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 Montesauleu's Considerations on the caus 
 
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THE GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE 
 OF THE ROMANS. 
 
MONTESQUIEU'S 
 
 CONSIDERATIONS ON THE CAUSES 
 
 OF THE 
 
 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE 
 OF THE ROMANS: 
 
 A NEW TRANSLATION, 
 
 TOQETHEB WITH 
 
 AN INTRODUCTION, CRITICAL AND ILLUSTRATIVE NOTES, 
 AND AN ANALYTICAL INDEX: 
 
 BY 
 JEHU BAKER; 
 
 BEINO INCIDENTALLY A RATIONAL DISCUSSION OF THE PEENOMENA 
 AND THE TENDENCIES OE HISTORY IN GENERAL. 
 
 Those whom we call ancients were really new In all things, and formed, properly 
 speaking, the infancy of the human race ; and, as "we have added to their knowledge 
 the experience of all succeeding centuries, it is in ov/rsel/oes that may be found that 
 antiquity which we reverence in th&m. — Pascal. 
 
 NEW YORE: 
 D. APPLETON AND COMPANY. 
 
 1882. 
 
/^cornell\ 
 university 
 
 N^LfERARV 
 
 Ehteekd, according to Act of CongreBs, in the year 1882, by 
 
 JEHU BAKEE, 
 In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 
 
PEE FACE. 
 
 The manuscript of this volume — aside from some 
 revision and emendation recently made — was finislied 
 in 1876. The subject, however, is one against which 
 time runs but slowly — if at all. 
 
 It win be seen that the book is by no means a 
 mere translation of Montesquieu's treatise; but that, 
 beyond this, the Romans are used as a nexus for all 
 antiquity, and the general movement of the world's 
 civilization sought to be inferred. 
 
 There must be errors ; but, in view of the nature 
 and difficulties of the task undertaken, it seems ob- 
 vious that criticism should be considerate and candid 
 — no more is asked. 
 
 The Notes which have been contributed by my- 
 self are duly indicated as such ; those which are in- 
 closed in 'brackets have been supplied by the French 
 editors; aU others are Montesquieu's. 
 
 Belleville, Illinois, March IS, 1882. 
 
GENERAL TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Translator's Inteoduction 9 
 
 Idea of " the Grandeur and Decadence of the Romans " — from the 
 
 French of La Harpe 15 
 
 Chap. I. — The Beginnings of Rome. — Her Wara. . 19 
 
 Note by the Translator 31 
 
 II. — Art of War among the Romans 48 
 
 Note by the Translator 51 
 
 III. — How the Romans were able to aggrandize themselves. ... 61 
 Note by the Translator • 66 
 
 IV. — ^The Gauls. — Pyrrhus. — Comparison of Carthage and 
 
 Rome. — ^War with Hannibal 76 
 
 Note by the Translator 91 
 
 V. — State of Greece, of Macedon, of Syria and Egypt, aft§r 
 
 the abasement of Carthage 107 
 
 Note by the Translator 124 
 
 VI. — Policy adopted by the Romans for the conquest of all 
 
 Nations 129 
 
 Note by the Translator 146 
 
 VII. — Mithridates. — How he was able to resist the Romans. . . . 165 
 Note by the Translator 160 
 
 VIII. — Of the Divisions which constantly existed in the City of 
 
 Rome 163 
 
 Note by the Translator IH 
 
8 GENERAL TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Chap. IX.— Two Causes of the Emu of Rome 180 
 
 Note by the Translator 188 
 
 X. — Corruption of the Romans 19T 
 
 Note by the Translator 201 
 
 XL — Sylla. — Pompey and Csesar ; 208 
 
 Note by the Translator 225 
 
 XIL— Condition of Borne after the Death of Csesar 245 
 
 Note by the Translator 254 
 
 XIIL— Augustus 288 
 
 Note by the Translator 270 
 
 XrV.— Tiberius 278 
 
 Note by the Translator 288 
 
 XV. — The Emperors from Caligula to Antoninus 293 
 
 Note by the Translator 308 
 
 XVL — State of the Empire from Antoninus to Probus 317 
 
 Note by the Translator. 334 
 
 XVIL — Change in the Government of the Empire 365 
 
 Note by the Translator. 367 
 
 XVm. — New Maxims adopted by the Romans 376 
 
 Note by the Translator 384 
 
 XIX. — Greatness of Attila. — Cause of the Establishment of 
 the Barbarians. — Reasons why the Western Em- 
 pire fell first 392 
 
 Note by the Translator 404 
 
 XX. — Conquests of Justinian. — His Government 413 
 
 Note by the Translator 427 
 
 XXI. — Disorders of the Eastern Empire 435 
 
 Note by the Translator 443 
 
 XXII. — Weakness of the Eastern Empire 445 
 
 Note by the Translator 4g2 
 
 XXIII. — Causes of the Duration of the Eastern Empire. — Its 
 
 Destruction 417O 
 
 Note by the Translator 482 
 
TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION. 
 
 I. As to the motive which has prompted the prep- 
 aration of this edition of Montesquieu's Considerations 
 on the Causes of the Grandeur and Decadence of the 
 Romans, I will only say, that it having occurred to 
 me that the place occupied in American thought by 
 this celebrated work was by no means proportionate to 
 its merits, the idea thence presented itseK of bringing 
 it forward in a new translation — associating the text 
 with such Notes as might serve not only to place the 
 original work in proper relation to the present status 
 of critical history, but serve withal — in an incidental 
 manner — to place the spirit of Eoman history, and of 
 ancient history in general, in proper comparison with 
 the spirit of modem times. The realization - of the 
 first object would be the same — difference of time 
 allowed for — as that which was so admirably accom- 
 plished by the original work nearly a hundred and 
 fifty years ago : it would be to present the general 
 spirit of Eoman history — as now apprehended — with- 
 in the narrowest limits of verbal expression. The 
 realization of the second object would be not only to 
 
10 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakee. 
 
 give an adequate idea of the relative quality and value 
 of the Eoman civilization, but of the ancient civiliza- 
 tions generally, when brought into comparison with 
 the civilization of the modem world — and this, too, 
 within a very limited compass of words. Both these 
 objects are certainly very large and very important. 
 How far they have been realized in the present vol- 
 ume is not for me to say. A man may know his 
 target better than his skill to hit it. 
 
 II. As to the Author of the original treatise, it 
 needs only to be said that he occupies a very eminent 
 position among that small number of great modern 
 thinkers who, measurably released from the limita- 
 tions of their country and their age, have sought to 
 discover the general reason which pervades the history 
 and the institutions of mankind. In his devotion to 
 this grand study his genius was remarkably self-cen- 
 tered and unitary. His Persian Letters, his Consid- 
 erations, and his Sjiirit of Laws, are of a piece. The 
 same quest of the general in the particular pervades 
 them all. Nor has any writer of modern times ac- 
 quired a reputation more honorable, or met with a 
 success more signal. His genius— akin to the great 
 subjects upon which he employed it — has overstepped 
 the boundaries of states and languages, and exercised 
 a marked influence upon the thought, and even upon 
 the legislation, of many nations. 
 
 And yet, since no man can emancipate himself 
 completely from his age and his surroundings, and 
 
INTRODUCTION.] OF THE ROMANS. H 
 
 since all objective thought — especially that which be- 
 longs to rational history — is subject to a law of pro- 
 gressive growth, Montesquieu, in common with all the 
 great positive thinkers of the world, has been supple- 
 mented by much which, although included within the 
 range of his method, did not come within the scope 
 of his conscious and definite recognition. 
 
 The most capital illustration of what has just been 
 said is seen in connection with the idea that a pro- 
 gressvoe movement pervades the history of the world. 
 This conception — to which present thought is strong- 
 ly lending — and which will probably mature into a 
 generalization rigorously supported by all the facts of 
 history proper, of archaeology, and of prehistoric re- 
 search, had no just equivalent in the thought of the 
 ancients. Their idea, as implied by Aristotle and ex- 
 pressed by Thueydides,' that the civilized societies 
 then existing had arisen out of an earlier and ruder 
 social condition, does not nearly come up to the level 
 of the present view, and can only be regarded as a 
 rudiment of the more mature phase of thought. 
 Machiavelli — who may be selected as an excellent 
 representative of the rise of the modem rational 
 spirit, and to whom Montesquieu is in some respects 
 closely related — appears to have had no conception 
 whatever that the world's history is the scene of an 
 ascensive change. His opinion was, that the progres- 
 sive and retrogressive changes which take place upon 
 
 • Aristotle's Politics, Book I, oh. ii ; Thucydides' Histort/, Book I, oh. i. 
 
12 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 the plane of universal history so balance each other 
 that the condition of the world, viewed as a whole, 
 remains the same." And even in the writings of Mon- 
 tesquieu himself, the idea that a progressive move- 
 ment, however irregular and complicated, extends 
 through the history of mankind, cannot be traced 
 with any considerable degree of completeness. 
 
 This great conception, in which all the particulars 
 and all the lesser generalizations of man's historic life 
 meet, and which seems eminently likely to take its 
 place as the Prime Law of History, is the most gen- 
 eral outcome of the comparative study of that im- 
 mense mass of exact observations bearing upon the 
 existing and the past estate of man which have been 
 made for the most part within the present century, 
 and even within the last fifty years. 
 
 Quite in harmony with this great generalization, 
 many of the Notes which I have added are designed 
 to indicate the comparative value of the Roman civ- 
 ilization, and, incidentally, the comparative value of 
 the ancient civilizations in general, when estimated 
 upon the scale of that progressive movement which 
 is thus deemed to pervade the history of man. In 
 the most comprehensive sense, all that we are in the 
 habit of including in "ancient history" is regarded 
 
 2 E pensando io come queste cose procedino, giudico il mondo sempre 
 easere stato ad un medesimo modo, ed in quello esser stato tanto di buono 
 quanto di tristo ; ma yariare questo tristo e questo buono di provincia la 
 provincia : come si rede per quello si ha notizia di quelli regni antichi 
 cho variavano dall' uno all' altro per la variazione de' costumi ; ma il 
 mondo restava quel medesimo. Viscorsi — Introduction to Book II. 
 
INTRODUCTION.] OF THE ROMANS. 
 
 13 
 
 as a middle term, preceded by a lower, and followed 
 by a higher stage of development. 
 
 III. As to the ground-subject of the wort, it seems 
 just to say, that in a truly rational sense, a supreme 
 interest attaches to Eoman as distinguished from all 
 other ancient history. This is chiefly if not wholly 
 due to one main fact. More than any other, the his- 
 tory of the Romans occupies a central ^position in uni- 
 versal histmy. As regards the world's main stream 
 of civilization, it may be said with substantial truth 
 on the one hand, that all pre-Eoman history meets in 
 the Roman Eepublic and Empire — as many tributa- 
 ries in one grand trunk — and on the other, that upon 
 the dissolution of this great body, the powerful influ- 
 ence of its spirit, surviving the loss of its form, has 
 penetrated to the limits of modern civilization. Thus, 
 in the actual course which history has taken, the 
 Eomans have performed, upon a gigantic scale, the 
 double oflfice of receiving from the past and dispens- 
 ing to the future ; and this focal position, taken in 
 connection with the very great influence thence exert- 
 ed upon the world's civilization, must ever impart a 
 leading interest to their history. Eminent writers 
 have claimed for the history of France some such cen- 
 tral position in reference to the development of mod- 
 em Europe;" but the figure of the Eomans in this 
 respect is altogether more colossal. 
 
 ' Guizot'3 Histoire de la Civilisation en Europe, Paris, 1871, pp. 6, 1; 
 Stephen's Leclures on the History of France, London, 1852, i, 6, 7. 
 
IDEA OF "THE GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE OF 
 THE ROMANS." 
 
 FEOM THE FRENCH OF LA HARPE.' 
 
 As M-e see in tlie Persian Letters the germ of tlie 
 Spirit of Laws, we think we also see in the Consid- 
 erations on the Grandeur and Decadence of the Ro- 
 mans a detached part of that immense work which 
 absorbed the life of Montesquieu. It is probable that 
 he determined to make a separate treatise of these 
 Considerations for the reason that, inasmuch as the 
 Romans constitute a great subject in themselves, the 
 author, who felt himself capable of the task, would 
 not, on the one hand, rest either below his matter 
 or below his talent, — whilst on the other, he feared 
 that the Eomans alone might occupy too large a place 
 in the Spirit of Laws, and thus mar the just pro- 
 portions of the work. 
 
 It is to this that we owe this excellent treatise, 
 of which we have no model in our language, and 
 which will endure as long as the language itself. It 
 
 ' These remarks of La Harpe appear as a note at the end of the Con- 
 siderations, Paris edition of 1866 — the one I have used in making the 
 present translation. — TnA.N:iLATOE. 
 
15 GEANDEUR AND DECADENCE [la bakpe. 
 
 is a chef-d'ceuvre of reason and of style, far surpass- 
 ing Machiavelli, Gordon, Saint-Eeal, Amelot de la 
 Houssaie, and all the other political writers who have 
 treated of the same subject. Never before were so 
 many profound thoughts and luminous views brought 
 together in so small a space. In view of the eleva- 
 tion and the difficulty of his subject, the merit of 
 conciseness in the expression of moral truths, as nat- 
 uralized in our language by Eochefoucauld and Bru- 
 yere, must yield to that of Montesquieu. They only 
 circumscribed within a given measure, and in forms 
 of remarkable expression, ideas of which the basis is 
 in every mind capable of reflection, for the reason 
 that every one has need of them : he adapted the 
 same precision to grand objects of thought, beyond 
 the reach and the usage of most men, and upon which 
 he shed at the same time a new light. 
 
 By the manner in which he presents his thought, 
 he causes us to see in the history of a people which 
 has fixed the attention of the whole world that which 
 no other had seen, and that which he alone seemed 
 capable of seeing. He was able to perceive in the 
 politics and the government of the Eomans that which 
 none of their own historians had detected. The one 
 among them all who was most akin to him and whom 
 he appears to have taken as a model in his manner 
 of writing-TacitQs— who was, like himself, a great 
 thinker and a great painter, has left us a fine treatise 
 on the manners of the Germans : but how far is the 
 
or THE ROMANS. I7 
 
 portrait of some semi-savage peoples, traced with, an 
 art aad in colors wMch cause the eulogy of barbari- 
 ans to be the satire of a corrupted civilization, sur- 
 passed by that vast tableau of twenty centuries, ex- 
 tending from the foundation of Eome to the capture 
 of Constantinople, and condensed into a .picture in 
 which, notwithstanding its diminutive size, the ob- 
 jects lose nothing of their grandeur, but even become 
 more salient and more striking ! In this species of 
 writing, what may be compared to so small a number 
 of pages, in which, so to speak, we find fused and 
 concentrated the whole spirit which sustained and 
 animated the Colossus of the Roman power, and at 
 the same time all the poisons which, after having 
 long preyed upon it, caused it to fall in ruins beneath 
 the strokes of the numerous nations which were united 
 against it ? 
 
CONSIDERATIONS ON THE CAUSES 
 
 OF THE 
 
 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE 
 OF THE ROMANS; 
 
 CHAPTEE T. 
 
 THE BEGINNINGS OF ROME. — HEE WAKS. 
 
 "We should not form the same idea of Eome in its 
 beginnings as that which is given us by the cities of 
 the present day; unless indeed we except those of 
 the Crimea — built to enclose plunder, animals, and 
 the fruits of the country. The ancient names of all 
 the principal places in Eome bore relation to such 
 usage. 
 
 The city was even without streets, unless we call 
 by that name the continuation of the roads which 
 led to it. The houses were distributed without order, 
 and were very small ; for the men, constantly at work 
 or assembled in the public place, passed but httle of 
 their time in houses. 
 
 ' [This work->-generally regarded aa the clief-d'auvre of Montes- 
 quieu — appeared in ]'734, The author was then in the forty-fifth year 
 of his age.] 
 
20 
 
 GEANDETJR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 But the grandeur of Eome appeared very soon in 
 her public structures. The works which heretofore 
 have given, and which yet give, the highest idea of 
 her power, were constructed under the kings.' (a) The 
 building of the eternal city was already commenced. 
 
 For the purpose of procuring citizens, wives or 
 lands, Eomulus and his successors were almost inces- 
 santly engaged in war with their neighbors. They 
 returned home bringing with them the spoils of van- 
 quished peoples— consisting of herds of cattle and 
 sheaves of grain. These were occasions of great re- 
 joicing in the city ; and such was the origin of those 
 Triumphs, which were in after times the principal 
 cause of the grandeur of the Eomans. 
 
 The power of Eome was greatly increased by her 
 tinion with the Sabines, a people as hardy and as war- 
 like as the Lacedaemonians, from whom they were 
 descended. Eomulus adopted their buckler, which 
 was large, instead of the small Argive buckler which 
 he had previously used.' And it should be noted, 
 that the circumstance which contributed most to ren- 
 der the Eomans masters of the world was, that hav- 
 ing contended successively against all nations, they 
 invariably renounced their own usages as soon as they 
 found better. 
 
 ° Witnesa the astonishment of Dionysius of Halicarnassus in con- 
 nection with the sewers constructed by Tarquin. (Ant. Horn. Book III ) 
 They exist yet, 
 
 (a) Consult my Note at the end of this chapter. — Tkanslator, 
 
 * Plutarch, Idfe of Emnulvs. 
 
CHAP. I.] OP THE ROMANS. 21 
 
 Among tlie republics of Italy at that time, it was 
 the opinion of men that the treaties which they had 
 entered into with a king did not bind them as towards 
 his successor ; and this, for them, was a species of law 
 of nations. Thus, all who had been subdued by one 
 king of Eome claimed to be free under another, and 
 wars sprang continually from wars. 
 
 The long and peaceful reign of l^uma was well 
 calculated to arrest Home in her mediocrity; and, if 
 at this time she had had a larger territory, and a 
 greater measure of power, there is some appearance 
 that her fortune would have been fixed for ever. 
 
 One of the causes of her prosperity was that her 
 kings were all great men. We do not find elsewhere 
 in history an uninterrupted succession of such states- 
 men and such captains.' 
 
 In the infancy of societies, the chiefs of the state 
 form the institutions ; afterwards, the institutions form 
 the chiefs of the state. 
 
 Tarquin took the crown without being elected, 
 either by the senate or by the people." The kingly 
 power became hereditary ; he rendered it absolute ; 
 and these two revolutions were speedily followed by 
 a third. 
 
 In the violation of Lucretia, Tarquin's son Sextus 
 committed an act which has almost always caused 
 
 ^ This is apparent from the whole course of the history of the Idngs. 
 
 5 The senate named a magistrate for the interregnum, who elected the 
 kmg: this election had to be confirmed by the people. Dionys. Hal., lib. 
 ii, iii, and iv. 
 
22 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 tyrants to be driyen from the cities whicli they have 
 ruled; for the people — stttng by such an act into a 
 keen sense of their servitude — are at once precipitated 
 upon an extreme resolution. A people can easily en- 
 dure the exaction of a new tribute ; for they do not 
 know but that some benefit may inure to themselves 
 from the use which may be made of the money ; but 
 when they are subjected to insult, they feel nothing 
 but their own misery, and they add thereto the idea 
 of all the evils which are possible. 
 
 It is however true that the death of Lucretia was 
 only the occasion of the revolution which followed;" 
 for a people who are at once proud, enterprising, 
 courageous, and enclosed within walls, must necessa- 
 rily throw ofi their yoke, or experience a softening 
 of their manners. 
 
 It was necessary that one of two things should 
 take place ; either that Eome should change her form 
 of government, or that she should continue to be a 
 small and a poor monarchy.' 
 
 " In a similar sense Machiavelli : " Tarquin was not therefore driven 
 out because his son Sextus had violated Lucretia, but because he had 
 broken the laws of the kingdom, and governed it tyrannically. . . . And 
 if the incident of Lucretia had not taken place, as soon as some other 
 accident had happened, it would have led to the same result." (Discorsi 
 lib. iii, cap. v.) It is one of the laws of historical causation that the 
 really effective causes of great external changes very often accumulate 
 in silence, until some occasional event performs the office of excitin"- 
 them into open activity, and thus wins, in a superficial way of thinking 
 the reputation of being the substantial cause of the change. Trans- 
 lator. 
 
 ' Here again Machiavelli expresses himself in a similar sense : " I am 
 of opinion that it was necessary, cither that the kings should be set aside 
 
CHAP. I.] OF TEE ROMANS. 23 
 
 Modem history furnishes us an example of the 
 same thing which then took place in Eome : and this 
 is very noteworthy ; for, since men have had the same 
 passions in all ages, the occasions which produce great 
 changes are different, but the causes are always the 
 same. As Henry YII of England increased the power 
 of the commons for the purpose of humbling the 
 aristocracy, Servius TuUius before him had extended 
 the privileges of the people in order to humble the 
 senate." But the people — become at once more bold 
 — overthrew the one and the other monarchy. 
 
 The portrait of Tarquin has not been flattered. 
 His name has escaped none of the orators who have 
 had occasion to speak against tyranny. But his con- 
 duct before his misfortune — which one sees that he 
 foresaw; his lenity towards conquered peoples; his 
 liberality to soldiers; that art which he had, of so 
 greatly interesting men in his conversation; his pub- 
 lic works, his courage in war, his constancy in adver- 
 sity, his continual resources ; the war of twenty 
 years duration, which, without kingdoms and without 
 wealth, he made or caused to be made upon the 
 
 or that Rome, in a very short time, should become weak and powerless ; 
 for, considering how corrupt the kings were become, if there had been a 
 succession of two or three such reigns, until the corruption which the 
 kings had contracted had begun to extend to the members, since the 
 members also would have thus become corrupted, reformation would have 
 been forever impossible. But, putting aside the head of the state while 
 the body was yet sound, it was easy to establish regulated liberty." {Dis- 
 corsi, lib. i, cap. xvii.) — Tbanslator. 
 
 * See Zonaras, and Dionys. Hal., lib. iv. 
 
24 GKAXDEUE AND DECADENCE [montesquieit. 
 
 Boman people — enable us to see very clearly that lie 
 was not a man to be despised. 
 
 The places assigned by posterity to men are sub- 
 ject, like others, to the caprices of fortune. Woe to 
 the reputation of a prince who is opposed by a party 
 which becomes dominant, or who has attempted to 
 destroy a prejudice which survives him ! 
 
 Eome, having expelled the kiags, established annual 
 consuls ; and this was another of the causes which con- 
 ducted her to such a height of power. Princes experi- 
 ence periods of ambition in the course of their lives, 
 after which other passions, and even sloth itseK, suc- 
 ceed. But the Bepubhc having chiefs who were 
 changed every year, and who sought to signalize their 
 magistracy in order to obtain a renewal of it, there 
 was not a moment to be lost to ambition. They 
 engaged the senate to propose war to the people, and 
 showed it new enemies every day." 
 
 The senate was already sufficiently inclined of itself 
 to the policy of war; for, being incessantly harassed 
 by the complaints and the demands of the people, it 
 sought to divert them from their inquietudes by oc- 
 cupying them abroad." 
 
 And war was almost always agreeable to the people 
 themselves ; for, by a wise distribution of its spoils a 
 means had been found of rendering it profitable. 
 
 " For some strictures upon the consular system of the Eoma 
 suit my Mote at the end of this chapter. — Tkanslator. ' 
 
 '" Besides, the authority of the senate was less limited in affairs w'th 
 out than within the city. 
 
CHAP. I.] OF THE EOMANS. 25 
 
 Eome being a city witliout commerce, and almost 
 without arts, pillage was the only means which pri- 
 vate individuals had of enriching themselves. 
 
 The manner of pillaging was therefore regulated 
 by discipline, and nearly the same order was observed 
 as that which is at present practiced among the Tar- 
 tar tribes. 
 
 The booty was first deposited in common," and then 
 it was divided among the soldiers. Nothing was lost ; 
 for, before setting out, each one took an oath that he 
 would appropriate nothing to his own use ; and of all 
 the peoples of the world the Homans were the m ost 
 religio us in the observance of the oath — a quahty which 
 was at all times the very nerve of their military dis- 
 cipline. 
 
 Pinally, the citizens who remained at home partici- 
 pated also in the fruits of victory. A portion of the 
 lands of the conquered people was confiscated and di- 
 vided into two parts, one of which was sold for the 
 benefit of the public, whilst the other was allotted to 
 poor citizens, subject to a rent reserved in favor of 
 the state. 
 
 Not being able to obtain the honors of a triumph 
 except by the achievement of a conquest or a victory, 
 the consuls made war with extreme impetuosity. They 
 marched straight to the enemy, and force decided at 
 once. 
 
 Kome was therefore engaged in ceaseless, and al- 
 " See Polybius, lib. x. 
 2 
 
2g GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquiext. 
 
 ways violent war. But, a nation wMcli was thua con 
 stantly at war— and that too by the very principle of 
 its organization— had necessarily to perish or to over- 
 come all the others, which, sometimes at war and some- 
 times in a state of peace, were never in such proper 
 condition for attack, nor so well prepared for defence. 
 
 By this incessant prosecution of war, the Eomans 
 acquired a profound knowledge of the military art. 
 In the case of occasional wars, most of the examples 
 are lost ; peace brings in other ideas, and men forget 
 their faults and even their virtues. 
 
 Another consequence of the principle of continual 
 war was that the Eomans never made peace except 
 as conquerors. Where, indeed, was the profit, in mak- 
 ing a discreditable peace with one nation in order to 
 proceed to the attack of another ? 
 
 Under the influence of this idea, it was their habit 
 to increase their pretensions in the measure of their 
 reverses. They thus dismayed the victorious enemy, 
 and imposed upon themselves the utmost necessity 
 of conquering. 
 
 Always exposed to the most frightful vengeance, 
 constancy and valor became necessary to them ; nor 
 could these virtues be distinguished in the Eoman 
 mind from the love of self, of family, of country, 
 and of all that is held dearest among men. 
 
 The peoples of Italy made no use of machines 
 adapted to the prosecution of sieges;" and as, in ad- 
 
 '^ Dionysius of Halicamaasus saya so formally, lib. ix ; and it so ap- 
 
CHAP. I.] OF THE ROMANS. 2Y 
 
 dition to this, the soldiers received no pay," it was 
 not possible to hold them for a long time before any 
 one place. Thus it was that few of their wars were 
 decisive. They engaged in battle for the plunder of 
 the camps or lands of their enemies ; after which the 
 victor and the vanquished withdrew, ekch into his 
 own city. It is this that explains the resistance of 
 the Italian peoples, and at the same time the obsti- 
 nacy of the Komans in the work of subjugating them. 
 It was this that gave to the latter victories which 
 did not corrupt them, and which left them in all 
 their poverty. 
 
 If they had rapidly conc[uered all the neighboring 
 cities, they would .have been found in a state of de- 
 cline at the arrival of Pyrrhus, of the Gauls, and of 
 Hannibal ; and, in conformity with the destiny of 
 nearly aU the states of the world, they would have 
 passed too quickly from poverty to wealth and from 
 wealth to corruption. 
 
 But, always striving and always meeting obstacles, 
 
 Eome caused her power to be felt without being 
 
 able to extend it ; and, within a circumference which 
 
 pears from history. They did not know how to construct galleries to 
 cover themselves from the besieged. They endeavored to capture cities 
 by scaling the walla. Ephorus says that Artemon, the engineer, invented 
 large machines for battering the strongest walls. Plutarch says that 
 Pericles first used these at the siege of Samos. — lAfe of Ferides. 
 
 '5 The Roman infantry received no pay until the year of the City 
 349, nor the cavalry until the year 352, during the siege of Veii ; thence- 
 forward they were paid by the state. (Comp. Adam's, Bx>m. Ant., 
 Phila., 18'72, p. 268, and Livy, Book IV, ch. 69, Book Y, ch. '7).— Tkahs- 
 
 LATOR. 
 
28 GRANDEUK AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 was very small, she exercised those virtues which 
 were to become so fatal to the world. 
 
 The peoples of Italy were not all equally warlike. 
 The Etrurians were enervated by their wealth and by 
 their luxury ; the Tarentines, the Capuans, and nearly 
 all the cities of Campania and Magna Grecia, lan- 
 guished in indolence and in the pursuit of pleasure. 
 But the Latins, the Hernicans, the Sabines, the ^qui- 
 ans, and the Yolscians, loved war passionately. They 
 were situated around Rome ; they offered to her an 
 inconceivable resistance, and were her equals in point 
 of obstinacy. 
 
 The Latin cities were colonies from Alba, founded 
 by Latinus Sylvanus." Besides ^ common origin 
 with the Romans, they had also common rites ; and 
 Servius Tullius had engaged them to have a temple 
 built in Eome, to serve as a bond of union for the 
 two peoples." Having been beaten in a great battle 
 near the lake Hegillus, they were reduced to an alli- 
 ance and military association with the Romans. " 
 
 During the short time that the tyranny of the De- 
 cemvirs continued, we see to what an extent the ag- 
 grandizement of Rome depended upon her liberty. 
 The state seemed to have lost the soul which caused 
 it to move." There were but two sorts of people in 
 
 " As we see in the treatise entitled : Origo genik TOmana'— which is 
 believed to be by Aurelius Victor. 
 
 " DioNYs. Hal., lib. iv. 
 
 " See in Dionys. Hal. one of the treaties made with them. 
 
 " Under pretext of giving written laws to the people, they seized the 
 govei-nmcnt. 
 
CHAP. I.] OF THE ROMANS. 29 
 
 the city — those who suffered servitude, and those who, 
 for theii" own private interests, sought to impose it 
 upon others. The senators withdrew as from a sti'ange 
 city; and the neighboring nations nowhere met with 
 resistance. 
 
 The senate having found the means of giving pay 
 to the soldiers, the siege of Yeii was undertaken — a 
 siege which lasted ten years. We now see a new art 
 among the Eomans, and another method of conduct- 
 ing war. Their successes are more striking, they profit 
 better by their victories, they make greater conquests, 
 and send out more colonies. The capture of Yeii was 
 a species of revolution." 
 
 But the difficulties which they encountered were 
 none the less. If they struck more powerful blows 
 against the Etrurians, the ^quians and the Yolscians, 
 this led to the desertion of their allies, the Hernicans 
 and the Latins, who had the same arms and the same 
 discipline as themselves; it led to the formation of 
 leagues among the Etrurians, and prompted the Sam- 
 nites — ^the most martial of all the peoples of Italy — to 
 make war upon them with the utmost fury. 
 
 From the time of the institution of pay, the senate 
 
 ceased to distribute the lands of conquered peoples 
 
 among the soldiers. It imposed other conditions upon 
 
 the vanquished. It obligated them, for example, to 
 
 " Veii was situated upon the opposite, or Etrurian side of the Tiber, 
 and only about twelve miles from Rome — so small was yet the territory 
 of the Romans, after three hundred and fifty years of all but incessant 
 war. — Tkanslatok. 
 
30 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [MONTEsaniEU. 
 
 furnish pay for the army during a certain time, and to 
 supply it with clothing and food." 
 
 The capture of Kome by the Gauls deprived it of 
 none of its strength. The army, rather dispersed than 
 vanquished, withdrev? almost entire to Yeii ; the peo- 
 ple saved themselves in the neighboring towns; and 
 the burning of the city was no more than the burning 
 of the cabins of a community of shepherds. 
 " See tlie treaties which were made. 
 
BAKEB.] OF THE ROMANS. qi 
 
 NOTE BY THE TKANSLATOE. 
 
 I. The burning of Eome by the Gauls is referred 
 to the year 365 of the city. It seems however that it 
 was not wholly burnt. The Gauls, at least in the be- 
 ginning of their occupancy, which is represented as ex- 
 tending to " many months," appear to have proceeded 
 tentatively in the application of the torch — ^reserving a 
 part of the town as a means of influencing the Capital 
 and the Citadel to capitulate. These, together with 
 "the temples of the gods" were at all events saved. 
 Yet, the destruction was so great, that a powerful 
 party, headed by the tribunes, is said to have favored 
 the abandonment of Home, and the transfer of its peo- 
 ple to Yeii, which had been acquired by the Bomans a 
 few years before — a measure which seems to have been 
 agitated to some extent even before the burning of the 
 city, and which was now effectually opposed by the 
 superior influence of Oamillus.' 
 
 The cause which is assigned for this Gallic inva- 
 sion, and the resulting disaster to the city of Eome, 
 shows that the Gauls, at this early period — 388 years 
 ' See LiTj, Book V., cha. 39-58, Spillan's trans., N. T., 1871. 
 
32 GRANDEUE AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 before Christ— had no mean idea of some of the prin- 
 ciples of International Law. Three Eoman brothers, 
 bearing the name of Fabius, had been sent to them 
 in the character of embassadors, for the purpose of 
 interceding in behalf of the Clusians, an Etrurian 
 people whom the Senonian Grauls, freshly arrived 
 from the north of the Alps, were pressing for terri- 
 tory. Having come to a rupture with the Gauls, 
 these embassadors joined the Etrurians in a battle 
 against them — fighting, as the story runs, in the very 
 van, and one of them killing a Gallic general with 
 his own hand. Hereupon the Gauls dispatched an 
 embassy to Eome, demanding that the three Fabii 
 should be delivered up to them. The senate, embar- 
 rassed by the case, referred it to the people, who, so 
 far from awarding any punishment whatever, con- 
 ferred upon the embassadors the distinction of Mili- 
 tary Tribunes with consular power. Thereupon the 
 Gauls, enraged that the offenders were not only not 
 punished, but actually honored, seized their standards 
 and advanced upon Eome. On their march to the 
 city they appear to have acted honorably towards the 
 intermediate peoples through whose states they passed, 
 quieting their fears by loud shouts as they moved pre- 
 cipitately along, that they were on their way to Eome 
 So far as the cause of quarrel goes, our sympathies 
 are decidedly with the Gauls.' 
 
 11. As regards the urban quality of Eome during 
 
 '' Idem, cha. S5, 36, 37. 
 
NOTE.] or THE ROMANS. 33 
 
 its early years, Livy states in effect that it was looked 
 upon by its neighbors, not as a city, but as a menac- 
 ing camp.' 
 
 Taken in connection with the ancient state of 
 Southern Europe, Northern Africa and Southwestern 
 Asia, the geographical position of Eome was admira- 
 bly adapted to empire. The great capital was found- 
 ed not very far from the center of these three vast 
 areas — over which its influence and its power were 
 destined to extend. In the speech which Camillus is 
 represented as making, with the view of dissuading 
 his countrymen from abandoning their own city and 
 moving to Yeii, we find a good statement of some 
 of the natural advantages of the site chosen by the 
 founders of the former city ; advantages however 
 which were obviously much better adapted to the 
 circumstances of ancient than they are to those of 
 modem times. " Not without good reason," the dic- 
 tator is represented as saying, " did gods and men 
 select this place for founding a city : these most 
 healthful hills ; a commodious river, by means of 
 which the produce of the soil may be conveyed from 
 the inland countries, by which maritime supplies may 
 be obtained ; close enough to the sea for all purposes 
 of commerce, and not exposed by too much proxim- 
 ity to the dangers of foreign fleets ; a situation in 
 the center of the regions of Italy, singularly adapted 
 by nature to the increase of a city."* 
 
 ' Book I, ch. 21. * Livy, Book V, oh. 84, Spillan's trans. 
 
34 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 The immediate physical relations of the ancient 
 city of Home may be stated in few words. It stood 
 in north latitude 41° 53' 52", which is something 
 more than one degree farther north than New York. 
 It was therefore, geographically speaking, a northern 
 rather than a southern city. It was huilt upon some 
 moderate hills which rise upon the left bank of the 
 Tiber, at a distance of about thirteen miles from the 
 ancient mouth of this river. These hills — as indeed 
 the whole face of the adjacent country — are of vol- 
 canic origin, indicating that in prehistoric times Kome 
 and its environs were a scene of much more violent 
 volcanic action than has been known within the 
 period of history. The city stood near the sea level, 
 it being ascertained by modern measurements that 
 the river at liome is twenty feet above the level of 
 the Mediterranean. 
 
 The Tiber, like the Jordan, the Scamander and 
 the Ilissus, derives its fame wholly from the human 
 interest with which it is associated, and in no appre- 
 ciable degree from its physical magnitude. In its 
 whole course, from its rise in the Tuscan Apennines 
 to its mouth, this celebrated river only measures 
 about two hundred and twelve miles. It is navigable 
 for boats of fifty tons burden for a distance of one 
 hundred miles. At Eome it is one hundred yards 
 wide, with a depth of twelve to eighteen feet. It is 
 yellow, from commixture with the mud which it brings 
 with it from the Apennines ; and the deposit of this 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 35 
 
 mud at the mouth of the river has, since the time of 
 the Romans, formed a delta of about two miles — the 
 ancient sea-port of Ostia being now about that dis- 
 tance inland.' 
 
 III. The observation of Montesquieu in relation 
 to the city of Rome, that "the works which hereto- 
 fore have given, and which yet give, the highest idea 
 of her power, were erected under the kings," admits 
 of comment. Such a statement appears to involve 
 an improbable inversion of ideas, and is scarcely in 
 harmony with facts, when rationally interpreted, al- 
 though favored by an opinion of Livy and by an 
 expression of Pliny.° 
 
 . It is true that the physical dimensions of the city, 
 as determined by the extent of the walls already es- 
 tablished during the time of the kings, underwent 
 no enlargement until near the close of the third cen- 
 tury after Christ. "What are called the walls of 
 Servius TuUius," says Dr. Arnold, "continued to be 
 the walls of Rome for nearly eight hundred years, 
 down to the Emperor Aurehan." It is also true that, 
 in presence of the numerous small states into which 
 ancient Italy was divided, the monarchy of the kings 
 was a considerable one, embracing probably the whole 
 of the little Latin Confederacy, besides something on 
 
 ' Sir George Head's Tour in Rome, London, 1849, Vol. 1, pp. 20-21 ; 
 Arnold's Bist. of Rome, ch. iii ; Mommsen's Romische Geschickte, Berlin, 
 1868, Vol. 1, p. 43 ; Chambers' Enc, arts. Tiber, Rome ; Anthon's Clas. 
 Die., art. Ostia, 
 
 * Livy, Book I, ch. 66 ; Adam's Rom. Ant., Phila., 1872, p. 405 ; Pliny, . 
 xxxri, 13. 
 
36 
 
 GEANDEUK AND DECADENCE [bakeb. 
 
 the opposite side of the Tiber —an extent of domain 
 which was greatlj reduced during the troubles which 
 immediately followed the expulsion of the house of 
 Tarquin, and which the Eepublic did not fully recover 
 until long afterward.' 
 
 Still, Eome under the kings was yet rude, weak, 
 and poor in comparison with what she ultimately came 
 to be under the Eepublic and Empire ; and it would 
 be curious indeed, if in a truly judicious sense, the 
 works which "give the highest idea of her power," 
 were constructed at this early and immature stage of 
 her development. The chief works referred to the 
 time of the kings were the Temple of Jupiter on 
 the Tarpeian Hill, the great Circus, and the " princi- 
 pal Sewer" of the city. It is in reference to the 
 sewers of Eome that Pliny makes the remark alluded 
 to above, saying that "they are called the greatest 
 of all works — passing under mountains — and that the 
 city, suspended above, is navigated underground ; " 
 {pperurn omnium dictu -maxim/um, snffossis monti- 
 lus, atque urbe pensili, suUerque navigatd) The 
 mountains here referred to were the low hills upon 
 which Eome stood ; the material used in the con- 
 struction of the sewers, according to Brocchi, was 
 volcanic tufa— a sort of stone which is easily wrought ; 
 and, as for the subterranean navigation of the city, 
 that must be accepted as a rhetorical ilourish. Even 
 granting that all these works were completed under 
 
 ■■ See Amold'a Hist, of Eome, N. Y., 1S5T, pp. 20-22, 44, 48-49. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 37 
 
 the kings — and it is known that much work was sub- 
 sequently and repeatedly done on the Circus Maximus 
 — we have to recount, at later periods, the Pantheon 
 of Agrippa — far surpassing the old temple of Jupiter ; 
 the Amphitheatre of Statilius Taurus; the Colisasum 
 of Vespasian and Titus ; the Baths, the Basilicas, the 
 hundreds of Temples by which the city was adorned ; 
 the immense system of Aqueducts by which it was 
 supplied with water from a distance — and which as 
 works of art must be adjudged as ranking the great 
 Sewer of the Tarquins; the stone piered bridges 
 which spanned so many of the rivers of Europe, espe- 
 cially the one over the Garden at Nismes, and those 
 of Trajan over the Tagus and the Danube ; and above 
 all, that grand system of massive stone Eoads, con- 
 necting the Capital with the cities of Italy and the 
 provinces of the Empire, and which were at once the 
 greatest mechanical achievement of the Eoman world, 
 and the greatest of the kind in all history. Here was 
 evident expansion in that assemblage of sensible ob- 
 jects which impresses an idea of power. As Eome 
 developed in her language, her literature, her empire 
 and her laws, she also developed in her material 
 works." 
 
 TV. I think also that the statement of Montesquieu 
 in relation to the consular system of the Eomans must 
 be regarded as incomplete. The provision which was 
 
 « See Livy, Book I, chs. 55, 66 ; Arnold's Hisi. of Rome, ch. t, note 
 6 ; Adam's Rom. Ant, Lum Circensbs. 
 
38 GKANDEUK AND DECADENCE [baksb. 
 
 made by the republic in tbis respect is to be viewed 
 rather as a necessity growing out of tbe imperiect 
 state of Eoman polity, than as an appointment wise 
 in itself. The division of the command of the same 
 forces between two chiefs of equal authority was 
 much the same thing as a single body with two heads. 
 The object appears to have been to prevent usurpa- 
 tion, by means of the mutual restraint which the two 
 consuls would exercise upon each other. But, in thus 
 accomplishing the object aimed at, the unity of the 
 consular function was destroyed, and, consequently, 
 the function itself very seriously impaired. In more 
 perfect social organizations, checks are not provided 
 for by thus sacrificing the unity of any of the great 
 functions of the state, but by so adjusting them that 
 they may mutually restrain each other, while left to 
 operate with undivided energy in their respective 
 spheres of action. 
 
 Doubtless the Koman consular system corresponded 
 well with the particular stage of social development 
 from which it sprang ; but it is none the less certain 
 that their dual consulate must be taken as evidence 
 of a very imperfect political organization. It was by 
 no means always that the two equal heads of the 
 same army agreed in their views, or that either of 
 them was willing to defer to the other. On numer- 
 ous occasions the evils of a divided command mani- 
 fested themselves, and sometimes in consequences 
 which were extremely serious. Thus— to give a few 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 39 
 
 out of many examples — the defeat on the Trebia was 
 preceded by a disagreement between the consuls — 
 Scipio reluctant, and Sempronius pressing the battle ; 
 at a later period, when the master of the horse, Mi- 
 nucius, was made equal in authority with the dictator, 
 Fabius, the army being divided into two independent 
 commands, that of Minucius came near being de- 
 stroyed by Hannibal before it could be succored by 
 the other division; and everybody is familiar with 
 the broils — well calculated to demoralize an army — 
 which occurred between the two Koman chiefs on 
 the eve of the fatal battle of Cannse — Paulus vehe- 
 mently opposing, and Yarro more vehemently urging 
 the conflict. 
 
 The custom was to divide the legions between the 
 two consuls ; but sometimes it seems each of the con- 
 suls commanded the whole army on alternate days. 
 Tlie Koman historian, Livy, was fully sensible of the 
 defects of such an arrangement; and Machiavelli fin- 
 ishes his discussion of the subject with the judicious 
 conclusion that " it is better to entrust a campaign to 
 one commander of ordinary prudence than to two of 
 the greatest ability and of equal authority " ; ° a maxim 
 which has been much approved, and which has been 
 shortened into the blunt English, that " one bad gen- 
 eral is better than two good ones." '° 
 
 ° Epuossi conchiudere veramenie, come gli i meglio mandare in una 
 espedizione un uomo solo di commiale prudema, che duoi valentissimi tiomi- 
 ni insieme con la medesima, autoriid. 
 
 'o Adam's Rom. Ant , Phila., 18Y2, p. 76 ; Livy, Book XXI, chs. 62, 
 
40 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 V. The reader needs hardly to be reminded of 
 the uncertainty which attaches to much of the early 
 history of Kome. But we should be careful not to 
 carry our skepticism too far. As regards the great 
 elements, from which the general movement and 
 spirit of this section of Koman history may be ration- 
 ally made out, we have a good foundation for his- 
 torical credence. Prominent among these elements 
 should be placed the following general facts. 
 
 1. That those kindred tribes which formed the Latin 
 language and coalesced under the Eoman name, had, 
 in prehistoric times, emigrated from Asia; being — 
 like the Hellenic tribes which formed the Greek lan- 
 guage and the Greek states — an ofE-shoot from that 
 great Aryan or Indo-European stock, whose primal, 
 or at least whose very early seat, appears to have 
 been somewhere in the interior of Southwestern Asia, 
 and whose waves of dispersion extended to India in 
 the one direction, and to Europe in the other. 
 
 2. That these immigrating tribes — destined in the 
 fullness of time to establish the capital of the world 
 upon the banks of the Tiber— found the Etrurians al- 
 ready old in Italy— a people of high civilization for 
 ancient times— and who, in their turn, had been pre- 
 ceded in all parts of Italy by peoples in that social 
 state, usually called savage, which is destitute of the use 
 of metals, and dependent upon implements of stone. 
 
 ^L« m!C^' ''' ''' ''' '' ^ "-'^ ^^' ^^- '' ■' «-'^>-"'. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 41 
 
 3. That the Romans started low, mucli lower than 
 their Etrurian neighbors, to whom they sent for au- 
 gurs and for master workmen, and to whom they 
 were indebted for many of their religious rites, for 
 their first mechanical and architectural structures, for 
 their earliest decorative art, for their household uten- 
 sUs, for their coinage of copper money, for their 
 institution of lictors, for their curule chairs of mag- 
 istracy, and for their famous purple-fringed robe of 
 state." 
 
 4. That they were governed first by kings, then 
 by consuls, tribunes and magistrates; and, that from 
 the time of the expulsion of the kings there was a 
 constant internal struggle going on between the 
 upper and the lower classes, and an equally constant 
 external struggle with the surrounding nations. 
 
 6. That their laws were hard, their manners 
 coarse, their customs cruel ; and that, being won- 
 derfully addicted to war, and none the less remark- 
 able for those sorts of fortitude, cunning, and fraud, 
 which are the accompaniments of incessant war in 
 low states of society, they were enabled gradually to 
 acquire ascendency over their hardy neighbors. 
 
 These, and similar general elements of the early 
 
 history of the Komans — intermixed, as we have seen, 
 
 with reliable particulars — appear to be thoroughly 
 
 credible, and, when taken together, they are quite 
 
 " Livy, Book I, chs. 8, 55, 66 ; Arnold's Mst. of Rome, N. Y., ISSV, 
 pp. 22-24 ; Francis Pulszky in Indigenous Races of the Earth, Phila., 
 1S68, p. 173. 
 
42 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakbh. 
 
 sufficient to enable ns to form a tolerably distinct 
 idea of the substance and spirit of the archaic his- 
 tory of this people. It is when we descend from 
 such generalities to the mass of facts of a minor 
 kind, that we come upon the appropriate field for 
 critical selection, doubt, and positive disbelief. 
 
 In respect to credibility — when the application of 
 the word is limited to all except such cardinal ele- 
 ments as have just been indicated — Koman history 
 may be divided into four periods ; the first extend- 
 ing from the beginning of the city to the expulsion 
 of the kings; the second from the expulsion of the 
 kings to the capture of the city by the Gauls; the 
 third from the capture of the city to the second Pu- 
 nic war ; and the fourth embracing the residue of 
 Koman history, down to the fall of the empire. 
 The detailed history of Eome becomes progressively 
 more credible as we pass from the first to the closing 
 member of this series of epochs. 
 
 The first period, commonly reckoned as com- 
 mencing Y63 years before Christ, and including 244 
 years, is intensely mythical and fabulous. The sec- 
 ond, embracing 121 years, is only less indistinct and 
 questionable than the first. Livy himself, who con- 
 siders both these periods as one, regards their annals 
 as obscure, not only on account of their antiquity, 
 but also from the extremely limited use of letters in 
 those early ages, and from the further circumstance 
 that the pontifical and other records were mostly 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 43 
 
 destroyed when the city was burnt." The third pe- 
 riod, which embraces 169 years, becomes more distinct 
 and authentic." But it is not until the beginning of 
 the fourth period — 534 years after the foundation of 
 the city — ^that we come upon the first Bomom histo- 
 rian, Fabius Pictor, who by the way, appears to have 
 been a writer of inferior ability and small credit. 
 Thence the stream of Roman history is enlightened 
 by a tolerable succession of writers, down to the dis- 
 solution of the empire — the main drawback being . 
 the loss of many parts of the best historians, among 
 which the missing portions of Polybius, Livy and 
 Tacitus, are especially to be regretted. 
 
 The names of Perizonius, Bayle, Pouilly, Beau- 
 fort, Voltaire, Mebuhr, Arnold and others — but in 
 a distinguished sense that of Niebuhr — are associated 
 with that spirit of modem criticism which has sub- 
 stituted rational views in the place of that undis- 
 criminating credence with which the early annals of 
 Pome were formerly received. Yoltaire supplies an 
 apt statement of the leading thought which under- 
 lies this critical spirit — whether applied to Eoman 
 history in particular, or to history in general : " It 
 is only at a very late period that the history of a 
 nation can ever be written. Men begin with some 
 extremely summary registries, which are preserved, 
 as well as may be, in a temple or a citadel. An 
 unfortunate war often destroys these annals, and it 
 •i! Book VI, ch. 1. " ^*'"- 
 
44: GRAlfDETIR AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 is necessary to reeommence twenty times, like ants 
 whose habitation has been disturbed by the foot. It 
 is only at the end of many centuries that it is pos- 
 sible for a history of some detail to succeed these 
 informal registries j and this first history is always 
 mixed with the false marvelous, by which men would 
 replace the truth which is wanting." " 
 
 The idea of historical development which is here 
 suggested, becomes yet more complete and more 
 striking, when we penetrate beyond the archaic 
 " registries " of which Voltaire speaks, and place our 
 thought in relation with those strictly prehistoric 
 ages, the rude memorials of which so generally in- 
 dicate a total want of letters, and a very low phys- 
 ical and mental condition for man. 
 
 As already intimated, such appears to have been 
 the most ancient condition of man in Italy. The 
 humble and semi-barbaric commencement of Eoman 
 greatness was preceded by a true barbarism, diffused 
 at an earlier period over the whole peninsula and its 
 adjacent islands. It is now well ascertained that 
 Italy must, in this respect, take its place in company 
 with the other European countries; and that, as in 
 Spain, Switzeriand, France, Germany, Belgium, the 
 British Islands and the Scandinavian states, an Age 
 of Stone preceded the use of metals and the begin- 
 nings of history proper, the same was equally true 
 of the Italian peninsula. In the provinces of Abruz- 
 
 » ffi««m Computes do Voltaire, torn, xis, p. 316, Paris, 1827. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 45 
 
 zo, Kome, Terra di Lavoro, Benevento, Otranto and 
 Calabria ; in the deposits of tlie Yibrata, and of the 
 Tiber not far from the city of Eome ; and in the 
 Islands of Elba and Capri, stone implements have 
 been found in abundance, similar in character to 
 those which mark the prehistoric barbarism of other 
 countries. In the valley of the Yibrata these imple- 
 ments "have been collected by thousands." In con- 
 cluding his account of the objects of the JSTicoUucci 
 collection — presented by Col. Theodore Lyman to the 
 Peabody Museum — ^professor Jeffries Wyman says : 
 " From this general statement of the kinds of objects 
 and their distribution, it will be seen that the penin- 
 sula of Italy, one of the last regions to be explored 
 for remains of the stone age, has yielded these very 
 largely. They antedate all historical records, and until 
 within a few years the existence of such does not 
 appear to have been generally known to archaeolo- 
 gists." " 
 
 Prehistoric knowledge, such as we have, is almost 
 whoUy a creation of the last half century, and as 
 Professor Wyman correctly suggests, it is but lately 
 that it has come to be definitely realized that in the 
 possession of a prehistoric stone age^ Italy forms no 
 exception to the general rule for Europe. In view 
 however of the actual knowledge which for some 
 time has existed upon the subject, the remarks of 
 
 " Sixth Annual Report of the Trustees oftlie Peabody Museum, 1873, 
 pp. 7-12 ; Gastaldi's Prehistoric Remains in Italy, London, 1865, pp. 2-6. 
 
46 6BANDEUR AND DECADENCE [b^^^- 
 
 one of the most eminent of recent writers upon Ko- 
 man history may be classed among the curiosities of 
 historical literature: "Italy however," says Momm- 
 sen, "is conspicuously destitute of mementoes of the 
 primitive epoch, and stands in this respect in remark- 
 able contrast with other seats of civilization. . . . ■ 
 ISTothing hitherto has come to light which authorizes 
 the conclusion that the existence of the human race 
 in Italy preceded the cultivation of land and the 
 smelting of metals; and if, within the confines of 
 Italy, man was really once in that primitive state 
 which we are accustomed to call savage, yet, every 
 trace of such a condition is utterly lost." " 
 
 It is certainly very remarkable that a statement 
 so erroneous and misleading, and that too upon a 
 question of high value as affecting the theory of uni- 
 versal history, should be republished at Berlin as 
 late as 1868, in a first class historical work, and with- 
 out a note of correction. Positive information re- 
 specting the stone epoch of Italy appeared in the 
 Annali delle Scienze Naturali di Bologna as early 
 as the year 1850. The work of Gastaldi was pub- 
 
 " " Italien indess ist-auffallend arm an Donkmalern der primitiven 
 Epoohe und steht in dieser Beziehung in einem bemerkenswerthcn Ge- 
 gensatz zu andern Culturgebieten. . . . Es ist bisher nicbts zum Vorschein 
 gekommen, was zu der Annabme bereobtigt, dass in Itallen die Existenz 
 deg MencbengescMechts alter sei als die Bebauung des Ackers und dag 
 Scbmelzen der Metalle ; und wenn wirklicb innerbalb der Grenzen Italiens 
 daa Meucbengeacblecbt einmal auf der primitiven Culturstufe gestanden 
 hat, die wir den Ziistand der Wildheit zu nennen pflegen, so ist davon 
 doch jede spur Bcblecbterdings ausgeloscbt." (RomiscJie Geschichte, Bth 
 edition, Berlin, 1868, Vol. i, pp. 8-9.) 
 
NOM.] OP THE ROMANS. 47 
 
 listed in Italian in 1862, and the English translation 
 in 1865." 
 
 Thus, as the great stream of Eoman history takes 
 its vague rise in a rude age and by the side of an 
 older civilization — the memory of which has only sur- 
 vived in fragments and glimpses — ^we thence look back 
 upon a period still more removed in tin^e, and still 
 ruder in its human conditions, when pure baibpxigm 
 held its low sway over all those seats which awaited 
 the coming of the Etrurian and the Eoman. 
 
 " See Prehistoric Remains in Italy, pp. 2-B, and Introduction to the 
 same work. 
 
4:8 
 
 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [MONTEsaniEU. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 AKT OF WAE AMONG THE EOMANS. 
 
 CoNSECEATmG themselves to war, and regarding it 
 as tlie sole art, the Eomans devoted their whole mind 
 and soul to its perfection. It was without doubt a 
 god, says Yegetius,' who inspired them with the idea 
 of the legion. 
 
 They regarded it as requisite that the soldiers of 
 the legion should he furnished with arms, both offen- 
 sive and defensive, which were heavier and stronger 
 than those of any other people whatever.' 
 
 But, as there are things to be done in war of which 
 a heavy corps is not capable, they provided that the 
 legion should be supplied with a light troop, which 
 might sally forth to engage in combat, and, in case of 
 necessity, fall back under cover of its ranks; that it 
 
 ' Lib. ii, ch. i. 
 
 ' See in Polybius — and in Josephus, de hello Jvdaico, lib. iii — what 
 ■were the arms of the Roman Boldier. The latter says there is little 
 difference between horses ranged in ranks and Roman soldiers. " They 
 carry," says Cicero, " their provisions for more than fifteen days, together 
 ■with all their camp equipage and implements for fortification ; and, with 
 regard to their arms, they arc no more encumbered by them than by their 
 hands." (Tuscul, liv. ii, ch. xv.) 
 
CHAP. 11.] OF THE ROMANS. 
 
 49 
 
 should be provided with cavalry, archers, and slingers 
 —for the pursuit of fugitives and the completion of 
 victory; that it should be defended by all sorts of 
 military machines — which it drew with it in its 
 marches; that it should entrench itself on the occa- 
 sion of each encampment," and be, as Yegetius says, a 
 species of stronghold.* 
 
 In order that they might be able to wield arms 
 which were heavier than those of other men, it was 
 necessary that they should render themselves more 
 than men. This they accomplished by incessant labor 
 — which increased their strength; and by exercises 
 which were calculated to give them dexterity — which 
 is nothing other than a just application of the natu- 
 ral force with which men are endowed. 
 
 "We remark at the present day that the soldiers 
 of our armies su:ffer much from immoderate labor;' 
 and yet it was by immense labor that the Eoman 
 soldiers preserved themselves. The reason is, I think, 
 
 that the labors of the latter were constant ; whereas 
 
 ' Lib. ii, eh. xv. 
 
 * " They never passed a night, even in the longest marches, without 
 pitching a camp, and fortifying it with a rampart and ditch." (Adam's 
 Rom. Ant., Phila., 1872, p. 253.) 
 
 A description of the camp thus improvised at the close of each day's 
 march will give some idea of the worit involved in the Eoman fashion of 
 soldiering : " The form of the Roman camp was a square, and always of 
 the same figure. In later ages, in imitation of the Greeks, they some- 
 times made it circular, or adapted it to the nature of the ground. It was 
 surrounded with a ditch, usually nine feet deep and twelve feet broad, 
 and a rampart, composed of the earth dug from the ditch, and sharp 
 stakes stuck into it." (Idem, p. 264.) — Translator. 
 
 ' Above all, in making earthworks. 
 
gQ GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieit. 
 
 our soldiers pass incessantly from extreme labor to 
 extreme idleness— wliicli of all things in the world is 
 most calculated to destroy their lives. 
 
 It is necessary that I should here notice what the 
 ancient writers tell us respecting the education of 
 the Eoman soldiers.' They were accustomed to the 
 military step, that is to say, to make twenty miles 
 in five hours, and sometimes twenty-four. During 
 these marches they had to carry weights of sixty 
 pounds.' They were inured to the habit of running 
 and leaping fully armed. In their exercises they 
 used swords, javelins, and arrows which were double 
 the ordinary weight ; and these exercises were con- 
 tinual.' 
 
 The camp was not the sole military school. There 
 was a place in the city where the citizens assembled 
 
 ' See Vegetius, liv. i. Also see in Livy, lir. xxvi, the exercises to 
 which Scipio Africanus subjected his soldiers after the capture of New 
 Carthage. Marius, notwithstanding hia age, repaired every day to the 
 Campus Martius. Pompey, at the age of fifty-eight years, went to the 
 field fully armed, with the young men : he mounted his horse, rode with 
 the bridle down, and hurled his javelin. (Plutarch, Lives of Marius and 
 Fompey) 
 
 ■■ An enumeration of the items which made up this burden will give 
 a more distinct idea of the physical capabilities of the Romans. " The 
 load which a Roman soldier carried is almost incredible; victuals for 
 iifteen days, sometimes more, usually corn, as being lighter, sometimes 
 dressed food, utensils, a saw, a basket, a mattock, an axe, a hook, and 
 leathern thong, a chain, a pot, &c., stakes usually three or four, some- 
 times twelve, the whole amounting to sixty pounds weight, besides 
 arms ; for a Roman soldier considered these not as a burden, but as 
 a part of himself." (Adam's Rom. Ant., Phila., 18Y2, p. 268.)-— TbanS- 
 
 LATOB. 
 
 ' Vegetius, liv. i, ch. xi-xiv. 
 
CHAP. II.] OF THE KOMANS. 51 
 
 for martial exercises. This -was the Campus Marti- 
 us. After the exercises were over, they threw them- 
 selves into the Tiber, in order to acquire the habit 
 of swimming,' and to free themselves from dust 
 and sweat." 
 
 We have no longer a just idea of the exercises 
 of the body. A man who now applies himself too 
 much to these is regarded as contemptible ; for, as a 
 general thing, such exercises have at present no 
 other object than agreeable accomplishments; where- 
 as, among the ancients, all, even to the dance, consti- 
 tuted a part of the military art. 
 
 It has even come to pass among us that too 
 exquisite a degree of skill in the use of the arms 
 which we employ in war has become ridiculous; 
 for, since the introduction of the custom of single 
 combats, the sword-exercise has come to be regarded 
 as the science of men who are either quarrelsome 
 or cowardly. 
 
 Those who criticise Homer, because he commonly 
 sets off in liis heroes the qualities of strength, ad- 
 dress, and activity of body, ought to find SaUust 
 exceedingly ridiculous; for he praises Pompey "as 
 
 ' And yet it would ecem that many Romans, even soldiers — at least 
 at some periods — did not acquire the art of swimming. Livy relates that 
 many of the Romans who fled before the Gauls at the river AUia, just 
 before the latter captured Rome, were drowned in their attempt to cross 
 the Tiber, either from not knowing how to swim or from the weight of 
 their armor. (Book V, ch. xxxviii.) — Translator. 
 
 "' Vegetius, liv. i, oh. x. 
 
52 GKANDEUK AND DECADENCE [montesqitieu. 
 
 being a man wlio ran, leaped, and carried a burden, 
 equally with any man of bis time."" 
 
 "Whenever the Eomans regarded themselves as in 
 danger, or when they desired to repair some disaster, 
 it was their constant practice to strengthen their mili- 
 tary discipline." Have they to make war upon the 
 Latins — a people as warlike as themselves? Manlius, 
 intent upon increasing the authority of his command, 
 directs the execution of his own son — who had van- 
 quished an enemy without orders. Are they beaten 
 before Numantia? Scipio jilmilianus immediately 
 deprives them of everything which had served to 
 enervate them.'" Have the Koman legions passed 
 under the yoke in ITumidia? Metellus has repaired 
 this disgrace from the moment that he has compelled 
 them to resume the observance of the ancient insti- 
 tutions. In order to beat the Cimbrians and the 
 Teutons, Marius commenced by turning the courses 
 of rivers; and Sylla imposed such grievous labors' 
 upon his soldiers — demoralized in the war against 
 Mithridates — that they demanded battle as an end of 
 their toils." Publius Nasica had his soldiers to buUd 
 
 " Cum alacribus saltu, cum velocihus cursu, cum validis vecte certabat. 
 Fragment of Salluat, cited by Vegetius, liv. 1, ch. ix. 
 
 " [Military discipline was the first thing which appeared among the 
 Romans, and it was the last thing which they lost ; so intimately was it 
 identified with the constitution of their Republic. (Bossuet, Disc, mr 
 VHist. univ, troisiemc partie, ch. vi.)] 
 
 " He sold all the beasts of burden belonging to the army, and made 
 each soldier carry grain sufficient for thirty days, and seven stakes. 
 (Epitome of Florus, liv. Ivii.) 
 
 " Frontinus, Slratagans, liv. i, ch. xi. 
 
CHAP. 11.] OF THE ROMANS. 53 
 
 a fleet which he did not need. Idleness was more 
 feared than the enemy. 
 
 Aulus-Gellius " assigns bad enough reasons for the 
 Eoman custom of bleeding soldiers who had com- 
 mitted some offense. The truth is, that physical 
 strength being the principal quality of the soldier, 
 the object was to degrade rather than enfeeble him. 
 
 Men so hardened were generally healthy. We do 
 not observe in the ancient writers that the Eoman 
 armies — which carried on war in so many climates — 
 suffered much from sickness ; whereas at the present 
 day it happens almost constantly that our armies, 
 without having engaged in battle, bury themselves, 
 .so to speak, in a single campaign. 
 
 Among us desertions are frequent, for the reason 
 that our soldiers are the vilest part of each nation, 
 and that none of them possess, or believe that they 
 possess, a certain distinction above other men. Among 
 the Eomans, desertions were more rare. Soldiers 
 drawn from the bosom of a people so proud, so 
 haughty, so confident of dominating other peoples, 
 could little think of so far undervaluing them- 
 selves as to cease to be Eomans. 
 
 As their armies were not large, it was easy to 
 provide for their subsistence ; the chief could know 
 his soldiers all the better, and be all the more readily 
 advised of offenses and breaches of discipline. 
 
 The physical strength and endurance which re- 
 " Liv. X, ch. viii. 
 
54 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieit. 
 
 suited from their exercises, together with the admir- 
 able roads which they had constructed, enabled them 
 to make long and rapid marches." Their unexpected 
 appearance chilled the spirits of their enemies ; and 
 they showed themselves above all after a bad success, 
 when the enemy was in that state of negligence 
 which follows victory. 
 
 In our battles at the present day, the individual 
 soldier has but little confidence except in the multi- 
 tude with which he acts ; but each Koman, more 
 robust and more inured to war than his enemy, 
 counted always upon himself. He possessed natural 
 courage, that is to say, that virtue which is the feel- 
 ing of one's own force. 
 
 Their troops being always the better disciplined, 
 it was likely, even in the most unfortunate combats, 
 that they would rally in part, or that the enemy 
 would somewhere be thrown into disorder. Thus we 
 continually see in their history, that, although over- 
 borne in the beginning by the number or the im- 
 petuosity of the enemy, they finally wrested victory 
 from their hands. 
 
 They were especially careful to ascertain in what 
 respects their enemy might possess some superiority 
 over them ; and they immediately took action accord- 
 ingly. They accustomed themselves to the sight of 
 blood and wounds at the Gladiatorial Spectacles, 
 
 '« Witness especially the defeat of Hasdrubal— and their activity in 
 dealing with Tariathus. 
 
CHAP. 11.] OF THE ROMANS. 55 
 
 whicK they borrowed from the Etrurians." The 
 trenchant swords of the Gauls,'' and the elephants 
 of Pyrrhus, only surprised them once. They first 
 supplied the weakness of their cavalry '" by taking 
 away the bridles from the horses, in order that their 
 impetuosity could not be checked, and afterwards by 
 mixing velites" with their cavalry proper. "When 
 they came to be acquainted with the Spanish sword, 
 they abandoned their own." " They eluded the skill 
 
 " Fragment of Nicolaus of Damascus, liv. x, taken from AtheuEeus, 
 liv. IT, ch. xiii. Before the soldiers departed for the army, they were 
 entertained by a gladiatorial combat. (Julius Capitolinus, lAves of 
 Maadnats and Balbinits.) 
 
 '* The Eomans presented their jaTelins, which received the strokes of 
 the Gallic swords, and blunted them. 
 
 " This cavalry was, however, superior to that of the small peoples of 
 Italy. It was composed of the principal citizens, for each of whom a 
 horse was kept at the public expense. When dismounted, there was no 
 injantry more formidable, and very often it determined the victory. 
 
 ''" These were young men, lightly armed, and the most active of the 
 legion, who at the least signal leaped upon the cruppers of their horsesi 
 or fought on foot. (Valeeius Maximus, liv. ii, ch. iii ; Livy, liv. xxvi, 
 ch. iv.) (a) 
 
 (a) Reference is here made to the practice of mounting light-armed 
 young men behind the cavalrymen. Each of these young r"en, or velites, 
 was armed with a buckler and several javelins. Carried by the horses 
 into the presence of the enemy, they suddenly dismounted, formed a line, 
 and discharged their javelins. (Livy, Book XXVI, ch. iv.) — Tkanslatok. 
 
 ^' Fragment of Polybius, cited by Suidas at the word machaira. 
 
 '' In ancient warfare, the sword was an incomparably more important 
 weapon than it is in modern times. On the same principle, therefore, 
 which claims " the survival of the fittest " in the " struggle for existence " 
 among animals, any superiority in the structure of this weapon would be 
 very apt to tell favorably upon the fortunes of war among men. 
 
 Two celebrated swords figured in the time of the Eomans — the Gallic 
 and the Spanish — both of which are described by Livy : " The shields of 
 the Gauls and Spaniards were of the same shape ; their swords unequal 
 and dissimilar. The Gauls had very long ones, without points. The 
 
56 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesqtiieu, 
 
 of pilots by the invention of a macliine wHcli Poly- 
 bius describes. In short, as Josepbus says," war was 
 for tbem a study, and peace an exercise. If any 
 other nation enjoyed any particular advantage — 
 whether derived from nature or arising from its in- 
 stitutions — they at once availed themselves of the 
 same. They did not neglect to provide themselves 
 with Numidian horses, Cretan archers, Balearic sling- 
 men, and Khodian ships. In fine, no nation ever 
 prepared for war with so much prudence, or carried 
 it on with so much audacity. 
 
 Spaniards, who were accustomed to stab more than to cut their enemy, 
 had swords convenient, from their shortness, and with points." (Book 
 XXn, ch. 46, Spillan & Edmond'a trans., N. T., 1871.) 
 
 The Gallic sword was therefore limited to the single office of cutting, 
 whilst the Spanish was capable of the double one of cutting and thrust- 
 ing. The Romans adopted the latter ; the Gauls adhered to theii own— 
 and were thus at a serious disadvantage in their numerous combats with 
 the great enemy by whom they were finally conquered. — Trahslaior. 
 
 '' De Bella Judaieo, lib. iii, ch. vi. 
 
EAKEB.] OF THE ROMANS. 57 
 
 NOTE BY THE TKANSLATOE. 
 
 The accounts wMcli we have of the Eoman mili- 
 tary discipline fully justify the opinion that it gauges 
 the high-water-marli of all human attainment in this 
 particular direction. The extent to which all the 
 active and passive powers of the Eoman soldier were 
 utilized has never been equalled upon a great scale. 
 
 This supremacy of the Eomans in the military 
 art conducts us at once to the most accurate idea of 
 their position in universal history. At a time when 
 the spirit of war was dominant among mankind, and 
 when, consequently, the warlike virtues were ad- 
 judged to be the highest, the Eomans had the merit 
 of beating the world according to its own standard 
 of excellence. The amount of real manhood in- 
 volved ia such a performance contains the secret of 
 that peculiar enthusiasm which is yet awakened by 
 the Eoman name. 
 
 The physical type of the Eoman harmonized well 
 with his intense devotion to war. The typical Eoman 
 was short in stature and heavily built ; his head was 
 low and broad; his jaws horseshoe-shaped, and his 
 
58 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakee. 
 
 nose aquiline. Describing this type from studies 
 made of the busts of the early emperors in the Ducal 
 gallery at Florence, M. Edwards says: "The vertical 
 diameter of the head is short, and, consequently, the 
 face broad. As the summit of the cranium is flat- 
 tened, and the inferior margin of the jaw-bone al- 
 most horizontal, the contour of the head, viewed in 
 front, approaches a square. The lateral parts, above 
 the ears, are protuberant ; the forehead low ; the 
 nose truly aquihne, that is to say, the curve com- 
 mences near the top and ends before it reaches the 
 point, so that the base is horizontal ; the chin is 
 round, and the stature short." ' 
 
 In just correspondence with their physical type 
 and their purely military character, the Romans — 
 during their period of conquest — were remarkably 
 deficient in art-feeling ; in which respect they dif- 
 fered widely from the Greeks, whose period of great- 
 est power in arms and greatest mastery in art very 
 nearly if not quite coincided. Among the latter, 
 Phidias was bom before Miltiades died; among the 
 former, art did not acquire a distinctively national 
 character until about the time of the emperors." 
 
 Deficient in the delicate sentiments, in the esthetic 
 faculties, and in the powers of abstract thought, the 
 hfe of the Eonian was intensely physical. His ge- 
 nius was severely concrete and practical ; and his will 
 
 ' Quoted from Types of Mankind, Phila., 1868, p. 98. 
 ' See Francis Pulszky, in Indigenous Races of the Earth, Phila., 1868, 
 pp. 172-174. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 59 
 
 differed but little from obstinacy. At a time in the 
 world's history when war was the leading interest 
 among men, it is easy to see how admirably he was 
 adapted to empire. He was the best embodiment of 
 the military spirit. 
 
 As suggested in the foregoing remarks, the ex- 
 treme military character of the Eomans was but a 
 marked instance, upon a great scale, of that ascend- 
 ency of the profession of arms over the industrial 
 callings, which was a prevailing characteristic of the 
 ancient societies generally. Upon a much smaller 
 scale, the Spartans illustrate the extreme intensity of 
 the same spirit among the Greeks. Comte has done 
 excellent service to rational history by indicating the 
 necessary causes which rendered the civilizations of 
 antiquity much more military in their tone than 
 those of modem times. Emerging from an extreme- 
 ly rude social condition, during which for many suc- 
 cessive ages they had been incessantly occupied with 
 the interests of war, when the communities of the 
 ancient world first come into historical view, their 
 life is seen to be — as we should rationally expect to 
 find it — very distinctly military. 
 
 "Under this aspect," says Comte, " it is constantly 
 necessary to regard the social state of antiquity as 
 radically the inverse of our modem social state, in 
 which war has finally become purely accessory, while 
 among the ancients it was necessarily and habitually 
 preponderant in a high degree. Thus, in ancient 
 
60 GKANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakee. 
 
 times, the same as among our present savages, the 
 greatest efforts of human industry were essentially con- 
 nected with war — a circumstance which gave occasion 
 to so many truly prodigious creations of the military 
 sort, above all in the art of conducting sieges. Among 
 the modems, on the contrary, although the immense 
 progress which has been made in the mechanical and 
 chemical arts has necessarily produced, in an accessory 
 manner, important military innovations — of which, how- 
 ever, the value is much exaggerated — it is neverthe- 
 less certain that the system of arms is much less 
 perfect, relatively to the present sum of human means, 
 than it was among the Greeks and Eomans, relatively 
 to their corresponding industrial state." ^ 
 
 The difference between the ancient and the mod- 
 ern types of society here indicated by Comte is a 
 generalization of very high value. It is one of a con- 
 siderable number of comprehensive facts, which, taken 
 in their sum, show that the world's civilization has, 
 in the long run, undergone a great progressive change. 
 
 ' Cours de PHlosophie I'ositive, Paris, 1869, tome v, pp. 119, 120. 
 
MONTESQUIEU.] OF THE ROMANS. Q1 
 
 CHAPTEE III. 
 
 HOW THE EOMANS WEEE ABLE TO AGGEANDIZE THEM- 
 SELVES. 
 
 As at the present time the peoples of Europe 
 have nearly the same arts, the same arms, the same 
 disciphne, and the same method of conducting war, 
 the prodigious fortune of the Komans appears incred- 
 ible to us. There is besides at the present day such 
 a disproportion of power among the nations of Eu- 
 rope, that it is not possible for a small state to rise 
 by its own force from the humble condition in which 
 Providence has placed it.' 
 
 It is needful that we should reflect upon this; 
 or else we shall look upon events without compre- 
 hending them ; and, not properly appreciating the 
 difference of circumstances, be led to believe, while 
 reading ancient history, that we see other men than 
 ourselves. ■ 
 
 In modem Europe, constant experience has proved 
 that a prince who has a million subjects cannot, 
 without ruining himself, support an army exceeding 
 ' See my Note at the end of this chapter. — Translator. 
 
62 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [moniesqcieu. 
 
 ten thousand men. It is therefore only great na- 
 tions that can have considerable armies. 
 
 It was not the same with the ancient republics; 
 for, the ratio of the soldiers to the rest of the pop- 
 ulation, which is at present as one to a hundred, 
 might easily be as one to eight among them." 
 
 The founders of these republics had made an 
 equal division of the lands. That alone constituted ■ 
 a strong people — that is to say, a weU regulated so- 
 ciety. That also secured a good army — each indi- 
 vidual having an equal interest, and a very great 
 interest, in defending his country. 
 
 When the laws ceased to be rigidly observed, 
 things came to the same pass in which they are at 
 present among us. The avarice of some and the 
 prodigality of others caused the lands to accumulate 
 in the hands of a few; and straightway those arts 
 were introduced which served to accommodate the 
 mutual wants of the rich and the poor. The result 
 was that there were but few citizens or soldiers any 
 longer; for the lands, formerly set apart for the sup- 
 port of the latter, were employed now for the main- 
 tenance of slaves and artisans — instruments of the 
 luxury of the new possessors, without which the 
 state— necessarily continuing to exist notwithstanding 
 its disorders — would have perished. Before corrup- 
 tion set in, the primitive revenues of the state were 
 divided among the soldiers, that is, among the labor- 
 " See idem. 
 
CHAP, ni.] OF THE ROMANS. 63 
 
 ers. After the republic had become corrupt, these 
 revenues passed at once into the hands of rich men, 
 who disbursed them upon slaves and artisans, reserv- 
 ing a portion, by means of tributes, for the support 
 of the soldiers. 
 
 Such men were little adapted to war. They were 
 cowardly, being already corrupted -by the luxury of 
 the cities, and often by the very arts which they fol- 
 lowed ; besides which, as they had properly speaking 
 no country, and as they plied their industry every- 
 where, they had but little to lose or preserve. 
 
 In a census of Home which was taken some time 
 after the expulsion of the kings,' and in that which 
 Demetrius Phalerius made of Athens,* there is found 
 nearly the same number of inhabitants. The popu- 
 lation of Home was four hundred and forty thousand, 
 of Athens, four hundred and thirty-one thousand. 
 But this census of Kome was taken at a time when 
 she was yet in the fall force of her institutions, and 
 that of Athens at a time when she had become thor- 
 oughly corrupt. "We find, in the case of Home, that 
 the number of citizens who had attained the age of 
 puberty constituted one fourth of the inhabitants, 
 whilst at Athens this class of citizens amounted to a 
 little less than one twentieth of the whole number. 
 
 ' This is the census of which Dionysius of Halicamassua speaks in 
 Book IX, art. 25, and it appears to me to be the same as the one which 
 he cites at the end of his 6th Book, and which was taken sixteen yeara 
 after the expulsion of the kings. 
 
 ^ Cetesicles, in Athenceus, lib. vi, oh. xix. 
 
64 GRANDEUE AND DECADENCE [mostesquieu. 
 
 The power of Eome tlien was to the power of Athens, 
 at these respective times, nearly as one fourth is to one 
 twentieth — that is to say, it was five times as great. 
 
 The kings Agis and Cleomenes seeing that instead 
 of the nine thousand citizens which Sparta contained 
 at the time of Lycurgus," there were at their time 
 not more than seven hundred, of whom scarcely one 
 hundred possessed lands,' and that all the rest were 
 nothing more than a cowardly populace, they imder- 
 took to re-estabhsh the laws in this respect;' and 
 Lacedsemon resumed her ancient power, and became 
 once more formidable to all Greece. 
 
 It w as the equal division of lands that rendered 
 Eome capable of rising at once from her original 
 feebleness. This is plainly seen after she became 
 corrupt. She was yet a small republic when, the 
 Latins having refused the contingent of troops which 
 they were obligated to furnish, ten legions were im- 
 mediately raised in the city.' " At the present time," 
 says Livy, "when all the world may not contain 
 Rome, she could hardly do as much if an enemy 
 should appear suddenly before her walls — proof evi- 
 dent that we have not become greater, but that we 
 
 ^ These were citizens of the town, and properly called Spartam. 
 Lycurgus made for them nine thousand shares, and thirty thousand for 
 the other inhabitants. 
 
 ' See Plutarch, lAves of Agis and Cleomenes. 
 
 ' See ibid. 
 
 8 Livy, First Decade, liv. vii. That was some time after the capture 
 of Rome — under the consulate of L. Furius Camillus and App. Claudius 
 Crassus. 
 
CHAP, m.] OF THE ROMANS. 65 
 
 have only augmented the wealtli and the luxury which 
 encumber us." 
 
 " Tell me," said Tiberius Gracchus to the Nobles,' 
 " which is the more worth, a citizen or a perpetual 
 slave ? a soldier or a man who is useless in war ? In 
 order to hold some acres of land more than the other 
 citizens, will you renounce the hope of the conquest 
 of the rest of the world ? or place yourselves in dan- 
 ger of seeing those very lands which you refuse to 
 us, taken from you by the enemies of your eoun- 
 tiy?" 
 
 ' Appias, on the Civil War, lib. 1, ch. xi. 
 
66 GEANDEUK AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 NOTE BY THE TEANSLATOE. 
 
 The author's remarks respecting the different de- 
 grees of difficulty experienced in ancient and in mod- 
 ern times by a weak nation seeking to become a 
 powerful one — his statement of the comparative ratios 
 of military force among the ancient republics and 
 the modern states of Europe — and finally, his brief 
 references to the land system of the Eomans — seem 
 to call for some further observations, partly critical, 
 and partly of a supplementary character. 
 
 1. Montesquieu says there is "at the present day 
 such a disproportion of power among the nations of 
 Europe that it is not possible for a small state to 
 rise by its own force from the humble condition in 
 which Providence has placed it." 
 
 This statement appears to be somewhat too strong. 
 It is doubtless true, as a general proposition, that the 
 modem is less favorable than the ancient condition 
 of Europe to the aggrandizement of a small state. 
 This appears due in a good measure to causes similar 
 to those which render it so difficult for an individual 
 to advance his fortunes in a society in which all the 
 
Nont.] OF THE EOMAKS. 67 
 
 posts of power, wealth and influence are strongly 
 preoccupied against him. And it may be said in 
 addition to this, that aggrandizement by force was 
 much more in harmony with ancient than it is with 
 modern ideas — a fact which, in ancient times, was at 
 once more favorable to the achievement of conquest, 
 and to acquiescence in its exactions. 
 
 Yet, there is a first class power in Europe to-day 
 which proceeded from small beginnings, and which 
 is of recent formation. It may certainly be said 
 with justice that, at the time Montesquieu published 
 these Considerations, (1734,) Prussia occupied a com- 
 paratively humble position in the European system 
 of states — ^possessing as she did a total population of 
 less than two and a quarter millions, and a domain 
 of no more than 2,160 German square miles. Since 
 that time she has steadily extended her power in 
 presence of her great neighbors — ^Kussia, Austria, and 
 France — until at length she stands at the head of an 
 empire of forty millions of people, and performs for 
 the time the leading role of Europe.' 
 
 2. The standing military ratio, as given by Mon- 
 tesquieu for the nations of modem Europe — one sol- 
 dier to a hundred of the population — and which he 
 thinks cannot be exceeded without serious injury to 
 the nation, sustains a curious relation to the late sta- 
 tistics of the more powerful class of the European 
 
 ' See Meyer's ffand-Zexikon des Allgemdnm Wissens, 1872, Zur Karte 
 Sistorisclie Ikiwickdimg von Freussen, 
 
68 
 
 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE 
 
 [bases. 
 
 states. In the following table I have embodied a 
 statement of the populations and standing military 
 forces of the seven principal powers of Europe, to- 
 gether with the proportions between the two for each 
 of these states taken separately, and between their 
 sums for all taken together : 
 
 Population. 
 
 No. of men in 
 Army and Navy 
 on peace footing. 
 
 No. of 
 people to 
 
 one sol- 
 dier and 
 Bailor. 
 
 Spain, including colonies (1870). 
 
 Army (1870) 295,000 | 
 
 Nayy (1869-70)... 22,117) 
 
 Itai.t(1870) 
 
 Army (1869) 198,232 ) 
 
 Navy (1869-70). . . 18,812 j 
 
 France (1871) 
 
 Army (1869) 404,794 ) 
 
 Navy (1869-70). . . 67,969 ) 
 
 AnsTKiA (1868) 
 
 Army (1871) 254,031 ) 
 
 Navy (1871) 5,702 f 
 
 Geb. Empire (1871) 
 
 Army (1871) 404,636 ) 
 
 Navy (1869-70)... 13,361 j 
 
 Gb. Britain (1871) 
 
 Army (1869-70). . .191,433 ) 
 Navy (1869-70)... 59,830) 
 
 Russia (1867) 
 
 Army (1871) 765,879 ) 
 
 Navy (1869-70)... 64,021 j 
 
 Total 
 
 23,219,526 
 
 25,766,217 
 
 36,594,845 
 
 35,904,435 
 
 40,144,295 
 
 31,465,480 
 
 82,159,630 
 
 317,117 
 217,044 
 472,763 
 259,733 
 417,997 
 251,263 
 829,900 
 
 276,254,428 
 
 2,765,817 
 
 74 
 119 
 
 78 
 139 
 
 97 
 122 
 
 99 
 
 100 
 
 For the statistics of population, and of land and 
 naval forces here given, compare Meyer's Band-Lexir 
 Icon des Allgemeinen Wissens, 1872, articles Spanien, 
 Italien, Frankreioh, &c., and Chambers' Enc., Phila., 
 1873, articles Armies, Nmies, Spain, Italy, France, 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 69 
 
 &c. I have myself reduced the proportions which 
 are exhibited in the last column, counting the sur- 
 plus fraction as unity in each case. Thus, the exact 
 result for Spain is Y3 and a fraction — set down in 
 the table at 74; for Italy 118 and a fraction — set 
 down at 119 ; and so of the rest. In view of the 
 considerable discrepancy in the proportions as shown ' 
 by the table, varying as these do from one in 74 in 
 the case of Spain, to one in 139 in that of Austria, 
 it is a curious, and certainly an unexpected result, 
 that the aggregate proportion for the European sys- 
 tem — as represented by these seven great states — 
 should be (me soldier and sailor to one hundred of 
 ths jpopulation — the proportion stated by Montes- 
 quieu. 
 
 If we turn now to the United States of America, 
 we shall see how immensely our country differs from 
 the monarchies of Europe in respect to the propor- 
 tion of its citizens detailed for military duty on the 
 peace footing: 
 
 Population of the United States (18Y0). 38,925,598 
 
 Army (1873), as limited by law (but actually still less). . 30,000 
 
 Navy (1869-70) 11,000 
 
 — showing a proportion of 950 of the total population 
 to one soldier and sailor. But, in view of our large 
 subsequent increase in population, it is safe to as- 
 sume at the present time — 1876 — that the military 
 ratio imposed by our republic in time of peace 
 
70 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakeb. 
 
 does not exceed one tenth of the average Eii/ropean 
 rate} 
 
 Tlie Komans started, and for a long time con- 
 tinued in, tliat immature social state in which, no 
 standing army existed among them — ^for the reason 
 that all were equally soldiers; and, under the influ- 
 ence of the intense military spirit which prevailed 
 during the greater part of this period, they may have 
 been capable of recruiting a force as great as stated 
 by Montesquieu — one in every eight of the entire 
 population. But no such force could have been other 
 than temporary — like the vast citizen armies which 
 on occasions of pressing emergency are raised in 
 modern states. With the coming in of the empire, 
 they finally adopted the system of standing armies 
 and permanent naVal establishments. It will be seen 
 by reference to my note at the end of Chapter XV 
 that the ratio between their peace establishment and 
 their entire population after this was done approxi- 
 mated the proportion of one to two hundred and 
 sixty-six — a ratio which, while being nearly three 
 times less than that of the principal states of modem 
 Europe, was nearly four times greater than that of 
 the United States. 
 
 3. The statements of Montesquieu respecting the 
 equal division of lands among the early Komans 
 and other ancient peoples — ^the massing of the lands 
 
 '^ See Compendium of (lie Ninth Census of the United Slates, p. 20 ; 
 Message and Documents, War Department, ISIS-H, Part I, p. 25 ; and 
 Chambers' Ihtc., art. Navies, 
 
NOTE.] OF THE EOMANS. 71 
 
 at a later period in the hands of a few — and the 
 closing reference to the agrarian law which agitated 
 Eome at the time of the Gracchi — are scarcely suf- 
 ficient to give an adequate general idea of the Ko- 
 man land system as now understood. 
 
 It appears to be true that, by the original organi- 
 zation of the Koman state, an equal division of land 
 among the citizens was provided for ; and indeed such 
 equal allotment of land may be regarded as a funda- 
 mental principle of organization among the ancient 
 republics generally. " It seems to have been a notion 
 generally entertained in the ancient world," says Dr. 
 Arnold, " that every citizen of a country should be a 
 landholder, and that the territory of a state, so far as it 
 was not left unenclosed or reserved for public purposes, 
 should be divided in equal portions amongst the cit- 
 izens." ' In order to avoid misapprehension, however, 
 it must be kept in view that these early communities 
 abounded in slaves and subjugated classes, and that 
 those who answered to the character of citizens con- 
 stituted but a minor part of the entire population of 
 the state. 
 
 The shares thus set apart to Homan citizens were 
 small, not exceeding it would seem seven jugera, or 
 about fonr and one third English acres.* 
 
 Besides the lands so allotted to the citizens, there 
 was an unallotted public domain, kept in reserve, and 
 belonging, like our public lands, to the state. 
 
 ' Hist, of Rome, N. Y., ISBT, p. 59. * Idem, p. 33. 
 
72 GRAKDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 Now, it was not only by absorbing these small 
 private estates, as Montesquieu appears to suppose, 
 but also by occupying and claiming a large part of 
 the public lands, that the ricb class of citizens came 
 to be sucb disproportionate landholders ; and the 
 Agrarian Laws, which among other things were de- 
 signed to remedy this mischief, seem to have been 
 intended to apply exclusively to the last species of 
 lands. Formerly, these laws were regarded, even 
 among the best scholars, as having in view the con- 
 fiscation of lands to which the rich were entitled in 
 their own private right; and the result of this mis- 
 conception has been, that the term "agrarian" has 
 become intimately associated with the arbitrary seizure 
 of the property of the more wealthy for the benefit 
 of the poorer class of citizens. It may be indeed 
 that agrarian laws were proposed, which looked to 
 the confiscation of private estates in lands, although 
 
 I find no direct and conclusive evidence that such 
 was the case. From the context of Cicero in Book 
 
 II chapter 21 of his Offices, it may be inferred that 
 the law brought forward, but afterwards abandoned, 
 by the tribune Philippus, was of this character. But 
 it now appears certain at all events that the actual 
 agrarian laws of Eoman history were intended to have 
 no other application than to lands which were in fact 
 owned by the state. 
 
 For the correction of the former misconception as 
 to the real nature of this class of laws we are main- 
 
NOTE.] OF THE EOMANS. Y3 
 
 ly indebted to Niebuhr. " If," eays Dr. Arnold, 
 " amongst Mebnhr's countless services to Koman his- 
 tory, any single one may claim our gratitude beyond 
 the rest, it is his explanation of the true nature and 
 character of the agrarian laws." ' 
 
 In the most general sense, the agrarian laws of 
 the Romans were simply their pvMic land laws. 
 From the time of the earliest kings, it was their 
 constant policy to appropriate some part of the lands 
 of the defeated enemy ; and sometimes the state 
 acquired lands by purchase. These lands, whether 
 acquired in the one way or the other, became the 
 exclusive property of the state, and were from time 
 to time allotted among citizens — who were removed 
 to and colonized upon them. 
 
 For the most part this system of gratuitous dis- 
 tribution of the public lands worked harmoniously ; 
 but there was one point upon which angry contro- 
 versies and even violent collisions in the bosom of 
 the state arose. It was. the custom of the govern- 
 ment to allow individuals to enter upon and occupy 
 unallotted public lands, paying to the state a certain 
 moderate rent therefor. Under this usage a great 
 portion of the public lands came to be occupied by 
 the rich class of citizens ; and even the payment of 
 the reserved rent came to be much neglected. By 
 the agrarian law of Licinius Stolo — passed about 369 
 years before Christ — which was the model for all 
 
 ^ Idem, p. 59. 
 4 
 
74 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 subsequent legislation of tlie kind, and wliicli is now- 
 understood to have related solely to public lands- 
 no individual was allowed to occupy more than 500 
 jugera, or about 311i English acres of such land; 
 and any excess above this amount was to be allotted 
 among the poorer class of citizens at the rate of 1 
 jugera to each. 
 
 In the legal aspect of the case, such occupants 
 of the public lands were tenants at will of the state, 
 and acquired no title whatever, as against the latter, 
 to the lands which they were thus permitted to pos- 
 sess and to use. But, as Dr. Arnold remarks, "al- 
 though the land was undoubtedly the property of 
 the state, and although the occupiers of it were in 
 relation to the state mere tenants at will, yet it is 
 in human nature that a long undisturbed possession 
 should give a feeling of ownership, the znore so as, 
 while the state's claim lay dormant, the possessor was 
 in fact the proprietor ; and the land would thus be 
 repeatedly passing by regular sale from one occupier 
 to another." ° It hence resulted that the passage of 
 the Licinian law was resisted with great bitterness 
 by the patricians and the richer class of citizens. 
 
 After having in a great measure corrected the 
 evil which it was intended to remedy, this law of 
 Licinius finally fell into disuse; and many of the 
 wealthier citizens, in total disregard of the limitation 
 imposed by the law, occupied immense tracts of 
 
 " Idem, p. 60. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 75 
 
 public land in addition to their private estates, wliilst 
 many of tlie poorer citizens were without lands. 
 
 In this state of things, and to remedy this enor- 
 mous abuse, Tiberius Gracchus — b. c. 132 — caused 
 the Licinian law to be revived in a modified form. 
 In its new form, the law, while retaining the old 
 limitation of 500 jugera of public land to each occu- 
 pant, allowed 250 jugera in addition to be occupied 
 for each son of the family ; and, whilst providing 
 that in all cases any excess should be resumed by 
 the state for allotment among the poorer class of 
 citizens, it also provided that payment should be 
 made for the improvements which had been put 
 upon the lands thus resumed. 
 
 Such, in substance, appear to have been the main 
 features of the agrarian laws. The disturbance which 
 followed the enactment of the law of Tiberius 
 Gracchus, and- in which that great statesman per- 
 ished, was not so much a sedition of the people as 
 a sedition of the patricians — in their spirit of hostility 
 to a just and wholesome law.' 
 
 ' Livy, Book TI, chs. 35-42 ; Arnold's Hist, of Rome, chs. ix and 
 xxvi; Niebuhr's Rom. Geschichte, Berlin, 1853, pp. 22-lr-240; Chambers' 
 Enc, art. Agrarian Law ; Anthon'a Clas. Die, articles Agrarice Leges 
 and Lieinius. 
 
76 GRAKDEUE AND DECADENCE [MONiESQCiEti. 
 
 CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 THE GAULS. PYEEHtTS. COMPAEISON OF CAETHAGE AND 
 
 EOME. WAE WITH HANNIBAl. 
 
 The Komans liad many wars with the Gauls. The 
 same love of glory, the same contempt of death, the 
 same obstinate resolre to conquer, characterized the 
 two. nations ; but their arms were different. The 
 buckler of the Gauls was small, and their sword bad. 
 They were handled, therefore, by the Eomans much 
 as the Mexicans have been in these later ages by 
 the Spaniards. It is surprising that these peoples, 
 whom the Romans encountered at nearly all places 
 and times, should have suffered themselves to be de- 
 stroyed, one after another, without ever knowing, 
 inquiring into, or remedying the cause of their 
 disasters.' 
 
 Pyrrhus made war upon the Eomans at a time 
 when they were in a condition to resist him, and to 
 gain instruction by means of his victories. He 
 taught them to entrench themselves, and how to 
 select and arrange a camp. He accustomed them to 
 ' See my Note at the end of this chapter. — Translator. 
 
CHAP. IT.] OF THE ROMANS. 77 
 
 elephants, and prepared them for wars upon a grander 
 
 scale.' 
 
 The greatness of Pyrrhus consisted solely in his 
 personal qualities." Plutarch tells us that he was 
 obliged to make war upon Macedon, for the reason 
 that he was unable to support his army of eight thou- 
 sand foot and five hundred cavalry.* This prince, 
 master of a little state of which we hear nothing 
 said after his time, was an adventurer, continually 
 engaged in enterprises, for the reason that he could 
 subsist in no other manner. 
 
 The Tarentines, his allies, had degenerated very 
 much from the institutions of the Lacedaemonians, 
 their ancestors.' He would have been able to accom- 
 plish great things with the aid of the Samnites, but 
 for the fact that the Eomans had nearly destroyed 
 this nation. 
 
 Carthage, become rich sooner than Pome, was also 
 sooner corrupted. Thus, whilst at Pome the public 
 
 ' [The war with Pyrrhus expanded the minds of the Eomans. Deal- 
 ing with an enemy of so much experience, they became more ingenious 
 and more enlightened than they were before. They found the means of 
 protecting themselves against the elephants, which in the first battle had 
 thrown their legions into disorder. They avoided the plains, and Bought 
 places which were advantageous against a cavalry which they had mis- 
 takenly despised. They learned afterwards to form their camp upon the 
 model of that of Pyrrhus — ^having admired the order and the distribution 
 of his troops, whilst among themselves all was confusion. (Saint-Etee- 
 MOKD, inflexions sur les divers gSnies du peuple romain dans les different 
 tempts de la ripablique, ch. vi.)] 
 
 ' See a fragment of Book I of Dion, in the Excerpt of Virtues and 
 Vices. 
 
 * lAfe of Pyrrhus. ' Justin, lib. xx, ch. 1. 
 
78 GKANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 employments were only obtained by virtue, and 
 yielded no profit except honor and a preference of 
 toil, all tbat society could bestow upon the citizen 
 was sold at Carthage, and every service performed 
 for the public was paid for by the state. 
 
 A Idngdom is not brought nearer to ruin by 
 the tyranny of the sovereign than is a republic by 
 indifference to the common welfare. The advantage 
 of a free state is that the revenues are better ad- 
 ministered; and, when they are even worse admin- 
 istered, the advantage of . a free state yet is, that 
 there are no favorites. But, when this is not the 
 case, and when, instead of the friends and relations 
 of a prince, it becomes necessary to provide for- 
 tunes for all those who have part in the adminis- 
 tration of the government — all is lost." The evasion 
 of the laws in a republic thus corrupted is more 
 dangerous than their violation by a monarch — ^who, 
 being the first citizen of his state, has the greatest 
 interest in its preservation. 
 
 At Home, ancient manners and a certain habit of 
 poverty rendered fortunes nearly equal; but at Car- 
 thage, individuals possessed the wealth of kings. 
 
 Of the two factions which reigned at Carthage, the 
 
 " These words of Montesquieu should arrest the attention of Ameri- 
 cans. The two evils which ho points out, indifference to the public welfare, 
 and the conversion of the public service into a means for the accumula- 
 tion of private fortunes, are alike destructive of the spirit, if not of the 
 form, of a republican government ; and the first of these evils is sure to 
 be followed by the other.— Translator. 
 
CHAP. IV.] OF THE ROMANS. 79 
 
 one constantly desired peace, the other, war; so that 
 it was impossible to enjoy the one or to prosecute the 
 other with effect. 
 
 "Whilst at Eome, war immediately reunited all in- 
 terests, it separated them the more at Carthage.' 
 
 In states governed by a monarch dissensions are 
 easily appeased, for the sovereign holds in his hands 
 a coercive authority which enables him to impose 
 checks upon the two parties ; but in a republic such 
 dissensions are more lasting, for the malady ordina- 
 rily attacks the very power which should be able to 
 cure it. 
 
 At Eome, governed by laws, the people suffered 
 the senate to take the direction of affairs ; at Carthage, 
 governed by abuses, the people desired to do every- 
 thing themselves. 
 
 Carthage, which made war with her opulence 
 against Eoman poverty, was, even in this respect, at 
 a disadvantage. Gold and silver may be consumed; 
 but virtue, constancy, force, and poverty, are inex- 
 haustible. 
 
