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BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME 
 FROM THE 
 
 SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND 
 
 THE GIFT OF 
 
 Slenrtj m. Sage 
 
 iSqx 
 
 Ajjam.^.. ja/j/. 
 
Cornell University Library 
 V765 .R32 
 
 Our iron-clad ships 
 
 olin 
 
 3 1924 030 752 905 
 
30. Devastation. 
 
 31. Swiftsure. 
 29. Resistance. 
 
 27. Defence. 
 
 28. Valiant. 
 
 2G. Nortluiniberland. 
 
 32. Iron Duke. 
 
 36. Vi.Ken. 
 
 37. Hotspur. 
 25. Wivern. 
 
 33. Repulse. 
 38. Belleroplion. 
 24. Hector. 
 
 34. Lord Warden. 
 
 35. Pallas. 
 39. Invincible. 
 
 22. Captain. 
 
 23. Prince Albert. 
 
 40. Thunderer. 
 21. Warrior. 
 
 41. Hercules. 
 
 1. Sultan. 
 
 2. Zealous. 
 
 42. Monarch. 
 
 43. Rupert. 
 
 19. Royal O.ak. 
 
 20. Minotaur. 
 
 [OUR IRON-CLAD SHIPS. 
 
32. Iron Duke. 
 
 36. Vixen. 
 
 37. Hotspur. 
 25. Wivern. 
 
 33. Repulse. 
 38. Bellerophon. 
 24. Hector. 
 
 34. Loi'd Warden. 
 
 35. Pallas. 
 39. Invincible. 
 
 22. Captain. 
 
 23. Prince Albert. 
 
 40. Thunderer. 
 21. Warrior. 
 
 41. Hercules. 
 
 [OUK IRON-CLAD SHI P.S.J 
 
 1. 
 
 Sultan. 
 
 2 
 
 Zealous. 
 
 42. 
 
 Monarch. 
 
 43. 
 
 Rupert. 
 
 19. 
 
 Koyal Oak 
 
 20. 
 
 Minfitaiir. 
 
 3. Royal Alfred. 
 
 4. Research. 
 
 44. Lord Clyde. 
 
 45. Glatton. 
 
 17. Royal Sovereign. 
 
 18. Waterwitch. 
 
 5, Viper. 
 
 6. Favorite. 
 
 46. PeDelope. 
 
 47. Enterprise. 
 
 15. Caledonia. 
 
 16. Prince Consort. 
 
 7. Audacious. 
 
 8. Vanguard. 
 
 9. Agincourt. 
 
 10. Ocean. 
 
 11. Triumph. 
 
 12. Scorpion. 
 
 13. Achilles. 
 
 14. Black Prince. 
 
OUR IRON-CLAD SHIPS; 
 
 THEIE QUALITIES, PEEFOKMANCES, 
 AND COST. 
 
 WITH CHAPTERS ON 
 
 TURRET SHIPS, lEON-CLAD RAMS, &c. 
 
 By E. J. EEED, C.B., 
 
 CHIEF CONSTRUCTOR OF THE NAVY, 
 
 VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE INSTITUTION OF NAVAL AROniTEOTS, AND nONORARY MEMBER 
 OF THE LIVERPOOL LITERARY AND PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY. 
 
 WITH ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 JOHN MUEEAT, ALBEMAELE STEEET. 
 
 1869. 
 
 flie right of 'franslation is rese^-ved. 
 
LO^"lX)^•: prikted by TviixrAM clowks and sons, sta^iford otreet, 
 
 AND CHABING CROSS. 
 
TO THE 
 
 RIGHT HONOURABLE HUGH G. E. GHILDERS, M.P., 
 
 FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY, 
 
 iTbis Dolume 
 
 IS EESPECTFTJLLY INSCRIBED BY 
 
 THE AUTHOR. 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tiiis bool< is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924030752905 
 
INTEODUCTION. 
 
 The iron-clad ship question is so continually under 
 discussion in the public press, and is justly deemed of 
 so much importance to the country, that the publication 
 of further information respecting it appears to be in 
 many ways desirable. It is a question which cannot 
 be thoroughly discussed in popular language— which 
 alone I propose to employ in the present work — for it 
 embraces many profound scientific problems ; but there 
 is a large mass of information relating to it which is 
 perfectly susceptible of familiar exposition, and which 
 there is no good reason for withholding from the read- 
 ing public. 
 
 The only sources of such information at present open 
 are undoubtedly insufiGcient. The annual speeches of 
 the Parliamentary representatives of the Admiralty — 
 able and copious as they often are — necessarily leave 
 numerous facts and considerations concerning iron-clad 
 ships untouched ; and although the newspapers abound 
 with intelligence upon the subject, they do not attempt 
 to supply the place of connected and comprehensive 
 statements embracing the subject as a whole, still less 
 do they seek to set it before the public from the same 
 point of view as those who daily regard it, so to speak, 
 from a nearer stand-point. In fact, a candid and general 
 survey of the iron-clad ship question will, I am sure, be 
 welcomed by none more cordially than by gentlemen of 
 
VI 
 
 Introduction. 
 
 the press, whose duty and privilege it is, to a large 
 extent, to shape and direct the national opinion. 
 
 I know of no question which better deserves, or 
 which is more likely to receive, impartial representa- 
 tion and advocacy than this iron-clad ship question, 
 provided only that it be understood. The efficiency of 
 its iron- clad fleet is of foremost importance to a small, 
 isolated, maritime country like this, anchored on the 
 edge of a continent like Europe, entrusted with the care 
 of woiid-wide interests, and charged to maintain its 
 power upon the sea at a time when the spirit of inven- 
 tion is setting at naught all past systems of ocean 
 warfare, and mocking at every trace and tradition of 
 the times when we won our naval renown. In pro- 
 portion as the past is prolonged into the present we are 
 weakened and endangered ; in proportion as the novel 
 capabilities of iron and steam are developed we are 
 strengthened and made safe. This is no time, then, for 
 clinging to any type of ship, or any feature of naval 
 construction, merely because it is old and accustomed — 
 no time for rejecting things because they are new and 
 unaccustomed. But, on the other hand, this being pre- 
 eminently a time of risk because of the transitions we 
 are passing through, it is pre-eminently a time for 
 making our great experiments with scrupulous care, 
 and for wasting nothing on methods which cannot 
 succeed. 
 
 There are special circumstances which render a broad 
 and clear review of the question peculiarly desirable at 
 present. Some of these arise out of the essentially 
 transitional character of the period, owing to the con- 
 tinual improvement of guns and armour. In a time of 
 
Introduction. vii 
 
 transition, for example, public criticism becomes loosed 
 from its usual restraints, and runs into error and ex- 
 travagance. Under ordinary circumstances, the con- 
 struction and behaviour of a war ship would admittedly 
 be an abstruse and scientific question ; but now, when 
 so many changes are in progress, there is scarcely a 
 journal, in town or country, which does not undertake 
 to prescribe the proper forms, dimensions, and fighting 
 features of war-ships. Hence it happens that great 
 diversity of feeling and opinion prevails on this subject, 
 and it is not to be expected that any Board of Admiralty, 
 or Admiralty designer, will give universal satisfaction. 
 And, further, a time of transition is also a time of 
 opportunity for all kinds of interested persons— in- 
 ventors, patentees, contractors, and many others. A 
 radical^ or even a very considerable change in the type 
 of our war ships, carries with it large orders to private 
 firms, and minor advantages to a much larger number 
 of persons ; so that, for this cause also, it is to the 
 interest of many to complain of, and even to denounce, 
 the ships built by the responsible authorities. Besides 
 these considerations there is the fact, that the change 
 from very long iron-clads to shorter and handier ships 
 of the first class was brought about by the substitution 
 of a young and comparatively untried Chief Constructor 
 for a much older and more experienced officer — a change 
 which naturally furnished a new occasion for hostility 
 to the powers that were. All these things have tended 
 to obscure the true state of the subject, and to suggest 
 the necessity for such a record and statement as I now 
 propose to offer. I cannot hope that I have discussed 
 every branch of the subject with perfect impartiality. 
 
viii Introduction. 
 
 for it is not possible to maintain absolute composure 
 amid the din and worry of battle, and most of my work 
 during the last seven years has been done under fire, 
 and under the fire, too, of noisy and distracting, if 
 not always powerful, ordnance. Nevertheless I have 
 written, as I have worked, with the feeling that the 
 only object worth consideration in this matter is the 
 production of what are really the best ships for 
 the Navy, and therefore I am not without confidence 
 in the general fairness of the following pages. 
 
 One of the results of the publication of this work 
 will, I trust, be to induce persons to look a little more 
 closely than heretofore to the true causes of the different 
 performances of the ships, both under steam and under 
 canvas. It is not only idle, it is contrary to common 
 sense and common experience, to visit upon the designer 
 all those short-comings which are obviously the conse- 
 quences of imperfect management. I appeal to the 
 experience of the best seamen in our Navy when I ask 
 if ships do not perform very differently in different 
 hands. The sailing of a ship is by no means an art in 
 which all persons are equally skilful. On the contrary, 
 it is only those who have combined great ability with 
 great devotion and professional love of their work, who 
 have been eminently successful in establishing that 
 delicate and beautiful relationship between the ship, 
 the sails, the helm, and the wind, which is essential to 
 great success in this branch of the sailor's art. The 
 trim of the ship has to be watched and studied, the 
 numerous detached sail-surfaces have to be brought 
 into careful co-operation, so that each may take the 
 utmost propulsive effort out of the wind ; the helm has 
 
Introduction. ix 
 
 to be so used that the ship may be humoured to the sea, 
 and find its way through it with as Kttle obstruction as 
 possible. These things cannot be accomplished with a 
 new ship in a day : some little experience, at least, of 
 a new craft is indispensable to the sailor's success in 
 managing her ; and, above all, he must possess the art 
 of adapting his measures to the qualities and circum- 
 stances of the ship he is called upon to handle. The 
 sailing of an iron-clad, with an extremely powerful 
 rudder, and an enormous screw propeller dragging in 
 front of it — the best position for which screw, when not 
 revolving, can only be ascertained by experience — is 
 obviously a more difficult operation than the sailing of 
 an old-fashioned frigate, and therefore requires greater 
 skill and attention than was demanded of old, the more 
 so as the pitches of the screws of the various ships 
 diifer greatly. How vain it is, then, to ignore all these 
 considerations, and to take it for granted that a new 
 ship, of new type, will exhibit her best sailing powers 
 under all circumstances. Yet this has been done over 
 and over again with our iron-clad ships ; and even 
 ships which have proved the best sailers in the fleet one 
 year, on repeated trials and under various conditions, 
 have been pronounced a year later as the worst sailers 
 in the same fleet, and the consequent discredit has fallen 
 upon the design — a circumstance of but little moment 
 in itself, but of very great moment when it diverts 
 attention from the true causes of the failure, and from 
 the remedies which should be applied. It really ought 
 to be borne in mind that ships which have sailed re- 
 markably well one season, and have undergone no con- 
 siderable change, would sail well the next under similar 
 
Introduction. 
 
 handling. In like manner the performances of the 
 ships under steam are, as I have shown in the text, 
 subject to the greatest possible variations by differences 
 of management, especially at the present time when but 
 few of tlie engineer or other oflScers of the Navy have 
 had much experience of the contrivances now intro- 
 duced into all our ships with the view of economising 
 fuel— superheaters, surface-condensers, &c. The enor- 
 mous modern steam engines, furnished with those ap- 
 pliances, present an entirely new field for the experience 
 of our officers and men, and a field which it is absolutely 
 necessary to cultivate with the greatest assiduity and 
 care, as it is by such engines that the great Channel 
 Fleets of England will be propelled for many years to 
 come. This is, to my mind, a very important point, for 
 I foresee in it the certain reversal of the past practice 
 of bringing our large war ships together for squadron 
 evolutions almost as soon as they are out of the builders' 
 hands. Until this year it has rarely happened that 
 the captain and engineer have had even a week at 
 sea in their ship, with freedom to vary their steaming 
 operations as they found necessary for the full develop- 
 ment of all those specialties of performance which 
 every engine more or less exhibits. The new ship has 
 been placed almost at once under the orders of the 
 Admiral of the Channel Squadron for the time being, 
 and whatever steaming has thenceforward been done 
 has been done to order, or rather to orders, for a single 
 signal from the Admiral often results in twenty signals 
 from the deck to the engine-room. I have heard on 
 good authority, and from more than one ship, that 
 when the squadron has been ascertaining, each ship for 
 
Introduction. xi 
 
 itself, the number of revolutions per minute correspond- 
 ing to a given speed of ship, nearly fifty orders for 
 altering speed have been received in the engine-room 
 in a single hour. If allowed a month or tvs^o at sea 
 under steam, with the necessary coal for the purpose, 
 and with freedom from external control, a good captain 
 and engineer would ascertain the number of engine- 
 revolutions required for every grade of speed with the 
 greatest ease and nicety, and would add to this know- 
 ledge all those nice adjustments and minor modifications 
 of the engines which would not only prevent those de- 
 rangements which sometimes result in large repairs, 
 but would also lead to great economy of fuel, of lubri- 
 cation, and of labour. Another month or two of cruising 
 alone, under canvas, would enable officers to bring out 
 the best qualities of their ships, and would avoid those 
 strange anomalies and discrepancies which abound in 
 some reports of the squadron sailings of our iron-clads. 
 Nor can it be doubted that with proper care the rolling of 
 the ships might, where desirable, be materially modified, 
 by altered stowage of weights, by consuming the coal 
 first out of certain bunkers, and the stores out of certain 
 store-rooms, and by other like contrivances. From the 
 foregoing considerations it will at least be perfectly 
 evident that while the designer is bound to do his 
 utmost to give good qualities to his ship, her per- 
 formances by no means rest in his hands alone. I 
 would also observe that the peace performances of such 
 ships as the ' Bellerophon,' Hercules,' and ' Monarch,' 
 offer absolutely no indication whatever of what their 
 fichting performances would be, seeing that their massive 
 armour and mighty armaments take no part in peace 
 
xii Introduction. 
 
 trials. It is not a little absurd sometimes to observe 
 even " gi'ave and reverend signiors " solemnly discus- 
 sing some wholly secondary performances — say the mere 
 sailing — of these ponderous steam fighting engines, in 
 total disregard of their armour, guns, rams, and steam- 
 ing qualities ; but it ceases to be absurd, and becomes 
 distressing, when one hears, as he sometimes does, 
 persons who influence public opinion and action, com- 
 mitting the same error. It would have been a great 
 misfortune to the country if the Administrators of 
 its Navy had in these days aimed primarily at pro- 
 ducing floating bodies which the wind could blow 
 about easily and rapidly, to the sacrifice of armour, 
 guns, rams, and steaming powers; and I, for one^ 
 while feeling the full importance of giving good sailing 
 qualities to ships that are to cruise in foreign and 
 remote seas, am well content to see our floating Channel 
 and Mediterranean Fortresses well armoured, well armed, 
 and well supplied with steam propellers, even although 
 they may be, and must be, a little less compliant to the 
 breeze than were the frigates and liners of the past. It 
 is nevertheless satisfactory to know that our armoured 
 frigates have not only sail enough to be useful to them 
 near home, but enough to take them abroad, perform 
 good service there, and bring them back again. The 
 ' Ocean ' has gone so well through one commission in 
 the China seas that she is about to be re-commissioned 
 there for another ; the same is true of the ' Royal 
 Alfred,' in North America, and of the ' Zealous,' in the 
 Pacific — the last news of the latter ship being that in 
 performing a service under sail she outstripped one of 
 our latest wooden sloops of war ; and the ' Favorite,' 
 
Introduction. xiii 
 
 while on the American station, raced with and beat 
 under canvas one of our latest and best wooden 
 corvettes, and has since returned from America to 
 England, and cast anchor at Spithead, under sail alone. 
 The chapter on " Armour " will, I hope, clear away 
 much of the misapprehension that has hitherto existed 
 respecting the relative strength of the armour of the 
 English and other ships. We have ships at sea more 
 securely armoured than any French vessel, and several 
 in course of construction which are very much stronger 
 still. The surprising strength of the American Monitors 
 has been much urged in this country, and has been 
 extolled in the house of Lords as well as in the House 
 of Commons : if the reader will examine the section of 
 the 'Kalamazoo,' on page 35, he will see that even 
 the strongest of all the American Monitors bears no 
 real comparison with our own later vessels, even as 
 regards the uniform thickness of its armour ; while 
 a reference to page 44 will convince him that the 
 ' Dictator/ which has been exhibited to us in terrorem 
 so very often, is, after all, a feeble construction, its 
 armour disappearing almost immediately beneath the 
 water's surface, so that every passage of a wave must 
 expose its unarmoured part to shot and shell. It will be 
 seen from this chapter, and especially from my remarks 
 on page 31, that I consider that Sir William Fair bairn 
 and Sir William Armstrong have been premature (to 
 say the least) in their advocacy — if I have not mis- 
 understood them — of the abandonment of armour for 
 the future. This result may ultimately be brought about, 
 but all the time this country can maintain, with a 
 
xiv hitroduction. 
 
 moderate annual expenditure, the superiority of strength 
 afloat which it now undoubtedly possesses, and which it 
 has gained mainly by the use of armour of increasing 
 strength in combination with improved guns, I am 
 persuaded it will not turn away from so satisfactory a 
 path, and trust all its armaments and all its seamen to 
 structures which can give them no security from even 
 a single shot or shell. For, it should be clearly under- 
 stood, that the notion of producing fast steamships 
 (which must of necessity be ships with large pro- 
 portionate boilers and engines) subdivided throughout 
 into very numerous small compartments, is a chimera, 
 and has not the smallest foundation in fact or practice. 
 We do well, no doubt, to build fleet unarmoured ships 
 for some of the purposes of the Navy ; but to urge that 
 our flag should be trusted to these alone, in the present 
 stage of our progress^ is, in my judgment, to press a 
 perilous pohcy. The abandonment of armour is advo- 
 cated upon the ground that it is incapable of resisting 
 the heavy projectiles that can now be fired from naval 
 guns, and is therefore of no more value than the 
 personal armour of the soldier, which was thrown 
 aside when the penetrating power of gunpowder was 
 brought into play. I deny both the assumption 
 and the analogy. I maintain that even the armour 
 which we have now afloat is impenetrable by exist- 
 ing naval guns under the ordinary conditions of sea 
 service; I further maintain that the armour which is 
 now afloat has by no means attained, or even ap- 
 proached, the thickness and weight which it is perfectly 
 practicable to carry on good sea-going ships of not 
 
Introduction. xv 
 
 immoderate dimensions, and I deny that, even if all 
 this were otherwise, there would be any analogy what- 
 ever between the armour of a soldier and the armour of 
 a ship. I base this last-named position upon the fact 
 that there is this broad and all-important distinction 
 between the armour of the soldier and the armour of 
 the ship, viz., that while the soldier's armour is abso- 
 lutely and unalterably limited to the weight which 
 a man can carry, there is no analogous limit to the 
 weight which a ship can carry. You cannot increase 
 the physical strength of men, but you can increase 
 indefinitely the carrying and steaming power of the 
 ship, and consequently the cause which long ago deter- 
 mined the abandonment of armour in the Army is 
 entirely without existence in reference to the armour 
 of the Navy. While gun-makers and others therefore 
 indulge in the complacent belief that armour is in vain 
 and that the gun is all in all, I am obliged to maintain 
 a wholly opposite position, and I assert with confidence 
 that just as the ' Hercules ' is at this moment impreg- 
 nable in the region of the water-line to the attack of 
 any and every gun afloat in any part of the world, so 
 the ships of the future may in like manner be endowed 
 with a like impregnability against the guns of the 
 future ; and my conviction is that before armour ceases 
 to be superseded as a defence against guns, guns will 
 themselves be superseded as a means of attack, and the 
 ship itself, viewed as a steam projectile — possessing all 
 the force of the most powerful shot, combined with the 
 power of striking in various directions — will be deemed 
 the most formidable weapon of attack that man's 
 ingenuity has devised. But at present neither guns 
 
xvi Introduction. 
 
 nor armour will be abandoned, and our clear duty for 
 some time to come will be to avoid alike false analogies 
 and speculative forecasts, and to develop as steadily 
 and as rapidly as heretofore the" power both of the gun 
 with which we assail the enemy, and of the armour 
 with which we repel his assaults upon us. As an 
 encouragernent to this course it may perhaps be not 
 amiss to mention that I have myself devised plans for 
 carrying extremely heavy armour which it has not yet 
 been necessary to divulge, but which will come into 
 active play when we have attained to the use of such 
 thicknesses of armour as are now deemed too great for 
 even a moment's consideration by those who think 
 superficially upon this subject. 
 
 The chapter on the Armament of the Iron-clads sets 
 forth the remarkable progress which the guns of the 
 navy have made in the last few years. It is but five 
 years ago that Parliament was discussing the practica- 
 bility of carrying BJ-ton guns at sea, especially in 
 broadside ships ; we have now 12-ton guns, fought at 
 sea with perfect ease, in many of the broadside ships of 
 the Mediterranean and Channel squadrons, and the 
 ' Hercules ' has long been cruising about, both at home 
 and abroad, with 18-ton guns worked most satisfactorily 
 at the broadside in ports 1 1 feet above the sea, and with 
 a horizontal range of fire which no unarmoured ship's 
 broadside guns possess. The ' Monarch ' has cruised 
 successfully in heavy weather with 25-ton guns mounted 
 in turrets. None but those who are hopelessly prejudiced 
 can now doubt that, whether they be placed in turrets or 
 out of turrets, the largest guns can be worked success- 
 fully and with terrible effect at sea, and in heavier 
 
Introduction. xvii 
 
 weather than the small guns of old could be fought. 
 For my part I look with lively expectation to the pro- 
 duction of much more powerful guns than we have yet 
 seen ; I believe that the wonderfully strong and beauti- 
 fully uniform metal, the manufacture of which Sir 
 Joseph Whitworth has worked out with so much skill 
 and perseverance, is opening up new possibilities in this 
 direction, which may yet be coupled with the superior 
 range, aim, low trajectory, and prolonged velocity which 
 his ordnance system promises, and I have no doubt 
 whatever that even the largest and best gun with which 
 either this or any other system may provide us, will be 
 effectually carried, and, if need be, gallantly fought at 
 sea beneath our flag. 
 
 I beg leave to recommend to the thoughtful attention 
 of the reader the chapter on the " Structure " of our 
 ships. The subject is not one that strikes the attention, 
 but there is no part of the iron-clad ship question more 
 fraught with practical and economical considerations, 
 nor is there any other feature which has had so much 
 to do with the present superiority of our ships as com- 
 pared with those of other Powers. If much anxious 
 thought, attention, and inventive labour had not been 
 devoted to this branch of the subject, the nation could 
 not have had such ships as the ' Hercules,' ' Monarch,' 
 and ' Audacious ' in its navy ; to carry their substance 
 of armour and their calibre and number of guns, with 
 unimproved structural arrangements, ships must have 
 been built of far larger proportions, and have cost very 
 much more ; while the ' Thunderer ' class, which is 
 being built under the auspices of the present Board of 
 Admiralty, must have been almost double their present 
 
 h 
 
xviii Introdnction. 
 
 size and cost. I repeat, tliis branch of the subject is 
 not one which ordinarily engages notice, but it is 
 second to none in its economical importance, or in its 
 relation to the offensive and defensive powers of the 
 navy. 
 
 It is unnecessary to refer at much length to the 
 chapter on the Steaming properties of the ships. The 
 recent cruise of the combined squadrons has signally 
 and conclusively shown how utterly unfounded were 
 those statements which represented that I had sacrificed 
 the steaming capabilities of the ' Hercules ' and other 
 recent ships by improperly curtailing the coal supply, 
 I have shown in the text that, owing to their moderate 
 consumption of fuel, consequent upon their possessing 
 engines of the new type, they are not only not inferior, 
 but are much superior in this respect to most of the 
 former ships. Now, in the ' Times' of October 4, 1869, 
 is printed the consumption of the ships during the 
 recent squadron trials, and what are the facts there 
 given ? These : that the consumption of the ' Hercules,' 
 as compared with that of the ' Minotaur,' ' Northumber- 
 land,' and 'Agincourt' (three sister ships of former 
 designers), was as follows — all the ships being employed, 
 be it remembered, upon the same service, viz., proceed- 
 ing together from Plymouth to Gibraltar, from Grib- 
 raltar to Lisbon, and from Lisbon to Queenstown : — 
 
 Tons. Cwt. 
 
 Minotaur g05 4 
 
 Northumberland ,. 579 10 
 
 Agincourt 545 19 
 
 Hercules 297 9 
 
 As the 'Hercules' carries as much coal as each of 
 the other three ships within fifty tons, it is perfectly 
 
Introdtiction. xix 
 
 obvious that I have even underrated in the text her 
 advantage in this respect over former ships. The 
 ' Monarch ' did not exhibit nearly such good results as 
 the ' Hercules,' owing chiefly to the packing of her 
 piston-rods blowing out, and to some leakage of steam 
 past the pistons into the vacuum ; but even with her 
 consumption very largely increased from these causes, 
 she burnt 107 tons less coal than the 'Minotaur,' 81i 
 tons less than the ' Northumberland,' and 47| tons less 
 than the 'Agincourt.' The ' Bellerophon '■ — another of 
 the recent ships which has been complained of for an 
 alleged deficiency of coal-carrying power — is shown by 
 the figures quoted in the ' Times ' to have burnt much 
 less than the ships of former design, the consumption of 
 which has been given. The figures for her are not 
 completely given, but her consumption from Plymouth 
 to Gribraltar, and from Gibraltar to Lisbon, are shown, 
 and, compared with those of the other three long and 
 fine-lined ships, and with the 'Hercules,' are as 
 follows : — 
 
 Tons. Cwt. 
 
 Minotaur 356 8 
 
 Koi'thumberland 338 6 
 
 Aginoourt 320 3 
 
 Bellerophon 235 17 
 
 Hercules 184 9 
 
 These figures, although they show that the ' Bellero- 
 phon' was less economical in her coal consumption than 
 her successor, the ' Hercules,' also show that she burns 
 much less than the other three ships, and that her supply 
 of 560 tons is capable of steaming her for a greater dis- 
 tance than they can steam with their somewhat larger 
 quantities. I hope these facts, taken with those given 
 in the text, will completely dispel the error of those 
 
 h 2 
 
XX Introdtiction. 
 
 who question the capability of the new ships to make 
 passages under steam as effectually as other ships. I 
 have but little doubt that the calculations by which 
 I have been led in the text to place the ' Monarch ' very 
 high in this respect, will be fully vindicated in future 
 trials with the engines in an efficient state. 
 
 In previous observations upon the performances of 
 the ships I have remarked at some length upon their 
 sailing qualities. The recent cruise of the squadron, in 
 so far as it has been publicly reported, has not added 
 materially to our knowledge as regards this part of 
 the subject. In the letter of the correspondent of the 
 ' Times,' published in that journal of September 18th, 
 certain trials are recorded in which the ' Hercules ' and 
 ' Monarch ' appear to have sailed but indifferently ; but 
 as these ponderous and powerful ships raced under 
 canvas only on the special trial with two unarmoured 
 and one very lightly armoured ship, I am unable to 
 feel surprise at their defeat; although it is worth 
 remembering that in a former letter, published on the 
 7th of September, the same gentleman, with the great- 
 est fairness, stated that these same two ships, heavily- 
 armoured and armed as they are, each " appeared to 
 " feel and spring to the pressure of her sails, although 
 " there was but a pleasant and, indeed^ a light summer's 
 " breeze." There can be but little doubt that these recent 
 ships, although so heavily burdened with thick armour 
 and immense guns, have combined therewith sail power 
 enough to enable them to greatly economise their fuel 
 which is the great object of their sails, and I feel cer- 
 tain that it w411 be highly satisfactory to many readers 
 of this work to learn that the ' Hercules ' went through 
 
Introdjiction. xxi 
 
 all the service performed during the five weeks that 
 the Admiralty flag floated over the Channel Squadron, 
 and returned to England with but one-half of her coal 
 consumed. 
 
 The question of the " rolling " of the ships received 
 very useful illustration during the late cruise. The 
 doctrine that a low freeboard is indispensable to steadi- 
 ness was then finally overthrown. The lofty-sided 
 armoured broadside ship ' Hercules,' the lofty-sided un- 
 armoured broadside ship ' Inconstant,' and the lofty- 
 sided armoured turret-ship ' Monarch,' were all signally 
 steady even in a heavy sea-way^ and formed gun-plat- 
 forms superior in steadiness to any previous ships. It 
 is stated^ possibly with truth, that on one occasion the 
 * Monarch,' from the superior elevation of her guns, 
 could have fought them with greater ease and efficiency 
 than any other ship ; but I cannot for a moment infer 
 from this, as some have done, either that she possessed 
 the power to destroy all the other ships, or that her 
 superiority as a fighting ship was thus established. I 
 cannot imagine why, even on this one extremely bois- 
 terous day, a squadron of ships carrying more or less 
 upper-deck guns, and still less a squadron of steam- 
 rams like the ' Bellerophon ' and ' Hercules,' should lie 
 idle under the attack of the ' Monarch ; ' and, on the 
 other hand, I am quite certain that the ' Monarch ' was 
 less capable, on all the other days of the five weeks, of 
 withstanding the fire of the ' Hercules ' than the ' Her- 
 cules ' was of withstanding the ' Monarch's,' for every 
 shot fired at short range from the central battery of the 
 ' Hercules ' would penetrate the ' Monarch's ' water-line 
 and boilers, while the water-line and boilers of the 
 
xxii Introdtiction. 
 
 ' Hercules ' are protected from the ' Monarch's ' fire by 
 a deep and impregnable armour-belt. The weakness 
 of the ' Monarch ' in this respect is due mainly to the 
 turret system itself, which demands so much armour 
 for the protection of the turrets as to leave com- 
 paratively little for the sides of the ship. It is on 
 paper, and in the imaginations of men only, that these 
 miraculous exploits of turret-ships take place : in an 
 actual engagement their omnipotence would be qualified, 
 and the impotence of other ships would be less easily 
 secured. It is very satisfactory indeed to find that the 
 Admiralty turret-ship ' Monarch,' of which everything 
 bad was originally predicted — and which Captain Coles 
 energetically disclaimed, as not representing his views 
 of a turret-ship, nor giving the principle a satisfactory 
 trial — has proved a fast, steady, and formidable ship, 
 and assuredly I shall not decry those real merits 
 which I have laboured hard to secure to her ; but on 
 a great and critical question of this nature we must 
 not pass by hasty inferences to false and perilous 
 conclusions, but must enlarge our experience, weigh 
 ojDposing considerations, and accept only well-established 
 and well-matured results. I have, however, dwelt so 
 fully upon the various aspects of this part of the sub- 
 ject in the chapter on Turret-Ships, that I need not 
 enlarge upon it here. 
 
 An impression has gone abroad to the effect that the 
 balanced rudder has failed ; but this is not the case. 
 The balanced rudder has accomplished most fully the 
 great object which it was introduced to aid, viz., the 
 endowment of our iron-clad steam-frigates and rams 
 with that necessary handiness which the ' Warrior ' 
 
Introduction. xxiii 
 
 and some other early iron-clads did not possess. The 
 handiness of the ' Bellerophon,' ' Hercules/ and 
 ' Monarch ' under steam is most remarkable, and all 
 that could be desired. When under canvas, the balanced 
 rudder requires careful handling, but a little practice 
 appears to remove all difficulties in that respect. With 
 twin-screws in light-draught armoured vessels, this 
 form of rudder does not appear to answer well, and it 
 will probably not be repeated in such vessels, although 
 it is common enough in the American monitors. But 
 in the large steam frigates it has answered its prime 
 object thoroughly well, and is without any such draw- 
 backs as would for a moment justify its condemnation. 
 
 The chapters on the Cost of our iron-clad fleet, and 
 upon the deeply important question of " Rams," shall 
 speak for themselves. The former I respectfully com- 
 mend to those gentlemen who study naval economy, 
 and who will learn in it the real facts of that expendi- 
 ture upon new iron-clads respecting which so much mis- 
 apprehension has existed ; the latter I no less respect- 
 fully commend to the earnest study of our naval officers. 
 I trust that by means of their consideration of, and 
 suggestions upon, the branch of naval construction and 
 warfare there treated, I may be enabled to add to the 
 interest and value of this chapter in future editions. 
 The final chapter, on the Conversion of wooden Line- 
 of-battle Ships into Iron-clads, will correct, I believe, 
 some misapprehensions on this subject, and will serve 
 to show that the devotion of large sums of money to 
 such conversions would have been the means of spend- 
 ing such sums upon weak, decaying, and wasteful 
 
xxiv Introdtiction. 
 
 If in this Introduction, or in the work itself, I seem 
 to write with praise or complacency of my own works, 
 I would ask the reader to believe that I have not written 
 this book with that or any other personal end in view, 
 but with the object of stating publicly facts which 
 deeply concern the public, and respecting which many 
 Members of Parliament and other gentlemen of weight 
 and authority in the State, together with several of the 
 reviewers of my former work on ' Shipbuilding in Iron 
 and Steel,' have expressed a strong wish to learn more 
 than has hitherto been published. Having entered 
 upon the task of writing such a book, I have felt bound 
 to write it freely and frankly, without staying to nicely 
 balance my phrases, trusting to the generosity of critics 
 and readers to put a kindly interpretation upon any- 
 thing that may seem to require it. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 VAEEETIES OF lEON-CLADS, 
 
 PAGE 
 
 All iron-clad navies marked by variety 1 
 
 Earliest European iron-clads were floating batteries 2 
 
 ' La Gloire ' and ' Warrior ' much, like ordinary ships 2 
 
 Eecent iron-clads differently shaped at bow and stem 3 
 
 Eadical and minor changes must be distinguished 4 
 
 Minor modifications often result from gradual advance on a settled plan . . i 
 
 Summary of principal changes made since ' Warrior ' was hxalt 6 
 
 Many changes necessitated by progress made in armour and guns . . . . 7 
 
 Rough estimate of strengths of armour in several iron-clads 8 
 
 Other causes that have introduced variety : — 
 
 Necessity for ships of different sizes 8 
 
 Adoption of twin-screws 9 
 
 Abandonment of extreme lengths 10 
 
 Variety in our iron-clads does not prevent their acting together 10 
 
 Nor give rise to such different performances as do secondary causes . . . . 11 
 
 Trials of Channel Squadrons prove this 11 
 
 Details of full-speed trial of 1st November, 1866 12 
 
 „ „ „ „ 26th November, 1867 15 
 
 Eemarks on sailing capabilities of ' Pallas' . . . . 17 
 
 Increase in ramming power has also led to variety 19 
 
 Structural modifications have done the same 20 
 
 Variety probably advantageous in actual warfare 22 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 ARMOUR OF THE IRON-CLADS. 
 
 Thicknesses of armour and backing of English ships : — 
 
 ' Warrior ' and other early iron-clads 24 
 
 ' Minotaur ' class, and their strength as compared with ' Warrior ' . . 25 
 
 'Lord Clyde 'and 'Lord Warden' 26 
 
 ' Bellerophon,' and improvements made in this target 26 
 
 'Penelope' 27 
 
 ' Monarch ' and ' Captain ' 29 
 
 'Hercules' 29 
 
 Recent monitors, and projected designs 31 
 
 Tabular statement of 32 
 
xxvi Co7itcnis. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Thicknesses of armour and backing of Frencli ships 33 
 
 Comparative strength of French and English ii-on-clada . . 36 
 
 American system of laminated armour ■ • 37 
 
 Comparntive strength of laminated, "built-up," and solid armour .. .. 38 
 
 Thicknesses of armour and backing of American ships 41 
 
 Systems of disposing armour on iron-clads : — 
 
 ' Warrior' plan— partial protection 45 
 
 ' Hector ' plan „ „ 45 
 
 ' Minotaur ' plan — complete protection 46 
 
 ' Enterprise ' plan — central battery and armour-belt 47 
 
 Comparison between these plans 48 
 
 I'pper-deck armoured batteries of ' Invincible ' class 50 
 
 French and American systems 50 
 
 Importance of deck-armour in monitors 51 
 
 Breastwork-monitor system, compared with American system 52 
 
 „ „ „ system of our other turret-ships 54 
 
 CHAPTEE III. 
 
 AE5IAMEXT OF THE lEON-GLADS. 
 
 Armament of latest wood line-of-battle ships and frigates 56 
 
 „ ' Warrior ' and other early iron-clads 57 
 
 Progress made in weight and power of our guns during last ten years . . .. 57 
 
 Reduction in number and increase in power of guns carried by iron-clads . . 58 
 
 Table of weights, charges, &c., of naval guns, and remarks thereon .. .. 61 
 
 Progress made in French naval guns 63 
 
 Comparative powers of French and English guns 63 
 
 Progress made in American naval guns 64 
 
 Comparative powers of American and English guns 65 
 
 Fight between the ' Weehawken' and 'Atlanta' 6(i 
 
 Report of American Ordnance Committee in February 1SG9 67 
 
 Necessity for great horizontal range of fire for protected guns, and means 
 
 employed to ohtaui it 68 
 
 CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 STEUCTLTKE OF THE lEGX-CLADS. 
 
 Our uon-clads mostly iron-built ... 70 
 
 Reasons why some of them are wood-built 70 
 
 Reasons for the preference of iron to wood hulls : — 
 
 Iron hulls are lighter 71 
 
 „ „ stronger 72 
 
 ,, ,, more durable 73 
 
 „ „ safer when properly constructed 70 
 
 Our wood-built ships are very valuable 77 
 
 French have continued the use of wood ; their reasons for so d. .ing . . . . 77 
 
 Wood ships, at present, have the advantage of keeping clean bottoms . . ,. 7S 
 
Contents. xxvii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Schemes for preventing fouling of iron ships' bottoms 79 
 
 Improvements made in recent iron-built iron-clads : — 
 
 Description of ' Warrior ' system of construction 80 
 
 „ „ 'Bellerophon' „ „ 81 
 
 Contrast between the two systems 81 
 
 Precautions in recent ships against loss by torpedoes 82 
 
 Greater shot-resisting power of later ships' sides 85 
 
 Summary of improvements, and Dr. Fairbaim's remarks thereon 85 
 
 Keductions of weight of hull in recent ships 86 
 
 Table illustrating reductions 87 
 
 Remarks on table 88 
 
 Increased thickness and weight of armour due in great measure to these 
 
 structural improvements 91 
 
 CHAP TEE V. 
 
 STEAMING OP THE lEON-CLADS. 
 
 Necessity for comparing steaming capabilities of iron-clads and wood ships 'J3 
 
 Gradual improvements made in wood frigates and line-of-battle ships . . . . 93 
 
 „ „ „ corvettes and sloops 94 
 
 Summary of full speeds attained by om' iron-clads 95 
 
 Comparison between full speeds of iron-clads and unannoured ships . . . . 96 
 
 Speeds attained by several iron-clads on six hours' run at sea 97 
 
 Half-power speeds of iron-clads 98 
 
 Comparison between full speeds of unarmoured ships and half-power speeds 
 
 of iron-clads 98 
 
 Objections to measured-mile trials of speed considered 99 
 
 Difficulty of adding to speeds already high 100 
 
 Speeds attained by French iron-clads 101 
 
 Speeds attained by American iron-clads 103 
 
 Coal supply of our iron-clads : — 
 
 False impressions entertained respecting it 103 
 
 Its connection with the improved engines of recent ships 104 
 
 Mistakes respecting times the coal carried would last 106 
 
 Table of time and distances several of our iron-clads and unarmoured 
 
 ships could steam at 12i and 11 knots 109 
 
 Iron-clads not inferior to unarmoured ships in this respect 109 
 
 Eecent iron-clads superior to earlier ii-on-clads 110 
 
 Further remarks on fable Ill 
 
 Trials of steam ships at the measured mile : — 
 
 Very generally condemned 1 12 
 
 Purposes served by 113 
 
 Primary objects of Ill 
 
 Objections made to 114 
 
 Some methods of "jockeying" 115 
 
 No such practices possible in trials of H.M. ships 117 
 
 Some almost unavoidable sources of error 117 
 
 Coal and stoking should always be equally good 121 
 
 Eeasons for preferring these trials to trials at sea 123 
 
xxviii Contents. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 SAILING OP THE lEON-OLADS. 
 
 PAG 15 
 
 Capacity for sea-serviee necessary in our ships 125 
 
 Not lost sight of in our iron-olada 126 
 
 Opinions of naval officers on their sailing power, extracted from :— 
 
 Eeportof Channel Squadron for 1864 127 
 
 1866 128 
 
 1867 130 
 
 1868 130 
 
 Voyages of ' Ocean ' and ' Zealous ' 132 
 
 Conclnding remarks 133 
 
 CHAPTEE YII. 
 
 EOLLINa OP THE lEON-CLADS. 
 
 Mistakes prevalent respecting the rolling of these ships 134 
 
 Iron-olads, as a whole, steadier than nnarmoured ships 134 
 
 Iron-clads proved to be fully capable of fighting at sea 135 
 
 Popular errors respecting rolling : — 
 
 That top-heaviness in iron-olads causes rolling 137 
 
 That ships with low free-board must be steady 138 
 
 That mere weight tends to cause heavy rolling 140 
 
 That the form of the bottom affects rolling greatly 141 
 
 Difficulty of designing a steady iron-clad 141 
 
 Relation between character of waves and ship's rolling 141 
 
 Eifect produced upon ship's behaviour by alterations in stowage 142 
 
 Methods of observing and recording rolling 143 
 
 Principal theoretical deductions on the subject of rolling 144 
 
 Practical appUoations of these deductions in recent ships 146 
 
 Trials at sea prove that these efforts have been successful 148 
 
 Resume oi results of trials of ships in Channel Squadrons : — 
 
 Trials made in 1864 148 
 
 1866 149 
 
 1867 149 
 
 „ 1868 157 
 
 Concluding remarks 161 
 
 CHAPTEE VIII. 
 
 DIMENSIONS OF THE IRON-CLADS. 
 
 Table of dimensions and proportions 164 
 
 ' Warrior ' compared with our finest wood ships .. 165 
 
 Design of ' Minotaur ' class 165 
 
 Objections to these two classes 166 
 
 Designs of ' Defence,' ' Hector,' and ' Caledonia ' classes 166 
 
 French iron-clads all of moderate proportions 167 
 
 Introduction of more moderate proportions in ' BeUerophon ' and later ships 
 
 than had been previously adopted in first-class iron-clads 167 
 
Contents. xxix 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Comparison between 'Bellerophon' and 'Black Prince' 168 
 
 „ „ „ 'Achilles' 169 
 
 Moderate dimensions of ' Lord Clyde ' and ' Lord Warden ' 171 
 
 Comparison between ' Lord Clyde ' and ' Black Prince ' 172 
 
 „ „ ' Hercules ' and ' Black Prince ' 173 
 
 Importance of handiness in iron-clads ; — 
 
 Admiral Sir Sidney Dacres' opinion 174 
 
 „ Yelverton's „ 175 
 
 „ Warden's ,, 175 
 
 Opinions of other officers 176 
 
 Superior handiness of recent iron-clads : — 
 
 Shown by turning trials on measured mile 177 
 
 ' Hercules' ' remarkable handiness 178 
 
 Shown by turning trials at sea 179 
 
 Kemarks on our experience with long and short iron-clads 181 
 
 CHAPTEE IX. 
 
 FORMS AND PEOPORTIONS OP lEON-CLADS. 
 
 Weight of material in hull should influence ship's form 183 
 
 Necessity for taking account of relation between form and weight of armour 
 
 in iron-clads 184 
 
 Remarks on " constants of performance " of steamships 1 85 
 
 These constants useful in calculating engine-power for new designs . . . . 186 
 
 Not standards of merit for all steamships 186 
 
 Anil certainly not for iron-clad vessels 187 
 
 Conditions under which constants are of use in comparing iron-clads . . . . 188 
 Raising the constants of iron-clads should not be the aim of the naval 
 
 architect 189 
 
 Remarks on steam-trials of Warrior,' 'Minotaur,' and 'Bellerophon' .. .. 190 
 
 Necessity for taking speed in connection with horse-power, foulness, &c. . . 194 
 
 Results of trials with short iron-clads 195 
 
 More moderate proportions should be adopted as thickness and extent of 
 
 armour are increased 196 
 
 Great frictioiial resistance of long iron-clads 196 
 
 Illustration taken from trials of ' Minotaur ' and ' Warrior ' 197 
 
 Abstract of paper on subject of relations between forms and weight of material 
 
 in iron-clads, read before Royal Society 200 
 
 Comparison between ' Hercules ' and design based on ' Minotaur's ' propor- 
 tions, but in most other respects equal to ' Hercules ' 208 
 
 Concluding remarks 212 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 COST OP THE IRON-CLADS. 
 
 DifBculty of estimating incidental and establishment charges for iron-clads 
 
 buUt in dockyards 214 
 
 System of charge introduced in 1865, and ifs effect 214 
 
 Example : nominal costs of ' Achilles ' and ' Bellerophon ' 215 
 
 Allowance of 12J per cent, ou net cost sufficient for these charges . . . . 216 
 
XXX Contents. 
 
 Cost of iron-clads up to January, 1868 :— ''^«'= 
 
 Of completed broadside-ships, contract-built 217 
 
 ,, ,, „ government-built 218 
 
 ,, unfinished broadside-ships, and turret-ships 219 
 
 Total expenditure 220 
 
 Total expenditure up to tTanuary, 1869 221 
 
 Total annual expenditures on navy from 1859 to 1869 221 
 
 Savings effected by introduction of short iron-clnds .. 222 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 TUREET-SHIPS. 
 
 Turret-ship question can now be discussed with fairness 223 
 
 Heavy guns can be trained easily through large arcs in turret-ships .. .. 223 
 
 But can also be worked on the broadside 224 
 
 Eeal advantages of the turret system — small port and great training . . . . 225 
 
 Fighting of tun-et guns on both sides considered 225 
 
 Tui-ret system best adapted for ships witliout masts or sails 227 
 
 Devices for adapting it to rigged ships 228 
 
 No satisfactory plan yet carried out 229 
 
 All-round fire of turret guns wanting in ' Captain ' and ' Monarch ' . . . . 230 
 
 Importance of right-ahead fire from protected guns 231 
 
 Stowage of boats in turret-ships 232 
 
 Offensive and defensive powers of turret-ships : — 
 
 Nearly all ships limited to simultaneous fire in two dh-ections only.. 233 
 
 Broadside guns each have independent training 233 
 
 ' Captain ' and ' Hercules ' compared as to simultaneous fire of guns 233 
 
 Turret porta, vulnerable points 236 
 
 Eevolution of turrets may be stopped by injury to glacis or deck .. 237 
 
 Ml-. Eads' remarks on this point 239 
 
 Small and fast sea-going tm-ret-ships carrying very heavy guns cannot 
 
 be built 240 
 
 Monitors of the American type : — 
 
 Not satisfactory sea-going ships 241 
 
 Inferior to breastwork-monitors 242 
 
 JJesMm^of experience as to sea-going qualities of 243 
 
 Mistakes as to sizes of 246 
 
 Ocean voyages of ' Monadnock ' and ' Miantonomoh ' 246 
 
 Comfort and healthiness of, mistakes respecting 249 
 
 Fights with Confederate iron-clads not severe tests 250 
 
 Engagements with land batteries, and their results 251 
 
 Mr. Eads' remarks on dangers of turrets becoming jammed . . . . 254 
 
 Concluding remarks 254 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 lEON-CLAD EAMS. 
 
 Eevival of the ancient method of attack 255 
 
 Construction of special classes of iron-clad rams '^, '_[ 2.56 
 
 American experience of ramming ' " o'rv 
 
Contents. xxxi 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Experience gained at Lissa 258 
 
 Handiness absolutely essential to efficiency 259 
 
 „ obtained principally by moderate dimensions 261 
 
 Extreme dimensions not necessary to give sufficient ramming power . . . . 262 
 
 Other means of making ram-ships handy 264 
 
 Fore-reaching ram-bows 265 
 
 Upright ram-bows 266 
 
 Spur-shaped ram-bows 266 
 
 Comparison between various forms 268 
 
 Supposed disadvantages of the spirr shape 272 
 
 Mistakes made respecting loss of the sloop ' Amazon,' and its bearing on the 
 
 efficiency of the spur-shaped ram-bow 274 
 
 Bow-waves of ships with spur-shaped ram -bows 280 
 
 Strengthenings of ram-bows in wood-built ships 281 
 
 „ „ „ iron-built ships 282 
 
 Provisions against loss by ramming made in our iron-clads 284 
 
 Manoeuvring and working of iron-clad rams : — 
 
 Preparations on board the ram vessel 287 
 
 Speed and direction of attack 289 
 
 Concluding remarks 290 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 CONVERSION OP LINE-OF-BATTLE SHIPS INTO lEON-CLADS. 
 
 Our navy contains several converted iron-clads 292 
 
 Ships completed could not readily be converted in the same way 293 
 
 But might be converted differently 293 
 
 Most schemes for conversion have been based on turret armament .. .. 293 
 
 Conversion of ' Eoyal Sovereign ' into turret-ship 294 
 
 Better plans have been prepared 295 
 
 Reasons why other ships have not been converted : — 
 
 Extensive repairs would be required 296 
 
 Hulls would be very heavy, and therefore armour inefficient . . . . 296 
 
 Speeds low, engines worn, &o 298 
 
 Probably behaviour at sea would be bad 298 
 
 Proposals for turning line-of-battle ships into rigged Monitors :— 
 
 Not satisfactory as to stability under canvas 800 
 
 Do not provide sufficient buoyancy 300 
 
 False basis of arguments for conversions 302 
 
 Our wooden fleet a valuable reserve 302 
 
 Concluding remarks 303 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 On the stability of Monitors under canvas 305 
 
 Index •■ 319 
 
( xxxii ) 
 
 LIST OF ILLUSTEATIONS. 
 
 Frontispieoe— Our iron-clad ships {to face Tille-page.) 
 
 PAGES 
 
 Armouk op the ikon-olads 34, 35 
 
 Sections of the aemouked sides of ' Thunderer ' and ' Diotatoe ' . . . . 44 
 
 Dispositions of armour on ikon-oiads 55 
 
 Armaments of the ieon-olads 60 
 
 Diagrams illustrative of measured-mile trials 116,118 
 
 Simultaneous fire of protected guns in ' Captain ' and ' Heboules ' . . 235 
 
 Sections of bows op ' Amazon,' ' Lord Clyde,' ' Belleeophon,' and 
 
 ' Hotspur ' 276 
 
 DliOEAMS illustrative OF THE STADILITT OF MONITORS UNDErI 306, 310, 311, 
 
 canvas I 316,318. 
 
OUR IRON-CLAD SHIPS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 VARIETIES OF IROX-CLADS. 
 
 It has often been remarked, as a matter of reproach to 
 the administrators and architects of the British iron- 
 clad nav}'-, that the vessels composing it are extremely 
 various in size, power, speed, and other c[ualities. It is 
 no doubt true — whether it be a fair ground of com- 
 plaint or not — that their variety is great, and is yearly 
 becoming greater still. But if the reader could glance 
 with me over a French photograph which is lying 
 before me, in which La Marine Moderne Cuirassee is 
 exhibited, he would discover that our portion of the 
 exhibition is characterised by quite a tiresome appear- 
 ance of sameness in comparison with the iron-clads of 
 other countries. Our neighbours, the French, have 
 particularly signalised themselves for variety of design. 
 They have not, it is true, built any ships of such great 
 length as some of ours ; but they have built them of 
 very different sizes, speeds, and strengths, and have 
 equipped them with rigs and sails even more diversified 
 than those of British ships. They have not done so 
 much in the way of building turret-ships as we have ; 
 but they have arranged their guns in batteries as novel 
 in form and character as turrets, and in such matters 
 
 B 
 
Varieties of Iron-Clads. Chap. I. 
 
 as "ram bows," "pink sterns," "internal shrouds," 
 " crane catheads," and other devices (the names of 
 which must sound oddly in the ears of non-nautical 
 readers), the French have gone to lengths which our 
 designers have never thought of approaching. The 
 Russians have built iron-clads even more various than 
 those of France ; the Prussians have already obtained 
 a very mixed fleet of such ships ; the Italians have 
 ships that differ almost as much as it is possible for 
 ships to differ ; neither the Austrian, the Turkish, nor 
 the Spanish ships are severely uniform in character ; 
 the Dutch are building ships of very opposite descrip- 
 tions ; and the Americans have not only given to the 
 world a new type in the monitor, but have secured a 
 specific renown for broadside iron-clads in the per- 
 formances of the ' New Ironsides,' and have displayed 
 the fertility of their invention in the construction of 
 the Stevens' battery and the ' Dunderberg,' the latter 
 ship (which now belongs to the French, and has been 
 re-named the ' Rochambeau ') being perhaps the most 
 singular sea-going iron-clad yet built. 
 
 The earliest European iron-clads — the French and 
 English floating batteries built during the Crimean 
 war — were without pretensions as ships, having, in 
 fact, nothing " ship-shape " about them, and being mere 
 floating forts designed for the attack of land batteries, 
 and not for sea service ; I shall therefore disregard 
 them in noticing the various types of iron-clad vessels. 
 The first examples of real iron-clad ships were ' La 
 G-loire,' in France, and the ' Warrior,' in England, 
 neither of which presented any great departures from 
 the forms and appearances of ordinary ships — unless 
 
Chap. I. Varieties of Iroii-Clads. 3 
 
 the sullen, low-browed, graceless aspect of ' La Gloire ' 
 entitles her to some distinction in this respect. Xor 
 was the ' Warrior ' in any marked degree a ship of 
 singular appearance escept in point of size. She was a 
 long, fine, handsome-looking frigate^ masted and rigged 
 as usual, and formed with a bow and stern in no way 
 differing from the bows and sterns of the most recent 
 and beautiful wooden frigates. The ' TVarrior ' and her 
 sister ship, the ' Black Prince,' were, however, destined 
 to be the only English iron-clads embodying those 
 forms and appearances which had come to be regarded 
 as the most favoured traits of beauty in a ship. The 
 ' Bellerophon,' the ^ Penelope,' and the ' Lord TVarden,' 
 have their stem-lines relieved by short curved knees ; 
 but these diminished adornments are rather the last 
 examples of the vanishing type of naval architecture 
 than indications of a return to it. All British iron-clads 
 are now built with stems approaching the upright above 
 water, and this style, which was so much decried at 
 first, is rapidly winning for itself Eesthetic sanctions. It 
 is already not an uncommon thing to hear a modern 
 bow, like that of the 'Hercules," for example, preferred 
 even in point of appearance to the ' TTarrior's.' Like 
 changes of style and preference have materially affected 
 the sterns of our iron-clads, and for very good reasons. 
 The bow has been modified in order to dispense with 
 overhanging weight, to increase its fitness to cleave 
 and surmount waves, and to adapt it for ramming 
 purposes. The stern has been modified in order to 
 give protection to the rudder-hfead, to deflect raking 
 shot, and to render it more fit to receive easily the blows 
 of following waves. It is not to be doubted, however, 
 
 B 2 
 
4 Varieties of Iron-Clads. Chap. I. 
 
 that both bows aiid sterns are far from having attained 
 ■ultimate and settled forms. 
 
 In disciTssing' the varieties of our iron-clad«, it is just 
 and necessary that an honest discrimination between 
 radical and minor changes should be exercised. It has 
 been too much the habit to cast discredit upon our ship- 
 construction on account of minor modifications, which, 
 instead of being, as has been represented, evidences of 
 change of plan and purpose, have, in fact, been proofs 
 of a proper persistency in these respects. For example, 
 it has of late been a steadily observed object in the 
 construction of broadside iron-clad ships to extend as 
 much as possible the horizontal range of the guns, both 
 b_v increasing the training of individual guns and by 
 placing guns in ports so situated as to facilitate bow 
 and stern fire. Even in the days of wooden ships this 
 was always deemed an important object, and often led 
 to the over-burdening of fine bows and sterns with 
 chase guns that seriously strained and weakened the 
 ships. In the ' Warrior ' and ' Defence ' classes no 
 attempt whatever was made to get any bow or stern 
 fire from guns placed behind the armour ; but of late 
 years great efforts, and, I am glad to say, very suc- 
 cessful eff"orts, have been made in this direction. If 
 this had not been done, and the Constructors had been 
 content with broadside fire only, they might have 
 e,-caped a very large part of the extravagant censure 
 l,)v which the first trial of the ' Research's ' guns was 
 followed. On that occasion a lantern or two and a 
 few cups wore shake?i off their hooks and broken 
 by the simultaneous firing of all the heavy guns 
 in ports cut for forward and stern fire only ; and 
 
Chap. I. Variclies of Iron-Clads. 5 
 
 this slight incident, which argued no defect whatever 
 in the ship, was at once so represented and exagge- 
 rated in one or two newspapers that the ship was ^aid 
 to be a perfect wreck. Complaints scarcely less extra- 
 vagant have been made at various times resjiecting 
 other vessels ; but in spite of all opposition the broad- 
 side system has been extended and improved, until in 
 the ships of tlae ' Invincible ' class, a perfectly all- 
 round fire, commanding every point of the horizon, 
 has been attained from within an elevated armour- 
 plated battery at the middle of the ship. Of course it 
 has been found desirable to progress by small and 
 careful steps towards this result, the light of expe- 
 rience being continually directed upon the path by 
 which the advance has been made. To the ordinary 
 eye these successive modifications have, no doubt, ap- 
 peared to indicate an absence of settled purpose ; but 
 the simple truth is, that in all these changes one course 
 has been steadily pursued, and those pi'ogressive trials 
 and improvements Imve been made which in a few short 
 years have brought about the complete fulfilment of 
 the wishes of our sailors in this respect. From this 
 example it will be seen how unfair it is for people to 
 loosely accuse the Admiralty of undue variety in their 
 plans ; and examples of a like kind, enforcing the 
 same caution, might be largely multiplied. 
 
 There have, however, undoubtedly been a few decided 
 changes of plan and purpose since the ' Warrior ' was 
 built. The chief of these — neglecting in this place the 
 new ships of the monitor type, such as the ' Glatton,' 
 ' Thunderer,' and ' Devastation,' which will be con- 
 sidered hereafter — are the following : — 
 
6 Va^'ictics of Iron-Clads. Chap. I. 
 
 The 'Warrior' was armoured at the middle only, 
 both bow and stern, and consequently the rudder-head 
 and steering-gear were exj)Osed to shot within thin iron 
 sides ; in later ships — in all which have been recently 
 designed — this central or "box" battery has been 
 associated with a continuous belt of armour extending 
 from stem to stern, and protecting the region of the 
 water-line and the steering-gear, the counter of the ship 
 being carried down below the water in order to further 
 screen the rudder-head. This last improvement, like 
 many others, is wholly due to the Controller of the 
 Navy, now Sir Spencer Robinson : 
 
 The ' Warrior's ' armour was of uniform thickness 
 over the whole of the protected broadside; in recent 
 ships, over the most vital parts — such as the region of 
 the water-line and in wake of the fighting decks — the 
 armour is thicker than on the less important parts, and 
 in some ships increased protection has been given to 
 the region of the water-line by additional teak backing, 
 and iron bulkheads fitted inside : 
 
 The ' Warrior ' possessed only broadside fire from her 
 battery guns ; all the later vessels have had their broad- 
 side fire supplemented by bow fire and stern fire of 
 greater or less extent, as already explained : 
 
 The ' Warrior ' had only a main-deck battery armour- 
 plated ; recent ships have had a protected upper-deck 
 l^attery given to them : 
 
 The ' Warrior ' was designed to carry a considerable 
 number of guns in an outspread battery ; later ships 
 have been built to carry a concentrated battery of very 
 much heavier guns : 
 
 The 'Warrior' and 'Minotaur' classes were made 
 
Chap. I. Varieties of Iroii-Clads. 7 
 
 extremely long, witti a view to speed ; recent siiips 
 have been made very mucii shorter in proportion : 
 
 The ' Warrior ' was designed with Y-formed trans- 
 verse sections for a great length at the bow ; later 
 ships have been formed with sections of a U-shape : 
 
 The form of stem given to the ' Warrior ' has been 
 departed from in recent ships, as previously explained. 
 
 The above changes have undoubtedly resulted for the 
 most part from radical diEferences of view between 
 the constructors of the ' Warrior ' and those of recent 
 ships ; but they are also due in part to the progress 
 made in the armour and guns carried by war ships. 
 This progress has been rapid and great. The armour 
 of the ' \Varrior ' is everywhere 4i inches thick ; the 
 ' Bellerophon's ' is 6 inches, and the water-line strake of 
 the ' Hercules ' is 9 inches ; the armour of the ' Hotspur ' 
 will be 11 inches thick, that on the sides of the 
 monitor ' Griatton ' 12 inches, and that on the turret of 
 the latter vessel 14 inches ; the monitors ' Thunderer ' 
 and ' Devastation,' now building at Portsmouth and 
 Pembroke Dock, will also bave 12 and 14-inch armour, 
 and the new ram ' Rupert,' which may be regarded 
 as a companion ship to the ' Hotspur,' will carry 11 
 and 12-inch armour. Presuming, as we may roughly 
 do for this purpose, that the resistance offered by single 
 armour plates to penetration varies as the square of the 
 thickness,* we shall have — 
 
 * In their last Eeport the Iron Plate Committee ohserve that they " arrived 
 " at the inference that with plates of equally good quality the resisting power 
 " mi^;ht he approximately considered proportional to the squares of their 
 " thicknesses." Xo donht this law is suhject to some important limita- 
 tions ; hut it is sufficiently accurate for the purpose tu which I have applied it 
 in the text. 
 
Varieties of Iron-Clads. Chap. I. 
 
 For the strength of the AVarriov's armour about 20 
 
 „ Bellerophon's >> 36 
 
 „ Hercules' (belt) „ 81 
 
 „ Hotspur's » 121 
 
 „ Glatton's and Thunderer's 12-inch .. „ lil 
 
 „ Glatton's and Thunderer's 14-inch ) j^gg 
 
 (turret) i " 
 
 In other words — 
 
 The Bellerophon's armour is nearly twica the strength of the Warrior's 
 
 The Hercules' „ about 4 times „ 
 
 The Hotsirar's „ „ 6 „ „ „ 
 
 The Glatton's and ) r, 
 
 Thimderer's j " 
 
 The Glatton's and ) , , i i a 
 
 „n 1 ' \ tm-rets nearly 10 ,, „ „ 
 
 Thunderers j j >> » 
 
 As regards guns, we have advanced from the original 
 45 -ton guns of the 'Warrior' to the 9-ton guns of the 
 ' Lord Warden,' the 12-ton guns of the ' Bellerophon,' 
 the 18-ton guns of the 'Hercules,' and the 25-ton guns 
 of the ' Monarch,' ' Captain,' and ' Glatton,' while the 
 turret-ships since designed, the ' Thunderer ' and ' De- 
 vastation,' will have 30-ton guns — an advance which in 
 about ten years has far exceeded all the progress ]Drevi- 
 ously made since the invention of gunpowder and guns. 
 
 It must be obvious even to the most non-nautical 
 reader that the necessity of carrying such armour and 
 such guns, and of firing them ahead and astern instead 
 of on the broadside only, has rendered essential many 
 modifications of the forms and arrangements of the sides 
 and decks of recent ships as successive new designs 
 have been required, and to this cause must be assigned 
 part of the variety which our ships present. There 
 are, however, other causes. There is, for instance, the 
 necessity for building ships of different sizes — a very 
 important point. The first of our sea-going iron-clads, 
 the ' Warrior,' was a very large ship, far larger than 
 
Chap. I. Vaj'ieties of Iron-Clads. g 
 
 the war-ships previoiisly built. The ' Minotaur ' class, 
 which followed the ' Warrior,' was still larger. The 
 ' Defence ' class and the ' Hector ' class were built on 
 much smaller dimensions, but in both classes great 
 sacrifices were made in consequence, and notwithstand- 
 ing these sacrifices neither of these ships fell much 
 below 4000 tons. The design of the ' Enterprise ' 
 opened the way to the production of much smaller sea- 
 going iron-clads. This vessel was of less than 1000 
 tons burden, and yet was armoured all round at the 
 water-line, carried heavier guns than any other vessel 
 of her date, and was of moderate draught of water. 
 This combination of qualities in a vessel so small was 
 obtained by means of various novel arrangements — 
 such, for instance, as a battery standing up above the 
 upper deck — and these novelties added, of course, to 
 the variety of our ships. It cannot be doubted, how- 
 ever, by any intelligent person that the novelties so 
 introduced, while adding to the variety, added also in a 
 most important degree to the efSciency of a navy upon 
 which demands for small ships as well as large are con- 
 tinually and properly made from every quarter of the 
 globe. 
 
 The introduction of twin-screws, and the desirability 
 of adding to the Xavy a few ships of comparatively 
 light draught, have also led to further differences. So 
 likewise has the desire — a very proper and praiseworthy 
 one — to abandon the use of wood in iron-clad ships. 
 Causes like these, taken in conjunction with those pre- 
 viously named, have justifiably and advisedly introduced 
 considerable variety into our iron-clad fleet. It cannot 
 be doubted, however, that the greatest cause of variety 
 
lo Vai'icties of Iron-Clads. Chap. I. 
 
 was the resort, some years ago, to the enormous lengths 
 of 380 and 400 feet in the ships of the 'Warrior' and 
 ' Minotaur ' classes respectively. It has been found 
 necessary to abandon these extreme lengths of hull for 
 reasons which will be discussed so fully hereafter that 
 it is unnecessary to dilate upon them here ; and it is 
 consequently sufficient to direct the reader's attention 
 to the facts of the case. 
 
 It is most necessary to observe next that variety in 
 the ships of a fleet is not attended by unfitness to act 
 together to any such extent as is often supposed and 
 represented. The primary object to be attained in this 
 respect is that of grouping a navy into squadrons of 
 about equal speed under full steam. If a moderate 
 speed only, say 12 knots, had been aimed at in our first 
 sea-going iron-clad, the ' Warrior,' it would have been 
 quite easy to have secured an equal speed for all sub- 
 sequent iron-clad frigates ; and by giving a uniform 
 speed of 10 knots to all smaller iron-clads, the entire 
 iron-clad fleet would liaA'e comjDrised but two classes 
 of vessels, as regards steaming capability. But the 
 enormous speed of 14 knots was aimed at and secured 
 in the ' Warrior ' by means of her large dimensions and 
 very fine lines, and the tendency ever since has been to 
 approach this speed as nearly as possible in most of our 
 armoured frigates. It is to this circumstance, perhaps 
 more than to any other, that the differences of the 
 speeds of our iron-clads are to be attributed. I shall 
 hereafter refer more fully to the subject of the steaming 
 capabilities of these vessels ; but it may be proper to 
 state here that, with a few exceptions, our iron-clad 
 frigates have attained speeds of 13 knots and upwards. 
 
Chap. I. Varieties of Iro7i-Clads. ii 
 
 and that tlie smaller armoured vessels have in most cases 
 exceeded 10 knots. Hence it appears that notwith- 
 standing the differences of speed which do undoubtedly 
 exist in our iron-clad navy, it is still quite possible to 
 group the ships in squadrons, the larger of which, 
 under judicious management, could proceed at a com- 
 paratively high speed even when the speed of the 
 squadron was determined by that of the slowest ships 
 in it. 
 
 Biit the fact which should be clearly pointed out 
 is that, great as the differences in point of speed may 
 be when the engines of all our iron-clads are exerting 
 their maximum power, and all their bottoms are clean, 
 these differences are not greater than — in truth, they 
 are not so great as — those differences of speed which 
 result from secondary causes, such as differences in the 
 quality of coal, in the stoking, in the management of 
 the engines, and in the degree of foulness of the bottom. 
 Of course it is not for a moment suggested that these 
 latter differences, of however common occurrence they 
 may be, justify a disregard of uniformity in the design 
 of shij)s ; but it is, nevertheless, the fact that the dif- 
 ferences of performance in our iron-clads at sea, which 
 have hitherto resulted from these secondary causes, 
 ha^'e proved abundantly sufficient to neutralise the 
 inherent differences in the quahties of the ships them- 
 selves, ^lany illustrations of this fact might be taken 
 from the various trials of the Channel Squadron ; but 
 a few cases will suffice for our present purpose. On 
 the 1st of November, 186G, a full-speed trial of the six 
 following frigates (with two or three smaller ships 
 which I need not notice) was ordered, viz., the 
 
12 
 
 Varieties 0/ Iron-Clads. 
 
 Chap. I. 
 
 ' Achilles,' ' Belleropton,' ' Caledonia,' ' Hector,' ' Lord 
 Clj-de,' and ' Ocean.' Tlie sea was smooth, with only a 
 shght swell, and the wind light, so that there was 
 nothing in the external circumstances to prevent the 
 several ships from doing their best, and obtaining results 
 proportionate to, if somewhat less than, the results of 
 their measured-mile trials. On the measured mile they 
 had performed as follows : — 
 
 Indicated Horse-Povrer. Speed In Knots. 
 
 Adiilles 5722 .. .. 14^ 
 
 BcUevoplion 6.521 .... \i^-^ 
 
 Caledonia 4552 .. .. 12,^^ 
 
 Hector 3256 .... 12^5 
 
 Lord Clyde 6064 .. .. 13 1% 
 
 Ocean 4244 .. .. 12^^ 
 
 On a full-speed trial, under similar external circum- 
 stances, if their bottoms were equally clean, and the 
 performances of their boilers and engines equally good, 
 they should have stood in the same order ; but their 
 bottoms were not in a similar condition, and the per- 
 formances of their boilers and engines were so extremely 
 different that the results of the squadron trial differed 
 excessively from the other results, and were as fol- 
 lows : — 
 
 Indicated Horse-PoTver. 
 
 Achilles 57H6 
 
 Belleropbon .. .. 4156 
 
 Caledonia 4597 
 
 Hector 2102 
 
 Lord Clyde 4852 
 
 Ocean 3997 
 
 Speed in Knots. 
 
 11 
 11-?- 
 
 '- 10 
 
 10 
 13 
 11 
 
 In order that the reader may readily compare the 
 performances of these six vessels on the two occasions 
 above referred to, I have arranged the results of the 
 trials in the following order : — 
 
Chap. I. 
 
 Varieties of Iron-Clads. 
 
 13 
 
 
 Indicated Horse- Power. 
 
 Speed in Knots. 
 
 
 On Measured- 
 Mile Trial. 
 
 On Trial of 
 1st Nov. 1866. 
 
 On Measured- 
 Mile Trial. 
 
 On Trial of 
 1st Nov. 1866. 
 
 Achilles 
 
 Bellerophon 
 
 Caledonia 
 
 Hector 
 
 Lord Clyde 
 
 Ocean 
 
 5722 
 6521 
 4552 
 3256 
 60G4 
 4244 
 
 5786 ' 
 
 4156 
 
 4597 
 
 2102 
 
 4852 
 
 3997 
 
 14 A 
 14t'b 
 
 12 ft 
 
 13 A 
 12^ 
 
 13^ 
 
 11^ 
 10 
 13 
 11 
 
 From this it will be seen that the order in which the 
 ships steamed on their sea trial was very dijfferent 
 indeed from the order given by their respective best 
 performances on the measured mile. That these great 
 differences in performance resulted from secondary 
 causes is obvious enough on the very face of the figures, 
 presuming the observations and recoids forwarded by 
 the Admirals in command to be tolerably accurate. In 
 the case of the ' Achilles,' the boilers and engines 
 (which are of the old type, and well understood) were 
 so successfully worked that they produced slightly more 
 power even than on the measured mile ; but the speed 
 of the ship fell short of her measured-mile speed by ^ 
 of a knot, a loss which must be principally attributed 
 to foulness of bottom. In the 'Bellerophon,' the boilers 
 and engines (which are of a new type, working at a 
 very high speed of piston, and not at the time well 
 understood) were less successfully worked, in fact, 
 developed only 4156 H.-P., instead of 6521 H.-P. ; and 
 the sj)eed of the ship was small in proportion, amount- 
 ing to only 11 knots. It is interesting to remark that 
 about 1 knot of this loss of speed is due to foulness 
 of bottom ; for at the measured mile, on a half-power 
 trial, she went 12 knots with about the same power as 
 the boilers and engines developed at this squadron 
 
14 Varieties of Iron-Clads. Chap. I. 
 
 trial. The 'Caledonia's' engines developed about tlie 
 same power on both the measured-mile and sea trials ; 
 but the speed obtained on the measured mile exceeded 
 that obtained at sea by more than a knot and a half ; 
 and as she is a copper-bottomed vessel, this can be 
 accounted for in part only by foulness of bottom. The 
 ' Hector ' developed but two-thirds of her power, and 
 fell short of her full speed by nearly 1\ knots. On the 
 measured mile she obtained, with reduced power, 10^ 
 knots, with but 1790 H.-P. ; so that with 2102 H.-P. 
 she ought to have approached 11 knots on the squadron 
 trial ; and the deficiency of a knot from this speed was 
 probably due, for the most part, to foulness. The 
 ' Lord Clyde ' develojDed but four-fifths of her full power, 
 and yet attained nearly to her full speed, losing nothing 
 from foulness. The ' Ocean's ' power on the sea trial 
 also closely approached the amount developed on the 
 measured mile, and yet her speed, like the ' Caledonia's,' 
 fell much more below her full speed than was to be 
 expected in the case of a copper-bottomed ship. 
 
 The foregoing facts show clearly enough that foul- 
 ness of bottom and deficient development of steam- 
 power introduced into the performances of the frigates 
 engaged in this trial far greater differences than ex- 
 isted in the inherent qualities of the ships. Looking 
 at the maximum (or measured-mile) performances of 
 the vessels, we find that the difference in speed of 
 the fastest and slowest of these six ships is 2 knots ; 
 whereas on the sea trial the ' Hector ' was nearly 3 .V 
 knots slower than the ' Achilles.' When each ship did 
 its best, the ' Achilles ' and ' Bellerophon ' differed by 
 less than a quarter of a knot ; but on the squadron 
 
Chap. I. Varieties of Iroti-Clads. 15 
 
 trial a difference of nearly 2^ knots existed. At their 
 greatest speeds tte ' Caledonia ' and ' Lord Clyde ' 
 differed by but little more tban half a knot ; but on 
 the sea trial the ' Lord Clyde ' beat the ' Caledonia ' by 
 2 knots an hour. The performance of the ' Ocean ' 
 was so similar to that of the ' Caledonia ' on both trials 
 as to require no special remark. 
 
 Now let us turn to another sea trial, also made in 
 smooth water, on the 26th November, 1867. The 
 seven large frigates tried on this occasion were the 
 'Achilles,' ' Bellerophon,' 'Lord Clyde,' 'Lord Warden,' 
 ' Minotaur ' (flag-ship), ' Prince Consort,' and 'Warrior.' 
 The flag-ship averaged 1 1^,^ knots per hour for the eight 
 hours of the trial, and her engines gave an average of 
 5629 H.-P. The results of the trial for the seven ships 
 were as follows : — 
 
 Indicated Horse-Power. 
 
 Achilles 5688 
 
 Bellerophon 5092 
 
 Lord Clyde 3822 
 
 Lord Warden .. .. 4472 
 
 Minotaur 5629 
 
 Prince Consort .. .. 3721 
 
 Warrior 4752 
 
 Speed in Knots. 
 
 '-- 10 
 
 11 J- 
 '■'^ 10 
 
 lO-S- 
 
 -^^10 
 1 o* 
 
 12 
 
 The full-speed performances of the ' Achilles,' ' Belle- 
 rophon,' and ' Lord Clyde,' on their measured-mile trials 
 have been given above, and those of the remaining four 
 vessels are given in the following statement, the results 
 
 * These speeds differ materially from those given by the common log, and 
 recorded at page 8 of the Parliamentary Eeturn, No. 128, " Navy (Channel 
 Fleet)," dated March 6, 1868, which are obvionsly a little in error in several 
 cases ; hut it has only been thought desirable to correct them in the three 
 cases where the errors were considerable. It will be seen by the diagrams 
 between pages 8 and 9 of the Return that the ' Achilles ' steamed about 20,686 
 yards, the ' Lord Warden ' 11,125 yards, and the ' Prince Consort ' 3349 yards, 
 more than the flag-ship, in the 8 hours ; so that their average speed must 
 have exceeded hers (11^ knots) by Ij^, 1%, and j% of a knot respectively. 
 
i6 
 
 Varieties of Iron-Clads. 
 
 Chap. I. 
 
 of the latest measured-mile trials (made at Stokes Bay 
 in 1868) being taken in tire cases of the ' Minotaur ' and 
 ' Warrior ' : — 
 
 
 Indicated Horso-Power. 
 
 Speed In Knots 
 
 Lord "Warden 
 
 .. .. 6706 
 
 ■ 13^% 
 
 Minotaur 
 
 .. 6702 
 
 Wt% 
 
 Prince Consort 
 
 .. .. 3953 
 
 • 12t^o 
 
 "Warrior 
 
 .. .. 5267 
 
 14 
 
 To facilitate the comparison of the results obtained 
 on the measured-mile and sea trials, I have in this case 
 also arranged a statement that will enable the reader to 
 see at a glance the differences which exist. Here also 
 it appears that through foulness of bottom, and deficient 
 develof)ment of steam-power, the order of merit of the 
 ships, in point of speed, was very different on the sea 
 trial from that given by the measured-mile trials. 
 
 
 Indicated Horse-Power. 
 
 Speed ir 
 
 Knots. 
 
 
 On Measured- 
 
 On Trial of 
 
 On >Ieasured- 
 
 On Trial of 
 
 
 Mile Trial. 
 
 26tli Nuv. 1.-C7. 
 
 Jlile Trial. 
 
 26th JJov. 1S6V. 
 
 Achilles 
 
 5722 
 
 5688 
 
 lilll 
 
 12 7o 
 
 Bellerophon 
 
 C.^21 
 
 5092 
 
 11t'-i 
 
 lU 
 
 Lord Clyde 
 
 6064 
 
 3822 
 
 13t1t 
 
 10 TB 
 
 Lord Warden 
 
 6706 
 
 4472 
 
 ! 13,:, 
 
 12 
 
 Minotaur 
 
 6702 
 
 I 5629 
 
 1 H,L 
 
 lU 
 
 Prince Consort . . 
 
 39r,3 
 
 3721 
 
 127ii 
 
 11t5 
 
 Wan-ior 
 
 5267 
 
 1 4752 
 1 
 
 14 
 
 1 
 
 12 
 
 Perhaps the difference between the results of the two 
 trials will appear even more striking if put in the 
 following form : — 
 
 Order of Merit. 
 
 According to Capability. 
 
 0. 1. jMinotaur. 
 
 2. Acliilles. 
 
 3. Bellerophon. 
 
 4. ^^'arl■iol■. 
 
