Japanese Expansion 
 
 And 
 
 American Policies 
 
 Abbott 
 
U^■ A\'3 
 
Corned University Library 
 DS 849.U5A13 
 
 Japanese expansion and American policies 
 
 3 1924 023 233 806 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tliis book is in 
 tlie Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924023233806 
 
JAPANESE EXPANSION AND 
 AMERICAN POLICIES 
 
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO - DALLAS 
 
 ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO 
 
 MACMILLAN & CO., Limited 
 
 LONDON • BOMBAY - CALCUTTA 
 MBLBOURNB 
 
 THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. 
 
 TORONTO 
 
JAPANESE EXPANSION AND 
 AMERICAN POLICIES 
 
 BY 
 
 JAMES FRANCIS ABBOTT, Ph.D. 
 
 SOMETIME INSTRUCTOR IN THE IMPERIAL 
 JAPANESE NAVAL ACADEMY 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 1916 
 
 All rights reserved 
 
 I 
 
! t <(^f "SO* 
 
 Copyright, igi6. 
 By the MACMILLAN COMPANY. 
 
 Set up and printed. Published January, 1916 
 
 Katisoob $te«g 
 
 J, S. Gushing Co. — Berwick & Smith Co, 
 
 Norwood, Mass,, U.S.A. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 In this little book, I have attempted to give the facts 
 upon which I base my opinion that war between Japan 
 and America during the present generation is a most 
 unlikely contingency. The fact that such a war is not 
 an impossibility is the chief reason why the American 
 people should inform themselves thoroughly regarding 
 Japan and our relations with that Empire. For if war 
 comes, it will be largely our own fault. 
 
 Americans know that in 1914 the absence of any 
 personal animosity whatever between the different peo- 
 ples of warring Europe had no weight in preventing 
 the great war. And in consequence they are little 
 inclined to consider the long historic friendship be- 
 ^,tween Japan and America from any other than a cyn- 
 ical viewpoint. Accordingly, while giving due weight 
 to this, so to speak, academic factor and, in particular, 
 to the prime necessity, on our part, of cultivating such 
 a Japanese friendship, I have tried to base my argu- 
 ment upon the more concrete and matter-of-fact aspects 
 of the case. 
 
vi PREFACE 
 
 The first three chapters I have devoted to a brief 
 historical Ir^sum^, in order that the reader may orient 
 himself with respect to the whole problem. The next 
 four chapters deal with the material upon which is 
 based the central conclusion of the book — that war 
 with America would be national suicide for Japan. 
 The last two chapters are an appeal to Americans to 
 recognize Japan's aspirations as an Oriental power, in 
 the belief that it will be to our own advantage to do so. , 
 
 J. F. A. 
 
 Washington University, 
 St. Louis, Mo., 
 
 October, 1915. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 PAGH 
 
 The Background i 
 
 CHAPTER n 
 Japan on Probation ii 
 
 CHAPTER HI 
 Japan Comes of Age 39 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 America, Japan, and the Philippines .... 75 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 Japan's Economic Evolution 107 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 The "Yellow Peril" in a "White Man's Country" . 143 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 The Chances of War 194 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 Japan's Dilemma 215 
 
viu CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 FJIGE 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine East and West . . .235 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 Some Guesses as to the Future .... 248 
 
JAPANESE EXPANSION AND 
 AMERICAN POLICIES 
 
JAPANESE EXPANSION AND 
 AMERICAN POLICIES 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE BACKGROUND 
 
 "Japan will make China a vassal and will militarize 
 its millions. Then it will be for your country [America] 
 to look out. Admiral Togo once said to a European, 
 ' Next will come a general European war, then will 
 come a great war in which my race will be against 
 yours.'" 
 
 Such were the statements credited in the press last 
 December to Admiral von Tirpitz, the chief of the 
 German navy. It is unlikely that Admiral von Tirpitz 
 said this; it is highly improbable that Admiral Togo 
 did. Yet, in a way, it does not make any difference 
 whether they did or not. So long as such statements 
 are pubHshed periodically all over America and so long 
 as hundreds of thousands of readers never dream of 
 questioning their accuracy or authenticity they might 
 as well be true as otherwise. 
 
2 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 Repeatedly during the past ten years have similar 
 remarks been made and similar fears been expressed. 
 And not always so crudely, nor through the channel of 
 an anonymous newspaper reporter. Public men, both 
 in Congress and elsewhere, have essayed the role of 
 Cassandra, in season and out. Bankers, globe-trotters, 
 merchants, and editors have enlightened us with their 
 views until we have reached a state of mind in which the 
 notion that "we are going to have trouble in the Pacific 
 one of these days" has become almost an obsession. 
 Said the Hon. James R. Mann of Illinois in the House 
 of Representatives October i, 1914 : ^ "We who are 
 legislating now, who do not bear in mind the inevitable 
 conflict, commercial or otherwise, which we wiU meet in 
 the Far East, have forgotten the principles that ought 
 primarily to actuate us. [Applause.] I have no doubt 
 that it is as certain as that the sun will rise tomorrow 
 morning that a conflict will come between the Far East 
 and the Far West across the Pacific Ocean ; all of that 
 which has taken place in the world during the history of 
 the human race up to now teaches us that the avoidance 
 of this conflict is impossible. I hope that the war will 
 not come ; I hope that there will be no conflict of arms. 
 But I have little faith that in this world of ours people 
 and races are able to meet in competition for a long period 
 ' Congressional Record, 63d Congress, p. 17466. 
 
THE BACKGROUND 3 
 
 of time without an armed conflict. A fight for commer- 
 cial supremacy in the end leads to a fight with arms 
 because that is the final arbiter among Nations. We 
 command the Pacific Ocean today with the land that 
 we have on this side, with the islands which we possess 
 in the sea and with the PhiKppines on the other side. 
 Will we surrender our command? I say no, never." 
 [Applause.] 
 
 A few years earlier Mr. Hobson said on the floor of 
 the same chamber i"^ "We are short on providing equi- 
 librium in the Atlantic and we have not a single battle- 
 ship in the Pacific and our relative naval strength is 
 steadily declining. War is therefore a physical cer- 
 tainty." "I will tell you frankly that in my judgment 
 you can count almost on the fingers of your two hands 
 twice around, the number of months. In my judgment 
 war will come before the Panama canal is completed !" 
 
 "Ever since this Nation went into the Hawaiian Islands 
 the Japanese nation served notice that they would never 
 acquiesce. Ever since 1898 when we went into the 
 Philippines, and Japan asked us to let her go in there 
 with us and we refused; ever since her citizens have 
 come to this country in great numbers and our people, 
 following the natural law of segregation of races, have 
 not given them the treatment that they thought they 
 ' Congressional Record, Feb. 20, 1911, p. 2989. 
 
4 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 ought to have, they have been preparing for war. . . . 
 I repeat, in my judgment, war is inevitable and not far 
 off. ... It will be humiliating, of course, for us to 
 see the Philippine Islands occupied practically without 
 a struggle. All we can hope to do there will be to hold 
 out at Corregidor. Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, the Aleutian 
 Islands, Alaska, and I have already mentioned Panama, 
 San Francisco and the Puget Sound region, the whole 
 Pacific Coast will be occupied without serious opposi- 
 tion on our part." 
 
 The prospect of a hostile nation "occupying" a 
 stretch of coast line (with its hinterland) 7000 miles 
 long and 5000 miles from her home base, to say nothing 
 of the Philippines 1000 miles away in a different direc- 
 tion, is sufficiently startling, but more than one writer has 
 pointed out precisely how it is to be done. One of the 
 most detailed of these programs is that of Homer Lea's 
 extraordinary book, "The Valour of Ignorance." ^ But 
 miUtary men also have discussed the invasion of Cali- 
 fornia so often that a share of the public has grown to 
 accept it as an inevitable coming event. 
 
 ' Not the least extraordinary feature of Lea's work is the apparent 
 seriousness with which it has been considered. William James, Norman 
 AngeU, and others have discussed his theses as if they represented the 
 opinions of an expert militarist. As a matter of fact " General " Lea was 
 an adventurer who never had any real position in China nor any real 
 military training. 
 
THE BACKGROUND 5 
 
 On October 18, 1912, General Leonard Wood is re- 
 ported to have stated that it would be "very easy for 
 an enemy to land in force in San Francisco unless we 
 had a west-coast army of 450,000 men." (The regular 
 United States army today is between 80,000 and 85,000 
 men, and England had but 250,000 men at the outbreak of 
 the European war of 1914.) Of course such an invad- 
 ing army could not be other than Japanese. Says 
 another expert : ^ "If 200,000 fighting men of any first- 
 class hostile power should be landed on our Pacific 
 Coast tonight, we should have no course save regret- 
 fully to hand over to a foreign nation the rich Empire 
 west of the Rockies, with its cities, its harbors, and the 
 wealth of its valleys and mountains." 
 
 Now the American of influence is a hard-headed man 
 of affairs, endowed with a sense of humor and not given 
 to panic. He has taken the dire prophecies with a 
 grain of salt. When the Panama canal was finished 
 without a Japanese war, he recalled Mr. Hobson and 
 smiled. 
 
 For many years we have grown accustomed to proph- 
 ecies of wars, particularly of the certainty of war in 
 Europe. We have treated them all in the same tolerant 
 fashion. We are an optimistic people and not easily 
 alarmed. We thought that Europe had too much to 
 » Wheeler, "Are We Ready?" New York, 1915. 
 
6 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 lose by war, that European nations were too closely knit 
 together, that the spirit of sociahsm was too strong, 
 that we had grown too wise to make a wreck of our 
 civilization, that the bankers would not furnish the 
 money, etc. 
 
 Then came the cataclysm of August, 1914, and when 
 we had recovered our senses, we began to recall the proph- 
 ecies of the past. We read von Bernhardi's book and 
 realized that common sense has its limitations when it 
 comes to the judging of foreign politics. We reread 
 books and articles that had vociferously predicted the 
 European conflict and reaUzed that the prophet for once 
 had come into his own. 
 
 And now that the first shock has passed and we have 
 grown somewhat accustomed to the incredible situation 
 across the Atlantic, we recall once more the foreteUings 
 of coming war in the other direction and our self-com- 
 placency is a bit shaken. After all, may there not be 
 something in it ? If we were all wrong in smiling away 
 the predictions of the European debacle, are we all right 
 in disregarding those of a coming American- Japanese 
 conflict? The man who is in the presence of an earth- 
 quake loses his confidence in the stability of all things 
 terrestrial. 
 (J) In spite of our skepticism, the constant reiteration of 
 the idea has left its mark. Subconsciously we have 
 
THE BACKGROUND 7 
 
 stored away in the back of our minds tags and ends of ' 
 
 anti- Japanese statements, the while we have repudiated , 
 
 / 
 the conclusions based upon them. There is no question \ 
 
 but that as a nation our former rather sentimental \ 
 
 friendship toward the Sunrise Kingdom has cooled. 
 
 Not knowing the best, we suspect the worst, and 
 
 the background for a national sentiment is slowly 
 
 crystallizing. 
 
 We might regain some peace of mind if we were 
 careful to sort out from among the predictions those 
 which hold a Japanese war to be inevitable from 
 those which hold such a one to be merely probable 
 or possible. 
 
 The writer does not think such a war is probable, but 
 that is a purely personal opinion, worth only what it will 
 bring. That suchawar is possible cannot be questioned. 
 Anything is possible in international poUtics.. All 
 wars have an economic basis, but most of them have a 
 sentimental inception. Hardly a more striking example 
 could be found than our own most recent conflict with 
 Spain. Whether sooner or later we should have drifted 
 into war in 1898 is not worth discussing. What did 
 plunge us into war precipitately was the blowing up 
 of the Maine. And the wave of unreasoning passion 
 that swept over the United States took no heed of cir- 
 cumstances nor of consequences. 
 
 ■f 
 
8 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 Now if during some racial controversy in California, 
 such as might attend the passage of a new and drastic 
 alien land law, after the press of both countries had been 
 filled with acrimonious discussions, a Japanese cruiser 
 should be anchored in San Francisco harbor, or an 
 American man-of-war in Yokohama harbor, and either 
 should be blown up, — no matter from what cause, — 
 war would not only be possible but very likely inevitable. 
 And this, in spite of the fact that the explosion might 
 be entirely accidental. Such an accident, or some other 
 of the same sort, might happen at any time, and happen- 
 ing by chance at a critical time, might have the direst 
 consequences. Yet change the scene a Uttle. Suppose 
 that such a thing should happen to either a Japanese 
 or an American warship in the harbor of Buenos Ayres. 
 War with Argentine on account of it, in the absence of 
 any evidence of hostility, would be absurd. And why? 
 Because there would be lacking the background of sus- 
 picion and irritation which gives the mob-mind a chance 
 to coalesce and overwhelm the rational thought and 
 judgment of a nation. 
 
 Now it is precisely the constant reiteration of fears 
 and suspicions of a foreign nation, of speculations as to 
 her designs upon us and of anxiety as to the future, that 
 spins the tissue of such a background. Nothing is 
 harder to confute than vague accusations and aspersions 
 
THE BACKGROUND 9 
 
 of motives. Nothing is more persistent than a false- 
 hood that is welcomed by the hearer.^ The innocent 
 victim of a Hbel discovers that no amount of damages 
 will compensate him or entirely wipe out the memory 
 of the falsehood in the minds of his fellows. We have 
 found it necessary to provide a libel law to protect the 
 individual. Let us hope that the time will come when 
 libels upon nations may be brought to some sort of an 
 international bar of justice. The old English law appli- 
 cable to sovereigns stated, "The greater the truth, the 
 greater the Hbel. " Whatever opinion we may have of that 
 with regard to individuals, it is worthy of consideration 
 in the present case. Suppose that we have grievances 
 and that Japan has also. Nations are no more perfect 
 than the people that compose them. Let us not talk 
 about them too much. We have our appointed ofi&cial 
 representatives upon whose shoulders rests the responsi- 
 bility. 
 
 1 A shining example is the oft-repeated statement that the Japanese 
 are so dishonest that they cannot trust one another to handle bank funds, 
 but are forced to employ the more trustworthy Chinese. As a matter of 
 fact Chinese are employed to a very limited extent in Japanese banks and 
 then, not because of their superior honesty, but because they are skilled, 
 through long experience, in detecting the multitude of counterfeit coins 
 that circulate through the Orient. 
 
 The great majority of Chinese who are observed by travelers in Japan 
 to be employed in banks are not the employees of Japanese banks at all, 
 but are the employees of Chinese and other foreign banks. 
 
lo JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 I would not favor a muzzled press nor a blind com- 
 placency and an indifEerence to what goes on in the world, 
 nor should I care to see our national interests flouted 
 nor our national pride humiliated. But at least let 
 us save our excitement for what does happen, not what 
 we fear might happen. And let us allow the dust cloud 
 of suspicion to settle instead of constantly stirring it up. 
 Wise old Francis Bacon said, long ago,^ "There is 
 nothing that makes a man suspect much more than to 
 know Httle; and therefore men should remedy suspi- 
 cion by procuring to know more and not to keep their 
 suspicions in smother." 
 Americans are little given to keeping " their suspicions 
 *l in smother," but the remedy of "procuring to know 
 ' more" is open to all. And nothing is more apt to dissi- 
 \ pate the cloud of war or render conflict unlikely. Na- 
 f tions that know one another well are much less likely 
 to get to fighting than if the reverse is true. And the 
 , cost of a battleship would pay for much national 
 ^ education. 
 
 ' Essays, XXXI, "On Suspicion." 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 JAPAN ON PROBATION 
 
 The earliest inhabitants of Japan, according to the 
 archaeologists, were a race of pygmies perhaps related 
 to the Philippine Nigritos, who lived in caves or pits 
 in the ground and are known in Japanese (or rather 
 Ainu) as Koropokguru. These were succeeded by a 
 fierce and warlike, very hairy race, known nowadays as 
 Ainu, who occupied the main island until after the begin- 
 ning of the Christian era. The Ainu never got beyond 
 the stone age nor achieved a written language. 
 
 About the fifth century B.C. there came an entirely 
 aUen race, or rather two of them, in two migrations. 
 One of these migrations was by way of the northwest 
 and the immigrants were-MongoUaii. or Turanian. The 
 other^was by way of the south, originating doubtless 
 from India and hence of Aryan origin, although without 
 question mixed with Malay and other elements on the 
 way. These two strejjns, almost as unhke in racial 
 characteristics and physiognomy as ItaUans and North 
 Germans are unlike, have nevertheless mingled together 
 in hajmflay:,.andjCQnstitiit&-tbe-j^panegj pe oplewe k now 
 
12 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 today. On the other hand, inherent racial prejudice 
 has prevented intermarriage, and the different types are 
 today very obvious to the casual observer. The Mon- 
 golian element outnumbers the other, twenty to one, 
 and constitute the heimin or common people. The 
 southern element is the ruling caste and has been for 
 centuries. Its members are known as shizoku (samurai) 
 or gentry. The officials of modern Japan, the poUti- 
 cians, the officers of the army and navy, the educated 
 classes generally, who represent Japan to the world and 
 absolutely control her internal and foreign affairs, — 
 these are mostly aU shizoku. The farmers, laborers, 
 coolies, and incidentally the bulk, of Japanese emigrants 
 to other countries, are heimin. The gulf between these 
 classes, although perhaps not recognized officially, is 
 certainly recognized socially, and the distinction between 
 the two is never lost in the Japanese mind. For Ameri- 
 cans to fail to make this same distinction (and most 
 of them do so fail) inevitably creates confusion of mind 
 and judgment. The resident of Boston, whose acquaint- 
 ance with the Japanese is confined to students and 
 officials, quite misapprehends the point of view of the 
 Californian, whose acquaintance with them is confined 
 in the main to members of the heimin class. Each 
 thinks the attitude of the other is perverse. In Japan 
 the very language takes account of the difference. For 
 
JAPAN ON PROBATION 13 
 
 an ordinary laborer to address a gentleman with the same 
 personal pronouns and verbal conjugations that the 
 latter does him would be the height of calculated insult. 
 This caste distinction is largely a relic of feudahsm, and 
 there are many such relics persisting in the modern 
 Japanese social system. It is gradually^ breaking down 
 today with the rise of the commercial middle class, but 
 nevertheless it is still a powerful factor in Japanese 
 life. 
 
 The incoming Japanese found the Ainu occup)dng 
 the land and disputing their advance. The presence of 
 a common foe welded the invaders together into a na- 
 tion. The Ainu were gradually driven north, until 
 today only a few hundred of them remain in the north- 
 ernmost island of Hokkaid5. 
 
 Chinese missionaries introduced the Chinese written 
 language, art, and culture about the sixth century, and 
 the Island Kingdom flourished under the rule of the 
 Mikados. Japan at this time was an absolute mon- 
 archy. Early in Japanese history the absolutism of the 
 Emperor began to cnmable and various powerful fami- 
 lies occupied the r61e of "king-maker." Toward the 
 close of the twelfth century a feudal system similar to 
 that of Europe appeared. The actual rule was then 
 usurped by subordinates who with the title of Shogun 
 held sway until 1868. The real Emperor was never 
 
14 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 actually done away with, but was kept a helpless prisoner 
 in KyotS while the Shoguns ruled in Yedo (the modern 
 Tokyo). 
 
 During the eight centuries of feudalism Japan was 
 divided up into fiefs, each ruled by a clan chief called 
 the daimyo (literally, "great name"). The daimyo 
 owed allegiance to the Shogun alone. Within their 
 own borders they were supreme, Hke the Barons of 
 Europe, and their knights were subject to them. The 
 keimin did the work and supported the inihtary caste. 
 Some of these families of daimyo were obscure, others 
 were almost as great and powerful as the Shogun him- 
 self. This clan spirit, persisting today, has been an 
 important factor in modem Japanese poUtics. Two of 
 these clans attained great power toward the end of the 
 feudal era. One, the clan of Satsuma, had its seat at 
 the southernmost end of the country; the other, the 
 Choshu, had its seat near the western entrance to the 
 "Inland Sea." The combination of the two, called in 
 Japan the "Sat-Cho" group, has largely controlled 
 governmental affairs. The army today is officered 
 chiefly by Choshu men, the navy by Satsuma men. 
 
 It is important to remember how very recent the 
 feudal system is in Japanese history. Ja^n has today 
 a constitutional governmeiit.j5Kith a parHament, but this 
 does not necessarily imply the same things^lSaf are true 
 
JAPAN ON PROBATION 15 
 
 of England and her government, any more than the 
 fact that Venezuela is a republic implies any similarity 
 between her government and that of the United States. 
 Eight centuries of feudalism cannot be wiped out of 
 existence in a generation, no matter what verbal changes 
 may be inaugurated. 
 
 Intercourse -with the Occident 
 
 In 1542 the Portuguese discovered Japan, and seven 
 years later the famous missionary St. Francis Xavier 
 arrived. His proselyting was very successful. Both 
 nobles and common people accepted the Faith by the 
 thousands, and the land was in a fair way to become a 
 Christian one. But the missionaries were overzealous 
 and attempted to combine temporal with spiritual power. 
 In consequence, the Japanese, fearing for their national 
 existence, turned on the foreigners and their religion, 
 forbade the practice of the Christian faith, expelled the 
 missionaries, and closed up the country absolutely. In 
 doing so they had the active assistance of the Dutch. 
 This was in 1624. For over two hundred years Japan 
 maintained her seclusion. Only the Dutch were allowed 
 to have a trading post at Nagasaki, where they were 
 compelled to pay annual tribute to the Shogun and were 
 subject to very humihating restrictions. 
 
 But the later generations of Shoguns did not have 
 
1 6 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 the strength of the earlier ones. Their authority crum- 
 bled. Japanese historians began to investigate the 
 history of their country and to call attention to the fact 
 that the Emperor, the Son of Heaven, was the real ruler, 
 whereas the Shoguns were usurpers. There grew up 
 also a restless element in the large cities that was ripe 
 for revolt. 
 
 Accordingly, when Commodore Perry of the United 
 States navy appeared in Tokyo bay in July, 1853, with 
 his little fleet of four warships, his coming was the last 
 push that sent the tottering structure of the Shogunate 
 to the ground. The watchword now became, "Restore 
 the Emperor to his full power." The Shogun and his 
 staff were between two fires. The Americans were fol- 
 lowed by the English, Russians, and French, and insur- 
 rection in the name of thetrue Emperor brokg out 
 against_the Shogun's party, that had opened the gate 
 to the hated foreigner. In 1866 the reigning Sh5gun 
 died. The next year the old Emperor died, and in 1868 
 the young Emperor came to the throne which he was to 
 occupy until 191 2. 
 
 It is a mistake to think that Perry, as it were, "hap- 
 pened upon" Japan at a fortunate time to negotiate. 
 As a matter of fact, Americans, officially and unofficially, 
 had made previously several futile attempts to enter 
 into relations with the proud and warlike Japanese. 
 
JAPAN ON PROBATION 17 
 
 Russia, England, and France had also made fruitless 
 efforts. In 1797 ^.n American vessel had visited Naga- 
 saki, chartered by the Dutch, who were the only people 
 the Japanese would permit to trade. When, a httle 
 later, the captain of the same ship tried to trade on his 
 own account, he was sent away. 
 
 In 1837 an elaborate expedition was fitted out with 
 the avowed purpose of returning to Japan a number of 
 shipwrecked Japanese who had been picked up adrift 
 on the open sea. This boat was fired upon and driven 
 away both from Tokyo and Kagoshima, the seat of the 
 Satsuma clan. History does not record that the ship- 
 wrecked Japanese ever saw their native land again. 
 
 In 1845 another attempt was made to return to Japan 
 some Japanese castaways, twenty-two in all. This time 
 the Japanese were allowed to land, but not the Ameri- 
 cans. The next year an official expedition was dispatched 
 under Commodore Biddle. This embassy was contemp- 
 tuously received and was entirely unsuccessful. 
 
 These attempts had been made in the interest of 
 furthering American trade, a very legitimate one, of 
 course. But it was brought to the attention of the State 
 Department soon after, that another reason existed for 
 desiring some sort of understanding with Japan. The 
 North Pacific at this time was full of American whalers 
 who not infrequently suffered shipwreck. When these 
 
i8 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 shipwrecked sailors were cast up on the inhospitable 
 shores of Japan, their plight was a pitiable one. They 
 were imprisoned and treated with great cruelty, even 
 subjected to torture. Some of these sailors were rescued 
 in 1849 by an American ship of war dispatched for the 
 purpose. 
 
 Perry's expedition was the culmination of these 
 various attempts. Every effort was made to give it a 
 dignified and ofi&cial character. A personal letter of 
 President Fillmore to the Japanese Emperor^ was in- 
 closed in a magnificent case. All sorts of valuable 
 presents were carried, including a miniature railway 
 with engine and cars, telegraph instruments, champagne, 
 and "many barrels of whisky." 
 
 Perry's squadron, the first steam vessels ever seen 
 by the Japanese, went up Tokyo bay against a head wind, 
 with black smoke belching from the funnels, and carried 
 consternation and dismay to the people on land, although 
 the panic was somewhat allayed when the threatened 
 invasion did not occur. 
 
 The Japanese tried the same tactics they had adopted 
 on previous occasions, but Perry insisted upon treating 
 with no one but a high official, and while showing every 
 consideration and a consummate tact, yet demanded 
 
 * In reality, the Shogun ; the Americans did not appreciate the true 
 situation with regard to the Japanese sovereign. 
 
JAPAN ON PROBATION 19 
 
 the respect and dignity due to the personal ambassador 
 of one of the great nations of the earth. The Japanese 
 made a virtue of necessity and finally consented to re- 
 ceive the President's letter, contrary to their own laws, 
 as they said. They, however, professed themselves 
 quite unwilling to grant the American's request to con- 
 clude a treaty. Wisely refraining from pressing the 
 matter too far or provoking hostilities which would have 
 defeated the purpose of the mission. Commodore Perry 
 departed, with the reminder that he would return with 
 a larger squadron in the spring for his definite answer. 
 
 The Americans "felt highly gratified at what had 
 been accomplished.^ They had received different treat- 
 ment from any Joreigners who had visited. Japan for 
 two centuries^ They had c ommanded respect and 
 secured intercourse upon the basis of equality. They, 
 held direct communication with the highest imperial 
 authorities without the intervention of the Dutch at 
 Nagasaki.^ They disregarded or caused to be with- 
 
 ^ When the Ambassador of the Dutch trading company was granted 
 audience by the Shogun, "he crawl'don his hands and knees, to a place 
 shew'd him, between the presents ranged in due order on one side and the 
 place where the Emperor sat on the other, and then kneeling, he bow'd 
 his forehead quite to the ground, and so crawl'd backwards like a crab 
 without uttering a single word. So mean and short a thing is the audi- 
 ence we have of this mighty monarch." [Kaempfer, " History of Japan, 
 1691."] We may well believe that a Yankee naval officer would decline to 
 participate in any such performance. On another occasion during the 
 
20 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 drawn local regulations which were derogatory to the 
 dignity of their nation. On the other hand, while ex- 
 hibiting firmness as to their rights, they showed the 
 utmost regard for the sovereignty and rights of the 
 Japanese. The crews of the vessels were not permitted 
 to go on shore. No native was insulted or maltreated ; 
 no woman was outraged; no property was taken; no 
 police regulation was violated — practices quite com- 
 mon on the part of the crews of other foreign ships." ^ 
 
 It is important to keep in mind this attitude of the 
 Japanese toward foreigners. A proud, self-sati^jgd 
 people^ with an^xtraxndinajily^comglex^ajid-s^btle^ 
 of etiquette, which was of course a sealed book to the 
 W^terner, could not help but look upon the outsider.. as,_ 
 
 same visit the Emperor condescended, for the edification of his ladies, and 
 Kaempfer relates that "he ordered us to take off our Cappa or Cloak, 
 being our Garment of Ceremony, then to stand upright that he might 
 have a f uU view of us ; again to walk, to stand still, to compliment each 
 other, to dance, to jump, to play the drunkard, to speak broken Japanese, 
 to read Dutch, to paint, to sing, to put our cloaks on and off. Mean- 
 while we obeyed the Emperor's commands in the best manner we could, 
 I join'd to my dance a love song in High German. In this manner and 
 with innumerable such other apish tricks we must suffer ourselves to 
 contribute to the Emperor's and the Court's diversion." One is re- 
 minded of the Igorrotes in the Filipino village at the St. Louis World's 
 Fair. The Japanese idea of this may be gathered from a remark made to 
 Kaempfer by the Governor of "Osacca" to the effect that "it was a 
 singular favour to be admitted into the Emperor's presence, that of all 
 nations in the world only the Dutch were allowed this honor." 
 ^ Foster, "American Diplomacy in the Orient," Boston, 1903. 
 
JAPAN ON PROBATION 21 
 
 a hopeless barbarian, ignorant of everything that in the 
 ^T^^ragsei^mid^distinguished. a cultured man from an 
 ignorant boor. It cannot be gainsaid that the actions 
 of sailorsTtraders, and others with whom they had pre- 
 viously come in contact had gone far to confirm this 
 impression. The dignity and restraint of Perry was in 
 sharp contrast to the demeanor of some of the foreigners 
 that had come to Japan, and this, together with the 
 suggestion of hidden powers revealed by his steamboats, 
 impressed the Japanese dignitaries favorably in spite 
 of their fears. The Dutch they frankly despised. That 
 they granted a measure of "equaUty" to the Americans 
 was a great concession, however absurd it may have 
 seemed to the latter. 
 
 In February, 1854, true to his promise. Commodore 
 Perry returned with a squadron of ten warships and 
 carried through the somewhat delicate negotiations in- 
 volved in making the treaty. Free trade in open ports 
 was not obtained at once, but many concessions were 
 gained ; the best of feeling seemed to prevail between 
 the Japanese and American officials, and Perry's suc- 
 cessful conclusion of his difficult mission was acclaimed 
 at home and abroad. 
 
 At once the United States took advantage of its 
 newly gained treaty rights to send a consul to Japan. 
 The man chosen was Townsend Harris. The name of 
 
22 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 Harris deserves as enduring a place in national memory 
 as that of Perry. Unsupported by a powerful fleet, 
 living for over a year in fact without communication 
 with his home country, apparently forgotten in Wash- 
 ington (for Webster who had planned the Perry expedi- 
 tion was dead), in the midst of a semi-anarchy attendant 
 upon the dissolution of the Shogunate and the restora- 
 tion of the Emperor, Harris nevertheless maintained 
 a steadfastness of purpose, and displayed a tact and 
 ability that deserve the highest praise. Every sort of 
 obstruction was placed in his way by the Japanese, but 
 in the end he won his way through to the conclusion of 
 a treaty, so skillfully drawn that it served as the model 
 for all subsequent treaties entered into by Japan with 
 other foreign nations. Indeed it served as the basis of 
 Japan's foreign relations until 1899. Harris refused to 
 crawl upon his hands and knees before the Sh5gim, and 
 that monarch respected his prejudices in the matter. 
 
 While the name of Townsend Harris, almost unknown 
 in America today, is highly respected by the Japanese, 
 that of Perry is nearly as well known in Japan as that 
 of any of their national heroes. In 1901 a monument was 
 dedicated to the memory of Perry on the spot where he 
 had landed, and this was made the occasion of striking 
 and impressive ceremonies in which representatives 
 both of the governments of Japan and the United States 
 
JAPAN ON PROBATION 23 
 
 took part. Perry is recognized in Japan as the instru- /■ 
 ment by which the empire took its first step on its reor- ) 
 ganization as a modem nation. There exists also in 
 the Japanese mind a subtler reason for venerating the 
 memory of the American commodore. Perry forced,^ 
 the hand of th e Shogun and his government in compel- ' 
 ling him to admit the hated foreigners. To so admit 
 them was considered by the daimyo a betrayal of the 
 coimtry, and hence there rallied about the true Emperor 
 the forces of opposition to the Shogun which caused the 
 overthrow of the latter and the restoration of the Mikado. 
 Respect for their Emperor amounts almost to fanaticism 
 with the Japanese. Since, therefore, Perry's visit con- 
 tributed largely to the restoration of the Emperor,, the 
 JapaneseH&ave an additional reason to venejate_his 
 njemory. On the other hand, the fair deaUng which 
 the Japanese received at the hands of our early repre- 
 sentatives, at a time when the former were as innocent 
 as children in the ways of international diplomacy, 
 strengthened the bonds of friendship between ourselves 
 and the Island Kingdom. 
 
 It was inevitable that in the disturbed political con- 
 ditions incidental to the restoration clashes should occur 
 between the foreigners and the fanatical warriors of 
 the various clans. Some of the clans refused to abide 
 by the decision to admit the foreigners, and numerous 
 
24 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 riots and anti-foreign demonstrations occurred. The 
 Secretary of the American Consulate was murdered and 
 an Englishman named Richardson was cut down while 
 attempting to break through the ceremonial procession 
 of the Daimyo of Satsuma. The EngUsh government 
 took cognizance of this and demanded an indemnity 
 of the Shogunate, which was paid, and another of the 
 Prince of Satsuma, which was refused, whereupon Kago- 
 shima, the capital of the province, was bombarded and 
 burnt. A little later the American legation was burned 
 by a mob, and all the foreign representatives were forced 
 to leave Tokyo and take refuge in Yokohama under the 
 guns of their warships. 
 
 The cuhnina^on of these TMsturbances was what is 
 known as the\"S]^monoseki affair." The straits of 
 Shimonoseki communicate between the Inland Sea and 
 the western waters between Japan and Korea. It was 
 bordered by the lands of the Prince of Choshu, a very 
 powerful and anti-foreign daimyo who refused to ac- 
 knowledge the sovereignty of the Shogun in concluding 
 treaties with the foreigners. He closed the straits and 
 fired upon passing vessels, American, French, Dutch, 
 and English. Representations were made to the Shogun, 
 but the latter confessed himself helpless to control the 
 actions of the lord of Choshu. So a combined fleet 
 of the four nations involved, consisting of seventeen 
 
JAPAN ON PROBATION 25 
 
 warships, descended upon Shimonoseki and demon- 
 strated to the Prince, with gunpowder, the futility of 
 attempting independently to rule his own domain. As 
 our Civil War was in progress at the time there was no 
 American fleet in Japanese waters, and the Federal 
 Government chartered a vessel from the Dutch in order 
 to participate in the chastisement of the bumptious . 
 daimyo. ^^ After the affray the four nations demanded "" 
 an indemnity of the Shogun's government in the amount 
 of $3,000,000, an enormous sum for the impoverished 
 treasury to pay. The booty was divided into four parts, 
 one fourth to each nation, although the United States 
 had but one gimboat in the fleet. This $750,000 rested 
 rather heavily on Uncle Sam's conscience, and twenty 
 years later, by act of Congress, it was returned, with 
 interest, to Japan, where it was gratefully accepted 
 and used in improving Yokohama harbor. This example 
 of altruistic endeavor has never been followed by the 
 other nations involved, although England later used her 
 share in a very questionable exchange. 
 
 A great deal of interest attaches to the Shimonoseki 
 affair in the light of recent events. The control of the 
 President of the United States over the actions of the 
 governor and legislature of California is as defective as 
 was that of the Shogun over the Prince of Choshu, 
 and if at the passage of the Webb Act (debarring Jap- 
 
26 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 anese from owning land in California) the American 
 government had been poor and helpless, and the Jap- 
 anese, with a powerful fleet in the Potomac River, had 
 chosen to press their grievances, the exaction of an 
 indemnity of Washington would have been on all fours 
 with the Shimonoseki levy.^ 
 
 It is to the credit of our pubUc officials, a nd a matter 
 of miuchsatislaction to American citizens, that__our 
 dealings with foreign countries, particularly in the Orient, 
 have been characterized in the main by a genero us feel- ^ 
 ing and a sense of equity rather rare in international 
 relations. It is true that in some matters nearer home, 
 such as those of Texas and Cahfornia, our motives have 
 been somewhat Jesuitical, yet as a rule we have scorned 
 to be sordid. 
 
 In 1856 the United States came into armed conflict 
 with China or rather with a Chinese province. Colli- 
 sions of various sorts finally led to a joint expeditionary 
 force which attacked Tientsin. Americans were in- 
 volved along with French, Russians, and Enghsh. Va- 
 rious losses to the property of American missionaries and 
 merchants were met by the payment of an indemnity 
 
 ' As a matter of fact, in the well-known New Orleans lynchings the 
 national government paid an indemnity to the families of the Italians 
 killed, while at the same time confessing to the Italian government its 
 inability to put any pressure upon the Louisiana authorities to punish 
 the ringleaders of the mob. 
 
JAPAN ON PROBATION 27 
 
 to US by China of $735,000. In 1885, however, we re- 
 turned to China the unexpended balance of $453,400. 
 The only other time that we came into collision with an 
 Oriental power was in 1900, at the time of the Boxer 
 outbreak. At the conclusion of this brief campaign a 
 crushing indenanity was levied. Again in a few years 
 the American share of this booty, over and above what 
 satisfied the actual damages, was returned to China. 
 
 Altogether, during the past century, our country has 
 come into armed conflict with the Orient three times. 
 None of the campaigns was of sufl&cient importance 
 to be called a war. In each of them, however, indemnity 
 was exacted, — in two of the cases only because the 
 foreign powers were associated together in joint action. 
 In every case the money was returned, except for the 
 proportion that went to satisfy just claims. 
 
 This sort of action may be styled "playing to the 
 gallery." The justice of such a charge depends upon 
 the sincerity of the motive. I think jt^ cannot be ques- 
 tjgned that the American people are overwhelmingly 
 opposed to keeping^^ney^hat does not belong to them. 
 Oriental peoples have a very keen sense of justice, and 
 it must be confessed that this trait has not been in the 
 past a conspicuous characteristic of the way of an Occi- 
 dental with an Oriental. This is particularly true of 
 China. 
 
28 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 But in the case of Japan another and very human 
 element enters into the impression made upon public 
 opinion by acts such as have just been described. When 
 the Japanese knight or samurai was in his glory, an im- 
 passable gulf separated him from the tradesman. Even 
 the artisan and the farmer were ranked higher. The 
 tradesmen occupied the lowest rung of the social ladder. 
 
 I" This accounted for a good deal of the contempt which 
 was shown the Dutch at Nagasaki during the long years 
 of seclusion. The latter were there for such money 
 as they could make, and cared not for sodal indignities 
 
 t so long as they could take their profit. All foreigners 
 were classed together in this regard by the Japanese, 
 and accordingly it was held beneath the dignity of a 
 noble to have intercourse with them. Perry's attitude 
 and his dignified bearing in the negotiations of 1853 
 were a surprise to the Japanese and caused them to 
 modify their original estimate of foreigners and perhaps 
 to think of Americans as somewhat in a class by them- 
 selves. 
 
 The feudal contempt for trade has passed away with 
 the^ growth of commerce and industrialism and with the 
 entrance of men of high lineage into the field of business. 
 But the old ideas still persist in part, particularly among 
 the gentry. It is not "good form" in Japan today to 
 pass money from one to another except when wrapped 
 
JAPAN ON PROBATION 29 
 
 in white paper (shopkeepers, of course, excepted). Even 
 your tip to the landlord of the inn must be wrapped up 
 and given with a disparaging remark. A Japanese 
 gentleman would think it beneath his dignity to count 
 his change. The writer once stirred up a hornet's 
 nest about himself by innocently checking over a laundry 
 list submitted to him by a houseman, who turned out 
 to be a samurai in very reduced circumstances. Even 
 in America the Far Westerner who doesn't bother to 
 wait for his change has a certain contempt for the resi- 
 dent of the Atlantic seaboard who counts his pennies. 
 
 Now the open-handed disregard for money for its own 
 sake, imphed in the remission of indemnities originally 
 levied by joint action of the "Powers," produced in 
 the Japanese mind a more favorable reaction than it 
 would in any other country, on account of the national 
 attitude described above, and has done much to aid the 
 development of a real friendship between Japan and 
 America. 
 
 In 1879 the Japanese people had an opportunity to 
 demonstrate their enthusiastic friendship for us. In that 
 year, ex-President Grant made a tour of the world. His 
 travels in Japan were in the nature of a triumph. No 
 foreigner, hardly any national hero before or since, has 
 had such a spontaneous demonstration of popular en- 
 thusiasm. Books describing Grant's visit are still sold 
 
30 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 in the bookstalls in Japanese cities. Grant was accorded 
 royal honors and acted with great tact throughout the 
 trip.^ He was asked to arbitrate between China and 
 Japan with regard to a controversy concerning the Riu- 
 Kiu Islands and carried out the delicate commission 
 with success. 
 
 The United States had yet one other opportunity 
 of demonstrating its friendship for the Island Kangdom 
 when the time came to revise the treaties that were 
 drafted at the beginning of foreign intercourse. The 
 original treaties drafted, one might say dictated, by the 
 Western Powers, followed the precedent that had been 
 adopted in estabUshing relations with semi-civilized 
 states in the past. At the time of the Restoration, tor- 
 ture was an important feature of Japanese judicial pro- 
 cedure, just as it had been in Europe not many centuries 
 before. Under such circumstances it was inconceiv- 
 able that Western nations should leave their own na- 
 tionals to the tender mercies of Japanese judges, and 
 accordingly a clause providing for extraterritoriality 
 was inserted in all the treaties. This prevails today in 
 a modified form in China and was but very recently 
 abrogated in Turkey. Under the working of the 
 
 ' Instance his refusal to cross the sacred bridge at Nikko, a privilege 
 reserved to the Emperor and offered to a foreigner for the first time in 
 history when Grant was invited to cross. 
 
JAPAN ON PROBATION 31 
 
 "extraterritoriality" provision, the control of all for- 
 eigners resident in Japan was in the hands of the foreign 
 consuls, who, as judges, tried all cases involving foreign- 
 ers, from petty larceny to murder. American consuls, 
 being poUtical appointees, in many cases had not a 
 vestige of legal training or judicial experience. Of 
 course the Japanese could not permit foreigners over 
 whom they had no control to wander at will through the 
 country, and the right of residence was therefore restricted 
 to the foreign "concessions" of the treaty ports. When 
 foreigners traveled or resided outside these concessions, 
 they had to be provided with pohce passports. This 
 situation, which was inevitable in the early days of 
 intercourse, soon became galling to the proud Japanese, 
 anxious to assimae a place in the family of nations. 
 
 Another clause of these early treaties was even more 
 a source of irritation. The Japanese who signed them 
 were wholly ignorant of the nature of modem inter- 
 national relations and placed their interests unreservedly 
 in the hands of the one they most trusted, the Ameri- 
 can consul-general, Townsend Harris. The latter drew 
 up a tariff in the best interests of the Japanese, with 
 foodstuffs and raw materials on the free hst and liquors 
 at 35 per cent ad valorem. Lord Elgin, at that time 
 in charge of British interests, negotiated a tariff treaty 
 soon afterwards. He utilized the English share of the 
 
32 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 Shimonoseki indemnity in a way suggestive of an Ameri- 
 can "gold-brick" expert, trading it back to the confiding 
 Japanese in exchange for a reduction to 5 per cent of 
 the import duty on wool and cotton manufactures. 
 Now there is a clause rarely omitted in international 
 treaties, termed the "most favored nation" clause, by 
 virtue of which any concession made to one nation is 
 of necessity shared by all other treaty-powers. This 
 English treaty resulted therefore in a reduction to 5 per 
 cent ad valorem aU around. The Japanese were help- 
 less in the matter, and the good offices of the American 
 representative were unavailing against the rapacity of 
 the Europeans. As cotton manufactures in particular 
 constituted at that time the bulk of the imports, and 
 was the industry most in need of "protection," this 
 resulted in a very unjust restriction upon Japanese 
 commerce. In fact, until the treaty revision of 1899 
 the customs receipts never reached four million dol- 
 lars, the largest annual total (that of 1899) being but 
 $3,140,000. This sum barely paid the cost of collection. 
 The worst of it was that the Japanese soon awoke 
 to the fact that not only had they bargained away to the 
 European Jacobs their rights of control over foreigners 
 in their own dominions and the right to fix their own 
 tariffs, but more than this, that they had done so, not 
 for a period of years, but apparently in perpetuity. At 
 
JAPAN ON PROBATION 33 
 
 least when they sought to improve their status, they 
 discovered that on account of the absence of a definite 
 date to terminate such treaties the Western powers 
 decided that the agreements should remain in force 
 until the said powers should agree to change them. 
 
