\ KF KF 5305.155"*"' ""'""">' '"'"'' A freatise on the law of municipal corpo 3 1924 019 959 125 ((nrnpU Slam ^rJyool ICtbraty A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 1 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES. ,,.: BY \;y^, \ CHRISTOPHER G. TIED EMAN, Author of " Real Property," " Limitations of Police Powei-," etc. and Professor of Law in the University of the City of New York. New York and Albany: BANKS & BROTHERS, LAW PUBLISHERS. 18^4. Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year One Thousand Eight Hundred and Ninety-four, Bt CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, in the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. V PREFACE. « The writing of a preface to a work like the present is rather a perfunctory performance, where the author and the merits and peculiar features of his work are known. The reader and critic will find, by an exami- nation of these pages, that the present volume, like the other works of the author, is designed to present with- in the confines of one volume a succinct and clear state- ment of the law of Municipal Corporations, by an inclu- sion of everything material, and exclusiofi of everything immaterial, to the clear comprehension of the general principles and rules of law, bearing upon, or involved in, the subject. v The author desires to make a public acknowledg- ment of his indebtedness to Mr. H. C. Underbill, LL. B. of Brooklyn, N. Y., for his active and efficient assistance in the preparation of the manuscript for the press. C. G. T. University of tlie City of New Tork, January, 1894. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS. Section 31. Proof of corporate existence. 32. Power to repeal and amend city charter, effect of exercise of such power. 33. Special power when repealed by general laws. 34. Implied repeal of general laws by special laws. CHAPTER IV. Dissolution of Municipal Corporations. Section 37. How dissolved in England. 38. How dissolved in the United States. 39. Forfeiture of corporate existence. 40. Effect of dissolution of corporation. 41. Eights of creditors on a dissolution of a municipal corpora- tion. 42. The rights of creditors where a second corporation has been established in its place. 43. Effect of dissolution of corporation in general, where no other corporation has been substituted therefor. 44. Revival by a new charter. CHAPTER V. Corporate iN^anie, Seal and Boundaries. Section 47. Corporate name, how obtained. 48. Change of corporate name — Name acquired by reputation. 49. Effect of misnomer in general. 50. Use of corporate name in suits. 51. Requirement of a corporate seal. 52. Seal, how proved. 53. Boundaries, how defined. 54. Corporate boundaries by reference to streams and highways. 55. Enlargement of boundaries — Annexation of territory. 56. What territory may be annexed — Farm lands. 57. Effect of extension of city boundaries. 58. Effect of annexation of one town to another. 59. Effect of division of one town into two. 60. Legislative power to apportion property and debts in cases of annexation and division. 61. Procedure in cases of annexation — When annexation legal. 62. Exercise of power beyond city limits, only one corporation ' over same area. 63. Division of municipal territory into wards. CHAPTER VI. Municipal Elections and Officers. Section 65. Time and place of holding elections. 66. Qualifications of voters — Residence. 67. Who are municipal officers ? 68. Legislative control over officers. TABLE OF CONTENTS. VU Section 69. Qualification for municipal office — ^Women when eligible. 70. Civil service examinations. 71. Preference for veterans. 72. Official bonds. 73. Official oaths. 74. Disqualifications on account of prior official position. 75. Appointments to office. 76. Exercise of the appointing power. 77. Legality of appointment presumed. 78. Acceptance of office. 79. Compensation. 80. Assignment of salary. 81. Holding over after expiration of term of office. 82. Vacancies. 83. Removals when for cause. 84. Proceedings to remove for cause. 85. Illegal removals — Right to salary. 86. Resignations — Incompatible officers — Change of residence. 87. General povrers and duties of officers. 88. De facto officers. 89. Police officials — Power to arrest. 90. The mayor — Nature of his duties and powers. 91. Liability of the officer to the corporation. 92. Municijial liability for official acts. 93. Jurisdiction of courts over elections. CHAPTER VII. Mnnicipal Councils, Meetings, Records and Courts. Section 95. Notice of corporate meetings — New England town meet- ings — Ad j ournment. 96. Town councils — Pi'esiding officers. 97. Regular, special and adjourned meetings. 98. Methods of proceeding — Ayes and noes. 99. Quorum of the council — Joint bodies — Action of the ma- jority binding. 100. Municipal business must be transacted by the council as a body — Meetings. 101. Municipal courts at common law. 102. Municipal courts — Power to establish. 103. Competency of corporators as jurors, judges and witnesses. 104. Summary proceedings — Jury trials. 105. Review by Superior Court — Jury trials. 106. Custody of municipal records— Power to amend. 107. Municipal records as evidence — ^Admissions. 108. Admissibility of parol evidence to explain municipal records, CHAPTER VIII. Charter Powers, their Nature, Construction and Limitations. Section 110. Classification and construction of charter powers. viii TABLE OF CONTENTS. Section 111. Imperative and discretionary powers distinguished. 112. Discretionary powers. 113. Delegated powers cannot be delegated. 114. Usage in construing powers — Prescription. 115. The indemnity for officials acting in good faith. 116. The police power of municipal corporations— Its scope and limitations. 116 a. Territorial limits of police regulations. 117 The municipal power to legislate upon subjects covered by State statutes. 118. Sanitary regulations — Slaughter houses— Cemeteries— Un- wholesome provisions. 119. Sanitary regulations continued — Contagious diseases — Re- moval of refuse — Water supply. 120. The regulation and abatement of nuisances in general. 121. Regulation of harbor and navigable waters. 122. Eegulation of occupations and amusements. 123. Licenses, when a police regulation, and when a tax. 124. License power of municipal corporation construed. 125. Licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquors. 126. Supervision and care of paupers, vagrants, indigent, insane and sick persons. 127. Inspection of goods and other commodities. 128. Establisliment and regulation of public markets. 129. Impounding of animals — Ordinances respecting dogs. 130. Prevention of fires — ^Fire limits — Purchase of fire apjiaratus. 131. Regulation of buildings and their construction. 132. Eegulation of private wharves. 133. Public wharves. 134. Ferries and ferriage. 135. Regulations providing for the public welfai'e, peace and safety. 135 a. Regulations of railroads within city limits. 136. Power to appropriate funds for lobbying purposes. 137. Power to borrow money. 138. Payment of bounties. 139. Celebrations and entertainments.' 140. Rewards. 141. Erecting, furnishing and repairing public bviildings. 142. Compromises and arbitrations. 143. Power of municipality to sue and be sued. 144. Power to create private monopolies. 144 a. Power to create and operate municipal monopolies — Mur nicipal ownership of gas, electric light and waterworks . CHAPTER IX. Ordinances. Sectiow 145. Definition — Ordinances and resolutions distinguished. 146. Power to pass ordinances. TABLE OF CONTENTS. IX Section 147. Delegation of power of legislation — OfBcial non-liability. 148. Method of enactment — Mode, time and proof of publication — Mayor's approval. 149. Ordinances must be enacted in good faith. 150. Ordinances must be lawful and reasonable. 151. Ordinances must not be oppressive. 152. Ordinances must be impartial and general. 153. Those on whom ordinances are binding — Notice — Evidence. 154. Power to enforce ordinances by fines or imprisonment. 155. Forfeiture. 156. Procedure to enforce ordinances — Arrest. 157. Action in name of corporation. 158. Pleading ordinances. 159. Validity of ordinances, a question of law. 160. Evidence — Defence — Construction of ordinances. 161. Repealing ordinances. 162. Eatification of invalid ordinances by Legislature. CHAPTER X. Municipal Contracts. Sectioit. 163. Inherent or implied power to contract. 164. Implied contracts. 165. Mode of contracting, writing or seal when necessary — Stat- ute of Frauds. 166. Municipal contracts with its agents. 167. Form of contracts made by municipal agents. 168. Non-liability of public ofiBcial acting within his authority. 169. Authority of municipal officials to contract — Ultra vires. 170. Ratification, what constitutes. 171. Contracts for public works — Contractor's bond — ^Payment. 172. Advertising and letting to lowest bidder — Patented articles. 173. Bids — Sealed proposals — Taxpayer's remedy — ^Fraud in bid- ding. 174. Annulment of contracts — Corporate control of work. 175. Contracts for water supply. 176. Contracts with attorneys at law. CHAPTER XI. Municipal Securities. Section 177. Municipal warrants — Negotiability — Form and effect — Pre- sentment — Payment. 178. Warrants payable out of a particular fund. 179. Presentment of warrants — ^Indorsement — Actions by and against whom. 180. When actions may be brought — ^Defences — Statute of Limi- tations. 181. Municipal scrip — Illegal obligations as circulating medium. 182. Implied power to borrow money and to emit negotiable paper. X TABLE OF CONTENTS. Section 183. Power to issue negotiable securities. 184. Public purposes— Aid to railroad. 185. Construction, completion and location of road as affecting the validity of bonds issued in its aid. 186. Subscriptions for stock— Conditions precedent. 187. Legislative power to compel the issue of bonds for public purposes. 187 a. Curative statutes valididating irregular subscriptions and invalid securities. 188. Bonds issued in aid of private purposes — Constitutional pro- hibitions. 189. Consent of taxpayers or voters as a condition precedent to issue of municipal bonds. 189 a. Limitations upon municipal indebtedness. 190. The municipal coupon bond — Its nature and definition. 190 a. Execution of the municipal bond — By what officials must it be signed. 191. Negotiability of coupon bonds— Eights of holder of the same. 191 a. To whom payable— Transfer by indorsement or delivery. 191 6. Eegistration of municipal securities by State officials. 192. Presentment of coupons for payment. 192 a. The time of payment. 192 b. Interest and exchange on bond and coupon. 193. Actions on bonds and coupons. 193 a. "When consideration paid to corporation for invalid bond may be recovered. 194. Legislative control of remedies to enforce payment of mu- nicipal debts. 194 a. Remedies for enforcement of municipal indebtedness. 195. Defences to bonds — Conflict of decisions. 195 a. Burden of proof. 196. Doctrine of estoppel, as applicable to hona flde holders — ■ Effect of i-ecitals in the bonds. 197. Renewal and funding. 198. Disposal and sale of bonds. 199. Statute of Limitations. CHAPTER XIL Kight of Mnnicipal Corporations to own aud control Property. Section 200. Eight of municipal corporations to acquire property. 201. Real estate beyond corporate limits. 202. Donations of land to a municipal corporation. 203. Power of municipal corporations to serve as trustee of a charitable use. 204. Devises and grants for objects foreign to corporate purposes. 205. Gifts or grants to unincorporated communities. 206. Interference by State courts in performance of trusts by mu- nicipal corporations. TABLE OF CONTENTS. XI Section 207. Invalid grants to municipal corporations, how invalidated. 208. Povrer of alienation. 209. Povrer to mortgage. 210. Povrer to lease corporate property. 211. Requisites of conveyances by municipal corporations. 212. Sale of corporate property on execution — Liability for debts, CHAPTER XIII. Dedication of Property to Public Use. Section 214. General statement. 215. . General requisites of statutory dedications. 216. Extent of statutory dedication. 217. General requisites of common law dedication. 218. Wlio may dedicate. 219. Intention to dedicate, how established. 220. Presumption of intention from long user. 221. Platting and sale of lots as evidence of intention. 222. A dedication irrevocable, when accepted. 223. Effect of acceptance. 224. Extent of common law dedication, as respects donor's titla 223. Public right to alluvium and accretions. 226. Dedication to use as public square. 227. Dedication to other public uses. 228. Effect of misuser or abandonment of dedicated lands. 229. Alienation of dedicated lands. CHAPTER XIV. Eminent Domain. Section 230. Eminent domain defined. 231. Constitutional limitations. 232. Exercise of power regulated by Legislature. 233. Delegation of power to municipal corporations. 234. What is a public purpose. 234 a. Power to take lands for a private road. 235. Power to take land for ornamental purposes. 236. Power to take lands for purpose of draining them. 237. Power to take land beyond city limits. 238. What property may be taken. 239. What constitutes a taking. 240. Exercise of eminent domain by municipal corporations. 241. Conditions precedent to the exercise of the power. 242. Effect of discontinuance of proceedings. 243. Compensation required. 244. Who entitled to receive compensation. 245. Who assesses the damages. 246. The measure of value or damages. 247. When payment should be made. 248. Apportionment of damages among lots benefited. 249. Revisory proceeding — Certiorari. 250. Effect of accepting damages. Xll TABLE OF CONTENTS. CHAPTER XV. Municipal Taxation and Local Assessments. Section 253. Taxation defined and distinguished from eminent domain and police power. 