Cornell University
Library
The original of tiiis book is in
tine Cornell University Library.
There are no known copyright restrictions in
the United States on the use of the text.
http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924097556884
In compliance with current
copyright law, Cornell University
Library produced this
replacement volume on paper
that meets the ANSI Standard
Z39.48-1992 to replace the
irreparably deteriorated original.
2003
(^ortteU Utttoeraitg Cibtatg
atljata, «ein fork
BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME OF THE
SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND
THE GIFT OF
HENRY W. SAGE
1891
SAARBRUCK TO PARIS, 1870: A
Strategical Sketch.
B7 Lieut.-Col. SISSON C. PRATT, late r.a. Sketches
and Maps. 5s. net.
" This^ is the first issue of a Special Campaign Series planned
by the pubUshers, which soldiers, especially junior of&cers,
should find of very great value. The idea is to describe, from
a, purely technical point of view, the famous campaigns of the
19th century, and though it is probable that the editor will try
to confine comment mainly to the strategy of the wars dealt
with, readers may count upon the various writers affording
useful tactical hints based on their reading of the material dealt
with." — Glasgow Herald.
" A clear and useful little work, plentifully supplied with
maps." — Athen^um.
" This strategical sketch is the first volume of a Special Cam-
'gn Series which promises to be of great value as a military
class book, and to the military student. Such a volume makes
study a pleasure, and we hope that it will have a long list of
successors." — Notts. Guardian
" A volume (the first) in the Special Campaign Series, sketch-
ing the strategy of the German invasion of France in 1870.
Others are to deal with the Russo-Turkish war, and if they
maintain the present high quality, the series (or a volume of it
certainly) ought to find a place, with the proverbial baton, in
every soldier's knapsack. The maps and sketches are clear, full,
and excellent." — Pall Mall Gazette.
" The series will certainly make a unique place for itself on
our shelves, if all the volumes display the brilliant qualities of
the initial volume." — Birmingham Post.
" Col. Pratt is first in the field with a volume on the war
which has been selected as the Special Campaign to be read up
by ofiicers preparing for the Competitive Examinations for
Commissions in the Army to be held in September, 1905, and
March, 1906. It is fortunate for those who have to prepare to
face the examiner that Col. Pratt has now turned his attention
to the compilation of volumes on Military History. It is hoped
that the Series will not only be useful for examination purposes,
but may form the nucleus of an interesting library for the military
student." — ^United Service Gazette.
" The book will be of especial interest to military men at the
present time, when another war is showing every day how steadily
success preponderates on the side of a nation that has plans and
equipments ready before the fighting begins." — ^Manchestke
Guardian.
" So long a time has elapsed since a military history series
has been ofifered to British soldiers, that Messrs. Sonnenscheiri
may claim the credit of bringing to fruition a virtually new idea.
With the limitations common to all or almost all British military
writers, the book before us is of great merit. We should select
for particular notiee the vigorous and even dramatic account
of the Sedan Campaign. The book is well illustrated by a good
general map and numerous sketch maps." — Broad Arrow.
" It gives a succinct account of the campaign, taking each
episode in turn, and criticising the strategy of either side. Num-
erous diagrams and maps help to elucidate the text of a little
book, which will be of obvious use to the student of military
tactics, but may be strongly recommended to a wider circle of
readers." — Yorkshire Post.
" An excellent sketch of what remains the most instructive
of modem wars, accompanied by admirable maps upon which
the student can follow the tactical as well as the strategical opera-
tions of the campaign. Altogether this is a very valuable book."
— United Service Magazine.
" Lt.-Col. Pratt, in his strategical sketch, presents a com-
pendium of the drama of the Franco-Prussian war, from the open-
ing scene on the banks of the Saar, to the fall of the curtain upon
beleagured Paris. The story, charged as it is with lessons
for the soldier and statesman, is no less instructive to the general
reader, in whose mind a careful study of the respective con-
ditions of the opposing forces will leave but Uttle doubt that
victory was assured to the Germans before a shot had been
fired. . . . The student of military history need search no
further than the Uttle volume under review in order to discover
the chief causes that led to the swift and complete collapse of a
Power esteemed by Europe so formidable a fighter that at the
commencement of the war the great majority of maps intended
to illustrate the campaign were projected eastward of the Rhine.
The author's account of the German scheme of mobilization is
very interesting and suggestive. So thorough is the organization
that every reservist in the land knows the position assigned to
him at the call to arms." — Madras Mail.
" The intention underlying this Series is excellent, to bring
the main outUnes of the campaign within the purview of many '
officers who have neither the time nor the opportunity to study
for themselves a more detailed account. Special mention must
be made of the ten excellent sketches and maps included in the
volume. We would add that the form of treatment in this
excellent Series should bring these books into the hands of a
good many others besides those with whom war is a business." —
Darlington Times.
THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR, 1877:
A Strategical Sketch.
By MAJOR F. MAURICE (The Sherwood For-
esters). With 3 Maps. Crown 8vo. 5s. net.
I " No student who can find time to give Major Maurice's work
its due attention shodld neglect a single page of the narrative.
The story is told so succinctly that the imagination is brought
iiito play tliroughout, and yet no single detail necessary for the
right direction of the student's imagination is omitted. The
sound, sober common-sense he displays throughout in dealing
with tactical problems merits the highest commendations in
aiii age in which all sense of comparative historical treatment
seems to have vanished and given place to modem theories.
Tlie maps provided are exceptionally good and obviously
prepared with the greatest possible care." — Broad Arrow.
" This is the second volume of a very useful Special Campaign
Series, and will prove of great value to officers of all ranks,
especially to those who have leanings towards the study of
mihtary history, a very necessary disposition in these days, when
the officer has to look to proficiency in his profession as the only
reUable means for obtaining advancement. The moment appears
propitious for the publication of an account in English, and
no one could have carried out this work in a more capable
manner than Major Maurice has done. The book is weU got
up, well bound in a neat cover, and has several maps to assist
the student." — United Service Gazette.
" This unpretentious httle book — a coinpanion to Saarbruck
to Paris, 1870 — deals merely with the strategy and major tactics
of the decisive part of the campaign in Europe. There is at the
end a large scale map of the theatre of war in Bulgaria, based
on the Austrian survey in 1S81 of the Balkan States." — Academy.
" Written with well-considered conciseness and usefully
equipped with illustrative maps, few books, if any, could be
found better fitted for military students and junior officers
desirous of a knowledge of the lessons which the campaign has
for a soldier." — Scotsman.
" This volume mairftains the credit of the series admirably.
Major Maurice does not pretend to give a complete history of
the war, but in fact, except that the final phase of the campaign
after the fall of Plevna is very rapidly summarized, the war is
very fully and minutely described indeed, considering the limit
set by the style of the volume. The student is indebted to
Major Maurice for the perfection with which the text is related
to the first-class pocket maps, which are on more adequate
scales." — Glasgow Herald.
" There is little English literature deaUng with this campaign,
and a. comprehensive strategical sketch such as Major Maurice
gives in the present work was badly needed by the military
student. It is a comprehensive and methodical survey of the
whole campaign, and he has not failed to underline the points
of principal application to English students." — Manchester
Guardian.
" Of very great value as a military class book. There is no
other way of aquiring the art of war than lay studying the
great campaigns of the past, and such a book as this renders
the task much simpler and the subject much more intelligible
to junior of&cers." — Nottingham Guardian.
" As a strategical sketch of a great war here is an excellent
example. The main outhnes of the campaign are described,
together with the crucial episodes, but the chief aim is to advance
what has been termed the science of war. A number of maps
and diagrams serve to illustrate the te.xt and enhance consider-
ably the value of the book as a means of military instruction."
— Leeds Mercury.
" Major Maurice makes the Russo-Turkish campaign deeply
interesting, and brings the lessons of Plevna home to islanders
to whom that struggle means much. The maps and plans are
extremely clear and are not overburdened with detail." West
Sussex Gazette.
FREDERICKSBURG: A Study in
War.
By Major G. W. Redway. With Maps and Plans.
Crown 8vo. 5^. net.
" The story ia very effectively told by Major Redway, a,
distinguished member of that increasing band of British officers
who so satisfactorily disprove the once general impression, that
men of high intellectual abilities and abundant professional
knowledge, are not too rarely to be found in our army. The
student of military history will be well rewarded by following
this succinct narrative assimilating the tactical lessons of the
great battle. He will see that the final success was the prize
of the most capable general. He was an undoubted master of
war, and his opponent Burnside decidedly his inferior in military
capacity." — Pall Mall Gazette.
" Major Redway's narrative is full of instruction for every
thoughtful and even for every weU-read soldier. His criticisms
are fair, temperate and made with an appreciation of the real
nature of war which we look for in vain in most of our historians
of war." — Broad Arrow.
" This is the third volume of the ' Special Campaign ' series of
books which are now being published by the above named enter-
prising firm, and in full maintains the standard of excellence
established by its predecessors. In a pocket at the end of the
book are four excellent maps of the Eastern Theatre of War and
of Fredericksburg and its neighbourhood, all particularly
clear, and none of them, as is often the case, overladen with
detail." — ^United Service Magazine.
■ ' It is no faint praise to say that its merits as a Uterary study
of war rival those of its predecessors." — Army and Navy
Chronicle.
" Rich in interest for soldiers who wish to understand how a
powerful enemy may be beaten by raising the price of success,
and wearing out rather than overthrowing his forces. Well
based historical studies concisely written, and finished with a
good equipment of instructive special maps, the work forms a
valuable accession to the scenes in which it appears." — Scotsman.
" Major Redway has made a very valuable addition to the
' Special Campaign Series, and also a more than useful contribution
to the history of the American Civil War. For he has evidently
given time, pains and indubitable skill to the study of the mass
of material available to the student, and has produced a story
self-contained, careful, vivid, as well as specially adapted by its
method for the military student. All the important movements
and dispositions of the troops on either side are lucidly detailed,
and can be followed on the maps, of which there are five as admir-
able specimens of cartography as one would expect in a much
more ambitious mOitary work." — Glasgow Herald.
" The present volume presents a striking contrast to the story
of a European campaign. From Saarbriick to Paris, with which
the series commenced, and Major Red way has done his work
admirably. His chapter on the ' American soldier — his social
status and professional ability ' is one of the best studies on the
subject that ever came under our notice." — Guardian.
" The very fact that in the American War the South was so over-
matched in wealth and resources makes all the more interesting
a close study of their tactics and their strategy, influenced as
these on both sides were by political as well as military considera-
tions. The ' Campaign Series ' ought to be found in every
military library." — Yorkshire Post.
" The book offers an instructive contrast in methods adopted
by an unskilful general on one side and by a great master of war
on the other." — Manchester Guardian.
" WhUe dealing mainly with the technical details of the cam-
paign, the author's narrative is so lucid and so skilfully told
that it may be followed with enjoyment and ease by the tyro, as
well as the expert in military matters." — Dundee Advertiser.
THE CAMPAIGN OF MAGENTA
AND SOLFERINO
1859
THE SPECIAL CAMPAIGN
SERIES
Price 51, net, each.
I. SAARBROCK to PARIS ! The
Franco-German War. By Col.
SissoN C. Pratt, late R.A.
II. THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR,
1877. By Major F. Maurice.
III. FREDERICKSBURG: A STUDY IN
WAR, 1862. By Major G. W.
Redway.
IV. THE CAMPAIGN OF MAGENTA
and SOLFERINO, 1S59. By Col.
H. C. Wylly, C.B.
In preparation.
V. THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA,
1866. By Lt.-Col. J. F. G.
GlUnicke.
VI. THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN.
By CoL SissoN C. Pratt, late R.A.
This book is now published by
Messrs. George Allen & Company, Ltd.
RUSKIN HOUSE,
44 & 45, RATHBONE PLACE,
OXFORD STREET, LONDON, W.
to whom all orders should be sent.
APRIL, 1911.
SPECIAL CAMPAIGN SERIES. No. 4
THE CAMPAIGN OF
MAGENTA AND
SOLFERINO
1859
By
COLONEL H. C. WYLLY, C.B
LaU The Sherwood Foresters, Nottinghamshire and
Derbyshire Regiment
LONDON
SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LIM
New York : THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
1907
fs
PREFACE
The campaign of 1859 in Northern Italy was one of the
first of the epoch-making, rapidly conducted wars which
marked the latter half of the nineteenth century. It
was, moreover, as has been pointed out by the author
of Impend Strategy, the " first war in Europe which
conveyed some preliminary indication of what railways
can accompHsh. The success of the French Army in
this short and brilliant, if rather lucky, campaign was
largely due to the efficient service of the southern rail-
ways." A study of the events of the war and of the
various considerations which led to the somewhat un-
expected determination to make peace, leads one to the
conviction that, while a lavish expenditure on the out-
break of war can so far repair the neglect of the years of
peace and plenty that armies may be improvised for a
campaign of short duration, neither hurried organisa-
tion nor make-shift armies are equal to a protracted effort,
or to oppose the forces of those who have used the
long years of peace to prepare for the days of war.
So far as I am aware this is the first study of the war,
compiled from official sources, which has yet appeared
in the English language. Several short accoimts of the
events of the campaign were published within a few
xii PREFACE
months of its conclusion, but all these were based upon
contemporary and unofficial accounts. In this short
history I have followed, at a respectful distance, the
general arrangement of the French official account,
while I have taken the descriptions of the country and
of the battlefields almost entirely from the writings
of the difierent newspaper correspondents of that day.
The large map is a copy of a portion of one in ''la
campagne de Napoleon III en Italic. "
H. C. W.
LIST OF WORKS CONSULTED
Campagne de Napoleon III en Italie, 1859 ; — Redigee au depot
de la guerre.
Dor Krieg in Italien 1859 ; — Generalstabs-Bureau fur Kriegs-
geschiohte.
Der Italienische Feldzug des Jahres 1859 ; — General Count von
Moltke.
La campagne d' Italie de 1859 ; — Baron de Bazancourt.
Relation historique et critique de la campagne d' Italie en 1859 .•
— Ferdinand Leoomte.
Der Italienische Krieg 1859 ; — W. Eiistow.
Great Campaigns : — ^Major 0. Adams.
Operations of War : — General Sir E. B. Hamley, K.C.B.
A Study of the Italian Campaign in 1859 ; — Major Miller, R.A.
The War in Italy : — The author of the Times Letters.
La guerre modeme : — V. Derrecagaix.
Magenta : — Lt. -General von Caemmerer
Campagnes modernes : — Lt. CoL J. ViaL
Etudes sommaires des hataiUes dun siecle : — Ch. Romagny et
Piales d'Axtrez.
Modern Italy : — Pietro Orsi.
Un souvenir de Solferino : — J. H. Dunant.
Documents officids sur la campagne d Italie en 1859 ;
Skizze des Feldzuges 1859 in Italien : — von einem siiddeutsohen
Offlzier.
xiv LIST OF WORKS CONSULTED
Life of Napoleon III :—P. G. HiU.
Lettres d'ltalie : — Amed6e Achard.
A German view of the Italian War : — from the U.S. Mag. for
Sept. 1859.
La Guerre d'ltalie 1859 .■ — Alfred Duquet.
The Italian campaign of 1859 .• — Edinburgh Review, 1859.
ERRATA
Plan VI. Solpeedto
For Desanzo, read Desenzano
Dele, R. Chiese.
CONTENTS
PAGE
CHAPTER I
Prepabations fob Was, 3
CHAPTER II
The Attsteian Advance to the Sesia ... 17
CHAPTER III
Action at Montbbello 43
CHAPTER IV
The Flank Maech by the Allies and the Fighting at
\ Palestbo 65
' CHAPTER V
I
The Aitsteians Recboss the Ticino and the French
i OccTTPT Robecchetto ...... 89
CHAPTER VI
The Battle op Magenta 113
CHAPTER VII
The Action at Melegnano 145
xvi CONTENTS
PAGE
CHAPTER Vni
Movements of the Vth French Corps — Action at Castb-
NEDOLO — AUSTRIAN'S ReTRBAT BEHIND THE MeNCIO. 167
CHAPTER IX
The Battle ob Solperino ..... 191
CHAPTER X
The Peace of Villabranca 227
APPENDIX A.
Order op Battle ob the three Armies on 4th June
1859 235
APPENDIX B.
Order of Battle of the three Armies on 24th June
1859 238
LIST OF MAPS AND PLANS '
[In pocket at end of book].
I. General Map ob the Theatre of War in Northern
Italy
II. Plan ob the Action at Montebello
III. Plan ob the Action at Palestro on May 31
IV. Plan of the Battle ob Maqenta
V. Plan of the Action at Melegnano
VI. Plan of the Battle of Solfeeino
PREPAEATIONS FOR WAE
CHAPTER I
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR
For centuries the nations of Europe had treated Italy
as their battlefield. Swiss mercenaries, German lanz-
knechts, French and Spanish men-at-arms have all
at various periods trampled Italy under foot and looked
upon her as a conquered country ; campaign has fol-
lowed upon campaign, and in few of these have the
natives of the country had any real or abiding interest,
while in all of them have they most grievously sufEered.
With the close of the war of the Spanish Succession,
Austria became the possessor of the Spanish dominions
in Italy, and, giving up the Two Sicilies to the Bourbons,
ruled the smaller states of the Peninsula. By the
terms of the Peace of Utrecht, Victor Amadeus II of
Savoy and Piedmont had obtained Sicily ; but in con-
sequence of the attempts of Cardinal Alberord, the
Spanish Minister, to recover the lost ItaUan provinces,
the Emperor Charles VI had insisted upon Amadeus
ceding Sicily to him, and taking in exchange the King-
dom of Sardinia, and thus the title of " King of Sardinia "
was borne henceforward by those who ruled in Piedmont
and Savoy.
The invasions of Buonaparte shattered temporarily
the power of Austria, while they introduced the teachings
THE CAMPAIGN OF
of the Revolution to the down-trodden peoples of North-
ern Italy and turned their thoughts to the " Risorgi-
mento." The Kingdom of Italy, which Napoleon had
created and whose crown he had assumed, fell with
him, and the former governments were at once restored.
The Congress of Vienna gave Lombardy and Venetia
to Austria and Genoa to Savoy, while members of the
House of Habsburg reigned in Parma, Modena and
Tuscany. In 1831 Charles Albert became King of
Sardinia, and by him the idea of a free and united Italy
was fostered and encouraged. When in 1848 the news
of the revolutions in France and Austria reached Italy,
Venice and Lombardy rose in revolt, drove the Austrian
troops under the guns of the Quadrilateral and asked
help of Piedmont. Tuscany sent troops, Ferdinand
of Naples promised assistance, the Pope sent 17,000
men, and thus encouraged and supported Charles
Albert took the field against the Austrians ; successful
at Goito, the Itahans were defeated by the veteran
Radetzky at Curtatone, Custoza and Novara, where^
upon Charles Albert capitulated and abdicated the
throne in favour of his son Victor Emmanuel. }
It was the Crimean War which first gave Piedmont
an opportunity of asserting herself among the nations
of Europe. Count Cavour had now become Prim^
Minister, and it seemed to him that by intervening
in so momentous a struggle, his country would acquire
an increased importance among the Powers ; and in
spite of many difficulties he succeeded in effecting an
alhance with England and France, under which 15,000
Piedmontese troops proceeded to the Crimea under
General La Marmora. At the Congress of Paris in
, MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 5
18^6 Cavour drew attention to the danger which now
threatened Italy in general, and Piedmont in particular,
pointing out that the military occupation by Austria
of the greater part of the Peninsula was effectually
destroying the political balance of power in the various
states.
In the summer of 1858 Napoleon III met Count
Cavour at Plombieres, where a treaty of alliance was
drawn up, under which it was agreed that France
should come to the assistance of Piedmont in the event
of the latter being attacked by Austria. At a reception
of the Corps Bijilomaiique on January 1, 1859,' the
Emperor of the French used the following words to
the Austrian ambassador : " Je regrette que les relations
entre nous soient si mauvaises ; dites cependant d,
votre souverain que mes sentiments pour lui ne sent
pas changes." In face of the attitude now assumed
by France and Piedmont, Austria despatched fresh
troops to various points on the Piedmontese frontier,
to which measures Cavour replied by asking ParUament
jfor a special credit and by calling upon Garibaldi to
{raise a corps of volunteers. England and Russia now
Suggested that all difficulties should be laid for settle-
inent before an international congress, to which pro-
posal the French Emperor acceded. Austria, however,
ilnsisted that Piedmont should first disarm, and on
April 23 she followed up this demand by an ultimatum
to be answered within three days. On the 26th the
jultimatum was rejected, and after a delay, occasioned
by renewed efforts at mediation on the part of England,
tihe Austrian troops crossed— on April 29 — the frontier
between Lombardy and Piedmont.
THE CAMPAIGN OF
Before detailing the preparations which each of
the three Powers had made and was still perfecting
against the impending struggle, it may be well to offer
some description of the country wherein great events
were about to transpire. " That portion in which
the more active part of the campaign took place hes
between Turin and Mantua, and may be described in
general terms as a plain, ninety miles long and thirty
broad, with the River Po forming its southern boundary.
It is crossed from north to south by several rivers — the
majority of them with wide gravelly beds and very
empty during the heats of summer ; sometimes two
or three channels separated by islands and sandbanks;
The Po is considerably larger than any of its tribuj-
taries, and at Valenza, below its junction with the
Sesia, the stream in winter is 550 yards wide. Tract^
of marshy ground, thick with bushes and trees, border!
the Po on either side, and the embankments, made to
preserve the country from inundations, have caused
the bed of the river to raise itself above the original!
level. In 1859 the land was very. closely cultivated — I
vines, com and rice — and was intersected in every
direction by irrigation channels. The whole country!
was Hke one vast orchard, being planted closely witl^
young fruit trees, impeding the view in every direction^
Villages were numerous and each one had its cemeterj'
beside it — square enclosures with stone walls eight to
fifteen feet high, entered by an iron gate with a gratec .
opening on either side. The roads were of three classes —
strade reale or postale, strade provinciale, and strade
communale ; the first were excellent, the second good]
while the third were often mere tracks, quickly bei
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 7
coming impassable in bad weather or mider much traffic.
Most of the railways were only single lines."
In view of the support, moral and material, which
Napoleon had given or was pledged to afford Piedmont
in her quarrel with Austria, there can be no doubt
that the rapid passing of events preliminary to the
outbreak of hostihties, found the French army danger-
ously unprepared. It is true that on January 1, 1859,
the effective strength of the French forces amounted
to close upon 562,000 men, but of these some 163,000
were en conge renouvddble ; the artillery was deficient
of nearly 25,000 horses, which had to be purchased
between the beginning of the year and the commence-
ment of the war ; while this arm of the service was at
phis very time engaged in the process of re-armament
with a new rifled field-gun. The infantry was almost
jequaUy unprepared ; the issue of a new rifle had, it
is true, been just completed, but the arsenals contained
in January — ^barely four months before the Austrian
iiltimatimi reached Turin — only fourteen million rounds,
ivhich had been manufactured and stored as practice
ammunition for the annual course of musketry which
was to have begun in February. The stores contained
clothing, equipment and camp equipage for rather
^ ess than four hundred thousand men ; there was any
imotint of transport material in the parks at Vernon
and Chateauroux, but men, horses and mules were
wanting ; and as late even as the begLoning of April,
the reserve supphes of rations and forage were wholly
insufficient for the large force which might well be
expected to take the field within a few days.
THE CAMPAIGN OF
By immense exertions and by means of a lavish
expenditure these deficiencies were in great measure
made good. By recalling men to the Colours, by
voluntary re-engagements, by calling in the men of
the 1857 class still remaining to be incorporated and
also the contingent for 1858, the total efEective strength
of the French Army was raised to a grand total of
639,000 men. By large purchases of remounts and
by the transfer to the artillery of 4,000 men from the
two other arms, the whole of the artillery of the four
first corps of the Army of Italy was completely organised
within twenty days ; sixty batteries were to have
been armed with the new rifled gim during the financial
year 1859, but events marched so rapidly that thd
execution of this intention had perforce to be abandoned!
• and France eventually took the field with only thirty-l
two batteries armed on the new system. Orders for
a hundred nulhon rounds of small arm ammunition!
were placed with different manufactories, while con-i
tracts for the soldiers' clothing, tentage and equipment
were given out, and were taken up and executed with
such dispatch that, on the actual outbreak of war^
almost everything necessary was ready for issue to thei
units under orders for Italy. The Transport Depart-
ment was greatly expanded in regard to 'personnel,
while later on, during the course of the campaign, an
auxiliary train of civihan employes with private wagons
was organized and proved of the greatest service. In
regard, too, to Commissariat suppHes, immense order^
for biscuit were placed in London and Liverpool, whil0
Colonel Saget, of the French General Staff, was fortu--
nately able to arrange with the Sardinian government
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 9
for seventeen days' rations for 100,000 men, with forage
for 10,000 animals, to be ready stored for the use of
the French troops at six different depots on Italian
soil.
Ever since the disastrous campaign of 1849 the mihtary
organization of the Kingdom of Sardinia and the
development of its warhke resources had been the chief
care of successive governments. The creation of the
new army had been the work of the last ten anxious
years; it 'had been entirely remodelled and had lost
that exclusive class-colouring which had formerly
distinguished it, and which had doubtless contributed
in some degree to its failure in the last struggle with
Austria. As the Piedmontese Army was to be the
nucleus round which soldiers from all parts of Italy
were to group themselves, it was felt that it could not
remain so exclusively aristocratic, but must be popular-
ised, and whatever was effected in this direction was
generally and justly attributed to General La Marmora.
By a patient process of years a cad/re was thus formed
on a sufficiently broad and expansive basis to include
the elements from the rest of the Peninsula in the event
of an Italian war of independence.
The Kingdom was divided into five military divisions —
Turin, Chambery (Savoy), Alessandria, Genoa and Cag-
liari (Sardinia) — and into two subdivisions — ^Novara and
Nice. The peace strength of the army was 49,000 men
with 80 guns, and it was capable of expansion to nearly
87,000 with 160 guns on the outbreak of war. This
force was distributed among 90 battaUons of infantry,
9 regiments of cavalry and 15 batteries, and was 'or-
10 THE CAMPAIGN OF
ganised in one cavalry division and five infantry divisions,
each of two brigades, the whole being under the imme-
diate command of King Victor Emmanuel.
With the pubUcation of the Emperor Napoleon's
speech of January 1, great preparations for war were
at once put in hand by the Sardinian government ;
suppUes were hastUy thrown into the fortresses of
Casale and Alessandria ; fortified camps were prepared ;
the defences of Valen^a were strengthened ; large
purchases of animals and clothing were made ; and
60,000 rifles were ordered in France to replace the
smooth-bore muskets with which the Itahan infantry
was armed. The agitation began to spread all over
the Peninsula and especially in Upper and Central
Italy. " The Italian National Society," which had
been formed under Garibaldi, La Farina and PaUaviciho
to promote the Itahan movement, had succeeded in
establishing an understanding with aU the most in-
fluential men, and by their exertions thousands of youths
were enabled to come into Piedmont to enlist. In
the month of March alone close upon 6,000 volunteers
were enrolled by the commissioner specially appointed
for that purpose in Turin — ^half of these being from
Lombardy and the remainder from Central Italy, and
altogether it is computed that some 14,500 men were
voluntarily enlisted.
The Piedmontese were no match single-handed for
the large forces which Austria had abeady ranged — or
was in process of concentrating — ^upon their eastern
frontier. It was therefore necessary to take up som6
strong defensive position wherein they could await
the arrival of the French troops, which, on the declara-
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 11
tion of war, would at once begin to arrive in Piedmont,
either by Susa through and over the passes of the Alps
or by sea by way of Toulon and Genoa. General Niel,
aide-de-camp to the Emperor of the French, had been
sent early to Turin to concert measures of defence with
General La Marmora, and by them it was decided that
a position should be taken up on the right bank of the
Dora Baltea, between the village of Mazze and the Po,
as it was considered that the Austrians would be unlikely
to risk an advance on Turin from the east, but would
more probably move on the capital by VerceUi, threat-
ening at the same time the debouches of the French
columns from the Alps. The Italian forces were con-
sequently thus disposed :
One division covering the valley of the Scrivia and
Genoa.
One division occupying Alessandria.
One division occupying Casale, watching the hue
of the Po at Valenza and maintaining communication
between Casale and Alessandria ; this distribution
thus left only two infantry divisions, the cavaby and
Garibaldi's corps to oppose the passage of the Dora
. Baltea. It was hoped, however, that the march of
the Austrians from the Ticino- might be so delayed as
to extend over five or six days, by which time the
French Army — debouching rapidly from the passes
of the Alps and using the two available Hnes of railway —
might weU be able to place the best part of three divisions
in line with the Piedmontese.
The Austrian Army — having a peace strength of
334,000 and a strength on a war footing of 720,000— was
12 THE CAMPAIGN OF
organised in four armies and twelve corps : at the end
of 1858 the Second Army — strength 44,837 men with
104 guns — under Count Gyulai, formed the normal gar-
rison of Northern Italy, with the Vth, Vllth and Vlllth
Corps, of which it was composed, occupying Milan,
Verona and Padua respectively. The infantry was
in process of re-armament with a new rifle, but only a
smaU number of these had been issued and many units
did not receive the new weapon' until actually on the
march to the theatre of war. Already in November,
1858, matters were beginning to assume so threatening
an aspect, that it was decided to raise the strength
of the Second Army to 76,000 men with 200 guns, and
further to arrange for the dispatch to Italy at short
notice of the Ilird Corps, but on a peace footing only,
taking steps, however, for increasing the number of
the effectives of these four corps to a total of 170,000
men at ten weeks' notice. G3ailai represented that
such a force was quite inadequate to guard against
all possible eventualities, and reminded thejWar Ministry
that similar half-measures in 1848 had obliged his pre-
decessor Radetzky temporarily to loosen his hold upon
Lombardy. These representations were, however, dis-
regarded, and the Ministry proceeded to carry out
the scheme already suggested. The Illrd Corps was
moved to Italy early in January, and on its arrival the
following was the dispositionof the four Austrian corps : —
The Vth Corps, with one brigade of the Illrd, between
the Ticino and the Adda ;
The Vllth Corps between the Mincio and the Adige ;
The Vlllth Corps in the Legations and in Venetia ;
while of the remaining brigades of the Illrd
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 13
Corps one was in Brescia, one in Bergamo, one
in Cremona and one in Lodi and Crema.^
On February 15 the Ilnd Corps followed the Ilird
to Italy and arrived in Milan on March 3.
It now appearing to be inevitable that Austria would,
in the event of war, have to deal both with France
and Piedmont, orders were issued on April 5 and 6 for
the five corps already in Italy to be at once brought
up t6 war strength, and on the 13th the IXth Corps also
left Vienna for the front.
Towards the latter end of April the five corps (Ilnd,
Ilird, Vth, Vllth and Vlllth), already standing ready
behind the Ticino, were made up as follows :
Army Corps.
Divisions.
Brigades.
Battalions.
Squadrons.
Guns.
Hnd . . .
2
4
20
40
nird . . .
2
4
24
8
56
Vth . . .
2
5
24
8
64
vnth . .
2
4
18
4
48
VlUth . .
2
4
20
4
48
Reserves
1 Infantry
Division .
3
14
3i
28
1 Cavalry
Division .
2
24
16
Artillery
116
12 divisions. 26 brigades. 120 battalions. 51J squadrons.
416 guna.
There were also 46 battalions of occupation or garrison
troops, with a few guns and a small body of cavalry.
' At this period the Ilird Corps contained 5 brigades.
14 THE CAMPAIGN OF '59
The total strength of the Austrian forces in the Peninsula
amounted to nearly 230,000 men, but from this total
some 70,000 must be deducted, required for the main-
tenance of order and for garrison duty in the Austrian
possessions in Italy, leaving barely 160,000 men available
to take the ofEensive beyond the frontier.
On April 25 the Imperial forces were thus distributed :
the Ilnd Corps between S. Angiolo and Lodi, the Illrd
Corps at Pavia, the Vth between Pavia and Milan,
the Vllth between Bereguardo and Abbiategrasso
on the Ticino, and the Vlllth at Piacenza. The two
brigades of the Cavalry Division were in Crema and
Manerbio, while of the Reserve Infantry Division, one
brigade was on its way to joui the Ilnd Corps and the
other two were in Brescia and Bologna. On April 27,
reports were received at Austrian Headquarters that
French ships had already arrived in Genoa, that the
disembarkation of men and material was proceeding
rapidly, and that French troops were marching to Italy
through Savoy. Gyulai had already arranged for the
violation of the frontier to commence on the 30th, but
on the morning of the 29th these orders were cancelled
and the passage of the Ticino was at once begim by the
Vllth and Vth Corps at Bereguardo, wMle the Ilird,
Vlllth and Ilnd, concentrating at Pavia, crossed the
river by the stone bridge at that town and by pontoons
which had previously been thrown across.
By night on the 30th practically the whole of Austria's
striking force had arrived upon hostile territory.
THE AUSTRIAN ADVANCE TO THE SESIA
CHAPTER II
THE AtrSTEIAN ADVANCE TO THE SESIA
In the meantime the French had quietly, but with
dispatch; continued their preparations for placing their
army upon a war footing and for holding it in readiness
for an immediate advance.
A large number of the veteran troops quartered in
Africa were ordered to be transferred to France, their
places being taken by less experienced soldiers, and
eight divisions of infantry and one of cavalry were
standing ready by the middle of April, behind the Alps
or between Lyons and the sea, to advance into Italy
through the mountain passes or by sea to Genoa. By
April 21 the French Government had fully made up
its mind as to the hostile intentions of Austria, and on
that date orders were issued for the formation of four
army corps which, with the Imperial Guard, were to
be known as " the Army of the Alps " — a title almost
immediately altered to that of " the Army of Italy."
Of this army the Emperor Napoleon III himseK took
command, while the subordinate commands were filled
as follows : —
The Imperial Guard — General Regnaud de Saint Jean
d'Angely ;
17 e
i8 THE CAMPAIGN OF
Tte 1st Army Corps — ^Marshal Count Baraguey
d'HilUers ;
Tte Ilnd Army Corps — General de MacMahon ;
The Ilird Army Corps — Marshal Canrobert ; and the
IVth Corps — General Niel. The command of the artil-
lery was held by General le Boeuf, and that of the
engineers by General Frossard. The Ilird and IVth Corps
were directed to move into Italy by the Alps, while
the two divisions of the Imperial Guard and the 1st
and Ilnd Corps were ordered to Marseilles and Toulon
for embarkation for Genoa. The Ilnd Corps was very
largely composed of troops serving in Africa, whose
transfer to French soil had not yet been quite com-
pleted, and these were consequently ordered to proceed
direct to Genoa from Algerian ports.
Of the available cavalry one division was attached
to the 1st and another to the Ilird Corps, while to the
Ilnd and IVth a brigade each only was allotted.
On April 25 the following movements were initiated ;
the division Bouat of Canrobert's Corps was entrained
at Lyons, reached railhead at St. Jean de Maurienne,
and by the 28th had crossed the Mont Cenis and de-
bouched at Susa.'^ Bourbaki's Division of the same
corps was directed on Brian9on, and ordered to move
at once into Piedmont, and by the 28th Ducrot's Brigade
of that division had surmounted the Mont Genevre.
On the 25th the division Renault of the Ilird Corps
marched on Montmelian in the direction of Mont Cenis.
The IVth Corps followed close behind the Ilird and was
succeeded by the cavalry of both.
* Bouat died almost immediately of sunstroke and was sue-
peeded by Trochu.
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 19
The movements by sea were executed with equal
rapidity. Bazaine's Division of the 1st Corps was already
on the 29th beguming to disembark at Genoa ; the divi-
sions Ladmirault and Forey were put on board the
transports as fast as they reached Toulon and Marseilles,
as were also the troops of the Imperial Guard arriving
at these ports from Paris, while transports were working
between Genoa and the Algerian ports conveying the
matured soldiers of the Army of Africa. The cavalry
division of the Guard, having been trained from Paris
to Marseilles, followed thence by march route the
Corniche road to Genoa.
While these various movements were in course of
execution, the formation of a Vth Corps was under-
taken ; this was placed under the orders of Prince
Napoleon, and the two divisions of which it was com-
posed were commanded by Generals D'Autemarre and
Uhrich. The 1st Division was entirely made up of
troops from the African garrisons, while the 2nd was
formed of regiments from Paris.
In preparing for a campaign beyond the frontiers of
the Empire, it was imperative that the defence of the
country, whence so large a force was to be withdrawn,
should be neither neglected nor overlooked. To keep
order in the interior of France and to safeguard her
borders the following dispositions were made : Marshal
de Castellane was placed in command of three infantry
divisions — one at Besan9on and two — with a cavalry
division — at Lyons ; Marshal Magnan was at the head of
four divisions of infantry, of which two were in Paris,
one at Lille and one at Mezieres ; while Marshal Pelis-
sier, Duke de MalakofE, united under his command
20 THE CAMPAIGN OF
four divisions of infantry and four of cavalry, wMch
were dispersed in Chalons, Metz, LuneviUe and Stras-
bourg.
It must be admitted that if the near approach of war
found the armies of France in great measure unprepared
for a struggle with her ancient foe, extraordinarily
successful efforts had been made within the course of
a month to atone for the perilous condition of un-
readiness to which the country had been permitted to
relapse after the termination of the Crimean War. Ex-
perience has over and over again taught nations and
individuals that the neglected work of years cannot be
made good in a few feverish days when war is imminent ;
in many respects the French armies were anything but
thoroughly equipped for a stern campaign, but the fact
remains that in something like twenty-five days an army
of 100,000 men of all arms had been collected in France
and in Algeria and set down in Piedmont, ready, so far
as the casual observer could judge, for all the exigencies
of war.
It will be noticed that while the advance of the Aus-
trians on the 29th — ^when they crossed the frontier
between Lombardy and Piedmont — actually opened
the campaign, the first infringement of existing treaties
came from France, whose troops advanced into Savoy
on the 25th. Some days, however, before that date,
it was known that war was inevitable ; it is true that
Austria's ultimatum was not presented in Turin before
the 23rd, but to the parties most nearly concerned its
contents was well known as early as the 21st. The
result made itself felt ; before the memorandum was even
presented, the railway had carried French troops to the
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 21
Piedmontese frontier, while many thousand soldiers
were concentrated in Toulon and Marseilles. Ten
steamers of the Messageries were lying in the JoKette
Harbour ready to take troops on board ; a number of
old paddle-wheel ships converted into transports were
moored close by. Several Hne-of -battle ships and large
transports were already on their way to fetch the African
divisions, while other ships, chartered for the conveyance
of stores, were loading with the utmost expedition.
Thus, if in the ultimatum a time-hmit, not of three days
but of twenty-four hours, had been fixed, the French
divisions, having already had a day's start, would have
still been in Piedmont at the end of the shorter period.
By the 26th, when the time fixed by the ultimatum had
expired, the French had had full five days to prepare,
and before the Austrian envoy left Turin with Cavour's
reply, French troops already stood upon Italian soil.
At the moment of advance the French Army was
divided into two great wings with no prospect of reimion
or support until each had arrived in Piedmont. The
left wing, composed of the Ilird and IVth Corps, was
therefore placed temporarily under the command of
Marshal Canxobert, while the right wing — the 1st and
Ilnd Corps — was under the orders of Marshal Bara-
guey d'HiUiers. The two forts of Exiles and of Esseil-
lon command respectively the eastern exits of the passes
of Mont Genevre and Mont Cenis, and, by arrangement
with King Victor Emmanuel, these were handed over
to mixed garrisons of French and Itahan troops.
Having set in motion the troops of the left wing, which
was ordered to concentrate at Turin and thence to march
by divisions to the position on the Dora Baltea, Marsha]
22 THE CAMPAIGN OF
Caniobert left Lyons on April 27, accompanied by General
Niel, the commander of the IVth Corps, reached Susa
on the night of the 28th and Turin the following day,
and moved out at once from here to the Dora Baltea
with King Victor Emmanuel and Generals Niel and
Frossard. Having carefuUy examined the ground,
the Marshal came to the conclusion that owing to its
extent, to the small numbers available for holding it,
and to the configuration of the ground itself, the position
was not specially favourable for defence. On the right
the position was good ; flanked by the River Po, there
lay beyond the Dora Baltea an open plain completely
dominated by the fire of guns placed on the right bank.
In the rear of the right the ground was very broken,
and covered with houses, trees and hedges, assisting
greatly in the defence ; a village caUed Verolengo was
itself strongly entrenched and could only be forced
with great difficulty, while this village, with that of Ter-
razza, stood out like two bastions connected by a
canal as by a curtain. The left at Mazze was on a hiU
commanding the ground to the front and too precipi-
tous for frontal assault. In ffont again the bed of the
Dora, enclosed between two high banks quite 2,000
yards apart, also assisted in the defence of the position
selected by the Sardinians ; while the railway, running
parallel to the course of the river, permitted of reinforce-
ments being brought up to any portion of the Kne which
might be threatened. Such were the considerations
which had influenced the Italians in the choice of the
position wherein to await the advance of the Austrians ;
but the following serious defects were pointed "out by
Marshal Canrobert.
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 23
The town of Rondissone formed the centre of the
position ; the high road from Turin to Milan ran through
it, and the ground in rear — flat and open — offered
no obstacle where an enemy might be detained or
defenders rallied. If the centre were forced the right
would be turned, the left compromised, and the second
line would be taken in reverse. Lastly the river, the
only obstacle covering Rondissone, here formed several
small channels almost everywhere f ordable at that season
of the year ; the banks also were thickly wooded and
precipitous. Then, too, although the left was strong,
it could easily be turned by the Austrians following the
high road, which crossed the river twelve miles north of
Mazze.
Such were the faults of the position, but it is possible
that none the less it would have been retained, had the
Ilird and IVth French Corps been able to join hands
with their aUies as early as had been anticipated. The
weather, however, had been deplorable, and the passage
of the Alps had been so greatly delayed, that, should the
Austrians only march rapidly on the Dora Baltea, there
seemed no prospect of reinforcing the defenders with
anything but very weak detachments of the French left
wing. These considerations led Marshal Canrobert to
ask that the position on the Dora be abandoned, and that
Turin should be defended at Alessandria and Casale,
since the occupation in force of the last-named place
in particular, might cause anxiety to the Austrian com-
mander for his left and for his communications in the
event of his advance by way of VerceUi. Thus, too, the
capital would be covered, Genoa safeguarded, the
unmolested arrival of the French detachments would
24 THE CAMPAIGN OF
be assured and the junction of the allied armies be placed
beyond danger.
These ideas of Marshal Canrobert were approved by
the King and by the Emperor, and the position on the
Dora Baltea, where La Marmora had already con-
structed important defensive works, was definitely
abandoned. By the use of the railway the troops were
rapidly withdrawn, and under the direction of General
Frossard works were begun on the left bank of the Po
at Casale, in the hope of thereby causing Count Gyul'ai
to beheve that an advance was contemplated against
his left flank should he march on Turin.