 Still relying on the justice of the nations of Christen- 
 dom, the Japanese in 187 1 dispatched a special embassy, 
 with Prince Iwakura, then foreign minister, at its head, 
 to make a tour of America and Europe, present the claims 
 of Japan to recognition and sovereignty and pave the 
 way for a new and more equitable revision of the existing 
 treaties. This embassy included some of the leaders 
 of the New Japan and altogether comprised more than 
 one hundred persons. They came first to America, 
 where they were made the ofl&cial guests of the nation, 
 were entertained royally, and received the assurance 
 of the State Department that the United States was 
 prepared to take up treaty revision on terms more favor- 
 able to Japan. But when the embassy reached Europe, 
 they found a very different attitude. Great Britain 
 was then the chief exponent of the "mailed fist" in the 
 Far East, and English commerce profited too greatly 
 by the tariff with Japan to permit any change. It is 
 but fair to suppose that if American commerce had been 
 to any degree comparable with that of England at the 
 time, the embassy might not have found so altruistic. 
 
34 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 not to say avuncular, an attitude displayed toward them 
 in this country. 
 
 The fact remains, however, that when the Japanese 
 returned to their own land from their fruitless quest 
 and summed up the results of their endeavor, the atti- 
 tude of the United States stood out in bold contrast 
 to that of the European powers and produced a pro- 
 found impression, not only upon the oflEicial classes, but 
 upon the mass of the people. Nothing was left, how- 
 ever, but to build up Japan to a status upon which she 
 might assert her independence and defend her rights. 
 This she forthwith bent every energy to accomphsh. 
 As might be expected, the Japanese turned to America 
 for the help which was freely granted. An American 
 organized the eflftcient postal system ; most institutions 
 of higher learning had Americans as professors in all 
 departments (except medicine, which was imported 
 bodily from Germany, and law, in which the methods of 
 the French are more congenial to Japanese institutions 
 than those of Anglo-Saxondom) ; the national fiscal 
 system was remodeled by officials from the United States 
 Treasury Department. Americans have constantly been 
 retained in the capacity of advisors to the Foreign Office. 
 In general, Americans both officially jmL privately 
 have Tieen largely instrumental in shaping the externals 
 of New Japan and enabling the modem n alJ Qji to~geE~- 
 
JAPAN ON PROBATION 35 
 
 jipon its feet. This relation has been intensified by the 
 great number of Japanese students who have come to 
 America to study in our colleges and universities. These 
 invariably have been shown every attention and given 
 every opportunity. Nor should we neglect to mention 
 the influence for the past forty-five years of the mission- 
 aries, most of whom have been American. As to the 
 success of their proselyting there may be two opinions, 
 but with regard to the influence upon Japanese pubUc 
 opinion and thought, of the presence of American fami- 
 lies of the highest tjrpe scattered throughout the Empire, 
 there can be but one. These missionaries, broad-minded 
 and cathoHc in thought, college graduates as a rule, 
 speaking the language fluently, associating on a plane 
 of equality with the most influential of the Japanese 
 intellectual and official classes, have been as bits of 
 leaven scattered through the mass of the Japanese popu- 
 lation, often unconsciously and unintentionally acquaint- 
 ing the Japanese with American ideas and ideals, and 
 rem oving the grea test of a,ll-barriers-tO-Jnterna.tional 
 amity, that of prejudice and ignorance of the foreigner. 
 The net result of all these factors is that the Japanese 
 people, high and low, know a great deal more of America 
 and the American people than we do of them. 
 
 But the Japanese realized that it was not sufficient 
 to remodel Japan on the basis of Western jurisprudence, 
 
36 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 commerce, medicine, and science. They had been slow 
 indeed if they had failed to take into account the place 
 that arms and force have occupied in Occidental diplo- 
 macy. Moreover, it would be too much to expect that 
 a whole population of professional warriors, the samurai, 
 would find places in an economic system that did not 
 include an army. Accordingly they sought the aid of 
 European drillmasters and began the not difficult task 
 of making over the army according to European stand- 
 ards and of estabhshing a modern navy. The use to 
 which they have put these adjuncts to modern civili- 
 zation will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
 Summary 
 
 Japan has emerged from a condition of complete 
 feudalism into that of a modern constitutional monarchy 
 within the experience of men now living. For two cen- 
 turies and a half previous to this change she had shut 
 herself off from intercourse with other nations, jeal- 
 ously guarding against the entrance of any outside bar- 
 barians and developing a high degree of civilization 
 in which flourished the arts of peace as well as those of 
 war. By the middle of the nineteenth century internal 
 disintegration had paved the way to revolution, and 
 when in 1853 the American Commodore Perry called 
 with his fleet, conditions were favorable for insisting 
 
JAPAN ON PROBATION 37 
 
 upon the assumption of friendly relations with the West- 
 em nations. 
 
 Japan then signed treaties, first with America and 
 later with other powers, in which she yielded up the right 
 to control foreigners within her dominions and to fix 
 her own tariffs. Being unable to secure a change in 
 these hard conditions until she should have made over 
 her national hfe upon Western models, she set herself 
 the great task of transforming a collection of eighty-six 
 semi-independent fiefs into a unified nation on Occidental 
 lines. This she accomplished in a remarkably short 
 space of time through the ability and foresight of her 
 leaders, the sterling qualities of her common people, and 
 the devotion of all classes to the Imperial throne. In 
 all this she received much help from Western countries, 
 and particularly from the United States. 
 
 As a whole and practically without exception, the 
 relations that existed between Japan and America for 
 the last half of the nineteenth century were more than 
 friendly. On the side of Ainerica they partook of the 
 a ttitude of a. proud teacher toward jl^ie exploits of_an 
 apt pupil^^^[oring naturally the fact that the young 
 Empire had other instructors). In the mind of Japan 
 the position of America was that of "elder brother," an 
 Oriental relationship that is hard to appreciate in the 
 Occident, where family connections are, by comparison, 
 
38 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 relatively insignificant. This attitude of America 
 was in part due to the fact that until 1897 America had 
 hardly attained self-consciousness as a nation of the 
 world. Constitutional America is only about seventy- 
 five years older than constitutional Japan, and to future 
 historians with the perspective of a couple of centuries, 
 the transformation of our own nation during the nine- 
 teenth century may seem more wonderful than that of 
 Japan. The two nations are not unlike two boys who 
 grow up together. And it is a common human experi- 
 ence that two bosom companions of youthful days may 
 find their paths diverge as maturity comes, and the 
 romantic affections of nonage cool to the more business- 
 like relations of men of the world. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 JAPAN COMES OF AGE 
 
 When the Japanese had reformed their judiciary and 
 their diplomatic and postal services, had established the 
 machinery for commerce, remodeled their educational 
 system, and, in general, made over their national gar- 
 ments by an Occidental pattern, they rather naturally 
 supposed that their years of probation were end ed' an d 
 that the irritating restrictions of extraterritoriahty and 
 lack of tariff autonomy would be removed by the nation s 
 that had been so prominent in leading Japan from the 
 darkened~"chamber of feudalism into the light of West- 
 em civiUzation. 
 
 They were doomed to a bitter disappointment. In 
 the attempt to mitigate the more irritating of these 
 two restrictions. Count Inouye, one of the ablest of 
 Japan's new leaders, after tedious discussions, at last in 
 1886 secured the concession that Japanese judges should 
 be allowed to serve on the bench in cases involving 
 aliens. But the foreign judges were to be nominated 
 by the European diplomats, were to constitute a ma- 
 jority, and to control the rules of procedure. 
 
 39 
 
40 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 This concession came so near to realizing the 
 Japanese proverb of "pointing at a stag and calling it 
 a horse," that great public indignation was aroused and 
 the conferences were broken off. The American minis- 
 ter alone supported the Japanese demands for recogni- 
 tion in opposition to his colleagues. Count Inouye's 
 successor to the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, Count 
 Okuma, tried to revise the treaties by negotiating with 
 each nation separately. America had long before ex- 
 pressed her wilhngness ; Germany, France, and Russia 
 were finally won over, but .Great Britain stood out to 
 the end against any concession. This aroused such 
 public indignation, and the snub was felt so keenly by 
 the Japanese, that Okuma, who was responsible for the 
 situation, was also forced to resign — however, not 
 before a fanatic had blown off his leg with a bomb. 
 
 The reaction from these d isappointments was keen 
 an^ took the _form of an anti-foreign sentiment ex- 
 pressed not so muchi against foreigners themselves,~as 
 against foreign ideas, dress, usages, etc., and the su- 
 periority^f_iiatiszB_institutions began to be preached. 
 THegovernment, however, went on with its reforms, and 
 in 1889 the Emperor promulgated the Constitution, 
 organizing a Diet and a machinery of government 
 modeled after that of Prussia. 
 
 But the Japanese were not stupid in reading history 
 
JAPAN COMES OF AGE 41 
 
 nor in observing it. They well knew that the profes- 
 sions of disinterestedness on the part of European 
 powers are frequently contradicted by their actions. 
 Even Perry's success was in no small part attributable 
 to his gunboats. The Japanese reahzed that however 
 far toward social perfection in the individual relations 
 the Western nations may have progressed, in inter- 
 national relations the law of the jungle still holds good. 
 A nd they kn ew that their mot ives, their cleverg ess, 
 their positive achievements m art, letters, and science, _ 
 would continue to count for Uttle with nations whose 
 poHtics are still based upon comparative military power. 
 Japan had tried to gain her place by achievements in 
 the arts of peace. She had failed. She therefore 
 determined to qualify in the arts of war. Her success 
 in the eyes of the West has an aspect almost ludicrous. 
 
 To say that Japan, with a brand new army and navy, ^ 
 was itching to show them off before the world, and j 
 was therefore only too glad of an excuse to fight, would 
 be to state something impossible to prove. There never » 
 yet has been a war that was not only wholly justifiable — 
 but really inevitable — to the power that declared it. 
 
 Unfortunately for China, whenever any other nation 
 wishes an excuse to fight her, she is more than accom- 
 modating. The attitude of the great Chinese Empire 
 toward the upstart Japanese, whom their earliest 
 
42 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 chronicles contemptuously term "dwarfs" and 
 "shrimps," has never been one calculated to allay 
 irritation. Nor has Korea behaved any better. In 
 fact, after the fall of the Shogunate, when Japan was 
 endeavoring to remodel her government on an Occi- 
 dental pattern, the Koreans considered such action 
 traitorous to the cause of the Orient and became very 
 contumacious. In 1875 they fired on a Japanese gun- 
 boat and Japan was compelled to dispatch a squadron 
 d, la Commodore Perry to force a treaty of "amity and 
 commerce" from the defiant Koreans. 
 
 This assertion of national independence on the part 
 of the Hermit Kingdom did not in the least suit China, 
 who had all along tried to maintain the fiction that 
 Korea was a vassal state. And Chinese officials began 
 to exercise an influence in Korean affairs, directed in the 
 main toward promotion of trouble with Japan. 
 
 The history of Korea is one long chronicle of corrup- 
 tion and misrule. As the activities of Japan and her 
 ascendancy in the eyes of the world were particularly 
 odious to those Korean officials who profited most by 
 the then poUtical condition of the peninsula, and as 
 China was disposed on her own account to back up the 
 latter, conflicts and disputes between Korea and Japan 
 became frequent. When the latter country tried to 
 press her own claims upon Korea, she was met by the 
 
JAPAN COMES OF AGE 43 
 
 Chinese contention that Korea was a tributary state of 
 China, a stand which China was prepared to support by 
 arms. Finally, in July, 1894, insurrection broke out in 
 Korea and things came to a crisis. 
 
 Nothing could have suited Japan better. However 
 scrupulous or fearful the statesmen of the rejuvenated 
 kingdom might have been, the army and navy were 
 spoiling for a fight. Nor were the Japanese as a whole 
 averse to the idea of "refonning" Korean institutions. 
 No one is so zealous as the new convert, and certainly 
 Korea has long been in chronic need of reformation. 
 China feared that Japan was bent upon annexing 
 Korea — a fear that has been completely justified by 
 subsequent events, although it is doubtful if it were 
 justified at the time. When war actually broke out, 
 the campaign was short and decisive. China was pro- 
 vided with battleships and Krupp guns, and on paper 
 was the better equipped, but the hopeless inefl&ciency 
 of the Chinese as a fighting man was most thoroughly 
 demonstrated and she was beaten in every battle. 
 The war lasted seven months and the Japanese lost 
 altogether 1000 men killed with 5000 wounded. China's 
 indemnity was fixed at 200,000,000 taels, and in addi- 
 tion she was forced to cede to the victor the island of 
 Formosa and the Liao-Tung peninsula, with the fortress 
 of Port Arthur. 
 
44 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 Japan thrilled with her success.^ At last she was 
 become a power in the world and a member of the 
 family of nations. Great Britain, long so obstinate, 
 hastened to conclude treaties with her, abrogating ex- 
 traterritoriality in five years and granting to her the 
 long-sought tariff autonomy; began the moves indeed 
 that eight years later culminated in the Anglo-Japanese 
 alliance. Japan felt that recognition was at last 
 achieved. 
 
 ^ This was certainly true, but the recognition of Japan's 
 prowess on the part of the rest of Europe was not at all 
 according to the cards. European nations had not been 
 so indifferent to Japan's progress as she had imagined. At 
 least one monarch had watched it with misgivings. This 
 was the German Emperor. With his active imagination 
 he saw disaster breeding from this awakening of the Ori- 
 ent. Attributing to the Far East the same motives of 
 aggression that have actuated the West, he had a vision 
 of hordes of Orientals swarming over Asia into Europe, 
 
 '■ Probably this was one of the most successful wars that have been 
 fought in modern times. Mr. Roosevelt has recently pointed to Japan 
 {" America and the World War ") as a nation that has "profited" by suc- 
 cessful war. Japan, in 1896, published the cost of the Chinese war to 
 be $97,246,210. The indemnity, therefore, represents a cash "profit" of 
 about 35 per cent. The paradoxical consequence of this success, how- 
 ever, was that military expenditure in Japan jumped from $6,405,000 in 
 1894 to $12,059,000 in 1896, and $19,471,000 in iSgS. And the Jap- 
 anese citizen's taxes advanced accordingly. 
 
JAPAN COMES OF AGE 45 
 
 wiping out European civilization with the sword which 
 the short-sighted West had put into their hands. Such 
 was the "Yellow Peril" which the Kaiser was to figure 
 later in his famous cartoon. 
 
 The victory of Japan came as an unpleasant shock 
 to Germany. Yet, if the Kaiser had read history to 
 better purpose, he would not have been so surprised. 
 The Japanese have ever been aggressive and warlike 
 and are most apt in imitation. They had merely 
 grafted the newest fashions in man-killing upon ances- 
 tral instincts and abilities. The ethics, instincts, and 
 abihties of the Chinese, on the other hand, are anti- 
 thetical to war, in spite of their unquestioned bravery. 
 But to the European statesman, at the time, all Orien- 
 tals were yellow, and, ipso facto, a "peril" to be antici- 
 pated. 
 
 One way to_ove rcome the Yellow^ Peril jvastja-JdJl- 
 it befor e it shou ld become a peril, to turn it back, as a 
 conflagration is stopped by backfiring. That Japan 
 should get a foothold upon the continent of Asia was 
 intolerable. The peace-treaty between China and 
 Japan should not be allowed to stand. So Germany 
 stepped in and, having persuaded France and Russia 
 to back her up, compelled Japan to cede back to China 
 the Liao-Tung peninsula and Port Arthur, in order to 
 preserve the "balance of power." Japan's interest in 
 
46 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 Port Arthur was at this time a political, not a colonial 
 one. It holds the key to Pekin, the hinterland of 
 Manchuria, and Korea, and her possession of it is a 
 great guarantee of safety for the Island Empire. More- 
 over, the peninsula is interposed, as it were, between 
 China and Korea and would pretty effectually block 
 off China from further interference in the latter coun- 
 try. Japan was very reluctant to give up the fruits of 
 her victory, but the depleted condition of her war-chest 
 and the mobilization of the navies of three powers left 
 her no recourse. A Japanese writer asserts that, "The 
 historical significance of this memorable incident de- 
 serves special emphasis. It is not too much to say that 
 with it Eastern Asiatic history radically changed its 
 character." * But in retroceding Port Arthur it ap- 
 parently did not occur to the Japanese to provide 
 against any other power getting hold of it. Perhaps 
 it would not have mattered anyway, since she was in 
 no position to enforce her demands. 
 
 The immediate effect of Japa n's victory was to stimu- 
 late European ..asFefession in the Orient! On the Teu- 
 
 tonic principle that "attack is the best defense" the 
 Powers hastened to intrench themselves before Japan 
 could be in a position to checkmate them. " Spheres of 
 influence" rapidly began to condense out of the nebula 
 ^ K. Asakawa, "Russo-Japanese Conflict." Boston, 1904. 
 
JAPAN COMES OF AGE 47 
 
 of Oriental politics, and for the next ten years it seemed 
 as if China was to cease to exist as a nation. 
 
 Russia assumed the role of a devoted friend of China 
 against the hated Japanese ; loaned her haK the money 
 (without security) to pay the indemnity and guaranteed 
 (in the secret "Cassini convention") to protect her 
 against her enemies. China was not ungrateful for this 
 help, and, in return, in 1898 "leased" to Russia for 
 99 years the same Port Arthur that Europe had forced 
 out of the hands of Japan. Port Arthur thus became 
 for Japan what Alsace-Lorraine has been for France for 
 forty years, and the first move of the Russo-Japanese 
 war-game was played. 
 
 There was something of a motive of self-protection 
 in Russia's action. The first aggressor was Germany, 
 and the leasing of Port Arthur was a sort of counter- 
 move. One of the finest harbors on China's coast is that 
 of Kiao Chau in the rich and populous district of Shan- 
 tung. Germany for some time had had her eye upon 
 this port, but it was not wise to attempt to gain a foot- 
 hold while Russia might object. For a few years 
 following the conclusion of the Chinese- Japanese war 
 Russia was very busy strengthening her "fences" in 
 Manchuria, and Germany saw her opportunity. For- 
 tunately two CathoHc priests were lynched November i, 
 1897, by a mob in Shantung. The governor of the 
 
48 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 province ordered an investigation at once and in three 
 weeks the ringleaders were caught. But it was too 
 late. Already the German warships were in Kiao Chau 
 harbor and German marines had seized the town. As 
 no diplomatic representations had been made to Pekin, 
 the Chinese authorities were left to infer that the seizure 
 was a punishment for the murders. Meanwhile Prince 
 Henry of Prussia had been sent by the Kaiser with a 
 squadron to proclaim the doctrine of the "mailed fist" 
 and to force the "lease" for 99 years of Kiao Chau. 
 Germany's justification for this action was expressed 
 by Herr von Biilow in the Reichstag April 27, 1898, 
 when he said: "Mention has been made of a partition 
 of China. Such a partition will not be brought about 
 by us at any rate. All we have done is to provide that, 
 come what may, we ourselves shall not go empty- 
 handed. The traveler cannot decide when the train is 
 to start, but he can make sure not to miss it when it 
 does start. The devil takes the hindmost." And in 
 Germany's contest with the devil, Herr von Biilow in- 
 tended that her place should be far from the rear.* 
 
 1 Close students of this phase of Germany's policy wiU note that von 
 Billow's Imperial Master did not take quite the same laissez-faire point 
 of view. In his famous speech at Bremen, to the troops departing for 
 China to participate in the quelling of the Boxer outbreak (July 27, igoo), 
 Kaiser WHhelm said : " The Chinese have overthrown the law of Nations ; 
 . . . preserve the old Prussian thoroughness ; show yourselves as Chris- 
 
JAPAN COMES OF AGE 49 
 
 Germany's action was immediately followed by 
 Russia's in Port Arthur, and a little later England 
 claimed equal privileges in Wei-hai-wei. Even Italy 
 spoke for a share, but was frowned upon by the others 
 for her presimiption. France had long since strongly 
 intrenched herself in Tonking on the south. England 
 and Germany both wanted the rich territories of the 
 Yangtse valley, and it is not unUkely that they might 
 have gone to war about it on some pretext or other by 
 this time if the Russo-Japanese war had not deflected 
 the trend of events. In short, the "break-up" of 
 China seemed very imminent. In this aggressive cam- 
 paign, which suggests a pack of jackals quarrehng over 
 the body of a dying ox, Japan was a disturbing element. 
 Actuated by no especially altruistic sentiments toward 
 China, she was nevertheless confronted by the prospect 
 of having her future markets preempted by hostile 
 powers and her own development checked. On the 
 other hand, the latter recognized in Japan, since her 
 
 tians in joyfully bearing your trials ; may honor and glory follow your 
 flags and weapons. You know very well that you are to fight against a 
 cunning, brave, well-armed, and terrible enemy. If you come to grips 
 with him, give no quarter, take no prisoners. Use your weapons in such 
 a way that for a thousand years no Chinese shall dare to look upon a 
 German askance. Show your manliness. The blessing of God be with 
 you. The prayers of an entire people and my wishes accompany you 
 every one. Open the door for culture once for all ! " [Official version 
 printed in the Reichsanzeiger, translated by Christian Gauss.] 
 E 
 
50 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 easy victory over China, the only considerable obstacle 
 to the success of their aggressive campaigns on the 
 continent. 
 
 One other event, a little later, strengthened the fears 
 of Europe and gave the Powers pause. This was the 
 notorious "Boxer "outbreak of 1900. The relief expe- 
 dition incident to the affair afforded another oppor- 
 tunity to show the world the proficiency of Japanese 
 arms. Ever since the conclusion of the war of 1895 a 
 seething current of anti-foreign propaganda had whirled 
 beneath the surface of things in China. A few foreigners 
 had seen the outbreak coming and had uttered warn- 
 ings, but they went unheeded. The seizure of terri- 
 tory on the part of the European powers at this time 
 was resented the more deeply because a national self- 
 consciousness was beginning to stir throughout the in- 
 choate Chinese Empire. Germany's activities were 
 particularly resented. Japan was an Oriental country, 
 and while the Chinese may have despised her they could 
 hardly resent her presence as a next-door neighbor. 
 Formosa was a prize of war and was not a part of the 
 sacred Empire anyway. Russia's activities were con- 
 fined to sparsely settled outlying districts. England 
 and France had been estabhshed so long that in a 
 measure the Chinese had grown accustomed to them. 
 But Germany's presence on Chinese soil was so un- 
 
JAPAN COMES OF AGE 51 
 
 called for, the excuse so flimsy, and her actions so 
 threatening that a very profound effect was produced. 
 
 Shantung, the province in which is located Kiao 
 Chau, is one of the oldest and the most densely popu- 
 lated of all China. It was the birthplace of Confucius 
 and is often referred to as the "sacred province." In 
 order to strengthen their grip on this province and their 
 control in the immediate hinterland of Kiao Chau, the 
 Germans began to construct a railway, the concession 
 for which was most unwillingly granted. Now any 
 long-settled district in China is one vast graveyard, and 
 nothing is so repugnant to the sensibilities and rehgion 
 of the Chinese as the desecration of the grave of an 
 ancestor. Granting that the Germans would not 
 wantonly affront the Chinese, yet to build such a 
 railroad without interfering with graves is a physical 
 impossibiHty, and it is certainly true that in construct- 
 ing the relatively short line now in operation, thousands 
 of graves were violated. This particular act (which 
 has been repeated to a greater or less degree whenever 
 railways have been built in the empire) did much to 
 inflame Chinese feeling. Again, the very great credulity 
 and superstition of the common people led them to 
 accept all sorts of wild tales regarding the hated for- 
 eigner. Distrust of the missionaries also contributed a 
 part to the general feeling, and economic influences 
 
52 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 likewise were not lacking, for the growth of foreign 
 trade and the introduction of Western manufactures in 
 many cases threatened to disturb the economic balance 
 of this very conservative people. 
 
 There has existed in China, for over a century, a secret 
 society (analogous let us say to our "Odd Fellows" or 
 "Knights of Pythias") called the / Ho Tuan and referred 
 to by foreigners as "Boxers." This society, half be- 
 nevolent, half mystical, and wholly patriotic, undertook 
 to clear their native land of the detested foreigners who 
 profaned it. The Boxer anti-foreign campaign rapidly 
 gained headway in Shantung and soon got quite out of 
 hand, for the Chinese soldiers sent to subdue them went 
 over to the Boxer side. 
 
 It would not be pertinent to devote space here to a 
 description of the startling and melodramatic crisis of 
 this agitation. The details of the siege of Pekin and 
 the rehef of the foreign legations by the troops of the 
 alHed powers will be found in any modern history of 
 China.^ But two aspects of this campaign of the for- 
 eign troops in North China deserve especial mention. 
 In the first place, the emergency was a very sudden 
 one in spite of the repeated warnings. America had 
 troops in the Philippines, and Japan was of course next 
 door. But the latter was disincKned to court criticism 
 * See especially "China in Convulsion," by A. H. Smith. 
 
JAPAN COMES OF AGE 53 
 
 by acting too precipitately, and as a matter of fact inter- 
 national jealousies played a conspicuous part in deter- 
 mining the relative proportion of troops each nation 
 should contribute to the expeditionary force dispatched 
 to Pekin. Russia was differently situated. The Trans- 
 Siberian railway was but just completed, and the 
 "Chinese-Eastern" branch, planned to exploit Man- 
 churia, ran for 1000 miles through a region sufl&ciently 
 wild and dangerous even under ordinary circumstances. 
 To guard this railway, and incidentally to get a firmer 
 grip on the three provinces, Russia at the first outbreak 
 of trouble began to pour in troops from Siberia. The 
 exact number will probably never be known, but it was 
 upward of 30,000. When the Boxer campaign was 
 ended and peace reigned once more in China, Russia 
 manifested a great reluctance to withdraw any troops 
 from Manchuria. To the protests of the Powers, she 
 answered by converting her army of occupation into 
 "railway guards." These guards were constantly being 
 shifted and, to the Japanese, the meaning of their 
 presence was only too clear. Russians began to employ 
 the present instead of the future tense in speaking of 
 Manchuria as Russian territory. 
 
 Thus was a second round in the Russo-Japanese game 
 played and the trick taken by Russia. The Boxer out- 
 break also tended to hasten the cUmax for another 
 
54 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 reason. The dispatch of the composite force up to 
 Pekin afforded a most interesting laboratory demon- 
 stration of the comparative eflSciency of the different 
 armies as they marched and fought side by side against 
 a common foe. In this, not only did the Japanese 
 troops stand comparison with any others in efficiency, 
 but in their conduct they shone above the majority. 
 The soldiery of Europe seemed bent upon justifying, 
 once and for aU, the Chinese designation of Westerners 
 as "foreign devils." Looting, rapine, murder and 
 devastation followed in their wake. After Pekin had 
 been entirely subdued, the inertia of destruction led 
 them into private "punitive expeditions" into various 
 parts of the country. In these, the Japanese (and the 
 Americans) took no part. The troops of both these 
 nations were under the complete control of their officers 
 and maintained the most perfect discipline. In bravery 
 and military efficiency the Japanese caused all the 
 Occidental experts to "take notice" and the diplomats 
 to think some long thoughts. If a handful of troops 
 showed themselves so efficient, what might the nation 
 under arms be like? If the West had madfe-4ts own 
 comparisons, had not the East done likewise(? Verily 
 this Oriental Carthage must be destroyed. Jap^ must 
 not be allowed to get so strong as to challenge the interests 
 of Europe in China. 
 
JAPAN COMES OF AGE 55 
 
 Thus the moves and countermoves on the diplomatic 
 chessboard grew more and more complex. It was no 
 longer the "Powers" against China and against one 
 another ; it was the Occident against the Orient. The 
 entrance of militant Japan into the game threatened 
 the success of the whole policy of aggression. In the 
 excited fancy of students of "welt-politik" whose knowl- 
 edge of the subject had not been gained at first hand, 
 and to whom all Orientals looked alike, Europe was 
 soon to be at the mercy of Asia, newly aroused to self- 
 consciousness, and possessed of the war tools of the 
 West. 
 
 Germany and France therefore had nothing to lose 
 by encouraging Russia to put down upstart Japan. 
 England saw a chance to profit herself by utihzing the 
 new militant power against her "hereditary foe" (des- 
 tined, in the inconsistency of politics, to be her ally in 
 1914), and concluded the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 
 1902. Japan thus found that the immediate effect of 
 her demonstration of military prowess was to make 
 herself both courted and feared. 
 
 By way of parenthesis let us note that the panicky 
 fear of a "Yellow Peril" rests upon a fallacy which has 
 only to be stated to be self-evident. This fallacy is the 
 assumption that a people can be both barbarous and 
 civilized at the same time. Ages ago, to be sure, Mon- 
 
S6 JAPAJSTESE EXPANSION 
 
 golian hordes overran Eastern Europe, but conditions 
 have changed since the times of Genghis Elhan. Mere 
 barbarians would stand no chance against the machine 
 guns and trained soldiery of a modern state. But it is 
 forgotten for the time being that for any people to 
 compete with a modern nation in war, that people must 
 be equally "civihzed." For military ability nowadays 
 demands not only the possession of modern arms, but 
 much more, the possession of a capacity for organiza- 
 tion, wealth, credit, a specialized commissariat, efficient 
 agencies for combating disease, etc. In pr oporti on, 
 therefore, as an Oriental people should evolve in ability 
 ,to compete in a military way with Europe, it would be 
 compelled at the same time to evolve in the accompany- 
 ing features of civiUzation, — to become, in other words, a 
 .civilized state. And when it should reach such a point, 
 it would be inhibited, ipso facto, from being the menace 
 to civilization it might have been, potentially, before 
 such an evolution began. For a member of the modem 
 family of nations has as little freedom of individual 
 action in comparison with a barbarian tribe as a man, 
 the member of a highly organized social community, 
 has in comparison with his brother of the jungle. This 
 does not mean of course that an armed Orient may not 
 in some future time challenge the supremacy of Europe 
 in war. Let us assume an analogous instance. It is 
 
JAPAN COMES OF AGE 57 
 
 conceivable, for example, that war may occur some day 
 between Germany and the United States. But it is 
 inconceivable that the peasantry of Germany, the shop- 
 keepers, bankers, students, and artisans, should simul- 
 taneously drop their several duties in the complex social 
 organization of that Empire, and in a frenzy of preda- 
 tory migration, swarm across the Atlantic to invade 
 America and attempt to replace our putative Anglo- 
 Saxon civiUzation with a Teutonic one. Assuming 
 that the Orient for centuries has been "unciviHzed" in 
 the Western sense (an assumption wholly gratmtous), 
 the Occident never need fear the sort of peril that Kaiser 
 Wilhelm so eloquently voiced. 
 
 Events moved fast in the- Oripnt during f tip ..first, fj?W- 
 
 y ears of < ^Tip v^-^^ ^ftn.tiiry japar. would only too, gladly 
 have dfil/iyprl the rlimfiT, biiL.s]i£JKaaiikeLJ, jma.i]i.-tied t o 
 a runawa]^_jyagQa,„ who jeither, Jja^_io_run__Wmself_ or_ 
 f^l_jjad— iia"-dFagged. Admiral Alexieff became the 
 Russian Viceroy of the Far East, and the Russian policy 
 became more aggressive, more domineering, more re- 
 gardless of outside opinion. Diplomatic intrigue, never 
 absent from Korea, fairly surcharged the atmosphere 
 of that unhappy peninsula. Not content with Port 
 Arthur, the Russians began to set the stage for the 
 acquisition of Masampho at Japan's very door. More 
 disquieting even, to Japan, was the ascendancy that 
 
S8 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 Russia was rapidly gaining over the Chinese oflScials at 
 Pekin. M. Pavloff, the Russian minister at Seoul, 
 professed the most supreme contempt for the Japanese 
 and all their works. In the face of all this, Japan was 
 not idle. She bent every energy in feverish haste to 
 prepare for the inevitable conflict. Every one in the 
 Far East knew that the shock would come, except, ap- 
 parently, the Russians. 
 
 When war broke, the Japanese quickly established 
 the command of the seas by practically annihilating the 
 Russian fleet. From their near-by base they swarmed 
 over Korea and into South Manchuria. Port Arthur 
 was besieged, and the Manchurian armies began to work 
 their way north along the line of the railway. Port 
 Arthur put up a stubborn resistance, and the Japanese 
 threw away many thousands of men in the assaults 
 upon the various forts that crowned the steep hiUs. 
 Eventually these fell, one by one, and Port Arthur for 
 a second time became the possession of Japan. Mean- 
 while the Japanese armies slowly pushed the Russians 
 back toward the Siberian frontier with longer battle 
 fronts and heavier losses than the world had hitherto 
 seen. But all the while the former were getting farther 
 from their home base and the Trans-Siberian railway 
 was responding better and better to the strain put upon 
 it, pouring in more Russian troops from the north. 
 
JAPAN COMES OF AGE 59 
 
 Japan's credit was strained to the utmost. In spite of 
 her apparently continuous victories, she began to find 
 herself in a precarious position. 
 
 The Far Eastern campaign, however, was very un- 
 popular in European Russia, and internal troubles began 
 to multiply at home which made the Russian situation 
 equally difficult. Consequently, when President Roose- 
 velt proposed a truce, both sides were glad to cease 
 fighting. 
 
 The people of Japan hailed this as a complete victory 
 for their arms and, naturally, it would have been im- 
 politic for their leaders to imdeceive them. They 
 looked for a great indemnity to recompense them for 
 the huge outlays and sacrifices they had made. But 
 the Japanese plenipotentiaries who came to Portsmouth 
 to arrange the terms of the treaty knew before they 
 started that they could expect no indemnity from an 
 enemy whose territory was not even touched by the 
 conflict. In the end, a fine was drawn at the point 
 (Changchun) where the armies had faced each other 
 at the conclusion of hostihties. This Mne practically 
 divided Manchuria into a northern half and a southern 
 half. South Manchuria thus became the "Sphere of 
 Influence " of Japan, while Port Arthur passed into her 
 hands as the successor of Russia to the "lease." An 
 intimate control was estabhshed over Korea, and a few 
 
6o JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 years later the unhappy kingdom was to find itself 
 annexed to Japan as an integral part of that Empire. 
 
 It must not be forgotten that it was Russia's troubles 
 at home that were largely responsible for her desire to 
 stop fighting, rather than the complete victory of Jap- 
 anese arms. But the masses of Japan did not know that, 
 and they gave voice to loud indignation when they 
 learned that there was to be no indemnity.' As feqose- 
 velt was identified in their minds with the stopping of 
 the war, they quite illogically but not unnaturally asso- 
 ciated America with the loss of their anticipated in- 
 demnity. 
 
 The attitude of the American people before and after 
 this conflict is an interesting study in mob psychology. 
 The mind of the American is rather emotional than 
 logical and his instinct is to favor the underdog. With 
 a mental picture of the relative sizes, on the map, of 
 Japan and Russia, and quite ignoring the comparative 
 efiiciencies of the two armies and navies, Americans were 
 almost unanimously and emphatically on the side of 
 Japan during the war. This state of mind was but 
 natural in the hght of past history, for the most amica- 
 ble of relations had existed between Japan and America, 
 while at the same time Russia had appealed to us as the 
 
 '■ A certain allowance was made Japan for the expense of keeping 
 Russian prisoners. 
 
JAPAN COMES OF AGE 6i 
 
 home of oppression and the antithesis of every ideal 
 that we most cherished. This pro- Japanese sentiment 
 was abundantly fostered by the fact that practically 
 aU the sources of pubUcity upon which American news- 
 papers depended were in the hands of Japan or her ally, 
 England. 
 
 Continental Europe could not look with equanimity 
 upon the accretion of power on the part of Japan or the 
 possible defeat of Russia by an Oriental country, and 
 realizing that our position facing the Pacific gave us a 
 peculiar interest in what was happening in East Asia, 
 Europeans were quite unable to comprehend our atti- 
 tude. This was because, as stated above, our point of 
 view, unlike that of Europe, was dictated, not by reason, 
 but by emotion. But it is dangerous to be the popular 
 idol of an emotional people. Hardly was the war over 
 when our enthusiasm began to cool, and, as is the way 
 with enthusiasts, we went to the opposite extreme. 
 
 There were several reasons for our change of mind, 
 and, as usual, we were again, as a people, the victim of 
 a press whose sources, if not tainted, were at least hardly 
 unprejudiced. 
 
 For one thing, Japan found herself in a difficult 
 position with regard to Korea and China, a position 
 that has not been without parallels in our own recent 
 history. 
 
62 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 When the cast of the die fovmd us in 1898 in posses- 
 sion of the Phihppines, official Washington was non- 
 plused by the problem of what we should do with 
 them. In the beginning, President McKinley did not 
 favor retaining the islands. But when the commis- 
 sioners appointed to negotiate the peace treaty finally 
 received their instructions, the President wrote : "With- 
 out any original thought of complete or partial acquisi- 
 tion, the presence and success of our armies at Manila 
 impose upon us obligations which we cannot disregard. 
 The march of events rules and overrules human action." 
 So the Commissioners were directed to demand the 
 cession of the island of Luzon. 
 
 But the imperialistic spirit of the American people 
 had been kindled and there arose differences of opin- 
 ion among the Commissioners themselves. President 
 McKinley, never unresponsive to the pressure of pubHc 
 opinion, finally changed his mind and cabled the United 
 States Commissioners to demand the cession of the entire 
 archipelago. This was done, and the islands became our 
 "property" against the vehement protests of the Spanish 
 Commissioners, who were put in "the painful strait of 
 submitting to the law of the victor." The sincerity of 
 their protests need not concern us. The fact remains 
 that in a brief space of time we found it expedient to 
 act quite differently from our announced intentions. 
 
JAPAN COMES OF AGE 63 
 
 It is rather absurd, though not at all unnatural, that 
 we should blandly forget all this and take umbrage at 
 Japan only a few years later, when she revised her policy 
 in a somewhat similar manner. During the six months 
 preceding the Russo-Japanese war the diplomatic com- 
 mimications that were constantly exchanged between 
 the two nations never failed to assert and reassert that 
 the "integrity and independence of Korea" (and on 
 Japan's side of Manchuria as well) was the one thing 
 sought and cherished above all others. In the Japanese 
 Imperial rescript declaring war upon Russia (after hos- 
 tilities had begun) occur the words : " The integrity of 
 Korea has long been a matter of gravest concern to our 
 Empire, not only because of the traditional relations 
 between the two countries, but because the separate 
 existence of Korea is essential to the safety of our 
 Empire." More than this, the Japanese government 
 went out of its way to assure the world of its good inten- 
 tions regarding Korea, in the Korean-Japanese Protocol,^ 
 in which Japan pledged herseK to guarantee "for all 
 time the independence and territorial integrity of the 
 Korean Empire " and the " safety and repose of the 
 Imperial House of Korea." 
 
 In spite of all this, only five years after the cessation 
 of hostilities, Korea found itself annexed as a part of 
 
 ' Feb. 27, 1904. 
 
64 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 the Japanese Empire, and her country " administered " 
 by Japanese of&cials in a way that left no doubt in the 
 minds of Koreans and foreigners as to the meaning of 
 the situation. So soon did Japan find her announced 
 intentions "overruled" by the "march of events." 
 ~ To enter upon a discussion of the rights and wrongs 
 of this change of attitude is not the writer's purpose. 
 The Japanese have, of course, justified their actions as we 
 did ours in the matter of the Philippines. Their neces- 
 sity, however, coincided in time with the natural re- 
 action in America from our excessively pro- Japanese 
 feeling described above, and we began to suspect the 
 motives of the Oriental Empire more than we otherwise 
 should have done. But not only did the press and 
 the public revise their opinions suddenly and decidedly. 
 Almost at the same time the State Department began 
 to show a quite different countenance toward America's 
 former protege. 
 
 With the advent of William H. Taft to the Presi- 
 dential chair came Philander Q. Knox as Secretary of 
 State to the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Knox 
 was a corporation lawyer whose relations with "Big 
 Business " were intimate, and his influence was soon felt 
 in the Far East. When the Russians evacuated Man- 
 churia after the occupation of 1900, one of the conditions 
 arranged for with China was the opening of three ports 
 
JAPAN COMES OF AGE 65 
 
 to trade. To these three new treaty ports the United 
 States promptly appointed consuls, and American trade 
 began to make a showing. The apparent importance of 
 our trade was due to the general lack of trade credited 
 to other nations rather than to the great amount of it 
 in itself. The American Tobacco Company, ousted from 
 Japan, sought to create a market in Manchuria, with the 
 Japanese government as its only competitor. The 
 Standard Oil Company began to build up a profitable 
 trade. We have done a good business in high-grade 
 sheetings. But there has never been much in the way 
 of general and varied imports, and of the importance of 
 Manchurian trade with America there has been a great 
 deal of misstatement and exaggeration in the news- 
 papers and the speeches of politicians. 
 
 After the fighting had ceased, but before the Japanese 
 troops had evacuated South Manchuria, and while 
 foreigners of other nationalities were strictly debarred 
 from the province, Japanese traders swarmed over the 
 country and, backed by the government, with its sys- 
 tems of drawbacks and rebates, the important Japanese 
 commercial houses, such as the Mitsui family, estab- 
 lished a firm foothold. 
 
 The American firms that had laid the foundation for 
 a profitable business saw their prospects dwindling and 
 began to bring pressure upon the State Department. 
 
66 JAPAJSIESE EXPANSION 
 
 The Japanese, while protesting their adherence to the 
 doctrine of conserving the independence and integrity 
 of Manchuria and Korea, had been equally prompt in 
 promising to retain the "Open Door," into which Sec- 
 retary Hay had thrust a foot at the beginning of the war. 
 But the "march of events" seemed indeed to give good 
 reason to beheve that there was as Uttle likeUhood of 
 the maintenance of the "Open Door" in Manchuria as 
 there was of its " integrity." 
 
 Theoretically Manchuria is still a Chinese province. 
 In the north, Americans not long ago established their 
 status with reference to the Russians by refusing to 
 deliver their passports to the Russian police for refer- 
 ence, as one is required to do in Russia. In other words, 
 they claimed to be foreigners, not in Russian, but in 
 Chinese territory. In theory, the same thing holds 
 south of Chang Chung. As a matter of fact. South 
 Manchuria is to-day Japanese territory in a much more 
 intimate way than Canada is British. There is nothing 
 in the pompous phrases of the various state papers to 
 indicate this, however. Nor is the status ofl&cially 
 accepted by China. 
 