254. Taxation authorized only for public purposes. 255. Municipal authority to levy taxes whence derived. 256. Municipal power to tax, when implied. 257. Legislature may change the taxing power of municipalities at will. 258. Federal limitations in the exercise of the power of taxation. 259. Constitutional provisions as to requirements of uniformity and equaUty. 259 a. Uniformity and equality in local assessments. 260. Road tax and compulsory labor on the same. 260 a. Poll tax, constitutional. 261. Power to tax professions, trades and callings. 262. Power to levy retrospective taxes. 263. Municipality cannot delegate its authority. 264. Power of taxation a continuing one. 265. Power of taxation cannot be varied or enlarged by city or- dinances. 266. Limitation of tax rate cannot be exceeded. 267. Construction and reconcilement of general laws with special charter provisions. 268. What can be taxed. 269. Discrimination between real and personal property, when permissible. 270. Exemption from taxes, when permitted. 271. Public property not taxable. 272. What property is within municipality for purposes of taxa- tion. 273. Taxation of banks, railways and other corporations. 274. Taxation of incorporeal heraditaments. 275. Choses in action when taxable. 276. Taxation of agricultural land. 277. Local assessments for sewers. 278. Notice to and assent of abutters to assessments. 279. Power of Legislature to dispense with notice. 280. Reassessments. 281. Adjoining owner's relation to contract— His liability. 282. Methods of collection. 283. Lien of taxes. 284. Statute of Limitations. CHAPTER XVL Streets, Bridges and Turnpikes. Section 286. Definition of street. 287. AUeys. 288. Conflict of jurisdiction over streets. TABLE OP COKTENTS. XIU Section 289. Delegation of legislative power over streets. 290. Construction of charter powers over streets. 291. Power to pave construed. 292. Power to improve, pave and grade continuous. 293. Eights of the municipality in soil of the streets, in general. 294. Eight of municipality in soil of the streets for construction of sewers and cisterns. 295. Pipes in streets, for gas and other purposes. 296. Power to grant an exclusive franchise to lay pipes and to use streets for other semi-private purposes. 297. Poles for the hanging of telegraph and other wires — Abut- ters' right to compensation. 298. Openings in and vaults under sidewalks. 299. Municipal regulation of street travel and traffic. 300. Street obstructions. 301. Legislative control of streets — Eights of abutting owners therein. 302. Legislative power over the construction of railroads. Its delegation to cities ; construction of grant. 303. Eights of abutting owners, how affected by construction of steam railroads along the street. 304. Abutting owners, how affected by surface street railways. 305. Elevated street railways in relation to abutting owners. 306. Municipal control over the construction and operation of rail- roads in streets. 306 a. Electric and cable cars on street railways. 307. Eemedies of abutters — Measure of damages. 308. Vacation of streets by Legislature — ^Delegation of power to municipal corporations. 309. Proceedings to vacate. 310. Burden and means of proving vacation and abandonment. 311. Compensation to abutters on vacation. 312. Statute of Limitations, as applicable to the public easement in street — ^Equitable estoppel. 313. Definition, character and construction of public bridges. 314. Legislative and municipal powers over bridges. 314 a. Kational control over construction and maintenance of bridges. 315. County liability for maintenance and repair of public bridges. 316. Eights and duties of municipal corporations in building, re^ building and maintaining bridges. 317. Private bridges on or intersecting highways. 318. Turnpikes. 319. Extent of municipal power over turnpike. 320. Incidents of toll. 321. Tlie law of the road. xiv TABLE OF CONTENTS. CHAPTER XVII. Liability of Municipal Corporations for Torts. Section 324. Implied liability of municipal corporations. 325. QMasi-municipal corporations not liable for breach of official duty. 326. Liability of municipal corporations for illegal taxes, fines and licenses. 326 a. Payment must be compulsory. 327. Municipal corporations not liable for nonperformance of dis- cretionary duties. 327 a. Failure to abate nuisances. 327 h. Liability for negligent supply of water. 828. Liability for manner in which discretionary powers are ex- ercised. 329. Consequential damages — Changes in the grade of streets — Improvements. 330. Constitutional and statutory provisions, guaranteeing com- pensation for property damaged — Eemedy. 331. Municipal corporations not liable for failure to enforce ordi- nances. 331 a. Liability for mistake as to corporate powers. 332. Municipality not liable for neglect or misconduct of health officers. 333. Municipality not liable for torts of police officials. 333 o. Liability for torts of firemen. 334. Liability for property destroyed by mobs and rioters. 335. Destruction of buildings to prevent a conflagration. 335 a. Destruction of property under military and sanitary regu- lations. 336. Receipt of consideration, as a ground of liability for negli- gence. 336 «. Liability as an owner of property. 337. How may negligence be proven. 338. Negligence of municipal servants — ^What must be proven — Torts ultra vires. 338 a. Who is a municipal officeT or agent. 339. Liability for the condition of highways and streets — Munic- ipal and g«asi-municipal corporations distinguished. 340. Statutory liability for neglect in maintenance and repair of highways — Construction. 341. QMasi-municipal corporation, when liable for specific duties. 342. Municipal liability for injury from defective streets — Horses taking fright. 343. Bailings or barriers, signs and lights, to guard excavations, areas, and basements. 344. Accidents caused by ice and snow. 344 a. Negligence in lighting streets. 345. Falling of weighty things in highways. TABLE OF CONTENTS. XV Section 346. Right to go outside the traveled path — Estoppel to deny ex- istence of highway — Sidewalks. 347. Liability for work given out on contract — Liability for torts of contractors. 348. Liability for torts of abutters — Liability of abutters for the same. 349. Liability for neglect in performance of ministerial duties. 350. Defects and obstructions created by municipal corporations. 350 a. Necessity for, and evidence admissible, to show notice, in order to charge corporation with negligence. 351. Proximate cause. 352. Contributory negligence. 352 a. Damages in suits for negligence. 353. Bridges. 354. Water courses. 354 a. Surface water. .355. Drains and sewers. CHAPTEE XVIII. Mandamns and Quo Warranto. Section 359. Nature of mandamus and wherein it differs from injunction. 360. Mandamus against municipal corporations. 361. Mandamus and quo warranto distinguished. 362. Distinction between discretionary and mandatory powers, as limiting the right to mandamus. 363. Who may apply for the writ. 364. Prior judgment, when not necessary. 365. Practice — Effect of laches. 366. Framing the writ and order to show cause. 367. Importance of a correct direction and proper service of the alternative writ. 368. Beturn to the alternative writ. 369. Peremptory wi'it, when allowed — Means of enforcing obedi- ence. 370. Final judgment — Effect of resignation or death of officials. 371. Mandamus, as applicable to municipal elections and to elec- tive officers. 372. Mandamus, as applicable to removal and suspension of offi- cials. 373. Mandamus, as applicable to custodians of public records and of public funds. 374. Mandamus against school officers. 875. Mandamus in aid of the rights of municipal creditors. 376. Mandamus to compel levy of a special tax for specific object 377. Mandamus, as applicable to municipal improvements. 378. Nature of quo warranto. 379. By whom proceedings are instituted. 380. Practice and procedure — Power discretionary. Xvi TABLE OF CONTENTS. Section 381. How far remedy by quo warranto is superseded by special statutory proceedings for the control of contested elections . 382. User on part of usurper necessary. 383. The burden of proof. 384. Quo warranto proceedings to secure the forfeiture of a mu- nicipal charter. 385. Quo warranto to test the legal existence of municipal cor- porations. 386. Effect of judgment in quo warranto. 387. Effect of judgment, when not rendered during official term. CHAPTER XIX. Bemedies against Mnnicipal Corporations in General. Section 391. Equitable remedies. 392. Necessity for equitable remedies — Code of Procedure — Pre- liminary injuction. 393. Equitable jurisdiction over municipal officials. 394. Municipal corporations as trustees. 395. Taxpayers' suits in equity. 396. Injunction to restrain damages to private property — ^Multi- plicity of suits. 397. Injunction to restrain the collection of taxes. 398. Scope of certiorari. 399. What may be examined under writ of certiorari. 400. Indictment. 401. Writ of prohibition. TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Aaron v. Broiles, (64 Tex. 316) 327, 328 Abbett V. Johnson Co., (114 Ind. 61) 353 Abbott V. Hermon, (7 Me. 118) 170 Abbott V. Mills, (3 Vt. 521) 219 Abbott V. K. C, etc., E. R. Co., (83 Mo. 271) 354 a Abbott V. Cottage City, (143 Mass. 521) 217 Abby V. Billups, (35 Miss. 618) 51 Abel V. Pembroke, (61 N". H. 357) 140 Aberdeen v. Blackmar, (6 Hill, 324) 348 Aberdeen v. Sykes, (59 Miss. 236) 196 Aberdeen v. Sanderson, (8 Sm. & M. 670) 13 Abernethy v. Van Buren, (52 Mich. 353) 353 Abilene v. Hendricks, (36 Kan. 6) 350 & Abraham v. Gt. Northern, etc., (16 Q. B. 386) 314 Academy v. Aberdeen, (21 Miss. 645) 13 Acker v. Anderson, (20 S. C. 495) 353 Ackley School Dist. v. Hall, (113 U. S. 135) 28, 183 Adam v. Wright, (84 Pa. 720) 33 Adams ». Bay City, (44 N. W. E. 138) 294 Adams v. Emerson, (6 Pick. 58) 293 Adams v. Farnsworth, (15 Gray, 423) 164 Adams v. Lancashire & Y. R'y Co., (L. E. 4 C. P. 739) 352 Adams v. Lindell, (5 Mo. Ap. 197) 28 Adams v. Mack, (3 N. H. 493) 107 Adams v. Mayor, (29 Ga. 56) 125, 150 Adams v. Memphis & L. R. R. E. Co., (2 Coldw., Tenn. 645) 209 Adams v. Newfane, (8 Vt. 271) 249 Adams v. Natick, (13 Allen, 429) 343 Adams v. Ohio Falls Car Co., (31 N. E. E., Ind. 92, 57) 226 Adams v. E. R., (2 Coldw. 645) 182 Adams c. Rome, (50 Ga. 765) 209 ii Adams v. Somerville, (2 Head, Tenn. 363) 267 Adams v. Walker, (34 Conn. 466) 354 a Adams v. Whittlesey, (3 Conn. 560) 169 Addis V. Pittsb., (85 Pa. St. 379) 172, 281 Addy V. Janesville, 70 Wis. 401) 355 Adger ». Mayor, (2 Spear, 719) 300 Adler v. Whitbeck, (9 N. E. Rep., Ohio, 672) 123 Adler ». Metro. E. R. Co, (33 N. E. R., 935; 138 N.T. 173)301 Ad ley v. Reeves, (2 M. & S. 61) 154, 155, 156 ' Adolph V. Central etc. Co., (65 N. Y. 554) 302, 321 Advertiser etc. v. Detroit, (43 Mich. 116) 87 ^tna L. I. Co. v. Nexson, (84 Ind. .347) 352 a JEtna Mills v. Waltham, (126 Mass. 122) 338. ^tna L. I. Co. v. Middleport, (124 U. S. 534) 195 c African Society v. Varick, (13 Johns. 38) 47, 49 Agaw^am N. Bk. v. South Hadley, (128 Mass. 503) 195 d Agnew V. Brail, (124 111. 312) 142, 163 Agnew V. Coruima, (55 Mich. 428) 351 Ah Fov, Ex parte, (57 Cal. 92) 123 Ahrens v. Fiedler, (43 N. J. L. 400) 363 Aiken Ave., In re, (11 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 228) 228, 278 Aiken v. Railroad Co., (20 N. Y. 370) 134 Aiken T. C. v. Lythgoe, (7 Rich. Law, 4.35) 219 Airy Street, Re, (113 Pa. St. 281) 28 Akron o. Chamberlain Co., (34 O. State, 328) 292 Alam V. Boyd, (87 Pa. St. 477) 167 Ala. M. R. Co. V. Newton, (Ala. 92, 10 So. R. 89) 245 Alabama S. R. Co. v. Railroad, (87 Ala. 154) 314. xvii xvm TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Alabama State Bar Assn., Ex parte, (Ala. 91, 18 So. E. 768) 363 Albany v. Cunliff, (2 ST. Y. 165) 169, 338 Albany North R. R. v. Brownell, (24 N. T. 345) 301 Albany City Nat. Bk. v. Albany, (92 N. T. 363) 70 Albany Street, In re, (11 Wend. 149) 259 a Albany etc. Co. v. Brownell, (24 N. Y. 345) 391 Albertine v. Huntsville, (60 Ala. 486) 3506 Albian v. Hedrick, (90 Ind. 545) 352 Albnow V. Sibley, (30 Minn. 186) 339 Albright v. Council, (9 Rich., S. C. 399) 163 - * Albrittin v. Huntsville,(60 Ala. 486) 32 Albuquerque v. Beres, (13 S. Ct. 143; 147 U. S. 87) 397 Alcorn v. Philadelphia, (112 Pa. St. 494) 264, 338 a Alcorn v. Horner, (38 Miss. 652) 259 a Alden v. Minneapolis, (24 Minn. 254) 354 a, 329 Alderman v. Finley, (5 Eng., 10 Ark. 423) (1850) 30, 31 Aldrich v. Gorham, (77 Me. 287) 342, 351 Aldrich v. Howard, (7 R. I. 87) 120 Aldrich v. Tripp, (11 R. I. 141; 23 Am. Rep. 434) 92, 336 Aldridge v. Railroad Company, (2 Stew. & Port. 199; 23 Am. Dec. 307) 232 Alexander v. Alexandria, (5 Cranch, 2)33 Alexander v. Baltimore, (5 Gill, Md. 383, 39.3) 255 Alexander v. Bennett, (60 N. Y. 204) 104 Alexander ». Helber, (35 Mo. 334) 282 Alexander v. Kerr, (2 Rawle, 83) 120 Alexander v. Milw., (16 Wis. 247) 292, 329 Alexander v. McDowell, (67 N. C. 330) 365 Alexander v. Railroad Co., (3 Strob. S. C. Law, 594) 133 Alexander v. State, (16 Ala. 661) 400 Alexander v. Tolleston Club of Chi- cago, (110 111. 65) 207 Alexander ». Vicksburg, (68 Miss. 564) 92 . Alger V. Easton, (119 Mass. 77) 92 Alger ». Lowell, (3 Allen, 402) 343, 352 Allen V. Boston, (Mass. 93, 34 N. E. R. 519) 299 Allen V. Burlington, (45 Vt. 202) 326 o Allen V. Chippewa Falls, (52 Wis. 530) 353, 354 a Allen 1). Dallas, etc., Co., (3 Woods, 316) 195 c Allen V. Decatur, (24 111. 332) 338 Allen V. Galveston, (51 Tex. 302) 165, 259 a, 290. Allen V. Hancock, (16 Vt. 230) 352 Allen V. Jay, (60 Me. 124, 11 Am. Rep. 185) 254 Allen V. Jersey City, (N. J. 91, 22 Atl. R. 257) Allen V. Jones, (47 Ind. 442) 240 Allen V. McKean, (1 Sumn. 276) 2. 