 5. Lord Warden. 
 
 6. Lord Ch-ilc. 
 
 7. Prince Consort. 
 
 According to Trial of 26tli \ov. 1S67. 
 Ko. 1. Achilles. 
 
 ^ (Lord AVardcn. 
 (AVarrior. 
 
 3. Bellerophon. 
 
 4. Prince Consort. 
 
 5. Minotaur. 
 
 6. Lord Clyde. 
 
Chap. I. Varieties of Iron-Clads. 17 
 
 So great were the differences of performance intro- 
 duced by different degrees of foulness, differences of 
 coal, different developments of power, and other 
 secondary causes, that the fastest ship of all, the 
 ' Minotaur,' was reduced almost down to the slowest ; 
 and the ' Lord Warden,' which should have been beaten 
 by four ships, was beaten by one only, she herself 
 greatly beating the ' Minotaur,' which ought to have 
 beaten her by nearly a knot an hour. 
 
 I have dwelt upon this point, and illustrated it at 
 some length, because it is very important that it should 
 be thoroughly understood that even the most perfect 
 uniformity in the steaming qualities of our iron-clad 
 frigates at their maximum powers, would fail altogether 
 to result in uniform performance at sea with only 
 ordinary management as regards the engines and 
 boilers, fuel, state of ship's bottom, and so forth ; and 
 that, after all that has been said about want of uni- 
 formity in the designs of our armoured ships, it will 
 obviously be futile to look in that direction only for a 
 guarantee of uniformity of performance and of steaming 
 qualities. 
 
 If I were to discuss, in like manner, the extent to 
 which uniformity of sailing performance is disturbed by 
 secondary influences, it would be quite easy to show 
 that the same facts and principles hold. It will only 
 be necessary to illustrate this by a single example, that 
 of the ' Pallas.' After witnessing the performances of 
 this ship under canvas (in 1866) for a long period, 
 Rear- Admiral Yelvei-ton reported of her to the Board 
 of Admiralty as follows : — "' On all occasions of trial- 
 " sailing, whether on a wind or going free, the ' Pallas '' 
 
 c 
 
1 8 Varieties of I ron-Clads. Chap. I. 
 
 " proved herself far superior to the rest of the squadron. 
 " Her power of going to v/indward is extraordinary. . . 
 " I may safely class her, in point of sailing, with some 
 " of our good 36-gun frigates of other days." Eear- 
 Admiral Warden, then second in command of the 
 squadron, also placed her first in order of sailing capa- 
 bility. In 1867, however, although the ship had 
 undergone no change in herself (beyond having some 
 of her running gear strengthened), her performance 
 under canvas was extremely bad, and Rear-Admiral 
 Warden reported that "the 'Pallas' was 'nowhere,' 
 " from inahility to do more." * It is obvious, notwith- 
 standing this falling off in performance, that, as the 
 "ability" of the ship could not have changed, her bad 
 performance must have been due to secondary causes, 
 having nothing whatever to do with her design. The 
 sailing trials made by the Channel squadron in 1868, of 
 Avhich the particulars are given in Admiral Warden's 
 Report, show that the ' Pallas ' again took a high place, 
 and prove the accuracy of the opinion here expressed. 
 
 It is unnecessary to dwell longer on this aspect of 
 the subject. It is plain that, whatever may be the 
 variety of design embodied in our iron-clad fleet, 
 the principal differences in the performances of the 
 ships at sea are due to other causes ; and that uni- 
 formity of steaming and sailing performances cannot be 
 secured by the designer alone. The ' Lord Warden ' 
 and ' Lord Clyde ' are just alike — built from the same 
 drawings, supplied with boilers and engines of the 
 same power, armoured to the same extent, and yet we 
 
 * The italics are mine. 
 
.Chap. I. Varieties of Irmi-Clads. 19 
 
 have seen how differently tliey have steamed at sea 
 under the same circumstances. It may Ije certainly 
 concluded, therefore, that the practical differences be- 
 tween our ships, as regards steaming and sailing, are 
 of much less importance than has been represented, 
 and that great inducements exist for us to do all we 
 can to secure uniformity in our fuel, our stoking, and 
 our use of steam ; and also to keep the bottoms of our 
 ships as clean as }:iossible. This is unquestionably a 
 verj' important subject, and points to the necessity of 
 a more careful training of all our officers, but more 
 especially of the engineer officers of the fleet. 
 
 I have already intimated, in an earKer part of this 
 chapter, that variety of design resulting from pro- 
 gressive improvements is, in my view, to be preferred 
 to a non-progressive uniformity. Before closing this 
 chapter, it will be well to revert to this aspect of the 
 subject. Let us take as an illustration the very im- 
 portant quality of power to ram an enemy. The first 
 sea-going iron-clad, the ' TTarrior." possessed this quality 
 in a very minor degree. She is not, it should be under- 
 stood, wholly unfit to act as a ram. Any strong and 
 well-built iron ship would deliver a formidable blow in 
 striking an enemv at even a moderate speed ; but the 
 ' TVarrior ' is much more than an ordinary ship in this 
 respect, having a massive solid forged rarn-stem. well 
 supported by bulkheads and frames, worked within her 
 elegant knee-of-the-head, expressly to adapt her for 
 delivering a destructive Ijlow upon an enemy. Still, 
 moi'e recent bows have varied largely and advan- 
 tageously from the ' "Warrior's,' in order to adapt them 
 to ram more efficiently, as will be shown further on ; 
 
 c 2 
 
2,0 Varieties of Iron-Clads. Chap. I,. 
 
 and, what is even more important to my present argu- 
 ment, the proportions of the 'Warrior' have been 
 wholly departed from in order to secure that quality of 
 handiness in which the 'Warrior' is so deficient, and 
 which is indispensable to the effective use of a ship as a 
 ram. Whether the proportions of such ships as the 
 'Bellerophon' and 'Hercules' are, or are not, superior 
 to those of the 'Warrior' and 'Minotaur' for steaming 
 purposes will be fully considered in a later chapter ; 
 but that they are superior for ramming purposes does 
 not admit of a doubt. The variation introduced in this 
 respect, and the further variation of giving ram-ships 
 the advantage of a balanced rudder are causes of 
 difference between early and recent iron-clads, no 
 doubt ; but it would have been an evil thing for Eng- 
 land if in the next naval action her iron-clad fleet 
 had consisted of Warriors and Minotaurs only, and 
 had comprised none of those stout and handy vessels 
 which are, I believe, capable of playing a most destruc- 
 tive part among a hostile squadron. The actual intro- 
 duction of this improvement is due much more to Sir 
 Spencer Robinson, the Controller of tlie Navy, than to 
 any other person ; and the foresight and persistency 
 with which he carried this change through will never 
 be more fully appreciated than in the hour of action, 
 should that unhappily arrive. Uniformity in our fleet 
 would have been dearly purchased at the expense of 
 this great improvement. 
 
 The modifications which the structure of the hulls of 
 our iron-clads has undergone constitute another cause 
 of variety, which, if mere variety be objectionable, are 
 open to censure, but which bear to my mind a very 
 
Chap. I. Varieties of Iron-Clads. 21 
 
 different aspect. Tliis remark applies botli to the 
 materials of wliicli the hulls have Leen composed and 
 to the disposition and distribution of those materials. 
 There never has been a doubt in the minds of the Con- 
 structors of the Xavy respecting the superior value of 
 iron as the material of construction for such ships, and 
 the present Controller of the Xavy has adopted iron to 
 the utmost extent compatible ^^ith other circumstances, 
 and long since abandoned wood altogether as tlie frame- 
 work of new constructions. The only reason for 
 building iron-clads in wood has been found in the 
 readiness and econcimy with which they could be pro- 
 duced either out of existing wood ships or out of stocks 
 of timber provided in the days of wood ships. But it 
 has been alleged that the iron upper-works of the 
 ' Enterprise,' the combined wood and iron upper works 
 of the ' Pallas,' and the compound or double armour of 
 the 'Lord TVarden' and 'Lord Clyde,' are examples 
 of want of uniformity and consistency of purpose on 
 the part of the Admiralty and its officers. This view 
 is not, however, accurate. The 'Enterprise' (a small 
 vessel of less than 1000 tons) was the first partially 
 armoured wooden vessel, and it was deemed very 
 desirable to render the construction of so small a vessel 
 available as an experimental trial of the practicability 
 of combining fire-proof iron upper works with the 
 wooden bottom of such vessels. This experiment has 
 succeeded remarkably well — so well that all the largest 
 wood-built iron-clads of the French navy are now 
 built with iron upper works. But it was precisely one 
 of those experiments which it was very undesirable to 
 repeat until its practical success or failure had been 
 
22 Varieties of Iron-Clads. Chap. I. 
 
 tested by a prolonged trial at sea, and consequently tlie 
 plan could not with security be adopted, and therefore 
 was not adopted, in the ' Pallas,' except in the imme- 
 diate vicinity of the battery guns, where an iron side 
 was indispensable. The plan was not applicable to 
 the converted ships ' Zealous,' ' Eoyal Alfred,' and 
 ' Repulse,' without too large an outlay for cutting 
 down the wooden upper works ; and the necessity for 
 repeating the ' Enterprise ' system in still later vessels 
 has fortunately disappeared altogether from our Navy 
 by the general adoption of iron in the construction 
 of iron-clads. The adoption of an inner thickness of 
 armour in the ' Lord Warden ' and ' Lord Clyde ' was 
 the most obvious and common-sense method of increas- 
 ing the defensive powers of those ships, after their 
 4i-inch armour had been provided, and when the pro- 
 gress of other navies rendered some increase necessary. 
 In all these respects, therefore, the variety of system 
 adopted has been the result not of fluctuating purposes, 
 but of steady and determined progress where progress 
 was all-important. The chapter which will follow upon 
 the structure of iron-clads will show, I believe, that 
 the same thing is true of the successive modifications 
 which the iron hull has undergone in successive ships. 
 
 There is one other consideration connected with the 
 variety of our armoured ships which appears to me well 
 worth the attention of the officers of the Navy — the 
 way in which that variety may be turned to account 
 in time of war. In the old days, when actions had to 
 be fought under sail, and when ships of a class were 
 in the main alike, the limits within which the arts, 
 the resources, and the audacities of the Navy were 
 
Chap. I. Varieties of Iron^Clads. 23 
 
 restricted were really very narrow ; and vet how 
 brilliant were its achievements ! I cannot but believe 
 that, if the Enghsh iron-clad fleet were now to be 
 engaged in a general action with an enemy's fleet, the 
 very variety of our ships — those very improvements 
 which have occasioned that variety — would be at once 
 the cause of the greatest possible embarrassment to the 
 enemy, and the means of the most vigorous and diver- 
 sified attack upon the hostile fleet. This is pecuharly 
 true of all those varieties which result from increase in 
 handiness, in bow fire, in height of port, and so forth ; 
 and unless I have mis-read our naval history, and mis- 
 appreciate the character of our naval officers of the 
 present day, the nation will, in the day of trial, obtain 
 the full benefit of these advantages. 
 
24 Armour of the Iron-Clads. Chap. II. 
 
 CHAPTBE II. 
 
 ARMOUR OP THE IRON-CLADS. 
 
 I HAVE already briefly alluded to tlie different modes of 
 distributing- or disposing the armour upon the hulls of 
 our iron-clad ships ; in this chapter I propose to deal 
 more fully with this subject, and to trace the additions 
 that have been gradually made to the thickness of the 
 armour carried by various ships. In order to add to 
 the interest of the division, I shall also give similar 
 information respecting some armoured ships of other 
 countries. 
 
 When the first iron-clad s were constructed, the most 
 powerful guns carried by our ships of war consisted of 
 the old smooth-bore 95-cwt. 68-pounders, and the 4|-inch 
 armour-plating which was employed was, when pro- 
 perly backed and supported, capable of withstanding 
 the fire of these guns. This thickness of armour, 
 backed in various ways, forms the protection of a large 
 number of our iron-clads, having been adopted in all 
 the iron-built ships first constructed, except those of the 
 ' Minotaur ' class ; in all the converted ships of the 
 'Caledonia' class (except the ' Eoyal Alfred '), which 
 were altered from line-of-battle ships ; and in all the 
 armoured corvettes and smaller vessels yet completed. 
 In the first iron ships — the ' Warrior,' ' Black Prince,' 
 ' Achilles,' ' Defence,' ' Eesistance,' ' Hector,' and 
 ' Valiant ' — the 4:^-inch armour was backed by 18 inches 
 
Chap. II. Armour of the Iron-Clads. 25 
 
 of teak fitted outside the iron hull ; and in the wood 
 ships the armour was bolted on outside the planking 
 of an ordinary line-of-battle ship, being consequently 
 backed by about 30 inches of timbering and planking. 
 In the ships of the ' Minotaur ' class, the armour was 
 increased in thickness to 5| inches; but instead of 
 having 18 inches of teak backing, as in the ' Warrior,' 
 and the other ships enumerated above, there was only a 
 thickness of 9 inches ; so that practically the sides of this 
 class of vessel are of the same strength as the armoured 
 portions of the ' Warrior' and ' Defence.' It was long sup- 
 posed, in consequence of certain experiments at Shoe- 
 bury ness, that the increase of armour and decrease of wood 
 backing in the ' Minotaur ' class, as compared with the 
 ' Warrior ' class, had resulted in a considerable reduction 
 in shot-resisting strength. This, however, ultimately 
 proved to be incorrect, the error having arisen from a 
 change in the strength of the powder employed.* In 
 
 * " The ' Minotaur ' target differed from the ' Warrior ' mainly in the 
 " reduction of its wood backing, and in an increase of equivalent weight in 
 " the armour. A single layer of 9-inch teak and armour-plates 5^ inches 
 " thick were used in this, the frames and skin-plating remaining about the 
 '' same. For a long time it was supposed that this target had proved much 
 " inferior to that of the ' Warrior,' and there were not wanting persons to 
 " publicly, and strongly and repeatedly, censure the departure that had been 
 " made from the ' Warrior ' system. I must confess that I was never able to 
 " join in that censure myself, and when it became my duty to consider, with 
 " the Controller of the Navy and his officers, how the ' Bellerophon ' might 
 " best be built in this respect, we ventured to adhere to the reduced thickness 
 " of wood backing and the increased thickness of armour, notwithstanding the 
 " outciy against them. I am happy to be able to state what, perhaps, many 
 " gentlemen present may not yet have heard (for it is ill news that flies apace, 
 " and not good news), viz., that all the gloomy and disparaging comparisons 
 " which were drawn between the ' Warrior ' and ' Minotaur ' targets have 
 " recently proved to be in error, it having been discovered that what is known 
 "as ' 2 A ' powder was used with two out of the three rounds of 150 lbs. 
 " cast-iron spherical shot which were fired from the lOj-inch gun, at the 
 
26 AnnoJtr of the Iroii-Clads. Chap. II. 
 
 the ' Lord Clyde ' aud ' Lord Warden,' the armour is in 
 some places 4:|-iuch and in others 5|-inch, worked out- 
 side a wooden hull of about the same thickness as the 
 converted ships of the ' Caledonia ' class ; but in order 
 to increase the resisting power of the ship's side, and 
 especially to prevent the entrance of shells (which are 
 so destructive to wood-built ships), a skin of 1^-inch 
 iron is Avorked behind a large part of the 4^-inch 
 armour, between the outside jolanking and the timbers. 
 By this means the total thickness of iron to be pene- 
 trated is made to equal 6 inches over a considerable 
 part of the area of the armoured side. The frames of 
 these two vessels, although no thicker than those of the 
 ships of the ' Caledonia ' class, are made solid through- 
 out, and are consequently much stronger. 
 
 In the ' Bellerophon,' the armour-plating is 6 inches, 
 and the teak backing 10 inches thick, while the effi- 
 ciency of the target presented by the ship's side is 
 greatly increased by having the skin-plating 1;^ inch 
 thick, or nearly 1 inch thicker than in the iron-built 
 vessels which preceded her. Another important feature 
 of the construction is that outside the skin-plating, and 
 
 " ' Minotaur ' target, the effect of using this powder having been to raise the 
 " striliing velocity of the shot from 1,C20 feet to 1,744 feet per second. The 
 ■' change in the powder was made (I know not how or why) immediately 
 '' after the first round, and invalidated all the comparisons that were made 
 " iu and after the report of the trial. The ' Minotaur,' ' Agincourt,' and 
 ' ' ' Northumberland,' are now known to possess much greater strength than 
 " has been supposed, and are in all probability at least equal to the ' Warrior ' 
 " in that respect. When the great cost of these large ships and the time 
 " which has been required for building them are considered, it must be highly 
 " satisfactory to the country to learn that no mistake was made in designing 
 " their armour, and that they are really as stout aud strong as their designers 
 " proposed." — From a Paper On the 'Belhrojplton,' '■Lord ll'tinhn' and ^ Jler- 
 rides ' Tiiiyctx, read by the Author at the Institution of Naval Architects, and 
 reprinted (';* exteuso in the Author's ' Shipbuilding in Iron and Bteel,' p. ibo. 
 
Chap. II. Armour of the Iron-Clads. 27 
 
 between tlie planks of the wood backing, longitudinal 
 girders ai'e woi'ked at intervals of about 2 feet, thus 
 forming a network of framing in conjunction with the 
 strong vertical frames inside the skin-plating, which are 
 about the same distance apart. This arrangement has 
 been proved most satisfactory as regards the efficient 
 support it gives to the armoured side, and has been 
 adopted in all our armour-clad ships built since the 
 ' Bellerophon.' * The ' Penelope ' has her hull protected 
 
 * Although the contrary has often been freely asserted, this arrangement 
 differs altogether from that proposed hy the late Mr. Chalmers, the essential 
 feature of which consisted of a series of loose edge plates interposed between 
 the strakes of wood backing to the outer armour-plate, and cut off from any con- 
 nection with the hull proper by means of a thin inner armour-plate backed by a 
 few inches of wood, so that no structural strength whatever was obtained by 
 their use. The following extract is taken from the Paper On the ' Warrior,' 
 ' Belleroplwn^ and ' Lord Warden ' Targets, referred to in the foot-note on 
 p. 25 :— 
 
 " I have now to describe to you the ' Bellerophon ' target ; and in order to 
 " make the principles of its construction clear, I must mention the two points 
 " in reference to which the ' Warrior ' and ' Minotaur ' targets appeared to 
 " me susceptible of improvement. It seemed, first, that a great addition to 
 " the general stability and strength of the structure might be secured if the 
 " strong vertical iron frames of the ship were crossed horizontally by other 
 " frames of approximately equal strength, and spaced like the vertical frames ; 
 " and, secondly, that the risk of shot or shell passing through the structure, 
 " between the frames, would be greatly reduced, and the resistance of the 
 " frames much more effectually elicited, wherever a shot or shell might strike, 
 " if the skin of the ship were considerably thickened. In other words, it 
 " appeared highly desirable to extend, throughout the entire structure, that 
 " double skin-plating, and those external frames or stringers, which had already 
 " been introduced, as we saw a minute ago, in the weakened portions of the 
 " ' Warrior ' target. These features constitute the characteristic merits — for 
 " they proved on trial to be merits — of the ' Bellerophon ' target ; and it is a 
 " pleasure to me, and not by any means a subject of regret, to know that the 
 " germs of these improvements may be traced in the structure designed by 
 " my predecessors. By virtue of these we secure many important objects. 
 " The combined horizontal and vertical 10-inch frames, coimected by the 
 " double skin of -|-inch iron, constitute an enormously strong and rigid 
 " structure, eminently well adapted to sustain the armour under all circum- 
 " stances, Avhile both the doubled skin and the external stringers (to \vhich 
 ■' we fitted butt-straps in the ' Bellerophon' herself), increase the longitudinal 
 
28 Armour of the Iron-Clads. Chap. II. 
 
 in tlie most vital parts — near tlie water-line, and in 
 wake of the fighting deck — by 6-incli armour, and in 
 
 " strength of the ship to a most unusual extent. It will complete the general 
 '' description of the ' Bellerophon ' target when I state that the armour was 
 " G inches thiols, and the teak 10 inches ; and that, instead of forming tho 
 " external frames or stringers of a plate and two angle irons, as was done in 
 " the ' Warridr,' we formed them of one large angle ii'on 10 by 3^ inches. 
 
 " You are now in a position to understand the true reasons that existed for 
 " riveting external stringers to the outside of the ' Bellerophon's ' sldn-plating, 
 '' and you cannot fail to see how little the adoption of that arrangement had 
 " to do with the notion of giving direct support to tho armour-plates. I 
 " mention this because it has been supposed, and stated pubhcly on many 
 " occasions, that these edge plates were adopted in imitation of a quite 
 " different system, and with the view of rigidly backing up the armour. 
 " This, however, is wholly a mistake ; for much as I, for one, should like 
 " to banish the teak fiom our iron-clads, and to make their hulls of iron 
 " throughout, I am of opinion that a rigid iron backing has many disadvan- 
 " tages. In fact, so far were we from valuing these edge plates as direct 
 " armour supports that we caused them to be reduced in depth behind one 
 " of the plates of the target, and to a large extent in the shiji also, cx]iressly 
 " in order to keep them from too immediate contact with the armour ; and 
 " we did so because it apipeared undesirable to bring the force of a blow so 
 " directly and fully upon that portion of the hull proper of the ship which is 
 " immediately in front of the shot, as these plates would otherwise tend to 
 " bring it, especially if placed closer together. "We put armour upon a ship to 
 " protect the hull, which we require to preserve fronr the blow as effectually 
 " as possible. A vei'y rigid backing, in direct contact with the skin of the 
 " ship, must obviously transfer much of the shock of a shot to that skin ; 
 " whereas a moderately yielding backing allows the force to expend itself upon 
 " the armour which is put there to receive it, and thus protects the skin from 
 " its violence. This is a very important point, and one upon -which too 
 " hasty opinions may easily be formed. I have given the most careful con- 
 " sideration to the matter, and have seen many corroborations of the sound- 
 " ness of the views here expressed. There is one test which is easily applied, 
 " but which is usually applied in a manner the very reverse of what it should 
 " be. It is this : wherever you see an armour-plate that is supported by close 
 " rigid edge jilates struck upon a line of support, you will find that the 
 •' armour-plate is comparatively but little injured, and on removing it from its 
 " backing, you will find that the edge plate has scored inore or less deeply into 
 " the back of the armour-plate. Now what does this point to? To the fact 
 " that the edge plate has been driven back with violence upon that which 
 " supports it, viz., that very skin of the ship which yuu desire to preserve 
 " intact. If the external frames or stringers of the ' Bellerophon ' had been 
 " situated within a few inches of each other, I should have considered this 
 '' circumstance so serious as to destroy all prospect of success in carrying out 
 " the plan ; but with the frames 2 feet apart, it is not so, as the isolated edge 
 
Chap. II. Armour of the I ron-C lads. 29 
 
 ttie remaimng portions by 5-iiicli, worked upon 10 and 
 11 inclies of teak backing respectively. Tbis was one of 
 tbe first of our sbips in wbicb tbe device of tbickening 
 tbe armour on portions of tbe broadside was adopted, a 
 device wbicb bas since been extensively employed. Tbe 
 longitudinal girders bebind tbe armour in tbe ' Pene- 
 lope ' are similar in tbeir arrangement to tbose of tbe 
 ' Belleropbon,' but tbere is not as great a tbickness 
 of skin-plating. Tbe turret-sbip ' Monarcb ' bas 7-incb 
 armour on tbe most important parts of tbe bull, and 
 6-incb on tbe otber parts, tbe armour being supported 
 by 12-incb teak backing, witb a tbickness of skin- 
 plating (1^-incb) and an arrangement of longitudinal 
 girders similar to tbose of tbe ' Belleropbon.' Tbe 
 ' Captain's ' protection resembles tbe ' ]\Ionarcb's,' except 
 in wake of tbe turrets, wbere tbere is 8-incb armour ; 
 tbe tbickness of tbe backing and skin-plating and 
 tbe arrangement of tbe girders are tbe same in botb 
 sbips. Tbe sbips of tbe ' Invincible ' class bave 8-incb 
 and 6-inch armour on tbe broadside, backed by 8 and 
 10 incbes of teak respectively, and by 1^-incb skin- 
 plating, witb tbe usual arrangement of girders. 
 
 Tbe tbickness of armour carried bas, bowever, for tbe 
 present, reacbed its maximum for sea-going broadside 
 sbips in tbe ' Hercules,' wbicb bas 9-incb armour at tbe 
 water-line, 8-incb on tbe most important parts of tbe 
 
 " plate of J-inoh iron buckles up under the blow before it can injure tbe skin. 
 " I will onlj' add on this head that in expressing the foregoing views I am 
 " not neglecting the consideration that closely situated edge plates must tend 
 " oreatly to distribute the blow : I am well aware of that fact ; but the answer 
 " to it is that the time allowed for distributing the force is very short, and 
 " that so far as they distribute it at ■ all, they distribute the blow upon and 
 " over the skin of the ship, which we wish to preserve, and take it for that 
 " purpose from the armour, which is employed expressly to receive it." 
 
30 Armour of the Iron-Clads. Chap. II. 
 
 broadside, and 6-incli on tlie remainder. Outside 
 the 1^-inch skin-plating of this vessel, teak backing 12 
 and 10 inches thick is fitted, together with longitudinal 
 girders of the usual character. This does not, however, 
 constitute the whole of her jorotection, for from below 
 the lower deck down to the lower edge of the armour 
 the sj^aces known as the " wing passages " are filled in 
 solid with additional teak backing, and inside this there 
 is an iron skin f inch thick, supported by a set of ver- 
 tical frames 7 inches deep. The total protection, there- 
 fore, of the most vital part of the ship, in the region of 
 the water-line, consists of the following thicknesses of 
 iron and wood : — Outside armour 9 inches ; then 1 0- 
 inch teak backing with longitudinal girders at intervals 
 of about 2 feet, worked upon 1^-inch skin-plating sup- 
 ported by 10-inch vertical frames spaced 2 feet apart ; 
 the spaces between these frames are filled in solid 
 with teak, and inside the frames there is a further 
 thickness of about 19 or 20 inches of teak ; the whole 
 being bounded on the inside by |-inch iron plating, 
 stiffened with 7-inch frames. The total thickness of 
 iron (neglecting the girders and frames) is thus 11^ 
 inches, and of this 9 inches are in one thickness ; the teak 
 backing has a total thickness of about 40 inches. The 
 trial at Shoeburj-ness of a target constructed to repre- 
 sent this part of the ship's side proved that it was vir- 
 tually impenetrable to the 600-pounder gun ; and per- 
 haps no better idea of the increase of the resisting 
 power of the sides of our iron-clads can be obtained than 
 that derived from a comparison of the 68-pounder giui 
 which the ' Warrior's ' side was capable of resisting with 
 the 600-pounder tried against the ' Hercules ' target ! 
 
Chap. II. Armour of the Iron-Clads. 31 
 
 But the limit of the thickness of armour carried must 
 not be considered to have been yet attained. Coast 
 defence vessels and rams are, as I have previoiisly 
 stated, being built to carry 11 and 12-inch armour ; the 
 new turret-ships ' Thunderer ' and ' Devastation,' lately 
 designed, will carry quite as great thicknesses, and 
 ships have been designed for sea-going purposes, and 
 may yet be constructed, which are to carry even 15 
 inches of armour. There can be little doubt that, as 
 improvements are made in the manufacture and working 
 of heavy guns, corresponding additions will be made to 
 the resisting powers of the iron-clads built. It is hardly 
 possible to foresee in what way the competition between 
 guns and ships will terminate ; but having the exjoe- 
 rience we possess of the successful accomplishment of 
 what, only a few years ago, were regarded as impossi- 
 bilities in the construction of iron-clads, it would be 
 folly to attempt to set a limit to the results that will be 
 attained in the future. The Admiralty have long been 
 in possession of a design for a turret-ship with sides 
 plated with 15-inch armour, and turrets with IS-inch 
 armour. I have also prepared outline designs, not on 
 extravagant dimensions, to carry 20-inch armoiu-, both 
 on broadsides and on turrets. 
 
 The preceding facts and figures may be briefly sum- 
 marised as follows, if the ships are grouped according 
 to the thicknesses of their armour and backing, irithout 
 regard to the greater or less extent of the surface protected. 
 For convenience I shall divide them into iron-built and 
 wood-built. In the turret-ships the turret armour is 
 generally a little stronger than the side armour. 
 
32 
 
 Armour of the Iron-Clads. 
 
 Chap. II. 
 
 Iron-built :- 
 
 Scorpion 
 Wiyern 
 
 Viper . . 
 Vixen .. 
 Waterwitoli . 
 
 Warrior 
 Black Prince 
 Achilles 
 Defence 
 Ecsistanco . . 
 Hector . . 
 Valiant 
 Prince Albert 
 
 Agincourt . . 
 
 Minotaur 
 
 Northumberland 
 
 Bellerophon 
 
 Penelope 
 
 Invincible 
 
 Audacious 
 
 Vanguard 
 
 Iron Duke 
 
 Swiftsure 
 
 Triumph 
 
 Armour. 
 
 Backing. 
 
 Inches. 
 
 Inches. 
 
 4i 
 
 9 
 
 ij 
 
 10 
 
 4J 
 
 18 
 
 5i 
 
 9 
 
 6 
 
 10 
 
 6 
 
 10 
 
 6 
 
 10 
 
 Skin- 
 Plating. 
 
 Inches. 
 
 '{ 
 
 n 
 
 li 
 
 The weakest of our 
 armour-clada. 
 
 But very slightly 
 stronger than the 
 above. 
 
 AU of equal strength 
 to resist shot. 
 
 The greater thickness 
 of skin-plating in this 
 and most of the follow- 
 ing ships is obviously 
 equivalent to an in- 
 crease in the thickness 
 of armour. 
 
 Note. — The ' Penelope's' ai-monr is only 5 Inches thick on some parts of the hroadside. The 
 * Invincible ' and her consorts have 8-inch armour on the water-line belt. 
 
 12 
 
 1* 
 
 Monarch 
 
 Captain 
 
 Note. — The ' Captain ' has 8-inch armour in wake of the turreta. 
 
 Hercules 
 
 Sultan 
 
 On belt 
 
 Over gun-slides 
 On sides generally 
 
 9 
 
 10 
 
 li 
 
 8 
 
 10 
 
 li 
 
 6 
 
 12 
 
 li 
 
 Note. — In the ' Hercules,' In the neighbourhood of the water-line, there is an additional 
 protection of about 30 inches of teak backed by a ^-inch iron skin, besides the belt protec- 
 tion named above. 
 
 Hotspur \ 
 
 On sides . . 
 On breastwork 
 
 p . J On sides . . 
 '' '^ \ On breastwork 
 
 Glatton 
 Thunderer . 
 Devastation 
 
 11 
 
 8 
 
 12 
 12 
 
 li 
 
 li 
 
 11 
 12 
 
 12 
 
 12 
 
 li 
 li 
 
 12 
 
 18 
 
 IJ 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 Armour of the Iron-Clads. 
 
 33 
 
 Annour, 
 
 Thickness of 
 Side. 
 
 Wood-bmlt :— 
 
 Caledonia . . 
 Ocean .. 
 Prince Coni^jrt 
 Eoval Oak . . 
 
 Inches. 
 
 Indies. 
 
 29* 
 
 Zealous 
 
 PaUas 
 
 Favourite . . 
 Research 
 Enterprise .. 
 
 Pioval Sovereign 
 Koyal Alfi-ed . 
 Piepulse 
 
 
 .301 
 
 
 22 
 
 ii 
 
 26 
 
 
 19i 
 
 ; 
 
 I 19J 
 
 1 5i 
 
 36 
 
 Lord Clyde 
 Lord AVarden 
 
 i\ 
 
 29.1 
 31 
 
 31i 
 
 li-incli inner skin of 
 iron. 
 
 ^OTE. — In these trro ships there is a strake of 53-lnch armour at the water-line, and the irame 
 Ifi filled in solid Vhind the armour, so that in addition 10 the outer and inner armour the whole 
 thickness of the side is available to resist penetration ; in all the other wood ships water 
 can enter when the outside planking, which is only 8 or 10 inchf? thick, is penetrated. 
 
 The information conveyed in the preceding summary 
 of the strengths of the respective iron-clads to resi.st 
 shot is illustrated in the accompanying woodcuts, which 
 show specimen hlocks cut out of the sides of a number 
 of the ships that may be taken as types of the various 
 classes. The ' Kalamazoo ' may be taken as a specimen 
 of the latest and strongest class of American monitors. 
 
 After the above brief statement of the thickness of 
 armour carried by our own ships, it may not be un- 
 interesting if I give a few facts of a similar character 
 with respect to the armoured ve.sfeels of the French and 
 American navies. The ' Grloire ' class, and the ' Magenta ' 
 and ' Solferino,' have armour a little over 4i inches 
 thick, worked upon ordinary wooden hulls. The same 
 thickness of armour as the ' Warrior's ' is carried by the 
 iron-built frigate ' Couronne,' and by the small wooden 
 floating batteries of the ' Palestro " cla.ss ; all the other 
 floating Ijatteries are iron-built, and have 5^-inch 
 
 D 
 
34 
 
 Arvunir of the Iron-Clads. 
 
 Chap. II. 
 
 Warrior 
 
 A/oRTfJl/ATSeRi-A A.'a 
 
 BeLJLeR O/^A/OA/ 
 
 Monarch 
 
Chap. II. ^4 rnioiir of the Iron-Clads. 
 
 35 
 
 f/j£/tC UI.ES 
 
 TnurjaefiER 
 
 ■Strongest American Mo n/ tor Kalamazoo 
 
36 Armour of the Iron-Clads. Chap. 1 1. 
 
 armour. The frigates of the ' Flandre ' class, and the 
 ram ' Taureau,' have armour a little less than 6 inches 
 thick outside wooden hulls ; while the armoured cor- 
 vettes or second-rate frigates of the ' Alma ' class have 
 5^-inch armour at the water-line, and A^-^ and 4-inch 
 ou other parts of the hull. The vessels of the 'Marengo ' 
 class (corresponding nearly to the ' Invincible ' class of 
 our own Navy) have 7-j^-inch armour at the water-line, 
 and 6 J--inch and 4-inch on other parts ; while the rams 
 of the 'Belier' class have 8^„-inch and 7-inch armour, 
 the strongest carried by any French vessel yet built. 
 It may be proper to add that by far the greater number 
 of French iron-clads are wood - built, and that the 
 armour is simply secured outside the planking of 
 the wooden hulls, no inner skin-plating or longitudinal 
 girders, similar to those of the English ships, being 
 worked. This fact renders the French ships weaker than 
 our vessels, even Avhen the thicknesses of the external 
 armour and of the backing are equal ; and to bring this 
 difference more clearly before the reader, I cannot do 
 better than quote from Captain Noble's ' Report on 
 Various Experiments carried out under the direction 
 of the Ordnance Select Committee, &c.' He says * :— 
 ' It might appear at first sight that wood backing 
 ' would have the effect of strengthening an iron plate 
 ' the results, however, of a very large number of cases 
 ' go to prove the opposite, namely, that the backing 
 ' affords little, if any, support to the plate unless it be 
 ' of the rigid form, such as the ' Chalmer,' ' Hercules,' 
 ' and ' Bellerophon.' In other words, if a shot is 
 
 See page 36 of the Eeport ' On the Effect of Bacldng to Iron Plates.' 
 
Chap. II. Armmir of tJie Iron-Clads. 37 
 
 " capable of penetrating an unbacked 4^inch plate, it 
 " will perforate it or break it away equally if it be 
 
 " backed by wood alone We bave evidence, 
 
 " however, that a rigid backing is a great advantage. 
 " Tliis was particularly apparent in tbe case of the 
 " ' Hercules,' where the plates were not perforated by 
 " some shot which struck with sufficient ' work ' to 
 " penetrate them completely if unbacked. We have 
 " also evidence of the great superiority of packed 
 " backing of teak, such as in the ' Warrior,' ' Minotaur,' 
 " &c., over the ordinary side of a Hne-of-battle ship, 
 " and of the great support which an inner skin affords. 
 " Thus it required 33 foot- tons per inch of shot's cir- 
 " cumference to penetrate the backing and skin of the 
 " ' Warrior,' viz. 18 inches of compact teak, and a 
 " |-inch iron plate strengthened and supported by iron 
 "ribs; and we see that 16 foot-tons per inch were 
 " sufficient to penetrate the side of an ordinary line-of- 
 " battle ship, viz. 25 inches of oak. We also find that 
 " the backing of the ' Lord Warden ' required 58 tons 
 " per inch, and of the small plate target about 16 tons 
 " per inch. This shows the vast superiority of com- 
 " pact backing supported by internal iron plates." It 
 need only be added that the '' small plate " target here 
 referred to was constructed in such a manner as to 
 fairly represent the armoured side of a French frigate 
 of the ' Flandre ' class, although the chief interest of 
 the trial consisted in the use of small plates and wood- 
 screw fastenings, instead of the larger plates and 
 through fastenings employed in our ships. 
 
 In the American navy what is known as " laminated" 
 armour has been almost universally adopted, the pro- 
 
38 A rmoiir of the h'-on- Clads. Chap. 1 1 . 
 
 tecting material being made up of several thicknesses. 
 This plan was at first necessitated by the fact that thick 
 armour-plates could not be produced in anything like 
 the required quantity by the ironworks in the country. 
 A few ships have been constructed with solid armour, 
 the greatest thickness being carried by the ' Roanoke,' 
 which has 5 J-inch plates ; and the other vessels having, 
 for the most part, 4^-inch armour. With the exception 
 of these three or four vessels, the American iron-clads 
 have laminated armour, which the trials made at Shoe- 
 buryness prove most conclusively to be far inferior in 
 its powers of resistance to solid armour of the same 
 thickness. Nearly all the monitors have their armour 
 made up of several thicknesses of 1-inch plate, backed in 
 some cases by what are termed " armour stringers," or 
 plank armour of very small breadth and of moderate 
 thickness. Even when thus strengthened, however, 
 laminated armour is not to be compared with solid 
 plates. In January, 1862, the Iron Plate Committee 
 carried out some experiments against ta,rgets constructed 
 on the laminated princij)le by Mr. Hawkshaw, and the 
 results will be found in Captain Noble's very able 
 Report.* Only a few experiments were made, so that 
 no exact estimate of the relative strengths of solid and 
 laminated armour can be based upon them,- but, as 
 Captain Noble observes, they show "that laminated 
 " armour is considerably weaker than solid armour," 
 and that " a 4-inch solid plate would have effectually 
 " stopped all the projectiles, whereas they easily pene- 
 " trated 6 inches of laminated plates." It is interesting 
 
 See page 25 of the lieport. 
 
Chap. II. Armo^ir of the Iron-Clads. 39 
 
 to observe that the law of the resistance of single 
 armour-plates varpng as the square of the thickness — 
 which law has been established by direct experiment for 
 thicknesses up to 5^ inches, and is perhaps approximately 
 true for greater thicknesses — is not conformed to in 
 the comparison of solid and laminated armour. For 
 example, a 4-inch solid plate would be sixteen times as 
 strong against penetration as a 1-inch plate, but would 
 not be four times as strong as four 1-inch plates riveted 
 together and forming laminated armour of equal thick- 
 ness with the solid plate, although it would undoubtedly 
 be much stronger than the laminated arrangement. In 
 short the multipHcation of thin plates has a tendency to 
 increase the amount of their proportionate resistance, 
 and it would be most improper to apply the law of the 
 resistance varying as the square of the thickness to 
 the comparison of such an assemblage with a solid 
 plate of equal thickness.* At the same time there is 
 
 * The subject of laminated armour came into prominence also during tlie 
 investigation respecting the " Gibraltar " shields v-hich was conducted in 
 1867-68 by a Special Committee, whose Report has since been presented to 
 Parliament. Captain Xoble's evidence (at p. 35 of the Report) is especially 
 interesting on this point, and he gives some valuable information respecting 
 trials made at Shoeburyness on the relative resistances of 7-inch armour when 
 made up of one plate, or of two or three thicknesses. He states that these 
 resistances to penetration were in the proportions of 61, 57, and 52 ; the solid 
 plate being about one-fourteenth stronc^er than the armour made up of two 
 3i-inch plates, and one-sixth stronger than that made up of three 2i-inch plates. 
 After giving these figures, Captain Xoble remarked that " these results show 
 " that plates thus built up in thick layers, bolted together, afford a very large 
 " amount of resistance to perforation, although they are not quite equal to a 
 " solid plate ;" but drew a marked distinction between this arrangement and the 
 laminated structures, such as the American monitors' armour, in which a 
 number of thin plates are used. There is, no doubt, great justice in these 
 opinions, although Captain Noble's final conclusion respecting the most favour- 
 able application of the plate-upon-plate system still gave the advantage to the 
 solid plate, and made a 13-inch plate equal to three 5-inch plates riveted 
 together. 
 
 In a Paper (published in volume xvii. of the Royal Engineers' ' Professional 
 
40 Armour of the Iron-Clads. Chap. il. 
 
 and can be no question tliat armour-plating is mucla 
 more effective in resisting projectiles when rolled in 
 
 Papers ') on ' Experiments on Iron Armour,' Colonel Inglis has given an inte- 
 resting account of experiments made to determine the relative resistances of solid 
 and built-up armour. I use the term " huilt-up " in contradistinction to " lami- 
 nated," because the targets fired at were formed of two or three thicknesses of 
 5-inch plates, and such structures obviously are not at all comparable with the 
 American laminated armour, in which plates only 1 inch thick are used. 
 From these experiments Colonel Inglis concludes that a solid 10-inch plate is 
 very little, if anything, stronger than 10-inch armour formed by fastening 
 together two 5-inch plates ; and that a solid 15-inch plate, while it proved 
 better than three thicknesses of 5-inch plates against a single blow, is more 
 liable to break up extensively under repeated blows than the built- ap armour. 
 There are several points in connection with these experiments which, in my 
 opinion, render them far from conclusive on the question at issue, but to which 
 I cannot refer at length. One fact, however, may be mentioned as an illustra- 
 tion of this remark, viz., that the 10-inoh plate taken as the representative of 
 solid armour had been pireviously fired at in testing it as a sample, and had 
 also been used as a target for testing Palliser and other projectiles. Colonel 
 Inglis himself says that " there was not clear space left on the plate for more 
 " than three rounds, but where they were planted it was quite uninjured." 
 The opinion here expressed with respect to the condition of the " clear space " 
 left after the tremendous battering which the plate had undergone, is one which 
 I cannot entertain in view of our experience with armour-plates that have been 
 subjected to the fire of heavy guns. It must be stated also that the targets 
 experimented upon were built and fastened in a manner that could not be 
 adopted for the side-armour of ships ; that the bolts connecting the three plates 
 were not aimed at ; and that the trials were made exclusively to determine 
 the relative worth of the two systems of armour-plating as applied to land 
 fortifications. A careful study of these trials, however, still leaves the im- 
 pression that solid armour is stronger than built-up armour, even when such 
 considerable thicknesses as 5-inoh plates are used in the latter. Colonel 
 Jervois, in a paper on ' Coast Defences,' says also that " experiments have shown 
 " that the resistances to penetration of thicli solid plates are not so much greater 
 " than those of an equal thickness made up of several layers of comparatively 
 " thick plates," thus indirectly confirming the opinion expressed above. 
 
 For land fortifications it is more important to economise in cost than in 
 weight of armour : in ship construction this is not so ; and it would obvi- 
 ously be better to apply the solid plates, which give greater protection in 
 proportion to the weight. All this, be it observed, is independent of the 
 consideration that the through fastenings of the layers of plates must be very 
 liable to injury, and that the protection would therefore suffer by the breaking 
 of the fastenings, as was found to be the case in the actual trials both on the 
 Hawkshaw targets and on the " Gibraltar " shields. This hability has, it is 
 true, been since reduced by means of various devices, but these do not entirely 
 remove it, and they could not be so satisfactorily applied on a ship's side as 
 they can in a shield for land fortifications. 
 
Chap. ii. Ar^nour of the Iron-Clads. 41 
 
 solid plates than when made up of several compara- 
 tively tliin plates ; and besides this, it must be remem- 
 bered that the connection of the various layers of 
 thin plates requires the employment of numerous large 
 rivets or bolts, and that the liability to injury from the 
 impact of projectiles is thus greatly increased. The 
 wood backing fitted in the monitors is, in many cases, 
 of great thickness, but it is not nearly so efficient as the 
 backing and girders of our ships ; and the system of 
 armour fastenings adopted is not to be compared with 
 that of our Navy.* 
 
 Keeping these facts in view, I would now invite 
 attention to a short statement of the thicknesses of armour 
 carried by the principal American iron-clads, excluding 
 from consideration the few ships which have solid 
 armour (to which reference has been made above) and 
 the light-draught vessels built for river service. The 
 original ' Monitor ' had her hull protected by five layers 
 of 1-inch plate, diminishing first to 4 inches and then 
 to 3 inches in thickness below the water. The wood 
 backing was 27 inches thick, and was bolted to -|-iuch 
 iron plating forming the skin of the ship. The next 
 vessels built — the ' Passaic ' class — have armour of the 
 same thickness as the first ' Monitor,' but have 39 inches 
 of wood backing. The ' Canonicus ' class have the five 
 layers of 1-inch plates supported by two " armour 
 stringers" let into 27-inch wood backing, in the neigh- 
 bourhood of the water-line, the intention being to 
 increase the strength of this part of the side. How 
 
 * Full particulars of the various systems of armour fastenings proposed and 
 adopted, as well as detailed information concerning the practical processes of 
 preparing and fixing armour-plates on the sides of ships, will be found in 
 chap. xxi. of my work on ' Shipbuilding in Iron and Steel.' 
 
4^ A^-monr of the L'on-Clads. Chap. II. 
 
 small the increase must be will appear wiien it is stated 
 tliat these stringers are only narrow planks of iron 
 6 J inches broad, and, for the most part, 4 inches thick ; 
 tliat they are totally unconnected with each other, and 
 that the additional protection thus afforded extends in all 
 over a breadth of 1 5 inches only. The ' Minatonomoh ' 
 and the ' Monadnock,' which are the best-known vessels 
 of this class, owiug to their ocean voyages in the Atlantic 
 and Pacific, appear from American authorities to be pro- 
 tected in nearly the same manner as the ' Canonicus,' but 
 they are wood-built. The ' Puritan ' and the ' Dictator ' 
 have six layers of 1-inch plates on their sides, with wood 
 backing 42 inches thick, into which three " armour 
 stringers " 5 inches thick are fitted near the water-line, 
 this additional protection extending over a depth of 25 
 inches only. In the ' Kalamazoo ' class the total thick- 
 ness of armour (6 inches) is made up of two layers of 
 3-inch plates, backed by 30 inches of oak, the side in the 
 neighbourhood of the water-line being strengthened by 
 three armour stringers, 8 inches broad, and of equal 
 thickness, which are let into the backing. These 
 stringers are a few inches apart, and the additional pro- 
 tection, including the intervening spaces, extends over 
 a depth of less than 4 feet near the water-line. This is 
 by far the most formidable armour carried by American 
 ships of the monitor type, and is sometimes referred to 
 as representing a protection of 14 inches of iron ; but 
 while it is true that this is the total thickness of armour 
 in some parts, it is also true that in other parts the pro- 
 tection is limited to the two thicknesses of 3-inch plates, 
 and that in no part is the side nearly as strong as it 
 would be when covered with 14 inches of solid iron. 
 
Chap. II. Armotir of the Iron-Clads. 43 
 
 The rapid diminution of the thickness of the armour 
 of the American vessels is a point too frequently lost 
 sight of, because the practical effect of it is to give even 
 the largest and most powerful of the monitors next to 
 no protection below water. If we take the case of the 
 ' Dictator',' for example, we shall find that in this 
 respect she literally bears no comparison with our own 
 vessels. At a distance of 1\ feet below the load water- 
 line, she has but two 1-inch plates to protect her ; and 
 at a distance of 3 feet, but one such plate. In the 
 engravings on the next page I have placed a section 
 of her armour and of the armour of the new English 
 turret-ships ' Thunderer ' and ' Devastation ' side by 
 side. In the ' Kalamazoo ' class, which are the most 
 effectually plated of the . American vessels, the lower 
 edge of the lowest block of iron backing is but 18 
 inches below the water, and at 2 feet 9 inches below 
 water the plating is but 3 inches thick. 
 
 To these remarks on the hull-armour of these vessels 
 it may be proper to add a few on the turret-armour. 
 The first ' Monitor ' had the turret made up of eight 
 thicknefeses of 1-inch plates, and the vessels which 
 succeeded her — the ' Passaic,' ' Canonicus,' and others — 
 had eleven thicknesses. The later ships, such as the 
 'Dictator' and 'Kalamazoo,' have turrets 15 inches 
 thick, made up of an inner drum of four or five 
 layers of 1-inch plates, and an outer drum similarly 
 constructed, and made up of five or six layers of plates, 
 with segments of wrought-iron hoops, 5 inches thick, 
 placed between the two drums. No wood backing or 
 frames are used in the construction of these turrets. 
 
 I have thus thrown together in a brief space the 
 
44 
 
 A^nnoitr of the Iron-Clads. 
 
 Chap. II. 
 
 principal foots connected with the thicknesses of armour 
 cari'ied by the ships of the American, French, and 
 
 Br 
 
 of 
 
 itish navies, and would now pass to an allied topic 
 great importance, viz., the disposition of the armour 
 
Chap. II. Armour of the Iron-Clads. 45 
 
 on the hulls. In our earlier iron-clads the protection is 
 only partial, extending over a portion of the length of 
 the broadside. No better example of this system can 
 be chosen than the ' Warrior.' Her length is 380 
 feet, and the armoured portion is only 213 feet in 
 length, the extremities of the ship being left entirely 
 unprotected. At the ends of the armoured portion, 
 both before and abaft, iron-plated bulkheads are built 
 across the ship, and enclose a central or "box" battery, 
 on the sides of which the armour extends from the 
 upper deck down to a little more than 6 feet below 
 water. By limiting the armour to the middle portion 
 of the ship, the weight to be carried is, of course, con- 
 siderably reduced, and very fine bow and stern lines 
 can be obtained, thus rendering the vessel's speed very 
 high in proportion to her engine-power. Outside the 
 battery, the hold of the ship is divided into numerous 
 watertight compartments, so that, even if the side 
 should be pierced, the safety of the vessel might be 
 ensured. The necessity for this precaution will appear 
 from the consideration that for nearly 170 feet of the 
 length, the side is as penetrable to projectiles as that 
 of an ordinary iron ship ; and even when all caie has 
 been taken to subdivide the extremities, the rudder 
 head and steering apparatus are left entirely unpro- 
 tected. This system of partial protection is also 
 adopted in the ' Black Prince,' ' Defence,' and ' Resist- 
 ance ; ' but the desire to increase the amount of pro- 
 tection led to the introduction into the ' Hector ' and 
 ' Valiant ' of a modification of the ' Warrior's ' disposi- 
 tion of armour. This modification consisted in adding 
 a belt of plating, extending from the upper to the main 
 
46 Arniorir of the Iron-Clads. Chap. II. 
 
 decks, before and abaft the main portion of the broad- 
 side armour, which was arranged similarly to the 
 ' Warrior's.' The main deck, on which the guns arc 
 fought, is thus protected throughout the entire length, 
 but the extremities " between wind-and- water " are 
 quite as unprotected as those of the ' Warrior,' and 
 the hold is divided into numerous watertight spaces as 
 previously described. 
 
 Both these plans of disposing the armour were after- 
 wards considered unsatisfactory, and resort was had in 
 the ' Minotaur ' class, and in the converted ships of the 
 ' Caledonia ' class, to the system which had been intro- 
 duced into the construction of the floating batteries 
 built during the Crimean war, by means of which 
 what is known as " complete protection " is secured. 
 Throughout the length the armour extends from the 
 upper deck down to about 6 feet below the water-line. 
 The same system of protection is followed in all our 
 turret-ships, except the ' Monarch,' and the breastwork 
 monitors ; but the upper decks of these vessels are at 
 a considerably less height above water than those of the 
 frigates. The principal advantages possessed by this 
 disposition of the armour over that of the ' Warrior ' 
 are that the extremities of the ship, and especially the 
 parts near the water-line, are iron-cased, and that the 
 protected guns can be ranged along the length of the 
 broadside instead of being concentrated in a central 
 battery. There are, however, the accompanying disad- 
 vantages of having the bow and stern heavily burdened, 
 and of requiring a great increase in the total weight 
 of armour. For wood-built iron-clads this plan has 
 the additional advantage of protecting the upper works 
 
Chap. II. Armotcr of the Iroii-Clads. 47 
 
 throughout the length from the destructive effects of 
 shells. The French ships are, for the most part, plated 
 in this manner, the principal exceptions being found in 
 vessels designed ^vithin the last four or five years. 
 
 The great development in the power of ordnance, 
 made almost simultaneously with the introduction of 
 armour-plating, led not only to increase in the thickness 
 of armour carried, but to changes in the system of pro- 
 tection, or, in other words, to different modes of dis- 
 posing or arranging the armour. As we have seen, 
 the ' Warrior ' has 4i-inch armour over a limited por- 
 tion of the hull — a "patch" on each side, to use a 
 phrase which the Times once applied with less fairness 
 to more recent vessels. The ' Minotaur ' on the con- 
 trary is completely armoured from stem to stern, and 
 was made 20 feet longer than the ' Warrior ' for the 
 purpose of accomplishing this result, and retaining a 
 fine form. The system introduced by myself, first in 
 the small sloop 'Enterprise,' and subsequently in the 
 ' Bellerophon,' ' Hercules,' and other large ships, con- 
 sists in completing the ship's armour in the region of 
 the water-line, but not in wake of the gun-deck. In 
 fact, this system, as far as arrangement of armour is 
 concerned, consists in taking a middle course between 
 the 'Warrior' and 'Minotaur.' Add a deep water- 
 line belt to the ' Warrior,' and you have the more 
 recent arrangement ; or take away the gun-deck armour 
 of the ' Minotaur ' at the ends of the ship, and you 
 have the same thing. After the conversion of the 
 ' Enterprise ' was ordered, each of these measures was 
 actually taken with ships of the classes named. The 
 ' Achilles,' a ship of the ' Warrior' class, had the water- 
 
48 Armour of the Iron-Clads. Chap. 1 1. 
 
 line belt added; and tile 'Northumberland,' a ship of 
 the ' Minotaur ' class, had the gun-deck armour omitted 
 from the ends. The new plan is known as the 
 " central battery and armour belt system," the pro- 
 tected guns being placed in a battery, like the ' War- 
 rior's,' of which the fore and after ends are shut in by 
 armoured bulkheads built across the ship. By this 
 arrangement the great weight of the armour and 
 armament of the battery are in the middle of the 
 length, and the extremities of the ship are not over- 
 loaded with an immense weight of iron as in the 
 ' Minotaur.' The armour belt extends from a few feet 
 below water up to a moderate height above, usually 
 ending at a deck of which the beams are covered with 
 stout iron plating, by means of which the parts of the 
 vessel before and abaft the battery are protected against 
 the effects of dropping or oblique fire. The belt serves 
 not only as a protection to the most vital parts of the 
 ship but also as a shield to the rudder-head and 
 steering apparatus ; and the plan is obviously extremely 
 favourable to the use of larger guns and thicker 
 armour than are usual, as it favours the contraction and 
 concentration of the armour and armament without 
 exposing the vital parts of the ship. 
 
 Compared with the 'Warrior's' or the 'Minotaur's' 
 disposition of armour, the new plan has advantages that 
 cannot fail to have struck the reader, but which it may 
 not be amiss to briefly summarise : — At the bow and 
 stern, the ' Warrior ' is so readily penetrable as to 
 render it certain that the water would find its way in- 
 board ; and though the ship's safety might be ensured, 
 or at the least prolonged, by the watertight compart- 
 
Chap. II. Armmi-r of the Iron-Clads. 49 
 
 monts, yet it will not be doubted that a veiy serious 
 reduction in speed would ensue, and tbat it would be 
 better, if possible, to prevent penetration altogether. 
 The armour belt does this, and by also protecting the 
 steering apparatus supplies an important feature which 
 is entirely wanting in the ' Warrior.' If the new plan 
 is compared with the system of complete protection, 
 exemplified in the ' Minotaur,' it will appear that 
 the former admits of a much greater thickness of 
 armour being carried by ships of moderate dimensions 
 than the latter. It must, of course, be obvious that 
 completely armoured ships can carry a larger number 
 of protected guns than ships with partial plating ; but 
 this is of comparati"\'e]y little moment, as the tendency 
 in modern war ships is to increase the size and diminish 
 the number of the guns. Xo more striking example of 
 this can be found than in the ' Minotaur,' which was 
 intended to carry 20 guns a side on the main deck and 
 carries II only, the weight of the guns carried having 
 been increased from 100-pounders to 6|-ton and 12^ton 
 guns. With a central battery of moderate length it is, 
 therefore, possible to carry as large a number of heavy 
 guns as is thought desirable, or at . least as many as 
 would give far greater offensive power than numerous 
 light guns ; and the range of training of these large 
 guns can be made as great as, or greater than, that of 
 the guns in a completely protected ship. The manner 
 in which this result is attained will be described in 
 another chapter, but it may be stated here that in the 
 ' Bellerophon,' ' Hercules,' and other ships, there are 
 also protected batteries at the extremities in which 
 bow and stern chasers are placed, the lengths of these 
 
 E 
 
50 Arniojir of the Iron-Clads. Chap. II. 
 
 batteries being comparatively small, and the weight of 
 protecti]ig armour not so considerable as to heavily 
 burden the extremities. 
 
 An important alteration has been made in the dis- 
 position of the armour in the ' Invincible ' class, the 
 plating being continued up to such a height above 
 the upper deck for a portion of the length amidships as 
 to protect four heavy guns mounted at the angles of 
 an octagonal battery, of which the ends are enclosed 
 by transverse iron-plated bulkheads. These guns can 
 be fired in the line of the keel as well as on the broad- 
 side, and as they are at such a considerable height 
 above water, could be fought in weather when the 
 ports of the main-deck battery could not be opened. 
 Previously to the design of these vessels, the ' Lord 
 Warden' and 'Lord Clyde' had been supplied with 
 powerful armoured bow batteries on the upper deck, but 
 the later arrangement has many advantages. 
 
 In their recent ships, the French have given up the 
 system of complete protection, and have adopted 
 the central battery and armour belt. They adopted 
 the same arrangement, however, much earlier in the 
 two-decked iron-clads, ' Magenta ' and ' Solferino/ 
 although their frigates are mostly armoured through- 
 out the length. In their latest ships of the ' Marengo ' 
 class, the arrangements are of a very similar character 
 to those of the ' Invincible ' class in our own N'avy, 
 there being protected batteries amidships on both the 
 main and upper decks, the latter commanding an en- 
 larged horizontal range of fire. 
 
 But few remarks are needed with respect to the 
 arrangement of the armour on American ships. Their 
 
Chap. II. ArniOTir of the Iron-Clads. 51 
 
 broadside frigate, the ' New Ironsides,' was only par- 
 tially protected, and the monitors are, of course, pro- 
 tected throughout the length from the upper deck down 
 to a few feet (usually about 4 feet) below water. The 
 small amount of free-board, or height out of water, in 
 these vessels reduces the area of the armoured surface 
 of the target presented by the ship's side, and lessens 
 the weight of armour required. A further reduction 
 in weight is effected, as before explained, by ending 
 some of the layers of plating at a very small dis- 
 tance below water ; but this obviously greatly re- 
 duces the resisting power of the side, as the example 
 of the ' Dictator ' clearly shows. This is a most 
 important point in connection with the protection of 
 the monitor class ; and another feature deserving 
 special notice is the necessity which exists of adding 
 very greatly to the weight and thickness of the iron 
 upper deck in order to preA'ent penetration by depressed 
 fire, a danger to which these vessels are peculiarly 
 hable on account of their small height out of w^ater. 
 This is a point much neglected by amateur advocates 
 of turret-ships with extremely low free-board, but one 
 which is really of vital importance, and which has been 
 so recognised by Mr. Ericsson and other American con- 
 structors ; while in our own Navy we have an example 
 of the high estimation in which the Admiralty hold 
 this matter in the monitors which they are now build- 
 ing, and which have iron upper decks 2, 2^, and 3 
 inches thick. The area of this deck in the ' Grlatton,' 
 for example, is 11,348 square feet; the total weight of 
 3-inch plating for such an area of deck is about 608 tons, 
 a weight sufficient to increase the free-board of such a 
 
 E 2 
 
52 Annoiir of the Iron-dads. Chap. II. 
 
 ship by 7 feet, even if tlic whole additional height of 
 side were plated, say, with 9-iuch armour. These facts 
 cainiot fail to bring home to the reader's mind the 
 importance attaching to the proper protection of the 
 decks of ships of the monitor type, and to show that 
 the total weight of armour required in these vessels 
 is not so much less than that in broadside ships of 
 the same principal dimensions, but having a greater 
 height of free-board and thinner upper deck, as many 
 persons suppose. The fact is that with a low free- 
 board you are at liberty to apply to the protection of 
 the deck the armour which, if applied on the broadside, 
 would leave the deck still exposed, thus either rendering 
 further armour necessary or exposing the ship to de- 
 pressed and vertical fire. It is in this that the real 
 economy of armour in ships of low free-board lies. 
 
 Before concluding this chapter, I desire to make a 
 few remarks respecting the arrangement of the armour 
 on the so-called " breastwork monitors," designed 
 within the last two or three years at the Admiralty. 
 These ships resemble American monitors in having 
 their upper decks at a comparatively small height 
 above water ; but instead of having those decks flush, 
 except where the turrets, the funnels, air-shafts, and 
 casings to hatchways rise above the deck-height, they 
 have a space amidships, enclosed by an armoured 
 breastwork, which rises several feet above the deck, in 
 which space the turrets, funnels, air-shafts, and prin- 
 cipal hatchways are situated. By this means the 
 actual height of free-board is increased considerably 
 for a large portion of the length ; the height of 
 the turret ports above water is made much greater 
 
Chap. II. Arnwiir of the Iron-Clads. -^^i 
 
 than is usual in the American monitors ; the habihty 
 to serious injury, resulting from the perforation of 
 the deck, funnels, &c., is much reduced ; and other 
 advantages are gained, to which I shall refer more 
 particularly in the chapter on turret-ships. For the 
 present I desire to deal only with the comparative 
 powers of carrying armour possessed by ships built 
 on the American and English systems, and for this 
 purpose a brief statement will suffice. 
 
 Supposing two ships to be built having tlie same 
 height of upper deck above water, and the same thick- 
 ness and weight of side armour, the question arise.> 
 whether it would be better to protect the lower parts of 
 the turrets, the funnels, and the air-shalts, as well as all 
 the openings in the deck, by separate patches of armour, 
 or to have an enclosing breastwork, which would pro- 
 tect all those parts. It will be obvious that, if the 
 former plan were adopted, the deck would have to be 
 completely plated over with strong iron, while the 
 latter plan would render it unnecessary for the large 
 space enclosed by the breastwork to be so stronglv 
 protected. This gives a considerable advantage to the 
 breastwork monitor, and one which would be little, if 
 at all, diminished by the difference in Aveight belween 
 the armour on the breastwork and the armour I'equired 
 for protecting separately the various parts enumerated 
 above. For instance, in a ship with two turrets, the 
 weight of armour on the lower parts of tlie turrets, 
 the funnel, and the air-shafts — all of which must be 
 plated for a considerable height above tlie low deck, 
 in order to prevent penetration and the consequent 
 entry of water into the interior of the ship —together 
 
54 Armour of the Iron-Clads. Chap. II. 
 
 with that protecting the hatchways, woiild not fall 
 below the weight of armour on a breastwork surround- 
 ing the bases of all these parts. 
 
 The breastwork system compares still more favourably 
 with that employed in the 'Prince Albert,' 'Captain,' 
 and other turret-ships, in which a height of free-board 
 of 7 or 8 feet has been adopted, in order to raise the turret 
 guns a considerable height out of water. In these 
 vessels the hulls are armoured throughout the length 
 up to the height of the upper-deck beams ; but by 
 adopting the breastwork and low free-board, the turret 
 guns can be carried at as great a height above water as 
 in ships with a greater height of ujoper deck above water, 
 or even higher, and the total surface to be armoured is 
 diminished. It is possible, therefore, either to carry a 
 greater thickness of armour on certain dimensions on 
 a breastwork turret-ship than can be carried by a turret- 
 ship of the ' Captain ' type, or to carry as thick armour 
 on a breastwork ship of smaller dimensions. 
 
 In order to render the preceding descriptions still 
 clearer, I have given in the accompanying engravings 
 illustrations of the various methods of disposing the 
 armour upon the hulls of our iron-clads. In each case 
 the darkened part represents the armoured portion of, 
 the ship, and the lower dotted lines indicate the posi- 
 tions of the lower edge of armour. It is only necessary 
 to add that the ' Cerberus ' is taken as the type of 
 breastwork monitors ; and that it has been considered 
 unnecessary to give a sketch of a completely protected 
 ship, as by omitting the upper-deck bow battery of the 
 ' Lord Clyde ' the reader will have a representation of 
 that arrangement. 
 
Chap. II. Armour of the Iron-Clads. (5 
 
 H/yiR/i/O/f 
 
 ACM/LLES 
 
 LORD CLYD£ 
 
 HERCULES 
 
 MV/A/C/BLE 
 
 CERBERUS 
 
 '*Hi"';-.-.'i-^B 
 
 MO AT ARCH 
 
56 Armament of the 1 7'on-Clads. Chap. ill. 
 
 CHAPTEE in. 
 
 ARMAMENT OP THE IRON-CLADS. 
 
 The powers of offence of our iron-clad ships have 
 grown simultaneously with their powers of defence, 
 and in the preceding remarks on the thicknesses and 
 arrangement of armour-plating I have of necessity 
 alluded, more than once, to the progress made in naval 
 ordnance within the last few years. A very few 
 remarks on the armament of these vessels will, there- 
 fore, suffice to complete the reader's information on the 
 subject. 
 
 The offensive powers of a war ship are principally 
 measured by the number and power of her guns, and 
 by the training which those guns command; while in 
 iron-clad ships protected guns are those which must be 
 chiefly considered. The wooden line-of-battle ships 
 and frigates of which the strength of our navy con- 
 sisted previously to the building of the ' Warrior ' 
 were armed with 68-pounders weighing 95 cwt., 8-inch 
 guns weighing G5 cwt., and 32-pounders of which the 
 heaviest weighed 58 cwt. and others only 42 cwt. 
 The 68-pounders were usually mounted as pivot-guns, 
 and the 65-cwt. guns were the heaviest mounted on 
 the broadside, while the bulk of the armament was 
 formed of 32-pounders. These guns, being distributed 
 along the broadside and arranged as bow and stern 
 chasers, commanded the whole sweep of the horizon ; 
 
Chap. III. Armament of the Iron-Clads. 57 
 
 and, as previously remarked, in some cases great sacri- 
 fices were made to accomplish this result. A great ad- 
 vance was made upon the weight of the broadside guns 
 carried by the ' Warrior,' her armament consisting, 
 at first, entirely of 68-pounders. The original intention 
 was to have thirty-six of these guns, two being mounted 
 as pivot-guns on the upper deck, and twenty of the 
 remainder being placed in the protected battery on the 
 main deck. These twenty guns constituted the real 
 strength of the ship, considered as an iron-clad, as the 
 sixteen carried outside the battery were CA^en more liable 
 to injury than they would have been in a wooden ship ; 
 but the arcs of training of the protected guns were 
 extremely limited (only extending about 25 or 30 degrees 
 before and abaft a transverse line), and there was, con- 
 sequently, an entire want of command over by far the 
 greater part of the circle of training, and of direct 
 ahead or astern fire. Similar remarks apply to the 
 protected guns of the ' Black Prince,' ' Defence,' and 
 ' Resistance.' In the vessels of the ' Minotaur ' class, 
 provision was, however, made for bow and stern fire; 
 a transverse armoured bulkhead was built across the 
 ship at about 25 feet from the bow, and the chase guns 
 were fought behind the bulkhead upon the upper deck. 
 I need not trace the various steps by which the 
 advance has been made in the power, weight, and 
 training of our naval guns, or describe the many and 
 ingenious contrivances that have been introduced by 
 Captain Scott and others into the mounting and 
 working of heavy guns. Suffice it to say that, instead 
 of the 68-pounders of the ' Warrior's ' original arma- 
 ment which failed to penetrate the 'Warrior' target 
 
58 Ai-mavient of the Iron-Clads. Chap. III. 
 
 at 200 yards' range, we now have 6i-ton guns that 
 would pierce the ' Warrior's ' side at 500 yards, 
 12-ton guns that would do the same at 2000 yards, 
 .and 25-ton guns that would probably penetrate any 
 iron-clad afloat, before the construction of the 'Her- 
 cules,' at a range of 4000 yards, while 30-ton guns 
 will be carried by the 'Thunderer' and 'Devastation.' 
 The armaments of the earlier iron-clads have, of 
 course, been changed as heavier guns have been intro- 
 duced, and as a representative case we may take that 
 of the ' Minotaur,' which has been previously alluded 
 to. This vessel was designed to carry fifty compara- 
 tively light Armstrong guns, forty of which were to be 
 placed in the main-deck battery, two to be used as pro- 
 tected bow-chasers, and eight to be unprotected on the 
 upper deck. As now arranged, her armament consists 
 of four 12-ton and eighteen 6J-ton guns in the battery, 
 and of four 6i-ton guns on the upper deck, two of 
 which are protected by an armoured bulkhead. The 
 number of guns (exclusive of boat and field guns, 
 &c.) now carried is, therefore, only one-half of that at 
 first intended ; but as their power is so much increased, 
 the wisdom of the change is too apparent to need any 
 comment.* 
 
 * In referring to this subject at the Royal United Service Institution in 
 1863, Captain Scott made the following interesting remarks: — " The size of 
 "the gun is of vast importance, more than is generally assigned to it, and for 
 " this reason — 20 guns, each a 1-pounder, are fired at a target of iron I3 in. 
 " thick, and produce no effect ; one gun, a 20-pounder, is fired and smashes it, 
 " the velocity in both cases being equal ; in both oases the same amount 
 " of metal is used ; and on this principle an ofBcial record of experiments at 
 "Portsmouth states that one 68-pounder produced more destruction than five 
 " 32-pounders. Arguing from this, it appears that one 150-pounder is more 
 "effective than ten 68- pounders, one 330-pounder is equal to seven 150- 
 " pounders, and a bi'oadside of three 330-pounders is more destructive than 
 
Chap. III. Armavtent of the Iron-Clads. 59 
 
 While, in ships already built, the substitution has 
 been made of a moderate number of heavy guns 
 capable of piercing the sides of most iron-clads, for a 
 considerable number of lighter guns which would be 
 virtually powerless against the greater number of 
 armoured vessels, it has naturally formed part of the 
 design of later ships to make provision for fewer but much 
 heavier guns. For example, the ' Bellerophon ' carries 
 ten 12-ton guns in her central battery, and three 6^-ton 
 guns on other parts of the main deck (two of the latter 
 being in an armoured bow battery), besides two more %\- 
 ton guns on the upper deck ; and the 'Hercules' has eight 
 18-ton guns in the central battery, two 12 -ton guns in 
 protected batteries at the bow and stern, and four 6|-ton 
 guns on the upper deck, the latter being unprotected. 
 These 18-ton guns, throwing projectiles of 400 lbs. 
 weight, are the most powerful yet mounted on the 
 broadside, but the arrangements for working them 
 were so complete as to leave no doubt of their suc- 
 cessful management — an anticipation which has been 
 fully realised in the trials since made at sea. The arma- 
 ments of the turrets of the 'Monarch,' 'Captain,' and 
 ' Glatton,' are to consist of 25-ton guns throwing 600-lb. 
 shot, and the monitors ' Thunderer ' and ' Devastation,' 
 designed this year (1869), are, as I have said, to have 
 30-ton guns. Judged simply by the projectiles, the 
 progress made in naval ordnance must seem enormous 
 
 "10^ Warriors." In this last statement the 'Warrior's' hroadside is taken 
 at twenty 68-poiinders. Captain Scott also gives a table based on this 
 principle, which will be found in the Journal of the Institution for 1863. 
 Without considering these deductions to be exact, we may take them as the 
 result of the attempts made by an experienced officer to infer from actual 
 experiment what the comparative value of different guns would probably be. 
 
6o 
 
 Armament of the Iron-Clads. <-'hav. III. 
 
 when the 68 -lb. cast-iron spherical shot of the 
 'Warrior's' guns is compared with the elongated, 
 
 OR/C//VAI. /i/?M/iMr/vr or /rom-cl/ids (68p^ sscwtcu/v) 
 
 CHARCC IG LBS 
 
 BeLLCffOPHOA/'s /I /7AM Mj^A/T ( SSO PB ISTONCUn) 
 
 CHARCE A3 LBS 
 
 H£RCULeS AffMAA7£Nr 
 
 (400 PS /eroA/ ct//v) 
 
 CHARGE GO LB^ 
 
 mo/varch's apa/!AM£:ajt feoop/i 2STorjcuAi) 
 
 C//ARCE 70 LBS 
 
 THUfilDeREp's /tRMAMCA/T ^600 Pf> 30 TON CUAIj 
 
 Cf/APCe /OO LB! 
 
Chap. III. Armament of the Iron-Clads. 
 
 61 
 
 steel or chilled-iron projectiles now used, wliich for 
 tiie 'Belleroplion's' guns weigh 250 lbs., for those of 
 the ' Hercules ' 400 lbs., and for the turret-ships' guns 
 GOO lbs. ; and when we add to this the substitution of 
 rifled ordnance for smooth-bore, the advancement made 
 in the last few years seems still more striking. The 
 effects produced by these enormous shot, propelled by 
 heavy charges of powder, we should naturally expect, 
 would be out of all comparison with those produced by 
 the old ordnance ; and in order to present the reader 
 with the means of partially comparing the powers of 
 our present guns and those of the guns carried by our 
 wooden fleet and our earliest iron-clads, the accom- 
 panying engravings and table are given * : — 
 
 Description of Gun. 
 
 Weight of 
 
 Initial 
 Velocity 
 
 with 
 Highest 
 
 Charge. 
 
 " Energy *' per inch 
 of Shot's Circumference 
 
 Total 
 " Energy " 
 of Projectile 
 
 at 
 1000 Yards. 
 
 Gun. 
 
 Pro- i Highest 
 Jectile. 1 Charge. 
 
 At 
 Muzzle. 
 
 At 
 1000 Yards. 
 
 Cast-iron, smooth-bore: — 
 32-pounder . . 
 
 8-inch (shell gun) 
 68-pounder . . 
 
 Wrought - iron, muzzle - 
 loading rifled : — 
 
 7-inch 
 
 8-iuch 
 
 9-inch 
 
 10-inch 
 
 12-inch 
 
 12-inch 
 
 Tons. Cwts. 
 
 2 18 
 
 3 5 
 
 4 15 
 
 6 10 
 9 
 12 
 18 
 25 
 30 19 
 
 lbs. 
 
 32 
 
 49| 
 
 68 
 
 115 
 
 180 
 250 
 400 
 600 
 600 
 
 lbs. 
 
 10 
 10 
 16 
 
 22 
 30. 
 43 
 60 
 70 
 100 
 
 Feet. 
 
 1690 
 1488 
 1.579 
 
 1430 
 1330 
 1340 
 1290 
 1212 
 
 Foot- tons. 
 46 
 
 75 
 ■88 
 111 
 148 
 163 
 
 Foot-tons. 
 18 
 
 52 
 
 66 
 
 85 
 
 123 
 
 137 
 
 Foot^tons. 
 452 
 
 1143 
 
 16,ra 
 2403 
 3863 
 5165 
 
 I would chiefly direct the reader's attention to the 
 three columns on the right-hand side of the table, as 
 they afford the best means of comparing the relative 
 powers of the guns. Without entering into an expla- 
 
 * As the 30-ton gun has been only recently adopted, and has not yet been 
 tried, I am unable to give the particulars of the initial velocity, &c. 
 
62 Arnianicnt of the Iron-Clads. Chap. III. 
 
 nation of the dynamical expression "energy" here 
 emj^loyed, it will be sufficient to state that the columns 
 headed " ' Energy ' per inch of Shot's Circumference," 
 represent what may Le termed the "^ punching " powers 
 of the guns, i.e., their power to force their projectiles 
 through an armour-plate and its backing ; while the 
 " total energy " tabulated represents the real amount of 
 power stored in each shot, and which can be expended on 
 a target. Before passing to the consideration of these 
 figures, it is necessary to remark that I have only given 
 them for the 68-pounder among the smooth-bore guns, 
 as that is the only case in which the penetrating power 
 is at all worth notice. Taking first the punching 
 power of the shot when it leaves the muzzle, it ap- 
 pears that the 25-ton gun is about 3^ times, the 
 18-ton gun more than 3 times, the 9-ton gun nearly 
 twice, and the 6^-ton gun more than 1^ time as power- 
 ful as the 68-pounder. These are noteworthy facts ; but 
 at the 1000 yards' range the proportionate powers 
 of the rifled guns are greatly increased. For example, 
 the 25-ton gun rises from 3^ times to more than 
 7^ times, and the 18-ton gun from 3 times to nearly 
 7 times the power of the 68-pounder ; and similar 
 remarks apply to the other rifled guns. The total 
 energy of the largest rifled guns, of course, increases 
 even more rapidly than the punching or penetrating 
 power per inch of circumference ; and at the 1000 
 yards' range we see from the last column that the 
 25-ton gun is more than 11 times, the 18-ton gun 
 about 8i times, and the 12-ton gun more than 5 times 
 as powerful as the 68-pounder 8-inch gun. The main- 
 tenance, at long ranges, of the penetrating power of 
 
Chap. III. Armament of the Iron-Clads. 6^ 
 
 heavy projectiles from rifled ordnance is a matter 
 of the highest interest and importance. I cannot, 
 however, dwell upon it now. but leave the reader to 
 study at his leisure the preceding table. The more 
 fully he grasps the facts there stated the higher will 
 become his appreciation of the immense advances 
 made in the power of the annaments of our iron- 
 clads. 
 