 In 1907 Japan came to a full understanding with 
 Russia regarding their mutual interests in Manchuria, 
 and in an agreement signed July 17, the two powers 
 mutually engaged to maintain the status quo. 
 
JAPAN COMES OF AGE 67 
 
 The heart of the Japanese control is the railroad. 
 Without the South Manchurian Railroad, Japan's 
 occupation of Manchuria would amount to but Uttle. 
 Keenly reaUzing this, Japan, early in the game, secured 
 from China the treaty by which the latter forswears 
 any project of paralleling the line or of estabhshing a 
 rival. 
 
 Many and detailed were the complaints that arose 
 from Americans concerning the alleged violations of the 
 "Open Door" agreement on the part of Japan. Finally 
 Mr. Knox stepped in. With a blandness almost 
 Chinese, in assumed innocence of anything but the 
 assured intentions of Japan to carry out her pledges, 
 Mr. Knox proposed an easy way to guarantee to 
 China the integrity of her Manchurian provinces. 
 This was to neutralize the South Manchurian Railway, 
 and to loan China $100,000,000 with which to buy it 
 back. The money was to be raised by a Joint loan to 
 be participated in by the various powers. 
 
 The proposal was received with bewildered astonish- 
 ment, dismay, and indignation in Japan. When they 
 had caught their breath, the Japanese protested that the 
 war had cost them ten times one himdred miUions, to 
 say nothing of 130,000 human Uves; that they alone 
 had prevented Russia from occup)dng Manchuria to 
 the exclusion of every other interest, and that China 
 
68 JAPAKESE EXPANSION 
 
 had been helpless to protect herself. Did any one 
 imagine that the clock could be put back to the period 
 before the war and have things again just as they were ? 
 
 Very well, Mr. Knox had something in his other hand. 
 This alternative proposal was to build a railway from 
 Kin-chau to Aigun on the Amur River, — a line parallel- 
 ing the South Manchurian Railway. Such a line, 
 China was inhibited from building by the terms of her 
 post-bellum agreement with Japan. The scheme was 
 to be financed by the cooperation of the English firm of 
 PauUngs and an American group consisting of J. P. 
 Morgan and Co., Kuhn Loeb and Co., The First Na- 
 tional Bank of New York, and the National City Bank. 
 On the assumption that Manchuria was still Chinese 
 territory, of course no other country than China could 
 offer vaHd objection to such a concession nor could any 
 other nation offer objection except to China. 
 
 This proposal amounted to a forcing of Japan's hand, 
 and put her statesmen ia a quandary. But in the end 
 her face was saved by the British bankers dropping out 
 of the agreement. Whether this action was due to 
 pressure brought to bear by the British government at 
 the instigation of her Oriental ally, Japan, has not been 
 made public, of course, but one may surmise as much. 
 The American bankers did not care to undertake the 
 project alone and the matter was dropped. 
 
JAPAN COMES OF AGE 69 
 
 The net result of Mr. Knox's Japanese policy was 
 nil from the standpoint of either diplomacy or of prac- 
 tical achievement. An old guide to chess-playing used 
 to have the rule, "Avoid useless checks." Mr. Knox's 
 proposals seem very much like useless checks. He could 
 hardly have anticipated a successful outcome to his 
 neutralization scheme. And if his idea was to " show 
 up " Japan to the world, it is hard to see what diplo- 
 matic advantage could lie in so doing. 
 
 Of course, if, as would have been the case with Russia 
 or Germany or England, these Manchurian maneuvers 
 had been merely the first move in a game in which they 
 should be followed up by a display or use of force ; if, 
 in other words, it had been the intention, the soberly 
 decided policy of the United States to become a partic- 
 ipant in Oriental politics, as European powers are par- 
 ticipants, then there would have been an explicable 
 motive in the Amerieaff action. But a democratic 
 government like our own cannot undertake poUcies 
 that are not supported by public opinion, and certainly 
 public opinion in this country would never tolerate the 
 use of the military arm of the nation to back up its 
 aggressive commercial diplomacy. Without this ip-tdn- 
 ^tioiijvlr. Knox's attempt was meaningless^,,,----'^ 
 
 But this""3oes-not- mean tbat-hrs"proposals were un- 
 important. On the contrary, their effect upon Ameri- 
 
70 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 can-Japanese relations has been most profound and 
 permanent. They mark the e nd of the "elder brothe r" 
 period. There still remain many thousands of the older 
 generation in both countries who cannot forget the 
 amicable relations that used to exist, or the attitude of 
 disinterested helpfulness of American ofi&cials toward 
 Japan, that meant so much to the latter in her early 
 struggles for a place in the Eastern sun. But fro m now 
 jon, America an d Tapan. a s nations, can never a^ain be 
 on .th£„sam e old footing.. Each will always suspect the 
 other's motives. Perhaps the situation could not have 
 been avoided sooner or later. Both peoples merely 
 have emerged from a period of national adolescence, 
 with its natural enthusiasms, into maturity, with its 
 cold practicaUty and its own selfish interests. Yet good 
 feeling between ahen peoples is a valuable poUtical asset, 
 and Mr. Knox's activities have done a p ood deal to 
 destroy the former American- Japanese frie ndship with- 
 out gaining any corresponding advantage. 
 
 One immediate effect of the ABsal^Sr proposals was 
 to throw the two erstwhile combatants into each other's 
 arms. A little over five months after Japan had de- 
 clined the neutralization proposal, she concluded (July 
 4, 1 910) an agreement with Russia to maintain the 
 status quo in Manchuria. The next year, however, 
 Russia began to extend her boundaries in the Sea of 
 
JAPAN COMES OF AGE 71 
 
 Okhotsk, and Japan replied by dispatching cruisers 
 thither. Russia offered to arbitrate the matter at 
 The Hague, but Japan in turn proposed to concede 
 the Russian demands if she could get as a quid 
 pro quo the full recognition of her own claims in 
 Manchuria. Russia consenting, the two powers, in a 
 new understanding executed in 191 2, agreed to defend 
 jointly their interests in that province. 
 
 Summary 
 
 The history of Japan's foreign relations during the 
 second half of the nineteenth century is mainly that of a 
 struggle for national autonomy, particularly in regard 
 to the control of aUens in her own dominions (extra- 
 territoriaKty) and the right to adjust her own tariffs. 
 These rights the Western nations refused to concede to 
 Japan until she had demonstrated her military prowess 
 in the war with China (1894-5). During this period 
 the "personal" relations between Japan and America 
 were intimate and cordial. America was in the 
 lead in granting to Japan her national rights and in 
 helping her upon her feet. For this reason, Japanese 
 learned to look upon the United States with especial 
 friendliness. 
 
 Following the Chinese war, in which the Japanese 
 were overwhelmingly victorious, Europe began to fear 
 
72 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 for the success of the aggressive projects that the va- 
 rious "Powers" had undertaken in China, which looked 
 to the ultimate partition of that country. The rise of 
 Japan was viewed with misgivings. As a consequence, 
 the European powers, especially Germany, Russia, and 
 England, hastened to intrench themselves firmly before 
 Japan should be strong enough to checkmate them. 
 The direct result of this activity, particularly that of 
 Germany in Shantung, brought on the "Boxer out- 
 break" in 1900, in the quelUng of which Japan showed 
 herself to be on a par with any other country in modern 
 warfare. 
 
 The Boxer trouble gave Russia a chance to establish 
 herself in Manchuria and to gain a preponderant in- 
 fluence in Korea and even in Pekin. The impossibihty 
 of Japan and Russia coming to an understanding with 
 regard to their mutual interests in continental Asia and 
 the arrogant attitude of the Russian officials, who de- 
 pended upon bluff and were convinced that Japan 
 would not fight, led finally in 1904 to the war between 
 the two countries. The earlier victories in this war 
 were all on the side of Japan, particularly on the sea, 
 but it is doubtful what the final outcome might have 
 been. Internal troubles in Europe led Russia to accept 
 President Roosevelt's offer of mediation, and the con- 
 flict ceased with neither side really victorious. The loss 
 
JAPAN COMES OF AGE 73 
 
 of an expected indemnity led to ill feeling toward 
 America on the part of the Japanese populace. 
 
 In order to gain what advantage she could, Japan 
 hastened to root herself securely in Manchuria and 
 annexed Korea. This was contrary to her announced 
 intentions and aroused the suspicion of Americans and 
 the antipathy of the United States State Department, 
 under the temporary influence of " Big Business." As a 
 result, impossible proposals were made to Japan by 
 America which have been the cause of ill feehng and 
 suspicion toward us, where only friendly feehngs pre- 
 viously existed. On the other hand, the activities of 
 Japan on the Continent, which she has felt were neces- 
 sary for her own protection and future, have done much 
 to dissipate our previously extra-friendly attitude toward 
 her. As a consequence, the end of the first haK century 
 of American- Japanese intercourse finds both nations on 
 the point of abandoning the standpoint of international 
 amity that has been so characteristic of their relations 
 in the past. 
 
 The feeUng of gradual estrangement has been accom- 
 panied in America by the fear that the rise of a strong 
 militant power in East Asia may have in it elements of 
 danger to our own commercial policies and aspirations. 
 Particularly since the Spanish war our possession of 
 the PhiHppines renders us peculiarly vulnerable to at- 
 
74 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 tack in the event of an international controversy aris- 
 ing, and compels us to look toward Japan from a very 
 different point of view than we should have had if a 
 whimsical fate had not bequeathed us an Oriental 
 problem of our own. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 ATVTERICA, JAPAN, AND THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 The "Philippine Problem" occupies a large share of 
 public attention at present, and rightly so, for few situa- 
 tions that we have ever been called upon to face have 
 demanded so much far-seeing statesmanship or have so 
 put to the test our national honor and responsibility, 
 concerning which we have such a good opinion. The 
 ultimate solution of this problem will have most signifi- 
 cant consequences for the future not only of the Philip- 
 pines but of the United States as well. For with it is 
 bound up the portentous "Problem of the Pacific," 
 which is the occasion of much high-sounding and alarm- 
 ing oratory, in Congress and out. 
 
 In the latter connection, Japan of course comes in for 
 much attention, and without doubt, in the event of a 
 war with Japan, it would make a great deal of difference 
 to America whether we retain our sovereignty over the 
 Islands or not, and if so, to what extent. 
 
 It is not my intention to discuss the pros and cons of 
 the Phihppine question with regard to our relations 
 with the Islands present and future, nor the question of 
 
 75 
 
76 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 their independence ; rather I shall confine myself solely 
 
 to such topics as have a bearing on American- Japanese 
 
 relations. 
 
 How We Got the Islands 
 
 The Spanish- American war of 1898 is one of the most 
 significant milestones in our national history, not so 
 much because of the importance of that conflict in itself 
 as because it opened the eyes of Americans to their 
 place in the world. Previously, we as a people had 
 been so preoccupied with home affairs that we had 
 become provincial. The Spanish war with its unex- 
 pected consequences shook us out of this attitude, once 
 for all, and brought us face to face with world move- 
 ments and world problems. 
 
 The most unforeseen consequence of the war to the 
 American people, as a whole, was the acquisition of the 
 Philippines. To nearly every one, previous to 1898, 
 the name was without meaning ; we hardly knew of the 
 existence of the islands or of the fact that Spain had 
 colonies in the Pacific.^ Of course the State and Navy 
 Departments were fully informed regarding the archi- 
 pelago, but when Admiral Dewey was sent with his 
 
 ^ Dean C. Worcester, one of the leading authorities on the Philippines 
 and their problems, relates that after his return to America as a member 
 of the first Philippine Commission a good old lady at his Vermont birth- 
 place asked him : "Deanie, are them Philippians you have been a visitin' 
 the people that Paul wrote the Epistle to?" , 
 
AMERICA, JAPAN, AND THE PHILIPPINES 77 
 
 squadron to seek the Spanish fleet in Manila harbor, 
 there was no other intention in his or any one's else 
 mind than that of attacking an enemy wherever he 
 might be exposed to attack. Yet there had not been 
 lacking far-sighted students of world-poUtics even 
 among the Filipinos (J. RLzal) who had foreseen the 
 western expansion of the United States, foreshadowed 
 in the occupation of Hawaii and Samoa * and had pre- 
 dicted that the Islands would some day come under the 
 sway of America. 
 
 The Spanish in their control of the PhiUppines had 
 pursued the same policy that they did in the two Ameri- 
 cas ; that is, they had exploited the country entirely for 
 the benefit of the privileged classes at home, incidentally 
 extending the benefits of the church to the "heathen." 
 Paternal and benign in the beginning, by the end of the 
 eighteenth century this control had developed in many 
 respects into a downright tyranny. 
 
 As a consequence, before the war, there had been 
 fomenting an active opposition to the rule of Spain on 
 the part of some of the Christian races of the Philip- 
 pines, which was on the point of bursting into open 
 rebellion, when the coming of Dewey and the collapse 
 of Spanish authority changed the whole situation. 
 
 During the progress of the peace negotiations, as 
 * See LeRoy, "The Americans in the Philippines," I. 
 
78 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 already described, the idea of retaining the whole archi- 
 pelago possessed the American people. The Spanish 
 Commissioners hoped to the last for European inter- 
 vention and purposely protracted the discussion. More- 
 over, they protested that to relinquish both the Philip- 
 pines and the West Indian Islands, while at the same 
 time retaining the debt of the latter, would precipitate 
 a crisis in Spain and force a resumption of the war, 
 suicidal as such a course would be. Such an outcome 
 was not without danger to America on account of the 
 possibilities of European intervention. One power, 
 Germany, was apparently not averse to such interven- 
 tion. It was discovered, unofl&cially, that Spain would 
 not be insulted at the offer of a cash compensation, and 
 the feeling on the part of the Americans was that such 
 a payment would be much less than the cost of resuming 
 war. Twenty million dollars was agreed upon finally 
 as the price for the transference of the whole Philippine 
 group to the United States. Of course all that we had 
 reaUy captured by arms was Manila and its environs, 
 and in the other islands were many thousands of Moros, 
 Igorrotes, and other races who did not discover till some 
 time afterwards that there had been a war or that they 
 had been "sold." They would indeed have resented 
 the idea that they had ever been "owned " by Spain or 
 anyone else. 
 
AMERICA, JAPAN, AND THE PHILIPPINES 79 
 
 As we look at these peace negotiations across the 
 space of eighteen years, it is evident that the Spanish 
 nobles were more than a match for the Yankees in 
 driving a good bargain. And the Spanish cartoons 
 current in 1898, picturing Uncle Sam as a pork-butcher 
 obsessed by the worship of the dollar, acquire a quite 
 unintentional slant of himaor. 
 
 The imf oreseen dropping into our laps of a rich colony 
 that many nations would have fought to obtain not 
 xmnaturaUy stirred the imperialistic spirit of the Ameri- 
 can people. There has always been a minority in the 
 United States, however, who looked into the future, and 
 foreseeing the complications that must inevitably f oUow 
 the participation of America in Oriental pohtics, behev- 
 ing that the retention of the islands will unquestion- 
 ably involve such participation, and failing to discover 
 enough profit in the possession of them to justify the 
 danger involved in keeping them, have opposed the 
 whole Philippine program. 
 
 These "anti-imperialists" found their hands 
 strengthened by the Filipinos themselves. (Perhaps 
 it would be truer to state it the other way roimd.) 
 Before the American occupation, insurrection was well 
 under way and the leader of the insurrectos, Aguinaldo, 
 strove to get as much credit out of the fall of Spanish 
 rule as possible. The Christian Filipino appears to 
 
8o JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 have many of the attributes of the Latin-American. 
 In both cases, perhaps, this is a heritage from Spain. 
 Like the Spanish-American, he is much given to ora- 
 tory, to intrigue and personal politics. If America had 
 not so unexpectedly stepped in in 1898, it is not at all 
 unlikely that within a few years conditions, in some of 
 the islands, at least, would be comparable to those in 
 Mexico to-day, inviting intervention, possibly by Ger- 
 many, possibly by Japan, and annexation to some other 
 country. 
 
 The Filipino protested violently against being sold 
 or traded as a chattel, and it cannot be gainsaid that the 
 transfer for a money consideration of an alien land and 
 its inhabitants from any country to the United States 
 would have worried the signers of the Declaration of 
 Independence or the American statesmen of the '6o's. 
 It is hard to say how sincere the Filipino agitators were. 
 It is much more certain that the American occupation 
 deprived them of their chance to shine as saviors of 
 their country from the yoke of Spain. 
 
 At any rate, supported by the discontented element 
 in the Islands and the anti-imperiaUsts in America, 
 armed resistance was offered to the Americans after the 
 transfer had been effected, and for three years our sol- 
 diers fought an inglorious guerilla war with the Filipinos. 
 In the end the Islands were pacified. The whole situa- 
 
AMERICA, JAPAN, AND THE PHILIPPINES 8i 
 
 tion has been complicated by the lack of any permanent 
 policy on the part of the American Congress toward the 
 Islands and their people. 
 
 It is repugnant to the ideals of the people of this 
 coimtry to hold subject any nation against its will. 
 The practice of exploiting a weaker race for the benefit 
 of the strong is equally obnoxious. The fallacy of one 
 nation "owning" another or profiting by such owner- 
 ship is pretty well understood here too. Altogether 
 
 the re is a very general consensus of opinion that so long 
 as we remain inthe Phihppines we shall do so foFthe 
 good of the Filipinos, not for our own profit. Such a 
 policy has not always been followed by other colony- 
 owning nations. Wholly altruistic at first sight, in the 
 long run, if successful, it will bear practical fruits. For 
 the establishment of an independent nation across the 
 seas, educated by American methods, with American 
 ideals and every reason for friendliness toward the 
 nation that has given them their chance, cannot help 
 but redound to the commercial advantage of the coun- 
 try which has played the part of a foster parent. 
 
 But apart from this consideration we feel that it is 
 our duty to lend every aid possible to a weaker people 
 that chance has thrown upon our hands, and with char- 
 acteristic thoroughness we have gone ahead. The his- 
 tory of the introduction of American schools and school 
 
82 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 teachers in the Islands is too well known to need repeat- 
 ing. The education has been practical in the extreme. 
 The Fihgino has learned the dign ity of labor and th e 
 means of making a Uving. Most striking of all has been 
 the success of the tactful American administrators 
 among the wild Mohammedans or the heathen tribes of 
 the hills. For the first time in ages peace reigns in 
 districts where heretofore head hunting has been the 
 only occupation. And the benefits of peace are begin- 
 ning to be felt. Among all the many tribes of various 
 origins and characteristics American schools have been 
 established. One effect is becoming obvious. Hereto- 
 fore no community of interest was possible where the 
 population was spUt up into scores of groups, speaking 
 different dialects. Now a common language, English, is 
 beginning to effect a solidarity preAnousIy~nbif^eHfetent. 
 Such a result would have been absolutely impossible if 
 exploitation of the people had been the motive of the 
 Americans. It would disappear as by magic should a 
 policy of exploitation be inaugurated. In the opinion 
 of Mr. Worcester, expressed before the Senate Com- 
 mittee, considering the recent Philippine biU : "There is 
 a great deal more EngKsh spoken in the Philippines 
 to-day, after a decade and a half of American rule, than 
 there was Spanish spoken after something more than 
 three centuries of Spanish rule." 
 
AMERICA, JAPAN, AND THE PHILIPPINES 83 
 
 The American is not given, temperamentally, to 
 counting pennies. Nowhere else in the world are chari- 
 ties so lavish. Altruism costs money, and we expect to 
 pay for the luxury. But the cost of the Philippine 
 enterprise has daimted even the American. It has re- 
 peatedly been stated in Congress that we have expended 
 over a billion dollars in the Islands since our occupancy 
 there. This again has been vehemently denied.^ 
 
 Hardly any two authorities agree on the cost of re- 
 taining the Philippines. We may believe, however, that 
 it is a sufl&ciently large sum. At any rate it approaches 
 $10,000,000 per year for the direct expense of the army 
 during a decade of more profound peace than the archi- 
 pelago has ever known before. The House Committee 
 
 ' Perhaps as dependable a statement as may be found is the one filed with 
 the Senate Committee on the Philippines by Brigadier General Mclntyre, 
 Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs. This statement covers the years 
 1903 to 1914 inclusive, and therefore does not include the $20,000,000 
 paid Spain in the beginning, nor the cost of putting down the insurrection. 
 
 Quartermaster Corps $98,063,695.03 
 
 Medical Department 360,553.35 
 
 Engineering Department 7,574,946.84 
 
 Ordnance Department 7,r74,i7o.2S 
 
 Signal Service 538,006.35 
 
 Coast and Geodetic Survey 1,947,379.82 
 
 Congressional Relief Fund 3,000,000.00 
 
 Philippine Census 35i,9^5-5o 
 
 Total $119,010,677.14 
 
 Yearly average (War Department), $9,475,947.65. These maybe 
 taken as the ultra-conservative rock-bottom figures. 
 
84 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 in charge of the subject reported in 191 2 that the United 
 States government expends directly and indirectly ap- 
 proximately $50,000,000 annually on the Islands. 
 
 The People of the Philippines 
 
 The "civilized" peoples of the Islands, exclusive of 
 whites, number about 7,000,000, distributed among eight 
 groups. Of these, the most numerous are the Visayans 
 and the most cultured are the Tagalogs. All are Ma- 
 layan in origin, although, in places, Chinese and other 
 strains have intermingled. Successive waves of oversea 
 migration appear to have struck the various islands. 
 Each new wave seems to have defeated and driven back 
 the inhabitants of the coast to the mountains of the 
 interior and to have replaced them. An extraordinary 
 diversity of tribes and dialects has thus resulted. Some 
 of the islands are very densely populated, Cebu, for in- 
 stance, having a population of 337 to every square mile, 
 but Httle less than that of Great Britain. 
 
 The islands were discovered by Magellan in 1521. 
 In 1564 one Miguil de Legaspi was sent to be governor 
 of the Philippines for life. He proceeded forthwith not 
 only to pacify, but to Christianize the people and met 
 with extraordinary success, except among those tribes 
 that had already embraced Mohammedanism (the 
 present-day Moros) or were too remote to reach. So 
 
AMERICA, JAPAN, AND THE PHILIPPINES 85 
 
 thoroughly Christianized did the northern peoples be- 
 come that in 1677 the Fihpinos themselves sent out 
 missionaries to Siam, China, and Japan to convert the 
 heathen in those lands. But the Japanese were httle 
 amenable to this process and tortured and killed the 
 missionaries. The Fihpinos thereupon canonized the 
 martyrs and enshrined their memories in popular his- 
 tory. Their attitude toward non-CathoHcs being pre- 
 cisely that of the Spanish or of the inhabitants of Latin 
 America, it has resulted that the Japanese are held in 
 popular estimation, even now, to be little better than 
 barbarians, an opinion that is not shared at aU by the 
 better-informed and more open-minded people of North 
 America and Northern Europe. 
 
 This attitude of the Fihpinos toward the Japanese is 
 an important factor to keep in mind in the present dis- 
 cussion. At various times in the past, the proposition 
 has been made that if the Phihppines are a burden to 
 the United States, the latter might sell them to some 
 other country with a greater itch for territory and 
 fewer scruples. England, Germany, and Japan were 
 suggested. The rumor was revived on two occasions 
 when ex-President Taft visited Japan. In both cases 
 it was reported that the Fihpinos were aroused to a 
 frenzy of indignation at the idea of being "sold," par- 
 ticularly to "pagan Japan." It is needless to say that 
 
\ 
 
 86 JAPANESE EXPAJSTSION 
 
 there never was any oflScial basis for such an idea, but 
 it is interesting to discover the reaction of the Filipinos 
 toward it. 
 
 The Chinese are much more numerous in the archi- 
 pelago than the Japanese, and to some extent have 
 intermarried with the Filipinos. Practically the entire 
 retail business of the Islands is in their hands, as 
 well as the greater part of the money. They have 
 been characterized as the "Jews of the Orient," and 
 the average Catholic Filipino has the same economic 
 background for his dislike of them that the Catholic 
 European has. 
 
 On the whole, although the Filipino is a Malay, his 
 racial antipathies are against the Oriental and his racial 
 sympathies are with the European. 
 
 The "non-Christian" Filipinos (including the wholly 
 savage Nigritos, the semi-civilized pagan Igorrotes, and 
 the Moslem Moros) are much less numerous, perhaps 
 because of their persistent activity in head hunting. 
 The Moros, moreover, have a very definite object in 
 kilKng non-Mohammedans, at once the most pleasing 
 and effective way of securing a safe passage to the Mos- 
 lem paradise. The opinion has been expressed that had 
 Legaspi not come three and a half centuries ago, the 
 active Moros might have "Moslemized" the whole 
 archipelago by now. These internecine and anti- 
 
AMERICA, JAPAN, AND THE PHILIPPINES 87 
 
 Christian feuds are at present stilled by the omni- 
 presence of the American rule. Should it be removed 
 now, without question they would break out anew. 
 
 The Resources of the Philippines 
 
 The tropics are the regions of the earth in which 
 Nature has been most lavish in her gifts to man. Rub- 
 ber, coffee, cocoa, dyestuffs and drugs, gums, sugar, 
 teak, mahogany and other precious woods, jute and 
 hemp, tea, tobacco, and many valued fruits, — these are 
 exclusively or in large part tropical products. The use 
 of them on the part of the inhabitants of temperate 
 climates is constantly increasing."^ The interest of 
 Europe and temperate America in the tropics is there- 
 fore weU founded. And of all tropical countries, the 
 Philippines appear to offer the greatest diversity of 
 riches coupled with a greater accessibility than is the 
 case with any other except the Dutch Indies. 
 
 The archipelago is in many places very wild and 
 mountainous and its mineral wealth is to a great extent 
 still undiscovered. Yet copper, gold, lead, petroleum, 
 zinc, mercury, antimony, platinum, and iron have been 
 found in quantity, and some day the mineral resources 
 of the Islands will be a conspicuous item in their natural 
 wealth. That day, however, must wait upon the invest- 
 
 ' See Benjamin Kidd, "The Control of the Tropics." 1898. 
 
88 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 ment of large amounts of capital, and capital will wait 
 upon the permanent establishment of stable conditions. 
 An exception must be made in the case of coal. In 
 some of the islands, notably Batan and Pollilo, enormous 
 beds of excellent coal are found. In the former field, 
 government engineers have estimated that there are 
 76,000,000 tons in sight. Nevertheless these sources 
 are practically unworked, and nearly all the coal used in 
 the islands is imported from Japan, with a small propor- 
 tion from AustraUa. 
 
 Yet it is in its agricultural wealth that the Philippine 
 archipelago is most noteworthy, for the growing season 
 is twelve months of the year and there is really no limit 
 to Nature's supplies of this sort. No less than 665 
 different kinds of hardwoods are found. Some of these 
 are of rare and exquisite beauty when finished, and the 
 Filipinos are being taught in the American trade schools 
 to make high-grade furniture that compares with any 
 produced in Europe or America. 
 
 The chief export and most valuable product is hemp, 
 which is the finest in the world for cordage, and because 
 of its superiority enjoys almost a monopoly in the 
 market. Much of this comes to America and a great 
 deal used to go to Europe. It constitutes likewise the 
 most important item of export to Japan, where it is 
 manufactured into hats. Hemp requires a "steaming 
 
AMERICA, JAPAN, AND THE PHILIPPINES 89 
 
 climate," and a great deal of it comes from the wild 
 Moro province of Mindanao. 
 
 Next to hemp in importance is copra, the dried fruit 
 of the cocoanut, which, before the great war, found its 
 market chiefly in Marseilles and Hamburg. The aver- 
 age annual export of copra is 115,000 tons, valued at 
 about $11,000,000. 
 
 Another valuable agricultural product is sugar, which, 
 however, is of low quality and finds most of its market 
 in China. Sugar-cane growing is attended with more 
 risk and demands more capital than almost any other 
 industry now exploited in the Philippines. Locusts, 
 droughts, and typhoons have proved heavy handicaps, 
 and the large concerns that have recently invested 
 heavily in sugar production have not as yet succeeded 
 in making a striking profit. 
 
 Tobacco is a product that in the minds of Americans 
 is associated with the Philippines more than any other. 
 Tobacco growing and curing was greatly stimulated by 
 the Spanish. Great quantities are consumed by the 
 Filipinos themselves, and tobacco forms but 4 or 5 
 per cent of the total export. 
 
 Rubber is a development of the future. In addition 
 to the rubber and gutta-percha trees, there are several 
 wild vines that carry a high percentage of rubber and 
 are easily treated. 
 
90 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 The Needs of the Islands 
 
 For centuries the interior of the large islands has been 
 the haunt of head-hunting savages and the southern 
 islands have been controlled by fierce and untamable 
 Moros. Some of the same head hunters (the Bontoc 
 Igorrotes) have achieved extraordinary skill in rice 
 culture. Yet it is a fact that except in the densely 
 populated island of Cebu the present population tends 
 to huddle together in villages, leaving unoccupied the 
 vast spaces of land between the settlements. The 
 amount of arable land that is at present under cultiva- 
 tion is but a fraction of what might be so utilized. This 
 situation is doubtless a legacy from unsettled conditions 
 in the past which made pioneering dangerous, although 
 it may be due to a lack of ambition on the part of the 
 inhabitants, for whom life is too easy. 
 
 Befgre_.tlie.-ihilippines shall ha ve taken their pla ce 
 in the world they must have developed their agricul- 
 tural resources tb" the point at which they ^^pOTly 
 supply their own food, but produce an excess to exchange 
 for the manufactured products of Europe and America, 
 upon which they will always be dependent. At preseiiF 
 this is far from being the case. Today large quantities 
 of foodstuffs, particularly rice, are imported into the 
 PhiHppines. The amount of these imports, however, 
 
AMERICA, JAPAN, AND THE PHILIPPINES 91 
 
 is rapidly dwindling. In 191 2, over 22 million dollars 
 worth of foodstuffs were imported, although in 1914 
 this amount had dropped to less than 13 million. This 
 one item is indicative of the lack of development of the 
 islands in a commercial way. 
 
 Nevertheless the effect of the American occupation 
 for a decade and a half is becoming evident. The total 
 exports and imports have about doubled in that inter- 
 val; and the imports from the United States have 
 risen from 10 per cent of the total in 1901 to 50 per cent 
 in 1914. 
 
 The prosperity of the islands, in the main, will depend 
 upon the development of their natural resources, mineral 
 and agricultural, and this in turn will depend upon two 
 factors : on the one hand, the investment of large 
 amounts of capital, and on the other hand, an increased 
 efl&ciency of the available labor. Both of these, but 
 particularly the former, in turn, are dependent upon 
 long-continued peaceful conditions. The timidity of 
 capital is axiomatic. At the present time, and for some 
 years, few, if any, large investments have been made 
 on account of the uncertainty regarding the plans and 
 purposes of the United States toward the Philippines. 
 This timidity has not been allayed, either by the intro- 
 duction of party poHtics in the present Phihppine ad- 
 ministration or the recent agitation in connection with 
 
92 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 the so-called Jones bill introduced in the 63d Con- 
 gress. 
 
 We may take it as demonstrated that the laborers, 
 upon whose shoulders the success of commercial develop- 
 ment finally rests, will of necessity continue to be Fili- 
 pino, Hindu, Chinese, or some race that is able to with- 
 stand a tropical climate. The American cannot do so, 
 r nor can the Japanese. As a laborer, the white man 
 I cannot exist in the tropics, at any rate not in competi- 
 V tion with the darker-hued peoples. Says Professor 
 Benjamin Kidd in connection with the attempt to 
 acclimatize the white man in the tropics : " Excepting 
 only the deportation of the African races under the 
 institution of slavery, probably no other idea which has 
 held the mind of our civiUzation during the last three 
 hundred years has led to so much physical and moral 
 suffering and degradation, or has strewn the world with 
 the wrecks of so many gigantic enterprises." (This was 
 written before the building of the Panama canal, which 
 forms a conspicuous exception to the above statement.) 
 One pressing need of the Philippines has been met in 
 great part by the American oflScials in control. This 
 is the opening up of communications, which not only 
 enable the Filipino farmer to bring his produce to market 
 or shipping point, but also bind the whole people 
 together in a community of intercourse that they have 
 
AMERICA, JAPAN, AND THE PHILIPPINES 93 
 
 never experienced hitherto. In a country of steep moun- 
 tains and torrential tropical rains, of course such roads 
 require constant care to keep them in condition. 
 
 International Relations 
 
 In the first flush of possession, the PhiKppine Islands 
 appealed to many citizens of this country as a tremen- 
 dous addition to our national wealth, — as a very valuable 
 asset. We have seen something of what the cost of 
 this possession has been, — the overhead charges, so to 
 speak. And there has been gradually brought home 
 to us the fact that, speaking still in commercial terms, 
 they are a Hability, not an asset. At the same time we 
 have realized that the only justification for our presence 
 in the islands is the benefit of the Filipino, not of our- 
 selves, unless we wish to make the FiHpino one of our- 
 selves, which is not a popular wish. 
 
 The reiterated phrase, "Trade follows the flag," is not 
 true. Trade foUows the fine of least resistance.^ In 
 1901 imports into the islands from the United States 
 were only about three fifths of what they were from 
 Great Britain and only half again as great as those 
 from Germany. Even in 1914 they were only one half 
 
 ' A British student of foreign afEairs said in Blackwood's Magazine 
 thirteen years ago : " It is true that trade follows the flag. It is sad to be 
 obliged to confess, however, that in the Pacific today, it Is the trade of 
 foreign nations which most successfully follows the Union Jack." 
 
94 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 of the whole amount. As for exports from the Philip- 
 pines to the United States, in 1901 they were only 40 
 per cent of those to England and in 191 4 they had risen 
 to only two fifths of the whole export total. And this 
 in spite of the fact that until the passage of the Under- 
 wood Tariff Law, an export duty was levied on PhiUp- 
 pine products, which was remitted in the case of exports 
 to America. Moreover, on dutiable goods a rebate of 
 25 per cent has been given in favor of the United States. 
 From the wholly selfish standpoint of national profit 
 we should have received enormously greater returns on 
 our money if we had devoted the millions that have 
 been expended in the Philippines to the development of 
 commerce with South America or even with Europe. 
 As a matter of fact, our experience with colonial posses- 
 sions as a source of profit has been quite in line with 
 , that of England, France, and Germany. Of course we 
 have our altruistic endeavor to console us. 
 
 Apart from direct pecuniary gain, there are those who 
 point to the position of the Philippines on the "thresh- 
 old of Asia," or particularly China, in the behef that 
 we shall obtain an important advantage in the contests 
 for the trade of that nation by such a foothold. The 
 writer is quite unable to appreciate this point. Our 
 trade with China consists in selUng individual Chinese 
 or Chinese firms, American products, particularly 
 
AMERICA, JAPAN, AND THE PHILIPPINES 95 
 
 American manufactures. None of this trade will ever 
 go via the Phihppines, nor will the islands nor their 
 people ever be instrumental in increasing it to any great 
 extent. It may, indeed, work out the other way. We 
 feel that it is for the good of the FiHpino not to subject 
 him to keen competition, so that we have extended the 
 Chinese exclusion act to the islands. The great anti- 
 American boycott of 1906 was occasioned primarily by 
 Chinese resentment at the administration of this same 
 law. Its enforcement in the Philippines, for which we 
 are responsible, may be the occasion of reviving the boy- 
 cott and losing us still more trade. 
 
 But the objection is at once raised : " Trade has a 1 
 political as well as a commercial aspect. Our foothold 
 in the Phihppines will give us a base from which to pro- ; 
 tect our Asiatic commerce. It is never claimed that| 
 they will be much of a factor in mere buying and sell-; 
 ing." This introduces us to the portentous phrase,' 
 "The Mastery of the Pacific." 
 
 Few poKtical questions have been more befuddled 
 by shibboleths than those of the Orient and the Pacific.^ 
 The Pacific is the largest ocean. Its "mastery" has 
 
 1 The " Yellow Peril " is a conspicuous example. The awful menace 
 of this phrase would not be half so impressive if the color were any other 
 than " yellow." Unconscious association and suggestion often completely 
 overshadow reason. Compare Havelock Ellis, "The Psychology of 
 Yellow." Pop. Set. Mo., vol. 68. 
 
96 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 a Nietzschian flavor that is compelling. But let us 
 analyze it. 
 
 In time of peace it is hard to conceive of any mastery 
 of an ocean except on the part of the nation that ships 
 the most goods across it. It is the goods, not the 
 nationahty of the carriers, that counts. American com- 
 merce, all over the world, before the European war, was 
 great and increasing in spite of the fact that it was 
 carried largely in foreign bottoms. The Japanese have 
 recently awakened to the fact that their heavily sub- 
 sidized Pacific steamship lines carry the larger percent- 
 age of their freight, not from Japanese ports, but from 
 Hongkong, China, to America and back, so that, as 
 their subsidy covers a prospective loss, they are taxing 
 themselves for the empty glory of carrying foreign 
 goods under the Japanese flag ! 
 
 It is otherwise, of course, in time of war. The United 
 States has discovered to its consternation that its trade 
 may suffer from lack of American ships. On the other 
 hand, there is no real analogy between Europe and Asia, 
 the Atlantic and the Pacific. It is possible for England 
 with her powerful fleet and the possession of Gibraltar 
 and the English Channel in a measure to control the 
 Atlantic so far as Germany is concerned. Such a con- 
 dition would be out of the question in the vast expanse 
 of the Pacific. The exploits of the will-o'-the-wisp 
 
AMERICA, JAPAN, AND THE PHILIPPINES 97 
 
 Emden in the autumn of 1914 are a striking com- 
 mentary upon the inability of the great Japanese fleet 
 to adequately patrol that waste of waters. No nation 
 can dominate the Pacific, so long as any other nation 
 can maintain a fleet there. And the Philippines, although 
 an advantage to our fleet in the Pacific, are by no means 
 a necessity.^ 
 
 The following colloquy at the hearing on the naval 
 appropriations bill before the House Committee on 
 Naval Affairs, December 15, 1914, is interesting in this 
 connection : 
 
 Mr. Witherspoon. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a 
 question or two. Commander, you speak of controlling the seas. 
 Is there any nation in the world that controls the seas ? 
 
 Commander Stirling. Well, I think England comes probably 
 nearer controlling it than any other nation. 
 
 Mr. Witherspoon. They do not control the Baltic Sea. 
 
 Commander Stirling. No ; I should say the Baltic Sea was 
 controlled by Germany. 
 
 Mr. Witherspoon. Does England control the Black Sea ? 
 
 Commander Stirling. Well, no ; her ally Russia does. 
 
 Mr. Witherspoon. Does England control the Mediterranean 
 Sea? 
 
 Commander Stirling. Well, her allies control it. 
 
 Mr. Witherspoon. I did not ask you anything about that. 
 I asked you about England. 
 
 1 This is, of course, a consideration quite apart from the need of coaling 
 stations at strategic points. 
 
98 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 Commander Stirling. It amounts to the same thing ; yes, sir. 
 
 Mr. Witherspoon. Is it not a fact that France controls the 
 Mediterraneaa Sea? 
 
 Commander Stirling. She has the greater force there. 
 
 Mr. Witherspoon. And she put the greater force there for 
 the very purpose of having control of that sea, and England has 
 concentrated all her battleships in the North Sea for the purpose 
 of controlling that. Is not that true ? 
 
 Commander Stirling. For the purpose of watching the Ger- 
 man fleet. 
 
 Mr. Witherspoon. Well, she has got control of the North Sea, 
 has she not ? I mean England. 
 
 Commander Stirling. She has control over the North Sea. 
 
 Mr. Witherspoon. And she has it because she has got her fleet 
 concentrated there. Is not that true ? 
 
 Commander Stirling. Yes, sir ; one reason. 
 
 Mr. Witherspoon. If she had her fleet divided and a part of 
 it in her possessions aU over the world, she would not have control 
 of the North Sea? 
 
 Commander Stirling. If she reduced her fleet so that Germany 
 thought she would have an equal chance of success — 
 
 Mr. Witherspoon (interposing). Has England got control 
 of the Atlantic Ocean ? 
 
 Commander Stirling. Yes. 
 
 Mr. Witherspoon. What ships has she got in the Atlantic 
 Ocean as powerful as our fleet ? 
 
 Commander Stirling. Now, of course, that opens up a little — 
 
 Mr. Witherspoon (interposing). Well, she has not got any- 
 thing in there except some cruisers ? 
 
 Commander Stirling. No, sir. 
 
 Mr. Witherspoon. She has not got a sLugle battleship in the 
 Atlantic Ocean ? 
 
AMERICA, JAPAN, AND THE PHILIPPINES 99 
 
 Commander Stirling. I consider that control means so far as 
 the belligerents are concerned. 
 
 Mr. Witherspoon. I am not talking about belligerents; I 
 am talking about the control of the sea. You mean by the control 
 of the sea the nation who has ships there powerful enough to domi- 
 nate it ? Is that what you mean by it ? 
 
 Commander Stirling. Yes, sir; I consider a nation controls 
 the sea that can send a dominant force into it. 
 
 Mr. Witherspoon. That can do it ? 
 
 Commander Stirling. Yes, sir. She may lose control of it 
 for a month or a week, but if she can eventually dominate it by 
 sending a force into it, she controls the sea. 
 
 Mr. Witherspoon. But if England could send a fleet into the 
 Atlantic Ocean and thereby control it, she would not have her fleet 
 in the North Sea, and she would not have control of that, would she ? 
 
 Commander Stirling. No ; against the world, against a com- 
 bination, I do not suppose England would be considered — I will 
 take that back. England does not control the sea against a com- 
 bination where the nation who is against her — • 
 
 Mr. Witherspoon (interposing). She could not control the 
 Asiatic waters, could she ? She has not any ships there powerful 
 enough to control it as against Japan ? 
 
 Commander Stirling. Against only Japan as an enemy she 
 would control it. 
 
 Mr. Witherspoon. Has she got any battleships ? 
 
 Commander Stirling. No, but she could send them out there. 
 
 Mr. Witherspoon. I am not asking you about that. I am 
 talking about what exists today. Is it not a fact that no nation 
 on earth is able to control but one part of the seas at the same 
 time? Is not that true? 
 
 Commander Stirling. Yes, sir; that is pretty true. She 
 only wants — 
 
lOO JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 Mr. Witherspoon (interposing). So that this thing of one 
 nation controlling all the oceans and seas of the world is what a 
 high French authority said when they adopted the policy of con- 
 trolling the Mediterranean, that it is a mere chimera? Is not 
 that true? 
 
 Commander Stirling. Yes; but at the same time, with one 
 enemy, if you consider that she had only one enemy in the Pacific 
 she could control the Pacific against that enemy. 
 
 Mr. Witherspoon. Well, that really comes down to this: 
 That if a nation has got a more powerful fleet than any other 
 nation, it can control that nation rather than the ocean. 
 
 Comm a nder Stirling. It can control the possible area of 
 hostilities." 
 
 If the control of the Pacific is a mere chimera, as the 
 writer, for one, believes it is, then the possession of the 
 Philippines is to us not only a liability in an economical 
 sense, but likewise in a political sense. For, to protect 
 the archipelago with its enormous coast line against 
 invasion would be a matter of stupendous difficulty. 
 They would offer to Japan or any other putative enemy 
 a vulnerable point to attack, as they did to us in the 
 Spanish war. While the loss of the islands, in the light 
 of the facts just presented, would be a real gain to us 
 from the standpoint of self-interest, their sacrifice in 
 war would involve a loss of prestige that the temper of 
 the American people would not tamely endure. 
 