85 Allen ». Louisiana, (103 U. S. 580) 189, 195 d Allen V. Sea, etc., Assn., (9 C. B. 574) 177 Allen V. Vincennes, (25 Ind. 531) 310 Allen V. Willard, (57 Pa. St. 374) 347, 352 Allen Co. v. Clinton, (Ind. 93, 32 ST. E. R. 735) 325 Allegheny v. Campbell, (107 Pa. St. 530) 132, 336 a Allegheny v. Ohio & Pa. R. R. Co., (26 Pa. St. 355) 289 Allegheny City ». McClurkin, (14 Pa. St. 81) 169 AUe. Co. V. Van Campen, (3 Wend. 49)<72 Allegheny Co. v. Broadwaters, (69 Md. 533) 352 AUentown Bor. v. Saeger, (20 Pa. St. 421) 326 a AUentown Sch. Dis. v. Derr, (115 Pa. St. 439) 192 6 Allentown v. Grim, (109 Pa. St. 113^ 148 Allentown v. W. U. Tel. Co., (23 Pa. St. 1070) 123 Alletson v. Chichester, (L. R. C. P. 319) 351 AUine v. LaMars, (71 Iowa, 654) 344, 352 Allisons. R. W. Co., (9 Bush, 247) 395 All Saints Church v. Lovett, (1 Hall, N. Y. 191) 48 Almy V. Churcli, (26 Atl. R. 58, R. I. 93) 312 Althen v. Kelley, (32 Minn. 280) 293 AHgelt V. San Antonio, (81 Tex. 436) 169 Alton u. Hope, (68 111. 167) 354a Alton V. 111. Transp. Co., (12 HI. 60) 229, 312 Alton V. Kirsch, (68 HI. 261) 156 Alton V. MuUedy, (21 HI. 76) 113, 164 TABLE OF CASES CITED. XIX References are to Sections. Alpero V. San Francisco, (32 Fed. Rep. 503) 392 Alvord». Syracuse Sav. Bk., (9 K. Y. 599) 196 Amboy v. Sleeper, (31 111. 499) 117 Ambrose v. Buffalo, (20 N. Y. S. 129; 29 Abb. N. C. 140) 396 Amer. B. N. Co. v. N. Y. E. R. R., (13 N. Y. S. 626) 248 American Bk. Note v. Railway Co., (59 N. Y. Super. Ct. 175) 3H6 American Ins. Co. v. Oakley, (9 Paige N. Y., 496) 51, 164 Amer. F. Go. v. Board, (43 Fed. R. 609) 259 Am. L. I. Co. V. Bruce, (105 U. S. 328) 196 Am. Nic. Pav. Co. v. Elizabeth City, (4 Fisher Pat. Cases, 189, 197) 338 Amer. Trint Wks. v. Lawrence, (23 N. J. L. 595) 335 Amer. R. F. Co. v. Haven, (101 Mass. 398) 373 Am. Union Exp. Co. v. St. Joseph, (66 Mo. 675) 261 Amery v. City, (72 Iowa, 401) 279 Araey v. Allegheny City, (24 How. 364) 148 Amey v. Allegheny City, (24 How. 364) 254 Ames ». Dorset, (23 Atl. R. 857) 354 Ames V. Duryea, (6 Lans. 155) 66 Ames V. Kansas. (11 U. S. 449) 380 Ames V. P. H. L. Co., (11 Mich.) 139 Ames B. Lake Superior & Miss. R. R. Co., (21 Minn. 241) 245 Amite City v. Clements, (24 La. An. 27) 2, 8 Amoskeag Co. v. Goodale, (62 N. H. BH) TA2 Amperse v. Kal. Counc, (59 Mich. 78) 362 Amperse ». Kalamazoo, (75 Mich. 228, 42 N. W. R. 821) 327 Amy V. Des Moines, (11 Wall. 136) 349 .Vmv V. Galena, (7 Fed. Rep. 163) 14 Amy V. Watertown, (130 U. S. 302) 86 Amyx V. Taber, (23 Cal. 370) 129- Anderson v. Anderson, (42 Vt. 350) 66 Anderson v. Bain, (22 N. E. R. 323) 330 Anderson v. Boone Co., (61 Mich. 489) 354 Andersons. Comrs., (12 Ohio St. 365) 108 Anderson v. Donnell, (7 S. E. R. 523) 30, 158 Anderson v. East, (117 Ind. 126, 129) 327, 345 Anderson v. Kerns Draining Co., (14 Ind. 199) 234 Anderson v. Mayfield, (Ky. 92, 19 S. W. R. 598) 12, 255, 270 Anderson v. O'Connor, (98 Ind. 168) 145 Anderson v. O'Donnell, (7 S. E. R. 524) 104 Anderson v. Pemberton, (89 Mo. 61) 241, 232 Anderson v. Santa Anna, (116 U. S. 364) 17, 195 Anderson v. St. Louis, (47 Mo. 484) 241, 249. Anderson v. State, (23 Miss. 459) 270 Anderson Co. v. Beal, (113 lb. 227) 216 Anderson Co. v. Houston etc. Co., (52 Tex. 228) 216 Andover b. Gould, (6 Mass. 40) 330 Andrews ». Dyer, (81 Me. 104) 49 Andrews v. Estes, (11 Me. 267) 167 Andrews v. Ins. Co., (37 Me. 256) 146 Andrews b. King, (77 Me. 224) 84 Andrews v. Portland, (79 Me. 484) 79, 85 Andrews v. Pratt, (44 Cal. 309) 79, 208 Annapolis v. Harwood, (32 Md. 471) 282 Annapolis v. State, (30 Md. 212) 28 Anne Arundel Co. o. Duckett, (20 Md. 467) 327 a, 349 Anthony Street, In re, (20 Wend. N. Y. 618) 242 Anthony b. Adams, (1 Met. 284) 4, 92, 338 Antones v. Eslava's Heirs, (9 Port. Ala. 527) 217 Antoni ». Greenhow, (107 U. S. 766) 283 Apple V. Crawford Co., (105 Pa. St. 300) 79 Appleby v. K. York, (41 N. Y. 481) 362 Appleby v. Mayor, (15 How., N. Y. Pr. 428) 172 Ansley v. Wilson, (50 Ga. 418) 282 Arbegust v. Louisville, (2 Bush, Ky. 271) 56 Archer b. Stelinas, (93 Cal. 43) 215 Areata v. Jfrcata R. R. Co., (92 Cal. 639) 302, 303 Arents v. Commonwealth, (18 Gratt. 776) 190, 192 Argente v. San Francisco, (16 Cal. 255) 282 Argus Co. V. Mayor etc., (55 N. Y. 495) 165 Arimond v. Green Bay Co., (31 Wis. 316) 238, 355 TABLE OP CASES CITED. Beterences are to Sections. Arkadelphia v. Windham,. (49 Ark. 139) 339 Arkadelphia L. Co. v. Arkadelphia, (19 S. W. Kep. 1053) 134, 261 Arkansas E. P. Co. v. Sarrells, (Ark. 88, 8 S. W. R. 683) 217, 229 Arlington v. Barnet, (15 Vt. 745) 288 Armfield v. Salen, (19 N. T. S. 44) 51 Ai-ms V. Knoxville, (32 Dl. Ap. 604) 328 Armstrong v. Ackley, (71 Iowa, 76) 350 ft Armington v. Barnet, (15 Vt. 745) 233 Armstrong v. St. Louis, (69 Mo. 309) 249 Armstrong v. Brunswick, (79 Mo. 319) 325, 327 a Armstrong v. Toler, (11 Wheat. 258) 352 Armstrong Co. v. Clarion Co., (66 Pa. St. 318) 164 Armsworth v. S. E. Ky. Co., (11 Jur. 758) 352 a Am V. Kansas City, (15 Fed. Hep. 336) 355 Arnold v. Cambridge, (106 Mass. 352) 397 Arnold v. Cov. & Cine. Br. Co., (1 Duvall, Ky. 372) 245 Arnold v. Decatur, (29 Midi. 11) 232 Arnold v. Hawkins, (95 Mo. 569, 8 S. W. E. 718) 266 Arnold v. Heniy Co., (81 Ga. 730) 315, 353 Arnold v. Shields, (n Dana, Ky. 18) 250, 401 Amot V. McClure, (4 Denio, N. Y. 45) 250 Amoult V. New Orleans, (11 La. An. 54) 28, 55 Arouheimer v. Stokley, (11 Phila. 283) 130 Aroma v. Auditor, (15 Fed. Kep. 843) 190 a Arapahoe v. Albie, (38 N. W. R. 737) 31 Arapahoe Co. v. Crotty, (9 Colo. 138) 362 Airowsmith v. New Orleans, (24 La. An. 194) 217 Arundel v. McCulloch, (10 Mass. 70) 314 Askew V. Hale Co., (54 Ala. 639) 3, 339 353 Ash V. People, (11 Mich. 347) 124, 128 AshbeiTy v. W. Senaca, (58 Hun, 602) 335 Ashbrook v. Com., (1 Bush, 139) 118 Asher v. Texas, (128 U. S. 129) 258 Asheville Com'rs v. Means, (7 Ired. L., N. C. 406) 256 Ashley's Case, (4 Abb. Pr. Rep. 35) 96 Ashley v. CaUiope, (71 Iowa, 466) 62 Ashley v. Port Hm-on, (35 Mich. 296) 355 Ashley v. Reynolds, (2 Strahan, 916) 326 a Ashton ». Rochester, (14 N. Y. S. 855) 162 Ashton V. Rochester, (10 N. E. R. 965, 133 N. Y. 187) 278 Aspinwall o. Daviss, (22 How. 364) 12, 14 Assessors, etc., v. Commissioners, (3 Brews. Pa. 333) 348 Assessor v. State, (21 N. J. L. 557) 273 Astor V. N. Y. Arcade Ry. Co., (113 N. Y. 93) 28, 302 Asylum ». New York, (12 N. E. R. 279, 104 N. Y. 381) 268 Atchison «. Bartholon, (4 Kan. 124)27 Atchison v. Butcher, (3 Kan. 104) 17 Atchison v. Challis, (9 Kan. 603) 328 Atchison v. Jansen, (21 Kan. 560) 339 Atchison v. King, (9 Kan. 550) 148, 351, 352 a Atchison v. Lucas, (83 Ky. 451) 69 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Maquilkin, (12 Kan. 301) 17, 53, 55, 61 Atchison, etc., Co. v. Miss. R. R. Co., (31 Kan. 660) 302 Atchison, etc., Co. v. Nare, (17 Pac. R. 587) 396 Athern v. District, (33 Iowa, 105) 108 Atliens V. Hemerick, (Ga. 93, 16 S. E. E. 72) 165 Atkins V. Phillips, (Fla. 91, 8 So. R. 429) 99, 123 Atkins V. Randolph, (31 Vt. 336) 14, 15, 18 Atkinson v. Mott, (102 Ind. 431) 129 Atkinson, etc., Co. v. Phillips Co., (25 Kan. 261) 185 Atlantic An. E. R. Co., In re, (32 N. E. R. 771, 136 N. Y. 292) 302 Atlanta v. Gate R. Co., (Ga. 88, 4 S. E. R. 209) .306 Atlanta v. Gate City, etc., (71 Ga. 106) 301 Atlanta v. Green, (67 Ga. 386) 330 Atlanta v. Perdue, (53 Ga. 607) 346 Atlanta v. Wilson, (60 Ga. 473) 343, 352 Atl. & Pac. R. E. Co. v. Cleino, (2 Dillon, 175) 270 Atlantic City Waterworks v. Atlan- tic City, (39 X. J. Eq. 367) 144, 163, 296. TABLE OF CASES CITED. XXI References are to Sections. Ail. etc. Tel. Co. v. Chicago etc. R. E. Co., (7 Blss. 158) 297 Attala Co. B'rd v. Grant, (17 Miss. 77) 369 Attaway v. Cartersville, (58 Ga. 740) 333 Attorney General v. Aspinwall, (2 My. & C. 613) 393 Attorney General v. Barstow, (4 Wis 749) 67, 371 Attorney General v. Boston, (142 Mass. 300) 290 Attorney General v. Boston, (123 Mass. 469) 359, 363, 3(55, 384, 392 Attorney General v. Brown, (24 N. J.. Eq. 89) 120 Attorney General v. Bowman, (2 B. & P. 532) 104 Attorney General v. Bradley, (36 Mich. "447) 28 Attorney General v. Bridge Co. (20 6i-ant, U. C. 34) 353 Attorney General v. Cohoes, (6 Paige, 133) 396 Attorney General v. Corporation of Worcester, (2 Phillips, 3) 48 Attorney General ». Corporation of Leicester, (9 Beav. Eng. 546) 48 Attorney General v. Corporation of Poole, (4 M. & Cr. 17) 105' Attorney General v. Detroit, (29 Mich. 108) 18 Attorney General v. Detroit, (26 Mich. 263) 165, 394 Attorney General v. Detroit, (55 Mich. 181; 5 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 497) 165 Attorney General v. Ean Claire, (37 AVis. 400) 254, 396. Attorney General v. Ely, (4 Wis. 420) 65 Attorney General v. Foote, (11 Wis. 14) 383 Attorney General v. Gas Co., (19 Bag. L. & Eq. 639) 120 Atty. Gen. i'. Goodrich, (5 Grant, Can. 402) 308 Attorney Gen. v. Hackney Local Bd. (L. K, 20 Eq. 626) 355 Atty. Gen. v. Hatch, (60 Mich. 229) 8 Atty. General v. Heelis, (2 Sim. & Stu. 67) 393 Atty. Genl. v. Hud. Riv. R. R., (9 J^. J. Eq. 526) 314 Atty. Gen. ». Johnson, (2 Wils. Ch.) 391 Atty. Gen. v. Kerr, (2 Beav. 420) 49 Atty. Gen. v. Lawrence, (11 Mass. 90) 371 A-ttorney General v. Leeds, (L. R. 5 Ch. App. 5^3) 35.5 Attorney Genl. v. Litchfield, (13 Simons, 547) 393 Atty. Gen. v. Lock, ( 3 Atk. 164) 110 Atty. Gen. v. Lombard, etc., (1 W. N. C, Pa. 491) 300 Attorney General ». Mid. Kent etc., (L. R. 3 Ch. 100) 353 Atty. Gen. v. Mayor of Rye, (7 Taunt., Eng. 546) 49, 50 Atty. Gen. v. Mayor of Norwich, (2 M. & C. 406) 115 Atty. Gen, v. Mayor, (3 Duer, 119) 113 Atty. Gen. v. Mayor, (128 Mass. 312) 371 Atty. Gen. v. Metro. R. R. Co., (125 Mass. 515) 304 Atty. Gen. v. Morris etc. Co., (20 X. J. Eq. 530) 302 Atty. General v. Myers, (58 Hun, 218) 360 Attorney General v. Norwich, (13 Simons, 225) 393 Atty. General v. Parker, (3 Atk. 576) 67 Attorney Genl. ■». Poole, (4 Mylne & C. 613) 393 Atty. Gen. ». Preston, 56 lb. 177) 87 Attorney Gen. v. Salem, (103 Mass. 138) 384 Atty. Gen. v. Tarr, (148 Mass. 309) 223 Atty. Gen. v. Toronto, (14 Grant's Ch., Can. 073) 302 Atty. Gen. v. Trombly, (50 N. W. R. 744; 89 Mich. 50) 18 Atty. Gen. v. Siddon, (1 C. & J. 220) 104 Attoi-ney General ». Shewsbury, (6 Beav. 220) 37 Atty. Genl. v. Walworth L. & P. Co., (Mass. 90, 31 N. E. R. 482) 396 Attorney Gen. v. Winnebago L. . Spring Lake, (61 Wis. 227) 351 Bailey v. Wobui-n, (126 Mass. 416) 234, 338 Bailey v. Culver, (12 Mo. App. 175) 287 Bailey v. Fairfield, (Brayt., Yt. 126) 352 a Bailyville v. Lowell, (20 Mass. 178) 142 Bain v. Mitchell, (82 Ala. 304) 90, 102 Baird b. Bank of Wash., (11 Serg. & R. 411) 207 Baird v. Rice, (63 Pa. St. 489) 226, 301, 308 Bagely r. People, (43 Mich. 355) 287 Bagg B. Detroit, (5 Mich. 336, 346) 395 Baker r. Big Rapids, (31 X. W. R. 810) 326 a Baker v. Boston, (12 Pick. 184) 120, 299, 338 Baker b. Chambles, (4 G. Greene, Iowa 428) 167 Baker v. Cincinnati, (11 Ohio St. 534) 259 a, 261, 326 a TABLE OF CASES CITED. XXlll. References are to Sections. Baker v. Cushman, (127 Mass. 103) 98 Baker ». Gartside, (86 Pa. St. 498) 281 Baker v. Johnson, (41 Me. 15) 3.59, 360 Baker c. Jobnston, (21 Mich. 319) 165, 217, 221, 226 Baker v. Pittsburgh, (4 Pa. St. 49) 79 Baker v. Portland, (58 Me. 199) 352 Baker v. Pt. Huron Police Coins., (62 Mich. 327) 75 ' Baker v. Seattle, (2 Wash. St. 576) 16, 178, 187 a, 189 Baker v. State, (80 Wis. 416) 18 Baker ». State, (27 Ind. 485) 327 a Baker v. St. Louis, (75 Mo. 671) 224 Baker v. Steamboat Milwaukee (14 Iowa, 214) 102 Baker v. Tehr, (97 Pa. St. 70) 321 Baker v. Vanderberg, (Mo. 89, 12 S. W. R. 462) 220 Baker v. Windham, (13 Me. 74) 115 Balch V. Essex Co. Com'rs, (103 Mass. 106) 235, 241 Baldwin v. Bangor, (36 Me. 518) 249 Baldwin v. Foss, (71 Iowa, 389) 327 Baldwin v. Hastings, (83 Mich. 639) 276 Baldwin Co. v. Liquor Dealers, (42 Ga. 325) 125 Baldwin v. Montgomery Council, (53 Ala. 437) 268 Baldwins. Newark, (38 N. J. 158) 194 Baldwin r. Phila., (99 Pa. St. 164) 79 Baldwin v. Shine, (Ky. 87, 2 S. W. R. 164) 262, 397 Baldwin v. Turnpike, (40 Conn. 238) 351 Baleman v. City of Covington, (1 S. W. 361) 133 Balfe V. Bell, (40 Ind. 337) 270 Balfe V. Lamraers, (109 Ind. 347) 282, 397 Ball V. Armstrong, (10 Ind. 181) 348 Ball V. Winchester, (32 N. H. 435) 325 Ball B. Woodbine, (61 Iowa, 83.) 92, 327 a, 331 Ballard v. Davis, (31 Miss. 525) 99 Ballard v. Harrison, (4 M. & W. 392) 346 Ballard Pews Co. v. Mandel, (2 Mac- Arthur, D. C. 351) 87 Baltimore v. Black, (56 Md. 333) 242 Baltimore v. Board of Police, (15 Md. 376) 8, 89 Baltimore v. Branmam, (14 Md. 227) 346 Baltimore v. Chase, (2 Gill & J., Md. 376) 282 Baltimore ». Clunet, (23 Md. 449) 159 Baltimore v. Gill, (31 Md. 575) 395 Baltimore v. Green Mt. Cem. Prop. (7 Md. 517) 270 Baltimore b. Hook, (62 Md. 371) 241 Baltimore v. Holmes, (39 Md. 243) 352 Baltimore v. Horn, (26 Md. 194) 17, 250 Baltimore ». Howard, (6 Har. & J. (Md.) 383) 282 Baltimore v. Hussey, (Md. 88, 9 Alt. 19) 262 Baltimore v. Johnson, (62 Md. 225) 281 Baltimore v. Lefferman, (4 Gill, Md. 425) 326 a Baltimore v. Musgrave, (48 Md. 272) 242 Baltimore v. O'Neill, (63 Md. 336) 338 a Baltimore v. Pennington, (15 Md. 12) 347 Baltimore v. Poultney, (25 Md. 18) 99, 100 Baltimore v. R. R. Co., (21 Md. 275) 393 Baltimore v. Radeke, (49 Md. 217) 120, 152 Baltimore v. Ray mo, (13 Atl. Rep. 383) 281 Baltimore v. Reynolds, (20 Mo. 1) 165, 169 Baltimore?). Scharf, (54Md.499) 113, 279 Baltimore v. State, (15 Md. 376) 270 Baltimore ». St. Agnes Hospital, (48 Md. 419) 247 Baltimore b. White, (2 Gill, 444) 133, 220 Baltimore & O. R. R. Co. v. Marshall County, (3 W. Va. 319) 270 Baltimore & O. R. R. Co. v. District, (3 MaoArthur, 122) 284 Baltimore & O. R. R. Co. v. County of Jefferson, (29 Fed. Rep. 305) 28 Baltimore & Susq. R. R. Co. v. Nes- bit, (10 How., U. S. 395) 242 Baltimore O. & C. R. Co. v. Ketring, (23 N. E. R. 527, 122 Ind. 5) 259 a Baltimore C. P. Ry. Co. v. McDon- nell, (43 Md. 534) 136 Baltimore U. P. R. Co. v. Baltimore, (71 Md. 405) 302 Baltimore, etc., Co. v. Bateman, (68 Md. 389) 342 Baltimore, etc., Co. b. Baltzell, (23 Alt. R. 74) 241 Baltimore, etc., v. Fifth Bap. Ch., (108 U. S. 317) 301 Baltimore, etc., Co. v. Kemp, (01 Md. 74) 352 a Baltimore, etc., Co. v. Mali, (66 MA. 53) 306 XXIV TABLE OP CASES CITED. Beferences are to Sections. Baltimore, etc., Co. v. Magender, (34 Md. 79) 354 Baltimore etc. R. E. Co. v. Magruder, (3.5 Md. 79, 6 Am. Rep. 310) 238 Baltimore etc. R. 9. Co. v. Pitts- burgh etc. Co., (17 W. Va. 812) 238 Bamford v. Turnley, (113 Eng. C. L. 66) 120 Bamber v. Rochester, (26 Hun, 587) 92 Banbury's Case, (10 Mod. 346) 37 Bancroft v. Cambridge, (126 Mass. 438) 116 Bancroft v. Dumas, (21 Vt. 456) 123 Bancroft v. Lynnfield, (18 Pick. 566) 115 Bangor v. Gotling, (35 Me. 73) 283 Bangor v. Lausil, (51 Me. 521) 354 a, 355 Bangs V. Dunn, (66 Cal. 72) 80 Bangs V. Snow, (1 Mass. 181) 110 Bangor S. Bk. v. Stillwater, (49 Fed. R. 721) 164, 181, 183 Banguss b. Atlanta, (12 S. W. R. 750; 74 Tex. 029) 346 Bank v. Bergen Co., (115 U. S. 334) 196 Bank v. Brainerd, (51 N. W. 814, Minn. 92) 3 Bank v. Bridge, (30 N. J. L. 112) 32 Bank v. Brown, (26 N. Y. 467) 24 Bank v. Charlotteville etc. Co. (5 S. C. 156) 165 Bank v. Daudridge, (12 Wlieat. 