastes ; but in every case an objective ethical standard is required to regulate the exercise of talents and the gratification of desires. A complete ethical standard will be both individual and social. A standard as aiming at individual good might forbid a man to persist in any occupation which was more injurious to his health and happiness than some other occupation possible for him ; and the standard as aiming at social good will forbid actions — such as coining money illegally — which injure the community. The moral virtues are the general forms which the tendency to seek the best (individual and social) takes in the different relations of life. Virtue, however, may be regarded as having a wider meaning than moral virtue.^ A special virtue may be taken to mean an aptitude for attaining by deliberate action some special class of good ends, for doing any good thing well ; the aptitude must include also the will to do these good things. Thus we may speak of a good mechanic, a good scholar, a good oars- man, — and so forth — as possessing virtues in their ' Just as ap^TT} had for Aristotle a wider meaning tlian ijft/c7) dper-q. INTRODUCTION 19 respective spheres; and their social aptitudes if exercised may be called special virtues. But why are these not called moral virtues, and vchy do Honesty, Charity, Temperance, etc., receive this title ? There are two reasons for this. In the first place, moral virtue is an aptitude of the whole character, and is one that must constantly be exercised ; it is the habitual tendency to seek the best possible.^ Now isolated virtues, like skill in music, mechanics, or oratory, though good in themselves, may interfere with the exercise of higher virtues ; and, to take another example, a good golfer possesses a " special " virtue, which may nevertheless interfere with some more important duties, since excellence in a profession — and perhaps excellence in other games — is a superior end to excellence in golf, except for a professional golfer. On the other hand, the moral virtues can never be superseded — this at least is commonly assumed and may be provisionally granted. Temperance, Charity, Honour, Justice, Mercy, cannot conflict with each other if each seeks the very best in its own relations.^ This expresses what is true in the Stoic doctrine that all moral -sirtues are on the same level — the highest. Secondly, public moral opinion (common-sense morality) holds that every one can and should possess all moral virtues, but does not ' The relation between moral virtue and special virtues corresponds to the relation between moral good and good in the general sense (see p. 6 sq.). ^ That Justice is consistent witli Mercy and Charity may be disputed ; but the popular view, that there is an opposition, seems to be due to the belief that Justice ignores the particular circumstances and the natural disposition of the agent. In a wider sense, however, Mercy seems to be a just appreciation of the natural weakness of individuals in overcoming temptation ; and Justice, far from being inconsistent with Charity, seems rather to demand that Charity should be consistent with itself, that it should not benefit one section of the community by injuring another, 20 A SHOKT HISTORY OF ETHICS make the same demand for special virtues. This is partly because special virtues depend on natural gifts and are not all attainable by every one ; and partly because few men can attain excellence in more than a few directions, even if they possess several natural aptitudes. But that public moral opinion does expect every one to cultivate some natural excellence, some special virtue, is shown by the fact that Industry and Perseverance are regarded as moral virtues. The moral virtues are therefore the general forms in which all special virtues ought to manifest themselves, or by which their exercise should be regulated. The division of virtues into moral and special is contrary to ordinary usage, but appropriate in Ethics, which most conveniently regards virtue as a property of character which leads the possessor to seek and enables hiiu to attain good ends, either in conduct generally (moral virtues) or in limited spheres of conduct (special virtues). In every system of Ethics such " special virtues " are regarded as good, either for their own sakes or for their results. Moral virtues and special virtues are mutually related. Industry, for example, is a sine qua, non of the development of any special virtue.^ And generally the true worth of any special virtue is lowered if its exercise conflicts with any of the moral virtues. On the other hand, the moral virtues are meaningless, apart from the special virtues through which they find practical expression. What worth or meaning would Charity have, for example, if there were no ' Industry, in the wide sense here intended, does not imply a lack of interest or enthusiasm ; it is an indispensable means of cultivating and satisfying permanent interests — e.g. Athletics, Art, or Science — even if these are only ' ' hobbies " or amusements. INTEODUCTION 21 concrete ends which one could help others to attain except a charitable disposition, — ends that could only be realised by the exercise of special virtues ? For Charity is a disposition to help others to attain good ends. Now this can be best eifected by giving them the means of attaining those good ends for themselves, so that Charity in the widest sense consists in help- ing others to exercise their special virtues ; ^ and it is clear that it would have no value, that it would be merely an empty form, if there were no good ends to be attained, no personal interests to satisfy, beyond the cultivation of a charitable disposition. Again, what worth or meaning would Honesty have, if there were no interests in the possession of external goods, interests that call forth special virtues to satisfy them ? Moral virtues, in short, are forms that ought to regulate the exercise of special virtues with refer- ence to the highest good. In what follows. Virtue will usually signify Moral Virtue, but precise determinations will depend on the context. Will, Character, Person, and Self. — For ethical purposes these four may be almost identified. In deliberate action it is the Will that is said to act, and this action involves a cognitive element, expressing itself in a judgment as to good or bad, and influenced by the complex of feelings, desires, and other motives that bear on the action. Thus understood, the Will embraces, in one whole, cognition, feelings, and desires, as well as an undefinable element of mental force or energy which conditions the resulting appropriate physical movements. In other words, the Will is the ^ Acoordiug to the definition of special virtues just given. 22 A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS Self, the indivisible subject of feeling and knowing as well as acting, and we shall not err in identifying it with the whole Character or Person.^ These four terms, however, differ in emphasis. The word " Will " usually suggests more particularly the element of mental force or energy ; " Character " emphasises the habitual motives from which a personal Will acts, and the nature of the ends sought and attained ; " Self " appears to lay stress on continuity of consciousness in the same person ; and the word " Person " draws special attention to the unity and permanence of the subject. Hence each word is useful because of its special suggestions. Goodness and Utility. — A thing or action is said to be useful for some purpose, and its utility is thus determined with reference to a good which is sought for its own sake. Goodness is an attribute of an end, utility of the means to an end. A good is some kind of satisfaction of desire or interest, or a complex of such satisfactions ; the useful is what enables us to attain a good. " Useful " may be applied to things, persons, or actions ; for example, crutches are useful to a lame man, not good in themselves ; a secretary is employed because he is useful, not because his presence is good in itself. The endurance of hardship may be useful though not necessarily good. Many things, fortunately for mankind, are both good and useful; this is often true of knowledge, which directly gratifies curiosity, is also a means of attaining other practical results, and, moreover, expands and deepens the powers of the intellect by removing error and disclosing ^ Nevertheless, many writers (.sucli as Kant) distinguish sharply between Will and Feeling, as two different faculties of the soul. INTEODUCTION 23 truth. Some forms of physical exercise are pleasant in themselves and also conducive to the happiness which health brings. The ideally happy life would be one in which every action was both good in itself (satisfying) and useful with reference to some future good. These remarks explain why we often speak of a thing as being " good " for some purpose, when we really mean " useful." The useful shines by a borrowed light ; it may in a sense be regarded as a part of the good to which it tends. In fact good, as an absolute end, is an inward conscious state or activity that is desirable for its own sake, though the term is very seldom used in this exact sense. Health, worldly prosperity, friendship, sympathy, honesty, and so forth are good only so far as they express themselves as some intrinsically desirable conscious state or activity in a person or persons. Externally viewed they are simply useful. The term " utility " since Bentham's time has received a technical sense in Ethics, and signifies tendency to general happiness. This is only a part of the meaning I have attached to it. Happiness, Pleasure, and Well-being. — In compar- ing Greek and modern systems of Ethics, a good deal of confusion often arises from identifying evSaifjiovia with " Happiness " in the sense in which the latter word is used in modern English Ethics. To avoid this confusion, evSai/j,ovta is hereafter translated " Well-being." ^ It signified the permanent realisation of good by an individual. The ethical problem, ' The capital is used when the word is intended as a translation of eOdaLfj.ovia. 24 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS " What is the highest attainable human good ? " was, for the Greeks, equivalent to " "What is Well-being ? " According to Aristotle Well-being consists in an activity of the soul ; according to the Greek hedonists ^ (the Cyrenaics and Epicurus) it consists in the passive enjoyment of pleasures ; according to the Stoics and Cynics, passive pleasures are not essential constituents of Well-being. None of the Greek moralists, then, started with verbally identifying pleasure and Well- being ; some asserted that the two are really different, and even the hedonists regarded this identification as something to be proved, not to be assumed from the start. And there is nothing essentially egoistic — in the exclusive sense — in thus identifying the pursuit of the highest good by a person with the pursuit of his own " Well-being." Aristotle fully recognised that the individual cannot regard his own Well-being as something distinct from that of others ; a soldier, for example, may find his own highest good in sacrificing or risking his life for the good of his country. The word " Happiness " has, in modern English Ethics, a narrower and a more " selfish " meaning than Well-being ; ^ it signifies generally the constant enjoyment of pleasure by the individual. It was therefore a real problem, and not merely one about the meaning of words, to determine whether the highest good attainable by each individual is his own Happiness, general Happiness, or something different from both. Subjective and Objective Good. — These terms which ' Hedonism identifies good with pleasure (from Greek rjdovri, pleasure). ^ The same is true on the whole of GluckseUgkeit, as used by Kant, which is translated "Happiness." It meant for him the constant gratification of desires whose fruition gives pleasure. INTRODUCTION 25 are used frequently in the following pages require some explanation. Subjective literally means exist- ing for the experience of a conscious subject. One person's feelings of pain and pleasure, his perceptions of external objects, his sensations of colour, warmth, and light, his susceptibility to beauty and ugliness, his views on politics, and so on — all these have a subjective side, because they have features whose existence is their existence in consciousness. Now good must have a subjective side, because as far as we can see, it must ultimately express itself as a desirable state or activity of consciousness in one or many persons. " Objective " means existing as an object, i.e. having a mode of existence which either extends beyond any immediate momentary experience of any single conscious subject, or is independent of the experience of any such subject. The State, or any organised group of men, is objective in the first sense but not in the second ; it is usually supposed — and here we need not dispute the question — that tables and chairs, houses and mountains — all " objects " of external nature — are objective in both senses. In Ethics the first meaning is preferable, since good cannot be independent of consciousness, though it may extend beyond any immediate momentary ex- perience of any single person. Thus improved sanita- tion, because it affects a number of persons, is objectively good, and a man's health is an objective good from one point of view, since its value is not apprehended in a momentary experience, but extends through the whole life. In general, as the examples just given show, the good of an individual is subjective in relation to the 26 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS good of society, which is objective ; and the good of a momentary experience of one person is likewise subjective in relation to the good of his whole life, which is objective. But usually the contrast is between the individual and society. When we say that good is merely subjective, we mean that the good of one individual is generically distinct from that of another, and that there is no common measure between them — -I can never judge your good to be mine. The issue of this doctrine is Exclusive Egoism, which reached its high-water mark in Hobbes. Common moral judgments presuppose that good is objective, so far as they are disinterested ; the average man disapproves of a murder and approves of an act of justice, even if his own life is not directly affected by either. Such judgments further imply that the person making them, if he is consistent, submits his private feelings to a law^the moral law. In con- demning or approving another's action he implicitly condemns or approves himself if ever he should perform the same action. If good is merely subjective, how are apparently disinterested moral judgments possible? This is the question which Exclusive Egoism has to face. If good is objective how can it also be subjective ? This is really the weightiest problem of pure Ethics. We have already noticed it in other forms ; it may appear as a conflict between moral obligation and private inclinations, or between the rights of the individual and the claims of society, or between im- mediate and remote good.^ General FroUems. — It appears then that there are ^ See pp. 5, 6, 8. INTRODUCTION 27 certain leading problems ; these will recur in the systems hereafter described. The more prominent are : — (1) The nature of individual good ; (2) The nature of social good ; (3) The relation between these ; (4) The ethical sanctions i.e. the motives that exist for the individual to pursue social good, or to do what is morally right; (5) The relation between pleasure and the good; (6) (In ancient Ethics especially) the nature of Virtue ; (7) (In modern Ethics especially) the ground of Duty and Moral obligation; (8) The Freedom of the Will; (9) The ethical worth of Positive Morality, i.e. the body of practical moral principles generally accepted in society, and recognised as binding by the average person. PAKT I GKEEK ETHICAL SYSTEMS 29 CHAPTER I THE SOPHISTS, SOCRATES, AND THE SOCKATIC SCHOOLS A. The Sophists In the fifth century B.C. there arose in Greece a body of professional teachers of philosophy and rhetoric known as the Sophists, who may be regarded as the pioneers in ethical science, since their predecessors in philosophy devoted attention to impersonal problems dealing with the constitution of the material universe, rather than to questions of human conduct. Protagoras of Abdera ^ represents the positive and constructive, and Gorgias of Leontini ^ tire negative and critical side of Sophistic teaching. To Protagoras is attributed the famous saying, " Man is the measure of all things.'' As applied to conduct this saying is commonly inter- preted as expressing that good is entirely subjective ; ^ it is relative to the individual who achieves it, and what appears to him to be good is good. Viewed in this light the dictum of Protagoras is one-sided, because it ignores the objective element in morality; if good exists only for the individual experiencing it there can be no objective social good. But the dictum 1 Bom circa 480 B.C. • ^ Born circa 483 B.C. 3 See pp. 25, 26. 31 32 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt.i expresses an important truth, namely, that the good sought by practical philosophy is personal ; it must ultimately be experienced by one or more human beings, for otherwise it would have no meaning. But this principle need not be interpreted as Ex- clusive Egoism, since it is quite consistent with the supposition that social good is superior to the good of any one individual. The experience in which the good is realised may be the collective experience of mankind, not the isolated experience of a single individual. The good may be objective and yet personal. The dictum as just interpreted may be said to express the principle of subjectivity in Ethics. But probably Protagoras intended to emphasise, not only that each individual has a right of free judgment as to what is good for liim, but also that different states or communities, — and perhaps different periods of history — may have different moral codes which are not universally binding; that each social group has a right to establish the moral code that best suits its welfare. From this point of view the doctrine ex- presses the ethical principle of relativity, which means that the laws of social morality are subject to varia- tion — not indeed arbitrary, but determined by the changes in social conditions and individual circum- stances. Plato's delineation of the ideal republic is partly intended to refute this doctrine ; he endeavours to show that there is but one ideal system of political organisation, and that all others are to be judged by the degree in which they approach it. Nevertheless, when applied to special cases of conduct the principle of relativity is a truism, for it CH. I THE SOPHISTS 33 only means that different cases may have to he treated in different ways if the cases really differ in essential points ; the law, for example, distinguishes between murder and accidental homicide, and we should judge less severely a starving man for stealing a loaf than a rich man for increasing his wealth by fraud. In the ideal government the principle would be fully exercised.^ But it is peculiarly liable to abuse by dishonest or illogical thinkers ; with the later Sophists its abuse led to the anarchical doctrine that each individual may do what he likes without reference to the good of others, that there is no objective distinction between good and bad. The philosophy of Protagoras was not profound enough to explain how the good can be both personal and objective. Gorgias accepted the principle of subjectivity in a negative sense, as equivalent to asserting that truth and goodness are purely sub- jective. The result was absolute scepticism ; there is no knowledge, in the proper sense, but only a particular feeling in the mind of a single person ; and good has only a limited subjective nature, con- sisting in a single agent's momentary feeling of gratifi- cation or approval. It follows that the conception of an objective social good is illusory from a practical point of view, since the good of another cannot be an end of action for me. It is not surprising to find that the teaching of the later Sophists, following the lines laid down by Gorgias, was purely egoistic. ' The principle of relativity is consistent with the uniformity of moral law ; just as in science the law of uniformity of nature — the same causes have the same effects — is consistent with the truth that the same event may be followed by different events if the conditions accompanying the antecedents differ ; fire may cook food or it may destroy property accord- ing to circumstances. D 34 A SHORT HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. i Thrasymachus/ for example, identified Justice with the private interests of those who have power. The Sophistic movement is important in the history of Ethics for three reasons. First, because it arose from a desire to criticise freely conventional theories of knowledge and morality ; it was essentially an appeal to nature and reason against the arbitrary forces of mere tradition. Secondly, the Sophists were the first to mark off Ethics — as a methodical search for the highest human good — from other inquiries, a division afterwards completed by Aristotle. Thirdly, the individualism prominent in the Sophist's teaching, expresses the important truth — which no subsequent ethical system has been able to evade — that there is no such thing as an abstract good of society apart from the good of the persons composing it.^ Further, each rational agent must in any case seek his own good, and therefore morality, in its historical begin- ning, naturally assumed an egoistic form. The good of another person cannot be a- rational end for me, unless I apprehend his good as mine. Not Egoism in general but only Exclusive Egoism — which asserts that no person can identify the good of another with his own good — is incompatible with a regard for social good. B. Socrates' The later Sophists, influenced chiefly by Gorgias, moved in the direction of Exclusive Egoism, and it 1 See p. 43. ^ Tliis may be regarded as defining the meaning of "individualism.'' ^ 469-399 B.C. Socrates was condemned to death by the Athenian Government and compelled to drink poison (399 B.C.). The accusation ■was that he corrupted youth and did not acknowledge the gods which the CH. I SOCEATES 35 was mainly against this erroneous negative develop- ment of the conception of human good that Socrates' criticisms were directed. Socrates recognised the truth contained in the principle of Protagoras ; the good we seek is human Well-being, and it can only be realised in persons. But it is not for that reason merely sub- jective ; it is proved to be objective by the fact that it can be understood by means of general conceptions, and its realisation is determined by definite uniform laws, which do not depend on the feelings of this or that individual. The doctrines ascribed to Socrates, that virtue is knowledge and that it is one, are partly criticisms of the moral scepticism of Gorgias, and partly an advance towards a constructive science of Ethics. The doctrine of the unity of virtue is a protest against the ethical anarchy which would reduce all morality to a matter of private caprice. Socrates wished to show that virtue and human Well-being are subject to unvarying laws independent of the fluctuating choice of in- dividuals. He held, further, that these laws may be discovered and communicated to others, — virtue is knowable and teachable. But the saying, " Virtue is knowledge " meant for him more than that virtue may be known ; he intended actually to identify practical excellence of character with intellectual insight into the true nature of actions ; he who knows what is good must act accordingly and no one State recognised. Ueberweg {History of Philosophy) remarks that " this accusation was literally false ; but considered with reference to its more profound bayis, it rested on the correct assumption of an essential relation- ship between Socrates and the Sophists, as evidenced in their common tendency to emancipate the individual, and in their common opposition to an immediate unreflectiug submission to the customs, law, and faith of the people and the State," 36 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. i voluntarily follows evil. Vice, on the other hand, is ignorance, and the sensualist is as stupid as an ox. Socrates wrote no treatise on the theory of Ethics ; he taught by personal discussions, in which he strove not merely to teach truths directly, but to draw forth and examine the living convictions of those with whom he conversed. He taught that the starting-point of that knowledge which is virtue, is to be conscious of one's own ignorance ; and that the next step is to know one's own soul, to learn what passions within the soul are opposed to wisdom, and to control them ; only by such self-knowledge can freedom be acquired. The personal influence of Socrates was the stimulus which gave rise to the subsequent Greek ethical systems. Those who came after him endeavoured to give exact systematic expression to the conviction they inherited from him, that there is a science of right living. The problem usually took the form, " What is human Well-being,^ and how is it to be attained ? " Among those who received direct instruction from Socrates, Plato was by far the greatest thinker. But two of the so-called Socratic Schools — the Cynic and the Cyrenaic, whose founders were disciples of Socrates — deserve special mention, because they represent very distinctly the two opposite poles towards which ethical theories tend to converge ; the one laying stress on action and endurance, the other on pleasurable feelings, as the chief constituents of a life of Well-being. ^ See pp. 23, 24. THE CYNICS C. The Cynics The founder of the Cynic ^ School was Antisthenes ^ who held that the highest end was life according to Virtue, that pain might be good as contributing to Virtue, and that pleasure sought as an end was an evil. He who has Virtue needs nothing else, he is independent of the society around him and of the laws of his own State. He is a citizen of the world, and is everywhere at home, because his Well-being depends on himself alone. Antisthenes agreed with Socrates that knowledge is essential to Virtue, but held that logic, physics, and all theoretical studies are only indirectly valuable as means to Well-being. The Cynics generally identified wisdom with practical Virtue ; they held that a merely theoretical knowledge is not a source of Well-being. The earlier Cynics appear to have accepted un- critically the Positive Morality of the age ; they held that the accepted practical virtues. Justice, Temperance, etc., are intrinsically good. Their doctrines give but little information about the true nature of Well-being, because they did not analyse the virtues, to discover their common ground. It is useless to define Well-being as living virtuously, when the only intelligible meaning of Virtue is a state of character leading to Well-being. Negatively, the Cynic system enjoins endurance of pain and a cultivation of contempt for pleasure ; it thus emphasises the truths that the ^ Called " CjTiic " perhaps because Antisthenes taught at Athens in the gymnasium called Cynosarges. The name is sometimes said to be derived from Kvwv (a dog), because of the open disregard of the school for the ordinary decencies of society. '■^ Boru circa 436 B.C. 38 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. i direct pursuit of pleasures is apt to defeat its own end, and that self-control is essential to Well-T)eing. Thus interpreted it is a protest against sensualism. But these doctrines are only superficially opposed to Hedonism.