 What is the way out of this dilemma? At present 
 there seems to be a confusion of counsel. We may cut 
 
AMERICA, JAPAN, AND THE PHILIPPINES loi 
 
 loose altogether; grant the Filipinos their absolute 
 independence and let them shift for themselves. Yet 
 those whose experience in the Phihppines is most ex- 
 tensive agree in the belief that it would not be long 
 before present-day conditions in Mexico were dupH- 
 cated. But there is no Monroe Doctrine to protect 
 the Filipino (at least it is questionable if Japan's 
 would extend so far from home), and it would not be 
 long before some other great power stepped in and re- 
 stored order. The Filipino would be in a worse plight 
 than ever. The United States would have lost national 
 prestige and an opportunity to render a service to a 
 dependent people, and her citizens would have lost 
 much wealth. 
 
 We might, of course, as has sometimes been suggested, 
 sell or give the archipelago to a nation of our choice. 
 But such a course is out of the question for reasons 
 discussed elsewhere. A protectorate is often proposed. 
 The function of a protector is to protect. In what sort 
 of a situation would Uncle Sam find himself "protect- 
 ing" the adolescent Phihppine nation against the con- 
 sequences of its own bumptious acts, the control over 
 which he had voluntarily resigned. Nothing, in the 
 mind of the writer, would be so certain to involve our 
 country in the perilous international controversies of 
 the Western Pacific as to assume the responsibility for a 
 
I02 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 suddenly freed Philippine nation given over to its own 
 devices. As a matter of fact, we need not announce 
 such a protectorate. It would be inevitable, if the 
 islands were given their independence now, on account 
 of the predominant place that American interests have 
 made for themselves in the present-day Philippines. 
 
 But such a course cannot be considered. Another 
 plan that has been mooted is to give the Filipinos their 
 independence subject to a joint protectorate, the islands 
 being neutralized by treaty with England, France, 
 Japan, Germany, and the United States. 
 
 Recent events have convinced the majority of Ameri- 
 cans that such a treaty would not be worth drafting so 
 far as Germany is concerned. And recalling the rapid 
 changes of front indulged in by Japan in her continental 
 diplomacy, many Americans feel that the same may be 
 said of her. In other words, a treaty is a contract, and 
 a nation that will not keep its word because it is to its 
 disadvantage to do so thereby destroys the only asset 
 that stands back of such a contractual obligation and 
 makes it of any value. If a neutralization agreement 
 were observed, it would only be because the United 
 States stood back of it. And in such a case we might 
 as well have the whole responsibility as the complica- 
 tions incident to sharing it with others. 
 
 It is the consensus of opinion that if the Filipinos 
 
AMERICA, JAPAN, AND THE PHILIPPINES 103 
 
 were given complete autonomy at present under such a 
 neutralization scheme, it would not be long before con- 
 flicts of authority would occur between FUipino ofl&cials 
 and aUens other than Americans, which might easily 
 call for intervention on the part of the alien power. 
 The United States would then be in a position either of 
 taking sides with the Filipinos against the foreign power, 
 or else of taking sides the other way round. In either 
 event quite unnecessary and dangerous problems would 
 be raised. In fact, any sort of a protectorate that as- 
 sumes responsibility and at the same time that relin- 
 quishes control (as would, of course, follow the granting 
 of FiUpino autonomy) would be dangerous and Ukely 
 to place us in an equivocal situation. 
 
 What the Japanese would do with the Islands 
 
 We may now focus the facts noticed in the preceding 
 pages upon the Japanese aspects of the problem. 
 
 Let us suppose that, overnight, American rule in the 
 PhUippines were replaced by Japanese. That is to say, 
 let us omit the uncertain and disturbing factor of a 
 conflict that by force would bring such a thing about. 
 Consider the fait accompli. In what situation would 
 the Japanese find himself? 
 
 In the first place he would discover that he was a 
 "heathen" in the midst of millions of Roman CathoUcs, 
 
I04 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 whose attitude toward him would be colored not only 
 by the feeUng of the conquered toward the conqueror, 
 but also by the aversion due to reUgious prejudice. So 
 far as the Japanese has had a chance to deport himself 
 as an overlord in Manchuria and Korea, the prospect 
 is not reassuring. The Japanese suffers from a lack of 
 that sort of sentiment, conspicuous in the Anglo-Saxon, 
 that inchnes the latter to assume a fatherly attitude 
 toward an ahen or an inferior. His methods as a colo- 
 nizer are rather more like the German — highly eflScient 
 but not whoUy sjonpathetic. In Korea, where anarchy 
 has been imminent for so long, he has felt it necessary 
 to adopt strong measures as a deterrent to opposition. 
 The Philippines, half conquered, would more than hkely 
 merit the same treatment in his eyes. But what would 
 be the result of the adoption of repressive measures? 
 We may help to answer this question by considering 
 Formosa, which has been a Japanese possession for two 
 decades. To-day the whole interior of this island is 
 occupied by head-hunting savages. The subjugation 
 of these has been an ever present problem for the For- 
 mosan authorities. Each year demanded a greater out- 
 lay until in 1908 the annual appropriation was nearly 
 $1,000,000. Then the Japanese authorities laid out a 
 regular program to extend over five years, beginning 
 1 910. Seven million five hundred thousand dollars was 
 
AMERICA, JAPAN, AND THE PHILIPPINES 105 
 
 appropriated. After four years' operations, involving 
 16,000 men and an expenditure, so far, of $4,500,000, 
 and hundreds of casualties, about one tenth of the pro- 
 gram had been carried out. At this rate, if successful, 
 the cost of subjugating the natives will be $45,000,000. 
 
 In the PhiUppines, the Japanese would be most un- 
 likely to follow out the disinterested pohcy of the 
 Americans ; indeed they could not afford to do so. The 
 cost of an army of occupation, in view of the peculiar 
 disadvantages under which they would labor, would 
 be many times that of the United States. Under any 
 circumstances, the Japanese control in the Phihppines 
 would never extend beyond the range of Japanese guns. 
 A few years of such conditions, and the roads built and 
 kept up with so much care under American direction 
 would be washed out and destroyed. The people of 
 the islands are not an industrial community like the 
 population of Belgium. It would be impossible to 
 destroy anything that would prostrate the population. 
 Outside of Manila and a few other cities there is nothing 
 to destroy that would matter. 
 
 Under such circumstances, and they seem to be in- 
 evitable, on the premise of a Japanese occupation by 
 force, what would the Japanese profit? The Philip- 
 pines cannot be colonized by Japanese laborers any 
 more than by Europeans. Any products that Japan 
 
io6 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 might need would of necessity be produced by Filipino 
 labor. Japan would get no rice, for the Philippines 
 annually import millions of dollars worth of that staple 
 from other lands. It has been suggested that the Jap- 
 anese might make a government monopoly of hemp 
 and rubber as they have of camphor in Formosa. But 
 these two products would be procured with the great- 
 est difi&culty under a military occupation and their cost 
 would be enormously greater than now. 
 
 It would be far more profitable to deal with the 
 islands as a foreign power, encouraging the development 
 of their resources in order that they might have the 
 more to exchange for Japanese goods, than to attempt 
 by forced control to increase such an output beyond the 
 limits of a fair exchange. 
 
 Above all, little development of the Philippines can take 
 place even under the most peaceful conditions, without the 
 investment of foreign capital. Pending such a develop- 
 ment, the islands would be a useless burden to Japan, and 
 the necessary capital she could never furnish herself. 
 
 Altogether no greater calamity could befall the 
 Japanese Empire than to be compelled to assume con- 
 trol over the Philippine Islands, so rich in potential 
 wealth and so poor in convertible assets. These facts 
 become much more striking when we examine in some 
 detail Japan's economic situation. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 japan's economic evolution 
 
 The Japanese like to compare themselves with the 
 English, and their Island Empire to the United King- 
 dom. Such a comparison has a certain justification. 
 Both are relatively small island groups closely adjacent 
 to a rich and populous continent. Each must depend 
 upon a strong navy for national protection. Each is 
 densely populated. So far as geographical influences 
 are of significance, similar conditions may be expected 
 to produce analogous results. One must not be too 
 easily impressed by analogies, however, for the histori- 
 cal background of the English and the Japanese and the 
 mental characteristics of the two races are as far apart 
 as possible. 
 
 Before the period that Toynbee has called the "In- 
 dustrial Revolution" (i 760-1830), England was a self- 
 sufiicient agricultural country, growing her own food 
 (in the seventeenth century her imports were only 
 one fortieth of her total consumption, whereas now they 
 are one fourth), and with her weaving and other indus- 
 tries carried on in the homes of the workers both in town 
 
 107 
 
io8 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 and country. This was Japan's economic status until 
 a few decades ago ; indeed to a great extent it is today, 
 for Japan is in the midst of an industrial revolution, 
 that, mutatis mutandis, is very similar to what England 
 has undergone. 
 
 In England's case the transforming change was due 
 in great part to a group of extraordinary inventors who, 
 working all in the same period, perfected machines that 
 very greatly increased the output of manufactured 
 articles. At the same time there developed an oversea 
 trade which brought enormous returns, and produced 
 in England a very large supply of capital to be reinvested 
 in industry. The social readjustment was painful and 
 left many persistent ills in its train, but in the end a 
 population essentially agricultural was transformed into 
 one essentially industrial. Moreover, industry became 
 wholly separated from state control and interference. 
 
 In Japan the acceleration of social change has been 
 such that the people have not had time to accommodate 
 themselves to new conditions, and the state has had to 
 step in and not only assume direction of commerce and 
 enterprise, but furnish the capital as well. 
 
 Japan as an Agricultural Country 
 
 In spite of the fact that Japan is an extraordinarily 
 mountainous country, her population is mainly agricul- 
 
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC EVOLUTION 109 
 
 tural. Nearly 65 per cent of the total population 
 are farmers. When we find that the chief agricul- 
 tural product is rice, mostly grown in flooded paddy- 
 fields, and that only about 15 per cent of the land 
 of the Empire is arable (only half of that paddy-fields), 
 we may gain some idea of the degree of intensive agri- 
 culture to which this product is carried. It is a char- 
 acteristic of all provincial peoples to be more conser- 
 vative about their food than about anything else. 
 Rice is the Japanese staple, and it will be a long time 
 before it is voluntarily replaced by a substitute in the 
 national diet. Nevertheless the rise in the cost of hv- 
 ing has been as keenly felt in recent years on the other 
 side of the globe as on this, and there are an increasing 
 number of Japanese to whom rice is becoming more 
 and more of a luxury. The increase in the price of 
 rice during the past ten years has been nearly 50 per 
 cent, and it is a commonplace that the Japanese farmer 
 is too poor to eat the rice he grows. This condition 
 makes it difiicult for the nation to depend upon imported 
 rice to any extent, as the cost of transportation must 
 be added to the price of the foreign-grown product. 
 Often rice is mixed with millet or barley to make it go 
 farther. Not infrequently these grains replace the rice 
 as a staple. The north provinces are adapted to the 
 raising of oats, and the annual crop of this cereal has 
 
no JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 increased by leaps and bounds in recent years. Wheat 
 is grown in considerable amount, although the abomi- 
 nable quality of most of the bread sold in Japan is such 
 as to offer slight inducement for any one to forsake rice 
 for it except under compulsion. Nevertheless wheat 
 and wheaten flour are consumed in increasing quantities 
 year by year. In 1913 Japan imported from America 
 nearly $5,000,000 worth of wheat, over twice the import 
 of 191 2, and nearly $500,000 worth of flour besides. 
 Buckwheat, which is made into macaroni, and beans are 
 also staple articles of Japanese diet. A large amount of 
 wheat is consumed in the manufacture of soy {shoyu), 
 the native sauce. 
 
 Altogether the enforced attention to the cultivation 
 of grains other than rice may result in modifying the 
 national diet and in extending somewhat the percentage 
 of arable land in the Empire. Indeed about 75,000 
 acres of wild land are reclaimed annually. But this 
 can by no means keep up with the great increase in the 
 population.* 
 
 The birth rate in 1904 and 1905 was 30.6 per 1000 ; 
 in 1906 it was 29.1 ; in 1907 it was 33.2 ; and in 1908 
 and 1909 it was 33.7. The death rate for the same period 
 
 * For many reasons it would be of great advantage to the national 
 welfare if meat could be made more of an item in the national diet, but 
 the extreme poverty of the people precludes this to any great extent. 
 Large amounts of seafood are of course consumed. 
 
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC EVOLUTION iii 
 
 has remained nearly stationary, about 21 per 1000. 
 This net increase in the population produces a cumula- 
 tive effect. The population of Japan (excluding Korea, 
 Formosa, etc.) in 1914 was 53,596,858, an increase of 
 3)342,387 since 1909. The annual increase is now 
 682,000 per year, although ten years ago it was but 
 500,000. This increase, without doubt, is due in part 
 to better conditions of life, together with the high char- 
 acter of Japanese medical practice.^ 
 
 Growth of Industrialism 
 
 The consequence of this condition is apparent. With 
 an arable area sharply limited by nature and a rapidly 
 increasing population, one of two things must happen. 
 Either the surplus population must migrate to other 
 food-producing lands or else Japan must modify her 
 national diet and buy her food of other countries. Mi- 
 gration presents many problems and practical difficul- 
 ties, the discussion of which must be deferred. To buy 
 her food abroad, however, she must have the where- 
 withal to pay for what she imports. Raw materials 
 that may be exported are few in number and small in 
 
 ' It is of interest to note that at no time since i8go has the female 
 moiety of the population exceeded the male. The annual birth rate of 
 males exceeds that of females from 3 per cent to 8 per cent, averaging, 
 as a rule, a fraction over 4 per cent. 
 
112 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 amount.! Circumstances, therefore, rather than national 
 instincts have forced Japan into the ranks of the indus- 
 trial nations, earning her national Uving by utilizing the 
 labor of her milUons of hands to increase the value of raw- 
 materials suppUed from abroad, and then passing them 
 on to other countries in the channels of foreign trade. 
 
 The group of statesmen who have directed the affairs 
 of Japan recognized this situation years ago, and the 
 government has bent every effort to stimulate and foster 
 industrial enterprise. This has been a much more diffi- 
 cult problem than it would be in an Occidental state. 
 It must be recalled that only a half century ago Japa- 
 nese society was feudal, — a feudaUsm that embraced 
 not only the military aspects of life, but even more the 
 arts and industries. Foreign commerce was something 
 to be feared and opposed. A modern factory was un- 
 thinkable. Accustomed to look to their superiors for 
 aid and initiative, no amount of economic pressure 
 ever would have induced the people themselves to have 
 embarked on industrial enterprise. The government 
 therefore took the lead, and began to estabUsh and sub- 
 
 ' These are practically limited to coal and copper. The annual value 
 of the total output of the former is $35,000,000 (1913) ; that of the latter 
 $21,000,000 (1913). Although the export of both of these has increased 
 greatly in the past two decades, the total amount is but a small part of 
 the total export trade. (The export of coal ini9i3 was about $1 1,000,000 
 and that of copper $14,000,000.) 
 
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC EVOLUTION 113 
 
 sidize all sorts of manufacturing ventures. Since the 
 Russian war it has had an additional incentive to par- 
 ticipate in any enterprise in which a profit could be 
 found, on account of the pressing need of getting hold 
 of aU available revenue to meet the heavy post-beUum 
 expenditures. This policy has resulted in making the 
 national government a partner in various commercial 
 undertakings to a degree quite unknown in the western 
 world. Cotton and silk-spinning factories, cement 
 works, glassworks, match factories, shipbuilding, brick- 
 making establishments, and iron foundries have been 
 inaugurated by a paternal government. Some of these 
 have been colossal failures.^ Others have been trans- 
 ferred to private owners after a good start has been 
 made. But such enterprises are fostered thereafter in 
 every possible way, — by protective tariffs, transpor- 
 tation rebates, bonuses, even the relending to private 
 companies, at a low rate of interest, of money borrowed 
 by the government abroad. 
 
 In 1896 there were 7600 factories of aU sorts, em- 
 ploying 434,832 operatives. In 1905 there were 9776 fac- 
 tories and 587,851 operatives. In 1913 there were 15,811 
 factories and 916,252 operatives. The place of women 
 and girls in the Japanese factory system is significant. 
 
 ' The annual deficit of the steel foundry operated by the state is about 
 $1,400,000. 
 
 I 
 
114 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 In silk-reeling, 90 per cent of the operatives are women ; 
 in weaving and cigarette making, over 80 per cent ; in 
 cotton spinning, over 60 per cent.^ 
 
 The predominance of women in Japanese industry 
 is correlated with the scarcity or total absence of the 
 "skilled artisan" type of man, a point to which we shall 
 recur farther on. The average daily wages of the fe- 
 male cotton-factory operatives are 13.9 cents (gold) a 
 day ; those of men average 22 cents. The cotton-spin- 
 ning factories run continuously, night and day, the 
 operatives working in shifts.^ 
 
 The government retains control of those industries 
 which are of importance to the national welfare, such as 
 dockyards, shipyards, arsenals, etc. In addition, the 
 government, for financial reasons, has created monopolies 
 in some hnes of business, such as the manufacture and 
 sale of cigarettes, camphor, and salt. 
 
 '■ This includes only factories in the American sense. A large per- 
 centage of the manufactured products of Japan is produced in the home 
 and all the women and children of a family participate. This condition 
 was also true of England until the industrial revolution. 
 
 " These figures are from the Official Report of the Japanese Depart- 
 ment of Agriculture and Commerce and are for the year igii (the latest 
 published). As the tendency has been for wages to constantly increase, 
 the current average wage is doubtless a cent or two higher. The Japan 
 Cotton Spinning Association compiles annually similar statistics, based 
 upon reports from all the mills, and publishes the average wages for women 
 (1911) to be 14.1 cents and for men 22.5 cents. About two thirds of the 
 operatives are paid by piecework and one third by the day. 
 
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC EVOLUTION 115 
 
 The Japanese Workman 
 
 The success or failure of an industrial system depends 
 in the last analysis upon the character of the human 
 element involved rather than upon machinery. Japan 
 can purchase machinery to dupUcate anything in a Euro- 
 pean or American factory. The success of the industrial 
 system, however, must be gauged by the efficiency of 
 the operatives and even more by the organizing ability 
 of the executive departments. 
 
 With respect to the last point it is perhaps too soon 
 to judge. In advertising, the Japanese have been 
 quick to imitate the more obvious devices of the West, 
 particularly of America. But it remains to be seen 
 whether they will be equal to the demands laid upon the 
 ingenuity and creative faculties of the executive heads 
 of big business enterprises, such as will be necessary in 
 a successful competition with Europe and America. In 
 pushing retail sales, particularly by means of itinerant 
 agents, the Japanese are most active, resourceful, and 
 successful. In the opinion of the writer they lack, 7 
 however, the patient persistence of the Germans and > ^v 
 the imagination and briUiancy of the successful Ameri-J 
 can sales manager. 
 
 The quahty of the Japanese workman is much more 
 evident. The traditions of Japanese social hfe are 
 
Ii6 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 responsible for the fact that in some lines Japanese 
 workmanship surpasses that of any other people. This 
 is particularly seen in the production of art-objects, 
 including fine metal work, cloisonne, damascene, porce- 
 lains, inlaid wood, ivory carving, etc. This perfection 
 of attainment is a national trait, fostered by feudahsm 
 and one of its lingering survivals. No Western nation, 
 except perhaps the French, can hope to rival the Japa- 
 nese in this line. Yet this abihty is curiously Hmited. 
 The Japanese artisan can produce an inlaid wooden box 
 of which the nicety of construction of its hundreds of 
 parts is a marvel to an Occidental, but he is quite in- 
 capable of finishing a scientific mechanism or instrument 
 of precision so that it can compare with the product of 
 a European or American workshop. 
 
 In the production of works of art, time is no object, 
 but in the savage competition of international com- 
 merce, time is worth dollars. Now in commercializing 
 her native industries, Japan stands a good chance to 
 lose that artistic quahty of her products that has largely 
 created their markets. This is felt today in those 
 artistic lines that have been stimulated by foreign de- 
 mand. In ceramics, for example, one wiU look in vain 
 for the old artistic quahties in the product of the big 
 "factories" of Kyoto and Nagoya. The adept who 
 knows the by-ways will fizid what he seeks in the tiny 
 
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC EVOLUTION 117 
 
 workshops of potters that have not yet been "commer- 
 cialized." If one wishes the finest embroideries, he no 
 longer finds them in the big shops of the cities. The 
 best work is done in the country districts. 
 
 The Japanese workman as an artist knows no rival; 
 as a skilled laborer in the Western sense one might al- 
 most say he knows no inferior. The amount of waste 
 energy and waste time that is expended in putting , 
 through a given job would drive a foreign foreman to,' 
 madness if he had an eye to the cost sheet. As a matter \ 
 of fact the "skilled workman" type is practically non-j 
 existent in Japan. This Umits appreciably the national 
 capacity for industrial development and probably ex- 
 plains in part the failures that have followed attempts 
 to develop many lines of manufactures. 
 
 Silk reeling, cotton spinning, and such other pro- 
 cesses as require not skilled effort but merely patient 
 attention are, of course, successfully carried out by 
 Japanese workmen (or more often workgirls). But 
 the beUef that the Japanese, given the machines, can 
 be equally successful in all other manufacturing hues 
 is quite unfounded. 
 
 In another group of industries, however, Japanese 
 success is marked. This involves not factory, but home 
 production, in which the family group, old and young, 
 work together. All the fancy straw matting, of which 
 
ii8 
 
 JAPAJSIESE EXPANSION 
 
 in 1913 we bought $1,500,000 worth, is made in this 
 way in three provinces adjacent to Kobe. The myriads 
 of cheap toys are similarly produced. Even silk is 
 still largely reeled in farmhouses throughout the coun- 
 try districts of central and southern Japan. One of the 
 
 UHITEB STATES 
 Exports 
 
 Imports j^i^ AMERICA NORTH & SOUTH 
 (except U.S.) 
 
 Imports 
 
 AI,I< EUROPE 
 
 Imports 
 
 ALI/ ASIA 
 
 (except \ 
 Fhilippines/ 
 
 HAWAH 
 
 Diagram of Japan's Foreign Trade — 1913. 
 
 great problems facing the government — one to which 
 apparently not much attention is being paid — is the 
 training of skilled workmen in those^ lines of manufacture 
 
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC EVOLUTION 
 
 119 
 
 that are alien to Japanese traditions, in which, however, 
 she hopes to compete with the Occident in supplying 
 the rest of Asia. 
 
 Japan's Foreign Trade 
 
 Pursuant to the policy mentioned above, state-fos- 
 tered foreign trade has steadily advanced. In 1890 the 
 combined imports and exports totaled a figure that 
 represented only $1.71 per capita. By 1900 it was $5.48 
 per capita. In 1913 it was $13 per capita. The accom- 
 panying diagram expresses the distribution of this trade 
 for the year 1913.^ (The European war, of course, has 
 rendered all trade conditions so abnormal that the quo- 
 tation of statistics for 1914 would not be pertinent.) 
 
 ^ The actual figures for 191 5 
 
 and 1913 are as follows : 
 
 
 Extorts 
 
 Imports 
 
 
 1912 
 
 United States 
 
 All America, north and south, 
 
 except United States . . 
 
 All Europe 
 
 Australia 
 
 All Asia except Philippines and 
 
 Kuantung 
 
 Philippines 
 
 Hawaii 
 
 Total (including other 
 
 $84,017,030 
 
 3,536,417 
 
 56,928,067 
 
 4,297,209 
 
 92,452,373 
 2,756,678 
 2,600,533 
 
 $63,253,847 
 
 1,258,943 
 101,247,690 
 
 6,370,409 
 
 114,074,041 
 
 2,627,565 
 
 14,650 
 
 countries) 
 
 $262,426,952; 
 
 $308,258,154 
 
120 
 
 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 From this diagram it will be seen that Japan sold to 
 all the world, except America, much less than she 
 bought. Of the great factors in this international trade, 
 the United States bought of Japan in 191 2, 25 per cent 
 more than she sold to her, arid in 1913, 33 per cent more. 
 Furthermore, while Asia is a better customer of Japan 
 than we are (to the extent of $8,435,000 in 1912 and 
 $27,555,000 in 1913), yet in those same years, the great- 
 est that Japanese export trade has known, nevertheless 
 she bought of Asia as imports into Japan, in 191 2, 
 $21,622,000, in 1913, $34,721,000 more than she sold to 
 Asia. These differences have been maintained ap- 
 proximately, year after year, in spite of the annual 
 increase of the total value of the trade. Their great 
 
 
 Exports 
 
 Imports 
 
 
 1913 
 
 United States 
 
 All America except United 
 
 States 
 
 All Europe 
 
 Australia 
 
 AH Asia except Philippines 
 
 and Kuantung .... 
 
 Philippines 
 
 Hawaii 
 
 Total (including other 
 
 91,868,612 
 
 3,628,991 
 
 73,320,864 
 
 4,298,273 
 
 119,424,371 
 3,129,211 
 2,486,071 
 
 60,959,364 
 
 2,303,903 
 
 109,704,487 
 
 7,441,686 
 
 154,145,655 
 
 3,808 621 
 
 45,088 
 
 countries) 
 
 $314,965,186 
 
 5363,256,960 
 
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC EVOLUTION 121 
 
 significance in another connection will be seen a little 
 later. 
 
 A detailed analysis of this trade would be quite out of 
 place here. Yet some points stand out conspicuously. 
 
 Considering first the imports into Japan, we find that 
 in 1913 these totaled $363,356,960. Of this sum the 
 United States contributed $60,959,364, being exceeded 
 only by Great Britain. This is more than one sixth of 
 her total imports. More than half of this is raw cot- 
 ton, which in 1913 Japan purchased from the United 
 States to the value of $31,981,732. 
 
 The Importance of Cotton 
 
 Cotton is perhaps the most important single item 
 in the daily Ufe of the Oriental. Of the hundreds of mil- 
 lions of inhabitants of Japan and China, it constitutes 
 the only material for clothing from January to Decem- 
 ber, — one thickness in summer ; wadded and inter- 
 Uned in winter. The fraction of the population that can 
 afford to dress in silk or wool is neghgible. In Japan, 
 thick cotton-stufEed futon, much Uke an American 
 "comforter," form not only the universal covering for 
 the Japanese bed, but the body of the bed itself. Japan 
 is therefore a large consumer of cotton and cotton- 
 goods. On the other hand, she is next door to China, 
 
122 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 whose heavy demand for cotton goods must also be 
 satisfied. These two facts make cotton a very impor- 
 tant consideration in Japanese commerce and industry. 
 
 Now very little cotton is grown in Japan itself, and 
 although experiments have been undertaken in growing 
 this staple in Korea and Formosa, the cHmate of the 
 former is not very favorable, and sugar and other crops 
 are more profitable in the latter. All the raw cotton 
 that is worked up into yarns and cloths in Japanese 
 mills must be imported. For the decade from 1900 to 
 1910 the total imports into Japan were $1,948,437,000, 
 and of this $473,143,000, or nearly one fourth, was 
 raw cotton. This percentage is increasing. In 191 1 
 raw cotton formed 28^ per cent of the total imports; 
 in 1912, 32§ per cent ; and in 1913, 32 per cent. 
 
 This large importation of raw cotton, ginned and un- 
 ginned, comes chiefly from India, China, and the United 
 States. Egypt contributes a relatively small amount. 
 India, up to the present, has supplied one half, or more, 
 of all the raw cotton consumed. American cotton is 
 preferred because of its better quality, and until 1900 
 formed 40 per cent of the total annual import. But 
 since then, with an occasional exception, the price has 
 risen until the cheaper Indian cotton has displaced it to 
 a considerable extent. Chinese cotton is cheap, but 
 harsh and of short staple. 
 
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC EVOLUTION 123 
 
 The factor of transportation plays an important r61e 
 in this trade. Indian cotton takes about forty days in 
 transit, and its importation is facilitated by subsidized 
 steamer hues between Japan and Bombay and Calcutta. 
 Until now, American cotton has had to travel either 
 across the Atlantic and via Suez to the Orient, or else 
 (the more usual route) overland via San Francisco and 
 across the Pacific. This requires rehandling, often 
 storage en route, and the use of the most expensive 
 transportation facihties. The time between Houston, 
 Texas, and Japan is about eighty days, but may be much 
 longer. There is always loss of weight on the road, and 
 the transportation charge is a heavy handicap. The 
 rate from Houston to Kobe is $30.24 per cubic ton, 
 whereas that from Bombay to Kobe (deducting a rebate) 
 is 10.59 rupees ($3.48) and from Shanghai to Kobe 
 $3.34 (=$1.67 gold) .1 
 
 It is obvious that American cotton must have char- 
 acteristic excellencies to compete at all. "Chinese cot- 
 ton is usually white, but does not possess any special 
 luster, while most of the Indian cottons have a brown- 
 ish tinge and both cottons are harsh. American cotton 
 is softer and more lustrous and the addition of it not 
 only adds to the strength but improves the feel and 
 
 ^ " Cotton Goods in Japan, " U. S. Department of Commerce Spec. 
 Agt. Series No. 86, 1914. 
 
124 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 appearance of the yarn and enables the mills to obtain 
 a better price." ^ 
 
 American cotton therefore will always have a market 
 if the Japanese mill owner can afford it. The Panama 
 canal ought to work an immediate and profound change 
 in the cotton situation and establish the supremacy of 
 our trade in that staple with Japan. Recognizing this, 
 the Nippon Yusen Kaisha S.S. hne to Seattle will be 
 reorganized after 191 5 and the service of those ships 
 will thereafter be extended to the newly organized 
 Panama Hne, for which a governmental subsidy of 
 $4,185,765 will be appropriated for the next five years. 
 
 Notwithstanding the great consumption of cotton 
 in Japan, it figures also as a very important item in 
 her export trade. An almost hmitless market exists at 
 present in China for cotton goods. In 1913 Japan sold 
 nearly $49,000,000 worth of cotton manufactures to 
 China, over six times the value of the raw cotton she 
 purchased from her. Thus a large part of American- 
 grown cotton finds its way to the Chinese consumer by 
 way of the Japanese factory. 
 
 Another important item of Japan's imports is that 
 of iron, steel, and machinery, of which she bought in 
 1913, roughly $40,000,000 worth,— Great Britain lead- 
 ing in this trade, with America and Germany con- 
 ^ L.c, p. 27. 
 
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC EVOLUTION 
 
 125 
 
 tributing about 25 per cent each. Kerosene oil is an 
 important item of import. Its use is widespread and 
 increasing and the oil fields of Northwest Japan never 
 have been a very paying venture. The United States 
 sells to Japan about $4,000,000 worth of oil annually, 
 and the Dutch East Indies half as much more. The 
 importation of wheat and wheat flour, which is mostly 
 supplied by America, is rapidly increasing and reaches a 
 value of over $6,000,000. 
 
 Turning to the other side of the ledger again, we find 
 a few items relatively conspicuous. The following 
 table will show this for the year 1913 : 
 
 ITEIIS 
 
 JAPAK Exported to 
 
 
 U.S.A. 
 
 Europe 
 
 Asia 
 
 Raw silk 
 
 Silk mfg. (Habutaye) . . . 
 Cotton yams and textiles . 
 
 Porcelains 
 
 Tea 
 
 $62,703,000 
 
 2,494,000 
 
 158,000 
 
 1,368,000 
 
 4,424,000 
 
 $3o,5SS,ooo 
 
 9,236,000 
 
 78,000 
 
 3S4,ooo 
 
 $3,393,000 
 
 60,872,000 
 
 125,000 
 
 85,000 
 
 Total exports .... 
 
 $95,498,000 
 
 $73,321,000 
 
 $122,554,000 
 
 In the above table many important items are omitted 
 in order to render more conspicuous the most important 
 ones. Thus Austraha and Canada are not mentioned, 
 although Japan maintains a growing trade with both. 
 A great variety of cheap manufactured goods, such as 
 
126 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 clocks, matches, and umbrellas, is sold to China. It 
 should be mentioned also that the exports to South 
 Manchuria (Kuantung), which are listed in the official 
 statistics, are omitted on the ground that, whatever may 
 be the diplomatic fictions still maintained, this district 
 is really part of Japan and its trade is "interstate traffic." 
 Ceylon tea is getting to be a very strong competitor in 
 the American market ^ and of recent years has replaced 
 Japanese tea to a great extent. The Japanese govern- 
 ment, recognizing this, is now attempting, unsuccess- 
 fully so far, to meet it by stimulating the development 
 of similar (dark) tea in Formosa. A trade which is of 
 very recent origin, but one that will without doubt 
 show an extraordinary development in the near future, 
 is that of cheap toys and favors. There is a large market 
 for these in America at Christmas, Easter, Hallowe'en, 
 and other festivals, which until very recently has been 
 suppUed by Germany. The writer has seen go-downs 
 in Kobe hterally filled with thousands of kinds of these 
 novelties. It only remains to create or enlarge the 
 market in America. These goods are manufactured 
 by the so-called "family industry" system rather than 
 in factories, a method that has already been described. 
 
 ^ Over 80 per cent of the tea produced in Japan finds its market in 
 America. The decline of the trade is seen in comparing the annual ex- 
 ports. In 1911 this represented $7,189,000; in 1913, $4,423,000. 
 
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC EVOLUTION 127 
 
 The most striking item in this table is that of raw 
 silk, which constitutes more than two thirds the entire 
 export to the United States and of which we buy twice 
 as much as all the rest of the world. Raw silk com- 
 prises nearly 30 per cent of Japan's entire export to the 
 world. Many times and in various places the culture 
 of silk has been attempted in this country, always with- 
 out success. It requires a cheap grade of labor of a 
 pecuHar temperamental make-up in which the Oriental 
 need fear no competition with the Occidental. The 
 great value of this import is an index to our national 
 wealth and luxury, for it is manufactured here into silk 
 stuffs, most of which are consumed at home. In the 
 manufacture of this raw siUc into high-grade fabrics 
 (other than kabutaye) American mills lead the world, 
 and it will be many a day before Japan can compete 
 with us in the world's market in this line. 
 
 Approximately, Japan sells annually to America 
 about 25 per cent less of goods than she does to Asia 
 (chiefly China) and over 30 per cent more than she does 
 to all Europe. Her total exports to the entire world 
 for 1913, totaled $314,965,186. Nearly one third of 
 all the goods she sells, therefore, are bought by the 
 United States. 
 
128 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 The Balance of Trade 
 
 The difference between the total value of goods bought 
 and sold by a nation in the channels of foreign conunerce 
 is known as the "Balance of Trade." This balance 
 for many years has been against Japan. In 1913 the 
 excess of the value of imports over exports was more 
 than $48,000,000. In other words, Japan had to pay 
 out that sum in gold abroad, instead of cancelling the 
 debt with the account on the other side of the ledger. 
 The distribution of this balance is interesting and 
 significant. In the account with Asia, that balance 
 was $36,000,000. With Europe the balance against 
 Japan was almost the same, $36,500,000. It is only 
 when we come to America that we find the situation 
 reversed, for in the same year we bought of Japan over 
 $32,000,000 worth of goods over and above what she 
 bought of us. This point has an especial significance 
 in connection with future contingencies. 
 
 Japan is the happy hunting ground of the well-to-do 
 globe-trotter and the adverse balance of trade is con- 
 siderably mitigated by the disbursements of tourists 
 in Japan, which taken together with the remittances 
 sent home by Japanese abroad (in Hawaii and Cah- 
 fornia, for example) may in good years even up the 
 account. An index of this is the number of foreigners 
 
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC EVOLUTION 129 
 
 who land at Japanese ports during the year. This 
 niunberin 1913 was 21,886, including over 4000 British 
 and 5000 Americans. 
 
 Of course an occasional adverse balance of trade is 
 not to be considered a national disaster, especially if the 
 amount involved is represented by industrial invest- 
 ments that are later to bring profitable returns. But 
 with a nation Uke Japan, carrying a very heavy per 
 capita national debt and at the same time with an ambi- 
 tious military program that diverts milUons into un- 
 productive channels, it is a much more serious matter. 
 
 In the thirteen years from 1900 to 19 13, only twice 
 has the trade balance been in favor of Japan (two and a 
 half milUon dollars in 1906 and nine milhons in 1909).^ 
 The total of the excess of imports into Japan over 
 exports for the other eleven years is $376,085,000. 
 
 Japan^s Market in China 
 
 The "awakening of China" has been much heralded. 
 A decade ago when the German Emperor had his vision 
 of an armed "yellow peril" this awakening was viewed 
 
 * The first of these was due to business depression of that year ; the 
 second in part to the Imperial Boshin rescript enjoining national economy. 
 It must be understood that the phrase, "trade balance," as used above 
 and as ordinarily used, refers only to "visible" exports and imports. 
 Such an adverse trade balance may often be compensated, as in the case 
 of England, by a favorable balance of "invisible" exports and imports. 
 
I30 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 with considerable alarm and European statesmen re- 
 minded one another when too late of the virtue in the 
 adage to let "sleeping dogs lie." This panic has passed 
 away. It is realized that from the standpoint of national 
 aggression China was more like an unstimulated jelly- 
 fish than a slumbering dragon. 
 
 But the awakened China has none the less a persistent 
 interest for the rest of the world. Four hundred mil- 
 lion human beings beginning (so we imagine) to throw 
 off the shackles of ages of conservatism and adopt at 
 least the externals of Western civilization, with new 
 ideas, new aspirations, new wants, — what a market is 
 this for the trade of Christendom ! A country of ap- 
 parently limitless natural resources, almost untouched, 
 with a population of unparalleled industry, — here are 
 the factors to create the wealth that makes China a 
 much-sought customer. 
 
 The recognition of this condition has long dominated 
 the field of international diplomacy. The possession 
 of India and the need for protecting her long sea lanes 
 to that Empire are responsible for Gibraltar and the 
 Suez canal. To get at the Orient by another route 
 has been the central problem of other European nations 
 with oversea ambitions, and the mainspring of much of 
 their foreign policy. It is this that impelled the Rus- 
 sians to throw their 5000-mile railway across Siberia 
 
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC EVOLUTION 131 
 
 to the Pacific and to seek there an ice-free port, a pohcy 
 that led eventually to the war of 1904. It was the 
 quest for the markets of China that led to all the polit- 
 ical undertakings of Germany in Turkey and the near 
 East, the struggle for a "place in the sun" and ulti- 
 mately the European conflict of 1914. 
 
 Nature has relieved two great nations of the necessity 
 for this struggle. Japan is at the very door of China 
 and America is across the ocean. Australia may be a 
 factor in the near future, but her relations so far have 
 been with Europe rather than with Asia. Compared 
 with America, Japan has the great advantage of prox- 
 imity and a certain common basis of written language. 
 America has the advantage of great wealth and natural 
 resources. What America sells to Asia is largely raw 
 materials. What Japan sells is of necessity chiefly 
 manufactured products. It is but natural then that 
 Japan should consider herself the middle man or com- 
 prador of the Orient and that she should seek every 
 avenue to China's markets. In fact the dominance of 
 this market is absolutely essential to that position of 
 national prestige and influence which is her ambition. 
 Her success so far has been very marked. 
 
 The amount of the exports from Japan to China has 
 increased year by year until in 1913 they were about 
 160 per cent greater than they were in 1902, whereas 
 
132 
 
 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 those of the United States had increased by only 20 
 per cent.* Both countries show a sharp fall in the year 
 1909 due to the Chinese boycott agitation. Japan 
 quickly recovered, but America has done so but little. 
 The gains for Japan from 191 1 to 1913 are phenomenal, 
 approximating $20,000,000 a year. In 1913 this great 
 gain (about two thirds of the entire American export 
 trade) is assignable almost entirely to increased sales of 
 copper (increase 100 per cent), cotton textiles and yarns 
 (increase 33 per cent), and refined sugar (increase nearly 
 100 per cent). The sales of cotton goods alone were 
 over $10,000,000 greater in 1913 than 1912. The great 
 
 ^The following table shows the increase in the value of Japan's 
 exports to China for the past twelve years. 
 
 Exports to China (Including Hong Kong) 
 
 
 Japan 
 
 Untted Statbs 
 
 1902 
 
 $36,357,000 
 
 $22,604,000 
 
 igo3 
 
 47,359,000 
 
 19,203,000 
 
 1904 
 
 48,572,000 
 
 21,886,000 
 
 190S 
 
 54,448,000 
 
 57,596,000 
 
 1906 
 
 58,890,000 
 
 33,327,000 
 
 1907 
 
 53,010,000 
 
 27,677,000 
 
 1908 
 
 40,472,000 
 
 26,672,000 
 
 1909 
 
 36,544,000 
 
 20,549,000 
 
 1910 
 
 56,748,000 
 
 16,160,000 
 
 1911 
 
 56,336,000 
 
 26,602,000 
 
 1912 
 
 71,482,000 
 
 26,736,000 
 
 1913 
 
 93,765,000 
 
 31,758,000 
 
 1914 
 
 97,824,000 
 
 35,395,000 
 
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC EVOLUTION 133 
 
 increase in sugar export, in spite of a heavy home con- 
 sumption, is due to a strongly stimulated production of 
 raw sugar in Formosa, where it has enjoyed government 
 bounties, tariff drawbacks, and farm subsidies. Pre- 
 viously, almost aU the raw sugar came from Java to be 
 refined in Japan. Another item of great importance 
 in Japan's China trade is that of small manufactures 
 such as clocks, matches, lamps, and umbrellas. These 
 things are luxuries for the moment, but quickly become 
 necessities as the spread of OccidentaHsm continues in 
 China. Suppose that education in Western conven- 
 iences had advanced to a stage at which the consump- 
 tion of matches in China is one five-cent box a year for 
 each inhabitant, — not a very extravagant prospect 
 surely. Yet the sum total of that year's trade in 
 matches would be $20,000,000, almost as much as 
 America's total exports to China today. 
 
 Of course this assumes that China would not begin 
 to manufacture her own matches, an assumption which 
 is very unlikely. It is more probable that before long 
 Chinese matches would begin to compete in the world's 
 markets with those of Japan and other countries. For 
 the present, however, that contingency is a matter of 
 the future. Certainly, just now, Japan's growing trade 
 with China in the products of her factories seems to be 
 outdistancing competitors. 
 
134 
 
 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 Other evidence of the growing prominence of Japanese 
 trade with China is seen in the great growth of her ship- 
 ping. During the last half of the nineteenth century 
 Great Britain dominated this trade and the greater 
 part of it was carried in British ships. The last fifteen 
 or twenty years have seen the gradual encroachment of 
 German and Japanese interests until England's pre- 
 eminence appears Ukely to slip from her. This result 
 has been due not so much to the decline of British trade 
 per se as to the fact that the extension of the Chinese 
 trade, which has been rapid, has mostly gone to her 
 rivals."^ 
 
 Japanese Finances 
 
 Japan has been forced to levy upon every conceiv- 
 able source of revenue to provide funds for her military 
 and commercial enterprises. First, there is the land 
 tax, running from 2.5 per cent to 5.5 per cent of the 
 assessed value. This supplies about $4,300,000. Next 
 
 ' The tonnage of the shipping which cleared Chinese ports for the past 
 ten years was as follows; the percentages are those of approximate 
 increase : 
 
 Great Britain 
 
 Japan 
 
 Germany 
 
 1902 
 1907 
 1912 
 
 3,627,364 
 
 4,594,424 (34 %) 
 4,930,821 (6 %) 
 
 1,223,601 
 2,416,400 (so %) 
 2,991,411 (25 %) 
 
 1,023,77s 
 1,291,067 (30 %) 
 1,310,494 (i| %) 
 
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC EVOLUTION 135 
 
 in importance is the income tax, on a sliding scale with 
 a minimum of $200. The percentage of taxation runs 
 from I per cent on the minimum to 5.5 per cent on 
 $50,000 or more. It is of interest to discover that only 
 thirteen individuals in the Empire have an annual 
 income of more than $20,000, only 67 pay on $12,000, 
 and only 140 pay on $5500. Only seven out of every 
 thousand make $1400 per year. Yet the income tax 
 yields the government about $15,000,000 a year. 
 