In consequence of these dispositions the following
alterations took place in the positions of the ItaUan
forces : —
Royal Headquarters at San Salvatore.
1st Division (Castelborgo) at San Salvatore.
2nd „ (Fanti) at Alessandria.
3rd „ (Duiando) at Valenza.
4th „ (CSaldini) at Giarole.
5th „ (Cucchiari) at Casale and Frassineto.
The Cavalry Division, with two batteries of horse
artillery, remained on the Dora Baltea, forming the
extreme left and observing the Austrian right, and
occupied the villages of Cighano, Mandria di Chivasso
and Rondissone.
On the date when operations should have commenced,
it had been reported in Milan that the Itahan forces
were still not concentrated, and it was clear therefore
that Austria's best chance of success in the coming cam-
paign lay in striking hard and expeditiously. To cross
' MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 25
into the Lomellina — as the southern portion of the
country between the Sesia and the Ticino is called —
was not the only line of advance open to Cotuit Gyulai ;
he could have advanced either by' the north or by the
south bank of the Po — the one led to the capital, the
other to the enemy's forces and lines of communica-
tion.
It is interesting, therefore, to study the memorandum
prepared by the Austrian General Staff and dated
April 20, of which the following are extracts : " The
military situation may shortly be summed up as follows :
our enemies in the first line are Sardinians, in the second
the French. The Sardinians, 60,000 strong, having been
somewhat abruptly disturbed in their military prepara-
tions and plans, have a double object in view : first, to
preserve intact their capital ; second, to secure their army
from defeat imtil the arrival of the French. Probably
they wiU consider that both of these objects are not to
be attained, and, having to select, wiU possibly prefer
to sacrifice Turin for a time, in the general interests of
the war, to exposing their army to an unequal contest
in its defence, which may entail its destruction. It is
to be feared, therefore, that the Sardinian forces will be
found concentrating under shelter of their fortresses on
the strong ground south of the Po, with the further pur-
pose of covering the defiles and communications between
Genoa and Alessandria. Should this anticipation not
be realized — ^should the Sardinians have divided their
forces in pursuit of a double objective and shomld they
have preferred to concentrate on the Dora Baltea,
which river has recently been prepared for defence,
with a view to cover Turin directly — the problem to be
26 THE CAMPAIGN OF '
solved by the Imperial Army will be considerably
simplified.
" In- either of these cases, assuming the Sardinian
Army to be inferior in numbers as well as in quality, the
decisive result of early collision would seem stiU more
certain than if the remedy for inferiority were sought
by enlisting such artificial aid as is presented by the
permanent fortifications south of the Po. On the other
hand it may be safely assumed that every nerve will
be strained by the French to arrive sufficiently early
on Sardinian soil to support their allies in the impend-
ing struggle. . . . Assuming that our ultimatum will
on dehvery be immediately telegraphed to Paris, it
may be calculated that the French wiU move within
twenty-four hoiurs from that time ; and considering
further the character of the commimications across the
Alps on one hand, and the difficulty attending the mari-
time transport of so large a body of men on the other —
though the distance does not exceed three hundred
miles — we may safely calculate that the Sardinians,
unless they retire on Genoa or Susa, will, during the
first six days, be entirely unsupported, and that in no
probable case wiU our operations be exposed to serious
danger from the arrival of the French — ^under proper
precautions — for a fortnight at least. Assuming, there-
fore, that our proper objective must be sought in the
Sardinian Army, and not in the Sardinian capital, in the
first instance, from considerations precisely similar to
those which influence our adversary, the question is
how best to utilize the time at our disposal for the
purpose in view — the destruction of the Sardinian Army.
... It would seem advisable that the advance upon
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 2'7
the position presumed to be occupied by the enemy
sbould be made by botb banks of the Po ; the army thus
operating ot, cheval along the river, with a view to secure
the passages as we proceed and to enlist the largest
possible number of communications for the rapid transit
of our forces towards the objective. . . . The first
objective points, marking the earliest phase of the
operations, are Valenza and Tortona. It is deemed
essential that the permanent passage at the former
town should be seized at once, and if the bridge be
destroyed or impaired, steps taken to restore immediate
communication with the north bank of the Po. The
construction of works on the south bank of the river
will be commenced at once.
" If the enemy stands here, dispositions for attack
should be issued to the army. If he prefers to cUng to
the high ground about Occimiano, the passage of the
river wiU be effected and the Ilnd and Illrd Corps will
cross at Valenza to the south bank.
"... It may be expected that Valenza will pass
into the hands of the Imperial Aimy on the 28th and
Tortona on the 29th. On the 30th or 31st at latest
the army should be concentrated for attack on the Sar-
dinians in a probably entrenched position. ... It
may be estimated that the Imperial Army may reach
the Sardinian capital about May 3, and further opera-
tions would then be dictated by circumstances which
cannot now be foreseen.
" In case of repulse at Occimiano, the army would
retire upon Valenza, where the necessary preparations
for its retreat to the north bank will have been made
. . and the army generally would take up a defensive
28 THE CAMPAIGN OF
position in the Lomellina, holding the passages of the
Po and Sesia, and leaning with its right upon Vercelli,
which should be strenthgened for that purpose."
It will be seen from the above that the Austrian
General Staff had formed a tolerably correct appreciation
of the situation hkely to arise out of an outbreak of
war, and of the best means of dealing with it ; the want
of decision apparent in the movements about to be
described is therefore the more inexphcable.
In spite of the fact that on April 25 Count Gyulai
telegraphed to Vienna his determination to remain
purely on the defensive, in view of the approaching con-
centration of the French and Itahan armies, the Aus-
trian forces continued to advance westwards after
crossing the Ticino. On the night of the 30th the out-
post hne was on the river Terdoppio, the Vlllth Corps
being at Cava — Zinasco — ^Piave d'Albignola — Corana ;
the Ilnd at GropeUo ; the Vllth at Gambolo — ^Vigevano ;
the Vth at Garlasco— Trumello ; and the Ilird Corps
at Dorno, while the Cavalry remained in Pavia. Orders
were given to the engineers to fortify the line of the
Gravellone stream, to bridge it in several places, to
improve all approaches to the several crossings of the
Ticino, to lay a semi-permanent bridge at Vigevano,
and to prepare bridge-heads at Vigevano and San
Martino — on the JMilan-Trecate-Novara road. ( The
bridge-head prepared at Vigevano consisted of five
separate field works, while that at San Martino com-
prised three lunettes.)
On May 1 Army Headquarters was at Garlasco and
the Austrians moved forward to the line of the Agogna —
the Vlllth Corps being at San Nazzaro, the Illrd at
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 29
Lomello and Ferrara, the Ilnd at San Giorgio, the
Vth at Mortara, and the Vllth between Albonese and
Cilavegna. The commander of the last-named corps
caused two squadrons and two companies to be pushed
on to Novara, where a requisition for 100,000 rations
was made and oompUed with, and where a number of
maps were seized. This day the Cavahy Division got
no further than Trumello on the Terdoppio.
Urban, commanding the Reserve Division, sent a
brigade to Barlassina on the Milan-Como road, owing
to the reported irruption of Itahan Free troops into
Lombardy from that direction.
On this date Gyulai was informed that in a fortnight's
time another corps would be dispatched to the scene
of operations..
On May 2 the advance was continued until the Im-
perial Army stood on the line of the Sesia, the different
corps being distributed as follows : the Vlllth at Piave
de Cairo, the Illrd at Torre dei Beretti, the Vth at Candia,
the Vllth occupying San Angelo — ^Robbio — ^Palestro —
Torrione— Rosasco, sending an advanced post to Ver-
celli and reconnoitring the roads towards Trino and
Casale ; the Ilnd Corps was at Mede, and Army Head-
quarters at LomeUo.
This day one of Urban's brigades arrived in Como,
being supported by a battaUon in Barlassina.
In front of the Vlllth and Vth Corps only were any
of the enemy to be seen ; the weather, which had been
favourable at the commencement of the advance, had
now changed again for the worse, and the Sesia was
greatly swollen.
Count Gjnilai issued for May 3 march orders of which
30 THE CAMPAIGN OF
the general object is anything but clear. The Vlllth
Corps was directed to send troops on to the island
opposite Cambioin the hope that the Allies 'would beUeve
that an attempt was to be made to cross the Po at Sale
and at Porto Cornale, while the Vth Corps was to make
demonstrations at different points along the Sesia and
Po, in order to delude the enemy into the belief that a
crossing might be attempted at Frassinetto. It would
seem that the idea of all these movements and demon-
strations was to cover a real attempt to cross the Po in
the direction of Alessandria. At Army Headquarters
it was intended that the Illrd Corps should seize the
bridge at Valenza, and that another should at the same
time be thrown across at Bassignana ; the Ilnd Corps,
followed by the Vlllth, was to pass over the river here,
while the Illrd, Vth and Vllth crossed at Valenza.
These corps were then to assault and capture the heights
of San Salvatore, and having effected the overthrow
of the ItaUan Army would then press on against the
French.
Early in the morning the artillery of the Illrd Corps
opened fire against Valenza, but the commander. Count
Schwartzenberg, seems to have been doubtful in regard
to his orders, for we find him writing to Army Head-
quarters to inquire whether the railway bridge was to
be captured or merely destroyed. The Vth Corps only
received its orders at 5.30 a.m., and the commander
then pointed out that both rivers were so full that it
would be no easy matter to send even cavalry across ;
that all boats had been removed by the enemy ; and
that it would be difficult to make a reaUstic feint of
crossing when no bridging material of any land was on
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 31
his charge. By midday, however, the Sesia had fallen
and was crossed in several places by Paumgartten's
division, which pushed on to Villanova, Terranuova
and Caresana, leading to some sharp skirmishing. At
Cambio and Cornale troops of the Vlllth Corps were
also j)ut across the Po in pontoons, but saw few signs of
the enemy.
On this date a bridge and bridge-head were commenced
at Vaccarizza below Pavia, which were intended, in the
event of a future retirement on Pavia, to cover the
communications and protect the passage of the army
over the river. Vercelli was occupied by the Vllth
Corps with outposts on the Casale and Trino roads.
Urban had returned this day to Brescia by rail, but
on receipt of intelligence that the Parma government
had been overturned, he was ordered to proceed to that
city and restore order.
Previous to crossing the Ticino the Austrian Com-
mander-in-Chief had received vague reports as to the
dispatch and arrival m Italy of the leading French
troops, but it was not until May 3 — at an hour when
Count Gjnilai had already issued his orders for the
demonstrations on the Po and Sesia — that he was in
receipt of telegraphic despatches from Vienna informing
him that — " fifty thousand Frenchmen had been directed
on Casale and Alessandria on May 1 ' ' — " that Bouat's
division had already arrived in Turin over the Mont
Cenis " — " that 10,000 men were being daily forwarded
via Toulon, 8,000 via Marseilles and 7,000 via Brian§on "
— and it was doubtless in consequence of these reports
that Gyulai telegraphed to Vienna on the evening of
the 3rd that " the approach of the French prevented
32 THE CAMPAIGN OF
Ms intention of breaking through at Bassignana." The
Ilird Corps (Schwartzenberg) was accordingly directed
to destroy the bridge at Valenza, but the rain was now
very heavy, the rising water drowned the mines which
had been akeady prepared, and the destruction of the
bridge was delayed for several days.
On the 4th Gyulai learnt that the IXth Corps was
being sent into Italy ; this had, at the outbreak of war,
been employed in the protection of the Adriatic Uttoral,
and on May 10 its transport to Italy via Venice com-
menced, one brigade moving daUy. Its place was taken
by the Xth Corps from Vienna.
Early on the morning of the 4th the Brigade Boer of
the Vlllth Corps crossed the Po at Porto Comale without
opposition, and at once commenced the construction
of a pontoon bridge. The remaining three brigades
followed, Castelnuova was occupied, and parties were
sent forward in the direction of Voghera, Ponte Curone
and Tortona, while the Corps Headquarters was estab-
Ushed at Cecosa. It had been intended that Ponte
Curone should be occupied in force, but the heavy rain,
which had now been falling continuously for fifteen
hours, had thrown many obstacles in the way of forward
movement ; later in the day, however, the Brigade
Philippovic sent a small force towards Voghera to
destroy the rail and telegraph, while arrangements were
also made for a mixed force (1 battaUon, 1 squadron,
and 2 guns) to proceed next day to Tortona, there
to levy requisitions. To support the Vlllth Corps,
the Ilnd was moved, half to San Nazzaro and half to
LomeUo.
The stream had risen so much in front of the Vth
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 33
Corps at Frassinetto that the fords were rapidly be-
coming impassable, and Count Stadion accordingly
recalled the whole of his troops to the left bank.
Of the Vllth Corps a whole division was now concen-
trated in Vercelh ; one squadron of the mounted troops
with this corps was at Villate and another at Novara.
Late at night orders were issued from Gynlai's Head-
quarters for entirely fresh dispositions on the morrow,
but no hint was vouchsafed of the reasons for any change
or of the purpose for which it was made ; in the orders,
however, given to the Vlllth Corps (Benedek) it was
remarked that the Commander-in-Chief "proposed to
move with the rest of the army from the line of opera-
tions Pavia — Lomello and to take up that of Milan —
Vercelli." The Vlllth Corps— to which the Brigade
Lippert of the Ilnd Corps was attached — was to cover
the left wing of the army during the operations now
impending, commence the construction of a bridge-head
at Porto Cornale, and at the same time push out parties
towards Sale, Tortona, Ponte Curone and Voghera, and
prevent information of the Austrian movements leaking
through to the enemy.
The main portion of the Imperial Army was ordered
to move as follows on May 5 : the whole of the Vllth
Corps was to concentrate in Vercelli, occupy San Ger-
mano and Stroppiana, each with half a brigade, and send
forward strong parties towards Desana, Biella and the
line of the Dora Baltea. Vercelli was to be prepared
for defence, and the local authorities were to be required
to supply 110,000 rations daUy ; work on the bridge-
head at San Martino was to be continued ; while the
Vth Corps was to move to Eobbio, the Ilird to Candia
D
34 THE CAMPAIGN OF
and Cozzo, and the Ilnd to Mortara and Cergnago. All
bridging materials and pontoons — less five pontoons
left at Cornale — were to reacli Lomello on the 5th and
Mortara on the 6th. Supplies for the Vlllth Corps
were to be forwarded via Pavia and San Nazzaro — for
the rest of the army by Milan and Novara.
The floods on the Po destroyed the bridge which had
been laid at Cornale and still prevented the destruction of
the railway bridge at Valenza, so that early on the morn-
ing of the 5th the orders already issued for the move to-
wards the Dora Baltea were cancelled, but the com-
mander of the Vlllth Corps was directed that, in the
event of any hostile advance before communication was
restored, he should retire on Piacenza, eventually rejoin-
ing the main army through Pavia. Nothing further
was to be done in regard to the bridge-head at Cornale,
but every possible means was to be taken to deceive
the enemy as to the isolated situation of the Vlllth
Corps. In these circumstances Benedek showed himself
very active, sending requisitions into Tortona and
destroying the telegraph line and two bridges over the
Scrivia near that town.
By the morning of the 6th the river had fallen con-
siderably, and by 2.30 p.m. commimication between
the north and south bank was restored, when the troops
commenced their retirement. By 11 p.m. all the Vlllth
Corps had recrossed and occupied Piave de Cairo,
MezzanabigH and San Nazzaro, the Ilnd Corps evacuat-
ing the last-named place and occupying Cergnago and
San Giorgio.
The following movements took place on the 7th :
one division of the Vllth Corps took up the line San
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 35
Germano — Cascine di Stra — ^Desana — ^Asigliano — Per-
tengp — Stroppiana, the remainder being concentrated
in Vercelli. Mortara and Novara were sufficiently forti-
fied to prevent their falling by a coup de main.
The Vth Corps held from Rosasco to Confienza through
Robbio ; the Headquarters of the Ilird Corps pro-
ceeded to Cozzo, having its brigades at S. Paolo, Leria,
Celpenchio and Candia. The enemy appeared in some
force about Valenza and Monte and their artillery came
into action. The Ilnd Corps moved to Nicorvo. This
day the bulk of the Vlllth Corps marched to Mortara,
but the brigade Lippert, detached from the Ilnd Corps,
was, with one of the brigades of the Vlllth Corps, placed
under the orders of General Lang, who, with his Head-
quartei^ at Lomello, was directed to watch the line of
the Po from Mezzana Corti to Breme and give timely
notice of any hostile advance in the direction of Piacenza.
In the event of the Allies crossing the river in strength
in his front, Lang was to retire on Mortara and there
make a stand to cover the left flank of the army.
The bridge at Vaccarizza was now ready, but the bad
weather had seriously hindered the completion of the
bridge-head.
The communication and supply lines of the difEerent
units of the army were again altered as follows : For
Lang's division — ^Pavia — San Nazzaro — Lomello ; for
the Ilnd and Ilird Corps — Abbiategrasso — ^Vigevano —
Mortara ; for the remainder of the army — Magenta —
Novara.
On May 8 the Vllth Corps pushed a brigade on from
San Germano to Tronzano, but beyond this it was f oimd
that the roads leading west and north had been cut,
36 THE CAMPAIGN Of
while the bridge over the Dora Baltea was said to have
been mined. Various reports of the presence of the
enemy were received ; a thousand horse were said to
be in front of Tronzano ; 25,000 Frenchmen were
reported to be in Biella, while the Emperor of the French
and the King of Italy were believed to be at , Rondissone
on the Dora Baltea with Durando's division — which
last, however, was at this moment actually iii Valenza.
A strong patrol was sent on to Biella and parties to Ivrea,
and from their reports it was clear that the AUies were
in no strength in this neighbourhood. The Brigade
Gablentz of the Vllth Corps sent a small force of all
arms to reconnoitre the bridge-head at Casale, and
this engaged the troops holding it and exploded a maga-
zine in the works ; the bridge-head was at the time held
by six battalions. In support of the Ilird and Vllth
Corps, the Ilnd moved from Nicorvo via Robbio to
Vercelli, where it bivouacked south of the town. The
Vth Corps — whose mission it was to destroy the railway
between Vercelli and Casale — crossed the Sesia at Pales-
tro and occupied the line Asighano — Caresana with a
brigade at Costanzana.
The Ilird Corps — less a small mixed force left to
connect with Lang's division and watch the Sesia from
its junction with the Po to Mantie — marched to Torrione.
The Vlllth Corps moved to Robbio, arriving, however,
very late, owing to its line of march crossing that of the
Ilnd and Ilird Corps at Robbio and Mcorvo.
The arches of the bridge at Valenza were this day at
last destroyed.
On this day Count Gyulai both wrote and telegraphed
to Urban, directing him to make a, strong demonstration
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 37
in the direction of Stradella with the object of drawing
off the attention of the enemy in front of the main army,
and of obtaining information as to the strength and
dispositions of the Alhes in the mountains to the south-
west of that town. Urban was, however, enjoined on
no accoimt to lose sight of the fact that his main duty
was to maintain order in Lombardy and Venetia, and
that he was not to move far from his base at Pavia or
from the nearly completed bridge-head at Vaccarizza.
G)nilai concluded by remarking that, while he was toler-
ably certain that the main force of the enemy was con-
centrated about Alessandria, and although he was satis-
fied as to the efficacy of the steps he had taken for the se-
curity of his left flank, stiU a hostile movement on Pavia
would be so useful to the enemy that everything possible
must be done to hinder or prevent any such attempt.
In the orders for the 9th — tissued at 8.30 the previous
evening — ^it had been directed that the Vllth Corps
should concentrate about San Germano with outposts
in Santhia and Tronzono and with patrols pushed still
further westward ; that the Vth Corps should move to
Tricerro with advanced troops in Trino and towards
Casale, and that the Ilnd, Ilird, and Vlllth Corps should
support these movements. Lang was also ordered to
cross the Po in strength and endeavour to clear up the
situation about Voghera.
■These movements were actually in progress on the
morning of the 9th, when fresh orders were issued can-
celKng all advance and directing the retirement of the
different corps behind the Sesia, and by evening the
whole of the troops — with the exception of the Vth
Corps — were across that river.
38 THE CAMPAIGN OF
In justification of this sudden retrograde movement,
Count Gyulai forwarded to Vienna a long dispatch,
dated the 9th, of which the following is an epitome :
he commenced by reiterating the words of his letter of
April 25 wherein he had stated his conviction that
an energetic ofEensive in the direction of Alessandria
was very difficult in view of the strength of the allied
forces — ^while a reverse would entail very serious conse-
quences ; that the offensive could only be imdertaken
to prevent or delay a junction of the French and ItaUan
armies ; and that such a consummation was only pos-
sible had the Austrians been in sufficient force to hold
the Italians to the defences at Alessandria and at the
same time to engage and defeat the French. A per-
manent separation of the Allies was impracticable, as a
junction could easily take place further west, when the
French could have advanced from Turin by Vercelli
and Novara against MUan — a movement which Gyulai
could not have prevented and which would have neces-
sitated a retirement on Piacenza or even further. This
retreat, moreover, by the right bank of the Po on a
single road, with aU the impedimenta of a large army
and with possible insurrection on the flank in Tuscany,
would have presented immense difficulties and would
have taken a long time to carry out.
Directly the French appeared upon the scene, Gyulai
stated that he became convinced any offensive against
Alessandria must be abandoned, and that he must take
up some position to cover Lombardy and prevent a
hostile advance on Piacenza. Such a position he
claimed to have discovered between Moirtara and Ver-
celli, where, moreover, the army was spread over a fertile
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 39
province. The enemy's advance would either be re-
stricted to a very narrow front between the Po and the
Apennines, or to a crossing of the river where the Aus-
trians could fall upon and crush him during the move-
ment.
After detaiUng the orders he had given for the 9th —
described as a " reconnaissance " (by four army corps),
Gyulai concludes his despatch by saying he has just
heard that the Dora Baltea hue has been abandoned on
his moving in that direction, and that the French are
advancing on Alessandria to threaten Piacenza ; that
consequently his previous orders for a westward move
have been cancelled, and that the corps have been
directed to concentrate about Mortara where he proposes
to await developments.
ACTION AT MONTEBELLO
CHAPTER III
ACTION AT MONTEBELLO
While the events were transpiring wMch have been
described in the latter part of the preceding chapter,
the different portions of the French Army had gradually
and unhindered been drawing closer to their aUies.
By May 1 three French corps — including that under
the command of Prince Napoleon — ^had already disem-
barked at Grenoa, and one of these — ^the 1st — ^was on its
way to Novi via Staglieno, Pontedecimo and Voltaggio.
Of the two corps moving into Piedmont through the
passes of the Alps, the Ilird was already strung out
along the Hne Susa — Turin — ^Alessandria, while the head
of the other was across the mountains. On the 2nd the
1st Corps was at Pontedecimo, Buzzola, Voltaggio and
Serravalle ; the Ilnd was at Bolzanetto, San Quilico
and Campomarone ; the Imperial Guard was at Genoa
while Trochu's division of the Ilird Corps reached
Alessandria on this date.
The Italian Headquarters was stiU at San Salvatore,
the 1st Division was at Occimiano and Valenza, the
2nd and 3rd were in Alessandria, the 4th ia Ozzano,
and the Vth in Frassinetto, Valenza and Bassignana.
On May 3 Garibaldi's Free Corps arrived in Casale, he
having been earnestly entreated by Cialdini to come
44 THE CAMPAIGN OF
there with all speed, as the advance of the Austrian Vth
Corps had caused Cialdini anxiety for the safety of his
bridge defences.
On the 4th the 1st French Corps was at Rigoroso,
Arquato and Serravalle ; the Ilnd at Gavi, Carosio
and Voltaggio ; the Illrd was partly in Turin and
partly in Alessandria, while the IVth was stiU between
Susa and the capital.
The French were gradually closing up during the
ensuing days, until on the 7th the head of the 1st Corps
— marching on the right bank of the Scrivia — had
reached Cassano ; the Imperial Guard following had
arrived at Buzzola ; the Ilnd Corps was at Tasserolo
just south of Novi ; and the Illrd and IVth Corps
were both in Alessandria, less one brigade which the
last-named corps had dropped at Susa.
Some sUght changes had been made in the disposi-
tions of the Piedmontese Army ; the 1st Division
was in San Salvatore, the 3rd on the line Valenza —
Mugarone — Bassignana, covering Alessandria, where
was the 2nd Division ; while the 4th and 5th were
between Frassinetto and Monte, covering Casale.
The French military authorities had been thoroughly
alive, not only to the evil moral efEect of a hostile
occupation of Turin even of a few days' duration, but of
the resultant danger of the interruption of communica-
tions between Susa and Alessandria ; it must therefore
have been with equal astonishment and relief that the
Allies heard on the 9th that the Austrians had suddenly
withdrawn the bulk of their troops behind the Sesia.
By the 13th the Austrians had all returned by forced
marches to the Lomellina, occupying ground between
i MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 45
the Sesia and the Ticino ; the Illrd and Vllth Corps
were on the Sesia — ^the latter still holding Vercelli — ^the
Vlllth was on the Po, the Ilnd and' Vth in rear at
Albonese and TrumeUo. Urban alone, with troops of
the Reserve Division, was on the south bank of the Po
at Casteggio, while Piacenza was left to its own garrison
and to the IXth Corps, which was now drawing near
to that city. Meanwhile the Allies were rapidly con-
centrating in two strong masses on either side of the
Tanaro — ^the Ist, Ilnd and Ilird French Corps in Sale,
Voghera and Tortona, the IVth and Sardinians about
Casale and Valenza, and the Imperial Guard at Ales-
sandria, bridges having been thrown across the Scrivia
and the Tanaro to facilitate inter-communication.
The first phase of the campaign had thus ended with-
out initial advantage to the Austrians. The object
of Gyulai's hasty invasion of Piedmont was less the
defeat of the isolated Italian Army, than the capture of
the capital and' the possible overthrow of the French
detachments debouching from the passes of the Alps.
But such an operation exposed the Austrian flank to
attack by the armies disembarking at Genoa, and there
can be no doubt that the true object of the invasion
should have been the defeat of the Italian Army standing
behind the Po and the Tanaro. The Austrian advance,
instead of being by the left bank of the Po, should have
been by the right ; a force should have occupied the
defiles of the Scrivia and observed Alessandria — thus
checking the French advance from Genoa — and the
bulk of the Austrian Army should have forced the pas-
sage of the Tanaro, and, having defeated the ItaUans,
46 THE CAMPAIGN OF
would then have stood ready to deal with the divided
forces of their allies. But while the Piedmontese divi-
sions stUl stood unsupported, Gyulai evinced no inclina-
tion to attack them either in front or on the strategic
flank, feints only were made in various directions. No
single advantage had been secured, the initiative had
been surrendered, and the morale of the Imperial troops
had been seriously impaired.
Within the course of the next few days Count Gyulai
learnt that two additional corps — the 1st (Clam Gallas)
and the Ilnd (Weigl) were being sent into Italy, and
on May 17 he was informed that the Emperor Franz
Josef himseK would probably shortly assume command
of the troops of the Second Army.
On May 14 Urban sent forward a brigade under
Colonel WaUon by Casteggio towards Voghera ; nowhere
was the enemy found in any strength, but a few patrols
of Italian lancers were seen in the neighbourhood of
Voghera. The Austrians heard here, however, of the
arrival in Alessandria of the Emperor Napoleon (he
had actually joined his army that very morning), and
from information locally obtained and transmitted to
the Austrian Headquarters, Gyulai seems to have now
formed the conclusion, on what, in the light of subse-
quent events, seems wholly insufficient basis, that the
Allies had the intention either of attempting a crossing
at Valenza or Frassinetto, or of advancing by Voghera
and StradeUa. To meet such dispositions Gyulai drew
up the following scheme, viz : should the enemy cross
at Valenza he proposed to engage him in front with
the Vlllth, Vth and Ilnd Corps, while the Ilird, with
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 47
one division of the Vlltli, was to take him in flank by
Sartirana and Semiana, the other division of the Vllth,
covering the flank at Vercelli and Palestro. In the
event of the Allies attempting to efEect the main crossing
at Frassinetto, the Ilird Corps was to hold them in
front as long as possible, while the Vllth attacked them
in flank from Robbio and the Vlllth from Sartirana —
the nird Corps being supported by the Vth, and the
Vllth by the Ilnd Corps. Again, should the enemy
advance by Voghera on Stradella, the Vlllth was to
fall back fighting — first to the line of the Agogna,
then to the Terdoppio and finally to Pavia. The Vllth
Corps was to retire by Nicorvo, Vigevano and Bere-
guardo, finally forming a reserve between Pavia and
Piacenza.
On May 19 VerceUi was definitely abandoned and
the railway bridge was destroyed, the army moving
more to the left ; the Ilnd Corps marched to San Gior-
gio and Cergnago, the Vth to watch the line of the Po
from the Agogna to Mezzana Corti, the VEIth moved
to Mortara with a brigade on the Agogna between Castel
d' Agogna and Nicorvo and a strong post on the Palestro-
Vercelli road ; the Ilird Corps occupied Trumello, and
Army Headquarters was at Garlasco. By this date
four brigades of the IXth Corps, with Headquarters,
had arrived in Piacenza.
Count Stadion, commanding the Vth Corps, had been
sent to Vaccarizza in view of carrying out a recon-
naissance in force against the enemy's right, and he
now furnished the following report: that there were
three regiments of French cavalry between Alessandria
and Tortona ; that 60,000 men were preparing to cross
48 THE CAMPAIGN OF
tie Po ; that French troops had moved on Bobbio by
the valley of the Trebbia, and that either on the 19th
or 20th a crossing would be attempted between Casale
and Cervesina, when the troops moving by the Trebbia
would fall upon the rear of the Austrians on the south
bank of the Po.
Every report that came into Army Headquarters at
Garlasco seems to have confirmed the impression that
the Allies would shortly attempt the passage of the
Sesia and Po, and Gyulai persuaded himself that the
endeavour could only be made in one of three direc-
tions : the first — which he considered the least probable
— from the line of the Sesia, when the attack would faU
upon the Vllth Corps, supported by the Vlllth, Ilnd,
and Ilird ; secondly, by Cambio and Valenza, to be
opposed by the Vlllth, supported by the Ilird, Ilnd,
and VTIth ; and thirdly, an advance against Stradella,
the Po being crossed at Spessa covered by feints on the
Sesia and at Valenza, to be met by the Vth Corps, sup-
ported by the Ilird, Ilnd, and Vlllth, crossing at
Pavia and Bereguardo.
It will be observed that Gyulai does not seem to have
considered the possibility of any advance other than
against his immediate front or left.
On the 20th the AUies were distributed as follows : —
Sardinians : the dth Division and the Cavaby Division
had moved forward towards VerceUi ; the 3rd Division
crossed the Po at Casale and occupied Caressana, Strop-
piana and Pezzana ; the 2nd moved to Gazzo and
Motta dei Conti on the Sesia ; the 1st to Casale, where
was now the King's Headquarters ; the 5th remained
between Frassinetto and Giarole. French ; the I Vth
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO,i85g 49
Corps (Niel) was at San Salvatore and Valenza ; tlie
Ilnd (MacMahon) was between Sale and Piovera ; the
Guard at Alessandria ; the Ilird Corps (Caniobert)
between Castello and Viguzzolo ; the 1st Division of
the Vth Corps had a regiment each in Voghera, Tortona
and Bobbio ; the 1st (Baraguey) was at Casei, Castel-
nuovo and Voghera. Forey's division in Voghera was
covered by ten squadrons of the Sardinian Cavalry Bri-
gade under Sonnaz ; three squadrons held the line of
the Coppa River between Verretto and Casteggio,
another was on the high ground to the right at Code-
villa, four squadrons at Pizzale and Calcababbio watched
the Stafiora and the bridge at Oriolo, while the remain-
ing two squadrons were in Voghera, where also five
fdotons of the 1st Chasseurs d'Afrique had arrived on
the 18th.
The AUies therefore were distributed in three groups :
between VereeUi and the junction of the Sesia and Po ;
between Casale and the Tanaro ; and between the Staf-
fora, the Po, the Tanaro and the Voghera — Alessandria
road. Of this last group, Forey's division and part of
D'Autemarre's (of the Vth Corps) were practically in
contact with the troops under Stadion, but the French-
men were closely supported by the rest of the 1st Corps
at Ponte Curone and at Casei.
It being considered by Gyrdai that Urban's presence
was no longer required at Stradella, since the IXth
Corps •was now sufficiently closed up to secure the safety
of the left flank of the army, he was ordered back to
'^rhe Po to assist in preparing and holding the bridge-
head now searing completion at Stella. He had reached
Barbianello on his way to Vaccarizza when he was
' ' , E
50 THE CAMPAIGN OF I
directed to return and place himself under the orders
of Count Stadion who was about to endeavour to clear
up the situation from Voghera westwards. For this
purpose the following troops had been put at Stadion's
disposal : the brigades Gaal and Hess and the brigade
Bils of Paumgartten's division — all three of Stadion's
own corps ; the brigades Braum of the IXth Corps
and SchafEgotsche of the Eeserve Division — these
under Urban — and the brigade Boer of the Vlllth
Corps, then at Vaccarizza.
Stadion directed that the advance should be made
in three columns : the left column — ^the two brigades
vmder Urban — marched by the main road from Broni
to Casteggio ; the centre column — which Coimt Stadion
accompanied — was commanded by Paimigartten, who
had with him the brigades Gaal and Bils, and moved
by Barbianello on Casatisma ; while Hess formed the
right column with his brigade and marched by Verrua
and Branduzzo on Oriolo. The troops with Urban
were the only ones who knew the country, and accord-
ingly a battalion from Schaffgotsche's brigade was
attached to the other two columns, while Urban's
deficiencies, thus caused, were made good by giving
him two battalions from Boer's brigade, Boer himself
moving up to Barbianello in reserve with two battalions
of infantry and the reserve artillery.
It will be noticed that while the force allotted to
Stadion for an important operation was drawn from
four different units — owing to Gyulai's disinclination
to make any temporary alteration in the general dis-
position of his forces — the error of mixing up minor imits,
strange to one another and their commanders, was st"
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 51
further accentuated by tlie man in immediate command
of the whole.
Urban reached San Giulietta without any opposition,
beyond that from some armed peasants, and was ordered
at 11 a.m. to push on and capture Casteggio, being
promised the support of the brigade Gaal should he need
it. Casteggio was occupied in like manner, the few
Italian vedettes being easily dislodged, and Urban then
resolved to move on rapidly and seize Montebello, and,
if possible, Genestrello, where he was ordered to stand
fast while the right and centre columns advanced upon
Voghera. While Urban was moving on Montebello,
Gaal, who had been directed to support him and who had
reached Casatisma, left there at 12.30 and marched on
Montebello in two columns — one by the main road,
the other by the Coppa valley and Verretto ; a reserve
was left in Casatisma and the brigade Bils remained in
Eobecco.
About 1.30 p.m. Stadion met Urban in Montebello,
which that officer had just occupied, and there decided
that, as the enemy seemed nowhere in strength, the
day's operations should cease with the further occupa-
tion of Genestrello, a tactical position of no Uttle im-
portance, standing as it did on an outlying spur of the
Apennines and commanding the open country up to
the StafEora River. The centre and right columns,
moving by cross-country roads, had made but indifferent
progress and Stadion accordingly issued the following
orders for security : —
Urban to send back one brigade to Casteggio, which
was to be placed in a state of defence ; the other brigade
to be posted between Genestrello and Torrazza Coste
52 THE CAMPAIGN OF
with cavalry advanced on the Voghera road, and to
reconnoitre towards CodeviUa.
Gaal's brigade to hold the railway bridge just north
of Montebello, and also the line of the Coppa with out-
posts covering Casteggio — where the reserve was to be
placed — and maintain communication with Urban on
the left and on the right with Hess in Branduzzo. Bils
was to remain in Casatisma.
These arrangements had been made about 2.30 and
orders conveyed to Paumgartten and Hess, when heavy
gun firing was heard from the direction of GenestreUo ;
the battahon holding the railway bridge north of Monte-
bello was at once directed to advance along the railway
to the assistance of the troops engaged at GenestreUo,
while Paumgartten was ordered to push on Gaal's
brigade to Montebello and Bils to Casteggio, the
battahon aheady in Casteggio to advance to Mon-
tebello.
What had happened was that the advance guard in
occupation of GenestreUo had been suddenly attacked,
before any steps had been taken to fortify either that
village or Montebello in rear.
General Forey had heard at 12.30 in Voghera of
Stadion's advance and at once moved out with two
guns and two battaUons of the 74th (Beuret's brigade),
which happened to be ready, leaving orders for the
remainder of the division to follow him as quickly as
possible. Arrived at the bridge crossing the Fossagazzo,
where two battalions of the 84th were already on out-
post, Forey placed his guns in position with a battahon
of the 84th on either flank, and held the rest of his
troops in reserve. On the right of the road the squadrons
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 53
of Italian cavaky, of the regiments of Novara and
Montferrat, were drawn up.
For some little time the French were greatly out-
numbered, and were in no Httle peril. Braum, advanc-
ing by the railway, drove the battalion of the 74th out
of the farm and hamlet of Caserne Nuova and occupied
it, but the 74th, supported by a battalion of Blanchard's
brigade which had now come up, returned to the attack
and again possessed themselves of the farm which was
now strongly held, while Blanchard extended a battalion
of the 91st Regiment between the railway and the main
road to strengthen the centre. The whole of Forey's
division had now arrived from Voghera, and that general
was prepared to take the ofiensive. With Beuret to
the right of the road and Blanchard on both sides of
the railway, Forey threw forward his right, attacked
and captured Genestrello, when Schaffgotsche fell back,
hotly pressed, on Montebello. Bils was called up ;
Braum, who had been fiercely struggUng for the re-
capture of Cascine Nuova, was directed to fall back
on Montebello where Gaal had taken up a position to
cover the retirement of SchafEgotsche's men ; while
Hess, who with five battahons had been unable to do
more than hold his own on the Staffora against one
and a half French battahons, was ordered to retire on
Casteggio, and there take up a defensive position.
Preparations for holding Montebello had already been
made by some of Gaal's troops and a battahon of Bils'
brigade, when the men falling back from Genestrello
already made their appearance. There was some con-
fusion before a decision was come to as to which troops
were to remain in occupation of the village and which
54 THE CAMPAIGN OF
to fall back to Casteggio, when the French advance,
energetically pressed by Forey, already reached the
high ground close to Montebello. Beuret's brigade,
was ordered to attack on the south-west, while Blan-
chard, moving along the railway, safeguarded the left.
Both brigades were soon heavily engaged among the
vineyards and terraces ; the fighting — much of it at the
closest quarters — continued for two hours ; the houses
of the village were carried one by one, and finally the
cemetery, commanding the road to Casteggio, was
stormed, carried with the bayonet and cleared of its
defenders. It was here that General Beuret fell mortally
wounded.
Bils, in position on the right bank of the Coppa,
covered the Broni and StradeUa road, while Hess,
deploying to the right between the road and the
railway, guarded the Casatisma road ; between these
two brigades the Austrian battalions fell back practically
unmolested. Urban on StradeUa and Paumgartten on
Stella.
To both combatants reinforcements were drawing
near when the action closed ; Bazaine was hurrying
up from Ponte Curone with three regiments of infantry
and had reached Genestrello, while Fehlmayr's brigade
of the IXth Corps had left Broni for Casteggio, but
was halted by Stadion at Borgo San GiuHetta.
The action had been principally confined to the infan-
try, but the Italian cavalry was of the greatest service,
made repeated charges o'n the Austrians, and did all
possible to check their advance until the French had
collected force sufficient to meet it. Artillery could
only play a secondary part in such a thickly cultivated
MAGENTA AND SOLFERlNO, 1859 55
and wooded country. Forey — as has been described —
placed two guns on the Fossagazzo bridge to support
his attack on Genestrello ; he afterwards posted two on
the high ground to the right, and employed others
near Cascine Nuova, from which the high ground about
MontebeUo is to some extent visible. The Austrians
had two guns on a piece of open ground near the church
of MontebeUo, others on a spur of the hill along which
runs the road between the village and the post-road.
Here they had constructed a sUght breastwork to give
cover to the men — an excellent position but for the
fact that the ground in front was much hidden by trees.
The following are the numbers engaged and the losses
sustained : —
Allies :
Two six-gun batteries — one only engaged.
Cavalry .... 1,294
Infantry
KiUed
Wounded
Missing
Austrians :
Artillery
Cavalry
Infantry
6,933
105 (of&oers and men)
549
68 guns
1,164
22,501
The numbers which actually took part in the action
were, however, very much less : e.g., the brigade Bils,
over 4,000 strong with eight guns, was not engaged
at all.
KiUed
Wounded
Missing
331 (ofBoers and men)
785
307
56 THE CAMPAIGN OF
In this mismanaged affair Stadion certainly failed
to distinguish himself ; he made no real use of his
reserves and was over cautious ; he had, however, a
very difficult task, but all that can be said is that if
the movement was injudicious, its execution was in-
different. Forey, on the other hand, acted with much
decision and boldness ; he took the offensive even
with inferior numbers, disregarded the chance of his
left being driven back, used every available man for
advancing his right, and gained the day by his bold, if
somewhat hazardous, attack. The result of the recon-
naissance, carried out in so dispirited a manner, was
to confirm the Austrian Commander-in-Chief in the
false ideas he had formed as to the intentions of the
AJhes, for even as late as May 23 he telegraphed to
Vienna that " the main forces of the French were be-
tween Alessandria and Voghera, and that preparations
were being made to strike the first blow in the direction
of Piacenza," and this in spite of the fact that news of
the operations conducted by Garibaldi in the north
had already reached Austrian Headquarters at Garlasco.
On May 17 Garibaldi, who had been accorded the
rank of Major- General, was at BieUa, where he had
collected a force of six battaUons of volimteers number-
ing 3,120 men.
On the 20th he was at Gattinara, and, without opposi-
tion and almost unnoticed, he crossed the Sesia next
day at Romagnano, owing to the fact that the attention
of the Austrians had been diverted to the Lower Sesia
by the operations which will be described later. Gari-
baldi left Borgomanero on the 22nd, and marched via
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 57
Arona on Castelletto, arriving on the 24tli at Varese,
where he proceeded to raise and organize fresh bodies
of volunteers. Garibaldi's movements had, however,
not been altogether unnoticed : the Military Governor
of Milan promptly moved out all his available troops
towards Varese, and Gyulai now directed Urban to
assume the direction of the operations about to be
undertaken in North Lombardy, taking with him the
brigade Rupprecht of his Reserve Division. Urban,
moving rapidly, reached Camerlata on the 24th, and
lost no time in assuming the offensive against the
invader. On the night of the 26th he marched upon and
attempted to surprise Varese, but news of his move-
ments had leaked out, and Garibaldi was ready to re-
ceive him. The attack was unsuccessful, and Urban
fell back upon Rebbio, being followed up all the way
and losing considerably. Here he learnt that his other
brigade (Sohaffgotsche) was being sent to him together
with the brigade Augustin of the IXth Corps. Hardly
had portions of these reinforcements joined him, when
he was again heavily attacked, and was eventually
forced to retire on Mon^a. On the 29th, however, he
moved forward on Varese with all three brigades and
was able to occupy that town. Garibaldi having withdrawn
his forces in order to attempt the capture of the small
fort at Laveno on the Lake Maggiore. Laveno held out,
and Garibaldi, returning towards Varese, foimd Urban
in possession, and that his own position had become
very critical, hemmed in as he was in the angle between
the Ticino, Lake Maggiore and the Swiss frontier, and
with his one exit — at Sesto Calende — closed by a force
of aU arms which Urban had already sent thither.
