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Cornell University Library 
 BF 133.W96 1896a 
 
 Outlines of Psy*^'^'''"^)?,',,,,,,!!!! 
 3 1924 014 474 534 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tiiis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924014474534 
 
OUTLINES 
 
 OF 
 
 PSYCHOL O GY 
 
 BY 
 
 WILHELM WUNDT 
 
 TKANSLATBD WITH THE COOPERATION OF THE AUTHOR 
 
 BY 
 
 OHAELES HDBBAED JODD, Ph. D. 
 
 INSTEUCTOE IN WESLETAN UNIVlEESIXr 
 
 LEIPZIG 
 
 PUBLISHED BY WILHELM ENGELMANN 
 LONDON I NEW YOKK 
 
 WILLIAMS & HOEGATE | GTJSTAV E. STECHEET 
 
 1897. 
 
Br 
 
 d- 
 
 C2l (^x^ y^ 
 
TMNSLATOE'S PEEFACE. 
 
 1 HIS translation has been made with the cooperation of 
 the author, who has not only contributed many valuable 
 criticisms and suggestions in regard to terminology, but has 
 read all the proof-sheets as they were being prepared for 
 the press. A few verbal changes have been introduced into 
 the text with a view to making the discussion somewhat 
 clearer. 
 
 The difficulties that arise in choosing English equivalents 
 for many German words, are too familiar to require detailed 
 discussion. The translator has derived assistance in this 
 respect from a comparison of other standard translations, 
 especially the English versions of Falckenberg's '-History 
 of Modern Philosophy", Wundt's "Lectures on Human and 
 Animal Psychology", and Kiilpe's "Outlines of Psychology"'. 
 The terminology here employed differs, however, at many 
 points from that used in the works mentioned. A glossary 
 of the principal terms has been added for the benefit of 
 those familiar with the German. The translation of the word 
 "Perception" is unusual. If it were translated 'perception' it 
 would be easily confused, especially in its verbal forms, with 
 the only possible equivalent of "Wahrnehmtmg", '■^ivah.r- 
 nehmen", and '•'■ Ansdiauung" . Since the process referred to 
 
IV Iranslaior's Preface. 
 
 by '■'■Perception^'' is so entirely different from that indicated 
 by the English word perception, it seemed best to employ a 
 word whose signification is not so fixed. Apprehension was, 
 accordingly, nsed, and the danger of confusing it with the 
 translation of "Auffassung" was for the most part avoided 
 by using other equivalents for the latter. 
 
 The thanks of the translator are due to the author for 
 his courtesy throughout the progress of the work. Mr. G. H. 
 Stempel has kindly aided in the task of preparing the proof- 
 sheets for the press. 
 
 Middletown, September, 1896. 
 
 C> H. J. 
 
AUTHOE'S PEEFACE. 
 
 1 HIS book has been written primarily for the purpose of 
 furnishing my students with a brief manual to supplement the 
 lectures on Psychology. At the same time it aims to give 
 the wider circle of scientific scholars who are interested in 
 psychology, either for its own sake or for the sake of its 
 applications, a systematic survey of the fundamentally im- 
 portant results and doctrines of modern psychology. In view 
 of this double purpose, I have limited myself in detailing 
 facts to that which is most important, or to the examples that 
 serve most directly the ends of illustration, and have omitted 
 entirely those aids to demonstration and experiment which 
 are properly made use of in the lecture-room. The fact that 
 I have based this treatise on the doctrines that I have come 
 to hold as valid after long years of labor in this field, needs 
 no special justification. Still, I have not neglected to point 
 out both in a general characterization (Introduction § 2), and 
 with references in detail, the chief theories that differ from 
 the one here presented. ^ 
 
 The relation in which this book stands to my earlier 
 psychological works will be apparent after what has been 
 said. The " Cfrundxiige der physiologisefien Psychologie" aims 
 to bring the means employed by the natural sciences, 
 
VI Author's Preface. 
 
 especially by physiology, into the service of psychology, and to 
 give a critical presentation of the experimental methods of 
 psychology, which have developed in the last few decades, 
 together with their chief results. This special problem ren- 
 dered necessary a relative subordination of the general psy- 
 chological points of view. The second, revised edition of 
 the "Vorlesungen uber die Menscheiv- und Thierseele" ') (the 
 first edition has long been out of date) seeks to give a more 
 popular account of the character and purpose of experimental 
 psj'chology, and to discuss from the position thus defined 
 those psychological questions which are also of more general 
 philosophical importance. While the treatment in the "Grund- 
 xilge" is, accordingly, determined, in the main, by the relations 
 of psychology to physiology, and the treatment in the " Vm-- 
 lesungen"' by philosophical interests-, this Outlines aims to 
 present psychology in its own proper coherency, and in the 
 systematic order that the nature of the subject-matter seems 
 to me to require. In doing this, however, it takes up only 
 what is most important and essential. It is my hope that 
 this book will not be an entirely unwelcome addition even 
 for those readers who are familiar with my earlier works as 
 well as with the discussion of the "Logik der Psychologie''' 
 in my "Logik der Geisteswisseoischaften" (Logik, 2. Aufl. II, 
 2. Abth.). 
 
 I have not thought it necessary to repeat here the refer- 
 ences to psychological works, in view of the fact that I have 
 given such references very fully under the various heads in 
 my " Grundxiige''\ The reader who wishes to make a more 
 
 1) Translated by Prof. J. E. Creighton and Prof. E. B. Titchener: 
 "Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology'^ Swan Sonnenschein"& Co., 
 1894. 
 
Author's Prefcu:4}. VII 
 
 thorough study of any particular question will turn in any 
 case to the more elaborate work. For the literature that has 
 appeared in this department since the fourth edition of the 
 " Gi-undzilge^'' (1893), the reader has but to refer to the last 
 volumes of the various periodicals devoted to psychology: to 
 the "Philosophische Studieii", the ^^Zeitschrift fur Psyehologie 
 und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane" , the "American Journal 
 of Psychohgy", and the "Psychological Revieiv". The last 
 three contain also reviews of the current literature in psy- 
 chology. As a recent addition to these the "Psychologischen 
 Arbeiten" edited by E. Kraepelin and devoted especially to 
 individual characterology and practical psychology, may be 
 mentioned. 
 
 Leipzig, January, 1896. 
 
 W. Wundt. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 INTEODUCTION. 
 
 page 
 
 § K Problem of Psychology 1 
 
 1. Older definitions. 2. Psychology as the science of 
 immediate experience. 3. Relation to the mental and to 
 the natural sciences. 
 
 § 2. General Theories of Psychology 6 
 
 1. Metaphysical psychology: spiritualistic and material- 
 istic, dualistio and monistic systems. 2. Empirical psy- 
 chology: two principles for the classification of its varieties. 
 3. Psychology of the inner sense. 4. Psychology as the 
 science of immediate experience. 5. Descriptive psychology: 
 faculty-psychology. 6. Explanatory psychology: intellec- 
 tualistic and voluntaristic psychology. 7. Intellectualistic 
 trends : logical theory and association-psychology. 8. Er- 
 roneous attribution of the nature of things to ideas, in 
 intellectualistic psychology. 9. Voluntaristic psychology. 
 10. Governing principles of the following treatise. 
 
 § 3. Methods of Psychology 18 
 
 ]. Relation of experiment and observation in general. 
 
 2. Application to psychology: particular significance of ex- 
 perimental methods for psychology. 3. Pure observation 
 m psychology. Analysis of mental products: social psy- 
 chology. 
 
 § 4. General Survey of the Subject 24 
 
 1. Analytic and synthetic problem of psychology. Psy- 
 chical elements. 2. The various synthetic problems in order: 
 psychical compounds, interconnections, and developments. 
 
 3. Laws of psychical phenomena and their causality. 
 
X Contents. 
 
 I. PSYCHICAL ELEMENTS. 
 
 page 
 
 § 5. Chief Forms and General Attributes of Psy- 
 chical Elements 28 
 
 1. Discovery of psyolaioal elements through abstraction. 
 2. Two kinds of psychical elements: sensations and simple 
 feelings. 3. Elementary nature and specific character of 
 psychical processes not identical. 4. Common attributes of 
 psychical elements : quality and intensity. 5. Homogeneous 
 and complex, one-dimensional, two-dimensional, and many- 
 dimensional systems of quality. 6. Distinguishing charac- 
 teristics of sensational and aflfective elements. 6a. Remarks 
 on the history of the concepts sensation and feeling. 
 
 § 6. Pure Sensations - 38 
 
 1. The concept pure sensation. 2. Rise of sensations. 
 Sense-stimuli. 3. Physiological substrata of the sensational 
 systems. Mechanical and chemical senses. 4. The so-called 
 law of specific energy of nerves. 5. The law of parallelism 
 of changes in sensation and in physiological stimulation. 
 
 A. Sensations of the general sense 45 
 
 6. Definition of the general sense. Sensational systems 
 of this sense. 7. Attributes and differences of the various 
 parts of the organ of the general sense. 8. The fobr systems 
 of the general sense in detail. 
 
 B. Sensations of sound 48 
 
 9. Simple noise-sensations. 10. Tone-sensations. 11. The 
 system of tonal sensations. 
 
 C. Sensations of smell and taste 52 
 
 12. Sensations of smell. 12a. Classes of olfactory 
 qualities. Reciprocal neutralization of odors. 13. Sensa- 
 tions of taste. The four primary qualities. 13 a. Mixture 
 and neutralization of gustatory stimuli. 
 
 D. Sensations of light 54 
 
 14. Sensations of achromatic light. 15. Sensation of 
 chromatic light. 16. Saturation of colors. 17. Brightness of 
 colors. 18. Relations between sensations of achromatic and 
 sensations of chromatic brightness. 19. Three-dimensional 
 system of light-sensations. 20. The four principal sensations. 
 21. Relations between sensation and stimulus for the visual 
 sense. 22. Complementary colors and color-mixtures. 23. The 
 
Contents. XI 
 
 \ 
 three fundamental colors. 24. Inference of tlie photochemical 
 character of retinal stimulation. 25. Persistence of the stimu- 
 lation. 26. Light-contrasts and color-contrasts. 26 a. Phy- 
 siological theories. 
 
 § 7. Simple Feelings 74 
 
 1. General characterization of the simple feelings. 
 
 2. Sense-feelings (affective tones of sensations). 3. Relations 
 between changes in sensations and feelings. 4. Influence 
 of qualitative sensational changes on the affective state. 
 
 5. Influence of sensational intensity on the feelings. 6.' Great 
 variety of the simple feelings. 7. The three chief directions 
 of feelings. 8. Examples of the various forms. 9. Inter- 
 connection of the three affective directions with the course 
 of psychical processes. 10. Physiological concomitants of 
 feelings. 11. Special relation to the pulse. 11a. Physiological 
 scheme of the activity of the pulse. 
 
 II. PSYCHICAL COMPOUNDS. 
 
 § 8. Definition and Classification of Psychical Com- 
 pounds 90 
 
 1. Definition of the concept psychical compound. 2. Com- 
 position of the psychical compounds. 3. Classification of the 
 same. 
 
 § 9. Intensive Ideas 93 
 
 1. General attributes of intensive ideas. Fusion. 2. Survey 
 of the intensive fusions in the various sensational spheres. 
 
 3. Intensive auditory ideas : the single clang. 4. Conditions 
 for the rise of complete clang-fusion. 5. Compound clangs. 
 
 6. Difference-tones. 7. Noise. 7 a. Theories of clang-analysis 
 and tonal fusion. 
 
 § 10. Spacial Ideas 102 
 
 1. General concept of extensive ideas. Special charac- 
 teristics of spacial ideas. 2. Psychological problem of anal- 
 ■ ysis of spacial ideas. 3. Kinds of spacial ideas. 
 
 A. Spacial touch-ideas 104 
 
 4. Localization of touch-stimuli. Qualitative local signs. 
 5. Else of spacial touch-ideas in normal cases with vision. 
 0. The tactual sense of the blind. 7. Theory of spacial ideas 
 of the blind. 8. General character of the space-fusions of 
 
XII Contents. 
 
 page 
 touch. 9. Fusions with memory-elements. 10. Ideas of one's 
 own movements when vision is present. 11. Ideas of one's 
 own movements in the case of congenital blindness. 12. Ideas 
 of the position and movement of the whole body. 12a. Theo- 
 ries of the rise of spacial ideas of touch. 
 
 B. Spacial sight-ideas 115 
 
 13. General character of visual ideas. 14. General factors 
 of such ideas. 
 
 a. The location of the elements of a visual idea in relation to one 
 
 another 116 
 
 15. Localization in the field of vision. 16. Keenness of 
 localization in different regions of the field of vision. Direct 
 and indirect vision. 17. Ocular movements. 18. Relation 
 of ocular movements to localization. 19. Constant optical 
 illusions of direction and magnitude due to the laws of 
 ocular movements. 20. Variable illusions in direction and 
 magnitude due to the universal attributes of voluntary 
 movements. 21. Distances in the field of vision not dependent 
 on the proximity of retinal elements to one another. 22. Two 
 elements of spacial vision. Necessity of assuming retinal 
 local signs and empirical demonstration of the same. 
 23. General theory of spacial vision. 
 
 b. The location of visual ideas in relation to the ideating subject . 130 
 
 24. Point of orientation in binocular vision. Direction of 
 the line of orientation. 25. Idea of the length of the line 
 of orientation. 26. Discrimination of far and near. 27. Per- 
 ception of points at different distances. 28. Theory of 
 binocular ideas of three dimensions. 29. Varying conditions 
 for ideas of depth. Influence of lines of fixation. 30. Bi- 
 nocular double images and localization in depth. 
 
 c. Relations between the location of the elemtents in regard to one 
 
 another and their location in regard to the subject .... 136 
 31. Erect vision. 32. Surface of the field of vision. 
 32 a. The complex local signs of depth and binocular paral- 
 lax. 33. The stereoscope. 34. Monocular ideas of depth. 
 Influence of accommodation. 35. The elements of perspec- 
 tive. 35 a. Survey of the theories. 
 
 § 11. Temporal Ideas 142 
 
 1. General conditions for temporal ideas. 2. Charac- 
 teristics of temporal as distinguished from spacial order. 
 2 a. The forms of temporal ideas and their names. 
 
Contents. XIII 
 
 page 
 
 A. Temporal toiiclt-ideas 144 
 
 3. Relation of the mechanical attributes of the limbs 
 to the temporal ideas. 4. The rhythmical tactual move- 
 ments. 5. The tactual ideas of beats. 
 
 B. Temporal auditory ideas 148 
 
 6. Favoring attributes of the auditory sense. Continuous 
 and discontinuous rhythms. 7. Analysis of simple ideas 
 of beats. 8. Changes in the rhythmical perception through 
 various objective conditions. 9. Subjective conditions of 
 rhythmical time-ideas. 
 
 C. General conditions for temporal ideas 153 
 
 10. Specific character of temporal ideas. 11. The inner 
 fixation-point. 12. The continuous S.ovr and one-dimensional 
 character of time. 13. General theory of temporal ideas. 
 The temporal signs. 13 a. Geometrical representation of 
 time. Nativistic and genetic theories. 
 
 § 12. Composite Feelings 158 
 
 1. Affective processes in general. 2. Character of inten- 
 sive affective combinations. 3. Component feelings: and resul- 
 tant partial feelings and total feelings. Interlacing of the 
 affective elements. 3 a. Exemplification with musical com- 
 pound clangs. 4. Common feelings. 4a. Deficiency of the 
 physiological theories of common feelings. 5. Pleasurable and 
 unpleasurable feelings. 6. Contrast-feelings. 7. Elementary 
 aesthetic feelings. Agreeableness and disagreeableness. 
 8. Intensive and extensive feelings. 9. Intensive feelings: 
 color-combinations and clang-combinations. 10. Extensive 
 feelings: feelings from form and those from rhythm. 11. Psy- 
 chological theory of composite feelings. 12. Principle of 
 the unity of the affective state. 
 
 § 13. Emotions 169 
 
 1. Definition of emotions. 2. Names of emotions. 3. General 
 course of emotions. 4. Physical concomitants: expressive 
 movements. 5, Classification of the expressive move- 
 ments. 5 a. Symptomatica! significance of these movements. 
 6. Changes in the pulse and respiration. Quiet, sthenic 
 and asthenic, rapid and sluggish emotions. 7. Connection 
 of changes in innervation with the formal attributes of 
 emotions. 8. Intensification of the emotions through the 
 physical concomitants. 9. Psychological classification of the 
 
page 
 emotions. 10. Emotional forms of the aflfective qualities. 
 
 Pleasurable and unpleasurable, exciting and depressing, 
 straining and relaxing emotions. 11. Names of emotions. 
 12. Emotional forms of affeotiye intensities: weak and 
 strong emotions. 13. Forms of occurrence: sudden, gradu- 
 ally rising, interihittent emotions. 13a. Predominating 
 significance of the affective qualities for the discrimination 
 of emotions. 
 
 § 14. Volitional Pkooesses 183 
 
 1. Relation to the eniotions. 2. External volitional acts. 
 3. Relation to the feelings. 4. Motives of volition. 5. Devel- 
 opment of volition. Impulsive acts. 6. Voluntary and selec- 
 tive acts. 7. Resolution and decision. The feeling of activity. 
 
 8. Weakening of emotions through intellectual processes. 
 
 9. Development of internal volitional acts. 10. Retrogra- 
 dation. Volitional processes become mechanical. Purposive 
 character of reflex movements. 10 a. Critique of theories 
 of -will. 1]. Temporal course of volitions. Reaction-experi^ 
 ments. Sensorial and muscular reactions. 12. Compound 
 reactions. 13. Reactions become automatic. 13 a. General 
 significance of reaction-experiments. Chronometric ap- 
 paratus. 
 
 ni. INTERCONNECTION OP PSYCHICAL COMPOUNDS. 
 
 §15. Consciousness and Attention 201 
 
 1. The concept consciousness. 2. Physiological con- 
 ditions. 2a. Localization of psychical functions in the brain. 
 
 3. Simultaneous and successive interconnections of con- 
 scious processes. Grade of consciousness. The sinking of 
 psychical processes into the state of unconsciousness. 
 
 4. Apperception and attention. 5, Degree of clearness of 
 contents of consciousness. 6. Scope of attention and of 
 consciousness. 6 a. Methods for the investigation of momen- 
 tary states of consciousness. 7. Affective influence of con- 
 scious contents which are merely apprehended. 8. Feeling 
 of apperception. Passive and active apperception. 8 a. Ex- 
 perimental methods. 9. Interconnection of processes of 
 attention and of volition. 10. The concepts subject and 
 object. 11. Self-consciousness. 12. Further development of 
 the discrimination between subject and object. 12a. Critique 
 
Coiiienfs. XV 
 
 page 
 of the dualistic hypotheses. 13, Transition to the various 
 psychical processes of combination. 
 
 § 16. Associations 224 
 
 1. History of the concept of association. 2. The ordinarily 
 so-called associations complex products of elementary as- 
 sociative processes. 3. Chief forms of elementary associa- 
 tive processes. 
 
 A. Simultaneous associations 227 
 
 4. Chief forms: assimilation and complication. 
 
 a. Assimilations . . 228 
 
 5. General character of assimilations. 6. Auditory as- 
 similations. 7. Assimilations in the sphere of intensive 
 affective processes. 8. Spacial assimilations of touch. 9. As- 
 similations in the case of visual ideas. 10. Psychological 
 analysis of assimilative processes. 11. Differences among 
 these processes. Illusion. 
 
 b. Camplications 231 
 
 12. Attributes and chief forms of complications. 
 
 B. Successive associations 235 
 
 13. Interconnection with the assimilations. 14. General 
 character of successive associations. 14 a. Serial association. 
 
 a. Sensible recognition and cognition .. .. 237 
 
 15. Attributes and differences of these processes. 15a. Ex- 
 perimental investigation of the influence of complications. 
 
 16. Passage from simultaneous to successive processes. 
 
 17. Differences between processes of recognition and those 
 of cognition. 
 
 b. Memory-processes 241 
 
 IS. Rise out of processes of recognition. 18a. Inter- 
 connection and general significance of memory-processes. 
 19. Stages of a memory-process: mixed forms between 
 recognition and remembering. 19a. The so-called "mediate 
 association" 20. Memory-processes based on repeated re- 
 cognitions and cognitions. 21. Elements of memory- 
 processes. 22. Character of memory-ideas. 23. The concept 
 memory. 
 
 § 17. Appeeceptive Combinations 248 
 
 1. Subjective attributes of apperceptive combinations. 
 2. Relation to associations. 3. General classification of 
 apperceptive combinations. 
 
XVI Contents. 
 
 page 
 
 A. Simple apperceptive functions (relating and comparing) 250 
 
 4. The relating process. 5. The comparing process. 
 6. Discovery of agreements and differences, "i- Measure- 
 ments of psychical elements and compounds. 8. Difference 
 between psychical and physical measurement. 9. Methods 
 of psychical measurement. 10. Stimulus -threshold and 
 difference-threshold. Weber's law. 10 a. Weber's law in 
 detail and the methods for its demonstration. 11. Psy- 
 chological contrast-phenomena. Interconnnection with the 
 physiological contrasts in vision. 1 3. Contrast between im- 
 pression and expectation. 
 
 B. Complex apperceptive functions (synthesis and analysis) . 260 
 
 14. Aggregate ideas. 15. Psychological analysis of the 
 activity of "imagination". 16. Psychological character of 
 the activity of "understanding". 17. Psychological character 
 of concepts. 18. Imagination and understanding as indi- 
 vidual traits. Talent. 
 
 § 18. Psychical States 267 
 
 1. General conditions of abnormal states. 2. Changes 
 in elements. 3. Changes in ideational compounds: hallu- 
 cinations and illusions. 4. Abnormities .in affective and 
 volitional processes: states of depression and exaltation. 
 5. Abnormities of consciousness. 6. Changes in association 
 and in apperception. 7. Dreams. 8. Hypnosis. 9. Relations 
 between sleep and hypnosis. 9 a. Physiological theories of 
 sleep, dreams, and hypnosis. 
 
 IV. PSYCHICAL DEVELOPMENTS. 
 
 19. Psychical Attributes of Animals 276 
 
 1. General remarks on the pryohical development of 
 animals. 2. Bate of animal development and one-sidedness 
 of their functions. 3. Animal instincts. 4. Development 
 of the instincts. 5. Genetic relation of animals to man in 
 regard to mental development. 5 a. Deficiency of deter- 
 mination of the line of division in regard to psychological 
 attributes. Theories of instincts. 
 
Contents. XVII 
 
 page 
 
 § 20. Psychical Development of the Child .... 283 
 
 1. Development of sense-functions. 2. Psychical ele- 
 ments in the individual development. 3. Rise of spacial 
 ideas. 4. Development of temporal ideas. 5. Associations 
 and apperceptive combinations. 6. Development of self- 
 consciousness. 7. Development of will, 8. Development of 
 speech. 9. Activity of the child's imagination. Play-im- 
 pulse. 10. Functions of the understanding. 10 a. Mistakes 
 in child-psychology. _ 
 
 § 21. Development of mental Communities 296 
 
 I. Differences betv^een human and animal communities. 
 2. Products of human communities. 
 
 A. Speech 298 
 
 4. Gesture-language. 4. General development of articu- 
 late language. 5. Changes in sound and meaning. 6. Psy- 
 chological significance of the order of words. 
 
 B. Myths ' 303 
 
 7. Personifying apperception. 8. General conditions for 
 its development. 9. Animism and fetishism. 10. The nature- 
 myth. 
 
 C. Oustoms 306 
 
 II. Relations to Myths. 12. Changes in the meaning 
 of customs. 13. Differentiation into customs, laws, and 
 morality. 14. Collective consciousness and collective will. 
 14 a. Critical remarks. 
 
 V. PSYCHICAL CAUSALITY AND ITS LAWS. 
 
 22. Concept of Mind 310 
 
 1. The general principle of causality. 2. The concepts 
 matter, force, and energy, 3. Mind as the supplementary 
 concept of psychology. 4. The concept of a mind-substance. 
 5. Materialistic and spiritualistic concepts of mind. 0. The 
 mind as an actuality. 7. Scientific development of the con- 
 cept of actuality. 8. The problem of the relation between 
 body and mind. 9. The principle of psycho -physical 
 parallelism. 10. Necessity of an independent psychical 
 causality. 
 
XVni Contents. 
 
 page 
 
 § 23. Psychological Laws of Relation 321 
 
 1. The three general laws of relation. 2. The law of 
 psychical resultants. 3. The principle of creative synthesis. 
 
 4. Increase of psychical, and constancy of physical, energy. 
 
 5. The law of psychical relations. 6. The law of psychical 
 contrasts. 7. Relation of the law of contrasts to the first 
 two laws. 
 
 § 24. Psychological Laws of Development 325 
 
 1 . The three general laws of development. 2. The law 
 of mental growth. 3. The law of heterogony of ends. 4. The 
 law of development towards opposites. 
 
 Glossary 329 
 
 Index 336 
 
INTRODUCTIOK 
 
 § 1. PROBLEM OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 1. Two definitions of psychology have been the most 
 prominent in the history of this science. According to 
 one, psychology is the "science of mind" : psychical processes 
 are regarded as phenomena from which it is possible to 
 infer the nature of an underlying metaphysical mind-sub- 
 stance. According to the other, psychology is the "science 
 of inner experience": psychical processes are here looked 
 upon as belonging to a specific form of experience, which 
 is readily distinguished by the fact that its contents are 
 known through "introspection", or the "inner sense" as 
 it has been called to distinguish it from sense-perception 
 through the outer senses. 
 
 Neither of these definitions, however, is satisfactory to 
 the psychology of to-day. The first, or metaphysical, defini- 
 tion belongs to a period of development that lasted longer 
 in this science than in others. But it is here too forever 
 left behind, since psychology has developed into an empirical 
 discipline, operating with methods of its own; and since the 
 "mental sciences" have gained recognition as a great de- 
 partment of scientific investigation, distinct from the sphere 
 of the natural sciences, and requiring as a general ground- 
 work an independent psychology, free from all metaphysical 
 theories. 
 
 WnxDT, Psychology. 1 
 
2 Introduction. 
 
 The second, or empirical, definition, which sees in psychol- 
 ogy a ''science of inner experience", is inadequate because 
 it may give rise to the misunderstanding that psychology has 
 to do with objects totally different from those of the so- 
 called "outer experience". It is, indeed, true that there are 
 contents of experience which belong in the spTiere of psycho- 
 logical investigation, but are not to be found among the 
 objects and processes studied by natural science: such are 
 our feehngs, emotions, and decisions. On the other hand, 
 there is not a single natural phenomenon that may not, 
 from a different point of view, become an object of psychol- 
 ogy. A stone, a plant, a tone, a ray of light, are, as nat- 
 ural phenomena, objects of mineralogy, botany, physics, etc.; 
 I but in so far as they arouse in us ideas, they are at the 
 same time objects of psychology. For psychology seeks to 
 account for the genesis of these ideas, and for their rela- 
 tions both to other ideas and to those psychical processes 
 not referred to external objects, such as feeHngs, volitions, etc. 
 There is, then, no such thing as an "inner sense" which 
 can be regarded as an organ of introspection, and thus dis- 
 tinct from the outer senses, or organs of objective perception. 
 Ideas, whose attributes psychology seeks to investigate, arise 
 through the outer senses no less than do the sense-percep- 
 tions on which natural science is based ; while the subjective 
 activities of feeling, emotion, and volition, which are neglected 
 in natural science, are not known through special organs, but 
 are directly and inseparably connected with the ideas referred 
 to external objects. 
 
 2. It follows, then, that the expressions outer and inner 
 experience do not indicate different objects, but different 
 points of view from which we start in the consideration and 
 scientific treatment of a unitary experience. We are natur- 
 ally led to these points of view, because every concrete ex- 
 
§ 1. Problem of Psychohgy. 3 
 
 perience immediately divides into two factms: into a content 
 presented to us, and our apprehension of this content. We 
 call the first of these factors objects of experience, the second 
 experiencing subject. This division points out two directions 
 for the treatment of experience. One is that of the natural 
 sciences, which concern themselves with the objects of ex- 
 perience, thought of as independent of the subject. The other 
 is that of psychology, which investigates the whole content 
 of experience in its relations to the subject and in its attri- 
 butes derived directly from the subject. The standpoint of 
 natural science may, accordingly, be designated as that of 
 mediate experience, since it is possible only after abstracting 
 from the subjective factor present in all actual experience; 
 the standpoint of psychology, on the other hand, may be 
 designated as that of immediate experience, since it purposely 
 does away with this abstraction and all its consequences. 
 
 3. The assignment of this problem to psychology, maldng 
 it an empirical science coordinate with natural science and 
 supplementary to it, is justified by the method of all the 
 merited sciences, for which psychology furnishes the basis. All ; 
 of these sciences, philology, history, and political and social j 
 science, have for their subject-matter immediate experience 
 as determined by the interaction of objects with the knowing 
 and acting subject. None of the mental sciences employs 
 the abstractions and hypothetical supplementary concepts of 
 natural science ; quite otherwise, they all accept ideas and the 
 accompanying subjective activities as immediate reality. The 
 effort is then made to explain the single components of this 
 reality through their mutual interconnections. This method 
 of psychological interpretation employed in the mental sciences, 
 must also be the mode of procedure in psychology itself, 
 being the method required by the subject-matter of psychol- 
 ogy, the immediate reality of experience. 
 
 1* 
 
4 Introduction. 
 
 3 a. Since natural science investigates the content of ex- 
 perience after abstracting from tte experiencing subject, its 
 problem is usually stated as the acquirement of "knowledge of 
 the outer world". By the expression outer world is meant the 
 sum total of all the objects presented in experience. The problem 
 of psychology has sometimes been correspondingly defined as 
 "self-knowledge of the subject". This definition is, however, 
 inadequate because the interaction of the subject with the outer 
 world and with other similar subjects is just as much a prob- 
 lem of psychology as are the attributes of the single subject. 
 Furthermore, the expression can easily be interpreted to mean 
 that outer world and subject are separate components of ex- 
 perience or that they can at least be distinguished as inde- 
 pendent contents of experience, whereas, in truth, outer ex- 
 perience is always connected with the apprehending and knowing 
 functions of the subject, and inner experience always contains 
 ideas from the outer world as indispensable components. This 
 interconnection is the necessary result of the fact that in 
 reality experience is not a mere juxtaposition of different ele- 
 ments, but a single organized whole which requires in each of 
 its components the subject that apprehends the content, and the 
 objects that are presented as content. For this reason natural 
 science can not abstract from the knowing subject entirely, but 
 only from those attributes of the subject which either disappear 
 entirely when we remove the subject in thought, as, the feel- 
 ings, or from those which, on the ground of physical researches, 
 must be regarded as belonging to the subject, as, the quali- 
 ties of sensations. Psychology, on the contrary, has as its sub- 
 ject of treatment the total content of experience in its imme- 
 diate character. 
 
 / The only ground, then, for the division between natural 
 science on the one hand, and psychology and the mental sciences 
 
 I on the other, is to be found in the fact that all experience 
 contains as its factors a content objectively presented, and an ex- 
 periencing subject. Still, it is by no means necessary that 
 logical definitions of these two factors should precede the sep- 
 aration of the sciences from one another, for it is obvious that 
 such definitions are possible only after they have a basis in the 
 investigations of natural science and of psychology. All that it is 
 
§ 1. Problem of Psychology. 5 
 
 necessary to presuppose from the first, is the consciousness which 
 accompanies all experience, that in this experience objects are 
 being presented to a subject. There can be no assumption of 
 a knowledge of the conditions upon which the distinction is 
 based, or of the definite characteristics by which one factor can 
 be distinguished from the other. Even the use of the terms 
 object and subject in this connection must be regarded as the 
 application to the first stage of experience, of distinctions which 
 are reached only by developed logical reflection. 
 
 The forms of interpretation in natural science and psychol- 
 ogy are supplementary not only in the sense that the first 
 considers objects after abstracting, as far as possible, from the 
 subject, while the second has to do with the part the subject 
 plays in the rise of experience; but they are also supplementary 
 in ihe sense that each takes a different point of view in cosr 
 sidering the single contents of experience. Natural science seeks 
 to discover the nature of objects without reference to the sub- 
 ject. The knowledge that it produces is therefore mediate or 
 conceptual. In place of the immediate objects of experience, it 
 sets concepts gained from these objects by abstracting from the 
 subjective components of our ideas. This abstraction makes it 
 necessary, continually to supplement reality with hypothetical 
 elements. Scientific analysis shows that many components of 
 experience — as, for example, sensations — are subjective effects 
 of objective processes. These objective processes in their ob- 
 jective character, independent of the subject, can therefore never 
 be a part of experience. Science makes up for this lack by 
 forming supplementary hypothetical concepts of the objective 
 properties of matter. Psychology, on the other hand, investigates 
 the contents of experience in their complete and actual form, 
 both the ideas that are referred to objects, and all the sub- 
 jective processes that cluster about them. Its knowledge is, 
 therefore, immediate and perceptual: perceptual in the broad sense 
 of the term in which not only sense-perceptions, but all concrete 
 reality is distinguished from all that is abstract and concep tual 
 in thought. Psychology can exhibit the interconnection of the 
 contents of experience as actually presented to the subject, only 
 by avoiding entirely the abstractions and supplementary concepts of 
 natural science. Thus, while natural science and psychology are 
 
6 Introduction. 
 
 both empirical sciences in the sense that they aim to explain the 
 contents of experience, though from different points of view, still 
 it is obvious that, in consequence of the character of its problem, 
 psychology is the more strictly empirical. 
 
 § 2. GENERAL THEORIES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 1. The view that psychology is an empirical science which 
 deals, not with specific contents of experience, but with the 
 immediate contents of all experience, is of recent origin. It 
 still encounters in the science of to-day oppositional views, 
 which are to be looked upon, in general, as the remnants 
 of earlier stages of development, and which are in turn 
 arrayed against one another according to their attitudes on 
 the question of the relation of psychology to philosophy and 
 to the other sciences. On the basis of the two definitions 
 mentioned above (§1, I) as being the most widely accepted, 
 two chief theories of psychology may be distinguished: metor- 
 physical and empirical psychology. Each is further divided 
 into a number of special tendencies. 
 
 Metaphysical psychology generally values very little the 
 empirical analysis and causal synthesis of psychical processes. 
 Regarding psychology as a part of philosophical meta- 
 physics, its chief effort is directed toward the discovery of 
 a definition of the "nature of mind" that shall be in accord 
 with the whole theory of the metaphysical system to which 
 the particular psychology belongs. After a metaphysical con- 
 cept of mind has thus been established, the attempt is made 
 to deduce from it the actual content of psychical experi- 
 ence. The characteristic that distinguishes metaphysical from 
 empirical psychology is, then, its attempt to deduce psychical . 
 processes, not from other psychical processes, but from some 
 
§ 2. General Theories of Psychology. ^ 
 
 substratum entirely unlike themselves: either from the mani- 
 festations of a special mind-substance, or from the attributes 
 and processes of matter. At this point metaphysical psy- 
 chology branches off in two directions. Spiritualistic psychol- 
 ogy considers psychical processes as the manifestations of a 
 sped fie mind-substance, which is regarded either as essen- 
 tially different from matter (dualism), or as related in nature 
 to matter (monism or monadology). The fundamental meta- 
 physical doctrine of spiritualistic psychology is the assumption 
 of the sup&'sensible nature of mind and, in connection with 
 this, the assumption of its immortality. Sometimes the 
 further notion of preexistence is also added. Materialistic 
 psychology, on the other hand, refers psychical processes to 
 the same material substratum which natural science employs 
 for the explanation of natural phenomena. According to this 
 view, psychical processes, like physical vital processes, are 
 connected with certain organizations of material particles 
 which are formed during the life of the individual and broken 
 up at the end of that life. The metaphysical character of 
 this trend of psychology is determined by its denial of the 
 supersensible nature of mind as asserted by spiritualistic 
 psychology. Both theories have this in common, that they 
 seek, not to interpret psychical experience from experience 
 itself, but to derive it from presuppositions about hypothetical 
 processes in a metaphysical substratum. 
 
 2. From the strife that followed these attempts at meta- 
 physical explanation, empirical psychology arose; Wherever 
 it is consistently carried out, it strives either to arrange 
 psychical processes under general concepts derived directly 
 from the interconnection of these processes themselves, or to 
 start with certain, as a rule simpler processes, and then ex- 
 plain the more complicated as the result of the interaction 
 of those with which it started. There may be various fun- 
 
8 Introduction. 
 
 damental principles for such an empirical interpretation, and 
 thus it becomes possible to distinguish several varieties of 
 empirical psychology. In general, these may be classified 
 according to two principles of division. The first has refer- 
 ence to the relation of inner and outer experience, and the 
 attitude that the two empirical sciences, natural science and 
 psychology, take toward each other. The second has reference 
 to the facts or concepts derived from these facts, which are 
 used for the interpretation of psychical processes. Every 
 system of empirical psychology has its place under both of 
 these principles of classification. 
 
 3. On the general question as to the nature of psychical 
 experience, the two views already mentioned (§1) on account 
 of their decisive significance in determining the problem of 
 psychology, stand over against each other: psychology of the 
 inner sense, and psychology as the science of immediate ex- 
 perience. The first treats psychical processes as contents of 
 a special sphere of experience coordinate with the experience 
 which, derived through the outer senses, is assigned as the 
 province of the natural sciences, but though coordinate, 
 totally different from it. The second recognizes no real 
 difference between inner and outer experience, but finds the 
 distinction only in the different points of view from which 
 unitary experience is considered in the two cases. 
 
 The first of these two varieties of empirical psychology is 
 the older. It arose primarily from the effort to establish 
 the independence of psychical observation, in opposition to the 
 encroachments of natural philosophy. In thus coordinating 
 natural science and psychology, it sees the justification for 
 the equal recognition of both spheres in their entirely differ- 
 ent objects and modes of perceiving these objects. This view 
 has influenced empirical psychology in two ways. First, it 
 favored the opinion that psychology should employ empirical 
 
§2. Qeneral Theories of Psychology, 9 
 
 methods, but that these methods, like psychological experience, 
 should be fundamentally different from those of natural science. 
 Secondly, it gave rise to the necessity of showing some con- 
 nection or other between these two kinds of experience, 
 which were supposed to be different. In regard to the first 
 demand, it was chiefly the psychology of the inner sense that 
 deyeloped the method of 'pure introspection (§ 3 , 2). In at- 
 tempting to solve the second question, this psychology was 
 necessarily driven back to a metaphysical basis, because of 
 its assumption of a difference between the physical and the 
 psychical contents of experience. For, from the very nature of 
 the case, it is impossible to account for the relations of 
 inner to outer experience, or for the so-called "interaction 
 between body and mind", from the position here taken, 
 except through metaphysical presuppositions. These presuppo- 
 sitions must then, in turn, effect the psychological investigation 
 itself in such a way as to result in the importation of meta- 
 physical hypotheses into it. 
 
 4. Essentially distinct from the psychology of the inner 
 sense is the trend that defines psychology as the "science of im-_ 
 mediate experience". Eegarding, as it does, outer and inner 
 experience, not as different parts of experience, but as different 
 ways of looking at one and the same experience, it can not 
 admit any fundamental difference between the methods of 
 psychology and those of natural science. It has, therefore, 
 sought most of all to cultivate experimental methods which 
 shall lead to just such an exact analysis of psychical processes 
 as that which the explanatory natural sciences undertake in 
 the case of natural phenomena, the only differences being 
 those which arise from the diverse points of view. It holds 
 also that the special mental sciences which have to do with 
 concrete mental processes , and creations , stand on this same 
 basis of a scientific consideration of the immediate contents of 
 
10 Introduction. 
 
 experience and of their relations to acting subjects. It follows, 
 then, that psychological analysis of the most general mental 
 products, such as language, mythological ideas, and laws of 
 custom, is to be regarded as an aid to the understanding of 
 all the more comphcated psychical processes. In its methods, 
 then, this trend of psychology stands in close relation to other 
 sciences: as experimental psychology, to the natural sciences; 
 as social psychology, to the special mental sciences. 
 
 Finally, from this point of view, the question of the rela- 
 tion between psychical and physical objects disappears en- 
 tirely. They are not different objects at all, but one and the 
 same content of experience, looked at in one case — in that 
 of the natural sciences — after abstracting from the subject, 
 in the other — in that of psychology — in their immediate 
 character and complete relations to the subject. All meta- 
 physical hypotheses as to the relation of psychical and phy- 
 sical objects are, when viewed from this position, attempts to 
 solve a problem that never would have existed if the case 
 had been correctly stated. Though psychology must dispense 
 with metaphysical supplementary hypotheses in regard to the 
 interconnection of psychical processes, because these processes 
 are the immediate contents of experience , still another meth- 
 od of procedure is open from the very fact that inner and 
 outer experience are supplementary points of view. Wherever 
 breaks appear in the interconnection of psychical processes, 
 it is allowable to carry on the investigation according to the 
 physical methods of considering these same processes, in order 
 to discover whether the lacking coherency can be thus supplied. 
 The same holds for the reverse method of filling up the 
 breaks in the continuity of our physiological knowledge, by 
 means of elements derived from psychological investigation. 
 Only on the basis of such a view, which sets the two forms 
 of knowledge in their true relation, is it possible for psychol- 
 
§2. Oeneral Theories of Psychology. \\ 
 
 ogy to become in the fullest sense an empirical science. 
 Only in this way, too, can physiology become the true supple- 
 mentary science of psychology, and psychology, on the other 
 hand, the auxiliary of physiology. 
 
 5. Under the second principle of classification mentioned 
 above (2), that is, according to the facts or concepts with which 
 the investigation of psychical processes starts, there are two 
 varieties of empirical psychology to be distinguished. They 
 are, at the same time, successive stages in the development 
 of psychological interpretation. The first corresponds to a 
 descriptive, the second to an explanatory stage. The attempt to 
 present a discriminating description of the different psychical 
 processes, gave rise to the need of an appropriate classi- 
 fication. Class-concepts were formed, under which the various 
 processes were grouped; and the attempt was made to satisfy 
 the need of an interpretation in each particular case, by sub- 
 suming the components of a given compound process under 
 their proper class-concepts. Such concepts are, for example, 
 sensation, knowledge, attention, memory, imagination, under- 
 standing, and will. They correspond to the general concepts 
 of physics which are derived from the immediate apprehension 
 of natural phenomena, such as weight, heat, sound, and hght. 
 Like those concepts of physics, these derived psychical con- 
 cepts may serve for a first grouping of the facts, but they 
 contribute nothing whatever to the explanation of these facts. 
 Still, empirical psychology has often been guilty of confound- 
 ing this description with explanation. Thus, the faculty- 
 psychology considered these class-concepts as psychical forces 
 or faculties, and referred psychical processes to their alter- 
 nating or united activity. 
 
 6. Opposed to this method of treatment found in the 
 descriptive faculty-psychology, is that of explanatory psychol- 
 ogy. When consistently empirical, the latter must base its inter- 
 
1 2 Introduction. 
 
 pretations on certain facts which? themselves belong to psychical 
 experience. These facts may, however, be taken from differ- 
 ent spheres of psychical processes, and so it comes that 
 explanatory treatment may be further divided into two va- 
 rieties, which correspond to the two factors, objects and sub- 
 ject, that go to make up immediate experience. When the 
 chief emphasis is laid on the objects of immediate experience, 
 intellectualistic psychology results. This attempts to derive 
 all psychical processes, especially the subjective feelings, 
 impulses, and volitions, from ideas, or intellectual processes as 
 they may be called on acount of their importance for objective 
 knowledge. If, on the contrary, the chief emphasis is laid 
 on the way in which immediate experience arises in the sub- 
 ject, a variety of explanatory psychology results which attri- 
 butes to those subjective activities not referred to external 
 objects , a position as independent as that assigned to ideas. 
 This variety has been called voluntai'isUe psychology, because 
 of the importance that must be conceded to volitional pro- 
 cesses in comparison with other subjective processes. 
 
 Of the two varieties of psychology that result from the 
 general attitudes on the question of the nature of inner 
 experience (3), psychology of the inner sense commonly tends 
 towards intellectualism. This is due to the fact that, when 
 the inner sense is coordinated with the outer senses, the con- 
 tents of psychical experience that first attract consideration 
 are those presented as objects to this inner sense, in a manner 
 analogous to the presentation of natural objects to the outer 
 senses. It is assumed that the character of objects can be 
 attributed to ideas alone of all the contents of psychical 
 experience, because they are regarded as images of the ex- 
 ternal objects presented to the outer senses. Ideas are, 
 accordingly, looked upon as the only real objects of the inner 
 sense, while all processes not referred to external objects, as, 
 
§2. Oeneral Theories of Psychology, 13 
 
 for example, the feelings, are interpreted as obscure ideas, or 
 ideas related to one's own body, or, finally, as effects aris- 
 ing from combinations of the ideas. 
 
 The psychology of immediate experience (4), on the other 
 hand, tends toward voluntarism. It is obyious that here, 
 where the chief problem of psychology is held to be the 
 investigation of the subjective rise of all experience, special 
 attention will be devoted to those factors from which natural 
 science abstracts. 
 
 7. Intellectualistic psychology has in the course of its 
 development separated into two trends. In one, the logical 
 processes of judgment and reasoning are regarded as the 
 typical forms of all psychoses; in the other, certain combi- 
 nations of successive memory-ideas distinguished by their 
 frequency, the so-called associations of ideas, are accepted 
 as such. The logical theory is most closely related to the 
 popular method of psychological interpretation and is, therefore, 
 the older. It still finds some acceptance, however, even in 
 modem times. The associatiorir-theory arose from the philo- 
 sophical empiricism of the last century. The two theories 
 stand to a certain extent in antithesis, since the first attempts 
 to reduce the totality of psychical processes to higher, while 
 the latter seeks to reduce it to lower and, as it is assumed, 
 simpler forms of intellectual activity. Both are one-sided, 
 and not only fail to explain affective and vohtional processes 
 on the basis of the assumption with which they start, but 
 are not able to give a complete interpretation even of the 
 intellectual processes. 
 
 8. The union of psychology of the inner sense with the 
 intellectualistic view has led to a peculiar assumption that 
 has been in many cases fatal to "psychological theory. "We 
 may define this assumption briefly as the erroneous attribution 
 of the nature of things to ideas. Not only was an analogy 
 
1 4 Introduetion. 
 
 assumed between the objects of the so-called inner sense and 
 those of the outer senses, but the former were regarded as the 
 images of the latter; and so it came that the attributes which 
 natural science ascribes to external objects, were transferred 
 to the immediate objects of the "inner sense", the ideas. 
 The assumption was then made that ideas are themselves 
 things, just as much as the external objects to which we refer 
 them; that they disappear from consciousness and come back 
 into it; that they may, indeed, be more or less intensely 
 and clearly perceived , according as the inner sense is stimu- 
 lated through the outer senses or not, and according to the 
 degree of attention concentrated upon them, but that on the 
 whole they remain unchanged in qualitative character. 
 
 9. In all these respects voluntaristie psychology is opposed 
 to intellectuaHsm. While the latter assumes an inner sense 
 and specific objects of inner experience, voluntarism is closely 
 related to the view that inner experience is identical with 
 immediate experience. According to this doctrine, the content of 
 psychological experience does not consist of a sum of objects, 
 but of all that which makes up the process of experience in 
 general, that is, of all the experiences of the subject in their 
 immediate character, unmodified by abstraction or reflection. 
 It follows of necessity that the contents of psychological expe- 
 rience should be regarded as an interconnection of processes. 
 
 This concept of process excludes the attribution of an 
 objective and more or less permanent character to the con- 
 tents of psychical experience. Psychical facts are occurrences, 
 not objects; they take place, like all occurrences, in time and 
 are never the same at a given point in time as they were 
 the preceding moment. In this sense volitions are typical 
 for all psychical processes. Voluntaristie psychology does 
 not by any means assert that volition is the only real form 
 of psychosis, but merely that, with its closely related 
 
§2, Oeneral Theories of Psychology. 15 
 
 feelings and emotions, it is just as essential a component of 
 psychological experience as sensations and ideas. It holds, 
 further, that all other psychical processes are to be thought 
 of after the analogy of volitions , they too being a series of 
 continuous changes in time, not a sum of permanent objects, 
 as intellectualism generally assumes in consequence of its 
 erroneous attribution to ideas of those properties which we 
 attribute to external objects. The recognition of the immediate 
 reahty of psychological experience excludes the possibility of 
 the attempt to derive any particular components of psychical 
 phenomena from others specifically different. The analogous 
 attempts of metaphysical psychology to reduce all psychological 
 experience to the heterogeneous, imaginary processes of a 
 hypothetical substratum, are for the same reason inconsistent 
 with the real problem of psychology. While it concerns itself, 
 however, with immediate experience , psychology assumes from 
 the first that all psychical contents contain objective as well 
 as subjective factors. These are to be distinguished only through 
 deUberate abstraction, and can never appear as really separate 
 processes. In fact, immediate experience shows that there are 
 no ideas which do not arouse in us feehngs and impulses of 
 different intensities, and, on the other hand, that a feeling or 
 volition is impossible which does not refer to some ideated object. 
 1 0. The governing principles of the psychological position 
 maintained in the following chapters may be summed up in 
 three general statements. 
 
 1) Inner, or psychological, experience is not a special sphere 
 of experience apart from others , but is immediate experience 
 in its totality. 
 
 2) This immediate experience is not made up of unchang- 
 ing contents, but of an interconnection of processes; not of 
 objects, but of occurrences, of universal human experiences 
 and their relations in accordance with certain laws. 
 
] Q Introduetion. 
 
 3) Each of these processes contains an objective content 
 and a subjective process, thus including the general con- 
 ditions both of all knowledge and of all practical human 
 activity. 
 
 Corresponding to these three general principles, we have 
 a threefold attitude of psychology to the other sciences. 
 
 1) As the science of immediate experience, it is supple^ 
 mentary to the natural sciences, which, in consequence of 
 their abstraction from the subject, have to do only with the 
 objective, mediate contents of experience. Any particular 
 fact can, strictly speaking, be understood in its full sig- 
 nificance only after is has been subjected to the analyses of 
 both natural science and psychology. In this sense, then, 
 physics and physiology are auxiliary to psychology, and the 
 latter is, in turn, supplementary to the natural sciences. 
 
 2) As the science of the universal forms of immediate 
 human experience and their combination in accordance with 
 certain laws, it is the foundation of the mental sciences. The 
 subject-matter of these sciences is in all cases the activities 
 preceding from immediate human experiences, and their effects. 
 ^ince psych ology has for its problenLjUie_mvestigatioa_of_the 
 iorms a nd laws o| these activities^- it is at once - the most 
 ^neral_menta.l science,^ a,nd the foundation^for all the 
 others, such as philology, history, political economy, juris- 
 prudence, etc. 
 
 3) Since psychology pays equal attention to both the 
 subjective and objective conditions which underlie not' only 
 theoretical knowledge, but practical activity as well, and since 
 it seeks to determine their interrelation, it is the empirical dis- 
 cipline whose results are most immediately useful in the in- 
 vestigation of the general prol()lems of the them-y of know- 
 ledge and ethics, the two foundations of philosophy. Thus, 
 psychology is in relation to natural science the supplementary, 
 
§2. Oemral Theories of Psychology. \'J 
 
 in relation to the mental sciences the fundamental, and in 
 relation to philosophy the propaedeutic empirical science. 
 
 10a. The view that it is not a difference in the objects of 
 experience, but in the way of treating experience, that distinguishes 
 psychology from natural science, has come to be recognized more 
 and more in modern psychology. Still, a clear comprehension of 
 the essential character of this position in regard to the scientific 
 problems of psychology, is prevented by the persistence of older 
 tendencies derived from metaphysics and natural philosophy. 
 Instead of starting from the fact that the natural sciences are 
 possible only after abstracting from the subjective factors of 
 experience, the more general problem of treating the contents 
 of all experience in the most general way, is sometimes assigned 
 to natural science. In such a case psychology is, of course, no 
 longer coordinate with the natural sciences, but subordinate to 
 them. Its problem is no longer to remove the abstraction 
 employed by the natural sciences, and in this way to gain with 
 them a complete view of experience, but it has to use the 
 concept "subject" furnished by the natural sciences, and to 
 give an account of the influence of this subject on the con- 
 tents of experience. Instead of recognizing that an adequate 
 definition of "subject" is possible only as a result of psycho- 
 logical investigations (§ 1,3 a), a finished concept formed exclusively 
 by the natural sciences is here foisted upon psychology. Now, for 
 the natural sciences the subject is identical with the body. Psychol- 
 ogy is accordingly defined as the science which has to determine 
 the dependence of immediate experience on the body. This posi- 
 tion, which may be designated as "psycho-physical materialism", 
 is epistemologically untenable and psychologically unproductive. 
 Natural science, which purposely abstracts from the subjective 
 component of all experience, is least of all in a position to give 
 a final definition of the subject. A psychology that starts with 
 such a purely physiological definition depends, therefore, not on 
 experience, but, just Hke the older materialistic psychology, on a 
 metaphysical presupposition. The position is psychologically un- 
 productive because, from the very first, it turns over the causal 
 interpretation of psychical processes to physiology. But physiol- 
 ogy has not yet furnished such an interpretation, and never 
 
 Wdsdt, Psychologj'. 2 
 
18 Introduction. 
 
 will be able to do so, because of the difference between the 
 manner of regarding phenomena in natural science and in psy- 
 chology. It is obvious, too, that such a form of psychology, 
 which has been turned into hypothetical brain -mechanics, can 
 never be of any service as a basis for the mental sciences. 
 
 The strictly empirical trend of psychology, defined in the 
 principles formulated above, is opposed to these attempts to 
 renew metaphysical doctrines. In calling it "voluntaristic", we 
 are not to overlook the fact that, in itself, this psychological 
 voluntarism has absolutely no connection with any metaphysical 
 doctrine of will. Indeed, it stands in opposition to Schopen- 
 hauer's one-sided metaphysical voluntarism, which derived all 
 being from a transcendental original will, and to the metaphysical 
 systems of a Spinoza or a Herbart, which arose from intellectu- 
 alism. In its relation to metaphysics, the characteristic of psy- 
 chological voluntarism in the sense above defined, is its exclusion 
 of all metaphysics from psychology. In its relations to other 
 forms of psychology, it refuses to accept any of the attempts 
 to reduce volitions to mere ideas, and at the same time empha- 
 sizes the typical character of volition for all psychological ex- 
 perience. Volitional acts are universally recognized as occurren- 
 ces, made up of a series of continual changes in quality and 
 intensity. They are typical in the sense that this characteristic 
 of being occurrences is held to be true for all the contents of 
 psychical experience. 
 
 § 3. METHODS OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 1. Since psychology has for its object, not specific con- 
 ) tents of experience, but general experience in its immediate 
 character, it can make use of no methods except such as 
 the empirical sciences in general employ for the determination, 
 analysis , - and causal synthesis of facts. The circumstance, 
 that natural science abstracts from the subject, while psychol- 
 ogy does not, can be no ground for modifications in the essential 
 character of the methods employed in the two fields, though 
 it does modify the way in which these methods are applied. 
 
§ 3. Methods of Psychology. 19 
 
 The natural sciences, which may serve as an example for 
 psychology in this respect, since they were developed earher, 
 make use of hvo chief methods: experiment and observation. 
 Experiment is observation connected with an intentional 
 interference on the part of the observer, in the rise and 
 course of the phenomena observed. Observation, in its proper 
 sense, is the investigation of phenomena without such inter- 
 ference, just as they are naturally presented to the observer 
 in the continuity of experience. Wherever experiment is 
 possible, it is always used in the natural sciences ; for under 
 all circumstances, even when the phenomena in themselves 
 present the conditions for sufficiently exact observation, it 
 is an advantage to be able to control at will their rise and 
 progress, or to isolate the various components of a composite 
 phenomenon. Still, even in the natural sciences the two 
 methods have been distinguished according ta their spheres 
 of application. It is held that the experimental methods are 
 indispensable for certain problems, while in others the desired 
 end may not infrequently be reached through mere obser- 
 vation. If we neglect a few exceptional cases due to special 
 relations, these two classes of problems correspond to the 
 general division of natural phenomena into processes and 
 objects. 
 
 Experimental interference is required in the exact deter- 
 mination of the course, and in the analysis of the components, 
 of any natural process, such as, for example, light-waves or 
 sound-waves, an electric discharge, the formation or disinte- 
 gration of a chemical compound, and stimulation and metaboUsm 
 in plants and animals. As a rule, such interference is desirable 
 because exact observation is possible only when the observer can 
 determine the moment at which the process shall commence. 
 It is also indispensable in separating the various components 
 of a complex phenomenon from one another. As a rule, this 
 
 2* 
 
20 Introduction. 
 
 is possible only through the addition or subtraction of certain 
 conditions, or a quantitative variation of them. 
 
 The case is different with objects of nature. They are 
 relatively constant; they do not have to be produced at a 
 particular moment, but are always at the observer's disposal 
 and ready for examination. Here, then, experimental in- 
 vestigation is generally necessary only when the production 
 and modification of the objects are to be inquired into. In 
 such a case, they are regarded either as products or com- 
 ponents of natural processes and come under the head of 
 processes rather than objects. When, on the contrary, the 
 only question is the actual nature of these objects, without 
 reference to their origin or modification, mere observation is 
 generally enough. Thus, mineralogy, botany, zoology, ana- 
 tomy, and geography, are pure sciences of observation so long 
 as they are kept free from the physical, chemical, and phys- 
 iological problems that are, indeed, frequently brought into 
 them, but have to do with processes of nature, not with the 
 objects in themselves. 
 
 2. If we apply these considerations to psychology, it is 
 obvious at once, from the very nature of its subject-matter, 
 that exact observation is here possible only in the form of 
 experimental observation, and that psychology can never be 
 a pure science of observation. The contents of this science 
 are exclusively processes, not permanent objects. In order to 
 investigate with exactness the rise and progress of these 
 processes, their composition out of various components, and 
 the interrelations of these components, we must be able first 
 of all to bring about their beginning at will, and purposely 
 to vary the conditions of the same. This is possible here, 
 as in all cases, only through experiment, not through pure 
 introspection. Besides this general reason there is another, 
 pecuHar to psychology, that does not apply at all to natural 
 
§ 3. Methods of Psychology. 21 
 
 phenomena. In the latter case we purposely abstract from 
 the perceiving subject, and under circumstances, especially 
 when favored by the regularity of the phenomena, as in 
 astronomy, mere observation may succeed in determining 
 with adequate certainty the objective contents of the pro- 
 cesses. Psychology, on the contrary, is debarred from this 
 abstraction by its fundamental principles , and the conditions 
 for chance observation can be suitable only when the same 
 objective components of immediate experience are frequently 
 repeated in connection with the same subjective states. It 
 is hardly to be expected, in view of the great complexity of 
 psychical processes, that this will ever be the case. The coin- 
 cidence is especially improbable since the very intention to 
 observe, which is a necessary condition of all observation, 
 modifies essentially the rise and progress of psychical pro- 
 cesses. Observation of nature is not disturbed by this in- 
 tention on the part of the observer, because here we pur- 
 posely abstract from the state of the subject. The chief 
 problem of psychology, however, is the exact observation of 
 the rise and progress of subjective processes, and it can be 
 readily seen that under such circumstances the intention to 
 observe either essentially modifies the facts to be observed, 
 or completely suppresses them. On the other hand, psychol- 
 ogy, by the very way in which psychical processes originate, 
 is led, just as physics and physiology are, to employ the ex- 
 perimental mode of procedure. A sensation arises in us under 
 the most favorable conditions for observation when it is 
 caused by an external sense-stimulus, as, for example, a 
 tone-sensation from an external tone-vibration, or a hght- 
 sensation from an external hght-impression. The idea of an 
 object is always caused originally by the more or less com- 
 plicated cooperation of external sense-stimuli. If we wish 
 to study the way in which an idea is formed, we can choose 
 
22 IntrodiCelion. 
 
 no other method than that of imitating this natural process. 
 In doing this, we have at the same time the great advantage 
 of being able to modify the idea itself by changing at will 
 the combination of the impressions that cooperate to form 
 it, and of thus learning what influence each single condition 
 exercises on the product. Memory-images, it is true, can 
 not be dii-ectly aroused through external sense impressions, 
 but follow them after a longer or shorter interval. Still, it 
 is obvious that their attributes, and especially their relation 
 to the primary ideas aroused through direct impressions, can 
 be most accurately learned, riot by waiting for their chance 
 arrival, but by using such memory-ideas as may be aroused, 
 in a systematic, experimental way, through immediately pre- 
 ceding impressions. The same is true of feelings and voli- 
 tions; they will be presented in the form best adapted to 
 exact investigation when those impressions are purposely 
 produced which experience has shown to be regularly con- 
 nected with affective and volitional reactions. There is, then, 
 no fundamental psychical process to which experimental 
 methods can not be applied, and therefore none in whose 
 investigation they are not logically required. 
 
 3. Pure observation, such as is possible in many depart- 
 ments of natural science, is, from the very character of psy- 
 chical phenomena, impossible in individual psychology. Such 
 a possibiUty would be conceivable only under the condition 
 that there existed permanent psychical objects, independent 
 of our attention, similar to the relatively permanent objects 
 of nature, which remain unchanged by our observation of 
 them. There are, indeed, certain facts at the disposal of 
 psychology, which, although they are not real objects, stUl 
 have the character of psychical objects inasmuch as they 
 possess these attributes of relative permanence, and indepen- 
 dence of the observer. Connected with these characteristics 
 
§ 3. Methods of Psychology. 23 
 
 is the further fact that they are unapprochable by means of 
 experiment in the common acceptance of the term. These 
 facts are the mental products that have been developed in 
 the course of history, such as language, mythological ideas, 
 and customs. The origin and development of these pro- 
 ducts depend in every case on general psychical conditions 
 which may be inferred from their objective attributes. Psy- 
 chological analysis can, consequently, explain the psychical 
 processes operative in their formation and development. All 
 such mental products of a general character presuppose as 
 a condition the existence of a mental community com- 
 posed of many individuals, though, of course, their deepest 
 sources are the psychical attributes of the individual. 
 Because of this dependence oil the community, in par- 
 ticular the social community, this whole department of psy- 
 chological investigation is designated as social psychology, 
 and distinguished from individual, or as it may be called 
 because of its predominating method, experimental psychology. 
 In the present stage of the science these two branches of 
 psychology are generally taken up in different treatises ; still, 
 they are not so much different departments as different meth- 
 ods. So-called social psychology corresponds to the method 
 of pure observation, the objects of observation in this case 
 being the mental products. The necessary connection of 
 these products with social communities, which has given to 
 social psychology its name, is due to the fact that the mental 
 products of the individual are of too variable a character to 
 be the subjects of objective observation. The phenomena 
 gain the necessary degree of constancy only when they 
 become collective. 
 
 Thus psychology has, like natural science, two exact 
 methods : the experimental method, serving for the analysis of 
 simpler psychical processes, and the observation of general 
 
'2'i IntrodueUon. 
 
 mental products, serving for the investigation of the higher 
 psychical processes and developments. 
 
 3a. Tlie introduction of the experimental method into psychol- 
 ogy was originally due to the modes of procedure in physiology, 
 especially in the physiology of the sense-organs and the nervous 
 system. For this reason experimental psychology is also com- 
 monly called "physiological psychology"; and works treating it 
 under this title regularly contain those supplementary facts from 
 the physiology of the nervous system and the sense-organs, which 
 require special discussion with a view to the interests of psy- 
 chology, though in themselves they belong to physiology alone. 
 "Physiological psychology" is, accordingly, an intermediate dis- 
 cipline which is, however, as the name indicates, primarily 
 psychology, and is, apart from the supplementary physiological 
 facts that it presents, just the same as "experimental psychology" 
 in the sense above defined. The attempt sometimes made , to 
 distinguish psychology proper from physiological psychology, by 
 assigning to the first the psychological interpretation of inner 
 experience, and to the second the derivation of this experience 
 from physiological processes, is to be rejected as inadmissible. 
 There is only one kind of causal explanation in psychology, and 
 that is the derivation of more complex psychical processes from 
 simpler ones. In this method of interpretation physiological 
 elements can be used only as supplementary aids, because of the 
 relation between natural science and psychology as above defined 
 (§ 2, 4). Materialistic psychology denies the existence of psychical 
 causality, and substitutes for this problem the other, of explain- 
 ing psychical processes by brain-physiology. This tendency, which 
 has been shown (§ 2, 10 a) to be epistemologically and psycho- 
 logically untenable, appears among the representatives of both 
 "pure" and "physiological" psychology. 
 
 § 4. GENERAL SUEVEY OF THE SUBJECT. 
 
 ; 1. The immediate contents of experience which constitute 
 the subject-matter of psychology, are under all circumstances 
 processes of a composite character. Sense-perceptions of ex- 
 
§ 4. General Survey of (he Subject. 25 
 
 ternal objects, memories of such sense-perceptions, feelings, 
 emotions, and volitional acts, are not only continually united 
 in the most various ways, but each of these processes is 
 itself a more or less composite whole. The idea of an ex- 
 ternal body, for example, is made up of partial ideas of its 
 parts. A tone may be ever so simple , but we localize it in 
 some direction, thus bringing it into connection with the idea 
 of external space, which is highly composite. A feeling or 
 volition is referred to some sensation that aroused the feeling 
 or to an object willed. In dealing with a complex fact of 
 this kind, scientific investigation has three problems to be 
 solved in succession. The first is the analysis of composite 
 processes; the second is ^e demonstration of the combinations 
 into which the elements discovered by analysis enter; the 
 third is the investigation of the laws that are operative in 
 the formation of such combinations. 
 
 2. The second, or synthetic, problem is made up of several 
 partial problems. In the first place, the psychical elements 
 unite to form composite psychical compounds which are 
 separate and relatively independent of one another in the con- 
 tinual flow of psychical processes. Such compounds are, for 
 example, ideas, whether referred directly to external impressions 
 or objects, or interpreted by us as memories of impressions 
 and objects perceived before. Other examples are composite 
 feelings, emotions, or volitions. Then again, these psychical 
 compounds stand in the most various interconnections with 
 one another. Thus, ideas unite to from larger simultaneous 
 ideational complexes or regular successions, while affective and 
 volitional processes form a variety of combinations with one 
 another and with ideational processes. In this way we have 
 the interconnection of psychical compounds as a class of syn- 
 thetical processes of the second degree, consisting of a union 
 between the simpler combinations, or those of elements into 
 
26 Introduction. 
 
 psychical compounds. The separate psychical interconnections, 
 in turn, unite to form still more comprehensive combinations, 
 which also show a certain regularity in the arrangement of 
 their components. In this way, combinations of a third degree 
 arise, which we designate by the general name psychical 
 developments. They may be divided into developments of 
 different scope. Developments of a more limited sort are 
 such as relate to a single mental trend, for example, the 
 development of the intellectual functions, of the will, or of the 
 feelings, or of merely one special branch of these functions, 
 such as the aesthetic or moral feelings. From a number of 
 such partial series arises the total development of a psychical 
 personality. Finally, since animals and in a still higher 
 degree human individuals are in continual interrelation with 
 like beings, there arise above these individual forms the gen^ 
 eral psychical developments. These various branches of the 
 study of psychical development are in part the psychological 
 foundations of other sciences, such as the theory of knowledge, 
 pedagogy, aesthetics, and ethics, and are, accordingly, treated 
 more appropriately in connection with these. In part they 
 have become special psychological sciences, such as child- 
 psychology, animal and social psychology. We shall, there- 
 fore, in this treatise discuss only those results from the three 
 last mentioned departments which are of the most importance 
 for general psychology. 
 
 3. The solution of the last and most general psychological 
 problem, the ascertainment of the laws of psychical phenom- 
 ena, depends apon the investigation of all the combi- 
 nations of different degrees, the combination of elements 
 into compounds, of compounds into interconnections, and 
 of interconnections into developments. And as this in- 
 vestigation is the only thing that can teach us the actual 
 composition of psychical processes, so we can discover the 
 
§ 4. General Survey of the Subject. 27 
 
 attributes of psychical causality, which iinds its expression 
 in these processes, only from the laws followed by the con- 
 tents of experience and their components in their various 
 combinations. 
 
 We have, accordingly, to consider in the following 
 chapters : 
 
 1) Psychical Elements, 
 
 2) Psychical Compounds, 
 
 3) Interconnection of Psychical Compounds, 
 
 4) Psychical Developments, 
 
 5) Psychical Causality and its Laws. 
 
I. PSYCHICAL ELEMENTS. 
 
 § 5. CHIEF FORMS A^D GENERAL ATTRIBUTES 
 OF PSYOHIOAL ELEMENTS. 
 
 l.^^AlLJ lie conten ts of psychical experience are of a com- 
 posite chara ctei:. It follows, therefore, that psychical elements, 
 or the absolutely simple and irreducible components of psy- 
 chical phenomena, can not be found by analysis alone, but 
 only with the aid of abstraction. This abstraction is rendered 
 possible by the fact that the elements are in reahty united 
 in different ways. If the element a is connected in one case 
 with the elements b, e, d . . ., in another with b', c', d' . . ., 
 it is possible to abstract it from all the other elements, be- 
 cause none of them is always united with it. If, for example, 
 we hear a simple tone of a certaia pitch and intensity, it 
 may be located now in this direction, now in that, and may 
 be heard alternately with various other tones. But since the 
 direction is not constant, or the accompanying tone the same, 
 it is possible to abstract from these variable elements, and 
 we have the single tone as a psychical element. 
 
 2. As products of psychical analysis, we have psychical 
 elements of two kinds, corresponding to the two factors con- 
 tained in immediate experience (§ 1, 2), the objective contents 
 and the experiencing subject. The elements of the objective 
 contents we call sensational elements, or simply sensations: 
 such are a tone, or a particular sensation of hot, cold, or 
 light, when we neglect for the moment all the connections 
 
§ 5. Chief Forms and General Attributes of Psychical Elements. 29 
 
 of these sensations with others, and all their spacial and 
 temporal relations. The subjective elements, on the other 
 hand, are designated as affective elements, or simple feelings. 
 We may mention as examples the feelings accompanying sen- 
 sations of hght, sound, taste, smell, hot, cold, or pain, the feel- 
 ings aroused by the sight of an agreeable or disagreeable object, 
 and the feelings arising in a state of attention or at the 
 moment of a voHtional act. Such simple feehngs are in a 
 double sense products of abstraction: each is connected with 
 an ideational element, and is furthermore a component of 
 a psychical process which occurs ia time, and diu'ing which 
 the feeHng itself is continually changing. 
 
 3. The actual contents of psychical experience always i 
 consist of various combinations of sensational and affective I 
 elements, so that the specific character of the simple psychi-; 
 cal processes depends for the most part not on the nature' 
 of these elements so much as on their union into composite 
 psychical compounds. Thus, /the idea of an extended body 
 or of a temporal series of sensations, an emotion, and a vo- 
 lition, are all specific forms of psychical experience. But 
 their character as such is as little present in their sensational 
 and affective elements as the chemical properties of a com- 
 pound body can be defined by recounting the properties of 
 its chemical elements. Specific character — siaA—ehmeiiia/r-y 
 nature of j)sychical processes are, accardingly-j two -entirely 
 different concepts. Every psychical element is a specific 
 content of experience, but not every specific content of imme- 
 diate experience is at the same time a psychical elenient^ 
 Thus, especially spacial and temporal ideas, emotions, and 
 volitional acts, are specific but not elementary processes. 
 Many elements are present only in psychical compounds of 
 a particular kind, but since these compounds regularly con- 
 tain other elements as well, their special characteristics are 
 
30 I- Psyehioal Elements. 
 
 to be attributed to the mode of union, rather than to the 
 abstract attributes, of their elements. Thus, we always refer 
 a momentary sound-sensation to a definite point in time. 
 This localization in time, however, is possible only by relat- 
 ing the given sensation to others preceding and following 
 it, so that the special character of the time-idea can not 
 arise from the single sound-sensation thought of as isolated, 
 but only from its union with others. Again, an emotion of 
 anger or a voHtion contains certain simple feelings that are 
 never present in other psychical compounds, still each of 
 these processes is composite, for it has duration, in the course 
 of which particular feelings follow one another with a certain 
 regularity, and the process itself is not complete without the 
 whole train of these feelings. 
 
 4. Sensations and simple feelings exhibit certain common 
 attributes and also certain characteristic differences. They 
 have in common two determinants, which we call quality and 
 intensity. Every simple sensation and every simple feeling 
 has a definite qualitative character that marks it off from 
 all other sensations and feelings; and this quality must al- 
 ways have some degree of intensity. Accordingly, we distin- 
 guish the different psychical elements from one another by 
 their qualities, but regard the intensity as the quantitative 
 value which in any concrete case belongs to the given ele- 
 ment. Our designations of psychical elements are based 
 entirely upon their quahties; thus, we distinguish such sen- 
 sations as blue, grey, yellow, hot, and cold, or such feelings 
 as grave, cheerful, sad, gloomy, and sorrowful. On the other 
 hand, we always express the differences in the intensity of 
 psychical elements by the same quantitative designations, as 
 weak, strong, medium strong, and very strong. These expres- 
 sions are in both cases class-concepts which serve for a first 
 superficial arrangement of the elements, and each embraces 
 
§ 5. Chief Forms and General Attributes of Psychical Elements. 31 
 
 an unlimitedly large number of concrete elements. Language 
 has developed a relatively complete stock of names for the 
 qualities of simple sensations, especially for colors and tones. 
 Names for the qualities of feelings and for degrees of intensity 
 are far behind. Clearness and obscurity, as also distinctness 
 and indistinctness, are sometimes classed with quality and 
 intensity. But^^ince these attributes, as will appear later 
 (§ 15, 4), always jrisfi-irom-Jhe,, interconnection of psychical 
 compounds, they can not be regarded as determinants -of 
 psychical elements. 
 
 5. Made up, at it is, of two determinants, quality and 
 intensity, every psychical element must have a certain degree 
 of intensity from which it is possible to pass, by continual 
 gradations, to every other degree of intensity in the same 
 quahty. Such gradations can be made in only two directions : 
 one we call ino'ease in intensity, the other decrease. The 
 degrees of intensity of every qualitative element, form in this 
 way a single dimension, in which, from a given point, we 
 may move in two opposite directions, just as from any point 
 in a straight Hne. This may be expressed in the general 
 statement: The various intensities of every psychical element 
 form a continuity of one dimension. The extremities of this 
 continuity we call the minimal and maximal sensation or 
 feeling, as the case may be. 
 
 In contrast with this uniformity in intensities, the qualities 
 have more variable attributes. Every quality may, indeed, be 
 so arranged in a definite continuity that it is possible to pass 
 uninterruptedly from a given point to any other points in the 
 same quality. But the various continuities of different qual- 
 ities , which we may call systems of quality, exhibit differences 
 both in the variety of possible gradations, and in the number 
 of directions of gradation. In these two respects, we may 
 distinguish, on the one hand, homogeneous and complex, on 
 
32 I- Psychical Elements. 
 
 the other, one-dimensional, two-dimensional, aiid many-dimsn^ 
 sional systems of quality. "Within a homogeneous system, 
 only such small differences are possible that generally there 
 has never arisen any practical need of distinguishing them 
 by different names. Thus, we distinguish only one quality 
 of pressure, hot, cold, or pain, only one feeling of attention 
 or of activity, although, in intensity, each of these qualities 
 may have many different grades. It is not to be inferred from 
 this fact that in each of these systems there is really only 
 one quality. The truth is that in these cases the number 
 of different qualities is merely very limited;,, if we were to 
 represent it geometrically, it would probably never reduce 
 entirely to a single point. Thus, for example, sensations of 
 pressure from different regions of the sldn show, beyond 
 question, small qualitative differences which are great enough 
 to let us distinguish clearly any point of the skin from another 
 at some distance from it. Such differences, however, as 
 arise from contact with a sharp or dull, a rough or smooth 
 body, are not to be reckoned as different qualities. They 
 always depend on a large number of simultaneous sensations, 
 and without the various combinations of these sensations into 
 composite psychical compounds, the impressions mentioned 
 would be impossible. 
 