^ It would be quite consistent for a pessimistic hedonist — one who believes that, though pleasure is the highest good, but little of it is attain- able — to recommend the direct pursuit of Virtue and self-control as the best method of getting what we can out of a world which at the best is painful. The Cynic Ethics was still on the plane of pure Egoism, for they sought individual self-dependence, rather than social good. Their cosmopolitanism ^ seems to have been rather a contempt (real or affected) for their fellow-countrymen than a regard for humanity. In this connection, however, it may be noticed that the English word " cynic '' seems expressive only of the worst negative aspect of the genuine earlier Cynicism, — namely, contempt for the excellences of others,— and does not fairly express the essence of their philosophy. The Cynic doctrine is nevertheless chiefly negative and formal^ whether in relation to individual or to social good ; and herein lies its chief defect. The inadequacy of the Cynic philosophy is shown by the fact that it moved afterwards in two opposite directions, the one towards Exclusive Egoism, the other towards the truer doctrine of Stoicism. This double movement was due to the ambiguity in the ^ The theory that pleasure is the highest good. This is quite different from sensualism. ^ A cosmopolitan is one who regards himself as a citizen of the world, not of any particular State. ^ The meaning of this will be understood by contrasting the Cynic with the Cyrenaic doctrine described in the next section. CH. I THE CYRENAICS 39 notion of the " Self." Corrupt later Cynicism regarded the Self as an isolated unit, and taught that Well- being lay in a contempt for society. But Stoicism in its higher forms regarded the Self as essentially social, and took self-dependence to mean an unflinching performance of the duties arising naturally from the position of the Self in society and in the universe. D. The Cyrenaics The Cynics, we have seen, identified the good with abstinence from pleasure and indifference to pain, and Well-being for them was mainly negative. The Cyrenaics, on the other hand, rightly held that good must be something positive and concrete. The only concrete good they could find was immediate pleasure. The founder of the School, Aristippus of Cyrene^ identified the End of Life with the pleasure of the moment. Knowledge and culture (they held) are valuable so far as they lead to pleasure, and the wise m'an cultivates self-control in order to get the most out of life; he rules and is not ruled by his pleasuies. Pleasures are to be estimated altogether by their intensity. The virtues are not ends in themselves, but only means. Justice is conventional and not natural, since it arises from the artificial needs of social life ; wisdom and friendship are estimated by the pleasure they bring to the possessor. The Cyrenaics were the first Greek representatives of Hedonism, the doctrine that only pleasure is good. The system of Epicurus was a more refined expression of the same doctrine ; it arose from the difficulty of ^ Bom circa 435 B.C. 40 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. i reconciling the two Cyrenaic positions, in one of which the good is identified with the pleasure of the moment, while in the other, self-control and mastery over pleasures are recommended/ ' A general criticism of Cyrenaic and Epicurean Hedonism "vvill be given later (pp. 90-92). CHAPTEE II PLATO The Cyrenaics and Cynics tried to answer the first and inevitable problem of Ethics in the form in which it was presented by Protagoras, — the determination, namely, of the good of the individual. That this is the primary ethical problem is clear from the fact that every conscious rational being, acting deliberately, must seek what he believes to be his own good, except in so far as his judgment is distorted by passion, or is not strong enough to influence his will ; if he voluntarily seeks the good of others it is because he in some way identifies social good with his own. The devoted life and deatli of Socrates seem to prove, more clearly than his teaching, that he was convinced that social good was an end really worth pursuing for its own sake. The Cyrenaie and Cynic doctrines, however, tend towards Exclusive Egoism, whether as a pursuit of self-dependence or of pleasurable feeling. Aristotle and Plato must therefore be regarded as more sincere followers of Socrates, for with them the question of social good and its relation to individual good came to the front. Hereafter moral questions became more difficult and complex, since there is 41 42 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. i always in human nature an apparent conflict between personal well-being and social good regarded as ultim- ate motives, and this conflict takes the form of a seeming contradiction in the idea of objective good.^ Plato and Aristotle differ, moreover, from most other Greek thinkers — not excepting Socrates — in treating knowledge of reality as an end desirable for its own sake, an integral part of well-being, not merely an external means of acquiring it. They have even a tendency to regard speculative wisdom as the highest good ; but this must not be interpreted as a narrow intellectualism ; ^ speculative wisdom was for them not the same thing as an abstract and merely theoretical knowledge, but included also the mental apprehension of man's true nature and his relations to the universe. Owing to this genuine love of knowledge both refused to subordinate the search for truth to a search for "Well-being ; accordingly Meta- physics, Logic, and Physical Science secured their disinterested attention quite as much as Ethics. The Ethics of Plato ' deals partly with individual good, partly with social good, and partly with the relations between the two. The BepnUic, for example, takes the wider threefold view, while the Pliilebus treats chiefly of the nature of individual good. From these two works can be derived a consistent system of Ethics, not formulated scientifically, but expressed with great literary skill in the form of imaginary dialogues between Socrates and other persons. 1 See pp. 25, 26. ^ See p. 82, note. ^ 427-347 B.C., a piipU of Socrates, and founder of the School at Athens known as the Academy. PLATO 43 A. The Idea of Justice The purpose of the Republic, which is the most important of Plato's ethical works, was to determine the nature and worth of Justice/ and the means of realising it in society as represented bj the State. In the first book the Sophist Thrasymachus puts forth the theory that Justice is " the interest of the stronger " ; ^ that for the rulers it consists in compelling obedience from selfish motives, while for the subjects, who have no political power, it means prudent obedience through fear of punishment. This doctrine, afterwards taught in a more complex form by Hobiifia, is an extreme type of Exclusive Egoism. It assumes that Justice, regarded as a personal virtue aiming at the good of the whole community, is a fiction, and that no one considers it to be worthy of cultivation for its own sake. Plato wishes to show that Justice in this pure sense is essentially good, not only for Society as a whole, but also for the individual who practises it, and with this end in view he proceeds first to analyse the conception of Justice. Method. — While recognising that Justice is funda- mentally a virtue of personal character, Plato (or rather Socrates, who, as the principal character in the dialogue, may be taken as expressing Plato's views) thinks that the easiest way of determining its nature will be to consider it first in the forms in which it is manifested on a large scale, in a State or organised group of individuals rather than in single persons, and after- wards as it presents itself in the character and conduct ^ bLKaioaivq. ^ t6 tou Kpcirrovos ffvfjip6v'r)(ns), dvdpeia, ctOfppocrOvr}, diKaiocrvvTj. Tl}e translations are only approximate ; even the Greek words are used by Plato in an unusually general sense. cii. n PLATO 45 by right education.^ Such convictions in a brave man are comparable to a good dye, they cannot be washed out by the lye of pleasure, pain, or fear. Temperance,^ as a quality of the State, is not characteristic of one class more than another ; it is the virtue of order, a harmony between all classes of the community, to be ensured by obedience on the part of the subjects, and by wise moderation and disinterestedness in the rulers. This harmony is compared by Plato to the proper tuning of the strings of a lyre. Justice is the highest of the cardinal virtues, because it includes all of them. It is realised in the State when the rulers govern wisely, the soldiers fight bravely, and the industrial classes work with energy and thrift, all being obedient to the Eeason that governs. From an external point of view Justice is the perfect consummation of the " division of labour," and is defined by Plato as " doing your own business and not interfering with that of other people." ^ It is the full realisation, the crown of other virtues, which, without it, miss their end. Wisdom alone may be ineffectual. Courage may be ill-directed, even Temperance (including loyalty and obedience), if separated from Wisdom and Courage, may be purely negative and repressive, and may end in an insipid formal harmony, whose parts possess no individuality or strength. Justice, on the other hand, demands the development of individuality, which is ensured by ' Tims i-vSpda includes our " moral " and "physical " courage, as well as the active power of resisting temptations of any kind. 2 The word aouppoairri as used hy Plato has a much wider meaning than our " Temperance," which is more akin to Aristotle's use of the same word. ^ rb TO, aOroO Tpdrreiv Kal fi-q it oKvir pay jj-oveiv. 46 A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS pt. i Courage, and is directed by Wisdom through the harmonising influence of Temperance. Justice, in short, is intelligence, strength, and unity combined ; it is not one virtue among many, but the due com- bination of all. Justice in the Individual. — Justice, however, is something more than an external adjustment of social functions ; though it has hitherto been treated as such with a view to determine its complete nature by a provisional definition. Its true essence is inward and spiritual, and for this reason it must reside in the personal characters of individuals. Every member of the State is to he just, not by compulsion, but because he sees that it is good; only then will the State as a whole possess Justice. Hence Plato is naturally led to consider Justice as a personal virtue. Following out his method he traces an analogy between the State and the individual. To the three classes in the State — the rulers, the soldiers, and the in- dustrial classes — there correspond in the individual the three different faculties of the soul, — Reason, Spirited Emotion^ and Desire (including appetite). Each of these should have freedom to perform its special function, and each is an essential element in human nature. When their functions are properly fulfilled they possess virtue.^ Wisdom is the special virtue of the rational part, Courage or Fortitude of the emotional, while Temperance consists in the obedience of the ^ X670S, Ovfids, iirLBvf/.ia. We have no word corresponding exactly to dv/ios. It included "not merely anger, but all the passions and sentiments which prompt to energetic action, and which, when sub- ordinated to Reason, are thus the natural counterpoise to the appetites of which either sensual pleasure or bodily repletion is the object." ■ — Thompson's Phaedrus, p. 166. ^ See p. 68, (or the general meaning of " virtue " [aper-fi). cH. 11 PLATO 47 emotions and desires to Eeason. Justice, finally, is the presence of all these virtues in the soul, and consists in the free harmonious exercise of Intellect, Emotion, and Desire under the guidance of Eeason. Its Worth for the Individual. — Justice, then, Plato infers, is the virtue of the soul ; it is spiritual beauty and health, as vice is ugliness and disease ; and it is as absurd to deny that it is profitable for its possessor as it is to deny that health is profitable to the body. It is the indispensable and sufficient condition of personal happiness. Social and Private Good. — Justice in the State (as a harmonious co-operation between different persons) and Justice in the individual (as a harmonious co- operation between the different faculties of the soul) seem to be two different conceptions connected only by analogy. But Plato, whether rightly or wrongly, identifies them, and finds in this identification the principle of unity between individual and social good. The just man is he who, led by Wisdom, aims at practically realising the conception of harmonious and vigorous development of parts within a whole ; as he seeks to realise this ideal within his own soul, so he seeks also to realise it in the State of which he is a member ; in both cases for the same reason — that he loves the conception of Justice. His own Well- being (it is implied) is reached only when perfect Justice reigns in every soul ; and with this consumma- tion comes the Well-being of all his fellow-citizens, which he does not separate from his own. The Ideal State. — It follows that the first work of social philosophy is to delineate the form of a perfect State in which universal Justice may find expression. 48 A SHOKT HISTORY OF ETHICS pt. i Here the leading idea is that traditional forms of government, whether democracy oligarchy or tyranny, should be replaced by a genuine aristocracy , or govern- ment by those best fit to govern.-' A knowledge and love of Justice, with courage to enforce it, are the essential characteristics of the rulers of the Ideal State. Primarily among the rulers, ultimately among all the citizens, a community of interests is to be established as a bond of national unity. The State is to become like an organism, in which if one member suffers or rejoices, all the members in some degree suffer or rejoice ; the end which Justice seeks to realise being general Well-being, not the Well-being of any select body. The Ideal Ruler. — If Justice existed in every soul rulers would be superfluous ; but only a few are naturally capable of apprehending it in its perfect beauty, and even for them this is possible only after a prolonged mental training. Hence the vital im- portance of educating the rulers properly. Justice, as we have seen, includes all the virtues. Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, and their specialised forms, and one might therefore suppose that all the cardinal virtues are equally essential to a good ruler. In one sense this is true ; the rulers must possess self-control and the courage of their opinions. But since they have to realise Justice in the State, their crowning virtue — the note of true aristocracy — is Wisdom, because they must apprehend intellectually the essence of Justice before it is fully realised, and learn what are the practical means for realising it. The ideal ruler is therefore a philosopher, a lover of Wisdom, ^ The original meaning of the word " aristocracy.'' cH. II PLATO 49 combining intellectual insight and practical intelligence. Justice, in fact, is Wisdom realised in society. Truth is usually conceived as the object of purely theoretical knowledge. But Plato, generalising the Socratic doctrine,^ holds that the ultimate object of knowledge is the Highest Good, in the realisation of which all opposition between theory and practice disappears. Now Wisdom is the faculty by which we apprehend the truth in this broad sense. The Idea of Justice is, on the one hand, an object of theoretical knowledge, and on the other hand, its realisation is essentially good. To know the nature of Justice is to desire above all things to realise it. The ideal ruler must therefore be a " lover of Wisdom " (a philosopher), in order that he may learn the nature of Justice. Now the lover of Wisdom does not pursue Justice alone, he seeks the truth everywhere, wherever it may be found." He looks, not at the isolated appearances but at the inner essence of reality. He is never satisfied with mere_ opinion, which pursues only the shadow of things ; he seeks and obtains knowledge, which apprehends the substance of things as they really ai^. It is characteristic of Plato that he regards this intellectual love of truth as the spring of moral virtue, as popularly understood. The philosopher is sincere in his conduct, because he loves the truth, whether found in his own soul or in another's. He is temperate, for his joys are spiritual, ' p. 35. ^ The mental attitude ■which seeks to take into account all relevant facts, in order to determine their due positions and correlations, is really an intellectual form of Justice, which was described as the co-ordination of parts within a whole, each part fulfilling its due function. Thus the Idea of Justice animates the truth-seeker from the very start of his inquiries. E 50 A SHOKT HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. i not carnal. He is not covetous, for he values only the things that are beyond price. He is great-minded and courageous, for falsehood and deception are all that he fears. He sees and loves beauty, for this is the- effulgence of truth. That he possesses Justice as a personal virtue follows naturally from the fact that he desires to realise the Idea of Justice wherever this is possible, whether in himself or in other persons, or in the State as a whole. Education of the Rulers. — The education of the Rulers is to be directed towards teaching them the nature of Justice ; and it must therefore aim at the cultivation of Temperance, Fortitude, and Wisdom, which are the three constituents of Justice. Without entering fully into the various schemes proposed by Plato for selecting and training the Eulers, we may say that he laid special stress on the following points. (a) An education in literature.^ A very careful selection of the best types is necessary. Literature — whether narrative or dramatic — in which gods and heroes are described as committing ignoble or in- decent actions, is to be excluded, because the good influence of literature is in proportion to the goodness of the characters whom the writer regards as worthy of admiration. Example is thus accepted by Plato as a means of moral education. (&) In music, luxurious and mournful styles must be abolished, because they weaken the moral fibre. Only those are to be admitted which express the tranquillity of a temperate man in prosperity, or ^ Literature and Music and all forms of Art are classed by Plato under the title fxouaiKi]. CH. II PLATO 51 the endurance of a brave man in adversity ; hereby Temperance and Fortitude are cultivated. The result of a proper education in all forms of Art (poetry, painting, sculpture, architecture, and music) is that the soul learns to love beauty, harmony, and propor- tion, and thus is ready, when Eeason develops, to understand the nature of the good, which, in the form of Temperance, is the expression of harmony in society and in the individual. (c) Gymnastic is to be included, not for the sake of the body but for the sake of the soul. The value of Gymnastic lies chiefly in its power of counter- acting effeminacy and the love of luxury, and thereby making possible the development of true spiritual Fortitude. {d) Fortitude, again, is to be developed and tested, not only by physical hardships, but also by passing through moral trials and temptations. The following preparatory training is also necessary in order to develop the reasoning powers : (e) An education in mathematics, viz. arithmetic, geometry, mathematical astronomy, and the mathe- matical principles of musical harmony.^ The use of these subjects is to evoke reflection, to stimulate the mind to pass beyond the disconnected particulars given to Sense towards the general laws of the Universe, which are apprehended by Eeason. Plato held also that the precision of mathematics foreshadows the perfect knowledge of real existence attainable only by Dialectic; but the mathematician does not really hnow, because he takes his first principles for granted, ^ Here the influence of Pythagoras is noticeable, who taught that number and harmony were the universal properties of real existence. 52 A SHOET HISTOKY OF ETHICS pt. i without examining their evidence. The two educa- tional ends here emphasised are the development of the powers of correct generalisation and of accuracy in details. (f) We shall see ^ that Plato regarded the universe as a rationally connected system, containing no isolated parts, and that the just State is likewise an organic whole, whose proper form can be determined only by Eeason. In order to prepare the mind for this view of things, those who are destined to be rulers must study the co-ordination of the sciences and their mutual dependence.^ This may be called the synoptic principle in education. "We learn more about things by determining their causes and their connections with other things. (g) Only the mind prepared by these studies is fit for the pursuit of Dialectic, the highest of all the sciences, which deals directly with the fundamental principles of real existence. This science is also described as the study of the " Idea of the Good " which ^ is the source of all truth, goodness, and beauty. The chief rulers are to be chosen from those who are best qualified in Dialectic, since it is their function to realise the social form of the Idea of the Good, namely Justice. The corresponding virtue is Wisdom. B. The Theory of Ideas One of the chief characteristics of Plato's philosophy is that he regards perfect types as being in a sense more real than the particular objects or processes of the physical world, or than any particular mental 1 See pp. 62, 63. ^ g^e p. 49, note. ^ See pp. 55-57. cu. ir PLATO 53 states of feeling or sensation. The real objects of knowledge are " Ideas," ^ and the particular objects of sensible experience are true only so far as the mind conceives them as manifestations of Ideas. The Ideas are described as eternal archetypes or models of per- fection, which the Creator uses to construct the physical and sensible world in space and time. By man the Ideas can only be apprehended by general conceptions which are, or oiujht to be, realised in the concrete world of Nature and Man. Thus the Ideas are of two kinds : ^ first, those which are actualised and made use of in Science and ordinary life, — these (in their exact forms) we may call scientific conceptions ; and secondly, ethical and artistic ideals, which are only inadequately realised in human experience. Examples of scientific conceptions are the Ideas of number, of equality, and of perfect geometrical figures ; while Temperance and Justice, etc., as described in the Republic, are examples of ethical ideals. As regards artistic ideals, Plato appears to have included them all without analysis under the one Idea of Beauty ; the same Idea is manifested in everything that is truly beautiful, whether it be a melody, a human form, a moral character, or a political constitution. But beauty ^ for Plato had a wider meaning than for us ; for him it was almost equivalent to the ethically good or perfect, and its highest expression is to be found in the ordering of societies by Temperance and Justice ; in general, anything properly fitted for its place or function in the scheme of things is beautiful. Only ' eXSos or IMa. ^ Plato does not draw special attention to this distinction, but only confusion can result from ignoring it. " rb KoKbv. 