 In addition to these two excises there is a business 
 tax levied under some twelve different headings; this 
 yields about $10,000,000 more. Then there is a docu- 
 ment tax on the "ad valorem" plan; a tax on soy (a 
 Japanese sauce) ; a tax on medicine ; a tax on liquors 
 corresponding to our own "internal revenue"; a tax on 
 sugar (from $1 to $5 a picul of 433 pounds) ; a 10 per 
 cent to 15 per cent special tax on silks and woolens 
 and a tax on traveling. Lastly there is the tariff which 
 is nicely adjusted to the principle of bringing in all 
 that the traffic will bear. Aside from foreign books, 
 fertilizers, and certain raw materials such as cotton, 
 rubber, ores, rags, and hemp, that are utilized in native 
 industries, everything on the list bears the maximu m 
 charge, subject only to the "law of diminishing returns." 
 The income from the tariff is roughly from $20,000,000 
 to $25,000,000 annually. 
 
136 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 In addition to the usual methods of taxation the 
 Japanese government realizes a direct profit from the 
 control of certain monopolies. These are three in 
 number: tobacco, salt, and camphor. In 1898 the 
 government took over the control of leaf tobacco, re- 
 quiring that all crops should be sold to it and reselling 
 the product at a fixed profit. But the Japanese people 
 consume incredible numbers of cheap cigarettes, and 
 two or three Japanese firms as well as the American 
 Tobacco Company (located in Kyoto) began to develop 
 and control a very large trade in the manufactured 
 article. The government, having embarked in trade, 
 could not tolerate a competitor, and in 1903 a law was 
 passed making the manufacture and sale of cut tobacco 
 and cigarettes also a monopoly. The companies re- 
 ceived an appraised sum for their plants and stocks, and 
 in addition 20 per cent profit on a year's sales. The 
 American company, thus closed out of Japan, went 
 over to Manchuria after the war and started a competi- 
 tion with the Japanese government. 
 
 The second monopoly is that of salt, which was taken 
 under control in 1905. The government does not 
 control the manufacture of salt, but only its sale. It is 
 practically all made from sea water. The importation 
 of foreign salt is discouraged and only allowed in special 
 cases by permission of the government. For all Japa- 
 
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC EVOLUTION 137 
 
 nese salt exported, a sort of bonus is paid the producer 
 by the government. The salt monopoly is very un- 
 popular. 
 
 The third monopoly is that of camphor, which is one 
 of the principal products of Formosa, although a con- 
 siderable amount of camphor is also produced in Japan 
 proper. 
 
 These three monopolies produced a net revenue in 
 1912-13 of over $30,000,000, which is approximately 
 the annual income from this source. 
 
 It is needless to say that a financial system which 
 is compelled to resort to such extraordinary expedients 
 in taxation is a heavy burden upon the people. Par- 
 ticularly is it true that taxes on salt, kerosene, and cot- 
 ton fabrics impose the heaviest load upon the poorest 
 classes. The income tax statistics disclose the indi- 
 vidual poverty of the Japanese compared with other 
 peoples. But even this takes no account of the great 
 numbers below the minimum income level who pay, 
 nevertheless, indirectly, a heavy price for the privilege 
 of existence. 
 
 In 1905 two well-known Japanese economists pub- 
 lished the results of their investigation of the national 
 wealth of Japan.^ They svunmed up their evaluations 
 under thirteen heads, viz., land, buildings; house fit- 
 1 "The National Wealth of Japan," by E. Igarashi and H. Takahashi. 
 
138 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 tings and furniture; domestic animals and birds; 
 mineral wealth; marine products; gas, waterworks, 
 and electrical enterprises; shipping; bullion; joint 
 stock companies and banks ; goods in stock ; railways, 
 telegraph and telephones ; navy. 
 
 Considering how soon naval equipment is "scrapped," 
 the last item ($90,000,000) might, perhaps, be omitted 
 from the table. The authors subtracted the amount 
 of the national debt ($202,708,000 in 1905) and arrived 
 at the net sum of $12,357,130,369. As the national 
 debt in 1913 amounted to $1,276,897,000, mostly occa- 
 sioned by wars and hence not represented by a corre- 
 sponding increment in the amount of the national 
 wealth, the above sum would be decreased to something 
 over eleven billions of dollars. This would amount to 
 approximately $201 per capita. The per capita wealth 
 of the United States, by comparison, is $1310, or over 
 six times as great. 
 
 With the burden of taxation growing yearly heavier, 
 the cost of living has been rising equally rapidly. This 
 is a phenomenon that is world-wide and is to be as- 
 cribed only partly, if at all, to local conditions in Japan. 
 A good index to this is the rise in the price of rice. In 
 1907 this was $8.01 per koku (5 bushels), in 1912 it was 
 $10.18. 
 
 A few years ago a Japanese economist investigated 
 
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC EVOLUTION 139 
 
 the status of what he called the "middle-class farmer" 
 in Japan and published his results in a technical Japanese 
 economic journal.^ They were rather starthng. He 
 foimd the average income of such a man to be $133.55 
 gold per annum and the average taxes to be 17 per cent. 
 The approximation of the bare necessities for Hving, 
 this economist estimated to be $158.10, leaving a theo- 
 retical deficit of $24.55. And I imagine that to a great 
 many of the middle-class farmers in Japan there is a 
 pronovmced shadow of reality to that theoretical deficit. 
 
 National Expenditures 
 
 It is of particular interest to scan the debit side of 
 the books of a nation so heavily in debt as Japan and 
 whose bonds are held so extensively by foreigners. 
 Has the borrowed money been invested in betterments 
 of the whole nation or in remunerative industry or has 
 it been sunk in the pit of military enterprise? 
 
 We have already mentioned the paternal character 
 of government enterprises in providing bonuses, sub- 
 sidies, refunds, loans at sub-market rates and similar 
 aids to selected fractions of the population on the 
 principle of ultimately benefiting the whole nation. 
 This is an expensive policy and one that has never before 
 
 * Takahashi Hideyomi, in the Tokyo Keizai Zasshi, vol. 61, p. 116. 
 
I40 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 been attempted on so comprehensive a scale. Its out- 
 come will be watched with much interest by foreign 
 students of history and economics. 
 
 Somewhat the same considerations apply to the nation- 
 alization of railways which has been recently consum- 
 mated. The purchase of those important lines that 
 had been built by private companies involved a bond 
 issue amounting to about $250,000,000, but it is antici- 
 pated that this will be paid off out of the profits and the 
 account is not included in the annual budget. 
 
 The ordinary budget expenditures total about 
 $207,000,000 annually, of which about $58,000,000 go 
 to the army and navy in the regular channels. The 
 latter two also take about $33,000,000 a year from the 
 extraordinary appropriations, making over $90,000,000, 
 or nearly one third, out of a grand total annual expendi- 
 ture of $277,000,000, that goes for the upkeep of a 
 military establishment. It is true that the same pro- 
 portion is maintained by Germany, England, and even 
 the United States. But it must be remembered that 
 these are rich creditor nations that may waste their 
 substance as they will. 
 
 This brings us to the complicated subject of the 
 national debt, a fuU discussion of which would be in 
 place only in a treatise on fijiancial history. We may 
 note one fact, however, that the curve of the national 
 
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC EVOLUTION 
 
 141 
 
 debt of Japan has steadily risen, each year overtopping 
 the last. In 187 1, the first year of constitutional gov- 
 ernment in Japan, the national debt was $2,500,000 or 
 seven cents per capita of population; in 1890 it was 
 $124,810,000 or $3.11 per capita; in 1900 it was 
 $251,488,000 or $5.74 per capita. The subsequent 
 changes may be noted in the following table : 
 
 Table of the Total National Debt of Japan from 1901 to 1914 
 WITH THE Relating per Capita Percentage 
 
 I90I 
 
 $254,234,000 
 
 1902 
 
 262,113,000 
 
 1903 
 
 276,090,000 
 
 1904 
 
 280,790,000 
 
 I90S 
 
 495,644,000 
 
 1906 
 
 936,190,000 
 
 1907 
 
 1,108,862,000 
 
 1908 
 
 1,138,410,000 
 
 1909 
 
 1,291,402,000 
 
 I9I0 
 
 1,325,178,000 
 
 I9II 
 
 1,276,833,000 
 
 I9I2 
 
 1,246,960,000 
 
 I9I3 
 
 1,272,540,000 
 
 1914 (May) 
 
 1,267,511,000 
 
 $5.31 per capita 
 
 S-44 
 
 S.6S 
 
 5.66 
 
 9.84 
 18.45 
 21.66 
 21.45 
 
 19-57 
 19.77 
 18.65 
 18.05 
 18.42 
 
 In order to meet the annual interest on foreign debt, 
 together with the annual unfavorable trade balance, the 
 Japanese government is compelled to maintain a large 
 gold reserve abroad. The gold thus hoarded at the 
 end of 1913 (aside from a reserve of $65,000,000 kept 
 at home to maintain the gold standard) amounted to 
 
142 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 $120,500,000; $102,000,000 in England, $13,000,000 
 in France; $3,500,000 in the United States and 
 $2,000,000 in Germany. 
 
 There is another side to this story, for if there were 
 no compensating income to counterbalance the heavy 
 outflow of gold, the drain would be heavier perhaps than 
 the present system of finance could stand. We have 
 already mentioned the amount of cash left in Japan 
 by Occidental travelers, a variable but by no means 
 inconsiderable amount. To this must be added a large 
 sum that is annually remitted home by the Japanese 
 abroad. The Minister of Finance recently announced 
 that this sum amounted to $13,000,000 for 191 2. It is 
 obvious that if a sufficiently large army of Japanese 
 should be quartered on foreign soil, as it were, sending 
 home the profits of their toil, the total amount alone 
 might in time even up the adverse trade balance. 
 Whether this would be looked upon with complacency 
 by the foreign nations is another question. And this 
 introduces us to one of the most vexing problems facing 
 the Japanese people — the status of their nationals 
 in foreign lands. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE " YELLOW PERIL " IN A " WHITE MAN'S COUNTRY " 
 
 The dynamic view of history sees mankind in a con- 
 stant flux, racial streams flowing this way and that, in 
 great migrations through the years and the centuries. 
 The clashes that have ensued when one wave encoun- 
 tered another, when the occupants of a frontier terri- 
 tory resisted the invader — these make up the tissue 
 of historic narrative, which is chiefly concerned with 
 fighting. These migrations began long before the dawn 
 of history and have continued to the present and we have 
 no reason to suppose that they will not persist in the 
 future, for the inertia of the human stream is very great. 
 
 Until comparatively recently, such movements have 
 been slow and hardly apparent to any one generation. 
 Nowadays, however, thanks to mechanical aids to 
 transportation, population movements are so rapid and 
 the results so startling that mankind for the first time 
 feels called upon to look ahead and, anticipating clashes 
 before they come, to try to avert them. 
 
 For many centuries, Asia seemed the bottomless well 
 whence came these human floods. The Persian invasion 
 
 143 
 
144 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 of Greece, the conquest of Southeastern Europe by the 
 Huns in the fifth century, the activities of the Tartars 
 under Genghis Khan in the thirteenth century, whose 
 hordes not only overran Europe but even turned to the 
 East, subdued Korea and attacked Japan, — these are 
 conspicuous examples of the pressure of Asia upon the 
 rest of the world. 
 
 In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, European 
 adventurers in their search for treasure disclosed the 
 two Americas to conquest and before long India and 
 the isles of the sea came under the sway of the Cauca- 
 sian. In the last century Africa has been parceled out 
 like a loaf of bread. 
 
 It might almost seem that the impulse which Asia 
 gave Europe from the East has been transmitted around 
 the globe. At any rate, the beginning of the present 
 century finds the European white man in control of 
 practically all the lands of the earth except the populous 
 regions of East Asia, — China and Japan. Against 
 the rock-like conservatism of these ancient Asiatic 
 states the tides of Occidental power have beaten up 
 and dashed themselves to spray. 
 
 The frontier of European civilization is the west 
 coast of America and the island continent of Australia, 
 and these lands face the Orient with peculiar interest, 
 now that the Orient has wakened to the existence of 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL" 145 
 
 the rest of the world. It is this situation that inspires 
 those long-distance prophets who see the Pacific Ocean 
 the scene of the most significant human conflicts the world 
 has yet endured. For it is no longer a matter of Europe 
 pouring itself out over the rest of the earth. Rather 
 Europe has come to a stop and must brace herself to 
 withstand the shock of East Asia pressing out in its turn. 
 
 The conditions that led to the comparatively recent 
 domination by Europe of the New World, Africa, and 
 Australia, were at the outset not those that have led 
 to the great racial migrations of the past nor indeed to 
 those of the present. It was not the pressure of over- 
 crowding that led primarily to the discovery of the new 
 lands and their settlement. Rather it was the lure of 
 gold, the spur of adventure, the lust of conquest, or the 
 promptings of religious zeal. Such motives led daring 
 souls to forsake their old homes for the new. The spirit 
 of such pioneers made possible the founding of our 
 Republic, the astonishing development of its material 
 resources, and the courageous vision that has made the 
 Far West of America one with the East. 
 
 Our latter-day immigration from the Mediterranean 
 countries and from Russia could never have achieved 
 a nation in such a space of time. These latter are the 
 overflow, crowded out by pressure of circumstances at 
 home, and they are very different in their psychology. 
 
146 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 The American immigrants of the seventeenth and eight- 
 eenth centuries, and of the first half of the nineteenth 
 as well, struck out into the wilderness and subdued it, 
 whereas their present-day successors huddle in cities 
 and save their pennies. 
 
 Preeminently of the former type were the men and 
 women who went to Cahfomia and the West in '49, and 
 their descendants retain many of their characteristics. 
 A man of this tj^e is accustomed to rely upon his own 
 initiative and Hkely to assume the status of an overlord 
 to "natives" or foreigners of a different caste. This 
 feature cannot be omitted from a study of the problem 
 of the Asiatic in California. The same thing applies as 
 well to the white settlers of Australia and West Canada. 
 
 The Experience of South Africa 
 
 In India and China the population is so dense that 
 the struggle for mere existence is extraordinarily keen. 
 Partly on this account at least, we find in these countries 
 a characteristic "coolie" class of unskilled laborers, 
 accustomed to live on the cheapest fare and to do the 
 hardest kinds of labor. Cheap labor of this sort means 
 large profits to owners of plantations, and the presence 
 of a large cooKe class, by driving out the competition 
 of the white laborer, leaves all the remaining whites 
 in the status of employers and overseers. 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL" 147 
 
 From the middle of the seventeenth century, when 
 the Dutch colonized South Africa, until the era of British 
 domination in the nineteenth, labor in South Africa 
 was aU done by black and Asiatic slaves. The British 
 freed the slaves, and in consequence the labor problem 
 grew constantly more difi&cult. Finally, in 1859 they 
 decided to import Hindus. To-day the Hindu popu- 
 lation in Natal is greater than the white, and they con- 
 trol the majority of the shops and farms. A writer 
 on the subject, after saying that the Hindu has driven 
 out the white workman, since the latter cannot compete 
 on the former's scale of living, states that "The Asiatic 
 is worth less to the country than the white man he dis- 
 places." It is estimated in Natal that the Oriental 
 only contributes £i/6/4§ a year to the public revenue, 
 whereas the white resident contributes £30/11/4. 
 
 The Hindu problem for South Africa grows daily 
 more menacing. The Hindu is a British subject, and 
 when he has finished his term of indenture as an imported 
 laborer in Natal and expresses a desire to stay on instead 
 of returning to India, he quite naturally fails to see why 
 he cannot do so ; why, in other words, a British subject 
 in one colony loses his rights in another. In the early 
 part of 1914, the resentment of the Hindu broke out 
 in the form of strikes and riots. The war has diverted 
 public attention from this part of the world, but in this 
 
148 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 apparently irreconcilable conflict between the white 
 and brown elements of the British Empire is foimd one 
 of the most difficult problems that British ImperiaUsm 
 has ever been called upon to face. 
 
 The White Australia Doctrine 
 
 In the early days of the gold excitement in Australia 
 it was difficult to keep white laborers on the ranches, 
 and Chinese cooUes were imported, but the consequences 
 of letting in the yellow flood were soon apparent, and 
 exclusion laws were enacted by the various provincial 
 governments. The Kanakas presented even a more 
 difficult problem, and it was not long before opposition 
 developed toward the entrance of all "off-colored" 
 races. The idea of keeping Australia a "white man's 
 country" took early root. 
 
 In AustraKa and New Zealand, perhaps because of 
 the newness of their settlement and the lack of conser- 
 vative traditions, the modern doctrines of the labor 
 parties, including those of socialism, have made great 
 headway. It is not too much to assert that politics 
 in the antipodes is controlled entirely by the labor 
 party. This does not mean that Australia is completely 
 unionized, but rather that every issue is fought out as 
 between labor and the rest of the community. The 
 slogan of this party is "Socialism in our Time." And 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL" 149 
 
 it is not difficult to infer the attitude of such an element 
 toward the question of the importation of coolie labor. 
 In this they find themselves at one with the rest of the 
 white population. 
 
 But the AustraUan labor party has been more than 
 short-sighted. Not only have they opposed the immi- 
 gration of Orientals; they have also bitterly opposed 
 the immigration of Southern Europeans as well. As a 
 consequence the sparse white population of this huge 
 continent is almost stationary, although it would appear 
 that the strongest sort of practical opposition to the 
 pressure of the Orient would be the filling up of the 
 Commonwealth with assimilable whites and thus in- 
 creasing the European population. For the condition 
 of Australia to-day with respect to the physical subju- 
 gation of the country resembles that of America a cen- 
 tury ago. 
 
 In fact, the arrogant point of view of Australians to- 
 day is much like that of Americans previous to the 
 Spanish war. But the world has moved fast, and 
 whereas America then could bluff with impunity, Aus- 
 tralia may see her bluff called at any time. 
 
 Australia, hke South Africa, is in a peculiar situation 
 as a part of an Empire the majority of whose members 
 are colored. The population and immigration question, 
 being foremost in the minds of her statesmen, was a 
 
I50 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 determining factor in bringing about the consolidation 
 of the various colonies into the Commonwealth at the 
 beginning of the present century. In union is strength : 
 and a united Australia could bring more pressure to 
 bear upon the home country than could independent 
 provinces. 
 
 That the immigration problem was one of the chief 
 motives for the establishment of the Australian Conmion- 
 wealth is evident from the fact that the first two laws 
 passed by the new Parliament dealt with this subject. 
 
 These laws were original enough and drastic enough 
 to merit special mention. They provided for the usual 
 basis of exclusion of immigrants as paupers, criminals, 
 etc.; but they provided also for a "literacy test," by 
 which it was very explicitly stated that only such for- 
 eigners should be admitted into the Commonwealth as 
 should prove themselves able to write at dictation fifty 
 words in any European language and sign them in the 
 presence of the immigration ofiicer. Thus, if there 
 were any reason for excluding Germans, they might be 
 given a passage in Spanish or Polish. The act was of 
 course devised against Orientals, — Hindus, Chinese, 
 and Japanese. It was explicitly promised, in fact, that 
 it should never be applied against Europeans. This 
 discrimination against the Asiatic implied in the de- 
 mand for a test in any European language gave great 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL" 151 
 
 offense, and in 1905 the act was amended by striking 
 out the word "European." Accordingly the test may 
 be applied by requiring the dictation in any language, 
 which may save the Oriental's face, but does not help 
 him much, for the high court of Australia has decided ^ 
 the precedent that "it is for the ofl&cer and not the im- 
 migrant to select the language for the dictation test." 
 That the Asiatic is aimed at, however, is obvious from 
 the fact that but one Oriental passed the test in 1905 
 and none has done so since then. The law was again 
 amended in 191 2, but the dictation test is retained. But 
 one quite unexpected result was that white immigration 
 into the Commonwealth almost ceased, it being diverted 
 to New Zealand. 
 
 Since the recent miUtary programs of the Japanese 
 have been inaugurated, the Australians have become 
 more fearful than ever. The expansive movement of 
 Japan is viewed with what appears to be quite unneces- 
 sary alarm, seeing how far away from that country they 
 are. Yet the sparsely settled condition of their conti- 
 nent is no doubt inviting to an over-populous nation, 
 and the Anglo-Japanese alliance arouses misgivings as 
 to what support England would give her dependency if 
 a crisis should arise. 
 
 This has been the prime motive of a change of poUcy 
 ' In the case of Cliia Gee vs. Martin. 
 
1 52 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 with regard to national defense. Hitherto Australia has 
 given a subsidy of £240,000 to the home country. This 
 has now been withdrawn, rather to England's disgust, if 
 one may judge by current EngUsh criticism. The func- 
 tion of England's fleet for several years has been that of 
 protecting Great Britain from Germany, British in- 
 terests in the Pacific being left to her ally Japan. Such 
 a plan has not suited the Australians at all, and they 
 have set about building a fleet of their own.^ The newly 
 begun fleet early had a chance to prove its usefulness, 
 not to Australia but to the British Empire, for it was 
 the Australian cruiser Sydney, it wiU be remembered, 
 not the Japanese, that put an end to the activities of the 
 Emden. It is worth noting, also, that the Japanese fleet 
 was unable to prevent the destruction of the English 
 squadron under Admiral Cradock off the coast of Chile. 
 Situated as they are, the Austrahans have a very keen 
 interest in the progress and completion of the Panama 
 canal. Not only Austraha but all the South Pacific 
 will without question be immensely benefited by it. 
 
 'The Australian "unit" consists of one armored cruiser, three un- 
 armored cruisers, six destroyers, and three submarines, representing a 
 total cost of £3,695,000. It is to be identical with the China and East 
 Indian naval units. Before the project was begun £1,000,000 was raised 
 by popular subscription to buy a "dreadnought" as a gift to the home 
 country. This money, after being collected, however, was expended 
 otherwise, one half going to assist European immigration. 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL" 153 
 
 It is likely that with their present independence of the 
 mother country, Australia will before long enter into 
 more intimate relations with America than with 
 England. The Australian indeed might not be un- 
 willing to extend such an entente beyond the domain of 
 trade. For in the problems of the Pacific the United 
 States and the Commonwealth have much more in 
 common than the latter has with England. Such a 
 feeling was evident when the American fleet made its 
 memorable tour of the Pacific in 1908. Our fleet met 
 with such an enthusiastic reception in Australia, ex- 
 ceeding in fact the welcome extended to the Prince of 
 Wales when he went to open the Commonwealth Par- 
 liament, that England was astonished and a bit non- 
 plused. Sir Joseph Ward, Premier of New Zealand 
 from 1906 to 1 91 2, is quoted as saying quite flatly that 
 "AustraHa looks to America as her natural ally in the 
 coming struggle against Japanese domination." 
 
 The Austrahan standpoint is graphically put by a 
 writer in the National Review: "The Australian fleet 
 (when there reaUy is such a fleet) will be found (when 
 the day comes for defining the situation) to exist, first, 
 for the purpose of keeping Australia a white man's 
 country against aU comers, and second (only second) 
 for the defense of the mostly colored empire. . . . The 
 British fleet is for the purpose of defending the British 
 
154 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 Isles against the Germans. This is of minor importance 
 to the Australian as regards Australia.^ What he wants 
 to know, supposing a powerful Australian fleet is built 
 and put under purely British command, which side the 
 fleet will be on if the time comes to resolve whether the 
 colored subject is a real yellow citizen or not." And 
 again: "The white Australia idea is not a political 
 theory. It is a gospel. It counts for more than reli- 
 gion ; for more than flag, because the flag waves over 
 all kinds of races ; for more than the Empire, for the 
 Empire is mostly black, or brown or yellow ; is largely 
 heathen, largely polygamous, partly cannibal. . . . 
 In fact the white Australia doctrine is based on the 
 necessity for choosing between national existence and 
 national suicide." 
 
 In my own opinion the white Australia idea, as 
 embracing the continent, is doomed to failure on 
 account of climatic conditions. Experience has shown 
 pretty definitely that the white man caimot endure 
 in the tropics as a workman. He may be the brains 
 of a tropical population but not the bone and mus- 
 cle. The colored races will inherit the tropics in the 
 end. 
 
 Now nearly half of Australia lies within the tropics, 
 and never will be a white man's coimtry in the sense that 
 1 It would be a terrible mistake for Australia so to consider it. 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL' 
 
 155 
 
 white men will constitute the bulk of its population or 
 supply the labor for its development. The following 
 table gives some idea of this situation : 
 
 
 Area Sq. Mi. 
 
 WHIXK POPDIATION, 
 191I 
 
 Queensland 
 
 North Territory .... 
 West Australia .... 
 
 670,500 
 523,620 
 97S.920 
 
 605,813 
 
 3,310 
 
 282,114 
 
 
 2,170,040 
 
 891,237 
 
 This is a concentration of roughly one person to 2f 
 square miles. When we learn, however, that 23 per 
 cent of the population of Queensland is found in the city 
 of Perth and 38 per cent of that of West Australia in 
 Brisbane, the sparseness of population (about one man 
 to 3f square miles) becomes more striking. There are 
 about 100,000 aborigines in the whole continent. These 
 do not count in "holding the territory." 
 
 This enormous area is not today "effectively occu- 
 pied " by any race. Some day it will be. Certainly not 
 by whites, although if they are lucky they may domi- i 
 nate it. Nevertheless at the present moment Austra- 
 lians will not consider such a possibility. Long ago 
 Dr. Pearson, who in his "National Life and Character" 
 first called attention to the "Yellow Peril," said: 
 "Transform the northern half of our continent into a 
 
156 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 Natal with thirteen out of fourteen belonging to an 
 inferior race [Query : inferior from what standpoint] 
 and the southern half will speedily approximate to the 
 condition of the Cape Colony where the whites are in- 
 deed a masterful minority, but still only as one to four." 
 
 The Oriental in British Columbia 
 
 Very much the same sort of phenomenon that has 
 been described for AustraHa has been witnessed in 
 British Columbia at the first impact of the Orient. 
 The Canadian province, however, is handicapped in its 
 actions for the reason that it is controlled in international 
 affairs by Ottawa, and Ottawa is more responsive to the 
 wishes of England than to those of the people on the 
 western frontier. 
 
 Like AustraUa, British Columbia is very sparsely 
 settled, and as in Australia, too, the labor element is 
 / powerful. The first anti-Chinese law was passed in 
 \ 1885, allowing but one Chinese per ton to the ship, — 
 a highly original method of Hmitation. In addition, 
 a head tax of $50 was imposed. In 1901 this was in- 
 creased to $100; in 1904 to $500. In addition, the law 
 prohibited Chinese from working in factories or work- 
 shops, although they might be employed in caimeries 
 or as domestic servants. This statute produced a 
 curious and unforeseen result. Immigration, of course. 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL" 157 
 
 stopped almost immediately.^ The Chinese already 
 within the province became increasingly important 
 from an economic standpoint, particularly as domestic 
 servants, in which capacity they are unexcelled. Their 
 wages doubled and tripled. Mr. King, the Chairman of 
 the Royal Commission appointed to consider the prob- 
 lem, reported that "without organization, without 
 expense, without agitation, every Chinaman became a 
 unit in a labor group more favored than the most exclu- 
 sive and highly protected labor union." 
 
 When it came to the Japanese, and more recently the 
 Hindus, the difl&culties of the British Columbians be- 
 came more critical, for the former are the allies of the 
 home country, and the latter, subjects of the same king. 
 In 1899 Great Britain concluded a treaty with Japan, 
 granting full reciprocal privileges of residence, travel, 
 and protection. The treaty did not include all the 
 Empire, India for instance being excluded, but Canada 
 thought she saw a chance to cultivate trade with the 
 
 1 Between June 30, 1900, and Jan. i, 1904, 16,007 Chinese entered Van- 
 couver; between Jan. i, 1904, and June 30, 1907, only 121. Since then, 
 however, the number has increased, as will be seen in the following table. 
 In 1910 it was further required that each Chinese bring with him $200 in 
 cash. 
 
 igo8 1887 Chinese entered 
 
 1909 2156 Chinese entered 
 
 1910 5278 Chinese entered 
 
 191 1 6247 Chinese entered 
 
158 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 Orient, and, sometime later, enrolled herself as a third 
 party to the convention, in exchange for tariff reduc- 
 tions on certain Canadian exports. 
 
 Again things worked out in imexpected fashion. 
 Shortly after the Russian war, anti- Japanese sentiment 
 began to stir in CaUfomia, and at the same time wages 
 began to faU in Hawaii. Consequently thousands of 
 Japanese descended upon British Columbia, and within 
 a few years have possessed themselves of two important 
 sources of natural wealth, — the mines and the fisheries. 
 Very valuable copper mines worth above $5,000,000 
 are now said to be owned and operated by Japanese, 
 and the product exported. The fisheries are almost 
 wholly in their hands. In this occupation, it was of- 
 ficially estimated in 1913 that 10,500 laborers were 
 employed, each one of whom earned from $500 to $3000 
 a year, practically all of which was sent home. It is 
 worthy of note that foreigners are prohibited from either 
 mining or fishing in Japan. Indeed, according to the 
 law only British subjects are licensed to fish in Canadian 
 waters. But naturalization involves merely a three 
 years' residence and the oath of allegiance, and the law 
 appUes only to the fisherman proper, not to his boat- 
 puUers or helpers. Nevertheless there are over 3000 
 such naturalized Japanese in British Columbia. The 
 Japanese coolies take this allegiance so lightly that 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL" 159 
 
 the provincial government contravenes the Dominion 
 law by prohibiting the naturalized Japanese from 
 voting. This disfranchisement has been upheld by 
 the Privy Council at London, England, on the 
 ground that the province has power to limit its own 
 electorate. 
 
 It is too much to expect that the whites, particularly 
 the labor element, should view the rapid influx of 
 Japanese with complacency. In September, 1907, a 
 tramp steamer landed 1200 Japanese at Vancouver, 
 and the event precipitated a riot. Agitators worked 
 up the mob spirit and hoodlums attacked the Japanese 
 quarter and began to wreck the shops. Finally the 
 Japanese turned at bay and with knives, pistols, and 
 broken bottles, coimter-attacked so fiercely that the 
 attacking whites took to their heels ! A few days later 
 the arrival of a consignment of Hindus started more 
 rioting. The Ottawa government took a decided stand 
 and promptly reimbursed the victims. Strong ofl&cial 
 pressure was put upon the Japanese press to make Ught 
 of the incident and both Japan and Great Britain found 
 it expedient to "change the subject" as quickly as 
 possible. A scapegoat had to be found, however, and 
 this the EngKsh press discovered in "paid agitators from 
 California." The United States was thus responsible 
 for the whole occurrence, and the Yorozu, one of the 
 
i6o JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 irresponsible yellow Journals of Tokyo, expressed the 
 belief of a certain section of the Japanese public, in 
 attributing the affair to the weak-kneed policy of the 
 Japanese Foreign Ofl&ce in connection with the San 
 Francisco affairs. 
 
 The next year, the British Columbia provincial gov- 
 ernment passed a bill enacting the "dictation test" in 
 force in Australia and Natal. Three times has this bill 
 been passed, only to be each time vetoed by the Dominion 
 government. Yet feeling still runs so high that when 
 the Japanese training squadron under Admiral Ijichi, 
 making its annual cruise, stopped at Vancouver, suf- 
 ficient hostiHty was displayed to prevent a parade of 
 Japanese sailors under arms. 
 
 The Hindu is the newest problem for British Columbia. 
 For with his outlandish garb and his caste prejudices, 
 he is far more exotic than the Japanese who gets into a 
 "hand-me-down" and a "derby" hat as soon as possible 
 after landing. When the Hindu cloud began to lower 
 on the horizon, the Canadian immigration officials, 
 never at a loss for original expedients, tried to ship these 
 colored immigrants off to Honduras. But the Hindus 
 naturally refused to go. Thereupon they passed a law 
 providing that no Asiatics should come in, except by 
 "continuous journey from the country of which they are 
 natives or citizens and upon through tickets." Of 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL" i6i 
 
 course as there is no direct steamer connection between 
 India and Canada, the law presumably accompHshes a 
 very effective if somewhat disingenuous check upon 
 Hindu migration. 
 
 The complacency of the Canadian authorities was 
 sadly shaken, however, when on the 23d of May, 1914, 
 a Japanese steamer, the Komagata Maru appeared in 
 Vancouver harbor with 350 Hindus (Sikhs) on board. 
 Led by one Gurdit Singh, the company had chartered 
 the boat and sailed direct from India. Arriving in 
 Vancouver, they asserted their rights as British subjects 
 to enter British dominions. 
 
 Faced by this emergency, the Canadian authorities 
 dropped euphemisms and flatly refused to allow their 
 fellow citizens from the Orient to land. In imitation 
 of the suffragettes the Hindus began a "hunger strike," 
 but the Canadians were unimpressed and the strike 
 was abandoned. Threats were made to burn the ship, 
 in the belief that the Canadians would rescue the pas- 
 sengers, but a lingering doubt as to whether the former 
 might see it that way caused the project to be aban- 
 doned. Meanwhile the matter came before the Court, 
 and in July a decision was rendered against the Hindus. 
 Still the Komagata Maru lay in the harbor and refused 
 to go. Finally, under the guns of a Canadian war 
 vessel (the Rainbow), she was towed to sea and told to 
 
i62 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 leave. This suggests the unsatisfactory method that 
 metropolitan poUce not infrequently employ toward 
 members of the vagrant class. 
 
 The Hindu in the United States has not risen to the 
 height of a problem. Yet we could hardly look with 
 indifference upon the immigration of any considerable 
 number of Hindus into Canada. For if we should 
 enact exclusion laws against them as we have against 
 the Chinese, yet, should they be given free access to 
 Canada, on the plea of their British citizenship, it 
 would be a most difficult problem to keep them 
 from filtering across the border into the United 
 States, introducing one more racial problem for our 
 distracted people to solve. 
 
 The Asiatic in California 
 
 In our own country very much the same history is 
 to be related. The chronicle of the early contact of 
 California with the Oriental and the consequent reac- 
 tion is quite like that of British Columbia. Cahfornia's 
 experiences of course antedated those of the Cana- 
 dian province, but in each case the Chinese were first 
 invited, then repulsed at the behest of organized labor, 
 and in each case the vacuum thus created was filled by 
 the Japanese, producing a greater problem still. 
 
 The tale of our treatment of the Chinese is not a pretty 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL" 163 
 
 one considering the high moral tone of our long diplo- 
 matic intercourse with China> 
 
 In the early days of the gold excitement, there were 
 no candidates for jobs as cooks, or in other menial em- 
 plo)anent. When the Chinese filled such places, they did 
 not displace any white labor at all. When the Pacific 
 railroad was building, it was absolutely necessary to 
 import about 3000 Chinese workmen in order to com- 
 plete the road within the time allowed by Congress. 
 
 The business depression that came in the '70's brought 
 together a great number of discontented men, out of 
 work, and the famous "sand-lot" agitation began. 
 The Chinese and the plutocrats were picked out by the 
 '■ Kearneyite" agitators as the enemies of the American 
 workman. Several exclusion bills of various sorts were 
 proposed in Congress, one of which was passed, and 
 vetoed by President Hayes, and another one later by 
 President Arthur. Meanwhile California submitted 
 the question to a popular vote, — one of the earliest 
 instances of the referendum in American politics — 
 and out of practically the entire vote of the state there 
 were 154,638 for exclusion and 883 against. In the 
 face of this unanimity of sentiment, after a varied 
 experience, an exclusion act was passed in 1882. This 
 
 ^ The interested reader will find a complete and dispassionate account 
 in Dr. M. R. Coolidge's "Chinese Immigration." 
 
1 64 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 first act was not difficult to evade and did not satisfy 
 the West. In various places, anti-Chinese riots broke 
 out. One in particular at Rock Springs, Wyoming, 
 partook of the nature of a "Boxer" outbreak, the 
 Chinese being hunted and shot "like antelopes."^ 
 In 1892 the Geary Act was framed, which not only ex- 
 cluded the Chinese, but provided for the most stringent 
 regulations concerning the methods of its administra- 
 tion. This law was to be in force ten years, and in 1902 
 it was reenacted for an indefinite period. The act was 
 later extended to include Hawaii, and hkewise, by Gen- 
 eral Otis, to include the Phihppine Islands. 
 
 It was not the exclusion act in itself that gave so 
 much offense to China as the method of administering 
 it. Incoming Chinese of the exempt classes — mer- 
 chants, students, and travelers — were treated almost 
 as criminals. Things reached a cUmax at the St. Louis 
 World's Fair in 1904. The Chinese exhibitors at the 
 Exposition, the invited guests of the nation, were forced 
 to endure a situation beside which the lot of the Filipino 
 savages on exhibition was an enviable one. The tales 
 reported by these returning travelers no doubt lost 
 nothing in the telling. They were the last straw, and 
 precipitated the great anti-American boycott, in which 
 
 • Some time later Congress voluntarily paid China an indemnity for 
 this outrage. 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL" 165 
 
 American trade and American interests in China suf- 
 fered so heavily in 1906-8. 
 
 But however much of unnecessary severity and lack 
 of tact may have attended the administration of our 
 Chinese exclusion laws, they have been, at any rate, 
 effective. The Chinese problem, unless we reopen it, 
 is no longer a problem. Chinese house servants in the 
 Far West have anything but the financial status of 
 " cheap labor." Other races are employed only by those 
 who cannot afford Chinese. As has been the experience 
 of British Columbia, the success of Chinese exclusion 
 created a sort of vacuum in the labor market. This 
 vacuum the Japanese rushed in to fill and another prob- 
 lem was hatched. 
 
 In 1880 there were but 86 Japanese in all California. 
 The increase, year by year, is seen in the table on page 
 166 (taken from Kawakami's "American- Japanese Rela- 
 tions"). From 1902 on the figures include immigration 
 into Hawaii, which explains the sudden jump. But as 
 great numbers of these immigrants merely used Hawaii as 
 a stepping stone to California, the figures are not highly 
 misleading. In the summer of 1907 the famous "gentle- 
 man's agreement" was entered into between Japan and 
 America, by which Japan voluntarily agreed to cease 
 giving passports to Japanese of the workman class for 
 the purpose of coming to this country. Thus the exclu- 
 
1 66 
 
 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 sion of Japanese immigrants at present rests not upon 
 our own statutes, as in the case of the Chinese, nor upon 
 a treaty mutually binding, but upon the goodwill of 
 Japan. Ofl&cially, such immigration has ceased alto- 
 gether since 1907. Probably it has really ceased to a 
 large extent. But the writer spent the summer of 1913 
 
 Year 
 
 Japanese 
 
 V-G-AV 
 
 Japanese 
 
 lUMIGRAHTS 
 
 
 Immigrants 
 
 1881 
 
 II 
 
 1894 
 
 1,931 
 
 1882 
 
 5 
 
 189s 
 
 1,130 
 
 1883 
 
 27 
 
 1896 
 
 1,110 
 
 1884 
 
 20 
 
 1897 
 
 1,526 
 
 i88s 
 
 49 
 
 1898 
 
 2,230 
 
 1886 
 
 194 
 
 1899 
 
 2,844 
 
 1887 
 
 229 
 
 1900 
 
 12,63s 
 
 1888 
 
 404 
 
 1901 
 
 5.269 
 
 1889 
 
 640 
 
 1902 
 
 14,270 
 
 1890 
 
 691 
 
 1903 
 
 19,968 
 
 1891 
 
 1 136 
 
 1904 
 
 14,264 
 
 1892 
 
 1498 
 
 190S 
 
 10,331 
 
 1893 
 
 1380 
 
 1906 
 
 13,835 
 
 
 
 1907 
 
 30,226 
 
 in the Santa Clara valley and talked with numbers of 
 Japanese workers in the strawberry fields. A great 
 many of these, according to their own statements, had 
 been but a few months in America. His questions as to 
 how they had got into California were evasively answered. 
 There is little doubt that the Japanese government 
 is sincere in its attempt to limit the inmaigration of its 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL" 167 
 
 citizens to the United States, although the real reason 
 has not been dwelt upon. Of course Japan with all her 
 present domestic difiSculties is not desirous of creating 
 an occasion for racial collision in America. But she is 
 more conca3ied--with...sa.M ngJier face by not giv i'Tig any- 
 opEortuniJ^fQX, discnmitiatory treatment. Above all, 
 and this is the chief consideration, she must maintain 
 friendly relations with Great Britain. Whether the 
 Anglo- Japanese alliance would stand the strain of an 
 immigration conflict in British Columbia is a question 
 better avoided than answered. And Japanese policy 
 must be consistent with respect to the whole west coast 
 of America. What will happen to this alliance in the 
 readjustments certain to follow the World War no one 
 can say, but if the Anglo- Japanese Alliance gives place 
 to a Japanese-Russian entente, as is not at all unlikely, 
 then the reason for maintaining such a "gentleman's 
 agreement" may no longer hold. 
 
 The Japanese immigrants in rural California tend to 
 hang together in groups, as is of course natural, since 
 they speak little or no EngUsh and are not too warmly 
 welcomed by the whites. On the one hand they hire 
 themselves out on a contract system, particularly to the 
 orchardists, who complain that they have no sense of the 
 sanctity of contracts. In work that requires squatting, 
 such as the picking of strawberries or the cultivation of 
 
1 68 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 sugar beets, they have no equals in efficiency. They 
 are not content long to hire out, however. When they 
 have acquainted themselves with the local situation, 
 they will lease a small farm, often at a high figure, and 
 start in on their own hook. Others follow. "Gresh- 
 am's law" begins to operate and the whites move out. 
 Leaseholds become freeholds, and a permanent Asiatic 
 nucleus becomes established. In this way they get a 
 monopoly of certain products. In Southern California 
 the celery and truck crops are chiefly in the hands of the 
 Japanese; in the Santa Clara valley, the berry crop. 
 Some of the richest and most prosperous districts of 
 Cahfornia (not necessarily sparsely settled regions) have 
 settled up with Japanese until the entire complexion of 
 the region has changed. Fresno and the Vaca valley 
 are notorious examples. It is stated in the Twelfth 
 Biennial Report of the California Bureau of Labor Sta- 
 tistics that "ninety per cent of all the people met, walk- 
 ing or driving on all the country roads around VacaviUe, 
 are Japanese." That is to say, the whites who formerly 
 lived there have migrated. 
 