 Our neighbours, the French, have made considerable 
 progress in the same direction, having to a great extent 
 exchanged the 55-pounder smooth-bore guns that at 
 first formed the bulk of their armaments for 5-ton 
 and 7^-ton rifled guns, while some of the larger and 
 later vessels carry ISf-ton and 21|-ton rifled guns. It 
 is of course difficult to compare these guns with those 
 carried by our own ships, but according- to the best 
 information at present made public, the 2l3-ton French 
 gun is about equal to our 18-ton gun, the 13f-ton 
 French to our 12-ton gun, and the T^-ton French to 
 our 6^ton gun. The calibres of the three French guns 
 are about 10|, 9^, and 7^ inches respectively, and 
 they are all breech-loaders. A writer in the Revue 
 Mcderne for December, 1868, who is evidently well 
 informed, criticises these guns most unfavourably, 
 stating that the breech arrangements are by no means 
 satisfactory, and that under the most favourable circum- 
 stances the heaviest guns could not be fired at a greater 
 rate than once in two minutes, while the English heavy 
 guns can be fired three or four times during that 
 interval. According to this authority our 9-inch 12-ton 
 gun is more powerful than the heaviest French gun, and 
 this he attributes to bad powder and to the improper 
 
64 Armament of the Iron-Clads. Chap. III. 
 
 construction of their guns, by which the initial velocities 
 obtained do not much exceed three-fourths those ob- 
 tained with our guns. His conclusion, with respect to 
 the relative merits of the guns of the two navies is 
 given in the sentence : — " It must then be confessed, 
 " whatever it may cost us, that in an engagement 
 " where the artillery would be called upon to play a 
 " decisive part, a French squadron would be almost 
 " powerless against an English squadron of similar 
 " force." Without professing to regard this verdict as 
 conclusive, I think there can be little doubt that our 
 artillery is, at present, much superior to the French^ 
 and that the system of muzzle-loading for heavy guns 
 has hitherto proved far better than that of breech- 
 loading.* 
 
 The Americans, as is well known, have followed a 
 different system in the development of their naval guns, 
 preferring to have a heavy projectile of large size with 
 a comparatively low velocity, instead of an elongated 
 projectile of less weight moving at a high velocity. 
 The American system has been well termed the " rack- 
 ing" or "battering" system, in opposition to our own 
 method, which is known as the " punching " system. In 
 carrying out their plan, the Americans have adopted 
 guns of 9, 11, 13, 15, and even 20-inch calibre, and 
 guns of 25-inch calibre and upwards are said to be 
 
 * The Ordnance Select Committee reported in 18G3 that " the preponderance 
 " of opinion seems to be against any breech-loading system for the larger 
 " guns." In chapter vi. of Mr. Holley's work on ' Ordnance and Armour ' 
 (London : Triibncr and Co., 1865) will be found full descriptions of the 
 merits and demerits of the various systems of breech-loaders proposed, and 
 accounts of the trials made with various guns. A study of these facts will, 
 I think, convince the reader of the wisdom of the policy of having made our 
 heavy guns muzzle-loaders, at any rate, up to the present time. 
 
Chap. III. Arma^ncnt of the Iron-Clads. 6j 
 
 contemplated. These large guns are almost without 
 exception of cast iron, and nearly all are smooth-bores 
 throwing cast-iron spherical shot. The 15-inch gun has 
 been adopted for the turret-armaments of most of the 
 monitors, but a few ships have 20-inch guns. The 
 15-inch guns throw a shot of about 450 lbs., with a 
 charge of 60 lbs. of their cannon powder •,* the 20-inch 
 guns throw a shot of about 1080 lbs., with a charge of 
 from 120 to 200 lbs. of their powder. G-reat differences 
 of opinion prevail with respect to the comparative 
 merits of our own and American guns. This we should 
 naturally anticipate, but a few facts drawn from the 
 trials made at Shoeburyness will serve to give a more 
 definite view of the subject. In his admirable Report 
 " On the Penetration of Armour-Plates by Steel Shot," 
 Captain Xoble shows that the American 15-inch gun, 
 charged with 50 lbs. of our powder, and throwing a 
 spherical steel shot weighing 4S4 }h<., would fail to 
 penetrate the ' Lord Warden's ' side at any range ; while 
 our 9-inch 12-ton gun, with a -IS-lb. charge, would send 
 its 250-lb. shot through her at a range of 1000 yards. 
 He also states that the 1 5-inch gun would not penetrate 
 the ' Warrior ' beyond a distance of 500 yards, while 
 our 7-incb 6^ton gims (weighing about one-third as 
 much as the 15-inch gun) would do the same with a 
 charge of 22 lbs. of powder and a 115-lb. shot ; and the 
 12-ton gun would penetrate up to 2000 yards. It must 
 be remembered that, instead of the steel shot here 
 supposed to be used with the 15-inch gun, cast-iron shot 
 are really employed by the Americans ; and this tends 
 
 This is about equal to 50 lbs. of English powcbjr. 
 
66 Armament of the I ron-Clads. Chap. ill. 
 
 to iu creased superiority in our guns as respects pene- 
 trating power. There can be little or no doubt that the 
 American guns have greater battering power ; the real 
 question at issue is, as before stated, the relative merits 
 of penetration, and racking or battering. "We think, 
 with the French, that the former is to be preferred ; the 
 Americans have preferred the latter. Experience can 
 scarcely be summoned to settle this difference of opinion 
 in favour of the latter plan, for even if the Americans 
 could show that their system was most successful in the 
 engagements of the Civil War (which I am by no means 
 prepared to admit they can do), it would still remain a 
 fact that no comparison could be drawn between the 
 improvised, hastily constructed, and ill-armoured ships 
 which the Confederates produced and the well-built and 
 carefully armoured and fastened ships of European 
 navies. It would not have been surprising to find the 
 armour and backing torn away bodily from the sides of 
 many Confederate ships by the impact of heavy shot ; 
 the wonder is rather that, instead of this taking place, 
 these very weak ships in some cases withstood a heavy 
 fire without receiving any serious injury to their hulls. 
 The advocates of the American system have laid 
 more stress, perhaps, upon the result of the fight between 
 the monitor ' Weehawken ' and the Confederate case- 
 mated ship ' Atalanta ' than upon any other event of the 
 war ; and I may, therefore, be pardoned a few additional 
 remarks respecting it. On this occasion the ' Atalanta's ' 
 side was smashed in by a 15-inch shot from the ' Wee- 
 hawken's' gun at a range of about 300 yards, and 
 mainly in consequence of this the ship was surrendered, 
 as she was aground and could not steam away. The 
 
Chap. III. Armament of the Iron-Clads. 67 
 
 protection on the side of this improvised iron-clad has 
 been described as 4i-inch armour, inclined at an angle 
 of 35 degrees to the horizon, and backed by more than 
 2 feet of wood ; the facts, according to reports of 
 American officers, seem to be that the armour consisted 
 of two layers of iron bars, about 6 inches wide, and that 
 the fastenings of these bars, as well as the other details 
 of the construction, were exceptionally weak and im- 
 perfect in consequence of the urgency with which the 
 preparation of the ship had been pushed forward, and 
 of the want of suitable materials in the Confederate 
 dockyards. In short, it is scarcely possible to conceive 
 that the battering system could have been applied 
 against a target better fitted to be shaken to pieces ; 
 and, from the results obtained under these circumstances, 
 it is absurd to attempt to deduce any correct ideas re- 
 specting the effect which this gun would produce against 
 European iron-clads. The results given in Captain 
 Noble's Eeport are so conclusive as to the powers of 
 the 15-inch gun that we are not likely to hear of the 
 fate of the ' Atalanta ' being again used as an indication 
 of what would befall any French or English iron-clad 
 that might be attacked by an American monitor. 
 
 It is not without interest to note that the latest 
 expression of American opinion on this question de- 
 cidedly inclines to the abandonment of their own 
 battering system, and the adoption of rifled guns with 
 a high speed of projectile. In their Eeport, issued on 
 15th February, 1869, the Ordnance Committee appointed 
 by the Congress say : — " To return to smooth-bores 
 " throwing huge spherical masses of iron at low velo- 
 " cities is to disregard all modern progress in the 
 
 P 2 
 
68 Armament of the Iron-Clads. Chap. III. 
 
 " science of gunnery, and to return to the arm in use 
 " two hundred years ago." Such an admission as this, 
 coming from such a body, cannot but be regarded as a 
 proof that, after some years of experience with their 
 own system, the Americans have become convinced of 
 the superiority of the European system. This conclusion 
 in no way detracts, however, from the credit due to the 
 American people for the extraordinary skill and enter- 
 prise which they brought to bear upon the construction 
 of both guns and ships when called upon to suppress 
 the gigantic rebellion of the Southern States by land 
 and sea. 
 
 In concluding these remarks on the armaments of 
 iron-clad ships, I would again refer to the great im- 
 portance of giving large arcs of training to protected 
 guns. The ' Warrior ' is very deficient in this respect ; 
 the ' Minotaur ' is powerful, but this power is obtained 
 in connection with complete protection. Our later 
 ships with central batteries and armour belts have been 
 gradually improved, by cutting ports in the armoured 
 bulkheads at the ends of the batteries, and recessing the 
 sides of some vessels so as to be able to fight guns at a 
 small angle (usually about 15 degrees) with the line of 
 the keel ; while in other ships, as in the ' Bellerophon,' 
 short protected batteries have been formed at the 
 extremities in order to get fore-and-aft fire. In our 
 most powerful broadside ship, the ' Hercules,' these two 
 plans are combined, the foremost and aftermost 18-ton 
 guns on each side of the central battery being capable 
 of firing through recessed ports in the bulkhead, as well 
 as at broadside ports, and a 12-ton gun being carried in 
 each of the batteries at the bow and stern to obtain 
 
Chap. III. Armament of the Iron-C lads. 69 
 
 fore-and-aft fire. By these arrangements every point 
 on the horizon can be commanded by powerful guns 
 sheltered behind armour. The most complete arrange- 
 ment yet made is, however, to be found in the ' Invin- 
 cible ' class, which commands an all-round fire from 
 guns placed in a central protected battery. This is 
 accomplished by means of the four upper-deck battery 
 guns, which can be fought either in a fore-and-aft line 
 or on the broadside, the main strength of the broadside 
 consisting, howevei', of the six guns in the main-deck 
 battery, which have the ordinary broadside training. 
 As previously stated, the French have made similar 
 arrangements, in order to increase the horizontal range 
 of their protected guns ; and the Americans have 
 recognised the importance of this feature of construc- 
 tion by having the deck arrangements of their monitors 
 of such a character as to permit the turret guns to be 
 fired in all, or nearly all, directions. The English 
 turret-ships constructed before the introduction of the 
 breastwork system for monitors accomplish the same 
 object in another way, but with many serious limita- 
 tions, as I shall explain in another chapter ; all the 
 breastwork monitors, however, have a complete com- 
 mand of all points of the horizon with their turret 
 guns. 
 
7° Siructnrc of the Iron-Clads. Chap. IV. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 STRUCTURE OF THE IRON-CLADS. 
 
 A PERUSAL of the preceding chapters will, I think, 
 have convinced the reader that great progress has been 
 made since the construction of the ' Warrior ' in both 
 the armour and the armament of iron-clads ; I propose 
 in this chapter to show that equally great and im- 
 portant progress has been made in the structure of 
 those ships. I shall not deal with the subject from a 
 technical point of view; my object will be rather to 
 show, in as popular language as possible, that the great 
 essentials of strength, combined with lightness, safety, 
 and durabihty, have all been carefully kept in view in 
 the changes made from time to time, and that those 
 changes really constitute improvements — in other 
 words, that our recent ships are much superior in their 
 structural arrangements to those which preceded 
 them. 
 
 It is well known that the adoption of armour-plating 
 was accompanied in this country by the introduction of 
 iron for the construction of the hulls of ships of war, 
 and our iron-clad fleet is for the most part iron-built. 
 There are, as I have previously stated, a considerable 
 number of wood-built iron-clads in our Navy, but most 
 of those vessels are converted ships — such as the 
 ' Caledonia ' class, the 'Royal Sovereign,' the 'Favorite,' 
 ' Research,' and ' Enterprise ' ; while the remainder — 
 
Chap. IV. Structure of the Iro7i-Clads. 71 
 
 such a.s the ' Lord T\^arclen,' ' Lord Clyde,' and • Pallas ' 
 — were built of wood mainlv for the purpose of utilir^ing 
 the large stores of timber that had been accumulated 
 in the dockyards for use in wood shipljiiildiug. "With 
 these exceptions, our iron-clads are iron-built, and 
 there is little, if any, reason to suppose that in the 
 future the numbers of our wood-built iron-clads will be 
 added to, unless it should become necessary, in order to 
 meet the exigencies of a war, to build such ships of 
 material already at hand, or to convert our line-of-battle 
 ships into armoured vessels. The feasibility and pro- 
 priety of converting these ships will be discussed in a 
 future chapter ; for the present I need only state that 
 plans have been prepared for the purpose of carrying 
 out such conversions should the necessity ever arise. 
 
 The non-professional reader may perhaps be surprised 
 to find that, when wood ship building had, through long- 
 years of practice, become so well understood and per- 
 fected, it should suddenly have given place to iron ; but 
 I shall endeavour to show that there were good reasons 
 for the change. It needs no argument to prove that in 
 the construction of all ships, and particularly of iron- 
 clads, one of the chief aims of the naval architect should 
 be the choice of such structural arrangements as will 
 best combine strength with lightness. The dimensions 
 and outside form of a ship determine her displacement, 
 and her capacity to carry weights of course depends 
 largely upon the weight of her hull, as the difference 
 between the total displacement and the weight of hull 
 is the exact measure of her carrying capacity,. No^v 
 in wood ships the hull weighs much more than m iron 
 ships of equal size ; in fact, while in well-built wood ships 
 
7^ Structure of the Iron-Clads. Chap. IV. 
 
 the weight of hull is quite one-half the displacement, in 
 properly constructed iron ships it is now considerably 
 less, and yet the structural strength is much greater. 
 This fact, with others, has led to the rapid development 
 of iron shipbuilding in the mercantile marine, where the 
 saving in weight of hull can be turned into remunera- 
 tive cargo carrying power. In iron-clad ships it is even 
 more important that this saving in weight of hull 
 should be made ; for all weight thus saved can be ap- 
 plied either to increasing the thickness and weight of 
 armour carried, or to decreasing the dimensions of the 
 ship required to carry a certain weight of armour. For 
 instance, an armoured ship having a total displace- 
 ment of 6000 tons will, if she is wood-built, have a hull 
 weighing about 3000 tons, and the weights she can 
 carry will be of about equal amount, whereas, if built of 
 iron, on the system of our recent iron-clads, the hull will 
 only weigh about 2500 or 2600 tons. The difference, 
 400 or 500 tons, can of course be applied to thickening 
 the armour and adding to the armament, if that is con- 
 sidered desirable ; or, if the total weights carried remain 
 the same in the two shij)s, it will allow of the tonnage 
 of the ship being reduced by fully that number of tons. 
 This illustration will, I think, convince the reader that 
 under this aspect the change from wood to iron is 
 highly beneficial, and I shall further on give some 
 examples, taken from actual ships, which will further 
 confirm this view. 
 
 Xor is this all. An almost equally important feature 
 in the comparison of wood and iron hulls for iron-clads 
 has just been alluded to, and now claims a brief notice, 
 viz. the greater strength of iron-built ships. Even in 
 
Chap. IV. S true hire of the Iron-Clads. 73 
 
 a well-built wood sMp-of-war it is found that more or 
 less working takes place when the ship is severely 
 strained by rolling and pitching at sea ; and this 
 working necessarily tends to reduce the structural 
 strength, gradually it is true, but no less certainly. In 
 ordinary iron ships working is practically impossible ; 
 and, Avhen the structural aiTangements are properly 
 made, the only serious cause of loss of strength is to be 
 found in the slow deterioration, in thickness especially, 
 of the various parts. When we pass from unarmoured 
 to armoured ships, the contrast is still more striking, 
 since the causes of straining naturally become developed 
 as the load becomes increased, and the armour, although 
 it forms so large a part of the total weight, has not as 
 yet been made fully available in giving additional 
 structural strength. It is true that a very considerable 
 amount of longitudinal strength is given by the armour ; 
 and that as far as our experience goes, the wood-built iron- 
 clads have not displayed any serious signs of weakness, 
 the reason doubtless being that the weights of armour 
 they carry are not very great. Still the fact remains, 
 that, in order to strengthen a wood ship sufficiently to 
 carry even a moderate weight of armour, very large 
 dimensions have to be adopted for the comj)onent parts 
 of the hull ; and if the weights of armour were made as 
 great as they have been of late in iron ships, the 
 strengthenings required in wood ships would un- 
 doubtedlv become increased in weight to an extent 
 which would make it still more desirable to use iron 
 instead of wood. 
 
 The durability of our costly iron-clads is another 
 most important feature, and in this respect also iron- 
 
74 Structure of the Iron-Clads. Chap. iv. 
 
 built ships are undoubtedly superior to wood. In an 
 iron-built armoured ship the hull proper is made up of 
 a material which is subject only to deterioration by the 
 action of the sea-water outside, and the bilge-water 
 inside, or other causes producing more or less rapid 
 oxidation. If proper precautions are taken to keep 
 the plating well coated with paint, or some other pro- 
 tective material, the deterioration resulting from these 
 causes is very slow indeed, as is proved by our 
 experience during the last twenty-five or thirty years. 
 We may conclude, therefore, that with proper care the 
 hulls of our iron-built iron-clads will remain in an 
 excellent condition for a long period ; and it is worth 
 notice also that the only part liable to decay not at 
 once accessible — the wood backing to armour — is really 
 outside the hull proper, and can, if it should become 
 necessary, be got at and renewed by removing the 
 armour only, the structure of the ship remaining 
 untouched. As far as our experience goes, however 
 (and it now reaches over ten or eleven years), it appears 
 that there is not so much reason to dread the rapid 
 decay of this backing as many persons have supposed. 
 The wood used for the purpose is teak, and the con- 
 ditions under which it is placed are such as to make it 
 probable that it will remain efficient for a very con- 
 siderable time ; while its freedom from acids prevents 
 any gradual wasting of the armour-plates and fas- 
 tenings such as would most probably take place if a 
 wood hke oak were employed.* The wood decks, 
 
 The part of the backing most liable to decay is obviously that near the 
 water-line of the ship, and doubts might reasonably have been entertained 
 respecting the durabiUty of this part, even if the other portions continued 
 
Chap. IV. Struchire of the Iron-Clads. 75 
 
 upper works (when of wood), and internal fittings of 
 these ships, are, of course, as liable to decay as those 
 of wood-built ships, but there is no difficulty in replacing 
 them, and their decay but slightly, if at all, affects the 
 strength of the structure. J^ow turn to a wood-built 
 ship, and what a different state of affairs do we meet ? 
 The materials used in the hull are all hable to more or 
 less rapid decay, and unless, as is very difficult to 
 ensure, the timber used is thoroughly seasoned, the 
 ship may soon be expected to require repairs. There 
 is no occasion to do more than allude to the fact that 
 within the period of service of many wood ships the 
 cost of repairs has far exceeded the original outlay on 
 the construction ; nor should it be forgotten that in the 
 best wood ships there must be some amount of working, 
 and that this tends to increased rapidity in decay and 
 loss of strength, while the parts most liable to decay 
 are just those which can be with the greatest difficulty 
 replaced. Instead of the continued efficiency which 
 with a fair amount of attention can be ensured in an 
 iron hull, we find, then, an unavoidable and certain 
 falling-off in efficiency in a wood hull ; and instead of 
 the comparative ease with which the repairs in the 
 subordinate portions of the former which are liable to 
 decay can be made, we have the difficult and expensive 
 repairs sure to be required in the essential parts of the 
 wood hull ; while even with those repairs, unless the 
 sums expended upon them are very large indeed, 
 
 sound. It has, however, been ascertained by a thorough examination of the 
 backing of some of the floating batteries built during the Crimean war that 
 no decay had taken place at any part after eleven years from the date of 
 launching;. 
 
76 Structure of the h'on-Clads. Chap. IV. 
 
 the wood-l^uilt iron-clad will not last nearly so long 
 as the iron-built ship. 
 
 Taking next the question of safety, the popular im- 
 pression is doubtless in favour of the superiority of 
 wood ships. So much has been said of the dangers 
 of iron ships foundering at sea, or being lost by driving 
 ashore and having the thin bottom plating penetrated, 
 tliat there was at first a very strong feeling expressed 
 against the propriety of embarking our naval forces on 
 ships which were liable to such dangers. It has also 
 been urged that the great comparative thickness of a 
 wood ship's bottom renders her much less liable to loss 
 by striking the ground, and that the fact of wood being 
 of so much less specific gravity than iron gives her a 
 great advantage. There is undoubtedly some truth 
 in these remarks, but nevertheless they do not fairly 
 represent the facts of the case. An ordinary iron 
 ship's bottom is without doubt very thin and liable to 
 ^Denetration by a rock or any other hard substance ; 
 but the danger resulting from penetration is very 
 greatly reduced by the adoption of a proper number of 
 watertight divisions or bulkheads in the ship's hold, 
 while it may be almost got rid of by the cellular 
 bottom, now given to all our iron-clads, which prevents 
 the entrance of water into the hold even when the 
 outer plating is penetrated. Then with respect to 
 the losses of iron ships at sea by breaking down the 
 side, it is only necessary to say that such accidents can 
 only happen to badly built ships, and that all our iron- 
 clads are well-built and specially strengthened. In 
 iron-built iron-clads, also, the liability to loss by fire is 
 practically reduced to a minimum, but this is not, and 
 
Chap. IV. Str7icture of tJie Iron-Clads. 77 
 
 in fact cannot be, the case in wood-biiilt ships ; so that, 
 while not inferior to our wood ships in freedom from 
 danger of foundering, our recent iron ships are on the 
 whole much safer vessels. I must add that, as shown 
 in Chapter II., the structural arrangements of an iron 
 sliip lend themselves much more readily than those 
 of a wood ship to the conversion of the side into an 
 efficient target ; so that in defensive power also the iron 
 ship is superior. 
 
 In lightness combined with strength — and therefore 
 in armour-carrying power — in durability, and in safety, 
 our iron-built iron-clads may therefore be assumed to 
 be superior to our wood-built ships. There were, how- 
 ever, very good reasons for the production of the latter 
 vessels at the time they were built, for by their con- 
 struction we were enabled to add rapidly in our dock- 
 yards to our armoiired fleet ships of equal merit with 
 those building by the French, while the resources of 
 the private shipbuilders of the country were made 
 available for the construction of iron-built ships such 
 as the 'TVarrior' and 'Minotaur.' When the urgent 
 needs of the earlier periods of the reconstruction of our 
 Xavy had thus been met, the Admiralty wisely deter- 
 mined to develope our iron-clad fleet mainly by means 
 of iron-built vessels, the only wood ii'on-clads con- 
 structed having, as I said above, been built for the 
 purpose of utilising some part of the large store of 
 timber in the dockyards. The French, as is well 
 known, have clung to the coustruction of wood ships, 
 only two or three large iron ships having yet been 
 built. This com-se has not, however, been unopposed, 
 manv advocates of iron for the hulls having urged the 
 
78 Structure of the Iron-Clads. Chap. I v. 
 
 adoption of a course similar to that followed in our 
 own Navy. The explanation of the French policy is 
 doubtless to be found in the facts that they have not 
 the same facilities for iron shipbuilding that we have 
 in this country, nor anything like the same resources 
 in ironworks and factories ; while they have an ample 
 sujoply of timber for shi^^building purposes, and are well 
 accustomed to all the processes of wood construction. 
 Most French shipbuilders do not deny the advantages 
 possessed by iron, and in their most recent iron-clads 
 some recognition of these advantages has been made, 
 the unprotected parts of the upper works (above the 
 armour belt and outside the central battery) being of 
 iron, while the main portion of the hull is of wood. 
 This is the system which was commenced in the ' Enter- 
 prise,' and it has the great advantage of making the 
 unprotected upper works of an iron-clad with a wood 
 hull practically incombustible — an advantage which is 
 of the greatest importance in naval warfare, since in- 
 cendiary shells are, perhaps, the most formidable 
 weapons of destruction that can be employed against an 
 entirely wood-built ship with only partial protection. 
 
 There is, however, one argument in favour of wood 
 on which many French and some English writers have 
 laid great stress, and which undoubtedly has some 
 weight, viz., the superiority in point of anti-fouling 
 possessed by copper-sheathed wood ships. This is at 
 present an incontestable advantage, but it is not 
 necessarily permanent, and various plans have been 
 proposed for covering iron ships' bottoms with paints, 
 compositions, and metallic sheathing, and doing away 
 with the fouling now so common. Our experience 
 
Chap. IV. Structure of the Iron-Clads. 79 
 
 goes to show that none of the paints or compositions 
 yet tried at sea secure immunity from fouling for any 
 considerable time, especially in tropical waters, and 
 this fact has brought the schemes for sheathing iron 
 ships' bottoms with metal into greater prominence. 
 Two iron-clads for our own Xavy, the ' ST\dftsure ' and 
 ' Triumph,' are being constructed, in which the bottoms 
 will be sheathed with wood, outside which will be 
 fastened a copper sheathing like that commonly used in 
 wood ships. I did not advise this experiment in the 
 case of these iron-clads, but the late Board of Admiralty 
 had sufficient confidence in the plan to authorise its 
 adoption in them. Other schemes have been proposed, 
 of a simpler and less expensive character, for using zinc 
 sheathing on the bottoms of iron ships, concerning which 
 valuable experience is being gradually gained. Even if 
 we did not already possess these means of at least par- 
 tially preventing fouling, however, there could not be 
 much doubt that some means would be discovered ; and 
 it would surely be bad policy to sacrifice the important 
 permanent advantages obtained by building iron hulls 
 solely on account of the present disadvantage resulting 
 from the fouling of iron bottoms. In the case of the 
 French navy, it is true that this argument for wood is 
 more weighty than with our Xavy, because they have 
 fewer dockyards and naval stations abroad where iron 
 ships could be docked or have their bottoms cleaned. 
 If we had not the advantage in this respect, however, I 
 think it would still remain true that the numerous and 
 important benefits resulting from the use of iron would 
 far more than balance the disadvantages connected 
 with foulness. 
 
8o Sinictnrc of the Iron-Clads. Chap. IV. 
 
 Having thus noticed the chief considerations con- 
 nected with the relative merits of iron and wood for the 
 structure of iron-clads^ I next pass on to observe the 
 improvements that have been made in the structure of 
 our iron-built ships since the date of the ' Warrior's ' 
 construction. These improvements are mainly the 
 result of the adoption of what is known as the " bracket- 
 frame " system, first introduced into the ' Bellerophon.' 
 A few particulars of the systems exemplified in the 
 ' Warrior ' and ' Bellerophon ' must therefore be given, 
 in order to make the improvements intelligible to the 
 non-professional reader, and in giving them, I shall, as 
 far as possible, use popular language.* 
 
 The 'Warrior' and the earlier iron-clads are con- 
 structed with deep frames, or girders, running in a 
 longitudinal direction through the greater part of the 
 length of the ship, combined with numerous strong 
 transverse frames, formed of plates and angle-irons, 
 crossing them at right angles. In fact, up to the height 
 of the armour the ship's framing very closely resembles 
 in its character that of the platform or roadway of a 
 common girder bridge, in which the principal, or longi- 
 tudinal, strength is contributed by the continuous 
 girders that stretch from pier to pier, and the transverse 
 framing consists of short girders fitted between and 
 fastened to the continuous girders. If we conceive such 
 a platform to be curved transversely to a ship-shape 
 form, and the under side to be covered with iron plating, 
 we have a very fair idea of the construction of the 
 
 * Full descriptions and detailed drawings of the structural arrangements of 
 our iron-built iron-clads, from the ' Warrior ' up to the ' Invincible ' class, will 
 be found in chapters vi. and vii. of my work on 'Shipbuilding in Iron and Steel' 
 
Chap. IV. Strticture of the Iron-Clads. 8 1 
 
 lower part of the ' Warrior.' If, instead of this arrange- 
 ment, we conceive the continuous longitudinal girders 
 to be considerably deepened, and the transverse girders 
 to be replaced by so-called " bracket-frames," and then, 
 after curving this to a ship-form, add iron-plating on 
 both the upper and the under sides, we have a corre- 
 spondingly good idea of the construction of the lower 
 part of the ' Bellerophon.' The ' Bellerophon's ' con- 
 struction is, therefore, identical in character with the 
 celhdar system carried out in the Menai and other 
 tubular bridges, which system has been proved by the 
 most elaborate and careful experiments to be that which 
 best combines lightness and strength in wrought-iron 
 structures of tubular cross-section. The ' Warrior's ' sys- 
 tem, wanting, as it does, an inner skin of iron — except 
 in a few places, such as under the engines and boilers — 
 is not in accordance with the cellular system, and is 
 inferior to it in strength. As regards safety, also, no 
 comparison can be made between the system of the ' War- 
 rior ' and that of the ' Bellerophon.' If the bottom plating- 
 is penetrated, in most places, the water must enter the 
 ' Warrior's ' hold, and she must depend for safety entirely 
 on the efficiency of her watertight bulkheads. If the ' Bel- 
 lerophon's' bottom is broken through, no danger of the 
 kind is run. The water cannot enter the hold until the 
 inner bottom is also broken through, and this inner 
 bottom is not likely to be damaged by an ordinary acci- 
 dent, seeing that it is two or three feet distant from the 
 outer bottom. Should some exceptional accident occur 
 by which the inner bottom is penetrated, the ' Belle- 
 ro2:)hon ' would still have her watertight bulkheads to 
 depend on, being, in fact, under these circumstances, in 
 
 G 
 
82 Struchirc of the Iron-Clads. Chap. I v. 
 
 a position similar to that occupied by tlie ' Warrior,' 
 whenever her bottom plating is broken through ; while 
 an accident which would prove fatal to the ' Warrior ' 
 might leave the ' Belleroj)hon ' free from danger so long 
 as the inner bottom remained intact. This is no mere 
 fancy picture of possible danger in one case and safety 
 in another ; our experience amply confirms it. For 
 examjole, the ' Great Eastern,' which is builf on the cel- 
 lular system, and has a double bottom, once ran upon 
 the rocks on her way to America, and had her outer 
 plating torn away to an extent which would have been 
 fatal to a ship without an inner skin, but as her inner 
 skin was not penetrated, the ship continued her voyage 
 in safety. A practical demonstration such as this of 
 the advantage in point of safety of the cellular system 
 can surely meet with no answer ; and the advantage in 
 point of strength is also manifest when it is remembered 
 that the ' G-reat Eastern,' notwithstanding her immense 
 size, has shown few signs of weakness, even when bur- 
 dened with the very heavy weights of telegraph cables 
 she has had on board. 
 
 It may be proper in this connection to draw attention 
 to the fact that the probable employment of torpedoes 
 in a future naval war has not been lost sight of in 
 carrying out these structural improvements. Up to 
 the present time torpedoes have been used almost solely 
 for coast and harbour defence, and have, under those 
 circumstances, proved most destructive^ as a glance 
 through the reports of the operations of the Federal fleet 
 at Charleston and other Confederate ports will show, it 
 is still doubtful, however, whether these formidable 
 engines of war can be applied with anything like the 
 
Chap. IV. Structure of the Iroti-Clads. 83 
 
 same efficiency at sea, under the vastly different condi- 
 tions which they will there have to encoiinter. The 
 Americans have, it is true, proposed to fit torpedo- 
 booms to their unannoured ocean-cruisers, such as the 
 ' Wampanoag-,' and a naval war would doubtless at once 
 bring similar schemes into prominence. Nothing less 
 than actual warfare can be expected to set the ques- 
 tion at rest ; but whatever the result of such a test 
 may be, it is obviously a proper policy of construction 
 to provide as much as possible against the dangers of 
 torpedoes ; and it must be freely admitted that the 
 strongest iron-clad yet designed, although practically 
 impenetrable by the heaviest guns yet constructed, 
 would be very liable to damage from the explosion of a 
 submerged torpedo. No ship's bottom can, in fact, be 
 made strong enough to resist the shock of such an ex- 
 plosion ; and the question consequently arises. How best 
 can the structure be made to give safety against a mode 
 of attack which cannot fail to cause a more or less ex- 
 tensive fracture of the ship's bottom, even if it does no 
 more serious damage ? In our recent ships, as 1 have 
 said, attempts have been made to give a practical answer 
 to this question. Seeing that the bottom must inevitably 
 be broken through by the explosion of a torpedo which 
 exerts its full force upon the ship, it obviously becomes 
 necessary to provide, as far as possible, a,aainst the 
 danger resulting from a great in-flow of water. This 
 is the leading idea which has been kept in view in 
 arranging the structural details of our ships to meet this 
 danger, and the reader cannot fail to perceive that the 
 double bottom and watertight subdivisions described 
 above are as available against injury from torpedoes as 
 
 a2 
 
84 Structure of the Iron-Clads. Chap. IV, 
 
 they are against the injuries resulting from striking the 
 ground. I may, however, add here that in our recent 
 ships — particularly in the breastwork monitors ' Glatton,' 
 'Thunderer,' and 'Devastation' — great care has been 
 taken to multiply watertight subdivisions in the hold to 
 as great an extent as is possible, and that the depth of 
 the double bottoms has been made very considerable, 
 both of which changes have an important bearing on 
 the subject now under discussion. The increased depth 
 of the double bottom increases the probability that the 
 inner skin may remain intact even after the outer skin is 
 broken through, pai'ticularly if, as might be done, the 
 spaces between the two bottoms had been previously 
 filled with water, which would act as a protection to the 
 inner bottom. The numerous watertight subdivisions 
 now formed in this space also add materially to the 
 shijo's chances of escape from foundering when struck 
 by torpedoes. The subdivisions in the hold proper, to 
 which I have alluded, add still more to the ship's safety. 
 They are formed by making watertight the partitions, 
 or bulkheads, which enclose the magazines, store-rooms, 
 lockers, passages, &c., in the hold of the ship, all of 
 which can be done at a comparatively trifling additional 
 expense, since these partitions are necessary to the 
 proper stowage of the ship, and would exist even if 
 they were not made watertight. Another series of sub- 
 divisions has been largely employed in our recent ships 
 also by fitting watertight iron plating on the decks and 
 platforms which come below the water-line ; and by 
 adopting watertight hatcliways, or trunks, by which 
 access is obtained to the parts liable to injury, without 
 any dango- of the ship being flooded if those parts were 
 
Chap. IV. Structure of the Iron-Clads. 85 
 
 filled witli water.* All these are, it must be remem- 
 bered, precautionary measures ; wlietber or not tliey 
 will prove sufficient against attack by torpedoes is 
 doubtful ; bat whatever may be the result of sucb a 
 trial, it is clear tbat the ship's safety against accidents 
 of more common occurrence is thereby increased to a 
 very considerable extent, and that the system of internal 
 subdivision must give a considerable degree of security 
 even against the torpedo attack. 
 
 Hitherto I have been describing the structural arrange- 
 ments of the lower parts of the ' Warrior ' and ' Belle- 
 rophon ;' a very few remarks will suffice respecting the 
 upper parts in wake of armour. It has been explained 
 in Chapter 11. that the skin-plating behind armour in 
 the ' Bellerophon ' is nearly 1 inch thicker than that 
 in the ' Warrior,' and that there are besides numerous 
 longitudinal stringers in the ' Bellerophon ' target, or 
 side, while there is no corresponding arrangement in 
 the ' Warrior.' These additions add greatly to the 
 structural strength of the ' Bellerophon,' both as a ship 
 and as a target, but at the same time they necessitate a 
 considerable increase in the weight of hull, beyond 
 what would be required if the skin-plating were iden- 
 tical in thickness with that of the ' Warrior.' 
 
 In brief, then, the changes made in the ' Bellerophon ' 
 and more recent ships involve the addition of an inner 
 bottom, and the adoption of thick skin-plating and 
 girders behind armour, besides a considerable increase in 
 the depth and strength of the longitudinal framing, all of 
 which changes tend to give greater strength and safety. 
 
 * Full particulars of these features of iron-clad cunstructiou will be found 
 in chapters vii. and xi. of my work on 'Shipbuilding in Iron and Steel.' 
 
86 Structure of the Iron-Clads. Chap. IV. 
 
 But aa these additions effect this result, it might well be 
 anticipated that the total weight of hull would also be 
 greater than if the weaker and less safe system of the 
 ' Warrior ' were carried out. The increased efficiency 
 has, however, been accompanied by a considerable 
 decrease in the total weight of hull — a decrease ob- 
 tained by saving unnecessary weight in other parts of 
 the ship, and by effecting a distribution of the material 
 more in accordance with the true principles of construc- 
 tion. I am entitled to say this, because Dr. Fairbairn, 
 in his important work on ' Iron Shipbuilding,' has 
 gone much further in his approval of the ' Bellerophon,' 
 or bracket-frame, system,* 
 
 In the ' Warrior ' and the earlier iron-built iron-clads, 
 the hull proper weighed quite as much as — in fact in 
 some cases more than — it would have weighed if built 
 of wood, but was, of course, much stronger than a wood 
 hull would have been. In the ships that came between 
 the ' Warrior ' and the ' Bellerophon,' and more espe- 
 cially in the ' Minotaur ' class, some improvement was 
 
 " At page 214 of that work Dr. Fairbairn says :— " The ' Bellerophon ' being 
 " the first ship built upon what we consider sound principles, we deem it 
 " important to show in detail how the different parts are united so as to form 
 " in combination a strong and effective ship. We may however observe, 
 " en passant, that great credit is duo to the Naval Constructor for having 
 " freed himself from all preconceived opinions, and for having adopted every 
 " improvement and every recommendation calculated to increase the efficiency 
 " and durability of this novel construction, and to promote the transfer now 
 " in progress in the Navy from wood to iron." Further on (at page 220), in 
 speaking of the earlier iron-clads, he observes : — " As regards these vessels, they 
 " do not contain the elementary strength of the ' Bellerophon ' as exhibited 
 " in the longitudinal keelson and cellular fonn of construction ; " and in 
 summing up his remarks on iron-clads (see page 236), he adds : — " Iron or steel 
 " of the best quality, carefully distributed in its strongest forms, and applied 
 " with judgment in the construction of ships, on the cellular system with 
 " double bottoms, is in our opinion the only material that will meet the 
 " requirements of an effective navy."' 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 Strtichire of the Iroti^Clads. 
 
 87 
 
 made, the weight of hull falling rather below the weights 
 of armour, armament, and equipment carried. In the 
 ' Bellerophon ' still further progress was made in this 
 direction, contemporaneously with the adoption of the 
 special provisions for strength and safety enumerated 
 above ; and since the ' Bellerophon's ' construction, the 
 proportion borne by the weight of hull to the weights 
 carried has been still more diminished. These state- 
 ments will perhaps be more clearly understood by refer- 
 ence to the following tabular statements of the weights 
 of hull and the weights carried for some of the principal 
 ships of our Navy : — 
 
 Wood-built iron-clads : — 
 
 Caledonia 
 
 Pallas 
 
 Lord Clyde 
 
 Earlier iron-bmlt iron-clads 
 
 Black Prince 
 
 Defence 
 
 Achilles 
 
 INIinotaur 
 
 Weight of 
 Hull. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 3382 
 1812 
 3647 
 
 4969 
 3500 
 5030 
 5043 
 
 Total Weights 
 Carried. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 3367 
 1844 
 3979 
 
 4281 
 2492 
 4495 
 5232 
 
 Eecent ii-on-built iron-clads : — 
 
 Bellerophon 
 
 Monarch (turret- ship) .. 
 
 Sultan 
 
 Audacious 
 
 Glatton (breastwork monitor) 
 Thunderer (ditto) 
 
 Weight of Hull, with 
 thick Slsin-PIating and 
 extra Girders included. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 3652 
 
 3674 
 
 3961 
 
 2675 
 
 2209* 
 
 3272* 
 
 Weights 
 Carried. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 3798 
 4632 
 4856 
 3224 
 2651 
 5790 
 
 * This weight of hull includes also the very strong defensive plating on the 
 upper decks and breastwork decks of these ships. The ' Glatton,' when at her 
 fighting draught, carries, on the same weight of hull, 324 tons more weight 
 of coal and water, so that the weights carried then reach a total of nearly 
 3000 tons. 
 
88 Structure of the Iron-Clads. Chap. IV. 
 
 A glance tlirougli these tables will put the reader into 
 possession of a brief summary of the facts previously 
 stated. In the wood sliips ' Caledonia ' and ' Pallas,' 
 the weights carried are as nearly as possible equal to 
 the weight of hull ; while in the ' Lord Clyde,' one of 
 our most recent wood armour-clad ships, the judicious 
 use of iron strengthenings to the wood hull, and other 
 improved methods of construction, ^brought down the 
 weight of hull to about 300 tons less than the weights 
 carried. Then in the first three of the iron-built iron- 
 clads named, we find the weight of hull considerably 
 exceeding the weights carried, and making those 
 ships compare most unfavourably as regards carrying 
 power with the wood ships, although doubtless much 
 superior in strength. The ' Jlinotaur ' occupies a more 
 favourable position, for in her the weights carried 
 exceed the weight of hull by 190 tons. Next come 
 the ships built on the bracket-frame system, with their 
 very strong framing and plating behind armour, their 
 double bottoms, &c. The first ship of the type, the 
 ' Bellerophon,' carries weights exceeding by about 150 
 tons the weight of the hull, an excess which is rather 
 greater, in proportion to the displacement, than that of 
 the ' Minotaur,' although the ' Bellerophon ' is so much 
 more strongly and safely built, and has included in her 
 weight of hull the second iron skin and the external 
 girders, both of which the ' Minotaur ' is without, and 
 Avhich might fairly be placed in the weights carried. 
 The importance of the last-mentioned featui-e will, per- 
 haps, b% better appreciated when it is stated that the 
 weight due to the increased thickness of skin plating 
 behind armour alone in the ' Bellerophon' exceeds 120 
 
Chap. IV. Structure of the Iron-Clads. 89 
 
 tons. The ' Minotaur,' however, being one of the most 
 improved of the earlier iron-clads, ought to be compared 
 with one of the vessels which succeeded the ' Belle- 
 rophon,' in order to contrast the two systems of con- 
 struction fairly. Take the ' Sultan,' for example, and 
 we find the weights carried exceeding the weight of 
 hull by nearly 900 tons, while in the ' Monarch ' the 
 excess is more than 950 tons. The progress made since 
 the ' Bellerophon ' was built is very well illustrated by 
 the comparison between that ship and the ' Monarch,' 
 for the later ship, with a hull of nearly the same weight 
 as the ' Bellerophon's,' carries 834 tons more than the 
 ' Bellerophon.' Another very striking instance of the 
 progress made since iron hulls came into vogue for 
 iron- clad ships is afibrded by the comparison of the 
 ' Defence ' with the ' Audacious,' The total weight of 
 these ships and their lading is very nearly the same, 
 the ' Defence ' weighing 5992 tons, and the ' Audacious ' 
 5899 tons when fully equipped. In the ' Defence,' 
 however, the hull exceeds the weights carried by 1000 
 tons, wliile in the ' Audacious ' the hull is less than the 
 weights carried by 550 tons. The difference in favour 
 of the carrying power of the ' Audacious ' amounts to 
 730 tons, although she is specially strengthened and 
 constructed on the bracket-frame system, while the 
 ' Defence ' is built after the ' Warrior ' pattern. Perhaps 
 the real magnitude of this saving will be better appre- 
 ciated if I state that, if the ' Defence ' had been built on 
 the system of the ' Audacious,' and the armoured surface 
 had remained the same, while in all other particulars 
 the ship had been completed as she now stands, the 
 saving in weight of hull would have been sufficient 
 
90 Sfrucfare of the Iron-Clads. Chap. I\^ 
 
 to have more than doubled the thickness of armour 
 throug-liout. As it is, we find the ' Audacious ' carrying 
 8-inch and 6-inch armour instead of the 44-inch armour 
 of the ' Defence,' having a total weight of armour and 
 backing exceeding that carried by the ' Defence ' by 
 210 tons, and carrying besides 520 tons greater weight 
 of armament, machinery, coals, and equipment. All 
 these advantages have been gained in this case, be it 
 remembered, in a shijD of comparatively small size, the 
 ' Audacious ' being of 2847 tons less tonnage than 
 the ' Minotaur.' 
 
 The two ships ' Glatton ' and ' Thunderer,' which 
 stand last in the table, cannot fairly be compared with 
 any of the other ships, on account of the difference of 
 type which has been explained in Chapter II. It will 
 be noticed, however, that the weights of hull given, 
 although they include the very strong and heavy upper- 
 deck and breastwork-deck plating, fall very considerably 
 below the weights carried ; and that in the ' Thunderer,' 
 one of our, most recent ships, the proportion of weights 
 carried to weight of hull is higher than it is in any 
 other ship. Some part of the improvement which I 
 have here traced is due, no doubt, to the use of steel 
 instead of iron ; but thus far our experience with steel 
 has been of such a character as to prevent its very 
 general employment. It may be taken for granted, 
 therefore, that improved structural arrangements are 
 really the main source of the saving in weight of hull ; 
 and as a proof of the opinions of practical men on this 
 matter, I may refer to the fact that nearly all private 
 shipbuilders in this country who construct ships of war 
 have followed the recent designs of the Admiralty, and 
 
Chap. IV. Strticture of the Iron-Clads. 91 
 
 have adopted the bracket system of construction for 
 large iron-clads. 
 
 I have dwelt at some length on this feature of the 
 subject, because to the minds of many persons it appears 
 doubtful whether or not the improvement in thick- 
 ness of armour in our recent ships has been obtained 
 simply by decreasing the area of protected surface and 
 concentrating the batteries. Undoubtedly this fact has 
 aided somewhat in obtaining the increase in thickness, 
 but the structural improvements have done much more. 
 That this is so will appear when it is remembered that 
 in the preceding table and statements, I have dealt only 
 with weights, irrespective of thicknesses and quite apart 
 from the disposition of the armour, or the extent of 
 armoured surface in the ships compared. It surely 
 needs no arguTnent to prove that if, on a given dis- 
 placement, a certain amount of weight is saved on the 
 hull, it can be applied in increasing the weights carried, 
 either of armour, armament, or equipment. This has 
 been done in our recent ships, and I have shown the 
 saving in weight of hull to be so considerable as to 
 allow the weights of armour, &c., carried by these ships 
 to bear a far greater proportion to the total weight, or 
 displacement, than in ships built on the ' Warrior ' 
 system. In fact, so great has the saving been in many 
 cases that ships of much smaller dimensions than the 
 ' Warrior ' carry an absolutely greater weight of armour. 
 Such results as these may be, and no doubt are, less 
 appreciated by the general public than some other 
 features of the iron-clad question, but they certainly 
 yield to no other in importance, for the savings in 
 
92 Strnctiu-c of the Iron-Clads. Chap. IV. 
 
 outlay already effected by them, in conjunction \vitli 
 better proportions, exceed a million sterling. It is 
 necessary that these important facts should be borne in 
 mind, and the nation be made acquainted with the j3ro- 
 gress attained even in the abstruser features of iron-clad 
 ship construction. 
 
Chap. V. Steaming of the Iron-Clads. 93 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 STEAMING OF THE IRON-CLADS. 
 
 The consideration of the steaming qualities of the iron- 
 clad ships of the Navy forms a subject not much, if at 
 all, inferior in importance to the questions that have so 
 far occupied our attention. The introduction of steam 
 propulsion into war ships necessitated the reconstruction 
 of all navies ; and in the later reconstruction, incident 
 to the adoption of armour-plating, the question of per- 
 formance under steam ha^ very properly occupied a 
 prominent place. When the iron-clad system came 
 into vogue, the wooden steam fleet had undergone a 
 long and highly successful course of improvement. 
 The hulls of every class of ship had been increased in 
 length and fineness of form as successive vessels had 
 been laid down, and their machinery had attained a 
 state of relative perfection that had given to its manu- 
 facturers an absolute and uncontested pre-eminence. 
 In order that the actual steaming qualities of the iron- 
 clads may be understood, it is necessary to bear in 
 mind what were and are the steaming qualities of our 
 unavmoured ships, and for this purpose the following 
 brief statement is given. 
 
 The earlier steam-frigates, such as the 'Dauntless,' 
 designed in 1844; the 'Termagant,' of 1847; and the 
 ' Imperieuse,' of 1850, were all ships of less than 10 
 knots' full speed at load-draught. The ' Tribune,' of 
 
94 Steaming of the Iroit-Clads. Chap. v. 
 
 1850, went nearly lOi ; the 'Shannon/ of 1855, lU ; 
 and the 'Diadem,' of the same year, 12 knots. Some- 
 what later, before the iron-clads came in, a load- 
 dranght speed of 13 knots was just attained in the 
 ' Ariadne ' and the ' Orlando,' which are the fastest 
 wooden steam frigates ever built for Her Majesty's 
 Navy. Like progress was made in the steam line-of- 
 battle ships, which were connnenced in 1849. The 
 speed of the ' Agamemnon,' designed then, and of 
 the 'St. Jean d'Acre/ designed in 1850, but little 
 exceeded 11 knots. The 'Hero,' built in 1854, had a 
 bow lengthened 5 feet from the 'Agamemnon's,' and 
 went nearly Hi knots. In 185G followed the ' Renown,' 
 lengthened 10 feet amidships from the ' Hero,' which 
 went over 11|- knots; and she was succeeded in 1858 
 by the ' Defiance,' lengthened 10 feet at the bow from 
 the ' Eenown,' with what result is not known, as the 
 last-named ship has never been completed and tried. 
 Meanwhile, in 1854, the three-decker 'Victoria' was 
 designed, and attained a speed of 12j knots at load- 
 draught ; and she was followed .by the ' Howe,' made 
 15 feet longer at the bow, the latter ship attaining, 
 when flying quite light (without masts, armament, or 
 stores), a sjoeed of 13i knots. This speed, however, 
 undoubtedly much exceeded the speed which would 
 have been secured with the ship rigged and loaded for 
 sea ; and I may, therefore, state with perfect confidence 
 that the fastest wooden line-of-battle ships, like the 
 fastest wooden frigates, after a long course of improve- 
 ment, realised no more than 13 knots as a crowning 
 speed at deep load-draught. 
 
 The wooden corvettes and sloops were similarly 
 
Chap. V. Steaming of the Iron-Clads. 95 
 
 improved in form and speed as successive ships were 
 laid down. For example, the corvettes ' Conflict ' and 
 'Highflyer,' designed before 1850, realised a little more 
 than 9i knots; the ' Pylades,' of 1852, reached nearly 
 lOi knots; the 'Pearl,' of 1853, attained 11 knots; 
 and the 'Jason,' of 1858, which may be taken as the 
 representative of our finest and fastest corvettes, went 
 
 12 knots on her load-draught trial. As to the sloops, 
 those designed before 1852 attained speeds of from ^\ 
 to 8 knots ; the ' Cordelia ' and ' Greyhound,' of 1855, 
 went a little over 9 knots ; and the ' Rinaldo,' of 1858, 
 realised 9| knots, the highest speed attained by any 
 vessel of her class. The limits of speed reached in 
 the unarmoured corvettes and sloops may be — taken, 
 therefore, as 12 and 9f knots respectively these speeds 
 being attained only by the latest ships of each class, in 
 which had been attempted every improvement that 
 experience had shown to be desirable. 
 
 Keeping these facts in mind, let us pass to the con- 
 sideration of the speeds attained by the iron-clads of 
 the Navy on their load-draught trials. AYe find that 
 the ' Warrior,' ' Black Prince,' ' Achilles,' ' Minotaur,' 
 ' Xorthumberland,' ' Bellerophon,' ' Hercules,' and ' Mon- 
 arch,' have exceeded 14 knots — the ' Bellerophon' having 
 realised 14"2 knots, the 'Achilles' and ' TA'arrior ' 14-3, 
 the ' Minotaur' 14-4, and the ' Hercules' 14'6ri, and the 
 ' Monarch ' 14"937 knots — the highest speed yet attained 
 by any of our armoured ships at load-draught. The 
 ' Lord Clyde " and ' Lord Warden ' have realised about 
 
 13 5 knots. The remainiDg vessel of the " Minotaur ' class, 
 the' ^gincourt." has gone nearly 15} knots when flying 
 light, with no stores on board, and only her lower masts 
 
96 Steaming of the Iroii-Clads. Chap. v. 
 
 in, so that we liave every reason to anticipate that she 
 also will exceed 14 knots on the load-draught trial. 
 Several of the ships of the ' Caledonia ' class, converted 
 from line-of-battle ships into iron-clad frigates, have 
 realised about 13 knots ; and the ' Pallas,' a ship of 
 only 2372 tons, has slightly exceeded that speed ; while 
 the ' Penelope ' has made a little more than 12| knots. 
 The ' Eoyal Oak ' and ' Valiant ' have gone a little 
 over 1 2^ knots, and the ' Hector ' and ' Eoyal Alfred ' 
 are about one-fourth of a knot slower. The ' Defence,' 
 ' Eesistance,' ' Zealous,' ' Favorite,' and ' Prince Albert', 
 have all realised about 11§ knots. Among the smaller 
 armoured vessels, the ' Scorpion ' has attained 10^ 
 knots ; the ' Wivern,' ' Enterprise,' and ' Eesearch,' 
 have gone about 10 knots ; the ' Yiper,' gunl^oat, has 
 gone nearly %\ knots ; and the ' Vixen ' and ' Water- 
 witch,' also gunboats, have exceeded 9 knots. 
 
 From this summary, it will be seen that several of 
 the iron-clads exceed in speed the fastest wooden line- 
 of-battle ships by more than a knot — an increase very 
 difficult to secure in high speeds ; that two other 
 armoured ships are half a knot faster than the fastest 
 unarmoured vessels ; and that the converted ships of 
 the ' Caledonia ' class are, with one or two exceptions, 
 about equal in speed to the most improved type of line- 
 of-battle ships. Of the remaining iron-clads having a less 
 speed than 13 knots, nearly all are either what may be 
 termed second-rate frigates, or turret-ships, or belong to 
 the smallest classes. It is difficult to make a comparison 
 between these ships and any wooden vessels, except in 
 the cases of the ' Pallas,' which may be fairly contrasted 
 with the first-class wooden corvettes, and of the ' Ee- 
 
Chap. V. Steaming of the Iron Clads. 97 
 
 search,' which may lie compared witli the largest wooden 
 sloops. The ' Pallas ' has a speed a little over 13 knots, 
 and thus exceeds the ' Jason's ' speed by more than a 
 knot ; while the ' Research ' is somewhat faster than 
 the swiftest sloop of previous date, the 'Einaldo.' As 
 regards the speeds at full power, the iron-clads com- 
 pare most favourably, therefore, with the fastest wooden 
 ships of the various classes. 
 
 As great suspicions are sometimes expressed with 
 respect to the results of measured-mile trials of speed, it 
 may be well to give some confirmation of the above- 
 stated facts. It will suffice if we confine our attention 
 to the trials of some of our fastest iron-clads — the 
 ' Warrior,' ' Minotaur,' and ' Bellerophon.' In the 
 early part of the year 1868, trials were made with these 
 ships, both on the measured mile and by six hours' runs 
 in the open sea. The results prove that, under similar 
 circumstances, there is but little difference between the 
 speeds obtained by continuous steaming at sea and those 
 realised on the measured mile. On the measured mile, 
 both the ' Warrior ' and ' Minotaur ' exceeded 14 knots, 
 and the ' Bellerophon ' very nearly reached that speed ; 
 while at sea the ' Minotaur ' and ' Bellerophon ' went 
 over 14 knots, and the ' Warrior ' was only a trifle slower. 
 These facts are interesting also when we consider that 
 all the ships have been some time in commission, and 
 that their recent performances are very nearly identical 
 with those originally obtained on the measured mile. In 
 this connection I may also refer to the fact that our 
 fastest iron-clad, the ' Monarch,' averaged on the six 
 hours' trial a speed only about one-fourth of a kngt less 
 than that reached on the measured mile. 
 
 H 
 
98 S (earning of the Iron-Clads. Chap. v. 
 
 But there is another feature of this question which is 
 well worth attention, viz. the speed of the iron-clads 
 under half-boiler power. In this respect, also, the 
 result of an examination proves most satisfactory. The 
 ' Achilles,' ' Black Prince,' ' Bellerophon,' and ' Her- 
 cules,' exceeded 12 knots; and the 'Warrior,' 'Mino- 
 taur,' ' Lord Clyde,' and ' Lord Warden,' fell very little 
 below that speed. The converted ships realised from 
 10 to 11 knots — the ' Pallas ' exceeded 11 knots, and the 
 ' Resistance ' went nearly 10 J knots. Of the remaining 
 iron-clads, several attained from 9 to 10 knots, and 
 none except the smallest fell below 8^ knots. The 
 half-iMwer speeds of a considerable number of the 
 armoured ships, therefore, do not fall below the full- 
 power speeds of the fastest wooden ships by more than 
 a knot. The difference between the full-power speeds 
 of the two classes is, consequently, quite as great as 
 that between the full-power speeds of the wooden ships 
 and the half-power sj)eeds of the iron-clads. The fastest 
 wooden frigates, when running comparatively light 
 (being rigged, but not stored), only attained 11^ knots 
 at half-power ; and this speed would, of course, be con- 
 siderably reduced when the full weights of provisions 
 and stores were on board. That this reduction would 
 ordinarily be considerable is proved by the fact that the 
 ' Mersey ' attained a full-power speed of nearly 13 J knots 
 at full power when the stores were not on board, but 
 only reached about 12| knots when complete for sea. 
 The advantage possessed by the iron-clad fleet in half- 
 power speeds must obviously be of great importance in 
 sea-gaing ships. The iron-clads could, by economising 
 their fuel, make longer passages under steam than could 
 
Chap. V. Steaming of the I ron-Clads. 99 
 
 be made in the same time by the wooden ships ; or, if re- 
 quired, they could keep the sea, without requiring fresh 
 supplies of coal, longer than the wooden ships, supposing 
 that all the vessels had to traverse equal distances in 
 equal times. Add to this the fact that, in case of emer- 
 gency, the largest vessels of the armoured fleet could, at 
 full power, distance the unarmoured ships, and reach any 
 place where their services might be required in a con- 
 siderably shorter time ; and it may fairly be concluded 
 that in steaming qualities our iron-clads are superior to 
 the wooden ships that immediately preceded them. 
 
 It will be observed that, in the preceding remarks, I 
 have taken the measured-mile speeds as representing 
 the real capabilities of both our armoured and un- 
 armoured ships. Many persons, I am aware, regard 
 this as a fallacious test of a ship's powers, and consider 
 speed trials at sea — not six hours' runs — as the only 
 true standards of performance. My own reasons for 
 preferring to take measured - mile trials have been 
 previously given in Chapter I. ; and I need only state 
 that, while sea trials in different ships are, almost with- 
 out exception, made under very different conditions of 
 engines, boilers, and stoking, with different degrees of 
 foulness of bottom, and very often under different cir- 
 cumstances of wind and weather, measured-mile trials 
 are conducted by experienced staffs of officers and 
 stokers in such a way as nearly, if not entirely, to 
 eliminate the effects of these secondary causes. Hence, 
 in order to secure anything like fairness of compa- 
 rison, it becomes absolutely necessary to refer to 
 measured-mile trials ; and a reference to the results of 
 sea trials previously given {see pages 12 and 15) 
 
 H 2 
 
lOO Steaming of the Iron-Clads. Chap. v. 
 
 will, I think, convince every one that no estimate of 
 a ship's actual steaming capability can he based upon 
 such trials. I must add that the speeds put forward 
 as attained by our iron-clad ships are not intended to 
 be taken as those which the ships would continue to 
 maintain at sea, say in a Trans- Atlantic voyage. It is 
 perfectly understood, no doubt, that on the measured 
 mile the ships are tried in nearly smooth water, and 
 generally with a low force of wind — in short, under 
 the most favoiirable circumstances. At sea, I need 
 hardly say, the circumstances are not often so favour- 
 able, and the speeds realised are consequently less ; 
 besides which, the fouling of the bottom, the varying 
 character of the coal and stoking, the different condition 
 and management of the engines, and other causes, tend 
 to produce, and sufficiently account for, very different 
 performances in the same ship at different times. Most 
 of these causes are beyond our control ; but of late, 
 great efforts have been made to prevent the loss of 
 speed incidental to fouling ; and in the ' Swiftsure ' 
 and 'Triumph,' the first attempt has been made to 
 give iron-built iron-clad ships the advantages of a 
 coppered bottom. Plans for sheathing the bottom 
 plating of iron-clads with zinc have also been under 
 consideration, and may possibly be carried out. 
 
 I have already referred to the difficulty of adding 
 to speeds that are already high, and as but few persons 
 at present feel the full force of this remark, it may be 
 well to add a word or two on this point. It may be 
 taken as roughly correct to say that, to increase a speed 
 of, say, nearly 12 knots to over 14 knots, it will be 
 necessary to nearly douhle the power — in some cases 
 
Chap. V. Steamifig of the Iron-Clads. loi 
 
 to quite double it. The following examples illustrate 
 this : — 
 
 In Northumberland .. 3279 H.-P. gave 11-729 knots. 
 
 , 6558 „ „ 14-132 „ 
 
 In Minotaur 3497 „ „ 11-842 „ 
 
 , 6949 „ „ 14-328 „ 
 
 InAcMlles 2546 „ „ 11-879 „ 
 
 „ 5035 „ „ 14-358 „ 
 
 In Bellerophon .. .. 3119 „ „ 12-103 „ 
 
 „ 5966 „ „ 14-227 „ 
 
 In Hercules 4045 „ „ 12-123 „ 
 
 „ 8529 „ „ 14-691 „ 
 
 These figures show how dearly the last two knots of 
 speed are purchased in all these ships, long and short ; 
 and they also serve to indicate that, when people speak, 
 as they often do, of a " speed of 13 or 14 knots," or 
 of a " speed of 14 or 15 knots," they speak with much 
 vagueness, for the difference between 13 and 14 knots 
 may mean a difference of 2000 horse-power, and the 
 difference between 14 and 15 knots may mean even a 
 much larger difference of power. 
 
 It may be of interest to add to this brief account of 
 the steaming of our own ships some few remarks on the 
 speeds attained by foreign iron-clads. Omitting for 
 the moment the ' Eochambeau,' late the ' Dunderberg,' the 
 fastest ship of the French navy is the ' Provence,' which 
 is said to have a little exceeded 14 knots, and the other 
 vessels of her class are said to go 14 knots. The ' Sol- 
 ferino ' is also reported to have attained 14 knots, and 
 her sister ship, the ' Magenta,' 13-7 knots. The vessels 
 first designed, ' La Grloire ' and her consorts, reached, 
 it is said, from 13^ to 13^ knots, and the ram 
 ' Taureau ' has attained nearly the same speed. The 
 ' Belliqueuse ' goes 12-5 knots, and the smaller iron- 
 clads or floating batteries have speeds ranging from 
 7 to about 7f knots. On a comparison of these results 
 
I02 Steaming of the I ron-Clads. Chap. v. 
 
 with those previously given, it vrill be seen that our 
 fastest iron-clads have higher speeds than those of the 
 French ; that the converted ships of the ' Caledonia ' 
 class are of very nearly the same speed as the ' Grloire ' 
 class ; and that our smaller iron-clads have considerably 
 greater speeds than the corresponding ships in the 
 French navy. It should also be stated that these 
 alleged speeds of the French vessels are taken from 
 French authorities, and are much greater than could be 
 fairly inferred from their known horse-power and the 
 forms of their water-lines. No great confidence is, 
 therefore, felt in the figures. Perhaps the most re- 
 markable performance yet reported, however, is that of 
 the ' Rochambeau,' or ' Dunderberg.' Before leaving 
 America for France, she was tried at the request of her 
 builder, Mr. Webb, and obtained a maximum speed of 
 II' 7 knots with 3778 indicated horse-power. Since her 
 arrival at Cherbourg some alterations have been made 
 in her machinery, and other trials of speed have taken 
 place. The ' Moniteur de la Flotte ' has published an 
 account of the trials, and from this it appears that the 
 mean speed of 14'635 knots was obtained, six runs 
 having been made ; no statement of the indicated power 
 appears to have been given. The vastly improved per- 
 formance of the ship on her later trial has naturally 
 caused some doubts to be cast upon the speed alleged, 
 and even French writers have joined in the expression 
 of such doubts. For instance, in his remarks on the 
 subject, Admiral Paris points out * the great differences 
 existing between the ship's capability as evidenced by 
 her two trials, and adds : — " There is here reason for 
 
 * See page 205 of ' L'Art naval k I'Exposition imiverselle a Paris en 1867.' 
 
Chap. V. Steaming of the Iron-Clads. 103 
 
 " thinking, and for desiring the details of so remarkable 
 " a change." In this opinion I entirely concur. 
 
 There is Httle definite information on the subject of 
 the speeds attained by the American iron-clads. The 
 fastest monitors are said to have realised 11 knots, but 
 the speed of most of the ships of this class does not 
 appear to have exceeded 7 knots, and in some cases the 
 speeds attained have been even less than this. The 
 greatest speed of the broadside frigate ' New Iron- 
 sides ' also seems to have been 7 knots. These figures 
 are for the most part taken from reports of American 
 officers to the Navy Department, and may, therefore, 
 be considered to prove conclusively that the speeds of 
 all except a few of their iron-clads fall considerably 
 below those of the smallest and slowest of our armoured 
 ships, and that their fastest ships are more than three 
 knots slower than our fastest. 
 
 There are scarcely any recorded facts with respect to 
 the speeds of iron-clads belonging to other countries 
 to put before the reader ; but it may, I think, be fairly 
 asserted that our own ships compare favourably in this 
 respect with any vessels yet built. 
 
 Intimately connected with the speeds attained by our 
 iron-clad ships stands the question of their coal supply; 
 in fact, no proper estimate of a ship's steaming capa- 
 bility can be made without taking into account the 
 time during which she can proceed under steam before 
 the coal she carries is exhausted, as well as the speed at 
 which she can proceed. A -few facts in relation to this 
 subject will doubtless prove interesting to the reader, 
 especially as this feature of our ii'on-clads — and par- 
 ticularly of the ships built since my appointment to my 
 
I04 Steaming of the I ron-Clads. Chap. V. 
 
 present office — has again and again been pronounced 
 unsatisfactory by writers and speakers professing to be 
 intimately acquainted with the subject. The pubhc 
 has been repeatedly informed that, in order to increase 
 the weight of armour, armament, engines, and boilers 
 in armoured ships, the coal supply has been greatly cut 
 down as compared with that given to our unarmoured 
 steamships ; and that a gradual progress in this wrong 
 direction has been made since the construction of the 
 earlier iron-clads. I may at once state that such 
 criticisms are both unfair and untrue ; and, I doubt 
 not, the reader will agree in this opinion when he has 
 read through the following brief statements of facts. 
 
 The old type of marine engine, with which our wood 
 ships and the earlier iron-clads were supplied, was 
 capable of developing from four to five times the 
 nominal power, and the total weight of engines and 
 boilers but little exceeded three-quarters of a ton per 
 nominal horse-power. It had been gradually improved 
 during a long course of years, and had been brought 
 to such perfection that the guaranteed power was often 
 exceeded on the measured-mile trial. The great draw- 
 back, however, to its many excellencies was its large 
 consumption of fuel ; and, in consequence of this, the 
 new type of engine, with surface condensers, super- 
 heaters, and other contrivances for economising fuel, 
 was introduced. This type is capable of developing 
 from six to seven times the nominal power, and the 
 total weight of engines and boilers about equals one 
 ton per nominal horse-power. The weight of the new 
 engines is thus considerably greater per nominal horse- 
 power than the old, but the developed power is also 
 
Chap. V. Steaming of the Iron-Clads. 105 
 
 gi-eater, and, as I shall show hereafter, they are far 
 more economical of fuel. Hence it happens that in 
 comparing the coal supplies of two ships, one of which 
 has the old-type engine and the other the new-type, it 
 is necessary to take accoimt, not only of the weights of 
 coal carried, but also of the weights of engines and 
 boilers, as the ship with the improved but heavier 
 engines has, so to speak, a portion of the total weight 
 of propelling apparatus and fuel converted into a 
 permanent economiser of fuel — ^in other words, a 
 portion of the weight which in one ship is given to fuel 
 is in the other put into superheaters, &c., in order to 
 economise fuel, so that it is not necessary to carry so 
 great a weight of coal. Take, for example, the cases of 
 the ' Warrior ' and ' Hercules.' The ' Warrior,' with 
 engines of 1250 H.-P. nominal, has 920 tons as her 
 weight of engines and boilers, and 800 tons as 
 her weight of coals, making a total weight of 1720 
 tons; while the 'Hercules' has engines, &c., weighing 
 1206 tons for 1200 H.-P. nominal, and carries 600 tons 
 of coal, making a total of 1806 tons, or 86 tons more 
 than the corresponding total for the ' Warrior.' It is 
 true that the 'Warrior' carries 200 tons more coal 
 than the ' Hercules,' but the ' Hercules' ' engines have 
 been made considerably hea^-ier on purpose to econo- 
 mise fuel, and, as I shall show further on, she can steam 
 about the same distance as the ' Warrior ' can before 
 her coal supply is exhausted. This is only a specimen 
 of the contrasts existing between the unarmoured ships, 
 or the eai'lier iron-clads, and the comparatively recent 
 iron-clads with improved engines. 
 
 Another point to which I must advert before going 
 
io6 Steaming of the Iron-Clads. Chap. v. 
 
 further is the very mistaken notion that prevails 
 respecting the times during which our iron-clads can 
 proceed under steam alone before their coal is ex- 
 hausted. One often hears it stated that those ships 
 can only steam for two or three days continuously, it 
 being assumed in nearly all cases that the measured- 
 mile full-speeds would be maintained for the whole of 
 the time ; it is tacitly assumed also that in this respect 
 our iron-clads fall far below our unarmoured war ships. 
 To these statements and assumptions I entirely demur, 
 for reasons which I will at once bring forward. In 
 the first place, there can be no doubt that, while 
 measured-mile performances are the fairest tests we 
 possess of a ship's utmost actual steaming power, under 
 the most favourable circumstances — with trained stokers 
 and good coal, and with the engines and boilers at their 
 best — they do not at all represent the conditions under 
 which a ship usually has to serve at sea. When 
 engaged in chasing an enemy, or any other service 
 requiring great despatch, it would, of course, be neces- 
 sary to drive a ship at as great a speed as possible, 
 although even then it cannot be expected that the 
 engine-power would be brought up to an equality with 
 that developed on the measured mile, and the con- 
 sumption of fuel, consequently, would not equal that 
 corresponding to the measured-mile speed. But when 
 engaged on general service, such extremely high 
 speeds would not be required ; and it is in obtaining 
 such high speeds that the largest expenditure of engine- 
 power and fuel is, as we have seen, involved. As 
 I have shown, also, the half-power speeds of many of 
 our iron-clads are but little less than the full-power 
 
Chap. V. Steaming of the Iron- Clads. 107 
 
 speeds of our fastest wood ships, so that it is absurd 
 to compare the times which iron-clads can proceed at 
 full speed with those which wood ships can proceed, 
 omitting altogether the consideration of the difference 
 of speed in the two classes. Adding to this the fore- 
 going considerations respecting the impropriety of 
 taking the full speeds and rates of coal consumption 
 from measured-mile trials, in order to measure a ship's 
 capability for performing sea voyages under steam, it 
 cannot fail to be seen that the popular opinion on the 
 subject is inaccurate. 
 
 In order to obtain a just idea of the relative coal sup- 
 plies of different ships, it becomes necessary, then, to 
 determine how long those supplies will enable them 
 to proceed at good, though not excessive, speeds, say at 
 from 11 to 12 or 12| knots. These would be very 
 high speeds for ships of war to maintain at sea, as the 
 fast Trans- Atlantic steamers do not average 12 knots. 
 It must be remembered also that 13 knots was the 
 crowning measured-mile speed attained by our wood 
 ships, and that only a few ships reached that speed on 
 their load-draught trials. The ' Mersey,' one of our 
 longest wood frigates, only made 12'587 knots; the 
 ' Galatea,' another long fine frigate, did not reach 
 
 12 knots on her last load-draught trial ; the 'Duncan,' 
 one of our finest two-deckers, although she exceeded 
 
 13 knots on the measured mile when flying light 
 (neither rigged nor stored), failed to reach 12 knots 
 on the only load-draught trial of which we have any 
 record ; and the ' Bristol,' which belongs to the class 
 of our frigates inferior only to the ' Mersey ' and 
 'Galatea' classes, did not much exceed 11^ knots. 
 
loH Steaming of the Iron-Clads. Chap. v. 
 
 These four ships may be taken, therefore, not only as 
 fair, but as more than average, specimens of our wooden 
 war-ships — the ' Mersey ' and ' Galatea ' being, in fact, 
 very exceptional cases ; and to give the reader a better 
 idea than words only can convey of the falseness of the 
 notion that our wood ships had coal supplies superior to 
 those of the iron-clads, I have in the following table 
 given the results of careful calculations, based upon 
 recorded trials, of the times and distances during which 
 those ships, and some of our iron-clads, could steam 
 either at 12^ or 11 knots per hour. 
 
 It is necessary to premise that, in the calculations 
 upon which the table is based, the rate of consump- 
 tion of fuel per indicated horse-power per hour has 
 been estimated, both for the old and the new type 
 of engine, from the results of our experience in nume- 
 rous ships of the Royal Navy. These results may be 
 briefly summed up in the statement that, for the old 
 type, from 4 to 4^ lbs. per indicated horse-power per 
 hour is a fair value, and, for the new type, from 2^ to 
 3 lbs. These figures will enable the reader to judge of 
 the amount of the saving of fuel resulting from the 
 adoption of the improved engines. I may add that, 
 while the table gives the probable results which would 
 be obtained with the ships named, as far as our know- 
 ledge of their performances extends, yet it is not put 
 forward as more than a good approximation, as the 
 various circumstances attending the steam-trials used 
 are, as I have previously shown, such as to preclude the 
 attainment of entirely accurate results. In the cases of 
 the ' Duncan ' and ' Bristol,' I have assumed that they 
 might be driven at 12^ knots by their present engines ; 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 Steaming of the Iron-Clads. 
 
 109 
 
 but it is only fair to state that the powers required to 
 be developed in order to attain this speed are far greater 
 than were ever developed in those ships, and would 
 equal the best recorded performances of the old type of 
 engine. This, of course, gives these two ships a con- 
 siderable advantage, crediting them, in fact, with greater 
 steaming powers than they have been shown to possess. 
 All the other ships have exceeded 12^ knots on trial, so 
 that in estimating their capabilities there is no similar 
 source of error. 
 
 Table showing the Times and Distances for which the under-mentioned 
 Ships can Steam before the Coal is exhausted. 
 
 Unarmoured ships : — 
 Duncan 
 
 Bristol 
 
 Mersey 
 
 Galatea 
 
 Armoured ships : — 
 
 Warrior 
 
 Achilles 
 Minotaur 
 Bellerophon .. 
 Hercules 
 Monarch 
 
 C!oal 
 Supply. 
 
 Speed of ) 2\ Knots. 
 
 Time. j Distance. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 520 
 364 
 850 
 700 
 
 800 
 620 
 650 
 560 
 600 
 600 
 
 Days. Honrs. 
 
 2 21 
 
 2 20 
 
 5 4 
 
 4 5 
 
 18 
 19 
 11 
 11 
 
 14 
 5 
 
 Knots. 
 
 860 
 
 850 
 
 1550 
 
 1260 
 
 1420 
 1140 
 1040 
 1340 
 1380 
 1560 
 
 Speed of 11 Knots. 
 
 Time. 
 
 Days. Hours. 
 
 4 19 
 
 4 3 
 
 8 19 
 
 7 2 
 
 23 
 9 
 20 
 11 
 17 
 
 8 18 
 
 Diftance. 
 
 Knots. 
 
 1260 
 1090 
 2320 
 1870 
 
 2100 
 1680 
 1540 
 1970 
 2030 
 2310 
 
 From this table it will be seen that the ' Duncan ' 
 and ' Bristol,' which are, to say the least, more than 
 average performers in our wooden steam fleet, would, 
 under the very favourable conditions stated above, steam 
 for a considerably less time, both at 12 J knots and at 
 11 knots, than all the iron-clad ships considered. The 
 ' Mersey ' and ' G-alatea,' having the exceptionally large 
 coal supplies named, can steam for a much longer time 
 than the other wood ships, and the ' Mersey ' can steam 
 
no Steaming of the I ron-Clads. Chap. v. 
 
 further at botli speeds than any of the iron-clads except 
 the ' I^Ionarch,' although she does not greatly surpass the 
 ' "Warrior,' ' Bellerophon,' and ' Hercules.' The ' Gala- 
 tea ' cannot steam so far as those four ships, and but 
 slightly exceeds the ' Minotaur ' and ' Achilles.' So far, 
 then, as this comparison goes, tlie iron-clads have a 
 decided advantage, on the whole, over the representa- 
 tives of our wooden fleet, and most of them are only 
 beaten by the ' Mersey,' which, with her sister-ship, the 
 ' Orlando,' stand alone in their very large coal supply, 
 I need add nothing to these facts in order to show more 
 fully the falseness of tbe impression that, in steaming 
 capacity, as measured by the time the coal on board will 
 last, our wooden ships are superior to our iron-clads. 
 
 There still remains the question of the relative coal 
 supplies of our earlier and more recent iron-clads, the 
 answer to which is also supplied by the preceding table. 
 The ' Monarch,' it will be observed, stands at the head 
 of the iron-clads in the times her coal will last at the 
 speeds taken. Next to her, and at a very small in- 
 terval, come the 'Warrior' and 'Hercules,' the latter 
 of which, with her improved engines, can do almost 
 as much with her 600 tons of coal as the ' Warrior ' can 
 with her 800. The 'Bellerophon' stands in nearly 
 the same position relatively to the ' Hercules ' that the 
 ' Hercules ' occupies with respect to the ' Warrior ; ' and 
 both the ' Achilles ' and ' Minotaur ' fall very much 
 below the ' Bellerophon,' although they carry greater 
 weights of coal. So far, therefore, from the recent 
 iron-clads being inferior in coal-carrying power (in pro- 
 portion to consumption) to the earlier armoured ships, 
 we find that one of them, the ' Monarch,' is superior 
 
Chap. V. Steaming of the I ron-Clads. iii 
 
 to all, while the ' Bellerophon ' and ' Hercules ' are 
 superior to all the other iron-clads named except the 
 ' Warrior,' and are not much inferior to that vessel. It 
 must be remembered also that the ' Warrior,' with her 
 partial protection, is not burdened with anything like 
 so great a weight of armour as the ' Hercules ' (the dif- 
 ference amounting to more than 500 tons), although 
 she is a considerabl}^ larger ship, and that she carries 
 114 tons less armour than the ' Bellerophon,' I need 
 scarcely say that this very great difference in favour of 
 the defensive powers of the later ships far outweighs 
 the comparatively small difference in favour of the 
 steaming capability of the ' Warrior ; ' and a small de- 
 duction from the weights of armour would enable the 
 coal supplies of the ' Bellerophon ' and ' Hercules ' to be 
 so increased as to make them far superior to the ' War- 
 rior.' In fact, if the 'Warrior' is to be classed as an 
 iron-clad alongside of the better protected ships, it is 
 only proper to make some allowance for the fact that 
 her coal supply has been made large at the expense of 
 her weight of armour. The same thing is, in a measure, 
 true of the other earlier iron-clads — the 'Minotaur' 
 and 'Achilles' — but, even when this consideration is 
 waived, we find, as I have said, that the ' Bellerophon ' 
 and ' Hercules ' stand considerably above them. 
 