 The Eomans were ambitious from pride, the Car- 
 thaginians from avarice ; those would command, these 
 would acquire. The latter, constantly calculating re- 
 
 ' The presence of Hannibal caused all divisions to cease among the 
 Romans ; but the presence of Scipio embittered those which already ex- 
 isted among the Carthaginians ; it took away from the government of 
 the latter all the force which it had left; the generals, the senate, the 
 nobles, became more suspected by the people, and the people became 
 more furious. See Appian's account of the war of the first Scipio. 
 
80 6KANDEUB AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 ceipts and expenses, always made war without lov- 
 ing it. 
 
 The loss of battles, the diminution of her people, 
 the ruin of her commerce, the exhaustion of her pub- 
 He treasury, and the revolt of the neighboring nations, . 
 were sufficient to induce Carthage to accept the hard- 
 est conditions of peace. But Kome was not guided 
 by the sentiment of benefits and calamities. She was 
 solely determined by the sense of her own glory ; and, 
 as she did not imagine that she could exist if she did 
 not command, there was no hope and no fear which 
 could induce her to mate a peace which she did not 
 impose. 
 
 There is nothing so powerful as a repubKc in 
 which the laws are observed, not from fear, not from 
 reason, but from passion — as was the case with the 
 Romans and the Lacedaemonians; for then there is 
 joined to the wisdom of a good government all the 
 force which is proper to a faction. 
 
 The Carthaginians availed themselves of foreign 
 
 troops; the Komans employed their own.° As the 
 
 latter always regarded the conquered as instruments of 
 
 future triumphs, they made soldiers of all the peoples 
 
 whom they subdued; and, the greater the difficulty 
 
 they might have in vanquishing them, the more they 
 
 regarded them as proper to be incorporated into their 
 
 * [Cartilage being founded upon commerce and Rome upon arms, the 
 first employed foreigners for its wars and citizens for its traffic ; the other 
 made citizens of all nations, and soldiers of its citizens. (Saint-Evre- 
 mond.)] 
 
CHAP. IT.] OF THE ROMAKS. 81 
 
 republic. Thus we see the Samnites — who were only 
 subjugated after twenty-four triumphs "-—become aux- 
 iliaries of their conquerors ; and, some time before the 
 second Punic war, the Romans drew from them and 
 from their allies — ^that is to say, from a country not 
 much larger than the states of the Pope and of Na- 
 ples — seven hundred thousand infantry and seventy 
 thousand cavalry, to oppose the Gauls." " 
 
 At the height of the second Punic war Rome 
 had constantly on foot from twenty-two to twenty- 
 four legions; and yet it appears from Livy that the 
 census did not then exceed about one hundred and 
 thirty-seven thousand citizens. 
 
 Carthage employed greater forces for attack. Home 
 for defense. The latter, as we have seen, armed a pro- 
 digious number of men against the Gauls and against 
 Hannibal, who attacked her ; but she sent out no more 
 than two legions against the greatest kings — a policy 
 which perpetuated her forces. 
 
 The establishment of Carthage in her territory 
 
 ' Flobus, lib. 1, ch. xvi. 
 
 '" See Polvbiug. The Summary of Florua says they levied three 
 hundred thousand men in the city and among the Latins. 
 
 " The large number stated in the text must not be understood as 
 applying to forces actually brought into the field, but as referring to the 
 total aggregate of men capable of military duty among the Romans and 
 all their allies at the time of the Gallic invasion alluded to — which was 
 225 years before Christ, and seven years before the beginning of the 
 second Punic war. This aggregate is said to have been as high as YSO,- 
 000 men ; but the number actually put into service against the Gauls 
 does not appear to have been more than about 171,000— whilst the at- 
 tacking force of the Gauls seems not to have exceeded Y0,000. (See 
 Arnold's Hist, of Rome, N. T., ISSY, pp. 464-465.)— Translator. 
 
82 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesotiep. 
 
 was less solid than that of Eome in hers. The lat- 
 ter was surrounded by thirty colonies, which served 
 her as so many ramparts." Prior to the battle of 
 Cannae no ally had abandoned her. The reason was, 
 that the Samnites and the other peoples of Italy were 
 accustomed to her domination. 
 
 Most of the cities of Africa, being but little for- 
 tified, surrendered at once upon the approach of an 
 enemy. Thus, all who disembarked upon the coast 
 of Africa — Agathocles, Kegulus, Scipio — immediately 
 reduced Carthage to despair. 
 
 The ills which befell the Carthaginians through- 
 out the war which the first Scipio made upon them 
 can hardly be attributed to any other cause than a 
 bad government. Their city and even their armies 
 were famished, whilst the Eomans were supplied with 
 an abundance of all things." 
 
 Among the Carthaginians, the armies which had 
 been beaten became more insolent. Sometimes they 
 crucified their generals, and punished them for their 
 own cowardice. Among the Komans, the consul deci- 
 mated the troops who had fled, and again led them 
 against the enemy. 
 
 The government of the Carthaginians was very 
 
 " LivT, lib. xxvii, chs. ix and x. [These colonies, established on all 
 sides of the empire, produced two admirable effects. The first was, that 
 they relieved the city of a great number of citizens, mostly poor. The 
 other was, that they guarded the principal posts, and gradually accus- 
 tomed foreign nations to Roman manners. (Bossuet, Disc, sur PHiel. 
 Univ., troisiferae partie, eh. vi.)] 
 
 " See Appian, lib. Libi/ke, oh. xxv. 
 
CHAP. IV.] OF THE ROMANS. 83 
 
 severe." They had oppressed the peoples of Spain 
 so cruelly that when the Eomans arrived there they 
 were regarded as liberators ; and, if we consider the 
 immense sums which Spain cost them in carrying on 
 a war in which they succumbed at last, we shall 
 plainly see that injustice is bad policy, and that it 
 does not even accomplish its own ends. 
 
 The commerce of Carthage had been much dimin- 
 ished by the founding of Alexandria. During 
 primitive times, superstition had in some sort ban- 
 ished foreigners from Egypt ; and when the Persians 
 had conquered that country, their only policy was to 
 weaken their new subjects ; but, under the Greek 
 kings, Egypt carried on nearly all the commerce of 
 the world, and that of Carthage began to decline. 
 
 Nations established upon commerce may exist 
 for a long time in a state of mediocrity; but their 
 grandeur is of short duration. They rise little by 
 little, and without attracting notice; for they do no 
 particular act which serves to arrest attention and to 
 signalize their power. But, when they have grown 
 to such an extent that none can fail to observe them, 
 all seek to deprive such a nation of an advantage 
 which it has only obtained, so to speak, by surprise." 
 
 " See what Polybiua says of their exactions, especially in the frag- 
 ment of Book IX, Excerpt of Virtues and Vices. 
 
 '° The idea here presented, that great commercial states are less 
 secure than others, can scarcely be accepted as a fundamental principle, 
 although doubtless true in its application to the states of antiquity — at a 
 period in the world's history when the war spirit was much more domi- 
 nant, when physical force was more unqualiiiedly accepted by nations as 
 
g4 GEANDEUE AND DECADENCE [montesquief. 
 
 The Carthaginian cavalry was superior to the 
 Eoman in two respects. In the first place, the JSTu- 
 midian and Spanish horses were better than those of 
 Italy; and in the next place the Eoman cavalry was 
 badly armed ; for, as we learn from Polybius," it 
 was not until the wars which they made against the 
 Greeks, that the Eomans changed their style in this 
 regard. In the first Punic war Eegulus was beaten 
 from the moment that the Carthaginians selected 
 plains for battle, in order to favor the operations of 
 their cavalry; and in the second, Hannibal owed 
 his principal victories to his Numidian horsemen." 
 
 Having conquered Spain, and formed an alliance 
 with Masinissa, Scipio deprived the Carthaginians of 
 this advantage. It was Numidian cavalry that gained 
 the battle of Zama and ended the war. 
 
 The Carthaginians had more experience on sea 
 than the Eomans, and better understood the manage- 
 ment of ships ; but it appears to me that this ad- 
 vantage was not so great at that time as it would 
 be at the present day. 
 
 ISTot haAdng the mariner's compass, the ancients 
 were Httle able to navigate except along the shores 
 
 a standard of right, and when wealth had not yet learned to draw to 
 itself that measure of defensive force which it so well knows how to 
 organize and employ in modern times. In the circumstances of the 
 modem world, Great Britain is a standing illustration of the security of 
 a first class commercial state. — Tkanslator. 
 
 '* Lib. Ti, ch. xxT. 
 
 " Some entire corps of Numidians passed over to the side of the 
 Eomans, who from that time began to experience a sense of relief. 
 
CHAP. IV.] OF THE ROMANS. 85 
 
 of seas ; tliey only used vessels provided with oars 
 — small and flat; nearly aU road-steads served them 
 as ports; the knowledge of pilots was very limited, 
 and their manoeuvering a very small affair. Hence 
 it was that Aristotle said it was useless to have a 
 corps of mariners, and that laborers would suffice 
 for that.'* Art was so imperfect, that not much 
 more was accomplished with a thousand oars than 
 is now with a hundred." Large vessels were dis- 
 advantageous; for, being difficult to put in motion 
 by the crew, they were unable to execute the nec- 
 essary evolutions. Of this, Anthony made a disas- 
 trous experiment at Actium."" His ships were unable 
 to move, whilst those of Augustus, being lighter, at- 
 tacked them on aU sides. As the ancient vessels 
 were propelLed by oars, the lighter could easily break 
 the oars of the larger ones, which were thus re- 
 duced to the condition of immovable machines, like 
 our present ships when dismasted. 
 
 Since the discovery of the mariner's compass all 
 this has been changed. We have abandoned the use 
 of oars;" we construct large vessels, and shun the 
 shores of the sea. The machinery of navigation has 
 
 '* Politics, Book VII, ch. vi. 
 
 " See what Perrault says respecting the oars of the ancients. Essai 
 de physique, tit. 3, Micanique des animaux. 
 
 2" The same thing happened at the battle of Salamis. (PLtriAKCH, 
 £i/e of Themistodes.) History is full of similar facts. 
 
 " From which we may judge how imperfect was the marine of the 
 ancients — since we hare abandoned a practice in which we were so supe- 
 rior to them. 
 
S6 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [moktesqdiec. 
 
 become more composite, and its applications more 
 multiplied. 
 
 The discovery of gunpowder has led to a conse- 
 quence which would not have been suspected. It is 
 that the force of navies consists more than ever in art ; 
 for, in order to resist the violence of cannon, and not 
 to be exposed to a superior fire, large vessels are neces- 
 sary ; but the power of art should be proportioned to 
 the magnitude of the machine. 
 
 The small vessels of the ancients grappled with 
 each other suddenly, and the soldiers of the two sides 
 joined in conflict. An entire land army was placed 
 on a fleet. In the naval battle which Eegulus and 
 his colleague gained, we see a hundred and thirty 
 thousand Komans engage with a hundred and fifty 
 thousand Carthaginians. At that time soldiers were 
 accounted for much and men of art for little; at 
 present, soldiers are accounted for little, and men of 
 art for much. 
 
 This difference is made manifest by the victory 
 which was achieved by the consul Duillius. The Eo- 
 mans were without knowledge of navigation; a Car- 
 thaginian galley grounded upon their coasts ; they used 
 this as a model for the building of others; in three 
 months time their fleet was constructed and equipped 
 and their seamen ready; they put to sea, found the 
 Carthaginian navy, and beat it. 
 
 At present, a whole lifetime is scarcely sufficient to 
 enable a sovereign to form a fleet capable of appear- 
 
CHAP. IT.] OF THE ROMANS. 87 
 
 ing before a power whicli has already the empire of 
 the sea. It is perhaps the sole thing which money 
 alone cannot do ; and if in our time a great mon- 
 arch succeeded at once in accomplishing such a task," 
 experience has caused others to see that his example 
 is more to be admired than followed." 
 
 The second Punic war is so famous that all the 
 world is acquainted with it. When we consider well 
 the crowd of obstacles which confronted Hannibal, 
 and which that extraordinary man surmounted, we 
 have before us the finest spectacle that antiquity pre- 
 sents. 
 
 Eome was a prodigy of constancy. After the bat- 
 tle of Ticinus, of Trebia, of Trasymenus — after that 
 of Cannas, which was more disastrous yet, and when 
 she was abandoned by nearly all the peoples of Italy, 
 she did' not ask for peace. The reason was that the 
 senate never departed from the ancient maxims. It 
 dealt with Hannibal as it had previously dealt with 
 Pyrrhus — with whom it had refused to enter into any 
 accommodation whilst he remained in Italy. And I 
 find in Dionysius of Halicamassus,'' that at the time 
 of the negotiation with Ooriolanus, the senate declared 
 that it would not violate its ancient customs ; that the 
 Koman people would not make peace so long as the 
 enemy remained upon their soil ; but that, if the Yol- 
 scians withdrew, all would be accorded which might 
 
 be just. 
 
 '' Spain and MuscoTy. 
 «' Louis XrV. '* Roman Antiquities, Book VIII. 
 
88 GEANDEUE AND DECADENCE [montesquied. 
 
 Kome was saved by the force of her institutions. 
 After the battle of Cannse, not even the women were 
 permitted to shed tears. The senate refused to ran- 
 som the prisoners, and sent the miserable remains of 
 the army to continue the war in Sicily — without rec- 
 ompense and without military honor — ^until Hannibal 
 should be driven from Italy.""" 
 
 On the other hand, the consul Terrentius Yarro 
 had fled shamefully to Venusia. This man, who was 
 of the lowest birth, had only been elevated to the 
 consulate in order to mortify the nobles. But the 
 
 ^* [After the battle of Cannse, when any other state would have sue- 
 cumbed to its bad fortune, there was not a movement of weakness among 
 the Eoman people, nor a thought which was not devoted to the good of 
 the republic. All orders, all ranks, all conditions exhausted themselves 
 voluntarily. Honor consisted in retaining less, shame in reserving more. 
 (Saint-E vremond. )] 
 
 *' Inflexible as the Roman character may have been, it was yet not 
 so completely devoid of sensibility and weakness as seems to be implied 
 in the text and in the passage from Saint-Evremond. The scenes of dis- 
 tress which took place in Rome immediately after the rout on the Allia, 
 and after the defeats of Trasymenus and Cannas, rank with the most un- 
 bounded displays of human feeling that are to be found in history. On 
 the first occasion, " the entire city " was " filled with wailings " ; on the 
 second, instances are given of women who fell dead from joy on meeting 
 sons whom they believed to have been slain in the battle ; on the third, 
 the city was seized with panic, the first hurried sitting of the senate took 
 place " while the loud lamentations of the women were resounding," and 
 Livy declares that the scene was indescribable. Montesquieu's remark 
 that " not even the women were permitted to shod tears " after this last 
 defeat, conveys an exaggerated idea of Roman stolidity. The fact waSj 
 that for prudential reasons, public and private, the senate passed a de- 
 cree, not forbidding the shedding of tears, but limiting the time of mourn- 
 ing to thirty days. (See Livy, Book V, chs. 39-40, Spillan's trans. ; and 
 Book XXII, chs. Y, 54, 65, and 56, Spillan & Edmonds' trans.) — Trans- 
 
CHAP. IV.] OF THE ROMANS. 89 
 
 senate refused to enjoy the unhappy triumph which 
 the occasion offered. Seeing how necessary it was in 
 the existing circumstances to draw to itself the con- 
 fidence of the people, this body went before Yarro 
 and thanked him for not having despaired of the 
 republic." 
 
 It is not ordinarily the actual loss which is occa- 
 sioned by a battle — that is to say, some thousands of 
 men — that is fatal to a state ; it is the imaginary loss 
 and the resulting discouragement which deprive it 
 even of the resources which fortune has left it. 
 
 There are things which everybody says, for the 
 reason that they have once been said. It is believed 
 that Hannibal committed a signal error in not hav- 
 ing laid siege to Eome after the battle of Cannae." 
 It is true that at first the terror of the city was ex- 
 treme; but the consternation of a warlike people, 
 which nearly always changes into courage, is not like 
 that of a vile populace, which feels nothing but its 
 own weakness. One proof that Hannibal would not 
 have succeeded is seen in the fact that the Eomans 
 were yet in a condition to send out succors in every 
 direction. 
 
 ^' [The senate thanked him for this publicly ; and from that moment 
 it was resolved, according to the ancient maxims, to listen to no propo- 
 sition of peace in this sad state of affairs. The enemy were astonished ; 
 the people took heart afresh, and believed that they possessed resources 
 which the senate knew of in its wisdom. (Bossuet, Disc, mr I'JSist. 
 Univ., troisi^me partie, ch. vi.)] 
 
 '^ [See Saint-Evremond, Reflexions sur Ics divers gSnies du peaple ro- 
 main, etc., ch. vii.] 
 
90 GEANDEUK AND DECADENCE [montesqtjibu. 
 
 It is further said that Hannibal committed a great 
 mistake in leading his army to Oapna, where it became 
 enervated. But it is overlooked that this view does 
 not ascend to the true cause. Become rich after so 
 many victories, would not the soldiers of this army 
 have found Capua everywhere ? Alexander, who com- 
 manded his own subjects, adopted an expedient in a 
 similar situation which Hannibal, who only had mer- 
 cenary troops, could not resort to ; he set fire to the 
 baggage of his soldiers, and consumed aU their wealth 
 and his own. We are told that Kublai Khan, after 
 the conquest of India, allowed only one hundred 
 rupees of silver to each soldier.'" 
 
 It was the very conquests which Hannibal made 
 that commenced to change the fortunes of the war. 
 He had not been sent into Italy by the magistrates 
 of Carthage; and, whether from the jealousy of the 
 one party, or from the too great confidence of the 
 other, he received very little support from hgrne. 
 So long as he kept his army together he beat the 
 Romans. But, when it became necessary to garrison 
 cities, to defend his allies, to besiege places or pre- 
 vent them from being besieged, his forces were found 
 to be too small, and he lost portions of his army in 
 detail. Conquests are easy to make, for the conqueror 
 achieves them with all his forces; they are difficult 
 to preserve, for he only defends them with a part of 
 his forces. 
 
 '» History of his life, Paris, 1742, p. 402. 
 
BAKEH.] OF THE ROMANS. 
 
 91 
 
 NOTE BY THE TRANSLATOR 
 
 In order that we may form a completer, and in 
 one instance a more acciirate, general idea of several 
 of the important subjects which are embraced in the 
 chapter just closed, it becomes necessary that I should 
 add some observations to the text. 
 
 I. In assigning to the Eomans and the Gauls " the 
 same obstinate resolve to conquer," and in making 
 the difference between them to consist in the in- 
 feriority of the wenpons of the latter, Montesquieu 
 does not distinguish the salient points of character 
 for which the two peoples M'ere noted. The will of 
 tlie Gaul was much the more impetuous, that of the 
 Roman much the more persistent. " Obstinate re- 
 solve" was a Roman, but scarcely a Galhc, quality. 
 
 Machiavelli has a curious chapter, entitled, "The 
 reason why the Gauls have been and still are adjudged 
 to be more than men at the beginning of a battle, and 
 afterwards less than women " ' — wherein he draws at- 
 tention to that characteristic quality of the Gauls 
 
 ' La mpionc pcrcht' i Franciosi sono stati c sono aiienra c/iiidicati nclle 
 :iit/f da jmiiripio piU che tiomini, c dipoi ineiio chc fanmine. Discorsi, 
 lib. iii, cup. xxxvi. 
 
92 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakeb. 
 
 which is SO closely akin to a national trait ascribed 
 by other modern nations to the French, and which 
 indeed is best expressed by the French word, elm. 
 
 "The ferocity of that Gaul," says Machiavelli, 
 "who, on the rirer Anio, challenged any Eoman 
 whatever to single combat, and the fight which en- 
 sued between him and Titus Manlius, remind me of 
 what Livy several times says, that in the beginnuig 
 of a battle the Gauls are more than men, and that 
 they afterwards become, in the issue of the combat, 
 less than women : and reflecting upon the cause of 
 this, it is believed by many that nature may have 
 made them thus— an opinion which may be correct; 
 but it does not therefore follow, that this nature of 
 theirs, which renders them ferocious in the beginning, 
 might not be so regulated by art that it would finally 
 enable them to maintain their ferocity to the last.'" 
 
 That affiliation of character which is traceable be- 
 tween the ancient Gaul and the modern Frenchman 
 is but one of a multitiide of instances going to show 
 the persistence — I do not say the absolute immutar 
 bility — of race characters. Whatever may be the 
 origin of races, when once formed, they become, to 
 say the least, pretty stable "facts — retaining their iden- 
 tity for many thousands of years, and impressing 
 their peculiar genius upon the history of the world. 
 In the mental process of referring the phenomena of 
 history to their proximate causes, it appears to me 
 
 ''Idem. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 93 
 
 tbat race is an exceedingly important factor; and I 
 am persuaded that Buckle and Mill set altogether too 
 low a value upon this element.' 
 
 Quetelet, who has perhaps done more than any 
 other man towards giving a character of precision to 
 social science, recognizes the high value of race, as 
 one of the modifying causes of social phenomena. 
 "It seems to me," he says, "that one of the first 
 distinctions to be taken in the study which occupies 
 us is that of the difEerent races of men inhabiting 
 the countries which we shall consider; it is, as we 
 shall very soon see, of the highest importance, al- 
 though it may not be that which first presents itself 
 to the mind."* 
 
 He adopts the estimate of Malte-Brun, that the 
 population of France — at a time prior to the late 
 Franco-Prussian war — was composed of three princi- 
 pal race elements — ^the Keltic, the Germanic, and the 
 Pelasgic, of which the first alone — ^being the modem 
 representative of the ancient Gallic stock — constitutes 
 nearly three fifths of the whole; and he quotes ap- 
 provingly the opinion of the great geographer, that 
 "the progress of civilization may alter the character 
 of a people, but cannot change it entirely." ' 
 
 Certainly the progress of civilization has done 
 
 much, by means of that "art" of which Machiavelli 
 
 speaks, to modify the military character of the Gaul 
 
 ' Sist. of Civ. in Eiigland, ch. !i, note 1. 
 
 * Physique Social, Bruxelles and Paria. 1869, torn, ii, pp. 279-280. 
 
 ' Idem, p. 280. 
 
94 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakek. 
 
 as it was known and described by tbe Eomans; but 
 it is none tbe less certain that the French elan of 
 to-day is a reminder of an ancestral quality which 
 may be traced back more than two thousand years. 
 
 According to the description given by Caesar in 
 his Commentaries, the Gauls were larger and taller 
 than the Eomans; and they looked with contempt 
 upon the short stature of the latter." But, superior 
 steadiness in character and purpose, no less than su- 
 perior arms, gave the mastery to the smaller race of 
 men. 
 
 II. It will be well to indicate, with a degree 
 more of precision and particularity than is found in 
 the text, the great salient features of the second 
 Punic war. It is noteworthy that all the four battles 
 referred to in this chapter — and which conducted 
 Hannibal to the summit of his power — took place 
 within about two years from the time when he first 
 descended from the Alps. He entered northern Italy 
 in the year 218 b. c, and gained, during that same 
 year, the two victories of Ticinus and Trebia — ^both 
 in cisalpine Gaul. The next year — 21Y b. c. — he 
 advanced further south, and defeated the Komans at 
 Trasymenus ; and the year following — 216 b. c— 
 having proceeded still further south, he inflicted upon 
 them the terrible defeat of Cannge — at which time 
 his ascendency attained its maximum. Thencefor- 
 
 ' Pr<s magtdtudine corpo}-um suorum, brevitas nostra contemtui est, 
 lib. ii, c. 30. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 95 
 
 ward, during tlie remaining thirteen years that he yet 
 tarried in Italy, we may trace a gradual decline in 
 his fortunes. 
 
 These celebrated victories, which thus marked the 
 rapid rise of Hannibal's power, were very unequal. 
 
 Ticinus was an affair of no great importance in 
 itself — a mere prelude to the shock of invasion which 
 threatened to extinguish the Eoman name ; Trebia 
 and Trasymenus — especially the latter — were destruc- 
 tive defeats; and Cannae was an appalling disaster. 
 The signal celebrity of the last two of these battles 
 will justify some more particular notice of each in 
 this place. 
 
 According to the account of Livy, there was, on 
 tlie part of the Romans, a total want of generalship at 
 Trasymenus. Between the lake Trasymenus and the 
 mountains of Cortona there was a narrow pass, which 
 expanded into a confined plain terminated by some 
 hiUs. The whole formed a sort of natural cul de sac. 
 BTannibal occupied the hills in person, with his Span- 
 ish and African troops — distributed his light infantry 
 along the mountain in flank — and concealed his cav- 
 alry in such a position that it could close the mouth 
 of the defile in the rear of the advancing Romans. 
 Into this trap Flaminius led his army a little before 
 dawn, amid the fogs arising from the lake, and with- 
 out the precaution of sending forward a reeonnois- 
 sance. The consul and fifteen thousand Romans were 
 killed outright upon the field, and as -many more were 
 
96 GKAN'DEUR AND DECADENCE [bakek. 
 
 captured, whilst only fifteen hundred of the Cartha- 
 ginians were slain. 
 
 Livy mentions a very extraordinary circumstance 
 in connection with this battle, and one which is well 
 calculated to show how utterly the mind of the sol- 
 dier is absorbed by the interest of the struggle in 
 which he is engaged : " and so great was the ardor of 
 the conflict, so intent were their minds upon the bat- 
 tle, that not one of the combatants felt an earthquake 
 which threw down large portions of many of the cit- 
 ies of Italy, turned rivers from their rapid courses, 
 carried the sea up into rivers, and levelled mountains 
 with a tremendous crash." 
 
 We also remark in the same writer's account of 
 this battle — as in numerous other instances among 
 the armies of antiquity — ^how completely similar was 
 the behavior of the ancient and modem soldier when 
 stricken with panic fear; and this notwithstanding 
 the relatively greater ascendency of the purely mili- 
 tary spirit among the ancients: "and now neither 
 the lake nor the mountains obstructed their hurried 
 retreat ; they run through all places, confined and pre- 
 cipitous, as though they were blind; and arms and 
 men are tumbled one upon another.'" 
 
 The battle of Cannae took place on the Aufidus, 
 — the modern Ofanto — a small stream flowing north- 
 east into the Adriatic, and at a point about six miles 
 
 ' Compare Lwy, Book XXII, chg. 4 to 7, Spillan & Edmonds' tran8. | 
 and Arnold's Hist, of Rome, ch. xliii. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 97 
 
 from its mouth. The scene of the conflict laj"^ in a 
 southeastern direction from Eome, and at a distance 
 of about five days' march from the city. The force 
 of the Eomans is variously estimated by their own 
 authorities, some placing it as high as 87,200, which 
 may be accepted as the more probable number. The 
 Carthaginian army consisted of 40,000 infantry and 
 10,000 cavalry. In the order of battle, it is said that 
 the Komans looked to the south, the Carthaginians to 
 the north, and that a strong wind, blowing over the 
 backs of the latter, carried blinding clouds of dust 
 into the faces of the Eomans. The center of the Car- 
 thaginian army giving way, the Eomans followed up 
 in a dense column, until, finally checked in this for- 
 ward movement by the troops which had first been 
 beaten back, their fianks were at the same time en- 
 veloped by the two powerful wings of the enemy, 
 and their rear assailed by his formidable cavalry. The 
 Eomans being thus surrounded, the contest — as at 
 Trasymenus — became a slaughter rather than a battle. 
 Their army was virtually annihilated. The debris, 
 assembled a few days after under cover of the walls 
 of the neighboring town of Canusium, seems not to 
 have exceeded 10,000 men. The total loss, therefore, 
 captured and slain, must have been about 77,000. 
 Livy puts the number of killed on the Eoman side 
 at 42,700, and on the side of the Carthaginians at 
 8,000. Considering the number of combatants, this 
 was an enormous mass of dead to lie upon one field 
 6 
 
98 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 —showing with what destructive ferocity some of the 
 ancient battles were fought. There is a touch of hor- 
 ror, 'felt anew after the lapse of so many ages, in Livy's 
 brief description of the scene of slaughter at the dawn 
 of the following morning. Some of the wounded, 
 covered with blood and rising amid heaps of slain, 
 were struck down by the unpitying hand of the foe ; 
 others, prostrate upon the field and unable to rise, laid 
 bare their necks to the merciful blade which would 
 end their suffering : some had excavated burrows for 
 their heads in the dusty plain where they fell, and 
 thus ended their agony by voluntary suffocation ; and 
 one instance is mentioned as attracting the special 
 notice of the Carthaginians who explored the field — 
 a dead Roman was found stretched upon the body of 
 a living Numidian, whom he had torn With his teeth 
 in the very act of expiring. A modern pen will be 
 excused by humanity itself for thus recurring to the 
 revolting details of an ancient battle. It is such 
 details, rather than descriptions of carnage in gross, 
 that touch the heart and quicken the feelings against 
 the brutal work of war. 
 
 As to the oft mooted question, whether or not 
 Hannibal could have taken Rome if he had pressed 
 forward immediately after the battle, I think it is 
 worthy of special notice that there was a strong 
 opinion among the Romans ihemselves that he could 
 have done so. " That day's delay," says Livy, refer- 
 ring to the inaction of Hannibal just after the battle 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 99 
 
 of Cannae, " is firmly believed to have been the pres- 
 ervation of the city and the empire." If the invest- 
 ment of Rome at that moment would have led to 
 the desertion of her Latin allies, as the defeat at Can- 
 nse led to the desertion of the peoples of Southern 
 Italy, it would seem that she must have succumbed. 
 But who can now say what the action of the Latins 
 would have been in such case? In favor of Montes- 
 quieu's view it may be added, that the character of 
 Hannibal, as it comes to us in histories written by 
 his enemies, represents him as combining — like all 
 first-rate generals and men of action — consummate 
 audacity with conswmmate prudence ; and that, being 
 but thirty-one years of age at the time of his great 
 victory, he had not yet reached that time in life 
 when the latter quality would be likely to act as an 
 undue check upon the former. On the whole, how- 
 ever, there appears to be no certain means of deter- 
 mining whether the Ilon>ans, at this awful crisis in 
 their history, were or were not indebted to fortune 
 for their escape from a Carthaginian master ; and the 
 one opinion may be as good as the other." 
 
 III. Here, too, it will be proper to add something 
 further in relation to the comparative power and 
 character of the two peoples who were thus engaged 
 in a life and death struggle for the empire of the 
 
 ' Comp. Livy, Book XXII, chs. 36 to 56, Spillan & Edmonds' trana. ; 
 Momrasen's Bomiache Oeschichte, Berlin, 1868, Vol. I, pp. 610-614; 
 Arnold's Hist, of Rome, oh. xliii ; Chambers' and Am. Encydopmdias, 
 art. Oanrm ; and Anthon's Glas. Die, arts. Aufidus and Oannce. 
 
100 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakee. 
 
 Mediterranean states — a struggle in -which the future 
 interests of the world's civilization were deeply in- 
 volved. 
 
 The single observation of Montesquieu, that "the 
 establishment of Carthage in her territory was less 
 solid than that of Eome in hers," goes far towards 
 accounting for the ultimate triumph of the latter. 
 The power of the one — while yet confined to Italy — 
 rested at once upon the solid physical base of a ter- 
 ritory which was continuous, and upon the solid so- 
 cial base of a group of peoples who were similar in 
 race, language, and political organization. The power 
 of the other reposed upon a territory which was de- 
 tached and straggling, and upon peoples between 
 whom and' their masters there existed very wide 
 ethnic, linguistic, and social differences. Carthage 
 extended her power or her influence along the north- 
 em margin of Africa for a distance of about eighteen 
 hundred miles, and held scattered outposts in Sicily, 
 Sardinia, Corsica, Malta, the Balearic Islands, and 
 Spain. The power of Eome was massed in the pen- 
 insula of Italy. 
 
 When we add to tliis that the Komans were in- 
 tensely warlike, and thus took the lead in their own 
 fighting, whilst the Carthaginians relied almost wholly 
 upon mercenary troops, which they were enabled to 
 subsidize by reason of their great gains in commerce, 
 we can readily anticipate the final result. The matter 
 of surprise is that Home was brought to such great 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 101 
 
 peril, and that the Carthaginians were not beaten 
 sooner and easier. This, however, is sufficiently ac- 
 coiinted for by two causes, the one special, the other 
 general. The special cause was, that it so happened 
 that the Carthaginian armies were commanded by a 
 succession of remai'kably able men, closing with Han- 
 nibal, the ablest of all. The general cause was, that 
 the Cai'thaginian mercenaries — especially the Iberians, 
 the Gauls, the Baleares and the Numidians — ^were the 
 very best troops of the mercenary sort of which we 
 have any account in ancient history — with the soli- 
 tary exception of that famous Ten Thousand who fii-st 
 dishonored the Greek name by marching for hire in 
 aid of a despotic pretender, and then immortalized it 
 by their unmatched retreat. 
 
 "With mercenary troops of such a character, con- 
 tinuing in service for years together, and led by a 
 great general whose command was permanent, the 
 military appointment of the Carthaginians was for a 
 time really superior to that of the Eomans them- 
 selves — embarrassed as the latter were by their system 
 of annual enlistments and annual chanse of com- 
 manders. 
 
 In her best days, Cai-thage is said to have been 
 23 niilea in circumference, and to have contained 
 700,000 inhabitants. Being of Phcenician origin, her 
 speech belonged to the Semitic family of languages, 
 and was closely allied to the Hebrew. Commercial 
 gain being her dominant idea, the leading feature of 
 
102 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bamr. 
 
 her government was aristocracy based upon wealth. 
 Aristotle speaks highly of her constitution; and Dr. 
 Arnold detects the identity of the two Suffetes— the 
 chief magistrates of the city — with those officers who 
 are styled Judges among the Hebrews. 
 
 The disgraceful malignity which prompted the 
 Romans to destroy Carthage, when it was at length 
 prostrate at their feet, and no longer able to lift a 
 hand in defense, is nearly equalled by that meanness 
 of spirit which suffered the literature of the great 
 people they had crushed to be blotted from exist- 
 ence. After the destruction of the city, instead of 
 transferring its libraries to Home, and there preserr- 
 ing them as the repositories of a valuable part of the 
 world's store of knowledge, it appears that the sen- 
 ate distributed them among the half savage "princes 
 of Africa " ; and the result is that a few meagre 
 fragments, in a version of Greek or Latin, is all that 
 survives to represent the entire literature of a nation 
 which was the most active and powerful branch of 
 that same Phoenician stock which gave letters to 
 Greece, to Eome, to Europe and America. 
 
 Taking, however, the most comprehensive view of 
 these rival cities, two facts — the one probable and 
 the other certain — are alone sufficient to show that 
 the Carthaginians were less adapted than the Eomans 
 to beneficial empire. 
 
 1. Hard as the Aryan Eomans were in their ex- 
 actions upon subject peoples, these African Semites 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 103 
 
 appear to have been still more so. Under the later em- 
 peroi-s, the land tax of the Eomans rose as high as thir- 
 ty-three and one third per cent, of the net produce; 
 whilst at the time of the first Punic War— if we are 
 to credit Polybius — the like tax imposed by the Cartha- 
 ginians upon their African subjects was fifty per cent. 
 2. Degrading and cruel as the Eoman supersti- 
 tion was in some of its features, it was greatly less 
 so than that of Carthage. The detestable rite of 
 Human Sacrifice — which is at once the effect and 
 the cause of the greatest debasement of spirit, al- 
 though having too much place among the Greeks 
 and Eomans themselves, had altogether a stronger 
 hold upon the Carthaginians, and, in their case, was 
 much more ingrained and organic. The worship of 
 the sun-god, Moloch or Baal — brought by the Cartha- 
 ginians from their mother country — was probably the 
 most revolting of which all antiquity contains any 
 account. Wherever their power extended, on either 
 coast of the Mediterranean, or along the shores of 
 its beautiful islands, they established the altars of 
 this hideous god ; and so inveterate was their attach- 
 ment to his worship, that for a long time after the 
 overthrow of Carthage the Eomans were unable to 
 extirpate it. The following description — quoted from 
 E. Simeon by Dr. IST. Davis in his work on Car- 
 thage and her Eemains — gives a frightful idea of 
 these rites — practiced by the Carthaginians in com- 
 mon with their Phoenician progenitors: 
 
104 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bazer. 
 
 "All the houses of idols were in the city of 
 Jerusalem, except that of Moloch, which was out of 
 the city, in a separate place. It was a statue with 
 the head of an ox, and the hands stretched out as a 
 man's who opens his hand to receive something from 
 another. It was hollow within, and there were seven 
 chapels raised, before which the idol was erected. 
 He that offered a fowl or a young pigeon went into 
 the first chapel; if he offered a sheep or a lamb, he 
 went into the second; if a ram, into the third; if a 
 calf, into the fourth; if a bullock, into the fifth; if 
 an ox, into the sixth; but he only who offered his 
 own son went into the seventh chapel, and kissed 
 the idol Moloch, as it is said, ' Let the men that sac- 
 rifice kiss the calves.' The child was placed before 
 the idol, and a fire made under it till it became red 
 hot. Then the priest took the child, and put him 
 into the glowing hands of Moloch. But, lest the 
 parents should hear his cries, they beat drums to 
 drown the noise. Therefore the place was called 
 Tophet, from Tho;ph, ITiuppim, that signifies drums. 
 It was also called Hinnom, because of the children's 
 cries, from the Hebrew word naham, to roar, or be- 
 cause the priests said to the parents, ' Yehenelah,^ 
 'It will be of advantage to you.'" 
 
 This abominable worship — a monstrous outbirth 
 from the Semitic genius— followed the expansion of 
 that race from Syria to the straits of Gibraltar, pol- 
 luting the fairest heaven with the smoke of its al- 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 105 
 
 tars, and filling the minds of its votaries with gloom 
 and terror. The description which Deodorus Sicnlus 
 gives of the Carthaginian Moloch is no less revolting 
 than the above — a brazen image with outstretched 
 arms so inclined as to roll the child "into a pit be- 
 low, filled with fire " ; and Dr. Davis is satisfied, 
 that the "ashes and bones" which he found in the 
 deep excavation which he made upon the site of the 
 ancient temple of Baal Hammon at Carthage, were 
 the identical "remains of the victims immolated to 
 this divinity." Nor were infants the only human 
 sacrifices which were made. Adults were also ac- 
 ceptable to the god, although it seems that children 
 were the favorite and usual offering. And the num- 
 ber who were sacrificed appears to have been shock- 
 ingly great. "WTien Agathocles invested Carthage, no 
 fewer than two hundred children, drawn from the 
 first families of the city, were offered up to appease 
 the wrath of Baal; and besides these, it seems that 
 more than three hundred adult persons presented 
 themselves as voluntary victims on the same occa- 
 sion. Over against this it may be stated that, when 
 Home was all but overwhelmed by the defeat at 
 Cannae, the burying alive of four persons — two Greeks 
 and two Gauls — was sufficient to satisfy her supersti- 
 tious fears. 
 
 Judging the Carthaginians therefore only by such 
 lights as we have in the total absence of the story 
 which they might have told for themselves had their 
 
106 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 literature survived, and assigning to them tlie most 
 liberal credits — as in such case justice demands that 
 we should do — ^yet, the sinister side of their character 
 rather plainly appears to have united the two fatal 
 drawbacks of supreme avarice and rapacity, and su- 
 preme devotion to a gloomy and bloody superstition. 
 These qualities rendered them unfit to take charge 
 of the general interests of civilization ; and we may 
 very safely conclude that it was not alone the des- 
 tiny, but also the better forttme, of the Mediterranean 
 world, that it was subjected to the Eoman instead of 
 the Carthaginian yoke.' 
 
 ' Aristotle's Politics, ch. xi ; Arnold's HM. of Rome, ch. xxii, & ch. 
 xxxix, notes 2 & 14 ; Hume's Phil. Works, Boston, 1854, vol. iii, pp. Vl, 
 478 ; Stephen's Lectures on Hist, of France, London, 1852, Tol. i, p. 24; 
 Adam's Rom. Ant., Phila., 18'72, pp. 214, 215, 221 ; Potter's Oredan 
 Ant., Edinburgh, 1808, vol. i, pp. 257, 258; Livy, Book XXII, ch. 61; 
 Gibbon's flome, vol. i, pp. 27-28 ; Anthon's Clas. Die., art. Cartluti 
 Carthage and her Remains, N. Y., 1861, ch. xiii. 
 
MONTESQUiEn.] OF THE ROMANS. 107 
 
 CHAPTER Y. 
 
 STATE OF GEEECE, OF MAOEDOlf, OF 8TEIA AND EGYPT, 
 AFTER THE ABASEMENT OF CAETHAGE. 
 
 I IMAGINE that Hannibal indulged in yerj few fine 
 sayings, and fewer still in favor of Fabius and Mar- 
 cellus and against himself. I regret to see Liry scat- 
 ter his flowers' of rhetoric over these colossal figures 
 of antiquity, and would prefer that he had followed 
 the example of Homer, who, whilst neglecting the 
 decoration of his heroes, knows so well how to make 
 them act. 
 
 It were at all events necessary that the remarks 
 attributed to Hannibal should be sensible ones ; but, 
 if, on being informed of the defeat of his brother, he 
 declared that he foresaw in that defeat the ruin of 
 Carthage, I know nothing which could have been 
 better calculated to depress the hopes of the peoples 
 attached to his cause, and to discourage an army 
 which looked forward to such great recompenses 
 after the war should be finished. 
 
 As the Carthaginians put forward no army in 
 Spain, Sardinia or Sicily, which was not unfortunate, 
 
-j^Qg GEANDEUE AND DECADENCE [MONTESQPiEn. 
 
 Hannibal, whose enemies constantly grew stronger, 
 was finally reduced to the necessity of making war 
 on the defensive. This suggested to the Eomans the 
 idea of carrying the war into Africa; and Scipio 
 descended upon the southern shore of the Mediterra- 
 nean. The successes which there attended his arms 
 compelled the Carthaginians to recall Hannibal — ^who, 
 in abandoning to the Komans a country in which he 
 had so often vanquished them, shed tears of bitter 
 regret. 
 
 All that a great statesman and a great general 
 could do, Hannibal did to save his country. Not 
 being able to incline Scipio to peace, he gave a bat- 
 tle, in which Fortune seeined to take pleasure in con- 
 founding his ability, his experience, and his good 
 sense.' 
 
 Carthage received peace, not from an enemy, but 
 from a master. She was required to give hostages, 
 to deliver over her vessels and her elephants, to pay 
 ten thousand talents in fifty years, to engage in no 
 war whatever vdthout the consent of the Koman 
 people ; and, in order to hold her in perpetual hu- 
 miliation, the power of Masinissa, her implacable ene- 
 my, was strengthened. 
 
 ' This was the battle of Zama, which was fought in Numidia, B. o. 
 202, at a point about " five days journey west of Carthage." (Anthoa's 
 Clas. Die, articles Zama & Hannibal.) Here the power of the Cartha- 
 ginians was irrecoverably broken. Their subsequent history is short, and 
 is marked by the desperate but vain effort to rise again. At the close of 
 the third Punic War, fifty-six years after the battle of Zama — b. c. 146 — 
 Carthage was captured and burned by the Romans. — ^Tkanslator. 
 
CHAP, v.] OF THE ROMANS. 109 
 
 After humbling the Carthaginians, Kome seldom 
 had other than small wars and great victories ; where- 
 as, before that task was accomplished, she had had 
 small victories and great wars. 
 
 Previous to the prostration of Carthage, there 
 were, so to speak, two separate worlds. In the one, 
 the Eomans and the Carthaginians contended for 
 empire ; the other was agitated by the quarrels which 
 continued from the time of the death of Alexander 
 the Great. The East gave no thought to what was 
 going on in the West;' for, although Philip, king 
 of Macedon, made a treaty with Hannibal, almost 
 nothing came of it. He contributed but very feeble 
 succors to the Carthaginians, and uselessly disclosed 
 to the Romans a bad will. 
 
 "When two great peoples engage in a long and 
 obstinate war, it is often bad policy in other nations 
 to imagine that they can remain tranquil spectators 
 of the conflict ; for the one of the two which is con- 
 queror immediately undertakes new wars, and a na- 
 
 " It is surprising, as Joaephus remarks in the book against Api- 
 on, that neither Herodotus nor Thucydides should erer have spoken 
 of the Romans, notwithstanding they had carried on such great 
 wars, (a) 
 
 (a) We here see a striking illustration of the very limited intercom- 
 munication which existed between the states of the ancient world when 
 compared with that which exists between modern nations. The penin- 
 sulas of Greece and Italy are only separated by an arm of the Mediter- 
 ranean — itself an inland sea ; and yet, for the purposes of mutual intelli- 
 gence, they were much farther apart in the times of Herodotus and 
 Thucydides, than are the continents of Europe and America at the present 
 time. — Tbaksiatob. 
 
110 GRANDEUK AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 tion of soldiers proceeds to attack peoples who are 
 
 only citizens.' 
 
 This was clearly illustrated at the time of which 
 we speak; for the Eomans had scarcely subdued the 
 Carthaginians, when they proceeded to assail new 
 peoples, and to display their standard as invaders of 
 
 the world. 
 
 There were then in the East but four powers 
 capable of resisting them. These were the Eepub- 
 lics of Greece and the Kingdoms of Macedon, Syria, 
 and Egypt. It is necessary that we should look at 
 the situation of the first two; for the Komans com- 
 menced by subduing them. 
 
 There were three considerable peoples iu Greece 
 — the ^tolians, the Achasans, and the Boeotians. 
 These were associations of free cities, having general 
 assemblies and common magistrates. The JEtohans 
 were warlike, hardy, rash, avaricious of gain, always 
 free with their word and their oath, and making war 
 upon land as pirates do upon sea. The Achseans 
 were incessantly harassed by their neighbors or by 
 
 ' What is here said was much more true in ancient than it is in 
 modern times ; and this is one of the prominent facts which go to prove 
 the relatively greater ascendency of the military spirit among the na- 
 tions of antiquity than is seen in our own day. Supposing our Ke- 
 public to have been influenced by the ancient spirit, it is eminently like- 
 ly that her great armies, triumphant over the Rebellion in 1866, would 
 have been turned upon Mexico or Canada; and, upon a similar sup- 
 position, it is equally likely that the returning armies of the German 
 Empire, fresh from their triumphal march through Paris in 1871, 
 would have been diverted to new fields of aggressive operation. — Tbass- 
 
 LATOK. 
 
CHAP, v.] OF THE ROMANS. HI 
 
 their inconvenient protectors.* The Boeotians, the 
 dullest of the Greeks, took the least part they could 
 in general affairs. Guided solely by the sentiment of 
 present good and evil, they had. so little spirit that 
 it was difficult for the orators to move them ; and — 
 what is extraordinary — their republic maintained itself 
 even in a state of anarchy.' 
 
 Lacedsemon had preserved her power— that is to 
 say, she had retained that warlike spirit which she 
 had received from the institiltions of Lycurgus. The 
 Thessalians were in some sort subject to the Mace- 
 donians. The kings of Illyria had already been ex- 
 tremely crippled by the Eomans. The Acarnanians 
 and the Athamanes were ravaged successively by 
 the forces of Macedon and by those of .^tolia. The 
 Athenians, without allies," and without power of their 
 own, had ceased to astonish the world except by the 
 flattery of kings ; and the tribune, where Demosthenes 
 had spoken, was no longer ascended except for the 
 proposal of the most cowardly and scandalous de- 
 crees. 
 
 * Reference seems here to be made to the Macedonians, whose aid 
 was involied by Aratus, the Achjean commander, in the war which he 
 was carrying on against Cleomenes, king of Sparta. As usual, the 
 friendly aid of the powerful protector soon degenerated into oppression. 
 — Teanslatok. 
 
 ' The magistrates, in order to please the multitude, ceased to open the 
 tribunals. The dying bequeathed their estates to their friends, to be ex- 
 pended in feasts. See a fragment of the twentieth Book of Polybius, in 
 the Extract of Virtues arid Vices. 
 
 ^ They had no alliance with the other peoples of Greece. (Polybius, 
 Book VIII.) 
 
112 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [MONTBSQTTnm. 
 
 Greece was otherwise formidable from her situa- 
 tion, her strength, the multitude of her cities, the 
 number of her soldiers, her police, her manners, and 
 her laws. She loved war and she knew the art of 
 war. She would have been invincible if she had 
 been united. She had been surprised by the first 
 Philip, by Alexander and Antipater, but not subju- 
 gated; and the kings of Macedon, who could not 
 consent to abandon their pretensions and their hopes, 
 persisted obstinately in the work of subduing her. 
 
 Macedon was almost surrounded by inaccessible 
 mountains. Her people were admirably adapted to 
 war. They were brave, obedient, industrious and in- 
 defatigable — qualities which they must have taken 
 from the climate — since yet at the present day the 
 men who are drawn from this country are the best 
 soldiers of the Turkish empire. 
 
 Greece maintained herself by a sort of balance of 
 power. The Lacedsemonians were generally allies of 
 the ^tolians, and the Macedonians of the Achseans. 
 But, upon the arrival of the Komans, all equihbrium 
 was destroyed. 
 
 As the kings of Macedon could not support 'a 
 large number of troops,' the least reverse was of 
 consequence to them ; and they found it difficult to 
 extend their power; for, their designs not being un- 
 known, the eyes of the other states were constantly 
 open to their proceedings ; and the successes which 
 
 ' See Plutarch, Life of Flaminius. 
 
CHAP, v.] 01? THE ROMANS. 113 
 
 they acliieved in wars undertaken for their allies were 
 regarded as evils which these same allies were the 
 first to counteract. 
 
 But these kings were generally able princes. Their 
 monarchy was not of the number of those which 
 move forward by a species of pace imparted at the 
 beginning. Continually instructed by dangers and 
 by affairs, embarrassed by all the quarrels of Greece, 
 it was necessary for them to gain the principal per- 
 sons of cities, to dazzle the people, and to divide or 
 reunite interests ; in short, they were obliged, at each 
 instant, to exhibit personal ability. 
 
 Philip,' who, by his moderation at the beginning 
 of his reign, had drawn to himself the love and 
 the confidence of the Greeks, suddenly changed his 
 course. At a time when he should have been just 
 from policy and from ambition he became a cruel 
 tyrant.' He saw, although at a distance, the Cartha- 
 ginians and the Eomans, whose forces were immense. 
 He had finished the war in which he had engaged 
 to the advantage of his allies ; and he had reconciled 
 himself with the ^tolians. It was natural that he 
 should think of uniting the whole of Greece with 
 himself, in order to prevent it from falling under the 
 dominion of foreigners. But, on the contrary, he 
 irritated the Greeks by small usurpations ; and, amus- 
 ing himself with the discussion of vain interests when 
 
 ' Philip V of Macedon is here meant. — Translator. 
 ' See, in PolybiuB, the injustices and the cruelties by which Philip 
 brought himself into discredit. 
 
114 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [mohtesquieu. 
 
 his very existence was at stake, by three or four bad 
 actions he rendered himseH odious and detestable to 
 all Greece. 
 
 The JEtolians were most ofEended; and the Ko- 
 mans, seizing the occasion of their resentment, or rather 
 of their foUy, formed an alliance with them, entered 
 into Greece, and armed it against Philip. 
 
 This prince was defeated at the battle of Cynos- 
 cephalse; and that victory was due in part to the 
 valor of the ^Etolians. Philip was so overwhelmed 
 with consternation that he consented to a treaty 
 which was less a peace than an abandonment of his 
 own forces. He withdrew his garrisons from all 
 Greece, delivered over his vessels, and obligated him- 
 seK to pay one thousand talents in ten years. 
 
 "With his usual good sense, Polybius compares the 
 military method of the Eomans with that of the 
 Macedonians — which last had been adopted by aU the 
 successors of Alexander the Great. He points out 
 the advantages and the inconveniences of the pha- 
 lanx and the legion. He gives the preference to the 
 latter; and, if we are to judge by the events of the 
 time, it would appear that he was right." 
 
 '» [Bossuet, in his Discours mr VHhtoire universelle, states these ad- 
 Tantages and inconveniences, and, after having weighed them, accepts 
 the opinion of Polybius, who for the rest has been followed by Livy, and 
 by most of the writers who have occupied themselves with military mat- 
 ters. The following are the remarks of the bishop of Meaux : 
 
 " The Macedonians, so jealous in preserving the ancient order of their 
 soldiery which had been formed by Philip an^l Alexander, believed that 
 their phalanx was invincible ; and they could not be persuaded that the 
 
CHAP, v.] OF THE ROMANS. 115 
 
 A circumstance wMcli contributed mucli to put 
 the Eomans in peril during the second Punic war was 
 the fact that Hannibal straightway armed his soldiers 
 in the Eoman manner. But the Greeks changed 
 neither their arms nor their method of fighting. It 
 did not so much as enter into their minds to renounce 
 usages by means of which they had accomplished such 
 great results. 
 
 The success which the Eomans achieved against 
 
 human mind was capable of contriving anytliing more firm. Polybius, 
 however, and Livy after him, have demonstrated that, considering solely 
 the nature of the Roman and the Macedonian armies, the latter could 
 not fail to be beaten in the long run; for the Macedonian phalanx, 
 which was but a great square battalion, and very heavy throughout, could 
 only move as a whole ; whereas the Roman army, divided into small 
 bodies, was more active, and better adapted to all sorts of movements. 
 
 " The Romans then had discovered or very early learned the art of di- 
 viding armies into many battalions and squadrons, and of forming corps 
 of reserve, of which the movement was so proper to push on or sustain 
 those who might give way at one point or another. Let the Macedonian 
 phalanx move against troops thus disposed. That big and unwieldy ma- 
 chine will be terrible, it is true, to an army on which it may fall with all 
 its weight. But, as Polybius says, it could not long preserve its natural 
 propriety — that is, its solidity and its consistence ; for it required fields of 
 action adapted to its composition, and, so to speak, made expressly for 
 it ; and in default of finding such it became self-embarrassed, or rather 
 it broke from its own proper movement ; and, being once broken, it knew 
 not how to rally. On the other hand, the Roman army, being divided 
 into small bodies, profited by all places, and accommodated itself to them. 
 It united and separated at will. It defiled easily and reassembled with- 
 out difiiculty. It was adapted to the sending out of detachments, to rally- 
 ing, and to all sorts of changes and evolutions, which it executed entire 
 or in part as occasion required. It had more diverse movements, and 
 consequently more action and more force than the phalanx. We con- 
 clude, therefore, with Polybius, that it was necessary that the phalanx 
 should succumb to it, and that Macedou should be conquered." {TroisUme 
 pariie, ch. vi.)] 
 
;|^-|^0 GRANDEUK AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 PHlip was the greatest of all the steps which they 
 took in the way of general conquest." In order to 
 assure themselves of Greece, they humbled, in all 
 manner of ways, those very JEtolians who had 
 helped them to conquer her; and they ordered that 
 every Greek city which had been under the domin- 
 ion of Philip or of any other prince should be gov- 
 erned for the future by its own laws. 
 
 It is easy to see that these small republics could 
 not be other than dependents. The Greeks aban- 
 doned themselves to a stupid joy, and believed them- 
 selves to be free in fact, for the reason that the 
 Eomans had declared them so. 
 
 The ^tolians, who had imagined that they should 
 dominate in Greece, finding that they had only given 
 themselves masters, were reduced to despair; and — 
 as they always took extreme resolutions — seeking 
 now to correct their folly by their foUy, they called 
 Antiochus, king of Syria, into Greece, as they had 
 previously called in the Romans. 
 
 The kings of Syria were the most powerful of 
 the successors of Alexander, for they possessed near- 
 ly all the states of Darius except Egypt; but events 
 had taken place which had led to a great reduction 
 of their power. 
 
 Seleucus, who founded the empire of Syria, had, 
 
 " If we regard the greatness of an achievement as proportioned to 
 its difficulty, the prostration of the power of Carthage must be viewed as 
 a much greater step in the career of Roman conquest than the subjuga- 
 tion of Greece. — Translator. 
 
CHAP, v.] OF THE ROMANS. 117 
 
 towards the close of his life, destroyed the kingdom 
 of Lysimachus. In the confusion of things many 
 provinces revolted. The kingdoms of Pergamns, Cap- 
 padocia, and Bithynia were formed; and these small 
 and timid states constantly regarded the humilia- 
 tion of their ancient masters as fortunate for them- 
 selves. 
 
 As the kings of Syria always looked with ex- 
 treme envy upon the felicity of the kingdom of 
 Egypt, they were absorbed with the purpose of con- 
 quering it. This led them to neglect the East ; and 
 the result was that they there lost many provinces, 
 whilst they were very badly obeyed in the others. 
 
 Finally, the kings of Syria held both high and 
 low Asia. But experience has shown in such case 
 that, when the capital and the principal forces are in 
 the provinces of low Asia, the dependencies of high 
 Asia cannot be preserved; and that, when the seat 
 of empire is in high Asia, it is weakened on the side 
 of the lower provinces. The empires of Persia and 
 Syria were never so strong as that of the Parthians, 
 who only held part of the provinces of the first two. 
 If Cyrus had not conquered the kingdom of Lydia — 
 if Seleucns had remained at Babylon, and left the 
 maritime provinces to the successors of Antigonus — 
 the empire of Persia would have been invincible to 
 the Greeks, and that of Seleucns to the Komans. 
 To mortify the ambition of men, nature has pre- 
 scribed certain boundaries to states. Whenever the 
 
jj^g GRANDEUK AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 Komans transgressed these, they almost invariably 
 perished at the hands of the Parthians;" whenever 
 the Parthians dared to disregard them, they were 
 immediately obliged to retrace their steps; and, in 
 our own day, the Turks, who have advanced be- 
 yond these limits, have been constrained to retire 
 within them. 
 
 The kings of Syria and Egypt had in their re- 
 spective countries two classes of subjects — ^the con- 
 quering and the conquered peoples.'^ The first, yet 
 full of the idea of their origin, were very difficult 
 to govern. They had not that spirit of independence 
 which prompts men to throw off the yoke, but they 
 were influenced by that impatience which creates the 
 desire for a change of masters. 
 
 But the principal weakness of the kingdom of 
 Syria arose from the feebleness of the Court, in 
 which reigned the successors of Darius rather than 
 of Alexander. Luxury, vanity, and efileminacy, which 
 at no period have quitted the courts of Asia, were 
 especially supreme in that of Syria. The malady 
 extended to the people and to the soldiers, and be- 
 came contagious among the Romans themselves; for 
 the war which the latter made against Antiochus 
 marks the true epoch of their corruption. 
 
 Such was the situation of Syria when Antiochus 
 
 '^ I will give the reasons for this In chapter xv. They arc drawn in 
 part from the geographical characters of the two empires. 
 
 " That is, the conquering Greeks and the conquered Syrians and 
 Egyptians. — Tkanslatok. 
 
CHAP, v.] OF THE ROMANS. H9 
 
 — who had heretofore accomplished great things — 
 undertook to make war against the Komans. But 
 on this occasion he did not conduct himself even 
 with the same prudence which men employ in ordi- 
 nary affairs. Hannibal advised that the war should 
 be renewed in Italy, and that Philip of Macedon 
 should be gained or rendered neutral." Antiochus 
 did nothing of the kind. He presented himself in 
 Greece with a small part of his forces ; and, as if he 
 had desired to be a spectator of war, instead of en- 
 gaging in it, he occupied himself with his pleasures 
 only. He was beaten, and fled back into Asia — 
 more frightened than conquered. 
 
 Philip — drawn along by the Romans during this 
 war as by a torrent — aided them with all his power, 
 and became the instrument of their victories. The 
 pleasure of revenging himself and of ravaging ^to- 
 lia — ^the jealousy which he felt towards Antiochus — 
 the promise that his tribute should be diminished 
 and that some cities should be left to him — ^in short, 
 small motives determined his course; and, not dar- 
 ing to conceive the thought of throwing off the 
 Eoman yoke, his only study was to mitigate its 
 rigor. 
 
 Antiochus judged so badly of affairs that he im- 
 agined that the Eomans would leave him undis- 
 turbed in Asia. But they followed him into his 
 
 " Hannibal was now at the court of Antiochus, whither he had fled 
 B. c. 196 — some six years after the battle of Zama, and in about the 
 fifty-first year of his age. — Tkanslator. 
 
-^20 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 own dominions; they defeated him again; and, in 
 his consternation, he consented to the most in- 
 famous treaty that was eyer accepted by a great 
 prince. 
 
 I know nothing so magnanimous as the resolu- 
 tion taken by a monarch who has reigned in our 
 own time" — to bury himself under the ruins of his 
 throne sooner than accept proposals which a king 
 ought not to hear. He possessed a soul too proud 
 to descend yet lower than his misfortunes had 
 placed him; and he knew that, whilst courage may 
 reaffirm a crown, infamy never does." 
 
 " Louis XIV. 
 
 '' I suppose Montesquieu here alludes to some incidents in the life of 
 Louis XIV which occurred during the war of the Spanish Succession. In 
 the year 1709 France was grievously pressed by the combined forces of 
 England, Holland, and Austria, and Louis was well-nigh reduced to the 
 last extremity. He sued for peace upon the humblest terms ; but the 
 allies, whom he had deeply offended, and who felt that they now had 
 him at their mercy, were inexorable. So deplorable was the condition of 
 France that, upon a representation of the state of the kingdom being 
 made at a sitting of the king's council, by the Duke de Beauvilliers, the 
 whole council was moved to tears. The Marquis de Torsi, a member of 
 the council, proposed to go in person on a mission of peace. He pro- 
 ceeded under an assumed name to the Hague, and appeared in the ante- 
 chamber of the Grand Pensionary, Heinsius. He could obtain no peace. 
 The allies were willing, however, to accord a truce, but upon terms which 
 were exceedingly humiliating, and coupled with conditions which were 
 still more so — among which was the requirement that the French king 
 " should unite his forces with those of his enemies, in order to drive his 
 own grandson from Spain within the space of two months." It was 
 upon being informed of these conditions that Louis is related to have 
 said in presence of his council : " Since I must fight, I prefer to make 
 war upon my enemies rather than upon my children." (PuisquHl faut 
 /aire la guerre, faime mieux la /aire d mes ennemis qu'd mes enfans.) 
 But the heroism of the incident is much impaired by the circumstance 
 
CHAP, v.] OF THE ROMANS. 121 
 
 It is a common thing to see princes -who know 
 how to fight a battle; but there are few among 
 them who know how to conduct a war; who are 
 equally capable of availing themselves of fortune 
 and of waiting for it; and who, together with that 
 disposition of mind which imparts distrust before en- 
 terprises are undertaken, possess that intrepidity 
 which fears nothing after they are entered upon. 
 
 After the overthrow of Antiochus, only small 
 powers remained — if we except Egypt — which, in 
 view of its situation, its fertility, and its commerce, 
 in view of the number of its inhabitants and the 
 strength of its forces on land and sea, ought to have 
 been a formidable state. But the cruelty, the cow- 
 ardice, the avarice and imbecility of its kings, joined 
 to their frightful sensuality, rendered them so odious 
 to their subjects that, for the most part, they were 
 only able to maintain themselves through the pro- 
 tection of the Eomans. 
 
 It was in some sort a fundamental law of the 
 crown of Egypt that sisters succeeded with brothers ; 
 
 that, still supplicating for peace, the plenipotentiaries of Louis soon af- 
 terwards offered to recognize the Archduke Charles as king of Spain, 
 to abandon Philip V to his fate, and even to furnish money to aid in 
 expelling him from the Spanish throne. 
 
 At a later period of the war (1712) it is further related of this mon- 
 arch that he told Marshall Harcourt " that, in case of a new disaster, he 
 should summon all the noblesse of his kingdom, lead them against the 
 enemy notwithstanding his age of 1i years, and perish at their head." 
 Executed, this would have been an heroic or a mad action ; threatened, it 
 may have been no more than gasconade. (See Siicle de Louis XIV, chs. 
 xxi, xxii.) — Teanslatoe. 
 6 
 
J22 GEANDEUK AND DECADENCE [moNTESQuiEr. 
 
 and, in order to maintain the nnity of the govern- 
 ment, the brother married the sister. It is difficult 
 to imagine anything more pernicious in the polity of 
 a state than such a succession. Every little domestic 
 quarrel became a public disorder. The one of the 
 two sovereigns who felt the least chagrin immediately 
 excited against the other the people of Alexandria — 
 an immense populace, always ready to join itself to 
 the first of its rulers who appealed to it. In addition 
 to this, the kingdoms of Gyrene and Cyprus being 
 ordinarily in the hands of other princes of the same 
 house, with reciprocal rights to all, it happened that 
 there were nearly always princes reigning and princes 
 who were pretenders to the crown. Thus it was that 
 the sovereigns of Egypt were seated upon unstable 
 thrones ; and, being badly established within their 
 own dominions, they were without power abroad. 
 
 The forces of the kings of Egypt, like those of 
 the kings of Asia, consisted in their Greek auxiliaries. 
 Aside from that spirit of liberty, of honor, and of glory, 
 which animated the Greeks, they occupied themselves 
 incessantly with all sorts of bodily exercises. They 
 established games in their principal cities, at which 
 the conquerors obtained crowns before the eyes of 
 all Greece; and thsis a spirit of general emulation 
 was created. 
 
 At a time when men fought with arms the eflS- 
 ciency of which depended upon the physical strength 
 and dexterity of those who used them, we cannot fail 
 
CHAP. T.] OF THE EOMANS. 123 
 
 to see tliat a nation of people tlius exercised would 
 possess great advantages over that multitude of bar- 
 barians who were taken indiscriminately and led to 
 war without choice — as we clearly see in the case of 
 the armies of Darius. 
 
 In order to deprive the kings of such soldiers, and 
 to quietly strip them of their principal forces, the 
 Eomans did two things. In the first place, they grad- 
 ually established it as a maxim among the Greek cit- 
 ies that the latter could form no alliance, supply no 
 succors, nor wage any war whatever, without their 
 consent. In the next place — in their treaties with 
 the kings — they prohibited them from making any 
 levies among the allies of the Homans, thus reducing 
 them to the employment of their own national troops." 
 
 " The Eomans had already practiced this policy with the Carthagin- 
 ians, whom they obligated by treaty to arail themselves no longer of the 
 services of auxiliary troops — as we see in a fragment of Dion. 
 
3^24 GEAITDEITK AND DECADENCE [bakeb. 
 
 NOTE BY THE TEANSLATOE. 
 
 At the close of this chapter — which carries us for- 
 ward to a time when the Eomans had extended their 
 power very considerably beyond the limits of Italy — 
 it is proper to add some observations with a view of 
 giving a more comprehensive and definite idea of 
 the manner in which that power affected the interests 
 of civilization in general. 
 
 Two leading facts challenge our attention. First, 
 in extending her sway over southern Europe, Rome 
 dealt almost exclusively with cities, towns, and vil- 
 lage communities. Secondly, the general character of 
 the society thus constituted was greatly changed by 
 her domination. Much light will be shed upon the 
 position which the Eomans occupy in universal his- 
 tory by considering the social value of these two car- 
 dinal 'facts — involving, as the one does, a rational idea 
 of the leading feature of European society when these 
 conquerors commenced their career, and the other a 
 like idea of the principal changes wrought in this 
 society by the extension of their power. 
 
 1. In early times, southern Europe was covered 
 
HOTE.] or THE ROMANS. 125 
 
 over with independent towns or small combinations 
 of towns, each surrounded by its little domain, and all 
 occupied with ever-recurring quarrels among them- 
 selves. As a general fact, these town communities 
 were more developed in Greece and Italy, and less 
 so in Spain and Gaul. Considering the comparative- 
 ly limited territories over which they were dispersed, 
 their number was very great. Thus, for the Italian 
 peninsula, we have to count the numerous towns of 
 Great Greece or southern Italy; those of Samnium, 
 Latium, Umbria, Campania, Picenum, and Etruria; 
 those of the Sabines, the ^quians, the Yolscians, the 
 Marsians, the Hemicans, the Pelignians, the Frenta- 
 nians, the Vestinians, and others. Of these, the httle 
 Latin confederacy alone is said to have been made 
 up of "forty -seven independent communities," by 
 which we are to understand towns with diminutive 
 portions of adjacent territory; and the ^quians — a 
 people of still less importance — are reported to have 
 possessed no less than forty " towns." 
 
 The Gallic peoples, lying further north, were di- 
 vided into many tribes, with loose interdependence, 
 and grouped about municipal centers of which we 
 may form some idea at a later epoch from the ac- 
 count of Csesar, and at an earlier one from the re- 
 mains of the Swiss Lake Tillages of the stone and 
 bronze periods. The number of these Gallic tribes 
 is variously stated by ancient writers at from one 
 hundred and fifteen to four himdred. 
 
J26 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakee. 
 
 The peninsula of Spain was divided among a great 
 number of these small communities, as is sufficiently 
 apparent from the single statement of Livy, that 
 Scipio, at the close of one campaign, received the 
 submission of more than one hundred and twenty 
 " states." 
 
 Crossing the Adriatic, we find that the same fun- 
 damental fact reappears upon the Grecian peninsula. 
 Small as this celebrated territory is, we find it occupied 
 by a considerable number of municipal states — ^Attica, 
 Bceotia, Laconia, Argolis, Messenia, Elis, Arcadia, Cor- 
 inthia, Achia, Megaris, and the rest — whose histories 
 are little more than the histories of Athens, Thebes, 
 Sparta, Argus, and the other capital cities of Greece. 
 
 Indeed — ^to ascend from particulars to a general 
 principle — the tribal and municipal character was a 
 necessary feature of all the early societies. It was a 
 direct consequence of that process by which primitive 
 societies appear to have been everywhere formed, and 
 which Aristotle points out with an acumen which his- 
 torical investigation persistently tends to verify : first 
 the family (hoikos), arising from the junction of the 
 sexes; then the tribe, or village (kome), arising from 
 the junction of several allied families ; then the more 
 extended state (polis), arising from the junction of 
 several villages, or towns ; and, it may be added, that 
 as the family thus grew up into the municipal state, 
 it very naturally gave to society its earliest form of 
 civil government — the patriarchal. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 127 
 
 Guizot fully recognizes the nmmcipal character of 
 that multitude of small European states which were 
 ahsorbed by the Eoman power; but he does not 
 couple the fact with the cause ; nor does he recognize 
 the like character as having belonged to the early 
 states of Asia. And Mr. Baldwin, in his able and 
 very suggestive work on " The Prehistoric Nations," 
 observing the municipal type of the ancient Mediter- 
 ranean states, regards this form of political organiza- 
 tion in Europe as having been due to a still more 
 ancient influence exerted by the Arabian Cushites; 
 thus referring to the particular genius of a single 
 people a form of organization which is necessarily 
 common to all mankind in a certain stage of social 
 development. 
 
 Thus, then, when the Eomans entered upon the 
 stage of action, the civilization of the European world 
 was divided up into a vast number of independent 
 nuclei, with the consequent absence of extensive in- 
 tercommunication and extensive social ideas, and the 
 consequent presence of an ever-recurring succession 
 of small wars. It appears probable that a society 
 thus loosely constituted could hardly have stood as a 
 bulwark against the accumulating force of the bar- 
 barous nations beyond the Alps, the Rhine, and the 
 Danube. It seems likely that it would have been 
 prematurely overwhelmed by the first great waves of 
 invasion that came from the north. 
 
 2. The Eomans changed this society in two main 
 
128 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakeb. 
 
 respects: they gave it a considerable degree of tmity; 
 and they conferred upon it the boon of internal peace. 
 As their standards advanced, carrying war in front, 
 their conquering arms left peace behind. The result 
 ■was that the social condition of southern Europe be- 
 came less distinctly municipal and more universal in 
 its character, less intensely military and more indus- 
 trial in its tone. And — ^to take what is probably the 
 highest view of the subject — that great Mediterra- 
 nean Society was thus formed which, in the then 
 existing condition of the world, seemed to be de- 
 manded as a counterpoise to the Barbarism of the 
 North, and which performed its office so efficiently, 
 not only by holding the barbarians in check during 
 so many ages, but none the less by so modifying the 
 threatening mass of barbarism itself, that, when its 
 hour of triumph came, it was as much conquered by 
 Eome as Rome by it. And thus it was that the 
 Eomans, without consciously intending it, and not- 
 withstanding their enormous greed and oppression, 
 performed an exceedingly great role in the interest 
 
 of the world's civilization.' 
 
 / 
 ' See Lubbock's Prehistoric Times, cb. vi ; Eiitimeyer's Fauna der 
 Fhalbauien in der Schweis, Basel, 1861, pp. 230-244 ; Gibbon's Rome, 
 ch. i, note 1\ ; Livy, Book XXII, cb. 20, and XXVII, ch. 9, SpiUan & 
 Edmonds' trans. ; Arnold's Hist, of Rome, chs. xi and xlvi ; Anthon's 
 Clas. Die., art. JEqui ; Ferguson's Hist, of Home, cb. i ; Dionys. Halicar., 
 lib. iv ; Maine's Ancient Law, New York, 1864, pp. 118-122 ; Guizot'sSs- 
 toire de la Civilisation en Europe, Paris, 1871, pp. 42-44 ; Baldwin's Pre- 
 historic Nations, New York, ISYl, pp. 112-116 ; and Comte's PhUosopUe 
 positive, Paris, 1869, torn, v, pp. 126, 121. 
 
MONTESQUiEiT.] OF THE KOMANS. 129 
 
 CHAPTEE VI. 
 
 POLICY ADOPTED BY THE EOMANS FOE THE CONQITEST OF 
 ALL NATIONS. 
 
 ' In the course of so mucli prosperity — from which 
 men ordinarily grow negligent — the Koman sen- 
 ate was constantly actuated by the same profound 
 policy; and, whilst the armies spread consternation 
 on all sides, it held to the earth the nations which 
 were once overthrown. 
 
 This body erected itself into a tribunal for the 
 judgment of all peoples; and at the end of every 
 war it decided upon the punishments and the recom- 
 penses which it conceived each to be entitled to. It 
 took away parts of the lands of the conquered states, 
 in order to bestow them upon the allies of Eome, 
 thus accomplishing two objects at once — attaching to 
 Rome those tings of whom she had little to fear 
 and much to hope, and weakening those of whom 
 she had little to hope and all to fear. 
 
 Allies were employed to make war upon an enemy ; 
 but the destroyers were at once destroyed in their 
 turn. Philip was beaten with the help of the ^to- 
 
■^30 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [MONiESQriEu. 
 
 lians, who were immediately afterwards annihilated 
 for having joined themselves to Antiochus. Antio- 
 chus was beaten with the help of the Ehodians, who, 
 after having received signal rewards, were humiliated 
 for ever under the pretext that they had requested 
 that peace might be made with Perseus.' 
 
 When they had many enemies on hand at the 
 same time, they accorded a truce to the weakest, 
 which considered itself happy in obtaining such a 
 respite — counting it for much to be able to secure a 
 postponement of its ruin. 
 
 When they were engaged in a great war, the 
 senate affected to ignore all sorts of injuries, and si- 
 lently awaited the arrival of the proper time for 
 punishment — when, if it saw that only some indi- 
 viduals were culpable, it refused to punish them — 
 choosing rather to hold the entire nation as criminal, 
 and thus reserve to itself a useful vengeance. 
 
 As they inflicted inconceivable evils upon their 
 enemies, there were not many leagues formed against 
 them ; for those who were most distant from danger 
 were not willing to draw nearer to it. The conse- 
 quence of this was, that they were rarely attacked — 
 whilst, on the other hand, they constantly made war 
 at such time, in such manner, and against such peo- 
 
 " This Perseus was the son and successor of Philip V on the throne 
 of Macedon. During his reign the war with the Romans was renewed. 
 The power of Perseus was destroyed by Paulus ^Emilius at the battle of 
 Pydna ; and Macedon — which under Alexander had extended her sway 
 over half the known world — sunk (b. c. 148) to the condition of a Roman 
 province. — Thanslatok. 
 
CHAP. VI.] OF THE ROMANS. 131 
 
 pies, as suited their convenience ; and, among the 
 many nations which they assailed, there were very 
 few that would not have submitted to every species 
 of injury at their hands if they had been willing to 
 leave them in peace. 
 
 It being their custom to speak always as masters, 
 the embassadors whom they sent to nations which 
 had not yet felt their power were certain to be in- 
 sulted; and this was an infallible pretext for a new 
 war.' 
 
 As they never made peace in good faith, and as, 
 with the design of universal conquest, their treaties 
 were, properly speaking, only suspensions of war, 
 they always put conditions in them which began the 
 ruin of the states which accepted them. They either 
 provided that the garrisons of strong places should 
 be withdrawn, or that the number of troops should 
 be limited, or that the horses or the elephants of 
 the vanquished party should be delivered over to 
 themselves ; and, if the defeated people was powerful 
 on sea, they compelled it to bum its vessels, and 
 sometimes to remove, and occupy a place of habita- 
 tion farther inland. 
 
 After having destroyed the armies of a prince, 
 they ruined his finances by excessive taxes, or by 
 the imposition of a tribute under pretext of requir- 
 ing him to pay the expenses of the war — a new spe- 
 
 ' One of the examples of this sort is seen in their war against the 
 Dalmatians. See Polybius. 
 
132 GEANDEUK AND DECADENCE [montesquiet. 
 
 cies of tyranny, wHcli forced the vanquished sover- 
 eign to oppress Ms own subjects, and thus to alienate 
 their affection. 
 
 "When they granted peace to a king, they took 
 some of his brothers or children as hostages. This 
 gave them the means of troubling his kingdom at 
 their pleasure. If they held the nearest heir, they 
 intimidated the possessor; if only a prince of a re- 
 mote degree, they used him to stir up revolts against 
 the legitimate ruler. 
 
 Whenever any people or prince withdrew their 
 obedience from their sovereign, they immediately 
 accorded to them the title of allies of the Eoman 
 people,' and thus rendered them sacred and invio- 
 lable; so that there was no king, however great he 
 might be, who could for a moment be sure of his 
 subjects, or even of his family. 
 
 Although the title of Eoman ally was a species 
 of servitude, it was nevertheless very much sought 
 after ; * for the possession of this title made it cer- 
 tain that the recipients of it would receive injuries 
 from the Komans only, and there was ground for 
 the hope that this class of injuries would be rendered 
 less grievous than they would otherwise be. Thus 
 there was no service which nations and kings were 
 not ready to perform, nor any humiliation which 
 
 ' See especially their treaty with the Jews, in the first Book of Mac- 
 cabees, ch. viii. 
 
 * Polybius tells us that Ariarathes made a sacrifice to the gods, in or- 
 der to return them thanks that he had obtMned this aUiance. 
 
CHAP. Ti.] OF THE ROMANS. 133 
 
 they did not submit to, in order to obtain tbis dis- 
 tinction. 
 
 The Eomans bad many sorts of allies. Some were 
 united witb tbem by privileges, and by participation 
 in their grandeur — as the Latins and the Hernicans; 
 others by the very act of establishment — as their col- 
 onies; some were attached to them by benefits con- 
 ferred — as Masinissa, Eumenes, and Attains, who owed 
 to them their Idngdoms or their aggrandizement ; 
 others yet were held by voluntary treaties — and 
 these, through a long continued habit of alliance, be- 
 came subjects — as Egypt, Bithynia, Oappadocia, and 
 most of the Greek cities; and many, finally, were 
 united to them by forced treaties, and by the law of 
 their subjugation — as Philip of Macedon and Antiochus 
 of Syria ; for they never made a treaty of peace with 
 an eneniy which did not involve an alliance ; in other 
 words, they never subdued a nation which they did 
 not use as an instrument in the subjugation of others. 
 
 Whenever they left a city free, they at once gave 
 rise to two factions among its citizens.' The one 
 fended the ancient laws and liberty of the city; the 
 other maintained that there was no law but the will 
 of the Romans ; and, as the latter faction was always 
 the stronger of the two, it is easy to see that such lib- 
 erty was no more than a name. 
 
 Sometimes they rendered themselves masters of a 
 country under pretext of testamentary inheritance. 
 ' See Polybiua on the cities of Greece. 
 
J 34 GEAJ^DEUR AND DECADENCE [uoNTESQmEn. 
 
 They entered into Pergamus, Bithynia, and Libya by 
 means of the testaments of Attains, Nicomedes," and 
 Apion ; and Egypt was enthralled by the will of the 
 king of Cyrene. 
 
 "With a view to rendering great princes perma- 
 nently weak, they would not allow them to receive 
 into their alliance any state to which they had ac- 
 corded their own;' and, as they never refused an 
 alliance with any of the neighbors of a powerful mon- 
 arch, this condition, embodied in a treaty of peace, 
 left him without allies. 
 
 Furthermore, when they had vanquished any con- 
 siderable prince, they provided in the treaty that he 
 should make no war on account of his differences 
 with the allies of Rome — that is to say, ordinarily, 
 that he should make no war with any of his neigh- 
 bors — but that he should put such differences in 
 arbitration — a provision which deprived him of the 
 future use of his military power. 
 
 And, in order to reserve such power wholly to 
 themselves, they even denied the use of it to their 
 own allies. As soon as the latter engaged in the least 
 quarrel with each other, they dispatched embassadors 
 who compelled them to make peace. We need only 
 refer to the manner in which they put a stop to the 
 wars of Attains and Prusias. 
 
 "Whenever any prince had achieved a conquest— 
 which oftentimes had exhausted him — a Eoman em- 
 
 ^ Son of Philopator. ' This was the case with Antiochus. 
 
CHAP. VI.] OF THE ROMANS. 135 
 
 bassador immediately came forward and plucked it 
 from his hands. Among a thousand examples of 
 this, we may recall how, with a word, they drove 
 Antiochus from Egypt. 
 
 Knowing how admirably the peoples of Europe 
 were adapted to war, they established it as a law 
 that no Asiatic king should be permitted to enter 
 into Europe for the purpose of subjugating any 
 people whatever." The principal cause of the war 
 against Mithridates was that he had subdued some 
 barbarians in controvention of this prohibition." 
 
 When they saw that two nations were engaged in 
 war, although they may have had no alliance and no 
 quarrel with the one or the other, they never failed 
 to appear upon the scene — and, like our knights-errant, 
 they took the part of the weaker. It was, says Dio- 
 nysius of Halicamassus, an ancient usage of the Eo- 
 mans to extend their aid to all who came to im- 
 plore it." 
 
 These customs were not merely some particular 
 facts which happened at hazard. They were perma- 
 nently established principles, as may be readily seen; 
 for the maxims which the Komans acted upon against 
 the greatest powers were precisely those which they 
 had employed in the beginning of their career against 
 
 ^ This prohibition was applied to Antiochus even before the Romans 
 made war with him, and it became general as to the other kings. 
 
 ' We have here a cm-ious anticipation of our so-called " Monroe Doc- 
 trine." — ^Translator. 
 
 '" Appian, De Bella Miihridaiico^oh. xiii. 
 
 '' Fragment of Dion. Hal. taken from the Excerpt of the Embassies. 
 
236 GKANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieii. 
 
 the small cities which surrounded them. They availed 
 themselves of Eumenes and of Masinissa in order to 
 subjugate PhiKp and Antiochus as they had availed 
 themselves of the Latins and the Hernicans in order 
 to subjugate the Yolscians and the Etrurians. They 
 required the fleets of Carthage and of the kings 
 of Asia to be turned over to them just as they 
 had previously exacted the barks of' Antium. They 
 dissolved the civil and pohtical connections of the 
 four parts of Macedon in like manner as they had 
 before broken the union of the small Latin towns." 
 
 But, above all, their constant maxim was to di- 
 vide. The Kepublic of Achaia consisted of an asso- 
 ciation of free cities : the Eoman senate declared that 
 for the future each city should govern itself by its 
 own laws, without dependence upon any common au- 
 thority. The Kepublic of Bceotia was a similar asso- 
 ciation of many cities; but as, during the war with 
 Perseus, some of these cities followed the party of 
 this prince, and others that of the Komans, the lat- 
 ter admitted them to grace, providing meanwhile for 
 the dissolution of their common alliance. 
 
 If a great monarch," who has reigned in our day, 
 had followed these maxims when he saw one of his 
 neighbors dethroned, he would have employed greater 
 forces to sustain him, and limited him to the island 
 which remained faithful to his cause. By thus divid- 
 ing the sole power which was able to oppose his de- 
 ^'' LiTT, Book Vn. IS [Louis XIV.] 
 
CHAP. Ti] OF THE ROMANS. 137 
 
 Bigns, he would have drawn immense advantages even 
 from the misfortune of his ally." " 
 
 "Whenever any controversy arose in a state the Ro- 
 mans immediately judged the affair. By this means 
 they were certain to have against them only the party 
 which they had condemned. If it were a case in 
 which princes of the same blood disputed the crown, 
 they sometimes declared both to be kings." If one 
 of them was under age, they decidefd in his favor, 
 and took him into their tutelage, as protectors of 
 the universe;" for they had carried things to such 
 a height that nations and kings were their subjects 
 without knowing precisely by what title — it being 
 established that it was enough to have heard them 
 spoken of in order to owe them obedience. 
 
 They never made war at a distance without hav- 
 ing first procured some ally near the enemy to be 
 attacked, who might join his forces to the army 
 which they sent out; and, as this army was never 
 considerable for its numbers, they constantly ob- 
 
 " [James II of England.] 
 
 "■ The view here presented by Montesquieu appears to me to be very 
 sagaoious-^that the true policy of Louis XIV, in imitation of that of the 
 Bomans in like case, was, not to attempt to drive William III from the 
 throne of Kngland, but to erect for James II a new throne in Ireland. — 
 Tkanslatob. 
 
 '' As happened to Ariarathes and Holophemes in Cappadocia. — Ar- 
 PIAN, in Syriake. 
 
 " In order to be able to work the ruin of Syria in the character of 
 tutors, they declared in favor of the infant son of Antiochus, and against 
 Demetrius, the latter of whom, being in their hands as a hostage, im- 
 plored them to render him justice, saying that Rome was his mother, 
 and her senators his fathers. 
 
138 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [MOWESiinm;. 
 
 served the practice of holding another in the prov- 
 ince which was nearest the enemy, and a third at 
 the city of Eome — always ready to inarch." Thus 
 they only exposed a third of their own forces, whilst 
 the enemy hazarded aU of his." 
 
 Sometimes they abused the subtlety of the terms 
 of their language. They destroyed Carthage, saying 
 they had promised to spare the city, and not the 
 town."" And we know how the ^tolians — who 
 abandoned themselves to their good faith — were de- 
 ceived by them. The Komans pretended that the 
 words — to aicmdon themselves to the good faith of 
 an enemy — imported the loss of all sorts of things 
 — of persons, lands, cities, temples, and even the sep- 
 ulchres of the dead. 
 
 "With equal facility they could impose an arbi- 
 trary interpretation upon a treaty. Thus, when they 
 desired to humble the Khodians, they said they had 
 not previously given them Lycia as a present, but 
 as a friend and ally. 
 
 When one of their generals concluded a peace 
 in order to save his army, which was ready to 
 perish, the senate, declining to ratify it, profited by 
 the peace and continued the war. Thus, when Ju- 
 
 '* This was an inTariable practice, as we may see in the course of 
 their history. 
 
 " See how they conducted themselves in the war with Macedon. 
 
 *" That is, to spare the city taken as a municipal corporation, composed 
 of its inhabitants, laws, and magistrates, as distinguished from the city 
 taken as the assemblage of its houses, &o. — Translator. 
 
CHAP. Ti.] OF THE ROMANS. 139 
 
 gurtha had cooped up a Eoman army, and had al- 
 lowed it to go upon the faith of a treaty, the very 
 troops which he had spared from the sword were 
 employed against him ; and, when the Numantians 
 had reduced twenty thousand Komans — near dying 
 of famine — to ask for peace, that peace, which had 
 saved the lives of so many citizens, was broken at 
 Home, and the public faith was eluded by sending 
 to the enemy the consul who had signed it.'" " 
 
 Sometimes they would treat for peace upon con- 
 ditions which were reasonable ; and, after these were 
 executed, they would add others which were such as 
 to force a renewal of the war. Thus, after they 
 had compelled Jugurtha to give up his elephants, his 
 horses, his treasure, and the deserters who had fled 
 to him, they demanded that he should surrender his 
 own person — a requisition which, being for a prince 
 the last of calamities, can never be made a condition 
 of peace."' 
 
 Finally, they judged kings for their faults and 
 for their private crimes. They heard the com- 
 plaints of all who had controversies with Philip, and 
 
 *' They acted in the same manner with the Samniteg, the Lnsitanians, 
 and the Corsicans. Eespecting these last, see a fragment of the first 
 book of Dion. 
 
 '^ C. Hostillus Mancinus was the consul here alluded to. To the 
 credit of the Numantians, they declined to receive him, and left him at 
 liberty to return to Rome, which he did. — Translator. 
 
 '' They acted in the same manner with Viriathus : after having com- 
 pelled him to surrender the deserters, they demanded that he should sur- 
 render his arms — to which neither he nor his followers could consent. 
 (Fragment of Dion.) 
 
j^^Q GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [MOUTESQurau. 
 
 sent deputies to look after their safety. They caused 
 Perseus to be accused before them for some mur- 
 ders, and for some quarrels with citizens of allied 
 
 towns. 
 
 As the glory of a general was estimated by the 
 quantity of gold and silver which was carried in 
 his triumph, he left nothing to the vanquished enemy. 
 Kome continually grew richer, and each war gave 
 her the means to undertake another. 
 
 All the nations who were her friends or allies 
 ruined themselves by the immense presents which 
 they made in order to retain her favor, or to obtain 
 it in greater measure; and half the money which 
 was sent for such purpose to the Eomans would have 
 sufficed to conquer them." 
 
 Masters of the world, they attributed to them- 
 selves all its wealth. They were ravishers less un- 
 just in their character as conquerors than in their 
 character as legislators. Having learned that Ptol- 
 emy, king of Cyprus, was immensely rich, they 
 enacted a law, in pursuance of the proposition of a 
 tribune, by which they gave to themselves the suc- 
 cession to a living man, and the confiscated estate 
 of a prince who was an ally." 
 
 Soon the cupidity of individuals completed the 
 spoliation of that which had escaped tl^e public 
 avarice. Magistrates and governors sold t\eir in- 
 
 " The presents which the senate sent to kings were mere trinfes, such 
 as a chair and a baton of ivory, or some robe of magistracy. 
 '' Flokus, Book III, ch. jx. 
 
CHAP. Ti.] OF THE ROMANS. 141 
 
 justice to kings. Two competitors would ruin eacli 
 other by their rivalry in the purchase of a protec- 
 tion which was always doubtful against any other 
 rival who was not wholly exhausted; for there was 
 wanting even the justice of brigands, who practice 
 a certain probity in the trade of crime itself. In 
 short, rights legitimate and rights usurped being 
 maintained by means of money alone, princes, in 
 order to obtain it, despoiled temples and confiscated 
 the property of the richer class of citizens. A 
 thousand crimes were committed in order to give to 
 the Komans all the money ia the world. 
 
 But nothing served Kome more effectually than 
 the respect which she inspired among all nations. 
 She immediately reduced king^ to silence, and ren- 
 dered them as dumb. With the latter, it was not a 
 mere question of the degree of their power: their 
 very persons were attacked. To risk a war with 
 Rome was to expose themselves to captivity, to 
 death, and to the infamy of a triumph. Thus it 
 was that kings, who lived in pomp and luxury, did 
 not dare to look with steady eyes upon the Eoman 
 people, and, losing courage, they hoped, by their 
 patience and their obsequiousness, to obtain some 
 postponement of the calamities with which they 
 were menaced." 
 
 Observe, I pray you, the conduct of the Eomans. 
 
 " As much as they could, they concealed their power and their 
 wealth from the Eomans. See, respecting this, a fragment of the first 
 book of Sion. 
 
-^^2 GRANDEUR AKD DECADENCE [MONiESQUiEr. 
 
 After the defeat of Antiochus, they were masters 
 of Africa, of Asia, and of Greece— holding, however, 
 in their own right scarcely any cities in either. It 
 seemed that they only conquered to bestow. But 
 they retained such complete mastery in fact, that 
 whenever they made war upon any king, they threw 
 upon him, so to speak, the weight of the universe. 
 The proper time for seizing conquered countries 
 had not yet arrived. If they had held the cities 
 which they took from Philip, they would have 
 opened the eyes of the Greeks. If after the second 
 Punic- war, or after the war against Antiochus, they 
 had seized the countries of Africa and Asia, they 
 would not have been able to retain conquests so 
 incompletely established." It was necessary to wait 
 until aU nations should become accustomed to obey 
 as free states and as allies before commanding them 
 as subjects, thus leaving them to lose themselves 
 little by little in the Eoman Kepublic. "Witness the 
 treaty which they made with the Latins after the 
 victory which they obtained over the latter near 
 the lake Eegillus.'' This treaty was one of the 
 principal foundations of their power ; and yet we 
 do not find in it a single word which might excite 
 a suspicion of empire. 
 
 ^' They did not dare to expose their colonies in these countries. 
 They preferred to stimulate ceaseless jealousy between the Carthaginians 
 and Masinissa, and to avail themselves of the aid of both in the subju- 
 gation of Macedon and Greece. 
 
 '5 Dionysius of Halicarnassus reports this treaty, Book VI, ch. xct, 
 Oxford edition. 
 
CHAP. VI.] OF THE ROMANS. 143 
 
 This was a slow metHod of conquering. They 
 Tanquished a nation, and contented themselves with 
 weakening it. They imposed conditions npon it 
 which insensibly undermined its power. If it raised 
 itself up, they humbled it yet more ; and thus it be- 
 came subject, without any one being able to fix the 
 epoch of its subjugation. 
 
 Thus Eome was not, properly speaking, either a 
 republic or a monarchy, but the head of a body 
 which was made up of aU the peoples of the world." ^ 
 
 29 [We are yet startled when we consider that nations which are at 
 present such formidable kingdoms — all of Gaul, all of Spain, nearly the 
 whole of Great Britain, lUyria as far as the Danube, Germany as far as 
 the Elbe, Africa as far as her frightful and impenetrable deserts, Greece, 
 Thrace, Syria, Egypt, all the kingdoms of Asia Minor and those which 
 lie between the Euxine and Caspian seas, and others, perhaps, which I 
 cither forget or will not mention — were, during many centuries, no more 
 than Koman provinces. (Bossuet, Disc, mr VSist. univ., troisiSme partie, 
 ch. vi.)] 
 
 *° And it may be added that, as in the sphere of empire this great 
 governing head, the city of Rome, subsidized the physical force and the 
 wealth of so many nations, so, too, in the sphere of intelligence, such 
 purely intellectual distinction as it attained was mainly acquired by sub- 
 sidizing genius from without. It has been justly remarked how few of 
 the Latin authors were natives of Rome. Indeed, the great body of the 
 Latin literature of the classical period was produced by men who were 
 born in the neighboring states of Italy or in the provinces. 
 
 Of the poets, Ennius, " the father of Roman song," was a native of 
 Calabria ; Nsevius was a native of Campania ; Virgil was bom at the 
 village of Andes, near Mantua, in Cisalpine Gaul ; Ovid at Sulmo, in the 
 territory of the Pelignians ; Horace at Venusia, in Apulia ; Martial at 
 Bilbilis, in Spain ; Catullus in the territory of Verona ; Persius at Vola- 
 terrae, in Etruria ; Terence at Carthage ; Lucan at Corduba, in Spain ; 
 Plautus at Sarsina, in Umbria ; and Juvenal is said to have been born at 
 Aquinum, in Latium. TibuUus and Lucretius were bom at Rome. 
 
 Of the prose-writers, Cicero was a native of Arpinum, in Latium ; 
 Livy of Patavium, in Cisalpine Gaul ; Pliny the Elder of Comum or Vero- 
 
H^ GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [MONiESQuiEt;. 
 
 If the Spaniards, after the conquest of Mexico 
 and Peru, had adopted a similar policy, they would 
 not have been obliged to destroy all in order to hold 
 all. 
 
 The desire to force their own laws and customs 
 upon all peoples is the folly of conquerors. Such a 
 policy is utterly worthless ; for men are capable of 
 obeying under every form of government. 
 
 Inasmuch as Eome imposed no general laws, the 
 nations subject to her power were not united among 
 themselves by any dangerous ties. They only consti- 
 tuted one body through a common obedience ; and, 
 without being compatriots, they were all Eomans. 
 
 It will be objected, perhaps, that empires founded 
 upon the laws of fiefs have never been either dura- 
 ble or powerful. But there are no two things in 
 the world more opposite than were the polity of the 
 Eomans and that of the barbarians ; and, to give but 
 a word to these respective schemes of government— 
 
 na, in the same province ; Pliny the Younger of Comum ; Sallast of Ami- 
 tumum, in the territory of the Sabines ; Quintilian of Calligurris, in 
 Spain ; Seneca of Corduba, in the same province ; and Tacitua is com- 
 monly supposed to have been born at Interamna, in Umbria. Csesar and 
 Varro were natives of Rome. (See Anthon's Clas. Die, art. Unnius, 
 etc.) 
 
 It may be that the number of the men of genius produced by Rome 
 bears some such relation to the number of those who took their origin 
 without as the population of the city bore to the aggregate population of 
 the outlying towns in which letters had taken some hold. But the facts 
 stated mean more. In harmony with the like experience in modern 
 times, they concur in showing that great cities have no special aptitude 
 for giving birth to great men, and that they rather serve as theatres for 
 the display of genius than as nurseries for its production. — Teanslaioe. 
 
CHAP. Yi.] OF THE ROMANS. 145 
 
 the first was the work of strength, the other of 
 weakness ; in the one subjection was extreme, in the 
 other independence. In the countries which were 
 conquered by the Germanic nations, the power of 
 the state was in the hands of vassals, the right only 
 in the hands of princes. The case was completely 
 the reverse with the Eomans, 
 
146 GKANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakeb. 
 
 i;rOTE BY THE TEANSLATOE. 
 
 We find in the preceding chapter a masterly state- 
 ment of the principal elements of what, in modem 
 phrase, may be termed the foreign policy of the Eo- 
 mans — that low, selfish, but exceedingly consistent 
 and able policy, which, in the circumstances of the 
 ancient world, was best calculated to conduct them to 
 empire. There was one custom, however — intimately 
 connected with this policy — which naerits more atten- 
 tion than is given to it in the text, inasmuch as it 
 supplies an exceptionally excellent illustration of the 
 semi -savage military spirit which characterized the 
 ancient nations in general and the Eomans in a spe- 
 cial manner. I allude to that Triumph which was so 
 much dreaded by kings and princes. When this usage 
 is studied in connection with the analogous war cus- 
 toms of the true savage, a close kinship is at once 
 detected ; and so important is the triumph, as a means 
 of helping to a correct idea of the Eoman type of 
 civilization, that I will here insert a description of it 
 at some length, drawn with admirable care and learn- 
 ing from many ancient sources: 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. liT 
 
 "The triumplial procession began from the Cam- 
 pus Martins, and went from thence along the Via 
 Triumphalis, through the Campus and Circus Flam- 
 inius to the Porta Triumphalis, and thence through 
 the most public places of the city to the capitol. 
 
 "The streets were strewed with flowers, and the 
 altars smoked with incense. 
 
