])5 BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME EROM THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND THE GIET OF Henrg ^. Sag* 1891 Amn 7^'^?^ Cornell University Library DS 478.H75 1898 A history of the Indian mutiny and of th 3 1924 024 060 711 Cornell University Library The original of tliis book is in tlie Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924024060711 A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN MUTINY A HISTOEY OF THE INDIAN MUTINY AND OF THE DISTURBANCES WHICH ACCOMPANIED IT AMONG THE CIVIL POPULATION BY T. RICE HOLMES * FIFTH EDITION REVISED THROUGEOUT AND SLIGHTLY ENLARGED WITH FIVE MAPS AND SIX PLANS MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited NEW TOEK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 1898 All rights reserved First four editions pvMished elsewhere. Fifth edition (revised) printed for MaormUan d Co., 1S98. PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION About two years ago Messrs. Macmillan agreed, at my request, to take over the publication of this history ; and it appeared to me that the time had come for thoroughly revisiag the whole book. In June, 1896, before the re- vision had proceeded far, the fourth edition was exhausted : but, although it was certain that a considerable time must elapse before the work could be finished, the publishers thought that it would be unwise to print any more copies from the old plates ; and indeed it would have been hardly fair to offer intending purchasers a reprint while I was trying to make the book better worth buying. The structure of the work remains unchanged ; and only such alterations have been made as appeared necessary. Wher- ever I could detect an inaccuracy, I have corrected it : wherever the narrative of military operations was deficient in lucidity, I have tried to amend it. I have struck out a few superfluous sentences, have added what, to my appre- hension, was wanting, and have modified judgements which, on reconsideration, appeared misleading or unfair. Among the more important alterations and additions are those which relate to the Afghan war, the battle of Sacheta and the events which led up to it, the battle of Chinhat, the defence of the Lucknow Eesidency, Havelock's campaign. Lord Canning's Oudh proclamation and the vexed question of Sir Colin Campbell's responsibility for the protraction of the war. On the whole, the text is enlarged by about PEEFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION twenty pages ; and several new appendices have also been written. I am sincerely grateful to Sir Henry Havelock-Allan, Sir William Olpherts, General McLeod Innes, Colonel de Kantzow, and many other officers who, in response to my queries, have given me valuable information. Lord Eoberts kindly lent me, through the medium of Sir Alfred Lyall, the revised proof-sheets of the first volume of his Forty-one Tears in India ; and Colonel Vibart, with equal kindness, allowed me to read the revised sheets of his new volume, Richard Baird Smith. 11 DouEO Place, Kbu-sinqton, W. November 4, 1897. PEEFACE TO THE FIEST EDITION Those who may open this book will not, I think, complain that it is wanting in detail or in that element of personal adventure which could not properly be excluded from a History of the Indian Mutiny. But it does not profess to give a minute account of what took place at every station and in every district in India during the struggle. A narrative minute enough, in most of its chapters, to satisfy the most curious reader has already been given to the world by Sir John Kaye and Colonel Malleson; and there is nothiQg to justify any one in undertaking to write another book on the subject on the same scale as that which they adopted. The history of the Mutiny, like every other history, must iadeed be told in detail, if it is to hold the interest of readers : but, while the narrator of recent events is expected to give a full account of all that are interesting in themselves, the writer who appears later in the field ought to reserve his detailed narrative for events of historical importance. There is, I am sure, room for a book which, while giving a detailed narrative of the chief campaigns, of the stirring events that took place at the various centres of revolt, and of every episode the story of which can permanently interest the general reader, and a more summary account of incidents of minor importance. PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION twenty pages ; and several new appendices have also been written. I am sincerely grateful to Sir Henry Havelock-Allan, Sir William Olpherts, General McLeod Innes, Colonel de Kantzow, and many other officers who, in response to my queries, have given me valuable information. Lord Eoberts kindly lent me, through the medium of Sir Alfred Lyall, the revised proof-sheets of the first volume of his Forty-one Tears in India ; and Colonel Vibart, with equal kindness, allowed me to read the revised sheets of his new volume, Richard Baird Smith. \ 1 DouRO Place, Kensington, W. November 4, 1897. PEEFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION Those who may open this book will not, I think, complain that it is wanting in detail or in that element of personal adventure which could not properly be excluded from a History of the Indian Mutiny. But it does not profess to give a minute account of what took place at every station and in every district in India during the struggle. A narrative minute enough, in most of its chapters, to satisfy the most curious reader has already been given to the world by Sir John Kaye and Colonel Malleson; and there is nothing to justify any one in undertaking to write another book on the subject on the same scale as that which they adopted. The history of the Mutiny, like every other history, must indeed be told in detail, if it is to hold the interest of readers : but, while the narrator of recent events is expected to give a full account of all that are interesting in themselves, the writer who appears later in the field ought to reserve his detailed narrative for events of historical importance. There is, I am sure, room for a book which, while giving a detailed narrative of the chief campaigns, of the stirring events that took place at the various centres of revolt, and of every episode the story of which can permanently interest the general reader, and a more summary account of incidents of minor importance. PEEFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION should aim at completing the solution of the real historical problems connected with the Mutiny. I am only too conscious how far my performance of this task falls below the standard which I have set myself. Still, I hope that my attempt may be of use. The whole truth about any period of history is never known until many workers have sought for it ; and it is possible that a writer who has derived almost aU his information from original sources may succeed in throwing light upon neglected aspects of his subject, and in gaining the attention of some who have hitherto known nothing of one of the most interesting chapters of their national history. Though this book is so much shorter than those which have preceded it, my object has not been to write a short history or a popular history, in the ordinary sense of the term, but simply to write the best history that I could; to record everything that was worthy to be remembered ; to enable readers to understand what sort of men the chief actors in the struggle were, and to realise what they and their comrades and opponents did and suffered ; and to ascertain what were the causes of the Mutiny, and how the civil population of India bore them- selves during its progress. As I have found myself unable to agree, on certain points, with Sir John Kaye and Colonel Malleson, it is the more incumbent on me to say that, if their books had never appeared, the difficulty which I have felt in finding my way through the tangled maze of my materials would have been greatly increased. In some cases, I am indebted solely to those books for information which I might have found it hard to get elsewhere. To students of military history Colonel Malleson's work will always be indispensable. . PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION ix In the last appendix I have given a short critical account of the authorities which I have used. In conclusion, I desire to express my gratitude to those who have helped me by answering queries, or by allowing me to read private letters or manuscripts. October 8, 1883. Note. — A few slight alterations and additions, based partly upon notes sent to me by readers who had served in the Mutiny, were made in the second edition, and are referred to in the preface to that edition. Some of the few items of information for which I was indebted to the works of Sir John Kaye and Colonel Malleson I have since verified from original sources. Others are contained in letters or memoranda from which they gave extracts. GLOSSAEY [Words explained iu the text are not given here. Nor are those which occur once only in the text, as they are explained in footnotes. The words given below have also been explained in footnotes, but are brought together for the convenience of readers.] Bhbbsty . Water-carrier. Baniya . Grain-dealer or money-lender Daooitt . Gang-robbery. Jamadab . Native lieutenant. Lines Long rows of huts in which sepoys lived. Nullah . A small stream or ditch. Raj . Government. Ryot Peasant-cultivator. Sttbahdar Native captain. Tahsildar Native revenue-collector. Tulwar . Native sword. Vakil Agent, or man of business. LIST OF MAPS AND PLANS Map of North-Westben and Central India . tofcbcepage 1 Battle of Cawnpore (July 16, 1857) . . . „ 290 Battle of Najafgarh „ 367 Delhi ,,382 Battle of Cawnpore (Dec. 6, 1857) . ,, 417 LucKNOw . . ,, 446 Map of Nokth-Eastern India . . . . ,, 460 Indorb ,, 482 Map of India . ,, 602 Map of Gwalior and its Environs . . . ,, 637 Map to illustrate thb Pursuit of Tantia Topi ,, 541 Note, — As it was necessary to print separate maps of North- Western and North-Eastem India, in order to avoid having a map too large for easy reference, I have given a small map of the whole of India as well, which illustrates especially chapters xiii. -xv. NOTE ON THE SPELLING OF INDIAN NAMES Unifokmitt in the spelling of Indian names has not yet been attained. Sir William Hunter, in preparing his system, so far admitted compromise as to spell a few very familiar names, for example, Lucknow and Cawnpore, in the old-fashioned way. But Colonel Malleson, who professed himself an adherent of the Hunteriau system, insisted on writing Lakhnao and Kanhpiir. A few years ago the Government of India issued authorised lists of proper names, which differed from Sir WiUiam Hunter's original list {Guide to the Ortho- graphy of Indian Proper Names, 1871) by making a considerable addition to the number of names which were to be regarded as familiar, and therefore to be spelled, without accents, in the old-fashioned way. Finally, Sir Wflliam Hunter, who had insisted that aU the contributors to his Rulers of India Series should follow his original system with its multiplicity of accents, pub- lished in 1896 a biography of Brian Hodgson, in which he dispensed with accents altogether. StiU, uniformity has been attained to this extent, that in India the authorised lists are generally followed ; and even in England, though there is still a great deal of confusion and inconsistency, the new orthography is gaining ground. It seemed to me therefore, when I was revising this book, that I had better conform in principle to the system of the authorised lists. I have, however, left the spelling in quotations, which I have given in foot- notes or appendices, unaltered. One word as to accents. Anglo-Indian newspapers omit them, because for Anglo- Indian readers they are unnecessary. But without them most English readers will pronounce every other word wrong. However, following the rule laid down in Sir "William Hunter's Imperial Gazetteer, I have put them in as sparingly as possible. Sometimes indeed accents, as printed in the Gazetteer,^ are, in regard to Anglo-Indian usage, misleading. Natives say Moradabad ; but Anglo-Indians, while laying stress on the first and the third a, pronounce them as in lad, not as in faXher. It is impossible to draw up rules for pronunciation which shall be absolutely comprehensive : but the chief points to note are that a vmaccented (which causes more perplexity than any other vowel) is generally pronounced like o in lutton or u in pv/rr, some- times like a in rural; -&wah and -dwar (as in Bedwar) like our ; ai like j/in lyre; au like ow in now; ii like oo in poor; and Bagh with the g hard, as if it were written £aa-g. The termination pur, though not accented, is pro- nounced like poor. To give a few examples, the old-fashioned Futtehgurh = Fatehgarh, Beebeegunge = Blbiganj, Poontch = Punch, Segowlie = Segauli, Mynpoorie = Mainpiari. Nowshera (properly Naushahra) is pronouncedas if it were written Nowshara, BareiUy like Barelly, " moulvi " like molevi. But the few readers who care about pronunciation will learn more from conversa- tion with Anglo-Indians than from rules. CONTENTS CHAPTER I General Sketch of Anglo-Indian History to the End of Lord Dalhousie's Administration The Mogul Empire . Dupleix attempts to found European empire in India Olive thwarts him The Black Hole of Calcutta Further successes of Cliye . Corruption of the British during Clive's absence in England cure's return ; his policy . His place in Anglo-Indian history Failure of his system of govern ment .... Warren Hastings His early measures . The Regulating Act . Hastings thwarted by Clavering, Monson, and Francis He recovers power . How he saved the empire . Outcry against him . Lord Comwallis War with Tippoo Balance of power The Pernianent Settlement Character of ComwaUis Sir John Shore ; non-intervention Marquess WeUesley . Critical state of the empire Overthrow of Tippoo. Policy of WeUesley . Treaty of Bassein. Mardtha war Treatment of the Mogul Emperor FAOE 1 I 3 S i 4 4 6 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 13 14 15 15 PAGE Dealings with Oudh . . .16 Tanjore, Surat, and the Camatic 16 Red Sea Expedition . , .16 Views and character of WeUesley 17 Second administration of Corn- waUis 18 Sir George Barlow . . .18 Lord Minto . . . .18 Bundelkhand . . . 18 Ranjit Singh . . .19 Amir Khan . . . .19 Conquest of Mauritius and Java 19 Lord Hastings . . . .20 Nepalese war . . . .20 i^^Sction of the Pinddris and theMardthas. . . .20 Lord Hastings's work . . 22 Lord Amherst. First Burmese war 22 Amherst and Ochterlony . 22 Capture of Bhurtpore . 23 Non-intervention . . .23 Lord William Bentinck . . 23 Mysore and Coorg . . .23 Settlement of the North- Western Provinces .... 24 Resumption ... 26 The Sale Law .... 26 The strong side of Bentinok's administration . . .26 Lord Auckland's policy towards Persia and AfghdnistAn . . 27 Conquest of Sind . . -29 XIV CONTENTS PAGE PAGE Ellenborough's dealings with Administi-ation of the Punjab 33 Sindhia 29 Lord Dalhousie's annexation His recall 30 policy .... 34 TheSiklis 30 Conquest of Pegu 37 First Sikh war . . . 30 Annexation of Oudh . 37 Sir Henry Hardinge tries to In^m Commission 40 maintain the native govern- Case of the Nana Sahib . 41 ment of the Punjab 31 Dalhousie's civilising measures 41 Henry Lawrence in the Punjab . 31 Review of the effects of the first Second Sikh war 31 century of British rule . 42 Annexation of the Punjab. 32 CHAPT'EE II The Sepoy Akmt Origin of the sepoy army . Qualities of the sepoys tested Idiosyncrasies of Bengal sepoys Golden age of the sepoy army The first mutinies Numbers of European officers increased. Powers of native officers diminished . The reorganisation of 1796 Vexatious orders issued to the Madras army .... The mutiny at VeUore and its results Advantages enjoyed by the se- poys The best oficers sednoed from their regiments by the pro- spect of staff employ Powers of commandants dimin- ished General order of 1824 The tragedy at Barrackpore 47 48 48 48 49 50 51 52 52 53 53 54 54 Pecuniary allowances of officers reduced Abolition of corporal punishment Bad effects of the Afgbto war . Deterioration of discipline . Interference with the sepoys' pay A succession of mutinies . Sir Charles Napier's dispute with Lord Dalhousie Dalhousie baulked by a native regiment .... Dalhousie and the multitude of counsellors .... Radical defects of the Bengal army ..... The vital question . Disproportion between the num- bers of European and native troops Reforms urged by Dalhousie The native army on the eve of Lord Canning's arrival . 55 55 55 56 56 56 57 60 60 60 62 63 64 65 CHAPTEE III PiKST Year of Lord Canning's Edle — Outbreak of THE MUTINT Resignation of Dalhousie. His character and place among Anglo-Indian rulers . . 66 Lord Canning . . . .67 The Supreme Council . 68 Affairs of Oudh . . 69 TheMoulvi . 72 Persian war . 72 CONTENTS XV PAGE Treaties witli Dost Mahomed . 73 General Service Enlistment Act 76 Grievances of tlie sepoys . . 77 Rumoured designs of Govern- ment against caste and religion 77 The greased cartridge . . 79 Action of Government . . 82 Colonel Mitchell and the 19th Native Infantry . . .83 General Hearsey and the 34th 84 Mungul Pandy ... 85 Disbanding of the 19th . . 87 Delay of Canning in punishing the 34th .... 87 How he acted, and how he ought to have acted . . .87 Excitement at Umhalla . 88 Incendiarism ... 89 The bone-dust fable 89 The chapatties ... 90 Excitement at Delhi . . .90 Nana Sahib's tour . . .91 Henry Lawrence tries to heal discontent in Oudh . . 92 Canning hopes that quiet is returning . . . .93 Disbandment of the 34th. Com- ments of the sepoys . . 94 Mutiny at Lueknow . . .94 Opinions of Canning and his counsellors thereon . . 96 Meerut 96 Delhi 104 Action of Canning . . .112 Action of General Anson, the Commander-in-Chief . . 113 His difficulties . . . .114 Barnes and Forsyth support him 115 Loyalty of Cis-Sutlej chiefs . 115 Panic at Simla . . . .116 Correspondence of Anson with Canning and John Lawrence . 117 Hodson's ride . . . .118 Anson's plan of campaign . .118 His death and character . .118 General Barnard marches for Delhi 119 The British at Meerut. Anarchy in the districts . . . 120 Battles on the Hindan . . 121 Wilson joins Barnard . 123 Battle of Badli-ki-Serai . . 124 The British encamp before Delhi 125 CHAPTEE IV The North-Westeen Pkovinobs, Qwalior, and Eajputana The North-Western Provinces John Colvin 127 128 128 Policy of Colvin . . .129 Mutinies in the Doab . . 130 Colvin's proclamation . . 131 Drummond .... 132 Disarming at Agra . . .132 Preparation of the fort for defence 132 Colvin's efforts to restore order . 133 133 184 134 134 135 137 137 137 Saharanpur Rohilkhand Shahjahinpm- . Bareilly . Khan Bahadur Khan Budaun . Moradabad Rohilkhand under Mahomedan rule 137 Farukhabad . . . .138 Siege of Fatehgarh . . .138 Character of the mutinies and disturbances in the North- western Provinces. . . 141 Gwalior, Sindhia, Dinkar R^o, and Macpherson . . .144 Folly of the Brigadier at Gwalior, and of Colvin . . .146 Mutiny at Gwalior . . . 147 Macpherson persuades Sindhia to keep his troops inactive at Gwalior 148 Rajputana . . . 148 George Lawrence . . . 149 His proclamation . . . 150 Colvin and Lieutenant Carnell secure Ajmere . . .150 Mutinies at Nusseerabad and Neemuoh . . . .151 XVI CONTENTS Shortcomings of Colvin. His miseries. He tries to do his duty 151 He removes the women and children at Agra into the fort 153 The provisional council . . 153 Battle of Sacheta . . . 155 The British forced to retire into the fdrt 156 Life in the fort . . . .158 CoiTespondence of Macpherson with Sindhia .... 159 Exploits of Dimlop . . 