54 A SHOKT HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. i the soul, however, and a society composed of souls, is beautiful in the strict sense, since beauty of physical form is merely a reflection or outward show of inward spiritual beauty. Though these ethical ideals are eternal types of perfection that yield to no man's convenience, yet Plato recognises that lower degrees of excellence are both possible and desirable. We may approach towards the perfect State, or towards perfection of character, though both may be unattainable in this life. There are, indeed (as the Stoics afterwards insisted) no degrees of perfection, but there are lower and higher stages that may have to be passed through on the road to perfection. In this admission — which is implied at least indirectly in Plato's works — he shows that practical moderation, that dislike of extravagance, which is a characteristic of all great thinkers. Scientific conceptions — the Ideas actualised in Nature and used by men — are not apprehended by Sense, but only by intuitive Eeason. Sense gives us only the detached particulars, but Eeason apprehends the universal Idea in the particulars ; it recognises that the objects of sensible experience are actually related and combined by Ideas. The Ideas of equality, of straight lines and circles, are too exact for Sense to apprehend. Number, again, is one of the simplest illustrations of the co-ordination of particulars by Ideas ; by it the " many " and the " one " are united, whereas for Sense, everything is detached and appears to exist by itself alone. In like manner (Plato meant) the ethical ideals are not known by particular feelings of pleasure, but cH. II PLATO 55 only by Eeason. Pleasure, indeed, has its proper position, and is an essential part of the good, but it is not the criterion, nor is it to be allowed to judge of what is good or bad. An ethical ideal, like a scientific conception, is a co-ordination of parts within a whole, but cannot be directly presented to Peeling. The Absolute Good. — From the preceding it may be gathered that the Ideas are, in some sense, to be conceived as principles of connection between diverse elements, or forms of the " one in many." Now, if we follow out this thought consistently, we are com- pelled — as Plato was — to conclude that there is one fundamental or highest Idea, by which all different Ideas are connected ; for otherwise these Ideas would be isolated, and would suffer from the same defect as the particulars of Sense. Different Ideas are to be conceived as manifestations of the highest Idea, which Plato calls the " Absolute Good," or " the Idea of the Good." ^ The Idea of the Good is not a merely abstract conception, nor is it identical with any particular existing object ; rather, it reveals itself in everything that truly exists. It is the source of all truth, of knowledge, beauty, and moral goodness. Its apprehension by the soul is knowledge, its in- dwelling in the soul is virtue, its shining forth to the soul (it may be through the medium of sense) is beauty. Its manifestation in the State is Justice In the Republic Plato expresses the belief that a knowledge of the Absolute Good can only be achieved by a long course of education by a few specially gifted minds. It may, therefore, be apprehended by Eeason, ' ^ ToC d7aSoD /5^a. Rep. Bk. VI. 56 A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS pt. i but its nature can only be described by an analogy : As the sun illumines the sensible world and is the source of the eye's power of vision, and of nourish- ment and growth in all living things, so the Good illuminates the intelligible world and gives the soul power to know and to grow in knowledge and virtue. The Absolute Good is the source of all knowledge and also the highest object of knowledge. The " Idea of the Good " was, for Plato, an object of mystical faith rather than of rational intuition, and he does not claim to know very much about it. It has been interpreted in various ways by com- mentators. By some it is identified with God, by some with the system of archetypal Ideas which the Creator uses to construct the real Universe, by some with the ultimate Laws of ISTature, and by some with the Final Cause of the Universe. All these interpre- tations are probably correct in some degree, but they are scarcely more definite than Plato's own descrip- tion, which, as he recognises, is unavoidably mystical. Clearly we cannot describe the Absolute Good until we have apprehended it.^ Plato probably meant to express, what he afterwards stated more explicitly in the Laws, that the Universe is a rational system, and that the true nature of anything depends on its position in the system.^ The Idea of the Good, however, is not to be pursued merely in order to satisfy the speculative intellect that everything really existing is good, or a means thereto. The Rulers are to study Dialectic, the Science of the Idea of the Good, for a practical purpose, in order that they may be able to realise ' Cf. Green (Chapter IX.). - pp. 62, 63. cH. II PLATO 57 Justice in Society, — Justice being in fact the social manifestation of the Idea of the Good. The Idea of the Good is, therefore, on the one hand, an eternally existing object of the speculative intellect, and, on the other hand, it is, or contains, a practical or ethical ideal {e.g. Justice) which ought to be realised, but is not yet realised. Here we have a serious opposition between the ideal and the actual, an opposition already seen in the division of the Ideas into two classes. The Ideal and the Actual. — Plato asserts that only the Ideas truly exist. Now we have seen that Ideas are either ethical ideals (e.g. Justice) or scientific conceptions {e.g. number). It is comparatively easy to admit that the latter are truly existent, so far as they are actualised in nature and used successfully in experience ; but great difficulties arise when we in- quire how ethical ideals, not yet realised, can be regarded as truly existing. The following alternative explanations naturally suggest themselves. — 1. That ethical ideals are imaginary types of per- fection, which are nevertheless useful for urging men -towards improvement. This is the common -sense, realistic view,^ that there is a cleavage between the existent and the non-existent good, whose realisation is desirable, but perhaps impossible, and certainly not inevitable so far as we know. This interpretation is, however, inconsistent with most of Plato's writings. 2. That ethical ideals are, and always were, realised in a supersensible world vsith which the soul may have communion in the present life. He who has such communion is the true philosopher, who sees ' See p. 14. 58 A SHOET HISTORY OF ETHICS pt. i things in their spiritual perfection and guides weaker souls into the light of truth. In a like spirit Keats addresses the great poets : — Bards of Passion and of mirtli Ye have left your soula on earth ! Ye have souls in heaven too, Double-lived in regions new ! According to this view the supersensible world alone truly exists ; the physical world is more than half illusion ; it exists only in so far as it is good — that is, manifests Ideas — -but on the whole it is a mere shadow of existence. Evil, therefore, is a negation ; in the soul it is mere illusion, and for that reason it is not a real object.^ Knowledge of what exists is identical with Well-being and virtue. 3. That ethical ideals, though not yet realised in the world, in Nature, and in human experience, will be realised in the future ; then and not till then will the world truly exist. According to this theory, ethical progress is inevitable, and it is in a sense a creation of the world, a transition from non-existence to existence. 4. Lastly, there is the view (a development of the preceding) that ethical ideals truly exist, provided the whole universe is taken into account. The part as a part is imperfect, but as co-ordinated with other parts it shares the absolute perfection of the whole. Things now seem imperfect, because we must think them in isolation ; but if we could trace their lines of development, and take a complete view of space and time and whatever is beyond them, we should see ' This view of evil is open to the objection that the mental state of illusion is itself the evil thing, and is not a mere negation. (II. 11 PLATO 59 that everything is perfect because the whole is perfect.' Evil, by this interpretation, consists in taking a merely partial view of things and is the same as error. We should, I think, accept the second, third, and fourth of the explanations just given as being, on the whole, most in accordance with Plato's doctrines. The theory of the Absolute Good is intended to express his conviction that the ideals of morality and art, and true scientific conceptions, come from the same source. The Idea, the Ideal, the truly existent, and the Highest Good, are coincident. External Nature truly exists in proportion to its perfection, its con- formity to Ideas. A State truly exists in proportion to its Justice, its conformity to the Idea of a co- ordinated system ot' persons, each performing his proper function. The individual soul, in like manner, truly exists — that is, realises its own proper nature — only in so far as it conforms to the Idea of Justice, which in this connection means the harmonious exercise of its different parts — knowledge, emotion, and appetite — under the control of Eeason. C. Pleasuke, Good, and Eational Okdek The Philehus contains an inquiry into the nature of individual good, under the form : — Is the good, as personal Well-being, identical with pleasure, or with the exercise of intelligence, or is it something superior to both ? The two possible constituents of the good were in some degree suggested by the Cyrenaic and Cynic theories, and the Philebus may be regarded as a criticism of their one-sided views. 1 See pp. 62, 63. 60 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS et. i 7s Pleasure the Good? — Plato uses the following arguments to prove that pleasure is not the sole constituent of the good. 1. The good is an ultimate end, being desired for its own sake ; it is perfect and sufficient, so that no addition to it can increase its worth ; it is sought by every intelligent being and completely satisfies desire. But mere pleasure has not these characteristics ; indeed, if unaccompanied by knowledge, perception, and memory, it can scarcely be said to rise above the threshold of consciousness, or if it does, it is like the consciousness of an oyster ; it is therefore either an indifferent object of desire or unsatisfying. 2. Since the good, wherever present, is essentially desirable, its different manifestations cannot be opposed to each other — it is in harmony with itself. Therefore pleasure per se cannot be the good, for different pleasures often conflict with each other. 3. The good is an ultimate end, but pleasure is in many cases a restoration of some kind of bodily harmony that has previously been disturbed ; as such it is a process or a " becoming," ^ a movement towards an end beyond itself, not an end in itself Plato holds that the pleasures of appetite, especially, have this characteristic, since appetite depends on pre- existing wants. Such pleasures, again, are not positively desirable, since their nature consists only in the removal of pain, discord, or want. We conclude that as some pleasures are not essentially good, pleasure as such is not essentially good ; its worth depends on its accompaniments. Is Mental Activity the Good ? — It is also true that €H. II PLATO 6 1 no mental state devoid of the feeling of pleasure can be identified with the good. A life of mental activity consisting in the exercise of wisdom, intellect,knowledge, and memory would not satisfy desire if the person were incapable of feeling pleasure and pain. No man is satisfied with mere thinking, he must also find pleasure in his thoughts. Therefore, the good, since it is not merely what ought to satisfy, but what does, when apprehended, satisfy desire,^ must contain pleasure as a constituent. The ffarmonious Life. — Since pleasure and mental activity are both essential to the good and neither is suflicient, it follows that Well-being must consist in a due combination of both. The proportions of feeling and mental activity that constitute the " mixed " life, are to be determined by wisdom, fulfilling its highest function of rational judgment. From this point Plato is led to an analysis of pleasures ; the general conclusion being that those accompanied by pain or precedent want are of less worth than " pure or unmixed " pleasures — those free from attendant pain.^ Por this reason aesthetic and intellectual pleasures are preferable to sensual, which are always preceded by want and accompanied by pain. " Necessary " pleasures — those accompanying the normal exercise of the appetites, must, nevertheless, be included in the life of Well-being. To these must be added the pleasures of Art and Science, of reflection and self-knowledge, the pleasures arising from health and temperance, and from all the recognised 1 See pp. 6, 7. ^ The reader will see that the standard by which Pinto in this connection judges pleasures was afterwards used by Epicurus and other hedonists. 62 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. i moral virtues, but above all, the pleasure of con- templating truth. The general sense of Plato's argument is that pleasurable feeling and mental activity are both essential to personal Well-being, and his doctrine is thus a correction of the one-sided theories of the Cynics and Cyrenaics. The result reached in the Republic is fundamentally the same, for it was there urged that the best life for the individual is one in v^hich intellect, emotion, and appetite work together in a harmony determined by Eeason. Beason in the Universe. — This perfect blending of pleasure and mental activity which constitutes the life of Well-being, is caused by symmetry, measure, and beauty. But these are more akin to wisdom than to pleasure ; for conscious Eeason, the over-ruling Mind, is the source of the order and perfection of the universe. Plato concludes that the good of the individual is more closely allied to wisdom than to pleasure ; Eeason and not Peeling is to determine what is good. In the Laws, the same idea of rational order, symmetry or measure, is used as an ultimate explana- tion. What truly exists is perfect, imperfection being due to taking a limited — and so far false — view of things. The whole universe is directed by the over- ruling Mind, Who orders all details for the welfare of the whole. Each part has its appropriate position, and, in particular, men have their proper functions, whether to do or to suffer. Plato therefore rejects the Protagorean dictum -^ and asserts that God, not man, is the measure of all things. The Ideas of divine ^ See p. 31. CH. 11 PLATO 63 order and harmony, nol the wishes and feelings of finite human beings, contain the ultimate explanation of the universe. The ideal for each lower soul is to become dear to God and to grow like Him. The greatest of all evils for man is the excessive love of self; man should rather love those who are higher in the kingdom of souls, and strive to reach their level. The soul consists of a mortal part and an immortal, and knowledge is the activity of the immortal part. In the Phaedo we are told that the mortal part belongs to the body, which impedes the immortal soul in its flight beyond the things of Sense. Eeason or intelligence, as the faculty of apprehending truth, is the proper regulator of human actions. Ignorance is the chief source of evil, and it practically means a failure to recognise one's proper position and work in the scheme of the universe. It is clear that this is an extension, beyond the limits of the State, of the Idea of Justice described in the Bepuhlic ; not only the perfect individual, not only the perfect State, but also the whole Universe is an ordered system in which each member has its due function. CHAPTER III The Separation of the Sciences. — The predecessors of Plato had a tendency to give special weight to one department of reality without recognising that their views were one-sided. Thus the earlier Greeks identi- fied the universe with external Nature, and Philosophy for them was a kind of abstract Physics. With the Sophists there came a humanistic movement which culminated in Socrates ; Ethics and Politics now attracted most attention, man and the State being the chief objects of intellectual interest. With Plato all this one-sidedness was abolished ; his system was synthetic, his object being to discover fundamental principles everywhere, and to find the connecting links between them. In the same dialogue we often find discussions on metaphysical, theological, ethical, educa- tional, and physical problems running into each other in a manner which shows that he regarded all truths as parts of one great system, as so many webs in the network of reality. Aristotle's conception of philosophy was fundamentally the same as Plato's, but he saw that an increased knowledge of classified details was ' 384-322 B.C. ; born at Stagira in Thrace, a pupil of Plato, tutor to Alexander the Great, and founder of the Peripatetic School at Athens. 61 CH. Ill AKISTOTLE 65 essential to the growth of the Sciences, and he therefore devoted separate works to Metaphysics, Ethics, Politics, Psychology, and many of the natural sciences. In the subsequent development of science the need for a division of labour naturally led to further specialisa- tion by different inquirers. This departure from the Platonic ideal of co-ordinated truth ' has in more modern times been kept in check by two causes : by the occasional appearance of " synthetic " systems of Philosophy, like Hegel's, Comte's, or Spencer's ; and by the recognition of the fact that co-ordination between different sciences is often a rich source of progress, as may be inferred from the titles " Physiological Chemistry," " Physical Geology," and from the depend- ence of many applied sciences (as Medicine) on the results of a variety of other Sciences. The Highest Science} — Aristotle in his Ethics defined good as " that at which all things aim," and the highest good or the good, as that which is desired for its own sake. The highest good of mankind forms the subject of the highest science, and this is " Political Science." ^ It deals with the good of the State, which is greater, more perfect, and more divine than the good of any single individual. Yet, since the State is composed of individuals, one part of " Political Science " takes the form of an inquiry into individual good, so far as this is attainable by action ; and this is the subject of the Ethics. Method. — Aristotle recognises that Ethics is not an 1 See pp. 52, 56. ^ See Jit hies, I. 1. ^ This included tlie Ethics of Society and of the Individual as well as what is now called Political Science. In Greece, before the growth of cosmopolitanism, society was identified with the State, not with humanity. 66 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. i exact Science like Mathematics or Logic. The results are only general and not always exact. The proper person for the inquiry is one who has had wide experience of life, a general education, and control over his emotions. The sources of information are intuitive perception, personal experience, and the communicated experience of others. The data thus acquired are to be collected and reduced critically to general principles ; thus the method, so far as popular social morality is concerned, is mainly inductive. Criticism of some Ethical Theories. — That the highest human good is the same as Well-being ^ is universally admitted, but there are different views as to the precise nature of Well-being. The vulgar often identify it with pleasure, wealth, or honour ; but these cannot be final ends, for some pleasures are not desirable, wealth is only a means to Well-being, and honour is sought rather to increase our confidence in our own virtue than as an end desirable for its own sake. Plato's doctrine that there is an absolute good, which is the a priori source of the excellence of all good things,^ must also be rejected as contrary to experience, since there are many things rightly called "good," though having nothing in common except that they are actually desired ; ^ this applies, for example, to wisdom and pleasure, which are both desirable. Again, the Cynic theory, that Well-being is identical with the possession of Virtue, cannot be accepted as final, since the worth of Virtue has to be estimated by the nature of the mental activities to which it leads ; regarded ' evSai/iovla, see p. 23. ^ See p. 55. ' Nevertheless, as we shall see, Aristotle recognises that there is a true general conception underlying Well-being and virtue, and this was partly Plato's meaning. cH. Ill ARISTOTLE 67 as a merely inactive possession, it is useless and almost meaningless. General Conception of Well-heing. — Aristotle is led to a provisional and formal definition of Well-being by the following considerations. In the first place, Well-being must be complete in itself,^ since it is not a subordinate end, but an unconditional good desirable for its own sake and preferable to any other. Secondly, man's Well-being must consist in the fulfilment of the work or function for which he exists, and in which his true being finds expression. The nature of this function can only be determined by considering the nature of the human soul. Now the human soul consists of two parts, the rational and the irrational which may be considered apart, though they are actually inseparable. The irrational part consists of an unconscious element, — which is the source of generation, nutrition, and growth, and is common to all forms of life — and of the conscious element of emotion and desire which is shared by man with the lower animals.^ Only the rational element is peculiar to man. His emotions and desires are naturally under the authority of Eeason which is the proper regulator of his conscious actions. In the exercise of Eeason, therefore, and in the regulation of emotion and desire by Reason, man fulfils his true function, the end for which he exists. Thirdly, since the life of Well-being is complete and all-satisfying, the function of the man who lives this life has reached its highest excellence, and this is equivalent to saying that he possesses virtue. Finally, Well-being is not attainable in a ^ adTapKT}^. ^ i">XV (soul) meant for Aristotle the principle of life, whether in the animal or the plant. 68 A SHORT HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. i single moment, but requires for its realisation the whole life of a man in its normal length from maturity to death. " For as one swallow or one day does not make a spring, so one day or a short time does not make a fortunate or happy ^ man." From this discus- sion there emerges the definition of "Well-being or human good as " an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue in a complete life." ^ This activity must be conscious, and either purely rational or in obedience to Eeason. It is to be understood that the uncon- scious nutritive process is only a one-sided and partial aspect of the human soul ; the same applies to emotion and desire, which, however, being forms of conscious- ness, are to be accepted as constituents of Well-being, so long as they submit to the authority of Eeason. The definition just given is formal, because it does not determine the content of Well-being. The problem now to be considered is, what is the nature of that virtue, which, when it expresses itself as activity, leads to Well-being ? Division of Virtue. — The Greek word for " virtue" ' signified literally excellence, and so the fitness of an organised structure or of an artificial product for the end for which it exists and by which its true nature is defined. The eye, for example, has virtue when it sees well, the body when it is in health, a knife has virtue when it cuts properly. A virtue of the conscious human soul is thus any permanent mental state which helps towards the realisation of the end for which man exists,* this end being rational activity. ' (idaliJ.uv, possessing Well-being. " \pvxv^ ^v^pyeia Kar dpeTTjv . . ^^ ^it^ reXciip. ^ aper-f}. * It is important to observe that, for Aristotle, the end for which man exists is not something external to his soul, but an inward conscious activity. TH. Ill ARISTOTLE 69 For practical purposes, therefore, a human virtue may be described as any praiseworthy mental state that is permanent.^ There are two kinds of virtue corre- sponding to the two conscious parts of the soul: (1) Intellectual Virtue,^ including knowledge, practical and theoretical, belongs to the rational soul when it performs well its function of knowing and dis- covering the truth ; (2) Moral Virtue ^ is attributed to the irrational but conscious part of the soul in its relation to Eeason, when emotions and desires are subordinated to Reason, and thereby fulfil their proper function, the facilitation of rational activity. Thus temperance and courage are instances of moral virtues, for the one expresses the permanent control, by Reason, of the desire for pleasure, the other of the emotion of fear. Characteristics of Moral Virtue. — Moral virtues spring from habit.* They are not innate in the sense of being naturally implanted qualities in us, for habit cannot alter any natural quality ; e.g. a stone naturally falls, and you cannot habituate it to rise by repeatedly throwing it up. There are, however, in man natural capacities for acquiring virtues, while the actual acquisition is due to habit. The moral are thus con- trasted with the intellectual virtues, which are gener- ally imparted by teaching.^ Again, morally virtuous ' Both intellectual and moral virtues are termed ?Jeis (permanent states). ^ biavo'qrLK-^ dper'^. ^ T]8tKT] dper^. * ISos, conneeted with ^dos, whence the title ri8iKri, from which the word "Ethics" is derived. ^ Aristotle's psychology is here open to criticism. Intellectual virtues, just as much as moral, are habits, since they are acquired by the gradual assimilation of ideas, not, as a rule, by the sudden reception of truth from others. This gradual assimilation is the formation of a mental habit by mental action. The real distinction is that moral virtues are acquired habits of regulating irrational impulses, whereas intellectual virtues are forms of knowledge. 70 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. i actions are deliberate, because Eeason acts consciously towards the realisation of a pre-conceived end. It follows that such actions must be done for the sake of what is good, since Eeason aims at good ends. Knowing, though essential, is not by itself strong enough to enforce right conduct ; Eeason must avail itself of the force of habits acquired by frequent repetition of good acting. Aristotle appears to assimie that the natural aptitudes for acquiring moral virtues are implanted in all, and that these aptitudes have originally enough strength to make 'possible the gradual formation of good habits ; or perhaps he meant that Eeason has originally enough directive force to select the best aptitudes for cultivation. The Doctrine of the Mean. — According to Plato the good man is he in whom knowledge, emotion, and desire work in perfect harmony, no part of the soul tyrannising over the rest, and each part ex- ercising its due activity.