THE CAMPAIGN OF
On June 3, however, Urban hurriedly fell back upon
Gallarate, leaving Garibaldi and his Free Corps to re-
occupy Varese, where for the present they may be left.
Already on May 18 the Italians had collected pon-
toons and other materials at Valenza for the re-establish-
ment of communication, which had been interrupted by
the partial destruction of the railway bridge. The
Austrians, however, opened a cannonade which de-
stroyed several pontoons and caused any proposed at-
tempt at bridging to be abandoned. VerceUi had been
evacuated on the 19th by the Austrians, who left only a
half brigade of the Vllth Corps under Colonel Ceschi,
to observe the line of the Sesia in front of Villata and
Torrione. The 4th Italian division (Qaldini) occu-
pied VerceUi, and on the 21st two small columns forded
the Sesia — one above and one below the town — and
drove back insignificant parties of the Austrians to
Orfengo on the Novara road. On the following day
Zobel, commanding the Vllth Corps, moved the rest
of the division to which Ceschi's troops belonged to-
wards Orfengo and Borgo VercelU, while his other
division was concentrating on Robbio. Cialdini with
this force in his front and a rising river in his rear judged
it best to withdraw, and on the 23rd the Italians accord-
ingly re-crossed the river and returned to VerceUi.
King Victor Emmanuel, to support Cialdini's advance,
had sent the 1st Division (Castelborgo) towards
Candia, the 3rd (Durando) to Caresana, while the 2nd
(Fanti) occupied some islands in the Sesia opposite
Motta dei Conti, the idea being to faciUtate Cialdini's
operations by drawing the enemy's attention upon the
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 59
three other divisions. The 1st Division returned on the
23rd to Casale, and on the night of the 24th-25th
Reischach, commanding a division of the Austrian
Vllth Corps, brought up one of his brigades to support
a brigade of Liha's division at Candia. Here Reischach
established during the night a battery of four 12-pounders
and four howitzers, opened early in the morning on
Fanti's men on the islands, and drove them back to the
right bank.
The Emperor of the French had early realized that
any attempt to force the passage of the Po and Lower
Sesia, where the Austrians were ready to oppose a cross-
ing, would be exceedingly hazardous, if not indeed alto-
gether impossible. On the Austrian left and centre,
where the Po could not be passed, without a bridge, an
advance was evidently awaited. There remained only
the Austrian right which had lately been greatly weak-
ened and was covered only by the Sesia, whose upper
waters could everjrwhere be forded by infantry.
For a few days there was no movement of troops on
either side ; it was the lull before the storm.
In regard to the events above described, Moltke ex-
presses admiration for the rapidity with which Forey
collected his division, answered attack with counter-
attack, and so snatched victory out of a threatened
defeat. Unlike his adversaries he employed the whole
strength of his force and won the day. But it cannot
be overlooked that had the Austrians only made proper
use of their unquestioned superiority in numbers, Forey
must have been defeated. Up to 2 p.m. SchafEgotsche
alone was numerically stronger than the French, after
6o THE CAMPAIGN OF
whicli hour tlie latter may not have had inferior num-
bers actually on the spot, although Forey had to employ
part of his force to hold Hess in check on the left. At
Montebello itself the two forces were about equal, but
at the time when the Austrians actually commenced their
retreat, they possessed at Casteggio a very greatly
superior force.
It is said that the Austrians from aU time have been
partial to such so-called reconnaissances, but under-
takings of this description are only of value when it is
intended that they should lead to a battle for which
every preparation has been made. If the results of a
reconnaissance are unfavourable, the operation cannot
be quickly enough broken off, whereas if they disclose
favourable conditions the opportunity must be seized
at once, since they may alter within a very few hours.
Stadion was hound to retire, no matter what imme-
diate advantage he gained, since three French corps were
within a few hours' march of Voghera ; the Austrian
Army, on the other hand, was on the further side of
the Po, with no nearer communication between the two
banks than that at Vaccarizza — a matter of three
marches. It must be considered how far an undertak-
ing is justifiable which entails heavy casualties without
compensating results. It is perhaps not impossible
that Stadion's movements were in a measure hampered
by some such considerations.
What indeed had he gained ? He had gleaned no
reUable information as to the real strength of the enemy,
since he was opposed by only one division, while he
could not be certain that even the force with which he
had been actually in contact would remain on the spot,
1 MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 61
since he himself fell back on the next day behind the
Po. AJl he knew for certain was that on May 20 a con-
siderable portion of the French Army was on the Ales-
sandria-Piacenza road in the neighbourhood of Voghera ;
as much lAight have been learnt by an officer's patrol
intelligently handled.
THE FLANK MARCH BY THE ALLIES AND THE
FIGHTING AT PALESTRO
CHAPTER IV
THE PLANK MARCH BY THE ALLIES AND THE FIGHTING AT
PALESTRO
The Emperor of the French having completed — ^practi-
cally unhindered — the concentration of his troops at
Alessandria, now conamenced the carrying out of . a
flank march from right to left imder cover of the Po
and of the Sesia, so turning the Austrian right on the
Novara-Milan road. While all students of the military
art are probably agreed that this movement was well
designed and admirably executed, the reasons by which
it was determined have been greatly criticized.
According to the French Offlcial History of the War in
Italy, the scheme, if successful, promised great results ;
Milan must thereby fall iato the hands of the Allies,
and if Gyulai should attempt to effect a crossing of the
Ticino at Bereguardo and Vigevano, the French and
Sardinians, in possession of the left bank, should be able
to fall in fuU strength upon isolated Austrian corps which
might endeavour to pass over the river. If the Aus-
trians should cross at Pavia, in order to retire upon
Belgiojoso and Pizzighettone, they would have to make
a serious flank movement across the front of the Allies,
who should be able to cut them in two and drive them
into the Po. If they, however, retired on the right bank
66 THE CAMPAIGN OF
of the Po by Pavia and La Stella, the Allies — crossing
the Adda at Lodi — could seize the passages and drive
the Austrians into the Duchies. Finally, if having
crossed the Ticino, the Austrians should there ofEer
battle, all that they would gain from a victory would be
the recovery of their menaced communications, while a
defeat would revive for them at Pavia and Piacenza the
disaster of Ulm.
Moltke has the following remarks : " Any operations
by the right bank of the Po required that an army
200,000 strong should advance practically by a single
road between the river and the mountains, since that by
Bobbio, through the Trebbia valley, could not be of
much assistance. Between Alessandria and Piacenza,
the road offers a succession of strong positions, and to
occupy these in defence the Austrians, already concen-
trated towards their left, could at any moment debouch
by the bridge at Vaccarizza. Finally Piacenza itseK
must present many difficulties to further onward move-
ment.
"The attackof the Allies might have been directed from
Valenza and Casale against the front ; an advance here,
however, led over a country made difficult by a network
of rice-fields straight at the Austrian entrenched posi-
tions. The enemy could in one day mass their main
force behind the Agogna, while, if the worst came to the
worst, and the Aiistrians found themselves driven from
their positions back to the left bank of the Ticino, they
could there again take up a defensive position.
" There remained then a third possibility — to turn
the Austrian right. For this the railway came to the
help of the French, while at Vercelli and Novara they
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 67
would meet no more than the extreme right of the hostile
force. So far, all was plain sailing ; it was later that
the difficulties began. Communication with Genoa
must then be given up, that with Turin must become
seriously endangered. The Allies would have their backs
to Switzerland — a neutral country. The one indispen-
sable condition for the success of the movement was that
the Allies should win aU their battles — that consequently
tactics must take the flace of strategy.
" Napoleon, however, could trust his army and he
was numerically superior to the Austrians. He acted
quickly, suddenly and with energy, and the advantage
is generally with those who thus act, and not with those
who .merely stand and wait."
Riistow finds it difiSicult to decide why Napoleon made
up his mind to a line of advance which, if unsuccessful,
promised disaster, and which, if all turned out well,
offered the most meagre results. He comes to the con-
clusion that by advancing by VerceUi — ^Novara — Milan,
the Emperor hoped to gain the latter city without blood-
shed, believing that Gyulai would fall back over the
Ticino without fighting so soon as he saw that his flank
was turned. The other reason put forward by Riistow
for Napoleon's action is a poUtical and — ^it must be con-
fessed — an ungenerous and somewhat sordid one. He
points out that on this flank the troops under Garibaldi —
men gathered from aU parts of Italy and for the most
part red-hot republicans — ^had pressed forward almost
to within sight of the capital of Lombardy, and he sug-
gests that Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel dehberately
selected the advance by the left in order by their own
presence to minimise the effect of Garibaldi's operations.
68 THE CAMPAIGN OF
Hamley considers that the Allies incuired grave risks
by the movement on Novara. " Had they moved from
the Sesia on Mortara and Lomello, and thence on Vige-
vano and Pavia, they would have perfectly covered both
lines to Turin by Casale and Vercelli ; and the restora-
tion of the bridge of Valenza behind them woidd have
given the means of passing the Po, and would have
materially strengthened their line of operation. Such
an operation, in accordance with the circumstances of
the case, would have given the army firm grounds from
which to manoeuvre for the passage of the Ticino, with
better chances of obtaining a decisive strategical success,
and with none of the risk of fatal disaster incurred by
the flank march."
The whole of this interesting question is discussed
at considerable length in Great Campaigns, and the
author of that book lays stress on two points which no
doubt weighed greatly in the decision come to by the
Emperor Napoleon : (1) that the difficulty and danger
of the flank march were not so great as have been esti-
mated, and that they were virtually reduced to the thirty
nules of road which intervene between Casale and No vara,
(2) that the nervous anxiety abeady displayed by the
Austrian commander for the safety of his communica-
tions doubtless added vigour and boldness to the offensive
operations of his adversary It is pointed out that the
Austrian left rested on the strong fortress of Piacenza ,
and that any attempt to turn this flank and the line of
the Ticino would have entailed bridging the Po between
that stronghold and Pavia at a point or points narrowly
watched and strongly guarded. Again, to force the
passage of the Lower Sesia or of the Po, between the
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 69
Sesia and tlie Ticino, by attacking the Austrian centre,
might have led to exposing the French in detail to the
attack of the four Austrian corps, whose concentration
could easily and quickly have been effected opposite
any threatened crossing point. There remained the
third course — the flank march to turn the enemy's right ;
this offered the prospect of an unopposed passage of the
upper Ticino, which — owing to the extravagant ideas of
the danger of the flank march held by the Austrian
Staff — ^had been left practically undefended. The author
of Great Campaigns writes : " The problem had all
along been how to invade Lombardy with the least
possible risk. Of the three doors by which such an
invasion could be attempted, two were closed, and one,
which led circuitously into Lombardy, but direct upon
the capital, was alone open. Doubtless to enter by this
placed the French Army relatively in a worse strategic
position, inasmuch as, if victorious, the enemy would be
defeated, not ruined ; while if they themselves were
repulsed, they would be in a position of grave danger.
. . . The question, however, arises — what had been
gained with reference either to tactical or strategic ad-
vantage ? It may be answered thus : that the enemy's
preparations and plans had been thwarted. He was
called upon to act without being able to deliberate. A
battle, if fought, would be engaged under circumstances
which enlisted every chance in favour of the French,
on the high road to and close to Lombardy, where the
attitude of the people was such as to render Gyulai
already anxious for his communications."
There has further been much discussion as to whether
the idea of an advance by the left was a sudden resolve
70 THE CAMPAIGN OF
made on finding the Austrians in strength in the south,
or whether the Emperor Napoleon and his military ad-
visers had formed this decision from the first. Colonel
Saget, who in 1859 was head of the Bureau Politique
of the French Headquarter Staff, is said to have stated
a year later to a Prussian officer in Paris that during the
halt in Alessandria, the left flank march was constantly
the subject of discussion among the marshals and the
officers of the Headquarter StafE. While General deUa
Eocca too has mentioned in his Reminiscences, that
soon after arriving in Alessandria, Napoleon III had dis-
cussed with Victor Emmanuel his plans for moving by
the left, in the presence of Marshal Vaillant and of della
Rocca himself.
On May 26 the Emperor of the French, accompanied
by Marshal Vaillant, Generals Frossard and La Marmora,
visited Vercelli and at once issued orders for the execu-
tion of the great turning movement upon which he had
decided.
The Italian Army, holding the left of the position, was
directed to mask the flank march of the French columns
by attacking the right of the Austrians — formed by
Lilia's division of the Vllth Corps — and throwing it back
upon Robbio. The Ilird French Corps (Canrobert) was
directed to support this advance and for this purpose was
moved by rail and march route to Casale, where it was
concentrated by the 29th.
On the 28th aU the other units of the French Army
began to conform to the general movement northwards,
D'Autemarre's division only, of the Vth Corps, remain-
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 71
'■ . .
ing until the 30th, in the vicinity of Voghera with cavaby
on the Stradella road, so as to conceal all trace of with-
drawal. Prossard had begun on the 27th the construc-
tion of trestle bridges over the Sesia at Vercelli, above
and below the railway bridge of which the two centre
arches had been destroyed by the Austrians ; while the
Italians commenced the building of a third bridge still
higher up the river. Next day Cialdini's division crossed
over and occupied some works forming a bridge-head.
On the 29th the Italians were concentrated in Vercelli,
the Ilird and IVth French Corps and the Guard were at
Casale, the Ilnd Corps was at Valenza, the 1st at Sale
and Bassignana, while the Emperor's Headquarters was
at Alessandria.
On the 30th three more Italian divisions commenced
the passage of the Sesia, while Canrobert was ordered
to cross at Prarolo as soon as the Austrians should have
been driven from Palestro. The 4th Division (Cialdini)
was to march upon and capture Palestro and there
strongly establish itself ; the 3rd (Durando) was to seize
Vinzaglio ; the 2nd (Fanti) having captured Casalino and
Confienza was to turn then upon Vinzaglio and hold
that village, while Durando moved thence to support
Cialdini at Palestro. The 1st Division following the 2nd,
was to form a reserve in Casalino, while Cucchiari
remained with the 5th Division in Casale.
The four villages thus menaced were held by detach-
ments of the brigades Weigl and Dondorf — ^having their
headquarters at Robbio and Mortara respectively — of
Lilia's division, whose nearest supports were the Ilnd
Corps at Castel d'Agognaand Reischach's brigades of the
Vllth Corps at Cozzo and Candia.
72 THE CAMPAIGN OF )
It was the anniversary of the battle of Goito — the one
Italian success in the disastrous campaign of 1848.
Palestro was occupied by three companies, two guns
and one troop of Hussars, while in Vinzagho and Con-
fienza there was only half a company of infantry for the
garrison of each village, but all these could be reinforced
within an hour from Robbio by ten companies from
Weigl's brigade, fourteen of Dondorf's and by fourteen
guns ; the numbers given as holding the villages do not,
of course, include the patrols and outlying picquets
which would faU back upon them. Palestro, the most
important of the group, stands on the road from VerceUi
to Robbio at a point where the Sesia, which here flows
close by the road, makes a sharp bend to the east ; the
village itself stood on a height commanding the plain
which was covered with rice-fields and cut up by deep,
broad irrigation channels and crossed only by the main
road and by the tracks which assisted communication
between the villages.
Some 1,600 yards from Palestro was a bridge on the
stream called the Roggia Gamara, in front of which the
road had been cut in several places. This bridge was
held by a small Austrian picquet, which, however, on
the advance of the Italians quickly fell back to the high
ground in rear. Galdini now prepared for the attack on
the plateau upon which Palestro stood, placed four guns
on the road and advanced with the Regina brigade in the
first line and the Savona brigade in the second. The 7th
Bersaglieri and the two battalions of the 9th Regiment,
well led, succeeded in establishing themselves on the
edge of the plateau, but could get no further owing to the
heavy musketry and gun fire from the defenders of the
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 73
village. Lilia had heard about 12.30 of the advance of
the ItaHans, and at once dispatched reinforcements
to all the villages threatened. Weigl himself pro-
ceeded to Palestro, but on arrival foimd that the village
had been carried and that the Austrians had rallied at
the Roggia Borghesa, the edge of which they were hold-
ing. Weigl now attempted to carry forward his rein-
forcements to the recapture of the village and did indeed
succeed in establishing himself temporarily among some
of the houses at the eastern outlet. Cialdini, however,
was able with his superior numbers to attack energetically
again, both from the south and from the Vinzaglio direc-
tion, and Weigl was forced to retreat— covered by part
of Dondorf's brigade — upon Robbio which he reached
about 5 p.m.
WhUe Cialdini was moving upon Palestro, the 3rd
Division (Durando), reinforced by two regiments of
cavalry, had marched towards Vinzaglio, the position
of which is very similar to that of Palestro. Durando
for some reason delayed his attack imtU midday, by
which time reinforcements of five companies of infantry
and two guns had reached Vinzaglio via Confienza.
Here again the superior strength of the ItaUans prevailed ;
the village was attacked on three sides and the Austrians
managed to draw ofE in good order. Part reached
Confienza in safety, the remainder with the two gims
sought to retire by the Vinzaglio-Palestro road, but
were heavily faUen upon by the Italians, then in posses-
sion of Palestro, and were driven in great disorder across
the rice-fields upon Confienza, being obliged to abandon
their guns in the heavy ground.
Fanti achieved his object — the occupation of Con-
74 THE CAMPAIGN OF
fienza — without fighting ; his movements were slow,
and he was further delayed near Borgo Vercelli by aii
encounter between his advanced troops and a squadron
of Austrian cavalry, which had left Novara early that
morning to feel for the enemy. Fanti had consequently
reached no further than CasaUno while fLghting was in
progress at Palestro and Vinzagho, and was not able to
be of any assistance, but his advance probably hastened
the retirement of the troops holding Confienza.
Castelborgo's division reached the vicinity of Con-
fienza late ill the afternoon, and the King slept that
night at Torrione.
While the Itahans had been fighting, the French Army
was safely prosecuting the preUminary operations for
the flank movement on Novara. Canrobert's three
divisions were concentrated at Prarolo by 2 p.m., on
the 30th, and as soon as he knew of the success of the
Itahans, Caniobert commenced the construction of a
bridge over the Sesia. The operation was covered on
the left, bank by the 3rd Zouaves, who belonged to
the Vth Corps (Prince Napoleon) and had been sent
to Canrobert, but were to act next day under the orders
of King Victor Emmanuel. (For this purpose the
Zouaves bivouacked that night at Torrione.)
The Itahans strengthened themselves in the villages
they had occupied and prepared for an advance next
day upon Eobbio.
The Austrian Army Headquarters at Garlasco had
been kept acquainted with all that had taken place,
and Gjmlai — though stiU convinced that the attack
was a mere feint to draw his forces northwards — decided
to strengthen his right, and towards evening ordered
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 75
the two divisions of the Ilnd Corps to move to Mortara
from Cergnago and San Giorgio. Late that night the
Commander-in-Chief himself rode over to Mortara in
order to confer with Zobel. He found that the stafE
of the Vllth Corps was still quite in the dark as to the
numbers by which the Austrians had that day been
opposed and as to the designs of the enemy. In order then
to clear up this dangerous uncertainty, Zobel was ordered
to attack early next morning with the division Lilia
of his own corps and the division Jellacic of the Ilnd ;
but it was carefully impressed upon him that a recon-
naissance in force was all that was required of him.
As a consequence of these orders Count Gyulai was
now about to send two divisions against the allied army,
which in and about the immediate neighbourhood of
VercelU numbered fourteen divisions of infantry and
seven brigades of cavalry ; while on the right banks of
the Po and Lower Sesia there now stood only four
French divisions against which Gyulai had still massed
ten divisions of infantry and one of cavalry.
During the night of the 30th, Zobel had conferred with
Lilia at Robbio, and it had been decided that the force
should advance next morning in three columns ; the
centre column (the brigades Dondorf and Koudelka) to
move by the direct road from Robbio to the east of
Palestro, and the left (Szabo) by the Castel d'Agogna-
Rosasco road against the south of the village ; these two
columns, numbering thirteen battalions with one rocket
and three field batteries, were thus to attack Palestro
in front and flank. The right column under Weigl,
and composed of only two battalions and four guns
with a troop of cavalry, was to operate against Con-
76 THE CAMPAIGN OF
fienza, and if there successful, to move tience on Vin-
zaglio. Tte greater part of the remainder of Weigl's
brigade was held back in Eobbio in reserve.
The attacks were intended to be delivered simul-
taneously ; Weigl was, however, apparently allowed
rather too much time for his longer march and was the
first engaged, but by ten o'clock aU three Austrian
columns had come in touch with the Italian outposts
before the intended advance of the enemy upon Robbio
had begun. The picquets in front of Palestro were at
once driven in and the Austrians established themselves
along the Une of the Roggia Borghesa, where, however,
they were much exposed to and suffered considerably
from the fire of the Itahans on the plateau. Here for
some time success inclined now to one side, now to the
other, until Zobel sent Koudelka's brigade in on the
right, when the determined advance of these fresh troops
drove back the ItaUans, while Szabo, pressing on from
the south, threatened to estabUsh himself in the out-
lying houses of the village. The Italian right was now
in imminent danger of being thrown back, while Szabo's
guns had opened a violent caimonade upon the bridge
near Prarolo, where Canrobert was then passing his
divisions over the Sesia. Afraid now of being driven
from his position, Cialdini sent an urgent appeal for
assistance to the Ilird Corps and to the 3rd Zouaves.
(This last-named corps had early that morning, taken
up a position on Cialdini's extreme right, to the south
of Palestro, and along the road leading from that village
to Prarolo.) Zobel, however, was not inclined to
press whatever advantage he had gained ; it was clear
to him that the enemy was present in overpowering
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 77
strength ; the Italians were very strongly entrenched in
the village, Szabo's artillery was no match for the guns
which Bourbald had now brought into action against
him, and at this moment a report was received from
Weigl, that he had been unable to carry Confienza.
Zobel therefore directed that the fight be broken off
and that the two fiank colimms shoidd retire respectively
upon Rosasco and Robbio ; about 1 p.m. the main
column withdrew but little molested by the enemy.
Weigl on the right had been given a task impossible
of attainment ; at or in rear of Confienza were two
Itahan divisions, the 2nd and 1st, and Fanti, who
had made all his preparations for an advance on Robbio,
received timely notice of Weigl's approach, so that when
this smaU column — ^barely a thousand strong — drew
near, it found itself opposed to a force of close upon
20,000 men with a numerous artillery, and was unable
to advance beyond the Busca. By this time too
Canrobert had passed two of his divisions across the
Sesia, and Renault had dispatched four battaUons to
support Cialdini's left, while Trochu had sent his 1st
Brigade to assist the 3rd Zouaves. Tl^ whole of the
Imperial Guard was now in VerceUi, as was also the
Ilnd Corps, while the Vth had left Borgo Vercelli,
and was marching in the direction of No vara.
Against such a superior force success was hopeless,
and Weigl was lucky to be able to effect his retirement
on Robbio as easily as he did.
The 3rd Zouaves, finding themselves under fire, had
deployed four companies, and these advancing on
Cialdini's request for help, soon found themselves in
contact with the skirmishers of the 7th Austrian Jagers,
78 THE CAMPAIGN OF
who had crossed a canal, only passable at a narrow
bridge called the Ponte della Brida, and were at some
distance in front of it. Pour guns had followed them
over and four more had come into action on the banks of
the Sesia close by. The left of the Jagers was covered
by a stream called the Sesietta ; this the Zouaves
unexpectedly forded and, climbing the bank, drove
in the skirmishers and fell with the bayonet upon the
flank of the Jagers. These attempted to faU back upon
a battalion in rear, but Bourbald's guns had been
firing into this corps during its advance and had thrown
it into disorder ; the Zouaves were not to be checked
and burst in upon the guns, capturing five. The shat-
tered remnants of Szabo's brigade retreated upon the
narrow bridge over the canal ; but the Zouaves, now
joined by two ItaUan battaKons, reached it simultan-
eously, and here wrought terrible havoc, numbers of
Austrians being bayonetted or drowned in the canal.
Two more guns were here captured by the Italians.
Szabo collected his brigade about 2 p.m. in Rosasco,
but in justice to this corps it should be mentioned that
it largely consisted — as did many of the other units of
the Austrian army — of young soldiers, many of whom
hardly knew how to handle their arms, and that the
regiments were filled with men recruited in Italy.
On this day the Austrians lost 2,118 in kiUed, wounded
and missing, and the Alhes, 601, of which number the
casualties in the 3rd Zouaves amounted to 46 killed and
233 wounded.
While the action was still in progress, Gyulai had
ordered the commanders of the Ilnd and Ilird Corps
each to send a division to Robbio to serve both as a
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 79
support to tlie troops falling back before the French,
and as the nucleus of a fresh force which was to attack the
Allies early next day and endeavour to drive them back
on VerceUi. These orders were changed in so far as
they referred to the Illrd Corps, of which one division
(Martini) marched to Mortara, the other (Schonberger)
to Castel d'Agogna. Liechtenstein had reached San
Angelo with the division detailed from the Ilnd Corps,
when he met fugitives of Szabo's brigade and learnt
th;:ough Zobel that the action had ceased. He accord-
ingly arranged to relieve Reischach's division, which
had extended to its right up to Celpenchio and San Paolo
Leria, and generally to cover the left of the division Lilia
of the Vllth Corps in Robbio.
Gyulai does not appear to have even yet grasped the
fact that the whole of the allied forces were gathering
on his right flank, for he issued instructions for the
Vlllth Corps to hold Breme and Sartirana in greater
strength, the Vth Corps was directed to occupy Otto-
biano and Ferrara each with a brigade, and all troops
in that neighbourhood were ordered to be on their
guard against any attempt to cross the river at Candia
and Frassinetto.
On the evening of the 31st Gyulai telegraphed to
Vienna that he had cancelled the orders for attack next
day, as the enemy appeared to be in overwhelming force.
Of the reinforcements recently ordered from Austria
to Italy, the 1st Corps (Count Clam) was directed on
Magenta — one brigade to Monza — the Xth to Adria,
MonseUce and Nogara, while the Xlth was ordered to
proceed to Borgoforte.
8o THE CAMPAIGN OF
On this night the Allies were thus disposed : their
front line ran from Cameriano to Palestro ; on the left,
the IVth Corps at Cameriano lay cL cheval the Vercelli-
Novara road. In the centre stood three Italian divisions,
while on the right was the Ilird French Corps and the
4th Italian division. The llnd Corps was at Borgo
VerceUi, the Imperial Guard in Vercelli, the 1st Corps
was at Casale, D'Autemarre's division of the Vth
Corps was partly at Tortona, partly in Alessandria,
while the 5th Italian division occupied Casale, Val-
enza and Alessandria.
It had been originally intended that the Italians
should move on Robbio at daybreak on June 1, drive
out the Austrians and pursue them to this side of Nicorvo,
so as to gain possession of the bridge over the Agogna,
while King Victor Emmanuel, retaining a substantial
part of his force at Robbio, should there occupy a good
position whence to command the roads leading to
Rosasco and San Angelo. Canrobert was to occupy
Palestro with two divisions, and Confienza, Vespolate
and Borgo Lavezzaro with the other. The IVth Corps
(Niel) was to move direct on Novara ; in fact, the move
on Robbio was intended merely to mask the march of
the main strength of the army on Novara.
The result of the action at Palestro — which ensured
the success of the flank movement — had necessitated
some alterations in these arrangements, and it was now
considered that the move on Novara was sufficiently
covered by the forces imder the King and Marshal Can-
robert, and that everything showed that the Austrian
centre was at Mortara and that the attention of the
enemy was stiU fixed upon the Po and the Lower Sesia.
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 81
The Novara road therefore was practically open. Since
Novara would henceforth be the new base for the army,
it was of the utmost importance to cover Vercelli and
the Sesia bridges, and General Frossard at once com-
menced the construction of a bridge-head on the left
bank at Vercelli.
Novara was held only by two battahons of infantry
and two guns, and these, attacked at daybreak by
Failly's division of the IVth Corps, fell back on the bridge
at San Martino. Niel passed through the town and
drew forward his whole corps upon the Mortara road ;
the 3rd Division (FaOly) was placed at Olengo, the 2nd
(Vinoy) to the right of the Mortara road at La Biccoca,
and the 1st (De Luzy) at Torrione Quartara with the
right resting on the Agogna. The Ilnd Corps encamped
between the IVth and Novara, and Desvaux's cavaby
division reconnoitred to Vespolate, Trecate and GaUiate
without seeing anything of the enemy.
The French Headquarter Staff could now no longer
hope that so extended a movement had altogether
escaped notice and fully expected that an attack would
be made upon the AlHes by the Austrians, but against this
the former were now well prepared.
If Gyulai attacked towards VerceUi, the Italians,
the 1st and Ilird Corps were strongly posted to meet
him — ^with the right on the Sesia and the left covered by
the difficult ground about the Agogna — while the troops
at Novara could seriously menace the flank of any such
attack. If, on the other hand, Gyulai attacked on the
line Mortara — Novara the advantage to the Allies would
be at least equally great ; the blow could only be
delivered on a narrow front, easy to defend and with
G
82 THE CAMPAIGN OF
both flanks covered by rivers ; La Biccoca and Olengo
were strongly held, and the troops at VerceUi could
menace the line of the Austrian retreat on Mortara
while keeping open that of the Allies by Vercelli.
The first report of the advance upon Novara was in
Gyulai's hands at 8.30 a.m. and by 10 o'clock the fol-
lowing orders had been issued : the Ilnd Corps to march
to Mortara and go into bivouac on the east of the town ;
Lilia's division of the Vllth Corps at Robbio to fall back
on Castel d'Agogna and there form a reserve for Rei-
schach's division of the same corps which was west of
San Angelo ; Schonberger's division of the Ilird Corps,
hitherto at Castel d'Agogna, to move at once on Robbie
and take over the duties of Liha's division ; Martini's
division of the Ilird Corps to send a brigade each to
Albonese and Nicorvo ; while finally, Mensdorfi's
cavalry division was to concentrate in Borgo Lavezzaro,
to patrol towards Nibbiola and Garbagna and keep touch
with the Ilird Corps. Little more than an hour later
fresh orders were issued to Schwartzenberg, who was now
directed to send Martini's division to Vespolate to hold
the enemy in check, supporting it with that of Schon-
berger to the north of Mortara. By the night of June 1,
therefore, Gyulai had drawn at least some of his
divisions northwards to meet the enemy about Novara,
whose strength he now estimated at from 50,000 to
60,000 men ; his troops in this quarter now faced west
and north, his outpost line being here drawn along the
Agogna to Nibbiola, then at right angles across the main
road to the Terdoppio, then to Cassalnovo and from here
to the Ticino. To the south Stadion (Vlllth Corps) was
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 83
directed to draw in as mucli as possible to Lomello,
employing chiefly mounted troops on his outpost Une,
and all corps commanders were warned of the prob-
ability of an early and general retirement behind the
Ticino.
Meanwhile the smaU force driven from Novara had
fallen back upon and occupied the bridge-head at San
Martino, whence the commander was calling for rein-
forcements. These were to be furnished by Count
Clam with the still incomplete 1st Corps which was
hurrying up by forced marches from Milan ; and at 2 a.m.
on the morning of the 2nd Clam had occupied Magenta
and thrown a brigade into San Martino.
It would seem then that Gjnilai had now begim to
hope that Clam and Urban between them naight be able
to hold back the left of the AlUes until the Austrian
Commander should be able to pass his corps over the
Ticino and mass them about Magenta for the defence
of the capital of Lombardy.
In discussing the attack by the Austrians in the second
day's fighting about Palestro, Moltke has much to say
of the ignorance of the Austrians in regard to the forces
by which they were Ukely to be opposed. He admits
that possibly the nature of the country prevented the
Austrians from recognising that they had in their
front the whole Italian Army, but the action of the 30th
should have at least made them realise that very con-
siderable forces were already on the left bank of the Sesia.
They can hardly have supposed that the Italians would
have thus cut themselves off from their base and exposed
themselves isolated to certain defeat, while their allies
84 THE CAMPAIGN OF
were marching on Piacenza. Being where they were,
the Italians must be supported by the French, and after
the events of the 30th at latest, the Anstrians should,
Moltke considers, have had no more anxiety whatever
about their southern flank. The French must now
either cross at Valenza andCasale or foUow the Italians —
the latter being the more likely procedure. Leaving
then two divisions at Robbio and one at Cozzo, the whole
of the remainder of the Austrian Army — even including
the IXth Corps — might in one march have been con-
centrated between Mortara and Garlasco. If the French
crossed in their front, the two Robbio divisions should
have been able to hold the Italians, while 90,000 Aus-
trians feU upon the French engaged in the passage of the
river. If, on the other hand, the French followed the
Itahans, it was certain that they would not attempt to
cross the Ticino without either attacking the Austrians
or being themselves attacked.
Before anything it was, however, vital that the Aus-
trians should concentrate.
Speaking of Napoleon's resolve to push part of his
army at once on to Novara after the second action at
Palestro, Moltke points out that, however sound these
dispositions may have appeared to the French, there
was the danger of being forced back into the moimtains
in the event of a check at Novara ; that Novara and
Palestro were half a day's march apart, that the initia-
tive lay with the opponent, and that had demonstrations
been made at the same time upon each portion of the
divided French forces, it would not have been easy to
recognise which was the real attack. Moltke, however,
sees in the position of the Allies just one of those dangers
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 85
wHcli every army must occasionally face when a great
stake is being played for ; one of those crises which cannot
be avoided, and which history, after the event, describes
as either a bold undertaking or an error iu strategy.
Since, however, neither portion of the divided army
was likely to be greatly inferior in strength to whatever
might be brought against them, Napoleon could well
afford to leave something to chance without risking
too much.
THE AUSTRIANS RECROSS THE TICINO AND
THE FRENCH OCCUPY ROBECCHETTO
CHAPTER V
THE AUSTRIANS RECEOSS THE TICINO AND THE FRENCH
OCCUPY ROBECCHETTO
" There are two passages over the Ticino in the neigh-
bourhood of Novara — ^that of BufEalora and that of
Turbigo. The first is the principal one and over it runs
the main road from Novara to Milan. A magnificent
bridge of large granite blocks, constructed in 1810 by
the French, connects the two banks of the river. The
other passage at Turbigo is from five to six miles up the
river and serves as an auxiliary means of commimica-
tion between the two sides of the Ticino. Although
tolerably frequented in the time of the Austrians, and
provided with the inevitable passport and custom-
house offices, it could only boast of a ferry-boat ; the
intention being to discourage as much as possible the
intercourse between Sardinia and Lombardy and re-
strict it to a few main arteries of communication. It
was between these two passages that the Allies had to
choose, for they were the only points on the river in the
neighbourhood of their position to which regular roads
led, and were consequently the only ones accessible to
a large army.
" The Ticino, like most of the feeders of the Po, is
skirted on both sides by a plateau which, according to
go THE CAMPAIGN OF
the capricious windings of the stream, approaches and
recedes, leaving sometimes only a narrow space between
it and the river, and at other places a distance of a
couple of miles. This plateau evidently indicates the
old bed of the river, through which the waters have
gradually eaten their way. Both at Ponte di Buffalora
and Ponte di Turbigo the river approaches close to
the plateau on the right bank. Owing to the action of
the stream this latter has been worn away and shows a
bold, precipitous Kne towards the river which runs forty
to seventy feet below it. On the left bank, on the con-
trary, the plateau is at some distance from the river,
leaving a space of more than a mile, which, by means of
irrigation, has been converted into a rich plain covered
with crops and trees. The right bank consequently
completely commands the left, which is therefore not
defensible.
" The Austrians, well aware of this circumstance and
yet anxious to have a foint d'appui in case of need, con-
structed a tete de pont on the right bank at San Martino
on the road to the Ponte di BufEalora. Coming from
Novara this road passes through a weU-cultivated dis-
trict abounding in crops of every kind, especially Indian
corn, and studded with mulberry and willow trees.
This lasts as far as the village of Trecate, which is just
half-way from Novara to the Ticino. Soon after leaving
Trecate the aspect of the country changes ; the signs of
cultivation disappear, and an open, heathy country,
with here and there a solitary tree, follows, through
which the road runs in an almost straight Hne to the
plateau overhanging the Ticino. Just at the edge of the
plateau, overlooking the river and commanding a mag-
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 91
nificent view over the opposite bank, is a cluster of
houses. This is San Martino, so called from an old
inn of the same name. Besides this inn there were
buildings which served formerly as the Sardinian custom-
house and poUce office, to which in later years the rail-
way station had been added ; here was formerly the
limit of the Sardinian territory and the seat of the
frontier authorities. Beyond San Martino the road
descends abruptly towards the bridge which is scarcely
two hundred yards distant from it.
" This then was the point chosen by the Austrians for
a tete de pont. Evidently they attached great impor-
tance to the position, for no labour had been spared to
convert the approach to the Ticino into a formidable
looking entrenchment. Not only were the cluster of
houses and the railway station included, but hkewise a
solitary house a quarter of a mile further north. The
whole space thus closed in comprised an area of at
least half a square mile, and all this ground was con-
verted into a large work, carried back on both flanks to
the very edge of the plateau, and provided with a
wide ditch, parapets, and embrasures for seventeen
guns.
" While' so much care had been taken to guard the
approaches to the Ponte di Bufialora, nothing was done
by the Austrians to defend the passage at Turbigo,
except removing the ferry-boat which served as the
means of communication at that place. This circum-
stance alone would have been sufficient to point out the
passage of Turbigo as the one to be preferred ; not that
the tite de pont at San Martino was very formidable — it
looked more so than it was in reality — but however weak,
92 THE CAMPAIGN OF
it was sufficient to allow a few thousand determined men
to defend themselves for some time, even against
superior forces, and thus gain time for the Austrian Army
to come up and occupy a position behind the Ticino
on the road to Milan. Besides this obvious reason for
effecting a passage at Ponte di Turbigo rather than at
Ponte di Buffalora, there were two even more cogent
grounds for this choice. The first of these was that
Ponte di Turbigo is six miles higher up the river and was
consequently so much further removed from the main
body of the Austrians, which had to come up from
Mortara and Vigevano ; thus there was more chance
of gaining the opposite bank before any large body of
Austrian troops could be brought to oppose this passage.
The second was that by crossing at Turbigo without
delay, it was possible to gain not only the left bank of
the river, but hkewise the opposite bank of the Naviglio
Grande Canal and thus to overcome this formidable
obstacle and open the road to Milan. The canal is here
only one and a quarter miles from the river and its
banks are less steep and precipitous than lower down ;
the NavigUo Grande issues from the river opposite
Oleggio and runs parallel to the Ticino, at a distance
varying from half a mile to four miles, until it reaches
Abbiategrasso where it takes a sudden turn in the
direction of Milan."
On the afternoon of June 2 General Camou received
orders to endeavour to effect the passage of the Ticino
at Turbigo with the 2nd Infantry Division of the
Imperial Guard, while Espinasse, with the 2nd Division
of the Ilnd Corps, moved on Trecate and San Martino.
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 93
Camou reached the river bank at 3.45 p.m. and saw
nothing of the enemy beyond a very few scouts, who had
occupied a small house on the left bank and who with-
drew as soon as the Chasseurs of the Guard commenced
to cross in small boats. Camou placed twelve guns on
the high ground to the left of the road and twelve more
on the river bank ; by these the whole of the approaches
to the spot where he proposed to throw a bridge — on the
site of the old ferry — were thoroughly commanded.
Covered by these guns and four companies of chasseurs,
who were passed over to the left bank by five o'clock, the
construction of the bridge was at once commenced under
the supervision of General Frossard, who had accompanied
Camou. While the work was in progress the 1st Brigade
(Maneque) took up a position on the high ground to
right and left of the road and the cavalry reconnoitred
towards Villa Fortuna. -At 7.30 the bridge was finished,
some temporary works had been thrown up for its pro-
tection, and so far the only hostile troops which had been
seen were some mounted men of the 1st Corps, who
quickly fell back.
Maneque noW crossed over with his brigade — Decaen
taking the positions he vacated — and as th% French
troops became visible on the left bank a squadron of
Austrian cavalry was seen to hurriedly leave Turbigo ;
it was learnt that these were some of Urban' s men from
Gallarate. During the night Turbigo itself was occu-
pied — the wooden bridge over the Grand Canal having
been found intact — and at daybreak on the 3rd, while
Turbigo was being rapidly placed in a state of defence,
Camou's troops were thus disposed; two battalions
under Maneque in front of Turbigo, two others on the
94 THE CAMPAIGN OF
right bank under Decaen, two in the works at the bridge
on the Ticino, and two battaUons occupying the bridge
over the Grand Canal.
The Emperor had thus secured, with unexpected
facihty, a crossing place over both the river and the
canal ; but before preparing to pass over the whole of
the allied army it was of the first importance to learn
something definite of the movements of the enemy, and
Niel was ordered to carry out a reconnaissance in force
in the direction of Mortar a on the morning of the 3rd.
Mel took with him Luzy's entire division and one brigade
of that of de Failly, the whole of the remainder of the
IVth Corps being held in readiness to follow him if
required. The three brigades left La Biccoca at sunrise
in two columns, one marching on Vespolate by the road
and railway, the other moving on Terdobbiate and Tor-
naco by Olengo ; arrived at Garbagna it was reported to
the right column that the enemy, who had been in
strength at Vespolate, had moved on Tomaco ; but at
Vespolate the French learnt that the town had been
evacuated at 3 a.m., and that the enemy had moved ofi
in the direction of Vigevano.
It wa3 at once apparent that the Austrians were mass-
ing on the Ticino, but on which bank was as yet uncer-
tain, and to guard against any attempt upon him by the
right bank the Emperor decided to keep the 1st, Ilird,
and IVth Corps in front of Novara, while with the Ilnd
and the Imperial Guard he prolonged his line to the left
and secujed the passages of the Ticino.
MacMahon was consequently directed to concentrate
the whole of the Ilnd Corps at Turbigo, while Mellinet's
division of the Guard was ordered to move on at once upon
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 95
Trecate and San Martino, relieving Espinasse, who was
to rejoin MacMahon.
June 2 was to find tlie irresolution and vacillation of
the Austrian Commander at their worst. During the
small hours of the morning he issued orders for the
Vllth and Ilnd Corps to move at once — the former to
Olevano (south of Mortara) and the latter to Mortara.