160 Death of Colvin . . .161 CHAPTEE V Canning's Policy : Events at Calcutta Canning fails to realise the gravity of the crisis . . . .162 He rejects the offers of the Cal- cutta volunteers, and refuses to disarm the sepoys at Barrack- pore and Dinapore. . . 163 He plays fast and loose with Jang Bahddur . . .165 Offers of the volunteers accepted 167 The Gagging Act . . . 168 Disarming at Barraokpore, Cal- cutta, and Dum-Dum . . 170 Panic Sunday . . . .170 Arrest of the King of Oudh . 171 Sir Patrick Grant . . .172 Gloomy announcements . . 173 The Clemency Order . . . 173 The Arms Act .... 174 Canning refuses to establish martial law in Bengal . . 174 Arrival of Outram, Peel, and Sir Colin Campbell . . .175 Review of the first year and a half of Canning's administration . 175 CHAPTEE VI Bbngai, and Western Behar Macdonald at Eohni . . .177 Halliday and Tayler . . .177 Dangerous situation of the Patna Division .... 179 Resources of Tayler . 179 His early measures . . . 180 Patna 180 The 7th of June at Patna . . 181 Affairs in the districts . . 181 Halliday will not believe that Patna is in danger . . . 182 Tayler in vain urges General Lloyd to disarm . . . 182 His measures for the preserva- tion of order .... 182 Conspiracy and sedition . .184 The natives who supported Tayler 185 Red tape .... 186 Major Holmes .... 186 Shall the Dinapore sepoys be disarmed ? . . . . Mutiny at Dinapore . Kunwar Singh .... Siege of Arrah . . . . Dunbar's expedition for the relief of Arrah . . . . The garrison of Arrah still holds out Vincent Eyre ..." He resolves to relieve Arrah Battle of Gujrajganj . Arrah relieved .... Eyre follows up his success Dangers which encompassed Tayler after Dunbar's failtire . His withdrawal order How Lautonr and Money acted upon it 187 189 190 191 . 192 194 195 196 197 198 198 200 201 201 CONTENTS PAGE Review of Tayler's conduct . 203 Halliday dismisses Tayler . . 203 Subsequent conduct of Halliday 204 Nemesis .... Tayler's struggle for redress PAGE , 205 . 206 Benares ai> The line between Calcutta and Delhi . . 208 Benares . . 208 Frederic Gubbins . 210 Tucker . . 210 Mutiny at Azamgarh . 210 James Neill . 211 OHAPTEE VII Allahabad How he dealt with the railway oflScials at Calcutta . . 211 He arrives at Benares . . 212 The crisis 212 Mutiny at Jaunpur. Anarchy in the districts . . . 214 Allahabad . . . .215 The mutiny and its consequences 217 Brasyer saves the fort . . 218 Neill arrives and restores order . 219 The cholera .... 221 What Neill had done, and what he hoped to do . . . 221 CHAPTEE VIII Cawnpoee Cawnpore 223 Sir Hugh Wheeler . . .224 His selection of a place of refuge 225 Eeinforcements arrive . . 225 The treasury placed under the charge of the Nana Sahib . 226 The agony of suspense . . 226 The mutiny . . . .227 The siege 229 The capitulation . . . 236 The massacre on the Ganges . 237 Pursuit of the fugitives . 238 The Nana proclaimed Peshwa . 240 The Beebeegurh . . . 241 Last act of the tragedy of Cawn- pore . f* . . . 242 CHAPTER IX LtJCKNOw and the Oudh Districts — Havelock's Campaign Anxiety of Canning for Oudh . 244 Henry Lawrence . . . 244 How he dealt with the population and the sepoys . . . 246 The news from Meerut and Delhi arrives 248 Lucknow 248 Arrangement of the garrison . 249 The Residency and the Machi Bh^wan . . . .250 Behaviour of the people of Luck- now and the sepoys • . 252 Telegram from Cawnpore . . 252 Unselfish exertions of Lawrence 252 Martin Gubbins . . .253 He advises the disarming of the. sepoys. Lawrence rejects the advice 253 Mutiny of May 30 . . . 254 Condition of Oudh . . .256 Story of the fugitives from Sita- pur 257 Mutinies in the districts . . 259 Behaviour of the population . 260 XVllI CONTENTS PAGE Affairs at Lucknow . . 260 Failing health of Lawrence . 261 The provisional council . . 261 The pensioners .... 262 Mutinies of the military police . 262 Suggestions of Gubbins . . 263 Battle of Chinhat . . .263 Commencement of the siege . 267 Death of Lawrence . . . 268 Brigadier Inglis . . . 270 The position which he had to defend 270 The besieged and the besiegers . 271 The siege 272 Henry Havelock . . . 279 He is chosen to command a column for the relief of Cawn- pore and Lucknow. . . 281 His preparations at Allahabad . 282 Composition of his column . 283 He marches from Allahabad . 283 Battle of Fatehpur . . .284 Battle of i.ung . . . .285 Battle of the Pandu Naddi . 286 Battle of Cawnpore . . . 286 Havelock at Cawnpore ' . 290 Battle of Unao . . 292 Battle of Bashiratganj . . 293 Havelock obliged to retreat . 294 His correspondence with Neill . 294 Second battle of Bashiratganj . 295 Havelock again obliged to retreat 296 NeQl appeals to him for help . 296 Havelock advances again, and fights another battle . . 297 His retreat to Cawnpore and its effect 297 Battle of Bithtir . . .297 Havelock superseded by Outram 298 Character of Outram . . .299 He goes to join Havelock . . 300 He leaves to Havelock the glory of relieving Lucknow . . 302 Composition of Havelock's aug- mented army . . . 302 The passage of the Ganges . 303 Final advance towards Lucknow 303 Battle of Mangalwar . . . 303 Battle of the Alambagh . . 304 Havelock's plans for effecting a junction with thegarrison over- ruled by Outram . . . 304 Feelings of the garrison . . 305 Morning of 26th of September . 306 Advance of the column . . 306 Excitement of the garrison . 307 Street-fighting . . . .308 The welcome . . 309 CHAPTER X The Punjab and Delhi State of the Punjab . . . 311 Tne Punjab officers . . .312 John Lawrence . . . 312 News of the seizure of Delhi reaches Lahore . . . 313 The ball at Meean-meer . . 314 The disarming parade . . 314 Montgomery's circular letter . 315 Measures taken for the safety of Amritsar, Phillaur, and Eangra 315 Mutiny at Ferozepore . .316 Achievements of the Punjab officers on May 13 and 14 . . 317 Peshawar . . . .317 Herbert Edwardes . . .318 Sydney Cotton. General Reed. Neville Chamberlain . . 318 Council at Peshawar . . 319 John Nicholson . . . 319 Resolutions of the council . . 321 State of the Peshawar Division . 323 Startling revelations . . 323 Measures of Nicholson . . 324 The crisis at Peshawar . . 325 Colonel Spottiswoode . , 326 The story of the 55th . . 326 Ajlin Khan and the garrison of Abazai 323 Policy of Edwardes and Cotton . 328 Jullundur and LudhiAna . . 330 Disarming at Mooltau . . 333 CONTENTS General policy of the Punjab Government . . . 333 Behaviour of the people . . 335 The Cis-Sutlej States . . 337 Lawrence's imperial policy . 338 March of the Guides for Delhi . 339 British position before Delhi . 339 Barnard's situation . . . 340 The proposed coup-de-main . 341 Encounters with the enemy . 344 Arrival of Neville Chamberlain and Baird Smith . . . 345 The British communications en- dangered .... 346 Disappointments of Barnard . 346 His character .... 347 His death 348 The question of assault reopened 348 Wilson 348 Deeds and sufferings of the army 349 State of affairs inside Delhi . 352 The Peshawar versus Delhi con- troversy . . . 354 State of the Punjab . . .358 Jhelum and Sialkot . . . 359 Measures of Montgomery . . 359 Nicholson in command of the Moveable Column . . . 359 Battles at the Trimmu Ghdt . 360 Nicholson marches for Delhi . 361 Cooper and the mutineers of the 26th 362 Edwardes and the capitalists of Peshawar . . . .363 PAGE Troubles on the border . . 364 Mutiny at Peshawar . . . 364 Syad Amir and the Mohmands . 365 The agony of suspense . 366 Nicholson at Delhi . . . 366 Battle of Najafgarh . . . 367 When shall the assault he de- livered ? . . . .368 Wilson's address to the army . 369 Eailure of the mutineers to con- centrate in sufi^cient strength upon Delhi . . . .369 The siege 370 Plan of assault .... 372 Examination of the breaches . 373 Preparations for the assault . 374 Advance of the columns . . 374 Operations of the first and second columns . . . .375 Of the fourth column and the cavalry brigade . . . 376 Attack on the Lahore bastion . 378 The Kashmir gate . . .379 Operations of the third column and the reserve . . . 380 Results of the day's fighting . 380 The debauch of Sept. 15 . . 381 The exodus . . . .381 Conduct of the British soldiers . 381 Capture of Delhi completed . 382 Movements of the King . . 382 Hodson 382 Hodson and the King . . 384 Hodson and the King's sons . 385 Death of Nicholson . . .388 CHAPTER XI Later Events in the Punjab — Operations consequent on THE Fall of Delhi — First Two OAMPAieNS oe Sir Colin Campbell Insurrection in Murree . . 390 Insurrection in Gugera . , 390 Greathed's march through the DoAb 391 Battle of Agra . . . .393 Hope Grant appointed to com- mand Greathed's column . 394 Operations of Van Cortlandt and Showers . . . .395 Retrospect of affairs in Rdjpu t4na Battle of Narmil Affairs at Delhi after its recap- ture .... Results of the fall of Delhi Sir Colin Campbell . Blockade of the Lucknow garri- son .... 395 397 397 399 400 401 CONTENTS PAGE Sir Colin's preparations . . 403 He starts from Calcutta . . 404 Battle of Kajwa . . . 404 Cawnpore threatened . . 404 In spite of Outram's advice, Sir Colin resolves to relieve Luck- now before securing Cavm- pore 405 Kavanagh volunteers to open communications between Out- ram and Sir Colin . . 406 His adventures . . . 406 Sir Colin adopts in principle the route recommended by Outram . . . .407 Sir Colin reviews his troops . 407 Operations of Nov. 12-15 . . 408 Attack on the Sikandar Bagh . 409 Attack on the Shah Najif . .411 Havelock operates in support of Sir Colin . . . .413 Attack on the Mess-house and the MotiMahdl . . . .413 Meeting of the Generals . .414 "Withdrawal of the garrison . 414 Death of Havelock . . .416 Sir Colin sets out for Cawn- pore ..... 417 Sir Colin's instructions to Wind- ham 417 TAntia Topi marches to attack "Windham . . . .418 Anxieties of "Windham . 418 He conceives a plan for foiling Tantia 418 But shrinks from the responsi- bility of executing it . . 419 Second battle of the Pandu Naddi 419 Growing audacity of TAntia . 420 Second battle of Cawnpore . 420 Sir Colin's march to Cawnpore . 423 Conclusion of the battle . . 424 The morning after . . . 424 The women, children, and invalids of Luoknow sent to Allahabad 425 Position of the rebels at Cawn- pore 425 Sir Colin's plan of attack . . 425 Thii'd battle of Cawnpore . . 426 HopeGrant follows up the victory 428 Sir Colin's plans for the recon- quest of the Dodb . . .428 Operations of Seaton, "Walpole, and Sir Colin . . .429 Battle of the Kali Naddi . . 430 The Oudh versus Eohilkhand controversy .... 431 Preparations for the siege of Lucknow .... 432 Anarchy in the Benares and Allahabad Divisions . . 433 Jang BahdduT and General Franks march for Lucknow . . 434 Outram at the Alambagh . . 436 Final arrangements of Sir Colin 438 Defences of Lucknow . 438 Sir Colin's plan of attack . . 439 The siege .... 439 The Oudh proclamation . 446 CHAPTER XII Anarchy in Wbstben Behar — Eastern Behar, Bengal, AND ChDTIA NaGPUR Sir Colin hears startling news . 451 State of the Patna Division after the dismissal of Tayler . . 451 Kimwar Singh's raid into the Azamgarh district . . . 452 Milman blockaded by Kunwar Singh in Azamgarh . . 452 Canning sends Lord Mark Kerr to rescue Milman . . . 453 Battle of Azamgarh . . . 453 Sir Colin sends Lugard to relieve Azamgarh .... 454 Kunwar Singh makes for Jag- dispur 454 His last victory . . . 454 His death 454 His followers maintain a guerilla war against Lugard and Doug- las . . . . 455 Sir Henry Havelock's plan . 455 CONTENTS XXI PAGE Campaign in the Kaimir hills . 457 Condition of Bengal . . . 458 The mutineers of Chittagong and Dacca 458 PAGE The Bhigalpur Division . . 459 Exploits of Yule and Dalrymple 459 The Chutia Nagpur Division . 460 CHAPTER XIII The Bombay Presidency The Bombay Presidency . . 462 Lord Elphinstone . . . 462 He resolves to save Central India 463 Plot at SatAra . . . .463 The Southern Maratha country . 464 Seton-Karr . . . 464 Mutiny at Eolhdpur . . . 465 Elphinstone sends Jacob to the rescue 466 The disarming parade . . 466 Punishment and investigation . 466 Policy of Seton-Karr. . . 467 Troubles expected at Bombay . 467 Disagreement of the authori- ties 467 TheMuharram . . . .468 Mutinies in the north of the Pre- sidency 470 Affairs in the Southern MarAtha country 470 Jacob and Manson promoted . 471 Manson and Bdba Sahib . . 471 Nemesis overtakes Baba Sahib . 472 The SAwant Dessayees . . 473 CHAPTER XIV The Central Indian Agency — The Malwa Campaign The Central Indian Agency Henry Marion Durand Gathering of the storm at In- dore Holkar . Policy of Durand The mutiny Consequences of the mutiny Hungerford and Holkar . 474 Movements of Durand . . 483 . 474 Intended insurrection in Malwa 484 In- Durand sets out to quell the in- . 475 surrection .... 485 . 476 Siege ofDhar . . . .485 . 477 March for Mandisvpar . . 486 . 479 Battle of Goraria . . .487 . 481 Triumphant return of Durand to . 482 Indore 488 CHAPT ER XV BUNDBLKHAND AND THE SaTJGOE AND NbRBDDDA TbERITOEIES- Nagpdr — Hyderabad Jhansi . 490 The Bani of Jhansi 490 Mutiny at Jhinsi . .491 Bold resolution of the Rani . 493 Mutiny at Nowgong . . . 493 State of Bundelkhand . 494 xxii CONTENTS PAGE PAGE Willoughby Osborne at Eewah 494 Cuthbert Davidson . . 499 The Saugor and ITerbudda Terri Sdlar Jang . 499 tories .... 496 The crisis . . 499 Plowden at WAgpur . 497 The victory . 501 The Nizam's dominions 498 The Assigned Districts . 501 Hyderabad 499 CHAPTEE XVI Campaigns of Sir Hugh Rose and Whitlock Sir Robert Hamilton's plan for the pacification of Central India 503 Sir Hugh Rose . . . 503 His preparations . . 504 Siege oiRatgarh 505 Battle of Barodia . 506 Entry into Saugor . 506 Capture of Garhakota . . 506 Preparations for the attack on Jhansi 507 Fighting in the hills south of Shahgarh . . . .507 Sir Coliu's ill-judged order 508 The Rani and her advisers . 509 Jhdnsi 509 The siege ..... 510 Battle of the Betwa . . . 512 . Plan of assault on Jhansi . .513 The assault .... 513 Plight of the Rani . . .514 Sir Hugh prepares for the capture ofKdlpi . . . .514 Battle of Kiinch . . .515 Whitlook's campaign . 516 Fears and hopes of the rebels 517 Operations near Kdlpi . . 518 Battle of Golauli . . .519 Startling news received by Sir Hugh 520 CHAPTEE XVII Campaigns in Rohilkhand and Oddh Effects of Rose's victories on the country north of the Jumna . 522 Condition of Oudh . . .522 Second Oudh versus Rohilkhand controversy .... 524 Sir Colin's plan for the recon- quest of Rohilkhand . . 524 Condition of the Doab . .524 Walpole's march into Rohil- khand 625 Sir Colin follows him . 526 Battle of Bareilly . . .526 The Moulvi attacks Shahjahan- pur 628 Sir Colin sends Jones to the rescue 528 Sir Colin's return march to Fa- tehgarh 529 The Moulvi and the Raja of Pawayan ... 530 Affairs in Oudh . . . 530 Sir Colin's plans for the recon- quest of Oudh . . . 531 The Oudh campaign . . . 532 CONTENTS XXlll CHAPTER XVIII Last Efforts of Tantia Topi and the Rani of Jhansi — Pursuit of Tantia Topi — The Queen's Proclamation Tantia and the Eani at Gopal- pur 535 They seize Gwalior . . . 535 Sir Hugh realises the significance of the news .... 536 He resolves to reconquer Gwa- lior 536 His preparations and plan of attack 536 Battle of Morar . . 537 Battle of ,Kotah-ki-serai . . 537 Sir Hugh joins Smith . 538 Battle of Gwalior . . .539 Attack on the fort . Sindhia re-enters Gwalior . Pursuit of Tantia Capture of Tantia His trial . His execution . PAGE . 540 . 540 . 541 551 551 551 Was it just? . . . .552 The end of the struggle . . 552 Why was the struggle so pro- tracted ? . . . .553 Assumption of the GoTernment of India by the Crown . . 554 The Queen's proclamation . . 554 CHAPTER XIX CONOLTTSION 556 APPENDICES A. LOKD AtrOKLAND AND THE FlKST AFGHAN Wak . . . 563 B. Would it have been useless to puesue the Mebeut Mutineers ? 567 C. John Colvin in the Mutiny . 568 D. The Battle of Saohbta 573 E. The Patna Industbial Institution 574 F. Did the Bengal Sbpots plan a Gbnekal Mutiny for May 31, 1857? 577 G. Cawnpoke . . 578 H. The Dismissal of the Luoknow Sepoys to their Homes at the Instance of Martin Gubbins 582 I. The Batile op Chinhat 583 J. Lieutenant Havelook and the Victoria Cross . . . 584 K. The Operations of the 25th op September, 1857 . . . 585 CONTENTS L. Did John Lawrence send the Moveable Column to Delhi UNDEK PEESSUKE FKOM HIS MILITARY SECRETARY ! . . 587 M. The Assault oe Delhi 688 N. HoDSON OF Hodson's Horse 591 0. Brigadier Greathed and the Battle of Agra . . . 617 P. Was Holkak Loyal during the Indian Mutiny ? . . . 619 Q. Did Sir Robert Hamilton direct Sir Hugh Rose to ' proceed WITH the Operations against Jhansi ' ? . . . . 622 R. General Innes on Sir Hugh Rose ... • . 623 S. The Behaviour op the Talukdaes of Oudh during the Mutiny 624 T. Sir Colin Campbell and his Critics . . . 627 TJ. Alleged Causes of the Mutiny 630 V. The Authorities on which this Book is based . 632 W. Discussion on certain Statements challenged by Critics OF the First Edition and on others which conflict WITH the Statements of later Writers . . . .634 INDEX 639 68' "\i^:^^£'^i^ f*h>£XJL 70" ^m TZ 74' 76' '^i4''r,'tl,-'^ -- ~.s:nx }^ 32' ^Eindaliax- S r '/ffllth^ S T *(^-, fl.: '^.•, / -^ lA 26 iW: \litni Bcuni ktjt ,v^ 7 '.^' '' V ifl X .LI t 'Ae/t/nr -jr-' , # !«5i/ . »'','.Vj"V«wr '' J. ^--t Niiliahxioj I ''fl^ iAImi/prJor ^^' / y'hiunpoor ^ * W / *.j^llm -., ^ 'j-V , ''\^^,U^,/> c.:# SuUiu .^irfe* 'i %ii._ Mi/tv/f', oi r .yji/tvff", ■ " ^ '•,K«hlnk*"^'"" y A%,/i .*>'' I B /' "(V JK^ "a/ij oShahgark ^ * i ^ /•----• \ --4----- '*7H' ^^ o,_^v' ... iJy^'.r Jfsnijner _ / ,< PlJoHfln X '«» latta%J 2i T& N' ^B \„., ^'»»ferB W„,„ t^iicbvc 'otilliifH! k -Jailor , W" ' "if,,. 'Bofc c'h-Tj y ^Tvv /A/n Iliilllil.'lUllly ' //,l -7>..- ////, ^#¥ ■ "• '~^' .- ■ 'ir'' / " '•. 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'S- ■:' m' ~*i \~; . n« .V/7fvc'<) \ Fyzabad- *-^ rco \ Joi.liipijp.'-'' ^ i/iW;\'*~4nie^uf/j '■'^^g;b.^2.5?#^-'l\ Ma.fe <^/n;i ■iliilipri P'.Mi/f>m 'Ti//f„/,/,„/^, I'fMioH Hriihiiir, Y (jhupiv Oaoiiittiiiitfl'ii] Oa\a ' -ilJinialfiifi0l fw'swvA,-; S^i-i^ IS --- (yarh ojtaiirjij <'in-,u>lflijj;lr^ .f**W«f»! *~- Hel-fe/,.. ./.' i*. ,\» -1--. ( %poor ( ^ Aruiula" 7 ,!/■ iJiidrinor e e /^ '^ \Kultiinpv tMiiiiili-lrPo '^ ijQ'Atuyor tilllT/urli ', S,|l:l il/rfc, «2' 84' 34' 32 30' 24 I I Lundon : Maemillan il* C^' !.'■ ■jtnjxford^'^ Gtoa^ Xj*i}h'', ZondjcTT' •^ CHAPTER II GENERAL SKETCH OF ANGLO-INDIAN HISTORY TO THE END OF LORD DALHOXTSIE'S ADMINISTRATION Three centuries ago, when the East India Company was still unformed, a great part of India submitted to the sway of a Mahomedan prince. This ruler, whose ^^If^ name was Akbar, was the most renowned of the 1525. descendants of Baber, who, early in the sixteenth century, had swept down from the north-west upon Hindustan, and founded the Mogul Empire. Unlike Mahomedan con- querors in the rest of the world, the Moguls respected the religion of their subjects, and established a government which, with all its faults, was contentedly accepted by the mass of ' As I only profess to give in this chapter such an introductory sketch as may help readers to understand the phenomena of the Indian Mutiny, I have not thought it necessary to give specific references to authorities except in a few cases, where it seemed possible that my statements might be questioned, and for the much-controverted administration of Dalhousie. The chapter, with the exception of the part which deals with Dalhousie's administration, is the result of a study, extending over several years, of the ordinary and some of the less known works on Anglo-Indian history, and nearly completed before I had conceived the idea of writing this book. Those who wish to know more about India and Indian history than this sketch can tell them, will do well to build up the skeleton of their know- ledge by studying Hunter's India, its Bistory, People, and Products ; and after- wards to clothe the skeleton with flesh and blood by reading a few good biographies. Many articles in the OalaMa Remew, the Gonvwailis Gorrespondence, Wellesley's Dispatches, Malcolm's Political History, Sir John Strachey's India, and Sir Alfred Lyall's Asiatic Studies, might also be read with profit by those who have time to spare. What prevents so many people from reading Anglo-Indian history with interest is that they start in complete ignorance of the way in which the Government was carried on, and of the characteristics of Indian life. Such books as I have recommended would help to supply the requisite knowledge. 