 I must observe, with respect to the ' Achilles ' and 
 ' Minotaur,' that the results of the trials of steaming at 
 fixed speeds made in the Channel Fleet of 1867 show 
 that their rates of coal consumption did not then occupy 
 the position relatively to the ' Bellerophon's ' rate which 
 I have assigned to them in the foregoing remarks. The 
 explanation of this apparent discrepancy is to be found 
 
112 Sieaviing of the Iron-Clads. Chap. v. 
 
 in the fact that, during this cruise, the ' Bellerophon's ' 
 superheaters, and other arrangements for economising 
 fuel, were not working at all satisfactorily, in fact, on 
 some occasions, were absolutely ineffective ; so that her 
 rate of consumption rose as high as the rates in ships 
 with the old type of engines. It would obviously be 
 unfair to judge of the ' Bellerophon's ' capability by her 
 performances under such circumstances, as the addi- 
 tional weights which had been put into her in order to 
 obtain greater economy were worse than useless; yet 
 this has been done on several occasions, as I shall show 
 in another chapter. The more reasonable course is, in 
 my opinion, that which I have followed, viz. to take 
 the average results of our experience in various ships — 
 an experience which, in the case of the new type, is 
 rapidly becoming more extensive — and thus to eliminate 
 the sources of error arising from differences in coal and 
 stoking, as well as in the condition and management 
 of the engines. For these reasons, therefore, I consider 
 the preceding figures to be fair representations of the 
 steaming powers of the ships named. 
 
 As I have had frequent occasion in this and former 
 chapters to make repeated reference to the great value 
 I set upon measured-mile trials, I will reprint here a 
 Paper which I read in 1867 at the Institution of Naval 
 Architects, " On Trials of Steam Ships at the Measured 
 Mile," and which was as follows : — 
 
 Nothing is more common now, in connection with 
 steamship performances, than to hear the usual system 
 of trial at the measured mile condemned as unfair, de- 
 ceptive, and inferior in every respect to a more pro- 
 longed trial at sea. We scarcely ever attend a steam- 
 
Chap. V. Steaming of the Iroit-Clads. 113 
 
 ship trial without hearing this opinion freely expressed ; 
 it frequently takes the form of a newspaper paragraph, 
 and I have even seen it stated in official documents by 
 responsible persons. 
 
 Now, in order to satisfy ourselves whether this 
 popular opinion is sound or not, it will be necessary 
 to consider what are the objects with which the mea- 
 sured-mile trial is undertaken, and whether those 
 objects may or may not be more satisfactorily accom- 
 pHshed by other means. 
 
 In discussing the first of these questions, it must be 
 borne in mind that the measured -mile trial has, for 
 convenience, come to fulfil objects for which it was 
 not, I presume, resorted to in tlie first instance, and 
 which could certainly be as well effected by a sea 
 trial. Among these objects, I may mention the testing 
 of the thorough efficiency of the boilers and engines 
 when pressed to the full extent of their capabilities ; 
 the examination of the hull of the ship when subjected 
 to the extreme power of the engines, with the view 
 of ascertaining if any weaknesses or leakages exist; 
 the examination of the connections of the hull and the 
 engines, such as thrust blocks and other bearers, and 
 the various steam and water pipes which are more or 
 less intimately attached to the hull; and the trial of 
 the draught to the boilers, and of the ventilating 
 arrangements of the engine and boiler rooms gene- 
 rally. All these objects may, I think, be accomplished 
 very satisfactorily on a continuous full-speed trial of 
 several hours away from a measured mile ; in fact, 
 the test at sea would be more searching and thorough 
 — in the case of the connections of the engines and the 
 
 I 
 
114 Steaming of the I ron-Clads. Chap. V. 
 
 hull, for example — when performed at sea than it can 
 be when performed in smooth water only. 
 
 The primary objects of the measured-mile trial are 
 not, however, those which I have already named, but 
 these, viz. the determination of the maximum steam 
 power of a given ship's engines, and the true speed of 
 the ship under the propulsive action of that power ; 
 and the determination of these facts under conditions 
 which can be repeated in other ships, in order to 
 afford scientific comparisons between them. The mea- 
 sured mile is also resorted to when the respective merits 
 of different forms of propellers have to be tested ; and, 
 generally, whenever exact comparisons have to be 
 drawn between the performances of steamships under 
 like external conditions. 
 
 Now I, for one, cannot for a moment admit that 
 a prolonged sea trial is better adapted than, or so well 
 adapted as, a measured -mile trial for accomplishing 
 these objects. On the contrary, I believe that, if the 
 latter system of trial were to be replaced by the former, 
 we should be left utterly without the means of making 
 satisfactory comjDarisons between the performances 
 of different ships, or even between the performances of 
 the same ship at different times ; and I am of this 
 opinion because it appears to me evident that in the 
 sea trials you must of necessity be subject to most of 
 the disadvantages and derangements of the measured- 
 mile trial, together with another set of disadvantages 
 and derangements peculiar to the trial at sea. 
 
 The objections to the measured -mile trial are, I 
 believe, these : It is presumed that the short duration 
 of the runs upon the mile, with intervening periods 
 
Chap. V. Steaming of the Iron-Clads. 115 
 
 usually of longer duration, affords opportunity for 
 what is called "jockeying," in more ways than one — 
 the chief way being that of " bottling up" the steam 
 when off the mile, and letting it into the cylinders at 
 full rush when on the mile ; it is presumed further 
 that the method of defining the length of the mile by 
 the transit of posts or other objects on the land affords 
 opportunity for deception ; that the tides are likewise 
 made available for increasing the apparent speed, espe- 
 cially in rivers ; and, generally, it is alleged that the 
 speed obtained on the measured mile in no way repre- 
 sents the actual steaming capabilities of the vessel when 
 on actual service. 
 
 In dealing with these objections, it is necessary 
 that we should very carefully discriminate between 
 the use of the measured mile and its abuses. I freely 
 admit that it may be, and very often is, abused, and 
 made the means of securing for ships an utterly un- 
 deserved reputation for speed. To so great an extent 
 are its abuses sometimes carried that I have seen a 
 vessel whose maximum speed was 9 knots tried in 
 such a manner as to secure an apparent speed of 
 11 knots, and have seen her announced in the news- 
 papers of the next day as having attained the latter 
 speed. On one occasion I observed, in addition to the 
 " jockeying " below, the open — I may even say the bare- 
 faced — resort to three obvious sources of falsification. 
 These were — 1, the running of the vessel in the full 
 strength of the tide when going with it, and near the 
 shore in slack water when going against it; 2, the 
 deduction of the average speed from an odd number 
 of runs, of which the larger portion were made with 
 
 I 2 
 
1 1 6 Steaming of the Iron-Clads. Chap. V. 
 
 the tide ; and 3, the bringing of a wrong object on as a 
 mark for the mile. This last device will be understood 
 when I explain that at one end of the mile the marks 
 were two posts, at the other end a post brought on 
 with the side of a house ; and the " dodge," if I may so 
 call it, consisted in bringing the post on with the wrong 
 side of the house. I have not the dimensions and dis- 
 tances involved, but it is easy to see from the accom- 
 panying diagram how the mile may be shortened by 
 these means. 
 
 Presuming the breadth of the house to be 21 feet, 
 the distance from it to the post .150 feet, and the 
 average distance of the vessel from the post 1500 feet, 
 you will at once see that this device shortened the mile 
 by 210 feet, reducing it from 6080 feet to 5870 feet. 
 A speed of lOi knots would thus be made to appear 
 11 knots from this cause alone. 
 
 The other two modes of securing a high nominal 
 result, viz. those of using the tide as a source of speed, 
 and the employment of an odd number of runs, are 
 so manifest to every spectator that one almost wonders 
 they are ever resorted to. But they are resorted to, 
 nevertheless, and if I were not anxious to avoid giving 
 personal offence, I would mention cases in which results 
 that have been trumpeted to the world as extraordinary 
 successes, have been secured by these means. And even 
 
Chap. V. Steaming of the Iron-Clads. 117 
 
 more than this may be said ; for I was informed not 
 long ago, on authority in which I place implicit con- 
 fidence, that in the case of a very fast steamship the 
 announced result was obtained by selecting three runs 
 out of several — two with the tide and one against it — 
 and even this one run against the tide was somehow 
 brought out much higher than any other of the runs 
 in the same direction. 
 
 Now let me say once for all, and without the least 
 apprehension of effectual contradiction, that no one of 
 these last-named causes of error can enter into the 
 official trials of Her Majesty's ships under the system 
 upon which they now are, and for long have been, 
 conducted. Those trials are carried out by a number 
 of perfectly independent officers of the Royal ISTavy, 
 who have no responsibility whatever for the vessel 
 as far as regards her success or failure, who act 
 under definite instructions, who record every result, 
 and who report the results in full detail to the 
 authorities at Whitehall. The standard miles are mea- 
 sured and marked by hydrographic officers ; the exact 
 nature of the marks is well understood by all on board ; 
 and the trials are usually attended by gentlemen of 
 the press, whose observation of the proceedings is very 
 close, and who are not usually slow in detecting errors 
 in official operations. 
 
 On the other hand, there are sources of error that 
 cannot well be avoided, which operate against the full 
 success of vessels, the trials of which are so conducted. 
 It is indispensable to the complete success of such a 
 trial that the vessel should come in to the mile with 
 her fullest speed ; that that speed should be maintained 
 
ii8 
 
 Steaming of the Iron-Clads. 
 
 Chap. V. 
 
 throughout the mile ; that the shortest line between the 
 mile-posts should be run; and that the vessel's course 
 upon the mile should be maintained without the use of 
 the rudder. Any departure from either of these con- 
 ditions must result in putting the apparent speed below 
 the real speed ; and it is obviously very difficult indeed 
 to avoid a departure from some one or more of them 
 du.ring a prolonged trial of, say, half a dozen runs. The 
 necessity for entering upon the mile at full speed, for 
 maintaining that speed throughout the run, and for 
 avoiding the resistance of the rudder, is obvious ; but 
 I have found the necessity of running on the shortest 
 line between the marks so ill appreciated that I will 
 trouble you with a few words upon it, notwithstanding 
 the exceeding simplicity of the subject. 
 
 We have here a diagram of the measured mile at 
 the Maplin Sands. Supposing a vessel that has to 
 
Chap. V. Steamhig of the Iron-Clads. 119 
 
 run tlie mile to enter upon it at the point P, going 
 eastward, it is obvious that, in the absence of corrected 
 compasses and a proper prescribed course, and in the 
 absence of marks ahead and astern, she may run upon 
 one of an indefinite number of hnes passing through 
 that point, and intersecting the lines through the mile- 
 posts. But it is easy to see that only one of all those 
 lines, viz. that which is perpendicular to the post lines, 
 is exactly a mile in length between those post lines ; 
 every other line is longer than a nautical mile. 
 
 A line inclined at 5° to the true line, for example, 
 is longer by nearly 8 yards ; one inclined at 10° is 
 longer by 31 yards; one inclined at 15° is longer by 
 71 yards ; and if the angle be 20°, the increase of 
 length is no less than 130 yards. A very simple cal- 
 culation will show that a vessel which is really steaming 
 at 14 knots will appear to be steaming at 13'94 knots 
 if running on the line inclined at 5° on the true line ; 
 the 14 knots will be reduced to 13"71 if running on the 
 10° line; to 13*52 knots if running on the 15° line ; 
 and to 13"15 if running on the 20° line. Now^ at the 
 A'cry important mile at Stokes' Bay, there were no 
 marks whatever to define the true course of the ship 
 (except in the clearest weather, when certain distant 
 objects were visible) until recently, when the Admi- 
 ralty, at my earnest request, laid down suitable buoys, 
 which answer admirably. The measured mile at Ply- 
 mouth is still deficient of these valuable guides. 
 
 It would be easy to show that in observing the 
 transit of the poles or other objects great delicacy of 
 observation is necessary when any important trial takes 
 place. Such trials are, in fact, as I frequently ha^e 
 
] 20 Steaming of the Iron-Clads. Chap. v. 
 
 occasion to observe, not trials of knots, but trials of 
 fractions of knots ; and these turn upon a few seconds 
 more or less. This is really a very important point, 
 and one which is too little considered. It is often of 
 great moment that a ship should attain a defined speed 
 in knots. In the case of the ' Bellerophon,' for ex- 
 ample, it was very satisfactory to me, and to persons 
 of much more importance than myself, that a speed of 
 14 knots should be attained. The actual average speed 
 attained was very nearly 14|; knots, represented by an 
 average run of 4 miu. 13 sec. on the mile. Now a 
 difference of only 5 sec. on the runs would have put 
 the speed below 14 knots, and slight as the deficiency 
 would have been, amounting to five-hundredths of a 
 knot only, it would have been ample for one's rivals 
 and enemies to have raised an outcry about. They 
 have often done so on less grounds ; that is, on none at 
 all. At low speeds, a second or two are of much less 
 importance. At very high speeds, the seconds are all in 
 all. To enforce these facts, I will give a few figures : — 
 
 At a speed of 6 knots, a loss of 54 seconds would 
 only occasion a loss of | a knot of speed. 
 
 At 7 knots, the ^-knot would be lost by a loss of 
 39 seconds. 
 
 At 8 knots, the ^-knot would be lost in 30 
 seconds. 
 
 At 9 knots, it would be lost in 23 seconds. 
 
 At 10 knots, in 18 seconds. 
 
 At 11 „ 15 „ 
 
 At 12 „ 13 „ 
 
 At 13 „ 11 „ 
 
Chap. V. Steaming of the IroTZ-Clads. 121 
 
 At 14 knots, 
 
 in 9 seconds. 
 
 At 15 
 
 8 „ 
 
 At 16 
 
 7 „ 
 
 At 17 
 
 6 „ 
 
 At 18 
 
 5 „ 
 
 At 19 
 
 4 „ 
 
 These considerations show how necessary it is to 
 conduct the measured-mile trials of steamships not 
 only with impartiality but with great care if truthful 
 and scientific results are to be obtained. Before quitting 
 this part of the subject, I must, however, submit a few 
 observations upon the " jockeying " to which I have 
 already referred. 
 
 In the boiler-room the chief "jockeying" possible 
 is, in my opinion, that of selecting better coal in one 
 case than another, and this may be got rid of, and 
 should, I think, be got rid of, by prescribing, in the 
 Royal ISTavy at least, the uniform and invariable use 
 of a given description of coal, which should be the 
 best procurable. It is well known that the heating 
 or steam-generating power of different descriptions of 
 coal differs very materially, and it is only from the 
 use of coal of the same kind on all trial trips that 
 similar comparative results can be obtained. Allow 
 me to observe, however, that changes in coal can only 
 influence the development of power, and not the per- 
 formances of ships. The latter are, of course, pro- 
 portioned to the power developed, no matter by what 
 means that power is obtained. It is, therefore, for 
 the purposes of comparison between the engines and 
 boilers of different ships, or between those of different 
 
122 Steaming of the I ron-Clads. Chap. V- 
 
 makers, that it is desirable to use always ttie same 
 kind of coal ; and for those purposes that condition is 
 almost indispensable. It may occur to some to say 
 that the management of the fires, or, in other words, 
 the stoking, may greatly modify the quantity of steam 
 and power developed, and this is perfectly true. But 
 the only means of approaching a standard in this respect 
 is, in my opinion, to aim at doing the utmost in every 
 case, by employing the same staff of stokers and others, 
 and that staff of the most efficient kind, on every occa- 
 sion. And this is what we practically do at Portsmouth 
 and other Government ports in the trials of H.M.'s ships. 
 
 In the engine - room there will always, I fear, be 
 some scope for " jockeying," but I believe this scope is 
 practically much less than many imagine. In the 
 trials of H.M.'s ships it is limited by the supervision 
 of several engineer officers, as well as by the general 
 consideration that, upon the whole, it is very doubtful 
 whether frequent interference with the valves does 
 not conduce to priming and to other derangements 
 to such an extent as to make it more advisable to 
 let the engines and boilers do their best continu- 
 ously throughout the trial. I speak with some hesi- 
 tation on this point, as there may be experienced 
 " jockeys " present, and as I really am but an amateui- 
 observer in this respect ; but I can with certainty 
 state that every effort is made in the public service by 
 the officers in charge to make the trials truthful, and 
 on the very last trial I attended, the captain of the steam 
 reserve forbade any interference with the engines during 
 the whole period of the trial. 
 
 It only remains for me to state why I consider the 
 
Chap. V. Steaming of the Iron-Clads. 123 
 
 prolonged trial at sea inferior to tlie measured-mile 
 trial, and you will already have seen that it is on 
 scientific grounds that I give it the preference. In 
 the brief and manageable trial at the measured mile 
 you can, when fully prepared, really develope for a 
 given period the full power of the boilers and engines 
 under the most favourable circumstances, and can 
 also observe with exactness the speed obtained by the 
 ship under the impulsion of that power. But send 
 the ship to sea for a day, or even half a day (12 
 hours), and you at once lose the assurance that you 
 are trying the power of the boilers and engines and 
 the speed of the ship, and find that you are really 
 testing not these, but the endurance of the stokers 
 and engineers. This is the vital part of the question. 
 I appeal to the experience of all present, and ask 
 whether, even in ocean races, it is possible in closely 
 contested races to satisfy the beaten party that the 
 race was lost simply and solely by the inferiority of 
 their steamer. It is not possible, because it is not the 
 real qualities of the steamers that in all cases, or even 
 often, decide such contests. In the most important 
 and interesting ocean race that I ever attended (that 
 between the ' Helicon ' and ' Salamis ') the faster 
 vessel lost much of her credit owing to what I may 
 call the accidents of the stoke-hold. In one vessel 
 (the ' Helicon ') we knew that we fell greatly short of 
 our maximum speed, owing to our deficiencies in 
 this respect; in fact, we had to go upon the first 
 grade of expansion, and work easily for fourteen 
 hours out of twenty-seven ; and in the other vessel, 
 the defeat which they even then sustained was boldly 
 
124 Steaming of the I ron-Clads. Chap. V. 
 
 attributed to inferior coal. And so, I believe, it 
 would ever be in ocean trials, whether by racing or 
 otherwise. The longer the trial, after a certain length 
 is passed, the less satisfactory will be the result as a 
 means of comparison with other results. You can 
 compare the results obtained on measured-mile trials ; 
 and although the formulas which we apply to those 
 results for obtaining the " constants " are but exceed- 
 ingly imperfect standards of excellence, that does not 
 detract from the validity of the results themselves, 
 which are, in my opinion, far more valuable than any 
 that could be obtained by prolonged sea trials, when 
 viewed as data for scientific and practical comparisons 
 between ships and engines. 
 
 In conclusion, let me say that my object in this 
 chapter is not to oppose the resort to prolonged trials 
 at sea for other purposes. For ascertaining the con- 
 sumption of fuel, for finding out the most economical 
 steaming speed, for comparing the load and light per- 
 formances of vessels, and for many other important 
 purposes which it would be easy to name — the ocean 
 trial is invaluable, indispensable. All I desire to main- 
 tain is that the measured-mile trial is also a very 
 valuable one for other and equally important purposes, 
 and that it is an error, and a very serious one, to suppose 
 that the trial at the mile could with advantage be dis- 
 pensed with. 
 
Chap. VI. Sailing of the Iron-Clads. 125 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 SAILING OF THE IRON-CLADS, 
 
 The steaming qualities of our iron-clad navy being, as 
 shown in the preceding chapter, highly satisfactory, 
 the question arises, How do these armoured ships behave 
 under sail? The importance of this subject, although 
 wholly secondary to the steaming question, is sufiS- 
 cient to demand the brief consideration which I propose 
 to give to it in this chapter. 
 
 The capacity for sea service must always form a 
 prominent feature in the navy of a country like our 
 own, which is essentially maritime, depends mainly 
 upon its power at sea for its position among the nations 
 of Europe, and has possessions in all parts of the world. 
 Our wooden steam navy had gradually been made so 
 efficient as to be capable of performing these services, 
 both at home and abroad, most satisfactorily. The 
 sailing qualities of the ships were not to any very 
 great extent diminished by their possession of steam- 
 power ; and the latter was generally employed, espe- 
 cially in the earlier periods, as an auxiliary to, rather 
 than as a substitute for, sailing power. In fact, the 
 comparatively limited time which the coal carried by 
 any ship would enable her to proceed under steam 
 alone would have rendered the performance of long 
 voyages and distant or cruising services almost impos- 
 sible without a considerable spread of sail. 
 
12,6 Sailing of the Iron-Clads. Chap. VI. 
 
 The necessity for sailing capability in iron-clads 
 intended for such services is, no doubt, as great as it 
 was in our wooden fleet ; but as a considerable number 
 of our armoured ships were mainly intended for Euro- 
 pean service, and more particularly for Channel service, 
 they have had much less sail-power given them than 
 the latest wooden line-of-battle ships and frigates were 
 provided with. All our iron-clads, however, have a 
 certain amount of sail-power as well as steam-power, 
 except those specially constructed for coast defence and 
 for ramming, and the new turret-ships ' Thunderer' and 
 ' Devastation,' which have an unusually large coal sup- 
 ply, and can keep the sea for a considerable time, but 
 which are not intended to perform the distant voyages 
 and continuous sea services which cruising ships in 
 our Navy have to undertake. The comparatively small 
 proportion of sail-power in many of our iron-clads is 
 partly due to the desirability of reducing the weights, 
 and partly to the desire to avoid as much as possible the 
 risk of fouling their screw propellers during action by 
 wreck of masts, spars, and rigging. The effect of such 
 canvas as these ships possess has, in most of them, been 
 greatly diminished by the fact that their propellers do 
 not lift. In the ' Warrior,' and some other ships with 
 unprotected sterns, the screws have been made to lift in 
 order to prevent this diminution of sailing capability ; 
 and some of the iron-clads now building have been 
 similarly contrived. But this is not the case with the 
 ' Achilles,' ' Minotaur,' ' Bellerophon,' ' Pallas,' and 
 many other ships. In the ' Bellerophon ' and ' Pallas,' 
 the sailing has been further checked by the engineers 
 giving exceedingly fine pitches to the screws, so that 
 
Chap. VI. Sailing of the Iron-Clads. 127 
 
 they stand almost directly across the ship's path, 
 having the eiTect of what is technically known as 
 " toggling " the vessel. But in spite of all these 
 drawbacks, serious as some of them are, it cannot be 
 said that the sailing performances of the iron-clads are, 
 on the whole, unsatisfactory. The Reports of the 
 Admirals in command of the Channel Fleet afford 
 the best means of forming a judgment upon this point, 
 and a few extracts from these Reports will doubtless 
 prove interesting. 
 
 In the Report of Rear- Admiral Sir Sydney Dacres, 
 for 1864, we find the following statements. During 
 the passage from Lisbon to Portland, the sailing of the 
 ' Warrior ' and ' Black Prince ' was good, enabling them 
 to keep company with the ' Edgar ' (screw line-of-battle 
 ship) under sail only. Captain (now Admiral) Hornby, 
 of the latter vessel, observes that, though under sail, the 
 ' Edgar ' " has generally an advantage ; in a head sea, 
 " as well as in steaming, the finer bows and long floors 
 " of the iron ships give them a great superiority." In 
 his remarks on the qualities of the iron-clads (see page 
 8 of the Parliamentary Return), Admiral Dacres says 
 of the ' Warrior ' and ' Black Prince ' that, " even as 
 " at present rigged, their sailing qualities on a wind on 
 " long stretches make them equal to keeping pace with 
 " vessels of the old class," and then adds, " the great 
 " drawback to the many excellencies of this class is 
 " that their extreme length interferes with their handi- 
 " ness in many most important points." Among other 
 points in which this unhandiness was felt, he mentions 
 wearing and staying under sail, and the rounding-to 
 of the ships when scudding. These drawbacks were. 
 
128 Sailing of the Tron-C lads. Chap. vi. 
 
 of course, incidental to the great lengths, and not to 
 the armour-plating of the ships. In the course of his 
 further observations, he states that the ' Defence ' (a 
 short ship) " is as handy in wearing and stays as any 
 " one could desire ; " and that the ' Prince Consort ' 
 and ' Eoyal Oak ' (two of the short converted ships of 
 the ' Caledonia ' class) ' ' are handy, though slow under 
 "sail." Admiral Yelverton (in his Report for 1866) 
 says, with respect to the sailing powers of the iron- 
 clads : " On both these occasions I was able to judge of 
 " the performance of the squadron, blowing hard and 
 " with a heavy sea, and have no hesitation in saying 
 " that, under all the ordinary circumstances of bad 
 " weather in the Atlantic, I see no reason to apprehend 
 " that the ships of this squadron would make worse 
 " weather of it than any of our line-of-battle ships." 
 He excepts two vessels from this statement, the 
 ' Hector,' which has always proved an inferior sea- 
 boat, and the turret-ship ' Wivern.' In his remarks on 
 the individual merits and deficiencies of the ships, the 
 Admiral states that the ' Achilles ' is "a safe and good 
 "sea-boat," although "from her great length most 
 "difficult to handle;" that the Bellerophon "is 
 " weatherly both in light and strong winds," although, 
 as he supposes, the very large area of the balanced 
 rudder tends "to stop the ship's way too suddenly 
 " under sail," and often causes her to miss stays ; that 
 the ' Lord Clyde,' ' Ocean,' and ' Caledonia,' though 
 not equal to the old line-of-battle ships as regards their 
 sailing capabilities, are most efficient ships of war ; 
 that the 'Pallas' (as quoted in Chapter I.) "on all 
 " occasions of sailing, whether on a wind or going free. 
 
Chap. VI. Sailing of ike Iron-C lads. 129 
 
 " proved herself far superior to the rest of the 
 " squadron," adding, " I may safely class her, in point 
 " of sailing, with some of our good 36-gun frigates of 
 " other days ; " and that the ' Research ' " sails well at 
 " all times both when close-hauled and going free." 
 In Rear-Admiral Warden's Report to Admiral Yel- 
 verton on the behaviour of the ships during the same 
 cruise, we find them placed in the following order 
 of precedence as regards performance under sail : — 
 'Pallas,' 'Research,' ' Bellerophon,' 'Ocean,' 'Hector,' 
 ' Achilles,' ' Lord Clyde,' and ' Caledonia.' Admiral 
 AYarden adds — " With regard to the quantity of sail- 
 " power carried by the several ships, I should say that 
 " generally it is quite sufficient ; nor do I think it 
 " ought to be less, considering the various duties they 
 " may be called upon to perform ; nor do I consider 
 "that it could be increased with advantage, or without 
 " incurring the risk of impairing their efficiency under 
 " steam. It is quite sufficient for all general purposes, 
 " for assisting them to make long passages to distant 
 " stations, for the purpose of economising fuel on 
 " general service, as has been exemplified during the 
 " last month." Admiral Yelverton's report confirms 
 the accuracy of these remarks; but both officers agree 
 in the opinion that, if the fleet were required to perform 
 evolutions under sail, all the ships would need steam- 
 power to ensure a certain and prompt performance of 
 them. Admiral Yelverton further states, however, 
 that, " as they are now rigged, they are able to keep 
 " their positions in any assigned latitude and longitude, 
 " tacking, and even wearing, with little doubt, pro- 
 " vided there be plenty of sea-room, and that they are 
 
 K 
 
[ 3 o Sailing of the Iron- CI ads. c n .\ p. \' i . 
 
 " not in line, nor called on to perform any manoeuvres 
 " or evolutions of a fleet." These are conditions which 
 are, in most cases, satisfied when vessels are cruising 
 or proceeding on long voyages; and the fact that all 
 modern naval battles must be fought under steam 
 renders it comparatively unimportant that our iron- 
 clads cannot perform all the evolutions of a fleet undei 
 canvas as certainly or speedily as our old sailing ships 
 could. It must be remembered also that these defi- 
 ciencies in manoeuvring power under sail are in some 
 measure due to the fact that the iron-clads are screw 
 steam-ships, and that in many of them, as I have 
 said, the propeller cannot be lifted, this disadvantage 
 being incurred in order to secure other advantages 
 in time of action. Admiral Warden's Report on the 
 trials of the Channel Fleet in 1867 does not give much 
 additional information on the sailing qualities of the 
 ships, beyond the fact that the change in the ' Achilles' ' 
 rig from four to three masts led to a far better per- 
 formance ; and the remarks respecting tlie apparent 
 falling-off in the performance of the 'Pallas' (previously 
 referred to), which is only explainable on the ground 
 of difference of management, the ship and her rig 
 having remained unaltered. 
 
 The Eeport on the Channel Fleet for 1868 does not 
 throw much additional light upon the sailing capability 
 of our iron-clads. Two trials of sailing took place on 
 the 20th and 29th June, the details of which are given 
 in a tabular form by Admiral Warden. On both 
 occasions the trial was made "on a wind under all 
 "plain sail," and the 'Warrior' was first, while the 
 ' Bellerophon ' was last. The ' Pallas ' was second on 
 
Chap. VI. Sailing of the Iron-Clads. 
 
 the 20th, and fifth on the 29tli, thus proving that her 
 sailing power had not really fallen off, as had been 
 inferred by some persons from her performance in 
 1867, The 'Defence' was third on both trials, and 
 the ' Achilles ' also took a high position, being fourth 
 on the first trial and second on the other trial. No 
 special remarks need, I think, be made regarding the 
 performances of the remaining ships of the squadron. 
 With respect to the ' Bellerophon's ' performance, it 
 will be sufficient to remark that these two trials only 
 showed, to quote from Admiral Ryder's Report, that 
 she " was the slowest of the eight ships on that point 
 " of sailing, viz., on a wind under all plain sail," and 
 that the results of previous trials have shown that her 
 real position, as regards sailing capability, among the 
 ships of the squadron is much higher than it would 
 appear to be from those trials. To these facts re- 
 garding the sailing of our iron-clads I shall only add 
 that the ' Hercules ' has also been shown to be a very 
 good vessel under sail, and in the opinion of one of the 
 officers in the squadron is "next best to the 'Warrior.'" 
 In this vessel the jointed balanced rudder admits of 
 being used as an ordinary rudder when under sail 
 alone, and by this means the rapid stoppage of the way 
 caused by the simple balanced rudder of the ' Bellei-o- 
 phon,' when she is going about, is prevented, and there 
 -is consequently not the same liability to miss stays. 
 
 These facts will serve to show the reader that our 
 iron-clads, whatever their imperfections as sailing 
 ships, are not deficient in sailing powers as far as they 
 are requisite in sea-going cruisers possessing steam- 
 power also. The capabihty of these ships to undertake 
 
 K 2 
 
lyi Sailing of the I ro7i-Clads. Chap. VI. 
 
 the most distant voyages cannot, however, he better 
 illustrated than by a brief reference to the performances 
 of one or two of them, and those not by any means the 
 best sea-boats of the armoured fleet. Lord Henry Lennox, 
 in one of his speeches on the Navy Estimates in 
 1868, referred to a voyage made by the converted 
 iron-clad ' Ocean ' from the Mediterranean to Batavia. 
 In the course of this voyage the ship encountered very 
 severe weather, especially after passing the meridian 
 of the Cape of Good Hope on the way to St. Paul's 
 Island in mid-ocean. Some idea of the violence of this 
 storm may be obtained from the fact that every boat at 
 the davits was stove. One of the officers, writing on 
 this subject, observed — " No wooden ship could have 
 " gone through it better, and a good many worse." 
 He also stated that " under sail alone we have gone 
 "12 knots," and that the runs made per day varied 
 from 195 to 243 knots, the latter giving an average 
 speed of more than 10 knots per hour. If any addi- 
 tional proof were required of the capability of our iron- 
 clads to proceed to any part of the world, the voyage 
 of the ' Zealous ' to Vancouver's Island might be men- 
 tioned, as she also encountered heavy weather and 
 behaved admirably. 
 
 At the same time I cannot help believing that, if we 
 had not resorted to excessive length in the earlier iron- 
 clads, we might have looked for better average per- 
 formances in the squadron generally, and should have 
 set up a higher standard of capability in all the 
 essential movements of ships under sail. It is satis- 
 factory to know that two of the powerful iron-clads 
 now building, the ' Swiftsure ' and ' Triumph/ are to 
 
Chap. VI. Sailing of the Iron-Clads. 133 
 
 carry lifting screws, and will have a large spread of 
 canvas ; so that the construction of the ' Thunderer ' 
 and ' Devastation,' without the compromises and 
 drawbacks which the presence of masts and spars 
 impose, will be attended by the construction of other 
 ships for distant service possessing superior qualities as 
 sailing vessels. 
 
134 Rolling of the Iron-Clads. Chap. VII. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 KOLLING OF THE lEON-CLADS. 
 
 There is no feature in the performances of our iron- 
 clad ships which has been so much misrepresented and 
 misunderstood as that of their rolHug at sea. From 
 the reports and criticisms of some persons, it would 
 appear that these ships roll to an extent which is most 
 excessive in comparison with wooden line-of-battle ships 
 and frigates ; and that in a very moderate sea-way the 
 iron-clads cannot open their main - deck ports and 
 fight their guns without shipping large quantities of 
 water. I hope to give the reader the means of judging 
 for himself as to the correctness of these views in 
 the course of the following remarks, but think it proper 
 at once to deny that they are true. In fact, instead 
 of all our iron-clads being heavy rollers as alleged, 
 several of them are remarkable for their steadiness, 
 being much superior in this respect to the wooden 
 ships, while the great majority are at least equal in 
 steadiness to the line-of-battle ships and frigates. In 
 support of this statement I will refer to a few of the 
 Reports of the Admirals in command of the Channel 
 Squadron. Admiral Smart says that the iron-clads he 
 had with him in 1863 (which are by no means the 
 steadiest of our ships) did not roll more than the screw 
 line-of-battle ship ' Revenge.' From Admiral Dacres' 
 Report for 1864, it appears that the 'Edgar' line-of- 
 
Chap. VII. Rolling of the Iron-Clads. 135 
 
 battle ship rolled througli greater angles than any of the 
 iron-clads, exceeding even the ' Prince Consort,' which 
 is considered a comparatively inferior performer among 
 the armoured ships. Admiral Yelverton's Report for 
 1866, and Admiral Warden's Reports for 1867 and 1868, 
 do not bear directly upon this point, as there were no line- 
 of-battle ships in the squadrons; but from the records of 
 the maximum angles rolled through, it appears that 
 several of the iron-clads behaved better than wooden 
 ships would have done under similar circumstances. 
 
 The trials of French ships also go to prove that the 
 iron-clads do not roll excessively, in comparison with 
 wooden ships. I will give one example of this, taken 
 from the reports of the squadron which was tried at sea in 
 1863. In the heaviest weather the ships experienced on 
 this occasion, three out of five armoured ships rolled less 
 than the ' Tourville' line-of-battle ship, and the other two 
 iron-clads rolled very little more than the wooden ship. 
 
 These facts constitute a general answer to the state- 
 ments so often made as to the heavy rolling of the iron- 
 clads ; a more detailed answer will be given further on. 
 I will first turn, however, to the question of their fight- 
 ing capabilities in a sea-way, as to wliich the public have 
 been equally misinformed. Here, again, I must refer to 
 the records of the trials of our Channel Squadrons, and 
 I will take Admiral Warden's Report for 1867 as our 
 guide. The long series of trials recorded in this Report 
 show that, with one exception (the 'Lord Clyde'), all 
 the iron-clads could have fought all their guns on all 
 occasions, although in doing so they would, on several 
 occasions, have shipped water through the main-deck 
 ports. This shipping of water is not an unusual thing 
 
136 Rollmg of the Iron-Clads. Chap. vil. 
 
 in wooden war ships, and naturally leads to the mention 
 of a fact which is frequently overlooked in the discus- 
 sion of this question of rolling. Our iron-clads are 
 frigates, carrying, at least, the greater part of their guns 
 on the main deck ; but they are nearly all as large as, 
 and many of them are larger than, line-of-battle ships. 
 The line-of-battle ship, however, had at least two gun- 
 decks ; and frequently, when the ship rolled heavily, 
 the lower-deck ports had to be closed, and the main- 
 deck guns only could be fought. This difference between 
 armoured ships and line-of-battle ships seems to have 
 entirely escaped the observation of many writers and 
 speakers. They expect the iron-clad, with her gun 
 deck, say, 8 feet above water, to fight her guns in as 
 heavy weather as that in which a wooden two-decker 
 could fight her main-deck guns, carried, say, 15 feet 
 above water, when the lower-deck guns of the latter 
 would be rendered entirely useless by the sea washing 
 over the ports, and necessitating their being closed. 
 This is obviously most unfair and improper ; but I may 
 remark, in passing, that the wisdom of giving armoured 
 upper-deck batteries to iron-clads — as has been done in 
 recent ships — hence becomes apparent. It need only 
 be added that in such dissimilar vessels as iron-clads 
 and line-of-battle ships the number of guns which can 
 be fought affords no test of the comparative rolling ; 
 and it is frequently found that the iron-clad frigates can 
 fight their main-deck guns in weather when wooden 
 frigates would have to close their ports. 
 
 Before proceeding to examine the records of the 
 actual rolling of our iron-clads, I desire to call attention 
 to a few popular but erroneous impressions on the sub- 
 
Chap. VII. Rolling of the I ron-Clads. 137 
 
 ject. One of the most generally received of these is the 
 belief that the heavy weights of armour carried on the 
 sides tend to make iron-clads roll. To the unpro- 
 fessional eye there does appear to be a " top-heaviness " 
 in armoured ships ; but this is more apparent than real. 
 Comparing an iron-clad with a line-of-battle ship, we 
 find the former with less lofty sides, and with a single 
 gun-deck ; so that, although the sides are covered with 
 armour, the weights, as a whole, are not carried so high 
 out of the water. For the sake of illustrating this point 
 more fully, T will take the case of a converted iron-clad, 
 say, of the ' Caledonia ' class. The two-decked wooden 
 ships which were turned into armoured frigates had 
 their sides cut down considerably, and the main deck 
 and its battery removed ; while the armour, although 
 about equal in weight to the parts removed, is not as 
 high above water. The iron-clad is, therefore, less top- 
 heavy than the wooden ship was previously to being 
 converted ; in other words, the conversion has the effect 
 of bringing down the centre of gravity of the ship. The 
 truth of this has been confirmed by actual experiment 
 and calculation for several converted ships, and it is 
 equally true of iron-built armoured vessels that they are 
 less over-weighted than wooden line-of-battle ships. 
 
 The fallacy of the popular impression will, however, 
 be seen still more clearly from a consideration of the 
 behaviour of actual ships. The French have, as is well 
 known, two vessels, the ' Solferino ' and ' Magenta,' which 
 are remarkable for being the only two-decked iron-clads 
 ever built. Their external appearance is that of ordi- 
 nary line-of-battle ships, with the exception of the bows, 
 which are " spur-shaped," and specially constructed 
 
138 Rolling of the I ron-Clads. Chap. VII. 
 
 for ramming. They liave two tiers of protected guns, 
 and tlieir armour extends to the upper-deck. Now, if 
 overweigliting on tlie upper portion is to be found in 
 any iron-clad, it will assuredly be found in these high 
 ships, with a gun-deck more than ordinary iron-clads 
 possess, and with their armour reaching to so great a 
 height ; so that, according to the popular belief, they 
 should roll excessively. So far from this being the case, 
 it appears from French official reports that these vessels 
 are far superior not only to the other iron-clads but 
 also to the wooden two-deckers tried on the same occa- 
 sions. The explanation of this singularly good beha- 
 viour will be given hereafter ; but, for the present, it 
 will suffice to say that this practical disproof of the cor- 
 rectness of the popular view admits of no answer. 
 
 It is not surprising, however, that those who think 
 ordinary iron-clads " top-heavy " should also believe 
 that ships with a small " free-board," or height of side 
 above water, must be very steady ; in fact, the one is 
 repeatedly set forth, in the press and elsewhere, as a 
 natural corollary to the other. The special subject in 
 connection with which these remarks are most fre- 
 quently made is the relative merits of low-decked 
 turret-ships and broadside iron-clads, the former being 
 supposed to roll much less than the latter. Here again 
 facts contradict the general belief, and show that low- 
 decked ships are not necessarily steadier than ordinary 
 vessels. For instance, the turret-ship ' Wivern,' be- 
 longing to the Eoyal Navy, has a low free-board (about 
 4 feet), and is very lightly armoured, while her arma- 
 ment is also very light. Yet on one occasion her be- 
 haviour at sea was so bad that she had to be brought 
 
Chap. VII. Rolling of the I ro7i-C lads. 139 
 
 head to wind in order to prevent her shipping large, and, 
 of course, dangerous, quantities of water, the extreme 
 angle of roll rising to 27 degrees each way. This is not a 
 singular case, as may be supposed. The ' Prinz Hendrik ' 
 also — a Dutch turret-ship which once received much 
 praise — has rolled so heavily, when in the trough of the 
 sea, as to make it very desirable to bring her head to wind. 
 In contrast with this heavy rolling of low-decked ships, 
 we can point to the ' Achilles,' which, according to Ad- 
 miral Warden's Report, was comparatively quite steady 
 in the trough of the sea under very similar circum- 
 stances, although she has lofty armoured sides ; and also 
 to the ' Hercules,' the steadiness of which ship is well 
 known. It will scarcely be asserted, in the face of 
 these facts, that by diminishing the height of a ship 
 above water, and by this means alone, rolling may be 
 almost entirely prevented. There can be no doubt that 
 ships of the monitor type are, in general, very steady, 
 although the reports of their commanding officers show 
 that they sometimes roll considerably, but this steadiness 
 is in a great measure due to the fact that the waves wash 
 over their decks instead of striking against, and running 
 up, the sides. Yery serious disadvantages, of course, 
 accompany the steadiness of these vessels. In this place 
 I need only mention those connected with working the 
 turret guns in a heavy sea. "When waves are breaking 
 over an ordinary monitor, she may remain comparatively 
 steady, but the guns, being at such a small height out 
 of water, could only be fought with difficulty, if fought 
 at all. In similar weather a broadside ship would pro- 
 bably roll more than a monitor (although, as we have 
 seen, this is not necessarily the case), but, having been 
 
HO Rolling of the Iron-Clads. Chap. VII. 
 
 constructed Avitli lofty sides for the very purpose of 
 fighting her guns under such circumstances, she could 
 do so safely ; and surely the fact that in fighting 
 capability the broadside ship is superior more than 
 outweighs the greater occasional steadiness of the 
 monitor. The reader will not fail to remark also 
 that the low-decked ships hitherto built are not sea- 
 going, in the proper sense of the term, although pro- 
 posals have been made to use them for sea service ; 
 whereas broadside ships can, as I have shown, make the 
 longest passages, and encounter storms, with perfect 
 safety. 
 
 Another point deserving notice is the belief enter- 
 tained by many that mere weight, irrespective of height 
 out of water, tends to produce excessive rolling in iron- 
 clads. This is also an error, as the records of trials 
 prove that the heaviest ships are also, in most cases, the 
 steadiest — the ' Hercules,' for example, rolling much 
 less than the ' Pallas,' and the ' Bellero23hon ' than the 
 ' Research.' In fact, the heavier a ship is the greater 
 is the resistance she offers to being set rolling, a state- 
 ment which it is scarcely necessary to illustrate, as we 
 are all familiar with the fact. It is true that great 
 weight tends to sustain motion when it has begun, but 
 even then it does not increase rolling. In fact, as far 
 as the mathematical theory of rolling goes, a ship's 
 behaviour is entirely independent of her weight, although 
 the heavier ship has the advantage of requiring a greater 
 effort to set her rolling, and is therefore, cceteris paribus, 
 steadier than a lighter vessel. In this connection it is 
 proper to state, that the amount of armour carried does 
 not influence a ship's rolling as many suppose it does. 
 
Chap. VII. Rolling of the Iron- Clads. 141 
 
 The ' Minotaur ' and ' Achilles,' for instance, are equally 
 steady, although the arrangement and weight of their 
 armour are so very different ; and other ships, quite as 
 dissimilar in these respects, are very similar in their 
 rolling. The form of a ship's bottom has been thought 
 by some persons, to have a great effect on her rolling, 
 but this does not appear to be true, within the limits of 
 form which are met with in actual ships, except as 
 regards easiness of motion, which is largely influenced 
 by the form of the ship in the neighbourhood of the 
 water-line. These are some of the chief popular views 
 on the subject of the rolling of iron-clads which require 
 to be set right, and the consideration of which will not, 
 I think, be unprofitable to the reader. 
 
 The difficulties -with which a naval architect has to 
 grapple in designing a steady iron-clad are not, and 
 from the nature of the case can hardly be, realised by 
 the public. For instance, it is not generally known 
 that a ship's rolling depends largely upon, and varies 
 with, the character of the waves she encounters in 
 relation to the time in which she would perform an 
 oscillation if set rolling in still water. A vessel may 
 be very steady under some circumstances, and yet she 
 may fall in with waves of even less magnitude, but 
 of such a " period "as to gradually increase the angles 
 to which she rolls. This can be illustrated from 
 Admiral Warden's Eeport. The ' Warrior ' and ' Lord 
 Warden' rolled very similarly on several occasions, 
 and it might reasonably have been assumed that they 
 would behave alike under most circumstances ; but on 
 some trials, the only change in the circumstances being 
 in the state of the sea, the ' Warrior ' rolled much less 
 
142. Rollhig of the Iron-Clads. Chap. VII. 
 
 than the ' Lord Warden.' Similar remarks apply to 
 the relative rolling of the sister ships ' Lord Warden ' 
 and ' Lord Clyde,' the latter in general rolling much 
 more heavily, but on one occasion being steadier than 
 the former. This case is also interesting as an illustra- 
 tion of the fact that sister ships, built from the same 
 dra^vings, do not always behave similarly. The de- 
 signer, of course, cannot predict the v^^eather which 
 any ship may encounter, and if he could, the attempt 
 would be hopeless to produce a ship which should be- 
 have equally well in waves of different " periods." All 
 he can do is to give such properties to the new vessel 
 as experience has shown desirable ; and this has, I 
 consider, in the great majority of cases, been done satis- 
 factorily in our iron-clads. 
 
 Besides the influence of the wave-period upon a ship's 
 rolling, there is the further consideration that changes in 
 the weights carried produce corresponding changes in the 
 rolling. These changes are to some extent unavoidable, 
 being in a war ship principally due to variations in the 
 quantity of coals, provisions, ammunition, and stores on 
 board. In any criticisms on the rolling of iron-clads 
 on particular occasions, it is consequently necessary to 
 take into account not only the state of the sea, but also 
 the stowage of the ship, as otherwise very false opinions 
 may be entertained. The construction of the hull also 
 exercises considerable influence on rolling. A wood- 
 built iron-clad, for example, is very differently con- 
 structed from an iron-built armoured vessel, and the 
 proportion of the weight of hull to the total weight of 
 the ship and her lading (in other words, to the total 
 displacement) also differs very considerably in the two 
 
Chap. VII. Rolling of the I ron-C lads. 143 
 
 ships. The centre of gravity of the wood hull is com- 
 paratively low. These facts tend to prepare us for the 
 fact which the trials of the Channel Fleet have de- 
 veloped, viz. that on the whole wood-built ships roll 
 more than those built of iron. 
 
 The manner in wbich the observations of a ship's 
 rolling are made and recorded necessarily forms an 
 important feature in any remarks on her qualities. In 
 our own Navy, the records are made in accordance 
 with a detailed scheme of instructions issued by the 
 Admiralty, and embrace accounts of the state of the 
 sea, and force and direction of the wind ; the stowage, 
 draught, and course of the ship ; and the angles 
 rolled through, as well as the number of oscillations 
 per minute. The two last-named features supply infor- 
 mation as to the range and the rate of the ship's rolling 
 respectively. The angles recorded are always the 
 total angles rolled through ; in other words, the sum of 
 the angles to port and starboard. The oscillations 
 recorded are the number of times the ship passes from 
 port to starboard, and vice versa, per minute. Three 
 instruments are in general use in our Navy for 
 measuring the angles of roll — the pendulum, the 
 clinometer, and the bar or batten instrument. The 
 last alone is correct, and is used in all the ships of 
 the French navy, the angle being determined by an 
 observation of the horizon. The pendulum is a very 
 bad instrument for measuring the roll, usually indicating 
 larger angles than the ship moves through, especially 
 when she is rolling heavily. We should anticij)ate 
 this from the fact that, even when a vessel is rolling 
 moderately, everything which is freely suspended on 
 
144 Rolling of the I ron-Clads. Chap. VII. 
 
 board is put into violent motion. In order to illustrate 
 the errors of the pendulum and the mistakes which 
 must arise from its employment, I need only turn to 
 Admiral Warden's Eeport. On one occasion the 
 'Lord Warden's' rolling amounted to 11 '4 degrees 
 according to the pendulum, but only reached 9*1 
 degrees according to the bar instrument ; and on 
 another trial the indications of the two instruments 
 gave 14' 9 and 12 degrees respectively as the angle of 
 roll. These are, as we shall see, by no means the 
 greatest differences which are recorded, but are given 
 as average specimens. The clinometer is a somewhat 
 better instrument than the pendulum, but its indica- 
 tions are not reliable, as it also often giA-es a greater 
 angle than the ship actually rolls. I will not enter at 
 greater length into this subject, but think that enough 
 has been said to bring home to the reader the necessity 
 for careful observations with reliable instruments. 
 
 The theoretical investigations connected with the 
 subject of rolling are of too abstruse a character to be 
 introduced into this chapter. The labours of Mr. 
 Froude (who has within the last few years taken 
 the lead in this matter), and of the other gentlemen 
 who have devoted their attention to the subject, have, 
 however, resulted in the establishment of two great facts 
 which can scarcely fail to be interesting to the general 
 reader. The first of these facts is that the principal 
 thing (although not by any means the only one) which 
 influences rolling, is the distance between the centre of 
 gravity of a ship and the point known to naval archi- 
 tects as the " metacentre ; " the second is that a ship's 
 rolling at sea is largely influenced by the period, &c., of 
 
Chap. VII. Rolling of the I ron-Clads. 145 
 
 the waves she meets with. Experience confirms the 
 accuracy of both these deductions. As to the latter we 
 need make no further remarks, since it has been pre- 
 viously illustrated by reference to the trials of the 
 Channel Squadron ; but the former requires a brief 
 notice. Ships which have a great distance between 
 the centre of gravity and the metacentre are technically 
 termed " stiff," and will carry large spreads of canvas, 
 but they usually roll with violence. On the other 
 hand, ships which have a moderate distance between 
 these points are not so stiff, and roll moderately ; while, 
 if this distance becomes very short, a ship will be 
 very " crank," and might possibly be upset under some 
 circumstances — for example, by accumulated motion re- 
 sulting from the action of very long waves. In order 
 to render this point clearer I will cite a few facts. 
 In the French squadron referred to above there were 
 five iron-clads, which stand in the following order as 
 regards the distances between the centres of gravity 
 and the metacentres — ' Solferino,' 'Magenta,' ' Cou- 
 ronne,' ' Invincible,' and ' Normandie.' The ' Solferino ' 
 has the least distance, and is the steadiest ship, and the 
 others are reported to have stood precisely in the order 
 in which they are named as regards their rolling. In 
 our own Navy similar results have been obtained. 
 For example, the ' Achilles ' has a distance of about 
 3 feet between the centre of gravity and the metacentre, 
 and is a remarkably steady ship ; whereas the ' Prince 
 Consort,' with a distance of 6 feet, rolls much more than 
 the ' Achilles.' It is even more interesting to remark 
 that, although the ' Warrior ' and ' Achilles ' are nearly 
 identical in external form, the former has a greater 
 
146 Rolling of the Iron-C lads. Chap. VII. 
 
 distance between these two points than the latter, and 
 is not nearly so steady. 
 
 These illustrations will serve to show the desirability 
 of mating the distance between the centre of gravity 
 and the metacentre — or, in technical language, the 
 " metacentric height " — as small as is consistent with 
 a proper amount of sail-carrying power, or stabiHty, 
 when a new iron-clad is being designed ; and this 
 course has been followed in all recent ships. The 
 position of the metacentre is determined by the form 
 and dimensions of a ship, especially at the water-line, 
 and by the total displacement ; and the position of the 
 centre of gravity is fixed by the stowage of the weights 
 on board, the disposition of the armour, and the mode 
 of constructing the hull. On certain fixed dimensions 
 there is a greater scope for altering the position of the 
 centre of gravity than for moving the metacentre, and 
 the results of our experience may be broadly stated 
 as follows : — A high position of the centre of gravity 
 tends to produce steadiness, and a low position tends 
 to cause excessive rolling. The recognition of these 
 principles leads to the explanation of some of the 
 a^jparently strange facts connected with the subject 
 of rolling. For instance, wood-built iron-clads have 
 heavier hulls than those built of iron, and the weights 
 of engines, boilers, &c., are placed low down, all of 
 which tends to bring down the centre of gravity, and 
 as the result the wood-built ships roll more heavily 
 than the iron-built ships. There are, of course, great 
 differences among the iron ships themselves, due in 
 great measure to different positions of their centres of 
 gravity resulting from variations in the armour, arma- 
 
Chap. VII. Rolling of the Iron-Clads. 147 
 
 ment, heights of engines and boilers, and stowage. 
 Take, for example, the two ships above referred to, the 
 ' Achilles ' and ' Warrior.' Their external forms are 
 almost identical, but the ' Achilles ' has an armour belt 
 throughout the length, which the ' Warrior ' has not, 
 by which the centre of gravity is brought higher up ; 
 she also has other weights above the water which the 
 ' Warrior ' has not, and her displacement is greater 
 than the ' Warrior's,' which brings down the meta- 
 centre, so that the combined effect of these changes is 
 to make the ' Achilles ' the steadier ship of the two. 
 In recent ships, such as the ' Bellerophon ' and ' Her- 
 cules,' the position of the centre of gravity has been 
 raised, by means of deep double bottoms and other 
 contrivances for carrying the great weights of engines, 
 boilers, &c., as high up as possible. 
 
 The fallacy of the popular belief that rolling is 
 caused by carrying heavy weights on the upper works 
 of iron-clads is rendered still more apparent by these 
 facts, which form a complete answer also to the attack 
 made upon the ' Invincible ' class in our own Navy. 
 These vessels have, as before stated, armoured upper- 
 deck batteries, the weight of which being carried at 
 such a height above water has been said, not only 
 by unprofessional writers and speakers, but by pro- 
 fessed naval architects, to be conducive to rolling. 
 The probability, amounting almost to certainty, is, 
 however, that these upper-deck batteries alone would 
 make the ships steadier, as they bring up the centre 
 of gravity ; although, on the other hand, the great 
 sail-power of these ships, necessitating, as it does, 
 a considerable amount of stability, has put a limit 
 
 L 2 
 
148 Rolling of the Iron-Clads. Chap. vii. 
 
 to this improvement. The good behaviour of the 
 ' Magenta ' and ' Solferino ' also becomes inteUigible 
 when it is remembered that their lofty sides, their 
 additional gun-deck, and the unusual height of their 
 armour, all tend to bring the centre of gravity higher 
 than it is in ordinary iron-clads. 
 
 In concluding these general remarks on rolling, I 
 may state that the trials of our recent ships prove that, 
 on the whole, this important and difficult subject has 
 been successfully grappled with ; and the trials of our 
 most recent broadside frigate, the 'Hercules,' have 
 shown her to be all that could be desired as a steady 
 gun platform. The ' Lord Clyde,' ' Eoyal Oak,' and 
 ' Prince Consort,' do undoubtedly roll more than the 
 iron-built ships ; but this, as we have already pointed 
 out, is due in a great measure to the fact that they 
 have wooden hulls. The ' Lord Warden ' is steadier, 
 the difference in behaviour being caused, most probably, 
 by her upper weights being somewhat greater than 
 those of the ' Lord Clyde,' a fact which tends to raise the 
 centre of gravity, and therefore to prevent rolling. 
 
 I now propose to consider the results of actual trials 
 of rolling, so far as the records given in the Reports 
 on our Channel Squadron will enable me to go, and to 
 give a brief resume of these results. Admiral Dacre's 
 Report for 1864 shows that on the four days when all 
 the ships were together, the means of the extreme rolls 
 recorded were as follow : — ' Hector,' 10 degrees ; 
 'Warrior' and 'Defence,' 10-25; 'Black Prince,' 
 11-05; 'Prince Consort,' 11-75 ; and 'Edgar' (wooden 
 line-of-battle ship), 14"25. The ' Warrior's' rolling 
 was measured by a different instrument from that used 
 
Chap. VII. Rolling of the Iron-Clads. 149 
 
 on board the other ships, so that she cannot be fairly 
 compared with them. This record is, however, of 
 great interest, on account of the comparison it renders 
 possible between the behaviour of the iron-clads and 
 the wooden two-decker, the latter proving the heaviest 
 roller in the squadron. In Admiral Yelverton's Eeport 
 for 1866, there are given examples of the comparative 
 rolling of several of the iron-clads, obtained from three 
 days' observations^ of which the mean results are : — 
 ' Achilles' and 'Bellerophon,' 6-6 degrees ; ' Hector,' 11"3 ; 
 'Ocean,' 14-3 ; 'Lord Clyde,' 16-1; 'Pallas,' 17-3. These 
 are, it will be remembered, the sums of the angles of roll- 
 ing to port and to starboard. The only ship present 
 at both trials was the ' Hector,' and she, from being 
 steadiest on the first occasion, dropped into the third 
 place on the second, although her rolling was not much 
 greater. Hence it would naturally be inferred that the 
 'Achilles' and 'Bellerophon' were steadier ships than 
 any of those present in the 1864 squadron; and this 
 inference has been shown to be correct by further trials. 
 The three heaviest rollers are wood-built ships, a fact 
 which partly explains their behaviour. The small size 
 of the ' Pallas,' as compared with the other ships, puts 
 her at a great disadvantage as regards comparative 
 rolling in ordinary waves. 
 
 Admiral Warden's Report for 1867 is much more 
 detailed in its records of rolling than either of the pre- 
 ceding Reports. The performances of various ships are 
 recorded separately, and there are, in addition, abstract 
 returns giving the mean results of the rolling of all the 
 ships tried on various occasions. The trials extended 
 over portions of the months of August, September, and 
 
150 Rolling of the Iron-Clads. Chap. VII. 
 
 October ; and in my remarks upon the results I will, 
 for convenience, follow the arrangement adopted ia the 
 Report, beginning with the returns for August. On 
 the 12th of that month, records of the behaviour were 
 made, when the four ships ' Minotaur,' ' Achilles,' 
 ' Bellerophon,' and ' Lord Clyde,' were proceeding for 
 10 hours at a 5-knot speed under steam, the sea being 
 nearly smooth. The ' Lord Clyde ' was the only ship 
 which rolled at all, and her maximum angle was only 
 3 degrees. From the 14th to the 17th of August, the 
 ' Achilles ' is stated to have rolled very slightly, 
 the maximum angle being 4 degrees ; the other ships 
 are not mentioned. On the 20th, the squadron was 
 under sail only, with a somewhat heavy sea on the 
 beam and bow, and the total mean rolls, measured 
 by the pendulum, were: — 'Minotaur,' 4*8 degrees; 
 'Achilles,' 5-8; 'Bellerophon,' 6-8; 'Lord Clyde,' 
 12*3, On the 21st the 'Achilles' is reported to have 
 rolled very slightly, her motion being scarcely per- 
 ceptible, and the remaining ships are not mentioned ; 
 but on the 23rd, the squadron being under steam in a 
 moderate sea, the pendulum gave the following total 
 mean rolls : — 'Minotaur,' 3*5 degrees; 'Bellerophon' 
 and 'Achilles,' 4 ; ' Lord Clyde,' 6-75. It may appear 
 strange that I should select the pendulum observations 
 after remarking on the errors incident to the use of 
 that instrument ; the reason is that this was the only 
 instrument with which all the ships were supplied. 
 The ' Lord Clyde's ' rolling was, no doubt, made to 
 appear greater than it really was by these observations ; 
 and this is rendered certain by the fact that on the 
 20tb, when the total mean roll was 12-3 degrees by 
 
Chap. VII. Rolling of the Iron^Clads. 151 
 
 the pendulum, that by the clinometer was only 10'4 
 degrees. It is to be regretted that the bar instrument 
 with which the 'Lord Clyde' was furnished was not 
 used on this occasion, the reason given being that 
 the " main trysail sheet was hauled aft, and in the 
 " way of fixing this instrument ; " for if the observa- 
 tions had been made, the true behaviour of the ship 
 would have been known. The total mean roll includes, 
 as we have before stated, both the angles of heel to 
 port and to starboard ; when the ' Lord Clyde,' for 
 example, had a total roll of 12.3 degrees, her roll to 
 port was a little less than half that amount, and that to 
 starboard a little more than half. The trials for August 
 were not made in severe weather, with the exception of 
 that on the 20th, on which occasion the 'Lord Clyde' 
 could not have fought her main-deck guns for about 
 three or four hours, although the other ships could have 
 fought all their guns throughout the day. It must not 
 be forgotten, however, that, even when rolling most 
 heavily, the upper-deck guns carried in the armoured 
 bow battery of the ' Lord Clyde ' could have been 
 fought, and would in all probability have proved most 
 formidable under the circumstances. 
 
 Passing on to the September records, we find that the 
 trials were made during the passage of the squadron 
 from Portland to Berehaven. Only the ' Lord Clyde ' 
 and the ' Bellerophon ' are mentioned in the abstract 
 returns for the 4th and two following days, but by taking 
 them in connection with the detailed reports for those 
 days, we make out the following facts : — The ' Belle- 
 rophon's ' total mean roll for the 4th was about 
 6 degrees by the pendulum, and the other ships did not 
 
1 5 2 Rolling of the Iron-Clads. Chap. VII. 
 
 roll so mucli. On tlie 5tli, the ships encountered a 
 heavy sea in crossing the entrance to the Irish Channel, 
 and the 'Minotaur' rolled 12 degrees, the 'Achilles' 
 13, the ' Bellerophon ' 15, and the 'Lord Clyde' 19. 
 The next day, in very similar weather, the rolling, on 
 the whole, resembled that of the 5th, although on one 
 occasion the ' Minotaur ' rolled 19 degrees, the ' Belle- 
 rophon ' 29 degrees (16 to starboard, and 13 to port), 
 and the ' Lord Clyde ' 23 to starboard, and 24i to port. 
 These two days' trials constituted the severest tests of 
 the rolling qualities of the iron-clads in the squadron, 
 and it is consequently of great interest to enquire as 
 to their fighting capabilities on these occasions. The 
 ' Bellerophon ' could have fought her guns with perfect 
 safety on the 5th, although the captain states that " the 
 " ports could not be kept permanently open." The 
 reports do not state the capability of any of the ships to 
 fight their guns on the 6th, except the ' Lord Clyde,' 
 which could not have fought her main-deck guns, as 
 the sea was washing entirely over the ports ; and this 
 was also the case with this ship at intervals on the 5th. 
 I need hardly again draw the reader's attention to the 
 upper-deck battery guns of this ship, which could, no 
 doubt, have been fought with great effect and perfect 
 safety, although no information is given in the report 
 as to her capability, or otherwise, in this respect. No 
 remarks are made as to the fighting capability of the 
 ' Minotaur ' and ' Achilles ' on the 5th ; but as they 
 were steadier than the ' Bellerophon,' there is no doubt 
 that they also could have fought their main-deck guns. 
 On the whole, therefore, the results of these trials in 
 heavy weather are very satisfactory. 
 
Chap. VII. Rolling of the Iron-Clads. 153 
 
 The October trials extended over a much longer 
 period, and the number of ships in the squadron was 
 larger. On the 9th the ships were under canvas, with 
 a long heavy sea on the beam, and the total mean rolls 
 were moderate for all the ships except the ' Lord 
 Clyde.' The ' Minotaur ' rolled 6'1 degrees, according to 
 the pendulum observations, but only 3 "8 degrees by the 
 batten instrument, another illustration of the inaccuracy 
 of the pendulum. No record was made of the ' Belle- 
 rophon's' performance. All the other ships had bar or 
 batten instruments, the observations with which gave 
 the following total mean rolls: — 'Achilles,' 5*9 degrees; 
 'Warrior,' 7-5; 'Lord Warden,' 9-1; 'Lord Clyde,' 
 21'5. With the exception of the 'Lord Clyde,' the 
 rolling of the ships on this occasion was probably less 
 heavy than that of wooden frigates would have been 
 under similar circumstances. The ' Lord Clyde's ' 
 behaviour was not so satisfactory, as she rolled from 
 9 to 12 degrees each way, and the captain's report 
 states that, "when at general quarters, although the 
 " guns, with lower half-ports up, might occasionally 
 " have been worked, they were practically useless, as 
 " the sea washed into the muzzles directly they were 
 " exposed." In the column headed " number of guns 
 " that could be worked with safety," we j£nd the 
 remark " none ; " but this does not, of course, include 
 the protected upper-deck guns before referred to. On 
 the next day, the ' Lord Clyde' rolled quite as heavily, 
 but the other ships only rolled moderately, and could 
 have fought all their main-deck guns. Their total 
 mean rolls by the bar or batten instruments were : — 
 ' Achilles, 2-2 degrees ; ' Minotaur,' 2-7 ; ' Bellerophon/ 
 
1 54 Rolling of the Iron-Clads. Chap. VII. 
 
 3 ; ' Warrior,' 6-1 ; ' Lord Warden,' 11'2. It is worth 
 notice that the pendulum observations gave the ' Belle- 
 rophon' a total mean roll of 8-2 degrees on this 
 occasion, although her actual roll was only 3 degrees. 
 During the next three days, the weather was much 
 more moderate, and the ' Minotaur ' and ' Bellerophon ' 
 had no appreciable motion, while the ' Achilles ' only 
 rolled 1'4 degrees on the 11th, and 3' 2 degrees on the 
 13th, being nearly steady on the 12th. The remainder 
 of the squadron were also without much rolling motion, 
 as will appear from the following total mean rolls of 
 the 11th : — ' Warrior,' 2" 8 degrees ; ' Lord Warden,' 
 4-9 ; ' Lord Clyde,' 6-5. On the 12th, their behaviour 
 was very similar ; and this was also the case with all 
 the vessels, except the 'Lord Warden,' on the 13th. 
 This vessel, as we have seen, was considerably steadier 
 on all preceding trials than her sister ship, the ' Lord 
 Clyde ;' but on this occasion, while the other ships were 
 comparatively steady, and the ' Lord Clyde ' was only 
 rolling 5" 5 degrees, the ' Lord Warden ' rolled 12 
 degrees. The explanation of this singular behaviour 
 is, doubtless, to be found in the character of the waves 
 among which she was rolling, as all other circum- 
 stances remained unchanged from the preceding day. 
 The squadron was under steam on the 14th, with a 
 long and heavy sea on the quarter. The rolling was 
 considerable, but all the ships, except the ' Lord Clyde,' 
 could have fought their main-deck guns, although the 
 ' Bellerophon,' ' Warrior,' and ' Lord Warden,' would 
 have shipped some water through the ports in doing so. 
 The ports of the ' Lord Clyde ' could be kept open, 
 according to the captain's report, without shipping 
 
Chap. VII. Rolling of the Iron-C lads. 155 
 
 water ; and yet it is added, " none of her guns could 
 " have been fought without great caution." As other 
 ships were shipping water when fighting their guns, 
 this report can only be explained by supposing that 
 there were defects in the arrangements for controlling 
 and working the guns of the ' Lord Clyde.' The total 
 mean rolls, measured by bar or batten instruments, on 
 this trial were: — 'Minotaur,' 6' 2 degrees; 'Achilles,' 
 6-3 •, ' Bellerophon,' 9-4; 'Warrior,' 12-6; 'Lord 
 Warden,' 14*5 ; 'Lord Clyde,' 21. Only two ships are 
 mentioned as having rolled on the 15th : the ' Achilles,' 
 which rolled as much as 10 degrees, and the 'Lord 
 Clyde,' which occasionally rolled deeply ; both ships 
 could, however, have fought their guns. 
 
 The concluding series of trials recorded in this Report 
 were commenced on the 2 5th of October, the ' Prince 
 Consort,' ' Eoyal Oak,' and ' Pallas,' having joined the 
 squadron. No abstract return is given for this day, but 
 from the detailed reports it appears that, with a 
 moderate breeze and a very long swell, the maximum 
 roll of the ' Achilles ' was about 6 degrees, by the 
 pendulum ; and that the average roll of the ' Warrior ' 
 was about 7 degrees, of the ' Prince Consort ' about 
 9 degrees, and of the 'Eoyal Oak' about 10 degrees. 
 The next day's records only give information with 
 respect to four ships, of which the total mean rolls 
 were : — ' Achilles,' 2-5 degrees ; ' Warrior,' 5*7 ; ' Eoyal 
 Oak,' 10 ; and ' Prince Consort ' (by pendulum), 10*4. 
 The ' Prince Consort ' was the only ship which did not 
 carry a batten instrument, and her rolling was no 
 doubt exaggerated by the pendulum observations. 
 During the 27th and 28th the rolling was so slight 
 
156 Rolling of the Iron-Clads. Chap. VI I. 
 
 as to require no notice; but on the 29th, in a heavy 
 sea, and under steam, some of the ships rolled con- 
 siderably. Taking the observations with the batten 
 instruments in all the ships except the 'Prince Consort,' 
 for which vessel the means of the pendulum and clino- 
 meter observations are taken, we find the total mean 
 rolls to have been as follow : — 'Minotaur,' 3*1 degrees; 
 'Achilles,' 5-9; ' Bellerophon,' 8-6; 'Warrior,' 9; 
 'Royal Oak' and 'Prince Consort,' ll'l ; 'Lord 
 Warden' and 'Pallas,' 12; 'Lord Clyde,' 27-J. All 
 except the last-named ship could fight their main-deck 
 guns ; and in the captain's report for the day we find 
 it stated that the ' Lord Clyde ' " might have been 
 " placed to have fought all her guns by bringing her 
 " head to the swell." The records conclude with the 
 trials of the 30th of October, when the sea was moderate, 
 and the ships were under steam. The ' Minotaur ' 
 and ' Bellerophon ' had no apj)reciable motion ; the 
 'Achilles' only rolled 2" 6 degrees; and the total mean 
 rolls for the other ships were given by the batten instru- 
 ment as follow : — ' Lord Warden,' 4*7 degrees; 'Royal 
 Oak,' 5-3 ; ' Prince Consort,' 5-7 ; ' Warrior,' 6-3 ; ' Lord 
 Clyde ' and ' Pallas,' 13. All the ships could have 
 fought their main-deck guns on this occasion. 
 
 From these records of rolling it appears that the 
 ' Minotaur ' and ' Achilles ' were the steadiest ships then 
 in the squadron, the former having a slight advantage, 
 which was probably due to her greater size and weight. 
 These two vessels are rather superior to the ' Bellero- 
 phon,' which is steadier than the ' Warrior.' When 
 the comparative smallness of the ' Bellerophon ' in re- 
 lation to these ships is taken into account, the high 
 
Chap. VII. Rolling of the Iron- Clads. 157 
 
 position she occupies as regards freedom from rolling 
 cannot fail to appear remarkable. As previously 
 stated, the wood-built ships roll more than the iron 
 ships, although the best of them, the ' Lord Warden,' 
 is but very little inferior to the ' ^Varrior.' The ' Lord 
 Clyde's ' behaviour is singularly bad, but as she is a sister 
 ship to the ' Lord Warden,' there can be little doubt that 
 she may be rendered much steadier by raising some of 
 the weights, or by some other equivalent means — in 
 fact, there is no a jjriori reason why she should not be 
 equally steady with the ' Lord Warden ' if the weights 
 carried were similarly arranged. The remaining wood- 
 built iron-clads were only present at a few trials, and 
 were not tested by anything approaching to heavy 
 weather except on the 29th October. As far as these 
 trials go, however, the ' Prince Consort ' and ' Royal 
 Oak ' appear to be nearly as well behaved as the ' Lord 
 Warden,' and the ' Pallas ' to be hardly as steady — a 
 result not to be wondered at when the small dimensions 
 of the ' Pallas ' are taken into account. I would 
 again call attention to the fact that throughout the.'^-e 
 trials all the ships, with the exception of the ' Lord 
 Clyde,' could have fought all their guns on all occa- 
 sions, although they would sometimes have shipped 
 water through the ports. 
 
 The Report on the trials of the Channel Fleet in 1868 
 also contains detailed returns of the rolling of several of 
 the iron-clads during the cruise which extended from 
 4th June to 6th July. I do not propose to go seriatim 
 through these returns, as the weather was on nearly all 
 occasions exceptionally fine, and shall simply state, with 
 respect to most of the returns, that the figures given as 
 
158 Rolling of the Iron-Clads. Chap. vil. 
 
 the result of the observations made show that the 'Mino- 
 taur/ 'Achilles,' and ' Bellerophon,' are the steadiest 
 ships ; that the ' Warrior ' is a little less steady ; and 
 that the other ships, particularly the ' Eoyal Oak,' 
 are not nearly so steady, although they behave quite 
 as well as unarmoured frigates would probably behave 
 under similar circumstances. The ' Hercules ' was 
 not present. There were, however, a few days 
 on which the behaviour of some ships was such as 
 to deserve notice, and I shall briefly refer to those 
 cases. 
 
 On the 8th of June, when the ships were under plain 
 sail, with a moderate sea on the beam and quarter, 
 the force of wind being 4 to 6, the ' Minotaur,' ' Bel- 
 lerophon,' ' Achilles,' and ' Warrior,' were scarcely 
 moving, their total mean roll not exceeding 2i degrees, 
 when the 'Defence's' roll was 8" 8 degrees, the 'Eoyal 
 Oak's' was 9-5 degrees, and the 'Prince Consort's' 
 10-3 degrees. Even the maximum roll on this occasion 
 was, of course, very moderate, and all the guns could 
 have been fought in all the ships ; but the figures given 
 are interesting as the means of comparing the behaviour 
 of the different ships. On the 10th we find the total mean 
 rolls recorded to be as follow : — ' Minotaur,' 4-3 degrees ; 
 'Achilles,' 5-2; 'Bellerophon,' ■5-4; 'Prince Consort,' 
 7-7; 'Warrior,' 9-3; 'Defence,' 11-2; 'Eoyal Oak,' 
 14-3. The ships were under plain sail, the sea was 
 " moderate and long on beam," and the force of wind 
 3, or less than on the 8th. All the ships rolled more 
 on this occasion than on the 8th, except the ' Prince 
 Consort,' which had a total mean roll 2i degrees less. 
 This circumstance can only be explained by the different 
 
Chap. VII. Rolling of the Ircm^Clads. 159 
 
 character of the waves on the two days, as the ship's 
 lading remained almost unaltered ; and it affords another 
 illustration of the varying effect which waves have 
 upon a ship's behaviour. The ' Royal Oak,' although 
 rolling considerably, could fight all her guns through- 
 out the day. One other feature of the returns for this 
 day deserves attention, viz. the fact that, while the total 
 mean roll of the 'Minotaur' was 8*2 degrees accord- 
 ing to the pendulum, it was only 4'3 degrees according 
 to the correct observations of the batten instrument. 
 It is no wonder, therefore, that Captain Groodenough 
 states in his report that he considers the pendulimi 
 observations to be " more than useless," and that he 
 recommends the exclusive use of the batten instrument. 
 On the 11th we find that the ' Royal Oak ' and ' Prince 
 Consort ' were rolling more heavily than on the pre- 
 vious day, while all the other ships were steadier, the 
 squadron being under steam. In fact, during some 
 parts of this day the ' Royal Oak ' could not have fought 
 her main-deck guns with safety, although the captain 
 remarks in his report — " In a case of emergency, and by 
 " watching the rolls, the guns on the highest side may 
 " be used." The ' Prince Consort ' was much steadier 
 than the 'Royal Oak,' her total mean roll being 11*1 
 degrees, while the 'Royal Oak's' was 19'2, and she 
 could fight all her guns throughout the day ; but during 
 a few hours about midday she rolled occasionally so 
 deeply as to render it probable that water would have 
 been shipped at the ports in fighting the guns. The only 
 explanation that can be offered of the fact that these two 
 ships rolled so heavily on a day wlien most of the other 
 ships were comparatively steady must be found in the 
 
i6o Rolling of the Iron-Clads. Chap. vil. 
 
 relative influence which the state of the sea had upon 
 their rolling. The case of the ' Prince Consort ' is 
 especially interesting, as we find her on the 8th rolling 
 more than any other ship in the squadron; on 
 the 10th, in rougher weather, rolling less than the 
 ' Warrior,' ' Defence,' and ' Eoyal Oak ' ; and on the 
 11th, when there was no wind, and the squadron was 
 under steam, again rolling more than any ship except 
 the ' Royal Oak.' Throughout the cruise the ' Royal 
 Oak ' continued to be, except on a few occasions, the 
 heaviest roller among the large ships in the squadron, 
 but the only times when she could not fight her guns 
 were the few hours on the 11th, previously referred to, 
 and from 5 to 6 o'clock on the morning of the 12th, 
 when she was rolling 10 degrees to starboard and 11 
 degrees to port. On the latter occasion the captain's 
 report states that the guns might have been fought 
 during the interval of the roll. 
 
 No remarks are necessary respecting the returns of 
 rolling from the 12th to the 19th of June, when the 
 ' Pallas ' joined the squadron, as the weather was very 
 fine and the rolling very moderate. On the 21st of June, 
 when the ' Minotaur ' and ' Bellerophon ' were prac- 
 tically still (their mean total roll being nine-tenths of a 
 degree), the ' Warrior ' was rolling 1"4 degrees, the 
 'Achilles' 2*1, the 'Prince Consort' S'l, while the 
 roll of the ' Royal Oak ' was 7*7 degrees, that of 
 the ' Defence ' 9*4 degrees, and that of the ' Pallas ' 
 13*4 degrees. Although the 'Pallas' was rolling 
 more than the other ships, she could fight all her guns 
 and keep all her ports open. On the 22nd and 23rd 
 the only ships whose total mean roll exceeded 6 degrees 
 
Chap. VI I. Rolling of the Iron-Clads. 1 6 1 
 
 were the ' Eoyal Oak ' and ' Pallas,' botli of whicli 
 rolled heavily as compared with the other ships, 
 although they were able to fight all their guns through- 
 out the day. On one or two occasions during the re- 
 mainder of the cruise, the ' Pallas ' distinguished herself 
 by rolling considerably more than the other ships, 
 particularly on the 28th, when she had a total mean 
 roll of 16 degrees, while the ship which had the next 
 greatest roll, the ' Royal Oak,' only rolled 5* 3 degrees. 
 It must be remembered, however, that the ' Pallas ' is 
 much smaller than any of tlie other ships, and that, 
 although she sometimes rolled more heavily, all her 
 guns could be fought on all occasions. 
 