^ This is one of the many connecting-links between Plato and Aristotle, whose doctrine of the Mean is a special way of expressing the same truth. Aristotle, we have seen, assumes that man, qua man, has a special function, some work or activity in the exercise of which he manifests his true essence and finds his Well-being. But what is true of the race is also true of the individual soul and its different parts. Every person has a special function, and so have all the parts of his soul ; these functions, when duly exercised, issuing in the appropriate work or activity. Now we find that every perfect work, whether of Science, Art, or Nature, possesses the characteristics of being a mean between ' pp. 46, 47. CH. Ill AEISTOTLE 71 two extremes, the one of excess and the other of defect. Every kind of excellence is such a mean, and this is true of Moral Virtue/ which is the excellence of naan in the sphere of action and emotion. Temperance, for example, is a mean between intemperance and asceticism, courage between cowardice and rashness. Accordingly, Aristotle defines Virtue as " a permanent mental state, expressing itself in deliberate actions, and lying in a relative mean fixed by Eeason, that is, as the man of practical wisdom would fix it." ^ It is implied that the permanent mental state is created by habitual actions of the same type as those to which it leads ; thus a man becomes temperate by constantly acting temperately ; hence Virtue is a kind of habit. In this definition certain points are further developed by Aristotle. I'irst, morally good actions are deliberate, not impulsive ; this is because the virtuous man, qua rational, aims at a rationally conceived end, and he is not satisfied with blindly following the promptings of irrational impulses with- out weighing their merits. The end, therefore, must be judged to be good, and this is expressed by saying that the action must be done " for the sake of what is noble." ^ Secondly, the path of Virtue is but one, whereas the paths of vice are many, being characterised by every degree of excess or defect.^ Thirdly, the middle path is not given by mechanical a priori rule, as in arithmetic ; it is known only by the man who is ^ In the rest of this Chapter, "virtue'' will signify "moral virtue" unless otherwise stated. ^ ^fis TrpoaLperlKT) iv fietxdTrjTL oStra ry irpbs tj/j-cLs, dpiffixivri "Kbyl^ Kal (is &!/ 6 (f>p6vi^os Qpiff€te. ^ TOO KoXou heKa. * Plato expressed the same idea in saying that the good is determined by "measure." Seep. 61. 72 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS tt. i a practical expert in right conduct. Certain practical rules may indeed be given for finding the mean, but, in the long run, instinctive moral intuition is the final court of appeal. Such intuition is partly innate, and partly the result of the experience of those who constantly seek the right path. The following are illustrations of the doctrine that virtue is a mean between two extremes in action or in emotion ^ : — Excess. Mean. Defect. Eashness Courage Cowardice Licentiousness Temperance Apathy Extravagance Generosity Miserliness Bad Temper Good Temper Servility Flattery Courtesy Eudeness Justice is a mean in the peculiar sense that it lies between the vice of taking more than one's share, and the opposite defect of taking less. Aristotle remarks that his theory is not to be strained too far ; it is (we might say) a sign-post pointing towards Virtue rather than an exact definition. Again, to some vices there corresponds no mean ; thus there is no mean in adultery or murder or theft. Stni it might be argued that those vices are the products of excessive passions such as licentiousness, fury, malice, or covetousness.^ Voluntary Actions and Eesponsihility. — An action ^ The names of the virtues are printed so as to represent the idea that the mean is often nearer one extreme than another, " Practically, the Doctrine of the Mean is equivalent to identifying moral excellence with rational moderation in all things, and is thus closely akin to the Platonic doctrine of the personal virtues of Temperance and Justice as expounded in the Republic, and to the Harmony Theory of the Philehus (see pp. 46, 61). In philosophic form, however, it is inferior to Plato's view, because it lays no stress on the idea of the co-ordination of parts within a complete whole. As a guide to conduct it has a show of cH. Ill AEISTOTLE 73 is voluntary when the agent is the original cause of the action, there being no external compulsion. Into a deeper discussion of this Aristotle does not enter; he evidently assumes that the Ego or Self can be an original source of actions — a doctrine which naturally leads to the Kantian theory of the Autonomy (self- determination) of the will.^ A man is held responsible and is praised or blamed for voluntary actions only. He is justly blamed for not cultivating virtuous habits, for though the violence of his passions may now de- prive him of the power of voluntary action, there was a time when he had a sufficient natural capacity for virtue to develop self-control. Ethically virtuous and ethically vicious actions and emotions are subjects of praise and blame, because they express the character which the agent himself has created by a series of voluntary actions. Some Special Virtues, TemperaTice, Courage, Justice, Friendship. — The four " cardinal virtues " have with Aristotle a much narrower meaning than with Plato (in the Republic) ; he is content to take the commonly accepted detached meanings, whereas Plato generalised with a view to securing philosophic co-ordination and unity. By Temperance ^ Aristotle means moderation in bodily pleasures, particularly those shared with the lower animals. Continence ^ is closely allied to Temperance, but is distinguished from it by the fact that the continent man has violent desires, whereas the temperate man either has none or clearness and precision which disappears when we find that, as Aristotle admits, the mean cannot be fixed by a general rule, but only by tlie instinctive moral perceptions of a man who is already wise and virtuous. ' See cliapter on Kant. ^ cruipposiPTt. ^ ^yKpareia. 74 A SHOET HISTORY OF ETHICS pt. i has completely mastered them. Continence is there- fore the inferior virtue ; but, its excess. Incontinence,' is more excusable than Licentiousness,^ the excess corresponding to Temperance ; because the incontinent man is urged against his will by the superior force of passion, whereas the will of the licentious man is corrupted, and excessive pleasure is sought deliberately. Courage or Fortitude ' is a mean between Cowardice and Eashness. For the exercise of true Courage the following conditions must be fulfilled. There must be real grounds for fear, and an actual feeling of fear, which is controlled for the sake of what is noble, in such a way that right action is not hindered |by fear, and the man does his duty unflinchingly. Also there must be a refusal to undertake unnecessary risks, whereby the excess of Eashness is avoided. War is the great occasion for the exercise of this virtue. The noble motive distinguishes true Courage — and indeed all moral virtues — from the spurious forms. For example, those forms of courage which are due to frequent experience of danger (the courage of the veteran), or to ignorance, or to insensibility, or to passion (as the courage of the lion), are not genuine moral virtues; they have a value, but they are not directed by Eeason. For Aristotle the sphere of Courage is limited to physical dangers; the corre- sponding virtue in Plato is much wider, and includes not only " moral " Courage (in the current sense) but also the mental force by which any kind of emotional temptation is resisted.* The whole of Book V. of the Ethics is devoted to ^ aKpaaia. ^ d/coXac/a. ^ avSpEta. ■* See pp. 44, 45, Plato's dpSpeia includes the ffuiippoaivi] and dvdpeia of CH. HI AEISTOTLE 75 the discussion of Justice and allied virtues. Plato, we have seen, attached a comprehensive philosophical meaning to the Greek word translated " Justice " ; Aristotle, on the other hand, tries to fix and analyse the meanings actually used, and finds that they are various. In the first place Justice often signifies obedience to the Law of the State. As the laws professedly aim at the good of the subjects, the word came to signify the perfection of social Virtue ; and, finally, since he who does his duty towards his neighbour is said to be virtuous. Justice is often identified with complete Virtue. Aristotle, however, is chiefly concerned with Justice in a narrower sense, as the virtue expressing itself in actions dealing with personal property. This " particular Justice " is again subdivided into (1) Distributive'' Justice and (2) Corrective ^ Justice. Distributive Justice uses two principles; one is that a man is to receive profit from an undertaking in proportion to the amount that he contributes ; the second is that the man is to contribute to public expenses in proportion to his possessions. We might illustrate the first by invest- ment, the second by taxation. Corrective Justice deals with infringements of the law of the land ; the penalty or compensation is measured by the degree of the injury, and has not (as in the case of Distributive Justice) any reference to the special circumstances of the persons involved. Justice assumes various other forms. When considered without any special reference to political Aristotle. Plato's avSpela is inseparable from his crwcppoaivTi, tut the former lays more stress ort the active resistance to be overcome in order to preserve the harmony expressed in the latter virtue. ' diane/iJiTiK-fi. '^ diopSuTiKri. 76 A SHORT HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. i law, it is Fairness of Mind,-* which implies a spon- taneous love of Justice apart from legal sanctions. Friendship ^ was a favourite subject of discussion with the Greek philosophers. Aristotle holds that there are three forms of Friendship ; it may be based on utility, on pleasure, or on goodness of character. But the first two forms are transient ; that which is based on goodness in both parties is Friendship in the true and permanent sense ; it includes the advantages of both the other types, for the good are both useful and pleasant to each other. Friendship is also essential to Well-being, for man is by nature social, and the exercise of this virtue stimulates many excellent activities which would otherwise lie dormant. (This is a criticism of the Cynic theory that the wise man is independent of others.) That activity of the soul which constitutes Well-being is indeed inward, yet it is dependent on the possession of some external goods, and a friend is the "' greatest of external goods." But, more than that, a friend is an inward spiritual possession, and is in truth " a second self " whose Well-being we can share. Life is essentially a good and pleasant thing for the good man, and thus to be conscious of the existence of a good friend is to increase our own Well-being, by sharing the life - activities which constitute another's Well-being. Self-Love and the Love of Others? — Traditional moral judgment, Aristotle remarks, condemns Self-love as a vice ; yet, as a matter of fact, every man pursues chiefly his own interests, and it appears to be reason- ^ The Greek words for Friendship and Love (as here used) are the same {iKavTia. CH. Ill ARISTOTLE 77 able that a man should love himself most. The explanation of this paradox is to be found in the ambiguity of the word " self." The bad man loves only his irrational self, and therefore he grasps more than his share of money, honour, bodily pleasures and other things by which this lower self is gratified. But the " Self " as a whole contains a rational part, which is the proper director and judge of man's actions. Thus he who truly loves himself obeys Eeason ; ^ loving noble deeds above all things, he serves others as well as himself, and will sacrifice his wealth and even his life for another, if the attainment of true good requires it. But the bad man is an enemy to himself as well as to others, since he gratifies his lower self, which, being only a part of the whole, is reaUy his/a^s« self. Pleasure, Pain, and the Good. — That the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain form the strongest of all motives to action cannot be denied, and legis- lators make use of this truth in inflicting punishments. But what is the ethical value of pleasure ? What is its true worth in the scale of goods ? That pleasure is a good must be admitted, because it is naturally desired for its own sake, not merely as a means to some other satisfaction. But pleasure cannot be the sole and sufficient constituent of complete Well-being, because it is a matter of general experi- ence that some pleasures are evil, owing to their unhealthy concomitants. All excess, too, is bad, and this is true of pleasures.^ It follows that pleasure 1 See p. 67. ^ Aristotle is appealing to general experience ; otherwise this argument would be a petitio prindpii. An excess of the highest good could not be bad I 78 A SHOET HISTORY OF ETHICS pt. i is not the good, not the supreme good. Aristotle's general conclusion (if we allow that he is consistent, which has been questioned) is that pleasure is an essential element of Well-being, but it is not the only constituent thereof^ In the seventh book (commonly attributed to Eudemus) pleasure is de- fined as an " unimpeded activity " of the soul, and is there regarded as almost identical with Well-being, which was defined as a perfect activity.^ It is clear, however, that Aristotle valued the nature of the activity quite as much as the feelings accompany- ing it ; and if pleasure is to be identified with Well- being this will be not merely because it is an unimpeded activity, but rather because of the intrinsic excellence of the activity which makes it " unimpeded." On the whole, Aristotle thinks that the worth of pleasure is to be determined by something outside the mere feeling, by some objective criterion. He evidently wishes to strike a mean between the Cynic and Cyrenaic theories. The apparent contradiction in Aristotle's view seems to arise from his not fixing the meaning of "pleasure," which in one place he regards as a passive feeling, and in another as a mental activity. Knowledge and Virtue. — Socrates identified Virtue with practical insight,^ — knowledge as applied to action. Aristotle admits that the virtues and practical insight are in fact inseparable, but he claims that they are not identical. Virtue without the intellectual element (insight) is merely natural or instinctive, not moral, since Moral Virtue is defined as the habitual sub- ^ This agrees witli Plato's doctrine as expressed in the Philebus. (Seepp.60-62.) 2 g^g p. §8. ' 1838-1900. 234 UTILITAEIANISM 235 A. Egoistic Utilitarianism — Jeremy Bentham " Nature/' says Bentham/ " has placed man under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do." Upon this foundation is based the " principle of utility," which " approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question." This " party " is, in general, the community, and its interest is the " sum " of the interests of its members. An action that ought to be done is one conforming to the principle of utility, and moral obligation has no other meaning. All other standards of morality are wrong if taken as ultimate ; in any case there would be no motive for obeying them. Asceticism, sympathy, moral sense, duty, the Will of God, the love of esteem — all these are per se impotent as ultimate motives ; though they may operate as external sanctions, since they are connected with pains and pleasures. The question now arises. How are pleasures and pains to be measured, what is the principle of the hedonic scale ? Bentham answers that the personal value of pleasure depends on its (1) intensity, (2) duration, (3) certainty, (4) propinquity, (5) fecundity (tendency to be followed by other pleasures), and (6) purity (freedom from accompanying or following pain). The value for the community depends further on (7) the extent, i.e. the number of persons who share the '■ Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789). 236 A SHOKT HISTORY OF ETHICS pt. n pleasures. From the last Beutham is led to the principle of impartiality, or equity; in distributing pleasures, " every one is to count for one, and no one for more than one." But he fails to show that any individual can have a motive for preferring equitable distribution to increasing his own pleasure. He appears to have held with Shaftesbury,^ that there is a perfect harmony between public and private interests. The individual, however, Bentham implies, can pursue only his own pleasure ; thus the doctrine is to some extent akin to Hobbes', and on this account I have named his system Egoistic. Virtue, Motive, Punishment. — The ordinary moral virtues (honesty, temperance, justice, veracity, etc.) are prized by the utilitarians as being types of character that tend on the whole to the greatest social happiness. Though the morality of an act is primarily dependent on its hedonistic effects, yet motives, intentions and dispositions are subjects of praise and blame and deserve rewards or punishment, because good motives, intentions and dispositions tend generally to increase social happiness, though in particular cases they may not be successful. In like manner bad motives and dispositions deserve punishment, because they tend towards a decrease of general happiness. Bentham's doctrine of punishment appeals strongly to the merciful feelings of mankind. Punishment, he holds, is essentially bad, and must only be used to avoid greater evil in accordance with the principle of utility. Herein the utilitarians differ widely from the purists, e.g. Kant (and Butler in some of his moods), who held that wrong motives deserve punish- ' p. 155. CH. VII UTILITAEIANISM 237 ment apart from its remedial effects.^ We must agree with Bentham in admitting that the remedial criterion of punishment is the proper one for men to use in their dealings with each other, even if the retributive doctrine be correct, because we are incapable of judging the worth of other men's motives except by their effects. B. Sympathetic Utilitarianism — J. S. Mill Bentham was unable to find a motive in human nature for obeying the utilitarian law, and thus the objections raised by him against other moral standards apply to his own. Mill endeavoured to get over this difficulty, but was unable to overcome it, because he, like Bentham, adhered to Psychological Hedonism, which assumes that pleasure is the motive of all actions. Proof of Utilitarianism!^ — Since all desire is for pleasure, it follows, according to Mill, that pleasure or happiness (an extended sum of pleasures) is alone desirable or good ; for there can be no proof that anything is desirable beyond the fact that people actually desire it. A further inference is that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the most desirable end. "Each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons." Hence follows the utilitarian doctrine, that tendency to produce general happiness is the sole moral criterion of the goodness of actions, characters, or motives. The Sanctions of Utilitarianism. — Mill's " proof " 1 Cf. also Hegel, p. 223. ^ The quotations are from Mill's Utilitarianism (1863). 238 A SHOET HISTOKY OF ETHICS pt. n tacitly assumes the Kantian principle, that the good is objectively and universally good, that what is really good or desirable for another is a desirable end for me to pursue. Now the advocate of Utilitarianism ought to explain why I should seek the general happiness, since if this is a good end for me I must have a motive for seeking it. In the proof, however, Mill has burnt his boats, because he based that proof on the principle that all desire is for pleasure, not for the general happiness. The only escape would be to show, in the manner of Shaftesbury, that the individual will get greatest pleasure by the course of action that tends most to multiply the pleasures of others. Mill, however, takes a different line ; he abandons Psychological Hedonism. In answer to the question, What are the sanctions of Utilitarianism ? — i.e. What are the sources of the obligation to adopt it instead of following private pleasure ? — Mill replies that these sanctions are to be found in the conscientious feelings of mankind, in the consciousness possessed by every one that he is an integral part of society. This feeling is natural and operates in every mind of well developed feelings, " in proportion to the sensitiveness and though tfulness of the character.'' Quality of Pleasures. — Mill differs from Bentham in admitting that the worth of pleasures depends on quality as well as on quantity. There are higher pleasures and lower, and those who have experienced both consciously prefer the higher, which proves that they are essentially more desirable. This preference of higher pleasures to lower. Mill attributes to a " sense of dignity," which makes a man choose rather to be Socrates unhappy than a pig satisfied. It has cH. VII UTILITARIANISM 239 often beea argued that Mill's recognition of a qualita- tive distinction in pleasures is inconsistent with mere Hedonism, which estimates the worth of pleasures by their quantity or intensity alone. The inconsistency was concealed from Mill by his ambiguous use of the word pleasure. He sometimes identifies pleasure with any desirable or desired state of consciousness, and he regards one pleasure as greater than another when it is desired more ; and the example of Socrates and the pig shows that the objects desired may be something more than passive feelings. At other times, speaking as a strict hedonist, he appears to regard pleasure as a special kind of feeling, for the most part sensuous, or at least passive, and not deriving any conscious worth from the nature of the object causing the feeling. Self-Sacrifice and Conventional Morality. — Mill is particularly anxious to show that Utilitarianism is consistent with the ideals of self-sacrifice and the nobler forms of Stoicism. " In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth we read the complete spirit of the Ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality." And he does not wish to be regarded as a radical in reference to conventional morality. The end to be pursued is not one's own pleasure, but public happiness. This explains why certain secondary moral rules are to be obeyed ; for example, though it may often be to a man's interest to tell a lie. Utilitarianism enjoins veracity as the " principal support of all present social well-being " ; though occasional exceptions may be allowed, as is acknowledged by most moralists. 240 A SHORT HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. n Virtue as an End. — Mill admits that virtue, though primarily only a means to happiness, is nevertheless often desired for its own sake. His views on this subject were similar to Hume's, but inferior in psychological subtlety ; so far as they can be expressed without inconsistency, they were some- what as follows. — Certain cultivated and sympathetic persons happen to find pleasure in increasing the general sum of human pleasures, i.e. they desire this increase. Now virtue is that habitual quality of character which prompts actions tending to increase the general sum of pleasures ; it is therefore an indispensable means for attaining this desired end. The means, being constantly thought of in connection with the pleasantness of the end, become associated with pleasure, and in this way give immediate pleasure, apart from their effects. Hence virtue — since every- thing pleasant is desired, and all desire is for pleasure — becomes an end desired for its own sake by culti- vated and sympathetic people, but not (it would seem) by other persons. In the same way money, power, and fame, are originally conceived as means of increas- ing pleasure, but, becoming mentally associated with the pleasantness of these effects, they are often desired for their own sakes. Criticism of Bentham and Mill. Psychological Hedonism, a doctrine criticised in connection with Hume,^ was the chief source of the inconsistencies in Bentham and Mill. Before the time of Spencer (who recognised the existence of CH. VII UTILITAEIANISM 241 powerful irrational instincts differing from the desire for pleasure) Naturalists generally accepted this doctrine ; but its inadequacy was brought into special prominence through the fact that Bentham and Mill confound it with Ethical Hedonism, — which asserts that pleasure ought to be the end of our actions. Hume was an open Naturalist ; he is not so liable to the charge of inconsistency, since he recognised that the naturalistic method can only decide what motives actually have influenced mankind. But Mill, in laying down the " greatest happiness of the greatest number" as the end which ought to be pursued, uses the intuitional principle of impartiality, which requires every one to regard the good of others (in this case pleasure) as equally desirable with his own good. The obligation to accept this principle cannot be deduced; it is either an ultimate ethical law, or it has no meaning. Pure Naturalism can only treat moral obligation as a feeling sometimes producing effects, but Intuitionism regards it as an objective fact which ought to dominate our feelings. Bentham and Mill fail to recognise, that if every one desires his own pleasure, it must be shown that actions which tend to increase general happiness must seem to the agent to increase his own happiness, before he can regard the greatest happiness of the greatest number as the most desirable end. But the proof would not be valid except for those already possess- ing, enough " sensitiveness and thoughtfulness of character" to make them feel most pleasure in increasing general happiness. Clearly Psychological Hedonism can only lead back to Hobbes ; for though it be true that pleasure is, metaphorically speaking, R 242 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. ii communicated through sympathy, it is also true that one person's pleasure is actually distinct from another's. These criticisms prove two things : first, that Utilitarianism cannot be based on Psychological Hedonism ; and secondly, since it claims to set up an ethical standard demanding obedience, it cannot be proved by naturalistic methods, since these are only concerned with what is, not with what ought to be. As Sidgwick recognised, it involves the axiom of impartiality, and a denial of the theory that every man can only desire his own pleasure. C. Intuitional Utilitarianism — Sidgwick Problem and Methods of Ethics. — Henry Sidgwick ^ defines Ethics as the study of " what individual beings ought, or what it is right for them, to do or to seek to realise by voluntary action." ^ All ethical methods are either Hedonism or Intuitionism,^ but these methods are not mutually exclusive. The first regards happiness as the ultimate end ; Egoistic Hedonism teaches that the agent must, or ought to, pursue his own happiness exclusively ; Universalistic Hedonism regards universal happiness as the end. According to the intuitional view, conduct is held to be right when conforming to certain precepts or 1 1838-1900 ; Professor in Cambridge. ^ All the quotations are from Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics. ' The meaning of " intuitionism " as used by Sidgwick must not be identified with the meaning given to the same word in other parts of this work (see p. 119). It happens, however, that the systems we have described as intuitional are also so described by Sidgwick. Our definition is chiefly appropriate in classifying English Eighteenth Century systems ; it has reference to the question whether good is objective. Sidgwick is thinking more of the source of our knowledge of right and wrong. CH. VII UTILITAEIANTSM 243 principles of duty, intuitively known to be un- conditionally binding. Any method which takes perfection or excellence of human nature as the ultimate end " will prima facie coincide to a great extent " with the intuitional view ; but Sidgwick holds that the intuitional method is somewhat wider, and that when strictly applied it leads to Universalistic Hedonism, which regards happiness, not perfection, as the end. Kant's system, moreover, though intuitional in the above sense, cannot prima facie be identified with the " perfection theory," since he denies that it is my duty to take the perfection of others as my end. There are three forms of intuitional morality. Perceptional Intuitionism, the common - sense view of conscience, holds that the rightness or wrongness of every particular action can be determined by direct intuition ; this view is unphilosophical, since it ignores the existence of general principles. Secondly, Dogmatic Intuitionism accepts common- sense morality and endeavours to express in abstract form the general principles underlying it. Sidgwick appears to regard the systems of Butler and Hutcheson as types of this theory, since they treat the moral sense or conscience of the ordinary man as a completely satisfactory guide to conduct. Thirdly, Philosophic Intuitionism accepts provisionally, but in a critical spirit, the morality of common-sense, and it " attempts to find for it a philosophic basis which it does not itself offer." The ideal philosophic basis is a system of self-evident axioms. Here Sidgwick confessedly follows Clarke,^ whom he takes as one of the 1 p. 150. 