3E „ B ANGLO-INDIAN HISTORY TO THE END chap. the governed, and won for the person of the emperor, or perhaps more truly for the imperial idea, a superstitious veneration which had not perished when the Indian Mutiny- broke out. The emperors governed their dominions through the agency of viceroys, whose provinces were larger than many European kingdoms, and who, in their turn, gave the law to inferior rulers. Gradually the boundaries of the empire were extended until, under Aurangzeb, it attained its 1668-1707. fg^j.(.jjgg^ jj^ij^g_ Yet it was from his accession that its decline dated ; for, by a religious bigotry which he had not learned from his somewhat lax predecessors, he did his best to alienate his Hindu subjects. The Eajputs rebelled against the rule to which they had never wholly submitted, even when it had humoured their religious prejudices. The Mardthas, a race of Hindu freebooters, poured down under their great leader, Sivaji, from" their fastnesses in the western mountains, and, by the swift and sudden inroads of guerilla warriors, sapped the strength of the central power. The vice- roys saw the growing weakness of the successors of Aurang- zeb, and hastened to secure their independence. The degene- rate inhabitants of Delhi bowed beneath the tyranny of the Persian invader, Nadir Shah. The decline and fall of an earlier and greater empire was re-enacted in India ; and there too, after the long agony of the night, a brighter day was to dawn upon the afflicted nations. If the story of an empire's decay is full of pathos, even when it has deserved its fate, the fall of the Mogul, who had ruled more unselfishly than any other Eastern power, may well claim our sympathy. Yet he too had sinned ; and his sins had found him out. Mogul civilisation had been only a splendid mockery ; and, while the viceroys were emancipating themselves from control, their own want of union was paving the way for the rise of a people who were to conquer the often -conquered nations of India once more, but to conquer them for their own good. For a century and a half the agents of the East India Com- ^^^^ pany, which had arisen under Elizabeth, had been mere traders; and, now that they were about to become conquerors, they had no thoughts of the destiny which lay before them. All unconsciously they began to work out the magnificent idea of founding a European empire in Asia. 1 OF LORD DALHOUSIE'S ADMINISTRATION 3 It was the genius of a Frenchman that had originated this idea. Dupleix, the Governor of the French settle- ment of Pondicherry, saw that the disturbed condition tJmptfto&ima of the native powers held out a chance of asrgrandise- a. European em- 1-1 , 11 11 1 P're m India. ment to a European statesman who would have the tact to interfere as an ally, and not as a principal ; while he knew the strength of the instrument which the superior courage and discipline of European troops placed in his hands. In 1748 Mzam-ul-Mulk,^ Viceroy of the Deccan, one of the under kings who had profited most by the decay of the imperial power, died ; and rival claimants appeared for the vacant throne. About the same time a competitor stood forward to dispute the title of the Nawab of the Carnatic, who had looked up to the late Mzam as his over-lord. Dupleix saw his opportunity. While he seemed to be supporting the cause of one pair of pretenders, about whose rights he did not trouble himself, he easily defeated the feeble efforts which the English made in self-defence to 1T48-1751 uphold their rivals, and made himself master of the Deccan. Some years before, when the hostilities between France and England in the war of the Austrian succession had spread to their settlements in India, Labourdonnais, an unrecognised hero, had captured the English settlement of Madras, and impressed the natives of India with a firm belief in the military superiority of the French over ourselves. The successes of Dupleix were strengthening this opinion, when a young Englishman accomplished a feat of arms which established his own fame as a commander, and the character of his country- men as warriors. Trichinopoly, the only fortress in the Carnatic that remained in the possession of the Nawab whom the English supported, was closely invested by the enemy, when Robert Olive conceived the plan of diverting their attention by the seizure of Arcot, which he held for fifty days •^^'^■ with a handful of men against all the forces that ^^'i^^^a they could bring against him. Thenceforth the power of the English in Southern India increased, while that of the French diminished, though Bussy, the most capable of Dupleix's lieutenants, exercised a commanding influence in the Deccan, and though, ten years later, the unfortunate Lally strove 1 His real name was Cb.m Kilich Khan. Nizam-uI-Mulk was a title, meaning " regulator of the state." Chin Kilich Khan's successors were always known as the Nizams. ANGLO-INDIAN HISTORY TO THE END to restore his country's fortunes in the Carnatic. A succession of victories added to Olive's fame ; and Dupleix returned, with ruined fortune and shattered hopes, to France, where an un- grateful people withheld the honours which might have solaced him, and treated his services with contempt. It was not in the south, however, that the decisive battle for the mastery of India was fought. In 1756 Clive, rfOakuti^°^° 'n^lio had but lately returned to Madras from a visit to England, was summoned northwards by the news that Suraj-ud-dowlah, the effeminate. Viceroy of Bengal, had captured the English settlement of Fort William, and suffered nearly all his captives to perish in the Black Hole of Calcutta. The instant recovery of Calcutta and the capture of the French settlement at Chandemagore, to which the Viceroy had looked for help, failed to teach him the wisdom of submitting to the English; but the hatred and contempt with which he was regarded by his subjects facilitated the development of a plot by which his General, Mir Jafar, aided by Olive, was to seize Piassey.'^"^'- his throne. The victory of Plassey, which gave the conspirators success, has been rightly seized upon by popular instinct as the date of the foundation of the British Empire in India ; for it gave the throne of Bengal to a man who owed everything to the English, and whom their sup- port could alone sustain in power. The designs of Dupleix had been realised, — ^but by Olive. Olive, however, had more victories to win, before he could seek rest again at home. At Patna he shattered ^s^s'of cuVe. the hopes of the Mogul's eldest son, who had set out to conquer the upstart Viceroy: he humbled the pride of the Dutch, who, trusting to the friendship of the fickle Mir Jafar, had sailed from Java, to share in the spoils of India, and to balance the overgrown power of the English ■ and he struck the French power in its most vital part by send- ing an army southwards under Colonel Forde, who won back some factories in the Northern Circars which Bussy had seized and expelled the French from that part of India. Meanwhile Lally was maintaining in the south a struggle for the restora- 1760. *^°" °^ ^^^ French power : but it was a hysterical effort, and doomed to failure. Eyre Ooote's victory at Wandewash sounded the knell of the French power in India. I OF LORD DALHOUSIE'S ADMINISTRATION 5 When the pressure of Olive's firm and just rule had been removed, the servants of the Company seized the opportunity of amassing wealth by illicit means. S°"SP.f^°?°' They set up and pulled down viceroys, and extorted during ciive's large presents from each new puppet. They claimed b^^IS™ for themselves unfair advantages in commerce, by which the Viceroy's subjects suffered. But, corrupt and grasp- ing as they were, they were not wholly inexcusable ; for their salaries were miserably insufficient. Their rapacity was emu- lated by the officers of the army, who were beginning to show a spirit of insubordination which could only be checked by the hand of the man who had led them to victory. Such an un- natural state of things could not be suffered to continue. At last CUve was sent out again to deal with the mass of evil which had accumulated ; and, if he could not cjiiyg.g return. destroy it, he at least held it in check while he remained in the country. But, besides waging war against corruption, he had to solve a difficult political problem. He saw that the English power, having advanced so far, could not, in the nature of things, remain stationary. Nevertheless, he desired to put a drag upon its onward course, to abstain, as far as he safely could, from all interfer- ence with native politics, and, while erecting a substantial fabric of government, and placing it upon a solid foundation, to give it a modest outward form, lest it should provoke the envy of his rivals. His idea was that the Company should take the govern- ment of Bengal into their own hands, but should do so not as a sovereign power, but as the nominal deputy of the puppet Mogul Emperor. He accordingly proceeded to Allahabad, and there, in an interview with the Emperor and the Vizier of Oudh, fixed the destinies of India. In the preceding year the Vizier, taking the unwilling Emperor with him, had invaded Behar, but had been signally defeated by Hector Munro at Buxar. This battle had given to the English the rich province of Oudh, the power of disposing of the Mogul, and the prestige of being the first power in India. Clive now turned these advantages to account. He restored Oudh to the Vizier, exacting from him as an equivalent an indemnity of five hundred thousand pounds, and induced the Mogul to invest the Company, in return for an annual tribute of three hundred thousand, with the office of Diwdn ^ of ^ Minister of Finance. Till 1772 the Company were only nominally Diwdn. ANGLO-INDIAN HISTORY TO THE END Bengal, Behar, and Orissa. The practical result of this arrange- ment was that the English received the revenues, and made them- selves responsible for the defence of the territory, while the civil administration remained for a time in the hands of a native minister.^ Olive was not a great statesman like Hastings ; for, though he knew how to iind expedients for overcoming His place in difficulties whcn there was no time for hesitation, totory." '™ he founded no lasting political system. But he will live in history as the Founder of our Indian Empire. Not only was he the first of the builders of three generations who laboured at the imperial fabric, like the families of workmen who, from father to son, reared the cathedrals of the Middle Age ; but he was in some sort its architect also. Here too the analogy holds good. There were more architects than one ; and all did not follow the same style. But Olive, though he would only lay the foundation himself, forecast in his mind the nature of the pile. He foresaw that, with or against their will, his successors would have to extend its dimensions.^ The years that followed Olive's departure were years of misery for the people of Bengal, and of shame for Failure of the English. The system of divided government of government, established by Olive had no vitality. The native administrators oppressed the peasants, and embezzled the revenues : the servants of the Company found it profitable to connive at these abuses, and neglected the in- waHen terests of their masters. At last the Directors Hastings, appointed Warren Hastings Governor of Bengal, and appealed to him to rescue their affairs from destruction. Hastings soon justified the confidence which had been reposed in him. He snapped the rotten chain that bound his masters in mock allegiance to the Mogul Emperor, and proclaimed them to be, what they really were, independent lords of Bengal. He transferred the internal administration from a native measures, minister to the servants of the Company. He created a system of police, justice, and revenue, which it is easy for doctrinaires to revile, but which was the best that could have been devised under the circumstances of ' Sir G. Aitchison's Treaties, Engagements, and Sunnuds, vol. i. pp. 60-69. ' Sir J. Malcolm's Political History of India, vol. ii. pp. 16-20. I OF LOED DALHOUSIE'S ADMINISTRATION 7 the time. By hiring out the Company's battalions to the Vizier of Oudh for the suppression of the turbulent Afghans who tyrannised over Eohilkhand, he crippled- a dangerous ^^^^ ^ neighbour, and placed four hundred thousand pounds to the credit of his employers. Suddenly, however, the work in which he took such pride was rudely interrupted. The abuses which he had begun to remedy had roused the attention of English statesmen to Indian affairs; and the Eegulating Act of 1773, which placed the Government of British India in the hands of a Governor-General and a SngAct!^* Council of four, with power over the other Presi- dencies of Bombay and Madras, and established a supreme court of judicature at Calcutta, independent of the Council, was the fruit of their labours. Hastings was the first Governor-General. The new constitution, while it left the entire load of responsi- bility upon his shoulders, gave him no more power than any of his colleagues.^ This radical defect became apparent when Clavering, Monson, and Francis, the three Councillors who had been sent out from home, arrived ; for they at once began a career of factious opposition to their chief. This notorious triumvirate threw the affairs of the other Presi- ^^rtedby dencies into confusion by their rash interference, oiaveiing, postponed all important business to a malicious Francis.' investigation into the past acts of the Governor- General, and encouraged the natives to bring accusations against him, and despise his authority. The people of Bengal had come to regard his cause as lost, when, by the bold stroke of bringing a counter-charge against the infamous Brahmin, Nuncomar, the foremost of these unscrupulous accusers, he recovered his position, and discomfited his colleagues. Nuncomar was executed by the sentence of the Chief Justice, Impey. At the sight of his ignominious death, every Hindu trembled, and began to regard Hastings as a man to whom all must bow. So long, indeed, as Hastings was outvoted at the council-table, he could carry into effect none of those great measures for the benefit of India and the estabhshment of British power which he had long contem- plated : but, strong in the love and trust of the English com- munity, he could and did do something to check the rash folly js, as lie himself explains in Ms Memoirs relatwe to the state of India, pp. 154-7, in some measure remedied this defect by disobeying his instructions when he thought it requisite, whatever his personal risk might be. 8 ANGLO-INDIAN HISTORY TO THE END chap. of his colleagues ; and he waited for 'his triumph with a patience which was thrown into stronger relief by his burning enthusiasm for the public service. His triumph came at last. "'«• The death of Monson left him supreme. And, pow?r.°^'" though Francis had poisoned the minds of the ministers against him, and the Directors, who had supported him in his earlier measures, had withdrawn their favour, there was a crisis at hand which forbade them to super- sede him. They recognised the genius of the man whom they had persecuted, and allowed him to save them. At that time the fame of England had sunk to its nadir. Twenty years before it had risen to its zenith. Let philosophical historians search as deep as they will for the general causes which had wrought this change. To plain understandings the explanation is clear enough. Pitt had ruled in 1758; but in 1778 Lord North was the chief of a Government that could not rule. America and half Europe were banded against England ; but India was the rock against which the storm broke in vain ; for India was ruled by a man who joined to the fiery zeal of a Pitt the calmness of a Marlborough. Two great dangers the G-overnor-Greneral saw and repelled. Hearing that the French were about to league the empire, themselves with the Mardthas for the overthrow of our empire, he showed his knowledge of the temper of Asiatics by striking the first blow, sending an army jyyg across India through unknown country to humble the Mardtha power. And, when Hyder, the usurping ruler of Mysore, carried his arms to the environs of Madras, and the feeble Presidency trembled before the power 1781 ■'^tich its rashness had provoked, he lost not a moment in despatching reinforcements under Eyre Coote, who rescued Southern India by the victory of Porto Novo. But even Hastings could not save an empire without money • and the Company's treasury was nearly empty. To replenish it, he demanded a contribution from Chait Singh, the so-called Eaja of Benares, a tributary of the Company, following a custom which superior powers in India had ever observed. Chait Singh, however, showed no alacrity to come to the aid of his over-lord • and, to punish him for his delay and evasion, Hastings went in person to Benares, to exact from him a heavy fine. But the I OF LORD DALHOUSIE'S ADMINISTRATION 9 few English soldiers whom he took with him were unprovided with ammunition, and badly commanded. For a time Hastings •was checked by insurrection : but it was speedily repressed by the English troops who, in their enthusiastic love for him, hastened up from the nearest posts to his rescue, and was pun- ished by the deposition of the Eaja and an increase of the tribute due from his successor. Still, more money was sorely needed ; and Hastings, in his extremity, looked to Oudh, the Vizier of which province, squandering his revenues upon his own pleasures, had long neglected to pay an English brigade which protected him. The money was obtained by confiscating the hoarded treasures of the late Vizier, which the Begams of Oudh, the mother and grand- mother of the reigning prince, had unlawfully retained. These dealings of Hastings with the Eaja of Benares and the Begams of Oudh formed the subject of two of the charges brought against him at the famous agaShim. trial in Westminster Hall. It would be impossible in a chapter like this to enter into a detailed examination of the justice of those charges, or the general morality of his administration. It will be enough to say that no other than that policy which Burke held up to execration could have saved the empire in the most momentous crisis through which it has ever passed ; and that those who condemn the morality of that policy must not shrink from the inevitable conclusion that the empire which has been charged with the mission of civilising India, and which gives England her great title to respect among the nations of Europe, was erected, could only have been erected upon a basis of iniqiiity. But men are slowly beginning to see that the views of Hastings's policy which Burke, in bitter but honest hatred, and Francis, in the malice of disappointed rage, disseminated, are untrue. The genius of Clarendon taught four generations of Englishmen to detest the name of the hero who had saved their liberties. The fate of Hastings has been similar. But the day will come when, in the light of a more extended knowledge of the history of British India, his political morality vnll be vindicated. ^ ' It has been vindicated since the first edition of this book was published. See Sir J. Stephen's The Story of Nuncomar and the Impeachment of Sir Elijah Impey, Sir J. Strachey's Hastings and the Rohilla War, and Mr. G. W. Forrest's Selections from the Letters, Despatches, and other State Papers presened in the Foreign Bepa/rtrfMnt qf the Qovernmeni of India, 1772-1785. 