64) 108 Bank ». Davis, (1 McCarter Ch.- N. J., 286) 33 Bank v. Dibrell, (3 Sneed, 379) 80 Bank v. Franklin Co., (65 Mo. 105) 179 Bank v. Farmington, (41 K. H. 32) 179 Bank v. Gottschalk, (14 Pet. 19) 167 Bank v. Grenada, (48 F. 278) 192 Bank v. JLockwood, (2 Harring., Del. 8)42 Bank v. Meredith, (44 Mo. 500) 397 Bank v. Patterson, (7 Cranch, 299) 164, 165 Bank v. Petway,- (3 Humph., Tenn. 522) 81 Bank v. Poitiaux, (3 Rand., Va. 136) 207 Bank v. Kew Orleans, (12 La. An. 421) 326 a Bank v. Niagara, (6 Cow. 196) 380 Bank v. Nilcs, (1 Doug. Mich., 401) 207 Bank v. Seton, (1 Peters, 299) 98 Bank v. Statesville, (84 N. C. 169) 170, 190 a Bank v. Supervisors, (5 Denio, 517) 115 See Bank v. Wilkes-Barre, (24 Atl. 11, Pa. 92) 272 Bank etc. v. Railroad Co., (30 Vt. 159) 51 Bank etc. v. St. Joseph, (31 Fed. Rep. 216) 195 d Bankhead v. Brown, (25 Iowa, 540) 234 a, 235 Bank of Chenango v. Brown, (26 N. T. 467) 161 Bank of Chillicothe ». Mayor, (7 Ohio, pt. 2, 31) 110, 182 Bank of Columbia v. Patterson, (7 Cranch, 299) 51 Bank of Commerce v. Grenada, (44 Fed. Rep. 262) 196 Bank of Commerce v. New York City, (2 Black, 620) 258 Bank of Commonwealtli v. New York, (43 N. Y. 184) 326 a Bank of Ga. v. Savannali, (Dudley, 130) 273 Bank of Ind. v. Madison, (3 Ind. 43) 273 Bank of Ireland u. Evans, (32 Eng. Law & Eq. 23) 51 Bank of La. v. City of N. O., (5 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 555) 191 Bank of Middlesex v. Rutland R. Co., (30 Vt. 159) 51 Bank of Rome v. Village of Rome, (19 N. Y. 24) 191 Bank of Rome v. Rome, (18 N. Y. 38) 24 Bannagan v. District, (2 Mackey 285) 355 Banton v. Wilson, (4 Tex. 400) 371 Barben v. Pol. Jury, (15 La. An. 559) 314 Barber Surgeons v. Pelson, (2 Lev. 252) 158 Barber v. Jackson Co., (40 111. App. 42) 326 a Barber v. Roxbury, (U Allen, 318) 340, 342 a Barber v. Sag. City, (34 Mich. 52) 87 Barbierc. Connelly, (118 U. S. 27) 121 Barbour v. Camden, (51 Me. 608) 139 Barbour b. Ellsworth, (67 Me. 294) 332 Barbour Co. v. Horn, (48 Ala. 566) .352 a Barbour Co. v. Brinson, (36 Ala. 362) 325 Barbour Co. v. Horn, (48 Ala. 566) 325 Barclay v. Brabston, (49 N. J. L. 629) 399 Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, (6 Pet. 498) 217, 218, 219, 220, 221 TABLE OF CASES CITED. XXV References are to Sections. Bardwell v. Jamaica, (15 Vt. 438) 313 Barker v. Peo., (3 Cow. 686) 83 Barker v. Savage, (45 N. Y. 19) 346 Barker v. State, (18 Ohio, 514) 56, 270, 276 Barker v. Worcester, (139 Mass. 74) 340 ■Barkley v. Levee Com'rs, (93 U. S. 258) 42, 67, 81 Barlow v. Newman, (2 W. Bl. 959) 131 Barnard v. District, (20 Ct. of 01. 257) 171 Barnert v. Paterson, (48 N. J. L. 395) 99 Barnes v. Bakersfield, (57 Vt. 375) 79 Barnes v. Barnes, (5 Vt. 388) 31 Barnes v. Oliicopee, (138 Mass. 67) 343 Barnura v. Concord, (2 N. H. 392) 340 Barnes 1). District, (91 U. S. 551) 324, 328,336 a, 339, 345, 349 Barnes v. Dyer, (56 Vt. 469) 259 a Barnes v. lull's, (138 Mass. 67) 343 Barnes v. Lacon, (84 111. 461) 195 d' Barnes v. Newton, (46 Iowa, 567) 346 Barnes v. Suddard, (117 111. 237) 207 Barnes v. Phila., (3 Phila. 409) 92 Barnes v. Ward, (9 C. B. 392) 348 Barnes v. Williams, (13 S. W. R. 845) 79 Barnett v. Johnson, (15 N. J. Eq. 481) 303 Barnett v. Mayor, (48 N. Y. 395) 176 Barnett v. New Orleans, (13 La. An. 105) 200 Barney v. Baltimore, (1 Hughes C. C. 118) 133, 225 Barney v. Dewey, (12 Johns. 225) 348 Barney v. Lowell, (98 Mass. 570) 92, 338, 338 a Barling v. West, (29 Wis. 307; 9 Am. Hep. 576) 124, 146 Bartch v. Cutler (Utah, 1890, 24 Pac. Rep. 526) 79 Barthol v. Meader, (72 Iowa, 125) 186 Bartons. Syracuse, (36 N. Y. 54) 3506, 355 Barton v. Union Cattle Co., (44 N. W. R. 454) 396 Bartram v. Cen. C. Co., (25 Cal. 283) 320 Barr v. Denisten, (19 N. H. 170, 180) 397 Barr » City, (Ifi S. W. R. 483, Kan. 91)3506 Barr v. Oscaloosa, (45 Iowa, 275) 311 Bjirre v. Greenwich, (1 Pick. 120) 69 Barret v. Henderson, (4 Bush, 255) 2(57, 268 Barrett v. New Orleans, (33 La. An. 542) 362 Ban-ett v. New Oris., (38 La. An. 101) 79 Barrett v. County Court, (44 Mo. 197) 191 Barrett v. Seward, (22 Vt. 176) 69 Barron v. Baltimore, (2 Am. Jour. 103) 355 Barron v. Detroit, (94 Mich. 601) 324, 328 Barrow B. Nashville & C. Turnp. Co., (9 Humph. 304) 207 Barrow v. Wilson, (39 La. An. 403) 211 Barry v. St. Louis, (17 Mo. 121 Barry v. Lo.well, (8 Allen, 127) 328, 355 Bartemeyer ». Iowa, (18 Wall. 129) 121 Barter v. Com., (3 Pa., P. & W. 253) 104, 117, 156, 339 Barteson v. Minneapolis, (33 Minn. 468) 241 Bartle v. Des Moines, (38 Iowa, 414) 189 a Bartlet v. State, (13 Kan. 99) 278 Bartlett v. Kittery, (68 Me. 357) 352 Bartlett v. U. S. (25 Ct. CI. 389) 79 Bartlett v. Hooksett, (48 N. H. 18) 342 Bartlett v. Amherstbergh, (14 W. C. Q. 152) 164 Basto V. Himrod, (8 N. T. 483) 24 Barton ti. Gadsden, (79 Ala. 495) 161 Barton v. Montpelier, (30 Vt. 650) 344, 346 Barton v. New Orleans, (16 La. An. 317) 118, 79 Barton v. Sch. Dist. (Idaho 92, 29 .iPac. R. 43) 32 Barton v. Syracuse, (36 N. Y. 54) 349 Bass V. Columbus, (30 Ga. 845) 187 a Bass V. Fontleroy, (U Tex. 698) 11, 12, 13 Bass B. Fort Wayne, (121 Ind. 389; 23 N. E. R. 259) 282, 3.54 Bass etc. Co. v. Parks Co., (115 Ind. 234) 169 Bassett v. Fish, (73 N. Y. 310) 338 Bassett v. Den, (17 N. J. L. 432) 73 Bassett v. Porter, (4 Cush. 487) 31 Bassett v. St. Joseph, (53 Mo. 290) 346 Bassford, In re, (50 N. Y. 509) 148 Bastable v. Syracuse, (72 N. Y. 64) 355 Bateman v. Ashton, (3 H. & N. 322) 163, 169 Bateman v. Covington, (Ky. 91, 74 S. W. B. 361) 169 Bateman v. McGowan, (1 Met., Ky 533) 105 XXVI TABLE OF CASES CITED. Befereuces are to Sections. 83; Bates Co. ». Winters, (97 U. S, s. c, 112 U. S. 325) 186, 195 d Bates V. Bassett, (60 Vt. 530) 210 Bates ». Gerber, (82 Cal., 22 Pac. E. 1115) 192 Bates V. Mobile, (46 Ala. 158) 272 Bates V. Plymouth, (14 Gray, 163) 363, 373 Bates D. Porter, (15 Pac. Rep. 732) 178, 194 Bates j;. Rutland, (62 Vt. 178; 20 Atl. 278) 92 Bates V. Westborougli, Mass. 90, (23 N. E. R. 1070) 355 Bath Co. 0. Amy, (13 Wall. 244) 184 Barthold c. Philadelphia, (26 Atl. E. 304; 154 Pa. St. 109) 324, 328, 336 a Baton Rouge v. Bearing, (15 La. An. 208) 102 Battersby v. New York, (7 Daly, 16) 344 Battle V. Mobile, (9 Ala. 234) (1846) 255, 264 Battles V. Landenslager, 84 Pa. St. 446) 195 b Batty V. Duxbery, (24 Vt. 155) 313 Baugan v. Mann, (59 111. 492) 218 Bauman v. Campan, (58 Mich. 444) 327 Baumgard v. New Orleans, (9 La. An. 119) 338 Baumgartner v. Hasty, (100 Ind. 575) 23, 130 Baxter v. Com., (3 Pa., Pen. & W. 253) 155 Baxter v. Providence, (12 R. I. 310) 354 a Baxter v. Seattle, (3 Wash. St. 3qg) 146 Baxter v. Winooski, (22 Vt. 123) 325 Bayer B. Franklin Co., (51 Mo. 205) 177 Bayerque v. San Fraacisco, (1 McAll. 175) 135 Bayha v. Webster Co., (18 Neb. 131) 79 Bavha v. Taylor, (36 Mo. App. 427) 294 Bayley v. Taber, (5 Mass. 285) 190 a 192 6 Bayly v. Mayor, (3 Hill, 538) 325 Bayliss v. Peterson, (15 Iowa, 279) 167 Bea B. Seeman, (W. Va. 92, 15 S. E. R. 173,) 399 Beach v. Elmira, (58 Hun, 606) 326 a 355 Beach v. Frankeuberger, (4 W. Va. 712) 348 Beach ». Haynes, (12 Vt. 15) 208 Beach v. Parmenter, (28 Pa. St. 196) 321 Beachy v. Lamkin, (1 Idaho, 48) 368 370 Beaufort v. Duncan, (1 Jones, N. C. Law, 234) 200, 211 Beaumont b. Wilkes-Barre, (Pa. 90) (21 Atl. 888) 259 a Beal V. McVicker, (8 Mo. App. 202) 80 Beals ». Providence Rubber Co., (11 R. L 381) 270 Beals V. Evans, (10 Cal. 459) 179 Bean v. Jay, (23 Me. 117) 95, 142 Bean v. AUentown, (Pa. 90, 23 Atl. R. 1062) 324, 328 Beard v. Decatur, (64 Tex. 7) 79 Beardsley v. Hartford, (50 Conn. 529) 343 Beardsley v. Smith, (16 Conn. 375) 212, 315, 375 Beardsleec. French, (7 Conn. 125) 312 Beasley v. Beckley, (28 W. Va. 81) 399 Beatty v. Gilmore, (16 Pa. St. 463) 347, 352 Beatty v. Knowles, (4 Pet., U. S. 152, 157) 30, 31, 256 Beatty v. Titus. (47 N. J. L. 89) 314 Beaver v. Manchester L. J., (26 Q. B. 311) 313 Beaver County v. Armstrong, (6 Wright 63) 192 b Beaver County v. Armstrong, (44 Pa. St. 63) 190 Beaver Creek v. Hastings, (32 Mich. 528) 95, 97 Beaver Dam v. Frings, (17 Wis. 398) 200 Bechtel v. Carslake, (3 Stockton Ch. 500) 396 Bechtel B. Village of Edgewater, (45 Hun, N. Y. 245) 54 Beck ». Carter, (68 N. Y. 283) 338, 34S Becker v. St. Charles, (37 Mo. 13) 223 Becker ». Washington, (7 S. W. R. 291, Mo. 88) 148 Becket v. Midi. By. Co., (L. R. 3 C. P. 82) 330 Beckett v. Midland R. Co., (1 L. R. C. P. C. 241 ; on appeal, 3 C. P. C. 82) 231 Beckman v. Railroad Company, (3 Paige 45 ; 22 An. Dec. 679) 232 Beckwell v. Amador Co., (30 Cal. 237) 79 Beckwith v. Racine, (7 Biss. 142) 81 Bedford v. Taunton, (9 Allen, 207) 92 Bedford etc. v. Anderson, (45 Pa. St, 388) 359 TABLE OF CASES CITED. xxvu References are to Sections. Bedford Union Poor Guard v. Bed- ford Impr. Commissioners, (7 Exoh. 777) 259 a Bedlo-w V. M. Y. Floating D. D. Co., (112 N. Y. 63) 132 Beebe v. Robinson, (52 Ala. 67) 67, 362 Beebe v. State, (26 Ind. 301) 121 Beecher v. Cheshire, (125 Mass. 555) 195 Beecher v. Derby etc. Co., (24 Conn. 491) 352 a Beecher v. People, (38 Mich. 289) 287 Beekraan, In re, (31 How. Pr. 16) 99 Beekman v. Saratoga & Schenectady R. R. Co., (3 Paige, 73, 22 Am. Dec. G79) 233, 247 Beers v. Arkansas, (20 How. U. S. 527) 5 Beers v. Beers, (4 Conn. 535) 105, 245 Beers v. Houghton, (9 Pet. 329) 194 Beers v. Pinney, (12 Wend. 309) 348 Bees man v. Peoria, (16 111. 484) 102 Begein v. Anderson, (28 Ind. 79) 62, 118 Belcher v. Farrar, (8 Allen, 325) 118 Belchers S. R. Co. v. St. Louis Grain Elev., (13 S. W. R. 822, Mo. '90) 133, 210 Belfast etc. Co. v. Brooks, (60 Me. 568) 189 Belknap v. Rheinhart, (2 Wend. 375) 169 Bell V. Americus, (3 S. E. R. 612) 190 Bell V. Burlington, (68 Iowa, 296) 223 Bell V. City of York, (31 Neb. 842) 344 Bell V. Foutch, (21 Iowa, 119) 288, ■iV> Bell V. Gouge, (23 N. J. L. 624) 200 Bell & Manvers, (2 U. C. C. P. 507) 115 Bell V. McClintock, (9 Watts, 119) 353 Bell V. Pierce, (51 N. Y. 12) 272 Bell V. Platteville, (71 Wis. 139) 108, 210 Bell V. Prouty, (43 Vt. 279) 234 a Bell V. Sun Printing Co., (42 N". Y. 566) 48 Bell V. West Point, (51 Miss. 262) 349 Bellaire Gob. Co. v. Findlay, (5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 418) 86, 166 Bellamy ». Atlanta, (75 Ga. 167) 350 a Bell County v. Alexander, (22 Tex. 350) 203, 204 Bellefontaine Ry. Co. o. Himter, (33 Ind. 335) 352 Belleville v. Stookev, (23 111. 44) 215 Belleville S. Bk. v. Winslow, (30 Fed. Rep. 488) 180 Bellinger v. N". Y. Central R. R. Co., (23 N. Y. 42) 239 Bellmyer v. Marshalltown, (44 Iowa, 564) 165 Bellows v. Bank etc., (2 Mason C. C. 43)43 Bell Point v. Pence, (17 S. W. R. 197) 254 Belo V. Forsythe Co., (76 N. C. 489) 196 Belt Line S. R. Co. v. Crabtree, (2 Tex. Ap. C. C, § 662) 330 Bend v. Kenosha, (17 Wis. 284) 397 Benbow v. Iowa City, (7 Wall. 313) 368 Bender v. Dungan, (99 Mo. 126) 282. Bender v. Nashua, (17 N. H. 477) 239 Benedict v. Denton, (Walk. Ch. 336) 52 Benedicts. Goit, (3 Barb. 459) 286, 329 Benjamin v. Wheeler, (8 Gray, 409, 412) 330 Beuoist V. St. Louis, (19 Mo. 179) 56 Benoit d. Conway, (10 Allen, 528) 114 BenoitD. Wayne Co., (20 Mich. 176)85 Bennett v. Berminghain, (31 Pa. St. 15) 124, 260, 272, 300 Bennett ». Buffalo, (17 N. Y. 383)283, 326 a Bennett v. Fifield, (13 R. I. 139) 342 Bennett v. Fisher, (26 Iowa, 497) 250 Bennett v. Lovell, (12 R. I. 160) 342 Bennett v. McCaffrey, (28 Mo. App. 220) 373 Bennett v. New Orleans, (14 La. An. 120) 92, 314, 338 a Bennett v. People, (30 111. 389) 124 Bennington v. Park, (50 Vt. 178) 196 Bennington K. Smitli, (29 Vt. 254)288 Bensinger v. District, (0 Mackey, 285) 279 Benson v. Carmel, (8 Me. 110) 177 Benson v. Mayor, (10 Barb. 223) 134 Benson v. Mayor, (24 Barb. 248) 184 Benson v. Monroe, (7 Cush. 125) 326, 327 Benson v. Waukesha, (41 N. W. R. 1017) 328, 342 Bentley v. County, (25 Minn. 259) 164, 281 Bentley v. Phelps, (27 Barb. 524) 78, 79, 85 Benton v. City Hospital, (140 Mass. 13) 324, 332 Benton v. Hamilton, (11 N. E. R. 238, 110 Ind. 294) 328 Benton v. Jackson, (2 Johns. Ch. 325) 25 Benton v. Milwaukee, 50 Wis. 368) 265 XXVlll TABLE OF CASES CITED. References ai'e to Sections. Bentz V. Armstrong, (8 Watts & S. 40) 355 Benwaie v. Pine Valley, (53 Wis. 52Y)3506 Bereldin v. Baltimore, (15 Md. 18) 278 Bergen v. Clarkson, (1 Halst, 352) 97 Bergen v. State, (32 N. J. L. 490) 161 Bergman v. Cleveland, (40 Ohio St. 651) 125 Bergman v. St. Louis etc. Co., (Mo. 90, 1 S. W. 384) 146 Berks Co. etc. o. Myers, (6 Serg. & Rawle, 12) 49, 50 Berlin v. Gorhara, (84 N. H. 266) 2, • 24 Berlin B. Co. v. Wagner, (57 Hun, 346) 15 Berliner v. Waterloo, (14 Wis. 378) 216 Berraingham v. Rumsey, (63 Ala. 352) 130 Bernarrtin v. No. Dnfferrin, (19 Can. S. C. E. 581) 51, 165 Bernards v. Morrison, (133 U. S. 523) 196 Bernards v. Stebbins, (109 U. S. 341) 192 () Bernlieimer v. Kilpatrick, (53 Hun, 316) 131 Bertholf v. O'Reilly, (74 N. Y. 509) 121 Berryraan v. Pt. Bur well Co., (24 U. C. Q. B. 34) 121 Bethura v. Turner, (1 Me. Ill) 225 Betts V. District, (20 Ct. of CI. 445) 171 Betts V. Warren, (5 Harr. 4) 397 Betts V. Williamsburg, (18 Pa. St. 26) 248 Bever v. North, (107 Ind. 544) 348 Beveridge v. Livingstone, (54 Cal. 54) 174 Beverly c. Barlow, (10 U. C. C. P. 178) 49 Bibb Co. V. Dorsey, (Ga. 93, 15 S. E. R. 687) 325 Bibb Co. Ct. V. Orr, (12 Ga. 137) 180 Bibel V. People, (67 111. 