 Complex systems of quality differ from those we have been 
 discussing, in that they embrace a large number of clearly 
 distinguishable elements between which all possible inter- 
 mediate forms exist. Li this class we must include the 
 tonal system and color-system, the systems of smells and 
 tastes, and among the affective systems those which form 
 the subjective complements of these sensational systems, such 
 as the systems of tonal feelings, color-feelings, etc. It is 
 probable also that many systems of feelings belong here, which 
 are objectively connected with composite impressions, but as 
 
§ 5. Chief Forms and Oeneral Attributes of Psychical Elements. 33 
 
 feelings are simple in character; such are the various feelings 
 of harmony or discord that correspond to the different com- 
 binations of tones. 
 
 The differences in the number of dimensions have heen 
 determined with certainty only in the case of certain sensa- 
 tional systems. Thus, the tonal system is one -dimensional. 
 The ordinary color-system, which includes the colors and their 
 transitional qualities to white, is two-dimensional; while the 
 complete system of Hght-sensations, which includes also the 
 dark color-tones and the transitional quahties to black, is 
 three - dimensional. 
 
 6. In the relations discussed thus far, sensational and 
 affective elements in .general agree. They differ, on the other 
 hand, in certain essential attributes which are connected 
 with the immediate relations of sensations to objects and of 
 feelings to the subject. 
 
 1) When varied in a single dimension, sensational elements 
 exhibit ^wre qualitative differences, which are always in the same 
 direction until they reach the possible limits of variation, where 
 they become maximal differences. Thus, in the color-system, 
 red and green, blue and yellow, or in the tonal system, the 
 lowest and highest audible tones, are the maximal, and at the 
 same time purely qualitative, differences. Every affective ele- 
 ment, on the contrary, when continuously varied in the 
 suitable direction of quality, passes gradually into a feeling 
 of opposite quality. This is most obvious in the case of the 
 affective elements regularly connected with certain sensational 
 elements, as, for example, tonal feelings or color-feeHngs. As 
 sensations a high and a low tone are differences that approach 
 more or less the maximal differences of tonal sensation; the 
 corresponding tonal feelings are opposites. In general, then, 
 sensational qualities are limited by maximal differences, affec- 
 tive qualities by maximal opposites. Between these opposites 
 
 WoNDT, Psychology. 3 
 
34 /• Psychical Elements. 
 
 is a middle zone, where the feeling is not noticeable at all. 
 It is, however, frequently impossible to demonstrate this in- 
 difference-zone, because, while certain simple feelings disappear, 
 other affective qualities remain, or new ones even may arise. 
 The latter case appears especially when the transition of the 
 feeling into the indifference-zone depends on a change in sen- 
 sations. Thus, in the middle of the musical scale, those feelings 
 disappear which correspond to the high and low tones, but the 
 middle tones have still other, independent affective qualities 
 which do not disappear with these opposites. This is to be 
 explained hy the fact that a feehng which corresponds to a 
 certain sensational quality is, as a rule, a component of a 
 complex affective system, in which it belongs at the same 
 time to various dimensions. Thus, the affective quaUty of 
 a tone of given pitch belongs not only to the dimension of 
 pitch-feelings, but also to that of feehngs of intensity, and 
 finally to the different dimensions in which the clang-qual- 
 ities of tones may be arranged. A tone of middle pitch 
 and intensity may, in this way, lie in the indifference-zone 
 so far as feelings of pitch and intensity are concerned, and 
 yet have a very marked clang-feeling. The passage of affec- 
 tive elements through the indifference-zone can be directly 
 observed only when care is taken to abstract from other 
 accompanying affective elements. The cases most favorable for 
 this observation are those in which the accompanying elements 
 disappear entirely or almost entirely. Wherever such an in- 
 difference-zone appears without complication with other affective 
 elements, we speak of the state as free from feelings, and of 
 the sensations and ideas present in such a state, as indifferent. 
 2) Peelings of specific, and at the same time simple and 
 irreducible, quality appear not only as the subjective com- 
 plements of simple sensations, but also as the characteristic 
 attendants of composite ideas or even complex ideational 
 
§ 5. Chief Forms and General Attributes of Psychical Elements. 35 
 
 processes. Thus, there is a simple tonal feeling which varies 
 with the pitch and intensity of tones, and also a feeling of 
 harmony which, regarded as a feeling, is just as irreducible, 
 but varies with the character of compound clangs. Still 
 other feelings, which may in turn be of the most various 
 kinds, arise from melodious series of clangs. Here, again, 
 each single feehng taken by itself at a given moment, appears 
 as an irreducible unit. Simple feelings are, then, much more 
 various and numerous than simple sensations. 
 
 3) The various pure sensations may be arranged in a 
 number of separate systems, between whose elements there is 
 no qualitative relation whatever. Sensations belonging to 
 different systems are called disparate. Thus, a tone and a 
 color, a sensation of hot and one of pressure, or, in general, 
 any two sensations between which there are no intermediate 
 qualities, are disparate. According to this criterion, each of 
 the four special senses (smell, taste, hearing, and sight) has a 
 closed, complex sensational system, disparate from the other 
 senses; while the general sense (touch) contains four homo- 
 geneous sensational systems (sensations of pressure, hot, cold, 
 and pain). All simple feelings, on the contrary, form a 
 single interconnected manifold, for there is no feeling from 
 which it is not possible to pass to any other through inter- 
 mediate forms or through indifference -zones. But here too 
 we may distinguish certain systems whose elements are more 
 closely related, as, for example, feelings from colors, tones, 
 harmonies, and rhythms. StUl, they are not absolutely closed 
 systems, but there are everywhere relations either of likeness 
 or of opposition to other systems. Thus, such feelings as those 
 from sensations of moderate warmth, from tonal hamorny, and 
 from satisfied expectation, however great their qualitative 
 differences may be, are all related in that they belong to the 
 general class of "pleasurable feelings". Still closer relations 
 
 3* 
 
36 I. Psychical Elements. 
 
 exist between certain single affective systems, as, for example, 
 between tonal feelings and color-feelings, where deep tones 
 seem to be related to dark colors, and bright colors to high 
 tones. When in such cases a certain relationship is ascribed 
 to the sensations themselves, it is probably due entirely to a 
 confusion of the accompanying feelings with the sensations. 
 This third distinguishing characteristic shows conclu- 
 sively that the origin of the feelings is more unitary than 
 that of the sensations, which depend on a number of differ- 
 ent and in part distinguishable conditions. It is the same 
 distinction that we find in the characterization of the sub- 
 ject, which stands in immediate relation to the feelings, as 
 a unit, in contrast with the plurality of the objects, to which 
 the sensations are related. 
 
 6 a. It is only in modem psychology that the terms "sen- 
 sation" and "feeling" have gained the meanings assigned to them 
 in the definitions above given. In older psychological literature 
 they were sometimes used indiscriminatingly, sometimes inter- 
 changed. Even yet sensations of touch and those from the 
 internal organs are called feelings by physiologists, and the sense 
 of touch itself is known as the "sense of feeUng". This corre- 
 sponds, it is true, to the original significance of the word, where 
 feeling is the same as touching, still, after the very useful 
 difierentiation has once been made, a confusion of the two terms 
 should be avoided. Then again, the word "sensation" is used 
 even by psychologists to mean not only simple, but also com- 
 posite qualities, such as compound clangs and spacial and tem- 
 poral ideas. But since we have the entirely adequate word 
 "idea" for such compounds, it is more advantageous to limit the 
 word sensation to psychologically simple sense-qualities. Finally, 
 the term "sensation" has sometimes been restricted so as to mean 
 only those stimulations which come directly from external sense- 
 stimuli. For the psychological attributes of a sensation, however, 
 this circumstance is entirely irrelevant, and therefore such a 
 definition of the term is unjustifiable. 
 
§ 5. Chief Forms and Qeneral Attributes of Psychical Mements, 37 
 
 The discrimination between sensational and affective elemenl.s 
 in any concrete case is very much facilitated by the existence 
 of indifference-zones in the feelings. Then again, from the fact 
 that feelings range between opposites rather than mere differ- 
 ences, it follows that they are much the more variable elements 
 of our immediate experience. This changeable character, which 
 renders it almost impossible to hold an affective state constant 
 in quality and intensity, is the cause of the great difficulties 
 that stand in the way of the exact investigation of feelings. 
 
 Sensations are present in all immediate experiences, but 
 feelings may disappear in certain special cases, because of their 
 oscillation through an indifference-zone. Obviously, then, we can, 
 in the case of sensations, abstract from the accompanying feel- 
 ings, but never vice versa. In this way two false views may 
 easily arise, either that sensations are the causes of feelings, or 
 that feelings are a particular species of sensations. The first of 
 these opinions is false because affective elements can never be 
 derived from sensations as such, but only from the attitude of 
 the subject, so that under different subjective conditions the 
 same sensation may be accompanied by different feelings. The 
 second is untenable because the two classes of elements are 
 distinguished , on the one hand by the immediate relation of 
 sensations to objects and of feelings to the subject, and on the 
 other by the fact that the former range between maximal differ- 
 ences, the latter between maximal opposites. Because of the 
 objective and subjective factors belonging to all psychical ex- 
 perience, sensations and feelings are to be looked upon as real 
 and equally essential, though everywhere interrelated, elements 
 of psychical phenomena. In this interrelation the sensational 
 elements appear as the more constant; they alone can be isolated 
 through abstraction, by referring them to external objects. It 
 follows, therefore, of necessity that in investigating the attributes 
 of both, we must start with the sensations. Simple sensations, 
 in the consideration of which we abstract from the accompanying 
 affective elements, are called ^wre sensations. Obviously, we can never 
 speak of "pure feelings" in a similar sense, since simple feelings 
 can never be thought of apart from the accompanying sensations 
 and combinations of sensations. This fact is directly connected with 
 the second distinguishing characteristic mentioned above (p. 34 sq). 
 
38 I. Psychical Elements. 
 
 § 6. PURE SENSATIONS. 
 
 1. The concept "pure sensation" as shown in § 5 is the 
 product of a twofold abstraction: 1) from the ideas in which 
 the sensation appears, and 2) from the simple feelings with 
 which it is united. We find that pure sensations, defined in 
 this way, form a number of disparate systems of quality ; each 
 of these systems, such as that of sensations of pressure, of 
 tone, or of hght, is either a homogeneous or a complex con- 
 tinuity (§5, 5) from which no transition to any other system 
 can be found. 
 
 2. The rise of sensations, as physiology teaches us, is re- 
 gularly dependent on certain physical processes that have 
 their origin partly in the external world surrounding us, 
 partly in certain bodily organs. We designate these pro- 
 cesses with a name borrowed from physiology as sense-stiTn- 
 uli or sensation- stimuli. If the stimulus is a process in 
 the outer world we call it physical; if it is a process in our 
 own body we call it physiological. Physiological stimuK may 
 be divided, in turn, into penpheral and central, according 
 as they are processes in the various bodily organs outside of 
 the brain, or processes in the brain itself. In many cases a 
 sensation is attended by all three forms of stimuli. Thus, to 
 illustrate, an external impression of hght acts as a physical 
 stimulus on the eye; in the eye and optic nerve there arises 
 a peripheral physiological stimulation; finally a central phys- 
 iological stimulation takes place in the corpora quadrigemina 
 and in the occipital regions of the cerebral cortex, where the 
 optic nerve terminates. In many cases the physical stimulus 
 may be wanting, while both forms of physiological stimuli are 
 present; as, when we perceive a flash of light in consequence 
 of a violent ocular movement. In still other cases the 
 central stimulus alone is present; as, when we recall a hght- 
 
§ 6. Pure Sensations. 39 
 
 impression previously experienced. The central stimulus is, 
 accordingly, the only one that always accompanies sensation. 
 When a peripheral stimulus causes a sensation, it must be 
 connected with a central stimulus, and a physical must be 
 connected with both a peripheral and a central stimulus. 
 
 3. "The physiological study of development renders it 
 probable that the differentiation of the various sensational 
 systems has been effected in part in the course of general 
 development. The original organ of sense is the outer skin 
 with the sensitive inner organs adjoining it. The organs of 
 taste, smell, hearing, and sight, on the other hand, are later 
 differentiations of it. It may, therefore, be surmised that 
 the sensational systems corresponding to these special sense- 
 organs, have also gradually arisen through differentiation from 
 the sensational systems of the general sense, from sensations 
 of pressure, hot, and cold. It is possible, too, that in lower 
 animals some of the systems now so widely differentiated are 
 even yet more alike. From a physiological standpoint the 
 primordeal character of the general sense is also apparent in 
 the fact, that it has for the .transfer of sense-stimuli to the nerves 
 either very simple organs or none at all. Pressure, temperatiu-e, 
 and pain-stimuli can produce sensations at points in the skin 
 where, in spite of the most careful investigation, no special 
 end-organs can be found. There are, indeed, special receiving 
 organs in the regions most sensitive to pressure (touch-cor- 
 puscles, end-bulbs, and corpuscles of Vater), but their struc- 
 ture renders it probable that they merely favor the mechanical 
 transfer of the stimulus to the nerve-endings. Special end-organs 
 for hot, cold, and pain-stimuU have not been found at all. 
 
 In the later developed special sense-organs, on the other 
 hand, we find everywhere structures which not only effect 
 the suitable transfer of the stimuli to the sensory nerves, but 
 generally bring about a physiological transformation of the 
 
40 I- Psyehical Elements. 
 
 stimulation which is indispensable for the rise of the peculiar 
 sensational qualities. But even among the special senses 
 there are differences in this respect. 
 
 The receiving organ in the ear, in particular, appears to 
 be of a character different from that of the organs of smell, 
 taste, and sight. In its most primitive forms it consists of a 
 vesicle filled with one or more solid particles (otoliths), and sup- 
 plied with nerve-bundles distributed in its walls. The particles 
 are set in motion through sound-vibrations, and must cause a 
 rapid succession of weak pressure-stimulations in the fibres of 
 the nerve-bundles. The auditory organ of the higher animals 
 shows an extraordinary complexity, still, in its essential struc- 
 ture it recalls this primitive type. In the cochlea of man 
 and the higher animals the auditory nerve passes at first 
 through the axis, which is pierced by a large number of fine 
 canals, and then emerges through the pores which open into 
 the cavity of the cochlea. Here the branches are distributed 
 on a tightly stretched membrane, which extends through the 
 spiral windings of the cochlea and is weighted with special 
 rigid arches (arches of Corti). This membrane — the basilar 
 membrane, as it is called — must, according to the laws of 
 acoustics, be thrown into sympathetic vibrations whenever 
 sound-waves strike the ear. It seems, therefore, to play 
 the same part here as the otohths do in the lower forms of 
 the auditory organ. At the same time one other change has 
 taken place which accounts for the enormous differentiation 
 of the sensational system. The basilar membrane has a differ- 
 ent breadth in its different parts, for it grows continually 
 wider from the base to the apex of the cochlea. In this 
 way it acts like a system of stretched chords of different 
 lengths. And just as in such a system, other conditions re- 
 maining the same, the longer chords are tuned to lower and 
 the shorter to higher tones, so we may assume the same to 
 
^' 6. Pure Sensations. 41 
 
 be true for the different parts of the basilar membrane. We 
 may surmise that the simplest auditory organs with their 
 otoliths have a homogeneous sensational system, analogous 
 perhaps to our systems of sensations of pressure. The 
 special development of the organ as seen in the cochlea of 
 higher animals explains the evolution of an extraordinarily 
 complex sensational system from this originally homogeneous 
 system. Still, the structure remains similar in this respect, 
 that it seems adapted, in the latter case as in the former, to 
 the best possible transfer of the physical stimulus to the 
 sensory nerve rather than to any transformation of the stim- 
 ulus. This view agrees with the observed fact that, just as 
 sensations of pressure may be perceived on regions of the 
 skin not supplied with special receiving organs, so, in the 
 case of certain animals, such as birds, where the conditions 
 are specially favorable for their transmission, sound-vibrations 
 are transferred to the auditory nerve and sensed even after 
 the removal of the whole auditory organ vnth its special re- 
 ceiving structure. 
 
 With smell, taste, and sight the case is essentially differ- 
 ent. Organs are present which render direct action of the 
 stimuli on the sensory nerves impossible. The external stim- 
 uli are here received through special organs and modified 
 before they excite the nerves. These organs are specially 
 metamorphosed epithelial cells with one end exposed to the 
 stimulus and the other passing into a nerve-fibre. Everything 
 goes to show that the receiving organs here are not merely 
 for the transfer of the stimuH, but rather for their trans- 
 formation. In the three cases under discussion it is probable 
 that the transformation is a chemical process. In smell and taste 
 we have external chemical agencies, ia sight we have light as 
 the causes of chemical disintegrations in the sensory cells; 
 these processes in the cells then serve as the real stimuli. 
 
42 I- Psychical Elements. 
 
 These three senses may, as chemical senses, be distinguished 
 from the mechanical senses of pressure and sound. It is 
 impossible to say with any degree of certainty, to which of 
 these two classes sensations of cold and hot belong. One 
 indication of the direct relation between stimuU and seiisation 
 in mechanical senses, as contrasted with the indirect relation 
 in chemical senses, is that in the first case the sensation 
 lasts only a very little longer than the external stimulus, 
 while in the latter case it persists very much longer. Thus, 
 in a quick succession of pressures and more especially of 
 sounds, it is possible to distinguish clearly the single stimuH 
 from one another; lights, tastes, and smellSj on the other 
 hand, run together at a very moderate rate of succession. 
 
 4. Since peripheral and central stimuli are regular physical 
 concomitants of elementary sensational processes, the attempt 
 to determine the relation between stimuH and sensations is 
 very natural. In attempting to solve this problem, physiol- 
 ogy generally considers sensations as the result of physio- 
 logical stimuli, but assumes at the same time that in this 
 case any proper explanation of the effect from its cause is 
 impossible, and that all that can be undertaken is to deter- 
 mine the constancy of the relations between particular stimuli 
 and the resulting sensations. Now, it is found in many cases 
 that different stimuh acting on the same end-organ produce 
 the same sensations ; thus, for example, mechanical and elec- 
 trical stimulations of the eye produce light sensations. This 
 result was generalized in the principle, that every receiving 
 element of a sense-organ and every simple sensory nerve-fibre 
 together with its central terminus, is capable of only a single 
 sensation of fixed quality; that the various quaUties of sen- 
 sation are, therefore, due to the various physiological elements 
 with different specific energies. 
 
 This principle, generally called the "law of specific energy 
 
§ 6. Pure Sensations. 43 
 
 of nerves", is untenable for three reasons, even if we neglect 
 for the moment the fact that it simply refers the causes of 
 the various differences in sensations to a qualitas occulta of 
 sensory and nervous elements. 
 
 1) It is contradictory to the physiological doctrine of the 
 development of the senses. If, as we must assume according 
 to this doctrine, the complex sensational systems are derived 
 from systems originally simpler and more homogeneous, the 
 physiological sensory elements must have undergone a change 
 also. This, however, is possible only under the condition 
 that organs may be modified by the stimuli which act upon 
 them. That is to say, the sensory elements determine the 
 qualities of sensations only secondarily, as a result of the prop- 
 erties which they acquire through the processes of stimulation 
 aroused in them. If, then, these sensory elements have under- 
 gone, in the course of time, radical changes due to the nature 
 of the stimuU acting upon them, such changes could have been 
 possible only under the condition that the physiological stimu- 
 lations in the sensory elements varied to some extent with 
 the quality of the stimulus. 
 
 2) The principle of specific energy is contradictory to 
 the fact that in many senses the number of different sensory 
 elements does not correspond at all to that of different sen- 
 sational quahties. Thus, from a single point in the retina 
 we can receive all possible sensations of brightness and color; 
 in the organs of smell and taste we find no clearly dis- 
 tinguishable forms of the sensory elements, while even a 
 limited area of their sensory surfaces can receive a variety 
 of sensations, which, especially in the case of the olfactory 
 organ,- is very large. Where we have every reason to assume 
 that qualitatively diferent sensations actually do arise in differ- 
 ent sensory elements, as in the case of the auditory organ, 
 the structure of the organ goes to show that this difference 
 
44 !• Psyehical Elements. 
 
 is not due to any attribute of the nerve -fibres or of other 
 sensory elements, but that it comes originally from the way in 
 which they are arranged. Different fibres of the auditory 
 nerve will, of course, be stimulated by different tone-vibrations, 
 because the different parts of the basilar membrane are tuned 
 to different tones; but this is not due to some original and 
 inexplicable attribute of the single auditory nerve-fibres, but 
 to the way in which they are connected with the end-organ. 
 
 3) Finally, the sensory nerves and central elements can 
 have no original specific energy, because the peripheral sense- 
 organ must be exposed to the adequate stimuli for a suf- 
 ficient interval, or must at least have been so exposed at 
 some previous period^ before the corresponding sensations can 
 arise through their stimulation. Persons congenitally bhnd 
 and deaf do not have any sensations of light or tone whatever, 
 so far as we know, even when the sensory nerves and centres 
 were originally present. 
 
 Everything goes to show that the differences in the qual- 
 ities of sensations are conditioned by the differences in the 
 processes of stimulation that arise in the sense-organs. These 
 processes are dependent primarily on the character of the 
 physical stimuH, and only secondarily on the peculiarities of 
 the receiving organ, which are due to its adaptation to ihese 
 stimuli. As a result of this adaptation, however, it may 
 happen that even when some stimulus other than that which 
 has effected the original adaptation of the sensory elements, 
 that is, when an inadequate stimulus acts, the sensation 
 corresponding to the adequate stimulus may arise. Still, 
 this does not hold for all stimuh or for all sensory elements. 
 Thus, hot land cold stimulations can not cause cutaneous 
 sensations of pressure or sensations in the special sense-organs; 
 chemical and electrical stimuli produce sensations of Hght 
 only when they act upon the retina, not when they act on 
 
§ 6. Pure Sensations. 45 
 
 the optic nerve; and, finally, these general stimuli can not 
 arouse sensations of smell or taste. When an electric current 
 causes chemical disintegration, it may, indeed, arouse such 
 sensations, but it is through the adequate chemical stimuli 
 produced. 
 
 5. From the very nature of the case, it is impossible to 
 explain the character of sensations from the character of phy- 
 sical and physiological stimuli. StimuU and sensations can 
 not be compared with one another at all; the first belong 
 to the mediate experience of the natural sciences, the second 
 to the immediate experience of psychology. An interrelation 
 between sensations and physiological stimuh must necessarily 
 exist, however, in the sense that different kinds of stim- 
 ulation always correspond to different sensations. This 
 principle of the paraUelism of changes in sensation and in 
 physiological stimulation is an important supplementary prin- 
 ciple in both the psychological and physiological doctrines 
 of sensation. In the first case it is used in producing defi- 
 nite changes in the sensation, by means of intentional varia- 
 tion of the stimulus ; in the second it is used in inferring the 
 identity or non-identity of physiological stimulations from the 
 identity or non-identity of the sensations. Furthermore, the 
 same principle is the basis of our practical life and of our 
 theoretical knowledge of the external world. 
 
 A. SENSATIONS OF THE GENERAL SENSE. 
 
 6. The definition of the "general sense" includes two 
 factors. In point of time, the general sense is that which 
 precedes all others and therefore belongs to all beings 
 endowed with mind. In its spacial attributes, the general 
 sense is distinguished from the particular senses in having the 
 most extensive sensory surface exposed to stimuli. It includes 
 not only the whole external skin and the adjoining areas of 
 
46 I- Psychical Elements. 
 
 the mucous membrane, but a large number of internal or- 
 gans supplied with sensory nerves, such as joints, muscles, 
 tendons, and bones, which are accessible to stimuli either 
 always, or at certain times, under special conditions, as is 
 the case with bones. 
 
 The general sense includes four specific, distinct sensa- 
 tional systems: sensations of pressure, hot, cold, and pain. Not 
 infrequently a single stimulus arouses more than one of these 
 sensations. The sensation is then immediately recognized as 
 made up of a raixture of components from the different 
 systems; for example, from sensations of pressure and pain, 
 or from sensations of hot and pain. In a similar manner, 
 as a result of the extension of the sense-organ, we may often 
 have mixtures of the various qualities of one and the same 
 system, for example, quahtatively different sensations of pres- 
 sure, when an extended region of the skin is touched. 
 
 The four systems of the general sense are all homogeneous 
 systems (§ 5, 5). This shows that the sense is genetically 
 earlier than the others , whose systems are all complex. The 
 sensations of pressure from the external skin, and those due 
 to the tensions and movements of the muscles, joints, and 
 tendons, are generally grouped together under the name touch- 
 sensations, and distinguished from the common sensations, 
 which include sensations of hot, cold, and pain, and those sen- 
 sations of pressure that sometimes arise in the other internal 
 organs. This distinction, however, has its source in the re- 
 lation of the sensations to ideas and concomitant feelings, 
 and has nothing to do with the qualities of the sensations 
 in themselves. 
 
 7. The ability of the different parts of the general sense- 
 organ to receive stimulations and give rise to sensations, 
 can be tested with adequate exactness only on the external 
 skin. The only facts that can be determined in regard to 
 
§ 6. Pure Sensations. 47 
 
 the internal parts, are that the joints are in a high degree 
 sensitive to pressures, while the muscles and tendons are 
 much less so, and that sensations of hot, cold, and pain 
 in the internal organs are exceptional, and noticeable only 
 under abnormal conditions. On the other hand, there is 
 no point of the external skin and of the immediately ad- 
 joining parts of the mucous membrane, which is not sen- 
 sitive at once to stimulations of pressure, hot, cold, and 
 pain. The degree of sensitivity may, indeed, vary at different 
 points, in such a way that the points most sensitive to pressure, 
 to hot, and to cold, do not, in generally, coincide. Sensitivity 
 to pain is everywhere about the same, varying at most in such 
 a way that in some places the pain-stimulus acts on the sur- 
 face, and in others not until it has penetrated deeper. On 
 the other hand, certain approximately punctiform cutaneous 
 regions appear to be most favorable for stimulations of 
 pressure, hot, and cold. These points are called respectively, 
 pressure-spots, hot-spots, and cold-spots. They are distributed 
 in different parts of the sldn in varying numbers. Spots of dif- 
 ferent modality never coincide ; still, temperature-spots always 
 receive sensations of pressure and pain as weU ; and a pointed 
 hot stimulus applied to a cold spot always causes a sen- 
 sation of hot, while hot-spots do not seem to be stimulated 
 by pointed cold stimuli. Furthermore, hot-spots and cold- 
 spots react with their adequate sensations to properly applied 
 mechanical and electrical stimuli. 
 
 8. Of the four quaHties mentioned sensations of pressure 
 and pain form closed systems which show no relations either 
 to each other or to the two systems of temperature-sensations. 
 These last two, on the other hand, stand in the relation of 
 opposites; we apprehend hot and cold not merely as different, 
 but as contrasted sensations. It is, however, very probable 
 that this is not due to the original nature of the sensations, 
 
48 I- Psychical Elements. 
 
 but partly to the conditions of their rise, and partly to the 
 accompanying feelings. For, while the other qualities may 
 be united without Limitation to form mixed sensations — as, 
 for example, pressure and hot, pressure and pain, cold and 
 pain — hot and cold exclude each other because, under the 
 conditions of their rise, the only possibilities for a given cu- 
 taneous region are a sensation of hot or one of cold, or else 
 an absence of both. "When one of these sensations passes 
 continuously into the other, the change regularly takes place 
 in such a way that either the sensation of hot gradually dis- 
 appears and a continually increasing sensation of cold arises, 
 or vice versa the sensation of cold disappears and that of hot 
 gradually arises. Then, too, elementary feelings of opposite 
 character are connected with hot and cold, the point where 
 both sensations are absent corresponding to their indifference- 
 zone. 
 
 In still another respect the two systems of temperature- 
 sensations are peculiar. They are to a great extent depen- 
 dent on the varying conditions under which the stimuli act 
 upon the sense-organ. A considerable increase above the 
 temperature of the skin is perceived as hot, while a con- 
 siderable decrease below the same is perceived as cold, but 
 the temperature of the skin itself, which is the indifference- 
 zone between the two, can adapt itself rapidly to the existing 
 external temperature within fairly wide Umits. The fact that 
 in this respect too, both systems are aUke, favors the view 
 that they are interconnected and also antagonistic. 
 
 B. SENSATIONS OF SOUND. 
 
 9. We possess two independent systems of simple auditory 
 sensations, which are generally, however, connected as a result 
 of the mixture of the two kinds of impressions. They are 
 
§ 6. Pure Sensations. 49 
 
 the homogeneous system of simple noise-sensations and the 
 complex system of simple tone-sensations. 
 
 Simple noise-sensations can be produced only under con- 
 ditions that exclude the simultaneous rise of tonal sensations, 
 as when air-vibrations are produced whose rate is either too 
 rapid or too slow for tone-sensations to arise, or when the 
 sound-waves act upon the ear for too short a period. Simple 
 sensations of noise, thus produced, may vary in intensity and 
 duration, but apart from these differences they are quahta- 
 tively alike. It is possible that small quaUtative differences 
 also exist among them, due to the conditions of their rise, 
 but such differences are too small to be marked by distin- 
 guishing names. The noises commonly so called are com- 
 pound ideas made up of such simple noise-sensations and of 
 a great many irregular tonal sensations (cf. § 9, 7). The 
 homogeneous system of simple noise-sensations is probably 
 the first to develop. The auditory vesicles of the lower 
 animals, with their simple otoliths, could hardly produce any- 
 thing but these. In the case of man and the higher animals 
 it may be surmised that the structures found in the vestibule 
 of the labyrinth receive only homogeneous stimulations, corre- 
 sponding to simple sensations of noise. Finally, experiments 
 with animals deprived of their labyrinths, make it probable that 
 even direct stimulations of the auditory nerve can produce 
 such sensations (p. 41). In the embryonic development of 
 the higher animals, the cochlea develops from an original 
 vestibular vesicle, which corresponds exactly to a primitive 
 auditory organ. We are, therefore, justified in supposing that 
 the complex system of tonal sensations is a product of the' 
 differentiation of the homogeneous system of simple noise- 
 sensations, but that in evefy case where this development' 
 has taken place, the simple system has remained along with 
 the higher. 
 
 Wdndt, Psychology. • 4 
 
50 !• Psychical Elements, 
 
 10. The system of simple tone-sensaUons is a continuity 
 of one dimension. We call the quality of the single simple 
 tones pitch. The one -dimensional character of the system 
 finds expression in the fact that, starting with a given pitch, 
 we can vary the quality only in two opposite directions: 
 one we call raising the pitch, the other lowering it. In 
 actual experience simple sensations of tone are never pre- 
 sented alone, but always united with othei^tonal sensations 
 and with accompanying simple sensations of noise. But 
 since, according to the scheme given above (§5, 1), these 
 concomitant elements can be varied indefinitely, and since 
 in many cases they are relatively weak in comparison 
 with one of the tones, the abstraction of simple tones was 
 early reached through the practical use of tonal sensations 
 in the art of music. The names c, c**, d**, and d stand 
 for simple tones, though the clangs of musical instruments 
 or of the human voice by means of which we produce these 
 different pitches, are always accompanied by other, weaker 
 tones and often, too, by noises. But since the conditions 
 for the rise of such concomitant tones can be so varied that 
 they become very weak, it has been possible to produce 
 really simple tones of nearly perfect purity. The simplest 
 means of doing this is by using a tuning-fork, and a resonator 
 tuned to its fundamental tone. Since the resonator increases 
 the intensity of the fundamental only, the other, accom- 
 panying tones are so weak when the fork sounds, that 
 the sensation is generally apprehended as simple and irre- 
 ducible. If the sound -vibrations corresponding to such a 
 tonal sensation are examined, they will be found to corre- 
 spond to the simplest possible form of vibration, the pendulum- 
 oscillation, so called because the vibrations of the atmospheric 
 particles follow the same laws as a pendulum oscillating in 
 
§ 6. Pure Sensations. 5| 
 
 a very small amplitude'). That these relatively simple sound- 
 vihrations correspond to sensations of simple tones, and that 
 we can even distinguish the separate tones in compounds, can 
 be explained, on the basis of the physical laws of sympathetic 
 vibrations, from the structure of the organs in the cochlea. 
 The basilar membrane in the cochlea is in its different parts 
 tuned to tones of different pitch, so that when a simple 
 oscillatory sound-vibration strikes the ear, only the part 
 tuned to that particular pitch will vibrate in sympathy. If the 
 same rate of oscillation comes in a compound sound-vibration, 
 again only the part tuned to it will be affected by it, while 
 the other components of the wave will set in vibration other 
 sections of the membrane, which correspond in the same way 
 to their pitch. 
 
 11. The system of tonal sensations shows its character 
 as a conUrvuous series in the fact that it is always possible 
 to pass from a given pitch to any other through continuous 
 changes in sensation. Music has selected at option from this 
 continuity single sensations separated by considerable inter- 
 vals, thus substituting a to'nal scale for the tonal line. This 
 selection, however, is based on the relations of tonal sensations 
 themselves. We shall return to the discussion of these 
 relations later, in taking up the ideational compounds arising 
 from these sensations (§ 9). The natural tonal line has two 
 extremities, which are conditioned by the physiological capacity 
 of the ear for receiving sounds. These extremities are the 
 lowest and highest tones; the former corresponds to 8 — 3 
 double vibrations per second, the latter to 40,000 — 50,000. 
 
 1) Pendulum-oscillations may be represented by a sine-curve, be- 
 cause the distance from the position of rest is always proportional 
 to the sine of the time required to swing to the point in question. 
 
 4* 
 
52 I. Psyehiecd Elements. 
 
 C, SENSATIONS OF SMELL AND TASTE. 
 
 12. Sensations of smell form a complex system whose 
 arrangement is still unknown. AU we know is that there 
 is a very great number of olfactory qualities, between which 
 there are all possible transitional forms. There can, then, be 
 no doubt that the system is a continuity of many dimensions. 
 
 12 a. Olfactory qualities may be grouped in certain classes, 
 each of which contains those sensations which are more or less 
 related. This fact may be regarded as an indication of how these 
 sensations may perhaps be reduced to a small number of prin- 
 cipal qualities. Such classes are, for examples, sensations like . 
 those from ether, balsam, musk, benzine, those known as aromatic, 
 etc. It has been observed in a few cases that certain olfactory 
 sensations which come from definite substances, can also be pro- 
 duced by mixing others. But these observations are still in- 
 sufficient to reduce the great number of simple qualities con- 
 tained in each of the classes mentioned, to a limited number of 
 primary qualities and their mixtures. Finally, it has been observed 
 that many odors neutralize ' each other, so far as the sensation 
 is concerned, when they are mixed in the proper intensi- 
 ties. This is true not only of substances that neutralize each 
 other chemically , as acetic acid and ammonia , but also of 
 others, such as caoutchouc and wax or tolu-balsam, which do 
 not act on each other chemically outside of the olfactory cells. 
 Since this neutralization takes place when the two stimuli act on 
 entirely different olfactory surfaces, one on the right and the 
 other on the left mucous membrane of the nose, it is probable 
 that we are dealing, not with phenomena analogous to those ex-, 
 hibited by complementary colors (22) , but with a reciprocal 
 central inhibition of sensations. Another observed fact tells 
 against the notion that they are complementary. One and the 
 same olfactory quality can neutralize several entirely different 
 qualities, sometimes even those which in turn neutralize one 
 another, while among colors it is always only two fixed qualities 
 that are complementary. 
 
§ 6. Pure Sensations. 53 
 
 13. Sensations of taste have been somewhat more thoroughly- 
 investigated, and we can here distinguish four Aistinct primary 
 qualities. Between these there are all possible transitional 
 tastes, which are to be regarded as mixed sensations. The 
 primary qualities are sour, sweet, bitter, and saline. Besides 
 these, alkaline and metalHc are sometimes regarded as inde- 
 pendent qualities. But alkaline quaUties show an unmis- 
 takable relationship with sahne, and metalhc with sour, so 
 that both are probably mixed sensations (alkaline made up 
 perhaps of saUne and sweet, metalhc of sour and saUne). 
 Sweet and saline are opposite qualities. When these two 
 sensations are united in proper intensities, the result is a 
 neutral mixed sensation (commonly known as "insipid"), even 
 though the stimuh that here reciprocally neutralize each other 
 do not enter into a chemical combination. The system of taste- 
 sensations is, accordingly, in all probabiKty to be regarded as 
 a two-dimensional continuity, which may be geometrically 
 represented by a circular surface on whose circumference the 
 four primary, and their intermediate, qualities are arranged, 
 while the neutral mixed sensation is in the middle, and the 
 other transitional taste-qualities on the surface , between this 
 middle point and the saturated qualities on the circumference. 
 
 13 a. In these attributes of taste-qualities we seem to liave 
 the fundamental type of a chemical sense. In this respect taste 
 is perhaps the antecedent of sight. The obvious interconnection 
 with the chemical nature of the stimulation, makes it probable 
 even here that the reciprocal neutralization of certain sensations, 
 with which the two-dimensional character of the sensational 
 system is perhaps connected, depends, not on the sensations in 
 themselves, but on the relations between the physiological stimu- 
 lations, just as in the case of sensations of hot and cold (p. 48). 
 It is well known that very commonly the chemical effect of 
 certain substances can be neutralized through the action of cer- 
 tain other substances. Now. we do not know what the chemical 
 
54 /■ Psychical Elements. 
 
 changes are that are produced by the gustatory stimuli in the 
 taste-cells. But from the neutralization of sensations of sweet 
 and saline we may conclude, in accordance with the principle of 
 the parallelism of changes in sensation and in stimuli (p. 45), 
 that the chemical reactions which sweet and saline substances 
 produce in the sensory cells, also counteract each other. The 
 same would hold for other sensations for which similar relations 
 could be demonstrated. In regard to the physiological conditions 
 for gustatory stimulations, we can draw only this one conclusion 
 from the facts mentioned, namely, that the chemical processes of 
 stimulation corresponding to the sensations which neutralize each 
 other in this way, probably take place in the same cells. Of course, 
 the possibility is not excluded that several different processes 
 liable to neutralization through opposite reactions, could arise in 
 the same cells. The known anatomical facts and the experiments 
 of physiology in stimulating single papillae separately, giye no 
 certain conclusions in this matter. Whether we are here dealing 
 with phenomena that are really analogous to those exhibited by 
 complementary colors (v. iaf. 22) is still a question. 
 
 D. SENSATIONS OF LIGHT. 
 
 14. The system of light-sensations is made up of two 
 partial systems: that of sensations of achromatic light and 
 that of se?isations of chromatic light. Between the quaUties 
 in these two, all possible transitional forms exist. 
 
 Sensations of achromatic light, when considered alone, 
 form a complex system of 07ie dimension, which extends, like 
 the tonal line, between two limiting quahties. The sensations 
 in the neighborhood of one of these limits we call black, in 
 the neighborhood of the other white, while between the two 
 we insert grey in its different shades (dark grey, grey, and 
 light grey). This one -dimensional system of achromatic 
 sensations differs from that of tones in being at once a 
 system of quality and of intensity; for every qualitative 
 change in the direction from black to white is seen at the 
 
§ 6. Pure Sensations. 55 
 
 same time as an increase in intensity, and every qualitative 
 change in the direction from white to black is seen as a decrease 
 in intensity. Each point in the series, which thus has a def- 
 inite quality and intensity, is called a degree of brightness 
 of the achromatic sensations. The whole system may, accord- 
 ingly , he designated as that of sensations of pure brightness. 
 The use of the word "pure" indicates the absence of all sen- 
 sations of color. The system of pure brightness is absolutely 
 one-dimensional for, both the variations in quality and those 
 in intensity belong to one and the same dimension. It 
 differs essentially, in this respect, from the tonal Hne, in which 
 each point is merely a degree of quaUty, and has also a whole 
 series of gradations in intensity. Simple tone -sensations 
 thus form a two-dimensional continuity so soon as we take 
 into account both determinants, quality and intensity, while 
 the system of pure brightness is always one-dimensional, even 
 when we attend to both determinants. The whole system 
 may, therefore, be regarded as a continuous series of grades 
 of brightness, in which the lower grades are designated black 
 so far as quality is concerned, and weak in point of inten- 
 sity, while the higher grades are called white and strong. 
 
 15. Sensations of color also form a orie-dimensional system 
 when their qualities alone are taken into account. Unhke 
 the system of sensations of pure brightness, this system returns 
 upon itself from whatever point we start, for at first, after 
 leaving a given quality, we pass gradually to a quality that 
 shows the greatest difference, and going still further we find 
 that the qualitative differences become smaller again, until 
 finally we reach the starting point once more. The color- 
 spectrum obtained by refracting sunlight through a prism, or 
 that seen in the rainbow, shows this characteristic, though not 
 completely. If in these cases we start from the red end of 
 the spectrum, we come first to orange, then to yellow, yellow- 
 
56 I. Psyehieal Elements, 
 
 green, green-blue, blue, indigo-blue, and finally to violet, 
 which is more like red than any of the other colors except 
 orange, which lies next to red. The line of colors in the 
 spectrum does not return quite to its starting-point, because 
 it does not contain all of the colors that we have in sen- 
 sation. Purple-red shades , which can be obtained by the ob- 
 jective mixture of red and violet rays, are wanting in the 
 spectrum. Only when we fill out the spectral series with 
 them, is the system of actual color- sensations complete, 
 and then the system is a closed circle. This characteristic 
 is not to be attributed to the circumstance that the spectrum 
 actually presents for our observation a series returning nearly 
 to its beginning. The same order of sensations can be found 
 by arranging according to their subjective relationship , colored 
 objects presented in any irregular order. Even children who 
 have never observed attentively a solar spectrum or a rain- 
 bow, and can, therefore, begin the series with any other color 
 just as well as with red, always arrange them in the same order. 
 The system of pure colors is, then, to be defined as one- 
 dimensional. It does not extend in a straight , line, however, 
 but returns upon itself. Its simplest geometrical represen- 
 tation would be a circle. From a given point in this system 
 we pass, when the sensation is gradually varied, first to similar 
 sensations, then to those most markedly different, and finally 
 to others similar to the first quahty, but in the opposite 
 direction. Every color must, accordingly, be related to one 
 other particular color as a maximum of difference in sen- 
 sation. This color may be called the opposite color, and in 
 the representation of the color-system by a circle, two oppo- 
 site colors are to be placed at the two extremities of the 
 same diameter. Thus, for example, purple-red and green, 
 yellow and blue, light green and violet, are opposite colors, that 
 is,, colors which exhibit the greatest qualitative differences. 
 
§ 6. Pure Sensations. 57 
 
 The quality determined by the position of a sensation in 
 the color-system, in distinction to other quahtative deter- 
 minations, is called color-tone, a figurative name borrowed 
 from tonal sensations. In this sense the simple names of 
 colors, such as red, orange, yellow, etc., denote merely color- 
 tones. The color-circle is a representation of the system of 
 color-tones abstracted from all the other attributes belonging 
 to the sensations. In reality, every color-sensation has two 
 other attributes, one we call its saturation, the other its 
 brightness. Saturation is peculiar to chromatic sensations, 
 while brightness belongs to achromatic sensations as well. 
 
 16. By saturation we mean the attribute of color-sensa- 
 tions by virtue of which they appear in all possible stages of 
 transition to sensations of pure brightness, so that a con- 
 tinuous passage is possible from every color to any point in 
 the series of whites, greys, and blacks. The term "satura- 
 tion" is borrowed from the common method of producing 
 these transitional colors objectively, that is, by the more or 
 less intense saturation of some colorless soluble with color- 
 pigment. A color may be ever so saturated, yet it is possible 
 to think of a still greater saturation of the same color-tone, 
 and, on the other hand, pure brightness always denotes the 
 end of the series of diminishing grades of saturation for any 
 color whatever. A degree of saturation may, therefore, be 
 thought of as an attribute of all color-sensations, and, at 
 the same time, as the attribute by which the system of 
 color-sensations is directly united with that of sensations of 
 pure brightness. If, now, we represent some particular sen- 
 sation of white, grey, or black by the central point of the 
 color-circle, aU the grades of saturation that can arise as 
 transitional stages from any particular color to this particular 
 sensation of pure brightness, wiU obviously be represented 
 by that radius of the circle which connects the centre with 
 
58 !■ Psychical Elements. 
 
 the color in question. If the grades of saturation correspond- 
 ing to the continuous transitional stages from all the colors 
 to a particular sensation of pure brightness, are thus geo- 
 metrically represented, we have the system of saturation-grades 
 as a circular surface whose circumference is the system of 
 simple color-tones, and whose centre is the sensation of pure 
 brightness, corresponding to the absence of all saturation. 
 For the formation of such a system of saturation-grades any 
 point whatever in the series of sensations of pure bright^ 
 ness may be taken, so long as the condition is fulfilled that 
 the white is not too bright or the black too dark, for in such 
 cases differences in both saturation and color disappear. 
 Systems of saturation which are arranged about different 
 points in the series of pure brightness, always have different 
 grades of brightness. A pure system of saturation, accord- 
 ingly , can be made for only one particular grade of bright- 
 ness at a time, that is, for only one point in the series of 
 sensations of pure brightness. "When such systems are made 
 for all possible points, the system of saturation will be sup- 
 plemented by that of grades of brightness. 
 
 17. Brightness is just as necessary an attribute of a 
 color-sensation as it is of achromatic sensations, and is in 
 this case, too, at once a quality and degree of intensity. 
 Starting from a given grade, if the brightness increases, every 
 color approaches white in quality, while at the same time 
 the intensity increases; if the brightness decreases, the colors 
 approach black in quahty, and the intensity diminishes. The 
 grades of brightness for any single color thus form a system 
 of intensive qualities, analogous to that of pure brightnesses, 
 only in place of the achromatic gradations between white 
 and black, we have the corresponding grades of saturation. 
 From the point of greatest saturation there are two opposite 
 directions for variation in saturation: one positive, towards 
 
§ 6, Pure Sensations. 59 
 
 white, accompanied by an increase in the intensity of the 
 sensation, and the other negative, towards black, with a 
 corresponding decrease in intensity. As limits for these two 
 directions we have, on the one hand, the pure sensation white, 
 on the other, the pure sensation black; the first is at the 
 same time the maximum, the second the minimum of inten- 
 sity. White and black are in this way opposite extremities 
 of the system of sensations of pure brightness, and also of 
 the system of color-sensations arranged according to grades 
 of brightness. It foUows obviously that there is a certain 
 .medium brightness for every color, at which its saturation is 
 greatest. From this point, the saturation diminishes in the 
 positive direction when the brightness increases, and in the 
 negative direction when the brightness decreases. The grade 
 of brightness most favorable for the saturation is not the 
 same for all colors, but varies from red to blue, in such a 
 way that it is most intense for red and least intense for 
 blue. This accounts for the familiar phenomenon that in 
 twilight, when the degree of brightness is small, the blue 
 color-tones — of paintings, for example — are still clearly 
 visible, while the red color-tones appear black. 
 
 18. If we neglect the somewhat different position of the 
 maximal saturation of the various colors in the line of brightness, 
 the relation that exists between sensations of chromatic 
 brightness and those of pure, or achromatic, brightness, by 
 virtue of the gradual transition of colors into white on the 
 one hand, and into black on the other, may be represented 
 in the simplest manner as follows. First, we may represent 
 the system of pure color-tones, that is, of the colors at their 
 maximal saturation, by a circle, as above. Then we may 
 draw through the centre of this circle, perpendicular to 
 its plaiie, the straight line of pure brightness, in such a 
 way that where it cuts the plane of the circular surface, 
 
60 !■ Psychical Elements. 
 
 it represents the sensation of pure brightness corresponding 
 to the minimum of saturation for the colors with which we 
 started. In hke manner, the other color-circles for increasing 
 and decreasing grades of brightness, may be arranged per- 
 pendicularly along this line, above and below the circle 
 of greatest saturation. But the decreasing saturation of the 
 colors in these latter circles must be expressed in the short- 
 ening of their radii; just as in the first circle, the shorter the 
 distance from the centre, the less the saturation. These 
 radii grow continually shorter, until finally, at the two extrem- 
 ities of the Mne, the circles disappear entirely. This corre- 
 sponds to the fact that for every color the maximum of 
 brightness corresponds to the sensation white, while its mini- 
 mum corresponds to black'). 
 
 19. The whole system of sensations of chromatic bright- 
 ness may, accordingly, be most simply represented by a spher- 
 ical surface whose equator represents the system of pure 
 color-tones, or colors of greatest saturation, while the two 
 poles correspond to white and black, the extremities of the 
 sensations of chromatic brightness. Of course, any other geo- 
 metrical figure with similar attributes, as, for example, two 
 cones with a common base and apexes pointing in different 
 directions, would serve the same purpose. The only thing 
 essential for the representation, is the gradual transition to 
 white and black, and the corresponding decrease in the 
 variety of the color-tones, which finds its expression in the 
 continual decrease in the length of the radii of the color-circles. 
 Now, as above shown, the system of saturations corresponding to 
 
 1) It must be observed, however, that the actual coincidence of 
 these sensations can be empirically proved only for the minimum 
 of brightness. Grades of brightness which approach the maximum 
 are so injurious to the eye that the general demonstration of the 
 approach to white must be accepted as sufficient. 
 
§ 6. Pure Sensations. gj 
 
 a particular sensation of pure brightness, may be represented 
 by a circular surface which contains all the sensations of 
 light belonging to one grade of brightness. When we unite 
 grades of saturation and brightness to a single system, the 
 toted system of all light s&nsaUons may be represented by a solid 
 sphere. The equator is the system of pure color- tones; the 
 polar axis is the system of pure brightnesses ; the surface 
 represents the system of chromatic brightnesses, and, finally, 
 every circular plane perpendicular to the polar axis, corre- 
 sponds to a system of saturations of equal brightness. This 
 representation by means of a sphere is indeed arbitrary, in 
 the sense that any other sohd figure with analogous attri- 
 butes may be chosen in its place; still, it presents to view 
 the psychological fact that the total system of light-sensations 
 is a closed continuity of three dimensions. The three-dimen- 
 sional character of the system arises from the fact that every 
 concrete sensation of light has three determinants : color-tone, 
 saturation, and brightness. Pure, or achromatic, brightness 
 and pure, or saturated, colors are to be regarded as the 
 two extreme cases in the series of saturations. The closed 
 form of the system comes from the circular character of the 
 color-line, on the one hand, and, on the other, from the 
 termination of the system of chromatic brightness in the ex- 
 tremes of pure brightness. A special characteristic of the 
 system is that only the changes in the ttvo dimensions, or 
 those of color-tones and saturations, are pure variations in 
 quality, while every movement in the third dimension, or 
 that of brightness, is at once a modification of both quality 
 and intensity. As a consequence of this circumstance, the 
 whole three-dimensional system is required to represent fully 
 the qualities of Hghl^sensations, but it includes also the in- 
 tensities of these sensations. 
 
 20. Certain principal sensations are prominent in this 
 
62 !■ Psychical Elements. 
 
 system, because we use them as points of reference for the 
 arrangement of all the others. These are white and block, 
 in the achromatic series, and the four principal colors, red, 
 yellow, green, and bltie, in the chromatic. Only these six 
 sensations have clearly distinguished names in the early de- 
 velopment of language. All other sensations are then named 
 either with reference to these or even with modifications of 
 the names themselves. Thus, we regard grey as a stage in 
 the achromatic series lying hetween white and black. We 
 designate the different grades of saturation according to their 
 brightness, as whitish or blackish, Kght or dark color-tones; 
 and we generally choose compound names for the colors be- 
 tween the four principal ones, as, for example, purple -red, 
 orange-yellow, yellow-green, etc. These all show their relatively 
 late origin by their very composition. 
 
 20 a. From the early origin of the names for the six qualities 
 mentioned, the conclusion has been drawn that they are funda- 
 mental qualities of vision, and that the others are compounded 
 from them. Grey is declared to be a mixture of black and 
 white, violet and purple-red to be mixtures of blue and red, etc. 
 Psychologically there is no justification for calling any light- 
 sensations compound in comparison with others. Grey is a simple 
 sensation just as much as white or black; such colors as orange 
 and purple-red are just as much simple colors as red and yellow ; 
 and any grade of saturation which we have placed in the 
 system between a pure color and white, is by no means, for that 
 reason, a compound sensation. The closed, continuous character 
 of the system makes it necessary for language to pick out certain 
 especially marked differences in reference to which all other 
 sensations are then arranged, for the simple reason that it is 
 impossible to have an unlimited number of names. It is most 
 natural that white and black should be chosen as such points 
 of reference for the achromatic series, since they designate the 
 greatest differences. When once these two are given, however, 
 all other achromatic sensations will be considered as transitional 
 
§ 6. Pure Sensations. 63 
 
 sensations between them, since the extreme differences are 
 connected by a series of all possible grades of brightness. The 
 case of color-sensations is similar; only here, on account of the 
 circular form of the color-line, it is impossible to choose directly 
 two absolutely greatest differences. Other motives besides the 
 necessary qualitative difference, are decisive in the choice of the 
 principal colors. We may regard as such motives, the frequency 
 and affective intensity of certain light- impressions due to the 
 natural conditions of human existence. The red color of blood, 
 the green of vegetation, the blue of the sky, and the yellow of 
 the heavenly bodies in contrast with the blue of the sky, may 
 well have furnished the earliest occasions for the choice of cer- 
 tain colors as those to receive names. Language generally names 
 the sensation from the object that produced it, not the object 
 from the sensation. In this case too, when certain principal 
 qualities were once determined, all others must, on account of 
 the continuity of the series of sensations, seem to be intermediate 
 color-tones. The difference between principal colors and tran- 
 sitional colors is, therefore, very probably due entirely to external 
 conditions. If these conditions had been other, red might have 
 been regarded as a transitional color between purple and orange, 
 just as orange is now placed between red and yellow^). 
 
 21. The attributes of the system of light-sensations above 
 described, are so peculiar as to lead us to expect a priori that 
 the relation between these psychological attributes and the 
 objective processes of stimulation, is essentially different from 
 that in the cases of the sensational systems discussed before, 
 especially those of the general and auditory senses. Most 
 
 1) The same false reasoning from the names of sensations, has 
 even led some scholars to assume that the sensation blue developed 
 later than other color-sensations, because, for example, even in Homer 
 the word for blue is the same as that for "dark". Tests of the color- 
 sensations of uncivilized peoples whose languages are much more 
 deficient in names for colors than that of the Greeks at the time of 
 Homer, have given us a superabundance of evidence that this as- 
 sumption is utterly without ground. 
 
64 !■ Psychical Elements. 
 
 striking, in this respect, is the difference between the system 
 in question and that of tones. In the latter case, the prin- 
 ciple of parallelism between sensation and stimulus (p. 45), 
 holds not only for the physiological processes of stimulation, 
 but to a great extent for the physical processes as well. A 
 simple sensation corresponds to a simple form of sound- 
 yibration, and a plurahty of simple sensations to a compound 
 form. Furthermore, the intensity of the sensation varies in 
 proportion to the amplitude of the vibrations, and its quality 
 with their form, so that in both directions the subjective 
 difference between sensations increases with the growing differ- 
 ence between the objective physical stimuli. The relation in the 
 case of light -sensations is entirely different. Like objective 
 sound, objective light also consists of vibrations in some medium. 
 To be sure, the actual form of these vibrations is still a 
 question, but from physical experiments on the phenomena of. 
 interference we know that they consist of very short and rapid 
 waves. Those seen as light vary in wave-length from 688 
 to 393 milhonths of a millimetre, and in rate from 450 to 
 790 billion vibrations per second. In this case, too, simple 
 sensations correspond to simple vibrations, that is, vibrations 
 of like wave-length; and the quality of the sensation varies 
 continuously with the rate: red corresponds to the longest 
 and slowest waves, and violet to the shortest and most 
 rapid, while the other color-tones form a continuous series 
 between these, varying with the changes in wave-length. Even 
 here, however, an essential difference appears, for the colors 
 red and violet, which are the most different in wave-length, 
 are more similar in sensation than those which lie between'). 
 
 1) Many physicists, to be sure, believe that an analogous relation' 
 is to be found between tones of different pitch, in the fact that every 
 tone has in its octave a similar tone. But this similarity, as we 
 
§ 6. Pure Sensations. 65 
 
 There are also other differences. 1) Every change in the 
 amplitude of the physical vibrations corresponds to a sub- 
 jective change in both intensity and quality, as we noted 
 above in the discussion of sensations of brightness. 2) All 
 light, even though it be made up of all the different kinds of 
 vibration, is simple in sensation, just as much as objectively 
 simple light, which is made up of only one kind of waves, as 
 is immediately apparent if we make a subjective comparison of 
 sensations of chromatic light with those of achromatic hght. 
 From the first of these facts it follows that light which is 
 physically simple may produce not only chromatic, but also 
 achromatic sensations, for it approaches white when the am- 
 pHtude of its vibrations increases, and black when the ampli- 
 tude decreases. The quality of an achromatic sensation does 
 not, therefore, determine unequivocally its source; it may be 
 produced either through a change in the amplitude of objective 
 light-vibrations or through a mixture of simple vibrations of 
 different wave-lengths. In the first case, however, there is 
 always connected with the change in amplitude a change in 
 the grade of brightness, which does not necessarily take place 
 when a mixture is made. 
 
 22. Even when the grade of brightness remains constant, 
 this achromatic sensation may have one of several sources. 
 A sensation of pure brightness of a given intensity may re- 
 sult not only from a mixture of all the rates of vibration 
 contained in solar light, as, for example, in ordinary day- 
 light, but it may also result when only two kinds of ligh1> 
 waves, namely those which correspond to sensations sub- 
 
 shall see (§ 9), does not exist between simple tones, but depends on 
 the actual sympathetic vibration of the octave in all compound 
 clangs. Attempts to support this supposed analogy by finding in the 
 color-line intervals corresponding to the various tonal intervals, third, 
 fourth, fifth, etc., have all been entirely futile. 
 
 WoNDT, Psychology. 5 
 
QQ I. Psyohioal Elements. 
 
 jectively the most different, that is, to opposite colors, are mixed 
 in proper proportions. Since opposite colors, when mixed 
 objectively, produce white, they are called complementary 
 colors. As examples of such opposite or complementary col- 
 ors we may mention spectral red and green-blue, orange 
 and sky-blue, yellow and indigo-blue. 
 
 Like achromatic sensations, each of the color-sensations 
 may also, though to a more limited extent, have one of 
 several sources. When two objective colors which lie nearer 
 each other in the color-circle than opposites, are mixed, the 
 mixture 'appears, not white, but of a color which in the series 
 of objectively simple quahties lies between the two with which 
 we started. The saturation of the resulting color is, indeed, 
 very much diminished when the components of the mixture 
 approach opposite colors ; but when they are near each other, 
 the diminution is no longer perceptible, and the mixture and 
 the corresponding simple color are generally subjectively ahke. 
 Thus, the orange of the spectrum is absolutely indistinguish- 
 able from a mixture of red and yellow rays. In this way, 
 all the colors in the color-circle between red and green can 
 be obtained by mixing red and green, all between green and 
 violet by mixing green and violet, and, finally, purple, which 
 is not in the solar spectrum, can be produced by mixing red 
 and violet. The whole series of color-tones possible in sen- 
 sation can, accordingly, be obtained from three objective col- 
 ors. By means of the same three colors we can also pro- 
 duce white with its intermediate stages. The mixture of red 
 and violet gives purple, and this is the complementary color 
 of green; and the white secured by mixing these complemen- 
 tary colors, when mixed in different proportions with the various 
 colors, gives the different grades of saturation. 
 
 23. The three objective colors that may be used in this 
 way to produce the whole system of light -sensations, are 
 
§ 6. Pure Sensatio7is. 57 
 
 called fundamental colms. In order to indicate their signif- 
 icance, a triangular surface is chosen to represent the system 
 of satiu'ations , rather than the circular surface which is de- 
 rived from the psychological relations alone. The special signif- 
 icance of the fundamental colors is then expressed by placing 
 them at the angles of the triangle. Along the sides are 
 arranged the color-tones in their maximal saturation, just as 
 on the circumference of the color- circle, while the other 
 grades of saturation in their transitions to white, which hes 
 in the centre, are on the triangular surface. Theoretically, 
 any set of three colors could be chosen as fundamental col- 
 ors, provided they were suitably distant from one another. 
 Practically, those mentioned, red, green, and violet, are 
 preferable for two reasons. First, by using them we avoid 
 haviug as one of the three, purple, which can not be produced 
 by objectively simple light. Secondly, at the two ends of 
 the spectrum sensations vary most slowly in proportion to 
 the period of vibration, so that when the extreme colors of 
 the spectrum are used as fundamental colors, the result ob- 
 tained by mixing two neighboring ones is most hke the 
 intermediate, objectively simple color'). 
 
 24. These phenomena show that in the system of light- 
 sensations a simple relation does not exist between the 
 physical stimuh and the sensations. This can be understood 
 from what has been said above (3) as to the character of 
 the physiological stimulation. The visual sense is to be 
 
 1) In the neighborhood of green this advantage does not exist, 
 and the mixtures always appear less saturated than the intermediate 
 simple colors. This is a clear proof that the choice of the three 
 fundamental colors mentioned is indeed the most practical, but 
 nevertheless arbitrary, and at bottom due to the familiar geometrical 
 principle that a triangle is the simplest figure that can enclose a 
 finite number of points in the same plane. 
 
 5* 
 
68 I- Psychical Elements, 
 
 reckoned among the chemical senses, and we can expect a 
 simple relation only between the photochemical processes in 
 the retina and the sensations. Now, we know from experience 
 that different kinds of physical light produce like chemical 
 disintegrations, and this explains in general the possibility 
 mentioned above, of having the same sensation from many 
 different kinds of objective light. According to the principle 
 of parallelism between changes in sensation and in the physio- 
 logical stimulation (p. 45), it may be assumed that the various 
 physical stimuli which cause the same sensation all produce 
 the same photochemical stimulation in the retina, arfd that 
 altogether there are just as many kinds and varieties of the 
 photochemical processes as kinds and varieties of distinguishable 
 sensations. In fact, all that we know, up to the present time, 
 about the physiological substratum of light-sensations is based 
 upon this assumption. The investigation of the physiological 
 processes of stimulation through light, has not yet given any 
 further result than that the stimulation is in all probability 
 a chemical process. 
 
 25. The relatively long persistence of the sensation after 
 the stimulation that originated it, is exphcable on the assumption 
 that the Hght-stimulations are due to chemical processes in 
 the retina (3, p. 42). This persistence is called, with reference 
 to the object used as stimulus, the after-image of the im- 
 pression. At first this after-image appears in the same 
 brightness and color as the object: white when the object is 
 white, black when it is black, and if it is colored, in the 
 same color. These are the positive and like-colored after-images. 
 After a short time it passes, in the case of achromatic impres- 
 sions, into the opposite grade of brightness, white into black, 
 or black into white; in the case of colors, it passes into the 
 opposite or complementary color. These are the negative and 
 complementary after-images. If hght-stimuli of short duration 
 
§ 6. Pure Sensations. 69 
 
 £lct upon the eye in darkness, this transition may be repeated 
 several times. A second positive after-image follows the 
 negative, and so on, so that an oscillation between the two 
 phases takes place. The positive after-image may be readily 
 explained by the fact that the photochemical disintegration 
 caused by any kind of light, lasts a short time after the action 
 of the light. The negative and complementary after-images 
 can be explained by the fact that disintegration in a given 
 direction causes a partial consumption of the photochemical 
 substance most directly concerned, and this results in a 
 corresponding modification of the photochemical processes 
 when the stimulation of the retina continues. 
 
 26. The origin of a part of the phenomena included under 
 the name light-contrasts and color-contrasts is very probably 
 the same as that of the negative and complemeiitary after- 
 images. These phenomena consist in the appearance of simul- 
 taneous sensations of opposite brightness and color in the 
 neighborhood of any light-impression. Thus, a white surface 
 appears to be surrounded by a dark margin, a black surface 
 by a bright margin, and a colored surface by a margin of 
 the complementary color. These phenomena, which are called 
 "marginal contrasts" when they are limited to the immediate 
 neighborhood of the object, are in part at least nothing but 
 negative or complementary after-images that are simultaneously 
 visible in the immediate neighborhood of the impression as a 
 result of continual weak ocular movements. Whether there 
 is also an irradiation of the stimulation is a question; its 
 existence still wants certain proof. The fact that these con- 
 trasts increase as the light becomes more intense, just as 
 after-images do, speaks for their interconnection with the 
 latter. In this respect, this physiological contrast differs essen- 
 tially from ceriSim psychological contrast-phenomena, with which 
 it is generally confused. The latter are closely connected in 
 
70 I- Psychical Elements. 
 
 their rise with numerous other forms of psychological contrast, 
 so that we will not discuss them until later, when we enter 
 into the general treatment (§ 17, 9) of such phenomena. 
 
 26 a. If we take the principle of parallelism between sensation 
 and physiological stimulation as the basis of our suppositions in 
 regard to the processes that occur in the retina, we may 
 conclude that an analogous independence in the photochemical 
 processes corresponds to the relative independence which appears 
 between achromatic and chromatic sensations. Two facts, one 
 belonging to the subjective sensational system, the other to the 
 objective phenomena of color-mixing, can be most naturally ex-' 
 .plained oh this basis. The first is the tendency that every color- 
 sensation shows, of passing into one of pure brightness when 
 the grade of its brightness decreases or increases. This tendency 
 is most simply interpreted on the assumption that every color- 
 stimulation is made up of two physiological components, one 
 corresponding to the chromatic, the other to the achromatic 
 stimulation. To this assumption we may easily add the further 
 condition, that for certain medium intensities of the stimuli the 
 ■chromatic components are the strongest, while for greater and 
 smaller intensities the achromatic components come more and more 
 to the front. The second fact is that any two opposite colors are 
 complementary ; that is, when mixed in suitable proportions, they 
 produce an achromatic sensation. This phenomenon is most easily 
 understood when we assume that opposite colors, which are subjec- 
 tively the greatest possible differences, represent objective photo- 
 chemical processes that neutralize each other. The fact that as a 
 result of this neutralization an achromatic stimulation arises, is very 
 readily explained by the presupposition that such a stimulation 
 accompanies every chromatic stimulation from the first, and is 
 therefore all that is left when antagonistic chromatic stimulations 
 counteract each other. This assumption of a relative independence 
 between the chromatic and achromatic photochemical processes, 
 is supported in a very striking way by the existence of an ab- 
 normity of vision', sometimes congenital , sometimes acquired 
 through pathological changes in the retina, namely total color- 
 blindness. In such cases all stimulations are, either on the whole 
 
§ 6. Pure Sensations. 7 1 
 
 retina or on certain parts of it, seen as pure brightness, without 
 any admixture of color. This is an incontrovertible proof that the 
 chromatic and achromatic stimulations are separable physiological 
 processes. 
 
 If we apply the principle of parallelism to the chromatic 
 stimulation, two facts present themselves. The first is that two 
 colors separated by a limited, short distance, when mixed give 
 a color that is like the intermediate simple color. This indicates 
 that color-stimulation is a process that varies with the physical 
 stimulus, not continuously, as the tonal stimulation, but in short 
 stages, and in such a way that the stages in red and violet are 
 longer than in green, where the mixture of colors fairly near 
 each other, shows the effects of complementary action. Such a 
 non-continuous variation of the process corresponds entirely with 
 its chemical nature, for chemical disintegration and synthesis must 
 always have to do with groups of atoms or molecules. The 
 Second fact is that certain definite colors, which correspond to 
 rather large differences in the stimuli, are subjectively opposite 
 colors, that is, are maximal differences, and the same colors are 
 objectively complementary, that is, mutually neutralizing, processes. 
 Chemical processes, however, can neutralize each other only when 
 they are in some way opposite in character. Any two com- 
 plementary color-stimulations must, therefore, stand in a relation 
 to each other similar to that which exists between the neutraliz- 
 ing processes operative in the case of antagonistic achromatic 
 stimulations. Still, there are two very essential differences here. 
 First, this opposition in the character of color- stimulations is 
 not limited to one case, but appears for every color distinguishable 
 in sensation, so that we must conclude, according to our pre- 
 supposition, that for every stage of the photochemical process 
 of chromatic stimulation which is to be assumed on the ground 
 of the results obtained by mixing neighboring colors, there is a 
 certain complementary process. Secondly, the difference between 
 two opposite colors, which is subjectively the greatest possible 
 difference, is mediated by transitional forms, not merely in one 
 direction from each color, as in the case of black and white, but 
 in two opposite directions. In a similar way, the objective 
 complementary action of two colors gradually diminishes as, start- 
 ing from opposite colors, they approach each other in either of 
 
72 !■ Psychical Elements. 
 
 these two directions. We may, then, infer from this twofold 
 elimination of complementary action that the return of the color-line 
 to its starting point, corresponds to a repetition of related photo- 
 chemical processes, on the same grounds that led us to infer the 
 opposite character of the processes corresponding to opposite colors, 
 from the fact that they are complementary. The whole process of 
 chromatic stimulation, beginning with red and passing beyond violet 
 through purple mixtures to its starting point, running parallel, as 
 it does , with continuous changes in the wave-length of objective 
 light, is to be regarded as an indefinitely long succession of photo- 
 chemical processes. All these processes together, form a closed drck 
 in which, for every stage, there is a neutralizing opposite and a 
 possible transition to this opposite in two different directions. 
 
 We know nothing about the total number of photochemical 
 stages in this circle of processes. The numerous attempts made 
 to reduce aU color-sensations to the smallest possible number of 
 such stages, lack adequate foundation. Sometimes they indis- 
 criminatingly translate the results of physical color-mixing into 
 physiological processes, as in the assumption of three fundamental 
 colors, red, green, and violet, from the different mixtures of which 
 all sensations of light, even the achromatic, are to be derived 
 (Young-Helmholtz hypothesis). Sometimes they start with the 
 psychologically untenable assumption that the naming of colors is 
 not due to the influence of certain external objects, but to the real 
 significance of the corresponding sensations (v. sup. p. 63), and 
 assume accordingly four fundamental colors as the sources of all 
 color-sensations. The four fundamental colors here assumed are 
 the two pairs red and green, yellow and blue, to which are added 
 the similar pair of sensations of pure brightness, black and white. 
 All other light -sensations such as grey, orange, violet, etc., 
 are regarded as subjectively and objectively mixed colors (Her- 
 ing's hypothesis). The evidence in support of the first as of 
 the second of these hypotheses has been derived for the most 
 part from the not infrequent cases oi partial color-blindness. 
 Those who accept three fundamental colors, assert that all these 
 cases are to be explained as a lack of the red or green sensa- 
 tions, or else as a lack of both. Those who accept four, hold 
 that partial color-blindness always includes two fundamental 
 colors that belong together as opposites, and is, therefore, either 
 
§ 6, Pure Sensations. 73 
 
 red-green-blindness or yellow-blue-blindness. An unprejudiced 
 examination of color-blindness does not justify either of these 
 assertions. The three-color theory can not explain total color- 
 blindness, and the four-color theory is in contradiction to cases of 
 pure red-blindness and pure green-blindness. Finally, both theories 
 are overthrown by the cases that unquestionably occur, in 
 which such parts of the spectrum as do not correspond to any 
 of the three or four fundamental colors, appear colorless. The 
 only thing that our present knowledge justifies us in saying, is 
 that every simple sensation of light is conditioned physiologically 
 by a combination of two photochemical processes, a mcmochromatic 
 and a chromatic. The first is made up, in turn, of a process 
 mainly of disintegration, when the light is more intense, and a 
 process of restitution, when the light is weaker. The chromatic 
 process varies by stages in such a way that the whole series of 
 photochemical color-disintegrations forms a circle of processes in 
 which the products of the disintegration for any two relatively 
 most distant stages, neutralize each other'). 
 
 Various changes as a result of the action of light have been ob- 
 served in the living retina, all of which go to support the assump- 
 tion of a photochemical process. Such are the gradual change into a 
 colorless state, of a substance which in the retina not exposed to 
 light is red (bleaching of the visual purple); microscopical 
 movements of the pigmented protoplasm between the sensitive 
 elements, or rods and cones; and, finally, changes in the form 
 of the rods and cones themselves. Attempts to use these 
 phenomena in any way for a physiological theory of light- 
 stimulation, are certainly premature. The most probable con- 
 clusion which we can now draw is that the difference in the 
 
 1) The further assumption is made by the defenders of the four 
 fundamental colors, that two opposite colors are related just as bright 
 and dark achromatic stimulations, that is, that one of these colors 
 is due to a photochemical disintegration (dissimilation), the other to 
 a restitution (assimilation). This is an analogy that contradicts the 
 actual facts. The result obtained by mixing complementary colors 
 is on its subjective side a sttppression of the color-sensation , 'while 
 the mixture of white and black, on the other hand, produces an 
 intermetUaie sensation. 
 
74 !• Psychical Elements. 
 
 forms of tte rods and cones is connected with a difference in 
 function. The centre of the retina, which is the region of direct 
 vision in the human eye, has only cones, while in the eccentric 
 parts the rods are more numerous; furthermore, in the centre 
 (which also wants the visual purple) the discrimination of colors 
 is much better than in the eccentric regions , while the latter 
 are much more sensitive to brightness. The natural conclusion 
 from these facts is that the differences in sensitivity are connected 
 with the photochemical properties of the rods and cones. Still, 
 we lack here too any particular evidence. 
 
 § 7. SIMPLE FEELINGS. 
 
 1 . Simple feelings may originate in very many more ways 
 than simple sensations, as was noted in § 5. Even sucli feelings 
 as we never observe except in connection with more or 
 less complex ideational processes, have a simple character 
 (p. 34 sq.). Thus, for example, the feeling of tonal harmony 
 is just as simple as the feeling connected with a single tone. 
 Several tonal sensations together are required to produce a 
 harmony, so that it is a compound so far as its sensational 
 contents are concerned, but the affective quality of certain 
 harmonious compound clangs is so different from that of the 
 feelings connected with the single tones, that both classes of 
 feehngs are, subjectively, equally irreducible. The only essential 
 difference between the two is that the feehngs which correspond 
 to simple sensations can be easily isolated from the inter- 
 connections of which they form a part in our experience, by 
 the same method of abstraction which we employed in dis- 
 covering the simple sensations (p. 38). Those, on the other 
 hand, that are connected with some composite ideational 
 compound, can never be separated from the feehngs which 
 enter into the compound as subjective complements of the 
 
§ 7. Simple Feelings. 75 
 
 sensations. Thus, for example, it is impossible to separate 
 the feeling of harmony connected with the chord c e g from 
 the simple feelings connected with each of the single tones 
 c, e, and g. The latter may, indeed, be pushed into the 
 background, for as we shall see later (§ 9, 3a), they always 
 unite with the feeling of harmony to form a unitary total 
 feelmg, but they can never be eliminated. 
 