Stadion was directed to make every preparation for the
retirement of the Vth and VTIIth Corps behind the
Ticino at the shortest possible notice, and a few moments
later Gyulai informed Count Clam that he was about to
effect his retirement across the river and that the Ilnd
and Ilird Corps would cross at Vigevano and fall into
line on the left of the 1st Corps. He ordered Clam at
once to recall Urban from Varese.
The Vllth Corps commenced its retirement at 9 a.m.,
covered by Weigl's brigade, and fell back practically
imopposed, part by Nicorvo and the remainder by
Castel d'Agogna. The Ilnd Corps, moving by Ceretto
and Castel d'Agogna, had almost reached Mortara, when
its commander received fresh instructions, from which
it appeared that the withdrawal over the Ticino had
now been cancelled.
At 11.30 the VTIth Corps was ordered not to march on
Olevano, but to remain at Castel d'Agogna, detaching
a brigade to Nicorvo and reoccupying Robbio with a
battalion. Zobel, however, who only received this order
ontheAgogna, considered its execution to be impossible,
since he was convinced that Robbio was ere this in the
occupation of the enemy ; he contented himself there-
fore with dropping Weigl's brigade in Ceretto, and
occupying San Angelo, Castelnovetto and Celpenchio
with detachments of cavalry and infantry. .
96 THE CAMPAIGN OF
At this liour Gyulai annouiiced that for the present
he should remain on the right bank of the Tioino and
that Urban was to pursue his operations against Gari-
baldi, but at midday Gyulai again changed his mind and
telegraphed to the Emperor Franz Josef that he had now
ordered the retirement of the army behind the river,
and that he hoped by next day to have taken his stand
between Magenta and Pavia.
The Ilnd Corps was the first to re- cross the Tioino ; it
passed the river at Vigevano, and late at night went into
bivouac at Soria. The Vllth Corps marched to Vige-
vano from Castel d'Agogna ; was greatly delayed near
Mortara by its route crossing that of the Ilnd Corps ;
reached its bivouac on the right bank, thoroughly worn
out, between 10 p.m. and midnight, and finally marching
next morning by Abbiategrasso reached Gaggiano,
where it was to be held iu reserve.
The Ilird Corps, which was still about Nicorvo, Borgo
Lavezzaro, Mbbiola and Vespolate, was informed of the
movements of the Ilnd and Vllth Corps, and was
ordered to retire on Vigevano as soon as the Vllth Corps
had cleared the bridge, and, having crossed over, to
move towards Abbiategrasso, taking up a position south
of Ozero. The passage of the river at Cassalnovo was
to be safeguarded ; the bridge and bridge-head at Vigevano
were to be held as long as possible, and to be destroyed if
evacuation became imperative. The Cavalry Division
was to move with the Ilird Corps and march on the
4th from Abbiategrasso to Magenta, to be there placed
at the disposal of Count Clam.
Late on the 2nd, Gyulai communicated to Clam his
intention of retiring next day, and informed him that he
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 97
would be reinforced in Magenta on the 3rd day by the
Ilnd Corps and on the 4th by the Cavahy Division.
Clam was directed to send half a brigade, with cavalry,
to Castano to watch the crossings at Turbigo and Torna-
vento ; he was ordered to hold the bridge-head at San
Martino at all costs, while if the garrison were forced
to retreat the guns were to be spiked, the magazine
blown up and the bridge destroyed. He was also
informed that Army Headquarters would next day be
at Rosate and that the Vth Corps would also^be there,
while the Vlllth woidd reach Binasco.
During the night of the lst-2nd the Commander of
the 1st Corps had been making great efforts to push
troops up to San Martino, and by early morning of the
latter date the strength of the force holding the bridge-
head — aU belonging to his 2nd (Cordon's) Division — was
five battalions with fourteen guns, five of which were
guns of position ; there was in addition half a' rocket
battery ; a squadron of cavalry had been sent towards
Turbigo, while between Buffalora and Ponte di Magenta,
on the left bank of the Grand Canal, was a reserve of
two battalions of infantry with a horse-battery. During
the forenoon of the 2nd, dam himself reached San
Martino and went round the defences, of which he
formed a very poor opinion. Not only did he consider
the works of weak profile, but the construction was
faulty; the perimeter was so great that, in his opinion, at
least three brigades woidd be required adequately to
man the works — ^which were, moreover, quite open to
attack on either flank — while the^crops and undergrowth
were so high in the immediate neighbourhood as to
permit of hostile approach quite undetected. Clam,
98 THE CAMPAIGN OF
however, decided that the place must be held at all
costs, and gave orders for such improvements to be
carried out as time and means permitted.
The unsatisfactory state of the defences at San
Martino was not improved by the unfortunate condition
of the men who were to hold them. These had out-
marched their suppHes and were moreover greatly
exhausted by the exertions they had recently undergone.
Clam made what arrangements he could, gave orders
that requisitions were to be made on the inhabitants,
and returned to Magenta.
Towards evening a report reached the Headquarters
of the 1st Corps from San Martiao that the enemy were
estabhshing some guns in battery on the Trecate road ;
Clam at once sent his Chief of StafE forward to investigate
this report, which on arrival he found to be confirmed ;
he learnt also at San Martino that requisitions had pro-
duced but very few suppHes and that the worn-out troops
were practically without rations. AppUcations for
suppUes had been made to Abbiategrasso, where there
was a depot ; but the local supply officer had reported
that his stores were inconsiderable and that for the
issue of what little he had he was wholly without trans-
port of any kind. At this time (8 p.m.) a report was
forwarded by the Officer Commanding the squadron
which had been sent towards Turbigo, that the Allies
had already there thrown a bridge over the river and
were that day in occupation of the left bank.
Clam had now at once to make up his mind as to how
he should act, for there was no time to acquaint Gyulai
with this new development and await his instructions ;
it seemed to the Officer Commanding the 1st Corps that
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 99
by continuing to hold the bridge-head at San Martino he
was in danger of exposing his troops at Magenta to an
attack in overwhehning force, while the defenders of
San Martino were engaged with an enemy advancing
from the direction of Trecate ; if Cordon's men in San
Martino were driven from the defences— of which Clam
had already formed so low an opinion — their retreat on
Magenta would be no easy one, since the road for a con-
siderable distance was carried along an embankment.
He had no immediate prospect of support, for although
he had been informed of the approach of the Ilnd Corps,
there was no reason to beUeve that it could reach
Magenta before the night of the 3rd. About 10 p.m.
therefore Clam gave orders for the bridge works to be
evacuated and for the bridge to be blown up at day-
break. The five big guns could not be brought away, so
these were spiked ; the troops were withdrawn from the
entrenchments and drawn up in a defensive position on
the left bank. At dawn the bridge was blown up, but
the damage done was inconsiderable ; the mines had been
laid in the second pier from the left bank so as to bring
down the two arches which it supported, but although
the two arches were displaced, the top of the pier only
gave way, and the bridge, though temporarily impassable
for cavalry and artillery, was quite fit for the passage of
infantry. Whatever the cause of the failure, the result to
the Allies was most important, for they had now two
undisputed communications with the left bank. Clam
gave orders that another attempt should at once be made
to more thoroughly effect the demolition of the bridge,
but the officer conimanding the engineers stated that
he had no more powder ; there was none procurable in
100 THE CAMPAIGN OF
Magenta and urgent requisitions were sent for some to
Pavia ; in the meantime, and in view of a possible forced
retirement to the line of the Grand Canal, the engineers
were directed to prepare for demolition aU the bridges
over it between Bernate and Robecco.
Early on the morning of the 3rd, Cordon left for the
direction of Turbigo to endeavour to discover in what
strength the enemy had crossed. He took with him
four complete battalions and portions of two others, a
horse battery and part of the rocket battery which had
formed a portion of the armament of the defences at
San Martino.
Gyulai had issued the following instructions to the
two corps composing the left wing of his army : " The
Vlllth Corps to move to-day (the 2nd) to TrmneUo, the
division of the Vth Corps, now in San Nazzaro to
Garlasco ; on the 3rd both corps to cross the Ticino at
Bereguardo. Sternberg's division of the Vth Corps to
march from Mortara via Gambolo to Borgo San Siro
where orders should reach them."
In accordance with the above, Stadion's divisions
bivouacked for the night at Garlasco and Borgo San
Siro, while the Vlllth Corps marched at 4.30 from
LomeUo through Ottobiano and halted for the night
in TrumeUo.
The decision to cross the Ticino was also communicated
to the IXth Corps and the commander was directed to
leave some troops between StradeUa and Piacenza and
to place the remainder of his force between Castelpuste
Orlengo and Corte Olona ; the Po was to be watched
below Vaccarizza, and the IXth Corps was to arrange the
safe passage of all sick and wounded down the river in
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 loi
boats to Borgoforte, ■whence they would be forwarded
via Mantua to Verona.
At 8 p.m. Gyulai received a telegram stating that
Feldzeugmeister Baron Hess was being sent by the
Emperor to confer with Gyulai on the spot, that he had
started for Milan where he expected to arrive at mid-
night and where fuU information regarding the move-
ments and dispositions of the units composing the
Second Army was to be sent him. Gyulai at once dis-
patched a special officer to Milan with the following
report (this officer appears, however, to have missed
Baron Hess) : —
" The Army will to-morrow (3rd) be thus disposed :
" The 1st and Ilnd Corps and the Cavalry Division in
Magenta, with one brigade at Castano, to watch
the passages of the Ticino at Tornavento and
Turbigo.
" The nird Corps at Abbiategrasso.
" The Vllth Corps in reserve at Gaggiano.
" The Vth Corps between Morimondo and Besate.
" The Vlllth Corps in reserve west of Binasco with
one division in Bereguardo.
"The IXth Corps between Piacenza and Corte Olona
with one brigade in Piacenza and one in the
bridge-head at Vaccarizza.
" These arrangements permit of a frontal defence of the
Ticiuo incase — which is improbable — the enemy should
attempt to cross between Magenta and Bereguardo. He
is, however, far more likely to turn our flank by crossing
at Turbigo and Tornavento."
About five o'clock on the morning of the 3rd, Hess
met Gyulai at Bereguardo and two hours later — ^in con-
102 THE CAMPAIGN OF
sequence of wliat Gyulai appears afterwards to have
described as more or less of a " mandate " — the Vth and
VTIIth Corps were ordered to stand fast wherever the
order to do so should reach them ; the Illrd was directed —
if its passage of the river was already completed — to take
up a position on the left bank with Diirfeld's brigade in
Vigevano, but, if it had not already crossed, the whole
corps was to remain in Vigevano.
At 9 a.m. Gyulai heard through the Ilnd Corps in
Soria, that the AUies had already bridged the Ticino at
Turbigo and that they were in strength on the left bank ;
that Clam had decided to withdraw from San Martino
and destroy the bridge ; and that the Ilnd Corps was
moving at once on Magenta. An hour later came the
disturbing news that the attempt to blow up the bridge
had failed, while it was suggested that the Ilnd and
Vllth Corps should march as speedily as possible north-
wards towards the San Martino-Milan road.
Orders were then sent to Cordon that he should pro-
ceed no further northward imtil the Ilnd Corps should
have drawn nearer to Magenta, but a report now came
in from him that he had reached and occupied Cuggiono
at 7 a.m. and had pushed patrols towards Turbigo,
Castano and Buscate ; he had, however, as yet learnt
nothing definite as to the strength of the allied forces at
Turbigo. Cuggiono was occupied by one battalion,
three guns and half a squadron of cavalry ; in Bernate
was one battaHon and another was in Ponte nuovo di
Magenta, but the two battalions which had been sent to
Inveruno had moved out, without orders, in the direction
of the enemy and Cordon knew nothing of their where-
abouts.
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 103
About this hour — between 9 and 10 a.m. — Hess finally
withdrew his objections to the movements eastwards of
the corps still on the right bank of the Ticino, and it was
therefore directed that they should be carried out as
previously ordered ; but the interference with the " man
on the spot " had of course entailed a cessation of all
movement during not less than six hours.
Clam was informed, but was given strict orders not to
push too far to the north as this would weaken the line
almost to breaking point ; Gyulai expressed his intention
of attacking in force the flank of the enemy should his
main body cross at Turbigo, but he pressed Clam for
detailed information of the strength of the Allies at that
point.
At 3 p.m. Gyidai left Rosate with his staff for Magenta,
and. during the course of the day the retirement of the
Second Army behind the Ticino was continued and was
accomplished as follows : —
The Ilird Corps began at daybreak to evacuate its
positions in front of Mortara ; Hartimg's brigade moved
on Vigevano by Tomaco and thence down the valley of
the Terdoppio ; Metzlar marched by Cassalnovo, and
Ramming direct on Vigevano where Diirfeld's brigade
had already arrived. Here, however, the passage of the
river could not be proceeded with for several hours. This
was caused in some degree, no doubt, by bad staff work,
but also by the contradictory orders which had been
issued, and by the fact that the difficulties of communica-
tion had in some cases delayed the receipt of instructions
and in others had prevented their receipt altogether.
The Ilnd Corps which had' reached and bivouacked at
Soria appears to have been strung out between that
104 THE CAMPAIGN OF
place and the Ticino ; Liechtenstein was preparing to
continue his march on Magenta on the morning of the
3rd, when he found that the Cavalry Division, the head
of the Vllth Corps (Reischach's division), and the
baggage of both were closing up to him from the bridge
in rear. Liechtenstein then allowed the cavalry to pass
through his corps, but directed Reischach to halt and
foUow the ILid Corps.
(The cavalry moved straight on Magenta and went in
to bivouac behind the town on the high ground.) Of the
Ilnd Corps, Kintzl's brigade occupied Robecco and
Ponte Vecchio each with two battaUons, while the others
moving on Magenta went into camp, Baltin and Szabo to
the right and left of the road respectively and Koudelka
in rear of the town.
The bulk of the Vllth Corps only cleared the bridge at
Vigevano about 11 a.m. and reached Abbiategrasso at
two o'clock. Here Lilia halted while Reischach marched
on to CereUa and there spent the night. As Abbiate-
grasso had been allotted to the Ilird Corps, Zobel
moved out Lilia's division to Casteletto where it arrived
between one and two in the morning of the next day. In
consequence of all these delays — under the circumstances
not altogether unavoidable — the Ilird Corps was not
across the bridge until after 4 p.m. and did not
reach Abbiategrasso imtil long after night had
fallen.
The Vth Corps had already reached the bridge at
Bereguardo with the head of Sternberg's division, while
that of Paumgartten had just left Garlasco, when —
about 8 a.m. — ^the order to stand fast was received.
When about 11.20 this was again cancelled, Stadion
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 105
began passing over his brigades and four of them ' had
crossed the river soon after 3 p.m. Bils was directed
to follow after the Ylllth Corps. Stadion took up the
line — Morimondo — Coronate — Binasco — ^FaUavecchia —
Besate for the night.
Benedek with the Vlllth corps left Trumello at 2
p.m., crossed the bridge at Bereguardo during the early
hours of the ith, and established himself at Bereguardo
and Motta Visconti.
The units of the IXth Corps were too scattered to
admit of their being collected to cross to the other side
of the Po on the 3rd, but all arrangements were made,
the outposts were gradually withdrawn, and the corps,
with the exception of Fehlmayr's brigade, which re-
mained in StradeUa, was concentrated about Piacenza
on the 4th.
To complete the tale of the Austrian movements on
the 3rd, it only remains to say that on this day Urban
withdrew the bulk of his troops from Varese to GaUarate,
sending some mounted men further south towards
Lonate Pozzolo, whence news of the action which this
day took place was conveyed to him.
It is now time to return to the operations of the
French.
About 2 p.m. on the 3rd, MacMahon with his 1st
Division (La Motterouge) arrived at the bridge at
Turbigo, and crossing the river accompanied by General
Camou, he mounted the tower of Robecchetto ; from
here he saw Cordon's advanced troops within a few hun-
1 It -will have been noticed that the 1st, Vth, Vlllth, and
IXth Corps had each five brigades, the other corps four only.
io6 THE CAMPAIGN OF
dxed yards hurrying to seize the village, behind which
MacMahon had proposed establishing his corps in
bivouac. Robecchetto is rather more than two miles
from Turbigo on the road to Buffalora, and, like both
villages, is situated on the edge of the plateau skirting
the vaUey of the Ticino ; there are two roads from
Turbigo to Robecchetto — one leading to the southern,
the other to the western portion of the village, while the
road to Bufialora leaves the village in an easterly
direction. The occupation of Robecchetto was to the
French of the first importance — both to cover the bivouac
of the Ilnd Corps and to ensure the success of any
further movement on Buffalora and Magenta.
On his return to Turbigo from the front, MacMahon
found that a regiment of Turcos was at the head of the
column, and he at once sent them forward to occupy
the village or dislodge its defenders. The 1st battalion
of Turcos, formed in column of divisions and preceded
by two companies of skirmishers, was to attack the
village from the south ; the 3rd battalion, forming the
left column and silhilarly disposed, was to attack it
from the west ; while the 2nd, somewhat in rear, was
to form a reserve to both. The other regiment, the
45th, of this brigade, and later the 2nd brigade of La
Motterouge's division, were sent forward — ^the 2nd
brigade by Castano — in support of the Turcos, who
were closely followed by a battery of artillery. Arrived
at Robecchetto the French found the Austrians in posi-
tion at the entrance and were received by a brisk fire,
but the Turcos rushing forward without firing, threw
themselves on the Austrians with the bayonet. In a
few minutes the village was cleared and the Austrians
io8 THE CAMPAIGN OF
led to final victory and to the abdication of the then
King of Sardinia. If the Austrians were inclined thus
to postpone the ultimate decision until the whole of their
1st, Xth and Xlth Corps had joined the army, they
would then have had the preponderance in strength
on their side, and a victory woidd have enabled them
to drive back the AJhes to the west, while their forces
at Borgoforte and Piacenza could have advanced to-
wards Genoa. " Here," says von Caemmerer, " was a
very practical method of bringing the campaign to a
successful conclusion." Had the retreat been arranged
on the night of June 1, it could have been carried
through without interruption.
Kuhn, on the other hand, urged his chief repeatedly
to take the ofEensive in the direction of Novara, and
declares that twice — on the nights of May 30 and June 1
— he drafted orders for such an advance. On the
latter occasion the attack — ^to be made by the Ilird, Vth
and VIII th Corps — was only practicable, he declared,
up to 3 p.m. on the 2nd, since strong reinforcements
were being rapidly pushed up to the AUies at Novara.
The result arrived at was a compromise, in that,
for the present the army was only ordered to retreat
behind the Ticino.
Moltke does not appear altogether to share von
Caemmerer's views as to the advantages of a retirement,
for he considers that 90,000 men might well have been
concentrated on June 1 at Mortara ready to assume the
offensive against Palestro and Olengo. The situation
of the enemy invited such a measure, and if the reten-
tion of the right bank of the Ticino was intended, no
other course was possible. If the worst befell, the
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 109
Austrians possessed a nimiber of fortified crossings by
wMoh to fall back, or even the entrencbed position
at Mortara in tbeir rear ; wbUe even if pressed back to
Pavia tbe ground about tbere was very favourable to
the employment of tbeir numerous cavalry for covering
tbeir retreat.
To tbe objection tbat tbe AUies at Palestro stood on
tbe flank of any Austrian movement on Novara, it is
pointed out tbat tbis flank was protected by tbe Agogna
and by tbe Austrian troops at Robbio. Tbe Frencb
were certainly already nearer to Milan tban were tbeir
enemies ; aU tbe more reason tben for a speedy termina-
tion of tbe situation, wbicb could be more quickly
arrived at by tbe rigbt tban by tbe left bank.
THE BATTLE OF MAGENTA
CHAPTER VI
THE BATTLE OF MAGENTA
In order that the operations of Jime 4, wliicli are
known as the Battle of Magenta, may be properly under-
stood, it win be as weU to give some description of the
ground on the left bank of the Ticino.
" Between the river and the village of Magenta there
is first a flat plain for a mile and a half, then a steep
irregular bank, some sixty feet high, with a flat table-
land on the top ; the former is intersected by numerous
irrigating channels and belts of trees and bushes, the
latter is cultivated for vines and corn with young fruit
trees planted very closely together. The railway and
post road run very straight across the plain and are liable
to be swept by artillery fire from the high ground, all
along which, at the edge of the bank, there are favourable
positions for guns. The plateau which skirts the Ticino
on its left bank, runs from Turbigo down to Bufialora
parallel to the course of the river. At Bufialora the
ridge makes a sweep away from the river for a quarter
of a mile, after which it again resumes its original direc-
tion. In this it continues for about a mile and a half,
and then throws out a spur towards the river, behind
which lies the village of Ponte Vecchio. Thus from
Bufialora to Ponte Vecchio a semi-circlp of positions is
113 T
114 THE CAMPAIGN OF
formed, facing the river and about one and a quarter
miles m length. The breadth of the ridge is nowhere
more than 200 yards, and beyond it begins the Lombard
plain corresponding to the plain of Novara. One and
a half miles in rear of the ridge hes the village of Magenta ;
at the latter point converge aU the roads coming from
that part of the Ticino and unite with the main road,
which runs to Milan.
" The Grand Canal, which from Turbigo to Bufialora
runs at the foot of the ridge, penetrates the latter at
the village of Bufialora, and keeps a hundred to a hundred
and fifty yards behind it aU along this position. The
stream runs nearly four miles an hour, and in the neigh-
bourhood of Magenta it has steep banks at each side
covered with thorny bushes. Altogether it forms an
obstacle quite impassable except at the bridges ; of
these five must be noticed.
" Between the bridge over the Ticino and the ridge
there is a space of about a mile of low fiat ground,
evidently formerly part of the bed of the river, but
now canalized and rendered fertile by cultivation. It
forms a succession of corn and rice-fields, of which the
latter were now under water. Through these low lands
two roads led up to the ridge ; one, which is the old
road to Milan, starts from the left of the present main
road and, leading in a succession of bends through the
low lands, crosses the ridge and canal just before entering
the village of BufEalora. The canal bridge here is
completely commanded by the houses of Bufialora, and
may be swept by artillery fire from the high ground
about the village.
" The second bridge over the canal is that of Ponte
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 115
Nuovo di Magenta, by wluch the great cJiaussee crosses
the canal. This road, starting from the Ticino bridge,
slopes gradually down to nearly the level of the high
ground which forms the sides of the valley and through
which the canal is led. At the canal bridge there are
four buildings — one in each angle between the road and
the canal ; those on the left or east bank of the canal
are particularly strongly built and formed in 1859 the
Austrian Custom-house.
" The railway bridge is about 500 yards below Ponte
Nuovo and crosses the canal at a lower level. The
railway, which crosses the Ticino by the same bridge as
the cAotwsee, instead of sinking to the vaUey as that does,
runs on an embankment across it, rising with a uniform,
but very gradual gradient to the point where, through
a cutting, it enters the high banks which frame in the
valley. This long and imiform slope is seen in its whole
length from the high ground and lies completely exposed
to the fire of guns. At the cutting a quantity of earth
had been quarried out to form the embankment over
the plain ; here a sort of redoubt had been thrown up.
" The fourth bridge is Ponte Vecchio di Magenta,
near which there is a tolerably large village on both
banks of the canal ; the part on the right bank consists
of older and less substantial buildings than that on the
left. There is no direct road to Ponte Vecchio from
the Ticino bridge, but roads run along both sides of the
canal at the top of the cutting through which it flows
from Ponte Nuovo.
" The fifth bridge is at Eobecco, a large and important
village built on both sides of the canal. From Ponte
Vecchio downstream the canal becomes shallower and
ii6 THE CAMPAIGN OF
more rapid and its banks are less Mgh and steep. As
it gradually diverges from the river, the breadth of the
high ground enclosed between it and the low river
valley widens gradually from near BufEalora, where it
begins to have a breadth of two miles. In cultivation
and character the plateau — often called the plateau of
Carpenzago — ^resembles the ground between Turbigo
and Magenta. The low ground or valley bed of the
Ticiao, though not absolutely impassable, is practically
unfit for the passage of troops."
On the night of Jime 3 the positions of the allied forces
were as follows : —
The Right : The 1st French Corps and the 1st and
4th Piedmontese divisions at Lumelogno.
The Centre : The Illrd and IVth French Corps, the
Cavalry Divisions Desvaux and Partouneaux
and Cassaignolles' brigade of the Cavalry of the
Guard at Novara.
The Left : The divisions Mellinet and Camou of the
Guard at Trecate and the Ilnd Corps at Turbigo.
The Reserve : The 2nd and 3rd Piedmontese infantry
divisions and Sambuy's Piedmontese cavalry
division at GaUiate.
As the Emperor was still uncertain whether Gyulai
was concentrating on the right or left bank of the Ticino,
he decided to place his army on the line Olengo —
Magenta ; on the right the 1st Corps to hold the road
and rail leading from Mortara to Novara, posted in the
strong positions of Olengo and on the Biccoca — occupy-
ing more or less the battle-ground of 1849. Baraguey
d'HiUier's right to be on the Agogna, where, moreover.
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 117
lie would be supported by Desvaux's cavalry division,
while Partouneaux would cover the left of the 1st Corps
and maintain communication with the IVth. In the
centre the IVth Corps at Trecate and the Ilird at San
Martino would watch the roads leading from Vigevano
by Sozzago and Cerano to the upper Ticino, and join
hands by the Olengo road with the 1st Corps and with
the Ilnd by the bridges at San Martino. On the left,
the Ilnd Corps at Magenta would safeguard its own left
flank with its brigade of light cavalry and be supported
on its right rear by the Guard at Buffalora.
It seemed to Napoleon that whether the Austrians
attacked on the left or right bank, he was now strong
enough on either to be able to hold his ground imtil he
could transfer to the point threatened the preponderance
of strength he undoubtedly possessed, although tem-
porarily debarred from its full use by the river, over
which, however, his communications were being hourly
improved.
On the night of the 3rd, MeUinet arrived at Trecate,
and Espinasse at once rejoined the Ilnd Corps in the
neighbourhood of Eobecchetto.
On the morning of the 4th the different imits of the
allied army had already marched off to take up the
positions assigned to them, when it became known
that the Austrians had completely evacuated the
left bant, and were moving on Milan ; the Emperor
then found himself obliged in some degree to modify
his earlier dispositions and to thrust forward to en-
gage the enemy those troops which were nearest to
him.
The Piedmontese divisions were ordered to cross the
ti8 THE CAMPAIGN OF
river at Turbigo and to follow the steps of MacMahon's
corps, while the Ilird and IVth Corps were directed to
push on as rapidly as possible and reach the scene of
action by way of the passages at San Martino. Circum-
stances, however, did not allow of the uninterrupted
flow of reinforcements to the troops actually in contact
with the forces of Count Clam. Of the Piedmontese
army only two divisions were able to cross at Tuibigo —
the 2nd (Fanti) and the 3rd (Duiando). Of these the
latter did not reach the scene of the battle at all, while
the other — Fanti — only arrived at Mesero at 6 p.m.,
too late to exert any appreciable influence upon the
result of the day's fighting. As a matter of fact the
roads and bridges about Tuibigo were greatly blocked,
whUe Urban's presence south of Gallarate — menacing
the flank and rear of the troops advancing on Magenta —
required that one division should show front to him
while the other covered the debouchures from the bridges.
In like maimer the IVth Corps marching from Novara
to Trecate, blocked the road by which Canrobert
should have reached the Ticino, and he consequently
was only able, very late in the day, to bring two brigades
into action, while only Vinoy's division of the IVth Corps
reached the field at aU.
To oppose the AUies the nearest troops were those
immediately under the command of Count Clam, and
these comprised Urban's three brigades, whatever units
of the 1st Corps it had been possible to gather together,
the whole of the Ilnd Corps, and a portion of the Vllth.
These numbered 44,780 infantry, 3,803 cavalry and 178
guns, and the various units were on the evening of
June 3 disposed as under : —
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 iig
Of Urban's force the brigade Eupprecht was at
Varese with detachments at Somma and Tradate, while
the brigades of Schafigotsche ■ and Brauni (the last
detached from the IXth Corps) were respectively south
and north of Gallarate.
Cordon's troops had passed the night south of Mar-
callo, but as the men had practically been without
either rest or rations since they arrived from Austria,
Clam withdrew them early on the 4th to Magenta,
leaving only a very few companies to watch that front.
Burdina (of Montenuovo's division of the 1st Corps)
had altogether some seven battaUons under his com-
mand and was posted on both sides of the canal about
Ponte Nuovo and the railway bridge.
Part of Reznicek's brigade of Cordon's division —
some 1,500 men — was on the east bank of the canal in
and near Buffalora with its right at Bernate.
Of the Ilnd Corps Kintzl's brigade was in Robecco
with two battalions in Ponte Vecchio on the west bank ;
the brigades of Szabo, Baltin and Koudelka were in
Magenta.
The Cavalry Division was in Corbetta, while the
brigades of Gablentz and Lebzeltern, of Reischach's
division of the Vllth Corps, were near Cerella.
Further off and at Gyulai's disposal were the follow-
ing : LUia's division of the Vllth, Corps — 7,600 men
with 16 guns — at CasteUetto ; the Ilird Corps — ^21,536
men and 56 guns — was at Abbiategrasso, Ozero and
Soria ; while the Vth Corps, fiirther off still, between
Coronate and Besate, numbered 25,092 men and 72
guns, exclusive of the brigade Bils en route to Pavia.
The Vlllth and IXth Corps were too far distant for
120 THE CAMPAIGN OF
their services to be of any value on this day, but even
without them the commander of the Second Army
might have been able to count upon some 107,000
infantry, over 5,000 cavalry and 400 guns being avail-
able in and about Magenta at some time during June 4.
Against these the Allies could muster in the first line —
viz. : the Imperial Guard, the Ilnd and Ilird Corps—
55,783 infantry, 6,068 cavalry and 144 guns, to hold any
Austrian attack in check until the IVth Corps and the
divisions of the Piedmontese Army — numbering alto-
gether 73,388 infantry, 4,909 cavalry and 147 guns —
should have had time to fall into line with them.
During the night reports came in to Clam from Ber-
nate, that the enemy appeared to be withdrawing from
Turbigo and to be moving down stream towards San
Martino ; as the Austrian outposts in this direction also
announced that large numbers of the enemy were gather-
ing on the right bank of the river, the Commander of the
1st Corps seems to have come to the conclusion that the
main attack wouldbedeHveredonthe line San Martino —
Milan — an impression which was strengthened by re-
ports from the cavalry sent out to the north, who stated
— even up to quite late on the morning of the 4th — ^that
Cuggiono and Inveruno were clear of the enemy.
At 9.15 a.m., however, Bernate reported that the
strength of the allied force about Turbigo appeared to
be increasing, and Clam accordingly ordered forward
Baltin's brigade of Herdy's division of the Ilnd Corps
to Buffalora. This brigade was there drawn up facing
both west and north — at Bufialora along the canal as far
as Bernate and thence fronting the north on the lin e
Bernate — Casate — ^Mesero. The canal bridge at Buffa-
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 121
lora was now at once blown up, apparently without
orders from superior authority ; a G-pounder was placed
behind the ruined bridge, seven others being in reserve
in t'he village ; while four 12-pounders were placed on
the plateau at the northern exit from BufEalora.
At 9.45 Clam reported as foUows to Gyxdai : " Two
Sufoijig colimms are advancing against the stone bridge
ovei' the Ticino and five other columns have been re-
ported on the Novara-San Martino road ; these appear
to be the Imperial Guard. At Ponte Nuovo, at the
railway bridge and in BufEalora I have nine battalions
of infantry, five 12-pounders and eight rockets, while at
Eobe\cco and Ponte Vecchio there is now Kintzl's bri-
gade. Inl the event of an attack upon Magenta, I shall
send a brjigade of the Ilnd Corps to Buffalora, keeping
the other !|two brigades of that corps and Eeznicek's of
the 1st in [reserve near Magenta. The Cavalry Division
remains a1^ Corbetto sending out strong patrols towards
Cuggiono and Inveruno." He then reports Cordon's
overthrow on; the previous day and winds up by saying
that " the enemy do not seem to have crossed iu strength
at Turbigo, although fresh reports point to some increase
in the hostile forces at that poiat." On receipt of this
message Gpdai directed Reischach's division of the
Vllth Corps to move via Corbetto on Magenta, where he
should act a« a support to Cordon and where he would
receive further instructions from Clam. At the same
time Clam was directed to make use of the divisions of
Cordon and ; JReischach to attack such of the Allies as
had already crossed at Turbigo and drive them back ;
if, howevrjf, the eneray were in too great force. Clam was
to break off the action and take up a defensive position
122 THE CAMPAIGN OF
about Magenta in view of recommencing the action on
the morrow with greatly increased numbers and with a
proportionately better hope of success. By the time,
however, that this message reached its destination,
fighting had already broken out on the main road at the
eastern end of the Ticino bridge, and Clam then con-
sidered that the instructions therein contained could no
longer be carried into execution.
Mellinet had been ordered to leave Trecate at 8 fi.m.
for San Martino ia order there to cover the construction
of a pontoon bridge which was to be thrown across the
Ticino just above the stone bridge ; his 2nd brigade
(Wimpffen) ^ left first and was followed two hours later
by Mellinet himseli with his 1st brigade (Cler).' Wimp-
ffen reached the river about 10, and perceiving Austrian
riflemen on the left bank, he at once passed ov'er several
companies and two guns — the latter being carried across
by hand — and, covered by these advanced troops, the
rest of the 2nd brigade crossed over and to^ok up a posi-
tion on the further side. Here the skirmishers of either
force became at once engaged, while Wimpffen's two guns
also came into action, opposing two Austrian pieces which
were in battery a few hundred paces from the canal
bridge on the west ba'nk, and which, together with the
Austrian skirmishers, fell back behind the canal, when
Wimpfien was able to push forward small parties to
Bufialora and Ponte Nuovo.
Mellinet now arrived upon the scene, and having re-
ceived strict orders from the Emperor not to lecome seri-
' It should be remembered that two Austrian gfinerals also
bore this name : the Commander of the First Army at Solferino
and a brigade commander in SchafEgotsche's Corps.
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 123
ously engaged until MacMahon's attack was developed
on the left, he directed WimpfEen to recall his troops
and to maintain his position on the east bank some 500
yards in front of the bridge. At this moment, however,
the Emperor, who had just arrived at the junction of the
Bufialora and Magenta roads, heard heavy musketry
are from the north, and concluding that MacMahon must
now be seriously engaged, he ordered Mellinet to attack
and endeavour to carry the villages of Ponte Nuovo and
Buiialora.
It will be as weU now to see what occasioned the firing
which led to the renewal of Mellinet's attack.
MacMahon had been instructed by the Emperor to
leave his bivouacs at 9 a.m., and at that hour his 1st
Division (La Motterouge) left Robecohetto by the BufEa-
lora road. About midday the division, accompanied
by MacMahon in person, had passed through Cuggiono
and found the Austrians deployed in front of Casate.
The Turcos at the head of the division attacked at once
and captured the village, the enemy retiring through
Bernate, where they were rallied. Bernate too was
carried in the same way with a rush, and the Austrians
fell back upon BufEalora with the Turcos in close pursuit.
In spite of MacMahon's orders to halt at two hmidred
yards from the village to give time for the arrival of the
whole division, the Turcos pushed on ; some of their
leading companies rushed on the heels of the fugitives
into the outskirts of Buffalora and into an entrenchment
to the east of the village, while two companies of the
2nd battalion seized a hovise close to the canal. The
3rd battalion remained in reserve. The 4th regiment
of the line followed escorting the divisional artillery, some
124 THE CAMPAIGN OF
of the gims of wHch were brouglit into action on the
little plateau of Bemate, and, engaged two of Baltin's
batteries at a range of about 1,200 yards. The 2nd
brigade (de Polhes) was formed up rather on the left
rear of the foremost troops midway between Bemate and
Marcallo.
Camou's division of the Guard, following La Motte-
rouge, debouched from Casate and took post in rear of
the 1st Division, the left of which was covered by the
cavalry of General Gaudin de VUlaine, who was directed
to keep touch with MacMahon's 2nd Division under
Espinasse.
This general had been ordered to move on Magenta
by Castano, Buscate, Inveruno, Mesero and Marcallo,
and reached the first-named village at 11.15, when,
expecting shortly to come in touch with the enemy, he
halted and deployed for attack from cohimn of route.
His 1st brigade (Gault) was moved off to and opened out
in the fields on the right of the road, while his 2nd (de
Castagny) was in echelon on the left of the road, which
was given up to the artiUery, and finally a dense cloud of
skirmishers covered the left flank of the division . Arrived
at Inveruno there was another halt, and it being found
that passage across the fields was no longer practicable,
the whole colmnn again took to the road, and it was 1.30
p.m. before the advance guard reached Mesero, where it
was met by a heavy fire and where Espinasse made pre-
parations for attack.
Wimpffen's renewed attack had by now been launched :
of his brigade, the 3rd regiment of grenadiers advanced
along the foot of the railway embankment, while the 2nd
regiment moved upon Buffalora ; the whole of the 1st
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 125
brigade of the same division was not as yet available,
but its regiment of zouaves was massed to tbe left of tbe
Buffalora road, wliile a battalion of the 1st grenadiers
formed the reserve. It was about 1.30 ; the 3rd grena-
diers moved straight upon the small work which covered
the railway bridge and stormed over the parapet, turn-
ing out the defenders, who fled to the further bank of the
canal leaving the railway bridge in the hands of the
French. But those of the Austrians who were holding
the houses of Ponte Nuovo now poured a heavy fire
into the rear of the open work ; at this moment the
supporting battalion of the 3rd grenadiers came up and
turning sharply to the left it moved up the canal bank,
and engaged under cover of the trees and brushwood,
covering this part of the field, the Austrians holding the
village. Ponte Nuovo was, however, occupied in consider-
able strength, the bank and buildings about the road and
railway bridges being defended by Burdiaa's battalions,
supported by Szabo's brigade, and it was as much as the
French could do to hold on to the ground they had
gained. At this moment Cler, commanding Mellinet's
1st brigade, was directed to advance ; his zouaves rushed
forward with great elan and carried the bridge and
the houses adjoining it, the zouaves and the grenadiers
pursuing the Austrians, who fell back in some confusion
upon Szabo's brigade. It was here that General Bur-
dina fell mortally wounded.
The road and railway bridges were thus in possession
of the French ; on the left, however, matters had not
gone so well.. Arriving in front of BufEalora the 2nd
grenadiers found that the bridge had been destroyed
and that the houses on the east bank were occupied in
126 THE CAMPAIGN OF
L
strength by the greater part of two battalions of Baltin's
brigade, and here all onward movement by the French
was temporarily checked.
It was 2 p.m. : Gyulai had just now reached Magenta
and learnt of the outcome of the fighting at the canal
bridges, and he at once ordered up Eeischach's division
to retake Ponte Nuovo. Passing through Magenta,
the division formed in two lines ; in front was Gab-
lentz's brigade, its left covered towards BufEalora by a
battalion of Szabo's brigade, while in rear were the batta-
lions of Lebzeltern. The advance of these fresh troops
was heralded and prepared by the fire of four guns.
Before, however, Eeischach's troops could enter into
the fight the situation had become worse for the
Austrians.
The rapid advance of Cler's brigade had taken Szabo
in flank, and these troops — which had already on a pre-
vious occasion been severely handled — fell back upon
Magenta, so closely followed by the zouaves that the
defence of Magenta was hurriedly taken in hand. On
the north of the main road Liechtenstein had brought
up three battalions of Koudelka's brigade, which engaged
the French at this point, but they were gradually forced
back behind the track connecting Builalora with the
main road. The French had now several battalions and
four guns on the east bank of the canal and on either
side of the road, and it appeared as though there was
nothing to prevent their unopposed march upon Magenta.
It was at this time that Reischach advanced upon
Ponte Nuovo and that the fresh troops thus introduced
into the fight sufficed to at least check the French
advance. Three of Gablentz's battalions fell upon the
; MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 127
left of the zouaves, drove them back upon the guns and
teaptured one wUcli was in action on the north side of
the road. General Cler was killed, the French were
repulsed, and in spite of the efforts of a handful of
chasseurs d cheval of the Guard, who repeatedly charged
the Austrian flank, the grenadiers and zouaves were
forced back fighting to the houses of Ponte Nuovo. But
the losses of the Austrians had not been slight; Rei-
schach himself had been wounded, and Gablentz halted
to reform his scattered troops before continuing to press'
his advantage. This delay was enough to change again
the issue of the combat and to give time for the entry into
the fight, first of Picard's brigade of the Ilird Corps and
later of those of Martimprey and La Charriere of the
IVth.
At this critical moment, when the French in this
part of the field had fallen back before the Austrian
reinforcements, the distant soujids of gun and rifle fire
which had been heard beyond Buffalora, and which had
decided the Emperor to launch Mellinet to the attack,
had unaccountably died down. MacMahon seeing and
hearing nothing of Espinasse on his left, and fearing for
the result of an attack upon him, while unsupported,
by the forces he had found in his front, had given orders
that the Turcos should be recalled from before Buffalora
and that the artillery shoiild cease fire. The guns with-
drew to Bernate and de Polhes' brigade extended in
their front, while Lefebvre strung his brigade out to the
left to endeavour to gain touch with the right of Mac-
Mahon's 2nd Division. In the meantime Espinasse was
continuing his leisurely advance ; his 1st brigade (Gault)
occupied MarcaUo, Reznicek's battalions retiring before
128 THE CAMPAIGN OF \
it, and here Espinasse intended again to halt, occupying
the village with his 1st brigade, while his 2nd was com-;
ing up in rear. He proposed to leave his convoy in thei
village, and seems to have been under the impression that
he was being closely followed by the divisions of the
Piedmontese Army. Once concentrated, it was his in--
tention to advance direct upon Magenta. Happily at
this moment MacMahon himself rode up and ordered
Espinasse to take ground more to his right so as to join
on to La Motterouge — ^keeping his extreme left only on
MarcaUo. After leaving Marcallo, however, both bri-
gades — now in line — seem to have sUghtly brought up
their left shoulders, since Marcallo was now beyond
Castagny's left and both were fronting rather in-
wards — that is towards the angle of the canal and the
main road. In rear of the two divisions of the Ilnd
Corps, Camou had formed his division in Une of bat-
talion columns at deploying intervals. To Castagny's
left front, MensdorfE's cavalry guarded the Milan road,
while LUia's divison of the Vllth Corps had reached and
occupied Corbetta on the line of retreat.
It was about 3.30 p.m. when the head of Eenault's
division of the Ilird French Corps reached the canal
where the Guard was holding on to the houses of Ponte
Nuovo on the right bank and to the railway buildings.
WimpfEen had succeeded in preventing Gablentz from
crossing the bridge and retaking the entrenchment, but
Wimpffen was now menaced by a regiment of Kintzl's
brigade which was moving up the right . bank from
Carpenzago and Ponte Vecchio to take him in flank.