175) 113 Biddle ». Hussman, (23 Mo. 597) 244 Biddle o. Willard, (10 Ind. 63) 82 Bieling r. Brooklyn, (24 N. E. R. 389, 120 X. T. 98) 345 Biencourt v. Parker, (27 Tex. 558) 86 Bier v. Garrell, (30 W. Va. 95) 79 Bigelow V. Hillman, (37 Me. 58) 98, 101 Bigelow 15. P. Amboy, (1 Dutch. 297) 108, 291 Bigelow V. Randolph, (17 Gray, 541) 3300,338 Bigelow V. Weston, (3 Pick. 267) 342 Bigelow V. West Wis. Ry. Co., (27 Wis. 478) 245 Bigg V. London, (L. R. 15 Eq. 376) 330 Biggs V. Board of Com'rs, (Ind. 93, 34 K. E. R. 500) 326 Biggs V. McBride, (17 Or. 640) 361 Big Rapids v. Comstock, (65 Mich. 78, s. c, 31 N. W. Rep. 811) 312 Bilbie v. Lumley, (2 East, 469) 327 Billard v. Erhart, (35 Kau. 611) 120, 396 Billings V. Mayor, (68 N. Y. 413) 79 Billings 1). O'Brien, (45 How. Pr. 392) 80 Bills V. Goshen, (117 Ind. 221) 150 Bingham v. Stewart, (13 Minu. 106) 167 Binghamptonc. Ry. Co., Cf., (61 Hun, 479) 14, 306 Binks V. Yorkshire etc. Co., (3 B. & S. 244) 348 Binssee v. Wood, (37 N. Y. 530) 348 Bircklev v. Boston, (20 Fed. Rep. 207) 212 Bird V. Wasco, (3 Or. 282) 79 Birdsall v. Clark, (73 N. Y. 73) 113 Birdsall v. Russell, (29 N. Y. 220) 192 6, 195 b Birmingham v. Anderson, (40 Pa. St. 506) 219 Birmingham v. Klein, (89 Ala. 461) 259 a Birmingham v. R. R. Co., (Ala. 93, 13 So. 841) 150, 300. Birmingham v. Rumsey, (63 Ala. 352) 212 Birmingham . Goldsmith, (12 Rich. S. C. Law, 470) 123 City Council d. Hudson, (15 S. E. R. 878, 88 Ga. 599) 336 a City Council ». Church, (4 Strobh. 306) 18 City Council ». King, (4 McCord. S. C. 487) 48, 103 City Council v. Louisville etc. Co., (4 So. Rep. 626) 130 City Council v. Moorehead, (2 Rich. S. C. Law, 430) 51, 52 City Council v. Plank Rd. Co., (31 Ala. 76) 169 City Council v. Rogers, (2 McCord, 495) 127 City Council ». Schmidt, (11 Rich. S. C. Law, 343) 160 • City Council v. Seeba, (4 Strobh. Law S. C. 319) 158 City Council v. Payne, (2 Nott & McC. 475) 116 City Council v. Pepper, (1 Rich. S. C. Law, 364) 103 City Com. of Charleston v. Benjar min, (2 Strobh. S. C. Law, 508) 134 City F. I. Co. V. Corliss, (21 Wend. 367) 335 City Gas & M. Co. v. Elwood, (114 Ind. 332) 296 City etc. v. Goldsmith, (2 Speers S. C. 435) 150 City etc. Co. v. Savannah, (77 Ga. 731) 306 City Nat. Bk. v. Paducah, (9 S. W. R. 218, Ky. 87) 258 City of Bloomington v. Pollock, (31 N. E. R. 146) 292 City of Anderson v. East, (117 Ind. 126) 331 City of Buffalo v. Schleifer, (21 N. Y. S. 913) 153 City of Covington v. Southgate, (15 B. Mon. 491) 259 City of Delphi v. Bowen, (61 Ind. 29) 53 City of Galesburg ». Hawkinson, (75 lU. 152) 53 City of Gloversville v. Johnston G. & K. R. Co., (21 N. Y. S. 146, 66 Hun, 627) 396 City of Jacksonville v. Ledwith, (Fla.,'7 So. R. 885) 128 City of Kansas v. Johnson, (78 Mo. 661) 267 City of Louisville v. Louisville Gas Co. (22 S. W. R. 550, Ky. 93) 281 Cf. City of Muscatine v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co., (55 jSr. W. R. 100, Iowa, 93) 282 City of Nevada v. Morris, (43 Mo. App. 586) 113 City of New York, In re, (63 Hun, 632) 241 City of Olympia ». Mann, (1 Wash. St. 389) 130 City of Pittsburgh, In re, (138 Pa. St. 401, 27 W. N. C. 457) 259 a City of Passaic, In re, (23 Atl. R. 517, N. J. 92) 87 City of Pensacola v. Louisville etc. R. Co., (21 Fla. 492) 55 City of Rock Island v. Huesing, (25 111. App. 600, 21 N. E. R. 558) 395 City of St. Louis v. Spiegel, (2 S. W. R. 839, 40 Mo. 587) 261 City of Springfield ». Knott, (49 Mo. App. 412) 278 City of Wilkes-Barre's App., (116 Pa. St. 246, 9 Atl. R. 308) 267 City R. R. Co. v. City R. R. Co., (20 N. J. Eq. 61) 304 Claiborne Street, In re, (4 La. An. 7) 240 Claiborne Co. v. Brooks, (111 U. S. 400, 406) 177, 184 Claflin V. Hopkins, (4 Gray, 502) 139, 397 Clapp V. Board of Pol., (72 N. Y. 415) 83 Clapp V. City of Spokane, (53 Fed. 515) 294, 393 Clapp V. Hartford, (35 Conn. 66) 30 Clapp V. Town, (3 N. Y. State Rep.) 317 Clarendon v. Phila., (13 Phila. 54) 75 Clark B. Adair, (79 Mo. 526) 325 Clark V. Board, (24 Iowa, 366) 374 Clark V. Barrington, (41 N. H. 44) 352 Clark B. Boston etc. Co., (N. H., 31 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 548) 136 Clark B. Corinth, (41 Vt. 449) 340 Clark V. Crane, (57 Cal. 629) 360 Clark B. Com., (4 Pick. 125) 321 Clark B. Com., (14 Bush, 166) 288 Clark B. Cape May, (50 N. J. L. 558) 83 Clark B. Cuckfleld Union, (11 Eng. L. & Eq. 442) 165 Clark B. District, (3 Mackey, 79) 344 Clark B. Davenport, (14 Iowa, 494) 266 Clark B. Butcher, (9 Cow. 674) 326 a TABLE OP CASES CITED. References are to Sections. xlv Clark V. Des Moines, (19 Iowa, 199) 17Y, 178 Clark V. Janesville, (10 Wis. 136) 148, 191 Clark V. Denten, (1 B. & A. 92) 114 Clark V. Easton, (146 Mass. 43) 338 a Clark V. Fry, (8 Ohio St. 358, 374) 300, 347 Clark V. Iowa City, (20 Wall. U. S. 583) 180,190, 192, 193 6 .Clark B. Lincoln Co., (20 Pac. K. 576) 379 Clark V. Lookport, (49 Barb. 580) 349, 352 Clark V. Louisville W. Co., (Ky. 91, 14 S. W. R. 502) 271 Clark Co. v. Lawrence, (63 HI. 32) Clark 13. Lincoln Co., (25 Am. & Eng. Car. Cas. 211) 325 Clark 13. Lebrew, (9 B. & C. 52) 114 Clark V. Leathers, (5 S. W. R. 576) 255, 270 Clark V. McKenzie, (7 Bush, 523) 371 Clark V. Mayor etc. of N. Y., (3 Barb. 290) 92 Clark i). Mobile Com'rs, (36 Ala. 621) 80 Clark V. No. Muskegon, (50 N. W. E. 254, 88 Mich. 808) 80 Clark !3. People, (15 111. 213) 383 Clark V. Polk Co., (19 Iowa, 248) 169, 190 a Clark V. Pratt, (55 Me. 546) 87 Clark 13. Pratt, (47 Me. 55) 211 Clark V. Peckham, (10 R. I. 35) 121 Clark V. Richmond, (88 Va. 355) 339, .343 Clark V. Richmond, (5 S. E. E. 869) 352 Clark V. Syracuse, (13 Barb. 32) 896 Clark V. Saybrook, (21 Conn. 318) 329 Clark V. School Dist., (3 R. I. 199) 179, 182 Clark V. South Bend, (85 Ind. 276) 130, 146 Clark V. Syracuse, (13 Barb. 32) 720 Clark V. Utica, (18 Barb. N. Y. 451) 245 Clark 13. Wilmington, (5 Harr. 243) 329, .3.54 a Clark V. Washington, (12 Wheat. 524) 165 Clark Co. 13. Paris, (11 B. Mon. 143, 154) 364 Clark Co. v. Paris etc. Co., (11 B. Mon. 143) 186 Clarke's Fees, In re, (25 Hun, 593) 79 Clarke v. Bank, (5 Eng., 10 Ark. 516) 30,31 Clarke i3. Birmingham etc. Co., (41 Pa. St. 147) 353 Clarke d. Board, (27 111. 310) 65 Clarke v. Farmers' etc. Co., (15 Wend. 256) 51 Clarke B. Janesville, (10 Wis. 136) 190 Clarke «. Potter Co., (1 Barr, Pa. 163) 50 Clarke v. Providence, (15 Atl. E. 763) 201, 208, 225, 226 Clarke 13. Rochester, (24 Barb. 481) 244 Clarke 13. Rogers, (81 Ky. 43) 231 Clarke Co. Comm'rsis. State, (61 Ind. 75) 368 Claughey 13. Hancock Co., (46 111. 856) 118 Clay, In re, (22 N. Y. S. 112) 278 Clayards 13. Dethick, ( 12 Q. B. 439) 352 Clayburgh ». Chicago, ( 25 111. 535) 92, 336 a, 349 Clay County 13. McAleer, (115 U. S. 616) 266 Clayton v. Caroy, (4 Md. 26) 871 Clayton 13. Laf argue, (23 Ark. 187) 397 Clayton 13. Heidelberg, (17 Miss. 623) 401 Clayton 13. Mc Williams, (49 Miss. 311) 180 Cleary 13. Trenton, (50 N. J. L. 381) 83 . Clee 1). Sandars, (42 N. W. R. 154, Mich. 89) 483 Cleghorn v. Postlethwaite, (43 111. 428) 279 Clemeuce v. Auburn, (66 N. Y. 834) 327 Clemens 13. Mayor, (16 Md. 208) 282 Clerk 13. Tucket, (3 Lev. 281) 155 Cleveland 1;. Board, (55 Barb.*288) 397 Cleveland 13. King, (132 U. S. 295) 347, 350!; Cleveland 13. Jersey City, (39 N. J. L. 629) 359 Cleveland v. St. Paul, (18 Minn. 279) 3.50 a Cleveland 13. Spier, ( 16 Q. B. N. S. 399) 337 Cleveland 13. Wick, (18 Ohio St. 303) 248 Cleveland etc. Co. «. Wynant, (114 Ind. 525) 342 Cleveland, P. & A. R. R. Co. 13. Penn- sylvania, (15 Wall. 800) 245, 258 Clifford 13. Dam, (81 K. Y. 52) 300, 348 Clifford 13. Tyman, (61 IST. H. 508) 321 Clift 13. State, (Ind. 93, 38 N. E. R. 211) 800 Clifton 13. Cook, (7 Ala. 114) 65 xlvi TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Cline V. Cornwall, (21 Grant, Can. 142) 300 • Clinton v. Cedar etc. Co., (24 Iowa, 455, 480) 2, 301, 302, 303, 306 Clinton v. Henry Co., (Mo. 93, 22 S. W. R. 494) 270, 282 Clinton v. Phillips, (58 111. 102) 150 Clinton v. Strong, (9 Johns. 370) 326 a Clinton Bridge, (10 Wall. U. S. 454) 313 Clintonville v. Keeting, (4 Denio, 341) 33, 125 Clough V. Hart. (8 Kan. 487) 176 Cloughessy v. Waterbury, (51 Conn. 405) 344, 350 & Clowes V. Staffordshire, (L. E. 8 Chapp. 125) 396 . Cluggish V. Rogers, (13 Ind. 538) 90 Clulow V. McClelland, (151 Pa. St. 583) 317 Coach Co. B. Camden H. E. E. Co., (33 N. J. Eq. 267) 302 Coal Ridge etc. Co. v. Jennings, (127 Pa. St. 397, 17 Atl. E. 986) 259 Coast etc. Co. v. Savannah, (30 Fed. Eep. 646) 306 Coast Line etc. Co. v. Cohen, (50 Ga. 451) 302, 396 Coats V. Dubuque, (68 Iowa, 550) 291 . Coates V. Canaan, (51 Vt. 131) 344, 348, 352 Cobb V. Boston, (122 Mass. 181) 116 Cobb V. Dalton, (53 Ga. 426) 324 Cobb V. Hague, (13 S. E. R. 633, 87 Ga. 450) 393 CobbettB. Slowman, (9Exch. 633) 104 Cobb V. Kingman, (15 Mass. 197) 59 Cobb V. Portland, (55 Me. 381) 777 Cobb V. Standi.sh, (14 Me. 477) 352 Coburu V. Ellenwood, (4 N. H. 99) 211 Coe V. Eailroad Co., (10 Ohio St. 372) 273 Coe V. Caledonia & M. Ey. Co., (27 Minn. 197) 186 Coe V. Wise, (5 B. & S. 440, 475) 121, 336 a Coe V. Lake Co., (37 N. H. 254) 396 Cochran v. McCleary, (22 Iowa, 75) 38, 96, 361, 379 Cockburn v. Bank, (13 La. An. 389) 106 Cockerel v. Cholmondely, (1 Euss. & Myl. 418) 192 6 Coffin V. Cohn, (7 Cush. 355) 129 Coffin V. Nantucket, (5 Cush. 269) 113, 355 Coffin V. Plymouth, (49 Me. 173) 107 Coffin B. Portland, (11 Sawy. C. C. E. 600) 228 Coffin V. State, (7 Ind. 157) 79 Coggeshall et al., New Eochelle Trs. V. Pelton, (7 Johns. Ch. 292) 202, 204 Coghlan v. Ottawa, (1 App. Can. E. 54) 355 Cogswell V. N. Y., N. H. & H. E. E. Co., (103 N. T. 10) 120, 329 Coggswell V. Lexington, (4 Cush. 307) 342 Cohen v. New York, (113 N. T. 532) 300, 331 Cohen v. Wigfall, (8 Rich. Law, 237,) 66 Cohn V. Parcels, (72 Cal. 367) 226 Cohoes V. D. & H. Can. Co., (31 N. E. E. 887) 218, 220 Coit V. Elliott, (28 Ark. 204) 365 Coit V. Lyons, (33 Conn. 109) 83 Coit V. State, (28 Ark. 417) 84 Colbeck V. Beford. (21 Up. Can. Q. B. 276) 340, 347, 3506 Colburn v. Chattanooga, (17 Am. L. E. N. S. 191) 395 Cold Spring etc. v. Tolland, (9 Cush. 492) 54 Cold water v. Tucker, (36 Mich. 474) 54 Cole V. Cheshire, (1 Gray, 441) 66 Cole V. Drew, (44 Vt. 49) 291 Cole V. Kegler, (64 Iowa, 59) 120 Cole u. Le Grange, (113 U. S. 1, 7 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 379) 188 Cole V. Muscatine, (14 Iowa, 296) 327, 330 Cole V. Medina, (27 Barb. 218) 349 Cole V. Nashville, (4 Sneed, 162) :131 a Coleman v. Chester, (14 S. C. 286) 338 a Coleman v. Flint etc. (64 Mich. 160) 312 Coleman u. Marion Co.. (50 Cal. 493) 186 Coleman u. Martin, (50 Cal. 493) 185 Coleman v. San Rafael Turnpike Co., (49 Cal. 517) 200 Coleman v. Sec. Ave. E. E., (38 N. T. 201) 302 Coleman v. Thurmond, (56 Tex. 514) 312 Coles V. Trustees, (10 Wend. 658) 100 Coles V. Madison Co., (Breese, 111. 120) 8 Coles Co. ». Allison, (23 111. 437) 65, 160 Col. Co. V. Bryson, (13 Fla. 281 ) 369 Collier v. U. S., (22 Ct. of CI. 125) 79 Collieries v. Gibb, (L. E. 5 Ch. Div. 713) 301 Collector v. Dendinger, (38 La. An. 261) 110 Collector v. Hubbard, (12 Wall, 1, 12) 164,326 TABLE OP CASES CITED. xlvii References are to Sections. Collector v. Board, (47 N. W. E. 227, 83 Mich. 367) 360 Collins V. Camden, (27 N. J. Eq. 293) 397 Collins V. Council Bluffs, (32 Iowa, 324) 344, 352 a Collins V. Davis, (.59 Iowa, 256) 398 Collins V. Dorchester, (6 Cush. 396) 107, 342 Collins V. Hatch, (18 Ohio, 523) 120, 150 Collins V. Holyoke, (146 Mass. 298) 98, 277 Collins ». Hall, (Ga. 93, 17 S. E. -E. 622) 150 Collins V. Louisville, (2 B. Mon. Ky. 134) 122, 256, 265 Collins V. Macon, (69 G-a. 542) 219, 338 Collins V. New Albany, (59 Ind. 396) 55, 56 Collins V. Philadelphia, (93 Pa. St. 272) 328, 335 Collins V. State, (8 Ind. 344) 18, 82 CoUiusville ». Scanland, (58 111. 221) 129 Collins V. Swindle, (6 Grant. 282) 166 Collins I). Savannah, (77 Ga. 745) 327 Collins V. Tracy, (36 Tex. 546) 83 Collins V. Welch, (58 Iowa, 72) 142 Colonial Bank v. Eich. Bank of Yar- mouth, (11 App. Gas. 84) 327 Colstrum v. Minn. etc. E. E. Co., (33 Minn. 516)39 6 Colton V. Hanohet, (13 111. 615) 315 Colton V. Phillips, (56 N. H. 220) 86 Colton V. Price, (50 Ala. 424) 85 Colton 1). Eossi, (9 Cal. 595) 247 Columbia v. Harrison, (2 Const. E. S. C. 213) 156, 160 Columbia o. Hunt, (5 Eich. L., S. G. 550) 154, 256 Columbia Co. Com'rs v. King, (13 Fla. 451) 364, 370, 375 Columbia D. B. Co. v. Geisse, (35 N. J. L. 558) 231 Columbus V. Dahn, (36 Ind. 330) 217, 219, 221 Columbus V. Jaques, (30 Ga. 506) 226, 391 Columbus V. Sohl, (44 O. State, 479) 278 Columbus V. Story, (35 Ind. 97) 265 Columbus V. Street E. E. Co., (45 Ohio St. 98) 144, 274 Columbus V. Woolen Mills, (33 Ind. 435) 355 Columbus City v. Cutcomp, (61 Iowa, 672) 125 Columbus etc. Co. v. Wright, (15 S. E. R. 293) 272 Columbus G. Co. v. Columbus, (Ohio, 93, 33 N. E. E. 292) 290, 292, 293, 324 Col. etc. Co. V. Humphrey, (26 Pac. E. 165) 245 Columbus V. Col. etc. Co., (45 Ohio, 98) 306 Columbus V. Columbus, (Wis. '92, 52 N. W. E. 425) 2, 18 Columbus & W. Ey. Co. v. Witherow, (82 Ala. 190) 224 Colville V. Judy, (73 Mo. 651) 279 Colwell V. Peden, (3 Watts, Pa. 327, 328) 326 a Commonwealth, Appeal of, (9 Atl. 524, Pa. 87) 327 Com. V. Adams, (114 Mass. 323) 352 Com. V. Alden, (143 Mass. 113) 120 Com. V. Alger, (7 Cush. 53) 82, 132, 135, 244 Com. V. Allen, (128 Mass. 308) 378, 380, 381 Commonwealth v. Allegheny Coun- ty, (37 Pa. St. 277, 290) 191 b, 212, 365, 368 Commonwealth v. Alb urge r, (1 Whart. Pa. 469) 219 Com. V. Arrison, (15 S. & E. 130) 96 Com. V. Arnold, (3 Litt. 309, Ky.) 84 Com. V. Arrott S. P. M. Co., (22 Atl. E. 243) 270 Com'rs V. Aspinwall, (24 How. IT. S. 376) 369 Com. V. Athearn, (3 Mass. 285) 373 Com. D. Bank, (28 Pa. St. 389) 379 Com'rs V. Baxter, (35 Pa. St. 263) 105 Com. V. Barry, (Hard. 229, Ky.) 83 CommonwealtlL v. Belden, (13 Met. 10, Mass.) 223 Com. V. Bean, (Thach. 