244 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. ii best examples of the method. The philosophic differs from the dogmatic view in claiming the right to transcend, and if necessary, to correct, the unmethodical judgments of common-sense. The philosophic Intuitionism which Sidgwick adopts leads him to Utilitarianism. Criticism of Common -Sense and Dogmatic Intui- tionism. — The axioms or fundamental principles of Ethics, if it is to be an exact science, possessing the highest possible degree of certainty, must satisfy four conditions :■ — The terms used must be clear and precise, the axioms self-evident, mutually consistent, and accepted by experts in the subject. Common- sense or traditional morality is open to criticism when judged by these conditions. The analysis of popular conceptions of Justice, for example, shows that the word is used in different and conflicting senses. Some- times Justice is regarded as Gratitude systematised, but it is not decided whether the benefit received or the trouble exerted by the benefactor is to be the just measure of the benefactor's claims. In determining what is just, various other principles are used, e.g. requital of desert, distribution according to the recipient's capacity for enjoyment, production of the maxiruum of freedom for all members of the com- munity, conformity to positive law, fulfilment of natural expectation ; all of these may conflict with each other. The ambiguities in the popular theories about other virtues (e.g. Chastity or Veracity) lead Sidgwick to conclude that a philosophic science of Ethics cannot be derived from the analysis of common-sense morality. Dogmatic Intuitionism can- not therefore be accepted as satisfactory. vu. vii UTILITAEIANISM 245 Philosophic Intuitionism. Many philosophic principles are useless as ethical axioms because they are tautological. This criticism applies to the maxims identifying right action with reasonable action, or with obedience to the higher parts of our nature; to Plato's theory of Virtue as a harmony ; to Aristotle's doctrine of the Mean, and to the Stoic or Butlerian injunction to " follow Nature." All these maxims, Sidgwick holds, are useless because they try to solve the problem by expressing it in different language.^ The Rational Axioms of Ethics. — A useful Philo- sophic Intuitionism is nevertheless possible, for there are certain absolute self-evident practical principles which are not tautological, though by themselves they are too universal and formal to determine particular right actions. These are — (1) The axiom of Justice or Equality : " that whatever action any one of us judges to be right for himself he implicitly judges to be right for all similar persons in similar circumstances." In Law this takes the form of " impartiality in the application of general rules." (2) The axiom of Rational Self-Love, " that one ought to aim at one's own good on the whole." The italicised words emphasise that the pursuit of my own good is to be impartial. I am not to sacrifice the present to the future, nor the future to the present. ^ Apparently Sidgwick means that these maxims, regarded as isolated propositions, are tautological. But the chapters on the systems mentioned show that the ideas suggested by the maxims were fully developed, and received complex meanings not capable of being expressed in a few abstract axioms. 246 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. ii (3) The axiom of Eational Benevolence, which is, strictly speaking, a product of two rational intuitions : — (a) " that the good of any one individual is of no more importance from the point of view ... of the universe than the good of any other," and (6) " that as a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally, so far as it is attainable by my efforts, not merely at a particular part of it." It follows that I am bound to seek impartially the good of all individuals, including myself. This axiom, with (1), Sidgwick regards as equivalent to Kant's Categorical Imperative, and to Clarke's axioms.^ Taken together they are exact expressions of the golden rule, " Do unto others as you would that they should do unto you." The Proof of Utilitarianism. — " Philosophic Intui- tionism" leads, according to Sidgwick, to Utilitarianism, which he maintains to be a logical inference from two distinct principles. The first is the axiom of Eational Benevolence, which is intuitively apprehended and neither requires nor is capable of proof. The second is the principle resulting from analysis, and also incapable of strict proof — that the only ultimate good is the pleasure of some sentient being. This maxim of Hedonism emerges from the following considerations. All personal qualities are only valuable " on account of the desirable conscious life in which they are or will be actualised." Now consciousness is either Cognition,^ Feeling, or Will ; but Will and Cognition 1 pp. 150, 194. ^ This psychological division is adopted by Hoffding (Psychology, chap. iv. ) and other psychologists, but Stout's division [Groundwork of Psychology, chap. iii. ) into Cognition and Interest {including Feeling and Conation) seemsl preferable, since it regards Feeling and Conation as in- dissoluble. This being so, Sidgwiok's argument falls to the ground, or is at all events seriously weakened. CH. VII UTlLlTAKiANISM 247 are neutral in respect of desirability, and desirable Feeling is the same thing as Pleasure. From these two principles it follows that we are to direct our actions towards impartially increasing the happiness of sentient beings.^ Utilitarianism and Common-Sense. — Sidgwick holds that Common-sense morality is, on the whole, an un- reflecting and unmethodical Utilitarianism. Both recognise that virtues like generosity, self-sacrifice, scrupulousness, etc., are of the highest value as expres- sions of the axioms of Rational Benevolence, but that in exceptional cases they may require to be restrained owing to their painful consequences; hence both condemn quixotism, over-scrupulousness, and fanatical self-sacrifice. Common-sense, again, while approving of benevolence, recognises that the individual's private interests should occupy his chief attention — a con- clusion consistent with Utilitarianism, since a man has more power to increase his own happiness than that of others. And though impartiality is an essential feature in Utilitarianism, the duties arising from the narrower social relations, such as those implied in gratitude, family affection, and patriotism, are recognised by Utilitarianism, as well as by Common-sense, because pleasure on the whole would be greatly diminished by ignoring them. The different and often conflicting elements in Common- sense conceptions of Justice appear to spring from utilitarian considerations, since each of these elements ^ Lower animals are included. Tliis snggests a serious practical obstacle to applying the utilitarian theory ; it is seldom possible to estimate the pains and pleasures of men, to say nothing of the lower animals. This, however, is not in any way a proof that the utilitarian theory is false, but only that it is unpractical. 248 A SHOBT HISTORY OF ETHICS pt. n if properly applied, tends to the happiness of society ; but all should be regulated and controlled by the strict utilitarian standard. Veracity, again is a utilitarian duty; and the exceptions allowed by common-sense are also utilitarian, e.g. deception of a criminal to prevent crime or of an invalid for his own good, or verbal inaccuracy for reasons of courtesy. In like manner other virtues are considered. Applications, Positive Morality. — Systematic Utili- tarianism is, however, required to correct and improve Common-sense Morality, to resist the tyranny of mere custom and tradition, by insisting that there is only the one unconditional standard of right action. But on the whole the utilitarian will be very cautious about interfering with the Positive Morality^ of his age and country, for two reasons. First, Positive Morality is a great force for social happiness, and is sanctioned by the power of custom and tradition, which would be wanting in the case of new rules of conduct, even though these were intrinsically better ; thus a theoretical improvement might practically result in anarchy. Secondly, Common-sense is offended by radical exceptions to its code, and the hasty reformer may lose all influence for good. The utilitarian seeks to reform gradually, but on the whole he will uphold traditional morality. In actions lying beyond strict duty. Utilitarianism will lay less stress than Common-sense on the negative virtues of self-restraint and will recommend conduct giving positive pleasure. Egoism and Altruism. — The axiom of Rational Egoism is the great stumbling - block for strict ^ Positive Morality anj Common-sense Morality are much the same. CH. VII UTILITAEIANISM 249 utilitarians, since they insist on impartiality in the distribution of pleasures. To establish a harmony between this axiom and the axiom of Eational Benevolence is, according to Sidgwick, " the profoundest problem of Ethics." The ultimate harmony between these two motives is to be regarded as " a hypothesis logically necessary to avoid a fundamental contradic- tion in one chief department of our thought." If there be any objective good which the individual can recognise as such, then he is bound to regard the good of others as ethically equivalent to his own. Sidgwick says, almost in the manner of Descartes, " I find that I undoubtedly seem to perceive, as clearly and certainly as I see any axiom in Arithmetic and Geometry, that it is ' right ' and ' reasonable ' for me to treat others as I should think that I myself ought to be treated under similar conditions, and to do what I believe to be ultimately conducive to universal good or happiness." This is the "clearest and most certain of our moral intuitions." It abides though the harmony of goods cannot be empirically established by sympathy or by religious sanction ; not by the former, since sympathy is often partial; nor by the latter, since we cannot tell with certainty what actions the Deity wishes us to perform. D. General Criticism of Utilitarianism Sidgwick, on the whole, follows in the lines laid down by Bentham and Mill, but he may be regarded as the most philosophical representative of Utilitarian- ism, since his logical analysis is far more thorough. He recognises that the impartiality, which is vital to 250 A SHOET HISTORY OF ETHICS pt. n the theory, is incompatible with the assumption that private pleasure or sympathy provides the sanctions. In this respect he was deeply influenced by Kant, and, if the phrase were not a misnomer, he might be called a " Kantian Hedonist." In the analysis^ which leads Sidgwick to conclude that pleasure is the ultimate good there are two distinct principles involved. The first is that the final good is some form of conscious life, whose worth is apprehended along with its content ; it is intrinsi- cally/ desirable, and contains its own ethical justification, as an inseparable part of its being. The Greeks,^ on the whole, recognised this primary self-evident axiom of individual ethics, and it has never been expressly denied. It was obscured, however, by the Stoics and Cynics, who laid undue stress on the active and resistive elements which, under the conditions in which man is placed, are indispensable to the realisation of the good, but do not constitute its whole nature ; and by Kant,^ who subordinated good to Duty, thereby inverting the proper order. Ethical Hedonism. — The second principle referred to is, that, of the three psychological elements, cognition and will are ethically indifferent, and that desirable consciousness is the same thing as desirable- feeling, i.e. pleasure. Reasonable men will admit that neither cognition nor will, per se, is intrinsically desirable, but it seems to be equally true that feeling per se is seldom, if ever, the only desirable element in conscious- ness.'' Cognition, feeling, and will are usually bound 1 p. 246. ' Especially Aristotle, who insists that Well-being is an activity of the soul, complete-in-itself, p. 68. ^ pp. 202, 203 sq. * Cf. Plato, p. 60, and Aristotle, pp. 77, 78. CH. vn UTILITAKIANISM 251 up so closely in a concrete mental experience that we regard the whole experience as intrinsically desirable or undesirable. In admitting, with Plato, that an experience is not intrinsically good unless it is also pleasant, we do not imply that pleasure is the only constituent that makes the experience good. The arguments used by Sidgwick in favour of Ethical Hedonism are, as we have seen, based on the division of mental experience into Feeling, Cognition, and Will. Now such divisions — as psychologists are well aware — are abstractions and are therefore liable to mislead. We know that none of these three elements ever occur in isolation, and, therefore, we cannot directly conclude that any particular element alone gives its value to an experience. Feeling, in fact, is a quality of a mental state which cannot exist apart from other elements any more than colour or shape can exist without matter. Feelings can only be remembered and identified by the characteristic elements which accompany them, including sensations, cognitions, and interests of specific kinds. It is not too much to say that we cannot be conscious of mere feeling, and, when we speak of feelings being valued or compared ethically we are referring to complex states of mind containing far more than pure feeling. The controversy is, however, partly verbal. If the feeling of pleasure in a mental experience means the desirableness of the experience (which of course includes the consciousness of the desirableness), then it is a mere truism to say that things are desirable in proportion to the pleasure they give ; but it must be recognised that the desirableness is an intrinsic element in the experience, and inseparable therefrom. 252 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. ii But the hedonists do not appear to mean this ; they mean that pleasure is something detachable from the elements of an experience ; if a man can feel equal pleasure in staring at a stone wall as in looking at a beautiful landscape, then, they say, the experiences are equally good. If, then, the feeling of pleasure is regarded as a particular separable mental element in experience, the conchision that pleasure is the essence of its desirable- ness is shown to be false by direct experience. For example, my conscious approval of a landscape or play is based on the perception of certain features in the landscape or play. The pleasure may, to a large extent, be bound up with the approval, but it is not the object approved.^ Even if we agree with Hume's questionable doctrine,^ that the pleasure is the approval, it is absurd to say that the object approved of is the approval ! To take another example : When a scientist or mathematician discovers a new law or fact, the source of his immediate pleasure is the conviction that he has discovered the truth ; it is the truth which he judges to be good, not his pleasure in finding it. If the law turns out to be false, he even disapproves of his false beliefs and of the pleasure he originally felt in its discovery. This again shows that the object of his approval is truth, not pleasure. The hedonistic argument is based on the fallacious logical inference that pleasure, because it is essential to the complete desirableness of an experience, must constitute the essence of its desirableness. The same misleading form of argument has been used in turn to prove that the essence of matter is extension > Cf. Hutcheson, p. 157. ^ p. 181. CH. VII UTILITAEIANISM 253 since all matter is extended, that it is motion since all matter is in motion, and that it is im- penetrability since all matter possesses this quality in some degree. From " all good contains pleasure " it is inferred that good and pleasure are identical. As Plato showed, this would imply that good is a self-contradictory conception, since different pleasures may clash with each other.^ The ideal experience is then not mere feeling, but a complex state in which knowledge and feeling are fully exercised and the will moves forward without restraint. 'The Quantification of Happiness. — Utilitarianism is also open to the objection that its fundamental formula, "seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number," has an illusory appearance of exactness. The concep- tion of a quantity of happiness will remain obscure, until it is shown how happiness is to be measured with practical accuracy. And this difficult problem has not yet been solved. Neither has it been shown how the above formula is to be combined with the Benthamite formula of impartiality, — " Every one to count for one, and no one for more than one," — and it is conceivable that these two formulae might practically conflict. Possibly, however, these defects may hereafter be partially removed by the discovery of some new formula of social distribution, without abandoning the spirit of Utilitarianism. A permanent truth in the doctrine that good may be quantified seems to be that there are in this life degrees of social good, that the present state of society may be improved ; and that, though a Best is here ' See p. 60. I think Plato used all the best arguments against ethical Hedonism. 254 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. n unattainable by merely human effort, a Better may nevertheless be realised. Thus social good possesses, it would seem, one attribute which may be expressed by number and quantity, namely order ; if A, B, C are three real or imagined social conditions, in saying that A is better than B, and B than C, we arrange these three in a scale, just as numbers naturally fall into a scale. Again, number certainly has much to say to the general good of a social group. If the welfare of one or more members of the group advances without interfering with the welfare of the other members, it is self-evident that the general welfare of the group advances, and that this advance is pari "passu with the number of persons sharing the improvement. But if the welfare of some members is sacrificed in order to increase that of others, we have no means of determining whether there is a general advance in welfare, whether the change is objectively good. "We cannot subtract the adversities of one person from the prosperity of another and say whether the resultant prosperity is plus or minus, or fix its degree otherwise. Indeed if prosperity is good and adversity is bad, then the change is both good and bad ; and this suggests — what we shall now consider more fully — that the utilitarian conception of good is self-contradictory, in the forms in which it is presented to us by its chief supporters. Logical Defect in Utilitarian Idea of Good. — ■ Sidgwick, we have seen, regards the axiom of Eational Self-love as self-evident. It must be noticed that this is an intuitional ^ axiom, expressing a real obliga- tion that is sometimes evaded ; it is not a mere ^ lu our sense of the term as well as Sidgwick's (p. 242, note 3). en. vu UTILITAEIANISM 255 assertion that each man must seek his own good. Now Sidgwick recognises that there is no final dogmatic solution of the possible opposition between self-love and benevolence. He is too cautious to assert that the need felt by practical Eeason of harmonising the two is a proof that such a harmony is possible, and he is not willing to accept as self- evident or necessary the solutions offered by Shaftes- bury, Butler, and Hutcheson, or Kant.^ This difficulty, which Sidgwick fully recognised, surely proves that the axiom of Benevolence is inconsistent with the axiom of Self-love, so long as good is identified with pleasure ; this identification is, in fact, the source of the contradiction in the " Idea of the Good " as described by the Utilitarians. Even if we accept Shaftesbury's proof that the actions most pleasant to the agent are those that tend most to increase the general happiness, the harmony established by this proof is merely external and accidental. The harmony does not differ widely from Hobbes' political harmony, since it consists merely in this, that Nature has arranged by means of sympathy and social feelings that conflicting interests will not clash. There is however no inward and true harmony of interests. We might resolve the logical difficulty by rejecting the axiom of Self-love ; but this would be a practical absurdity, since, in recognising that a good is worthy of pursuit, I appropriate that good and regard it as mine ; besides, to exclude my own good would be inconsistent with the principle of impartiality, and would lead to a form of inverted Egoism. If good 1 See pp. 156, 158, 172, 201. 256 A SHOET HISTORY OF ETHICS pt. ii is identical with pleasure, the goodness of an end is, for the agent, proportional to the pleasure which its realisation gives him. But one person's pleasure, though loosely described as communicable by sympathy, is always distinct — as a feeling — from another person's pleasure. Ethical Hedonism, in short, is reaUy equivalent to Egoistic Hedonism, and leads back to Epicureanism, unless the axiom of Self- Love is given a subordinate place. At this point the logical value of the Platonic doctrine of the Unity of the Good becomes very clear.^ Good, if identified with pleasure, does not possess logical unity, that is, it contradicts itself, since my pleasure is not another person's pleasure. This contradiction appears in all the eighteenth - century intuitional systems, since they regard virtue and general happi- ness as two distinct ultimate ends, both equally good. The distinction is not removed by the dogma that virtue always leads to happiness either in this world or the next. 'If we once sever Self-love from Benevolence and Virtue they cannot be re-united. What is required is a return to the simplicity of the Aristotelian doctrine that the Well-being of an individual consists in apprehending and realising objective good ; that Well-being is not merely an external reward of good actions ; it lis those good actions ; as Spinoza said, " Beatitudo non est virtutis premium sed ipsa virtus." ^ But if this doctrine is to avoid Egoistic Hedonism, it must be shown that the idea of an " absolute and common good'' is a possible one. This was the problem which Green attempted to solve.^ 1 See p. 60 (par. 2). ^ £i/jic(j^ y_ 42. 3 gg^ q^^^^ jx. CHAPTEE VIII EVOLUTIONAL NATURALISM DAEWIN AND SPENCER Historical Position. — Modern ethical Naturalism began with Hobbes. We have seen that he regarded self- preserving and self -gratifying impulses as the ultimate principles of action in all living things, and attempted to reduce to these all so-called benevolent and social affections. This exclusive Egoism was corrected by Butler, who pointed out in the first place — following Shaftesbury — that un- selfish social affections and impulses are actual constituents of human nature, and, secondly, that Conscience, though not always obeyed, yet provides a motive tending to urge a man to sacrifice his own immediate interests for the public good. In the second doctrine he was supported by Kant, who insisted that the consciousness of duty is capable of overcoming personal inclinations. Auguste Comte ^ went further, and maintained that individual happi- ness was best secured by the complete subordination of egoistic to altruistic sentiments, thus asserting an identity between self-seeking and other -seeking motives. From a rationalistic standpoint Fichte and Hegel taught that the individual can realise his true 1 1798-1857. 