 The returns for 1868 do not, as I have said, throw 
 much light on the probable behaviour of our iron-clads 
 in heavy weather -^t sea, but as all the ships except the 
 ' Defence ' had been present in the 1867 squadron, this 
 is the less to be regretted. The little which we can 
 learn is, however, confirmatory of the conclusions drawn 
 from the former trials, and tends to show, not only that 
 our iron-clads do not roll excessively, but that most 
 of them are comparatively steady. Trials at sea have 
 shown that our last large broadside ship, the 'Her- 
 cules,' is probably the steadiest of all the iron-clads ; 
 certainly she ranks with the very best of them. 
 
 The whole subject of rolhng, in both its theoretical 
 and its practical aspects, is still very unsettled ; and 
 from the nature of the inquiry it can hardly be brought 
 to exact results. Theoretical investigations have done 
 much to clear away misapprehensions with respect to 
 the causes of, and remedies for excessive rolling, and 
 have brought out the two great facts above-mentioned 
 
1 62 Rolling of the Iron-Clads. Chap. VII. 
 
 — the effects of tlie metacentric height and of the wave 
 period upon a ship's rolling in a sea-way. Practical 
 observations and experiments have also been of great 
 service, despite their inaccuracy and incompleteness, and 
 have joroved that theoretical conclusions agree very 
 closely with actual performance. What is wanted in 
 order to advance our knowledge of the subject still 
 further is a series of carefully conducted trials with 
 ships of different types, under varied circumstances of 
 wind and weather, the observations being made and 
 the results recorded in a more reliable manner than 
 heretofore. I would not be misunderstood in these re- 
 marks, as I have no intention to throw discredit upon the 
 reports which appear in the Parliamentary Papers. In 
 fact, as far as the Admiralty regulations go, there is 
 little or nothing left to be desired in the mode of con- 
 ducting the trials of rolling ; but any one who goes 
 carefully over the records cannot fail to remark that 
 in many respects they are very imperfect. We have 
 already referred to the fact that in many cases the 
 angles of rolling were measured by different instru- 
 ments in different ships, and have shown this to be 
 a fruitful source of error. Of late this fault has been 
 remedied by using the bar or batten instruments in all, 
 or nearly all, our ships, and by this means checking 
 the errors of the pendulum and clinometer observations. 
 When uniformity in the method of conducting the trials 
 and recording the results has become more general, we 
 shall obtain more valuable and reliable information 
 with respect to rolling than we now possess, and may 
 hope to advance correspondingly in the improvement 
 of our iron-clads. The most valuable aid to this end 
 
Chap. VII. Rolling of the Iron-C lads. 163 
 
 must, however, be derived from the advanced scientific 
 attainments of onr naval officers, as the trials conducted 
 by officers who have mastered the theory of rolling, 
 and are cognisant of the special points requiring settle- 
 ment, cannot fail to be more valuable than those 
 carried out in a spirit of blind obedience to regula- 
 tions, without any regard to, or knowledge of, the 
 underlying principles. 
 
 M 2 
 
164 
 
 Dime7tsions of the Iron-Clads. Chap. VIII. 
 
 CHAPTEE VIII. 
 
 DIMB.YSIOXS OF THE IRON-CLADS. 
 
 Eeference has already been made to the differences in 
 dimensions and proportions existing among our iron- 
 clads. I now propose to enquire at greater length into 
 those differences, and to describe in as popular language 
 as possible the principles which have been developed in 
 the designs of various ships. In order that the reader 
 may readily grasp the facts connected with this subject, 
 I have arranged them in the following table, which 
 gives the lengths, breadths, and proportions of the 
 longest and finest of our wooden vessels, as well as 
 those of our most important iron-clads : — 
 
 Ships. 
 
 Wood ships : — 
 
 Longest three-decked Ime-of-battle sliips . . 
 „ two-decked „ „ •• 
 „ &igates 
 
 Iron-clada : — 
 
 Warrior class 
 
 Minotaur „ 
 
 Defence and Resistance 
 
 Hector and Valiant 
 
 Caledonia class (converted ships) 
 
 Lord Clyde and Lord Warden 
 
 Bellerophon 
 
 Pallas 
 
 Favorite 
 
 Prince Albert (turret-ship) 
 
 Hercules 
 
 Penelope 
 
 Monarch) /,,,.> ( 
 
 Captain } (turret-ships) | 
 
 Invincible class 
 
 Thunderer class (turret-ships) 
 
 Rupert (ram) 
 
 Length. 
 
 Breadth. 
 
 Ft. 
 
 Ins. 
 
 Ft. Ins. 
 
 260 
 
 
 
 61 
 
 254 
 
 9 
 
 55 4 
 
 300 
 
 
 
 52 
 
 380 
 
 
 
 58 4 
 
 400 
 
 
 
 59 4f 
 
 280 
 
 
 
 54 2 
 
 280 
 
 2 
 
 56 4 
 
 273 
 
 
 
 58 6 
 
 280 
 
 
 
 58 11 
 
 300 
 
 
 
 56 1 
 
 22.5 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 225 
 
 
 
 46 ^\ 
 
 240 
 
 
 
 48 1 
 
 325 
 
 
 
 59 
 
 260 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 330 
 
 
 
 57 6 
 
 320 
 
 
 
 53 
 
 280 
 
 
 
 54 
 
 Proportion. 
 
 4-3 
 
 4-6 
 5-8 
 
 285 
 250 
 
 58 
 53 
 
Chap. VIII. Dimensions of the Iron-Clads. 165 
 
 On looking througli this table, the reader cannot fail 
 to be struck with the increase in size and proportions 
 in our earlie.st iron-clad frigate, the ' Warrior,' as com- 
 pared with the longest and finest ships which preceded 
 her. The length is 80 feet greater than that of the 
 longest wooden frigates, and the displacement of more 
 than 9100 tons is 3000 tons greater than that of 
 our largest wooden two -decked ships. These great 
 changes were considered desirable in consequence of the 
 adoption of armour-plating over about 213 feet of the 
 amidship part of the broadside. The objects kept in 
 view in the design were the carrying of a considerable 
 weight of armour on a long fine ship, of which the 
 form was suited to a high speed relatively to the engine- 
 power. It is well known that these objects were most 
 satisfactorily attained, the high estimated speed having 
 been secured with a moderate proportional expenditure 
 of power. 
 
 The partial system of protection being considered 
 objectionable^ for the reasons previously stated, the 
 ' Minotaur' class was designed. In these ships the 
 intention was to combine complete protection with a 
 proportional economy of steam-power similar to that 
 obtained in the ' Warrior.' The very large dimensions 
 given in the table, and the load displacement of over 
 10,200 tons, were then considered the least possible in 
 order to fulfil the conditions laid down, and to enable 
 the requisite weights of equipment to be carried. In 
 this case also the high estimated speed has been obtained 
 on trial, but, owing to their great length, these vessels, 
 even more than those of the ' Warrior ' class, have been 
 found unhandy and wanting in manoeuvring power, a 
 
1 66 Dimensions of the Iron-C lads. Chap. VIII. 
 
 feature of the utmost importance in war sliips. Without 
 for the present entering into the discussion of the rela- 
 tive merits of long and short iron-clads,which will be con- 
 sidered at length in the following chapter, it will be suffi- 
 cient to state that in my opinion the designs of these 
 two classes of ships were in error in this respect — that, 
 in order to save a comparatively small amount of en- 
 gine-power, very long, large, costly, and unhandy ships 
 were constructed. In war ships it is no merit to have 
 a large proportion of weights carried to steam-power 
 developed, if that proportion is obtained by means of 
 excessive length and size ; and an armoured ship should 
 rather carry a large weight of armour and guns upon a 
 short, cheap, and handy hull, a good sjjeed being ob- 
 tained by an increase in the steam-power. 
 
 In the designs of the ' Defence ' and ' Eesistance,' 
 which were prepared soon after the ' Warrior's,' the 
 dimensions and proportions were much more mode- 
 rate, and the estimated speeds were lower. These 
 ships are only 280 feet long^ and the proportion of 
 length to breadth exceeds 6 to 1 ; but the ' Hector ' and 
 ' Valiant,' of the same length, are 2 feet broader, and 
 have a proportion of about 5 to 1, these modifica- 
 tions having been made in consequence of the different 
 disposition of the armour. In the converted ships of 
 the ' Caledonia' class, there was, of course, comparatively 
 little room for change from the original designs pre- 
 pared for two-decked ships of the line. The length was 
 increased by about 20 feet, and the breadth remained 
 almost unchanged, their dimensions, when converted, 
 being 273 feet long by 58^ feet broad, and the proportion 
 of length to breadth being nearly the same as in the 
 
Chap. viii. Dimensions of the Iron-Clads. 167 
 
 finest two-deckers. The French converted ships of the 
 ' Gloire ' class are nearly identical in proportions with 
 the ' Caledonia' class, but are about 18 feet shorter, and 
 it is of interest to know that these moderate proportions 
 have been retained in nearly all the ships of the Impe- 
 rial Navy. In some ships the proportion of length to 
 breadth has been raised to 5 to 1 , and in a few of the 
 floating batteries it is as low as 2^ to 1, but the latter 
 ought hardly to be classed with ships. 
 
 Having sketched the particulars of the dimensions 
 and proportions of the earlier iron-clads, it becomes 
 necessary to refer to the adoption of more moderate pro- 
 portions in the ' Bellerophon ' and other recent ships. 
 The opinions entertained by me on this much contro- 
 verted subject of long and short ships have been repeat- 
 edly stated in public, and for the present I shall deal only 
 with the results of the trials and experiences made with 
 these ships, observing that the new method of design is 
 based upon the considerations that a war ship should 
 be handy, and therefore of moderate length ; and that 
 the high speeds thought desirable can be obtained with 
 fuller lines and a shorter ship, by adding somewhat to 
 the engine-power. The increased manoeuvring power, 
 and the reduction in prime cost, resulting from the adop- 
 tion of moderate proportions, more than make amends 
 for this small addition to the steam-power. 
 
 This new method received its first illustration in the 
 * Bellerophon,' and has undergone in that vessel a series 
 of trials, the results of which are, on the whole, of a 
 most satisfactory character. In order to enable the 
 reader to judge for himself on this point, the following 
 tabular statements are given, which also afford the means 
 
i68 Dimensions of the Iro7i-Clads. Chap. vili. 
 
 of comparing the offensive and defensive powers of this 
 vessel with those of longer ships. It may, however, 
 be proper to state beforehand that the ' Bellerophon,' 
 having a central and a bow battery on the main deck 
 and being protected throughout the length at the watei-- 
 line, is so much superior offensively and defensively 
 that she cannot be satisfactorily compared with the 
 ' Warrior ' or ' Black Prince,' which are only protected 
 amidships. Still it is worthy of remark that the ' Belle- 
 rophon ' compares with the ' Black Prince ' as follows, 
 the measured-mile trials being taken as the indices of 
 steam performance ; observing that in this and the 
 following comparison the excess in weight of the 
 thicker backing adopted in the longer ships is not 
 regarded, as this is fully counterbalanced by the much 
 stronger skin-plating, and the longitudinal girders 
 behind armour, fitted in the ' Bellerophon ' : — ■ 
 
 i 
 
 i Bellerophon. I Black Prince. 
 
 Weight of armament 359 tons 
 
 „ armour 1089 „ 
 
 Thickness of armour 6 inches 
 
 Resisting strength of ai-mour, estimated as the\ of. 
 
 square of the thickness /| 
 
 Speed .. 14:'17 knots 
 
 Horse-power (indicated) 6521 
 
 Cost £364,327 
 
 (to which add a 
 
 percentage for 
 
 dockyard charges) 
 
 340 tons 
 975 „ 
 4i inches 
 
 20 
 
 13-604* knots 
 5772 
 
 £378,310 
 
 The advantage thus lies with the ' Bellerophon ' in 
 every point of the comparison, excepting perhaps the 
 cost (when swelled by the dockyard charges), and the 
 
 * In this and the following Table on page 172 I have given the maximum 
 speed attained by the 'Black Prince' at load draught in the first seven years 
 of her existence, as the 14-knot trial of 1868 came after the bulk of this 
 chapter was written, and is irreconcilable with all her former trials. 
 
Chap. VIII. Dimensions of the Iron-Clads. 
 
 169 
 
 engine-power. In addition, she possesses extreme liandi- 
 ness as compared with the ' Black Prince,' which would 
 be anticipated from the fact that she is 80 feet shorter. 
 It may be objected to this comparison that the ' Black 
 Prince ' is inferior in performance to her sister ship, the 
 ' Warrior ;' but while this is true, it is no less a fact 
 that both vessels are embodiments of the same prin- 
 ciple. If, however, the ' Warrior ' were taken as the 
 representative long ship, it would still appear that the 
 ' Bellerophon ' had the advantage as respects armour 
 and armament — and, of course, as respects handiness — 
 while only very little inferior in speed. The ' Warrior's' 
 indicated horse-power is, as we should expect, consider- 
 ably less. This point will be examined further on in 
 discussing the results of recent trials. 
 
 The objection made above to the comparison of the 
 ' Bellerophon ' with the ' Black Prince ' on account of 
 their different systems of protection does not apply to 
 the comparison of the ' Bellerophon ' with the 'Achilles,' 
 as both vessels have a central battery and a water-line 
 belt. The following table will give a good idea of the 
 contrast between the two ships : — 
 
 Weight of armament 
 
 „ armour 
 
 Thickness of armour 
 
 Resisting strength of armour, estimated as before 
 
 Speed 
 
 Horse-power (indicated) 
 
 Cost (net) 
 
 Bellerophon, 
 
 359 tons 
 1089 
 
 6 inches 
 36 
 
 14-17 knots 
 6521 
 £364,327 
 
 Acliilles. 
 
 297 tons 
 1200 „ 
 4^ inches 
 20 
 
 14- 35 knots 
 5722 
 £470,330 
 
 The ' Achilles,' it must be remembered, is of the same 
 dimensions and proportions as the ' Warrior,' being 80 
 feet longer and of more than 2000 tons' greater dis- 
 
1 7° Dimensions of the Iron-Clads. Chap. VI 1 1. 
 
 placement than the ' Bellerophon ;' yet we find the latter 
 carrying thicker armour and a greater weight of arma- 
 ment than the ' Achilles.' The total weight of armour 
 carried by the ' Achilles ' is, it is true, greater than that 
 carried by the ' Bellerophon,' but in the larger vessel it 
 is spread over a very long hull, and is therefore only 
 4tV inches thick in the thickest part, whereas the ' Bellero- 
 phon ' carries 6-inch plating. The ' Achilles ' has a small 
 advantage as respects speed and indicated horse-power ; 
 this slight superiority being purchased at a cost of which 
 the money value is represented by 106,000/. — the dif- 
 ference between the first cost of the two ships — and of 
 which the real value cannot be estimated without also 
 taking into account their relative powers of offence and 
 defence. The latter may, to some extent, be understood 
 from the foregoing table, but this must be supplemented 
 by the superior handiness of the shorter ship. The 
 difference of indicated power, amounting, as it does, to 
 only 800 H.-P., really represents about 120 H.-P. nomi- 
 nal of the new type of marine engine. This fact is 
 worth notice, as the additional cost for engines of this 
 increased power would not exceed 8000/. or 9000/., and 
 this still leaves a very large margin (approaching one 
 hundred thousand pounds) between the first costs of the 
 two ships. It may, however, be thought that the expense 
 involved in maintaining the additional power — extra 
 fuel, &c. — during the period of the ship's service, would 
 tend to still further decrease this margin, and tell 
 against the shorter ship. That this would not be the 
 case will be evident when it is observed that every 
 means has been taken in the new type of engines to 
 economise fuel ; and that the experience gained on 
 
Chap. VIII. Dimensions of the Iron-Clads. 
 
 actual service goes to prove that this aim has been most 
 satisfactorily attained. It will also be obvious that the 
 longer ship would require a larger number of men in 
 the crew ; and that consequently the total cost of main- 
 taining her will be considerably greater. On the whole, 
 then, it may be fairly concluded that it would have 
 been most improper to have made the ' Beilerophon ' as 
 long and as large as the ' Achilles ' in order to save 
 a small amount of power, and thus to have sacriiiced 
 the other and very important advantages enumerated 
 above. 
 
 In the succeeding chapter I shall again have to 
 refer to steam-trials made with the * Beilerophon,' and 
 shall therefore pass on now to notice some of the other 
 iron-clads, constructed since that vessel, in which similar 
 moderate dimensions have been adopted. Several of 
 these ships have been tried at sea, and the results 
 obtained have been equally satisfactory with those 
 obtained with the ' Beilerophon.' The ' Lord Clyde ' 
 and her sister ship, the ' Lord Warden,' are included 
 among those vessels, and are perhaps the most striking 
 illustrations of the advantages of the new system of 
 construction. They are 280 feet long^ about 59 feet broad, 
 and have a load displacement of about 7700 tons. The 
 proportion of length to breadth is thus very little more 
 than 41 to 1, while in the 'Beilerophon' it is about 5^ 
 to 1, in the ' Warrior ' 6g to 1, and in the ' Minotaur ' 
 6| to 1. The sides of these short broad ships are com- 
 pletely protected, and there are in addition powerful 
 bow batteries on the upper deck. The armour is 4|- 
 and 5^ inches thick, and there is besides an inner skin 
 of 1^-inch iron between the outside planking and the 
 
17- 
 
 Divieiisions of the Iron-Clads. Chap. VIII. 
 
 timbers of the frame, extending entirely around the 
 battery for a depth of 10 feet. The armament is also 
 very heavy, and the speed realised imder steam is about 
 1 3^ knots. The reader will gain a better idea of these 
 vessels, however, from a comparison of some of their 
 more important particulars with the corresponding 
 ])artici;lars of the ' Warrior ' class. I have taken the 
 ' Lord Clyde ' and the ' Black Prince ' as the represen- 
 tatives of the two classes in the following comparison : — 
 
 Length 
 
 WeigM of armament . . 
 „ armour 
 
 Speed 
 
 Horae power (indicated) 
 Cost 
 
 Lord Clyde. 
 
 2S0 feet, 
 376 tons. 
 1379 „ 
 18-43 knots 
 6064 
 £294,481 
 (to which add a per- 
 centage for dock- 
 yard charges) 
 
 Black Prince. 
 
 380 feet 
 840 tons 
 975 „ 
 13-604 knots 
 5772 
 £378,810 
 
 In Speed and indicated horse-power, the ' Black Prince,' 
 it will be seen, has a very slight advantage ; but the 
 short ship has some advantage as regards armament, 
 and an immense advantage as regards armour, cost, and 
 handiness. With these facts before him, I cannot 
 imagine any one maintaining that the proper course to 
 have adopted in designing the ' Lord Clyde ' would 
 have been to make her 100 feet longer than she is, to 
 take away more than one-fourth of her armour and part 
 of her guns, to deprive her of all bow and stern fire 
 from protected guns, to leave almost half her length 
 wholly unprotected, and to spend at least 50,000/. more 
 upon her, in order to make her performance under 
 steam quite equal with the same power to that of the 
 longer ship. 
 
 Other examples might be given of the favourable 
 
Chap. VIII. Dimensions of the Iron-Clads. 173 
 
 results obtained witli short ships. The ' Lord Warden ' 
 has been as successful as the ' Lord Clyde,' and the 
 ' Pallas ' (225 feet long and 50 feet broad) has realised 
 over 13 knots. With these facts before him, the reader 
 will not, I think, be surprised to find that the ' Hercules,' 
 although she has about 1.300 tons' greater displacement 
 than the ' Bellerophon, ' has very nearly the same pro- 
 portion of length to breadth ; and that in the ' Monarch,' 
 ' Penelope,' and the ' Invincible ' class, similar moderate 
 proportions and dimensions have been retained. 
 
 The ' Hercules ' is the last ship tried, and it is but 
 just, in conclusion, to state that in her, on a displace- 
 ment of about 8700 tons and a length of 325 feet, a 
 total vreight of armour of 1481 tons is carried, the thick- 
 nesses employed being 9, 8, and 6 inches. The ' Black 
 Prince' carries 975 tons of 4i-inch armour, on a length 
 of 380 feet and a displacement of about 9250 tons. The 
 ' Black Prince ' has only the amidship part protected, 
 while the ' Hercules ' has an armour belt throughout 
 her length, rising to the height of a lofty main-deck ; 
 in addition to central, bow, and stern batteries, in which 
 the guns are efficiently protected. Add to this the facts 
 that the shorter and smaller ship carries about 140 tons 
 greater weight of armament than the ' Black Prince,' 
 and can command an all-round fire from guns sheltered 
 behind armour, while the battery guns of the long ship 
 only have the ordinary broadside training (about 30 
 degrees each way), and some idea will be gained of the 
 advances that have been made in the powers of offence 
 and defence of our iron-clads simultaneously with the re- 
 duction of their proportions and dimensions from those 
 first adopted. The speed attained by this vessel (the 
 
174 Dimensions of the Iron-Clads. Chap. VIII. 
 
 ' Hercules') on her load-draught trial (14'69 knots) is 
 greater than any other iron-clad (except the ' Monarch ') 
 has realised at load draught ; the engine-power required 
 to drive her at that speed was, of course, very large ; but I 
 have always held the opinion that the additional power 
 required on account of her moderate proportions was 
 much more than compensated] for by the saving in first 
 cost and the superior handiness which result, and I pro- 
 vided for such additional power in the original design. 
 As I shall have occasion hereafter to refer at some length 
 to the comparative performance under steam of this ship, 
 and of a design of longer and fin6r form which, except in 
 handiness, would be her equal as an engine of war, I 
 shall not discuss the subject further here. 
 
 It may be thought by some persons that in the pre- 
 ceding remarks too high a value has been put upon 
 handiness in iron-clad war-ships, but that this is not the 
 opinion of experienced seamen will appear from the 
 following extracts from Reports of trials of ships com- 
 posing the Channel Fleet. In his Report for 1864, 
 Admiral Dacres observes : — " As the speed of a steam 
 " fleet is only equal to that of its slowest ships so the 
 " recent evolutions with ships of such different length 
 " and form have gone far to show that the rapid 
 " manoeuvring of a fleet must be ]-egulated by its longest 
 " ships, for the diameter of the circles described by the 
 " ' Black Prince ' and ' Warrior,' being, say, 1000 yards 
 " at moderate speed, a fleet of which they form part 
 " must move in circles with a radius of 500 yards, 
 " instead of about 250, which could be done by vessels 
 " of the length and steering as readily under steam as 
 " the ' Hector : ' but to convince of the imhandiness of 
 
Chap. VIII. Dimensions of the Iron-Clads. 175 
 
 " these vessels from their length with the present 
 " means in our power of steering ships, I need only add 
 " that, where other vessels require only to be two cables 
 " apart, the ' Warrior ' and ' Black Prince ' must be 
 " kept four cables." In another paragraph he says : — 
 " The great drawback to the many excellencies of this 
 " class of vessel (the ' Warrior') is that their extreme 
 " length interferes with their handiness in many most 
 " important points." In 1866, Admiral Yelverton 
 wrote as follows of the ' Achilles/ which is of the same 
 dimensions as the ' Warrior ' : — " With all her good 
 " qualities, the ' Achilles ' is, from her great length, most 
 " difficult to handle ; and this defect in action, more 
 " especially if engaged with a turret-ship, might be her 
 " ruin. ... I feel certain that this ship might, and 
 " probably would, have to go out of action to turn 
 " round, thus exposing herself, in almost a defenceless 
 " position, to the fire of more than one of the enemy's 
 " ships." In concluding his Eeport, he added : — " As the 
 " result of this cruise I feel bound to award the first 
 " place to the ' Achilles.' I am, however, of opinion 
 " that her great length is an insurmountable objection, 
 " and have no hesitation in saying that ships of the 
 " ' Bellerophon ' class, from their size and general han- 
 " diness, particularly under steam, will prove more 
 " efficient and valuable for war purposes." 
 
 In the Eeports of the trials of the Channel Fleet in 
 1868, Admiral Warden says that " the ' Bellerophon ' is 
 '' the readiest and most easily handled under steam " 
 of all the ships in the squadron. Admiral Eyder re- 
 marks — " There can in my opinion be no doubt that, as 
 " a general rule, the short class has and must have the 
 
176 Dimensions of the I 7-on-Clads. Chap. Vl 11. 
 
 " advantage, as regards general handiness under steam 
 " alone, over tlie long class," and in nearly the same 
 words speaks of the comparative handiness of the two 
 classes under sail alone, provided the short class have 
 sail enough. The same opinion is expressed in most of 
 the Reports of the captains of the different ships, Captain 
 Goodenough, of the ' Minotaur,' in a tabular form of the 
 merits of the various vessels, giving the ' Bellerophon ' 
 more than twice as many marks for " handiness for 
 " manoeuvre " as he gives to any of the long ships, and 
 Captain Vansittart, of the ' Achilles,' stating that " there 
 " cannot be a doubt the shorter ships are handier under 
 " steam, sails furled^ than their longer companions." In 
 these Reports also the question of handiness in connec- 
 tion with the power of ramming, or avoiding an enemy's 
 charge, is considered, and the general opinion enter- 
 tained is, as Admiral Ryder puts it, that " the short 
 " class must, amongst broadside ships, have the advan- 
 " tage over the long class for giving effect to ramming, 
 " and also, but to a less extent, for escaping from being 
 " rammed." The latter feature obviously possesses 
 great importance, since there can be little doubt but 
 tliat in future naval actions mucli will depend upon it, 
 and the experience of Lissa proves that quickness of 
 turning is absolutely essential in order that a ship may 
 avoid being rammed. I shall revert to this subject 
 hereafter. 
 
 With these high estimates of the value of handiness 
 before him, the reader will feel a greater interest in the 
 following facts as to the relative turning powers of our 
 long and short iron-clads. On the measured-mile trials 
 of ships of the Navy it is usual to perform a complete 
 
Chap. viii. Dimensions of the Iron-Clads. 
 
 Time. 
 
 j Diameter of Circle. 
 
 .Min. S-c. 
 
 '•' Yar.l.s ] 
 
 7 38 
 
 ;)3;i , 
 
 9 10 
 
 1050 ! 
 
 7 15 
 
 Xijt recorcled i 
 
 4 9 
 
 55!) 
 
 4 48 
 
 COO 1 
 
 4 56 
 
 i 031 1 
 
 1 
 
 circle under full steam-power with the helra hard over, 
 and to record the diameter of the circle traversed as 
 well as the time occupied in turning. As these trials 
 are conducted by experienced staffs of naval and pro- 
 fessional officers, and under very similar circumstances, 
 they afford the best means which are accessible of 
 testing a ship's manoeuvring powers. In the following 
 table I have given the results of these trials for a few 
 ships, in order to enable the reader to judge for himself 
 as to their comparative handiness. 
 
 Minotaur . . 
 Wiinior .. 
 Achilles .. 
 Bellirophon . 
 Lord Warden 
 Lord Clyde 
 
 The great advantages possessed by the three short 
 ships, both as respects the time of turning and the 
 circle traversed, are so apparent as to require no 
 comment. The ' Bellerophon,' it will be seen, is the 
 handiest ship, although she is 20 feet longer than the 
 ' Lord ^Varden ' and ' Lord Clyde,' her superiority being 
 due, no doubt, to the balanced rudder with which she 
 is fitted. Her moderate length is, however, the great 
 cause of her handiness, as is evident from the fact that 
 the other two short ships, having ordinary rudders, are 
 so much superior to the three long ships, and so little 
 inferior to the ' Bellerophon ' herself. Besides being 
 much handier, the short ships require fewer men at the 
 steering wheels than tlie long ships ; and in this re.'ipect 
 the ' Bellerophon ' stands pre-eminent, as her balanced 
 
 X 
 
178 Dimensions of the Iron-Clads. Chap. VIII. 
 
 rudder has the special advantage of requiring only a 
 moderate force to put it over to a considerable angle — 
 for example, on the measured-mile trial 8 men steered 
 the ' Bellerophon ' with her rudder at an angle of 37 
 degrees, whereas the 'Minotaur' required 18 men at 
 the wheel, and no less than 60 more at the tackles 
 (total 78), with the rudder at only 23 degrees. It may 
 be interesting to add that on the ' Lord Clyde's ' trial 
 12 men were at the wheel with the rudder at 25 
 degrees, thus proving the otherwise obvious fact that 
 short ships require much less power to steer them. 
 
 The results obtained with the ' Hercules ' in the trials 
 of turning power made on the measured mile in Stokes' 
 Bay are, however, of even a more striking character 
 than those just referred to. When steaming at full 
 speed (i4"691 knots), with 16 men at the steering 
 wheels, and the helm over to about 40 degrees, she re- 
 versed her course — that is, completed the half-circle — in 
 1 minute 50 seconds. She turned the whole circle in 4 
 minutes, its diameter being 527 yards when turning to 
 starboard, and 697 yai'ds when turning to port, giving 
 a mean of 562 yards. In time of turning the ' Hercules ' 
 is therefore somewhat superior to the ' Bellerophon,' 
 while the circles of turning of the two ships are almost 
 identical. Comparison is needless between the ' Her- 
 cules ' and any of the long ships named in the pre- 
 ceding table. It is, however, only proper to state that 
 this heavy ship can turn in less time than any war-ship 
 afloat ; and that there is no merchant-ship of considerable 
 size, whether twin-screw or single screw, which ap- 
 proaches in speed of turning this ponderous and power- 
 ful iron-clad. 
 
Chap. VIII. Dimensions of the Iron-Clads. 
 
 179 
 
 Sea trials of the turning powers of ships are not as 
 reliable as those made at the measured mile, this differ- 
 ence arising principally from the facts that at sea different 
 ships are very differently managed, and that so much 
 is left to the individual opinions of the officers in com- 
 mand. Notwithstanding these differences of opinion 
 and management, the records of trials of the Channel 
 Squadron show most strikingly the superior handi- 
 ness of the shorter ships. Taking Admiral Warden's 
 Report for 1867, we find a table of the results of trials 
 of steaming in circles, from which I have abstracted 
 some of the performances of the ' Minotaur,' ' Achilles,' 
 ' Warrior,' ' Bellerophon,' ' Lord Clyde,' and ' Lord 
 Warden,' in order that the previously stated facts may 
 receive further confirmation. For convenience I have 
 selected the highest and the lowest trial speeds, 12 and 
 5 knots respectively, and have arranged the results in 
 two groups, taking account only of the trials with the 
 helms hard over. At the high-speed trial neither the 
 ' Minotaur ' nor ' Lord Warden ' were tested, not having 
 attained the required speed, but the remaining vessels 
 performed as follows : — 
 
 
 Hard Starboard. 
 
 Hard Purt. 
 
 Mean. 
 
 
 Time. 
 
 Diameter. 
 
 Time. 
 
 Diameter. 
 
 Time. 
 
 Diameter. 
 
 AcLillcs 
 Warrior 
 Bcllcrophou 
 Lord Clyde . . 
 
 Min. Sec. 
 
 6 40 
 
 7 21 
 4 40 
 4 56 
 
 Yards. 
 616 
 753 
 365 
 377 
 
 Min. Sec. 
 6 40 
 8 11 
 4 55 
 4 52 
 
 Yards. 
 620 
 768 
 487 
 379 
 
 Min. Sec. 
 
 6 40 
 
 7 46 
 4 47 
 4 54 
 
 Yards. 
 618 
 760 
 401 
 378 
 
 These results agree in their general character with 
 those of the measured-mile trials, although, from the 
 fact that the ships were not at full speed, the two sets 
 
i8o Dimensions of the Iron-Clads. Chap. VIII. 
 
 of observations are not strictly comparable. Tbe ' Lord 
 Clyde's ' behaviour was, it will be noticed, considerably 
 better on this occasion than on the measured-mile trial 
 as far as the distance traversed in turning is concerned, 
 the time of turning remaining almost unaltered ; while 
 the ' Bellerophon ' took more than half a minute longer 
 on the sea trial than on the measured mile, and turned 
 in a much smaller circle, although the mean diameter 
 of the circle she traversed was greater, than that moved 
 through by the ' Lord Clyde.' As regards the behaviour 
 of these short ships relatively to the long ships, the 
 results are almost as. satisfactory in this case as on the 
 measured-mile trials. On the measured-mile trials of 
 the ' Hercules ' above referred to, when under half-boiler 
 power, a speed of a little more than 12 knots was at- 
 tained, and the figures given in the report of her turning 
 the circle at this speed are fairly comparable with those 
 given in the preceding table. In going round with 
 helm a-starboard, the time of completing the circle was 
 4 minutes 36 seconds, and the diameter of the circle was 
 590 yards ; with helm a-port, the time was 5 minutes 
 20 seconds, and the diameter 651 yards ; the mean there- 
 fore was, for time, 4 minutes 58 seconds, and for diameter 
 620 yards. In time of turning at this speed the 
 ' Hercules ' is, so far as these figures can be relied ujDon, 
 a little inferior to the ' Bellerophon ' and ' Lord Cl3'de ; ' 
 the space traversed in turning is greater than that 
 moved through by those two ships. She is much 
 superior to the ' Warrior ' and ' Achilles ' in time of 
 turning, although the diameter of the circle is almost the 
 same as for the ' Achilles,' but is much less than that for 
 the ' Warrior.' 
 
Chap. VIII. Dimensions of the Iron-Clads. 
 
 i8i 
 
 At the lowest trial speed of the Channel Squadron, 
 5 knots, the shorter ships were also proved to have 
 similar advantages, the results being as follow : — 
 
 Minotaur 
 Achillea 
 Warrior .. 
 Bellerophon . 
 Lord Clyde . 
 Lord Warden 
 
 Hard Starboard. 
 
 Time. 
 
 Mill. Sec. 
 
 i 13 
 
 i 13 18 
 
 I 10 51 
 
 ; 1, 5 
 
 9 5t 
 
 8 55 
 
 Diameter. 
 
 Yards. 
 570 
 G18 
 GS7 
 270 
 392 
 386 
 
 Time. 
 
 Mill. Sec. 
 12 11 
 
 12 
 
 12 
 
 IS 
 
 32 
 52 
 15 
 
 Diameter. 
 
 Yards. 
 596 
 615 
 
 420 
 388 
 393 
 
 Mean. 
 
 Time. 
 
 Diameter 
 
 Min. Sec. 
 
 Yar.ls. 
 
 12 35 
 
 583 
 
 12 56 
 
 616 
 
 11 3i 
 
 609 
 
 8 48 
 
 345 
 
 9 53 
 
 390 
 
 8 35 
 
 389 
 
 The ' Lord ^Varden's ' behaviour on this trial is very 
 striking as compared with that of the ' Lord Clyde,' her 
 sister ship, and with that of the ' Bellerophon ; ' the 
 latter vessel having taken a little longer to go about, 
 but traA-er.^ed a smaller circle. But even when the ' Lord 
 Clyde,'. the least handy on this trial, is taken as the re- 
 presentative short ship, her behaviour is so superior to 
 that of either of the long ships as to render furthei 
 remarks superfluous. Taking these facts, then, as to 
 actual performance in connection with the opinions of 
 the high authorities quoted above, and the repeatedly 
 expressed beliefs of almost all naval men, it must, I 
 think, be admitted that too high an estimate has not 
 been put upon the value of manoeuvring power in ships 
 of war, and that the superiority of the short ships in 
 this respect has not been overrated. 
 
 In concluding this chapter, I may remark that it has 
 been my duty to carry into practice principles of design 
 totally opposed to those exemplified in the ' Warrior ' 
 and ' Minotaur ; ' but that our experience with long and 
 short iron-clads ma\' be fairlv stated as follows : — That 
 
i82 Dimensions of the Ircm-C lads. Chap. vill. 
 
 the short ships may be driven as fast as the long ships 
 by a moderate addition to their engine-power ; that in 
 turning power and general handiness nnder steam and 
 sail the short ships are much superior ; and that the 
 great reduction in the prime cost of short ships much 
 more than makes amends for the addition to the steam- 
 power. That this is so, the preceding facts and figures 
 will prove ; and that it was reasonable to anticipate 
 those results before actual trials had taken place, it will 
 be my endeavour to show in the following chapter. 
 
Chap. IX. Forms and Proportio7is of Iron-Clads. 183 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 FORMS AND PROPORTIONS OF IROX-CLADS.* 
 
 Having, in the preceding chapter, given a summary of 
 the dimensions and proportions adopted in our principal 
 armoured vessels, and compared the powers and per- 
 formances of some long and short ships, I now propose 
 to discuss the question of the forms and proportions of 
 iron-clads from a more theoretical point of view, illus- 
 trating and enforcing the conclusions arrived at by 
 means of reference to recorded facts. 
 
 Scientific writers upon the forms and resistances of 
 ships have generally recommended the adoption of forms 
 of least resistance, and have taken no account whatever 
 of the effect which the weight of the material in the 
 hull should have upon the form of a ship. The most 
 cursory glance will, however, be sufficient to show that 
 this generalisation cannot include the designs of all 
 ships. Take, for example, the vastly different con- 
 ditions to be fulfilled in a merchant-ship and in an iron- 
 clad war-ship. The former is designed to carry cargo 
 economically, and the weight of hull forms a compara- 
 tively small fraction of the total displacement ; while 
 the latter is in reality a floating fortress, constructed 
 with a view to efficiency in powers of offence and de- 
 
 * Part of the substance of this chapter was given in a Paper on "Long 
 and Short Iron-Clads," read hefore the Institution of Kaval Architects in 
 March, 18U9. 
 
184 Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. Chap. ix. 
 
 fence, and carrying great quantities of armour, the 
 weight of which depends upon the form and propor- 
 tions of the huU. The merchant-ship may, with advan- 
 tage, he made long and fine, since the requisite carrying 
 power can he secured as well by means of great length 
 as of great beam, and the proportion of speed to engine 
 power is thus increased. In the iron-clad, however, 
 any addition to the length leads to a corresponding 
 increase in the area of the surface to be armoured, and 
 in the unproductive weight to be carried; while a 
 reduction in the length leads to a considerable decrease 
 in that area, and in the total weight of armour. 
 
 The impossibility of correctly prescribing any general 
 form of ship, in disregai'd of the armour, will exhibit 
 itself even more strikingly if we consider independently 
 one end of a ship, say the bow or entrance. To fix our 
 ideas, we will take the case of the ' Minotaur,' for which 
 ship it has been found by actual calculation that in still 
 water the weight of the first 80 feet of the bow exceeds 
 its disp)lacement by about 420 tons. This excess of 
 weight must clearly be floated by the central part of 
 the shijD where the buoyancy exceeds the weight ; and 
 the length of this part being 250 feet, while its mean 
 breadth is about 5 6 feet, its immersion must be increased 
 by about 13 inches, in consequence of the unsupported 
 weight forward. This additional immersion increases 
 the area of the midship section which has to be pro- 
 pelled through the water by from 60 to 65 square feet. 
 Now, let us imagine this bow to be so shortened and 
 shaped — on the one hand increasing its buoyancy, and 
 on the otlier diminishing its weight — as to produce an 
 equilibrium between its total weight and buoyancy. 
 
Chap. IX. Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. 185 
 
 No doubt by making it bluffer we shall increase its 
 resistance to motion tbrougb the water, but we shall at 
 the same time lighten the burden upon the central part 
 of the ship, and reduce the total area of the midship 
 section to be driven as well as the total weight. It is 
 easy to see that by this means we may succeed in get- 
 ting the same speed with a given power as would have 
 been obtained by employing the longer and finer, but 
 much heavier, bow. This is the essence of the principle 
 which I have laid down, and carried out in practice. 
 
 In the design of all merchant steamships the con- 
 ditions to be fulfilled are so similar, and the proportions 
 of weight of hull, equipment, and cargo to displacement 
 are so nearly the same, that we should expect to find a 
 similarity of form in the greater number of these vessels. 
 Nor is our expectation disappointed, for although differ- 
 ences do exist, they are not usually of a very striking- 
 character, and this fact makes the adoption of the 
 ordinary " constants " for steam performance a very 
 fair standard of excellence for merchant-ships. For 
 armoured war-shijjs the case is very different, and these 
 constants are by no means to be taken as standards of 
 merit, as I shall show almost immediately. 
 
 The constants here referred to are, I need hardly say, 
 estimated from the two formulae — 
 
 (Speed) ^ X Midship Section Immersed 
 
 (1) Constant = 
 
 (2) Constant = 
 
 Indicated horse-power. 
 (Speed)' X (Displacement) ^ 
 
 Indicated horse-power. 
 
 These formulai are alwa}-s used in calculating the results 
 of the trials of ships of tlie Navy. In them it is assumed 
 (1) that, within certain limits, the resistance to a ship's 
 
1 86 Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. Chap. ix. 
 
 motion varies as the square of the velocity, and that, 
 therefore, the propelhng power must vary as the cube 
 of the velocity ; (2) that the resistance also varies, 
 ecBteris paribus, as the area of immersed midship section 
 in the jBrst formula, and as the two-thirds power of the 
 displacement in the second formula ; (3) that the indi- 
 cated horse-power bears a constant ratio to the useful 
 work of the engine, i. e. to the power actually available 
 for propulsion. These assumptions are not, of course, 
 strictly accurate, but they are sufficiently so to render 
 the constants of much service in comparing perform- 
 ances, and in determining the engine-power needed in a 
 new design. 
 
 I may remark in passing, that the method of cal- 
 culating the horse-power just referred to is much more 
 reliable than any methods based upon more theoretical 
 investigations. Nor is this a matter of surprise when 
 it is remembered that the difficulties surrounding the 
 subject of fluid resistance are very great, and that the 
 amount of experimental knowledge possessed regarding 
 it is very small. On the other hand, a glance through the 
 elaborate table of trials printed by the Admiralty enables 
 one to select a few ships, similar in form and proportions 
 to the new design, and from the constants obtained by 
 those ships to calculate the horse-power required for the 
 estimated sjoeed with a very fair amount of accuracy. 
 
 While recognising the value of the constants, how- 
 e\"er, I cannot entertain the opinion that they should 
 form the sole standards by which all steam-ships, ar- 
 moured as well as uuarmoured, should be judged. Such 
 an opinion virtually amounts to a belief that the chief 
 aim of the naval architect ought to be the lowering of 
 
Chap. IX. Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. 187 
 
 the proportions borne by the indicated horse-power to 
 the speed attained, to the midship section immersed, 
 and to the displacement. As far as form alone is con- 
 cerned, this view is, no doubt, correct ; but obviously, 
 if carried out in its entirety, it would lead to the con- 
 struction of ships that would carry no weights except 
 those of the propelling apparatus. This is, of course, 
 an extreme case, and it may be thought unfair to argue 
 from it the folly of the system as a whole. But if 
 economy of steam-power is the chief desideratum in ship 
 design, the case imagined is also the fullest develop- 
 ment of the principle ; and if we once admit other con- 
 siderations besides form — such as cargo-carrying power, 
 first cost, and handiness — the failure of the constants as 
 criteria is tacitly acknowledged. 
 
 There can be no doubt that in merchant-ships in- 
 creased proportions and fineness of form have led, and 
 do lead, to increased carrying power, and to economy 
 of steam-power ; and that in such cases the constants of 
 performance have higher values. The lightness of the 
 hull would, in my opinion, tend to produce these results, 
 and I have previously stated that for merchant-ships — 
 and it is true also in a great measure for unarmoured 
 war-ships— the constants are very fair standards of 
 excellence. But with iron-clad ships, if a similar mode 
 of comparison were followed, we should in many in- 
 stances be comparing vessels of which the armour ^^-as 
 of extremely different degrees of efficiency, and should, 
 at the same time, wholly exclude this important fact 
 from our consideration. 
 
 For example, if the ' Warrior ' and ' Bellerophon ' 
 were compared, we should have the former with com- 
 
1 88 Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. Chap. IX. 
 
 paratively thin armour-plating extending over a little 
 more than half the length ; and the latter protected 
 with thicker armour throughout the length at the water- 
 line, hesides having armoured central and how batteries. 
 It would obviously be most delusive, in comparing these 
 ships, to waive all consideration of these facts, and to 
 take constants of performance as the sole criteria. In 
 fact, such a course would be equivalent to requiring 
 that the proportion of weight of hull (including armour) 
 to the displacement should be considerably greater in 
 the shorter than in the longer ship. At the same time 
 the other most important jooints connected with first 
 cost, character and weight of armament, and handiness, 
 would be entirely neglected. 
 
 In short, constants of performance can only be of use 
 in comparing the merits of two iron-clads when there is 
 similarity, or at least equality, of construction, armour, 
 and armament ; and when this condition is satisfied, the 
 conclusions based upon the values of the constants must 
 be supplemented by considerations of cost and handiness. 
 The merits of iron-clad ships do not consist in carrying 
 a large proportion of weights to engine-power, or having 
 a high speed in proportion to that povi^er ; but rather 
 in possessing great powers of offence and defence, being 
 comparatively short, cheap, and handy, and steaming at 
 a high speed, not in the most economical way possible, 
 but by means of a moderate increase in power on 
 account of the moderate proportions adopted in order 
 to decrease the weight and cost, and to increase the 
 handiness. It must be obvious that, if a ship 300 feet 
 long, plated all over with given armour, carrying a 
 given armament, and costing, say, 300,000/., steams at 
 
Chap. IX. Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. 189 
 
 a given speed with a given power, it would be a mere 
 waste of money and a sacrifice of handiness to build her 
 400 feet long, at a cost, say, of 380,000/., for no other 
 object than that of driving the greater weight at the 
 same speed with about the same power ; in other words, 
 for the mere purpose of raising the constants. 
 
 It ma}^, perhaps, be objected to this statement that the 
 trials of actual ships do not show that a ship 300 feet 
 long can be driven at the same speed, with about the 
 same power as a shij) 400 feet long, when the armour is 
 equally efficient in the two ships. Now, I need hardly 
 say that in dealing with speed trials great care is 
 required in order to ensure a fair comparison of the 
 performances of any two ships. So many causes of 
 difference exist that, until it is known that they are 
 either inactive, or else acting similarly, in the ships 
 compared, the comparison is of little worth. The 
 quality of the coal, the character of the stoking, the 
 condition of the engines, and the state of the bottom, as 
 well as the force of the wind and condition of the sea, 
 are the chief causes of error in such comparisons ; and 
 the reports on the performances of our iron-clads prove 
 that greater varieties of speed are due to these, so to 
 speak, secondary causes than are shown to exist when 
 the ships are first tried on the measured mile. This 
 is, as I have previously shown, a most important fiict, 
 requiring to be borne in mind when the policy of our 
 naval construction is being discussed ; for the present I 
 only refer to it as connected with the speeds actually 
 attained on trial. 
 
 "With these prefatory remarks I desire to call atten- 
 tion more closely to the results of a series of trials, 
 
190 Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. Chap. IX. 
 
 already briefly referred to in former chapters, which 
 took place in the spring of 1868, and which were con- 
 ducted in such a manner as to eliminate, as far as 
 possible, the effects of these sources of error ; care being 
 taken to ensure equally good coal and stoking, the 
 bottoms being cleaned almost immediately before the 
 trials took place, and the engines, as the trials showed^ 
 being in excellent condition. The ships tried were the 
 ' Minotaur,' ' Bellerophon,' and ' Warrior ; ' but, for 
 the present, I shall confine attention to the two first- 
 named vessels, as their performances will throw some 
 light on the point now under discussion. It has been 
 found, by actual calculation, that the weights per square 
 foot of the protecting material — armour and backing — 
 in these ships, when uniformly distributed over the 
 surface of the side from the lower edge of armour up 
 to the upper deck, are very nearly identical ; so that it 
 may fairly be assumed that, if the ' Bellerophon ' were 
 completely protected, she would have quite as strong 
 armour as the ' Minotaur,' the excess in thickness of 
 the skin-plating in the ' Bellerophon ' over that in the 
 ' Minotaur ' being put into armour. Hence, it follows 
 that these ships may be taken as representatives of the 
 300-foot and 400-foot ships previously referred to. 
 
 Before being tried by a six-hours' run at sea, the 
 ships were put over the measured mile in Stokes' Bay, 
 where the ' Minotaur' attained a speed of 14*41 1 knots 
 with an indicated power of 6702 H.-P., and the ' Bel- 
 lerophon ' realised 13-874 knots with an indicated 
 power of 6002 H.-P. With a greater power by 700 
 H.-P., therefore, the 'Minotaur' beat the 'Bellerophon' 
 by abont half a knot. This trial does not help us much 
 
Chap. IX. Forms and Proportions of Iroii-C lads. 191 
 
 in our investigation, but the six-hours' trials are of 
 exactly the right character for our purpose, since on 
 them the indicated horse-powers were, as nearly as 
 possible, identical. On this trial, when the ' Minotaur ' 
 had only been out of dock nine days, she made 14" 165 
 knots with 6193 H.-P. ; and on a similar trial the 
 ' Bellerophon,' which had been twenty-one days out of 
 dock, made 14-053 knots with 6199 H.-P. As the 
 Controller of the Navy remarked in his report on 
 these trials, " the ' Bellerophon ' had the disadvantage 
 " of having been twice as long in the water as the other 
 " two ships, and at this time of the year (the spring) 
 " the growth of weeds is particularly rapid ; " so that, 
 allowing for the greater foulness of her bottom, it may 
 be fairly stated that her speed was nearly identical with 
 that of the ' Minotaur,' when the engines of the two 
 ships developed equal power. I do not for a moment 
 intend it to be supposed that a single trial of each of 
 these ships, however carefully conducted, is sufficient 
 to establish the general principle that 300-foot and 
 400-foot ships, of the character previously described, 
 always should steam at the same speed with about the 
 same power. But, on the other hand, it is right to 
 state that on this, the only occasion when such ships 
 have been tried under similar conditions, they did per- 
 form in accordance with that principle ; and this fact 
 shows the want of force in the objections supposed to 
 be based on the results of steam trials. 
 
 Having compared the performances of the • Minotaur ' 
 and ' Bellerophon ' on this trial, it may not be amiss for 
 me to refer briefly to the results obtained with the 
 ' Warrior ' under similar circumstances, although I wish 
 
192 Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. Chap. IX. 
 
 to repeat the opinion tliat tlie differences in offensive 
 and defensive power between her and the other two 
 ships preclude anything like a fair comparison. On 
 the measured mile, the 'Warrior's' speed was 14"079 
 knots and her power 5267 H.-P. ; and on the six-hours' 
 trial at sea, the speed was 13' 936 knots, and the power 
 5092 H.-P. Hence it appears that on the measured 
 mile the ' Bellerophon ' was about one-fifth of a knot 
 slower than the ' Warrior,' although her engines de- 
 veloped about 430 H.-P. more than those of the longer 
 ship; and on the sea trial, with 1100 H.-P. less, the 
 ' Warrior ' was only about one-ninth of a knot slower 
 than the ' Bellerophon.' The additional power required 
 in the ' Bellerophon,' as compared with the ' Warrior,' 
 is undoubtedly considerable, and, taking the sea trial 
 as a test, may be assumed to fall somewhat below 
 1000 H.-P. indicated, when a speed of about 14 knots 
 is realised. The nominal horse-power corresponding to 
 this additional power may, with the new type of engine, 
 be roughly estimated at 150 H.-P., and its suj)ply would 
 involve an outlay of about 10,000^. This is to be re- 
 garded as the price paid for superior handiness, for 
 much more efficient armour and armament, and for an 
 enormous reduction in the prime cost of the ship as a 
 whole — a price which it has always been acknowledged 
 would probably have to be paid, and for which pro- 
 vision was made in the design of the engines, while it 
 is really trifling when compared with the results ob- 
 tained. I need not do more than refer to the facts 
 that the expense involved in maintaining and provid- 
 ing fuel for this additional power is much more than 
 counterbalanced by the additional outlay required for 
 
Chap. IX. Forms and Proportions of Iroti-Clads. 193 
 
 the maintenance of the much larger crew of the longer 
 ship ; and that in cost of repairs the short ship is sure 
 to fall below the other. 
 
 But while I thus recognise the more economical 
 steam-performance of the ' Warrior ' when compared 
 with the ' Bellerophon,' I must again draw attention to 
 the facts previously stated respecting the relative per- 
 formances of the ' Minotaur ' and ' Bellerophon.' Both 
 of the long ships had their extreme length given them 
 in order to make them economical of steam-power, and 
 I have therefore a perfect right, if I choose, to select 
 the ' Minotaur ' as the 1 epresentative of long ships 
 instead of the ' Warrior,' and to say that the ' Bellero- 
 phon ' can be driven at equal speed with about the 
 same engine-power. I shall only add that the obvious 
 conclusion to be drawn from the relative performances 
 of the two long ships is that more moderate proportions 
 and less fineness of form than had been employed in 
 the ' Wari'ior ' might with advantage have been adopted 
 in the ' ^linotaur' when it was determined to com- 
 pletely protect that ship, instead of increasing her 
 proportions to the extent that was done. 
 
 I may remark in this connection that, to again quote 
 from the Controller's report, " these experiments prove 
 " that, with good coal and good stoking, there is but 
 " little difference between the results of a trial at the 
 " measured mile and one lasting for six hours on 
 " the open sea, all the circumstances being alike ; " 
 and the fairness of the measured-mile trials as tests of 
 steaming capabilities is thus strongly established. 
 
 The discussion of the merits of our long and short 
 iron-clads, as developed in their various trials at sea, 
 
 
 
194 Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. Chap. I x. 
 
 has often run into error, on account of the speeds 
 attained having alone been considered, and the horse- 
 powers developed at the time of trial having been 
 neglected. Such a course is obviously incorrect, as 
 the connection between horse-power and speed is indis- 
 soluble ; and it has been truly said that complaints of 
 fallings off in speed, which were really due to smallness 
 of horse-power, amount to complaints that the hull did 
 not drag the engines along at a greater rate than that 
 at which they were working. The fact is that all the 
 long iron-clads have engines of the old type, which had 
 been gradually improved upon, until — apart from the 
 great consumption of fuel — it had been made to ap- 
 proach perfection, and not only was the development 
 of the guaranteed power ensured, but in many cases 
 that power was considerably exceeded. The recent 
 short iron-clads, on the other hand, have the new type 
 of engines with surface-condensers, superheaters, and 
 other novel arrangements, which, like all newly intro- 
 duced mechanical contrivances, are liable to occasional 
 failures that could hardly have been foreseen, and can 
 be easily remedied, but that, for the time, cause very 
 mistaken notions of their true character. As experience 
 is gained in the construction and working of these im- 
 proved engines, they, like the older type, will no doubt 
 be perfected ; but, at present, their performance is not 
 nearly of so certain a character as that of the more 
 wasteful type which preceded them. It has happened, 
 in consequence of this fact, that on some occasions the 
 power developed in, and the speed obtained by our 
 short ships at sea, have fallen considerably below ^the 
 corresponding- results on the measured-mile trials ; and 
 
Chap. IX. Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. 195 
 
 in published reports of these so-called failures, the low 
 speeds have been given MAithout any mention being 
 made of the want of engine-power. One instance of 
 this will suffice. The ' Bellerophon's ' engines, of 1000 
 H.-P. nominal, were designed to work up to about 
 6i times, and on the measured mile did develope the 
 estimated power and drive the ships at 14' 17 knots. 
 About a year after this trial, the ' Bellerophon ' was 
 again tried at sea with the Channel Squadron, and only 
 made 11*8 knots, the indicated power being only a little 
 more that 4i times the nominal (4580 H.-P.). This 
 comparatively small development of power was the 
 result of failure in the working of the superheaters and 
 other arrangements intended to secure the estimated 
 results, and the speed was further reduced by the ex- 
 cessive foulness of the bottom. These facts were not of 
 course known to the public, to whom the statement 
 of the full speed attained seemed quite conclusive 
 evidence of her inferiority as a steam-ship, no thought 
 being given to the question of how great, or how little, 
 an amount of power was developed. In fact, on this 
 occasion, adverse critics became quite jubilant, consider- 
 ing that the question of "long versus short ships" had 
 received a practical demonstration that admitted of no 
 reply. The folly of such criticisms has, however, been 
 shown by the further trials made with the ' Bellerophon ' 
 both on the measured mile and at sea, which have con- 
 firmed the correctness of the original measured-mile 
 trial as a standard of steaming capability. 
 
 The results of the trials of all the short ships may be 
 summed up in the statement that, when the engine- 
 power has reached the amount guaranteed, the estimated 
 
 2 
 
196 Forms and Proportions of Iron-C lads. Chap. IX. 
 
 speed has been attained, but that, when the power has 
 fallen off, the speed also has necessarily declined. It is 
 not the function of a ship to propel her engines, but to 
 be propelled by them at a speed exactly proportioned 
 to the power exerted ; and this is a complete answer to 
 a multitude of complaints respecting the performances 
 of one or two short ships. 
 
 As far as our experience goes, then, I am warranted 
 in making the assertion that in armoured ships, as the 
 extent and thickness of the armour to be carried are 
 increased, the proportion of length to breadth should be 
 diminished, and the fulness of the water-lines increased ; 
 and that the shorter, fuller ship can be propelled at as 
 great a speed as the longer, finer ship, with about the 
 same, or only a little greater, horse-power. The con- 
 stants of performance will undoubtedly be lower in the 
 shorter ship ; but they are only hypothetical standards 
 of merit, and the benefits in point of first cost, handi- 
 ness, and maintenance, resulting from moderate propor- 
 tions, are tangible facts, far outweighing in importance 
 the small economy of steam-power resulting from the 
 adoption of greater proportions and fineness of form. 
 
 One other point requires attention when we are dis- 
 cussing the propriety of building very long iron-clads — 
 the fact that in such ships the proportion of frictional 
 resistance to direct head resistance becomes considerably 
 increased. It appears probable even that, if very ex- 
 treme proportions were adopted, the advantages result- 
 ing from the reduction in head resistance would be 
 more than counterbalanced by the increase in frictional 
 resistance. To illustrate this statement, I will suppose 
 a fully armoured ship to be lengthened amidships, and 
 
Chap. IX. Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. 197 
 
 made finer at the extremities with a view to increased 
 speed in proportion to engine-power. In such a case a 
 great weight of armour would be added ; the strength 
 of the hull proper would require to be increased ; and 
 the immersed surface would be made so much greater 
 as to render it questionable whether the saving in horse- 
 power, or the increase of speed, if any, would be at all 
 commensurate with the increased cost, or make amends 
 for decreased handiness. Adding to this the considera- 
 tions that a greater area of immersed surface means a 
 greater area subject to fouling, and that one of the chief 
 causes of falling off in speed of a sea-going iron-built 
 ship is foulness of bottom, we may, I think, fairly con- 
 clude that this is a feature of the question which ought 
 not to be overlooked. 
 
 That this is so will perhaps appear more clearly if I 
 refer to the results of one or two trials of actual ships. 
 Before doing so, I would observe that the advocates of 
 long iron-clads have at various times urged the im- 
 portance of increasing the proportions borne by the 
 displacement and the midship section to the indicated 
 power, and have declared our recent iron-clads to be 
 wanting in these, which they consider the " chief ele- 
 " ments of naval architecture." Having so fully stated 
 my own opinion on this matter in a previous part of this 
 chapter, I need hardly say that in using, as I shall do, 
 these measures of efficiency, I only wish to make a com- 
 parison between two long ships in a manner of which 
 those who favour long iron-clads must approve, and that 
 I by no means approve of this method of comparing the 
 merits of armoured ships. 
 
 The trials to which I refer are those which took place 
 
198 Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. Chap. IX. 
 
 in the spring of 1868, in wliicli the 'Warrior,' 
 ' Minotaur,' and ' Bellerophon,' were engaged. Taking 
 the six-hours' trials at sea of the two long ships, it is 
 found that the proportion of horse-power to displace- 
 ment in the 'Minotaur' was 603 to 1000^ and in the 
 ' Warrior' 553 to 1000, while the proportion of horse- 
 power to midship section immersed was 468 to 100 in 
 the 'Minotaur,' and 404 to 100 in the 'Warrior.' In 
 other words, the horse-power is less per ton of displace- 
 ment, and per square foot of midship section in the 
 ' Warrior' than in the ' Minotaur,' although the latter 
 is the longer ship, and has the greater proportion of 
 length to breadth. It is proper to state that the 
 ' Minotaur ' steamed faster than the ' Warrior,' so that 
 her proportion of horse-power was on that account 
 somewhat greater than that of the ' Warrior ; ' but in 
 order that the proportionate expenditure of power 
 might be the same in the two ships, the ' Minotaur's ' 
 indicated power would have to be diminished by more 
 than 500 H.-P., which is doubtless a greater diminution 
 than would be necessary if the ' Minotaur ' were driven 
 at the ' Warrior's ' speed. Here then we have a result 
 which follows from the adoption of a standard of merit 
 brought forward by the advocates of long iron-clads, 
 b\it which goes against the theory that increased length 
 and proportions tend to increased economy of steam- 
 power. I shall be glad to see this seeming contradiction 
 explained^ if that be possible ; for my own part I am 
 inclined to think that these facts are confirmatory of 
 the opinion previously expressed, that in very long 
 ships the increase of frictional resistance is so consider- 
 able as to become, at least, as imjjortant as the decrease 
 
Chap. IX. Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. 199 
 
 in direct head resistance. At the same time I do not 
 wish to appear to base a general theory on one or two 
 trials ; and there can be little doubt that limits do 
 exist at which the increase of length ceases to be bene- 
 ficial, whether these limits have as yet been reached or 
 not. 
 
 In the course of the year 1868 attention was drawn 
 to the relations which should subsist between the form 
 and dimensions of iron-clad ships and the weight of 
 material in the hull, in a paper read by me before the 
 Royal Society, and since published in their ' Trans- 
 actions.' By the pln-ase " weight of material " I mean 
 the weight of hull per unit of surface, say, per square 
 foot, and when the armour is included, this is very dif- 
 ferent in different ships, varying with the extent and 
 thickness of the armour. The methods and arguments 
 of the paper are, in reality, applicable to both com- 
 pletely and partially armoured ships, including in the 
 latter class ships like the ' "Warrior ' without any pro- 
 tection at the extremities, and the very much more 
 efiScient ships with armour-belts, and central, bow, or 
 stern batteries. In order to make a fair comparison, 
 however, between ships having different Eirrangements 
 and thicknesses of armour and backing, I have thought 
 it proper to distribute the total weight of protecting 
 material over the whole length of the broadside in each 
 case ; thus, in fact, turning all ships into equivalent, but 
 completely protected ships, for the purpose of com- 
 parison. By this means a fair idea can be obtained of 
 the relative defensive powers of the ships considered, 
 before any steps are taken to compare their perform- 
 ance under steam. To aftbrd a general view of the 
 
2.00 Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. Chap. ix. 
 
 methods employed and the results arrived at, I have 
 given the following abstract, which is a reprint of that 
 sent to the Royal Society: — 
 
 "Abstract of Paper sent to tlie Royal Society ' On the 
 " Relation of Form and Dimensions to Weight of 
 " Material in the Construction of Iron- Clad Ships' 
 
 " The object of the paper is to show that the pro- 
 " portion of length to breadth in a ship, and the form 
 " of her water-lines, should be made in a very great 
 " degree dependent upon the weight of the material of 
 " which her hull is to be constructed — that an armour- 
 " plated shi]3, for example, should be made of very dif- 
 " ferent proportions and forni from those of a ship 
 " without armour, and that, as the extent and thickness 
 " of the armour to be carried by a ship are increased, 
 " the proportion of length to breadth should be dimi- 
 " nished, and the water-lines increased in fulness. 
 
 " It is highly desirable that this subject should receive 
 " the attention of men of science, not only because it 
 " bears most directly upon both the cost and the effi- 
 " ciency of future iron-clad fleets, but also because it 
 " opens up a theoretical question, which has hitherto, 
 " the author believes, received absolutely no considera- 
 " tion from scientific writers upon the forms and resist- 
 " ances of ships, viz. the manner in which the weight 
 " of the material composing the hull should influence 
 " the form. Prior to the design of the ' Bellerophon,' 
 " the forms of ships were determined in complete dis- 
 " regard of this consideration, and even the most recent 
 " works upon the subject incite the naval architect to 
 " aim always at ai^proaching the form of least resist- 
 
Chap. IX. Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. 201 
 
 " ance. The investigations given in the paper show, 
 " however, that the adoption of a form of least resist- 
 " ance, or of small comparative resistance, may, in fact, 
 " lead to a lavish outlay upon our ships, and to a great 
 " sacrifice of efficiency ; while, on the other hand, the 
 " adoption of a form of greater resistance would con- 
 " tribute in certain classes of ships to great economy 
 " and to superior efficiency. 
 
 " In order to indicate clearly, but approximately 
 " only, the purpose in view, the author first considers 
 " the hypothetical cases of a long and a shorter ship, 
 " both of which are prismatic in a vertical sense. The 
 " length of the long ship is seven times its breadth, and 
 " its horizontal sections consist of two triangles set base 
 " to base. The length of the short ship is five times its 
 " breadth, the middle portion being parallel for two- 
 " fifths of the length, and the ends being wedge-shaped. 
 " It is assumed also that, at a speed of 14 knots, the 
 " long ship will give a constant of 600, and the short 
 " ship a constant of 500 in the Admiralty formula : — 
 
 Speed ' X Mid. Section 
 Indicated horse-power. 
 
 " The draught of water is in each case 25 feet, and 
 " the total depth 50 feet. 
 
 " It is taken for granted that the form of the long 
 " ship has been found satisfactory for a ship of such 
 " scantlings that we may consider her built of iron of 
 " an uniform thickness of 6 inches, the top and bottom 
 " being weightless. 
 
 " Now, let it be required to design a ship of equal 
 " speed, draught of water, and depth, but of such 
 
202 Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. Chap. ix. 
 
 " increased scantlings (whether of hull proper or of 
 " armour) that the weight shall be equivalent to an 
 " uniform thickness of 12 inches of iron, the top and 
 " bottom being weightless as before. First, the new 
 " ship has the proportions of the long ship given to her, 
 " and, secondly, those of the shorter ship. In each case 
 " the engines are supposed to develope seven times 
 " their nominal horse-power, and to weigh (with boilers, 
 " water, &c.) one ton per nominal horse-power. The 
 " coal supply in each case equals the weight of the 
 " engines, so that both ships will steam the same dis- 
 " tance at the same speed. But as the equipment of 
 " the smaller ship will be less weighty than that of the 
 " larger ship, we will require the larger ship to carry 
 " 2000 tons, and the smaller 1500 tons additional 
 " weight. 
 
 " Assuming the breadth extreme in each case to be 
 " the unknown quantity, we can, from the Admiralty 
 " formula given above, deduce an expression for the 
 " indicated horse-power ; thence under the assumed con- 
 " ditions the weights of engines and coals can be found; 
 " and these being added to the weights of hull (calcu- 
 " lated on the assumption that the sides are of 12-inch 
 " iron) and to the weights carried, give an expression 
 " for the total displacement in tons of each ship. 
 " Another expression is found for this displacement 
 " by finding the weight of water displaced. The two 
 " expressions are equated, and a quadratic equation is 
 " formed, from which the breadth extreme is deter- 
 " mined, and from it all the other values can be found. 
 
 " The accompanying table shows the results obtained 
 " by this method for the two classes of ships : — 
 
Chap. IX. Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. 203 
 
 Long Ship. I Shorter Ship. 
 
 Length, extreme 581 feet. i 342 feet. 
 
 Breadth 83 „ i CSJ „ 
 
 Nominal horse-power .. .. 1,350 H.-P. i 1,337 H.-P. 
 
 Indicated „ .... 9,450 „ ' 9,359 „ 
 
 Weight of huU 12,570 tons. 7,576 tons. 
 
 „ engines 1,350 „ 1,337 „ 
 
 „ coals.. .. . 1,350 „ \ 1,337 „ 
 
 „ carried 2,000 „ 1,500 „ 
 
 Total displacement 17,270 „ 11,750 „ 
 
 "^ It will, therefore, be seen that, by adopting the 
 ' proportions and form of the shorter ship, a ship of 
 ' the required scantlings and speed will be obtained, 
 ' on a length of 342 feet, and a breadth of 68^ feet ; 
 ' whereas if the proportions of the long ship are adopted, 
 ' the ship, although of the same scantlings and speed 
 ' only, will require to be 581 feet long and 83 feet 
 ' broad, the steam-power in both cases being as nearly 
 ' as possible the same. 
 
 " Considerations of this character, worked out more 
 ' fully, led the designer of the ' Bellerophon ' to depart 
 ' so considerably from the form and proportions of the 
 ' ' Minotaur.' 
 
 " The next part of the investigation is based upon 
 ' the official reports of the measured-mile trials of the 
 ' ' Minotaur ' and ' Bellerophon,' when fully rigged, and 
 ' upon calculations made from the drawings of those 
 
 * ships. It is assumed that a prismatic vessel having 
 ' the same mean draught as each of these ships, and 
 
 • having the same form and dimensions as the mean 
 ' horizontal section — which equals the mean displace- 
 ' ment in cubic feet, divided by the mean draught of 
 ' water — will give the same constant as the ship herself 
 ' at the assumed speed of 14 knots, which, as nearly as 
 
204 Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. Chap. ix. 
 
 " possible, equals the speed obtained by both the ' Mino- 
 " taur' and the ' Bellerophon ' on the measured mile. 
 " For each ship the weight of the armour and backing 
 " is supposed to be uniformly distributed over vertical 
 " prismatic sides of the dimensions of the armoured 
 " sides, and the weight of hull is similarly distributed 
 " over vertical prismatic sides of the dimensions below 
 " water of the mean horizontal section, and above water 
 " of the armoured side. The actual weights carried by 
 " the ships are thus transferred to what may be termed 
 " representative prismatic vessels, having the same con- 
 " stants of performance as the ships. The detailed 
 " calculations in the paper show that the weight per 
 " square foot of the material in the hulls of the two 
 " ships, when distributed over the sides of the repre- 
 " sentative prismatic vessels, is very nearly the same 
 " for both, and the same holds with respect to the 
 " weight per square foot of armour and backing. The 
 " ' Minotaur' is rather heavier in both respects, but, for 
 " the reasons given in the paper, the means of the 
 " values found for the two ships are taken, and are 
 " found to be : — 
 
 Weight per square foot of hull \ = 152 ton. 
 
 ,j „ armour and backing = 'll ton. 
 
 " The questions next considered are these : — Pre- 
 " suming it to be necessary to build another ship 
 "which shall also steam 14 knots, carry the same 
 "proportionate supply of coal to engine-power, and 
 " proportionate quantities of stores, but shall have her 
 " armour and backing of double the weight of armour 
 " and backing of the ' Bellerophon ' and ' Minotaur,' 
 " then, 1st, what will be the size, engine-power, and 
 
Chap. IX. Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. 205 
 
 " cost of the new ship of the ' Minotaur' type, and 
 " having the same mean draught and depth of armour ; 
 " and, 2nd, what will be the size, engine-power, &c. if 
 " built on the ' Bellerophon ' type, and having her 
 " mean draught and depth of armour ? this condition 
 " implying of course that the same constants of per- 
 " formance as before will be realised in each case. On 
 " account of the great disproportion in size between the 
 " two types of ship, it is obvious that the smaller one 
 " will require much less weight of equipment. It is 
 " assumed, therefore, that the additional weights of the 
 " smaller ship (exclusive of engines, boilers, and coals) 
 " amount to 700 tons, and those of the larger ship to 
 " 1000 tons. The developed power of the engines, 
 " proportionate supply of coal, and the weight of en- 
 " gines, &c., are taken exactly the same as in the hypo- 
 " thetical case first given. 
 
 " By proceeding with the investigation for each case 
 " in a way similar to that sketched for the hypothetical 
 " ships, only treating the breadth extreme of the mean 
 " horizontal sections of the new ships as the unknown, 
 " the following results are obtained. The new ship of 
 " the ' Minotaur ' type which fulfils the required con- 
 " ditions will be nearly 490 feet long, 72^ feet breadth 
 " extreme, and have a total displacement of 14,250 tons, 
 " while the new ship of the 'Bellerophon' type is 380 
 " feet long, 71 feet breadth extreme, and has a total 
 " displacement of 10,950 tons. It thus becomes obvious 
 " that a correction is needed in the weight per square 
 " foot of hull in the new ship of the ' Minotaur ' type, 
 " as her length has been so greatly increased; it is 
 " considered that an increase of at least 10 per cent, is 
 
2o6 Forms mid Proportions of Iron-Clads. Chap. IX- 
 
 required, and this is the allowance made. On the 
 other hand, the new ship of the ' Bellerophon ' type 
 is still shorter than the 'Minotaur' herself, and the 
 displacement is not much greater thSin the actual dis- 
 placement of the ' Minotaur,' so that no correction is 
 needed in her weight per square foot of hull. When 
 the correction has been made for the new ship of the 
 ' Minotaur ' type, the final results in round numbers 
 are as follow for the two classes of ship : — 
 
 Length 
 
 Breadth .... 
 
 Tonnage 
 
 Nominal horse-power 
 
 Indicated „ 
 
 Weight of hull 
 
 ,, armonr and backing 
 
 „ engines and coals . . 
 
 „ stores carried . 
 
 Displacement 
 
 New Ship of 
 Minotaur Type. 
 
 510 feet. 
 75 „ 
 13,770 tons. 
 1,080 H.-P. 
 7,560 „ 
 7,100 tons. 
 5,190 „ 
 2,160 „ 
 1,000 „ 
 
 New Ship of 
 Bellerophon Type. 
 
 380 feet. 
 71 „ 
 8,620 tons. 
 1,080 H.-P. 
 7,560 „ 
 4,460 tons. 
 3,630 „ 
 2,160 „ 
 
 700 „ 
 
 15,450 
 
 10,950 
 
 " Taking the cost per ton at 55^. (which is the 
 average cost per ton of tonnage for the hulls of 
 armour-clad ships), the saving made by adopting the 
 new ship of the ' Bellerophon ' type would amount to 
 283,250/., or considerably more than a quarter of a 
 million sterling. 
 
 " It must also be considered that the ship of the 
 ' Bellerophon ' type would cost less for maintenance 
 and repair, and be much handier in action. 
 " The last investigation in the paper is purely 
 theoretical, and consists of a determination of the 
 dimensions which would be required in two ships, of 
 which the horizontal sections are curves of sines, and 
 which are prismatic vertically, if they were built with 
 
Chap. IX. Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. 207 
 
 the same weight per square foot of hull (say -^ ton) 
 as the ' Bellerophon,' but carried twice the weight of 
 armour per square foot (say ^-^ ton). In these cases 
 the bottom is taken to have weight as well as the 
 sides, the speed for both is 14 knots, the draught of 
 water is 25 feet, and the depth of the armoured side 
 24 feet. One of the ships is seven times her breadth 
 in length, and the other is five times. Professor 
 Rankine's rule for the calculation of horse-power and 
 speed is employed, and the same conditions of engines, 
 &c., are assumed as have been indicated previously. 
 The larger ship carries 1350 tons additional weights, 
 and the smaller 900 tons. 
 
 " The results obtained for these ships are as follows, 
 when expressed in round numbers : — 
 
 Length 
 
 Breadth 
 
 Nominal horse-power 
 
 Indicated „ 
 
 Weight of hull _ .. 
 
 „ armour and backing 
 „ engines and coals . . 
 „ carried 
 
 Displacement 
 
 Larger Ship. 
 
 585 feet. 
 84 
 1,270 H.'-P. 
 8,890 „ 
 7,586 tons. 
 6,124 „ 
 2,540 „ 
 1,350 „ 
 
 17,600 
 
 Smaller Ship. 
 
 425 feet. 
 85 „ 
 
 980 H.-P. 
 6,860 „ 
 5,540 tons. 
 4,470 „ 
 1,960 „ 
 
 900 „ 
 
 12,870 
 
 " These results are very different in detail from those 
 " obtained in the cases based on the actual trials of the 
 " ' Bellerophon ' and ' Minotaur,' but not more so than 
 " might have been anticipated from the adoption of 
 " such a different form of ship and mode of calculating 
 " resistance. The 2000 horse-power which is needed by 
 " the larger ship above the power required by the 
 " smaller ship is principally due to the difference 
 
2o8 Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. Chap. IX. 
 
 " between the immersed surfaces of the two ships, and 
 " is spent in overcoming friction. The immersed mid- 
 " ship sections, it will be remarked, only differ by a 
 " very small amount. 
 
 " This last investigation serves to show that the 
 " theoretical best form of ship being taken, and the 
 " most recent rule being applied in the calculations, 
 " the speed of 14 knots can be obtained in the short 
 " type of ship at a surprisingly less cost and size than 
 " the long type requires, and this result agrees with 
 " that of the preceding investigation based on actual 
 " trials," 
 
 I will now refer briefly to another aspect in the case 
 of long versus short iron-clads. Supposing two ships to 
 be constructed, having the same central, bow, and stern 
 batteries, and the same height of port above water ; the 
 same depth and thickness of armour in the water-line 
 belts ; the same proportion of weight of hull to total 
 surface ; and the same equipment and armament ; with 
 engines of the same type, and with weights of coal 
 which would enable them to proceed equal distances at 
 the same speed, would the advantage, on the whole, 
 rest with the ship which had the form and proportions 
 of one of our long iron-clads, say the 'Minotaur,' or 
 with the ship having more moderate proportions, say 
 those of the ' Hercules ' ? 
 
 It will be obvious that this is a different case from 
 those considered in the Eoyal Society paper, and one 
 in which the disadvantage of the long ship as com- 
 pared with the short ship is not so great as in those 
 cases. In the wholly armoured ship, in passing from a 
 
Chap. IX. Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. 209 
 
 short to a long ship, we increase the armour very 
 largely ; while in the case now about to be discussed, 
 we propose to lengthen the belted portion only of 
 the armoured surface, and therefore get the benefit of 
 length with a less burden of armour. Still we shall see 
 that, even in this case, the short ship is to be preferred 
 to the long. 
 