 "First went musicians of various kinds, singing 
 • and playing triumphal songs ; next were led the oxen 
 to be sacrificed, having their horns gilt, and their heads 
 adorned with fiUets and garlands; then in carriages 
 were brought the spoils taken from the enemy — stat- 
 ues, pictures, plate, armor, gold and silver, and brass ; 
 also, golden crowns, and other gifts sent by the allied 
 and tributary states. The titles of the vanquished 
 nations were inscribed on wooden frames, and the 
 images or representations of the conquered countries, 
 cities, &c. The captive leaders followed in chains, 
 with their children and attendants ; after the captives 
 came the Hctors, having their fasces wreathed with 
 laurel, followed by a great company of musicians and 
 dancers, dressed like satyrs, and wearing crowns of 
 gold : in the midst of whom was a pantomime, clothed 
 in a female garb, whose business it was, with his 
 looks and gestures, to insult the vanquished. Next 
 followed a long train of persons carrying perfumes. 
 Then came the general (Dux), dressed in purple em- 
 broidered with gold, with a crown of laurel on his 
 head, a branch of laurel in his right hand, and in his 
 
148 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakek. 
 
 left an ivory sceptre, with an eagle on the top, having 
 his face painted with vermilion, in like manner as the 
 statue of Jupiter on festival days, and a golden ball 
 hanging from his neck on his breast, with some amu- 
 let in it, or magical preservative against envy, standing 
 in a gilded chariot adorned with ivory, and drawn by 
 four white horses, at least after the time of Camillus, 
 sometimes by elephants, attended by his relations, and 
 a great crowd of citizens all in white. His children ■ 
 used to ride in the chariot along with him, and, that 
 he might not be too much elated, a slave, carrying a 
 golden crown, sparkling with gems, stood behind him, 
 who frequently whispered in his ear, Kemembee That 
 Thou Aet A Man ! After the general, followed the 
 consuls and senators on foot, at least according to the 
 appointment of Augustus; for formerly they used to 
 go before him. His legati and military tribunes com- 
 monly rode by his side. 
 
 " The victorious army, horse and foot, came last, 
 all in their order, crowned with laurel, and deco- 
 rated with the gifts which they had received for 
 their valor, singing their own and their general's 
 praises ; but sometimes throwing out railleries against 
 him, often exclaiming lo TEroMPHE, in which all the 
 citizens, as they passed along, joined. 
 
 "The general, when he began to turn his chariot 
 from the forum to the capitol, ordered the captive 
 kings and leaders of the enemy to be led to prison, 
 and there to be slain, but not always ; and when he 
 
NOTE.] OF TEE EOMANS. 149 
 
 reached the capitol, he used to wait till he heard 
 that these savage orders were executed." ' 
 
 Upon analyzing this representation, it is seen, on 
 the one hand, that the display of the spoils of the 
 enemy — ^the coarse exultation of the conquering chief 
 — the red war-paint with which his face was covered 
 — ^the cruel insult and mockery inflicted upon the 
 disarmed and powerless captives — and the admitted 
 right, sometimes at least exercised, of slaying these 
 captives as a part of the performance — are strictly 
 savage elements; whilst, on the other hand, the re- 
 sources of art which entered into the spectacle, the 
 forethought, the purpose of great and permanent 
 empire with which it was associated, evince a cul- 
 ture much more than savage. And thus the Tri- 
 umph declares the status of Eome to have been 
 what it reaUy was — an intermediate state between 
 pure savagery and the more advanced civilization 
 which has succeeded. 
 
 It is this hard military character of the Eomans, 
 combined with their relentless policy of conquest, 
 that has given rise to the greatest difficulty in set- 
 tling their true historical value — the judgments of 
 eminent writers fluctuating between the opposite 
 opinions that they were a great beneflt and a great 
 curse to the interests of humanity. With a view 
 to clearing up, or at least diminishing this difficulty, 
 I have already devoted some part of these Notes 
 
 ' Adam's Roman Antiquities, Phila., 18'72, pp. 265, 266. 
 
150 GEANDEUK AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 to the purpose of presenting an idea of tlie Tnain 
 function wMcli the Eomans performed in nniversal 
 history; and I will here add something further in 
 the same direction. 
 
 Correct conceptions of such national functions, or, 
 in other words, correct conceptions of the "world- 
 historical" values of different peoples, belong to the 
 highest results of rational history; and, in the ab- 
 sence of such conceptions, our historical knowledge, 
 however complete in details and in lesser generaliza- 
 tions, remains essentially superficial. "We need to 
 know what distinctive service each of the historical 
 peoples has rendered to civilization in general. The 
 whole of human history is to be viewed as a vast 
 movement in the direction of an ideally perfect civ- 
 ilization ; and particular nations are to be valued ac- 
 cording to the influence which they exert upon this 
 movement. Waiving the difficult and obscure ques- 
 tion whether or not there are peoples whose values 
 are purely retardative, it is certain, at all events, that 
 the best contributions to human development so far 
 have been chiefly due to a comparatively small part 
 of the total race. Take away what has been done 
 by the Aryan family, and by the small Judaic sec- 
 tion of the Semitic family, and the civilization of 
 the world becomes wonderfully impoverished. 
 
 Of the Aryan stock in ancient Europe, the 
 Greeks were pre-eminent for thought and art, the 
 Eomans for action. The distinctive genius of the 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 151 
 
 one was eminently theoretical — everywliere seeking 
 universality in idea and perfection in taste ; the dis- 
 tinctive genius of the other was intensely practical — 
 everywhere seeking universality of empire. One 
 great consequence which has proceeded from this 
 difEerence is, that the Greeks have left an unchal- 
 lenged reputation as rich contributors to the world's 
 store of civilization, whilst the repute of the Eomans 
 in this respect is by no means so unequivocal. 
 
 As transcendent thinkers and artists, the prodig- 
 ious impulse which the Greeks gave to the world's 
 thought and sesthetic feeling is a fact so singularly 
 attractive in itself, and so obviously beneficent in its 
 nature, that all agree in assigning to it a very high 
 positive value. As transcendent actors, on the other 
 hand, the Eomans were the great disturbers of the an- 
 cient world — everywhere beating down, often destroy- 
 ing, and always pursuing a policy of conquest which 
 was thoroughly selfish and unscrupulous. It hence 
 follows that our idea of their work will vary, accord- 
 ingly as we set more store upon the worse or the 
 better results of their action. Under the first aspect, 
 they are to be viewed as cruel and remorseless con- 
 querors — so cunning with all their pride, so secretive 
 with all their professed openness of character, so 
 double-dealing with all their boasted regard for good 
 faith, that their proceedings often rivalled the most 
 unworthy passages that are to be found in the an- 
 nals of human meanness. Under the second aspect. 
 
152 GKANDEUK AND DECADENCE [bakbb. 
 
 they are to be viewed as the agents by whom a civ- 
 ilization made up of scattered nuclei, and character- 
 ized for small social ideas, small policies, small an- 
 tagonisms, and small industrial development, was 
 transmuted into a civihzation vastly larger in its 
 physical connections and social conceptions, and at 
 the same time much more pacific and industrial in 
 its character. "We have here a result of such pri- 
 mary importance, that it seems judicious to say that 
 it overbalances the immense debit side of the ac- 
 count, and thus admits the Eomans to the distinc- 
 tion of having imparted — in a manner however dif- 
 ferent from that of the Greeks — a great and funda- 
 mental impulse to the world's civilization. 
 
 As a justification of the analysis just made, it is 
 curious and instructive to notice the two different 
 classes of terms which distinguished writers have 
 employed to express their most general idea of the 
 part which the Eomans performed in history. 
 
 Mainly influenced, it would seem, by the first of 
 the foregoing views. Dr. Robertson says : " The 
 martial and independent spirit which had distin- 
 guished their ancestors became, in a great measure, 
 extinct among all the people subjected to the Eoman 
 yoke; they lost not only the habit but even the 
 capacity of deciding for themselves, or of acting 
 from the impulse of their own minds; and the do- 
 minion of the Eomans, like that of all great em- 
 pires, degraded and debased the human species." 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 153 
 
 Quite in the same vein is the language of Abb6 
 Eaynal in reference to the influence exerted by the 
 Roman sway : " Their despotism, their military gov- 
 ernment, oppressed the nations, extinguished genius, 
 and degraded the human race." And BucMe seems 
 to be influenced chiefly by the same side of the case 
 when he speaks of the Eomans as — " The scourges 
 and oppressors of the world, whom a false and 
 ignorant sympathy has invested with noble qualities 
 which they never possessed." 
 
 Not to go further, Gibbon and Comte, pn the 
 other hand — with what I take for better reason — 
 appear to regard the second of the foregoing views 
 as the leading element of a correct historical valu- 
 ation. " Whatever evils," says the great historian, 
 "either reason or declamation has imputed to ex- 
 tensive empire, the power of Home was attended 
 with same beneficial consequences to mankind; and 
 the same freedom of intercourse which extended the 
 vices difiused likewise the improvements of social 
 life." . And Comte supplies a much more definite 
 and Compi-ehensive appreciation of the value of the 
 Eomans upon the plane of the world's history : 
 " Bom to command in order to assimilate — destined 
 to extinguish irrevocably, by their universal ascend- 
 ant, that sterile military activity which threatened 
 indefinitely to prolong the decomposition of human- 
 ity into small antagonistic peoples, who only agreed 
 with each other in delaying the general rise of a 
 
154 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakee. 
 
 fundamental civilization — this noble people, notwith- 
 standing their immense imperfections, certainly mani- 
 fested, in a high degree, that assemblage of qualities 
 which were best adapted to such a mission — a mis- 
 sion which, inasmuch as it could never reproduce 
 itself, nor consequently permit a new eclat of the 
 same kind, will necessarily perpetuate their name to 
 whatever age the political life of our species may be 
 prolonged." ' 
 
 It is chiefly to the fact that the Komans united 
 a multitude of small hostile states in a single great 
 one of comparative internal peace and order, and to 
 the further fact that the powerful state thus consti- 
 tuted stood for ages as a barrier to, and a modifier 
 of, the ancient barbarism of northern Europe and 
 northwestern Asia, that we must look for a rational 
 conception of the highest and best part which these 
 conquerors performed in the world's history.' 
 
 ^ See Comte's Philosophie Positive, Paris, 1809, torn, t, pp. 198, 194 ; 
 Gibbon's Rome, New York, 1870, vol. i, p. 65 ; Buckle's Hist, of Civ. in 
 England, New York, 1870, vol. ii, p. 129 ; Eaynal's Histoire PUlosophiqm 
 des deux Indes, Paris, 1783, torn, i, p. 8 ; Robertson's Charles V, Phila., 
 1812, vol. i, p. 2. 
 
 ^ See my Note at the end of Chapter V. 
 
MONiESQUiEn.] OF THE ROMANS. 155 
 
 CHAPTEE yil. 
 
 MITHBIDATES HOW HE WAS ABLE TO EESIST THE EOMANS. 
 
 Of all the kings whom the Romans attacked, 
 Mithridates alone defended himself with courage, and 
 placed them in peril. The situation of his states was 
 admirable for the prosecution of war against Eome. 
 They ^touched upon the inaccessible countries of the 
 Caucasus, filled with fierce nations which he could 
 summon to his service; and thence they extended 
 along the shores of the Pontus - Euxine. This sea 
 Mithridates covered with his fleets, by means of 
 which he was enabled continually to bring in new 
 armies of Scythian mercenaries. Asia was open to 
 his incursions; and — ^inasmuch as his cities upon the 
 Euxine carried on an advantageous commerce with 
 the less industrious nations — he was rich. 
 
 Proscription — of which the practice commenced 
 at this time— compelled many Eomans to abandon 
 their country. These Mithridates received with open 
 arms. He formed legions in which he placed them, 
 and which constituted his best troops.' 
 
 ' Frontinus (Straiac/erm, Book II) aay3 that Archelaua, lieutenant of 
 Mithridates, engaged against Sylla, placed his scythe-chariots in the first 
 
■j^gg GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquied. 
 
 On the other hand, Kome, embarrassed by her 
 civil dissensions, and occupied with ills more press- 
 ing, neglected the affairs of Asia, and left Mithri- 
 dates to pursue his victories, or to recuperate after 
 his defeats. 
 
 ITothing had contributed more to the ruin of 
 most of the kings than the desire which they had 
 manifested for peace. They had thus discouraged all 
 other peoples from sharing with them in a danger 
 from which they had shovTn so marked an inclinar 
 tion to withdraw themselves. But Mithridates at 
 once caused it to be everywhere felt that he was an 
 enemy of the Eomans, and that he would always be 
 such. 
 
 Finally, the cities of Greece and Asia, finding 
 that the Koman yoke grew heavier upon them every 
 day, gave their confidence to this barbaric king," who 
 called them to liberty. 
 
 rank, hia phalanx in the second, and in the third his auxiliaries armed in 
 the Roman manner : Mixtis fugitivk Italice, quorum pervicacice mullum 
 fidehat. Mithridates even formed an alliance with Sertorius. See Plu- 
 tarch, lAfe of Lucullus. 
 
 ' It seems probable that few contemporary Romans were superior, and 
 not many equal, to this " barbaric king " in mental culture. He is said 
 to have given " great attention to the study of philosophy and polite 
 literature," and to have been " able to converse in twenty-two different 
 languages " — which would apparently make him the linguistic superior of 
 Sir William Jones, whose number of really conquered languages appears 
 to have been but sixteen — but would yet leave him greatly the inferior of 
 Mezzofanti, who "understood and spoke fifty-eight different tongues, 
 and whom Byron might well describe as " a walking polyglot, a monster 
 of languages, and a Briareus of parts of speech." (Anthon's Clas. Die-, 
 art. Mithridates ; Lord Teigumouth's lAfe of Sir Wm. Jones, Phila., 1803, 
 pp. 385, 386 ; Chambers' Enc., art. Mezzofanii.) — Tkanslator. 
 
CHAP. Til.] OF THE ROMANS. 157 
 
 This disposition of affairs gaye rise to three great 
 wars, which form one of the finest parts of Eoman 
 history ; for we do not here contemplate princes al- 
 ready conquered by liixury and pride — as was the 
 case with Antiochus and Tygranes — nor yet by their 
 fears — as we see in the instances of Philip, Perseus, 
 and Jugurtha; but we behold a magnanimous king, 
 who, in the midst of adversities — ^like the lion that 
 looks at his wounds — was only rendered the more 
 resolute and indignant. 
 
 These were singular wars; for during their con- 
 tinuance rerolutions were incessant and always unex- 
 pected. If, on the one hand, Mithridates could easily 
 replenish his armies, it happened on the other, when 
 reverses took place, and when consequently there 
 was most need of obedience and discipline, that his 
 barbaric troops abandoned him. If he had the art 
 of winning nations, and of iuducing cities to revolt, 
 he in his turn experienced perfidy on the part of 
 his generals, his children, and his wives; and if at 
 times he had incompetent Roman commanders to 
 deal with, he was confronted at other times by 
 Sylla, LucuUus, and Pompey. 
 
 After having beaten the Eoman generals, and 
 achieved the conquest of Asia, Macedon, and Greece, 
 this prince was vanquished in his turn by Sylla, 
 and reduced by treaty to his ancient limits. Har- 
 assed still by the Roman commanders, he became a 
 second time their conqueror, and the conqueror of 
 
]^58 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 Asia. Driven before Lucullus, lie was followed into 
 his own country, and compelled to fly to the court 
 of Tygranes; and, seeing the latter ruined without 
 resource after the defeat to which he too was sub- 
 jected, and relying solely upon himself, he took refuge 
 in his own states, and there re-established himself. 
 
 Pompey succeeded Lucullus, and Mithridates was 
 overwhelmed. He fled from his own states. Cross- 
 ing the Araxes, he marched from peril to perU through 
 the country of the Lazians; and, assembling the bar- 
 barians whom he found along the line of his route, 
 he appeared in Bosporus, before his son Machares, 
 who had made his peace with the Komans.' 
 
 In the abyss in which he found himself, Mithri- 
 dates formed the design of carrying the war into 
 Italy — of marching to Eome at the head of the same 
 nations who subjugated the empire some centuries 
 later — and by the same road which they took.* Be- 
 trayed by Pharnaces, another of his sons, abandoned 
 by an army which was alarmed at the greatness of 
 his enterprises and deterred by the dangers which 
 he was about to seek, he died as a king.' 
 
 It was then that Pompey, by the rapid succes- 
 sion of his victories, completed the pompous work 
 of Eoman aggrandizement. He added immense 
 countries to the body of the empire — countries, how- 
 
 ' Mithridates had made him king of Bosporus. On hearing of the 
 arrival of his father, he liilled himself. 
 
 ■■ See Appian, De Bdlo Mihridatico, eh. cix. 
 
 ' He committed suicide, to avoid capture. — Translatob. 
 
CHAP, vii.] OF THE ROMANS. 169 
 
 ever, which contributed more to the spectacle of its 
 magnificence than to the real measure of its force; 
 and, although it appeared by the placards which 
 were borne in his triumph that he had augmented 
 the revenues of his country by more than one third, 
 yet, in fact, the actual power of the state was not 
 increased, whilst public liberty was only the more 
 endangered.' 
 
 ' See Plutarch, in the lAfe of Pompey ; and Zonaras, Book II. 
 
IQQ GKANDETJR AND DECADENCE [bakee. 
 
 NOTE BY THE TEANSLATOE, 
 
 MiTHEiDATES was one of tlie most extraordinary 
 men with whom we meet in the whole course of 
 Eoman history. Cicero, who was his contemporary, 
 reckons him to have been, after Alexander, the 
 greatest of the kings ; ' and in another place attrib- 
 utes to him the distinction of having been indisput- 
 ably the foremost of all the kings with whom the 
 Eoman people had waged war." Next to Hannibal, 
 he appears to have been the most formidable enemy 
 with whom republican Eome had to deal; and, had 
 the material of his armies been equal to that which 
 composed the phalanxes of Greece, the legions of 
 Eome, or the columns of the Carthaginians during 
 the second Punic war, it is easily within the range 
 of rational conception that his role as a warrior or 
 conqueror might have ranked in history with those 
 of Hannibal, Csesar, and Alexander. But the marked 
 and ever-recurring inferiority of the Asiatic infantry 
 
 "... ille rex post Alexandrum maximus. Acad. Qucesl,, lib. secun- 
 du3, 1. 
 
 "... omnibus regihus, guihuscum populiis Romanus hellvm gessU, 
 hunc regem nimirum antcpones. Pro Murena, cap. 10. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 161 
 
 to that of Europe made it impossible for any leader, 
 however great his ability, to effectually resist the ex- 
 pansion of the Eoman power into Asia. 
 
 Tor five-and-twenty years, with small interrup- 
 tions, Mithridates kept up the struggle with Eome; 
 defeating and being defeated; rallying from disaster 
 and reinstating himself with astonishing genius and 
 energy; until at length, reduced to extremity, he 
 formed the daring design to which Montesquieu re- 
 fers in the text. This was — to march from the north 
 and east of the Euxine to Gaul, and thence, with the 
 added forces which he might assemble on his route, 
 and with the still additional aid of the disaffected 
 Gauls, descend upon northern Italy, availing himself, 
 furthermore, of all disaffeetions towards Korae which 
 he might find among the Italian peoples — ^repeating 
 thus, in a modified form, the great movement of 
 Hannibal.' 
 
 At the time Hannibal executed his feat he was 
 about twenty-nine years of age; at the time Mithri- 
 dates resolved to execute his, he was about sixty-eight. 
 
 The education of Mithridates was Grecian, and he 
 appears to have excelled all the monarchs of his time 
 in mental culture. According to the description given 
 of him by Appian, he was endowed with a magnificent 
 physique. He was great in size, powerful, and active ; 
 he drove eight pair of horses before his car; and he 
 was able to ride^by means of a relay of horses — one 
 ' See Appian, De Bella Miihridatico, ch. 109. 
 
IQ2 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakeb. 
 
 thousand stadia in a day^ — a distance equal to about 
 one hundred and fifteen English miles. He evidently 
 belonged to the Nimrod rather than to the Sardana- 
 palus type of Asiatic despots. 
 
 For the rest, Mithridates seems to have united 
 Tillanous criminality with his great ability. Appian 
 accuses him of having murdered his mother, his 
 brother, three sons, and as many daughters ; " and he 
 is, moreover, doubtfully accused of having ordered 
 that general massacre of Koman citizens in Asia, the 
 victims of which are variously stated at 80,000 or 
 150,000 persons. In presence of such deeds — whether 
 certain or doubtful — ^history is constrained to acquiesce 
 in his overthrow — despite his eminent genius and his 
 heroic resistance of Home. 
 
 After the prostration of the power of Mithridates, 
 the door to Asia was flung wide open to the Eomans ; 
 and the greatly increased spoils thence transported to 
 Eome hastened the corruption in which the republic 
 was so soon to perish. 
 
 * Ibid., ch. 112. 
 
 ' E>-af autem o-udelis in omnes et sanguinarius ; mairis fraimqw 
 interfector, et trium filiorum acfiliarum totidem. (Ibid.) 
 
MONTESQUIEU.] OF THE KOMANS. 163 
 
 CHAPTEJl YIII. 
 
 OF THE DIT1SI0N8 "WHICH CONSTANTLY EXISTED IN THE 
 CITY OF EOME. 
 
 Dheing the time that Eome was conquering the 
 world, a hidden war was going on inside her own 
 walls. The fires which burned within her bosom, 
 like those of volcanoes, burst forth whenever any 
 exciting cause presented itself to increase their ac- 
 tivity.' 
 
 ' Machiavelli attributes Koman liberty to the incessant struggle here 
 referred to between the upper and the lower classes. He says "two 
 diverse humors " exist in all cities, which derive their origin from the 
 fact " that the people desire to be neither commanded nor oppressed by 
 the great, whilst the great desire to command and oppress the people " ; 
 and, speaking of the Romans in particular, he adds : " Those who con- 
 demn the tumults between the Nobles and the Plebs appear to me to 
 blame the very things which were the first cause of the maintenance of 
 Koman liberty, and to looli more to the uproar and the outcries which 
 attended these tumults than to the good effects which they produced, 
 and not to consider how it is that there are in every republic two diverse 
 humors — that of the people and that of the great — ^from the disagree- 
 ment of which proceed all the laws which are made in favor of liberty, 
 as we may readily see was the case in Kome ; for, from the time of the 
 Tarquins to the time of the Gracchi, which was more than three hundred 
 years, the tumults of Rome rarely led to exile, and very rarely to the 
 shedding of blood. Neither can these tumults be regarded as mis- 
 chievous, nor a republic as divided, which, by reason of its dissensions 
 
^Qj. GRANDETJK AND DECADENCE [montesqtjief. 
 
 After tlie expxilsion of the kings, the govera- 
 ment became an aristocracy. The patrician famihes 
 alone obtained all the magistracies, all the dignities," 
 and consequently aU the civil and military honors of 
 the state.' 
 
 Desii'ing to prevent the return of the kings, the 
 patricians sought to strengthen the revolutionary 
 movement which had taken place in the popular 
 mind. But, in accomplishing this purpose, they did 
 more than they intended; for, while imparting to 
 the people a hatred for kings, they imparted to them 
 an immoderate desire for liberty ; and, inasmuch as 
 the entire authority of the kings had passed into the 
 hands of the consuls, the people felt that they had 
 not obtained that liberty, the love of which the pa- 
 tricians had so much encouraged. They sought, there- 
 fore, to lessen the power of the consulate, to ob- 
 tain plebeian magistrates, and to share the curule 
 offices with the patricians. 
 
 The latter were forced to concede aU that the 
 
 during so long a period of time, sent into exile not more than eight or 
 ten of its citizens, put Tery few of them to death, nor even imposed a 
 pecuniary fine upon many." (Discorsi, Jib. i, cap. ir.) 
 
 The " two diverse humors " of Maohiavelli presents an idea which 
 goes deep and extends far. Everywhere liberty has been the result of 
 sharp self-assertion on the part of the people ; and everywhere, when 
 this has been wanting, " the great " have absorbed the powers of the 
 state.— Translator. 
 
 ' The patricians had even in some sort a sacred character; they 
 only could take the auspices. See in Livy, Boot VI, chs. xl, xli, the 
 harangue of Appius Claudius. 
 
 ^ For example, they only could have the honors of a triumph, since 
 they only could be consuls and command armies. 
 
CHAP. Till.] OF THE ROMANS. 165 
 
 people demanded; for, in a city in which poverty 
 was public virtue, and in which wealth — that stupid 
 means to power — was despised, birth and dignities 
 could give no great advantage. It was necessary, 
 therefore, that the power of the state should return 
 to the greatest number, and that the aristocratic 
 should be gradually changed into a popular form of 
 government. 
 
 Those who obey a king are less tormented by 
 jealousy and envy than the citizens of a country 
 governed by an hereditary aristocracy. A monarch is 
 so distant from his subjects that he is seldom seen, 
 and he is so far above them that they cannot im- 
 agine any likeness between him and themselves 
 which is ' capable of being a source of offense to 
 them ; but the nobles who govern a country are 
 under the eyes of everybody; and they are not so 
 elevated but that odious comparisons are continually 
 made. Accordingly, it has been the experience of 
 all past ages, as it is of the present, that the people 
 detest aristocrats. Republics, in which birth con- 
 fers no part in the government, are in this respect 
 the most happy; for the people feel less envy of 
 an authority which they themselves bestow upon 
 whom they will, and which they can resume at 
 their pleasure. 
 
 The people of Rome, being dissatisfied with the 
 patricians, withdrew to the Mons Sacer.* Deputies 
 
 ' A ridge of hillg, lying about three miles outside the city, beyond the 
 little river Anio, and called sacred mount, not at the time, but from the 
 
1QQ GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesotieu. 
 
 were sent by the other party, who succeeded in ap- 
 peasing them; and, since they all promised mutual 
 assistance to each other in case the patricians should 
 not observe their pledges ' — a means of defense which 
 would have led to seditions at every instant, thus 
 disturbing all the functions of the state — - it was 
 thought best to create a magistracy whose duty it 
 should be to prevent injustice from being done to 
 the plebeians." But, by an eternal infirmity of 
 human nature, the plebeians, who had obtained 
 Tribunes for defense, employed them for attack.' 
 Little by little they wrested from the patricians a 
 share in all their prerogatives — a course of proced- 
 ure which gave rise to contiaual dissensions in the 
 state. In these contests the people were sustained, 
 or rather animated, by their tribunes, whilst the 
 patricians were defended by the senate — which body, 
 being composed almost wholly of patricians, was 
 governed more by the ancient maxims, and influ- 
 enced by a fear that the populace would elevate 
 some tribune to the tyranny. 
 
 On their part, the people resorted to their own 
 
 circumstance that it was subsequently dedicated to Jupiter. (Livy, Book 
 11, ch. 32 ; Ferguson's Horn. Rep., ch. ii ; Anthon's Clas. Die., art. Mons 
 Sacet:) — Translator. ' 
 
 ' Zonaras, i, ii. 
 
 * This was the origin of the Tribunes of the people. 
 
 '' So far from being an infirmity, the property of human nature here 
 referred to is, at bottom, one of its noblest endowments j it is that prop- 
 erty which aspires to an equality of rights among men, and which im- 
 parts to the world's civilization a slow, interrupted, but ever-recurring 
 movement in the direction of Democracy. — Tuanslatob. 
 
CHAP, vm.] OF THE ROMANS. 167 
 
 proper force, and made use of tlieir superiority in 
 the BufErage ; they refused to go to war, and threat- 
 ened to withdraw; they availed themselves of the 
 partiality of their laws,' and passed judgments of con- 
 demnation against those who resisted their demands 
 too strenuously. The senate, on the other hand, de- 
 fended itself by its wisdom, its justice, and the love 
 of country which it inspired; by the benefactions 
 which it dispensed, and the wise application which it 
 made of the public funds ; by the respect which the 
 people had for the glory of the principal families 
 and the virtues of great personages;" by the influ- 
 ence of religion, the prestige of ancient institutions, 
 and the suppression of days of public assemblage 
 under pretext that the auspices had not been favor- 
 able; by the hold which it had upon its clients, by 
 the opposition of one tribune to another, and by the 
 creation of a dictator;" by the diverting influence of 
 
 ' That is, of the plebiscites, originally a sort of " by-laws," made by, 
 and applicable to, the pleba alone, but afterwards so extended in their 
 operation as to affect the other orders of the state. (See Cooper's Jus- 
 tinian, Phila., 1812, p. x; and Ferguson's Bom. Mep., ch. ii.) — ^Trans- 
 lator. 
 
 ' The people, who loved glory, and who were composed of men who 
 had passed their lives in war, could not refuse their suffrages to a great 
 man under whom they had fought. They obtained the right to elect 
 plebeians, and they elected patricians. Whilst providing that there 
 should always be one plebeian consul, they were obliged to tie their own 
 bands ; for the plebeian families also, who were once placed in office, 
 were continually elected thereto afterwards ; and, when the people ele- 
 vated .some man of little worth, as Varro or Marius, it was a species of 
 victory which they achieved over themselves. 
 
 " As a means of defending themselves, the patricians resorted to the 
 expedient of creating a dictator. This succeeded admirably; but the 
 
158 GKANDEUK AND DECADENCE [montesquiep. 
 
 a new war, or the quieting effect of calamities whidi 
 reunite all interests; by a paternal condescension in 
 according to the people a part of their demands in 
 order to induce them to abandon others ; and, finally, 
 by the constant maxim of preferring the preservation 
 of the Kepublic to the prerogatives of any order or 
 of any magistracy whatever. 
 
 In the course of time, when the plebeians had so 
 far humbled the patricians that the distinction be- 
 tween the two had become a vain thing," and when 
 patricians and plebs were indiSerently elevated to 
 the honors of office, new disputes arose among the 
 common people. They were agitated on the one 
 hand by the tribunes, and on the other by the prin- 
 cipal patrician and plebeian families, who were now 
 called nobles, and who were supported by the senate 
 — which body was composed of them. But, inas- 
 much as the ancient maiiners_Jaad_disappeared, as 
 private individuals possessed immense fortunes, and 
 as it is impossible that wealth should not give power, 
 the nobles resisted with more force than the patri- 
 cians had done ; and this was the cause of the death 
 of the Gracchi, and of many others who acted upon 
 their principles.'" 
 
 plebeians — having obtained the right to be elected to the consulate- 
 could also be chosen as dictators ; and this disconcerted the patricians. 
 See in Livy, Book VIII, how Publius Pliilo humbled them during his 
 dictatorship. He made three laws which were very prejudicial to them. 
 
 " The patricians only retained some sacerdotal offices, and the right 
 of creating the magistrate, who was called Irderrex. 
 
 '^ As Saturninus and Glaucias. 
 
CHAP. VIII.] OF THE ROMANS. 169 
 
 It is necessary that I should here say something 
 of a magistracy which contributed much to maintain 
 the government of Eome. It was that of the cen- 
 sors. These magistrates were charged with the duty 
 of taking the census of the people ; and, in addition , 
 to this, inasmuch as the strength of the republic con- , 
 sisted in discipline, in austerity of manners, and in 
 the constant observance of certain customs, they cor- 
 rected such abuses as the law had not foreseen, or 
 those which the ordinary magistrate could not pun- 
 ish." There are bad examples which are worse than 
 crimes; and more states have perished by reason of 
 a departure from wholesome manners than from a 
 violation of the laws. At Home, domestic and pub- 
 lie disorders — everything that threatened to introduce 
 dangerous novelties, or to change the heart or the 
 spirit of the citizen — and, if I may so say, whatever 
 tended to prevent the perpetuation of relapses from 
 the ancient manners — belonged to the jurisdiction of 
 the censors. They could drive from the senate 
 whom they would; they could take from an eques- 
 trian the horse which was kept for him at the public 
 expense ; they could place a citizen in. another tribe, 
 and even among those who paid the expenses of the 
 city without having any share in its privileges." 
 
 " We may observe how the censors degraded those who, after the 
 battle of Cannae, advised the abandonment of Italy — those who surren- 
 dered to Hannibal — and those who, by a disingenuous interpretation, had 
 broken the parol which they had given him. 
 
 " This was called cerarium aliquem facere aut in cwrimm tabulaa 
 8 
 
170 GRANDEUE AND DECADENCE [MONiESQiimT. 
 
 M. Livy even took notice of the masses of tlie peo- 
 ple themselves; and, out of thirty-five tribes, he 
 placed thirty-foTir in the rank of those who had 
 no share in the privileges of the city." "For," said 
 he, "after having condemned me, yon have made 
 me consul and censor: it must be, therefore, that 
 you have once betrayed your trust, by inflicting a 
 punishment upon me, or that you have twice be- 
 trayed it, in first creating me consul and then cen- 
 sor." M. Duronius, a tribime of the people, was 
 driven from the senate by the censors, for the reason 
 that daring his magistracy he had abrogated the law 
 which limited the expenses of banquets." 
 
 The censorship was a very wise institution. These 
 officers could not, however, deprive any one of a mag- 
 istracy, for that would have interrupted the .exercise 
 of the public power;" but they struck down order 
 and rank, and deprived the citizen, so to speak, of his 
 personal nobility. 
 
 Servius Tullius had made that famous division by 
 Centuries, which Livy " and Dionysius of Halicarnas- 
 sus " have so weU explained. He had distributed one 
 hundred and ninety-three centuries into six classes, 
 and placed all the common people in the last, century, 
 which alone formed the sixth class. We see that this 
 
 refen-e. The citizen wag removed from his century, and had no longer 
 the right of suffrage. " Livy, Book XXIX, ch. 37. 
 
 " Valerius Maximus, Book II, ch. 9. 
 
 " The dignity of Senator was not a magistracy. 
 
 '8 Book I, ch. 43. " Book IV, art. 16 d seq. 
 
CHAP, vni.] OP THE ROMANS. 171 
 
 arrangement excluded the masses of the people from 
 the sufirage— not in point of law, hut as a matter of 
 
 fact." 
 
 In the course of time it was provided that, except 
 in some particular cases, the exercise of the right of 
 suffrage should follow the division hy Tribes. There 
 were thirty-five tribes, four in the city and thirty-one 
 in the country, each of which, voting as a tribe, cast 
 one vote. The principal citizens, who were all labor- 
 ers, entered naturally into the country tribes, whilst 
 those of the city received the meaner sort of the peo- 
 ple," who, being confined to the town, exercised very 
 little influence upon affairs. This arrangement was 
 regarded as the salvation of the repubUc ; and, when 
 Fabius replaced in the four tribes of the city those 
 inferior people whom Appius Claudius had distributed 
 through all, he thereby acquired the surname of Maxi- 
 mus." 
 
 Every five years the censors examined into the 
 actual condition of the republic, and so distributed 
 the people in their different tribes that the tribunes 
 and ambitious aspirants could not render themselves 
 masters of the baUot, and that the people themselves 
 could not make an abusive use of their own power." 
 
 '" See my Note at the end of this chapter. — ^Tbanslatob. 
 
 '' Called turba foremis. 
 
 »» See Livy, Book IX, eh. 46. 
 
 '^ [The functiona of the censors were not limited to this examination 
 and moral distribution of the individuals who composed the republic. 
 They also took the census of the people ; and, " by this means," says 
 
172 GRANDEUE AND DECADENCE [montesquieit. 
 
 The government of Eome was admirable in this 
 — that from its origin its constitution was such — 
 whether from the spirit of the people, the influence 
 of the senate, or the authority of certain magistrates 
 — that all abuses could be corrected..^ j 
 
 Carthage perished, for the reason that, when it 
 became necessary to retrench abuses, she could not 
 even tolerate the hand of her own Hannibal. Athens 
 fell, for the reason that her errors appeared to her 
 so sweet that she did not desire to remedy them. 
 And, among us, the republics of Italy, which boast 
 of the perpetuity of their governments, should only 
 boast of the perpetuity of their abuses; and, accord- 
 
 Bossuet, " Eome knew what number of citizens she had who wore capa- 
 ble of bearing arms, and what she could rely upon from the youth who 
 were coming of age every day. Thus, she so managed her forces against 
 an enemy who came from the shores of Africa that time alone should 
 destroy him, placed as he was in a foreign country, in which succors 
 were so slow to arrive, and where even his victories, which cost him so 
 much blood, were fatal to him. Therefore it was, that whatever disasters 
 might happen, the senate, always advised of the number of good soldiers 
 yet remaining, had only to temporize, and never suffered itself to be 
 cast down. When, by the defeat at Cannae, and by the revolts which 
 followed, it saw the forces of the Republic so far diminished that it could 
 hardly have defended itself if the enemy had pushed immediately on, it 
 yet sustained itself by its courage, and, without being disturbed by the 
 public calamities, it addressed its attention to the means of victory. As 
 soon as it was seen that Hannibal, instead of pressing his advantage, only 
 thought for a time of enjoying it, the senate became reassured, and 
 clearly saw that an enemy who could neglect to pursue his fortune, and 
 who was capable of being dazzled by his great successes, was never born 
 to conquer the Romans. From that moment Eome continually achieved 
 greater enterprises ; and Hannibal, supremely able and courageous, and 
 completely victorious as he was, could not maintain himself against her." 
 Disc, sur PHist. miiv., troisifeme partie, ch. vi.] 
 
CHAP. Till.] OF THE ROMANS. 173 
 
 ingly, they enjoy no more liberty than was found 
 at Eome during the time of the Decemvirs." 
 
 The government of England is wiser; for it con- 
 tains a body which continually inspects it, and which 
 as continually inspects itself." The errors of this 
 government are such that they are never of long 
 duration, and — in consequence of that spirit of vigi- 
 lance which they awaken in the mind of the nation 
 — they are often useful. 
 
 In a word, a free government — that is to say, 
 one which is constantly agitated — can never maintain 
 itself if it is not, by its own laws, capable of cor- 
 rection. 
 
 '* Nor have they oven more power. 
 
 '^ The parliament — especially the House of Commons. — Translator. 
 
174 GEANDEUE AND DECADENCE [bakeb. 
 
 NOTE BY THE TEANSLATOK. 
 
 In the preceding chapter Montesquieu presents, 
 among other things, a very general idea of the rela- 
 tions and comparative political rights of the different 
 classes of Koman citizens. This idea will become at 
 the same time more distinct and more comprehensive 
 if, on the one hand, we look a little closer than he 
 has done into the distribution which was made by 
 classes, centuries, and tribes, and, on the other, take a 
 somewhat more extensive and definite view than he 
 has presented of the Roman constitution in its rela- 
 tion to liberty. 
 
 1. As to the division by classes and centuries — 
 commonly referred to Serving TiiUius^we are at 
 once admitted to the spirit of the Koman people by 
 the circumstance that this was simply a division of 
 the army, foot and horse. Accordingly, when called 
 upon to meet in their quality of classes and centu- 
 ries, the people were summoned, Uke an army, by 
 the martial blast of the horn; they assembled in 
 the Campus Martins, a field lying outside the city 
 walls, and dedicated to the god of war ; and, in their 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 175 
 
 aggregate capacity, they were called "Exercitus TJr- 
 banus," or "the Army of the City." 
 
 According to the account of Livy, there were five 
 classes of infantry, and a sixth which was composed 
 of citizens who were excluded from the military ser- 
 vice. This classification was based upon property. An 
 estate of not less than one hundred thousand Koman 
 asses — a sum equal in value to $970 — admitted the 
 owner to a place in the first class ; seventy-five thou- 
 sand asses was the qualification for the second class; 
 fifty thousand for the third; twenty -five thousand 
 for the fourth ; eleven thousand for the fifth ; and 
 all whose estates were of less value than this last 
 sum were placed in the sixth class. Of these classes, 
 the first was divided into eighty centuries ; the second, 
 third, and fourth, into twenty each; the fifth into 
 thirty ; and the whole of the sixth made one century 
 only. Five additional centuries were incorporated 
 into the infantry service, apparently without respect 
 to property qualification, but with regard to their 
 special art — two of mechanics and three of trumpeters 
 and horn-blowers — ^the former being attached to the 
 centuries of the first class, the latter to those of the 
 fifth. Thus, of the footmen — including the non- 
 military century, which embraced the whole of the 
 sixth class — ^there were one hundred and seventy-six 
 centuries. 
 
 The knights, or horsemen, constituted a body to 
 themselves, and were composed of two social elements 
 
176 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baMIB. 
 
 blended together — the patricians and the richeiSt of 
 the commons. They were divided into eighteen cen- 
 turies — thus making the entire number of centuries 
 one hundred and ninety-four. 
 
 When a vote was to be taken, the centuries of 
 horsemen — as being of the highest rank and dignity 
 — took the lead, and cast their eighteen votes. Next 
 came the centuries composing the first or wealth- 
 iest class of footmen, with their eighty votes ; then 
 the centuries of the second class of footmen, and 
 so on down the scale. But, if the horsemen and the 
 first class of footmen agreed, as they very generally 
 did, the voting was carried no further — since the 
 sum of the votes of these two bodies constituted 
 a clear majority of the whole; and in practice the 
 canvass was rarely carried as far as the last or lowest 
 class. 
 
 It is obvious that this distribution of power con- 
 stituted an aristocracy of rank and wealth, and that 
 the political rights of a great majority of the citizens 
 were rather theoretical than real. 
 
 The custom of voting by tribes, which afterward 
 became common, was considerably more democratic; 
 but even here the habit of placing greatly unequal 
 numbers of voters in different tribes of equal elec- 
 toral weight removed the constitution of Eome — 
 even in respect to her citizens only, and in total 
 disregard of her slaves and provincial subjects — very 
 far from the standard of a pure democracy. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 177 
 
 2. In taking, however, a still more general view 
 of the Koman constitution in its relation to liberty, it 
 is necessary that we should regard, not alone those 
 who bore the character of citizens, but also the two 
 other great classes of people just alluded to — the pro- 
 vincials and the slaves ; and, in thus extending our 
 view, it is not too much to say that, during the whole 
 course of the republic, the masses of mankind who 
 were governed, controlled, or disposed of by Roman 
 laws or Eoman mandates, possessed very little political 
 power indeed in proportion to their numbers. And, 
 to speak in terms of complete generality, we may add 
 that the domination of Rome in this respect was but 
 one instance upon a grand scale of what, within more 
 circumscribed limits, was equally true of all the repub- 
 lics of antiquity. The government of Carthage, for 
 example, was an aristocracy of wealth, mainly con- 
 trolled by a few great families. The men who voted 
 at Athens were but a handful compared with the 
 number of those whom they governed or owned. The 
 republic of Argos, which, from the nature of its or- 
 ganization, and from its reputed seniority in the family 
 of Greek states, may be taken as a typical form to 
 which all the rest of the group approximated, con- 
 tained a population which was made up of three classes 
 — citizens of the town, inhabitants of the country, and 
 slaves; and such political power as belonged to the 
 people appears to have been in the hands of the first 
 class only. 
 
178 GEANDEUE AND DECADENCE [bakeb. 
 
 Such communities — ^whether Eoman or Grecian — 
 althougli bearing the name of republics, were much 
 less republican, iu fact, than are the monarchies of 
 our present Europe; and, when their institutions are 
 placed in comparison with those of the United States, 
 it is seen that they can only be regarded as rudi- 
 mentary forms of free government. 
 
 It is true that the Koman republic became progres- 
 sively more liberal in its internal polity from the time 
 of the expulsion of the kings to the time of its sub- 
 version. The ever-renewed contest between the popu- 
 lar and the patrician parties went, in the main, some- 
 what in favor of the former ; and, as the conquests of 
 Eome extended, she gradually admitted the neighbor- 
 ing peoples of Italy to the privileges of citizenship. 
 But, at the close of the republic, we would probably 
 not be far out of the way in supposing that the pro- 
 vincials, without any power in the enactment of Eoman 
 laws, were twice as numerous as the citizens, and that 
 the slaves were equally as numerous as both ; in other 
 words, that at the period of the greatest liberality in 
 her constitution not more than one sixth of all the 
 subjects of republican Home had so much as a theo- 
 retical right to participate in the governing power. 
 Of course there are no direct and precise statistics 
 upon which to base such a supposition ; but, in view 
 of the census which was taken by the Emperor Clau- 
 dius, within less than a century after the fall of the 
 repubhc. Gibbon concludes that the above proportions 
 
BOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 179 
 
 will probably express the relative magnitudes of the 
 three classes of persons in question at the time of 
 that emperor ; and there is reason to believe that the 
 proportions of these classes did not greatly differ dur- 
 ing the last age of the republic and the first of the 
 empire. 
 
 The fact is, that republican government, in any- 
 thing like the sense in which it is realized in our 
 own country, was an impossibility in ancient times. 
 Such government is so much an affair of superior 
 social ability on the part of the people, and the 
 masses of mankind in all the ancient states were so 
 ignorant and incompetent to self-rule, that it resulted, 
 as a necessary consequence, that the best form of re- 
 public which they were anywhere capable of was cor- 
 respondingly low.' 
 
 ' Livy, Book I, ch. 43 ; Arnold's Hist, of Rome, ch. v ; Aristotle's 
 Politics, Book II, ch. xl; Anthon's Clas. Die, Table X. — Y. Roman 
 Moneys, articles Carthago, Athence, Argos, and authorities there cited ; 
 and Gibbon's Rome, ch, ii. 
 
-j^gQ GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesqpieu. 
 
 CHAPTEE IX. 
 
 TWO CAUSES OF THE EUIN OF EOME. 
 
 "Whilst the domination of Eome was limited to 
 Italy, the republic could easily maintain itself. Every 
 soldier was equally a citizen; each of the consuls 
 levied an army ; and the remaining citizens went to 
 war in their turn under him who succeeded. The 
 number of troops not being excessive, care was 
 taken to receive only such men into the military 
 service as possessed a sufficiency of property to 
 cause them to feel an interest in the preservation of 
 the city.' The senate, having a near view of the 
 conduct of the generals, was thus enabled to restrain 
 them from all thought of doing anything contrary 
 to their duty. 
 
 ' The freedmen, and those who were called capiie censi — inasmuch as 
 they possessed very little property, and paid only a capitation tax — were 
 not at first enrolled in the infantry service, except on urgent occasions. 
 Servius Tullius had placed them in the sixth class, and soldiers were 
 taken from the first fiive only. But Marius, preparing for the war against 
 Jugurtha, enrolled all sorts of men indifferently. Miliiea sa-ibere, says 
 Sallust, non more majorum^ neque dassilrus^ sed uti cujtt^que libido erat^ 
 capite censos ^to-osi/Mf . {De Bella Jugurth.) It should be observed that, 
 in the division by tribes, those who were in the four tribes of the city 
 were nearly the same as those who, in the division by centuries, were in- 
 cluded in the sixth class. 
 
CHAP. IX.] OF THE ROMANS. 181 
 
 But, when the arms of the republic were carried 
 beyond the Alps and the sea, the soldiers, who had 
 to be left during many campaigns in the countries 
 which were subdued, gradually lost the spirit of Ro- 
 man citizens; and the generals — who disposed of 
 armies and kingdoms — feeling their power, would no 
 longer obey. 
 
 It was then that the legionaries began to recog- 
 nize their general only — to found aU their hopes 
 upon him — and to see the city at a greater distance. 
 They 'ceased to be soldiers of the republic, and came 
 to be soldiers of Marius, of Sylla, of Pompey, and 
 of Csesar. Home could no longer know whether he 
 who was at the head of an army in a province was 
 her general or her enemy. 
 
 So long as the Eonian people were corrupted by 
 their tribunes only — upon whom they could confer 
 no power which was not limited to the city — the 
 senate could effectually defend itself; for this body 
 acted with constant steadiness of purpose, whilst the 
 populace passed incessantly from the extreme of fury 
 to the extreme of weakness. But, when the people 
 became able to give to their favorites a formidable 
 power abroad, all the wisdom of the senate was ren- 
 dered futile, and the republic was lost. 
 
 The reason why free states are less durable than 
 others is, that the calamities and the successes which 
 fall to their lot nearly always cause them to lose 
 their liberty ; whilst, on the other hand, the successes 
 
182 GEANDBUR AND DECADENCE [montesqtjieu. 
 
 and the calamities of despotic states equally confirm 
 the servitude of their subjects. A wise republic 
 should hazard nothing which exposes it either to 
 good or to bad fortune. The sole good which it 
 ought to aspire to is its own perpetuity. 
 
 If the grandeur of empire ruined the Koman re- 
 public, the grandeur of the city ruined it none' the 
 less. 
 
 Rome had subdued all nations with the assist- 
 ance of the peoples of Italy, to whom, at diEEerent 
 times, she had. extended divers privileges." Most of 
 tjiese peoples did not at first set any great store 
 upon the right of Eoman citizenship, and some of 
 them preferred to retain their own usages.' But, 
 when this right became that of universal sovereignty 
 — when a man was nothing in the world if he was 
 not a Roman citizen, and everything if he bore that 
 title — the peoples of Italy resolved to perish or be- 
 come Romans. ITot being able to attain their end 
 by canvassing and by supplication, they resorted to 
 arms. They revolted in aU that part of Italy which 
 looks towards the Ionian sea ; and other Roman al- 
 lies proceeded to follow the example.* Obliged thus 
 
 ' Jm Lata, jus italicum. 
 
 ^ The Equians said in their assemblies : " Those who have been able 
 to choose for themselves have preferred their own laws to the rights of 
 the city of Rome, which last have been a necessary hardship for those 
 who have been unable to defend themselves." Livy, Book XI, ch. 45. (a) 
 
 (a) I presume that Book IX instead of XI is here meant. — Teanslatob. 
 
 ■* The Asculans, the Marsians, the Vestinians, the Marrucinians, the 
 Ferentinians, the Hirpiniana, the Pompoianians, the Venusians, the lapy- 
 
CHAP. IX.] OF THE EOMANS. 183 
 
 to contend against those who were, so to speak, the 
 very hands by means of which she had enchained 
 the universe, Rome was lost. She was about to be 
 reduced to her walls. She conceded the right — so 
 much coveted — first to such allies as had not yet 
 ceased to be faithful;' and little by little she ex- 
 tended it to all. 
 
 After this, Rome was no more a city whose people 
 possessed the same spirit, the same love of liberty, 
 and the same hatred of tyranny ; in which jealousy 
 of the power of the senate and the prerogatives of 
 the great — ^mixed always with respect — was in reality 
 nothing other than a love of equality. The peoples 
 of Italy having become her citizens, each city imported 
 into the great capital its own genius, its own particu- 
 lar interests, and its own dependence upon some great 
 protector.' The distracted city ceased to be an entire 
 whole; and since its citizens were only such by a 
 species of fiction, since they had no longer the same 
 magiistrates, the same walls, the same gods, the same 
 temples, and the same sepulchres for their dead, they 
 no longer looked upon Rome with the same eyes, nor 
 
 ■ ges, the Lucanians, the Samnites, and others. (Appian, The CivU War, 
 Book I, ch. 39.) 
 
 ' The Tuscans, the Umbrians, the Latins. This led some of the re- 
 volted peoples to submit — and, as they also were made citizens, still 
 others laid down their arms. Finally, the Samnites only remained, and 
 they were exterminated. 
 
 ^ Let one imagine to himself this monstrous head of the Italian na- 
 tions which, by means of the suffrage of all, directed the rest of the 
 world. 
 
1^4: GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [MONiKSQniEtj. 
 
 felt the same love of country. The Eoman sentiment 
 was gone forever.' 
 
 Ambitious men caused the populations of entire 
 cities and nations to congregate at Eome for the pur- 
 pose of corrupting the suffrage, or of obtaining their 
 votes for themselves. The assemblies were veritable 
 conspiracies. A troop of seditious persons was called 
 by the name of cornices. The authority of the peo- 
 ple, their laws, themselves even, became chimerical 
 things ; and the anarchy was such that it could no 
 longer be known whether the people had or had not 
 adopted an ordinance.' 
 
 Historians constantly speak of the divisions which 
 ruined Eome, not reflecting that these divisions were 
 necessary, that they had always existed in the city, 
 and that they ought always to have existed therein. 
 It was solely the magnitude of the republic which 
 produced the evil, by changing popular tumults into 
 civil wars. It was inevitable that divisions should 
 exist among the Eomans, and it was not to be ex- 
 pected that those warriors who were so fierce, so auda- 
 cious, and so terrible abroad, would be very moderate 
 at home. To ask, in a free state, for men who are bold 
 in war and timid in peace, is to desire impossible things ; 
 and, as a general rule, wherever we find all the peo- 
 ple quiet in a state which has given to itself the name 
 of republic, we may be assured that there is no liberty. 
 
 ' See my iVofe at the end of this chapter. — Thanslatou. 
 ' See the Letters of Ciccrc to Atticue, Book IV, Letter xviii. 
 
CHAP. IX.] OP THE ROMANS. 185 
 
 That wliicli is called union in a body politic is a 
 very equivocal tiling. A true union is one of har- 
 mony, by which all the social elements of the state, 
 however opposed to each other they may appear to 
 be, concur in promoting the general good of society, 
 just as the discords in music concur in producing the 
 total accord. There may be union in a state — that is 
 to say, a harmony from which results the welfare of 
 the people, and which is the only true peace — ^where 
 all appears to be a scene of confusion. Such a union 
 of the different elements in a body politic may be 
 compared to the union which pervades the universe, 
 all the parts of which are eternally held together 
 by the action of some and the reaction of others. 
 
 But amid the accord of Asiatic despotisms, as in- 
 deed of all governments which are not moderate, there 
 is always a real separation of the social elements. 
 The laborer, the warrior, the merchant, the magis- 
 trate, the noble, are not joined together, only in so 
 far as some oppress the others without resistance. 
 If there is union in such a state, it is not citizens 
 who are united, but dead bodies buried close to each 
 other. 
 
 It is true that the laws of Eome became powerless 
 for the government of the republic, but it has always 
 been seen that good laws, which have caused a small 
 republic to become powerful, are afterwards a burden 
 to the state which they have fostered into greatness ; 
 and this for the reason that these laws are such that 
 
j^gg GKANDEITR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 their natural effect is to produce a great people, but 
 not to govern them. 
 
 There is much difference between good laws and 
 suitable ones — ^between those which are calculated to 
 enable a nation to render itseK master of others, and 
 those which are adapted to maintain its power when 
 once acquired." 
 
 There is at the present time a republic which is 
 very little known ", and which, in secrecy and silence, 
 constantly grows stronger. Should it ever attain that 
 measure of greatness which its wisdom proposes, it is 
 certain that it will change its laws ; and this change 
 wiU not be the work of the legislator, but of corrup- 
 tion itself. 
 
 Eome was adapted to self-aggrandizement ; and, 
 for the attainment of that end, her laws were admi- 
 rable. Thus, under whatever constitution the state 
 had assumed — under the kings — ^under the aristocracy 
 — under the popular form of government — she never 
 ceased to prosecute difficult enterprises, and to prose- 
 cute them to a successful issue. She was not wiser 
 than all the other states of the earth for a day only, 
 but continually. She sustained a small, a mediocre, 
 
 ° We see by the manner in which Montesquieu states the distinction 
 here talien — ^between the laws which are proper to the acquisition of em- 
 pire by conquest and those which are fitted to govern it afterwards — as- 
 signing to the one class the quality of " good," to the other the quality 
 of " suitable " — that his genius was not wholly emancipated from the 
 spirit of antiquity — a fact which shows itself several times in the course 
 of this work. — Translatok. 
 
 '" The Canton of Bern. 
 
CHAP. IX.] OF THE ROMANS. 1S7 
 
 and a great fortune, with the same superiority. She 
 experienced no success of which she did not profit ; 
 she suffered no disaster which she did not turn to 
 her service. 
 
 She lost her liberty for the reason that she accom- 
 plished her work too soon." 
 
 " [We might add many particular incidents to the causes of the ruin 
 of Kome. The rigorous exactions of the creditor upon the debtor class 
 caused great and frequent revolts. The prodigious number of gladiators 
 and slaves with whom Rome and Italy were surcharged led to frightful 
 outbreaks, and even to bloody wars. Exhausted by so many foreign and 
 civil wars, Rome created such great numbers of new citizens — either from 
 reason or from the influence of faction — that, amidst the multitude of 
 strangers whom she had naturalized, she could hardly recognize herself. 
 The senate was filled with barbarians ; the Roman blood became inter- 
 mixed ; the love of country by which Rome had elevated herself above all 
 the nations of the earth was not natural to those citizens who came from 
 abroad, and the rest of her citizens were corrupted by intermixing. Divi- 
 sions increased with this prodigious increase of new citizens, and turbulent 
 spirits found therein a new means for the promotion of disorder and for 
 the prosecution of their enterprises. 
 
 Meantime, as a result of the luxury, the debauchery, and the idleness 
 which were introduced, the number of the poor increased without limit. 
 Those who found themselves ruined had no resource but sedition, and, 
 in any case, they cared but little if all perished with them. Ambitious 
 leaders and the rabble, who have nothing to lose, always love change'. 
 These two sorts of citizens prevailed in Rome ; and the middle class, 
 which alone holds all steady in popular states, being the weakest, it was 
 inevitable that the republic should fall. Bossuet, Disc, sur VHist. imiv., 
 troisiSme partie, ch. vii.] 
 
188 
 
 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakeb. 
 
 l^OTE BY THE TEANSLATOE. 
 
 To that absorption of the old Eoman stock which 
 is suggested hy Montesquieu, and more definitely re- 
 ferred to by Bossuet, must be assigned a prominent 
 place among the causes of the disappearance of the 
 old Eoman spirit. De Gobineau, in his " Essay on 
 the Inequality of the Human Eaces," attempts to 
 generalize this cause, and to show that it is the 
 leading principle presiding over the decline of na- 
 tions. "Every human agglomeration," he says, "al- 
 though protected by the most ingenious complication 
 of social ties, contracts, at the very time of its for- 
 mation, and conceals among the elements of its hfe, 
 the principle of inevitable death. . . . Yes, it is really 
 in the very bosom of a social body that is found 
 the cause of its dissolution. But what is that cause? 
 Degeneracy, it has been answered ; nations die when 
 they are composed of elements which are degenerate. 
 The answer is good, etymologically and in every 
 manner. It only remains to define what must be 
 understood by these words — degenerate nation. It 
 is there that we make shipwreck. ... I think then, 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 189 
 
 that the word degenerate^ when applied to a people, 
 ought to signify, and does signify, that the people 
 in question no longer have the intrinsic value which 
 they formerly possessed, for the reason that they no 
 longer have in their veins the same blood — of which 
 successive mixtures have gradually modified the value ; 
 in other words, that, while retaining the same name, 
 the nation has not preserved the race of its found- 
 ers ; in short, that the man of decadence — he whom 
 we call the degenerate man — is a different product, 
 in an ethnical point of view, from the heroes of the 
 great epochs. I am very wiUing to allow that he 
 possesses something of their essence; but the more 
 he degenerates, the more this something attenuates. 
 The heterogeneous elements which henceforth pre- 
 dominate in him compose a nationality which is 
 wholly new, and very unfortunate in its originality. 
 He is not related to those whom he still calls his 
 fathers, except by a line very collateral. He will 
 die out definitively, and his civilization with him, 
 whenever the primordial ethnical element comes to 
 be so subdivided and drowned by the influx of for- 
 eign races that the power of this element is no 
 longer adequate to the exercise of a sufficient in- 
 fluence." ' 
 
 The conception of De Gobineau must not, how- 
 ever, be carried too far, nor be made — as he seems 
 
 ' Essai sur Vlvigaleli des Races Humaines, Paris, 1853, torn, i, pp. 3, 
 38-40. See also Indigenous Races of the Earth, Phila., 1868, p. 214. 
 
190 GEANDEUK AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 to do — exclusive. It is by no means universally true 
 that "th§ man of decadence" differs ethnically from 
 "the heroes of the great epochs." He has often 
 been their lineal descendant, corrupted by the for- 
 tune entailed upon him, or by other depressing 
 causes. Such in a great measure was the case with 
 the Eomans when they reached their period of de- 
 cline. The considerable remnant of "the primordial 
 ethnical element" had become thoroughly corrupt — a 
 natural result of low culture combined with great for- 
 tune and great power acquired by conquest. Whilst 
 it is true, therefore, that the republic was abandoned 
 to a great influx of strangers who lacked the Koman 
 consciousness and feeling, and by admixture with 
 whom the original stock was largely absorbed, it is 
 none the less true that what remained of this stock 
 had, to a very great extent, lost the Koman virtue — 
 from causes having little or nothiag to do with for- 
 eign admixture. 
 
 The question of the causes of Roman decline — that 
 is, of the causes which led to the transition of the 
 Koman state from the first of its two great life- 
 phases to the second — naturally connects itseK with an 
 historical determination of much rational value. In 
 a work upon "-the Grandeur and Decadence of the 
 Komans," complete accuracy of thought demands that 
 a definite idea of the historical range of the one 
 and the other of these terms should be presented; 
 or, at least, that some certain criterion should be 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 191 
 
 pointed out by means of wMcli sucli an idea can be 
 closely approximated. 
 
 At wbat time, tben, did the grandeur of the Ko- 
 mans reach its acme, and their decadence begin? 
 Some reasonably approximate answer to this question 
 is indispensable to a truly rational conception of Ro- 
 man history as a whole. 
 
 That quality of character which consists in up- 
 rightness and fidelity on the part of the citizen in all 
 his relations to the state of which he is a member 
 is more comprehensive than patriotism, and may be 
 fitly called civio virtue. This, therefore, appears to 
 be the standard of comparison which we want. 
 
 If, then, we adopt the decay of civic virtue as 
 the true criterion which marks the transition from 
 grandeur to decadence among the Romans, and if, 
 guided by this test, we should indicate the rise and 
 decline of the Roman state by a curve, I conceive 
 that it should be so drawn as to represent ascent dur- 
 ing a period of about 650 years from the foundation 
 of the city, and after that a continual descent for 
 about 573 years — at the end of which time the "West- 
 em Empire was extinguished. 
 
 According to this view, the climax of the pe- 
 riod of grandeur is reached about sixty years before 
 Csesar overthrew the republic — whilst the final ca- 
 tastrophe of the period of decadence comes at the 
 close of the reign of Augustulus, a. d. 4Y6 or 479. 
 The last sixty years of the republic are not thus pre- 
 
192 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakeb. 
 
 fixed to the empire arbitrarily ; they are connected as 
 primary and secondary stages of decadence. Within 
 these sixty years fall the Social War, the Civil Wars 
 of Marius and Sylla, and the wholesale Proscriptions 
 of the latter. When these great disorderly phenom- 
 ena are studied in connection with the previous in- 
 ternal contests which had constantly agitated the 
 republic, they are seen to be of a totally different 
 kind, and clearly to indicate the decline of civic vir- 
 tue. For more than four centuries following the ex- 
 pulsion of the Tarquins, there had been an inces- 
 sant struggle between the aristocratic and the demo- 
 cratic parties; but this struggle had generally been 
 held within some tolerable limits of moderation; and 
 even the seditions which took place in the time of 
 the Gracchi — during the generation immediately pre- 
 ceding the internal wars alluded to — although giving 
 an unmistakable note of warning that a great change 
 was impending in the state, were in themselves com- 
 paratively small affairs. That change was realized in 
 the convulsions which soon followed under Marius 
 and Sylla. The old aristocratic and democratic par- 
 ties, which, as just said, had agitated the state as far 
 back as the time of the kings, but which, by their 
 mutual forbearance, had hitherto been compatible 
 with the existence of an imperfect republic, having 
 now degenerated into mere factions, seeking each 
 other's destruction by the sword, were become whoUy 
 incompatible with a republican constitution for the 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 193 
 
 state. From the standpoint of these civil wars it is 
 easy to foresee the approaching revolution in the gov- 
 ernment. The average citizen of both the old par- 
 ties having changed the character of a partisan for 
 that of a factionist, the descent of the repiiblio into 
 CcBsarism and the Empire was hut the adjustment of 
 a lower form of government to the already lowered 
 civic character of the Roman peojple. 
 
 Here, then, a few decades before the end of the 
 repubKc, we detect the turning-point from grandeur 
 to decay. !N^or is this view really invalidated by 
 the facts — that the Koman literature continued to 
 develop until the age of Augustus — that the Roman 
 law may have gone on developing until the time of 
 Alexander Severus — that the territorial area of the 
 empire did not reach its maximum until the time of 
 Trajan — and that the effective power of the Roman 
 arms did not for a long time after the fall of the 
 republic experience any sensible decline. These are 
 facts; but it must be observed that all the elements 
 of a decaying social system do not begin to decline, 
 or even cease to develop, simultaneously. In the 
 case of the Romans — and I presume they are but any 
 instance of a general law in like circumstances — the 
 civic character of the people became degenerate^ 
 that is, the average citizen hecame corrupt in his re-\ 
 lations to the state a considerable time before decline 
 set in, and even before progress was arrested, in 
 several important particulars. But, inasmuch as this 
 
194 GRAJS^DEUR AND DECADENCE [eakkk. 
 
 civic declension, although accompanied for a time by 
 certain kinds of progress, was fundamental to the 
 state, and tended constantly and with accumulating 
 efficiency to bring down the whole system, the era 
 of its open commencement should be selected as the 
 great critical period in the Eoman national life. 
 
 This conception becomes all the clearer in its 
 reason when we recur to the causes which conducted 
 the Romans to that turning-point in their destiny 
 which I have indicated. These causes were mainly 
 two — the great and sudden increase of wealth and 
 power which attended the rapid Eastern expansion 
 of the republic after the second Punic war, and 
 the vast number of new citizens who, without pos- 
 sessing the Roman feeling or the Roman traditions, 
 had been incorporated into the governing body. Here 
 we have the immediate sources of that civic demor- 
 alization which first exploded in the wars of Marius 
 and Sylla, and soon afterwards reached a fatal issue 
 for the republic in those of Caesar and Pompey. 
 
 In connection with that ascending and descend- 
 ing movement of Roman history viewed as a single 
 phenomenon, the two great sections of which I have 
 here undertaken to measure with some precision, 
 there are three parallels which appear to be note- 
 worthy. 
 
 First, at an early period in their rising career, 
 the Romans threw off a lower and took on a higher 
 form of goverament— they passed from the govern- 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 195 
 
 ment of the kings to the republic; at an early 
 period ia their declension they threw off a higher 
 and took on a lower — they passed from the republic 
 to the empire. 
 
 Secondly, when their power commenced to grow, 
 for a long time it grew very slowly; when it com- 
 menced to decliae, for a long time it declined very 
 slowly. 
 
 Thirdly, to the period of long, slow gro^^th, suc- 
 ceeded a shorter period of rapid expansion to the 
 zenith of their grandeur ; to the period of long, slow 
 decline, succeeded a shorter period of rapid declen- 
 sion to the end of the empire. 
 
 These parallels are by no means accidental. The 
 causal relation which exists between the character of 
 a people and the character of their government de- 
 termined the first ; the very obstinate resistance 
 which the Romans for a long time met with, and 
 the enormous stored-up force of their political sys- 
 tem when it reached its height and began to decline, 
 explains the second; whilst the tendency of great 
 acquired power — which is yet active and aggressive 
 =— to make large and prompt additions to itself, and 
 the equal tendency of accumulating weakness to 
 find at length a point from which it passes speedily 
 to its end, sufficiently accounts for the third. 
 
 If the principal conception embodied in this note 
 is correct. Gibbon has omitted a very considerable 
 part of the " Decline " of the Eoman Empire. He 
 
196 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakek. 
 
 commences his great liistorj with a magnificent sur- 
 vey of the Roman world under the Antonines; and 
 he reckons the decline of the empire to begin with 
 their immediate successor, Commodus — the eighteenth 
 emperor, counting from Osesar as the first. I think 
 De Quincey has successfully criticised this view of 
 Gibbon — maintaining as his own opinion that "the 
 empire itself, from the very era of its establishment, 
 was one long decline of the Eoman power." ' 
 
 In thus carrying the idea of decline back to the 
 very inception of the empire, it appears to me that 
 De Quincey is so far correct; but, for the reasons 
 stated above, it would, seem that a still completer 
 idea of the phenomenon of Eoman decadence is at- 
 tained by dating it back to that great change in the 
 civic character of the citizen which preceded the 
 fall of the republic. This last appears really to 
 have been the view of Montesquieu — although it is 
 not expressed in the text with that degree of dis- 
 tinctness which so capital a conception seemed to de- 
 mand. 
 
 2 The Ccesars, Boston, 1854, pp. 146, \1%. 
 
MONTESQUIEU.] OF THE ROMAICS. 197 
 
 CHAPTEE X. 
 
 COEETTPTIOIT OF THE EOMANS. 
 
 I BELIEVE that the doctrines of Epicurus — which 
 were introduced into Eome towards the close of the 
 republic — did much towards corrupting the mind and 
 the heart of the Eomans." The Greeks had been 
 infatuated with these doctrines at an earlier period, 
 and they had also become sooner corrupted. Polyb- 
 ius says that in his time oaths had no power to 
 inspire confidence in a Greek, whilst the Roman 
 was, so to speak, enthralled by the oath which he 
 had taken.' 
 
 A fact is stated in the letters of Cicero to Atti- 
 cus,' which shows how much the Eomans had 
 
 ' Cyneas having discoursed upon these doctrines at the table of Pyr- 
 rhus, Fabricius expressed the wish that all the enemies of Eome might 
 adopt the principles of such a philosophy. (Plutarch, lAfe of Pyrrhus.') 
 
 2 " If you lend a talent to a Greek — with ten promises, ten sureties, 
 and as many witnesses — it is impossible that he should keep his faith ; 
 but among the Romans, whether they have to account for public or pri- 
 vate moneys, they are faithful — because of the oath which they have 
 taken. The fear of hell, therefore, has been wisely established, and it is 
 without reason that men combat it at the present time." (Poltbius, 
 Book VI.) 
 
 ' Book rV, Letter xviii. 
 
]^98 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesqcieu. 
 
 changed in this respect since the time of Polybius. 
 " Memmius," he says, " came to inform the senate of 
 the agreement which his competitor and himself had 
 entered into with the Consuls— by which the latter 
 had engaged to favor them in their canvass for the 
 consulate the year following, whilst they, on their 
 part, had obligated themselves to pay to the consuls 
 four hundred thousand sesterces if they should fail 
 to furnish them three augurs who would declare that 
 they were present when the people had adopted the 
 law curtate^ — although no such law had been made 
 — and also two ex-consuls who would affirm that 
 they had assisted at the signing of the senatiis-con- 
 suUum which had regulated the state of their prov- 
 inces — although nothing of the hind had ever been 
 done." How many dishonest men in a single con- 
 tract ! 
 
 Aside from the fact that religion is always the 
 best guarantee we can have of the morals of man- 
 kind, there was this in particular among the Eo- 
 mans: they mingled some religious sentiment with 
 the love which they bore for their country. That 
 city— founded under the best auspices; that Eomu- 
 lus— their king and their god; that capitol— eternal 
 as the city — and the city as eternal as its founder — 
 
 •• The law mriate conferred the military power of the governor, and 
 the smatm-consiiUum regulated the troops, the money, and the officers 
 which he should have charge of. In order that all this might work to 
 their fancy, the consuls in question desired to fabricate a false law and a 
 false senatzcs-co?isultum. 
 
CHAP. X.] OF THE ROMANS. 199 
 
 had formerly exercised an influence upon tlie spirit 
 of the ^Romans wliicli it were to be desired that they 
 had continued to feel. 
 
 The greatness of the State led to the greatness 
 of private fortunes. But, as opulence consists in 
 manners and not in riches, the wealth of the Eo- 
 mans, which admitted no bounds, produced an un- 
 limited luxury and profusion in life." Those who 
 were first corrupted by their wealth were afterwards 
 corrupted by their poverty. With an estate above 
 that of a private condition, it was difiBcult to be a 
 good citizen; with the desires and the regrets which 
 attend a great fortune ruined, men were ready for 
 every outrage; and, as Sallust says,° we see a gener- 
 ation of men who were neither able to possess patri- 
 monies of their own, nor willing to allow others to 
 retain theirs. 
 
 Meantime, however great the corruption of Eome 
 may have been, she was not yet wholly corrupt; 
 for snch was the strength of her institutions that, 
 in the midst of her wealth, her effeminacy, and 
 voluptuousness, she still preserved a heroic valor, 
 and retained all of her devotion to war. This has 
 
 ' The house which had cost Cornelia seTenty-five thousand drachms 
 cost LucuUua, a short time afterwards, two million five hundred thousand. 
 (Plutarch, lAfe of Marius.) (a) 
 
 (a) Plutarch, in the place cited, reads for the last sum, 600,200. 
 {Latighorne's trans.) — Translator. 
 
 « Ut merito dicatur gmitos esse, qui nee ipsi habere possent res fa- 
 miliares, nee alios paii. (Fragment of Sallust's History, taken from the 
 book of the City of Qod, Book II, ch. xyiii.) 
 
200 GRANDEUK AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 not, I believe, been true of any other nation of the 
 world/ 
 
 Eoman citizens regarded comnierce* and the arts 
 as occupations for slaves,' and did not engage in them. 
 If there were exceptions, they were limited to some 
 freedmen who continued in the pursuit of their for- 
 mer occupations, but in general the Eoman citizen 
 knew only the art of war, which was the sole road to 
 offices and to honors ; '° and thus it was that the war- 
 like virtues survived after all the others were lost. 
 
 ' This is but an illustration of the familiar saying — equally applica- 
 ble to nations and to individuals — that "the ruling passion is strong 
 in death." The speculative Greek of the Eastern Empire, absorbed with 
 subtle theological disputations whilst his country was sinking to ruin, 
 recalls the same national trait which had given immortality to the Acad- 
 emy and the Portico. — Tkanslatob. 
 
 * Romulus allowed only two sorts of occupations to freemen — agri- 
 culture and war. Merchants, artificers, tavern-keepers, and those who 
 lived in rented houses, were not citizens. [Dionys. Hal., Book II ; idem, 
 Book IX.) 
 
 ^ Cicero gives the reasons for this in his Offices, Book III. 
 
 '^ It was necessary to have served ten years, between the ages of six- 
 teen and f orty-sev«n. See Polybius, Book VI. 
 
BAKER.] OF THE ROMANS. 201 
 
 NOTE BY THE TEANSLATOE. 
 
 When we reflect How fundamental is the relation 
 of industry to civilization, and consider in what low 
 estimation the industrial vocations were held by the 
 governing classes in ancient times, we cannot fail to 
 realize the immense social interspace which, in this 
 respect, separates the societies of antic[uity from the 
 societies of the present day. What Montesquieu says 
 at the close of the preceding chapter in relation to the 
 industrial system of the Eomans was substantially true 
 of all the ancient nations. Everywhere the tone of 
 opinion among the governing classes strongly associ- 
 ated industry with the notion of social degradation, 
 and this for the obvious reason that aU the industries 
 of the time were mostly carried on by slaves. Men's 
 idea of work is but a reflex of their idea of the 
 worker. If the latter is a slave, the former is re- 
 garded as a servile employment ; if a free and self- 
 respecting man, the " dignity of labor " emerges into 
 view. 
 
 As being the basis of the labor system of the 
 Eomans, and of the ancient states generally, it is 
 
202 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakeb. 
 
 essential that we should form a rational idea of the 
 nature and extent of slavery as it existed in these 
 old societies. 
 
 ISText to the dominant position occupied by war, 
 slavery was the most prominent social fact of anti- 
 quity, and it is easy to see that the relatively large 
 proportions of both these interests in the ancient 
 world were due to the relatively low status of the 
 ancient societies. War and slavery, in the absorbing 
 dimensions which they assumed in these early and 
 immature communities, were but the natural out- 
 growths of the existing social state, and the one was 
 the primary basis and feeder of the other. The men- 
 tal process by which the two were connected was 
 short and simple. The fundamental idea of the law 
 of war was that the victor might rightfully take the 
 life of his captive. In saving him for enslavement, 
 therefore, a milder was deemed to be substituted in 
 place of a more rigorous measure of justice. Leaving ' 
 aside all derivative and subsidiary sources of servitude, 
 such was the tap-root of ancient slavery — the larger 
 right, to Tclll, included the lesser one, to enslave. 
 
 This conception was not limited to the Komans; 
 it appears to have been present among all the ancient 
 peoples — especially during the earlier stages of their 
 history. 
 
 Under the influence of this fundamental idea, aided 
 by some cognate ideas which were variously associated 
 with it in different countries — such as, that a man 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 203 
 
 might sell himself into slavery, that a father might 
 sell his children, that certain offenders might be sold 
 by the state, that insolvent debtors might be sold by 
 their creditors, and that certain peoples might be en- ' 
 slaved by reason of their mental inferiority — the an- 
 cient states came to be surcharged with slaves. From 
 the scattering statistics which have come down to us, 
 taken in connection with numerous statements of the 
 classical writers, it seems probable that the world con- 
 tained quite as many slaves as free persons, and some 
 particular states very many more. Athens, for instance, 
 with a population of 21,000 citizens, is said to have 
 contained 400,000 slaves ; and the Helots were proba- 
 bly seven times as numerous as their Spartan masters. 
 But that great power which absorbed so many nations 
 will best represent the state of the world in general ; 
 and the E,omaa empire is reckoned to have contained 
 20,000,000 citizens, 40,000,000 provincials, and 60,- 
 000,000 slaves. Some single Eomans are said to have 
 possessed as many as 20,000. 
 
 During nearly seven hundred years of Eoman his- 
 tory the master was an absolute despot — being clothed 
 by the law of his country with- a power of life and 
 death over his slave which was unlimited save by his 
 own will. It appears that no legal restraint whatever 
 was imposed upon this power until the passage of the 
 lex Cornelia de sicariis, under the dictatorship of 
 Sylla, in the year 81 before Christ. Thence under 
 Claudius, Nero, Adrian, Antoninus Pius, Severus, Con- 
 
204 GRAJfDEmi AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 stantine, and Justinian, there was an increasing legal 
 interference with the private power of the master; 
 whilst, in another direction, the Christian church con- 
 tributed its powerful aid in amelioration of the con- 
 dition of the seryile class, not only by infusing the 
 spirit of the new charity into the lives of men, hut 
 also by excommunicating those who dared to execute 
 their slaves without legal warrant. 
 
 How low was the state of conscience among the 
 higher class of Eomans in respect to their slaves may 
 be inferred from a few representative facts. Tacitus, 
 who is so terrible in his arraignment of tyrannical 
 emperors for the cruelties which they inflicted upon 
 patrician families, coolly approves an atrocious decree 
 of the senate, in accordance with which, if a master of 
 a household should be killed by any of his slaves, all 
 the slaves of the same household who might happen to 
 be made free by the master's will should equally suffer 
 death. The prasfect Pedanius Secundus having been 
 murdered by one of his household slaves— of whom 
 there were 400 — the whole number were condemned to 
 death in conformity with Eoman law, the senate, upon 
 full consideration of the frightful hardship of the case, 
 deliberately refusing to relax the savage rigor of the 
 rule. To the credit of the populace on this occasion, 
 they assembled tumultuously in defense of the inno- 
 cent slaves, and forbade the execution of the sen- 
 tence ; nor could it be carried out until the military 
 were summoned to the scene ; and then the mournful 
 
HOTE.] OF THE KOilANS. 205 
 
 group, of all ages and both sexes, were marched to 
 their death between lines of soldiers. 
 
 Roman masters appear to have made a very free 
 use of fetters. Many of their field slaves were made 
 to work in chains. Italy abounded in underground 
 workhouses, in which chained slaves toiled at the 
 miU; and the participant of Eoman hospitality, in 
 the polite age of Augustus, was met at the threshold 
 of his host by a chained slave in company with a 
 chained dog. It appears not to have been an uncom- 
 mon custom to carry old or sick slaves to an island 
 in the Tiber, and there leave them to die of starva- 
 tion. 
 
 Especially in view of the vast preponderance of 
 slavery in the ancient societies, and the relatively low 
 sense of humanity with which it was tempered, we 
 can very safely accept the comprehensive conclusion 
 of Hume : " But, to one who considers coolly on the 
 subject, it will appear that human nature in general 
 really enjoys more liberty at present in the most arbi- 
 trary government of Europe than it ever did during 
 the most flourishing period of ancient times." 
 
 Kesolving all history into fovu' great periods, we 
 detect a progressive change in the general condition 
 of the working classes. 
 
 1. During the first period, which may be regarded 
 as coextensive with ancient history, we have just seen 
 that the industrial classes of the world were chiefly 
 slaves. The dominant military spirit, combined with 
 
206 
 
 GEANDEUB AND DECADENCE [bakee. 
 
 that law of war wHch transmuted the prisoner into 
 a slave, had everywhere developed an immense ser- 
 vile population— upon which the work of society was 
 principally imposed. All the great material monu- 
 ments of this period are closely associated with servile 
 toil. The Eoads of Rome, the Pyramids of Egypt, 
 the Eock Temples of India, the Cyclopean Walls of 
 Phoenicia, were mainly the work of slaves. 
 
 2. During the second period, which should be 
 reckoned as coextensive with the Middle Ages, thus 
 extending from the close of the fifth to the close of 
 the fifteenth century, the serf had taken the place of 
 the slave in the states of Europe. 
 
 3. During the third period, which should he made 
 to reach from the close of the fifteenth to the close 
 of the eighteenth century, the free oitizen with small 
 political influence had taken the place of the serf. 
 
 4. During the fourth period, which opens with 
 the American and French Eevolutions, and extends 
 to the present time, the free citizen with an in- 
 creased measure ef political influence has taken the 
 place of his immediate predecessor. 
 
 Of course the end is not yet. The proof is evi- 
 dent that this vast movement, of which nations have 
 been but elements, and whole epochs but single steps, 
 is still heading in the same direction, and that too 
 with quickened pace. 
 
 In the light of this series of ascensive changes — 
 thus displayed upon the broad field of the world's 
 
N0IE.1 OF THE ROMANS. 207 
 
 history — we are not only enabled to determine the 
 comparative values of the industrial systems of the 
 past and the present, but also to pronounce with 
 much confidence upon the fundamental meaning of 
 that spirit of unrest and tendency to increased self- 
 assertion which, in our own time, pervades the in- 
 dustrial classes of Europe and America. This last 
 fact — which is one of supreme social moment — ^is so 
 far from being abnormal that it is only to be viewed 
 as proof that the great progressive movement which 
 I have sketched — and which is eminently humanita- 
 rian and moral — is still going on.' 
 
 ■ For the facts stated in the preceding Note respecting ancient slavery, 
 see Hume's FhilosopldcaL WorTcs^ Boston, 1854, vol. iii, pp. 415-425; 
 Institut. Just., lib. i, tit. iii, 3, and lib. i, tit. vii, 2 ; Cooper's Jiistinian, 
 pp. 410^12; Adam's JRom. Ant, Phila., 18'72, pp. 23-29, 134-135, 3S9 
 and 379 ; Gibbon's Rome, eh. ii ; Tac. Annals, Book XIII, ch. 32, Book 
 XIV, chs. 42-45 ; Maine's Ancient Law, N. Y., 1864, p. 157 ; Anthon's 
 Clas. Die, art Helotce ; Chambers' Enc, art. Slavery ; and for the law of 
 slavery among the Jews, see Exodus, ch. xxi, 2-11, ch. xxii, 2-3 ; Leviti- 
 cus, ch. XXV, 39-54, and II Kings, ch. iv, 1 ; and for some profound 
 views concerning the rationale of ancient slavery, see Comte's PMloso- 
 pkie Positive, Paris, 1S69, torn, v, pp. 134-139, 148-149, and torn, vi, pp. 
 67-68. 
 
208 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 STLLA. — POMPET AND C^SAE. 
 
 I PEAT that I may be permitted to turn away 
 my eyes from the horrors of the wars of Marius 
 and Sylla. Their frightful history may be found 
 in Appian. In addition to the jealousy, the ambi- 
 tion, and the cruelty of the two chiefs, every Eoman 
 was furious. The new citizens and the old no 
 longer regarded themselves as members of the same 
 republic;' and they carried on a war against each 
 other which, from its particular character, was at the 
 same time civil and foreign. 
 
 Sylla enacted three laws which were very well 
 calculated to remove the cause of the disorders which 
 we have seen. These laws increased the authority 
 of the senate, tempered the power of the people, 
 and regulated that of the tribunes. And the fancy 
 
 ' As Marius — with a view to obtaining command in the war against 
 Mithridates to the prejudice of Sylla — had, with the assistance of the 
 tribune Sulpitius, distributed eight new tribes of Italian peoples among 
 the ancient ones — a measure which rendered the Italians masters of the 
 ballot — it resulted that the latter were mostly of the party of Marius, 
 whilst the old citizens were of the party of Sylla. 
 
CHAP. XI.] OF THE ROMANS. 209 
 
 wHch prompted Mm to abdicate the dictatorship 
 seemed to restore the life of the republic. But, 
 amid the frenzy which had attended his successes, 
 he had done things which rendered it impossible 
 for Home to retain her liberty. 
 
 In his Asiatic expedition he had ruined all mili- 
 tary discipline. He had accustomed his army to 
 rapine,' thus giving it wants which it had never be- 
 fore felt; and, having once corrupted the soldiers, it 
 was inevitable that they in their turn should after- 
 wards corrupt their officers. 
 
 He had entered into Eome sword in hand, and 
 had thus taught Roman generals to violate that 
 asylum of liberty." 
 
 He had given the lands of citizens to soldiers,* 
 and thus rendered them covetous for the future ; ' 
 for from that moment there was no longer a soldier 
 who did not look for an occasion which might place 
 in his own hands the property of his fellow citizens. 
 
 He had invented the Proscription, and set a price 
 
 ' See in the Conjuratione de Catilma the portrait which Sallust gires 
 of this army. 
 
 ' Fugatis Marii copiis, primus urhem Romam cum armis ingresms est. 
 (Fragment from John of Antioch, in the Extract of Virtues and Vices.) 
 
 * A part of the lands of conquered enemies had, indeed, at the begin- 
 ning been distributed ; but Sylla gave the lands of citizens. 
 
 ' [Confiscations, even while enriching accomplices, only convert them 
 into malcontents and ingrates. From the moment they begin to possess 
 something, they begin to regard the troubles and disorders of the state 
 as insupportable ; and all authority which is not placed entirely in their 
 own hands they regard as usurped by others. (The Advocate Geno-al 
 Servan.)] 
 
2]^0 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 upon tlie heads of ' tiiose who were not of his own 
 party.' From the time of the introduction of this 
 practice, it was impossible for the citizen to attach 
 himself longer to the cause of the republic; for, 
 placed between two ambitious leaders who contended 
 for ascendency, those who were neutral, and who 
 adhered to the party of liberty, were sure to be 
 proscribed by the one of the two who might be 
 conqueror. It was therefore the part of prudence to 
 join the one or the other. 
 
 There came after him, says Cicerp,' a man who, 
 in an impious cause, and in the achievement of a 
 victory yet more shameful, confiscated not only the 
 wealth of private individuals, but involved whole 
 provinces in the same calamity." 
 
 In laying down the dictatorship, SyUa appeared 
 to be only desirous of living under the protection of 
 his own laws. But that act, which indicated so 
 much moderation, was itself a sequence of his vio- 
 lences. He had established forty-seven legions in di- 
 
 ' See my Note at the end of tbis chapter. — Translatok. 
 
 ' Offices, Book II, oh. viii. 
 
 * The statement here attributed to Cicero is more severe upon Caesar, 
 and less discriminatingly just, than the words of the former import. 
 The following is the actual passage of Cicero: Secuhts est, qui in causa 
 impia, victoria eliam fmdiore, non singulorum civium bona publicaret, sed 
 universas provincias regionesque una calamitatis jure comprehenderit. 
 " He was followed by one who, in an impious cause, and in a victory yet 
 more abominable, did not confiscate the property of individual citizens, but 
 involved whole provinces and regions in one common calamity." The 
 clause which I have italicized indicates the correction which ia needed in 
 the text of Montesquieu. — Translator. 
 
CHAP. XI.] OF THE KOMANS. 211 
 
 vers places ia Italy. These soldiers, says Appian, 
 regarding their fortime as contingent upon his life, 
 watched over his safety, and were constantly ready 
 to succor or to avenge him.' 
 
 It being inevitable that the republic should per- 
 ish, it was only a question as to how and by whom it 
 should be overthrown. 
 
 Two men who were equally ambitious — except 
 that the one did not know how to proceed to his 
 end so directly as the other — effaced all the other 
 citizens by their credit, their exploits, and their 
 virtues. Pompey appeared first; Caesar followed him 
 closely.'" 
 
 In order to draw upon himself the popular fa- 
 vor, Pompey procured the abrogation of those laws 
 of Sylla which limited the power of the people ; and 
 when he had thus sacrificed to his ambition the most 
 salutary laws of his country, he obtained all that he 
 desired. The temerity of the people knew no bounds 
 in their admiration of him. 
 
 The laws of Pome had wisely divided the public 
 power among a great number of magistracies, which 
 mutually supported, checked, and tempered each other. 
 As all these magistracies were depositaries of only a 
 limited measure of power, every citizen was eligible 
 to them ; and the people — being used to seeing many 
 personages, one after another, pass before them — did 
 
 ' We may note what happened after the death of Csesar. 
 ■" Pompey was about six years the senior of Caesar ; the one was 
 born B. c. 106, the other b. c. 100. — Tkanslator. 
 
212 GKANDEUR AOT) DECADENCE [montesquieij. 
 
 not become accustomed to any one in particular. But, 
 at the time of wHcli we now speak, the system of 
 the republic had changed. The most powerful men 
 induced the people to give them extraordinary com- 
 missions — commissions which annihilated the author- 
 ity of the magistrates and of the people themselves 
 — and which placed all grades of affairs in the hands 
 of one man or of a few." 
 
 Was it necessary to make war against Sertorius? 
 the commission was given to Pompey. Against Mith- 
 ridates ? all cried out for Pompey. "Was Pome need- 
 ing a supply of grain from abroad? The people 
 regarded themselves as ruined if Pompey had not 
 charge of the business. Was it resolved to destroy 
 the pirates? Pompey only was capable of doing it. 
 And, when Caesar threatened to march upon Pome, 
 the senate in its turn raised its voice for Pompey, 
 and felt no hope except in him. 
 
 " I really believe," said Marcus " to the people, 
 "that Pompey, whom the nobles follow, would 
 rather secure your liberty than their domination; 
 but there was a time when each of you had the pro- 
 tection of many, instead of all having the protection 
 of one — a time when it was unheard of that a single 
 mortal possessed the power to give or take away 
 such things." 
 
 Among the Eomans, whose poKty was adapted to 
 
 " PleUs opes immilutce, paucorum, poteniia crevit. (Sallust, De 
 Ccmjuratione Catil.) 
 
 " Fragment of SallusVs History. 
 
CHAP. XI.] OF THE ROMANS. 213 
 
 self-aggrandizement, it was necessary to confer honors 
 and power upon the same persons — that which, in 
 times of pubhc trouble, might serve to fix the admi- 
 ration of the people upon a single citizen. 
 
 "When honors are conferred, we know precisely 
 what is given; but when power is added, we can- 
 not say to what extent it may be carried. 
 
 Excessive preferences, extended to any one citi- 
 zen in a republic, are always attended by certain 
 necessary effects : they either excite the envy of the 
 people, or increase beyond measure their love for 
 the popular favorite. 
 
 On two occasions Pompey returned to Eome mas- 
 ter of the destinies of the republic; but he had the 
 moderation to disband his armies before entering the' 
 capital, and to present himself therein in the charac- 
 ter of a simple citizen. These acts — which covered 
 him with glory — determined the senate afterwards to 
 declare steadily in his favor — notwithstanding all he 
 had done to the prejudice of the laws. 
 
 Pompey was actuated by an ambition which was 
 slower and more moderate than that of Caesar. The 
 latter, like SyUa, was willing to obtain sovereign 
 power by armed violence ; but this style of oppres- 
 sion was not agreeable to Pompey. He aspired to 
 the dictatorship, but he wished to obtain it by the 
 suffrages of the people. He would not consent to 
 the usui"pation of power, but he desired that it might 
 be placed in his hands. 
 
214: GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 As the favor of the people is never constant, 
 there came a time when Pompey saw his credit di- 
 minish;" and— what touched him verj sensibly — he 
 saw the increasing credit of men whom he despised, 
 and who employed their growing influence against 
 him. This led him to three courses of action which 
 were equally destructive. 
 
 He corrupted the people by the use of money, 
 and put into the elections a price upon the suffrage 
 of each citizen. 
 
 Further, he engaged the vilest of the populace to 
 disturb the magistrates in the exercise of their func- 
 tions — hoping that the orderly citizens, thus left to 
 live in a state of anarchy, would make him dictator 
 from despair. 
 
 Finally, he united his interests with those of Cae- 
 sar and Crassus. 
 
 Cato said it was not the enmity of these men that 
 ruined the republic, but their union ; and in fact Rome 
 was in such a wretched condition that she was less 
 hurt by the civil wars than by the ensuing peace, 
 which, by uniting the views and the interests of the 
 principal leaders, was nothing other than a state of 
 tyranny. 
 
 Properly speaking, Pompey did not lend his credit 
 to Caesar, but, without knowing it, he sacrificed it to 
 him. Yery soon Caesar employed against him the 
 very power which he had received from him, and 
 
 " See Plutarch, Life of Pompey. 
 
CHAP. XI.] OP THE ROMANS. 215 
 
 even liis own artifices. He disturbed the city by bis 
 emissaries, and rendered himself master of the elec- 
 tions. Consuls, prsetors, tribunes, were purchased at 
 the prices which they placed upon themselves. 
 
 The senate — which clearly comprehended the de- 
 signs of Csesar — ^had recourse to Pompey, and prayed 
 that he would take upon himself the defense of the 
 republic — if, indeed, we may call by that name a gov- 
 ernment which asked for protection at the hands of 
 one of its citizens. 
 
 I believe that that which above all ruined Pom- 
 pey was the shame which he felt at the thought that, 
 in elevating Cffisar as he had done, he had been 
 wanting in foresight. He yielde(f as slowly as possi- 
 ble to this idea; he did not place himself in a state 
 of defense, in order that he might not have to admit 
 that he had placed himself in danger; he maintained 
 to the senate that Csesar would not dare to make 
 war ; and, because he had so often said this, he con- 
 tinued to repeat it. 
 
 It seems that one circumstance had put Csesar in 
 a position to undertake all. This was that, by an 
 unfortunate conformity of names, Ganl beyond the 
 Alps had been joined to his government of cisalpine 
 Gaul. 
 
 Policy did not permit that armies should be sta- 
 tioned near Kome, and neither did it permit that 
 Italy should be entirely stripped of troops. The con- 
 sequence of this was' that considerable forces were 
 
216 GRANDEUE AND DECADENCE [mootesqdieu. 
 
 held in cisalpine Gaul — that is, in the country which 
 extended from the Kubicon, a small river in Eo- 
 magna, to the Alps. But, in order to render the 
 city of Eome secure from these troops, the celebrated 
 senatus consultum was passed, the inscription of which 
 is still to be seen on the road leading from Eimini 
 to Cesena, and by which, whoever might pass the 
 Eubicon with an army, a legion, or a cohort, was 
 devoted to the infernal gods, and declared to be sac- 
 rilegious and a parricide. 
 
 To a government so important as that of cisal- 
 pine Gaul, and which held the city in check, was 
 joined one which was more considerable yet. This 
 was transalpine Gaul, comprehending the countries 
 of the south of France, and offering Caesar an op- 
 portunity to carry on war during many years with 
 whatever peoples he would. The result was, that 
 his soldiers grew old with himself, and that he con- 
 quered them no less than the barbarians. If CoBsar 
 had not had the government of transalpine Gaul, he 
 would neither have corrupted his soldiers, nor caused 
 his name to be respected by so many victories. If 
 he had not had the government of cisalpine Gaul, 
 Pompey would have been able to arrest his passage 
 of the Alps; whereas, from the very beginning of 
 the war, the latter was compelled to abandon Italy 
 — a circumstance which ruined the reputation of his 
 party; and, in civil wars, reputation is power itself. 
 
 The same consternation which Hannibal created 
 
CHAP. II.] OF THE ROMANS. 217 
 
 in Eome by his victory at Cannae, Caesar created by 
 crossing the Rubicon. Pompey was dismayed ; and, 
 in the first moments of the war, he saw no course 
 to take except that which remains in connection 
 with desperate affairs. He could only succumb and 
 fly. He retreated from the capital, leaving the pub- 
 lic treasure behiad him; he could nowhere retard 
 the career of the conqueror; he abandoned a part of 
 his troops, all Italy, and passed beyond the sea. 
 
 Much has been said respecting the fortune of Cae- 
 sar ; but that extraordinary man possessed so many 
 great qualities in perfection — although he had many 
 vices also — that it is difficult to conceive that he 
 would not have been conqueror, no matter what 
 army he had commanded, or that he would not have 
 governed, no matter in what republic he had been 
 born. 
 
 After having defeated the lieutenants of Pompey 
 in Spain, Caesar proceeded to Greece in search of 
 the chief himself. Pompey, who held the shore of 
 the sea, and commanded superior forces, was on the 
 verge of seeing the army of Caesar perish from want 
 and famine ; but, as he possessed in a supreme de- 
 gree the weakness of desiring to be approved, he 
 could not refrain from lending an ear to the vain 
 discourses of his followers, who incessantly rallied or 
 accused him." He wishes, said one, to perpetuate 
 his command, and, like Agamemnon, to be king of 
 
 '* See Plutarch, Life of Pompey. 
 10 
 
218 GEANDEUE AlfD DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 kings. I warn you, said another, tliat we shall eat 
 no more Tusculan figs this year. Some particular 
 successes which he achieved turned the heads of the 
 senatorial troop that attended him ; and thus, in 
 order not to be blamed, he did a thing which pos- 
 terity will always censure : he sacrificed all his ad- 
 vantages in order to proceed, with raw troops, to 
 engage in battle with an army which had so often 
 conquered." " 
 
 When, after the battle of PharsaHa, the remains of 
 Pompey's forces had withdrawn into Africa, Scipio, 
 who commanded them, would not follow the advice 
 of Cato — which was to protract the war into a long 
 one. Inflated by some advantages, he risked all and 
 lost all; and, when the party was re-established by 
 Brutus and Cassius, the same precipitation ruined the 
 republic a third time. 
 
 It is to be observed that during the civil wars, 
 which lasted for so long a time, the power of Eome 
 constantly increased abroad. Under Marius, SyUa, 
 Pompey, Caesar, Anthony, and Augustus, Eome con- 
 tinually grew more terrible, and completed the over- 
 throw of all the kings who yet remained. 
 
 There is no state which so dangerously menaces 
 others with conquest as one which is experiencing the 
 horrors of civil war. AH orders of men — the noble, 
 
 " This is well explained in Appian, The Civil War, Book IV, oh. cviii, 
 etc. — The army of Octavius and Anthony would have perished of famine 
 if battle had not been given, 
 
 " See my Note at the end of this chapter. — Tuanslatok. 
 