 2. The feeling connected with a simple sensation is com- 
 monly known as a sense- feeling, or the affective tone of a sen- 
 satimi. These two expressions are capable of misinterpretation 
 in two opposite senses. There is a tendency to think that 
 by "sense-feeling" we mean not merely a component of imme- 
 diate experience that may be isolated through abstraction, 
 but one that really exists by itself. "Affective tone", on the 
 other hand, may be regarded as an affective quality that must 
 inevitably belong to a sensation, just as "color-tone" is a ne- 
 cessary determinant of a color-sensation. In reahty, however, 
 a sense-feeling without a sensation can no more exist than can 
 a feeling of tonal harmony without tonal sensations. When, 
 as is sometimes the case, the feelings accompanying sensations 
 of pain, of pressure, of hot, and of cold, and muscle-sensa- 
 tions, are called independent sense-feelings, it is due to the 
 confusion of the concepts sensation and feeling (p. 36) which 
 is still prevalent, especially in physiology. As a result of 
 this confusion certain sensations, such as those of touch, are 
 called "feelings", and in the case of some sensations accom- 
 panied by strong feelings, as sensations of pain, the dis- 
 crimination of the two elements is neglected. In the second 
 place, it would be just as inadmissable to ascribe to a given 
 sensation a definite feeling fixed in quahty and intensity. 
 The real truth is that in every case the sensation is only one 
 of the many factors that determine the feeling present at a 
 given moment; besides the sensation, the processes that have 
 
76 /. Psychical Elements. 
 
 gone before and the permanent dispositions — conditions that 
 we can only partially account for in special cases — play 
 an essential part. The concept "sense-feeHng" or "affective 
 tone" is, accordingly, in a double sense the product of anal- 
 ysis and abstraction: first, we must think of the simple feeling 
 as separated from the concomitant pure sensation, and secondly, 
 we must pick out from among all the various changiag 
 affective elements which are^ connected with a given sensation 
 under different conditions, the one that is most constant and 
 is connected with the sensation after the removal, so far as 
 possible, of all the influences that could disturb or complicate 
 the simple effect of the sensation. 
 
 The first of these conditions is comparatively easy to 
 meet, if we keep in mind the psychological meaning of the 
 concepts sensation and feehng. The second is very difficult, 
 and, especially in the case of the most highly developed sen- 
 sational systems, the auditory and visual, it is never really 
 possible to remove entirely such indirect influences. "We can 
 infer what the pure affective tone of a sensation is, only by 
 means of the same method that has already been used for 
 the abstraction of pure sensations (§ 5, p. 28). Here, too, 
 we may assume that only that affective tone which remains 
 constant when all other conditions change, belongs to the 
 sensation itself. The rule is easily applied to sensation, but 
 only with great difficulty to feelings, because the secondary 
 influences referred to are generally as closely connected 
 with the sensation as is the primary occasion of the affective 
 tone. Thus, for example, the sensation green arouses almost 
 unavoidably the idea of green vegetation , and since there are 
 connected with this idea composite feelings whose character 
 may be entirely independent of the affective tone of the 
 color itself, it is impossible to determine directly whether the 
 feeling observed when a green impression is presented, is a 
 
§7. Simple Feelings. 77 
 
 pure affective tone, a feeling aroused by the attending idea, 
 or a combination of both. 
 
 2 a. This difficulty has led many psychologists to argue 
 against the existence of any pure aifective tone whatever. They 
 assert that every sensation arouses some accompanying ideas and 
 that the affective action of the sensation is due ia every case 
 to these ideas. But the results of experimental variation of the 
 conditions for light-sensations, tell against this view. If the 
 attendant ideas were the only sources of the feeling, it would 
 necessarily be strongest when the sensational contents of the im- 
 pression were most like those of the ideas. This is by no means 
 the case. The affective tone of a color is greatest when its grade 
 of saturation reaches a maximum. The pure spectral colors 
 observed in surrounding darkness have the strongest affective 
 tone. These colors are, however, generally very different from 
 those of the natural objects to which accompanying feelings 
 might refer. There is just as little justification for the attempts 
 to derive tonal feelings from such ideas exclusively. It can not 
 be doubted that familiar musical ideas may be aroused through 
 a single tone ; still, on the other hand, the constancy with which 
 certain tonal qualities are chosen to express particular feelings, 
 as, for example, deep tones to express grave and sad feelings, 
 can be understood only under the condition that the correspond- 
 ing affective quality belongs to the simple tonal sensation. The 
 circle in which the argument moves is still more obvious when 
 the affective tones of sensations of taste, smell, and the general 
 sense are derived from the accompanying ideas. When, for 
 example, the agreeable or disagreeable tone of a taste-sensation 
 is increased by the recollection of the same impression as expe- 
 rienced before, this can be possible only under the condition that 
 the earlier impression was itself agreeable or disagreeable. 
 
 3. The varieties of simple sense-feelings are exceedingly 
 numerous. The feelings corresponding to a particular sen- 
 sational system also form a system, since, in general, a change 
 in the quality or intensity of the affective tone runs parallel 
 to every change in the quality or intensity of the sensations. 
 
78 I- Psyehioal Elements. 
 
 At the same time these changes in the affective systems are 
 essentially different from the corresponding changes in the 
 sensational systems, so that it is impossible to regard the 
 affective tone as a third determinant of sensations, analogous 
 to quality and intensity. If the intensity of a sensation is 
 varied, the affective tone may change not only in intensity, 
 hut also in quality; and if the quality of the sensation is 
 varied, the affective tone usually changes in quality and inten- 
 sity both. For example, increase the sensation sweet in 
 intensity and it changes gradually from agreeable to dis- 
 agreeable. Or, gradually substitute for a sweet sensation 
 one of sour or bitter, keeping the intensity constant, it will be 
 observed that, for equal intensities, sour and, more especially, 
 bitter produce a much stronger feeling than sweet. In gen- 
 eral, then, every change in sensation is usually accompanied 
 by a twofold change in feeling. The way in which changes 
 in the quality and intensity of affective tones are related to 
 each other follows the principle already stated (p. 33) that 
 every series of affective changes in one dimension ranges 
 between opposites, not, as is the case with the corresponding 
 sensational changes, between greatest differences. 
 
 4. In accordance with this principle, the greatest quah- 
 tative differences in sensations correspond to the greatest 
 opposites in affective quality, and to maxima of affective in- 
 tensity which are either equal or at least approximately equal, 
 according to the special pecularities of the qualitative opposites. 
 The middle point between these two opposites corresponds to 
 an absence of all intensity, so far as only the single dimension 
 to which the opposites belong is concerned. This absence of 
 intensity can be observed only when the corresponding sen- 
 sational system is absolutely one-dimensional. In all other cases, 
 a point which is a neutral middle for one particular series of 
 sensational differences, belongs at the same time to another 
 
§ 7. Simple Feelings. 79 
 
 sensational dimension or even to a number of such dimensions, 
 in each of which it has a definite affective value. Thus, for 
 example, spectral yellow and blue are opposite colors which 
 have corresponding opposite affective tones. In passing grad- 
 ually along the color-line from one of these to the other, 
 green would be the neutral middle between them. But green 
 itself stands in affective contrast with its opposite color, 
 purple; and, furthermore, it is, like every saturated color, 
 one extremity of a series made up of the transitional stages 
 of a single color-tone to white. Again, the system of simple 
 tonal sensations forms a continuity of only one dimension, 
 but in this case more than in others it is impossible to iso- 
 late the corresponding affective tones through abstraction, as 
 we did the pure sensations, because in actual experience we 
 always have, not only intermediate stages between tones of 
 different pitch, but also transitions between absolutely simple 
 tones and noises made up of a profusion of simple tones. 
 The result of these conditions is that every many-dimensional 
 sensational system has a corresponding complex system of 
 affective tones, in which every point generally belongs at 
 once to several dimensions, so that the feeling corresponding 
 to a given sensation is a resultant of the affective elements 
 due to its position in various dimensions of the sensational 
 system. It follows that discrimination between simple and 
 composite feehngs in the sphere of affective qualities, can not 
 be carried out. The feeling that corresponds to a particular 
 sensation, is as a rule, for the reasons given, a product of 
 the fusion of several simple feelings, though it is still as 
 irreducible as a feeling of originally simple nature (cf. § 12, 3). 
 A further consequence is that the neutral naiddle between 
 opposite affective quaUties, can be actually found in experi- 
 ence only in the special cases where the affective tone of a 
 particular sensation corresponds to the neutral middle of all 
 
go I. Psychical Elements. 
 
 the dimensions to which it belongs. This special condition 
 is obviously fulfilled for the many-dimensional sensational 
 systems, especially those of sight and hearing, in just the 
 cases in which it is of special practical value for the undis- 
 turbed occurrence of affective processes. In the one case, 
 sensations of medium brightness and those of the low grades 
 of chromatic saturation approximating them, in the other, the 
 auditory impressions of our ordinary environment, which are 
 between a tone and noise in character (as, for example, the 
 human voice), form the neutral indifference-zones of affective 
 quality. On both sides of these zones arise the more intense 
 affective tones of the more marked sensational qualities. 
 The existence of such indifference-zones makes it possible for 
 the complex feelings which correspond to the various combi- 
 nations of these sensational qualities, to develop almost in- 
 dependently, without regard to the accompanying sense-f eeKngs. 
 5. The variations in affective quality and intensity that 
 run parallel to the grades of sensational intensity, are much 
 simpler. They can be most clearly seen in the homogeneous 
 sensational systems of the general sense. Each of these 
 systems is of a uniform quaUty throughout, and can be fairly 
 well represented geometrically by a single point, so that the 
 only possible sensational changes are those of intensity, and 
 these can be attended only by a one-dimensional series of 
 affective changes between opposites. The neutral indifference- 
 zone is, accordingly, always easy to observe in these cases. 
 It corresponds to the medium sensations of pressure, hot, 
 and cold, that are connected with the normal, medium in- 
 tensity of ordinary sense-stimuli. The simple feehngs on 
 both sides of this zone exhibit decidedly opposite characters, 
 and can, in general, be reckoned, on the one side, to pleas- 
 urable feelings, on the other, to unpleasurable (v. inf. 6). 
 The unpleasurable feehngs are the only ones that can be 
 
§ 7. Simple Feelings. §1 
 
 produced with certainty, by increasing the intensity of the 
 sensation. Through habituation to moderate stimuli, such an 
 expansion of the indifference-zone has taken place in these 
 systems of the general sense, that when the stimuli are weak, 
 as a rule only a succession of sensations very different in 
 intensity or quality, can produce noticeable feehngs. In 
 such cases, feelings of pleasure always correspond to sen- 
 sations of medium intensity. 
 
 The regular relation between sensational intensity and 
 affective tone, can be better observed without this influence 
 of contrast, in the case of certain sensations of smell and 
 taste. At first a pleasurable feeling arises with weak sen- 
 sations and increases with the increasing intensity of the sen- 
 sations to a maximum, then it sinks to zero with a certain 
 medium sensational intensity, and finally, when this intensity 
 increases still more, the feeling becomes unpleasurable and 
 increases until the sensational maximum is reached. 
 
 6. The variety of simple affective qualities is exceedingly 
 great, much greater than that of sensations. This is due to 
 two facts. First, every sensation of the many- dimensional 
 systems belongs at once to several series of feelings. Secondly, 
 and this is the chief reason, the different compounds arising 
 from the various combinations of sensations, such as inten- 
 sive, spacial, and temporal ideas, and also certain stages in 
 the course of emotions and volitions, have corresponding 
 feelings, which are, as above remarked (p. 76), irreducible, 
 and must therefore be classed among the simple feelings. 
 
 It is greatly to be regretted that our names for simple 
 feelings are so much more hazy than those for sensations. 
 The proper nomenclature of feeling is limited entirely to the 
 expression of certain general antitheses, as pleasurable and un- 
 pleasurSible, agreeable and disagreeable, grave and gay, excited 
 and quiet, etc. These designations are usually based on the 
 
 Whsdi, Psychology. 6 
 
82 / Psychical Elements. 
 
 emotions into which the feelings enter as elements, and are 
 so general that each includes a large number of single 
 simple feelings of Yery different character. In other cases, 
 complex ideas whose affective character is similar, are used 
 in describing the feelings connected with certain simple im- 
 pressions, as, for example, by Goethe in his description of 
 the affective tone of colors, and by many musical writers in 
 describing the feelings accompanying clangs. This poverty 
 of language in special names for the feehngs, is a psycho- 
 logical consequence of the subjective nature of the feehngs. 
 All the motives of practical life which give rise to the names 
 of objects and their attributes, are here wanting. To con- 
 clude, for this reason, that there is a corresponding poverty 
 of simple affective qualities themselves, is a gross psycho- 
 logical mistake, which is furthermore fatal since it makes an 
 adequate investigation of the composite affective processes 
 impossible from the first. 
 
 7. In consequence of the difficulties indicated, a complete 
 list of simple affective qualities is out of the question, even 
 more than is such a Hst in the case of simple sensations. 
 Then, too, there are still other reasons why it would be im- 
 possible. The feelings, by virtue of the attributes described 
 above, do not form closed systems, as do the sensations 
 of tone, of light, or of taste, but are united in a single 
 manifold, interconnected in all its parts (p. 35). Furthermore, 
 the union of certain feelings gives rise to feehngs which are 
 not only unitary, but even simple in character (p. 75). In this 
 manifold of feelings, made up, as it is, of a great variety of 
 most delicately shaded quahties, it is nevertheless possible 
 to distinguish certain different chief directions, including certain 
 affective opposites of predominant character. Such directions 
 may always be designated by the two names that indicate 
 their opposite extremes. Each name is, however, to be looked 
 
§ 7, Simple Feelings. § 3 
 
 upon as a collective name including an endless number of 
 feelings differing from one another. 
 
 Three such chief directions may be distinguished; we will 
 call them the direction of pleasurable and unpleasurable 
 feelings, that of arousing and subduing (exciting and depress- 
 ing) feelings , and finally that of feelings of strain and re- 
 laxation. Any concrete feeling may belong to all of these 
 directions or only two or even only one of them. The last 
 mentioned possibihty is all that makes it possible to distin- 
 guish the different directions. The combination of different 
 affective directions which ordinarily takes place, and the above 
 mentioned (p. 79) influences which are due to the overlapping 
 of feelings arising from various causes, all go to explain 
 why we are perhaps never in a state entirely free from feeling, 
 although the general nature of the feelings demands an in- 
 difference-zone. 
 
 8. Feelings connected with sensations of the general sense 
 and with impressions of smell and taste, may be regarded 
 as good examples of pure pleasurable and unpleasurable 
 forms. A sensation of pain, for example, is regularly accom- 
 panied by an unpleasurable feeling without any admixture of 
 other affective forms. Li connection with pure sensations, 
 arousing and subduing feelings may be observed best in the 
 case of color-impressions and clang-impressions. Thus, red is 
 arousing, blue subduing. Feelings of strain and relaxation are 
 always connected with the temporal course of processes. 
 Thus, in expecting a sense-impression, we note a feeling of 
 strain, and on the arrival of the expected event, a feeling 
 of relaxation. Both the expectation and satisfaction may be 
 accompanied at the same time by a feeling of excitement or, 
 under special conditions, by pleasurable or unpleasurable 
 feelings. Still, these other feelings may be entirely absent, 
 and then those of strain and relaxation are recognized as 
 
84 I- Psychical Elements. 
 
 specific forms whicli can not be reduced to others, just as 
 the two directions mentioned before. The presence of more 
 than one direction may be discovered in the case of very 
 many feelings which are, nevertheless, simple in quaUty, just 
 as much as the feelings mentioned. Thus, the feeUngs of 
 seriousness and gaiety connected with the sensible impres- 
 sions of low and high tones or dark and bright colors, are to 
 he regarded as characteristic qualities which are outside the 
 indifference -zone in both the pleasurable and unpleasurable 
 direction and the exciting and depressing direction. We are 
 never to forget here that pleasurable and unpleasurable, ex- 
 citing and depressing, are not names of single affective qual- 
 ities, but of directions, within which an indefinitely large 
 number of simple qualities appear, so that the unpleasurable 
 quality of seriousness is not only to be distinguished from 
 that of a painful touch, of a dissonance, etc., but even the 
 different cases of seriousness itself may vary in their quahty. 
 Again, the direction of pleasurable and unpleasurable feelings, 
 is united with that of feelings of strain and relaxation, in 
 the case of the affective tones of rhythms. The regular 
 succession of strain and relaxation in these cases is attended 
 by pleasure, the disturbance of this regularity by the opposite 
 feeling, as when we are disappointed or surprised. Then, too, 
 under certain circumstances the feeling may, in both cases, 
 be of an exciting or a subduing character. 
 
 9. These examples lead very naturally to the assumption 
 that the three chief directions of simple feelings depend on 
 the relations in which each single feehng stands to the whole 
 succession of psychical processes. In this succession every 
 feeling has in general a threefold significance. 1) It repre- 
 sents a particular modification of the state of the present 
 moment; this modification belongs to the pleasurable and 
 impleasurable direction. 2) It exercises a certain definite 
 
§ 7. Simple Feelings. 85 
 
 influence on the succeeding state; this influence can be distin- 
 guished in its opposite forms as excitation and inhibition. 
 3) It is determined in its essential character by the preced- 
 ing state ; this determining influence shows itself in the given 
 feeling in the forms of strain and relaxation. These conditions 
 also render it improbable that other chief directions of 
 feeling exist. 
 
 9 a. Of the three aifective directions mentioned, only that of 
 pleasurable and unpleasurable feelings has generally been recog- 
 nized; the others are reckoned as emotions. But the emotions, 
 as we shall see in § 13, come from combinations of feelings; 
 it is obvious, therefore, that the fundamental forms of emotions 
 must have their antecedents in the affective elements. Some 
 psychologists have regarded pleasurable and unpleasurable feel- 
 ings, not as collective terms including a great variety of simple 
 feehngs, but as entirely uniform, concrete states , so that, for 
 example, the unpleasurableness of a toothache, of an intellectual 
 failure, and of a tragical experience are all regarded as identical ia 
 their affective contents. Still others seek to identify the feelings 
 with special sensations, especially with cutaneous sensations and 
 muscle-sensations. Such entirely untenable assertions require no 
 criticism. They indicate , however, the uncertain state of the 
 doctrine of feelings, even at the present time. 
 
 1 0. The question has been raised whether or not particular 
 physiological processes correspond to the simple feehngs, as 
 is the case for the sensations. Older psychology was inclined 
 to answer this question in the negative, and to contrast the 
 feehngs as inner, purely psychological, states with sensations 
 as processes aroused from without. In modern times, on the 
 contrary, the affirmative answer has generally been given, 
 but for the most part without the support of adequate em- 
 pirical proof. 
 
 Obviously, our assumptions in regard to the physiological 
 phenomena accompanying the feelings must be based on 
 
86 /• Psychical Elements. 
 
 actually demonstrable physiological processes, just as our 
 assumptions in regard to the physiological conditions of sen- 
 sations were deduced from the structure and functions of 
 the sense-organs. In looldng for such processes, it follows 
 from the subjective nature of the feelings, that we should 
 not expect to find them among the processes produced in 
 the organism directly by external agents, as the sensations 
 are, but rather in reactions which arise indirectly from these 
 first processes. The observation of compounds made up of 
 affective elements, that is, of emotions and volitions, whose 
 easily perceptible concomitants are always external move- 
 ments or changes in the state of the organs of movement, 
 also points in the same direction. 
 
 The analysis of sensations, and of the psychical compounds 
 derived from them, makes direct use of the impression- 
 method; while the investigation of simple feelings, and of the 
 processes resulting from their combinations, can employ this 
 method only indirectly. On the other hand, the expressitm- 
 method, that is, the investigation of the physiological reactions 
 of psychical processes, is especially adapted to the examination 
 of feelings and processes made up of them, because as shown 
 by experience, such reactions are regular symptoms of affective 
 processes. All the phenomena in which the inner state of 
 the organism is outwardly expressed, may be utiUzed as aids 
 for the expression-method. Such are, besides the movements 
 of the external muscles, especially the respiratory and cardiac 
 movements, the contraction and dilation of the blood-vessels 
 in particular organs, the dilation and contraction of the pupil 
 of the eye, etc. The most dehcate of these is the beating 
 of the heart, which can be examined as exactly reproduced 
 in the pulse of some peripheral artery. All other phenomena 
 are generally wanting in the case of a simple feeling. It is 
 only for high intensities, where the feelings always pass into 
 
§ 7. Simple Feelings. 
 
 ,87 
 
 emotions, that we have other, added symptoms, especially 
 changes in respiration, and mimetic expressive movements. 
 
 11. Of the chief directions of feeling mentioned above, 
 especially that of pleasurable and impleasurable feelings can be 
 shown to stand in regular relation to the pulse. When the 
 feeling is pleasurable, the pulse is retarded and intensified, 
 when unpleasurable, the pulse is accelerated and weakened. 
 For the other directions, the accompanying changes can only 
 be inferred with some degree of probability, from the effects 
 of the corresponding emotions (§ 1 3, 5). Thus, exciting feelings 
 seem to betray their presence only through stronger pulse- 
 beats, and subduing through weaker, without a change of rate 
 in either case. For feehngs of strain, we have retarded and 
 weakened pulse, for those of relaxation, accelerated and in- 
 tensified pulse. Single feelings belong for the most part to 
 several of these directions at the same time; as a result, the 
 action of the pulse is in many cases so complex that the most 
 that can be concluded is the predominance of one or the 
 other direction. The conclusion is, however, uncertain so 
 long as it is not confirmed by direct observation of the 
 feehng. 
 
 11a. The relations that seem probable from experiments on 
 the symptoms of feelings and emotions as found in pulse- activity, 
 may be presented in. the following scheme. 
 
 retarded 
 
 pleasurable 
 feeling 
 
 Pulse 
 
 strong 
 
 accelerated retarded 
 
 I 
 
 weak 
 
 accelerated 
 
 exciting feeling of feeling of subduing unpleasura- 
 feeling relaxation strain feeling ble feeling. 
 
 I 
 
 Exciting and subduing feelings, then, show themselves by 
 simple changes in the pulse, the others by double changes. But 
 
88 I. Psychical Elements. 
 
 this scheme, which is derived for the most part from the effects 
 of complex emotions, needs confirmation from experiments in 
 which attention is paid to the isolation of these various affective 
 directions. Changes in respiration , muscle-tension , etc., also 
 need further investigation. It is obvious from the equivocal 
 character of each symptom, that when a particular feeling is given 
 in psychical experience, we can infer particular resulting inner- 
 vations from the symptoms which appear, but that we can never 
 infer the presence of particular feelings from the physiological 
 symptoms. It follows that the expression-method can not be as 
 highly valued from a psychological point of view as the impression- 
 method. From the very nature of the case, the impression- 
 method is the only one that can be used in arousing and varying 
 psychical processes at will. The expression-method gives results 
 that explain only the physiological phenomena which accompany 
 feelings, not the psychological nature of the feelings themselves. 
 The variations observed in the pulse must be regarded as 
 the results of a changed innervation of the heart, coming from 
 the cardiac centre in the brain. Physiology shows that the heart 
 is connected with the central organs by two kinds of nerves: 
 eaxitatory nerves, which run through the sympathetic system and 
 originate indirectly in the medulla, and inhibitory nerves, which 
 belong to the tenth cranial nerve (vagus) and also have their 
 source in the medulla. The normal regularity of the pulse 
 depends on a certain equilibrium between excitatory and inhibitory 
 influences. Such influences come not only from the brain, but 
 from the centres in the ganglia of the heart itself Thus, every 
 increase and every decrease of the heart's energy may be inter- 
 preted in two different ways. The first may be due to an increase of 
 excitatory, or to a decrease of inhibitory innervation, and the second 
 may be due to a decrease in excitatory or to an increase in inhibitory 
 innervation, or in both cases the two influences may be united. We 
 have no universally applicable means of investigating these possibil- 
 ities, still, the circumstance that the stimulation of the inhibitory 
 nerves has a quicker effect than the stimulation of the excitatory, 
 gives us good ground in many cases for conjecturing the presence of 
 the one or the other. Now, the changes in the pulse always follow 
 very quickly the sensations that cause them. It is, therefore, 
 probable that in the case of feelings and emotions, we have 
 
§ 7. Simple Feelings. 89 
 
 chiefly changes in inhibitory innervation, originating in the brain 
 and conducted along the vagus. It may veell be assumed that 
 the affective tone of a sensation on its physiological side, corre- 
 sponds to a spreading of the stimulation from the sensory centre 
 to other central regions which are connected with the sources 
 of the inhibitory nerves of the heart. Which central regions 
 are thus affected, we do not know. But the circumstance that 
 the physiological substrata for all the elements of our psychological 
 experience, are in all probability to be found in the cerebral 
 cortex, leads very naturally to the assumption that the same" is 
 true for the centre of these inhibitory innervations. Further- 
 more, the essential differences between the attributes of feelings 
 and those of sensations, make it probable that this centre is not 
 identical with the sensory centres. If a special cortical region 
 is assumed as the medium for these effects, there is no reason 
 for supposing a special one for each sensory centre, but the 
 complete uniformity in the physiological symptoms goes more 
 to show that there is only one such region, which must then 
 at the same time serve as a kind of central organ for the con- 
 nection of the various sensory centres. (For the further significance 
 of such a central region, and its probable anatomical position, 
 compare § 15, 2 a.) 
 
11. PSYCHICAL COMPOUNDS. 
 
 . § 8. DEPENITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF 
 PSYCHICAL COMPOUNDS. 
 
 ]. By "psychical compound" we mean any composite 
 component of our immediate experience which is marked off 
 from the other contents of this experience by particular 
 characteristics, in such a way that it is apprehended as a 
 relatively independent unity and is, when practical necessity 
 demands it, designated by a special name. In developing 
 these names, language has followed the general rule that 
 only classes and the most important species into which phe- 
 nomena may be grouped, shall have special designations, while 
 the discrimination of concrete compounds is left to immediate 
 perception. Thus, such expressions as ideas, emotions, voli- 
 tional acts, etc., designate general classes of psychical com- 
 pounds, such expressions as visual ideas, joy, anger, hope, 
 etc., special species included in these classes. So far as these 
 designations, which have arisen from practical experience, 
 are based upon actual distinguishing characteristics, they may 
 be retained by science. But science must give an account 
 of the nature of these characteristics and also of the pecul- 
 iar contents of each of the chief- forms of psychical com- 
 pounds, in order to give every single term an exact meaning. 
 In doing this, we must avoid from the first two presuppo- 
 sitions to which the existence of these names might easily 
 naislead us. The first is the view that a psychical compound 
 
§ 8. Definition and Classification of Psychical Cojnpounds. 91 
 
 is an absolutely independent content of immediate expe- 
 rience. The second is the opinion that certain compounds, 
 as, for example, ideas, have the nature of things. The 
 truth is that compounds are only relatively independent 
 units. Just as they are made up of various elements, so they 
 themselves unite to form a complete interconnection, in which 
 relatively simple compounds may continually combine to form 
 more composite ones. Then, again, compounds, like the 
 psychical elements contained in them, are never things, but 
 processes which change from moment to moment, so that it 
 is only through deliberate abstraction, which is, indeed, in- 
 dispensable for the investigation in many cases, that they 
 can be thought of as constant at any moment (§ 2, p. 13 sq.). 
 2. All psychical compounds may be resolved into psychi- 
 cal elements, that is, into pure sensations and simple feelings. 
 The two kinds of elements behave, however, in an essentially 
 different manner, in accordance with the peculiar properties 
 of simple feelings as described in § 7. The sensational ele- 
 ments found by such a resolution, always belong to one of 
 the sensational systems already considered. The affective 
 elements, on the other hand, include not only those which 
 correspond to the pure sensations contained in the compounds, 
 but also those due to the interconnection of the elements into 
 a compound. The systems of sensational qualities, accordingly, 
 always remain the same, no matter how great a variety of 
 compounds arises, while the systems of simple affective qual- 
 ities continually increase. Connected with this increase is 
 another attribute which is thoroughly characteristic for the 
 actual nature of psychical processes. The attributes of 
 psychical compounds are never limited to those of the ele- 
 ments that enter into them, but new attributes, peculiar to 
 the compounds themselves, always arise as a result of the com- 
 bination of these elements. Thus, a visual idea has not only 
 
92 n. Psychical Compounds. 
 
 the attributes of the light-sensations and of the sensations of 
 ocular position and movements contained in it, but also that 
 of the spacial {irrangement of the sensations, which these 
 elements in themselves do not have. Again, a volition is 
 not only made up of the ideas and feelings into which its 
 single acts may be resolved, but there result from the combi- 
 nation of these acts, new affective elements which are specif- 
 ically characteristic of the complex vohtion. Here, again, 
 the combinations of sensational and affective elements are 
 different. In the first case, on account of the constancy of 
 the sensational systems, no new sensations can arise, but 
 only peculiar forms of their arrangement. These forms are 
 the extensive spacial and temporal manifolds. When, on the 
 other hand, affective elements combine, new simple feelings 
 arise, which unite with those originally present to make «w- 
 tensive affective units of composite character. 
 
 3. The classification of psychical compounds is naturally 
 based upon the character of the elements that make them 
 up. Those composed entirely or chiefly of sensations are 
 called ideas, those consisting mainly of affective elements, 
 affective processes. The same limitations hold here as in 
 the case of the corresponding elements. Although com- 
 pounds are more the products of immediate discrimination 
 among actual psychical processes than the elements are, still, 
 there is at bottom no pure ideational process and no pure 
 affective process, but in both cases we can only abstract to 
 a certain extent from one or the other - component. As in 
 the case of the two kinds of elements, so here we can neglect 
 the accompanying subjective states when dealing with ideas, 
 but must always presuppose some idea for the affective pro- 
 cesses. Still, these ideas may be of very different kinds for 
 the single species and varieties of affective processes. 
 
 We distinguish, accordingly, three chief forms of ideas: 
 
§ 9. Intensicc Ideas. 93 
 
 1) intensive ideas, 2) spacial ideas, 3) temporal ideas; and 
 three forms of affective processes: 1) intensive afEective com- 
 binations, 2) emotions, 3) volitions. Temporal ideas constitute 
 a sort of link between the two kinds of processes , for cer- 
 tain feelings play an important part in their formation. 
 
 § 9. INTENSIVE IDEAS. 
 
 1. A combination of sensations in which every element 
 is connected with any second element in exactly the same 
 way as with any other, is called an intensive idea. Thus, 
 for example, a compound clang made up of the tones d f a 
 is such an intensive idea. For the immediate apprehension, 
 each of the partial combinations into which this compound 
 clang can be resolved, as df, da, fd, fa, ad, nf, are all entirely 
 equivalent, in whatever order they are thought of. This is 
 obvious at once if we compare the compound clang with any 
 succession of the same tones, where df, da, fd, fa, etc., are 
 essentially different ideas. We may define intensive ideas, 
 accordingly, as combinations of sensational elements, in ivhicJi 
 the order of flie eletnents may be indefinitely varied. 
 
 It follows from their nature, that intensive ideas do not 
 have, arising from the way in which their elements are united 
 any characteristics, by means of which they can be resolved 
 into separate parts. Such a resolution is possible only through 
 the differences in the constituent elements themselves. Thus, 
 we discriminate the elements of the compound clang d f a, 
 only because we hear in it the qualitatively different tones d, 
 f, and a. Still, the separate components in such a unitary 
 idea are less clearly distinguishable than in their isolated 
 state. This fact, that the elements are pushed into the 
 background by the impression of the whole, is of great im- 
 
94 11, Psyehieal Compounds. 
 
 portance for all forms of ideational combination. "We call 
 it the fusion of sensations, and in -particular, for intensive 
 ideas, intensive fusion. If the connection of one element 
 with others is so close that it can be perceived as a part of 
 the whole only through unusual concentration of the attention 
 aided by experimental variation of the conditions, we call the 
 fusion compute. If, on the other hand, the elements are im- 
 mediately recognized in their proper qualities, and merely 
 recede somewhat into the background in comparison with 
 the impression of the whole, we call the fusion incomplete. 
 If certain particular elements are more prominent in their 
 characteristic qualities than others, we call them the pre- 
 dominating eleme^its. The concept of fusion as here defined 
 is a psychological concept. It presupposes that the fused 
 elements of the idea are really subjectively distinguishable. 
 It must not be confounded with the entirely different and 
 purely physiological concept of the fusion of external im- 
 pressions into a single resultant stimulation. For example, 
 when complementary colors unite and give white, the fusion 
 is, of course, not psychological. 
 
 In reality, every intensive idea always enters into certain 
 spacial and temporal combinations. Thus, for example, a 
 compound clang is always a process having a cei'tain duration, 
 and is at the same time localized by us in some direction or 
 other, though often only very indefinitely. But since these 
 temporal and spacial attributes can be indefinitely varied, 
 while the intensive character of the ideas remain the same, 
 we may abstract from the former in investigating the inten- 
 sive attributes. 
 
 2. Among ideas of the general sense we have intensive 
 fusions in the form of combinations of sensations of pressure 
 with those of hot or cold, or combinations of pain-sensations 
 with those of temperature or pressure. All these fusions 
 
^ 9. Intensive Ideas. 95 
 
 are incomplete, and very often there is no decidedly pre- 
 dominating element. The combination of certain sensations 
 of smell and taste are more intimate. This is obviously 
 favored on the physiological side by the proximity of the 
 sense-organs, on the physical side by the regular connection 
 between certain stimulations of the two senses. In such cases 
 the more intense sensations are generally the predominating 
 elements, and when these are the sensation of taste, the 
 composite impression is usually regarded as a taste-quahty 
 only. Thus, most of the impressions known in ordinary life 
 as "tastes", are in reality combinations of tastes and smells. 
 
 The greatest variety of intensive ideas, in all possible grada- 
 tions of complexity, are presented by the sense of hearing. 
 The relatively most simple of these ideas and those which are 
 most closely related to simple tones , are the single clangs. As 
 more complex forms, we have compound clangs. Comple.r, noises 
 may arise from the latter when they are united with sensa- 
 tions of simple noises, and under certain other circumstances. 
 
 3. A sijigle clang is an intensive idea which is made up 
 of a series of tonal sensations regularly graded in quality. 
 These elements, the partial tones of the clang, form a complete 
 fusion, in which the sensation of the lowest partial tone be- 
 comes the predominating element. The pitch of the tone is 
 determined by this principal tone. The other elements are 
 higher and are, accordingly, called overtones. The overtones 
 are all grouped together under the name clang-color as a 
 second determinant of the clang, added to the predominating 
 tone. All the partial tones that go to determine the clang- 
 color are placed along the tonal line at certain regular inter- 
 vals from the principal tone. The complete series of possible 
 overtones in a clang consists of the first octave of the prin- 
 cipal tone, the fifth of this octave, the second octave of the 
 principal tone, and the major third and the fifth of this 
 
9g //. Psychical Compotmds. 
 
 second octave, etc. This series corresponds to the following 
 proportions between the number of objective tonal waves: 
 1 (principal tone), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, ... . (overtones). 
 When the pitch of the principal tone remains constant, only 
 the second determinant of the tonal quality, the clang-color, 
 can vary according to the number, position, and relative in- 
 tensity of the overtones. In this way we can explain the 
 great variety of clang-colors in musical instruments, as 
 well as the fact that for every instrument the clang-color 
 changes somewhat with the pitch; for in the case of low 
 tones the overtones are generally relatively strong, in that 
 of high relatively weak, while they disappear entirely when 
 they are too high to be audible. Even the slight differences 
 in clang-color in single instruments of the same kind, are 
 to be explained in the same way. 
 
 From a psychological point of view the chief condition 
 for the rise of a single clang, is the complete, or approxima- 
 tely complete, fusion of several tonal sensations with only one 
 predominating element. As a rule, it is impossible to 
 distinguish with the unaided ear the overtones in a clang. 
 They can be made perceptible by the use of resonators (re- 
 sonator-tubes tuned to the overtones sought), and after they 
 have been isolated in this experimental way, the stronger 
 ones can be successively heard in the clang, even without 
 the aid of the resonators, if the attention is directed to them. 
 4. There are three conditions necessary if there is to be 
 only one predominating element in a tonal fusion. First, one 
 tone must be relatively more intense. Secondly, in its quah- 
 tative relations to the other partial tones, the principal tone 
 must be the fundamental of a series whose members are all 
 harmonious. Thirdly, all the partial tones must be uniformly 
 coincident. This , coincidence is objectively guaranteed by 
 deriving the clang from a unitary source, (that is, producing 
 
§ 9. Intensive Ideas. 97 
 
 the clang through the vibrations of one string, 07ie reed-pipe, etc.) 
 The result is that the objective vibrations of the partial tones 
 always stand in the same relation to one another — a result 
 which can not be secured when clangs from several sources are 
 united. The first two of these conditions relate to the elements, 
 the third to the form of their combinations. The first is the least 
 essential to the idea of a single clang. If the second is not 
 fulfilled, the combination becomes a compound clang when the 
 predominating fundamental is wanting, or a noise when the 
 series of tones is not harmonious, or a mixed form between a 
 clang and a noise when both parts of the condition are un- 
 fulfilled. If the third condition, of constancy in the phases of 
 the partial tones, is not met, the clang becomes compound even 
 when the first two conditions are compKed with. A series 
 of simple clangs from a member of tuning-forks which should 
 unite to a single clang so far as intensity and quality are 
 concerned, always produces in reality the idea of a com- 
 pound clang 1). 
 
 5. A compound clang is an intensive combination of single 
 clangs. It is in general an incomplete fusion with sevetal 
 predominating elements. There are, as a rule, all possible 
 
 1) The case is different when the fundamental itself contains 
 overtoaes of noticeable intensity, which are also repeated as inde- 
 pendent clangs in the compound tone. The single clangs of such 
 a series arrange themselves in the same phases as these overtones, 
 and the compound clang has the character of a single clang, with 
 very strong overtones. Helmholtz concluded from experiments in 
 which he combined in various ways simple clangs from tuning-forks, 
 that differences in phase have no influence on the clang-color. But 
 as the idea of a single clang can not be produced in this way, it is 
 probable that an entirely constant relation of the phases of different 
 tonal vibrations from independent sources can never be brought 
 about with this method. Experiments by R. Koenig tell for the in- 
 fluence on the clang-color, of the form of the clang as determined 
 by the relation of the vibration-phasee. 
 
 Wdndt, Psychology. 7 
 
98 II- Psyehiml Compdunds. 
 
 grades of fusion in a compound clang, especially when it is 
 made up of single clangs of composite quality. In such a 
 case, not only does every single clang form a complete fusion 
 in itself, but these single clangs fuse the more completely 
 with one another the more their fundamentals approach the 
 relation of elements of a single clang. So it comes that in 
 a compound clang made up of single clangs rich in overtones, 
 those components whose fundamentals correspond to the 
 overtones of some other single clang in the compound, fuse 
 more completely with this related clang than with others. 
 The other clangs, in turn, fuse the more completely the more 
 their relation approaches that of the first members of a series 
 of overtones. Thus, in the compound clang c e g e' the clangs 
 c and c' form a nearly complete fusion, while the fusions of 
 the clangs c and g, c and e, are incomplete. Still less 
 complete is the fusion between c and e^. A measure for 
 the degree of fusion may be obtained in all these cases by 
 allowing an observer to hear the compound clang for a very 
 brief interval, after which he is to decide whether he perceived 
 only one clang or several. This experiment is repeated many 
 times, and the relative number of judgments in favor of the 
 unity of the clang is a measure for the degree of fusion. 
 
 6. Besides the elements contained in the single clangs of 
 a compound, there are always, arising from the combination 
 of vibrations in the auditory organ, additional elements which 
 cause new tonal sensations, characteristic for the different 
 kinds of compound clangs. These may also fuse more or less 
 completely with the original clang. They are sensations of 
 difference-tones; they correspond, as their name indicates, to 
 the difference between the number of vibrations in two pri- 
 mary tones. They may have a twofold origin, either from 
 the interference of the vibrations in the outer ear, especially 
 in the tympanum or chain of ossicles (Helmholtz's combi- 
 
§ 9. Intensive Ideas. 99 
 
 nation-tones), or from the interference of the vibrations in 
 the auditory nerve-fibres (Koenig's beat-tones). The first are, 
 from the very character of their origin, weak tones; espe- 
 cially in comparison with the original tones, they are always 
 relatively very weak. The second class, on the other hand, 
 are generally stronger and may even surpass the original 
 tones in intensity. It is probable that the first appear only 
 in the case of harmonious compound clangs, while the second 
 appear also in dissonant compound clangs. The fusion of 
 difference-tones with the chief tones of the compound is the 
 more complete the less intense the former are, and the more 
 they tend to form a simple harmonious tonal series with the 
 original components of the clang. As a result of these attri- 
 butes, the difference-tones are to compound clangs what the 
 overtones are to single clangs. They are, however, almost 
 entirely independent of the clang-color of the components of 
 the compound, but vary greatly with the relation in which 
 the principal tones of these components stand to one another. 
 This explains the relative uniformity in the character of a 
 given compound clang even when the clang-colors of its com- 
 ponents vary. 
 
 7. A compound clang may pass through all possible inter- 
 mediate stages into a third form of intensive auditory ideas, 
 that of noises. "When two tones are no longer included 
 within a series of harmonious tones and when at the same 
 time the difference between the number of their vibrations 
 does not exceed certain limits, for higher tones about sixty 
 vibrations and for lower thirty or even fewer, there arise 
 disturbances in the compound clang, which correspond in 
 number to the difference between the number of vibrations 
 in the primary tones, and are due to the alternating coinci- 
 dence of like and opposite phases of vibration. These dis- 
 turbances are either interruptions of the clang-sensation, 
 
IQQ II. Psyehical Compounds. 
 
 beats, or, especially in the case of deep tones, intermittent 
 sensations of a difference-tone, tonal beats. If the differences 
 in the number of vibrations exceed the numbers mentioned, 
 the tones at first sound continuous, for the interruptions 
 disappear, but they are harsh. Later the harshness dis- 
 appears and we have pure dissonance. Ordinary dissonance 
 is made up of a mixture of beats or harshness and pure 
 dissonance. The first two are due to perceptible or just 
 , disappearing interruptions of the sensation, the latter to the 
 entire absence of the unity of the clang, that is, of the con- 
 sonance that would have arisen if a complete or partial fusion 
 had taken place. This lack of accord in tones, due to the 
 relation of their pure qualities, may be designsited bisonance. 
 If through the simultaneous sounding of a great number of 
 non-accordant tones the various conditions for an ordinary 
 dissonance, beats, tonal beats, harshness, and "bisonance, are all 
 added together, a noise is the result. Qn the psychological 
 side this means that the predominating tonal elements disappear 
 entirely or become mere modifying elements in the total idea. 
 For our apprehension of noises, in the case of those which 
 last a short interval only, the general pitch of the most in- 
 tense elements is determinative, in the .case of those which last 
 longer, the form of the disturbance resulting from the rapidity 
 of the beats, from the accompanying tonal beats, etc., also 
 has an influence. 
 
 Human articulations are characteristic examples of different 
 forms of noise. The vowels are intermediate between clangs 
 and noises with predominantly clang character; the resonants 
 are noises of long duration, and the proper consonants' noises 
 of short duration. In whispers the vowels become simply 
 "lioises. The circumstance that the differences in vowels are 
 perfectly distinct in whispers, goes to prove that the character 
 of vowel§ depends essentially on their noise-elements. It is 
 
§ 9. Intensive Ideas. 101 
 
 probable that simple sensations of noise (p. 49) enter into 
 all noises together with the numerous tonal elements that 
 go to make them up. The ii-regular air-vibrations arising 
 from the disturbances in the tonal waves, excite both the 
 nervous elements in the vestibule of the labyrinth, which 
 are sensitive to such stimulations, and the auditory nerve- 
 fibres themselves. 
 
 7 a. Helmholtz's resonance hypothesis has aided us materially 
 in understanding the physiological substratum of intensive auditory 
 ideas, especially those of clangs (p. 51). It is assumed that certain 
 parts of the auditory organ are so tuned that tonal waves of a 
 given rate always set in sympathetic vibration only the part 
 correspondingly tuned. This explains in a general way the 
 analyzing ability of the auditory sense, as a result of which we 
 can distinguish the elements not only in. a compound clang, but 
 to some extent even in a single clang. The resonance hypothesis, 
 however, accounts physiologically for only one side of tonal fusion, 
 the persistence of the single sensation in the total intensive idea, 
 not for the other side, the more or less intimate combination of 
 the elements. The assumption of an imaginary "organ of fusion" 
 in the brain for this purpose, is one of those fictions that are 
 more harmful than helpful, in which the attempt is made to 
 satisfy a demand for explanation with an empty word. The tonal 
 elements that produce an intensive clang-idea persist as real 
 sensations and still give up their independence more or less in 
 the total idea. Tonal fusion is, then, a psychical process and 
 requires a psychological explanation. But since this fusion is 
 very different under different objective conditions, as, for example, 
 when the impressions are due to the combined vibrations from a 
 single source or to vibrations from several distinct sources; these 
 differences must have some physiological and physical grounds 
 for their explanation. The most natural way to attempt such an 
 explanation is properly to supplement the resonance hypothesis. 
 If we assume that besides the analyzing parts of the auditory 
 organ, the resonant membrane, still others exist which are effected 
 by the total, unresolved clang, we have a sufficient physiological 
 substratum for the different effects of the various conditions. The 
 
102 !!• Psychical Compounds. 
 
 observations (p. 41) on birds deprived of their labyrinths make 
 it possible to infer that the auditory nerve-fibres in the canals 
 of the labyrinth may be such organs. Then, too, the existence 
 of beat-tones (p. 99), which sometimes surpass the primary tones in 
 intensity, and the observation that the interruptions of a single 
 tone may unite to form a second sensation when sufficiently 
 rapid, both seem to require a similar supplementation of the 
 resonance hypothesis. 
 
 § 10. SPAOIAL IDEAS. 
 
 1. Spacial and temporal ideas are immediately distinguished 
 from intensive ideas by the fact that their parts are united, not 
 in an arbitrarily variable, but in a definitely fixed order, so 
 that when the order is thought of as changed the idea itself 
 changes. Ideas with such a fixed arrangement are called in 
 general extensive ideas. 
 
 Of the possible forms of extensive ideas, spacial ideas 
 are distinguished by the fact that the fixed arrangement 
 of the parts of a spacial compound holds only for the re- 
 lation of the parts to one another, not for their relation to 
 the ideating subject. This latter relation may be thought of 
 as indefinitely varied. The objective independence of spacial 
 compounds from the ideating subject is called the movability 
 and torsibility of spatial compounds. The number of directions 
 in which such movement and torsion may take place, is 
 limited. They may all be reduced to three dimensions, in 
 each of which it is possible to advance in two opposite 
 directions. The number of directions in which the parts of 
 a single compound may be arranged as well as the number 
 in which various compounds may be arranged with reference 
 to one another, is the same as the maximal number of 
 directions in which movement and torsion are possible. This 
 is what we call the three-dimensional character of space. A 
 
§10. Spacial Ideas. 103 
 
 single spacial idea may, accordingly, be defined as a three- 
 dimensional compound whose parts are fixed in their location 
 ivith regard to one another, hut capable of indefinite variation 
 in their location with regard to the ideating subject. This 
 definition neglects, of course, the frequent changes in the 
 arrangement of the parts, which occur in reality. When these 
 changes take place, they are to be regarded as transitions from 
 one idea to another. This three-dimensional arrangement of 
 spacial ideas must of necessity include one-dimensional and 
 two-dimensional arrangements as special cases. In such cases, 
 however, the wanting dimensions must always be added in 
 thought as soon as the relation of the idea to the ideating 
 subject is taken into account. 
 
 2. This relation to the ideating subject, which is really 
 present in all spacial ideas, renders it from the first psycho- 
 logically impossible that the arrangement of the elements in 
 such an idea should be an original attribute of the elements 
 themselves, analagous to the intensity or quaUty of sensations ; 
 it requires rather that this arrangement should result from the 
 bringing together of these elements, and should arise from 
 some new psychical conditions that come with this coexistence. 
 If this is not admitted, it becomes necessary not only to at- 
 tribute a spacial quality to every single sensation, but also to 
 postulate for every sensation, however limited, a simultaneous 
 idea of the whole of three-dimensional space in its location 
 with regard to the ideating subject. This would lead to the 
 acceptance of an a priori space-perception prior to all concrete 
 sensations, which is not only contradictory to all our ex- 
 periences as to the conditions for the rise and development of 
 psychical compounds in general, but also contradictory to all 
 our experiences as to the influences that affect spacial ideas 
 in particular. 
 
 3. All spaoial ideas are arrangements either of tactual 
 
104 II- Psychical Compounds. 
 
 or of visual sensations. Indirectly, through of connection of 
 other sensations with either tactual or visual ideas, the spa- 
 cial relation may be carried over to other sensations. In the 
 cases of touch and sight, it is obvious that the extended sur- 
 face of the peripheral sense-organs, and their equipment with 
 organs of movement, which render possible a varying location 
 of the impressions in regard to the ideating subject, are both 
 favorable conditions for an extensive, spacial arrangement of 
 the- sensations. The tactual sense is the earlier of the two 
 here in question, for it appears earlier in the development 
 of organisms and shows the structural relations in much 
 coarser, but for that reason in many respects much plainer, 
 form than the more delicately organized visual organ does.. 
 Still, it is to be noted that where vision is present, the 
 spacial ideas from touch are greatly influenced by those 
 from sight. 
 
 A. SPACIAL TOUCH-IDEAS. 
 
 4. The simplest possible touch-idea is a single, approxi- 
 mately punctiform impression on the skin. If such an impres- 
 sion is presented even when the eyes are turned away, there 
 arises a definite idea of the place touched. Introspection shows 
 that this idea, which is called the localization of the stimulus, 
 under the normal condition where vision is present is not im- 
 mediate, as we we should expect it to be if the spacial quality 
 were an original attribute of sensations, but that it depends 
 upon a secondary, generally very obscure, visual idea of the 
 region touched. Localization is, therefore, more exact near 
 bounding Unes of the touch- organs than on the uniform 
 intervening surfaces, since these bounding lines are more 
 prominent in the visual images. The arousal of a visual idea 
 through the tactual impression, even when the eyes are turned 
 away, is possible because every point of the organ of touch 
 
§10. Spacial Ideas. 105 
 
 gives to the touch-sensation a pecuHar qualitative coloring, 
 which is independent of the quality of the external impres- 
 sion and is probably due to the character of the structure 
 of the skin, which varies from point to point and is never 
 exactly the same in two separate regions. 
 
 This local coloring is called the local sign of the sensation. 
 It varies in different regions of the skin at very different rates : 
 rapidly on the tip of the tongue, on the ends of the fingers, and 
 on the lips; slowly on the broader surfaces of the limbs and 
 trunk. A measure for the rate of this variation may be ob- 
 tained by applying two impressions near each other to any region 
 of the skin. So long as the distance of the impressions is less 
 than that of distinguishable local signs they are perceived as a 
 single one, but so soon as they pass this Umit they are perceived 
 as spacially separate. The smallest, just noticeable distance be- 
 tween two impressions is called the spaee~fhreshold for touch. 
 It varies from one or two millimetres (tips of tongue and 
 fingers) to sixty-eight millimetres (back, upper arm, and leg). 
 On the pressure-spots (p. 47), when the stimuli are favorably 
 applied, still shorter distances can be perceived. Then, too, 
 the threshold is dependent on the condition of the tactual 
 organ and on practice. As a result of the first, for example, 
 the threshold is smaller for children than for adults, since 
 the differences in structure that condition the local signs, are 
 obviously more crowded together. As a result of practice, 
 the threshold is smaller in the case of the bHnd than of 
 those who have vision, especially at the ends of the fingers, 
 which are most used for touching. 
 
 5. The influence of visual ideas of the regions touched, 
 where vision is present, as just described, teaches that the 
 localization of tactual impressions and the spacial arrange- 
 ment of a number of such impressions is not due to an 
 original spacial quality of cutaneous points or to any 
 
106 II- Psychical Compcmnds. 
 
 primary space-forming function of the tactual organ. On the 
 contrary, it presupposes spacial ideas of sight, which can be 
 made use of, however, only because the various parts of the 
 tactual organ have certain qualitative attributes, local signs, 
 which arouse the visual image of the part touched. There 
 is no reason for attributing an immediate spacial relation to 
 the local signs themselves; it is obviously enough that they 
 act as qualitative signals to arouse the appropriate visual 
 images. This connection with vision depends upon the frequent 
 union of the two. The keenness of localization will, there- 
 fore, be aided by all the influences that increase either the 
 clearness of the visual images or the quaHtative differences 
 in local signs. 
 
 We may describe the formation of spacial ideas in this 
 case as the arrangement of tactual' stimuli in visual images 
 already present. The whole process is a consequence of the 
 consta.nt connection of these images with the qualitative local 
 signs of the stimuli. The union of the local signs and the 
 visual images of the corresponding region may, then, be 
 regarded as an incomplete, but very constant, fusion. The 
 fusion is incomplete because both visual image and tactual 
 impression retain their independent character; but it is so 
 constant that, when the state of the tactual organ remains 
 the same, it seems invariable. This last fact explains the 
 relative certainty of localization. The predominating elements 
 of this fusion are the tactual sensations. For many persons 
 the visual images are pushed so far into the backgroimd that 
 they can not be perceived with any certainty, even with the 
 greatest attention. The apprehension of space, in such cases, 
 is perhaps an immediate function of tactual and motor sen- 
 sations, as for the blind (v. inf. 6). As a rule, however, more 
 careful observation shows that it is possible to recognize the 
 position and distance of the impressions only by attempting 
 
§10. Spacial Ideas. 107 
 
 to make the indefinite visual image of the region touched 
 more distinct. 
 
 6. The conditions that hold when vision is present, are 
 essentially different from those found in cases of blindness, 
 especially congenital or early acquired blindness. Blind per- 
 sons retain for a long time memory images of familiar visual 
 objects, so that the spacial ideas of touch always remain, to 
 some extent, products of a fusion between tactual sensations 
 and visual images. But these visual images can not be con- 
 tinally renewed, so that the persons in question come more 
 and more to make use of movements. The sensations of 
 movement that arise from the joints and muscles in passing 
 from one tactual impression to another (p. 46), serve as a 
 measure for the movement executed and, at the same time, 
 as a measure for the distance between the two impressions. 
 These sensations of movement, which in acquired bhndness 
 are additions to the gradually fading visual images and 
 in part substitutes for them, are, in congenital blindness, 
 the only means present from the first for the formation 
 of an idea of the relative position and distance of the 
 single impressions. We observe in the latter case contin- 
 ual movements of the touch -organs, especially the fingers, 
 over the object. Added to these movements are a more 
 concentrated attention to tactual sensations and a greater 
 practice in their discrimination. Still, the low grade of devel- 
 opment of this sense, in comparison with sight, always shows 
 itself in the fact that the apprehension of continuous Hnes ^nd 
 surfaces is much less perfect than that of approximately 
 punctiform impressions arranged in various ways. The neces- 
 sity of making a blind-alphabet of arbitrary figures formed 
 by various combinations of raised points, is a striking proof 
 of this. Thus, for example, in the ordinary alphabet (Braille's) 
 one point represents A, two points in a horizontal line B, 
 
J 08 H- Psychical Oamponrnds. 
 
 two points in a vertical line C, etc. With six points at 
 most all the letters can be formed, but the points must be 
 far enough apart to be perceived as separate with the 
 end of the index finger. The way in which this alphabet is 
 read is characteristic for the development of the space-ideas 
 of the blind. As a rule the index fingers of both hands are 
 used for this purpose. The right finger precedes and appre- 
 hends a group of points simultaneously (synthetic touch), the 
 left finger follows somewhat more slowly and apprehends the 
 single points successively (analytic touch). Both the syn- 
 thetic and analytic impressions are united and referred to the 
 same object. This method of procedure shows clearly that 
 the spacial discrimdnation of tactual impressions is no more 
 immediately given in this case than in the case where vision 
 was present, but that here the movements by means of which 
 the finger that is used for analytic touch passes from point 
 to point, play the same part as the accompanying visual ideas 
 did in the normal cases with vision. 
 
 An idea of the extent and direction of these movements 
 can arise only under the condition that every movement is 
 accompanied by an inner tactual sensation (p. 46, 6). The 
 assumption that these inner tactual sensations are immedi- 
 ately connected with an idea of the space passed through in 
 the movement, would be highly improbable, for it would not 
 only presuppose the existence of a connate perception of 
 surrounding space and of the position of the subject in respect 
 to the same (p. 103), but it would include another particular 
 assumption. This is the assumption that inner and outer 
 touch-sensations, although they are otherwise alike in quahty 
 and physiological substrata, still differ in that inner sen- 
 sations give, along with the sensation, an image of the po- 
 sition of the subject and of the spacial arrangement of the 
 immediate environment. This would really necessitate a return 
 
§10. Spaeial Ideas. 109 
 
 to the Platonic doctrine of the memory of innate ideas, for 
 the sensations of movements arising from touch are here 
 thought of as the mere external occasional causes for the 
 revival of innate transcendental ideas of space. 
 
 7. Apart from its psychological improhabihty, such an 
 hypothesis as that just mentioned can not be reconciled with 
 the influence exercised by practice on the discrimination of 
 local signs and of differences in movements. There is no 
 other way except to attribute the rise of spaeial ideas here, 
 as in normal cases with vision (p. 106), to the combinations 
 of the sensations themselves as presented in experience. These 
 combinations consist in the fact that in passing from one 
 outer tactual impression to another, any two sensations, a and 
 b, with a certain difference in local signs, always have a 
 corresponding inner touch-sensation, a, accompanpng the 
 movement; while two sensations, a and c, with a greater dif- 
 ference in local signs, have a more intense sensation of move- 
 ment, y. For the bhnd there is always such a regular com- 
 bination of inner arid outer touch-sensations. From the 
 strictly empirical point of view it can not be affirmed that 
 either of these sensational systems, in itself, brings the idea 
 of spaeial arrangement; we can only say that this arrange- 
 ment results regularly from the combination of the two. On 
 this basis the spaeial ideas of the bhnd, arising, as they do, 
 from external impressions, may be defined as a product of 
 the fusion of external tactual sensations and their qualita- 
 tively graded local signs, with internal tactuM sensation 
 graded according to intensity. The external sensations with 
 their attributes as determined by the external stimulus, are 
 the predominating elements in this fusion. These push the 
 local signs with their quahtative peculiarities, and the sen- 
 sations of movement with their intensive attributes, so far 
 into the background, that, like the overtones of a clang, they 
 
no II. Psyehieal Compounds. 
 
 can be perceived only when the attention is especially con- 
 centrated upon them. Spacial ideas from touch are, accord- 
 ingly, due to a complete fusion. Their characteristic peculi- 
 arity, in contrast, for example, with intensive tonal fusions, 
 is that the subordinate and supplementary elements are dif- 
 ferent in character, and at the same time related to one 
 another according to definite laws. They are different, for 
 the local signs form a pure qualitative system, while the iimer 
 touch-sensations which accompany the movements of the tac- 
 tual organs, form a series of intensities. They are related, 
 for the motor energy used in passing through an interval 
 between two points, increases with the extent of the interval, 
 so that, in proportion to the qualitative difference between 
 the local signs, there must also be an increase in the intensity 
 of the sensations of movement. 
 
 8. The spacial arrangement of tactual impressions is thus 
 the product of a twofold fusion. First, the subordinate ele- 
 ments fuse, in that the various qualities of the local sign 
 system, which is spread out in two dimensions, are related 
 to one another according to the grades of intensity of the 
 sensations of movement. Secondly, the tactual impressions as 
 determined by the external stimuli, fuse with the product of 
 the first union. Of course, the two processes do not take 
 place successively, but in one and the same act, for the local 
 signs and movements must both be aroused by the external 
 stimuli. Still, the external sensations vary with the nature 
 of the objective stimulus, while the local signs and internal 
 tactual sensations are subjective elements, whose mutual rela- 
 tions always remain the same even when the external im- 
 pressions vary. This is the psychological condition for the 
 constancy of attributes whiclv,we ascribe to space itself, in 
 contrast wich the great changeableness of the quaHtative attri- 
 butes of objects in space. 
 
§ 10. Spaeial Ideas. m 
 
 9. After the fusion between local signs and internal tac- 
 tual sensations has once been effected, either one of these 
 elements by itself, though perhaps in a limited degree, is able 
 to bring about a localization of the sensations, and even to 
 arouse complex spaeial ideas. In this way not only normal 
 individuals with vision, but also the blind, even the congen- 
 itally blind, have an idea of the place touched, and can per- 
 ceive as spacially separate two impressions that are far enough 
 apart, even when the touch-organs remain perfectly quiet. 
 Of course, the congenitally blind can have no visual image 
 of the region touched, but they have instead of this an idea 
 of a movement of the part touched and, where several im- 
 pressions are received, the idea of a movement from one to 
 the other. The same fusion takes place injdeas thus formed 
 as in the ordinary ones, where movements are really present, 
 only here the one factor, the inner tactual sensation is 
 merely a memory-image. 
 
 10. In the same way, we may have the reverse process. 
 The real contents of experience may be a sum of inner tac- 
 tual sensations which arise from the movement of some part 
 of the body, while no noticeable external tactual sensations 
 whatever are given, and yet these internal sensations which 
 accompany the movement may still be the basis of a spaeial 
 idea. This is regularly the case when we have pure ideas 
 of our own movements. If, for example, we shut our eyes 
 and then raise our arm, we have at every moment an idea 
 of the position of the arm. To be sure, external tactual 
 sensations that arise from the torsion and folding of the skin, 
 play some part here too, but they are relatively unimportant 
 in comparison with the internal sensations from the joints, 
 tendons, and muscles. 
 
 It can be easily observed that where vision is present, this 
 idea of position comes from an obscure visual image of the 
 
112 II- Psychical Compounds. 
 
 limb with its surroundings, which is aroused even when the 
 eyes are closed or turned away. This connection is so close 
 that it may arise between the mere memory-image of the inner 
 tactual sensation and the corresponding visual idea, as is 
 observed in the case of paralytics, where sometimes the mere 
 will to execute a certain movement arouses the idea of a 
 movement really executed. Evidently, the ideas of one's own 
 movements depend, when vision is present, on incomplete 
 fusions, just as the external spacial ideas of touch do, only 
 here the internal sensations play the part that the outer 
 sensations play in the former case. This leads to the assump- 
 tion that the inner tactual sensations also have local signs, 
 that is, the sensations in the various joints, tendons, and mus- 
 cles show certain series of local differences. Introspection 
 seems to confirm this view. If we move alternately the 
 knee-joint, hip-joint, and shoulder- joint, or even the correspond- 
 ing joints on the right and left sides, the quality of the 
 sensation seems each time a little different^ even if we neglect 
 the connection with a visual image of the limb, which can 
 never be entirely suppressed. Then, too, it is impossible to 
 see how accompanying visual images could arise at all with- 
 out such differences. That would require not only a connate 
 idea of space in the mind, but also a connate knowledge of 
 the position and movements of the Hmbs in space for every 
 moment. 
 
 11. Froni the relations that exist in the normal cases with 
 vision, we can understand the way in which the ideas of their 
 own movements arise in the case of the congenitally bhnd. 
 Here, instead of a fusion with a visual image, there must 
 be a fusion of sensations of movement mth the local signs. 
 Outer tactual sensations also act as aids in this case. In 
 fact, they are much more important here than when vision 
 is present. The ideas of the blind as to their own move- 
 
§10. Spaeial Ideas. 113 
 
 ments are exceedingly uncertain so long as they are unaided 
 by contact with external objects. When, however, they touch 
 such objects, they have the advantage of greater practice 
 with the external tactual sense and a keener attention for 
 the same. The so-called "distance-sense of the blind" is a 
 proof of this. It consists in the ability to perceive from 
 some distance, without direct contact, a resisting object, as, 
 for example, a neighboring wall. Now, it can be experi- 
 mentally demonstrated that this distance -sense is made up 
 of two factors: a very weak tactual stimulation of the fore- 
 head by the atmospheric resistance, and a change in the 
 sound of the step. The latter acts as a signal to concentrate 
 the attention enough so that the weak tactual stimulations 
 can be perceived. The "distance- sense" disappears, accord- 
 ingly, when the tactual stimulations are prevented by binding 
 a cloth around the forehead or when the steps are rendered 
 inaudible. 
 
 12. Besides our ideas of the position and movements of 
 the various parts of our body, we have also an idea of the 
 position and movement of our whole body. The former can 
 never have anything but a relative significance; it is only 
 when considered in connection with the latter that they 
 become absolute. The organ of orientation for this general 
 idea is the head. We always have a definite idea of the 
 position of the head; the other organs are localized in 
 our ideas, generally, indeed, very indefinitely, with reference 
 to it, according to the particular complexes of inner and 
 outer tactual sensations in each case. The specific organ of 
 orientation in the head is the system of semicircular canals, 
 to which are added as secondary aids the inner and outer 
 tactual sensations resulting from the action of the muscles 
 of the head. The function of these canals as an organ of 
 orientation can be most easily understood by assuming that 
 
 Wdkbt, Paycliology. 8 
 
114 II- Psychical Compounds. 
 
 inner tactual sensations with especially marked differences in 
 local signs, arise in them through the influence of the chang- 
 ing pressure of the fluid medium, which fills them. It is 
 highly probahle that dizziness, which comes from rapid 
 rotation of the head, is due to the sensations caused by the 
 violent movements of this fluid. This is in accord with the 
 observations that partial derangements of the canals bring 
 about constant illusions in localization, and complete de- 
 rangement of the same is followed by an almost total sus- 
 pension of the ability to localize. 
 
 12 a. The antagonistic theories in regard to the psycHcal 
 formation of spacial ideas, are generally called nativism and 
 empirism. The nativistic theory seeks to derive localization in 
 space from connate properties of the sense-organs and sense- 
 centres, while the empiristic theory seeks to derive it from the 
 influences of experience. This discrimination does not give proper 
 expression to the actual opposition that exists, for the assumption 
 of connate spacial ideas may be attacked without affirming that 
 these ideas arise through experience. This is the case when, as 
 above, space-perceptions are regarded as products of psychical 
 fusions due both to the physiological properties of the organs of 
 sense and of movement, and to the general laws for the rise of 
 psychical compounds. Such processes of fusion and the arrange- 
 ments of sense-impressions based upon them, are everywhere 
 the substrata of our experience, but for this very reason it is 
 inadmissible to call them "experience" itself. It is much more 
 proper to poiat out the opposition that really exists, as that of 
 nativistic and genetic theories. It is to be noted that the wide- 
 spread nativistic theories contain empirical elements, while, on the 
 other hand, empirical theories contain nativistic elements, so that 
 the difference is sometimes very small. Supporters of the nativ- 
 istic view assume that the arrangement of impressions in space 
 corresponds directly to the arrangement of sensitive points in the 
 skin and retina. The special way in which the projection out- 
 ward is effected, especially the ideas of the distance and magnir 
 tude of objects, and the reference of a plurality of spacially 
 
§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 115 
 
 separated impressions to a single object, are all regarded as 
 dependent upon "attention", "will", or even "experience". Sup- 
 porters of the empirical theory, on the other hand, generally 
 presuppose space as given in some way or other, and then in- 
 terpret each single idea as a localization in this space due to 
 some empirical motive. In the theory of spacial ideas from 
 sight, tactual space is generally regarded as this origiaally given 
 space; in the theory of tactual ideas, original spacial qualities 
 have sometimes been attributed to motor sensations. Thus, in 
 the actual concrete theories empirism and nativism are very 
 ill defined concepts. They agree in the use of the complex con- 
 cepts of popular psychology, such as "attention", "will", and 
 "experience", without any examination or analysis. In this respect 
 they are different from the genetic theory, which seeks to show 
 the elementary processes from which the ideas rise, by means 
 of a psychological analysis of the ideas. In spite of their weak- 
 nesses, the nativistic and empiristic theories have served to 
 set the psychological problem that exists here, clearly before 
 us, and to bring to light a great number of facts for its 
 solution. 
 
 B. SPACIAL SIGHT -IDEAS. 
 
 13. The general properties of the touch-sense are repeated 
 in the visual sense, but in a more highly organized form. 
 Corresponding to the sensory surface of the outer skin, we 
 have here the retina with its rods and cones arranged in 
 rows and forming an extraordinarily fine mosaic of sensitive 
 points. Corresponding to the movements of the tactual organs, 
 we have the movements of both eyes in fixating objects and 
 following their bounding lines. Still, while tactual impressions 
 are perceived only through immediate contact with the objects, 
 the refractive media in front of the retina throw inverted, 
 reduced images upon it. These images are so small that 
 space is allowed for a large number of simultaneous im- 
 pressions, and the ability of light to traverse space makes it 
 possible for both neighboring and distant objects to yield 
 
116 II. Bsyehical Cdmpoimds. 
 
 impressions. Vision thus becomes a distance-sense in a much 
 higher degree than hearing. Light can be perceived from 
 incomparably greater distances than sound. Furthermore, 
 only visual ideas are directly localized at different distances 
 from the subject; for auditory ideas this locaKzation is al- 
 ways indirect, through the aid of visual ideas of space. 
 
 14. With regard to its spacial attributes, every visual 
 idea may be resolved into two factors: 1) the location of the 
 single elements in relation to one another, and 2) their loca- 
 tion in relation to the ideating subject. Even the idea of 
 one single point of Mght, contains both these factors, for we 
 must always represent a point in some spacial environment, 
 and also in some direction and at some distance from our- 
 selves. These factors can be separated only through dehb- 
 erate abstraction, never in reality, for the relation of any 
 point in space to its environment, regularly determines its 
 relation to the ideating subject. As a result of this depend- 
 ence, the analysis of visual ideas may better start with the 
 location of the elements in relation to one another, and then 
 take up later the location of the compound in regard to the 
 subject. 
 
 a. Tfie Location of the Elements of a Visual Idea in 
 Relation to One Another. 
 
 15. In the apprehension of the reciprocal relations 
 between elements of a visual idea, the attributes of the 
 tactual sense are all repeated, only in a much more highly 
 organized form,, and with a few modifications significant for 
 the visual ideas. Here, too, we immediately connect with the 
 simplest possible, approximately punctiform, impression the 
 idea of its place in space; that is, we give it a certain defi- 
 rdte position in relation to the parts of space about it. This 
 localization is not effected, however, as in touch, by the 
 
§ 10. Spaeial Ideas. 1 1 7 
 
 direct reference of the impression to the corresponding point 
 of the sense-organ itself, but we project it into a field of 
 vision, which lies at some distance outside of the ideating 
 subject. Here too we have a measure, as in the case of 
 touch, for the accuracy of localization, in the distance at 
 which two approximately punctiform impressions can be just 
 distinguished as spacially different. The distance is not given 
 in this case as a directly measurable linear extension on 
 the sensory surface itself, but as the shortest perceptible 
 interval between two points in the field of vision. The field 
 of vision may be thought of as placed at any distance 
 whatever from the subject, so that it is best to use as a 
 measure for the fineness of localization, not a linear exten- 
 sion, but an angle, the angle formed by the intersection of 
 the lines passing through the nodal point of the eye, from 
 the points in the field of vision to the corresponding retinal 
 points. This angle of vision remains constant so long as the 
 size of the retinal image is unchanged, while the distance 
 between the points in the field of vision increases in pro- 
 portion to their distance from the subject. If an equivalent 
 linear distance is sought in place of the angle of vision, it 
 can be found in the diameter of the retinal image. This 
 may be reckoned directly from the angle and the distance of 
 the retina from the nodal point of the eye. 
 
 16. The measurements of the keenness of localization with 
 the eye, made according to this principle, show that there is 
 a great difference for different parts of the field of vision, 
 just as was found for different regions of the tactual organs 
 (p. 105). StUl, the distances that measure the smallest per- 
 ceptible intervals here are all very much smaller. Then, 
 again, there are many regions of finer discrimination scattered 
 over the tactual organ, but only one region of finest discrim- 
 ination in the field of vision. This is the middle, which 
 
118 //. Psychical Compounds. 
 
 corresponds to the centre of the retina. From this region 
 towards the periphery the fineness of localization diminishes 
 very rapidly. The whole field of vision or the whole retinal 
 surface, is, accordingly, analogous to a single tactual region, 
 as, for example, that of the index finger, except that it very 
 much surpasses the latter in fineness of localization, especially 
 at the centre, where two impressions at a distance corre- 
 sponding to 60" — 90" in the angle of vision, are just distin- 
 guishable, while two degrees and a half toward the periphery, 
 the smallest perceptible extension is 3' 30", and at eight 
 degrees it increases to 1°. 
 
 In normal vision we turn the eye towards objects of which 
 we wish to gain more accurate spacial ideas, in such a way 
 that they lie in the middle of the field of vision, their images 
 falhng, accordingly, on the centre of the retina. "We speak 
 of such objects as seen directly, of all others, which he in 
 the eccentric parts of the field of vision, as seen indireetly. 
 The centre of the region of direct vision is called the point 
 of regard, or the ficcation-point. The line that unites the 
 centre of the retina with that of the field of vision is known 
 as the line of regard. 
 
 If we reckon the distance on the retina that corresponds 
 to the smallest angle of vision at which two points in the 
 centre of the field of vision may be perceived as separate, 
 it will be found to be .004 to .006 mm. This distance is 
 equal to the diameter of a retinal cone, and since the 
 cones are so close together in the centre of the retina that 
 they are in direct contact, it may be concluded with 
 probability that two impressions must fall upon at least two 
 different retinal elements if they are to be perceived as sep- 
 arate in space. This view is supported by the fact that 
 in the peripheral regions of the retina the rods and cones, 
 which are the two forms of elements sensitive to Hght, are 
 
§ 10. Spaeial Ideas. 1 ] 9 
 
 really separated by greater intervals. It may, then, be 
 assumed that the keenness of vision, or the ability to distin- 
 guish two distinct points in the field of vision, is directly de- 
 pendent on the proximity of the retinal elements to one 
 another, for two impressions can be distinguished as spacially 
 different only when they act upon different elements. 
 
 16 a. Because of this interrelation between the keenness of 
 vision and the arrangement of retinal elements, it has often been 
 concluded that every such element has from the first the property 
 of localizing any stimulus that acts upon it, in that position in 
 space which corresponds to its own projection in the field of 
 vision. In this way the attempt has been made to reduce the 
 property of the visual sense by virtue of which it represents 
 its objects in an external field of vision at some distance from 
 the subject, • to a connate energy of the retinal elements or of 
 their central connections in the visual centre in the brain. There 
 are certain pathological disturbances of vision that seem at first 
 sight to confirm this assumption. When some region of the 
 retina is pushed out of place as a result of inflammation under- 
 neath, certain distortions in the images, the so-caUed metamor- 
 phopsia, arise. The extent and direction of these distortions can 
 be fully explained when it is assumed that the displaced retinal 
 elements continue to localize their impressions as they did when 
 in their normal positions. But it is obvious that these distor- 
 tions of the images when, as in most cases, they appear as con- 
 tinually changing phenomena during the gradual formation and 
 disappearance of the excretion, furnish us with no more evidence 
 for a connate energy of localization in the retina than does the 
 readily observed fact that distorted images of objects are seen 
 when one looks through prismatic glasses. If, on the other hand, . 
 a stationary condition is gradually reached, the metamorphopsia 
 disappear, and that, too, not only in cases where it may be as- 
 sumed that the retinal elements return to their original position, 
 but even in those cases where such a return is entirely iniprob- 
 able on account of the extent of the affection. In cases like 
 the latter, the development of a new connection between the 
 single retinal elements and their corresponding points in the .field 
 
120 11- Psychical Compounds. 
 
 of vision, must be . assumed >). This conclusion is supported' by- 
 observations made with normal eyes on the gradual adaptation to 
 distorted images which are produced by external optica,l appli- 
 ances. If a pair of prismatic glasses are worn before the eyes, 
 marked and disturbing distortions of the images are the regular 
 results'. The straight bounding lines appear bent and the forms 
 of the objects are thus distorted. These disturbances gradually 
 disappear entirely if the glasses are worn some time. When the 
 glasses are removed the distortions may appear in the opposite 
 direction. All these phenomena can be understood if we pre- 
 suppose that the spaoial localizations of vision are not original, 
 but acquired. 
 