 I have taken the ' Hercules ' as the representative 
 short iron-clad, and have used the known quantities 
 representing her weights of hull, of equipment and 
 armament, and of engines, boilers, and coals at the time 
 of her trial, and of armour and backing on batteries and 
 belt, in order to determine the corresponding quantities 
 in the new design for a ship having the same form 
 and proportions, below water, as the 'Minotaur,' but 
 in other respects fulfilling the same conditions as the 
 ' Hercules ' in the manner explained above. I have 
 also taken the indicated horse-power developed in, and 
 the full speed realised by, the ' Hercules ' on her load- 
 draught trial in order to determine the proportion of 
 indicated to nominal horse-power in the engines which 
 would drive the new ship at the same speed, thus 
 ensuring that the new ship shall have engines of an 
 identical character with those of the ' Hercules.' In 
 determining the coal supply of the new ship I have 
 considered it proper to provide such a weight as would 
 enable her to proceed at the half-boiler speed attained 
 by the ' Hercules,' as far as the ' Hercules ' could steam 
 at that speed. This is obviously just to the long ship, 
 as the half-power speed is the maximum which would 
 be employed in all cruising services when under steam. 
 
 As the result of careful calculations made in accord- 
 
2IO Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. Chap. IX. 
 
 ance with the above-stated conditions, I am enabled to 
 give the following dimensions and particulars of the 
 new ship ; and in order to compare them with the 
 corresponding features in the ' Hercules ' at the time of 
 trial, have arranged the subjoined table : — 
 
 Length between perpendiculars 
 
 Breadth extreme 
 
 Tonnage B.O.M 
 
 Nominal horse-power 
 
 Indicated „ 
 
 Weightofhull 
 
 Weight of armour and backing, in belt 
 
 „ „ „ on batteries 
 
 „ engines, boilers, and coala .. 
 „ equipment and armament .. 
 
 Displacement 
 
 New Ship. 
 
 385 feet. 
 57 ft. 2 in. 
 5936 tons. 
 
 925 H.-P. 
 6585 „ 
 4574 tons. 
 1518 „ 
 
 398 „ 
 1460 „ 
 1138 „ 
 9088 „ 
 
 Hercules. 
 
 325 feet. 
 59 „ 
 5226 tons. 
 1200 H.-P. 
 8529 „ 
 4022 tons. 
 1292 „ 
 
 398 „ 
 1826 „ 
 1138 „ 
 8676 „ 
 
 From these figures it will be seen that the new ship 
 would be 60 feet longer, and 1 foot 10 inches narrower, 
 than the ' Hercules,' and that she could be driven at the 
 same full speed by engines having a nominal power 
 275 H.-P. less than the engines of the ' Hercules.' 
 Her tonnage, however, is 710 tons greater than that 
 of the ' Hercules,' and her construction would conse- 
 quently cost considerably more, while her engines 
 would cost less, and her expenditure of fuel not be so 
 great as that of the ' Hercules.' Hence, apart from the 
 question of handiness, it becomes necessary in con- 
 trasting the merits of these ships to determine the 
 difference of prime cost approximately. Taking 55/. 
 per ton of tonnage as the cost of the hull, which is a 
 fair average for iron-clads, and taking 60/. per nominal 
 horse-power as the cost of the machinery, which is also 
 a fair average, we obtain the following results : — 
 
Chap. IX. Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. 211 
 
 Excess in the prime cost of the hull of the new) _ ,?^ ^ c e _ qn^Acrt 
 ship over that of the 'Hercules' ^ - /iu x t)t> - dy.UbU 
 
 Decrease in the prime cost of the machinery of) = 275 x 60 = 16,500 
 the new ship from that of the ' Hercules ' . . ) 
 
 Excess in the prime cost of the hull and engines) _ „ „„ ..^ 
 
 of the new ship over that of the ' Hercules 'J ~ * ^^P^^ 
 
 This will, I think, be admitted to be a considerable 
 saving, and one which can scarcely fail to show the 
 desirability of building ships of moderate proportions, 
 even if we have to increase the engine-power in order 
 to obtain the very high speed. 
 
 There may, however, still be a suspicion in the minds 
 of some advocates of long ships that the additional cost 
 of maintenance for the more powerful engines of the 
 ' Hercules ' would in a comparatively short time make 
 up for the difference in the prime cost, although that 
 difference is considerable, I shall attempt to show 
 what the difference of cost of maintenance may amount 
 to, in order to clear up this point ; but before doing so, 
 I must draw attention to the fact that the new ship, being 
 more than 700 tons burden greater than the ' Hercules,* 
 will require an addition of at least fifty men to her crew, 
 and that the cost of their maintenance will be con- 
 siderable. Taking 70?. as the average total cost per 
 man per annum, this would involve an additional 
 annual outlay on the large ship of 3500?. From calcu- 
 lations based upon the average consumption of coal in 
 ships with the improved type of engine, it appears that 
 the cost of fuel in the new ship, for a day's steaming 
 (24 hours) at half-boiler power, would be less than that 
 in the ' Hercules ' by a little over \U. Hence it follows 
 that the saving of wages and provisions in the ' Hercules,' 
 as compared with the new ship, would cover the dif- 
 
 p 2 
 
212 Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. Chap. IX. 
 
 ference in the cost of steaming at 12 knots for 229 days, 
 of 24 hours each, in the year. I need hardly say that 
 our iron-clad ships are not under steam for anything 
 like that time in a year, and consequently the difference 
 in cost of fuel for the two ships would he much more 
 than counterbalanced by the smaller expenditure re- 
 quired on the crew of the ' Hercules.' 
 
 Even if this necessary difference in the numbers of the 
 crew were waived, it will be obvious from the facts 
 just stated that the interest, at a low rate, on the dif- 
 ference of prime cost, would quite make up for the 
 additional cost of fuel in the ' Hercules/ supposing 
 her to be in commission and on general service. This 
 matter, in my opinion, is thus placed beyond question. 
 
 Having disposed of this objection, it is only fair that 
 I should call attention to the facts that the ' Hercules,' 
 being smaller, is sure to be less costly in repairs than 
 the new ship would be ; and that as she is 60 feet 
 shorter she cannot fail to prove much handier. In 
 several parts of this chapter, I have had occasion to 
 refer to this latter feature of short iron-clads ; and it 
 may be thought that undue stress has been laid upon 
 the point. The resume of the estimates put upon handi- 
 ness by eminent naval officers, given in the preceding 
 chapter, will, however, show that this is not the case. 
 
 On a review of the facts stated in this chapter, it can, 
 I think, be scarcely doubted that the policy of building 
 armoured ships of moderate length and proportions is 
 superior to that of adopting greater length and fine- 
 ness of form. The change from the ' Minotaur ' to the 
 ' Bellerophon ' was undoubtedly very great ; but I sub- 
 mit that experience has shown it to be a proper one. 
 
Chap. IX. Forms and Proportions of Iron-Clads. 213 
 
 and the construction and trials of other ships of nearly 
 the same proportions have tended to confirm this view. 
 In prime cost, handiness,'^and general efficiency short 
 ships have been shown to be better than long ships. In 
 economy of engine-power long ships may be, and in 
 some cases undoubtedly are, superior to short ships; 
 but since this economy is inconsiderable in proportion 
 to the total saving, it may be fairly concluded that the 
 shorter iron-clads are, on the whole, greatly to be 
 preferred. 
 
^14 Cost of the Iron-Clads. Chap. X. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 COST OP THE IRON-CLADS. 
 
 In dealing with the cost of our iron-clads, and especially 
 in comparing the cost of those built in the Royal Dock- 
 yards with those built by private shipbuilders, it is 
 extremely difficult to lay down a proper basis for what 
 are known as "incidental and estabHshment " charges, 
 which ought to be added to the net cost of labour 
 and material. The private builder has to find a slip 
 or dock, building-plant, offices, officers, clerks, and so 
 forth, in addition to the requisite labour and material. 
 The Government has to do the same •, but while the 
 builder has a direct interest in limiting incidental 
 expenses to the utmost, the Grovernment^ on the con- 
 trary, has both to incur expenses having nothing what- 
 ever to do with shipbuilding and to regulate their 
 shipbuilding means with a view rather to contingencies 
 which may arise than to the actual circumstances of the 
 moment. In other words, the Grovernment own as well 
 as build ships, and both in shipowning and in ship- 
 building they have to maintain large reserves. 
 
 The net cost of dockyard-built ships being known, 
 the proper addition to be made to it for incidental 
 expenses remained undetermined; and in attempting 
 to settle this addition, the persons concerned went from 
 one point to another, until at length in 1865 they 
 determined to distribute the entire cost of all the naval 
 
Chap. X. 
 
 Cost of the Iron-Clads. 
 
 21 i 
 
 establishments, at home and abroad, over the actual 
 work done. In consequence of this determination, every 
 ship built, say at Chatham or Pembroke, became subject 
 to a charge of no less than 51| per cent, on the net cost 
 of labour and material expended upon her. The effect 
 of the sudden imposition of so enormous a charge upon 
 dockyard work may readily be imagined ; nevertheless, 
 it may be well to aid the imagination with one example. 
 Two iron-clads were built in succession at Chatham 
 Dockyard, under circumstances as nearly as possible 
 alike, in so far as the actual current expenses of the 
 establishment are concerned, viz. first the ' Achilles,' 
 and then the ' Bellerophon.' The ' Bellerophon ' was 
 much the smaller ship of the two, and her net cost was 
 106,000?. less tlian that of the 'Achilles ;' but coming 
 under the new system of incidental charge, she had a 
 sum of 123, 41H. added to her actual cost; while the 
 ' Achilles,' under the previous system, escaped with but 
 13,981?. as incidental charge. The latest figures which 
 I have noticed on this point are as follow : — 
 
 
 AchlUes. 
 
 Bellerophon. 
 
 Actual cost of hull 
 
 „ „ engines and fittings 
 
 „ „ masts, sails, stores, &c 
 
 £. 
 375,473 
 69,117 
 25,740 
 
 £. 
 
 256,114 
 
 88,612 
 
 19,601 
 
 Total actual cost for labour and materials ; . 
 Arbitrary, incidental, and establishment charges 
 
 470,330 
 13,981 
 
 364,327 
 123,411 
 
 Nominal total cost 
 
 484,311 
 
 487,738 
 
 Here it will be seen that, by an arbitrary system of 
 charge, a ship which really cost 106,000/. less than 
 another is made to appear to have cost 3000?. more. 
 
2'i6 Cost of the Iron-Clads. Chap. x. 
 
 I am glad to see that one effect of Mr. Seely's Parlia- 
 mentary Committee of 1868 has been to sweep away 
 the more extravagant features of this system of charge. 
 
 This illustration will suffice to show how necessary it 
 is to lay down some reasonable and fixed percentage as 
 a basis for all comparisons between the cost of dock- 
 yard-built and private-built ships. It will, I think, be 
 generally admitted that 12 i per cent, upon labour and 
 material is, or ought to be, an ample addition for estab- 
 lishment and other incidental charges, exclusive, of 
 course, of all consideration of profit to the builder, 
 which does not affect the question — first, because the 
 Government has not to make a commercial profit by 
 their work ; and, secondly, because private firms often 
 build iron-clads for little or no profit — at least so they 
 themselves allege. Many private builders have assured 
 me that 10 per cent, is generally sufficient to cover all 
 expenses, and I have never heard the sufficiency of 12i 
 per cent, questioned. Let us take it for granted, then, 
 that 12i per cent, upon actual outlay is all that need 
 be added to the cost of dockyard-built ships, to com- 
 plete the expenditure upon them. We certainly could 
 build iron-clads either at Chatham or Pembroke for 
 this percentage under fair conditions. 
 
 Assuming this allowance to be made for incidental 
 charges on dockyard-built ships, and that the same per- 
 centage[is allowed on the actual outlay at the dockyards 
 necessary to equip and complete for sea contract-built 
 ships, it may be interesting to examine what the actual 
 cost of our iron-clads has been, say up to the com- 
 mencement of the year 1868, choosing this date because, 
 when this chapter was first written, the figures were 
 
Chap. X. 
 
 Cost of the Iron-Clads. 
 
 217 
 
 readily available up to that time, and also because 
 this date closes a period of seven years from the launch 
 of the ' Warrior,' thus giving an ample range for 
 experience and comparison of dockyard and contract 
 work. In giving these figures, I shall take first the 
 contract-built broadside ships which were then com- 
 pleted, and the dockyard-built ships of a similar cha- 
 racter ; after which I shall consider the expenditure 
 upon the broadside ships then unfinished, and upon 
 turret-ships, unfinished and finished. 
 
 COXTKACT-BUILT BeOADSIDE ShIPS. 
 
 
 Actual Outlay on Labour and ifateriala. 
 
 Total with 
 12| per cent. 
 
 on the 
 actual outlay 
 
 at the 
 Dockyards. 
 
 
 Hull. 
 
 Engines 
 
 and 
 Fittings. 
 
 Masts, Sails, 
 
 Stores, &c,, 
 
 until complete 
 
 for Sea. 
 
 TotaL 
 
 Warrior 
 
 Black Prince . . 
 
 Defence . . 
 
 Resistance 
 
 Hector 
 
 ^'aliant 
 
 Agincourt . . 
 
 Minotaur .. 
 
 Northumberland 
 
 Viper 
 
 Vixen 
 Watem'itch 
 
 £ 
 
 282', 581 
 
 283,511 
 
 203,229 
 
 208.571 
 
 237,911 
 
 264,443 
 
 3i;2 771 
 
 .371,446 
 
 360,439 
 
 42,287 
 
 46,331 
 
 43,080 
 
 £. 
 74,409 
 74,482 
 34,. 357 
 33,765 
 45,738 
 48,32:>, 
 83,277 
 79,328 
 72,691 
 7,611 
 7,869 
 13,642 
 
 £. 
 
 22,164 
 
 20,317 
 
 15,836 
 
 15,784 
 
 10,969 
 
 12,449 
 
 9,590* 
 
 28,081 
 
 11,126* 
 
 3,309 
 
 3,320 
 
 3,308 
 
 £. 
 
 379,1.54 
 
 378,310 
 
 2.i3,422 
 
 258,120 
 
 294,618 
 
 325,215 
 
 455,638 
 
 478,855 
 
 444,256 
 
 53,207 
 
 57,520 
 
 60,030 
 
 £ 
 
 385,188 
 
 384,064 
 
 257,109 
 
 262,427 
 
 299,050 
 
 327,917 
 
 458,020 
 
 485,340 
 
 445,905 
 
 54,194 
 
 58,679 
 
 60,879 
 
 Grand totals . . 
 
 2,706,600 575,492 
 
 156,253 
 
 3,438,345 , 3,478,772 
 
 I have previously explained that most of the contract- 
 built ships named above had to be completed for sea in 
 Royal Dockyards, and that in such cases it is necessary 
 to add \1\ per cent, to the actual outlay at the dock- 
 yards, in order to arrive at the totals, which can be 
 fairly compared with the totals for dockyard-built ships. 
 
 * These two ships had not been fully rigged and equipped when this account 
 was made up. 
 
2l8 
 
 Cost of the Iron-Clads. 
 
 Chap. X. 
 
 For instance, the completion of the ' "Warrior ' for sea 
 involved an actual outlay of over 48,000^. at a dock- 
 yard in labour and materials ; and 6000Z. has been 
 added, in consequence, to the sum of the payments to 
 contractors and the dockyard expenditure, in order 
 to arrive at what we have agreed to regard as the fair 
 total cost. The same thing is true in various degrees 
 of all the other ships, I next pass to the completed 
 dockyard-built broadside ships, upon which the following 
 sums had been expended up to the date considered : — 
 
 GOVEKNMBNT-BTnLT BeOADSIDE ShIPS. 
 
 
 Actual Outlay on Labour and Materials. 
 
 Total with 
 12i per cent. 
 
 on the 
 actual outlay 
 
 at the 
 Dockyards. 
 
 
 Hull. 
 
 Engines 
 
 and 
 Fittings. 
 
 Masts, Sails, 
 
 Stores, SiC, 
 
 until complete 
 
 for Sea. 
 
 Total. 
 
 Eoyal Oat 
 Prince Consort . . 
 Caledonia . . 
 Ocean 
 
 Boyal Alfred .. 
 Zealous 
 Lord Clyde 
 Lord Warden . . 
 Pallas .. .. 
 Favorite . . 
 Research . . 
 Enterprise 
 Achilles . . 
 BeUerophon 
 
 £. 
 189,381 
 174,392 
 212,763 
 201,6.51 
 221,765 
 170,292 
 212,167 
 236,197 
 144,003 
 122,423 
 56,734 
 51,762 
 375,473 
 256,114 
 
 £. 
 45,310 
 52,603 
 51,895 
 52,162 
 47,512 
 54,134 
 63,602 
 68,279 
 39,810 
 24,016 
 10,125 
 
 8,676 
 69,117 
 88,612 
 
 £. 
 19,846 
 15,554 
 18,672 
 17,417 
 22,263 
 14,832 
 18,712 
 18,367 
 10,884 
 10,206 
 6,263 
 3,480 
 25,740 
 19,601 
 
 £. 
 254,537 
 242,549 
 283,330 
 271,230 
 291,540 
 239,258 
 294,481 
 322,848 
 194,197 
 156,645 
 78,122 
 68,918 
 470,830 
 364,327 
 
 £. 
 280,518 
 266,173 
 312,034 
 298,451 
 321,881 
 262,285 
 323,175 
 854,520 
 218,391 
 173.146 
 80,986 
 70,794 
 520,362 
 398,736 
 
 Grand totals . . 
 
 2,625,117 
 
 675,853 
 
 221,387 
 
 3,522,807 
 
 3,876,402 
 
 The only remark that need be made on this table is 
 that the percentage for incidental charges, being taken 
 upon the actual outlay at the dockyards, does not, of 
 Course, apply to the machinery, since all our ships' 
 engines are made by contract ; and in the lump sum 
 paid to the contractor his percentage for such charges 
 is included. 
 
Chap. X. 
 
 Cost of the Iron-Clads. 
 
 ii() 
 
 In order to complete the statement of the expenditure 
 upon our armoured fleet up to the date above men- 
 tioned, I must add the particulars of the sums spent 
 upon unfinished broadside ships, and upon turret-ships 
 up to the same date, January, 1868. The former stand 
 as follows : — 
 
 UiTFiNisHED Broadside Ships. 
 
 Contract-built 
 Ships. 
 
 Total Payment 
 on Account 
 of Contract. 
 
 Govemment^-bnilt 
 Ships. 
 
 Total Outlay 
 
 on Labour 
 
 and Materials. 
 
 Total with 
 12^ per cent on 
 
 actual outlay 
 at the Dockyards. 
 
 Audacious .. 
 Invincible . . 
 
 £. 
 
 19,330 
 
 8,868 
 
 Hercules 
 Penelope 
 Eepulse 
 
 £. 
 275,325 
 151,4:17 
 181,239 
 
 302,315 
 166,227 
 197,663 
 
 Total.. .. 
 
 28,198 
 
 Total.. .. 
 
 608,061 
 
 666,205 
 
 The turret-ships stand as follows : — 
 
 Captain . . 
 Monarch .. 
 Prince Albert . . 
 Royal Sovereign 
 Scorpion .. 
 Wivern . . 
 
 Total.. 
 
 Total Outlay 
 
 on Labour 
 
 and Materials. 
 
 139,864 
 175,513 
 207,549 
 133,980 
 112,587 
 119,672 
 
 889,165 
 
 Total with 
 12i per cent, on 
 
 actual outlay 
 at the Dockyards. 
 
 £_ 
 139,864 
 194,152 
 215,158 
 150,431 
 112,922 
 120,245 
 
 932,772 
 
 A few remarks are necessary with respect to the 
 expenditure on these turret-ships. The ' Captain ' and 
 ' Monarch ' were unfinished when the expenditure given 
 for them was calculated, the former being under con- 
 struction at Messrs. Laird's yard at Birkenhead, and 
 the latter at Chatham Dockyard. The expenditure 
 on the ' Captain,' therefore, consisted solely of the 
 
2.20 Cost of the Iron-Clads. chap. x. 
 
 payments on account of the contract, while the 12 J 
 per cent, allowance has been added in the case of the 
 ' Monarch.' All the remaining vessels have heen com- 
 pleted for sea, and all are contract-built except the 
 ' Royal Sovereign.' This ship, it will be remembered, 
 was altered from a three-decked line-of-battle ship, and 
 only the cost of the conversion is charged against her in 
 the preceding table, no account being taken of the ori- 
 ginal cost. The contract-built turret-ships have been 
 completed in the dockyards, so that they come under 
 the \1\ per cent, rule; and in the case of the 'Prince 
 Albert,' the addition made to the total outlay is, it 
 will be seen, nearly 8000/. — the outlay on labour and 
 materials in the dockyards having exceeded 60,000/. 
 
 Bringing the above sums together, we have for the 
 total expenditure on iron-clad ships up to January, 
 1868:— 
 
 £. 
 Contract-built broadside ships, completed .. .. 3,478,772 
 
 ■unfinished .. .. 28,198 
 
 Government-built broadside ships, completed .. 3,876,402 
 
 unfinished .. 666,205 
 Turret-ships, finished and unfinished 932,772 
 
 Grand total 8,982,349 
 
 Thus far I have, for the reasons previously assigned, 
 dealt only with the details of the expenditure on our 
 iron-clads up to the commencement of 1868. It may 
 be interesting if, before concluding this chapter, I add 
 a brief statement of the expenditure on iron-clads for 
 the year 1868, bringing the information up to January, 
 1869. This expenditure, in round numbers, was as 
 follows : — 
 
Chap. X. 
 
 Cost of the Iron-Clads. 
 
 221 
 
 £. 
 
 Contract-built broadside ships 306,000 
 
 turret „ 128,500 
 
 Government-built broadside ships 301,000 
 
 turret „ 126,250 
 
 Total expenditure for the year 1868 
 
 „ up to January, 1868 (as above) 
 
 861,750 
 8,982,349 
 
 1869 9,844,099 
 
 In round numbers, therefore, our iron-clad navy has 
 cost the nation ten millions sterling up to the com- 
 mencement of the present year. 
 
 This expenditure commenced in May, 1859. The 
 total annual expenditure upon the navy, year by year, 
 since that period, has been (in round numbers) as 
 follows : — 
 
 1859-60 
 1860-61 
 1861-62 
 1862-63 
 1803-64 
 1804-05 
 1865-66 
 1866-67 
 1867-68 
 1868-69 
 
 Total 
 
 £. 
 
 12,700,000 
 13,000,000 
 13,500,000 
 11,800,000 
 10,700,000 
 10,600,000 
 10,200,000 
 10,500,000 
 12,700,000 
 11,100,000 (estimated) 
 
 £ 116,800,000 
 
 Out of this 116 millions sterling, 10 millions only 
 have, as we have seen, been expended upon the building 
 and equipment of new iron-clads, the remaining 106 
 millions having been expended upon other objects. It 
 is desirable that this fact should be better understood 
 than it is at present. There are many influential per- 
 sons who seem to think that it is upon new iron-clad 
 ships that millions have been annually spent of late 
 years, whereas, in point of fact, one million per year, or 
 
22,2 Cost of the Iroii-Clads. Chap. x. 
 
 less than one-eleventh of our outlay on the navy, is all 
 that has been expended in this way ; and I venture to 
 say that it would be very difficult to prove either that 
 our present magnificent and powerful iron-clad fleet has 
 been dearly purchased at ten millions, or that any other 
 ten millions of the one hundred and sixteen have secured 
 for the country a more valuable result. 
 
 I shall trust myself to add but little respecting the 
 savings effected by the introduction of the short iron- 
 clads upon my plan in place of the long and costly ships 
 that preceded them. The saving has been — and is 
 known by successive Boards of Admiralty to have been 
 — at the rate of nearly or quite 100,000^. per ship, and 
 numerous ships have been built. 
 
Chap. XI. Turret-Ships. o.'z^ 
 
 CHAPTEE XL 
 
 TURRET-SHIPS. 
 
 I NOW come to the consideration of the turret-ship 
 question, a question which has, to a large extent, 
 passed out of that controversial state in which it too 
 long remained, Recent circumstances have removed 
 the objections which I felt to writing publicly upon 
 this subject, and have made it possible for me to discuss 
 it with all necessary freedom, and to attempt to state 
 both sides of the question with perfect fairness. 
 
 The turret system possesses both so many advantages 
 and under certain circumstances so many disadvantages 
 that its introduction almost necessarily occasioned much 
 division of opinion among naval officers and naval 
 architects; but I must say that I have always con- 
 sidered that this controversy has been unnecessarily 
 embittered by the unrestrained manner in which its 
 advocacy has been urged. The inherent merits of the 
 system are, however, so great that the only effect of 
 this error of advocacy has been to somewhat retard its 
 extensive adoption. I may do myself the justice to add 
 that the views which I am now about to set forth are 
 those which I have held from the beginning. 
 
 The first and most obvious advantage of the turret 
 system consists in the facility which it affords for 
 training large guns smoothly and easily through large 
 arcs, and for making the same guns available on both 
 
224 Turret-Ships. Chap. xi. 
 
 sides of the ship. This is an advantage which has never 
 been questioned, and which certainly needed no extra- 
 vagant statement of its worth ; but unfortunately, in 
 putting it forward, some of the promoters of the turret 
 system, in its early days, associated it with the assertion 
 that large guns could not, in fact, be mounted and 
 worked upon the broadside, or, indeed, upon any other 
 plan whatever. To this it was obviously impossible 
 to assent, and the experience subsequently acquired — 
 first in the ' Bellerophon,' with 12-ton guns, and after- 
 wards in the 'Hercules,' with 18-ton guns — has shown 
 that there was no foundation for such an assertion. 
 Indeed, upon the very face of the matter, it is obvious 
 that it would be contrary to all mechanical principles 
 to suppose that a central pivot has so great an advantage 
 over an end-pivot as to make it perfectly easy to work 
 a 200-ton turret upon the former, while it was im- 
 possible to work a 20-ton gun, only upon the latter. 
 It may not be uninteresting to observe that one of the 
 favourite illustrations of the extreme advocates of 
 turrets was drawn from a mechanical arrangement 
 of the very reverse character, viz. the turn-table at 
 the Greenwich Eailway terminus. This was often 
 cited as an instance of the facility with which the 
 great weight of a locomotive engine can be turned 
 round a centre, after the manner of a turret, whereas a 
 glance at the arrangement itself will show to any one 
 that it is in fact strictly analogous to the slide of a 
 broadside gun, turning round a pivot at the end, through 
 part of the circle. 
 
 With Captain Scott's gear, guns even of the largest 
 class are now trained with all necessary ease on the 
 
Chap. XI. Turret-Ships. 225 
 
 broadside ; the same is true of the turret, the real 
 advantage of the latter consisting in the fact that while 
 the arc of training of the turret gun may be made 
 very great without any increase in the size of the port, 
 it is impossible to obtain a large arc of training with 
 a broadside gun, or with a gun mounted broadside 
 fashion, without enlarging the port and weakening the 
 ship's side considerably in its immediate neighbourhood. 
 For this reason, and for some others that will follow, 
 I have always looked forward to a large adoption of 
 the turret system in those classes of ships in which 
 masts and sails are not requisite, or in which they can 
 be so subordinated to the turret armament as to leave 
 it in possession of this its prime advantage, fviz., a large 
 range of horizontal command. 
 
 The next point to which I shall advert is the capa- 
 bility of fighting the same guns on both sides of the 
 ship. There can be no doubt that this is, in the 
 abstract, an advantage, but it is one which is attended 
 with great drawbacks in the turret system. The chief 
 of these is the very large weight of armour in various 
 forms, much of which has to be devoted to the pro- 
 tection of the guns, and which may be roughly taken 
 as double the amount that is requisite on the broadside 
 system, gun for gun. In other words, with a given 
 weight, you can protect and work eight guns, mounted 
 on the broadside, four on each side of a ship, about 
 as effectually as you can protect and work four guns 
 only mounted in two turrets ; and, looking to the 
 history as well as to the prospective circumstances of 
 naval warfare, it must of necessity be better to have 
 four guns to fight with on each side simultaneously 
 
 Q 
 
226 Turret-Ships. Chap. XL 
 
 than to have only four altogether, whatever facility of 
 training the latter may possess. This point has been 
 very much lost sight of by many advocates of the 
 turret system, whose notion no doubt was, and in many 
 cases perhaps still is, that you can carry even more 
 guns on the turret plan than on the broadside plan. 
 The fact is, however, quite otherwise, and would be 
 even more favourable to the broadside system than it is, 
 if the same sacrifice of independent training were made 
 in the case of broadside guns as is made with turret 
 guns, viz. that of fixing two guns side by side, and 
 depriving both of all independent training. For it 
 must be borne in mind that even in the largest turret- 
 ships of our own and other navies — excepting the 
 ' Eoyal Sovereign/ the ' Prince Albert,' and two or 
 three vessels built in Eussia and America — there are 
 but two turrets, and that the two gnns in each of these 
 are so connected as to be compelled to train together ; 
 whereas every gun of the eight in an equivalent broad- 
 side ship has a perfectly independent set of motions. 
 If, on the other hand, we were to mount broadside guns 
 in pairs, it would be quite practicable to shorten the 
 central batteries, and give to the broadside ship an 
 even greater attacking force on each side than the 
 turret-ship has available for both sides. It will be 
 necessary to bear this aspect of the question in mind 
 when we come to consider more closely the relative 
 merits of turrets and broadside ships in respect of their 
 attacking powers.* 
 
 * This proposal to mount guns in pairs at broadside ports is by no meaus 
 a novelty. For example, Mr. J. B. Eads, of St. Louis, Missouri, an eminent 
 
Chap. XI. Turret-Ships. zi'j 
 
 I have already intimated that the enlarged adoption 
 of the turret system has usually been associated in my 
 mind with those classes of vessels in which masts and 
 sails are not required. It is well known that others 
 have taken a wider view of its applicahihty, and have 
 contended that it is, and has all along been, perfectly 
 well adapted for rigged vessels. I have never con- 
 sidered it wholly inapplicable to such vessels ; on the 
 contrary, I have myself projected designs of sea-going 
 and rigged turret-ships, which I believe to be safe, 
 commodious, and susceptible of perfect handling under 
 canvas. But most assuredly the building of such 
 vessels was urged by many persons long before satis- 
 factory methods of designing them had been devised ; 
 and my clear and strong conviction at the moment of 
 writing these lines (March 31, 1869) is that no satis- 
 factorily designed turret-ship with rigging has yet been 
 built, or even laid down. 
 
 The most cursory consideration of the subject will, I 
 think, result in the feeling that the middle of the upper 
 deck of a full-rigged ship is not a very ehgible position 
 for fighting large guns. Any one who has stood upon 
 the deck of a frigate, amid the maze of ropes of all kinds 
 and sizes that surrounds him, must feel that to bring 
 even guns of moderate size away from the port-holes. 
 
 engineer, who constructed the ' Baron de Kalb,' ' Carondelet,' ' Mound City,' 
 and other casemated and turreted iron-clads which did good service on the 
 western rivers during the late Civil War, has worked out the details of a plan 
 of this kind. In his arrangement the guns are mounted on turntables, in 
 pairs, which are trained together, while the battery is constructed in such a 
 manner as to admit of the same guns being fought on both broadsides. Pull 
 details of the scheme are given in a letter to the Secretary of the United 
 States Navy, since published by Mr. Eads. — (New York, D. Van Nostrand, 
 1868.) 
 
 Q 2 
 
2.28 Turret-Ships. Chap. XI. 
 
 to place them in the midst of these ropes, and discharge 
 them there, is utterly out of the question ; and the im- 
 practicability of that mode of proceeding must increase 
 in proportion as the size and power of the guns are 
 increased. But as a central position, or a nearly central 
 position, is requisite for the turret, this difficulty has 
 had to be met by many devices, some of them tending 
 to reduce the number of the ropes, and others to get 
 them stopped short above the guns. In the former 
 category come tripod masts, in the latter flying decks 
 over the turrets : the former have proved successful in 
 getting rid of shrouds, but they interfere seriously with 
 the fire of the turret guns, and are exposed to the danger 
 of being shot away by them in the smoke of action : the 
 latter are under trial, but however successful they may 
 prove in some respects, they will be very inferior in 
 point of comfort and convenience to the upper decks of 
 broadside frigates. In the case of the ' Monarch,' which 
 has a lofty upper deck, neither the tripod system nor a 
 flying deck for working the ropes upon has been adopted. 
 A light flying deck to receive a portion of the boats, 
 and to afford a passage for the officers above the turrets, 
 has been fitted ; but the ropes will be worked upon the 
 upper deck over which the turrets have to fire, and con- 
 sequently a thousand contrivances have had to be made 
 for keeping both the standing and running rigging 
 tolerably clear of the guns. It seems to me out of the 
 question to suppose that such an arrangement can ever 
 become general in the British Navy, especially when 
 one contrasts the ' Monarch ' with the ' Hercules ' as a 
 rigged man-of-war. Nor is the matter at all improved, 
 in my opinion, in the case of the ' Captain ' and other 
 
Chap. XI. Turret-Ships. 229 
 
 rigged turret-ships in whicli the ropes have to be worked 
 upon bridges or flying decks poised in the air above the 
 turrets. Such bridges or decks, even if they withstand 
 for long the repeated fire of the ship's own guns, must 
 of necessity be mounted upon a few supports only ; and 
 I am apprehensive that in action an enemy's fire would 
 bring down parts, at least, of these cumbrous structures, 
 with their bitts, blocks, ropes, and the thousand and 
 one other fittings with which a rigged ship's deck is 
 encumbered, with what results I need not predict. 
 
 It is for these reasons, and for others of like nature, 
 that I object to some features of every rigged turret- 
 ship which I have yet seen. The only description of 
 rigged turret-ship which I believe would be at all likely 
 to succeed sufficiently to justify its large adoption is one 
 which I contrived at the Admiralty some years ago, but 
 of which no example has yet been built. In this type 
 of ship the turrets are placed as near the ends of the 
 ship as is consistent with proper ease of motion in a sea- 
 way ; the all-round fire is secured to them ; but the 
 whole of the ship's side between the turrets is carried 
 up to a spar-deck, which deck is prolonged as far as is 
 necessary to embrace the foremast and mizenmast, and 
 to receive their running gear. The head-ropes present 
 the only difficulty that attends this plan ; but as part of 
 the plan is to have even the deck before and abaft the 
 turrets situated at a good height above the water — 10 
 to 12 feet — these head-ropes could, no doubt^ be satis- 
 factorily dealt with. This kind of ship would unques- 
 tionably possess good sea-going and cruising qualities; 
 her turrets would possess that unbroken command of 
 the horizon which is the only justification for their use ; 
 
23° Turret-Ships. Chap. xi. 
 
 and she might be as well-rigged and commodious a ship 
 as a broadside vessel. The only thing to be considered 
 is whether even this ship would be better, or so good, 
 as a well-designed broadside vessel, which may be fairly 
 open to question. At present, with our limited expe- 
 rience, I express no conclusion upon this point. 
 
 It is well known that both in the ' Captain ' and in 
 the ' Monarch ' the turrets have been deprived of their 
 primary and supreme advantage, that of providing an 
 all-round fire for the guns, and more especially a head- 
 fire. This deprivation is consequent upon the adoption 
 of forecastles, which are intended to keep the ships dry 
 in steaming against a head-sea, and to enable the head- 
 sails to be worked. When it first became known that 
 the ' Monarch ' was designed with a forecastle (by order 
 of the then Board of Admiralty), there were not wanting 
 persons who considered the plan extremely objectionable, 
 and who took it for granted that as a turret-ship the 
 new vessel would be fatally defective. The design of 
 the ' Captain ' shortly afterwards, under the direction of 
 Captain Coles, with a similar but much larger forecastle, 
 was an admission, however, that the Board of Admiralty 
 did not stand alone in the belief that this feature was a 
 necessity, however objectionable. Both these ships, 
 therefore, are without a right-ahead fire from the turrets, 
 the ' Monarch ' having this deficiency partly compensa- 
 ted by two forecastle (6^-ton) guns protected with 
 armour, while the ' Captain ' has no protected head-fire 
 at all, but merely one gun (6^-ton) standing exposed on 
 the top of the forecastle. The question arises— and a 
 very serious question it is — what is the amount of the 
 sacrifice thus made ? 
 
Chap. XI. Turret-Ships. 23 1 
 
 This question is mucli too lightly passed over by 
 many persons, who would have ns believe that, if turret 
 guns or central-battery guns can be brought within 15 
 or 20 degrees of the line of keel, that is all that will 
 really be necessary in war. To this I demur ; this I 
 deny. If we consider the matter closely, it will be 
 observed that, in cbasing, the disadvantage of having 
 to turn 15 or 20 degrees from your course would, in 
 many cases, be very great, not to say fatal to success ; 
 for in chasing a ship of nearly equal speed you would 
 be reduced to the necessity of either abstaining from 
 firing a shot, or of letting the enemy escape. If by 
 steaming at your utmost you could but just gain on her, 
 by diverging from your course you would evidently lose 
 her. On the other band, if you failed to diverge, you 
 would be subject to her stern-fire throughout the chase, 
 without the means of replying or of doing her any harm. 
 And besides all this, there is the very important fact 
 that it is extremely difficult to aim with accuracy with 
 the ship swerving right and left under the action of the 
 helm. Or, taking the case of having to break a line of 
 battle, it may easily be seen how extreme a disadvantage 
 you would labour under by being unable to fire within 
 less than, say, 20 degrees of the line of keel. I say 
 20 degrees, because, although in both the ^Monarch' 
 and ' Captain ' guns can with care and contrivance be 
 brought within a less angle, I believe that in actual 
 warfare this would not, in fact, be so, especially after 
 the smoke of the action had begun to embarrass the sight. 
 Now, what are the facts of the case ? Suppose a fleet 
 formed in line of battle, and a turret-ship, with her guns 
 shut in by a forecastle 20 degrees on each side, to be 
 
232 Turret-Ships. Chap. XI. 
 
 approaching. At a distance of 4000 yards, which is 
 within range, this forecastle would cut off from the men 
 in the turrets all sight of a fleet extending over a distance 
 of more than 2500 yards, at right angles to her course. 
 In other words, more than twenty ships as large as the 
 ' Hercules ' could lie one ahead of the other in line, and 
 the turret-ship in question, which we suppose to be 
 steaming up to them, would be incapable of getting a 
 shot at any one of them without diverging from her 
 course. At 2000 yards more than ten such ships would 
 be concealed by her forecastle; at 1000 yards five of 
 them ; and at 500 yards three of them. The forecastle 
 would, in fact, prevent such a ship from bringing her 
 guns to bear* upon any part of a ship as big as herself, 
 and lying within her own length of herself right across 
 her path. These I hold to be very serious facts, and 
 the more so as this loss of right-ahead fire is now pecu- 
 liar to turret-ships. In point of fact, the ' Captain ' is 
 the only iron-clad ship of recent construction which is 
 unable to fire ahead from behind her armour. 
 
 A thousand objections to turrets are, however, swept 
 away the moment we do away, with masts and spars in 
 turret-ships. The only formidable difficulty that then 
 remains is that of raising, carrying, and lowering the 
 boats with proper facility and security. And this, I do 
 not hesitate to say, is a more important point than is 
 supposed by some advocates of turrets. They say, and 
 so far say with truth, that in action the boats of every 
 man-of-war are not only liable to destruction, but are 
 almost certain to be destroyed ; it is therefore, they 
 argue, of but little moment whether they are to be 
 lowered with facility or not. But it is hard to admit 
 
Chap. XI. Turret-Ships. 2^^ 
 
 that no means should exist for readily lowering a 
 boat even in a time of action, and there are obviously 
 numerous occasions out of war in which the ready use 
 of the boats should be practicable simultaneously with 
 gun exercise and practice. But by placing the guns in 
 the middle of the ship, and from that position firing in 
 all directions — which is, or should be, the specialty of 
 turret-ships — this is made impossible, and it ought to 
 be frankly avowed that in respect of the ready use 
 and easy stowage of their boats real turret-ships, with 
 all-round fire, are at a great disadvantage compared 
 with broadside ships. 
 
 Let us now consider a little more fully the offensive 
 and defensive powers of turret-ships, premising that we 
 are dealing with vessels carrying two turrets. In con- 
 sidering their offensive powers, it is necessary to bear in 
 mind the fact, to which a passing reference has already 
 been made, that they are all limited to the means of 
 firing at any moment in two directions only. It is 
 astonishing how little considered, probably how little 
 recognised, this extraordinary feature of turret-ships has 
 hitherto remained. In a broadside ship each gun is an 
 independent element of attack, and all the guns of such 
 a ship may be directed upon separate points. In the 
 case of the ' Hercules,' for example, notwithstanding the 
 concentration of her armament, and neglecting her un- 
 protected upper-deck guns, she can bring eight 18-ton 
 and two 12-ton guns to bear on separate points, thus 
 striking out in ten different directions simultaneously 
 with powerful guns. The ' Captain,' on the contrary, is 
 limited to two directions only. No doubt the turret-ship 
 can hit much harder in those two directions than the 
 
2-34 Turret-Ships. Chap. XI. 
 
 other shijD hits with each of its ten blows. The shock 
 of two 600-lb. shot from 25-toii guns, with full charges 
 and at short range, striking within a few feet of each 
 other must he terrific ; but so also must be the effect of 
 a concentrated broadside from the four 18-ton guns 
 of the ' Hercules ;' and my present position is that, 
 while the latter ship possesses the faculty of dealing 
 such broadsides in combination with the power of using 
 each gun independently, the turret-ship is absolutely 
 without this power, and is limited to concentrated fire 
 alone. If it be said, by way of reply, that every step 
 taken in the direction of increasing the size and dimi- 
 nishing the number of guns is to some extent open to a 
 similar objection, I must observe that this is not in my 
 opinion a correct view of the case, for the objection holds 
 against an undue limitation of the independent action of 
 guns of equal power. For example, let us suppose the 
 'Hercules,' instead of being armed with four 18-ton 
 guns on each broadside, to be armed (as she might be) 
 with three 25-ton guns, the latter being of equal weight 
 per gun with the ' Captain's ' and ' Monarch's.' Her 
 battery will then obviously possess the power of firing 
 six such guns simultaneously in as many separate direc- 
 tions, while the turret-ship can fire simultaneously in 
 two directions only. On the other hand, it must be 
 borne in mind that the broadside ship can never con- 
 centrate more than three such guns upon a single point 
 while the turret-ship can concentrate four ; and that 
 the arcs through which these four can be concentrated 
 on each side of the ship are greater than the arcs within 
 which the broadside fire is limited. It is very difficult 
 to set just comparative values upon these diverse capa- 
 
Chap. XI. 
 
 Turret-Ships. 
 
 ^35 
 
 bilities of guns mounted on the two systems, but when 
 the multitudinous attacks to which a ship is liable in a 
 general action are remembered, the fact that a turret- 
 ship is deprived of simultaneous fire in all but two 
 directions assuredly deserves the most serious attention 
 of naval men. The accompanying diagram illustrates 
 the relative powers of the ' Captain ' and ' Hercules ' in 
 this respect. 
 
 CAPT/I/ /V. 
 Simultaneous Fire. 
 
 
 
 Intimately connected with this last consideration is 
 another, which, to my mind, appears of much greater 
 
236 Turret-Ships. Chap. XI. 
 
 importance still. I allude to the fact that, as all the 
 fire of a turret-ship must emanate from two points, all 
 the attack upon her may be attracted to those two 
 points, which unfortunately have the disadvantage of 
 being most clearly marked out, being the centres of two 
 conspicuous cylinders. And besides this, a special 
 danger appears to me to result from the circumstance 
 that, in order to send a shell into the interior of a 
 turret, it is not necessary to aim at a port at all, but to 
 direct your fire upon the centre of the turret on either 
 side of which a port is situated. The accuracy of fire 
 attained with guns at sea will never be so great as to 
 make it easy, under ordinary circumstances, to aim at a 
 port and hit it ; but the accuracy already attained is 
 sufficient to justify the belief that, by aiming at the 
 centre line of the turret between the ports, there would 
 be a very fair probability of your lodging a shell in one 
 or other of the two adjacent ports. It is fortunately 
 true that the turret ports are small, and that the guns 
 approximately fill them when run out ; but after making 
 every allowance for these things, I still feel that turret- 
 ships most invite attack precisely where they are most 
 vulnerable, and where a couple of shells would place them 
 Jiors de combat. I am also afraid that with guns placed 
 so extremely close to each other as they are in turrets, a 
 slight derangement of the mechanism of one may effec- 
 tually silence the other, even without shot or shell enter- 
 ing the turret. It will probably be left for future naval 
 actions to show how far my apprehensions in these 
 respects are well founded ; but I confess that it appears 
 to me doubtful whether a smart captain, in a ship armed 
 with numerous light guns, might not under favourable 
 
Chap. XI. Turret-Ships. 237 
 
 circumstances range np to a heavy tnrret-sliip, and, by 
 maintaining a continuous fire directed at the centre of 
 her turrets, get shell or shrapnel into her ports and 
 place her hors de combat without allowing her to deliver 
 a single shot. Smarter things than this have often been 
 done in war both on land and on sea, and the mere possi- 
 bility of its occurrence ought to exercise some restraint 
 upon those persons who, without experience, and even 
 without reflection, would have us send the entire navy 
 of the country to sea in turret-ships ; for however small 
 the risk may prove to be in ships like the ' Thunderer,' 
 with lofty and unembarrassed guns, it would certainly 
 be increased in ships with lower turret ports and carry- 
 ing masts and rigging, the fire of which would be less 
 at the command of the captain and gunners. 
 
 It has been generally taken for granted of late that 
 the revolving of the turret is not practically liable to 
 being stopped by the blows of shot, and the experiments 
 made at Portsmouth by firing the 12-ton guns of the 
 ' Bellerophon ' at the turret of the ' Royal Sovereign ' 
 have been supposed to establish this view. I was not 
 present at those experiments ;* but I carefully studied 
 them afterwards, and to my mind they never have 
 appeared in the least degree conclusive, and for an 
 obvious reason, viz. that no shot struck what I consider 
 to be the vulnerable place, which is the junction of the 
 turret with the deck. The experiments were satisfac- 
 tory on the other point — the impunity of the revolving 
 apparatus, as fitted in the ' Royal Sovereign,' with 
 reference to the fire of 12-ton guns ; but this was never 
 in my judgment the point in doubt. My conviction is, 
 
 * I was out of health at Malvern. 
 
238 Turret-Ships. Chap. xi. 
 
 and always lias been, that a large shot striking the 
 deck quite close to the turret, with considerable force, 
 will inevitably block the turret and prevent it from 
 revolving. An iron glacis-plate, sloping upwards to- 
 wards the turret, will not in my opinion hinder this ; 
 but will, on the contrary, facilitate it. I have never 
 yet seen, and do not expect to see, a large shot moving 
 with great velocity strike any mass of iron without 
 driving much of the mass before it through a space of 
 at least many inches ; and the iron of a turret glacis- 
 plate, when so driven forward, must of necessity be 
 driven into the turret and so fix it. A horizontal 
 glacis-plate would be much safer than a plate sloping 
 upwards ; and perhaps the safest arrangement of all 
 would be a reversed glacis, sloping downwards towards 
 the turret, the junction of which with the turret could 
 not be struck at all except by a dropping shot, which 
 could not strike with any great velocity or force. 
 
 The foregoing remarks apply primarily, and perhaps 
 almost exclusively, to turrets which pass down through 
 a deck after the manner preferred by Captain Coles. 
 In the case of monitor turret-ships of the American 
 type, the junction of the turret with the deck upon 
 which it stands is protected by a massive ring of iron 
 surrounding the base of the turret — an arrangement 
 which, in my opinion, would be safe and satisfactory 
 only on the condition of the ring being of much larger 
 proportions than it has usually been made. In discuss- 
 ing this question, Mr, Eads, of St. Louis, Missouri, of 
 whose abihty and experience I have previously had 
 occasion to speak, in a letter to the Secretary of the 
 Navy, writes as follows : — 
 
Chap. XI. Turret-Ships. 239 
 
 " I believe tiiat the distinguished inventor of the 
 " monitor system has advocated the use of engines of 
 " sufficient power to rotate the turret without its being 
 " raised by the central spindle, and while its weight 
 " rests entirely upon the deck. This would make it, 
 " however, no less liable to have its rotation stopped if 
 " the wall were swelled downwards at any point in the 
 " plane of its base in consequence of the impact of 
 " the projectile near the deck, unless the power of the 
 " engines was sufficient to drag it around despite such 
 " irregularities, a provision against such casualties that 
 " would involve great additional weight and cost of 
 " machinery. The use of a heavy base-ring around the 
 " turret or around the pilot-house, to protect the joint 
 " at the deck, or at the base of the pilot-house, is but a 
 " partial remedy for a radical defect in the rotating 
 " system. The base-rings around the monitor turrets 
 " found necessary to protect the joint of the 10-inch 
 " walls against 10-inch round shot at Charleston are 
 " about 5 by 15 inches in cross-section. It is an 
 " interesting question, and one having an important 
 " bearing on the value of the monitor system, to know 
 " how much would be required to protect 15-inch 
 " walls at this joint against 15-inch shot, to say 
 " nothing of the larger projectiles that have been found 
 " practicable. It is but a poor argument in favour of 
 " retaining a system which has such a vulnerable point 
 " of attack to prove that turrets have been repeatedly 
 " under fire without being damaged at their weakest 
 " place, when this weak point has on other occasions 
 " been struck and the turret disabled thereby. The 
 " argument against such a system has a double force 
 
24° Turret-Ships. Chap. XI. 
 
 " when we remember that the means of strengthening 
 " this point against heavier projectiles have never been 
 " tested, and the result of their failure in action may 
 " involve the capture of the ship." 
 
 I cannot conceal from myself the fact that there is 
 much ground for the remark with which this extract 
 closes, and I certainly see reason to fear that a naval 
 action may open up more elements of derangement and 
 danger in turret-ships than some are willing to believe 
 at present.* Meantime it is, and will remain, our duty 
 to diligently forecast and guard against such results to 
 the utmost of our ability. 
 
 Before concluding this part of the subject, it may be 
 well to observe that those small and fast sea-going 
 turret-ships carrying very heavy guns, which were 
 once so much urged upon the Admiralty even in 
 Parliament, are proving to be what I and some others 
 always said they were, viz., mere chimeras of the brain. 
 In order to carry 25-ton guns, the turrets of the 
 ' Monarch ' have had to be made 26J feet in diameter ; 
 the ' Captain's,' for the same guns, are still larger ; and 
 the ' Thunderer's,' to carry 30-ton guns, have been 
 made more than 31 feet in diameter. There are some 
 practical gunners who contend that all these turrets 
 should have been of much greater size. It will not, 
 therefore, be extravagant to assume that turrets for 
 50-ton guns will require to be about 35 feet in diameter. 
 
 * In this connection I say nothing respecting the experience in actual 
 warfare had with the Danish turret-ship 'Eolf Krake,' and similar vessels, 
 because the shot and shell by which the turrets of those ships were struck 
 were so extremely light as to put the effects of their impact altogether out of 
 comparison with the projectiles of our present naval guns. 
 
Chap. XI. Turvet-Ships. 241 
 
 Now, 35 feet is the full breadth of many sloops of war ; 
 the new corvettes, ' Drnid ' and ' Briton,' of nearly 1400 
 tons, are of only 36 feet extreme breadth, and are there- 
 fore obviously incapable of carrying a 35-feet turret 
 inside of them. The new fast corvettes of 2320 tons, 
 the ' Volage ' and ' Active,' are of but 42 feet extreme 
 breadth, and therefore, even if they could sustain the 
 weight of such a turret, would have but a space of 
 7>\ feet on either side between the outside of the turret 
 and the outside of the ship. In fact, the space would 
 in reality be much less, as the extreme breadth of the 
 ship would not exist abreast of the turret. A few con- 
 siderations of this kind, coupled with the diflSculty of 
 driving small ships carrying great weights at a high 
 speed, are sufficient to show that small and fast turret- 
 ships, heavily armoured and armed, are entirely out of 
 the question. 
 
 The combination of the turret system of mounting 
 naval ordnance with the monitor type of vessel in the 
 American navy, and the occasional performances of 
 ocean voyages by American monitors, and by vessels 
 of similar type, have led many to contend that vessels 
 of that type may be taken as efficient sea-going ships, 
 adapted for the general purposes of a navy like our 
 own. My opinion, on the contrary, is that no monitor 
 of the American type — i.e. a monitor with her turrets 
 standing upon the low deck, unprotected by a breast- 
 work, and with all her hatchways, &c., opening 
 through the low deck — can be considered a satisfactory 
 sea-going vessel. Such a vessel, depending, as it does, 
 upon the watertightness of the junction between the 
 turret and the deck, and obtaining that watertightness 
 
14-2 Turret-Ships. Chap. XI. 
 
 by means of the weight of the turret closing the junc- 
 tion, is unable to revole her turret and fight her guns 
 in a seaway, a circumstance which alone renders her 
 unfit for fighting actions at sea. And besides this, let 
 partisans say what they will about the dryness of 
 monitors, nothing can possibly prevent a pure monitor 
 vessel from being deluged by the sea in rough weather, 
 to an extent which is as incompatible with proper 
 ventilation and comfort as it is with fighting efficiency. 
 It is for this reason that I have devised the Breastwork 
 Monitor System, which has been briefly described in the 
 Chapter on Armour, and the characteristic feature of 
 which is that all the openings into the ship which are 
 to be used at sea are comprised within an armour- 
 plated breastwork, the top of which is situated, even in 
 small vessels, at a height of 8 or 10 feet above the sea 
 level, and at a height of about 12 feet in the ' Thunderer' 
 class. But even with this provision, monitors are, in 
 my opinion, incapable of steaming against a head sea 
 unless they are either of very large dimensions, and 
 therefore make up for deficient height by enormous 
 deck area, or else are fitted with sunk forecastles like 
 that of the ' Thunderer.' Nor can it be doubted, I 
 think, that even this class of ship will often be deluged 
 forward by the sea^ and consequently all its fittings 
 will be so arranged as not to subject the ship to 
 leakage from this cause. 
 
 The experience gained with the American monitors 
 is not by any means so uniformly satisfactory as has 
 been supposed. It has been stated in the most public 
 manner that in weather when the transports off Port 
 Sumter had to run for safety, the monitors lay like 
 
Chap. XI. Turret-Ships. 243 
 
 ducks on the water, dry and seaworthy, and were 
 never disabled from firing their guns. Of the following 
 monitors which took part in the operations off Fort 
 Sumter, in Charleston Harbour, viz. ' Passaic,' ' Wee- 
 hawken,' ' Montauk,' 'Patapsco,' ' Catskill,' 'Nan- 
 tucket,' and ' Nahant,' we have the following accounts : 
 — The captain of the ' Passaic ' says that in making 
 the passage from Hampton Eoads to Beaufort, when 
 off Cape Hatteras, the wind freshened from the S.W., 
 " causing the ship to pitch and labour a good deal." 
 In another letter he says that, " had it not been for 
 " the weather cloths, the sea would have" broken 
 "■ regularly over the top of the turrets." The turret 
 was up in the position necessary for fighting it, and, 
 owing to the difficulty of raising and lowering it, it 
 defied all their efforts to get it down. The ship took in 
 water rapidly round the turret's base, and at one time 
 the water had covered the fire hearths to within three 
 inches of the fires, and the splashing had nearly 
 quenched three of them. The captain of the ' Wee- 
 hawken ' reports that she behaved admirably in a 
 storm, but says that she made so much water that at 
 one time the ash-pits were covered. The captain of 
 the * Montauk ' observes " that on the whole she has 
 " behaved very well with the moderate test she has 
 " had, but she gives positive indications that, if forced 
 " end on into a sea, she will strain both overhangs 
 " greatly, and if she gets into the trough of the sea, she 
 " will wallow very heavily — to such an extent^ indeed, 
 " as to render the breaking of a tolerably high sea over 
 " the turret almost certain," The captain of the 
 ' Nahant ' reports that the decks leaked badly, and that 
 
 R 2 
 
a44 Ttirret-SJiips. chap. xi. 
 
 a considerable quantity of water forced its way under the 
 turret, wetting the belts of the blowers, putting every- 
 body to serious inconvenience for want of air below, and 
 causing instant depression of the steam by stopping the 
 draught, because of the constant necessity to stop the 
 blowers to repair damages to the belting. The other 
 ships were of nearly the same size and class as those 
 to which I have referred, and although we have no 
 details of their behaviour, we are bound to conclude 
 that it did not differ much from theirs. 
 
 When ordered to employ the monitors on blockading 
 duty outside the bar at Charleston, Admiral Du Pont 
 reported " that they are totally unfit for the duty, and 
 " particularly in the hot season. In even a slight sea 
 " the hatches must be battened down, and the effect 
 " upon the crew, if continued for a brief period in hot 
 " weather, would be most deleterious, indeed in such 
 " weather they are not habitable." The commanding 
 officers in a joint report on the same subject say " that 
 " the hatches would have to be battened down the 
 " whole time, and the vessel could not fail to be disabled 
 " from loss of health to the crew." 
 
 If anything more were necessary, I would refer to 
 the reports upon the original ' Monitor.' Captain Worden 
 reports of her that " she would be unable to work her 
 " guns at sea, as the ports are obhged to be kept closed 
 " and caulked, they being but five feet above the water." 
 Commander Bankhead reports that on her passage 
 from Hampton Eoads, northward (the passage on 
 which she was lost), " she plunged heavily, completely 
 " submerging lier pilot-house, the sea washing over and 
 " into the turret, and at times into the blower pipes " 
 
Chap. XI. Tiirret-Ships. 245 
 
 (she was then in tow of the ' Rhode Island '). Con- 
 tinuing, he says — "when the 'Rhode Island' was 
 " stopped to see if that would cause the ' Monitor ' to ride 
 " easier, the latter fell off immediately into the trough 
 " of the sea, and rolled heavily '' She let in water 
 round the hase of the turret, and, as the captain 
 believes, at leaks caused by the heavy shocks received 
 by the projecting armour as she came down upon the 
 sea, and she went down, in spite of pumps capable of 
 throwing 2,000 gallons a minute, which were in good 
 order and working constantly. 
 
 It may be mentioned also that, although the ' Wee- 
 hawken,' as we have seen, weathered out a storm, she 
 afterwards sank at her moorings in Charleston harbour 
 at midday, with a large number of her crew, her loss 
 being caused by a wave having passed over the deck 
 when the fore-hatch was open for ventilation. This 
 brought her down by the head, and caused her to take 
 in water through the hawse-holes, and although the 
 pumps were immediately set to work, the ship could not 
 be saved. Three minutes elapsed from the time of flying 
 the signal of distress to the time when she went down. 
 The rush of the men up through the turret prevented 
 anyone going down in time to warn those in the engine- 
 room, and of the whole crew about thirty went down in 
 her. As further instances of the suddenness with which 
 these vessels sink when injured in their hulls, we have 
 information of the ' Tecumseh ' having gone down in 
 four minutes with all hands, after being struck by a 
 torpedo, and of the ' Patapsco ' in one minute, by the 
 same means, with the supposed loss of sixty- two men. 
 
 A very great point has been made of the supposed 
 
246 
 
 Turret-Ships. 
 
 Chap. XI. 
 
 smallness of the American monitors as compared with 
 Bnghsh ships, and the sizes of the American monitors 
 have been given as follow : — The ' Passaic ' class, 844 
 tons ; the 'Monadnock' class, 1564 tons ; the 'Kalamazoo' 
 and ' Dictator' classes, 3250 tons. But the fact is that 
 these American tonnages are measured in a way very 
 different to ours, and consequently people have entirely 
 mistaken the relative sizes of English and American 
 vessels— of the ' Pallas ' and ' Monadnock ' for example 
 — as the following table of dimensions will show :— 
 
 
 Pallas. 
 
 Research. 
 
 Enter- 
 prLse. 
 
 Monad- 
 nock. 
 
 Dictator. 
 
 Kalama. 
 zoo. 
 
 Tonnage B. 0. M., in-1 
 eluding extra breadth! 
 in wake of armour . . ) 
 
 2372 
 
 1253 
 
 993 
 
 3345 
 
 3777 
 
 5260 
 
 Ditto, excluding extra 1 
 breadth in wake of> 
 armour ) 
 
 Length at water-line . . 
 
 2372 
 
 Feet. In. 
 225 
 
 1253 
 
 Feet, In. 
 195 
 
 993 
 
 Feet. In. 
 180 
 
 2796 
 
 Feet. In. 
 257 
 
 2668 
 
 Feet. In. 
 314 
 
 4308 
 
 Feet. In. 
 342 
 
 Extreme breadth . . 
 
 50 
 
 38 6 
 
 36 01 
 
 52 10 
 
 50 
 
 56 8 
 
 The ' Pallas,' ' Research,' and ' Enterprise,' are English 
 iron-clads ; the ' Monadnock,' ' Dictator,' and ' Kala- 
 mazoo,' are American monitors. 
 
 It is evident from the above particulars that the 
 ' Pallas ' is not a larger, but a very much smaller, ship 
 than even the ' Monadnock,' and only about half the 
 size of the ' Kalamazoo.' Any remarks based on the 
 supposed smallness of these American vessels therefore 
 fall to the ground. 
 
 Several passages in the reports of the Commodore 
 respecting the passage of the ' Monadnock' tound Cape 
 Horn have been referred to. It should, however, be 
 borne in mind that this was not in the nature of an 
 
Chap. XI. Ttirret-Ships. 247 
 
 ocean cruise, but was a passage from one coasting sta- 
 tion to another, calling at several points on the coast to 
 take in coals, the vessel being fitted with temporary 
 wooden pilot-houses, &c., and with coats round the 
 bases of the turrets to keep them water-tight, but which 
 would have to be slackened if the ship had to prepare 
 for an engagement. There are many points, however, 
 in the passage of this ship with which I was impressed 
 at the time the reports reached us, even after carefully 
 eliminating any little exaggeration. For instance, in a 
 quotation from this report, we find it stated that, " in a 
 " gale off Point Conception on the coast of California, 
 " two successive waves rose which interposed between 
 " my ship and the mast-head hght of the ' Monadnock.' 
 " Upon enquiry I found that the light was elevated 75 
 " feet above the water, my own eye being about 25 feet 
 " above the sea level. In this sea, according to the 
 " testimony of her officers, she was very easy." 
 
 I remember being struck with this passage in the 
 report on considering that Scoresby's ocean storm-wave 
 is only 30 feet high. The following questions also sug- 
 gested themselves : — How high were the crests of these 
 waves above the top of the turret of the monitor at the 
 time ? Could the monitor work her guns ? And if so, 
 what kind of practice would she make at an enemy on 
 the other side of these waves ? In the same report we 
 find it stated that " in the long seas of the Pacific to 
 " the southward of Valparaiso, I observed that the ' Mo- 
 " nadnock ' took very little water upon her decks, rising 
 " over the waves easily and buoyantly." Dry decks 
 under these circumstances are hardly compatible with a 
 steady gun platform. 
 
248 Turret-Ships. Chap. XI. 
 
 The following extracts from the report of Mr. Fox, 
 Assistant Secretary of the American Navy, on the 
 passage of the ' Miantonomoh,' have been much com- 
 mented on : — " The extreme lurch observed when lying 
 " broadside to a heavy sea and moderate gale was seven 
 " degrees to windward and four degrees to leeward," 
 These angles I assume to be from the vertical, but I 
 would remark that the danger to a monitor is measured 
 more by her inclination to the wave surface than to the 
 vertical. With respect to the alleged steadiness of 
 these monitors, I may add that the general steadiness 
 has never been disputed ; but we have sufBcient evi- 
 dence in the foregoing extracts from the reports of their 
 commanders to show that it would be a great mistake 
 to suppose that they are exempt at all times from con- 
 siderable rolhng. It is, however, unnecessary to enlarge 
 here upon this aspect of the question, which has already 
 been considered in Chapter YII. 
 
 When Mr. Fox is quoted as having said — " The 
 " monitor type of iron-clad is superior to the broadside, 
 " not only for fighting purposes at sea, but also for 
 •' cruising," it is quite clear from the report that he 
 uses the term cruiser in the sense in Avhich the ' Mianto- 
 nomoh ' is a cruiser, viz. a ship able to steam as far as 
 her coals will allow her, which in the American ships is 
 a very small distance. Mr. Fox in the same report 
 says : — " In the trough of the sea her ports will be liable 
 " to be flooded if required to use her guns to windward. 
 " This, therefore, would be the position selected by an 
 " antagonist who desired to fight a monitor in a sea- 
 " way." He might have added that, when the waves 
 rose higher than the ports (6 feet 6 inches), even when 
 
Chap. XI. Turret-Ships. 249 
 
 the ship rose over them sufficiently to prevent her ports 
 being flooded, she would only be able to fire her guns 
 when she mounted the crest. He would then have had 
 to face the further consideration whether there was 
 time, before sinking again into the hollow, to train and 
 fire a turret gun. This view of the case of guns near 
 the water in a heavy sea is supported by the ofiicial 
 report of Admiral Yelverton, after encountering heavy 
 weather in the Atlantic, in which he recommends a 
 turret- ship ] 2 or 14 feet out of the water. Guns in such 
 a ship would, in other than very exceptional circum- 
 stances, be enabled to keep an enemy constantly in view, 
 or, if it were a monitor, the places where she disap- 
 peared, and where she would be likely to appear again. 
 Another passage from the same report says : — " The 
 " comforts of this monitor to the officers and men are 
 " superior to those of any other class of vessels in the 
 " navy." This, in so far as it is accurate, may be 
 accounted for in this case by the smallness of the crew ; 
 it would be very different if the monitor had to carry 
 the number of men necessary to work a sailing cruiser. 
 We have, however, abundance of evidence from the 
 reports of officers, after a long experience with the 
 American monitors, to prove that they are not well 
 ventilated or comfortable. I have already given the 
 opinions of Admiral Du Pont and the commanders of 
 the monitor fleet at Charleston on their ventilation, if 
 kept on outside blockading duty. The ' Monitor,' when 
 engaged against Drew's Blufi" batteries, had to drop 
 down the river out of action^ because of the exhaustion 
 of the crew. The thermometer in the turret stood at 
 140 degrees, and the commander says that at the time 
 
250 Turret-Ships. Chap. XI. 
 
 of writing the letter one-third of his crew were suffering 
 from debihty. We have instances of the blowing appa- 
 ratus becoming deranged, stopping the draught, and 
 driving the crew on deck, and of great discomfort to the 
 crew from leaks in the deck. In the officers' reports of 
 the passage of the ' Monadnock,' we find the following 
 passages : — " Sixteen of the firemen and coalheavers 
 " have been removed from the fire room in a state of 
 "insensibility." And again, from another place, we 
 find the commander writes : — " seven men have been 
 " removed from the fire-room in an insensible condition 
 " from the effects of the heat." 
 
 A few facts respecting the fighting qualities of the 
 American monitors, drawn from the reports of officers 
 who served in them during the late war, will doubtless 
 prove interesting, and will serve to illustrate some of 
 the preceding remarks on the advantages and disadvan- 
 tages of the turret system. I need hardly say that 
 most of the services of these vessels consisted in blockad- 
 ing harbours and the months of rivers, and in attacking 
 land forts. There were -only two or three occasions on 
 which monitors had to compete with Confederate iron- 
 clads of any pretensions. The first action fought by 
 the original ' Monitor ' in Hampton Eoads has again 
 and again been referred to as an incontestable proof of 
 the superiority of the ' Monitor ' to the ' Merrimac ; ' 
 but the official accounts show that the ' Monitor ' 
 received considerable assistance from the wooden frigate 
 ' Minnesota,' and that the ' Merrimac ' only withdrew 
 when her bow had been injured by ramming. These 
 facts are the more remarkable when it is remembered 
 that the ' Merrimac ' was only an imjarovised and hastily 
 
Chap. XL T^^rret-Sh^ps. 2,5 1 
 
 coDstructed iron-clad, her armour being said to consist 
 of railway bars, while the ' Monitor ' was, with a few 
 minor exceptions, in all respects a pattern vessel of the 
 type to which she gave her name. The only other 
 engagement to which I shall refer is that between the 
 monitor ' Weehawken ' and the Confederate casemated 
 ship ' Atalanta ; ' and this certainly afforded no better 
 information respecting the real merits of monitors as 
 compared with broadside iron-clads. The ' Atalanta ' 
 was originally an iron merchant-ship, and when con- 
 verted into an iron-clad, she was cut down to a foot or 
 two above the water, and upon the low hull a case- 
 mated battery was built, armoured with two layers of 
 bar iron, 2 or 2^ inches thick, and 6 or 7 inches wide ; 
 in fact, it has been stated that the bars were made of 
 English railroad iron rolled out flat. It is surely no 
 wonder that such a structure should have been smashed 
 in by the blows of the 15-inch shot from the ' Wee- 
 hawken's ' guns, especially when it is considered that 
 the ' Atalanta ' had unfortunately got aground on her 
 way down to the Federal squadron ; nor is it surprising 
 that, under such circumstances, the fire from the 
 ' Atalanta's ' guns should have been almost ineffective 
 against the * Weehawken's ' deck and turret. 
 
 Although our information respecting the capabilities 
 of monitors as compared with other iron-clads is so 
 meagre, the reports give full accounts of the engage- 
 ments of these ships with the land fortifications at 
 Charleston and elsewhere ; and from these accounts it 
 is, I think, possible to infer, with considerable accuracy, 
 what effects would be produced on an American monitor 
 \)j heavy guns well mounted, and worked on board an 
 
252 Tui-ret-Ships. Chap. XI. 
 
 iron-clad engaging her. In the first attack on Charles- 
 ton, seven monitors were engaged, and Admiral Du 
 Pont, who commanded, states that in 40 minutes four 
 of these ships were disabled either wholly or partially. 
 In two ships^ — the ' Nahant ' and ' Passaic ' — the turrets 
 became jammed, although in the latter it was got in 
 motion again after some delay ; in the ' Nantucket ' the 
 port-stopper became jammed, several shots striking very 
 near the port, and driving in the plates, preventing 
 the further use of the 15-inch gun during the action ; 
 and in the ' Patapsco,' the rifled gun could not be used 
 after the fifth fire. In their joint report on this attack, 
 the commanding officers of the monitors stated that, in 
 their opinion, " it had been proved that any heavy 
 " blow on the turret was very apt to disorder and stop 
 " it," and " that the side armour and decks were pene- 
 " trable." They also give a summary of the injuries 
 received by the various ships, in order to justify their 
 opinion that " it would have been out of the question to 
 "renew the action the next day." I shall not go 
 through this summary in order, but shall simply state 
 that it entirely supports the views I have previously 
 expressed regarding the danger of turrets being jammed 
 by the driving inwards of base-rings or glacis-plates, 
 and the liability to injury from shot entering or striking 
 close to the turret ports. 
 
 In his report on the attack on Fort McAllister, 
 Captain Drayton confirms the accuracy of the latter 
 opinion, stating that " the gunners in the fort never 
 " exposed themselves to the fire of the monitors ; they 
 " usually discharged their pieces either while the moni- 
 " tors were loading or just as the port came in line, 
 
Chap. XI. Turret-Ships. i^^ 
 
 " and before the guns were quite ready ; the turrets 
 " being painted black not deceiving them any more 
 " than a different colour had done on the first attack." 
 This extract also shows the want of force in the state- 
 ment that has been so often made respecting the great 
 advantages resulting from being able to turn away the 
 turret ports from an enemy while the guns are being 
 loaded. Of course, this turning away of the ports does 
 prevent the possibility of shot entering the turret 
 through them ; but at the same time the monitor's 
 offensive powers entirely disappear, and an enemy can 
 if he chooses, pour upon her an unopposed fire while 
 the turret ports are turned away ; or he can reserve his 
 fire, as the Confederate gunners did, until the turret 
 has just been brought round into line, but while the 
 guns are still unprepared to fire. This report also 
 bears testimony to the vulnerability of the low decks. 
 
 One other report will suffice to show how American 
 monitors can stand the fire of forts, armed, be it 
 remembered, with nothing heavier than 10-inch and 
 7-inch guns. The second attack on the batteries at 
 Charleston was made at night; but notwithstanding 
 this fact, the monitors were often hit and badly injured, 
 particularly on the decks, which in many cases were 
 penetrated. Several of the turrets were more or less 
 jammed ; and in one case the turret-spindle was so 
 deranged as to carry the pilot-house — which ought to 
 have remained fixed — around with the turret, thus 
 destroying the ship's steering apparatus, and disabling 
 her. The opinion of American officers seems to be 
 that turrets like those of the monitors are especially 
 liable to be driven out of their proper position, which 
 
^54 Tiirret-Ships. Chap. xi. 
 
 is perpendicular to the deck, by the spindles becoming 
 bent when the turrets are struck by heavy shot. 
 
 Yery similar consequences seem to result from the 
 straining unavoidable in a seaway ; and Mr. Eads, to 
 whom I have before referred, says on this point : — " Ex- 
 " perience has shown that the rotation of the turret is 
 " greatly interfered with by the straining of the vessel 
 "in a seaway; the slightest deviation from a perfect 
 " plane in the form of the base-ring on which it rests 
 " being sufficient to create enough friction to check and 
 "sometimes prevent rotation altogether. The ' Mian- 
 " lonomoh,' on her late cruise, is a case in point." I may 
 add that, in some of the monitor turret-ships built in this 
 country for foreign governments, similar accidents have 
 occurred through the spindle of the turrets becoming 
 strained by the ship's rolling at sea, those in charge not 
 having lowered the turrets down upon its bed, as they 
 ought to have done. The liability to such accidents has, 
 as I have shown, the effect of practically destroying the 
 fighting powers of monitors at sea, when the turrets are 
 thus mounted on central spindles. With Captain Cole's 
 arrangement there is not the same danger, as the turret is 
 carried on a set of rollers fixed in a band at the circumfer- 
 ence of the turret-base, and is simply centred on a spindle, 
 
 I will not further extend these remarks upon turret- 
 ships. I have said sufficient, I hope, to indicate that if 
 we have made a mistake with reference to the intro- 
 duction into the British Navy of turret-ships, and 
 especially of monitors, that mistake has consisted in 
 adopting them too rapidly, rather than too slowly. At 
 least there has been ample cause for the exercise of 
 prudence and caution in introducing them. 
 
Chap. XII. Iron-Clad Rams. 255 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 IROX-CLAD RAMS. 
 
 Simultaneously with the introduction of armour- 
 plating, numerous proposals were made for reviving 
 the ancient method of naval warfare — that of disahling 
 or sinking an enemy by ramming. It is true that some 
 years before, when our wooden steam fleet was being 
 constructed, some naval officers had turned their atten- 
 tion to the subject, and had insisted on the possibility of 
 using our line of-battle ships and frigates as rams ; but 
 for various reasons the idea was not worked out, and 
 had passed out of consideration at the time when the 
 iron-clad reconstruction was commenced. As soon, 
 however, as the ' Warrior's ' design was determined on, 
 the matter again came into prominence, and that ship 
 ■was, as I have said in another chapter, built in such a 
 manner — with a ram stem inside the knee-of-the-head, 
 and with internal strengthenings — as to render her 
 capable of being employed as a ram. In all succeeding 
 iron-clads, also, more or less efficient provisions have 
 been made to strengthen the bows for the same pur- 
 pose ; and in this chapter I propose to consider briefly 
 what, as far as our experience enables us to judge, are 
 the best means for securing efficiency in iron-clad 
 rams. I shall, as far as possible, inform the reader also 
 of the conclusions at which naval officers in our own 
 Navy, and in the navies of other countries, have arrived, 
 
^5 6 Iron-Clad Rams. Chap. XI I. 
 
 giving special prominence, as is but right, to the 
 opinions entertained by Austrian and American officers, 
 both of whom have seen actual service. 
 
 It may be interesting to state, before passing on, that 
 the greater weight was at first given to efficiency in 
 ramming power on account of the fact that the 4i-inch 
 armour, carried by the earlier ships, was practically 
 impenetrable to the 68-pounder gun, then the heaviest 
 carried on the broadside. On this account the advocates 
 of ramming contended that it was an absolute necessity 
 to avail ourselves of the attacking power possessed by a 
 ship in virtue of her weight and speed — a power which, 
 when effectually employed, would suffice to cut down 
 and sink even the most formidable adversary. Since 
 that time, the power of the armaments of iron-clads has, 
 as I have shown, been greatly increased ; and it is only 
 our most recent ships that are practically impenetrable 
 to our 25-ton and 30-ton 600-pounder guns. But even 
 now the argument in favour of making use of a ship's 
 momentum, as one of the most important features in her 
 powers of attack, remains in full force ; and in all our 
 recent ships care has been taken to provide such bows 
 and bow-strengthenings as will enable them to inflict 
 the greatest damage on an enemy without themselves 
 receiving, it is hoped, any serious injury. The French 
 have also fitted their iron-clads for similar services ; 
 but the fact that most of their ships are wood-built 
 prevents the bows being so effectually strengthened as 
 they can be in iron ships. In both our own and the 
 French navies also, within the last few years, ships 
 have been included which are designed specially for 
 ramming, and therefore carry only one or two of the 
 
Chap. XII. Iron-Clad Rams. 257 
 
 most powerful guns. The French led the way in this 
 direction by constructing the ' Taureau ;' and they have 
 since put four more rams on the stocks, one of which, 
 the ' Cerb^re,' is now fitting, and the other three are 
 still building. We have two such vessels now building 
 — the ' Hotspur ' and the ' Rupert ' — which bear some 
 general resemblance to the French rams, although they 
 are differently constructed, and are of a less unusual 
 form. All these ships depend upon their powers of 
 ramming for the main strength of their attack, but are 
 by no means incapable of fighting with their heavy 
 guns at long ranges, and of engaging an enemy while 
 steaming up to attack him. They are not to be rigged 
 as sailing ships, although they will carry a small spread 
 of canvas, but will really be steam war-engines capable 
 either of delivering a tremendous blow or of manoeuvr- 
 ing and fighting with their heavy guns. Ships like 
 these attached to a squadron of iron-clads, or lying 
 under easy steam in the Channel, or off one of our 
 naval stations — say, off Gibraltar — would undoubtedly 
 be of great value in time of war. 
 
 During the late American war, both sides availed 
 themselves of this method of attack ; and from official 
 reports of Federal officers it appears that the Con- 
 federates produced some of the most extraordinarily 
 shaped vessels for ramming that could possibly be 
 devised, and which could only be used for service in 
 rivers or harbours. Most, if not all, of the monitors 
 also were strengthened for ramming purposes, and 
 many of the engagements, particularly those that took 
 place on the western rivers, were decided, not by artil- 
 lery, but by ramming. The fact that the vessels used 
 
2'58 Iron-Clad Rams. Chap. XII. 
 
 in this contest, especially the Confederate ships, were 
 comj)aratively weak, very slow, and not at all handy, 
 prepares us for the conclusion to which a study of the 
 reports of the war conducts, viz. that in most cases where 
 such a ship was fairly struck by a ram she sank. It 
 cannot^ of course be assumed that with stronger, swifter, 
 and handier ships similar results would be obtained ; and 
 Araerican officers have been among the first to point this 
 out ; but the conviction of these officers with regard to 
 ramming, after their experience in the war^ may be fairly 
 summed up in the words of Admiral Groldsborough : — 
 " Every iron-clad, as a matter of course, should be an 
 '' unexceptionable ram ; or, in other words, susceptible 
 " herself of being used as a projectile." 
 