10 ANGLO-INDIAN HISTORY TO THE END The resignation of Hastings marks the close of the third act in the drama of Anglo-Indian history. Olive had been forced by the quarrel thrust upon him to realise Dupleix's imperial visions. He had founded an empire. It was left to Hastings to create a government, and to organise and set on foot its numerous branches. He had conceived, more- over, and had begun to carry out the idea of grouping the native states in alliance round the power of England, which had practically taken the place of the effete Mogul empire, and was therefore bound to take upon itself the duties, and yield the protection expected by all natives from the Paramount Power. But this great idea was destined to be forgotten for a time. The malignant influence of Francis had borne its fruit. At home men cried out against the policy of Hastings ; warns?"™" and Lord Cornwallis ^ was sent out to inaugurate a reign of peace and non-intervention, and armed with that power of acting on his own responsibility, even against the judgement of his Council, which Hastings had sought for in vain. He tried to carry out the wishes of his masters : but, though he was a man of peace, he was not a man to look on tamely while a new enemy arose to threaten our TippTO. power. The great Hyder had left a son Tippoo, who inherited some of his father's ability, and all his love of aggrandisement and hatred of the English. Pro- voked by an attack which he had made on an ally of the British Government, Cornwallis resolved to punish him, and, after an unlucky campaign conducted by his im-2 generals, went in person to the seat of war, fought his way to the gates of Seringapatam, and there dictated terms of peace. Influenced by public opinion and by that strong disinclination to all extension of territory which the Directors had already begun to show,^ he only crippled the Sultan when he should have destroyed him. Such a half-hearted policy bore its natural ' After the resignation of Hastings, Macpherson served as locum tenens until the arrival of Cornwallis. There were several other instances in which, owing to an interval between the departure of one Governor-General and the arrival of his successor, a Company's servant was obliged to hold the reins of government temporarily ; but I have not thought it necessary to allude to them in the text. ^ The Oornwallis Correspondeme, vol. ii. pp. 144, 158 ; M. Wilks'a Kist. of MysooT, vol. iii. pp. 251-2. 1 OF LORD DALHOUSIE'S ADMINISTRATION 11 fruit. The evil day was only put off; for a few years later Wellesley was forced to annihilate Tippoo's power at a cost of blood and treasure which would have been saved if he had been disarmed in time. But the Directors shrank from becoming emperors ; for they feared that, by so doing, they would suffer as merchants. The aim of CornwaUis's policy was to maintain the peace of India by the old-fashioned European plan of preserving a balance of power among the chief states. The theory of the balance of power, however, takes S^^^^"' for granted in individual states, if not unselfishness, at least some sort of fellow-feeling suitable to the members of a family of nations, some serious desire to keep the bonds of peace intact. But among the powers of India these conditions were wholly wanting. Their political education was not sufficiently advanced for them to imderstand that, even for nations, pure selfishness cannot be expedient. CornwalKs saw clearly enough that the English Government ought to stand in the place of the father of this family of nations : but it was reserved for a greater ruler to see that the family must, for some time and for their own good, be treated not as intelligent adults, but as dis- orderly and deceitful children. The war with Tippoo was the central event of CornwaUis's foreign policy. His reign is equally remembered for the judicial and fiscal reforms which he carried |^ttkS™^°' out. The English had hitherto been content to follow the old Mogul system for the collection of the land- revenue of Bengal. Under that system, the privilege of collect- ing the revenue had been from time to time put up to auction to native collectors, who were known as Zamlndte : but no attempt had been made to ascertain and definitely fix the amount which the cultivators might fairly be called upon to pay. As, however, under this system, the revenue was collected in a very irregular and unsatisfactory manner, the Directors instructed CornwalUs to introduce some reform. The result was the famous Permanent Settlement, by which the Zamlnddrs were raised to the position of landlords, and engaged i^ss. in return to pay a fixed annual rent -charge to the G-overn- ment. The Permanent Settlement was a sad blunder. CornwaUis had indeed tried to learn something about the landed interests 12 ANGLO-INDIAN HISTORY TO THE END chap. with whicli he had to deal: but he did not realise the vast extent and intricacy of the subject. Preoccupied by English ideas of land tenure, his mind was too narrow and too destitute of sympathetic force to seize the notion that a different set of ideas might prevail in India ; and he therefore naturally leaped to the conclusion that, as the Zaminddrs were the highest class connected with land, they either were, or ought to be con- stituted landed proprietors.^ The result of his action may be told in a few words. The inferior tenants derived from it no benefit whatever. The Zaminddrs again and again failed to pay their rent-charges ; and their estates were sold for the benefit of the Grovernment. Though Cornwallis was not a ruler of the first rank, in one respect at least he left his mark upon the Indian comwaius?^ service. He would not countenance jobbery, even when Royal petitioners asked favours of him ; and he tried to remove the temptations to corruption to which the Company's servants were exposed, and to raise their standard of efficiency, by endeavouring to procure for them adequate salaries. Cornwallis was succeeded by Sir John Shore, a conscientious Sir John Shore P^'instaking official, who had worked his way, step Non-interven- ' by Step, to the head of the Government, but whose dread of responsibility made him unfit to rule. The great political event of his administration was a war between the Mardthas and the Nizam. The Mard,thas were the aggressors : the Mzam was an ally of the British, and importunately pressed them for the assistance to which he was morally entitled j but Shore was afraid to depart a hair's-breadth from the policy of neutrality which his masters had prescribed. The result was that the Mzam was completely beaten, and lost all con- fidence in the English, whose alliance had proved to be a sham ; while the power of the Mardthas was unduly exalted, ' " Aooording to English ideas someone must be proprietor, and with him a settlement should most properly be made ; but we did not for a long time see that different parties may have different degrees of interest without altogether excluding others, and hence the long discussions on the question who were the actual proprietors, when in fact the contending parties had different but con- sistent interests in the same land — Government as rent receivers, Zemindars as delegates of Government, and the communities as having possession and entire management of the soil." — Sir George Campbell's Modern India and its Govern- ment, pp. 301-2. See also C. Eaikes's Ifotes on the North-Western Provinces of India, pp. 41-64. I OF LOEB DALHOUSIE'S ADMINISTRATION 13 and for years their turbulence and greed caused anxiety to the Paramount Power. In 1798 Shore was succeeded by Lord Mornington, better known by his later title of Marquess Wellesley, a young Irish peer who had already distinguished weiSsiey. himself by an elaborate speech in which he had thundered against the French Eevolution, and pleaded for the continued prosecution of the anti-GralHcan crusade. The appoint- ment was made not a moment too soon ; for another great crisis in Anglo-Indian history was at hand, and, if Shore had remained in office much longer, the empire might have been lost. The European war was at its height. Napoleon was in the full tide of success, and had extended his views of conquest to Asia. If he had triumphed in Egypt, ?^*empSl:*' °' and pushed on into India, the leading native states would pirobably have welcomed his arrival. Our allies, the Nizam and the Nawab of the Carnatic, were not to be depended upon. The one, as has been shown, had become estranged from us, and now put his trust in a strong force, officered by French- men, which he kept in his pay. The other was unable to govern his own country, and, so far from helping us, was continually asking for our aid. Tippoo was intriguing against us with every prince who would listen to him. Hating us with all the force of Mahomedan bigotry, inherited enmity, and the thirst of vengeance, he was only waiting an opportunity to attack Us. The MarAthas would have been not less dangerous if they had not been disunited : but, as it was, their foremost chief, Daulat Edo Sindhia, was gaining power every day, and, like the Nizam, had an army, officered by Frenchmen, in his service. These very French adventurers were a separate source of danger. They had the disgrace of old defeats to wipe out, and visions of conquest to gratify. Dupleix, Bussy, and Lally had been frustrated in their open endeavours to create a Franco-Indian empire : but there was a lurking danger not less formidable in the presence of General Perron at the head of Sindhia's battalions. Wellesley saw the danger, and faced it. The conduct of Tippoo, who rashly allowed it to be known that overthrow he had sent an embassy to Mauritius to ask for ofuppoo. French aid, gave him the opportunity of striking the first 14 ANGLO-INDIAN HISTORY TO THE END chap. blow. He instantly demanded guarantees for the preservation of peace. Eager to gain time, Tippoo evaded the demand until Wellesley's patience was worn out. Converting the nominal alliance of the Nizam into an effective reality by disarming his French contingent and substituting for it a British force, Wellesley directed the armies of Bombay and Madras, strengthened by a native contingent furnished by the Nizam, to converge upon Seringapatam. After a short and uniformly successful campaign, the Sultan's capital was won ; and he himself fell in the assault. His sons were pensioned oif, and kept in honourable confinement, while the representative of the old Hindu dynasty, which Hyder had displaced, was proclaimed as Raja of a portion of the con- quered country. The remainder was divided between the British G-overnment and the Nizam, whose share was afterwards appropriated to the payment of an additional subsidiary force which was to be kept in his service. Finally, the government of the restored dynasty of Mysore was placed under the friendly supervision of an English Eesident. The overthrow of Tippoo, which re-established British prestige, gave a blow to the hopes of the French, and struck Wei°edey. terror into the minds of aggressive native princes, was the key-stone of Wellesley's policy. The aim of that policy may be described as the establishment of the supremacy of the British power for the joint benefit of the British and of the people of India. The native powers were to be grouped in alliance round the central power of the British Government, which was to defend them at their own cost, and in some cases, to administer their civil affairs or those of a part of their territories as well, in others merely to reserve the right of interference. In other words, Wellesley, strengthened by the authority and resources which had been denied to Hastings, set himself to develop the far-reaching conception which the latter had originated. The grand idea of pressing this consolidated Anglo-Indian Empire into the service of the British Empire itself, and forcing it to take its part in the overthrow of Napoleon, was Wellesley's own. Let us see how he worked it out. A treaty which he had October, 1800. concluded with the Nizam had bound him to defend that prince against the attacks of the Mardthas. With the view of taming this restless people. I OP LORD DALHOUSIE'S ADMINISTRATION 15 Wellesley tried to draw their nominal head, the Peshwa, Biji Edo, within the circle of subsidiary alliance.^ The reluctance of this prince to surrender his independence was at last over- come by his fear of Jeswant Edo Holkar, a rising Mar^tha chieftain, whose family name is so often mentioned in connexion with that of Sindhia. The treaty of Bassein marked the change in the Peshwa's condition. But Sindhia and the MarAtha Eaja of Berar, who feared that they too would have subsidiary BasseLi"' alliances forced upon them, and no longer be allowed to prey upon their weaker neighbours, resented the treatment of their nominal head, and compelled ,, ... „ , , X Maratha war. the Governor-General to conquer them. It was in the war by which this conquest was achieved that the name of his brother, Arthur Wellesley, first ^^^^_^ became famous. Holkar, who held aloof from his brother chiefs, might have escaped, if his invincible love of plunder had not brought upon him the wrath of Wellesley : but the campaign for his reduction was chequered by more than one disaster; and he was not finally subdued till after Wellesley had left India. Thus one power after another was drawn into the number of dependent states. Unhappily, however, Wel- lesley had neglected one rare opportunity which S^*^™j°' the fortune of war had thrown in his way. In Emperor. the campaign against Sindhia, Delhi had fallen into our hands ; and Wellesley had been called upon to decide the Emperor's fate. Though the power of the Great Mogul had long faded away, his title still attracted the superstitious veneration of the natives ; and fifty years later it was the spell that drew successive armies of mutineers to the focus of Delhi. If, instead of perpetuating this phantom dynasty, Wellesley had boldly proclaimed that his Government had succeeded to its rights, an element which was to give strength and a show of dignity to the Indian Mutiny might have been destroyed. The native states were ready enough to claim the protection of our Paramount Power. They would have repaid it for this protection by their attach- ^ For some remarks on the subsidiary alliance system see my article on "Wellesley," in the Westminster Review of April, 1880. 16 ANGLO-INDIAlir HISTORY TO THE END chap. ment, if it had not shrunk from avowing itself to be what it was. 1 Three years before, Wellesley had applied the same principle that inspired his Mardtha policy to his dealings Deaimgswith ^(.j^ q^^]^ rpj^^^^. ^q^^^^j j^y directly in the path of any invader who might meditate an attack on the British possessions from the north-west ; and a conqueror might have easily overrun it on his march, for its Government was powerless, and its army was a rabble. Wellesley converted it from a source of weakness into a bulwark of the British jggj provinces by his favourite method. The Vizier was obliged to accept an English subsidiary force, and to cede a large portion of his territory for its support. But one great evil sprang from this arrangement. The govern- ment of Oudh was even then the worst in India. The Vizier wasted part of his revenues in shameful self-indulgence, and hoarded the rest. The farmers of the revenue extorted from the peasantry all that they could; and the latter toiled on, barely supporting life on the remnant of their earnings which the policy, not the humanity of their masters allowed them. Wellesley, however, shrank from interfering in the internal administration. The Vizier's officers were therefore supported in their exactions by British bayonets. Wellesley's excuse is that, distrusted as he was by the Directors, he did not feel him- self strong enough to assume the government of the country, which was the only way of remedying its unhappy condition. He doubt- less expected that his successors would soon be forced to take this final step. For more than fifty years, however, it was not taken. The Nawabs of Tanjore, of Surat, and of the Carnatic were 1799 1800 1801. °^%® The suggestion was made on March 2. — Pari. Papers, vol. xxx. (1857), p. 7. 86 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY ohap. hi adjutant, Lieutenant Baugh, and walked to the parade-ground. The sepoy was marching up and down in front of the quarter-guard, calling upon his comrades to aid him and strike a blow for their religion. Catching sight of the Englishman, he fired at him, but without effect. Presently the adjutant rode up and cried, " "Where is he ! where is he ! " " Ride to the right, sir, for your life ! " shouted Hewson, " the sepoy will fire at you ! " The words were hardly uttered when the mutineer fired at the adjutant from behind the shelter of the station gun, and brought his horse to the ground. Baugh sprang unhurt to his feet, advanced on the mutineer, and fired at him, but missed. Then began a desperate hand-to-hand encounter. The mutineer drew his tulwar,^ and slashed the adjutant across his left hand and neck. Hewson rushed to support his ofiicer ; but the sepoy was a match for them both. Hard by stood the guard of twenty sepoys looking on unconcerned; while their jamadAr^ made no attempt to bring them for- ward, and even suffered them to strike their helpless officers with the butt - ends of their muskets. One man only, a Mahomedan named Shaikh Paltu, came to help the struggling Europeans, and held the mutineer while they escaped. Mean- while, other European officers were hurrying to the spot. One of them, Colonel Wheler of the 34th, ordered the guard to seize the mutineer : but no one obeyed him. Then Grant, the brigadier of the station, interposed his superior authority : but still the guard paid no heed. The solitary but successful mutineer was still taunting his comrades for allowing him to fight their battles unaided ; the British officers, their authority despised, were still looking helplessly on ; when their chief with his two sons rode up at a gallop to the ground. Indignantly he asked his officers why they had not arrested the mutineer. They answered that the guard would not obey orders. "We'll see that," said Hearsey, and descrying the mutineer, he rode to- wards the quarter-guard. " His musket is loaded," cried an officer. " Damn his musket," answered Hearsey ; and then turning to the jamadir, and significantly shaking his revolver, he said, " Listen to me : the first man who refuses to march when I give the word is a dead man. Quick, march ! " Sullenly the guard submitted, and followed their master to arrest Mungul Pandy ; but he too saw that the day was lost, and in despair ^ Native sword. ^ Native lieutenant. 1857 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY 87 turned his musket against himself. He fell wounded ; but he did not save himself from a felon's death.