 17. Besides the fetinal sensations there are other psychical 
 elements that always take part in the reciprocal spacial 
 arrangement of light-impressions. The physiological proj)er- 
 ties of the eye point a priori to the sensations that accom- 
 pany ocular movements, as such elements. These movements 
 obviously play the same part in the estimation of distances 
 in the field of vision as the tactual movements do in the 
 estimation of tactual impressions. The grosser conditions of 
 touch are, however, here reproduced in a much more delicate 
 and hightly developed form. The eye can be turned in all 
 directions about its centre of rotation, which is fixed in its 
 relation to the head, by means of a most admirably arranged 
 system of six muscles. It is thus well suited to following 
 continuously the bounding lines of objects or to passing each 
 
 1) A process analogous to this elimination of the metamopTiopsia 
 is sometimes observed in "binoeula/r vision when the disturbances 
 arising from sqidnting are gradually oirercome. When the ' squiiiting 
 begins,' the two lines of regard no longer meet in the field of vision, 
 so that double images of Objects arise. These may gradually dis- 
 appear, however, if the condition of the eyes remains perfectly 
 stationary; a new set of relations is developed for the retinal ele- 
 ments of the squinting eye. 
 
§10. Spacialldeas. 121 
 
 time in the shortest line from a given fixation-point to another. 
 The movements in the directions wliich correspond to the 
 position of the objects most frequently and closely observed, 
 namely, downward and inward movements, are favored above 
 the others by the arrangement of the muscles. Furthermore, 
 the movements of the two eyes are so adapted to one another 
 through the synergy of their innervation, that normally the 
 two lines of regard are always turned upon the same fixation- 
 point. In this way a cooperation of the two eyes is made 
 possible which not only permit a more perfect apprehension 
 of the position of objects in relation to one another, but, more 
 especially, furnishes the most essential means for the deter- 
 mination of the spacial relation of objects to the subject 
 (24 seq). 
 
 18. The phenomena of vision teach that the idea of 
 the relative distance of two points from each other is depend- 
 ent on the motor energy of the eye employed in passing 
 through this distance, just as the discrimination of two dis- 
 tinct points in the field of vision depends on the arrangement 
 of the retinal elements. The motor energy becomes a com- 
 ponent of the idea through its connection with a sensation 
 wliich can be perceived, especially in extensive movements 
 and by comparing ocular movements in various directions. 
 Thus, for example, the upward movement of the eyes is 
 clearly accompanied by more intense sensations than the 
 downward movements; and the same is true of outward 
 movements of one eye as compared with its inward move- 
 ments. 
 
 The influence of sensations of movement on the locali- 
 zation are most apparent in the cases of disturbance arising 
 from partial paralysis of single ocular muscles. These disturb- 
 ances correspond exactly to the changes in the amount 
 of energy required to move the eye. The general principle 
 
122 II' PsyeMeal Compotmds. 
 
 of such disorders is that the distance between two points 
 seems greater when they lie in the direction of the more 
 difficult movement. The more difficult movement has a 
 correspondingly more intense motor sensation, which under 
 normal conditions accompanies a more extensive movement. 
 As a result, the distance passed through appears greater. 
 Furthermore, the same illusion may appear for distances that 
 lie in the same direction, but have not been actually passed 
 through, for the standard found during a movement deter- 
 mines the motor impulse in the eye even when it is not moved. 
 19. Similar differences in the estimation of distances can 
 be demonstrated for the normal eye. Although the ocular 
 muscles are so arranged that their movements in various 
 directions require about the same amount of exertion, still, 
 this is not exactly so. The reasons are apparently closely 
 connected with the adaptation of the eye to its functions. 
 The neighboring objects of our immediate environment, on 
 which the hnes of regard must be converged, are the ones 
 most often looked at. For this reason, the muscles of the 
 eye have so adapted themselves that the movements for the 
 convergence of the lines of regard are the easiest, particu- 
 larly those directed downwards as compared with other pos- 
 sible movements of convergence. This general facilitation 
 of convergence has been acquired by the addition of special 
 auxiliary and compensatory muscles (superior and inferior 
 obHque) to the muscles that move the eye upwards and 
 downwards (superior and inferior recti). As a result of the 
 greater complexity of muscular activity thus necessary for 
 the upward and downward movements of the eyes, the exer- 
 tion is greater in these directions than towards the two sides, 
 where only the internal and external recti act. The relative 
 ease of downward movements of convergence shows itself 
 partly in the differences in the intensity of sensations accom- 
 
§10. SpacialMeas. 123 
 
 panying the movements, as already remarked (p. 121), and 
 partly in the fact that downward convergence is involuntarily 
 too great and upward too small. 
 
 There are certain constant optical ilkmons depending on 
 the direction of the object in the field of vision, which cor- 
 respond to these differences in the motor mechanism. They 
 are of two kinds: illusions of direction, and those of mag- 
 nitude. 
 
 Both eyes are subject to an illusion as to the direction 
 of vertical lines in the field of vision. Such a line whose upper 
 end is incUned 1° — 3° outward, appears vertical, and one 
 really vertical, seems inclined inward. Since the illusion is 
 in opposite directions for the two eyes, it disappears in binoc- 
 ular vision. It can obviously be explained by the fact just 
 noted, that the downward movements of the eyes are con- 
 nected with an involuntary increase, and the upward move- 
 ments with a decrease, in the convergence. This deflection 
 of the movement from the vertical is not noticed, but 
 we refer it to the object as a deflection in the opposite 
 direction. 
 
 An equally regular illusion in magnitude appears when 
 we compare distances extending in different directions in the 
 field of vision. This, too, is very probably to be referred to 
 the asymmetry in the arrangement of the muscles which 
 arises from the adaptation of the eye to the ordinary posi- 
 tion of objects in space. A vertical straight line is judged 
 on the average Ye too long as compared with an equal hori- 
 zontal hne. ^ square, accordingly, appears as a rectangle 
 whose base is shorter than its sides, and a square drawn 
 by the eye is always too low. This illusion is explained 
 when we remember that, as a result of the highly developed 
 tendency to convergence, the muscular activity for upward and 
 downward movements is much more complex than for inward 
 
] 24 !!• Psychical Compounds. 
 
 and outward movements. The consequence is the same as 
 in the case of partially paralyzed eyes, distances in the 
 direcfiion of the more difficult movement appear greater. 
 
 19 a. Besides this difference between vertical and horizontal 
 distances, which is most noticeable because it is so large, there 
 are less marked differences between upward and downward, as 
 well as between outward and inward distances. The upper half 
 of a vertical line is overestimated on the average by '/i 6 of i^ 
 length, and the outer half of a horizontal line by Y40. The first 
 may be due to a slight asymmetry in the arrangement of the 
 upper and lower muscles, or it may be due to the involuntary 
 convergence of the lines of regard in downward movement, or, 
 finally, to a combination of both influences. The effect of con- 
 vergence is due to the fact that it corresponds to an approach 
 of the object, so that we are generally inclined to see the lower 
 half of the line nearer. In accordance with certain conditions of 
 association to be described later (§ 16, 9), when the angle of vision 
 remains constant, whatever is judged as nearer is judged to be 
 smaller, so that the lower half of a line seems shorter than the 
 upper. This explanation by the perspective can not be applied 
 to the greater illusion in the overestimation of vertical as com- 
 pared with horizontal ilines, for if it were applicable, the illusion 
 would at most be about equal to that found in the comparison 
 of the two halves of a vertical line, while in reality it is approx- 
 imately three times as great. The fact that this greater illusion 
 appears only when straight distances are compared, not in the 
 case of objects bounded by curved lines, is also a proof against 
 the explanation by perspective. A circle, for example, does not 
 appear as an ellipse with a longer vertical axis, but as a real 
 circle. The slight overestimation of the outer half of a hori- 
 zontal line is also due most probably to the asymmetrical activ- 
 ity of the muscles, which arises from the relative ease of con- 
 vergence-movements. 
 
 20. Added to these two illusions, which arise from the 
 special structure of ocular muscles in their adaptation to the 
 purposes of vision, there are certain other variable optical 
 
§ 10. Spaeial Ideas. ] 25 
 
 illusions tliat are due to certain attributes of all voluntary 
 movements and have their analoga in the movements of the 
 tactual organs. These illusions may also be divided into 
 those of direction, and those of magnitude. The former follow 
 the rule that acute angles are overestimated, obtuse under- 
 estimated, and that the dii'ection of the intersecting lines 
 varies correspondingly. For the illusions of magnitude we have 
 the rule, forced or interrupted movements require more exertion 
 than free and continuous ones. Any straight line that neces- 
 sitates fixation is, accordingly, overestimated in comparison 
 with an open distance marked off by two points, and a 
 straight line interrupted by several dividing lines is over- 
 estimated in comparison with an uninterrupted line. 
 
 The tactual analogon of the illusion in angles is the ten- 
 dency to overestimate small articular movements and to 
 underestimate large ones. This comes under the general 
 principle that a relatively greater expenditure of energy is 
 required for a short movement than for a more extensive 
 one, because it is more difficult to begin a movement than 
 to continue it after it is already started. The tactual phe- 
 nomenon analogous to the overestimation of interrupted lines, 
 is that a distance estimated by a movement of one of the 
 limbs always seems shorter when it is passed through in a 
 single continuous movement than it does when the movement 
 is several times interrupted. Here, too, the sensation corre- 
 sponds to the expenditure of energy, which is, of course, 
 greater for an interrupted than for a continuous movement. 
 The overestimation of interrupted lines by the eye, takes place, 
 as we can easily understand, only so long as no motives 
 arise from the way in which the division is made, to hinder 
 the movement of the eye over the interrupted line. Such a 
 hindrance is present, for example, when the line is inter- 
 rupted only once. This one point of division makes fixation 
 
;^26 ^^- Psychical Compotmds. 
 
 necessary. If we compare such a line with a continuous 
 one, we tend to estimate the first without any movement, 
 with the point of division as a fixation-centre, while the sec- 
 ond is apprehended by a movement of the eye. As a result 
 the continuous line seems longer than the interrupted line. 
 
 21. All these phenomena point to the immediate depend- 
 ence of the apprehension of spacial directions and magnitudes 
 on ocular movements. As further evidence pointing in the same 
 direction, we have the negative fact that the arrangement of 
 the retinal elements, especially their proximity to one another, 
 normally has no influence on the ideas of direction and 
 magnitude. This is most strikingly evident in the fact that 
 the distance between two points appears the same whether 
 observed in direct or indirect vision. Two points that are 
 clearly distinguished in direct vision, may become one in the 
 eccentric parts of the field of vision, but so soon as they 
 are distinguished at all, they will appear just as far apart in 
 one region as in the other. This independence of the prox- 
 imity of the retinal elements, in our perception of magnitude, 
 holds even for a part of the retina that is not sensitive to 
 light at all — for the blind spot, where the optic nerve comes 
 into the eye. Objects whose images fall on the bHnd spot 
 are not seen. The size of this spot is about 6°, and it is 
 located 15° inward from the point of fixation. Images of 
 considerable size, as, for example, that of a human face at a 
 distance of six feet, may disappear entirely on it. Still, 
 when points appear at the right and left or below and above 
 this region, we locaUze them just as far from each other as 
 we should in any other, uninterrupted part of the field of 
 vision. The same fact is observed when some part of the 
 retina becomes blind through pathological conditions. The 
 resulting break in the field of vision shows itself only 
 in the fact that images falling on it are not seen, never 
 
§10. Spaoial Ideas. 127 
 
 through, any changes in the locaHzation of objects lying on 
 opposite sides of the blind region.') 
 
 22. All these phenomena teach that the keenness of vision 
 and the apprehension of directions and distances in the field of 
 tision, are two different functions, which depend upon different 
 conditions : the first depends on the prommity of the retinal ele- 
 ments to one another, the second on ocular movements. It follows 
 directly that spacial ideas from sight can not be regarded 
 as original and given immediately in the action of impressions 
 of light with their spacial arrangement, any more than can 
 the spacial ideas of touch. The spacial order is, here too, 
 developed from the combination of certain sensational com- 
 ponents which, taken separately, have no spacial attributes 
 whatever. Other conditions also indicate that the sensational 
 elements are related here in the same way as in the case of 
 touch, and that the development of visual space under normal 
 conditions runs entirely parallel to the development of space 
 in congenital blindness, the only condition under which touch 
 attains a similar independence. Retinal impressions corre- 
 spond to impressions of contact, and ocular movements to 
 touch-movements. Tactual impressions can gain spacial 
 qualities only through the local coloring of the sensations 
 connected with them — the local signs — and in like man- 
 ner, we must presuppose the same for retinal impressions. 
 
 22 a. To be sure, a qualitative gradation of local signs on 
 
 1) In this connection, we have the fact that the blind spot does 
 not appear as a break in the field of vision, without sensational con- 
 tents, but as a continuation of the general brightness and color of the 
 whole field; for example, as white when we are looking at a white 
 surface, as black when we look at a black one. This filling out of 
 the blind spot is possible only through reproduced sensations, and 
 is to be considered as one of the phenomena of association to be 
 discussed later (§ 16). 
 
128 H. Psychical Gompounds. 
 
 the retina can not be demonstrated with the same evidentness as 
 for the skin. Still, by the use of colors it can be established in 
 general that for greater distances from the retinal centre the sensa- 
 tional quality gradually changes. The colors are not so saturated 
 in indirect vision, and the color-tone also changes; for example, 
 yellow appears orange. There is, indeed, in these properties of 
 the retina no strict proof for the existence of pure local differ- 
 ences ia the sensations, at least not in the fine gradations that 
 must be assumed in the retinal centre, for example. Still, they 
 show that local differences in sensations do exist, and this seems 
 to justify the assumption of such even beyond the limits of dem- 
 onstration. This is all the more justifiable because here, where 
 the gradations are much finer, the tendency to translate sen- 
 sational dififerences directly into local differences, which has already 
 been noticed in the case of touch, will be much more apt to 
 destroy their specifically qualitative character. As a confirmation 
 of this view we have the fact that the clearly demonstrable sen- 
 sational differences at greater distances from the retinal centre, 
 can be observed only under the favorable conditions of limited 
 impressions, and disappears entirely when surfaces of uniform 
 color are looked at. This disappearance of qualitative differences 
 which are in themselves considerable, must be attributed in part 
 at least to their relation to local differences. When, however, 
 such relatively great differences disappear as a result of this 
 relation, so that special methods are required for their demon-' 
 stration, it can not be expected that very small differences will 
 be demonstrable at all. 
 
 23. "We assume, accordingly, qualitative local signs, which, 
 judging from the data derived from the keenness of" vision, 
 are graded in the finest stages at the retinal centre and 
 more slowly in the eccentric parts. The formation of visual 
 space may then be described as a combination of this system 
 of local signs arranged in two dimensions, with a system of 
 intensive sensations of movement. For any two local signs a 
 and b there will be a corresponding sensation of movement 
 a arising from the movement through the distance a b and 
 
§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 129 
 
 serving as a measure of the same. A longer distance a c 
 will have a more intense sensation of movement, y. Just as 
 the point of finest discrimination on the finger is the centre 
 of reference, so in the same way the retinal centre is such 
 a point of reference for the eye. In fact, this is from the 
 laws of ocular movements more obvious for the eye than it 
 is for the tactual organ. Any luminous point in the field 
 of vision is a stimulus for the centre of ocular innervation, 
 and tends to turn the line of regard reflexly upon itself. This 
 reflex relation of eccentric stimuli to the retinal centre is 
 probably an essential condition for the development of the 
 synergy of ocular movements mentioned above, and is, at the 
 same time, an explanation of the great difficulty of observ- 
 ing objects in iadirect vision. This difficulty is evidently 
 due to the greater reflex impulse toward a point in indirect 
 vision when the attention is concentrated upon it, than toward 
 less favored points. As a result of the preeminent impor- 
 tance which the retinal centre has for ocular movements, the 
 point of fixation necessarily becomes the centre of reference 
 in the field of vision, and all distances in this field are 
 brought under a unitary standard by being determined with 
 reference to the fixation-point. The excitation of local signs 
 is due to the action of external impressions, and both to- 
 gether cause the movement towards the retinal centre. The 
 whole process of visual space-arrangement is thus due to the 
 fusion of three different sensational elements: first, the sen- 
 sational quahties depending upon the character of the exter- 
 nal stimulus, second the qualitative local signs depending 
 on the places where the stimuh act, and third, the inten- 
 sive motor sensations determined by the relation of the 
 stimulated points to the centre of the retina. The latter 
 elements may either accompany actual movements — this 
 is the original case — or, when the eye remains at rest, are 
 
 W0NDT, Psycliology. 9 
 
130 JI- Psychical Compounds. 
 
 mere motor impulses of a particular intensity. Because of 
 the regular connection between qualitative local signs and 
 intensive sensations of movement, they may both together be 
 regarded as a single system of complex heal signs. The 
 spacial localization of a simple visual impression, is a pro- 
 duct of a complete fusion of the sensation caused by the 
 external stimulus with the two interconnected elements be- 
 longing to this system of complex local signs. The arrange- 
 ment of a number of simple impressions in space consists 
 in the combination of a great number of such fusions, which 
 are graded in quality and intensity according to the elements 
 of the system of local signs. The predominating elements 
 in these fusions are the sensations due to the external stimu- 
 lation. In comparison with these, the elements of the system 
 of local signs are so obscure, even in their original qual- 
 ity and intensity, that for the immediate apprehension of 
 objects they are entirely lost except as spacial quahties. 
 
 Connected with this complex process of fusion, which 
 determines the order of the elements in the field of vision, 
 is still another. This latter process, which takes place in 
 the formation of every spacial idea, arises from the relation 
 of the object seen to the subject. We pass now to the 
 consideration of this second process. 
 
 b. The Location of Visual Ideas in Relation to the 
 Ideating Subject. 
 
 24. The simplest case of a relation between an impres- 
 sion and the subject, that can appear in a visual idea, is 
 evidently that in which the impression is reduced to a single 
 point. If a single point of hght is presented in the field of 
 vision, both lines of regard are turned upon it as a i-esult 
 of the reflex impulse exerted by the stimulus (p. 129), in such 
 
§10. Spacial Ideas. 131 
 
 a way that in both eyes the images fall upon the retinal 
 centres. At the same time the organs of accommodation are 
 adapted to the distance of the point. The point thus repre- 
 sented on the centres of both retinas is seen as single and 
 as situated in a certain particular direction and at a certain 
 particular distance from the ideating subject. 
 
 The subject is represented, as a rule, by a point that 
 may be defined as the middle point of the straight line 
 connecting the centres of rotation of the two eyes. "We will 
 call this the point of wientation for the field of vision, and 
 the straight line drawn from it to the intersection of the 
 two lines of regard, that is to the extemaL fixation-point, the 
 line of orientation. When a point in space is fixated, there 
 is always a fairly exact idea of the direction of the hne of 
 orientation. This idea is produced by the inner tactual sen- 
 sations connected with the position of the two eyes. Such 
 sensations are very noticeable because of their intensity, 
 when the eyes are rotated much out of the central position. 
 They are just as perceptible for a single eye, so that locali- 
 zation in direction is as perfect in monocular as in binocular 
 vision. In the former case, however, the line of orientation 
 generally coincides with the line of regard i). 
 
 25. The idea of the distance of the objects from the 
 subject, or of the absolute length of the Hne of orientation, 
 is much more indefinite than that of its direction. "We are 
 always inclined to ideate this distance shorter than it 
 really is, as may be shown by comparing it with a standard 
 
 1) The habit of seeing -with two eyes results in exceptions to 
 this rule. Often when one eye is closed, the line of orientation re- 
 mains the same as in binocular vision and does not coincide with the 
 line of regard. In such cases the closed eye usually makes the cor- 
 responding movements of convergence upon a common fixation-point 
 with the open eye. 
 
 9* 
 
132 II- Psychical Compounds. 
 
 placed somewhere in the field of vision perpendicular to the 
 line of orientation. In this way we find that the distance 
 on the standard judged to be equal to the line of orientation, 
 is always much shorter than the real length of this line. The 
 difference between the two increases the further away the point 
 of fixation moves, that is, the longer the hne of orientation 
 becomes. The only sensational components that can produce 
 this idea of distance, are those inner tactual sensations con- 
 nected with the position of the two eyes, that arise partic- 
 ularly from the convergence of the Hues of regard and give 
 somewhat of a measure for the absolute extent of this con- 
 vergence. In fact, it is possible to observe sensations when 
 the convergence is changed; mainly from the inner angle 
 of the eye when the degree of convergence is increased, from 
 the outer, when it is decreased. The sum of all the sen- 
 sations corresponding to a given position of convergence 
 distinguishes it completely from aU other positions. 
 
 26. It follows that an idea of a definite, absolute length 
 of the Hne of orientation can be developed only through 
 the influences of experience, where in addition to the sen- 
 sational elements a great many associations also have a part. 
 This explains why these ideas always remain indefinite and 
 why they are sometimes aided, sometimes interfered with by 
 other components of visual ideas, especially by the size of the 
 retinal images of famihar objects. On the other hand, we 
 have a relatively fine measure in the sensations of convergence 
 for differences in the distances of objects seen, that is, for 
 the relative changes which the length of the line of orien- 
 tation undergoes when the fixation-point approaches or recedes. 
 For positions in which the lines of regard are nearly parallel, 
 changes in convergence may be perceived . that correspond 
 to an angle of vision of 60" or 70". "When the convergence 
 increases, this least perceptible change in convergence also 
 
§10. Spacial Ideas. 133 
 
 increases considerably, but, in spite of that, the corresponding 
 differences in the length of the hne of orientation become 
 smaller and smaller. Thus the purely intensive sensations 
 which accompany movements of convergence, are translated 
 directly into ideas of changes in the distance between the 
 fixation-point and the point of orientation of the subject. 
 
 This translation of a certain particular sensational com- 
 plex into an idea of distance, is not due to any connate 
 energy, but to a particular psychical development, as is 
 shown by a great number of experiences which point to such 
 a development. Among these is the fact that the apprehen- 
 sion both of absolute distances and of differences in distance, 
 is greatly improved by practice. Children are generally 
 inclined to localize very distant objects in the immediate 
 neighborhood: they grasp at the moon, at the slater on the 
 tower, etc. In the same way, it has been observed that the 
 congenitally bUnd are, immediately after an operation, entirely 
 unable to distinguish near and far. 
 
 27. It is of importance for the development of this dis- 
 crimination between far and near, that under the natural 
 conditions of vision not mere isolated points are presented, 
 but extended three-dimensional objects, or at least a number 
 of points at different depths, to which we assign relatively 
 different distances along their respective lines of orientation. 
 
 Let us consider first the simplest case, where two points 
 a and b are presented, lying at different depths and connected 
 by a straight line. A change in the fixation from a to 6 
 is always accompanied by a change in convergence, and 
 brings about, first, the passage through a continuous series 
 of retinal local signs corresponding to the line ab, and, 
 secondly, a sensation of movement, a, corresponding to the 
 difference in convergence between these two points. This 
 gives us here, too, the elements of a spacial fusion. The 
 
J 34 II- Psychical Compounds. 
 
 product of this fusion is, however, peculiar in kind ; it differs 
 in both its components, in the successive series of local signs 
 and in the -concomitant sensations of movement, from the 
 fusions that arise when a line in the field of vision is passed 
 over (p. 128). In the latter case the changes in local signs 
 and sensations of movement are alike for both eyes, while 
 in changing the point of fixation from far to near or the 
 reverse they are opposite in the two eyes. For when the 
 convergence gives the right eye a rotation towards the left, 
 it will produce a rotation towards the right in the left eye, 
 and vice versa. The same must also hold for the movement 
 of the retinal images: when the image of the point as it 
 leaves the point of fixation, moves towards the right in the 
 right eye, it moves towards the left in the left eye, and vice 
 versa. The first takes place when the eyes turn from a 
 nearer to a more distant point, the latter, when they move in 
 the opposite direction. Such fusions arising from movements 
 of convergence have, so far as their qualitative and intensive 
 components are concerned, a composition analagous to that 
 on which the arrangement of the elements in the field of 
 vision with regard to one another depends; but the special 
 way in which these elements are united is entirely different 
 in the two cases. 
 
 28. Thus, the fusions between local signs and sensations 
 of convergence form a system of complex heal signs which is 
 analogous to that deduced above (p. 130), but still pecuhar 
 in its composition. This system, differing in composition from 
 the system of local signs in the field of vision, is supple- 
 mentary to the latter in that it adds to the reciprocal rela- 
 tion between the objective elements a relation between the 
 ideating subject and these elements. The relation to the 
 subject divides into two ideational elements, characterized 
 by peculiar sensational elements : the idea of direction and 
 
§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 135 
 
 that of distance. Both refer primarily to the point of orien- 
 tation in the head of the ideating subject, and are then 
 secondarily applied to the relations of external ohjects in 
 regard to one another. Thus, we come to assign to two points 
 which lie at different distances along the hne of orientation 
 a direction and distance in relation to each other. All such 
 ideas of spacial distance referring to various positions along 
 the hne of orientation, when taken together, are called ideas of 
 depth, or when they are also ideas of particular single objects 
 ideas of three dimensions. 
 
 29. An idea of depth arising in the way described varies 
 according to objective and subjective conditions. The deter- 
 mination of the absolute distance of an isolated point in the 
 field of vision, is always very uncertain. Even the deter- 
 mination of the relative distance between two points a and b 
 lying at different depths is generally certain only under the 
 condition assiuned above, that they are connected by a line 
 along which the points of fixation for the two eyes can move 
 in changing the convergence from a to b. We may call 
 such lines which connect different points in space with one 
 another lines of fixation. The principle may then be for- 
 mulated: points in space are apprehended in their true rela- 
 tions only when they are connected by hues of fixation, along 
 which the point of fixation may move. This principle is ex- 
 plicable on the ground that the condition of a regularly 
 connected change in the local signs of the retina and in 
 the accompanying sensations of convergence, that is, the 
 condition for the rise of ideas of depth as we found before 
 (p. 133), is obviously fulfilled only when impressions are pre- 
 sented which can arouse the appropriate local signs. 
 
 30. When the condition mentioned is not fulfilled, there 
 arises either an imperfect and indefinite idea of the different 
 relative distances of the two points from the subject, or else 
 
136 ^I- Psyohical Compounds. 
 
 the two points seem to the equally distant -^ a phenomenon 
 which can appear only when one of the points is rigidly 
 fixated. Under the latter condition still another change al- 
 ways arises in the idea; only the fixated point is seen as 
 single, the other is double. The same thing happens in 
 looking at extended objects when they are not connected 
 with the binocular fixation-point by means of lines of fixa- 
 tion. Double images that arise in this way are uncrossed — 
 i. e., the right belongs to the right eye, the left to the left 
 eye — • when the fixated point is nearer than the observed 
 object, and crossed when the point is beyond the object. 
 Binocular localization in depth and binocular double 
 images are, accordingly, phenomena directly interrelated; 
 where the former is indefinite and imperfect, we have double 
 images, and. where, on the other hand, the latter are absent, 
 the localization in depth is definite and exact. The two 
 phenomena stand in such a relation to the line of fixation 
 that, when it is present, localization is aided and double 
 images removed. Still, this rule is not without exception, 
 for when a point is rigidly fixated with both eyes, double 
 images arise easily in spite of any lines of fixation that may 
 be present. This is explained by the general necessary con- 
 ditions for ideas of depth as mentioned above (p. 133). Just 
 as the absence of Hnes of fixation results in the lack of the 
 required succession of the local signs, so in a similar man- 
 ner the sensations of convergence connected with movement, 
 are absent in rigid fixation. 
 
 c. Relations between the Location of the Elements in Regard 
 to one another and their Location in Regard to the Subject. 
 
 31. When the field of vision is thought of as merely a 
 location of visual impressions in relation to one another, we 
 represent it to ourselves as a surface, and call the single ob- 
 
§ 10. Spaeial Ideas. 137 
 
 jects lying in this surface ideas of two dimensions, in con- 
 trast to the ideas of depth. But even an idea of two 
 dimensions must always be related to the seeing subject in 
 two ways. First, every point in the field of vision is seen 
 in a particular direction on the subjective line of orien- 
 tation mentioned above (p. 131). Secondly, the whole field 
 of vision is locahzed at some distance or other from the 
 subject, though this distance may be very indefinite. 
 
 The location in a particular direction results in an eu'ect 
 ideational object corresponding to an inverted retinal image. 
 This relation between the objective localization in direction and 
 the retinal image is as necessary a result of ocular movements 
 as the inversion of the image itself is a result of the op- 
 tical properties of the eye. Our line of orientation in space 
 is the external line of regard or, for binocular vision, the 
 middle line resulting from the combined effects of movements 
 of fixation. A direction upward on this fine of orientation 
 in external space corresponds to a direction downward in 
 the space where the retinal image lies, behind the centre of 
 ocular rotation, and vice versa. It follows that the retinal 
 image must be inverted if we are to see the object erect. 
 
 32. The location at some distance or other, which is also 
 never absent, brings about the result that all the points of 
 the field of vision seem to be arranged on the surface of a 
 ccmcave hemisphere whose centre is the point of orientation, 
 or, in monocular vision, the point of the eye's rotation. Now, 
 small areas of a large curved surface appear plane, so that the 
 two-dimensional idea,s of single objects are as a rule plane; 
 thus, for example, figures drawn upon a plane, as those of 
 plane geometry. But as soon as some parts of the general 
 field of vision separate from it in such a way that they are 
 localized before or behind, that is in different planes, the idea 
 of two dimensions gives place to one of tln-ee. 
 
138 ^- Psychical Compounds. 
 
 32 a. The fusions formecl between qualitative local signs and 
 sensations of convergence when we change from the fixation of 
 a more distant point to a nearer, or the reverse, may be called 
 complex local signs of depth. Such local signs form for every 
 series of points lying before or behind the fixation-point, or for 
 an extended body which is nothing but a series of such points, 
 a regularly arranged system in which a stereometric form located 
 at a particular distance is always unequivocally represented by 
 a particular fusion. When one of two points lying at different 
 distances is fixated, the other is characterized by the different 
 position of its images in the two eyes, and by the correspondingly 
 different direction of the complex local signs in the two cases. 
 The same is true for connected series of points or extended 
 bodies. When we look at a solid object, it throws images in the 
 two eyes that are difi'erent from each other on account of the 
 different relative position of the object with regard to the two 
 eyes. We may designate the difference between the positions of 
 a certain point in the image in the two eyes as the binocular 
 parallax. This parallax is zero for the point fixated and for those 
 points which are equally distant on the line of orientation; for 
 all other points it has some real positive or negative value ac- 
 cording as they are more or less distant than the fixation-point. 
 If we fixate solid objects with both eyes, only the point fixated, 
 together with those points which are equidistant and in. its neigh- 
 borhood in the field of vision, will give rise to images corresponding 
 in position in the two eyes. All points of the object located 
 at different distances, give images varying in position and size. 
 These differences in the images are just what produce the idea 
 of the solidity of the object when the proper Unes of fixation 
 are present. For in the way above described, the angle of binoc- 
 ular parallax for the image of any point lying before or behind 
 the point of fixation and connected with the same by a line of 
 fixation, furnishes, according to its direction and magnitude, a 
 measure for the relative distance of. this point in depth through 
 the complex local signs connected with the angle of parallax. 
 This angle of parallax for a given objective depth, decreases 
 proportionally to the distance of the solid object, so that the im- 
 pression of solidity diminishes, the further off the objects are, 
 and when the distance is so great that all angles of parallax 
 
§ 10. Spacial Ideas. I39 
 
 disappear, the body will appear flat, unless the associations to be 
 discussed later (§ 16, 9) produce an idea of depth. 
 
 33. The influence of binocular vision on the idea of 
 depth may be investigated experimentally by means of a stereos- 
 cope. This instrument consists of two prisms with their angles 
 of refraction turned toward each other in such a way that 
 it renders possible a binocular combination of two plain 
 drawings which correspond to the retinal images from a three- 
 dimensional object. The influence of the various conditions 
 that underlie the formation of ideas of depths, may, in this 
 way, be studied much better than by looking at actual three- 
 dimensional objects, for here we may vary the conditions at will. 
 To give a concrete illustration, it is observed that complex 
 stereoscopic pictures generally requirg several movements of 
 convergence back and forth before a clear plastic idea arises. 
 Furthermore, the effect of the parallax appears in looking 
 at stereoscopic pictures whose parts are movable in respect 
 to each other. Such movements are accompanied by changes 
 ia the relief which answer exactly to the corresponding 
 changes in binocular parallax. This parallax is dependent 
 on the distance of the two eyes from each other, so that 
 ideas of depth can be produced even in the case of objects 
 too distant in reality to give a plastic effect, by combining 
 in the stereoscope pictures taken from positions much fur- 
 ther apart than the two eyes are. This is done, for example, 
 in making stereoscopic photographs of landscapes. The result 
 is that these photographs when combined do not look like 
 real landscapes, but like plastic models regarded from a 
 short distance. 
 
 34. In monocular vision all the conditions are absent 
 which are connected with movements of convergence, and with 
 binocular differences in the retinal images, and which may be 
 
140 ^^- Psychical Compounds. 
 
 artificially reproduced with the stereoscope. Still, not all the 
 influences are wanting eren here to produce a localization in 
 the third dimension, although this localization is more imperfect. 
 
 The direct influence of movements of accommodation have 
 in comparison with other conditions a relatively small, per- 
 haps entirely insignificant influence. Still, like movements 
 of convergence, .they too are accompanied by sensations which 
 can he clearly perceived in the case of greater changes of 
 accommodation from distant to neighboring points. For 
 smaller changes in depth these sensations are very uncertain. 
 As a result the movement of a point in the direction of the 
 hue of regard, when it is looked at with only one eye, is 
 generally not clearly observed until a change in the size of 
 the retinal image appears. 
 
 35. For the development of monocular ideas of depth 
 the influences which the components of the so-called per- 
 spective exercise, are of the greatest importance. These are 
 the relative magnitude of the angle of vision, the trend of 
 limiting liaes, the direction of shadows, the change in colors 
 due to atmospheric absorption, etc. All these influences, 
 which act in exactly the same way in monocular and biaoc- 
 ular vision, depend on associations of ideas, and will, there- 
 fore, be treated in a later chapter (§ 16). 
 
 35 a. "We have in general the same opposing theories for 
 the explanation of visual ideas as for tactual ideas (p. 114). The 
 empirical theory has sometimes committed the fallacy of limiting 
 itself to optics and turning the real problem of space perception 
 over to touch. In such cases it has tried to explain only how 
 a localization of visual ideas can take place with the aid of ex- 
 perience, on the basis of already existing spacial ideas from touch. 
 Such an interpretation is, however, not only self-contradictory, but 
 it also conflicts with experience, which shows that in normal per- 
 sons with vision, visual space-perception determines tactual, not 
 the reverse (p. 104). The fact of general development, that touch 
 
§10. Spacial Ideas. 141 
 
 is the more primitive sense, can not be applied to tlie develop- 
 ment of the individual. The chief evidences in support of nativ- 
 istic theories are, first, the metamorphopsia after dislocation of 
 retinal elements (p. 1 1 9) and, secondly, the position of the line of 
 orientation (p. 1 H 1 ), which indicates united functioning of the two 
 eyes from the first. It has been noted already (p. 120) that the 
 metamorphopsia and other related phenomena prove the exact 
 opposite as soon as the changes to which they are due become 
 stationary. Furthermore, the fact that in long continued use of 
 only one eye the line of orientation comes to coincide with the 
 line of regard (p. 131), proves that the position of this line is 
 not given from the first, but that it has arisen under the influ- 
 ence of the conditions of vision. Still another fact against the 
 nativistic and in favor of the genetic theory is the development 
 in the child of the synergy of ocular movements under the influ- 
 ence of external stimuli and the organization of space-perceptions 
 which apparently accompanies it. Here as in many other respects 
 the development of most animals is diiferent. In the latter cases 
 the reflex connections of retinal impressions with movements of the 
 eyes and head function perfectly immediately after birth, (v. inf. 
 § 19, 2). 
 
 The genetic theory has gained the ascendency over older 
 nativistic and empirical views primarily through the more thorough 
 investigation of the phenomena of binocular vision. Nativism 
 has difficulty with the question why we generally see objects 
 single although they produce images in each of the two eyes. 
 The effort is made to avoid the difficulty by assuming that two 
 identical retinal points are connected with the same optic fibre 
 which divides in the chiasma, and that in this way they repre- 
 sent in the sensorium only a single point. This doctrine of the 
 "identity of the two retinas" was, however, untenable as soon as 
 the actual conditions of binocular vision in three dimensions be- 
 gan to be investigated. Especially the invention of the stereo- 
 scope thus brought with it a new era for the genetic theory of 
 vision. 
 
J 42 //. Psychical Compounds. 
 
 § 11. TEMPOEAL IDEAS. 
 
 1. All our ideas are at once spacial and temporal. Just 
 as the conditions for the spacial arrangement of impressions 
 belong originally only to the tactual and visual senses, and 
 just as spacial relations are only secondarily carried over 
 from these to all other sensations, so there are oiily two 
 kinds of sensations, namely, the inner tactual sensations from 
 movements and the auditory sensations, vfhich are the primary 
 sources of temporal ideas. Still, there is a characteristic 
 difference between spacial and temporal ideas in the fact that 
 in the first the two senses mentioned are the only ones which 
 can develop an independent spacial order, while in the sec- 
 ond the two most important kinds of sensation are merely 
 those in which the conditions are most favorable for the 
 rise of temporal ideas. These conditions are not entirely 
 wanting, however, for any sensations. This indicates that 
 the psychological bases of temporal ideas are more general, 
 and that they are not determined by the special structures 
 of particular sense-organs. It follows from this fact that 
 even when we abstract from the ideas that enter into any 
 series of psychical processes, and take account only of the 
 subjective phenomena accompanying the ideas, such as feel- 
 ings and emotions, we still ascribe to the affective processes 
 thus isolated through abstraction exactly the same temporal 
 attributes as to the ideas. In philosophy the conclusion has 
 generally been drawn from this fact that time is a "universal 
 form of perception", that is, there is absolutely no psychical 
 content that does not have a position in time, though such 
 content may exist without spacial attributes. This conclusion 
 that time-perception is more universal, arising, as it does, from 
 the greater universality of the conditions of such perception, is 
 erroneous and is not confirmed by psychological observation. 
 
§ 11. Temporal Ideas. 143 
 
 In the same way that we carry over spacial attributes from 
 the two senses that give us space-perception to other kinds 
 of sensations, we also give them secondarily to feehngs and 
 affective processes through the sensations and ideas insepa- 
 rably connected with them. It may with equal right be 
 doubted whether affective processes in themselves, without 
 their related ideas, would have temporal attributes, for among 
 the conditions of a temporal order are certain attributes of 
 the sensational elements of ideas. The real facts in the case 
 are that our ideas and, therefore, since ideas enter into 
 every psychical experience, all psychical contents are at once 
 spacial and temporal. The spacial order arises from certain 
 particular sensational elements : in normal cases where vision 
 is present from visual, in blindness, from tactual impressions ; 
 while time-ideas can arise from all possible sensations. 
 
 2. Temporal compounds like spacial and in contrast to 
 iatensive ideas, are characterized by the definite, unchange- 
 able order of their component elements. If this order is 
 changed, the given compound becomes another, even though 
 the quality of its components remains the same. In spacial 
 compounds, however, this unchangeableness of the order refers 
 only to the relation of the elements to one another, not to 
 the relation of the elements to the ideating subject. In 
 temporal compounds, on the other hand, when the relation 
 of one element is changed with regard to other elements, it 
 is at the same time changed with regard to the ideating sub- 
 ject. There is no change of position in time analogous to 
 that possible in the case of space-compounds. 
 
 2 a. This property of the absolute, strictly speaking unchange- 
 able, relation of every temporal compound and every time-ele- 
 ment, however short, to the ideating subject, is what we call 
 the flow of time. Every moment in time filled by any con- 
 tent whatever has, on account of this flow, such a relation to 
 
144 n. Psychical Compoimds. 
 
 the ideating subject that no other moment can be substituted 
 for it. With space the case is just reversed: the very possibil- 
 ity of substituting any spacial element in its relation to the 
 subject for any other element whatever, is what gives rise to 
 the idea of Constance^ or absolute duration, as we express it, by 
 applying a time-idea to a space-idea. The idea of absolute dura- 
 tion, that is of time in which no change takes place, is strictly 
 speaking impossible in time-perception itself. The relation to 
 the subject must change continually. We speak of an impres- 
 sion as lasting, when its single periods in time are exactly alike 
 so far as their sensational contents are concerned, so that they 
 differ only in their relation to the subject. The concept of dura- 
 tion when applied to time is, therefore, a merely relative con- 
 cept. One time-idea may be more lasting than another, but 
 no time-idea can have absolute duration, for without the double 
 relation of different sensations to one another and to the ideat- 
 ing subject, no such ideas at all could arise. Even an unusually 
 long unchanging sensation can not be retained. We interrupt it 
 continually with other sensational contents. 
 
 We may, however, separate the two temporal relations always 
 united in actual experience, that of the elements to one another 
 and to the ideating subject, since each is connected with certain 
 particular attributes of time-ideas. In fact, this separation of the 
 two relations found its expression in particular words for certain 
 forms of occurrence in time even prior to an exact psycho- 
 logical analysis of time-ideas. If the relation of the elements to 
 one another is alone attended to, without regard to their relar 
 tion to the subject, temporal modes come to be discriminated, 
 such, for example, as brief, long, regularly repeating, irregularly 
 changing, etc. If, on the contrary, the relation of the subject 
 is attended to and the objective forms of occurrence abstracted 
 from, we have as the chief forms of this relation the temporal 
 stages past, present, and future. 
 
 A. TEMPORAL TOUCH-IDEAS. 
 3. The orginal development of temporal ideas belongs to 
 touch. Tactual sensations, accordingly, furnish the general 
 substratum for the rise of both the spacial and temporal 
 
§11. Temporal Ideas. 145 
 
 arrangements of ideational elements (p. 104, 3). The spacial 
 functions of touch, however, come from the outer tactual 
 sensations, while the inner sensations which accompany move- 
 ments are the primary contents of the earliest temporal 
 ideas. 
 
 The mechanical properties of the limbs are important 
 physiological bases for the rise of these ideas. The arms and 
 legs can be moved in the shoulder-joints and hip-joints by 
 their muscles, and are at the same time subject to the action 
 of gravitation drawing them downward. As a result there 
 are two kinds of movements possible for them. First, we 
 have those which are continually regulated by voluntary ac- 
 tivity of the muscles and may, therefore, be indefinitely va^ 
 ried and accommodated at every moment to the existing needs 
 — we will caU. these the arhythmical movements. Secondly, 
 we have those in which the voluntary energy of the muscles 
 is operative only so far as it is required to set the limbs 
 oscillating in their joints and to maintain this movement — 
 rhythmical movements. We may neglect for our present 
 consideration the arhythmical movements exhibited in the 
 various uses of the limbs. Their temporal attributes are in 
 aU probability derived from the rhythmical movements, and 
 only a very indefinite comparison of the duration of irregular 
 movements is possible. 
 
 4. With rhythmical movements the case is different. Their 
 significance for the psychological development of time-ideas is 
 due to the same principle which gives them their importance 
 as physiological organs, namely, the principle of the isochron- 
 ism of osciUations of like amplitude. In walking, the regu- 
 lar oscillations of our legs in the hip-joints not only make 
 the muscular energy expended less, but reduce to a minimum 
 the continual voluntary control of the movements. Further- 
 more, in natural walking the arms are supplementary aids. 
 
 WosDT, Psychology. 10 
 
146 II- Psychical Compounds. 
 
 Their oscillation is not interrupted at every step like that of 
 the legs by the placing of the foot on the ground, so that 
 they furnish because of their continuity a means for the 
 more uniform regulation of the movements. 
 
 Every single period of oscillation in such a movement is 
 made up of a continuous succession of sensations that are 
 repeated in the following period in exactly the same order. 
 The two limits of the period are marked by a complex of 
 outer tactual sensations: the beginning by the impression 
 accompanying the removal of the foot from the ground, the 
 end by that accompanying its return to the ground. Be- 
 tween these there is a continuous series of weak inner tactual 
 sensations from the joints and muscles. The beginning and end 
 of this series of inner sensations coincide with the outer 
 sensations and are more intense than those between them. 
 They arise from the impulse of movement coming to the 
 muscles and joints and from the sudden inhibition of the 
 same, and serve also to mark off the periods. 
 
 Connected with this regular succession of sensations is 
 a regular and exactly parallel series of feelings. If we con- 
 sider a single period in a series of rhythmical movements, 
 there is always at its beginning and end a feeling of fulfilled 
 expectation. Between the two limits of the period, beginning 
 with the first movement, is a gradually growing feeling of 
 strained expectation, which suddenly sinks at the last moment 
 from its maximum to zero, to make place for the rapidly 
 rising and sinking feeling of fulfillment. From this point on 
 the same series is again repeated. Thus, the whole process 
 of a rhythmical touch-movement consists, on its affective side, 
 of two qualitatively antagonistic feehngs. In their general 
 character these feelings belong to the direction of straining 
 and relaxing feelings (p. 83). One is a momentary feeling, 
 that is, one that rises very rapidly to its maximum and then 
 
§ 11. Temporal Ideas. 147 
 
 sinks with equal rapidity; the other is a feeling of long duration 
 which gradually reaches a maximum and then suddenly dis- 
 appears. As a result, the most intense affective processes 
 are crowded together at the extremities of the periods, and 
 are made all the more intense through the contrast between 
 the feeling of satisfaction and the preceding feeling of ex- 
 pectation. Just in the same way that this sharply marked 
 hmit between the single periods has its sensational substratum 
 in the strong outer and inner tactual impressions that arise 
 at this instant, as above mentioned, so we have a complete 
 correspondence between the gradual rise of the feehng of 
 expectation and the continuous series of weaker inner tactual 
 sensations accompanying the oscillatory movements of the 
 hmbs. 
 
 5. The simplest temporal ideas of touch are made up of 
 the rhythmically arranged sensations that follow one another 
 with perfect uniformity in the manner described, when like 
 oscillatory movements are repeatedly carried out. But even 
 in ordinary walking a slight tendency toward a somewhat 
 greater complication arises ; the beginning of the first of tico 
 successive periods is emphasized, both in the sensation and in the 
 accompanying feeling, more than the beginning of the second. 
 In this case the rhythm of movement begins to be metrical. 
 In fact, such a regular succession of accented and unaccent- 
 ed ideas corresponds to the simplest measure, ^/s-time. It 
 arises easily in ordinary walking because of the physiological 
 superiority of the right side, and appears very regularly when 
 several persons are walking together — in marching. In the 
 latter case even more than two periods may be united into 
 one rhythmical unit. The same is true of the complicated 
 rhythmical movements of the dance. But in such composite 
 tactual rhythms the auditory temporal ideas have a decided 
 influence. 
 
 10* 
 
148 -^' Psychical Compounds. 
 
 B. TEMPORAL AUDITORY IDEAS. 
 
 6. The attribute of tlie auditory sense which most of all 
 adapts it to the more accurate apprehension of the temporal 
 relations in external processes, is the exceedingly short per- 
 sistence of its sensations after the external stimulation; so 
 that any temporal succession of sounds is reproduced with 
 almost perfect fidehty in the corresponding succession of 
 sensations. In close connection with this we have certain 
 psychological properties of temporal auditory ideas. In the 
 first place, they differ from temporal ideas of touch in that 
 often only the extremities of the single intervals that go to 
 make up the total idea, are marked by sensations. In such 
 a case the relations of such iatervals to one another are 
 estimated essentially by the apparently empty or heteroge- 
 neously filled intervals that lie between the limiting sen- 
 sations. 
 
 This is especially noticeable in the case of rhythmical 
 auditory ideas. There are in general two possible forms of 
 such ideas: continuotis or only rarely interrupted successions 
 of relatively lasting sensations, and discontinuous successions 
 of strokes, in which only the extremities of the rhythmical 
 periods are marked by external sounds. For a discontinuous 
 succession of entirely uniform sounds the temporal attributes 
 of the ideas are in general more apparent than for lasting 
 impressions, since in the former case the influences of the 
 tonal qualities are entirely wanting. We may confine our 
 consideration to discontinuous series, because the principles 
 that apply here hold for continuous successions also. In 
 fact, the rhythmical division in the latter case, as may he 
 easily observed, is made by means of certain single accents 
 which are either given in the external impression or abitra- 
 rily applied to it. 
 
§ 11. Temporal Ideas. 149 
 
 7. A series of regular strokes made in this way as the sim- 
 plest form of temporal auditory ideas, is distinguished from 
 the simplest form of temporal touch-ideas, described above 
 (p. 147), mainly by the absence of all objective sensational 
 content in the intervals. The external impressions here do 
 nothing but divide the separate intervals from one another. 
 Still, the intervals of such a series are not entirely empty, 
 but are filled by subjective affective and sensational contents 
 which correspond fully to those observed in tactual ideas. 
 Most emphatic of all are the affective contents of the inter- 
 vals. These feelings in their successive periods of gradually 
 rising and suddenly satisfied expectation, are the same as in 
 the course of a rhythmical tactual movement. Even the 
 sensational substratum for these feehng is not entirely ab- 
 sent ; it is merely more variable. Sometimes it is nothing but 
 the sensations of tension of the tympanum in their various 
 intensities. Then again it is the accompanying sensations of 
 tension from other. organs, or finally other sensations of move- 
 ment in cases where an involuntary rhythmical movement is 
 connected with the auditory series. But on account of the 
 changeable character and generally small intensity of these 
 motor sensations, the affective processes in auditory ideas are 
 very much more clearly perceptible. 
 
 It follows from the conditions described that the influence 
 of the subjective elements on the character of time-ideas is 
 the easiest to demonstrate. First of all, this shows itself in 
 the effect which different rates of the sensations have on the 
 formation of temporal ideas. It is found that there is a 
 certain medium rate of about 0.2 sec. which is most favor- 
 able for the union of a number of successive auditory im- 
 pressions. Now, it is easy to observe that this is the rate 
 at which the above mentioned subjective sensations and feel- 
 ings are most emphatic in their alternation. If the rate is 
 
150 II' Psyehieal Compov/nds. 
 
 made much slower, the strain of expectation is too great and 
 passes into an unpleasurable feeling which becomes more and 
 more unendurable. If, on the contrary, the rate is acceler- 
 ated, the rapid alternation of feehngs becomes fatiguing. 
 Thus, in both directions Hmits are approached where the 
 synthesis of the impressions into a rhythmical time-idea is no 
 longer possible. The upper limit is about one second, the 
 lower about 0.1 sec. 
 
 8. Then again, this influence of the course of our sen- 
 sations and feelings upon our apprehension of temporal inter- 
 vals, shows itself just as clearly in the changes that our idea 
 of such an interval undergoes when the conditions of its 
 apprehension are varied without changing its objective length. 
 Thus, it has been observed that in general a period divided 
 into intervals is estimated as longer than one not so divided. 
 "We have here a phenomenon analogous to that observed in 
 the illusion with interrupted lines (p. 125). The overestimation 
 is generally much greater for temporal intervals. This is ob- 
 viously due to the fact that the oft repeated alternation in 
 sensations and feelings in an interval of time have a much 
 greater influence than the interruption of the movement 
 through points of division in the case of the similar space- 
 iUusion. Furthermore, if in a long series of regular beats 
 single impressions are emphasized by their greater intensity 
 or by some quaMtative peculiarity, the uniform result is the 
 overestimation of the intervals preceding and following the 
 emphasized impression, in comparison with the other inter- 
 vals of the same series. If, however, a certain rhythm is 
 produced successively with weak and then with strong beats, 
 the rate appears slower in the first case than in the second. 
 
 These phenomena are also explicable from the influ- 
 ence of the sensational and affective changes. An impres- 
 sion distinguished from the rest, demands a change in the 
 
§11. Temporal Ideas. 151 
 
 course of the sensations, and especially of the feelings, preceding 
 its apprehension, for there must be a more intense strain of 
 expectation and a correspondingly stronger feeling of rehef 
 or satisfaction. The feeling of expectation lengthens the 
 interval preceding the impression, the feeling of relief that 
 following. The case is different when the whole series is 
 made up at one time of weak impressions, and at another of 
 strong ones. In order to perceive a weak impression we 
 must concentrate our attention upon it more. The sensations 
 of tension and the accompanying feelings are, accordingly, 
 more intense, as may be easily observed, for weaker beats than 
 for stronger ones. Here too, then, the different intensities of 
 the subjective elements that give rise to them are reflected 
 in the differences between temporal ideas. The effect is, 
 therefore, not only lost, but even reversed, when we compare 
 not weak with strong but strong with still stronger beats. 
 
 9. The tendency found in the case of rhythmical touch- 
 ideas for at least two Hke periods to unite and form a re- 
 gular metrical unit shows itself in auditory ideas also, only 
 in a much more marked degree. In tactual movements, 
 where the sensations that limit the single periods are under 
 the influence of the will, this tendency to form a rhythmical 
 series shows itself in the actual alternation of weaker and 
 stronger impressions. With auditory sensations, on the other 
 hand, where the single impressions can be dependent only 
 on external conditions, and are, therefore, objectively exactly 
 alike, this tendency may lead to the following characteristic 
 illusion. In a series of beats which are exactly alike in in- 
 tensity and are separated by equal periods of time, certain 
 single beats, occurring at regular intervals, are always heard 
 as stronger than the others. The time that most frequently 
 arises when there is nothing to determine it, is the 2/s-t™^, 
 that is, the regular alternation of arses and theses. A slight 
 
152 II- Psychical Compounds. 
 
 modification of this, the 3/8-t™ie, where two unaccented fol- 
 low one accented heat, is also very common. This tendency 
 to mark time can be overcome only by an effort of the will, 
 and then only for very fast or very slow rates, where, from 
 the very nature of the series, the limits of rhythmical per- 
 ception are nearly reached. For medium rates, which are 
 especially favorable to the rise of rhythmical ideas, a sup- 
 pression of this tendency for any length of time is hardly 
 possible. If the effort is made to unite as many impressions 
 as possible in a unitary time-idea, the phenomena become 
 more complicated. "We have accents of different degrees which 
 alternate in regular succession with unaccented members of 
 the series and thus, through the resulting divisions of the 
 whole into groups, the number of impressions that may be 
 comprehended in a single idea is considerably increased. 
 The presence of two different grades of accent gives 74-tinie 
 and -Yg-thne, the presence of three grades gives Y4-time and 
 74-time, and as forms with three feet we have ^/s-time and 
 ^"^l^-iime. More than three grades of accentuation or, when 
 the unaccented note is counted, more than four grades of 
 intensity, are not to be found in either musical or poetical 
 rhythms, nor can we produce more by voluntarily formation of 
 rhythmical ideas. Obviously, these three grades of accentua- 
 tion mark the limits of the possible complexity of temporal 
 ideas, in a way analogous to that in which the maximal num- 
 ber of included beats (§ 15, 6) marks the limits of their 
 length. 
 
 The phenomenon of subjective accentuation and its in- 
 fluence on the sensation of rhythms, shows clearly that 
 temporal ideas, like spacial ideas, are not derived from objective 
 impressions alone, but that there are connected with these, 
 subjective elements, whose character determines the appre- 
 hension of the objective impressions. The primary cause 
 
§11. Temporal Ideas. I53 
 
 of the accentuation of a particular beat is always to be found 
 in the increased intensity of the preceding and concomitant 
 feelings and sensations of movement. This increase in the in- 
 tensity of the subjective elements is then carried over to the 
 objective impression, and makes the latter also seem more 
 intense. The strengthening of the subjective elements may 
 be voluntary, through the increase of the muscular strain 
 which produces sensations of movement, and in this way, 
 finally results in a corresponding increase in the feelings of 
 expectation; or this strengthening may take place with- 
 out volition, when the effort to perceive a nxmiber of im- 
 pressions together brings about an immediate articulation of 
 the temporal idea through the corresponding subjective sen- 
 sational and affective variations. 
 
 C. GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR TEMPORAL IDEAS. 
 
 10. If we seek to account for the rise of temporal ideas 
 on the basis of the phenomena just discussed, and of the 
 regular combination of subjective sensational and affective ele- 
 ments with objective impressions, as it is there apparent ; we 
 must start with the fact that a sensation thought of by itself, 
 can no more have temporal than it could have spacial attri- 
 butes. Position in time can be possible only when single 
 psychical elements enter into certain characteristic relations 
 with other such elements. This condition of the union of a 
 number of psychical elements holds for temporal ideas just 
 as much as for those of space, but the kind of union is 
 characteristic, and essentially different from that in space- 
 ideas. 
 
 The members of a temporal series a b c d e f, can all 
 be immediately presented as a single whole, when the series 
 has reached /, just as well as if they were a series of points 
 in space. In the latter case, however, they would, on ac- 
 
154 ^- Psychical Compounds. 
 
 count of original ocular reflexes, be arranged in relation to 
 the point of fixation, and this fixation-point could, at different 
 times, be any one of the impressions a to f. In time-ideas, 
 on the other hand, it is alwa-ys the impression of the present 
 moment in relation to which all the rest are arranged in time. 
 When a new impression becomes, in a similar manner, the 
 present impression, even though its sensational contents are 
 exactly the same as that of the earlier, still, it will be ap- 
 prehended as subjectively different, for though the affective 
 state accompanying a sensation may, indeed, be related to 
 the feelings of another moment, the two can never be iden- 
 tical. Suppose, for example, that following the series a h c 
 d e /", there is a second series of impressions, a' V d d' e' 
 f, in which a = a, b' = b, c' = c, etc., so far as their sen- 
 sational elements are concerned. Let us represent the ac- 
 companying feelings 'bj a jS y 6 s cp and «' /?' y' 8' s' <p'. 
 Then a and a', ^ and fi', y and y', etc., will be similar 
 feehngs, because the sensations are the same; but they will 
 not be identical, because every affective element depends not 
 only upon the sensation with which it is immediately con- 
 nected but also upon the state of the subject as determined 
 by the totality of its experiences. The state of the subject is 
 different for each of the members of the series a' V c' d' . . ., 
 from what it was for the corresponding member of the series a b 
 c d . . ., because when the impression a' arrives, a has already 
 been present, and so a' can be referred back to a, while no 
 such thing was possible in the case of a. Analogous differ- 
 ences in the affective states show themselves in composite 
 series when repeated. These states are never identical, how- 
 ever much the subjective conditions of the momentarily present 
 feelings may agree, for every one of them has its character- 
 istic relation to the totality of psychical processes. If we 
 assume, for example, a succession of a number of similar 
 
§ 11. Temporal Ideas. 155 
 
 series abed, a' V c d', a" h" c" d", etc., in which a equals 
 a' and a", b equals b' and b", etc., so far as their sensation- 
 al contents are concerned, still, a" differs from a' in its 
 affective conditions, for a' can be referred back only to a, 
 while a" can be referred back to both a' and a. Besides 
 this, it is true that other differences between impressions 
 like in themselves always arise from some chance accompany- 
 ing sensations which influence the affective state. 
 
 11. Since every element of a temporal idea is arranged 
 in relation to the impression immediately present, as above 
 remarked, it follows that this present impression will have 
 one of the attributes of the fixation-point in spacial com- 
 pounds. It will be more clearly and distinctly perceived 
 than other elements of the same idea. But there is a great 
 difference in the fact that this most distinct perception is 
 not connected, as in the case of spacial ideas, with the phys- 
 iological organization of the sense-organ, but is due entirely 
 to the general attributes of the ideating subject, as expressed 
 in the affective processes. The momentary feeling accom- 
 panying the immediately present impression is what helps 
 to its clearest apprehension. We may, accordingly, call 
 the part of a temporal idea which forms the immediate 
 impression the fixation-point of the idea or in general, since 
 it does not depend on external structure, as does the fixation- 
 point of spacial ideas, we may call it figuratively the inner 
 fixation-point. The inner fixation-point is, then, that part 
 of a temporal idea which corresponds to the most clearly 
 ideated and the immediately present impression. The impres- 
 sions that he outside this point of fixation, that is, impressions 
 that have preceded the present, are indirectly perceived. 
 They are arranged in a regular gradation of diminishing 
 degrees of clearness, from the fixation -point. A unitary 
 temporal idea is possible only so long as the degree of clear- 
 
156 II- Psychical Compounds. 
 
 ness for each of its elements has some positive yalue. When 
 the clearness of any element sinks to zero, the idea divides 
 into its components. 
 
 12. The inner fixation-point of the temporal senses differs 
 essentially from the outer fixation-point of the spacial senses, 
 in that its character is primarily determined, not by sensa- 
 tional, but by affective elements. Since these affective ele- 
 ments are continually changing, in consequence of the vary- 
 ing conditions of psychical Hfe, the inner fixation-point is 
 also always changing. This change of the inner fixation- 
 point is called the continuous flow of time. By continuous 
 flow we mean to express the fact that no moment of time 
 is like any other, and that no such moment can return 
 (cf. sup. p. 143, 2 a). This fact is connected with the one- 
 dimensional character of time, which is due to this very 
 circumstance, that the. inner fixation-point of temporal ideas 
 is continually moving forward, so that a single point can 
 never recur. The arrangement of time in one dimension, 
 with reference always to a changing point of fixation, in 
 which the subject represents itself, is what gives rise to the 
 result that the elements of time-ideas have a fixed relation, 
 not only with respect to one another, but also with respect 
 to the ideating subject (p. 143, 2). 
 
 13. If we try to give an account of the means for 
 the formation of this reciprocally interdependent order of 
 the parts of an idea, and of their determination in regard 
 to the ideating subject, it is obvious that these means can 
 be nothing but certain of the elements of the idea itself, 
 which, considered in themselves, have no temporal attributes, 
 but gain such attributes through their union. We may call 
 these elements temporal sigms, after the analogy of local signs. 
 The characteristic conditions for the development of temporal 
 ideas indicate from the first that these temporal signs are. 
 
§11. Temporal Ideas. 157 
 
 in the main, affective elements. In the course of any rhyth- 
 mical series every impression is immediately characterized 
 by the concomitant feeling of expectation, while the sensa- 
 tion is of influence only in so far as it arouses the feeling. 
 This may be clearly perceived when a rhythmical series is 
 suddenly interrupted. Furthermore, the only sensations that 
 are never absent as components of all time-ideas are the 
 sensations of movement. In the case of tactual ideas these 
 sensations of movement belong to the immediate elements 
 of the ideas themselves, in auditory and other compounds 
 that are brought into the time form, they are always present 
 as subjective accompanying phenomena. We may, accord- 
 ingly, regard the feelings of expectation as the qualitative, 
 the sensations of movement as the intensive, temporal signs 
 of a temporal idea. The idea itself must then be looked 
 upon as a fusion of the two kinds of temporal signs with 
 each other and with the objective sensations arranged in the 
 temporal form. Thus, the sensations of movement, as a series 
 of intensive sensations, give a uniform measure for the ar- 
 rangement of the objective sensations as characterized in 
 quality by the concomitant feelings. 
 
 13 a. The sensations of movement play a similar part in the 
 formation of both time-ideas and space-ideas. This like sen- 
 sational substratum leads very naturally to a recognition of a 
 relation between these two forms of perception, which finds its 
 expression in the geometrical representation of time by a straight 
 line. Still, there is an essential difference between the complex 
 system of temporal signs and the systems of local signs in the 
 fact that the former is based primarily, not on the qualitative 
 attributes of sensations, connected with certain special external 
 sense-organs, but on feelings which may come in exactly the 
 same way from the most widely differing kinds of sensation, since 
 they are not dependent on the objective content of these sen- 
 sations, but on their subjective synthesis. These characteristics 
 
1^58 ^- Psychical Compounds, 
 
 of time-ideas account for tlie universal significance that we attribute 
 to them. This was what was improperly expressed in the Kantian 
 principle, that time is a "form of the inner sense". This ex- 
 pression is to be criticised on the ground of its erroneous pre- 
 supposition of an inner sense (p. 8 sq.) 
 
 Here again we have the same opposed nativistic and genetic 
 theories on the psychological origin of time-ideas, as we had in the 
 case of spacial ideas (p. 114, 12 a). In this case, however, nativism 
 has never developed a theory in any proper sense. It usually 
 limits itself to the general assumption that time is a "connate 
 form of perception", without attempting to give any account 
 of the influence of the elements and conditions of temporal ideas 
 which can be actually demonstrated. The genetic theories of 
 older psychology, as, for example, that of Herbart, seek to de- 
 duce time-perception from ideational elements only. This is, 
 however, pure speculation and loses sight of the conditions given 
 in actual experience. 
 
 § 12. COMPOSITE PEELINGS. 
 
 1. In the development of temporal ideas it appears clear- 
 ly that the discrimination of sensational and afEective com- 
 ponents in immediate experience is purely a product of 
 ahstraction. For time-ideas the abstraction proves impossible, 
 because, in this case, certain feelings play an essential part 
 in the rise of the ideas. Time-ideas may, therefore, be called 
 ideas only when the final results of the process, the arrange- 
 ment of certain sensations in relation to one another and to 
 the subject, are considered; when their real composition is 
 looked into, they are complex products of sensations and 
 feelings. They are thus to a certain extent transitional forms 
 between ideas and those psychical compounds that are made 
 up of affective elements, and are designated by the general 
 name affective p7vcesses. These affective processes resemble 
 time-ideas especially in the impossibility of an abstract sepa- 
 
§ 12. Composite Feelings. 159 
 
 ration of the affective from the sensational elements in the 
 investigation of their rise. This is due to the fact that in 
 the development of all kinds of affective processes, sensations 
 and ideas are determining factors, just as feelings are among 
 the essential factors of temporal ideas. 
 
 2. Intensive affective combinations, or composite feelings, 
 must be the first affective processes discussed, because in 
 them the characteristic attributes of a single cordpound are 
 the products of a momentary state. The description of the 
 feeling, therefore, requires only the exact comprehension of 
 the momentary condition, not a combination of several pro- 
 cesses occurring in time and proceeding from one another. 
 In this respect, the composite feehngs stand in the same 
 relation to emotions and vohtions, which always consist of 
 affective processes extending through periods of time, as 
 intensive ideas do to extensive. Intensive psychical com- 
 pounds, in the broadest sense of the term, include, accord- 
 ingly, intensive ideas and composite feelings. Extensive com- 
 pounds include as special forms of temporal arrangements, 
 besides the temporal ideas, also emotions and volitions. 
 
 3. Composite feelings, then, are intensive states of uni- 
 tary character in which single simple affective components 
 are to be preceived. We may distinguish in every such 
 feeling component feelings and a resultant feeling. The last 
 component feehngs are always simple sense-feehngs. Several 
 of these may unite to form a partial resultant which enters 
 into the whole as a compound component. 
 
 Every composite feehng may, accordingly, be divided, 
 
 1) into a total feeling made up of all its components, and 
 
 2) into single partial feelings which go to make up the 
 total feeling. These partial feelings are in turn of different 
 grades according as they are simple sense-feehngs (partial 
 feehngs of the first order) or feehngs which are themselves 
 
160 ^- Psychical Compounds. 
 
 composite (partial feelings of the second or higher orders). 
 Where we have partial feelings of higher orders, complicated 
 combinations or interlacings of the component elements may 
 take place. A partial feehng of lower order may, at the 
 same time, enter into several partial feelings of higher order. 
 Such interlacings may render the nature of the total feeling 
 exceedingly complicated. The whole may sometimes change 
 its character, even when its elements remain the same, ac- 
 cording as one or the other of the possible combinations of 
 partial feelings takes place. 
 
 3 a. Thus, the musical chord c e g has a corresponding total 
 feeling of harmony whose last elements, or partial feelings of 
 the first order, are the feelings corresponding to the single clangs 
 c, 6, and g. Between these two kinds of feeling stand, as par- 
 tial feelings of the second order, the three feelings of harmony 
 from the double clangs c e, e g and e g. The character of the 
 total feeling may have four different shades according as one of 
 these partial feelings of the second order predominates, or all 
 are equally strong. The cause of the predominance of one of 
 these complex partial feelings may be either the greater inten- 
 sity of its sensational components, or the influence of preceding 
 feelings. If, for example, c e g follows c^ e g the effect of c e 
 will be intensified, while ii c e g follows e e a the same will 
 hold for c g. Similarly, a number of colors may have a differ- 
 ent effect according as one or the other partial combination 
 predominates. In the last case, however, because of the exten- 
 sive arrangement of the impressions, the spacial proximity has 
 an influence antagonistic to the variation in the manner of com- 
 bination and, furthermore, the influence of the spacial form with 
 all its accompanying conditions is an essentially complicating 
 factor. 
 
 4. The structure of composite feeHngs is, thus, in general 
 exceedingly complicated. Still, there are different degrees 
 of development even here. The complex feelings arising from 
 impressions of touch, smell, and taste are essentially simpler 
 
§12. Composite Feelings. 161 
 
 in character than those connected with auditory and visual 
 ideas. 
 
 The total feeling connected with outer and inner tactual 
 sensations is designated in particular as the common feeling 
 since it is regarded as the feeling in which our total state of 
 sensible comfort or discomfort expresses itself. From this 
 point of view, the two lowest chemical senses, those of smM 
 and iaste., must also be regarded as contributors to the sen- 
 sational substratum of the common feeling, for the partial 
 feelings that arise from these two senses unite with those 
 from touch to form inseparable affective complexes. In single 
 cases, to be sure, one or the other of these feelings may 
 play such an important part that the others disappear entire- 
 ly. Still, in the midst of all this change in its sensational 
 substratum, the common feehng is always the immediate 
 expression of our sensible comfort and discomfort, andT is, 
 therefore, of all our composite feelings most closely related 
 to the simple sense-feelings. Auditory and visual sensations, 
 on the other hand, contribute to the sensational substratum 
 of the common feeling only in exceptional cases, especially 
 when the intensity is unusually great. 
 
 4 a. The combination of partial feelings to a composite feeling 
 was first noticed in the case of the common feeling. The psy- 
 chological laws of this combination were indeed misunderstood, 
 and, as is usually the case in physiology, the feeling was not 
 distinguished from its underlying sensations. Common feeling 
 was, thus, sometimes defined as the "consciousness of our sen- 
 sational state", or again as the "totality, or unanalyzed chaos 
 of sensations" which come to us from all parts of our body. 
 As a matter of fact, the common feeling consists of a number 
 of partial feeling. But it is not the mere sum of these feelings ; 
 it is rather a resultant total feeling of unitary character. At 
 the same time it is, however, a total feeling of the simplest 
 possible composition, made up of partial feelings of the first 
 
 WosDT, Psychology. 11 
 
162 II- Psychical Compmmds. 
 
 order, tliat is, of single sense-feelings which generally do not 
 unite to form partial feelings of the second or of higher orders. 
 In the resultant feeling a single partial feeling is usually predomi- 
 nant. This is regularly the case when a very strong local sen- 
 sation is accompanied by a feeling of pain. On the other hand, 
 weaker sensations may determine the predominant affective tone 
 through their relatively greater importance. This is especially 
 frequent in the case of sensations of smell and taste, and also 
 in the case of certain sensations connected with the regular func- 
 tioning of the organs, such as the inner tactual sensations accom- 
 panying the movements of walking. Often the relatively greater 
 importance of a single sensation is so slight that the predomi- 
 nating feeling can not be discovered except by directing our 
 attention to our own subjective state. In such a case the 
 concentration of the attention upon it oan generally make any 
 partial feeling whatever predominant. 
 
 5. The common feeling is the source of the distinction be- 
 tween pleasurable and unpleasurable feelings. This distinction 
 is then carried over to the single simple feelings that com- 
 pose it, and sometimes even to all feelings. Pleasurable and 
 unpleasurable are expressions well adapted to the indication 
 of the chief extremes between which the common feeling, as 
 a total feeling corresponding to the sensible comfort or dis- 
 comfort of the subject, may oscillate; though to be sure, this 
 feeling may not infrequently lie for a longer or shorter period 
 in an indifference-zone. In the same way, these expressions 
 may be applied to the single constituents so far as they go 
 to make up one of the total feelings. On the other hand, 
 it is entirely uniustifia,ble to apply these names to all other 
 feelings, or, as is sometimes done, to make their appH- 
 cabiHty a necessary factor in the general definition of feeUng. 
 "Even for the common feeHng, pleasurable and unpleasurable 
 can only be used as general class-names which include a 
 number of qualitatively different feehngs. This variety among 
 
^S 12. Composite Feelings. Ig3 
 
 feelings of the same class results from the very great varia- 
 tions in the composition of the single total feelings that we 
 have included under the general name common feeling (cf. 
 p. 82 sq.)- 
 
 6. The composite character mentioned is the reason v^rhy 
 there are common feelings which can not, strictly speaking, 
 be called pleasurable or unpleasurable, because they contain 
 elements belonging to both classes, and under circumstances 
 either the one kind or the other may predominate. Such 
 feelings made up of partial feelings of opposite character and 
 deriving their characteristics from this combination, may be 
 called contrast-feelings. A simple form of such among the 
 common feehngs is that of Uclding. It is made up of a weak 
 pleasurable feeling accompanying a weak external tactual sen- 
 sation, and of feehngs connected with muscular sensations 
 aroused by the strong reflex impulses from the tactual stimuh. 
 These reflex impulses may spread more or less, and often 
 cause inhibitions of respiration when they reach the dia- 
 phragm, so that the resultant feeling may vary greatly in 
 single cases in intensity, scope, and composition. 
 
 7. The composite feelings from sight and hearing are 
 commonly called elementary aesthetic feelings. This name 
 includes aU feelings that are connected vdth composite per- 
 ceptions and are therefore themselves composite. As a spe- 
 cial form of feehngs belonging to this class defined by the 
 broader meaning of the term aiad-tjaig, we have those which 
 are the elements of aesthetic effects in the narrower sense. 
 The term elementary does not apply in this case to the 
 feelings themselves, for they are by no means simple, but it 
 is merely intended to express the relative distinction be- 
 tween these and still more composite higher aesthetic feelings. 
 
 The perceptive, or elementary aesthetic, feelings of sight 
 and hearing may serve as representatives of all the com- 
 
 11* 
 
1 54 II- Psychical Compounds. 
 
 posite feelings that arise in the course of intellectual pro- 
 cesses, such as the logical, moral, and higher aesthetical 
 feelings. For the general psychological structure of these 
 complex affective forms is exactly that of the simpler per- 
 ceptive feelings, except that the former are always connected 
 with feelings and emotions that arise from the whole inter- 
 connection of psychical processes. 
 
 "While the extremes between which the common feelings 
 move are chiefly the affective qualities that we call pleasur- 
 able and unpleasurable in the sense of personal comfort and 
 discomfort, the elementary aesthetic feelings belong to the 
 same affective direction, but in the more objective sense of 
 agreeable and disagreeable feelings. These terms express the 
 relation of the object to the ideating subject rather than any 
 personal state. It is still more apparent here than in the case 
 of pleasurable and unpleasurable feeUngs, that each of these 
 terms is not the name of a single feeling, but indicates a 
 general direction, to which belong an endless variety of feelings 
 with individual pecuHarities for each single idea. In single 
 cases, too, but more variably, the other affective directions 
 (p. 83), those of the arousing and subduing, of the straining 
 and relaxing feelings, may show themselves. 
 