 In the trades also, Japanese competition has been keenly 
 felt. In carpentering, laundering, construction contracts, 
 they are undercutting their white competitors below the 
 limit of doing business on an American basis. Cheap 
 restaurants are also gradually passing into their hands. 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL" 169 
 
 It is needless to say that the native American in 
 CaKfornia took cognizance of the situation long ago. 
 Contrary to general belief, especially in the Eastern 
 United States, the anti-Japanese movement did not 
 originate in union labor circles, though it naturally 
 quickly enlisted a following among the working and 
 tradespeople. Indeed the movement has been not a 
 little embarrassed and deprived of the consideration it 
 should have received in other quarters, by the unre- 
 strained activities of the "Asiatic Exclusion League" 
 and some of its spokesmen. 
 
 The San Francisco school troubles of 1907, already 
 described, were quieted, and dropped from the limeHght 
 of pubHc attention, but the feeling that had precipi- 
 tated the affair was by no means dead. Two years 
 afterward, in 1909, the California legislature considered 
 various bills designed to segregate Japanese in the 
 schools, prevent Japanese ownership of land, and in 
 other ways restrict their activities within the state. 
 President Roosevelt again intervened and induced the 
 California officials to drop the matter. This was wise, 
 as the bills were not carefully drawn and their passage 
 would inevitably have involved the national government 
 in difficulties. 
 
 In 1913 the California legislature again occupied 
 itself with an ti- Japanese legislation. Bills were pro- 
 
170 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 posed in both chambers. In one of these bills the words 
 "ineligible to citizenship" were used. Fearing that 
 the enactment of this legislation might upset delicate 
 international relations, President Wilson took the 
 unusual course of personally interesting himself to 
 the extent not only of telegraphing to the governor of 
 the state his own views and wishes, but also of sending 
 Mr. Bryan, the Secretary of State, to the coast to con- 
 fer with the lawmakers. Mr. Bryan was cordially 
 received and accorded a respectful hearing. He re- 
 quested the Cahfornians to defer action until President 
 Wilson and the State Department should have had an 
 opportunity, either alone or in conjunction with a com- 
 mittee of the California legislature, to negotiate with 
 Japan, or else to enact a law similar to that of Illinois 
 which allows aliens to hold land for but six years. 
 
 The legislature did not act upon any of those sugges- 
 tions, but, instead, turned its attention to a new bill, 
 drafted by the state attorney-general, U. S. Webb. 
 The Webb bill passed both houses, but governor John- 
 son had promised the President to refrain from signing 
 it until a chance had ofEered for the national government 
 to act in the matter. President Wilson did request that 
 the bill be not signed until the matter could be taken up 
 diplomatically with Japan. But the governor refused 
 to see any "absolutely controlling necessity" for with- 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL" 171 
 
 holding his signature and it became a law, August 10, 
 
 1913- 
 
 The Webb Act provides first that "All aliens eligible 
 to citizenship under the laws of the United States may- 
 acquire, possess, enjoy, transfer, and inherit real property, 
 or any interest therein, in this State in the same manner 
 and to the same extent as citizens of the United States, 
 except as otherwise provided by the laws of this State." 
 In the second section it was enacted that "All ahens 
 other than those mentioned in section I may acquire, 
 possess, enjoy, and transfer, real property or any inter- 
 est therein, in the manner and to the extent and for the 
 purpose prescribed by any treaty now existing between 
 the government of the United States and the nation and 
 country of which said aUen is a citizen, or subject, and 
 not otherwise." Such aliens are permitted to lease 
 agricultural lands for three-year periods. 
 
 In his detailed reply to the President's request that 
 he withhold his signature from the bill, Governor John- 
 son said that other states had enacted similar laws, that 
 the naturalization laws of the United States determine 
 who may and who may not be eligible for citizenship; 
 that the phrase "persons who cannot become eligible 
 under the existing laws to become citizens of the United 
 States" occurs in the immigration law passed by both 
 houses of the Sixty-second Congress; and that Califor- 
 
172 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 nia was merely following the statutes of the United 
 States in any discrimination regarding citizenship. 
 The governor further stated that the question was not 
 "whether any offense had been taken [by Japan], but 
 whether justly it should be taken." 
 
 The claim has been made, and perhaps with some 
 show of justice, that party politics played more of a 
 part in the enacting of this legislation than it should 
 have done and that a "Progressive" governor was not 
 averse to putting a Democratic President "in a hole." 
 If this were true, it would betray an almost incompre- 
 hensible short-sightedness on the part of California's 
 officials. For it has been well said that the "California 
 Japanese question is 2 per cent Californian and 98 per 
 cent national." 
 
 The Japanese government took official cognizance 
 of the situation even before the Webb law was passed* 
 Ambassador Chinda having called upon President 
 Wilson the second day of his administration, and 
 expressed the belief that should any of the bills pend- 
 ing in the Cahfornia legislature become laws "the ef- 
 fect would be very serious." Later, Viscount Chinda 
 made other representations, and it seems to have been 
 a result of the pressure thus exerted that the adminis- 
 tration took the unusual steps to influence state legis- 
 lation that have been described. When the Webb bill 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL" 173 
 
 had become law, the Japanese government lodged a 
 formal protest with the State Department (May 10, 
 1913), which pointed out that in the Japanese view the 
 law was not only unfair and discriminatory, but vio- 
 lated the spirit of the American- Japanese treaty. The 
 American reply pointed out that the difficulty was an 
 economic not a poKtical one, and that if the Japanese felt 
 their treaty rights to have been abridged, they might 
 have recourse to the Federal courts. This did not sat- 
 isfy the Japanese government and a second protest was 
 lodged on June 4. This document contained the sig- 
 nificant statement that as Japan and America were 
 "geographically destined to be permanent neighbors," 
 it behooved both sides to adopt an attitude of conciUa- 
 tion and cooperation and to avoid anything that might 
 hurt the feeUngs of the other. 
 
 On July 16 the Secretary of State tendered his reply 
 to this protest. In this document Mr. Bryan reiter- 
 ated his statement that the difficulty is an economic one, 
 not a racial one, and pointed out the similarity of the 
 situation with the working of Imperial Ordinance 352,1 
 designed to operate against the Chinese in Japan. The 
 Japanese standpoint was that "the separate states of 
 the United States are, internationally speaking, wholly 
 unknown and entirely without responsibility," the cor- 
 
 * See page 188, 
 
174 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 ollary of which is that the Federal government is re- 
 sponsible. Mr. Bryan, however, in his note, recurred 
 to and quoted an indiscreet expression of opinion which 
 Baron Uchida had made to Mr. Kjiox in a communica- 
 tion of an earlier date. In it Baron Uchida had said: 
 "In return for the rights of land ownership which are 
 granted Japanese by the laws of the United States (of 
 which, I may observe, there are now about thirty) the 
 Imperial Government will, by liberal interpretation of 
 the law, be prepared to grant land ownership to Ameri- 
 can citizens from all the States, reserving for the future, 
 however, the right of maintaining the condition of reci- 
 procity with respect to the separate States." [The italics 
 are Mr. Bryan's.] 
 
 As there seemed no possibility of getting anywhere 
 along this Mne, the Japanese government then under- 
 took to arrange a new ^treaty, but this proposal was 
 withdrawn after a time and has not been made pubhc. 
 At last account, therefore, the discussion had again 
 swung round to what diplomats love to refer to as the 
 status quo. 
 
 General Considerations 
 
 Along with the negro question there is no doubt that 
 the problem of Oriental immigration into America is one 
 of the most difficult and one of the most important that 
 we have ever been called upon to face. Face it we must, 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL" 175 
 
 however, and solve it with whatever of poUtical wisdom 
 we may be able to develop. It is dif&cult to judge the 
 facts wholly impersonally. The CaHfornian is apt to 
 consider the subject too objectively, the Easterner too 
 academically. It is wholly unreasonable for one to 
 ignore the standpoint of the other. We may set aside 
 the opinion of the advocate of "cheap labor to properly 
 develop the resources of the State," regardless of the 
 future, as we may also that of the Harvard professor 
 who finds that racial antipathies are "the childish phe- 
 nomena in our hves, not noble phenomena." We are 
 dealing with the vital problem of hundreds of thou- 
 sands of American citizens who are as incapable of 
 prostituting their children's inheritance for the profit 
 of the moment as they are of ordering their hves by 
 the subtle tenets of a psychological analysis. 
 
 We hear a good deal about opposition to Asiatic im- 
 migration being "un-American" on the ground that our 
 whole population is an immigrant one. But this ignores 
 the important fact that when the strong tide of European 
 immigration began to set toward the New World, it 
 came first from those parts of Europe that had drawn 
 the greater part of our original settlement population and 
 hence were most easily assimilated. As these sources ' 
 became exhausted and a larger proportion and increas- 
 ing numbers began to come from Southern Europe and 
 
176 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 Russia, the difficulty of assimilation became more 
 marked and the question of regulating the flow came to 
 the fore. But all the people of Europe are of one great 
 race even if of various stocks (unless we wish to except 
 the Jews) , and all have the same social heritage, the same 
 common historic background of tradition and rehgion. 
 Compared with the Asiatic in assimilabiUty it is as if 
 Slav and Saxon, SiciHan and Swede, were of one family. 
 If the assimilation of the "wop" is difficult, that of the 
 "Jap" is impossible. It is vain to prove, as Professor 
 Wigmore does, that the Japanese are not MongoKans. 
 Granted. This gains nothing except perhaps the tech- 
 nical evasion of a law. 
 
 It is equally beside the point to speak of men like 
 Kitasato, Takamine, Kawakami, Okakura, Nitobe, 
 Asakawa, and scores of other Japanese who have gath- 
 ered laurels in Occidental fields, as it is on the other 
 hand to mention instances of individuals without any 
 conception of the sacredness of contractual obligations. 
 No one who knows anything about the Japanese at all 
 will deny them their full meed of credit and praise for 
 the possession of as many excellences as may be found 
 in any people of Europe. Particularly is this true of 
 the "common people." Nowhere else in the world are 
 the peasantry possessed of those graces of manner and 
 genuine courtesy that we continually meet in interior 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL" 177 
 
 Japan. Many a time have I traveled in third-class 
 cars and put up at third-class inns that I might enjoy 
 the genial companionship of the unpretentious country 
 folk. Possibly this was because I was deferred to, 
 which always makes for complacency ! But because 
 I may be proud to know a man like Kitasato or count 
 a Mitsukuri as a friend, does not mean that I should 
 care to have Hyakushoya Gombei for my next-door 
 neighbor in CaUfornia, occupied in gaining a living. 
 One of the happiest years of my Hfe I spent in a little 
 inland village in Japan of less than two thousand inhab- 
 itants as the "pajdng guest" in a Japanese family; yet 
 I hate to think what my experiences might have been 
 if I had tried to operate a retail shop in that same town. 
 For it makes all the difference in the world whether 
 aliens meet one another as guest and host or as com- 
 petitors. 
 
 Now the Japanese scattered throughout colleges in 
 the East or as occasional curio-shop keepers are essen- 
 tially guests, and the Easterner's relations with them 
 are those of hosts ; moreover, they are most often mem- 
 bers of the gentry. But in the West the Japanese 
 (almost always of the heimin class) are competitors, 
 and, pulling together by a sort of racial surface tension, 
 they attain a solidarity in competition that is not 
 achieved by the whites, even in CaHfornia. And, in 
 
178 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 the main, it is a successful competition, by fair means or 
 foul. 
 
 Many writers, arguing from the acknowledged excel- 
 lences of the Japanese race and some of the best-known 
 deficiencies of our own, believe that the admixture of a 
 Japanese element would be a good thing for our popu- 
 lation ; that the Japanese would become good Americans. 
 This is bound to be largely a matter of opinion. I 
 believ e, personally, that it is an eco nomical a nd a bio- 
 logical impossibility fox the^tssco races .to, assimilate, jg^ 
 ceptperhaps in an age-long interval of time t hat is no w 
 no longer available.-- And the presence of an undigested 
 and indigestible alien mass in Cahfornia cannot be 
 other than a breeder of future trouble. 
 
 In this matter Americans will do well to consider the 
 "French problem" in portions of Canada, especially in 
 Ontario and Quebec. To the theorist, there should 
 not be any very great difficulty experienced by the Eng- 
 lish in assimilating a people so intimately connected 
 with them through centuries of history as the French. 
 A good deal of the difficulty is at bottom religious, of 
 course, and we should not expect a great amount of 
 intermarriage between Catholics and Protestants, even 
 in two centuries of association. But there seems to be 
 something more fundamental than this. During all 
 these years, the French of Canada have remained French. 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL" 179 
 
 The Germans in the United States, on the other hand, 
 melt into the American mixture, as a rule, in a few gen- 
 erations. There is a racial solidarity about the French, 
 when collected in groups, that resists and reacts against 
 the attrition of another race, even if not a very alien 
 one. 
 
 In 191 2, as a result of a series of complaints, the Pro- 
 vincial government appointed a commission to inspect 
 the schools of Ontario. They found the Roman Cath- 
 olic catechism taught in thirty of the pubUc schools, 
 contrary to the rules. French was more extensively 
 used than English and the teachers in many schools 
 spoke English very imperfectly. 
 
 In the summer of that same year a Congress of the 
 French language was held — the avowed purpose of 
 which was to protect " the French life and the unity of 
 the French race," which "depend upon the preservation 
 of their language." Resolutions were adopted stating, 
 among other things, that the French in Quebec and 
 Ontario should be encouraged to migrate to other 
 provinces and found colonies; that Frenchmen should 
 insist upon a better status for the French language in 
 the schools there; and that in any "biUngual school" 
 the language of instruction should be that of the majority 
 and that pupils should be permitted to choose the lan- 
 guage for the written examinations. It will be seen that 
 
i8o JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 citizenship has nothing to do with this situation, in fact 
 increases the difficulty. 
 
 The racial solidarity of the French is as nothing com- 
 pared with that of the Japanese, — one of the most 
 inbred peoples of the earth. Let us imagine the Japa- 
 nese admitted to citizenship and allowed free entrance 
 to CaUfornia. Will they scatter generally among the 
 whites or will they form groups of their own kind? 
 \ No one with the slightest experience of the situation 
 lean be doubtful of the answer to this question. The 
 whites themselves hasten the result by moving away 
 when the Japanese become numerous. Will they, with 
 their love of home and country, their devotion to their 
 'national history and its ideals, be more likely to become 
 more English-speaking or less, as the numbers of their 
 ' own kind increase in a given locahty ? German officials 
 ; are reported to deplore the loss to the fatherland of 
 i Germans who emigrate to America. There is little 
 I question that this race is the most easily assimilated 
 I here of any non-EngHsh that enter our country. Yet 
 1 the writer has spent days in towns of Missouri and 
 southern Illinois, settled by Germans long ago, and has 
 never heard an English word spoken during his stay. 
 
 Suppose that in Solano County in California, the 
 Japanese, each an American citizen with a vote, decide 
 to adopt the attitude of the French Canadian with regard 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL" i8i 
 
 to his native tongue. When his vote is one of a majority 
 in that county, and he passes the same regulation that 
 instruction shall be in the language of the majority of 
 the citizens, could anything more effective be devised 
 for the peaceful conquest of the country? 
 
 Those who pooh-pooh the Japanese danger fail to 
 distinguish the difference between individual Japanese 
 and Japanese in the mass. The dangerous conse- 
 quences arising from the presence of the latter are 
 due in the main to the good qualities of the race 
 rather than otherwise, — qualities which abstractly we 
 should praise.^ 
 
 The intermingling of Orientals and Occidentals en 
 masse is something Hke the admixture of oil and water. 
 They simply do not form a stable mixture if suddenly 
 poured into one another. But if a trace of alkali be 
 added to the water, the result is an emulsification of the 
 oil so that an intimate and permanent suspension is 
 produced. And the housewife knows that when she 
 makes mayonnaise dressing, which is nothing but a thick 
 
 1 How persistent racial prejudices are, even if without the slightest 
 foundation in fact, will be attested by any one who has lived any length 
 of time in the country districts of Japan, especially in the west. It is a 
 deeply rooted belief there, that curly hair always goes with a treacherous 
 heart (perhaps a relic of an ancient Nigrito experience). And many 
 a young Japanese girl has had her life fairly ruined on account of a slight 
 waviness of hair. 
 
i82 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 emulsion of olive oil, she must add the oil, drop by drop. 
 To do otherwise would curdle the whole mixture. 
 
 I have not the shghtest doubt that if Japanese were to 
 be very slowly added to our body politic and, instead of 
 aggregating in colonies, were to diffuse throughout our 
 population, it would result in a sort of racial emulsifica- 
 tion that would be of permanent advantage to both sides. 
 This would take a long period of time to accomplish, how- 
 ever, and nothing would interfere with the process so 
 much as hasty and ill-considered exclusive legislation. 
 
 After all, it is a practical problem. For what dif- 
 ference does it make whether or not the standpoint of 
 the white population of British Columbia, California, 
 and Australia is logically sound, so long as they think 
 ahke on the subject? And with a few conspicuous ex- 
 ceptions, they do think ahke. If the eight or ten million 
 whites in these countries were possessed of heterodox 
 notions regarding transubstantiation, let us say, to the 
 extent that they were prepared to fight for their opinions, 
 no rational atheist could afford to ignore the situation. 
 
 The Other Side of the Shield 
 
 It is of interest to discover that the Japanese, on their 
 part, have long had very clearly defined ideas on this 
 subject and understand the situation and its impHca- 
 tions better than we do. 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL" 183 
 
 In 1892 when Japan was taking the final steps in the 
 way of concluding the current treaties with foreign 
 powers, this matter of the alien danger perhaps to be 
 encountered with the aboUtion of extraterritoriality 
 greatly agitated her statesmen. Mr. (now Viscount) 
 Kaneko took occasion to write Herbert Spencer, who 
 was a sort of oracle on such things, asking his advice. 
 Spencer answered at length.^ Among other things he 
 said: "The Japanese poUcy should, I think, be that of 
 keeping Americans and Europeans as much as possible 
 at arm's length. In the presence of the more powerful 
 races, your position is one of chronic danger and you 
 should take every precaution to give as little foothold 
 as possible to foreigners. It seems to me that the only 
 forms of intercourse which you may with advantage 
 permit are those which are indispensable for the exchange 
 of commodities and exchange of ideas. No further 
 privileges should be allowed to people of other races, 
 and especially to people of the more powerful races, 
 than is absolutely needful for the achievement of these 
 ends. Apparently you are proposing, by revision of the 
 treaty powers with Europe and America, to open the 
 whole Empire to foreigners and foreign capital. I 
 regard this as a fatal policy. . . . 
 
 " In pursuance of the advice thus generally indicated, 
 
 1 "Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer." II, 14. 
 
i84 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 I should say, in answer to your first question, that there 
 should be, not only a prohibition to foreign persons to 
 hold property in land, but also a refusal to give them 
 leases and a permission only to reside as annual tenants." 
 "To your remaining question respecting the intermar- 
 riage of foreigners and Japanese, my reply is that, as 
 rationally answered, there is no difl&culty at all. . . . 
 
 It is at root a question of biology. _^^;_ If you 
 
 mix the constitutions of two widely divergent varieties 
 which have severally become adopted to widely diver- 
 gent modes of life, you get a constitution which is 
 adapted to the mode of life of neither — a constitution 
 which will not work properly, because it is not fitted for 
 any set of conditions whatever. By all means, there- 
 fore, peremptorily interdict marriages of Japanese with 
 foreigners." 
 
 "I have for the reasons indicated entirely approved 
 of the regulations which have been established in Amer- 
 ica for restraining the Chinese immigration, and had I 
 the power, would restrict them to the smallest possible 
 amount, my reasons for this decision being that one of 
 two things must happen. If the Chinese are allowed to 
 settle extensively in America, they must either, if they 
 remain unmixed, form a subject class in the position, 
 if not of slaves, yet of a class approaching slaves; or 
 if they mix, they must form a bad hybrid. In either 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL" 185 
 
 case, supposing the immigration to be large, immense 
 social mischief must arise and eventually social disor- 
 ganization. The same thing will happen if there should 
 be any considerable mixture of the European or American 
 races with the Japanese." 
 
 "You see, therefore, that my advice is strongly con- 
 servative ia aU directions and I end by saying as I began 
 — ^_ff^o^er races at arm's length as much as possible." 
 
 Viscoimt Kaneko has never reveaIed~to what extent 
 Spencer's advice was followed. But Spencer was the 
 great vogue in Japan in the '90's and it must have had 
 weight. The anxiety concerning mixed marriages in 
 Japan seems to have been quite unfounded. 
 
 As for land tenure and foreign capital, the Japanese 
 have been in a dilemma that was not understood by 
 Mr. Spencer. Above all things, Japan requires capital 
 to develop her industries, and in the absence of a large 
 home supply, it must needs be foreign capital. Capi- 
 tal is anything but altruistic and becomes very timid 
 when it is impossible to invest it in physical form. 
 So fearful have the Japanese been, however, that this, 
 their most crying need, has been smothered in their 
 anxiety not to permit a foot of Japanese territory to 
 pass into foreign hands. 
 
 In the earlier days, it was not unusual for foreigners 
 to hold buildings and groimds in the names of Japanese 
 
1 86 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 who were expected to function as dummies or in some 
 cases as trustees. In not a few cases ^ the Japanese 
 thus chosen failed to appreciate the obligations of trus- 
 teeship and converted the fiction of their property rights 
 into reality. 
 
 Nowadays foreigners may hold land under the legal 
 fiction of "juridical persons." A juridical person may 
 be a partnership or a joint-stock company, but not an 
 individual. In addition foreigners enjoy the right to 
 lease land ("superficies") frequently for long periods, 
 but these substitutes for ownership have not attracted 
 capital. 
 
 In 1910 the Japanese diet passed a new law relating 
 to foreign right of ownership in land.^ Apparently the 
 new law removes the restrictions. According to it 
 foreigners may own land if the reciprocal privilege is 
 granted to Japanese in his own country. He must ob- 
 tain permission of the Home Ofl&ce so to do, however, 
 and his coimtry must have been previously designated 
 by Imperial Ordinance. The law does' not apply 
 to (i) Hokkaido, (2) Formosa, (3) SaghaUen, and 
 (4) "Districts necessary for national defense." But 
 foreigners find a "joker" in Article III of the law, which 
 states that "In case a foreigner or a foreign juridical 
 
 ' The Doshisha school troubles, for instance. 
 
 "The "Gwaikoku-jin no tochi shoyu-ken ni Kwan-zuru ken." 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL" 187 
 
 person owning land ceases to be capable of enjoying the 
 right of ownership in land, the ownership of such land 
 shall revert to the National Treasury unless he disposes 
 of it within a period of one year." In case the foreigner 
 withdraws his business or moves away, the above period 
 shall be extended to five years. To those who appreciate 
 what "team work" the Japanese are capable of, the 
 requirement to sell within a year appears to amount to 
 confiscation. And it seems to be left entirely to the 
 Japanese authorities to determine just what conditions 
 may be under which the foreigner "ceases to be capable 
 of enjoying the right of ownership in land." It may 
 well be that such a privilege would depend upon the 
 attitude of the foreigner's own country anent Japan. 
 In fact the whole paragraph appears to be a weapon of 
 retaliation against such nations as may in the future 
 pass laws distasteful to Japanese emigrants. Although 
 promulgated April 13, 1910, the law has not yet been 
 put into force by Imperial Ordinance. 
 
 In connection with the indignant protests of the Jap- 
 anese government regarding the Californian Exclusion 
 Law and the protracted diplomatic interchanges between 
 Washington and Tokyo that were at the last hearing 
 still "unsatisfactory" to the latter, it is of a great deal 
 of interest to look into Japan's own attitude toward the 
 same problem. 
 
1 88 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 We have seen the Japanese attitude toward foreign 
 land holding, in spite of the great need for foreign 
 capital which the present laws frighten away. We 
 might think that a country not so large as Cahfomia 
 with a population half that of the whole United States 
 need not fear foreign immigration, particularly of la- 
 borers. The idea is of course absurd — from the Occi- 
 dental standpoint. But Japan is very close to China. 
 If the pressure of population in Japan is great, in Shan- 
 tung it is greater, and between the two a sort of inter- 
 national plasmolysis may very well occur if no restric- 
 tions be erected. If the Japanese can underHve and 
 undersell the American in his own land, so can the 
 Chinese underlive and defeat the Japanese if he has 
 half a chance. Fifteen years ago Chinese peddlers 
 began to be numerous in Japan, especially in the south- 
 em and central parts. They traveled all over the coun- 
 try and did a thriving business. Moreover, after the 
 Russian war, Chinese cooUes began to come into Japan, 
 attracted by the high wages there to be had. Thus the 
 Japanese found themselves confronted by very much 
 the same problem that has vexed California, British 
 Columbia, and AustraUa, — native labor displaced by 
 "cheap foreign labor." 
 
 In 1899 an Imperial Ordinance, No. 352, was promul- 
 gated regarding the residence of foreigners outside the 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL" 189 
 
 "treaty ports," in accordance with the new treaty- 
 relations with Europe and America. At this time, very 
 likely with a Chinese invasion in mind, of which the 
 peddlers were the advance guard, such residence was 
 denied to laborers except by permission of the Home 
 Office. This permission can be revoked by any provin- 
 cial governor at his own discretion. "Laborers" were, 
 at the same time, defined to be those engaged in "agri- 
 cultural, fishing, mining, civil-engineering work, archi- 
 tectural, manufacturing, transporting, carting, steve- 
 doring, and other miscellaneous work." Exception 
 was made for cooks and waiters. 
 
 It is obvious that Occidentals were not in the mind of 
 the Home Minister when he drafted this regulation, but 
 as it is a general law, it is equally obvious that it is ap- 
 plicable to Americans, particularly when no one nation 
 is specified. And there is httle doubt that the Ordi- 
 nance would be promptly invoked should American 
 competition begin in any of the Knes cited above. Of 
 course the American tourist or student is welcomed 
 (officially, as a matter of fact) as the Japanese traveler 
 is in this country, and with much greater reason, as the 
 gold the globe-trotter leaves in Japan goes a long way, 
 as we have seen, toward offsetting the annual unfavorable 
 balance of trade. 
 
 In 1907 several hundred Chinese were deported from 
 
I go JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 Nagasaki by the governor of the province. When the 
 Chinese Minister protested, the Home Office referred 
 him to the law just quoted by virtue of which the pre- 
 fectural governor is empowered to use his own discretion 
 and stated that it could not interfere. This was "states 
 rights" of the American kind. It is significant that the 
 deported Chinese were of two groups, one of the groups 
 being composed of coolies and the other of skilled 
 artisans. 
 
 Solution of the Problem in America 
 
 He would be a wise man, not to say a presumptuous 
 one, who should attempt to outline a definite and con- 
 clusive solution to the problem indicated in the preced- 
 ing pages. Not only must such a solution rest upon an 
 intelligent and disinterested appreciation of numerous 
 factors, apparently unrelated, but many of these factors 
 are contingent upon future events, the outcome of which 
 can be but vaguely predicted. Nevertheless certain fim- 
 damental postulates cannot be ignored in any solution. 
 
 First, it is not a CaUfomian, nor a Canadian, nor an 
 Australian problem, but a world problem. The white 
 inhabitants of these countries are but the advance guard 
 of the spreading army of migration that has circled the 
 globe from East to West until it has come face to face 
 with the Farther East. The empty places of the earth 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL" 191 
 
 are filling up. Some modus vivendi must be found along 
 the zone in which East meets West. The conflict may 
 be a potential one, but it is none the less real. Whether 
 it be allowed to drift into a military or an economic 
 conflict will depend in large measure upon the degree 
 to which the peoples involved avoid false steps. To 
 some it seems better to avoid a conflict and to leave the 
 Pacific Ocean like a boundary fence between two incom- 
 patible neighbors. These are the exclusionists of one 
 sort or another. Naturally the instinct of self-preser- 
 vation places the dwellers on the Pacific shores in this 
 class. Others with no personal interests at stake are 
 willfaig to "let Nature take her course," confident that 
 in such a struggle for racial existence Occidental civil- 
 ization will be dominant over Oriental. This acaderaic 
 vigw^jwhich^lds. that an armed conflict with the Orient 
 is inevitable and hence to be prepared for (Hobson, 
 Homer Lea), or that it is desirable and hence to be has- 
 tened (Kaiser Wilhelm), is obviously directly opposed 
 to that of the first standpoint just mentioned. Yet an 
 exclusion program that is uninteUigently conceived or 
 injudiciously administered may of itself lead to conflict. 
 
 For this reason it ought to be understood that the con- 
 trol of Japanese immigration is not a state affair nor 
 even a national affair, but an international one. 
 
 The Japanese contend, and with justice, that they do 
 
192 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 not wish to push in where they are not wanted and that 
 they are not pressing for the right to emigrate en masse 
 - to America, where their presence is an increasing cause 
 of friction. But they do feel themselves the equal of 
 ' any other nation and they resent being treated as a class 
 apart. They of course concede the right of any nation 
 to determine its own conditions of immigration and 
 naturalization, but they insist that all ahens shall be 
 treated alike. The necessity for saving Japan's face in 
 this matter is hardly appreciated enough in the Occi- 
 dent. It is not easy to beheve that in the Far East the 
 shadow is sometimes more highly valued than the sub- 
 stance. But any kind of an exclusion act that fails to 
 take this important feature into account is certain to be 
 a source of irritation and international friction. 
 
 The only plan that appears to the writer even partially 
 to meet the difl&culty (in the way of immigration, not 
 in the side issues of owning land or of doing business) is 
 the plan proposed by Dr. Sidney L. GuHck/ as well- 
 equipped a student of American- Japanese questions as 
 there is in either land. This plan bases the number of 
 immigrants that may be admitted to this country in 
 any one year upon our capacity to assimilate them. 
 Since this task must fall chiefly upon those aliens natu- 
 
 'The interested reader will find the plan discussed in detail in "The 
 American Japanese Problem," by Sidney L. Gulick. New York, 1914. 
 
THE "YELLOW PERIL" 193 
 
 ralized or ready to be who are already here and know 
 both languages, Mr. Gulick finds ready at hand a cri- 
 terion by which to determine the number that may be 
 safely taken in, and one that can give offense to no one, 
 since it is based upon purely mechanical considerations. 
 From North Europe, whence our most valued immigra- 
 tion has come in the past, we have such a large number 
 of naturalized citizens that the present immigration 
 falls far short of the proportion that might be allotted to 
 such a population under the plan. From Southern 
 Europe and Russia the allowable number would be much 
 smaller, which would be highly desirable. From the 
 Far East it would be negHgible. Yet all would be 
 treated on the same basis. Various objections have 
 been offered to this scheme and many details would have 
 to be worked out. Yet it is becoming increasingly evi- 
 dent that the whole problem of immigration into Amer- 
 ica from the East as well as from the West is in need of 
 a readjustment based upon a broader and more far- 
 sighted understanding of our future necessities than our 
 present laws provide, and Dr. Gulick's plan certainly 
 marks a long step in advance. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE CHANCES OF WAR 
 
 In the beginning we have pointed out that a Japanese- 
 American war may be inevitable, probable, or merely 
 possible, according to the temperament of the prophet. 
 Granting that anything of the sort is possible, the 
 probability of such an occurrence or its inevitability 
 rest upon somewhat different premises. 
 
 Moreover, it makes a difference which side is to be 
 considered the aggressor. Let us begin by assuming 
 that it is the United States. What grounds may be 
 offered for declaring war against Japan? As Japan 
 is many thousands of miles away, opportunities for 
 collision are not very numerous. The writer can 
 think of but three. First, a state of tension may arise 
 that would lead to acts of hostility against Americans 
 in the Orient, which we could not ignore ; second, we 
 may consider the academic proposition of maintaining 
 the "Open Door" in China; and third, Japan may 
 assume such an aggressive attitude toward helpless 
 China that we should feel called upon to come to the 
 defense of the latter. 
 
 194 
 
THE CHANCES OF WAR 195 
 
 The last we may dismiss without discussion. Wars 
 are not made in America at the whim of rulers, and 
 the people of this country are disincUned to interfere, 
 least of aU by arms, with the affairs of another and 
 alien people. The second consideration is equally 
 impossible. American interests in Mexico today are 
 vastly more valuable than they are in China and the 
 temptation to interfere infinitely greater, yet as a 
 whole the American people are steadfast in their de- 
 termination to keep out of Mexico if it is humanly 
 possible to do so. The idea of fighting any country 
 for the purpose of increasing the profits of trade is 
 little likely to attract a following in America. We 
 want an open market for our goods in China, but to 
 pay for it with a costly war would be the worst sort 
 of bad business. It is needless to say that sympathy 
 for China would be very keen in America, particularly 
 if Japanese ascendancy there meant loss of American 
 trade, and that is something which Japan would do 
 well to keep in mind as a possible offset to any assumed 
 advantages of unnecessarily harsh measures on the 
 continent. 
 
 As Japan and the United States rub elbows more 
 and more, many opportunities may arise and probably 
 will arise, from time to time, to mar the friendly tone 
 of American-Japanese relations. Yet the chance of 
 
196 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 any overt hostile act being committed against Ameri- 
 cans in Japan is extremely remote. Almost universally, 
 American residents in Japan are well liked and Amer- 
 ican tourists are welcomed, if for no other reason than 
 the money they spend, and in any event it is very un- 
 likely that Japan would fail to make full reparation 
 for any real injury due to the acts of irresponsible 
 Japanese citizens. The only reason that she might 
 fail to do so would be that she would desire to take 
 intentional advantage of such an occasion to declare 
 her hostihty. And this brings us to the other aspect 
 of the question: Japan may be the aggressor. As a 
 matter of fact, this is the only viewpoint adopted by 
 those who preach the Japanese danger. 
 
 Again let us try to analyze the possible causes for a 
 war which might be declared by Japan against the 
 United States. The responsibility for such a conflict 
 may rest upon our own unthinking heads. For in- 
 stance, conceding that we are foolish enough to persist 
 in a pohcy of irritation such as we have toward the 
 Chinese, with respect to the administration of the 
 immigration laws, or that we treat Japanese immigrants 
 in CaHfornia with barbaric harshness, mob them or 
 lynch them, why then it is quite likely that we may 
 goad Japan or force her into a false position, in which, 
 under the current code of national honor, she may 
 
THE CHANCES OF WAR 197 
 
 feel that she has to fight even if it should be her down- 
 fall. But this must also assume that America will, 
 without real reason, go back on her long record of 
 friendship for Japan, and likewise that, in the wrong, 
 we shall as a nation refuse to make such amends as 
 one gentleman may make to another. We are a mer- 
 curial people, but I cannot believe that we are in any 
 danger of acting so contrary to our honorable past 
 history. The nation that followed out her pledge 
 and gave Cuba back her independence, or that stuck 
 to the letter of her bargain in regard to the Panama 
 canal tolls, is not likely to do wrong by another na- 
 tion and refuse just reparation. What other motive 
 then will exist for a declaration of war by Japan upon 
 America? There is left the motive of national ag- 
 grandizement. And this is the basic motive assumed 
 by practically aU the war writers. 
 
 The author possesses no secrets of the Japanese 
 government. He would not presume to say that 
 Japan has no idea of going to war with America for 
 the profit to be made out of it. Nations are no wiser 
 than their leaders, and nations have been fooHsh in 
 the past. But the profitableness of past wars for Japan 
 has been noted on a previous page.' And Japan's 
 foreign policy has long been pursued with an astuteness 
 
 ' See page 44. 
 
198 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 and a far-sightedness that gives no hint of such stu- 
 pendous folly as would be involved in the calculated 
 bringing on of war against a power like America. 
 
 Let us keep the conditions clearly in mind. Grant 
 that war will not be forced upon Japan by ourselves. 
 Grant that if Japan becomes so incensed, or so humili- 
 ated, that her national honor will demand war, that 
 the responsibility will be upon our own shoulders, not 
 hers; then the only other motive left to consider will 
 be that of cold, calculated design, the hope on the one 
 hand of ruling the entire domain of the Pacific by 
 eliminating the last great rival and on the other hand 
 of appropriating, a la Rob Roy, the riches which America 
 has so industriously accumulated and neglected to 
 guard. 
 
 The money cost of modern warfare is appalUng. To 
 conduct an aggressive campaign a nation must have 
 either an enormous gold reserve or else unlimited credit. 
 Japan has neither. It is computed that the cost of 
 maintaining a soldier in the field is at the least $2.50 
 a day. Five hundred thousand is the very lowest 
 number that could hope to effectively occupy any 
 portion of the west coast of America. This would 
 mean $1,125,000 a day, to which must be added the 
 enormous cost of transport 5000 miles from the home 
 base. The interest on foreign debt which cripples 
 
THE CHANCES OF WAR 199 
 
 Japan so badly at present is but $35,000,000 annually, 
 enough to last, let us say, three weeks. 
 
 It has often been said that the lack of money has 
 never yet prevented a war nor deterred a nation from 
 declaring war. This is no doubt true, but it does not 
 follow that the lack of money is of equally little con- 
 sequence in winning a war. And according to our 
 original premises, if an anti-American campaign should 
 be inaugurated by Japan for her own gain, it could 
 only be with the outcome clearly foreseen. Either 
 (i) she should have made secret agreements with other 
 powers so that enormous loans to finance such a war 
 would be obtainable, or (2) she would depend upon 
 striking quickly and paralyzing the American defense 
 so that our prostrate country would be compelled to 
 sue for peace and to pay an enormous indemnity, or 
 (3) she might seize the coveted Hawaii and the Philip- 
 pines with their boundless resources and make them 
 her own, or (4) having done so, and not wishing to 
 keep them, she might turn them over to some European 
 power for a large cash sum and thereby realize the 
 equivalent of an indemnity without even attacking 
 continental America. All these possibiHties have been 
 discussed in one form or another by the American 
 press and war experts. Let us examine them a httle 
 more closely. 
 
20O JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 First, let us consider the financing of such a war by 
 a European (and presumably hostile) power. Assuming 
 that any European power should have reason for such 
 a conspicuous display of hostiUty, or particularly any 
 advantage to be gained by it, its feasibility would de- 
 pend primarily upon the conviction on the part of such 
 European power that Japan would surely be the victor 
 in the contest. To speak not too bumptiously, that 
 would be a "long chance" to put much money upon. 
 But let us be more specific. What powers could finance 
 such an enormously expensive campaign? Would it 
 be Russia ? Russia has no money to lend, for one thing, 
 and some who are weatherwise have even claimed that 
 (at least until August, 1914) she was saving her permies 
 to retriieve her lost prestige of 1904. Would it be 
 Germany? With the memory of Tsingtao in mind, 
 that sounds like irony. Would it be England? The 
 writer cannot conceive of any situation in which it 
 would be possible, for no other nation in the world 
 would lose quite so much by the humbling of the United 
 States and its conquest by an Oriental power as Eng- 
 land. The defeat of the United States at the hands 
 of an Oriental power would mean the break-up of the 
 British Empire. There is left France. But granting 
 that France would care to oppose England as regards 
 the Far East, her eggs are in the same basket with 
 
THE CHANCES OF WAR 201 
 
 Germany's. But all this is rather academic, men of 
 straw whose knocking down merely rounds out the 
 argument. 
 
 The second consideration mentioned above rests on 
 the assumption that Japan could make a sudden raid, 
 seize the coast, perhaps burn Los Angeles, San Fran- 
 cisco, Portland, and Seattle, or hold them for ransom, 
 and that the United States, helpless because unpre- 
 pared, would be forced to pay a heavy indemnity in 
 order to make the Japanese leave. Such a campaign, it 
 is thought, would be comparatively inexpensive for Japan, 
 and, if successful, might be very profitable. That the 
 United States is wholly unprepared to resist invasion in 
 force is of course well known. (We have omitted any 
 consideration of the American fleet, which presumably 
 might justify its existence.) Yet, granting everything, 
 allowing that the Japanese expeditionary forces have 
 landed at any of the many unprotected localities pointed 
 out by the experts, what then? They would seize 
 the towns, of course, but the coast states are mainly 
 agricultural. Wealth is not concentrated as it is in 
 industrial communities, and moreover the greater 
 part of the country is rough and mountainous. 
 
 Any one who believes that the inhabitants of these 
 Western states, whose fathers and grandfathers were 
 the pioneers that subdued the wilderness a half century 
 
202 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 ago, will meekly bow the head to the invader or that 
 the nation as a whole would do so, has a singular con- 
 ception of the spirit of the American people. These 
 men and women are not Flemish peasants. Grant 
 that our mihtia would be useless and the Japanese ad- 
 vance almost undisputed, yet in the mountains and in 
 the districts away from the cities, there doubtless would 
 ensue a protracted guerilla warfare that could last indefi- 
 nitely, and the longer it lasted the worse ofif Japan would 
 be. Past experience teaches that even savages can keep 
 up an almost endless warfare of this sort and one that is 
 very expensive for the invading force. Japan knows 
 something about this from her twenty years' experience 
 in trjang to subdue the natives of Formosa. At any 
 rate, the belief that because we have no large army to 
 oppose a Japanese invasion, such an invasion would 
 spell a quick victory and a prompt conclusion of hos- 
 tilities with the levying of a crushing indemnity, is 
 quite without justification. Moreover, the wealth of 
 the four large cities named, even if all seized, would 
 not be a drop in the bucket compared with the ex- 
 penditures required to take it. The millionaires of 
 Pasadena would not linger long to be captured. And 
 the Japanese could not realize much more except by 
 harvesting the crops on the ranches, which is their 
 appointed task in times of peace. In short, the hope 
 
THE CHANCES OF WAR 203 
 
 of a sudden realization of profit would be doomed to 
 failure, and Japan would be in for a long and ruinously 
 expensive campaign.^ 
 
 The point is, not that Japan could not invade and con- 
 quer the coast states, but that, having done so, she could 
 not stand the financial and economic strain of holding 
 them for a long time under a necessarily mihtary occupa- 
 tion. Hence if she realizes this, there will be no motive 
 for her to attempt the enterprise. 
 
 The third consideration is one that has received more 
 attention than any of the others. It is obvious that 
 we could not protect the entire Philippine archipelago 
 against invasion without the concentration of a very 
 strong army there. Corregidor, high above the sea, 
 might hold out for a long time, but in the end an at- 
 tacking force would probably prevail. This, of course, 
 on the assumption that it had the freedom of the sea, 
 on account of the destruction of the American fleet. 
 It has been pointed out, moreover, that Japan's pohcy, 
 as exemplified in the Russian war, is to strike first and 
 issue the declaration of war at her convenience. 
 
 There are some who feel that Americans, on the 
 whole, would be glad to be rid of the Philippines, and 
 would welcome any chance to transfer the responsibil- 
 
 ' Ruinous because her American trade, and to a great extent the rest 
 of her trade, would be automatically destroyed. 
 
204 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 ities to another nation. This may be true, if it could 
 be done in a legislative way, but to lose them in war, 
 to have them taken by force, would be much more 
 likely to rouse all the fighting blood in the American 
 people and make them determined to keep the islands 
 at all hazard; would, in fact, commit us irrevocably 
 to the possession of them. 
 
 However, to continue our former assumption, — 
 concede that Japan by a sudden coup captures the 
 PhiUppines, which is a very probable contingency in 
 the event of war. Concede, if you will, that the Amer- 
 ican fleet is destroyed so that we are helpless. Assume 
 even that we have been forced to consent to an in- 
 glorious peace. Japan would then have achieved her 
 design. She would be in undisputed possession of 
 these treasure islands of the Pacific at the cost of a 
 few broadsides. (Whether any European power would 
 interfere at this stage is worthy of consideration, but 
 we need not include such a contingency at present.) 
 