^ The general had suppressed open mutiny ; but he could not hinder secret mischief. Next day the 19th, _ jjjgbanding who had marched quietly and penitently down ofthewth. from Berhampore, knowing that, when they ^^'^''''^^■ reached their goal, they were to be disbanded, were met at Barasat by some emissaries from the 34th, who urged them to join that regiment in slaughtering the European officers. But the 19th atoned for their past sins by resisting the tempters, and marched on sadly to Barrackpore. There, on the last day of March, confronted by two field batteries and all the European and native troops that could be mustered, they listened to their sentence, piled their arms in obedience to the order which it conveyed, and received their last issue of pay. Then, with Hearsey's Mnd farewell ringing in their ears, they went their way, cheering their old general ; for they knew that, while he punished, he forgave them.^ Very different was the treatment of the sullen Sdth. Mun- gul Pandy was indeed tried and sentenced on the 6 th of April, and executed two days later. But canmngin though the jamaddr who had forbidden his men ^^g^^^^ to aid their officers was sentenced on the 1 1th, his execution was delayed till the 21st, owing to a difficulty which routine threw in the way. Worse still, the men themselves, who had struck their defenceless officers, were suffered to go absolutely unpunished, because the Governor - General feared that any hasty act of retribution would confirm instead of allaying the evil temper of the army.* He did not know that the army attributed his leniency not to humanity but to fear. The records of the proceedings of Government during these months are indeed a melancholy, though not un- edifying collection. While the Governor-General ^ThowTe^''' ought to have been acting, he was wasting his °"f^'*°^*™ time in trying to solve casuistical puzzles, writing elegant minutes, and devising elaborate expedients for coaxing ' Letter in CaZautta Englishman, April 4, 1857 ; Pari. Papers, vol. xxx. (1857), pp. 126, 135-7 ; Cave-Browne's The Prnijah and Delhi in 1857, vol. i. p. 20 ; Forrest, pp. 109-31, 178-207. 2 Forrest, pp. 97-102 ; Kaye, vol. i. p. 544. " Cave-Bro-vme, vol. i. pp. 20, 21 ; Pari. Papers, vol. xxx. (1857), p. 145 ; pp. 20, 21 ; Forrest, Introduction, p. 15, and pp. 107, 207, 211. 88 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY chap, iti the sepoys into accepting the cartridges. The cartridges would have offered no terrors to troops who were under a strict discipline, and who had an affectionate confidence in their officers. John Jacob's irregulars laughed at the idea that any sensible man could possibly object to them. Such a healthy state of mind was not indeed to be expected from the Bengal sepoys; but they were not beyond the reach of a drastic remedy. When a number of men are possessed by a delusion, to endeavour to reason away each successive development of their morbid fancies is the surest way to encoui'age the fertility of the latter. Even if the cartridges had been altogether with- drawn, matters would not have been mended : the sepoys would simply have felt that the Government was afraid of them. If Canning had understood their characters, he would have seen that it was his duty to give one clear and patient explanation of the harmless character of the cartridges that were being issued ; then peremptorily to insist on their being accepted and used; and to punish with terrific severity the first man, if necessary the first regiment, that disobeyed. Long before this the infection had spread beyond the furthest limits of the North-Western Provinces. In the umbai"™'** middle of March the Commander-in-Chief, who, escorted by the 36th Native Infantry, was engaged on a tour of inspection, had arrived at Umballa. Two non- commissioned officers belonging to a detachment of the 36th, which was already at the station, ran out to welcome their com- rades ; but, instead of receiving the cheery greeting which they expected, were railed at as perverts to Christianity, handlers of the accursed cartridges. The miserable men ran to the musketry instructor of the Dep6t, Lieutenant Martineau, and told him what had befallen them. He saw at once the terrible significance of their story, and promptly took pains to ascertain the feelings of the troops, by whom he was thoroughly trusted. Next day he reported, as the result of his enquiries, to the Assistant Adjutant-General that the whole Bengal army was labouring under a dread of conversion, and had resolved to treat as outcastes any men who should degrade themselves by using the cartridges. The Commander-in-Chief tried himself to soothe the men of the Dep&t; but, unable to address them except through an interpreter, he was not likely to succeed when Hearsey had failed. The native officers listened respectfully to 1857 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY 89 his arguments, but privately told Martineau that, though their own fears and those of their men had been removed, the general fears of the army remained. Must they obey the order to use the cartridges, they piteously asked, when obedience would cast them out from the society of their comrades, and even of their own families. Anson was sorely perplexed. He was unwilling to discontinue rifle practice at the Dep6t, in deference to prejudices which his best native officers admitted to be groundless ; but, when those officers told him that, unless they yielded to the groundless prejudices, their lives would be made a burden to them, he was loth to be severe. , ., , April 4. At last, however, the Governor-General put an end to his difficulties by deciding that concession would be weakness. As soon as this decision had been made known to the men, fires began to break out in the Government build- ings and the officers' bungalows. The authorities, ^"rprim""' who had not yet learned that incendiarism was the regular symptom of coming mutiny, were long unable to find a clue "to the origin of these outrages. Courts of enquiry were held; but no one would come forward to give evidence. Later on, however, a hut belonging to a sepoy attached to the musketry school was set on fire. On the following night five huts belonging to men of the 60th Native ^^ ^3 Infantry, were burned down. The former outrage was clearly an expression of the hatred felt towards the musketry school sepoys for submitting to use the cartridges. The latter was an act of retaliation. Probably, then, the earlier fires had also been the work of sepoys. Towards the end of April this conjecture was confirmed by the evidence of a Sikh attached to the school, who said that the men had sworn to bum down every bungalow in the station, in revenge for the order to use the cartridges.^ Thus, within three months after the Lascar had told his story, it had become an article of faith with nine- tenths of the sepoys in Northern India. Mean- Sbie^™'"*"" while another delusion had fixed itself in their minds. Persuaded that Government had concocted this hellish plot for the destruction of their caste, they could easily believe that, if it could not force its unclean cartridges upon them, it would find some other engine of pollution. The new fable said that the officers were mixing dust ground from the bones of ' Cave-Browne, vol. i. pp. 42-50. 90 OaTBEEAE OF THE MUTINY chap, iii cows with the flour for their men's use, and throwing it into the wells. There had been like stories at earlier periods of Anglo-Indian history; but the times had never before been so favourable for their circulation. That the present belief was no sham was proved by the conduct of the men at Cawnpore, who, though the flour sold there had risen far above its usual price, refused to touch a cheap supply sent specially down from Meerut, because they feared that it had been adulterated. And, while this new lie was adding to the perplexities of the English, „ , . they were asking each other what could be the J.IIO Cll£ip3rtJbl6S. . - . . I'll! meanmg of a mysterious phenomenon which had startled them a few weeks before. In January a strange sym- bol, the flat cake or chapatty which forms the staple food of the Indian people, began to pass from village to village through the length and breadth of the North- Western Provinces, like the fiery cross that summoned the clansmen of Eoderick to battle. Here and there a magistrate tried in vain to stop the distribution. The meaning of the portent has never been posi- tively discovered : but it is certain that many of the natives regarded it as a warning that Government was plotting the overthrow of their religion. ^ Whether or not the authors of the distribution intended to create this belief, the belief itself had its share in unsettling men's minds. Meanwhile at Delhi, where Bahddur Shah, the aged repre- sentative of the house of Timour, was still suff'ered Sm™' *o ^old ^is court, the news of the gathering dis- loyalty of the sepoys had begun to stir the smoulder- ing embers of Mahomedan fanaticism into flame. It was of the last importance to the English to keep a firm hold upon that city ; for it contained a vast magazine stored with munitions of war which were practically inexhaustible. Yet they had per- mitted the palace, which dominated the magazine, to remain in ^ See Kaye, vol. i. pp. 632-9, and Evidence taken before the Court appointed for the Trial of the King of Delhi, p. 268. On the other hand. Major G. W. Williams in his Memo, on the Mutirvy of Meerut wrote, "The oiroulation of chapatties so shortly before the outbreak, though appearing to us most mysterious and suspicious, yet, if we may credit the statements of those I have questioned on the subject . . . was not regarded by them as an ill omen, but supposed to have originated in some vow," p. 4. See also Syad Ahmad Khan's The Causes of the Indian Revolt, p. 3. The truth evidently is that the chapatties were regarded differently in different districts, [Mr. M. Thomhill (Adventures dwring the Indian Mutiny, p. Z) says that a similar distribution of chapatties preceded the Mutiny at Vellore in 1806.] 1857 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY 91 the hands of a Mahomedan prince, and, with incredible folly, had neglected to post a single company of British soldiers to keep a check upon the native garrison.^ And now the hearts of the Mahomedans were beating fast in the expectation of great political changes by which their city was again to become the imperial city of India. It was universally believed that a vast Russian army was soon coming to expel the English. A native journal announced that Dost Mahomed, the pretended ally of the Governor-General, was secretly encouraging Persia to resist him. The courtiers in the recesses of the palace talked of a general mutiny of the sepoy army as an event sure to happen soon, and believed that it would restore the King to the position of his ancestors, and advance their own fortunes. The King, though for his part he never believed that the sepoys would rally round one so poor and so fallen as himself, fancied that, if the British Government were to be overthrown, a new dominant power would arise, which would treat him more respectfully and considerately than its predecessor had done.^ In this gloomy spring of 1857, while the hearts of a turbulent soldiery were failing them for fear, yet vibrating with ambition, while officers and civilians, blind to^®^"'''' to what was passing around them, were dining, and dancing, and marrying, and giving in marriage, there was one man who, wandering from place to place, and observing the ' Kaye (vol. ii. p. 17, note) says that Sir Charles Napier, when Commander- in-C!hief, did not lay any stress upon the fact that no European troops were posted in Delhi. He may not have done so in his oSBoial correspondence ; hut in a private letter he wrote " Men from all parts of Asia meet in Delhi, and some day or other much mischief will be hatched within those walls, and no European troops at hand. I have no confidence in the allegiance of your high-caste mercenaries. " — History of the Siege of Delhi, by an OfBcer who served there, p. 10, note. "^ Evidence taken before the Court appointed for the Trial of the King of Delhi, pp. 225, 230, 231, 267. This seems the right place to speak of a pro- clamation, purporting to come from the Shah of Persia, which was posted up on the walls of the Jamma Masjid in Delhi in March, 1857. This proclamation stated that a Persian army was coming to expel the English from India, and called upon all true Mahomedans to put on their armour, and join the invaders. — Kaye (vol. i. p. 483) appears to regard it as genuine ; but Sir Theophilus Metcalfe and other witnesses examined at the trial of the king, spoke of it as the work of an impostor, and said that it attracted scarcely any attention. Evidence, &c. pp. 180, 190. The Shah afterwards admitted that he had fomented disaffection in Upper India during the Persian war, and had intended to invade India ; but in Oct. 1857 he offered to lend 30,000 men to the British Government. — Endomres to Secret Letters frmn India, Nov. 24, 1857, p. 455. [John Lawrence pointed out {Pa/rl. Papers, vol. xxv. Sess. 2, p. 332), that there was no evidence of any connexion between the intrigues of the King of Delhi with the Shah and the Mutiny itself.] 92 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY signs of the times, considered how he might make his profit out of them, but did not yet imagine the grim details of the part that destiny had reserved for him. It was not strange that, as the Nana Sahib passed on his way from Bithilr through Kdlpi, .J Delhi, and Lucknow, the English saw nothing ^" ' remarkable in such unwonted activity on the part of a native nobleman. Never doubting the justice of the deci- sion which had refused to him the continuance of his adoptive father's pension, they did not know the abiding resentment which it had stirred up in his soul. Thus he went his way ; and none can tell what foul treasons he was even then hatching. But there is reason to suspect that he had long been trying to stir up native chieftains against the English, and that, at first indifferent, they lent a ready ear to his suggestions after the annexation of Oudh had aroused their alarm.^ All this time Henry Lawrence was striving with holy zeal at once to redress the grievances of the aflSicted people renc7trierto of Oudh, and to disarm their resentment. The ilToS""*™' officials had hushed their quarrels at his coming, and had xmited in devotion to his will. He had won the affection of Jackson, though he had not hesitated to reprove his follies ; and he had gained the confidence and sympathy of Gubbins. He was able to write, a few weeks after his arrival, that all his subordinates were loyally supporting him.^ But he had to complain too of the blind haste with which they had forced their improvements on the people, and of the bitter resentment which they had evoked by demolishing houses, seizing religious buildings as Government property, and fixing an ex- cessive rate of revenue in their anxiety to show the profitable- ness of annexation.^ Nor had the seditious utterances of the Moulvi been the only dangerous symptoms of discontent. An angry townsman had thrown a clod at Lawrence himself, while he was driving through the streets. But by the seizure and imprisonment of the Moulvi, the prompt payment of the pensions which had been promised to the royal family and their depend- ' Kaye, vol. 1. p. 579 and note, App. pp. 646-8. ^ Life of Sir II. Lawrence, pp. 555-7, 564. ' Gutbins, the Financial Commissioner, himself admitted that the rate of revenue had, in some instances, heen fixed too high. — Mutiwies im Oudh, p. 9. Still, the total amount raised by the British Government was only Es. 104,89,755, whereas the ex-king had exacted Rs. 138,03,731. — Anmial Report on the Ad- ministration of the Province of Oudh for 1858-9, p. 32. 1857 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY 93 ents, the issue of orders for the readmission of the displaced native officials and disbanded native soldiers to employment, and the promise of restitution to the dispossessed landholders, Law- rence quickly restored order, and re-established content among the great mass of the civil population. It was from the sepoy regiments alone that he looked for danger. While Lawrence was waiting quietly for the storm which he hoped that he would be strong enough to weather, '^ cannin ho es Canning, observing a general luU, deceived himself that quiet is with the belief that it presaged a lasting calm. Nor "^ °™"s- was he alone in his want of foresight. It does not appear that a single official of rank in India, except Sir Henry Lawrence, was seriously troubled by forebodings. On the 4th of May John Lawrence wrote that the sepoys at the Sidlkot Dep6t were charmed with the new rifle. Their officers confirmed his opinion. General Barnard warmly praised the patient zeal of the men at Umballa in extinguishing the fires which, though he would not believe it, some of their own number had caused. The Com- mander-in-Chief was so little impressed by the symptoms of mutiny which obtruded themselves upon his attention, that he did not think it worth while to make a single representation about them to the home authorities.^ It was not extraordinary then that the Governor-G-eneral, who knew little of India, and who had no genius to supply the lack of experience, should have failed to perceive that a general mutiny was at hand. It was no wonder that he laboured at his ordinary round of business as calmly as if no danger-signals had appeared, and thought that there was no further need for the presence of the regiment which he had fetched from Eangoon.^ He could not foresee that in a few days he would have cause to rejoice that there had been no vessel to convey it back to Burma when he had ordered its return. Still he could not ignore the misconduct of the Sith, or mis- understand the reports of their daily increasing insolence and untrustworthiness. Yet, whereas he should have long since severely punished these sullen soldiers, and executed the guard who had dared to strike their adjutant, he tortured himself with doubts as to the justice of even disbanding the remaining com- ^ Life of Sir If. Lawrence, pp. 564-5, 568. 2 Letters of Indophilus to the Times, p. 25. ' E. Mon^omery Martin's The Indian Empvre, vol. ii. p. 135 ; H. Mead's Sepoy Revolt, p. 59. 94 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY chap, m panics, — those companies of which not a single man had stirred to arrest their mutinous comrade, — and wasted precious days in wearisome discussion, until the remonstrances of Hearsey and Anson roused him to action. Even then he spent four more days in examining with microscopic accuracy the claims of individuals to indulgence, so that his decision was not made known until the 4th of May, five weeks after the commission of the crime. The delay in punishing, however, was less fatal than the choice of punishment. The disbanded sepoys, stripped of their uniforms, but suffered to retain the Kilmarnock caps which otat^m-hf they had paid for themselves, contemptuously tt™epoys.°^ trampled under foot these only remaining tokens of their former allegiance to the Company,^ and, welcoming their so-called punishment as a happy release from bondage, went off with light hearts to swell the number of our enemies. Discontented Europeans muttered against the lenity of the Governor-General; uncompromising journalists openly attacked it ; ^ and worst of all, when the order for dis- bandment was read out at the military stations throughout the country, and the sepoys, after listening to its solemn denuncia- tions of the terrible crime which their comrades had committed, and expecting to hear that a terrible punishment had been in- flicted upon them, learned at last that they had been sentenced not to death but to disbandment, they did not care to conceal their contempt for rulers whom they now believed to be afraid to punish them.^ Henry Lawrence, who understood what an effect the order must have upon the minds of the sepoys, would not allow it to be published at Lucknow.