 8. If we neglect for the moment this general classification 
 mentioned, according to which the single forms are brought 
 under the chief affective directions, all perceptive feelings may 
 be divided into the two classes of intensive and extensive 
 feelings, according to the relations which exist between the 
 sensational elements and determine the quality of the feeUngs. 
 By intensive feelings we mean those that depend on the re- 
 lation of the qualitative attributes of the sensational elements 
 of the ideas, by extensive feelings those that arise from the 
 spacial and temporal arrangement of the elements. The 
 expressions "intensive" and "extensive" do not refer to the 
 
§12. Composite Fedings. 165 
 
 character of the feelings themselves, for they are in reality 
 always intensive, but to the conditions for the rise of these 
 feehngs. 
 
 Intensive and extensive feeling are, accordingly, not mere- 
 ly the subjective concomitants of the corresponding ideas, 
 but, since every idea consists usually of elements that are 
 qualitatively different and of some extensive arrangement of 
 these impressions, the same idea may be at once the substratum 
 of both intensive and extensive feelings. Thus, a visual ob- 
 ject made up of different colored parts arouses an intensive 
 feeling through the mutual relation of the colors and an 
 extensive feeling through its form. A succession of clangs 
 is connected with an intensive feeling which corresponds to 
 the qualitative relation of the clangs, and with an exten- 
 sive feeling coming from the rhythmical or arhythmical 
 temporal succession of the same. In this way, both inten- 
 sive and extensive feelings are always connected with visual 
 and auditory ideas, but, of course, under certain conditions 
 one form may push the other into the background. Thus, 
 when we hear a clang for just an instant, the only feeling 
 perceived is the intensive feeling. Or when, on the other 
 hand, a rhythmical series of indifferent sounds is heard, only 
 the extensive feeling is noticeable. For the purpose of psy- 
 chological analysis it is obviously of advantage to produce 
 conditions under which one particular affective form is pres- 
 ent and others so far as possible excluded. 
 
 9. When intensive feditigs are observed in this way, it 
 appears that those accompanying the combination of colors 
 follow the rule that a combination of two colors whose qual- 
 itative difference is a maximum, also gives a maximal 
 agreeable feeling. Still, every particular color- combination 
 has its specific affective character made up of the partial 
 feelings from the single colors, and of the total feeling arising 
 
166 I^' Psyehical Compounds. 
 
 as a resultant of the same. Then, too, as in the case of 
 simple color-feelings, the effect is complicated by chance 
 associations and the complex feelings coming from them (p. 76). 
 Combinations of more than two colors have not been ade- 
 quately investigated. 
 
 The feelings connected with combinations of clangs are 
 exceedingly numerous and various. They constitute the affect- 
 ive sphere in which we see most clearly the formation of 
 partial feelings of different orders discussed above (p. 160), 
 together with their interlacings varying under special condi- 
 tions. The investigation of the single feelings that thus arise 
 is one of the problems of the psychological aesthetics of 
 music. 
 
 10. Extensive feelings may be subdivided into spacial and 
 temporal. Of these, the first, or the feelings of form, belong 
 mainly to vision, and the second, or the feelings of rhythm, 
 to hearing, while the beginning of the development of both 
 are to be found in touch. 
 
 The optical feeling of form shows itself first of all in the 
 preference of regular to irregular forms and then in the 
 preference among different regular forms of those which have 
 certain simple proportions in their various parts. The most im- 
 portant of these proportions are those of symmetry, or 1 : 1, and 
 of the golden section, ora:;+l:a:; = a;:l (the whole is to the 
 greater part as the greater part is to the smaller). The fact that 
 symmetry is generally preferred for the horizontal dimensions of 
 figures and the golden section for the vertical, is probably due 
 to associations, especially vnth organic forms, such as that 
 of the human body. This preference for regularity and cer- 
 tain simple proportions can have no other interpretation than 
 that the measurement of every single dimension is connect- 
 ed with a sensation of movement and an accompanying 
 sense-feeling which enters as a partial feeling into the total 
 
§ 12. Composite Feelings. 167 
 
 optical feeling of form. The total feeling of regular arrange- 
 ment that arises at the sight of the whole form, is thus 
 modified by the relation of the different sensations as well as 
 of the partial feelings to one another. As secondary compo- 
 nents, which also fuse with the total feeling, we may have 
 here too associations and their concomitant feelings. 
 
 The feding of rhythm is entirely dependent on the con- 
 ditions discussed in considering temporal ideas. The partial 
 feelings are here the feelings of strained and fulfilled expec- 
 tation, which in their regular alternation constitute the rhyth- 
 mical time-ideas themselves. The way in which these partial 
 feelings are united, however, and especially the predominance 
 of special ones in the total feehng, is, even more than the 
 momentary character of an intensive feeling, dependent on 
 the relation in which the feeling present at a given instant 
 stands to the preceding feelings. This is especially apparent 
 in the great influence that every alteration in rhythm exer- 
 cizes on the accompanying feeling. For this reason as well 
 as because of their general dependence on a particular tem- 
 poral form of occurrence, the feelings of rhythm are the 
 direct transitions to emotions. To be sure, an emotion 
 may develop from any composite feeling, but in no other 
 case is the condition for the rise of a feeling, as here, at the 
 same time a necessary condition for the rise of a certain 
 degree of emotion. The emotion is, however, usually moder- 
 ated in this case, through the regular succession of feelings 
 (cf. § 13, 1, 7). 
 
 11. The immense variety of composite feelings and the 
 equally great variety of their conditions, render any such 
 comprehensive and at the same time unitary psychological 
 theory as that which was possible for spacial and temporal 
 ideas, entirely out of the question. Still, there are even here 
 some common attributes, through which composite feelings 
 
168 II- Psychical Compounds. 
 
 may be brought under certain general psychological heads. 
 There are two factors which go to make up every feeling: 
 first, the relation of the combined partial feelings to one 
 another, and second, their synthesis to a unitary total feel- 
 ing. The first of these factors is more prominent in inten- 
 sive, the second in extensive feelings. But in reality they 
 are always united, and determine each other reciprocally. 
 Thus, a figure which is all the time agreeable, may be more 
 and more complex the more the relations of its parts accord 
 with certain rules, and the same holds for a rhythm. On the 
 other hand, the union to a single whole helps to emphasize 
 the separate affective components. In all these respects 
 combination of feelings show the closest resemblance tp in- 
 tensive ideas. The extensive arrangement of impressions, 
 on the contrary, especially the spacial arrangement, tends, 
 much more to favor a relatively independent coexistence of 
 several ideas. 
 
 12. The close intensive union of all the components of 
 a feeling, even in the case of those feelings whose corre- 
 sponding ideas are spacial or temporal, is connected with a 
 principle that holds for all affective processes, including those 
 which we shall have to discuss later. This principle we will 
 call that of the unity of the affecUve state. It may be for- 
 mulated as follows: In a given moment only mie total feel- 
 ing is possible, or in other words, all the partial feelings 
 present at a given moment unite, in every case, to form a 
 single total feeling. This principle of the unity of affective 
 states is obviously connected with the general relation 
 between idea and feeling. For the "idea" deals with an 
 immediate content of experience and the properties that 
 belong to it, without regard to the subject; the "feeling" 
 expresses the relation that invariably exists between this 
 content and the subject. 
 
§13. Emotions. Igg 
 
 § 13. EMOTIONS. 
 
 1 . Feelings, like all psychical phenomena, are never per- 
 manent states. In the psychological analysis of a composite 
 feeling, therefore, we must always think of a momentary af- 
 fective state as held constant. This is easier the more slowly 
 and continuously the psychical processes occur, so that the 
 word feding has come to be used mainly for relatively slow 
 processes and for those which in their regular form of oc- 
 curence never pass beyond a certain medium intensityj such 
 as the feelings of rhythm. Where, on the other hand, a 
 series of feelings succeeding one another in time unite to 
 an interconnected process which is distinguished from preced- 
 ing and following processes as an individual whole, and 
 has in general a more intense effect on the subject than a 
 single feeling, we call the unitary succession of feelings an 
 emoUon. 
 
 This very name indicates that it is not any specific sub- 
 jective contents of experience which distinguish emotion from 
 feeling, but rather the effect which comes from a special 
 combination of particular affective contents. In this way it 
 comes that there is no sharp line of demarcation between 
 feeling and emotion. Every feeling of greater intensity 
 passes into an emotion, and the separation between the two 
 depends on a more or less arbitrary abstraction. In the case 
 of feelings that have a certain particular form of occurrence, 
 that is feelings of rhythm, such an abstraction is strictly 
 speaking impossible. The feeling of rhythm is distinguished 
 at most by the small intensity of its moving effect on the 
 subject, which is what gives "emotion" its name. StiU, even 
 this distinction is by no means fixed, and when the feelings 
 produced by rhythmical impressions become somewhat more 
 Mense, as is usually the case, especially when the rhythm 
 
170 ^- Psychical Compowids. 
 
 is connected with sensational contents that arouse the feelings 
 greatly, they become in fact emotions. Feelings of rhythm 
 are for this reason important aids both in music and 
 poetry for portraying emotions and arousing them in the 
 auditor. 
 
 2. The names of different emotions, like those of feelings, 
 do not indicate single processes, but classes in which a large 
 number of single affective processes are grouped on the ground 
 of certain common characteristics. Emotions such as those 
 of joy, hope, anxiety, care, and anger, are accompanied in 
 any concrete case by peculiar ideational contents, while their 
 affective elements also and even the way in which they occur 
 may vary greatly from time to time. The more composite 
 a psychical processes is, the more variable will be its single 
 concrete manifestations; a particular emotion, therefore, will 
 be less apt to recur in exactly the same form than will a 
 Ijai-ticidar feeling. Every general name fore motions indicates, 
 accordingly, certain typical forms in which related affective 
 processes occur. 
 
 3. Not every interconnected scries of affective processes 
 is an emotion or can be classed as such under one of the 
 typical forms discriminated by language. An emotion is a 
 unitary whole which is distinguished from a composite feeling 
 only through the two characteristics that it has a definite tem- 
 poral course and that it exercises a more intense present and 
 subsequent effect on the interconnection of psychical processes. 
 The first characteristic arises from the fact that an emo- 
 tion is a process of a higher order as compared with a single 
 feeling, for it always includes a succession of several feeUngs. 
 The second is closely connected with this first characteristic; 
 it depends on the intensification of the effect produced by a 
 summation of the feehngs. 
 
 As a result of these characteristics emotions have in the 
 
§13. Emotions: 11 j 
 
 midst of all their variations in form a regularity in the man- 
 ner of their occurrence. They always begin with a more or 
 less intense iticeptive feeling which is immediately character- 
 istic in its quality and direction for the nature of the 
 emotion, and is due either to an idea produced by an ex- 
 ternal impression (outer emotional stimulation) or to a psy- 
 chical process arising from associative or apperceptive con- 
 ditions (inner stimulation). After this inceptive feehng comes 
 an ideational process accompanied by the corresponding feel- 
 ings. This process shows characteristic differences in the 
 cases of particular emotions both in the quality of the feel- 
 ings and in the rapidity of the process. ' Finally, the emotion 
 closes with a terminal feeling which continues even after the 
 emotion has given place to a quiet affective state, and in 
 W'hich the emotion gradually fades away, unless it passes 
 directly into the inceptive feeling of a new emotion. This 
 last case occurs especially in, feelings of the intermittent 
 type (cf. inf. 13). 
 
 4. The intensification of the effect which may be observed 
 in the course of an emotion, relates not merely to the psy- 
 chical contents of the feelings that compose it, but to the 
 physical concomitants as well. For single feelings these 
 accompanying phenomena are Mmited to very slight changes 
 in the innervation of the heart and respiratory organs, which 
 can be demonstrated only by using exact graphic methods 
 (p. 86 sq.). "With emotions the case is essentially different. 
 As a result of the summation and alternation of succesive 
 affective stimuli there is here not only an intensification of 
 the effect on heart, blood-vessels, and respiration, but the 
 external mitscles are always affected in an unmistakable 
 manner. Movements of the oral muscles appear at first 
 {mimetic movements), then movements of the arms and of 
 the whole body (pantomimetic movements). In the case of 
 
172 JI- Psyohieal Compounds. 
 
 stronger emotions there may be still more extensive disturb- 
 ances of innervation, such as trembling, convulsive con- 
 tractions of the diaphragm and of the facial muscles, and 
 paralytic relaxation of the muscles. 
 
 Because of their symptomatical significance for the emo- 
 tions, all these movements are called expressive movements. 
 As a rule they are entirely involuntary, either reflexes follow- 
 ing emotional excitations, or impulsive acts prompted by the 
 affective components of the emotion. They may be modified, 
 however, in the most various ways through voluntary inten- 
 sification or inhibition of the movements or even through 
 intentional production of the same, so that the whole seriea 
 of external reactions which we shall have to discuss under 
 volitional acts, may take part in these expressive movements 
 (§ 14). These different forms of movement may be entirely 
 alike in external character and may pass into each other 
 without sharp limitations on their psychical side, so that for 
 the outside observer they are as a rule indistinguishable. 
 
 5. According to their symptomatical character, expressive 
 movements may be divided into three classes. 1) Purely 
 intensive symptoms ; these are always expressive movements for 
 more intense emotions, and consist of stronger movements 
 for emotions of middle intensity, and of sudden inhibition and 
 paralysis bf movement for violent emotions. 2) Qualitative 
 expressions of feelings; these are mimetic movements, the 
 most important of which are the reactions of the oi'al mus- 
 cles, resembling the reflexes following sweet, sour, and bitter 
 impressions of taste; the reaction for sweet corresponds to 
 pleasurable emotions, those for sour and bitter to unpleasur- 
 able, while the other modifications of feeling, such as ex- 
 citement and depression, strain and relief, are expressed by 
 a tension of the muscles. 3) Expressions of ideas ; these are 
 generally pantomimetic movements that either point to the 
 
§13. Emotions. . 173 
 
 object of the emotion (indicative gestures) or else describe 
 the objects as well as the processes connected with them by 
 the form of the movement (depicting gestures). Obviously 
 these three classes of expressive ~ movements correspond ex- 
 actly to the psychical elements of emotions aiid their fun- 
 damental attributes: the first to their intensity, the second 
 to the quality of the feelings, and the third to their idea- 
 tional content. A concrete expressive movement may unite 
 all three forms in itself. The third class, that of expressions 
 of ideas, is of special psychological significance because of 
 its genetic relations to speech (cf. § 21, 3). 
 
 6. The changes in pulse and respiraUmi that accompany 
 emotions are of three kinds. 1) They may consist of the 
 immediate effects of the feehngs that make up the emotions, 
 as, for example, a lengthening of the pulse-curve and 
 respiration-ciu-ve when the feelings are pleasurable, and a 
 shortening of the same for unpleasurable feelings (cf. sup. 
 p. 87). This holds only for relatively quiet emotions, where 
 the single feelings have sufficient time to develop. When 
 this is not the case, other phenomena appear which depend 
 not merely on the quality of the feelings, but also, and that 
 mainly, on the intensity of the innervations due to theii- 
 summation. 2) Such summations may consist of intensified 
 innervation, which arises from an increase in the excitation 
 resulting from a summation when the succession of feelings 
 is not too rapid. This increase shows itself in retarded and 
 strengthened pulse-beats, since the intenser excitation effects 
 most the inhibitory nerves of the heart. Besides these there 
 is usually an increased innervation of the mimetic and panto- 
 mimetic muscles. These are called sthenic emotions. 3) If 
 the feelings are very violent or last an unusually long time 
 in a single direction , the emotion brings about a more or 
 less extended paralysis of the innervation of the heart and 
 
174 n. Psychical Compoimds. 
 
 of the tension of the outer muscles. Under certain circum- 
 stances disturhances in the innervation of special groups of 
 muscles appear, especially those of the diaphragm and the 
 sympathetic facial muscles. The first symptom of the pa- 
 ralysis of the regulative cardiac nerves is a marked acceler- 
 ation of the pulse and a corresponding acceleration of the 
 respiration, accompanied by a weakening of the same, and a 
 relaxation of the tension of the external muscles to a degree 
 equal to that in paralysis. These are the asthenic emotions. 
 There is still another distinction, which is not important 
 enough, however, to lead to the formation of an independant 
 class of physical effects of emotions, since we have to do 
 here only with modifications of the phenomena characteristic 
 of sthenic and asthenic emotions. It is the distinction between 
 rapid and sluggish emotions, based upon the greater or less 
 rapidity with which the increase or inhibition of the inner- 
 vation appears. 
 
 6 a. Older psychology, following the method of Spinoza's fa- 
 mous doctrine of emotions, generally offered all kinds of logical 
 reflections about emotions, for a theory of emotions or even for 
 a description of them. In recent times, on the other hand, the 
 expressive movements and the other concomitants of emotion in 
 the changes of innervation in pulse , respiratory organs , and 
 blood-vessels, have attracted the most attention. Still, these 
 phenomena, which are indeed valuable when rightly interpreted, 
 are often used in a very wrong way as a means for the investi- 
 gation of the psychological nature of affective processes. This 
 has in turn led to a classification of emotions based entirely 
 on their physical characteristics, and the strange theory has 
 gained adherence that emotions are nothing but the results of 
 expressive movements. The emotion of sorrow, for example, is 
 regarded as made up entirely of the sensations that come from 
 the mimetic movements of weeping. In a somewhat more mod- 
 erate way the attempt has been made to use the expressive 
 lilovements as general characteristics whose presence may' be 
 
§ 13. Emotions. I75 
 
 regarded as a mark to distinguisli emotions from feelings. This 
 is, however, unjustifiable since similar physical expressive phenom- 
 ena appear even for the feelings, and the minor circumstance 
 that these symptoms are in one case externally more or less 
 clearly visible, evidently can not be decisive. The essential dif- 
 ference between emotion and feeling is psychological. The emotion 
 is made up of a series of feelings united into a unitary whole. 
 Expressive movements are the results, on the physical side, of 
 the increase which the preceding parts of such a series have 
 on those succeeding. It follows directly that the deciding 
 characteristics for the classification of emotions must be psyclio- 
 logical (cf. inf. 9). 
 
 7. Though important constituents of emotions, the phy- 
 sical concomitants stand in no constant relation to the 
 psychical quality of the same. This holds especially for the 
 effects on pulse and respiration, but also for the pantomimetic 
 expressive movements of stronger emotions. It may some- 
 times happen that emotions with very different, even oppo- 
 site kinds of affective contents, may belong to the same 
 class so far as the accompanying physical phenomena are 
 concerned. Thus, for' example, joy and anger may be in 
 like manner sthenic emotions. Joy accompanied by surprise 
 may, on the contrary, present the appearance, on its physi- 
 cal side, of an asthenic emotion. The general phenomena of 
 innervation which give rise to the distinction between sthenic 
 and asthenic, and rapid and sluggish emotions, do not show 
 the character of affective contents of these emotions, but 
 only the formal attributes of the intensity and rapidity of 
 the feelings. This is clearly proved by the fact that differ- 
 ences in involuntary innervation analogous to those wliich 
 accompany the different emotions, may be produced by a 
 mere succession of indifferent impressions, as, for example, 
 by the strokes of a metronome. It is observed in such a 
 case that especially the respiratimi tends to adapt itself to 
 
176 H- Psyekical Gompcnmds. 
 
 the faster or slower rate of the strokes, becoming more rapid 
 when the rapidity of the metronome increases. As a rule, too, 
 certain phases of respiration coincide with particular strokes. 
 To be sure, the hearing of such an indifEerent rhythm is 
 not unattended by emotion. When the rate changes, we ob- 
 serve at first a quiet, then a sthenic, and finally when the 
 rapidity is greatest an asthenic emotion. Still, the emotions 
 in this case have to a certain extent a mere formal charac- 
 ter; they exhibit a great indefiniteness in their contents. 
 This indefiniteness disappears only when we think into them 
 concrete emotions of like formal attributes. This is very 
 easy, and is the condition of the great utility of rhythmical 
 impressions for describing and producing emotions. All that 
 is necessary to arouse an emotion in all its fulness, is a 
 mere hint of qualitative affective content, such as it is po8- 
 sible to give in music through the clangs of a musical com- 
 position. 
 
 7 a. It follows from this relation of the physical effects to 
 the psychical content of emotions, that the former can never be 
 put in the place of the psychological observation of the emo- 
 tions. They are general symptoms, but of such equivocal char- 
 acter that, though they are of great value when connected with 
 introspection controlled by experimental methods, alone they have 
 no value whatever. They are especially useful as checks for 
 experimental introspection. The principle that the observation 
 of psychical processes which present themselves in the natural 
 course of life is entirely inadequate, holds especially for the 
 emotions. In the first place, emotions come to the psychologist 
 by chance, at moments when he is not in a condition to subject 
 them to scientific analysis ; and secondly, in the case • of strong 
 emotions whose causes are real we are least of all able to ob- 
 serve ourselves with exactness. This can be done much more 
 successfully when we arouse in ourselves voluntarily a particular 
 emotional state. In such a case, however, it is not possible to 
 estimate how nearly the subjectively aroused emotion agrees in 
 
§13. Hmotions. 177 
 
 intensity and mode of occurrence with one of like character due 
 to external circumstances. For this purpose the simultaneous 
 investigation of the physical effects, especially of those most re- 
 moved from the influence of the wiU, those on the pulse and 
 respiration, furnishes a check for introspection. For when the 
 psychological quality of emotions is alike, we may infer from their 
 like physical effects that their formal attributes also agree. 
 
 8. Both in natural and in voluntarily aroused emotions, 
 the physical concomitants have, besides their symptomatica! 
 significance, the important psychological attribute of inten- 
 sifying the emotion. This attribute is due to the fact that 
 the excitation or inhibition of certain particular groups of 
 muscles is accompanied by inner tactual sensations which 
 produce certain sense-feelings. These feelings unite with the 
 other affective contents of the emotion and increase its in- 
 tensity. From the heart, respiratory organs, and blood-vessels 
 we have such feelings only for strong emotions, where they 
 may indeed be very intense. On the other hand, even 
 in moderate emotions the state of greater or less tension of 
 the muscles exercises an influence on the affective state and 
 thereby on the emotion. 
 
 9. The great number of factors that must be taken into 
 consideration for the investigation of emotions renders a 
 psychological analysis of the single forms impossible. This 
 is all the more so because each of the numerous distin- 
 guishing names marks off a whole class, within which there is 
 a great variety of special forms, including in turn an end- 
 less number of single cases of the most various modifications. 
 All we can do is to take a general survey of the fundamen- 
 tal farms of em-otions. The general principles of division 
 here employed must, of course, be psychological, that is, such 
 as are derived from the immediate attributes of the emotions 
 themselves, for the accompanying physical phenomena have 
 
 Wu.vDT, Psychology. 12 
 
178 II- Psychical Compournds. 
 
 only a symptomatica! value and are eyen then, as noted 
 above, equivocal in character. 
 
 Three such psychological principles of classification may 
 be made the basis for the discrimination of emotions : 1 ) ac- 
 cording to the quality of the feelings entering into the 
 emotions, 2) according to the intensity of these feelings, 
 3) according to the form of occurrence, which is conditioned 
 by the character and rate of the affective changes. 
 
 10. On the basis of quality we may distinguish certain 
 fundamental emotional forms corresponding to the chief af- 
 fective directions distinguished before (p. 83). This gives 
 us pleasurable and unpleasurable, exciting and depressing, 
 straining and relaxing emotions. It must be noted, however, 
 that because of their more composite character the emotions 
 are always, even more than the feelings, mixed forms. Generally 
 only a single affective direction can be called the primary 
 tendency for a particular emotion. There are affective ele- 
 ments belonging to other directions, that enter in as secondary 
 elements. Their secondary character usually appears in the 
 fact that under different conditions various sub-forms of the 
 primary emotion may arise. Thus, for example, joy is pri- 
 marily a pleasurable emotion. Ordinarily it is also exciting, 
 since it intensifies the feelings, but when the feelings are too 
 strong, it becomes a depressing emotion. Sorrow is an un- 
 pleasurable emotion, generally of a depressing character; when 
 the intensity of the feelings becomes somewhat greater, how- 
 ever, it may become exciting, and when the intensity be- 
 comes maximal, it passes again into very marked depression. 
 Anger is much more emphatically exciting and unpleasant 
 in its predominant characteristics, but when the inten- 
 sity of the feelings becomes greater, as when it develops 
 into rage, it may become depressing. Thus, exciting and 
 depressing tendencies are always mere secondary qualities 
 
§13. Emotions. 179 
 
 connected with pleasurable and unpleasurable emotions. Feel- 
 ings of strain and relaxation, on the contrary, may more fre- 
 quently be the chief, or at least the primary components of 
 emotions. Thus, in expectation, the feeling of strain peculiar 
 to this state is the primary element of the emotion. When 
 the feeling develops into an emotion, it may easily be asso- 
 ciated with unpleasurable feelings which are according to 
 circumstances either exciting or depressing. In the case of 
 rhythmical impressions or movements there arise from the 
 alternation of feelings of strain with those of relaxation 
 pleasurable emotions which may be either exciting or depressing 
 according to the character of the rhythm. When they are 
 depressing we may even have unpleasurable feelings inter- 
 mingled with them, or they may all be of this kind, espe- 
 cially when other affective elements cooperate, for example 
 feelings of clang or harmony. 
 
 11. Language has paid the most attention in its devel- 
 opment of names for emotions to the qualitative side of 
 feelings, and among these qualities particularly to pleasurable 
 and unpleasurable. These names may be divided into three 
 classes. First we have those of emotions that are subjec- 
 tively distinguished, chiefly through the nature of the affec- 
 tive state itself, such as joy and sorrow and, as subforms of 
 sorrow in which either depressing, straining, or relaxing ten- 
 dencies of the feeling are also exhibited, sadness, care, grief, 
 and fright. Secondly, there are names of objective emotions 
 referring to some external object, such as delight and dis- 
 pleasure and, as subforms of the latter in which, as above, 
 various tendencies unite, annoyance, resentment, anger, and 
 rage. Thirdly, we have names of objective emotions that refer 
 rather to outer events not expected until the future, such 
 as hope and fear and, as modifications of the latter, worry 
 and anxiety. They are combinations of feeUngs of strain 
 
 12* 
 
180 II- Psychical Compounds. 
 
 with pleasurable and unpleasurable feelings and, in different 
 ways, with exciting and depressing tendencies as well. 
 
 Obviously language has produced a much greater variety 
 of names for unpleasurable emotions than for pleasurable. In 
 fact, observation renders it probable that unpleasurable emo- 
 tions exhibit a greater variety of typical forms of occurrence 
 and that their different forms are really more numerous. 
 
 12. On the basis of the intensity of the feelings we may 
 distinguish weak and strong emotions. These concepts, de- 
 rived from the psychical properties of the feeHngs, do not 
 coincide with those of sthenic and asthenic emotions, based 
 upon the physical concomitants, for the relation of the psy- 
 chological categories to the psycho-physical is dependent not 
 only on the intensity of the feeKngs, but on their quality 
 as well. Thus, weak and moderately strong pleasurable 
 emotions are always sthenic, while, on the contrary, unpleas- 
 urable emotions become asthenic after a longer duration, 
 even when they are of a low degree of intensity, as, for 
 example, care and anxiety. Finally, the strongest emotions, 
 such as fright, worry, rage, and even excessive joy, are always 
 asthenic. The discrimination of the psychical intensity of 
 emotions is accordingly of subordinate significance, especially 
 since emotions that agree in all other respects, may not only 
 have different degrees of intensity at different times, but may 
 on the same occasion vary from moment to moment. Then 
 too, since this variation from moment to moment is essen- 
 tially determined by the sense-feehngs that arise from the 
 accompanying physical phenomena, in accordance with the 
 principle of the intensification of emotions discussed above 
 (p. 177), it is obvious that the originally physiological antith- 
 esis of sthenic and asthenic often has a more decisive in- 
 fluence even on the psychological character of the emotion 
 than the primary psychical intensity itself. 
 
§ 13. Emotions. 181 
 
 IS. The third distinguishing characteristic of emotions, 
 the form of occurrence, is more important. Here we distin- 
 guish three classes. First, there are sudden, irruptive emo- 
 tions, such as surprise, astonishment, disappointment, fright, 
 and rage. They all reach their maximum very rapidly and 
 then gradually sink to a quiet affective state. Secondly, we 
 have gradually arising emotions, such as anxiety, doubt, 
 care, mournfulness, expectation, and in many cases joy, 
 anger, worry. These rise to their maximum gradually and 
 sink in the same way. As a third form and at the same 
 time a modification of the class just mentioned we have 
 intermittent emotions, in which several periods of rise and 
 fall follow one another alternately. All emotions of long 
 duration belong here. Thus, especially joy, anger, mournful- 
 ness, and the most various forms of gradually arising emo- 
 tions, come in waves and often permit a distinction between 
 periods of increasing and those of decreasing emotional in- 
 tensity. The sudden, irruptive emotions, on the contrary, 
 are seldom intermittent. This happens only in cases in which 
 the emotion may also belong to the second class. Such 
 emotions of a very changeable form of occurrence are, for ex- 
 ample, joy and anger. They may sometimes |3e sudden and 
 irruptive. In this case, to be sure, anger generally becomes 
 rage. Or they may gradually rise and fall; they are then 
 generally of the intermittent type. In their psycho-physical 
 concomitants, the sudden irruptive emotions are all asthenic, 
 those gradually arising may be either sthenic or asthenic. 
 
 13 a. The form of occurrence, then, however characteristic 
 it may be in single cases, is just as little a fixed criterion for the 
 psychological classification of emotions as is the intensity of 
 the feelings. Obviously such a classification can be based only 
 on the quality of the affective contents, while intensity and form 
 of occurrence may furnish the means of subdivision. The way 
 
Ig2 11. Psychical Compounds. 
 
 in wHch these conditions are connected with one another and 
 with the accompanying physical phenomena and through these 
 with secondary sense-feelings, shows the emotions to be most 
 highly composite psychical processes which are therefore in single 
 cases exceedingly variable. A classification that is in any degree 
 exhaustive must, therefore, subdivide such varying emotions as 
 joy, anger, fear, and anxiety into their subforms, according to 
 their modes of occurrence, the intensity of their component feel- 
 ings, and finally according to their physical concomitants which 
 are dependent on both the psychical factors mentioned. Thus, 
 for example, we may distinguish a strong, a weak, and a vari- 
 able form of anger, a sudden, a gradually arising, and an inter- 
 mittent form of its occurrence, and finally a sthenic, asthenic, 
 and a mixed form of its expressive movements. For the psy- 
 chological explanation, an account of the causal interconnection 
 of the single forms ui each particular case is much more im- 
 portant than this mere classification. In giving such an account, 
 we have in the case of every emotion to do with two factors: 
 first, the quality and intensity of the component feelings, and 
 second, the rapidity of the succession of these feelings. The 
 first factor determines the general character of the emotion, the 
 second its intensity in part and more especially its form of oc- 
 curence, while both together determine its physical accompani- 
 ments and the psycho-physical changes resulting from the sense- 
 feelings connected with these accompanying phenomena (p. 177). 
 It is for this very reason that the physical concomitants are as 
 a rule to be called psycho-physical. The expressions "psycholog- 
 ical" and "psycho-physical" should not, however, be regarded 
 as absolute opposites in this case, where we have to do merely 
 with symptoms of emotion. We speak of psychological emotional 
 phenomena when we mean those that do not show any imme- 
 diately perceptible physical symptoms, even when such symptoms 
 can be demonstrated with exact apparatus (as, for example, chan- 
 ges ia the pulse and in respiration). On the other hand we 
 speak of psycho-physical phenomena in the case of those which 
 can be immediately recognized as two-sided. 
 
§14. Volitional Processes. 183 
 
 § 14. VOLITIONAL PEOOESSES. 
 
 1. Every emotion, made up, as it is, of a series of in- 
 terrelated affective processes having a unitary character, may 
 terminate in one of two ways. It may give place to the 
 ordinary variable and relatively unemotional course of feehngs. 
 Such affective processes that fade out without any special 
 result, constitute the emotions in the strict sense as discussed 
 in the last paragraph. The process may, in a second class 
 of cases, pass into a sudden change in sensational and 
 affective content, which brings the emotion to an instantan- 
 eous close; such changes in the sensational and affective 
 state which are prepared for by an emotion and bring about 
 its sudden end, are called volitional acts. The emotion itself 
 together vrith its result is a volitional process. 
 
 A volitional process is thus related to an emotion as a 
 process of a higher stage, in the same way that an emotion 
 is related to a feehng. Volitional act is the name of only 
 one part of the process, that part which distinguishes a 
 voHtion from an emotion. The way to the development of 
 volitions out of emotions is prepared by those emotions in 
 connection with which external pantomimetic movements 
 (p. 1 73) appear. These movements appear chiefly at the end 
 of the process and generally hasten its completion; this is 
 especially true of anger, but to some extent also of joy, 
 care, etc. Still, in these mere emotions, the changes in the 
 train of ideas which are the immediate causes of the mo- 
 mentary completion of the emotion in vohtions, and also the 
 characteristic feehngs attending these changes, are all wanting. 
 
 This close interconnection of volitional acts with panto- 
 mimetic movements necessarily leads us to look upon those 
 volitions which end in certain bodily movements resulting 
 from the preceding train of ideas and feelings, that is, those 
 
Ig4 n. Psychical Compounds. 
 
 ending in external volitional acts, as the earliest stages in 
 the development of volitions. The so-called internal volitional 
 acts, on the other hand, or those which close simply with 
 effects on ideas and feelings, appear in every case to be 
 products of a more highly developed intelligence. 
 
 2. A volitional process that passes into an external act 
 may be defined as an emotion which closes with a panto- 
 mimetic movement that has, in addition to the characteristics 
 belonging to all such movements and due to the quality and 
 intensity of the emotion, the special property of produdng 
 an external effect which removes the emotion itself. Such an 
 effect is not possible for all emotions, but only for those in 
 which the very succession of component feehngs produces 
 feelings and ideas which are able to remove the preceding 
 emotion. This is, of course, most commonly the case when 
 the final result of the emotion is the direct opposite of the 
 preceding feelings. The fundamental psychological condition 
 for volitional acts is, therefore, the contrast between feelings, 
 and the origin of the first volitions is most probably in all 
 cases to be traced back to unpleasurable feelings that arouse 
 external movements whose results are contrasted pleasurable 
 feelings. The seizing of food to remove hunger, the struggle 
 against enemies to appease the feeling of revenge, and other 
 similar processes are original volitional processes of this kind. 
 The emotions coming from sense-feelings, and the most wide- 
 spread social emotions, such as love, hate, anger, and re- 
 venge, are thus both for men and animals the common origin 
 of will. A volition is distinguished in such cases from an emo- 
 tion only by the fact that the former has added to its emo- 
 tional components an external act that gives rise to feehngs 
 which, through contrast with the feelings contained in the 
 emotion, bring the emotion itself to an end. The execution 
 of the volitional act may then lead directly, as was originally 
 
§14. Voliiional Processes. Ig5 
 
 always the case, or indirectly through an emotion of con- 
 trasted affective content, into the ordinary quiet flow of 
 feelings. 
 
 3. The richer the ideational and affective contents of ex- 
 perience, the greater the variety of the emotions and the 
 wider the sphere of volitions. There is no feehng or emotion 
 that does not in some way prepare for a volitional act or 
 at least have some part in such a preparation. All feelings, 
 even those of a relatively indifferent character, contain in 
 some degree an effort towards or away from some end. This 
 effort may be very general and aimed merely at the main- 
 tenance or removal of the present affective state. While 
 volitions appear as the most complex form of affective pro- 
 cesses, presupposing all others — that is, feehngs and emotions 
 — as their components, still, we must not overlook the fact 
 that single feelings continually appear which do not unite to 
 form emotions, and emotions appear which do not end in voh- 
 tional acts. In the total interconnection of psychical processes, 
 however, these three stages condition one another and form 
 the related parts of a single process which is complete only 
 ■when it becomes a volition. In this sense a feeling may be 
 thought of as the beginning of a volition, or a volition 
 may be thought of as a composite affective process, and an 
 emotion may be regarded as an intermediate stage between 
 the two. 
 
 4. The single feelings in an emotion that closes with a 
 volitional act are usually far from being of equal importance. 
 Certain ones among them, together with their related ideas, 
 are prominent as those which are most important in pre- 
 paring for the act. Those combinations of ideas and feelings 
 which in our subjective apprehension of the volition are the 
 immediate antecedents of the act, are called motives of vo- 
 lition. Every motive may be divided into an ideational and 
 
186 II- Psychical Compounds. 
 
 an affective component. The first we may call the moving 
 reason, the second the impelling force of action. "When a 
 beast of prey seizes his victim, the moving reason is the 
 sight of the same, the impelling force may be either the 
 unpleasurable feeling of hunger or the race-hate aroused by 
 the sight. The reason for a criminal murder may be theft, 
 removal of an enemy, or some such idea, the impelling force 
 the feehng of want, hate, revenge, or envy. 
 
 "When the emotions are of composite character, the rea- 
 sons and impelling forces are generally mixed, often to so 
 great an extent that it would be difficult for the author of 
 the act himself to decide which was the leading motive. 
 This is due to the fact that the impelling forces of a voh- 
 tional act combine, just as the elements of a composite feel- 
 ing do, to form a unitary whole in which all other impulses 
 are subordinated under a single predominating one; the 
 feelings of like direction strengthening and accelerating the 
 effect, those of opposite direction weakening it. In the com- 
 binations of ideas and feelings which we call motives, the 
 deciding importance in preparing for the act of will belongs 
 to the feelings, that is, to the impelling forces, rather than 
 to the ideas. This follows from the very fact that feelings 
 are integral components of the volitional process itself, while 
 the ideas are of influence only indirectly, through their con- 
 nections with the feelings. The assumption of a volition 
 arising from pure intellectual considerations, of a decision 
 opposed to the inclinations expressed in the feelings, is a 
 psychological contradiction in itSelf. It rests upon the ab- 
 stract concept of a transcendental will absolutely distinct 
 from actual psychical volitions. 
 
 5. The combination of a number of motives, that is, of 
 ideas and feelings which are distinguished in the composite 
 train of emotions to which they belong, as those determining 
 
§ 14. Volitional Processes. 187 
 
 the discharge of the act, furnish the essential conditions for 
 the development of will, and also for the discrimination of 
 the single forms of volitional action. 
 
 The simplest case of volition is that in which a single 
 feeUng in an emotion of suitable constitution, together with 
 its accompanying idea, becomes a motive and brings the pro- 
 cesses to a close with its corresponding external movement. 
 Such volitional processes determined by a single motive, may 
 be called simple volitions. The movements in which they 
 terminate are often designated impulsive acts. In popular 
 parlance, however, this definition of impulse by the simplic- 
 ity of the motive, is not sufficiently adhered to. Another 
 element, namely, the character of the feeling that acts as 
 impeUing force, is here usually brought in. All acts that are 
 determined by sense-feelings, especially common feelings, are 
 generally called impulsive acts without regard to whether only 
 a single motive or a plurality of motives is operative. This 
 basis of discrimination is psychologically inappropriate and 
 the complete separation of impulsive from volitional acts as 
 a specifically distinct kind of psychical processes, which fol- 
 lows very naturally from it, is entirely unjustifiable. 
 
 By impulsive act, then, we mean a simple volitional act, 
 that is, one resulting from a single motive, without refer- 
 ence to the position of this motive in the series of affective 
 and ideational processes. Impulsive action, thus defined, must 
 necessarily be the starting point for the development of all 
 volitional acts, even though it may continue to appear along 
 with the complex volitional acts. To be sure, the earliest 
 impulsive acts are those which come from sense-feeling. In 
 this sense most of the acts of animals are impulsive, but 
 such impulsive acts appear continually in the case of man, 
 partly as the results of simple sense-emotions, partly as the 
 
188 II- Psychical Compounds. 
 
 products of the habitual execution of certain voUtional acts 
 which were originally determined by complex motives. 
 
 6. When several feelings and ideas in the same emotion 
 tend to produce external action, and when those components 
 of an emotional train which have become motives tend at 
 the same time toward different external ends, whether related 
 or antagonistic, then there arises out of the simple act a 
 complex volitional process. In order to distinguish this from 
 the impulsive acts that precede it in the line of development, 
 we call it a voluntary act. 
 
 Voluntary and impulsive acts have in common the char- 
 acteristic of proceeding from single motives, or from com-t 
 plexes of motives that have fused together and operate as a 
 single unequivocal impelling force. They differ in the fact 
 that in voluntary acts the decisive motive has risen to pre- 
 dominance from among a number of simultaneous and antag- 
 onistic motives. When a clearly perceptible strife between 
 these antagonistic motives precedes the act, we call the vo- 
 lition by the particular name selective act, and. the process 
 preceding it a choice. The predominance of one over other 
 simultaneous motives can be understood only when we pre- 
 suppose such a strife in every case. But we perceive this 
 strife now clearly, now obscurely, and now not at all. Only 
 in the first case can we speak of a selective act in the 
 proper sense. The distinction between voluntary and select- 
 ive acts is by no means hard and fast. Still, in ordinary 
 voluntary acts the psychical state is more Uke that in im- 
 pulsive acts, while the difference between the latter and select- 
 ive acts is clearly recognizable. 
 
 7. The psychical process immediately preceding the act, 
 in which the final motive suddenly gains the ascendency, is 
 called in the case of voluntary acts resolution, in the case 
 of selective acts decision. The first word indicates merely 
 
§14. Volitional Processes. 189 
 
 that action is to be carried out in accordance with some 
 consciously adopted motive; the second implies that several 
 courses of action have been presented as possible and that 
 a choice has finally been made. 
 
 In contrast to the first stages of a volition, which can 
 not be clearly distinguished from an ordinary emotional pro- 
 cess, the last stages are absolutely characteristic. They are 
 especially marked by accompanying feelings that never appear 
 anywhere but in volitions, and must therefore be regarded 
 as the specific elements pecuUair to will. These feehngs are 
 first of all those of resolution and of decision. The latter 
 differs from the former only in its greater intensity. They 
 are both exciting and relaxing feelings, and may be united 
 under various circumstances with pleasurable or unpleasur- 
 able factors. The relatively greater intensity of the feeling 
 of decision is probably due to its contrast with the preced- 
 ing feeling of doubt which attends the wavering between 
 different motives. Its opposition to this doubt gives the 
 feeling of relaxation a greater intensity. At the moment 
 when the voHtional act begins, the feelings of resolution and 
 decision give place to the specific feehng of activity, which 
 has its sensational substratum, in the case of external voli- 
 tional acts, in the inner tactual sensation accompanying the 
 movement. This feeling of activity is clearly exciting in its 
 character, and is, according to the special motives of the 
 volition, accompanied now by pleasurable, now by unpleas- 
 urable elements, which may in turn vary in the course of 
 the act and alternate with one another. As a total feeling, 
 this feehng of activity is a rising and falling temporal pro- 
 cess extending through the whole act and finally passing 
 into the most various feelings, such as those of fulfilment, 
 satisfaction, or disappointment, or into the feelings and emo- 
 tions connected with the special result of the act. Taking 
 
1 90 II- PsycMeal Compov/nds. 
 
 the process as seen in voluntary and selective acts as complete 
 volitional acts, we must distinguish impulsive acts from them 
 essentially by the absence of the antecedent feelings of re- 
 solution and decision. The feehng connected with the motive 
 passes in the latter case directly into that of activity, and 
 then into those which correspond to the effect of the act. 
 
 8. The transition from simple to complex volitional acts 
 brings with it a number of other changes which are of great 
 importance for the development of will. The first of these 
 changes is to be found in the fact that the emotions which 
 introduce the volitions lose their intensity more and more, 
 as a result of the counteraction of different mutually inhibit- 
 ing feelings, so that finally a volitional act may result from 
 an apparently unemotional affective state. To be sure, emo- 
 tion is never entirely wanting; in order that the motive 
 which arises in an ordinary train of feehngs may bring 
 about a resolution or decision, it must always be connected 
 with some degree of emotional excitement. This can, how- 
 ever, be so weak and transient that we overlook it. We do 
 this the more easily the more we are inchned to unite a 
 short emotion of this kind, attending merely the rise and 
 action of the motive, with the resolution and execution in 
 the single concept of a vohtional act. This weakening of the 
 emotions results mainly from the combinations of psychical 
 processes which we call intellectvxil development and of which 
 we shall treat more fully in the discussion of the interconnec- 
 tion of psychical compounds (§ 17). Intellectual processes 
 can, indeed, never do away with emotions; they are, on the 
 contrary, in many cases the sources of new and character- 
 istic emotions. A volition entkely without emotion, deter- 
 mined by a purely intellectual motive, is, as already remarked 
 (p. 186), a psychological impossibility. Still, intellectual de- 
 velopment exercises beyond a doubt a moderating influence 
 
§14. Volitional Processes. 191 
 
 on emotions, particularly on those that prepare the way for 
 volitional acts wherever intellectual motives enter into them. 
 This may be due partly to the counteraction of the feelings 
 which is generally present, partly to the slow development 
 of intellectual motives, for in general emotions are the 
 stronger the more rapidly their component feelings rise. 
 
 9. Connected with this moderation of the emotional com- 
 ponents of volitions under the influence of intellectual motiyes 
 is still another change. It consists in the fact that the act 
 which closes the volition is not an external movement. The 
 effect which removes the exciting emotion is itself a psychical 
 process that does not show itself directly through any ex- 
 ternal symptom whatever. Such an effect which is imper- 
 ceptible for objective observation is called an internal voli- 
 tional act. The transition from external to internal vohtional 
 acts is so bound up with intellectual development that the 
 very character of the intellectual processes themselves are 
 to be explained to a great extent by the influence of voK- 
 tions on the train of ideas (§ 15, 9). The act that closes 
 the volition ia such a case is some change ia the train of 
 ideas, which follows the precediag motives as the result of 
 some resolution or decision. The feelings that accompany 
 these acts of unmediate preparation, and the feeling of ac- 
 tivity connected with the change itself, agree entirely with 
 those observed in the case of external volitional acts. Fur- 
 thermore, action is followed by more or less marked feeUngs 
 of satisfaction, of removal of preceding emotional and affect- 
 ive strain, so that obviously the only difference between 
 these special volitions connected with the iatellectual devel- 
 opment and the earHer forms, is to be found in the fact 
 that here the final effect of the volition does not show itself 
 in an external bodily movement. 
 
 Still, we may have a bodily movement as the secondary 
 
192 II- Psyohieal Compotmds. 
 
 result of an internal volitional act, when the resolution refers 
 to an external act to be executed at some later time. In such 
 a case the act itself always results from a special external 
 volition whose decisive motives come from the preceding in- 
 ternal voKtion, but which we must consider as a new process 
 distinct from the earlier. Thus, for example, the formation 
 of a resolution to execute an act in the future under certain 
 expected conditions, is an internal voHtion, while the later 
 performance of the act is an external action different from 
 the first, but requiring it as a necessary antecedent. It is 
 evident that where an external volitional act arises from a 
 decision after a conflict among the motives, we have a tran- 
 sition in which it is impossible to distinguish clearly be- 
 tween the two kinds of volition, namely that consisting 
 in a single unitary process and that made up of two such 
 processes, an internal and an external. In such a transitional 
 form, if the decision is at all separated in time from the 
 act itself, it may be regarded as an internal volitional act 
 preparatory to the execution. 
 
 10. These two changes connected with the development 
 of will, namely, the moderation of emotions and the render- 
 ing independent of internal volitions, are changes of a pro- 
 gressive order. In contrast with these there is a third process 
 or one of retrogradation. When complex voUtions with the 
 same motive are often repeated, the conflict between the 
 motives grows less intense; the opposing motives that were 
 overcome in earher cases grow weaker and finally disappear 
 entirely. The complex act has then passed into a simple, 
 or impulsive act. This retrogradation of complex volitional 
 processes into impulsive processes shows clearly the utter 
 inappropriateness of the limitation of the concept "impul- 
 sive" to acts of will arising from sense-feelings. As a result 
 of the gradual elimination of opposing motives, there are 
 
§ 14. Volitional Processes. 193 
 
 intellectual, moral, and aesthetic, as well as simple sensuous, 
 impulsive acts. 
 
 This retrogradation is but one step in a process that 
 unites all the external acts of a Uving being, both the voli- 
 tional acts and the automatic reflex movements. When the 
 habituating practice of certain acts is carried further, the 
 determining motives finally become, even in impulsive acts, 
 weaker and more transient. The external stimulus origi- 
 nally aroused a strongly affective idea which operated as a 
 motive, but now it causes the discharge of the act before it 
 can be apprehended as an idea. In this way the impulsive 
 movement finally becomes an automatic movement. The more 
 often this automatic movement is repeated, the easier it, in 
 turn, becomes, even when the stimulus is not sensed, as, for 
 example, in deep sleep or during complete diversion of the 
 attention. The movement now appears as a pure physiological 
 reflex, and the volitional process has become a simple reflex 
 process. 
 
 This gradual reduction of volitional to mechanical pro- 
 cesses, which depends essentially on the elimination of all 
 the elements between the physical beginning and end of the 
 act, may take place either in the case of movements that 
 were originally impulsive or in that of movements which 
 have secondarily become such through the retrogradation of 
 voluntary acts. It is not improbable that all the reflex move- 
 ments of both animals and men originate in this way. As 
 evidence for this we have, besides the reduction of vohtional 
 acts to pure mechanical processes through practice, as de- 
 scribed above, also the appropriate character of reflexes, which 
 points to the presence at some time of a purposive idea as 
 motive. Furthermore, the circumstance that the movements 
 of the lowest animals are aU evidently simple volitional 
 acts, not reflexes, tells for the same view, so that here 
 
 Wdkdt, Psychology. 13 
 
194 ^- P^ehical Oompounds. 
 
 too there is no justification for the assumption frequently 
 made that acts of will have been developed from reflex 
 movements. Finally, we can most easily explain from this 
 point of view the facts mentioned in § 13 (p. 172), that 
 expressive 'movements may belong to any one of the forms 
 possible in th'e scale of external acts. Obviously the simplest 
 movements are impulsive acts, while many complicated 
 pantomimetic movements probably came originally from 
 voluntary acts which passed first into impidsive and then 
 into reflex movements. Observed phenomena make it necessary 
 to assume that the retrogradations that begin in the in- 
 dividual Hfe are gradually carried further through the trans- 
 mission of acquired dispositions, so that certain acts which 
 were originally voluntary may appear in later descendants 
 from the first as impulsive or reflex movements (§19 and 
 §20). 
 
 10 a. For reasons similar to those given in the case of emo- 
 tions, the observation of volitional processes that come into ex- 
 perience by chance, is an inadequate and easily misleading method 
 for establishing the actual facts in the case. Wherever internal 
 or external volitional acts are performed in meeting either the 
 theoretical or practical demands of life, our interest is too much 
 taken up in the action itself to allow us at the same time to 
 observe with exactness the psychical processes that are going on. 
 In the theories of voHtion given by older psychologists — theories 
 that very often cast their shadows in the science of to-day — we 
 have a clear reflection of the undeveloped state of the methods 
 of psychological observation. External acts of will are the only 
 ones in the whole sphere of volitional processes that force them- 
 selves emphatically on the attention of the observer. As a result 
 the tendency was to limit the concept will to external volitional 
 acts, and thus not only to neglect entirely the whole sphere so 
 important for the higher development of will, namely, internal 
 volitional acts, but also to pay very little attention to the com- 
 ponents of the volition that are antecedent to the external acts. 
 
§ 14. Volitional Processes. 195 
 
 or at most only to the more striking ideational components of the 
 motive. It followed that the close genetic interconnection be- 
 tween impulsive and voluntary acts was not observed, and that 
 the former were regarded as not belonging to will, but as closely 
 related to reflexes. Will was thus limited to the voluntary and 
 selective actions. Furthermore, the one-sided consideration of the 
 ideational components of the motives led to a complete oversight 
 of the development of volitional acts from emotions, and the 
 singular idea found acceptance that volitional acts are not the 
 products of antecedent motives and of psychical conditions which 
 act upon these motives and bring one of them into the ascendency, 
 but that volition is a process apart from the motives and in- 
 dependent of them, a product of a metaphysical volitional faculty. 
 This faculty was, on the ground of the limitation of the concept 
 volition to voluntary acts, even defined as the choosing faculty 
 of the mind, or as its faculty for preferring one from among the 
 different motives that influence it. Thus, instead of deriving 
 volition from the antecedent psychical conditions, the final result 
 alone, the volitional act, was used to build up a general concept 
 which was called ^Dill and this class-concept was treated in 
 accordance with the faculty-theory as a first cause from which 
 all concrete volitional acts arise. 
 
 It was only a modification of this abstract theory when 
 Schopenhauer and, following him, many modern psychologists and 
 philosophers declared that volition in itself is an "unconscious" 
 occurrence which comes to consciousness only in its result, the 
 volitional act. In this case, obviously, the inadequate observation 
 of the volitional process preceding the act, has led to the assertion 
 that no such process exists. Here, again, the whole variety of con- 
 crete volitional processes is supplanted by the concept of a single 
 unconscious will, and the result for psychology is the same as 
 before : in place of a comprehension of concrete psychical processes 
 and their combination, an abstract concept is set up and then 
 erroneously looked upon as a general cause. 
 
 Modern psychology and even experimental psychology is still 
 to a great extent under the ban of this deep-rooted abstract doc- 
 trine of will. In denying from the first the possibility of ex- 
 plaining an act from the concrete psychical causality of the 
 antecedent volitional process, it leaves as the only characteristic 
 
 13* 
 
196 ^- Psyehieal Compounds. 
 
 of an act of will tke sum of the sensations th.at accompany the 
 external act, and may immediately precede it as pale memory- 
 images in cases where the act has often been repeated. The 
 physical excitations in the nervous system are regarded as the 
 causes of the act. Here, then, the question of the causality is 
 taken out of psychology and given over to physiology instead of 
 to metaphysics, as in the theory discussed before. In reality, 
 however, it is here too lost in metaphysics in attempting to 
 cross to physiology. For physiology must, as an empirical science, 
 abandon the attempt to give a complete causal explanation of a 
 complex volitional act from its antecedents, not only for the 
 present, but for all time, because this leads to the problem of 
 an infinite succession. The only possible basis for such a theory 
 is, therefore, the principle of materialistic metaphysics, that the so- 
 called material processes are all that make up the reality of things 
 and that psychical processes must accordingly be explained from 
 material processes. But it is an indispensable principle of psy- 
 chology as an empirical science, that it shall investigate the facts of 
 psychical processes as they are presented in immediate experience, 
 and that it shall not examine their interconnections from points 
 of view that are entirely foreign to them (§ 1 and p. 17, sq.). 
 It is impossible to find out how a volition proceeds in any other 
 way than by following it exactly as it is presented to us in im- 
 mediate experience. Here, however, it is not presented as an 
 abstract concept, but as a concrete single volition. Of this par- 
 ticular volition, too, we know nothing except what is immediately 
 perceptible in the process. We can know nothing of an un- 
 conscious or, what amounts to the same thing for psychology, a 
 material process which is not immediately perceived but merely 
 assumed hypothetically on the basis of metaphysical presuppositions. 
 Such metaphysical assumptions are obviously merely devices to 
 cover up an incomplete or entirely wanting psychological obser- 
 vation. The psychologist who pays attention to only the ter- 
 mination of the whole volitional process, will very easily hit 
 upon the thought that the immediate cause of volition is some 
 unconscious immaterial or material agent. 
 
 11. The exact observation of volitional processes is, for 
 the reasons given above, impossible in the case of volitional 
 
§ 14. Volitional Processes. 197 
 
 acts that come naturally in the course of Hfe; the only way 
 in which a thorough psychological investigation can be made, 
 is, therefore, that of experimental observation. To be sure, 
 we can not produce volitional acts of every kind at will, 
 but we must limit ourselves to the observation of certain 
 processes which can be easily influenced through external 
 means and which terminate in external acts. The experiments 
 which serve this purpose are the so-called reaction- experi- 
 ments. They may be described in their essentials- as follows. 
 A simple or complex volitional process is incited by an ex- 
 ternal sense-stimulus and then after the occurrence of certain 
 psychical processes which serve in part as motives,- the voli- 
 tion is brought to an end by a motor reaction. 
 
 Reaction-experiments have a second and more general 
 significance besides that mentioned. They furnish means for 
 the measurement of the rate of certain psychical and psycho- 
 physical processes. Li fact, such measurements are always 
 made in these experiments. The primary significance of the 
 experiments, however, consists in the fact that each one 
 includes a volition and that it is therefore possible, in this 
 way, by means of introspection to follow with exactness the 
 succession of psychical processes in such a volition, and at 
 the same time, by the dehberate variation of the conditions, 
 to influence this succession in a systematic manner. 
 
 The simplest reaction-experiment that can be made is 
 as follows. A short interval (2 — 3 sec.) after a signal that 
 serves to concentra;te the attention, an external stimulus is 
 allowed to act on some sense-organ. At the moment when 
 the stimulus is perceived, a movement that has been 
 determined upon and prepared before, as, for example, a 
 movement of the hand, is executed. The psychological con- 
 ditions in this experiment correspond essentially to those 
 of a simple volition. The sensible impression serves as a 
 
198 II- Psychical Compounds^ 
 
 simple motive, and this is to be followed invariably by a 
 particular act. If now we measure objectively by means of 
 either graphic or other chronometric apparatus, the interval 
 that elapses between the action of the stimulus and the 
 execution of the movement, it will be possible, by frequently 
 repeated experiments of the same kind, to become thoroughly 
 acquainted with the subjective processes that make up the 
 whole reaction, while at the same time the results of the 
 objective measurement will furnish a check for the constancy 
 or possible variations in these subjective processes. This check 
 is especially useful in those cases where some condition in 
 the experiment and thereby the subjective course of the vo- 
 lition itself is intentionally modified. 
 
 Such a modification may, indeed, be introduced even in the 
 simple form of the experiment just described, by varying the 
 way in which the reactor prepares, before the appearance of the 
 stimulus, for the execution of the act. When the expectation is 
 directed toward the stimulus which is to serve as the motive, 
 the form of reaction known as sensorial results. "When, on the 
 other hand, the preparatory expectation is directed toward 
 the act to be executed in response to the motive, we have 
 the so-called rmiscular reaction. In the first case the idea- 
 tional factor of the expectation is a pale memory-image of 
 the famiHar sense-impression. When the period of prepara- 
 tion is more extended, this image oscillates between alternating 
 clearness and obscurity. The affective element is a feeling 
 of expectation that oscillates in a similar manner and is 
 connected with sensations of strain from the sense-organ to 
 be affected, as, for example, with tension of the tympanum, 
 or of the ocular muscles of accommodation and movement. 
 In the second case, on the other hand, where the reaction 
 is muscular, we may observe during the period of preparatory 
 expectation a pale, wavering memory-image of the motor 
 
§ 14. Volitional Processes. 199 
 
 organ that is to react (e. g., the hand) together with strong 
 sensations of strain in the same, and a fairly continuous 
 feeling of expectation connected with these sensations. Sen- 
 sorial reaction-time is on the average 0.210 — 0.290 sec. (the 
 shortest time is for sound, the longest for Hght), with a 
 mean variation of 0.020 sec. for the single observations. 
 Muscular reaction-time is 0.120 — 0.190 sec, with a mean 
 variation of 0.010 sec. The different values of the mean 
 variation in the two cases are chiefly important as objective 
 checks for the discrimination of these forms of reaction'). 
 
 12. By introducing special conditions we may make sen- 
 sorial and muscidar reactions the starting points for the 
 study of the development of volitions in two different direc- 
 tions. Sensorial reactions furnish the means of passing from 
 simple to complex volitions because we can in this case 
 easily insert different psychical processes between the per- 
 ception of the impression and the execution of the reaction. 
 Thus we have a voluntary act of relatively simple character 
 when we allow an act of cognition or discrimination to follow 
 the perception of the impression and then let the move- 
 ment depend on this second process. In this case not the 
 immediate impression but the idea that resiilts from the act 
 of cognition or discrimination is the motive for the act to 
 be performed. This motive is only one of a greater or 
 smaller number of equally possible motives that could have 
 come up in place of it; as a result the reaction-movement 
 takes on the character of a voluntary act. In fact, we may 
 
 1) The reaction-times for sensations of taste, smell, temperature, 
 and pain are not reckoned in the figures given. They are all longer. 
 The differences are, however, obviously to be attributed to pure phys- 
 iological conditions (slow transmission of the stimulation to the 
 nerve-endings, and in the case of pain slower central conduction), 
 80 that they are of no interest for psychology. 
 
200 H. Psychical Compownds. 
 
 observe clearly the feeling of resolution antecedent to the 
 act and also the feelings preceding that and connected with 
 the perception of the impression. This is still more em- 
 phatically the case, and the succession of ideational and 
 affective processes is at the same time more complicated, 
 when we bring in still another psychical process, as, for 
 example, an association, to serve as the decisive motive for 
 the execution of the movement. Finally, the voluntary pro- 
 cess becomes one of choice when, in such experiments, the 
 act is not merely influenced by a plurality of motives in 
 such a way that several must follow one another before one 
 determines the act, but when, in addition to that, one of a 
 number of possible different acts is decided upon according 
 to the motive presented. This takes place when preparations 
 are made for different movements, for example, one with the 
 right, another with the left hand, or one with each of the 
 ten fingers, and the condition is prescribed for each move- 
 ment that an impression of a particular quality shall serve 
 as its motive, for example, the impression blue for the right 
 hand, red for the left. 
 
 13. Muscular reactions, on the contrary, may be used to 
 foUow out the retrogradation of volitional acts to reflex move- 
 ment. In this form of reaction the preparatory expectation 
 is directed entirely towards the external act, so that a 
 voluntary inhibition or execution of the act in accordance 
 with the special character of the impression, that is, a tran- 
 sition from simple to complex acts of will, is in this case 
 impossible. On the other hand, it is easy by practice so to 
 habituate one's self to the invariable connection of an im- 
 pression and. a particular movement, that the process of 
 perception fades out more and more or takes place after 
 the motor impulse, and finally the movement becomes just 
 like a reflex movement. This reduction of volition to a 
 
§ 14. Volitional Processes. 201 
 
 mecliaiiical process, wliich in the case of sensorial reactions 
 is never possible from the very nature of their conditions, 
 shows itself in the shortening of the objective time to that 
 observed for pure reflexes, and in the subjective coincidence 
 in point of time of impression and reaction, while the char- 
 acteristic feeling of resolution gradually disappears entirely. 
 
 13 a. The chronometric experiments familiar in experimental 
 psychology under the name of "reaction-experiments", are im- 
 portant for two reasons: first, as aids in the analysis of volitional 
 processes, and secondly, as means for the investigation of the 
 temporal course of psychical processes in general. This twofold 
 importance of reaction-experiments reflects the central importance 
 of volitions. On the one hand, the simpler processes, feelings, 
 emotions, and their related ideas, are components of a complete 
 volition; on the other, all possible forms of the interconnection 
 of psychical compounds may appear as components of a volition. 
 Volitional processes are, consequently, an appropriate transition 
 to the interconnection between psychical compounds to be dis- 
 cussed in the next chapter. 
 
 For a "reaction-experiment" which is to be the basis of an 
 analysis of a volitional process or any of its component psychical 
 processes, we must have first of all exact and sufficiently fine 
 (reading with exactness to toVt ^^'^■) dhronometrie apparatus 
 (electric clock or graphic register). The apparatus must be so 
 arranged that we can determine exactly the moment at which 
 the stimulus acts and that at which the subject reacts. This 
 can be accomplished by allowing the stimulus itself (sound, light, 
 or tactual stimulus) to close an electric current that sets an 
 electric clock, reading to xrJW ^^^-i ^"^ motion, and then allow- 
 ing the observer, by means of a simple movement of the hand 
 wliich raises a telegraph-key, to break the current again at the 
 moment in which he apprehends the stimulus. In this way we 
 may measure simple reactions varied in different ways (sensorial 
 and muscular reactions, reactions with or without preceding 
 signals), or we may bring into the process various other psy- 
 chical acts (discriminations, cognitions, associations, selective 
 processes) which may be regarded either as motives for the volition 
 
202 H- Psychical Compoimds. 
 
 or as components of the general interconnection of psychical 
 compounds. A simple reaction always includes, along with the 
 volitional process, purely physiological factors (conduction of the 
 sensory excitation to the brain and of the motor excitation to the 
 muscle). If, now, we insert further psychical processes (dis- 
 criminations, cognitions, associations, acts of choice), a modification 
 which can be made only when sensorial reactions are employed, 
 the duration of clearly definable psychical processes may be gained 
 by subtractiQg the interval found for simple reactions from those 
 found for the compound reactions. In this way it has been 
 determined that the time required for the cognition and for the 
 discrimination of relatively simple impressions (colors, letters, 
 short words) is 0.03 — 0.05"; the time for choice between two 
 movements (right and left hand) is 0.06", between ten movements 
 (the ten fingers) 0.4", etc. As already remarked, the value of 
 these figures is not their absolute magnitude, but rather their 
 utility as checks for introspection, while at the same time we 
 may apply this introspective observation to processes subject to 
 conditions which are prescribed with exactness by means of ex- 
 perimental methods and which may therefore be repeated at 
 pleasure. 
 
III. INTERCONNECTION OF PSYCHICAL 
 COMPOUNDS. 
 
 § 15. CONSCIOUSNESS AND ATTENTION. 
 
 1. Every psychical compound is composed of a number 
 of psychical elements which do not usually all begin or end 
 at exactly the same moment. As a result, the interconnection 
 which unites the elements to a single whole always reaches 
 beyond the individual compounds, so that different simulta- 
 neous and successive compounds are united, though indeed 
 somewhat more loosely. We call this interconnection of 
 psychical compounds consciousness. 
 
 Consciousness, accordingly, does not mean anything that 
 exists apart from psychical processes, nor does it refer merely 
 to the sum of these processes without reference to how they 
 are related to one another. It expresses the general syn- 
 thesis of psychical processes, in which the single compounds 
 are marked off as more intimate combinations. A state in 
 which this interconnection is interrupted, as deep sleep or 
 a faint, is called an unconscious state; and we speak of 
 "disturbances of consciousness" when abnormal changes in 
 the combination of psychical compounds arise, even though 
 these compounds themselves shovt^ no changes whatever. 
 
 Consciousness in this sense, as a comprehensive inter- 
 connection of simultaneous and successive psychical processes, 
 shows itself in experience first of all in the psychical life of 
 
204 -27. Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 
 
 the individual as individiud consciousness. But we have an 
 analogous interconnection in the combination of individuals, 
 although it is limited to certain sides of mental Hfe, so that 
 we may further include under the more general concept con- 
 sciousness the concepts of collective consciousness, of social 
 consciousness, etc. For all these broader forms, however, the 
 foundation is the individual consciousness, and it is to this 
 that we vrill first turn our attention. (For collective conscious- 
 ness see § 21, 14.) 
 
 2. Individual consciousness stands under the same external 
 conditions as psychical phenomena in general, for which it is, 
 indeed, merely another expression, referring more particularly 
 to the mutual relations of the components of these phenomena 
 to one another. As the substratum for the manifestations 
 of an individual consciousness we have in every case an in- 
 dividual animal organism. In the case of men and similar 
 higher animals the cerebral cortex, in the cells and fibres 
 of which all the organs that stand in relation to psychical 
 processes are represented, appears as the immediate organ 
 of this consciousness. The complete interconnection of the 
 cortical elements may be looked upon as the physiological 
 correlate of the interconnection of psychical processes in 
 consciousness, and the differentiation in the functions of 
 different cortical regions as the physiological correlate of the 
 great variety of single conscious processes. The differentia- 
 tion of functions in the central organ is, indeed, always 
 merely relative; every psychical compound requires the co- 
 operation of numerous elements and many central regions. 
 When the destruction of certain cortical regions produces 
 definite disturbances in voluntary movements, or in sen- 
 sations, or when it interferes which the formation of certain 
 classes of ideas, it is perfectly justifiable to conclude that 
 this region furnishes certain links in the chain of psychical 
 
§ 15. Conseiotisness and Attention. 205 
 
 elements that are indispensable for the processes in question. 
 The assumptions often made on the basis of these phenom- 
 ena, that there is in the brain a special organ for the 
 faculties of speech and writing, or that visual, tonal, and 
 verbal ideas are stored in special cortical cells, are not only 
 the results of the grossest physiological misconceptions, but 
 they are absolutely irreconcilable with the psychological anal- 
 ysis of these functions. Psychologically regarded, these as- 
 sumptions are nothing but modem revivals of that most 
 unfortunate form of faculty-psychology known as phrenology. 
 
 2 a. The facts that have been discovered in regard to the 
 localization of certain psycho-physical functions in the cortex, 
 are derived partly from pathological and anatomical observations 
 on men and partly from experiments on animals. They may be 
 summed up as follows: 1) Certain cortical regions correspond to 
 certain peripheral sensory and muscular regions. Thus, the cortex 
 of the occipital lobe is connected with the retina, a part of the 
 parietal lobe with the tactual surface, and a part of the temporal 
 with the auditory organ. The central ganglia of special groups 
 of muscles generally lie directly next to or between the sensory 
 centres functionally related to them. 2) Certain complex; disturb- 
 ances have been demonstrated when certain cortical regions which 
 are not directly connected with peripheral organs, but are inserted 
 between other central regions, fail to carry out their functions. 
 The only relation of this kind which has been proved with 
 certainty, is that of a certain region of the temporal lobe to the 
 functions of speech. The front part of this region is connected 
 in particular with the articulation of words (its disturbance results 
 in interference with motor coordination, so-called ''ataxic aphasia,"), 
 the part further back is connected with the formation of word-ideas 
 (its disturbance hinders sensorial coordination and produces in this 
 way the so-called "amnesic aphasia") . It is a,lso observed that these 
 functions are as a rule confined entirely to the left temporal lobe 
 and that generally apoplectic disturbances in the right lobe do not 
 interfere with speech, while those in the left lobe do. Furthermore, 
 in all these cases, in both simple and complex disturbances, there 
 
206 III- Interconnection of Psychical Compotmds. 
 
 is usually a gradual restoration of the functions in the course of 
 time. This is probably effected by the vicarious functioning of 
 some, generally a neighboring cortical region in place of that 
 which is disturbed (in disturbances of speech, perhaps it is the 
 opposite, before untrained, side that comes into play). Localization 
 of other complex psychical functions, such as processes of memory 
 and association, has not yet been demonstrated with certainty. 
 The name "psychical centres", applied to certain cortical regions 
 by many anatomists, is for the present at least based exclusively 
 either on the very questionable interpretation of experiments on 
 animals, or else on the mere anatomical fact that no motor or 
 sensory fibres running directly to these regions can be found, and 
 that their connective fibres in general are developed relatively 
 late. The cortex of the frontal brain is such a region. In the 
 human brain it is noticeable for its large development. It has 
 been observed in many cases that disturbances of this part of 
 the brain soon result in marked inability to concentrate the 
 attention or in other intellectual defects which are possibly 
 reduceable to this; and from these observations the hypothesis 
 has been made that this region is to be regarded as the seat of 
 the function of apperception which will be discussed later (4), 
 and of all those components of psychical experience in which, as 
 in the feelings, the unitary interconnection of mental life finds its 
 expression (comp. p. 89). This hypothesis requires, however, 
 a firmer empirical foundation than it has at present. It is to 
 be noted that those cases where, in contrast with the first ones 
 mentioned, a partial injury of the frontal lobe is sustained without 
 any noticeable disturbance of intelligence, are by no means proofs 
 against this hypothesis. There is much evidence to show that 
 just here, in the higher centres, local injuries may occur without 
 any apparent results. This is probably due to the great com- 
 plexity of the connections and to the various ways in which the 
 different elements can, therefore, take the place of one another. 
 The expression "centre" in all these cases is, of course, employed 
 in the sense that is justified by the general relation of psychical 
 to physical functions, that is, in the sense of a parallelism be- 
 tween the two classes of elementary processes, the one regarded 
 from the point of view of the natural sciences, the other from 
 that of psychology (comp. §1,2 and § 22, 9). 
 
§ 15. Gonscioitsness mid Attention. 207 
 
 3. The interconnection of psychical processes, which con- 
 stitutes what we understand under the concept consciousness, 
 is in part a simultaneous, in part a successive interconnection. 
 The sum of all the processes present at a given moment is 
 always a unitary whole whose parts are more or less closely 
 united. This is the simultaneous interconnection. A present 
 state is derived directly from that immediately preceding either 
 through the disappearance of certain processes while others 
 change their course and still others begin, or, when a state 
 of unconsciousness intervenes, the new processes are brought 
 into relation with those that were present before. These 
 are successive interconnections. In all these cases the scope 
 of the single combinations between preceding and following 
 processes determines the state of consciousness. Consciousness 
 gives place to unconsciousness when this interconnection is com- 
 pletely interrupted, and it is more incomplete the looser the 
 connection of the processes of the moment with those preceding. 
 Thus, after a period of unconsciousness the normal state of 
 consciousness is generally only slowly recovered through a 
 gradual reestablishment of relations with earlier experiences. 
 
 So we come to distinguish grades of consciousness. The 
 lower limi t, or zero grade, is unconsciousness. This condition, 
 which consists in an absolute absence of aU psychical inter- 
 connections, is essentially different from the disappearance 
 of single psychical contents from consciousness. The latter 
 is continually taking place in the flow of mental processes. 
 Complex ideas and feehngs and even single elements of these 
 compounds may disappear, and new ones take their places. 
 This continuous appearance and disappearance of elementary 
 and composite processes in consciousness is what makes up 
 its successive interconnection. Without this change, such an 
 interconnection would, of course, be impossible. Any psychical 
 element that has disappeared from consciousness, is to be 
 
208 HI- Interconnection of Psychical Compoimds. 
 
 called unconscious in the sense that we assume the possibility 
 of its renewal, that is, its reappearance in the actual inter- 
 connection of psychical processes. Our knowledge of an 
 element that has become unconscious does not extend beyond 
 this possibility of its renewal. For psychology, therefore, 
 it has no meaning except as a disposition for the rise 
 of future components of psychical processes which are 
 coimected with others before present. Assumptions as 
 to the state of the "unconscious" or as to "unconscious 
 processes" of any kind which are thought of as existing along 
 with the conscious processes of experience, are entirely un- 
 productive for psychology. There are, of course, physical 
 concomitants of the psychical dispositions mentioned, of which 
 some can be directly demonstrated, some inferred from various 
 experiences. These physical concomitants are the effects which 
 practice produces on all organs, especially those of the nervous 
 system. As a universal residt of practice we observe a facil- 
 itation of action which renders a repetition of the process 
 easier. To be sure, we do not know any details in regard to 
 the changes that are effected in the structure of the nervous 
 elements through practice, but we can represent them to 
 ourselves through very natural analogies with mechanical 
 processes, such, for example, as the reduction of friction 
 resulting from the rubbing of two surfaces against each other. 
 4. It was noted in the case of temporal ideas, that the 
 member of a series of successive ideas which is immediately 
 present in our perception, has the most favorable position. 
 Similarly in the simultaneous interconnection of consciousness, 
 for example in a compound clang or ia a series of spacial 
 objects, certain single components are favored above the 
 others. In both cases we designate the differences in the 
 perception as differences in clearness and distinctness. Clearness 
 is the relatively favorable comprehension of the object in itself. 
 
^ 15. Consciousness and Attention. 209 
 
 distinctness the sharp discrimination from other objects, 
 which is generally connected with clearness. The state 
 which accompanies the clear grasp of any psychical content 
 and is characterized by a special feeling, we call attention. 
 The process through which any such content is brought to 
 clear comprehension we call apperception. In contrast with 
 this, perception which is not accompanied by a state of 
 attention, we designate apprehension. Those contents of 
 consciousness upon which the attention is concentrated are 
 spoken of, after the analogy of the external optical fixation- 
 point, as the fixation-point of consciousness, or the irvriier 
 fixationr-point. On the other hand, the whole content of 
 consciousness at any given moment is called the field of covr- 
 seiousness. When a psychical process passes into an uncon- 
 scious state we speak of its sinking below the threshold of 
 consciousness and when such a process arises we say it appears 
 above the threshold of consciousness. These are all figurative 
 expressions and must not be understood literally. They are 
 useful, however, because of the brevity and clearness they 
 permit in the description of conscious processes. 
 