85, Mass. Crim. Gas.) 158 Com. V. Blaisdell, (107 Mass. 234) 300 Com. V. Borden, (til Pa. St. 272) 156 Com. V. Boston, (97 Mass. 555) 286, 297 Com. V. Brenham, (22 N. E. E. 628) 855 Com. V. Breunan, (103 Mass. 70) 125 Com. !). Brooks, (90 Mass. 439) 123, 209 Com. V. Browden, (Thach. Cr. Gas. 9) 102 Com. V. Bumm, (10 Phila. 162) 380 Com. V. Cambridge, (7 Mass. 158) 309 Com. V. Capp, (48 Pa. St. 53) 301 Com. V. Gen. IBridge Corp., (12 Gush. 244) 313 Com. V. Cen. Pass. etc. Co., (52 Wend. 506) 378 Com. V. Chambei's, (1 J. J. Marsh 160) 83 xlviii TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Commonwealth v. Chaplin, (Pick. 199, 16 Am. Dec. 386) 239 Commonwealth v. Charlestown, (1 Pick. 180, Mass.) 240 Com'is V. Chase, (6 Cush. 248) 107, 129 Commonwealth u. Cole, (26 Pa. St. 187) 220 Commonwealth v. Commissioners, {o Kawle, 75) 65 Commonwealth v. Cluley, (56 Pa. St. 270) 380 Cora. V. Crogan, (Pa. '93, 26 Atl. E. 697) 76 Com. V. Crowell, (30 N. E. K. 1015) 258 Commonwealth v. Gary Improve- ment Co., (98 Mass. 19, 22) 258 Com. V. Cutter, (29 N. E. Kep. 1146) 119, 134, 158 Commonwealth v. Cullen, (1 Harris 133, Pa.) 38 Com. V. Dallas, (3 Teates, 300) 162 Com. V. Davis, (140 Mass. 485) 154, 148 Com'rs V. Day, (19 Ind. 450) 179 Com. V. Deerfield, (6 Allen, 449) 313 Com. V. Denworth, (145 Pa. St. 172, 22 Atl. E. 820) 18 Com. V. Dow, (10 Met. 382, Mass.) 125 Com. V. Duff, (87 Ky. 586) 34 Com. V. Eichenburg, (21 Atl. Eep. 258) 123 Com. V. Ellis, (11 Mass. 465) 398 Commonwealth v. Emigration Sav. Bank, (98 Mass. 12) 192 b Com'rs V. Emery, (11 Cush. 406) 104 Com. V. Evans, (74 Pa. St. 124) 67 Com. V. Erie etc. Co., (27 Pa. St. 339) 302 Com. V. Fenton, (139 Mass. 195) 299 Com'rs t). Frankfort, (Ky. '92, 17S. W. 287) 802 Com. V. Gamble, (62 Pa. St. 343) 67 Com. V. Gardner, (133 Pa. St. 284) 123 Com. D. Gay, (5 Pick. 44) 155 Com. V. German Soc, (15 Pa. St. 251) 85 Com. V. Germania Ins. Co., (Pa. '91, 22 Atl. E. 240) 259. Com. V. Genther, (17 S. & E. 135) '91 Com. V. Gillespie, (23 Atl. E. 393) 399 Com. 0. Gill, (3 Whart. 228) 383 Com. V. Goodrich, (13 Allen, 545) 118, 152 Com. 0. Guardians, etc., (6 S. & E. 469, Pa.) 83 Com. V. Hanley, (7 Pa. St. 513) 82 Com. V. Hastings, (9 Met. 259) 89 Com. V. Hawkes, (123 Mass. 525) 8 ; 102 Com. V. Harris, (101 Mass. 29) 120 Com. V. Henry, (49 Pa. St. 530) 363, 377 Com. V. Hopkinsville, (7 B. Mon. 38) 400 Commonwealth v. Industrial Assn., "(98 Mass. 12) 190 Com. o. Jones, (10 Bush, 725) 83 Com. V. Jones, (12 Pa. .St. 365) 69, 380 Commonwealth v. Johnson, (2 Binn. 275, Pa.) 360 Commonwealth v. Judges, (8 Pa. St. 391) 24 Com. V. King, (13 Met. 115, Mass.) 300 Com. V. Kinperts, (12 Pa. Co. Ct. E. 463) 400 Commonwealth v. Lancaster, (5 Watts. 152, Pa.) 375 Com'rs 13. Leech, (44 Pa. St. 332) 105, 381 Com. V. Leight, (1 B. Mon. 107) 90 Commonwealth v. Look, (108 Mass. 452) 239 Commonwealth v. Lowell Gasl. Co., (12 Allen 75, Mass.) 274 Commonwealth v. Lyndall, (2 Brew. 425, Pa.) 368 Com. V. Mathews, (122 Mass. 60) 123 Com. V. Maury, (82 Va. 882) 261 Com. V. McPeek, (Ky. '91, 20 S. W. E. 220) 83 Com. V. McCafferty, (145 Mass. 384) 301 Com. V. McWilliams, (11 Pa. St. 61) 184 Com. V. McClosky, (2Eawle, 369, Pa.) 105, 381 Commonweath v. McCarter, (98 Pa. St. 607) 380 Com. V. MacFerron, (25 Atl. E. 556) 8 Cora. V. McKibben, (14 S. W. E. 572) 270 Com'rs B. Meeser, (44 Pa. St. 341) 105, 379 Commonwealth v. Milton, (12 B. Mon. 212, Ky.) 258 Com. V. Moorhead, (118 Pa. St. 344, 12 Atl. E. 424) 223 Com. V. New Bedford, (2 Gray, 229) 400 Com. V. Ife-wburyport, (103 Mass. 129) 400 Com'rs V. N. Y. etc. Co., (Pa. '90, 22 Atl. 212) 259 Com. V. Odenweller, (Mass. '92, 30 N. E. 1022) 158 Com. V. Patch, (97 Mass. 221} 129 TABLE OP CASES CITED. xlix References are to Sections. Commonwealth v. Pa. Canal Co., (66 Pa. St. 41, 5 Am. Rep. 329) 238 Commonwealth ». Painter, (10 Pa. St. 214) 24 Com. V. Page, (Mass. '92, 29 N. E. R. .512) 300 Com. V. Parker, (9 Mete. 263) 331 a Com. V. Parks, (9 Phila. 481, Pa.) 363 Com. V. Parks, (30 N. E. Rep. 1'74) 134 Com. V. Passmore, (1 Serg. & R. 217) 300 Com. V. Patch, (97 Mass. 221) 121 Com. V. Peo., (99 111. 587) 377 Com. V. Perkins, (43 Pa. St, 400) 212, 375 Com. V. Pindar, (11 Met., Mass. 539) 104 Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh, (34 Pa. St. 496) 182, 183, 266, 359, 362 364, 368 Com. V. Pittsburgh, (41 Pa. St. 278) 183 Com. V. Pittsburgh, (88 Pa. St. 66) 375 Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh etc. E. R. Co., (58 Pa. St. 26) 302 Com. V. Pittston F. B. Co., (Pa. '92, 24 Atl. 87) 314 Com. V. Philada. Co., (5 Rawle, 75) 361 Com. V. Phila. Comrs., (5 Binn., Pa., 534) 76 Com. V. Philadelphia, (27 Pa. St. 497) 326 Com. 1). Plaisted, (19 N. E. 224, 148 Mass. 375) 18 Commonwealth v. Quarter Sessions, (8 Pa. St. 395) 24 Com. V. Read, (1 Gray, 475) 102, 103, 120 Com. V. Reynolds, (137 Pa. St. 389) 26 Com. V. Reynolds, (8 Pa. Co. Ct. E. 568) 28 Commonwealth v. Riohter, (1 Pa. St. 467) 239 Com. V. Roark, (8 Cush. 210) 104 Com. V. Robertson, (5 Cush. 438) 150 Com. V. Robinson, (5 Cush. 438, 442) 158 Com. ». Eodes, (5 Mon., Ky., 318) 360 Com. V. Rosencrans, (9 Pa. Co. Ct. 399) 123 Commonwealth b. Roxbury, (9 Gray, 510) 40 Com. V. Roy, (140 Mass. 432) 146 Com. ». R. E. Co., (27 Pa. St. 339) 290 Com. V. Rush, (14 Pa. St. 186) 129 iv Cora. V. Ryan, (5 Mass. 90) 103 Commonwealth v. Shumau's Adm., (18 Pa. St. 34.3) 250 Com. u. Shepp, (10 Phila. 518) 380 Com. V. Shaw, (1 Pitts., Pa. 492) 104 Com. B. Shaver, (3 W. & S. .338) 83 Com. V. Slifer, (25 Pa. St. 23) 83 Com. V. Smead, (11 Mass. 264) 380 Cora. V. Smith, (132 Mass. 289) 65 Com. V. St. Patricks etc., (2 Binn. 441)83 Com. I). Stodder, (2 Cush. 262) 124 Com. ■». Sutherland, (3 So. R. 145) 83 Com. V. Taunton, (7 Allen, 309) 314 Commonwealth ». Taylor, (36 Pa. St. 263) 369 Com. V. Temple, (14 Gray, 69) 321 Com. V. Tewksbury, (11 Met. ,551) 116 Com. V. Turner, (1 Cush. 493) 125, 145, 140 Com. V. Upton, (6 Gray, 473) 120 Com. V. Vt. & Mass. R. R. Co., (4 Gray, 22) 400 Com. V. Wilmington, (105 Mass. 599) 343 Commonwealth ». Wilder, (127 Mass. 1)207 Com', v. Williams, (79 Ky. 42) 83 Com. ». Wilkinson, (16 Pick. 175) 318 Com. V. Wellsboro etc. Co., (35 Pa. St. 152) 391 Com. V. Wetzel, (84 Ky. 537, 2 S. W. R. 123) 34 Com. V. Westborough, (3 Mass. 406) 309 Com. V. Woelpei', (3 Ser. . Humbert, (91 U. S. 294) 194 a, 396 Dowen v. Team, (6 Rich, 398) 312 Dowlan v. Sibley, (36 Minn. 430) 2 Dowling V. Altsohul, (33 Pac. R. 495) 279 Downer v. Boston, (7 Gush. 277) 277 Downing «. Indiana etc. Co., (129 Ind. 443) 8, 9 Downing v. Marshall, (23 N. Y. 366) 200, 202 Downing v. Rugar, (21 Wend. 178) 97 . 99 Ir TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Dows V. Town of Elrawood, (34 Fed. Kep. 114) 28 Dows V. Chicago, (11 Wall. 108) 397 Doyle V. Wragg, (1 F. & F. 7) 352 Doyle ». Austin, (47 Cal. 353) 271 Doyle V. Continental Ins. Co., (94 TJ. S. 535) 258 Doyle V. Raleigh, (89 N. C. 133) 67 Drain Commissioners v. Baxter, (57 Mich. 127) 62 Drake v. Lowell, (13 Mete. 292) 345 Drake v. Mayor etc., (7 Lans. 340) 87 Drake v. Phillips, (40 HI. 388) 356, 397 Draper v. Springport, (104 U. S. 501) 165, 191 6, 193 b Dreher v. Fitohburg, (22 Wis. 675) 342 Dressel v. Keokuk, (47 Iowa, 597) 155 Dressell v. Kingston, (32 Hun, 533) 347 Drevon v. Drevon, (34 L. J. Ch. 129) 66 Drew V. Sutton, (55 Vt. 58) 343, 346 Drexel v. Lake, (127 111. 54) 355 Driess v. Frederick, (11 S. W. K. 493) 352 a Driggs V. Philips, (103 N. Y. 77) 310 Drisko v. Columbia, (75 Me. 73) 95 Driver v. Western Union R. R. Co., (32 Wis. 569, 14 Am. Rep. 726) 246 Dronberger D. Reed, (11 Ind. 420) 247 Drott V. Riverside, (4 Ohio Cir. Ct. 312) 79 Drucker v. Manhattan Ry. Co., (106 N. Y. 157, 16 J. & S. 429) 305 Dry Dock E. B. & B. R. Co. v. New York, (47 Hun, 231) 302 Duanesburg d. Jenkins, (40 Barb. 579) 184 Dubach v. H. & St. Jo., etc. Co., (89 Mo. 483) 208, 302, 396 Dubois V. Augusta, (Dudly, 30) 119 Dubois V. Canal Co., (4 Wend. 285) 167 Dubois V. Kingston, (102 N. Y. 219) 336 a, 342, 352 Duboistown v. Roch. Brew. Co., (9 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 442) 123 Dubuque v. Benson, (23 Iowa, 248) 210, 224 Dubuque v. 111. Cent. R. R. Co., (39 Iowa, 56) 273 Dubuque v. Maloney, (9 Iowa, 450) 120, 217, 221, 224, 294 Dubuque v. Korthwestern L. Ins. C(i., (29 Iowa, 9) 268 Dubuque v. Rebman, (1 Iowa, 444) 105 Dubuque v. Wooten, (25 Iowa, 571^ 279 ' ' Dubuque F. Col. v. Township etc., (13 Iowa, 555) 170. Dubrio v. Voss, (19 La. Ann. 210) 83 Ducat V. Chicago, (48 111. 172) 258 Ducheneau v. Ireland, (13 Pac. 87) 401 Duckworth v. New Albany, (25 Ind. 283) 134 Ducksworth v. Johnson, (4 H. & N. 653) 352 a Dudley v. Bolles, (00 Wend. 465) 321 Dudley v. Frankfort, (12 B. Mon. 610) 290. 312, 396 Dudley v. Gilmore, (35 Kan. 555) 397 Dudley v. Westen, (1 Met. 477) 107 Duerr v. Board, (26 Atl. R. 144) 83, 84 Duffield v. Detroit, (15 Mich. 474) 249 Duify V. Dubuque, (63 Iowa, 171) 343, 345 Duffy V. Hobson, (40 Cal. 240) 258 Duffy V. Upton, (113 Mass. 544) 337 Dugau V. Baltimore, (1 Gill & J. 499) 282 Dugan V. Bridge Co., (27 Pa. St. 303) 314 Dugan V. Mayor, (5 Gill & J. 375) 133 Dugan V. United States, (3 Wheat. 172) 167 Dugro, In re, (50 N. Y. 513) 172 Duke !). Brown, (96 N. C. 127) 195 d Duke V. Rome, (20 Ga. 633) 327, 331 a Duke of Buccleuch v. Metro. Board, (L. R. 5 H. L. C. 418) 330 DuUauty v. Town of Vaughn, (45 N. W. Rep. 1128) 170 Dullea V. Taylor, (35 Up. Can. Q. B. 395) 354 Duluth B. Mallet, (43 Minn. 204) 120 Duluth V. St. Paul etc. Co., (51 N. W. R. 1163) 221 Duluth V. Krupp, (49 N. W. Rep. 235) 123 Dumesnil v. Dupont, (18 B. Mon. 800) 120 Dummer v. Jersey City, (20 N. J. L. 80) 217, 227 Dunbar v. Boston, (112 Mass. 75) 92 Dunbar v. Frazer, (78 Ala. 538) 362 Dunbar v. Soule, (129 Mass. 284) 202 Duncan v. Cen. P. Ry. Co., (4 S. W. R. 228) 397 Duncan v. Louisville, (8 Bush. 98) 242, 337 Duncan v. Niles, (32 111. 532) 169 Duncan v. State, (10 So. 815) 25, 31, 314 Duncombe v. Ft. Dodge, (38 Iowa, 281) 165, 171 Dundas v. Lansing, (42 N. W. R. 1011) 3506 TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixi References are to Sections. Dunham v. Chicago, (55 111. 357) 270 Dunham v. Rochester, (,') Cow. 462) 124, 150 Dunkin v. Troy, (61 Barb. 437) 844 Dunlap V. Gallatin Co., (15 111. 9) 282 Dunlap V. Snyder, (17 Barb. 561) 129 Dunn V. Charleston, (Harper, Law, 189) 235, 238 Dunn V. Great Falls, (31 Pac. R. 1017) 297 Dunn V. Rector etc. of St. Andrews Church, (14 Johns. 118) 51 Dunnell v. Newell, (2 A. 766, 15 R. I. 233) 326 a Dunnell Mfg. Co. v. Pawtucket, (7 Gray, 277) 327 Dunnovan v. Green, (57 111. 63) 195 Dunsmore's App., (52 Pa. St. 374) 8, 104 Dupage Co. v. Jenks, (65 111. 275)397 Dupree v. Brunswick, (85 Ga. 727) 130 Duroch's App., (62 Pa. St. 491) 2, 8 Durango v. Pennington, (8 Cal. 257) 165, 170 Durant b. Jersey City, (25 N. J. L. 309) 279 Durant v. Kauffman, (34 Iowa, 194) 56, 259 Durant o. Palmer, (5 Dutch. 544) 348 Durant v. Iowa Co., (Woolw. 69) 189 a Durgin v. Dyer, (68 Me. 143) 127 Durgin v. Lowell, (3 Allen, 398) 220 Durham v. Hussraau, (55 N. W. 11) 312 Durkee b. Kenosha, (59 AVis. 122) 92 Durkee v. Jamesville, (2S Wis. 464) 256, 347 DurrB. Howard, (21 Ark. 211) 104 Durr B. Howard, (6 Ark. 461) 104 Dusenbury o. M. U. T. Co., (Abb. New Cas. 440) 297 Dusenbury b. Mayor, (25 N. J. Eq. 295) 397 Dutchess Mfg. Co. v. Davis, (14 Johns. 238) 48, 49 Dutton B. Aurora, (114 111. 138) 119 Dutton B. Board, (41 Miss. 236) 339 Dutton B. Strong, (1 Black, 23) 132 Dwight V. Springfield, (4 Gray, 107) 249, 398, 399 Dwight Printing Co. v. Boston, (122 Mass. 583) 237 Dwyer b. Brenham, (65 Tex. 526) 110 Dyckman b. New York, (5 N. Y. 434) 241 Dyer b. Bayne, (54 Mich. 87) 76 Dyer b. Brogan, (70 Cal. 136) 108 Dyer b. Chase, (52 Cal. 440) 291 Dyer b. Covington, (10 Pa. St. 200) 177 Dygert b. Schenck, (23 Wend. 446) 313, 315, 328, 348 E. Eager, In re, (46 N. T. 190) 172 Eagle V. Beard, (33 Ark. 497) 67 Eames v. New Engl. Worsted Co., (11 Met. 570) 248 Eames b. Northumberland, (44 N. H. 67) 311 Eames b. Savage, (77 Me. 212) 375 Eakia b. Brown, (1 E. D. Smith, 44) 348 Earing b. Lansing, (7 Wend. 185) 321 Earl Beauchamp b. Winn, (L. R. 6 H. L. 2J3) 327 Earl of Ripon b. Hobart, (3 Mylne & K. 169) 120 Earle v. New Brunswick, (38 N. J. L. 47) 218 Barley's App., (103 Pa. St. 273) 169 Earnhart b. Lebanon, (5 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 578) 162 Earp B. Earl, (71 111. 193) 120 East & West India Docks Co. c. Gattke, (3 MacN. & G. 155) 231 East Ave. Bapt. Church, In re, (11 N. Y. S. 113, 57 Hun, 590) 17, 187 a East Ang. E'ways Co. v. East Co. Ry. Co., (11 C. B. 775) 169 Easterly v. Goodwin, (35 Conn. 279) 66 Eastern Ry. v. Portsmouth, (62 N. H. 344) 303 E. Dallas b. State, (73 Tex. 370) 380 East Dannas b. State, (73 Tex. 371) 55 East Hartford b. Hartf. R. Co. (10 How. 511) 12 East Kingston b. Towle, (48 N. H. 57) 129 Easton S. E. & W. E. Ry. Co. Appeal, (25 W. N. C. 493) 302 E. Lincoln b. Davenport, (94 IT. S. 801) 186, 196 East Livermore b. Fai'mington, (74 Me. 154) 66 Eastman v. Meredith, (36 N. H. 280) 132, 314, 325, 332, 355 Eastman b. Clackamas Co., (34 Fed. Rep. 139) 339 Easton Road, (8 Eawle, 195) 288 Easton b. Neff, (102 Pa. St. 474) 327 Easton's Case, (12 A. &. E. 645) 104 East Riv. etc. Co. v. Donnelly, (93 N. Y. 557) 173 East Portland b. Multnomah Co., (6 Ore. 62) 259 East Riv. Bridge etc., In re, (26 Hun, 490) 305 Ixii TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. East St. Louis v. Flanlgan, (26 111. App. 449) 13, 189 a East St. Louis v. Gas Co., (98111. 415) 104 East St. Louis v. Giblin, (3 111. App. 219) 347 East St. Louis v. Klug, (3 111. App. 90) 347 E. St. Louis V. Launtz, (20 111. App. 644) 87 East St. Louis v. St. John, (47 111. 