Pi^ard's brigade now came up and entered the entrench-
ment just as Kintzl's men arrived at the southern para-
\ MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 129
4—
,pet. These were greeted with a mnrderous fire and the
Frenchmen then, pouring tumultuously over the earth-
works, drove the enemy before them as far as the nearest
buildings of Ponte Vecchio, where further pursuit was
checked by the timely destruction of the bridge over the
canal. His right being thus cleared, WimpfEen added
Picard's remaining battaUons to his own, stUl struggUng
for foothold, and managed to seize and retain a small
group of farm buildings situated to the south of the rail-
way line and about 600 yards beyond the canal. In Uke
manner the houses on the left bank were recaptured and
held — ^in spite of the efforts of one of Lebzeltern's regi-
ments—and three batteries of the artillery of the Guard,
taking up a position about Ponte Nuovo, seemed by their
fire to assure its possession to the French.
Reischach's men were, however, not yet finished with :
his left wing, strengthened by Szabo's brigade, again
charged forward ; the farm was retaken by the Austrians,
and the defenders were driven back to the canal bank.
The debouchures of the bridges on the main road and
railway were still in the hands of the French, but the
troops were greatly exhausted by the continuous fight-
ing, and it was feared that a fresh attack might effect
their overthrow, when about 4.45 General Mel arrived
on the scene with Martimprey's brigade of Vinoy's divi-
sion. Two of these fresh battalions were at once sent
forward to the recapture of the farm, and the rest of the
brigade, under Martimprey, was ordered to push on to
Magenta ; La Charriere now appearing with three batta-
lions, he was directed to send two in support of Picard
and with the other to follow those attacking the farm.
While the French right wing was thus struggling to
K
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 131
zenberg to advance on Ponte Vecchio by both banks of
tbe canal with bis wbole force. Ramming, accordingly,
led Hs brigade by the east bank and moved upon Ponte
Vecchio, Hartung followed on the west of the canal,
while still further out to the west Wetzlar conducted
his men across the swamps and rice-fields of the Ticino
valley in the endeavour to cut the French communica-
tions at the San Martino bridge. In rear of all followed
Diirfeld's brigade supporting Hartung on the right bank
of the Grand Canal.
The French also had received a small reinforce-
ment for the desperate fighting which was about to be
reopened for the possession of Ponte Vecchio : Jannin's
brigade of Renault's division had just crossed the river
and was moving along the main road.
By now Vinoy had succeeded in recapturing the farm
buildings to the south of the railway and was moving
upon Ponte Vecchio, from the attack on which — on
the western bank — ^Picard had just fallen back. The
arrival now of Schwartzenberg's corps made matters
once more serious, and by Hartung's advance Picard
was driven back to the entrenchment at the bridge.
All efforts of both combatants seemed to be now con-
centrated on Magenta and Ponte Vecchio, where it
appeared the final issue would be fought out. Reznicek
occupied the northern outskirts of Magenta ; what
was left of Baltin's brigade, with the battalions driven
from Cascina Nuova, was falling back upon the same
point to reform ; on the Magenta road Martimprey was
driving Gablentz and Lebzeltern before him, and Szabo
was retiring on Magenta where Koudelka and Burdina's
brigades had already taken up positions. On either side
132 THE CAMPAIGN OF
of the canal Schwartzenberg's infantry was preparing
to assault Ponte VeccHo ; Bamming and Diirfeld
were marching up the east bank to oppose Vinoy, while
Wetzlar, unable to cross the swamps by the Ticino, was
moving nearer to the canal.
When the brigades of Espinasse hurled back the attack
of Baltin and Reznicek on the French left, they followed
up the Austrians almost to within view of the town of
Magenta, but here — taking post behind the railway em-
bankment — the Austrians were able to rally, and the
French battahons, failing to make any impression upon
their adversaries, found themselves once more compelled
to fall back. But Clam seemed now unaccountably to
have renounced any attempts against the French left,
and recalled the troops of the 1st and Ilnd Corps to the
defence of Magenta itself. During the pause which now
ensued MacMahon reformed his line of battle and bring-
ing round his right, directed La Motterouge upon Cascina
Nuova, whose walls and outbuildings were then still
held by the three battalions which had retired from
Buffalora ; while on either flank of the buildings stood
fragments of Szabo's, Baltin's and Lebzeltern's brigades.
Upon this farm now converged the attack of several
battalions ; the 4:5th regiment of the line, on the right
of MacMahon's 1st Division, rushed upon it with the bay-
onet, while several companies of Martimprey's column
joined also in the assault. Cascina Nuova was captured
and here some 1,500 prisoners were taken. There was
now no obstacle between the Ilnd Corps and Magenta ;
La Motterouge was ordered to attack from the direction
of BufEalora, Espinasse from Marcallo, while Camou,
deployed in rear of the two, was to support both attacks.
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 133
It was now 6.30 p.m. : Espinasse formed his leading
brigade in two columns ; he himself accompanied that
which moved djrect upon Magenta by the Marcallo
road, while Gault — circling round to the east — was to
approach Magenta from the Milan direction ; Castagny's
brigade followed Espinasse more slowly and at some dis-
tance in rear. Magenta was ill-adapted for defence ;
by the gradual pressure applied by MacMahon, the Aus-
trians were forced from the outworks and driven to the
houses of the little town. Within its walls all was con-
fusion ; scattered detachments of all arms and of every
unit filled each street and open space, while some troops
of the 1st and Ilnd Corps had already passed hurriedly
through the town and retired on Corbetta. On the
right of La Motterouge, Martimprey had rapidly pushed
on at the head of two battalions and, crossing the rail-
way, he entered upon a desperate struggle for the pos-
session of the church and cemetery, in the course of
which the general himself was seriously wounded and
his battalions lost half their effectives.
After a protracted struggle Vinoy had captured Ponte
Vecchio but had been driven out by Diirf eld's brigade,
and altogether the possession of this village changed
hands some six times. On aU sides fresh troops were
reaching the field ; the head of the Vth Austrian Corps
was in sight ; Bataille's brigade of the Ilird (Can-
robert's) Corps had arrived at the Ticino ; Fanti's div-
sion of the Piedmontese Army was now visible on the
high ground north of MarcaUo. The French artillery,
however, was now gaining the upper hand ; General
Auger had suceeeded in establishing a long line of guns
on the left bank of the canal and had brought the whole
134 THE CAMPAIGN OF
ground between Ponte VeccMo and Magenta under a
heavy fire.
Towards 7.30 o'clock Espinasse ordered the final
advance of his division upon Magenta, and his two
columns entering from the north and east, while La
Motterouge, closely followed by Camou, penetrated from
the west, bloody fighting took place — in the streets, in the
churches and from house to house. Here General Espin-
asse was kiUed. The Austrians were driven from the
town and fell back in great confusion upon Corbetta,
covered by Liha, by Mensdorff, and by Lippert of the
Vlllth Corps who had at this moment reached the scene
of action.
About Ponte Vecchio, however — on the left bank —
the battle still raged. Eamming, having thrown a
battalion into the village, had marched on Magenta,
but Schwartzenberg's remaining brigades were fighting
hard for victory. The village was captured and re-
captured ; Vinoy was driven out by the Austrians,
and they in turn were driven out by him, and at times
portions of Ponte Vecchio were in possession of both
combatants. On the right bank, too, the tide of battle
rose and fell ; the arrival of reinforcements gave a
fleeting success first to one side, then to the other ;
at one time it seemed that here at least victory would
crown the splendid efforts of Hartung and Diirfeld,
when the French finally flung two fresh battaUons
into the fight and secured success for the AUies in this
portion also of the bloody field. Wetzlar's attack
was paralysed by the heavy fire of the French, and
the Austrians fell back in some disorder upon Robecco,
closely followed by their adversaries, whose pursuit
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 135
was, however, checked by the brilhant efEorts and
repeated charges of the 10th Austrian Hussars over
ground quite unsuited to the action of cavahy. Marshal
Canrobert himself was nearly captured by these gallant
horsemen.
In the battle the losses of the combatants were as
follows : —
Killed. Wounded. Killed. Wounded. Missing.
French. Officers. 52. 194. Rank and File. 655. 3,029. 655.
Austrians. „ 64. 221. „ „ 1,304. 4,137. 4,500.
(Those shown as " missing " among the Austrians
included prisoners.) The Times correspondent with
the AUies states that " all the French and many of the
Austrian wounded had been removed during the night,
but on the third day after the battle some were foimd
lying about the field and brought in. This was owing
in a great measure to the idea which had been inculcated
in the Austrian soldiers, that the Allies ill-treated and
kiUed the wounded ; so they hid themselves, thinking
the chances of starving preferable to certain death.
Numbers concealed themselves in the cellars of the
houses of Magenta and in the farmhouses near which
they had been wounded."
On this night the French and Piedmontese bivouacked
practically where the close of the battle foimd them ;
Eenault (Ilird Corps) and Vinoy (IVth) at Ponte
Vecchio on either side of the canal, where they were
joined during the night by the divisions of Trochu and
BourbaM of the Ilird Corps. Of the Imperial Guard,
Mellinet was at Buffalora and Ponte Nuovo, Camou
was in rear of Magenta, while the whole of the Ilnd
136 THE CAMPAIGN OF
Corps occupied the town. The remaining two divisions
of the IVth passed the night at Trecate, the 1st Corps
at Olengo ; while of the Piedmontese divisions, Fanti
was at Marcallo and the others at Turbigo and GaUiate.
The Imperial Headquarters was at San Martino, that
of Victor Emmanuel at ViUa Fortuna.
Of the Austrian corps the 1st, Ilnd, and Vllth were
in or about Corbetta and Cerella, the Ilird and Vth
were at Robecco, MensdorfE at Bareggio, and Head-
quarters at Abbiategrasso ; the nearest unit of the
Vlllth Corps was at Bestazzo, and the IXth Corps was
still south of Pavia.
Duxiag the whole of the 4th, Urban had done nothing
beyond assisting to delay — by the mere fact of the
presence of two of his brigades south of Gallarate —
the advance of the Piedmontese divisions. His instruc-
tions, however, had been of the vaguest, for all that
he had been told was that Clam, if he considered it
advisable, would attack the Allies at Turbigo, but that
if on the other hand he retired on Magenta, Urban
should take the opportunity of striking at the flank
of the French, were they then to advance.
About midday on the 4th, Urban learnt from the
commander of a detachment which he had placed at
Ferno, that fighting appeared to be goiag on south of
Cuggiono, but that touch could not be established with
the troops of the 1st Corps. Urban now moved the
two brigades with him by Busto Arsizio and Vanzaghello
to beyond Magnano where he remained for the rest
of the day, unable to advance and yet making no attempt
to rejoia the main army.
A consideration of the numbers actually engaged on
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 137
either side* seems to prove that a battle was not anti-
cipated on the 4th, either by the Allies or by the
Austrians. It appears to be clear that the situation
was not thoroughly appreciated by the Austrian Com-
mander-in-Chief, and that he was drawn into a general
action through not supporting at the outset, and with
sufficient forces, the lieutenant who had been surprised
by the advance of MacMahon.
By the morning of the 4th, GyTilai knew that a crossing
had already been effected at Turbigo and that there
was nothing to prevent the passage of the Trecate
columns (already reported) at San Martino. Had
then the bridges over the canal at Bernate, Buffalora,
Ponte Nuovo and Ponte Vecchio been destroyed — and
Clam had already on the night of the 2nd given orders
that all of them were to be prepared for demoUtion —
the junction of the two French columns must have
been greatly hindered and delayed, and Gyulai might
have had time to array largely superior forces between
MarcaUo and Buffalora to oppose MacMahon ; might
have watched the Une of the Grand Canal with com-
paratively few troops ; and could himseK have moved
in strength, by Robecco and Carpenzago, against the
flank of the allied columns crossing at San Martino.
Riistow suggests the following dispositions for the
morning of the 4th (it being accepted that the canal
bridges, except that at Robecco, had by then been all
destroyed) : one of Clam's divisions at Cuggiono to
check the advance of the Turbigo column ; Liechten-
stein's corps to hold the canal liiae with weak detach-
1 French, 48,090 men and 87 guns ; Austrians, 61,618 men
and 176 guns.
138 THE CAMPAIGN OF
ments at Bernate, Buffalora, Ponte Nuovo and Ponte
Vecchio, the remainder in reserve on the chaussee ;
another of Clam's divisions and Zobel's corps as main
reserve in Magenta, for employment when necessary
against MacMahon ; while Schwartzenberg's corps
at Robecco to be held in readiness to strike at the
flank of the San Martino columns — ^whence too it could
be drawn in to Magenta should it be found impossible
to prevent the junction of the allied forces.
In a letter published in a German newspaper shortly
after the war, and generally attributed to Count Gynlai,
the following statement occurs : " The battle of Magenta
was in no way an accident. When the Austrian Com-
mander gave up the advantage offered by his excellent
position at Eobbio and Mortara against the oblique
line of operations of the enemy, and when he had, as
a consequence of this, also renounced all idea of the
indirect defence of the Ticino by Pavia and Bereguardo,
he decided on a direct defence behind the river. This
could be carried out in two ways ; either from a position
outside the Milan-Magenta road or by a flank attack — ■
of the same nature as the one from Mortara based on
Pavia and Bereguardo — against the Une VerceUi —
— Novara."
The first of these alternatives was, he says, rejected,
because in case of a reverse a retreat must have been
made by Milan and Brescia. It was proposed then
to remain in the vicinity of the Po to occupy with the
help of the points Vaccarizza, Piacenza, Brescia and
Borgoforte interior hues between the forces of the enemy
in the north and those approaching from the south. It
was also decided, on giving up the Lomellina, to make
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 139
a flank movement against the line Novara — Milan.
Gyulai then suggests that when this retreat commenced
on June 2, the orders given to the different corps
had provided for the offensive being assumed against
the enemy's flank whenever opportunity offered, and
for retirement, if necessary, behind the Abbiategrasso-
Milan canal. He hints that the sudden intervention
of Hess upset these plans, and that the army thus reached
its positions late and assumed a formation which had
not been intended, with the result that the battle com-
menced and was sustained, not — as had been planned —
by the whole army, but by a portion of it only.
Moltke insists that the Austrians should under no
circumstances have joined battle on the 4th. The
Allies would certainly have been able to complete
their passage of the river undisturbed, but this could
not by then have been prevented. He considers that
all was not then lost, for if the Austrians had only
concentrated somewhere north of the Abbiategrasso-
Milan canal, the Allies must have attacked them
before marching on Milan. One primary condition
however, for not fighting on the 4th was that the Aus-
trians should under no circumstances be drawn into a
premature action ; if Clam was attacked, he should
have been withdrawn towards Abbiategrasso. Moltke
maintains that neither the French nor the Austrians
intended to fight at Magenta, and that the Austrians
permitted themselves to be drawn into the action through
supporting Clam. If, however, they stood to fight
at Magenta, they should have fought behind the line
of the canal, since the river and canal were so close
together that if an attempt were made to hold both,
140 THE CAMPAIGN OF
the canal must follow the loss of the river Une. The
position, too, behind the canal was the more commanding,
could have been held by fewer troops, and would have
permitted of larger forces being employed against
Turbigo.
Even as late as the morning of the 4th when he was
already engaged. Clam should have been recalled,
and the decisive action postponed until the day fol-
lowing. Kuhn, the Austrian Chief of the StafE, cal-
culates that on the 5th the Austrians would have had
a superiority of 45,000 men with 296 guns, and, according
to Moltke, the night of the 4th was for Napoleon a
very anxious one. He must have known that he had
only been engaged with a portion of the Austrian Army,
and that even that, though defeated, remained in
threatening proximity. The whole of Gyulai's force
could be brought up next day to renew the action, and
this, as we shall see, was actually decided upon.
A considerable portion of the alhed army was still
on the right bank, while the passage at San Martino
on the exposed flank might well have been endangered
by an Austrian success in the morning about Ponte
Nuovo. All that night the AlHes were passing infantry
and artillery over the river in readiness for accepting
battle next day under the best possible conditions.
Von Caemmerer thoroughly approves of the decision
to strike at the allied flank between the Ticino and
Magenta, but finds serious fault with the execution,
and especially with the ever present idea that an attack
by the Alhes in the front had stiU to be guarded against.
He rightly complains of the multiphcity and excessive
detail of the orders issued by the Austrian Headquarter
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 141
Staff to subordinate commanders, but he finds fault
with Gyulai for not giving Clam precise directions
as to which side of the canal he was to take his stand.
On neither side in this battle did everjrthing fall out
quite as had been arranged or intended, but on the battle-
field the French certainly displayed superior fighting
powers, as their leaders showed better generalship.
On the other side the Austrians were brought piecemeal
into action ; there seemed at times something almost
like a reluctance to engage ; and throughout reserves
were kept far too much in hand — caution, as on pre-
vious occasions, prevailing over enterprise.
THE ACTION AT MELEGNANO
CHAPTER VII
THE ACTION AT MELEGNANO
At 8.30 p.m. on the night of the battle, Gyulai — who
at that houi was still in Rohecco — issued orders for
the renewal of the action on the morrow. The Ilird
Corps was directed to hold on to Robecco at all costs,
the Vth Corps being placed in rear of the village ia
support ; Schwartzenberg was given the command
of both these corps. The 1st, Ilnd, Vllth, and Vlllth
Corps were directed to hold the position about Corbetta,
and these were all placed at the disposal of Count Clam.
Schwartzenberg's line of retreat was by Abbiategrasso,
that of Clam by Gaggiano. Shells were stUl falling
in Robecco while those orders were being dispatched,
and Army Headquarters withdrew to Abbiategrasso,
where the details of the operations of the next day were
worked out.
From a fragmentary order — which was then drawn
up but does not appear to have ever reached the Ilird
Corps, for which it was intended — it seems that Gyulai's
intentions were something as follows : in the event
of the Allies moving forward in the morning, he pro-
posed remaining altogether on the defensive until they
should debouch from Magenta, when he intended
falling upon them with the whole of his reserves —
146 T
146 THE CAMPAIGN OF
driving them back and endeavouring to enter Magenta
with them. The Austrian Commander-in-Chief gives
no hint as to what was likely to be the result of the
possible recapture of Magenta, and then proceeds to
issue instructions as to retreat upon the hne of the
Abbiategrasso-MUan canal, should a retirement become
necessary.
Late that night, Melczer, who was commanding in
Milan, was ordered to evacuate the capital, sending
all munitions and suppUes by rail to Verona and the
troops to Lodi, whither also any of Clam's oncoming
troops were to be directed ; the railway bridge over
the Adda at Cassano was to be destroyed.
At the time that these orders were in course of
preparation, Gyulai seems to have had no conception
of the degree of demorahzation of some of the units
under his command. Clam had just dispatched a
staff officer to Army Headquarters conveying a report
of the deplorable condition of the portion of the army
imder his orders, when, about midnight, he received
Gynlai's instructions relative to the renewal of the
battle on the morrow. Clam then sent off the following
statement, which reached Abbiategrasso about 1.30 a.m.
on the 5th, and which — together with one of similar
purport and couched in much the same terms from
Zobel — decided Gyulai to renounce all idea of resuming
the offensive : " I have this moment — 11.45 p.m. —
received from Rittmeister Zichy the general orders for
to-morrow and feel myself urgently compelled to state
that it is quite impossible that the instructions therein
contained can be carried out, since their execution
would only result in the complete and irreparable
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 H7
ruin of the army. Some of the troops are so absolutely
disorganised that a complete company — far less a
whole battalion — cannot be got together.^ Many
days are required for ralljdng. The troops of all units
are completely mixed up and scattered in different
places. The only way to save the army is to retreat
as quickly as possible. Under these circumstances
it is quite impossible for me to comply with the in-
structions received, and I shall therefore continue
before dawn the retirement on Binasco which I have
already ordered. I have made dispositions to this
end as far as can be done, and it is impossible for me
to countermand them. I therefore urgently and humbly
request that the orders now received may be can-
ceUed."
At 3 a.m. then on the 5th, Army Headquarters
issued the following orders for the retreat : —
The Ilird Corps to move by Abbiategrasso to Mori-
mondo on the 5th, and to Pavia on the 6th.
The Vth Corps on the 5th to Fallavecchio and Basiano
and next day to Fossarmato.
The Vllth Corps to Rosate and Gudo Visconti on
the 5th, and on the 6th to Campo Morto
and Gualdrasco.
The Ilnd Corps to move on the 5th by Guggiano to
Tainate, and on the following day to Torre
Vecchia.
The Vllth Corps to Piave on the 5th, and Landriano
on the 6th.
' 47 officers and 3,411 men of seven different regiments had
retired direct on Milan, besides individuals of other corps.
148 THE CAMPAIGN OF
^ The 1st Corps to Piave on the 5tli, and Torre VecoMa
on the 6th.
The Cavaby Division to move by Bareggio to Gudo
Gambaredo on the 5th, and on the next day
to Siziano.
Army Headquarters was to be on the 5th at Binasco,
and on the 6th at Belgiojoso.
Before, however, any orders regarding the intended
retreat had reached the Ilird and Vth Corps, fighting
had again broken out at Carpenzago during the early
hours of the 5th. Both sides declare that the action
was initiated by the attack of the other, but the prob-
abiHty is that it resulted naturally from the propinquity
of the advanced troops of both. However this may
be, Hartung's brigade of the Ilird Corps advanced
from Robecco and vigorously attacked Ponte Vecchio,
the 14th Austrian Regiment of infantry — which had
already greatly distinguished itself and sufiered heavy
losses the previous day — advancing with great dash
against Bataille's brigade, which found the outposts
at Ponte Vecchio. The French were here, however,
in great strength, and the Austrians were repulsed, but
were not pursued beyond Robecco.
The Austrian losses in this little affair are not forth-
coming in any detail, but they can hardly have been
less than those of the French, who admit having had
13 officers and 216 men killed and wounded.
The French made no organised advance until the 6th,
^ It should be noted that this corps was still anything but
complete ; the brigade Hoditz was in Bergamo, Paszthory
between Verona and Milan, and Brunner between Verona and
Botzen.
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 149
when the Emperor Napoleon threw forward strong
columns on either flank — the one to regain touch with
the main body of the enemy retreating south, the other
to endeavour to cut off Urban, who had been reported
to be about Monza. The Ilird and IVth Corps moved
accordingly upon Abbiategrasso, which they found to
be evacuated and where they learnt that the Austrians
were retiring upon Pavia and Lodi, while the Ilnd
Corps with Desvaux's cavalry and the Piedmontese
advanced on Rho and Garbagnate, whence a force of
all arms was launched in pursuit of Urban.
We have already seen that this commander had
passed the whole of the 4th in a state of hesitation and
inactivity, and it was not until the following morning
that he made any movement. He then advanced to-
wards Castano and Turbigo, and there at once found
himself confronted by the Piedmontese divisions, which
had crossed the canal and were moving on Magenta.
He then appeared to realize the gravity of the general
situation and his own immediate peril, and at once
retired to Castegnate, sending orders to Rupprecht to
withdraw from Somma and Varese — the troops at Somma
to Gallarate and Castegnate, those at Varese to Tradate.
On the 6th Urban learnt that Milan and Monza had
been evacuated by the Austrians, and he at once fell
back with all speed to escape the net which was being
spread for him.
MacMahon's 2nd Division (now commanded by
Decaen vice Espinasse killed in action) moved up from
Magenta on Garbagnate, the Piedmontese on San
Lorenzo, while Garibaldi — whom recent events had
rescued from a somewhat critical situation — descended
150 THE CAMPAIGN OF
from Varese by Como and Barlassina ; but Rupprecht's
brigade, forming Urban's rearguard, just managed, by
hard marcliing, to slip tkrougb tbe converging forces.
During the night of the 6th all three brigades crossed
the Lambro at Canonica, and pushing on at daybreak
on the 7th made for the Adda by Vimercate.
On the 7th the Allies entered Milan, and early next
morning Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel rode in at the
head of their victorious armies, receiAdng a tremendous
reception from the MUanese ; an eye-witness, however,
remarks : "On seeing this indescribable scene of grati-
tude, joy, happiness, homage — one might almost say
worship — it could not be forgotten that within fifty
yards of the scene of this wild enthusiasm is the Gasa
Creppi, on the balcony of which stood Charles Albert
and Victor Emmanuel when, after the disasters of
August, 1848, they were fired upon from the crowd
below."
On the night of the 7th the Imperial Headquarters
was at Quarto Gaguino, the Guard was at Casa Pobietta,
the 1st Corps at SanPietro d'Olmo, theillrd at Gaggiano,
the IVth at Corsico, while the Piedmontese were at
Nerviano, Parabiago and Lainate, the Royal Head-
quarters being at the last-named place. The Ilnd
French Corps was in Milan, while the cavalry divisions
of Desvaux and Partouneaux occupied Magenta. " There
are two great arteries of communication which intersect
Lombardy from west to east, from the Ticino to the
Mincio, thus forming two chief lines of operation in that
country. One is the high road from Ponte di BuSalora
to Milan and from thence to TrevigUo, Calcio, Brescia
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 151
and the Mincio ; the other more to the south from Pa via
by Belgiojoso, Pizzighettone, Cremona and Bozzolo to
Mantua. By the flanking movement of the Allies and
the battle of Magenta the Austrians were cut off from
the first of these two lines and pressed towards this
latter, which they have always considered as their chief
line of operations. Running as it does in the vicinity
of the Po, it has been provided with a series of strong-
holds, all of them erected at the passages of the con-
fluents of the Po, which come down from the north almost
at right angles to the latter.
" The object being to out-manoeuvre rather than to
beat the Austrians, who were retreating on the southern
line towards the Mincio, the northern was chosen by
the AUies for theirs. Again, keeping the object to be
attained in view, nothing could be more appropriate
than this choice and the plan based on it. The northern
line of operations runs in a straight line, almost to the
Mincio, is consequently shorter than the southern, to
which besides the Austrians had, under the most favour-
able circumstances, two marches from Abbiategrasso.
Thus there was every possibility of reaching the
Mincio line as soon as, if not sooner than, the
enemy."
The Austrian troops remained twenty-four hours in
the positions which they had been told to reach on the
6th, the outposts occupying a line drawn from the Ticino
through Giovenzano and Carpiano ; Roden's brigade
of the Vlllth Corps held Melegnano with outposts at
San Giuhano on the Milan road, and both Roden and
Mensdorff received the strictest orders to push patrols
in all directions and right up to the very gates of the
152 THE CAMPAIGN OF
capital. The upper Adda about Treviglio was held
by the brigades of Hoditz and Brunner.
The Aiistrian retreat was continued on the 7th as
follows : —
Vlllth Corps with four brigades to the right bank
of the Adda at Lodi — Roden remaining in Meleg-
nano.
Vllth Corps to the left bank of the Adda at Lodi.
Ist Corps to hold the Une of the Adda from Lodi to
Treviglio with three brigades of Montenuovo's
division, one of these three being Teuchert's,
made up from the late garrison of Milan .
Hoditz to hold the Hne of the railway from Brescia
to Grorlago.
The Cavalry Division to Lodi, bivouacking on the left
bank of the Adda on the Pandino road.
All these were placed under the orders of Benedek,
commanding the Vlllth Corps.
The Ilnd Corps was to move to Borghetto.
The Ilird Corps, with the troops from Pavia — the
latter under General Pokorny — to bivouac be-
tween San Angiolo and Bargano : these two corps,
with the remainder of the Ist, moving by the
same road after crossing the Adda, were placed
imder Schwartzenberg's command.
The IXth Corps marched to Codogno, while of the Vth
one division (Sternberg's) moved to Campo
Rinaldo, and Paumgartten's to Santa Cristina.
From the above it will be seen that the retirement
of the Austrian Army was to be carried out in three
great columns : that on the right, under Benedek, by
Lodi, Soncino, Manerbio to Montechiaro ; the centre,
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 153
under Schwartzenberg, by Borghetto, Bertonico and
Robeoco to Valeggio, Volta and Roverbello ; while the
third or left column, accompanied by the heavy baggage
and other impedimenta, moved by Pizzighettone, Cre-
mona and Piadena towards Mantua. The different
columns were directed so to time their marches as to
reach their destinations on the 11th and 12th, but the
Vlllth Corps, which was as yet intact, was, with the
Cavalry Division, to follow a day's march in rear of
the Vllth Corps, acting as a rearguard and maintaining
touch with the enemy.
Benedek was given the following instructions : in
the event of the pursuit not being pressed he was to
take up a position about Montechiaro, occupying Ponte
San Marco and Calcinate in strength ; if, however, he
were closely followed, he was to withdraw by Castiglione
delle Stiviere behind the Miucio, making towards Valeg-
gio with the bulk of his troops whUe covering his flank
with a small force near Lonato. Should, on the other
hand, his retirement by Leno and Montechiaro appear
likely to involve him in any danger, he was to use
his discretion as to retiring by Asola and Goito.
It was the intention of Gyulai, should the retreat of
the Second Army not be molested, to concentrate be-
tween CastigUone and Lonato — holding Ponte San Marco
and Montechiaro as advanced posts — whence he esti-
mated that the line of the Mincio could best be defended,
while retaining one corps for the defence of the lower
Chiese and Oglio.
Urban, who had this day regained touch with the
main army, was directed to send aU his heavy ordnance
and other stores to Peschiera under the escort of one
154 THE CAMPAIGN OF
of his brigades, which, on completion of this duty, was
to return and take up a position on the Chiese at Ponte
San Marco and so safeguard the right flank of the army.
With his two other brigades Urban was ordered to cross
into Valtehn by Edolo and the Aprioa pass, crush the
revolution which had there broken out and restore order,
taking measures at the same time for safeguarding his
ultimate retreat into the southern Tyrol by Mount
Tonale.
The strength of the garrison of Piacenza was raised,
for the Austrian Commander-in-Chief hoped eventually
to use the fortress as the pivot of an energetic offensive,
which appeared to Gyulai not to be impossible in view
of the serious losses which he believed the French to
have suffered at Magenta. Bergamo and Brescia were
for the present to be held, the garrison of the former to
effect its ultimate retreat by Eomano to Antignate,
there joining on to Montenuovo's troops from Trevigho,
and withdrawing thence to Bagnolo ; the troops from
Brescia were later on to retreat behind the Chiese, hold-
ing the bridges at Ponte San Marco, Calcinato, and
Montechiaro.
During the night of the 7th-8th, Gyulai received
from the Emperor Franz Josef stringent orders to stand
fast on the Adda, or, in the event of that river being
already passed in retreat, at least to take up a position
on the high ground between Piacenza and Lodi, and
upon these orders Gyulai isued very early on the morning
of the 8th the following instructions for the resumption
of the offensive— instructions which, however, did not
reach some units until they had already recommenced
their retirement : Pa via, which was already evacuated.
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 155
was to be reoccupied by one brigade of the Vth Corps,
the remaining brigades taking up a position about Corte
Olona. The Ilird Corps was to stand fast at San
Angiolo, sending one brigade to Landriano and stretch-
ing out a hand to Roden's brigade of the Vlllth Corps
in Melegnano. The 1st and Ilnd Corps were to remain
in Borghetto, while the Vllth and Vlllth Corps and
the Cavahy Division were to halt in Lodi, sending out
strong patrols towards Milan, Paullo and Melzo, and
establishing a chain of posts on the right bank of the
Adda covering the north-west of Lodi. Roden was to
place Melegnano in a state of defence and join hands
with the brigade in Landriano ; the IXth Corps was to
concentrate in Codogno ; while Bergamo and Brescia
were to be held until the army should resume its retreat.
The brigades of Hoditz and Brunner were placed at
the disposal of Urban, who was now ordered to concen-
trate his five brigades at Trevigho and Canonica ; while
Montenuovo was directed to halt on the Adda, with
Pandino as his centre, and watch the line of the river
from Lodi to the Milan-Treviglio road — ^if possible,
occupying Paullo and sending strong reconnoitring
parties to Melzo and Gorgonzola.
Early on the 8th, it becoming apparent that the Allies
were advancing towards the Lambro from Milan, Benedek
ordered up Boer's brigade from Lodi to support Roden
in Melegnano, where Berger, the divisional general, was
himself in command. Berger had been instructed to
ofier resistance only to weak detachments of the enemy,
and to fall back before any show of real strength.
The report of the advance of the Allies, and of the
measures which Benedek had adopted, reached Army
156 THE CAMPAIGN OF
Headquarters in Codogno about 1 p.m., and Gyulai
at once issued orders for striking at the enemy's flank
on tlie morrow. The Vlllth, supported by the Vllth
Corps, was to hold the enemy at Melegnano, while the
Ilird, 1st, and Ilnd struck at his right or western flank ;
the Vth Corps was to advance along the left bank of
the Ticino in the direction of Rosate, thus guarding the
Austrian left, while the IXth Corps was to form a general
reserve at San Angiolo. These dispositions, however,
did not commend themselves to Baron Hess, who con-
sidered that any offensive effort was hopeless in view
of the numerical superiority of the enemy, and after a
long discussion with Gyulai the idea of the offensive
was — apparently under some pressure — abandoned.
The Allies seem to have been well informed of the
movements of the Austrians, and especially of the occu-
pation of Melegnano by Roden, and of the efforts which
that commander was making to put the town in a state
of defence. The Emperor Napoleon was, however, unable
to satisfy himself whether the intention was merely
to cover the further retreat of the Austrians, or whether
the town was meant to serve as a base for an offensive
movement against Milan. On the evening of the 7th,
therefore. Marshal Baraguey d'Hilliers received orders
to take steps towards clearing up the situation. The
Marshal was instructed to endeavour — with the assist-
ance of the Ilnd Corps — to intercept the Austrians
retiring from Binasco and Landriano on Lodi, and for
this purpose he was to move at 4 a.m. on the 8th to-
wards Melegnano, halting either at San Donato or San
Giuliano ; during the 8th, however, further orders
reached Baraguey, under which he was to carry Meleg-
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 157
nano the same day. For this purpose MacMahon's ^
corps was placed under his orders, while General Niel
was also detailed to support the movement.
Baraguey's 1st Division (the brigades Dieu and
Blanchard) having reached San Donate, branched off
by Civesio, Viboldone and Mezzano and made for
Riozzo, in view of estabUshing itself at Cerro to cut
off the retreat of the Austrians from Melegnano by the
right bank of the Lambro. The 2nd Division (the
brigades Niol and de Negrier) quitted the maia road
at San Giuhano and marched down the Lambro by
Zivido and San Brera to gain the Austrian right flank ;
while the 3rd Division (the brigades Goze and Dumont)
moved down the main road straight upon Melegnano,
but being greatly delayed by the congested state of
the road, it was not until 5.45 p.m. that this division
arrived within sight of the town. The road by which
the 3rd Division moved was broad and straight and
was bordered throughout by wide ditches, crossed here
and there by stone bridges leading out to the fields,
which were seamed by irrigation cuts and covered with
high crops and trees, the field of view being thus greatly
restricted.
Roden's brigade had been in occupation of Melegnano
since the evening of the 6th, and considerable time and
labour had been expended in putting the place in a
state of defence ; the churchyard lying to the front
of the town had walls six feet high, and these had been
provided with banquettes, whUe a farm on the opposite
side of the main road had been fortified. The chaussee
1 MacMahon had been created a Marshal of France and Duke
of Magenta for his share in the viotory of the 4th.
158 THE CAMPAIGN OF
itseK had been cut and a strong barricade erected across
it, and at tbe northern entrance of the town an earth-
work had been thrown up and four guns there placed
in position ; the walls, too, to the north had all been
loopholed. Melegnano was held by the 2nd and
3rd battalion of the 11th Infantry Regiment — the
whole of the 3rd battalion holding the Milan front,
while the 2nd gave one company for the defence
of the cemetery and half another for that of the
farm. Four companies of this regiment guarded
the west and south-west, towards Landriano. The
Grenadier Battalion of the same regiment formed
the local reserve, and was posted on the east
side of the town. A general reserve, of two batta-
lions, one and a half batteries and a few cavalry, was
placed to the south-east of Melegnano in the angle
between the Lodi and Mulazzano roads. The out-
posts which had held the line Mezzano — San Brera —
Colturano fell back before the advance of the French
columns.
Melegnano is divided by the Lambro into two parts
of unequal size ; it is, moreover, a very straggling town,
formed of groups of detached buildings, making it
difficult to defend, and with an old castle in the larger
or western portion of the town, surrounded on three
sides by a moat.
About 6 p.m. Baraguey ordered Bazaine (3rd Division)
to attack ; a company of zouaves extended on either
side of the main road, and two guns came into action
on the chaussee itseK, engaging the Austrian guns behind
the earthwork. Very soon Bazaine — considering that
the vigour of the Austrian artillery fire was slackening —
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 159
prepared to assault ; the knapsacks were tlirowii down
on the road, three companies of zouaves deployed to
the right, followed by two battalions of the 34th regi-
ment of the line, while the remainder of the zouaves,
supported by the 33rd, charged up the road straight
at the barricade. The French artillery ceased firing,
and the 2nd brigade — halting at the spot where
the road had been cut — ^remained in reserve.
In the meantime the 2nd Division (Ladmirault)
had barely reached San Brera when firing was heard on
its right ; pushing on rapidly, the 10th battalion of
chasseurs and the 15th regiment of the line were soon
able to join hands with Bazaine's zouaves, and forcing
back the Austrians in this quarter, possessed themselves
of the outskirts of the town between the river and the
San Brera road.
The divisional artillery had accompanied General
Forey, and was established about 1,200 yards from the
village with infantry on either flank and the rest of the
brigade ia reserve. The other brigade had just de-
bouched from Mezzano. MacMahon during this time
was endeavouring, in accordance with his instructions,
to gain the extreme right and rear of the Austrians.
His 2nd Division (Decaen) leading, he marched by
Linate and Bettola and reached Mediglia about 4 p.m.,
La Motterouge — some considerable distance in rear —
making for the same spot by Monticello and Carpianello.
Decaen moved on Balbiano and was preparing there to
halt when the guns of the 1st Corps were heard in action,
and he at once resimied his march, pushing on through
Dressano with the idea of placing his division astride
the Melegnano-Lodi road.
i6o THE CAMPAIGN OF
The IVth Corps (Niel) made a wide detoui to the
west, and the two leading divisions reached and halted
at Carpiano, whUe the third, pushing further south,
arrived at Gnignano and threw forward artillery and
infantry towards Landriano. Here about 6 p.m. the
IVth Corps heard the sound of the firing at Melegnano,
but no attempt whatever was made to advance or co-
operate further, in the absence of orders other than
those issued : " That the IVth Corps was to be held
in readiness to assist the 1st Corps — ^if required."
Bazaine's leading battalions had now made repeated
assaults upon the front of the town ; driven back
more than once by a murderous fiire from the Austrians
in the houses and behind the enclosures, the zouaves
and 33rd returned again and again to the attack ; first
the cemetery and then the farms were captured and the
two main streets were occupied, when Ladmirault,
penetrating at the same time from the east, drove in
upon Bazaine's men the defenders of that flank. There
was desperate fighting hand to hand, the Austrians
offering a gaUant resistance to overwhelming numbers
and nearly capturing in the mMee the Eagle of the 33rd.
One of the Austrian guns at the northern entrance of
the town was dismounted by a shell and captured by
the French, but the others were successfully brought off.
Berger now ordered Roden to evacuate Melegnano
covered by Boer's brigade, which had come up and
was in position in rear of the town, holding the Casa
Bernada and deployed towards Riozzo.
Ladmirault, collecting portions of three of his bat-
talions, sent them towards the Mulazzano road, with
orders to cross it and endeavour to cut the Austrian
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 161
retreat ; but these were received by so heavy a fire
from Boer's men that they were not able to advance ;
MacMahon's guns, however, had reached the Mulazzano
road more to the east, and were able seriously to harass
the final retirement of the Austrians upon Lodi. Ro-
den's brigade passed through that of Boer — who had
by now been mortally wounded — and the remains of
the two Austrian brigades were able to efiect their
retreat, practically unmolested, under the cover of a
violent rainstorm which had long been threatening,
and which now burst over the field.
The French had pushed their attack so quickly that
the greater part of the town was already in their hands
while many isolated bodies of the enemy were still
holding out in the houses and enclosures, and to this
circumstance may in large measure be attributed
the many captures which were effected. That the
brigades under Boer and Roden did weU is unquestion-
able ; the French were in six times greater strength,
and if the " missing " are left out of count, the Austrians
inflicted a greater loss than they themselves suffered,
while they were able to draw off without serious hind-
rance. For this last they were indebted to the failure
in combination of the 1st and Ilnd Corps and to the
extraordinary inaction of Niel, but as Baraguey d'Hil-
liers states in his report on the action to the Emperor :
" Pour que ces combinaisons pussent avoir un plein
sumIs, il fallait que le temps ne manqudt pas d, leur
developpement, et, en me prescrivant d'operer le jour
mime de mon depart de San Pietro d'Olmo, Voire
Majeste rendait ma tdche plus difficile.^'
The French acknowledge a loss of 153 killed, 734
M
i62 THE CAMPAIGN OF
wounded. (70 officers were killed and wounded) and 64
missing, while the Austrian casualties are given as 120
kiUed, 240 wounded, and 1,114 missing, of whom some-
thing over a hundred only were able to rejoin their
units a few days after the action.
Of the three French corps engaged at Melegnano,
the 1st occupied the town that night ; the Ilnd bivouacked
at Dressano, the IVth at Carpiano ; while of the Austrians
the IXth Corps, with Army Headquarters, was in
Codogno, the Vllth and Vlllth and part of the 1st in
Lodi ; at Borghetto was the rest of the 1st and the whole
of the Ilnd, while the Ilird was at San Angiolo and the
Vth at Corte Olona.
Moltke does not see that any object whatever was
gained by the Austrians standing fast at Melegnano,
their action being only justified if they had any intention
of moving forward across the Lambro, and there was
certainly at this time no idea of resuming the offensive
against the concentrated army of the Allies. All the
Austrians really needed to do was to halt and endeavour
to glean sonde intelligence of the enemy's movements' ;
it was, above aU things, important to avoid just then
the moral effect of heavy losses accompanied by defeat.
Lecomte says that to derive any real advantage,
the Allies shoidd have advanced upon Melegnano forty-
eight hours earher, when Lodi and Pizzighettone might
well have been for Gyulai what the passage of the
Beresina was for the First Napoleon. He blames Bara-
guey d'HUliers for assaulting Melegnano and thereby
incurring such heavy casualties, pointing out that he
was not, as stated in his report on the action, directed
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 163
to " chasser Vennemi de Mdegnano," but to " intercepter
les Autrichiens qui se retirent de Binasco et de Lan-
driano sur Lodi." This mission, Lecomte submits,
might well have been accompUshed by holding Roden in
front with a small force, and outflanking him on the left
with both the 1st and Ilnd Corps.
MOVEMENTS OF THE VTH FRENCH CORPS-
ACTION AT CASTENEDOLO— AUSTRIANS
RETREAT BEHIND THE MINCIO
CHAPTER VIII
MOVEMENTS OF THE VTH FBENCH CORPS — ACTION AT
CASTENEDOLO — AUSTEIANS RETREAT BEHIND THE
MINCIO
It was stated in the first chapter that on the mobilization
of the " Army of Italy," a Vth Corps had been formed
and placed under the command of Prince Napoleon,
and that Generals D'Autemarre and Uhrich had been
appointed to lead the two divisions of which it was
composed. So far but Uttle has been heard of the move-
ments of this corps, to which a special mission had been
confided, and it may be as well to give a short account
of its operations before proceeding with the narrative
of the events in Lombardy subsequent to the action at
Melegnano.