257 S 258 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. n self only by identifying his interests with those of the larger whole of society. These results explain why the starting-point of Evolutional Naturalism is quite different from that of Hobbes. The former assumes, as acknowledged data, the existence and operation of purely altruistic (race-preserving) motives and impulses as well as the purely egoistic (self-preserving), and it attempts to explain the value and origin of both by a new principle, that of natural evolution. Evolution. — In its widest sense, "evolution" signifies the unfolding or development of the manifestly complex from apparently simple forms. The seed, for example, in its evolution becomes a tree, though to human eyes it is a far less complex structure ; and the modern State is " evolved " from simpler and more primitive forms of government. A follower of Aristotle might describe evolution as the transition from the " potential " {i.e. what exists only in germ or possibility) to the actual ; the seed, for example, potentially contains the fruit, which is the actuality of the seed. The idea of explaining by tracing development is of course not new,'' but as a comprehensive philosophic method it was probably first used systematically by Comte and by Hegel, though in very different senses. Comte traces the historical growth of the sciences ; he claims that the simple precedes the complex, each stage making use of the results already reached. He urges that the Sciences should be taught in this order which is the natural one. Comte's method is chiefly empirical ^ E.g. the Ionics, tlie first Greek philosophers, liad some idea of tracing the origin of everything Irom one fundamental substance, such as water or air. OH. VIII EVOLUTION 259 or descriptive. Hegel's, on the other hand, is rational; he endeavours to show that the actual development of knowledge and of social and moral institutions is the necessary order in which Eeason finds expression ; the development is the manifestation of Eeason or Mind. The term " evolution," as used by Darwin and Spencer, includes '' growth," but also emphasises the idea that growth is not the creation of new forms, but the necessary outcome of what already exists ; it also suggests that growth is not merely of individuals hut of races and institutions, and even of material systems. What is required to give pre- cision to the term is to state some principle by which growth takes place; and such principle may be either a law, working mechanically {e.g. " survival of the fittest ") or an ideal end at which Nature or the Mind in Nature aims. Unless some working method or end of evolution is implied, the word evolution can mean little more than change.^ A. Daewin Natural Evohotion. — The empirical hypothesis of Natural Evolution, though foreshadowed by Comte in the sphere of knowledge, and by others in biology, is specially associated with the name of Charles Darwin,^ who first collected the facts required to ^ A number of different views as to the meaning of evolution and its applications will be found in the essays collected under the title Darwin and Modern t>cience (1909). What is still required is a systematic exposition of the connecting links between these different meanings. 2 1809-1882. His most famous works are the Origin of Species (1859), and the Descent of Man (1871). 260 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. n give it support. With him it signified the principle that all living species, plants, animals, and men, originally sprang from less developed forms of life ; that species have become differentiated through the survival of those endowed with organs and faculties adapted for life in the environment in which they happen to be placed. Thus the "survival of the fittest"^ is the mechanism by which evolution is said to take place, and the process is described by Darwin as a " struggle for existence," carried on by each individual, partly with the inanimate environ- ment, and partly with other living creatures; the result being that only those survive who possess the appropriate armour for the struggle.^ The process by which the unfit are eliminated and the fit survive is metaphorically called " natural selection " by Darwin. In order to apply the principle to explain the survival of races it is necessary to assume as an additional mechanism — -whether original or accidentally evolved — some kind of heredity, by which life-preserving organs or aptitudes are transmitted from parent to offspring. Darwin was chiefly interested in the physical evolution of species, but he drew attention to the possibility of explaining the existence of moral instincts in the same way, and the subject was fully worked out by Herbert Spencer ; who, however, took 1 This term was first used by Spencer, not by Darwin. ^ That the fittest survive and the unfit are eliminated are truisms, since possessing fitness to survive and actual surviving are the same from the naturalistic standpoint. As an abstract principle the theory gives no information, but it is of use when taken in conjunction with the empirically observed fact that certain qualities — e.g. strength, agility, fleetness, endurance, and intelligence — help individuals in the struggle for existence. OH. vni SPENCER 261 up the idea of evolution quite independently of Darwin, and endeavoured to apply it, not only to Ethics, but to all human institutions and customs. B. Herbekt Spencer^ The End imposed hy Nature — Life. — Evolution is applied by Spencer not only to the physical growth of organisms (Biology) but also to the moral growth of humanity (Ethics) and to the development of societies (Sociology). The Darwinian conception of evolution as a differentiation of species is accepted, but generalised, so that evolution is regarded by Spencer as a process from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, from the simple to the complex. In every case there is a transition from elementary and comparatively few adjustments to needs to com- plex and more numerous ones, necessitated by the struggle for existence, in which increased power of adaptation to circumstances is always an advantage. The objective end imposed by Nature is life — the life of the individual organism and, through it, of the race. Life is defined by Spencer as the " continuous adjust- ment of internal relations to external relations." The Subject of Ethics. — In the course of evolution through survival of the fittest, organisms acquire the useful power of adapting their actions to various ends, such as the acquisition of nourishment or the avoid- ance of danger. Such adaptation of actions is Conduct. Conduct again evolves further, for, as the ends sought become more numerous and various, life increases in ^ 1820-1903. The Data of Ethws and Justice contain the funda- mental principles of Spencer's Ethics. 262 A SHORT HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. n breadth and intensity as well as in length. The evolution of conduct takes place in three directions, , since the immediate end may be the preservation of the individual (the agent), of the offspring, or of the race. As we ascend in the scale increased security is given to life in all the senses mentioned. Now Ethics has for its subject-matter that form which universal conduct takes during the last stages of its evolution, and this stage is represented by the human race. Good and Bad. — These terms generally have refer- ence to some prescribed ends ; thus a " good knife " is one that cuts well, a bad umbrella is one that leaks — and so forth. With animate beings the same thing is true ; here the terms are used of conduct, and the end tacitly assumed is life. Applying this to the three divisions of conduct, we find that actions are called good or bad, according as they tend to further or to hinder the complete life ^ of self, offspring, or fellow-men. The Ethical End — Pleasure. — A difficulty now arises that occurs in all forms of Naturalism. The end imposed by Nature is life ; but life may be un- desirable for the unconscious subject, and, therefore, ethically objectionable in the ordinary sense. The pessimist asserts that life is not worth living and is therefore under an obligation to destroy life. The optimist, however, holds that life is essentially desir- able. Spencer holds that optimists and pessimists agree in the doctrine that " life is good or bad according as it does or does not bring a surplus of agreeable feeling." ^ Spencer is himself a hedonistic ' I.e. life in length, breadth, and intensity. Breadth consists in the fullest possible exercise of different aptitudes. ^ Notice the questionable doctrine that every standard of Ethics is hedonistic. ou. vm SPENCER 263 optimist ; he holds that all opposition between the " biological " and " ethical " conceptions of good and bad tends to be removed in the course of Evolution. As soon as sentiency appears amongst living creatures, only those survive who, on the whole, take pleasure in life-preserving acts. Spencer on the Evolution of Conduct. This is considered by Spencer from four points of view, the physical, the biological, the psychological, and the sociological. In each case moral conduct stands at the highest point of development. (1) Physically, the evolution proceeds from the indefinite and incoherent to the definite and coherent.^ Corresponding to this, moral conduct follows fixed principles ; immoral or indifferent conduct is fickle and inconstant. (2) The "physical view " is purely formal, but the " biological view " considers conduct with reference to its natural end — breadth and length of life — and thus provides a test of moral actions. The moral man is one whose functions '" are all discharged in degrees duly adjusted to the conditions of existence." * " The performance of every function is in a sense a moral obligation." The " biological view " introduces a consideration of the causal connection between feeling and function. Sentient beings strive to exercise functions that give pleasure, and to avoid those that give pain. It follows that " sentient existence can evolve only on condition 1 Compare with the "widest sense'' of "evolution," p. 258. '■' Cf. Plato's conception of " Justice in the individual " (p. 46), and Aristotle's doctrine of the Mean (pp. 70, 71). 264 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. ii that pleasure -giving acts are life -sustaining acts." Thus, that Nature tends to produce a harmony between her end (life) and the human ethical good (pleasure) follows deductively from the evolutional principle. Experience verifies this inference, by showing that pleasure as such increases the vital powers and so prolongs life, whereas pain lowers vitality.^ Pleasure is essentially good, both biologically and ethically, though its indirect consequences may sometimes ■ be injurious to life. In the course of evolution these occasional injurious consequences tend to disappear, and pleasure-giving, self-preserving, and race-preserv- ing acts will ultimately coincide. (3) In the " 'psychological view " of the evolution of conduct, Spencer assumes that feelings and sensations are the ultimate elements of consciousness. Feelings may be either immediate sensations or ideal (re- presentative) feelings, referring to a possible future (e.g. expectation, hope, or fear). In the course of development immediate simple sensations become sub- ordinated to the more complex ideas of sensations to come. This power of looking into the future is on the average favourable to the preservation of life, and thus the psychological view coheres with the biological. A remote good becomes now more valued than an immediate one, and there thus arises the sense of ohligation (the felt need for repressing an immediate impulse), of the authority of one motive over another, and of a scale of worth. From this point of view moral feelings are at the highest level ; honesty and truthfulness, for example, restrain the desire for immediate profit. Spencer insists, however, that the 1 Cf. Hobbes (p. 129 and note 2). OH. VIII SPENCER 265 authority of a remote good is not unconditional; it would be absurd and suicidal to sacrifice the present to the future on every occasion, since the fruition of good is in the present, and is only postponed in order that it may be realised in another " present." The sense of duty or moral alligation is not an isolated representative feeling ; it is the idea attached to all representative feelings that possess the two elements of authority and coerciveness. The sense of compulsion proceeds from an anticipation of the natural consequences of transgression, and is increased by the associated ideas of legal penalties. Spencer holds that " the sense of duty or moral obligation is transitory, and will diminish as fast as moralisation increases." He means by this that, as evolution proceeds, morally good actions will tend to be per- formed spontaneously, through the immediate pleasure they give to the agent. (4) The " sociological view " of the evolution of conduct investigates the natural laws of right living for human societies. For any particular society or State, these laws are to be determined by the condition that the lives of each of its members may be " the greatest possible, alike in length and breadth." Spencer appears to assume that Nature aims at the preserva- tion of the type rather than of the individual, and that, therefore, " the life of the social organism must as an end rank above the lives of its units." On this account the individual is often required to sacrifice his welfare or life for the sake of the community, as, for example, in war with other communities. But here we are met with the difficulty that the ultimate end is the welfare of 266 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. n individuals, and that social communities only arise because on the average the individual profits by living with others. The type, moreover, exists only in individuals. Evolution solves this contradiction hy gradually removing the opposition between in- dividual and social good. This takes place in two ways : First, by the improvement in the mutual relations of different States, by which war will gradually die out; secondly, by improvement in the relations between members of the same State. The Limit of Social JEvolution. — The advantages of social life are shared by each member of the society concerned, and arise from co-operation. The essential requirements are absence of mutual aggres- sion and mutual fulfilment of contracts. But the " limit of evolution " is not reached until spontaneous and disinterested Benevolence is added to Justice. The natural source, both of Justice and Beneficence, is Sympathy, which, therefore, tends to increase through survival of the fittest races. This is only a special application of the general principle that the end imposed by Nature (life) and the ethical end approved by man (pleasure) must move towards harmony if the race is to survive. Spencer concludes that "pleasure will eventually accompany every mode of action demanded by social conditions." This ideal is the limit of social evolution. Egoism and Altruism. — Egoism is biologically prior to altruism, since, if there were no self-preserving impulses, altruism would be meaningless and all would lose their lives. But egoism is ethically, as well as biologically, prior to altruism, since the individual is the ultimate seat of happiness. Moreover, CH. VIII SPENCEE 267 the exercise of special faculties generally conduces to the happiness, not only of the agent, but of the society around him. " The pursuit of individual happiness within those limits prescribed by social conditions is the first requisite to the attainment of the greatest general happiness." A strong, healthy, and cheerful constitution is the most valuable bequest a parent can give to a child, and this is secured only by the parent taking care of his own health and happiness. Good health and good spirits tend to produce happiness in those around us, often more than directly altruistic actions. Again, the egoistic individual retains those powers and energies that make altruistic action possible. Moreover, unselfishness carried to extremes tends to increase selfishness, partly through the fact that it cannot be exercised without evoking the selfishness of the recipient ; and partly because un- selfishness as such tends to lower vitality, and in the long run, through natural selection, to diminish the number of the altruistic. Altruism, as well as egoism, is essential to the preservation of a species. The " spontaneous fission " by which the more elementary types multiply is a form of physical altruism. In general the life of the offspring is secured by sacrifice on the part of the parent. Self-sacrifice may take the form of instinct (as with birds), or it may be conscious or deliberate (as often with man). But in any case parental altruism, whatever its motive, is essential to the life of the race. Unduly egoistic and unduly altruistic individuals alike tend to disappear from the race. Parental altruism advances by degrees into social 268 A SHOET HISTORY OF ETHICS pt. ii altruism, the effects of which are best seen in the human race. Spencer shows, after the manner of Hobbes, that a universal recognition of the laws of Justice (abstinence from mutual aggression, and fulfilment of contract), and of honourable dealing, is an advantage to each member of the community, and that this fact provides an egoistic motive for pre- serving those laws intact. Further, the well-beings of different members of a community are closely interdependent ; physical strength and mental talents and skill, in individuals, tend to benefit aU the members of the social group ; the same is true of moral qualities like social truthfulness {e.g. in re- commending servants). There are therefore egoistic motives for looking after the physical health and the mental and moral education of other people. More- over unselfishness and sympathy reap more direct rewards, by creating mutual regard and prompting unstinted return of favours. Altruism, besides, often has an immediate egoistic value arising from the joys of sympathy and kindly action. The pleasures of Art depend to a large extent on the power of sympathising with joy and sorrow and other human feelings. On the whole an egoism that ignores the welfare of others defeats its own end, and would produce social dissolution,^ if it became universal, or grew beyond a certain limit. On the other hand, pure altruism is an untenable moral ideal, for it likewise defeats itself. We cannot gratify the pleasures of others unless they have egoistic pleasures. The pleasure of sympathy cannot exceed the direct pleasure of the person sympathised with ; ' Compare the discussion in this paragraph with Shaftesbury (p. 155). cu. viu SPENCEK 269 the pleasure of giving is inferior to, and dependent on, the pleasure of receiving the gift. The mere altruist feeds on the egoistic pleasures enjoyed directly by others. Compromise.- — The maxims, " Live for Self " and " Live for others," are both wrong. "What is required is a compromise between egoism and altruism. But a complete reconciliation cannot he secured ly an artificial attempt on the part of all to seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number} It must he left to the forces of natural evolution, which are constantly working towards a more and more perfect adaptation of egoistic to altruistic requirements, partly through the deepening of sympathy and partly through the adjustment of social conditions. Spencer's Theory of Justice. Justice in general is concerned with the causal relations that ought to subsist in a community between acts and their pleasant or painful consequences to the agent or others. Justice is an evolutional ideal tending necessarily towards realisation, and its form is to be determined by considering what laws in this sphere tend to increase the " length and breadth " of the life of the species. Spencer assumes that Nature's end is the preservation of the type, and of the individual only in so far as his preservation tends to ensure that of the type. " Suh - human " Justice. — Any living species, to survive, must conform to two laws. First, the helpless ^ Spencer, however, does not reject Utilitarianism. He insists that it is of little use as a practical guide owing to its indeflniteness and to its tendency to degenerate into mere Altruism. 270 A SHOET HISTORY OF ETHICS pt. n offspring must be preserved ; and here the rule is that " during immaturity benefits received must be inversely- proportional to capacities possessed." Secondly, after maturity, " benefit must vary directly as worth — worth being measured by fitness to the conditions of existence." If this law were violated the helpless young would not survive, and the species would disappear. The second law leads to the law of sub-human justice, which applies to all living species : " Each individual shall receive the benefits and the evils of its own nature and its consequent conduct." Spencer holds that this " law of relation between conduct and consequence '' is the chief condition that the principle of the " survival of the fittest " may operate, and is therefore " the primary law holding of all creatures." It works most freely with solitary animals, since amongst gregarious animals it is restricted by the condition that each individual is to be restrained from impeding the conduct by which others in like manner receive the benefits or evils of their own actions. Punishments arise from the need for preventing transgression ; a " rogue " elephant is banished from the herd ; the idle drones, when useless encumbrances, are killed by the other bees. A second modification of the primary law arises amongst gregarious animals by the occasional need for individuals to sacrifice or endanger their lives for the sake of the community, as in the protection of the females and young by the males among various animals. Human Justice. The Formula of Justice. — As human life is a development of sub-human life, so human justice is a development of sub-human justice, and its formula is essentially the same. In order cH. VIII SPENCEE 271 that the fittest may survive, " each individual ought to receive the benefits and the evils of his own nature and consequent condu'ct." As an actual law Justice becomes more pronounced among higher animals, and is most influential in the human race ; evolution tends to increase its efficacy, and to realise it in society. In order that Justice may operate generally, trans- gression must be prevented, and in this way is evolved the custom of inflicting punishments by the community as a whole. A modification arises from the fact that in human races the need for the sacrifice of individuals in defence of the species assumes large proportions. Spencer claims that such sacrifice is justified only in defensive war, and even this will ultimately die out, since it hinders human welfare. Since conduct is the expression of the individual will, the formula for Justice, containing both a positive and a negative element, may be expressed as follows: " Every man is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other." This is not to be taken as justifying retaliation ; its meaning, as interpreted by the condition that " the greatest sum of happiness is the remote end," is that " the sphere within which each may pursue happiness has a limit on the other side of which lie the similarly limited spheres of action of his neighbours." Development of the Sentiment of Justice and of the Idea of Justice. — The sentiment of Justice passes through three stages, the egoistic, the " pro-altruistic," ^ and the altruistic. (1) the egoistic sentiment of Justice is rooted in the universal love of freedom ^ A " pro-altruistic " sentiment apparently means a sentiment coming befme the genuine altruistic sentiment, or perhaps a substitute for the latter. 