 Japan would then have on her hands a very large 
 group of tropical islands with a decidedly mixed popu- 
 lation. Some of the people are savage or part savage ; 
 some are fanatical Moros, and about 7,000,000, or one 
 seventh of the population of Japan, are various sorts 
 of FiHpinos with a physical inheritance Malay, and 
 a spiritual inheritance Spanish; that is to say, Ro- 
 
THE CHANCES OF WAR 205 
 
 man Catholic with a mediaeval attitude toward the 
 heathen. 
 
 Japan would find herself in essentially the same 
 position in which we were at the close of the Spanish 
 war. It took us three years of exasperating guerilla 
 warfare before opposition to our presence finally dis- 
 appeared. And how did we succeed at last? By 
 kilHng off as many of the population as possible? 
 Hardly; if that had been our poKcy, we should be 
 doing it still. We only succeeded when we convinced 
 the Filipinos that we were not there to exploit them. 
 This is a truth that no one acquainted with the facts 
 would think of denying. We have given of our best 
 as only a very wealthy nation can. We have respected 
 the religious prejudices of our new wards, whatever 
 they were. In the personal relations we have treated 
 them with unswerving honesty and fair dealing. In 
 short, we have assumed an obhgation of humanity, 
 although not without the hope, perhaps, that our 
 bread cast upon the Pacific might return after not too 
 many days. 
 
 Now the obvious presumptions are against Japan 
 playing that sort of a role. We have already com- 
 mented ^ upon the peculiar difficulties that Japan 
 would be called upon to face in the event of an occu- 
 
 ,1 See page 103 ff. 
 
2o6 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 pation of the archipelago. She would find all the 
 population arrayed against the "heathen" invader, 
 and in remote quarters which she could not hope to 
 subdue. At once the old inter-tribal feuds would 
 break out again. In short, anarchy would reign in the 
 islands, mitigated here and there by military despotism. 
 This sort of occupation would cost Japan as it did the 
 United States.^ Japanese statesmen might then begin 
 to wonder where the profits came in. The potential 
 wealth of the Philippines, as we have seen, is enormous ; 
 but it is only available under conditions of protracted 
 peace. Metals, hardwoods, hemp, rubber, — these 
 products are only translatable into money by peaceful 
 commerce. The first gun fired at Manila would mean 
 the total collapse of all the money-making machinery 
 in the islands. Moreover, the development of com- 
 merce there waits upon the investment of large amounts 
 of capital, that of which Japan herself is so greatly in 
 need, and under any circumstances the wealth of a 
 country is in the hands of the people who make it and 
 it would be a generation before Japan as a nation could 
 profit by occupying the Philippines. It would be 
 much better business to let Uncle Sam make the in- 
 
 ' In August, 1911, General Leonard Wood, then Chief of Staff, stated 
 that "For the past ten or twelve years our army expense had been 
 $167,486,000 in excess of the cost of maintaming an army of similar size 
 in this country." 
 
THE CHANCES OF WAR 207 
 
 vestments and take the responsibilities and then to 
 develop a peaceful commerce with the islands, as Eng- 
 land does. On the whole, if Japanese statesmen have 
 ever contemplated enriching their nation by seizing 
 the Philippines, it would be well for them to carefully 
 consider the debit side of the account. 
 
 The fourth consideration, that of seizing the islands 
 for the purpose of turning them over to some other 
 power, need not detain us. Any other power would 
 have almost the same difl&culty that has been just 
 described. But more than this, the last thing in the 
 world that Japan would seek would be to intrench a 
 rival power in the Far East. America is for her in- 
 nocuous, for America has never had nor ever will have 
 any idea of territorial aggression in China. So far as 
 Japan is concerned, American possession of the Philip- 
 pines "neutralizes" them for her. This would not 
 be the case with any other power. To make this clear 
 — although it is the purest speculation of course — let 
 us conceive of a situation in which the United States 
 should be at war with another power. Just as was the 
 case with Spain, we should be vulnerable to attack in 
 the Philippines. We can believe that rather than 
 permit any other power to take the Philippines from 
 us, Japan would come to the rescue as an ally. For 
 it is obviously so much to her advantage that we, rather 
 
2o8 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 than a European nation, should hold the islands, that 
 war might seem to her justifiable to prevent our pos- 
 session of them being threatened. 
 
 But from the standpoint of national profit, there is 
 another aspect of the case which must be included. 
 It is not without significance that America is the only 
 large nation that buys more of Japan than she sells. 
 The declaration of war would put an end to this. What 
 Japan makes of us as profit in a year ($31,000,000 in 
 1913) practically pays the interest on her national 
 debt abroad. With any other country her foreign 
 trade might cease and, temporarily, Japan would be 
 the gainer. This would not be true for the United 
 States. The $70,000,000 of silk and tea which she 
 annually sells us would have to seek (in vain) another 
 market. The American cotton which she requires in 
 order to hold the Chinese market she would no longer 
 have, and Indian cotton, if hostilities continued, would 
 drive the Japanese from the Chinese field. 
 
 In all her foreign trade, which she has so sedulously 
 cultivated for many years, equally hard conditions 
 would obtain; for an inspection of Japan's foreign 
 trade summaries reveals the interesting fact, that with 
 the exception of China, the great bulk of her exports 
 to other countries are luxuries and the great bulk of 
 her imports are necessities. We are discovering now 
 
THE CHANCES OF WAR 209 
 
 how the confusion of war affects the business of so 
 solvent a nation as the United States, far from any 
 active campaigning. How much more devastating for 
 Japan would be the effect of a war with a nation with 
 which she is so intimately and dependently connected, 
 as the United States; always keeping in mind, of 
 course, that the original premise was based upon the 
 idea that such a war would be profitable. 
 
 So far, in order not to comphcate the argument, we 
 have omitted the consideration of two factors which 
 should not be ignored. First of these is the United 
 States fleet which, now that the Panama canal is com- 
 pleted, should be an additional hazard to be taken into 
 account by Japan if she contemplates hostihty. Sec- 
 ondly, we have dealt with only the two nations, Japan 
 and ourselves. The first of these we need not consider 
 otherwise than to mention it, since we are not con- 
 cerned so much with the probable course of a conflict 
 as with the question whether Japan will bring on such 
 a conflict, and the American fleet figures in such a dis- 
 cussion only to the extent to which it enters into the 
 calculations of the Japanese. As to this we know nothing. 
 It is likely, however, that other considerations should be 
 much more of a deterrent than the opposition of a fleet 
 which is subject always to the possibility of elimination 
 by defeat. The second point is more significant. 
 
2IO JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 It is difficult, almost impossible, to conceive of such a 
 conflict being limited to the two powers primarily in- 
 volved. Just as in Europe, the declaration of war upon 
 Servia by Austria brought the whole house of cards 
 tumbhng down, so in a very different way does the 
 Pacific situation involve much more than Japan and the 
 United States. 
 
 We may decry racial antagonism as much as we 
 please. It remains an historical fact that has been the 
 cause of much woe to empire builders who have ignored 
 it. Those who have traveled about the earth and 
 who have the leisure and opportunity to read and 
 observe may reflect that men are pretty much alike 
 the world over, that the good and evil in different races 
 balance off rather well and that criticism of a foreigner's 
 characteristics is bad taste in one who realizes by com- 
 parison the faults in his own kind. But the mass of 
 the population in any country, inbred and provincial, 
 whose whole energy is exerted in gaining a hard living, 
 whose prejudices become elevated into precepts, and 
 whose pecuUarities are exalted to virtues, to such as 
 these, a genial cosmopohtanism is denied. Toward 
 the stranger, they have the instinctive antipathy of 
 the street dog toward the stray cur who has wandered 
 out of his usual orbit. 
 
 Race prejudice is an evil, and we should strive by every 
 
THE CHANCES OF WAR 211 
 
 possible means to eradicate it, for our own sake. But 
 we cannot ignore it. It is a state of mind, if you like, 
 without material reason for being, but we cannot cure 
 it, as we can some personal disorders, by ceasing to 
 think about it. 
 
 Now to any one who examines the facts, the most 
 striking characteristic of the white peoples that in- 
 habit the lands bordering the Pacific is their instinct of 
 racial soKdarity against the Oriental. I should not 
 call it enmity, for it is, as a rule, impersonal. At bot- 
 tom, the difficulty is an economic one, and for that 
 reason so fundamental that it transcends the artificial 
 divisions of nationalism. 
 
 When Japan fought Russia, Germany and France 
 did not view the situation with equanimity, although 
 they did not interfere, partly because of the Anglo- 
 Japanese alliance, and partly because the battlefield 
 was many thousand miles away. Like China, Japan 
 has profited by the mutual jealousies of the "Powers," 
 and the reluctance of any of them to offer a lead to any 
 other. 
 
 But should Japan declare war against the United 
 States, particularly on the plan so often discussed in 
 this country, the situation from the European stand- 
 point would be very much graver. Were the antagonist 
 any other than an Oriental one, we may well beheve 
 
212 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 that a good many European nations would view the 
 thorough trouncing of the United States with com- 
 placency. But the defeat of any leading Occidental 
 power by Japan would be a calamity from the stand- 
 point of any nation in Europe. England would with- 
 out doubt be given the immediate alternative of re- 
 nouncing the Japanese alliance or of losing Canada and 
 Australia from the Empire. At any rate it is incon- 
 ceivable that England should be anything but neutral 
 in a matter in which her own self-interest would be so 
 much concerned. But with England neutral, that is, 
 with Japan deprived of the backing of the English 
 alliance, both Russia and Germany would appear on 
 the scene of continental Asia, the one with keen recol- 
 lections of Port Arthur and Dalny and the other with 
 equally keen remembrance of Kiao-Chau, and both 
 ready to seize the long-deferred chance to secure them- 
 selves in China by evicting the Japanese. 
 
 Japan would find herself isolated, beggared, and with 
 all the deHcate structure of her new and hardly won 
 economic development crumbling to ruins about her. 
 In the midst of a world of enemies, she would fight on, 
 no doubt, indefinitely. For there are no braver folk 
 on earth, no more steadfast and loyal to their own, 
 than the fifty milHon stout-hearted people who fill the 
 islands of the Japanese Empire. But is it very reason- 
 
THE CHANCES OF WAR 213 
 
 able that she should deliberately bring on all this, 
 in the belief that she would profit thereby ? 
 
 There are some ^ who grant that there is no im- 
 mediate danger of conflict on the Pacific, but who, taking 
 a long-range view, looking down the vista of the twen- 
 tieth century, foresee certain trouble from the very fact 
 that two strong powers are bound to rub elbows with 
 one another in the Pacific. 
 
 It is very difficult to conceive of what the next two 
 decades wiU bring forth in any part of the world. The 
 poUtical writer who, by drawing on his imagination, 
 should have attempted fifty years ago to describe the 
 war of 1914, with its submarines and its aeroplanes, 
 its siege howitzers and its wireless telegraphy, yes, even 
 its automobiles and bicycles, would have been laughed 
 into obhvion as a Jules Verne without the saving grace 
 of probabiHty. Any writer of 1815 who should have 
 attempted to foresee the probable relations that would 
 exist between England and the United States at the 
 end of the century would have been wide of the mark 
 in just the degree to which he should have based his 
 predictions upon actual knowledge of current history of 
 that time and an understanding of the trend of the past. 
 
 The behef that conffict is sure to come in the course 
 of time is a vicious one; illogical because based upon 
 • Mr. Mann is apparently of this group. See page 2. 
 
214 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 no data that may be relevant to the future and im- 
 politic because a persistent fear stimulates the feeling 
 of reprisal and aggression. 
 
 We owe a duty to our grandchildren not to place 
 difl&culties in their way by inconsiderate action now, 
 and naturally, we should shape our present course 
 with as inteUigent an appreciation of future conditions 
 as is possible to get, but after aU, instead of a pohcy 
 based upon specific conditions that may, or may not, 
 come to pass, our best legacy to posterity will be the 
 record of foreign relations carried on as successful 
 business is carried on between individuals, that is, 
 based upon common honesty and the recognition of 
 the rights of others. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 japan's dilemma 
 
 We have already noted the small amount of arable 
 land in Japan proper. A yearly gross increase in the 
 population of 682,000 creates a problem that is difl&- 
 cult of solution. It is nearly the number of all the 
 factory operatives in the country. In other words, 
 the agricultural hmit has been nearly reached on the 
 one hand, and on the other, no imaginable development 
 of industrialism can provide work indefinitely for so 
 many new hands. Migration seems to be the only 
 reUef, and the internal pressure of population will seek 
 a vent at any possible outlet. This contingency is 
 perhaps not now so imminent as might be thought, 
 since large areas in the Hokkaido are but sparsely in- 
 habited. These northern provinces are fertile, but the 
 winters are severe and they will not accommodate 
 many extra milhons. Sooner or later the pressure of 
 population will be felt throughout the Empire. 
 
 A glance at the map of the Pacific will reveal the 
 possibiUties for Japanese emigration. Beginning with 
 Alaska, except for the break of British Columbia, the 
 
 215 
 
2i6 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 Pacific is bordered by the territories of the United 
 States down to the thirty-second parallel. Then comes 
 Mexico, Central and South America; next Australia, 
 the Dutch Indies, and the Phihppines; then China 
 proper, lastly Manchuria, Korea, and Siberia. 
 
 We may as well disregard the idea of extensive Jap- 
 anese colonization of North America or Australia, at 
 least for the present. China is over-populated already. 
 Siberia is out of the question, for the Japanese is not 
 the type of the hardy pioneer. The Philippines we 
 have already considered. There is left South America 
 and the adjacent Orient. 
 
 Brazil, Peru, and Chile, it is understood, have made 
 overtures looking to Japanese colonization. They would 
 be welcomed in those scantily settled regions as they 
 would not be in more northern states. A Japanese 
 steamship hne connects Japan with South America, 
 and it may be that sometime in the future we shall 
 see a considerable immigration into the more tem- 
 perate parts of the southern continent. 
 
 Brazil, seeking cheap labor to develop her industries, 
 has made great concessions both to Germany and to 
 Japan. As a result of the former there is a thriving 
 German colony in the South American republic. Brazil 
 is said to have offered a free grant to Japan of 122,500 
 acres in Sao Paulo, with the privilege of buying more, 
 
JAPAN'S DILEMMA 217 
 
 and free transportation for the emigrants. It is of- 
 ficially stated that the Japanese population in Brazil is 
 but 10,000, but it is claimed that two or three times that 
 number are under contract on the coffee plantations. 
 
 Peru, like Brazil, has welcomed the Japanese and 
 made similar concessions to them. There are probably 
 many more in Peru than in Brazil, and they appear to 
 have adapted themselves very well. 
 
 Mexico in turn has tried to turn some of the tide her 
 way, but the poUtical conditions in Mexico have sufficed 
 to greatly restrict such emigration. 
 
 But South America, particularly its eastern portion, 
 is many thousands of miles from Japan, and connection 
 with the northern country would always be rather 
 tenuous for Oriental colonists there. Moreover, it is 
 the avowed policy (as well as the logical policy) of the 
 government to direct Japanese immigration toward 
 adjacent territory rather than to distant parts of the 
 earth. Not only are perplexing social and economic 
 problems incident to contact with wholly aHen races 
 thus avoided, but the colonizing Japanese are thereby 
 concentrated and occupy the new territory far more 
 effectively than they would if scattered to the ends of 
 the earth. This is of particular significance in the 
 practical occupation of the sparsely settled province of 
 South Manchuria. 
 
2i8 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 When we come to the Orient, Formosa at once claims 
 attention. But Formosa has proven an unexpected 
 problem for Japan. This island, ceded to her as a 
 prize of war at the conclusion of the struggle with 
 China, has many of the superficial aspects of the Philip- 
 pines. Its area is about 15,000 square miles, but it is 
 very mountainous and wild and its population is made 
 up of a number of fierce and unciviHzed tribes who are 
 constantly at war. The climate is hot and the Jap- 
 anese cannot endure labor in the open, as can the Chi- 
 nese and hillmen. As a consequence, they mostly con- 
 gregate in the coast cities. Every effort has been 
 made by the central government to stimulate coloniza- 
 tion and induce Japanese to migrate to Formosa, but 
 in spite of subsidies and financial aids of all sorts, in 
 the twenty years during which the island has been in 
 the possession of Japan, less than 100,000 Japanese 
 have been induced to settle there, amid three and a 
 half million aborigines and Chinese.^ The prospect of 
 any considerable percentage of surplus population 
 overflowing into Formosa or any other part of the 
 tropics does not seem bright. 
 
 ^In 1912 some 1750 farmers in family groups were assisted by the 
 government at a cost of $200,000. These are settled in communities, 
 about sixty families to a village, the paternal government furnishing 
 houses and medical and educational facilities. Each family, however, 
 had to have $100 capital. 
 
JAPAN'S DILEMMA 219 
 
 Manchuria and Korea, on the other hand, are much 
 more favorably situated. Either is accessible now, 
 within a few hours' steamer and rail journey from 
 Japan. 
 
 Korea is the natural outlet for Japan, and since its 
 annexation in 191 1, the way has been cleared for ex- 
 tensive immigration. The area of Korea is 86,000 
 square miles and the Korean population (191 2) is 
 14,566,783, or about 173 to the square mile. Com- 
 paring this with Japan or China, it will be seen that 
 there is room for many Japanese, in spite of the 
 40,000,000 acres of forests and mountains in the pen- 
 insula. As a matter of fact, there were probably not 
 more than 50,000 Japanese in Korea ten years ago, 
 whereas there are now more than 200,000. As a Japan- 
 ese pubHcist puts it: "Each square mile in Japan has 
 contributed six persons to each square mile in Korea.'' 
 
 Rice, soy beans, and barley are grown in Korea, and 
 there may be a future for upland cotton, which would 
 be an important factor in the development of Japanese 
 industry. Silk is also an important product. But 
 the most striking feature of Korea is the opportunity 
 it affords for stock raising. If the Japanese can break 
 away from their conventional point of view, and, in- 
 stead of producing a scant crop of rice at the expense 
 of infinite labor, devote themselves to the raising 
 
220 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 of cattle and hogs, without doubt they can develop a 
 source of wealth in Korea beside which the gold mines 
 would be insignificant. For the Japanese have a fond- 
 ness for beef, and if it were made cheaper, it would be 
 of vast benefit to the nation to introduce it more ex- 
 tensively into the national diet.' The by-products 
 would also be made use of as effectively as they are in 
 America. On the other hand, the Chinese are fond of 
 pork, and hogs raised on the farms and pastures of 
 Korea would find a ready market near at hand. The 
 fisheries also provide a maintenance for great numbers 
 of Japanese. On the whole, Korea affords a congenial 
 and remunerative field for Japanese expansion. Emi- 
 grants cannot make money so fast, nor so easily there, 
 as they can in California, but their settling stirs up no 
 new sources of trouble. The native Korean must ac- 
 commodate himself as best he can. 
 
 Japan had a foothold in Manchuria before Korea was 
 definitely annexed, and of course annexation could 
 never have been accomplished so long as Russian in- 
 fiuence was all powerful in Manchuria. There is Httle 
 likelihood that Japan will relinquish what of the latter 
 province she holds, and the more she can settle her 
 citizens there, the stronger will be her claim to the 
 whole south province. The problem is a somewhat diffi- 
 cult one, however, and one fraught with pecuKar dangers. 
 
JAPAN'S DILEMMA 221 
 
 To those who have been accustomed to consider 
 Manchuria as a part of China (as it still is in diplomatic 
 fiction) a comparison of the relative density of popu- 
 lation between this province and the other eighteen 
 provinces of China is starthng. The area of China 
 proper is 1,588,000 square miles,i with an estimated 
 population of 407,518,750; that is, a concentration of 
 256 per square mile throughout the Empire. The con- 
 centration in the populous coastal provinces, however, 
 is double that. (The concentration in Japan is 342 per 
 square mile, exceeded only by Great Britain and Bel- 
 gium.) Manchuria has an area of 376,800 square 
 miles and a population (before the Russian war) of 
 8,500,000. This represents a concentration of 22 J per 
 square mile, about equal to that of Kansas and much 
 less than that of Minnesota and Wisconsin. The al- 
 most untouched natural resources and the agricultural 
 possibilities of this country are sufficient to support a 
 population many times greater than the present one, 
 so long as peace is maintained and industry encouraged. 
 Here would seem to be a natural outlet for Japan's 
 surplus population, and indeed, since the Russian war, 
 the national government has made every endeavor to 
 induce an immigration to South Manchuria, now under 
 
 * These figures are from L. Richard, " Geographic de I'Empire de 
 Chine." 
 
222 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 Japanese control. The stimulus of subsidized railways 
 and steamship lines, of freight and customs rebates, 
 and even less justifiable means have been used in the 
 aid of Japanese immigrants. 
 
 One reason for the scanty population of Manchuria, 
 previous to the building of the railway, was the exist- 
 ence of wandering brigands, "Hunghuntzies," who 
 terrorized the country. The new government of the 
 Japanese is stable, if arbitrary,^ and under its aegis, 
 Chinese are attracted as well as Japanese. This may 
 be an advantage or otherwise to the Japanese, according 
 to circumstances. If the Chinese supply the unskilled 
 labor necessary to develop the resources of the country 
 and are amenable to Japanese control, it may work out 
 to the great advantage of the latter settlers, who would 
 thus have the prestige and the profits of employers, 
 instead of being employees. If, on the contrary, the 
 Chinese assume the position of rivals in commerce and 
 industry, it may not work out that way, for it is not at 
 all certain that as rivals in the same field the more 
 mercurial Japanese is a match for the keen and indus- 
 trious Chinese. 
 
 ' The actual legitimate control in the hands of the Japanese is confined 
 to the Kuantung district, in which Port Arthur is situated, and the regions 
 contiguous to the railway, its branches, and the mines. This, however, 
 very effectively dominates the province. 
 
JAPAN'S DILEMMA 223 
 
 We have already mentioned a well-known rule in 
 theoretical finance termed Gresham's law, the essence 
 of which is that in a given locality a baser or cheaper 
 metal coinage will drive out of circulation the more 
 valuable. An economist has attempted recently to 
 apply this law to competing races in the Hawaiian 
 Islands and claims to have found the same sort of 
 efEect, — "cheap" labor displacing higher priced labor. 
 
 It will be of much interest to watch the interplay 
 of racial influences in Manchuria from this standpoint. 
 Before the Russians came, stable government seems 
 hardly to have existed outside the large cities, and, of 
 course, where the economic motive was lacking, settlers 
 stayed away. The Russians not only brought order 
 but stimulated industry very greatly by the construc- 
 tion of the railway, the fiat city of Dalny, the works 
 of Port Arthur, etc. This stimulation was artificial 
 and was bound to have come to a natural end soon if 
 the rapid progress of events had not brought it to an 
 abrupt close by war. The Chinese, however, profited 
 greatly by this regime. They migrated into Man- 
 churia from Shantung and other provinces, and as 
 the Russians paid good wages and were absolutely 
 dependent upon this sort of labor for the carrying out 
 of their plans, things were in a very satisfactory state 
 from the standpoint of the Chinese. A peaceful rule 
 
224 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 of the country, even if in the hands of foreigners, of- 
 fered every advantage for permanent settlers, and the 
 Chinese part of the population increased correspond- 
 ingly. 
 
 The war, of course, upset things considerably, and 
 for a year or so after the Peace of Portsmouth the 
 Japanese had everything their own way. But even 
 the army men understood that there was no final ad- 
 vantage in maintaining a military rule in a country 
 whose only use was as a field for commercial exploita- 
 tion. And with the withdrawal of the troops and the 
 establishment of civil law again, the Chinese once 
 more began to settle down. It makes no practical 
 difference to a Chinaman whether Manchuria, on the 
 map, be Russian, Japanese, or Chinese, so long as he is 
 allowed to take his profit in peace,^ and it cannot be 
 too often repeated that for Manchuria to be ceded to 
 Japan entirely would avail the latter country little, 
 so long as there were more Chinese than Japanese in 
 the province, or so long as those Chinese that are there 
 are able to compete to advantage with the Japanese. 
 For Japan to attempt to exclude Chinese from Man- 
 
 ' It is true that in the throes of the " rights-recovery" fever a few years 
 ago the Chinese made the occupation of Manchuria one of the grounds of 
 the great anti- Japanese boycott, yet this agitation was most conspicuous 
 in Canton, far away. Your Shantung Chinaman is a practical man, 
 taking the world as he finds it. 
 
JAPAN'S DILEMMA 225 
 
 churia, as they are excluded from America, would be 
 practically impossible, but if they continue to settle in 
 this region in the future as they have in the past, one 
 of two things must happen if Japan is to reap any ad- 
 vantage from the possession of the province. Either 
 more Japanese settlers must enter the province than 
 Chinese or else those that are there must prove them- 
 selves more efl&cient and more successful than the 
 Chinese. The latter alternative is very unhkely. The 
 former is the problem that faces the goverimient of 
 Japan today. 
 
 In her continental ambitions, Japan has two serious 
 obstacles to overcome, apart fiom the natural reluc- 
 tance of her people to uproot themselves and settle in 
 a new country, as pawns in the great game of higher 
 politics. One of these is the opposition of China her- 
 self, and the other is that of the European powers, 
 Russia, Germany, England, and France, who for many 
 years have attempted to sap their way into the terri- 
 tory of China, dismember that country, and distribute 
 the pieces among themselves. As Japan looks to 
 China for her own future market, such an eventuality 
 would probably be disastrous to her interests. On 
 the other hand, any encroachment upon Chinese terri- 
 tory on the part of Japan brings that nation into rivalry 
 with the European Powers. In the keen diplomatic 
 
 Q 
 
226 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 contest that has been waged in Pekin for many years, 
 the Japanese have played their part with skill, and 
 when fortune and an audacious opportunism carried 
 Russia down into Manchuria in the early years of the 
 century, with the likehhood of dominating Pekin and 
 the certainty of dominating Seoul, Japan did not hesi- 
 tate to change the game from a diplomatic to a miUtary 
 one. It was because Russia utterly failed to under- 
 stand Japan's real interests and because Alexieff could 
 not beUeve that she was not "blufl&ng" that the Russians 
 allowed themselves to be dragged into that unfortunate 
 and unpopular war. 
 
 But Russia has not been the only rival of Japan in 
 China. England, so long as she feared the Russian 
 bear, deluded herself with the notion that she was 
 protecting her interests in Asia by the Anglo- Japanese 
 alhance. In reality it was Japan that profited most, 
 since by t)dng the hands of England she eliminated, 
 temporarily, another rival. For the natural interests 
 of Great Britain — her national instinct, one might 
 say — places her in the opposition to Japan in all that 
 concerns China. England's trade along the China 
 coast led all the rest until very recently, and it has 
 chiefly been her partner in the alhance that has played 
 the successful rival and reduced the relative importance 
 of that trade. No one can say what results will follow 
 
JAPAN'S DILEMMA 227 
 
 the conclusion of the Great European war. It is 
 doubtful, however, if Russia is ever again the bugaboo 
 to England that she has been in the past, and if that 
 is so, then the chief motive on England's part for main- 
 taining the Japanese alhance will disappear, and her 
 own interests, as well as the pressure which Canada 
 and AustraHa will exert, will force her into the other 
 camp. For the time being, however, her hands are 
 tied and the recent retrocession of Wei-hai-wei to China 
 eliminates her from further participation in the dis- 
 memberment of that unhappy country. 
 
 The third dangerous rival has also but lately been 
 eUminated. This is Germany. Germany's activities 
 in East Asia have been so startHng in their crude ag- 
 gressiveness, her frank contempt for the Oriental and 
 his institutions, and has seemed so Ukely to make future 
 trouble, that the "Peace of Asia" seems a great deal 
 nearer realization now that Kiau-Chau has been cap- 
 tured by the Japanese. German trade threatened a 
 serious rivalry to Japan's, and this fact, in addition to the 
 strong influence that Germany exerted toward the dismem- 
 berment of China, made it highly advantageous to Japan 
 that this power be ehminated from the stage of Far East- 
 em poHtics. Japanese have not forgotten, either, that 
 it was Germany who in 1895 led the coalition of the 
 Powers that checkmated Japan's first move in the game. 
 
2 28 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 What Japan will do with Kiao-Chau is a question 
 that may be foolish to speculate upon at the present 
 writing. Probably Japan herself does not know very 
 definitely. It is unlikely, however, that she will give 
 the district back to China, preferring rather to consider 
 herself the heir of the ninety-nine-year lease granted 
 to Germany. Port Arthur is of course a precedent 
 for such a stand. Shantung, however, is too full of 
 Chinese to be much of a field for Japanese colonization. 
 The actual possession of the province would entail 
 heavy expense without any corresponding profit, and 
 it will doubtless appear to the Japanese ofiicials that 
 eventually more is to be gained by using it as a pledge 
 to exact some other quid pro quo from China than by 
 indefinitely retaining it. The same consideration would 
 prevent Japan from ever conquering or controlHng to 
 any extent any of the populous provinces of China 
 proper. The possibilities l)dng before such an enter- 
 prise would be such as to daunt the boldest gambler in 
 Japanese politics. 
 
 The partition of China, therefore, has become, in 
 recent years, an apparently remote contingency (unless 
 Japan herself essays the task), and England, Germany, 
 and Russia no longer threaten Japan's dominance by 
 territorial possession. 
 
 But China herself is a factor that must be considered. 
 
JAPAN'S DILEMMA 229 
 
 This huge unwieldy nation has undergone some starthng 
 changes within recent years. Some of these changes 
 may be more superficial than the casual American 
 might beUeve. The individual Chinaman, except for a 
 haircut, is doubtless much the same sort of a man that 
 he used to be. But one transforming change has been 
 working in the Middle Kingdom that cannot be undone 
 and is of profound significance. The Chinese within 
 the last decade have discovered themselves, in other 
 words have developed a national self-consciousness that 
 previously did not exist. The opening up of communi- 
 cations in the form of railways, posts, and telegraphs, 
 on the one hand, and the development of a vernacular 
 press to publish and distribute the news of Asia and the 
 world, on the other hand, have combined to transform 
 a group of detached provinces with practically nothing 
 in common but their ancestry and their ignorance of 
 one another into a unified nation. 
 
 In the past. South China has been indifferent to what 
 European Powers were doing in North China. Nowa- 
 days, the inhabitants of remote parts of the Empire are 
 keenly alive to any such encroachments and, further- 
 more, a vigorous "rights-recovery" agitation has been 
 set going, the purpose of which is to retrieve the losses 
 of the past. This movement is patriotic, however un- 
 wise it may be. 
 
230 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 Naturally the new spirit in China does not look with 
 any too much favor upon Japan's activities in Man- 
 churia, nor, it may be added, in Shantung either. What 
 China wants is for Japan to keep out of Chinese terri- 
 tory (including Manchuria) altogether. Japan's "mani- 
 fest destiny," to say nothing of her pressing necessity, 
 on account of the pressure of population, is to do other- 
 wise. And as Japan has the army and navy, there is 
 not much doubt which contention will prevail. Yet 
 complete success would Hkely be a Pyrrhic victory for 
 her, since the motive for her whole national policy is 
 the development of an industrial system with particular 
 reference to the markets of China. And it is self- 
 evident that profitable trade can hardly be forced at 
 the point of a gun. 
 
 China is an adept at "playing both ends against the 
 middle" and setting rival powers by the ears. Her 
 safety in the past lay in the number of her enemies. 
 For the moment, Japan is alone and mistress of the 
 situation, but no one knows how long this will last. 
 She may have to pay for her temerity, and it is the fear 
 of such retaliation that makes her so feverishly pile up 
 her armaments, with no enemy in sight. More than this, 
 the apparent calm of political conditions in China is 
 notoriously deceptive. Any day an explosion may 
 occur that will throw that nation into chaos. In such 
 
JAPAN'S DILEMMA 231 
 
 an event, Japanese intervention would be a foregone 
 conclusion, if only to prevent the worse alternative of 
 European intervention. 
 
 We are now in a position to appreciate the dilemma 
 in which Japanese statesmen find themselves. On the 
 one hand, confronted with the absolute necessity of 
 transforming their nation from an agricultural into an 
 industrial commonwealth; on the other hand, faced 
 with the necessity of finding an outlet for a surplus 
 population that increases at the rate of three quarters 
 of a million a year. In seeking such an outlet they find 
 themselves excluded from the greater part of the earth's 
 surface and in the most likely quarter, confronted with 
 rivals and powerful opponents. To contend with the 
 latter they must spend the bulk of their revenues for 
 unproductive war machinery instead of putting them 
 into profitable industrial machinery. This impoverishes 
 the people and necessitates huge foreign loans. It is a 
 vicious circle and there seems no stopping place. It 
 might appear as if every penny of revenue were already 
 extracted from a long-suffering people. Yet one more 
 asset remains. The standing of Japanese bonds in- 
 dicates that the borrowing power of the nation has 
 been nearly reached. If the Manchurian-Korean situa- 
 tion demands more expenditure still, then the only 
 way that any considerable amount of money could be 
 
232 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 raised abroad would be to h3rpotliecate national assets 
 such as some of the monopolies, or the customs, and 
 this would be the beginning of the end of Japan, as a 
 first-class power. 
 
 American readers, it is hoped, will appreciate that 
 Japan's armaments are necessitated by her interests in 
 continental Asia and that to use them in another quarter 
 (i.e. against the United States) would be to incite at- 
 tack in the very place in which she is most vulnerable 
 and which is of the most consequence to her. 
 
 Is there a way out for Japan and the rest of the world ? 
 Will the nations ever learn that the attempt to grab 
 everything in sight simply to prevent another from 
 grabbing leads to complicated ruin? We insist upon 
 the Monroe Doctrine for America. Why not for Japan 
 in Asia ? The cautious engineer provides a safety valve 
 for his own protection, not primarily for that of his 
 boiler. Why not provide a safety valve for Japan and 
 help our own peace of mind ? 
 
 When dreams do not come out right, we sometimes 
 fall asleep again and dream them over. But we cannot 
 roll back the carpet of history. Asia can never again 
 be what it was before the Cassini convention. Korea is 
 a part of Japan now and South Manchuria is under her 
 control. Let us accept the situation. China may 
 well heed Japan's contention that she took them, not 
 
JAPAN'S DILEMMA 233 
 
 from her, but from Russia, against whom the former 
 was helpless. Japan's needs for expansion are real 
 and obvious. Manchuria and Korea could hold the 
 double of the Japanese population. Why try to "head 
 her off." They are her safety valve. If the stream 
 flows that way, it will not flow to us, nor to Canada and 
 Australia. If Japan does not fear aggression in Asia 
 nor opposition in her natural trends, she need not break 
 her back with the enormous burden of armaments and 
 she therefore may be able to build up her industrial 
 system as she wishes to. If she could do so, and could 
 become strong and wealthy, instead of impoverished 
 and debt-burdened, it would profit Russia more, and 
 Germany and England more, than if any of these coun- 
 tries "owned" or administered any territory in East 
 Asia. For a wealthy Japan means a bigger market for 
 European and American goods, and a Japan impover- 
 ished by the necessities of armed defense means the 
 loss of such a market. Why, then, carmot the white 
 nations profit themselves by assisting, instead of try- 
 ing to block, Japan? For this seems to be the way 
 out for her and for us. 
 
 Summary 
 
 Japan, with a rapidly increasing population, has 
 nearly reached the limit in the home country. In- 
 
234 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 ternal pressure of population and the expanding energy 
 of the people force her to seek an outlet. Racial 
 opposition, dense population, or climatic conditions 
 limit the field of such expansion, except in the con- 
 tiguous territories of Korea and Manchuria. In these 
 provinces, however, Japan has encountered the an- 
 tagonism both of China and of various European Powers 
 intent upon territorial aggrandizement. In order to 
 control the situation, Japan has been compelled to 
 fight two wars and build up an expensive mihtary 
 equipment that is breaking her down financially. So 
 long as other nations threaten Japan's natural expan- 
 sion, she will be compelled to maintain this armed 
 preparedness. In the writer's opinion it would profit 
 the other Powers' selfish interest to no longer oppose 
 this movement, on the ground that a solvent Japan is 
 of more value to them than a bankrupt Japan. Japan's 
 future commercial prosperity depends upon the in- 
 tegrity of China and her interests in that quarter are 
 consonant with those of America. We need not fear 
 that Japan will ever permanently control China proper, 
 even as the result of a successful war. There are too 
 many Chinese, and it would be too expensive an under- 
 taking. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE MONROE DOCTRINE EAST AND WEST 
 
 In the previous chapter the Monroe Doctrine was 
 mentioned. As this is a subject that touches America 
 very nearly it may be profitable to examine it in more 
 detail. 
 
 The United States until very recently can hardly claim 
 to have had a foreign policy, in the European sense. The 
 isolation of America, due to the two oceans that wash 
 her shores, has rendered unnecessary the careful con- 
 sideration of "policy" required of the states of Europe 
 whose alien peoples are separated almost entirely by 
 artificial boundaries. Moreover, there have been in 
 America no dynastic houses the perpetuation and ag- 
 grandizement of which would have been the occasion 
 for the formulation of "poHcies" unconnected with the 
 economic needs of the people. 
 
 In Washington's famous "Farewell Address" he 
 warned us to beware of "entangling alhances" and we 
 have followed that injunction very Hterally. Whether 
 we can continue this poHcy much longer is very doubtful 
 since our national interests are now no longer confined 
 to the New World and our former isolation is now gone. 
 
 235 
 
236 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 On the other hand, the American people and their 
 leaders have cherished one dogma with a reverence that 
 has been at times the source of much irritation to Europe. 
 This is the famous Monroe Doctrine. 
 
 After Napoleon had been finally disposed of at Water- 
 loo, a reaction set in in Europe that aroused great fear 
 in the hearts of American statesmen, — a fear that was only 
 too well justified. For the "Holy Alliance" of Russia, 
 Prussia, Austria, France, and Spain was organized with 
 the avowed purpose of rooting out, once and for all, 
 the growth of democratic ideas that had made such 
 headway in Europe during the latter half of the eigh- 
 teenth century. The weak and struggling republic of 
 the United States had every reason to fear this combina- 
 tion, for one of the objects of the alliance was to retrieve 
 its waning influence in the New World, to restore to Spain 
 the control over her revolted American colonies, to get 
 back for France the great territories in the northern 
 continent that had passed from her hands, and in par- 
 ticular to block off any further expansion of the United 
 States. And in spite of the fact that the liberal ten- 
 dencies of Great Britain forbade her to join the Holy 
 Alliance the people of the United States had been in 
 conflict with that nation so recently that they feared her 
 most of all. 
 
 The Spanish colonies of South America had taken ad- 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE EAST AND WEST 237 
 
 vantage of the collapse of Spanish power to free them- 
 selves from her tyranny. And the North Americans, so 
 lately become independent, could not help but look with 
 friendly sympathy upon these newer states, founded on 
 democratic principles and modeled, externally at least, 
 after their own government. 
 
 Thus the New World, from the standpoint of ideals, 
 was sharply opposed to Europe ; the one, the center of 
 democracy ; the other, the focus of reactionism and ab- 
 solutism. The enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine 
 was, in fact, the expression of the instinct of self-preserva- 
 tion, than which, we are taught, there is no higher law. 
 
 The events of the first half of the nineteenth century 
 amply justified this point of view. The Spanish claims 
 to the whole Pacific Coast and their refusal to cede 
 Florida to the United States although themselves unable 
 to control that province, the English claims to the North- 
 west, the starthngly rapid extension of Russian influence 
 in the same region,^ the encroachment of all the European 
 Powers upon the Latin-American states, which cul- 
 minated in the attempt of the French to seat the Aus- 
 trian MaximiHan, as Emperor, upon the throne of 
 Mexico, — such a succession of incidents might well in- 
 
 ' In 1821, the Russian government forbade any foreign vessel to ap- 
 proach within 100 nules of the west coast of America down to the sist 
 degree of latitude. 
 
238 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 spire fear in the youthful repubHc. It is not too much 
 to say that the energetic pretensions of the United States 
 prevented both South and North America from being por- 
 tioned out among the powers of Europe as Africa has been 
 and as Asia is likely to be. And this, in spite of the fact 
 that it has been the menace of England rather than our 
 own prowess that has deterred the Continental powers. 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine has been thus a most significant 
 factor in our short national Hfe. Even if we should as- 
 sume that our great territorial expansion was not ab- 
 solutely necessary, that the American people might have 
 worked out their salvation in a territory limited, let us 
 say, by the Mississippi River, more intensively but 
 equally successfully, it would still remain true that had 
 the rest of the continent been the scene of the schemings 
 and dickering of European powers, with "spheres of 
 influence" and a finely adjusted "balance of power" 
 the nature of that destiny would have been very different. 
 The possibility of conflict on our borders would have 
 necessitated a large army, and the presence of many 
 alien powers would have compelled international rela- 
 tions and obligations from which, happily, we have been 
 free. Americans have done well to give the Monroe Doc- 
 trine the place it has in our estimation, notwithstand- 
 ing the United States is no longer weak and that she has 
 little to fear nowadays from European aggression. 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE EAST AND WEST 239 
 
 In later years the demand of this country has been, in 
 substance, that the rest of the world should recognize 
 both American continents as her "sphere of influence" 
 in that foreign powers shall not be permitted to acquire 
 any part of the New World as vassal territory nor even 
 to attempt armed intervention. The Monroe Doctrine 
 has never been accepted by any European government 
 except very recently by England and it is probable that 
 it would have been challenged in war ere this had not 
 the mutual jealousies of the challenging powers, nota- 
 bly Germany and England, acted as a restraint upon 
 one another. 
 
 Asia for the Asiatics 
 
 From the standpoint of modern (European) civiliza- 
 tion America and Japan are the newest nations and in 
 their relations with the older peoples of Europe whose 
 culture has in varying degree been transmitted to both 
 of them, they share many problems in common. Each 
 is the dominant economic and military power in a large 
 area of the earth's surface. Each is the object of the 
 thinly veiled jealousy of the "Powers" of Europe. 
 
 Moreover, the attitude of the Chinese toward the 
 Japanese is strikingly like that of the Latin-Americans 
 toward the people of the United States : a blending of 
 respect for acknowledged power, on the one hand, and 
 
240 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 contempt and personal aversion on the other, due to 
 fundamental differences in race and national traditions. 
 Now the Monroe Doctrine, as has been said, is far from 
 being an unselfish policy, although as a matter of fact 
 it has been administered in a very altruistic spirit. The 
 North American has no particularly brotherly interest 
 in the Latin-American. Primarily for the former the 
 policy is one of self -protection ; secondarily it is based 
 on the belief that the preservation of the national exist- 
 ence of these weaker sister states will be ultimately of 
 greater advantage to us than would be the case if they 
 became provinces of some European power. 
 