Prince Napoleon had disembarked at Genoa on May
12, but the moiety of his command was taken from him,
when — within a week of his arrival upon Itahan soil —
D'Autemarre's division was placed under the orders of
the Commander of the 1st Corps, and thenceforth took
part in the operations described in the preceding chap-
ters. There only remained, therefore, under the imme-
diate orders of the Prince, Uhrich's division and the
cavalry brigade of General Dalmas de Laperouse, and
with these troops the Commander of the Vth Corps
i68 THE CAMPAIGN OF
was directed to re-embark and proceed to Leghorn for
the occupation of Tuscany, which had been abandoned
by its Grand Duke, and for which protection against
■the Austrians had been sought by Tuscan envoys sent
to the Emperor Napoleon. The mission confided to
the Prince was to efEect a diversion in the south and so
cause the enemy to divide his forces, and further to
preserve the neutraUty of the Papal States ; it was
authoritatively stated that no attempt to violate the
territory of the PontifE would be made by the Allies
provided Austria exercised equal consideration. It
was also anticipated that the presence in Tuscany of
even a weak corps would tend to prevent the Austrians
from drawing suppUes from Central Italy ; while the
Prince would be able to assist in the organisation of the
military forces of the Duchies. For the furtherance
of this end, the Prince was to assume command of the
Tuscan troops under General UUoa and of the various
bodies of volunteers under command of General Mezza-
capo.
The Prince reached Leghorn on the 23rd, and, three
days later, Uhrich's division was disembarked, the
mounted troops of Laperouse only arriving on May 30.
The Commander of the Vth Corps occupied the posi-
tions to the west of the Apennines with his 2nd
brigade (du Bourguet), so as to watch the Duchy of
Modena with the assistance of the local troops and volun-
teers ; while the 1st brigade (Grandchamp), with the
cavalry, was concentrated in Florence. Reconaissances
were pushed in all directions, and the French troops
were kept constantly exercised, ready for the part which
all hoped they yet might take in the more active work
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 169
of the campaign. Aiter the battle of Magenta, Prince
Napoleon asked sanction to cross the Apennines and
establish touch with the main army of the Allies — driving
the Austrians back to the right bank of the Po. As a
matter of fact, however, the enemy had by now already
prepared to evacuate the Duchies ; Ancona was given
up, the garrisons of Pavia and Piacenza were withdrawn
early in June, and on the 12th the troops at Bologna
fell back upon Perrara, preparatory to retiring across
the Po. The Duchess of Parma now fled to Switzerland,
while the Duke of Modena joined the staff of the Emperor
Franz Josef.
On June 12 the Vth Corps commenced its march to
the north, passed the Apennines, by bad roads and in
tempestuous weather, about the 16th, and by the 27th
Uhrich's diAdsion was concentrated in Parma. It was
not, however, until the end of the month that the Vth
Corps was ultimately reunited at Piadena.
No forward movement was made by the AUies either
on the 9th or 10th, and the time was passed by the
troops in the rest they so much needed, and by the
Emperor Napoleon in perfecting his arrangements for
the advance. To reach the Mincio from the Ticino, it
was necessary to cross all the northern tributaries of
the Po — each, of which — ^the Adda, the Serio, the Oglio,
the Mella and the Chiese — forms an excellent defensive
line for an army retreating eastward. It was not yet
definitely known to what extent the Austrians had
really suffered at Magenta, and it was confidently
expected that G3rulai would stand on the Adda, whose
torrent can only be passed at the bridges of Vaprio and
lyo THE CAMPAIGN OF
Cassano, Lodi and Pizzighettone. The roads which
lead across the river at the two latter places are that
from Milan to Crema by Melegnano and that ffrom Pavia
to Mantua, and it was only by these roads that the
Second Army was conducting its retreat. It was known,
too, that the bulk of the army was about Lodi, and it
was presumed that Gyulai would await attack on the
lower portion of the Adda.
Reconnaissances sent along the Lodi road soon made
it clear that the town was evacuated and that the Aus-
trians — abandoning aU attempt to defend the hne of the
river — were in full retreat, and the Emperor Napoleon
then resolved to foUow by the northern road, crossing
the Adda at Vaprio and Cassano. Vaprio was given
up to the troops under Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi,
while the bulk of the French corps prepared to cross at
Cassano.
In pursuance of these intentions it was necessary first
to recall the 1st, Ilnd, and IVth Corps to the Milan — -
Cassano line. On the 11th the 1st Corps was directed
on Linate and Limito, MacMahon moved on Paullo
and Gavazzo, while Niel took, in Milan, the place of
Canrobert who marched to Melzo.
The ItaUan Army, starting on the 10th, reached Monza
on that day and Vimercate on the 11th, intending to
reach the Adda on the day following.
Canrobert reached Cassano on the 12th, but the four
bridges — road and railway — over the Muzza canal and
the Adda, had been destroyed by the troops of the
enemy retiring from Milan, and three pontoon and other
bridges had to be thrown across ; this work was com-
pleted long before dark and the Ilird Corps, crossing
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 171
over, reached Treviglio that night. The 1st Corps
occupied Meko, Pozzuolo and Vignate, the Ilnd Albig-
nano and Truccazzano ; the Vth Corps bivouacked at
Pioltello, while the Guard was at Gorgonzola. The
Italians, crossing the Adda at Vaprio, had occupied
Ciserano, Cologno, Lurano, Pagazzano, Morengo and
Romano — ^thus covering the front and left of the Ilird
Corps.
On the 13th MacMahon moved over to the left bank
and reached Caravaggio ; the 1st Corps marched to Tre-
viglio, which Canrobert vacated, moving to Mozzanica ;
while in rear Niel with the IVth Corps reached Albignano,
TreceUa and Pozzuolo, and the Guard Le Fomaci —
both these last ready to cross next day. On the 14th
the Guard, with the Imperial Headquarters, marched to
Treviglio ; the Ilird Corps crossed the Serio at Moz-
zanica and pursued, from Antignate, the Soncino road,
leaving the Calcio road free for the Ilnd Corps following
in rear. The 1st Corps moved up to Mozzanica, while
the IVth marched to Caravaggio. Thus the French
Army had its front on the Oglio covered by the Ilnd
and Illrd Corps at Urago and Soncino, while the Guard,
the 1st and the IVth Corps were massed a short distance
in rear. On this day the Italian divisions on the left
reached Coccaglio and Castegnate, thus threatening
the Austrian right and extending a hand to Garibaldi.
Any intention which Gyulai might have entertained
on the 8th of striking at the flank of his enemy was
definitely abandoned on the full results of the action
at Melegnano becoming known, and late that night
orders for the continuance of the retreat were issued
as under : —
172 THE CAMPAIGN OF
The 1st Corps to move from Borghetto on Bertonico,
cross the Adda and take up a position beyond
Gombito.
The Ilnd Corps — also from Borghetto — to move
north and hold as long as possible the passages
over the Muzza on the Borghetto — ^Lodi and
Lodi — Castelpuste Orlengo roads — eventually
retiring on the last named place.
The Vth Corps to move to Castelpuste Orlengo.
The Illrd Corps to form a reserve to the Ilnd Corps
behind the Muzza, retiring eventually on Castelpuste
Orlengo.
The Vth and IXth Corps were each to give a battaUon
for the strengthening of the Piacenza garrison, and
Urban was directed to abandon the projected expedition
to the Valtehn and to retire from Canonica, Romana,
Urago and Bagnolo to Montechiaro. It was found,
however, to be impossible to carry out the above orders
in their entirety, and consequently the movements on
the 9th were unimportant.
It was now ordered that the strong places Piacenza,
Pizzighettone and Cremona were to be evacuated, and
their fortifications, as far as possible, dismantled, and it
was calculated that the garrisons thus set free, from
those and similar places, would add some 14,000 men to
the effectives of the Second Army.
To effect the required concentration on the Chiese
the following orders were issued on the 9th : —
The Vllth Corps to move on the 10th by Crema,
Orzinovi, Leno to Montechiaro — arriving on the
14th.
The Vlllth, with Mensdorff's Cavalry Division, to
/
\
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 173
move on the llth by Crema, Orzinovi, Manerbio
to Montecliiaro — arriving on the 14th.
The 1st to move on the 10th by Soresina, Castel
Visconti, and Mottella to Carpenedolo — arriving
on the 13th.
The Ilnd to move on the 10th by Soresina, Castel
Visconti and Gabbiano to Carpenedolo — arriving
on the 13th.
The Ilird to move on the 10th by Soresina and Acqua-
lunga to Carpenedolo — arriving on the 14th.
The Vth to move on the 10th by Zanengo, Farfengo,
Quinzano and Pralboino to Casalmore — arriving
on the 14th.
Urban to move on the 12th by Urago d'Oglio, Con-
ticeUe to Castenedolo — ^arriving on the 14th.
The IXth Corps to reach Acquanegra (west of Cre-
mona), on the 10th, and to move thence by
Qgognolo, Piadena and Marcaria to Piubega —
arriving on the 14th.
Army Headquarters to move on the 10th by Soresina
and Verolanova to Carpenedolo — arriving on
the 14th.
In issuing the above, Gyulai expressed his intention,
if the enemy did not harass the retreat, of concentrat-
ing the whole of the Second Army in the Lonato —
Castiglione position.
Late on the evening of this day Benedek represented
that for the Vllth and Vlllth Corps to hold the passages
of the Adda until the 11th would, from the proximity
of the AlUes, probably bring on an action, and sanction
was therefore accorded to his proposal to evacuate his
position during the night of the 9th- 10th ; but he was
174 THE CAMPAIGN OF
enjoined to burn tlie bridges behind Mm and to remain
with both corps on the left bank dming the 10th. The
Ilird Corps was at the same time ordered to move to
the left bank and to destroy the bridges after crossing.
The march orders for the 10th were carried out with
some sUght alterations ; the Cavaby Division which
was to have marched on the 11th withdrew from
Lodi on the 10th and reached Crema. The 1st Corps
bivouacked at Azzanello instead of at Castel Vis-
conti.
The garrison of Piacenza — some 9 battahons of in-
fantry, If squadrons, 2 batteries, 1 company of garrison
artillery and 2 of engineers, under Major-General
Eoesgen — quitted the fortress at 2 p.m. The Com-
mander had been ordered to join the army by way of
BresceUo and Borgoforte ; but a revolt had broken out
in Parma, the town of Fiorenzola was already in the
hands of the revolutionary party, and Roesgen wisely
decided on retreating by Pizzighettone and the left
bank of the Po, aind was able to join the Vth Corps
the same night. Of the guns in the fortress, 91 were
sent by water to Borgoforte, 5 by land to Mantua, while
about 130 others were destroyed or spiked ; the two
outer forts were blown up, and one pier and two arches
of the Trebbia bridge were destroyed.
The Commandant of Brescia was directed to stand
fast, if possible, until the 11th, when he was to retire
with the garrison to Lonato, after sending aU the
railway rolling stock to Verona and blowing up the
two bridges on the Chiese at Ponte San Marco.
On the 11th the moves were carried out as previously
arranged, with the exception that the Ilird Corps this
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 175
day reacheff^Padernello beyond Acqualunga, while
Urban, who was not to have retired before the 12th,
but whose position at Vaprio — Canonica had been
somewhat threatened, fell back — one brigade by Co-
logno — Romano, the other by Morengo ; but the Serio
being in flood, the only bridge available was that at
Mozzanica and the crossing was greatly delayed, with
the result that the brigades only reached Antignate,
Romano and Fara. On this day, too, Montenuovo's
division fell back behind the Serio and held an outpost
line on that river from Crema to Sola.
On the 11th three more strong places were evacuated
by the Austrians. Early in the afternoon the heavy
guns of Pizzighettone were either destroyed or sent off
to Mantua ; the bridge over the Adda was set on fire
and the garrison withdrew. In the same way Cremona
was evacuated, the guns being removed to Mantua ;
while Brescia was also denuded of troops and munitions,
the bridges over the Chiese being blown up as soon as
the garrison had crossed at Ponte San Marco.
The retirement of the Austrians on the 12th was
carried out without any interference from the Allies,
and, so far as the Austrian information went, none of
the enemy's regular troops had passed the Adda up to
midday, although some of Garibaldi's men had been
seen in the neighbourhood of CoccagHo. Urban had
this day reached Chiari and Cizzago, and had sent a
small force of all arms towards Pontoglio to watch the
crossing there and patrol towards Palazzolo. This
detachment at once reported that Palazzolo had been
occupied in force since the previous day, that reinforce-
ments had arrived there during the night — of which
176 THE CAMPAIGN OF
4,000 men had pushed on to Brescia — and further that
Garibaldi was advancing on Pontoglio.
The somewhat premature evacuation of Brescia had
left Urban in a critical position, since his right and rear
were both threatened by Garibaldi's troops. He was
accordingly ordered to fall back as rapidly as possible
behind the Mella, while Reznicek's brigade was directed
to move on the evening of the 12th to Azzano-Capriano,
secure the crossing at that spot and push strong patrols
towards Brescia.
News coming in to Army Headquarters this evening
that Brescia had been occupied by 12,000 Italians
under Garibaldi and Cialdini, decided Gyulai to effect
some alterations in his dispositions for the 13th : the
Vllth Corps marched to Castenedolo, the Vlllth to
OfB.aga and Cignano, Mensdorff to Paverzano, the Ilird
Corps stood fast at Padernello, the Ilnd at Quinzano
and the Vth at Verolanova and Pontevico, while the
IXth Corps marched to Marcaria and Bozzolo. Rezni-
cek had pushed forward very early on the roads leading
to Brescia, maintaining communication in rear with
the Vllth Corps, but on Urban crossing the Mella and
estabUshing himself in Poncarale, Bagnolo and Capriano,
Reznicek fell back upon the 1st Corps.
On the 14th the Austrians occupied the following
places : —
Urban in Castenedolo.
The 1st Corps in Bagnolo.
The Vllth at Montechiaro with a brigade in Calcinato.
The Vlllth and Cavalry Division in Leno.
The Vth in Gottolengo and Isorella.
The Ilird in Gambara.
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 177
The Ilnd in Pralboino.
The IXth in Maroaria.
On the 15th MacMahon crossed the Oglio at Calcio
and took up a position in front of Urago, the Imperial
Guard and Ilird Corps closing up to him in rear and
forming a second line at Romano, Covo and Fontanella ;
the remainder of the French corps did not move, but
the Italians reached Brescia, with Garibaldi's troops in
their front moving towards the Ghiese.
During Urban's occupation of Vaprio — Canonica,
Garibaldi had been at Bergamo, hesitating to advance
further without support, but learning on the 12th that
Vaprio had been vacated, he pushed forward by Marti-
nengo and Palazzolo, crossed the OgUo and, as has been
already stated, entered Brescia on the morning of the
13th. Next day, finding that the head of the Italian
divisions in rear were in touch with him, he advanced
to San Bufemia, where it was evident that he must, ere
long, become engaged with Urban's troops. These
were disposed as foUows : one brigade (Eckert, formerly
Schaffgotsche) in Castenedolo with outposts towards
Brescia, Gintowt's brigade more to the east on the
Montechiaro road with the reserve artillery, with
Rupprecht to the north watching CiUverghe and Rezzato.
Late that night Garibaldi was ordered by the King
to advance on the 15th towards Lonato and to repair
the bridge at Bettoletto, for which operation he was
promised the support of Sambuy's cavalry. Garibaldi
prepared to carry out these instructions, but having
learnt in the morning that Urban was in Castenedolo,
N
178 THE CAMPAIGN OF
it was necessary to guard against any attack on the right
flank. Counting on the speedy arrival of the promised
cavalry, Garibaldi sent the whole of his 1st Regiment
to contain Rupprecht, occupied Bettola and Ciliverghe
with a battalion of the 2nd, and moved himself with
the rest of his force towards Bettoletto.
In the orders for the 15th which had been sent to
Urban, he had been directed to stand fast at Castenedolo
until 11 a.m., at which hour it was arranged that the
1st Corps would cross the Chiese. Urban had made all
his arrangements for withdrawal accordingly, but before
he had marched off he was attacked by Garibaldi's
troops. The skirmishers of the 1st Regiment of the
Cacciatori delle Alpi came upon Rupprecht's advanced
troops between 7.30 and 8 a.m. and drove them in, but
reinforcements coming up the ItaUans in their turn
were forced back to the hne of the railway. Fearing
now that his retreat might be threatened from the
direction of Cihverghe, Urban sent thither one battaUon,
two guns and a squadron of cavalry, and these engaging
the single battaUon of Garibaldi's 2nd Regiment threw
it back in some disorder.
In the meantime Cialdini had been hurried forward
with the 4th ItaUan Division and reached San Eui emia
just as the action came to a close. Urban wisely deciding,
under all the circumstances, not to press the shght
temporary advantage he had gained. He accordingly
broke off the action about 3 p.m. and fell back upon
Calcinate. Cialdini bivouacked at Rezzato and San
Bufemia and Garibaldi about Bettoletto.
Neither side experienced much loss in this affair,
the Austrians having 12 killed, 89 wounded and 8
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 179
missing ; while the Italians lost 15 killed, 120 wounded
and had 73 men taken prisoners.
While the above action was in progress, the 1st Aus-
trian Corps had reached Chiarini, but as the brigades
were preparing to bivouac, a report arrived from Urban
of the attack made upon him and of the consequent
threatened turning of the Austrian right. Clam there-
upon sent two of his brigades towards Calcinato and
another to Vighizzolo, but finding Urban's retreat was
unmolested these brigades returned to Chiarini. The
Cavalry Division moved to Rho, the Vlllth Corps to
Montechiaro, the Vth to Carpenedolo, the Ilird to
Castel GofEredo, the Ilnd to San Cassiano, the IXth
to Gazzoldo, and Army Headquarters to Castiglione
delle Stiviere.
After eleven days of retreat the Second Army was
now established in an admirable position behind the
Chiese, ready agaia to offer battle to the Allies. The
deliberation, too, with which the retirement had been
conducted, had allowed time for the Austrian military
authorities to initiate, and to some extent to carry
through, arrangements for increasing and reorganising
the Austrian forces ; and the opportunity may perhaps
here well be taken of describing, as briefly as possible,
the general scheme of reorganisation, whereby it was
hoped that success — which now for so many weeks
had eluded the army — might yet be attracted to its
banners.
On May 26 an Imperial rescript had emanated from
Vienna, directing the calling out of the First Army,
and stating that the Emperor Franz Josef himself would
i8o THE CAMPAIGN OF
proceed to Italy and there assume tte command-in-
chief of both armies, so soon as the First should be ready
to take the field ; until then the force already in Italy,
as well as aU details en route thither, were to remain as
heretofore under Gyulai's command. Feldzeugmeister
Count WimpfEen was placed at the head of the First
Army, while the commands of the Third and Fourth
Armies, intended for the defence of the Austrian fron-
tiers, were confided respectively to Prince Liechtenstein
and Count Schlick. On May 30 the Emperor hitnseK
proceeded to Verona, accompanied by the Imperial
Headquarters Staff, and while exercising a general
supervision over the operations, for the actual conduct
of which Gyulai was apparently still in the main re-
sponsible, he occupied himseH principally in the perfect-
ing of the arrangements for the increase and reorganisa-
tion of the Austrian forces already in the field or
approaching thereto. A statement of the composition of
the different armies as newly organised will be found ia
the appendices, but it may be convenient to state here
that the First Army was to consist of the Ilnd, Ilird,
IXth, Xth, and Xlth Corps and the Cavalry Division of
General Zedtwitz, while the Second Army contained
the 1st, Vth, Vllth, and Vlllth, with the Cavaby
Division under Mensdorff.
On June 16 the Emperor Franz Josef took over the
command of the Second Army, so as to bring its move-
ments into hne with those of the First Army, which
had by this time arrived in the theatre of war. Gyulai's
idea of making a stand on the Chiese was now no longer
entertained and he received orders to move on this day
towards the Mincio, in readiness to cross to the left
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 181
bank on the ITth and take up the positions which had
been assigned to the corps under his command.
To cover the retirement of the Second Army, Urban
was directed to estabUsh himself on the 16th between
Lonato and Castiglione, following the rear of the army,
partly by Peschiera, partly by Volta and Valeggio. On
the 18th it was intended that Urban's division should
be broken up, Rupprecht's brigade going to strengthen
the garrison of Verona, while the others were to be
distributed among the various corps of the reconstituted
armies.
The following movements were to commence on the
17th :—
Second Army.
The Vllth and Vlllth Corps to move between Pes-
chiera and Valeggio and to be jointly responsible
for that portion of the line of the Mincio.
The 1st Corps to Somma compagna to form a reserve.
The Ilnd Corps to march to Mantua there to be
incorporated in the First Army.
The Ilird Corps to Quaderni and to watch the line
of the river from Valeggio to Pozzolo.
The Vth Corps to Villafranca to form a reserve.
The IXth Corps to march to Mozzecane and join the
First Army, linking on to the outpost line of the
Ilird and carrjring it on to just above Goito.
The Headquarters of the Second Army to move to
Custoza.
First Army.
The Xlth Corps to march from Mantua to Tormene
i82 THE CAMPAIGN OF
and establish outposts about Goito — ^joining those
of the IXth Corps. The Cavaby Division of Zedt-
witz to move to about San Zenone. The Head-
quarters of the First Army to Mozzecane.
Garrisons for Mantua and Legnago were to be found
by the Ilnd Corps, while the 1st provided those of
Peschiera and Verona.
In accordance with the foregoing, Gyulai directed
that on the 16th the Vllth Corps should march to
Desen^ano, theVIIIth Corps and the Cavalry Division
to Guidizzolo, the 1st to Peschiera, the Ilird to Goito,
and the Vth to Volta, while Urban moved to Lonato
and CastigUone.
From reports which had reached Gyulai on the night
of the 15th, it appeared that the Allies were standing
fast in front, while an outflanking movement on a large
scale was in course of execution, and that it was in-
tended to move large forces by Lake Garda to operate
on the north of the Mincio position. The Imperial
Headquarters thereupon decided that the retreat of
the Second Army — ^then already commenced — should
be countermanded and that Gyulai should reoccupy
the Lonato — Castiglione position with a view to striking
a decisive blow at the Allies before the Vth Corps, under
Prince Napoleon, could join them from the south.
In accordance with this determination the VTIth
Corps was ordered to move to Lonato extending its
right to the lake, the Vlllth Corps to Castighone, the
1st to Castel Venzago as a reserve (with the Cavalry
Division at Guidizzolo) to the Vllth and Vlllth Corps.
Urban was to join the Vlllth Corps, and Gyulai's
Headquarters was to be at Pozzolengo. These
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 183
positions were to be maintained during the 17th'
and the 1st Corps and Urban's troops were to be
hurled against the enemy's flank ; in the event of the
AlUes being driven back to the Chiese, the crossings at
Ponte San Marco and at Montechiaro were to be once
more held. Should the positions of the Vllth and
Vlllth Corps be attacked in force, the Ilird Corps
from Goito and the Vth from Volta were to be used, as
seemed best, either to strike at the enemy's flank or to
strengthen the Lonato — -Castighone position.
The Vlth Corps, then in Tyrol, was to endeavour to
threaten the enemy's flank from the Upper Chiese
valley, moving by Storo on Vestone and Salo ; the Com-
mander was advised that the army would probably
move forward towards Brescia on the 21st, and he
was particularly enjoined to concentrate in as great
strength as possible about Vestone on the 20th.
These counter-orders were evidently quite unexpected,
and some of the units of the Second Army had already
covered some considerable distance in their retreat to
the Mincio before the fresh orders overtook them. It
was then impossible for the directions to be complied
with in fuU that day, and it was not untU the 17th
that Gyulai was able to report that the Lonato — Casti-
glione position had been reoccupied as directed.
On this day the First Army was in position behind
the Mincio — ^the IXth Corps between Roverbella and
Belvidere, the Ilnd in and south of Mantua, the Xth to
the east of Mantua, the Xlth in reserve about Tormene ;
the Cavalry Division was on its way to Verona, and
Army Headquarters was at Mozzecane.
The Commander of the Vllth Corps now asked for
i84 THE CAMPAIGN OF
another division to strengthen his right, and Urban was
ordered to move on the 18th to Desen^ano, pushing
one brigade to Padenghe and stationing another on the
northern side of Desenzano. Gjulai partictilarly asked
sanction to concentrate his troops for the purpose of
more effectual support, pointing out that Lonato — the
key of the position — was held by the Vllth Corps,
which had recently, from various causes, been greatly
reduced in numbers, and that the distance at which
the 1st Corps was posted efiectually prevented anything
like timely support. To this a reply was given that
there was no intention of really holding the position,
which would only be maintained so long as the enemy
made no serious attack upon it. Gyulai was also in-
formed that the army would probably be withdrawn
behind the Mincio on the 20th, and the orders issued
to the Vlth Corps in Tyrol were now cancelled.
On this day, the 18th, Urban's division, now com-
manded byRupprecht, made the moves ordered on the
previous day, while the other units of the Second
Aimy remained halted. Early in the afternoon, however,
orders were issued that the withdrawal of the Second
Army behind the Mincio was to be so carried out that
all the units should have crossed and reached their
allotted positions by midday on the 21st, the Ilird
Corps to Pozzolo, the Vth to Valeggio, the Vlllth to
Prentina and Salionze, the 1st, YTIth, and Cavalry to
Quademi, Mozzecane and Malvicina in reserve.
On the 18th Count Gyulai tendered the resignation of
his command and his place was filled by Count Schlick,
lately commanding the Fourth Army.
On the 20th and 21st the retreat was resumed ; a
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 185
large number of crossings had been prepared over the
Mincio, viz, : —
Two bridges at Pescbiera ;
One bridge „ Salionze ;
One ,, „ Monzambano ;
One „ „ Valeggio ;
One „ „ Pozzolo ;
Three bridges „ Goito ;
and by the latter date both armies were in position on
the left bank from Peschiera to Mantua, having, to all
appearance, no other intention than to dispute with the
enemy the passage of the river
The Xth Corps, drawn well back behind the left,
covered that flank from any attack from the right bank
of the Po.
In the meantime the Allies had resumed their measured
advance after the action at Castenedolo ; on the 16th
the 1st, Ilnd, and Ilird Corps, with part of the Guard,
crossed the Oglio, when the most advanced points occu-
pied by the French were Chiari, Castrezzato, Comezzano
and Orzinovi. The rest of the army was on or behind
the OgUo. The Emperor was at Calcio, while the King
was at Castegnate with his divisions in and about
Brescia. On the 17th the Italians advanced in two
columns, the 1st and 2nd Divisions by the Castenedolo
road, the 3rd and 4th towards Eezzato. The French
arrived on the MeUa'and pushed Desvaux's cavahy on to
Bagnolo and Montirone, and the next day the Emperor
reached the right bank of the Chiese ; the marching was
slow but the heat was extreme. The French were now
i86 THE CAMPAIGN OF
disposed in order of battle : Baraguey d' Hilliers was
on the left moving on Lonato and Castiglione, Mac-
Mahon in the centre at San Zeno and Borgo SatoUo,
and Niel on the right at Bagnolo ; in the rear was the
Guard at Brescia with Canrobert at Poncarale.
The army halted on the 19th and 20th, and received
a cavalry reinforcement in the shape of a brigade of
cavalry of the Guard under General Morris.
Reconnaissances sent out on the 19th found that Mon-
techiaro was occupied, but on the morrow it became
known that the position had been completely abandoned.
Moving forward again on the 21st the IVth Corps
crossed the Chiese at Mezzane and occupied Carpene-
dolo with the flanks covered by the cavahy under Par-
touneaux and Desvaux ; the Ilird Corps closed up in
rear of the IVth, remaining, however, on the right bank ;
while the Ilnd Corps occupied Montechiaro, with the
1st behind the river at Rho. Of the Piedmontese one
division (3rd) was at Desenzano, with the 1st and 5th
in support at Lonato. Victor Emmanuel held his
2nd Division in reserve with his Headquarters at Cal-
cinate, while the Imperial Headquarters was with the
Guard at Castenedolo. On the 22nd MacMahon again
moved on, occupying CastigHone, while the Guard
crossed to Montechiaro.
No forward movement was made on the 23rd, but
reconnaissances were sent out to cover thoroughly the
whole country between the Chiese and the Mincio ;
while from the hiUs about Castiglione the brothers
Goddard repeated a balloon ascent which they had
made two days before from Castenedolo. From aU
available sources of information it seemed clear that there
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 187
was considerable movement among the Austrians ;
that SoKerino, Cavriana, Guidizzolo and Medole were
occupied, and that heavy columns were about Goito
and Pozzolengo. To the Emperor all this seemed
merely to prove that the Austrians — anxious to dis-
cover the points where the passage of the Mincio was
likely to be attempted — ^were supporting, in consider-
able strength, the troops which they had thrown forward
to gain information ; and the Emperor Napoleon can
hardly be blamed if it failed to occur to him that the
Austrians— having evacuated the strong positions on
the Chiese and permitted their occupation by the Allies
— should now be about to offer battle with the Mincio
at their backs and in a position far inferior to that which
they had voluntarily given up.
It was, however, the unexpected which was about to
happen, and which was to result in the greatest battle,
in point of numbers, which had, up to then, been fought
since Leipzic.
Moltke has discussed the question whether Piacenza
shoidd have been evacuated, or whether, as some have
held, it should have been made use of as a strong flank
position, whence Lombardy might have been successfully
defended. A retreat behind the Po would have put an
end to all pursuit, while the Xth and Xlth Corps might
have joined the armj^ by way of Mantua and Borgoforte.
Had the AUies then still held on there way to the Mincio,
the Austrians could have moved on their right flank
from or below Piacenza, or could even have returned to
the right bank of the Ticino and cut the communica-
tions in rear of the French and Italian armies. Against
i88 THE CAMPAIGN OF '59
all this must be said that, since the Austrians were
not pursued, they were in no immediate need of the pro-
tection of the fortress, and that flank movements when
executed from beyond a certain distance lose much of
their value. A position on the flank behind the canal
must have checked the march of the Allies on Milan ;
whereas one behind the Po would have had no effect
on their onward movement. By holding fast at Pia-
cenza, the Austrians were not drawing nearer to their
reinforcements, while they were allowing the enemy
time to strengthen his hold on Lombardy. Moltke
considers that the evacuation of Piacenza was justified,
since its fortifications were not sufficiently completed
for it to stand alone ; but none the less a bad impression
was made by its enforced abandonment.
There is very much to be said in favour of a stand on
the Chiese, as Gyulai had intended. The left bank
everjrwhere commanded the right, the northern flank
of the position could not be turned, while if the left
flank were attempted, there was there admirable ground
for the employment of the Austrian cavalry in support
of the main army attacking across the river. At the
worst the fortresses of the Quadrilateral were only one
day's march in rear, and if the hilly country behind
the Chiese increased the difficulties of retreat, it added,
at least in equal measure, to those attending an advance.
THE BATTLE OF SOLPEEINO
CHAPTER IX
THE BATTLE OP SOLPEEINO
In order to discover something definite about the dis-
positions of the Franco-Italian Army, and also to regain
touch, which had been temporarily relaxed, the Com-
mander of the Second Army sent out on the night of
the 21st a strong patrol, consisting of two squadrons
of cavalry and two horse-artillery guns, under Major
von Appel of the 12th Uhlans. This patrol was ordered
to cross the Mincio at Monzambano and make for Poz-
zolengo, move next day by Rivoltella to Lonato, and
return by way of Castighone, Guidizzolo and Volta
toValeggio. Major von Appel was not, however, able
completely to fulfil all that had been confided to him ;
he came everywhere upon the enemy in considerable
force, and was never able to pierce the screen behind
which their main strength was concealed. But from
the reports which this officer sent in during his tour,
rather than perhaps from the general conclusions to be
drawn from his expedition as a whole, the Imperial
Headquarter Staff came to the conclusion that only
fart of the Alhed Army was on the left bank of the Chiese
— viz. the Italians to the north in the neighbour|iood of
the Lake of Garda by Desen2iano and Lonato, and some
192 THE CAMPAIGN OF
of the Frencli troops in the hilly country about Esenta,
Castiglione and Carpenedolo.
With the retirement of the Austrians behind the
Mincio, the Emperor Franz Josef and his military advisers
had apparently by no means reUnquished aU idea of a
return to the offensive ; the numerous bridges which
had been constructed, or which were already in existence,
over the river had all been retained ; many commanding
positions on the right bank had been occupied and
entrenched, and from these and other signs and prepara-
tions, it seems tolerably clear that the Austrians were
only awaiting an opportunity, following upon the con-
centration of their armies, once again to endeavour to
fall upon and overwhelm the enemy. The whole force
under the Emperor Franz Josef was now indeed strength-
ened and recuperated, and its concentration efEected,
and it was resolved to assume the offensive while the
enemy was engaged in the passage of the Chiese, and
before the 60,000 men — said to be threading the passes
of the Apennines — could strike at the lower reaches of
the Po and turn the Austrian left flank. Late then on
the 22nd, after the return of the Emperor to Villafranca
from an inspection of the position of the 1st Corps at
Quaderni, orders were sent out directing the advance of
the armies across the Mincio on the 24th. Before,
however, these orders had much more than started on
their way to the corps concerned, the date of the intended
movement was changed, in the hope of falling upon the
Allies before their passage of the Chiese had been com-
pleted.
The Army Order detailing the proposed movement
is too long to quote verbatim, but the following comprises
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 193
its main points : " The Imperial Army will resume
the offensive on the 24th, and the operations, wherein
both armies will be engaged, will consist in — (1) Crossing
the Mincio ; (2) the overthrow of the enemy in the
immediate neighbourhood; (3) the advance to the
Chiese ; (4) the preliminaries to an action on the Chiese
should the enemy there concentrate.
" Movements of the Second Army.
" The VTIIth Corps wiU cross at SaHonze, being pre-
viously joined in Peschiera by a brigade of the Vlth
Corps (Major-General Reichlin-Meldegg ^), and wiU
move on Pozzolengo.
" The Vth Corps will cross at Valeggio and move on
Solferino.
" The 1st Corps wiU cross at Valeggio in rear of the
Vth, and will move on Volta and Cavriana.
" Mensdorff's Cavalry Division, and in its rear the
Vllth Corps, wiU cross at Ferri after the Ilird Corps,
and will move, the Cavalry to the east of Cavriana,
the Vllth Corps to Foresto.
" Movements of the First Army.
" This army, as the left flank, will at first remain
refused and will protect Goito from any possible attack.
As soon as the movement of the Second Army has
developed, the Ilird Corps will cross at Ferri, moving on
Guidizzolo.
" The IXth Corps will cross at Goito and also move
on Guidizzolo.
" In rear of the IXth Corps will cross Zedtwitz's
Cavalry Division and then the Xlth Corps, which will
^ This brigade actually joined during the night of the
22nd-23rd.
194 THE CAMPAIGN OF
move to tlie west of Cereta. The Cavalry Division will
protect the left flank towards Medole with detachments
pushed forward to Casaloldo and Castel GofEredo.
" The Ilnd Corps will detach two brigades to the IXth
Corps and these will move to Marcaria to protect the
left.
" The passage of the river to begin at 9 a.m. with
the Second Army, and at 10 a.m. with the First.
" In the event of a reverse both armies will retire in
the same manner and reoccupy their original positions
behind the Mincio.
" On the 24th the Imperial Headquarters will be at
Valeggio.
" Movements for the 25th : Second Army.
" The Vlllth Corps and Reichhn's brigade to Lonato
and Desenzano.
" The Vth Corps to Esenta.
" The 1st Corps to Castiglione delle Stiviere.
" The Vllth Corps to Le Fontane.
" Mensdorff's Cavalry Division, supported by the Vth
Corps to Montechiaro.
"First Army.
" The IXth Corps to between Carpenedolo and Acqua
Fredda.
" The IlIrd and Xlth Corps to Carpenedolo and San
Vigilio.
" Zedtwitz's Cavahy Division to Acqua Fredda and
Casalmoro.
" Of the two brigades of the Ilnd Corps one to move
to Acquanegra and one to Asola.
" Movements to commence at 9 a.m. Imperial Head-
quarters at Guidizzolo."
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 ^95
Then follows the after-order, directing that the cross-
ing on the 24th be now carried out on the 23rd, and
that the forward movement detailed for the 25th should
now be commenced on the 24th.
The Officer Commanding the Vlth Corps in Tyrol was
also enjoined to conform to the movements above
indicated by marching towards Salo and Gavardo, and
the Commandant of Mantua was ordered to prepare
a bridge and bridge-head at Borgoforte. From a con-
sideration of aU the above, one is led to the conclusion
that the offensive was resumed on the presumption that
on June 23, at least a considerable portion of the AUied
Army had yet to cross +he Chiese, and that what had
already passed over was Uttle more than strong advanced
guards. The Austrian main stroke then was to be
directed upon CastigHone and the three passages of the
Chiese at Ponte San Marco, Montechiaro, and Carpene-
dolo ; for this purpose two corps (Vth and 1st) were to
advance on SoKerino and Cavriana along the Castiglione
road ; two other corps (IXth and Ilird) with the same
objective to Guidizzolo ; Mensdorff was to maintain
connexion between the two armies ; two corps (Vllth
and Xlth) were to be held in reserve at Foresto and
Cereta ; while the flanks were to be covered by the
Vlllth Corps at Pozzolengo and by Zedtwitz and part
of the Ilnd Corps between Medole and Marcaria.
By the evening of the 23rd the passage of the Mincio
and the onward march of the Austrian corps to their
destinations were completed in accordance with the
orders which had been issued.
On this date the Austrians were able to count upon
the following numbers ; —
196 THE CAMPAIGN OF
With tlie Second Aimy : the 1st (including Reichlin's
brigade), Vth, Vllth and Vlllth Corps and Mensdorffs
Cavahy Division numbered 102 battahons, 36 squadrons
and 49 batteries — a total of 86,273 men, 11,023 horses
and 392 guns.
With the First Army : the Ilnd, Ilird, IXth, Xth,
and Xlth Corps and Zedtwitz's Cavalry Division com-
prised 121J battalions, 52 squadrons and 45 batteries —
a total of 103,375 men, 11,608 horses and 360 guns, or
a grand total for both armies of 189,648 men, 22,631
horses and 752 guns.
The Alhes acknowledge to the following numbers : —
With the French — including the Vth Corps but ex-
clusive of some 8,900 cavalry and infantry with General
Ulloa — there were 198 battahons, 80 squadrons and 432
guns, or 118,019 men and 10,206 horses.
With the Italians there were 96 battahons, 37 squad-
rons and 90 guns or 55,584 men and 4,147 horses, making
a grand total of 173,603 men, 14,353 horses and 522 guns.
It is now necessary to give some description of the
ground over which this great battle was about to be
fought. " The Mincio, issuing from the Lago di Garda,
runs due south, while the direction of the hills on both
banks runs at right angles almost towards it ; those on
the right bank, with which alone we have to do here,
coming down from the north and north-west, strike
the Mincio in a south-easterly direction. The hilly
country on the right bank of the Mincio, thus forms
a tolerably regular parallelogram from north-west
to south-east, the four angles of which are Loiiato,
Peschiera, Volta and CastigUone. This parallelogram of
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 197
hills is about twelve miles in length and eight in width,
and is divided longitudinally by the Redone, a little
stream coming out of the hills between Lonato and
CastigKone and running into the Mincio.
" The lulls rise gradually from the shores of the lake in
successive irregular wave lines, the last towards the plain
towering high above the rest, and forming, as it were,
a mighty wall roimd the west and south sides of the paral-
lelogram. The south side, above all, is remarkable
for its height and steepness all along its length from
CastigKone to Volta. Being formed of a succession of
long steep ridges, strongly indentated, it looks from the
plain like the ruins of some Titanic stronghold, destroyed
by time and overgrown with grass. Two points, higher
than the rest, stand in the centre of this Une of ridges.
These two points are SoHerino and Cavriana. Both
detached from the others, and sloping down precipi-
tously towards the plain, they resemble two bastions,
while the lower, but scarcely less precipitous, slopes of
San Cassiano between them may well represent the
curtain of these gigantic bastions.
" From the interior another range of hills runs down
towards the outer one. It skirts the north or left bank
of the little stream Redone, and comes down with it
from the neighbourhood of Lonato, in an almost south-
erly direction, to within a mile from the heights of Sol-
ferino. It there makes a sudden bend to the north-
east, runs on for a couple of miles in this direction, and
then breaks off. At the point where it breaks off Ues
Pozzolengo, and at the point where the ridge approaches
nearest to Solferino, stands in an isolated position the
church of Madonna della Scoperta. SoKerino and
igS THE CAMPAIGN OF
Cavrianaonthe outer ridge and Pozzolengo and Madonna
della Scoperta on the inner, mark the position of the
Austrians in the Mincio hills. The relative positions
of these four points is such that if a line were drawn
round them, it would give the figure of a truncated cone ;
Cavriana and Pozzolengo forming the base of it towards
the Mincio, and Solferino and Madonna della Scoperta
the top towards Castiglione and Lonato. With the
exception of the road near the lake to Peschiera, the
others leading through this hilly country to the Mincio
all touch one or more of these points ; consequently
their possession shuts the hills of the Mincio to an advanc-
ing army.
" While they thus in their ensemble give the command
of the Mincio hills, each of these four points forms the
centre of a group of ridges branching out from that
centre. The position of the Austrians in the hills must
thus be represented as a colossal natural redoubt with
four bastions, each of them with numerous outworks
and only assailable at the angles.