* He had lately proved that he was as able to suppress mutiny himself as he was sagacious in detecting the failure of* his superiors to suppress it. The finest sepoy corps at Lucknow, the 48th Native Infantry, was the first to manifest a mutinous spirit. Early Lu^7ow* in April Dr. Wells, the surgeon of the regiment, feeling unwell, went into the hospital for a bottle of medicine, and raised it to his lips, forgetting that he had thus hopelessly polluted it in the eyes of his Hindu patients. The ^ Red Pamphlet, pp. 33-4. ^ Friend of India, May 14, 1857, p. 459 ; Omrland Bombay Times, 1857, p. 81 ; Mead, pp. 58-9 ; Englishman, Ap. 8, 1857. ' I. Priohard's Mutimes in Rajpootama, pp. 24-5. * R£d Pamphlet, p. 34. 1857 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY 95 sepoys soon heard what he had done, and raised an outcry for their caste. Their colonel had the bottle broken in their presence, and severely reprimanded the offender ; but the matter did not end there. A few days later Wells's bungalow was burned down ; and it was soon known that the regiment was thoroughly dis- affected. Still no overt act of mutiny took place. But May brought a change. On the 1st of that month the recruits of the 7th Oudh Irregular Infantry refused to accept their cartridges, on the ground that their seniors had warned them that the obnoxious grease had been applied to the ends. The officers laboured, apparently with some success, to explain to their men that the cartridges were precisely the same that they had been in the habit of using. But the day after this explanation had been given, not the recruits only but the whole regiment refused to touch them. Then Lawrence ordered the Brigadier to hold a parade, and try the effect of a conciliatory speech. It was of no use. The men said that they must do as the rest of the army did. Even of the well-intentioned sepoys only the most resolutely faithful could stand against the opinion of their public. Let Englishmen think whether they could have resisted the terrors of social ostracism and religious excommunica- tion before they condemn poor ignorant Asiatics. But this particular regiment was not well-intentioned. On Sunday, the 3rd of May, they were drifting from passive towards active mutiny. When Lawrence heard that they had threatened to murder their officers, he saw that he must act promptly ; and, taking with him his whole available force, he marched against the mutineers. It was late in the evening when he confronted them. By the uncertain light of the moon the mutineers saw an irresistible force before* them, and were anxiously expecting its movement, when suddenly a port-fire was incautiously lighted by one of Lawrence's artillerymen, and seemed to their guilty imaginations to be the signal for their destruction. First a sepoy here and there stole away : then great gaps appeared in their ranks ; and soon all but a hundred and twenty had fled. The rest laid down their arms at Lawrence's order; and before two in the morning the troops had returned to their lines.^ When Canning heard of this fresh outbreak, he bethought 1 Gubbins, pp. 3, 10-13 ; lAfe of Si/r H. Lawrence, pp. 562-3, 671 ; Pari. Papers, vol. xxx. (1857), pp. 247-8. 96 OUTBREAK OP THE MUTINY chap, hi Mm of his old remedy, disbandment ; but Dorin was beginning to discern the signs of the times, and demanded a Canning and severer punishment.1 The multitude of counsellors thlrTO™^°^°'* were still busily recording their opinions in elaborate minutes, when a telegram was passed from one to another, containing the first dim tidings of a disaster which all felt to be the heaviest that had yet befallen them. At the great military station of Meerut were quartered the 11th and 20th regiments of Native Infantry and Meerut. ^^^ g^^ Native Cavalry. The station covered a great extent of ground, and was split into two parts by a deep ditch. On the northern side were scattered a number of officers' bungalows. Beyond them stretched the European barracks. The church stood between the barracks of the infantry and those of the cavalry. A long way oS, on the opposite side of the ditch, were the native lines. The intervening space was covered by a wilderness of bazaars, extending southwards in the direction of the town. 2 The radical fault in the plan of the station was the great distance that separated the quarters of the Eiu-opean from those of the native troops. The Lascar's story had caused even more excitement at Meerut than elsewhere. It was afterwards ascertained that some of the sepoys had made a compact with their comrades at Delhi, promising, in case the cartridges were pressed upon them, to join the regiments there. The English residents, however, feared nothing; for they were guarded by a dragoon regiment, a battalion of the 60th Rifles, and bodies of horse and foot artillery, forming altogether the strongest European force at any post in the North-Western Provinces. Still the officers, confident though they were, did not neglect the usual conciliatory assurances to their men. But the excitement was not abated. At length Colonel Smyth, who commanded the 3rd Native Cavalry, a hard ■ It is fair to say that on the 12th of May Canning recorded a minute, con- curred in hy Dorin as well as the other memhers of Council, in which he said " I did not conceive, that ... all graver punishments would be swallowed up in disbandment." i)orin's original minute, however, was conceived in a far more vigorous spirit than that of Canning. "The sooner," he wrote, "this epidemic of mutiny is put a stop to the better. Mild measures won't do it. A severe example is wanted ... I would try the whole of the men concerned for mutiny, and punish them with the utmost rigour of military law." — lb. p. 249, inc. 4 in No. 14, pp. 252-3, inc. 8 in No. 14. ^ Cave-Browne, vol. i. p. 61 ; Thornton's Gazetteer, vol. iii. p. 449 ; sketch-plan drawn for me by an oflScer who was once quartered at Meerut. 1857 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY 97 and unpopular oflScer/ but one of the few Europeans that had discerned symptoms of disease in the sepoy army, resolved to take advantage of the order i for tearing off the ends of the car- tridges instead of biting them, to give a final explanation to his troopers. Accordingly, on the 23rd of April, he ordered a parade of the skirmishers of his regiment for the following morning. The cartridges that were to be issued were of the old kind, which the men had long been in the habit of using. A rumour ran through the station that the skirmishers would refuse them ; and a fire which broke out in the evening boded disaster. In the course of the night the colonel was informed that the men desired the postponement of the parade : but, as he had heard that the whole army was going to mutiny, he felt that to yield to such re- monstrances would be a sin. Early next morning ninety men met him on the parade-ground ; but, though he pointed out to them how the new regulation had been drawn up out of consideration for their scruples, five only would even touch the cartridges.^ He could only break up the parade, and order a court of enquiry to assemble. The court elicited the fact that, as at Umballa, not genuine fear of the cartridges, but fear of public opinion had influenced the mutineers.® A report of the proceedings was sent to the Commander-in-Chief ; and his orders were awaited. All this time nightly fires told of the evil passions which were work- ing in- the sepoys' hearts ; but few heeded the warning. Early in May a message came from the Commander-in-Chief, ordering the mutineers to be tried by a native court-martial. They had virtually nothing to say in defence of their conduct. The court sentenced them to ten years' imprisonment ; and General Hewitt, the commander of the Division, approved of the sentence for all, except eleven of the younger offenders, half of whose punishment he remitted. On the morning of the 9th of May, beneath a sunless sky darkened by rolling storm-clouds, the whole brigade was assembled to see the culprits disgraced. Stripped of their uniforms, these miserable felons were handed over to the smiths, who riveted fetters on their arms and legs. In vain they entreated their general to have mercy upon them. As they were being led away, they yelled out curses at their colonel.* Their brethren, choking with suppressed indignation, longed to strike a blow in 1 See App. "W;. 2 Pamphlet by Col. Smyth, printed for private oiroulation ; Forrest, vol. i. pp. 227-45. s Pml. Papers, vol. xliv. (1857-58), Part 4, p. 178. * Montgomery Martin, vol. ii. p. 146. H 98 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY chap, hi their behalf ; but fear was stronger than the thirst for vengeance. After gazing passively at the removal of the prisoners to the gaol, they dispersed. There was an unnatural stiUness in the lines for the rest of that day ; an unwonted respectfulness in the manner of the sepoys towards their officers.^ But none could interpret the omen. The lines of the sepoys were too far distant from the dwellings of the Europeans for the latter to hear what Mussulman and Hindu were saying of them. In the afternoon a native officer of the disgraced regiment told Lieutenant Hugh Gough, who was temporarily commanding the troop to which he belonged, that the men had determined to rescue their imprisoned comrades. Gough at once went to Colonel Smyth and reported what he had heard : but the colonel ridiculed the story ; and Brigadier Arch- dale Wilson, the commandant of the station, was equally sceptical.^ Officers jested at mess ; civilians talked over the work of the day ; ladies chatted gaily in their verandahs. On the ^ ■ Sunday morning the church held its usual congrega- tion ; and, when the worshippers returned to their homes, they hardly noticed the unusual absence of their native servants. Here, as elsewhere, the self-satisfied Englishman knew nothing of the inner life of the despised races around him ; and he was punished for his neglect by the moral blindness which would not let him guard against their vengeance. Unknown to him, the sepoys were moving to and fro all that Sunday afternoon with war in their hearts ; the courtesans were taunting the troopers who had looked on at the humiliation of their comrades, and calling upon them to prove their courage if they dared; the children were wondering at the strange commotion around them ; and the budmashes, like foul harpies, were emerging from their haunts, to profit by the troubles which they foresaw. In the hearts of the sepoys a vague but irresistible fear mingled with hatred and the thirst for vengeance, and impelled them to antici- pate the doom which they imagined the English to be preparing for them ; while stronger than all their passions was the sense of a brotherhood linking them with the rest of the army, and joining with religious fanaticism to hurl them as martyrs against ■ the British battalions, whose power they knew to be stronger than their own. Towards sunset the Christian residents prepared, as usual, for ^ Cave-Browne, vol. i. p. 53. " Lord Roberts's Forty-one Tears in India, vol. i, p. 88. 1857 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY 99 church. One of the chaplain's female servants begged him to stay at home, assuring him that there was going to be a fight. Disregarding her warning, he drove off. But, as he approached the church, his ears caught the sharp reports of volleying musketry ; and, looking up, he saw clouds of smoke ascending from burning houses into the air.^ The woman had told the truth. It was the dread with which the sepoys regarded the movements of the Eifles, whose assemblage for church parade they interpreted as the signal for their own imprisonment, that precipitated the outbreak.^ Suddenly a cry was raised, "The Rifles and Artillery are coming to disarm all the native regi- ments " ; and the sepoys who were lounging in the bazaars started ^ The Chaplain's Narrative of the Siege of Delhi, by the Rev. J. E. W. Botton, p. 4. '' I have been convinced of this by the arguments of Colonel G. W. Williams, vpho collected a vast amount of evidence on the subject of the rising at Meerut, and prefaced it by an invaluable little essay, entitled Memorandum on the Mutiny and Outbreak at Meerut in 1857. He points out on p. 3 that Nos. 22 to 26 of the Depositions taken under his direction prove that "the mutineers fled as a disorganised mob . . . many towards Dehlie, but others in totally opposite quarters," which they would not have been likely to do, if they had acted upon a prearranged plan. The following extracts from the Depositions strongly support the argument. P. 7. " Q. — Did the regiments preconcert the rebellion ? A. — The said regiments did not plot anything beforehand. Had they done so, they would not have kept their wives and children with them as they did. Q. — How then (if there was no preconcerted plan) did the detached guards at some distance from the lines at once join the mutineers ? A. — The uproar and confusion was very great, and immediately it reached the guards, they joined their regiments." Other witnesses gave similar replies. ^ — See pp. 10-14. Moreover the native residents In the Bazaar suspected nothing ; for " their shops were all open and goods unprotected ; men were passing to and fro, paying, realising, and carrying about . . . money ; vendors of goods hawking about their wares as usu,al ; and travellers journeying unarmed both to and from the city and district." — Merm. p. 6. A girl in the tovra was indeed told at 2 p.m. on the 10th that there was going to be a mutiny that day ; but her iiiformant was probably only repeating some vague utterances of the sepoys ; and the incident does not prove more than that the idea of mutiny was " in the air." [Still there is evidence that some sowars of the 3rd Cavalry determined on the 9th to mutiny on the following day. Sir Hugh Gongh says {Old Memories, pp. 21-2) that the native officer who spoke to him on the 9th warned him that there would be a mutiny on the morrow ; and Mr. P. V. Luke shows in MaaimlUm's Magazine, Oct. 1897, p. 403, that the telegraph wire between Meerut and Delhi was cut soon after 4 P.M. on the 10th. (See also Depositions, pp. 37, 41.) This evidence, however, is not irreconcileable with the depositions which Major Williams collected. The native oiBcer doubt- less heard some of the sowars threaten to mutiny on the Sunday : but his state- ment does not prove the existence of a general plot ; and there is no evidence that the sowars who cut the wire acted in pursuance of a generally understood plan. It is indeed probable that even if the panic which precipitated the outbreak had not arisen, and only a few men had mutinied, the rest of the sepoys, though not forewarned, would have followed them : but whoever studies the depositions will, 100 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY chap, m up, and, followed by a mob of townsmen, rushed wildly to their respective lines. The 3rd Cavaby took the lead. Some hundreds of the troopers dashed off at a gallop towards the gaol, to the terror of the quiet citizens whom they passed, wrenched out the bars that guarded the windows, and struck the fetters off their comrades. Not all, however, were swept away by the tide of mutiny. Colonel Smyth indeed never went near his regiment from the moment that he heard of their uprising ; but two of his officers. Captain Craigie and Lieutenant Melville Clarke, handling their own troop as though mutiny were a thing unknown, brought it to the parade- ground in perfect order. ^ Meanwhile the infantry regiments were surging tumultuously in their lines. Hearing the uproar, the officers hastened thither, and began to remonstrate with their men. The latter were quietly submitting, when suddenly a trooper galloped past, and shouted out that the European troops were coming to disarm them. The 20th at once ran to seize their muskets : but the 1 1th, who had all along shown the least obstinate spirit, wavered. Colonel Finnis, their commanding officer, was imploring them to be faithful, when some men of the other regiment fired upon him ; and he feU riddled with bullets, the first victim of the Indian Mutiny. Seeing the fate of their commandant, and feeling sure that they would never be forgiven, the 11th no longer hesitated to throw in their lot with his murderers.^ The thirst of the mutineers for the blood of Christians was only stimulated by the slaughter of Finnis. The convicts, let I think, arrive at the conclusion that the bulk of the mutineers acted on the spur of the moment, and that no definite plot for a general mutiny had been prearranged. See also Oazetteer of the N.W.P., vol. iii. p. 340.] There is, however, evidence that the sepoys at Delhi expected that those at Meerut would sooner or later mutiny and come to join them. At the trial of the King of Delhi a news-writer named Jat Mall deposed, " I heard a few days before the outbreak, from some of the sepoys of the gate of the palace, that it had been arranged in case greased cartridges were pressed upon them, that the Meerut troops were to come here, where they would be joined by the Delhi troops." — Evidence taken before the Court appointed for the Trial of the King of Delhi, p. 182. The king's confidential physician, a highly trustworthy witness, deposed that the 38th N.I. " said, that before the breaking out of the mutiny, they had leagued with the troops at Meerut, and that the latter had corresponded with the troops in all other places." lb. p. 158. [On the [other hand, the Judge Advocate-General had no authority for saying, in his review of the evidence, that " the sepoy guards at the gate of the palace on Sunday evening . . . spoke openly ... of what they expected to occur on the morrow." They did not mention any date. Ih. p. 185,] 1 See App. W. ^ Depositions, pp. 3, 10-12, 14, 25. 1857 OUTBREAK OP THE MUTINY 101 loose from the gaols, and fraternising with the native police and the increasing swarm of budmashes, joined in the bloody work. Gangs of these marauders, armed with swords and clubs, roamed about the station, hurled showers of bricks upon every stray Eui'opean who crossed their path, burst into peaceful dwellings, murdered the inmates, and poured forth again ladeil with plunder ; and the terrified witnesses of this dreadful scene heard mingling with the roar of the flames that leaped up from the fired houses the savage voices of Mahomedans shouting, " Ali, Ali." ^ Soon, however, the sepoys had had enough of pillage : they were sure that the white troops must be coming : " Quick, brother, quick ! " was their cry, " Delhi, Delhi " ; and the bud- mashes were left alone.^ A staflT-ofiicer rode to the telegraph oflSce, in the hope of sending a message of warning. He was disappointed. The signaller had already attempted to com- municate with Delhi : but there was no reply ; and he realised that the wire had been cut.^ Meanwhile, incredible as it may appear, the Treasury Guard, though beset by extraordinary temptations, remained faithful to their trust* And, even when the rioters were doing their worst, their intended victims never doubted that the white regiments would soon come to rescue and avenge them. It was not the fault of the British soldier, but of his com- mander, still more of the system which had given him such a commander, that this hope was unfulfilled. General Hewitt, an infirm old man who had long outlived whatever military capacity he might once have possessed, was almost too inert to be even bewildered by the crisis, and remained simply passive. But Archdale Wilson did make some attempt to grapple with the danger. On receiving the news of the outbreak, he mounted ' Williams's Memo., pp. 1, 7. 