 5. If we try to describe the train of psychical compounds 
 in their interconnection with the aid of these figurative ex- 
 pressions, we may say that it is made up of a continual 
 coming and going. At first some compound comes into the field 
 of consciousness and then advances into the inner fixation- 
 point, from which it returns to the field of consciousness 
 before disappearing entirely. Besides this train of psychical 
 compounds which are apperceived, there is also a coming and 
 going of others which are merely apprehended, that is, 
 enter the field of consciousness and pass out again without 
 reaching the inner fixation-point. Both the apperceived and 
 the apprehended compounds may have different grades of 
 clearness. In the case of the first class this appears in 
 
 Wdnot, Psychology. 14 
 
210 lH- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 
 
 the fact that the clearness and distinctness of apperception 
 in general is variable according to the state of consciousness. 
 To illustrate: it can easily be shown that when one and the 
 same impression is apperceived several times in succession, 
 if the other conditions remain the same, the successive 
 apperceptions are usually clearer and more, distinct. The 
 different degrees of clearness in the case of compounds that 
 merely apprehended, may be observed most easily when 
 the impressions are composite. It is then found, especially 
 when the impressions last but an instant, that even here, 
 where all the components are obscure from the first, that 
 there are still different gradations. Some seem to rise more 
 above the threshold of consciousness, some less. 
 
 6. These relations can not be determined through chance 
 introspections, but only by systematic experimental observations. 
 The best kinds of conscious contents to use for such obser- 
 vations are ideas because they can be easily produced at any 
 time through external impressions. Now, in any temporal 
 idea, as already remarked (§ 11, p. 155), those components 
 which belong to the present moment are in the fixation-point 
 of consciousness. Those of the preceding impressions which 
 were present shortly before, are still in the field of conscious- 
 ness, while ' those which were present longer before, have dis- 
 appeared from consciousness entirely. A spacial idea, on the 
 other hand, when it has only a limited extent, may be 
 apperceived at once in its totahty. If it is more composite, 
 then its parts too must pass successively through the inner 
 fixation-point if they are to be clearly apprehended. It follows, 
 therefore, that composite spacial ideas (especially momentary 
 visual impressions) are peculiarly well suited to furnish a 
 measure of the amount of content that can be apperceived 
 in a single act, or of the scope of attention; while composite 
 temporal ideas (for example, rhythmical auditory impressions. 
 
§ 15. Consciousness and Attention. 2 1 J 
 
 hammer-strokes) may be used for measuring the amount of 
 all the contents that can enter into consciousness at a given 
 moment, or the scope of cmisciousness. Experiments made in 
 this way give, under different conditions, a scope of from 
 6 to 12 simple impressions for attention and of 16 to 40 
 such impressions for consciousness. The smaller figures are 
 for those impressions which do not unite at all to ideational 
 combinations, or at most very incompletely, the larger for 
 those in which the elements combine as far as possible to 
 composite ideas. 
 
 6 a. The most accurate way of determining the scope of attention 
 is to use spacial impressions of sight, for in such cases it is 
 very easy, by means of an electric spark, or the fall of a screen 
 made with an opening in the centre, to expose the objects for 
 an instant and in such a way that they all lie in the region 
 of clearest vision. This gives us physiological conditions that 
 do not prevent the apperception of a greater number of im- 
 pressions than it is possible to apperceive because of the limited 
 scope of attention. In these experiments there must be a point 
 for fixation in the middle of the surface on which the impressions 
 lie, before the momentary illumination. Immediately after the 
 experiment, if it is properly arranged, the observer knows that 
 the number of objects which were clearly seen in a physiological 
 sense, is greater than the number included within the scope 
 of attention. When, for example, a momentary impression is 
 made up of letters, it is possible, by calling up a memory-image 
 of the impression, to read afterwards some of the letters that 
 were only indistinctly apprehended at the moment of illumination. 
 This memory-image, however, is clearly distinguished ia time 
 from the impression itself, so that the determination of the scope 
 of attention is not disturbed by it. Careful introspection easily 
 succeeds in fixating the state of consciousness at the moment the 
 impression arrives, and in distinguishing this from the subsequent 
 acts of memory, which are always separated from it by a notice- 
 able interval. Experiments made in this way show that the scope 
 of attention is by no means a constant magnitude, but that, even 
 
 14* 
 
212 III- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 
 
 wken tlie concentration of the attention is approximately at its 
 maximum, its scope depends in part on the simplicity or com- 
 plexity of the impressions, in part on their familiarity. The 
 simplest spacial impressions are arbitrarily distributed points. Of 
 these a maximum of six can be apperceived at one time. When 
 the impressions are somewhat more complex but of a familiar 
 character, such as simple lines, figures, and letters, three or four 
 of them are generally apperceived simultaneously, or, under 
 favorable conditions, even five. The figures just given hold for 
 vision; for touch the same limits seem to hold only in the case 
 of points. Six such simple impressions can, under favorable 
 conditions, be apperceived in the same instant. When the im- 
 pressions are familiar but complex, even for vision, the number 
 of ideas decreases, while that of the single elements increases 
 very markedly. Thus, we can apperceive two or even three 
 familiar monosyllabic words, which contain in all ten or twelve 
 , single letters. Under any circumstances, then, the assertion often 
 made, that the attention can be concentrated on only one idea at 
 a time, is false. 
 
 Then, too, these observations overthrow the assumption some- 
 times accepted, that the attention can sweep continuously and 
 with great rapidity over a great number of single ideas. In the 
 experiment described, if the attempt is made to fill up frcyn 
 memory the image which is clearly perceived an instant after the 
 impression, a very noticeable interval is required to bring into 
 clear consciousness an impression that was not apperceived at 
 first; and in the process the first image always disappears from 
 attention. The successive movement of attention over a number 
 of objects is, accordingly, a discontinuous process, made up of 
 a number of separate acts of apperception following one another. 
 This discontinuity is due to the jfact that every single apperception 
 is made up of a period of increasing followed of by a period 
 decreasing strain. The period of maximal tension between the two, 
 may vary considerably in its duration. In the case of momentary 
 and rapidly changing impressions, it is very brief; when, on the 
 other hand, we concentrate on particular objects, it is longer. But, 
 even when the attention is thus concentrated on objects of a con- 
 stant character, a periodic interruption, due to the alternating 
 relaxation and renewed concentration, always appears. This may be 
 
^ 15. Consciousness and Attention. 213 
 
 easily observed, even in the ordinary action of attention. But here, 
 too, we gain more detailed information through experiments. ■ If 
 we allow a weak, continuous impression to act on a sense-organ 
 and remove so far as possible all other stimuli, it will be observed 
 when the attention is concentrated upon it that at certain, generally 
 irregular, intervals the impression becomes for a short time in- 
 distinct, or even appears to fade out entirely, only to appear 
 again the next moment. This wavering begins, when the im- 
 pressions are very weak, after 3 — 6"; when they are somewhat 
 stronger, after 18 — 24". These variations are readily distinguished 
 from changes in the intensity of the impression itself, as may be 
 easily demonstrated when, in the course of the experiment, the 
 stimulus is purposely weakened or interrupted. There are essen- 
 tially two characteristics that distinguish the subjective variations 
 from those due to the changes in the stimulus. First, so long 
 as the impression merely passes back and forth from the obscure 
 field of consciousness to the inner fixation-point, there is always 
 an idea of its continuance, just as there was in the experiments 
 with momentary impressions an indefinite and obscure idea of 
 the components which were not apperceived. Secondly, the 
 oscillations of attention are attended by characteristic feelings and 
 sensations which are entirely absent when the changes are ob- 
 jective. The characteristic feelings are those of expectation and 
 activity, which regularly increase with the concentration of atten- 
 tion and decrease with its relaxation. These will be discussed 
 more fully later. The sensations come from the sense-organ 
 affected, or at least emanate indirectly from it. They consist in 
 sensations of tension in the tympanum, or in those of accom- 
 modation and convergence, etc. These two series of characteristics 
 distinguish the concepts of the clearness and distinctness of psy- 
 chical contents from that of the intensity of their sensational 
 elements. A strong impression may be obscure and a weak one 
 clear. The only causal relation between these two different con- 
 cepts is to be found in the fact that in general the stronger 
 impressions force themselves more upon the apperception. Whether 
 or not they are really more clearly apperceived, depends on the 
 other conditions present at the moment. The same is true of the 
 advantages which those parts of a visual impression have that 
 fall within the region of clearest vision. As a rule, the fixated 
 
214 m. Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 
 
 objects are also the ones apperceived. But, in the experiments 
 with momentary impressions described above, it can be shown 
 that this interconnection may be broken up. This happens when 
 we voluntarily concentrate our attention on a point in the 
 eccentric regions of the field of vision. The object which is 
 obscurely seen then becomes the one which is clearly ideated. 
 
 6 b. In the same way that momentary spacial impressions are 
 used to determine the scope of attention, we may use those which 
 succeed one another in time, as a measure for the scope of con- 
 sciousness. In this case we start with the assumption that a 
 series of impressions can be united in a single unitary idea only 
 when they are all together in consciousness, at least for one 
 moment. If we listen to a series of hammer-strokes, it is obvious 
 that while the present sound is apperceived, those immediately 
 preceding it are still in the field of consciousness. Their clearness 
 diminishes, however, just in proportion to their distance in time 
 from the apperceived impression, and those lying beyond a certain 
 limit disappear from consciousness entirely. If we can determine 
 this Hmit, we shall have a direct measure for the scope of con- 
 sciousness under the special conditions given in the experiment. 
 As a means for the determination of this limit we rnay use the 
 ability to compare temporal ideas that follow one another im- 
 mediately. So long as such an idea is present in consciousness 
 as a single unitary whole, we can compare a succeeding idea 
 with it and decide whether the two are alike or not. On the 
 other hand, such a comparison is absolutely impossible when the 
 preceding temporal series is not a unitary whole for conscious- 
 ness, that is, when a part of its constituents have passed into 
 unconsciousness before the end is reached. If, then, we present 
 two series of strokes,, such as can be produced, for example, by 
 a metronome, one immediately after the other, marking off each 
 series by a signal at its beginning, as, for example, with a bell- 
 stroke, we can judge directly from the impression, so long as 
 they can be grasped as single units in consciousness, whether the 
 two series are alike or not. Of course, in such experiments 
 counting of the strokes must be strictly avoided. In making the 
 judgments it may be noticed that the impression of likeness is 
 produced by the affective elements of the temporal ideas mentioned 
 before (p. 156). Every stroke in the second series is preceded 
 
§ 15. Consciousness and Attention. 215 
 
 by a feeling of expectation corresponding to the analogous stroke 
 of the first series, so that every stroke too many or too few 
 produces a feeling of disappointment attending the disturbance 
 of the expectation. It follows that it is not necessary for the 
 two successive series to be present in consciousness at the same 
 time in order that they may be compared; but what is re- 
 quired is the union of all the impressions of one series together 
 in a single unitary idea. The relatively fixed boundary of the 
 scope of consciousness is clearly shown in the fact that the 
 likeness of two temporal ideas is always recognized with certainty 
 so long as they do not pass the bound that holds for the conditions 
 under which they are given, while the judgment becomes absolutely 
 uncertain when this limit is once crossed. The extent of the scope 
 of consciousness as found in measurements made when the con- 
 ditions of attention remain the same, depends partly on the rate 
 of the successive impressions and partly on their more or less 
 complete rhythmical combination. When the rate of succession 
 is slower than about 4", it becomes impossible to combine sucessive 
 impressions to a temporal idea; by the time a new impression 
 arrives, the preceding one has already disappeared from conscious- 
 ness. When the rate passes the upper limit of about 0.18", the 
 formation of distinctly defined temporal ideas is impossible because 
 the attention can not follow the impressions any longer. The 
 most favorable rate is a succession of strokes every 0.2 — 0.3". 
 With this rate, and with the simplest rhythm, which generally 
 arises of itself when the perception is uninfluenced by any 
 special objective conditions, the Yg-time 8 double or 16 single 
 impressions can be just grasped together. The best measure 
 for the apprehension of the greatest possible number of single 
 impressions is the ^/^-measure with the strong accent on the first 
 stroke and the medium accent on the fifth. In this case a 
 maximum of five feet or forty single impressions, can be grasped 
 at once. If these figures are compared with those obtained when 
 the scope of attention was measured, putting simple and compound 
 temporal impressions equal to the corresponding spacial im- 
 pressions, we find that the scope of consciousness is about four 
 times as great as that of attention. 
 
216 ni- Inierconnection of Psychical Compounds. 
 
 7. Besides the properties of clearness and distinctness 
 which belong to conscious contents in themselves or in their 
 mutual relations to one another, there are regularly others 
 which are immediately recognized as accompanying processes. 
 These are partly affective processes that are characteristic 
 for particular forms of apprehension and apperception, partly 
 sensations of a somewhat variable character. Especially 
 the ways in which psychical contents eiiter the field and 
 fixation-point of consciousness vary according to the different 
 conditions under which this entrance may take place. When 
 any psychical process rises above the threshold of conscious- 
 ness, the affective elements, as soon as they are strong enough, 
 are what first become noticeable. They begin to force them- 
 selves energetically into the fixation-point of consciousness 
 before anything is perceived of the ideational elements. This 
 is the case whether the impressions are new or revivals of 
 earher processes. This is what causes the peculiar states of 
 mind which we are not exactly able to account for, some- 
 times of a pleasurable or unpleasurable character, sometimes 
 predominantly states of strained expectation. In this last 
 case the sudden entrance of the ideational elements belonging 
 to the feelings, into the scope of the attention, is accompanied 
 by feehngs of relief or satisfaction. When we are trying to 
 recall something that has been forgotten, the same affective 
 state may arise. Often there is vividly present in such a 
 case, besides the regular feeling of strain, the special affective 
 tone of the forgotten idea, although the idea itself still 
 remains in the background of consciousness. In a similar 
 manner, as we shall see later (§ 16), the clear apperception 
 of ideas in acts of cognition and recognition is always 
 preceded by special feelings. Similar affective states may be 
 produced experimentally by the momentary illumination of a 
 field of vision in which there are impressions of the strongest 
 
^ 15. Consciousness and Attention, 217 
 
 possible affective tone in the region of indirect vision. All 
 these experiences seem to show that every content of con- 
 sciousness has some influence on attention. It shows this 
 partly in its own affective coloring, partly in the feelings 
 regularly connected with acts of attention. The whole effect of 
 these obscure contents of consciousness on the attention 
 fuses, according to the general law of the synthesis of affec- 
 tive components (p. 159), with the feelings attending the 
 apperceived contents to form a single total feeUng. 
 
 8. When psychical content enters the fixation-point of 
 consciousness, new and peculiar affective processes are added 
 to those that have been described. These new feelings may 
 be of a variety of kinds, according to the different conditions 
 attending this entrance into the fixation-point. The conditions 
 are of two classes, and are interconnected for the most part 
 with the above described preparatory affective influences of 
 the content not yet apperceived. 
 
 First, the new content forces itself on the attention 
 suddenly and without preparatory affective influences; this 
 we call passive apperception. While the content of conscious- 
 ness is becoming clearer both in its ideational and affective 
 elements, there is first of all a concomitant feehng of passive 
 receptivity, which is a depressing feehng, and generally 
 stronger the more intense the psychical processes, and the 
 more rapid its rise. This feeling soon sinks and then 
 gives place to an antagonistic, exciting feeling of activity. 
 There are connected with both these feeHngs characteristic 
 sensations in the muscles of the sense-organ from which the 
 ideational components of the process proceed. The feeling 
 of receptivity is generally accompanied by a transient sensation 
 of relaxation, that of activity by a succeeding sensation of 
 strain. 
 
 Secondly, the new content is preceded by the preparatory 
 
218 m- Intercormection of Psychical Compounds. 
 
 affective influences mentioned above (7), and as a result the 
 attention is concentrated upon it even before it arrives; this 
 we call active apperception. In such a case the apperception of 
 the content is preceded by a feeling of expectation, sometimes of 
 longer, sometimes of shorter duration. This feehng is generally 
 one of strain and may at the same time be one of excitement; it 
 may also have pleasurable or unpleasurable factors, according 
 to its ideational elements. This feeUng of expectation is 
 usually accompanied by fairly intense sensations of tension 
 in the muscles of the sense-organ affected. At the moment 
 in which the content arises in clear consciousness, this feeling 
 gives place to a feehng of fulfillment which is generally very 
 short and always has the character of a feehng of rehef. 
 Under circumstances it may also be depressing or exciting, 
 pleasurable or unpleasurable. After this feehng of fulfillment 
 we have at once that of activity — the same that appeared 
 at the close of passive apperception, and is here, too, united 
 with an increase in the feehngs of strain. 
 
 8 a. The experimental observation of the different forms of 
 apperception can be carried out best with the aid of the reaction- 
 experiments described in § 14, 11 sq. Passive apperception may 
 be studied by the use of unexpected, and active by the use of 
 expected impressions. At the same time it will be observed that 
 between these typical differences there are intermediate stages. 
 Either the passive form will approach the active because of the 
 weakness of the first stage, or the active will approach the passive 
 form because in the sudden relaxation of the expectation the 
 contrast between the expectation and the relief and depression which 
 come in the succeeding feeling of fulfillment, is more marked than 
 usual. In reality we have everywhere continuously interconnected 
 processes which are opposite character only in extreme cases. 
 
 9. If the affective side of these processes of attention are 
 more closely examined, it is obvious that they are exactly 
 the same as the affective content of all volitional processes. 
 
§ 15. Consoirmsness and Aitmtion. 219 
 
 At the same time it is clear that in its essential character 
 passive apperception corresponds to a simple impulsive act, while 
 the active form corresponds to a complex voluntary act. Li the 
 first case we may evidently regard the psychical content that 
 forces itself upon attention without preparation, as the single 
 motive which, without any conflict with other motives, gives 
 rise to the act of apperception. The act is here too con- 
 nected with the feeling of activity characteristic of all volitional 
 acts. In the case of active apperception, on the other hand, 
 other psychical contents with their affective elements tend to 
 force themselves upon the attention during the preparatory 
 affective stages, so that the act of apperception when it finally 
 is performed is often recognized as a voluntary process or 
 even as a selective process when the conflict between different 
 contents comes clearly into consciousness. The existence of 
 such selective acts under the circumstances mentioned was 
 recognized even in older psychology where "voluntary attention" 
 was spoken of. But here too, as in the case of external vo- 
 litional acts, will stood alone; there was no explanation of 
 it by its antecedents, for the central point in the development, 
 namely, the fact that so-called involuntary attention is only 
 a simpler form of internal voHtion, was entirely overlooked. 
 Then, too, in full accord with the methods of the old faculty- 
 theory "attention" and "will" were regarded as different, some- 
 times as related, sometimes as mutually excluding psychical 
 forces, while the truth evidently is that these two concepts 
 refer to the same class of psychical processes. The only 
 difference is that processes of apperception and attention are 
 those which occur only as so-called internal acts, that is, 
 have no external effects except indirectly when they lead to 
 other processes. 
 
 10. Connected with these internal volitional acts, which 
 we call processes of attention, there takes place a formation 
 
220 III- Interoormeciion of Psyehieal Compounds. 
 
 of certain concepts of the highest importance for all psychical 
 development. This is the formation of the concept svhject 
 and the correlate presupposition of objects as independent 
 realities standing over against the subject. This can be carried 
 out in its logical form only with the aid of scientific reflection, 
 still it has its substratum in the processes of attention. 
 
 Even in immediate experience there is a division between 
 components of' this experience. On the one hand are those which 
 are arranged in space with relation to the point of orientation 
 mentioned above (p. 131), and are called either objects, that is, 
 something outside the perceiving subject, or, when we attend to 
 the mode of their rise in consciousness, ideas, that is something 
 which the subject perceives. On the other hand, there are 
 those contents of experience which do not belong to this 
 spacial order, though they are continually brought into relation 
 with it through their quaKty and intensity. These latter con- 
 tents, as we saw in § 12 — 14, are intimately interconnected. 
 Feelings are parts of emotions and emotions are to be con- 
 sidered as components of voliUonal processes. The^ process 
 may end before it is fuUy completed, as often when a feeling 
 gives rise to no noticeable emotion, or when an emotion fades 
 out without really causing the volitional act for which it 
 prepared the way. All these affective processes may, accord- 
 ingly, be subsumed under the general concept voliUonal 
 p^vcess. This is the complete process of which the two others 
 are merely components of simpler or more complex character. 
 IVom this point of view we can easily understand how it is 
 that even simple feelings contain, in the extremes between which 
 they vary, a volitional direction ; and express, in the same way, 
 the amount of volitional energy present at a given moment; 
 and finally, correspond to certain particular phases of the 
 volitional process itself. The direction of volition is obviously 
 indicated by the pleasurable or unpleasurable directions of 
 
§ 15. Consciousness and Attention. 221 
 
 feelings, which correspond directly to some sort of effort to 
 reach something or to avoid it. The energy of volition finds 
 its expression in the arousing and subduing directions of 
 feelings, while the opposite phases of a Yolitional process are 
 related to the directions of strain and relaxation. 
 
 11. Thus, volition proves to be the fundamental fact from 
 which all those processes arise which are made up of feelings. 
 Then, too, in the process of apperception^ which is found 
 through psychological analysis to have all the characteristics 
 of a volitional act, we have a direct relation between this 
 fundamental fact and the ideational contents of experience 
 which arise from the spacial arrangement of sensations. Now, 
 volitional processes are apprehended as unitary processes and 
 as being uniform in character in the midst of all the variations 
 in their components. As a result there arises an immediate 
 feeling of this unitary interconnection, which is most intimately 
 connected with the feeling of activity that accompanies all 
 volition, and then is carried over to all conscious contents 
 because of their relation to will, as mentioned above. This 
 feeling of the interconnection of all single psychical experiences 
 is called the "ego". It is a feeling, not an idea as it is often 
 called. Like all feelings, however, it is connected with certain 
 sensations and ideas. The ideational components most closely 
 related to the ego are the common sensations and the idea 
 of one's own body. 
 
 That part of the affective and ideational contents which 
 separates off from the totality of consciousness and fuses 
 closely with the feeling of the ego, is called self-consciousness. 
 It is no more a reality, apart from the processes of which 
 it is made up, than is consciousness in general, but merely 
 points out the interconnection of these processes, which further- 
 more, especially in their ideational components, can never 
 be sharply distinguished from the rest of consciousness. This 
 
222 -27. Iniercormection of Psy(^iecd Oompotmds. 
 
 shows itself most of all in the fact that the idea of one's 
 own body sometimes fuses with the feeling of the ego, some- 
 times is distinct from it as the idea of an ohject, and that 
 in general self-consciousness in its development always tends 
 to reduce itself to its affective basis. 
 
 12. This separation of self-consciousness from the other 
 contents of consciousness also gives rise to the discrimination 
 of subject and objects. This discrimination was prepared for, 
 to be sure, by the characteristic differences among the original 
 contents of consciousness, but is fully carried out only as a 
 consequence of this separation. The concept sidyeet has 
 accordingly as a result of its psychological development three 
 different meanings of different scope, each of which may at 
 different times be the one employed. In its narrowest sense 
 the subject is the interconnection of volitional processes which 
 finds expression in the feeling of the ego. In the next wider 
 sense it includes the real content of these voHtional processes 
 together with the feeUngs and emotions that prepare their 
 way. Finally, in its widest significance it embraces the 
 constant ideational substratum of these subjective processes, 
 that is, the body of the individual as the seat of the common 
 sensations. In the line of development the widest significance is 
 the oldest, and in actual psychical experience the narrowest is 
 continually giving way to a return of one of the others because 
 it can be fuUy attained only through conceptual abstraction. 
 This highest form is, then, in reaUty merely a kind of limit 
 towards which the self-consciousness may approach more or 
 less closely. 
 
 12 a. This discrimination of subject and objects, or the ego 
 and the outer world as it is commonly expressed by reducing the 
 first concept to its original affective substratum and gathering 
 the second together in a general concept — this discrimination 
 is the basis of all the considerations responsible for the dualism 
 
§ 15. Consciotisness and Attention. 223 
 
 which first gained currency in the popular view of things and 
 was then carried over into the philosophical systems. It is on 
 this ground that psychology comes to be set over against the 
 other sciences, in particular the natural sciences, as a science of 
 the subject (§ 1, 3 a.) This view could be right only under the 
 conditions that the discrimination of the ego from the outer 
 world were a fact preceding all experience and that the concepts 
 subject and objects could be unequivocally distinguished once 
 for all. But neither of these conditions is fulfilled. Self-con- 
 sciousness depends on a whole series of psychical processes of 
 which it is the product, not the producer. Subject and object 
 are, therefore, neither originally nor in later development abso- 
 lutely different contents of experience, but they are concepts 
 which are due to the refiection resulting from the interrelations 
 of the various components of the absolutely unitary content of 
 our immediate experience. 
 
 13. The interconnection of psychical processes which makes 
 up consciousness, necessarily has its deepest spring in the 
 processes of combination which are continually taking place 
 between the elements of the single contents of experience. 
 Such processes are operative in the formation of single psy- 
 chical compounds and they are what give rise to the simul- 
 taneous unity of the state of consciousness present at a given 
 moment and also to the continuity of successive states. These 
 processes of combination are of the most various kinds ; each 
 one has its individual coloring, which is never exactly re- 
 produced in any second case. Still, the most general differ- 
 ences are those exhibited by the attention in the passive 
 reception of impressions and the active apperception of the 
 same. As short names for these differences we use the term 
 association to indicate a process of combination in a passive 
 state of attention, and apperceptive combination to indicate 
 a combination in which the attention is active. 
 
224 III' Interconnection of Psychical Compotmds. 
 
 § 16. ASSOCIATIONS. 
 
 1. The concept association has undergone, in the modem 
 development of psychology, a necessary and very radical 
 change in meaning. To be sure, this change has not been 
 accepted everywhere, and the original meaning is still re- 
 tained, especially by those psychologists who support, even 
 to-day, the fundamental positions on which the association- 
 psychology grew up (§ 2, p. 13 sq.). This psychology which 
 is predominantly intellectualistic, pays attention to nothing 
 but the ideational contents of consciousness and, accordingly, 
 limits the concept of association to the combinations of ideas. 
 Hartley and Hume, the two founders of association-psy- 
 chology, spoke of "association of ideas" in this limited sense, i) 
 Ideas were regarded as objects, or at least as processes 
 that could be repeated in consciousness with exactly the 
 same character as that in which they were present at first 
 (p. 13, 8). This led to the view that association was a 
 principle for the explanation of the so-called "reproduction" 
 of ideas. Furthermore, it was not considered necessary to 
 account for the rise of composite ideas with the aid of psy- 
 chological analysis, since it was assumed that the physical 
 union of impressions in sense-perception was sufficient to 
 explain the psychological composition and so the concept of 
 association was Hmited to those forms of so-called reproduc- 
 tion in which the associated ideas succeed one another in 
 time. For the discrimination of the chief forms of successive 
 associations Aristotle's logical scheme for the memory-processes 
 was accepted, and in accordance with the principle of classi- 
 fication by opposites the following forms were discriminated: 
 
 [1) The author remarks that the English word idea as here used 
 corresponds to the German VorsteUung. Tr.] 
 
§ 16. Associations. 225 
 
 association by similarity and contrast, and association by 
 simultaneity and succession. These class-concepts gained by 
 a logical dichotomic process were dignified with the name 
 "laws of associations". Modern psychology has generally 
 sought to reduce the niimber of these laws. Contrast is 
 regarded as a special form of similarity, for only those con- 
 trasted concepts are associated which belong to the same 
 general class ; and associations by simultaneity and succession 
 are both included under contiguity. Contiguity is then regarded 
 as outer association and contrasted with imner association 
 by similarity. Some psychologists believe it possible to reduce 
 these two forms to a single, still more fundamental, "law of 
 association" by making association by contiguity a special form 
 of similarity, or, what is still more common, by explaining simi- 
 larity as a result of association by contiguity. In both cases 
 association is generally brought under the more general 
 principle of practice or habituation. 
 
 2. The whole foundation for this kind of theorizing ia 
 destroyed by two facts which force themselves irresistibly 
 upon us as soon as we begin to study the matter experimen- 
 tally. The first of these facts is the general result of 
 the psychological analysis of sense-perceptions, that com- 
 posite ideas, which association-psychology regards as irre- 
 ducible psychical units, are in fact the results of synthetic 
 processes which are obviously in close interconnection with the 
 complex processes commonly called associations. The second 
 fact comes from the experimental investigation of memory- 
 processes. It is found that the reproduction of ideas in the 
 strict sense of a renewal in its unchanged form of an earlier 
 idea, never takes place at all, but that what really does happen 
 in an act of memory is the rise of a new idea in consciousness, 
 always differing from the earlier idea to which it is referred, and 
 deriving its elements as a rule from various preceding ideas. 
 
 WuiiDT, Psychology. 1 5 
 
226 III- Interconneetion of Psychical Compounds. 
 
 It follows from the first fact that there are elementary 
 processes of association between the components of ideas 
 preceding the associations of composite ideas with one another, 
 to which the name is generally limited. The second fact 
 proves that ordinary associations can be nothing but complex 
 products of such elementary associations. These conclusions 
 show the utter unjustifiableness of excluding the elementary 
 processes whose products are simultaneous ideas rather than 
 successive, from the concept association. Then, too, there is 
 no reason for limiting the concept to ideational processes. 
 The existence of composite feehngs, emotions, etc., shows, on 
 the contrary, that affective elements also enter into regular 
 combinations, which may in turn unite with associations of 
 sensational elements to form complex products, as we saw 
 in the rise of temporal ideas (§ 11, p. 156 sq.). The intimate 
 relation between the various orders of combining processes 
 and the necessity of elementary associations as antecedents 
 to all complex combinations, furnishes further support for 
 the observation made on the general mode of the occurrence 
 of conscious processes, that it is never possible to draw a 
 sharp boundary line between the combinations of the elements 
 that compose psychical compounds, and the interconnection 
 of the various psychical compounds, in consciousness (p. 203). 
 
 3. It follows that the concept of association can gain a fixed, 
 and in any particular case unequivocal, significance, only when 
 association is regarded as an elementary process which never 
 shows itself in the actual psychical processes except in a more 
 or less complex form, so that the only way to find out the 
 character of elementary association is to subject its complex 
 products to a psychological analysis. The ordinarily so-called 
 associations (the successive associations) are only one, and the 
 loosest at that, of all the forms of combination. In contrast 
 with these we have the closer combinations from which the 
 
§ 16. Associations. 227 
 
 different kinds of psychical compounds arise and to which yve 
 apply the general name fusions, because of the closeness of the 
 union (p. 94, sq.). The elementary processes from which the 
 various compounds, the intensive, spacial, and temporal ideas, 
 the composite feelings, the emotions, and the vohtional processes 
 arise, are, accordingly, to be considered as associative processes. 
 Por the purpose of practical discrimination, however, it will 
 be well to limit the word "association" to those combining 
 processes which take place between elements of different com- 
 pounds. This narrower meaning which we give the term 
 association in contrast with fusion, is in one respect an 
 approach to the meaning that it had in older psychology 
 (p. 224), for it refers exclusively to the interconnection of 
 psychical compounds in consciousness. It differs from the 
 older concept, however, iu two important characteristics. First 
 it is here regarded as an elementary process, or, when we are 
 dealing with complex phenomena, as a product of such ele- 
 mentary processes. Secondly, we recognize, just as in the 
 case of fusions, simultaneous associations as well as successive. 
 In fact, the former are to be looked upon as the earlier. 
 
 A. SIMULTANEOUS ASSOCIATIONS. 
 
 4. Simultaneous associations made up of elements from 
 different psychical compounds may be divided into two 
 classes: into assimilations, or associations between the ele- 
 ments of like compounds, and complications, or associations 
 between elements of unlike compounds. Both may take place, 
 in accordance with our limitation of the concept association, 
 between those compounds only which are themselves simul- 
 taneous combinations, that is, between intensive and spacial 
 ideas and between composite feelings. 
 
 15* 
 
228 III- Interconnection of Psychical Gompoimds. 
 
 a. Assimilations. 
 
 5. Assimilations are a form of association that is con- 
 inually met with, especially in the case of intensive and 
 spacial ideas. It is an essential supplement to the process 
 of formation of ideas by fusion. In the case of composite 
 feehngs this form of combination never seems to appear ex- 
 cept where we have at the same time an assimilation of the 
 ideational elements. It is most clearly demonstrable when 
 certain single components of the product of an assimilation are 
 given through external sense-impressions, while others belong 
 to earlier ideas. In such a case the assimilation may be 
 demonstrated by the fact that certain components of the 
 idea which are wanting in the objective impression or are 
 there represented by components other than those actually 
 present in the idea itself, can be shown to arise from earlier 
 ideas. Experience shows that of these reproduced components 
 those are most favored which are very frequently present. 
 Still, certain single elements of the impression are usually of 
 more importance in determining the association than others 
 are, so that when these dominanting elements are altered, as 
 may be the case especially with assimilations of the visual 
 sense, the product of the assimilation undergoes a corresponding 
 change. 
 
 6. Among intensive compounds it is especially the auditory 
 ideas which are very often the results of assimilation. They 
 also furnish the most striking examples for the principle of 
 frequency mentioned above. Of all the auditory ideas the 
 most familiar are the readily available ideas of wards, for 
 these are attended to more than other sound-impressions. As 
 a result the hearing of words is continually accompanied by 
 assimilations; the sound-impression is incomplete, but it is 
 entirely filled out by earlier impressions, so that we do not 
 
^ 16. Associations. ' 229 
 
 notice the incompleteness. So it comes that not the correct 
 hearing of words, but the misunderstanding of them, that is, 
 the erroneous filling out of incomplete impressions through 
 incorrect assimilations, is what generally leads us to notice the 
 process. "We may find an expression of the same fact in the 
 ease with which any sound whateyer, as, for example, the cry 
 of an animal, the noise of water, wind, machinery, etc., can 
 he made to sound like words almost at will. 
 
 7. In the case of intensive feelings we note the presence 
 of assimilations in the fact that impressions which are accom- 
 panied by sense-feeHngs and [elementary aesthetic feeling, very 
 often exercise a second direct affective influence for which 
 we can account only when we recall certain ideas of which 
 we are reminded by the impressions. In such cases the 
 association is usually at first only a form of affective associa- 
 tion, and only so long as this is true is the assimilation 
 simultaneous. The ideational association which explains the 
 effect is, on the contrary, a later process belonging to the 
 forms of successive association. For this reason it is hardly 
 possible, when we have clang-impressions or color-impressions 
 accompanied by particular feehngs, or when we have simple 
 spacial ideas, to decide what the immediate affective influence 
 of the impression itself is and what is that of the association. 
 As a rule, in such cases the affective process is to be looked 
 upon as the resultant of an immediate and an associative 
 factor which unite to form a single, unitary total feeling in 
 accordance with the general laws of affective fusion (p. 159). 
 
 8. Association in the case of spacial ideas is of the most 
 comprehensive character. It is not very noticeable in the 
 sphere of touch when vision is present, on account of the 
 small importance of tactual ideas in general and especially 
 for memory. For the bHnd, on the other hand, it is the 
 essential means for the rapid orientation in space which is 
 
230 III- Interconnection of Psychical Compoimds. 
 
 necessary, for example, in the rapid reading of the blind- 
 alphabet. The effects of assimilation are most strikingly evident 
 when several tactual surfaces are concerned, because in such 
 ■ cases its presence is easily betrayed by the illusions which may 
 arise in consequence of some disturbance in the usual inter- 
 relation of the sensations. Thus, for example, when we touch 
 a small ball with the index and middle fingers crossed, we 
 have the idea of two balls. The explanation is obvious. In 
 the ordinary position of the fingers the external impression 
 here given actually corresponds to two balls, and the many 
 perceptions of this kind that have been received before, exer- 
 cise an assimilative action on the new impression. 
 
 9. In visual sense-perceptions assimilative processes play a 
 very large part. Here they aid in the formation of ideas of the 
 magnitude, distance, anij three-dimensional character of visual 
 objects. In this last respect they are essential supplements of 
 immediate binocular motives for projection into depth. Thus, 
 the correlation that exists between the ideas of the distance and 
 magnitude of objects, as, for example, the apparent difference 
 in the size of the sun or moon on the horizon and at the 
 zenith, is to be explained as an effect of assimilation. The 
 perspective of drawing and painting also depends on these 
 influences. A picture drawn or painted on a plane surface can 
 appear three-dimensional only on condition that the impression 
 arouses earMer three-dimensional ideas which are assimilated 
 with the new impression. The influence of these assimilations is 
 most evident in the case of unshaded drawings that can be seen 
 either in relief or in intaglio. Observation shows that these differ- 
 ences in appearance are by no means accidental or dependent 
 on the so-called "power of imagination", but that there are 
 always elements in the immediate impression which determine 
 completely the assimilative process. The elements that are 
 thus operative are, above all, the sensations arising from the 
 
§ 16. Associations. 231 
 
 position and movements of the eye. Thus, for example, a 
 linear design which can be interpreted as either a sohd or 
 a hollow prism, is seen alternately in relief and in iatagHo 
 according as we fixate in the two cases the parts of the 
 drawing which correspond ordinarily to a solid or to a hoUow 
 object. A solid angle represented by three lines in the same 
 plane appears in relief when the fixation-point is moved along 
 one of the lines, starting from the apex, it appears in intaglio 
 when the movement is in the opposite direction, from the 
 end of the line towards the apex. In these and all like cases 
 the assimilation is determined by the rule that in its movement 
 over the fixation-Hnes of objects the eye always passes from 
 nearer to more distant points. 
 
 In other cases the geometric optical illusions (§ 10, 19 and 
 20) which are due to the laws of ocular movements, produce 
 secondarily certain ideas of distance, and these not in- 
 frequently eliminate the contradictions brought about in the 
 picture by the illusions. Thus, to illustrate, an interrupted 
 straight line appears longer than an equal uninterrupted line 
 (p. 125); as a result we tend to project the first to a greater 
 depth than the latter. Here both lines cover just the same 
 distances on the retina in spite of the fact that their length 
 is perceived as different, because of the different motor 
 energy connected with their estimation. An elimination of this 
 contradiction is effected by means of the different ideas of 
 distance, for when one of two hues whose retinal images are 
 like, appears longer than the other, it must, under the ordinary 
 conditions of vision, belong to a more distant object. Again, 
 when one straight line is intersected at an acute angle by 
 another, the result is an overestimation of the acute angle, 
 which sometimes gives rise, when the line is long, to an 
 apparent bending near the point of intersection (p. 125). Here 
 too the contradiction between the course of the line and the 
 
232 I, III- Iniereonnection of Psyehioal Compoimds. 
 
 increase in the size of the angle of intersection, is often elim- 
 inated by the apparent extension of the line in the third 
 dimension. In all these cases the perspective can be explained 
 only as the assimilative effect of earlier ideas of corre- 
 sponding character. 
 
 10. In none of the assimilations discussed is it possible 
 to show that any former idea has acted as a whole on 
 the new impression. Generally this is impossible because we 
 must attribute the assimilative influence to a large number 
 of ideas, differing in many respects from one another. Thus, 
 for example, a straight line which intersects a vertical at an 
 acute angle, corresponds to innumerable cases in which an in- 
 clination of the hne with its accompanying increase of the 
 angle appeared as a component of a three-dimensional idea. 
 But all these cases may have been very different in regard 
 to the size of the angle, the length of the hues, and other 
 attending circumstances. We must, accordingly, think of the 
 assimilative process as a process in which not a single definite 
 idea or even a definite combination of elements from earlier 
 ideas, but as a rule a great number of such combinations 
 are operative. These need agree only approximately with the 
 new impression in oMer to affect consciousness. 
 - We may gain some notion of the way in which this 
 effect is produced from the important part that certain ele- 
 ments connected with the impression play in the process, as, 
 for example, the sensations of ocular position and move- 
 ments in visual ideas. Obviously it is these immediate 
 sensational elements that serve to pick out from the great 
 mass of ideational elements which react upon the impression, 
 certain particular ones that correspond to themselves, and 
 then biing these selected factors into, a form agreeing with 
 that of the rest, of the components of the immediate im- 
 pression. At ihe. same time it appears that not. merely the 
 
§ 16. Associations. 233 
 
 elements of our memory -images are relatively indefinite 
 and therefore variable, but that even the perception of an 
 immediate impression may vary under special conditions 
 ■within fairly wide limits. In this vyay the assimilative process 
 starts primarily from elements of the immediate impression, 
 chiefly from particular ones which are of preeminent impor- 
 tance for the formation of the idea, as, for example, the sensa- 
 tions of ocular position and movement in visual ideas. These 
 elements call up certain particular memory-elements corre- 
 sponding to themselves. These memories then exercise an 
 assimilative effect on the immediate impression, and the im- 
 pression in turn reacts in the same way on the reproduced 
 elements. These separate acts are, like the whole process, 
 not successive, but, at least for our consciousness, simultaneous. 
 For this reason the product of the assimilation is apperceived 
 as an immediate, unitary idea. The two distinguishing 
 characteristics of assimilation are, accordingly, 1) that it is 
 made up of a series of elementary processes of combination, 
 that is, processes that have to do with the components of ideas, 
 not with the whole ideas themselves, and 2) that the united 
 components modify one another through reciprocal assim- 
 ilations. 
 
 11. On this basis we can explain without difficulty the 
 main differences between complex assimilative processes, by 
 the very different parts that the various factors necessary 
 to such a process play in the various concrete cases. In 
 ordinary sense-perceptions the direct elements are so pre- 
 dominant that the reproduced elements are as a rule entirely 
 overlooked, although in reaUty they are never absent and 
 are often very important for the perception of the objects. 
 These reproduced elements are much more noticeable when 
 the assimilative effect of the direct elements is hindered 
 through external or internal influences, such as indistinctness 
 
234 III- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 
 
 of the impression or affective and emotional excitement. In 
 all cases where the difference between the impression and 
 the idea becomes, in this way, so great that it is apparent 
 at once on closer examination, we call the product of the 
 assimilation an illusion. 
 
 The universality of assimilation makes it certain that such 
 processes occur also between reproduced elements, in such a 
 way that any memory-idea which arises in our mind is im- 
 mediately modified by its interaction with other memory- 
 elements. Still, in such a case we have, of course, no means 
 of demonstration. All that can be established as probable 
 is that even in the case of so-called "pure memory-processes" 
 direct elements in the form of sensations and sense-feelings 
 aroused by peripheral stimuli, are never entirely absent. In 
 reproduced visual images, for example, such elements are 
 present in the form of sensations of ocular position and 
 movement. 
 
 b. ComplieaUons. 
 
 12. Complications, or the combinations between unlike 
 psychical compounds, are no less regular components of con- 
 sciousness than are assimilations. Just as there is hardly an 
 intensive or extensive idea or composite feeHng which is not 
 modified in some way through the processes of reciprocal 
 assimilation with memory-elements, so almost every one of 
 these compounds is at the same time connected with other, 
 dissimilar compounds, with which it has some constant rela- 
 tions. In all cases, however, complications are different from 
 assimilations in the fact that the unlikeness of the compounds 
 makes the connection looser, however regular it may be, so 
 that when one component is direct and the other reproduced, 
 the latter can be readily distinguished at once. Still, there 
 is another reason which makes the product of a compUcation 
 
^S 16. Assoeiatiotis. S^g 
 
 appear unitary in spite of the easily recognized difference 
 between its components. This cause is the predominance of 
 one of the compounds, which pushes the other components in- 
 to the obscurer field of consciousness. 
 
 If the complication unites a direct impression with mem- 
 ory-elements of disparate character, the direct impression 
 with its assimilations is regularly the predominant com- 
 ponent, while the reproduced elements sometimes have 
 a noticeable influence only through their affective tone. 
 Thus, when we speak, the auditory word-ideas are the 
 predominant components, and in addition we have as ob- 
 scure factors direct motor sensations and reproductions of 
 the visual images of the words. In reading, on the other 
 hand, the visual images come to the front while the rest 
 become weaker. In general it may be said that the existence 
 of a complication is frequently noticeable only through the 
 peculiar coloring of the total feeling that accompanies the 
 predominant idea. This is due to the ability of obscure ideas 
 to have a relatively intense effect on the attention through 
 their affective tones (p. 216). Thus, for example, the 
 characteristic impression of a rough surface, a dagger-point, 
 or a gun, arises from a complication of visual and tactual 
 impressions, and in the last case of auditory impressions as 
 well; but as a rule such comphcations are noticeable only 
 through the feelings they excite. 
 
 B. SUCCESSIVE ASSOCIATIONS. 
 
 13. Successive association is by no means a process that 
 differs essentially from the two forms of simultaneous asso- 
 ciation, assimilation and complication. It is, on the contrary, 
 due to the same general causes as these, and differs only in 
 the secondary characteristic that the process of combination, 
 
236 ^- Interconneetion of Psychical Oompoimds. 
 
 which in the former cases consisted, so far as immediate 
 introspection was concerned, of a single instantaneous act, 
 is here protracted and may therefore be readily divided into 
 two acts. The first of these acts corresponds to the appearance 
 of the reproducing elements, the second to the appearance of 
 the reprodticed elements. Here too, the first act is often 
 introduced by an external sense-impression, which is as 
 a rule immediately united with an assimilation. Other re- 
 productive elements which might enter into an assimilation 
 or complication are held back through some inhibitory in- 
 fluence or other — as, for example, through other assimilations 
 that force themselves earlier on apperception — and do not 
 begin to exercise an influence untU later. In this way we 
 have a second act of apperception clearly distinct from the 
 flrst, and differing from it in sensational content the more 
 essentially the more numerous the new elements are which 
 are added through the retarded assimilation and complication 
 and the more these new elements tend to displace the earlier 
 because of their difEerent character. 
 
 14. In the great majority of cases the association thus 
 formed is limited to two successive ideational or affective 
 processes connected, in the manner described, through assim- 
 ilations or complications. New sense-impressions or some 
 apperceptive combinations (§ 17) may then connect themselves 
 with the second member of the association. Less frequently 
 it happens that the same processes which led to the flrst 
 division of an assimilation or complication into a successive 
 process, may be repeated with the second or even with the 
 third member, so that in this way we have a whole associa- 
 tional series. Still, this takes place generally only under ex- 
 ceptional conditions, especially when the normal course of 
 apperception has been disturbed, as, for example, in the so- 
 called ''flight of ideas" of the insane. In normal cases such 
 
§ 16. Associations. 237 
 
 serial associations, that is, associations with more than two 
 members, hardly ever appear. 
 
 1 4 a. Such serial associations may be produced most easily 
 under the artificial conditions of experimentation, when the effort 
 is purposely made to suppress new sensible impressions and 
 apperceptiTe combinations. But the process resulting in such 
 cases differs from that described above in that the successive 
 members of the series do not connect, each with its immediate 
 predecessor, but all go back to the first, until a new sense-im- 
 pression or an idea with an especially strong affective tone furnishes 
 a new starting point for the succeeding associations. The associa- 
 tions in the "flight of ideas" of the insane generally show the 
 same type of returning to certain predominant centres. 
 
 a. Sensible Recognition and Cognition. 
 
 15. The way in which the ordinary form of association, 
 made up of two partial processes, may be most clearly ob- 
 served, is in the simultaneous assimilations and complications of 
 sensible recognition and cognition. The qualification "sensible" 
 is added when referring to these associative processes, to 
 indicate, on the one hand, that the first member of the pro- 
 cess is always a sense-impression, and, on the other, to 
 distinguish these from the logical processes of cognition. 
 
 The psychologically simplest case of recognition is that 
 in which an object has been perceived — for example, seen 
 — only once and is recognized as the same when met a second 
 time. If this second perception follows very soon after the 
 first, or if the first was especially emphatic and exciting, 
 the association usually takes place immediately as a simul- 
 taneous assimilation. This process differs from other assimi- 
 lations, which take place in connection with every sense- 
 perception, only in the characteristic accompanying feeling, 
 the feeling of familiarity. Such a feeling is never present 
 except when there is some degree of "consciousness" that the 
 
238 III- Intereonmedion of Psychical Gompoimds. 
 
 impression has already been received before. It is, therefore, 
 evidently one of those feelings which comes from the ideas 
 obscurely present in consciousness. The psychological difference 
 between this and an ordinary simultaneous assimilation must 
 be looked for in the fact that at the moment when, in the 
 apperception of the impression, the assimilation takes place, 
 there arise in the obscure regions of consciousness some 
 components of the original idea which do not enter into the 
 assimilation. Their relation to the elements of the idea that 
 is apperceived finds expression in the feeling of famiharity. 
 The unassimilated components may be elements of the earlier 
 impression that were so different from certain elements of 
 the new that they could not be "assimilated, or, and this is 
 especially often the case, they may be complications that 
 were clear before, but now remain unobserved. This influence 
 of complication explains how it is that the name of a visual 
 object, for example the proper names of persons, and often 
 other auditory quahties, such as the tone of voice, are very 
 great helps in the recognition. To serve as such helps, 
 however, they need not necessarily be clear ideas in con- 
 sciousness. When we have heard a man's name, the recog- 
 nition of the man the next time we meet him may be aided 
 by the name without our calling it clearly to mind. 
 
 1 5 a. This influence of complications may be demonstrated 
 experimentally. If we take a number of disks that are alike in 
 all other respects, but differ in color from white through various 
 shades of grey to black, and present them to view once, so long 
 as only five shades are used (white, black, and three shades of 
 grey) each disk can be easily recognized again. But when more 
 shades are used, this is no longer possible. It is very natural 
 to surmise that this fact is related to the existence of five familiar 
 names, white, light grey, grey, dark grey and black. This view 
 is confirmed by the fact that by purposely using a larger number 
 of names more shades (even as many as nine) are recognized. In 
 
§ 16. Associations. 239 
 
 such experiments the complication may be clearly observed, but 
 it is not necessarily so, expecially for tlie five ordinary shades. 
 As a rule the name is here thought of after the act of recognition 
 proper is passed. 
 
 16. The observations discussed also show what the con- 
 ditions are under which a recognition may pass from a simul- 
 taneous to a succcessive association. If a certain interval 
 elapses before the elements of the earher idea which gradually 
 rise in consciousness, can produce a distinct feeling of 
 familiarity, the whole process divides into two acts: into 
 the perception and the recognition. The first is connected 
 with the ordinary simultaneous assimilations only, while in 
 the second the obscure, unassimilated elements of the earlier 
 idea show their influence. The division between the parts is, 
 accordingly, more distinct the greater the difference between the 
 earher impression and the new one. In such a case, not only 
 is there usually a long period of noticeable inhibition between 
 perception and recognition, but certain additional apper- 
 ceptive processes, namely the processes of voluntary attention 
 that take place in the state of recollection, also come to the aid 
 of the association. As a special form of this kind of process 
 we have the phenomenon called "mediate recognition". This 
 consists in the recognition of an object, not through its own 
 attributes, but through some accompanying mark or other, 
 which stands in a chance connection with it, as, for example, 
 when a person is recognized because of his companion. Be- 
 tween such a case and a case of immediate recognition there 
 is no essential psychological difference. For even those charac- 
 teristics that do not belong to the recognized object in itself, 
 still belong to the whole complex of ideational elements that 
 help in the preparation and final carrying out of the association. 
 And yet, as we should naturally expect, the retardation which 
 divides the whole recognition into two ideational processes, 
 
240 m- Intercotmeotimi of Psychical Compmrnds. 
 
 and often leads to the cooperation of voluntary recollection, 
 generally appears in its most evident form in mediate 
 recognitions. 
 
 17. This simple process of recognition which takes place 
 when we meet again an object that has been perceived once 
 before, is a starting poiat for the development of various 
 other associative processes, both those which hke itself stand 
 on the boundary between simultaneous and successive asso- 
 ciations, and those in which the retardation in the formation 
 of assimilations and complications that leads to the successive 
 processes, is still more clearly marked. Thus, the recognition 
 of an object that has often been perceived is easier and, 
 therefore, as a rule an instantaneous process, which is also 
 more like the ordinary assimilation because the feeling of 
 familiarity is much less intense. Sensible cognition differs 
 generally but little from the recognition of single familiar ob- 
 jects. The logical distinction between the two concepts consists 
 in the fact that recognition means the establishment of the 
 individual identity of the newly perceived with a formerly 
 perceived object, while cognition is the subsumption of an 
 object under a familiar concept. Still, there is no real logical 
 subsumption in a process of sensible cognition any more than 
 there is a fully developed class-concept under which the sub- 
 sumption could be made. The psychological equivalent of 
 such a subsumption is to be found in this case in the mere 
 process of relating the impression in question to an in- 
 definitely large number of objects. This presupposes an earlier 
 perception of various objects which agree only in certain 
 particular properties, so that the process of cognition ap- 
 proaches the ordinary assimilation more and more in its psy- 
 chological character the more familiar the class to which the 
 perceived object belongs, and the more it agrees with the 
 general characteristics of the class. In equal measure the 
 
§16. Associations. 241 
 
 feelings peculiar to the processes of cognition and recognition 
 decrease and finally disappear entirely, so that when we 
 meet very famiHar objects we do not speak of a cognition 
 at all. The process of cognition hecomes evident only when 
 the assimilation is hindered in some way, either because the 
 perception of the class of objects in question has become 
 unusual, or because the single object shows some unique 
 characteristics. In such a case the simultaneous association 
 may become successive by the separation of perception and 
 cognition into two successive processes. Just in proportion 
 as this happens, we have a specific feeling of cognition which 
 is indeed related to the feeMng of familiarity, but, as a result 
 of the different conditions for the rise of the two, differs from 
 it, especially in its temporal course. 
 
 b. Memory-processes. 
 
 18. Essentially different is the direction along which the 
 simple process of recognition develops, when the hindrances 
 to immediate assimilation which give rise to the transition from 
 simultaneous to successive association are great enough, so 
 that the ideational elements which do not agree with the new 
 perception unite — either after the recognition has taken place 
 or even when there is no such recognition whatever — to form 
 a special idea referred directly to an earher impression. The 
 process that arises imder such circumstances is a memory- 
 process and the idea that is perceived is a memory-idea, or 
 memory-imMge. 
 
 18 a. Memory-processes were the ones to which association- 
 psychology generally limited, the application of the concept asso- 
 ciation. But, as has been shown, these are associations that take 
 place under especially complicated conditions. An understanding 
 of the genesis of association was thus rendered impossible from 
 
 Wdndt, Psychology. 16 
 
242 m. Intercormeetion of Psychical Compounds. 
 
 the first, and it is easy to see that the doctrine accepted by the 
 associationists is limited essentially to a logical rather than a psy- 
 chological classification of the different kinds of association that are 
 to be observed in memory-processes. A knowledge of these more 
 complex processes is possible, however, only through a study start- 
 ing with the simpler associative processes, for the ordinary simul- 
 taneous assimilations and simultaneous and successive recognitions 
 present themselves very naturally as the antecedents of memory- 
 associations. But even simultaneous recognition itself is nothing but 
 an assimilation accompanied by a feeling which comes from the un- 
 assimilated ideational elements obscurely present in consciousness. 
 In the second process these unassimilated elements serve to retard 
 the process, so that the recognition develops into the primitive 
 form of successive association. The impression is at first assimi- 
 lated in the ordinary way, and then again in a second act with 
 an accompanying feeling of recognition which serves to indicate 
 the greater influence of certain reproduced elements. In this 
 simple form of successive association the two successive ideas are 
 referred to one and the same object, the only difference being that 
 each time some different ideational and affective elements are 
 apperceived. With memory-associations the case is essentially 
 different. Here the heterogeneous elements of the earlier im- 
 pressions predominate, and the first assimilation of the impression 
 is followed by the formation of an idea made up of elements of 
 the impression and also of those belonging to earlier impressions, 
 that are suitable for the assimilation because of certain of their 
 components. The more the heterogeneous elements predominate, 
 the more is the second idea different from the first, or, on the 
 other hand, the more the like elements predominate, the more 
 the two ideas will be alike. In any case the second idea is 
 always a reprodiMed idea and distinct from the new impression as 
 an independent compound. 
 
 19. The general conditions for the rise of memory-images 
 may exhibit shades and differences which run parallel to the 
 forms of recognition and cognition discussed above. Various 
 modifications of the memory-processes may arise from the 
 different kinds of ordinary assimilation that we become 
 
§ 16. Associations. 243 
 
 acquainted with above (15, 17), as the recognition of an object 
 perceived once and that of an object familiar through frequent 
 perceptions, and also from the cognition of a subject that 
 is familiar in its general class-characteristics. 
 
 Simple recognition becomes a memory-process when the 
 immediate assimilation of the impression is hindered by ele- 
 ments that belong not to the object itself, but to circumstances 
 that attended its earlier perception. Just because the former 
 perception occurred only once, or at least only once so far 
 as the reproduction is concerned, these accompanying elements 
 may be relatively clear and distinct and sharply distinguished 
 from the surroundings of the new impression. In this way 
 we have first of all transitional forms between recognition and 
 remembering: the object is recognized, and at the same time 
 referred to a particular earlier sense-perception whose accom- 
 panying circumstances add a definite spacial and temporal 
 relation to the memory-image. The memory-process is especially 
 predominant in those cases where the element of the new im- 
 pression that gave rise to the assimilation is entirely suppressed 
 by the other components of the image, so that the associative 
 relation between the memory-idea and the impression may 
 remain completely unnoticed. 
 
 19 a. Such cases have been spoken of as "mediate memories", 
 or "mediate associations". Still, just as with "mediate recognitions" 
 we are, here too, dealing with processes that are fundamentally 
 the same as ordinary associations. Take, for example, the case 
 of a person who, sitting in his room at evening, suddenly re- 
 members without any apparent reason a landscape that he passed 
 through many years before ; examination shows that there happened 
 to be in the room a fragrant flower which he saw for the first 
 time in that landscape. The difference between this and an 
 ordinary memory-process in which the connection of the new im- 
 pression with an earlier experience is clearly recognized, obviously 
 consists in the fact that here the elements which recall the idea 
 
 16* 
 
244 in. Intercormeatim of P$yehical Gompmrnds. 
 
 are puslied into the obscure background of consciousness by 
 other ideational elements. The not infrequent .experience, com- 
 monly known as the "spontaneous rise" of ideas, in which a 
 memory-image suddenly appears in our mind without any assignable 
 cause, is in all probability reducible in every case to such latent 
 associations. 
 
 20. Memory- processes that develop from recognitions 
 which have been often repeated and from cognitions, are in 
 consequence of the greater complexity of their conditions, 
 different from those connected with the recognition of objects 
 perceived but once. "When we perceive an object that is familiar 
 either in its own individual characteristics or in those of its 
 class, the range of possible associations is incomparably 
 greater, and the way in which the memory-processes shall 
 arise from a particular impression depends less on the single 
 experiences that give rise to the association, than it does on 
 the general disposition and momentary mood of consciousness 
 and especiajlly on the interference of certain active apperceptive 
 processes and the intellectual feelings and emotions that are 
 connected with them. When the conditions are so various, 
 it is easy to see that as a general thing it is impossible to 
 calculate beforehand what the association will be. As soon 
 as the act of memory is ended, however, the traces of its 
 associative origin seldom escape careful examination, so that 
 we are justified in regarding association as the universal and 
 only cause of memory-processes under all circumstances. 
 
 21. In thus deriving memory from association, it is never 
 to be forgotten that every concrete memory-process is by 
 no means a simple process, but is made up of a large number 
 of elementary processes, as is apparent from the fact that it is 
 produced by a psychological development of its simple ante- 
 cedents, namely, the simultaneous assimilations. The most im- 
 portant of these elementary processes is the assimilative 
 
§ 16. Associations. 245 
 
 interaction between some external impression and the elements 
 of an earlier psychical compound, or between a memory-image 
 already present and such elements. Connected with this there 
 are two other processes that are characteristic for memory- 
 processes: one is the hindrance of the assimilation by unlike 
 elements, the other the assimilations and complications con- 
 nected with these elements and giving rise to a psychical 
 compound which differs from the first impression and is referred 
 more or less definitely to some previous experience, especially 
 through its complications. This reference to the earlier ex- 
 perience shows itself through a characteristic feeling, the 
 feding of remembering, which is related to the feehng of 
 familiarity, but is in its temporal genesis characteristically 
 different, probably in consequence of the greater number of 
 obscure complications that accompany the appearance of the 
 memory-image. 
 
 If we try to find the elementary processes to which both 
 memory-processes and all complex associations are reducible, 
 we shall find two kinds, combinations from identity and from 
 contiguity. In general the first class is predominant when 
 the process is more like an ordinary assimilation and recog- 
 nition, while the second appears more prominently the more 
 the processes approach mediate memory in character, that is, 
 the more they take on the semblance of spontaneous ideas. 
 
 21a. It is obvious that the usual classification, which makes 
 all memory-processes associations by either similarity or contiguity, 
 is entirely unsuitable if we attempt to apply it to the modes of 
 psychological genesis that these processes manifest. On the other 
 hand, it is too general and indefinite if we try to classify the 
 processes logically according to their products, without reference 
 to their genesis. In the latter case the various relations of sub- 
 ordination, superordination, and coordination, of cause and end, 
 of temporal succession and existence, and the various kinds 
 of spacial connection, find only inadequate expression in the very 
 
246 ^^- Iriierconnection of PsycMeal Gompotmds. 
 
 general concepts "similarity" and "contiguity". When, on the 
 other hand, the manner of origin is studied, every memory-process 
 is found to be made up of elementary processes that may be called 
 partly associations by similarity, partly associations by contiguity. 
 The assimilations which serye to introduce the process and also those 
 which serve to bring about the reference to a particular earlier ex- 
 perience at its close, may be called associations by similarity. But 
 the term "similarity" is not exactly suitable even here, because it is 
 identical elementary processes that give rise to the assimilation, and 
 when such an identity does not exist, it is always produced by the 
 reciprocal assimilation. In fact, the concept of "association by 
 similarity" is based on the presupposition that composite ideas 
 are permanent psychical objects and that associations take place 
 between these finished ideas. The concept itself must be rejected 
 when once this presupposition is given up as entirely contr0,dictory 
 to psychical experience and fatal to a proper understanding of 
 the same. When certain products of association, as, for example, 
 two successive memory-images, are similar, this likeness is always 
 reducible to processes of assimilation made up of elementary 
 combinations through identity or contiguity. The association 
 through identity may take place either between components that 
 were originally the same, or between those that have gained this 
 character through assimilation. Association by contiguity is the 
 form of combination between those elements that hinder the 
 assimilation, thus dividing the whole process into a succession of 
 two processes, and also contributing to the memory-image those 
 components which give it the character of an independent com- 
 pound different from that of the impression which gave rise to it. 
 
 22. The character of memory-ideas is intimately connected 
 with the complex nature of the memory-processes. The de- 
 scription of these ideas as weaker, hut otherwise faithful, 
 copies of the direct sensihle idea, is as far out of the way 
 as it could possibly be. Memory-images and direct sensible 
 ideas "differ not only in quality and intensity, but most 
 emphatically in their elementary composition. "We may 
 diminish the intensity of a sensible impression as much as 
 
§ 16. Associations. 247 
 
 we like, but so long as it is perceptible at all it is an essen- 
 tially different compound from a memory-idea. Tbe incom- 
 pleteness of tbe memory-idea is mucb more cbaracteristic 
 than tbe small intensity of its sensational elements. Por 
 example, wben I remember an acquaintance, tbe image I bave 
 of bis face and figure are not mere obscure reproductions of 
 wbat I bave in consciousness wben I look directly at bim, 
 but most of tbe features do not exist at all in tbe repro- 
 duced ideas. Connected with tbe few ideational elements 
 that are really present and that can be but little increased 
 in number even wben tbe attention is intentionally concen- 
 trated upon the task, are a series of combinations through 
 contiguity and of compUcations, such as the environments in 
 which I saw my acquaintance, his name, finally and more 
 especially, certain affective elements that were present at the 
 meeting. These accompanying components are what make 
 tbe image a memory-image. 
 
 23. There are great individual differences in tbe effec- 
 tiveness of these accompanying elements and in the distinct- 
 ness of tbe sensational elements of the memory-image. Some 
 persons locate their memory-images in space and time mucb 
 more precisely than others do ; the abibty to remember colors 
 and tones is also exceedingly different. Very few persons 
 seem to bave distinct memories for odors and tastes ; in place 
 of these we bave, as substitute complications, accompanying 
 motor sensations of the nose and taste-organs. 
 
 These various different functions connected with the pro- 
 cesses of recognition and remembering are all included under 
 tbe name "memory/". This concept does not, of course, refer 
 to any unitary psychical force, as faculty-psychology assumed 
 (p. 11), still, it is a useful supplementary concept in empha^ 
 sizing the differences between different individuals. "We speak 
 of a faithful, comprehensive, and easy memory, or of a good 
 
248 ^- Inierconnection of Psychical Com/poimds. 
 
 spacial, temporal, and verbal memory, etc. These expressions 
 serve to point out the different directions in which, according 
 to the original disposition or habit of the person, the' elemen- 
 tary assimilations and complications occur. 
 
 One important phenomenon among the various differences 
 referred to, is the gradual weakening of memory with old age. 
 The disturbances resulting from diseases of -the brain agree 
 in general with this phenomenon. Both are of special im- 
 portance to psychology because they exhibit very clearly the 
 influence of complications on memory-processes. One of the 
 most striking symptoms of failing memory, in both normal 
 and pathological cases, is the weakening of verbal memory. 
 It generally appears as a lack of ability to remember, first 
 proper names, then names of concrete objects in the ordi- 
 nary environments, still later abstract words, and finally 
 particles that are entirely abstract in character. This suc- 
 cession corresponds exactly to the possibility of substituting 
 in consciousness for single classes of words other ideas that 
 ^re regularly connected with them through complication. This 
 possibility it obviously greatest for proper names, and least 
 ior abstract particles^ which can be retaiaed only through their 
 ^rerbal signs. 
 
 § 17. APPERCEPTIVE COMBINATIONS. 
 
 1. Associations in aU their forms and also the closely 
 4-elated processes of fusion that give rise to psychical com- 
 pounds, are regarded by us as passive experiences, because 
 the feeUng of activity, which is characteristic for all pro- 
 icesses of volition and attention, never appears except in 
 connection with the apperception of the completed p'oduct, 
 presented as a result of the combination (cf. p. 217). Asso- 
 fCiations are, accordingly, processes that can arouse volitions. 
 
§17. Appereepiive Combinations. 249 
 
 but are not themselves directly influenced by volitions. This 
 is, however, the criterion of a passive process. 
 
 The case is essentially different with the second kind of 
 combinations that are formed between different psychical 
 compounds and their elements, the apperceptive combinations. 
 Here the feehng of activity with its accompanying variable 
 sensations of tension does not merely foUow the combinations 
 as an after-effect produced by them, but it precedes them 
 so that the combinations themselves are immediatdy recognized 
 as formed with the aid of the attention. In this sense they are 
 called active experiences. 
 
 2. Apperceptive combinations include a large number of 
 psychical processes that are distinguished in popular parlance 
 under the general terms thinking, reflection, imagination, 
 understanding, etc. These are all regarded as higher psy- 
 chical processes than sense-perceptions or pure memory-pro- 
 cesses, still, they are all looked upon as different from one 
 another. Especially is this true of the so-called functions 
 of imagination and understanding. In contrast with this loose 
 view of popular psychology and of the faculty-theory, which 
 followed in its tracks, association-psychology sought to find 
 a unitary principle by subsuming the apperceptive combina- 
 tions of ideas also under the general concept of association, 
 at the same time limiting the concept, as noted above (p. 224), 
 to successive association. This reduction to association was 
 effected either by neglecting the essential subjective and ob- 
 jective distinguishing marks of apperceptive combinations, or by 
 attempting to avoid the difficulties of an explanation, through 
 the introduction of certain supplementary concepts taken from 
 popular psychology. Thus, "interest" or "intelhgence" was 
 credited with an influence on associations. Very often this 
 view was based on the erroneous notion that the recognition 
 of certain distinguishing features in apperceptive combinations 
 
250 -H^- Iniercormection of Psychical Gonvpownds. 
 
 and associations meant the assertion of an absolute indepen- 
 dence of the former from the latter. Of course, this is not 
 true. All psychical processes are connected with associations 
 as much as with the original sense-perceptions. Yet, just as 
 associations always form a part of every sense-perception and 
 in spite of that appear in memory-processes as relatively 
 independent processes, so apperceptive combinations are based 
 entirely on associations, but their essential attributes are not 
 traceable to these associations. 
 
 3. If we try to account for the essential attributes of 
 apperceptive combiuations, we may first of all divide the 
 psychical processes that belong to this class into simple and 
 complex apperceptive functions. The simple functions are those 
 of relating and comparing, the complex those of synthesis 
 and analysis. 
 
 A. SIMPLE APPERCEPTIVE FUNCTIONS. 
 (Relating and Compaiing.) 
 
 4. The most elementary apperceptive function is the 
 relating of two psychical contents to each other. The grounds 
 for such relating is always given in the single psychical com- 
 pounds and their associations, but the actual carrying out 
 of the process itself is a special apperceptive activity through 
 which the relation itself becomes a special conscious content 
 distinct from the contents which are related, though indeed 
 inseparably connected with them. For example, when ^we 
 recognize the identity of an object with one perceived before, 
 or when we are conscious of a definite relation between a 
 remembered event and a present impression, there is in both 
 cases a relating apperceptive activity connected with the 
 associations. 
 
 So long as the recognition remains a pure association, the 
 process of relating is limited to the feeling of familiarity that 
 
§17. Apperceptive Oombmatiom. 251 
 
 follows the assimilation of the new impression either immediately 
 or after a short interval. When, on the contrary, apper- 
 ception is added to association, this feehng is suppHed with 
 a clearly recognized ideational substratum. The earlier per- 
 ception and the new impression are separated in time and 
 then brought into a relation of identity on the basis of their 
 essential attributes. The case is similar when we are con- 
 scious of the motives of a memory-act. This also presupposes 
 that a comparison of the memory-image with the impression 
 that occasioned it, be added to the merely associative process 
 which gave rise to the image. This, again, is a process that 
 can be brought about only through active attention. 
 
 5. Thus, the relating function is brought into activity 
 through associations, wherever they themselves or their products 
 are made the objects of voluntary observation. This function 
 is always connected, as the examples mentioned show, with 
 the function of comparing, so thg-t the two must be regarded 
 as interdependent partial functions. Every act of relating 
 includes a comparison of the related psychical contents, and 
 a comparison is, in turn, possible only through the relating 
 of the contents compared with one another. The only difference 
 is that in many cases the comparison is completely subordinated 
 to the end of reciprocally relating the contents, while in others 
 it is in itself the end. We speak of a process of relating in 
 the strict sense in the first case, and of a process of com- 
 paring in the second. I call it relating when I think of a 
 present impression as the reason for remembering an earlier 
 experience; I call it comparing, on the other hand, when 
 I estabhsh certain definite points of agreement or difference 
 between the earher and the present event. 
 
 6. The process of comparing is, in turn, made up of two 
 elementary functions which are as a rule intimately inter- 
 connected : of the perception of agreements on the one hand. 
 
252 m. Int&reomiection of Psyehical Gomtpmmds. 
 
 and of differences on the other. The erroneous view still finds 
 frequent acceptance that the existence of psychical elements 
 and compounds is the same as their apperceptive comparison. 
 The two are to he held completely apart. Of course, there must 
 he agreements and differences in our psychical processes them- 
 selves, or we could not perceive them; still the comparing 
 activity by which we perceive, is different from the agree- 
 ments and differences themselves and additional to them. 
 
 7. Psychical elements, the sensations and simple feelings, 
 are compared in regard to their agreements and differences 
 and thus brought into definite systems, each of which contains 
 such elements as are closely related. Within such a system, 
 especially a sensational system, two kinds of comparison are 
 possible: that in respect to quality, and that in respect to 
 intensity. Then, too, a comparison between grades of clear- 
 ness is possible when attention is paid to the way in which 
 the elements appear in consciousness. In the same way com- 
 parison is apphed to intensive and extensive psychical com- 
 pounds. Every psychical element and every psychical compound, 
 in so far as it is a member of a regular graded system, con- 
 stitutes a psychical qimntity. A determination of the value 
 of such a quantity is possible only through its comparison ' 
 with some other quantity of the same system. Quantity is, 
 accordingly, an original attribute of every psychical element 
 and compound. It is of various kinds, as intensity, quality, 
 extensive (spacial and temporal) value, and, when the different 
 states of consciousness are considered, clearness. But the 
 determination of quantity can be effected only through the 
 apperceptive function of comparison. 
 
 8. Psychical measurement differs from physical measure- 
 ment in the fact that the latter may be carried out in 
 acts of comparison separated almost indefinitely in time, 
 because its objects are relatively constant. For example, 
 
§ 17. Apperceptive Combinations. 253 
 
 we can determine the height of a certain mountain to-day 
 with a barometer and then after a long time the height 
 of another mountain, and if no sensible changes iu the con- 
 figuration of the land have taken place in the interval, we 
 can compare the results of our two measurements. Psychical 
 compounds, on the other hand, are not relatively permanent 
 objects, but continually changing processes, so that we can 
 compare two such psychical quantities only under the con- 
 dition that they are presented in immediate succession. This 
 condition has as its immediate corollaries: first, that there is 
 no absolute standard for the comparison of psychical quan- 
 tities, but every such comparison stands by itself and is 
 of merely relative value; secondly, that finer comparisons are 
 possible only between quantities of the same dimension, so 
 that a transfer analogous to that by which the most widely 
 separate physical quantities, such as periods of time and 
 physical forces, are reduced to spacial quantities of one 
 dimension, are out of the question in psychical comparisons. 
 9. It foUows that not every relation between psychical 
 quantities can be estabHshed by direct comparison, but this 
 is possible only for certain particularly favorable relations. 
 These favorable cases are 1) the equality between two psy- 
 chical quantities, and 2) the ju^t noticeable difference between 
 two such quantities, as, for example, two sensational inten- 
 sities of like quahty, or two qualities of like intensity belonging 
 to the same dimension. As a somewhat more complex case 
 which stUl Kes within the limits of immediate comparison we 
 have 3) the equality of two differences between quantities, 
 especially when these quantities belong to contiguous parts 
 of the same system. It is obvious that in each of these 
 three kinds of psychical measurements the two fundamental 
 functions in apperceptive comparison, the perception of agree- 
 ments and of differences, are both applied together. In the 
 
254 HI- Interconneetion of Psychical Compounds. 
 
 first case the second of two psychical quantities A and B 
 is gradually varied until it agrees for immediate comparison 
 with A. In the second case A and B are taken equal at 
 first and then B is changed until it appears either just 
 noticeably greater or just noticeably smaller than A. Finally, 
 the third case is used to the greatest advantage when a 
 whole Mne of psychical quantities, as, for example, of sen- 
 sational intensities, extending from ^ as a lower to C as an 
 upper limit, is so divided by a middle quantity B, which 
 has been found by gradual variations, that the partial distance 
 AB is apperceived as equal to BC. 
 