CHAP. XI,] OF THE ROMANS. 219 
 
 the burgher, the artisan, the laborer — become soldiers ; 
 and, -when the contending forces ai-e reunited by peace, 
 such a state possesses great advantages over others, 
 whose populations consist mostly of citizens only. In 
 addition to this, great men are often formed during 
 civil wars ; for, in the midst of confusion, great men 
 come to light ; each determines for himself his own 
 place and his own rank, whilst at other times the 
 places of men are determined for them, and often 
 with no regard to their capabihties. And, to pass 
 from the example of the Romans to others more re- 
 cent, the French have never been so formidable 
 abroad as after the quan-els of the houses of Bur- 
 gundy and Orleans, after the troubles of the League, 
 and after the civil wars which occurred during the 
 minorities of Louis XIII and Louis XIV. England 
 has never been so much respected as under Cromwell 
 after the wars of the Long Parliament. The Germans 
 did not acquire superiority over the Turks until after 
 the civil wars of Germany. The Spaniards under 
 PhiHp V, immediately after the civil wai's of the Suc- 
 cession, displayed a power in Sicily which astonished 
 Europe ; and at the present day Persia, rising afresh 
 from the ashes of civil war, himiiliates the Turks. 
 
 At length the Eoman republic was subverted. 
 There is no necessity that we should accuse the am- 
 bition of a few individuals, but there is a necessity 
 that we should accuse man — always the more greedy 
 for the acquisition of power in proportion as the 
 
220 GRANDEUK AND DECADENCE [montebquieit. 
 
 amount wliicli lie already possesses is great. He de- 
 sires all for no other reason than that he already pos- 
 sesses much.' 
 
 If Csesar and Pompey had thought as Cato, others 
 would have thought as Csesar and Pompey; and the 
 republic, ready to perish, would have been drawn to 
 the precipice by another hand. 
 
 Csesar pardoned everybody; but it appears to me 
 that the moderation which a man shows after he has 
 first usurped all does not merit great praise. 
 
 "Whatever may have been said of the activity of 
 Csesar after the battle of Pharsalia, Cicero justly ac- 
 cuses him of having been slow. The latter tells Cas- 
 sius that they had never believed that the party of 
 Pompey would have thus revived in Spain and Af- 
 rica ; and that, if they could have foreseen that Csesar 
 would amuse himself as he did in his war at Alexan- 
 dria, they would not have made their peace with him, 
 but would have withdrawn with Scipio and Cato into 
 Africa." Thus, by a foolish amour, Csesar encum- 
 bered himself with four wars, and, in not anticipating 
 the last two, he again put in question that which had . 
 been decided at Pharsalia. 
 
 At first, Csesar governed under the titles of the 
 Poman magistracies; for men are not much touched 
 except by names; and, as the peoples of Asia ab- 
 horred those of consul and proconsul, the peoples of 
 Europe detested that of king; so that, at this time, 
 
 " Familiar Letters, Book XV. 
 
CHAP. XI.] OF THE ROMANS. 221 
 
 these names constituted the happiness or the despair 
 of the earth. Caesar attempted to have a diadem 
 placed upon his head, but, seeing that the acclama- 
 tions of the people ceased, he rejected it. He made 
 yet other attempts;" but I cannot comprehend that 
 he believed that, since the Komans endured him as 
 tyrant, they therefore loved a tyranny, or that they 
 really thought they had done what in fact they had 
 done. 
 
 On one occasion, while the senate conferred cer- 
 tain honors upon him, he neglected to rise from his 
 seat ; and then the gravest members of this body 
 completely lost their patience. 
 
 Men are never more offended than when their 
 ceremonies and usages are disregarded. Seek to sub- 
 due them; this is sometimes a proof of the esteem 
 which you have for them. Shock their customs; 
 this is always taken as an indication of contempt. 
 
 At all times an enemy of the senate, Caesar 
 could not conceal the contempt he had conceived 
 for that body, which — since it possessed power no 
 longer — was become almost ridiculous. For this 
 reason, even his clemency was insulting. He was 
 regarded, not as pardoning, but as disdaining to 
 punish. 
 
 He carried his contempt for the senate so far that 
 he himself made senatorial decrees, and subscribed 
 to them the names of the first senators that came 
 '8 He set aside the tribunes of the people. 
 
222 GRANDEUE AND DECADENCE [MONTESQDiEtr. 
 
 into his mind. "I learn sometimes," says Cicero,'" 
 "that a senatus-consultvm,, passed upon my recom- 
 mendation, has already been carried into Syria and 
 Armenia before I have become aware of its exist- 
 ence; and many princes have written me letters of 
 thanks for having advised that the title of king 
 should be given them, whom not only I did not 
 know to be kings, but I did not so much as know 
 that they were in the world." 
 
 In the letters of some great men of this time," 
 which have been placed under the name of Cicero 
 for the reason that most of them were written by 
 him, we may see to what a condition of humiha- 
 tion and despair the first men of the republic were 
 reduced by that sudden revolution which deprived 
 them of their honors, and even of their occupations ; 
 when — inasmuch as the senate was shorn of its 
 powers — they could no longer hope for that credit 
 which they had heretofore enjoyed throughout the 
 earth, except in the cabinet of one man. This 
 state of things is much better realized from these 
 letters than from the accounts of historians. They 
 are a masterpiece of the naivete of meti united by 
 a common calamity, and of an age when a meri- 
 tricious politeness had not diffused falsehood every- 
 where. "We do not see in these letters, as in most 
 of our modem correspondence, people who desire to 
 
 " Familiar Letters, Book IX. 
 
 ^^ See the Letters of Oieero and of Servius Sulpitius. 
 
CHAP. XI.] OF THE ROMANS. 223 
 
 deceive; but we feel that we are iu the presence 
 of Tinhappy friends, who seek to communicate all 
 to each other. 
 
 It was very difficult for Caesar to defend his life. 
 Most of the conspirators were men who either be- 
 longed to his own party, or who had been loaded 
 with benefits by him;" and that this should have 
 been so was very natural. The conspirators had 
 realized great advantages from Caesar's success; but 
 the more their fortunes improved the more they 
 began to participate in the common calamity;" 
 for, to a man who has nothing, it imports little 
 enough, in certain respects, under what government 
 he lives. 
 
 In addition to this, there was a certain law of 
 nations — a certain opinion established in all the re- 
 publics of Greece and Italy— according to which the 
 assassin of any one who had usurped sovereign power 
 was regarded as a virtuous man. Especially at Eome, 
 after the erpulsion of the kings, this law was defi- 
 nite, and its execution approved. The republic 
 armed the hand of each citizen, constituted him a 
 magistrate for the moment, and acknowledged him 
 as her defender. / 
 
 Brutus dared even to say to his friends that, if it 
 had been his own father, returned to the earth, he 
 
 '1 Deeimus Brutus, Caius Casea, Treboniu3, TuUius Cimber, Minutius 
 Basilius, were friends of Caesar. (Appian, De Bdlo Civili, lib. ii, ch. cxiii.) 
 
 " I do not speak of the satellites of a tyrant, who would share his 
 ruin, but of the companions of a tyrant, under a free government. 
 
224 GKANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 would have killed him aU the same ; " and although, 
 in consequence of the continuance of the tyranny, this 
 spirit of liberty was gradually lost, yet, at the begin- 
 ning of the reign of Augustus, conspiracies were con- 
 stantly reviving. 
 
 This idea of assassinating tyrants arose from a 
 dominant love of country which, passing beyond the 
 ordinary rules prescribed for the judgment of crimes 
 and virtues, and listening to the voice of patriotism 
 only, saw neither citizen, nor friend, nor benefactor, 
 nor father. Virtue seemed to forget herself in order 
 to surpass herself; and the act which could not at 
 first sight be approved, for the reason that it was 
 atrocious, she caused to be admired as divine." 
 
 In fact, was not the crime of Caasar — who Hved 
 under a free government — of such a nature that it 
 could not be punished otherwise than by assassi- 
 nation? And, to ask why he was not pursued by 
 open force, or by the laws — would not that have 
 been the same thing as to have appealed to his own 
 crimes for redress? 
 
 ^' Letter of Brutus, in the collection of those of Cicero. 
 ^ Compare the remarks upon tyrannicide, which may be found at the 
 close of my Note at the end of this chapter. — Translator. 
 
BAKEK.} OF THE KOMANS. 225 
 
 l^OTE BY THE TEAISTSLATOE. 
 
 The vast relative importance wliicli, in tlie gen- 
 eral scheme of Roman history, attaches to the clos- 
 ing age of the republic, will justify some further 
 reference to the three prominent actors whom Mon- 
 tesquieu places in the foreground of this eventful 
 epoch. The proscriptions of Sylla, the military genius 
 and character of Pompey, and the role which Ceesar 
 performed in the usurpation of supreme power, will 
 therefore constitute the subjects of some additional 
 remarks ; to which may be fitly added some further 
 notice of the ancient doctrine of tyrannicide, in the 
 application of which the great usurper perished — 
 thus f ulfiUing the law of tragic interest by mingling 
 his own blood with the fall of the republic. 
 
 1. The proscrijpUon was a novelty in the Koman 
 system, taking its rise from the general fury of the 
 civil wars, exalted to a yet greater degree of inten- 
 sity in the special frenzy of Sylla. It was a fright- 
 ful instrument of injustice and tyranny; and its in- 
 troduction clearly indicated that the republican spirit 
 — ^which had heretofore upheld the institutions of 
 
226 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakeb. 
 
 Eome — had experienced a fatal collapse. The fol- 
 lowing extract from the accurate and learned work 
 of Dr. Adam will give some idea of what this nov- 
 elty was, and how it was operated by its inventor: 
 
 "Sylla first introduced the method of proscrip- 
 tion. Upon his return into the city, after having 
 conquered the pai-ty of Marius, he wrote down the 
 names of those whom he doomed to die, and ordered 
 them to be fixed up on tables in the public places of 
 the city, with the promise of a certain reward for 
 the head of each person so proscribed. ISTew lists 
 were repeatedly exposed as new victims occurred to 
 his memory, or were suggested to him. The first 
 list contained the names of forty senators and 1,600 
 equites. Incredible numbers were massacred, not 
 only at Eome, but through all Italy. Whoever har- 
 bored or assisted a proscribed person was put to 
 death. The goods of the proscribed were confiscated, 
 and their children declared incapable of honors. The 
 lands and fortunes of the slain were divided among 
 the friends of Sylla, who were allowed to enjoy pre- 
 ferments before the legal time." " 
 
 The proscription, therefore, was wholesale mur- 
 der and robbery, perpetrated by the successful upon 
 the defeated faction; and, in forming a just idea of 
 the ruin of the republic, which speedily followed, 
 it is worthy of special remark that this violent and 
 bloody practice originated with the aristocratic, and 
 
 ' Rom. Ant., Phila., 1812, p. 134. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE EOMANS. 227 
 
 not with the popular faction. Sylla was the leader 
 of the former, Marius of the latter; and, whilst 
 Marius was in the ascendant — however extensive may- 
 have been his massacres and assassinations — he organ-_ 
 ized no machinery for systematic destruction, he re- 
 sorted to no such cold-blooded and awful instrument 
 of tyranny as the proscription. 
 
 Mr. Maine — one of that small number of writers 
 in the English language who have carried the spirit 
 of philosophy and general reason into the literature 
 of law — thinks the proscription may be traced to the 
 want of power in the Homan criminal tribunals, or 
 Qusestiones Perpetuse, to inihct the penalty of death. 
 " The incompetence of the Eoman tribunals to pass 
 sentence of death," he says, "led distinctly and di- 
 rectly to those frightful revolutionary intervals, 
 known as the proscriptions, during which all law 
 was formally suspended simply because party violence 
 could find no other avenue to the vengeance for 
 which it was thirsting."' I suspect that the cause 
 here assigned is not equal to the effect claimed for 
 it. It may be admitted, indeed, that such want of 
 power in the criminal courts existing in the time of 
 Marius and Sylla had some tendency to increase ir- 
 regular violence in a society filled with vicious per- 
 sons; but it- appears to me, nevertheless, that the 
 main cause of the proscriptions is to be sought, not 
 in any defect in the criminal law, but in that grow-' 
 
 ' Ancient Law, N. T., 1864, p. 376. 
 
228 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakeb. 
 
 ing revolutionary spirit whicli had at length brought 
 the two factions to a trial of armed force, and which, 
 proceeding as this disorderly spirit did from gen- 
 eral causes, would have conducted the state to the 
 same issue, no matter how efficient the provisions of 
 the criminal law might have been. Doubtless proper 
 laws have a tendency to anticipate and ward off revo- 
 lution; and in some instances they will actually do 
 so. But, where the temper of a people has ceased 
 to be compatible with their existing form of govern- 
 ment, the disorderly forces of society are too large 
 for legal restraint; and this seems to have been the 
 case with the Eomans at the time of which we speak. 
 Laws punishing particular crimes with death would 
 hardly have stayed the hand of a man lite SyUa, 
 whose passion and whose principle it appears to have 
 been, to strike off the heads of the enemies of his 
 faction, whether guilty of any such crimes or not. 
 
 Condemning, killing, and confiscating by way of 
 proscription, which admitted no charge legally pre- 
 ferred, no notice to answer, no trial and no proof of 
 guilt or innocence, but simply inscribed the victim's 
 name upon a tablet, and armed against him a troop 
 of assassins, each vying with the rest for the price set 
 upon his head, must clearly take its place as one of 
 the basest and most criminal contrivances that was 
 ever resorted to by power ; and, when we remember 
 that all Italy was thus stained with the blood of the 
 Marian faction — which in its turn had been guilty 
 
KOTE.] OF THE EOMANS. 229 
 
 of atrocities only second in extent and quality — we 
 may have some idea of the causes which were already 
 hurrying the republic to ruin, when Sylla and Marius 
 were succeeded, and, so far as party position was con- 
 cerned, represented, by Pompey and Caesar. 
 
 2. The great and successful part which Pompey 
 for BO long a time acted in connection with the des- 
 tiny of Home, followed as it finally was by an over- 
 throw in which he perished with the republic, gives 
 rise to an interesting question respecting the real char- 
 acter of his military genius. 
 
 Whatever excuse there may or may not have 
 been for his neglect to anticipate Caesar, by placing 
 Borne and the adjacent parts of Italy in a state of 
 defense, it appears certain at all events — after the 
 storm had burst upon the unguarded capital — that he 
 manifested great and prompt ability in assembling the 
 land and naval forces of the republic in Greece and 
 upon the neighboring seas. And, fully aware how su- 
 perior were the veteran legionaries of Cffisar to his own 
 new levies, his plan appears to have been to compen- 
 sate the inferiority of his material by protracting the 
 war and awaiting the effect of discipline, by carefully 
 avoiding a decisive engagement, by availing himseK 
 of his greatly superior numbers on land for secure 
 defense in strong positions, and of his overwhelming 
 ascendency on sea to supply his own forces and to cut 
 off the supplies of his enemy. This plan seems to 
 have been consummately well conceived in the circum- 
 
230 GEANDEUK AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 stances in whicli he was placed after his abandonment 
 of Italy ; and, had it been rigorously adhered to, it ap- 
 pears probable that Cjesar would have been beaten in 
 the end. So long as Pompey was faithful to his own 
 theory of the contest, the scale inclined in his favor. 
 Cassar — conscious that the military requirements of 
 his situation were the reverse of those of his antaaro- 
 nist — knowing that his weak side consisted in delay, 
 and his strong one in early and decisive action — made 
 repeated and almost desperate attempts to draw Pom- 
 pey into a general engagement. For many months 
 all such attempts were skilfully foiled by his adver- 
 sary ; and, up to the time of Caesar's withdrawal from 
 Dyrrachium, it must be confessed that Pompey had 
 played the master hand. At this crisis the affairs 
 of Caesar, whether in Greece, on sea, or in Italy, 
 bore the hue of a waning cause ; and public opinion 
 rather strongly expected his overthrow. 
 
 It is mainly at this point that the question arises 
 upon Pompey as a general. In departing from the 
 plan which he had hitherto pursued, in following his 
 enemy into the open field with troops of greatly in- 
 ferior quality, and staking all on a single battle, and 
 that, too, at a time when delay alone was visibly work- 
 ing the ruin of Caesar, was Pompey impelled by his 
 own judgment as a soldier ? If so, his genius would 
 clearly have to be held defective ; but he does not ap- 
 pear to have been thus determined. Was he biased 
 by the augurs and the haruspices, whose divinations- 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 231 
 
 really a reflex of the public expectation — converged 
 strongly in his favor ? If so, his genius was impaired 
 by an unworthy superstition; and it may be that he 
 was in some degree touched by this influence. Was 
 he virtually coerced by a demoralization in his com- 
 mand which was equally as dangerous as the peril of 
 a decisive battle ? If so, he may be classed among 
 those great but unfortimate men who have been over- 
 borne by circumstances too strong for any human will 
 to control ; and there was much in the composition of 
 his command and in the character of his retainers to 
 indicate that something of this sort may have been 
 present. But, finally, was he, as Montesquieu sup- 
 poses, determined by the mere impatience, raillery, 
 and importunity of the great personages who had as- 
 sembled in his camp ? If so, his vanity was superior 
 to his genius — a truly fatal defect ia a general on a 
 trying occasion. But the real state of the case, as it 
 presents itself for judgment at this distance of time, 
 seems rather to be that Pompey may have been influ- 
 enced by the last three causes combined ; and, as it is 
 extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine in 
 what degree by each, it appears to be equally difficult 
 to say with precision to what extent his military con- 
 duct was culpable or excusable. 
 
 Dr. Middleton presents much the same view as 
 that of Montesquieu, but in terms somewhat more 
 favorable to Pompey. " But, after all," says this able 
 writer, " it must be owned that Pompey had a very 
 
232 GEANDEUK AND DECADENCE [bakee. 
 
 difficult part to act, and much less liberty of execut- 
 ing what he himself approved than in all the other 
 wars in which he had been engaged. In his wars 
 against foreign enemies his power was absolute, and 
 aU his motions depended on his own will ; but in 
 this, besides several kings and princes of the East 
 who attended him in person, he had with him in his 
 camp almost all the chief magistrates and senators of 
 Eome, men of equal dignity with himself, who had 
 commanded armies, and obtained triumphs, and ex- 
 pected a share in all his councils ; and that, in their 
 common danger, no step should be taken but by their 
 common advice : and, as they were under no engage- 
 ment to his cause but what was voluntary, so they 
 were necessarily to be humored, lest through disgust 
 they should desert it. l^ow, these were all uneasy in 
 their present situation, and longed to be at home in 
 the enjoyment of their estates and honors ; and, hav- 
 ing a confidence of victory from the number of their 
 troops and the reputation of their leader, were per- 
 petually teasing Pompey to the resolution of a battle, 
 charging him with a design to protract the war for 
 the sake of perpetuating his authority; and caUing 
 him another Agamemnon, who was proud of holding 
 so many kings and generals under his command ; till, 
 being unable to withstand their reproaches any longer, 
 he was driven by a kind of shame, and against his 
 judgment, to the experiment of a decisive action."' 
 
 ' Life of Cicero, London, 1839, p. 188. 
 
SOTE.] or THE ROMANS. 233 
 
 After resolving to risk an open and general battle 
 with such troops as he commanded, it was no dis- 
 credit to Pompey's capacity that he was overthrown. 
 Osesar himself indicated the quality of his rival's 
 forces by the characteristic remark, just before leaving 
 Italy for Spain, that " he was going against an army 
 without a general, and that he should thence return 
 against a general without an army." * The question 
 of capacity on the part of Pompey arises solely upon 
 his resolution to fight a decisive battle under the cir- 
 cumstances, and it is curious to reflect that, but for 
 the seemingly fortuitous circumstances which appear 
 to have diverted him from the masterly plan of oper- 
 ations which he had formed, and for a considerable 
 time adhered to, it is clearly within the scope of rea- 
 sonable probabihty that he, and not Osesar, would 
 have acquired the repute of being the first military 
 man of Kome. It is obvious, at all events, that the 
 easy and vulgar method of judging by the event has 
 too much obscured the just fame of Pompey. This 
 able man had nearly, doubled both the domain and 
 the revenues of the republic, and the triumphs with 
 which he had been honored had commemorated his 
 achievements in Europe, Asia, and Africa. The con- 
 trast of so much greatness with his wretched flight 
 from Pharsalia, and his miserable death by the hand 
 of an assassin on the coast of Africa, is one of the 
 
 * Professus ante inter suos, ire se ad exercitum sine duce, et inde rever- 
 surum ad ducem sine exerciiu. Suet. Ccesar, 34. 
 
23J: GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 sharpest which history presents. Like Hannibal and 
 Napoleon, it was his fate to touch the extremes of 
 fortune ; but, unlike them, his fame has not proved to 
 be wholly superior to the reverses by which his career 
 was broken and ended. 
 
 3. The part which Cssar performed — in giving 
 the final blow to a republic which, in fact, was al- 
 ready virtually ruined as such before he had as- 
 sumed the toga virilis — has probably fixed more 
 attention than any other transaction in the secular 
 history of mankind. Two leading phases of opinion 
 may be discriminated. On the one hand, the sympa- 
 thies of liberal minds have been attracted to the 
 expiring republic; eloquence has exhausted itself in 
 painting the crime of the usurper; and poetry has 
 gone so far as all but to deify his assassins. On the 
 other hand, the spirit of imperialism has selected 
 Csesar as its supreme prototype and representative; 
 it has distinguished his r61e as being eminently in 
 the interest of order and public weal; and its most 
 devoted advocates have wanted terms to express 
 their admiration of one whom they have accepted 
 as the world's foremost public man. The rational 
 thinker — identifying himself with neither of these 
 views — sees in the fall of the republic the mere 
 completion of a social change which had taken its 
 rise in general causes, and which had been rapidly 
 tending to a revolutionary crisis for more than a 
 generation. No special view, no one-sided or par- 
 
NOTE.] OF THE EOMANS. 235 
 
 tisan estimate, . is competent to embrace the true 
 meaning and value of the revolution in which Caesar 
 triumphed and the Roman Patriciate went down. 
 We cannot, indeed, suppress our human sympathies 
 in presence of so great and terrible a tragedy, and 
 we ought not to do so if we could; but we can see 
 that the wreck of fortunes, the ruin of great families, 
 and the bitter humiliation with which this ruin was 
 attended, were but results of an inevitable social 
 explosion, which had been long preparing in the 
 bosom of the state, and that the only open question 
 was as to which of the two great factions should 
 come out uppermost. 
 
 In this view, it is necessary to accept with care 
 and qualification many of the finest things that have 
 been said in relation to the subversion of the Roman 
 republic. Macintosh, for instance, has some beau- 
 tiful reflections upon the subject, which it appears 
 to me should be so received. " The Roman Patri- 
 ciate," he says, "trained in the conquest and gov- 
 ernment of the civilized world, in spite of the 
 tyrannical vices which sprung from that training, were 
 raised by the greatness of their objects to an eleva- 
 tion of genius and character unmatched by any other 
 aristocracy, ere the period when, after preserving 
 their power by a long course of wise compromise 
 with the people, they were betrayed by the army 
 and the populace into the hands of a single tyrant 
 of their own order — ^the most accomplished of usurp- 
 
236 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakek. 
 
 ers, and, if humanity and justice could for a mo- 
 ment be silenced, one of the most illuBtrious of men. 
 There is no scene in history so memorable as that 
 in which Caesar mastered a nobility of which Lucul- 
 lus and Hortensius, Sulpieius and Catulus, Pompey 
 and Cicero, Brutus and Cato were members." ' 
 
 It is certainly true that for many centuries the 
 Eoman aristocracy displayed very great administra- 
 tive ability, and it might be conceded that the 
 scene of their overthrow was one of the most mem- 
 orable in history; but I think it is not true that 
 this revolution can be adequately expressed by the 
 formula of a betrayal on the part of "the army and 
 the populace." Too special and limited a view of 
 the cause of the event is thus suggested. Stated in 
 its just breadth, the real cause of the revolution was 
 that the aristocracy, the populace, and the army had 
 become corrupt together, and that the particular vir- 
 tues which are essential to a republican government 
 nowhere existed in sufficient force to longer uphold 
 the old institutions. Under the influence of the 
 great wealth which had been rapidly gathered into 
 Eome after the second Punic war, in the form of 
 spoils, tributes, and perquisites from powerful clients 
 abroad, the whole tone of the Eoman character had 
 undergone a profound change ; and, instead of wealth 
 being despised as a mark of social distiuction, or as 
 a means of political advancement — as in the days of 
 » Dissertation on the Progress of ElUcal Philosophy, sec. 2. 
 
NOTE.] OP THE EOMANS. 237 
 
 Oincinnatus, Fabricius, and Curius Dentatus — the Ro- 
 man wlio lived in the time of Pompey and Caesar 
 placed a money value upon everything connected 
 with the interests of the state. Offices, public du- 
 ties, suffrages, had acquired a mercenary price. So 
 desperately corrupt had the elections become that 
 even Cato himself — who is generally regarded as 
 having been the most virtuous citizen of his age — 
 yielded to the delusion, on the occasion of a certain 
 consular election, that the public good would be ad- 
 vanced by bribing the voters." It is apparent, indeed, 
 from the details of the history of the time, that 
 the demagogues of the popular faction, with Caesar 
 at their head, were the more open and indecent in 
 their corrupt practices; but it is equally apparent 
 that the aristocratic faction, under the lead of Pom- 
 pey, had very generally lost the old patrician vir- 
 tues. 
 
 The political character of all orders in the state 
 being thus lowered, it was fatally necessary that the 
 government should respond to the declension of the 
 national character, and seek a new adjustment to 
 the altered conditions of the national life. There 
 were two ways in which it seemed possible that this 
 might be accomplished, accordingly as the patrician 
 or the popular faction might triumph. In the one 
 case the government would become much more in- 
 tensely aristocratic, and its popular functions would 
 
 ' SvM. C<esar, 19. 
 
238 GRANDEUK AND DECADENCE [bakeb. 
 
 be reduced to practical insignificance ; in the other, 
 the chief powers of the state would pass into the 
 hands of a princely demagogue, compelled by the 
 logic of his position to humble the patricians and to 
 pander to the army and the populace. In either 
 event there was no longer any reasonable hope for the 
 old republic. The time for mutual concession had 
 passed. The two ancient parties, which for five cen- 
 turies had contended together with such loyal gallant- 
 ry — corrupted at length by great empire in connection 
 with low culture — had become the most depraved of 
 factions, thoroughly unscrupulous in the choice of 
 means, and filled with the bitterest mutual enmity. 
 The spirit of compromise, by which their dissensions 
 had been so often reconciled, had wholly disappeared 
 in the blood which had been shed under Marius 
 and Sylla. The contest between these chiefs was 
 the fijst great armed struggle of the factions. In 
 this opening conflict the popular faction had been 
 badly worsted; and it was evidently the intention 
 of SyUa to so cripple it that it could not rise again. 
 In this, however, his will was completer than his 
 ' deed. He left the state filled with the sons, rela- 
 tions, and friends of men who had fallen by his 
 military executions, or perished by his murderous 
 proscriptions. The short period which intervened 
 between his death and the renewal of the struggle 
 was a hollow truce, a delusive calm, alarmed by 
 conspiracies and disturbed by seditions. The general 
 
KOiE.] OF THE ROMANS. 239 
 
 temper of the Eoman mind was such that it was ' 
 unavoidable that the contest should go on until the 
 one or the other of the factions should be effectually 
 crushed. 
 
 In looking at the two opposing prinGij>les, there 
 appears to be small ground for rational choice. We 
 are to choose between the rule of a corrupt aristoc- 
 racy, inflated by success and inflamed by resentment, 
 and the rule of a single tyrant equally corrupt, and 
 relying for his support upon the populace and the 
 military. In looking at the two leaders, the case is 
 otherwise. Here we are to choose between a man 
 who, had he succeeded, would all but certainly have 
 imitated Sylla in drenching his country in the blood 
 of his defeated fellow-citizens,' and one who, in spite 
 of his amazing vices,' was much superior to Marius. 
 It so fell out that the latter triumphed; and, under 
 the bad conditions of the situation, it is difficult to 
 see that humanity, justice, and liberty were worse off 
 than they would have been had he failed and his 
 rival succeeded. 
 
 Such, in the most comprehensive view of the 
 question, appears to me to be the rai/ionale of that 
 famous revolution by which the Eoman republic 
 came to an end. General causes made it inevitable 
 that it should fall ; particular causes determined the 
 manner and form of the catastrophe. The princi- 
 
 ' Middleton's IA.fe of Cicero, London, 1839, p. 185. • 
 8 Suet. Cmar, 40, 43, 44, 49, 50, 52, 54, 76. 
 
240 
 
 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [basee. 
 
 pled monarchist and the principled republican can 
 equally acquiesce in the change; the one from the 
 mistaken and superficial conviction that all popular 
 governments are abnormal ; the other from the knowl- 
 edge that, although the republican type of govern- 
 ment is demonstrably the highest and best, it can- 
 not beneficially survive the loss of its precedent social 
 conditions. 
 
 "We have the testimony of Tacitus that the great 
 mass of the subjects of Kome— the numerous peoples 
 ■who were distributed through the provinces— were 
 not averse to the overthrow of the old regime, dis- 
 gusted as they were with a government which was 
 perturbed by "the dissensions of the great" and de- 
 based by " the avarice of the magistrates " ; a govern- 
 ment in which "the laws were invalidated by force, 
 ambition, and bribery." ° There is little in the sub- 
 version of such a government — stiU holding though 
 it did the name of a republic — to enlist the sympa- 
 thies or to excite the regret of a rational friend of 
 free institutions. 
 
 4. In view of the state of opinion among the 
 Romans in relation to the killing of tyrants, it was, 
 of course, natural that Caesar's life should be brought 
 to a violent end; and in the remarks which Mon- 
 tesquieu makes upon the subject, he assumes the 
 
 ' Ncque provincice ilium rerum statum ahnuebant, suspeclo smcUns pop- 
 ulique imperio o5 certamina potentium, et avaritiam magistratuum ; in- 
 valido legum auxilio, guce vi, amhitu, postremo pecunia iurbabantur. — An- 
 nal, i, 2. 
 
NOTE.] OP THE ROMiNS. 241 
 
 tone of an ancient rather than of a modern pMloso- 
 pher. 
 
 The tyrant (fyrannos, tyranrmi) of the Greeks 
 and Komans originally signified a lawful supreme 
 ruler; but in the course of time — after the establish- 
 ment of repubhcs by both peoples — the term came to 
 be applied to usurpers of the sovereign power; and 
 there was a strong .opinion to the effect that it was 
 not only right, but eminently meritorious, to assassin- 
 ate such intruders. Thus, among the Greeks, Har- 
 modius and Aristogiton — the assassins of Hipparchus 
 — ^received all but divine honors; and, shortly after 
 the expulsion of the kings from Rome, a law was 
 -.made which authorized every citizen of the republic 
 to become at once judge and executioner, and to 
 slay any one who might aspire to the regal power; 
 and it seems that this law was still standing at the 
 time of the killing of Csesar — more than four hun- 
 dred and fifty years after its enactment. '° 
 
 Cicero — who is commonly so just in his ethical 
 principles, and who, in point of intellectual force and 
 accomplishments, was probably the greatest and most 
 luminous genius that adorned republican Kome — 
 gives his full sanction to the doctrine of assassina- 
 tion as apphed to tyrants. "What," he says, "can 
 be more deeply criminal than to slay, not only a 
 man, but a man who is furthermore an intimate 
 
 ^^ Comp. lAvy, ii, 8 ; Plutarch, Life of FuUicola ; and Gibbon's Rome, 
 ch. xliv. 
 
 11 
 
242 
 
 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [eakee. 
 
 friend? Does he, therefore, involve himself in 
 crime who slays a tyrant — ^however intimate a friend 
 he may be ? Certainly the Roman people— who re- 
 gard this as the most beautiful of all illustrious acts 
 —do not so view it. Has utility, then, triumphed 
 over virtue? On the contrary, utility has in truth 
 followed virtue."" 
 
 The very wide difference between ancient and 
 modern thought on the subject of tyrannicide is a 
 fact of much significance. Eightly considered, it in- 
 dicates a profound social and ethical progress. There 
 is no instance in modern times in which a desirable 
 reputation has been acquired by the assassination of 
 a ruler. On the contrary, this class of assassins has 
 very generally been consigned to the execration of 
 history. In the present century, it is probable that 
 no writer of character has gone further in extenua- 
 tion of the assassination of a tyrant than Lamartine 
 in his remarks upon Charlotte Corday — ^the least cul- 
 pable, perhaps, of all the modern assassins : " In the 
 face of murder, history dares not praise, and, in the 
 face of heroism, dares not condemn her." The old 
 admiration of the ancient assassins is also dying out. 
 It would be hardly possible for another such rhapsody 
 
 " Quod potest majus esse scelus, quam non modo hominem, sod etiam 
 familiarem hominem occidere < Num. igiiur se astnnxit scelcre, si gui 
 ii/rannum occidil, guamvis familiarem ? Fopuh quidem Romano rwn 
 videtur, qui ex omnibus prceclaris fac/is illud pulcherrimwm existimat, 
 Vieit ercfo utUitas lumestatem I Immo vera honeslas utilitaiem secuta est. 
 (De Officiis, iii, 4.) 
 
NOTE.] OF THE KOMANS. 243 
 
 as that of Akenside upon Brutus" to be produced 
 at the present day ; and, if produced, it would have to 
 come from some enthusiastic youth or closeted " mod- 
 ern ancient." As liberty comes to be better under- 
 stood, and as men grow to be more capable of it, 
 sympathy with the doctrine of assassination of iy- 
 rants diminishes. As civilization does its work, con- 
 science more and more shrinks from a doctrine 
 which, whilst professing to limit itself to the de- 
 struction of the worst of men, authorizes treachery, 
 falsehood, and stealth, as means for the accomplish- 
 ment of murder, and places the Hves of such men 
 as William the Silent, Henry lY of France, and our 
 own Lincoln, at the disposal of such abnormal 
 wretches as Baltasar Gerard, Erangois Eavaillac, and 
 John "Wilkes Booth. 
 
 What is the definite reason for this great change 
 of opinion on the subject of tyrannicide? I think it 
 
 " Or is there in the abyss, 
 Is there among the adamantine spheres 
 Wheeling unshaken through the boundless void, 
 Aught that with half such majesty can fill 
 The human bosom, as when Brutus rose 
 Refulgent from the stroke of Caesar's fate 
 Amid the crowd of patriots ; and, his arm 
 Aloft extending like eternal Jove 
 When guilt brings down the thunder, call'd aloud 
 On Tully's name, and shook the crimson sword 
 Of justice in his rapt, astonish'd eye. 
 And bade the father of his country hail. 
 For lo, the tyrant prostrate on the dust. 
 And Rome again is free ? 
 
 {Tlie Pleasures of tlie Imagination, Book II.) 
 
344: GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakee. 
 
 emperors before the blood of human victims ceased 
 to flow, either as an offering to the gods or to the 
 souls of the dead ; and thus we have, in the case of 
 the Romans, a striking illustration of the general law 
 of history — that in all progressive societies the popu- 
 lar religious ideas yield tardily to the advancing so- 
 cial movement. 
 
 IV. I suspect that a neglected, but very impor- 
 tant, cause of the final overthrow of the Roman power 
 by the nations of the North may be found in the pro- 
 gressive diffusion of the use of iron among these rude 
 peoples, and in the consequent positive increase of 
 their military force and efficiency. 
 
 The earliest periods of Greek and Roman history 
 seem to abut upon an Age of Bronze. " It is stated," 
 says Professor Worsaae, "by Homer, Hesiod, and 
 other authors, that the Greeks in the most ancient 
 time, before they had knowledge of iron, used bronze, 
 which was also the case with the Romans." At 
 later, though yet remote periods in their history, these 
 leaders of ancient European civilization appear to 
 have gradually acquired the use of iron. "Already 
 in the time of Homer," says the same writer, "the 
 Greeks had iron, although it was very scarce and 
 expensive; the Romans seem to have had and used 
 iron before the kings were expelled." Thence the 
 use of iron appears to have spread slowly among 
 the peoples of the North. Professor Worsaae con- 
 tinues: "It was partly an effect of Greek and Ro- 
 
NoiE.] OF THE KOMAJfS. 345 
 
 man influence tliat the use of iron was known at a 
 comparatively early period in the northern parts of 
 Italy, in South Germany, and Gallia, the inhabitants 
 of which countries were thereby enabled to contend 
 so gallantly with the Komans. Polybius mentions, 
 however, that the Gauls, who, about two hundred 
 years before Christ, fought against the Eomans in 
 the north of Italy, were obliged in their battles to 
 straighten their swords by putting their feet upon 
 them, because they bent when exposed to a heavy 
 blow; a fact which shows that the Gauls did not 
 then possess steel. The invention of making the iron 
 hard is attributed to the Celts of ISToricum ; in the 
 time of Augustus, the Noric swords were famous in 
 Eome. 
 
 " But, if the people in the neighborhood of Eome, 
 and influenced by Eoman civilization, at the com- 
 mencement of the Christian era, generally possessed 
 weapons of iron, it does not follow that the people 
 in the E"orth had also, at so early a time, plenty of 
 that metal. Caesar says distinctly that, ia Britain, 
 iron was only to be found at the coasts, and that in 
 such small quantities that the inhabitants used im- 
 ported bronze {'cere utantur irnportato''). It must 
 also be remembered that he speaks of their using 
 iron rings as money. A century after Christ, the 
 Britons seem to have got a great deal more iron, but 
 the Germans had still so little of it that they very 
 rarely had swords, or large lance-heads, of that metal. 
 
246 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquiec. 
 
 Before Ms death, and while preparing for his ex- 
 pedition against the Parthians, Csesar had named the 
 magistrates for several years in advance, in order that 
 he might leave behind him officers attached to his 
 interests, and upon whom he could rely for the main- 
 tenance of the tranquillity of his government during 
 his absence. Thus it fell out that, after his death, 
 the adherents of his party felt that they were sup- 
 plied with resources for a long time. 
 
 As the senate had approved all the acts of Osesar 
 without exception, and as the execution of these de- 
 volved upon the consuls, Anthony — who was a con- 
 sul — seized Caesar's book of accounts, gained his secre- 
 tary, and caused to be written therein whatever he 
 desired. Thus the dictator reigned more imperiously 
 than during his hfe; for what he had never done 
 Anthony did. Money which Csesar had never given, 
 Anthony gave ; and all men who cherished bad in- 
 tentions towards the republic suddenly found a re- 
 ward in the books of Caesar. 
 
 As an additional misfortune, Csesar had amassed 
 and deposited in the temple of Opis immense sums 
 for his Parthian expedition. Anthony, with his book, 
 disposed of this treasure at his fancy. 
 
 The conspirators had at first resolved to throw 
 the body of Csesar into the Tiber.' They would 
 
 " This would not have been without precedent. After Tiberius Grac- 
 chus was killed, Lucretius, an a;dile, who was afterwards called Vespillo, 
 threw his body into the Tiber. (Aukeltos Victok, De Vir. lUust., ch. 
 Ixiv.) 
 
CHAP. XII.] OF THE ROMANS. 247 
 
 have met with no obstacle in the execution of that 
 purpoBe; for, in the first moments of consternation 
 which follow an unexpected action, it is easy to do 
 all that men may dare. This purpose, however, was 
 not carried into execution ; and the following is what 
 came of the omission to do so: 
 
 The senate felt itself compelled to permit the 
 celebration of the obsequies of Csesar; and, in fact, 
 from the moment that this body had failed to de- 
 clare him a tyrant, it could not refuse him the rites 
 of sepulture. Now, it was a custom among the Ro- 
 mans, much extolled by Polybius, to carry the images 
 of their ancestors in their fimeral processions, and to 
 pronounce afterwards a funeral oration for the dead. 
 Anthony, who delivered the oration on this occa- 
 sion, exhibited to the people the bloody robe of 
 Csesar, read to them the will of the deceased — ^in 
 which he had left them large legacies— and thus 
 stirred up their passions to such a pitch that they 
 set fire to the houses of the conspirators. 
 
 We have an opinion of Cicero — who ruled the 
 senate throughout this affair' — that it would have 
 been better to have acted with rigor, and to have 
 exposed themselves to destruction, and that not one 
 would have perished. But he excuses himself on 
 the ground that when the senate assembled it was 
 already too late ; and no one will be astonished at 
 this who knows the value of a moment in connec- 
 ' Letta-s to Attims, Book XIV, Letter x. 
 
248 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 tion with affairs in wHch tlie people take so large 
 
 a part. 
 
 There was yet another casualty. Whilst the games 
 were being performed in honor of Caesar, a comet 
 with a long train appeared during seven successive 
 days. The people believed that his soul had been re- 
 ceived into heaven. 
 
 It was very customary among the Greets and 
 Asiatics to build temples to kings, and even to the 
 proconsuls who had governed them.' They were per- 
 mitted to do these things as affording the strongest 
 evidence of their servitude which they could give; 
 and the Eomans themselves— as regarded then- lares, 
 or objects of private worship— might render divine 
 honors to their ancestors;' but I do not find that, 
 from Komulus to Caesar, any Eoman had been placed 
 in the number of the public divinities."" 
 
 ^ See thereon the Letters of Cicero to Atlicus, Book T, and the remark 
 of the Abb6 de Mongault. 
 
 * " The Lares of the Romans appear to have been the manes of their 
 ancestors. Small waxen images of them, clothed with a skin of a dog, 
 were placed round the hearth in the hall. On festivals they were 
 crowned with garlands, and sacrifices were offered to them. There were 
 not only iMres (hmestici et familiares, but also compitales et viales, mUi- 
 tares et marini" &c. Adam's Rom. Aid., Phila., 18'72, pp. 188, 189. 
 The worship of the lares was not, therefore, wholly domestic and private. 
 Those of the cross-roads and highways, and those of soldiers and mari- 
 ners, partook in some degree of a public character. — Translator. 
 
 ' Dion says that the Triumvirs — each of whom hoped some day to 
 occupy the place of Ctesar — did all they could to increase the honors 
 which were extended to him. Book XLVII. 
 
 " Montesquieu here has in view the fact — which he implies rather 
 than states — that a place was given to Caesar among the gods. " He 
 perished," says Suetonius, " in the fifty-sixth year of his age, and was 
 
CHAP. XII.] OF THE ROMANS. 249 
 
 The government of Macedon had fallen to the lot 
 of Anthony. He desired that of the Gauls instead, 
 from what motive it is easy to see. Decimns Brutus, 
 who had the government of cisalpine Gaul, having 
 refused to turn it over to him, Anthony resolved to 
 expel him hy force. This gave rise to a civil war, in 
 which the senate declared Anthony to be an enemy 
 of his country. 
 
 As a means of ruining Anthony, who was his par- 
 ticular enemy, Cicero resorted to the bad policy of 
 elevating Octavius; and thus, instead of seeking to 
 induce the people to forget Caesar, he placed him 
 before their eyes. 
 
 Octavius conducted himself with Cicero as an 
 able man. He flattered him, he praised him, he con- 
 sulted him, and employed all thpse artifices which 
 vanity never distrusts. 
 
 Nearly all affairs are marred by the fact that 
 those who undertake them commonly seek to realize, 
 in addition to the principal object, certain small, par- 
 ticular successes which flatter their self-love, and thus 
 render them content with their part. 
 
 I believe that, if Cato had reserved himself for 
 
 placed in the number of the gods, not only by the form of a decree, but 
 by the credence of the vulgar." {Periit sexto et guinquagesimo ceiatis 
 anno : atque in deorrnn numei-um relaius est, non ore modo decerntium, sed 
 etpersmsione miXgi. Suet. Caesar, 88.) Thus we see that the spirit of ex- 
 cessive admiration of particular men — ascending in its extremes to actual 
 worship, and which is so inconsistent with a republican government — after 
 having been thrown off by the Roman people for many centuries, was 
 resumed by them with the commencement of the empire. — Translator. 
 
250 GEANDEUK AND DECADENCE [mohtesquieu. 
 
 the republic, lie would have given a totally different 
 turn to things. Endowed as Cicero was with ad- 
 mirable parts for a secondary role, he was incapable 
 of the first. To a superb genius he united a soul 
 which was often common. "With him, virtue was tlie 
 accessory ; with Cato, glory.' Cicero always saw him- 
 self first; Cato as constantly forgot himself. The 
 latter would have saved the republic for its own 
 sake; the former in order to boast of his services.' 
 I might continue the parallel by saying that whilst 
 Cato foresaw, Cicero feared; that when Cato hoped, 
 Cicero was confident ; that the one always looked 
 upon things with a cool head, the other through a 
 hundred small passions. 
 
 Anthony was defeated at Mntina; and the two 
 consuls, Hirtius and Pansa, there perished. The sen- 
 ate, which believed that it held the upper hand in 
 its own affairs, thought of humbling Octavius — who, 
 for his part, ceased to act against Anthony, marched 
 his army to Eome, and caused himself to be de- 
 clared consul. 
 
 And thus it was that Cicero, who boasted that 
 his robe had destroyed the armies of Anthony, gave 
 to the republic an enemy yet more dangerous, for 
 the reason that, whilst his name was dearer to 
 
 ' J&ae quam videri bonus malehat ; ilaque, quo minus glonam 
 petehat, eo magis illam assequebatur. (Sallust, De Belh Catil., ch. 
 liv.) 
 
 * With all his vanity, I think Cicero's patriotism was much deeper 
 than is here implied. — Translator. 
 
CHAP. XII.] OF THE EOMANS. 251 
 
 the people, his rights were apparently- more legiti- 
 mate.' 
 
 After his defeat, Anthony had taken refuge in 
 transalpine Gaul, where he had been received by Lep- 
 idus. These two men united with Octavius ; and the 
 three gave, each to the others, the lives of their friends 
 and their enemies." 
 
 Lepidus remained at Eome; the other two pro- 
 ceeded in quest of Brutus and Cassius, and found 
 them in a region of country in which the empire of 
 the world was three times disputed by contending 
 armies." 
 
 Brutus and Cassius killed themselves with inex- 
 cusable precipitation; and we cannot read this pas- 
 sage in their lives without a feeling of pity for the 
 republic which was thus abandoned. The tragedy, 
 which commenced in some 'sort by their deaths, was 
 ended by the suicide of CatO. 
 
 We might assign many causes for that custom of 
 suicide which was so common among the Romans: 
 
 ' Octavius wa3 heir of Csssar, and his son by adoption. 
 
 '" So insensate was their cruelty that they ordered, under penalty of 
 death, that everybody should rejoice in the proscriptions. See Dion. 
 
 " I suppose reference is here made to the battles of Pharsalia, Phil- 
 Ippi, and Actium. In the first, b. c. 48, Ceesar triumphed over Pompey ; 
 in the second, b. c. 42, Octavius and Anthony defeated Brutus and Cas- 
 sius ; in the third, b. c. 31, Octavius consolidated his power by the over- 
 throw of Anthony. All three of these battles took place within the con- 
 fines of Greece or upon its neighboring waters — in which fact we may 
 detect a certain poetical propriety. Csesar expired at the base of Pom- 
 pey'a statue ; the ambitious and corrupt republic gave to itself its final 
 and mortal stabs upon the soil and under the eye of vanquished Greece. 
 — Teanslatok. 
 
252 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 the progress of the stoical philosophy, which en- 
 couraged self-destruction ; the institution of the tri- 
 umph, and that of slavery, which caused many great 
 men to believe that they ought not to survive a defeat ; 
 the privilege which the accused had of killing them- 
 selves, instead of submitting to a judgment by which 
 their memory would be tarnished and their property 
 confiscated;'" a certain point of honor, more reason- 
 able, perhaps, than that which prompts us at the 
 present day to slay our friend for a jest or a word; 
 and, finally, the great commodity for heroism which 
 suicide supplied — each one finishing the part which 
 he played in the world at the place which he chose 
 for himself." 
 
 We might add to the foregoing the great facihty 
 with which self-destruction is executed. The soul, 
 wholly occupied with the act which it is going to 
 commit, with the motives which determine it, with 
 the perils which it is about to escape, does not, prop- 
 erly speaking, see death ; for passion causes us to 
 feel, but never to see. 
 
 Self-love — the love of our own preservation — 
 transforms itself in so many ways, and acts from 
 principles so opposite, that it prompts us to sacrifice 
 our being for the love of our being ; and such is the 
 
 '^ Eorum qui de se slatuehant humahantur corpora, manebanl testa- 
 menta, pretium festinandi. Tacitus, Annales, lib. vi, ch. xxix. 
 
 " If Charles I and James 11 had lived under the influence of a re- 
 ligion which permitted them to kill themselves, the one would not have 
 had to endure such a death, nor the other such a life. 
 
CHAP. XII.] OF THE ROMANS. 253 
 
 store wWcli we place upon ourselves, that, by virtue 
 of a natural and obscure instinct, whicli causes us to 
 love ourselves more tlian our own life, we consent to 
 cease to live." 
 
 " [In some modern editions tliis chapter ends with the following 
 paragraph : 
 
 " It is certain that men haye become less free, less courageous, less 
 impelled to great enterprises, than they were at a time when, by virtue 
 of that power which they held over themselves, they were able, at any 
 instant, to escape from every other power." 
 
 But, this passage not being found in any of the editions published 
 during the life of Montesquieu, we have thought it right to remit it to 
 the foot of the page. (P.)] 
 
254 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 NOTE BY THE TEAJSTSLATOR. 
 
 In the foregoing remarks upon suicide, as in those 
 respecting tyrannicide, at the close of Chapter XI, we 
 see that Montesquieu was considerably influenced by 
 the ancient spirit. 
 
 The thought which needs to be placed in the 
 foreground in connection with suicide is that, where 
 it does not proceed from insanity, it very generally 
 results from a want of courage to meet, and of forti- 
 tude to endure, the ills of life. Involving thus a 
 retreat in the face of the enemy — that is, a retreat 
 in the face of the evils with which life is environed 
 — suicide is wanting in the two fundamental ele- 
 ments of true heroism — aggressive courage and pas- 
 sive endurance. It is the office of the first of these 
 to impel the soul to brave, positive action; of the 
 •second, to sustain it in those circumstances of misfor- 
 tune in which the active powers are no longer of any 
 avail. It is clear that the quality of a man is most 
 tried when he is reduced to the latter condition; 
 from which we see that the highest type of heroism 
 consists more in the power to endure than to do. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 255 
 
 The choice of suicide, however, even in such cir- 
 cumstances, is still a confession that the soul is too 
 weak, too unheroic, to sustain the burden which has 
 been cast upon it. 
 
 The vague impression, in which Montesquieu ap- 
 pears to share, that suicide was relatively more 
 comjnon in ancient than it is in modern times, is 
 probably erroneous. This impression seems to be 
 founded upon the consideration that among the an- 
 cients self-destruction was commended by philosophy, 
 permitted by religion, and approved by the law ; 
 whilst in our modern societies it is forbidden by the 
 first two, and discouraged as much as may be by the 
 third. But it would appear that there are social 
 causes at work in modern times which act more 
 powerfully in the production of suicide, than law, re- 
 ligion and philosophy are able to do in restraint of 
 it. There are, of course* no ancient statistics upon 
 the subject, by means of which a direct comparison 
 may be made with modem results; but such modern 
 statistics as we have give rise to a suspicion that 
 suicide has increased in our existing societies with 
 the increase of social development.' Should this sus- 
 picion come to be verified for the future, suicide 
 will take its place as an obstinate retii/rning cur- 
 rent in the vast direct movement of the stream of 
 civilization. 
 
 ' See Quetelet's Physique Sodale, Bruxelles and Paris, 1869, torn, ii, 
 pp. 232-236. 
 
256 GEANDEUE AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 One feels a sad interest in considering side by 
 side two of the laws which Quetelet has generalized 
 from a wide range of facts — the laws which express 
 the tendency to crime and the tendency to suicide 
 in the life of the arerage individual : 
 
 " The penchant to cri/me increases very rapidly 
 towards the adult age; it attains its maxi/mum, a/nd 
 then decreases slowly to the end of life. . . . The 
 penchant to suicide, already developed in infancy, 
 increases sensibly towards the adult age, amd goes on 
 continually increasing to the most advanced old age — 
 regard ieing had to the numbers of the population." ' 
 
 Thus it appears, if Quetelet is right, that whilst 
 the tendency to crime diminishes with the burden of 
 years, the tendency to throw off life increases. 
 
 The sphere of the activities, and, consequently, the 
 sphere of the mental excitations, of our modem socie- 
 ties, are evidently much more extensive, complex, and 
 intense than were the like in the societies of ancient 
 times ; a difiEerence which probably stands connected, 
 not only with an increased tendency to suicide, but 
 with an increased tendency to insanity as well. But, 
 inasmuch as all normal activity and mental excita- 
 tion tend to promote physical and cerebral health and 
 energy, we must suppose that the fault lies in that 
 abnormal, and eminently irrational, element of rush 
 and stress which has place in our present societies — 
 above all, in that of the United States. The physi- 
 
 " FJiysiquc Sociale, torn, ii, pp. 366, SGY. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 257 
 
 cal, intellectual, and moral waste, wreckage, and bad 
 work, thence resulting, are enormous. If we moved 
 at a more seK-contained pace, we should make much 
 better speed in respect to every rational human in- 
 terest, and have much less insanity and suicide. 
 
 The active forces in our modem societies — and 
 eminently so in the United States — are for the time 
 being considerably larger than the wisdom which con- 
 trols them ; and one of the chief problems which is 
 set before our time — especially before Americans — 
 is to put these two factors in better proportion and 
 accord with each other. 
 
258 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 CHAPTEE XIII. 
 
 AUGUSTirS. 
 
 Sextus Pompet held Sicily and Sardinia. He 
 was master of the sea, and had with him an im- 
 mense number of fugitives and proscribed citizens 
 who fought for their last hopes. Octavius prosecuted 
 two very laborious wars against him, and, after many 
 bad successes, .finally vanquished him by means of 
 the ability of Agrippa. 
 
 The conspirators had nearly all ended their lives 
 unhappily.' It was very natural that men who were 
 at the head of a party which was so often beaten, 
 and that, too, in civil wars in which no quarter was 
 given, should perish by violence. From this circum- 
 stance, however, was drawn the conclusion of a 
 divine vengeance, which pursued the murderers of 
 Caesar, and proscribed their cause. 
 
 Octavius gained the soldiers of Lepidus, and de- 
 spoiled him of the powers of the triumvirate. He 
 
 ' In our times, nearly all those wto condemned CHarlea I came to a 
 tragic end. The reason was, that it is scarcely possible to do such 
 things without raising up mortal enemies on all sides, and, consequently, 
 •without incurring an infinity of dangers. 
 
CHAP. XIII.] OF THE ROMANS. 259 
 
 even envied him the consolation of leading an ob- 
 scure life, and forced him to assume an humble 
 appearance in the assemblies of the people. We 
 feel quite content in witnessing the humiliation of 
 this man. He was the most wicked citizen of the 
 republic, always first to commence disturbances, and 
 incessantly forming mischievous projects in which 
 he was obliged to associate abler men than himself. 
 A modem author," who has been pleased to write 
 his eulogy, cites Anthony, who, in one of his let- 
 ters, gives Lepidus the name of an honest man ; 
 but an honest man for Anthony should not be much 
 so for others. 
 
 I believe that Octavius is the only one of all 
 the Roman commanders who succeeded in gaining 
 the affection of his soldiers while giving them in- 
 cessant proofs of natural cowardice. At this time, 
 however, the soldiers placed a higher estimate upon 
 the liberality than upon the courage of their gen- 
 eral. Perhaps it was even fortunate for Octavius 
 that he did not possess that valor which is capable 
 of giving empire; and it may be — inasmuch as he 
 was less feared — that he was borne to it by this 
 veiy defect in his character. It is not impossible 
 that the qualities which dishonored him most served 
 him best. If he had at once shown a great soul, 
 all men would have been apprehensive of him. If 
 he had possessed a bold spirit, he would not have 
 
 » The Abb6 do Saint-Ri5al. 
 
2g0 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquku. 
 
 given Anthony time to ruin himself by his extrava- 
 gances. 
 
 Whilst preparing for war against Octavius, An- 
 thony bound himself by an oath to his soldiers, that 
 within two months after he should achieve victory 
 he would re-establish the republic ; from which it is 
 easy to see that the soldiers themselves were jealous 
 of the liberty of their country, although they were 
 constantly destroying it — there being nothing so blind 
 as an army. 
 
 The battle of Actium took place; Cleopatra fled, 
 and drew Anthony with her. It is certain that in 
 the end she betrayed him.' It may be that, influ- 
 enced by that inconceivable spirit of coquetry which 
 belongs to women, she had formed the design of 
 bringing yet a third master of the world to her feet. 
 
 A woman for whom Anthony had sacrificed the 
 world betrayed him ; the numerous captains and kings 
 whom he had either aggrandized or set np deserted 
 him; but, as if generosity were allied to servitude, 
 a troop of gladiators stood by him with heroic fidehty. 
 Cover a man with benefits, and you at once inspire 
 him with the idea of looking about for the means of 
 preserving them; they are new interests which you 
 have given him to defend. 
 
 That which is surprising in these wars is the fact 
 that one battle nearly always decided the affair, and 
 that defeats were not repaired. 
 
 ' See Dion, Book LI. 
 
CHAP. XIII.] OF THE ROMANS. 261 
 
 Properly speaking, the Koman soldiers were not 
 actuated by the spirit of party. They did not fight 
 for a certain thing, but for a certain person. They 
 knew only their chief, who engaged them by im- 
 mense expectations. But once beaten, the chief 
 being no longer in a condition to fulfill his promises, 
 they passed over to another side. The provinces en- 
 tered into the quarrel with no more sincerity; for it 
 imported very little to them whether the senate or 
 the people had the upper hand. Thus it was that, as 
 soon as one of the chiefs was beaten, they gave them- 
 selves to the other ; ' for it was necessary that each city 
 should take care to justify itself before the conqueror, 
 who, having vast promises to keep with his soldiers, 
 would sacrifice to them the most culpable communities. 
 
 "We have had two sorts of civil wars in France. 
 Those which had religion for a pretext were long 
 ones; for the motive from which they sprung con- 
 tinued to exist after a victory was gained. The other 
 class of our civil wars had, properly speaking, no mo- 
 tive, but were excited by the folly or the ambition 
 of some great persons; and these were speedily ter- 
 minated. 
 
 Augustus — for this is the name which flattery 
 gave to Octavius — established order; that is to say, 
 lasting servitude;' for, when the sovereign power 
 
 '' No garrisons had been stationed in the cities for the purpose of 
 holding them ; the Komans had needed no other means than armies and 
 colonies for the security of their empire. 
 
 ' [Most ambitious men who elevate themselves take new titles in 
 
262 GEAiJDEUE AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 comes to be usurped in a free state, whatever tends to 
 establish the unlimited authority of the usurper takes 
 the name of order, whilst, on the other hand, what- 
 ever tends to maintain the honest liberty of his sub- 
 jects is called disorder, dissension, bad government. 
 All those who had heretofore cherished ambitious 
 projects had labored to throw the republic into a 
 species of anarchy. Pompey, Crassus, and Csesar suc- 
 ceeded marvelously in this. They established an im- 
 punity for every variety of public crimes. All that 
 might have a tendency to arrest the corruption of 
 manners, all that might aid in maintaining an effi- 
 cient police, they abolished; and, as good legislators 
 seek to render their fellow-citizens better, these la- 
 bored to make them worse. They, therefore, intro- 
 duced the custom of corrupting the people with 
 money ; and when an accusation for the offence was 
 preferred, they corrupted the- judges also. They 
 caused the elections to be disturbed by all sorts of 
 violence ; and when the offenders were brought to 
 justice, they furthermore intimidated the courts." 
 Even the authority of the people was annihilated. 
 Witness the proceeding of Gabinius, who, after hav- 
 ing employed his army — in disregard of the will of 
 
 order to authorize new power. Rut Augustus desired to conceal new 
 power under known names and ordinary dignities. He had himself called 
 emperor, in order to preserve his authority over the legions; he had 
 himself created tribune, as a means of controlling the people ; and prince 
 of (he senate, in order to govern that body. (Saint-Eteemond.)] 
 « This is very apparent in the LMeis of Cicero to Atticus. 
 
CHAP, xiii.] OF THE ROMANS. 263 
 
 the people — for the purpose of re-establishing Ptol- 
 emy, coolly returned and demanded the honors of a 
 triumph.' 
 
 The first men of the republic had sought to dis- 
 gust the people with their own power, and to render 
 themselves necessary by aggravating the inconveni- 
 ences of republican government. But when Augus- 
 tus was once master, policy induced him to labor for 
 the re-establishment of order, to the end that the 
 conveniences of a despotic government might be felt. 
 
 So long as Augustus was yet contending for as- 
 cendency in the field, he feared revolts among the 
 soldiers, and not conspiracies among the citizens. It 
 was for this reason that he temporized with the for- 
 mer and was so cruel to the latter. When, however, 
 peace was established, he feared conspiracies; and 
 having the destiny of Caesar constantly before his 
 eyes, he was studious to abstain from his conduct in 
 order to avoid his fate. This is the key to the whole 
 life of Augustus. He attended the sittings of the 
 senate with a cuirass under his robe; he refused the 
 name of dictator; and, whereas C^sar had insolently 
 said that the republic was nothing, and that his word 
 was law, Augustus spoke incessantly of the dignity 
 of the senate, and of the respect which he had for 
 the republic. He was careful, therefore, to establish 
 a government which would be in the greatest pos- 
 
 ' Csesar made war upon the Gauls, and Crassus upon the Parthians, 
 without any deliberation of the senate or decree of the people. See 
 Dion. 
 
264 GEANDEUE AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 sible degree acceptable to others without interfering 
 with his own interests ; and the result was that, while 
 the government which he organized was an aristoc- 
 racy in its relation to civil affairs, it was a monarchy 
 in its relation to the military power. This ambiguous 
 government, not being upheld by its own proper 
 force, could only stand during the pleasure of the 
 monarch; and it was, consequently, completely mo- 
 narchical at bottom. 
 
 The question has been raised, whether or not Au- 
 gustus did in reality cherish a design of abdicating 
 the empire. But who does not see that, if he had so 
 desired, it was impossible that he should not have 
 succeeded in executiag his purpose? The circum- 
 stance that he asked every ten years to be relieved 
 from the weight Of government, and yet always con- 
 tinued to carry the burden, makes it manifest that 
 he was only acting. It was a piece of small finesse, 
 in order to have given to him anew, that which he 
 did not believe he had sufficiently acquired. I am 
 determined in this judgment by the entire life of 
 Augustus; and although men are capable of being 
 extremely capricious, yet it rarely happens that a 
 man renounces in a moment an object upon which 
 he has reflected during his whole life. All the acts, 
 all the regulations of Augustus, tended visibly to the 
 establishment of a monarchy. SyUa voluntarily laid 
 down the dictatorship ; but in the entire life of this 
 man — even in the midst of his excesses — we see a re- 
 
CBAP. XIII.] OF THE ROMANS. 265 
 
 publican spirit. All his measures, although tyran- 
 nically executed, tended constantly to a certain form 
 of republic. Sylla was an intensely passionate man ; 
 and he carried the Romans to liberty with violence. 
 Augustus was a cunning tyrant;* and he conducted 
 them gently to servitude. Whilst under Sylla the 
 republic regained its powers, all the world raised the 
 cry of tyranny; whilst under Augustus tyranny for- 
 tified itself, men only spoke of liberty. 
 
 The custom of triumphs, which had contributed 
 so much to the grandeur of Rome, was lost under 
 Augustus ; or, rather, this honor became a privilege 
 of sovereignty.' For the most part, the course which 
 affairs took under the emperors had its origin in the 
 regimen of the republic ; '° and it is necessary to con- 
 sider the one in connection with the other. He 
 alone had the right to demand a triumph under 
 whose auspices the war had been conducted ; " but 
 it was always conducted under the auspices of the 
 
 * I here employ this word in tlie sense of the Greelcs and Eomans, 
 who gave the name of tyrant to all who had overthrown a democratic 
 government. 
 
 ' Only the triumphal ornaments were thenceforth given to generals. 
 (Dion, in Aug.) 
 
 '" The Eomans having changed their government without having been 
 invaded, the same customs continued after the change ; and even the 
 form of the government remained nearly the same. 
 
 " Dion, in Aug., Book LIT, says that Agrippa, influenced by modesty, 
 neglected to render to the senate an account of his expedition against 
 the nations of the Bosporus, and even refused a triumph — and that 
 after him no person of his rank triumphed ; but this was- a favor which 
 Augustus desired to confer upon Agrippa, and which Anthony did not 
 confer upon Ventidius the first time the latter vanquished the Parthians. 
 12 
 
2gg GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquied. 
 
 chief, and consequently — after the fall of the re- 
 public— under those of the emperor, who was the 
 head of all the armies of the empire. 
 
 As, during the time of the republic the govern- 
 ing principle had been to carry on incessant war, 
 under the emperors the cultivation of peace was a 
 leading maxim of state. With armies which might 
 set too high a price upon their services, victories 
 were only regarded as subjects of disquietude. Those 
 who held commands feared to undertake too great 
 achievements. It was necessary so to moderate their 
 own glory that it might awaken the attention with- 
 out arousing the jealousy of the prince, and not to 
 appear before him with an eclat which his eyes 
 could not endure. 
 
 Augustus was very cautious in extending the 
 right of Koman citizenship;" he made laws" to pre- 
 vent the emancipation of too many slaves ; " he rec- 
 ommended in his testament the future observance of 
 these two maxims, and also that his successors should 
 not seek to extend the empire by new wars. 
 
 These three parts of policy were intimately con- 
 nected. From the moment that there should be no 
 more wars there would be no further necessity for 
 new citizens, nor for the emancipation of slaves. 
 
 Whilst Rome was engaged in a constant succes- 
 sion of wars, it was necessary that she should con- 
 
 " Suetonius, in Aug. '^ SnExomus, ibid. See Institutes, lib. i. 
 
 " Dion, in Aug. 
 
CHAP, xin.] OF THE ROMANS. 267 
 
 tinually replenisii her population. At the commence- 
 ment of her career she appropriated a part of the 
 inhabitants of conquered towns. In process of time, 
 many citizens of the neighboring towns came to 
 Kome for the purpose of participating in the right 
 of suffrage; they established themselves in such 
 great numbers that, upon the remonstrance of allies, 
 the Eomans were often obliged to return them ; and, 
 finally, the inhabitants of the provinces arrived in 
 crowds. The laws favored marriages, and even ren- 
 dered them necessary. In the course of her numer- 
 ous wars, Rome acquired a prodigious number of 
 slaves; and when her citizens came to be loaded 
 with wealth, they purchased them everywhere; but, 
 influenced by generosity, avarice, or weakness, they 
 emancipated them in great numbers." Some desired 
 to reward faithful slaves; the motive of others was 
 to obtain, in the name of their emancipated slaves, 
 the grain which the republic distributed to poor 
 citizens ; and others yet were influenced by the desire 
 of having their funeral pageants followed by numer- 
 ous trains of attendants bearing garlands of flowers. 
 The people were composed almost wholly of freed- 
 men;'° so that these masters of the world, not only 
 in their beginning, but in the whole course of their 
 history, were for the most part of servile origin. 
 When the common people — consisting as they 
 
 '^ DioNTS. Hal., lib. iv. 
 
 " See Tacitus, Annales, lib. xiii, ch. xxvii, late fumm in corpus, etc. 
 
268 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 did all but entirely of freedmen or sons of freedmen 
 — became inconveniently numerous, they were colo- 
 nized; and by this means the fidelity of the prov- 
 inces was guaranteed. There was thus a circulation 
 of the men of all nations. Eome received them as 
 slaves and returned them as Komans. 
 
 Under pretext of some riots which took place 
 during the elections, Augustus placed a governor and 
 a garrison in the city. He made the legions per- 
 petual; he stationed them on the frontiers; he es- 
 tablished particular funds for their pay ; and he 
 ordered that the veterans should receive their recom- 
 pense in money and not in lands." 
 
 Many bad effects had resulted from that distribu- 
 tion of lands which had been made since the time 
 of Sylla. The property of citizens was rendered in- 
 secure. If the soldiers of a cohort were not located 
 in the same place, they became disgusted with their 
 establishment, left their allotments uncultivated, and 
 became dangerous citizens ; " whilst, on the other 
 hand, if the lands were distributed by legions, am- 
 bitious men could in a moment find the material for 
 armies against the republic. 
 
 Augustus provided fixed establishments for the 
 marine. As before his time the Eomans had no 
 
 " He provided that the praetorian soldiers should receive five thousand 
 drachms : two thousand after sixteen years of service, and the other 
 three thousand at the expiration of twenty years. (Dion, in Aug.) 
 
 " See Tacitus, Annales, lib. xiv, ch. xxvii, in respect to the soldiers 
 who were taken to Tarentum and Antium. 
 
CHAP, xm.] OF THE KOMANS. 269 
 
 perpetual bodies of troops for service on land, nei- 
 ther had they any permanent organization for service 
 on the sea. The principal object of the fleets of 
 Augustus was to serve as security for convoys, and 
 to establish communication between the diflTerent 
 parts of the empire ; for in other respects the Ro- 
 mans were masters of the whole of the Mediterra- 
 nean; this was the only sea then navigated; and 
 they had no enemy to fear. 
 
 Dion has well remarked that after the establish- 
 ment of the empire it was more difficult to write 
 history. All became secret. All dispatches from 
 the provinces were carried into the cabinet of the 
 emperors; and no more was known than what the 
 folly or the hardihood of tyrants did not care to con- 
 ceal, or — what the historians conjectured. 
 
270 GKANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakeb. 
 
 NOTE BY THE TRAISTSLATOE. 
 
 The establishment of standing military and naval 
 bodies at tbe commencement of tbe empire, and the 
 greatly increased material and mental intereommuni- 
 cation which at the same time ensued throughout the 
 Koman world, are two phenomena of such capital im- 
 portance that I shall here bestow a few remarks 
 upon the reason of the one, and the comparative 
 value of the other. 
 
 1. Paradoxical as the statement may at first sight 
 appear, it may be accepted, as a general principle, 
 that the institution of standing armies is the accom- 
 paniment of a diminished military spirit. In the 
 early stages of the ancient societies every able-bodied 
 man was a soldier. The profession of arms, therefore, 
 and consequently the military spirit, was equally dif- 
 fused through the whole society. Such was the nor- 
 mal condition of the Eoman state down to the time 
 of the emperors. "With annual enlistments from the 
 body of the people, with no establishment which an- 
 swers to our idea of a standing army, the military 
 spirit was supreme, and the career of conquest uninter- 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 271 
 
 nipted. Under Augustus — when the love of war 
 had become a less salient feature of the Koman char- 
 acter — the military and naval establishments became 
 permanent ; and, in the time of the Antonines, when 
 peace was the prevailing condition of the Koman 
 world, the standing land force of the empire con- 
 sisted of about three hundred and ninety -five thou- 
 sand men.' 
 
 A similar order of facts has been repeated in Eu- 
 rope since the fall of the Western Empire. Erom 
 the fifth to the fifteeth century the military spirit was 
 relatively much more dominant than it has since 
 been; and yet, during the former period, standing 
 armies were not, properly speaking, an institution of 
 European society. That vast system of permanent 
 military organizations which we now see in Europe 
 has grown up within the last three or four centuries ; 
 and, what is especially noteworthy, it has grown up 
 beside the still greater industrial and civil interests 
 which characterize our modern society, and which, 
 by virtue of this division of social functions, have 
 been left to work with less interrupted energy. 
 These interests of peace — in other words, these inter- 
 ests orf the higher as opposed to the lower powers of 
 man — are gradually acquiring a stronger hold upon 
 the spirit of Europe ; and the outlook for the future 
 clearly indicates an ultimate and great diminution of 
 those immense military bodies which occupy a ra- 
 ' See Gibbon's Borne, ch. i. 
 
272 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 tional but transitory place in the career of human de- 
 velopment. 
 
 Roman society had traveled a long way in reach- 
 ing a condition characterized by standing armies and 
 navies, and in which, consequently, the great mass of 
 the people were relegated to the pursuits of peace. 
 Eut, when it had gone thus far, it could not take 
 the next forward step — it could not stiU. further re- 
 lease itself from the military spirit; and this, in the 
 main, for two prominent reasons : it was too corrupt 
 and too ignorant to preserve voluntary order; and it 
 stood in presence of a formidable outlying force of 
 barbarism. 
 
 European society has reached the corresponding 
 stage; but, unlike the Eoman, it gives sign of pass- 
 ing through it. Though old, this society is fuU of 
 progressive forces. It feels the impulse of growing 
 science and expanding culture. Its public opinion is 
 becoming more enlightened and more vigorous. Its 
 public life is being more and more influenced by ra- 
 tional motives. It is acquiring the faculty for vol- 
 untary order; it is threatened by no great external 
 force ; the fears and jealousies which exist between 
 its independent states, and which are the chief mo- 
 tives for heavy armed preparation, must gradually 
 succumb to a growing culture ; and the promise, 
 therefore, is that its enormous standing armies — 
 themselves an indication of a half-vanquished mili- 
 tary spirit — will finally shrink to very greatly re- 
 
SOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 273 
 
 duced proportions; perhaps to the proportions of 
 police establishments. 
 
 2. In respect to intercommunication, the ancient 
 world may be regarded as having reached its maxi- 
 mum during the period which extended from the 
 beginning of the reign of Augustus to the close of 
 the reign of Marcus Antoninus. The sphere of in- 
 tercommunication which had been opened up by the 
 Greeks, and which culminated in the empire of 
 Alexander and his successors, was considerably less 
 in extent, and very much less complete in its appoint- 
 ments. And, when we ascend to stiU earlier periods, 
 and consider the character of intercommunication 
 that centered in Assyria, Babylonia, Phoenicia, Egypt, 
 we find in each case that it was sensibly less expan- 
 sive and important than that which was established 
 by the Greeks. Thus, in the course of that great 
 procession of ancient nations and civilizations which 
 was led by the Egyptians and closed by the Eo- 
 mans, we detect a progressive development of inter- 
 communication among mankind, attaining its highest 
 result in the last. 
 
 But — standing as it did in advance of all other 
 ancient attainments of the sort — how does Roman 
 intercommunication compare with that of modem 
 times? Two parallels will go a great way towards 
 supplying an answer. Uoman navigation, with its 
 small nautical attainments, was mostly limited to one 
 inland sea; modern navigation, with its greatly en- 
 
274 GKANDEUE AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 larged science, art, and power, extends to all tlie 
 oceans of the globe. Under the sway of Koman ap- 
 pliances, the Mediterranean states were brought into 
 a circle of xmitnal relations ; under the sway of mod- 
 em appliances, all the nations of the earth have 
 been placed in connection. 
 
 And, if we descend to intercommunication in par- 
 ticular states, we shall readily see that the famous 
 stone roads of Eome, viewed as a means of transit 
 and circulation in a great empire, are incomparably 
 excelled by the present railway systems of Europe 
 and the United States — especially by the latter, which, 
 although still in a very immature stage of develop- 
 ment, has already attained proportions so enormous 
 as to greatly surpass any other system of intercom- 
 munication in a single nation which has heretofore 
 had place in the world. 
 
 •And all this is to say nothing of those mar- 
 velous discoveries and inventions of our most recent 
 times — the Electric Telegraph- and the Submarine 
 Cable, by means of whose subtle force — the prac- 
 tical uses of which were not so much as imagined 
 by the ancients — human thought is transmitted with 
 the celerity of lightning across continents and oceans. 
 
 In all that regards intercommunication respecting 
 the material, business, and social interests of men, 
 there is something vastly more gigantic in the reach 
 and movement of the modern spirit; whilst, in aU 
 that regards intercommimication respecting their 
 
NOTB.] OF THE ROMANS. 275 
 
 higher intellectual interests, the contrast between an- 
 cient and modern times is equally striking. 
 
 Quetelet remarks that " That which above all char- 
 acterizes our modern times is the substitution of asso- 
 ciations in place of individuals, whenever the latter, 
 in their narrow circle, have exhausted their means of 
 action." He adds that "examples of this are numer- 
 ous in all that belongs to the sphere of intelligence, 
 and especially so in that which pertains to the study 
 of our globe.'" And he then refers to the French 
 Academy of Sciences, and to the Koyal Societies of 
 London and Berlin, as illustrations of modern asso- 
 ciated intelligence, working with the aid of many 
 hands, many minds, and singleness of purpose, in all 
 parts of the earth. Through such associations a sys- 
 tem of intellectual circulation is established, by which 
 the mental results of the race are speedily translated 
 to and from every country, and by which the intel- 
 lect of the world is rapidly becoming one immense 
 organism. The table of excha/nges of any one of the 
 hundreds of institutions for the promotion of knowl- 
 edge is exceedingly suggestive. One from the Smith- 
 sonian Institution, now before me, is a study.' The 
 annual contribution of intelligence comes to the in- 
 stitution at Washington from all parts of the globe. 
 Every country of Europe is liberally represented, with 
 Germany at the head, which alone sends the contri- 
 butions of five hundred and seventy-three institu- 
 ' Sysieme Sociale, Par's, 1848, p. 229. ' Smithsonian Report, 18V1, p. 19. 
 
276 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [sAKBai. 
 
 tions. South America is represented by thirty-three; 
 British America by twenty-seven ; Asia by thirty-six ; 
 Turkey by eleven; Africa by eighteen; Australia by 
 twenty-six ; ]Srew Zealand by eleven ; the West Indies 
 by eleven; Mexico by eight; Central Ainerica by 
 one ; Polynesia by one ; and even from the snows 
 of Iceland come the contributions of two institutions 
 to take their place along with those from Melbourne, 
 Calcutta, and the Cape of Good Hope. Thus, the 
 modern world may be regarded as dotted over with 
 nuclei of intelligence, the number of which is con- 
 stantly increasing, and all of which maintain a grow- 
 ing sympathy and communication with each other — 
 somewhat like the ganglia of a vast nervous system 
 which is developing into a completer individuality. 
 
 All the ancient representatives of this aspect of 
 modern civilization were very decidedly inferior. 
 The best ones are seen in the schools of Greece, in 
 the Museum of Alexandria, and in that informal 
 college of poets and literary men which flourished at 
 Home under the patronage of Augustus and the 
 favor of Maecenas. But the spheres of associated 
 intelligence which centered in Athens, Alexandria, 
 and Rome — great as they were for ancient times- 
 must be regarded as very limited in extent, and in- 
 choate in character, when compared with those which 
 radiate from London, Paris, and Berlin — especially 
 when we keep in view that mental network of 
 which I have spoken, and through "which all coun- 
 
NOTE.] OP THE ROMANS. 277 
 
 tries are brought into relation with these, as yet, 
 principal intellectual centers of the modern world. 
 
 In studying the phenomena of history, we can 
 never fully master their meaning by looking directly 
 at them. It is only when put in comparison with 
 the similar phenomena which have preceded and fol- 
 lowed, that their just place and value become ap- 
 parent. Viewed in this way, it is seen on the one 
 hand that the age of Augustus marks the opening 
 of a period of about two centuries, during which 
 the civilization of the ancient world, dominated by 
 Home, made its nearest approach to the cosmopoli- 
 tan character; whilst it is equally seen on the other 
 hand that this character is very much more com- 
 pletely realized by the civilization of modem times. 
 
278 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [MONTESQniEu. 
 
 CHAPTEE XIV. 
 
 TIBEEIUS. 
 
 As we see a river slowly and silently undermin- 
 ing the dikes which confine it, until at length it 
 bursts through them in a moment and floods the 
 country which they have protected — so the sovereign 
 power, which had acted insensibly under Augustus, 
 overflowed with violence under Tiberius. 
 
 There was a la/w of Majesty — for the punishment 
 of offences against the Eoman people. Tiberius 
 seized upon this law, and applied it, not to the class 
 of cases for which it had been made, but to all 
 those in which it might be used as an instrument of 
 his hate or his suspicions. It was not actions only 
 that were brought within the scope of this law, but 
 words, signs, and even thoughts ; for the things that 
 i.re said in those outpourings of tTie heart which 
 take place between two friends can only be regard- 
 ed as thoughts. There was consequently no longer 
 any freedom at entertainments, confidence among 
 relations, or fidelity among slaves. The dissimular 
 tion and gloom of the prince communicated them- 
 
CHAP. xiT.] OF THE ROMANS. 279 
 
 selves everywhere. Friendsliip was looked upon as a 
 stumbling-block ; frankness passed for imprudence ; 
 and virtue was regarded as an affectation wbich 
 might recall the happiness of other times.' 
 
 There is no tyranny more cruel than that which 
 is perpetrated under color of the laws and in the 
 name of justice — ^when, so to speak, one is drawn 
 down and drowned by means of the very plank 
 which should have borne him up and saved his life. 
 
 ' [The Rtjlexions sur les divers genies du pmple remain, although Tery 
 inferior to the work of Montesquieu, are not, however, without interest. 
 Wo have had occasion to appreciate these Reflections in some citations 
 which we have already made. We will here add a picture of the tyranny 
 of Tiberius, persuaded that our readers will excuse us for this further 
 recurrence to the same writer. 
 
 " Till now," says Saint-Evremond, " we have looked upon crimes which 
 were inspired by the jealousy of a false polity ; at present we witness 
 open cruelty and avowed tyranny. Not content with abandoning good 
 maxims, the most salutary laws were abolished ; and, in their stead, an 
 infinity of new ones were made, which looked apparently to the safety of 
 the emperor, but, in reality, to the ruin of the virtuous men who remained 
 in Kome. Every offence amounted to the crime of treason. Heretofore 
 real conspiracies were punished ; now men were punished for an innocent 
 word maliciously interpreted. Complaints intrusted to the unhappy for 
 the purpose of consoling them in their misery ; tears — those natural ex- 
 pressions of grief ; sighs — which escape the heart despite itself ; simple 
 looks — became destructive. Unaffected simplicity of speech evinced 
 wicked designs ; the discretion of silence concealed bad intentions. Joy 
 was regarded as indicating a hope which looked to the death of the 
 prince ; sadness as implying chagrin at his prosperity, or weariness rff 
 his life. If, in the midst of these dangers, the peril in which men lived 
 led them to show some signs of fear, this was taken as evidence of an 
 alarmed conscience, which, betraying itself, . discovered what they were 
 about to do, or what they had already done. If a man had the reputa- 
 tion of possessing courage or firmness of character, he was feared as a 
 daring person, capable of undertaking anything. To speak, to be silent, 
 to rejoice, to be afflicted, to fear or to hope — all was criminal, and all 
 merited the last punishment." (Ch. xvii.)] 
 
280 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [MONTESQniEU. 
 
 And, as it has never happened that a tyrant has 
 lacked instruments for the execution of his tyranny, 
 Tiberius never failed to find judges who were ready 
 to condemn all whom he might suspect. During 
 the time of the republic the senate did not as a 
 body adjudicate the affairs of individuals, but, upon 
 information through a delegation of the people, it 
 took cognizance of crimes which were imputed to 
 the alhes. Tiberius in like manner referred to this 
 body the adjudication of all that he called the crime 
 of treason against himself. The senate fell iato a 
 state of degradation which cannot be expressed. 
 Senators led the advance in the downward march of 
 servitude. Under the patronage of Sejanus the most 
 illustrious among them carried on the trade of in- 
 former." 
 
 It appears to me that I see many causes for that 
 spirit of servility which now reigned in the senate. 
 
 ' Probably no better illustration can be given of the debasement of 
 the senatorial character during the time of Tiberius than that which is 
 supplied by the conduct of several senators in connection with the con- 
 spiracy against Titius Sabinus. With a view of becoming witnesses to 
 the words of the latter, and acting in "concert with a confederate, these 
 senators secreted themselves in an ignoble manner, and thus awaited 
 the arrival of their victim and his pretended friend. As Tacitus nar- 
 rates the incident: "Into the space between the roof and the ceiling, 
 a concealment as vile as the treachery was execrable, three senators 
 stowed themselves, and applied their ears to the chasms and crannies. 
 . . . The accusation was forthwith dispatched ; and in a written me- 
 morial to Tiberius, these senators opened the order of the fraud, and 
 became narrators of their own infamy." (Tacitus, Annoilei, Oxford 
 Trans. Revised, New York, 1869, Book IV, 68, 69.) Senator, conspira- 
 tor, eavesdropper, and informer, are certainly a strange medley to find 
 united in the same person. — Translaiok. 
 
CHAP. XIV.] OF THE ROMANS. 281 
 
 After Csesar had vanquished the party of the repub- 
 lic, both the friends and the enemies which he had 
 in the senate concurred equally in removing all the 
 limitations which the laws interposed against his 
 power, and in conferring excessive honors upon him. 
 The former sought to please him, the latter to ren- 
 der him odious. Dion tells us that some went so 
 far as to propose that he should be permitted to 
 have access to all women at his pleasure. The re- 
 sult of this obsequiousness was that Csesar had no 
 suspicion of the senate, and that he came to be assas- 
 sinated in its presence; and a further result was, 
 that in the succeeding reigns there was no excess 
 of flattery which was without precedent, and which 
 might revolt the minds of men. 
 
 Before Eome came to be governed by a single 
 ruler, the wealth of the principal Eomans was im- 
 mense — whatever may have been the means which 
 they had employed for its acquisition. Under the 
 emperors, this wealth was nearly all taken away. 
 Senators no longer retained those great clients by 
 whom they had formerly been loaded with contribu- 
 tions.' In the provinces, little could be taken except 
 
 ' The relation of patronage on the part of the Roman patricians ex- 
 tended not alone to individuals, but even to cities and to countries. " In 
 after times, even cities and whole nations were under the protection of 
 illustrious Roman families ; as the Sicilians under the patronage of the 
 Marcelli ; Cyprus and Cappadocia under that of Cato ; the AUobroges un- 
 der the patronage of the Fabii ; the Bononienses, of the Antonii ; Lacedje- 
 mon, of the Claudii. Thus the people of Puteoli chose Cassius and the 
 Bruti for their patrons ; Capua chose Cicero. This, however, seems to 
 
282 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesotieu, 
 
 for Cffisar, especially after the imperial procurators 
 came to be established therein — a class of officers 
 who were nearly the same as our present intendants. 
 Meanwhile, although the sources of wealth were cut 
 off, the expenses of living continued. The course of 
 life was established, and it could no longer be sup- 
 ported except through the favor of the emperor. 
 
 Augustus had taken from the people the power of 
 making laws, and the right of judging public crimes ; 
 but he had left to them, or at least had seemed to 
 leave to them, the right of electing the magistrates. 
 But Tiberius, who feared such numerous assemblies 
 of the people, took from them this privilege of elec- 
 tion also, and turned it over to the senate — that is to 
 say, to himself.* 
 
 It is all but incredible to what an extent this de- 
 cay of the power of the people debased the spirit of 
 the great men of the state. "Whilst the people had 
 the disposal of the public dignities, the magistrates 
 who canvassed for them descended, it is true, to 
 many base practices; but such practices were asso- 
 ciated with a certain magnificence which served to 
 
 have taken place also at an early period." (Adam's Rom. Ant., Phila., 
 1872, pp. 20, 21.) 
 
 Thug we can all the more readily see that the " groat clients " of 
 whom Montesquieu speaks might well be a source of prodigious wealth 
 to the Roman aristocracy. Nor can we fail to recognize the striking im- 
 perfection of a system of government and a state of society in which not 
 only individuals, but entire nations, were under the necessity of placating 
 the governing power by interesting the cupidity of the few great families 
 by which it was mostly exercised. — Translator. 
 
 * Tacitus, Annates, lib. i, ch. xv ; Dion, lib. liv. 
 
CHAP. XIV.] OF THE ROMANS. 283 
 
 conceal them — whether by the way of entertaining 
 the people with plays and banquets, or by the distri- 
 bution of money or grain. Although the motive may 
 have been low, yet there was something noble in the 
 means ; for it is always becoming in a great man to 
 obtain the favor of the people by liberalities.' But 
 when the people no longer had anything to give, 
 and when the emperor, in the name of the senate, 
 disposed of all public employments, office was sought 
 and obtained by shameful instrumentalities. Flattery, 
 infamy, crime itself, became the arts which were nec- 
 essary for its attainment. 
 
 It does not appear, however, that Tiberius desired 
 to debase the senate. There was nothing of which 
 he complained so much as of the tendency of this 
 body towards servility. His life is full of expres- 
 sions of disgust on the subject. But, like most other 
 men, he desired contradictory things. His general 
 policy was not in harmony with his particular pas- 
 sions. . He desired a free senate, capable of making 
 his government respectable ; but he wanted at the 
 same time a senate wHch was ready at every mo- 
 ment to respond to his fears, his jealousies, his hates. 
 In short, the statesman constantly succumbed to the 
 man. 
 
 ' Montesquieu ia here scarcely on a level with himself. It is " be- 
 coming in a great man " to obtain — as he certainly deserves — the favor 
 of the people by his sympathy with their wants and his fidelity to their 
 rights, and not by the vulgar appliance of a species of " liberality " which 
 ceases to be such from its motive, and of which the greatest demagogue 
 is apt to be the greatest master. — Teanslator. 
 
284 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [MomESQurEr. 
 
 We have seen that the people had formerly ob- 
 tained from the patricians the concession of magis- 
 trates of their own body, who defended them against 
 the insults and the injustice which might be offered 
 them. In order that these magistrates might be 
 placed in a condition to exercise their power, they 
 were declared to be sacred and inviolable ; and it was 
 provided that whoever should maltreat a tribune, 
 whether by act or word, might be immediately pun- 
 ished with death. E"ow, the emperors — being invest- 
 ed with the powers of the tribunate— obtained also 
 the privileges of that office; and it was upon this 
 ground that so many people were destroyed, that 
 informers were enabled to carry on their trade at 
 their pleasure, and that the accusation of treason — 
 the crime, as Phny says, of those against whom no 
 crime could be imputed — was extended to whatever 
 was desired.' 
 
 I believe, however, that some of these causes of 
 
 " The remark of Pliny the Younger, here referred to, occurs in his 
 Panegyric on Trajan, sec. 42 : Loeupletabant etfiscum d cemrmm non tarn 
 Vocomce et Julim leges, quam majestatas singulare et unicum crimen eoi-um 
 qui crimine vacarent — " The privy purse of the emperor and the public 
 treasury were not so much enriched by the Voconian and Julian laws as 
 by the charge of treason— the sole crime of those who were without crime." 
 
 Nothing can give a darker idea of that species of tyranny which, 
 while affecting to observe the law, punishes for offences unknown to the 
 law, than the fate which befell the adherents of Sejanus, long the chief 
 minister of Tiberius. Some time after the fall of this favorite, the em- 
 peror, according to Tacitus, "ordered aU who were in prison under accu- 
 sation of attachment to Sejanus to be put to death." Then follows the 
 sententious and terrible description of the scene of slaughter: "There 
 lay the countless mass of slain— of every sex and age— the illustrious 
 
CHAP, xir.] OF THE ROMANS. 285 
 
 accusation were not as ridiculous as tliey appear to 
 us at tlie present day. I cannot think that Tiberius 
 would have had a man accused for having sold a 
 statue of the emperor along with his house; that 
 Domitian would have had a woman condemned to 
 death for having undressed herseK before his image, 
 and a citizen because he had a representation of the 
 earth painted upon the walls of his chamber — if these 
 acts had only awakened in the minds of the Romans 
 the same ideas which they present to us. I believe 
 that the explanation of such proceedings is in part 
 due to the fact that, Home having changed her form 
 of government, things which appear to us to have 
 been of no consequence whatever might then have 
 had some significance ; and I judge of these instances 
 in the- light of what we now see in the case of a 
 nation which cannot be suspected of tyranny, but 
 which prohibits the act of drinking to the health of 
 a certain person.' 
 
 I may pass nothing unnoticed which will help to 
 
 and the mean ; some dispersed, others collected in heaps ; nor was it 
 permitted to their friends or kindred to be present, or to shed a tear over 
 them, or any longer even to go and see them ; but guards were placed 
 around, who marked signs of sorrow in each, and attended the putrid 
 bodies till they were dragged to the Tiber, where, floating in the stream, 
 or driven upon the banks, none dared to bum them, none to touch them." 
 (Tacitus, Annals, Oxford Trans. Revised, N. Y., 1869, Book VI, 19.)— 
 Tkanslator. 
 
 ' I suppose reference is here made to the English nation, and to the 
 unfortunate son of James II, commonly known as the Pretender, who was 
 a contemporary of Montesquieu. (Compare Gibbon's Hist. Deal, and Fall, 
 ch. xxii, note 68.) — Translator. 
 
286 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquibu. 
 
 make known the genius of the Koman people. They 
 were so completely accustomed to ohey, and to place 
 aU their happiness in the deference which they felt 
 for their masters, that, after the death of Germanicus, 
 they gave way to expressions of grief, regret, and 
 despair, which are no longer seen among us." It is 
 necessary to read the accounts of the public desola- 
 tion which the historians have left" — ^it was so great, 
 so long continued, and so immoderate ; and this exhibi- 
 tion of feeling was no play, for the entire body of 
 the people never indulges in affectation, flattery, or 
 dissimulation. The Koman people — who took no 
 further part in the government, who were composed 
 almost wholly of freedmen or of persons without in- 
 dustry, living at the expense of the public treasury — 
 had a deep sense of their powerless condition. They 
 grieved as women and children who are made deso- 
 late by the feeling of their own weakness. Their 
 estate was ill; they had placed their fears and their 
 hopes in the person of Germanicus; and, that object 
 being taken from them, they were overwhelmed with 
 despair. 
 
 There is no class of people who have so great a 
 dread of misfortunes as those who should be reas- 
 sured by the wretchedness of their condition, and 
 who ought to say with Andromacha — would to God 
 that I could fear ! There are at the present day 
 
 ^ See my Note at the end of this chapter. — Translator. 
 ' See Tacitus. 
 
CHAP. XIV.] OF THE ROMANS. 287 
 
 fifty thousand men at Naples who live upon nothing 
 but herbs, and who have for their entire store of 
 wealth a half garment of linen. These people — the 
 most unhappy of the earth — are seized with an alarm- 
 ing faintness at the sight of the least smoke from 
 Vesuvius. They have the foUy to fear that they 
 will become unhappy ! 
 
288 6KANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakee. 
 
 NOTE BY THE TEANSLATOE. 
 
 The interesting idea which Montesquieu presents 
 in the foregoing chapter, by the suggestion that the 
 emotional excitation of the Eomans on the occasion 
 of the death of Germanicus, is without parallel in 
 modern societies, will admit of some further reflec- 
 tions. 
 
 Other causes not interfering, it is doubtless true 
 that the more dependent men are in their condition, 
 and the more like children they are in their intelli- 
 gence, the more extravagantly will their emotional 
 nature display itself; and it seems probable that a 
 general distinction might be traced in this respect 
 between the peoples of ancient and those of modem 
 times. It would appear that some such distinction 
 ought to be one of the results of the greater men- 
 tal development, and consequently greater sense of 
 self-resource, which we find diffused among the masses 
 of men in our present societies. 
 
 Still, the question as to such a difference is a high- 
 ly complicated one — affected by considerations of race, 
 local institutions, customs, the particular degree of 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 289 
 
 national culture, and the special hardening influence 
 which a low social state tends to exert upon some 
 of the emotions. The typical American Indian, for 
 instance, combined a puerile intelligence with, in 
 some respects, the emotional restraint of a Grecian 
 stoic — the one having attained his self-control through 
 the repressing discipliae of savage life, the other 
 through sublime speculations upon the grandeur of 
 the soul and the superiority of supersensuous to sen- 
 suous things; and it is certain that the causes which 
 thus influenced the American savage were consider- 
 ably more active in ancient than they have been in 
 modern times. 
 
 On the whole, however, it is very likely that the 
 superior mental development which has place in our 
 modern societies has imparted a somewhat more chast- 
 ened tone to those great outbursts of popular feel- 
 ing — scattered here and there through the history of 
 all nations — commonly taking their rise in the attach- 
 ment of the people to some one person whom they 
 regard as children regard a father — and some of 
 which, as depicted by historians, are exceedingly 
 touching. 
 
 ^Nevertheless — in apparent deviation from the idea 
 of Montesquieu — ^particular instances of popular emo- 
 tional excitement in modern times may be pointed 
 out, which appear to be completely on a level with 
 the one cited by him in connection with the death of 
 Germanicus. Such, for example, was the exhibition 
 
 13 
 
290 GRANDEUK AND DECADENCE [bakek. 
 
 of feeling which took place among his own country- 
 men in connection with an incident which occurred 
 during his lifetime, and only a few years after the 
 publication of his Considerations. I allude to the 
 agitation and distress of the French people upon be- 
 ing informed of the dangerous illness of Louis XY, 
 at Metz, in August, 174:5. I translate from Voltaire : 
 "This event carried fear and desolation from city 
 to city. The people ran in from all the environs of 
 Metz. The roads were filled with men of every con- 
 dition and of all ages, who, by their conflicting re- 
 ports, increased their common inquietude. The dan- 
 ger of the king became known at Paris in the night- 
 time. The people rose and ran forth tumultuously, 
 without knowing whither they went. The churches 
 were opened in the depth of the night. Men took 
 no further thought of the time for sleeping, or for 
 waking, or for repasts. Paris was beside itself. All 
 the houses of men in place were besieged by contin- 
 ual crowds. Men assembled at all the comers of the 
 streets. The people exclaimed : ' If he dies, it will 
 be for having marched to our assistance.' Everybody 
 was approached, and people interrogated each other 
 in the churches without being acquainted. There 
 were many churches in which the priests, who pro- 
 nounced the prayer for the health of the king, inter- 
 rupted the chant with their tears; and the people 
 responded to them with their cries. The courier 
 who on the 19th brought to Paris the news of the 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 291 
 
 king's convalescence was embraced and almost suffo- 
 cated by tbe people. They kissed bis borse ; tbey 
 led bim in triumph; and all the streets rang with 
 the cry of joy : ' The king has recovered.' "When 
 the monarch was told of these unheard-of transports 
 of joy, which bad succeeded those of desolation, be 
 was melted to tears ; and, rousing himself by a move- 
 ment of sensibility which restored his composure, 
 'Ah!' said be, 'how sweet it is to be thus loved! 
 and what have I done to merit it ? ' Such are the 
 French people — emotional to enthusiasm, and capable 
 of every excess in their affections as in their discon- 
 tents." ' 
 
 It must be confessed that the general spirit of this 
 scene — although happening in the eighteenth century 
 — vividly recalls the lamentation of the Eomans for 
 Germanicus; whilst in some of the details — such as 
 hurrying in the night-time to the churches on the one 
 occasion and to the temples on the other' — there is 
 complete identity. The key to the phenomenon is 
 the same in both cases : a great family of children 
 is afflicted on account of the real or apprehended 
 loss of one to whom it looks as to a father, and 
 without whom it feels that its hope and its stay is 
 gone. 
 
 The scene which was witnessed in the United 
 States when the mind of the nation was startled by 
 
 ' Precis du Slide de Louis XV, ch. 12. 
 ' See Tacitua, Anncds, Book II, ch. 82. 
 
292 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bamb. 
 
 the announcement of the assassination of Lincoln, is 
 a better illustration of the modern spirit. The great, 
 simple-hearted President was, indeed, very dear to 
 the people ; but their grief was unmixed with any 
 feeling of their own weakness and dependence : it was 
 less self-regarding, and consequently more self-con- 
 tained. 
 
MONTBSQUiEtr.] OF THE ROMANS. 293 
 
 CHAPTEE XV. 
 
 THE EMPEEOES FROM CALIGULA TO ANTONINXrS. 
 
 Caligula succeeded Tiberius. It was said of 
 him that there was never a better slave nor a worse 
 master. These two characters are closely enough re- 
 lated ; for that same disposition of mind which causes 
 a man to be vividly impressed with the unlimited 
 power of him who commands wiU cause him to place 
 no less estimate upon authority when he himself 
 comes to command. 
 