2 Letter from Colonel MoUerus Le Champion (the Lieut. Moller mentioned in the text), who was an eye-witness of the scene. ' Information from Capt. R. H. Peal, late of the Telegraph Department. See also Depositions, pp. 37, 41, and Pioneer, April 1, 1897. * The following is one of several instances recorded by Colonel Williams of the inconsistency so often remarked in the conduct of the native soldiers during the Mutiny : — "A few days after the outbreak at Meerut, a small guard of the 8th Irregular Cavalry ... of their own accord and for greater safety, escorted the Oiflce records and Treasure-chest in their charge from Meerut to Agra, fighting their way down, and, when attacked by insurgent villagers, beating them off mth heavy loss. They were well rewarded for their fidelity ; yet, in less than two months after, deserted almost to a man." 102 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY chap, hi his horse, ordered the British artillery to join him on the parade- ground of the Eifles, galloped thither himself, and directed the colonel to dismiss his men from church-parade, and reassemble them for action.^ But there was delay in supplying the Eifles ■with ammunition, and the Dragoons were nowhere to he seen ; for, as they were on their way to grapple with the sepoys, Wilson had turned them back, and sent them on a bootless errand to the gaol.^ At last Hewitt appeared on the parade- ground, and, though too helpless to take the initiative himself, sufl'ered Wilson to act for him. Placing himself at the head of the Artillery, and some companies of the Eifles, Wilson marched for the Infantry lines. But the sepoys had not failed to take advantage of the incompetence of their officers. Only a few stray troopers remained near the lines ; and even these easily found refuge in a wood, concealed in which they laughed at the efibrts of the artillerymen to destroy them. Then the British began a hunt in the dark for the mutineers. Marching in breathless haste to their own quarter of the station, they found only a few unarmed plunderers on whom to wreak their vengeance. By that time great numbers of the mutineers were far on their way to Delhi. Many of them had at first not known their own minds. Hardly had they got outside the station when the leaders of the cavalry stopped to consider what they should do next. The majority were for taking refuge in Eohilkhand ; but one pointed out that the best course would be to make a dash for Delhi ; and his counsel prevailed.* Marvelling to find that they had escaped all reprisals, the mutineers never doubted, as they pressed on by the light of the moon, that the White Man, rousing himself from his lethargy, was pursuing, and would soon overwhelm them.* But they were never for a moment in danger. Asserting that it was his duty to provide for the safety of the station of which he was Brigadier, Wilson left Delhi to perish because he dared not leave Meerut exposed to the attacks of the escaped ^ 6. W. Forrest's Selections from State Papers, vol. i. pp. 260-62. ^ I have not seen it anywhere positively stated that Wilson gave this order ; but Colonel Le Champion has written to me, "I have always heard it was Brigadier Wilson " ; and, as Hewitt expressly said to Le Champion, "I give no orders without Wilson's permission," I am sure that the statement in the text is true. See also letters from Colonel Custanoe and Colonel Le Champion, quoted by Kaye, vol. ii. pp. 687-91. * Pari. Papers, vol. xviii. 1859, p. 335, par. 15 ; Depositions, p. 8. * Forrest, pp. 261-2 ; Anruds of the Indian Rebellion, p. 101. 1857 OUTBEEAK OF THE MUTINY 103 convicts and the budmashes. He forgot that one half of his British soldiers was sufficient for the permanent protection of the station, now freed from its most dangerous enemies ; and that the other half, led by able officers, of whom there were some even at Meerut, would have been able to punish the mutineers, and to reinforce their destined victims. ^ But there were at least two men who felt indignant that one of the strongest garrisons in India should take no thought for the safety of any station but its own. Captain Eosser of the Dragoons offered to arrest the flight of the mutineers, if but one squadron of his regiment and a few guns were allowed to accompany him. Lieutenant Moller of the 11th entreated Hewitt to allow him to ride to Delhi, and warn the authorities of their danger.^ These brave men were not suffered to retrieve the errors of their superiors. The baffled Europeans bivouacked on their parade-groiuid, but did nothing to help the suffering people for whose protection they had been retained, though the sullen roar of a thousand fires lighting up the darkness of the night might have warned them to be up and doing. It was not to them but to a few faithful natives that those who were saved owed their lives. Greathed, the Commissioner, and his wife had fled to the roof of their house on the first sound of tumult ; but their furniture was set on fire by a band of ruffians,* and they must soon have perished but for the devotion of one of their servants, G-olab Khan. While they expected every moment to be destroyed by the flames, this man, pretending that he could point out their hiding-place, decoyed away their enemies, and thus gave them time to escape.* Not less heroic was the self-sacrifice of Craigie's 1 See App. B. ^ "Dr. O'Callaghan," says Mr. H. G. Keene, "mentions Eosser's offer (contra- dicted ty Kaye), and has since informed me that ... he was only fifteen feet from the Brigadier when Eosser spoke, who then came over, reined up his horse by O'Callaghan's side, and repeated to him what he had said." Moller made his offer before the mutineers left Meerut. ' H. Greathed's Letters mritten during the Siege of Delhi, App. ii. p. 291. * An Afghan pensioner, named Syad Mir Khan, also risked his life in endeavouring to repel a mob which had collected round the Commissioner's house. His account of his own exploits is so exquisitely comic that I cannot resist the pleasure of quoting from it. " The mob appearing," he deposed, " I attacked them with great ferocity like a terrible lion ... By the favour of God I fought many actions with the mutineers . . . The above is but a short account of my doings, if I were to detail them it would be immense. " — Depositions, etc. , pp. 17-18. 104 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY chap, hi troopers, who, posting themselves outside his bungalow, protected his wife from the attacks of a savage mob. But when daylight revealed the grim charred skeletons of what had been neat bungalows, the heaps of property wantonly destroyed, and the mutilated corpses, the soldiers, though they burned to be avenged upon the rufBans who had wrought this destruction, were forbidden by their officers to stir. Not all, however, were paralysed by this effeminate weakness. Lieutenant MoUer, resolving to execute justice upon the murderer of a brother officer's wife, sought and obtained evidence of his identity; tracked, arrested, and carried him back to cantonments single- handed ; and then delivered him over to the judgement of a drum- head court-martial, by whose sentence he was summarily hanged. Thus even Meerut had its heroes. The negligence which had permitted the great disaster, the apathy which had made no effort to retrieve it, were half redeemed by the promptitude of Clarke and Craigie, the daring of Eosser, the gallant self-sacrifice of Golab Khan, the chivalrous courage of the faithful troopers of the 3rd, the swift vengeance of Lieutenant Moller. On the morning of the 11th the sun which exposed the nakedness and desolation of the wrecked station of Meerut was shining gloriously upon the gorgeous mosques and palaces of Delhi. The great city wore its usual aspect. The traders were chaffering with their voluble customers. The civil authorities were patiently listening to suitors, or trying prisoners in cutcherry. The officers were preparing for breakfast after morning parade, in happy ignorance of what had passed the night before. Even the sepoys, though emissaries from Meerut had come among them on the previous afternoon, masked their feelings so cleverly that only a few penetrating eyes could see anything unusual in their demeanour. Suddenly the civil authorities were startled at their work by messengers who reported that a line of horsemen had been seen galloping along the high road from Meerut. Not at once realising the whole import of the news, they nevertheless lost no time in acting upon it. The magistrate galloped to the cantonments, and put Graves, the Brigadier, upon his guard, while another civilian hurried off to warn Lieutenant Willoughby, the chief officer of the great magazine, to look to the safety of his charge. Mean- while, however, the rebel horsemen, followed by some of the infantry, had made good their entrance into Delhi. Some, after 1857 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY 105 fording the Jumna a little below the city, had burst open the gaol, and released the prisoners. The foremost of the main body rode straight for the palace, and, surging round its walls, clamoured fiercely for admittance, boasting that they had already slaughtered the English at Meerut, and crying, " Help, King ! we pray for assistance in our fight for the faith." In vain Captain Douglas, the commandant of the palace guards, came out upon the balcony, and called down to them that their King desired them to depart. Unable to force an entrance where they were, they made for the Edjghdt gate, which was thrown open to them by a Mahomedan rabble, and then, with these new allies in their train, rushed back towards the point from which they had started, firing every European dwelling, and murdering every European inhabitant upon their route ; while the citizens shut up their shops in terror, and trembled as they thought of the retribution which the English would exact for such wicked- ness.i On returning to the palace, the mutineers were joined by the guards and the King's dependents, to whose loyalty Douglas and Eraser, the Commissioner, were fruitlessly appealing, their once dreaded voices drowned by the insolent shouts of the multitude. Falling back before the advancing crowd, Douglas leaped into the moat, and, wounded cruelly by his fall, was carried by some natives into the palace ; but Eraser reached the Lahore gate^ unhurt, and, while his injured friend was being taken up to his apartments, remained himself in the court below, and made a last effort to control the furious mob who were pressing into it. While he was speaking, a lapidary cut him down : some of the guards despatched him ; and the rest, rushing upstairs, smashed open the door, and massacred the collector, the chaplain, his daughter and a lady who was staying with him, and the helpless Douglas. Soon the rest of the Meerut infantry arrived, and joined the murderers; while another party of troopers, who had just come up, finding what their comrades had achieved, and eager to rival their exploits, went off to the Darya Ganj, to work their will upon the Eurasian ^ Christians and poorer Eiu'opeans who lived in that quarter of the city.* Some were slaughtered on the spot ; others, who had barricaded ' Kaye, vol. ii. p. 77. ^ Of the palace, not the city. ^ Eurasian — a person horn of a European father and an Indian mother, or any person of mixed European and Indian origin. ^ Cave-Browne, vol. i. pp. 58-61, 63, 65-6 ; Evidence taken before the Court 106 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY chap, iii themselves in houses, or fled to the river side, were soon over- powered, and thrown into a room beneath the palace. After being confined for five days in this dark and pestilential dungeon, ill-fed and constantly insulted, but defying their tormentors to the last, they were dragged out to execution,^ and ^^ ■ their bodies flung into the river. Meanwhile another gang of mutineers had chosen for their operations the portion of the city in which the ^^ " chief public buildings were situated. Here the teachers in the Government colleges were slain in the midst of their work : ^ the manager of the bank was cut down with his wife after a gallant defence in which she had supported him : the missionaries, European and native, were murdered without distinction ; and the compositors at the Delhi Press, who had just finished printing special editions of the Gazette, announcing the crisis of which they were themselves to be the victims, fell at their posts. Here too the church was foully desecrated. In the telegraph office outside the city a young signaller named Brendish was standing, with his hand upon the signalling apparatus. Beside him was his fellow signaller, Pilkington ; and Mrs. Todd, the widow of their chief, who had been murdered a few hours be- fore, was there too with her child. They heard the uproar and the rattle of musketry ; and native messengers brought news of the atrocities that were being enacted in the city. Mashed up the wires to Umballa, to Lahore, to Edwalpindi and to Peshawar, this message warned the authorities of the Punjab, " We must leave office. All the bungalows are on fire, burning down by the sepoys from Meerut. They came in this morning. We are cS." More fortunate than their countrymen in the city, the boys, with their helpless charge, were in time to escape the fate which, in the performance of their duty, they had dared. Before these things took place, the Brigadier had acted upon the information which he had received, feeling sure that the English regiments from Meerut would soon come to his support. The cantonments, in which the bulk of his force was posted, appointed for the Trial of the King of Delhi, pp. 183, 186, 189, 199, 202 ; see also Kaye, vol. ii. p. 79, note. ' A Mrs. Aldwell and her three children saved their lives by pretending to be Mahomedans. — Evidence taken before the Court appointed for the Trial of the King of Delhi, p. 203. ^ Cave-Browne, vol. i. p. 67 ; Pioneer Mail, March 4, 1897 ; MaomiUan's Magasine, Oct. 1897, pp. 404-5. See App. W. 1857 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY 107 were situated upon a high ridge, about two miles north-west of the city. Colonel Eipley of the 54th, leaving a portion of his regiment to escort two guns which were to follow him under Captain de Teissier, marched with the remainder towards the Kashmir gate, the nearest entrance to the city. He had just reached the main-guard near the gate, where a detachment of the 38th under Captain Wallace was on duty, when he found his progress disputed by the troopers of the 3rd cavalry. Wallace ordered his men to fire upon the mutineers ; but they insolently refused. The troopers fired their pistols at the officers of the 54th, six of whom fell dead. The 54th did in- deed fire at the word of command, but only into the air, and then, bayoneting their own colonel, joined the 38th and the cavalry. When the murderers heard that de Teissier's guns were coming down, they turned and fled. The guns, on their arrival, were placed at the main-guard ; while Wallace, who had galloped back to hasten their advance, rode on, after he had met them, to beg for further succours. A few companies of the 38 th, the 74th, and a handful of artillerymen formed the whole of the Brigadier's force. Not a man of the 38th responded to Wallace's appeal : but, when Major Abbott, who commanded the 74th, called upon his men to prove their loyalty, they came forward in a body, and demanded to be led against the mutineers.^ Taking them at their word, he marched them down with two more guns to strengthen the main guard. He and his country- men whom he had left behind at cantonments had still an after- noon of terrible anxiety to Hve through. The Brigadier and his officers, wondering why no succours came from Meerut, laboured manfully to keep their mutinous men in check, and placed the women and children and their servants for safety in a building known as the Flagstaif Tower. There, huddled to- gether in a room smaller than the Black Hole of Calcutta, was collected a great company of every age and class, frightened children crying and clinging to their not less frightened ayahs, women bewailing the deaths of their husbands or brothers, others bravely bearing up against heat, and discomfort, and anxiety, and busily unfastening cartridges for the men. At last, when the agony of waiting for help became insupportable, a young Englishman offered to ride to Meerut for reinforcements; 1 i.e. all -who were present, about 240. The rest were distributed in detach- ments over cantonments. 108 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY chap, hi but lie had only gone a little way when he was shot by the men of the 38th on guard at the powder magazine. Then Dr. Batson of the 74th started on the same errand, disguised as a native ; but he too was fired upon, and escaped, only to be robbed and stripped by the villagers.^ There is no reason to suppose, however, that, even if these brave men had succeeded in reaching Meerut, their devotion would have shamed the authorities into action. Meanwhile the ofBcers at the main-guard were keeping watch over their men, knowing nothing of what was passing else- where, except what they could gather from the stray fugitives who from time to time joined them. Only the distant roar in the great city suggested to their imaginations the horrors that were being wrought within its walls. While the two parties at the main-guard and at cantonments were in this suspense, both were startled by the sound of a tremendous explosion, and, looking towards the city, saw a cloud of white smoke, followed by a coronal of red dust, rising into the air.^ They knew that the great magazine had been blown up. Was it accident or design ? Presently two artillery subalterns came into the main-guard, and told the story. Warned of the approach of the mutineers. Lieutenant Willoughby had lost no time in sending to the Brigadier for help. The young officer well knew that the possession of his magazine, with its vast stores of ammunition, would be eagerly coveted by the mutineers, and that, standing as it did close to the palace, it must be an early object of attack. He could not trust his native guards, and he had only eight Europeans ^ to support him ; but he could depend upon these for any sacrifice, and he could depend upon himself. For, though chance acquaint- ances saw in him only a shy, refined, boyish-looking subaltern, his friends knew that, in the cause of duty, he would face any danger.* No help came in answer to his appeal : the suifering and the glory of that day were for him and his gallant eight alone. His dispositions were soon made. Barricading the outer gates of the magazine, he placed guns inside them, and assigned 1 Cave-Browne, vol. i. pp. 68-9, 71, 73-4 ; Times, Aug. 18, 1857, p. 3, cols. 4, 5. ^ Cave-Browne, vol. i. p. 83. " Lieutenants Forrest and Raynor, Conductors Buckley, Shaw, and Scully ; Sub-Conductor Crow, and Sergeants Edwards and Stewart. * Red Pamphlet, p. 41. 1857 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY 109 to each man his post. But what if defence should fail ! He had another plan in reserve. A train was laid from the powder store to a tree standing in the yard of the magazine. Here stood Conductor Scully, who had volunteered to fire the train when- ever his chief should give the signal. If the enemy broke into the stronghold, they should find death, not plunder within. For a time, however, the enemy seemed to hesitate. It was because they and their King feared the vengeance of the white troops from Meerut. But at last the King's scouts told him that no white troops were coming.