 10. The most direct and most easily utihzable results 
 derived from these methods of comparison are given by the 
 second method, or the method of minimal differences as it is 
 called. The difference between the physical stimuli which 
 corresponds to the just noticeable difference between psychical 
 quantities is called the difference-threshold of the stimulus. 
 The stimulus from which the resulting psychical process, for 
 example, a sensation, can be just apperceived, is called the 
 stimulus-threshold. Observation shows that the difference- 
 threshold of the stimulus increases in proportion to the distance 
 from the stimulus-threshold, in such a way that the relation 
 between the difference-threshold and the absolute quantity 
 of the stimulus, or the relative difference-threshold, remains 
 constant. If, for example, a certain sound whose intensity 
 is 1 must be increased -J- in order that the sensation may 
 be just noticeably greater, one whose intensity is 2 must be 
 increased -|, one 3, f, etc., to reach the difference-threshold. 
 This law is called Weber's law, after its discoverer E. H.Weber. 
 It is easily understood when we look upon it as a law of 
 apperceptive comparison. From this point of view it must 
 obviously be interpreted to mean that psychical qua/nUUes are 
 compared according to their relative values. 
 
§17. Apperceptive Combinations. 255 
 
 This view that Weber's law is an expression of the general 
 law of the relaUvity of psychical quantities., assumes that 
 the psychical quantities that are compared, themselves in- 
 crease in proportion to their stimuli withia the limits of the 
 validity of the law. It has not yet been possible to demon- 
 strate the truth of this assumption on its physiological side, 
 on account of the difficulties of measuring exactly the stimu- 
 lation of nerves and sense-organs. Still, we have evidence 
 in favor of it in the psychological experience that in certain 
 special cases, where the conditions of observation lead very 
 naturally to a comparison of absolute differences in quanr 
 tity, the absolute difference-threshold, instead of the relative 
 threshold, is found to be constant. "We have such a case, 
 for example, in the comparison, within wide limits, of minimal 
 differences in pitch. Then, too, in many cases where large 
 differences in sensations are compared according to the 
 third method described above (p. 254), equal absolute stimuli- 
 differences, not relative differences, are perceived as equal. 
 This shows that apperceptive comparison follows two different 
 principles under different conditions: a principle of relative 
 comparison that finds its expression in Weber's law and must 
 be regarded as the more general, and a priuciple of absolute 
 comparison of differences which takes the place of the first under 
 special conditions which favor such a form of apperception. 
 
 10 a. Weber's law has been shown to hold, first of all, for the 
 intensity of sensations and then, within certain limits, for the com- 
 parison of ea;fensi«e compounds, especially temporal . ideas, also, to 
 some extent, for spacial ideas of sight and for motor ideas. On 
 the other hand, it does not hold for the spacial ideas of external 
 touch, obviously on account of the complexity of the local signs 
 (p. 105); and it can not be verified for sensational qualities. In 
 fact, for the comparison of pitches the absolute, not the relative 
 difiference-threshold is constant within wide limits. Still, the scale 
 of tonal intervals is relative, for every interval corresponds to a 
 
256 m. Intercofmeetion of Psyehieal Gompoimds. 
 
 certain ratio between the number of vibrations (for example,' an 
 
 octave 1:2, a fifth 2:3, etc.). This is probably due to the 
 
 relationship between clangs which is due to the relation of the 
 
 fundamental tone to its overtones (comp. p. 95 sq.). Even 
 
 where an absolute comparison takes place instead of a comparison 
 
 according to Weber's law of relativity, we must not, of course, 
 
 confuse this with the establishment of an absolute measure. That 
 
 would presuppose an absolute unit, that is, the possibility of 
 
 finding a constant standard, which, as noted above (p. 253), is in 
 
 the psychical world impossible. Absolute comparison must take 
 
 the form, of a recognition of the equality of equal absolute 
 
 differences. This is possible -in the various single cases without 
 
 a constant imit. Thus, for example, we compare two sensational 
 
 lines AB and BG according to their relative values, when we 
 
 think in both cases of the relation of the upper to the lower 
 
 extreme sensation. In such a case we judge AB and BG to be 
 
 B G 
 equal when -; = □ (Leber's law) . On the other hand, we eom- 
 
 pare A B and B G according to their absolute values when the 
 difference between G and B in the single sensational dimension 
 in question appears equal to that between B and J., that is, when 
 G — B = B — A (law of proportionality). Weber's law has some- 
 times been regarded as the expression of the functional relation 
 between sensation and stimulus, and it has been assumed that the 
 law holds for infinitely small changes on both sides. On this 
 basis there has been given to it the mathematical form of the 
 logarithmic function: sensation increases in proportion to the 
 logarithm of the stimulus (Eechner's psycho-physical law). 
 
 The methods for the demonstration of Weber's law, or of other 
 relations between psychical quantities, whether elementary or 
 compound, are usually called psycho-physical methods. The name 
 is unsuitable, however, because the fact that physical means are 
 here employed is not unique, but holds for all the methods of 
 experimental psychology. They could better be called "methods 
 for the measurement of psychical quantites". With these methods 
 it is possible to follow one of two courses in finding the 
 relations mentioned as favorable for judgment. A first or 
 direct mode of procedure is as follows: one of two psychical 
 quantities A and 5, as, for example, A, is kept constant, and B is' 
 
§17. App&'cepHve Combmaiions. 257 
 
 gradually varied -until it stands in one of the relations mentioned^ 
 that is, either equals A or is just noticeably greater or smaller,' 
 etc. These are the adjitstment-methods. Among these we have 
 as the method most frequently applied and that which leads 
 most directly to conclusions, the "method of minimal changes", 
 and then as a kind of modification of this for the case of ad- 
 justment until equality is reached, the "method of average error". 
 The second mode of procedure is to compare in a large number 
 of cases any two stimuli, A and B, which are very little different, 
 and to reckon from the number of cases in which the judgment^ 
 are A = B, A^ B, A<CB, the position of the relations men- 
 tioned, especially the difference-threshold. These are the reckoning- 
 methods. The chief of these is the method known as that of 
 "right and wrong cases". It would be more proper to call it the 
 "method of three cases" (equality, positive difference, and negative 
 difference). Details as to this and the other methods belong in a 
 special treatise on experimental psychology. 
 
 There are two other interpretations of Weber's law still met 
 with besides the psychological interpretation given above; they may 
 be called the physiological and the psycho-physical theories. The 
 first derives the law from hypothetic ally assumed relations in the 
 conduction of excitations in the central nervous system. The second 
 regards the law as a specific law of the "interaction between 
 body and mind". The physiological interpretation is entirely 
 hypothetical and in certain cases, as, for example, for temporal 
 and spacial ideas, entirely inapplicable. The psycho-physical 
 interpretation is based upon a view of the relation of mind which 
 must be rejected by the psychology of to-day (cf. § 22, 8). 
 
 11. As special cases in the class of apperceptive com- 
 parisons generally falling under Weber's law we have the 
 comparison of quantities that are the relatively greatest serir- 
 sational differences or, when dealing with feelings, opposites. 
 The phenomena that appear in such cases are usually gathered 
 up in the class-name contrasts. In the department where 
 contrasts have been most thoroughly investigated, in visual 
 sensations, there is generally an utter lack of discrimination 
 
 WoMDT, Psyohology. 17 
 
258 -2?. Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 
 
 between two phenomena which are obviously entirely different 
 in origin, though the results are to a certain extent related. 
 "We may distinguish these as physiological and psychological 
 contrasts. Physiological contrasts are closely connected with 
 the phenomena of after-images, perhaps they are the same 
 (p. 68 sq.). Psychological contrasts are essentially different; 
 they are usually pushed into the background by the stronger 
 physiological contrasts when the impressions are more intense. 
 They are distinguished from the physiological by two important 
 characteristics. First, they do not reach their greatest intensity 
 when the brightness and saturation are greatest, but when 
 they are at the medium stages, where' the eye is most sen- 
 sitive to changes in brightness and saturation. Secondly, they 
 can be removed by comparison with an independent object. 
 Especially the latter characteristic shows these contrasts to 
 be unqualifiedly the products of comparisons. Thus, for 
 example, when a grey square is laid on a black ground and 
 close by a similar grey square is laid on a white ground and 
 aU is covered with transparent paper, the two squares appear 
 entirely different; the one on the black ground looks bright, 
 nearly white, that on the white ground looks dark, nearly 
 black. Now after-images and irradiations are very weak when 
 the brightness of the objects is small, so that it may be 
 assumed that the phenomenon described is a psychological 
 contrast. If, again, a strip of black cardboard which is also 
 covered with the transparent paper, and therefore appears 
 exactly the same grey as the two squares, is held in such a 
 way that it connects the two squares the contrast will be 
 removed entirely, or, at least, very much diminished. If in this 
 experiment a colored ground is used instead of the achromatic, 
 the grey square will appear very clearly m the appropriate com- 
 plementary color. But here, too, the contrast can be made to 
 disappear through comparison with an independent grey object. 
 
I? n. Apperceptive Combmations. 259 
 
 12. Psychical contrasts appear also in other spheres of 
 sensation so far as the conditions for their demonstration are 
 favorable. They are also especially marked in the case of 
 feelings and may arise under proper conditions in the case 
 of spacial and temporal ideas. Sensations of pitch are 
 relatively most free, for most persons have a well developed 
 ability to recognize absolute pitch and this tends to overcome 
 contrast. In the case of feelings the effect of contrast is 
 intimately connected with their general attribute of develop- 
 ing toward certaia opposites. Pleasurable feelings especially 
 are intensified by unpleasant feelings immediately preceding, 
 and the same holds for many feelings of relaxation following 
 feelings of strain, as, for example, a feeling of fulfilment 
 after expectation. The effect of contrast in the case of spacial 
 and temporal ideas is most obvious when the same spacial 
 or temporal interval is compared alternately with a longer 
 and with a shorter interval. In the two cases the interval 
 appears different, in comparison with the shorter it appears 
 greater, in comparison with the longer, smaller. Here too the 
 contrast between spacial ideas can be removed by bringing 
 an object between the contrasted figures in such a way that 
 it is possible easily to relate them both to it. 
 
 13. We may regard the phenomena that result from the 
 apperception of impressions whose real character differs from 
 that expected, as special modifications of psychical contrast. 
 For example, we are prepared to lift a heavy weight, but in 
 the actual liftiag of the weight it proves to be lighter, or 
 the reverse takes place and we lift a heavy weight instead 
 of a light one as we expected: the result is that in the first 
 case we underestimate, in the second overestimate the real 
 weight. If a series of exactly equal weights of different sizes 
 are made so that they look like a set of weights varying regularly 
 from a lighter .to a heavier, they will appear to be different in 
 
 17* 
 
260 HI- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 
 
 weight when raised. The smallest will seem to be the heaviest 
 and the largest to be the lightest. The famihar association that 
 the greater volume is connected with the greater mass aids the 
 contrast. The varying estimations of the weight, however, is the 
 result of the contrast between the real and the expected sen- 
 sation. 
 
 B. COMPLEX APPEECEPTIVE FUNCTIONS. 
 (Synthesis and Analysis.) 
 
 14. When the simple processes of relating and comparing 
 are repeated and combined several times, the complex psy- 
 chical functions of synthesis and analysis arise. Synthesis 
 is primarily the product of the relating activity of apper- 
 ception, analysis of the comparing activity. 
 
 As a combining function apperceptive synthesis is based 
 upon fusions and associations. It differs from the latter in 
 the fact that some of the ideational and affective elements 
 that are brought forward by the association are voluntarily 
 emphasized and others are pushed into the background. The 
 motives of the choice can be explained only from the whole 
 previous development of the individual consciousness. As a 
 result of this voluntary activity the product of this synthesis 
 is a complex whole whose components all come from former 
 sense-perceptions and associations, but in which the combination 
 of these components usually varies more or less from the actual 
 impressions and the combinations of these impressions that 
 are immediately presented in experience. 
 
 The ideational elements of a compound thus resulting 
 from apperceptive synthesis may be regarded as the substratum 
 for the rest of its contents, and so we call such a compound 
 in general an aggregate idea. "When the combination of the 
 elements is peculiar, that is, markedly different from the 
 products of the fusion and associations, the aggregate idea 
 and each of its relatively independent ideational components 
 
§17. Apperceptive Combinations. 261 
 
 is called an idea of imagination or image of imagination. 
 Since the voluntary synthesis of elements may vary more 
 or less, according to the character of the motives that gave 
 rise to it, from the combinations presented in sense-perception 
 and association, it is obvious that practically no sharp line 
 of demarcation can be drawn between images of imagination 
 and those of memory. But we have a more essential mark 
 of the apperceptive process in the positive characteristic of 
 a voluntary synthesis than in the negative fact that the com- 
 bination does not correspond in character to any particular 
 sense-perception. This positive characteristic gives also the 
 most striking external difference between images of imagination 
 and those of memory. It consists in the fact that the sen- 
 sational elements of an apperceptive compound are much 
 more like those of an immediate sense-perception in clearness 
 and distinctness, and generally in completeness and intensity. 
 This is easily explained by the fact that the reciprocally 
 inhibitory influences which the uncontrolled associations exer- 
 cise on one another, and which prevent the formation of fixed 
 memory-images, are diminished or removed by the voluntary 
 emphasizing of certain particular ideational compounds. It is 
 possible to mistake images of imagination for real experiences. 
 "With memory-images this is possible only when they become 
 images of imagination, that is, when the memories are no 
 longer allowed to arise passively, but are to some extent pro- 
 duced by the will. Generally, too, there are voluntary modi- 
 fications in them or a mixing of real with imagined elements. 
 All our memories are therefore made up of "fancy and truth" i). 
 Memory-images change under the influence of our feelings 
 and volition to images of imagination, and we generally deceive 
 ourselves with their resemblance to real experiences. 
 
 1) ("Dichtung und Wahrheit.") 
 
262 ^^- Intercomwciicm of Psychical Gompcnmds. 
 
 15. From the aggregate ideas thus resulting from apper- 
 ceptive synthesis there arise two forms of apperceptive activity 
 in the opposite direction of analysis. The one is known in 
 popular parlance as activity of the imagination, the second 
 as activity of the understanding. The two are by no means 
 different, as might be surmised from these names, but closely 
 related and almost always connected with each other. Their 
 fundamental determining motives are what distinguish them 
 first of all and condition all their secondary differences as well 
 as the reaction that they exercise on the synthetic function. 
 
 In the case of the activity of "imagination" the motive is the 
 reproduction of real experiences or of those analogous to reality. 
 This is the earlier form of apperceptive analysis and rises direct- 
 ly from associations. It begins with a more or less comprehensive 
 aggregate idea made up of a variety of ideational and affective 
 elements £ind embracing the general content of a complex 
 experience in which the single components are only indefinitely 
 distinguished. The aggregate idea is then divided in a series 
 of successive acts into a number of more definite, connected 
 compounds partly spacial, partly temporal in character. The 
 primary voluntary synthesis is thus followed by analytic acts 
 which may in turn give rise to the motives for a new syn- 
 thesis and thus to a repetition of the whole process with a 
 partially modified or more limited aggregate idea. 
 
 The activity of imagination shows two stages of development. 
 The first is more passive and arises directly from the ordinary 
 memory-function. It appears continually in the train of thought, 
 especially in the form of an anticipation of the future, and plays 
 an important part in psychical development as an antecedent 
 of volitions. It may, however, in an analogous way, appear as 
 a representation in thought of imaginary situations or of 
 successions of external phenomena. The second, or active, 
 stage of development is under the influence of a fixed idea 
 
§ 17. Apperceptive Combmations. 263 
 
 of some end, and therefore presupposes a high degree of volun- 
 tary control over the images of imagination, and a strong 
 interference, partly inhibitory, partly selective, with the 
 memory-images that tend to push themselves into conscious- 
 ness without voluntary action. Even the first synthesis of 
 the aggregate idea is more systematic. An aggregate idea, when 
 once formed, is held more firmly and subjected to a more 
 complete analysis into its parts. Yery often these parts them- 
 selves are subordinate aggregate ideas to which the same 
 process of analysis is again applied. In this way the principle 
 of organic division according to the end in view governs all 
 the products and processes of active imagination. The pro- 
 ductions of art show this most clearly. Still, there are, in 
 the ordinary play of imagination, the most various intermediate 
 stages between passive imagination, or that which arises 
 directly from memory, and active imagination, or that which 
 is directed by fixed ends. 
 
 16. In contrast with this reproduction of real experiences 
 or of such as may be thought of as real, which constitutes 
 the content of the apperceptive functions that we include 
 under the concept "imagination", the fundamental motive of 
 the ^understanding'" is the perception of agreements and 
 differences and other derived logical relations between contents 
 of experience. Understanding also starts with aggregate ideas 
 in which a number of experiences that are real or may be 
 ideated as real, are voluntarily set in relation to one another 
 and combined to a unitary whole. The analysis that takes 
 place in this case, however, is turned by its fundamental 
 motive in a different direction. It consists not merely in a 
 clearer grasp of the single components of the aggregate idea, 
 but in the estabHshment of the manifold relations in which these 
 components stand to each other and which, we may discover 
 through comparison. As soon as such analyses have been made 
 
264 III. Intereonneetkn of Psyehical Comfounds. 
 
 several times, results of the relating and comparing processes 
 gained elsewhere cam be employed in any particular case. 
 
 As a result of its more strict application of the elementary 
 relating and comparing functions, the activity of understanding 
 follows definite rules even in its external form, especially 
 when it is highly developed. The principle that holds in 
 general for imagination and even for mere remembering, that 
 the relations of different psychical contents which are apper- 
 ceived are presented, not simultaneously, but successively, so 
 that in every case we pass on from one relation to a succeed- 
 ing — this principle becomes for the activity of understanding, 
 a rule of discursive division of aggregate ideas. It is expressed 
 in the law of the dtudity of the logiccd forms of thotight, 
 according to which analysis resulting from relating com- 
 parison divides the content of the aggregate idea into two 
 parts, subject and predicate, and may then separate each 
 of these parts again once or several times. These secondary 
 divisions give rise to grammatical forms that stand in a logical 
 relation analogous to that of subject and predicate, such as 
 noun and attributive, verb and object, verb and adverb. In 
 this way the process of apperceptive analysis results in a 
 judgment. 
 
 For the psychological explanation of judgment it is of 
 fundamental importance that it be regarded, not as a syn- 
 thetic, but as an analytic function.' The original aggregate 
 Ideas that are divided by judgment into their reciprocally 
 related components, are exactly like ideas of imagination. The 
 products of analysis that result are, on the other hand, not as 
 in the case of imagination, images of more limited extent and 
 greater clearness, but conceptual ideas, that is ideas which 
 stand, with regard to other partial ideas of the same whole, 
 in some one of those relations which are discovered through 
 the general relating and comparing functions. If we call the 
 
§ 17. Apperceptive Combinations. 265 
 
 aggregate idea which is subjected to such a relating analysis 
 a thought, then a judgment is a division of this thought into 
 its components, and a concept is the product of such a division. 
 17. Concepts found in this way are arranged in certain 
 general classes according to the character of the analyses 
 that took place. These classes are the concepts of objects, 
 attributes, and states. Judgment, as a division of the ag- 
 gregate idea, sets an object in relation to its attributes or states, 
 or various objects in relation to one another. Since a single 
 concept can never, strictly speaking, be thought of by itself, 
 but is always connected in the whole idea with one or more 
 other concepts, the conceptual ideas are strikingly different 
 from the ideas of imagination because of the indefiniteness 
 and variableness of the former. This indefiniteness is essen- 
 tially increased by the fact that a single concept may 
 exist in an unlimited variety of modifications, since concepts 
 which result from differents cases of like judgment, may form 
 components of many ideas that differ in their concrete 
 characters. Such general concepts constitute, on account of 
 the wide application of relating analysis to different contents 
 of judgment, the great majority of all concepts; and they 
 have a great number of corresponding single ideational con- 
 tents. It becomes necessary, accordingly, to choose a single 
 idea as a representative of the concept. This gives the con- 
 ceptual idea a greater definiteness. At the same time there 
 is always connected with this idea the consciousness that it 
 is merely a representative. This consciousness generally takes 
 the form of a characteristic feeling. This conceptual feeling 
 may be traced to the fact that obscure ideas, which have 
 the attributes that make them suitable to serve as represen- 
 tations of the concept, tend to force themselves into con- 
 sciousness in the form of variable memory images. As evidence 
 of this we have the fact that the feeling is very intense so 
 
266 -H?. Intereonneetion of Psychical Compounds. 
 
 long as any concrete image of the concept is chosen as its 
 representative, as, for example, when a particular individual 
 stands for the concept man, while it disappears almost entirely 
 so soon as the representative idea differs entirely in content 
 from the objects iacluded under the concept. Wordr-ideas 
 fulfil this condition and that is what gives them their im- 
 portance as universal aids to thought. These aids are 
 furnished to the individual consciousness in a finished state, 
 so that we must leave to social psychology the question of 
 the psychological development of the processes of thought 
 active in the formation of language (comp. § 21, A). 
 
 18. From all that has been said it appears that the 
 activities of imagination and understandiug are not specifically 
 different, but interrelated, inseparable in their rise and mani- 
 festations, and based at bottom on the same fundamental 
 functions of apperceptive synthesis and analysis. What was 
 true of the concept "memory" holds also of the concepts 
 "understanding" and "imagination": they are names, not of 
 unitary forces or faculties, but of complex phenomena made 
 up of elementary psychical processes of the usual, not of a 
 specific, distinct kind. Just as memory is a general concept for 
 certain associative processes, imagination and understanding are 
 general concepts for particular forms of apperceptive activity. 
 They have a certain practical value as ready means for the 
 classification of an endless variety of differences in the capac- 
 ity of various persons for iutellectual activity. Each class 
 thus found may in turn contain an endless variety of grada- 
 tions and shades. Thus, neglecting the general differences 
 in grade, we have as the chief forms of individual imagination 
 the perceptive and the combining forms; as the chief forms 
 of understanding, the inductive and deductive forms, the 
 first being mainly concerned with the single logical relations 
 and their combinations, the second more with general con- 
 
§18. Psychical Sf,ates. 267 
 
 cepts and their analysis. A person's talent is Ids total capacity 
 resulting from the special tendencies of both his imagination 
 and understanding. 
 
 § 18. PSYCHICAL STATES. 
 
 1. The normal state of consciousness upon which the 
 discussion of the foregoing paragraphs has been based may 
 undergo such a variety of changes that general psychology 
 must give up the attempt to discuss them in detail. Then, 
 too, the more important of these changes, namely, those which 
 are observed in the various forms of nervous diseases, brain- 
 diseases, and insanity, belong to special branches of pathology 
 which border upon psychology and are more or less dependent 
 upon it. All that psychology can do is to indicate the main 
 psychical conditions for such abnormal states of consciousness. 
 We may distinguish in general, in accordance with what has 
 been said about the attributes of psychical processes and their 
 interconnection in consciousness three kinds of such con- 
 ditions. They may consist I) in the abnormal character of the 
 psychical elements, 2) in the way psychical compounds are con- 
 stituted, and 3) in the way psychical compounds are combined 
 in consciousness. As a result of the intimate interconnection 
 of these different factors it scarcely ever happens that one of 
 these three conditions, each of which may appear in the most 
 various concrete forms, is operative alone; but they usually 
 unite. The abnormal character of the elements results in the 
 abnormity of the compounds, and this in turn brings about 
 changes in the general interconnection of conscious processes. 
 
 2. The psychical elements, sensations, and simple feehngs, 
 show only such changes as result from some disturbance in 
 the normal relation between them and their psycho-physical 
 conditions. For sensations such changes may be reduced to 
 
268 HI- Intercomketion of Psychical Compoimds. 
 
 an increase or decrease of tlie sensitivity for stimuli (hyper- 
 aesthesia aind anaesthesia) resulting especially from tlie action 
 of certain physiological influences in the sensory centres. The 
 most important psychological symptom in this case is the 
 increased excitability which is one of the most common com- 
 ponents of complex psychical disturhances. In similar fashion, 
 changes in the simple feelings hetray themselves in states of 
 depression or exaltation as a decrease or increase in the 
 affective excitabiUty. These different states may he recognized 
 from the way in which the emotions and volitional processes 
 occur. Thus, changes in the psychical elements can be demon- 
 strated only by the influence that they exercise on the 
 character of the various psychical compounds. ^ 
 
 3. The defects in ideational compounds arising from periph- 
 eral or central anaesthesia are generally of limited im- 
 portance. They have no far-reaching effect on the inter- 
 connection of psychical processes. It is essentially different 
 with the relative increase in the intensity of sensations resulting 
 from central hyperaesthesia. Its effect is especially important, 
 because under such circumstances reproduced sensational ele- 
 ments may become as intense as external sense-impressions. 
 The result may be that a pure memory-image is objectified as 
 a sense-perception. This is an hallucination. Or, when ele- 
 ments are united which are partly from direct external 
 stimulation, partly from reproduction, the sense-impression 
 may be essentially modified through the intensity of the re- 
 produced elements. The restdt is then an illusion of fancy^). 
 
 1) The expression "illusions of fancy" is used when this class of 
 illusions is to be distinguished from the sense-illusions that appear in 
 the normal state of consciousness, as, for example, the radiating form 
 of the stars, which is due to the refraction of light in the crystalline 
 lens, or the varying apparent size of the sun or moon at the horizon 
 and at the zenith. 
 
§18. Psychioal States. 269 
 
 The two are not always distinguisliable. In many cases, to 
 be sure, particular ideas can be shown to be illusions of 
 fancy, but the presence of pure hallucinations is almost 
 always doubtful because it is so easy to overlook some direct 
 sensational elements. In fact, it is by no means improbable 
 that the great majority of so-called hallucinations are illusions. 
 These illusions are in their psychological character nothing 
 but assimilations (p. 228 sq.). They may be defined as 
 assimilations in which the reproduced elements predominate. 
 Just as normal assimilations are closely connected with suc- 
 cessive associations, so for the same reason the illusions of 
 fancy are closely related to the changes in the associative 
 ideational processes to be discussed later (5). 
 
 4. In the case of complex affective and volitional pi'ocesses 
 the abnormal states of depression and exaltation are clearly 
 distinguishable from the normal condition. The state of 
 depression is due to the predominance of inhibitory, asthenic 
 emotions, that of exaltation to a predominance of exciting, 
 sthenic emotions, while at the same time we observe, in the 
 first case a retardation or complete checking of resolution, 
 in the second an exceedingly rapid, impulsive activity of the 
 motive. In this sphere it is generally more difficult to draw 
 the hne between normal and abnormal conditions than in 
 that of ideational compounds, because even in normal mental 
 life the affective states are continually changing. In patho- 
 logical cases the change between states of depression and 
 exaltation, which are often very striking, appear merely as 
 an intensified oscillation of the feelings and emotions about 
 an indifference-condition (pp. 34, 80). States of depression 
 and exaltation are especially characteristic symptoms of general 
 psychical disturbances; their detailed discussion must there- 
 fore be left to psychical pathology. General psychical dis- 
 turbances are always symptoms of diseases of the brain, so 
 
270 -H?- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds, 
 
 that these abnormities in affective and volitional processes are 
 doubtless accompanied, like those of the sensations and ideas, 
 by physiological changes. The nature of these changes is, 
 however, still unknown. We can only surmise, in accordance 
 with the more complex character of affective processes, either 
 that they are more extensive than the changes in central 
 excitability accompanying hallucinations and illusions, or that 
 they effect the central cortical regions directly concerned in 
 apperceptive processes. 
 
 5. Connected with these changes in the sensory excitability 
 and with states of depression and exaltation, there are regularly 
 simultaneous changes ia the interconnection and course of 
 psychical processes. Using the concept consciousness that we 
 employ to express this interconnection (p. 203), we may call 
 these changes abnormal changes of consciousness. So long as 
 the abnormity is limited to the single psychical compounds, 
 ideas, emotions, and volitions, consciousness is of course 
 changed because of the changes in its components, but we 
 do no speak of an abnormity of consciousness itself until not 
 merely the single compounds, but their combinations also 
 exhibit some noticeable abnormities. These always arise, to 
 be sure, when the elementary disturbances become greater, 
 since the combination of elements to compounds and of com- 
 pounds with one another are processes that pass continuously 
 into each other. 
 
 Corresponding to the different kinds of combination that 
 make up the interconnection of consciousness (p. 223), there 
 may be distinguished in general three kinds of abnormities 
 of consciousness: 1) changes in the associations, 2) changes 
 in the apperceptive combinations, and 3) changes in the re- 
 lation of the two forms of combination to each other. 
 
 6. Changes in associations are the first to result directly 
 from the elementary disturbances. The increase of sensory 
 
§18. Psychical States. 271 
 
 excitability changes noriifal assimilations into illusions of fancy, 
 and this results in an essential disturbance in the associative 
 processes of recognition (p. 237): sometimes that which is 
 known appears to be unknown, and then again what is unknown 
 appears famiHar, according as the reproduced elements are 
 connected with definite earUer ideas, or are derived from 
 perceptions that have only a remote relation to one another. 
 Then, too, the increased sensory excitability tends to ac- 
 celerate the association, so that the most superficial con- 
 nections, occasioned by accidental impressions or by habit, 
 are the ones that predominate. The states of depression 
 and exaltation, on the other hand, determine inainly the 
 quality and direction of the association. 
 
 In a similar manner the elementary ideational and affective 
 changes influence apperceptive combinations, either retarding 
 or accelerating them, or else determining their direction. 
 Still, in these cases all marked abnormities in ideational or 
 affective processes result in an increase, to a greater or less 
 degree, of the difficulty of carrying out the processes con- 
 nected with active attention, so that often only the simpler 
 apperceptive combiriations are possible, sometimes even only 
 those which through practice have become simple associations. 
 Connected with the last fact mentioned are the changes that 
 take place ia the relation between apperceptive and associative 
 combinations. The influences discussed so far are in the 
 main favorable to associations, but unfavorable to apperceptive 
 combinations, and one of the most frequent symptoms of a 
 far-reaching psychical abnormity is a great preponderance 
 of associations. This is most obvious when the disturbance 
 of consciousness is a continually increasing process, as it is 
 in many cases of insanity. It is then observed that the 
 functions of apperception upon which so-called imagination 
 and understanding are based, are more and more supplanted 
 
272 ^- Intereonneetion of Psyehical Compov/nds. 
 
 by associations, until finally the latter are all that remain. 
 If the disturbance progresses still further, the associations 
 gradually become more Hmited and confined to certain 
 habitual combinations (fixed ideas). Finally this state gives 
 place to one of complete mental paralysis. 
 
 7. Apart from mental diseases in the strict sense of the 
 term the irregularities of consciousness just discussed are to 
 be found in two conditions that appear in the course of 
 normal life: in dreams and hypnosis. 
 
 The ideas of dreams come, at least to a great extent, 
 from sensations, especially from those of the general sense, 
 and are therefore mostly illusions of fancy, probably only 
 seldom pure memory-ideas that have become hallucinations. 
 The decrease, of apperceptive combinations in comparison with 
 associations is also striking, and goes to explain the frequent 
 modifications and exchanges of self-consciousness, the con- 
 fusion of the judgment, etc. The characteristic of dreams 
 that distinguishes them from other similar psychical states, 
 is to be found, not so much in these positive, as in their 
 negative attributes. The increase of excitability which is 
 attested by the hallucinations, is limited entirely to the sensory 
 functions, while in ordinary sleep and dreams the external 
 voKtional activity is completely inhibited. 
 
 When the fanciful ideas of dreams are connected with 
 corresponding volitional acts, we have the very infrequent 
 phenomena of sleep-walking, which are related to certain 
 forms of hypnosis. Motor concomitants are generally limited 
 to articulations, and appear as talking in dreams. 
 
 8. Hypnosis is the name applied to certain states related 
 to sleep and dreams and produced by means of certain defi- 
 nite psychical agencies. Consciousness is here generally in 
 a condition halfway between waking and sleeping. The 
 main cause of hypnosis is suggestion, that is, the communi- 
 
§18. Psychical States. • 273 
 
 cation of an idea strong in affective tQne. This generally 
 comes in tlie form of a command from some other person 
 (outward suggestion), hut may sometimes be produced by the 
 subject himself, when it is called autosuggestion. The com- 
 mand or resolution to sleep, to make certain movements,* to 
 see objects not present or not to see objects that are present, 
 etc., — these are the most frequent suggestions. Monotonous 
 stimuli, especially tactual stimuli are helpful auxiliaries. Thep, 
 too, there is a certain disposition of the nervous system of 
 still unknown character, which is necessary for the rise, of 
 the hypnotic state and is increased when the state is repeat- 
 edly produced. 
 
 The first symptom of hypnosis is the more or less com- 
 plete inhibition of volition, connected with a concentration 
 of the attention on one thing, generally the conunands of 
 the hypnotizer (automatism). The subject not only sleeps at 
 command, but retains in this state any position that is 
 given him, however unnatural (hypnotic catalepsy). If the 
 sleep becomes still deeper the subject carries out movements 
 as directed, to all appearances automatically, and shows that 
 ideas suggested to him appear like real objects (somnambulism). 
 In this last state it is possible to give either motor or sen- 
 sory suggestions to go into effect when the subject awakes, 
 or even at some later time (terminal suggestions). The 
 phenomena that accompany such "posthypnotic effects" render 
 it probable that the latter are due either to a partial per- 
 sistence of the hypnosis or (in the case of terminal sug- 
 gestions) to a renewal of the hypnotic state. 
 
 9. It appears from all these phenomena that sleep and 
 hypnosis are related states, differing only in that their mode 
 of origin is different. They have as common characteristics 
 the inhibition of volition, which permits only passive apper- 
 ception, and a disposition toward aroused excitability in 
 
 WuSDT, Psychology. Jg 
 
274 ^- Interconnection of Psychical Compotmds. 
 
 the sensory centres that brings about an assimilation of 
 the sense-impressions which results in hallucinations. The 
 characteristics that distinguish them are the complete in- 
 hibition of volition in sleep, especially of the motor functions, 
 and the concentration in hypnosis of the passive attention 
 on one thing. This concentration is conditioned by suggestion 
 and is at the same time favorable to the reception of further 
 suggestions. StiU, these differences are not absolute, for in 
 sleep-walking the will is not completely inhibited, while on 
 the other hand it is inhibited in the first lethargic stages of 
 hypnosis just as in ordinary sleep. 
 
 Sleep, dreams, and hypnosis are, accordingly, in all prob- 
 ability, essentially the same in their psychophysical conditions. 
 These conditions are specially modified dispositions to sen- 
 sational and volitional reactions, and can therefore, like all 
 such dispositions, be explained on their physiological side 
 only by assuming changes in the activity of certain central 
 regions. These changes have not yet been investigated 
 directly. StiQ, we may assume from the psychological symp- 
 toms that they consist in the inhibition of the activity in 
 the regions connected with processes of volition and attention, 
 and in the increase in the excitability of sensory centres. 
 
 9a. It is then, strictly speaking, a physiological problem 
 to formulate a theory of sleep, dreams, and hypnosis. Apart 
 from the general assumption based on psychological symptoms, 
 of an inhibition of activity in certain parts of the cerebral cortex, 
 and increase in the activity of other parts, we can apply only 
 -one general neurological principle with any degree of probability. 
 That is the principle of eompensation of functions, according to 
 -which the inhibition of the activity of one region is always 
 'Connected with an increase in the activity of the others 
 interrelated with it. This interrelation may be either direct, 
 neurodynamic, or indirect, vasomotoric. The first is probably due 
 to the fact that energy which accumulates in one region as the 
 
§18. Psychical States. 275 
 
 result of inhibition, is discharged through the connecting fibres 
 into other central regions. The second is due to contraction of 
 the capillaries as a result of inhibition and a compensating dilation' 
 of the blood-vessels in other regions. The increased blood supply 
 due to this dilation is in turn attended by an increase in the 
 activity of the region in question. 
 
 Dreams and hypnosis are often made the subjects of mys- 
 tical and fanciful hypotheses, in some cases even by psy- 
 chologists. We hear of increased mental activity in dreams and 
 of influence of mind on minds at a distance in dreams and 
 hypnosis. Especially hypnotism has been used in modern timeSj 
 in this way, to support superstitious spiritualistic ideas. In con- 
 nection with "animal magnetism", which may be completely ex- 
 plained by the theory of hypnosis and suggestion, and in connection 
 with "somnambulism", there are a great many cases of self- 
 deception and intentional humbug. In reality all that can stand 
 the light of thorough examination in these phenomena is in general 
 readily explicable on psychological and physiological grounds; 
 what is not explicable in this way has always proved on closer 
 examination to be superstitious self-deception or intentional fraud. 
 
 18* 
 
ly. PSYCHICAL DEVELOPMENTS. 
 
 § 19. PSYOHICAIi ATTRIBUTES OF Al^IMAJLS. 
 
 ' 1. The animal kingdom exiibits a series of mental develop- 
 ments which may be. regarded as antecedents to the mental 
 development of man. The mental life of animals shows 
 itself to be in its elements and in the general laws of their 
 combination everywhere the same as that of man. 
 
 Even the lowest animals (protozoa and coelenterata) mani- 
 fest vital phenomena that allow us to infer ideational and 
 volitional processes. They seize their food to all appearances 
 spontaneously; they flee from pursuing enemies, etc. There 
 are also to be found in the lowest stages of animal Hfe 
 traces of associations and reproductions and especially pro- 
 cesses of sensible cognition and recognition (p. 237). They 
 reach a more advanced stage of development in higher ani- 
 mals only through the increase in the variety of ideas and in 
 the length of time through which the memory-processes ex- 
 tend. . From the like structure and development of the sense- 
 organs we must draw the conclusion that the character of 
 the sense-ideas are in general the same, the only difference 
 being that in the lowest forms of Hfe the sensory functions 
 are limited to the general sense of touch, just as ta the 
 case of the higher organisms in the first stages of their in- 
 dividual development (p. 39). 
 
 In contrast whith this uniformity of psychical elements 
 and their simpler combinations there are great differences in 
 
^ 19. Psychical Atiribtttes of Animals. 277 
 
 all the processes connected with the development of apper4 
 ception. Passive apperception is never absent as the basis 
 for the simple impulsive acts that are found everywhere; 
 but active apperception in the form of voluntary attention 
 to certain impressions and a choice between different motives 
 probably never exists except in the higher animals. Jjven 
 here it is limited to the ideas and associations aroused by 
 immediate sensible impressions, so that we can at most, if at 
 all, only find the first beginnings of intellectual processes in 
 the proper sense of the word, that is activities of imagination 
 and understanding, even in the animals with the highest mental 
 development. Connected with this fact is the other that 
 higher animals have no developed language, though they are 
 able to give expression to their emotions and even their ideas, 
 when these are connected with emotions, through various 
 expressive movements often related to those of man. 
 
 2. Though the development of animals is in general far 
 behind that of man in spite of the qualitative likeness of the 
 fundamental psychical processes, still, in two ways it is often 
 superior. First, animals reach psychical maturity much more 
 rapidly, and secondly, certain single funetiom particularly 
 favored by the special conditions under which the speicies 
 lives, are more highly developed. The fact of more rapid 
 maturity is shown by the early age at which many animals; 
 some immediately after birth, are able to receive relatively 
 clear sense-impressions and to execute purposive movements. 
 To be sure, there are very great differences among higher 
 animals in this respect. For example, the chick Just out of 
 the shell begins to pick up grain, while the pup is blind at 
 birth, and for a long time after clumsy in his movements. 
 Yet, the development of the child seems to be the slowest 
 and the most dependent on help and care from others. 
 
 3. The special one-sided development of single funciwns^ 
 
278 ^^- Psychical Developments. 
 
 in some animals is still more striking. These functions show 
 themselves in certain iinpulsive acts reguldrly connected 
 with the satisfaction of Certain needs, either cif aUmen- 
 taiion, reproduction, or protection, and in the development 
 of the sense -perceptions and associations that form the 
 motives for such acts. Such specially developed impulses 
 are called instincts. The assumption that instincts belong 
 only to animal and not to human consciousness is, of course, 
 entirely unpsychological, and contradictory to experience. The 
 disposition to manifest the general animal impulses, namely, 
 the alimentive and sexual impulses, is just as much a connate 
 attribute of man as of the animals. The only thing that is 
 characteristic is the special highly developed form of the 
 purposive acts by which many animals reach the ends aimed 
 at. Different animals, however, are very different in this 
 respect. There are numerous lower and higher animals whose 
 acts resulting from connate instincts show as few striking 
 characteristics as those of men. It is also remarkable that 
 domestication generally tends to do away with . the instincts 
 that animals had in their wild state, and to develop new 
 ones that may generally be regarded as modifications of the 
 wild instincts, as, for example!, those of certain hunting dogs, 
 especially those of bird-dogs and pointers. The relatively 
 high development of certain special instincts in animals as 
 compared with men, is simply a manifestation of the general 
 unsymmetrical development of the former. The whole psychical 
 life of animals consists almost entirely of the processes that 
 are connected with the predominating instinct. 
 
 4. In general, instincts may be regarded as impulsive acts 
 that arise from particular sensations and sense-feehngs. The 
 physiological sources of the sensations chiefly concerned ia 
 instincts are the alimentary and genital, organs. All animal 
 instincts may, accordingly, be reduced to aUmentive and 
 
§ 19. Psyehieal Attrilmtes of Anmuds. 279 
 
 sexual instincts, though in connection with the latter, espe- 
 cially in their more complex fonns, there are always auxihary 
 protective and social impulses which may he regarded, from 
 the character of their origin, as special modifications of 
 the sexual impulse. Among these auxiliary forms must be 
 reckoned the impulses of many animals to build houses and 
 nests, as in the case of beavers, birds, and nimierous insects 
 (for example, spiders, wasps, bees, ants), then, too, the instinct 
 of animal marriage found chiefly among birds and appearing 
 both in the monogamic and polygamic forms. Finally, the 
 so-called "animal states", as those ■ of the bees, of ants, and 
 of termites, belong under this head. They are in reality not 
 states, but sexual communities, in which the social impulse 
 that unites the individuals, as well as the common protective 
 impulse, are modifications of the reproduction-impulse. 
 
 Li the case of all instincts the particular impulsive acts 
 arise from certain sense-stimuli partly external, partly internal. 
 The acts themselves are to be classed as impulsive acts, or 
 simple voHtions, since they are preceded and accompanied by 
 particular sensations and feelings that serve as simple mo- 
 tives (p. 85 sq.). The complex, connate character of these acts 
 can be explained only from general inherited attributes of 
 the nervous system, as a result of which certain connate 
 reflex mechanisms are immediately set in action by particular 
 stimuli, without practice on the part of the individual. The 
 purposive character of these mechanisms must also be re- 
 garded as a product of gen&ral psycho-physical development. 
 As further evidence for this we have the fact that instincts 
 show not only various individual modifications, but even a 
 certain degree of higher development through individual 
 practice. In this way, the bird gradually learns to bmld its 
 nest better ; bees accommodate , their hive to changing needs ; 
 instead of sending out new colonies they enlarge the hive 
 
280 ^^- Psychical Denelopments. 
 
 if they have the necessary room. Even abnormal habits may 
 be acquired hy a single community of bees or ants; the first, 
 for example, may learn to rob a neighboring hive instead of 
 gathering the honey from the flowers, or the latter may 
 acquire the remarkable habit of making the members of 
 another species slaves, or of domesticatiag plant-Uce for the 
 sake of their honey. The rise, growth, and transmission of 
 these habits as we can trace them, show clearly the way 
 in which all complicated instincts may arise. Such an 
 instinct never appears alone, but there are always simpler 
 forms of the same instinct in related classes and species. 
 Thus the hole that the wall-wasp bores in the wall to lay 
 her eggs in, is a primitive pattern of the ingenious hive of the 
 honey-bee. Between these two extremes as the natural trans- 
 ition stage we have the hive of the ordinary wasp made of 
 a few hexagonal cells constructed of cemented sticks and 
 leaves. 
 
 We may, accordingly, explain the complex instincts as 
 developed forms of originally simple impulses that have 
 gradually differentiated more and more in the course of 
 numberless generations, through the gradual accumulation of 
 habits that have been acquired by individuals and then trans- 
 mitted. Every single habit is to be regarded as a stage in this 
 psychical development. Its gradual passage into a connate 
 disposition is to be explained as a psycho-physical process of 
 practice through which complex volitional acts gradually pass 
 into purposive movements that follow immediately and reflexly 
 the appropriate impression. 
 
 5. If we try to answer the general question of the 
 genetic relation of man to the animals on the ground of a 
 comparison of their psychical attributes, it must be admitted, 
 in view of the likeness of psychical elements and of their 
 simplest and most general forms of combination, that it is 
 
^^^ 19. Psychical Attributes of Animals. 28 1 
 
 possible that human consciousness has developed from a lower 
 form of animal consciousness. This assumption also finds strong' 
 support in the fact that the animal Icingdom presents a whole 
 series of different stages of psychical development and that 
 every human individual passes through an analogous develop- 
 ment. The doctrine of psychical development thus confirms ia 
 general the results of the theory of physical evolution, still 
 we must not overlook the fact that the differences between 
 the psychical attributes of man and those of the animals, 
 as expressed in the intellectual and affective processes re- 
 sulting from apperceptive combinations, are much broader 
 than the differences in their physical characteristics. Then, too, 
 the great stability of the psychical condition of animals, 
 which undergoes little change even in domestication, renders 
 it exceedingly improbal)le that any of the present animal 
 forms will develop much beyond the limits that they have, 
 already reached in their psychical attributes. 
 
 5 a. The attempts to define the relation of man and animals from 
 a psychological point of view vary between two extremes. One of 
 these is the predominating view of the old psychology that the higher 
 "faculties of mind", especially "reason", were entirely wanting in 
 animals. The other is the wide-spread opinion of representatives of 
 special animal psychology, that animals are fully equal to man in 
 all respects, in ability to consider, to judge, to draw conclusions, in 
 moral feelings, etc. With the rejection of faculty-psychology the 
 first of these views becomes untenable. The second rests on the 
 tendency prevalent in popular psychology to interpret all objective, 
 phenomena in terms of human thought, especially in terms of logical 
 reflection. The closer psychological investigation of so-called mani- 
 festation of intelUgence among animals shows, however, that they 
 are in all cases fully explicable as simple sensible recognitions and 
 associations, and that they lack the characteristics belonging to con- 
 cepts proper and ,to logical operations. But associative processes 
 pass without a break into apperceptive, and the beginnings of the 
 latter, that is simple acts of active attention and choice, appear 
 
282 ^- Psychical Developments. 
 
 without any doubt in the case of higher animals, so that the 
 difference is after all more one of the degree and complexity of 
 the psychical processes than one of kind. 
 
 Animal instincts presented a very great difficulty to the older 
 forms of psychology, such as the faculty-theory and the intellec- 
 tualistic theories (§ 2). Since the attempt to deduce these instincts 
 from the conditions given in each individual case led to an im- 
 probably high estimation of the psychical ability of the animal, 
 especially when the instinct was more complex, the conclusion 
 was often accepted that instincts are incomprehensible, or, what 
 amounts to the same thing, due to connate ideas. This "enigma 
 of the instincts" ceases to be an enigma when we come to look 
 upon instincts, as we have done above, as special forms of im- 
 pulsive action, and to consider them as analogous to the simple 
 impulsive acts of men and animals, for which we have a psy- 
 chological explanation. This is especially true when we follow 
 the reduction of what were originally complicated acts, to im- 
 pulsive or reflex movements in the phenomena of habit, so easily 
 observed in the ca^e of man, as, for example, the habituation to 
 complex movements in learning to play the piano (comp. p. 192 sq.). 
 It is often argued against this theory of instinct that it is im- 
 possible to prove empirically the transmission of acquired individual 
 variations which we have assumed, that, for example, there are 
 no certain observations in proof of the transmission of mutilations, 
 as used to be asserted so frequently. Many biologists accept the 
 view that all the properties of the organism arise through the 
 selection resulting from the survival of the individual best adapted 
 to natural conditions, that all such properties are accordingly 
 deducible from "natural selection", and that in this way alone 
 changes can be produced in the germ and transmitted to descend- 
 ants. Though it must be admitted that an attribute acquired by a 
 single individual, generally has no effect on the descendents, stUl, 
 there is no apparent reason' why habitual acts, which are indeed 
 indirectly due to outer natural conditions, but depend primarily on 
 the inner psycho -physical attributes of the organism, may not 
 cause changes in the nature of the germ when these acts are repeated 
 through many generations, just as well as the direct influences 
 of natural selection. As further evidence for this view we have 
 the fact that in some cases whole families inherit peculiar 
 
§ 20. Psychical Development of the Child. 283 
 
 expressive movements or technical ability in some line (p. 285). 
 This does not exclude in any case the cooperation of natural 
 influences, but is in full agreement with the facts of observation 
 which show that these influences act in two ways: first, directly 
 in the changes that natural selection brings about in the organism 
 while the organism remains passive, and secondly, indirectly in the 
 psycho-physical reactions that are caused by the outer influences, 
 and then in turn give rise to changes in the organism. If we neglect 
 the latter fact, we not only lose an important means of accounting 
 for the eminently purposive character of animal organisms, but 
 further, and more especially, we render impossible a psychological 
 explanation of the gradual development of volition and its retro- 
 gradation into purposive reflexes as we see it in a large number 
 of connate expressive movements (§ 20, 1)., 
 
 § 20. PSYOmOAL DBYELOPMENT OF THE 
 CHILD. 
 
 1. The fact that the psychical development of man is 
 regularly slower than that of most animals is to be seen in 
 the much more gradual maturing of his sense-functions. The 
 child, to be sure, reacts immediately after birth to all kinds 
 of sense-stimuli, most clearly to impressions of touch and 
 taste, with the least certainty to those of sound. Still, it is 
 impossible to doubt that the special forms of the reaction- 
 movements in all these cases are due to inherited reflexes. 
 This is especially true for the child's crying when afEected 
 by cold and tactual impressions, and for the mimetic reflexes 
 when he tastes sweet, sour, or bitter substances. It is prob- 
 able that all these impressions are accompanied by obscure 
 sensations and feelings, yet the character of the movements 
 can not be explained from the feelings whose symptoms they 
 may be considered to be, but must be referred to connate 
 central reflex tracts. 
 
 Probably nothing is clear in consciousness until the end of the 
 
284 rF- Psyekieal Developments. 
 
 first month, and even then, as the rapid change of moods shows, 
 sensations and feelings must be relatively very changeable. It 
 is at about this time that we begin to observe symptoms of 
 pleasurable and unpleasurable feelings in the child's laughter 
 and in Hvely rhythmical movements of his arms and legs after 
 certain impressions. Even the reflexes are not completely 
 developed at first — a fact which we can easily understand 
 when we learn from anatomy that many of the connecting 
 fibres between the cerebral centres do not develop untU after 
 birth. Thus the associative reflex-movements of the two eyes 
 are wanting. From the first each of the eyes by itself 
 generally turns towards a light, but the movements of the 
 two eyes are entirely irregular, and it is only in the course 
 of the first three months that the normal coordiuation 
 of the movements of the two eyes with a common fixation- 
 point, begins to appear. Even then the developing regularity 
 is not to be regarded as a result of complete visual per- 
 ceptions, but, quite the reverse, as a symptom of the gradual 
 functioning of a reflex-centre, which then renders clear visual 
 perceptions possible. 
 
 2. It is, generally speaking, impossible to gain any ade- 
 quate information about the qualitative relations oi psychical 
 elements in the child's consciousness, for the reason that we 
 have no certain objective symptoms. It is probable that the 
 number of different tonal sensations, perhaps also the number' 
 of color-sensations, is very limited. The fact that children two 
 years old not infrequently use the wrong names for colors 
 ought not however, to be looked upon as unqualified evidence, 
 that they do not have the sensation in question. It is much 
 more probable that lack of attention and a confusion of the 
 names is the real explanation in such cases. 
 
 Towards the end of the first year the differentiation of 
 feelings and the related development of the various emotions 
 
§ 20. F^ckical Development of the Child. 285 
 
 take place, and show themselves strikingly in the characteristic 
 expressive movements that gradually arise. We have uri- 
 pleasurahle feelings and joy, then in order, astonishment, 
 expectation, anger, shame, envy, etc. Even in these cases 
 the dispositions for the combined movements which express 
 the single emotions, depend upon inherited physiological attri- 
 butes of the nervous system, which generally do not begin 
 to function until after the first few months, in a way anal- 
 ogous to the combined innervation of the ocular muscles. 
 As further evidence of this we have the fact that not in- 
 frequently special peculiarities in the expressive movements 
 are inherited by whole families. 
 
 3. The physical conditions for the rise of spacial ideas 
 are connate in the form of inherited reflex-connections which 
 make a relatively rapid development of these ideas possible. 
 But for the child the spacial perceptions seem at first to be 
 much more incomplete than they are in the case of many 
 animals. There are manifestations of pain when the skin is 
 stimulated, but no clear symptoms of localization. Distinct 
 grasping movements develop gradually from the aimless move- 
 ments that are observed even in the first days, but they do 
 not, as a rule, become certain and consciously purposive until 
 aided by visual perceptions, after the twelfth week. The 
 turning of the eye toward a source of light as generally 
 observed very early, is to be regarded as reflex. The same 
 is true of the gradual coordination of ocular movements. 
 Still it is probable that along with these reflexes there are 
 developed spacial ideas, so that all we can observe is the 
 gradual completion of these ideas from very crude beginnings, 
 for the process is continuous and is always interconnected 
 with its original physiological substratum. Even in the child 
 the sense of sight shows itself to be decidedly more rapid in 
 its development than the sense of touch, for the symptoms 
 
286 I^- Psychical Developments. 
 
 of visual localization are certainly observable earlier than 
 those of tactual localization, and the grasping movements, 
 as mentioned above, do not reach their full development 
 until aided by the sense of sight. The field of binocular 
 vision is much later in its development than that of monocular 
 vision. The latter shows itself in the discrimination of 
 directions in space. The beginnings of the development of 
 a field for binocular vision coincide with the first coordination 
 of ocular movements and belong, accordingly, to the second 
 half of the first year. The perception of size, of distance, 
 and of vaarious three-dimensional figures remains for a long 
 time very imperfect. Especially, distant objects are all thought 
 to be near at hand, so that they appear relatively small to 
 the child. 
 
 4. Temporal ideas develop along with the spacial ideas. 
 The abiHty to form regular temporal ideas and the agree- 
 ableness of these to the child shows itself in the first months 
 in the movements of his limbs and especially in the tendency 
 to accompany rhythms that are heard, vnth similar rhythmical 
 movements. Some children can imitate correctly, even before 
 they can speak, the rhythmical melodies that they hear, in 
 sounds and intonations. Still, the ideas of longer intervals 
 are very imperfect even at the end of the first year and later, 
 so that a child gives very irregular judgments as to the 
 duration of different periods and also as to their sequence. 
 
 5. The development of associations and of simple apper- 
 ceptive combinations goes hand in hand with that of spacial 
 and temporal ideas. Symptoms of sensible recognition (p. 237) 
 are observable from the very first days, in the rapidly ac- 
 quired abiUty to find the mother's breast and in the obvious 
 habituation to the objects and persons of the environment. 
 StUl, for a long time these associations cover only very short 
 intervals of time, at first only hours, then days. Even in 
 
§ 20. Psychical Development of the Child. 287 
 
 the third and fourth years children either forget entirely or 
 rememher only imperfectly persons who have been absent 
 for a few weeks. 
 
 The case with attention is similar. At first it is possible 
 to concentrate it upon a single object only for a very short 
 time, and it is obvious that passive apperception which always 
 foUows the predominating stimulus, that is the one whose 
 affective tone is strongest (p. 217), is the only form present. 
 In the first weeks, however, a lasting attention begins to 
 show itself in the way the child fixates and foUows objects 
 for a longer time, especially if they are moving; and at the 
 same time we have the first trace of active apperception in 
 the abUity to turn voluntarily from one impression to another. 
 From this point on, the ability becomes more and more fully 
 developed; still, the attention, even in 'later childhood, 
 fatigues more rapidly than in the case of adults, and requires 
 a greater variety of objects or a more frequent pause for 
 rest. 
 
 6. The development of sdf-consdousness keeps pace with 
 that of the associations and apperceptions. In judging of 
 this development we must guard against accepting as signs 
 of self-consciousness any single symptoms, such as the child's 
 discrimination of the parts of his body from objects of his 
 environment, his use of the word "I", or even the recognition 
 of his own image in the nairror. The adult savage who has 
 never seen his own reflected image before, takes it for some 
 other person. The use of the personal pronoun is due to 
 the child's imitation of the examples of those about him. 
 This imitation comes at very different times in the cases of 
 different children, even when their intellectual development 
 in other respects is the same. It is, to be sure, a symptom 
 of the presence of self-consciousness, but the first beginnings 
 of self-consciousness may have preceded this discrimination 
 
288 I^- Psychical Developments. 
 
 in speech by a longer or shorter period of time ^s the case 
 may he. Again, the discrimination of the body from other 
 objects is a symptom of exactly the same kind. The re- 
 cognition of the body . is a process that regularly precedes 
 that of the recognition of the image in the mirror, but one 
 is as little a criterion of the beginning of self-consciousness 
 as the other. They both presuppose the existence of some 
 degree of self-consciousness beforehand. Just as the developed 
 self-consciousness is based upon a number of different con- 
 ditions (p. 221), so in the same way the self-consciousness of 
 the child is from the first a product of several components, 
 partly ideational in character, partly affective and volitional. 
 Under the first head we have the discrimination of a constant 
 group of ideas, under the second the development of certain 
 interconnected processes of attention and volitional acts. The 
 constant group of ideas does not necessarily include aU parts 
 of the body, as, for example, the legs, which are usually 
 covered, and it may, as is more often the case, include 
 external objects, as, for example, the clothes generally worn. 
 The subjective affective and volitional components, and the 
 relations that exist between these and the ideational com- 
 ponents in external voHtional acts, are the factors that exercise 
 the decisive influence. Their greater influence is shown 
 especially by the fact that strong feelings, especially those 
 of pain, very often mark in an individual's memory the first 
 moment to which the continuity of his self- consciousness 
 reaches back. But there can be no doubt that a forfia of 
 self-consciousness, even though less intercoimected, exists even 
 before this first clearly remembered moment, which generally 
 comes in the fifth or sixth year. Still, since the objective 
 observation of the child is not supplied at first with any 
 certain criteria, it is impossible to determine the exact moment 
 when self-consciousness begins. Probably the traces of it 
 
§ 20. Psychical Development of the Child. 289 
 
 begin to appear in the first weeks; after this it continually 
 becomes clearer under the constant influence of the conditions 
 mentioned, and increases in temporal extent just as conscious- 
 ness in general does. 
 
 7. The development of wiU is intimately connected with 
 that of self-consciousness. It may be inferred partly from 
 the development of attention described above, partly from 
 the rise and gradual perfection of external volitimial acts, 
 whose influence on self-consciousness has just been mentioned. 
 The immediate relation of attention to will appears in the 
 fact that symptoms of active attention and voluntary action 
 come at exactly the same time. Very many animals execute 
 immediately after birth fairly perfect impulsive movements, 
 that is, simple volitional acts. These are rendered possible 
 by inherited reflex-mechanisms of a complex character. The 
 new-bom child, on the contrary, does not show any traces 
 of such impulsive acts. Still, we observe in the first days 
 the earHest beginnings of simple volitional acts of an im- 
 pulsive character, as a result of the reflexes caused by sen- 
 sations of hunger and by the sense-perceptions connected 
 with appeasing it. These are to be seen in the evident quest 
 after the sources of nourishment. With the obvious growth 
 of attention come the voKtional acts connected with im- 
 pressions of sight and hearing: the child purposely, no longer 
 merely in a reflex way, follows visual objects, and turns 
 his head towards the noises that he hears. Much later come 
 the movements of the outer muscles of the limbs and trunk. 
 These, especially the muscles of the limbs, show from the 
 first lively movements, generally repeated time and time 
 again. These movements are accompanied by all possible feel- 
 ings and emotions, and when the latter become differentiated, 
 the movements begin gradually to exhibit certain differences 
 characteristic for the quality of the emotions.- The chief 
 
 WosDT, Psychology. 19 
 
290 IT^' Psychical Developmenis. 
 
 difference consists in the fact that rhythmical movements 
 accompany pleasurable emotions, while arrhythmical and, as a 
 rule, violent movements result when the emotions are un- 
 pleasurable. These expressive movements, which must be 
 looked upon as reflexes attended by feeUngs, then, as soon 
 as the attention begins to turn upon the surroundings, pass 
 as occasion offers into ordinary voluntary expressive move- 
 ments. Thus, the child shows through the different accom- 
 panying symptoms that he not only feels pain, annoyance, 
 anger, etc., but that the wishes to give expression to these 
 emotions. The first movements, however, in which an ante- 
 cedent motive is to be recognized beyond a doubt, are the 
 grasping movements which begin in the twelfth to the four- 
 teenth week. Especially at first, the foot takes part in these 
 movements as well as the hand. We have here also the first 
 clear symptoms of sense-perception, as well as the first in- 
 dications of the existence of a simple volitional process made 
 up of motive, decision, and act. Somewhat later intentional 
 imitative movements are to be observed. Simple mimetic 
 imitations, such as puckering the lips and frowning, come 
 first, and then pantomitnetic, such as doubling up the fist, 
 beating time, etc. Very gradually, a's a rule not until after 
 the beginning of the second half of the first year, complex 
 volitional acts develop from these simple ones. The oscillation 
 of decision, the voluntary suppression of an intended act or 
 one already begun, commence to be clearly observable at 
 this period. 
 
 Learning to walk, which usually begins in the last third 
 of the first year, is an important factor in the development 
 of voluntary acts in the proper sense of the term. Its im- 
 portance is due to the fact that the going to certain particular 
 places furnishes the occasion for the rise of a number of 
 conflicting motives. The learning itself is to be regarded as 
 
§ 20. Psychical Development of the Child. 291 
 
 a process in which the developmeiit of the will and the effect 
 of inherited dispositions to certain particular combinations of 
 moTements are continually interacting upon each other. The 
 first impulse for the movement comes from voUtional motives ; 
 the purposive way in which it is carried out, however, is 
 primarily an effect of the central mechanism of coordination, 
 which in turn is rendered continually more and more purposive 
 as a result of the individual's practice directed by his wUl. 
 
 8. The development of the child's ability to speak follows 
 that of his other volitional acts. This, too, depends on the 
 cooperation of inherited modifications in the central organ 
 of the nervous system on one hand, and outside influences 
 on the other. The most important butside influences in this 
 case are those that come from the speech of those about the 
 child. In this respect the development of speech corresponds 
 entirely to that of the other expressive movements, among 
 which it is, from its general psycho-physical character, to be 
 classed. The earliest articulations of the vocal organs appear 
 as reflex phenomena, especially accompanying pleasurable 
 feelings and emotions, as early as the second month. After 
 that they increase in variety and exhibit more and more the 
 tendency to repetition (for example, ba-ba-ba, da-da-da-da, 
 etc.). These expressive sounds differ from those of many 
 animals only in their greater and continually changing variety. 
 They are produced on all possible occasions and without any 
 intention of conmiunicating anything, so that they are by no 
 means to be classed as elements of speech. Through the in- 
 fluence of those about the child these sounds generally become 
 elements of speech after the beginning of the second year. This 
 result is brought about chiefly by certain imitative movements. 
 It comes, in the form of sound-sensations, from two sides. On 
 the one hand, the child imitates adults, on the other, adults 
 imitate the child. In fact, as a rule, it is the adults who 
 
 19* 
 
292 IV- Psyehieal Developments. 
 
 begin the imitating; they repeat the involuntary articulations 
 of the child and attach a particular meaning to them, as, 
 for example, "par-pa" for father, "ma-ma" for mother, etc. 
 It is not until later, after the child has learned to use these 
 sounds in a particular sense through intentional imitation, 
 that he repeats other words of the adults' language also, and 
 even then he modifies them to fit the stock of sounds that 
 he is able to articulate. 
 
 Gestures are important as means by which adults, more 
 instinctively than voluntarily, help the child to understand 
 the words they use. These are generally indicative gestures 
 towards the objects; less frequently, ordinarily only in the 
 case of words meaning* some activity such as strike, cut, 
 walk, sleep, etc., they take the form of depicting gestures. 
 The child has a natural understanding for these gestures, 
 but not for words. Even the onomatopoetic words of child- 
 speech (such as bow-bow for dog, etc.) never become intelKgible 
 to him until the objects have been frequently pointed out. 
 The child is not the creator of these words, but it is rather 
 the adult who seeks instinctively to accommodate himself in 
 this respect also to the stage of the child's consciousness. 
 
 All this goes to show that the child's learning to speak 
 is the result of a series of associations and apperceptions in 
 whose formation both the child and those about him take 
 part. Adults voluntarily designate particular ideas with certain 
 words taken from the expressive sounds made by the child, 
 or with onomatopoetic words made arbitrarily after the pattern 
 of the first class. The child apperceives this combination of 
 word and idea after it has been made intelUgible to him 
 with gestures, and associates it with his own imitative articu- 
 lative movements. Following the pattern of these first apper- 
 ceptions and associations the child then forms others, by 
 imitating of his own accord more and more the words and 
 
§ 20. Psychical Development of the Child. 293 
 
 verbal combinations that he accidentally hears adults using, 
 and by making the appropriate associations with their meanings. 
 The whole process is thus the result of a psychical interaction 
 between the child and those about him. The sounds are at 
 first produced by the child alone, those about him take up 
 these sounds and make use of them for purposes of speech. 
 
 9. The final development that comes from all the simpler 
 processes thus far discussed, is that of the complex functions 
 of apperception, that is the relating and comparing activities, 
 and the activities of imagination and understanding made up 
 of these (§ 17). 
 
 Apperceptive combination in its first form is exclusively 
 the activity of imagination, that is the combination, analysis, 
 and relating of concrete sensible ideas. Thus, individual 
 development corroborates what has been said in general about 
 the genetic relation of these functions (p. 266). On the basis 
 of the continually increasing association of immediate im- 
 pressions with earlier ideas, there arises in the child, as soon 
 as his active attention is aroused, a tendency to form such 
 combinations voluntarily. The number of memory-elements 
 freely combining with the impression and added to it, furnish 
 us with a measure for the fertiHty of the individual child's 
 imagination. As soon as this combining activity of imagination 
 has once begun to operate, it shows itself with an impulsive 
 force that the child is unable to resist, for there is not as 
 yet, as in the case of adults, any activity of the understanding 
 to prescribe definite intellectual ends regulating and inhibiting 
 the free sweep of the ideas of imagination. 
 
 This imchecked relating and coupling of ideas in imagination 
 is connected with voKtional impulses aiming to find for the 
 ideas some starting-points in immediate sense-perception, how- 
 ever vague these starting-points may be. This is what gives 
 rise to the child's play-impulse. The earliest games of the 
 
294 IT^- Psychical Developments. 
 
 child are those of pure imagination; while, on the contrary, 
 those of adults (cards, chess, lotto, etc.) are almost as exclusively 
 intellectual games. Only where aesthetical demands exert an in- 
 fluence are the games of adults the productions of the imagina- 
 tion (drama, piano-playing, etc.), hut even here they are not 
 whoUy untrammeled Uke those of the child, but are regulated 
 by the understanding. When the play of a child takes its natural 
 course, it shows at difEerent periods of its development all 
 the intermediate stages between the game of pure imagination 
 and that in which imagination and understanding are united. In 
 the first years this play consists in the production of rhyth- 
 mical movements of the arms and legs, then the movements 
 are carried over to external objects as well, with preference 
 to such objects as give rise to auditory sensations, or such 
 as are of bright colors. In their origin these movements are 
 obviously impulsive acts aroused by certain sensational stimuli 
 and dependent for their purposive coordination on inherited 
 traits of the central nervous organs. The rhythmical order 
 of the movements and of the feelings and sound-impressions 
 produced by them, obviously arouse pleasurable feelings, and 
 this very soon results in the voluntary repetition of the move- 
 ments. After this, during the first years, play becomes gradu- 
 ally a voluntary imitation of the occupations and scenes that 
 the child sees about him. The range of imitation then widens 
 and is no longer limited to what is seen, but includes a free 
 reproduction of what is heard in narratives. At the same 
 time the interconnection between ideas and acts begins to 
 follow a more fixed plan. This is the regulative influence of 
 the activity of understanding, which shows itself in the games 
 of later childhood in perscribed rules. This development is 
 often accelerated through the influence of those about the 
 child and through artificial forms of play generally invented 
 by adults and not always suited to the child's imagination; 
 
§ 20. Psychical Development of the Child. 295 
 
 Still, the development is to be recognized as natural and 
 necessarily conditioned by tbe reciprocal interconnection of 
 associative and apperceptive processes, since it agrees witb 
 the general development of the intellectual functions. The 
 way in which the processes of imagination are gradually 
 curtailed and the functions of understanding more and more 
 employed, renders it probable that the curtaiUng is due not 
 so much to a quantitative decrease of imagination as to an 
 obstruction of its action through abstract thinking. When 
 this has once set in, because of the predominating exercise 
 of abstract thinking, the activity of imagination may itself 
 through lack of use be interfered with. This view seems to 
 be supported by the fact that savages usually have all through 
 their lives an imaginative play-impulse related to that of the child. 
 10. From imaginative forms of thought as a starting- 
 point the functions of understanding develop very gradually 
 in the way already described (p. 264). Aggregate ideas that are 
 presented in sense -perception or formed by the combining 
 activity of imagination are divided into their conceptual 
 components, into objects and their attributes, into objects 
 and their activities, or into the relations of different objects 
 to one another. The decisive symptom for the rise of the 
 functions of understanding is therefore the formation of 
 fioneepts. On the other hand, actions that can be explained 
 from the point of view of the observer by logical reflection, are 
 by no means proofs of the existence of such reflection on 
 the part of the actor, for they are very often obviously 
 derived from associations, just as in the case of animals. 
 In the same way there may be the first beginnings of sjieech 
 without abstract thinking in any proper sense, since words 
 refer originally only to concrete sensible impressions. Still, 
 the more perfect use of language is not possible until ideas 
 are conceptually analyzed, related, and transferred, even 
 
296 IV^. Psyekieal Developments. 
 
 though the processes are in each case entirely concrete and 
 sensible. The development of the functions of understanding 
 and that of speech accordingly go hand in hand, and the 
 latter is an indispensable %id in retaining concepts and fixing 
 the operations of thought. 
 
 10 a. Child-psychology often suffers from the same mistake 
 that is made in animal psychology: namely, that the obserTations 
 are not interpreted objectively, but are filled out with subjective 
 reflections. Thus, the earliest ideational combinations, which are 
 in reality purely associative, are regarded as acts of logical 
 reflection, and the earliest mimetic expressive movements, as, for 
 example, those of a new-born child due to taste-stimuli, are looked 
 upon as reactions to feelings, while they are obviously at first 
 nothing but connate reflexes which may, indeed, be accompanied 
 by obscure concomitant feelings, but even these can not be 
 demonstrated with certainty. The ordinary view as to the devel- 
 opment of volition and of speech, labors under a like miscon- 
 ception. Generally there is a tendency to consider the child's 
 language, because of its peculiarities, as a creation of his own. 
 Closer observation, however, shows that it is created by those 
 about him, though in doing this they use the sounds that the 
 child himself produces, and conform as far as possible to his 
 stage of consciousness. Thus it comes that some of the very 
 detailed and praise-worthy accounts of the mental development of 
 the child in modern literature can serve only as sources for 
 finding objective facts. Because they stand on the basis of a 
 reflective popular psychology, their psychological deductions require 
 correction along the lines marked out above. 
 
 § 21. DEVELOPMENT OP MENTAL OOMMUNITIES. 
 
 1. Just as the psychical development of the child is the 
 resultant of his interaction with his environment, so matured 
 consciousness stands continually in relation to the mental 
 cominuhity in which it has a receptive and an active part. 
 Among most animals such a conununity is entirely wanting. 
 
^ 21. Development of Mental Communities. 297 
 
 In animal marriage, animal states, and flocks, we have only 
 incomplete forerunners of mental communities, and they are 
 generally limited to the accompKshment of certain single 
 ends. The more lasting forms, animal marriage and the 
 falsely named animal states (p. 279), are really sexual com- 
 munities; the more transient forms or flocks, as, for example, 
 flocks of migratory birds, are communities for protection. In 
 all these cases it is certain instincts that have grown more 
 and more fixed through transmission, which hold the individ- 
 uals together. The community, therefore, shows the same 
 constancy as instinct, in general, and is very Uttle modified 
 by the influences of individuals. 
 
 While animal communities are, thus, mere enlargements 
 of the individual existence, aiming at certain physical vital 
 ends, human development seeks from-i'the first so to unite 
 the individual with his mental environment that the whole 
 is capable of development, serving at once the satisfaction of 
 the physical needs of Hfe and the pursuit of the most various 
 mental ends, while permitting also great variations in these 
 ends. As a result the forms of human society are exceed- 
 ingly variable. The more fully developed forms, however, 
 enter into a continuous train of historical development which 
 extends the mental ties that connect individuals almost un- 
 Mmitedly beyond the bounds of immediate spacial and temporal 
 proximity. The final result of this development is the forma- 
 tion of the notion of humanity as a great general mental 
 community which is divided up according to the special 
 conditions of life into single concrete communities, peoples, 
 states, civilized societies of various kinds, races, and families. 
 The mental community to which the individual belongs is, 
 therefore, not one, but a changing plurality of mental unions 
 which are interlaced in the most manifold ways and become 
 more and more numerous as development progresses. 
 
298 ^^- PsyoMcal Developments. 
 
 2. The problem of tracing these developments in their 
 concrete forms or even in their general interconnection, be- 
 longs to the history of civilization and to general history, 
 not to psychology. Still, we must give some account here 
 of the general psychical conditions and the psychical pro- 
 cesses arising from these conditions that distinguish social 
 from individual life. 
 
 The condition -which is a prime necessity of every mental 
 community at its beginning, and a continually operative factor 
 in its further development, is the function of speech. This 
 is what makes the development of mental communities from 
 individual existences psychologically possible. In its origin it 
 comes from the expressive movements of the individual, but 
 as a result of its development it becomes the indispensable 
 form for all the common mental contents. These common 
 contents, or the mental processes which belong to the whole 
 community, may be divided into two classes, which are merely 
 interrelated components of social Hfe, not distinct processes 
 any more than are the processes of ideation and volition 
 in individual experience. The first of these classes is that 
 of the common ideas, where we find especially the accepted 
 conclusions on the questions of the content and significance 
 of the world — these are the mythological ideas. The second 
 class consists of the common motives of volition, which 
 correspond to the common ideas and their attending feelings 
 and emotions — these are the laws of custom. 
 
 A. SPEECH. 
 
 3. We obtain no information in regard to the general 
 development of speech frond the individual development of 
 the child, because here the larger part of the process depends 
 on those about him rather than on himself (p. 292 sq.) Still, 
 the fact that the child learns to speak at all, shows that he 
 
§ 21. Development of Mental Communities. 299 
 
 has psychical and physical traits favorable to the reception 
 of language -when it is communicated. In fact, it may he 
 assumed that these traits would, even if there were no com- 
 munications from without, lead to the development of some 
 kind of expressive movements accompanied by sounds, which 
 would form an incomplete language. This supposition is 
 justified by observations on the deaf and dumb, especially 
 deaf and dumb children who have grown up without any 
 systematic education. In spite of this lack of education, an 
 energetic mental intercourse may take place between them. 
 In such a case, however, since the deaf and dumb can per- 
 ceive only visual signs, the intercourse must depend on the 
 development of a natural gesture-language made up of a 
 combination of significant expressive movements. Eeehngs 
 are in general expressed by mimetic movements, ideas by 
 pantomimetic, either by pointing at the object with the 
 finger or by drawing some kind of picture of the idea in 
 the air, that is, by means of indicative or depicting gestures 
 (p. 173). There may even be a combination of such signs 
 corresponding to a series of successive ideas, and thus a kind 
 of sentence may be formed, by means of which things are 
 described and occurrences narrated. This natural gesture- 
 language can never go any further, however, than the com- 
 munication of concrete sensible ideas and their interconnection. 
 Signs for abstract concepts are entirely wanting. 
 