" From whichever side the traveller approaches the
Mincio hills, one of the first objects which will attract
his attention is a square, weather-beaten tower on a
high conical hill covered with green turf. It is the
Spia d' Italia, so called because from it the eye can pry
over a large part of the Lombard plain, over the shores
of the Lago di Garda, and over the Mincio far beyond
the spires and domes of Mantua. The hill on which
it is built, called the Bocca di Solferino, rises abruptly
to the north-west of the village to which it has given
its name. After attaining two-thirds of its height, it
throws out two spurs like two horns, one to its left —
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 199
sharp, narrow, precipitous, showing a bold outhne
towards the plain and falling off suddenly. It is called
Monte di Cipressi, from a row of these trees which crown
its summit conspicuous from afar. The other to the
right, having no particular name, but commonly called
Monte della Chiesa with the church of St. Nicholas on
the top. Stretching out in the direction of Castiglione,
it rises abruptly from the valley of the Eedone, and
throws out towards this river a lower, but equally abrupt,
branch similarly crowned with a church — that of San
Pietro. On the other side — that is towards the plain —
it slopes down more gradually towards the Monte di
Cipressi. In the hollow between the two Kes the httle
hamlet of Pozzo di Solferino, as the villagers call
it. The spurs, although forming part of the group
of the Bocca, are separated by a depression in the
ground from the Bocca itself, and this depression has
been used to lead the roads from Castiglione over the
group to the village of Solferino behind it. There are
two of these roads — one which runs along the plain at
the base of the lulls and, leaving the village of Grole to
its left, turns up between the Monte di Cipressi and the
Monte della Chiesa to the hamlet of Pozzo di SoUerino,
and crosses the ridge between the Bocca di SoHerino
and the Monte della Chiesa ; the other, leaving CastigUone
and the outer ridge to its right, winds along the hills
almost parallel to the former, and risiag in a steep
incKne between Monte della Chiesa and the smaller
spurs of San Pietro, tops the ridge at the same point as
the road through the plain. Both roads united there
run down to the village of Solferino. Just where the
two unite, rise the walls of the church of St. Nicholas,
200 THE CAMPAIGN ;0F " " !■
occupying the whole summit of the Bocca. These walls,
about 20 to 30 feet high, enclose, besides the church,
a belfry, the schools and the dwelling of the parish priest,
which occupy three sides. In front of the church is a
large open plot of ground, and to the right of it the hiU,
protected only by a low waU, descends abruptly towards
the hill road which runs up to its foot. Beyond the
walls of St. Nicholas the summit of the Bocca presents
a narrow green plateau with another much whiter
looking enclosure at its edge ; this is the cemetery of
SolEerino. Beyond the cemetery, but separated from
it by a depression ia the ground, begin the scale or ladders
of SoKerino, a succession of steep, precipitous ridges
between the plain and the valley of the Redone, which
extend as far as the Httle village of Grole.
" The hill group of Solferino forms then a succession
of formidable positions, easy to defend and very diffi-
cult to approach. In the two roads are deep and narrow
defiles, flanked by the spurs between which they run
up to the top of the ridge. By the ridge itself the
advance is scarcely less dangerous, for each ridge is
commanded by the following one. Besides this, each
is likewise separated from the other by a strong depres-
sion in the ground, forming, as it were, the ditch to each
of these successive positions.
" While the position of SoKerino is thus well pro-
tected in front and on the flanks, it is not less so in the
rear ; for, from the foot almost of the Bocca hill, rises
another ridge sloping down terrace-like towards the
scattered houses of the village of San Cassiano in the
plain. Between this ridge and the base of the Bocca
hUl, the road from San Cassiano to the village of Solferino
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 201
runs up. While the slopes of San Cassiano are held,
it is, therefore, like the roads in front, a defile. The
ridge of San Cassiano extends, in an almost uninterrupted
line, to Cavriana, the sister group of Solferino, which
had been chosen by the Austrians for their re-
serves.
" Of a similar conformation as Solferino, the slopes
of San Cassiano are to it what the scale are to Solferino
— a kind of natural outwork. Both look down on what is
called the Campo di Medole, an open plain devoid of trees,
through which the main road from CastigUone passes
to Goito. This road, coming out of Castiglione to the
left of the Mincio hills, runs for about half a mile through
a country Hke the rest of Upper Lombardy, covered
with vineyards and mulberry trees, but less cut up by
canals than other portions of it. There being a scanti-
ness of water, the vegetation is not very rich and the
ground more open and adapted to military movements.
After running through this country for a mUe and a
half, the road enters the Campo di Medole just at the
point where a cross road, intersecting the plain, runs
in a straight Une to Medole. The main road continues
for about two and a haK miles in this open plain until
it comes to the outskirts of the village of Guidizzolo,
where the trees begin again. The open plain is scantily
cultivated with only here and there a corn or a maize
field and the rest bad pasture ground. About a mile
from the southern outskirts of the Campo di Medole
runs the road from Medole to Guidizzolo, and, parallel
almost to the main road to Goito, another from Car-
penedolo by Medole to Ceresara in the direction of
Mantua."
202 THE CAMPAIGN OF
In the orders given out overnight for the onward
movements of the two armies on the 24th, Count Schlick
had directed that the Vlllth Corps should move off
at 8 a.m., the others at 9, while Wimpffen ordered his
Ilird and IXth Corps to march at 9, the cavalry at 10,
and the others to conform to these movements
The Emperor Napoleon, on the other hand, in issuing
his orders for the same day had directed that the
following movements should commence not later than
3 a.m. : —
The 1st Corps from Esenta to Solferino.
The Ilnd Corps from Castighone to Cavriana.
The Ilird Corps from Mezzane to Medole.
The IVth Corps with the cavalry of Partouneaux and
Desvaux — from Carpenedolo to Guidizzolo.
The Imperial Guard, with Headquarters, to Castighone.
The Itahan Army to move on to Pozzolengo, main-
taining touch with the 1st Corps by means of the 2nd
Division (Fanti), which had bivouacked north of Esenta.
The Austrians then on June 24 were to leave the line
Pozzolengo — SoHerino — Guidizzolo and gain the line
Lonato — Castighone — Carpenedolo ; while the Allies
were on the same date to abandon the positions
Lonato — Castighone — Carpenedolo and move forward
to the hue Pozzolengo — SoKerino — Guidizzolo. The
result of such movements, executed the same day and
on the same lines, could only be a general action,
wherein the advantage must he with that side which
had taken the initiative. The Alhes started from
five to six hours earlier than their adversaries,
and the latter were consequently taken greatly by
surprise.
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 203
The events now about to be described may most
conveniently be divided into three parts : —
1. The operations between Solferino and the lake of
Garda — between the Piedmontese on the one side and
the Vlllth and part of the Vth Austrian Corps on
the other, viz. the operations in the north.
2. Those against Solferino and Cavxiana — the 1st
and Ilnd French Corps and the Imperial Guard being
pitted against the Vth, Vllth and 1st Austrian Corps,
viz. the operations in the centre.
3. The battle in the plain, wherein Niel and Caniobert
fought against the Ilird, IXth, and Xlth Corps of the
first Austrian Army, viz. the operations in the south.
The action commenced to the south ; the IVth French
Corps, on the right of the Allied Army, left its bivouac
at 3 a.m., and its three divisions — de Luzy leading —
took the road from Carpenedolo to Medole. De Luzy's
front was covered by two squadrons of the 10th Chas-
seurs a Cheval, and these came upon some of the enemy's
light cavalry rather more than two miles from Medole
and drove them in, but their own further advance was
arrested by the fire of the Austrians who had occupied
the village with both infantry and artillery. Niel now
ordered de Luzy to advance his division and carry
Medole.
This important post had been occupied on the pre-
vious evening by two battalions of the Austrian 52nd
Regiment, two guns and a few hussars belonging to
Blumencron's brigade of Crenneville's division of the
IXth Corps. SchafEgotsche had given orders for the
march to be continued at 9 a.m. on the 24th, but as
204 THE CAMPAIGN OF
early as 5 tliat morning Crenneville reported that his
outposts at Morino, to the north-east of Medole, had
been attacked. Schaffgotsche then prepared to advance
at once on Medole, but almost immediately the report
was contradicted, and the Corps Commander, reluctant
to move before his men had had their morning meal,
decided to stand fast. At six o'clock, however, a report
was received direct from the front stating that fighting
had already for some considerable time been in progress
at Medole and that the Austrians had been driven from
the village. The defenders of Medole had offered for
something like three hours a very stubborn resistance
to greatly superior numbers, attacking on two sides
and supported by a powerful artillery. As soon as the
attack developed. Major Urs, who commanded in Medole,
sent word to his brigadier, Blumencron, then in camp
to the west of Guidizzolo, but that commander, being
himself unable to detect the sound of firing, decided to
take no action whatever and did not even forward a
report to his divisional chief. Driven at last from his
defences on the west of the village, Urs defended Medole
house by house, and when finally forced to fall back upon
the remainder of the brigade, he was able only to bring
off the equivalent of two companies with two officers
— nine-tenths of the latter and four-fifths of the men
being either lolled, wounded or prisoners.
Lauingen's cavalry brigade had been formed up in
rear of Medole — on the Ceresara side — ^to cover and
support the retirement of the infantry, but Lauingen
withdrew fixst half-way to Ceresara and, then, consider-
ing that the ground here was unsuitable for the move-
ments of cavalry, he fell back behind Ceresara ; finally
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 205
retiring altogether and arriving at Goito about 9 a.m.,
and taking thenceforth no part or interest in the action.
His divisional general, Zedtwitz, himself rode off in search
of him, and the result of the action of these two cavalry
commanders was the practical loss of the services of the
mounted troops on the Austrian left flank for the rest
of the day.
While the IVth Corps had been thus engaged at Medole
the Ilird Corps, imder Caniobert, starting at 2.30 a.m.,
crossed the Chiese opposite Visano and moved on Medole
by Acqua Fredda and Castel Goffredo. This latter
place was reached about 7, and being occupied only by
a few mounted men was captured without difficulty,
and Canrobert, now hearing the guns in action at Medole,
ordered Eenault's division to push on in that direction.
Part of Blimiencron's brigade had also been in occu-
pation of Casa Morino, and MacMahon, advancing early
towards Cavriana from CastigUone, came upon this
post and drove out its defenders ; but seeing now that
the 1st Corps on his left had been checked in its advance,
MacMahon decided to content himself with holding
his position for the present, in view of the large hostile
columns now visible in the plain to his front. He sug-
gested now to Mel that they should both take ground
to their left — MacMahon for the purpose of drawing
nearer to the 1st Corps and Niel to prevent any gap
occurring between the Ilnd and IVth. Niel, then engaged
in front of Medole, promised to conform as soon as the
village should be captured and Canrobert had drawn
up to him on the right. As a temporary measure, how-
ever, the cavalry under Partouneaux and Desvaux
2o6 THE CAMPAIGN OF
was ordered to occupy the interval between Mel and
MacMalion. MaoMahon then disposed his troops as
follows : one of the brigades of the division of La Mot-
terouge, deployed at right angles to the road, main-
tained touch between the Ilnd Corps and Desvaux's
cavalry, while the other remained in reserve behind the
Casa Morino ; Decaen's division formed to the left of
La Motterouge in the direction of the 1st Corps.
The hostUe columns noticed by the Duke of Magenta
were the divisions of the IXth, Iltd, and 1st Corps
advancing westwards. SchafEgotsche, however, seems
even now to have been ia ignorance of the fact that
two complete French Corps were in his front, and stUl
thought that Medole had been occupied by httle more
than the enemy's advanced troops, and that its recapture
would scarcely delay the carrying out of the prescribed
movement on Carpenedolo. The Coromander of the
IXth Corps directed his 2nd Division (Crenneville) to
march on Medole from its position to the east of Casa
Morino, and of the three brigades of his 1st Division
(Handl) he placed one on the Rebecco-Medole road,
one stiU further south towards Ceresara, and the third
in reserve, and arranged with Schwartzenberg that the
IIL-d Corps should move on CastigHone by way of Casa
Moriao. The coimtry about here, however, being much
broken and enclosed, the various brigades failed to keep
touch, wandered apart and came iadependently into
action. Crenneville moving on Medole was threatened
on his right, was fired iato on the left by Vinoy's
division of the IVth Corps — which had been pushed
well forward in the cultivation — and was imable to
make any concerted attack.
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 207
Handl's brigades — widely separated at the outset —
became more so as the advance was prosecuted and
arrived independently before Medole, where the French
had made careful preparations for their reception. At
9 a.m. the situation in this part of the field was as follows :
what was left of Crenneville's two brigades stood on the
main Mantua-CastigHone road and held a farm to the
south of it and immediately north of Baite, confronting
Vinoy's division of the IVth and the whole of the Ilnd
Corps ; at Rebecco one of Handl's brigades was engaged
with one of de Luzy's, while further south another was
held in check byLe Noble, and Handl's third brigade,
which had already suffered greatly in the action, had
fallen back shattered to Guidizzolo. On the side of the
French, de Failly's division of the IVth Corps sup-
ported, de Luzy towards Eebecco and Baite.
The head of Canrobert's columns reached Medole
shortly after nine o'clock, when the Commander was
warned by Napoleon that an Austrian corps, of an
estimated strength of 20-25,000 men, which had left
Mantua on the 23rd, had its outposts at Acquanegra,
but at the same time Canrobert was ordered to support
Niel's right. Canrobert now pushed forward Jannin's
brigade towards Ceresara.
In the centre Baraguey d'HiUiers had been ordered
to march on the left of the Ilnd Corps from Esenta to
Solferino. His 2nd Division (Ladmirault) started the
first at 3 o'clock and by 6 a.m. had arrived in front
of the heights about Solferino, which were found to be
held by the enemy. Ladmirault formed his division
in three columns of attack — ^two to turn the flanlis and
2o8 THE CAMPAIGN OF
the third to assault in front — and covered by the fire
of the only four guns which had been able to traverse
the mountain road followed by Ladmirault's infantry,
the 2nd Division prepared to attack the commanding
position held by the Austrian Vth Corps.
The 1st Division (Forey) had left Esenta about 4 a.m.,
passed through Castighone, and followed the road by
Le Grole, while Bazaine, with the 3rd Division, marched
in rear of Forey.
When on the afternoon of the 23rd the Vth Austrian
Corps had occupied Solferino with outposts on the hills
to the west, the picquets furnished by Bils' brigade
reported the presence of large bodies of the enemy in
their front, and Stadion was satisfied that a general
action must take place on the morrow, and he therefore
fortified his positions as far as possible. These picquets
at once noted and reported the French advance against
Medole early on the 24th, as also the movements of the
1st French Corps against Stadion's position ; but the
Austrian outposts were none the less driven in by the
French, and feU back upon the battalions occupying
Le Grole and the hiUs in the vicinity. Le Grole was in
tiu'n captured after some very sharp fighting, and the
defenders then retired upon their reserves, holding the
next line of hills some 3,000 yards in front of Solferino.
The battle for the possession of these heights was pro-
tracted and bloody, but they were taken about 10
o'clock, and the French were then able to move for-
ward and place upon them several guns which engaged
the Austrian pieces about Solferino. Stadion had long
since informed Count Schlick of the attack which was
pressing upon him, and the 1st and Vllth Corps were
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 209
moved up close in support, while MensdorfE's cavalry
left Bregnedolo and moved into the open country between
the Casa Morino and Cassiano.
On the left of the French centre Ladmirault was gain-
ing but little ground, and even that with great sacrifice,
but Baraguey now found himself able to send forward
his remaining division — that of Bazaine — as the Emperor
Napoleon, who had now himself reached this part of
the field, had deployed the two infantry divisions of the
Guard in support. Already Bils' brigade, which had
suffered grievously, had begun to give ground, and the
brigades of Festetics and Puchner had fallen back to
the heights round thfe village of Solferino and had occu-
pied the houses, the cemetery and the Monte di Cipressi.
Here they had been reinforced by several battalions
from the brigades of Hoditz and Paszthory of the 1st
Corps, which had reached the scene of action. The
troops were all well covered behind walls and inside the
houses and ofiered for long a formidable resistance, but
the French were at last able, after great difficulties and
with immense loss, to bring a battery on to the heights,
and at a range of 300 yards to open fire upon the ceme-
tery and attempt to batter down its walls.
The Itahan Army had passed the night of the 23rd
in the folio-wing positions : the 2nd Division (Fanti)
at Malocco maintained touch with Baraguey d'Hilliers ;
the 1st (Durando) and 5th (Cucchiari) were in bivouac
about Lonato; the 3rd (Mollard) was at Rivoltella, while
the 4th (Galdini) had been sent north towards Tyrol
in support of Garibaldi. The 1st, 3rd, and 5th Divisions
were each ordered to send forward on the 24th strong
P
210 THE CAMPAIGN OF
reconnoitring coltuims towards Pozzolengo, and in accord-
ance with these iostructions Durando dispatched at 4
a.m. a brigade, which, on reaching Venzago about 5.30,
detached 2 battalions, 2 guns and 2 squadrons towards
Pozzolengo. These found Madonna della Scoperta occu-
pied by the enemy and their advanced troops became
engaged.
Cucchiari in like manner had sent forward a similar
detachment, which left Lonato at 3 a.m., passed through
Desenzano, followed the railway for some distance and
then turned south towards Pozzolengo.
Mollard sent out no fewer than four such reconnoitring
parties, and all came more or less in contact with the
Austrians in position in front of Pozzolengo and Madonna
della Scoperta ; but this breaking up of the Italian
forces into numerous smaU and independent columns,
efiectuaUy prevented King Victor Emmanuel from dis-
posing usefully of masses of troops, and exercised a bane-
ful influence upon the action of his army as a whole, from
which it suffered throughout the remainder of the day.
The Vlllth Corps had bivouacked on the night of the
23rd with all its brigades in and around Pozzolengo,
whence it was to have marched next day ia three columns
upon Lonato and Desenzano. About 6.30 a.m., how-
ever, the advance of the Italians upon Pozzolengo was
detected and Benedek at once placed four brigades on
the hiUs covering the town from the west, holding
back in reserve the greater part of two complete bri-
gades. These arrangements were more than sufficient ;
the various Italian columns attacked the positions held
by the Austrians, but were easily driven back upon the
brigades in rear. The Austrians then pursuing, possessed
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 211
themselves of the high ground about San Martino, but
not being at the moment sufficiently strongly supported,
found it necessary to fall back. Benedek had by now
reaUsed that he had no longer to deal with mere reconnoi-
tring parties, but that practically the whole ItaUan
Army was in his front, and deciding, if possible, to seize
the strong position of San Martino, he attacked it with
three brigades, and after heavy fighting succeeded in
there establishing himself.
He was not, however, to be permitted to remain there
undisturbed ; between 9 and 10 o'clock Cucchiari's
division advanced from the direction of Eivoltella, and
being joined by one of MoUard's brigades, threw itself
against the Austrians. The attack, at first successful,
was repulsed with loss and Cucchiari's troops fell back
across the railway to Eivoltella and San Zeno to reform.
By 10.30, then, aU the Itahan attempts in this portion
of the field had been heavily defeated, and for something
like two hours there was no resumption of hostihties in
this quarter. Benedek, however, did not dare to pursue ;
the Vth Corps on his left was still heavily engaged, and it
seemed best to the Commander of the Vlllth Corps not
to uncover his left flank by any premature advance.
MeanwhUe the 2nd Piedmontese Division (Fanti)
was at last ia movement from the vicinity of Malocco,
where it had long been awaiting orders. The Emperor
Napoleon had sent for the division to support Bara-
guey's attack upon Solferino, but while on the march to
the centre Victor Emmanuel, seeing the turn which events
had taken in the northern part of the field, directed
Fanti to move to the help of the Italians, ordering him
to place one brigade imder the orders of Mollard, while
212 THE CAMPAIGN OF
Fanti himself proceeded ■witli the other towardiS Madonna
della Scoperta to assist Duiando.
The Emperor Napoleon had now established himself
in front of the centre near the heights which Baraguey's
troops had captured, and he was convinced that here
lay the key of the whole of the Austrian position. Neither
on the right or left had any real impression as yet been
made upon the enemy's battle line, and the Emperor
now decided to attempt to help the efforts of his flanks
by breaking through in the centre. He then ordered
d' Alton's brigade of Forey's division (which had not
yet been engaged) to advance, but it was received with
so terrible a fire that it was unable to push far forward,
and General Forey, who had himself led the brigade,
then called for reinforcements. These were at once
forthcoming : Camou's division of the Imperial Guard
was ordered to support Baraguey's corps — Picard's
brigade being directed along the heights to the left, while
that of Maneque supported d' Alton.
This fresh attack was irresistible ; covered by the fire
of two batteries of the artillery of the Guard, the Tower
and the Monte di Gipressi were now taken with a rush,
while further to the left Bazaine — whose batteries had been
pounding the walls of the cemetery — now sent forward
his infantry. Joined by some battalions of Ladmirault's
division the cemetery was now stormed and finally
carried with the bayonet, and the defenders, faUing back,
evacuated the village of Solferino, leaving several guns
and many prisoners in the hands of the French.
While these events were passing in the centre, MacMahon
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 213
— heanng from Niel that he was about to move on Cav-
riana — was now able to take gromid to his left and connect
with the GuanL He therefore gave instructions to La
Motteronge to march on Solferino, followed by the
2nd Division nnder Decaen. To obviate the danger of
any gap being thns formed between his own corps and
Desvaux's Cavalry Division, MacMahon ordered the
cavalry of the Guard — which had been placed at his dis-
posal — to take post on his right. In the south General
Xiel, who with his single corps had more than stood
his ground against the troops of Schwartzenberg and
Scha%otsche, now, about 11 a.uL, saw the heads of
the columns of another Austrian corps — ^that of Weigl —
entering upon the field from the direction of Castel
Grimaldo.
Yinoy had by this time turned CrenneviQe's men
out of the farm north of Baite, but to capture and hold
it, as also the line Rebecco — Baite — main road, against all
the attacks of the Austrians, had used up practically
the whole of Kiel's reserves. At last, however, his
repeated calls upon Caniobert for co-operation met
with some response ; Renault's division of the IUrd
Corps had already been sent to cover de Ltizy's right
flank south of Rebecco, and becoming easier in his mind
in r^ard to the approach of the mythical men from
Mantua, Canrobert placed one of Trochu's brigades at
duel's disposal, retaining the other at Medole, while
Bourbaki's division remained near Castel Goffredo to
watch the roads from the south and south-east.
In the centre Ladmirault, whose division had suSered
heavily, was left to hold Solferino ; Bazaine was directed
214 THE CAMPAIGN OF
to follow Stadion, who had retired towards Pozzolengo ;
Foray's division, with the Guard, was ordered on Cavriana ;
while MacMahon moved forward upon Cassiano — which
was occupied without much difficulty— and then stormed
the Monte Fontana in rear, held by two brigades of the
Vllth Corps. This, too, was captured and guns brought
up to it. It was now about 2 p.m. MacMahon, then,
seeing that the Guard had not yet been able to get up
into hne with him, and that the Austrians were now
again threatening to strike between himself and Niel,
decided to make no onward moveUient for the present
and to content himself with merely holding his ground.
The Austrians, however, made a desperate attempt to
regain possession of the hill, and for some time their
adversaries had considerable difficulty in retaining
possession, and it was not indeed until MacMahon had
ordered a general advance of his whole corps, supported
by a powerful artillery and a brigade of the Imperial
Guard, that the remnant of the two gallant Austrian
brigades of Wallon and Wussin were finally swept off
the Monte Fontana and hurled back to Cavriana, where
shells were already falling.
Supported now by the file of forty- two guns, Niel in the
south was still holding out against his numerous foes, and
strengthened by the arrival of the brigade brought him
by Trochu, and which he placed in rear of his centre, he
even threw forward the few troops he stiU had in hand to
the attack of Guidizzolo. This village was, however,
held in great strength and the battahons which Niel had
sent against it were obhged to fall back upon Baite.
Caniobert had now at last, about 3 p.m., satisfied him-
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 215
i
self that the right of the army was in no danger of sur-
prise, and he therefore drew Bourbaki's division from the
neighbourhood of Castel Gofiredo nearer to the IVth
Corps, whereupon Niel ordered Trochu to send Bataille's
brigade to the attack of Guidizzolo. The Commander
of the First Austrian Army had, ere this, received orders
from his Emperor to endeavour to relieve the pressure on
the centre by bringing round his left and then striking
with his whole strength at the flank of the French centre.
It was, however, already impossible to carry out the
Emperor's wishes. The Ilird and IXth Corps could not
now be withdrawn from the actions in their front and
set free to seek a fresh objective in a new direction ;
the cavalry had left the field ; and the Xlth Corps —
which as a body might yet have been used efiectively —
had been drained away in driblets to fill up gaps and to
strengthen weak points. The few infantry reserves, too,
which now emerged from Guidizzolo, preparatory to
marching on Cassiano and Solferino, were charged and
checked by the French cavalry of the Guard connecting
MacMahon and Niel.
Bataille's brigade moved with ' great dan upon
Guidizzolo, but although the Austrians were driven in
and many prisoners were taken, the French were unable
to penetrate into the town.
In the centre, however, the Guard and the Ilnd Corps
had now captured Cavriana, and in the northern part of
the field only had the Austrians been able to hold — and
more than hold — their own.
The four brigades in Benedek's front line had endured
and beaten back the attacks of the ItaHan divisions of
2i6 THE CAMPAIGN OF
Mollard and Cuccliiari, and had indeed so completely
overtliiown them that about 1 o'clock the battle in
this portion of the field had died down, and for some
two hours there was no more heard " the voice of them
that shout for mastery and the noise of them that cry,
being overcome." Benedek was still in ignorance of the
fact that Cialdini's division was detached and that
Durando was engaged about Madonna della Scoperta
with the right wing of the Vth Corps. He only knew
with whom he had been fighting, and had no idea by
whom the action might be renewed.
After two o'clock, as the Italians were again gathering
for the attack, Benedek heard of the renewal of the
assault, in overwhelming force, upon Solferino, and
received an order from Count SchUck to endeavour to
make a diversion against the left of the French. This was
shortly followed by a query from Imperial Headquarters
whether it was possible for the Vlllth Corps to detach
troops to the assistance of the Austrians about Solferino.
Benedek wisely decided that neither of these proposals
were practicable and that he could best help to gain
the day by the defeat of the enemy akeady in his front.
It was clear to him that the King of Italy had not yet
fully developed his attack and the force in his front
seemed to be momentarily increasing in strength. To
send any real help to SoKerino he must detach at least two
complete brigades, and he did not feel any confidence
that he could at the most hold his ground with the
troops then remaining, while the loss of his position
would entail that of Pozzolengo, in rear of which lay the
line of retreat of the Second Army.
About 3 p.m., the first reports reaching Benedek of the
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 217
commencement of the retreat of the Vth Corps, he
withdrew four battaUons from his position and sent
General EeichUn with them to occupy some hills to the
south and south-west of Pozzolengo, so as both to secure
the right flank of the Vlllth Corps and also cover the
retirement of the Vth. Reichlin reached his intended
position about 4 p.m. — reheving there the rearguard of the
Vth Corps — and was almost immediately attacked by
the brigade Piedmont of Fanti's division, which, ordered
to support Durando, had pushed forward by Madonna
deUa Scoperta, then vacated by the troops under
Stadion. Since then Mollard.with Fanti's other brigade,
was at this moment preparing to attack San Martino in
front, while Cucchiari was operating against it from the
direction of RivolteUa and San Zeno, it wiU be realized
that Benedek's position was thus endangered from
three sides.
Shortly after four, o'clock the Vlllth Corps received
orders to retire and cross the Mincio at SaUonze. Bene-
dek, however, was determined to hold his ground until
the Vth Corps had got well away and until he had sent
off his wounded and trains ; it seemed clear to him, too,
that any attempt to cross at Salionze with his whole
corps must interfere with Stadion's retirement, so he
arranged for two brigades with the ammunition reserve
columns to pass the river at Peschiera.
About 5 o'clock a tremendous rain and thunder-
storm — accompanied by iatense darkness — broke over the
whole field, and in other portions of it put an end to the
fighting and assisted the Austrian retreat ; in front of
San Martino, however, the battle was resumed and
continued to rage.
2i8 THE CAMPAIGN OF
Reichlin was driven from his position and forced to
retire on Monzambano, but tbe remainder of the corps
fought magnificently up to and during the retreat, which
Benedek only commenced about 9 p.m. — himself leading
one last desperate counter-attack which overthrew the
Itahans and secured a practically immolested retire-
ment for the much-tried Vlllth Corps. By 3 a.m. on
the 25th the passage of the Mincio was accompUshed, as
arranged, at Salionze and Peschiera.
The First Army had fallen back long before. As early
as 2 p.m. Wimpffen, having no cavalry at hand, seeing
no signs of the Ilnd Corps, and all his reserves having
long since been thrown into the fight, had reported to the
Emperor Franz Josef that he could no longer hold his
ground ; he directed that the IXth Corps should fall
back upon Goito, the Ilird by Cerlungo to Ferri, while
the Xlth Corps covered the retreat of both and eventu-
ally retired by Goito to Roverbella. When about 3 p.m.
the Emperor heard of the capture of Solf erino and Cassiano
and the retreat of the Vth and 1st Corps, he gave instruc-
tions that the Vth Corps should fall back fighting to
Pozzolengo, and that Schhck — gathering up all the still
effective units of the Second Army — should take up^a
fresh position about Cavriana and hold his ground
there as long as possible. The Austrian Emperor did
not at that time regard the loss of Solferino as implying
the loss of the battle, and hoped that with the 1st and
Vllth Corps he might yet be able to hold back the
French in the centre, while the stroke which he had
ordered Wimpffen to make fell upon the flank of the
advancing enemy. But it was not long before news
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 219
reached the Emperor at Cavriana that the First Army
had abeady begun to fall back and therewith vanished all
hope of re-estabUshing the fight. The Emperor then
ordered a retreat behind the Mincio, and SohHck — direct-
ing the Vllth to make as protracted a stand as possible at
Cavriana and at Volta — withdrew his remaining corps
from the battlefield.
The fatigue of the AlUes, and the heavy storm which at
5 p.m. descended upon the field, put an end to the fight-
ing and checked aU pursuit ; the Austrian corps fell back
unhindered, and by the evening of the 25th they had all
regained the positions on the left bank of the Mincio
which they had quitted on the morning of the 23rd.
Even then, however, the rest they so greatly needed
was not assured, for the Emperor Franz Josef directed
that in the event of any serious attack upon the line of
the Mincio on the 25th, the retreat should be continued to
the banks of the Adige.
The losses sustained by the imits of both
armies were
follows : —
AtrSTBIAHS
First Army: —
Officers.
Men.
nird Corps
109 . .
. 3,098
IXth „
130 .
. 1,219
Xlth
61 . .
. 2,140
Zedtwitz's Cavalry Div. . .
2 . .
37
Second Aimy: —
1st Corjg
90 . .
. 2,734
Vth ,
124 . .
. 4,318
Vllth ,
34 .
. 1,844
Vlllth,,
79 . .
. 2,536
Mensdorfi's Cavalry Mv. .
. 10 . .
172
Grand Total 639 officers & 21,098 men.
220
THE CAMPAIGN OF
Of whicli there were killed
94 officers 2,198 men
„ „ „ „ wounded .
500
10,307 „
., missing .
45
8,593 „
Allies
KiUed.
Wounded.
Miasing.
Imperial Guard 181 .
704 .
03
1st Corps . . 610 . . .
3,162 .
. 659
Ilnd „ . . 234 . . .
986 .
. 275
Ilird „ . . 37 . . .
257 .
19
IVth „ . . 560 . . .
3,421 .
. 502
Italian Army 691 .
3,572 .
. . 1,258
Grand Total 2,313
12,102
2,776
Out of wliichtlie French had 117 officers killed and 644
wounded ; the Italians had 49 officers killed and 167
wounded. The casualties among the senior officers was
very heavy on both sides ; the Austrians had four general
officers woimded, the French five and the Italians two,
and of these latter two of the French and one of the
Italians died of their wounds. Among, too, those of
junior rank, who this day died for France, there was one
who bore a name associated with the triumphs of the
First Napoleon upon Itahan soil ; this was Lieut. -Col.
Junot, Duke of Abrantes, Chief of the Staff to General
de Failly.
That night the Allied Army bivouacked where the
end of the battle had left them — the troops of Victor
Emmanuel at San Martiao, the 1st French Corps at
Solferino, the Ilnd at Cavriana, the Ilird at Rebecco,
the IVth between Medole and Guidizzolo, the Guard
and Imperial Headquarters at Cavriana, and the cavalry
of Desvaux and Partouneaux about Guidizzolo.
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 221
Of the battle itself Hamleysays : " There was no exhibi-
tion on either side of strategical art ; none of the move-
ments on either side since the battle of Magenta had
altered the chances of success ; and the result was alto-
gether due to tactics." He cites the battle of SoUerino
as a good illustration of the necessity for moving as
compactly and as nearly in fighting order as possible
when in the vicinity of the enemy. " Both armies,"
he says, " had reconnoitred the country between the
Chiese and Mincio ; each expected to find its adversary
awaiting it behind the river ; neither anticipated the
encounter ; but the French Army was by far the best
prepared for it by the order of its march." Further
Hamley points out that the peculiar conformation of the
hill of Solferino — the back steep, scarped and accessible
by but one winding path and with nearly two miles of
broken ground between it and the hills about Cavriana
— minimised its advantage as an advanced post in front
of the general position ; he would have had it either left
altogether unoccupied or have advanced the whole line
of battle so as to include it.
The cause of the victory of the Allies at Solferino,
Moltke finds in the better leading of the French, but
above all in the fact that the Austrian Commander had
no general reserve anywhere at his own disposal. The
Austrian Army, too, had only quite recently been re-
organised, and the three years' term of universal military
service had been only some two years established, so
that the army was practically composed of recruits.
The supply arrangements of the Austrians were through-
out faulty and frequently came altogether to a stand-
still. The actual rations were insufficient for men
222 THE CAMPAIGN OF
enduring the hardsMps of field service, since they only
received half a pound of meat a man per diem and
were not permitted to cook their food oftener than
once in twenty-four hours.
To the objection made by some that the Austrians
fought with a river at their backs, Lecomte porats out
that in this particular case, where the Miticio was
spanned by numerous bridges and also covered by two
fortresses, the usual dangers and inconveniences of such
a position were reduced to a minimum. The best proof
of the correctness of his assertion is that the Austrian
retirement was easily and rapidly conducted, although
at the same time it is not improbable that a knowledge
of the risks of their position induced them to fall back
full early.
Riistow seeks the chief reasons for the Austrian over-
throw in the fact that owing to the Austrian force hav-
ing been divided into two armies, the Emperor Franz
Josef— nominally the Commander-in-Chief — had no
troops, and especially no general reserve, at his own dis-
posal, and that consequently each army fought for its
own hand. Further, up to and after 10 a.m. the Aus-
trian Staff refused to believe that a general action had
long since commenced, and thrust brigade after brigade,
as each came up, into the fight, where they were at
once overpowered by superior numbers at the particu-
lar point, so that when any real reinforcement was
required none was to hand. But Riistow very truly re-
marks that it was not gun or rifle or even tactics which
won the day at Solferino, but the offensive spirit which
was wanting in the Austrian leaders ; and in support of
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 223
this statement he points out that the Austrians, who
crossed the Mincio simply and solely to attack the Allies,
had no sooner met them than they took up defensive
positions.
THE PEACE OF VILLAFRANCA
Q
CHAPTER X
THE PEACE OF VILLAFEANCA
Aftee the battle of Solferino — whereat the French claim
to have captured 2 Colours, 30 guns and 6,000 pris-
oners — ^no pursuit of the Austrians was attempted, even
on the 25th, on which day the French moved quietly
forward — the 1st Corps to the vicinity of Pozzolengo
and the IVth to Volta. The rest of the AUied Army
remained in the positions of the previous night with
the exception that the Ilird Corps replaced the 1st at
Solferino, leaving one of its divisions at Guidizzolo with
the cavalry of Desvaux and Partouneaux.
The Austrians, on recrossing the Mincio, had either
destroyed or prepared for destruction all the bridges
in their rear ; orders had been issued, as has been al-
ready mentioned, that in the event of serious attack the
Mincio line was not to be held, but that the army should
fall back behind the Adige ; on the morning of the 27th,
however, a fresh order was given out that the troops
should hold their ground, making none the less every
preparation for orderly retirement in case of need. In
the course of the day the Emperor Franz Josef visited
the Headquarters of both armies, and, in reply to in-
quiries, was assured by their Commanders that it was
227
228 THE CAMPAIGN OF
doubtful whether their men would stand against any
real attack and the advisability of retirement behind
the Adige was urged. The Emperor then finally de-
cided that the army should withdraw from the line of
the Mincio, and that night the outposts of both armies fell
quietly back ; leaving the bivouac fires aUght, the
Austrians retired, and during the course of the 28th
the Second Army was already in position on the left
bank of the Adige and about Verona, the First Army
falling into line the next day.
The Emperor Napoleon had decided that, prior to
marching on Verona, it was necessary to reduce the fort-
ress of Peschiera, the possession of which was important
to cover his main Kne of operations, to serve as a base
for any onward movements, and to assure, if such became
necessary, his line of retreat. The siege operations
had been entrusted to the ItaHans, who took up a line
from Ponti to Rivoltella, and on the 26th Baraguey
d'Hilliers pushed one of his divisions on to Monzambano
in their support. On the 28th the 1st Corps crossed the
river to Casa Prentina, while on the day following, Niel —
who for his share in the victory of Solferino had been
created a Marshal of France — moved to Borghetto and"
Valeggio, the Itahans establishing on the 30th their
5th Division at Salionze.
On July 1 the Headquarters of King Victor Em-
manuel were moved to Pozzolengo, his 3rd and 5th
Divisions were placed on the left of the 1st Corps, and
the investment of Peschiera was complete. On this day
the whole of the remainder of the French Army was
transferred to the left bank of the Mincio, crossing at
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 229
Monzambano, Borglietto and Pozzolo, and occupied
positions — the 1st Corps at Oliosi, the Ilnd at Santa
Lucia, and the IVth at Gustoza ; the whole of the rest
of the French Aimy was about Valeggio, except Bour-
baki's division, which was at Goito. The cavahy were
occupied in pushing forward parties towards Mantua,
and also towards the Oglio to meet Priuce Napoleon,
whose corps actually joined the main army on the 3rd.
On the 2nd MacMahon had moved to ViUafranca and
Niel to Sommacompagna, while the 1st Corps occupied
Castelnuovo and Cavalcaselle.
The measured • movements of the Allies, which had
given the enemy breathing time after the battle of
SoKeriuo, are said to have been due, in the first instance,
to a deficiency of suppUes and to the fact that these,
even when forthcoming, could not be brought up, as all
transport was required for the evacuation of the wounded
of both armies — one might almost say of all three, since
very many of the Austrian wounded had of necessity
been left on the field ; in the second instance, to the
tardy arrival of the material required for the prosecu-
tion of the siege of Peschiera. Already on June 16
orders had been sent to France to expedite the dispatch
of the necessary siege guns, for which the projectiles
and the fuzes were still in course of manufacture in
French arsenals. On July 3, however, part of the siege
park arrived at Pozzolengo, and a week later the French
were able to commence the establishment of their bat-
teries before Peschiera.
A very brief account must now be given of the opera-
tions which had been carried out in the mountains of
230 THE CAMPAIGN OF
Tyrol and of those wMoh were projected on the sea.
We have seen that the Vlth Corps shared with the
main army in the alternate advances and retirements
dictated by the vacillating methods of the Austrian
Headquarter Staff, and that its Commander had been
ordered to support the westward movement of Juno
23, which culminated in the defeat at Solferino, by push-
ing forward towards Salo and Gavardo. At this time
Austrian garrisons were besieged in Rocca d'Anfo and
Bagolina ; the latter place fell and the required advance
to Salo was now scarcely practicable and was not indeed
carried out, the Vlth Corps falling back to cover tlio
approaches to the Upper Adige.
On the 26th, Cialdini's division had occupied Aprica,
Edolo, Breno, Lavenone and Salo, while Garibaldi's
troops had advanced into the Valtelin ; the principal
valleys and the westward approaches thereto, being
thus held and safeguarded, there was no longer any fear
for the left flank and rear of the Allied Army, since the
Vlth Corps was thus held completely in check. The
troops under Cialdini and Garibaldi — the latter was early
in July at Tirano with eleven battalions and several
independent compames — were not to be the only force
available for service in the mountains. Another infan-
try division, that of General Hugues, left France on
July .3, and was sent on to Brescia, there to form a
support to the Italian troops operating in Tyrol.
The navy, too, was ready to effect a diversion by strik-
ing at Venice, which had been blockaded since Juno 1
by a small squadron under Rear-Admiral Jurien de la
Graviere. On June 12 the main fleet sailed from Toulon
and arrived on the 21st at Antivari, whore, being joined
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 231
by four Italian ships, Admiral Eomain Desfoss6s now
united under his command 50 ships of war, mounting
800 gims. From Antivari the fleet proceeded to the
Island of Lossini, which had been chosen to serve as an
advanced base for future naval operations ; the island is
only a few hours' sail from Venice and is almost equi-
distant from Trieste, Pola, Fiume and Zara. The orders
given to the Admiral in command were to force an
entrance to the harbour of Venice, penetrate into the
lagoons and bombard the forts. The ships had only
embarked 1,000 infantry and artillery for landing pur-
poses, but it was the intention of the Emperor Napoleon
to send forward, at a favourable moment, a corps to
operate from Venice upon the Austrian communications.
General Wimpffen — who had been promoted from bri-
gadier after Magenta — was nominated to the command
of the military forces intended to be landed upon the
shores of the Adriatic, and a body of 8,000 men had been
ordered to embark in Algeria to form the nucleus of
such a force.
There are three main channels of approach to Venice —
that by the Lido, by Malamocco and by Chioggia, and
the last had been selected as the point where the fleet
shoidd force an entrance.
The following then were the dispositions of the Emperor
Napoleon for carrying on the war : on the left, by the
operations of Cialdini and Garibaldi, to threaten the
Austrian right and the line of the Adige ; in the centre,
having possessed himself of Peschiera, to capture
Verona ; and with the fleet to attack and seize Venice,
using that town as a base whence to laimch attacks upon
the Austrian line of communications.
232 THE CAMPAIGN OF
But at this moment the Emperor Napoleon discovered
signs that the prosecution of the war might possibly
result in its being no longer confined to the three Powers
now engaged, and that France might be called upon to
fight not only on the Adige but also on the Rhine. He
decided then that it would be inexpedient to risk " ce
qu'U n'est fermis a un souverain de mettre en jeu que pour
I'iiidependance de son pays," and being desirous of dis-
covering the views of the Emperor of Austria, he sent
General Fleury to him at Verona on July 6, proposing
a suspension of arms. At the same time he wisely made
aU preparations for the continuation of the siege of Pes-
chiera and for the protection of the besieging force ;
and with this object the French Army took up a position
next morning on the hills bordering the Tione, having
its left at Oastelnuovo, where was the 1st Corps, its right
at Valeggio held by the Ilird, the centre being made up
by the IVth Corps at Oliosi and the Ilnd at Santa Lucia ;
in rear were the Vth Corps and the Imperial Guard.
In the meantime, however. General Fleury had re-
turned from Verona with the acceptance of the proposed
armistice, and aU hostile movements both by land and
sea were at once suspended. The terms of the armistice
signed on the 8th, provided for a suspension of arms until
August 15, and for lines of demarcation between the
respective armies ; but on the 11th there was a meeting
between the two emperors at ViUafranca, and the condi-
tions of peace — finally ratified at Ziirich ia the following
November — were then discussed and afterwards drawn
up. By this treaty Austria was to cede Lombardy to
Napoleon, who was then to hand it over to Piedmont ;
the Italian States were to be amalgamated into a con-
MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 233
federation under the Pope ; but Venice, though' forming
part of this confederation, was to remain under Austrian
rule.