 The engagement at Lissa affords more conclusive 
 evidence of the great results that may be achieved by 
 the proper use of this method of attack, especially in 
 actions between sea-going ships. This engagement, as 
 is well known, resulted in the total defeat of the Italian 
 fleet, that defeat being in a great measure due to the 
 excellent performances of the Austrian ship ' Ferdinand 
 Max,' which rammed and sank the ' Ee d' Italia,' and 
 damaged other ships severely. The lessons to be learnt 
 from these results I shall hereafter attempt to set forth. 
 
 In dealing with the question of ramming efficiency, 
 it is most natural to consider the subject under two 
 aspects : first, how best to construct and prepare a ship 
 for inflicting the greatest damage upon an enemy with 
 the least possible injury to herself ; second, how best to 
 manoeuvre and work such a ship when in action. The 
 first of these points is of course, as much a matter of 
 interest to the naval architect as it is to the naval 
 
Chap. XII. Iron^Clad Rams. 259 
 
 officer ; the second is peculiarly the business of the 
 naval officer. I shall refer to both, treating the former 
 at some length, and the latter only briefly, and shall 
 strive to set forth, and to weigh fairly, the various 
 opinions entertained on the subject. 
 
 In order that a ship may be efficient as a ram, it is 
 obvious, first of all, that she must be handy under steam. 
 The effect of the blow she can deliver is in a large 
 measure dependent on the directness of her attack, and 
 an oblique or glancing blow on an enemy's side might 
 sometimes do as much damage to the ram herself as to 
 the ship she attacks. When a vessel steams directly 
 down upon a ship at rest, as the ' Merrimac ' did upon 
 the ' Cumberland ' at Newport News, or upon a vessel 
 which can only manoeuvre sluggishly, as the ' Ferdinand 
 Max ' did upon the ' Re d' Italia ' at Lissa, the attack 
 by ramming can scarcely fail to be successful. But 
 when an enemy is under way, and is perfectly under 
 command of the steersman, there is much opportunity 
 for her either entirely or partially to evade the attack of 
 a ram, unless the latter is capable of beiug manoeuvred' 
 much more rapidly. 
 
 All naval officers, and others who have written upon 
 the subject, have recognised these facts. Admiral 
 Warden, in his report on the Channel Fleet for 1868, 
 says :— " It is as clear as anything can be that, so long as 
 " a ship has good way on her, and a good command of 
 " steam to increase her steam at pleasure, that ship 
 " cannot be what is called ' rammed ;' she cannot even be 
 " struck to any purpose so long as she has room^ and is 
 " properly handled. The use of ships as rams, it appears 
 " to me, will only be called into play after an action has 
 
 s 2 
 
2.6o Iron^Clad Rams. Chap. xil. 
 
 " commenced, wlien ships, of necessity, are reduced to a 
 " low rate of speed — probably their lowest." It should 
 be stated that Admiral "Warden does not look so favour- 
 ably on attack by ramming as some other officers, so 
 that his remarks on the difficulty of effectually ramming 
 a steamship are of great weight, inasmuch as they 
 indirectly bring handiness in rams into the most pro- 
 minent position. In his accompanying Eeport, Admiral 
 Ryder goes fully into the discussion of this point in his 
 answer to the question — " What class, in your opinion, 
 " presents the greatest advantage for giving effect to 
 " ramming or otherwise ? " He decidedly prefers the 
 short class exemplified in the ' Bellerophon ' to the long 
 class of which the ' "Warrior ' and ' Minotaur ' are ex- 
 amples, and in justifying this preference says: — "The 
 " short class is the handiest, and is therefore more likely 
 " to hit the enemy if she is moving ; to hit that part of 
 " her which it is desired to penetrate ; to hit her at 
 " about the desired angle, so as to injure our own stem 
 " as little as possible ; to minimise the wrenching strain 
 " on her stem, as this short class is more easily turned." 
 This able summary requires, I think, no further remarks 
 in order to enforce its important bearing on the point 
 now under discussion. 
 
 It may be interesting if, to these opinions of English 
 naval officers, I add an extract from the Report of the 
 American Admiral Goldsborough. In speaking of 
 the elements of efficiency in iron-clads, he says : — 
 " Among these elements is that of celerity in turning, 
 " and as it is a point to which sufficient attention has 
 " not been given hitherto, I wish to impress my con- 
 " victions in regard to it." Then, applying this to 
 
Chap. XII. Iron-Clad Rams. 261 
 
 rams, lie adds, respecting their success : — " This, how- 
 " ever, cannot be the case unless they can be directed 
 " with a great degree of promptness to any desired 
 " quarter, or turned with every degree of quickness 
 " necessary." Farther on he says : — " But to return to 
 " the point of celerity in turning, no practical means, 
 " in my judgment, should be neglected, more par- 
 " ticularly in an iron-clad, to secure this cardinal 
 " quality." 
 
 These are a few specimens of the opinions enter- 
 tained by naval men respecting the necessity for 
 handiness in iron-clad rams ; the means of obtaining 
 this facility of manoeuvring next claim attention. The 
 chief of these consists, as I have shown in preceding 
 chapters, in the adoption of moderate dimensions and 
 proportions, in combination with improved means of 
 steering, and more especially with the use of balanced 
 rudders. Having so fully illustrated the superiority in 
 steering power of our short ships as compared with the 
 ' Wai'rior ' and ' Minotaur ' classes, I need not do 
 more than refer the reader to Chapter VIII., as he will 
 there find the results of trials of turning, and some 
 criticisms on the opinions which have been expressed 
 respecting them. Without doubt, I am correct in 
 saying that a large majority of the officers in our Navy 
 are in favour of the change, which was inaugurated in 
 the ' Bellerophon,' to shorter and smaller ships than 
 had previously been in vogue as the types of first-class 
 iron-clads, and that their preference is based upon the 
 fact that recent ships are so much more manageable. 
 If we compare the ' Warrior,' taking 9 minutes 
 10 seconds at full speed to go round a circle of 1050 
 
2.62 Iron-Clad Rams. Chap. XII. 
 
 yards diameter, with the ' Hercules,' which when 
 turning to starboard at full speed took only 4 minutes 
 — considerably less than half the time taken by the 
 'Warrior' — to go round a circle of only 527 yards 
 diameter, it must appear that the shorter ship has a 
 much better chance of striking an enemy fairly, or of 
 avoiding a charge, than the long ship. 
 
 The reduction in dimensions here alluded to, of 
 course, leads to a reduction in the force of the blow 
 which the ship can deliver, supposing the attack to be 
 made at the same speed and with equal directness, and 
 it may be thought that this fact tells in favour of the 
 longer and larger ships. No doubt there is some truth 
 in this opinion, but there are one or two points 
 requiring notice which considerably modify an estimate 
 of its importance. For instance, it is scarcely reason- 
 able to suppose that the longer ship could in general 
 attack an enemy with a directness equal to that of the 
 shorter ship, seeing that the latter is so much more 
 readily handled. On this account oblique attacks are 
 much more likely to result in the diminished force of 
 the blows delivered by long ships than in those by 
 short ships ; so that on this account there will be much 
 less difference, if there be any, in favour of the larger 
 ships than their greater weight would lead one to 
 anticipate. Besides this it is quite unnecessary to com- 
 pare the attacking powers of two rams when the 
 smaller one is able at a moderate speed to deliver a 
 blow far heavier than is required to smash in the 
 armoured side of any ship yet built or likely to be 
 built. Taking, for example, a ship like the ' Rupert,' 
 of about 5000 tons weighty and supposing her to charge 
 
Chap. XII. Iron-Clad Rams ^ 263 
 
 an enemy at a fair speed, say at 10 knots per hour, the 
 " energy " of the blow she can strike is measured by 
 about 22,300 foot-tons; and we know from the trials at 
 Shoeburyness that the 600-lb. shot from a 25-ton gun 
 is capable of penetrating all the French iron-clads, for 
 example, at a short range, although its "energy," 
 when it leaves the muzzle of the gun, is only a little 
 over 6000 foot-tons. What then must be the effect of 
 the ' Rupert's ' attack ? and what would be gained by 
 doubling her size and making her of 10,000 tons dis- 
 placement, like the ' Minotaur,' even if the larger ship 
 could be made to. strike as fairly, which is^ as a rule, 
 out of the question ? The blow struck by the heavier 
 ship would obviously be heavier, but then it must be 
 evident from the preceding figures that the smaller 
 ship has a very large reserve of power, and that it is 
 quite unnecessary to add to it, especially as in doing so 
 we take away from her handiness. Admiral Ryder, in 
 the Report from which I have already quoted, says 
 with respect to the long and short iron-clads, repre- 
 sented by the ' Minotaur ' and ' Warrior ' on the one 
 hand and the ' Bellerophon ' on the other : — " Speed and 
 " weight are, no doubt, of great importance in ramming, 
 " but both classes have speed enough and weight 
 " enough for the purpose." 
 
 The reader will, I think, be inclined to believe that 
 this is really less than might be said on the subject ; 
 and that smaller ships than the ' Bellerophon ' may be, 
 and are, thoroughly efficient as rams. The Admiralty 
 and the French authorities have both acted on these 
 considerations, in designing ships like the ' Hotspur ' 
 and the ' Taureau,' which are essentially steam-rams, 
 
^H Iron-Clad Rams Chap. xil. 
 
 and which have ample ramming power in combination 
 with good manoeuvring power. 
 
 Among other means of obtaining increased handiness 
 in iron-clad rams, the chief is the adoption of twin- 
 screws, which increase a ship's manoeuvring power 
 considerably, and give her special facilities for turning 
 in a small space — a matter of the highest moment in an 
 action where many ships are crowded together. As 
 far as our experience goes, it appears that the single 
 screw has some advantage over twin-screws in point of 
 speed attained, but it has the disadvantage of requiring 
 greater draught of water, and given less power to turn 
 a ship upon her own centre without change of place. 
 For these and other reasons, it has been considered 
 desirable to give iron-clad rams twin-screws. In these 
 ships — such as the ' Rupert ' and ' Hotspur ' in our 
 own Navy, and the ' Belier ' class in the French navy 
 — specially designed for ramming and but lightly 
 rigged, there is another and most weighty reason for 
 adopting twin-screws, viz. that the probability of their 
 being disabled through accidents to their engines is 
 much reduced. These ships, as I have said, are not 
 capable of proceeding under sail alone, and depending, 
 as they do, on their steam-power for propulsion, it 
 would obviously be bad policy to entrust their safety to 
 one engine and one screw, when it is possible to have 
 the separate engines and screws of the twin-screw plan. 
 Even if one of the screws were disabled, the ship would 
 still be manageable, and could proceed at a fair speed, 
 as is shown by the fact that twin-screw ships often 
 perform the greater portion of distant voyages with 
 only one screw working, and are then perfectly under 
 
Chap. XII. Iron-Clad Rams. 2.6^ 
 
 control. There can, I think, be no reasonable doubt, 
 therefore, that, in adopting twin-screws to the extent 
 they have, the Admiralty have acted wisely, in so far 
 as the efficiency of our iron-clad rams is concerned. 
 
 Handiness being secured in an iron-clad ram, the 
 next great object of the naval architect is to adopt 
 the form and structural arrangements of bow best fitted 
 for deahng a deadly blow on an enemy's side without 
 itself receiving too serious damage. It is generally 
 agreed that, at least in iron-built ships, ram-bows can 
 be efficiently strengthened, and I shall revert to the 
 arrangements made for this purpose in another part of 
 this chapter. As to the proper form for ram-bows, 
 there is not, however, the same unanimity of opinion. 
 Some persons are in favour of a contour of stem which 
 reaches forward above water, something like the knee- 
 of-the-head in our wooden frigates and line-of-battle 
 ships ; others have expressed their preference for an 
 upright or nearly upright ram-stem ; but the majority 
 are decidedly in favour of the under-water prow, spur, 
 or eperon, which has been adopted to a greater or less 
 extent in the iron-clads both of our own and of foreign 
 navies. 
 
 The advocates of the overhanging, or fore-reaching, 
 stem think that there is an advantage iu delivering 
 the blow above rather than under water ; and that in 
 ramming low-decked monitors, or ships having a small 
 height of armour belt above water, there is a probability 
 of over-running the enemy and making the weight of 
 the attacking ship aid in sinking her. They also hold 
 that there is not the same Hability to danger by the 
 bow becoming more or less "locked" in an enemy's 
 
^66 Iron-Clad Rams. Chap. xii. 
 
 side when ramming has taken place, as exists in a ship 
 with a projecting under-water prow. I shall again 
 refer to these opinions almost immediately, but may 
 add for the reader's information that a statement of the 
 advantages claimed for the fore-reaching stem will be 
 fonnd in a paper on ' ISTaval Construction ' read by 
 Sir Edward Belcher before the Institution of Kaval 
 Architects in 1868, and since pubhshed in their 
 ' Transactions.' 
 
 Those who advocate the upright, or nearly upright, 
 ram-stem contend that the blow it is capable of deliver- 
 ing is not so local in its character as that delivered either 
 by the fore-reaching or the eperon bow, and that on this 
 account the smashing or damaging effect of an enemy's 
 side is sure to be increased. The upright bow is also 
 thought to be more readily disengaged from an enemy's 
 side after ramming than the under-water prow, and to 
 be less liable to twisting or wrenching. The latter is 
 the consideration to which most weight has been 
 attached, and I shall, therefore, direct particular atten- 
 tion to it hereafter. Amongst those who are in favour 
 of the upright bow, I may mention Admiral Warden, 
 who expresses his preference in the Eeport on the 
 Channel Fleet for 1868, to which I referred above. 
 
 The eperon, or spur-bow, is intended to deliver a 
 strictly local blow, the aim kept in view being rather 
 to sink an enemy by penetrating the weak side below 
 water than to smash in or otherwise damage the strong 
 armoured side above water. In fact, in comparing this 
 form of bow with either of the others, its great advan- 
 tage consists in the greater penetrating power which it 
 undoubtedly possesses. The armour of even the strongest 
 
Chap. XII. Iron-Clad Rams. 267 
 
 iron-clads does not extend much more than 6 feet below 
 water, and below this depth the ship's safety depends 
 upon the comparatively weak planking, or plating of 
 the bottom, remaining intact. The foremost point 
 of the projecting prow^ in ships with spur-bows, is 
 situated about 7 or 8 feet below water, and is conse- 
 quently in the best possible position for penetrating the 
 weak side below the armour, before meeting with much, 
 if any, resistance from the stronger armoured portions. 
 It must, then, be obvious that the force required in 
 order to make this kind of bow effective in sinking or 
 severely injuring an enemy will be much less than 
 is required to make either of the other forms equally 
 effective, supposing such a result to be possible. This 
 is an important feature, for a ram may be so situated as 
 to be unable to gather much speed before the attack, 
 or to avoid attacking obliquely, instead of directly, but 
 may still have power enough to break through the side 
 below the armour, while powerless, or almost powerless, 
 against the armoured side. A large hole below water 
 in a ship's side must inevitably lead to her loss, unless 
 some special provisions, in the way of water-tight divi- 
 sions or compartments in the hold, have been made ; 
 and I need hardly say that adequate provisions have 
 not been made in most iron-clads, while the shock of 
 a collision may be expected to greatly disarrange and 
 damage any but the best arrangements of the kind. It 
 is not unreasonable to expect, therefore, that a well- 
 executed charge by a ship with a spur-bow must prove 
 a source of great, if not fatal, damage to the ship 
 attacked, and that very serious results will follow even 
 from a blow possessed of but moderate force. 
 
^■68 Iron-Clad Rams. Chap. xil. 
 
 Another advantage whicli the spur-bow has . is its 
 extreme adaptation for damaging an enemy's rudder, 
 or screw. Both rudder and screw are perfectly secure, 
 in modern ships with full pink sterns and overhang- 
 ing counters sheathed with armour, against injury 
 from an upright or fore-reaching stem ; but even a light 
 touch of the under-water spur, which is exactly adapted 
 for passing in under the counter, would suffice to disable 
 the finest single-screw iron-clad in the world, and place 
 her at the mercy of her foe. 
 
 The other forms of ram-bow do not, I repeat, possess 
 the foregoing advantages. A fore-reaching stem, whether 
 striking amidships or abaft, must encounter resistance 
 from the armoured portion of the side, and the ram 
 must be moving directly down upon her enemy at a 
 good speed in order to inflict serious damage. The un- 
 armoured upper works of a ship with an armour belt 
 may, it is true, be swept away by a moderate blow ; but 
 the loss of these will not at all affect the ship's safety, 
 and but little interfere with her fighting efficiency. The 
 over-running of an enemy, to which so much importance 
 is attached, would certainly require a rapid attack, except 
 perhaps in the case of monitors of the American type, 
 with extremely low freeboard ; but even in the case of 
 these vessels it seems a much more certain means of 
 destruction to penetrate the thin side, and to trust to 
 the in-rush of water to sink the ship, than to rely mainly 
 upon the super-position of the weight of the ship 
 upon the monitor for that purpose. The margin of 
 buoyancy is so small in these ships that a leak of only 
 moderate amount becomes important, and the cases of 
 the * Weehawken ' and other monitors prove that a 
 
Chap. XII. Iron-Clad Rams. 2,6g 
 
 comparatively small hole in tlie side below water would 
 suffice to sink them. The ' Weehawken,' in spite of the 
 efforts made to save her, went down at her moorings in 
 a few minutes ; the ' Tecumseh ' was sunk by a torpedo 
 in about four minutes ; and the ' Patapsco ' is said to 
 have sunk one minute after being struck ; while the 
 original ' Monitor ' went down in consequence of the sea 
 washing over and into the turrets, and through the 
 junction of the turret with the deck. These losses, 
 resulting from the admission of the sea into the ship, I 
 think, leave no doubt as to the efficacy of the spur-bow 
 as compared with the fore-reaching bow even when moni- 
 tors are the objects of attack. I am aware that it has been 
 stated that the overhang of the armour and backing 
 on the sides of monitors would prevent the spur from 
 reaching and striking the thin sides of the ship. There 
 can, I think, be little doubt, however, that, in most cases, 
 a charge by a ship with a spur-bow against a monitor 
 would tend to lift the side of the latter somewhat, and 
 thus render the penetration of the weak portions pos- 
 sible ; and the bows of our recent ram-vessels are of 
 such a form as to entirely do away with this objection, 
 as they can pierce the side of any monitor afloat without 
 coming in contact with the overhanging armour. It 
 will also be clear, from the drawings and description of 
 American ships given in Chapter II. (on Armour), that 
 their customary mode of greatly reducing the thickness 
 of the armour at a very small depth below water, tends 
 to render it still more probable that the spur-bow would 
 be most effective. 
 
 The upright, or nearly upright, bow has more numerous 
 supporters than the fore-reaching bow, and it has been 
 
270 Iroit-Clad Rams. Chap. XII. 
 
 adopted in several of our iron-clads, such as the ' Achilles,' 
 the ' Minotaur ' class, and the converted ships of the 
 ' Caledonia ' class. The French also adopted it in their 
 earlier iron-clads, but, like ourselves, have since deserted 
 it in favour of the spur-bow. The reasons for this deser- 
 tion will, I think, be regarded by the reader as amply 
 sufficient when he considers the merits of the two forms. 
 The very advantage claimed for the upright bow — the 
 non-local character of the blow it delivers — is un- 
 doubtedly a serious disadvantage ; for an attack con- 
 centrated upon a limited area must, with a given 
 attacking force, be more effective than one distributed 
 over a considerable area. Nor should it be forgotten 
 that the force of the blow delivered by an upright bow 
 is, for the most part, distributed over an area of the 
 armoured side ; whereas the spur-bow, as I have said, 
 inflicts injury upon a smaller area of much less strength. 
 The proportion of the force of the blow struck to the 
 strength of the side which resists it is, therefore, enor- 
 mously greater in the latter than in the former kind of bow. 
 If it be true, as I think most persons will admit, that the 
 ne plus ultra of ramming efficiency consists in the capacity 
 to sink an enemy, there seems to be no good ground for 
 maintaining the equality, much less the superiority, of 
 the njsright bow as compared with the spur. There 
 can be no doubt that, if a powerful iron-clad ram, with 
 an upright bow, came down at a good speed directly 
 upon the broadside of an enemy, she would inflict injury 
 of so terrible a character as usually to occasion the loss 
 of the ship attacked ; but in action it might well happen 
 that a ram. could not ensure either a swift or a direct 
 charge, and on this account the form of bow which does 
 
Chap. XII. Iron-Clad Rams. 271 
 
 the greatest damage with the least force must be con- 
 sidered the best. 
 
 The experience of the Americans may be referred to 
 as proof of the efficiency of the upright ram-bow, and 
 a few words on this point may be of interest. In most 
 of their monitors the ram consists of a wedge-shaped 
 prolongation of the overhanging side armour and back- 
 ing beyond the hull proper, the structural arrange- 
 ments being made to conform as much as possible to 
 the necessity for unusual strength. This was the 
 readiest means of making these vessels available as 
 rams, and in them had special advantages connected 
 with raising the anchors, &c. : but it must not there- 
 fore be regarded as the best means, and was not so 
 regarded by the Americans themselves, who, in the 
 ' Keokuk,' ' Dunderberg,' and other vessels, adopted 
 bows approximating more or less closely to the spur 
 shape. That the monitors did good service is not for 
 a moment disputed, but it is necessary to remark 
 that little or nothing respecting the merits of their 
 form of ram-bow can be applied to the present discus- 
 sion. The monitor ram was upright, and it struck an 
 enemy's side on the armour close to the water-line, the 
 blow being distributed over a depth of five or six feet ; so 
 far, therefore, the conditions resembled those we have 
 been considering. But the ships which were attacked in 
 this manner, and in most cases sank, were not to be com- 
 pared in structural strength with most European iron- 
 clads ; and from the efiect produced upon them by a 
 ram of any form whatever it is impossible to infer 
 anything respecting the damage that would be done to 
 
^7^' Iron-Clad Rams. Chap. xil. 
 
 such ships as the ' Minotaur,' ' Bellerophon,' and 
 ' Hercules.' One point appears clear, however, from the 
 reports of the losses of ships by ramming, viz. that in 
 many cases the hulls were so weakly built as to be 
 made to leak seriously by the vibration caused by the 
 shock, even when the parts struck were not penetrated, 
 nor seriously injured. "We know that in some of the 
 monitors themselves the strains of a coasting voyage 
 were sufficient to cause leaks of great magnitude, and 
 it requires no argument to show that ships thus weak 
 themselves, and moving at such low speeds, could not 
 have been formidable as rams against any but hastily 
 constructed ships like those of the Confederates. I 
 need only add that the latter in many of their rams 
 adopted the under-water prow, but so imperfectly were 
 these vessels constructed and strengthened, owing to 
 their hurried building and the limited means possessed 
 by their builders, that they often sustained serious 
 damages in inflicting injury on an enemy. ' The ' Merri- 
 mac,' for example, with a wrought-iron or metal cleaver 
 upon her bow, did good execution among the Federal 
 fleet at Hampton Eoads, but was at length obliged to 
 retire on account of the injury sustained by the ram- 
 bow. On the whole, then, I do not think American 
 experience can be regarded as affording any evidence 
 of the merits of any form of bow. 
 
 Having contrasted the merits of the spur-bow with 
 those of the other two forms, I pass on to notice the 
 disadvantages which have been said to be connected 
 with this form. The chief of these assumed disadvan- 
 tages consists in the difficulty that would be experi- 
 
Chap. XII. Iron-Clad Rams. 273 
 
 enced in disengaging a spur-bow after ramming an 
 enemy, and the danger that would exist of such a bow 
 being twisted or wrenched off. Both of these points 
 have been brought very prominently forward by the 
 opponents of this bow, and have been considered by 
 some sufficiently weighty to justify its rejection. I 
 shall therefore attempt to show how far these opinions 
 are justified by the few facts in our possession. With 
 respect to the difficulty of disengaging this bow from 
 an enemy's side, I may remark that, so far as my in- 
 formation extends, no such difficulty has ever been 
 experienced in actual warfare ; in fact, judging from 
 the action at Lissa, this difficulty does not exist. The 
 ' Ferdinand Max,' which has a bow of this form, sus- 
 tained no serious injury from the effect of her four 
 collisions, one of which had caused the loss of the ' Ee 
 d' Italia,' which went down so rapidly as to test most 
 thoroughly the capacity of the ram to disengage her- 
 self from the sinking ship. It is, of course, within 
 the bounds of probability to suppose that a ship may 
 by some extraordinary combination of circumstances 
 become locked to the vessel she has rammed, and 
 be endangered ; but experience warrants us rather in 
 believing that, when an iron-clad ram is properly 
 handled, her engines being reversed as soon as the blow 
 has been delivered, no difficulty will be experienced in 
 clearing the sinking ship. 
 
 Next, as to the danger of injury to a spur-bow by 
 twisting or wrenching taking place. Those who con- 
 sider such danger probable have supported their opinion 
 by reference to the loss of the unarmoured wood sloop 
 
2-74 Iron-Clad Rams. Chap. XII. 
 
 * Amazon,' which sank after coming into collision with 
 the merchant steam-ship ' Osprey ' — an example which, 
 I shall proceed to show, has really no hearing on the 
 matter. In order to do this, I must state a few facts 
 respecting the ' Amazon,' and this is the more needed 
 as statements of a most mistaken character have heen 
 repeatedly put forward as the bases of arguments on the 
 proper forms of ram-bows. This ship had a stem very 
 similar in its contour to that adojoted in our iron-clads of 
 recent date, but without any actual point or spur, being 
 merely curved like a swan's breast. This form was not in 
 any way connected with an intention to use the ship as 
 a ram, nor was such an idea ever entertained. The pro- 
 file of the stem was really adopted because it favoured 
 the use of fine horizontal sections, or water-lines, in 
 combination with U-shaped transverse sections at the 
 bow, by which combination the fineness of form requi- 
 site for good speed was associated with the amount of 
 buoyancy required to render the ship's pitching and 
 'scending motions easy. The intentions of the de- 
 signers in both these respects were more than realised 
 in the actual performance of the ship, but as the idea 
 of employing her as a ram was, as I have said, never 
 entertained, no means whatever were employed to 
 specially strengthen the bow, which was constructed 
 just in the same way as it would have been in another 
 wood ship with the ordinary contour of stem ; in fact, 
 I have in my possession the original memorandum 
 upon the authority of which I designed this vessel, 
 directing the adoption of the form of bow^ not for 
 ramming purposes. One other fact requires to be men- 
 
Chap. XII. Iron-Clad Rams. 275 
 
 tioned, viz. that, in order to prevent the projecting 
 wood prow from being chafed by the cables when the 
 ship was riding at anchor, it was thought desirable to 
 put on a thin metal casing on the front of the wood 
 stem. This casing, I need hardly say, added nothing 
 to the strength of the bow. 
 
 It is on the loss of a small lightly-built sloop of this 
 kind — neither built nor strengthened for ramming pur- 
 poses — by the twisting of her light false stem, and the 
 opening of her bow planks through collision with an 
 iron vessel moving across her bows at a good speed 
 (said to be 9 or 10 knots per hour), that the very 
 decided condemnations of the spur-bow to which I have 
 referred have been based. On the face of the matter, 
 however, it must appear that it is absurd to argue 
 from the ' Amazon's' case to that of a bow built for 
 ramming, and to consider that case as more conclusive 
 of the merits of the spur-bow than the experience had 
 with the real ram-vessel ' Ferdinand Max,' not in an 
 accidental collision, but in actual warfare. There 
 can be absolutely no sort of comparison made between 
 the strength of ram-bows like the ' Lord Clyde's ' and the 
 ' Bellerophon's,' or the ' Hotspur's,' and the weak bow 
 of a small wood sloop, even though the contours of the 
 stems may be somewhat similar. That this is so will be 
 evident even to the non-professional reader if he refers 
 to the accompanying drawings, which show sections, on 
 the same scale, of the bow of the Amazon, and the 
 ram-bows of the three ships just named. No remarks 
 are needed to give additional force to the comparison. 
 
 It is only necessary to observe that the parts shown 
 in black are of solid iron. 
 
 T 2 
 
276 
 
 Iron-Clad Rams. 
 
 Chap. XII. 
 
 StSM of ilM/120/l/" 
 
Chap. XII. Iron-Clad Rams. 277 
 
 No doubt it is the fact that the ' Amazon' had the 
 swan-shaped contour of stem given to her for the rea- 
 sons assigned above which has misled nany critics, 
 and particularly those foreign writers who have re- 
 ferred to tbe subject. Admiral Paris, for example, who 
 is so well known as a writer on naval architecture 
 and the associated sciences, says of the 'Amazon's" 
 bow : — " The most remarkable part of this ship is the 
 " bow, which, although the vessel is unarmed, is of 
 " the same form as that adopted in the English iron-clad 
 " frigates, and projects forward under water like the 
 " prow of the ' Bellerophon,' and is doubtless intended 
 " for ramming shijDS of equal size with the ' Amazon.' "* 
 The assumption here made is, I need hardly say, an 
 altogether mistaken one, as is also another which the 
 same writer makes soon after, that " the iron-clads have 
 " not stronger prows (than the ' Amazon '), since they 
 " are placed below their armour, and consequently are 
 " similarly constructed whether there is or is not 
 " armour." To compare the ' Amazon's ' bow with the 
 ' Lord Clyde's ' is not more reasonable than to compare 
 a walking-cane with the pike of one of Cromwell's 
 Ironsides. 
 
 A still more striking instance of the mistakes made 
 respecting the ' Amazon's ' bow is found in the Report, 
 on " Munitions of War," of the United States' Commis- 
 sioners at the Paris Exhibition in 1867. Speaking of 
 the ' Amazon,' they say f : — " Here, en passant, let us for 
 " a moment consider the loss of this vessel in connection 
 
 * ' L'Art naval a I'Exposition universelle de Paris en 1867. Paris, Artlius 
 Bertrand. See page 134. 
 
 t See page 249 of the Report. London, E. & F. N. Spon, 1868. 
 
27^ Iron-Clad Rams. Chap. XII. 
 
 " with the ram principle of attack. The ' Amazon, it 
 " is true, was a wooden ship, but she was fitted with a 
 " projecting prow, armed with a strong cleaver of cast 
 " brass for the purpose of being used as a ram if occasion 
 " required* If she was, comparatively speaking, a small 
 " ship of war, the vessel she ran into was only a small 
 " coasting steamer of less than half her tonnage. Hence 
 " it is reasonable to conclude that the projecting prow 
 " of the ' Amazon ' was as formidable to the ' Osprey ' 
 " as that of the ' Bellerophon ' would be to the ' Mian- 
 " tonomoh,' and that it would, in proportion to the 
 " weight of the ship, be as strong as the prows of iron- 
 " built and iron-plated ships generally." After the brief 
 statement of the real facts of the case given previously, 
 I feel sure that no further remarks are necessary in 
 order to demonstrate the errors of description and 
 deduction contained in this quotation ; but I cannot 
 forbear noticing the ingenuity which converts the thin 
 metal casing, which protected the wood stem from the 
 chafing of the cables, into "a strong cleaver of cast 
 " brass," and the bold assertion that the ship was in- 
 tended to be " used as a ram if occasion required." 
 Such remarks are, however, beneath further notice, 
 having absolutely no relation to the practical construc- 
 tion of iron-clad rams. 
 
 Not only have foreign writers fallen into these mis- 
 takes, but there are a few English naval officers and 
 shipbuilders who have also joined in the belief that the 
 loss of the ' Amazon ' finally settles the merits of the 
 projecting prow for ramming : and the phrase "Amazon 
 
 "* The italics are mine. 
 
Chap. XII. Iron-Clad Rams. 279 
 
 fashion" has heen employed more than once to give 
 full expression to the probable effect of a collision upon 
 the strengthened ram-bows of our recent iron-clads. 
 All such opinions obviously rest on fundamental mis- 
 conceptions vrith respect to the purposes intended to be 
 served by the ' Amazon/ and the construction of her 
 bow, and require no answer additional to that given 
 above. While maintaining, as I have done, that the 
 ' Amazon's ' loss does not render it in the least likely 
 that a similar accident would ha^Dpen to an iron-clad 
 ram with a spur-bow, I admit most freely that^ if 
 a ram attacks a ship which is moving ahead at a 
 good speed, there will be some danger of the ram-bow 
 becoming twisted. It is also evident that in a prow 
 which projects forward under water for a very con- 
 siderable distance, the liability to twisting is increased, 
 especially when this contour of stem is associated with 
 very fine water-lines. In our iron-clads, however, the 
 prow does not project to anything like a dangerous 
 extent, nor is there such fineness of form as to prevent 
 a proper amount of lateral strength being given to the 
 bow. When ships are engaged in a general action, 
 they are nearly sure to be moving at only moderate 
 speeds, and on that account also the danger to the ram- 
 bow is rendered less ; in fact, with proper care there 
 seems no reason to suppose that the danger is at all 
 considerable. At Lissa, on one occasion, the ' Ferdinand 
 Max ' is said to have struck a ship at an angle of nearly 
 50 degrees in consequence of the attempt made by the 
 enemy to avoid the charge ; but, as I have said, no 
 serious injuries were inflicted on the ram-bow. This 
 satisfactory result was no doubt due to the great care 
 
2.8o Iron-Clad Rams. chap. XII. 
 
 taken on board the Austrian vessels ttrongliout the 
 engagement to put the helm in such a position at the 
 moment of striking an enemy as would prevent 
 the ram from turning to port or starboard and 
 wrenching or twisting her bow. This simple precau- 
 tion would not, I am sure, be overlooked by any naval 
 men under similar circumstances, while the experience 
 had at Lissa shows it to be amply sufficient. 
 
 One other point in connection with the spur-bow 
 demands brief notice, viz, the now notorious bow-wave 
 which it causes, and which some persons consider to be 
 so prejudicial to a ship's steaming capability, and to the 
 power of fighting her bow guns, as to make it desirable 
 to do away with this form of bow even if it were the 
 best adapted for ramming. It is the great stress laid 
 upon these points which has led me to mention the 
 subject, for obviously they are quite independent of 
 the merits or demerits of the bow as far as ramming 
 only is concerned. I shall therefore content myself 
 with stating that, in view of the steam trials made with 
 ships having spur-bows, it may be asserted that no 
 serious falling-off in performance has been caused by 
 the bow-wave. When a ship is steaming at great 
 speed against a head-sea, the bow-wave may, no doubt, 
 at times, render it difficult or even impossible to fight 
 chase guns in bow batteries on the main deck, but the 
 upper-deck guns would never be similarly affected. At 
 moderate speeds in rough water, or at full speeds in 
 smooth water, the bow-wave is not at all likely to reach 
 such a height as to interfere with the working of the 
 main-deck guns, and as general actions are sure to be 
 fought at low speeds, there is no reason to anticipate 
 
Chap. XII. Iron-Clad Rams. 281 
 
 that the fighting efficiency of ships with spur-bows will 
 be at all affected by the wave at the bow. In heavy 
 seas, with any form of stem, main-deck bow-guns will 
 be swamped if the ports are kept open, but under such 
 circumstances the form of the stem has but little effect. 
 
 These remarks on the proper form for ram-bows have 
 unavoidably run to some length ; but I shall be very 
 brief in my statements respecting the almost equally 
 important subject of the proper modes of constructing 
 and strengthening such bows. This is a subject to 
 which great attention has been paid by both French 
 and English shipbuilders, all of whose efforts and plans 
 may be said to have, in the main, two objects : first, to 
 provide such longitudinal strength at the bow as to 
 prevent its deformation by being driven inwards in the 
 direction of the vessel's length ; second, to provide such 
 lateral strength as to prevent the bow from being 
 twisted or wrenched. Besides these objects, there has 
 also been kept in view, especially in iron ships, the 
 desirability of adding to the ship's safety by dividing 
 the bow into numerous watertight compartments. 
 
 Wood-built iron-clads can be made very efficient as 
 rams by bolting strong timbers and iron straps, placed 
 in a longitudinal direction, upon the inside of the hull 
 proper, and thus supporting the bow ; while the stem 
 in such cases is usually armed with an iron or metal 
 " cleaver " strongly bolted to the outside of the ship. 
 This is the kind of arrangement carried out in the 
 ' Lord Warden,' ' Lord Clyde,' and some other wood 
 ships in our own Navy ; and it has been adopted also 
 in many of the French iron-clads. In fact, all the 
 French vessels specially intended for ramming, such as 
 
282 Iron-Clad Rams. Chap. XII. 
 
 the ' Belier,' 'Boule-dogue,' and ' Taureau,' are wood- 
 built, their efficiency as rams consequently depending 
 mainly upon the solidity of the timbering used to 
 strengthen the bows and massive spurs or cleavers 
 on the stems. Whatever degree of efficiency may be 
 attained in such bows by means of elaborate and 
 weighty strengthenings, it cannot be espected that 
 they will equal the ram-bows of iron-built ships, and I 
 shall attempt to show why this is so. First of all, the 
 materials and fastenings in a wood-built bow are of 
 such a character that some amount of injury — as, for 
 instance, the starting of bolts, opening of butts of plank, 
 tearing of stem, &c. — is nearly sure to be caused by 
 ramming, and more or less extensive leaks will often 
 result, against which it is scarcely possible to make 
 sufficient provision. On the other hand, an iron-built 
 bow has a solid mass of wrought iron for a stem, 
 which is well backed up by the armour, the sides, and 
 the longitudinal frames (of which the strength is im- 
 mense), so that the only damage to be apprehended is 
 that the comparatively thin side plating will be broken 
 through ; but even then the space inside is so cut up 
 by watertight partitions, which also contribute to the 
 strength of the bow, as to render the liability to danger 
 from the inflow of water very small indeed. Any one 
 who has studied the construction of the bow in such a 
 ship as the ' Bellerophon ' * will, I am sure, agree with 
 me in the opinion that either the force required to 
 drive the bow in and to fold up the immensely strong 
 
 * Full particulars and detailed drawings of the bow of this ship are to 
 be found at pages 117 and 118 of my work on ' Shipbuilding in Iron and 
 Steel.' 
 
Chap. XII. Iroti-Clad Rams. 283 
 
 longitudinal girders that abut against the stem, or that 
 required to twist or wrench off these same griders in 
 the manner described above, would be immense ; and 
 that, even if a part of the bow were torn away by a 
 collision, the ship's safety would remain almost un- 
 touched. In such a bow the great principle of com- 
 bining lightness with strength is fully exemplified : for 
 instead of having the heavy wood logs and the iron 
 braces required to strengthen the bow of a wood ship 
 inside the framing of the hull proper, we have the 
 framing of the hull itself made to give longitudinal and 
 lateral strength to the bow of the iron ship. Hence, 
 although weaker, the wood ship's bow is heavier than 
 that of the iron ship, and I need hardly say that ex- 
 cessive weights at the extremities are very objectionable, 
 since they tend to produce both pitching and straining. 
 This is another aspect of the advantages resulting from 
 the use of iron for the hulls of iron-clads instead of 
 wood, and one which gives additional force to the 
 remarks made in Chapter IV. 
 
 The preceding summary, brief though it be, will, I 
 think, convince the reader that in strength of bow our 
 iron-clad rams are not deficient, and that our iron-built 
 ships such as the ' Bellerophon,' ' Hercules,' ' Hotspur,' 
 and ' Rupert,' would probably stand the shock of a 
 collision very satisfactorily. In ramming, as in 
 artillery, the force spent in breaking up or injuring 
 the projectile is so much lost from the amount that 
 should be expended on the object of attack. To render 
 the attack most effective, therefore, the ram-bow must 
 approximate most nearly to a weapon little liable to 
 injury, and this condition is best attained by adopting 
 
2'84 Iron-Clad Rams. Chap. XII. 
 
 the arrangements possible in an iron structure. It 
 may happen that the thin side plating below the 
 armour will receive some damage and be broken 
 through, but this is no cause for anxiety ; and in our 
 recent ships, the 'Hotspur' and 'Rupert,' the armour 
 has been carried down over the bow to such a depth as 
 renders accidents of this kind very improbable, while it 
 admits of enormous support being given to the ram-stem. 
 Hitherto I have almost exclusively dealt with the 
 provisions made to secure offensive power > in iron-clad 
 rams ; but it is obvious that provisions also have to be 
 made in these ships in order to render them capable 
 either of avoiding the charge of another ram, or of being 
 but little endangered by it. Under this aspect also handi- 
 ness is the great essential, and all the means of securing 
 it referred to in the earlier portions of this chapter are, 
 as I have said, quite as applicable to avoiding a charge 
 as they are to delivering an effective blow. In fact, 
 there can be little doubt that a ship possessing good 
 manoeuvring power, and being well handled, could, as 
 long as she kept moving at a moderate speed, at least 
 avoid being dangerously injured by ramming. But 
 even if she were struck, unless the blow were dehvered 
 directly, and at a very high speed, one of our iron- 
 built iron-clads would still, in all probability, remain 
 comparatively efficient, as the penetration of the side 
 and the entrance of water into the ship would not 
 involve anything like the serious consequences which 
 would result in a wood ship, or in iron ships built on 
 the ordinary plan. This superiority in our iron-built 
 ships is due to the fact that, with one or two exceptions, 
 they have a strong longitudinal watertight skin of 
 
Chap. XII. Iron-Clad Rams. 285 
 
 iron, situated at a few feet inside the bottom plating, 
 and extending from the ship's bilge up to a considerable 
 height above water. In fact, this longitudinal partition, 
 or bulkhead, shuts in a space on each side of the ship 
 into which the water may enter freely when the outside 
 plating is broken through by a ram, but the passage 
 of the water into the hold of the ship is rendered 
 impossible so long as the partition remains intact. The 
 watertight space, or " wing," on each side of the ship 
 is also subdivided by numerous transverse partitions so 
 that the water which enters through a hole in the side 
 is really limited to a space about 20 or 25 feet long, 
 and can therefore be of but inconsiderable amount. 
 The situation of the inner plating here referred to 
 (usually styled in technical language the " wing bulk- 
 heads") is such as to give special protection to the ship 
 " between wind and water," just where the attack of a 
 spur-shaped bow would be made. This is a point worth 
 notice, especially as there is not a corresponding pro- 
 vision in the iron-built ships belonging to other navies, 
 except in some of those built in this country, nor can there 
 be so satisfactory a provision in wood-built ships. It is 
 this fact which gives special weight to the remarks pre- 
 viously made on the advantages of the projecting under- 
 water prow as applied in our ships. 
 
 The direct and swift attack of an iron-clad ram on 
 the broadside of one of our iron-clad frigates would 
 undoubtedly smash in not only the outside plating but 
 the "wing bulkhead" also, and then the water would 
 have free access to the hold. Such a result is scarcely 
 probable, unless the iron-clad attacked became un- 
 manageable by the loss of her steering power, or was 
 
2.86 Iron-Clad Rams. Chap. xil. 
 
 charged bj a much handier ship, with a very projecting 
 prow ; but since it is possible, it is only proper to con- 
 sider the consequences. Even if the side were thus 
 broken through, any one of our iron-built ships would 
 most probably remain afloat, although her efficiency 
 would be considerably impaired, the water which would 
 enter being confined to the watertight compartment 
 of the hold, enclosed by bulkheads crossing the ship at 
 a moderate distance before and abaft the part broken 
 through. In fact, under these circumstances, the ship 
 struck would be in exactly the same condition as an 
 ordinary iron ship which by any accident has had the 
 bottom plating broken, and one of the hold-compart- 
 ments filled with water, so that we have good reason to 
 believe that her safety need not be despaired of, unless, 
 by the blow being delivered at, or very near, a bulkhead, 
 more than one compartment should be injured and filled. 
 All iron ships can thus be protected to some extent 
 against being sunk by a single blow of a ram, and our 
 own vessels have the further and important protection 
 of the watertight wings just described ; but wood ships 
 are not similarly safe. One hole in the side of the 
 ' Re d' Italia ' sufficed to sink her ; but this would 
 scarcely have been possible in an iron ship with properly 
 arranged watertight compartments. The French, in 
 their latest iron-clads, have become alive to this danger, 
 and have fitted transverse iron bulkheads in the holds 
 of wood-built ships in order to add to their safety. 
 No doubt this is an improvement, but our experience 
 with wood ships leads us to have grave doubts whether 
 these bulkheads can be made efficient watertight 
 divisions in the hold, on account of the working that 
 
Chap. XII. Iron-Clad Rams. 287 
 
 is sure to take place in a wood hull. This fact adds 
 another to the arguments previously advanced in favour 
 of iron hulls for armoured ships ; for it appears that an 
 iron-built ship, constructed on the system of our recent 
 iron-clads, is comparatively safe against destruction by 
 a ram, unless she is repeatedly attacked when in a 
 disabled state, while a wood-built ship may, and most 
 likely will, be totally lost in consequence of one well- 
 delivered heavy blow. 
 
 Before concluding this chapter, I desire to touch 
 briefly upon the subject of the manoeuvring and working 
 of iron-clad rams in time of action, a subject which 
 is of special interest to the naval ofScer, and which 
 really belongs to him mainly, but in which the naval 
 architect and the marine engineer also have a share. 
 The officer in command of a ram would undoubtedly 
 require to exercise his judgment as to the best speed, 
 direction, and place of attack upon an enemy's ship, 
 and success would for the most part be dependent upon 
 the correctness of his decision. There are, however, 
 some points of importance which are sure to require 
 notice in all, or nearly all, attacks by ramming, how- 
 ever different the circumstances attending the attacks 
 may be, and to some of those it may be of interest to 
 refer. 
 
 The jfirst of these matters is the necessity for arranging 
 and securing everything on board liable to derangement 
 by the shock, in such a manner as to prevent serious 
 injury. Most of our iron-clad rams are, it will be 
 remembered, rigged, and in them it would consequently 
 be proper to take precautions, such as running in the 
 
288 Iron-Clad Rams. Chap. XII. 
 
 bowsprit (which can be done in all the ships) and 
 clearing the head-gear, sending down the topgallant 
 masts and as many of the upper yards as possible, and 
 securing the spars which remain aloft in the best 
 possible manner by preventer stays, &c. In the ' Hot- 
 spur ' and ' Eupert,' these preparations would not be 
 required, as they are only lightly rigged, and it is 
 hardly necessary to repeat that these ships may be 
 regarded as steam war-engines, always cleared for 
 action. I may mention in this connection, as a proof 
 of the necessity for these preparations in a full-rigged 
 ship, that the Austrian hne-of-battle ship ' Kaiser,' 
 which went into action at Lissa without having been 
 prepared for ramming, but which did resort to that 
 mode of attack, lost her foremast and bowsprit in 
 attacking some Italian vessels. Besides these prepara- 
 tions, it is also necessary to look well to the stowage 
 of anchors, boats, and other heavy articles on board ; 
 to train the guns in such a manner as to render them 
 least liable to being dismounted when the shock comes ; 
 to secure the engines and boilers against displacement 
 (arrangements for which are made in the original con- 
 struction and equipment of our ships) or injury by the 
 shock ; and to take such precautions as to prevent any 
 temporary derangement or stoppage of the machinery 
 being caused by the water in the boilers being forced 
 by the shock into the steam passages and cylinders. 
 These are a few of the principal precautions which 
 would have to be taken in all cases before an attack is 
 made, and I may add that the crew should be so placed 
 as to feel the shock as little as possible— either by lying 
 on the deck, or swinging by their hands from the 
 
Chap. XII. Iron-Clad Rams. 289 
 
 beams of the deck above, as was done by the Austriaus — 
 and to be out of the way of any heavy stores that may 
 be dislodged by the blow. 
 
 So much for the preparations on board the ram- 
 vessel ; a few words will suffice respecting the mode of 
 attack likely to prove most efficient. A fair speed 
 is necessary for two reasons : first, in most cases an 
 attack to be most effective must be direct, and, when 
 charging an enemy not disabled, a direct attack must 
 partake somewhat of the nature of a surprise ; second, 
 a fair speed is requisite to give proper effect to the 
 blow. With a spur-bow which strikes an enemy's 
 side below the armour, it is possible, as T have shown, 
 to inflict great damage with a very moderate force, and 
 in such cases it might be thought desirable to attack at 
 a low speed ; but it must not be overlooked that a direct 
 attack should be the great aim kept in view, and that 
 a very slow rate of approach would usually militate 
 against the attainment of this object. On the other 
 hand, it must be confessed that there is great truth in 
 Admiral Ryder's remark,* that " any more momentum 
 " than is necessary to pierce to a vital point only tends 
 " to more seriously injure the bow of the rammer ;"' 
 and it appears from Austrian accounts that the ' Ferdi- 
 nand Max ' was not steaming 8 knots per hour when 
 she delivered the blow that sunk the ' Ee d' Italia.' On 
 this point of speed, as I said before, the officer in com- 
 mand of the ram is by far the best judge, and its 
 decision must be left in his hands. At whatever speed 
 the ram attacks, however, it is obvious — and the experi- 
 
 Reporl ou Channel Fleet for ISliS, page 13. 
 
 U 
 
290 Iron-Clad Rams. ChapXII. 
 
 ence of Lissa shows it to be true — that the engines should 
 be kept going up to a very short time before the blow- 
 is delivered, but that at the time of striking they should 
 be stopped ; while they should be reversed directly 
 after striking an enemy in order to disengage the ram- 
 bow. Eeference has previously been made also to the 
 care required at the ship's helm at the moment of 
 impact, in order to prevent the bow from being twisted 
 or wrenched violently, and this constitutes the only 
 other feature of importance to which I shall here draw 
 attention. 
 
 Up to the present time our experience with rams is 
 but limited, but this is almost equally true of all iron- 
 clad ships of the European types, the action at Lissa 
 forming the only reliable evidence we have of both the 
 fighting and ramming powers of these ships when 
 engaged in a general action. Whether or not ramming 
 power will eventually take rank before armament in 
 our iron-clads it is impossible to foretell. Yery decided 
 opinions have been expressed on both sides of this 
 question, but a series of real engagements between well 
 equipped and efficient iron-clads can alone afford a 
 proper solution ; and in the absence of such a solution 
 — which no one can desire — we cannot, I think, do 
 better than perpetuate the policy that has guided the 
 Admiralty thus far. If so, the greater number of our 
 ships will remain well armed fighting ships possessing 
 ramming power, so to speak, as an auxiliary ; and a 
 less number will be built in which the ramming effi- 
 ciency is the main feature, but which, like the ' Hotspur' 
 and ' Rupert,' will be armed also with a small number 
 
Chap. XII. Iron-Clad Rams. 291 
 
 of very heavy guns. Even now, it may with justice 
 be asserted that some of our iron-built broadside iron- 
 clads are the most formidable ram-ships afloat, and 
 there need be no fear that our specially constructed 
 rams will require to avoid the presence of any other 
 vessels of the kind either building or built. Much 
 remains to be learnt, no doubt, on this subject, and many 
 improvements may be made in the course of a few 
 years, especially if our experience is added to by any 
 naval war ; for the present, however, we may rest 
 assured that in ramming power our iron-clad fleet is, to 
 say the least, more than equal to that of any other 
 navy in the world. 
 
 u 2 
 
292. Conversion of Wooden Chap. XIII. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 CONVERSION OF WOODEN LINE-OP-BATTLB SHIPS INTO 
 
 IRON-CLADS. 
 
 When the reconstruction of our Navy was commenced 
 about ten years ago on the introduction of armour- 
 plating, our wooden steam fleet had been brought to a 
 very efficient state, and in all the dockyards line-of- 
 battle ships and frigates of the most improved type 
 were in process of construction. The Admiralty, re- 
 cognising the importance of quickly creating a con- 
 siderable iron-clad fleet, ordered that several of the 
 line-of-battle ships, then building, should be modified 
 and converted into iron -clad frigates. As the result 
 we have the class of ship to which I have given 
 the name ' Caledonia ' class in the preceding chapters, 
 and which can well compare with the ' Gloire ' and 
 ' Flandre ' classes in the French navy. Having in 
 various parts of the preceding chapters had occasion to 
 refer to the construction and performances of these 
 ships, I need add nothing here beyond the statement 
 that, considering the exigencies of the time when they 
 were produced, and the great success which has attended 
 their conversion, there can be no doubt that the course 
 adopted was, on the whole, the best. 
 
 But though the partly built line-of-battle ships were 
 thus, with a few exceptions, economically utilised as 
 iron-clads, the large number of line-of-battle ships com- 
 
Chap. XIII. Line-of-Battle Ships into Iron-Clads. 293 
 
 pleted and afloat could not with economy be similarly 
 treated. The ' Caledonia ' class were considerably 
 lengthened and otherwise altered from their original 
 designs as two-deckers, besides having their upper 
 decks omitted, and being thus turned into frigates. 
 Similar changes would have been very costly if carried 
 out in ships that had already been completely built and 
 finished. Hence arose, the question, Would it not be 
 advisable to devise some scheme by which the wooden 
 steam ships, having their machinery on board, could be 
 turned into iron-clads ? Of course, on the face of the 
 matter it was evident that such a conversion could be 
 made by removing more or less of the top weight of 
 these ships, reducing their height out of the water, and 
 putting the weight thus saved into armour for the 
 whole or part of the exposed portions of the hull that 
 would remain. Such conversions might be carried out 
 either in accordance with the broadside or turret 
 systems of armanent ; in fact, we have in our Navy 
 examples of both methods, the ' Zealous ' having been 
 converted as she stood into a broadside iron-clad, and 
 the ' Royal Sovereign ' being a converted turret-ship. 
 Either of these conversions could be repeated, of course, 
 in other line-of-battle ships, and it is highly probable 
 that, if a prolonged war should occur, many of these 
 ships would be razeed and plated with a few strakes 
 of armour. It is, however, in connection with the 
 turret armanent that pubHc opinion has mostly been 
 drawn to schemes for conversion, since that system can, 
 it is supposed, be well associated with extremely low free- 
 board ; and most of these schemes have been intended 
 to produce a class of vessels specially fitted for coast 
 
^94 Conversion of Wooden Chap. xiii. 
 
 defence. In the following remarks, therefore, I shall 
 for the most part confine attention to the feasibility 
 and propriety of turning our line-of-battle ships into 
 monitors ; but it must be clearly understood that these 
 ships could, if it were thought fit, be turned into broad- 
 side iron-clads, and that most of the arguments advanced 
 will apply with equal force to both classes of converted 
 ships. 
 
 The ' Royal Sovereign,' to which I have just referred, 
 was originally a three-decked line-of-battle ship, but in 
 1862 was cut down to the height of about 7 feet above 
 the water, her upper, main, and middle decks being 
 removed, and the weight thus saved, together with 
 those due to the very large reductions made in masts, 
 sails, anchors, cables, coals, and general equipment, 
 were replaced by the side armour, the plating on the 
 deck, and the turrets. This conversion, allowing 12 J 
 per cent, on actual expenditure for incidental charges, 
 cost about 150,000/. in addition to the first cost of the 
 vessel, and as the result a ship was obtained which, 
 while valuable for coast defence, is not fitted for any- 
 thing but Channel service. In this ship, it is true, 
 Captain Coles' system of turrets received its first trial ; 
 it may therefore be proper to assume that the cost of 
 conversion was much greater than it would have been 
 if the work had not been of an unusual character ; but 
 the wisdom of repeating such an experiment may well 
 be doubted when for very little, if any, more expense it 
 would be possible to construct, of iron, a new armour- 
 plated monitor, better defended, drawing much less 
 water, and more durable and efficient in every respect. 
 
 This view of the matter leads me to refer more fully 
 
Chap. XIII. Line-of-Batth Ships into Iron-Clads. 295 
 
 to some of the reasons wlaicli have hitherto prevented 
 the carrying out of any general scheme for converting 
 our wooden hne-of-battle ships into iron-clads. We 
 have it is true, a considerable number of such ships, 
 which could be thus treated, and if necessity should 
 arise, doubtless many would be converted by ready and 
 inexpensive methods ; but the question may well be 
 asked. Whether the money that would be required for 
 such conversions could not be better spent, especially 
 at a time like the present, when saving of time is not 
 i mperative or pressing ? My own opinion is that our 
 money could be and has been better employed, and I 
 shall almost immediately show why 1 hold this opinion. 
 Before doing so, however, I may remark that the 
 capabihty of our old line-of-battle ships for rapid con- 
 version into either armoured broadside ships or monitors 
 has been fully recognised by the Constructive Depart- 
 ment of the Admiralty, and detailed designs have been 
 prepared which would enable the conversions to be 
 immediately carried out if there should ever be a great 
 and sudden demand for such vessels. It is only due to 
 the officers of the Admiralty to make this statement, as 
 it has frequently been assumed, and stated, that they 
 were entirely opposed to any scheme of conversion. I 
 may add that the experience obtained with the hastily 
 built and improvised iron-clads used by the Confederates 
 during the late war shows the importance which, under 
 some circumstances, might attach to the possession by 
 this country of a wooden steam fleet, and of the resources 
 in public and private ironworks and dockyards which 
 would enable us to turn it into a fleet of iron-clads in a 
 very short time. If need were, the Channel might 
 
^9" Conversion of Wooden Chap. xill. 
 
 within a brief space be held, and every English port of 
 importance be defended, by ships beside which the 
 much-talked-of ' Merrimac,' ' Atalanta,' and ' Tenessee ' 
 would appear contemptible, and which would be stronger 
 in both offensive and defensive powers than most, if not 
 all, of the American monitors. 
 
 Eeverting, however, to the reasons why our armoured 
 fleet has not yet been thus developed, it is necessary to 
 observe that there are many strong reasons for not 
 expending large sums of money upon the conversion of 
 our wooden line-of-battle ships in a period of peace, and 
 when no prospect of naval war exists. In the first 
 place, the development of our wooden steam fleet was 
 so sudden that many of our line-of-battle ships were 
 built with timber not thoroughly seasoned, and decay 
 has consequently been more rapid in them than is 
 usual in wood ships. Again, it must be remembered 
 that even the newest of these ships are now eight or 
 ten years old, and many of them are considerably older ; 
 so that their condition is on that account the less satis- 
 factory. If these ships were taken in hand for con- 
 version, therefore, extensive repairs would be required 
 in the hulls, and it would be necessary to greatly renew 
 and strengthen! them in order to adapt them for armour. 
 But, supposing for the moment that the hulls did not 
 require to be repaired and strengthened, and were likely 
 to last a reasonable time after conversion, there would 
 still remain the extremely important fact that the 
 weights of these wooden hulls are much greater than 
 those of iron hulls, and that the weight of armour they 
 would carry would be consequently much smaller than 
 could be c^irried by iron-built ships. It may be well to 
 
Chap. XIII. Line-of -Battle Ships into Iron-Clads. 297 
 
 take the cases of a few ships in order to illustrate this 
 fact. In the converted broadside ship ' Zealous,' a hull 
 weighing 3067 tons carries only 3055 tons (as nearly as 
 possible its own weight) of armour, armament, engines, 
 coals, and equipment of all kinds ; while in the new 
 iron-built broadside ship ' Audacious,' a hull weighing 
 2675 tons — nearly 400 tons less than that of the 
 'Zealous' — carries 3224 tons of armour, &c., or nearly 
 200 tons more than are carried in the ' Zealous.' In 
 fact^ had the ' Zealous ' been built of iron on the same 
 system as the ' Audacious,' the weight saved on the 
 hull would have sufficed to increase the armour from 
 its present thickness of 4i inches to 6 inches. In the 
 turret -ships this feature is even more striking, as 
 the following comparison will show : — 
 
 Royal Sovereign (converted ship) 
 Glatton (breastwork monitor) 
 Thunderer „ 
 
 Weight of Hull. 
 
 Weights Carried. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 3243 
 
 1837 
 
 2209* 
 
 2975 
 
 3272* 
 
 5790 
 
 This comparison need not be dwelt upon ; the figures 
 speak for themselves. It is but proper to state, how- 
 ever, that the ' Royal Sovereign ' was the first and only 
 ship so converted, and that the superiority of the new 
 ships is to some extent the result of the difference of 
 type. On the other hand, this superiority is mainly 
 due to the material employed being iron instead of 
 wood, and to the system adopted in the construction of 
 the recent ships. 
 
 * Including very strong defensive deck plating, and jjlating on top of 
 breastwork. The ' Glatton " is taken at her fighting draught. 
 
298 Conversion of Wooden Chap. xili. 
 
 Besides this, it must be remembered that these line- 
 of-battle ships are comparatively slow, and have engines 
 (in most cases more or less worn) which are deficient of 
 modern appliances for reducing coal consumption, so 
 that they would need to carry larger supplies of coal 
 than ships with new engines, which is another reason 
 for concluding that their armour must be thinner than 
 that of a new ship. Finally, these ships all have a 
 considerable draft of water, and on that account are less 
 fitted for coast defence than shallower ships would be. 
 For all these reasons, therefore, I think it must be 
 admitted that the Admiralty have acted wisely in re- 
 fraining from expending large sums on the conversion 
 of our line-of-battle ships. To sum up, they are un- 
 doubtedly more or less decayed and weak ; are ot 
 deeper draught than they should be for coast defence ; 
 are slow, and have comparatively wasteful engines ; and 
 could not carry nearly so great a weight or thickness of 
 armour as new iron ships, the mere hulls of which can 
 be very cheaply and quickly built by the great private 
 firms of the country. 
 
 These are reasons for the comprehension of which no 
 amount of technical knowledge is required ; there are 
 others which are no less weighty, but more technical, 
 to which I shall briefly refer. The chief of these is the 
 probable behaviour at sea of these ships if converted 
 into monitors ; for, although not sea-going ships in the 
 usual sense of the term^ such vessels ought to be capable 
 of keeping in the Channel under most circumstances of 
 wind and weather. It is — as I have before said when 
 treating of rolling — natural at first sight to suppose 
 that, when the lofty sides of a line-of-battle ship are cut 
 
Chap. XIII. Line-of-Battle Ships into Iron-Clads. 299 
 
 down and the top-weights removed, the converted ship 
 should be steadier than the line-of-battle ship ; but I 
 have shown that this is not so, and that, in general, the 
 reverse is to be expected. I have also called attention 
 to the fact that a wood ship with her heavy hull, and 
 great weights of engines, boilers, &c., low down, is 
 much more likely to roll heavily than an iron ship with 
 the improved structural arrangements introduced into 
 the iron- clad ships of the Navy. In the converted 
 ships, then, it must be expected that the rolling would 
 be considerable, and the only good means of reducing 
 the rolling somewhat would be the carrying out of the 
 breastwork monitor system in combination with a low 
 free-board, as has been provided for in the designs for 
 converting these ships prepared at the Admiralty. It 
 would of course be true that the waves would wash over 
 the decks of these converted monitors, and that the 
 tendency to roll would on this account be somewhat 
 checked ; but in any but breastwork monitors this would 
 also cause inability to fight the turret-guns. These 
 considerations render it still more apparent that the 
 conversion would not place very satisfactory ships at 
 the service of the country. 
 
 So far I have dealt chiefly with the proposals for 
 turning our line-of-battle ships into coast defence vessels, 
 or monitors which would not be rigged so as to be 
 capable of proceeding under sail, but would closely 
 resemble in this respect the ' Eoyal Sovereign ' and the 
 ' Prince Albert.' Proposals have, however, been made 
 for converting them into sea-going monitors, in which 
 lowness of free-board is retained, but associated with 
 the masts and sails of a full-rigged ship. All that has 
 
300 Conversion of Wooden Chap. xill. 
 
 been said previously (except the remarks relating to 
 draught of water) applies to these proposals also ; but 
 there are many special objections to the latter class which 
 I consider it desirable to indicate, as the Admiralty and 
 their professional officers have been subjected to some 
 strictures for declining to entertain proposals of the 
 kind. In an Appendix at the end of this volume, I 
 have considered theoretically the question of " The 
 Stability of Monitors under Canvas," and have pointed 
 out some of the dangers to which such vessels are liable. 
 I need only say here, therefore, that the chief of these 
 dangers consists in the risk of overturning, or upsetting, 
 which results from the fact that in a monitor a mode- 
 rate inclination puts a portion of the lee-side of the deck 
 under water, and that the stability is thus diminished, 
 especially in other than breastwork monitors. This 
 danger is at its greatest when the ship is at sea, when 
 the actual amount of heel is often virtually increased 
 by the slope of the wave-surface. That this is no phan- 
 tom danger will, I think, be seen by all my readers 
 from the preceding brief statement, but the reality of 
 the danger will perhaps be best understood by naval 
 officers and naval architects. 
 
 Leaving this most serious feature out of consideration 
 for the present, there are, however,^several other points 
 of importance which, in my estimation, render the plans 
 unsuited for practical application. For example, a sea- 
 going full -rigged ship requires a large complement of 
 men, a great weight of stores and equipment, and a good 
 coal supply. Now I venture to assert that in no pro- 
 posal yet made for converting the line of-battle ships 
 into sea-going iron-clads has adequate provision been 
 
Chap. XIII. Line-of- Battle Ships into Iron-Clads. 301 
 
 made in these respects, in association with a sufficient 
 thickness of armonr. At the present time it would, 
 without doubt^ be worse than folly to construct an 
 armoured ship for general sea -going purposes that 
 should not have a reasonable prospect of being able to 
 meet at least most of the existing iron-clads on equal 
 terms as regards defensive armour ; and if armour of 
 the thickness required for this purpose be carried on a 
 converted ship, she cannot carry besides the weights of 
 coal, stores, and equipment necessary in a full-rigged 
 ship, nor provide proper accommodation for her nume- 
 rous crew. On paper it may be possible to meet all 
 these requirements ; in practice it is impossible. Of the 
 plans that have been put forward for the purpose, it 
 may without exception be said that they all fail to allow 
 sufficient weights and space — in other words, far too 
 much has been attempted to be done on the dimensions. 
 As an example of this, I may mention that on one occa- 
 sion the Secretary of the Admiralty stated in his place 
 in Parliament that, had one of these schemes for con- 
 version been carried out, instead of having a free-board 
 of between 3 and 4 feet, as, was estimated, the upper 
 decks of some ships would have been only a few 
 inches above water, when all the weights intended to 
 be carried were on board. The result of careful exa- 
 mination of such schemes and of calculations connected 
 with them may be briefly summed up as follows : — 
 None of our screw line-of-battle ships can be converted 
 into efficient sea-going iron-clad monitors, having the 
 necessary sail-power and the crews required to work 
 them under sail, together with the weights of stores and 
 equipment required in a full-rigged ship. They may 
 
3°2. Conversion of Wooden Chap. xili. 
 
 be converted as partially-armoured broadside ships like 
 the ' Zealous ' and ' Eepulse ; ' or, by giving up masts, 
 spars, sea-stores, and a large vreight of equipment, such 
 ships can, as I have said, be turned into formidable coasi^ 
 defence monitors ; but even such conversions would not 
 be justifiable except in the emergencies of a war. 
 
 Before concluding this chapter I may observe that 
 the question of the policy of carrying out these con- 
 versions has been often argued from false premises. 
 Statements have repeatedly been made respecting the 
 loss to the nation involved in the non-conversion ot 
 the line-of-battle ships, which are not only mistaken 
 but positively absurd. We hear of ships representing 
 a money value little short of 10,000,000^. lying in 
 harbour and rotting, when they might, by the expendi- 
 ture of a moderate sum, be converted into useful iron- 
 clads. The truth is, however, that a considerable 
 number of those ships have been in service, and that, 
 although many of them have not been completed, they 
 have really constituted a reserve force that would have 
 been drawn upon if occasion had arisen. The transi- 
 tion from wood to iron-clad war-ships has undoubtedly 
 been rapid, and the Admiralty acted wisely in sus- 
 pending the construction of wooden line-of-battle ships 
 and frigates when the expediency of building iron- 
 clads became apparent ; but the action at Lissa shows 
 that wooden ships are far from ineffective in engage- 
 ments where iron-clads are present, and there can be 
 little doubt that the value of such ships as a reserve 
 would be very great, since the first iron-clad action 
 would greatly cripple the armoured ships of the enemy, 
 and give scope for the operations of the wooden fleet. 
 
Chap. XIII. Line-of -Battle Ships into Iron-Clods. 303 
 
 For these reasons, then, I hold that it is a very- 
 wrong assumption that is made when the wooden 
 steam fleet of this country is put down as virtually 
 powerless for purposes of war, and the money locked 
 up in it is represented as being worse than useless. 
 To convert the hne-of-battle ships into iron-clads would 
 he to incur considerable expense, as is proved beyond 
 doubt by the case of the ' Eoyal Sovereign ; ' and the 
 class of ship that would be produced would undoubtedly 
 be less durable and efficient for coast defence than the 
 new monitors which could be built of iron for about 
 the same money.* In war time the rapidity with 
 which these ships might be converted into iron-clads 
 would probably outweigh these considerations, impor- 
 tant though they be, although it may fairly be ques- 
 tioned whether even this advantage would exist in 
 presence of our enormous resources for building quickly 
 in iron. In time of peace there is not the same 
 urgency, and it would certainly be false policy to 
 devote any considerable part of the sums annually 
 voted for the construction of iron-built iron-clads to the 
 production of such inferior and short-lived ships as 
 the converted vessels must undoubtedly prove. 
 
 * We have seen that the conversion of the ' Eoyal Sovereign's ' hull, with 
 560 tons of armour, cost ahout 153,000?., whereas the contract price of the hull 
 of the iron-built ' Cerberus,' with 670 tons of armour, is but 99,000?., and the 
 estimated cost of the hull of the powerful monitor ' Glatton,' with no less than 
 1065 tons of armour is (including 12 i per cent, for establishment expenses) 
 but 163,000?. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 ON THE STABILITY OF MONITORS UNDER CANVAS. 
 
 Bead at the Ninth Session of the Institution of Naval Architects, 
 April 4:th, 1868, the Bev. Joseph Woollet, LL.D., F.E.A.S., 
 Vice-President, in the Chair. 
 
 The proposal to mast monitors and to send them to sea as full- 
 rigged sailing ships has been so often made, and urged upon the 
 public witli so much zeal, even by persons claiming to speak 
 with weight upon questions of naval construction, that I have 
 deemed it desirable to lay before the members and friends of 
 this Institution a few considerations which will exhibit some of 
 the dangers of such a course, and which will at the same time 
 present a few examples of what are certainly very interesting 
 and exceptional cases of " stability." 
 
 Permit me, at the outset, to say that I employ the term 
 stability in the sense in whicli it has hitherto been used in 
 scientific works upon naval architecture. In nautical parlance 
 the word is often employed as the synonym of steadiness ; 
 the 'Achilles,' for instance, being in this way pronounced the 
 most " stable " ironclad in the Channel Squadron. This, how- 
 ever, is not at all the scientific sense of the term stability ; 
 for, in that sense, the 'Achilles' is (for her size) the least stable 
 of the iron-clads, and, in point of fact, owes her superior 
 steadiness to the very circumstance of her stability being 
 so small. Tlie ' Bellerophon,' which is, I believe, next to the 
 'Achilles' in steadiness, is next to her also in the smallness of 
 her stability, while the ' Lord Clyde ' and other ships of much 
 larger stability are correspondingly deficient in the quality of 
 steadiness. It is to be regretted that this discrepancy exists 
 between the scientific and the nautical use of the term; but 
 the fact of its existence should incite both seamen and naval 
 
 X 
 
3o6 On the Stability of Monitors nnder Canvas. App. 
 
 architects to cultivate a mutual understanding of both uses of 
 the word. 
 
 In naval architecture — forgive me for detaining you a 
 moment while I reiterate an elementary fact or two which 
 may help this mutual understanding — the word stability is 
 applied to the effort which a ship makes, when inclined, to 
 return to the upright position. If she is urgent to return to it, 
 she has great stability; if slow to return, she has small 
 stability; and the fact to be chiefly observed— for it ex- 
 hibits the cause of the discrepancy in question — is this, viz. 
 that a ship which is reluctant to move out of the upriglit 
 position in still water, and urgent to return to it, is usually 
 the most urgent to obey the fluctuations and impulses of 
 waves. We naral architects say such a ship is too stable; 
 seamen say she is not stable enough ; and I must say that 
 our use of the word is a mere fair-weather use of it, and that we 
 must forgive naval ofScers if they laugh at us for pronouncing 
 a ship stable in proportion as she rolls about in waves at sea. 
 Still, our use of the word is a perfectly legitimate one ; it is too 
 firmly built into our scientific terminology to be removed, and 
 all we can do is to endeavour to make it as well and widely 
 understood as possible. 
 
 Strictly speaking, stability, in our sense, is of two kinds — 
 statical and dynamical. Permit me to explain both briefly. 
 
 Fig. 1 represents the section of a ship heeled over to a certain 
 angle ; G is the position of the centre of gravity of the ship ; C 
 
App. , On the Stability of Mo7iitors under Canvas. 307 
 
 and B are the centres of buoyancy in the upright and inclined 
 positions respectively ; B M is a vertical line along which the 
 buoyancy of the ship acts upwards ; G W, a vertical line along 
 wliich the weight of the ship acts downwards. These two forces 
 form a couple, the arm of which is G Z, tending to restore the 
 ship to the upright position. The moment of this couple is 
 called the moment of statical stability ; and since the weight and 
 buoyancy are constant whatever the angle of heel may be, the 
 length of the arm, G Z, will be a measure of the statical 
 stability. 
 
 The dynamical stability is the mechanical icorh necessary to 
 heel the ship over to any augle. It may be measured in two 
 ways. Either by taking the sum of the distances through which 
 the centre of gravity ascends, and the centre of buoyancy de- 
 scends, in moving from their vertical into their inclined 
 positions, and multiplying it by the weight of the ship. Or, by 
 means of the formula : — 
 
 Dynamical stability =/ McZ ^ = W /rcZ ^; where M = the 
 moment of statical stability, r — the length of the arm G Z of 
 the couple, at an inclination Q, and W = the weight of the ship. 
 
 Now I think it will be seen upon consideration that the 
 security of ships of the ordinary form, when under canvas, or 
 when rolling in a seaway, against being turned over by a sudden 
 gust of wind, or by a deep roll, depends in a great measure upon 
 the fact that the moment of statical stability increases with the 
 angle of inclination, which it generally does, nearly in proportion 
 to the angle of heel. In the case of a ship under sail, in smooth 
 water, the angle of heel increases until the moment of statical 
 stability is equal to the moment of the wind upon the sails ; and 
 this becomes a position of equilibrium if the force of the wind 
 remains constant. In order that this inclined position may be 
 one of stable equilibrium, it is necessary that, when the sliip is 
 moved from this position towards the vertical, the moment of 
 stability should decrease and become less than the moment of 
 sails ; and that, when she is heeled over farther from the vertical, 
 the moment of stability should increase, so as to exceed that of 
 tlie sails. Or, in other words, in the neighbourhood of this in- 
 clined position of equilibrium, the moment of statical stability 
 should increase as the angle of heel increases. 
 
 X 2 
 
3o8 On the Stability of Monitors imder Canvas. App. 
 
 The conditions are the same for a ship carrying canvas in a 
 seaway. But, since the rolling, caused by the variation of the 
 wave surface, and the variation of the force of the veind, takes 
 place about the inclined position of equiUbrium, and is more 
 likely to be considerable than the effect of the variation of the 
 wind alone in still water, it becomes necessary that the condi- 
 tions, above stated, should not be confined to the neighbourhood 
 of the inclined position, but should extend on both sides of it to 
 a safe distance beyond the probable extreme inclination of the 
 ship to the wave surface. 
 
 If, however, the stability — and by stability I must be under- 
 stood to mean the moment of statical stability when not other- 
 wise stated — of any class of ships increases as the ship heels 
 over, until, when she reaches a certain angle, it becomes a 
 maximum, and then decreases as she still continues to heel 
 over until it passes through zero and becomes negative, there 
 will be three positions of equilibrium of the vessel ; one of 
 stable equilibrium in the upright position, and one of unstable 
 equilibrium on each side of it at a certain angle of inclina- 
 tion. And if these positions of unstable equilibrium occur 
 within the limits of roll of an ocean steamer when not under 
 canvas, the ship will evidently be unsafe for sea-going purposes. 
 It will also be shown that, although the positions of unstable 
 equilibrium fall beyond the limit of rolling, if they fall near that 
 limit, the ship may be safe under steam, but may be totally unfit 
 to carry sail. 
 
 The first condition to be fulfilled to enable a ship of the latter 
 class to carry sail will evidently be that the moment of sails at 
 any time shall not be greater than the maximum statical 
 stability of the ship. Now, suppose this condition fulfilled, and 
 the ship heeled over, under the influence of the wind, to some 
 finite angle, less than that of greatest stability. It will be seen 
 that, if by any disturbing cause, such as the alteration of the 
 wave slope, the ship were inclined beyond her position of 
 maximum stability, the resistance to heeling would become less 
 the farther she went, until she reached a position at which her 
 moment of stability would be the same as before the disturbing 
 force began to act. And in this position she would remain in 
 unstable equilibrium if the disturbing forces were removed. But 
 
App. On the Stability of Monitors under Canvas. 309 
 
 if she should pass this position before the disturbing forces, and 
 the angular velocity caused by them, cease, the ordinary moment 
 of the sails will then be greater than the resistance offered by 
 the stability in any other position through which she will pass, 
 and she will be turned over. General considerations led us, of 
 course, to foresee that the above critical state would be likely to 
 occur in low-decked turret-ships, with great weights concentrated 
 upon and above their decks ; but in order to find out more 
 definitely how the stability did vary in this class of ship as com- 
 pared with that of ships of a high freeboard, two ships were 
 taken, viz. the ' Duncan ' cut down to a freeboard of 3 feet 6 
 inches, and fitted with three heavy turrets, and a ship with the 
 same displacement and immersed body as the 'Duncan 'when 
 so cut down, but whose sides were continued up like those of an 
 ordinary ship, observing that the centre of gravity was estimated 
 to be in the water-line in the latter case, and "2 of a foot below 
 it in the former case. The moment of statical stability and the 
 length of G Z were calculated in each case at every 5° of incli- 
 nation, and the results are laid down on the diagram shown in 
 Fig. 4. In this diagram, the angles of inclination of the 
 ships are marked along the base line, and the corresponding 
 ordinates of the curves represent the lengths (on the scale 
 marked in the left-hand column) of the arm (G Z, Fig. 1) of the 
 couple, at the ends of which the weight and buoyancy of the 
 ship act, tending to restore her to the upright position. 
 