^ Then he gathered confidence to demand the surrender of the magazine. The garrison did not even answer the summons ; and, when the multitude no longer hesitated to advance, opened fire upon them from every gun. The most daring of the assailants planted ladders against the walls, and came swarming in.; but the guns, served with in- credible swiftness, though the gunners were exposed to a fearful musketry fire, poured round after round of grape into their midst. Yet so grpat were their numbers that the survivors, strengthened by the native guards, who had treacherously joined them, must soon have overpowered the little band of Englishmen. Still Willoughby hoped on. He had defended his magazine for three hours, and he would still defend it against any odds if only reinforcements were coming. Running to the river bastion, he bent over for a last look towards Meerut. No English were to be seen. Then, resolving that, though his countrymen had failed him, he would be true to himself, he gave the fatal order to Conductor Buckley : Buckley raised Ms hat as a signal : and Scully fired the train. In a moment some hundreds of rebels were destroyed, while many more without were struck down by flying splinters of shot and shell. Lieutenants Forrest and Eaynor, Conductors Buckley and Shaw, and Sergeant Stewart lived to wear the Victoria Cross : but Scully died where he fell, too cruelly wounded to escape; and Willoughby only survived to be murdered on his way to Meerut.^ ^ Cave-Browne, vol. i. p. 77 ; Eotton, p. 20 ; Hist, of the Siege of Delhi, ty an Officer who served there, p. 39. ^ G. W. Torrest's Selections from, State Papers, vol. i. p. 264 ; Cave-Browne, vol. 1. pp. 75-9. Evidence taken before the Court appointed for the Trial of the King of Delhi, pp. 186-7. It is stated in the History of the Siege of Delhi, hy an Officer who served there (p. 38), that "Scully . . was killed, when trying to escape, by a sowar." no OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY chap, hi At the sound of the explosion the mutinous sepoys flung off every remnant of disguise. The natives of all classes beUeved that the King had turned against the English ; and his followers, asjsured that the day had come for the restoration of the Mogul Empire and the revived supremacy of Islam, were burning with the lust of plunder and the more terrible passion of religious fanaticism. Suddenly the 38th at the main-guard fired a volley at their officers. Three fell dead. Two of the survivors rushed up to the bastion of the main-guard, and jumped down thirty feet into the ditch below. The rest were following, when hear- ing the shrieks of women in the guard-room, they ran back under a storm of bullets to rescue them. The women were shuddering as they looked down the steep bank, and asking each other whether it would be possible to descend, when a round shot, whizzing over their heads, warned them not to hesitate. Fastening their belts and handkerchiefs together, the officers let themselves down, and then, having helped the women to follow, carried them with desperate struggles up the opposite side.i Meanwhile at the Flagstaff Tower, though the men of the 74th who had remained behind continued respectful, those of the 38 th were becoming every minute more insolent. At last an officer suggested that it was time to retreat. The Brigadier was indignant. He could not abandon his post, he said. But the sun was fast sinking ; there was no prospect of succour ; and there was nothing to be gained by remaining. At last the Brigadier gave way. Accordingly the women and children and a few of the officers got into their carriages and drove down the hill towards canton- ments. The sepoys marched obediently for a few minutes ; but once in cantonments, they began to disperse, hinting to their officers that they had better make haste if they wanted to save themselves. The fugitives could see their deserted bungalows already on fire.^ Then began that piteous flight, the first of many such incidents which hardened the hearts of the British to inflict a terrible revenge, not more for the physical sufferings of their kindred than for their humiliation by an inferior race. Driven to hide in jungles or morasses from despicable vagrants, robbed and scourged and mocked by villagers who had en- ' Cave-Browne, vol. i. p. 80 ; Evidence taken before the Court appointed for the Trial of the King of Delhi, p. 205. " Narrative of Mr. Le Bas in Frasers Magazine, Feb. 1858, pp. 186-8. 1857 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY 111 trapped them with promises of help, scorched by the blazing sun, blistered by burning winds, half-drowned in rivers which they had to ford or swim across, naked, weary, and starving, they wandered on ; while some fell dead by the wayside, and others, unable to move further, were abandoned by their sorrow- ing friends to die on the road.^ But some, who reached at last a haven of refuge, had to tell of genuine acts of kindness shown to them in their distress by the subject-people.^ The outbreak at Meerut was soon seized upon by an unerring instinct as the real starting point of the Indian Mutiny ; for the weakness of Hewitt and of Wilson, allowed the mutineers to seize the imperial city of India with its inexhaustible munitions of war, and to enlist the influence of the Mogul's name on their side, and thus yielded to them an immense moral and material advantage at the very outset of their operations. Now that they had proved their strength, they could confidently appeal to the discontented who had hitherto longed but feared to rebel. It is impossible to do more than conjecture whether, if the out- break at Meerut had been crushed, the Indian Mutiny would have been nipped in the bud. Perhaps, if there had been a Nicholson at Meerut to annihilate the mutinous regiments, the whole Bengal army might have taken warning by their fate. But it may be that their passions, having been so long allowed to gather strength, could not at that late hour have been at once extinguished, but would have only smouldered on for a time, to burst forth thereafter with still more awful fury. It may even be that nothing short of a mutiny could have awakened the rulers to a sense of their shortcomings. On the 12th of May Canning, perhaps uneasily conscious of the popular verdict upon his treatment of mutineers, declared in a minute that that treatment had not been too mUd.* On the very same day a telegram from Agra announced the outbreak at Meerut. Dorin tried at first to disbelieve a report which suggested so rude a comment upon the policy in which he had • Letter from aa officer of the 38th N. I. to the Times, Aug. 6, 1857, p. 7, ool. 4. See also numerous other letters and pamphlets written hy survivors. [Many of these narratives 'will be found iu Annals of the Indian Rebellion.'] 2 " The Mahometan villagers distinguished themselves by their cruelty - . . Some were protected and kindly treated for weeks by Hindoo villagers." — Histmy of the Siege of Delhi, by an Officer who served there, p. 40. See also Dr. Batsou's narrative, Times, Aug. 18, 1857, p. 3, cols. 4, 5. 3 Farl. Papers, vol. xxx. (1857), p. 253, inc. 8 in No. 14. 112 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY ■ chap, hi concurred. But further details kept coming in ; and the main facts of the risings at Meerut and Delhi were known on the 14th. Like the lightning-flash, which makes itself seen even by closed eyes, the great 4isaster penetrated the mental blindness of the Grovernment. Men looked anxiously to see how they would act upon their knowledge, and tried to combat their distrust of the ruler to whom they felt that loyalty was due. When Canning heard the news, he thought of what Grillespie had done with his dragoons at Vellore, and asked CamSng!' indignantly why the powerful European force at Meerut had tamely suffered such a disaster.^ For, though he had not yet learned to spurn the feeble counsels of his advisers, his spirit was never for a moment cowed by the blow. Yet, though he might fairly complain of the false economy that had weakened the strength of the British force in India, it was his own fault that so few British regiments were immediately available. If he had formed an accurate diagnosis of the events which had passed at Berhampore, at Barrackpore, and at Umballa, he would long ago have summoned to his aid the regiments whose tardy arrival he was now forced to await. Even those who would not blame him for having lacked a foresight which only a great statesman would have displayed, will hardly defend him if it can be shown that he neglected to avail himself of the resources that lay ready to his hand. Of this neglect he was guilty. He allowed the 84th to remain inactive at Barrackpore for eight days after he heard of the outbreak at Meerut, though ever since the 6th of May it had been disengaged. Nor was this all. On the I7th he received a telegram from Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, containing an offer to send a fast steamer with despatches to England : but he saw no reason for authorising such irregular energy. Fortunately, how- ever, the successful conclusion of the Persian war had set free a considerable body of troops who were now on their way back to Bombay. These he ordered to be sent on instantly to Calcutta. „ ,, At the same time he ordered the 43rd, and the 1st Madras Fusiliers to be kept ready for embarkation at the southern Presidency ; despatched a steamer to fetch the ^^ ^g 35th from Pegu; telegraphed to Colvin, the Lieutenant -Grovernor of the North -Western Pro- vinces, to order John Lawrence to send down every available > Kaye, vol. i. p. 597. 1857 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY 113 Sikh and European soldier from the Punjab to Delhi ; begged the Governor of Ceylon to send him as many men as he could spare; and took upon himself the ^^ responsibility of diverting from its course an army which was then on its way to punish the insolence of the Chinese Govern- ment.^ Contemporary journalists and pamphleteers were loud in asserting that he ought not to have the sole credit, which was surely not very great, of the idea of sending for reinforce- ments ; but the suggestions of others had nothing to do with his determination. He gave his two most trusted lieutenants, Henry and John Lawrence, full authority to act as they might think best in Oudh and the Punjab. Finally, to supplement his material resources by a moral stimulus, he empowered commanding officers to reward on the spot native soldiers who might perform distinguished acts of loyalty, and at last issued that reassuring order to the sepoy ^ army on the subject of its religion and its caste which Birch had long ago recommended, but against which the Adjutant General had successfully pleaded. But the order was issued too late. Had it been published before, and preceded by the condign punishment of the Barrackpore mutineers, it might have done some good. The effect which it actually produced upon those whom it was meant to conciliate was shown by a proclama- tion which the Bang of Delhi in his turn issued towards the end of May : "If the infidels now become mild," said he, " it is merely an expedient to save their lives." ^ On the same day on which the Governor-General heard the first vague rumour of the great disaster, a clear though incomplete statement of the main facts May 12. reached the Commander-in-Chief at Simla. He General"' was in poor health at the time, and was looking ^son the^ forward to a shooting excursion in the hills. in-Chicf. Naturally, therefore, he could not at first bring himself to believe the whole truth of the announcement. Still he could not entirely ignore it. At first he contented himself with sending an order to Kasauli for the 75th Eegiment to march thence to Umballa, and to the Company's European regiments at Subdthu and Dagshai to hold themselves in readiness to march. Next day, however, becoming more alive ' Encloswres to Secret Letters from India, 4th July, 1857, p. 662. 2 Mead, p. 108. I 114 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY chap, hi to the magnitude of tlie danger, lie directed the last-named regiments actually to put themselves in motion, and the Sirmiir battalion of Gurkhas to move down from Dehra to Meerut. Seeing the paramount necessity of securing the great magazines in the Punjab, he warned the commandants of those at Ferozepore, Govindgarh, and Phillaur to be on their guard. Finally, he ordered a siege-train to be made ready at Phillaur, and directed the Nasiri battalion of Gurkhas and a detachment of the 9th Irregular Cavalry to prepare to escort it to Umballa. But he did not himself stir from Simla till the following day. From Umballa, which he reached on the 15th, he wrote to _. ,._ ,,. the Governor- General, complaining of the insur- mountable obstacles which the want of transport, of ammunition, and of siege-artillery threw in his way. And in truth he hardly overrated his difficulties. He had had little more than a year's experience of Indian life when he was called upon to face a crisis far greater than that which, eight years before, had tested the mettle of a Napier. Blind, like his fellows, to every sign of disaffection, he had made no preparations for coming trouble. His departmental officers, unable to extricate themselves from the clogging processes of routine in which they had been educated, gave him no support. With provoking unanimity the Quarter - master- General, the Adjutant-General, the Commissary -General, and the head of the Medical Department told him that the tasks which he had set them were impossible. Dalhousie had, from motives of economy, abolished the permanent transport service j^ and the Commissary-General, who had no authority to draw upon the resources of the country, was at the mercy of native contractors. While Anson could thus get small encouragement from those around him, he saw no cheering signs in the distant outlook. He could not hope for aid from the native regiments in the Punjab. He might, however, at least have disarmed the native regiments at Umballa, and thus have set himself free for an immediate march on Delhi. John Lawrence implored him to take this obvious step. But he listened to the remonstrances of the Umballa officers, who told him that they had guaranteed their men against the shame of being disarmed, and would not ^ Pmrl. Papers, vol. xlv. 1856 (Dalhousie's Farewell Minute, par. 160) ; letter from Canning, quoted by Kaye, vol. ii. pp. 167-8 ; information from Mr. H. G. Keene. 1857 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY 115 hearken to the counsels of the Chief Commissioner. , It was in vain that the latter pointed out to him that the sepoys' repeated acts of disobedience had absolved him from the duty of observ- ing their officers' pledges. He resolved to trust men who had shown themselves unworthy of trust, and thought to bind them to loyalty by proclaiming the resolve ^^ of Government to respect their religion. It was no time for proclamations.^ There were two men, however, whose unconquerable energy was all this time supporting the Commander -in- Barnes and Chief, and making up for the failures of the Forsyth sup- Departments. No sooner had Forsyth, the ^° ™" Deputy - Commissioner at Umballa, received the news from Delhi than he despatched a message to warn his j, ,, Chief, George Barnes, the Commissioner of the Cis-Sutlej States, who was then at KasauU, and hastened to make all necessary arrangements in his absence. First he organised a body of Sikh poKce to protect Umballa. Then he proceeded to organise a system for the defence of the whole of the Cis-Sutlej States. Fortunately the means of defence were independent of the sluggish motions of department-governed battalions. In the wide district between the Sutlej and the Jumna were a number of Sikh chieftains, whose ancestors many years before had sought and obtained Loyalty of the protection of the English against the encroach- chiefs! ments of Ranjit Sing. In anticipation of the Commissioner's sanction, Forsyth applied for help to the Rajas of Patidla and of Jhind. The Eaja of Patidla promptly sent a body of troops to Thaneswar, to keep open the road to Karnd,l, where the troops from Umballa were to assemble; while the Eaja of Jhind, who, on hearing the news from Delhi, had voluntarily sent to Umballa to ask for instructions, hastened, at Barnes's request, to KarnAl, to protect that station, and thus preserve an unbroken communication between Umballa and Meerut.2 The Nawab of Karndl had already paved the way for the coming of the Raja by exerting his influence in the cause ^ Cave-Bro-wne, vol. i. pp. 189, 193-4, 203, 208, 377-9 ; Enclos%ures to Secret Letters frmnlruUa, May, 1857 ; Pari. Papers, vol. xliv., Part 3, pp. 200-1 ; Kaye, vol. ii. pp. 138-41, 167-8 ; G. W. Forrest's Selections frcnn State Papers, vol. i. pp. 277-82. 2 Cave-Bro-wne, vol. i. pp. 190-1 ; Ptmjab Mutiny Report, p. 85, par. 7, p. 97, par. 9. This dooument is to be found in Pwrl. Papers, vol. xviii. (1859). 116 OUTBEEAK OF THE MUTINY csas. hi of order. Presenting himself before the chief civil authority at Karnil, he had said, "Sir, I have spent a sleepless night in meditating on the state of affairs. I have decided to throw in my lot -with yours. My sword, my purse, and my followers are at your disposal." Thus early the more sagacious of the natives foresaw the ultimate triumph of the British. Meanwhile Barnes himself, who had reached Umballa on the night of the 1 3th, was actively suppressing the disaffection which had followed swiftly upon the events at Meerut and Delhi, posting guards at the fords of the Jumna, and sending out the contingents of the native rajas and jdgirddrs to maintain order in the districts. When the success of these precautionary measures was apparent, he and his lieutenant began to collect carriage and stores for Anson's troops, to make up for the shortcomings of the commissariat. Their energy carried all before it, though the natives of every class, bankers, tradesmen, contractors, and coolies, tried to keep aloof, fearing the downfall of the English Edj.^ While, however, the labours of the civilians were removing most of his difficulties, Anson was suddenly dis- sfmia ** quieted afresh by the news that the Nasiri Gurkhas, complaining that, while they had been ordered to undertake a distant service, their pay had been allowed to fall into arrear and no provision had been made for the safety of their families, had mutinied near Simla. The Deputy-Commis- sioner Lord William Hay and the officers of the regiment re- mained at their posts ; but the English inhabitants, dreading the same fate that had befallen their brethren at Meerut ^ ' and Delhi, fled headlong from the station, women screaming to their servants to carry their children faster out of danger, men offering bribes to the bearers to carry their baggage and leave the women to shift for themselves.^ The Gurkhas, however, were simply out of temper with the English, and had no thought of touching a hair of their heads. Anson entrusted Captain Briggs, an officer who thoroughly knew the temper of the hill-tribes, with the work of bringing the mutineers to reason. Feeling that it was necessary to conciliate them at all costs, as, while their defection lasted, the siege-train must remain idle at Phillaur, he restored them to good-humour by granting ^ Cave-Browne, vol. i. pp. 192-3 ; Punjab Mutiny Report, pp. 86-7, pars. 12-3, p. 97, par. 15. ' Kobertson, pp. 81-2 ; Cave-Browne, vol. i. pp. 196-202. 1857 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY 117 their demands and offering a free pardon to all. Then, ashamed of their groundless panic, the fugitives returned to their homes. While his forces were moving down, Anson was discussing the plan of his campaign with John Lawrence. He tried to convince him of the imprudence of correspond- risking an advance against Delhi with so small ^thCamSng a force as he could command. His idea was to con- ™