 Precisely the same considerations hold with respect to 
 China from the standpoint of Japan. The "break-up 
 of China " and the parceUng out of her provinces among 
 the European Powers, which seemed so imminent fifteen 
 years ago, threatens the same danger to Japan that a 
 similar parceling out of America would have threatened 
 to the United States seventy-five years ago. The latter 
 met it with the threat or bluff of the Monroe Doctrine 
 ■which, fortunately, she so far has never had to back up 
 by force ; Japan has had to defend her interests twice by 
 arms, first in the Russian war of 1904 and latterly in the 
 Tsingtao chapter of the great European war. It may be 
 urged that in both cases Japan has substituted herself 
 for the European aggressor and that her policy has been 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE EAST AND WEST 241 
 
 one of aggrandizement. This is to a certain degree 
 true, but we must not pass too hasty a judgment. In 
 fact, without any intention of extending our own domain 
 by conquest, we have done precisely the same thing in 
 the Philippines. Nor can we justly claim an analogy be- 
 tween Japan's occupancy of South Manchuria and her 
 latest activity in Shantung. There is Uttle in common 
 between Manchuria and Shantimg. The former was 
 a sparsely settled province of which China was merely 
 the nominal owner. The Russians, and after them the 
 Japanese, occupied it as Americans occupied CaKfornia 
 and annexed it for the same reason. Shantung is in 
 a different category. No foreign nation can ever effec- 
 tively occupy that province. There are too many China- 
 men there. What Japan has done is to displace the 
 European, and this was a vital matter to her. Russia's 
 activity just prior to the war of 1904, her intrigues, 
 evasions, and dilly-dallying with Japan, particularly her 
 obvious designs in Masampho, left no doubt in any one's 
 mind what fate Japan was to expect. Since Russia's 
 " set-back," Germany's activities in the Orient have been 
 directed toward the same end. After the retrocession of 
 Port Arthur, Japan would have been bhnd indeed to 
 have failed to see the consequences to her of Germany's 
 avowed policy in the Orient. 
 
 The land-hungry European has been a real menace 
 
242 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 to Japan's existence as an Oriental power. Since China 
 has been impotent to protect herself, it has fallen to 
 Japan's lot to come to her rescue, — not, be it understood, 
 from altruistic concern for China, but as a matter of self- 
 interest and protection for herself. 
 
 The American with his nation's history in mind 
 and the importance which he himself attaches to the 
 Monroe Doctrine ought to be able to keenly appreciate 
 Japan's position in this difficulty and to sympathize 
 with her as a European might not be expected to do. 
 Rightly or wrongly, we believe that much of our national 
 success has been due to our insistence upon the Monroe 
 Doctrine. Believers, as we are, in the principle of " Live 
 and let live," shall we not grant to Japan in her greater 
 difficulty the same freedom that we have demanded for 
 ourselves ? 
 
 But the question is more than an academic one. There 
 are many people in this country who admire Japan and 
 wish her well. But such an appeal can hardly be made 
 to the majority of Americans, particularly to the many 
 to whom Japan looms only as a threatening bugaboo. 
 To such it should be brought home that our own self- 
 interest demands that we recognize her claim of an 
 Asiatic Monroe Doctrine. National policies are and 
 should be those of enlightened selfishness. A business 
 man who may dispose of his own wealth as he sees fit 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE EAST AND WEST 243 
 
 is bound to safeguard to the extreme the property of 
 which he is a trustee. Statesmen and governments are 
 the trustees of a nation and particularly of that nation's 
 future generations. We must consider whether it is for 
 our future advantage or disadvantage that Japan should 
 be supported in her contention. 
 
 It reduces to the question of whether it would be to 
 our own advantage or contrariwise that China should 
 be the scene of the pulUng and hauhng diplomacy so 
 conspicuously the feature of the past two decades' 
 history, or whether we should profit most by the eHmina- 
 tion of the European Powers (Russia, England, Germany, 
 and France) from poUtical control of Chinese territory 
 and interference in Chinese politics. 
 
 We, in this country, wish peace in the Pacific and its 
 shores. We wish to find the greatest possible market for 
 our goods in both Japan and China. We have seen some- 
 thing of the present status of the Oriental trade. We 
 have seen that the greatest current market at present is 
 for cotton manufactures; secondly, for such goods as 
 matches, umbrellas, cigarettes, lamps, oil, etc., the use 
 of which is easily acquired and is increasing in China. 
 In the third rank are the manufactures, the use of which 
 will have to be acquired by the Chinese as their scale of 
 living changes, — such things as sewing machines, 
 electrical apphances, scientific instruments, phonographs, 
 
244 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 household conveniences, plumbing supplies. We may 
 add structural iron and railway equipment. 
 
 The market for these at present is embryonic. Now, 
 of the first class, that of cotton yarns and cloths, Japanese 
 goods are attaining a startlingly rapid ascendancy in 
 the Chinese markets. Neither Europe nor America 
 can hope to compete with Japanese cotton mills, em- 
 ploying work girls at fifteen cents a day and running 
 nineteen to twenty-three hours out of the twenty-four.* 
 But, as we have seen, Japan depends to a great extent 
 upon American raw cotton to supply this market, since 
 a certain admixture is necessary to bring her product to 
 the proper standard. In other words, since the Chinese 
 customer demands the best he can afford, if Japan should 
 attempt to do without American raw cotton, depending 
 upon that from China and India, then her control of the 
 market would pass. Here, therefore, Japan's success is 
 really America's joint-profit and Europe does not count. 
 
 In the second class, all essentially cheap articles, it is 
 likely that with the exception of kerosene oil the trade 
 will also tend to settle into Japan's hands, although in 
 this case in certain Hues her competition may come from 
 Europe. Oil we shall doubtless continue to supply. 
 
 It is in the third group of manufactures that American 
 industry has its greatest opportunity. The product of 
 1 U. S. Department of Commerce, Spec. Agt. Rept. 86, p. i86, 1914. 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE EAST AND WEST 245 
 
 American workshops, employing the highest grade of 
 skilled labor, need not fear competition from the Japa- 
 nese, at least not for many years to come. There is every 
 reason to believe that the Chinese demand for such prod- 
 ucts will grow apace. Our competitors here, however, will 
 be Germany, England, and France. Again we find our 
 interests are not threatened by Japan, but by those 
 powers that have tried to establish a control over large 
 portions of Chinese territory, and have been opposed by 
 Japan in that attempt. 
 
 Commercially, therefore, and from the standpoint 
 of strict national selfishness, it is to our advantage to 
 keep Europe out of East Asia, which involves the ac- 
 ceptance of Japanese dominance in Far Eastern affairs. 
 Every consideration points to a community of interest 
 between America and Japan with reference to the de- 
 velopment of China's trade, provided only that Japan 
 does not make the mistake of attempting to monopolize 
 the whole trade. 
 
 Such a policy on her part, the attempted closing of 
 the "Open Door," in other words, in the long run 
 would prove fatal to her best interests, for it would not 
 only alienate American sympathy, which is very valuable 
 to her, but would stifle or at least delay China's own de- 
 velopment, and this would be likewise a disadvantage 
 to her. The greater purchasing power that China de- 
 
246 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 velops, the more goods Japan can sell to her, and the 
 development of this purchasing power is dependent upon 
 foreign capital which Japan is unable to furnish and 
 which would not likely be furnished by any other power, 
 if Japan should seize political control. 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine has been in the past an un- 
 acceptable thesis to the states of Europe. But in 1903 
 Great Britain accepted it " unreservedly." Without 
 doubt her motives were not entirely unselfish. She was 
 very willing to block Germany from acquiring a large 
 slice of South America, which has been the avowed in- 
 tention of the latter. But on the other hand, while thus 
 protecting herself, she has greatly profited by the kindly 
 feeling and the more, intimate relations that have de- 
 veloped between herself and America. May we not 
 take a leaf out of the same book? If we accept the 
 Japanese "Monroe Doctrine" with respect to con- 
 tinental Asia, we shall not only regain the good will 
 of Japan and the advantages of closer and more friendly 
 intercourse, but on the other hand we shall profit our- 
 selves by assisting in blocking off European aggression 
 (passively, of course, but none the less effectively) and 
 keeping the Chinese market open to our own trade. 
 Indeed we might even make the firm estabUshment of 
 the "Open Door" a quid pro quo in exchange for such 
 acknowledgment. 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE EAST AND WEST 247 
 
 To repeat, our real competitor in the Chinese market 
 is Europe, not Japan. Nothing could suit Europe's 
 purpose better than to divert American sentiment from 
 this essential point by stimulating antagonistic feeling 
 between the Japanese and ourselves. We have a strate- 
 gic advantage over Europe in the contest for the trade of 
 the Pacific. It remains to be seen whether we shall be 
 fools enough to waste our opportunity antagonizing 
 Japan instead of dividing the field with her. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 SOME GXJESSES AS TO THE FUTTJEE 
 
 The writer has no intention of plunging into prophecy. 
 He has seen too many prophets in Far Eastern matters 
 covered with confusion by the real progress of events, 
 to have much faith in his own conjectures. Prophecy, 
 except at long range, is a precarious pastime, in any 
 quarter of the globe. But prophecy in Oriental poUtics 
 should be left to the trained writer of romances. 
 
 Yet we must concede it to be a matter of momentous 
 significance, that the decisions which America shall be 
 called upon to make in the near future, as to her Oriental 
 policy, shall be wise decisions ; that they shall be based 
 upon all the knowledge available regarding this part of 
 the world and our place in it, and that they shall be 
 illuminated by the Kght of justice and fair-dealing which 
 hes back of any ultimately successful diplomacy. Many 
 of us as schoolboys learned the stirring oration of Patrick 
 Henry in which occurs the phrase : "I have no Ught to 
 guide my footsteps save the lamp of experience." We 
 may well ask what our own brief history has to teach 
 us regarding our Oriental pohcy, and with what measure 
 of success it is likely to be attended. 
 
 248 
 
SOME GUESSES AS TO THE FUTURE 249 
 
 To this end, I shall briefly review some of the features 
 of our long intercourse with England, with which power 
 our international relations have been perhaps more 
 conflicting than with any other, in the hope of discover- 
 ing some parallels between them and the situation with 
 regard to Japan. 
 
 We are just getting far enough away from the nine- 
 teenth century to begin to get a perspective, to hold it 
 off at arm's length, as it were, and appreciate the real 
 significance of various incidents and the trend of events, 
 and to determine the causes of important effects whose 
 nearness has made us hardly conscious of their existence. 
 When we do so, one of the most striking things that we 
 discover is the fact that while in the first half of the 
 nineteenth century the United States, speaking generally, 
 looked upon England with suspicion and distrust, envy 
 and fear, and England in turn looked upon us with con- 
 tempt not unmixed with exasperation, on the other 
 hand, in the first decade of the twentieth century, the 
 relations between the two nations had grown so cordial 
 and so firmly grounded in reality as to cause the opinion 
 to be universally expressed in both countries that war 
 between them is unthinkable. 
 
 What has wrought this wondrous change ? Why have 
 the two nations come to a cordial understanding instead 
 of drifting apart in the course of a century? It is of 
 
2 so JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 course contrary to all human experience that peoples 
 recently at war with one another should forget the 
 hatreds engendered by conflict and the disaster wrought 
 in cattle as soon as a treaty of peace is signed. The 
 Revolutionary War was fought out on American soil, and 
 it is, inevitable that Americans should long cherish the an- 
 cient grudge, not only against the mother country whose 
 stupid policy had made her a tyrannical oppressor in 
 the eyes of the colonists, but also against the colonial 
 Tories who had taken sides against them and who con- 
 centrated across the border in Canada. On the other 
 hand, England's interests were all directed toward 
 European affairs, and she thought of her former subjects, 
 whenever she did think of them, as presumptuous up- 
 starts whose attempts at starting a democracy were fore- 
 doomed to failure. England was mistress of the seas 
 and the dominant power in the world. This position 
 made her imperious and arbitrary, and led to such acts 
 as the enforcement of the right of search on American ves- 
 sels and the impressment of seamen, which culminated in 
 the second war of 1812, a war that renewed all the vin- 
 dictive feelings toward Great Britain inherited from the 
 previous conflict. The treaty of Ghent, at the conclu- 
 sion of this war, did not decide the real issues, although 
 the return of Napoleon from Elba diverted all attention 
 in Europe from affairs across the ocean. The treaty of 
 
SOME GUESSES AS TO THE FUTURE 251 
 
 Ghent "did not weaken the conviction in the minds of 
 many Americans that a leading principle of British policy 
 was to bully and dragoon the United States into a condi- 
 tion of dependence as near as possible to that which had 
 been thrown ofif in 1776; it did not extinguish the fear 
 among the English in Canada that the United States was 
 resolutely bent on conquering and annexing them; it 
 did not quaUfy the behef widespread among the ruling 
 aristocracy in England that the American democracy 
 was a barbarous, brawling poUtical organization whose 
 growth was to be restricted by aU possible means in the 
 interests of civilization. For each of these various behefs 
 there was not lacking a certain foundation in fact." ^ 
 
 Following the war of 181 2 we have had no other armed 
 conflict with Great Britain, but we have had an astonish- 
 ing succession of exasperating controversies both with 
 England and with Canada. The early part of the cen- 
 tury was the period of an extraordinary expansion on 
 our part and conquest of territory, some of which has 
 only recently become adequately settled. England felt 
 it her duty to obstruct us so far as possible in all this. 
 In Florida, in Oregon, in CaUfornia, and in Texas she 
 endeavored to prevent us from assuming control of the 
 new territories. Although she failed in all except the 
 northern part of Oregon, yet the distrust and resentment 
 
 > Dunning, "The British Empire and the United States." 1914. 
 
2S2 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 engendered in America by her policy fanned the old 
 flame and kept it alive. Moreover, she maintained 
 the "right of search" which the United States could not 
 concede, on the ground that it impaired her sovereignty. 
 And it was not until 1858 that England finally acceded 
 to the American point of view. 
 
 The Civil War, to the European soothsayer, marked 
 the end of the extraordinary experiment of democracy. 
 The ultimate success of the Southern cause was never 
 questioned in England, and her decision to maintain 
 strict neutrahty (which involved the right to seU ships 
 and arms to whomsoever she pleased) had the result 
 of exciting anger and resentment on the part of both 
 belligerents, each of whom ascribed a large share of its 
 troubles to her attitude. It is not strictly true that 
 England favored the Confederate cause, in spite of the 
 notorious case of the Alabama, but it would have been 
 impossible to convince a Northerner of that fact. 
 
 In 1847 S'lid 1848 the terrible famine in Ireland drove 
 hordes of starving Irish to America, and the immigration 
 increased until the Irish element of our population be- 
 came an important one. The average Celt has two 
 characteristics that are of great significance in con- 
 sidering him as an element of the American population. 
 These are his fondness for politics and his hatred of 
 England and all her works. The former gave him a 
 
SOME GUESSES AS TO THE FUTURE 253 
 
 chance to play an important part in our democracy 
 and the latter became an irresistible source of appeal 
 in the hands of political leaders interested in securing 
 the Irish vote. In consequence, no grievance against 
 England was ever allowed to die down, but "twisting 
 the Hon's tail" became recognized as the most effective 
 weapon in pohtical campaigning. All this tended to 
 keep alive the anti-English feeHng, until, being over- 
 done, it lost its effect. 
 
 The climax of all this sentiment came with the famous 
 Venezuela incident of President Cleveland's administra- 
 tion. The English were wholly unable to comprehend 
 the American attitude in a matter in which rationally 
 they might be expected to have scant interest. The ex- 
 planation seems to be that unconsciously, or subcon- 
 sciously, the American people were looking for a chance 
 to demonstrate their coming-of-age politically, and their 
 right to a voice in the settling of the world's affairs. 
 England conceded this point then, and from that time 
 on, Anglo-American relations have been relatively tran- 
 quil. When the throw of the dice made of the United 
 States a colonizing power, far from opposing us, England 
 consistently aided and applauded us, knowing that in 
 shouldering the "white man's burden" we have made 
 her cause our own. 
 
 England's ministers have often been noted for their 
 
254 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 lack of tact, but rarely for a lack of good sense. They 
 have long realized that war between England and 
 America would be economically so disastrous for her that 
 no possible gain in territory or in prestige could compen- 
 sate for it. They have waited with a greater or less 
 degree of calmness until we should mature sufficiently to 
 realize the same fact. 
 
 In the earlier decades of our national existence we were 
 not unlike an overgrown boy with his first pair of long 
 trousers, clumsy, crude, obstreperous, and beUigerent. 
 In the middle of the century we might be said to bear a 
 resemblance to the same youth in his late teens, when 
 he acquires the use of cigarettes and tilts his hat over 
 one ear. Now at last, having passed the hobbledehoy 
 period, we have reached maturity and are ready to take 
 a hand in the world's business. And England, like an 
 anxious but not always tactful parent, is more than 
 willing to forget the irritations of the past and to take 
 us into the firm. 
 
 What lessons can we read in aU this that may help 
 us to understand Japan? 
 
 In the beginning we must confess that nothing like 
 the occasions for disagreement between England and our- 
 selves have occurred between Japan and ourselves. Of 
 course the century is young, and no one knows what 
 the next several decades will bring forth. But we have 
 
SOME GUESSES AS TO THE FUTURE 255 
 
 no stinging memories of conflict to stir up bitterness. 
 Even the worst jingo in America has no hatred of the 
 Japanese. He merely fears or mistrusts them, or else 
 looks down upon them with a toplofty tolerance infi- 
 nitely more galling than hatred. The "Jap is cocky." 
 "He is dishonest and tricky." "He knows not the sanc- 
 tity of contract." "He has no morals or home hfe." 
 These, after all, are mild aspersions compared with the 
 English view of an American a half century ago. " Swag- 
 ger and ferocity, built on a foundation of vulgarity and 
 cowardice," are the characteristics of "an ideal Yankee," 
 said the London Times discussing the Mason and SlideU 
 affair in 1861.^ 
 
 England has forgotten these brave words and many 
 like them and so has America, though more slowly, 
 for nothing lingers quite so long in the mind as the sting 
 of a contemptuous speech. But how much better it 
 would have been if they had never been said. And 
 can we not take a lesson from our own experience and 
 refrain from the same kind of utterance, knowing how 
 useless it is and how productive of ill feeling. 
 
 The Japanese may be expected to overlook the 
 
 heated language of the man in the street or of the editor 
 
 of a yellow newspaper (the Japanese themselves have a 
 
 press of which the hues of saffron exceed anything 
 
 • Quoted by Dunning, t.c. 
 
256 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 known in this country) ; but the speeches of members 
 of Congress and of Senators are on a different status. 
 As a nation we have discarded the bumptious practice of 
 "twisting the Uon's tail." But there is danger that in 
 seeking an outlet for our energies we may grow too much 
 accustomed to airing our suspicions of the motives of 
 our Oriental neighbors. We are in danger of getting the 
 "Japanese habit," as some one has called it. 
 
 The "certain condescension in foreigners," partic- 
 ularly Englishmen, the tacit assumption of superiority, 
 the unmerited satires of Dickens, Mrs. Trollope, and the 
 rest, — the older generation among us still recall how 
 productive of ill feehng they were, and how really sig- 
 nificant in postponing a settlement of differences and the 
 establishment of cordial relations between ourselves and 
 Great Britain. With this recollection so fresh in our 
 minds, may we not appreciate the advisability of not 
 doing "as we have been done by" anent Japan? 
 
 For many years the irreconcilable difference between 
 Great Britain and the United States was the former's 
 insistence upon the right of search, — a small matter to 
 insist upon, we think to-day, and one that might have 
 been conceded the new repubhc without damaging the 
 prestige of the British Empire. Suggestive of analogy is 
 the Japanese contention that our laws, whether local ones 
 regarding schools or state ones regarding land-ownership. 
 
SOME GUESSES AS TO THE FUTURE 257 
 
 should recognize the Japanese as on a par with the 
 European and American, a contention which every one 
 with enough knowledge of the subject to be entitled to 
 an opinion knows to be just. In this case it is we that 
 wUl not concede the point ; but shall we allow it to muddy 
 the water for years as England did the former ques- 
 tion, to no profit to ourselves, but rather to the detriment 
 of cordial international relations? This of course does 
 not imply unlimited immigration. 
 
 Japan is passing through her own hobbledehoy period. 
 Her cockiness, her bumptiousness, her exaggerated sense 
 of dignity, her concern to be recognized as an interna- 
 tional power ; all these phenomena we ourselves have dis- 
 played in our time and with far greater crudity. It was 
 a passing phase with us and it will be with the newer 
 nation if we do not take it too seriously. At any rate, 
 nothing is so futile, so stupid, as international recrimina- 
 tions. We have much to gain by retaining Japan's per- 
 sonal friendship, we have everything to lose by losing it. 
 
 England's attempts to Hmit our expansion to the Pacific 
 were based upon a priori considerations, not on her own 
 desires for that territ6ry. The United States expanded 
 through its own exuberant energy rather than through 
 necessity or pressure of population, and England's 
 attempts at hindrance roused the fiercest resentment.^ 
 
 1 The slogan of 1844, " Fifty-four Forty or Fight," will be recalled. 
 
258 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 Japan's present-day expansion is also partly a phenom- 
 enon of national vigor as well as of economic pressure, 
 and the attempts of foreign nations to curb it excite 
 the same resentment that we ourselves have experienced. 
 Again, have we any call to put ourselves on the side of 
 Japan's opponents ? 
 
 To summarize : During the past century, we have had 
 many acrimonious disputes with England and our self- 
 love has suffered from her affronts. Our Irish contingent 
 has constantly kept the kettle boihng until we learned to 
 think of her as our hereditary enemy. In the end, we 
 have outgrown these feeUngs and have come to realize 
 the value of an international friendship with Great 
 Britain. How much more reasonable seems the hope 
 that strained relations between Japan and the United 
 States shall cease to exist ; two nations that have never 
 been at war with one another, whose territories are not 
 adjacent and whose past history has been until very 
 recently one of uninterrupted friendship. If the one 
 difficulty has been solved, shall the other, so much 
 simpler one, long vex us? 
 
 Many statesmen from Seward to Roosevelt have 
 looked westward to the Pacific Ocean and have visioned 
 it as the scene of the world's greatest events in the 
 immediate future. As international activities in the 
 past have been concerned chiefly with war, it is not 
 
SOME GUESSES AS TO THE FUTURE 259 
 
 t 
 
 unnatural to think of the Pacific as the stage for a 
 great conflict. 
 
 But business men have learned that cooperation 
 brings more success than cut-throat competition. The 
 nations most interested in the Pacific are those whose 
 shores are washed by its waters. The interests of 
 America, Japan, and China are so diverse, and at the 
 same time so interrelated, that if the three nations can 
 work in harmony, each will profit vastly more than if 
 each attempts to shape its future independently or in 
 conflict with the others. 
 
 America wishes the "Open Door" in China, Japan 
 wishes the equivalent of a Monroe Doctrine for the 
 East. If America supports Japan's contention, and 
 Japan, America's, Europe will be forced to acquiesce, 
 and peace in the Pacific will be assured. 
 
 In a word, we must abandon, once and for all, the anti- 
 Japanese policy inaugurated by Knox ; more than that, 
 we must abandon the laissez-faire, indifferent policy that 
 many advocate to-day. Rather our policy should be 
 one of active cooperation, an alUance, if you will, though 
 not necessarily one in the conventional military sense. 
 
 As a first step toward such a consummation, an inter- 
 national conference on Pacific problems might be called, 
 to be participated in by accredited representatives from 
 the United States, Canada, Japan, China, Australia, 
 
26o JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 and perhaps Chile and Peru. The discussions of such 
 a conference might deal with such subjects as : 
 
 Trans-Pacific trade relations and tariff reciprocity. 
 
 Immigration and naturalization. 
 
 The supply of capital for the development of Oriental 
 industry. 
 
 Fiscal reform of China. 
 
 Publicity bureaus, planned to facilitate the exchange 
 of information between East and West, increase 
 facilities for tourists, devise a basis for visiting or 
 exchange professors and students, nullify canards 
 and disseminate true information. 
 
 The reports of such a conference might be made 
 the basis for international conventions that would 
 insure peace and prosperity on the Pacific for decades 
 to come. 
 
 But the skeptical ones, while granting of course the 
 highest measure of disinterestedness on the part of the 
 United States, will concede to Japan no such far-seeing 
 motives. They beUeve that Japan is trying to supplant 
 all the European aggressors in China and seize huge 
 slices of Chinese territory for herself. And they point 
 to results in South Manchuria and Korea and later in 
 Kiao-Chau as confirmatory evidence. 
 
 We have already discussed the essential difference 
 between the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and 
 
SOME GUESSES AS TO THE FUTURE 261 
 
 Korea and that of China proper. But let us assume 
 that Japan does fulfill the prophecies of these critics and 
 attempts to appropriate Chinese territory and administer 
 it as her own. How would it work out ? 
 
 We learn, for instance, that the Germans had de- 
 veloped a considerable industry in strawbraid in the 
 Kiao-Chau province, of which they were just about to 
 reap the advantage, and that the Japanese have fallen 
 heir to this industry. Of course the people who profit 
 by such an industry, in the first instance, are the Chinese 
 who make the strawbraid. The Japanese may take their 
 profits also as entrepreneurs. Well and good. This is 
 legitimate. But if they must charge off against the other 
 side of their ledger the heavy cost of military occupation, 
 these profits are going to dwindle to the vanishing point. 
 
 The Chinese of course are easy to conquer in a military 
 way. We can easily believe that if the occasion de- 
 manded it, Japan might seize half the Empire and by 
 quartering enough troops at strategic points might main- 
 tain that condition, perhaps not indefinitely, but for a 
 considerable length of time. Having done so, she must 
 reap some very great economic advantage to compensate 
 for the great expense. She could of course seize the 
 natural resources, the coal, iron, and copper, but she could 
 hardly choose a more expensive and unprofitable way of 
 acquiring them. Let us assume then that she would 
 
262 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 try to control the channels of trade,to give her own goods 
 a clear field by excluding foreign competition. The 
 easiest way to do this would be by a preferential tariiff. 
 
 This has been done before in various parts of the world 
 (by the French in Madagascar, for instance), but never 
 with a large and prosperous nation against the will of 
 that nation. If Japanese goods already have a good 
 market (cotton yarns, for instance), they need no such 
 bulwark to protect them; they beat their competitors 
 in the open market. If, on the other hand, they are 
 inferior in quaUty or higher in price, and the Chinese is 
 prevented from buying in the most favorable market, — 
 and this is the only way in which it is conceivable that a 
 miUtary occupation could be made profitable, — then 
 the Chinese would discover that he was being exploited 
 in the interest of his enemy, and there is little question 
 as to what he would do. 
 
 He has, as a matter of fact, a far more effective weapon 
 than any manufactured by Kxupps. This is the boycott. 
 Whether any other nation could successfully carry 
 through a national boycott or not is hard to say. The 
 Chinese are the only ones who have done so. And it is 
 a weapon that they have employed with increasing 
 frequency as their contact with foreign powers has 
 grown more intimate and disagreeable. 
 
 The long record of grievances against the United States 
 
SOME GUESSES AS TO THE FUTURE 263 
 
 culminated in 1904, and the first great boycott was in- 
 augurated against us. This lost us millions of dollars 
 m trade and we have never recovered the old status. 
 Japan, as weU, has been the victim more than once. 
 The Manchurian program, particularly the Mukden- 
 Antung Railway controversy, the affair of the Tatsu 
 Maru, a Japanese ship that carried arms to the Chinese 
 rebels, and numerous other subjects ot difference aroused 
 the national self-consciousness of the Chinese and kept a 
 boycott going to the very great loss of the Japanese 
 trade. Numerous other minor boycotts have been 
 inaugurated in recent years, enough to show that the 
 weapon is a very effective one, and one that the Chinese 
 are ready to use. It is reported that a very active boy- 
 cott was instituted in Shanghai against Japan on account 
 of the recent "demands" made upon China by that 
 nation (February, 1915). It is significant that the most 
 important and far-reaching of these boycotts have been 
 based upon academic grounds, and moreover have 
 originated, and have been maintained with greatest 
 fervor, in Canton and the southern provinces, even the 
 one due to the Manchurian controversies. 
 
 Now it is manifestly impossible for even the wildest 
 Japanese jingo to think of holding all the eighteen 
 provinces of China, with their 407,000,000 inhabitants, 
 by a military occupation. The most she could do would 
 
264 JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 be to hold some of the populous districts of the north or 
 the Yang-tse Valley. If, however, the analogy of past 
 events has any weight, such a condition would result 
 in the most active boycott that the south and west have 
 ever known. And Japan could not make enough from 
 the conquered provinces to compensate the losses from 
 the rest. 
 
 But the whole thing is the dream of a madman. 
 Japan's future success must be an industrial and com- 
 mercial one. Her greatest, her most vital market is 
 China. The tradesman does not try to stimulate busi- 
 ness by affronting and antagom'zing his prospective 
 customers. 
 
 More than this, the tradesman, if he be wise, knows 
 that his greatest prosperity lies in the prosperity of 
 his neighbors; that the green-grocer cannot buy of 
 the baker unless he himself sells his own wares. As 
 Japan looks to China for her future trade, more than to 
 other parts of the world, as the Chinese trade is more 
 vital to her than to other nations, so an impoverished 
 and humiliated China must mean loss to her, whereas 
 an independent and prosperous China would mean her 
 own national success. These considerations are so 
 obvious that we can hardly believe that Japan's future 
 policy in China will take permanently any other direc- 
 tion. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Aggression European in Orient, 46. 
 Aggressive warfare. Cost of, 198. 
 Aguinaldo, 79. 
 Ainu, 13. 
 Alexieff, S7- 
 
 Alliance, Anglo- Japanese, 44. 
 American assistance in Japan, 34. 
 American policy in Philippines, 62, 81. 
 American Tobacco Co., 65. 
 Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 44, $5- 
 Annexation of Korea, 63. 
 Art-objects, Japanese, 116. 
 Assimilation of Japanese, 178. 
 Australian Fleet, 152. 
 
 Bacon, Francis, quoted, 10. 
 
 Balance of Trade, 128. 
 
 Biddle, Commodore, 17. 
 
 Bilingual schools, 179. 
 
 Birth rate in Japan, no. 
 
 Boxer indemnity, 27. 
 
 Boxer outbreak. 50. 
 
 Boycott, Anti-American, 164. 
 
 Boycott, Chinese, 132, 262. 
 
 Brazil, Japanese in, 216. 
 
 British Columbia, Oriental problem, 
 
 156, 160. 
 Budget, Japanese, 140. 
 
 California, Asiatics in, 162. 
 Camphor, 137. 
 
 Capital, Lack in Philippines, 91. 
 Capital, Need for, in Japan, 185. 
 Cash remitted home by Japanese, 142. 
 China "awakening," 129. 
 
 Breakup of, 49. 
 Chinda, Viscount, 172. 
 Chinese culture in Japan, 13. 
 
 deported from Japan, 89. 
 
 In Japanese banks, 9. 
 
 In Manchuria, 222. 
 
 markets, 130. 
 
 Modem tendencies, 229. 
 Chino-Japanese War, 43. 
 Clan spirit, 14. 
 Cleveland, President, 253. 
 Commercializing Japanese art, 116. 
 Competition, Japanese, in California, 
 
 168. 
 Competitors, Japanese as, 177. 
 Conference, International, 259. 
 Control of the seas, 97. 
 Copper mines in British Columbia, 158. 
 Cotton, in the Orient, 121. 
 Customs receipts, 32. 
 
 Debt, National, of Japan, 140. 
 Deportation of Chinese from Japan, 
 
 187. 
 Dictation test, 151. 
 Dilemma, Japanese, 215. 
 Disfranchisement of Japanese in B.C.| 
 
 159- 
 Dutch, Relations with, 15. 
 
 Elgin tariff, 31. 
 
 England's attitude toward U.S., 249, 
 
 251- 
 Etiquette, 20. 
 
 European attitude, Jap.-Amer. war, 211. 
 Exclusion, Japanese, 191. 
 
 League, 169. 
 Executive qualities of Japanese, 115. 
 Exports, Japanese, 125. 
 Extraterritoriality, 30. 
 
 Factories in Japan, 113. 
 Feudalism in Japan, 112. 
 Filipino, Attitude toward Japan, 85. 
 traits, 80. 
 
 26s 
 
266 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Finances, Japanese, 134. 
 
 Financing of war, 200. 
 
 Fishing in Britisli Columbia, 158. 
 
 Fleet, Australian, 152. 
 
 Foreign trade, Japanese, 119, 208. 
 
 Formosa, Japanese colonization, 104, 
 
 218. 
 French problem in Canada, 178. 
 
 Geary Act, 164. 
 
 " Gentleman's Agreement," 165. 
 
 Germans in Kiao-Chau, 261. 
 
 in U.S., iSo. 
 Germany in East Asia, 227. 
 Gold reserve, 141. 
 
 Government patronage in Japan, 113. 
 Grant, U. S., Tour of, 29. 
 Gresham's Law, 168, 223. 
 Gulick, Sidney, quoted, 192. 
 
 Harris, Townsend, 21, 31. 
 Hearing on Naval Affairs, 97. 
 Heimin, 12. 
 
 Hemp in Philippines, 88. 
 Henry, Patrick, quoted, 248. 
 Hobson, Mr., quoted, 3. 
 "Holy Alliance," 236. 
 Home production in Japan, 117. 
 
 Immigration, Character of American, 
 145- 
 
 into Australia, 149. 
 Indemnity, Levied by U.S., 25, 27. 
 
 Failure of Japanese, 60. 
 Industrialism in Japan, in. 
 Industrial revolution, 107. 
 Inouye, Count, 39. 
 Intercourse with Occident, is. 
 International conference, 259. 
 Invasion, Japanese, 202. 
 Irish in America, 252. 
 Iwakura embassy, 33. 
 
 Japan an agricultural country, 108. 
 Japan, Birth rate, no. 
 
 Industrialism, in. 
 
 Foreign trade, 119. 
 
 Poverty of, 140. 
 
 Wealth of, 137. 
 
 Japanese castes, 12. 
 
 -Chinese trade, 132. 
 
 clan spirit, 14. 
 
 dishonesty, 9. 
 
 etiquette, 20. 
 
 factories, 113. 
 
 feudalism, 112. 
 
 finances, 134. 
 
 in California, 165. 
 
 in Philippines, 103. 
 
 Origin of, 11. 
 
 proficiency in arms, so. 
 
 -Russian entente, 167. 
 
 workmen, 115. 
 Juridical persons, 186. 
 Justice, sense of, in Oriental, 27. 
 
 Kaempfer, quoted, 19. 
 Kiao-Chau, 47, 51, 228. 
 Kin-chau-Aigun Railway, 68. 
 Knox, P. Q., 64, 67. 
 Komagata Maru, 161. 
 Korea, Annexation, 63. 
 
 Early relations with Japan, 42. 
 
 Japanese immigration into, 219. 
 
 Labor in Philippines, 92. 
 Land ownership by Japanese in U.S., 
 169. 
 in Japan, 186. 
 Lea, Homer, 4. 
 Legaspi, Miguil de, 84. 
 Literacy test in Australia, iso. 
 
 ine, blown up, 7. 
 McKinley, quoted, 62. 
 Manchuria, Area and population of, 
 221. 
 Japanese in, 65. 
 Mann, James R., quoted, 2. 
 Market, China as a, 130. 
 Mastery of the Pacific, 96. 
 Maximilian, 237. 
 Missionaries in Japan, 3s. 
 Monopolies, Government, 136. 
 Monroe Doctrine, 232. 
 
 Neutralization scheme (Knox's), 67. 
 New Orleans lynchings, 26. 
 
INDEX 
 
 267 
 
 Occident, Intercourse with, 15. 
 Oil, Kerosene, 125. 
 Okuma, Failure of, 40. 
 Open Door, 245. 
 Ordinance No. 352, 188, 173. 
 
 Paciiic, Problem of, 75. 
 Panama Canal, 124. 
 Pearson, Dr., quoted, 155. 
 Peasantry, Character of Japanese, 177. 
 Perry, Commodore, r6, 21. 
 Peru, Japanese in, 217. 
 Philippines, Cost to U.S., 83. 
 
 History, 84. 
 
 Japanese invasion of, 203, 206. 
 
 Needs, go. 
 
 Japanese in, 103. 
 
 Peoples of, 84. 
 
 Protectorate for, loi. 
 
 Resources, 87. 
 
 Roads in, q2. 
 
 Sale of, lor. 
 
 Spanish pohcy in, 77. 
 
 Tariff of, 94. 
 Population of North Australia, iss- 
 Port Aithiu:, 43, 46, 49. 
 Portsmouth treaty, 224. 
 Profit for Japanese in Philippines, 105. 
 
 Retrocession of Port Arthur, 46. 
 Rice, Imported into Philippines, 90. 
 
 Increased cost in Japan, 109, 138. 
 Richardson, Cut down, 24. 
 Riots, Anti-Chinese, 164. 
 
 Japanese in British Columbia, 159. 
 Russia in East Asia, 47, 226. 
 
 in Manchuria, 53. 
 Russian- Japanese entente, 70. 
 
 -Japanese war, 58. 
 
 St. Louis Fair, Chinese at, 164. 
 
 Salt monopoly, 136. 
 
 Sand-lot agitation, 163. 
 
 Shimonoseki affair, 24. 
 
 Shipping, Japanese, 134. 
 
 Shizoku, 12. 
 
 Silk, Japanese, 127. 
 
 South Africa, Orientals in, 146. 
 
 South America, Japanese in, 217. 
 Spanish policy in PhUippines, 77. 
 Spencer, Herbert, quoted, 183. 
 Standard Oil Co., 65. 
 Straw matting, 118. 
 Subsidies for Japanese ships, 96. 
 Successful wars, 44. 
 Sugar in Philippines, 89 
 Superficies, 186. 
 
 Tariff, 3r, 135. 
 
 in PhiHppines, 94. 
 Tax, Land, r34. 
 
 Income, 135. 
 Tea in Japan, 126. 
 Tientsin affair, 26. 
 Tobacco in Philippines, 89. 
 
 monopoly in Japan, r36. 
 Togo, Admiral, quoted, i. 
 Tourist disbursements, 128. 
 Toys, Japanese trade in, 126. 
 Trade balance, 128. 
 
 Japanese, 119. 
 
 with China, 243. 
 Tradesmen, Status of, in Japan, 28. 
 
 Uchida, Baron, quoted, 174. 
 
 Venezuela incident, 253. 
 von Bijlow, quoted, 48. 
 von Tirpitz, quoted, i. 
 
 Wages of Japanese workmen, 114. 
 War, Chances of, 194. 
 Russo-Japanese, s8- 
 Ward, Premier, quoted, 153. 
 Wealth of Japan, 137. 
 Webb Act, 171. 
 Wei-Hai-Wei, 49. 
 Wheat in Japan, no. 
 White AustraUa doctrine, 148. 
 Wood, General, quoted, 5. 
 Workmen, Japanese, 115. 
 Worcester, Dean C, quoted, 76, 82. 
 
 Xavier, St. Francis, ij. 
 
 I Yellow peril, 45, 55, 95. 
 
 Printed in the United States of America. 
 
'T^HE following pages contain advertisements of 
 Macmillan books on kindred subjects. 
 
The Japanese Problem in the United States 
 By H. a. MILLIS 
 
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 that has yet appeared. It is thorough and exact." 
 
 — Brooklyn Daily Eagle. 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 Publishers 64-66 Kfth Avenne Hew Tork 
 
The New American Government and Its Work 
 By JAMES T. YOUNG 
 
 Professor of Public Administration in the Universi^ of Pennsylvania 
 
 Cloth, Svo, $2^J 
 
 This book, intended for that growing circle of readers who are inter- 
 ested not only in political form and structure, but also more especially 
 in What the Government Is Doing and Why, is characterized by the 
 following features : 
 
 1 . It places greater emphasis than usual on the work of the govern- 
 ment. 
 
 2. It pays more attention to present problems, especially to the 
 Public Regulation of Business. 
 
 3. It applies to every aspect of government the test of Results — 
 whether the subject be the powers of the President, the election laws, 
 or the Sherman Act — for the value of a court, a statute, or a political 
 institution should be known by its output. 
 
 4. It depicts the Government As It Is, and as it has developed. 
 Our system is not a finished crystal, nor an ancient historical manu- 
 script, but a growth. And it is still growing. 
 
 5. It includes the interpretation of the Constitution and the chief 
 regulative laws, in the most recent Decisions of the Supreme Court. It 
 is this that gives clear, definite meaning to the discussion of govern- 
 ment forms and activities. 
 
 6. It presents an Ideal. It does not hesitate to point out the moral 
 defects, and the social cost of political weakness and inefficiency but its 
 Tone is Optimistic. 
 
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 FublisheTB 64-66 Pifth Avenue New York 
 
The Government of American Cities 
 
 By Professor WILLIAM B. MUNRO 
 
 Of Harvard University 
 
 Clotk, 8V0, $2.00 
 
 Here Professor Munro presents with fairness and impartiality 
 all the aspects of such subjects as Commission Government, 
 The Initiative, The Referendum, The Recall. Other phases of 
 municipal government in this country are also considered, so 
 that the work may be described as a comprehensive survey of 
 present conditions in our cities. The book is found even more 
 interesting and stimulating than the author's " The Government 
 of European Cities." 
 
 The Operation of the Initiative, 
 Referendum and Recall in Oregon 
 
 By JAMES D. BARNETT 
 
 Professor of Political Science in the University of Oregon 
 
 Cloth, 8vo, $2.00 
 
 This book is a valuable and significant record of the actual 
 operation of the Initiative, Referendum and Recall. Professor 
 Barnett is a careful observer, and well trained in his field ; he 
 has analyzed the theoretical phases of the political machinery, 
 and discussed the problems they present in the light of actual 
 results obtained. There is no vague generalizing in his pages, 
 but specific, detailed information on the Initiative, Referendum 
 and Recall in a state where these measures have been in opera- 
 tion. The book forms an admirable text for courses in Govern- 
 ment, Political Science, etc. 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 Pablishers 64-68 Fifth Avenne ITew York 
 
Towards International Government 
 
 By JOHN A. HOBSON 
 
 CloA, 8vo, ti.oo 
 
 Towards International Government is a plea for 
 universal peace. Written with Mr. Hobson's usual 
 vivacity and force of argument, the book urges a 
 federation of the world's nations, based on a desire 
 for international harmony and assured by a plan of 
 forced arbitration and appeal to an international 
 congress and executive. He rests his case on the 
 needs and demands of the great majority of people, 
 especially those of the working classes, and he aims 
 well-deserved blows at military governments and the 
 methods of modern democracy. Mr. Hobson's book 
 is with the trend of the times — for the overthrow of 
 militarism and the extension of the influence of the 
 democratic ideal. 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 Fulilishers 64-66 Fifth Arenue Kew York 
 
American Municipal Progress 
 
 By CHARIvES ZUEBLIN 
 
 New Edition, Entirely Rewritten and Greatly Enlarged 
 
 Professor Zueblin's work has a message for all who Uve in 
 either a great metropolis or a small, progressive town. It is 
 not so much a new and revised edition of Mr. Zueblin's earlier 
 work as it is a new volume. The development of the cities and 
 the growth of the social conscience in the past decade have 
 made necessary a larger treatment, and the author, although 
 using the earlier work as a nucleus for the new, has almost 
 doubled its pages, and at the same time has added to its value 
 with many illustrations. 
 
 The book takes up in detail such problems as public utilities, 
 schools, libraries, children's playgrounds, parks, public baths 
 and public gymnasiums ; also such questions as those of rapid 
 transit, sanitation and the care of streets ; the latest experiments 
 in municipal ownership and municipal administration are re- 
 corded. The discussion is from the standpoint of public welfare, 
 and is based on repeated personal investigations in the leading 
 cities of the United States. Despite its large interest for the 
 general reader, its comprehensiveness makes it valuable to the 
 research student as well, and its exhaustive bibliography is in- 
 valuable to the specialist. The work is unique and will be 
 found a complete guide in many unfamiliar paths. 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York