 The line AaB, Fig. 4, shows how the stability of the 
 ' Duncan ' monitor varies for the different angles of heel. Her 
 moment of statical stability increases nearly in proportion to the 
 angle of heel through an inclination of 7° ; the deck then begins 
 to be immersed, as shown in Fig. 2, and the stability increases 
 less rapidly, imtil the ship reaches about 10^°, as in Fig. 3, at 
 which inclination the stability is a maximum. It then begins to 
 decrease as the angle of heel increases, and she loses all stability 
 before she is inclined to 25°, arriving there at a position of un- 
 stable equilibrium, and past this position her tendency is to turn 
 over still farther. 
 
 The line A C, Fig. 4, shows how the stability varies in the 
 ship of ordinary form. And it will be seen that the moment of 
 
3IO On the Stability of Monitors 7inder Canvas. App. 
 
 stability goes on increasing through very large angles of heel 
 nearly in proportion to the inclination. 
 
 FIC.2 
 
 Hitherto I have referred to the case of a monitor with a free- 
 board of 3 feet 6 inches, which is far more than the American 
 monitors have possessed, and much more than has been contem- 
 plated by many persons who have proposed the adoption of 
 sailing monitors in this country. It is also certainly a greater 
 freeboard than most of our line-of-battle ships would possess if 
 cut down and weighted with armour and turrents to the extent 
 which has sometimes been recommended, and especially more 
 than we could depend upon getting if they were placed for con- 
 version into the hands of any one not capable of resisting the 
 
App. On the Stability of Monitors ^lnder Canvas. 311 
 
 temptation to produce a formidable-looking ship on paper by 
 adding armour regardless of weight. I have therefore taken the 
 
 FIG. 4 
 
 S" 10" u° B" 13° 14" 15" 16' 17' 18° 19° 20° 2f 22' 23* 24' i€ 23° 27' 
 Degrees of Inclination. 
 
 case of the ' Duncan ' monitor with increased draught so as to 
 give a freeboard of 2 feet 6 inches, and also with a freeboard of 
 2 feet, and have shown by means of the curves, A cZ D, and 
 
312, Oil the Stability of Monitors under Canvas. App. 
 
 A e E, Fig. 4, how their stabilities var3\ I assume the centre 
 of gravity to remain in the same position as bei'oj-e relative to 
 the ship, and therefore to be 1"2 feet below the water-line in 
 the former case, and VI feet below it in the latter case. In the 
 former case, viz. with the freeboard of 2 feet 6 inches, the 
 stability increases until the ship is inclined to an angle of 5°. 
 The edge of the deck is then immersed, and as the ship goes on 
 increasing her angle of heel, the stability increases very slowly, 
 until it reaches a maximum at 8° ; it then decreases, and the 
 ship reaches a position of unstable equilibrium at 18^° incli- 
 nation. 
 
 In the case where the freeboard is 2 feet, the edge of the deck 
 is just immersed when the ship is inclined to 4° ; up to this point 
 the stability increases nearly the same as in the other cases, and 
 it will be seen that it has then almost reached its maximum 
 value ; it increases slightly until the angle of heel reaches 6^°, 
 and then decreases as the angle increases until the ship becomes 
 unstable, which takes place before she has reache:! 16° incli- 
 nation. 
 
 I will here explain what seems at first sight to be an anomaly 
 in Fig 4. We see that the curve A C lies inside of the curve 
 A a B at the small angles of inclination, thus showing that in 
 these two cases, and in these positions, the monitor has the 
 greater stability. This is, of course, due to the fact of her 
 centre of gravity being the lower, while both the displacement 
 and load-water section are the same in each case. But the 
 curves A t^ D and A e E also fall inside of A a B at first, although 
 the centre of gravity in the two former cases is much farther 
 below the water than in the latter. This apparent anomaly may 
 be explained in the following way :— The moment of inertia of 
 the water-line remaining nearly constant as the ship sinks in the 
 water, while the displacement increases, causes the distance 
 between the metacentre and centre of buoyancy to diminish ; at 
 the same time the centre of gravity decends faster than the 
 centre of buoyancy, and consequently approaches it. Now if 
 the metacentre approaches the centre of buoyancy faster than 
 the centre of gravity approaches it the distance of the meta- 
 centre from the centre of gravity, and with it the arm of the lever, 
 Gr Z (Fig. 1), will be diminishing, and this is just what occurs here. 
 
App. On the Stability of Monitors tinder Canvas. 313 
 
 It is interesting also to compare the dynamical stabilities, or 
 mechanical work necessary to heel these ships through equal 
 angles. Tliis may be done by comparing the areas enclosed 
 (Fig. 4,) between the base lines, the curves, and the ordinates 
 drawn to the curves at the particular angles of heel. That 
 these areas are proportional to the dynamical stabilities may be 
 seen from the formula given before, viz. : — 
 
 Dynamical stability = Wy r d 6. 
 
 If we take the case of the first monitor being heeled over to 
 the position H G, Fig. 4 (4°), under the pressure of sail, and 
 draw the line H m M, so that it shall represent the variation of 
 the moment of sails, due to their inclination ; and suppose the 
 line HmM, also to represent the effect of the sail upon the 
 other ships, it will then divide each of the ai'eas A C B, A a B, 
 A ^ D, and A e E into two parts, the lower of which wiU repre- 
 sent the work which the wind (at a constant pressure) would be 
 capable of doing in overturning them, and the areas above the 
 line H M will represent the whole of the energy which the ship 
 could put forth to withstand any additional impulse, such as the 
 effect of waves, or a sudden gust of wind. We thus see, by com- 
 paring the areas, H X, H a M, H c? m, and the small part of 
 A e E above H M, the relative amounts of energy stored up in 
 the ships wlien sailing at the given inclinations, and this energy 
 it is which chiefly constitutes their safety. Comparisons may 
 be made in the same way at any other angles of heel under sail. 
 
 It must be obvious from this that the danger to be appre- 
 hended to these monitors, when under canvas is very great. And 
 when we think that they are liable at any moment to be over- 
 taken by sudden gusts of wind, and that, if tliey are heeled over 
 beyond 8° or 10^ the farther they go the less resistance they 
 offer to being capsized, their unfitness to carry sail must be quite 
 evident. 
 
 If it should occur to any one to consider that the case of an 
 ordinary barge is both an illustration and a refutation of the 
 subject as I am here stating it, I would beg leave to remind him 
 that the two cases differ in a most essential respect — the barge 
 usually has nearly the whole weight, both of her hull and of her 
 cargo, below the water, and therefore comparatively low down : 
 
314 On the Stability of Monitors under Canvas. App. 
 
 wliereas it is the object of these monitors to carry a large weight 
 of armour, guns, and turrets, mainly above water, so that the 
 centi'e of gravity — the position of which is so important to the 
 stability — cannot well be got low down. Any one who will take 
 the trouble to closely compare the two cases will find that they 
 differ exceedingly, and that, although barges sometimes carry a 
 deck cargo, it is always of comparatively light material, and 
 when unbalanced by weights in the hold, leaves a considerable 
 height of freeboard ; and this leads me to observe that the state 
 of the monitor which I have been describing would become very 
 materially modified if the centre of gravity of the vessel could 
 be greatly lowered, say to the extent of many feet. If, for 
 example, it could be brought down to the depth of the centre of 
 buoyancy, or beyond. On reverting to Fig. 1, it will be seen 
 that, when the ship heels over in the direction of the arrow, the 
 centre of buoyancy, 0, moves out in the same direction. This is 
 the case, more or less, however low the freeboard. We also see 
 that if the centre of gravity, G-, of the ship is above C, the 
 vertical line, GrW, through G, in the inclined position 
 moves in the same du-ection. In other words, the vertical 
 lines, GrW and BM, both move outwards in the direc- 
 tion of the arrow ; and we have seen that in the case of the 
 monitors which we have been considering, owing to the low free- 
 board, B M moves slowly, so to speak, and is soon overtaken by 
 Gr W, and the ship then capsizes ; but if we suppose the centre 
 of gravity to be below the centre of buoyancy, say at g, 
 and draw the vertical line g W, then it is obvious that, as the 
 ship is inclined, B M and ^ W move off from the middle line in 
 opposite directions, and the distance between them, and con- 
 sequently the statical stability, increases as the ship heels over. 
 This case, no doubt, corresponds to that of the sailing barges, 
 loaded deep with hold-cargoes, before referred to ; and it is a good 
 illustration of the fact that vessels which may seem to a casual 
 observer alike in principle may, nevertheless, be seen by the 
 naval architect to possess totally opposite qualities. 
 
 A very little reflection will suffice to show that we cannot 
 as a rule avail ourselves of this last exhibited principle in the 
 construction of armoured monitors. The tendency of things 
 is to increase the upper weights, that is to say, the weights of 
 
App. On the Stability of Monitors under Canvas. 3 1 5 
 
 the deck, the turrets, and the guns, and to lighten the construc- 
 tion of the hull below water as much as possible : and although 
 the resort to great engine-power and coal supply would tend to 
 correct this tendency and to lower the centre of gravity, it is 
 extremely improbable that in future iron-built ships we shall 
 ever have a very low centre of gravity associated with the 
 monitor type of vessel. 
 
 I do not, however, wish to use the present paper as a bar to 
 future developments of the monitor system ; its sole object is to 
 show that monitors having their centres of gravity situated 
 approximately like the centres of gravity of other ships would 
 be quite unfit to carry a press of canvas. 
 
 Before closing this paper, I may make a few observations on 
 the behaviour of these monitors as influenced by wave motion. I 
 have already referred to the fact that the steadiness at sea of some 
 of our iron-clads is due to their want of stiffness or stability, and 
 their consequent increased time of oscillation in still water ; and 
 I may add, that it is a very well established fact that ships which 
 have great stiffness in still water are very uneasy rollers. Now, 
 it will be seen that these monitors converted from line-of-battle 
 ships, as before mentioned, have great stiffness for small angles 
 of inclination, and they would consequently start rolling under 
 the same influences as ordinary ships which are very stiff aad have 
 a lofty freeboard. This would, but for another consideration, be 
 a very dangerous feature in the monitors, because it would cause 
 them to roll quickly until the range of roll became large, and 
 they would then get into positions where their stabilities would 
 be small and decreasing, and from which, if under canvas, they 
 might not be able to right themselves. Suppose, for instance, a 
 ship of this kind rolling among waves of the same periodic time 
 as her small oscillations. Should she roll beyond her position 
 of maximum stability, she would have her time of roll increased, 
 and t!ie following circumstances would then occur : — When 
 reaching the hollow, she would not have flnished her oscil- 
 lation, and might be still rolling towards the approaching 
 wave; the alteration of the direction of the water surface 
 caused by the front of the approaching wave — instead of de- 
 veloping in the ship a greater moment of stability tending to 
 right her, as is the case with all ships which have a high free- 
 
3 1 6 On the Stability of Monitors under Canvas. App. 
 
 board — would diminish what stability there was remaining, and 
 the danger of her being blown over, if she carried sail, would be 
 very great. The stability of these ships, in fact, would appear to 
 vary in the worst manner possible for safety. They would have 
 all the characteristics of very uneasy ships until they rolled 
 deeply, and not have the advantage of an increasing stability to 
 prevent their rolling too far. The consideration which modifies 
 this state of things materially is, that the very absence of free- 
 board which deprives them of the necessary stability at great 
 inclinations, would usually operate in the early stages of rolling 
 to mitigate the impulses which the waves impress. 
 
 And besides this, the amplitude of rolling is undoubtedly 
 much diminished by the disturbance of the water, which the 
 immersed angle between the deck and the side causes, and is 
 still further diminished by the plan adopted in America of 
 allowing the armour and backing to project from the side, 
 instead of their being imbedded in the side as proposed in 
 the cases which we have been considering. In fact this pro- 
 jection of the armour beyond the side must play an important 
 part in the alleged steadiness of the American monitors. Its 
 action is like that of an immense bilge keel, and is very effective 
 in diminishing the angle of roll. For instance, if a ship of the 
 form of Fig. 5 were set rolling, the resistance caused by the 
 
 action of the projection at A on the surrounding water would be 
 very great, and would tend to diminish the amplitude of roll. 
 The action of the angle B, when immersed, which would be 
 of the same kind in all monitors, whether the armour projected 
 or not, would be as follows :— If the ship were rolling towards 
 the side A B, the angle B, would have very little effect on the 
 amplitude of roll, but as soon as the ship commenced to return 
 
app. On the Stability of Monitors under Canvas. 317 
 
 to the upright, it would act to prevent her, and thus tend to 
 increase her time of roll; and, by diminisliing the force 
 with which she returns to the upright, would indirectly tend to 
 decrease the amplitude of the next roll, It will thus be seen 
 that the action on the water by the angle at A is always in the 
 right direction, while the action of the angle at B may be 
 against the ship when she is in the most critical positions, viz. 
 when she has rolled over to an inclination where her stability is 
 very small — and with decks as low as the American monitors 
 this would be the case at very moderate angles of roll — so that 
 by losing A while retaining B, wliich we do if we put the 
 armour in a recessed side, we give up a really valuable feature, 
 while we retain one which, under certain circumstances, may 
 prove a disadvantage. I need hardly add that I am here 
 speaking only of monitors which liave to serve at sea, and not 
 at all of mere harbour defence ships. 
 
 I have recently had occasion to consider two other cases of a 
 somewhat similar kind. We are building for the Government 
 at Melbourne an iron-clad monitor with a height of deck above 
 the water of 3 feet, and with an armour-plated breastwork 
 surrounding the bases of the turrets, and enclosing the hatch- 
 ways, as in Figs. 6 and 7. This monitor has to be navigated to 
 Melbourne, and for this purpose is to be fitted with a temporary 
 side and upper deck. I have shown in Fig. 4-, by means of 
 the curves A F K and A F L, the variation of the stability of 
 this vessel with different conditions of freeboard, observing that, 
 as this is a very much smaller vessel than the ' Duncan,' the 
 actual stability is much less than in her case. The curve A F K 
 siiows how her stability would increase if the side were continued 
 up as an ordinary ship, the whole length fore and aft. The curve 
 A F L shows how it varies when the side runs up before and 
 abaft the breastwork only, as in Figs. 8 and 9. The difference 
 between these two curves is caused by the break in the ship's 
 side in wake of the breastwork, and shows how the stability is 
 influenced by a departure of this kind from the usual continuous 
 side. In neither case, however, have we that alarming decrease 
 and loss of stability which the monitor proper would un- 
 doubtedly possess, especially with a veiy low freeboard. 
 
 In conclusion, I will only add that it will be no answer to the 
 
3i8 On the Stability of Monitors under Canvas. app. 
 
 doctrines of this paper to say that the rolling of ships is affected 
 by the lateral distribution of weights as well as by their vertical 
 
 heights. That is undoubtedly true, and would deserve great 
 attention in a discussion upon rolling. But my ruling argument 
 is that the monitors we have considered would be dangerously 
 deficient of statical stability, and this argument would hold 
 equally with their weights either distributed or concentrated. 
 
 Index. 
 
( 3^9 ) 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 BACKING TO ARJIOUK. 
 
 ' Achilles,' the— 
 
 speed trials of, 12, 15, 95, 98, 101. 
 armour of, 24, 32. 
 alteration in the protection of, 47. 
 weight of hull and weights carried, 87. 
 times coal supply will last at certain 
 
 speeds, 109. 
 sailing capabilities of, 128, 130. 
 records of rolling of, 139, 145, 149, 
 
 150-157, 158-160. 
 comparison of with ' Bellerophon,' 169. 
 unhandy on account of great length, 
 
 175. 
 results of trials of turning, 177, 179, 
 
 181. 
 nominal cost of, compared with ' Belle- 
 
 rophon's,' 215. 
 details of expenditure on, 218. 
 ' A<jincourt' the — 
 armour of, 82. 
 speed of, 95. 
 cost of, 217. 
 'Alma' class, the, of French iron-clads — 
 
 armour of, 36. 
 ' Amazon^ the unai-moured sloop — her loss 
 
 has no bearing upon the proper form 
 
 of bow for iron-clad rams, 274—279. 
 American iron-elads — 
 
 variety in designs of, 2. 
 
 armour of, 38, 41. 
 
 disposition of armour on, 51. 
 
 armament of, 64. 
 
 speeds attained by, 103. (See also 
 
 Monitors.) 
 'Ariadne,' the, one of our fastest wood 
 
 frigates, 94. 
 Armnineut of English irjn-clad^ — 
 
 ' Warrior ' at first armed with 68- 
 
 pounders, 57. 
 heavier guns since introduced, 58, 59. 
 table of weights, etc., of present naval 
 
 guns and projectiles, 61. 
 
 of French iron-clads, 63. 
 
 of American iron-clads, 64. (See 
 
 also Guns.) 
 Armour — 
 
 -ipproximate law of resistance for single 
 
 solid plates, 7, 39. 
 relative strength of solid and lamin- 
 ated, 38. 
 
 Armour — 
 
 " built-up'' must be distinguished from 
 
 laminated, 39, 40. 
 solid, best for iron-clads, 40. 
 of English iron-clads, built and build- 
 ing, 7, 24^31. 
 further increase in thickness probable, 
 
 31. 
 tabular statement of thicknesses in our 
 
 ships, 32. 
 of French iron-clads, 33. 
 of most American iron-clads is lami- 
 nated, 38. 
 thicknesses of, on American monitors,41 . 
 dispositions of — 
 
 ' Warrior ' system, 45. 
 
 'Hector' system, 45. 
 
 Complete protection, 46. 
 
 Central battery and armour-belt 
 system, 47. 
 
 ' Invincible ' system, 50. 
 
 on French and American ships, 50. 
 
 breastwork-monitor system, 52. 
 connection between weight and thickness 
 
 of, and foi-ms of ship.'^, 184, 196, 200. 
 • Atalanta,' the Confederate iron-clad — her 
 
 fight with the ' Weehawken,' 66, 251. 
 ' Audacious,' the — 
 armour of, 32. 
 weight of hull and weights carried, 87, 
 
 89, 297. 
 compared with ' Defence,' 89. 
 outlay upon, up to January, 1868, 219. 
 compared with ' Zealous,' 297. 
 Austrian iron-clads — 
 
 variety in designs of, 2. 
 
 experience had at Lissa with, 258, 273 
 
 279. 
 
 Backing to armour — 
 
 in earlier iron-clads, 24. 
 improvements in ' Bellerophon,' 26. 
 exceptional arrangements in 'Hercules ' 
 
 30. 
 table of thicknesses in our ships, 32. 
 relative strengths of, in wood and iron 
 
 ships, 36. 
 of French iron-clads, 36. 
 of American iron-clads, 41. 
 does not decay rapidly, 74. 
 
320 
 
 Index. 
 
 BALANCED-ECDDEE. 
 
 BROADSIDE 1R0N-CLAD8. 
 
 Balanced-rudder — 
 
 given to ram-ships, 20, 261. 
 
 eiiect on ' Bellerophou's ' performance 
 
 under sail, 131. 
 jointed, of ' Hercules,' 131. 
 Bar, or batten instrument — 
 
 only correct means of observing angles 
 
 of rolling, 143. 
 used by the French, 143. 
 now supplied to all our ships, 162. 
 Batteries, floating, built during Crimean 
 
 war, 2, 33. 
 
 armoured, of broadside ships — 
 
 " Box," or ' Warrior ' system, 45. 
 * Hector's ' arrangement, 46. 
 ' Minotaur's ' arrangement, 46. 
 with armour belts, 47, 68. 
 bow and stern, 49, 68, 151. 
 upper-deck of ' Invincible ' class, 50, 
 
 69. 
 Mr. Eads' proposal for, 227. 
 Battering system of naval ordnance — 
 adopted by Americans, 64. ^ 
 
 compared with punching system, 65. 
 condemned by American Ordnance 
 
 Committee, 67. 
 Battery, the American Stevens', 2, 
 ' Belter,' the French ram — ■ 
 armour of, 36. 
 has twin-screws, 264, 
 is wood-built, 282. 
 ' Bellerophon,' the — 
 
 ram-bow of, 3, 276, 282. 
 
 armour and backing of, 7, 26, 32. 
 
 armament of, 8, 59. 
 
 speed trials of, 12, 15, 95, 97, 98, 101, 
 
 190. 
 target of, differs greatly from ' Chal- 
 
 mer's ' target, 27. 
 disposition of armour on, 47, 49, 68. 
 structural arrangements of, contrasted 
 
 with 'Warrior's,' 81, 85. 
 weight of hull and weights carried, 
 
 87, 88. 
 times coal will last at certain speeds, 
 
 109. 
 sailing capabilities of, 126, 128, 131. 
 records of rolling, 149, 150-157, 158- 
 
 160. 
 dimensions of, 164. 
 compared with ' Black Prince ' and 
 
 'Achilles,' 168, 169. 
 very handy under steam, 175. 
 turning trials of, 177, 179, 181. 
 steaming performances compared with 
 
 'Minotaur's' and 'Warrior's,' 190, 
 
 192. 
 new design based upon, considered in 
 
 Eoyal Society Paper, 203. 
 nominal cost of, compared with that of 
 
 'Achilles,' 215. 
 details of cost of, 218, 
 
 ' Belliqueuse,' tlie French iron-clad, speed 
 
 of, 101. 
 Belt-and-hattery system of protection — 
 
 introduced into the ' Enterprise,' and 
 since generally adopted, 47. 
 
 advantages of as compared with other 
 systems, 48. 
 Blade Prince, the — 
 
 sister ship to ' Warrior,' 3. 
 
 armour of, 24, 32. 
 
 disposition of armour on, 45. 
 
 battery guns have only broadside train- 
 ing, 57. 
 
 weight of hull and weights carried, 87. 
 
 speed trials of, 95, 98. 
 
 sailing capabilities of, 127. 
 
 rolling of, 148. 
 
 compared with ' Bellerophon, ' Lord 
 Clyde,' and 'Hercules,' 168, 172, 
 173. 
 
 an unhandy ship, 174. 
 
 details of cost of, 217. 
 Bow-fire of protected guns — ■ 
 
 importance of, 4, 68, 231. 
 
 means of obtaining, 57, 68, 230. 
 
 wanting in many turret-ships, 230. 
 Bows of iron-dads — 
 
 changes in form and structure of, 3, 
 19. 
 
 consideration of the proper form for 
 ram-ships, 265-281. 
 Bracket-frame system of constructing iron- 
 clads— 
 
 first introduced into ' Bellerophon,' 80. 
 
 described and compared with ' War- 
 rior's system, 81. 
 
 usefulness of double-bottoms as a means 
 of safety, 82. 
 
 adapted to prevent loss by torpedo ex- 
 plosions, 83. 
 
 summary of advantages of, 85. 
 
 Dr. Fairbairn's remarks on, 86. 
 
 weights of hull of ships so built, illus- 
 trating lightness of construction, 87. 
 
 adopted generally for large ships built 
 in this country, 90. 
 Breastu-ork-moniiors (see Monitors). 
 Breech-loading guns — 
 
 adopted by the French, 63. 
 
 not so efficient as heavy muzzle-loading 
 guns, 64. 
 ' Bristol,' the wood frigate — 
 
 speed attained by, 107. 
 
 time coal would last at certain speeds, 
 109. 
 Broadside iron-clads — 
 
 increased horizontal range of guns in 
 recent, 4, 68. 
 
 systems of protection adopted in, 45-50. 
 
 superior in fighting power at sea to 
 American monitors, 139. 
 
 outlay upon our, 217-221. 
 
Index. 
 
 BROADSIDE IRON-OLADS. 
 
 321 
 
 COXVERSION. 
 
 Broadside iron-clade — 
 
 Channel Squadrons, repoits on trials of— 
 
 heaviest guns can now be worked in, 224. 
 
 full speed t)-ials at sea, 12, 15. 
 
 gun ports have to be larger than in 
 
 sailing trials, 127. 
 
 tuirets, 225. 
 
 records of rolling, 134, 135, 148, 149, 
 
 weight of armour per gun less than in 
 
 157. 
 
 turret-ships, 225. 
 
 turning trials, 179, 181. 
 
 guns posse-s independent training in, 
 
 Clinometer, use of the, for observing angles 
 
 22li, 2a3. 
 
 of roll, 144. 
 
 guns might be mounted in pairs on, 226. 
 
 Coal supply of iron-clads — 
 
 better adapted for masts and sails than 
 
 its intimate connection with steaming 
 
 existing turret-ships, 228. 
 
 capability, 103. 
 
 have greater facilities for raising and 
 
 mistaken statements made respectingjl 04. 
 
 securing boats than tunet->hips, 233. 
 
 connection between type of engines and 
 
 Bulkheads — 
 
 rate of consumption, 104. 
 
 armoured at ends of batteries, 45, 48, 50. 
 
 is not to be judged by rate of con- 
 
 watertight, their usefulness in iron 
 
 sumption on measured-mile trials, 106. 
 
 .ships, 76, 81, 83, 286. 
 
 but by the rate at good speeds, 12 or 
 
 " wing," valuable in iron-dads, 285. 
 
 12J knots, 107. 
 
 
 table of times coal will last certain ships 
 
 
 at 11 and 12J knots, 109. 
 
 ' Caledonia,' the, and her class — 
 
 on the whole superior to that of wood 
 
 speed trials of, 12, 96, 98. 
 
 war ships, 1 10. 
 
 armour of, 24, 33. 
 
 lecent iron-clads are better off than 
 
 weight of hull and weights carried, 87, 
 
 earlier iron-clads, 110. 
 
 88. 
 
 'Thunderer' class have exceptionally 
 
 sailing capabilities of, 128. 
 
 large supplies, 126. 
 
 centi e of gravity of, lowered by conver- 
 
 sading ciipab lity enables coal to be 
 
 sion, 137. 
 
 economi.sed, 126. 
 
 dimensions of, 164, 166. 
 
 Coles, Captain — 
 
 cost of, 218. 
 
 his design of the tun-et-ship 'Captain,' 
 
 coirespond to ' Gloire ' and ' Flandre ' 
 
 230. 
 
 classes of Fiench navy, 292. 
 
 his system of working turrets superior 
 
 ' Canonicus,' the American monitor — ■ 
 
 to the American, 254. 
 
 side-armour of, 41. 
 
 the ' Hoyal Sovei eigti ' converted on his 
 
 turrets of, 43. 
 
 designs, 294. 
 
 ' Captain,' the tun-ef-ship — 
 
 Confederate iron-clads, 66, 250. 272. 
 
 armament nf, 8, 59. 
 
 ConsiaiUs of steam-ship performance — 
 
 armour of, 29, 32. 
 
 lair standards of merit foi- merchant 
 
 dimensiuns of, 164. 
 
 ships, 185. 
 
 expenditure upon up to January, 1868, 
 
 veiy useful in calculating horse-powers 
 
 219. 
 
 for new ships, 186. 
 
 devices for working sails in, 228. 
 
 not to be taken as sole standards of 
 
 limitations of range of turret-^juns, 230. 
 
 merit for all iion-c'ads, 187. 
 
 simultaneous fire of turret-guns, com- 
 
 conditions essential to their useful appli- 
 
 pared with that of the battery guns of 
 
 cation to iron-clads, 188. 
 
 ' Hercules,' 233. 
 
 Conversion of line-of-lattle ships into iron- 
 
 diameter of turiets of, 240. 
 
 clads — 
 
 Centres of gravity of iron-clads — 
 
 remarks on the 'Caledonia' cla-s, 292 
 
 usually lower than tho^e of wood two- 
 
 {see ' Caledonia '). 
 
 deckers, 137. 
 
 finished ships required to be conveited 
 
 relation between position of, and ship's 
 
 differently, 293. 
 
 steadi^e^s, 145. 
 
 * Galons ' and ' Royal Sovereign ' were 
 
 means of securing high positions of, 147. 
 
 converted, 293, 294. 
 
 ' Cerberus,' the breastwork monitor, 54, 
 
 schemes proposed mostly for tuiTet coast 
 
 303. 
 
 defence ships, 293. 
 
 Chalmers, Mr.— differences between his target 
 
 designs for the, have been prepared at 
 
 and the ' Bellerophon's,' 27. 
 
 the Admiralty, 295, 299. 
 
 Changes in iron-clads — 
 
 reasons why they have not been can led 
 
 summaiy of principal, made since * War- 
 
 out, 296-299. 
 
 lior's ' design, 6. 
 
 schemes for turning these ships into 
 
 chief causes of, 7, 19. 
 
 rigged seagoing monitors not admis- 
 
 important structural, 70, 80. 
 
 sible, 299-302. 
 
322 
 
 Index. 
 
 CONVERSION. 
 
 ' ENTEKPEISB.' 
 
 Conversion of Um-of-hattle s/iips into iron- 
 clads — 
 mistaken arguments advanced in favour 
 
 of, 302. 
 money required for, better spent on 
 new iron-built ships, 303. 
 Copper slieafliing for iron-built iron-dads, 
 
 79, 100. 
 Corvettes, wood, speeds attained by our, 95. 
 Cost of our iron-clads — 
 
 varying incidental charges made upon 
 
 ships built in Royal dockyards, 214. 
 
 effect of arbitrary charges on nominal 
 
 cost of those ships, 215. 
 12i per cent, on net outlay a sufficient 
 
 allowance for such charges, 216. 
 up to January, 1868 — 
 
 of completed contract-built broad- 
 side ships, 217. 
 of completed government - built 
 
 broadside ships, 218. 
 of unfinished broadside ships, and 
 
 of turret-ships, 219. 
 total outlay, 220. 
 up to January, 1869, 221. 
 only one-eleventh of expenditure upon 
 
 the navy from 1859 to 1869, 221. 
 savings effected by adopting ships of 
 moderate dimensions, 170, 206, 211, 
 222. 
 ' Couronne,' the French iron-clad, armour 
 of, 33. 
 
 Dacres, Admiral Sir Sidney, his reports on — 
 
 sailing capabilities of iron-clads, 127. 
 
 rolling of iron-clads, 134, 148. 
 
 importance of handiness, 174. 
 Deck-armour «/ monitors, must be strong, 
 
 51, 253. 
 ' Defence,' the — 
 
 limited horizontal range of guns in 
 battery of, 4, 57. 
 
 dimensions of, moderate, 9, 164, 166. 
 
 armour of, 24, 32. 
 
 disposition of armour on, 45. 
 
 weight of hull and weights carried, 
 87. 
 
 compared with ' Audacious,' 89. 
 
 speed trials of, 96. 
 
 sailing capabilities of, 128, 131. 
 
 rolling of, 148, 158-160. 
 
 cost of, 217. 
 ' Defiance' the, our longest and finest line- 
 
 of-battle ship, 94. 
 ' Devastation; the breastwork-monitor— 
 
 armour of, 7, 31, 32. 
 
 armament of, 8, 59. 
 
 large coal supply of, 126. 
 
 has no masts or sails, 126, 133. 
 ' Dictator; the American monitor — 
 
 armour of, 42, 43. 
 
 ' Dictator; the American monitor — 
 turret of, 43. 
 dimensions of, 246. 
 Dimensions of iron-clads — 
 
 table of, for our ships, and remarks 
 
 thereon, 164-166. 
 of French ships, 167. 
 of our recent ships and their moderate 
 
 proportions, 167. 
 *Bellerophon' compared with 'Black 
 
 Prince ' and ' Achilles,' 168, 169. 
 of 'Lord Clyde' and 'Lord Warden,' 171. 
 ' Lord Clyde ' compared with ' Black 
 
 Prince,' 172. 
 'Hercules' compared with 'Black 
 
 Prince,' 173. 
 moderate, give great handiness, 174 
 
 (see Handiness). 
 table of, for some Englisli and American 
 
 ships, 246. 
 Douhle-hottoms in iron-clads — 
 
 form part of bracket-frame system, 80. 
 give great safety and strength, 81, 83. 
 ' Duncan; the line-of-battle ship — 
 speed attained by, 107. 
 times coal would last at 11 and 12^- 
 
 knot speeds, 109. a 
 ' Dunderherg; the casemated ship (now 
 
 ' Rochambeau ') — 
 singular features of, 2. 
 remarkable speed trials of, 102. 
 ram-bow of, 271. 
 Du Pont, Admiral, his remarks on American 
 
 monitors — 
 sea-going qualities of, 244. 
 fighting qualities of, 252. 
 Dutch iron-clads — 
 
 variety in designs of, 2. 
 
 ' Prinz Hendrik,' turret-ship, 139. 
 
 Eads, Mr., the American engineer — 
 
 his plan for working broadside guns in 
 
 pairs, 226. 
 his remarks on the turrets of monitors, 
 
 239, 2.)4. 
 Engines, marine — 
 
 new and old types of, in iron-clads, 
 
 compared, 104, 194. 
 rates of fuel-consumption in two types, 
 
 108. 
 of new type, required experience to 
 
 perfect them, 112, 194. 
 ' Enterprise; the — 
 
 our first small iron-clad, 9. 
 
 novel upper works of, 21, 78. 
 
 armour of, 33. 
 
 ' battery and belt' system first adopted 
 
 in, 47. 
 speed trials of, 96. 
 cost of, 218. 
 dimensions of, 246, 
 
Index. 
 
 3^3 
 
 GUX.S, NAVAL. 
 
 Ericsson, Mr., on deck-armour of monitors, 51. 
 Expenditure on our iron-clads (see Cost). 
 lij-perimenls — 
 
 on ' Minotaur' target, 25. 
 
 on * Hercules' target, 30. 
 
 on ''small plate" target, 37. 
 
 on laminated targets, 38. 
 
 on Gibraltar shield, 39. 
 
 on ' Iron Armour,' Colonel Inglis' re- 
 marks, 40. 
 
 with English and American guns, G.5. 
 
 made on 'Royal Sovereign' at Ports- 
 mouth, 237. 
 
 Fnirhairn, Dr., on the bracket-frame sys- 
 tem, 86. 
 ' Favorite' the — 
 
 armour of, 33. 
 
 speed-trials of, 96. 
 
 dimensions of, 164-. 
 
 cost of, 218. 
 ' Ferdinand Max* the Austrian iron-clad — 
 
 her performances at Lissa, 258, 
 
 sustained no serious injury to her ram- 
 bow, 273, 279. 
 ' Flandre,' the, class of French iron-clads — 
 
 armour of, 36. 
 
 rank with our ' Caledonia ' class, 292. 
 Forms and proportions of iron-clads — 
 
 weight and thickness of armour should 
 influence, 183, 199. 
 
 not to be determined with a view to 
 obtaining high constants of perform- 
 ance, 187, 189. 
 
 remarks on steaming performance of 
 long and short ships, 190-196. 
 
 moderate proportions desirable in 
 thickly-plated ships, 196. 
 
 Abstract of Royal Society Paper on, 200. 
 
 consideration of a design based on ' Her- 
 cules' and ' Minotaur,' 208. 
 Foulness of bottom — 
 
 seriously reduces speeds of iron-clads, 
 13, 19. 
 
 means of preventing, 78, 100. 
 
 most serious in very long ships, 197. 
 Fox, ^Ir., Assistant-Secretary of American 
 Navy — his report on Trans-Atlantic 
 vovage of the monitor ' ]\Iiantono- 
 moh,' 248. 
 Frii'-hoard of iron-clads — 
 
 real advantages of low, 52. 
 
 rolling not necessarilv caused by high, 
 137. 
 
 nor necessarily reduced by low, 138. 
 
 low, has many disadvantages, 139. 
 French iron-clads — 
 
 variety in designs of, 1. 
 
 * La Gloire,' first ship, 2. 
 
 now built witli wood bottoms and iron 
 upper-works, 21, 78. 
 
 French iron-clads — 
 
 armour of, 33. 
 
 dispositions of armour on, 50. 
 
 armament of doubtful efficiency, 63. 
 
 mostly wood-built, 77, 281. 
 
 speeds attained by, 101. 
 
 rolling of, 135, 137, 145. 
 
 dimensions of, 167. 
 
 intended to act as rams, 256. 
 
 watertight bulkheads recently fitted 
 in, 286. 
 Frirjafes, our wood — 
 
 armament of, 56. 
 
 steaming capabilities of, 93. 
 
 dimensions of largest, 164. 
 Fronde, Jlr., his valuable investigations on 
 
 rolling of ships, 144. 
 Fuel, supply and consumption of, in iron- 
 clads (see Coal supply). 
 
 ' Galatea' the wood frigate — 
 speed attained by, 107. 
 me coal would la, 
 knot speeds, 109. 
 Gibraltar Siiield, experiments made on, 39. 
 Girders, longitudinal behind armour, 27, 85. 
 ' Glatton,' the breastwork monitor — 
 armour of, 7, 32. 
 armament of, 8, 59. 
 deck-armour of, 51. 
 weight of hull and weights carried, 87, 
 
 90, 297. 
 compared with ' Royal Sovereign, 297, 
 303. 
 ' Gloire,' the French iron-clad — . 
 first of their iron-clad ships, 2. 
 armour of, 33. 
 speed of, 101. 
 dimensions of, 167. 
 ranks with our ' Caledonia,' 292. 
 Goldsborough, Admiral, on iron-clad rams 
 
 258, 260. 
 Goodenough, Captain, on the handiness of 
 
 iron-clads, 176. 
 ' Great Eastern,' the structural arrange- 
 ments of, 82. 
 Guns, naval, — English — 
 
 increase in weight and power of, 8, 58. 
 decrease in number of guns carried by 
 
 ships, 49, 58. 
 improved methods of mounting broad- 
 side, 57, 224. 
 table of weights, etc., of past and pre- 
 sent, 61. 
 comparative powers of past and present 
 
 58, 62. 
 compared with French and American 
 63, 65. 
 
 ■ French — 
 
 increase in weight and power of, 63. 
 compared with English, 63. 
 
 T 2 
 
3^4 
 
 Index. 
 
 GUNS, NAVAL. 
 
 IROS-CLADS. 
 
 Guns, naval, — American — 
 
 increase in weight and power of, 64. 
 
 compared witli English, 65. 
 
 Opinion of American Ordnance Com- 
 mittee respecting, 67. 
 
 large arcs of training must 
 
 be given to, 4, 68, 230. 
 
 means of obtaining great horizontal 
 range for, 49, 68, 2'25. 
 
 turret and broadyide guns compared, 
 224, 233. 
 
 Sandiness of iron-dads — 
 
 moderate propoition.s and balanced rudders 
 give greater, 20, 128, 167, 177, 261. 
 twin-screws also increase the, 264. 
 opinions of naval officers on importance 
 
 of, 174. 
 essential to efficiency of rams, 176, 259. 
 tests of, under steam, 177, 179, 181. 
 Hau'ksliaw, Mr., experiments on laminated 
 targets constructed by, 38. 
 
 * Sect 07-,' the — 
 
 moderate dimensions of, 9, 164, 166. 
 
 speed trials of, 12, 96. 
 
 armour of, 24, 32. 
 
 disposition of armour on, 45. 
 
 performance at sea, 128. 
 
 rolling of, 148, 149. 
 
 cost of, 217. 
 
 * Helicon,^ the despatch vessel, her race with . 
 
 the ' Salamis,* 123. 
 ' Hercules' the — 
 
 ram-bow of, 3, 283. 
 
 armour of, 7, 29, 32. 
 
 armament of, 8, 59. 
 
 disposition of armour on, 47, 49, 68. 
 
 speed trials of, 95, 98, 101. 
 
 has heavy engines in order to econo- 
 mise fuel, 105. 
 
 times coal supply will last at 11 and 
 12^-knot speeds, 109. 
 
 sailing capabilities of, 131. 
 
 steadiness of, 148, 161. 
 
 dimensions of, 164. 
 
 compared with ' Black Prince,' 173. 
 
 extremely handy, 178, 180. 
 
 compared with new design based upon 
 ' Minotaur," 208. 
 
 outlay upon, up to January, 1868, 219. 
 
 simultaneous fire of battery guns, com- 
 pared with that of ' Captain's ' turret 
 guns, 233. 
 Holley, Mr., his book on 'Ordnance and 
 
 Armour,' 64. 
 Eornby, Admiral, on the sailing capabilities 
 
 of iron-clads, 127. 
 ' Hotspur,' the iron-clad ram — 
 
 armour of, 7, 32. 
 
 characteristic features of, 257. 
 
 has twin-screws, 264. 
 
 ram-bow of, 276, 284. 
 
 ' Hoice,' the three-decker, one of our finest 
 
 Avood ships, 94. 
 Hulls of iron-dads — 
 
 iron superior to wood for construction 
 
 of, 21, 77. 
 reasons for preferring iron to wood — ■ 
 iron gives 
 
 greater lightness, 71. 
 greater strength, 72. 
 more durability, 73. 
 increased safetj', 76, 284, 286. 
 most French iron-clads have wood hulls, 
 
 77. 
 wood hulls, at present, surpass iron in 
 
 anti-fouliug qualities, 78. 
 but means of preventing fouling of iron 
 
 will be devised, 78. 
 structural arrangements of * Warrior ' 
 
 and ' Bellerophon' contra^ted, 80. 
 provisions for safety against torpedoes, 
 
 82. 
 weights of, for some ships, 87, 297. 
 iron-built, tend to make ships steadier 
 than wood-built, 143, 146, 149, 157. 
 should be iron-built in ram-ships, 282 
 {See also Structure). 
 
 Tnglis, Colonel, on experiments on iron 
 
 armour, 40. 
 ' Invincible,' the — 
 
 possesses all-round fire, 5, 50. 
 armour of, 29, 32. 
 upper-deck battery of, 50. 
 probable behaviour at sea of, 147. 
 dimensions of, 164. 
 
 outlay upon, np to Jauuarv, 1868, 219. 
 Iron-cluds, our — 
 
 varieties of, 1 (see Variety), 
 armour of, 24 (see Armour), 
 armament of, 56 (see Armament and 
 
 Guns). 
 structure of, 70 (see Hulls and Struc- 
 ture), 
 steaming of, 93 (see Steaming), 
 sailing of, 125 (see Sailing), 
 rolling of, 134 (see Rolling), 
 dimensions of, 164 (see Dimensions), 
 forms and proportions of, 183. 
 long and short, comparati ve merits of — 
 principles exemplified in long ships 
 not the best possible, 165, 184. 
 reasons for preferring moderate 
 dimensions, 166, 167, 175, 212, 
 261. 
 principles exemplified in short 
 
 iron-clads, 185, 188. 
 steam performances of long and 
 short, compared, 168, 177, 190. 
 deductions from and remarks on 
 
 these performances, 194-199. 
 hypothetical cases considered in 
 Royal Society Paper, 201, 206. 
 
Index. 
 
 :rox-clad3. 
 
 lIEiS'jr.BD-lIILE TRIALS. 
 
 Z^S 
 
 Iron-dads, o\ir — 
 
 cases based upon * Bellerophon ' and 
 
 'Minotaur,' 203. 
 case based upon tbe * Hercules ' and 
 
 ' Minotaur,' 208. 
 savings due to introduction of 
 sbortev ships, 170, 206, 211, 
 222. 
 cost of, 2\i (see Cost), 
 use of, as rams {see Iu^ms). 
 pi-oposed additions to {see Conversion). 
 
 , foreign (see Ameiican, Austrian, 
 
 Dutch, French, Prussian, Eussian, 
 Spanish, and Turkish). 
 ' Iron iJvhe,' the, armour of, 32. 
 Iron hulls for iron-dads (see Hulls). 
 Iron Plate Committee, tlic — 
 
 law of re^istance for armour given by, 7, 
 
 39. 
 experiments on laminated aiTnour, 38. 
 Iron upper-works, for wood-built iron-clads, 
 
 21, 78. 
 Italian iron-clads — 
 
 variety iu designs of, 2. 
 defeat at Lissa, 258. 
 
 Jervois, Colonel, on iron armour, 40. 
 * Jason,' the wood con'ette — 
 
 fastest of her class, 95. 
 
 compared with ' Pallas,' 97. 
 
 ' Kalamazoo,' the Ameiican monitor — 
 
 armour of, 42. 
 
 turrets of, 43. 
 
 dimensions of, 246. 
 ' Keokuk,' the American iron-clad, ram-bow 
 of, 271. 
 
 Laminated armour — • 
 
 adopted by the Americans, 38. 
 
 Shoebuiyness experiments on, 38. 
 
 law of resistance for solid plates does not 
 
 apply to, 39. 
 must be distinguished from " built-up " 
 
 armour, 39. 
 wealier than solid armour, 38, 41. 
 Lennox, Lord Henry, on the voyage of iron- 
 clad ' Ocean,' 132. 
 Line-ofAiatlle ships, wood — 
 armaments of, 56. 
 steaming qualities of, 94. 
 dimensions of, 164. 
 
 their convei-sion iuto iion-clad<, 292 (see 
 Conversion). 
 Lissa, remaiks on the action at, in 1866, 
 
 258, 27.;, 279. 
 Long iron-clads — • 
 
 ' War] lor ' and ' Minotaur ' classes swift 
 
 but unhandy, 1G5, 174. 
 principal objections to adoption of, 166, 
 181. 
 
 Long iron-clads — 
 
 steaming performances compared with 
 those of short ships, 168, 177, 190. 
 
 not mucli more economical of steam- 
 powei" than short ships, 196. 
 
 frictional resistance of gieat impoi-tauce 
 in, 196. 
 
 cases considered in Royal Society paper, 
 201, 203, 206. 
 
 new design based upon * Minotaur,' com- 
 pared with * Hercules,' 208. 
 ' Lord Clyde' the — 
 
 speed trials of, 12, 15, 18, 95, 98. 
 
 armour of, 21, 26, 33, 171. 
 
 bow battery on upper deck of, 50, 151. 
 
 weiyht of hull and weights carried, 87, 
 88. 
 
 sailing capability of, 128. 
 
 rolling of, 142, 148-157. 
 
 dimensions of, 164, 171. 
 
 compared with ' Black Piince,' 172. 
 
 turning trials of, 177, 179, 181. 
 
 cost of, 218. 
 
 ram-bow of, 276, 281. 
 ' Lord Warden,' the — 
 
 aiTnameut of, 8. 
 
 speed trials of, 15, 18, 95, 98. 
 
 armour of, 21, 26, 33, 171. 
 
 bow battery on upper deck of, 50. 
 
 resisting power of side of, 65. 
 
 lolling of, 141, 148, 153-157. 
 
 dimensions of, 164, 171. 
 
 turning trials of, 177, 179, 181. 
 
 cost of, 218. 
 
 ram-bow of, 281. 
 
 ' Magenta,' the French iron-clad — 
 armour of, 33, 50. 
 speed of, 101. 
 steadiness of, 137, 148. 
 Manceuvring power of iron-clads (see 
 
 Handines:>). 
 ' Marengo ' class of French iron-clads, the, 
 
 armour of, 36, 50. 
 Measured-mile trials of speed — 
 results of, for wood ships, 93. 
 lesults of, for iron-clads, 95, 98. 
 agree veiy fairly with results of six 
 
 hours' runs, 97, 193. 
 to be preferred to sea-trials on many 
 
 accounts, 99, 114, 123. 
 speeds obtained not expected to be main- 
 tained at sea, 100, 106. 
 often condemned, 113. 
 now used for pui-poses that sea-Lrials 
 
 would serve, 113. 
 primary objects of, 114. 
 objections made to, considered, 114. 
 examples of " jockeying " on, 116. ' 
 nothing of the kind possible in ships of 
 
 Xavy, 117. 
 unavoid.ible errors of, 117. 
 
326 
 
 Index. 
 
 MBASDRED-JITLE TRIALS. 
 
 'SEW IRONSIDES.' 
 
 Measured-mile trials of 
 
 care required in making observations 
 
 on, 119. 
 "jockeying" in boiler-room on, 121. 
 do not render sea-trials unnecessary, 
 
 l;i-l. 
 ' Merrimac,' the Confederate iron-clad — 
 her fight with the ' Monitor,' 250. 
 her attack on Federal fleet at Hampton 
 
 Roads, 272. 
 ' Merseji,' the wood frigate — 
 
 steaming performances of, 94, 98, 107. 
 times coal would last at 11 and 12^- 
 
 knot speeds, 109. 
 Metaeentric-lieight of iron-dads, connexion 
 
 of, witli steadiness, 145. 
 ' Miantonomoli, the American monitor — 
 armour of, 42. 
 
 Trans-Atlantic voyage of, 248. 
 ' Minotaur,' the — 
 
 extreme size and proportions of, 9, 164. 
 speed trials of, 15, 95, 97, 98, 101, 
 
 190. 
 armour of, 25, 32. 
 target of, compared with * Warrior's,' 
 
 25. 
 complete protection of, 46. 
 alteration of armament, 49, 58. 
 possesses head and stern fire from pro- 
 tected guns, 57. 
 weight of hull and weights carried, 87, 
 
 knot speeds, 109. 
 rolling of, 150-160. 
 principles of design exemplified in, 165. 
 turning trials ofj 177, 181. 
 weight and buoyancy of fore part, 184. 
 steam-performances of, compared with 
 
 ' Bellerophon's' and 'Warrior's,' 190, 
 
 198. 
 new design based upon, compared with 
 
 ship based on ' Bellerophon,' 20.S. 
 new design based upon, compared with 
 
 ' Hercules,' 208. 
 cost of, 217. 
 
 remarks on ramming efficiency of, 263. 
 ' Monadnock,' the American monitor- 
 armour of, 42. 
 dimensions of, 246. 
 voyage of, to the Pacific, 246, 250. 
 ' Monarch,' the turret-ship— 
 armament of, 8, 59. 
 armour of, 29, 32. 
 weight of hull and weights carried, 87, 
 
 89. 
 speed trials of, 95, 97. 
 times coal would last at 11 and 12J- 
 
 knot speeds, 109. 
 dimensions of, 164. 
 
 outlay upon, up to January, 1868, 219. 
 devices for working sails of, 228. 
 
 ' Monarch,' the turret-ship — 
 
 turret-guns cannot be fired fore-and- 
 aft, 230. 
 
 has armoured bow and stern batteries, 
 230. 
 
 diameters of turrets of, 240. 
 ' Monitor,' the original American^ 
 
 armour of, 41. 
 
 turret of, 43. 
 
 experience with, and loss of, at sea, 244. 
 
 ventilation, etc., of, 249. 
 
 her fight with ' iMerrimac,' 250, 272. 
 Monitors — American — 
 
 laminated armour of, 41. 
 
 turrets of, 43. 
 
 deck-armour of, should be stronger, 51, 
 253. 
 
 armaments of, 65. 
 
 horizontal range of guns in, 69. 
 
 speeds of, 103. 
 
 protection of turret-base in, 238. 
 
 Mr. Eads' remarks on turrets of, 239, 
 254. 
 
 not satisfactory sea-going ships, 241. 
 
 experience at sea with, resume of re- 
 ports on, 242. 
 
 mistakes respecting sizes of, 245. 
 
 voyages of 'Monadnock' and ' Mianto- 
 nomoli,' 246. 
 
 ventilation and comfovt of, doubtfid. 249. 
 
 fighting qualities of, extracts from re- 
 ports on, 250. 
 
 strengthened and used for ramming, 
 257, 271. 
 
 spur-bow most efficient form for at- 
 tacking them, 268. 
 English breastwork — 
 
 armour of, 7, 31, 32. 
 
 armament of, 8, 59. 
 
 deck-armour of, 51. 
 
 description of system, 52. 
 
 compared with American monitors, 53. 
 
 compared with ordinary turret-ships, 54. 
 
 possess all-round fire of turret guns, 
 69. 
 
 capable of fighting at sea, 242. 
 
 designs for converting line-of-battle 
 ships into, 298. 
 
 • stability of, under canvas, 305. 
 
 ' Montaulc,' the American monitor, report on 
 experience off Charleston with, 243. 
 Muzzle-loading guns — 
 
 hitherto superior to breech-loading, 64. 
 
 rifled, adopted in our navy, 64. 
 
 smooth-bore, adopted by Americans, 65. 
 
 ' Xahant,' the American monitor — 
 
 behaviour of, at Charleston, 243. 
 
 turret of, jammed in the attack, 252. 
 ' New Ironsides,' the American iron-clad— 
 
 their only broadside frigate, 2, 51. 
 
 speed attained by, 103. 
 
Index. 
 
 y-i 
 
 RAMS, IRON-CLAD. 
 
 Nohht Captain, his remarks on — 
 
 advantages of English system of backing 
 
 to armour, 36. 
 relative strengths of solid and laminated 
 
 arnnour, 38, 39. 
 relative power of English and American 
 guns, 65. 
 ' Northumberland,' the — 
 armour of, 32. 
 
 alteration in protection of, 48. 
 speed trials of, 95, 101. 
 cobt of, 217. 
 
 ' Ocean' the — 
 
 speed trials of, 12. 
 
 ai-mour of, 33. 
 
 sailing c-npabilities of, 128. 
 
 voyage to Batavia, 132. 
 
 rolling of, 149. 
 
 cost of, 218. 
 Ordnance, American Committee on, their 
 last report, 67. 
 
 , Select Committee, their remarks 
 
 on breech-loading guns, 67. 
 
 , naval {see Guns). 
 
 ' Orlando,* the long wood frigate — 
 
 steaming qualities of, 94. 
 
 exceptional coal-supply of, 110. 
 
 ' Palestro ' class, of French floating bat- 
 
 terK's, the armour of, 33. 
 ' Pallas,' the — 
 
 sailing,capabilities of, 17, 126, 128, 130. 
 wood and iron upper works of, 21. 
 armour of, 33. 
 weight of hull and weights carried, 87, 
 
 88. 
 speed tiials of, 96, 98. 
 rolling of, 149, 156, 157, 160. 
 dimensions of, 164, 246. 
 cost of, 218. 
 Papers, reprints and abstiacts of, on — ■ 
 
 ' Trials of Steamships at the measured 
 
 mile,' 112. 
 ' The relation of form and dimensions to 
 
 weight of material in the construction 
 
 of iron-clad ships,' 200. 
 * The Stability of Monitors under Can- 
 vas,' 305. 
 Paris, Admiral, his remarks on — 
 
 speed trials of* Dunderberg,' 102. 
 loss of the sloop ' Amazon,' 277. 
 ' Passair,' tlie American monitor — 
 armour of, 41. 
 turrets of, 43. 
 report on behaviour of, at Charleston, 
 
 243. 
 injuries sustained by, in the attack, 252. 
 * Pafapsco,' the American monitor — 
 sunk by a torpedo, 245. 
 disabled in first attack on Charleston, 
 
 252. 
 
 Pendulum, the, not to be relied on as a 
 measure of rolling, 143, 150, 154, 
 159. 
 ' Penehpe,' the — 
 
 contour of stem of, 3. 
 armour of, 27, 32. 
 speed trials of, 96. 
 dimensions of, 164, 
 
 outlay upon up to January, 1868, 219. 
 ^Prince Albert,' the turret-ship — 
 armour of, 32. 
 speed trials of, 96. 
 dimensions of, 164. 
 cost of, 219. 
 
 exceptional number of turrets in, 226. 
 only fitted for coast-defence, 299. 
 ' Prince Consort,' the — ■ 
 speed trials of, 15. 
 armour of, 38. 
 sailing capabilities of, 128. 
 rolling of, 135, 145, 148, 155-161. 
 cost of, 218. 
 ' Prinz Sendrik,' the Dutch turret-ship, her 
 
 behaviour at sea, 139. 
 Projectiles for naval guns — 
 increased weight of, 59. 
 table of weights, velocities, etc., for our 
 
 guns, 61. 
 of American guns, 65. 
 Proportions of iron-dads (see Forms), 
 Protection, systems of, for iron-clads — 
 ' Warrior ' system, 45. 
 ' Hector' system, 45. 
 complete protection, 46. 
 central battery and armour-belt system, 
 
 47. 
 comparative merits of these systems, 48. 
 ' Invincible ' system, 50. 
 French and American, 50. 
 bieastwork monitor system, 52. 
 ' Provence,' the, speed of French iron-clad, 
 
 101. 
 Prussian iron-clads — variety in designs 
 
 of, 2. 
 Punching system of naval ordnance — 
 
 adopted by ourselves and the French, 
 
 64. 
 compared with American battering sys- 
 tem, 65. 
 'Puritan,' the American monitor, armour 
 of, 42. 
 
 Bams, iion-clad — 
 
 armour of our, 7, 32, 
 
 introduction of, has been a cause of 
 
 variety, 19. 
 armour of French, 36. 
 all our ships more or less efficient, 255. 
 arguments first used in favour of, 256. 
 construction of special classes ofi 256. 
 experience had in America with, 257, 
 271. 
 
328 
 
 Index. 
 
 RAMS, IRON-CLAD. 
 
 ' ROYAL OAK. 
 
 Rams, ii on-clad — 
 
 expeiience had at Lifsa with, 258, 273, 
 
 279. 
 handiness under steam absolutely essen- 
 tial in, 259. 
 modeiate dimensions and balanced rud- 
 ders give handiness to, 261. 
 ample attacldng force obt;iinable with 
 
 moderate dimensions, 262. 
 increased handiness results from adop- 
 tion of twin-screws, 264. 
 foims of bow for — advantages claimed 
 for— 
 
 the fore-reaching bow, 265. 
 
 the upright bow, 266. 
 
 the eperon or spur-bow, 266, 285. 
 
 comparison between the various 
 
 forms, 268. 
 supposed disadvantages of the spur- 
 bow, not proven, 273, 279. 
 loss of the ' Amazon' has no bearing 
 
 upon merits of spur-bow, 274. 
 wave caused by spur-bow, not a 
 serious drawback, 280. 
 modes of strengthening bows of, 281. 
 iron hulls preferable to wood for, 282. 
 our j'ecent ships are probably strong 
 
 enough to act as, 283. 
 provisions for safety against ramming 
 
 made in our ships, 287. 
 manceuvring and worlcing of, 287. 
 future employment of, uncertain at pre- 
 sent, 290. 
 ' Re d/ Italia,^ the Italian iron-clad, was 
 rammed and ^unlc at Lissa, 258, 286. 
 ' Renown,' the, our fiistest line-of-battle ship 
 
 tried, 94. 
 Reports, extracts from — 
 
 on trials of Channel .'Squadrons — 
 steaming, 12, 15. 
 sailing, 127. 
 
 rolling, 134, 135, 148, 149, 157. 
 turning, 179, 181. 
 Captain Is'oble's, on E.\'peiiments of Ord- 
 nance Select Committee, 36, 38, 65. 
 of Special Committee on Gibraltar Shield, 
 
 39. 
 of Ordnance Select Committee, 64. 
 of American Ordnance Committee, 67. 
 on behaviour and fighting qualities of 
 American monitors, 243, 246, 250. 
 'Repulse,' the — ■ 
 
 structural anangements of, 22. 
 armour of, 33. 
 
 outlay upon, up to January, 1868, 219. 
 ' Research,' the — ■ 
 
 first trial of guns in, 4. 
 armour of, 33. 
 speed trials of, 96. 
 sailing capabilities of, 129* 
 cost of, 218. 
 dimensions of, 246. 
 
 'Resistance,' the — 
 aimour of, 24, 32. 
 disposition of armour on, 45. 
 limited horizontal range of battery guns 
 
 of, 57. 
 speed trials of, 96, 98. 
 dimensions of, 164, 166. 
 cost of, 217. 
 Rifled guns — ■ 
 
 muzzle-loading, carried by our ships, 61. 
 breech-loading, cairied by Fiench shins, 
 
 63. 
 ' Rinaldo,' the, our fastest wood sloop jf 
 
 the old class, 95. 
 ' Roanoke,' the American iron-clad, armour 
 
 of, 38. 
 Robinson, Sir Spencer — 
 
 protection of rudder-head inti-oduced by, 
 
 6. 
 introduction of iron-clads of modeiale 
 
 propojtions mainly due to, 20. 
 his remarlcs on the six hours' trials of 
 
 the ' Wan-ior,' ' Minotaur,' and ' Bel- 
 
 lerophon,' 191, 193. 
 ' Rochamheau,' the French iron-clad (see 
 
 Dunderberg). 
 Rolling of iron-clads — 
 
 mistalves made lespecting the. 134, 
 
 not as heavy as that of wood ships, 134, 
 
 149, 153. 
 does not seriously affect their fighting 
 
 powers, 135, 151, 157, 161. 
 popular errors respecting — 
 
 that it is due to " top-heaviness," 137, 
 147. 
 
 that it is necessarily reduced by 
 lowering the free-board, 138. 
 
 that mere weight increases it, 140. 
 
 that form of bottom gi eatly influences 
 it, 141. 
 influence of wave " period," etc., upon, 
 
 141, 144, 154, 159, 160. 
 influence of construction and stowage 
 
 upon, 142, 146, 149, 157. 
 Admiralty instructions for observing and 
 
 recording, 143. 
 instruments used for measuring angles 
 
 of, 143. 
 connection between metacentric height 
 
 and, 145. 
 high position of centie of gravity tends 
 
 to reduce, 146. 
 records of, from reports of Channel 
 
 Squadrons, 148-161. 
 additional knowledge still required, 162. 
 ' Royal Alfred,' the — 
 
 structural arrangements of, 22, 
 armour of, 33. 
 speed trials of, 96. 
 cost of, 218. 
 ' Royal Oak',' the — 
 armour of, 33. 
 
'koyal oak.' 
 
 Index. 
 
 329 
 
 SPUR-BOWS. 
 
 ' Boyal Oak,' the — 
 
 speed trials of, 96. 
 
 sailing capabilities of, 128. 
 
 rolling of, 148, 155-161. 
 
 cost of, 218. 
 ' Moyal Sovereign,' the turret-ship — 
 
 armour of, 3.3. 
 
 cost of conversion, 219, 294. 
 
 exceptional number of turrets in, 226. 
 
 experiments made at Portsmouth on, 
 237. 
 
 fii'st ship on Captain Coles' system, 294. 
 
 weight of hull and weights carried, 297. 
 
 compared with ' Cerberus ' and ' Glat- 
 ton,' 303. 
 Bvdder-heads of iron-clads, should be pro- 
 tected, 8, 6, 48. 
 ' Rupert,' the iron-clad ram — 
 
 armour of, 7, 32. 
 
 dimensions of, 164. 
 
 characteristic features of, 257. 
 
 attacking force of, 263. 
 
 is a twin-screw ship, 264. 
 
 how strengthenings of, 284. 
 Russian iron-dads, variety in design of, 2, 
 
 226. 
 Ryder, Admiral, his remarks on — 
 
 sailing trials of Channel Sqnadron in 
 1868, 131. 
 
 importance of handiness in iron-clads, 
 175, 260. 
 
 iron-clad rams, 263, 289. 
 
 Sailing of iron-clads — 
 
 influenced by secondary causes, 17. 
 sail-power necessary in most of our 
 
 ships, 12.5. 
 reasons for giving them only moderate 
 
 sail-power, 126. 
 extracts from Reports on, 127. 
 on the whole satisfactory, 131. 
 influenced prejudicially by great lengths 
 of early ships, 132. 
 ' Salamis,' the despatch vessel, her race 
 
 with 'Helicon,' 123. 
 'Scorpion,' the turret-ship — 
 ai'mour of, 32, 
 speed trials of, 96. 
 cost of, 219. 
 Scott, Captain — 
 
 improveil methods of mounting broad- 
 side guns introduced by, 57, 224. 
 remarks of, on advantages obtained by 
 adopting heavy guns, 58. 
 Sea-trials of speed — 
 
 of Channel Squadrons, 12, 15. 
 
 not so reliable as measured-mile trials, 
 
 99, 114, 123. 
 but useful and necessary, 124. 
 Sedey's Mr., Committee, system of charges 
 on dockyard-built ships improved 
 by, 216. 
 
 Slieathing of iron-built iron-clads — 
 wood with copper outside, 79, 100. 
 zinc, 79, 100. 
 Short iron-clads — 
 
 preferable to extremely long, 166, 212. 
 advantages of, exemplified in ' IJelle- 
 
 rophon' and j-ecent ships, 167. 
 savings effected by adopting, 170, 206, 
 
 211, 222. 
 much handier than long, 175, 261. 
 principles exemplified in design of, 185, 
 
 188. 
 performances of, compared with those 
 
 of long, 168, 177, 190. 
 remarks on these comparative perform- 
 ances, 194-199. 
 cases considered in Royal Society Paper, 
 
 201, 203, 206. 
 ' Hercules ' compared with design based 
 upon ' Minotaur,' 208. 
 Skin-plating behind armour — 
 
 adopted in ' Lord Clyde ' and ' Lord 
 
 Warden,' 26. 
 special arrangements of, in ' Bellero- 
 
 phon,' and later ships, 26, 85. 
 table of thicknesses of, for our iron- 
 clads, 32. 
 increased resistance due to, 37. 
 Sloops, wood, speeds attained by on mea- 
 
 su]"ed-mile, 95. 
 Smart, Admiral, on the rolling of iron-clads, 
 
 134. 
 Smoofli-hore guns — 
 
 formerly in use in our navy, 56, 61. 
 still used by Americans, 65. 
 inferior to rifled guns, 65, 67. 
 ' Solferino,' the French iron-clad — 
 armour of, 33, 50. 
 speed of, 101. 
 steadiness of, 137, 148. 
 Spanish iron-clads, variety in designs of, 2. 
 Speeds attained by English iron-clads — 
 on measured-mile trials, 12, 16, 95, 98. 
 on sea-trials, 12, 15. 
 on six-hours' runs, 97, 190. 
 
 French iron-clads, 101. 
 
 American iron-clads, 103. 
 
 our wood ships of war, 
 
 93. 
 
 of ships, affected by secondary causes, 
 
 11, 99, 189. 
 
 , great expenditure of power 
 
 required to increase high, 101. 
 , connection of, with engine- 
 power, 194. 
 Spur-lows for iron-clad rams — 
 generally approved, 265. 
 advantages claimed for, 266, 285. 
 compared with fore-reaching and up- 
 right bows, 268. 
 no serious difiiculty experienced in 
 clearing, 273. 
 
330 
 
 Index. 
 
 SPUR-BOWS. 
 
 Spur-hows for iron-clad rams — 
 
 merits of, not influenced by loss of 
 sloop 'Amazon,' 274. 
 
 not likely to be twisted, 279. 
 
 wave caused by, no serious disadvan- 
 tage, 280. 
 Steadiness of iron-clods — 
 
 not less than that of wood ships, 134. 
 
 not prejudiced by high free-board, 137. 
 
 not ensured by low free-board, 138. 
 
 heaviest ships usaally steadiest, 140. 
 
 difficulties to be overcome in securing, 
 141. 
 
 connection between metacentric height 
 and, 145. 
 
 high position of centre of gravity usu- 
 ally gives, 146. 
 
 fairly secured in recent ships, 148. 
 
 comparative, of ships in Channel Squad- 
 rons, 156, 159. 
 Steaming of iron-dads — 
 
 importance of, 93. 
 
 results of trials of our ships, 12, 15, 95, 
 98, 190. 
 
 compared with that of wood ships, 96, 
 98. 
 
 of French ships, 101. 
 
 of American ships, 103. 
 
 connected with coal supply of ships, 
 103 (see Coal Supply). 
 Steam-power — 
 
 secondary causes aifect development of, 
 11, 19, 99, 189. 
 
 greatly increased expenditure of at 
 bigli speeds, 101. 
 
 developments of in old and new types 
 of engines, 104. 
 
 economy of, not the prime feature of 
 iron-clad designs, 184, 188. 
 
 connection between developed, and 
 speed, 194. 
 Steamship performance — 
 
 Admiralty constants of, tests of merit 
 in merchant ships, 185. 
 
 but not sole standards of merit for 
 iron-clads, 186, 196. 
 
 conditions necessary to fair use of con- 
 stants in comparing iron-clads, 188. 
 
 comparison between performances of 
 
 ' Minotaur,' ' Bellerophon,' and 
 
 ' Warrior,' 190. 
 
 Sterns of iron-clads, changes in forms of, 3. 
 
 Stevens' battery, the American, 2. 
 
 Stowage of iron-clads, influences their 
 
 rolling, 142. 
 Structure of iron-clads — 
 
 variety caused by changes in, 20. 
 
 reasons why some of our ships are 
 wood-built, 70. 
 
 iron hulls preferable to Avood, 71, 86 
 (see Hulls). 
 
 French still adopt wood hulls, 77. 
 
 Structure of iron-clads — 
 
 sheathing proposed for iron hulls, 78. 
 
 improvements made in iron hulls, 80,86. 
 
 advantages of bracket-frame system, 
 81, 91 (see Bracket-frame). 
 
 provisions recently made against tor- 
 pedo-attacks, 82. 
 
 connection between construction of hull 
 and rolling, 142. 
 
 considered in connection with use of 
 iron-clad rams, 281, 287. 
 ' Sultan,' the — ■ 
 
 armour of, 32. 
 
 weight of hull and weights carried, 
 87, 89. 
 ' Swiftsure' the — 
 
 armour of, 32. 
 
 bottom sheathing of, 79, 100. 
 
 probably an efficient cruiser, 132. 
 
 TabU of— 
 
 results of speed-trials of iron-clads, 13, 
 
 16. 
 thicknesses of armour and backing on 
 
 iron-clads, 32. 
 weights, etc., of guns and projectiles, 61. 
 weights of hull and weights carried by 
 
 some iron-clads, 87, 297. 
 times coal carried by certain ships 
 
 would last at certain speeds, 109. 
 dimensions and proportions of iron- 
 clads, 164. 
 comparison between — 
 
 ' Bellerophon ' and ' Black Prince,' 
 
 168. 
 ' Bellerophon' and 'Achilles,' 169. 
 'Lord Clyde' and 'Black Prince,' 172. 
 results of turning-trials of iron-clads, 
 
 177, 179, 181. 
 dimensions and weights of — 
 
 hypothetical long and short iron- 
 clads, 203, 207. 
 new designs based upon ' Minotaur ' 
 
 and ' Bellerophon,' 206. 
 ' Hercules ' and new design based 
 upon ' Minotaur,' 210. 
 cost of — 
 
 ' Achilles ' and ' Bellerophon,' as 
 
 charged, 215. 
 contract-built broadside ships, 217. 
 government-built broadside ships, 
 
 218. 
 unfinished broadside ships, and tur- 
 ret-ships, 219. 
 all iron-clads up to January, 1868, 
 
 220. 
 all iron-clads up to January, 1869, 
 221. 
 expenditure on navy from 1859 to 1869, 
 
 221. 
 dimensions of English and American 
 iron-clads, 246. 
 
Index. 
 
 'i'i^ 
 
 VAEIETY OF lEON-OLADS. 
 
 Targets — 
 
 comparative strength of Warrior' and 
 
 ' Minotaur,' 25. 
 description of ' Belleroplion' target, 27. 
 'Hercules' target virtually impene- 
 trable by 600-pounder gun, 30. 
 trial of small-plate target, 37. 
 trial of Mr. Hawkshaw's laminated, 38. 
 strengths of various targets, 65. 
 ' Taureau/ the French iron-clad ram — 
 armour of, 34. 
 speed of, 101. 
 
 fii'st European ship of her class, 257. 
 is wood-built, 282. 
 ' Tecvmeshj' the American monitor, loss of, 
 
 215. 
 ' Thunderer,' the breastwork-monitor — 
 armour of, 7, 31, 32. 
 armament of, 8, 59. 
 weight of hull and weights carried, 87, 
 
 90, 297. 
 large coal supply of, 126. 
 has no masts or sails, 126, 133. 
 dimensions of, 164. 
 diameter of turrets of, 240. 
 provisions made to render her efficient 
 at sea, 242. 
 Torpedoes — 
 
 probable employment of, in ocean war- 
 fare, 83. 
 provisions made in recent ships against 
 
 attack by, 83. 
 examples of effects produced by, 245. 
 Training of protected guns — 
 
 arcs of, should be large, 4, 68. 
 
 very limited in the earlier iron-clads, 
 
 4, 57, 68. 
 means of obtaining large arcs of, 49, 
 
 68, 225. 
 in turret-ships, 223, 225, 230. 
 Trials of iron-clads — 
 speed at sea, 12, 15. 
 speed on the measured-mile, 12, 16, 95, 
 
 98, 190. 
 speed on the six-hours' runs, 97, 190. 
 sailing, 17, 127. 
 rolling, 148-161. 
 turning, 177, 179, 181. 
 ' Triumph,' the — 
 armour of, 32. 
 
 bottom-sheathing of, 79, 100. 
 probable cruising qualities of, 132. 
 Turkish iron-clads, variety in designs of, 2. 
 Turning trials of iron-clads, 177, 179, 181. 
 Turrets — 
 
 construction of, in American monitors, 
 
 43. 
 best adapted for ships without masts 
 
 and sails, 227, 232. 
 ports of may be made smaller than 
 
 broadside ports, 225. 
 ports are vulnerable places in, 236, 258. 
 
 Turrets — 
 
 possibility of their becoming jammed, 
 
 237, 252, 254. 
 protection of bases of, 238. 
 Captain Coles' plan of working, 238, 
 
 254. 
 diameters of, for heavy guns, 240. 
 Turret-ships— 
 
 ' Captain ' type and breastwork moni- 
 tors compared, 54. 
 great horizontal range of guns in, 69, 
 
 223. 
 cost of our, 219, 221. 
 guns available on both sides of, 224. 
 errors made in advocating, 224. 
 small ports possible in, 225. 
 very large weight of armour per gun 
 
 in, 225. 
 independent training of each gun want- 
 ing in, 226. 
 usually have two turrets, 226. 
 rigged and sea-going — 
 
 difficult to design, 227. 
 
 devices for working sails of, 228. 
 
 most satisfactory type of, 229. 
 arcs of training of guns often seriously 
 
 limited in, 230. 
 importance of right ahead tire in, 231. 
 difficulties of raising and securing boats, 
 
 232. 
 simultaneous fire of, compared with 
 
 broadside ships, 233. 
 vulnerability of gun-ports in, 236, 253. 
 possibility of turrets becoming jammed 
 
 in action, 237, 252, 254. 
 small sea-going, with high speeds and 
 
 heavy guns, cannot be built, 240. 
 rapid adoption of, would not have been 
 
 advisable, 250. [See also Monitors.) 
 Twin-screws — 
 
 introduction of, caused variety in our 
 
 iron-clad fleet, 9. 
 especially valuable in iron-clad rams, 
 
 264. 
 
 ' Taliant,' the — 
 
 armour of, 24, 32. 
 
 disposition of armour on, 45. 
 
 speed trials of, 96. 
 
 dimensions of, 164, 166. 
 
 cost of, 217. 
 ' Vanguard' the, armour of, 32. 
 Vansittart, Captain, on handiness of iron- 
 clads, 176. 
 Variety of our iron-clads — 
 
 not so great as that of other navies, 1. 
 
 radical and minor changes must be dis- 
 tinguished, 4. 
 
 principal causes of, 7, 8, 19. 
 
 not the means of preventing them from 
 acting together, 10. 
 
332 
 
 Index. 
 
 VARIETY OF lEON-OLADS. 
 
 ZINC-SHEATHING. 
 
 Variety of our iron-dads — 
 
 not the cause of such different per- 
 formances as result from secondary 
 causes, 11, 17. 
 may be advantageous in time of war, 22. 
 ' Victoria' steaming qualities of the wood 
 
 three-decker, 94. 
 'Viper' and 'Vixen,' the iron-clad gun- 
 boats — 
 armour of, 32. 
 speed trials of, 96. 
 costs of, 217 
 
 ' WampaTioag ' class of American cruisers, 
 
 to have torpedo-booms, 83. 
 Warden, Admiral, his reports on — 
 sailing of iron-clads, 18, 129, 130. 
 rolling of iron-clads, 135, 149, 157. 
 handiness of iron-clads, 175, 259. 
 iron-clad rams, 259, 266. 
 ' Warrior,' the — 
 
 our first iron-clad ship, 2. 
 
 limited horizontal range of battery 
 
 guns in, 4, 57, 68. 
 principal changes made in iron-clads 
 
 built since, 6. 
 armour of, 6, 24, 32. 
 original armament of, 8, 57. 
 great size of, 8, 10, 165. 
 high speed of, 10, 15, 95, 97, 192. 
 not a very efficient ram, 19, 255. 
 target of, compared with 'Minotaur' 
 
 target, 25. 
 disposition of armour on, 45, 165. 
 resisting power of side, 58, 65. 
 structural arrangements of, 80, 85. 
 weights of engines, etc., compared with 
 
 those of ' Hercules,' 105. 
 times coal would last at 11 and 12J- 
 
 knot speeds, 109. 
 sailing capabilities of, 126, 127, 130. 
 rolling of, 141, 145, 148, 153-160. 
 dimensions and proportions of, 164. 
 unhandiness of, 174. 
 turning-trials of, 177, 179, 181. 
 performances under steam compared 
 with ' Bellerophon's ' and ' Mino- 
 taur's,' 192, 198. 
 cost of, 217. 
 ' Waterwitch,' the, iron-clad gunboat- 
 armour of, 32. 
 speed trials of, 96. 
 cost of, 217. 
 
 ' Weehawlcen,' the American monitor — 
 
 her fight with the ' Atalanta,' 66, 251. 
 
 report on behaviour of, 243. 
 
 loss of in Charleston harbour, 245. 
 Weights of — 
 
 our naval guns and projectiles, 61. 
 
 French naval guns, 63. 
 
 wood and iron hulls of iron-clads, 72, 
 87. 
 
 hull, savings recently effected in, 86. 
 
 armour, increase lately made in, 89, 91. 
 
 old and new types of engines in iron- 
 clads, 105. 
 
 coal carried by wood and iron-clad war 
 ships, 109. 
 
 hulls of converted and iron-built iron- 
 clads, 297. 
 ' Wivern,' the turret-ship — 
 
 armour of, 32. 
 
 speed trials of, 96. 
 
 not a good sea-boat, 128, 138. 
 
 cost of, 219. 
 Wood hulls for iron-clads (see Hulls). 
 Wood sheathing to iron-built iron-clads, 
 
 79, 100. 
 Wood ships of war — 
 
 armaments of, 24, 56. 
 
 gradual improvements made in, 93. 
 
 speeds attained by, 93, 98. 
 
 efficient under sail, 125. 
 
 not steadier than iron-clads, 134, 149, 
 153. 
 
 dimensions and proportions of, 164. 
 
 have constituted a valuable reserve 
 force, 302. 
 
 Yelverton, Admiral, his reports on — 
 
 sailing of iron-clads, 17, 128. 
 
 rolling of iron-clads, 149. 
 
 importance of handiness of iron-clads, 
 175. 
 
 recommendations as to height of free- 
 board in turret-ships, 249. 
 
 'Zealous,' the— 
 
 structural arrangements of, 22. 
 
 armour of, 33. 
 
 speed trials of, 96. 
 
 voyage of, to Vancouver's Island, 132. 
 
 cost of, 218. 
 
 conversion of, 293. 
 
 compared with ' Audacious,' 297. 
 Zinc sheathing for iron-built irnn-clads, 
 79, 100. 
 
 LONDON : PKISTED BY WILLIAM CLOTl'ES AND SONS, STAMTOKD STREET 
 AND CHARING CKOSS. 
 
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