272 A SHORT HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. n possessed by all living things, the desire of each individual to retain control over his own natural powers. (2) the "pro-altruistic " sentiment is partly egoistic, and depends on fear. There is the fear of retaliation, of adverse public opinion. Again, when political authority is established for the good of the tribe, the warrior chief punishes mutual trespasses in order to prevent his tribe from being weakened by dissension. Finally the dead chief is deified, his commands are accepted as divine sanctions, and infringements are punished. (3) But it is mainly through the sympathy which develops in gregarious animals in proportion to their intelligence that the " altruistic sentiment of Justice " is able to evolve. Sympathetic Justice leads men to feel for the rights of others, and thus presupposes the existence of the egoistic sentiment of Justice, and, in addition, a developed imagination and a power of mental representation. Its full development is possible only in a permanently peaceful state. Finally, the Idea of Justice is a much later development, since it calls into play the highest powers of abstraction, whereas the sentiment is only evoked instinctively in particular cases. The Idea of Justice is the recognition of the universally binding force of the Formula. It is a generalisation of the altruistic sentiment of Justice. Error of Communism. — The communistic theory of Justice as equality, in the sense that every one is to receive an equal share of the results of human activity, is contrary to the formula of Justice. It violates the principle of the survival of the fittest, and is thus injurious to the race as a whole. Justice is equality only in the sense that equal opportunities OH. VIII SPENCEE 273 for action are to be given to all, and that each agent is to receive the benefits and evils of his own actions. But it is inequality in the sense that these benefits and evils vary, because the capacities of individuals vary. The Authority of the Formula of Justice. — Spencer holds that the formula of Justice, as regards its authority, is derived in the first place from a direct intuitive a priori belief It is the " principle of natural equity," and is equivalent to the Golden Kule, to Kant's Categorical Imperative,^ and to the Benthamite principle that all men have an equal right to happiness. But the law of Justice has also an a posteriori justification, based on the observation of the natural laws of life, since its operation is the condition of the maintenance of life in general, and, in particular, of social life. The belief in it is " but a conscious response to certain necessary relations in the order of nature." " No higher warrant can be imagined." The law of equal freedom is in fine an " ultimate ethical principle having an authority transcending every other." ^ Applications. — From the principle expressing the right to equal freedom Spencer deduces various practical corollaries relating to the Eight to Physical Integrity, to Property, etc., the Eights of Women, the Duties of the State, etc. He shows, for example, that the State is a machinery that has evolved naturally for enforcing the law of equal freedom by preventing aggression from without, and securing justice within the community. ' p. 194 sq. - Justice, vii. 35. Compare Sidgwick on the Axiom of Eational Benevol- ence, which is equivalent to Spencer's formula {p. 246). T 274 A SHOET HISTORY OF ETHICS pt. n Criticism of Spencerian Ethics. The Fittest to survive are not necessarily the Ethically Best. — The principle of the survival of the fittest is, when considered alone, a truism, and occupies in Biology the same position as the Law of Contradiction in Logic.^ It receives a concrete meaning only when it has been determined, by inference from experience, what general types of life tend to survive. The claws of a tiger, the swiftness of an antelope, the wings of a bird, the instincts which lead beavers to build their houses in a stream, and spiders to spin webs to catch flies, the higher intelligence of men — all these are " biologically good," because they help the survival of the types possessing themv But even if it could be proved — and Spencer has not proved it — that actions biologically good and actions ethically good coincide in the limit of evolution, the two conceptions are yet radically different. The biological view makes life per se the end, and prefers one type of life to another, only if it is more permanent ; thus the character or type of life has only a secondary value. Pigs and cows and corn are biologically as good as man, because they are likely to survive as long as the human race, unless, indeed, the " limit of evolution " for man is cannibalism, or starvation, or feeding on minerals. But for Ethics it is the character of life, not life per se that is good or bad. Life cannot be the ethical standard, for the worth of any type of life has to be judged by an ethical standard. Ethical Judgment is Free not Mechanical. — If " ethically good " has a meaning, it must be predicated 1 See footnote 2, p. 260. CH. VIII GEITICISM OF SPENCER 275 of some ideal type of life of which thinking beings approve and are able in some degree to realise through that approval. It may be said that Nature compels men to approve of certain types and actions, but this is meaningless if the approval is free and ultimate ; as, for example, in the case of pleasurable feeling, or in the case of the authority of the Law of Justice, which Spencer himself holds is given by direct intuition. The power of conscious ethical judgment may emerge in living creatures at a definite period of time, but, when it has appeared, it acquires a freedom to direct external Nature in some degree towards ends intrinsically desirable for conscious beings. That conscious choice actually produces effects at which it aims is a matter of experience, since, within a certain sphere of action, it is constantly followed by these effects, which (as, for instance, the building of a house) are never caused without the presence of conscious choice preconceiving the end,^ It is not easy to say how far the deliberate pursuit of ethical good can determine the course of social evolution ; but that it has some efficacy is undoubtedly true, and we may therefore conclude that it is of practical importance to determine the true character of ethical good. But this cannot be done if we adhere too closely to Natural- ism, which is not concerned with the true worth of ethical ideals, but only with their origin, and with their possible effects in prolonging or shortening the life of the human race. Confusion between Naturalism and Intuitionism. — Had Spencer admitted that conscious judgment of what is intrinsically good is either impossible or I Seep. 141. 276 A SHORT HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. n iaefficacious, he could not be open to the charge of inconsistency, and his work might be regarded as a purely naturalistic or descriptive theory of the origin of moral beliefs and instincts that operate mechanically towards the prolongation or destruction of life, but are not to be regarded as judgments about what is really good. But a prominent difficulty in estimating the ethical meaning of his work arises from his constant confusion between ethical considerations and descriptive biology, sociology, and anthropology ; or — to express it otherwise — a confusion between intui- tional and naturalistic methods in Ethics.' Preserva- tion of certain types of life is the only end that can be attributed to Nature ; what these types are can only be determined by observing what types have so far survived, and which are likely to continue. But, as we have seen, we cannot argue that the ethically best types are those most fit for physical life, if ethically good means that which is apprehended by consciousness as intrinsically desirable. Spencer, recognising to some extent the opposition between the natural " end " and the ethical idea, strives to overcome it by introducing two new conceptions. (1) "Breadth of life" is introduced as a connecting link between biology and Ethics, for it indicates a principle of natural selection other than that of mere fitness for organic life. By " breadth " Spencer refers to the variety of functions which a higher animal is capable of exercising ; and he assumes that " breadth " is favourable to the type by increasing the power of adaptation to unfavourable circumstances. This is exemplified by intelligence, and the corre- 1 See p. 122. CH. VIII CEITICISM OF SPENCER 277 spending complex nervous structure. But it would seem that prolific multiplication, rapid migration, minuteness (to avoid the notice of enemies), and an adaptable digestive structure, would afford a mechanism more suitable for the preservation of the type than the complex brain structure found in man and higher animals. Moreover, certain lower forms of life — such as edible animals and fruits — which man requires for Ms life, must survive as long as he (otherwise he would starve), and are therefore as good according to the biological meaning of good. The " breadth of life " that is ethically good — namely, a variety of interests and tastes and means to gratify them — is clearly not synonymous with the " breadth of life " which is biologically good, and it is conceivable that it might hinder the preservation of the type. (2) Spencer argues that the ethical good, which he identifies with immediate pleasure, will in the limit of evolution accompany every action tending towards the natural good, the preservation of the life of the type. But during the many generations that must be born and disappear before this elysian state is reached, before Love is an unerring right And Joy its own security, how is man to guide his actions if there happens to be opposition between pleasure-giving and type- preserving actions ? Is he to seek his own pleasure or to sacrifice it for the mere physical life of future races ? Spencer might reply, that a man should seek his own pleasure, and that the life of future races must be left to Nature. If his own pleasures happens to be biologically good, he will have the satisfaction 278 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. n of knowing that his type of character will survive. If his pleasures are biologically bad, he will die young, his type will be eliminated, and future races will reap the hedonistic benefit of his self-immolation. Hedonism and the Limit of Evolution. — Assuming for the moment that the ethically good is pleasure, can we infer that Nature, in the " limit of evolution " will necessarily realise general social happiness, by preserving only those whose pleasures are life- preserving ? Surely not. There are many powerful instincts and impulses quite different from the desire for pleasure,^ and Nature might secure her end by eliminating, not those who find pleasure in life- destroying actions, but those whose instincts and impulses are too weak to resist the allurements of pleasure towards actions possibly injurious. There might arise, then, by natural selection, a race of Stoics whose sense of duty would unconsciously lead them to race-preserving conduct, not yielding the maximum of pleasure even in " the limit of evolution." Experience further shows that only moderate pleasures are good for the health, and that excessive feelings of any kind are attended by injury to the individual and to the race, and this law seems likely to survive in the race. Nature points, therefore, to temperance, as being more biologically desirable than pleasure ; and if, as Spencer asserts, pleasure is the supreme ethical good, the con- tradiction between the natural and the human good is never completely removed. Can any one believe that the human race is moving towards a state in which excessive and indiscriminate indulgence in pleasure will be good, even in the biological sense of the term ? 1 Cf. p. 168. OH. vni CRITICISM OF SPENCER 279 In Spencer's treatment of Justice the futility of attempting to deduce strictly ethical principles from the biological law of survival is still more marked. It is a truism to say that types survive if the actions of their component individuals tend to preserve the type. Further, that each individual is to be affected more than other individuals by his own actions is a condition of his being an individual. Hence the formula of Justice, from the purely naturalistic stand- point, is nothing more than the statement that if the fittest individuals survive there must be individuals. But Spencer, as usual, confuses the naturalistic and the intuitional standpoints. The ethical formula of Justice is not a truism. The authority for it is ethical ; it is, as Spencer observes, an a priori intuition, not derived from any theory as to what will happen in the limit of evolution, or what is favourable to life. To sum up these criticisms : Spencer confounds the naturalistic or descriptive method of dealing with ethical questions with the analysis of the intuitional principles of Ethics, and he adopts the following intuitional principles without proving that they are consistent : (1) Ethical Hedonism, (2) Utilitarianism, which we have seen is inconsistent with Ethical Hedonism, (3) the formula of retributive Justice, and its consequence, that unfit races and individuals ought to be eliminated. C. Different Types of Evolution The idea of evolution has acquired in philosophy, science, and in the history of mankind, a position which it can never lose. So far as psychology, the 280 A SHOET HISTORY OF ETHICS pt. n history of moral customs, and social science are con- cerned, this is mainly due to the influence of Spencer. The so-called "genetic" method, now much used in studying these subjects, endeavours to understand things by tracing their past development. It was used by Hume in reference to ethical beliefs and the theory of knowledge, but its wider application to the race and to the whole of nature was made popular by Spencer. But evolutional philosophy in the proper sense aims at something more than merely tracing the stages of growth ; it may be described as history ruled by uniform ideas or principles. Evolution is synonymous with change, unless it can be shown to " evolve " some- thing definite, to converge towards an end, passing through a series of stages, each of which foreshadows the end better than the preceding stages. Evolutional theories differ, then, according to the principles they use, and the subjects with which they deal. The following is a list of the notable types that have become prominent since the middle of the nine- teenth century. (1) The "transcendental " or rational evolution taught by the Rational Idealists; (2) the evolution of different forms of life from a common stock (Lamarck and Darwin), and (3) of special types of society, and of customs and beliefs (Spencer) ; (4) the evolution of solar systems from nebulae — following the known laws of matter — was suggested by Kant and worked out by Laplace and modern astronomers in different forms ; (5) the hypothesis that matter, as we know it, has evolved from one fundamental substance^ — following laws of which very little is known — was revived after the discovery of radium, for 1 Strangely enough, Greek pUlosophy began with this theory. OH. viii TYPES OF EVOLUTION 281 it has been found that some " elements " formerly thought irreducible can be transmuted. Whatever may be the actual facts, it is certain that the only principle which can make evolution fully intelligible is the idea of good, or of a rational end ; no purely mechanical principle can explain any- thing but change. If there is intelligible evolution it must follow a rational idea, and in the end the good and the rational coincide. The system of T. H. Green lays stress on this truth, which was the guiding thought of Eational Idealism. The moral develop- ment of society, which is conceived by Spencer as mechanical, is interpreted by Green as spiritual. CHAPTEE IX english rational idealism Green The Ethics of Thomas Hill Green ^ aimed at giving a practical interpretation — suitable to individual needs — of German Eational Idealism. Unlike Fichte and Hegel, he uses no strict method, but agrees with both in regarding speculative and practical Eeason as inseparable. He had much sympathy with the philanthropic spirit of Utilitarianism, but he showed that this spirit is inconsistent with the groundwork of their philosophy. His Ethics is also inspired by opposition to the descriptive and historical method of morality used by Hume and Spencer. The descriptive method is open to the objection that it traces the development, in temporal order, of moral ideas in the individual or in the race, without exhibiting the true ground of moral obligation. Green holds that morality is in no sense a natural development of animal instincts or sympathy Metaphysics. — Green's Ethics is based on a sublime metaphysical theory of which only an outline is here 1 1836-1882, Professor at Oxford. The substance of Green's Philo- sophy is contained in Ms Prolegom&na to Ethics, from wlilcli the quotations in this chapter are taken. 282 CH. IX GREEN 283 given. Science presupposes that Nature is a complex of law -bound relations manifested in the forms of Time and Space. The existence of such an ordered unity implies the presence of one conscious Intelligence, transcending Time and Space, by Whom the spatially and temporally revealed unity of Nature is created, and for Whom it exists. Human knowledge, further, is inexplicable except on the assumption that the spirit of man is a reproduction of the eternal timeless Spirit ; for otherwise Nature, the object of Science, would be different for every person, and would not possess the unity and objectivity that is presupposed by Science. Objective morality has its root in the same ground ; only because man is conscious of himself as a being transcending the time-series is he able to have a conception of personal good, which is essentially a good of the permanent self; only because all persons are reproductions of the same Eternal Spirit is it possible for each individual to conceive the good of others as objectively good, while yet remaining a personal good. Thus Morality and Science are explained by the same principle, that all persons are reproductions of the one Divine Spirit, for Whom Nature exists. This repro- duction wherever it takes place is Eeason. Will, Reason, and Freedom of the Will. — Eeason enables man to conceive a future state of the self that is better than the actual, and Will is the self realising this conception. Thus Will and Eeason are intimately connected, but they do not completely coincide until the ideal is realised. Will is entirely distinct from animal want, for the latter is a form of physical or mechanical causality, whereas the former is the self-determination of a conscious being. 284 A SHORT HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. n The freedom of the Will consists in this self-deter- mination. The actions of the self, though free, are necessary, not as being the necessary physical results of the past, but because they really express the character independently of temporal events. The will, character, self, and person are morally equivalent.^ It is the power of self-determination that distinguishes man from the lower animals, who are moved by instincts and feelings only.^ Whatever, therefore, the evolutionists may prove as to the physical origin of life, they can never explain moral responsibility as a development of animal feelings. The Good Will — Criticism of the Hedonists and Kant. — An act of will is " one in which a self-conscious individual directs himself to the realisation of some idea, as to an object in which for the time he seeks self- satisfaction." The fundamental problem of Ethics is to find the distinction between the good and bad will. From the definition just given it follows that this distinction must depend on the nature of the objects willed. The Kantian theory,^ which derives the good- ness of an action from the motive and ignores the effect, cannot be accepted in its entirety, because a will is not completely good unless it realises its objects. The Hedonists, on the other hand, lay stress on the pleasurable effects, and regard the motive as of second- ary importance ; * but they are wrong, because the self-satisfaction which constitutes the good cannot be identified with pleasure. It is true that all satisfaction is attended by pleasure, but this pleasure is not always the object of desire, nor is it identical 1 Of. pp. 21, 22. ^ Cf. Kant on Autonomy and Free- Will (pp. 198, 199). 3 See pp. 133, 205. * See p. 236. CH. IX GREEN 285 with the satisfaction of desire. Even the voluptuary- seeks, not pleasure, but the supposed satisfaction of self by means of the attainment of ends that yield pleasure. The motive determining the will is always an idealised future state of the self, whether as feeling pleasure or as finding satisfaction otherwise. The generic conception of the good is that it satisfies desire, or, what is equivalent, that it gives satisfaction to some person. Moral Good. — The good, however, as above described, may be more apparent than real. The true or moral good alone is permanent and fully satisfying. The philosophy of Ethics has here to face the difficulty that we cannot completely know what the moral ideal is until it has been realised. We have to be satisfied with a partial knowledge of the good, of the direction in which the ideal is to be sought. This partial knowledge — which is practically sufficient — is to be derived from the past moral experience of the individual and the race. " Of a life of completed development, of activity with the end attained, we can only speak or think in negatives. . . Yet the conviction that there must be such a state of being . . . may have supreme influence over conduct, in moving us to that effort to the Better, which, at least as a conscious effort, implies the conviction of there being a Best.'' This ideal is for ever actualised in the Divine Con- sciousness, which transcends the limits of Time, and it is just because the soul of man is a reproduction of the Divine Spirit that he is able to conceive, however dimly, the truth of the ideal and to work towards its realisation. Character of the Moral Ideal. — Though we cannot 286 A SHORT HISTOEY OF ETHICS pt. n fully apprehend the ideal, we know something about it. The moral good must realise itself in persons, in beings conscious of themselves. It must also realise itself in society, since it is only through society that men become conscious of themselves as persons. The ideal is, then, a society of persons, in which each has reached his own highest satisfaction, and each identifies another's good with his own.^ The ideal is not a mere progress ad infinitum in time, since, as we have said, it is already timelessly realised for the Divine Consciousness. The formal character of the ideal can also be determined ; for the ideal, being an absolutely desir- able end, gives rise to a Categorical Imperative,^ a law enjoining the unconditional pursuit of that end. Particular duties cannot have the same unconditional force ; they are, however, at least those which the past experience of man has proved to be good. This experience gives rise to conventional morality, the precepts of which are binding, except in so far as increased experience shows that they are inconsistent with the further development of the moral ideal. Origin of the Ideal. — According to the naturalists social morality is either the product of a conscious adjustment of rival claims between self-seeking individuals (Hobbes)^ or, as the naturalistic evolu- tionists hold, an unconscious adjustment due to the elimination of immoral races and individuals, and the consequent growth of sympathy.* Green wholly rejects these explanations. Eeason, the consciousness 1 Cf. Kant's Kingdom of Snds (pp. 197, 198). 2 See Kant, p. 19i. '^ ■^. \%2 sq. * See Chap. VIII. , especially paragraph on The Limit of Social Evolu- tion (p. 266). CH. IX GEEEN 287 of ourselves and others as persons, is the only means by which the conception of a moral good is possible ; therefore there can be no gradual evolution of the fundamental essence of morality ; where Eeason exists morality is possible, and where Eeason does not exist there is no morality. Eeason enables us to form the conception of " an absolute and common good " which all can apprehend as such, because each person is the reproduction of the one Eternal Spirit. Development of the Ideal. — The history of morality then begins with the first appearance of Eeason, not with the first appearance of life. But, though the fundamental conception of a personal good has not gradually evolved, it has nevertheless passed through a development in two directions: (1) There has been an extension of the area of the common good, which, in the earlier history of humanity, was limited to the family or group to which the person belonged. Later, with the Greeks for example, the area of duty was extended to the nation, but excluded foreigners. Under the influence of the Stoic philosophy, the Eoman jurists, and Christian teaching, these limitations of race and nation were abolished; and a duty to humanity is now recognised. (2) A progressive de- termination of the content of the moral ideal has taken place. The " content " consists in the satisfaction of those permanent social interests that present themselves in ordinary life, not in the pursuit and enjoyment of mere pleasure. Even in primitive humanity the idea of a permanent good was the idea of a social good, for man can only think of himself as the subject of permanent satisfaction by " the identification of himself with others, in whose continued life he contemplates 288 A SHOKT HISTORY OF ETHICS pt. h himself as living.'' The element of self-sacrifice is present from the beginning, but is confined by the narrowness of the " content," which at first was identified with the gratification of animal wants ; afterwards, with the Greeks, intellectual and aesthetic pleasures took the chief place. Only now has morality reached the point where neither animal gratification nor artistic and intellectual pleasures are seen to be the highest good, but the devotion of self to the interests of humanity. And we have no right to assume, as the Utilitarians do, that the more developed state of the human soul is one in which a larger aggregate of pleasure is enjoyed than in the less perfect state. " The perfection of the human soul may in- volve the constant presence of a lower nature, con- sisting in certain tendencies, never indeed dominant, but in conflict with which alone the higher energies of man can emerge." This inspiring and eminently practical thought expresses very finely the attitude which every man must adopt who wishes to get the most out of life. Concluding Eemaeks A complete criticism of Green's philosophy is not here attempted. His metaphysical theory raises religious problems, and this is particularly true of his use of the Hegelian doctrine that there is one self-conscious Mind in society. I have given an account of his metaphysical theory, chiefly because he regarded speculative and practical Eeason as inseparable. With the help of the German Eational Idealists he has reached the point where the opposition between social and private CH. IX CONCLUSION 289 good disappears, at least for abstract philosophy. Aristotle really took the correct view in teaching — at least indirectly — that personal well-being is the pursuit and attainment of objective good, and, consequently, that it includes the performance of our social duties. We must recognise, however, that all the difficulties of the problem were not considered by Aristotle. Those difficulties were emphasised by Christianity, which taught that each person is of infinite worth. Thus the actual disorders of society, which were, and are, due to the prevalence of Exclusive Egoism, are the source of the practical contradiction which was the stimulus to modern Ethics. If each person is of infinite worth he is entirely justified in pursuing his own good ; and, for the same reason, he should sacrifice himself for the good of others, since they likewise are of infinite worth. The conclusion we have reached, by a critical study of the history of Ethics, is this : Either the performance of duty gives the highest satisfaction to a rational being who really thinks about the matter, or the problem is insoluble for him. Philosophy cannot go any further than this. As soon as a man has discovered his true position in society, and has become conscious that society is a complex of thinking, willing, and feeling souls, who, like himself, are able to endure pain as well as to enjoy pleasures, the contradiction disappears. But so long as complete good is identified with pleasurable feeling there is a permanent contradiction.