 Caligula re-established the comitia,' which Tibe- 
 rius had taken away from the people; and he abol- 
 ished that arbitrary crime of treason which his prede- 
 cessor had established: from which we may judge 
 that the beginning of the reign of bad princes is 
 often lite the end of the reign of good ones; for, 
 influenced by a spirit of contradiction to reverse the 
 action of those who have preceded them, they may 
 do from a perverse disposition what others do from 
 principle. It is to this spirit of contradiction that we 
 are indebted for many good laws as well as bad ones. 
 ' He abolished them afterwards. 
 
294 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [MONiEsaniEn. 
 
 What, however, was gained? Caligula had abol- 
 ished the accusations, the charges of treason ; but he 
 caused all who displeased him to perish by the mili- 
 tary power. And it was not only some particular 
 senators who were obnoxious to him: he held the 
 sword suspended over the senate itself, and threat- 
 ened to exterminate the entire body. 
 
 The amazing tyranny of the Roman emperors 
 was an outgrowth from the general spirit of the 
 Eoman people. As the latter feU suddenly under 
 the power of an arbitrary government, and as there 
 was scarcely any interval between their state of mas- 
 tery and their state of servitude, they were not pre-' 
 pared for the change by an amelioration of manners. 
 The ferocious temper remained. Koman citizens were 
 treated as they themselves had treated their conquered 
 enemies; and they were governed on the same plan. 
 Sylla entering into Eome was no other person than 
 Sylla entering into Athens: he exercised the same 
 rights of war on both occasions. In the case of 
 nations which have insensibly lost their liberties, 
 when laws fail them, they are stiU governed by man- 
 ners. 
 
 The constant sight of gladiatorial combats had 
 the effect of rendering the Romans extremely fero- 
 cious." It was remarked that Claudius became more 
 inclined to the shedding of blood upon seeing these 
 spectacles. The example of this emperor, who was 
 ' See my Note at the end of this chapter. — Tkanslatok. 
 
CHAP, xy.] OF THE ROMANS. 295 
 
 naturally of a mild disposition, and who nevertheless 
 committed so many cruelties, enables us to see how 
 different was the education of his time from that of 
 ours.' 
 
 Accustomed to sport with human nature in the 
 persons of their children and their slaves, the Ro- 
 mans could know but little of that virtue which we 
 call humanity/ Whence comes that ferocity which 
 we observe among the inhabitants of our colonies, 
 except from the constant habit of inflicting chastise- 
 ments upon an unfortunate portion of our race? 
 When cruelty is organized in the institutions of a 
 state, what can we expect from the natural kindness 
 and justice of men? 
 
 In reading the history of the Eoman emperors, 
 we are wearied with the vast number of people whom 
 they caused to be put to death in order that they 
 might confiscate their estates. We find nothing simi- 
 lar in our modern histories. This difference, as we 
 have just intimated, ought to be attributed to man- 
 ners which are more gentle, and to a religion which 
 is more restraining ; and it may be added that we 
 have not the families of senators to despoil who had 
 ravaged the earth. From the mediocrity of our for- 
 tunes we draw the advantage that they are more se- 
 
 ' See idem. — Tkanslator. 
 
 * See the Roman laws on the power of fathers over their children, and 
 that of masters over their slaves, (a) 
 
 (a) For some notice of these laws, see my Note at the end of chapter 
 X, and idem at the end of chapter xx. The power extended to life and 
 death in both cases. — Translator. 
 
296 
 
 GRANDEtJK AND DECADENCE [MOUTEsatiiEr. 
 
 cure, and we set no value upon the apprehension that 
 our estates will be ravished from us." 
 
 The people of Eome — those who were called ^Ms 
 
 did not hate the most wicked of the emperors. 
 
 After they had lost their power, and when they 
 ceased to be occupied with war, they became the 
 vilest of aU peoples. They regarded commerce and 
 the arts as proper occupations for slaves only, and 
 the distributions of grain which they received caused 
 them to neglect the cultivation of lands. They were 
 accustomed to plays and spectacles, and, when they 
 no longer had tribunes to listen to, nor magistrates 
 to elect, these vain things became necessaries, and 
 their idleness increased their taste for them. Nero, 
 Caligula, Commodus, Caracalla, were regretted by the 
 people because of the very follies in which they in- 
 dulged; for these emperors loved with fervor that 
 which the people loved ; they contributed to their 
 pleasures with all their power, and even with their 
 persons ; they lavished upon them the wealth of the 
 empire; and, when this was exhausted, the people 
 looked on without pain whilst all the great families 
 were despoiled. They enjoyed the fruits of the tyr- 
 anny without any alloy of fear, for they found safety 
 in their baseness. It was natural that such emperors 
 should hate good men. They knew that they were 
 
 ' The duke of Braganza had immense estates in Portugal ; when he 
 reTolted, the king of Spain was congratulated upon the rich confiscation 
 which he was about to realize. 
 
CHAP. XT.] OP THE ROMANS. 297 
 
 not approved by them." Indignant at the contradic- 
 tion or tlie silence of an austere citizen, and drunk 
 with the applause of the populace, they came to im- 
 agine that their government constituted the public 
 happiness, and that none but evil-minded men could 
 censure it.' 
 
 Caligula was a true sophist in his cruelty. As 
 he was descended equally from Anthony and Au- 
 gustus, he said he would punish the consuls if they 
 celebrated the day of rejoicing which had been set 
 apart in memory of the victory of Actium, and that 
 he would punish them if they did not celebrate it; 
 and, Drusilla — to whom he had accorded divine hon- 
 ors — having died, it was a crime to weep, for the 
 reason that she was a goddess, and it was a crime 
 not to weep, for the reason that she was his sister. 
 
 * The Greeks had games iu which men contended decently and con- 
 quered gloriously. The Romans had little else but spectacles ; and that 
 of the infamous gladiatorial combat was peculiar to them. Roman gravity 
 did not permit a great personage to descend into the arena or mount upon 
 the stage. How, indeed, could a senator think of doing so — he to whom 
 the laws forbade the contracting of any alliance with those who had been 
 tarnished by the disgusts, or even by the plaudits, of the people ? Yet, 
 Roman emperors appeared upon the arena and the stage; and this 
 folly, which showed the greatest derangement of heart — a contempt for 
 the comely, the decent, and the fit — is always associated by the historians 
 with a character for tyranny. 
 
 ' In seeking an explanation for that good understanding which existed 
 between the populace and the worst of the emperors, I think we shall find 
 it, not only in the causes mentioned in the text, but in the fundamental 
 fact that the empire itself was but the permanent triumph of the popular 
 over the patrician faction. This fact was one of the traditions of the 
 people, and hence they regarded the successors of Csesar rather in the 
 light of popular chiefs. — Tkanslatoe. 
 
298 GKiNDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieit. 
 
 Here we may fitly indulge a reflection upon the 
 course of human affairs. When in the past history 
 of Rome we see so many wars undertaken, so much 
 bloodshed, so many peoples destroyed, so many great 
 actions, so many triumphs, so much policy, wisdom, 
 prudence, constancy, and courage; when we contem- 
 plate that scheme for the conquest of all nations, 
 which was so well conceived, so ably sustained and 
 so successfully executed — in what has it all ended at 
 last, except to satiate the passions of five or six 
 monsters ? That senate has only struck down so 
 many kings in order to fall itself into the most 
 degrading slavery at the hands of some of the worst 
 citizens of the state, and — to exterminate itself by 
 its own decrees ! Men only build up their power to 
 the end of seeing it completely overthrown ! they 
 only labor to increase it in order to see it turned 
 against themselves in more fortunate hands ! 
 
 Caligula having been killed, the senate assembled 
 with the view of establishing a form of government. 
 While they were yet deliberating, some soldiers en- 
 tered the palace for the purpose of pillaging. In 
 an obscure part of the building they came upon a 
 man trembling from fear. This was Claudius. They 
 saluted him as emperor. 
 
 In conferring upon his officers the right to exer- 
 cise judicial powers, Claudius completed the ruin of 
 the ancient orders.' The wars between Marius and 
 
 ' Augustus had established procurators, but they had no judicial 
 
CHAP. XV.] OF THE ROMANS. 299 
 
 Sylla had turned principally upon the question as to 
 who possessed this right — ^the senators or the eques- 
 trians." The fancy of an imbecile took it away from 
 the one and the other — strange issue of a dispute 
 which had put the world in combustion ! 
 
 There is no authority more absolute than that of 
 a prince who succeeds a republic; for he finds him- 
 self in possession of all the powers of a people who 
 had not been capable of imposing limitations upon 
 themselves. Thus, at the present day, we see the 
 kings of Denmark exercising a power which is more 
 arbitrary than any other in Europe. 
 
 The people were no less debased than the senate 
 and the equestrians. We have seen that they had 
 been so warlike down to the time of the emperors 
 that the armies which were levied in the city were 
 disciplined immediately and marched directly to the 
 enemy. During the civil wars of Vitellius and Yes- 
 pasian, Rome became a prey to the ambitious men 
 of all parties; and, full of timid citizens, she trem- 
 bled before the first band of soldiers that might ap- 
 proach her walls. 
 
 The condition of the emperors was no better, 
 As there was no particular army which had the 
 
 power; and when they were not obeyed, if was necessary that they 
 should recur to the authority of the governor of the province, or to the 
 praetor. But, under Claudius, these ofiScers had ordinary jurisdiction, as 
 lieutenants of the province ; and, in addition to this, they had jurisdiction 
 of fiscal affairs — that which placed the fortunes of all men in their 
 hands. 
 
 ' See Tacitus, Annales, lib. xii, ch. liv. 
 
300 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [moktesotibu. 
 
 right or possessed the boldness to elect them, it was 
 enough that some one should be proclaimed by any 
 army to become disagreeable to the others — who at 
 once gave him the appellation of competitor. 
 
 Thus, as the magnitude of the republic was fatal 
 to republican goremment, the magnitude of the em- 
 pire was fatal to the lives of the emperors.'" If they 
 had only had a moderate - sized country to defend, 
 they would have had only one principal army; and 
 this, having once elected an emperor, would have re- 
 spected the work of its own hands. 
 
 The soldiers had been attached to the family of 
 Caesar, which was the guarantee of aU the advan- 
 tages which they had received from the revolution. 
 The time came when all the great families of Home 
 had been exterminated by that of Caesar, and when 
 the family of Caesar itself perished in the person of 
 Nero. The civil power, which had been incessantly 
 beaten down, found itself incapable of counterbalancing 
 the military : each army desired to create an emperor. 
 
 We will here take a comparative view of differ- 
 ent epochs. When Tiberius began his reign, what 
 support did he not draw from the senate ? Learning 
 that the armies of Illyria and Germany had revolted, 
 he acceded to some of their demands, but main- 
 tained that it was the province of the senate to judge 
 of the others ; " and the deputies whom he sent to 
 
 ■" See my Note at the end of chapter xvi. — Translator. 
 
 " Ccetera senatui servanda. (Tacitus, Annales, lib. i, eh. xxv.) 
 
CHAP. XT.] OF THE ROMANS. 301 
 
 the insurgents were members of that body. Those 
 who had ceased to fear their power might yet re- 
 spect their authority; and, when it was represented 
 to the soldiers that in a Roman army the chUdi'en 
 of the emperor and the deputies of the Roman sen- 
 ate ran the risk of their lives," they repented of 
 their disobedience, and went so far as to inflict pun- 
 ishment upon themselves." But, when the senate 
 came to be completely prostrated, its example touched 
 no one. In vain did Otho harangue his soldiers in 
 order to induce them to speak of the dignity of that 
 body." In vain did Yitellius send a deputation of 
 principal senators to make his peace with Yespasian." 
 Men do not in a moment give back to the orders of 
 a state that respect which they have so long lost. 
 The armies of Vespasian only regarded these depu- 
 ties as the most cowardly slaves of a master whom 
 they had already chastised. 
 
 It was an ancient custom of the Romans that he 
 who enjoyed the honors of a triumph should distrib- 
 ute some denarii to each soldier: it was a small af- 
 fair." During the civil wars, these donatives were 
 increased." They had previously consisted of money 
 
 " See tte harangue of Germanicus. {Ibid., ch. xlii.) 
 
 '' Gnudehai ccedibus miles, quasi semet absolveret. (Ibid., ch. xliv.) 
 The extorted privileges were afterwards revoked. (Ibid.) 
 
 " Tacitus, History, Book I, ch. Ixxxiv. " Ibid., Book III, ch. Ixxx. 
 
 '' See in Livy the sums distributed on the occasions of divers tri- 
 umphs. The spirit of the generals was to put much money into the pub- 
 lic treasury, and to give little of it to the soldiers. 
 
 " At a time when the magnitude of the conquests had caused an in- 
 
302 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 which had been taken from the enemy ; but during 
 these unhappy times the money of citizens was 
 taken for the purpose, the soldiers desiring a share 
 where there was no booty. Formerly, these distribu- 
 tions had only taken place at the conclusion of a 
 war; Nero made them in time of peace. The sol- 
 diers became accustomed to such gifts; and they 
 were enraged against Galba, who had the courage to 
 tell them that he knew how to choose, but not to 
 purchase them. 
 
 The reigns of Galba, Otho," and Yitellius were 
 transient. Vespasian was elected, as they had been, 
 by the soldiers. He devoted himself during the 
 whole course of his reign to the re-establishment of 
 the empire, which had been ruled by six tyrants 
 equally cruel, nearly all furious, often imbecile, and 
 — for climax of misfortune — ^prodigal to madness. 
 
 Titus, who succeeded Vespasian, was the delight 
 of the Eoman people. 
 
 In Domitian we meet a new monster, more cruel, 
 or at least more implacable, than those who had pre- 
 ceded him, for the reason that he was more timid. 
 His favorite freedmen, and, as some say, his wife, 
 seeing that he was as dangerous in his attachments 
 as in his enmities, and that he imposed no limits 
 
 crease of these liberalities, Paulus Emilius only distributed one hundred 
 denarii to each soldier ; but Ctesar gave two thousand ; and his example 
 was followed by Anthony and Octavius, by Brutus and Cassius. See 
 Dion and Appian. 
 
 " Simcepere duo manipulares impa-ium populi romani Iransfermdum 
 et tramtulermU. (Tacitus, History, lib. i, ch. xxv.) 
 
CHAP. XV.] OF THE ROMANS. 303 
 
 either upon his suspicions or his accusations, made 
 way with him. Before striking the fatal blow they 
 looked about for a successor, and chose Nerva, a 
 venerable old man. 
 
 Nerva adopted Trajan, the most accomplished 
 prince of whom history had ever spoken. It was a 
 blessing to be bom in his reign, which was the hap- 
 piest and most glorious that the Koman people had 
 experienced. He was a great statesman and a great 
 soldier. He possessed a heart which determiaed him 
 to good ends, and an intellect which disclosed to 
 him the best means for their attainment. He was 
 endowed with a noble, grand, and beautiful soul. 
 He united all the virtues without being extreme in 
 any. He was, in short, a man most admirably adapted 
 to reflect honor upon human nature, and to repre- 
 sent the divine." 
 
 Trajan executed the project of Caesar : he con- 
 
 " Fine as this portraiture is, I prefer the tone of Gibbon in relation 
 to the same great emperor : " Trajan was ambitious of fame ; and, as 
 long as mankind shall continue to bestow more liberal applause on their 
 destroyers than on their benefactors, the thirst of military glory will ever 
 be the vice of the most exalted characters. The praises of Alexander, 
 transmitted by a succession of poets and historians, had kindled a dan- 
 gerous emulation in the mind of Trajan. Like him, the Roman emperor 
 undertook an expedition against the nations of the East ; but he lamented, 
 with a sigh, that his advanced age scarcely left him any hopes of equal- 
 ing the renown of the son of Philip." (Gibbon's Rome, ch. i.) If the 
 higher sort of greatness is characterized by being superior to the ignorant 
 opinion of the multitude, and for rising above the common objects of a 
 vulgar ambition, then the fame of the two Antonines rests upon a better 
 foundation, and is more worthy of enlightened approval, than that of 
 Csesar and Trajan — a kind of opinion which gains ground in proportion 
 as culture increases among men. — Tbanslatoe. 
 
304 GKANDEUK AND DECADENCE [montesqdieu. 
 
 ducted a successful war against tlie Parthians. All 
 others had succumbed in the prosecution of an enter- 
 prise In which danger was constantly present and 
 succor at a distance — an enterprise in which it was 
 absolutely necessary to conquer, and in which there 
 was no assurance that the invader would not perish 
 after having conquered. 
 
 The difficulty consisted in the situations of the 
 two empires, and in the different methods of war- 
 fare which were practiced by the two peoples. 
 
 Taking the Arminian road — towards the sources 
 of the Tigris and the Euphrates— a mountainous and 
 difficult country was met with, over which supplies 
 could not be transported, so that an army was half 
 ruined before it arrived in Media."" If it penetrated 
 by a more southern route, and passed by the way of 
 Nisibis, it encountered the frightful desert that sep- 
 arated the two empires. If it advanced by a route 
 lying still further south, and proceeded through Meso- 
 potamia, it was compelled to traverse a country which 
 was partly uncultivated and partly submerged; and, 
 the Tigris and the Euphrates flowing from the north 
 to the south, an army could not advance far to the 
 east without receding from these rivers, and neither 
 could it leave them any great distance in its rear 
 without perishing.'' 
 
 '" The country did not furnish enough of large trees to make machines 
 for besieging purposes. (Plutarch, Zife of Anlhony.) 
 
 " Malte-Brun gives an animated description of those inhospitable 
 wastes which separated the Parthians from the Komans : " The desert of 
 
CHAP, xy.] OF THE ROMANS. 305 
 
 As to their relative methods of making war, tlie 
 force of the Eomans consisted in an infantry which 
 was the firmest, strongest, and best disciplined in the 
 world ; whilst, on the other hand, the Parthians had 
 no infantry, but an admirable cavalry. They fought 
 at a distance, and beyond the range of the Koman 
 arms. The javelin could rarely reach them. Their 
 arms consisted of formidable bows and arrows. They 
 rather besieged than attacked an army. It was use- 
 less to pursue them, for with them to fly was to 
 fight. They caused their people to retire as an ene- 
 my approached, and only left garrisons in strong 
 places, which, when captured, it was necessary to de- 
 stroy. They skilfully burnt all the country around 
 an invading army, not even leaving the grass to the 
 enemy. In short, they made war in much the same 
 
 Mesopotamia, in all its gloomy uniformity, now meets our view. Saline 
 plants cover detached spots at great distances, in the burning sands or the 
 parched selenite. Here the wormwood, like the heath in Europe, takes 
 possession of immense spaces, to the exclusion of every other plant. . . . 
 This desert is a continuation of the great desert of Arabia, giving a speci- 
 men of its horrors beyond the Euphrates. The air, like that of Arabia, 
 is generally pure and dry. In the bare plains of sand it sometimes be- 
 comes burning. The miasmata arising from stagnant waters are diffused 
 in it, and its pestilential qualities are aggravated by exhalations from 
 salt putrescent lakes. It is this element, set in motion by some want of 
 equilibrium in the atmosphere, that has been supposed to create that 
 fatal wind known by the name of the samoom or samiel, which is less 
 dreaded in the middle of Arabia than on its borders, and chiefly in Syria 
 and Mesopotamia. When this dreadful wind arises, the sun seems cov- 
 ered with blood, from the dust which is raised to an immense height in 
 the atmosphere; animals in consternation lay themselves flat on the 
 ground to escape its terrifying force, which suffocates any living being 
 rash enough to expose itself." ( Universal Geography, Phila., 1827, voL 
 i, p. 342.) — Tbanslator. 
 
3Qg GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesqcieu. 
 
 manner as that whicL. we still see carried on at the 
 present time in the same country. 
 
 Moreover, the legions of Illyria and Germany, 
 which were employed in this war, were not adapted 
 to the service." Accustomed to hearty living in their 
 own country, nearly all the soldiers of these legions 
 perished. 
 
 Thus the Parthians achieved that which no other 
 nation had been able to make good — immunity from 
 the Eoman yoke — not, however, as being invincible, 
 but as being inaccessible. 
 
 Hadrian abandoned the conquests of Trajan," and 
 limited the empire to the Euphrates; and it is an 
 admirable reflection that the Romans, after so many 
 wars, did not lose that which they voluntarily aban- 
 doned, but that their empire was like that of the 
 sea, which is none the less extended when it retires 
 of itself. 
 
 The conduct of Hadrian caused much murmur- 
 ing. It was recorded in the sacred books of the 
 Eomans, that when Tarquin was about to build the 
 capitol, he found that the most proper site was al- 
 ready occupied by the statues of many gods. Through 
 his knowledge of augury he inquired whether or not 
 they would give up their places to Jupiter. All con- 
 sented to do so except Mars, Juventas, and the god 
 Terminus." This gave rise to three religious opin- 
 
 '^ See Herodian, lAfe of Alexander. 
 
 °' See Eutropius. Daoia was not abandoned until the time of Aurelian. 
 
 "^ Saint Augustine, The City of God, Book IV, chs. xxiii and xxix. 
 
CHAP. XT.] OF THE ROMANS. 307 
 
 ions : that the people of Mars would never surrender 
 the place which they occupied ; that the Eoman youth 
 would never be overcome; and that the Eoman god 
 Terminus would never retrace his steps. This last, 
 however, took place under Hadrian. 
 
3Qg GEANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 ISIOTE BY THE TKANSLATOE. 
 
 I. The Koman empire, at the period of its maxi- 
 mum expansion, under Trajan, extended considerably 
 more than three thousand miles east and west, and, in 
 its greatest breadth, something more than two thousand 
 north and south. Its total area was about six millioa 
 square miles, including the basins of the Mediterrar 
 nean and Euxine seas. Reaching, as it did — even 
 after the abandonment of the conquests of Trajan — 
 from the western shores of Spain and the British 
 Islands to the Eiiphrates, and from the 24th to the 
 66th parallel of north latitude, it embraced a very 
 great diversity of climates — African, Asiatic, and 
 European. 
 
 Over this ample and varied area — ^thus extend- 
 ing from the torrid deserts of Africa and Arabia to 
 the frosts of middle Europe and the northern shores 
 of the Euxine — there was distributed a great variety 
 of peoples, which, before being subjected to the Eo- 
 man sway, had been divided into hundreds of dif- 
 ferent states. 
 
 .The lines of communication which the Eomans 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 309 
 
 established throtigliout this immense empire were ut- 
 terly Tiiiequalled in all antiquity, and are only sur- 
 passed by our modern railway system. The analo- 
 gous works of Persia, Assyria, Egypt, Greece, and 
 Carthage were small affairs when compared with those 
 of Kome.' FoUowiug the authority of different an- 
 cient writers, of whom he distrusts that of Josephus 
 only, Gibbon enumerates no less than three thousand 
 five hundred and fifty-seven cities within the limits 
 of Italy, Gaul, Spain, Africa, and Asia proper; and 
 he adds : " AH these cities were connected with each 
 other, and with the capital, by public highways, 
 which, issuing from the Forum of Rome, traversed 
 Italy, pervaded the provinces, and were terminated 
 only by the frontiers of the empire." The city of 
 Home being the center upon which this great system 
 of roads converged, hence arose the saying that " all 
 roads lead to Eome." Thence they penetrated to the 
 Khine, to the Euphrates, and beyond the Danube. 
 The liue of communication from the Straits of Gib- 
 raltar to the Euphrates was not less than three thou- 
 sand miles ; and that from the wall of Antoninus to 
 Jerusalem — including two slight interruptions for 
 communication by water — was about three thousand 
 seven hundred and forty miles. 
 
 According to Gibbon's estimate, the total peace 
 establishinent of the empire on land probably con- 
 sisted of about three hundred and ninety-five thou- 
 ' See my Note at the end of chapter xiii. 
 
310 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakw. 
 
 sand men; on water, of about fifty-five thousand. 
 Of the former, twenty thousand were stationed near 
 the capital ; two hundred thousand guarded the fron- 
 tiers of the Khine and the Danube; one hundred 
 thousand protected the frontier of the Euphrates; 
 and seventy-five thousand were divided between Egypt, 
 Africa, Spain, and Britain. The naval force was 
 stationed at proper points on the Mediterranean and 
 the Euxine, on the coasts of Gaul and Britain, and 
 along the Khine and the Danube. Thus, in con- 
 formity with the same general conception, both the 
 army and the navy were distributed around the bor' 
 ders of the empire, and along an irregular line of 
 circumvallation which could scarcely fall short of 
 ten thousand miles. Within the area enclosed by 
 this vast girt there were but few troops; and for 
 several centuries together men experienced — so far as 
 danger from without was concerned — a profound 
 sense of peace and security. 
 
 Gibbon places the total population of the empire 
 at about one hundred and twenty millions ; and, the 
 whole military and naval establishment being taken, 
 as above, at four hundred and fifty thousand, the re- 
 sult is that there was only one soldier and sailor to 
 two hundred and sixty-six of the population — a ratio 
 of miKtary draft upon society which w'as but little 
 more than one third as great as that of the seven 
 principal states of onr present Europe.' This result 
 " See my Note at the end of chapter iii. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 311 
 
 is very significant, as showing in a demonstrable 
 manner the great work which the Komans accom- 
 plished in imparting a pacific and industrial charac- 
 ter to that immense military society over which their 
 ascendency had been acquired by force, policy, and 
 fraud.' 
 
 n. The extreme brevity of the allusions which 
 Montesquieu makes in the foregoing chapter to the 
 Gladiatorial Combats, to the defective sense of Hu- 
 manity among the Romans, and to the difference be- 
 tween their Education and that of modem times, 
 will justify some further remarks upon each of these 
 topics. In our effort to grasp the general spirit of 
 Eoman history, these subjects are too important to be 
 dismissed with a passing glance. 
 
 1. The Oladiatorial Spectacle was an institution 
 which, like the Triumph, supplies a striking illustra- 
 tion of the semi-savage character of the Roman civ- 
 ilization. It appears that these spectacles were not 
 publicly exhibited at Home before a. u. c. 490 — that 
 is, about the year 262 b. o. ; and that they originated 
 in the ancient religious rite of sacrificing prisoners of 
 war to the manes of the dead — a rite which is recog- 
 nized for example by Homer, in the sacrifice of pris- 
 oners which Achilles makes to the dead Patroclus. 
 It was as a funeral rite, and at the period stated, 
 that we first meet with the practice as a public spec- 
 
 ' See Gibbon's Rome, ehs. i and ii ; Adam's Rom. Ant. Vice. Also, 
 see my Notes at the ends of chapters v and vi. 
 
312 GKANDETJR AND DECADENCE [siKEE. 
 
 tacle at Eome. The combatants fought in pairs, and 
 thus sacrificed each other on funeral occasions. JS^^oth- 
 ing can better enable us to realize the intensely say- 
 age element which had place in the Eoman life than 
 the fact that the illustrious Scipio Africanus himself 
 gave such a spectacle after the death of his father 
 and uncle. All the victims on this occasion were 
 volunteers. 
 
 The custom finally lost its religious and funeral 
 character, and became a mere secular amusement. 
 Candidates for office popularized themselves with the 
 people by treating them to these bloody exhibitions ; 
 and even the guests at private reunions were en- 
 tertained by the mutual slaughter of gladiators. 
 The practice increased rapidly down to about the 
 time of Trajan; and the number of gladiators who 
 killed each other for the amusement of the Eoman 
 people appears to have been very great. It is said 
 that no less than ten thousand fought in the spec- 
 tacles which were given by Trajan after the eon- 
 quest of Dacia. These murderous contests took 
 place in the presence of vast concourses of people, 
 composed of both sexes and of every order, from 
 the rabble to the elite of Eome ; and all appear to 
 have enjoyed the brutal entertainment with equal 
 zest. 
 
 Considered in itself, the gladiatorial spectacle be- 
 speaks a society purely savage. Considered in con- 
 nection with the advanced social elements with which 
 
KOTK.] OF THE ROMANS. 313 
 
 it was mixed, it is evidence, like the Triumph,* of a 
 semi-savage social state, at least as far as regards the 
 great virtue of humcmity. 
 
 This truly barbarous custom, after having been 
 interdicted but not extirpated by Constantino, was 
 finally abolished, a. d. 404, by Honorius, or, a. d. 
 500, by Theodoric the Ostrogoth, a prince who, al- 
 though an Arian, was, in the estimation of the Eo- 
 mans, an indisputable barbarian. Whatever doubt 
 may exist as to the exact time of its final extinction, 
 it is certain that this horrid amusement had polluted 
 the amphitheatres of the Roman world for more than 
 six hundred years, and that it finally succumbed to 
 the spirit of Christianity." 
 
 2. The practice of Infcmtidde may be selected as 
 another striking illustration of the comparative want 
 of Humanity, not only among the Eomans, but among 
 the ancient nations generally. Gibbon remarks that 
 "the exposition of children was the prevailing and 
 stubborn vice of antiquity: it was sometimes pre- 
 scribed, often permitted, almost always practiced with 
 impunity, by the nations who never entertained the 
 Roman ideas of paternal power"; and he adds that 
 "the Roman empire was stained with the blood of 
 infants, till such murders were included, by Valen- 
 tinian and his colleagues, in the letter and spirit of 
 
 * See my Note at the end of chapter vi. 
 
 ' Adam's Rom. Ant., PhUa., 1872, p. 229 ; Uvy, Book XXVIII, eh. 
 xxi; Iliad, Book XXI; Potter's Qrecian Antiquities, Edinburgh, 1808, 
 vol. i, p. 268; Gibbon's Rome, ch. xxx; Chambers' Enc, art. Gladiator. 
 14 
 
314 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakkb. 
 
 the Cornelian law." General, however, as the custom 
 was, it seems that it was not quite universal; it is 
 said that the Thehans forbade the practice under pen- 
 alty of death. 
 
 The destruction of infants among the ancients ap- 
 pears to have been mainly accomplished in two ways : 
 they were either killed outright — ^usually it would 
 seem by strangulation — or exposed to perish from the 
 elements, from hunger, or from birds and beasts of 
 prey. The Spartans had a special method of their 
 own. All their newly-born children were taken be- 
 fore judges whose office it was to determine which 
 were fit to live and which not ; and the latter were 
 condemned to be thrown into a deep cave in the 
 neighborhood of the Taygetus mountains. 
 
 If anything can more clearly indicate the undevel- 
 oped feeling of humanity in ancient times than the 
 fact that child murder was either enjoined, permit- 
 ted, or practiced with legal impunity, by the most 
 civilized nations, it is seen in the additional fact that 
 the custom was approved by the most eminent think- 
 ers and moralists of antiquity. Aristotle expressly 
 recommends that the law should provide for the de- 
 struction of all "imperfect or maimed" infants; and, 
 if necessary as a check to population, he even recom- 
 mends the killing of those who are not physically 
 defective ! 
 
 After having been practiced for ages by the Eo- 
 mans, this cruel and revolting custom finally yielded 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 315 
 
 to that growing spirit of humanity which preceded 
 and accompanied the introduction of Christianity into 
 the empire." 
 
 3. Probably no contrast between ancient and mod- 
 em societies is more marked or more significant than 
 that which is seen in connection with Education. 
 Neither among the Komans, nor Greeks, nor any 
 other ancient nation, is there evidence to show that 
 society had anywhere come up to the idea of a truly 
 popular education. In the most advanced states, learn- 
 ing was the privilege of the few, illiterate ignorance 
 the heritage of the many. The narrowness of base 
 upon which the Eoman and Greek repubKcs rested — 
 in common with the ancient societies generally — is 
 in no respect more plainly seen than in the restriction 
 of culture to a small class. In the rise of the modem 
 system of popular education civilization has taken a 
 new departure; and the polity of modem nations — 
 seeking through elementary culture to render every 
 individual in the state a center of mental and moral 
 force — ^has added very greatly to the breadth and 
 strength of the social foundation. 
 
 In the increasing tendency among modem nations 
 to educate at public expense, and to make education 
 universal, we observe that a f andamental unity of end 
 pervades the whole system of popular culture in Eu- 
 
 * Gibbon's Some, toI. ly, pp. 344, 345 ; Potter's Grecian Aniiguiiies, 
 vol. ii, pp. 326-328, Edinburgh, 1808; Adam's Horn. Ant., Phila., 1872, 
 p. 35 ; Aristotle's Politics, Book VII, ch. 16. 
 
316 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 rope and America — that end being to strengthen and 
 enrich the state by the development of the faculties 
 of all the individuals of which it is composed ; and we 
 are everywhere looking at a fact of the highest value 
 and strongest hold upon our modern societies, which 
 either had no place whatever, or at most, but little 
 more than a rudimentary one, in the policies of the 
 ancient states/ 
 
 ' For a good statement of the growth and condition of the public 
 school establishments of the principal European states, see Barnard's 
 NatioTwl Education in Europe, Hartford, 1854 ; for a like statement in 
 reference to our own country, see the Report made by the same accom- 
 plished educator to the Congress of the United States, Washington, 1868 ; 
 for an excellent comparative view of the recent state of national cul- 
 ture on both continents, see Hoyt's Report on Educatwn, in the sixth 
 volume of Reports of Commissioners to the Paris Exposition, Washington, 
 1870 ; and for the most advanced ideas upon education in ancient times, 
 see Aristotle's Politics, Book III, ch. 13 ; Book V, ch. 9 ; Book VII, eh. 
 14 ; and Book VIII, ch. 1. 
 
MONTESQMEU.] OF THE ROMANS. 317 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 STATE OF THE EMPIEE EEOM ANTONINUS TO PEOBTJS. 
 
 At the time whicli we have now reached, the 
 Stoical School was extending itself and acquii'ing 
 credit in the empire. As the earth causes plants to 
 grow in places which the heavens have never looked 
 upon, so it seemed that human nature had made an 
 effort to produce, from its own resources, this admi- 
 rable system of philosophy. 
 
 The Romans owed their best emperors to this 
 school.' ^Nothing can ever obliterate the memory of 
 the first Antoninus, except the fame of Marcus Au- 
 relius, whom he adopted. "We experience a secret 
 pleasure when we speak of this emperor. We can- 
 not read his Hf e without being touched with a spe- 
 cies of tenderness. Such is the effect which it pro- 
 duces that we have a better opinion of ourselves for 
 the reason that we have a better opinion of man- 
 kind.' 
 
 ' For an idea of the central principle of the stoical philosophy, see 
 my Note at the end of this chapter. — Translatok. 
 
 ' For some more extended notice of the two Autonines, see idem. — 
 Teanslatok. 
 
318 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [MONTESQuniu. 
 
 The wisdom of Nerva, the glory of Trajan, the 
 courage of Hadrian, and the virtue of the two Anto- 
 nines, commanded the respect of the soldiers. But, 
 when new monsters succeeded them, the abuses of a 
 military government appeared in all their excesses; 
 and the soldiers who had sold the empire assassi- 
 nated the emperors in order to obtain a new price 
 for it. 
 
 It is said that there is a prince now living who 
 has labored fifteen years to abolish the civil govern- 
 ment of his states, in order to establish a mihtary 
 government instead. I would make no odious reflec- 
 tions upon his designs. I will only say that, in ac- 
 cordance with the nature of things, two hundred 
 guards may place the life of a sovereign in safety — 
 but not eighty thousand ; besides which, it is more 
 dangerous to oppress an armed people than one 
 which is not. 
 
 Commodus succeeded his father, Marcus Aurelius. 
 He was a monster, who followed not only all his 
 own passions, but all those of his ministers and 
 courtiers. Those who delivered the world of his 
 presence put Pertinax in his place — a venerable old 
 man, whom the Prtetorian guards massacred at 
 once. 
 
 These guards put up the empire at auction; and 
 Julianus Didius bid it off by means of his promises 
 — a proceeding at which all men were revolted; for, 
 although the empire had often been purchased, it 
 
CHAP. xTi.] OF THE ROMANS. 319 
 
 had never before been sold as merchandise. Percen- 
 nius Niger, Severus, and Albinus were saluted as 
 emperors; and Julianus, not having been able to pay 
 the immense sums which he had promised, was aban- 
 doned by the soldiers. 
 
 Severus overthrew Niger and Albinus. He pos- 
 sessed great qualities; but lenity — ^that first virtue of 
 princes — ^he lacked. 
 
 The power of the Eoman emperors could more 
 readily assume the appearance of tyranny than that 
 of the monarchs of our time. As their official dig- 
 nity was a composite of all the Koman magistracies 
 — as they were dictators under the name of emper- 
 ors, tribunes of the people, proconsuls, censors, grand 
 pontiffs, and, if they desired, consuls also — they had 
 frequent occasion to exercise the judicial function;- 
 and thus they might easily incur the suspicion of 
 having oppressed those whom they had condemned 
 — the people ordinarily judging of the abuse of 
 power by the magnitude of the power possessed. 
 Our kings of Europe, on the contrary, being legis- 
 lators and not executors of the law, princes and not 
 judges, are discharged from all that part of authority 
 which might be odious to the people; and, whilst 
 reserving to fliemselves the dispensation of mercy, 
 they have committed the infliction of punishments to 
 particular magistrates. 
 
 Few of the emperors were more jealous of their 
 authority than Tiberius and Severus ; meanwhile 
 
320 GEANDETJK AND DECADENCE [MONTESQtriEU. 
 
 botli suffered themselTes to be wretchedly governed 
 — the one by Sejanus, the other by Plautian. 
 
 The unhappy custom of proscription, which had 
 been introduced by Sylla, was continued under the 
 emperors. And, indeed, it was necessary that an em- 
 peror shoxdd possess some virtue in order not to re- 
 sort to it; for, as his ministers and favorites threw 
 their eyes over the prospect of so many confiscations, 
 they incessantly pressed upon him the necessity of 
 punishment and the dangers of clemency. 
 
 The proscriptions of Severus caused many of the 
 soldiers of Niger' to seek refuge among the Par- 
 thians.* These refugees taught the latter what they 
 lacked in their military art. They taught them the 
 use and even the manufacture of the Boman arms; 
 and the result was that these people, who had com- 
 monly been content with defending themselves, were, 
 in succeeding times, nearly always aggressors.' 
 
 It is remarkable that, in that succession of civil 
 wars which were continually renewed under the em- 
 perors, those who controlled the legions of Europe 
 very generally conquered those who were supported 
 by the legions of Asia;° and we find in the history 
 
 ' Herodian, Life of Severus. 
 
 * The evil continued under Alexander. Artaxerxea, who re-established 
 the empire of the Persians, became formidable to the Romans — for the 
 reason that their soldiers, either from caprice or licentiousness, deserted 
 to him in crowds. {AbridgmeiU of XipMlimis, of Book LXXX of 
 Dion.) 
 
 ' That is to say, the Persians who succeeded them. 
 
 ^ Severus overthrew the Asiatic legions of Niger, Constantine those 
 
CHAP. XVI.] OF THE ROMANS. 321 
 
 of Severus that he was unable to capture the city 
 of Atra in Arabia, for the reason that, his European 
 legions having mutinied, he was compelled to rely 
 upon those of Syria. 
 
 This difference was felt from the time that the 
 Komans first began to make levies in the provinces ; ' 
 and it was with the legions as with the nations them- 
 selves — which, by nature and by education, were more, 
 or less, adapted to war. 
 
 The levies which were made in the provinces led 
 to another consequence. The emperors, who were 
 generally taken from the armies, were nearly all for- 
 eigners, and sometimes barbarians. Thus Eome ceased 
 to be mistress of the world, and received her laws 
 from all nations. Each emperor carried with him to 
 the capital something which was peculiar to his own 
 country, either in the form of manners, or morals, 
 or police, or worship ; and Heliogabalus went so far 
 that he desired to destroy all the objects of venera- 
 tion which he found in Rome, to remove all the 
 gods from the temples, and to set up his own in- 
 stead. 
 
 of Lioinius, and Vespasian, although proclaimed by the armies of Syria, 
 made war upon Vitellius with the legions of Moesia, Pannonia, and Dal- 
 matia only. Cicero wrote from the place of his government to the senate 
 that troops levied In Asia were not to be relied upon. Constantino, as 
 Zosimus says, only vanquished Maxentius by means of his cavalry — in re- 
 lation to which see the seventh paragraph of the xxii chapter of this work. 
 ' Augustus gave a fixed character to the legions, and placed them in 
 the provinces. During the earliest times, troops were only levied in 
 Rome ; later, tha levy was extended to the Latins ; later still, to Italy ; 
 and, finally, to the provinces. 
 
322 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesqtjiku. 
 
 This, independently of the hidden ways which 
 God had chosen, and which were known to him 
 only, aided much in the establishment of Christian- 
 ity; for this religion was no longer a stranger in 
 the empire, and men were prepared to receive all the 
 customs which an emperor might d6sire to introduce. 
 
 It is known that the Eomans received into their 
 city the gods of other countries. They received them 
 as conquerors, and caused them to be carried in their 
 triumphal processions. But, when they were brought 
 in by foreigners themselves, with a view to estabhsh- 
 ing their worship, they were immediately interdicted. 
 It is known, too, that the Romans were in the habit 
 of giving to foreign gods the names of such of their 
 own as appeared to resemble them most ; but, when 
 the priests of other countries attempted to introduce 
 the worship of their deities into Home under their 
 proper names, they were not permitted to do so; 
 and this was one of the great obstacles which the 
 Christian religion encountered.' 
 
 "We might call CaracaUa, not a tyrant, but the 
 destroyer of men. Caligula, l^ero, and Domitian 
 limited their cruelties to the city of Eome ; CaracaUa 
 extended his fury to the whole empire." 
 
 ^ For some idea of the darkest side of the religion of the Romans, see 
 my Kote at the end of this chapter. — Thanslatob. 
 
 ' A good illustration of the inherent momentum with which a great 
 social organism moves, and of the superiority of the aggregate social force 
 to the special bias of a particular tyrant, is seen in the fact that the gen- 
 eral course of the Roman Law was not disturbed, and, it may be, its act- 
 ual development not arrested, by the tyranny of CaracaUa. " Under the 
 
CHAP. XVI.] OF THE ROMANS. 323 
 
 By means of the exactions of a long reign, and 
 by the proscription of those who had adhered to the 
 cause of his competitors, Severus had amassed im- 
 mense sums. Caracalla, who commenced his reign 
 by slaying his brother Geta with his own hand, em- 
 ployed this wealth in rendering his crime sufferable 
 to the soldiers, who were attached to Geta, and who 
 said they had taken the oath of fidelity to both the 
 sons of Severus, and not to one only. 
 
 Wealth amassed by sovereigns scarcely ever pro- 
 duces other than bad effects. It corrupts the suc- 
 cessor, who is dazzled by his fortune. If it does not 
 spoil his heart it impairs his genius. He at once 
 projects great enterprises upon the basis of a power 
 which is accidental, which cannot last, which is not 
 natural, and which is rather puffed up than great. 
 
 Caracalla increased the pay of the soldiers. Ma- 
 crinus wrote to the senate that this increase amount- 
 ed to seventy million" drachms." It appears that 
 this emperor inflated things; and, if we compare the 
 expense arising from the pay of our soldiers at the 
 present day with the residue of the public expendi- 
 tures, and follow the same proportion for the Ko- 
 
 weakest and moat vicious reign," sayg Gibbon, speaking of this emperor, 
 " the seat of justice was filled by the wisdom and integrity of Papinian 
 and Ulpian ; and the purest materials of the Code and Pandects are in- 
 scribed with the names of CaraciiUa and his ministers." (Gibbon's Romii, 
 ch. xliv.) — Teanslatok. 
 
 '" Seven thousand myriads. (Dion, in Macrinm.) 
 
 " The Attic drachm was the Koman denarius — the eighth part of an 
 ounce, and the sixty-fourth part of our mark. 
 
324 GEANDEUK AND DECADENCE [mohtesqitieu. 
 
 mans, we shall see that the sum would be enor- 
 mous. 
 
 It is necessary that we should inquire what was 
 the pay of the Koman soldier." 
 
 "We learn from Orosius that Domitian added one 
 fourth to the established pay." It appears, from the 
 discourse of a soldier in Tacitus," that at the time of 
 the death of Augustus it was ten ounces of copper, 
 "We find in Suetonius" that Cagsar had doubled the 
 pay in his time. Pliny " says that during the second 
 Punic war it was diminished one fifth. It was there- 
 fore about six ounces of copper during the fib:«t Punic 
 war," five ounces during the second,'' ten under Cae- 
 sar, and thirteen and a third under Domitian." Upon 
 this I will make some comments. 
 
 The pay which the republic could easily afford 
 whilst it was yet a small state — when each year 
 
 ■'^ Pay per diem is to be understood. — Translator. 
 
 ■' He increased it in tlie ratio of seventy-five to a hundred. 
 
 '^ Annales, lib. i, ch. xvii. 
 
 " Life of Ccssar. 
 
 '^ Natural History, Book XXSIII, art. 13. Instead of giving ten ounces 
 of copper for twenty, sixteen of tlie latter denomination were given. 
 
 " A soldier, in the Mostellaria of Plautus, says it was three asses — 
 which can only be understood as referring to the as of ten [two ?] ounces. 
 But, if the pay was exactly six asses [ounces ?] in the first Punic war, it 
 was not diminished in the second by a fifth, but by a sixth, and the frac- 
 tion was neglected. 
 
 '^ Polybiua, who adopts the Greek values of money, only differs by a 
 fraction. 
 
 " See Orosius, and Suetonius in Domit. They say the same thing 
 in different words. I have reduced these values to ounces of copper in 
 order to be understood by those who are not acquainted with the values 
 of the Boman moneys. 
 
CHAP. XVI.] OF THE KOMANS. 325 
 
 brought a new war, and along with it fresh spoils 
 into the public treasury — it could no longer provide 
 for without becoming indebted during the time of 
 the first Punic war, when it had extended its arms 
 beyond the limits of Italy, and when it had to sus- 
 tain a long war and to support large armies. 
 
 During the second Punic war the pay was re- 
 duced to five ounces of copper — a reduction which 
 could be made without danger, at a time when most 
 of the citizens blushed to accept soldiers' pay, and 
 desired to serve their country at their own expense. 
 
 The wealth of Perseus, and of many other kings, 
 which poured continually into Eome, caused the levy 
 of taxes to cease ; '" and, in the midst of great public 
 and private opulence, the Eomans had the wisdom 
 not to increase the pay of five ounces of copper. 
 
 Although this pay was charged with a deduction 
 for grain, clothes, and arms, it was yet sufficient ; for 
 only such citizens were enrolled as possessed a patri- 
 mony of their own. 
 
 Marias having enrolled men who were without 
 property, and his example having been followed, Cse- 
 sar was compelled to increase the pay. 
 
 This increase having been continued after the 
 death of Caesar, it became necessary, under the eon- 
 sidate of Hirtius and Pansa, to re-establish the taxes. 
 
 The weakness of Domitian having led him to add 
 yet one fourth to the pay, he thereby inflicted a 
 '" Cicero's Offices, Book U. 
 
326 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 great wound upon the State, the misfortune of which 
 is, not that luxury reigns within it, but that it reigns 
 among classes which, from the nature of things, 
 ought to have nothing more than what is physically 
 necessary." Caracalla having added still further to 
 the pay, the empire was reduced to such a condition 
 that, being unable to maintain itself without the sol- 
 diers, it could not maintain itself with them. 
 
 In order to allay the feeling of horror which had 
 been excited by the murder of his brother, Caracalla 
 placed him in the rank of the gods. It is singular 
 that this was exactly the treatment which he himself 
 received from Macrinus, who, after having procured 
 his assassination, erected a temple for his worship, 
 and established priests in his honor — seeking thus to 
 appease the anger of the praetorian guards, who were 
 enraged at the death of a prince from whom they 
 had received so much. The result of his deification 
 was, that his memory was not tarnished ; and, the sen- 
 ate not daring to judge him, he was not, like Com- 
 modus, placed in the rank of the tyrants — though 
 none the less meriting the dishonor." 
 
 Of the two great emperors, Hadrian and Sevenis,"' 
 the one established military discipline, whilst the other 
 
 2' This statement is more worthy of a philosopher who is at once the 
 satellite of a throne, and the apologist of privileged orders and privileged 
 abuses, than of the free and great genius of Montesquieu. — ^Translator. 
 
 ^' JElws Lampridius, in Vita A lex. Seven. 
 
 ^' See the Abridgment of Xiphilinus, Life of Hadrian ; and Hero- 
 dian, Life of Sevems. 
 
CHAP, xvi] OF THE ROMANS. 327 
 
 relaxed it. The effects of this difference correspond- 
 ed accurately with their causes. The reigns which 
 followed that of Hadrian were happy and tran- 
 quil; after Severus we look upon a reign of hor- 
 rors. 
 
 CaracaUa had indulged in immense profusion 
 towards the military. He had observed well the dy- 
 ing counsel of his father — ^to enrich the soldiers, and 
 not to trouble himself with others. But such a policy 
 was not of much service except for a single reign; 
 for the successor, not being able to support the 
 same standard of expense, was at once massacred by 
 the army; so that we constantly see the wise em- 
 perors put to death by the soldiers, and the bad 
 ones by conspirators, or in pursuance of judgments 
 of the senate. 
 
 "Whenever a tyrant abandoned himself to his ar- 
 mies, and left the citizens exposed to military vio- 
 lence and rapine, this state of things could only con- 
 tinue during a single reign; for the soldiers, by the 
 destructive excess of their license, went so far as to 
 destroy the very means of their own support; and 
 it thereupon became necessary to think of re-estab- 
 lishing the military discipline — an enterprise which 
 always cost the life of him who dared to attempt 
 it. 
 
 After Caracalla had been killed by the creatures 
 of Macrinus, the soldiers — rendered desperate by the 
 loss of one who had lavished his favors upon them 
 
328 GKAOT»EUE AND DECADENCE [MOSiESQniEU. 
 
 without measure — elected Heliogabalus ; " and when 
 the latter — who occupied himself solely with his 
 filthy voluptuousness, and left the soldiers to Uve as 
 they pleased— could no longer be endured, they mas- 
 sacred him also. With equal readiness they killed 
 Alexander, who wished to re-establish discipline, and 
 who spoke of punishing them." And thus a tyrant, 
 who was able to commit crimes, but was unable to 
 provide for the security of his own life, perished with 
 the same destructive facUity as he who desired to do 
 better perished after him. 
 
 After Alexander, Maximin was elected. He was 
 the first emperor of barbaric origin. His gigantic 
 height and his great physical strength had brought 
 him into notice. Both he and his son were killed 
 by his soldiers. The first two Gordians perished in 
 Africa. Maximus, Balbinus, and the third Gordian 
 were massacred. Philip, who had procured the mur- 
 der of the young Gordian, was himself killed, together 
 with his son ; and Decius, who was elected in his place, 
 perished in his turn by the treachery of Gallus."" 
 
 " At this time all sorta of men believed themselves eligible to the 
 empire. See Dion, lib. Ixxix. 
 
 '^ See Lampridius. 
 
 "' Cassaubon remarks upon the Augv^tan History that, duriag the one 
 hundred and sixty years which it embraces, there were seventy persons 
 who bore, justly or unjustly, the title of Caesar. "Adco erani in illo 
 principatu, quern iamen omnes miraniur, comiiia imperii semper incerta " ; 
 from which it is manifest how great was the difference between this gov- 
 ernment and that of France, in which there have been but sixty-three 
 kings in twelve hundred years. 
 
 " For a more general and more particular idea of the destructive fate 
 
CHAP. XVI.] • OF THE EOMAKS. 329 
 
 That which is called the Eoman empire was, at 
 this period, a species of irregular republic, much the 
 same as the aristocracy of Algiers, iu which the sol- 
 diers, who hold the sovereign power, make and un- 
 make the magistrate whom we call the Dey ; and per- 
 haps it is a tolerably general rule that military gov- 
 ernments are, iu certain respects, rather republican 
 than monarchical. 
 
 Let it not be thought that the soldiers took no 
 part in the government except by their disobediences 
 and their revolts. Were not the harangues which 
 the emperors delivered to them essentially of the 
 same nature as those which the consuls and the trib- 
 unes had formerly delivered to the people? And 
 although the armies had no particular place for as- 
 sembling, and were governed by no definite forms — 
 although they did not, as a general thing, proceed 
 with coolness, used as they were to deliberating little 
 and acting much — yet, did they not exercise a sover- 
 eign control over the fortunes of the empire? and 
 what was an emperor but the- minister of a govern- 
 ment of force, elected to subserve the particular in- 
 terests of the soldiers? 
 
 When the army associated Philip with the em- 
 pire "* — ^he being at the time preetorian prefect of the 
 third Gordian — the latter requested that the sole com- 
 
 whieh attended the Roman emperors, see the concluding part of my Note 
 at the end of this chapter. — Tkanslatoe. 
 '* Julius Capitolinus. 
 
330 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 mand miglit be left in his hands ; but his request was 
 denied. He harangued the army in order to induce 
 it to divide the power equally between him and Philip ; 
 and this also was denied. He supplicated that the 
 title of Csesar might be left to him; and this, too, 
 was refused. He asked that he might be made prag- 
 torian prefect ; and, this being equally denied, he 
 finally spoke for his life. The army, in passing 
 these divers judgments, exercised the supreme power 
 of the state. 
 
 The barbarians, who were originally unknown to 
 the Eomans, and who at later periods had only been 
 annoying to them, were now become formidable. By 
 the most extraordinary career of success that the 
 world has seen, Eome had so completely annihilated 
 all nations that, when she came to be conquered 
 herself, it seemed as if the earth had given a new 
 birth to the destroyed peoples, in order to prepare 
 the means for her own destruction. 
 
 The rulers of great states generally have but few 
 neighbors who are objects of their ambition. Should 
 neighbors of this kind have once existed, they would 
 have been enveloped in the course of conquest. Such 
 states are, therefore, bounded by seas, mountains, and 
 deserts — by outlying regions the poverty of which 
 causes them to be despised." Thus it was that the 
 
 '' It will be observed that this characterization of a great state is 
 altogether more applicable to ancient times — when the spirit of conquest 
 was so much more active — than it is to the circumstances of the modem 
 world. — Translator. 
 
CHAP. XVI.] OP THE ROMANS. 331 
 
 Eomans left the Germans in their forests, and the 
 peoples of the North in their ice and snow; and 
 there it was that those nations were preserved, or 
 even formed, by which they were themselves finally 
 subdued. 
 
 Under the reign of GaUus, a great number of 
 nations — who afterwards became more celebrated — 
 ravaged Europe; and the Persians, having invaded 
 Syria, only abandoned their conquests in order to se- 
 cure their spoils. 
 
 Those swarms of barbarians which formerly poured 
 down from the ]!^orth are no longer seen. Eoman 
 violence had caused the nations to retire from the 
 South to the ITorth. As long as the force which 
 pressed them back remained unabated, they continued 
 in their new seats. When this force came to be en- 
 feebled, they spread themselves everywhere.^" The 
 same thing took place some centuries later. The con- 
 quests and the tyrannies of Charlemagne had a sec- 
 ond time caused a movement of nations from the 
 South to the ITorth; and, as soon as this empire 
 became weakened, they flowed a second time from 
 the North to the South. And if, at the present 
 day, some monarch should again commit the same 
 ravages in Europe, the nations, driven to the North 
 — ^pressed back to the limits of the earth — would 
 there abide firmly until the moment arrived when 
 
 '" We see to what the famous question is reduced : " Why is the 
 North no longer as populous as it formerly was ? " 
 
332 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquief. 
 
 they would inundate and conquer Europe a third 
 time." 
 
 The frightful disorder which prevailed in the suc- 
 cession to the empire having reached its height, we 
 see towards the end of the reign of Yalerian, and 
 during that of Galhenus his son, thirty different pre- 
 tenders to the imperial purple, who, having for the 
 most part destroyed each other, and having had 
 reigns which were very short, received the name of 
 tyrants." 
 
 Yalerian having been taken prisoner by the Per- 
 sians, and Gallienus, his son, neglecting the affairs of 
 the state, the barbarians penetrated on all sides. The 
 empire was in the same condition in which we find 
 it about a century later in the "West;" and it would 
 have been destroyed at that time but for a concur- 
 rence of fortunate circumstances which relieved it. 
 
 Odenatus — prince of Palmyra and ally of the Ko- 
 mans — drove back the Persians, who had invaded al- 
 most the whole of Asia, The city of Kome raised 
 an army of its own citizens, and dispersed the bar- 
 barians who came to pillage it. An innumerable 
 army of Scythians, which had crossed the sea in six 
 
 *' For a neglected but important cause of the great power of the 
 northern barbarians during the closing ages of the Western Empire, see 
 my Note at the end of this chapter. — Translator. 
 
 '^ Gibbon reduces the number to nineteen, but yet implies that it 
 may be thirty, if we count the women and children upon whom the im- 
 perial title was conferred. (Vol. i, pp. 321, 322.) — Translator. 
 
 '' One hundred and fifty years later, under Honorius, the barbarians 
 OTerran the empire. 
 
CHAP. XVI.] OF THE ROMAICS. 333 
 
 thousand vessels, peiaslied from shipwreck, exposure, 
 famine, and its own magnitude. And, Gallienus hav- 
 ing been killed, Claudius, Aurelian, Tacitus, and Pro- 
 bus — four great men who fortunately succeeded each 
 other — re-established the empire — which was on the 
 verge of ruin. 
 
334 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [badb. 
 
 NOTE BY THE TKANSLATOK. 
 
 In the course of the preceding chapter Montes- 
 quiea touches very cursorily upon several subjects of 
 marked interest, most of which, indeed, are of great 
 significance in estimating the spirit of Eoman history. 
 The Stoical Philosophy, which was received by the 
 Romans from the Greeks — the characters of the two 
 Antonines, the noblest productions of that philosophy 
 — the Popular Superstition of the Komans, as seen 
 under the aspect of its darkest trait — ^the growing 
 power of the Barbarians of the North, as connected 
 with a cause which has not been much noticed — and 
 the Tragic Succession of the emperors of the West, 
 as indicating the low social state of the Eoman 
 world — will, therefore, be the subjects of some fur- 
 ther reflections. 
 
 I. In view of the practical inflaence exerted 
 upon the Koman character by the various systems 
 of Greek philosophy during the five centuries pre- 
 ceding Constantino, Macintosh very justly assigns the 
 preference to the school of the stoics. " If," says 
 he, " any conclusion may be hazarded from this trial 
 
NOTE.J OF THE ROMANS. 335 
 
 of systems — tlie greatest which history has recorded — 
 we must not refuse our decided, though not undis- 
 tinguishing, preference to that noble school which 
 preserved great souls untainted at the court of disso- 
 lute and ferocious tyrants; which exalted the slave 
 of one of Nero's courtiers to be the moral teacher of 
 after times ; which for the first, and hitherto for the 
 only time, breathed philosophy and justice into those 
 rules of law which govern the ordinary concerns of 
 every man; and which, above all, has contributed, 
 by the examples of Marcus Fortius Cato and of Mar- 
 cus Aurelius Antoninus, to raise the dignity of our 
 species, to keep alive a more ardent love of Virtue, 
 and a more awful sense of duty throughout all gen- 
 erations." ' 
 
 Here is not the place to discuss such a question 
 at any length, but I believe it can be shown, first, 
 that the central idea of the Greek stoicism — ascen- 
 dency of the reason and moral sentiments over the 
 passions and appetites — does not admit of limitation 
 to any special system of philosophy, but belongs to 
 the common sense of mankind; secondly, that this 
 idea underlies all the best precepts which were pre- 
 scribed for the conduct of life in the ancient world 
 —whether among Greeks, Eomans, Egyptians, Per- 
 sians, Hindoos, or Chinese; and, thirdly, that the 
 same idea is fundamental to the best ethical concep- 
 tions among the moderns. "Whatever may be true or 
 ' Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical PTdlosophy, sec. ii. 
 
336 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 false as to other hierarchies, there is certainly a 
 hierarchy of the powers of man's nature, the su- 
 preme law of which is, that well-being demands that 
 the superior shall rule the inferior. This law is 
 so forced upon man's attention by his actual expe- 
 rience in every condition of life, that it has taken 
 some place in the systematic ethics of all cultivated 
 nations, and has been extensively incorporated into 
 the "folk lore" of every people. The distinction 
 of the intellectual Greeks was, that they gave the 
 deepest and richest expression to the law, and thus 
 drew to themselves the credit of being in some sense 
 the originators of a species of moral truth which has 
 been felt and acted upon among mankind generally. 
 In the whole range of ethical literature, it would 
 be difficult to find a better statement of that general 
 principle upon which stoicism rests — and which ap- 
 peals so directly to the common apprehension of 
 men — than is found in the following fine stoical 
 passage from Hooker: "First, therefore, having ob- 
 served that the best things, where they are not hin- 
 dered, do still produce the best operations, (for which 
 cause, where many things are to concur unto one ef- 
 fect, the best is in all congruity of reason to guide 
 the residue, that, it prevailing most, the work princi- 
 pally done by it may have greatest perfection ;) when, 
 hereupon, we come to observe in ourselves, of what 
 excellency our souls are in comparison of our bodies, 
 and the diviner part in relation unto the baser of 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 337 
 
 our souls; seeing that all these concur in producing 
 human action, it cannot be well unless the chiefest 
 do command and direct the rest. The soul, then, 
 ought to conduct the body, and the spirit of our 
 minds the soul. This is, therefore, the first Law, 
 whereby the highest power of the mind requireth 
 general obedience at the hands of all the rest con- 
 curring with it unto action."" 
 
 Nothing can excel the beauty and tnith of the 
 philosophy thus enunciated — a philosophy which, 
 wherever practiced, has elevated and ennobled hu- 
 man nature ; and the influence of which upon the 
 lives of particular Romans has given to history some 
 of its noblest characters — even amid that dreary 
 waste of criminality and moral decay that attended 
 the declining empire. 
 
 II. A personal interest of a high order attaches 
 to the characters of the two Antonines, and a still 
 higher interest which is not personal: they were pro- 
 ductions of the ancient system — of the stoical school. 
 As such, they may be presented as the best practical 
 results of the ancient philosophy, and as a sort of 
 test, therefore, of its possible capacity. I here incor- 
 porate De Quincey's idea of both these extraordinary 
 men: 
 
 " The elder of the two, who is usually distin- 
 guished by the title of Pius, is thus described by one 
 of his biographers : ' He was externally of remarkable 
 
 « Ecd. Pol., Book I, ch. 8, sec. 6. 
 15 
 
338 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 beauty ; eminent for his moral character, full of be- 
 nign dispositions, noble, with a countenance of a most 
 gentle expression, intellectually of singular endow- 
 ments, possessing an elegant style of eloquence, dis- 
 tinguished for his literature, generally temperate, an 
 earnest lover of agricultural pursuits, mild in his de- 
 portment, bountiful in the use of his own, but a 
 stern respecter of the rights of others ; and, finally, he 
 was all this without ostentation, and with a constant 
 regard to the proportions of cases, and to the de- 
 mands of time and place.' . . . Little, indeed, did Pius 
 want of being a perfect Christian in heart and in 
 practice." Proceeding from the character of Pius to 
 that of Marcus, the same writer says : " A thoughtful 
 Eoman would have been apt to exclaim. This is too 
 good to last, upon finding so admirable a ruler suc- 
 ceeded by one still more admirable in the person of 
 Marcus Aurelius " : ' and he applies to the latter the 
 hypothesis that he must have experienced a "sub- 
 conscious influence" from Christianity — a surmise 
 which may, indeed, contain some possible measure of 
 truth, but which it seems difficult to reconcile with 
 the circumstance that this emperor persecuted the 
 Christians — a fact, by the way, which De Quincey cu- 
 riously overlooks in estimating his character. 
 
 In assigning to the emperor Pius a character 
 which he regards as all but perfect, and to Marcus a 
 higher one still, De Quincey probably expresses the 
 
 ^ See De Quincey's Cmsars, Boston, 1854, pp. 146, 149, 153, 164, 267. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 339 
 
 prevailing opinion among recent scholars. The pref- 
 erence thus given to the younger Antoninus is doubt- 
 less largely owing to his " Meditations," a work which 
 takes an eminent place in the world's literature of 
 moral thought. Pius claims no such literary distinc- 
 tion ; but the fact that this man — although charged 
 during so many years with the immense powers of a 
 Roman emperor — has given to history a life which 
 appears to be wholly without reproach, whilst that 
 of his successor is tarnished by the single stain of per- 
 secution, . seems to supply a solid ground of prefer- 
 ence in his favor. The emperor Marcus may have 
 possessed a higher order of intellectual endowments ; 
 and, barring the single stain alluded to, he was a 
 prodigy in the practice of all the virtues. He ap- 
 pears to have just missed being the most illustrious 
 prince that has ever ruled over men. 
 
 On the whole, it seems fair to say that it would 
 be difficult to name, in the entire history of the 
 world, two sovereigns who have supported authority 
 with equal self-control, or who have so beautifully 
 exemplified the advantages which flow from philoso- 
 phy enthroned with power. 
 
 III. The religion of the Eomans was but a great 
 phase of that general system of Polytheism which, 
 ethnically, was coextensive with the Indo-European 
 races, whilst geographically it was diffused from In- 
 dia to the Atlantic Ocean. Probably the most sig- 
 nificant character of this system of religious ideas 
 
340 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakeb. 
 
 and usages is the negative one, that it sustained but 
 a feeble relation to the virtue of humanity ; and it 
 appears certain that that new doctrine of Charity, 
 which took its historical origin in Judea, and among 
 a Semitic people — and which is, hitherto, the world's 
 highest spiritual product — was much more nearly an- 
 ticipated by the philosophy of the Greeks than by 
 the religion of Polytheism. 
 
 There is but one feature of the religion of 
 the Romans which I here propose to point out. It 
 is one, however, of large representative value — giv- 
 ing, perhaps, a darker idea of the mental status of 
 the masses of the Eo^ian people than anything else 
 which is found in their history, not even except- 
 ing the horrors of the gladiatorial spectacle. I allude 
 to the practice of human sacrifice. We have seen 
 that this practice probably attained its most revolting 
 proportions, as it certainly assumed its most revolting 
 form, among the Carthaginians, and the Phcsnician 
 Semites from whom they derived their origin.* But, 
 in greater or less degrees, the practice appears to 
 have been diffused quite generally over the ancient 
 world. We meet it among Gauls, Germans, Brit- 
 ons, Eomans, and Greeks. The story of Iphigenia, 
 in which so much tragic interest has centered, might 
 as well have been truth as fiction. It is quite in' 
 harmony with the probabilities of early Greek hfe. 
 Aristomenes is represented as sacrificing three hun- 
 ^ See my Note, at the end of chapter iv. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 341 
 
 dred human victims to Jupiter, a Spartan king being 
 one of tlie number. Just before joining in the bat- 
 tle of Salamis, Themistocles, or rather his soothsayer 
 and his ignorant soldiers, sacrificed three beautiful 
 Persian captives — reputed nephews of Xerxes — to 
 the god Bacchus Omestes ; and upon the altar of the 
 Arcadian Bacchus, "young damsels were beaten to 
 death with bundles of rods.'" 
 
 This rite of human sacrifice, in one form or 
 another, stains the history of Kome from the earliest 
 ages down to the time of the empire. "We have 
 abeady seen that the mutual slaughter of the gladia- 
 tors themselves originally involved the idea of a 
 sacrifice to the manes of the dead." In the time of 
 the kings it is said that certain classes of offenders 
 were devoted by law to the infernal gods, and might 
 be slain by any one who chose to do so. It appears 
 also that in early times boys were annually sacri- 
 ficed; and that it was customary, on the ides of 
 May, to throw thirty old men from one of the bridges 
 into the Tiber, as an offering to the souls of the 
 dead. In the time of the republic, it was lawful 
 for any consul, dictator, or praetor to devote to the 
 gods either himself or any member of a regularly 
 enrolled legion, the idea being that the enemy were 
 devoted along with the victim, and that the soul of 
 the latter, aided by the infernal powers, drew them 
 
 ' Potter's Grecian Antiquities, Edinburgh, 1808, vol. i, pp. 257, 268; 
 and Plutarch's Life of Tliemistocles. 
 
 * See my Note at the end of chapter xv. 
 
312 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakeh. 
 
 after him to the earth and to the shades below. 
 Livy mentions two notable instances of consuls 
 who thus devoted themselves on the field of bat- 
 tle.' 
 
 The sacrifice was at times expiatory. Thus — to 
 recur to an incident referred to in a former note — 
 after the disaster of Oannse — among other expurga- 
 tory proceedings, two men and two women were let 
 down alive into a walled pit in the cattle market; 
 and the historian who records the incident, while 
 claiming with doubtful credit that the rite was not 
 Roman, admits that the same spot had previously 
 been polluted by human sacrifice." As late as the 
 year 45 b. c, it is related that two men were sacri- 
 ficed in the Campus Martius by the priests of Mars ; 
 and even so late as the time of Horace, boys were 
 yet slain in connection with the rites of magic. Sex- 
 tus Pompey — son of Pompey the Great — inflated by 
 his naval power, and assuming the distinction of " the 
 son of Neptune," cast Kving men into the sea as 
 offerings to that god ; and on the ides of March, in 
 the year 40 b. c, Octavius ordered three hundred, or, 
 as another authority has it, four hundred, senators 
 and knights of the opposing faction " to be sacrificed 
 as victims on the altar of Julius Ccesar " — an instance, 
 however, so mixed up with the venomous party hatred 
 
 ' Adam's Rom. Ant., Phila., 1872, pp. 214, 215, 221 ; Livy, Book 
 VIII, ch. ix ; Book X, oh. xxviii. 
 « Livy, Book SSH, chap. Ivii. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 343 
 
 of the time that it is difficult to determine the exact 
 nature of the sacrifice." 
 
 We must rationally conclude that, in the course 
 of Koman history, the number of human victims 
 who were sacrificed in order to satisfy the demands 
 of an ignorant superstition was very much greater 
 than we have any account of; and that the religious 
 conceptions of a large section of the Koman mind 
 were upon much the same level as those of the Az- 
 tecs at the time of Cortes. There was, however, a 
 more advanced order of thought in the state, and a 
 consequent protest — ^long futile, or only partially ef- 
 fective — against the benighted custom of human sac- 
 rifice. 
 
 On the legal side, Junius Brutus has the credit 
 of interfering with it, and in some degree checking 
 it, in the first days of the republic; and then, after 
 a long interval, we come, in the year 96 b. c, upon 
 a decree of the senate which wholly or partially pro- 
 hibited the practice." 
 
 On the side of enlightened opinion, the cultivated 
 intellect of Eome commenced early to be detached 
 from the absurdities, and especially from the atroci- 
 ties, of the popular superstition. But so powerful 
 was the popular belief, and so ready its ministers to 
 give it efEect, that we reach the time of the first 
 
 ' Adam's Rom. Ant., Phila., 18T2, p. 215 ; Suetonius in Octavius, ch. 
 15 ; Ferguson's Rome, ch. xxxiii ; Anthon's Clas. Die., art. Potnpems. 
 '» Adam's Rom. Ant, Phila., 1872, pp. 215 and 221. 
 
34:4 GRAJSTDEITR AND DECADENCE [bakee. 
 
 emperors before the blood of human victims ceased 
 to flow, either as an offering to the gods or to the 
 souls of the dead ; and thus we have, in the case of 
 the Komans, a striking illustration of the general law 
 of history — that in all progressive societies the popu- 
 lar religious ideas yield tardily to the advancing so- 
 cial movement. 
 
 IV. I suspect that a neglected, but veiy impor- 
 tant, cause of the final overthrow of the Roman power 
 by the nations of the North may be found in the pro- 
 gressive diffusion of the use of iron among these rude 
 peoples, and in the consequent positive increase of 
 their military force and eiSciency. 
 
 The earliest periods of Greek and Koman history 
 seem to abut upon an Age of Bronze. " It is stated," 
 says Professor Worsaae, "by Homer, Hesiod, and 
 other authors, that the Greeks in the most ancient 
 time, before they had knowledge of iron, used bronze, 
 which was also the case with the Komans." At 
 later, though yet remote pei'iods in their history, these 
 leaders of ancient European civilization appear to 
 have gradually acquired the use of iron. "Already 
 in the time of Homer," says the same writer, "the 
 Greeks had iron, although it was very scarce and 
 expensive ; the Romans seem to have had and used 
 iron before the kings were expelled." Thence the 
 use of iron appears to have spread slowly among 
 the peoples of the North. Professor Worsaae con- 
 tinues: "It was partly an effect of Greek and Eo- 
 
MOTE.] OF THE ROMAifS. 345 
 
 man influence that the use of iron was known at a 
 comparatively early period in the northern parts of 
 Italy, in South Germany, and Gallia, the inhabitants 
 of which countries were thereby enabled to contend 
 BO gallantly with the Eomans. Polybius mentions, 
 however, that the Gauls, who, about two hundred 
 years before Christ, fought against the Eomans in 
 the north of Italy, were obliged in their battles to 
 straighten their swords by putting their feet upon 
 them, because they bent when exposed to a heavy 
 blow; a fact which shows that the Gauls did not 
 then possess steel. The invention of making the iron 
 hard is attributed to the Celts of Noricum ; in the 
 time of Augustus, the Noric swords were famous in 
 Home. 
 
 " But, if the people in the neighborhood of Eome, 
 and influenced by Eoman civilization, at the com- 
 mencement of the Christian era, generally possessed 
 weapons of iron, it does not follow that the people 
 in the North had also, at so early a time, plenty of 
 that metal. Caesar says distinctly that, in Britain, 
 iron was only to be found at the coasts, and that in 
 such small quantities that the inhabitants used im- 
 ported bronze {'cere utantiM^ importato''). It must 
 also be remembered that he speaks of their using 
 iron rings as money. A century after Christ, the 
 Britons seem to have got a great deal more iron, but 
 the Germans had still so little of it that they very 
 rarely had swords, or large lance-heads, of that metal. 
 
346 GRiNDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakek. 
 
 It was when the Romans got colonies in Hungary, 
 Germany, Gaul, and Britain, or about from the third 
 century of the Christian era, that their civilization 
 first got some influence in the northern part of Ger- 
 many, and in Scandinavia, where, however, it evi- 
 dently had a hard struggle with the old civiliza- 
 tion."" 
 
 The same learned antiquary states further, that 
 the iron-period "can first be traced with any cer- 
 tainty in Sweden and Norway as late as the fourth 
 and fifth centuries " ; and, that we cannot " carry the 
 complete introduction of the civilization of the iron- 
 period into Denmark farther back than to the sixth 
 and seventh centuries." " 
 
 "We may say comprehensively, therefore, that the 
 history of the ancient progress of the use of iron 
 runs parallel with the history of the diffusion of 
 ancient civilization in Europe ; and, that it took 
 about fifteen centuries, or from the time of Homer 
 down to the sixth century after Christ, for the ef- 
 ficient use of iron to advance from the Mediterra- 
 nean to the northernmost limits of Europe. And 
 we can readily see that, as the use of this metal 
 worked its way north, the invasions of the South 
 which proceeded from that quarter would become 
 more formidable. 
 
 V. Much light may be shed upon the downward 
 
 " rrimeval Antiquilies of Denmark, Loudon, 1849, pp. 138-140. 
 " Idem, p. 142. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 347 
 
 moTement of the Koman empire by such proximate 
 measurements of the reigns and the deaths of the em- 
 perors as are within our reach. For this purpose, the 
 whole series of emperors, from Caesar to Augustulus, 
 may be conveniently divided into three groups: the 
 first group extending from b. o. 46 to a. d. 180, and 
 including a period of 226 years; the second extend- 
 ing from A. D. 180 to A. d. 285, and embracing 105 
 years ; the third extending from a. d. 285 to a. d. 
 476, and covering a period of 191 years. This divi- 
 sion is not made at random. The first group closes 
 with Marcus Antoninus, and abuts upon Commodus, 
 with whom Gibbon considers the decline of the em- 
 pire to begin ; the second group closes with N'ume- 
 rian and Carinus, and abuts upon Diocletian, with 
 whom an important change in the empire took 
 place; and the third group, closing with Augustulus, 
 the last pretense of a Roman emperor in the "West, 
 abuts upon the barbaric rule of Odoacer the Goth. 
 
 1. In the first group we count Caesar, Augustus, 
 Tiberius, CaKgula, Claudius, Nero, Galba, Otho, Yi- 
 telhus, Yespasian, Titus, Domitian, ]!^erva, Trajan, 
 Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, and Antoninus Marcus — 
 seventeen in all. The average reign of these em- 
 perors was thirteen years three months and fifteen 
 days. Seven of them — Csesar, Tiberius, Caligula, 
 Claudius, Galba, Yitellius, and Domitian — were mur- 
 dered ; and two of them — ^Nero and Otho — resorted to 
 self-destruction in order to escape the vengeance of 
 
348 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 their enemies. Eeducing the proportion to the scale 
 of one hundred, and neglecting the surplus fraction, 
 the nine who thus came to a violent death amount 
 to fifty-two per cent of the whole growp. 
 
 2. In the second group we have Commodus, Per- 
 tinax, Julianus Didius, Septimius Severus, Oaracalla 
 and Geta, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander Severus, 
 Maximin, the two Gordians, Maximus and Balbinus, 
 the third Gordian, Philip, Decius, Gallus, ^milianus. 
 Valerian, Gallienus, Claudius, Quintillius, Aurelian, 
 Tacitus, Florianus, Probus, Cams, Numerian, and 
 Carinus — thirty in the aggregate. Supposing all 
 these succeeded each other consecutively — as in the 
 first group — their average reign would be but three 
 yea/rs and six Tnonths, which is little more than one 
 fourth of the preceding average. But, inasmuch as 
 some of the reigns in this group were wholly or 
 partly concurrent with each other, the true average 
 reign would be somewhat longer. The determination 
 of the ratio of deaths by assassination and forced 
 suicide admits of more precision. Of these thirty 
 emperors, two were victims of compulsory suicide — 
 the elder Gordian and QuintiUius ; twenty were mur- 
 dered — Commodus, Pertinax, Julianus Didius, Geta, 
 Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander Severus, 
 Maximin, Maximus and Balbinus, the third Gordian, 
 Philip, Gallus, ^milianus, Gallienus, Aurelian, Flori- 
 anus, Probus, and Carinus; and thus the proportion 
 of deaths by violence in our second' group rises to 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 349 
 
 seventy-three per cent of the whole number. Nor does 
 even this enormous ratio of assassination give an ade- 
 quate idea of the murderous propensity of our sec- 
 ond period. We have seen that in the reign of Gal- 
 lienus no less than nineteen pretenders assumed the 
 imperial purple, all of whom are excluded from our 
 second group of emperors, and not one of whom 
 died a natural death." 
 
 3. During our third period we meet with the 
 curious fact that, although the confusion and disin- 
 tegration of the Eoman world increased, there was 
 yet some falKng off in the rate of assassination. 
 Early in this period — ^following the reigns of Dio- 
 cletian and Maximian — arose a succession of civil 
 wars which were perhaps as destructive as those 
 which preceded and attended the fall of the republic. 
 At one time no less than six emperors reigned to- 
 gether." In the course of this period, too, we first 
 encounter the distinction of the Eastern and the 
 Western empire — a distinction which, whilst it still 
 further complicates the affairs of the Eomans, seems 
 to me to signify, at least for a considerable time, 
 rather a division of administration than the conscious 
 resolution of the empire into two independent sover- 
 eignties. With such drawbacks it is extremely diffi- 
 cult to mate an arrangement of our third group of 
 emperors which will approach closely to a true suc- 
 
 " Gibbon's Rome, New York, ISYO, vol. i, p. 324. 
 " Idem, p. 466. 
 
350 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 cessional order. Their names, omitting the names 
 of those whose operations were wholly limited to the 
 East, are as follows ; Diocletian, Maximian, Galerius, 
 Constantius, Severas, Maxentius, Licinius, Maximin, 
 Oonstantine, Constantine II, Oonstantins II, Constans, 
 Magnentius, Vetrano, Decentius, Julian, Jovian, Val- 
 entinian I, Gratian, Theodosius the Great, Yalentinian 
 
 II, Maximus, Eugenius, Honorius, John, Yalentinian 
 
 III, Petronius Maximus, Avitus, Majorian, Libins 
 Severus, Anthemius, Olybrius, Glycerins, Julius He- 
 pos, and Augustulus — thirty-five in all. Supposing, 
 as above, that these emperors reigned successively, 
 their average reign wotdd be Jive years jvoe months 
 and fourteen days, an increase of nearly two years 
 upon our next preceding average ; but, inasmuch as 
 a considerable number of these reigns overlapped 
 each other, our present average is still sensibly too 
 short. Here again, however, we can determine the 
 ratio of deaths by violence with more accuracy. Of 
 the thirty-five emperors who make up this group, 
 eleven were certainly murdered — Licinius, Constans, 
 Gratian, Yalentinian II, Maximus, Eugenius, John, 
 Yalentinian III, Petronius Maximus, Anthemius, and 
 Julius Nepos; three were jardbdbly murdered — Avi- 
 tus, Majorian, and Libius Severus ; and four perished 
 by compulsory suicide — ^Maximian, Severus, Magnenti- 
 us, and Decentius. Thus the entire number of deaths 
 which are to be attributed to violence is eighteen, 
 which amounts to fifty -one per cent of the whole group. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 351 
 
 We see, therefore, that the observation which 
 Montesquieu makes in the succeeding chapter — to the 
 effect that, for the causes there stated, the emperors 
 after Diocletian began to rest more secure of their 
 lives — is justified by our figures, although with feeble 
 emphasis indeed. From fifty-two per cent in the first 
 group, the work of murder ascends to seventy-three 
 in the second, and descends no lower than fifty-one 
 in the third. 
 
 4. Putting our three periods together, we find 
 that, during the five hundred and twenty-two years 
 which extend from Caesar to Augustulus — both in- 
 clusive — ^there were eighty-two emperors, the average 
 of whose reigns, all taken as consecutive, would be 
 six years four months and eleven days — which average, 
 however, for the reason already given, must be in- 
 creased to some extent. 
 
 It is instructive to compare this general result 
 with some like averages taken from modem mon- 
 archies. Adopting the statement of Montesquieu, 
 (note 26 of the preceding chapter), that for twelve 
 hundred years France had only sixty-three kings, we 
 see that the average reign of her monarchs in the 
 course of this long period was nineteen years and 
 seventeen days. . During the seven hundred and sev- 
 enty-one years which intervened between the conquest 
 of "William the Conqueror and the accession of Yic- 
 toria, England had but thirty-five reigns — counting 
 the Commonwealth as one — of which the average 
 
352 GRA^IDEUE AND DECADENCE [bakeb. 
 
 duration was twenty-two years and ten days. Thus 
 we see that the mean length of the Koman reigus 
 was only about one third as great as those of Eng- 
 land and France — a discrepance which indicates the 
 immense organic superiority of these modern states, 
 and which stands closely related to the indeterminate 
 character of the Eoman monarchy, vacillating as it 
 did between the elective, the hereditary, and the patri- 
 monial types." 
 
 5. Of the eighty-two emperors whom I have enu- 
 merated, the deaths of forty-nine are referable to as- 
 sassination or compulsory suicide, a proportion which 
 rises to a large fraction oyqt fifty-nine per cent of the 
 whole number. This was probably the most fatal lot- 
 tery from which royal prizes were ever drawn, and, 
 in reckoning np the bloody roll, one experiences an 
 instinctive sense of pity for the imperial victims. 
 The words of De Quincey are completely apposite: 
 " The crown of the Oassars was, therefore, a crown of 
 thorns; and it must be admitted that never in this 
 world have rank and power been purchased at so 
 awful a cost in tranquillity and peace of mind."" 
 
 In the light of such a series of facts, consequent 
 upon a monarchy resting upon no determinate idea, 
 but abandoned to the irregular impulses of ambition 
 and crime, we can fully realize, with Gibbon, " The 
 Apparent Eidicule and Solid Advantages of Heredi- 
 
 " Gibbon's Rome, New York, 1852, vol. iii, p. 365. 
 " TJie Casars, Boston, 1854, p. 261. 
 
soTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 353 
 
 tary Succession." " All experience lias shown, as rea- 
 son miglit anticipate, tliat societies which are so unde- 
 veloped as to require a monarchial form of govern- 
 ment are likewise so deficient in that high social 
 ability which is implied in the orderly election of the 
 sovereign, that- their best security against internal 
 disorder must be sought in the simple principle of suc- 
 cession by inheritance — a principle which is so absurd 
 when applied to the transmission of government that 
 it gives rise to an irrepressible feehng of contempt — 
 and which is yet so indispensable to order in mo- 
 narchial states that the philosopher becomes recon- 
 ciled to it as a ridiculous necessity. The extent of 
 the Roman empire was so great, and its composition 
 so heterogeneous and unstable, that the sentiment 
 which underlies this principle — so useful in immature 
 societies — could never acquire permanent ascendency; 
 and hence, in great part, that destructive violence 
 which marked the succession of the emperors. 
 
 The division which I have made of the Eoman 
 emperors into three groups, together with the prox- 
 imate average of the reigns, and the ratio of assas- 
 sination, for each of these groups respectively, and 
 for all conjointly, may be taken as a good illustration 
 of the facility and brevity with which the general 
 spirit of extensive and complicated social phenomena 
 may sometimes be presented by means of exact sta- 
 tistical measurements. With a view to fulfilling the 
 
 " Vol. i, Contents, p. xlii. 
 
354 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE ■ [bakeb, 
 
 conditions of scrupulous fairness, I will add, in con- 
 clusion of the subject, that the conception of subject- 
 ing the emperors to this treatment was suggested by 
 some similar, but detached and incomplete, observa- 
 tions of De Quincey." 
 
 " See The Cwsara, Boston, 1854, pp. 184, 241. 
 
MONTESQUIEU.] OF THE ROMANS. 355 
 
 CHAPTEE XVII. 
 
 CHAM'GE m THE GOVEEITMENT OF THE EMPIEE. 
 
 In order to guard against the ever-recurring treach- 
 ery of the soldiers, the emperors associated persons 
 with themselves in whom they had confidence; and 
 Diocletian, under pretext of the magnitude of the 
 public affairs, established the rule that there should 
 constantly be two Emperors and two Caesars. He 
 supposed that the four principal armies, beiug under 
 the control of those who had part in the empire, 
 would act as checks upon each other; that the other 
 armies, not being strong enough to hazard the enter- 
 prise of making their chiefs emperors, would grad- 
 ually lose the habit of election ; and, finally, the 
 dignity of the Caesars being always subordinate, he 
 imagined that the powers of the state, thus divided 
 between four, for the safety of the government, would 
 yet remain wholly in the hands of two. 
 
 But that which still more effectively restrained 
 the license of the military was the circumstance 
 that, public and private wealth having diminished, 
 the emperors were no longer able to bestow such 
 
356 GRANDEUK AND DECADENCE [MONTESQtiiEir. 
 
 considerable donatives tipon the soldiers; so that the 
 profit ceased to be proportioned to the dangers of a 
 new election. And, in addition to this, tlie praeto- 
 rian prefects, whose powers and functions were about 
 the same as those of the grand viziers of the present 
 day — and who, in order to take their places, procured 
 the assassination of the emperors at will — were much 
 humbled by Constantino, who only left them their 
 civil functions, and increased their number to four 
 instead of two. 
 
 The lives of the emperors began, therefore, to be 
 more secure; they could die in their beds; and this 
 seemed in some small degree to soften their manners. 
 They no longer shed blood with so much ferocity. 
 But, as it was necessary that their immense power 
 should overflow in some direction, we see a species 
 of tyranny which was different, but more inexorable. 
 It was no longer the massacre, but the iniquitous 
 judgment — forms of judicial procedure, which only 
 seemed to postpone death in order to dishonor life. 
 The court was itself governed, and in its turn gov- 
 erned the empire, with more artifice, cunning, and se- 
 crecy. Instead of that boldness in the conception of 
 bad deeds, and that impetuosity in their execution, 
 we witness the reign of vices which are peculiar to 
 feeble minds, and of crimes which have been re- 
 flected upon. 
 
 A new sort of corruption came in. The first 
 emperors loved pleasure ; these sunk into effeminacy. 
 
CHAP, xvn.] OF THE ROMANS. 357 
 
 They showed themselves less to the military; they 
 were more indolent, more influenced by their domes- 
 tics, more attached to the palace, and more separated 
 from the empire. 
 
 As the court became more detached from affairs, 
 its poison increased. Nothing was said directly ; 
 everything was insinuated; all great reputations were 
 attacked; and the ministers of state and the officers 
 of the army were constantly at the mercy of that 
 sort of men who are incapable of serving their coun- 
 try themselves, and who will not allow others to dp 
 so with honor." 
 
 That sociableness of the first emperors — which 
 alone could afford them the means of knowing their 
 affairs — had entirely disappeared. The emperor no 
 ■ longer knew anything except on the report of a few 
 confidants, who — always acting in concert, often even 
 when they seemed to be of contrary opinions — per- 
 formed no more than the office of a single adviser. 
 
 The sojourn of many of the emperors in Asia, 
 and their constant emulation of the kings of Persia, 
 caused them to desire, like their eastern rivals, to be 
 adored ; and Diocletian, or, according to others, 
 Galerius, ordered such adoration by an imperial 
 edict. 
 
 Asiatic ostentation and pomp being estabUshed, 
 the eyes of men became accustomed to the change at 
 
 ' See what the historians toll us of the court of Oonstantine, of Ta- 
 lens, etc. 
 
358 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 once; and when Julian would demean himself with 
 simplicity and modesty, thuB recalling the memory of 
 the ancient manners, he was reproached with being 
 forgetful of the dignity of his station. 
 
 Although after the time of Marcus Aurelius there 
 may have been several emperors reigning at once, 
 there had been but one empire ; and, the authority 
 of all being recognized in the provinces, there was a 
 single power, exercised by several. Bnt Galerius and 
 Constantius Chlorus, not being able to agree, actually 
 divided the empire ; ' and, this example being after- 
 wards followed by Constantine — who adopted the 
 plan of Galerius and not that of Diocletian — a cus- 
 tom was introduced which was less a change than a 
 revolution.' 
 
 Furthermore, Constantine's desire to found a new 
 city, and the vanity which prompted him to endow 
 it with his name, determined him to carry the seat of 
 empire to the East. 
 
 Although the circumference of Rome was not 
 nearly so great as it is at the present time, the sub- 
 urbs of the city were prodigiously extended.*' Italy, 
 covered over with pleasant places, was, properly speak- 
 ing, only the garden of Home. The laborers were in 
 
 ' See Orosiua, Book VII ; and Aurelius Victor. 
 
 ^ In relation to the division of the empire, see my Note at the end of 
 this chapter. — Tbanslatou. 
 
 " Mxspatiantia tecia mulias addidere urbes, says Pliny. (Natural His- 
 tory, Book III.) 
 
 ' Respecting the extent and population of ancient Rome, see my 
 Note at the end of thi^ chapter. — Translator. 
 
CHAP. XVII.] OF THE ROMANS. 359 
 
 .Sicily, Africa, and Egypt,' the gardeners in Italy; 
 and the lands were almost wholly cultivated by the 
 slaves of Koman citizens. But, when the seat of 
 empire came to be established in the East, almost the 
 entire population of Eome proceeded thither, the 
 principal citizens being accompanied by their slaves 
 — that is to say, by nearly aU the people; and thus 
 Italy was deprived of its inhabitants. 
 
 In order that the new city might in no respect 
 fall short of the old one, Constantine desired that 
 grain should be distributed therein also; and he or- 
 dered that the grain of Egypt should be sent to 
 Constantinople, and that of Africa to Home — a pro- 
 vision which does not appear to me to have been a 
 very sensible one. 
 
 In the time of the republic, the Roman people — 
 sovereign of all others — should naturally have re- 
 ceived some part of the tributes ; and, accordingly, the 
 senate first sold them grain at a low price, and after- 
 wards distributed it among them free of charge. 
 "When the government had become monarchical, this 
 custom — although contrary to the principles of the 
 monarchy — ^was continued. The abuse was left stand- 
 ing because of the inconveniences which would have 
 attended its removal. But Constantine, in founding a 
 new city, transferred it thither without good reason. 
 
 ' Formerly, says Tacitus, grain was carried from Italy to the remote 
 provinces, and Italy is not yet sterile ; but we prefer to cultivate Africa 
 and Egypt, and choose rather to expose the lives of the Roman people 
 to chance. {Annales, lib. xii, ch. xliii.) 
 
3 go GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 "When Augustus had conquered Egypt, he trans- 
 ported the wealth of the Ptolemies to Kome. This 
 led to a revolution in the latter city, wMcli was nearly 
 the same as that which was afterwards produced in 
 Europe by the discovery of the Indies, and which 
 certain systems have given rise to in our own day.' 
 Keal estate doubled in price at Rome;' and, as this 
 city continued to draw to itself the wealth of Alex- 
 andria, which received in its turn the wealth of 
 Africa and the East, gold and silver became very 
 common in Europe; and this placed the nations of 
 the empire in a condition to pay very considerable 
 imposts in specie. 
 
 But, when the empire came to be divided, this 
 wealth flowed into Constantinople. We know, besides, 
 that the mines of England were not yet opened;' 
 that there were very few mines in Italy and in the 
 Gauls ; " and that, after the Carthaginians, the miaes 
 of Spain were but little worked, or at least that they 
 
 ' Doubtless allusion is here made to the financial scheme of John 
 Law, which was adopted by the Regent of France during the minority of 
 Louis XV, and at a time when Montesquieu was a young man, 1716. — 
 Tkanslator. 
 
 ' Suetonius, in Augiishts ; Oeosius, lib. vi. Rome had often experi- 
 enced such revolutions. I have said that the wealth of Maoedon, which 
 was transferred to the conquering city, caused the cessation of all taxes. 
 (Cicero's Offices, Book IL) 
 
 ' Tacitus, De Moribus Germanorum, says so expressly. ^We know, 
 moreover, nearly the epoch of the opening of most of the mines of Ger- 
 many. See Thomas Sesreiberus, on the origin of the Hartz mines. It is 
 believed that those of Saxony are less ancient. 
 
 " See Pliny, Book XSXVII, art. 11. 
 
CHAP, xvn.] OF THE ROMANS. 361 
 
 were no longer so rich as formerly." Italy, possess- 
 ing nothing but abandoned gardens, could not, by 
 any means, draw to herself the money of the East. 
 Meanwhile the "West, in order to obtain the merchan- 
 dise of the East, sent thither its own money in ex- 
 change. Gold and silver, therefore, became extremely 
 scarce in Europe. But the emperors continued to 
 exact the same tributes; and this ruined all. 
 
 When the government of a country has taken a 
 form wliich has continued for a long time, and when 
 things have assumed a certain adjustment, it is nearly 
 always prudent to leave them as they are; for the 
 causes, often complicated and unknown, which have 
 led to the continued existence of such a state, are a 
 guarantee that it will still maintain itself; but, when 
 the whole system is changed, only such abuses can 
 be remedied as present themselves in theory, whilst 
 those which experience only can discover, are left un- 
 provided for. 
 
 Thus, although the empire was too large, its 
 division ruined it ; for all the parts of this vast 
 body — long united — had, so to say, adjusted them- 
 selves to the whole, and become mutually dependent 
 upon each other. 
 
 After having weakened the capital, Constantine 
 struck a blow upon the frontiers." He withdrew the 
 
 " Diodorus says tlie Carthaginians knew very well the art of profiting by 
 these mines, and the Romans, the art of preventing others from doing so. 
 '^ In what is here said of Constantine, we do not contradict the eccle- 
 16 
 
362 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 legions -whicli had been stationed upon the shores of 
 the great rivers, and distributed them in the prov- 
 inces — a measure which involved two evils : the bar- 
 rier was removed which kept back the barbarous na- 
 tions; and the soldiers," addicted to the theatre and 
 the circus, became effeminate." 
 
 When Julian was sent into the Gauls by Constan- 
 tine, he found that fifty cities along the Rhine had 
 been captured by the barbarians;" that the provinces 
 had been sacked; and that there was nothing more 
 than the shadow of a Eoman army, which the very 
 name of an enemy was sufficient to put to flight. 
 
 By his wisdom, his constancy, his economy, his 
 conduct, his valor, and an uninterrupted succession 
 of heroic actions, Julian was enabled to drive back 
 the barbarians ; " and the terror of his name held 
 them in check while he lived." 
 
 The brevity of the imperial reigns, the divers 
 
 siastical writers, who declare that they only intend to speak of such ac- 
 tions of this emperor as relate to piety, and not of those which relate to 
 the government of the state. (Ecsebids, Ufe of Constaiitine, Book I, 
 oh. ix ; Socrates, Book I, ch. i.) 
 
 " Zosimus, Book VIII. 
 
 '* After the establishment of Christianity, the gladiatorial combats 
 became rare. Constantino prohibited them, and they were entirely abol- 
 ished under Honorius, as appears from Theodoret and Otho de Frisingua. 
 Of their ancient spectacles, the Romans only retained those which were 
 calculated to depress courage and stimulate voluptuousness. 
 
 '* Ammiannus Marcelunus, lib. xvi, xvii, xviii. 
 
 " Idmn. 
 
 " See the magnificent eulogy of Ammiannus Marcellinus on this 
 emperor, lib. xxv ; see also the fragments of the History of John of 
 Antioch. 
 
CHAP. xTii.] OF THE EOMANS. 363 
 
 political parties, tlie different religions, and the par- 
 ticular sects into wMch these religions were divided, 
 have caused the characters of the emperors to come 
 down to us under forms extremely equivocal. I will 
 only give two examples of this. Alexander, who is 
 so cowardly in Herodian, appears full of courage in 
 Lampridius. Gratian, who is so highly praised by 
 the orthodox, is compared to Nero by Philostorgius. 
 
 Valentinian, more than any other, felt the neces- 
 sity of the ancient plan. He employed his whole life 
 in fortifying the banks of the Ehine — in throwing 
 up levees, building castles, and providing for the estab- 
 lisljment and subsistence of troops along the course 
 of that river. But an event took place which deter- 
 mined Valens, his brother, to open the Danube; and 
 this was followed by frightful consequences. 
 
 In the country which 'hes between the Palus 
 Moeotis," the Caucasian Mountains, and the Caspian 
 Sea, there were many peoples, belonging mostly to 
 the nation of the Huns or to that of the Alans. 
 Their lands were extremely fertile ; they loved war 
 and rapine; they were almost always on horseback, 
 or mounted upon their wagons, wandering over the 
 country in which they were enclosed. They carried 
 their ravages as far as the frontiers of Persia and 
 Armenia ; but the Caspian gates were easily de- 
 fended, and it was difficult for them to penetrate 
 into Persia by any other route. As they did not 
 " The modern Sea of Azof. — Translator. 
 
364 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 imagine tliat it was possible to cross the Palus Moeo- 
 tis," they knew nothing of the Komans ; and, whilst 
 other barbarians ravaged the empire, they remained 
 within the limits which their ignorance had pre- 
 scribed to them. 
 
 Some have said that the mud brought down by 
 the Tanais " had formed a species of crust upon the 
 Cimmerian Bosporus, over which they passed ; " oth- 
 ers, that two young Scythians, pursuing a hind 
 which crossed this arm of the sea, followed her to 
 the opposite shore."" They were astonished at find- 
 ing an unknown world; and, returning to their 
 companions, they informed them of the new lands, 
 and — if I may use the expression — of the Indies 
 which they had discovered." " 
 
 Innumerable swarms of Huns passed over at 
 once ; and, meeting the Goths first, they drove 
 them before them. It seemed as if these nations 
 had precipitated themselves one upon another, and 
 that Asia, in order to fall upon Europe, had ac- 
 quired a new weight. 
 