Napoleon had entered upon the campaign announcing
his intention of " freeing Italy from the Alps to the
Adriatic." It has been said, however, " that he wished
Italy to be free, but did not want Italian imity ;
rather did he desire the formation of a confederacy
wherein France could always make her own pre-
dominance felt in the Peninsula." Circumstances ia the
end, however, proved to be too strong for him; the pro-
visional government in Florence suddenly determined
to unite Tuscany to Piedmont, and Romagna, EmiUa,
Parma and Modena at once followed suit. " In the con-
vention of Plombieres it had been agreed that in the
event of a kingdr>m of eleven million inhabitants being
established from the Alps to the Adriatic, Piedmont
would cede Savoy to France. As, however, by the treaty
of Villafranca, Venetia had remained under the Austrian
yoke, no more had been said about cession of territory,
but, by the annexation of Central Italy, the number of
Victor Emmanuel's subjects was now augmented to
eleven million. In order to induce Napoleon to approve
of such an annexation, Cavour ofiered him Savoy, but
the Emperor claimed Nice as well." These were ceded
to France in March, 1860, and thus, by a strange irony
of fate. Savoy, the cradle of the dynasty whose reigning
representative had made Italy a kingdom, and Nice
Garibaldi's native province, became the spoils of the Ally .
APPENDIX A.
ORDRE DE BATAILLE OP THE SARDINIAN ARMY
ON THE 4TH JUNE, 1859.
Ist DIVISION.
4(A DIVISION.
Castelboigo.
Claldlnl.
l3t Bde. (Regina).
Villamarina.
7th Bersaglieri .
S
o
1
1
03
Effectives.
S
o
i
1
O
Effectives.
8t Bdo. (Grenadiers)
CoUiano.
1
1
S
3rd BersagUeri
1
—
—
—
—
1
_
_
_
_
Ist Grenadiers
4
— ■
—
—
—
9th Regiment
4
.
2nd
4
—
—
—
—
10th
4
,nd Bde. (Savoy).
2nd Bde. (Savona).
Perrier.
Broglia.
4th Beiaaglieri
1
—
—
—
—
6th Bersaglieri .
1
1st Regiment . .
4
— ■
—
—
—
16th Regiment .
4
—
—
. .
2nd „ . .
4
—
—
—
—
16th „
4
,
,
Cavalry . .
—
4
—
—
—
Cavalry .
4
ArtiUery .
■
— .
18
— ■
—
ArtiUery . .
Total of 4th Division
5th DIVISION.
—
12
—
—
:otal of 1st Division
18
4
18
9961
400
18
4
12
10,757
400
2nd DIVISION.
Cucchlarl.
Eanti.
1st Bde (Caaale).
1st Bde. (Piedmont).
Pettinengo.
Mollard.
8th BersagUeri
1
—
—
9th Bersaglieri
1
—
—
—
—
11th Regiment .
4
3rd Regiment
4
—
—
—
—
12th
4
—
—
«h „ . .
4
—
—
—
—
2nd Bde. (Aocim).
3nd Bde. (Aosta).
Gozzanl.
Banesl.
6th BersagUeri .
1
1st Bersaglieri
1
—
—
—
—
17th Regiment
4
■
,
6th Regiment
4
—
—
—
—
18th
4
6th „ . .
4
—
—
—
—
CavalTy .
—
4
.
Cavalry .
— ■
4
—
—
— ,
ArtiUery . .
—
18
,
Artillery . .
—
—
18
—
—
Total of 2nd Division
18
4
18
11082
400
Total of 6th Division
18^
4
18
10,993
400
GAVALRT
DIVISION.
3Ti DIVISION.
Samhny.
Durando.
1st Bde. Sonnaz .
—
8
2nd Bde. Savoironx
8
Ist Bdo. (Cmieo).
Arnaldi.
1
Horse ArtiUery .
Total of Cav. Division
—
12
—
—
10th BersagUeri .
16
12
__
1980
7th Regiment .
4
— .
—
—
—
==
8th „ . .
4
—
—
—
—
OAOOIATORI
2nd Bde. (Pinerolo).
DBLLB ALPI.
Morozzo.
2nd Bersaglieri .
1
_
Garibaldi.
13th Regiment .
4
_.
—
—
—
1st Regiment . .
2
14th ,;
i
__
—
—
2nd „ . .
2
Cavalry . .
4
3rd „ . .
2
Artillery . .
—
—
12
—
—
Cavalry . .
Total . . .
1
—
—
—
Total of 3rd Division
'18
4
12
10,696
400
6
1
—
8420
50
23S
ORDRE DE BATAILLE OF THE FRENCH ARMY ON 4TH JUNE, 1859.
IMPERIAL GUAilD.
Regiiiiud dc S. Jean d' Aiigely.
1ST OOE.PS.
Baraguey d'Hilliers.
1st Infantry Division.
Forey.
1st Bde. Bieu.
17th Chasseurs ....
74th aegt
84th „
2nd Bde. Blanchard.
91st aegt
98th „
Artillery ....
Total . . .
2nd Infantry Division.
de Ladniirault.
1st Bde. Niol.
10th Chasseurs ....
1.5th Eegt
21st „
2nd Bde. de Negrier.
61st Kegt
100th
Artillery ....
Total . . .
3rd Infantry Division.
Bazaine.
1st Bde. Gozc.
1st Zouaves
33rd Ecgt
34th
2nd Bde. Dumont.
37th Begt
78th
Artillery ....
Total . . .
Cavalry Division.
Desvaux.
1st Bde. do Planhol.
5th Hussars
1st Ch. d'Afriqne . , .
2nd Bde. de Forton
2nd Ch. d'AMque
3rd
Artillery ....
Total . , .
Total, including Corps Artil-
lery (21 guns) ....
IIND Corps.
de MacMahon.
ls( Infantry Division.
de la Motterouge.
1st Bde. Letebvre.
Alg. Tiraillrs
45th Begt. .....
2nd Bde. de Polhes.
65th Eegt
70th ,
Artillery ....
Total . . .
2nd Infantry Division
Esptnasse.
1st Bde. Gault.
11th Chasseurs ....
71st Begt
72nd
2nd Bde. de Castagny.
2nd Zouaves ....
1st Etrangers ....
2nd „ ....
Artillery ....
Total . . .
Cavalry Brigade.
Gaudin de Villaine.
4th Chasseurs k cheval .
7th „ „ . .
Total . . .
Total, including Corps Artil-
lery {15 guns) ....
Of which, actually engaged at
Magenta
IIIED COUPS.
Caurobert.
ls( Infantry Divin-on.
Renault.
1st Bde. Picard.
8th Chasseurs
23rd Begt
90th
2nd Bde. Jannin.
41st Begt
56th „
Artillery ....
Total . . .
2nd Infantry Division.
Trochn
1st Bde. Bataille.
19th Chasseurs ....
43rd Begt
44th ,
2nd Bde. Colliueau.
64th Begt
88th ,
Artillery ....
Total . . .
3rd Infantry Division.
Bourbaki.
1st Bde. Verge.
18th Cha.sseurs ....
nth Begt
14th ,
2nd Bde. Ducrot.
46th Eegt
59th „
Artillery . . .
Total . . .
Cavalry Division.
Partoune,aux.
1st Bde. de Clerembault,
2nd Hussars ....
7th „ ....
2nd Bde. de tabareyre.
1st Lancers .."...
4th „ ....
Artillery ....
Total . . .
Total, including Corps Artil-
lery (15 guns) ....
Of which actually engaged at
Magenta
IVth CORPS.
Jfiel.
1st Infantry Division.
de Luzy.
1st Bde. Douay.
5th Chasseurs ....
30th Begt. .....
49th
2nd Bde. Lenoble.
6th Eegt
8th „
Artillery ....
Total . . .
2nd Infantry Division.
Vinoy.
1st Bde. de Martimprey.
6th Chasseurs ....
52nd Eegt
73rd
2nd Bde. de la Charriere.
85th Begt
S6th
Artillery ....
Total . . .
Srd Infantry Division.
de Failly.
1st Bde. O'Farrell.
15th Chasseurs ....
2nd Eegt
53rd „
2nd Bde. Saurin.
55th Eegt
76th „
Artillery ....
Total . . .
Cavalry Brigade.
de Eochfort.
2nd Chasseurs a cheval .
10th „ „ . .
Total . . .
Total, including Corps Artil-
lery (21 guns) ....
Of which actually engaged at
Magenta
.S
1
1
Vth CORPS.
Prince Napoleon.
1st Infantry Division.
d'Auteniarre.
1st Bde. Neigre.
3rd Zouaves
76th Eegt
89th Eegt
2nd Bde. Correard.
93rd Begt
99th ,
Artillery ....
Total . . .
2nd Infantry Division.
Uhrich.
1st Bde. Grandchanip.
14th Chasseurs ....
18th Eegt
26th
2nd Bde. du Bourguct.
80th Regt
82nd
Artillery ....
Total . . .
Cavalry Brigade.
de Laperouse.
6th Hussars ....
8th „ . .
Artillery ....
Total . . .
Total of Vth Corps . . .
d
o
1
2
•s
CO
=3
Effectives.
1
S
ei
S
CD
O
Effectives.
o
1
g
CO
Bffeetivcs.
a
s
i 1
i
&
CO
5
Effectives.
s
1
Effectives.
J
B
3
3
3
3
3
s 1
Effectives.
ls( Infantry DiviHon.
Melliuet.
1st Bde. Clcr.
Zouaves
1st Greuadicrs ....
2nd Bde. de Wimpffeu.
2nd Grenadiers . '.
3rd „ ....
Artillery . . '.
Men.
Horses.
Men.
Horses.
Men.
Horses.
Men.
Horses
a;
Men.
Horses
o
a*
CO
o
12
Men.
Horses.
2
3
3
3
—
12
-
-
1
3
3
3
3
;
12
3
3
3
3
—
z
12
—
~
1
3
3
3
3
-
12
~
-
1
3
3
3
3
-
12
-
-
~
-
-
Total
11
-
12
6,0BB
~
12
-
12
9,306
1
13
-
12
5,483
-
13
-
12
8,979
-
13
-
12
6,394
-
15
—
12
11,915
1
3
3
3
3
-
12
-
1
3
3
3
2
3
15
-
12
-
~
ZnA Infantry Division.
Caraou.
1st Bde, Maneque.
Cliasseurs
1st Voltigeurs ....
2nd Voltigeurs ....
2nd Bde, Becaeu.
3rd Voltigeurs ....
4th Voltigeurs ....
Artillery
1
3
3
3
3
12
-
-
1
3
3
3
3
~
12
-
1
3
3
3
3
13
1
3
3
3
8
-
12
-
-
1
3
3
3
3
-
12
~~
-
Total
13
-
12
8,168
-
— ! —
13
-
12
6,222
-
12
9,460 j —
13
-
12
6,702
12
12
6,916
-
IS
—
12
■
4
4
4
4
4
4
12
-
-
Cavalry Division.
Morris.
1st Bde. Marion.
1st Cuirassiers ....
2nd „
2nd Bde. dc Chaniperon.
3
3
3
3
3
-
12
-
-
—
4
4
~
~
—
1
3
3
3
3
13
-
—
12
-
-
~
~
—
4 1
4
- 1
^ 1
;
-
8
-
-
1,097
__ 1 ■
28
8 j
8
6
— ! 1,128
3rd Bde. Cassaignolles.
27
8
39
18,766
1,097
Chasseurs
~ 1 ~
30
21,127 1
1,128
Artillery
25
8
39
17,766
1,097
Total . . .
_
24
12
_
3,672
15
-
12
8,514
-
12
7,113
—
13
-
12
6,590
^
Total, including Corps Artillery
(12 guns)
24
24
48
14,223
3,672
-
4
4
4
4
6
-
4
4
4
4
6
-
-
4
4
-
-
-
Of which actually engaged at
Magenta
22
1
48
13,223
110
i
39
8
8
67
^
920
-
-
19,899
920
—
16
6
-
2,309
-
16
6
-
1,299
13
6,915
-
)'
39
16
57
22,794
1,299
41
16
63
20,219
2,309
i 1
13
—
-
8,979
—
■,' i
I \
1
1
i
ORDRE DE BATAILLE OF THE AUSTB
* Total of 1st Corps .
Engaged at Magenta
Cavalry Division.
Mensdorff.
l8t Bde. Holstein.
5th Dragoons .
6tii „ ...
2nd Bde. Palffy.
1st Uhlans ....
12th Hussars .
Artillery .
Total of Cavalry Division
Engaged at Magenta
1st corps.
Olam-Gallas.
Isl Division.
Montenuovo.
1st Bde. Burdina.
2nd Jaegers
60th R«gt. . .
2nd Bde. Paszthory
24th Jaegers .
16th Regt. . .
3rd Bde. Brunner
2nd Banal .
29th Regt. . .
Artillery .
2nd Division.
Cordon.
1st Bde. Hoditz.
14th Jaegers .
48th Regt. . .
2nd Bde. Reznicek,
2nd Banal.
37th Regt. . . .
Artillery .
Corps Artillery .
EJfoctivcs.
25
24
3
i —
8 j —
8ti "
— I 16
25 : 16
IlND CORPS.
Liechtenstein.
Isl Divisioit.
Jellacic.
1st Bde. Szabo.
7th Jaegers .
12th Regt. .
2nd Bde. Koudelk,
21st Jaegers .
46th Regt. .
Artillery .
10,767
2,469
1,200
*, No record of actual strength m men.
t Of these i squadrons were with the IXth Corps .and 4 with Urban.
'Itid Dimsion.
Herdy.
1st Bde. Baltiii.
10th Jaegers .
9tli Eegt 4 ;
2iid Bde. Kintzl.
45th Regt ! 4 ;
Artillery . . . . : — ;
Cavalry (r2th Uhlans)! — ;
Corps Artillery .
Total of Ilnd Corps ^■
Engaged at Magenta .
• Tl>is division lust 8 guns at Palostio.
IIIru corps.
Schwartzenberg.
Isi Division.
Schonberger.
1st Bde. Biirfekl.
15th Jaegers
58th Regt. . . .
2nd Bde. Ramming.
13tli Jaegers .
27th Regt.
Artillery .
'2nd Division.
Martini.
1st Bde. Wetzlar.
2nd Grenz Regt.
Sth Regt
2nd Bde. Hartung.
23rd Jaegers .
14th Regt. . . .
Artillery .
Cavalry (10th Hussars)
Corps Artillery .
Total of Illrd Corps .
Engaged at Magenta .
?.
i
o
?.
n
%
f»
o2
I
4
—
1
_._
4
—
1
4
-~ i
1
-_
4
—
—
8
—
—
20
8
20
8
Horses.
Vth corps.
Stadion.
1st Division.
Paumgartten.
1st Bde. Gaal.
1st Grenz Regt.
3rd Regt. . .
2nd Bde. Hess.
4t)i Jaegers .
31 St Regt.
Ki — — 3rd Bde. Bils.
3rd Greiiz Regt.
47tli Regt. .
Artillery .
2«(/ Division.
Sternberg.
1st Bde. Koller.
3rd Gronz Regt.
32nd Regt. .
16 — — I 2nd Bde. Festetics.
6th Jaegers .
24 i — — I 21st R«gt.
Artillery .
56 20,391 i 1,145 Cavalry (12th Uhlans)
Corps Artillery .
56 I 20,391 1,145
Total of Vth Cor))a
Engaged at Magenta
* DetucJied in Tavia.
NoiK. — There was in addition an Army ArtiUery Itcservi
E AUSTRIAN ARMY ON THE 4TH JUNE, 1859.
1*1
4 I
25
Men.
Horses.
24
16 __ : _
32 : — I —
72 ' 24,452 I 040
■ ; i_
8 : 4,120 ! —
VIIth corps.
Zobel.
U'< Division.
feischaoh.
1st Bde. Lebzeltern.
1st Kegt. .
2ik1 Bde. Gableiitz
3rd Jaegers .
54th Regt. .
Artillery .
2nd Division.
Lilia.
1st Bde. Wcigl.
53rd Regt.
2nd Bde. Bondorf.
2iid Grenz- Regt.
22nd Regt . .
Artillery .
Cavalry (1st Hu.ssars)
Corps Artillery .
Total of VIIth Corps
Klfecttvcs.
— _ : iG I —
HoKe-s.
10
— 4 _ ; _
— — 24 —
18
4 ', 56
16
15,464 i 571
7,293 571
VIIIth corps.
Benedck.
l6'( Division.
Berger.
1st Bde. Veranemaim.
2nd Jaegers .
7th Regt
2nd Bde. Rodcn.
4th Grenz Regt. .
11th Regt . . .
Artillery .
'2,nd Division.
Lang.
1st Bde. Philippovio.
5th Jaegers .
17th Regt . .
2nd Bde. Boer.
3rd Jaegers .
39th Regt. . .
3rd Bde. Lippert.
9th Jaegers .
59th Regt. . .
Artillery .
Cavalry (1st Hussars)
Corps Artillery .
Total of VIIIth Corps
Engaged at Magenta
IXth corps.
Schaffgotsclie.
\sl Division.
Handl.
1st Bde. Castiglioue.
8th Grenz Regt.
19th Regt. .
2nd Bde. Braum.'
8th Greuz Regt.
40th Regt .
3rd Bde. Augustin.
16th Jaegers .
34th Ilegt. .
Artillery .
'ind Division.
Creuneville.
1st Bde. Blumencron.
4th Jaegers .
52nd Regt . . .
2nd Bde. Pehlmayr.
Titler Grenz Regt. .
8th Regt. ....
Artillery .
Cavalry (12th Hussars)
Corps Artillery .
Total of IXth Corps .
Engaged at Magenta .
* Detached with Urban
=3
1
!
\ s
1
a*
Effectives.
Men.
Horyes.
1
4
—
—
—
— .
1
4
1
4
—
—
—
10
—
—
1
4
1
4
4
16
^-
—
—
2
—
—
25
4
56
20,975
428
Nil.
irtiUery lleserve o{ 88 guua, of wliicU 24 ouly were employed at Magenta.
APPENDIX B.
ORDRE DE BATAILLE OP THE SARDINIAN ARMY
ON THE 24TH JUNE, 1859.
1st DIVISION.
m DIVISION.
T\nrm\^n .^
nifiMim
xiuianuui r-
i
i
Effectives.
VitVlUlLlli
a
i
Effectives.
t Brigade.
1
o
i
fl
i
1st Brigade.
1
■a
i
d
%
Colliano.
s
o
s
1
Villamarina.
9th Regiment
00
a
S
1
1st Grenadiers
4
—
_-
—
—
4
—
—
—
—
2iid
4
__
—
—
•~—
10th
4
—
—
—
8rd Boisaglieri .
1
—
—
—
—
7th Bersaglieri .
2nd Brigade.
1
—
—
—
nd Brigade.
Broglia.
Perrier.
15th Regiment .
4
—
—
—
1st Regiment . .
4
—
—
—
—
16th
4
—
—
—
2nd „ . .
4
—
• —
—
—
6th BersagUeri .
1
—
—
—
4th Bersaglieri
1
—
—
—
—
Cavalry .
—
4
—
—
Cavalry
—
4
—
—
—
ArtiUery .
—
—
12
—
Artillery . .
18
Total . .
sm DIVISION.
18
4
12
10,927
400
Total - .
18
4
18
10,083
400
2nd DIVISION.
Cuccliiari.
Fanti.
1st Brigade.
Pettinengo.
I9t Brigade.
11th Regiment .
4
—
—
—
—
Camerana.
12th
4
—
—
— .
—
3rd Eegiment
4
—
—
—
—
8th Bersaglieri
1
—
—
— ■
—
4th
4
—
—
—
—
2nd Brigade.
9th Bersaglieri .
1
—
—
—
—
Gozzani.
2nd Brigade.
17th Regiment
4
—
—
— ■
—
Danesi.
18th
4
—
—
—
— ■
6th Regiment
4
—
— .
—
—
6th BersagUeri
1
—
—
—
—
6th
4
—
—
—
—
Cavalry . .
4
—
—
—
lat Bersaglieri
1
—
—
—
—
Artillery . .
18
—
— .
Cavalry .
Artillery .
4
—
18
—
—
Total . .
CAVALRY
DIVISION.
18
4
18
10,743
400
Total . .
18
4
18
9,558
400
Sambuy.
Srd DIVISION.
1st Bde. Sonnaz .
8
_
_
Mollard.
2nd Bde. Savoiroux
8
Ist Brigade.
4
Horse Artillery.
Total . .
—
12
—
—
Amaldl.
-
16
12
—
2097
7th Regiment
8th
4
—
—
—
—
10th Bersaglieri .
1
—
—
—
—
CACCIATORl
nd Brigade.
DBLLB ALPI.
Morozzo.
Garibaldi.
13th Regiment .
4
—
—
. —
—
14th
4
—
—
—
— .
Ist Regiment
2
—
— ,
2nd Bersaglieri .
1
—
—
—
—
2nd „ . .
2
—
—
—
—
Cavalry .
—
4
—
— .
—
3rd
2
—
.
—
Artillery . .
—
—
12
—
—
Cavalry . .
Total . .
1
—
—
—
Total . .
18
4
12
11,15[
400
6
1
~
3,120
60
ORDRE DE BATAILLE OF THE FRENCH ARMY ON THE 24TH JUNE, 1859.
IMPERIAL GUABD.
Reguaud de S. Jeau d'Angely.
1ST CORPS.
Baraguey d'Hilliers.
1st Bivision.
Forey.
1st Bde. Dicu.
17tll Cliasseurs ....
74th Eegt
84th „
2nd Bde. d'Aiton.
91st Regt
98th
Artillery ....
Total . . .
2nd Bivision.
de Ladmirault.
1st Bde. Douay (F.).
10th Cliasseurs ....
15th Regt
21st ,
2nd Bde. de Hegrier.
6l3t Regt
100th
Artillery ....
Total . . .
Zrd Bivision.
Bazaine.
1st Bde. Goze.
1st Zouaves
33rd Kegt
34th „
2nd Bde. Dumont.
37th Regt
78th „
Artillery .....
Total . . .
Cavalry Bivision.
Desvaux.
1st Bde. de Planhol.
5th Hussars
1st Ch. d'Afrique . . .
2nd Bde. de Forton.
2nd Ch.' d'AMque . . .
Srdi „ ...
Artillery; ....
Total . . .
Corps Artillery; . .
Grand Total of 1st Corps
Engaged at Solferino
IIND CORPS,
de MacMahon.
Isi Division.
La Motterouge.
1st Bde. Lcfebvrc.
Turcos
45th Regt
2nd Bde. Douay.
65th Regt
70th ,
Artillery ....
Total . . .
2nd Divt^on.
Decaen.
1st Bde. Gault.
11th Chasseurs ....
71st Regt
72nd „
2nd Bde. de Castagtiy.
2nd Zouaves ....
1st Etrangers ....
2nd „ ....
Artillery ....
Total . . .
Cavalry Brigade.
Gaudin de Villaine.
4th Chasseurs a cheval .
7th „ „ . .
Total . . .
Corps Artillery .
Grand Total of Ilnd Corps .
Engaged at Solferino .
3
3
3
3
S
m
IIIKD CORPS.
Caurobert.
1st Bivision.
Renault.
1st Bde. Doens.
8th Chasseurs ....
23rd Regt
90th Regt
2nd Bde. .Jannin.
41st Regt
56th „
Artillery ....
Total . . .
2nd Bivision.
Trochu.
1st Bde. Bataille.
19th Chasseurs ....
43rd Uegt
44th „
2nd Bde. Colhncau.
64th Regt
88th
Artillery ....
Total . . .
Srd Division.
Bourbaki.
1st Bde. VergS.
18th Chasseurs ....
11th Regt
14th ,
2nd Bde. Ducrot.
46th Regt
59th
Artillery ....
Total . . .
Cavalry Bivision.
Partouneaux.
1st Bde. de Clerembault.
2nd Hussars . .
7th .......
2nd Bde. de Labareyre.
1st Lancers . . .
4th „ . . . . .
Artillery ....
Total ...
1 Corps Artillery .
Grand total of Illrd Corps .
Engaged at Solferino . . .
ivth corps.
Mel.
1st Division.
de Luzy.
1st Bde. Doiiay (C).
5th Ciiasseurs ....
30th Eegt
49th
2nd Bde. Lcnoble.
6th Regt
8th
Artillery ....
Total . . .
2nd Divisum.
Vlnoy.
1st Bde. de Capriol.
6th Chasseurs ....
52nd Regt
73rd „
2nd Bde. de la Charriere.
85th Regt
86th
Artillery ....
Total . . .
3rd Division. ■
de Failly.
1st Bde. O'Farrell.
15th Chasseurs ....
2nd Regt
53rd ,
2nd Bde. Saurin.
55th Regt
76th „
Artillery ....
Total . . .
Cavalry Brigade.
de Rochefort.
2nd Ch. a cheval ....
10th „ ....
Total ...
Corps Artillery .
Grand total of IVth Corps .
Engaged at Solferino .
vth corps.
Prince Napoleon.
1st Division.
D'Autemarre.
1st Bde. Neigre.
3rd Zouaves ....
76th Regt
89th ,
2nd Bde. Correard.
93rd Regt
99th
ArtiUery ....
Total . . .
2nd Bivision.
Uhrich.
1st Bde. Grandchanip.
14th Chasseurs ....
18th Eegt
26th
2nd Bde. du Bourguet.
80th Regt
82nd
Artillery
Total . . .
Cavalry Brigade.
de Laperouse.
6th Hussars
8th „
Artillery
Total . . .
Corps Artillery .
Grand total of Vth Corps
Engaged at Solferino .
S
3
3
1
S
-a
$
a-
i
Effectives.
3
3
1
tf
^
3
Effectives.
Effectives.
1
1
1
Effectives.
a
o
1
m
d
s
IS
s
■CO
■ Effectives.
1
P3
o
a
Effectives.
1st Division.
Melliuet.
Men.
Horses.
Men.
Horses.
Men.
Horses.
Men.
Horses.
Men.
Horses.
Men. 1 Horse
i
Zouaves
1st Grenadiers ....
2nd Bde. Blanchard.
2nd Grenadiers ....
3rd „ ....
Artillery
2
3
3
3
11
-
12
~
~
1
3
3
3
3
—
12
-
-
—
12
—
-
1
3
3
3
3
-
12
-
-
1
3
3
3
3
12
:
3
3
3
3
3
15
—
12
-
12
6,313
-
12
-
12
7,902
-
Total . . .
13
—
12
6,602
—
13
-
12
8,070
-
13
1
3
3
3
3
-
12
7,864
-
—
12
12,112
1
3
3
3
3
IS
-
12
"
;
1
3
3
3
2
3
-
12
-
-
ind Ihvision.
Camou.
1st Bde. Mandque.
Cliasseurs
1st Voltlgeurs ....
2nd „ ....
2nd Bde. Picard
3rd Voltigeurs ....
4th „ ....
Artillery
1
3
3
8
3
-
12
~
-
1
3
3
3
3
13
12
-
-
12
-
—
1
3
3
3
3
-
12
-
-
12
7,709
^r__
Total . . .
13
—
12
6,968
—
15
—
12
8,254
_
-
12
7,067
-
13
~
12
6,046
-
13
-
12
8,948
-
Cavalry Bivision.
Morris.
1st Bde. Marion.
1st Cuirassiers ....
2nd „ ....
2nd Bde. de Champeron.
—
4
4
4
4
4
4
12
-
-
3
3
8
3
3
-
12
-
I
—
i
4
-
1
3
3
3
3
-
12
—
-
1
3
3
3
3
-
12
-
-
4
4
6
-
-
8
-
-
1,347
Dragoons
~
8
6
__
1,044
-
-
24
-
-
3rd Bde. Cassaigolles.
Ciiasseurs
Guides
28
8
24
—
27
8
48
17,021
1,347
54
Nil.
21,060 1.04
Artillery
Total . . .
Corps Artillery . .
15
-
12
8,307
-
25
8
48
16,156
1,347
13
^
12
7,876
—
18
—
12
7,117
—
12
—
-
4
4
4
4
6
-
-
—
4
4
4
4
6
—
-
-
4
4
-
; -
-
_ — — — - — — —
Grand Total of Guard . .
24
24
48
14,022
3,2B9
24
24
36
14,022
3,2B9
Engaged at Solferino . .
—
8
—
^
986
--
-
24
-
-
39
8
60
21,026
986
—
16
6
-
2,467
-
16
6
~
1,113
39
8
60
21,026
986
—
24
-
-
-
-
24
-
-
41
16
66
21,877
2,457
39
16
66
23,013
1,113
38
16
66
20,527
2,457
20
16
24
11,204
1,113
FIRST ARMY— COUNT WIMPFFEN
ORDRE DE BATAILLE OF
IInd Corps.
Liechtenstein.
Isl Division.
Jellaoic.
1st Bde. Szabo.
1st Btn. 9th Grenz Regt.
12th Eegt
2nd Bde. Wachter.
2nd Btn. 10th Grenz Regt.
46th Regt
Artillery . . . .
Total . . .
Ivd Division.
Hetdy.
1st Bde. Kintil
45th Regt
2nd Bde. Hahn.
4th Btn. 21st Regt.
31st „
32nd „
39th „
47th „
54th „
Artillery .
Total .
JIanfcua garrison att.
4th Btn. 1st Regt.
33rd „
49th „
Cavalry (12th Hussars)
Corps Artillery .
Grand Total .
2 S
:i it
i
Effectives.
i
Men. i Hor.-5es.,
■ 1 ; _ ^ _
: 4 : — : —
4 ■ — ; —
— ; — : 16
1
1 1
10 — ! le
i
■
'■ 4:': —
^loj-
8
8
—
j
i
— i 4 : —
- i - 1 32
i i
~~
- i
22JI 4 :
56
17,710
450 1
niRD CORPS.
Schwartzenberg.
Isi Division.
Sohonberger.
1st Bde. Pokorn/.
15th Jaegers .
58th Regt. . .
2nd Bde. Dienstel.
13tli Jaegers .
27th Regt. . .
Artillery .
Total .
'2nd Division:
Haberraann.
1st Bde. Wetzlar.
2nd Btn. 2nd Grenz, Itegt
5th Regt
2nd Bde. Hartung.
23rd Jaegers .
14th Regt. . . .
3rd Bde. Rosgen.
7th Jaegers .
49th R«gt. . . .
Artillery . . .
Total . .
Cavalry (10th Hussars)
Corps Artillery .
— ■ Grand total ....
ISffcctives.
=c ^
10 ; —
16 —
16 ; —
15
24
24
32
IXth CORPS,
Schaffgotsche.
\sl Division.
Handl.
Lst Bdo. Oaatiglione.
2nd Btn. 8th Grenz Regt.
1 9th Regt. . . .
2nd Bde. Winipffcn.
1st Btn. 8th Grenz Ucgt,
40th Regt. . . .
3rd Bde. Suini.
16th Jaegers .
34th Regt. . . .
Artillery .
Total . .
2nd Division.
Crennevillc.
1st Bde. Blumenoron.
4th Jaegers .
52nd R«gt.
2nd Bde. Fehlmayr.
Titler Grenz Btn.
8th Regt
Artillery .
Total . .
— Cavalry (12th Uhlans)
— Corps Artillery .
72 j 17,895 I 880
Grand total
.1
1
i
o
1
a
Effectives.
Men. HoKcs.
1
4
~
—
I
1
4
—
—
—
24
—
—
15
—
24
—
—
1
4
—
—
■
—
1
4
—
16
—
—
10
--
lo; - _
_
4
„
—
—
24
—
—
25
4
64
18,728
480
Xth corps.
Wernhardt.
\sl Division.
Marziani.
1st Bde. Maroicic.
12th Jaegers ....
15th Regt
2ud Bde. Anthoine.
1st Btn. 14th Grenz Regt.
4th Regt
3rd Bde. Jablonsky.
20th Jaegers ....
33rd Regt
Artillery ....
Total . . .
'2nd Division.
Wallemare.
1st Bde. Schiller.
5th Jaegers ....
6th Regt
2nd Bde. Mollinary.
1st Btn. 13tli Grenz Regt.
56th Regt. . . . ' .
Artillery ....
Total .
Cavalry (4th Uhlans) .
Corps Ai'tillery ....
Grand total
Effectives.
• o
Moil.
Hoiscs.
1
4
1
4
1
=
—
—
—
—
— '
4
—
—
—
—
—
24
—
;
15
—
24
—
—
I
4
1
1 4
—
Hi
—
—
10
—
16
—
—
' —
4
—
—
: —
—
32
—
—
; 25
4
72
20,710
520
XlTH CORPS.
Woigl.
\st Division.
Sohwartzel.
1st Bdo. Sebottcndorf.
loth Jaegers ....
37th Itegt
2nd Bde. Gre-schke.
35th Regt
Artillery ....
Total .
2nd Division.
Blomberg.
1st Bde. Baltin.
2nd Btn. 5th Grenz Regt.
9th Regt
2nd Bde, Dobrzcn.sky.
21st Jaegers ....
42nd Regt
3rd Bde. Host.
2nd Btn. 9th Grenz Regt.
57tli Regt
Artillery ....
Total .
Cavalry (4th Uhlans)
— Corps Artillery .
Grand total
1 _ ' —
1 ~ : —
4 _ ■ __
— -^ : 16
6 i — I 10
1
4
— 24
—
1
15
-!24
—
—
— ;
4 \ —
— ; 8
—
—
21 \
4 j 48
12,486
560 1
CAVALRY DIVISION.
Zedtwitz.
Kifcctivcs.
ten. liorsus.
1st. Brigade.
Vopatemy.
- —
3rd Hus.sars
nth „
Artillery ....
Z__^__=^
Total . . .
•2nd Brigade.
Lauingen.
1st Dragoons ....
3rd Dragoons ....
Artillery ....
- 1 —
Total . . .
■
Grand total .
Army Artillery Reserve
15
«■;
•s
PO
«
8
-
8
.TAILLE OF THE AUSTRIAN ARMY ON THE 24TH JUNE, 1859.
16
— 6
— : 6
12
28
Kffeutives.
8 ; — i —
SECOND ARMY— COUNT SCHLICK
2,970
1st corps.
Clam Gallas.
1st Division.
Monteiiuovo.
1st Bde. Pasathory.
2nd Jaegers .
60th Eegt. . .
2nd Bde. Briinner.
11th Grena Regt.
29th Regt. . .
Artillery .
Total .
Total . .
Cavalry (12th Hussars)
Corps Artillery.
Grand total . "^ .
a
G
Effectives.
5
^
C
CO
o
Men. HordOd.
1
4
—
—
— —
— ; — 16 — —
11 _ 16 I — —
'2nd Division.
Stankovios.
1st Bde. Hoditz.
1
14th Jaegers .
1 —
48th Regt. . . .
4 ^ — —
2nd Bde. Reznicek.
24th Jaegers .
■ 1 ' - -
16th Regt. . . .
.1 4 - -
Artillery . . .
• i - - '«
4 —
— 24
21
4 56
Vth corps.
Stadion.
Ist Division.
Palffy.
Ist Bde. Gaal,
1st Btn. 1st Grcn/i Hogt.
3rd Regt
2nd Bde. Puclinor.
4th Jaegers ....
31st Regt
3rd Bde. Bils.
2nd Btn. 3rd Grenz Regt.
47th Regt
Artillery ....
Total . . .
2>id Ditfision.
Sternberg.
Ist Bde. Koller.
1st Btn. 3rd Grenz Regt
32nd Regt.
2nd Bde. Pestetics.
6th Jaegers .
21st Regt. . . .
Artillery .
Total
15,190 , 480 Cavah-y (12th Uhlan-s)
',. Corps Artillery . .
Grand total
Kffectiveij.
.Men.
Uofrios.
4 — : —
15
24
24
10
16
16
20
60
19,596 : 480.
VIIth CORPS.
Zobel.
1st Division.
Hess.
1st Bde. Wussin.
2nd Btn. 1st Greuz Regt.
1st Regt
2nd Bde. Gablentz.
1st Btn. 4th Grenz Regt.
54th Regt
Artillery . . . .
Total . . .
2nd DivUion.
Lilia.
1st Bde. Brandenstein.
19th Jaegers .
53rd Regt. . . .
2nd Bde. Wallon.
Ist Btn. 2nd Grenz Regt.
22nd Regt. . . .
Artillery .
Total
Cavalry (1st Hussars)
Corps Artillery ,
Grand total
1 —
4 —
1 —
4 ■ —
10 —
Effectives,
Hon. I Horses.
16
16
— 16 —
(10
—
16
—
—
—
4
16
—
—
i.!"i
4
48
15,728
480
vmiH CORPS.
Benedek.
1st Division.
Berger.
1st Bde. Watervliet.
2nd Jaegers ....
7th Regt.
2nd Bde. Kuhn.
2nd Btn. 4th Grenz Regt.
17th Regt. ....
Artillery ....
Total . . .
2nd Division.
Lang.
1st Bde. Philippovic.
5th Jaegers .
1 Ith Regt. . .
2nd Bde. Dauber.
3rd Jaegers .
30th Regt. . .
3rd Bde. Lippert.
9th Jaegers .
59th Regt. . .
Artillery .
Total .
Cavalry (1st Hussars)
Corps Artillery .
Attd. from Vlth Corpt
Grand total
i
j
CO
5
Effectives.
1
Men.
Horses.
1 '■ —
4 —
1 _
4 —
II III
II 112
—
10
1
4
1
4
—
; ■ !
16 ; — : _ ;
-
—
1
1
CAVALRY DIVISION.
MensdorfE.
\st Brigade.
Holstein.
5th Dragoons
6th Dragoons
Artillery .
Total . .
2nd Brigade.
Ziohy.
1st Uhlans ....
Artillery .
Total . .
Grand total
Army Artillery Reserve
1
4
—
24 -
;
15
— ; 24 i —
— ;
4
4
24 ; —
8 ; —
—
29
4
72 1 20,160
560
1
£
a
5-
3D
1
5
Effectives.
Men.
Horses.
'-I 6
- ; 6
j
8
—
—
— '■ 12
8 : — ^ —
—
8
8
—
— 1 8
8
—
-J^-
16 — i 2,600
112 — —
8'^June, 1859 MELEGNANO abovZ e.p.jn..
■$wf.H icx«.t«iC"t"'
51 ^^Ha^ 1859. PALESTRO cCboiXb S- ^-^^
Frlnch
Italians msiuMS
SlVjtM SoftMEI^SCHCIN £ CP £ K<
■^^j-
SCALE
Z4'^Juna.1859 SOLFERINO aiout 6 a^rm.
ZO'f'Mcu^ 1859. MONTEBELLO a,bout4-pm.
#4 xl^^f^^-"***^ i
.-#1
>ii
"^^m^-^
%
\Smnnia
CallitPKlc
^l\i/''
"^f'uqttyfa
lU^^o ,
ifJfur^'/i- GtaoenKafio \
/Thi'po/xio
fie^c
i'Tholiioiie
Jfcxx.
\Swreiah.
^unale
Landpuiijo
^uatii
auirdo
'SC/.an
I Iw Mm-:u\
*\f^rgiiafio
}0//anrti(fo
^xntio
Jiiuti'ano
Cl'tXtl^O
^^'fitineuM
FraSsinelU)
ihiuin
>JC^i,
\^'i^.Bhj-Utio
\flrola
Btr:%olc
flirana
\Jhnlarhio
Alatjna .
'4/rrrr/yt
Girtionaf>a^
KAVIjE (ffhx/ttfmafo
yni-vi-t/w/^/io/ct '
Satyana
porfehetlo
^fiwji&/7f'
so
■W-t '^yS^M'^^''''''Ximii
M^^
■'•■^^^ tC*^. J^ft
•iTf*'
J? X? j\
Erba 1
MMr
\J
E arntr
Bm-tiis!*
S^'cv^
y ^
h/Mwi \
T^Pirr^i'
'rnaao
w^fy
Osta^a^i:::^!^^:s^
MttjUa
/
' Coi'gonKAi
CorstooX
ii II I I ' f I' i' iiVii .Cfii/rino
. Sftaecmt
'\
^t^uzie
M
dfOrilr "^
RA
<{7ivoo
liXIMi,^
\/f///yt> J^Jt'ro ^p
"J^
/Ss^mirlTsoo
/ .Uaj/i»a/
^\ i*iyv^^Sv
it*
^"^•'^iritrru
^^i/fOJtv
if^ffKUru Jt 1
] I
W/fanfiiffo
CfXXiljfO
vUtdo
Tarbckh , , , , ,
faSt^' ^'"y'>-f'"'>''i \<,y
tXZentt J
Mair.
Chi
^.
{Tn'iiolo
f&Hmfff
aiaritti' \j£j^
ontecltiairo v
J?fl^i^
fjiToeaUi
*illLeno
CasUg^Uone-j
fJ^-Mttf^O'
U* Vei-ol im ova
■penedoto
^^iiktnno
Ia/Jfait:(i\
ngiolo
PAVXE o/aofarf/ittto
Ct^nffitf
J^Offiitgo
■/• f/W/£i£ffi0/tt \
Ca^
Pizzie"iielt«nf
fflj?^ ,
J^JfaTmr-
r Jteheoco
Trunoli.-^>\'^'^
yuu
Kifux^ii
Ciijt^isGrinuUilo
fert-t
o rPi-Uaton^
^onmo
\lr.Viuifip
\&S.inu-tt'iio
■»!%«.*.?
Sor.salc
^A '"s^ .Wit- J'' -,
l!??^Ms^i*,
,
\
ffot^a J^Ji're
v\
/
J^Jiry////y^ \r^^
^■^
-7S^
V
"|\S.(rtOi>fi;i<\
Sk <3i/vigjww^ \^r
«^ir«na
\
* / \^ /
- — ^r'Su™
MontaHato
o ■
/
■i«^
/jdhfreSere,
^^^^'ih
^^^o^^. >/fe,
fW%'
XamUt
"^-^'ss^^^^ rv^!^f!3lf^ u ~r""M ''-''"'"s^^/"
'Cfli
'armoho
G^o^nol.
^JtoHofrCito
Jtfoulicelli
.tfttMlKja
IRA/
"1 f^**uii^f^Utt V ■ .i^
^ 1. ■
( is)olla7.«o
iSezze
'I
-•">
^
tiaUmraMiif
//
// li
° \
/l"
> )
/A.^1
"ivv^
/ »
■^==^
^^^^^^1
\
\^l
'.*fc -1
^■''!^
•A
V?
!tU)NK
G
D i:
E
\
ty^i ■^1
Jj^V.
/C-l
SCALE iM Muss
y
15
'"^
■*^
SWI^N SO)iN£NSCH£/N & C9 IT^ lOfiaON
1 J?
fy^cfuh J^tx:dda
f Rehfoco
^ Otddi
^(ktfgii/crro
GaxxotdoS
Oi^Unet.
MaX
, fiffar^^ill T^x\
cJk'ttK'ti
Calriudino
/i/^W^ fc/
1^
SCALE IN MiiES
o • i -3
'
K4 t-H t= JE
IS
MlfiS
Bozzolo>
^fiMtticehio
Gax>uu*h\
MAN}
vordiiruJFO/ \
BoraoforU'
.o
bioneU a
CH^ASTALI-A
Rresoello
./
rt'ai'
s
/'