 4. The primitive development of articulate language can 
 hardly be thought of except after the analogy of the rise 
 of this natural gesture-language. The only difference is that 
 in this case the ability to hear results in the addition of a third 
 form of movements to the mimetic and pantomimetic move- 
 ments. These are the articulatory movements, and since they 
 are much more easily perceived, and capable of incomparably 
 more various modification, it must of necessity follow that 
 
300 I^- PsycMcul Devdopmmts, 
 
 they soon exceed the others in importance. But just as 
 mimetic and pantomimetic gestures owe their intelligibility to 
 the immediate relation that exists between the character of 
 the movement and its meaning, so here also we must pre- 
 suppose a hke relation between the original articulatory 
 movement and its meaning. Then, too, it is not improbable 
 that articulation was at first aided by accompanying mimetic, 
 and pantomimetic gestures. As evidence for this view we 
 have the unrestrained use of such gestures by savages, and 
 the important part they play in the child's learning to speak. 
 The development of articulate language is, accordingly, in 
 all probability to be thought of as a process of differentiation, 
 in which the articulatory movements have gradually gained 
 the permanent ascendency over a number of different variable 
 expressive movements that originally attended them, and have 
 dispensed with these auxDiary movements as they themselves 
 gained a sufficient degree of fixity. Psychologically the pro- 
 cess may be divided into two acts. The first consists in the 
 expressive movements of the individual member of the com- 
 munity. These are impulsive volitional acts, among which 
 the movements of the vocal organs gain the ascendency over 
 the others in the effort of the individual to communicate 
 with his fellows. The second consists in the subsequent 
 associations between sound and idea, which gradually become 
 more fixed, and spread from the centres where they originated 
 through wider circles of society. 
 
 5. From the first there are other physical and psychical 
 conditions that take part in the formation of language and 
 produce continual and unceasing modifications in its com- 
 ponents. Such modifications may be divided into two classes : 
 those of sound and those of meaning. 
 
 The first class have their physiological cause in the 
 gradual changes that take place in the physical structure of 
 
§ 21. Development of Mental Communiiies. 3OI 
 
 the vocal organs. These changes are, to a great extent at 
 least, either physically or psycho-physically conditioned. They 
 come partly from the general changes which the transition 
 from a savage to a civilized condition produces in the phys- 
 ical organism, partly from the special conditions that result 
 from increased practice in the execution of articulatory 
 movements. Many phenomena go to show that the gradually 
 increasing rapidity of articulation is of especially great in- 
 fluence. Then, too, the words that are in any way analogous 
 effect one another in a way that indicates the interference 
 of the psychical factor of association. 
 
 As the change in sound modifies the outer form of words; 
 so the change in meaning modifies their inner content. The 
 original association between a word and the idea it expresses 
 is modified by the substitution of another different idea. 
 This process of substitution may be several times repeated 
 with the same word. The change in the meaning of words 
 depends, therefore, on a gradual modification of the asso- 
 ciative conditions determining the ideational complication that 
 shall arise in the fixation-point of consciousness when a word 
 is heard or spoken. It may, accordingly, be briefly defined 
 as a shifting of the ideational component of the complications 
 connected with articulate sounds (p. 234). 
 
 These changes in the sound and meaning of words operate 
 together in bringiug about the gradual disappearance of the 
 originally necessary relation between sound and meaning, so 
 that a word finally comes to be looked upon as a mere ex- 
 ternal sign of the idea. This process is so complete that 
 even those verbal forms in which this relation seems to be 
 still retained, onomatopoetic words, appear to be, for the 
 most part, products of a relatively late and secondary assim- 
 ilative process which seeks to reestablish the lost affinity 
 between sound and meaning. 
 
302 IV". Psychical Developments. 
 
 Another important consequence of this combined action 
 of changes in sound and meaning, is to be found in the fact 
 that many words gradually lose entirely their original con- 
 crete sensible significance, and become signs of general con- 
 cepts and means for the expression of the apperceptive 
 relating and comparing functions and their products. In 
 this -way abstract thinking is developed. It would be im- 
 possible without the change in meaning of words upon which 
 it is based and it is, therefore, a product of the psychical and 
 psycho-physical interactions from which the progressive devel- 
 opment of language results. 
 
 6. Just as the components of language, or words, are under- 
 going a continual development in sound and meaning, so in 
 the same way, though generally more slowly, changes are 
 going on in the combinations of these components into com- 
 plete wholes, that is, in sentences. No language can be 
 thought of without some such syntactic order of its words. 
 Sentences and words are, therefore, equally primitive as 
 psychological forms of thought. In a certain sense the sen- 
 tence may even be called the earlier, for, especially in the 
 more incomplete stages of language, the words of a sentence 
 are so uncertainly distinguished that they seem to be nothing 
 but the products of a breaking up of an originally unitary 
 thought expressed by the whole sentence. There is no uni- 
 versal rule for the order of words, any more than there is 
 for the relation of sound to meaning. The order that logic 
 favors with a view to the relations of reciprocal logical de- 
 pendence between concepts, has no psychological universality ; 
 it appears, in fact, to be a fairly late product of development, 
 due in part to arbitrary convention, and approached only 
 by the prose forms of some modern languages which are 
 syntactically nearly fixed. The original principle followed 
 in apperceptive combination of words is obviously this, the 
 
§ 21. Development of Mental Communities. 3(J3 
 
 order of the words corresponds to the succession of ideas. 
 Especially those parts of speech that represent the ideas 
 which arouse the most intense feehngs and attract the atten- 
 tion, are placed first. Following this principle, certain re- 
 gularities in the order of words are deyeloped in any given 
 community. In fact, such a regularity is to be observed 
 even in the natural gesture-language of the deaf and dumb. 
 Still, it is easy to understand that the most various modi- 
 fications in this respect may appear under special circumstances, 
 and that the possible range of these modifications is very 
 great. In general, however, the habits of association lead 
 more and more to the fixation of particular syntactic forms, 
 so that a certain rigidity usually results. 
 
 Apart from the general laws presented in the discussion 
 of apperceptive combinations, and there shown to arise from 
 the general psychical functions of relating and comparing 
 (p. 264), the detailed discussion of the characteristics of syn- 
 tactic combinations and their gradual changes, must be left, 
 in spite of their psychological importance, to social psy- 
 chology, because they depend so much on the specific dis- 
 positions and conditions of civilization in a given community. 
 
 B. MYTHS. 
 
 7. The development of myths is closely related to that 
 of language. Mythological thought is based, to be sure, 
 just as language itself, upon certain attributes that are never 
 lost in human consciousness; stiQ, these attributes are modi- 
 fied and limited by a great variety of influences. As the 
 fundamental function which in its various forms of activity 
 gives rise to all mythological ideas, we have a characteristic 
 kind of apperception belonging to all naive consciousness and 
 suitably designated by the name personifying apperception. 
 It consists in the complete determination of the apperceived 
 
304 IV. Psyehieal Developments. 
 
 objects through the nature of the perceiving subject. The 
 subject not only sees his own sensations, emotions, and 
 voluntary movements reproduced in the objects, but even his 
 momentary affective state is in each case especially influential 
 in determining his view of the phenomena perceived, and in 
 arousing ideas of their relations to his own existence. As 
 a necessary result of such a view the same personal attri- 
 butes that the subject finds in himself are assigned to the 
 object. The inner attributes, of feeling, emotion, etc., are 
 never omitted, while the outer attributes of voluntary action 
 and other manifestations Hke those of men, are generally 
 dependent on movements actually perceived. The savage may 
 thus attribute to stones, plants, and works of art, an inner 
 capacity for sensations and feelings and their resulting effects, 
 but he usually assumes immediate action only in the case of 
 moving objects, such as clouds, heavenly bodies, winds, etc. 
 In all these cases the personification is favored by associative 
 assimilations which may readUy reach the intensity of illusions 
 of fancy (p. 268). 
 
 8. Myth-making, or personifying, apperception is not to 
 be regarded as a special form or even as a distinct sub-form 
 of apperception. It is nothing but the natural inceptive stage 
 of apperception in general. The child shows continually 
 obvious traces of it, partly in the activities of his imagination 
 in play (p. 293), partly in the fact that strong emotions, 
 especially fear and fright, easily arouse illusions of fancy 
 with an affective character analogous to that of the emotion. 
 In this case, however, the manifestations of a tendency to 
 form myths are early checked and soon entirely suppressed 
 through the influences of the child's environment and education. 
 With savage and partly civilized peoples it is different. There 
 the surrounding influences present a whole mass of mythological 
 ideas to the individual consciousness. These, too, originated 
 
§ 21. Development of Mmtal Communiiies. 305 
 
 in the minds of individuals, and have gradually become fixed 
 in some particular community, and in continual interrelation 
 with language have, like the latter, been transmitted from 
 generation to generation and become gradually modified in 
 the transition from savage to civilized conditions. 
 
 9. The direction in which these modifications take place, 
 is determined in general by the fact that the affective state 
 of the subject at the time is, as above remarked, the chief 
 influence in setthng the character of the myth-making apper- 
 ception. In order to gain some notion of the way in 
 which the affective state of the subject has changed from 
 the first beginnings of mental development to the present, 
 we must appeal to the history of the development of mytholog- 
 ical ideas, for other evidences are entirely wanting. It ap- 
 pears that in all cases the earliest mythplogical ideas referred, 
 on the one hand, to the personal fate in the immediate future, 
 and were determined, on the other, by the emotions aroused 
 by the death of comrades and by the memory of them, and 
 also in a high degree by the memories of dreamy. This 
 is the source of so-called "animism", that is, all those ideas 
 in which the spirits of the dead take the parts of controllers 
 of, fortune and bring about either weal or woe in human 
 life. "Fetishism" is a branch of animism, in which the 
 attribute of abihty to control fate is carried over to various 
 objects in the environment, such as animals, plants, stones, 
 works of art, especially those that attract the attention on 
 account of their striking character or of some accidental outer 
 circumstance. The phenomena of animism and fetishism 
 are not only the earliest, but also the most lasting, productions 
 of myth-making apperception. They continue, even after all 
 others are suppressed, in the various forms of superstitions 
 among civilized peoples, such as belief in ghosts, enchant- 
 ments, charms, etc. 
 
 WoNDT, Psychologj. 20 
 
306 I^- Psychical Developments. 
 
 10. After consciousness reaches a more advanced stage, 
 personifying apperception begins to deal with the greater 
 natural jihenomena which act upon human life both through 
 their changes and through their direct influence, such as the 
 clouds, rivers, winds, and greater heavenly bodies. The 
 regularity of certain natural phenomena, such as the alterna- 
 tion of night and day, of winter and summer, the processes 
 in a thunderstorm,- etc.,' gives occasion for the formation of 
 poetical myths, in which a series of interconnected ideas are 
 woven into one united whole. In this way the nature- myth 
 arises, which from its very character challenges the poetic power 
 of each individual to develop it further. It thus becomes 
 gradually a component of popular and then of literary poetry, 
 and tmdergoes a change in meaning through the fading out 
 of some of the features of the single mythical figures and 
 the appearance of other new features. This change, in turn, 
 makes possible a progressive inner change of the myth, 
 analogous to the change in words, by which it is always 
 accompanied. As the process goes on, single poets and. 
 thinkers gain an increasing influence. 
 
 In this way, there gradually results a division of the 
 whole content of mythological thought into science (philosophy) 
 and religion, while, at the same time, the nature-gods in 
 religion give place more and more to ethical ideas of deity. 
 After this division has taken place, the two departments in- 
 fluence each other mutually in many important ways. Still, 
 these facts must be left to social psychology and the history of 
 civilization, for they must be discussed in the light of special 
 social conditions as well as of general psychological laws. 
 
 C. CUSTOMS. 
 
 11. The development of customs is related to that of 
 myths in the same way that outer volitional acts are related 
 
§ 21. Development of Mental Communities. 307 
 
 to inner motives. Wherever we can trace out the origin of 
 ancient and wide-spread customs with any degree of proba- 
 bility, we find that they are remnants or modifications of 
 certain cult-forms. Thus, the funeral feasts and burial cere- 
 monies of civihzed peoples point to a primitive ancestor- 
 worship. Numerous feasts and ceremonies connected witli 
 particular days, with the change of the seasons, the tillage 
 of the fields, and the gathering of the harvest, all point back 
 to nature-myths. The custom of greeting, in its various forms, 
 betrays its direct derivation from the ceremonies of prayer. 
 
 This does not exclude the possibility that other motives 
 also, especially those of practical utiHty, have given rise to 
 what were at first individual habits, but gradually spread 
 throughout a community and thus became laws of custom. 
 The predominant feature of this development, however, is 
 the fact that primitive customs, even when they incidentally 
 serve practical needs, as, for example, the custom of wearing 
 a uniform pattern of clothes, of having meals at a regular time, 
 etc., still depend more or less on particular mythological ideas. 
 In fact, it would be hard to think of it as otherwise at a 
 time when consciousness was under the complete control of 
 a myth-making apperception. 
 
 12. With customs, as with language, the change in meaning 
 has exercised a modifying influence on their development. As 
 a result of this change, two chief Mnds of transformation 
 have taken place. In the first, the original mythical motive 
 has been lost and no new one has taken its place. The 
 custom continues as a consequence of associative habit, but 
 loses its imperative character and becomes much weaker in 
 its outward manifestations. In the second class of trans- 
 formations, a moral-social purpose takes the place of the 
 original mytho-religious motive. The two kinds of change 
 may in any single case be most intimately united; and even 
 
 20* 
 
308 I^- Psyehiccd Developments. 
 
 when a custom does not serve any particular social end 
 directly, as is the case, for example, with certain rules of 
 deportment, of etiquette, on the manner of dressing, eating, 
 etc., still it may do so indirectly in that the existence of some 
 common rules for the members of a community is favorable 
 to their united life and therefore to their common mental 
 development. 
 
 13. The psychological changes in customs as pointed out, 
 constitute the preparation for their differentiation into three 
 spheres, namely those of custom, of laiv, and of morality. 
 The last two are to be regarded as special forms of custom 
 aiming at moral-social ends. The detailed investigation of 
 the psychological development and differentiation of customs 
 in general is, however, a problem of social psychology, and 
 the discussion of the rise of law and morality belong also to 
 general history and ethics. ■ 
 
 14. We have here, in mental communities, and especially 
 in their development of language, myths, and customs, mental 
 interconnections and interactions that differ in essential respects 
 from the interconnection of the psychical compounds in an 
 individual consciousness, but still have just as much reality 
 as the individual consciousness itself. In this sense we may 
 speak o:f the interconnection of the ideas and feelings of a 
 social community as a collective consciousness, and of ■ the 
 common voHtional tendencies as a coUective will. In doing 
 this we are not to forget that these concepts do not mean 
 something that exists apart from the conscious and volitional 
 processes of the individual, any more than the community 
 itself is something besides , the union of individuals. Since 
 this union, however, brings forth certain mental products, 
 such as language, myths, and customs, for which only the 
 germs are present in the individual, and since it deter- 
 mines the development of the individual from a very early 
 
§ 21. Devehpment of Menial Commimities. 309 
 
 period, it is just as much an object of psychology as the 
 individual consciousness. For psychology must give an account 
 of the interactions which give rise to the products and attributes 
 of collective consciousness and of the collective will. 
 
 14a. The facts arising from the existence. of mental com- 
 munities have only recently come within the pale of psychological 
 investigation. These problems were formerly referred either to the 
 special mental sciences (philology, history, jurisprudence, etc.) or, if 
 of a more general character, to philosophy, that is to metaphysics. 
 If psychology did touch upon them at all, it was dominated, as 
 were the special sciences, history, jurisprudence, etc., by the 
 reflective method of popular psychology, which tends to treat all 
 mental products of communities, to as great an extent as possible, 
 as voluntary inventions aimed from the first at certain utilitarian 
 ends. This view found its chief philosophical expression in the 
 doctrine of a social contract, according to which a mental com- 
 munity is not something original and natural, but is derived from 
 the voluntary union of a number of individuals. This position 
 is psychologically untenable, and completely helpless in the presence 
 of the problems of social psychology. As one of its after-effects 
 we have even to-day the grossest misunderstandings of the concepts 
 collective consciousness and collective will. Instead of regarding 
 them simply as expressions for the actual agreement and inter- 
 action of individuals in a community, some still suspect that there 
 is behind them a mythological being of some kind, or at least a 
 metaphysical substance. 
 
PSYCHICAL CAUSALITY 
 AND ITS LAWS. 
 
 § 22. CONCEPT OF MIND. 
 
 1. Every empirical science has, as its primary and charac- 
 teristic subject of treatment, certain particular facts of ex- 
 perience whose nature and reciprocal relations it seeks to 
 investigate. In solving these problems it is found to be 
 necessary, if we are not to give up entirely the grouping 
 of the facts under leading heads, to have general supplemenr- 
 tary concepts that are not contained in experience itself, but 
 are gained by a process of logical treatment of this experience. 
 The most general supplementary concept of this kind that 
 has found its place in all the empii'ical sciences, is the concept 
 of causality. It comes from the necessity of thought that 
 all our experiences shall be arranged accoi'ding to reason 
 and consequent, and that we shall remove, by means of 
 seco7idary supplementary concepts and if need be by means 
 of concepts of a hypothetical character, all contradictions 
 that stand in the way of the establishment of a consistent 
 interconnection of this kind. In this sense we may regard 
 all the supplementary concepts that serve for the interpretation 
 of any sphere of experience, as apphcations of the general 
 principle of causation. They are justified in so far as they 
 are required, or at least rendered probable, by this principle; 
 they are unjustifiable so soon as they prove to be arbitrary 
 
§22. Conoept of Mind. 311 
 
 fictions resulting from foreign motives, and contributing 
 nothing to the interpretation of experience. 
 
 2. In this sense the concept matter is a fundamental 
 supplementary concept of natural science. In its most general 
 significance it designates the permanent substratum assumed 
 as existing in universal space, to vrhose activities vre must 
 attribute all natural phenomena. In this most general sense 
 the concept matter is indispensable to every explanation of 
 natural science. The attempt in recent times to raise energy 
 to the position of a governing principle, does not succeed in 
 doing away with the concept matter, but merely gives it a 
 different content. This content, however, is given to the 
 concept by means of a second supplementary concept, which 
 relates to the causal activity of matter. The concept of 
 matter that has been accepted in natural science up to the 
 present time, is based upon the mechanical physics of Galileo, 
 and uses as its secondary supplementary concept the concept 
 of force, which is defined as the product of the mass and the 
 momentary acceleration. A physics of energy would have to 
 use everywhere instead of this the concept energy, which in 
 the special form of mechanical energy is defined as half the 
 product of the mass multiplied by the square of the velocity. 
 Energy, however, must, just as well as force, have a position 
 in objective space, and under certain particular conditions the 
 points from which energy proceeds may, just as well as the 
 points from which force proceeds, change their place in space, 
 so that the concept of matter as a substratum contained in 
 space, is retained in both cases. The only difference, and 
 it is indeed an important one, is that when we use the con- 
 cept force, we presuppose the reducibility of all natural 
 phenomena to forms of mechanical motion, while when we 
 use the concept of energy, we attribute to matter not only 
 the property of motion without a change in the form of 
 
312 v. Psychical CausalHy and its Laws. 
 
 energy, but also the property of the transformability of quaU- 
 tatively different forms of energy into oiie another without 
 a change in the quantity of the energy. 
 
 3. The concept oi mind is a supplementary concept of 
 psychology, in the same way that the concept matter is a 
 supplementary concept of natural science. It too is indis- 
 pensable in sO far as we heed a concept which shall express 
 in a comprehensive way the totality of psychical experiences 
 in an individual consciousness. The particular content of the 
 concept, however, is in this case also entirely dependent on 
 the secondary concepts that give a more detailed definition of 
 psychical causality. In the definition of this content psy- 
 chology shared at first the fortune of the natural sciences. 
 Both the concept of mind and that of matter arose primarily 
 not so much from the need of explaining experience as from 
 the effort to reach a systematic doctrine of the general inter- 
 connection of all things. But while the natural sciences have 
 long since outgrown this mythological stage of speculative 
 definition, and make use of some of the single ideas that 
 originated at that time, only for the purpose of gaining definite 
 starting-points for a strict methodical definition of their con- 
 cepts, psychology has continued under the control of the 
 mythological, metaphysical concept of mind down to most 
 modem times, and still remains, in part at least, under its 
 control. This concept is not used as a general supplemen- 
 tary concept that serves primarily to gather together the 
 psychical facts and only secondarily to give a causal inter- 
 pretation of them, but it is employed as a means to satisfy 
 so far as possible the need Of a general universal system, 
 including both nature and the individual existence. 
 
 4. The concept of a mind-substance in its various forms 
 is rooted in this mythological and metaphysical need. In its 
 development there have not been wanting efforts to meet 
 
§22. Concept of Mind. 313 
 
 from this position, so far as possible, the demand for a 
 psychological causal explanation, still, such efforts have in 
 all cases been afterthoughts; and it is perfectly obvious that 
 psychological experience alone, independent of all foreign 
 metaphysical motives, would never have led to a concept of 
 mind-substance. This concept has beyond a doubt exercised 
 a harmful influence on the treatment of experience. The view, 
 for example, that all the contents of psychical experience are 
 ideas, and that these ideas are more or less permanent ob- 
 jects, would hardly be comprehensible without such presup- 
 positions. That this concept is really foreign to psychology, 
 is further attested by the close interconnection in which it 
 stands to the concept of material substance. It is regarded 
 either as identical with the latter, or else as distinct in nature, 
 but still reducible in its most general formal characteristics 
 to one of the particular forms of the concept matter, namely 
 to the atom. 
 
 5. Ttvo forms of the concept mind- substance may be 
 distinguished, corresponding to the two types of metaphysical 
 psychology pointed out above (§ 2, p. 6). The one is 
 materialistic and regards psychical processes as the activities 
 of matter or of certain material complexes, such as the 
 brain-elements. The other is spiritualistic and looks upon 
 these processes as states and changes in an unextended and 
 therefore indivisible and permanent being of a specifically 
 spiritual nature. In this case matter is thought of as made up 
 of similar atoms of a lower order (monistic, or monado-logical 
 spiritualism), or the mind -atom is regarded as specifically 
 different from matter proper (dualistic spiritualism) (comp. p. 7). 
 
 In both its materialistic and spiritualistic forms, the con- 
 cept mind-substance does nothing for the interpretation of 
 psychological experience. Materialism does away with psy- 
 chology entirely and puts in its place an imaginary brain- 
 
314 V. Psyehioal Causality and its Laws. 
 
 physiology of the future, or when it tries to give positive 
 theories, falls into douhtful and unreliable hypotheses of cere- 
 bral physiology. In thus giving up psychology in any proper 
 sense, this doctrine gives up entirely the attempt to furnish 
 any practical basis for the mental sciences. Spiritualism 
 allows psychology as such to continue, but subordinates actual 
 experience to entirely arbitrary metaphysical hypotheses, 
 through which the unprejudiced observation of psychical 
 processes is obstructed. This appears first of all in the in- 
 correct statement of the problem of psychology, with which 
 the metaphysical theories start. They regard inner and outer 
 experience as totally heterogeneous, though in some external 
 way interacting, spheres. 
 
 6. It has been shown (§ 1, p. 3) that the experience 
 dealt with in the natural sciences and in psychology are 
 nothing but components of one experience regarded from 
 different points of view: in the natural sciences as an inter- 
 connection of objective phenomena and, in consequence of 
 the abstraction from the knowing subject, as mediate ex-- 
 perience; in psychology as immediate and underived ex- 
 perience. 
 
 When this relation is once understood, the concept of a 
 mindr-substance immediately gives place to the concept of the 
 actuality of mind as a basis for the comprehension of psy- 
 chical processes. Since the -psychological treatment of ex- 
 perience is supplementary to that of the natural sciences, in 
 that it deals with the immediate reality of experience, it 
 follows naturally that there is no place in psychology for 
 hypothetical supplementary concepts such as are necessary 
 in the natural sciences because of their concept of an object 
 independent of the subject. In this sense, the concept of 
 the actuality of mind does not require any hypothetical 
 (loterminants to define its particular contents, as the concept 
 
§ 22. Concept of Mind. 315 
 
 of matter does, but quite to the contrary, it excludes such 
 hypothetical elements from the first by defining the nature 
 of mind as the immediate reality of the processes themselves. 
 Still, since one important component of these processes, 
 namely the totality of ideational objects, is at the same time 
 the subject of consideration in the natural sciences, it ne- 
 cessarily follows that substance and actuality are concepts 
 that refer to one and the same general experience, with the 
 difference that in each case this experience is looked at from 
 a different point of view. If we abstract from the knowing 
 subject in our treatment of the world of experience, it appears 
 as a manifold of interacting substances; if, on the contrary, 
 we regard it as the total content of the experience of the 
 subject including the subject itself, it appears as a manifold 
 of interrelated occurrences. In the first case, phenomena 
 are looked upon as outer phenomena, in the sense that they 
 would take place just the same, even if the knowing subject 
 were not there at all, so that we may call the form of ex- 
 perience dealt with in the natural sciences outer experience. 
 In the second case, on the contrary, all the contents of 
 experience are regarded as belonging directly to the 
 knovring subject, so that we may call the psychological 
 attitude towards experience that of inner experience. In 
 this sense outer and inner experience are identical with 
 mediate and immediate, or with objective and subjective 
 forms of experience. They all serve to designate, not different 
 spheres of experience, but different supplementary points of 
 view in the consideration of an experience which is presented 
 to us as an absolute unity. 
 
 7. That the method of treating experience employed in 
 natural science should have reached its maturity before that 
 employed in psychology, is easily comprehensible in view of 
 the practical interest connected with the discovery of regular 
 
316 V^. Psychical Catosality and its Laws. 
 
 natural phenomena thought of as independent of the subject; 
 and it was almost unaroidable that this priority of the natural 
 sciences should, for a long time, lead to a confusion of the 
 two points of view. This did really occur as we see by the 
 different psychological substance-concepts. It is for this reason 
 that the reform in the fundamental position of psychology, 
 which looks for the characteristics of this science and for its 
 problems, not in the specifically distinct nature of its sphere, 
 but in its method of considering all the contents presented 
 to us in experience in their immediate reality, unmodified by 
 any hypothetical supplementary concepts — this reform did 
 not originate with psychology itself, but with the dngle 
 mental sciences. The view of mental processes based upon the 
 concept of actuality, was familiar in these sciences long be- 
 fore it was accepted in psychology. This inadmissible dif- 
 ference between the fundamental position of psychology and 
 the mental sciences is what has kept psychology until the 
 present time from fulfilhng its mission of serving as a foun- 
 dation for all the mental sciences. 
 
 8. "When the concept of actuality is adopted, 'a question 
 upon which metaphysical systems of psychology have been 
 long divided is immediately disposed of. This is the question 
 of the relation of body and mind. So long as body and 
 mind are both regarded as substances, this relation must 
 remain an enigma, however the two concepts of substance 
 may be defined. If they are like substances, then the different 
 contents of experience as dealt with in the natural sciences 
 and in psychology can no longer be understood, and there 
 is no alternative but to deny the independence of one of 
 these forms of knowledge. If they are unlike substances, their 
 connection is a continual miracle. If we start with the theory 
 of the actuality of mind, we recognize the immediate reality of 
 the phenomena in psychological experience. Our physiological 
 
§ 22. Concept of Mind. 3 1 7 
 
 concept of the bodily organism, on the other hand, is nothing 
 but a part of this experience, which we gain, just as we do 
 all the other empirical contents of the natural sciences, by 
 assuming the existence of an object independent of the 
 knowing subject. Certain components of mediate experience 
 may correspond to certain components of immediate experience, 
 without its being necessary, for this reason, to reduce the 
 one to the other or to derive one from the other. In fact, 
 such a derivation is absolutely impossible because of the 
 totally different points of view adopted in the two cases. 
 StiU, the fact that we have here not different objects of 
 experience, but different points of view in looking at a uni- 
 tary experience, renders'necessary the existence at every point 
 of relations between the two. At the same time it must 
 be remembered that there is an, infinite number of objects 
 that can be approached only mediately, through the method 
 of the natural sciences : here . belong all those phenomena 
 that we are not obHged to regard as physiological substrata 
 of psychical processes. On the other hand, there is just as 
 large a number of important facts that are presented only 
 immediately, or in psychological experience: these are all 
 those contents of our subjective consciousness which do not 
 have the character of ideational objects, that is, the character 
 of contents which are directly referred to external objects. 
 
 9. As a result of this relation, it follows that there must 
 be a necessary relation between all the facts that belong at 
 the same time to both kinds of experience, to the mediate 
 experience of the natural sciences and to the immediate ex- 
 perience of psychology, for they are nothing but components 
 of a single experience which is merely regarded in the two cases 
 from different points of view. Since these facts belong to both 
 spheres, there must be an elementary process on the physical 
 side, corresponding to every such process on the psychical 
 
318 V- Psyehical GausaMy and its Laws. 
 
 side. This general principle is known as the prirmpleof 
 psyclm-physical parallelism. It has an empirico-psychological 
 significance and is thus totally different from certain meta^ 
 physical principles that have sometimes been designated by 
 the same name, but in reality have an entirely different 
 meaning. These metaphysical principles are all based on 
 the hypothesis of a psychical substance. They all seek to 
 solve the problem of the interrelation of body and mind, either 
 by assuming two real substances with attributes which are 
 different, but parallel in their changes, or by assuming one 
 substance with two distinct attributes that correspond in their 
 modifications. In both these cases the metaphysical principle 
 of parallelism is based on the assumption that every physical 
 process has a corresponding psychical process and vice 
 versa; or on the assumption that the mental world is a 
 mirroring of the bodily world, or that the bodily world is an 
 objective realization of the mental. This assumption is, 
 however, entirely indemonstrable and arbitrary, and leads in 
 its psychological application to an intellectuahsm contradictory 
 to all experience. The psychological principle, on the other 
 hand, as above formulated, starts vdth the assumption that 
 there is only one experience, which, however, as soon as it 
 becomes the subject of scientific analysis, is, in some of its 
 components, open to two different kinds of scientific treatment: 
 to a mediate form of treatment, which investigates ideated 
 objects in their objective relations to one another, and to an 
 immediate foim, which investigates the same objects in their 
 directly known character, and in their relations to all the other 
 contents of the experience of the knowing subject. So far as 
 there are objects to which both these forms of treatment are 
 applicable, the psychological principle of parallelism requires, 
 between the processes on the two sides, a relation at every 
 point. This requirement is justified by the fact that both 
 
§ 22. Concept of Mind. 3 1 9 
 
 forms of analysis are in these two cases really analyses of 
 one and the same content of experience. On the other hand, 
 from the very nature of the case, the psychological principle 
 of parallelism can not apply to those contents of experience 
 which are objects of natural-scientific analysis alone, or to 
 those which go to make up the specific character of psy- 
 chological experience. Among the latter we must reckon the 
 characteristic combinations and relations of psychical elements 
 and compounds. To he sure, there are combinations of phys- 
 ical processes running parallel to these, in so far at least 
 as a direct or indirect causal relation must exist between the 
 physical processes whose regular coexistence or succession is 
 indicated by a psychical interconnection, but the character- 
 istic content of the psychical combination can, of course, in 
 no way be a part of the causal relation between the physical 
 processes. Thus, for example, the elements that enter into 
 a spacial or temporal idea, stand in a regular relation of 
 coexistence and succession in their physiological substrata 
 also; or the ideational elements that make up a process of 
 relating or comparing psychical contents, have corresponding 
 combinations of physiological excitation of some kind or other, 
 which are repeated whenever these psychical processes take 
 place. But the physiological processes can not contain any- 
 thing of that which goes most of all to form the specific 
 nature of spacial and temporal ideas, or of relating and com- 
 paring processes, because natural science purposely abstracts 
 from all that is here concerned. Then, too, there are two con- 
 cepts that result from the psychical combinations, which, 
 together with their related affective elements, lie entirely 
 outside the sphere of experience to which the principle of 
 parallelism applies. There are the concepts of valiie and 
 end. The forms of combination that we see in processes 
 of fusion or in associative and apperceptive processes, as well 
 
320 y^- Psychieal Causality and its Laws. 
 
 as the values that they possess in the whole interconnection 
 of psychical development, can only be understood through 
 psychological analysis, in the same way that objective phe- 
 nomena, such as those of weight, sound, light, heat, etc., or 
 the processes of the nervous system, can be approached only 
 by physical and physiological analysis, that is, analysis that 
 makes use of the supplementary substance-concepts of natural 
 science. 
 
 10. Thus, the principle of psycho-physical parallelism in 
 the incontrovertible empirico-psychologicai significance above 
 attributed to it, leads necessarily to the recognition of an 
 independent psychical causality, which is related at all points 
 with physical causality and can never come into contradiction 
 with it, but is just as different from this physical causality 
 as the point of view adopted in psychology, or that of im- 
 mediate, subjective experience, is different from the point of 
 view taken in the natural sciences, or that of mediate, ob- 
 jective experience due to abstraction. And just as the nature 
 of physical causality can be revealed to us only in the fun- 
 damental laws of nature, so the only way that we have of 
 accounting for the characteristics of psychical causality is to 
 abstract certain fundamental laws of psychical phenomena 
 from the totality of psychical processes. We may distinguish 
 two classes of such laws. The laws of one class show them- 
 selves primarily in the processes which condition the rise and 
 immediate interaction of the psychical compounds; we call 
 these the psychological laws of relation. Those of the second 
 class are derived laws. They consist in the complex effects 
 that are produced by combinations of the laws of relation 
 within more extensive series of psychical facts; these we call 
 the psychological laws of development. 
 
§23. Psychological Laws of Relation. 321 
 
 § 23. PSYCHOLOGICAL LAWS OP RELATION. 
 
 1 . There are three general psychological laws of r'plation. 
 We designate them as the laws of psychical resultants, of 
 psychical relations, and of psychical contrasts. 
 
 2. The law of psychical resultants finds its expression in 
 the fact that every psychical compound shows attributes which 
 may indeed be understood from the attributes of its elements 
 after these elements have once been presented, but which are 
 by no means to be looked upon as the mere sum of the 
 attributes of these elements. A compound clang is more in 
 its ideational and affective attributes than merely a sum of 
 single tones. In spacial and temporal ideas the spacial and 
 temporal arrangement is conditioned, to be sure, in a per- 
 fectly regular way by the cooperation of the elements that 
 make up the idea, but still the arrangement itself can by no 
 means be regarded as a property belonging to the sensational 
 elements themselves. The nativistic theories that assume this, 
 implicate themselves in contradictions that cannot be solved; 
 and besides, in so far as they admit subsequent changes in 
 the original space-perceptions and time-perceptions, they are 
 ultimately driven to the assumption of the rise, to some 
 extent at least, of new attributes. Pinally, in the apperceptive 
 functions and in the activities of imagination and under- 
 standing, this law finds expression in a clearly recognized form. 
 Not only do the elements united by apperceptive synthesis 
 gain, in the aggregate idea that results from their combination, 
 a new significance which they did not have in their isolated 
 state, but what is of stiU greater importance, the aggregate 
 idea itself is a new psychical content that was made poss,i,ble, 
 to be sure, by these elements, but was by no means contained 
 in them. This appears most strikingly in the more complex 
 
 Wdmdt, Psychology. 21 
 
322 ■ T^- Psychical Causality and its Laws. 
 
 productions of apperceptive synthesis, as, for example, in a 
 work of art or a train of logical thought. 
 
 3. The law of psychical resultants thus expresses a prin- 
 ciple which we may designate, in view of its results, as a 
 principle of creative synthesis. This has long been recognized 
 in the case of higher mental creations, but generally not 
 applied to the other psychical processes. In fact, through 
 an unjustifiable confusion with the laws of physical causahty, 
 ■ it has even been completely reversed. A similar confusion is 
 responsible for the notion that there is a contradiction be- 
 tween the principle of creative synthesis in the mental world 
 and the general laws of the natural world, especially that of 
 the conservation of energy. Such a contradiction is impossible 
 from the outset because the points of view for judgment, 
 and therefore for measurements wherever such are made, are 
 different in the two cases, and must be different, since natural 
 science and psychology deal, not with different contents of 
 experience, but with one and the same content viewed from 
 different sides (§ 1, p. 3). Physical measurements have to 
 do with objective masses, forces, and energies. These are 
 supplementary concepts which we are obhged to use in 
 judging objective experience; and their general laws, derived 
 as they are from experience, must not be contradicted 
 by any single case of experience. Psychical measurements, 
 wMch are concerned with the comparison of psychical com- 
 ponents and their resultants, have to do with subjective values 
 and ends. The subjective value of a whole may increase 
 in comparison with that of its components; its purpose may 
 be different and higher than theirs without any change in 
 the masses, forces, and energies concerned. The muscular 
 movements of an external vohtional act, the physical processes 
 that accompany sense-perception, association, and apperception, 
 all follow invariably the principle of the conservation of energy. 
 
§ 23. Psychological Laivs of Relation. 323 
 
 But the mental values and ends that these energies re- 
 present may be very different in cxuantity even while the 
 quantity of these energies remains the same. 
 
 4. The differences pointed out show that physical measure- 
 ment deals with quantitative values, that is, with quantities 
 that admit of a variation in value only in the one re- 
 lation of the quantity of the phenomena measured. Psychical 
 measurement, on the other hand, deals in the last instance 
 in every case with qualitative values, that is, values that vary 
 in degree only in respect to their qualitative character. The 
 tihiUty to produce purely quantitative effects, which we designate 
 as physical energy is, accordingly, to be clearly distinguished 
 from the ability to produce qualitative effects, or the ability to 
 produce values, which we designate as psychical energy. 
 
 On this basis we can not only reconcile the increase of 
 psychical energy with the constancy of physical energy as 
 accepted in the natural sciences, but we find in the two 
 reciprocally supplementary standards for the judgment of our 
 total experience. The increase of psychical energy is not seen 
 in its right hght until it is recognized as the reverse, sub- 
 jective side of physical constancy. The former, being as it 
 is indefinite, since the measure may be very different under 
 different conditions, holds only under the condition that the 
 psychical processes are continuous. As the psychological cor- 
 relate of this increase we have the fact which forces itself 
 iipon us in experience, that psychical values disappear. 
 
 5. The law of psychical relations supplements that of 
 resultants; it refers not to the relation of the components of 
 a psychical interconnection to the value of the whole, but 
 rather to their reciprocal relation. The law of resultants thus 
 holds for the synthetic processes of consciousness, the law 
 of relations for the analytic. Every resolution of a conscious 
 content into its single members is an act of relating analysis. 
 
 21* 
 
324 V. Psychical Gaitsality and its Laws. 
 
 Such a resolution takes place in the successive apperception 
 of the parts of a whole which is ideated at first only in a 
 general way, a process which is to he seen in sense- perceptions 
 and associations, and then in clearly recognized form in the 
 division of aggregate ideas. In the same way, every apper- 
 ception is an analytic process whose two factors are the 
 emphasizing of one single content and the marking off of this 
 one content from all others. The first of these two partial 
 processes is what produces clearness, the second is what 
 produces distinctness of apperception (p. 208, 4). The most 
 complete expression of this law is to be found in the processes 
 of appercepti,ve analysis and the simple relating and comparing 
 functions upon which it is based (p. 250 and 260). In the 
 latter more especially, we see that the essential content of 
 the law of relations is the principle that every single psychical 
 content receives its significance from the relations in which it 
 stands to other psychical contents. When these relations are 
 quantitative, this principle takes the form of a principle of 
 relative quantitative comparison such as is expressed in Weber's 
 law (p. 254). 
 
 6. The law of psychical contrasts is, in turn, supplementary 
 to the law of relations. It refers, like the latter, to the relations 
 of psychical contents to one another. It is itself based on the 
 fundamental division of the immediate contents of experience 
 into objective and subjective components, a division which 
 is due to the very conditions of psychical development. Under 
 subjective components are included all the elements and com- 
 binations of elements which, like the feelings and emotions, 
 are essential constituents of volitional processes. These are all 
 arranged in groups made up of opposite qualities corresponding 
 to the chief affective directions of pleasurable and un- 
 pleasurable, exciting and depressing, straining and relaxing 
 feelings (p. 83). These opposites obey in their succession the 
 
^ 24. Psychological Laws of Development. 325 
 
 general law of intensificatiuii thtough contrast. In its con- 
 crete application, this law is always determined in part by 
 special temporal conditions, for every subjective state requires 
 a certain period for its development; and if, when it has once 
 reached its maximum, it continues for a long time, it loses 
 its ability to arouse the contrast-effect. This fact is connected 
 with the other, that there is a certain medium, though greaitly 
 varying, rate of psychical processes most favorable for the 
 intensity of all feelings and emotions. 
 
 This law of contrast has its origin in the attributes of 
 the subjective contents of experience, but is secondarily applied 
 to the ideas and their elements also, for these ideas are always 
 accompanied by more or less emphatic feelings due either 
 to their own content or to the character of their spacial and 
 temporal combination. Thus the principle of intensification 
 through contrast finds its broader application especially in the 
 case of certain sensations, such as those of sight, and in the 
 case of spacial' and temporal ideas. 
 
 7. The law of contrast stands in close relation to the two 
 preceding laws. On the one hand, it may be regarded as 
 the application of the general law of relations to the special 
 case where the rela,ted psychical contents range' between 
 opposites. On the other hand, the fact that under sidtable 
 circumstances antithetical psychical processes may intensify 
 each other, while falling under the law of contrast, is at the 
 same time a special appMcation of the principle of creative 
 synthesis. 
 
 § 24. PSYCHOLOGICAL LAWS OF DEVELOPMENT. 
 
 1. "We have as many psychological laws of development 
 as we had laws of relation, and the former may be regarded 
 as the application of the latter to more comprehensive psychical 
 
326 V' Psychical Causality and its Laws. 
 
 interconnections. We designate the laws in question as those 
 of mental growth, of heterogony of ends, and of development 
 towards opposites. 
 
 2. The law of mental groivth is as little applicable to all 
 contents of psychical experience as any other psychological 
 law of development. It holds only under the limiting con- 
 dition under which the law of resultants, whose apphcation 
 it is, holdSj namely under the condition of the continuity of 
 the processes (p. 323). But since the circumstances that tend 
 to prevent the realization of this condition, are, of course, 
 much more frequent when the mental developments concerned 
 include a greater number of psychical syntheses, than they 
 are in the single syntheses themselves, it follows that the law 
 of mental growth can be demonstrated only for certain develop- 
 ments taking place under normal conditions, and even here 
 only within certain limits. Within these limits, however, the 
 more comprehensive developments, as, for example, the mental 
 development of the normal individual and the development of 
 mental communities, are obviously the best exemplifications 
 of the fundamental law of resultants which lies at the basis 
 of this development. 
 
 3. The law of heterogony of ends is most closely con- 
 nected with the law of relations, but it is also based on the 
 law of resultants, which is always to be taken into consideration 
 when dealing with the larger interconnections of psychical 
 development. In fact, we may regard this law as a principle 
 of development which controls the changes arising, as results 
 of successive creative syntheses, in the relations between the 
 single partial contents of psychical compounds. The result- 
 ants arising from united psychical processes include contents 
 that were not present in the components, and these new- con- 
 tents may in turn enter into relation with the old components, 
 thus changing again, the relations between these old components^ 
 
§ 2d. Psychological Laws of Development. 327 
 
 and consequently the new resultants that arise from them. 
 This principle of continually changing relations is most striking 
 when an idea of ends is formed on the basis of the given 
 relations. Here the relation of the single factors to one 
 another is regarded as an interconnection of means which 
 has for the end aimed at, the product arising from the 
 interconnection. The relation between the actual effects in 
 such a case and the ideated ends is such that secondary 
 effects always arise that were not thought of in the first ideas, 
 of end. These new effects enter into new series of motives, 
 and thus modify the old ends or add new ones to them. 
 
 The principle of heterogony of ends in its broadest sense 
 dominates all psychical processes. In the special teleolog- 
 ical coloring which has given it its name, however, it is to be 
 found primarily in the sphere of volitional processes, for here 
 the ideas of end attended by their affective motives are of 
 the chief importance. In the various spheres of applied psy- 
 chology it is therefore especially ethics for which this law is 
 of great importance. 
 
 4. The laiv of development toivards opposites is an applica- 
 tion of the law of intensification through contrast, to more 
 comprehensive interconnections which form in themselves series 
 of developments. These series, in accordance with the fun- 
 damental law of contrasts, are of such a character that feel- 
 ings and impulses which were of small intensity at first, in- 
 crease gradually in intensity through contrast with feelings of 
 opposite quality that were for a time predominant, until, finally, 
 they gain the ascendency over the formerly predominant feel- 
 ings and are themselves for a longer or shorter time in control. 
 From this point the same alternation may be once or even 
 several times repeated. But generally the principles of men- 
 tal growth and heterogony of ends operate in the case 
 of such an oscillation, so that succeeding phases are like 
 
328 T'. Psychical Causality and its Laws. 
 
 GorresiDonding antecedent phases in their general affective 
 direction, but still essentially different in their special com- 
 ponents. 
 
 The law of development towards opposites shows itself in 
 the mental development of the individual, partly in a purely 
 individual way within shorter periods of time, and partly in 
 certain universal regularities in the relation of various periods 
 of Hfe. It has long been recognized that the predominating 
 temperaments of different periods of life present certain con- 
 trasts. Thus, the light, sanguine excitability of childhood, which 
 is seldom more than superficial, is followed by the slower 
 but more retentive temperament of youth with its frequent 
 touch of melancholy. Then comes manhood with its mature 
 character, generally quick and active in decision and execution, 
 and last of all, old age with its leaning toward contemplative 
 quiet. Even more than in the individual does this principle 
 of antithesis find expression in the alternation of mental 
 tendencies that appear in the social and historical life of 
 communities, and in the reactions of these tendencies on 
 civilization and customs and on social and political develop- 
 ment. In the same way that the principle of heterogony 
 of ends applied chiefly to the domain of moral life, this 
 principle of development towards opposites finds its chief 
 significance in the more general sphere of historical life. 
 
GLOSSARY. 
 
 Accord 
 
 Affect 
 
 angeborea 
 
 Anschaulich 
 
 Anschauuug 
 Raum- 
 Zeit- 
 
 Apperception 
 -function 
 personifioirende 
 -verbindung 
 
 Assimilation 
 
 Association 
 Aehnlichkeits- 
 Beruhrungs- 
 Gleichheits- 
 reihweise 
 
 Auffassung 
 
 Aufmerksamkeit 
 AufrecMsehen 
 
 chord, 
 emotion, 
 connate. 
 
 perceptual (p. 5). 
 perception, 
 space-p. 
 time-p. 
 apperception, 
 apperceptive function, 
 personifying. 
 
 apperceptive combination, 
 assimilation, 
 association, 
 by similarity, 
 by contiguity, 
 by identity, 
 serial. 
 
 apprehension, perception, or ap- 
 perception (see Perception), 
 attention, 
 erect vision. 
 
 Bedinguhg 
 
 B egleiters oheinung 
 
 Begriff 
 
 Actualitats- 
 
 Allgemein- 
 
 Hulfs- 
 
 Werth- 
 
 Zweck- 
 begrifflich 
 Beobachtung 
 
 Selbst- 
 
 der Seeje 
 
 condition. 
 
 concomitant or accompanying 
 
 phenomenon, 
 concept, (sometimes in looser 
 
 sense] deiinition. 
 concept of the actuality of mind, 
 general c. 
 supplementary c, 
 c. of value, 
 c. of end. 
 conceptual, 
 observation, 
 introspection. 
 
330 
 
 Glossary. 
 
 Beweggrund 
 Bewegung 
 
 Ausdrucks- 
 
 mimische 
 
 pantomimische 
 Bewusstsein 
 
 Gesammt- 
 
 Selbst- 
 Bezieliung 
 
 Complication 
 Contrast 
 
 Farben- 
 
 Licht- 
 
 Rand- 
 
 reason for action, 
 movement, 
 expressive m. 
 mimetic m. 
 pantomimetic m. 
 consciousness, 
 collective c. 
 self-c. 
 relation. 
 
 complication, 
 contrast, 
 color-c. 
 light-c. 
 marginal c. 
 
 Dauer 
 
 Nach- 
 Deutlichkeit 
 Doppelbilder 
 Druck 
 
 -punkt 
 
 Eigenschaft 
 Ein druck 
 Elemente 
 Empfindlichkeit 
 Empfindung 
 
 Druck- 
 
 Parben- 
 
 farblose 
 
 Helligkeits- 
 
 Geruchs- 
 
 Geschmacks- 
 
 Haupt- 
 
 Haut- 
 
 Kalte- 
 
 Licht- 
 
 Schall- 
 
 Schmerz- 
 
 Ton- 
 
 Warme- 
 
 duration. 
 persistence, 
 distinctness, 
 double images, 
 pressure, 
 p. -spot. 
 
 attribute or property. 
 
 impression. 
 
 elements. 
 
 sensitivity. 
 
 sensation. 
 
 s. of pressure or pressure-s. 
 
 color-s. or s. of chromatic light. 
 
 achromatic s. or s. of achromatic 
 
 light, 
 s. of brightness, 
 s. of smell. 
 s. of taste, 
 principal s. 
 cutaneous s. 
 s. of cold. 
 
 light-s. or s. of light. 
 s. of sound or sound-s. 
 pain-s. or s. of pain, 
 tonal s. or tone-s. 
 s. of hot. 
 
Glossary. 
 
 331 
 
 Entscheidung 
 EntscHiessung 
 Entstehung 
 Entwickelung 
 
 regressive 
 Erfahrung 
 
 mittelbare 
 
 unmittelbare 
 Erinnerungsbild 
 Erinnerungsvorgang 
 Erkennung 
 
 Farben 
 
 Erg^nzungs- 
 
 -ton 
 
 Gegen- 
 
 Grund- 
 Fixationslinie 
 Pixationspunkt 
 
 Gebilde 
 Gedachtniss 
 Gefallen 
 Gefiihle 
 
 allmaUicli ansteigende 
 
 Anfangs- 
 
 BegrifFs- 
 
 Bekanntheits- 
 
 beruhigende 
 
 Contrast- 
 
 deprimirende 
 
 End- 
 
 Erinnerungs- 
 
 Erkennungs- 
 
 Erieiden (G. des) 
 
 excitirende 
 
 Form- 
 
 -ton 
 
 Gemein- 
 
 losende 
 
 Lust- 
 
 rhythmische 
 
 sinnliche 
 
 resolution. 
 
 decision 
 
 rise. 
 
 development. 
 
 retrogradation. 
 
 experience. 
 
 mediate. 
 
 immediate. 
 
 memory-image. 
 
 memory-process. 
 
 cognition. 
 
 colors. 
 
 complementary c. 
 
 c.-tone. 
 
 opposite c. 
 
 fundamental c. 
 
 line of fixation. 
 
 fixation-point or point of fixation. 
 
 compound. 
 
 memory. 
 
 agreeable feeling. 
 
 feelings. 
 
 gradually arising. 
 
 inceptive f. 
 
 conceptual f. 
 
 f. of familiarity. 
 
 c[uieting f. 
 
 contrast-f. 
 
 depressing f. 
 
 terminal f. 
 
 f. of remembering. 
 
 f. of cognition. 
 
 f. of passive receptivity. 
 
 exciting f. 
 
 f. of form. 
 
 affective tone. 
 
 common f. 
 
 relaxing f. 
 
 pleasurable f. 
 
 f. of rhythm. 
 
 sense-f. 
 
332 
 
 Olossary. 
 
 Gefiihle, spannende 
 
 
 straining f. 
 
 Thatigkeits- 
 
 
 f. of activity. 
 
 Total- 
 
 
 total f. 
 
 Unlust- 
 
 
 unpleasurable f. 
 
 zusammengesetzte 
 
 
 composite f. 
 
 Geisteserzengniss 
 
 
 mental product. 
 
 Geisteswissenschaft 
 
 
 mental science. 
 
 geistig 
 
 
 mental. 
 
 Gemeinschaft 
 
 
 community. 
 
 Gemuthsbewegung 
 
 
 affective process. 
 
 Gemuthslage oder 
 
 Gemuthszu- 
 
 affective state. 
 
 stand 
 
 
 
 Gerausch 
 
 
 noise. 
 
 Geschehen 
 
 
 phenomena. 
 
 Gesetz 
 
 
 law. 
 
 Beziehungs- 
 
 
 1. of relation. 
 
 G. d. Contraste 
 
 
 1. of contrasts. 
 
 G. d. Eelationen 
 
 
 1. of relations. 
 
 G. d. Resultante 
 
 
 1. of resultants. 
 
 G. d. Entwicklung 
 
 in Gegen- 
 
 1. of development towards op- 
 
 satzen 
 
 
 posites. 
 
 G. d. Heterogonie 
 
 der Zwecke 
 
 1. of heterogony of ends. 
 
 G. d. geistigen Wachsthums 
 
 1. of mental growth. 
 
 GesicMswinkel 
 
 
 visual angle. 
 
 Grossenbestimmung 
 
 
 measurement. 
 
 Haudlung 
 
 
 act, action. 
 
 Helligkeit 
 
 
 brightness. 
 
 Hemmung 
 
 
 inhibition. 
 
 Illusion 
 
 
 illusion. 
 
 phantastisclig 
 
 
 i. of fancy. 
 
 Indifferenzzone 
 
 
 indifference-zone. 
 
 luhalt 
 
 
 content. 
 
 Klang 
 
 
 clang. 
 
 Einzel- 
 
 
 single cl. 
 
 -farbe 
 
 
 clang-color. 
 
 Zusammen- 
 
 
 compound cl. 
 
 Klarheit 
 
 
 clearness. 
 
 LooalisationssoMrfe 
 
 
 keenness of localization. 
 
 Localzeichen 
 
 
 local signs. 
 
Qlossary. 
 
 333 
 
 Methode 
 
 method. 
 
 Abzahlungs- 
 
 reckoning-m. 
 
 Ausdrucks- 
 
 expression-m. 
 
 Eindrucks- 
 
 impression-m. 
 
 Einstellungs- 
 
 adjustment-m. 
 
 der Minimal an derung 
 
 m. of minimal changes. 
 
 d. minimalen'- Unterschiede 
 
 m. of minimal differences. 
 
 d. mittleren Fehler 
 
 of average error. 
 
 Missfallen 
 
 disagreeable feeling. 
 
 BTachbild 
 
 after-image. 
 
 Nahrungsinstinct 
 
 alimentive instinct. 
 
 Orientation 
 
 orientation, or location in rela- 
 
 
 tion to. 
 
 -linie 
 
 line of orientation. 
 
 -punkt 
 
 point of orientation. 
 
 Perception 
 
 apprehension. 
 
 Phantasie 
 
 imagination. 
 
 Punkt 
 
 point or spot. 
 
 Druck- 
 
 pressure-sp. 
 
 Kalte- 
 
 cold-sp. 
 
 Warme- 
 
 hot-Sp. 
 
 Eaum 
 
 space. 
 
 Reaction 
 
 reaction. 
 
 zusammengesetzte 
 
 compound r. 
 
 Recht 
 
 law. 
 
 Reiz 
 
 stimulus. 
 
 Richtung 
 
 direction, or (figuratively) theory. 
 
 
 trend. 
 
 S3.ttigung 
 
 saturation. 
 
 Schema 
 
 scheme. 
 
 Schmerz 
 
 pain. 
 
 SchSpferieche Synthese 
 
 creative synthesis. 
 
 Schwebungen 
 
 beats. 
 
 Schwelle 
 
 threshold. 
 
 Raum- 
 
 space-t. 
 
 Schwelle, Reiz- 
 
 stimulus-t. 
 
 Seele 
 
 mind. 
 
 Sehfeld 
 
 field of vision. 
 
334 
 
 Olossary. 
 
 Sehsoharfe 
 
 keenness of vision. 
 
 Sinn 
 
 sense. 
 
 Sitte 
 
 custom. 
 
 Spraohe 
 
 speech or language. 
 
 Geberden- 
 
 gesture-1. 
 
 Laut- 
 
 articulate-1. 
 
 Suggestion 
 
 suggestion. 
 
 System 
 
 system. 
 
 gleichforiaiges 
 
 homogeneous b. 
 
 mannigfaltiges 
 
 complex s. 
 
 Tiefe 
 
 depth or third dimension. 
 
 TSne 
 
 tones. 
 
 Differenz- 
 
 dififerenoe-t. 
 
 Grund- 
 
 fundamental t. 
 
 Ober- 
 
 overtones. 
 
 Stoss- 
 
 beat-t. 
 
 Tonempfindung 
 
 tonal sensation or sensation of t. 
 
 TonhShe 
 
 pitch. 
 
 -linie 
 
 tonal line. 
 
 -scala 
 
 tonal scale. 
 
 -stSsse 
 
 tonal beats. 
 
 Trieb 
 
 impulse. 
 
 -feder 
 
 impelling force. 
 
 -handlung 
 
 impulsive act. 
 
 Spiel- 
 
 play-impulse. 
 
 Umfang 
 
 scope. 
 
 Urtheil 
 
 judgment. 
 
 Verbindung 
 
 combination. 
 
 Vergleicbung 
 
 comparison. 
 
 Verhaltniss 
 
 relation or proposition. 
 
 Verschmelzung 
 
 fusion. 
 
 Verstand 
 
 understanding. 
 
 VSlkerpsyohologie 
 
 social psychology. 
 
 Vorgang 
 
 process. 
 
 Vorstellung 
 
 idea. 
 
 Gehor- 
 
 auditory i. 
 
 Gesammt- 
 
 aggregate i.i) 
 
 1) For this tr9,nslation I am indebted to Prof. Titchener. 
 
Glossary. 
 
 335 
 
 Vorstellung, G-esichts- 
 
 visual i. 
 
 i-aumliche 
 
 spaoial i. 
 
 Raum- 
 
 space-i. 
 
 zeitliclie 
 
 temporal i. 
 
 Zeit- 
 
 time-i. 
 
 Wahrnehmung 
 
 sense-perception. 
 
 Wesen 
 
 nature. 
 
 Wi edererkennung 
 
 recognition. 
 
 sinnliche 
 
 sensible r. 
 
 Wille 
 
 will. . 
 
 Gesammt- 
 
 collective w. 
 
 "Wahl- (z. B. Vorgang) 
 
 selective (process), 
 
 Willens- ( „ „ ) 
 
 volitional (p.). 
 
 Willkur- ( „ „ ) 
 
 voluntary (p.). 
 
 Zeitarten 
 
 temporal modes. 
 
 Zeitstufen 
 
 t.- stages. 
 
 Zeitzeiohen 
 
 t. signs. 
 
 Zusammenhang 
 
 interconnection. 
 
 Zustande 
 
 states. 
 
 Zweckmassig 
 
 purposive. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 page 
 
 A. 
 
 Abnormities in 
 apperception . . . . 271 
 
 association 270 
 
 psychical elements .... 267 
 Abstract thinking . . . . 302 
 
 Accentuation 152 
 
 Acquired attributes . . . 282 
 Actuality, concept of . . . . 314 
 Adjustment-methods .... 257 
 Affective processes ... 92, 158 
 
 states, unity of 168 
 
 tone 75, 77 
 
 After-image 68 
 
 Aggregate ideas 260 
 
 discursive division of . . . 264 
 
 Anaesthesia 268 
 
 Analysis 262 
 
 Animals 276 
 
 psychical relation to man 281 
 Animal marriage ...... 279 
 
 states . . 279 
 
 Animism 305 
 
 Aphasia 205 
 
 Apperception 206, 209 
 
 active 218 
 
 in child ... ... 293 
 
 centre of 206 
 
 feeling of activity in . . . 217 
 
 passive 217 
 
 personifying 303 
 
 as volitional process . . . 218 
 
 Apprehension 209 
 
 Aristotle 224 
 
 Assimilation 228 
 
 page 
 
 Assimilation, of auditory ideas 228 
 of intensive feelings . . . 229 
 of spacial ideas . . . 269- 
 
 of visual ideas 230 
 
 Association 224 
 
 by contiguity .... 225, 245 
 
 by contrast 245 
 
 laws of . . . .... 225 
 
 mediate 243 
 
 serial 236 
 
 by similarity 225, 246 
 
 simultaneous 227 
 
 by succession 225 
 
 successive 235 
 
 Attention 209 
 
 in child 287 
 
 scope of 210, 211 
 
 voluntary 219 
 
 B. 
 
 Basilar membrane . . . 40, 101 
 
 Beats 100 
 
 tonal 100 
 
 Beat-tones (Koenig's) .... 99 
 
 Bisonance 100 
 
 Black 54, 59 
 
 Blind-alphabet 107 
 
 Blindness 107 
 
 Blind-spot 126 
 
 Brightness 55, 58 
 
 negative 59 
 
 positive 58 
 
 C. 
 
 Causality (psychical) . . 27, 320 
 Chemical sense. ... 42, 53, 68 
 
Index. 
 
 337 
 
 Child 283 
 
 Choice 188 
 
 Chronometrio apparatus . . 201 
 Clang 
 
 compound 95, 97 
 
 single 95 
 
 -color 95 
 
 Clearness 208, 324 
 
 Cochlea 40 
 
 Cognition, sensible 240 
 
 Cold-spots 47 
 
 Color 
 
 -blindness 77 
 
 complementary colors . . 66 
 
 -contrasts 69 
 
 fundamental colors . . .67 
 names of colors .... 62 
 
 -sphere 61 
 
 theories of colors . . . 72 
 
 -triangle 67 
 
 Combination-tone (Helmholtz's) 98 
 
 Comfort 161 
 
 Communities, mental .... 296 
 
 Comparison 251 
 
 Complications 234 
 
 Compounds, psychical . . 25, 90 
 interconnection of ... . 25 
 
 names of 90 
 
 Concepts 263 
 
 classes of 265 
 
 of end 319 
 
 general 265 
 
 of value 319 
 
 Conceptual knowledge ... 5 
 
 Cones 115 
 
 Consciousness 203 
 
 collective 204, 308 
 
 grades of 207 
 
 scope of 211, 214 
 
 social 204 
 
 threshold of 209 
 
 Consonants 100 
 
 WuNDT, PByeliology. 
 
 page 
 Contrasts 
 
 color 69 
 
 law of psychical 324 
 
 physiological 69, 258 
 
 psychological ... 69, 258 
 Coordination of eyes in child 285 
 Creative synthesis . . . 322 
 Customs . 306 
 
 D. 
 
 Dance ... 
 
 . . 147 
 
 Decision . ... 
 
 . . 188 
 
 Deductive thought . . 
 
 . . 266 
 
 Depression, state of . 
 
 . . 269 
 
 Development, law of d. toward 
 
 opposites 327 
 
 Difference, relative ... . 254 
 
 -threshold 254 
 
 -tones 98 
 
 Differences, maximal . . . 33 
 
 Discomfort 161 
 
 Dissonance, pure . . . . 100 
 Distance-sense .... .113 
 
 Distinctness 208, 324 
 
 Distortion of visual images . 1 19 
 
 Dizziness 114 
 
 Double-images 136 
 
 Doubt 189 
 
 Dreams 272 
 
 theory of 274 
 
 £. 
 
 Bar 
 
 Ego .... 
 Elementary nature 
 Elements, psychical 
 
 affective . . 
 
 in child . . 
 
 intensity of 
 
 names of. . 
 
 quality of . 
 
 sensational. 
 Emotions . . 
 
 40 
 221 
 
 29 
 28 
 28 
 
 284 
 30 
 30 
 30 
 28 
 
 169 
 
 22 
 
338 
 
 Index. 
 
 page 
 
 Emotions, asthenic .... 171 
 
 classification of . . . . 174 
 
 depressing 178 
 
 exciting 178 
 
 forms of 178 
 
 gradually arising 181 
 
 inceptive feeling in . . . 171 
 ideational process in . . . 171 
 
 intensity of 178 
 
 intermittent 181 
 
 mode of occurrence of 178, 181 
 
 names of 179 
 
 pleasurable 178 
 
 quality of 179 
 
 rapid 174 
 
 relaxing 178 
 
 sluggish 174 
 
 sthenic 173 
 
 straining 178 
 
 strong 180 
 
 sudden 181 
 
 terminal feeling in . . . . 171 
 
 unpleasurable 178 
 
 weak 180 
 
 Empirism 114, 140 
 
 End, concept of 319 
 
 Energy 311 
 
 physical 323 
 
 psychical 323 
 
 Exaltation, state of 269 
 
 Expectation in active apper- 
 ception 218 
 
 Experiment 19 
 
 F. 
 
 Fechner's law ...;... 256 
 
 Peeling 36 
 
 of activity 189 
 
 agreeable 164 
 
 arousing 83 
 
 of cognition 241 
 
 common 161 
 
 page 
 
 Feeling, component . . . .159 
 
 composite 158 
 
 conceptual 265 
 
 contrast- 163 
 
 depressing 83 
 
 directions of 82 
 
 disagreeable 164 
 
 elementary aesthetic ... 163 
 
 exciting 83 
 
 extensive 164 
 
 of familiarity 237 
 
 of form 166 
 
 intensity 78 
 
 intensive 164 
 
 quality of 78 
 
 partial 159 
 
 names of 81 
 
 pleasurable 83, 162 
 
 of receptivity 217 
 
 of relaxation 83 
 
 of remembering 245 
 
 resultant 159 
 
 of rhythm 167 
 
 simple 29, 74 
 
 of strain . . . 83 
 
 subduing 83 
 
 total 159 
 
 unitary character of . . . 36 
 unpleasurable .... 83, 162 
 
 Fetishism 305 
 
 Field of consciousness . . . 209 
 
 of vision 117 
 
 Fixation-point 118 
 
 . of consciousness 209 
 
 ' inner 155 
 
 Force 311 
 
 Frontal brain 206 
 
 Fusion 94 
 
 G. 
 
 General sense 45 
 
 Genetic theory. . 114, 141, 158 
 
Index. 
 
 339 
 
 Goethe 82 
 
 Golden section 166 
 
 Grey .54 
 
 H. 
 
 Hallucination 268 
 
 Hartley 224 
 
 Bering's hypothesis .... 72 
 
 Heterogony of ends, law of. 326 
 
 Hot-spots 47 
 
 Humanity, idea of . . 297 
 
 Hume .224 
 
 Hyperaesthesia 268 
 
 Hypnosis 277 
 
 theory of 274 
 
 ]. 
 
 Ideas 92 
 
 conceptual 264 
 
 of depth 135 
 
 of direction 134 
 
 extensive 102 
 
 of imagination 261 
 
 intensive 93 
 
 of movement Ill, 113 
 
 of position 113 
 
 spacial. . 102 
 
 temporal 142 
 
 Illusions, optical 123 
 
 of direction 123 
 
 of magnitude 123 
 
 of fancy 268 
 
 Imagination 262 
 
 in child 293 
 
 images of 261 
 
 Immediate experience . . 3 
 
 Impelling force 86 
 
 Impulsive acts 187 
 
 Indifference-zones . . . . 34, 78 
 
 Inductive thought 266 
 
 Instincts 278 
 
 alimentive 278 
 
 sexual 279 
 
 page 
 Intensification of emotions . 177 
 
 Introspection, pure 9 
 
 Isochronism 145 
 
 J. 
 
 Judgment 264, 265 
 
 K. 
 
 Keenness of localization . . 117 
 vision 119 
 
 L. 
 
 Language 173 
 
 articulate ........ 299 
 
 gesture- 299 
 
 Law^ 308 
 
 Light-contrasts 69 
 
 -stimulations 64, 70 
 
 Lines of fixation 135 
 
 Line of orientation 131 
 
 of regard 118 
 
 Localization of brain-functions 205 
 Localization of touch-stimuli 104 
 
 Local signs 105 
 
 complex 134 
 
 of eye 127 
 
 of depth 138 
 
 M. 
 
 Magnetism, animal ... . 275 
 
 Marching 147 
 
 Marginal contrast 69 
 
 Materialism 313 
 
 Matter, concept of 311 
 
 Measurements, physical. . . 322 
 
 psychical 252, 322 
 
 Mechanical processes .... 193 
 
 senses 42 
 
 Mediate experience 3 
 
 knowledge 5 
 
 memory 243 
 
 recognition 239 
 
 Memory 247 
 
 -ideas 241 
 
 -ideas, character of ... 246 
 22* 
 
340 
 
 Index. 
 
 page 
 Memory 
 
 -image 241 
 
 -processes 241 
 
 Mental growth, law of . . . 326 
 
 sciences 3 
 
 Method 
 
 of average error . . . 257 
 
 expression- 86 
 
 impression- 86 
 
 of minimal differences . . 254 
 
 psycho-physical 256 
 
 reckoning- 257 
 
 of right and wrong cases 257 
 
 Mind 312 
 
 Mind-substance 312 
 
 Mistakes in child-psychology 296 
 
 Morality 308 
 
 Motives 185 
 
 MovabUity 102 
 
 Movements 
 
 of accommodation .... 140 
 
 arrhythmical 145 
 
 automatic 193 
 
 expressive 172 
 
 mimetic 172 
 
 ocular 120 
 
 pantomimetic 173 
 
 rhythmical 145 
 
 Moving reason 186 
 
 Muscles of eye 122 
 
 Muscular reaction ... . 198 
 Myths 303 
 
 N. 
 
 Nativism '. . 114, 140 
 
 Natural selection 282 
 
 Nature-myth 306 
 
 Noise 99 
 
 0. 
 
 Observation 19 
 
 pure 22 
 
 Objects a, 4, 220, 222 
 
 Onomatopoetic words. 
 Opposite colors . . 
 
 Otoliths 
 
 Overtones 
 
 page 
 
 292 
 56 
 40 
 95 
 
 P. 
 
 Pain 48 
 
 Parallax, binocular 138 
 
 Parallelism, principle of . . 45 
 Perceptual knowledge ... 5 
 Personality (psychical) ... 26 
 
 Perspective 140 
 
 Pitch 50 
 
 Plane figures 137 
 
 Play-impulse 293 
 
 Point of orientation .... 131 
 
 of regard 118 
 
 Posthypnotic effects .... 273 
 
 Pressure-spots 47 
 
 Problem of psychology ... 1 
 
 Products, mental 23 
 
 Proportionality, law of . . 256 
 Psychology 
 
 association- 224 
 
 descriptive 11 
 
 empirical 7 
 
 experimental .... .23 
 
 explanatory 11 
 
 faculty- 11 
 
 intellectualistic .... 13 
 
 materialistic 7 
 
 metaphysical 6 
 
 relation to mental sciences 16 
 relation to natural science 16 
 relation to philosophy . . 16 
 Science of immediate ex- 
 perience 9 
 
 Science of inner sense . . 8 
 
 social 10, 23 
 
 spiritualistic 7 
 
 voluntaristic 14 
 
 Pulse 73, 87, 176 
 
Index. 
 
 341 
 
 Quality, systems of 
 
 complex 
 
 homogeneous. . . 
 many-dimensional 
 one-dimensional . 
 two-dimensional . 
 
 Quantities, psychical 
 
 page 
 
 31 
 32 
 32 
 32 
 32 
 32 
 252 
 
 B. 
 
 Reaction-experiments . . 197, 201 
 
 Reckoning-methods . . 257 
 
 Recognition 239 
 
 mediate 239 
 
 sensible 237 
 
 Reflex processes 193 
 
 purposive character of . . 193 
 
 Relation of body and mind . 316 
 
 Relations, law of psychical . 323 
 
 Relating fuiiction 251 
 
 Relativity, law of (v. Weber's 
 
 law]. 
 
 Reproduction of ideas . . . 225 
 
 Resolution 188 
 
 Resonance hypothesis (Helm- 
 
 holtz's) 101 
 
 Resonants 100 
 
 Respiration 173 
 
 Resultants, law of psychical 321 
 
 Retrogradation ... . 192, 200 
 
 Rods 115 
 
 S. 
 Saturation ... . . 57 
 
 Selective acts 188 
 
 Self-consciousness 221 
 
 in child 287 
 
 Sensations 28, 36 
 
 achromatic light- . . .54 
 
 of alkaline 53 
 
 of bitter 53 
 
 chromatic light- 54 
 
 pnge 
 
 Sensations, color- 55 
 
 of cold 46 
 
 common . . .... 46 
 
 disparate character of . . 35 
 
 of hot 46 
 
 of light 54 
 
 of metallic 53 
 
 of movement 107 
 
 of noise . . 49 
 
 of pain 46 
 
 'persistence of 68 
 
 of pressure 46 
 
 principal color- 61 
 
 pure 37, 38 
 
 of pure brightness .... 55 
 
 rise of 38 
 
 of saline 53 
 
 of smell 52 
 
 of sound 48 
 
 of sour 53 
 
 of sweet 53 
 
 of taste 52 
 
 tone- 50 
 
 tactual 46 
 
 Sense-feelings 75 
 
 Sense-stimuli 38 
 
 Sensorial reaction 198 
 
 Sentences 302 
 
 Sine-curve 51 
 
 Sleep-walking 272 
 
 Space-threshold of touch . .105 
 
 Spacial ideas 102 
 
 in child 285 
 
 of sight 115 
 
 of touch . 104 
 
 Specific character ... .29 
 
 Specific energy 42 
 
 Speech 298 
 
 -centre 205 
 
 child- 291 
 
 Spiritualism 313 
 
 monadological 313 
 
342 
 
 Index. 
 
 page 
 
 Spiritualism, monistic . . . 313 
 
 Squinting 120 
 
 States, psychical ... . 267 
 
 Stereoscope 139 
 
 Stimulus 
 
 physical 38 
 
 physiological 38 
 
 physiological central ... 38 
 
 physiological peripheral . 38 
 
 -threshold 254 
 
 Subject 3, 4, 220, 222 
 
 Suggestion 272 
 
 Synthesis (apperception) . . 260 
 
 T. 
 
 Talent 267 
 
 Temporal ideas 142 
 
 auditory 148 
 
 in child 286 
 
 tactual 144 
 
 Temporal modes 144 
 
 signs 156 
 
 stages 144 
 
 Thought 265 
 
 Threshold of consciousness . 209 
 
 Tickling 163 
 
 Tonal line 51 
 
 scale 51 
 
 Tones 
 
 fundamental 96 
 
 highest 57 
 
 lowest , . . 57 
 
 partial 95 
 
 principal 95 
 
 Torsibility 102 
 
 Touch 
 analytic 108 
 
 page 
 
 Touch 
 
 synthetic 108 
 
 Transformation of stimuli . . 41 
 
 U. 
 
 Unconscious state 203 
 
 Understanding 263 
 
 in child 295 
 
 T. 
 
 Value, concept of 319 
 
 Vertical lines, illusion with 123 
 Vision 
 
 angle of 117 
 
 direct 118 
 
 erect 137 
 
 indirect 118 
 
 Visual purple 73 
 
 Volition 
 
 internal 191 
 
 theories of 194 
 
 Volitional acts 183 
 
 processes 183 
 
 Voluntary acts 188 - 
 
 Vorstellmig 224 
 
 Vowels 100 
 
 W. 
 
 Walk, learning to . . . .290 
 
 White 54, 59 
 
 Will 
 
 in child . . 289 
 
 collective 308 
 
 theories of 194 
 
 Weber's law . . . 254, 255, 256 
 Word-ideas 266 
 
 Y. 
 
 Young-Helmholtz theory . . 72 
 
 Printed by Broitkopf and Hartel, Leipzig.