 " Prooopius, Miscellaneous History. 
 
 '^ The modern Don. — Translator. 
 
 '^ ZosiMus, lib. iv. 
 
 ^' JoBNANDES, De Rebus geticis ; Miscellaneous History of Procopius. 
 
 ^' See Sozomen, lib. vi. 
 
 " Compare Gibbon, eh. xxvi, note 56. lie properly distrusts the 
 bridge of mud and the adventure of the hunters, but treats in too slight- 
 ing a manner the just conception of Montesquieu, that the Huns, when 
 they first turned their faces toward Europe, experienced a feeling similar 
 to that which Europe itself afterward felt upon the discovery of the In- 
 dies. — Translator. 
 
CHAP, xvn.l OF THE ROMANS. 365 
 
 The frightened Goths presented themselves upon 
 the bants of the Danube, and, with joined hands, 
 supplicated the privilege of a retreat. The flatter- 
 ers of Yalens seized upon the occasion, and repre- 
 sented it to him as the happy conquest of a new 
 people, who were come to defend and to enrich the 
 empire." 
 
 Valens ordered that they should pass without 
 arms ; but, influenced by money, his officers allowed 
 them to retain as many of their arms as they 
 pleased." He directed that a distribution of lands 
 should be made to the new-comers; but, unlike the 
 Huns, the Goths did not cultivate their lands;" and 
 
 *s Ammianus Marcellinus, lib. xxix. 
 
 ^^ Of the officers who received these orders one conceived an infamous 
 love ; another was captivated by the beauty of a barbaric woman ; and 
 others still were corrupted by presents, such as linen garments and 
 fringed carpets ; men had no other care but to fill their houses with 
 slaves, and to cover their farms with cattle. {History of Dixipus.) (a) 
 
 (a) It must be understood, as Gibbon says, that the articles of manu- 
 facture here mentioned were obtained by the Goths from the Roman 
 provinces. See Decl. and Fall, ch. xxvi, note 68. — Tkansiatoe. 
 
 ^^ See the Gothic History of Priscm, in which this difference is well 
 established. 
 
 It may be asked, perhaps, how nations that did not cultivate lands 
 became so powerful, whilst those of America are so weak. The reason 
 ia that pastoral nations are provided with a means of subsistence which 
 is much more certain than that of hunters. 
 
 It appears from Ammianus Marcellinus that the Huns, while they yet 
 remained in their original seats, did not cultivate their lands. They lived 
 upon their flocks, in a country abounding in pasturage, and watered by 
 many rivers — as yet do the tribes of lesser Tartary, who inhabit a part 
 of the same country. It seems that these people, after their emigration, 
 coming to inhabit countries less adapted to the support of herds, com- 
 menced the cultivation of lands. 
 
366 GKANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesqtiieu. 
 
 even the grain whicli had been promised them was 
 withheld. They were dying of famine, and they 
 were in the midst of a rich country; they had arms 
 in their hands, and they were unjustly treated. They 
 ravaged the whole country from the Danube to the 
 Bosporus; they exterminated Valens and his army, 
 and only recrossed the Danube in order to abandon 
 the frightful solitude which they had made." 
 
 ^^ See Zosimus, lib. iv ; see also Dixipus, in the Excerpt of the Em- 
 bassies of Constantine Porphyrogenitus. 
 
BAKER.] OF THE ROMANS. 367 
 
 NOTE BY THE TEANSLATOE. 
 
 Gibbon quotes the concluding words of the pre- 
 ceding chapter, and adds : " The president Montes- 
 quieu seems ignorant that the Goths, after the de- 
 feat of Yalehs, never abandoned the Eoman territory. 
 . . . The error is inexcusable, since it disguises the 
 principal and immediate cause of the fall of the 
 Western empire of Eome." It seems true that the 
 Yisigoihs — who crossed the Danube in the manner 
 stated in the text — did not return. They finally en- 
 tered into a treaty with Theodosius the Great, suc- 
 cessor of Yalens, were settled in Thrace, and be- 
 came subjects of the emperors in a sense strikingly 
 similar to that in which our Indian tribes are sub- 
 ject to .the sovereign authority of the United States, 
 whilst retaining their tribal character and internal 
 polity. The case was different with the Ostrogoths. 
 Their numerous hordes crossed the unguarded Dan- 
 ube without permission of the Eomans, not long after 
 the passage of the Yisigoths, joined the latter m 
 their ravages, assisted them in the destruction of 
 Valens and his army, and then made a "voluntary 
 
368 GRANDEUK AND DECADENCE [bakeb. 
 
 retreat" from the Danubian provinces. Thej re- 
 turned some four years later, accompanied by other 
 barbarians, and, in tlieir attempt to recross the Dan- 
 ube in the night-time, were overwhelmed by the Eo- 
 mans, who distributed the remnant of their number 
 in Lydia and Phrygia.' 
 
 In view of the fact that the Ostrogoths — who ac- 
 companied the Yisigoths in their rapine, and aided 
 them in crushing Yalens and his army — did recross 
 the Danube, there seems to be small ground for the 
 harsh and illiberal criticism of Gibbon upon the 
 probable, but apparently casual, error of Montesquieu. 
 
 We shall find more interest, however, in noticing, 
 more particularly than Montesquieu has done in the 
 preceding chapter, the subject of the division of the 
 empire into two parts, and the question of the actual 
 extent and probable population of ancient Eome. 
 
 I. Following the authority of Orosius and Aurehus 
 Victor, Montesquieu states that the empire was actual- 
 ly divided in the time of Galerius and Constantius, 
 the immediate successors of Diocletian and Maximian. 
 Gibbon notices and discredits this view of our au- 
 thor. " It is difficult, however, to discover," he says, 
 "in what respect the plan of Galerius differed from 
 that of Diocletian." ' But the conceptions of Gibbon 
 himself, and, I may add, of historical writers gen- 
 
 ■ Gibbon's Rome, New York, 1852, toI. iii, cb. xxvi, but especially pp. 
 31-33, 36, 42, 43, 49, 60, 63, 66, 68, and note 136. 
 ' Idem, ch. xiv, note 1. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE EOMANS. 369 
 
 erally, are by no means clear and distinct on the 
 subject of tlie division of the Eoman empire. The 
 common .idea appears to be that the empire was vol- 
 untarily resolved into two States, with much vague 
 assertion as to when this took place. By some it is 
 referred to the time of Diocletian, and his institution 
 of the Eastern and "Western Augusti, and their re- 
 spective Coesars.' Others, whose view, as we have 
 seen,. Montesquieu represents, refer it to the reign 
 immediately succeeding that of Diocletian. Gibbon 
 directs his attention to still later dates. He first says 
 that Yalentinian and Valens — ^a. d. 364 — "executed 
 the solemn and final division of the Eoman em- 
 pire " ; and afterwards he characterizes the division 
 which was made by Arcadius and- Honorius — a. d. 395 
 — as the " final and permanent division of the Eoman 
 empire." * There could hardly be two " final " divisions. 
 
 Two classes of facts appear to me to shed much 
 light on the real significance of the successive par- 
 titions which were made of the Eoman provinces : 
 
 1. After those divisions commenced to be made, 
 which are variously referred to as amounting to a 
 severance of the empire, the whole of it was repeat- 
 edly united under a single ruler — as under Constan- 
 tine, under Julian, and finally under Theodosius the 
 Great, only about eighty years before the extinction 
 of the Western empire.' 
 
 ' Chambers' Enc., art. Rome. * Gibbon, vol. ii, p. 629 ; vol. iii, p. 165. 
 ' Gibbon, vol. iii, p. 127. 
 
370 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 2. There is much evidence which tends to show 
 that the idea of the legal unity of the empire was 
 not effaced from the Koman mind. Thus, after the 
 division which was made by Valentinian and Yalens, 
 the legal proceedings of the Koman world ran in the 
 names of both the emperors, and that of Gratian, 
 the associated Augustus of the West." After the 
 death of Yalens, Gratian, then emperor of the "West, 
 conferred the Eastern empire upon Theodosius.' In 
 like manner, two among the very last of the West- 
 ern emperors — Anthemius and Nepos — were set up 
 by the court of the East; and the expiring act of 
 the Western empire — after the forced abdication of 
 Augustulus — was the sending a deputation from the 
 Eoman senate to the Eastern emperor Zeno, recog- 
 nizing him as the sole head of the entire empire, and 
 praying him to invest Odoacer — ^under the title of 
 Patrician — with the government of Italy." 
 
 On the whole, therefore, it would seem that the 
 separation of the empire into Eastern and Western 
 is to be regarded, less as constituting two completely 
 independent states, than as a division in the admin- 
 istration of one — certainly so at times. 
 
 II. Ancient Eome, judged by the area of the 
 walled enclosure, was not very remarkable for its size. 
 From a comparison of dififerent accounts, it seems 
 doubtful whether its walls ever exceeded 12 miles 
 
 « Idem, vol. ii, pp. 591, 592. ' Idem, vol. iii, pp. 56-58. 
 
 ^ Idem, pp. 512, 513 ; but compare idem, p. 350. 
 
NOTE.] QF TBE ROMANS. 371 
 
 and 345 paces in extent, whilst the walls of the mod- 
 ern city measure 12f miles." 
 
 And, as the imaginary magnitude of the walled 
 enclosure of the city has been very considerably di- 
 minished by modern measurements, so the imaginary 
 magnitude of its former population may be brought 
 within the limits of reasonable probability. De Quin- 
 cey, Lipsius, and Isaac Vossius have supposed very 
 large numbers, the first placing the population at no 
 less than from four to six millions, and the latter two 
 raising it as high as from four to fourteen mill- 
 ions." These estimates — especially in the direction of 
 their higher extremes — ^must be regarded as tending 
 decidedly to exaggeration ; and the calculation of Gib- 
 bon, by which he infers a population of only about 
 1,200,000, appears to me to err quite decidedly in 
 the opposite direction — and this, although his conclu- 
 sion has the valuable approval of Milman." The 
 manner in which he reaches his result is open to 
 the observation that it is based upon a method 
 which yields greatly different results at different 
 times. The fact happens to be well attested that in 
 the time of Theodosius, the entire number of houses 
 which Eome contained was 48,382. If it were 
 known what number of persons ought, on the aver- 
 
 ' See Gibbon's Rome, New York, 1852, rol. iv, p. 161, and note 77, 
 together with Milman'a accompanying note ; see also Hume's Phil. Worlcs, 
 Boston, 1864, vol. iii, note on pp. 470, 471. 
 
 '» Th£ Omars, Boston, 1854, pp. 1, 2 ; Gibbon's Borne, oh. xxxi, note 66 
 
 " Vol. iii, pp. 265-267. 
 
3Y2 GKANDEUB AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 age, to be assigned to each house, the population 
 could be readily approximated. As, however, this 
 factor is unknown, Gibbon supplies it supposititiously 
 by adopting and applying to Kome the average which 
 was observed for Paris in his time. M. de Messance 
 had assigned to the latter city 23,565 houses, and a 
 population of 576,630." This would give about 25 
 inhabitants to the house — an average which, multi- 
 pUed into the known number of houses in Rome 
 during the time of Theodosius, would disclose a 
 total population of about 1,200,000. Such is Gibbon's 
 method. 
 
 But, in 1866, Paris contained 1,825,274 inhabi- 
 tants, and about 45,000 buildings, a disparity of num- 
 bers which calls for 40^'-i;- inhabitants to the build- 
 ing ; and, adopting this for the average of the houses 
 of Kome, the population of the latter would approach 
 closely to 2,000,000. The process which has gone on 
 in Paris, by which the mean number of persons to tbe 
 house has increased with the number of the houses 
 and the 'magnitude of the population, undoubtedly 
 took place in Pome also, and is likely to be a law, 
 applicable in some degree ta all growing cities, al- 
 though it is plain that, when this mean number gets 
 to be large, it will increase very slowly, and ulti- 
 mately find a limit. As regards the proximate de- 
 termination of the population of Eome at the time 
 of Theodosius, the only question is as to whether we 
 
 '2 Idem, p. 267, note 72. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 373 
 
 should adopt the higher or lower of these Parisian 
 averages, or some intermediate one. Guided by the 
 similar number of houses contained by Rome at the 
 time stated, and by Paris in 1866, and assigning a 
 just value to the known habit in both cities, espe- 
 cially in Pome — of piling them story above story to 
 great heights — there appears to be conclusive grounds 
 for preferring the larger average, which conducts us 
 to a probable population of about 2,000,000 for the 
 ancient city proper. But we must not leave out of 
 view the widely extended suburbs of Eome at the 
 period of its greatest prosperity ; and, when these are 
 taken into account, it appears quite safe to infer a 
 total contiguous population much larger than that of 
 our present Paris, and approaching that of our pres- 
 ent London. 
 
 It is curious to compare the ratios between popu- 
 lation and number of dwellings, thus known for mod- 
 em Paris and rationally inferred for ancient Pome, 
 with the like ratios in some other cities, in which 
 urban life has been influenced by widely different 
 social ideas. In 1861 London contained 330,237 " in- 
 habited houses," and a population of 2,803,034, which 
 shows an average of but SjY^ inhabitants to each 
 house. The United States census for the year 1870 
 shows that the city of New York contained 64,044 
 dwellings, 942,292 inhabitants, and U^-^ persons to a 
 dwelling; that Philadelphia contained 112,366 dwell- 
 ings, 674,022 inhabitants, and an average of 6-^^ 
 
374 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakeb. 
 
 persons to the dwelling ; that the like average for 
 Boston was 8^^, for Brooklyn S^ViD ^or Baltimore 
 e^aSy, for Cincinnati 8^^, for Chicago 6t^\%, for St. 
 Louis 7^, for New Orleans 5^, and for San Fran- 
 cisco B^-Y^. 
 
 This series of Anglo-American statistics indicates 
 a wide departure from the Eoman and Parisian habit 
 of crowding many persons into one building. 
 
 Berlin, on the other hand, approaches much nearer 
 to, and Yienna even exceeds, the supposed Eoman 
 standard. In 1867 Berlin contained 33,883 buildings, 
 exclusive of churches and chapels, and a population 
 of 702,437, inclusive of the stationed military, which 
 gives an average of ^0^^ persons to each building. 
 Yienna, in 1869, contained about 11,000 houses, with 
 a population of 632,127, including its garrison, thus 
 showing the very high average of 57^^ inhabitants 
 to the house.'' 
 
 It would seem, therefore, that the city life of the 
 ancient Komans, like the city life of modern French- 
 men and Germans, was considerably more "gregari- 
 ous " than that of Englishmen and Americans is found 
 to be. 
 
 '' For the recent statistics of modern cities here given, see Meyer's 
 ffand-ZexiJcon des Allgemeinen Wisseris, 1872, arts. Paris and Berlin i 
 Chambers' ^nc, Phila., 1873, art. London; Compendium of tlie Ninth 
 
 Census of the United States, Washington, 1872, p. 543; and Dmdselir 
 amerilcanisclies Conversations- Lexikon, N. Y., 1874, Lieferung 107, art. 
 
 Wien. 
 
MONTESQCiEu.] OF THE ROMANS. 375 
 
 CHAPTEE XVIII. 
 
 HEW MAXIMS ADOPTED BT THE EOMANS. 
 
 Sometimes the cowardice of the emperors, often 
 the weakness of the empire, led to the policy of paci- 
 fying, by means of money, the nations that threatened 
 invasion.' But peace cannot be purchased; for those 
 who have once sold it have only placed themselves 
 in a better condition to compel its purchase again. 
 
 It is wiser to incur the risk of a disastrous war 
 than to give money for peace ; for men always respect 
 a prince when they know that he can only be con- 
 quered after a long resistance. 
 
 Besides, such gratifications were changed into trib- 
 utes. Free in the beginning, they grew to be com- 
 pulsory. They came to be regarded as acquired rights ; 
 and whenever an emperor refused them to any peo- 
 ple, or desired to give less, they became mortal ene- 
 mies. Among a thousand examples of this, the army 
 which Julian led against the Persians was pursued in 
 its retreat by the Arabs, to whom he had refused the 
 
 ' At first, all was given to soldiers ; afterwards, all was given to ene- 
 mies. 
 
376 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 customary tribute ; " and shortly afterwards, during the 
 reign of Yalentinian, less valuable presents than or- 
 dinary having been offered to the Alemans, they 
 became indignant; and these nations of the JS'orth, 
 already governed by the point of honor, avenged 
 themselves of this pretended insult by a cruel war. 
 
 The wealth of the Romans was gradually ab- 
 sorbed by all the nations which were distributed 
 around the empire in Europe and Asia;' and, as 
 they had aggrandized themselves by appropriating 
 the gold and the silver of aU the kings, they were 
 now impoverished by the transfer of tJieir gold and 
 their silver to other peoples.* 
 
 The faults which statesmen commit are not al- 
 ways voluntary. They are often made necessary by 
 the situation ; and inconveniences give rise to incon- 
 veniences. 
 
 As we have already seen, the military had be- 
 come a very heavy charge upon the state. The 
 soldiers received three sorts of compensation — the 
 ordinary pay, the recompense at the end of their 
 term of service, and occasional liberalities — which 
 
 " Ammianus Marcellinus, lib. xxv. 
 
 ' Idem, lib. xxvi. 
 
 * " Do you desire wealth ? " said an emperor to his discontented army ; 
 " behold the kingdom of Persia, and march thither in quest of it. Be- 
 lieve me, that of all the vast treasure which the Roman republic pos- 
 sessed, nothing now remains ; and the evil is chargeable to those who have 
 taught princes to purchase the peace of barbarians. Our finances are 
 exhausted, our cities destroyed, our provinces ruined. An emperor who 
 Icnows no other good than that of the soul is not ashamed to confess an 
 honest poverty." {Idem, lib. xxiv.) 
 
CHAP, xvm.] OF THE EOMANS. 377 
 
 last, among men who held both the emperor and the 
 people in their hands, very often assumed the char- 
 acter of rights. 
 
 The inability of the state to meet these charges 
 led to the employment of a soldiery which was less 
 costly. Treaties were entered into with barbarous 
 nations— nations which were free from the luxury of 
 the Koman soldiers, and which possessed neither the 
 same spirit nor were influenced by the same preten- 
 sions. 
 
 And there was stiU another convenience connected 
 with this arrangement. As it was the habit of the 
 bai-barians to fall suddenly upon a country, without 
 stopping to make any preparations after they had re- 
 solved to move, it was difficult to levy troops in the 
 provinces in time to meet them. The emperors there- 
 fore availed themselves of another body of barbarians, 
 who were always ready to receive money, to pillage, 
 and to fight against each other. Thus they were 
 relieved for the moment; but in the course of time 
 they found it as difficult to restrain their auxiliaries 
 as their enemies. 
 
 The early Eomans did not give place in their 
 armies to a greater number of auxiliary than Eoman 
 troops ; ' and, although their allies were properly speak- 
 ing their subjects, they would not have subjects who 
 
 ' This is an obserration of Vegetiu3 ; and it appears from Livy that, 
 if the number of the auxiliaries was sometimes in excess, it was only to 
 a very small extent. 
 
378 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesqitieu. 
 
 were more warlike than themselves. But, at the time 
 of which we now speak, they not only disregarded 
 this proportion as to their auxiliary troops, but they 
 even filled up their national corps with barbaric sol- 
 diers. 
 
 Thus, they established usages which were exactly 
 the reverse of those which had rendered them mas- 
 ters of the world ; and, as it was formerly their con- 
 stant policy to reserve the military art to Eomans, 
 and to deprive all their neighbors of the advantages 
 of that art, they now abandoned it among themselves 
 and established it among others. 
 
 Behold, in a word, the history of the Eomans : 
 they conquered all nations by their maxims ; but when 
 they had done so, their republic could not stand; a 
 change in the form of their government became ne- 
 cessary ; and the maxims which were adopted under 
 the new government — contrary to the first — caused 
 jheir empire to fall. 
 
 The world is not ruled by fortune. We may ap- 
 peal to the Eomans, who experienced a continual 
 succession of prosperities whilst they governed them- 
 selves upon a certain plan, and an uninterrupted 
 series of reverses when they conducted themselves 
 upon another. There are general causes, moral and 
 physical, which act upon every monarchy, building it 
 up, maintaining it, or casting it down. All accidents 
 are submitted to the control of these general causes; 
 and, if the hazard of a battle — that is to say, a par- 
 
CHAP. XTiii.] OF THE ROMANS. 379 
 
 ticular cause — has been sufficient to ruin a State, 
 there was a general cause which determined that 
 such State should perish by a single battle. In a 
 Word, the principal movement of events draws with 
 it aJl particular accidents. t__ 
 
 We see that for well-nigh two hundred years 
 the infantry of Dentoark has been all but uniformly 
 beaten by that of Sweden. Independently of the 
 courage of the two nations, and of the particular 
 arms which they employ, there is necessarily some 
 hidden vice in the military or civil government of 
 the Danes which has produced this effect ; and I 
 do not think it is difficult to discover. 
 
 The Romans finally lost their military discipline, 
 and even abandoned the use of their own proper 
 arms. Vegetius says that the soldiers, finding them 
 too heavy, first obtained leave of the Emperor 
 Gratian to abandon the cuirass, and afterwards the 
 helmet; so that, exposed without protection to the 
 strokes of the enemy, their only thought was flight.' 
 
 Yegetius adds that they also lost the custom of 
 fortifying their camps, and that, in consequence of 
 this neglect, their armies were captured by the cav- 
 alry of the barbarians. 
 
 The early Romans had but little cavalry. It 
 only constituted the eleventh part of the legion, 
 and very often less. It is extraordinary that they 
 had much less cavalry than we find in our present 
 
 ' De Be militari, lib. i, ch. xx. 
 
380 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [Montesquieu. 
 
 armies, whicli have so many sieges to make — in 
 whicli cavalry is of little use. When, however, the 
 Eomans were in their decline, their military force 
 consisted almost wholly of cavalry. It appears to me 
 that the wiser a nation becomes in the art of war, 
 the more it will rely upon infantry, and that the 
 less it knows of this art the mt»re it wiU multiply 
 its cavalry. The reason is that infantry, whether 
 heavy or light, is nothing without discipline, whilst 
 cavalry, however disorderly, is constantly in motion.' 
 The action of the latter consists more in its impetu- 
 osity, and in a certain shock ; that of the former in 
 its resistance, and in a certain immobility : it is rather 
 reaction than action. In short, the force of cavalry 
 is momentary; infantry acts during a longer time; 
 but, in order to render it capable of such protracted 
 action, discipline is necessary. 
 
 It was not solely by the art of war, but also 
 by their prudence, their wisdom, their constancy, 
 their love of glory, and their patriotism, that the 
 Eomans had attained the supremacy of the world. 
 When, under the emperors, all these virtues had 
 disappeared, they still retained their military art, by 
 means of which, notwithstanding the feebleness and 
 the tyranny of their princes, they yet preserved 
 what they had acquired; but, when corruption pene- 
 
 ' Without observing any of our military maxims, the oaralry of the 
 Tartars has achieved great things in all ages. See the accounts of these 
 people, and especially that of the last conquest of China. 
 
CHAP. XTiii.] OF THE ROMANS. 381 
 
 trated to the military itself, they became the prey 
 of all nations. 
 
 An empire which is founded by arms needs to 
 be sustained by arms. But, as when a state is in 
 trouble men cannot imagine how it can extricate 
 itself, so, when it is at peace, and when -its power is 
 respected, it does not enter into their minds that this 
 state of things can change: they therefore neglect, 
 and even often seek to weaken, the military, from 
 which they beKeve they have nothing to expect, and 
 all to fear. 
 
 It was an inviolable rule among the early Romans 
 that whoever had abandoned his post, or left his arms 
 in battle, should be punished with death. Julian and 
 Yalentinian had, in these respects, re-established the 
 ancient penalties. But the barbarians who were taken 
 into the Roman service — accustomed as they were to 
 make war as the Tartars do at the present day, to 
 fly in order to continue the combat, and to seek 
 plunder more than honor — were incapable of such 
 discipline.' 
 
 Such was the discipline of the early Romans, that 
 we have seen generals condemn their own sons to 
 death for having gained a victory without orders ; 
 but, when they came to be mixed with the bar- 
 
 ' Thoy would not subject themselves to the labors of the Roman sol- 
 diers. See Ammianus Marcellinus, lib. xviii. He states, as an extraor- 
 dinary circumstance, that they did, on one occasion, submit to these 
 labors, in order to please Julian, who desired to put some places in a 
 state of defence. 
 
382 GEANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesqcieu. 
 
 barians, they contracted that spirit of independence 
 which marked the character of these nations ; and, if 
 we read the history of the wars of Belisarius against 
 the Goths, we shall see that the general was nearly 
 always disobeyed by his officers. 
 
 Even aiaid the fury of the civil wars, Sylla or 
 Sertorius would have perished sooner than to have 
 taken any step which might have been advantageous 
 to Mithridates ; ° but at a later age, whenever a min- 
 ister of state or some great personage came to be- 
 lieve that his avarice, his revenge, or his ambition 
 would be gratified by the introduction of the bar- 
 barians, he immediately gave them the empire to 
 ravage." 
 
 There is no state which is in greater need of 
 revenue than one which is growing weaker; so that 
 it is necessary to increase the public burdens in pro- 
 portion as there is less ability to sustain them. The 
 tributes levied upon the Koman provinces soon be- 
 came intolerable. For an idea of the horrible ex- 
 actions which were imposed upon the people, it is 
 necessary to consult the pages of Salvian." The 
 
 ' This statement is not accurate as to Sertorius. He sent some 
 troops from Spain to aid Mithridates. See note 1, ch. vii, of this work, 
 and Plutarch's lAfe of ImcuUus. — Translator. 
 
 '" This was not at all astonishing, in that mixture -which had taken 
 place with nations which had been wanderers, which knew no country, 
 and among whom entire corps of troops often joined the enemy by whom 
 they had been vanquished, and took arms even against their own nation. 
 See in Procopius what the Goths were under Vitiges. 
 
 " See the whole of Book V, De Gubernatione Dei ; see also, in the 
 
CHAP, xvni.] OF THE ROMANS. 383 
 
 citizen, pursued by the farmers of the revenue, had 
 no other resource but to seek refuge among the bar- 
 barians, or to surrender his liberty to the first person 
 who would accept it. 
 
 This condition of things will serve to explain, in 
 our French history, the patience with which the Gauls 
 suffered a revolution to take place which was calcu- 
 lated to work that grievous change which is involved 
 in the conversion of a noble nation into a nation of 
 serfs. In rendering so many citizens slaves of the 
 glebe — that is to say, of the fields to which they were 
 attached — the barbarians did but little which had not 
 been more cruelly done before them." 
 
 embassy written by Priacus, the discourse of a Roman established among 
 the Huns, upon Ms happy condition in that country. 
 
 '^ See Salvian again, lib. v ; and the laws of Tlie Code and the Digest, 
 in relation thereto. 
 
384 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakee. 
 
 ISrOTE BY THE TEANSLATOK. 
 
 In order to the attainment of a truly rational 
 appreciation of Roman history in all its principal 
 features, it is needful that we should form a some- 
 what completer idea of the important subject of tax- 
 ation, as it existed among the Komans, than is given 
 in the brief hint of Montesquieu at the close of the 
 preceding chapter. By adhering to strict generaUty, 
 this may be done within the compass of a few para- 
 graphs. 
 
 I. As regards the subject matUrs of taxation, there 
 are probably few sorts of tax known to modem times 
 which were not anticipated by the Eomans at one 
 period or another of their history; and they resorted 
 to some which have disappeared from civilized socie- 
 ties. They had import and export duties ; tithes 
 for the use of the public arable lands ; a tax for the 
 use of the public pasture grounds; tolls for the pas- 
 sage over bridges ; a tax upon salt ; a tax in kind 
 upon corn, upon barley, upon wine, upon oil, upon 
 meat, upon wood, upon iron ; a tax upon legacies, 
 upon inheritances, upon sales; a tax upon the value 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 386 
 
 of manumitted slaves ; a capitation tax ; a land tax ; 
 a tax upon the wages of prostitution, and a tax upon 
 a commodity wMch I will not here set down. The 
 Eoman legislator was fertile in the discovery or in- 
 vention of forms of taxation. 
 
 II. As to their method of collecting taxes, it was 
 altogether more defective than anything of the kind 
 which has retained a place in our modern societies. 
 It seems that during the whole course of their his- 
 tory the principal taxes were collected through the 
 instrumentality of fwrmers of the revenue, or jmbli- 
 cani, a class of middle men, to whom the public 
 taxes were farmed out or discounted, whose private 
 interest constantly prompted them to vex and op- 
 press the tax-payer, and whose powers, especially in 
 disorderly times, or under bad emperors, enabled 
 them to do so with comparative impunity. The per- 
 manent retention of this wretched system of tax- 
 gathering — ^under the kings, under the republic, and 
 under the empire — clearly indicates the limitation of 
 the Eoman genius in the sphere of civil administra- 
 tion. The same or a similar system — inherited from 
 the Eomans — long held its place in France, but finally 
 succumbed to the progress of French society : the 
 fermier general disappeared in the revolution of 1Y89. 
 
 III. As to the gross amount of the annual revenue 
 which the empire collected in its best days. Gibbon 
 supposes that in the time of Augustus it may have 
 been equal to fifteen or twenty million pounds ster- 
 
 17 
 
386 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 ling, or, in our money, about seventy -five or one 
 hundred million dollars; whilst Wenck and Guizot 
 appear to prefer, with the authors of the Unwersd 
 History, to place it as high as forty million pounds 
 sterling, or about two hundred million dollars. In 
 the absence, however, of a knowledge of the jpwrcha^- 
 ing power of money at the time, neither of these sums 
 can give us any rational idea of the real amount of 
 the Eoman revenue. To this end it is necessary 
 that we should know, as Adam Smith expresses it, 
 the "quantity of labor and commodities" which a 
 given quantity of money would purchase among the 
 Romans. Taking wheat as the best representative 
 of commodities — assuming that its price at Eome was 
 the same towards the close of the republic and at 
 the beginning of the empire, accepting Smith's state- 
 ment that the " ordinary " price of Sicilian wheat 
 under the republic was probably eightpence for the 
 Eoman modius or English peck, and adopting one 
 dollar per bushel as the present' standard gold price 
 for wheat in the United States — the result would be 
 that the twenty million pounds sterling supposed by 
 Gibbon would represent upwards of one hundred 
 and fifty-six million dollars, and the forty milHons 
 preferred by others, something more than three hun- 
 dred and twelve millions of our money. According 
 to modern ideas, either of these sums would appear 
 to be small for an empire extending over such a 
 
 • isTe. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 387 
 
 vast geographical surface, containing one hundred and 
 twenty million people, and supporting a military 
 and naval establishment of four hundred and fifty 
 thousand men. But a large portion of the revenues 
 of the principal modern states goes in payment of 
 interest on imnaense national debts — a species of 
 burden from which the Eomans were free; and the 
 much greater complexity and fruitfulness of modern 
 production of wealth is necessarily associated with a 
 greater complexity and magnitude of expenditure in 
 the form of taxes. 
 
 TV. As to the weigTit with which taxation fell 
 upon the Roman citizen, we can with some distinct- 
 ness trace four periods: 
 
 1. From the commencement of Roman history 
 down to the time of the conquest of Macedon the 
 taxes were, on the whole, comparatively light. The 
 continual acquisitions which the state was making 
 during this period of growth — the seizures which it 
 made of the wealth of kings, and the exactions which 
 it imposed upon vanquished nations — served, in a 
 great measure, to meet the demands of the govern- 
 ment. This period extended to the year 586 of the 
 city. 
 
 2. In the year just stated — which marks the 
 close of the first and the beginning of the second 
 period — all direct taxes were taken off ; and this 
 exemption continued down to the consulate of Hir- 
 tius and Pansa, in the year 711 of the city— that 
 
388 GRANDEUK AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 is, during a period df one hundred and twenty- 
 five years. Something more than a century after the 
 direct taxes were thus suspended — that is, in the 
 year of the city 692 — the import duties were like- 
 wise taken off ; but these were replaced by Caesar, 
 probably about fifteen years after their removal, and 
 only about four years before the reimposition of 
 the direct taxes; so that, for about a century and 
 a quarter, the Romans paid no direct tax, whilst for 
 about fifteen years of this time they were charged 
 with no tax of any sort, direct or indirect. For 
 their immunity from the first, they were indebted 
 to the immense spoils of Macedon, brought in by 
 Paulus ^milius ; for their immunity from the second, 
 they were indebted to the still greater spoils of 
 Asia, brought in by Pompey ; and it is worthy of re- 
 mark that, as their condition became such that they 
 could relieve themselves from taxation, they first 
 threw off the direct, and then the indirect tax; and 
 that, when it became necessary to resume these bur- 
 dens, they took them up in the reverse order — thus 
 disclosing the same preference for a masked rather 
 than an open charge, which we observe in our mod- 
 ern societies. 
 
 3. From the time of the reimposition of the di- 
 rect taxes in the consulate of Hirtius and Pansa to 
 the time of Diocletian, we have about three hun- 
 dred and twenty-five years, during which the public 
 charges were much heavier than they had previously 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 389 
 
 been, with an average tendency to grow heavier 
 still. 
 
 i. From the time of Diocletian to the closing 
 days of the empire — a period of something less than 
 two centuries — taxation settled like a vampire upon 
 the Eoman world, literally absorbing the life-prin- 
 ciple of the state. The imperial indictions and su- 
 perindictions, which we now meet, fell with dis- 
 tractive weight upon agriculture, a branch of indus- 
 try upon which the Koman power was stiU more 
 dependent than is the power of any great state at 
 the present time. Sir James Stephen says that the 
 land tax in Gaul rose "to the almost incredible 
 amount of one third of the net produce of the 
 land"; and, as the indiction extended to all the 
 lands of the empire, and was based upon an actual 
 survey as to amount, and classification as to quality, 
 it is presumable that the tax laid upon the Gaulish 
 lands may be taken as a fair sample of the general 
 burden.^ "The curse of fiscal tyranny," adds the 
 same writer, speaking of the condition of Gaul, "had 
 depopulated extensive districts, had stricken the land 
 with barrenness, had swept away all the smaller pro- 
 prietors, had degraded into slaves the actual culti- 
 vators of the soil, and had broken asunder the bonds 
 by which the wealthy and the poor had once been 
 united; and now, when the very name and shadow 
 of the empire was departing, the fairest of her 
 former possessions awaited as a helpless prey the 
 
390 GEANDETIR AND DECADENCE [eakeb. 
 
 first formidable arm and resolute will wUcIl should 
 assert a sovereignty over it." As we might expect, 
 the collection of these ruinous impositions upon the 
 lands of the empire was guarded by legal penalties 
 of monstrous rigor. By a law of the Theodosian 
 Code, death and confiscation of estate was the pun- 
 ishment denoimced against the farmer who should 
 attempt to evade the tax. And a certain periodical 
 tax — which was collected upon other industries at 
 intervals of four years — appears to have been equally 
 oppressive. According to Gibbon, "the historian 
 Zosimus laments that the approach of the fatal pe- 
 riod was announced by the tears and terrors of the 
 citizens, who were often compelled by the impending 
 scourge to embrace the most abhorred and unnatural 
 methods of procuring the sum at which their prop- 
 erty had been assessed." The additional remark of 
 the English historian, that "the testimony of Zosi- 
 mus cannot indeed be justified from the charge of 
 passion and prejiidice," need not reflect the slightest 
 discredit upon the statement of this writer, when 
 read, as it should be, in the light of that law of the 
 Theodosian Code to which I have just alluded — the 
 atrocious inhumanity of which not only shows the 
 wide difference between the fiscal enactments of the 
 Koman emperors and those of our own time, but 
 furnishes a solid ground for belief that shocking 
 cruelty was practiced in the collection of the impo- 
 sitions. Where the legal punishment for the evasion 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 391 
 
 of taxes is death and confiscation, the employment 
 of the scourge in their collection is by no means 
 improbable. 
 
 In short — tracing the power of Home from its 
 origin to its fall — the tax imposed upon her citizens 
 and subjects was first moderate, then nil, then heavy, 
 and finally crushing." 
 
 2 See Gibbon's Rome, New York, 1852, vol. i, pp. 189-196 ; vol. ii, pp. 
 141-150 ; Adam's Rom. Ant., Phila., 1872, pp. 45, 46 ; Oicero, De Officiis, 
 lib. ii, c. xxii ; Suetonius, Julitts Ccesar, 43 ; Stephen's Lectures on the His- 
 tory of France, London, 1852, vol. i, pp. 24, 54, 55; Guizot's Sistoire de 
 la Civilisation en France, torn, i, pp. 50, 61 ; Smith's Wealth of Nations, 
 Phila., 1789, vol. i, pp. 64, 284, 285. 
 
392 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesqoteu. 
 
 CHAPTEE XIX, 
 
 GEEATNESS OF ATTILA. OATJSB OF THE ESTABLISHMENT 
 
 OF THE BAEBAEIANS. BEASONB "WHY THE WESTEEN 
 
 EMPIEE FELL FIEST. 
 
 Since Christianity grew stronger as the empire 
 grew weaker, the Christians reproached the Pagans, 
 and the Pagans arraigned the Christians, as being the 
 cause of the decay of the state. The Christians said 
 that Diocletian had ruined the empire by his policy 
 of associating three colleagues with himself ; ' that 
 each emperor incurred as great expenses, and sup- 
 ported as large armies, as if he had been the sole 
 ruler ; and that, the number of those who gave, 
 being no longer justly proportioned to the number 
 of those who received, the burdens of the government 
 had become so oppressive that the cultivated lands, 
 abandoned by the laborers, were grown over with 
 forests. The Pagans, on the contrary, incessantly 
 cried out against the new worship, unheard of until 
 recently ; and, as formerly, when Eome was flourish- 
 ing, the floods of the Tiber and other efEects of nature 
 ' LACTANTins, On tJie Death of Persecutors. 
 
CHAP. XIX.] OF THE ROMANS. 393 
 
 were attributed to the wratli of the gods, so now, 
 when Eome was dying, the public calamities were 
 imputed to the new religion, and to the overthrow 
 of the ancient altars. 
 
 In a letter written to the emperors on the sub- 
 ject of the altar of Victory," the prefect Symmachus 
 makes the most of the popular argument against 
 Christianity — ^the argument which was consequently 
 the one most capable of misleading. "What," said 
 he, " can better conduct us to a knowledge of the 
 gods than the experience of our past prosperity? 
 We ought to be faithful to the example of so many 
 ages, and follow our fathers as they so happUy fol- 
 lowed theirs. Be persuaded that Eome addresses you 
 and says to you : ' Great Princes ! Fathers of your 
 country! respect my years, during which I have con- 
 stantly observed the religion of my ancestors. It is 
 this religion that has siibjected the world to my laws ! 
 It was by this that Hannibal was repelled from my 
 walls, and that the Gauls were driven from the Capi- 
 tol ! ' It is for the gods of our country that we sup- 
 plicate peace ; we entreat it in behaK of the indig- 
 nant gods ! We enter into no disputes which are 
 
 ^ In pagan times the altar and the statue of Victory had stood in the 
 senate chamber, and upon this altar the senators were aworn. Gibbon 
 describes the goddess as " a majestic female standing on a globe, with 
 flowing garments, expanded wings, and a crown of laurel in her out- 
 stretched hand." The altar and the statue had been removed by Conatan- 
 tius, replaced by Julian, again removed by Gratian, and now the pagan 
 party sought to hare it again restored. (Gibbon's Rome, New York, 1852, 
 vol. iii, pp. 133-136.) — Tkanslator. 
 
394 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [moniesquied. 
 
 proper only to idle men; and we offer prayers and 
 not violence.'" 
 
 Three celebrated writers replied to Symmachus. 
 Orosius composed bis history in order to prove that 
 the world had always been the theatre of as great 
 calamities as those of which the Pagans complained. 
 Salvian wrote a book in which he maintained that it 
 was the disorders of the Christian church which had 
 drawn upon the empire the ravages of the barba- 
 rians ; * and St. Augustin showed that the City of 
 God was different from that city of the earth in 
 which the ancient Komans had — by means of some 
 human virtues — received recompenses which were as 
 vain as these virtues." 
 
 We have said that it was the early policy of the 
 Romans to divide every power that gave them um- 
 brage ; but in the course of time they were no 
 longer able to do so. They were powerless to pre- 
 vent Attila from subduing all the nations of the 
 ITorth. He extended his sway from the Danube to 
 the Rhine — destroyed all the fortifications and works 
 which had iieen erected upon these rivers — and laid 
 both the empire of the East and the West under 
 tribute. " Theodosius," he had the insolence to say, 
 " is, like myself, the son of a very noble father ; but, 
 by paying tribute to me, he has forfeited his birth- 
 right, and become my slave ; and it is not right that 
 
 ' Zetters of Symmachus, Book X, letter liv. 
 
 * The Oovernmeni of God. ■ ^ T/ie City of God. 
 
 it 
 
CHAP. XIX.] OF THE ROMANS. 395 
 
 he, like a bad slave, should set snares for his mas- 
 ter."" 
 
 "It is not fit," said he on another occasion, "that 
 an emperor should be a liar. He has promised one 
 of my subjects that he would give him the daughter 
 of Saturninus in marriage. If he will not keep his 
 word, I wiU declare war against him ; if he can not, 
 and is in such a condition that his subjects dare to 
 disobey him, I wiU march to his relief." 
 
 "We need not suppose it was from moderation 
 that Attila suffered the Romans to exist. He fol- 
 lowed the custom of his nation, which led them not 
 to conquer, but to render other peoples tributary to 
 their power. This prince, quartered in the wooden 
 house in which he is represented to us by Priscus," 
 master of all the barbaric nations, and in some sort 
 master of nearly all the polished nations as well,° 
 was one of the grandest monarchs of whom history 
 
 ' Gothic History, and Relation of the Mmbassy, written by Priscus. 
 It was Theodosiua the Younger. 
 
 ' The utterance of these words grew out of an affair which shows 
 that, however insolent their tone, they carried a merited reproof to a 
 rery unworthy monarch. A plot for the assassination of Attila, to which 
 Theodosiua the Younger was privy, had been concocted in Constantinople. 
 The conspiracy was disclosed to its intended victim, who at once dis- 
 patched an embassy to the Court of the East, where, according to Gib- 
 bon's account of the incident, the reproof was administered directly to 
 the emperor, in presence of his courtiers, by an embassador of the king 
 of the Huns. (Gibbon's Rome, vol. iii, pp. 416-418.) — Tkanslator. 
 
 ' Gothic History : Hoe sedes regis harhariem totam tenentis, hmc captis 
 civitatibtis habitacida prmponebat. ( Joknandes, De Rebus getids.) 
 
 ' It appears, from the Relation of Priscus, that the idea of imposing 
 tribute upon the Persians also was entertained at the court of Attila. 
 
396 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 speaks. We see at his court the embassadors of the 
 Eastern and the "Western empire — come to receive his 
 laws or to implore his clemencj. Sometimes he de- 
 manded the rendition of Huns who had deserted, or 
 of Eoman slaves who had escaped. At other times 
 he desired that some minister of the emperor should 
 be delivered into his hands. He levied a tribute of 
 two thousand one hundred pounds of gold upon the 
 empire of the East." He received the emoluments 
 of a general of the Eoman armies. Those whom he 
 wished to reward he sent to Constantinople, in order 
 that they might be loaded with presents — carrying 
 on thus a constant traffic in the fears of the Eo- 
 mans. 
 
 He was feared by his subjects, but it does not 
 appear that he was hated by them." Prodigiously 
 proud, and yet cunning; fiery in his wrath, and yet 
 knowing how to pardon, or to proportion his punish- 
 ments to his interests ; never making war when peace 
 was sufficiently profitable, he was faithfully waited 
 upon by dependent kings, whilst reserving for him- 
 self alone the simplicity of the ancient manners of 
 the Huns. Eor the rest, one cannot bestow much 
 praise upon the courage of the chief of a nation in 
 which the sons were seized with frenzy at the re- 
 cital of the warlike feats of their fathers, whilst the 
 
 '" This was an annual tribute. (Gibbon's Rome, vol. iii, p. 402.) — 
 Translator. 
 
 " For the character of this prince, and the manners of his court, Jor- 
 nandea and Priscus should be consulted. 
 
CHAP. XIX.] OP THE ROMANS. 397 
 
 fathers wept because they were no longer able to 
 imitate their sons." 
 
 After the death of Attila, all the barbaric nations 
 were again separated ; but the Komans were so feeble 
 that no nation was so weak as to be unable to hurt 
 them. 
 
 It was no particular inyasion, but all of them to- 
 gether, that ruined the empire. After the invasion 
 which had taken place under Gallus, and which was 
 so general, it appeared to be re-established, for the 
 reason that it had lost no territory ; but, step by step, 
 it proceeded from its decline to its fall, until, under 
 Arcadius and Honorius, it sank suddenly down." 
 
 In vain had the barbarians been repeatedly driven 
 back into their own countries ; they would have gone 
 
 " It may be of interest to add here the physical portrait of this re- 
 markable barbarian, in whom, on the mental side, we can so distinctly 
 trace the rude lineaments of the spirit of chivalry. Following Jornandes, 
 Gibbon says of the person of Attila: " His features, according to the ob- 
 servation of a Gothic historian, bore the stamp of his national origin ; 
 and the portrait of Attila exhibits the genuine deformity of a modem 
 Calmuk ; a large head, a swarthy complexion, small, deep-seated eyes, a 
 flat nose, a few hairs in the place of a beard, broad shoulders, and a 
 short, square body, of nervous strength, though of a disproportioned 
 form." (Vol. iii, p. 389.)— Translatoe. 
 
 " Montesquieu is not here to be understood as meaning that the West- 
 em empire terminated with the reign of Honorius, A. D. 395-423, but 
 simply as characterizing, by a strong expression, the great and sudden 
 collapse which it experienced during this reign, and from which it never 
 recovered. It will be seen that he subsequently speaks of Odoacer as 
 giving the "mortal blow" which finished the empire of the West, thus 
 directing the mind to Augustulus (whom Odoacer set aside) as the last of 
 the Western emperors, and to the year a. d. 476 or 479 as the date of 
 the final catastrophe. (See Gibbon's Home, vol. iii, pp. 512, 513, and 
 note 125.) — Tkanslator. 
 
ggg GRANDEUK AND DECADENCE [montesquibu. 
 
 back all the same in order to secure their plunder. 
 In vain were they exterminated ; cities -were none the 
 less sacked, towns burned, and families killed or dis- 
 persed." 
 
 When one province had been laid waste, the bar- 
 barians who came after, finding nothing left, were 
 obliged to pass on to another. At first they only 
 ravaged Thrace, Moesia, and Pannonia. When these 
 countries had been devastated, they ruined Macedon, 
 Thessaly, and Greece; and thence it was necessary 
 that they should penetrate to Noricum. The empire 
 — that is, the inhabited part of it — continually dimin- 
 ished, and Italy became the frontier. 
 
 The reason why the barbarians made no perma- 
 nent establishment under Gallus and Gallienus was, 
 that they still found countries to pillage. 
 
 In like manner, when the Normans — who were 
 the very image of the conquerors of the Koman em- 
 pire — had ravaged France during many centuries, and 
 when at length they no longer found anything to 
 plunder, they accepted a province which was totally 
 devastated, and divided it among themselves." 
 
 During the times of which we speak, Scythia be- 
 ing almost wholly uncultivated," its peoples were 
 
 " The Goths were a very destructive nation. They destroyed all the 
 laborers of Thrace, and out off the hands of all wagon-drivers. (Mal- 
 CHOS, Byzantine History, in the Excerpt ofilie Embassies.) 
 
 '* See, in the Chronicles collected by Andr^ of Chesne, the state of 
 this province towards the end of the ninth, and at the beginning of the 
 tenth century. (Script. Norm. hist, veteres.) 
 
 " The Goths, as we have already said, did not cultivate their lands. 
 
CHAP. XIX.] OF THE ROMANS. 399 
 
 subject to frequent famines. They subsisted in part 
 by means of commerce with the Bomans, who car- 
 ried them food from the neighboring provinces of 
 the Danube." The barbarians gave in return the 
 articles of booty which they had obtained by pillage, 
 the prisoners whom they had taken in war, and the 
 gold and silver which they had received as the price 
 of their peace. But, when the empire could no 
 longer afford to pay them tributes sufficiently large 
 to enable them to subsist, they were forced to estab- 
 lish themselves." 
 
 The empire of the West was the first to fall. 
 The reasons for this were as follows: 
 
 Aiter passing the Danube, the barbarians found 
 the Bosporus, Constantinople, and all the forces of 
 the Eastern empire to their left. This arrested them 
 in that direction, and caused «^;hem to turn to the 
 right, in the direction of Illyria, and to push on to 
 the West. There was thus a reflux and a transfer 
 of nations westward. The passes into Asia being 
 
 The Tandals called them Ti-ulles — the name of a small measure — for the 
 reason that during a famine they sold them such a measure of grain at a 
 very high price. (Oltmpiodokus, in the BiUiothelce of Photius, Book 
 XXX.) 
 
 " We see in Priscus' History that there were trading posts estab- 
 lished by treaties along the shores of the Danube. 
 
 " When the Goths sent a deputation to request Zeno to receive 
 Theodoric, son of Triarius, into his alliance on the same terms which he 
 had accorded to Theodoric, son of Balaraer, the senate, after consulting, 
 made answer that the revenues of the state were not sufficient to support 
 two Gothic nations, and that it was necessary to choose the friendship of 
 the one or the other. {Malchm' History, in the Excerpt of the Embas- 
 sies). 
 
400 GEANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 better guarded, all moved towards Europe ; whereas 
 at the time of the first invasion, under GaUus, the 
 forces of the barbarians separated." 
 
 The empire having been really divided, the em- 
 perors of the East, who had entered into alliances 
 with the barbarians, would not break with them in 
 order to succor the emperors of the West. This 
 division of the administration, says Priscus,'" was 
 very prejudicial to the affairs of the "West. Thus, 
 the Komans of the East — because of their alliance 
 with the Vandals — refused a fleet to their brethren 
 of the "West ; " the Yisigoths, having formed an alli- 
 ance with Arcadins, entered the "Western empire, and 
 Honorius was obliged to seek refuge in Ravenna;" 
 and Zeno, with a view of getting rid of Theodoric, 
 persuaded him to invade Italy — which Alaric had 
 already ravaged. 
 
 There was a very close alliance between AttUa 
 and Genseric, king of the Yandals." The latter 
 feared the Goths." He had married his son to the 
 daughter of the Gothic king, and, after having caused 
 her nose to be cut off, he had returned her. It was 
 
 " The great invasion, or rather Invasions, under Decius and Gallus — 
 A. D. 249-253 — ^took place about seventy years before the founding pf 
 Constantinople, and consequently before the line of the Bosporus had 
 been so strengthened as to deflect the whole force of the barbarians 
 upon the European provinces, after they had crossed the Danube. — 
 Teanslatok. 
 
 »» PRISC0S, Book II. " Ibid. 
 
 °^ Peooopius, War of the Vandals. '' Prisocs, Book II. 
 
 '* See JoENANDES, De Bebus geiicis, cap. xxxvi. 
 
CHAP. XIX.] OF THE ROMANS. 401 
 
 therefore that he united himself with Attila ; and the 
 two empires, bound as it were in chains by these 
 two barbaric princes, did not dare to succor each 
 other. The condition of the Western empire was 
 especially deplorable. It had no fBrce upon sea. 
 The entire marine was in the East " — in Egypt, 
 Cyprus, Phoenicia, Ionia, Greece — the only countries 
 in which any commerce was then carried on. The 
 Yandals and other barbaric nations attacked the West 
 on all sides. We learn from Priscus that an embassy 
 of Italians was sent to Constantinople for the pur- 
 pose of making it known that it was impossible for 
 the Western empire to maintain itself longer without 
 a reconciliation with the Vandals." 
 
 Those who governed in the West were not want- 
 ing in policy. They decided that it was necessary 
 to save Italy, which was in some sort the head and 
 the heart of the empire. The barbarians were re- 
 moved to the frontier provinces, and there located. 
 The design was well conceived and well executed. 
 These nations demanded nothing more than a sub- 
 sistence. Plains were assigned to them; mountainous 
 countries, defiles, passes over watercourses, and strong- 
 holds along the great rivers, were reserved — as was 
 also the sovereignty of the empire." Appearances 
 
 '5 This is especially apparent in the war between Constantine and 
 Licinius. 
 
 '« Peiscus, Book n. 
 
 '' For the purpose of fixing a definite conception, by means of a 
 familiar illustration, I will again draw attention to the similarity of the 
 
402 GRAifDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquietj. 
 
 indicated that the barbaric nations would have been 
 forced to become Komans ; and the facility with which 
 these destroyers were themselves destroyed by the 
 Franks, by the Byzantine Greeks, and by the Moors, 
 sufficiently justifies that idea. But this whole system 
 was overturned by a revolution which was more fatal 
 than all the others. The army of Italy — composed 
 of foreigners — exacted the same terms which had 
 been accorded to nations more foreign still. Under 
 Odoacer this army formed an aristocracy which ap- 
 propriated to itself one third of the lands of Italy; 
 and thus the mortal blow was given to the empire. 
 
 In the midst of so many disasters we feel a sad 
 curiosity in following the destiny of the city of 
 Eome. It was, so to speak, without defence ; it 
 could be easily reduced by famine ; and the extent of 
 its walls rendered it very difficult to defend them. 
 As the city was situated upon a plain, it could be 
 readily carried by storm. Its people — who were ex- 
 tremely reduced in numbers — were without resources. 
 The emperors were compelled to retire to Eavenna, 
 a city formerly defended by the sea, as Yenice is at 
 the present day. 
 
 Being nearly always abandoned by their sover- 
 eigns, the Koman people began to become sovereign 
 themselves, and to make treaties for their own pres- 
 
 Indian policy of the United States and the policy of the Romans in set- 
 tling the barbarians within the limits of the empire. We notice, in both 
 cases, a like reservation of the ultimate sovereign power. — Translator. 
 
CHAP. XIX.] OP THE EOMANS. 403 
 
 ervation,"' thus adopting the most legitimate means 
 for the acquisition of sovereign power. It was thus 
 also that the people of Armorica and Brittany began 
 first to live under their own laws." " 
 
 Such was the end of the empire of the "West. 
 Kome had grown great for the reason that she had 
 only conducted wars which were successive, each na- 
 tion, by an inconceivable good fortune, not attacking 
 her until another had been ruined. Home was de- 
 stroyed for the reason that all nations attacked her at 
 once, and penetrated her dominions on all sides. 
 
 "^^ Alaric, who besieged Eome during the reign of Honoring, com- 
 pelled that city to accept his alliance, even against the emperor, who was 
 unable to help himself. (PROOOFins, Gothic War, Book I.) See Zosi- 
 mus, Book VI. 
 
 " ZosiMus, Book VI. 
 
404 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakee. 
 
 NOTE BY THE TEANSLATOE. 
 
 I. Maohiavelli notices tlie same remarkable fea- 
 ture of the rising power of Eome which is men- 
 tioned by Montesquieu at the close of the preced- 
 ing chapter. He discusses the question whether the 
 Eomans, in the acquisition of their empire, were 
 more favored by virtue or by fortune ; ' and, con- 
 trary to the opinion of Plutarch and others, he pre- 
 fers the former hypothesis. "But, whatever may 
 have been the cause," he continues, "it never hap- 
 pened that they were engaged in two very great 
 wars at the same time. It always fell out, on the 
 contrary, that, either at the beginning of one war 
 another was terminated, or at the termination of one 
 another took its rise, as may be readily seen from 
 the succession of their wars ; for— leaving aside those 
 which they made before Eome was taken by the 
 Gauls— it is seen that, whilst they fought against the 
 -(Equians and the Volscians, no other nations rose 
 against them so long as these peoples remained pow- 
 
 ' Quale fu piii cagione dello iraperio che acquistorono i Romani, o la 
 virtil, la fortuna. Discorsi, lib. ii, cap. 1. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 405 
 
 erful. When they were subdued, the war against the 
 Samnites followed ; and, although before this war was 
 finished the Latins rebelled against the Romans, yet, 
 after such rebellion took place, the Samnites were 
 in league with Eome, and, with their army, helped 
 the Romans to chastise the insolence of the Latins. 
 These subdued, the war was renewed with the Sam- 
 nites; and, after they were beaten in many battles, 
 the war with the Etrurians followed ; and this being 
 terminated, the Samnites were again aroused by the 
 passage of Pyrrhus into Italy. As soon as Pyrrhus 
 was repulsed, and had returned to Greece, the first 
 war with the Carthaginians ensued; and no sooner 
 was this ended than aU the G-auls on both sides of 
 the Alps conspired against the Romans, until — be- 
 tween Popolonia and Pisa, where the tower of St. 
 Yincent now stands — they were overthrown with im- 
 mense slaughter. After this the Romans had no war 
 of much importance for the space of twenty years ; 
 for they only fought with the Ligurians, and with 
 the remnant of the Ganls in Lombardy; and thus 
 matters stood until the second Carthaginian war, 
 which occupied Italy during sixteen years. This war 
 being concluded with supreme glory, then followed 
 the war with Macedon ; and this being finished, next 
 came that of Antiochus and of Asia; after which 
 there remained in the world neither Mng nor re- 
 public strong enough^ — either singly or all combined — ■ 
 to stand against the Roman power. But, before this 
 
406 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 final triumpli, whoever will consider the succession 
 of these wars, and the method of conducting them, 
 will not fail to see, mixed with fortune, a virtue and 
 a prudence of the highest order." ' 
 
 Quite in harmony with the conception of Machia- 
 velli, it may be added that it is neither matter of 
 astonishment nor proof of "inconceivable good for- 
 tune" that in ancient times a conquering state like 
 Rome was not arrested by a powerful and sustained 
 combination of the neighboring states. Such combi- 
 nations imply a more advanced social condition than 
 existed among the ancient Italian peoples; and thus 
 Home was permitted, step by step, to acquire ascend- 
 ency in Italy. This was accomplished before she ar- 
 rested the serious attention of the two great outlying 
 powers — Carthage, and Greece — the one weakened in 
 its foreign policy by faction at home, the other dis- 
 tracted and pi'eoccupied by mutual jealousies, in- 
 trigues, and quarrels. Taking into view the single- 
 ness of purpose and the supreme military spirit of 
 Home on the oiie hand, and the actual condition of 
 the rest of the world on the other, there is nothing 
 in Koman aggrandizement which violates historical 
 probability. 
 
 II. The final extinction of the "Western empire 
 
 marks, in the principal sense, the close of Homan 
 
 history. From the time of that event, A. n. •diTG, to 
 
 the like extinction of the empire of the East, we 
 
 ° Discorsi, lib. ii, cap. i. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 40Y 
 
 have yet the long period of 977 years, whicli, although 
 justly reckoned as belonging in some sort to Koman 
 history, ought to be accepted as such in a very subor- 
 dinate and inferior sense. The Eastern empire was 
 Greco-Koman ; its ruling ethnic element was the 
 Greek stock ; its dominant speech was the Greek lan- 
 guage; its ideas, its manners, its genius, were mainly 
 Grecian. The provinces of the East had been con- 
 quered, and ruled for several centuries, by the Ro- 
 mans ; but, inasmuch as these provinces, at the time 
 the Komans acquired ascendency over them, were 
 already occupied by an ancient and powerful civili- 
 zation — much superior to that of Eome herself in 
 nearly all that belongs to taste, science, and intellect — 
 their populations were not nearly so much modified 
 by their conquerors as were the rude and illiterate na- 
 tions of the West which fell under the Roman sway.' 
 The old empire of Alexander — first divided under his 
 successors, then swallowed up and long governed by 
 Rome, then detached from the "West, under an ad- 
 ministration of its own, and then surviving for nearly 
 a thousand years as the representative of the Roman 
 name — preserves under all these changes its original 
 Grecian aspect. It is to the survival of the Roman 
 law in the East, and to the retention of the Latin 
 tongue as the language of the law, that we must 
 mainly look for the rational justification of that gen- 
 eral conception which brings the Greek empire with- 
 ' See Gibbon's Rome, vol. i, pp. 44-46. 
 
408 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakek. 
 
 in the complete circle of Eoman history. As re- 
 stricted, howe^r, to the career and the fate of the 
 Latin stock and its Italian allies, that history virtu- 
 ally runs out with the fall of the Western empire. 
 
 It is a curious fact that, more than five hundred 
 years before this event took place, there was already 
 an opinion among the augurs of Rome that the 
 twelve vultures, which Komulus was said to have 
 seen, signified the twelve centuries during which the 
 Eoman power was destined to continue; and, from 
 the founding of the city to the total extinction of 
 the empire of the West, we count 1,229 years, the 
 last twenty or more of which being marked by the 
 mere shadow and semblance, rather than by the sub- 
 stance, of power.* 
 
 III. At the close of an empire of such unequalled 
 fame we may fitly indulge some reflections upon the 
 periods which ITature or Providence assigns to the 
 existence of nations. 
 
 Quetelet has a chapter upon " The Average dura- 
 tion of Nations and States,"" in which a curious 
 application of statistics is brought to view, and one 
 which may possibly assume a high value in the 
 future, as a means of helping to more definite con- 
 ceptions of some of the laws of universal history." 
 I do not vouch for the accuracy of the periods of 
 
 * Idem, vol. iii, p. 45T ; and De Quinooy's Ccesars, Boston, 1854, p. 250. 
 
 ' Duree moyennc des nations et des &ats. 
 
 ^ Bu SysUme Social, Paris, 1848, pp. 158-164. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 409 
 
 duration wMch he adopts for a number of the nations, 
 governments, and cities of the past, but will only 
 notice in particular that he makes the Eoman period 
 a century too short, that he abbreviates the reign of 
 the Eoman kings to a like extent, and that, in the 
 light of the investigations of KoseUini, Lepsius, Ma- 
 riette, and others, his period for Egypt is very con- 
 siderably too short. He assigns the following values as 
 the respective life-terms of the five following nations : 
 
 TEARS. 
 
 Assyria. 1_680 
 
 Egypt 1,663 
 
 The Jews 1,522 
 
 Greece 1,410 
 
 Eome 1,129 
 
 — the average of which is 1,461 years. 
 
 He observes that "Nations necessarily endure 
 longer than States " — by which last term he means 
 forms of government ; and he assigns the following 
 values for the respective durations of ten ancient 
 governments : 
 
 TEAE8. 
 
 Greece under kings 556 
 
 " " republics 854 
 
 Rome under kings 145 
 
 " republic 478 
 
 " " empire 506 
 
 Jews under judges 476 
 
 " " kings 920 
 
 " " republic 121 
 
 " The three empires formed of the dSbris of the ancient 
 
 Assyrian empire" 211 
 
 The empire of Persia founded by Cyrus 206 
 
 — showing an average of 448 years. 
 
 18 
 
410 GKANDEtJR AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 He notices also the terms of duration of tliree 
 celebrated cities of antiquity, and giyes to them the 
 following values : 
 
 TEABS. 
 
 Tyre 680 
 
 Carthage '?01 
 
 Syracuse 601 
 
 — disclosing an average of 627 years. 
 
 This leads him to observe the considerably longer 
 duration of the city-republics of Yenice and Genoa 
 — the one extending through eleven, and the other 
 through nine to ten centuries. 
 
 Here Quetelet approaches, but does not pursue, the 
 comparison of the modem with the ancient world; 
 nor does he attempt to infer any law which may 
 express the general relation of the two in regard to 
 the longevity of nations. I think, however, this may 
 be done. 
 
 The nations of modern Europe may be distinctly 
 traced as far back as the fall of the Western empire, 
 and some of them, as for instance the Germans and the 
 French, much farther. It would apparently be quite 
 fair, therefore, to assign to these nations an average 
 term already of 1400 years — a period very nearly 
 equal to that which Quetelet educes for the complete 
 average life-term of the five ancient nations to which 
 he directs his attention. But it is obvious that our 
 modern nations have yet a long future before them. 
 It could be shown, I think, that not one of them 
 has yet reached the climax of its civilization ; and it 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 411 
 
 would seem to follow, accordingly, that tJie modem 
 nations promise to he much longer-li/ved tho/n the 
 ancient. Nor is it difficult to point out tlie causes 
 wluch ouglit to give rise to such a difEerence. These 
 causes are principally two : 
 
 1. The larger territorial extension of modern civ- 
 ilization, and the consequently lessened store of the 
 world's total barbaric force, combined with the rela- 
 tively increased influence of the intellectual, moral, 
 and industrial elements in our modem civilized so- 
 cieties, and the consequently diminished influence of 
 the military spirit over them — have very greatly less- 
 ened — ^nay, virtually extinguished — ^the chance that 
 any member of the m,odern family of nations will 
 ever he destroyed hy force exerted from without — an 
 agency of national destruction which was exceedingly 
 active and efficient in ancient times. 
 
 2. The larger and more diversified mental results 
 of civilization which are incorporated into the life of 
 the modem nations leads to the remarkable conse- 
 quence—full of hope for the future of humanity — 
 that they resist, hetter than the nations of antiquity 
 did, the corrupting infiuence of wealth and luxury — 
 an influence which exerted itself powerfully and rap- 
 idly in the work of running down and dissolving 
 the ancient nations. 
 
 Both these destructive agencies were displayed 
 upon a gigantic scale in the career of the Romans. 
 "With ruthless hand these conquerors effaced the na- 
 
412 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakeb. 
 
 tionalitieB of mamerous peoples. But, grown rich 
 upon the spoils of a vanquished worid, they at once 
 succumbed to the corrupting influence of their own 
 great fortune, and then disappeared in their turn 
 beneath the stalwart blows which were given them 
 by the rude nations of the North. 
 
MONTESQUIEU.] OF THE ROMANS. 413 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 
 CONQUESTS OF JUSTINIAN. HIS GOVEENMENT. 
 
 As all these nations entered pell-mell into the 
 empire of the West, they mutually incommoded each 
 other; and the whole policy of the time consisted in 
 arming barbarians against barbarians, a policy which 
 their ferocity and their avarice made it easy to exe- 
 cute. They destroyed each other for the most part 
 before they were able to establish themselves; and 
 thus the empire of the East was left in a condition 
 still to stand. 
 
 Moreover, the source of supply had exhausted it- 
 seK. "We cease to see those innumerable armies is- 
 suing from the North which at first appeared. After 
 the first invasions by the Goths and the Huns, and 
 especially after the death of Attila, these nations, 
 and those that followed them, came in less force. 
 
 "When the invading nations, which had first been 
 massed as armies, came to be dispersed as peoples, 
 their power was much diminished. Scattered over 
 the different countries which they had conquered, 
 they were themselves exposed to invasion. 
 
4.14 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquxef. 
 
 It was under these circumstances that tTustinian 
 undertook to reconquer Africa and Italy, and that 
 he did what our Franks accomplished so successfully 
 against the Visigoths, the Burgundians, the Lombards, 
 and the Saracens. 
 
 At the time when the Christian religion had been 
 carried to the barbarians, Arianism was in some sort 
 dominant in the empire. Yalens had sent them Arian 
 priests, and these were their first apostles. During 
 the interval, however, which intervened between their 
 conversion and their establishment, Arianism had been 
 in a manner extinguished among the Komans; so 
 that, finding the whole Koman world orthodox, the 
 barbaric Arians could never gain the good-wUl of its 
 inhabitants; and it was easy, therefore, for the em- 
 perors of the East to give them trouble. 
 
 Furthermore, the art and the genius of the bar- 
 barians being but little adapted to the attack of 
 cities, and still less to their defence, they left the 
 walls of fortified towns to fall into ruins. Proco- 
 plus teUs us that Belisarius found those of Italy in 
 this condition. The walls of the fortified cities of 
 Africa had been dismantled by Genseric,' as those of 
 Spain afterwards were by Vitisa,' under the idea of 
 being thus more secure of their inhabitants. 
 
 Most of these nations from the North contracted 
 at once the luxurious manners of the southern coun- 
 
 ' Procopius, War of the Vandals, Book I. 
 
 ' MAEiANi, History of Spain, Book YI, ch. xix. 
 
CHAP. XX ] OF THE ROMANS. 415 
 
 tries in which they were established, and became in- 
 capable of sustaining the fatigues of war.' The Van- 
 dals languished in voluptuous pleasures. A delicate 
 table, effeminate habits, music, gardens, baths, the 
 dance, the theatre, were become necessaries among 
 them. As we learn from Malchus,* they no longer 
 gave any inquietude to the Eomans' after they had 
 ceased to maintain those armies which Genseric held 
 constantly in readiuess, and by means of which he 
 was enabled to anticipate his enemies, and to aston- 
 ish the world by the facility with which he executed 
 his enterprises. 
 
 The cavalry of the Romans was very expert in 
 the use of the bow ; but that of the Goths and the 
 Yandals used only the sword and the lance, and could 
 not fight at a distance." It is to this difference that 
 Belisarius attributes a part of his successes. 
 
 The Romans, especially under Justinian, received 
 great assistance from the Huns — the nation from 
 which the Parthians were derived — and whose war- 
 riors fought in the same manner. After they had 
 lost their power by the defeat of Attila, and from 
 the divisions which were occasioned by the great 
 
 ' PROCOPins, War of the Vandals, Book II. 
 
 * Byzantine History, in the Excerpt of the Embassies. 
 
 ' In the time of Hunneric. (a) 
 
 (a) Hunneric was son and successor of Genseric, so quickly did the 
 power of the Vandals dechne. — Translator. 
 
 ^ See Peocofius, War of the Vandals, Book I ; and the same author, 
 War of the Goths, Book I. The Gothic archers fought on foot, and were 
 but little disciplined. 
 
416 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [MOuiESQiJiEn. 
 
 number of his cMldren, they entered the service of 
 the Eomans in the character of auxiliaries, and be- 
 came their best cavaby. 
 
 All the barbaric nations were distinguished from 
 each other by their particular arms, and by their par- 
 ticular manner of fighting.' The Goths and the Yan- 
 dals were formidable for their use of the sword ; the 
 Huns were admirable archers; the Sueri were good 
 infantry; the Alans were heavily armed, the Heruli 
 lightly. The Eomans selected from these different 
 nations the diverse bodies of troops which were 
 adapted to their purposes; and thus they made war 
 upon one alone with the advantages of all the 
 others. 
 
 It is singular that the weakest nations were those 
 which affected the greatest establishments. "We shall 
 be much deceived if we judge of their forces by 
 their conquests. In that long succession of incursions 
 into the empire, the barbaric peoples, or rather the 
 swarms which came from them, destroyed or were 
 themselves destroyed. All depended upon circum- 
 stances; and, whilst a powerful nation was being as- 
 sailed by force of arms, or held in check, a troop of 
 adventurers would penetrate into an unguarded coun- 
 try and commit frightful ravages. The Goths— the 
 disadvantage of whose arms caused them to fly be- 
 
 ' A remarkable passage in Jornandes gives all these differences ; it 
 is on the occasion of the battle between the Gepidaj and the sons of 
 Attila. 
 
CHAP, xs.] OF THE ROMANS. 4.I7 
 
 fore 80 many nations — established themselves in 
 Italy, in Gaul, and in Spain. The Yandals, aban- 
 doning Spain on account of their weakness, crossed 
 over into Africa, and there founded a great em- 
 pire. 
 
 Against the latter nation Justinian could only 
 equip a fleet of fifty vessels ; and when Belisarius 
 disembarked he had no more than five thousand sol- 
 diers.' It was a very daring enterprise; and Leo, 
 who had formerly sent an army of a hundred thou- 
 sand men against the same enemy — ^borne upon 
 a fleet composed of all the vessels of the East 
 — had not only failed to conquer Africa, but had 
 had occasion to apprehend the loss of his own em- 
 pire. 
 
 These grand fleets, like grand armies on land, have 
 never been very successful. Inasmuch as they ex- 
 haust the state if the espedition is a long one, or if 
 some disaster befalls it, they can neither be supplied 
 nor repaired. If a part is lost, the remainder is use- 
 less; for the vessels of war, the transports, the cav- 
 alry, the infantry, the munitions — in short, the differ- 
 ent parts — are dependent upon the whole. In conse- 
 quence of the slowness with which the enterprise 
 proceeds, the enemy is always found prepared; and, 
 since it seldom happens that the expedition is ready 
 to move at the proper time in the year, it falls upon 
 the season of storms — such vast preparations being 
 * Procopius, War of the Goths, Book IT. 
 
418 GRANDEUK AND DECADENCE [moktesquieu. 
 
 hardly ever completed until some months later than 
 the promised time.* 
 
 Belisarius invaded Africa. He was much aided 
 in this enterprise by the large store of provisions 
 vrhich he drew from Sicily by means of a treaty 
 which was made with Amalasontha, the queen of the 
 Goths; and, when he came to be sent against Italy, 
 seeing that the Goths derived their support from the 
 same source, he commenced by conquering Sicily. 
 He thus reduced his enemies to famine, whilst his 
 own army was abundantly supplied. He took Car- 
 thage, Home, and Ravenna, and sent the captive 
 kings of the Goths and Yandals to Constantinople, 
 where we see, after the lapse of so long a time, a 
 renewal of the ancient triumphs.'" 
 
 "We may find in the qualities of this great man 
 the principal causes of his success." Eeing a general 
 who revived all the maxims of the early Komans, he 
 formed an army which was like the ancient armies 
 of Bome. In a state of servitude, great virtues are 
 ordinarily concealed or lost; but the tyrannical gov- 
 ernment of Justinian could not obscure that superi- 
 ority of genius, or extinguish that grandeur of soul, 
 which marked the character of Belisarius. 
 
 The eunuch Narses also contributed to render 
 
 ' The Spanish armada and the army of Xerxes are recalled by what 
 is here said. — Tkanslator^ 
 
 '" Justinian only accorded to Belisarius a triumph for the conquest of 
 Africa. 
 
 " See Suidas, at the article Belisarius. 
 
CHAP. XX.] OF THE ROMANS. 419 
 
 tliis reign illustrious. Grown up in the palace, he 
 possessed all the more completely the confidence of 
 the emperor; for princes always regard their cour- 
 tiers as their most faithful subjects. 
 
 But the bad conduct of Justinian — ^his prodigality, 
 his vexations, his rapines — liis furor for building, 
 changing, reforming — the inconstancy of his plans, 
 and the cruelty and the wealcness of a reign which 
 was made worse by a protracted old age — were the 
 real evils which were mixed with his vainglory and 
 his profitless victories. His conquests — which had 
 for their cause, not the strength of the empire, but 
 certain particular circumstances — ruined all. Whilst 
 his armies were occupied in making them, new na- 
 tions crossed the Danube and desolated Illyria, Mace- 
 don, and Greece; and the Persians, in the course of 
 four destructive invasions, inflicted incurable wounds 
 upon the East.'" 
 
 The more rapidly these conquests were made, the 
 less solidly were they established. Italy and Africa 
 were scarcely conquered when it became necessary to 
 conquer them again. 
 
 Justinian had elevated to the throne a woman 
 who had long prostituted herself upon the stage." 
 She governed him with an authority that has no ex- 
 ample in history; and, mixing incessantly the pas- 
 
 '^ The two empires ravaged each other .all the more destructively, 
 since neither of them had any hope of preserving the conquests which it 
 made from the other. " The empress Theodora. 
 
420 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [MosTESQCiEtr. 
 
 siona and the fancies of lier sex with the affairs of 
 the state, she marred the most fortunate victories 
 and successes. 
 
 In the East polygamy has prevailed in all ages; 
 and this custom has denied to the women of those 
 countries that prodigious ascendant which they have 
 over us in these climes;" but at Constantinople the 
 law of a single wife admitted that sex to empire — 
 and this was sometimes the occasion of weakness in 
 the government." 
 
 The people of Constantinople were at all times 
 divided into two factions — ^that of the hlues and that 
 of the greens. These factions took their origin from 
 the preference which the people in the theatre showed 
 for certain actors rather than for others. In the 
 games of the circus, the charioteers who were dressed 
 in green disputed the prize with those who were 
 dressed in blue, and the interest of the spectators 
 amounted to a furor. 
 
 These two factions were spread through all the 
 
 ''' En Orient, on a do tout tem,ps multiplU Vusage des femmes, pour 
 leur dter Vascendant prodigieux gu'elles ont smt nous dans ces climats. 
 
 " Montesquieu probably felt the influence of the Salic law, by which 
 women were excluded from the throne of France. It ia likely, however, 
 that the reigns of female sovereigns will, on the whole, compare favor- 
 ably with the rest. It is certain that a very great majority of those 
 rulers who have merited the name of monsters have been men ; and as 
 for weakness, it would be difficult to point out in the world's history a 
 queen or an empress who was as much so as Heliogabalus. The good 
 sought by monarchy is order in the state, and not personal ability in the 
 sovereign ; and, in the realization of this good, experience does not ap- 
 pear to have discriminated against women. — Translator. 
 
CHAP. 3x.] OF THE ROMANS. 421 
 
 cities of the empire, and they were more or 
 furious in proportion to the size of the city — that is, 
 in proportion to the number of idle people. 
 
 But divisions — always necessary in a republican 
 government, in order to maintain it — could only be 
 fatal to the government of the Eoman emperors ; 
 for such divisions only led to a change of the sov- 
 ereign, and not to the re-establishment of the laws 
 and the correction of abuses. 
 
 Justinian, who favored the hlues, and denied all 
 justice to the greens," embittered, the two factions, 
 and consequently strengthened both. They went so 
 far as to annihilate the authority of the magistrates. 
 The Hues ceased to fear the laws, for the reason that 
 they were protected against them by the emperor; 
 the greens ceased to respect them, for the reason that 
 they could no longer rely upon them for protection." 
 All the obligations of friendship, of consangiiinity, of 
 duty, of gratitude, ■ were thrown ofE. Families de- 
 stroyed themselves. Every wretch who desired to 
 commit a crime was of the faction of the hlues; all 
 who were robbed or assassinated were of the faction 
 of the greens." 
 
 " This malady was ancient. Suetonius says that Caligula, who was 
 attached to the faction of the greens, hated the people because they ap- 
 plauded the other. 
 
 " In order to form an idea of the spirit of these times, it is neces- 
 sary to consult Theophanes, who reports a long conversation which took 
 place in the theatre between the emperor and'the greens. 
 
 " Nothing, perhaps, can better illustrate the puerile character of the 
 masses of the Roman people during the decline of the empire than the 
 
^23 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [moktesquieu. 
 
 A government thus wanting in sense was yet 
 more crael. The emperor was not content with in- 
 flicting general injustice upon his subjects by impos- 
 ing ruinous public exactions upon them ; he harassed 
 them with every species of tyranny in their private 
 affairs. I should not be naturally inclined to believe 
 
 excesses whicli are recorded in connection with these factions of the 
 circus and the hippodrome. They are suggestive of the feuds which we 
 sometimes observe in our modern cities between the "up town" and 
 " down town " boys ; and they belong to the same level of mental 
 development. But, when the circumstance is added that even the chiefs 
 of the state — as in the cases of Caligula, Nero, VitelUus, Commodus, 
 Caracalla, Heliogabalus, and Justinian himself — were so identified with 
 factions which involved no principle and no interest, that the administra- 
 tion of public justice came to be corrupted by idle distinctions in the 
 costume of charioteers, we are amazed at the possibilities of human 
 folly. From Constantinople, Gibbon writes, " the pestilence was diffused 
 into the provinces and cities of the East, and the sportive distinction of 
 two colors produced two strong and irreconcilable factions, which shook 
 the foundations of a feeble government. The popular dissensions, 
 founded on the most serious interest, or holy pretence, have scarcely 
 equalled the obstinacy of this wanton discord, which invaded the peace of 
 families, divided friends and brothers, and tempted the female sex, though 
 Seldom Been in the circus, to espouse the inclinations of their lovers, 
 or to contradict the wishes of their husbands. Every law, either human 
 or divine, was trampled under foot, and, as long as the party was success- 
 ful, its deluded followers appeared careless of private distress or pubhc 
 calamity." {Decline and Fall, vol. iv, pp. 57, 58.) Originally there were 
 but two colors worn by the charioteers of the Roman circus — the lo/ito 
 and the red ; afterwards two others — the green and the blue — were added ; 
 and finally Domitian supplemented two additional ones — the golden and 
 the purple. " The spectators favored one or the other color, as humor 
 or caprice inclined them. It was not the swiftness of the horses, nor 
 the art of the men, that attracted them ; but merely the dress. In the 
 time of Justinian no less than 30,000 men are said to have lost their 
 lives at Constantinople in a tumult raised by contention among the par- 
 tisans of these several colors." (Adam's Rom. Ant., Phila., 1872, p. 
 226 ; and, compare Gibbon, vol. iv, p. 66.)— Teanslatob. 
 
CHAP. XX.] OF THE ROMANS. 423 
 
 all that Procopius says upon this subject in his Secret 
 History ; for the magnificent eulogies upon Justinian 
 which we find in his other works weaken his testi- 
 mony in this, wherein he paints the emperor as the 
 most stupid and the most cruel of tyrants. But I 
 confess that two considerations induce me to accept 
 the Secret History. The first is that its representa- 
 tions harmonize best with the astonishing weakness 
 of the empire at the end of this reign and during 
 those which followed. The other is suggested by a 
 monument which still exists — the laws of this em- 
 peror — ^from which we see that jurisprudence varied 
 more in the course of a few years than it has done 
 during the last three centuries of our monarchy. 
 These changes are for the most part in connection 
 with matters of such little importance " that we are 
 unable to discover any reason which should have 
 induced a legislator to make them — unless, indeed, 
 we resort for explanation to the Secret History, and 
 conclude that this prince sold equally his judgments 
 and his laws. 
 
 But that which inflicted the greatest injury upon 
 the political status of the government was the pro- 
 ject of Justinian to reduce all men to the same 
 opinion in matters of religion — and this, too, under 
 circumstances which rendered his zeal wholly in- 
 discreet. 
 
 Whereas the ancient Eomans had strengthened 
 
 " See the Novels of JttsHnian. 
 
424: GEANDEUE AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 their empire by tolerating every species of worship, 
 it was at length reduced to nothing, by cutting off, 
 one after another, the religious sects which were not 
 dominant. 
 
 These sects were entire nations. Some of them, 
 after having been conquered by the Romans, had 
 still preserved their ancient religion — as, for example, 
 the Samaritans and the Jews. Others were dispersed 
 through particular countries. Thus, the sectaries of 
 Montanus were scattered over Phrygia, whilst the 
 Manichseans, the Sabatians, and the Arians were 
 distributed in other provinces. Besides these, a large 
 part of the rural population were yet idolaters — in- 
 fatuated with a religion as gross as themselves. 
 
 Justinian destroyed these sects by the sword or 
 by his laws. In driving them to revolt, he entailed 
 upon himself the necessity of exterminating them ; 
 and thus many provinces were laid waste. He be- 
 lieved that he had increased the number of the faith- 
 ful ; he had only diminished the number of men. 
 
 Procopius informs us that by the destruction of 
 the Samaritans Palestine became a desert ; and a 
 singular interest is lent to this fact by the circum- 
 stance that, through zeal for religion, the empire was 
 thus weakened upon the very side by which, some 
 reigns later, the Arabs penetrated for the purpose 
 of destroying it. 
 
 It is in the last degree discouraging to know that, 
 while the emperor carried his intolerance so far, he 
 
CHAP. XX.] OF THE ROMANS. 425 
 
 did not himself agree with the empress upon the 
 most essential points of doctrine; he followed the 
 council of Chalcedon; she favored those who tvere 
 opposed to that council — whether, as Evagrius says, 
 this opposition of views existed in good faith, or was 
 the result of design." 
 
 When we read Procopius's account of the edifices 
 of Justinian, and consider the strongholds and the 
 fortifications which he caused to be erected all over 
 the empire, we are constantly under the influence of 
 an idea — ^but a very false one — that we are contem- 
 plating a flourishing state. 
 
 At flrst the Komans had no fortified places. They 
 relied wholly upon their armies, which they posted 
 upon the shores of the rivers, along which, from 
 point to point, they built towers for the lodgment 
 of the soldiers. But when they no longer had good 
 armies — when often they even had none at aU — the 
 frontier ceasing to defend the interior, it became 
 necessary to fortify; and then there were more 
 strongholds and less strength, more retreats and less 
 security." The country being no longer inhabitable 
 
 =» Book IV, ch. X. 
 
 *' Augustus had established nine frontiers or marches. Under the 
 succeeding emperors the number of these was increased. The barbarians 
 sliowed themselves where they had not appeared before ; and Dion, in 
 Book LV, relates that in his time — under the reign of Alexander — there 
 were thirteen. We see by an account of the state of the empire, written 
 after the time of Arcadius and Honorius, that there were fifteen in the 
 Eastern empire alone. The number constantly increased. Pamphylia, 
 Lycaonia, and Pisidia became marches ; and the whole empire was cov- 
 ered with fortifications. Aurelian had been obliged to fortify Rome. 
 
426 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 except in the neighborliood. of fortilied places, these 
 were multiplied everywhere. It was the same as in 
 France during the time of the Normans;'''' and 
 France was never so weak as when aU her towns 
 were surrounded by walls. 
 
 Thus, the numerous fortifications which Justinian 
 erected — the names of which cover entire pages in 
 the work of Procopius — are only to be regarded as 
 monuments of the weakness of the empire. 
 
 " And of the EnRlish. 
 
BAKEB.] OF THE ROMANS. 427 
 
 NOTE BY THE TEANSLATOE. 
 
 In the whole course of the preceding chapter 
 Montesquieu places a very low estimate upon Justin- 
 ian, and accords him no credit whatever. A more 
 accurate measure of justice would appear to be that, 
 whilst in many respects the reign of this monarch 
 should be condemned as weak, cruel, and despicable, 
 his fame, on the other hand, should be regarded as 
 in some degree redeemed by the care which he took 
 — or allowed to be taken — to embody and perpetuate 
 the Laws of the empire. The Code, the Pandects, 
 and the Institutes are immortal monuments of ancient 
 law; they constitute the principal nexus through 
 which the juridical ideas of the Eomans are connect- 
 ed in one unbroken whole with the juridical ideas 
 of modern societies ; and thus it is that the otherwise 
 soiled and dishonored name of Justinian is irrevo- 
 cably associated with a body of law the sphere of 
 whose authority or influence is coextensive with the 
 ancient and the present limits of civilization. 
 
 No conception of the " Grandeur " of the Eomans 
 can be complete which does not include some estimate 
 
^28 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakeb. 
 
 of the comparative value of tlieir system of law on 
 the plane of universal history. It is remarkable that 
 Montesquieu — himself a lawyer and a judge — should 
 have made so capital an omission. 
 
 In the career of a great nation, certain conse- 
 quences of an exceptional character ought to be found 
 connected with an exceptionally wide range of do- 
 minion and power. 
 
 One of the results of the prodigious expansion of 
 the Kepublic and Empire, and the consequent magni- 
 tude and number of the social facts which entered 
 into the aggregate of the Roman national life, was 
 that the intellectual development of Rome, in the 
 province of historical thought, was probably superior 
 to that of Greece herself.' 
 
 Another result of the same general cause was 
 that, in the province of law, the Eomans stood be- 
 yond the reach of comparison with any other ancient 
 people. Progressively absorbing as they did all the 
 civilized nations of Europe, Africa, and Southwest- 
 ern Asia, their genius for administration and civil 
 rule, lite their power in arms, became supreme. 
 Their system of law was more thoroughly cogitated, 
 more composite and mature, more universal in the 
 grasp of its principles, and more rational in the com- 
 position of its parts into a single whole, than any 
 other juridical system known to antiquity; and the 
 resiilt is that the purely legal influence exerted by 
 
 ' See Comte'a PhUosopliie Positive, Paris, 1S69, torn, v, p. 194. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 429 
 
 the Roman law upon modern societies is mucli great- 
 er tlian that which comes from all other ancient 
 sources together. 
 
 The law of the Romans — like their empire — had 
 its infancy, its growth, its culmination, and decline. 
 Combining the analysis of Gibbon and the prefatory 
 emendation thereof made by Professor Hugo, the 
 history of Roman jurisprudence may be divided into 
 four periods, quite distinct in their general charac- 
 ter, and differing but little in length of time. 
 
 The first period — extending from the foundation 
 of the city to the adoption of the Twelve Tables — 
 embraces about 303 years ; the second — extending 
 from the adoption of the Twelve Tables to the T)irth 
 of Cicero — ^includes 348 years; the third — extending 
 from the birth , of Cicero to the close of the reign 
 of Alexander Severus — embraces 342 years ; and the 
 fourth — extending from the 'tieath of Alexander 
 Severus to the death of Justinian — covers a space of 
 330 years. The first of these periods is Hugo's ; the 
 last three, Gibbon's.' 
 
 1. During the first of these epochs the Roman 
 law was in its stage of semi-savage infancy. Tow- 
 ards the close of the epoch it may have been in 
 some part written; but it certainly consisted mainly 
 of unwritten customs down to the end of the pe- 
 riod. The Jus Papirianum — so named from its 
 
 ' See Gibbon's Rome, N. Y., 1851, vol. iy, pp. 319, 320, and Wam- 
 konig's note on p. 320. 
 
430 GKANDEUE AND DECADENCE [bakes. 
 
 reputed compiler, Papirius — was the most ancient 
 written collection of Koman law for wMch ttere is 
 any claim; and it is supposed to date from about 
 the time of the expulsion of the kings. Its authen- 
 ticity is doubted by Gibbon, and asserted by ISTie- 
 buhr. Among the Komans, as among other ancient 
 nations, the date of the first employment of letters 
 by the legislator is vague and indeterminate ; and 
 the very fact that the case is so marks the doubt- - 
 ful interval as one during which both the manners 
 and the laws of the nation were yet in a very rude 
 state." 
 
 2. At the opening of the second epoch the law 
 was fixed in a written code — that is, in the famous 
 Twelve Tables — which, according to the theory of 
 the Koman lawyers, as tersely expressed by Livy, 
 became "the fountain of all pubhc and all private 
 rights" — fons omnis 2)utUci, privaUque juris. In 
 the entire course of this epoch there is yet no name 
 which rises to the first order of eminence in connec- 
 tion with the law as a science apart. Jurisprudence 
 was not yet sufficiently differentiated from arms to 
 admit of this; and Cato the Censor may be taken as 
 the typical representative of the jurisconsults of the 
 period — proud, ignorant, narrow, and barren. 
 
 3. The third epoch was — to use the words of 
 Gribbon — "the learned and splendid age of juris- 
 prudence." It is during this period that we find al- 
 
 ' Idem, p. 302, and notes ; ArnoM'a History of Rome, oh. xiy. 
 
KOiE.] OF THE ROMANS. 431 
 
 most the whole of the jurisconsults of the highest 
 order — Quintus Mucius, Cervidius Scsevola, Servius 
 Sulpitius, Gaius, Papinian, Paulus, and Ulpian. 
 
 4. The fourth epoch was one of decline in the 
 law, and it is only adorned by a solitary name 
 which may claim eminence of the first order — ^that 
 of Tribonian, the presiding genius of the Code, the 
 Pandects, and the Institutes, of Justinian. 
 
 In allusion to the studies of the-'Koman lawyers, 
 and in view of "the multitude of voluminous civil- 
 ians," Gibbon thinks " it is evident that such studies 
 may be pursued, and such works may be performed, 
 with a common share of judgment, experience, 
 and industry." "The genius of Cicero and Vir- 
 gil," he adds, "was more sensibly felt, as each re- 
 volving age had been found incapable of producing 
 a similar or a second ; but the most eminent teachers 
 of the law were assured of leaving disciples equal or 
 superior to themselves in merit and reputation." * 
 
 This opinion of Gibbon appears to be open to 
 criticism. Diligent dullness, dealing with the law as 
 an empirical art, may indeed do much in a purely. 
 practical way; and the reputations thus made are as 
 numerous as they are short-lived and cheap. But, 
 supreme rational intelligence is probably as rare in 
 the domain of the law as it is in other fields of 
 thought; and the Koman jurists who have been set 
 apart as first-class by the common consent of the 
 
 * Vol. iv, p. 321. 
 
432 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 learned, in all countries are scarcely more numerous 
 than tlie great Latin poets and orators. 
 
 Viewed as a single phenomenon, developing in 
 time, the Eoman law is deeply marked by two fun- 
 damental characters. On the one hand, it is largely 
 made up of "survivals" from the barbarous state of 
 society in which it took its origin ; and on the other, 
 it gradually drew to itself and appropriated more 
 enlightened principles of justice. 
 
 Of the first sort, we have good illustrations in 
 the power which the law gave to the father to sell 
 his children or to put them to death; in the like 
 power, coupled with the one-sided and absolute lib- 
 erty of divorce, which it gave to the husband over 
 the wife ; in the power of life and death which it 
 gave to the master over his slaves ; and in the power 
 which it conferred upon creditors either to cut in 
 pieces the body of their insolvent debtor, or to sell 
 him into slavery among foreigners. These, and sim- 
 ilar elements of Eoman law, are striking instances of 
 savage "survival," carried along by the state in its 
 advance from its rude primitive condition, and grad- 
 ually falling into desuetude as its civilization im- 
 proved.' 
 
 Of the second sort, we have a fine illustration in 
 the capital legal conception that all human law ought 
 
 'Table IV, 1; Cooper's Justinian, Phila., 1812, p. 411; Table IIT, 
 6 ; Gibbon's Some, vol. iv, pp. 348, S'72, and notes 106 and 178 to ch. 
 
NOTE.] OP THE KOMANS. 433 
 
 to be brought into conformity with the law of nat- 
 ure — a recognition of the " Higher Law " which laid 
 at the foundation of the great and solid jural prog- 
 ress which the Eomans made. It may be added that, 
 as regards liberty, the theory of the Eoman law was 
 even superior to the theories of the most eminent of 
 the Greek philosophers. Plato, in his ideal Eepuhlic, 
 simply recommends— for an expedient reason— that 
 there should be no slaves of Hellenic blood. Aristo- 
 tle regards liberty and slavery as conditioned upon 
 capacity, — nature, in his view, designing some men 
 for a state of slavery, and others for a state of free- 
 dom. But the Roman lawyers rose to the simple 
 and uniform conception that, by the Law of Ifature, 
 Liberty is the status of all men, and that slavery, in 
 contravention of this law, derived its origin from the 
 usages of war; "for wars ensued, and from these 
 sprang captivity and slavery, which are contrary to 
 natural justice; for by the law of nature all men 
 are bom free."" 
 
 These great jural conceptions — ^by which the Law 
 of Nature is held up as the ideal standard of all 
 legal excellence, and by which that law is inter- 
 preted as the perpetual sanction of Universal Lib- 
 erty — must take their place among the most pre- 
 cious products of civilization; and they have exerted 
 
 ' Bella etenim oria sunt, el captivilates secuics, et servitwfes, quae sun 
 naiuralijw'i conirarim : jure enim nalurali omnes Jwrmnes ah initio liheri 
 nascehantur. Inst, lib. i, tit. ii, 2. 
 19 
 
434 
 
 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakee. 
 
 a very deep and widespread influence upon modern 
 societies.' 
 
 Thus, in the most comprehensive view which can 
 be taken of the subject, Eoman law is to be regarded 
 as a connecting link between the ancient Barbarism 
 of Europe and modem Civilization. TJnder the one 
 relation, it participates largely of the character im- 
 pressed upon it by its rude origin ; under the other, 
 it anticipates much of what is best in modern law. 
 Taken in connection with what went before, and what 
 has come after, this system of law represents the 
 middle stage of a vast progressive movement, of 
 which the first stage is represented by the archaic 
 legal ideas of primitive Europe, and the last by the 
 riper legal development of existing societies. 
 
 ' See Maine's Ancient Law, N. Y., 1864, pp. 73, 1i ; Jowett's Plato, 
 N. T., 1871, vol. ii, p. 296; Aristotle's Poliiics, Book I, chs. 2, 4, B, 
 and 6. 
 
BONiESQuiEU.] OF THE ROMANS. 435 
 
 CHAPTEE XXI. 
 
 DISOEDEES OF THE EASTEEN EMPIEE. 
 
 At the time whieli we have now reached, the Per- 
 sians were in a better condition than the Romans. 
 They had little to fear from the nations of the I^orth,' 
 for they were separated from the latter by that part 
 of Mount Taurus which extends between the Caspian 
 and the Pontus-Euxine ; and this mountain-chain was 
 only traversed by a single narrow gap, which was 
 closed by a gate ' and held by the Persians. This was 
 the only route by which cavalry could pass. In at- 
 tempting to penetrate at any other point, the barba- 
 rians were compelled to descend precipices, and thus 
 to abandon their horses, which constituted their en- 
 tire force ; and they were-et-ill further arrested by the 
 Araxes, a deep river flowing from west to east, the 
 passes of which were easily defended.' 
 
 In addition to this, the Persians were quiet on 
 their eastern frontier; they were bounded on the 
 south by the sea; and they could readily keep alive 
 
 ' The Huns. ' The Caspian gates. 
 
 ' Peocopius, War of (lie Persians, lib. i. 
 
436 GKANDEUK AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 the divisions which existed among the Arabic princes, 
 whose only thought was to pillage each other. Prop- 
 erly speaking, therefore, they had no enemy but the 
 Romans. " "We know," said an embassador of Hormis- 
 das, " that the Romans are occupied with many wars, 
 and have to contend against nearly all nations; they 
 know, on the contrary, that we have no wars except 
 with themselves." * ' 
 
 In proportion as the Romans had neglected, the 
 Persians had cultivated, the military art. " The Per- 
 sians," said Belisarius to his soldiers, " do not surpass 
 you in courage ; they only have the advantage of you 
 in discipline." '■ They had acquired the same superi- 
 ority in negotiation as in war. Under pretext that 
 they maintained a garrison at the Caspian gates, they 
 demanded tribute of the Romans — as if it did not 
 devolve upon each nation to guard its own frontiers. 
 They exacted pay for peace, for suspensions of arms, 
 for the time consumed in negotiations, and for the 
 time spent in war. 
 
 The Avars having crossed the Danube, the Ro- 
 mans, most of the time, had no troops to oppose them ; 
 
 ' Mnbassies of Mmmider. 
 
 ' Hormisdas was a Persian prince, who became a fugitive, and wa3 
 contemporary with Constantine, Constantius, and Julian. — TnANSLATOB. 
 
 ' In riew of the fact that these so-called Romans were still engaged in 
 so many more wars than the Persians, it may seem strange that the latter 
 had come to be superior to the former in military discipline ; the expla- 
 nation lies in the fact that the old Roman stock, discipline, and spirit, had 
 well-nigh disappeared, and that the material of the armies of the empire 
 was greatly iuf jrior to what it had been in former times. — Translator. 
 
CHAP. XXI.] OF THE ROMANS. 437 
 
 and, occupied as they were with the Persians when it 
 was necessary to meet the Avars, and with the Avars 
 when it was necessary to arrest the Persians, they 
 were again forced to subnait to a tribute; and thus 
 the majesty of the empire was tarnished before the 
 eyes of all nations. 
 