463) 240 East St. Louis w. Trustees, (102 111. 489) 123 East St. Louis v. Underwood, (105 111. 308) 2ii() East St. Louis v. Wehrung, (46 111. 392) 113, 125 East St. Louis v. Zebley, (110 U. S. 321) 260 East St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. v. Eisen- trant, (24 N. E. K. 760) 354 East St. Louis etc. Co. v. East St. Louis, (31 m. App. 398) 161 East Stroudsburg, In re, (9 Pa. Co. Ct. 529) 48 Eaton V. Boston etc. E. R. Co., (51 N. H. 504) 233, 239, 353 Eaton V. Burke, (22 Atl. R. 452) 34, 361, 363 Eaton V. Manitowoc Co., (44 Wis. 489) 3, 282 Eaton V. Monroe. (63 Mich. 525) 171 Eaton E. R. R. Co., (51 N. H. 504, 529) 292, 329 Eaton V. State, (7 Blackf. 65) 380 Eaton & H. R. R. Co. v. Hunt, (20 Ind. 457) 191 b Eaves, In re, (30 Fed. Rep. 21) 83 Ebey b. Ebey, (1 Wash. Ter. 185) 244 Eckhard u. Donahue, (9 Daly, 214) 283 Eckstein, In re, (24 Atl. R. 63, 30. W. N. C. 59) 86 Edenton o. Wool, (65 N. C. 379) 102 Edenville v. C. M. & P. R. Co., (77 Iowa, 69) 218 Edgerly v. Concord, (59 N. H. 78) 338 a Edgerton i-. Green Cove Springs, (19 Ela. 140) 248, 259 a Edgerton v. Municipality, (1 La. An. 435) 375 Edgewood, In re, (18 Atl. R. 646) 24 Edge wood W. Co. v. Troy W. Co., (7 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 476) 238 Edings c. Seabrook, (12 Rich. L. 504) 239 Edmonds v. Herbrandson, (50 N. W. R. 970) 26 Edmunds v. Gookins, (20 Ind. 477) 55 Edmundston i-. Pittsburgh etc. Co. (Ill Pa. St. 316) 347 Edwards b. Kearzey, (96 U. S. 595) 194 Edwards b. U. S., (103 U. S. 471) 78, 86, 370 Edwards v. Watertown, (61 How. Pr. 463) 93, 113 Eflfingham v. Hamilton, (68 Miss. 523) 374 Ege ». Koontz, (3 Pa. St. 109) 327 Egington, In re, (2 E. & B. 717) 104 Egleston b. City Council, (1 Mill. Const. 45) 102 Egypt Street, (2 Grant, 455) 33 Egyptian Levee Company v. Hardin, (27 Mo. 495) 248 Ehrgott V. Mayor etc. of New York, (96 >r. Y. 264, 6 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 31, 48 Am. Rep. 622) 57, 3386, 351, 352 a Eichels b. Evansville St. Ry. Co., (78 Ind. 261) 33, 144, 304 Eichenlaub v. St. Joseph, (21 S. W. R. 8) 146 Eidemiller r. Wyandotte City, (2 Dillon C. C. 376) 249 Eifert o. Central Covington, (15 S. W. R. 180) 276 Eilert b. Oshkosh, (14 Wis. 576) 265 Elam V. State, (75 Ind. 518) 81, 82 Elder b. Dwight Mfg. Co., (4 Gray, 201) 104 Eldora v. Burlingame, (62 Iowa, 32) 108 Eldridge b. Smith, (34 Vt. 484) 235 Elgin B. Beckwith, (119 111. 367) 225 Elgin B. Eaton, (83 111. 537) 330 Elgin 0. Kimball, (90 111. 356) 355 Elgin V. PofE, (38 111. Ap. 362) 92 Eliasou B. Coleman, (86 IST. C. 235) 67 Elizabeth b. Combs, (10 Bush, 382) 311 Elizabeth b. Force, (29 N. J. Eq. 591) 192 &, 195 6 Elizabethtown c. Leffler, (23 111. 90) 158 Elizabethtown etc. Co. v. Thompson, (79 Ky. 52) 803 Elizabeth L. etc. Co. e. Combs, (10 Bush. 382) 352 a Elkins V. Athearn, (1 Hill, 50) 363 Elkliart v. Ritter, (66 Ind. 136) 352 a Elkhart b. Weckwire, (22 N. E. E. 342) 348, 355 EUerman o. McXains, (30 La. An. 65) 12, 13 Ellet V. St. Louis etc. Co., (76 Mo. 518) 353 EUebric Ry. Co. b. Grand Rapids, (84 Mich. 257) 302 TABLE or CASES CITED. Beferences are to Sections. Ixiii Elliott V. Falrhaven etc. R. R. Co., (32 Conn. 579, 58t)) 238, 304 Elliott V. Oil City, (18 Atl. R. 553) 355 Elliott V. Oliver, (29 Pac. R. 1) 368 Elliott V. Pliila., (f Pliila. 128) 92, 312 Elliott V. Williamson, (11 Lea, 38) 312 Ellis V. Bristol, (2 Gray, 370) 373 Ellis !). Iowa City, 29 Iowa, 229) 354 a, 355 Ellis V. Peru, (23 111. Ap. 35) 352 Ellis V. Sheffield etc., (23 L. J. Q. B. 42) 295 Ellis V. State, (5 Ind. 77) 5 Ellis V. State, (4 Ind. 1) 07 Ellis V. State, (21 S. W. R. 66) 312 Ellis B. Ry. Co., (77 Wis. 114) 184 Ellison V. Lindford, (28 Pao. R. 744) 276 Ellison t). Aldermen of Raleigh, (89 N. C. 125) 361, 371 EUsworth 0. Lord, (42 N. W. R. 389, 40 Minn. 337) 217, 220 Ellsworth V. Nelson, (46 N. W. R. 740) 29 Ellsworth !). Rossiter, (26 Pac. 274) 165 Ell. Co. V. Kitchen, (14 Bush, 289) 364 Ellyson, In re, (20 Gratt. 10) 401 Elma V. Carney, (30 Pac. R. 732) 283 Elmendorf v. Covert, (1 Hill, 674) 398 Elmendorf c. Mayor, (25 Wend. 693) 54, 98 Elmwood V. Marcy, (92 U. S. 289) 187 a Elsterc. Springfield, (301^. E. R. 274) 292, 329 Elrod ». Bernadotte, (53 111. 368) 212, 375 Elstonj). Crawfordsville, (20 Ind. 272) 61 Elwell V. Prop'rs etc., (3 H. of L. Cases, 812) 312 Elwell !). Greenwood, (26 Iowa, 377) 396 Ely V. Parsons, (55 Conn. 83) 220 Ely V. Rochester, (26 Barb. 133) 141 Ely V. Supervisors, (36 N. Y. 297) 122 . Elyton Ld. Co. v. Ayres, (62 Ala. 413) 397 Episcopal C. So. v. Epis. Church, (1 Pick. 372) 170 Erd V. Paul, (22 Minn. 446) 3506, 351 El' Paso V. Causey, (1 111. Ap. 531) 336 a Embury v. Conner, (3 N". Y. 511) 240 Emerich «. Indianapolis, (118 Ind. 279) 62 Emerson v. Saltmarsh, (7 A. & E. 266) 259 a Emerson v. Babcock, (66 Iowa, 257) 300 Emery v. Lowell, (104 Mass. 13) 326 a, 355 Emery v. Mariaville, (56 Me. 315) 177, 179 Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co., (28 Cal. 345) 248, 256, 271, 281 Emery v. Washington, (1 Brayton, 128) 223 Emigrant Co. v. Wright Co., (97 U. S. 339) 166 Emmelmaun v. Indianapolis, (108 Ind. 530) 343 Emmerton v. Mathews, (7 H. & N. 586) 127 Emmett, In re, (65 How. Pr. 266) 84 Emmert v. Belong, (16 La. An. 317) 92 Emmons ». Lewiston, (24 N. E. R. 58) 123 Empire L. & B. Ass'n i>. City of At- lanta, (77 Ga. 496) 396 Emporia v. Gilchrist, (15 Pao. 532, 37 Kan. 621) 327 Emporia v. Norton, (16 Kan. 236) 17, 148 Emporia v. Smith, (22 Pac. R. 616) 8, 55 Emporia v. Sohmidling, (7 Am. Eng. Cor. Cas. 86) 342 Emporia v. Soden, (25 Kan. 588) 239, 396 Emporia v. Volner, (12 Kan. 622) 105 Enfield Bridge Co. v. Hartford, (17 Conn. 40) 313 Enfield v. Jordan, (119 U. S. 680) 3 England v. New York Publishing Co., (8 Daly, 375) 48 English V. People, (96 111. 566) 256 English V. Smock, (34 Ind. llo) 391 Enrighti). Atlanta, (78 Ga. 288) 3506 Erie's App.,( 91 Pa. St. 398) 189 Erie v. Caulkins, (85 Pa. St. 24) 92, 343 Erie v. Erie Canal Co., (59 Pa. St. 174) 2, '8, 15, 136, 319 Erie v. Flint, (8 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 482) 2 Erie v. Reed's Ex., (113 Pa. St. 468) 255, 392 Erie v. Sohwingle, (22 Pa. St. 384) 352 Erie v. Magill, (101 Pa. St. 616) 352 Erie Co. v. Butler, (120 Pa. St. 374) 281 ' Erie Co. v. Jones, (119 N. Y. 337) 79 Erie County v. E. Water Com'rs, (113 Pa. St. 368) 271 Ixiv TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Ernst V. Kunkle, (5 Ohio St. 520) 259 a Escanaba v. Chicago, (107 U. S. 678) 314 Eschback v. Pitts, (6 Md. 71) 282, 283, 284 Eslava v. Jones, (83 Ala. 139) 338 Essex J). Assessors, (26 N. E. K. 431) 271 Essex V. Day, (52 Conn. 483) 196 Essex Pub. Rd. Board v. Skinkle, (140 U. S. 334) 8, 32 Estes D. Owen, (90 Mo. 113) 291, 293 Estelle V. Lake Crystal, (27 Minn. 243) 331 a, 346, 352 Estep V. Keokuk Co., (18 Iowa, 199) 169 Estey V. Starr, (56 Vt. 690) 98 Estey V. Westminster, (97 Mass. 324) 170 Etherington v. Wilson, (L. K. 1 Ch. Div. 160) 66 Etherington v. P. P. etc. E. E. Co., (88 ST. Y. 641) 352 a Eudora v. Miller, (30 Kan. 494) 314, 353 Eufaula v. McNab, (67 Ala. 588) 110, 188 Eufaula v. Simmons, (86 Ala. 515) 354 a Eureka Basin, In re, (96 If. T. 42) 188 Eureka v. Davis, (21 Kan. 578) 125 Eureka v. Armstrong, (22 P. Rep. 828) 221, 310 Eustace v. Johns, (38 Cal. 3) 346, 348 Evans v. Adams, (122 Ind. 362) 352 Evans d. Evansville, (37 Ind. 229) 219 Evans v. Erie Co., (66 Pa. St. 222) 312 Evans v. Jus., (3 Hayw. 26) 83 Evans v. Job, (8 Nev. 322) 26 Evans b. Miss. etc. Co., (64 Mo. 453) 396 Evans v. North Side etc. Co., (26 Fed. Rep. 718) 353 Evans v. People, (28 N. E. R. 1111) 278 Evans v. Populus, (22 La. Ann. 121) 79 Evans v. Trenton, (24 N. J. L. 764) 79 Evans v. Utica, (69 N. T. 166) 352 Evanstou b. Gunn, (99 U. S. 660) 324, 349 ' Evansville v. Decker, (84 lud. 325, 328) 353 Evansville v. Evans, (37 Ind. 229) 217 Evansville v. Evansville, (15 Ind. 395) 177 ' Evansville v. Hall, (14 Ind. 27) 272 Evansville i). Martin, (41 Ind. 145) 120 Evansville v. Paige, (23 Ind. 525) 56, 220 Evansville v. Phistere, (34 Ind. 36) 397 Evansville v. State, (118 Ind. 426) 18, 256 Evansville etc. Co. v. Crist, (116 Ind. 453) 352 Evansville etc. Co. v. Evansville, (15 Ind. 395) 196 Evansville & C. R. R. Co. v. Miller, (30 Ind. 209) 245 Everett v. Baily, (24 Atl. R. 700, 150 Pa. St. 152) 313 Everett v. Council Bluffs, (46 Iowa, 6) 120 Everett v. Marquette, (53 Mich. 450) 120 Everson v. Syracuse, (100 N. T. 577) 338 Evertsen v. Nat. Bank of Newport, (11 N. Y. S. C. 694) 190 Every v. Smith, (26 L. J. Excb. 344) 224 Ewbanks v. Ashley, (36 111. 177) 148, 156 Ewing V. Dallas Co., (19 S. W. R. 380) 40 Ewing V. Hoblitzelle, (85 Mo. 73) 302 Ewing V. Filley, (43 Pa. St. 384) 65, 104 Ewing V. St. Louis, (5 Wall. 413, 419) 397, 398 Ewing V. State, (16 S. W. R. 872) 54 Exchange Alley, In re, (4 La. An. 4) 240 Exchange Bank of Columbus v. Hines, (3 Ohio St. 1) 269 Exeter v. Starre, (2 Show. 159) 158 Excelsior Brick Co. v. Haverstraw, (62 Hun, 620) 308 Eyerly v. Jasper Co., (72 Iowa, 149) 375 Eyerman v. Provenchere, (15 Mo. App. 256) 171 Eyerman v. Blaksley, (78 Mo. 145) 248 Eyerman v. Blaksley, (78 Mo. 145) 259 a Eyler v. County Com'rs, (49 Md. 257) 347 Eyraan v. People, (6 111. 8) 400 F. Faber v. St. Paul etc. Co., (29 Minn. 465) 136 Fair v. Philadelphia, (88 Pa. St. 309) 327 a, 354 (i Fair v. London & N. W. Ry. Co., (21 L. T. n: S. 327) 352 a Fairchild v. Bascom, (35 Vt. 398) 309 TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixv References are to Sections. Fail-child ». Ogdensburg etc. Co., (15 N. T. 338) 177 Fairchild v. R. Co., (15 N. Y. 387) 179 Fail-child v. Wall, (29 Pac R. 60, 93 Cal. 401) 281 Fairfield v. People, (94 111. 244) 262 Fail-field v. RatclifE, (20 Iowa, 396) 256 Faiiiawn Coal Co. v. Scranton, (23 Atl. R. 1069, 148 Pa. St. 231) 328 Falconer v. BufC. etc. Co., (69 N. Y. 491) 186 Fall Eiv. etc. v. Old Col. R. R., (5 Allen, 221) 814 Falls V. Cairo, (58 111. 408) 826 a Falmer v. Nuckolls Co., (6 Neb. 204) 395 Fanning v. Gregoire, (16 How. 524) 134 Faribault v. Misener, (20 Minn. 396) 260 a Fai-ibauelt v. Wilson, (34 Minn. 254) 153 Fai-ist etc.Co. C.Bridgeport, (60 Conn. 278) 235 Farmers etc. v. Coventry, (10 Johns. 389) 320 Farmers L. & I. Co. v. Galesburg, (133 U. S. 156) 174 Farmers M. Co. v. R.R.Co., (10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 25) 232 Farmers M. Co. v. R. R. Co., (21 Atl. 902, 28 W. N. C. Ill) 247 Farmington etc. Co. v. Commission- ei-s, (112 Mass. 206) 279 Farmington R. W. P. Co. v. Comrs., (112 Mass. 206) 399 Farnham v. Sherry, (74 Wis. 568, 37 N. W. R. 577) 271 Farnumu. Concord, (2N. Y. 392) 325, 352 ■ Famsworth v. Boston, (121 Mass. 173) 368 Farnsworth v. Pawtucket, (13 R. I. 82) 169 Farrar v. Greene, (32 Me. 574) 352 Farrar v. St. Louis, (80 Mo. 379) 279 Farfell v. Bridgeport, (45 Conn. 191) 07, 85, 89 Farrell v. King, (41 Conn. 448) 106 Farrell v. Winchester Ave., (61 Conn. 127, 23 Atl. 757) 306 a Farrelly v. Cincinnati, (2 Disney, 516) 852 a Farrington v. Tennessee, (95 IT. S. 679) 273 Farris v. Dudley, (78 Ala. 124) 354 a Farquar v. Roseburg, (21 Pac. Rep. 1103) 349 Farwell v. Cambridge, (11 Gray, 413) 245 Farwell v. Chicago, (71 Illinois 269) 298 Farwell e. Hathaway, (22 N. E. R. 849) 267 Farwell v. Smith, (1 Harr. 133) 158 Fash V. Third etc. Co., (1 Daly, 105) 302 Faulkner v. Home, (29 N. E. R. 645) •49 Fauntleroy v. Hannibal, (1 Dillon, C. C. 118) 31 Faust v. Huntington, (91 Ind. 498) 220 Fay, In re, (15 Pick. 243) 184 Fay B. Weber, (48 N. W. R. 859) 39 6 Fay V. Wood, (32 N. W. R. 614) 263 Fayette v. Shafrath, (25 Mo. 445) 104 Fayette Co. ». Peoples Bank, (47 Ohio St. 503) 259 a Feiten v. Milwaukee, (47 Wis. 494) 242 Feldman v. Charleston, (23 S. C. 57) 188 Fellows V. Walker, (89 Fed. R. 657) 26, 392 Fellows 1). Fayette Soh. Dis., (39 Me. 559) 326 a Fellowes v. New Haven, (44 Conn. 240) 329 Feltmakers v. Davis, (1 Bos. & P. 98, 100) 149, 157 Feltham v. England, (L. R. 2 Q. B. 3.3) 337 Felton V. Addison, (101 Ind. 58) 279 Fennimore v. New Orleans, (20 La An. 124) 836 a Fenton ». Scott, (17 Or. 189) 65 Fenwick v. Sears, (2 Cranch. 150) 77 Fesh V. Com., (4 Dana, 522) 102 Fession v. Landrey, (24 N. E. R. 96) 221 Ferguson v. Chittenden, (6 Ark. 479) 99 Ferguson v. Davis Co., (57 Iowa, 601) 853 Ferguson v. Landran, (5 Bush, 230) 254 Ferguson b. Selma, (43 Ala. 398) 118, 120 Fernald v. Boston, (12 Cush. 574) 830 Ferris v. Bramble, (5 Ohio St. 109) 234 a Ferris v. Wellborn, (64 Miss. 29) 896 Ferry u. Ferry, (2 Cush. 92) 199 Ferry Co. v. Boston, (101 Mass. 350) 360 Fertilizer Co. ». Hyde Park, (97 U. S. 659) 129 Fetterly ». Municipality etc., (14 U. C. Q. B. 433) 164 Ixvi TABLE OF CASES CITED. Beferences are to Sections. Ficklen v. Taxing District, (145 U. S. 1, 12 S. Ct. 810) 258 Fidelity etc. Co. v. Shenandoah etc. Co., (32 W. Va. 244) 53 Field V. Can-, (59 111. 198) 215, 221 Field V. Chipley, (79 Ky. 260) 80 Field D. Commonwealth, (32 Pa. St. 478) 83, 85 Field V. Des Moines, (39 Iowa, 57?) 335, 338 Field ». Girard Col., (54 Pa. St. 233) 75 Field B. West Orange, (36 N. J. Eq. 118) 354 a Fields 1;. Stockley, (99 Pa. St. 306) 335 Fifth St., In re, (17 Wend. 667) 329 Fifteenth Ward, Ee, (11 Phila. 466) 63 Filby V. Combe, (2 M. &W. 677) 129, 130 Files V. State, (3 S. W. K. 817, 48 Ark. 529) 270 Finch V. Temaha Co. Sup., (29 Cal. 453) 269 Fink V. Milwaukee, (17 Wis. 26) 155 Fink ». Missouri etc. Co., (82 Mo. 283) 347 Fink V. Newark, (40 N. J. L. 11) 247 Finley v. Philadelphia, (32 Pa. St. 381) 272 Finnell v. Kates, (19 Ohio St. 405) 279 Finney v. Oshkosh, (18 Wis. 220) 265 Finnegan v. Fernandina, (15 Fla. 379) 282 Fire Dept. v. Chanman, (10 Daly, 377) 131 Fire Dept. v. Hill, (14 N. Y. S. 158) 13 Fire Dept. v. Kip, (10 Wend. 266) 23, 31 Fire Dept. v. Stetson, (14 Daly, 125, 6 N. y. St. R. 255) 131 Fire Dept. v. Sturtevant, (33 Hun, 407) 131 Fire Dept. v. Wendell, (13 Daly, 430) lol Fire Dept. v. Wright, (3 E. D. Smith, 478) 258 First Bap. Church v. Utica etc., (6 Barb. 313) 301 First Eccl. Soo. of H. v. Hartford, (38 Conn. 274) 326 First Municipality o. McDonough, (2 Robinson, 244) 182 First N. Bk. v. Arlington, (16 Blatch. 