^ The ideal good, so far as it can be conceived as a whole, is a harmony to which each individual contributes his part, not by sacrificing his individuality, but by asserting it, ' See pp. 255, 256. U 290 A SHOET HISTOKY OF ETHICS pt. u subject to these instinctive moral judgments which, as Butler taught, form a part of his true nature. This harmony is the Platonic Idea of Justice, which combines the principles of " Temperance " with that of " Courage " or " Individuality." ^ And the same thought is expressed in Mr. F. H. Bradley's doctrine of " self - realisation," ^ which is an individualistic interpretation of Hegelian Ethics. The philanthropic disposition of Green led him to regard " self-devotion " to the interests of humanity as the highest of all virtues. This doctrine expresses the full truth only if self-devotion is identified with "self-realisation," not with "self-abnegation." The self to be " realised " is fundamentally a social self, but that it is likewise a subject of private interests is an important truth kept alive by Hedonism in spite of its defects. Self-abnegation derives its value mainly from the spontaneous interests which it helps others to gratify, interests always containing some emotional or intellectual elements not having a reference to the interests of other persons.^ If the content of the good were merely the consciousness that it is shared by others, it would really have no content. This is quite consistent with the truth that sympathy and other social relations increase the number and value of private interests. Hence arises naturally the problem of Applied Ethics, How are the special interests of individuals to be regulated with a view to securing the good of the whole ? Applied Ethics. — In the preceding pages we have dealt chiefly with pure Ethics, which differs from I See pp. 45, 46. '' Ethical Studies (1876). ' See Spencer on Egoism and Altruism, pp. 266, 267. cu. IX CONCLUSION 291 applied in being more general and seeking for funda- mental, principles. But it is not always possible to draw a sharp line between them. Pure Ethics inevitably leads to applied, since taken alone it is too abstract to fulfil any practical end. Applied Ethics deals with more concrete subjects, the Family, the State, and special economic social and legal questions ; these again require special knowledge, and thus it happens that applied Ethics cannot altogether be regarded as a distinct science; it is rather the intelligent application of Science, Art, and the other results of human experience in accordance with the spirit of the ethical ideal that is adopted. Very few general ethical principles can be used with precision in actual life, because they cannot take into account all the particular circumstances which may arise ; consequently there is often uncertainty about the answers to moral problems until we come to particular cases. Hence the individual has to use his own judgment, to construct his own system of applied Ethics ; and here conscientiousness, the permanent will to act in the spirit of the objective ideal in which he believes, is indispensable, though it may mislead, unless guided by reflecting intelligence. And some " moral sense," or an intuitive practical insight, is essential, though, as we have seen, it cannot be regarded as infallible. The practical use of pure ethical theory, and of the study of its history, is to correct moral insight by arousing reflection, which is one of the stepping-stones by which man can rise to higher things. INDEX The numbers refer to the pages. Principal references are Tuarked Absolute {see also Good, absolute) : Schelling on, 214, 216 Idea, Hegel on, 216 Mind, Hegel on, 227 Absolutism, political, 136, 142 Affections : Shaftesbury's division, 155 Butler on, 168, 170 Altruism (see also Social Ethics, etc. ; Good, individual and social ; Benevolence) : and Egoism, Sidgvviok on, 248, 249 Speucer on, 266 sqq. Apathy, Stoic, 100 Aristotle, 64 sqq* relation to predecessors, 41, 42 influence of, etc., 115, 118, 120, 126, 145,167,175,258,289 on Well -Being and Virtue, 68, 175, 206 Art {see also Beauty) : Schelling on, 214 Hegel on, 227 Spencer on, 268 Associationists' theory of Virtue, 240 (of. 182) Atomism : Epicurean, 86 of external Nature, Hegel on, 217 Augustine, 114 Authority : of Reason or Conscience Aristotle, 67, 68 Butler, 167, 169 the Intuitionists, 122, 159 Authority ; of motives, Spencer on, 264 of Formula of Justice, Spencer on, 273 Autonomy {see also Self-Determina- tion. Free-will, Freedom) : defined, 167 note in Butler's ethics, 167 Kant on, 197 sqq.* Fichte on, 212 in Hegel's ethics, 225 Axioms, ethical ; Clarke, 150, 151 Sidgwick, 244-246 Bacon, Francis, 125, 126, 127, 178, 180, 234 Bad {see Good) Beatitudo, 143, 145 Beauty, 53, 55, 62, 83 and note sense of, compared with moral sense, 153, 154. 157, 181 Benevolence {see also Altruism) : Hobbes on, 132 Clarke on, 150 Shaftesbury ou, 155 Hutcheson on, 158 Butler on, 169 Kant on, 195, 197 Rational, Sidgwick's axiom of, 246 Bentham, Jeremy, 235 sqq.* criticised, 237, 240 sqq. Biological view of evolution of conduct : Spencer on, 263 Biological view of good criticised, 274 293 294 A SHOET HISTOEY OF ETHICS Bradley, F. H.,233, 290 Butler, 159, 162, 163 sqq.*, 243, 257 criticism of, 172 sqq. relation to Kant, 192, 193 Cardinal Virtues, Plato on, 44 sqq. Character, 21, 22 Charity, 19 and note, 20, 21 Christianity, 108, 110, 113-115, 117, 174, 221, 287, 289 Chrysippus, 93 Clarke, 149 sqq.*, 191 influence on Sidgwick, 243, 246, Classification of modern systems, 119 sqq., 123, 124, 229-233 Cleanthes, 93 Common-sense morality, Sidgwick on, 243, 244, 247 Communism, Spencer on, 272 Compassion [see also Pity), Butler on, 170 Comte, 115, 230 sq.*, 257 on development, 231, 258 Conduct, 1, 12 as deliberate action, implies knowledge, 15 Spencer on, 261 sqq. on evolution of, 263 Conscience [see also Obligation, Ought), 159, 161 Butler on, 165-170*, 172, 173 Conscientiousness, 14 note, 291 Consciousness, Hegel on, 218 Contradiction, apparent, in idea of objective good, 289 Cosmopolitanism, 38 and note, 102, 104, 108 Courage (see Fortitude) Cudworth, 121, 124, 148 sqq.*, 191 Custom, a source of moral judg- ments, 181 sqq. Cynics, 36, 37 sqq.*, 41, 62, 66, 78, 106, 120 Cyrenaics, 36, 39*, 41, 62, 78, 106, 121 Darwin, Charles, 259 sqq. Deductive science, 126 Descartes, 125 Descriptive method, 122, 276 Desire : relation to Good, 6, 203 Aristotle on, 65-68 Plato on, 46 Epicurus on, 87, 90, 91 Stoics on, 96 Hobbes on, 129, 131 Kant on, 193 note, 202, 203 Hegel on, 219, 220 Development [see also Evolution, Social Evolution), 231, 258 ethical, Hegel on, 222 ethical. Green on, 287 Dialectic, Plato on, 52, 56, 82 method, Hegel's, 215 sqq. Divine Spirit, Green's doctrine con- cerning, 283, 285, 287 Dogmatic Intuitionism, Sidgwick on, 243, 244 Duties, particular : Kant on, 202 Green on, 286 perceptional theory of, 243 remarks on, 291 Duty [see also Conscience, Obliga- tion), 11, 118, 121, 122 Hobbes on, 134 a motive distinct from pleasure, 188, 189, 193 sqq. Kant on, 193 sqq. and Well-Being, 204, 206, 228, 229 Education, a source of moral judgments, 182 of Rulers, Plato on, 50-52 Effect (see Motive) Ego (see also Self) : Hobbes on, 128, 131 note, 140, 142 Hume on, 178, criticised, 187 Fiohte on, 212 Egoism (see also Self-Love), 34 exclusive, 26, 34, 41, 132, 156, 289 [see also Hobbes) ; criti- cism of, 137 sqq., 213 Hobbes on, 130 sqq. Kant on, 198 Fichte on, 213 Hegel on, 219, 224 INDEX 295 Egoism : Utilitarian difficulty concerning, 248, 249, 256, 256 inverted, 255 and Altruism {see also Benevol- ence), Spencer on, 206 sqq. Emotion, 46, 67, 68, 98 sqq. Empiricism, 148, 180 End of absolute worth, Kant on, 196 Ends, 3 kingdom of, 197 Epiotetus, 93 Epicurus, 85 sqq.*, 109, 115, 116, 121 criticism of, 90 Equality : Sidgwioli's axiom of, 245 and Justice, Spencer on, 272, 273 Equity : Clarke's rule of, 150, 151 Spencer's principle of natural, 273 Erigena, 114 Ethics : general description of, 1, 6 Sidgwiok'a description of 242 individual and social, 6 pure and applied, 6, 117, 291 Spencer on, 261 sqq. Evil {see also Good), Plato on, 58, 59, 63 Spinoza on, 144 Hegel on, 224, 227, 228 Evolution {see also Naturalism, evolutional) : general meaning, 258, 259 Spencer's use of, 261 different types of, 279 sqq. naturalistic, 257 sqq.* Existence of God : Oidworth on, 149 note Kant on, 200, 201 Feeling {see also Emotion, Moral sense. Pleasure) : Hume on, 178, 180 Kant on, 198, 199 {see Inclina- tion) relation to good, reason, and moral law, 203 and note. 209 Feeling : Comte on social, 231 Sidgwick on, 246 difficulty of separating from other mental elements, 251 relation to function, Spencer on, 263 sqq. Felicity, Hobbes on, 130 Fichte, 211 sqq.*, 257 connection with Kant, 207 note, 211,212 connection with Hegel, 215, 216 Formalism, 38, 110, 203 sqq. Fortitude (or Courage) : Plato on, 44 sqq., 199 note, 290 Aristotle on, 74 Epicurus on, 88 Stoics on, 98 Free- Will (see also Nature, external ; Necessity and Freedom) : elementary, 11 Aristotle on, 72, 73 Epicurus on, 87, 89 opposite views on, 121, 122 Kant on, 192 note, 199 sqq., 201 Freedom (see also Free-Will) : Socrates on, 36 Stoics on, 100 Spinoza on, 145 two meanings of, 145, 146 Fichte on, 212 of knowing mind, 212 Hegel on Freedom of Mind, 217 sqq., 221 Hegel on Freedom of Will, 220 Hegel on unity of Freedom and Necessity, 225 Spencer on Freedom of Indi- vidual, 271 Friendship, 39, 76, 89, 102, 132 Future life, Butler on, 171, 172 Genetic Method, 189 sq.. 280 Golden Rule, 239, 246, 273 Good : general sense of term, 6-9 ; a form of conscious life, 25, 32, 159, 246, 250, 276 ; Aristotle's definition, 65; Hcbbes', 129, 136; Hegel, 223, 224; Kant 296 A SHOKT HISTOEY OF ETHICS on relation to moral law, 202 ; Kant criticised, 203, 208 ; Utilitarians, 237, 246, 250 ; Spencer, 262 ; Green, 285. absolute (see also Ideal), 14 Plato, 55 ; Aristotle, 66 ; Hobbes, 130; Green, 287 immediate, remote and moral, 6-9; Spencer, 264 moral, 9, 209 Green, 285 and Knowledge, 15 sqq. various theories concerning, 37, 39, 42, 70, 78-79, 82- 83, 85, 93, 118, 127, 144, 149, 212, 214 objective and subjective, 24, 25, 32, 33 and Useful, 22 individual and social {see also, Altruism, Egoism), 25, 26, 41, 42, 116, 118, 119 Plato, 47, 82, 83, 108 ; Aris- totle, 65, 77, 82, 83, 108 ; Shaftesbury, 155 ; Hutche- son, 158 ; Butler, 164 sqq. ; Fichte, 213 ; Hegel, 226 ; Comte, 231 ; Spencer, 266 ; Green, 286 sqq. ; concluding remarks on, 289, 290 individual, Plato on, 59 sqq. Gorgias, 33, 35, 105 Government, Civil, Hobbes on, 135, 138 Greek Ethics : Pt. I. survey of, 105 sqq. influence on modern, 115 sqq., 174 Green on, 287, 288 Green, T. H., 14, 282 sqq.* relation to predecessors, 210, 233, 256, 281 Habit, 69, 71 Happiness : distinct from Pleasure and Well- Being, 23 and Virtue {see also Self- Love), Shaftesbury, 153-156 ; But- ler, 164 ; Kant, 200 sqq. Happiness : Kant on, 193 and tiote Hegel on, 220 Utilitarians on, 234 sqq. Harmonious Life, 61. 70, 72 note, 107, 109, 168, 289 sqq. Hedonism {see also Pleasure) : defined, 24 note, 38 psychological, 87, 168 note, 188 used as basis of Utilitarianism, 185, 236, 237 same use criticised, 241 sq. ethical, 87, 92, 246 Plato's criticism of, 60 criticised, 250 sqq. egoistic, 90 sqq., 242 universalistic, 234, 242 opposed to moral purism, 193 sqq., 206 note evolutional naturalists on, 262 ; criticised, 278 criticised by Green, 284 source of contradiction in Ethics, 289 merit of, 290 Hegel {see also Idealism, Rational), 215 sqq.*, 257 method, 215 relation to Fichte and Sohelling, 215, 216 compared and contrasted with Comte, 231, 258 Heredity, 260 Heteronomy, Kant on, 198 Hobbes, 115, 116, 125, 126 sqq.^ criticism of his ethics, 137 sqq. inconsistencies in his philosophy, 110 influence of, and criticisms of, 144, 147, 148, 152, 156, 161, 165, 168, 173, 177, 178, 179, 198, 202, 213, 236, 257 compared and contrasted with Hume, 184 contrasted with Kant, 207 and note his starting-point different from that of evolutional natural- ists, 258 Hume, 119, 157, 161, 177 sqq.* INDEX 297 Hvime : criticised, 185 sqq. relation to Kant, 192 Hutcheson, 156 sqq.*, 234, 243 Idea of Justice : Plato's (see Justice) Spencer's, 271, 272 Ideal and Actual, 57 Ideal Life, 47, 61, 79 sqq. Green on, 285 sqq. Ideal State, 47 sqq. Idealism, 14 rational, 123, 211 sqq.*, 227, 282 sqq.* distinct from Naturalism and Intuitionism, 229 Ideals and scientific conceptions, 53 Ideas, Plato's theory of, 52 sqq. Immortality, 63, 81 Kant on, 192 note, 201 Immutable morality : Hobbes, 134, 135 Cudwortb and Clarke, 148 sqq. Impartiality, principle of, 151, 208, 236, 245, 246 a difficulty for Utilitarians, 253 Imperative : Kant's categorical, 19i sqq. interpreted, 195 note Sidgwick on, 2-16 Spencer on, 273 Green on, 286 Impressionism, 178 criticised, 185 sqq. Inclination, contrasted with duty by Kant, 193 sqq. Individual Good (see Good) Individualism, 34 and note, 139, 176 Individuality, Ficbte on, 212 Inductive method, 66, 163 Industry, 20 Intellectualism, 42, 82, 109 Intelligence and Will, Hegel on, 219-221, 221 note Intention, 13 Hegel on, 223 Bentham on, 236 Interests, 3 and note, 6, 290 Green on, 287, 288 iDtuition, 72, 202 the clearest moral, Sidgwick on, 249 Intuitionism : and Naturalism, defined, 119 sqq. and Rational Idealism, 229 rational, 148 sqq.* relation to Kant, 191 aesthetic, 152 sqq.* opposed by Kant, 192, 198 sympathetic, 160 sqq.* opposed by Kant, 192, 198 autonomic, 163 sqq.* Kant combines two forma, 192 Sidgwick's use of term, 242 sqq. Intuitive element in judgments about good, 159, 291 Intuitively known ethical principles (see also Axioms) : Spencer, 273 Judgments ; ethical, 9, 158, 159, 166 are free, not mechanical, 274, 275 Justice, 8, 121 mercy, and charity, 19 note Plato on, 43 sqq.*, 121 Plato's justice the true social ideal, 290 Aristotle on, 75 Epicurus on, 89, 121 Stoics on, 98, 101-102 Hobbes on, 134 Hume on, 183, 184 Sidgwick on popular theories of, 244 Sidgwick's axiom of, 245 contract theory of, 89, 134, 184 Spencer on, 269 sqq. criticised, 279 formula of, Spencer's, 271, 273 Kant, 191 sqq.*, 12, 243 relation to English predecessors, 191, 192 criticised, 202 sqq. influence of, etc., 207 sqq., 211, 246, 250, 257 criticised by Hegel, 224 and note criticised by Green, 284 298 A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS Knowledge (see also Science) : and Good {see Good) and Virtue (see Virtue) theory of, Epicurus', 86 theory of, Stoic, 94 Law {see Nature ; Moral law ; Eight, legal) Laws, Plato's, 62 Life: Spencer on, 261 sqji. criticised, 274 Locke, 150 rwte, 157 note, 178, 180, 181, 185 note, 186 Logic {see also Knowledge, theory of ; Dialectic) : Hobhes', 126 Hegel's, 216 Love and Self-Love, 76, 77 Marcus Aurelius, 93 Materialism, 86, 94, 127, 128 criticism of, 140, 141 Mean : Aristotle's doctrine of, 70 sqq^. compared with Plato's theory, 72 note Mercy, 19 note Merit, Hobbcs on, 134 Metaphysics (see ajso Philosophy), 3; Green's, 282 Method, ethical : Aristotle's, 66 Plato's (in the Repiiblic), 43 naturalistic or descriptive, 122, 282 Clarke's deductive, 150 Butler's inductive, 163 Hume's inductive, 178 genetic, 189, 190, 280 Kant's, 193 Hegel's dialectic, 215 Mill's, 237 Sidgwick on, 242 sqq. Sidgwick's axiomatic method, 244, 245 Sidgwick's, in proving Utilitari- anism, 246 evolutional, 259 Spencer's, 261, 263, 274, 276, 279 Method, ethical : Spencer's, in analysing Justice, 269, 274, 279 Mill, J. S., 180, 237 sqq* criticised, 240 sqq. Mind, Hegel's Philosophy of, 217 sqq. Modern Ethics, Pt. II. Moral approval and disapproval [see also Conscience) ; Hume's theory of, 181 sqq. Moral Law, Kant on, 194 sqq., 202 Moral nature of man, Butler on, 166 Moral sense,. 153. 154, 156 sqq. criticism of, 158-160, 291 Hume on, 180, 181 Kant on, 198 Bentham on, 235 Morality : positive, 2-3, 37 Hegel on, 228 Mill on, 239 Sidgwick on, 248 ideal, 2 Hegel on, 223, 224 Motive, 12, 71 and note 3 prominent in modern Ethics, 118 and effects, Kant on, 193 sqq. ; criticised, 204 sqq. Bentham on, 236 Green on, 284 Natural equality, Hobbes on, 132, 134 Naturalism : and intuitionism, 119 sqq., 177, 229, 275 sqq. evolutional, 116, 117, 123, 257 sqq.* relation to Kant, 210 and rational idealism, 229, 232 (3) egoistic, 126 sqq. rationalistic, 143 sqq. sympathetic, 177 sqq. defect in naturalistic methods, 188 sqq. Nature {see also Nature, external) ; Stoics on, 95, 90, 120 INDEX 299 Nature : Butler on human, 120, 166 sqq* various meanings of, 120, 166 Hobbes' Laws of, 133 sqq. Hume's Laws of, 184 Spencer on, 261, 264, 265 Nature, external : and freedom : Kant on, 199 sqq. ; criticised, 207 Fichte on, 212, 213 Sohelling on, 214 Hegel on, 217 Green on, 283 relation to Mind, 217, 230, 231 283 Necessity and freedom : Kant on, 200 Schelling, 214 Hegel, 225 Green, 284 Neo-Platonists, 113 Objective {sm also Good, Right) : Mind, Hegel on, 221 sqq., 227 Obligation, moral {see also Duty, Conscience), 11, 118, 121, . 241 Hobbes on, 134 Intuitionists on, 146 Butler on, 164, 167 Hume on, 183 ; criticised, 189 natural obligation to Justice, 184 Kant on, 193 sqq. Bentham on, 235 Spencer on, 264, 265 Optimism, 209 hedonistic, 232, 262, 263 Spencer on, 262 Origin of moral beliefs or truths, 3 different theories of, in Modern Ethics, 119-124, 286 Green on, 286, 287 Ought (see also Obligation) implies free-will (Kant), 199 implies contingency (Hegel), 224 Pain, 37, 232 (see also Pleasure) Paley, 234 Panaetius, 93 Pantheism, 95 Passion (see ato Affections, Feeling), Hume on, 178, sqq. Patristic, 114 Peace, Hobbes' Articles of, 133 Person, 21, 22 Personal meaning of good (see also Good, individual ; Indi- vidualism), 32, 34, 283, 286, 289 sqq. Pessimism : Schopenhauer, 209, 231, 232 Spencer on, 262 Phaedo, 63 PhUebus, 42, 59 sqq.* Philo, 113 Philosophic Intuitionism, Sidgwiok on, 243, 245 sqq. Philosophy • Plato on, 49 Hobbes on, 126, 127 Kant on ethical, 193 Schelling on, 214 Hegel's division of, 216, 217 Physical view of evolution of Con- duct, Spencer's, 263 Physics : Epicurean, 86 Stoic, 94 and note Pity (see also Compassion), Hobbes' definition of, 132 Plato, 41 sqq.*, 14, 15, 66, 120 compared with Aristotle, 82-84, 107 contrasted with other Greek systems, 103, 104, 109, 110 influence of, etc., 113, 114, 121, 145, 148, 153, 156, 167, 174, 227, 290 on Ethical Hedonism, 60, 253, Pleasure (see also Hedonism), 24 and Tiotes Cynics on, 37 Cyrenaios on, 39, 40 Plato on, 59 sqq. Aristotle on, 77, 78, 81, 103 Epicurus on, 87 sqq. Stoics on, 99 Hobbes on, 129 and note 300 A SHOET HISTORY OF ETHICS Pleasure : Hume ou, 178, 181, 185 Kant on, 193 and note, 198 Beutham on, 235 Mill on, 237 sqq. ambiguity in meaning of, 239, 251 difficulty of separating from other mental elements, 251 Spencer on, 262, 263, 264, 266 criticised, 277, 278 Plotinus, 113 Porphyry, 113 Posidonius, 93 Positive Morality {see Morality) Positivism, 230, 231 Postulates of Morality, Kant's, 192, 200 sqq. Power, desire for (Hobhes), 130 sqq. Problems, general, 27 Proclus, lis Protagoras, 31 sqq.*, 35, 41, 105 dictum of, 31, 62 Providence, 62, 95, 226 Prudence (practical insight, some- times called practical wis- dom), 36, 37, 39, 49, 78, 79, 88, 98 Psychological divisions : Plato's, 46 Aristotle's, 67 Hobbes', 128 Hume's, 178 Sidgwick's, 246 criticism of, 251 Stout's, 246 note 2 Spencer's, 264 Psychological view of evolution of conduct, Spencer's, 264 Public affections, 165 Punishment, 223, 236, 237, 270, 271 Purism, moral {see also Kant), 174 note, 191 sqq.* ; defeats itself, 205 Quality and quantity of pleasures, 238, 239 Quantification of happiness, 253, 254 Realism and Idealism, 14, 84 in another sense, 218 Reason {see also Idealism, Rational) : Plato on, 54, 62, 63 Aristotle on, 67, 70, 77, 80-81 Stoics on, 96 sqq., 103, 109 Cudworth and Clarke on, 148 sqq. Practical and speculative, 149, 152, 187 ; Kant on, 192 and note ; united by Fichte, 212 ; united by Schelling, 214 ; Hegel on {see Intelligence) Hutcheson on, 157 Butler on, 169 Hume on, 178 sqq.; criticised, 185 sqq. opposite views on, 180 concrete and abstract, 185, sqq. Kant on, 192 and note as regulative principle, 46, 67, 169, 209 Hegel on, 216, 219 ,Green on, 283, 287 Relativity, principle of, 32, 33 Religion, 114, 158, 171, 227 Republic, 42, 43, sqq.*, 167 Resentment, Butler on, 171 Resignation, 98 Responsibility ; Aristotle on, 73 Spinoza on, 144, 145 Butler on, 176 Right, 9 objectively and subjectively, 10 Right, legal, Hegel on, 222, 223 Rulers, Plato's ideal, 48-52 Rules of Righteousness, Clarke's 150, 151 Sacrifice of individuals, Spencer on, 265, 271 Sanctions of Utilitarianism, 237, 238 Scale, ethical, 14 Schelling, 211, 213 sqq.-", 215, 216 Scholastic philosophy, 114 Schopenhauer, 231 relation to Kant, etc., 209 relation to Fichte, 231 INDEX 301 Science (see also Knowledge) : ethical value of, 17, 231 the highest, 65 of morals, 1 note, 178 Selection, natural, 260 Self, 21, 22 double meaning of, 39, 77 Hohbes on, 128, 140, 142 Smith's two selves, 160, 161 the true self, 77, 162, 167, 187, 198, 203 Hume on, 178 criticised, 187 Green on, 283, 285, 287 Self-consciousness, 211, 212, 215 Hegel on, 218, 219 Self-control, 38, 39, 98 involves Reason, 186, 187 Self-devotion : Green on, 288 correct view of, 290 Self-determination {see also Auto- nomy) : Aristotle on, 73 Green on, 283, 284 Self-Love {see also Egoism) : Aristotle on, 76, 77 Aesthetic intuitionists on, 153, 158 Butler on, 165, 169, 172 Kant on, 195 sqq. Rational, Sidgwick's axiom of, 245 and Virtue, If disjoined cannot be reunited, 256 Self-preservation {see also Self- Love) : Stoics on, 95 Hobbeson, 129, 131 Self-realisation, 290 Self-sacriiice, 290 Mill on, 239 Seneca, 89, 93 Sense, Sensation (for Moral Sense see Moral) : Epicurus on, 86 Plato on, 54, 55 Hobbes on, 128 Cudworth on, 148 Hume on, 178 Spencer on, 264 Sentiment of Justice, Spencer on, 271, 272 Shaftesbury, 153 sqg.*, 164, 173, 234, 257 Sidgwick, 242 sqq* Smith, Adam, 160 sqq. Social Ethics, Hegel on, 224, 225 Social Evolution, limit of, Spencer on, 266 Social good {see Good) Social nature of man ; Butler on, 164 sqq. Evolutional naturalists on, 258 Society and Individual {see also Good, individual and social ; Altruism) : Spencer on, 265, 271 Sociological view of evolution of conduct, Spencer on, 265 Socrates, 15, 3i sqq.*, 79, 105, 118, 120 Sophists, 32-34 Soul: Aristotle on, 67 and note Hegel on, 218 Speculative (see also Reason, Practical and Speculative) : wisdom, 42 knowledge, explained by morality for Fichte, 212, 213 knowledge, the explanation of morality for Schelling, 214 Spencer, Herbert, 115, 232, 261 sqq.* criticised, 274 sqq. Spinoza, 121, 125, 143 sqq.^, 229 compared with Greeks, 144-147 Standard, ethical, 18 State : Plato on, 43 sqq. Aristotle on, 65 Hobbes on, 135, 136 Hegel on, 226 Spencer on, 273 Stoics, 93 sqq.*, 89, 109, 115, 120, 144, 166, 174, 287 criticism of, 103, 109, 110 relation to Spinoza, 144 to Kant, 202 Stout, 246 note Struggle for existence, 260 302 A SHORT HISTOEY OF ETHICS Subjective {see also Good, Right) : Mind, Hegel on, 218, 227 Subjectivity : principle of, 32 Hegel on, 224 Substance, the ethical (Hegel), 225 Suicide, Kant on, 195, 197 Summuvi Bonum, Kant on, 201, 203 Supremum Bonum, Kant on, 200 Survival of the fittest, 259, 260 and notes, 270, 272 ethical use of the principle, criti- cised, 274, 279 Sympathy : as source of moral judgments : Smith, 160 Hume, 181, 183 Bentham's criticism, 235 Green's criticism, 286 in evolution of Justice, Spencer, 272 Synthetic philosophies, 65 Tautology in ethical maxims, Sidg- wick on, 245 Temperance : Plato on, 44 sqq. Aristotle on, 72, 73 sqq. Epicurus on, 88 Stoics on, 98, 99 Theism, 94 Theological principles, used by Hutcheson and Butler, 158, 163 note, 173, 175 Theoria, 80, 81 and note, 82, 107, 108, 115 Theory, ethical, practical use of, 291 Thomas Aquinas, 114, 115 Thrasymachus, 34, 43 Truth, 49, 56, 80, 81 note, 151 Universality of moral law ; recognised by rational intuition- ists, 151 Kant on, 194 sqq. correct meaning of, 208 Utilitarianism, 124, 127, 234 sqq.* Shaftesbury, 154 and note, 234 Utilitarianism : Hutcheson, 158, 234 Hume, 185, 189, 234 relation to Kant, 209 egoistic (Bentham, J.), 235 sympathetic (Mill, J. S. ), 237 intuitional (Sidgwick), 242 general criticism of, 249 sqq., esp. 255 Spencer on, 269 and note, 271 Green on, 282, 284, 288 Utility {see also Utilitarianism) : and Goodness, 22, 23 public, as standard, 185, 235' Veracity : Kant on, 193, 205 Utilitarians on, 239, 248 Virtue, Virtues, 9 sqq. moral and special, 17 sqq. cardinal, 44 sqq., 96 and Imowledge, 15, 35, 37, 39, 49, 78-79, 98, 106 Aristotle on, 68 sqq. Epicurus on, 88, 89 Stoics on, 96 sqq. unity of, 35, 106 Hobbes' definition, 131 Hume on 180, 181 ; his division of virtues, 182 Kant on, 200, 201 Utilitarians on, 236, 240, 247, etc. popular conceptions of, incon- sistent, 244 and Happiness {see Happiness) Voluntarism, pessimistic, 209, 231 Voluntary action {see also Free- wm): Aristotle on, 72, 73 Hobbes on, 129 Well-being, 23, 24, 36, 37, 39, 47, 61, 66-68, 87, 95, 106, 143, 145 distinct from Happiness, 23 sqq. wrongly separated from Duty, 204, 206 Westermarck, 190 note INDEX 30J "Will {see also Free-Will), 21, 22 prominent in Stoic theory, 103, 109 Hobbes on, 130 not the source of moral distinc- tions, 148 the good, Kant on, 193 sqq. Green on, 284 Fichte on, 212 Hegel on, 220 Schopenhauer on, 231 Will and Beason, Green on, 283 Will, Universal and Individual : Hegel on, 222, 224, 225 Green on, cf. 283 Wisdom, 37, 39 Plato on, 44 sqq., 49 practical {see Prudence) Wise man. Stoic, 101 Wrong, 9 Zeno, 93 THE END Printedhy R. & R. Clark, Limited, Edinburgh.