 The emperors Justin, Tiberius, and Maurice'' la- 
 bored with care in defence of their country. The last 
 possessed virtues ; but these were debased by an ava- 
 rice which was almost inconceivable in a great prince. 
 For a half piece of silver per head the king of the 
 Avars offered to return to him the prisoners he had 
 taken; and, on his refusal, the Avar caused the pris- 
 oners to be massacred. The Koman army, indignant 
 at this act of cruel neglect, revolted. The greens 
 being in a state of revolt at the same time, a centu- 
 rion, named Phocas, was elevated to the empire ; and 
 the new emperor caused Maurice and his children to 
 be put to death. 
 
 The history of the Greek empire — for it is thus 
 that the Koman empire is named for the future — is 
 nothing but a tissue of revolts, seditions, and perfidies. 
 The subjects of the empire had not so much as an idea 
 of the fidelity which is due to princes ; and the succes- 
 sion of the emperors was so interrupted that the title 
 oi porphyrogenitus' — that is to say, born in the apart- 
 
 ' These were immediate successors of Justinian. — Translatok. 
 ' [This word, derived from the Greek, signifies born in tlie pur- 
 pk. (P.)] 
 
438 GEANDEUE AND DECADENCE [MONiESQniEiJ. 
 
 ment in wlucli the empresses were accouched — was 
 a title of distinction which few of the princes of the 
 different imperial families were able to assume. 
 
 All instrumentalities were good for the attainment 
 of the empire. The imperial power was disposed of 
 by the army, the clergy, the senate, the people of 
 the country, the people of Constantinople, and the 
 people of other cities. 
 
 The Christian religion having become dominant, 
 many heresies grew up which it was necessary to con- 
 demn. Arius having denied the divinity of the 
 "Word, the Macedonians the divinity of the Holy 
 Ghost, Nestorius the unity of the person of Jesus 
 Christ, Eutyches his two natures, and the Monothe- 
 lites his two wills, it became necessary to assemble 
 councils against them ; but, the decisions of these 
 councils not having been at once universally re- 
 ceived, many emperors were seduced into the accept- 
 ance of condemned errors. And as there had never 
 been a nation which hated heretics as violently 
 as did the Greeks — ^who believed themselves to be 
 polluted if they spoke to or dwelt with a heretic 
 — it thus came to pass that many emperors lost the 
 affection of their subjects ; and the people fell into 
 the habit of thinking that princes, who were so often 
 rebels against God, could not have been chosen by 
 Providence to govern them. 
 
 A certain opinion, derived from the idea that it 
 was not proper to shed the blood of Christians, and 
 
CHAP. XXI.] OP THE ROMANS. 439 
 
 wMcli became more firmly established after the ap- 
 pearance of Mohammedanism, led to the infliction 
 of light punishments for such crimes as did not di- 
 rectly involve the interests of religion. Justice was 
 content with putting out the eyes, or cutting off the 
 nose or hair, or with mutilating in some manner 
 the persons of those who had excited a revolt or at- 
 tempted the life of 'the prince.' Such acts could 
 be committed without danger, and even without 
 courage." 
 
 A certain respect for the imperial ornaments 
 caused the people to turn their eyes at once upon 
 those who dared to assume them. It was a crime 
 to wear, or to have in one's house, stuffs of a purple 
 color; but immediately a man clothed himself in 
 this color he was followed, the regard of the people 
 attaching to the regalia rather than to the person. 
 
 Ambition was still further stimulated by a strange 
 mania which prevailed during these times. There 
 was hardly any considerable man towards whom 
 
 ' Zeno contributed much to establish this relaxation of punishments. 
 See Malohug, Byzantine History^ m the Excerpt of the Embassies. 
 
 '° I am unable to see immunity from danger where the offender, (or 
 the holder of coveted power,) was liable to have his nose cut off, his 
 tongue cut out, or his eyes seared with a red-hot iron. The degen- 
 erate Greeks did these things with great facility. The emperor Philip- 
 picua was taken in a drunken sleep at noonday, and " bound, blinded, 
 and deposed, before he was sensible of his danger." Martina and He- 
 racleonas — the widow and the son of the emperor Heraclius — were con- 
 demned by the senate, the one to lose her tonffiie, the other his nose : not 
 very light punishments, to be sure ! (See Gibbon's Some, toI. iv, pp. 
 673, 674, 581.)— Tbanslatob. 
 
440 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE , [montesquieu. 
 
 some prediction did not point wUch promised him 
 the empire. 
 
 The maladies of the human mind do not easily 
 rectify themselves. Among the Christians judicial 
 astrology and the art of predicting the iutme by 
 means of objects seen in a basin of water had suc- 
 ceeded the abolished Pagan art of predicting by the 
 entrails of victims or by the flight of birds." As 
 vain predictions supplied the motive for most of the 
 rash enterprises of private individuals, so they were 
 deemed to constitute the wisdom of the counsel of 
 princes. 
 
 As the misfortunes of the empire increased day 
 by day, men were naturally led to attribute the re- 
 verses which befell in time of war, and the shameful 
 treaties which were made in time of peace, to the 
 bad conduct of those who governed. 
 
 Eevolutions gave rise to revolutions, and effects 
 became causes. As the Greeks had seen so many 
 different families pass successively to the throne, they 
 were attached to none ; and, as fortune had taken 
 emperors from all conditions in life, there was no 
 birth 80 low, or merit so slender, as to extinguish 
 the hope of attaining the empire. 
 
 Many examples, approved by a nation, form its 
 general spirit and constitute its manners ; and these 
 reign as imperiously as laws. 
 
 It would seem that great enterprises may be more 
 " See NiCETAS, Life of Andronicus Comnenus. 
 
CHAP. XXI.] OF THE ROMANS. 441 
 
 difficult to manage among us than they were among 
 the ancients. -They can no longer be conducted with 
 much concealment; for the communication which 
 now exists between nations is such that every prince 
 has ministers at the courts of all others, and is liable 
 to find betrayers in every cabinet. 
 
 The introduction of the postal service has caused 
 news to fly with rapidity, and to diffuse itself every- 
 where. 
 
 As great enterprises cannot be carried on with- 
 out money, and as, since the introduction of bills of 
 exchange, merchants are masters of that, their affairs 
 are very often connected with secrets of state, and 
 they neglect no means of penetrating them. 
 
 ' Yariations in the value of exchange, which take 
 place without any known cause, prompt many persons 
 to enquire for the secret, and they find it in the end. 
 
 The invention of printing, which has placed 
 books in the hands of everybody ; the discovery of 
 the art of engraving, which has rendered geographi- 
 cal maps so common; and, finally, the establishment 
 of political journals — constitute a sufficient means of 
 intelligence upon general interests to enable every 
 individual to become all the more easily enlightened 
 upon matters which are secret. 
 
 State conspiracies have become difficult ; for, since 
 the introduction of the postal service, all particular 
 secrets are within the power of the public." 
 
 ■' This statement, unless taken with very considerable qualification, 
 
442 GEANDEUE AND DECADENCE [montesqtjieu. 
 
 Princes can act with promptitude, for they hold 
 the forces of the state in their hands; conspirators 
 are obliged to act slowly, for they are wanting in all 
 sorts of resources; but at the present time, when 
 everything is brought to light with more facility and 
 promptness, the least loss of time in the preparation 
 of a conspiracy is sufficient for its discovery." 
 
 is much more in harmony with the past political genius of France than 
 it is with the ideas of Englishmen and Americans. — Translator. 
 
 '' The Nihilistic conspirators of Eussia seem to baffle all the im- 
 proTed modern appliances for detection to which Montesquieu refers — 
 and more besides. — Translatos. 
 
BAKER.] OF THE ROMANS. 443 
 
 NOTE BY THE TKANSLATOE. 
 
 DoimTLESs it is true, as Montesqiiieu suggests, 
 that enterprises of a secret character were, as a gen- 
 eral rule, much more easily conducted to a successful 
 issue in ancient than they are in modem times. Eut 
 why he should dignify undertakings of this kind 
 with the distinction of "great enterprises" {grandes 
 entreprises) is not very apparent. The secret, crimi- 
 nal intrigues of Roman praetorians or Greek courtiers, 
 by -which the empire was so often transferred sud- 
 denly from one tyrant to another, must take their 
 place among the most ignoble transactions of human 
 history ; and nothing that is ignoble should be ac- 
 counted great. 
 
 All such enterprises, however, as are truly great, 
 are executed with much more facility in modern 
 than they were in ancient times — as may be readily 
 shown. 
 
 1. Our superior knowledge of the forces of na- 
 ture, combined with our superior appliances for the 
 utilization of these forces, imparts to modern times 
 a much larger and more diversified store of physical 
 
444 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakee. 
 
 resources than had place in the societies of an- 
 tiquity. 
 
 2. The mental results which enter into our pres- 
 ent civilization being at once greater in their variety 
 and sum, and more extensively distributed, it thence 
 follows that our time is also more richly endowed 
 with intellectual resources. 
 
 3. The beneficial reflex action of the two preced- 
 ing elements upon man's moral sentiments — aided by 
 the direct influence of the immense superiority of 
 Christianity over the polytheism of ancient times — 
 has had the efEect furthermore of giving to modern 
 societies a greater store of moral resowrces. 
 
 From these premises it would seem to follow : 
 
 Firstly, that every species of enterprise which is 
 in accord with the interests of civilization can now 
 be dispatched with much more promptness and ease' 
 than was possible in ancient times. 
 
 Secondly, that those enterprises which depend 
 upon secrecy and concealment — and which, therefore, 
 as a class, carry with them some odor of moral sus- 
 picion — are, as a rule, more difficult to manage under 
 the broad lights of the present day than they were 
 among the ancients. 
 
 In estimating the general movement of history, 
 the double conclusion just reached is of very high 
 rational value. As the world's civilization develops, 
 its forces and its motives become not only more 
 efficient^ but also more overt. 
 
MONTESQUIEU.] OF THE ROMANS. 445 
 
 OHAPTEE XXII. 
 
 WEAKNESS OF THE EASTEEN EMPIRE. 
 
 Amid the confusion of things, Phocas being but 
 badly established upon the throne of the East, He- 
 raelius came from Africa and caused him to be put 
 to death. The new emperor found the provinces in- 
 vaded and the legions destroyed. 
 
 Scarcely had he been able in some degree to re- 
 store the affairs of the state when the Arabs issued 
 from their own country, for the purpose of extend- 
 ing the religion and the empire which Mohammed 
 had founded with the same hand. 
 
 N"ever was progress so rapid. They at once con- 
 quered Syria, Palestine, Egypt, Africa, and invaded 
 Persia. 
 
 God permitted that his religion should cease to 
 be dominant in many countries ; not that he had aban- 
 doned it, but because, whether in a state of glory or 
 in a state of external humiliation, it is always equally 
 capable of producing its natural effect — the sanctifi- 
 cation of the soul. 
 
 The prosperity of religion is different from the 
 
446 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [MONTESQniED. 
 
 prosperity of empires. A celebrated writer says it is 
 a very small affliction to be ill, for the reason, that 
 sufEering is the true state of the Christian.' We 
 might even say that the times of the humiliation of 
 the Church — the times of her dispersion, of the de- 
 struction of her temples, and the sufferings of her 
 martyrs — ^have been the times of her glory ; and that, 
 when in the eyes of the world she has appeared to 
 triumph, she has ordinarily been in a state of abase- 
 ment. 
 
 In order to explain the famous event of the con- 
 quest of so many nations by the Arabs, it is not 
 necessary that we should have recourse to enthusiasm 
 alone. The Saracens had long been distinguished 
 among the auxiliaries of the Komans and the Per- 
 sians. They and the Osroenians ° were the best 
 archers in the world. Alexander Severus and Maxi- 
 min engaged as many of them as they could in their 
 service, and employed them with great success against 
 the Germans, whom they destroyed at a distance ; 
 and, during the reign of Valens, the Goths could not 
 resist them.' In short, they were, at that time, the 
 best cavalry in the world. 
 
 We have said that among the Eomans the legions 
 
 ' Pascal : "La maladie est I'etat nature! des Chretiens," etc. (Pemecs 
 diverses sur la relic/ion, Ixxxv.) — Translator. 
 
 ' The people so called dwelt in the northern part of Mesopotamia ; 
 Edessa and Nisibis were their principal cities, the former being their 
 capital. (Gibbon's Rome, vol. i, pp. 242, 243.) — Teanslatob. 
 
 ' ZosiMus, lib. iv. 
 
CHAP. XXII.] OF THE ROMANS. 447 
 
 of Earope were superior to the legions of Asia. The 
 case was wholly the contrary in respect to cavalry. 
 I speak of the cavalry of the Parthians, the Osroe- 
 nians, and the Saracens. It was this that arrested 
 the conquests of the Eomans; for, after the time of 
 Antiochus, a new Tartar people, whose cavalry was 
 unequalled, had seized high Asia. 
 
 This cavalry was heavy ; * that of Europe light 
 — a state of case which is conapletely reversed at the 
 present day. Holland and Friesland — so to speak — 
 were not yet made,' and Germany was covered with 
 forests, lakes, and morasses, and was consequently a 
 country in which cavalry could be of little service. 
 
 Since a regular course has been given to the great 
 rivers, these morasses have disappeared, and Germany 
 has changed its face. The works of Yalentinian on 
 the ISTecker, and those of the Komans on the Ehine," 
 effected many changes;' and, commerce being intro- 
 duced, those countries which had not formerly pro- 
 duced horses now produced them — and thus they 
 came into use.' 
 
 ■* See what Zosimus, lib. i, says respecting the cavalry of Aurelian, 
 and that of Palmyra ; see also Ammianus Marcellinus on the cavalry of 
 the Persians. 
 
 ' These counti-ies consisted for the most part of submerged lands, 
 which art has rendered fit for the habitation of man. 
 
 ' See Ammianus Marcellinus, lib. xxvii. 
 
 ' The climate of these regions is not now so cold as the ancients re- 
 port it to have been. 
 
 * Caesar says the horses of the Germans were small and shabby. 
 {Gallic War, Book IV, ch. ii.) And Tacitus, on the Manners of the Ger- 
 mans, says : Germanm pecorum fecunda, sed plerague improcera. 
 
448 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 Constantine, the son of Heraclius, having been 
 poisoned, and his son Constantine ° having been killed 
 in Sicily, Constantine Pogonatus, the eldest son of 
 the latter, succeeded to the empire." Being assem- 
 bled, the grandees of the Eastern provinces desired 
 to have the two brothers of the reigning sovereign 
 crowned also — maintaining that, since it was neces- 
 sary to believe in the Trinity, it was alike reasonable 
 to have three emperors. 
 
 The history of the Greek empire is full of such 
 passages. Feebleness of mind having become the 
 characteristic of the nation, there was no longer any 
 wisdom in affairs ; and we see disorders without cause 
 and revolutions without motives. 
 
 An universal bigotry depressed the courage of the 
 people and stupefied the whole empire. Constanti- 
 nople was, properly speaking, the only place in the 
 East in which Christianity became dominant ; and the 
 cowardice, the indolence, and effeminacy of Asiatic 
 life were blended with devotion. Among a thousand 
 examples I will only notice that of Philippicus — the 
 general of the emperor Maurice — who, being on the 
 eve of engaging in battle, fell to weeping at the 
 thought of the great number of people who were 
 about to be killed." 
 
 There were tears of a very different sort — those 
 
 ' The name here should be Constans II. fSee Gibbon's Fame, vol. 
 iv, p. 674.) — Tkanslator. 
 
 " ZoNABAS, Idfe of Constantine the Bearded. 
 
 " TlieopJiylaclv,s, lib. ii, ch. iii; History of the Emperor Maurice. 
 
CHAP. XXII.] OF THE ROMANS. 449 
 
 of the Arabs, who wept from the grief which they 
 felt because their general had agreed to a truce 
 which interrupted the shedding of Christian blood."' 
 
 There is a total difEerence between an army of 
 fanatics and an army of bigots. "We have seen this 
 illustrated in the course of a famous revolution which 
 has taken place in modern times, wherein the army 
 of Cromwell was like that of the Arabs, and the 
 armies of Ireland and Scotland like those of the 
 Greeks of the Eastern empire. 
 
 A gross superstition — which debases the human 
 mind as much as religion elevates it — placed all the 
 virtues and all the hopes of man in an ignorant and 
 stupid regard for images; and we see generals raise 
 a siege," and loose a city," in order to obtain a relic. 
 
 Under the Greek empire, the Christian religion 
 degenerated until it reached the same condition in 
 which it was found in our own day among the Mus- 
 covites, before Peter I had given a new birth to that 
 nation, and introduced more changes in the state 
 which he governed than conquerors have done in 
 those which they have usurped. 
 
 It is easy to believe that the Greeks fell into a 
 species of idolatry. We can have no suspicion that 
 either the Italians or the Germans of that time were 
 but moderately attached to external worship ; and yet, 
 
 " M. Ockley's History of (lie Conqiiest of Syna, Persia, and Egypt, by 
 the Saracens. 
 
 " ZoNAEAS, lAfe of Romanus Lecaperms. 
 " NiCETAS, lAfe of John Comnenus. 
 
450 GKANDEUR AND DECADENCE [MONiESQDiEtr. 
 
 when the Greek historians speak of the contempt of 
 these nations for relics and images, we would say we 
 were listening to our own controversialists, who heat 
 themselres against Calvin. "When the Germans were 
 on their way to the Holy Land, Mcetas says the Ar- 
 menians received them as friends, for the reason that 
 they did not adore images ; but if, in the Greek way 
 of thinking, the Italians and the Germans did not 
 sufficiently worship images, what must have been the 
 enormity of their own idolatry ? 
 
 There was a strong movement in the East towards 
 the accomplishment of nearly the same revolution as 
 that which took place about two hundred years ago 
 in the "West — when, after the revival of letters, as 
 men began to realize the abuses and the disorders 
 into which they had fallen, all sought a remedy for 
 the evil, whilst those who were too bold and in- 
 tractable rent the Church asunder instead of reform- 
 ing it." 
 
 Leo the Isaurian, Constantino Copronymns, and 
 Leo his son, made war upon the images ; and, after 
 the worship of them had been re-established by the 
 empress Irene, it was again abolished by Leo the 
 Armenian, Michael the Stammerer, and Theophilus. 
 These princes believed that they could not moderate 
 without destroying the worship of images. They 
 made war upon the monks, who were hurtful to the 
 
 " Reference is here made to the Reformation of the sixteenth cen- 
 tury. See my Note at the end of this chapter. — Translator. 
 
CHAP, xzii.] OF THE ROMANS. 451 
 
 state;" and, always resorting to extreme measures, 
 they determined to exterminate them by the sword, 
 instead of seeking to regulate them. 
 
 Accused of idolatry by the partisans of the new 
 ideas, the monks " charged the accusers in their turn 
 with the practice of magic;" and, pointing out to 
 the people the churches despoiled of their images, 
 and of all that had heretofore rendered them objects 
 of popular veneration, they stimulated the opinion 
 in the mind of the multitude that these once holy 
 edifices had become temples for the worship of de- 
 mons. 
 
 The reason why the quarrel about images was so 
 violent, and that it finally became impossible for sen- 
 sible men to propose a moderate worship, was that 
 the controversy was connected with exceedingly deli- 
 cate interests. It was a question of power; and the 
 monks having usurped this, they could neither extend 
 it nor retain it without adding incessantly to that ex- 
 ternal worship of which they had made themselves 
 partisans. It was for this reason that the wars against 
 the images were always wars against the monks, and 
 
 " Long previously, Valens had made a law compelling monks to serve 
 in time of war ; and he put to death all who did not obey. (Joknandes, 
 De Hegn. success. ; and law xxvi, Cod. de JDceur.) 
 
 " Nothing that is here said in relation to the Greek monks has any 
 bearing upon the monastic institution itself ; for we cannot say that a 
 thing may not be good, because at certain times, or in some countries, it 
 has been abused. 
 
 " Leo the Grammarias, Life of Leo the Armenian, Life of Theophi- 
 his. See Suidas, at the article Constantine, son of Leo. 
 
^52 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [montesqdieu. 
 
 that, when the latter had succeeded in maintaining 
 the images, their power no longer had any limits. 
 
 A question arose now which we find discussed 
 some centuries later in the quarrel which took place 
 between Barlaam and Acindynus on the one hand 
 and the monks on the other, and which continued 
 to torment the empire down to the time of its de- 
 struction. It became a subject of dispute whether 
 the light which appeared around Jesus Christ on 
 Tabor was created or uncreated. At bottom, the 
 monks did not care whether it was the one or the 
 other ; but, as Barlaam attacked them directly, it was 
 necessary that the light in question should be un- 
 created. 
 
 The war which the iconoclastic emperors waged 
 against the monks led in some degree to the resump- 
 tion of the principles of government, to the employ- 
 ment of the public revenues in favor of the public, 
 and, in short, to the removal of the shackles which 
 had been imposed upon the state. 
 
 "When I think of the profound ignorance in which 
 the Greek clergy plunged the laity, I cannot but 
 compare this priesthood with those Scythians of whom 
 Herodotus speaks, who put out the eyes of their 
 slaves, in order that nothing might distract their at- 
 tention, and thus interrupt them while churning their 
 master's milk." 
 
 The empress Theodora re-established the images, 
 " Book IV. 
 
CHAP.' XXII.] OF THE ROMANS. 453 
 
 and the monks recommenced the abuse of the popu- 
 lar piety." They went so far as to oppress even the 
 secular clergy itself ; they appropriated all the great 
 sees ; " and, little by little, they excluded all the 
 ecclesiastics of the episcopate. It was this that ren- 
 dered this clergy intolerable; and if we compare it 
 with the Latin clergy — if we compare the conduct of 
 the Popes with that of the Patriarchs of Constanti- 
 nople — we shall see men on the one hand who were 
 as wise as the others were wanting in sense." 
 
 There is a strange inconsistency in the human 
 mind. The ministers of religion among the early 
 Eomans were not excluded from offices or from civil 
 society, and yet they embarrassed themselves but little 
 with affairs. When the Christian religion was first 
 established, the ecclesiastics — who were more separated 
 than the early Eoman priesthood from the affairs 
 of the world — mingled with moderation in secular 
 matters; but during the decay of the empire, when 
 monks had come to be the only clergy, these men 
 — although destined by a profession still more strict 
 to fly from and to shun temporal affairs — embraced 
 every occasion to take part in them. They filled 
 the empire with their noise, and incessantly agitated 
 
 ™ This Theodora wag the widow of the emperor Theophilus, the most 
 violent of the Iconoclasts. Her re-establishment of image worship — A. D. 
 842— was final. The struggle had lasted something more than a hundred 
 years, having begun about the year a. d. 136, during the reign of Leo 
 the Isaurian. (See Gibbon's Rome, vol. v, pp. 1-39.) — Tkanslatoe. 
 
 " See Pachymer, lib. viii. 
 
 " See my Note at the end of this chapter. — Tkasslator. 
 
454 GRANDEUK AND DECADENCE [MONTESQCiEr. 
 
 the world wMcli they had abandoned. No affair of 
 state, no war, no truce, no negotiation, no marriage 
 could be conducted except through the ministration 
 of monks. The councils of the prince were full of 
 them, and the assemblies of the nation were almost 
 wholly composed of them. 
 
 It is difficult to realize the extent of the evil 
 which resulted from this ascendency of the monks. 
 They enfeebled the minds of the emperors, and caused 
 them to do even excellent things in an imprudent 
 manner. "Whilst Basil employed the soldiers of his 
 navy in building a church to St. Michael, he left the 
 Saracens to piUage Sicily and to capture Syracuse ; and 
 Leo, his successor, who put his fleet to the same use, left 
 them to occupy Tauromenium and the isle of Lemnos." 
 
 Andronicus Palseologus abandoned his navy, for 
 the reason that he was assured that God was so high- 
 ly pleased with his zeal for the peace of the Church 
 that his enemies would not dare to attack him. This 
 emperor also feared that God would demand of him 
 an account for the time which he gave to the gov- 
 ernment of his state, and which he thus robbed from 
 spiritual affairs." 
 
 The Greeks, who were great talkers, great dis- 
 putants, and natural sophists, never ceased to embroil 
 religion in controversies." 
 
 ^' ZoNAEAS and Nicephokus, life of Basil, and of Leo. 
 
 '* Pachtmee, lib. vii. 
 
 *' We can readily trace the old ■ Greek genius of the classical ages — 
 
CHAP, xxu.] OF THE ROMANS. 455 
 
 As the monks possessed great credit witli the 
 court — which was always the more feeble as it grew 
 to be more corrupt — it thence fell out that the monks 
 and the court mutually corrupted each other, and that 
 the distemper of the state was lodged in both. The 
 result was that the entire attention of the emperors 
 was monopolized, sometimes in the work of calming, 
 often in the work of irritating, theological disputes — 
 which, as has always been observed, become more 
 violent in proportion as they are more frivolous." 
 
 Michael Palseologus — whose reign was so much 
 agitated by religious disputes — seeing the frightful 
 ravages which were committed by the Turks in Asia, 
 exclaimed, with a sigh, that the rash zeal of certain 
 persons — -who by decrying his conduct had excited 
 his subjects against him — ^had compelled him to de- 
 vote his whole care to his own preservation, and to 
 abandon the provinces to ruin. "I have contented 
 myself," said he, "with providing for these distant 
 parts of the empire through the ministration of gov- 
 
 however modified and enfeebled — in the religious controversiea of tlie 
 Eastern empire. We detect the same penchant for abstract thinldng and 
 for refined and subtle distinctions. One important consequence of this 
 characteristic of the Greek intellect was that much the greater part of 
 the numerous speculative disputes, which for a long time vexed and tor- 
 mented the Church, were of Greek paternity. — Teanslatok. 
 
 '* The reason of this curious fact may as well be given. For men to 
 be sufficiently interested in frivolous theological questions to make them 
 a subject of serious dispute implies great folly ; great folly raises the 
 dispute to a quarrel ; the violence of the quarrel will be proportioned to 
 the amount of folly ; and this will, of course, be greatest where the dif- 
 ference quarreled over is least. — Translatok. 
 
456 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [MONTEsaniEir. 
 
 ernors who have misrepresented to me the needs of 
 their provinces — either that they have been corrupt- 
 ed by money, or influenced by the fear of punish- 
 ment." " 
 
 The patriarchs of Constantinople possessed im- 
 mense power. As, during the times of the popular 
 tumults, the emperors and the great men of the 
 state were accustomed to retire into the churches, 
 and, as the patriarchs had it in their power to de- 
 liver them up to the people or not — a power which 
 they exercised at their fancy — they thus constantly 
 found themselves, although indirectly, the arbiters of 
 all public affairs. 
 
 Andronicus the elder ^° caused it to be communi- 
 cated to the patriarch that he should attend to the 
 affairs of the church, and leave those of the empire 
 to himself. "It is," replied the patriarch, "as if 
 the body should say to the soul: I claim nothing in 
 common with you, and I have no need of your 
 assistance in the performance of iny functions." 
 
 Such monstrous pretensions being insupportable to 
 the emperors, the patriarchs were often driven from 
 their seats. But, among a superstitious people^who 
 regarded as abominable all the ecclesiastical functions 
 which might be performed by a patriarch who was 
 believed to be intrusive — these expulsions were a 
 
 ^' Pachtmee, lib. vi, ch. xxix. We have used the ti-anslation of 
 President Cousin. 
 
 '* Palseologus. See Cantacuzene'a IRstory of ilie two Andronicuses, 
 lib. i, ch. 4. 
 
CHAP. XXII.] OF THE ROMANS. 457' 
 
 source of continual schisms. Each patriarch — the old, 
 the new, the still more recent — had his followers. 
 Quarrels of this sort were much more grievous than 
 those which turned upon dogmatical points ; for they 
 were like a hydra, which a new expulsion of the head 
 of the Church was always sufficient to reproduce. 
 
 The fury of disputation became a condition so nat- 
 ural to the Greeks that when Cantacuzene captured 
 Constantinople he found the emperor John and the 
 empress Anne occupied with a council against some 
 enemies of the monks." Theological rancor was not 
 suspended even during the time that Mohammed II 
 was laying siege to the city;" and the council of 
 Florence was an object of more interest to its inhabi- 
 tants than the army of the Turks." 
 
 In the case of ordinary disputes, as each party 
 feels that he may be mistaken, opiniativeness and 
 obstinacy are not extreme ; but, in the disputes 
 which we have in relation to religion — since by the 
 nature of the thing involved each believes that his 
 opinion is certainly the true one — we become indig- 
 nant towards those who, instead of changing their 
 own opinion, set themselves stubbornly to make us 
 change ours. 
 
 ^' Cantacuzene, lib. iii, ch. xcix. 
 
 *» DucAS, Ektory of the last Fcdaologi. 
 
 " People asked each other if they had heard maas from a priest who 
 had consented to the union ; and such an one waa shunned as a consum- 
 ing fire. The great Church waa regarded as a profane temple ; and the 
 monk Gennadiua launched his anathemas agMust all who desired peace. 
 (DucAS, Sistory of tlie last Palceologi.) 
 20 
 
458 GKANDEUB AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 Those wlio will read the history of Pachymer 
 will plainly see how powerless the theologians were — 
 and always must be, when left to themselves — to ac- 
 commodate their own differences. We see in that 
 history, on the one hand, an emperor" who passed 
 his life in the work of assembling, hearing, and rec- 
 onciling the clergy ; we see, on the other, a hydra 
 of disputes incessantly revived ; and we feel that — 
 with the same method, the same patience, the same 
 hopes, the same desire to reach a conclusion, the 
 same simplicity in presence of their intrigues, and 
 the same respect for their enmities — the theologians 
 would not have effected an accommodation among 
 themselves to the end of the world. 
 
 "We will give a remarkable instance in illustra- 
 tion of what has just been said. At the solicitation 
 of the emperor, the partisans of the patriarch Arse- 
 nius entered into a convention with the followers of 
 the patriarch Joseph ; the terms being that each of 
 the parties should make a statement of their respec- 
 tive pretensions upon paper; that both the papers 
 should be thrown into a brazier ; that, if one of the 
 two remained intact, the judgment of God should be 
 followed accordingly; and that, if both were con- 
 sumed, they should renounce their differences. The 
 fire devoured both the papers; the two parties re- 
 united, and the peace continued for a day. But the 
 next day they said their change ought to depend 
 8* Andronicua Palseologus. 
 
CHAP, xxn.] OF THE ROMANS. 459 
 
 upon interior persuasion, and not upon cliance ; and 
 the war was renewed more violently than ever." 
 
 Great attention should be given to the disputes 
 of theologians; but, as far as possible, the interest 
 which is felt in such disputes should be concealed. 
 The trouble which is taken to calm them always has 
 the effect of increasing the credit of the clergy, by 
 causing it to be seen that their manner of thinking 
 is so important that it affects the repose of the state 
 and the security of the sovereign. 
 
 The controversies of theologians can no more be 
 brought to an end by listening to their subtleties, 
 than the practice of dueling might be abolished by 
 establishing schools wherein refinements upon the 
 point of honor should be taught. 
 
 The Greek emperors were so wanting in pru- 
 dence that, when the theological disputes were 
 quieted, they had the madness to - revive them. 
 Anastasius," Justinian,'" Heraclius," and Manuel Com- 
 nenus " proposed points of faith to the clergy and to 
 the people, who would not have received the truth 
 — as coming from them — even if they had possessed 
 it. Thus, sinning always in form, and generally in 
 substance also, and desiring to make a display of 
 their penetration — which they might so well have 
 shown in the many other affairs which were con- 
 
 '^ Paohtmee, lib. i. ** Evageius, lib. iii. 
 
 ^ Peocopics, Secret History. ** Zonaeas, lAfe of JBeradius. 
 
 " NiCETAS, lAfe of Manuel Comnenus. 
 
460 GEANDEtTR AND DECADENCE [montesquikct, 
 
 fided to them — these emperors undertook vain dis- 
 putes on the nature of God — who, concealing him- 
 self from the learned for the reason that they are 
 proud, shows himself none the more to the great of 
 the earth. 
 
 It is an error to suppose that there is any human 
 authority in the world which is, in all respects, des- 
 potic. There never was and there never will be such. 
 The most enormous power is always limited on some 
 side. Let the Grand Seignior impose a novel tax 
 upon Constantinople, and the general outcry will im- 
 mediately disclose limits to his power which he had 
 not known. A king of Persia may indeed constrain 
 a son to kill his father, or a father to kill his son;" 
 but to compel his subjects to drink wine would be 
 beyond his power. There is in every nation a gen- 
 eral spirit upon which power itself is founded. When 
 it shocks this spirit, power disturbs its own founda- 
 tion, and thus necessarily checks itself." 
 
 The most poisonous source of all the misfortunes 
 which befell the Greeks of the Eastern empire was 
 the fact that they never knew either the nature or 
 the limits of the ecclesiastical and the secular power 
 — an ignorance which caused them to fall into con- 
 tinual errors in the one direction or the other. 
 
 This great distinction, which is the basis upon 
 which reposes the tranquillity of nations, is founded 
 
 '" See Chardin. 
 
 " See my Note at the end of this chapter. — Tkanslatok. 
 
OHAP. XXII.] OF THE KOMANS. 461 
 
 not only upon religion, but also upon reason and nat- 
 ure, which will not allow that things really separate, 
 and which can only exist as separate, should ever be 
 confounded. 
 
 Although the priesthood did not constitute a sep- 
 arate body among the ancient Komans, yet this dis- 
 tinction was as well known among them as it is 
 among us. Claudius having consecrated Cicero's house 
 to Liberty, the latter, on returning from his exile, 
 demanded its restitution. The pontiffs decided that, 
 if the house had been conseci'ated without an ex- 
 press order of the people, it might be restored to its 
 former owner without prejudice to religion. "They 
 have declared," says Cicero," "that they had only 
 examined the validity of the consecration, and not 
 the law made by the people; that they had judged 
 the first question as pontifiEs, and that they should 
 judge the second as senators." 
 
 *" Letters to Attieus, Book IV, let. ii. 
 
462 GRANDEtJK AND DECADENCE [bakbb. 
 
 NOTE BY THE TEANSLATOE. 
 
 I. MoNTESQTnE0's general conception, that there 
 was a strong but abortive tendency in the Greek 
 empire during the eighth and ninth centuries to 
 effect a religious revolution in the East similar to 
 the one vrhich took place in the "West during the 
 sixteenth century, is a highly important one. His 
 accompanying intimation, however, that it would 
 have been wiser, and, consequently, better for the 
 interests of humanity, to have so restrained the latter 
 as to have reformed abuses whilst preserving the un- 
 broken integrity of the Church of Eome, is consider- 
 ably more than doubtful, from both the Protestant 
 and the rationalistic points of view. The completest 
 reform of abuses would have left in full force the 
 difficulties springing from dogma — and these pre- 
 sented an extremely grave obstruction to the riper 
 development of the human intellect, and the maturer 
 growth of human liberty. In the course of these 
 Notes I have more than once had occasion to essay 
 some rational justification of the course which an- 
 cient history actually took in connection with some 
 
NOTE.] OF THE EOMAKS. 463 
 
 situations of the highest moment to the world's civ- 
 ilization ; and, in view of the vast interests involved 
 in the Keformation of the sixteenth century, and the 
 manner in which these interests have been and are 
 being affected by the event, I am quite persuaded 
 that reason must fully approve the direction which 
 that great movement actually took, in separating it- 
 self completely from the domination of the Church 
 of Eome, instead of limiting itself to the reform of 
 abuses — which work, no matter how completely it 
 might have been effected, would have still left the 
 mind and the liberty of all Europe hampered and 
 hedged about by powerful and obstinate restraints 
 upon natural and healthy expansion. 
 
 Montesquieu claims a very wide distinction be- 
 tween the Popes of Eome and the Latin clergy on 
 the one hand, and the Patriarchs of Constantinoj)le 
 and the Greek monks on the other — a distinction, in- 
 deed, which marks all the interspace between wisdom 
 and folly. And yet it appears to be a fact that the 
 Popes and the Western clergy were equally as zeal- 
 ous as the Greek monks in their attachment to ex- 
 ternal rites, and in their hostility to the reform which 
 proposed to purge the Church of the worship of 
 images. That section of the Greek mind which was 
 headed by the iconoclastic emperors, and which found 
 its best expression in the Synod of Constantinople 
 (a. d. Y54), made a stout but ineffectual resistance to 
 the widespread movement by which Paganism was 
 
464 GKANDEUK AND DECADENCE [bakeb. 
 
 everywiiere combimng with Christianity. It was over- 
 borne by that accumulating weight of ignorance and 
 superstition which extended from the Bosporus to the 
 Tiber — and which was led by Patriarchs and by 
 Popes, by Greek monks and by Italian clergy.' 
 
 It is curious to observe that, as the Keformation 
 of the sixteenth century had its first foreshadowing in 
 the Idol Breakers of the East during the eighth and 
 ninth centuries, so it had a second in the Albigenses 
 of the "West during the twelfth and thirteenth. The 
 former movement was crushed out by Byzantine 
 monks, and left no sign. The latter was seemingly 
 extinguished in blood and fire by the Church of 
 Pome ; but, three centuries later, it had its resurrec- 
 tion further north. Had there been a Germany north 
 of Constantinople as there was north of Pome, it is 
 easy to believe that the East would also have had its 
 successful Peformation. But Providence had en- 
 dowed the world with only one Germany. 
 
 II. The brief observations of Montesquieu respect- 
 ing the limitations upon power which have place in 
 all governments, even the most despotic, present a 
 subject of much interest to those who would form 
 truly rational ideas in regard to the great matter of 
 government in general. 
 
 Hume has expressed substantially the same view 
 as that of our author. "Nothing," says this saga- 
 cious thinker, " appears more surprising to those who 
 
 ' See Gibbon's Rome, vol. t, pp. 1-39. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 465 
 
 consider human affairs with a philosophical eye than 
 the easiness with which the many are governed by 
 the few; and the implicit submission with which 
 men resign their own sentiments and passions to those 
 of their rulers. When we inquire by what means 
 this wonder is effected, we shall find that, as force 
 is always on the side of the governed, the governors 
 have nothing to support them but opinion. It is, 
 therefore, on opinion only that government is found- 
 ed ; and this maxim extends to the most despotic 
 and most military governments, as well as to the 
 most free and most popular. The soldan of Egypt, 
 or the emperor of Eome, might drive his harmless 
 subjects, like brute beasts, against their sentiments 
 and inclination. But he must, at least, have led his 
 mamialukes or jprmtorian hands, like men, by their 
 opinion." " 
 
 The general principle as stated by Montesquieu 
 and Hume — ^to the effect that all governments rest 
 upon opinion — must be accepted with due qualifica- 
 tion, and with due regard to the forc6 of the term 
 opinion, when appMed to different governments. 
 
 In the first place, it is to be noticed that a con- 
 siderable class of exceptions to the principle arises in 
 cases in which the government is forced upon the 
 nation from without. In such cases there need be 
 no concurring opinion whatever in the mind of the 
 people who receive the government. 
 
 ' Philosophical Works, vol. iii, p. 28, Boston, 1854. 
 
466 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakee. 
 
 In the next place, it must be kept in view that 
 in the lower social states government rests more upon 
 the opinion of a few, whilst in the higher ones it 
 rests more upon the opinion of many. 
 
 The following, therefore, woiild seem to be a 
 closer statement of the principle: 
 
 Where nations are left to themselves, and not co- 
 erced from without, all governments rest ultimately 
 upon opinion ; but this opinion — so far as it is posi- 
 tive and active, and hence efficient to maintain, mod- 
 ify, or reject the government — ^has, in despotic socie- 
 ties, its minvmum, and in free societies, its moijcimum, 
 social extent. This last distinction is, indeed, im- 
 plied in the illustrations given by Hume. Praetorian 
 Guards, Mamalukes, Janizaries, and other, like bodies, 
 which have been the depositaries of opinion support- 
 ing despotic governments, have constituted but a 
 small part of the total society. 
 
 The opinion, therefore, that underlies despotisms, 
 when taken as a measure of liberty or choice, is a 
 fact which, although of the same species, is of very 
 limited quantity and value when compared with the 
 opinion upon which free governments repose. 
 
 III. The statement of Montesquieu, that the dis- 
 tinction between the civil and the ecclesiastical power 
 was "as well known" among the ancient Eomans 
 "as it is among us," I regard as probably erroneous 
 — and certainly so if we take into consideration the 
 development of opinion which has taken place since 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 467 
 
 his time. However tolerant the religion of the Ro- 
 mans may have been, it was very much mixed up 
 with the affairs of the state; and, indeed, in the 
 whole Eoman system there was a confusion and a 
 blending of functions which, on the one hand, mark 
 the conformity of this system to the prevaiHng typo 
 of all ancient constitutions, and, on the other, offer 
 one of the great features of contrast between it and 
 the more distinctly classified and defined polities of 
 modern societies. " The same person," says Dr. 
 Adam, "might regulate the police of the city and 
 direct the affairs of the empire, propose laws and 
 execute them, act as a judge or a priest, and com- 
 mand an army." The augurs exercised very grieat 
 influence over purely secular affairs. Dr. Adam re- 
 marks that " nothing of importance was done respect- 
 ing the public, either at home or abroad, in peace 
 or in war, without consulting them " ; and in this 
 connection we may particularly notice that sort of 
 sacerdotal authority to which Montesquieu refers in 
 the eighth chapter of this work, by virtue of which 
 the priesthood had it in their power even to suppress 
 the days appointed for the public assemblage of the 
 people, "under pretext that the auspices were not 
 favorable." The fecial priesthood exercised functions 
 in relation to the declaration of war and the conclu- 
 sion of treaties which in all modern nations are per- 
 formed by secular functionaries. The college of pon- 
 tiffs possessed in some cases the power to inflict the 
 
4.68 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [bakeb. 
 
 penalty of death— limited, it is true, by the right of 
 appeal to the people. The pontifex maximus could 
 restrain even a consul — ^if he happened withal to be 
 a priest — from absenting himself from the city ; and, 
 in later times, this supreme spiritual dignity was as- 
 sumed by the emperors; so that the same person 
 was at once head of the state and head of all the 
 sacerdotal orders of the empire. I think it is clearly 
 true that there was no period, either under the 
 Mngs, under the republic, or under the empire, when 
 the distinction between the secular and the spiritual 
 was as well realized in the Eoman policy, or as well 
 apprehended in the Koman mind, as it is at the 
 present day.' 
 
 It may be stated in general terms that the re- 
 ligious and the civil functions were more blended to- 
 gether in ancient than they are in modem times; 
 and that, in proportion as the world's civilization de- 
 velops, there is a persistent and increasing tendency 
 to work out a complete separation of the two. That 
 process of differentiation by which so many things 
 that were commingled in the early stages of civiliza- 
 tion have since come to be separated, can be distinct- 
 ly traced in connection with the affairs of the state 
 and the affairs of religion ; but, in consequence of 
 the vast interests involved, and the immense influ- 
 ence of established priesthoods over the masses of 
 mankind, the process of separation, in this last re- 
 
 s See Adam's Bom. Ant., Phila., 1872, pp. 73, 192-204. 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 469 
 
 Bpect, has been mucli less rapid than it has been in 
 
 numerous other regards. And yet nothing can be 
 
 more unmistakable than the tendency of that great 
 
 mental impulse which civilization has felt since the 
 
 reyival of learning in the fifteenth century. That 
 
 tendency has been, and is, to completely secularize all 
 
 the powers of civil government — a result which has 
 
 been already accomplished in one great nation,' and 
 
 the ultimate consummation of which in aU the other 
 
 states of the civiHzed world is only a question of 
 
 time. 
 
 * The United States of America. 
 
4.70 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [MONiESijuiED. 
 
 OHAPTEK XXIII. 
 
 CAUSES OF THE DTJKATION OF THE EA8TEEN EMPIEE. — ITS 
 DESTEUGTION. 
 
 After what I have said in relation to the Greek 
 empire, it is natural to inquire how it was able to 
 continue its existence during so long a period of 
 time. I believe I can give the reasons for this. 
 
 The Arabs having attacked the Eastern empire, 
 and having conquered some of its provinces, their 
 chiefs came to a dispute in relation to the caliphate; 
 and thus the fire of their first zeal only produced 
 civil discords among themselves. 
 
 The same Arabs having conquered Persia, and 
 having there also become divided and weakened, the 
 Greeks were no longer compelled to hold the prin- 
 cipal forces of the empire upon the Euphrates. 
 
 An architect, named Callinicus, who had come 
 from Syria to Constantinople, discovered the compo- 
 sition of a fire which was blown through a tube, and 
 which was of such a nature that water, and all sub- 
 stances that extinguish ordinary fires, only had the 
 effect of increasing its violence. The Greeks made 
 use of this fire, and were thus enabled, during many 
 
CHAP, xxni.] OF THE ROMANS. 471 
 
 centurieB, to burn all the fleets of their enemies, 
 especially those of the Arabs, who came from Africa 
 or Syria to attack them before Constantinople. This 
 fire was placed in the rank of state secrets; and Con- 
 stantine Porphyrogenitus, in his work on the admin- 
 istration of the empire — dedicated to his son Eo- 
 manus — warns the latter that, in case the barbarians 
 should ask him for Greek fire, he should tell them 
 that it was not permitted that he should give it to 
 them, for the reason that an angel, who had brought 
 it to Constantino, had forbidden its communication 
 to other nations, and that those who had dared to 
 do so had been immediately devoured by fire from 
 heaven upon entering into a church." 
 
 ' In the two great attacks which the Arabs made upon Constantino- 
 ple — the one in the latter half of the seventh and the other early in the 
 eighth century — Gibbon attributes the deliverance of the city mainly " to 
 the novelty, the terrors, and the real efficacy of the Gi-eekfire." On the 
 latter occasion, after investing the city on the land side, a fleet of the 
 enemy, recruited from Syria and Egypt, and stated at eighteen hundred 
 ships, made its appearance for the purpose of supporting by water the 
 operations of the siege. I add Gibbon's animated description of the 
 scene which followed : " This huge armada proceeded on a smooth sea, and 
 with a gentle gale, towards the mouth of the Bosporus ; the surface of the 
 strait was overshadowed, in the language of the Greeks, with a moving 
 forest, and the same fatal night had been fixed by the Saracen chief for 
 n general assault by sea and land. To allure the confidence of the enemy, 
 the emperor had thrown aside the chain that usually guarded the entrance 
 of the harbor ; but while they hesitated whether they should seize the op- 
 portunity or apprehend the snare, the ministers of destruction were at 
 hand. The fire-ships of the Greeks were launched against them; the 
 Arabs, their arms, and vessels, were involved in the same flames ; the 
 disorderly fugitives were dashed against each other or overwhelmed in 
 the waves ; and I do not find a vestige of the fleet that had threatened 
 to extirpate the Roman name." (Gibbon's Rome, vol. v, pp. 280-282.) 
 
^Y2 GEANDEUE AND DECADENCE [mohtesqcieu. 
 
 At a time when tlie Gothic natioHS on tlie one 
 side, and the Arabs on the other, had ruined com- 
 merce and industry everywhere else, Constantinople 
 carried on the greatest, and indeed almost the sole, 
 commerce of the world. The manufacture of silk 
 had passed from Persia to this city; and, after the 
 invasion by the Arabs, this manufacture was much 
 neglected in Persia itself. The Greeks being, more- 
 over, masters of the sea, these advantages brought 
 immense wealth into the state, and consequently en- 
 dowed it with great resources. The result was, that, 
 whenever the empire experienced some respite, we 
 at once see the public prosperity reappear. 
 
 Some suppose that the secret of this composition, instead of being 
 discovered by Callinicus, was derived from India. (Chambers' Ene., art. 
 Greek fire.) 
 
 At a later period the Saracens themselves got possession of the secret, 
 and used it with effect against the Christians. Gibbon describes the fiery 
 missile, launched by the former against the latter, in the terms of an 
 old French knight : " It came flying through the air, says Joinville, like a 
 winged, long-tailed dragon, about the thickness of a hogshead, with the 
 report of thunder and the velocity of lightning; and the darkness of 
 night was dispelled by this deadly illumination. (Vol. v, p. 286.) 
 
 Voltaire, however, is skeptical as to the reputed efiBcacy of this 
 celebrated compound. Eef erring to the ease with which the Crusad- 
 ers captured Constantinople in the year 1204, he says: "We do not 
 see that the Greek fire, so much vaunted by the historians, produced 
 the least effect. If it were such as it was said to be, it should have 
 always given certain victory, on sea and land. If it were something 
 similar to our phosphorus, the water might, it is true, preserve it ; but 
 then it would have had no action while in the water. In short, not- 
 withstanding this secret, the Turks had taken almost the whole of 
 Asia Minor from the Greeks, and the Latins took from them the re- 
 mainder." (Ouvres Complies de Voltaire, Paris, 1828, tom. xxi, pp. Bl, 
 52.) — Tr4.nsi.atoe. 
 
CHAP, mil.] OF THE ROMANS. 473 
 
 Of this we will give a notable example. Androni- 
 cus Comneims the elder was the Nero of the Greeks ; 
 but since, with all his vices, he showed an admirable 
 firmness in protecting the people against the injus- 
 tices and the vexations of the grandees, it was re- 
 marked that, during the three years that he reigned, the 
 prosperity of many of the provinces was re-established." 
 
 Finally, the barbarians who dwelt upon the shores 
 of the Danube having become settled, they were no 
 longer as formidable as they once were, and they 
 even served as a barrier against other barbarians. 
 
 Thus, while the empire of the East was weighed 
 down by a bad government, it was yet sustained by 
 particular causes. It is thus that we see at the pres- 
 ent day some of the nations of Europe maintain 
 themselves, notwithstanding their weakness, by the 
 wealth which they derive from the Indies; that we 
 see the temporal States of the Pope protected by the 
 respect which is felt for their sovereign; and the 
 Corsairs of Barbary maintained by the obstructions 
 which they put upon the commerce of the smaller na- 
 tions — whereby they render themselves useful to the 
 more powerful ones.'* 
 
 The empire of the Turks is at the present time 
 
 ' NiCETAS, lAfe of Andronicus Comnenus, lib. i. 
 
 ' They hinder the commerce of the Italian states on the Mediter- 
 Ta^ean. 
 
 * The motive here assigned for the former toleration of the pirates of 
 the Barbary coast need not be questioned ; but it ought not to be stated 
 without being at the same time stigmatized as belonging to the most un- 
 worthy species of human meanness. — Translator. 
 
474 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [MONiESQtriEn. 
 
 in nearly the Bame degree of weakness as was that 
 of the Greeks before; but it will continue to exist 
 for a long time; for, if any sovereign should, in the 
 course of his conquests, place this empire in peril, 
 the three commercial powers of Europe understand 
 their affairs too well not to interpose immediately in 
 its defence." ° 
 
 It is the good fortune of the Turks that God has 
 permitted nations to exist in the world which are 
 adapted to the useless occupation of a great empire. 
 
 During the time of Basil Porphyrogenitus, the 
 power of the Arabs was destroyed in Persia. Mo- 
 hammed, son of Sambrael, who reigned there, called 
 from the North three thousand Turks, in the char- 
 acter of auxiliaries.' Upon the occurrence of some 
 dissatisfaction, he sent an army against them; but 
 they put his army to flight. Indignant at the con- 
 duct of his soldiers, Mohammed ordered that they 
 should pass before him clad in the garments of 
 women; but they joined themselves to the Turks, 
 who proceeded at once to capture the garrison which 
 guarded the bridge over the Araxes ; and thus the 
 
 ' Thus, the projects against Turkey — as, for instance, the one which 
 was formed under the pontificate of Leo, by which the emperor was to 
 approach Constantinople by the way of Bosnia, the king of France by the 
 way of Albania and Greece, whilst other princes were to embark from 
 their respective ports — these projects, I say, were either not serious, or 
 else were undertaken by men who did not comprehend the interests of 
 Europe. 
 
 " See my Note at the end of this chapter. — Translator. 
 
 ' Hist, written by N. B. Cmsar, Lives of Const. Ducas and R. Diogenes. 
 
CHAP. XXIII.] OF THE ROMANS. 475 
 
 way was opened for an inmimerable multitude of 
 their countrymen. 
 
 After having conquered Persia, the Turks spread 
 from east to west over the provinces of the empire; 
 they captured the emperor, Komanus Diogenes, who at- 
 tempted to arrest their career, and subdued nearly the 
 whole of the Greek possessions east of the Bosporus. 
 
 Some time later, during the reign of Alexis Com- 
 nenus, the Latins attacked the East. An unhappy 
 schism had long since engendered an implacable ha- 
 tred between the nations of the two rites; and it 
 would have broken out sooner if the Italians had not 
 been more intent upon humbling the emperors of 
 Germany, whom they feared, than the emperors of 
 the Greeks, whom they only hated. 
 
 It was in these circumstances that a religious opin- 
 ion suddenly spread through Europe, that, the place 
 where Jesus Christ was bom, and the place where 
 he suffered, being profaned by infidels, the means of 
 effacing one's sins was to take arms for their expul- 
 sion. Europe was full of men who loved war, and 
 who had many crimes to expiate. It was proposed 
 that they should expiate their crimes by following 
 their dominant passion. The result was that im- 
 mense multitudes took the cross and the sword. 
 
 Having arrived in the East, the crusaders besieged 
 and captured Nice.' They restored this city to the 
 
 ' They took it from the Turks, who had made it their capital.— 
 Translator. 
 
J fro GKANDEUR AND DECADENCE [mohtesqcieh. 
 
 Greeks ; and, amid the consternation of the infidels, 
 Alexis and John Comnenus drove the Turks back to 
 the Euphrates. 
 
 But, whatever advantages the Greeks may have 
 derived from these expeditions of the crusaders, there 
 was no Greek emperor who might not tremble iu 
 presence of the danger of seeing a succession of 
 heroes so haughty, and of armies so large, pass 
 through the very heart of his states. They sought, 
 therefore, to disgust Europe with these enterprises; 
 and the crusaders everywhere met with betrayals, 
 perfidy, and all that might be expected from a timid 
 enemy. 
 
 It must be admitted that the French, who com- 
 menced these expeditions, did nothing to render them- 
 selves indurable. In the invectives of Andronieus 
 Comnenus against us ' we see, at bottom, that the 
 French did not restrain themselves when in a foreign 
 country, and that we possessed then the same defects 
 of character for which we are reproached at the pres- 
 ent time. 
 
 A French count proceeded to seat himself upon 
 the throne of the emperor. " Tou ought to know," 
 said Count Baldwin, taking him by the arm, "that 
 when one is in a country he should observe its customs." 
 "Indeed!" replied the other, "that is a fine clown to 
 be seated here while so many captains are standing ! " 
 
 The Germans, who passed through afterwards, and 
 
 ' History of Alexius, his Father, lib. x and xi. 
 
CHAP, xxni.] OF THE ROMANS. 477 
 
 who were the best people in the world, were sub- 
 jected to a rough penance for the wild conduct of the 
 French. They everywhere found that the minds of 
 the Greeks had been revolted by the behavior of their 
 predecessors." " 
 
 Hate finally reached its height ; and some bad treat- 
 ment of Venetian merchants, combined with ambition, 
 avarice, and false zeal, determined the French and the 
 Yenetians to enter upon a crusade against the Greeks. 
 
 They found the latter as little warlike as at a 
 later period the Tartars found the Chinese. The 
 French mocked their effeminate habiliments; they 
 promenaded the streets of Constantinople, decked out 
 in painted robes ; they carried inkhoms and paper in 
 their hands, in derision of a nation which had re- 
 nounced the profession of arms ; " and, after the war 
 was over, they refused to admit any Greek whatever 
 into their military service." 
 
 They subdued the whole of the western part of 
 the empire, and there elected the count of Flanders 
 as emperor, whose remote states could not be the 
 occasion of any jealousy in the minds of the Italians. 
 The Greeks maintained themselves in the eastern part, 
 separated from the Turks by the mountains and from 
 the Latins by the sea. 
 
 '" NiCETAS, Sisiory of Manuel Comnerms, lib. i. 
 " See my Note at the end of this chapter.— Translator. 
 " NicETAS, History, after the capture of Constantinople, ch. ii. 
 " For an idea of the contempt into which the Greek and Koman 
 names sunk, see my Note at the end of this chapter. — Translator. 
 
478 GBANDEDR AND DECADENCE [montesquueu. 
 
 The Latins, wlio had encountered no obstractions 
 while effecting their conquests, met with an infinity 
 of obstacles in the work of aifirming theii* acquisi- 
 tions. The Greeks returned from Asia into Europe, 
 retook Constantinople, and recovered almost all they 
 had lost in the West. 
 
 But this new Greek empire was no more . than 
 the phantom of the first. It possessed neither the 
 same resources nor the same power. It held httle 
 in Asia except the provinces on this side of the 
 Mseander and the Sangarius; and most of the Euro- 
 pean provinces were divided up into petty sovereign- 
 ties. And it must be observed, in addition, that, dur- 
 ing the sixty years that Constantinople had remained 
 in the hands of the Latins, the conquered Greeks 
 being dispersed, and the conquerors being occupied 
 with the interests of war, commerce had passed en- 
 tirely to the cities of Italy, and Constantinople had 
 thus lost her wealth. 
 
 Even the internal commerce of the new empire 
 was carried on by the Latins. The Greeks, newly re- 
 established, and filled with fears, were willing to con- 
 ciliate the Genoese by conceding to them the privi- 
 lege of trading without the payment of duties ; " and 
 the Yenetians — ^who accepted no terms of peace, but 
 agreed to some suspensions of hostilities, and whom 
 the Greeks were unwilling to irritate — paid no more 
 for the same privilege. 
 
 " C^NTACDZENE, lib. iv. 
 
CHAP, xxni.] OF THE ROMAKS. 479 
 
 Although before the capture of Constantinople by 
 the Latins, Manuel Comnenus had suffered the ma- 
 rine of the empire to fall into decay, yet, since com- 
 merce stm existed, it was easy to re-establish it ; but 
 when, under the new empire, commerce itself was 
 abandoned, the evil admitted no remedy, for the state 
 was constantly growing weaker. 
 
 This empire, which dominated many islands, which 
 was divided by the sea, and surrounded by it in many 
 of its parts, was without vessels for the navigation 
 of its own waters. The provinces were no longer in 
 communication with each other; the inhabitants were 
 obliged to retire further inland, in order to avoid 
 the pirates ; and, when they had done so, they were 
 compelled to seek refuge in fortresses, in order to 
 save themselves from the Turks." 
 
 The Turks at this time carried -on a singular war 
 against the Greeks. Properly speaking, they hunted 
 and chased them as game. Sometimes they traversed 
 two hundred leagues of country for the purpose of 
 perpetrating their ravages. As they were divided 
 under many sultans, it was impossible, by means of 
 presents, to make peace with all, and it was useless 
 to do so with a part of them." They were invet- 
 erate Mohammedans ; and their zeal for their religion 
 imparted to them a marvelous zest in the work of rav- 
 aging the lands of the Christians. As they were, 
 
 " Pachtmee, lib. Tii. 
 
 '* Cantacuzene, lib. iii, ch. xcvi ; and Pachymee, lib. xi, ch. ix. 
 
480 GRANDEUB AND DECADENCE [montesquieu. 
 
 besides, the ugliest people on earth — and as their 
 women were as hideous as themselves" — ^from the 
 moment that they had seen the Greek women they 
 could no longer endiire others; and thus they were 
 prompted to the perpetration of continual abduc- 
 tions." In short, they had always been addicted to 
 rapine; and they were those same Huns who had 
 heretofore inflicted so many calamities upon the Eo- 
 man empire." 
 
 The Turks inundating all that remained of the 
 Greek empire in Asia, such of the inhabitants as 
 were able to effect their escape fled before them to 
 
 " This gare room for that tradition of the North, related by the Goth 
 Jornandes, that Pliilimer, king of the Goths, having entered into the ter- 
 ritory of the Getse, and having there found women who were sorcerers, 
 he drove them far from his army ; that they wandered into deserts, where 
 inoubi cohabited with them, from which intercourse sprang the nation of 
 the Huns. Germs ferocissimum, quod fuit primum inter paludes, minu- 
 tum, ielrum, atgue exile, nee alia voce notum, nisi guw humani sermonis 
 imaffiTiem assiffnabaf. 
 
 's Michael Duoas, History of John Manuel, John and Oonstantine, 
 chap. ix. Oonstantine Porphyrogenitna, at the beginning of his Excerpt 
 from the Embassies, warns the Romans that, whenever the barbarians 
 visit Constantinople, they should be very careful not to show them the 
 greatness of their wealth, nor allow them to see the beauty of their 
 women. 
 
 " The race identity of the Turks and the Huns has been maintained 
 and denied. Mllman rejects the theory of M. de Guignes, which had been 
 followed by Gibbon, and which appears to have the effect of bringing the 
 Huns and the Turks together in a common origin ; and in rejecting this 
 theory the learned editor fortifies his dissent with the authority of Schlozer, 
 Klaproth, St. Martin, and A. R^musat, who, he says, " concur in consider, 
 ing the Huns as belonging to the Finnish stock, distinct from the Moguls, 
 the Mandscheus, and the Turks." (Gibbon's Eome, vol. iii, text and notes, 
 pp. 15, 16.) Others, however, incline to the view that the two peoples in 
 question are at least related, if not originally the same. — Translator. 
 
CHAP. XXIII.] OF THE ROMANS. 481 
 
 the Bosporus; and those who found vessels sought 
 refuge in the western part of the empire — a circum- 
 stance which considerably increased the population of 
 the European provinces. But this population soon 
 diminished. The civil wars which broke out were so 
 furious that the two contending parties called in 
 different Turkish sultans, subject to a condition as 
 extravagant as barbarous — that all the inhabitants 
 whom they might capture in the country belonging 
 to the opposite party might be carried away into 
 slavery;'" and thus both the factions, with the view 
 of ruining their enemies, concurred in the destruction 
 of their nation. 
 
 Bajazet having subdued all the other sultans, the 
 Turks would have then completed what they after- 
 wards did under Mohammed II, if they had not them- 
 selves been on the verge of destruction at the hands 
 of the Tartars. 
 
 I have not the heart to speak of the calamities 
 which followed. I will only say that, under the last 
 emperors, the empire of the East, reduced to the 
 suburbs of Constantinople, ended as the Ehine — 
 which is no more than a brook when it loses itself 
 in the ocean. 
 
 '" See the History of the Emperors John Palmologus and John Cantacu- 
 zene, written by Cantacuzene. 
 21 
 
^.82 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 NOTE BY THE TRAJSTSLATOE. 
 
 In tie course of his concluding chapter, Mon- 
 tesquieu either very briefly refers to, or merely hints 
 at, several matters which, for completer general ap- 
 preciation, will admit of some further remarks. 
 
 I. The crusades of Christianity against Mohamme- 
 danism were the most remarkable phenomena — as 
 being upon the most extensive scale — that are to be 
 found in the world's entire history of religious fanati- 
 cism. These great waves of invasion, precipitated 
 from west to east, continued for about one hundred 
 and seventy-five years,* with the final result — after 
 enormous ruin and sacrifice of life — that Mohamme- 
 danism remained in firm possession of Asia — including 
 the primitive seats of Christianity — while its antag- 
 onist was left to occupy Europe, and to extend itself 
 over the new continents which were about to be dis- 
 covered. 
 
 It is curious to reflect that both these great, active 
 religions — which have engaged in such frightful con- 
 tests in the past, and which have divided the larger 
 
 • From 1096 to 1272. 
 
KOTE.] OP THE EOMAKS. 483 
 
 portion of the modern world between them — took 
 their rise in the bosom of the same Asiatic race — Chris- 
 tianity among the Judaic, Mohammedanism among 
 the Arabic, Semites. "We have already seen that it 
 was the Semitic race that gave birth to the worship 
 of Moloch" — so wonderfully fecund of diverse religions 
 has this race been, ranging in quality from the most 
 abominable that the world has known to the one 
 whose morals must coalesce with the last possible re- 
 sults of human development. What a prodigious in- 
 terspace between the nadir and the zenith of the re- 
 ligious genius of the same race — the one extreme 
 touching hell in its worship of Moloch, the other scal- 
 ing the heaven of heavens in its doctrine of purity 
 and charity! 
 
 II. The distinction which Montesquieu takes be- 
 tween the conduct of the Germans and that of the 
 French during the crusades which they made against 
 the East, and his remark about the French not re- 
 straining themselves "when in a foreign country," 
 leads me to observe that Yoltaire is quite in the same 
 vein in his estimate of some of the national traits of 
 his own countrymen. Speaking of the capture of 
 Constantinople by the crusaders in the year 1204, 
 he says: "They entered the city almost without re- 
 sistance ; and, having killed all whom they met, they 
 abandoned themselves to every excess of fury and 
 avarice. Nicetas asserts that the booty of the French 
 
 ' See pp. 103-105 of this volume. 
 
484 GEANDEUK AND DECADENCE [bakee. 
 
 Beigniors alone was valued at two hundred thousand 
 pounds weight of silver. The churches were pil- 
 laged; and — what sufficiently marks the character of 
 the nation, which has never changed — the French 
 danced with the women in the sanctuary of the 
 church of Saint Sophia, whilst one of the prostitutes 
 who followed the army of Baldwin sang the songs 
 of her profession in the patriarchal pulpit. The 
 Greeks had often called upon the holy Virgin while 
 assassinating their princes ; the French drank, sang, 
 and caressed the girls in the cathedral while pillaging 
 it ; every nation has its character." " 
 
 In view of the facts of modern history, we may 
 safely infer that the persistent traits of national char- 
 acter which are so frankly confessed by Voltaire and 
 Montesquieu have been, in the long run, a serious 
 drawback upon the stable extension of French domi- 
 nation outside the limits of France. 
 
 III. Apropos of what Montesquieu says relative 
 to the disdain which the crusading French and Vene- 
 tians felt for the soldierly qualities of the Byzantine 
 Greeks, it may be stated, in more general terms than 
 he has employed, that history affords no more strik- 
 ing illustration of the mutations of time and fortune 
 than is seen in the contempt into which both the 
 Greek and the Roman name sunk in the estimation 
 of the new nations that came forward to take the 
 places of these fallen magnates of the past. ^"We learn 
 
 ' Ouvres Completes de Voltaire, torn, xxi, p. 50, Paris, 1828. 
 
NOTE.] OF TEE ROMANS. 485 
 
 from Liutprand that, whenever the Lombards, Saxons, 
 Franks, Burgundians, and other peoples desired to 
 express their utmost scorn for an enemy, they re- 
 sorted to no other term of reproach but to call him 
 a Eoman ; and the bishop adds that " in this alone — 
 that is, in the name of Koman — is comprehended 
 whatever is ignoble, whatever is cowardly, whatever 
 is avaricious, whatever is luxurious, whatever is men- 
 dacious, and, indeed, the sum of all the vices." * 
 Milman remarks that this language of Bishop Liut- 
 prand was applied to " the Byzantine Eomans " ; 
 but it expresses the exaggerated contempt which is 
 always felt by rude and rising nations for those who 
 retain a great name without possessing either the 
 power, the influence, or the character with which it 
 was once associated.'' 
 
 IV. The words of Montesquieu • respecting the 
 long future continuance of the Turkish Empire, not- 
 withstanding its weakness, have been prophetic for 
 nearly one hundred and fifty years ; the Crimean 
 war of 1853-56, with its resulting treaty of Paris, 
 illustrates their sagacity — as does also the more recent 
 Eusso-Turkish war of 1877-78, with its resulting 
 Congress of Berlin; and the conflicting interests and 
 jealousies of the great powers of Europe may, for a 
 
 ^ Hoc solo, id est Homanorum nomine, quicquid igTwhilitatis, quicquid 
 timiditatis, quicquid avarUice, quicquid luxurice, quicquid mendacii, immo 
 quicquid vitiorum est camprehendentes 
 
 ° See Gibbon's Home, vol. v, p. 22, and note 44, from which I have 
 extracted a part of the text of Liutprand. 
 
486 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baeeb. 
 
 considerable time yet, maintain the ascendency of the 
 Porte upon both sides of the Bosporus. But, in view 
 of the influences which prescribe the flux and reflux of 
 races, and especially in view of the forces which enter 
 into the two types of civilization which touch each 
 other, it seems eminently probable that, as the power 
 of the Moor receded from Spain, the power of the 
 Turk will ultimately recede from Eastern Europe; 
 and that the Dardanelles — appointed by nature to be 
 one of the greatest channels of intercommunication 
 and commerce upon the globe — will be reclaimed by 
 the Cross and dominated by the genius and energy 
 of the Aryan race. 
 
 Europe's Eastern question is too remote from the 
 circle of American interests to be of international 
 concern to us, but it presents an intellectual and hu- 
 man interest which is commensurate with the limits 
 of civilization — an interest which is deeply and inti- 
 mately connected with that expansive exploration of 
 the past which has been made in the course of this 
 volume. Eome was the typical city of the ancient 
 Latin civilization, Athens of the Grecian. After long 
 abasement — after infinite confusion, struggle, and he- 
 roic aspiration — Kome stands again at the head of 
 united Italy — one of the finest facts accomplished 
 that the modern world has seen. After like abase- 
 ment, struggle, and endeavor — ^but confronted by still 
 more obstinately adverse conditions — Athens stands 
 at the head of only a petty state. Historical pro- 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 487 
 
 priety, in common with the general interests of hu- 
 manity, demands that the renaissance of these two 
 famous headlights of the old Mediterranean world 
 should be more equally proportioned. In their fu- 
 ture dealings with the Eastern Question it appears 
 to be the plain duty of the great powers of Europe 
 to aid Athens in drawing to her center all the cog- 
 nate elements which may naturally and fitly coalesce 
 in the growing Greek state; so that, when this ques- 
 tion shall have been finished — when the Moham- 
 medan and the Christian of both rites shall have 
 found their status of equilibrium — the new Hellenic 
 civilization of the eastern peninsula shall be a fair 
 counterpoise to the new Latin civilization of the west- 
 ern. If this great work shall come to be adequately 
 achieved in both its parts, history will have wit- 
 nessed one of its noblest consummations: the far 
 gone and renowned past wiU have been fitly brought 
 into bonds of visible union with the living and mov- 
 ing world. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 Feom the founding of Rome to the fall of Con- 
 stantinople we reckon the exact term of two thou- 
 sand two hundred and six years. It is over this 
 ample period that Koman history is deemed to ex- 
 tend — first under the kings — then under the republic 
 — then under a sole empire — then under the empire 
 of the West and the empire of the East — and, final- 
 ly, closing with the latter alone. 
 
488 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE [baker. 
 
 Viewed as a single phenomenon, that great sec- 
 tion of universal history which is represented by the 
 Eomans follows the law which governs all vital and 
 all social phenomena: it begins in weakness and it 
 ends in weakness. A band of semi -savage adven- 
 turers pitch their camp among the hitherto unbroken 
 woods and thickets that crown some volcanic hills 
 upon the eastern bank of the Tiber. Such is the 
 beginning of Eoman greatness. Twenty-two centu- 
 ries later, a solitary city, situated upon the western 
 shore of the Thracian Bosporus, and about to suc- 
 cumb to the Turk, represents all that remains of an 
 empire which has absorbed hundreds of states, and 
 extended its gigantic sway from the Atlantic to the 
 Tigris. 
 
 Constantinople was finally captured by Mohammed 
 II, in the year 1453 — just thirty-nine years before 
 Columbus discovered America, forty-four years before 
 Vasco de Gama doubled the Cape of Good Hope, 
 and little more than a half-century before the Ee- 
 vival of Learning in Europe had already given birth 
 to the Reformation of Luther, and open promise of 
 a coming intellectual emancipation and expansion 
 which should be new to the world : so nearly syn- 
 chronous were the closing scene of Eoman history 
 and the most fruitful achievements and events of 
 modem times; the one drojiping the curtain upon 
 the greatest succession of human transactions that 
 had place in the past, the other lifting it to an incom- 
 
NOTE.] OF THE ROMANS. 489 
 
 parably greater in the future. And thus it is, that 
 the world is able to afford the death of its giants. 
 
 "We have now finished the survey of this vast 
 and checkered tableau, studying with Montesquieu its 
 genius and spirit, and endeavoring, in a special manner 
 of our own, to indicate its comparative value — and, 
 withal, the comparative value of the ancient civiliza- 
 tions in general — upon the plane of the world's history. 
 
 The general effect has been that, whilst the Ko- 
 mans exerted a greater practical influence upon man- 
 kind than any other ancient people, their results — 
 as, indeed, the results of all antiquity — must take a 
 decidedly subordinate place when compared with the 
 greatly larger and completer contents of modem civ- 
 ilization. 
 
 In the course of the wide retrospect which we 
 have taken, we have had ample occasion to realize 
 the delusion of that species of imagination which has 
 ever been prone to obscure the goods and to mag- 
 nify the ills of the present, whilst exalting the vir- 
 tues and ignoring the ghastly realities of the past — 
 thus inferring a painful and discouraging contrast 
 between the actual time and bygone halcyon days 
 which never had any real existence whatever — a spe- 
 cies of delusion which we already find rebuked in 
 the earliest records of human wisdom." 
 
 * Say not thou, What is the cause that the former days were better 
 than these ? for thou dost not enquire wisely concerning this. — Ecclesias- 
 tes Tii, 10. 
 
490 GRANDEUR AND DECADENCE OF THE ROMANS. 
 
 We have very clearly seen that the actual way of 
 the Romans, in common with the actual way of the 
 ancient world in general, was unspeakably rough, 
 hard, and cruel. We have gathered the distinct, ra- 
 tional impression, that the movement of the world's 
 civiHzation, from the time of the primeval savagery 
 of Europe to the present day, has been, so to speak, one 
 continuous battle-journey, in which the forces presid- 
 ing over the conflict have become less purely physical 
 and animal, and more controlled by intelligence, jus- 
 tice, and mercy; and we may quite safely conclude 
 that the very age in which we live — despite its enor- 
 mous drawbacks — is at once more richly endowed in 
 respect to knowledge and power, more tempered by 
 liberty in respect to action and thought, more influ- 
 enced by moral feeling in respect to justice and hu- 
 manity, and, consequently, more comfortable in respect 
 to human happiness, than any other age which our 
 race has experienced in its long, embittered, and 
 struggling career. 
 
 In this view — which is abundantly supported by 
 the course of the world's history — we may justly 
 draw encouragement from the feeling that the sun 
 of hope casts its shadows behind and not before, and 
 that we are moving in the direction of the light. 
 
AJ^ALTTIOAL Iiq"DEX. 
 
 Aedses; necessary that a free goT- 
 emment, by virtue of its own laws, 
 may te capable of correcting, lYl- 
 173. 
 
 AoBLfiANS : one of the principal peo- 
 ples of Greece at the time it was 
 attacked by the Eomana, 110. 
 
 AoTrDM, battle of, referred to as an 
 Illustration of the disadvantage of 
 large vessels in ancient naval war- 
 fare, 85 ; further notice of, 251, note 
 11. 
 
 Adam, Dr. Alexattoee : his descrip- 
 tion of the Eoman triumph, 147- 
 149; and ofthe Eoman proscription, 
 226; his account of the Eoman 
 lares, 248, note 4; his statement 
 respecting patronage among the 
 Bomans, 281, note 3 ; his remarks 
 respecting the colors and the fac- 
 tions of the Eoman circus, 421, 
 note 18 ; respecting the relation of 
 Eoman priests to civil affairs, 467 ; 
 in regard to the Eoman camp and 
 the burden of the Eoman soldier, 
 49, note 4, and 50, note 7. 
 
 ^MLLinB, Paulus: his decisive vic- 
 tory over the Macedonians referred 
 to, 130, note 1 ; influence of the 
 
 spoils brought in by, on Eoman 
 taxation, 388. 
 
 iEQDiAifs, 28 ; their numerous towns, 
 125. 
 
 jEtolias s : their character, and how 
 they made war, 110 ; they call the 
 Eomans into Greece against Mace- 
 don, 114 ; how they are treated by 
 them, 116 ; they call in Antiochus 
 against the Eomans, ibid. ; and fare 
 worse, 119, 138. 
 
 Afkica, ancient cities of, generally 
 but little fortified, 82 ; idea of the 
 extent of the Carthaginian posses- 
 sions in, 100. 
 
 AoATHOOLEs, 82 ; sacrifice of human 
 victims by the Carthaginians when 
 he invested their city, 105. 
 
 Agis : his attempt to re-establish the 
 ancient laws of Sparta, 64. 
 
 AoBAEiAif Laws: Montesquieu's al- 
 lusion to these laws, 62 ; their real 
 nature, 70-75. 
 
 AoBioTTLTUBE, preference of, among 
 the Eomans, 200, note 8 ; Italy, 
 devoted to gardening, neglects 
 grain-raising, 358, 359, and note 
 6; Sicily, Egypt, and Africa, the 
 principal agricultural countries of 
 the Eomans, iMd. ; their agricultu- 
 ral work chiefly done by slaves, 
 
492 
 
 ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 ibid. ; destructive burdens imposed 
 upon agriculture under the later 
 emperors, 388, 389. 
 
 Akenside, allusion to, in relation to 
 Brutus, 2i2, 243. 
 
 Alans : their Asiatic seat and man- 
 ner of life, 363; their arms, 416. 
 
 Alexandeb : Ms advantage over 
 Hannihal in ha-idng his own sub- 
 jects for soldiers, 90; empire of, 
 less in extent and inferior in inter- 
 communication to the Eoman, 273 ; 
 empire of, still retained its Grecian 
 character after being ahsorted by 
 the Eomans, 407. 
 
 Alexaudela, effect of the founding 
 of, upon the commerce of Carthage, 
 83; museum of, as an intellectual 
 center, compared with those of 
 modern times, 276. 
 
 Algiebs: similarity of government 
 of harbario Algeria to that of the 
 Eoman empire at a certain period, 
 329. 
 
 Allia (Eiver), defeat of the Eomans 
 on, hy the Gauls, refeiTcd to, and 
 the resulting scenes of distress in 
 Eome, 88, note 26. 
 
 Allies : five different sorts of Eoman 
 allies, 133 ; title of ally a species 
 of servitude, hut much coveted, 
 132. 
 
 ANDKOKicua, THE ELnER : his curious 
 relation to the patriarch of Con- 
 stantinople, 456. 
 
 Anthony : his corrupt use of Cesar's 
 book of accounts, 246 ; he delivers 
 Cassar's funeral oration, 247 ; the 
 government of Macedou falls to his 
 lot, 249 ; he undertakes to expel 
 Decimus Brutus from Cisalpine 
 Gaul, ibid. ; he is defeated at 
 Mantua, 250 ; he joins Lepidus and 
 Ootavius, 251 ; the cruelty of the 
 three, ibid. , and note 10 ; he hinds 
 himself by oath to restore the re- 
 
 public, 260 ; he is defeated by the 
 forces of Octavius at Actium, ibid. ; 
 he is betrayed by Cleopatra, ibid. ; 
 rcfiections on his fate, ibid. 
 
 Antiochus : he makes war against 
 the Eomans, 118, 119; he is de- 
 feated and humbled, 119, 120. 
 
 Antonines: Montesquieu's idea of 
 them, 317; their characters dis- 
 criminated, 337-339. 
 
 Aqueduots of Eome charaoteiized as 
 works of art, 37. 
 
 Akgos : viewed as the typical form 
 of the Grecian repubUcs, 177 ; low 
 grade of its Eepublioan institu- 
 tions, 177, 178. 
 
 Arians, persecution of, by Justinian, 
 424 ; the bai'harians converted by 
 Arian missionaries, 414 ; the lead- 
 ing tenet of Arius, 438. 
 
 Akistotle : his profound views in 
 regard to the formation of primi- 
 tive societies, 126 ; they are con- 
 firmed by historical investigation, 
 ibid. ; his theory of human hberty 
 inferior to that of the Eoman law- 
 yers, 433 ; his approval of the ex- 
 position of children, 314. 
 
 Aemies : soldiers of Eoman armies, 
 unlike those of modem times, not 
 injured by excessive labor, 49, 50 ; 
 healthiulness of the Eoman as com- 
 pared with modem armies, 53; 
 rareness of desertion among the 
 Eomans as compared with the like 
 experience in modem times, and 
 the cause of this difierence, ibid. ; 
 the Eomans long had no standing 
 armies, but were capable of raising 
 pi-eat temporary forces, 70 ; they 
 finally resorted to the system of 
 standing armies, ibid. ; the normal 
 military proportion for the Eoman 
 empire, 70, 310; for the leading 
 states of modem Europe, 68 ; for 
 the United States of America, 69 ; 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 493 
 
 the institution of standing armies 
 an aocompaniment of a diminished 
 military spirit, 270 ; parallel move- 
 ment of the Roman state and mod- 
 ern Em-ope in the adoption of stand- 
 ing armies, 270, 271 ; indications 
 that those of the latter mU finally 
 be greatly reduced, 272 ; similaiity 
 of panic fear in Eoman and modem 
 armies, 96. 
 
 Aenold : his relation to the critical 
 spirit as applied to early Eoman 
 history, 43 ; cited in relation to the 
 laud system of the ancient states, 
 71 ; in relation to the agrarian laws, 
 73, 74 ; in relation to the walls of 
 Eome under the tings, 35. 
 
 Absenitjs, a patriarch : curious agree- 
 ment between his followers and 
 those of the patriarch Joseph, 458. 
 
 Aet : early Eomans dependent upon 
 the Etrurians for their decorative 
 art, etc., 41 ; their deficiency in 
 art-feeling, 58 ; contrast between 
 them and the Greeks in this re- 
 spect, ibid. 
 
 Aeyak Eaoe : its early seat in Asia, 
 40 ; it forms the Eoman and Greek 
 states, ibid, ; its distinguished 
 share in forming the world's civil- 
 ization, 150. 
 
 Asia : the prehistoric seat of the an- 
 cestors of the Greeks and Eomans, 
 40 ; luxury and effeminacy of courts 
 of, 118; Eomans become corrupt 
 from the time their conquests ex- 
 tend into, ibid. ; infantry of ancient 
 Europe superior to that of ancient 
 Asia, 320, and note 6 ; the reverse 
 true as to cavalry, 446, 447. 
 
 AssAssoTATioN : Statistics of assassin- 
 ation of the Eoman Emperors from 
 Csesar to Augustulus, 346-352 ; 
 assassination of rulers — ancient and 
 modem ideas of, 240-244. 
 
 AsTEOLOGT, judicial, succeeded 
 
 among Christians the Pagan art 
 of divination, 440. 
 
 Athens, ancient, compared with 
 Eome, 63, 64 ; degeneracy of the 
 Athenians at the time Greece was 
 attacked by the Eomans, 111 ; low 
 character of the polity of Athens in 
 relation to liberty, 177, 203. 
 
 Athens, modem: its renaissance, 
 486, 487. 
 
 Aitila; extent of his dominions, 
 394-396 ; his relations to the East- 
 em and the Western empire, ibid. ; 
 description of his person, 397, note 
 12; his empire dissolves after his 
 death, 397. 
 
 Attgites : their infiuence over civil 
 affairs, 467. 
 
 Augustulus, the last Eoman empe- 
 ror of the "West, 347, 370. 
 
 Augustus (Oetavius) : he is the 
 adopted son and heir of Cffisar, 
 251, note 9 ; he is advanced by 
 Cicero, 249 ; his artifices with the 
 latter, 249 ; he joins Anthony and 
 Lepidus, 251 ; their cruelties, iiirf., 
 and note 10 ; he despoils Lepidus 
 of his power in the triumvirate, 
 258 ; his forces overthrow Anthony 
 at Actium, 260 ; instance of his 
 cruelty in the sacrifice of three 
 hundred senators and knights to 
 the manes of Cffisar, 342 ; he is the 
 only cowardly commander among 
 the Eomans who gained the affec- 
 tion of his soldiers, 259 ; what this 
 fact indicates as to the changed 
 character of the latter, ibid. ; con- 
 trast of his method with that ot 
 Cffisar, 263 ; contrast of his charac- 
 ter with that of Sylla, 264, 265 ; 
 idea of his pohcy, 261-269 ; the or- 
 der which he established charac- 
 terized, 261 ; his sm&W finesse, 264 ; 
 his ambiguous government, ibid. ; 
 it followed the forms of the repub- 
 
49i 
 
 ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 lie, 265, and note 10 ; he rendered 
 the military and naval establish- 
 ments of the empire permanent, 
 268 ; signifioanoe of this change, 
 270, 271 ; his age opens the epoch 
 of the greatest intercommunication 
 in ancient times, 273 ; comparison 
 of the sphere of intercommunica- 
 tion then existing with that of the 
 present day, 278, 274 ; informal 
 college of poets and literaiy men 
 gathered at Eome duiiug his reign, 
 276 ; comparison of the inteUeotual 
 center, thus established, with the 
 principal ones of modern times, 
 ibid. ; idea of Eoman manners 
 during this polite age, 205. 
 
 B 
 
 Bajazet : his overthrow by the Tar- 
 tars postpones the fall of Constan- 
 tinople, 481. 
 
 BiXDWiif, Mr. J. D. : his conception 
 as to the cause of the municipal 
 type of the ancient Mediterranean 
 states, 127. 
 
 Baleabes : their high character as 
 mercenaries, 101. 
 
 Baeeaeians : idea of their general 
 relation to the civilisation of South- 
 ern Europe, 127, 128; they were 
 originally unknown to the Bomans, 
 330 ; idea that the expansion of the 
 Eoman power pressed them north- 
 ward, 331, 332; the empire imper- 
 iled by, during the reigns of Deoi- 
 us, Grallus, and GaUienus, 332, 
 333, 400, note 19 ; displacement of 
 European barbarians by movement 
 of Huns from Asia, 363-365 ; trade 
 of, with the Eomans, 398, 399 ; 
 tribute imposed by, on the Eomans, 
 375, 376, 394, 396, 399; employ- 
 ment of, by the Romans as auxili- 
 aries, 377, 378 ; their different arms 
 
 and methods of fighting, 416 ; they 
 become Arians before they settle 
 in the empire, 414; what causes 
 concenti'ated them upon the empire 
 of the West, 399, 400, and note 19 ; 
 their method of invading, and the 
 cause of their final settlement, 397, 
 399 ; policy by which the Eomans 
 all but escaped from being over- 
 whelmed by them, 401, and note 
 27, also 307 ; rapidity with which 
 their maimers softgned when set- 
 tled in the countries of the south, 
 414, 415 ; idea of the influence of 
 the progressive increase of the use 
 of iron among them, 344-346. 
 
 Baelaam and AcisDTinjs : the curi- 
 ous question which they discussed 
 with the Greek monks, 452. 
 
 Basil, an emperor of the East: his 
 conduct as an illustration of the en- 
 feebling influence of superstition, 
 454. 
 
 Batle : his service to early Eoman 
 history, 43. 
 
 Beaot'oet : his critical relation to the 
 early history of Eome, 43. 
 
 Belisasibs : his invasion of Africa 
 and Italy referred to, 418 ; idea of 
 his great character, ibid. 
 
 Bills of Exchange referred to as 
 a feature of modern civilization, 
 441. 
 
 BcEOTiAns, the " dullest of the 
 Greeks" ; their deficiency in spir- 
 it, etc.. 111. 
 
 BossnET : his idea of the identity of 
 military discipline with the consti- 
 tution of the Eoman repubUo, 52, 
 note 12; his comparison of the Eo- 
 man legion and the Greek phalanx, 
 114, note 10 ; his statement of the 
 grandeur of the Eoman empire, 
 143, note 29 ; his statement in rela- 
 tion to the Eoman census and its 
 advantage to the state, 171, note 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 495 
 
 23 ; his idea of the causes of Eoman 
 decline, 187, note 11; Ms statement 
 respecting the Eoman colonies, 82, 
 note 12. 
 
 Bkidges, Eoman, referred to, 37. 
 
 Bboitze, archaic Greek and Eoman 
 history abuts upon an age of, 344. 
 
 Beutus, Jdnits, credited with check- 
 ing the practice of human sacrifice 
 among the early Eomans, 343. 
 
 Beotds, Maeohs : his sentiment in 
 relation to the part he took in the 
 assassination of C^sar, 223, 224; 
 his precipitate suicide, 251 ; Aken- 
 side's rhapsody on, 243, and note 
 12. 
 
 BuoKLE : his inadequate idea of the 
 iniuence of race on the phenomena 
 of history, 92, 93 ; his view of the 
 influence of the Eomans upon the 
 world, 153. 
 
 BuoKLEH, difTerent sorts of, in an- 
 cient times, 20 ; Eomans adopt that 
 of the Sabines, 'Hid. 
 
 C^sAE : place of his birth, 143, note 
 30 ; his physical description of the 
 Gauls, 94 ; violent character of his 
 ambition, 213 ; his corrupt prac- 
 tices, 214, 215, 262 ; his govern- 
 ment of the Gauls prepares the 
 way for his ambitious designs, 216 ; 
 he makes war upon the Gauls with- 
 out authority, 263, note 1 ; his pas- 
 sage of the Eubicon, 216, 217 ; his 
 great ability, iMd. ; he follows 
 Pompey into Greece, ibid. ; battle 
 of Pharsalia, 218 ; his idea that 
 Pompey was a " general without an 
 army," 233 ; his alleged slowness 
 after the battle of Pharsalia, 220 ; 
 he governs at first under the titles 
 of the Eoman magistracies, 220, 
 221 ; his clemency, 220, 239 ; his 
 
 attempt to assume a crown, 221 ; 
 his indecent contempt of the sen- 
 ate, and the obsequiousness of this 
 body, 221, 222, 280, 281 ; humilia- 
 tion of the patricians during his as- 
 cendency, 222 ; his assassination, 
 223, 224 ; his obsequies, 247 ; inci- 
 dent during the celebration of, in 
 illustration of the low mental status 
 of the Eoman people, 248 ; he is 
 placed in the number of the publio 
 divinities, »S«i. ; significance of this 
 action as indicating the decline of 
 the Eoman people, 'IHd. , note 6 ; 
 tragic end of his assassins, 258, and 
 note 1 ; the immaturity of their 
 plan, 245 ; Caesar's role in subvert- 
 ing the repubhc rationally consid- 
 ered, 219, 220, and 234 to 240 ; his 
 family destroys the other great 
 families of Eome, and runs out in 
 Nero, 300. 
 
 Caligula : his character, his reforms, 
 his tyranny, 293, 294 ; his sophis- 
 tical cruelty, 297. 
 
 CALLmions : his supposed but ques- 
 tioned discovery of Greek Are, 470, 
 471, and note 1. 
 
 Camillus: his speech in opposition 
 to the abandonment of Eome after 
 it was captured by the Gauls, 33. 
 
 Camp, Eoman, description of, 49, 
 and note 4 ; Eomans learned the 
 art of an-angingandfortifying their 
 camps from Pyrrhus, 77, and note 
 2; they finally abandon the cus- 
 tom, 379. 
 
 CaiotjE, battle of, referred to, 87; 
 description of, 96-98; scenes of 
 panic and consternation in Eome 
 after, 88, note 26. 
 
 Cautaoczeue : his capture of Con- 
 stantinople referred to, 457. 
 
 Capuasts : their early corruption, 28. 
 
 Cabaoalla: unlike Nero and Do- 
 mitian, ho extends his cruelties to 
 
496 
 
 ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 the whole empire, 322; state of 
 Eoman law during his reign illus- 
 trates the inherent tnomentum of a 
 great social organism, ibid.^ note 9 ; 
 his singular fate, 826. 
 
 Cabthage : sooner enriched and cor- 
 rupted than Eome, 77 ; vast wealth 
 of individual citizens of, whUst for- 
 tunes were nearly equal among the 
 Eomans, 78 ; the two factions which 
 
 • divided Carthage and their evil ef- 
 fects, 78, 79 ; Carthage founded 
 upon commerce, Eome upon arms, 
 80, note 8 ; difference between the 
 civil character of the Carthagin- 
 ians and that of the Eomans, 80 ; 
 avarice the leading source of am- 
 bition with the former, pride with 
 the latter, 79, 80 ; effect of this dif- 
 ference on the comparative endur- 
 ance of the two peoples, 80 ; the 
 Carthaginians relied on mercenary 
 troops, the Eomans on their own, 
 ibid. ; Carthage less firmly estab- 
 lished in her territory than Eome 
 in hers, 81, 82, 100; most of the 
 cities under Carthaginian rule but 
 little fortified, and hence easily 
 taken, 82 ; government of Carthage 
 very oppressive, 82, 83; her con- 
 stitution commended, however, by 
 Aristotle, 102 ; it was an aristocra- 
 cy of wealth, 177 ; license of the 
 defeated Carthaginian armies con- 
 trasted with the submission of the 
 Eoman, 82 ; oommeroe of Carthage 
 much impaired by the rise of Alex- 
 andria, 83 ; Carthaginians superior 
 to the Eomans on sea, 84 ; idea of 
 the territorial possessions of the 
 two peoples, 100 ; and of the ethnic 
 composition of their subject states. 
 Hid. ; the Carthaginians of Ph(Kni- 
 oian origin, 101 ; their language 
 Semitic, and closely allied to the 
 Hebrew, ibid. ; their worship of 
 
 Moloch and saerifloe of human vic- 
 tims, 103 ; magnitude and popular 
 tion of their city, 101 ; it is de- 
 stroyed by the Eomans, 102 ; bad 
 faith of the latter in so doing, 138, 
 and note 20 ; their literatm'e almost 
 wholly lost, 102 ; general compari- 
 son of the Carthaginians with the 
 Eomans, 102-105; the former less 
 adapted than the latter to beneficial 
 empire, 106 ; duration of Carthage 
 compared with that of certain an- 
 cient and modem cities, 410. 
 
 Caspian Gate : its critical impor- 
 tance to the Persian empire, 435. 
 
 Cassaubon : his remark upon the 
 Augustan History, 328, note 26. 
 
 Cassids, hasty suicide of, 251. 
 
 Cato the Censoe, viewed as a rep- 
 resentative of the jurisconsults of 
 his age, 430. 
 
 Cato the Yottnger ; comparison of, 
 with Cicero, 249, 250 ; his suicide, 
 251 ; reckoned the most virtuous 
 citizen of his age, 237 ; yet yields 
 to the delusion that the public good 
 would be" advanced by bribing 
 voters, ibid, 
 
 Catdliijs, referred to, 143, note SO. 
 
 Cause : relation of historical causes 
 to occasional events, 22, and note 
 6 ; variability of the occasions and 
 constancy of the causes • of great 
 social changes, 23 ; the world gov- 
 erned by general causes which are 
 not fortuitous, 378, 379. 
 
 Cavalrt : Eoman cavalry, 55 ; Car- 
 thaginian cavalry superior to the 
 Eoman, 84 ; relation of infantry 
 and cavalry to the military art, 
 879, 380; cavalry of the Parthians, 
 305 ; cavalry of Asia in ancient 
 times superior to that of Europe, 
 446, 447. 
 
 Censoes : their great and partially 
 undefined authority, 169-171, and 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 497 
 
 note 23 ; iimtanoe of the capricious 
 use of the censorial power, 170. 
 
 Chaelemagne : effect of his empire 
 upon the nations of Europe similar 
 to that of the Eomans, 331, 332. 
 
 Chables I, referred to, 252, note 13 ; 
 difference between the armies that 
 espoused his cause and those of 
 Cromwell and the Arabs, 449. 
 
 Chbistiamitt : the Christian doctrine 
 of Charity more akin to the Phi- 
 losophy than to the Religions which 
 preceded it, 339, 340 ; its ameliora- 
 ting influence on Eoman slavery, 
 204 ; its influence in abolishing the 
 gladiatorial combats, 313, 362, note 
 14 ; disputed relation of Christian- 
 ity to the decaying empire, 392- 
 394 ; it ceases to be dominant in the 
 East, 445, 446 ; it degenerates under 
 the Greek empire, 448-450 ; and 
 combines with Paganism, 463, 464. 
 
 CioEHO : place of his birth, 143, note 
 30 ; instance of Soman corruption 
 from, 197, 193 ; his judgment of 
 the action of Csesar — correction of 
 Montesquieu's statement of same, 
 210, and note 8 ; his idea that Cae- 
 sar was inactive after the battle of 
 Phaisalia, 220 ; instance from, of 
 Caesar's contempt of the senate, 
 221, 222 ; high historical value of 
 his letters, 222, 223 ; his opinion 
 as to the manner in which the 
 assassination of Csesar should have 
 been followed up, 247, 248 ; his bad 
 pohcy in elevating Octavius, 249 ; 
 his character as compared with that 
 of Cato, 249, 250 ; his great vanity 
 and small passions, 250, and note 8; 
 idea of his place in Eoman history, 
 241 ; his opinion on the doctrine 
 of Tyrannicide, 241, 242 ; his state- 
 ment in reference to the confisca- 
 tion of his house, 461 ; in reference 
 to Eoman soldiera, 48, note 2. 
 
 CiNoiKNATus : spirit of his age, as 
 compared with that of Pompey 
 and Cffisar, 286, 237. 
 
 CiBocs : the great ch-cus at Eome one 
 of the principal works which relate 
 back to the time of the kings, 36 ; 
 factions of the circus and the hip- 
 podrome, 420, 421 ; their puerile 
 character an indication of the men- 
 tal status of the people, 421, note 
 18. 
 
 Cities : great cities not specially fa- 
 vorable to the production of genius, 
 143, note 30 ; few of the eminent 
 Latin poets and prose writers born 
 in Eome, ibid. ; parallel experience 
 of modern times, ibid. ; average 
 number of persons to the dwell- 
 ing in the city of Eome, compared 
 with the like element for the prin- 
 cipal modern cities of Em'ope and 
 America, 370-374. 
 
 Civilization : -ancient civilization 
 much more military and much less 
 industrial than the modern, 59, 60 ; 
 more diversity in the social condi- 
 tion of ancient than of modern Eu- 
 rope, 61 ; this fact favored the ag- 
 grandizement of the Eomans, ibid. ; 
 more disproportion of power among 
 the modem than the ancient states 
 of Europe, ibid. ; this fact renders 
 it difficult in modem times for a 
 small European state to rise to emi- 
 nence, ibid. ; the case of Prussia 
 considered, 66, 67 ; spirit of con- 
 quest more pronounced in ancient 
 than in modem societies, 67; in-\ 
 fluence of the Eomans upon the 
 world's civilization, 124-128, 149- 
 154, 427-434 ; when ancient civili- 
 zation was most cosmopolitan in 
 character, 273 ; comparison of an- 
 cient with modem civilization in 
 this respect, 273-277 ; emotional 
 excitement in ancient and modem 
 
498 
 
 ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 societies, 286, 286, 288-292 ; rela- I 
 tion of ancient and modem civili- 
 zations to the longevity of nations, 
 408-412 ; comparative relation of 
 ancient and modem civilizations to 
 liberty and slavery, 174-179, 201- 
 207 ; to hvmianity and education, 
 311-316, 204, 205, 432, 146-149; 
 their comparative relation as to 
 territorial extension, 411 ; as to in- 
 tercommunication, 273-277 ; how 
 the relation of the civil and ecclesi- 
 astical powers varies with the de- 
 velopment of civilization, 466-469. 
 
 CiAXTDius : the manner of his eleva- 
 tion, 298 ; he completes the ruin 
 of the ancient orders, ibid. ; effect 
 of the gladiatorial spectacles on, 
 294. 
 
 CiEOMEifEa: his attempt to restore 
 the ancient Spartan laws, 64. 
 
 CleOpatea : her hetrayal of An- 
 thony, 260 ; reflection on her rep- 
 resentative coquetry, ibid. 
 
 Coinage, of copper money derived by 
 the Eomans from the Etrurians, 41. 
 
 Coliseum, alluded to, 37. 
 
 Colonies, Eoman , 82 ; their twofold 
 advantage, ibid., note 12; Eoman 
 policy of colonizing redundant pop- 
 ulation, 267, 268. 
 
 CoLTiMETis, referred to, 488. 
 
 CoMMEEOE, the early Eomans with- 
 out, 25; Carthage founded upon, 
 80, note 8 ; commerce of Carthage 
 reduced by the founding of Alex- 
 andria, 83 ; Montesquieu's view re- 
 specting the instability of great 
 commercial nations, ibid. ; this 
 view considered, ibid., note 15; 
 Constantinople becomes the prin- 
 cipal commercial center of the 
 world, 358-360, 472 ; commerce 
 passes thence to the Italian cities, 
 478. 
 
 CoMNENCs, Andbonicus : his invec- 
 
 tives against the French crusaders, 
 476. 
 
 Compass, maeineb's, ancients with- 
 out, 84, 85 ; effect of discovery of, 
 on navigation, 85, 86. 
 
 CoMTE : his idea of the comparative 
 military spirit of ancient and mod- 
 em societies, 59, 60 ; his apprecia- 
 tion of the influence of the Eomans 
 on civilization, 153, 154. 
 
 Conquest : slowness with which the 
 early Eomans effected their con- 
 quests, and the advantage thence 
 resulting, 27, 29, and note 18 ; 
 spirit of conquest more in harmony 
 with ancient than with modern 
 ideas, 67 ; illustration of same from 
 the action of the United States and 
 the German Empire, 110, note 3 ; 
 Eoman policy of conquest particu- 
 larly stated, 129-145; this pohoy 
 low and selfish, but most success- 
 ful for ancient times, 146. 
 
 CoNSTANTiNE THE Geeat : Hs policy 
 in relation to the praetorian pre- 
 fects, 356 ; in the founding of a 
 new capitol, 358-360 ; in disposing , 
 of the military force of the empu-e, 
 361, 362. 
 
 Constantinople : disastrous effect of 
 the founding of, upon Eome and 
 upon Italy, 358-361 ; the new city 
 becomes a center of great wealth, 
 360 ; bad policy of Constantine in 
 providing for the distribution of 
 grain to the inhabitants of, 359 ; it 
 carries on the principal commerce 
 of the world, 472 ; transfer of the 
 commerce of, to the cities of Italy, 
 478 ; the two great attacks upon, 
 by the Arabs, 471, note 1 ; capture 
 of, by the cmsaders, 483, 484 ; by 
 Cantacuzene, 457 ; it finally repre- 
 sents all that remains of the Greek 
 empire, 481 ; and is captured by 
 Mohammed II, 488. 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 499 
 
 CoNSTAHnus Chlokus : alleged divis- 
 ion of the empire between him and 
 Galerius, 358. 
 
 Constitution, Eomau : such that it 
 admitted the oorreotion of abuses, 
 172 ; necessity of this In a free 
 state, 173 ; the examples of Athens, 
 Carthage, the modern republics of 
 Italy, and England, as illustra- 
 tions, 172, 173 ; the constitution of 
 Servius Tullius (providing for a 
 divisioD of the people by classes 
 and centuries) reaUy an aristocracy 
 of rank and wealth, 174-176 ; the 
 subsequent division by tribes more 
 liberal, but still greatly unequal, 
 176 ; general view of the constitu- 
 tion of republican Eome in its re- 
 lation to liberty, 177, 178 ; its infe- 
 riority in this respect to the gov- 
 ernments of modem Europe, and 
 especially to that of the United 
 States, 179. 
 
 Consuls : institution and advantages 
 of the consular system, 24; its 
 drawbacks, 37-39. 
 
 CoHDAT, Chaelotte, allusion to, 242. 
 
 CoEioLANus, reference to, 87. 
 
 CoEBupTioN : general idea of Eoman 
 corruption, 197-200 ; Romans re- 
 tained their devotion to war after 
 they became corrupt, 199, 200 ; this 
 viewed as an instance of the sur- 
 vival of the " ruling passion," 200, 
 note 7 ; instance of Eoman corrup- 
 tion given by Cicero, 197, 198 ; 
 monstrous corruption of Cassar, 
 Pompey, and Crassus, 262 ; idea of 
 the corruption of the two parties 
 and its causes, 191-194, 236-240 ; 
 cornipt manners more dangerous 
 to a state than violation of the laws, 
 169 ; idea that the ancient nations 
 were more readily corrupted by 
 wealth and luxury than the mod- 
 em, 411. 
 
 CoBSAiKs : unworthy motive on 
 account of which they were for- 
 merly tolerated by the great states 
 of Europe, 473, and note 4. 
 
 Ckassus : his corruption, 262 ; he 
 makes war upon the Parthians 
 without authority, 268, note 7. 
 
 Ceomwell : the character of his army 
 referred to, 449. 
 
 Ceusades: opinion in which they 
 originated, 475, 476 ; menacing atti- 
 tude of the crusaders toward the 
 Eastern empire, 476 ; comparative 
 conduct of the French and German 
 crusaders, 476, 477 ; Latin crusade 
 against the empire of the East, 477; 
 conduct of the French crusaders on 
 capturing Constantinople, 477, 483 ; 
 extent of the empire of the Latin 
 crusaders, 478 ; period of their dom- 
 ination in the East, ibid. ; they are 
 expelled by the Greeks, ibid. ; the 
 Crusades the most remarkable phe- 
 nomena in the world's history of re- 
 ligious fanaticism, 482 ; their period 
 of duration and final result, ibid. 
 
 GuBULE Chaies : Eoman curule 
 chairs of magistracy derived from 
 the Etrurians, 41. 
 
 CYSosoEPHALiE : Macedon humbled 
 by the battle of, 114. 
 
 Ctpeus, relation of the kingdom of, 
 to the crown of Egypt, 122. 
 
 CrKENE, relation of, to Egypt, 122. 
 
 Daeius : inferior material of his 
 armies as compared with those of 
 the Greeks, 122, 123. 
 
 Davis, Dr. N. : his work on " Car- 
 thage and her Eemains " referred 
 to and cited, 103, 104. 
 
 Decemvies : paralyzing effect of their 
 tyranny on the state, 28, 29. 
 
 Decline, Eoman : magnitude of the 
 
500 
 
 ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 repuTilio and magnitude of the city, 
 two causes of, according to Montes- 
 quieu, 180-187 ; the original Eo- 
 mans overwhelmed by the influx 
 of foreigners, 182-184; the disor- 
 ders thence resulting, and the ex- 
 tinction of the ancient Eoman 
 spirit, iKd. ; further statement of 
 the causes of Eoman decline, 187, 
 note 11 ; absorption of blood by 
 foreign admixture the general cause 
 of national decline, according to De 
 Gobineau, 188, 189 ; this concep- 
 tion considered generally, and in 
 relation to the Eomans in particu- 
 lar, 189, 190 ; attempt to determine 
 with precision the epochs of Eo- 
 man grandeur and decadence, 190- 
 194 ; the two chief causes of the 
 latter, 194 ; three notable parallels 
 between the rise and the decline of 
 the Eoman power, and the rationale 
 of the same, 194, 195; Gibbon's 
 idea of the period of Eoman de- 
 cline questioned, 195, 196 ; De 
 Quincey's idea of the same, ibid. 
 
 Debt, National, Eoman empire dis- 
 tinguished from modem states in 
 reference to, 387. 
 
 De GoBUJEAn : his idea that the de- 
 cline of nations depends upon the 
 absorption of the national blood, 
 188, 189; this conception consid- 
 ered and limited, 189, 190. 
 
 Dentatus, CuEnjs: contrast of the 
 spirit of his age with that of Csesar 
 and Pompoy, 236, 237. 
 
 De Quih-oey: his criticism of Gib- 
 bon respecting the period of Eo- 
 man decline, 195, 196 ; his idea of 
 the two Autonines, 337, 338; his 
 idea of the population of ancient 
 Eome, 871 ; and of the unhappy po- 
 sition of the Eoman emperors, 852. 
 
 DicTATOES originate with the aristo- 
 cratic party, 167, and note 10. 
 
 DiniDs, JuLiAuns, purchases the em- 
 pii-e at auction, 318, 819. 
 
 Diocletian : his rule that there 
 should be two emperors and two 
 Cffisars, 355. 
 
 Discipline, Militabt, standard of, 
 among the Eomans, 48-56; it was 
 their resource in all extremities, 
 52; it was the first thing which 
 they acquired and the last which 
 they lost, 52, note 12. 
 
 DtriLLius : his naval victory over the 
 Carthaginians, 86. 
 
 E 
 
 Eastern Question, relation of, to 
 modern Greece, etc., 485-487. 
 
 Education, Mental, contrast be- 
 tween ancient and modem societies 
 in relation to, 315, 316 ; narrow- 
 ness of base of the Greek and 
 Eoman republics in this respect, 
 ibid. ; modem system of popular 
 education, ibid. ; its fundamental 
 idea of rendering education univer- 
 sal had but a rudimentary place in 
 ancient societies, ibid. 
 
 Education, Physical, among the 
 Eomans, 50, 51 ; among the Greets, 
 122, 123 ; more regarded in ancient 
 than in modem times, 51. 
 
 Edwabds, M. : his idea of the physi- 
 cal type of the Eomans, 58. 
 
 Egypt : in primitive times supersti- 
 tion deban-ed foreigners from, 83 ; 
 injurious rule of the Persians in, 
 ibid. ; under the Greeks, took the 
 lead in the world's commerce, 
 ibid. ; condition and internal poli- 
 ty of, when approached by the Eo- 
 mans, 121, 122 ; sisters shared with 
 brothers in succession to the crown 
 of, ibid. ; its forces consisted of 
 Greek auxiliaries, 122; effect of 
 conquest of, on the value of money 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 501 
 
 at Eome, 360 ; duration of, referred 
 to, 409. 
 
 EiiBAssADOES, Eesident : a feature of 
 modern as distinguislied from an- 
 cient societies, 4iO, 441 ; institu- 
 tion of, inimical to secret state en- 
 terprises, ibid. 
 
 Ejipekoes: the magistracies of the 
 republic assumed by, and united 
 in, 319 ; difference of their func- 
 tions from those of modem mon- 
 archs, ibid. ; it was in the char- 
 acter of tribunes that they per- 
 petrated their greatest enormities, 
 2S4; rationale of their amazing 
 cruelty, 294 ; their executions for 
 the purpose of confiscating the 
 estates of their victims without a 
 parallel in modem societies, 295 ; 
 they were inimical to the aristoc- 
 racy and friendly to the plebs, 296, 
 297 ; rationale of this double rela- 
 tion, iHd.^ and note 7 ; elective re- 
 lation of the armies to, 329, 380 ; 
 facility with which they were mas- 
 sacred by the soldiers, 327, 328 ; 
 plan resorted to by Diocletian to 
 render their lives more secure, 355 ; 
 difference between the manners of 
 the early and the later emperors, 
 356, 357 ; influence of Asiatic ideas 
 and manners upon them, 357, 358 ; 
 statistics of their assassination and 
 their reigns from Csesar to Augus- 
 tulus, 346-352 ; light thence shed 
 upon the comparative excellence of 
 the £oman polity and that of the 
 monarchies of modem Europe, 352, 
 353. 
 
 ■Empiee, EoiLUf : rationale of the 
 passage of the republic into the 
 empire, 188-195, 225-228, 234^240 ; 
 on establishment of the empire the 
 forms of the republic stUl observed, 
 265, note 10; the empire to be 
 viewed as the permanent triumph 
 
 of the popular over the patrician 
 faction of the republic, 297, note 7 ; 
 and 237-239 ; it was at some periods 
 a species of irregular military gov- 
 ernment, similar to that of Algiers, 
 329 ; in its whole course it vacillated 
 between the elective, the hereditary, 
 and the patrimonial types of mon- 
 archy, 351 , 352 ; great inferiority of 
 the government of, to the monar- 
 chies of modem Em-ope, ibid. ; idea 
 of the physical extent, ethnic com- 
 position, intercommunication, pop- 
 ulation, andmilitary and naval force 
 of, at the period of its greatest es- 
 tate, 308-311 ; division of, into 
 Eastern and Westem, 358 ; ration- 
 ale of this division, 368-370 ; prov- 
 inces of, which were first overrun 
 by the barbarians, 398 ; the manner 
 of the barbarians in subverting the 
 empire of the West, 397-402 ; why 
 the Westem empire fell first, 399, 
 400, and note 19 ; time of its final 
 extinction, 405, and 397, note 18 ; 
 fall of the Westem empire marks 
 the close of Eoman history in the 
 principal sense, 406, 407 ; reflec- 
 tions in connection with this event, 
 408-412 ; curious opinion of the 
 Eomau augurs in respect to the 
 duration of the Eoman power, 408. 
 
 Empire of the East : its Grecian as- 
 pect, 406, 407; in what sense its 
 history is Eoman, 407, 408 ; long 
 period of its duration after the fall 
 of the Empire of the West, 408, 
 407 ; the causes of this, 470-473 ; 
 its low civU character, 437-440 ; 
 partial conquest of, by the Turks, 
 475 ; by the Latin crusaders, 477, 
 478 ; expulsion of the latter by the 
 Greeks, 478 ; weakness of the new 
 Greek empire, 478, 479 ; it is final- 
 ly subdued by the Turks, 488. 
 
 Enolani), taken as an illustration 
 
502 
 
 ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 of tlie stability of great commercial 
 states in modem times, 83, note 
 1 5 ; self- correcting character of her 
 constitution, referred to, 173; aver- 
 age reign of her monarohs from 
 "William the Conqueror to Victoria, 
 compared with that of the Koman 
 emperors from Caesar to Augustu- 
 lus, 351, 352; great organic supe- 
 riority of the modem state indi- 
 cated thereby, ibid. 
 
 Engeatdto, influence of the modern 
 art of, referred to, 441. 
 
 Emnns, reference to, 143, note 30. 
 
 Epioubtis : corrupting influence of his 
 philosophy on the Eomans, 197. 
 
 Epieds, small historical signifioanoo 
 of, after the time of Pyrrhus, 77. 
 
 Eqtjesteiaits, horses of, kept at the 
 public expense, 55, note 19 ; they 
 were divided into eighteen centu- 
 ries, and took precedence of the 
 other classes, 175, 176. 
 
 Eteubians preceded the Eomans in 
 civilization, and were first cornipt- 
 ed, 28, 40 ; they supplied the early 
 Eomans with augurs, skilled work- 
 men, decorative art, household 
 utensils, coinage of copper money, 
 etc., 41 ; the Eomans derived from 
 them their institution of liotors, 
 the curule chair of magistracy, the 
 purple robe of state, ibid. ; and the 
 gladiatorial spectacle, 54, 55. 
 
 Edeope, AiroiEirr, prehistoric stone 
 age of, referred to, 44, 45 ; detached 
 character of the civilizations of, 
 124^127 ; unity impressed upon 
 these by the Eoman power, 127, 
 128; progressive diffusion of use 
 of iron from south to north of, 344- 
 346. 
 
 EuEOPE, Modeek: the ratio of the 
 military and naval forces of its 
 principal powers, as compared with 
 the like ratio for the United States 
 
 and the Eoman empire, 68-70, 310 ; 
 progressive state of, 272, 273 ; pros- 
 pect of ultimate and great diminu- 
 tion of its immense military estab- 
 lishments, ibid. 
 
 Faeids, referred to, 107 ; how he ac- 
 quired the surname of Maximus, 
 171. 
 
 FiBEioitis : his opinion of the Epi- 
 curean philosophy, 197, note 1; 
 difference between the spirit of his 
 age and that of Pompey and Cse- 
 sar, 236, 237. 
 
 Fetiales : their functions in relation 
 to peace and war, 467. 
 
 Flandees, Count of, elected em- 
 peror of the East, 478. 
 
 FoETiFioATioirs I no machines used 
 by ancient Italians for attacking 
 fortified places, 26, 27 ; when such 
 machines began to be used among 
 the Greeks, 26, note 12; ancient 
 African cities but little fortified, 
 82; Eoman method of fortifying 
 their camps, 49, and note 4 ; 76, 77, 
 and note 2 ; they at length aban- 
 don this custom, 379 ; fortifications 
 of Koman cities neglected or dis- 
 mantled by the barbaric conquer- 
 ors, 414 ; the early Eomans had no 
 fortified places, 425 ; their great 
 number during the decline of the 
 empii-e, 425, 426, and note 21. 
 
 Fbauoe : extent to which the ancient 
 Galhc stock survives in, 93 ; simi- 
 larity of Gallic and French traits 
 given as an instance of the persist- 
 ency of race characters, 91, 94; the 
 two sorts of civil wars of, 261 ; 
 average reign of her kings com- 
 pared with that of the Eoman em- 
 perors, 351, 352; what this com- 
 parison indicates, ibid. ; early 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 503 
 
 French history explained by the 
 oppressiveness of the Boman gov- 
 ernment, 883, 389 ; character of the 
 French crusaders as compared with 
 that of the German, «6, 477, 483, 
 484. 
 Feieslajtd, physical condition, of, in 
 ancient times, 447, and note 5. 
 
 6 
 
 Gaics : his place as a Eoman lawyer, 
 431. 
 
 Galebixis, alleged divisioa of the 
 empire in the time of, 358, 368. 
 
 Galueitos, critical condition of the 
 empire during the reign of, 332, 333. 
 
 Gailot, great invasion of barbarians 
 during the reign of, 331. 
 
 Gastaldi: his "prehistoric Eemains 
 in Italy " referred to, 46, 47. 
 
 Gatjls: their captui'e of Eome, and 
 the cause of the quarrel that led to 
 this event, 30-32 ; their numerous 
 wars with the Eomans, 76 ; their 
 defective arms, tMd. ; their general 
 character according to Montes- 
 quieu, ibid. ; the same otherwise 
 viewed, 91 ; Maohiavelli's and 
 Livy's idea of the same, 91-93; 
 afBhation of the ancient Galhc and 
 modern French characters, 92; 
 large proportion in which the Gal- 
 lic element survives in the French 
 nation, 93 ; idea of the pJiydque of 
 the Gauls as compared with that 
 of the Eomans, 94 ; great number 
 of Gallic tribes, 125 ; destructive 
 exactions of the Eoman government 
 upon Gaul under the later em- 
 perors, 389. 
 
 Genoa, duration of, in comparison 
 with certain ancient cities, 410 ; 
 commerce of the decaying Greek 
 empire transferred to, and to other 
 Italian eities, 478, 479. 
 
 Gensebio, reference to, 400, 401. 
 
 Gebmaniods, excessive grief of the 
 Eoman people on the death of, 285, 
 286 ; like instance of extravagant 
 popular feeling in modem times, 
 289-291. 
 
 Geemahty, physical aspect of, in 
 ancient times, 447 ; how this has 
 been changed by art, iiM, ; char- 
 acter of the German crusaders as 
 compared with that of the Jrench, 
 476,- 477, 483, 484 ; pacific return 
 of German armies at close of 
 Franco-Prussian war referred to, 
 as an illustration of the modern 
 spirit, 110, note 3 ; mental produc- 
 tiveness of, alluded to, 275, 276; 
 relation of, to reformation of 16th 
 century, 464, 
 
 Gibbon : his view of the influence of 
 the Eomans upon manldnd, 153 ; his 
 conception of the period of Eoman 
 decline questioned, 195, 196; his 
 idea of the character of Trajan, 303, 
 note 19 ; his remarks respecting in- 
 fanticide among the ancients, 313 ; 
 his allusion to the statement of Zosi- 
 mus respecting the oppressiveness 
 of the Eoman tax, 390 ; his state- 
 ment respecting the purity of the 
 Eoman law during the reign of 
 Caracalla, 322, note 9 ; his division 
 of the history of the Eoman law 
 into three periods, 429 ; remark by, 
 in relation to the Eoman law and 
 lawyers, 431 ; his estimate of the 
 population of ancient Eome exam- 
 ined and modified, 371, 373; idea 
 from, of the factions of the circus, 
 421, note 18 ; his description of 
 AttUa, S97, note 12 ; his idea of the 
 efficacy of Greek fire, 471, note 1 ; 
 references to, in relation to the 
 cities, roads, population, and mili- 
 tary establishment of the empire, 
 309, 310. 
 
604 
 
 ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 Gladiatobs, Spectacle of, bor- 
 rowed from the Etrmians, 54, 55 ; 
 used by the Komans aa a stimulus 
 to martial ferocity, 55, note 17 ; 
 had the effect of rendering the spec- 
 tators bloodthirsty, 294 ; origin 
 and description of, 311-313 ; great 
 number of victims slain in the ex- 
 hibitions of, 312 ; value of this 
 spectacle as an indication of the 
 status of the Romans, 312, 313 ; it 
 succumbed to the spirit of Chiis- 
 tianity, ibid., and 362, note 14. 
 
 Goths : how they entered the em- 
 pire, 363-366 ; their ravages, 366 ; 
 unlike the Huns, they did not culti- 
 vate lands, 365, and note 27 ; their 
 settlement in the empire, 367 ; their 
 destructive character, 398, note 14. 
 
 GovEBiTMENT : no government in all 
 respects despotic, 460 ; all power 
 rests on the general spirit of the 
 nation, and is unsettled when this 
 is shocked, ibid. ; sense in which 
 all governments repose upon opin- 
 ion, 465, 466 ; difference between 
 free and despotic governments in 
 this respect, 466 ; the utility and 
 the rationale of the principle of 
 hereditary succession in monar- 
 chical states, 352, 353. 
 
 Geaoohi, political significance of se- 
 ditions in time of, 192 ; appeal of 
 Tiberius Gracchus to the nobles, 
 65 ; his Agrarian law and his un- 
 just fate, 75, 246, note 1. 
 
 Greece, Anciewt ; numerous muni- 
 cipal states of, 126 ; condition of, 
 when attacked by the Eomans, 110- 
 114 ; would have been invincible 
 if united, 112; "balance of power" 
 among the little states of, ibid. ; ne- 
 cessarily dependent character of the 
 Greek republics, 116 ; ascendency 
 of the Eomans in, 115, 116 ; pohti- 
 cal maxim which they established 
 
 among the cities of, 123 ; schools of, 
 viewed as one of the chief intellect- 
 ual oentera of antiquity, 276 ; com- 
 parison of these with the similar 
 centers of modern civilization, 276, 
 277. 
 
 Geeeoe, MoDEBir, referred to in 
 connection with Europe's eastern 
 question, 480, 487. 
 
 Greek Fiee, 470, 471, and note 1. 
 
 Greeks : Greek cities in Italy — their 
 early coiTuption, 28 ; unlike the 
 Eomans, the Greeks attained their 
 best in war and art at the same 
 time, 58 ; beneficial influence of 
 their rule upon Egypt, 83; their 
 games, 122; sesthetio superiority 
 of these to the Eoman spectacles, 
 297, note 6 ; their physical superi- 
 ority to the barbarians and Asiatics, 
 122, 123 ; their defective observ- 
 ance of the oath, 197, and note 2 ; 
 unequivocal character of their in- 
 fluence on the world's civilization, 
 150, 151 ; how they differ from the 
 Eomans in this respect, 151, 152 ; 
 the "Ten Thousand" referred to, 
 101. 
 
 Greeks or the Eastern Empire; 
 idea of their bigotry, and of their 
 passion for theological disputation, 
 448-460 ; their mental penchant 
 akin to that of the Greeks of the 
 classical ages, 454, note 25; most 
 of the speculative disputes which 
 vexed the Christian church of 
 Greek paternity, ibid. ; their idea 
 of shedding the blood of Christiaus, 
 and the peculiar character of their 
 punishments, 489, and note 10; 
 their insensate folly during the 
 closing days of the empire of the 
 East, 481 ; the Greek and Latin 
 schism of the church referred to, 
 475. 
 
 Gdizot: his partially just, but in- 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 505 
 
 complete, idea of the munioipal 
 character of ancient societies, 127. 
 Gdnpowdeb, curious effect of the dis- 
 covery of, on the force of navies, 
 86.. 
 
 H 
 
 Qasbiah: he voluntarily abandons 
 the conquests of Trajan, 806 ; his 
 policy in this respect occasions 
 much discontent, ibid. ; idea of 
 the vast extent of the empire after 
 it was thus reduced, 308. 
 
 HiionBAL: his position in ancient 
 history, 87 ; Montesquieu's idea 
 that he could not have taken Eome 
 after the battle of Cannse, 89 ; the 
 question considered further, 98, 99 ; 
 drawback arising from the merce- 
 nary character of his troops, 90; 
 he armed his soldiers in the Eoman 
 manner, 115 ; he was not sent into 
 Italy by the government of Car- 
 thage, nor much succored by it, 
 90 ; fortune turned against him by 
 his own conquests, ibid. ; Livy's 
 hoiir-mots of, distrusted, 107 ; rapid 
 rise and gradual decline of his 
 power in Italy, 94, 95 ; his recall, 
 108 ; his defeat at Zama, ibid., and 
 note 1 ; he flies to the court of An- 
 tiochus, 119, note 14 ; his futile ad- 
 vice to that monarch, 119. 
 
 Heliosabalus, 321, 328, 420, and 
 note 15. 
 
 Helots : their number relative to the 
 number of their Spartan masters, 
 203. 
 
 HEjntT IV, OF Fkaitoe : his assassi- 
 nation referred to, 243. 
 
 Hebacleonas, punishment inflicted 
 upon— method of the degenerate 
 Greeks, 439, note 10. 
 
 Heeodotds makes no mention of the 
 Eomans, 109, note 2; significance 
 of this, ibid., note (o). 
 22 
 
 Hesiod : his authority as to a Bronze 
 Age among the Greeks, 344. 
 
 HisTOBT, Genbbal: idea that prog- 
 ress pervades, mainly a result of 
 modern thought, 11,12; truth of, as 
 to men, much affected by fortune, 
 24 ; universal history to be viewed 
 as a movement towards an ideally 
 perfect civilization, 150 ; nations to 
 be valued according to their influ- 
 ence upon this movement, ibid. ; 
 resolution of history into four great 
 periods as regards the condition 
 of the industrial classes, 205-207 ; 
 phenomena of history only to be 
 understood when looked at com- 
 paratively, 277 ; intellectual de- 
 velopment of the Eomans superior 
 to that of the Greeks in the sphere 
 of history, why? 428. 
 
 HisTOEr, EosiAu: its place in uni- 
 versal history, 13; how far early 
 Eoman history thoroughly credible, 
 40-42 ; how far partially so, 42 ; 
 four periods of Eoman history as to 
 credibility, 42, 43 ; it becomes more 
 secret and obscure after the estab- 
 lishment of the empire, 269 ; it ter- 
 minates in the principal sense on 
 the fall of the empire of the West, 
 406 ; but continues in a subordinate 
 sense until the faE of the empire of 
 the East, 406, 407. 
 
 HoLLAHD, physical condition of, in 
 ancient times, 447. 
 
 HoMEB : his high regard for the phys- 
 ical accomplishments of his he- 
 roes, 51 ; his testimony that the 
 use of bronze preceded the use of 
 iron among the Greeks, 344. 
 
 HoNOEics : great collapse of the em- 
 pire during the reign of, 397, and 
 note 13. 
 
 HooEiEB, citation from, in illustration 
 of the stoical philosophy, 336, 337. 
 
 HoEAOE : place of his birth referred 
 
506 
 
 ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 to, 143, note 30 ; superstitious rite 
 of human Baoriflee among the Eo- 
 mans in the time of, 342. 
 
 Htioo : his emendation of Gibbon's 
 threefold division of the history of 
 Eoman Uiw, 429. 
 
 Humanity, Virtue of : the polythe- 
 ism of the GreeliS, Eomans, and 
 other Indo-European nations de- 
 ficient in, 339, 340 ; want of, in the 
 Eoman system of slavery, 204, 205 ; 
 and in the legal power of Eoman 
 father over child, husband over 
 wife, and debtor over creditor, 482 ; 
 and in the custom of the Roman 
 triumph, 146, 149 ; and in the 
 gladiatorial spectacle, 311, 313 ; 
 and in the practice of infanticide, 
 313-315. 
 
 Human Saceifige: among Eomans, 
 Greeks, Gauls, Gei-mans, Britons, 
 340; annual sacrifice of boys and 
 old men in early Eoman times, 
 341 ; human saerifices made by the 
 Eomans after the battle of Cannae, 
 342 ; others made as late as 45 b.o., 
 ibid. ; sacrifice of boys in connec- 
 tion with the rites of magic in the 
 time of Horace, ibid. ; sacrifice of 
 men by Sextus Pompey and Oota- 
 vius, ibid. ; high representative 
 value of this practice as Indicating 
 the mental status of the masses of 
 the Eoman people, 340; human 
 sacrifices made by Aristomenes, 
 340, 341 ; by the Grecks^before the 
 battle of Salamis, 341 ; girls beaten 
 to death on the altai- of the Aroadi- 
 .in Bacchus, ibid. ; human sacri- 
 fice assumes its most revolting form 
 among the Carthaginians and Phos- 
 nioians, 103-105. 
 
 HmiK : his idea that the worst mod- 
 em state of Europe is more favor- 
 able to human liberty in genejCl 
 than were the best ancient ones. 
 
 205 ; his idea that all governments 
 are founded on opinion, 464, 465 ; 
 this idea considered and qualified, 
 465, 466. 
 HuNs : their Asiatic seat and manner 
 of life, 363, and 365, note 27 ; their 
 movement into Europe and its im- 
 mediate effects, 364, 365 ; their 
 character, 396, 397; their custom 
 of life, 395 ; their race affinity with 
 the Parthians, 415 ; they become 
 auxiliaries Of the Eomans, 415, 416; 
 question of their race identity with 
 the Turks, 480, and note 19. 
 
 I 
 
 Ibeeians : their excellent character as 
 mercenaries, 101. 
 
 Iconoclasts : their war upon the 
 worship of images, 450, 453 ; dura- 
 tion and result of the conflict, 453, 
 note 20 ; monks, clergy, patiiarohs, 
 and popes oppose the abolition of 
 this worship, 463, 464 ; movement 
 of the iconoclasts a precursor of 
 Eeformation of 16th century, 450, 
 464; it is crushed by Byzantine 
 monks, 464. 
 
 Image Worship, among the Greeks 
 of the Eastern empire, and the 
 quari'el respecting it, 449, 450 ; 
 cause of the violence of this quar- 
 rel, 451 ; it terminates in the tri- 
 umph of the image worshipers, 452, 
 453, and note 20. 
 
 Indians, Amebican : analogy of the 
 Eoman policy respecting the bar- 
 barians to that of the United States 
 in relation to the Indian tribes, 
 367, 401, and note 27. 
 
 Indo-European or Aryan Stock: 
 its Asiatic source, and the sphere 
 of its diSusion, 40 ; Eomans and 
 Greeks ofishoots of, in prehistoric 
 times, ibid. ; great influence of this 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 507 
 
 stock on the world's oivfliaation, 
 150, 151. 
 
 Intahtioide, custom of, in ancient 
 times, 313, 315. 
 
 luTEROOMMmnoATioN, limited extent 
 of, between nations at the time of 
 , the second Punic war, 109, and 
 notes 2 and (a) • at the time of 
 Herodotus and Thucydides, Hid. ; 
 idea of the progressive develop- 
 ment of, in antiquity, 2T3 ; Egyp- 
 tians, Phosnioians, Babylonians, 
 Assyrians, Greeks, Eomans, in re- 
 lation to, Hid. ; intercommunica- 
 tion of Eoman empire the most 
 perfect in ancient times, ibid., and 
 308, 309 ; comparison of the physi- 
 cal and mental interoommmiication 
 of the Eoman world with the like 
 in modern times, 278-277. 
 
 Iphigesia, story of, in haimony 
 with the probabilities of early 
 Greek life, 340. 
 
 Ibon, idea of the progressive diffu- 
 
 ^ sion of the use of, in ancient times, 
 from the Mediterranean to the 
 northern limits of Europe, 34i- 
 84S ; limited use of, among the 
 early Greeks and Eomans, 344; 
 dififusion of, in the north, gradu- 
 ally increased the force of the bar- 
 barous nations, 346. 
 
 IiAiT, AifoiEHT, prehistoric stone 
 period of, 44-47 ; numerous muni- 
 cipal states of, 124, 125 ; difference 
 in the military character of its peo- 
 ples, 28 ; idea of treaties among the 
 early republics of, 21 ; idea of their 
 method of warfare, 26, 27. 
 
 iTAiT, MoDEBN, Unity of, referred 
 to, 486. 
 
 Jews: duration of their nation and 
 several forms of government ac- 
 cording to Quetelet, referred to, 
 
 409 ; persecution of, by Justinian, 
 424. 
 
 Jones, Sib Williaji : his knowledge 
 of languages as compared with that 
 of Mithridates, 156, note 2. 
 
 JoENAifDES : his account ot the differ- 
 ent arms and styles of fighting 
 among the barbarous nations, 416, 
 and note 7 ; fabulous account given 
 by, of the origia of the Huns, 480, 
 note 17. 
 
 JosEPHos: his notice of the Eoman 
 soldiers, 48, note 2; and of the 
 silence of Herodotus and Thucydi- 
 des respecting the Eomans, 109, 
 notes 2 and (o). 
 
 JoTiEiirAi.s, Political, a feature of 
 modem civilisation, 441 ; they ren- 
 der secret state enterprises more 
 difficult, ihid. 
 
 JuauRTHA, bad faith of the Eomans 
 in dealing with, 138, 139. 
 
 JuuAS : his accomplished character, 
 862 ; the republican 'simplicity of 
 his life, 357, 358. 
 
 JupiTEK, temple of, under the kings, 
 36 ; fable in relation to, and other 
 gods, at the founding of the Capitol, 
 306, 307. 
 
 Jus PAPiKiANtnu: ; the most ancient 
 written collection of Eoman law for 
 which there is any claim, 429 j its 
 alleged date and doubtful authen- 
 ticity, 430. 
 
 Justinian : his rcconquest of Africa 
 and Italy referred to, 414r-418 ; his 
 bad administration, and the futility 
 of his military successes, 419 ; his 
 marriage with Theodora, ibid. • his 
 relation to the factions of the circus, 
 420, 421 ; his tyranny and his perse- 
 cutions, 422-424 ; the great number 
 of fortifications which he built, 425, 
 426 ; his service in embodying and 
 perpetuating the Eoman law, 427. 
 
 Juvenal, reference to, 143, note 30. 
 
508 
 
 ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 K 
 
 Kings (Eomait), ability of, 21 ; com- 
 parative greatness of the works 
 eonstruoted under, 20, 35-37 ; oom- 
 parative extent of walla of city 
 under, 35 ; magnitude of their mon- 
 archy, 35, 36 ; their expulsion nec- 
 essary to the greatness of the state, 
 22, and note 1. 
 
 Labob: Bomans regarded commerce 
 and the arts as servile occupations, 
 200 ; low estimation in which the 
 industries were held in ancient 
 times, 201 ; reason of this, ibid. ; 
 slavery the basis of the industrial 
 system of the Eomans and of the 
 ancient nations generally, 201, 202 ; 
 progressive emancipation of the in- 
 dustrial classes, 205, 207 ; rationale 
 of the present spirit of imreat 
 among these classes, 206, 207. 
 
 Laced^moihab's : their motive for 
 observing the law sprang from pas- 
 sion and not from reason or fear, 
 80 ; lost their power and resumed 
 it, how, 64 ; their condition at the 
 time Greece was attacked by the 
 Eomans, 111. 
 
 La Haepe : hia idea of the Grand- 
 eur and Decadence of the Bomans^ 
 15-17. 
 
 Lake ViirAQEs of ancient Switzer- 
 land, referred to, 125. 
 
 Lamaetote : his remark on Charlotte 
 Corday, referred to, 242. 
 
 Lands : portion of lands of conquered 
 peoples distributed to Eoman citi- 
 zens, 25 ; when this ceased to be 
 done, 29 ; the original division of 
 lands in the ancient republics gen- 
 erally, 62, 71 ; the advantages 
 thenoe resulting, 62; subsequent 
 
 massing of the lands in few hands, 
 and the evils thenoe resulting, 
 ibid. ; attempt of Agis and Cleo- 
 menes to restore the ancient system 
 to Lacedsemon, 64 ; it was the equal 
 ' division of lands that gave force to 
 the early Eoman state, 64, 65. 
 
 Laees, sacrifices to, a species of an- 
 cestral worship among the Eomans, 
 248, and note 4. 
 
 Latins : their warlike character, 28 ; 
 their common origin with the Eo- 
 mans, ibid. ; the municipal compo- 
 sition of their confederacy, 125 ; 
 they were probably included with- 
 in the monarchy of the Eoman 
 kings, 36; and were subsequently 
 beaten and reduced to an alliance 
 with republican Eome, 28. 
 
 Law : the genius of the Eomans in 
 tlie sphere of law superior to that 
 of any other ancient nation, why ? 
 428 ; great influence which their 
 jural system has thence exerted 
 upon modem societies, 428, 429 ; 
 idea of the Eoman law during the 
 fowe periods of its growth and de- 
 cline, 429-431 ; its two fundamental 
 characters, 432; its low elements 
 connect it with the barbarism in 
 which it took its origin, 432; its 
 high theoretical relation to Natural 
 Law and to Liberty, 432, 433 ; its 
 place in the world's jural history, 
 432, 434. 
 
 Legioit, the Eoman, 48, 49 ; Polybi- 
 us's comparison of the legion and 
 the phalanx, 114; the same by 
 Bossuet, ibid., note 10 ; legions of 
 Europe superior to those of Asia, 
 820, and note 6 ; the reverse true 
 as to cavalry, 446, 447. 
 
 Leo, suooessoe or Basil: how he 
 employed his fleet — in illustration 
 of the superstitious spirit of the 
 declining empire of the East, 454. 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX 
 
 509 
 
 Lepidcs seizes the forum with ai'ined 
 men the day after Csesar's assassi- 
 nation, 245 ; becomes one of the 
 triumvirs, 251 ; is despoiled of his 
 power hy Octavius, 258 ; is the 
 most wicked citizen of the republic, 
 259 ; but is pronounced an honest 
 man by Anthony, ittid. 
 
 Lepsius, referred to, 409. 
 
 LmEKTY, Persona!,, relation of Eo- 
 man polity to, 202-205 ; same as to 
 ancient states generally, 202, 203 ; 
 great superiority of modem socie- 
 ties in this respect, 205 ; theoret- 
 ical relation of Boman law to, 432, 
 433. 
 
 liEEETY, PoLiTicAi, relation of Eo- 
 mau polity to, 174r-179 ; same as to 
 the anoi ent republics generally, 177 ; 
 how these republics compare with 
 the United States in this respect, 
 178, 179 ; Uberty everywhere condi- 
 tioned upon sharp self-assertion on 
 the part of the people, 163, note 1 ; 
 progressive growth of, in the course 
 of the world's histoiy, 205-207. 
 
 LicTOEs, EoMAir, derived from the 
 Etrurians, 41. 
 
 LmooLif: his assassination alluded 
 to, 243 ; comparative effect of this 
 act upon popular feeling, 286, 288- 
 292. 
 
 LioTPBAifD, illustration from, of the 
 contempt into which the Eoman 
 name sunk in the estimation of the 
 barbaric nations, 484, 485. 
 
 livr, M. : his capricious action as 
 Censor, in illustration of the arbi- 
 trary powers of the censorate, 170. 
 
 LivT, T. : place of hia birth referred 
 to, 143, note 30 ; his just view in 
 regard to the defects of the consu- 
 lar system, 39 ; and in regard to 
 early Eoman history, 42 ; his de- 
 scription of the Gallic and Spanish 
 swords, 55, note 22 ; his idea of 
 
 the Gallic character, 92; his ac- 
 count of the battle of Trasymcnus, 
 95 ; his description of the field of 
 Canna3 on the morning succeeding 
 the battle, 98. 
 
 Louis XIV : his sudden building of 
 a great navy referred to as an ex- 
 ceptional feat, 87 ; some semi-he- 
 roic incidents in the life of, which 
 are referred to by Montesquieu as 
 completely heroic, 120, and note 
 16 ; idea that he erred in not imi- 
 tating the Eoman policy in his 
 manner of succoring James II, 136, 
 137, and note 15. 
 
 Louis XV, emotional extravagance 
 of the French people on occasion 
 of the illness of, compared with 
 that of the Eomans on the occasion 
 of the death of Germanicus, 285, 
 286, 288-292. 
 
 LuojlS, referred to, 143, note 30. 
 
 LuoKETiA, rape of, 21 ; why such 
 offences beget a revolutionary 
 spirit, 22, and note 6. 
 
 LroEETiHS, alluded to, 143, note 30. 
 
 M 
 
 Maoedon, relation of, to the Greek 
 republics. 111, 112 ; character of its 
 people, ancient and modem, sup- 
 posed to result from its climate, " 
 112 ; idea of the policy of its kings, 
 112, 113 ; conduct of Philip V, 
 king of, 113 ; he is defeated and 
 humbled by the Eomans, 114; 
 great importance of this achieve- 
 ment to the latter, 115, 116, and 
 note 11 ; Macedon becomes a Eo- 
 man province, 130, note 1 ; iniiu- 
 ence of the spoils of, on the Eoman 
 revenue, 388. 
 
 Machiavelli: his idea of the pas- 
 sage of civilization from country to 
 country, and its stationariness for 
 
510 
 
 ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 the world entire, 12; hia idea of 
 the cause of the expulsion of the 
 kings, 22, note 6 ; and of the ne- 
 cessity of that event, 22, note 1; 
 and of the consular system, 39 ; and 
 of the character of the Gauls and 
 the French, 91, 92; his idea that 
 Koman liberty sprang from the 
 struggle of the two parties that 
 divided the state, 163, note 1 ; his 
 "two diverse humors," ibid. ; his 
 idea of the succession of Eoman 
 wars, and their relation to fortune 
 and to policy, 404, 406. 
 
 Macintosh : his idea of the cause of 
 the prostration of the Koman pa- 
 triciate at the close of the republic, 
 235, 236 ; this idea drawn in ques- 
 tion, 236, 237 ; his just estimate of 
 the stoical philosophy, 334, 335. 
 
 M.s:oEB"AS : his patronage of poets 
 and literary men referred to, 276. 
 
 Maine, Mr. : his idea that the Eo- 
 man proscription arose from the 
 want of power in the criminal tri- 
 bunals to inflict the penalty of 
 death, 227 ; this conception drawn 
 in question, 227, 228. 
 
 Malte-Beun : his analysis of mod- 
 em France into its principal race 
 elements, 93 ; his idea of the promi- 
 nent influence of race upon na- 
 tional character, ifid. ; his descrip- 
 tion of the deserts which separated 
 the Parthians from the Eomans, 
 304, note 21. 
 
 Manlius: his execution of his son 
 referred to, 52. 
 
 Mahoeli.inus, AMMiAirns : hia state- 
 ment of the social condition of the 
 Huns in their original seats, 865, 
 note 27. 
 
 Makiette, reference to, 409. 
 
 Makihs : his conduct in the war 
 against the Cimbrians and the Teu- 
 tons referred to, 52; he is leader 
 
 of the democratic, Sylla of the aris- 
 tocratic faction, 226, 227; is less 
 extreme than his rival, ibid. ; he is 
 the party prototype of Cffisar, Sylla 
 of Pompey, 228, 229 ; he is more 
 excelled by Cffisar than Sylla by 
 Pompey, 239 ; rationale of his wars 
 with Sylla, 191-193, 237, 238. 
 
 Maks : superetitious opinion in rela- 
 tion to his patronage of Some, 306, 
 307 ; field of, 174 ; human victims 
 sacrificed by the priests of, 342. 
 
 Maetiax, referred to, 143, note 30. 
 
 Mabtina, widow of Eeraolius, pun- 
 ishment inflicted on, in illustration 
 of the Byzantine method, 439, note 
 10. 
 
 Maxims : societies first molded by in- 
 dividuals — afterwards the reverse, 
 21 ; a people can endure oppression 
 more readily than iosult, 22; the 
 occasions of great social changes 
 vary, the causes are constant, 23 ; 
 the reputations of men are blasted 
 when the prejudice or superstition 
 which they attack survives them, 
 24 ; it is generally the imaginary, 
 not the actual loss, that makes de- 
 cisive battles, 89 ; there are things 
 which everybody says for the rea- 
 , sou that they have once been said, 
 ibid. ; few are equally capable of 
 availing themselves of fortune and 
 of waiting for it, 1 21 ; there are bad 
 examples which are worse than 
 crimes, 169 ; more states have per- 
 ished by reason of departure from 
 wholesome manners than from vio- 
 lation of the laws, ibid. ; religion is 
 the best guarantee we can have of 
 the morals of mankind, 198 ; men 
 are the more greedy for the acquisi- 
 tion of power in proportion as the 
 amount which they already pos- 
 sess is great — they desire all for the 
 reason that they have much, 219, 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 511 
 
 220 ; most affairs are marred by 
 seeking to add to the principle ob- 
 ject certain small advantages whicb 
 ■will flatter the self-love of those 
 ■who manage them, 249 ; cover a 
 man ■with benefits, and you at once 
 inspire him with the idea of look- 
 ing about for the means of preserv- 
 ing them — they are ne^w interests 
 ■which you have given him to de- 
 fend, 260 ; there is no tyranny more 
 cruel than that "which is perpe- 
 trated under color of the la^ws and 
 in the name of justice, 279 ; the en- 
 tire body of the people never in- 
 dulge in affectation, flattery, or dis- 
 simulation, 286 ; no class of people 
 have so great a dread of misfor- 
 tunes as those ■who should be reas- 
 sured by the ■wretchedness of their 
 condition, 286. 
 Messaitce, M. de: his determina- 
 tions for the city of Paris used by 
 Gibbon in approximating the popu- 
 lation of ancient Rome, 371, 372 ; 
 Gibbon's result questioned, 371- 
 373. 
 Mezzofakti: his prodigious kno^wl- 
 edge of languages referred to, 156, 
 note 2. 
 MiDDLETON, Dr. : his idea of the 
 influences ■which precipitated the 
 ruin of Pompey, 231, 232. 
 Mill : his inadequate idea of the in- 
 fluence of race on the phenomena 
 of history, 92, 93. 
 Mikes ; reference to the mines of an- 
 cient Europe, 360, 361, and notes. 
 MiTHEiDATEs : his heroic character 
 and resistance of the Eomans, 155- 
 158 ; his great linguistic accom- 
 plishments, 156, note 2; he is 
 joined by many Eomans who fly 
 from the proscription, 155 ; he is 
 defeated by Pompey, 158 ; he con- 
 ceives the same movement against 
 
 Italy which was afterwards exe- 
 cuted by the barbarians of the 
 North, 158 ; further notice of, 160- 
 162. 
 
 Mohammed II, theological rancor 
 among the Greeks not arrested dur- 
 ing siege of Constantinople by, 457 ; 
 his capture of this city, 488. 
 
 MoLOOH, or Baal, worship of, by the 
 Phoenicians and Carthaginians, 
 103-105 ; description of the Phoe- 
 nician Moloch and his worship, 104; 
 description of the Carthaginian Mo- 
 loch by Diodorus Siculus, 105 ; Dr. 
 Da^vis's excavation on the site of 
 the temple of the Carthaginian 
 Baal Hammon, ibid. ; this ■worship 
 the most revolting of ancient times, 
 103 ; it was an outbirth of the Se- 
 mitic genius, 104 ; and followed 
 the expansion of the Semitic race 
 westward, ibid. 
 
 MoMMSEN : his eri'or in respect to the 
 prehistoric stone epoch of Italy, 45, 
 46. 
 
 MoKET, variation in the purchasing 
 power of, at Eome, 199, note 5, 360, 
 and note 8 ; alternate abundance 
 and scarcity of, in Eoman Europe, 
 260, 261. 
 
 Monks, Gbeek : they espouse the 
 cause of the images, 449-451 ; they 
 are required by Valens to serve in 
 war under penalty of death, 451, 
 note 16 ; they plunge the laity in 
 profound ignorance, 452; illustra- 
 tion of the foUy of their discussions, 
 ibid. ; their professed withdrawal 
 from, and incessant meddling in, 
 the affairs of the world, 4S^-iSii ; 
 evils which resulted from their as- 
 cendency, 455 ; their disputes char- 
 acterized, 457-460. 
 
 "MoNEOE DocTErsE," curious an- 
 ticipation of the, by the Eomans, 
 135, and note 9. 
 
512 
 
 ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 Moifs Saoee ; withdrawal of the 
 Plebs to, 165, and note 4. 
 
 MoFTESQUEETj : his position as a 
 thinker, 10-12 ; his limitation, 10, 
 11 ; La Harpe's idea of his Grande 
 eur aThd Decadence of the Somans^ 
 15-17 ; his genius iniluenoed by 
 the spirit of antiquity — instance 
 of, 186, note 9 ; further instance 
 of, 240, 241 ; still fui-ther instance 
 of, 254 ; the same again, 330, and 
 note 29 ; instance of questionable 
 sentiment by, in reference to great 
 men, 283, and note 5; like in- 
 stance in reference to classes of 
 men, 326, and note 21. 
 
 MooBs : idea that their expansion 
 into southern Europe is similar to 
 that of the Turks into the eastern 
 part of the same continent, 486. 
 
 Muoius, QniMTOs : his place as a Ro- 
 man lawyer, 431. 
 
 MuNiciPAi. States : municipal char- 
 acter of the states of ancient Eu- 
 rope, 124^126 ; those of Italy, 125 ; 
 of Gaul, 125; of Spain, 126; of 
 Greece, 125; this was the necessary 
 type of all early societies, why, 
 126 ; service of the Eomans in 
 bringing these detached societies 
 together, 127, 128 ; they were thus 
 rendered less military and more 
 industrial, 128; and their aggre- 
 gation served as a timely bulwark 
 against the barbarism of the North, 
 128 ; see also 151, 154. 
 
 N 
 
 N.EVins, the poet, referred to, 143, 
 note 30. 
 
 Naples, the lazzaroni of — their 
 wretched condition and absm-d fear 
 of misfortunes, 286, 287. 
 
 Nations, nature prescribes territo- 
 rial limits to, 117, 118 ; their main 
 
 functions to be studied in order to 
 comprehend history rationally, 149, 
 150 ; their influence upon the 
 world's civilization the true crite- 
 rion of their value, 150 ; eminent 
 distinction of the Aryan, and the 
 Judaic section of the Semitic, na- 
 tions in this respect, 150, 339, 340, 
 482, 488 ; the duration of nations, 
 408-412 ; the modern promise to 
 be longer lived than the ancient, 
 410, 411 ; the two principal causes 
 of this difference, 411 ; nations 
 more durable than governments, 
 409 ; illustrations of this from the 
 Greeks, Eomans, Jews, and other 
 peoples, 409, 
 
 Navies : how ancient navies were 
 composed and operated, 84, 85 ; 
 inverse relation of ancient and 
 modem times in respect to the 
 composition of navies and the fa- 
 cility of their construction, 86. 
 
 Natioation and Naval Battles: 
 general limitation of navigation in 
 ancient times, 84, 85 ; effect of the 
 discovery of the mariner's compass 
 on, 85, 86 ; great difference be- 
 tween ancient and modem navi- 
 gation, 85, 86 ; how the naval bat- 
 tles of the ancients were fought, 80 ; 
 naval battles between the Eomans 
 and Carthaginians, 86; the battle 
 of Actium, 85 ; inverse relation of 
 ancients and moderns in respect to 
 art in handling armed navies, 86 ; 
 idea of Eoman navigation, 268, 
 269 ; limited extent of, when com- 
 pared with that of modem nations, 
 273, 274; disadvantages attending 
 great fleets, 417. 
 
 Nebo, the family of Ctesar runs out 
 in the person of, after having ex- 
 terminated the other gi'eat families 
 of Eome, 300. 
 
 NiooLLDOoi : bearing of his archseo- 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 513 
 
 logical collection on the preMstorio 
 epocli of Italy, 45-47. 
 
 NiEBDHR : Ms distinguished connec- 
 tion with the modem reform of 
 early Eoman history, 43 ; his cor- 
 rection of the erroneous opinion 
 respecting the Agrarian Laws, 72, 
 73. 
 
 NoRMAirs : similarity of their estab- 
 lishment in France to that of the 
 Barbarians in the Eoman empire, 
 398. 
 
 NcMAHTiAifs, bad faith of the Eo- 
 mans in dealing with, 139, and 
 note 22. 
 
 NmimiA, superiority of cavalry of, 
 84; high character of Numidian 
 mercenaries, 101. 
 
 Oath, difference between Eomans 
 and Greeks in observance of, 197, 
 and note 2. 
 
 Odoaoee : his army appropriates one 
 third of the lands of Italy, 401, 
 402 ; other references to, 347, 370, 
 397, note 18. 
 
 Ososnis : object of his book in reply 
 to Symmachus, 394. 
 
 Ovid, reference to, 143, note 30. 
 
 Paganism : its want of the virtue of 
 humanity, 339, 340 ; controversy 
 between Pagans and Christians re- 
 specting the decay of the empire, 
 892-394 ; as Christianity advanced 
 the country districts remained the 
 strongholds of Paganism, 424 ; mix- 
 ture of, with Christianity, 463, 464. 
 
 Pal^ologus, AiriiBONioTrs, abandons 
 his navy and relies on the protec- 
 tion of God, 454. 
 
 Pai^ologus, Michael, condition of 
 
 the Eastern empire during the reign 
 of, 455. 
 
 Pahio, similarity of, among ancient 
 and modem soldiers, 96. 
 
 Paktheon, of Agrippa, reference to, 
 37. 
 
 Papiniait : his place as a Eoman ju- 
 rist, 431. 
 
 Paethiajns : physical situation of 
 their dominions in reference to tho 
 Eoman empire, 303, 304, and note 
 21 ; their method of fighting as 
 compared with that of the Eomans, 
 305 ; why they were not subdued 
 by the latter, 806. 
 
 Parties : factious character of those 
 that divided Carthage, 78, 79 ; dif- 
 ferent character of the early Eoman 
 parties in this respect, 79, and 
 note 7; idea of the two political 
 parties that existed in Eome, 163- 
 168 ; Machiavelli's idea of the same, 
 163, note 1 ; the aristocratic party 
 in complete ascendency at the be- 
 ginning of the republic, 164; 
 thenceforward the popular party 
 becomes stronger until the republic 
 is overthrown, 164r-168, 178 ; seces- 
 sion of the people to Mens Saeer, 
 165, and note 4; origin of the Tri- 
 bunate — it is a measure of the popu- 
 lar party, 165, 166, and note 7; 
 origin of the Dictatorship — it is a 
 measure of the aristocratic party, 
 167, and note 10 ; means of influ- 
 ence resorted to by the two parties, 
 166-168 ; steadiness of the one, fit- 
 ful character of the other, 181 ; 
 self-restraint of the two parties for 
 more than four centuries, 192 ; they 
 then become factions^ inconsistent 
 with the continuance of the repub- 
 lic, 192, 193 ; the two great causes 
 of this fatal change, 194; Marius 
 and Caesar leaders of the popular 
 faction, Sylla and Pompey of the 
 
514 
 
 ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 aristocratic, 226, 227 ; in the first 
 great armed struggle the popular 
 faction badly worsted, 238 ; in the 
 next it triumphed, 239 ; the empire 
 to be regarded as the continuation 
 of this triumph, 297, and note 7 ; 
 parties necessary in a republic, 
 184, 421. 
 
 Pascal, referred to, 446, and note 1. 
 
 Patbiakohs, of Constantinople : their 
 great powers, 456 ; their extrava- 
 gant pretensions, 456, 457; their 
 policy as compared with that of the 
 popes, 453, 463, 464. 
 
 Patkiaeoht, the primitive fonn of 
 civil government — why, 126. 
 
 Pateonage, of Eoman patricians ex- 
 tended not only to individuals but 
 to cities and countries, 281, and 
 note 3 ; imperfect state of society 
 and government indicated by, ibid. 
 
 Paulus : his place as a jurist indi- 
 cated, 430, 431. 
 
 Peace : the Eomans only made peace 
 as conquerors, 26 ; their uuiform 
 want of good faith iu making, 131. 
 
 Perizokitjs: his relation to the re- 
 form of early Eoman history, 43. 
 
 Peeseus, King of Macedon : his over- 
 throw by the Eomans, 130, and 
 note 1. 
 
 Peesia : depressing effect of the Per- 
 sian rule upon Egypt, 83 ; destruc- 
 tive character of the wars between 
 the Persians and the Eomans, 419, 
 and note 12; natural defense of 
 Persia against the barbarous' na- 
 tions of the North, 435 ; the Per- 
 sians superior to the later Eomans 
 in the military art, 436, and note 
 6 ; they impose tribute upon the 
 latter, 436 ; Persia conquered by 
 the Arabs, 470 ; and by the Turks, 
 474, 475. 
 
 Peesids, the poet, reference to, 143, 
 note 30. 
 
 Petee the Gebat, reference to, 449. 
 
 Phalanx, Greek, comparison of, 
 with the Eoman legion, 114, and 
 note 10. 
 
 Phaesalia, battle of, action of Pom- 
 pey in relation to, 217, 218, 229-234. 
 
 Philip V, King of Macedon : his pol- 
 icy, 113, 114 ; he is defeated by the 
 Eomans, 114; and aids them in 
 their further conquests, 119. 
 
 Philippi, battle of, referred to, 251, 
 and note 11. 
 
 Philippious, general ol the Em- 
 peror Maurice, incident in connec- 
 tion with, illustrative of the spirit 
 of the Greeks of the Eastern empire, 
 448. 
 
 Philippious, an emperor of the East- 
 em empire: his treatment as an 
 illustration of the degenerate Greek 
 method, 439, and note 10. 
 
 Philosophy : the Cliristian doctrine 
 of charity more nearly anticipated 
 by the Greek pliilosophy than by 
 the religion of polytheism, 340; 
 bad influence of the school of Epi- 
 curus upon the Eomans, 197 ; good 
 influence of the stoical school, 317 ; 
 idea of the fundamental principle of 
 the stoical system of phHosophy, 
 384-337. 
 
 PHfEN loiANS : letters of European na- 
 tions derived from, 102 ; their wor- 
 ship of Moloch, 103; the Cartha- 
 ginians an offshoot of, 102. 
 
 PicTOE, Eabius, the first Eoman his- 
 torian, 43. 
 
 Plato : hLs idea of human liberty as 
 compared with the theoretical con- 
 ception of the Eoman lawyers on 
 same subject, 433. 
 
 Plautps, allusion to, 143, note 30. 
 
 Plujt the Eldee, reference to, 143, 
 note 30 ; his description of the sew- 
 ers of Eomo, 36. 
 
 Pliny the Youngee, referred to. 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 515 
 
 lis, note 30 ; his observation upon 
 the crime of treason under the em 
 perors, 284, and note 6. 
 Policy, Eoman : Eoman policy of 
 conquest analyzed and particularly 
 stated, 129-145 ; this policy "best 
 adapted to empire in the circum- 
 stances of ancient times, 146 ; it 
 was a principle of Eoman policy to 
 renounce their own methods when- 
 ever they found better among for- 
 eigners, 20 ; to provide for aU dan- 
 gers and to remedy all disasters by 
 strengthening their military dis- 
 cipline, 62 ; to attack with smaller 
 forces and defend with larger, 81 ; 
 to treat with no enemy who occu- 
 pied Eoman territory, 87 ; to re- 
 strain kings from levying troops 
 among the allies of Eome, 123 ; to 
 dissemble all injuries when hard 
 pressed, and to exact a severe reck- 
 oning afterwards, 130 ; to allow no 
 Asiatic king to extend hjs conquests 
 into Europe, 135, and note 9 ; to 
 lay by till a conquest was effected, 
 and then pluck it from the ex- 
 hausted conqueror, 134, 135 ; to 
 deny the war-making power to 
 their own allies, and to reserve it 
 wholly to themselves, 134 ; to first 
 destroy the armies of princes and 
 then ruin them in the estimation 
 of their subjects by the imposition 
 of onerous tributes upon their 
 states, 131, 132; to immediately 
 extend the title and protection of 
 Eoman allies to such states and 
 princes as withdrew their allegi- 
 ance from their own sovereigns, 
 132; to interfere on the weaker 
 side in foreign wars, 135 ; to work 
 divisions in foreign states, 136 ; to 
 create two parties in cities which 
 they affected to leave free — ^the 
 stronger under their own control, 
 
 133 ; to never make peace in good 
 faith, but with a view to universal 
 conquest, 131 ; constancy with 
 which these elements of their pol- 
 icy were pursued, 135 ; the differ- 
 ent sorts of allies, 133 ; the Eomans 
 adjudicated theeontroversies which 
 took place in foreign states, 137 ; 
 theii" custom of attacking with one 
 ai'my and holding two others in 
 readiness, 137, 138 ; their false and 
 unjust construction of treaties, 138 ; 
 their method of holding conquered 
 countries by infiucnoe and policy, 
 141, 142 ; peculiar position of Kome 
 as the result of this policy— being 
 neither a republic nor a monarchy, 
 but the head of a body composed 
 of many nations, 143 ; contrast of 
 the Eoman with the Spanish policy 
 in making conquests, 144; Eome 
 imposed no general laws, 144 ; 
 change of policy on establishment 
 of the empire, 266; further change 
 of policy dm-ing the decline of the 
 empire, 375-382. 
 
 PoLTEins : his compaiison of the 
 military methods of the Greeks and 
 the Eomans, 114; his notice of the 
 comparative business-honesty and 
 regard for the oath among the two 
 peoples, 197, and note 2. 
 
 Polygamy, prevalence of, in Asia, 
 deprives woman of the influence 
 she exercises in Europe, 420, and 
 note 15. 
 
 PoMPEY THE Geeat : general idea of 
 his career as rival of Csesar, 211- 
 218 ; his manual accomplishments, . 
 51, 52 ; he defeats Mithridates, 158 ; 
 his conquests and their ill-effects 
 upon the Eomans, 158, 159 ; influ- 
 ence of his conquests upon the 
 revenues of Eome, 159, 388 ; pro- 
 cures the abrogation of the laws of 
 Sylla as a means of gaining favor 
 
516 
 
 ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 ■with the people, 211 ; his great ' 
 popularity and infiuenoe, 211, 212; 
 he twice declines to usurp supreme 
 power, 213 ; difference between his 
 style of ambition and that of Caesar, 
 213 ; decline of his credit, 214 ; his 
 corrupt practices, 214, 262; his 
 great vanity, 217, 218 ; considera- 
 tions on his military genius, 229- 
 234; reflections on his fate, 233, 
 234 ; would probably have imitated 
 the severity of Sylla if he had beat- 
 en Cffisar, 239. 
 
 PoMPEY, Sextds : his great naval 
 power, 258 ; he is defeated by 
 Agrippa, lieutenant of Octavius, 
 258 ; he casts living men into the 
 sea as offerings to Neptune, 342. 
 
 PoiTTiFFs, College of, 467, 468 ; the 
 emperor as Pontifex maximus was 
 head of all the sacerdotal orders of 
 the empire, 468. 
 
 Popes, comparison of, with the pa- 
 triarchs of Constantinople, 453, 463, 
 464 ; their attachment in former 
 times to external worship, 463, 
 464 ; their temporal states former- 
 ly protected by a certain sentiment, 
 473. 
 
 Postal Seevioe, referred to, 441, and 
 note 12. 
 
 Pouillt: his connection with the 
 modem critical spirit in history, 43. 
 
 PB.ET0EIAN Guards : they place the 
 empire at auction, 318. 
 
 Pk^toeian Prefects : their func- 
 tions and their assassinations, 356 ; 
 they are humbled by Constantine, 
 355. 
 
 PRisTiirG, introduction of, has made 
 secrecy in state affairs more diffi- 
 cult, 441. 
 
 Prooopius : his secret history re - 
 ferred to, 422, 423. 
 
 Progeess, Histoeioal, indicated by 
 the imperfection and fabulous char- 
 
 acter of all afchaio history, 43, 44; 
 by the prehistoric barbarism of 
 Europe, 44-47 ; by the necessarily 
 dominant military spirit of the an- 
 cient types of civilization, 59, 60 ; 
 by the consequent superior recog- 
 nition oi force in ancient societies, 
 67 ; by the comparative insecurity 
 of states founded upon commerce 
 in ancient times, 83, and note 15 ; 
 by the radical difference between 
 ancient and modem navigation, 84, 
 85 ; by the feeble relation which 
 the religion of Polytheism sus- 
 tained to the virtue of humanity, 
 339, 340 ; by the like feeble rela- 
 tion of ancient education, laws, and 
 customs to the same virtue, 146, 
 149, 202, 204, 205, 294, 295, 311- 
 316, 432 ; by the comparatively 
 hmited physical and mental inter- 
 communication of ancient times, 
 109, notes 2 and (o), 273-277 ; by 
 the comparatively limited extent of 
 political and personal liberty in 
 ancient societies, 177-179, 201-207 ; 
 by the comparative absence of 
 popular education in these societies, 
 315, 316 ; by the servile status of 
 the working classes in ancient 
 times, and the gradual amelioration 
 of the condition of these classes, 
 201-207 ; by the fact that the socie- 
 ties of antiquity were more influ- 
 enced than the modem ones by the 
 passions, and less by the higher 
 reflective powers, of men, 243, 244 ; 
 by the fact that nations tend to 
 grow longer lived, 410, 411 ; by the 
 fact that the area of the world's 
 civilization has increased, whilst 
 the total store of its barbarism has 
 diminished, 411 ; by the fact that 
 the modern nations resist, better 
 tlian the ancient ones, the corrupt- 
 ing influence of wealth and luxury. 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 517 
 
 411 ; by the fact that modern so- 
 cieties are endowed more richly 
 than the ancient ones with physi- 
 cal, intellectual, and moral re- 
 sources, 443, 444 ; by the fact that 
 these societies are thence enabled 
 to prosecute all great enterprises 
 with more facility than was possi- 
 ble in ancient times, 443, 444 ; by 
 the fact that the forces and motives 
 of the world's civilization have be- 
 come less secret and more overt, 
 444 ; by the fact that the diverse 
 social functions are more distinctly 
 separated in the modem than they 
 were in the ancient societies, 468, 
 469 ; and by the general course of 
 the world's history, 489, 490. 
 
 PEOscKiPTioiir : its political signifi- 
 cance referred to, 192 ; many Ro- 
 mans driven from their country by, 
 155 ; it is introduced by Sylla, 
 and thu5 originates with the ai*is- 
 tocratic faction, 226 ■; idea of the 
 atrocity of, 226-229; practice of, 
 continued under the emperors, 320. 
 
 Pbussia, as an instance of a small 
 modem state lising to great power, 
 66, 67. 
 
 Pmno "Wae, Sbhond : its fame in 
 history, SI ; its salient features, 
 94-99 ; terms imposed by the Eo- 
 mans at the close of, 108 ; suooesa- 
 ful conclusion of, a marked era in 
 their history, 109 ; their spirit of 
 conquest greatly stimulated there- 
 by, 110. 
 
 PuEPLE : Eoman purple robe of state 
 derived from the Etrurians, 41 ; 
 legal prohibition of purple among 
 citizens, 439 ; excessive veneration 
 for this color, 439. 
 
 PrniTA, battle of— Macedon made a 
 Eoman province by, 130, note 1. 
 
 Ptkehds : his war upon the Eomans 
 a benefit to them, 16, 11, and note 
 
 2; they learn from him the art 
 of arranging and fortifying their 
 camp, ibid. ; his character as an 
 adventurer, 11 ; cause of his war 
 against Macedon, ibid. 
 
 QuETELET : his great service to posi- 
 tive social science, 93 ; his high ap- 
 preciation of the influence of race 
 on social phenomena, 93 ; his laws 
 expressing the penchant to crime 
 and the penchant to suicide, 256 ; 
 his idea that the substitution of 
 associations in place of individuals 
 is the leading oharaeteristio of mod- 
 ern oivihzation, 275 ; his ideas re- 
 specting the average duration of 
 nations and states, 408-410. 
 
 QriNTiLiAN, reference to, 143, note 
 
 E 
 
 Eaoe, great influence of, upon the 
 phenomena of history, 93 ; this in- 
 fluence underrated by Buckle and 
 Mill — properly appreciated by 
 Quetelet and Malte-Brun, 92, 93 ; 
 the world's civilization due to a 
 comparatively small part of the to- 
 tal race, 150. 
 
 Eailway, comparison of, with the 
 stone roads of Eome, 273, 274, 308, 
 309. 
 
 Eaykal : his idea of the influence of 
 the Eomans upon the world, 153. 
 
 Eefoemation, of sixteenth century : 
 analogous but abortive movement 
 in the Greek empire during the 
 eighth and ninth centuries, 450, 
 453, note 20 ; further reference to 
 same, 462-464. 
 
 Eegillus, lake: decisive battle be- 
 tween Eomans and Latins near, 28. 
 
518 
 
 ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 EEsraos : beaten by the superior 
 Carthaginian oavaliy, 84; his naval 
 battle with the Carthaginians, 86. 
 
 Eeligion : many of the religious rites 
 of the Komans derived from the 
 Etrurians, 41 ; religion of the Phoe- 
 nicians and Carthaginians, 103- 
 105 ; human saoriflces among these 
 peoples, ibid. ; same among Greeks, 
 Eomans, Gauls, Germans, Britons, 
 103, 340, 341 ; religion of the Eo- 
 mans but a phase of Aryan polythe- 
 ism, 339 ; ethnical and geographi- 
 cal diffusion of the latter, 339 ; its 
 most distinctive quality the nega- 
 tive one of defective humanity, 339, 
 340 ; religion of the Eomans illus- 
 
 . trates the law that popular religious 
 ideas yield tardily to the social 
 movement in progressive societies, 
 343,344; the sentiments of religion 
 and patriotism blended together in 
 the Eoman mind, 198, 199 ; custom 
 of Greeks and Asiatics to build tem- 
 ples to kings and proconsuls, 248 ; 
 ancestor worship among the Eo- 
 mans, 248, and note 4 ; no Eoman 
 placed among the public divinities 
 from Eomulus to Csesar, 248, and 
 note 6 ; significance of the deifica- 
 tion of Cassar, ibid. ; civil wars 
 springing from religion the most 
 persistent in their motive, 261 ; 
 limits within which the Eomans 
 admitted the worship of foreign 
 gods, 322 ; tolerance of the early 
 EoDians and intolerance of the lat- 
 ter, 428,- 424 ; three religious opin- 
 ions connected with the founding 
 of the Capitol, 306, 307 ; difference 
 between the prosperity of religion 
 and the prosperity of empires, 445, 
 446 ; idea of the bigotry and the 
 theological spirit of the Greeks of 
 the Eastern empire, 448-459 ; they 
 were ignorant of the proper dis- 
 
 tinction between the ecclesiastical 
 and the secular power, 460 ; Mon- 
 tesquieu's idea of the degree of 
 completeness with which this dis- 
 tinction was realized by the ancient 
 Eomans, 461 ; the same further con- 
 sidered, 466-468 ; the religious and 
 the civil functions more blended 
 together in ancient than in modem 
 times, 468, 469 ; as civilization de- 
 velops, the two become more dis- 
 tinctly separated, 469; why theo- 
 logical disputes are more violent in 
 proportion as they are more frivo- 
 lous, 455,and note 26 ; difference be- 
 tween bigotry and fanaticism illus- 
 trated, 448, 449 ; infiuenoe of Chris- 
 tianity in ameliorating slavery, and 
 in abolishing the gladiatorial spec- 
 tacle, 204, 313, 362, note 14. 
 Eepuelio, Eomab": its slow expan- 
 sion for a time, 27, 28 ; its small 
 extent in the middle of the fourth 
 century of the city, 29, note 18 ; for 
 a long time much smaller than the 
 monarchy which it had superseded, 
 35, 36 ; its territorial extent about 
 the begiiming of the second Punic 
 war, and its force actually under 
 arras during this war, 81 ; its total 
 force capable of bearing arms just 
 before this war, 81, and note 11 ; its 
 conquering policy, 129-143 ; it be- 
 came more liberal in ita internal 
 polity from expulsion of kings to 
 its subversion, 164, 165, 168, 178 ; 
 but at best it made veiy imperfect 
 provision for political and personal 
 liberty, 178, 179, 201-205 ; the two 
 parties that agitated the state final- 
 ly degenerated into factions, 191- 
 193 ; rationale of this change, which 
 forecast the destruction of the re- 
 public, 194, 236-238 ; republic con- 
 tinued to expand during the civil 
 wars in time of Marius, Sylla, Pom- 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 519 
 
 pey, Caasar, Anthony, and Augus- 
 tus, 218; ambition of particular 
 men not the true cause of its sub- 
 version, 219, 220 ; rationale of this 
 event, 191-193, 225-228, 234^240. 
 
 Eepdblios (generally) : lands divid- 
 ed equally among the citizens of 
 the ancient republics, 62, 64, 71 ; 
 but this class of persons relatively 
 small in those societies, Yl ; indif- 
 ference to the public good, and 
 employment of office as a means to 
 fortune, two great enemies of a re- 
 public, IS ; and the first of these is 
 followed by the second, 78, and note 
 6 ; the republican the strongest 
 form of government, when, 80 ; im- 
 perfection of the republics of mod- 
 em Italy, 172, 173 ; reason why 
 free states, according to Montes- 
 quieu, are less durable than others, 
 181, 182 ; parties necessary in, 184, 
 421 ; comparative influence of re- 
 publican and other forms of gov- 
 ernment on the passions of envy 
 and jealousy, 165; limited measure 
 of liberty in the ancient republics 
 generally, 178, 179, 201-207 ; why 
 all the ancient republics were nec- 
 essarily of low type, 179 ; the re- 
 publican the highest and best type 
 of government, but can not bene- 
 ficially survive the loss of its pre- 
 cedent social conditions, 239, 240. 
 
 Eeveittje : proximate idea of revenue 
 of Roman empire, 385-387. 
 
 Ehodiaits, bad faith of the Eomans 
 toward, 130, 138. 
 
 EoADS, EoMAir : the greatest achieve- 
 ment of the kind in history, 37, 
 308, 309 ; comparison of, with mod- 
 em railways, 274. 
 
 EoEEETsoiT : his idea of the influence 
 of the Eomans on the interests of 
 humanity, 152. 
 
 Eomans : a branch of the Indo-Eu- 
 
 ropean stock, and originally came 
 from Asia, 40 ; incessantly engaged 
 in violent war, 25, 26 ; they re- 
 duced pillage to a system, and prac- 
 ticed it as a means of gaining 
 wealth, 25 ; their method of divid- 
 ing the fruits of successful war, 
 25; their mastery of the military 
 art, 26 ; their strict regard for the 
 oath, 25, 197, and note 2 ; their 
 low, primitive condition, 41 ; their 
 originally subordinate relation to 
 the Etrurians, 41 ; their physical 
 type in harmony with their char- 
 acter, 57, 58 ; general idea of their 
 character, 58, 59 ; they made sol- 
 diers of all conquered peoples, 80, 
 81 ; their prodigious constancy af- 
 ter the battles of Ticinus, Trebia, 
 Trasymenus, and Cann^, 87 ; their 
 want of sensibility overstated, how- 
 ever, by Montesquieu and Saint- 
 Evremond, 88, and notes 25, 26 ; 
 their monstrous spoliations and ex- 
 actions, 140, 141 ; their foreign pol- 
 icy, 129-145 ; effect of their do- 
 minion upon the world's civiliza- 
 tion, 124-128,149-154, 427-429,433, 
 434 ; they were at all times mostly 
 of servile origin, 267, 268 ; puerile 
 character of the masses of, in the 
 time of Tiberius, 285, 286 ; debased 
 character of, in the time of ViteHius 
 and Vespasian, 299 ; they finally 
 abandon the military art, 379 ; con- 
 siderations on the absorption of the 
 original Eoman stock, 188-190; 
 contempt in which the new nations 
 held the Eoman name, 484, 485. 
 EoME, CiTT OF : its beginnings, 19 ; 
 for a time regarded as a military 
 camp and not as a city, 32, 33 ; its 
 capture by the Gauls, 81, 32; its 
 geographical position in reference 
 to southern Europe, northern Af- 
 rica, and southwestern Asia, 33 ; 
 
520 
 
 ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 its topographical relations, 34 ; ex- 
 tent of its walled enclosure under 
 the kings, 35 ; comparison of Eome 
 and Athens, 63, 64 ; its clroumfer- 
 enoe as compared with that of the 
 modern city, 358, 870, 371 ; extent 
 of its walls, and proximate idea of 
 its population under the empire, 
 3'70-3V3 ; idea of its urban life as 
 compared with that of Paris, Ber- 
 hn, Vienna, London, and several 
 Ameriean cities, 373, 374 ; few of 
 the eminent Latin writers natives 
 of, 143, note 30. 
 
 Eome, Kingdom of, its probable ter- 
 ritorial extent, 35, 36. 
 
 EosELLnn, referred to, 409. 
 
 Etibicok ; senoMis consultum, forbid- 
 ding the crossing of, 215, 216 ; con- 
 sternation created upon crossing of, 
 by Cffisar, 216, 217. 
 
 SiBATiAisrs, persecution of, by Jus- 
 tinian, 424. 
 
 Sabines, Eomans unite with, 20 ; 
 and adopt their buckler, 20 ; their 
 warlike character, 28. 
 
 Saimt-Evbemokd : his idea of the 
 advantages which the Eomans de- 
 rived from the war with Pyrrhus, 
 77, note 2 ; his idea of the fortitude 
 of the Eomans after the battle of 
 Cannee, 88, note 25 ; his picture of 
 the tyi'anny of Tiberius, 279, note 1. 
 
 Salio Law, referred to, 420. 
 
 Sallust: his notice of Pompey's 
 physical accomplishments, 51, 52 ; 
 place of his birth referred to, 143, 
 note 30. 
 
 Salvias-, reference to, in respect to 
 the oppressiveness of Eoman taxa- 
 tion, 882 ; his reply to Symmaehus, 
 394. 
 
 SAMAEiTAifa, destruction of, by Jus- 
 
 tinian, and consequence of this act, 
 424. 
 
 Samsites: their intensely warlike 
 character, 29 ; they are nearly de- 
 stroyed by the Eomans, 77; and 
 are only subjected after twenty- 
 four triumphs, 81. 
 
 Sabaoens: rapidity of their con- 
 quests, 445; enthusiasm not the 
 sole cause of the sudden extension 
 of their power, 446 ; their previous 
 martial character, 446; their fa- 
 naticism, 448, 449 ; Eastern empire 
 relieved by their dissensions among 
 themselves, 470 ; their two great 
 assaults upon Constantinople, 471, 
 note 1. 
 
 Sc^voLA : his place as a Roman law- 
 yer indicated, 430, 431. 
 
 Soipio, JSmilianus, referred to, 52, 
 and note 13. 
 
 Soipio, Ai'moAUDs: his conquest of 
 Spain and alliance with Masinissa, 
 84 ; origin of the idea of carrying 
 the war into Africa, 107, 108 ; his 
 successes there compel the recall of 
 Hannibal, 108 ; the decisive battle 
 of Zama, 108, and note 1; his 
 gladiatorial sacrifloe to the manes 
 of his father and uncle, 312. 
 
 SoTTHiA : its uncultivated state iu 
 ancient times, 898 ; its inhabitants 
 subject to frequent famines, 388, 
 899 ; their -trade with the Eomans, 
 399, and note 17. 
 
 Senate, Eoman : its policy of quiet- 
 ing the people by occupying them 
 with wars abroad, 24; its power 
 greater in foreign than in domestlo 
 aifairs, 24, note 10 ; deference of 
 the Eoman people for, 79 ; it refuses 
 to treat with an enemy who occu- 
 pies Eoman territory, 87 ; it thanks 
 VaiTO for not despairing of the re- 
 public, 88, 89, and note, 27 ; it erects 
 itself into a tribunal for the judg- 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 521 
 
 ment of all nations, 129 ; assumes 
 jurisdiction of the private offenses 
 of foreign rulers, 139 ; it leads the 
 aristocratic party of the state, 166- 
 168 ; power of censors over mem- 
 bers of, 169 ; it acts with constant 
 steadiness, whilst the popular party 
 vacillates from one extreme to an- 
 other, 181 ; instance of its cruelty 
 towards slaves, 20i, 205 ; it adheres 
 to Pompey, why, 213 ; degradation 
 of, under the rule of Ca3sar, 221, 
 '222, 280, 281 ; after the assassina- 
 tion of Cffisar it approves all his 
 acts, 246 ; politic regard of Augus- 
 tus for, 963 ; debasement of, in time 
 of Tiberius, 280, and note 2 ; pro- 
 gressive degradation of, under the 
 emperors, 300, 301 ; how its mem- 
 bers were sworn into office, 393, 
 and note 2 ; its expiring act, 370. 
 
 Seiteoa, referred to, 143, note 30. 
 
 Sebtobids, reference to, 382, and 
 note 9. 
 
 Seevius Tullius, favors the people 
 with a view to depressing the sen- 
 ate, 23 ; parallel between the revo- 
 lution which followed and that of 
 England, 23 ; his division of the 
 Eoman people into centuries and 
 classes, and the effect of this ar- 
 rangement on the suffrage, 170, 171, 
 174-176. 
 
 Sewebs, of Eome under the kings — 
 admiration of, in ancient times, 
 20, and note 2, 36, 37. 
 
 SiBOEs, no use of machines for the 
 oonduotiag of, among the people of 
 ancient Italy, 26, and note 12. 
 
 Silk, transfer of manufacture of, 
 from Persia to Constantinople, 472. 
 
 Simeon : his description of the Phce- 
 nician Moloch and his worship, 
 103, 104. 
 
 Slavebt : next to war the most 
 prominent social fact of antiquity. 
 
 202 ; it was the basis of the ancient 
 labor system, 201, 202 ; and hence 
 degraded labor in ancient opinion, 
 201; origin of, in war, 202, 203, 
 433 ; great extent of, in ancient 
 times, 203 ; law of, among the Eo- 
 mans, 208 ; low sense of humanity 
 among Eoman masters, 204, 205; 
 amelioration of, by Christianity, 
 203, 204 ; gradual transmutation of 
 European slavery into milder forms 
 of domiuation, 205-207 ; reflection 
 on the effect of, among the Eomans 
 and in the French colonies, 295. 
 Smith, Adam, reference to, ia esti- 
 mating the proximate revenue of 
 the Eoman empire, 386. 
 Smithsontan Institution : its sphere 
 of exchanges cited as an illustration 
 of the mental intercommunication 
 of modem, as compared with an- 
 cient times, 275, 276. 
 Society : aU early societies were nec- 
 essarily tribal and municipal, why, 
 126, 127 ; all the elements of a de- 
 caying society do not commence to 
 decline at once, 193, 194; illustra- 
 tion of this from the Eomans, Hid. ; 
 usefulness of hereditary succession 
 in societies so undeveloped as to 
 require monarchical government, 
 352, 353 ; difference between free 
 and despotic societies in reference 
 to the idea of social union, 185; 
 irrational element of rush and stress 
 in modem societies, especially in 
 that of the United States, 256, 
 257. 
 SoLDiEBs, Eoman: their military edu- 
 cation, 50, 51 ; Eoman custom of 
 bleeding their soldiers, alleged rea- 
 son of, 53 ; desertions rare among 
 Eoman soldiers and common in 
 modem times — cause of this differ- 
 ence, 53 ; comparative healthful- 
 ness of the Eoman and modem 
 
522 
 
 ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 armies, 53 ; the Eoman soldier 
 counted upon himself as an indi- 
 vidual, the modem relies upon the 
 army as a whole, 54 ; panic fear in 
 Soman and in modem armies, 96 ; 
 fatal change in the spirit of the Eo- 
 man soldiers after the republic be- 
 came great, 181 ; their spirit dur- 
 ing the civil wars, 261 ; part which 
 they took in the government of the 
 empire, 3^, 330; part taken by 
 the Prsetorian guards and Prsefects, 
 318, 356; when the soldiers first 
 received pay, 27, and note 13 ; idea 
 of their pay and its progressive in- 
 crease, 324^326 ; their degenerate 
 character towards the close of the 
 empire, 377-379. 
 
 Spain, Anoient, numerous munici- 
 pal states of, 126. 
 
 Spahta, original division of lands 
 among citizens of, 64; subsequent 
 concentration of lands in few 
 hands, 64 ; attempt of Agis and 
 Cleomenes to restore the ancient 
 system, 64 ; slavery among the 
 Spartans, 203 ; their system of in- 
 fanticide, 314. 
 
 Statilius Tadetjs, amphitheatre of, 
 referred to, 37. 
 
 St. Augustine : his " City of God " 
 referred to, 394. 
 
 Stephen : his statement of the exac- 
 tions of the later Eoman emperors 
 in Gaul, 389. 
 
 Stoics, school of: general idea of the 
 stoical doctrine, 335, 336 ; illustra- 
 tion of, from Hooker, 336, 337 ; ex- 
 cellent influence of this school on 
 the Eomans, 317, 337. 
 
 Stolo, lionnus: his agrarian law, 
 73 ; it was the model of all subse- 
 quent ones, 73, 74. 
 
 Stone Age, of pre-Eoman Italy, 44 ; 
 of prehistoric Europe, 44, 45. 
 
 Suetonius : cited in relation to Cse- 
 
 sar and Pompey, 233; in relation 
 to Cato the Younger, 237 ; in rela- 
 tion to the character of Coesar, 239 ; 
 in relation to the deification of 
 Caesar, 248, note 6 ; referred to 
 in relation to Caligula, 421, note 
 IG. 
 
 SuFFBTES : the Carthaginian chief 
 magistrates, similar to the Hebrew 
 judges, 102. 
 
 Suicide, causes of custom of, among 
 Eomans, 251-253 : reflections on, 
 252, 253 ; rationale of, and herein 
 the true idea of heroism, 254, 255 ; 
 suicide approved by law, religion, 
 and philosophy among the ancients, 
 and discouraged by all three in 
 modem times, 255 ; indications, 
 however, that it is more common 
 in modern than it was in ancient 
 societies, 255 ; Quetelet's laws re- 
 specting the average tendency to 
 suicide and to insanity, 256 ; gen- 
 eral cause for larger proportion of 
 suicide and insanity in modem 
 than in ancient societies, 256, 257. 
 
 SuLPiTius, Seevius: his place as a 
 jurisconsult, 430, 431. 
 
 SwoED : much more important in 
 ancient than in modem warfare, 
 55, note 22 ; the Gallic and the 
 Spanish sword, ibid. ; the latter 
 adopted by the Eomans, ibid. ' 
 
 Sylla : his treatment of his soldiers 
 in the Mithridatic war, 52; his 
 laws in restraint of the popular fac- 
 tion, 208 ; he ruins military disci- 
 pline, 209 ; other of his misdeeds^ 
 209, 210 ; he invents the proscrip- 
 tion, ibid. ; atrocity of this device, 
 225-229 ; he lays down the dicta- 
 torship, 210 ; his law de sieariis, 
 203 ; his purpose of crushing the 
 popular faction not successful, 238 ; 
 he is influenced by a certain fero- 
 cious republican spirit, 264, 285; 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 523 
 
 comparison of his character with 
 that of Augustus, 265. 
 
 Stmmaohus: his appeal in behalf of 
 Paganism, 393. 
 
 Sybaouse, duration of, in compari- 
 son with certain modern cities, 410. 
 
 Sybu,: its strength, and the poIio7 
 of its kings, 116, 117 ; weaker for 
 embracing both high and low Asia, 
 117 ; two classes of subjects of, 
 118, and note 13 ; luxury and fee- 
 bleness of its court, 118 ; Antio- 
 chus, king of, makes war against 
 the Eomans, 118, 119 ; he disre- 
 gards the advice of Hannibal, 119, 
 and note 14 ; he is beaten by the 
 Bomans and reduced to the accept- 
 ance of an infamous treaty, 119, 
 120 ; conquest of Syria marks the 
 true era of Eoman corruption, 118. 
 
 Tacitus : place of his birth, 143, note 
 30 ; illustration from, of inhuman- 
 ity of Eomans towards their slaves, 
 204, 205; statement of, as to the 
 corruption of the expiring republic, 
 and want of attachment to, among 
 the mass of its subjects, 240 ; illus- 
 tration from, of the debasement of 
 the senate in the time of Tiberius, 
 280, note 2 ; and of the tyranny of 
 this emperor, 284, note 6. 
 
 Taeentines : their early corruption, 
 28 ; they were allies of Pyrrhus, 
 77. 
 
 TAEQTjnr : his usurpation and expul- 
 sion, 21, 22 ; his ability, 23, 24. 
 
 Taetaes : a new Tartar people seize 
 high Asia, 447; their superiority 
 as cavalry, 447, and 380, note 7. 
 
 Taxation, Eoman : oppressiveness 
 of, under the later emperors, 382, 
 383; light thence shed upon early 
 French history, 383, and 389, 390 ; 
 
 idea of, from the beginning of Eo- 
 man history to the fall of the West- 
 ern empire, 384-391 ; varieties of, 
 884, 385 ; method of collecting, 385 ; 
 great defects of this method, 385 ; 
 proximate idea of the amount of 
 revenue under the empire, 385-387 ; 
 four periods of Eoman history in 
 reference to the weight of taxation, 
 387-391. 
 Teeence, referred to, 143, note 30. 
 TEEMDsns, the god : superstitious 
 idea among the Eomans that he 
 would never retrace his steps, 307. 
 Theodoea: her bad character, and 
 her elevation to the throne, 419 ; 
 her great ascendency over Justin- 
 ian, and her pernicious influence, 
 419, 420. 
 Theodora, widow of TheophUus, 
 final re-establishment of image- 
 worship by, 452, 453, and note 
 •20. 
 Theodoeio, referred to in connection 
 with the abolition of the gladia- 
 torial spectacle, 313. 
 Theodosius the Geeat : how he was 
 called to the empire of the East, 370 ; 
 both empires united under, 869; 
 number ' of houses contained by 
 Eome during his time, 371. 
 Theodosius the Yototgee: hla rela- 
 tions with Attala, 394, 395, and 
 note 7. 
 Thuotdides: his idea of the rude, 
 primitive condition of the ancient 
 civilized states, 11 ; he takes no 
 notice of the Eomans, 109, notes 2 
 and (o) ; significance of this fact, 
 ihid. 
 Tiber, general description ol, and 
 
 source of interest in, 34, 35. 
 TiBEEitrs, idea of the tyranny of, 
 278, 279, and note 1 ; 280, 284, and 
 note 6. 
 TiBULLOs, refeiTcd to, 143, note 30. 
 
524: 
 
 ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 Tionnis, battle of, referred to, 87, 94, 
 95. 
 
 Titos, reference to, 302. 
 
 Teajan : his character according to 
 Montesquieu, 303 ; the same other- 
 wise viewed, 303, note 19 ; he con- 
 ducts a successful war against the 
 Parthians, 303, 304 ; he entertains 
 the Eoman people with great gladi- 
 atorial spectacles, 312. 
 
 Trastmbnus, Battie of, referred to, 
 87 ; description of, 95, 96 ; lamen- 
 tation in Rome after, 88, note 26. 
 
 Tkeason, loose and abusive idea of, 
 under the Eoman emperors, 278- 
 280 ; 284, and note 6. 
 
 Treaties, idea of, among the early 
 republics of Italy, 21. 
 
 Tkebia, battle of, referred to, 87, 95. 
 
 Tkiboni^ut : his place as a Eoman 
 lawyer indicated, 431 ; his relation 
 to the institutes, pandects, and 
 Code of Justinian, ibid. 
 
 Tkibunes : their institution, 165, 166 ; 
 originally designed for defense, 
 afterward employed for attack, 166, 
 and note 7 ; their inviolable char- 
 acter, 284; the functions of the 
 tribunate assumed by the emperors, 
 284, 319. 
 
 Triumph : takes its origin in the pil- 
 laging expeditions of the early 
 Eomans, 20; glory of a general 
 estimated by the amount of gold 
 and silver borne in, 140 ; terror 
 with which kings regarded the, 
 141 ; particular description of, 146- 
 149; analysis of, and its signifi- 
 cance as an indication of the status 
 of the Romans, 149 ; on establish- 
 ment of the empire, right of, merged 
 in the emperor, 265. 
 
 Tridmvirate, formation of, between 
 Ootavius, Anthony, and Lepidus, 
 251 ; cruelties of the three, 251, 
 and note 10. 
 
 Tdbks : their alleged affinity with the 
 Huns, 480, and note 19 ; their ug- 
 liness of person, 480; how they 
 entered into and conquered Persia, 
 474, 475 ; they thence extend their 
 conquests over the Greek provinces 
 in the direction of the Bosporus, 
 475 ; their singular warfare against 
 the Greeks, 479, 480 ; their passion 
 for abducting the Greek women, 
 480 ; extension of their power to 
 the Bosporus, 481 ; their capture 
 of Constantinople, 488 ; their em- 
 pire upheld by the mutual jealous- 
 ies of the great powers of Europe, 
 474, 485, 486 ; this state of things 
 not likely to be permanent, 486 ; 
 duty of the great powers of Europe 
 to Greece in connection with the 
 prospective recession of the Turk- 
 ish rule, 486, 487. 
 
 Twelve Tables, theory of the Eo- 
 man lawyers in relation to, 430 ; 
 some of their contents, 432. 
 
 Type : physical type of the Eomans. 
 57, 58; some idea of that of the 
 Gauls according to the description 
 given by Caesar, 94. 
 
 Tyuanntoide, doctrine of, among the 
 Greeks and Eomans, 223, 224 ; 240- 
 244 ; Eoman and Greek law author- 
 izing the killing of aspirants to 
 regal power, 223, 241; difference 
 between ancient and modem 
 thought on the subject of, 242, 243 ; 
 cause of this difference, 243, 244. 
 
 Ttre, comparative duration of, 410. 
 
 Plpian : his place as a jurist, 430,431. 
 
 Union : idea of true union in a body 
 politic, 185. 
 
 UinTED States of Ameeioa : ratio of 
 population of, to military and naval 
 force on peace footing, 69 ; same 
 
ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 525 
 
 for the principal states of modem 
 Europe, 68 ; same for Soman em- 
 pire, 70, 310 ; diabandment of ar- 
 mies of, at close of rebellion, an 
 illustration of the diminished mili- 
 tary spirit of modem times, 109, 
 110, and note 3 ; how institutions 
 of, compare with those of the ancient 
 republics, 178, 179 ; position of, in 
 relation to the civil and ecolesias- 
 tioal powers, 468, i69 ; its system 
 of intercommunication on a scale 
 of magnitude unequaled in his- 
 tory, 274; people of, injuriously 
 affected by irrational rush and 
 stress, 256, 257. 
 
 Valens: Goths enter the empire 
 during the reign of, how, 363-365 ; 
 they destroy him and his army, 
 365, 866. 
 
 VALENTOTEAir : his policy of fortifying 
 the Ehine, 363. 
 
 Vandals : their aUiance with AttUa, 
 400, 401 ; they are rapidly modified 
 by the influence of the southern 
 countries in which they settle, 414, 
 415 ; they abandon Spain and found 
 an empire in Africa, 417 ; they are 
 invaded there by Justinian, 417, 
 418. 
 
 Vaeeo, Teubentius, before Cannae, 
 39 ; after Cannae, 88 ; the senate 
 thanks him for not despairing of 
 the republic, 89, and note 27. 
 
 Vaeeo, " the most learned of the 
 Eomans," reference to, 143, note 30. 
 
 Vasoo de Gama, referred to, 488. 
 
 Vegetius, referred to, in reference to 
 the Eoman military art, 48, 50, 379. 
 
 Veu, siege of, by the Eomans, 29 ; its 
 capture marks an era in Eoman 
 history, 29 ; location of, in refer- 
 ence to Eome, 29, note 18 ; Eomans 
 
 agitate the question of abandoning 
 their own city and moving to, 31, 
 33. 
 
 Velites : 55, and notes 20 and (a). 
 
 Venice, duration of, compared with 
 that of Tyre, Carthage, and Syra- 
 cuse, 410 ; commerce of declining 
 Greek empire transferred to, and 
 other Italian cities, 478, 479. 
 
 Vespabiait: his reign characterized, 
 302. 
 
 VioTOKT, the altar and statue of, 393, 
 and note 2. 
 
 ViEsiL : place of his bu-th refeiTcd 
 to, 143, note 30. 
 
 ViTELLiTjs : character of the Eoman 
 people in his time, 299. 
 
 ViziEES : analogy of their functions 
 and practices to those of the Prae- 
 torian Praefects, 356. 
 
 VoLsciANs: their warlike character, 
 28. 
 
 VoLTAiEE : his service to critical his- 
 toiy, 43 ; his idea of all early h^- 
 toiy, 43, 44 ; his description of the 
 emotional excesses of the French 
 people on the occasion of the illness 
 of Louis XV, 290, 291 ; his skepti- 
 cism as to the alleged efficacy of 
 Greek fire, 471, note 1 ; his idea of 
 some traits of the French character, 
 483, 484. 
 
 W 
 
 Wae : Eomans perfected in the art 
 of war by its incessant practice, 25, 
 26 ; indecisive character of the wars 
 among the ancient Italian nations, 
 26, 27 ; war regarded by the Eo- 
 mans as the sole art, 48 ; labor and 
 discipline of Eoman soldiers, 49, 
 and not« 4 ; supremacy of Romans 
 in the art of war supplies the key 
 to their position in history, 57 ; 
 their superiority in this respect but 
 a marked instance of the general 
 
626 
 
 ANALYTICAL INDEX. 
 
 militaiy character of antiquity, 57, 
 69 ; why the love of war wa3 more 
 dominant in ancient than it is in 
 modem societies, 59, 60 ; funda- 
 mental idea of law of war in ancient 
 times was that the victor might 
 rightfully slay the captive, 202 ; 
 this idea the principal source of an- 
 cient slavery, 202, 203. 
 Wabs, Civil: social and civil wars 
 of the Eomans — their political sig- 
 nificance, 191-193, 237-239; no 
 qtiarter given in the latter, 258 ; 
 Marius headed the new, Sylla the 
 old, citizens, 208, and note 1 ; Eo- 
 man power continued to extend 
 during the civil wars, 218 ; such 
 wars render a state more dangerous 
 to its neighhors, 218, 219, but com- 
 pare 110, note 3 ; great battles of 
 the Boman civil wars fought in 
 Greece, 251, note 11. 
 
 WiLiiAM THE SiLEKT : Ms assassino- 
 tion referred to, 243. 
 
 Woman : her inferior position under 
 the Koman law referred to, 432; 
 her influence over man weakened 
 by polygamy, 420 ; experience does 
 not discriminate against her as a 
 sovereign, 420, note 15. 
 
 "WoBKS, PtrBLio, under the kings 
 and under the republic and empire, 
 compared, 36, 37 ; sewers, great cir- 
 cus, aqueducts, coliseum, bridges, 
 roads, etc., ibid. 
 
 Woksaae: his observations on the 
 diffusion of the use of iron in an- 
 cient Europe, 344r-346. 
 
 WTMAif : his remarks on the stone 
 period of Italy, 45. 
 
 Zama, battle of, referred to, 84 ; fur- 
 ther notice of, 108, and note 1. 
 
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