57) 190 a First Nat. Bk. v. Americus, (68 Ga. 119) 326 a First Nat. Bk. v. Cook, (77 111. 622) 397 First Nat. Bk. v. County Com'rs, (14 Minn. 79) 191 First Nat. Bk. v. Lindsay, (43 Fed. R. 619) 259 a First Nat. Bk. v. Mt. Tabor, (52 Vt. 87) 191, 193 First Nat. Bk. etc. v. Nat. Ex. Bank, (92 U. S. 122) 143 First Nat. Bk. v. Salem etc. Co., (39 Fed. R. 89) 51 First Nat. Bk. of Louisville ». Com- monwealth, (9 Wall. 353) 258 Fish V. Dodge, (4 Den. 311) 120 Fish V. Kelly, (17 C. B. N. S. 194) 338 Fish V. Rochester, (6 Paige, 268) 293 Fisli 11. Weatherwax, (2 Johns. Cas. 217) .371 Fisher v. Beard, (32 Iowa, 346) 217, 221 Fislier b. Boston, (104 Mass. 87) 92, 130, 332, 335, 338 a Fisher v. .Charlestown, (17 W. Va. 595, 17 lb. 682) 375 Fislier v. Harrisburg, (2 Grant Cas. 291) 154, 294 Fisher v. McGirr, (1 Gray, 1) 122 Fisher v. Rochester, (6 Lans. 223) 293 Fisher v. Sch. Dis. No. 17, (4 Cush. 494) 99, 170 Fisher v. San Diego, (24 Pac. 1000, 86 Cal. 158) 54 Fisher v. Thirkell, (21 Mich. 1) 298 Fisk V. Chester, (8 Gray, 506) 66 Fisk V. Havana, (88 111. 208) 219 Fisk B. Jefferson Par. etc., (11617.8. 131) 79, 377 Fiske, Ex parte, (72 Cal. 125) 130, 148 Fiske B. Hazard, (7 R. I. 4.38) 139 Fiske B. Chicago etc. E. E. Co., (13 Barb. 472) 66 Fitch V. Creighton, (24 How. 159) 283 Fitch V. Pinckard, (5 111. 78) 110, 159, 265 Fitchburg etc. Co. b. Grand etc. Co., (1 Allen, 552) 302 Fitz u. Boston, (4 Cush. 365) 342 Fitzpatrick v. Slooum, (89 N. Y. 358) 92 Fitzgerald v. Berlin, (64 Wis. 203)346 Fitzgerald b. Berlin, (51 Wis. 81) 343 Fitzgerald v. Weston, (32 Wis. 354) 352 Fitzsimmons v. B'klyn, (102 N. Y. 536) 79 Fitzsimmons v. Brooklyn, (102 N. Y. 536) 85 Flack ». Fry, (32 W. Va. 364) 62 Flagg B. Elmira, (33 Mo. 440) 192 6 Flagg B. Hudson, (142 Mass. 280) SSI Flagg B. Palmyra, (33 Mo. 440) 196, 364, 376 TABLE OF CASES CITED. Keferences are to Sections. Ixvii Flagg ». St. Charles, (27 La. An. 319) 177 Flagg V. Worcester, (13 Gray, 601) 328, 355 Flanagan v. Plainfield, (44 N. J. L. 118) 121 Flatbusli Av., In re, (1 Barb. 286) 259 a Flatbush, In re, (60 N. Y. 398) 15 Fleckner v. U. S. Bank, (8 Wheat. 338, 357) 165 Fleming, In re, (4 Hill, 581) 359 Fleming b. Shenandoah, (71 Iowa, 456) 352 a Fleming v. Guthrie, (3 Law Rep. An. 53) 360 Fleming v. Manchester, (44 L. J. N. S. 617) 328 Fleming ». Mershom, (37 Iowa, 413) 397 Fletcher v. Auburn etc. Co., (25 Wend. 462) 302 Fletcher v. Oliver, (25 Ark. 289) 259 Fletcher v. Oshkosh, (18 Wis. 229) 265 Fletcher ». Peck, (6 Cranch, 135) 10 Fleuellen v. Proetzel, (15 S. W. R. 1043) 32 Flick, In re, (6 Gulp, 329) 224 Flint v. Russell, (5 Dill. 151) 120 Flori B. St. Louis, (69 Mo. 341) 325 336 a Flower, In re, (29 IST. E. R. 463) 16 Floyd V. Cora'rs, (14 Ga. 358) 102, 104, 156 Floyd V. Turner, (23 Tex. 293) 243 Floyd Acceptances, (7 Wall. 667) 177 Floyd Co. V. Day, (19 Ind. 450) 179, 180 Flynn v. Boston, (26 N. E. B. 868) 54 Flynn u. Canton, (40 Md. 312) 324, 327, 346 Flynn ». Com'rs, (22 N. E. R. 1100) 316 Flynn ». Detroit, (53 N. W. R. 815, 93 Mich. 590) 312, 314 Flynn ». Taylor, (28 N. E. R. 418, 127 N. Y. 596, aff'g 6 N. Y. S. 96) 396 Fogg V. Nahant, (98 Mass. 578) 342 Foley J). Haverhill, (144 Mass. 352) 326 Folinsbee v. Amstex-dam, (21 N. Y. S. 42) 292 Follman u. Mankato, (45 Minn. 457) 355 FoUmer ». Nuckolls Co., (6 Neb. 204) 173 FoUweiler ». Lutz, (112 Pa. St. 107) 66 Folsom V. Underhill, (36 Vt. 580) 223, 352 Folsom V. Sch. Dis., (91 HI. 404) 182 Folsom, In re, (56 N. Y. 60) 264 Folts V. Huntley, (7 Wend. 210) 244 Foltz B. Kerlin, (105 Ind. 221) 74 Foot V. Bronson, (4 Lansing, 47) 355 Foote t). Hancock, (15 Blatchf. 343) 195 c, 199 Foote V. Cincinnati, (11 Ohio, 408) 24,244 Forbush v. Norwich, (38 Conn. 225) 92 Force v. Batavia, (61 111. 99) 65 Ford B. Board etc., (81 Cal. 19) 83 Ford B. Clough, (8 Me. 334) 142, 302 Ford B. Cartersville, (84 Ga. 213) 266 Ford B. Har. Comrs., (81 Cal. 19) 79 Ford B. No. Des Moines, (45 N. W. R. 1031) 24 Ford B. Thrailkill, (84 Ga. 169) 146 Ford B. Umatilla Co., (16 Pac. Rep. 33) 353 Ford B. Williams, (13 N. Y. 577, 585) 167 Foreman b. Canterbury, (L. R. 6 Q. B. 214) 342 Fork Ridge etc. Assn. b. Redd, (10 S. E. R. 405, 33 W. Va. 262) 232 Forney b. Calhoun Co., (86 Ala. 463) 215, 218 Forney b. Calhoun Co., (84 Ala. 215, 4 So. 153) 216 Forristal v. Milwaukee, (57 Wis. 628) 174 ForsterB. Scott, (17 N. Y. S. 479) 243 Forsyth b. Kreuter, (100 Ind. 27) 278 Forsyth b. Atlanta, (45 Ga. 152) 327 a Porsythe v. Hooper, (11 Allen, 419) 347 Fort Dodge b. More, (37 Iowa, 388) 271 Fort Dodge b. Minn. R. R. Co., (54 N. W. R. 243) 317 Ft. Edward etc. ». Payne, (17 Barb. 567) 318 Fortin b. East Hampton, (145 Mass. 196) 344 Fort Scott ». Hickman, (112 U. S. 150) 199 Fort Smith v. Dodson, (46 Ark. 296) 155 Fort Smith v. McKibhen, (41 Ark. 45) 312 Fort St. etc. Co. b. Jones, (83 Mich. 415) 241 Fort Wayne v. Breeze, (23 N. E. 1038) 352 Fort Wayne b. Combs, (107 Ind. 75) 353 Fort Wayne b. DeWitt, (47 Ind. 396) 312 a Fort Wayne b. Jackson, (7 Blackf 36)50 Ixviii TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Fort Wayne v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ky. Co., (32 N. E. R. 215) 208 Fort Wayne v. Eosenthal, (75 Ind. 156) 166 Fort Wayne v. Shaaf, (106 Ind. 66) 259 a, 397 Fort Worth v. Davis, (57 Tex. 225) 265 Fort Worth etc. Co. v. Downie, (82 Tex. 383) 246 Fort Worth v. Howard, (22 S. W. E. 1059) 330 Fort Worth v. Crawford, (74 Tex. 404) 120, 327 a FosdiokB. Hempstead, (125 N. Y. 581, 26 N. E. K. 801) 203 Fosdick V. Perryville, (14 Ohio St. 472) 188 Foshay v. Glen Haven, (25 Wis. 288) 342 Fosters. Boston, (127 Mass. 290) 350 b Foster v. Coleman, (10 Cal. 27«) 177 Foster v. Findlay, (5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 455) 86 Foster v. Goddard, (40 Me. 64) 321 Foster v. Juniata B. Co., (4 Har. 393) ■353 Foster v. Kansas, (112 U. S. 201) 83, 121 Foster v. Kenosha, (12 Wis. 615) 195 Foster v. Koads, (19 Johns. 191) 153 Foster v. Scarf, (15 Oliio St. 535) 65 Foster v. St. Louis, (71 Mo. 157) 254 a Foster v. Shaw, (7 Serg. & Kawle, 163) 52 Foster ■». Swope, (41 Mo. App. 137) 352 Fountain v. Warren Co., (27 N". E. R. 125) 15 Fourth Av., In re, (4 Wend. 452) 359 a Fowle V. Alexandria, (3 Pet. 398) 32, 331 Fowler, In re, (53 K. T. 60) 232, 233 Fowler v. Atkinson, (6 Minn. 579) 167 Fowler v. Pierce, (2 Cal. 165) 368 Fox V. Catherine etc. Co., (12 Pa. Co. Ct. 180) 302 Fox V. Glastenbury, (29 Conn. 204) 352 Fox V. Hart, (11 Ohio, 414) 312 Fox V. Lansingburgh, (59 Hun, 617) 326 a, 350 6 Pox V. McDonald, (13 So. R. 416) 74 Fox ». Northern Liberties, (3 Watts & S. 103) 338 Fox V. Rockford, (38 111. 451) 288 Fox V. Sackett, (10 Allen, 535) 352 Fox V. Shipman, (19 Mich. 218) 177 Fox I). State, (5 How. 410) 117 Fox's Will, (52 N. Y. 530, 94 U. S. 315) 202 Frammer v. Richmond, (31 Gratt. 646) 123 Francis v. Blair, (96 Mo. 515) 18 Francis v. Cockrell, (5 Q. B. 184) 121 Francis v. Troy, (74 N. Y. 338) 164 Franey v. Miller, (11 Pa. St. 434) 215 Frank, In re, (52 Cal. 606) 110, 150, 159 Frank v. San Fran., (21 Cal. 668) 375 Frankford etc. v. Philadelphia, (58 Pa. St. 119) 302 Frankfort v. Anghe, ( 15 W. E. Rep. 802) 158 Frankfort B. Co. v. Williams, (9 Da- na, 403) 317 Frankfort Bridge Co v. Frankfort, (18 B. Mon. 41) 51, 164 Frankfort etc. Co. v. Philadelphia, (58 Pa. St. 119) 123 Franklin v. S. E. Ry. Co., (3 H. & N. 211) 352 a Franklin B. Fisk, (13 Allen, 211) 354 a Franklin v. Winopa etc. Co., (37 Minn. 409) 351 Franklin Co. Ct. v. Dep. Bank, (9 S. W. R. 212) 268 Franklin Co. Gram. Sch. v. Baily, (62 Vt. 467) 9 Franklin Co. Comm'rs v. Lathrop, (9 Kan. 453) 215 Franklin's Trust, (24 Atl. 626) 203 Franklin Wlif. Co. v. Portland, (67 Me. 46) 355 Franklyn v. Portland, (67 Me. 46) 300 Franklyn, Succession of, (7 La. Ann. 395) 66 Frankner v. Aurora, (85 Ind. 130) 331 Franz v. Railroad Co., (55 Iowa, 107) 238, 303 Frautz ». Jacob, (11 S. W. 654) 188 Frazee, In re, (63 Mich. 396) 152, 154 159 Frazier b. Warfield, (73 Md. 279) 114 Freburg v. Davenpoi-t, (63 Iowa, 119) 329 Freeh v. Philadelphia, ( 39 Md. 574) 338 Frederick v. Augusta, (5 Ga. 561) 17, 134, 101 Frederick v. Goshen, (20 Md. 436) 395 Frederick Co. v. Winchester, (57 S. E. Rep. 884) 216, 226, 229 Freedman v. Sigel, ( 10 Blatclif. 327) 258 Freeholders v. Barber, ( 2 Halst. 64) 124 Freeholders D. Towns, (20 N. Y. State Rep. 394) 310 Freeholders v. Strader, ( 18 K. J. L. lOS) 325 TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixix References are to Sections. Freeland v. Hastings, (10 Allen, 570) 138, 254. Freeman v. Phlla., (13 Pliila. 154) 92 Fieemansburg v. Rogers, (8 Atl. 872) 292 Freeport v. Isbell, (83 III. 440) 344 a Fi-eeport v. Marks, ( 59 Pa. St. 253) 149 Fremont v. Boling, ( 11 Cal. 380) 397 Fremont etc. Co. v. Holt Co., (45 N. W. R. 163) 326 Fremont v. Marley, (25 Keb. 138) 355 Fremont etc. v. Sherwin, (6 Neb. 48) 184 French ». Auburn, (62 Me. 452) 164 French v. Boston, (129 Mass. 592) 353 French v. Brunswick, (21 Me. 29) 346 French v. Quincy, (3 Allen, 9) 202, 203 French v. Springwells H. Comm'rs, (12 Mich. 267) 249 French v. White, (24 Conn. 174) 234 Frend v. Dennett, (4 C. B. 576) 165 Fresno v. Canal & Irr. Co., (32 Pac. 943) 300 Fretwell v. Troy, (18 Kan. 271) 123 Frevert v. Finrock, (31 Ohio St. 621) 391 Frick V. St. Lonis etc. Co., ( 75 Mo. 595) 136 Friday v. Floyd, (63 HI. 50) 129 Friesner v. Charlotte, ( 52 N. W. 18) 24 Frigally v. Memphis, (6 Coldw. 382) 104 Frio V. Earnest, (16 S. W. 1036) 325 Fritsch v. Allegheny, (91 Pa. St. 226) 342 Fritz V. First Div. etc. Co., (22 Minn. 404) 129 Fritz V. Hobson, ( L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 542) 120, 307 Fritz ». Kansas City, (84 Mo. 632) 325, 327, 346 Frolickstein v. Mobile, (40 Ala. 725) 134 Frommer v. Richmond, ( 31 Gratt. 646) 124 Front «. Belmont, (6 Allen, 152) 136 Front St. Cable Ry. Co. v. Johnston, (25 Pac. R. 1084) 212 Frost v. Flick, (1 Dakota, 131) 397 Frost V. Leatherman, (55 Mich. 33) 265 Frost V. Waltham, (12 Allen, 85) 352 Frostburg v. Duffy, ( 70 Md. 47) 355 Frostburg v. Hitchins, ( 16 Atl. R. 380) 355 Fi-y V. Albemarle Co., (9S. E. R. 1004) 325 Fry V. Comrs., (82 N. C. 304) 375 Fry, In re, (3 Mackey, 135) 105 Fry's Election, (71 Pa. St. 302) 66 Fullam V. Brookfleld, (9 Allen, 1) 165, 167 Fuller V. Atlanta, (66 Ga. 80) 329 Fuller V. Chicago, (89 111. 282) 189 a Fuller V. Edings, (11 Rich. Law, 739) 133, 239 Fuller V. Groton, (14 Gray, 340) 115 Fuller, In re, (25 Ark. 261) 363 Fulliam v. Muscatine, (30 N. W. R. 861) 346, 352 Fulsome v. Concord, (46 Vt. 135) 351 Fulton V. Lincoln, (9 Neb. 358) 165, 265 Fulton V. Mehrenfield, (8 Ohio St. 440) 215 Fulton V. Riverton, ( 42 Minn. 395 ) 196 Fulton Co. V. Miss. etc. Co., (21 111. 338) 189 Fulton Co. V. Rickel, ( 106 Ind. 501 ) 325, 353 Fulweiler v. St. Louis, ( 61 Mo. 479 ) 103 Funk's Admrs. ». Waynesboro, (10 Atl. R. 427) 242 Furraan v. Nichol, (8 Wall. 44) 14 Furnell v. St. Paul, (20 Minn. 117) 342, 346, 350 b. <3r. GabeU v. Houston, (29 Tex. 335) 134 Gaddis v. Richmond, (92 Ind. 119) 196 Gaffney v. Brown, (150 Mass. 479) 352 Gaffney v. Gough, (36 Cal. 104) 282 Gage V. Chicago, (32 N. E. R. 264) 278 Gage V. Chicago, (2 111. App. 332) 87 Gage V. Evans, (90 111. 569) 397 Gage V. Graham, (57 111. 144) Gage V. Hornelsville, (41 N. Y. 87) 87 Gage V. Nichols, (135 111. 128) 187 a, 256 Gahagan v. Boston etc. Co., (1 Allen, 187) 306 Gainbur v. Mayoret, (4 Sand. 109) 83 Gaines v. Hot Spr. Co., (39 Ark. 262) 312 Galbes ». Girard, (46 Fed. R. 500) 5 Galbraith v. Luttiech, (573 111. 209) 108, 310 Galbraith v. Olivet, (3 Pitts. 79) 120 Galbreath v. Armour, (4 Bell App. Cas. 374) 302 Galbreath v. Newton, (30 Mo. Ap. 380) 278 Gale V. Kalamazoo, (23 Mich. 344) 113, 124 Gale V. Mayor, (8 Hun, 370) 87 Galena v. Amy, (5 Wall. 705) 14 Ixs TABLE OF CASES CITED. Eeferences are to Sections. Galena v. Corinth, (48 111. 42,S) 163 Galesburg v. Hawkinson, (75 111. 152) 53 Gall V. Cincinnati, (18 Ohio St. 563) 128 Gallegher v. St. Paul, (28 Fed. Rep. 305) 346 Gallowaj v. Corbett, (52 Mich. 460) 399 Galoway v. London, (1 H. L. 34) 392 Galtin v. Tarborough, (78 N. C. 119) 259 Galveston v. Barbour, (62 Tex. 172) 336 o, 352 a Galveston c. Devlin, (19 S. W. K. 395) 86 Galveston v. Heard, (54 Tex. 420) 259 a, 281 Galveston ». Loomis, (54 Tex. 517) 163, 189 a Galveston v. Menard, (23 Tex. 349) 312 Galveston v. Morton, (53 Texas, 409) 170 Galveston v. Posnainsky, (62 Tex. 118) 324, 351 Galveston v. Williams, (6 South West. Eep. 860) 221 Galveston City Co. v. Galveston, (56 Tex. 486) 326 a Galveston etc. Co. v. Fuller, (63 Tex. 467) 330 Galveston Wharf Co. v. Galveston, (63 Tex. 14) 133, 271 Gamble v. St. Louis, (12 Mo. 617) 220 Gannon v. Hagadon, (10 Allen, 106) 354 a Gant's App., (23 Pitts. Leg. J. 219) 308 Garden City v. Abbott, (34 Kan. 283) 146, 300 Gardenier v. Sup., (17 St. Eep. 983) 362 Gardiner Cotton & W. F. Co. b. Gar- diner, (5 Me. 133) 272 Gardner v. Haney, (86 Ind. 17) 374 Gardner v. Johnston (12 Atl. Kep. 888) 223 Gardner v. INewburg, (2 Johns. Ch. 162) 234, 396 Gardner v. Ogden, (22 JT. Y. 332) 166 Gardner v. State, (21 N. J. L. 557) 267 Garmer v. St. Louis, (37 Mo. 554) 79 Gargan v. Railroad, (12 S. W. R. 259) 311 Garland v. Gaines, (2 S. W. R. 460) 326 Garland v. Towne, (55 N. H. 55) 300, 348 Garlinghouse v. Jacobs, (4 N. T. 161) 325 Garlington v. Copeland, (10 S. E. K. 616) 282 Garratt v. Canandaigua, (61 Hun, 623) 328 Garrett v. St. Louis, (25 Mo. 505) 259 a, 271 Garrison v. Chicago, (7 Biss. 480) 144 a, 295 Garrison v. New York, (21 Wall. 196) 242 Garrittee v. Baltimore, (23 Md. 422) 121 Gartsede v. East St. Louis, (43 111. 47) 392 Garvin r. Daussman, (16 N. E. R. 826) 279 Garvin v. Gorman, (63 Mich. 221) 399 Garvin v. Wells, (8 Iowa, 286) 158 Garvin v. Wiswell, (83 111. 215) 177, 179 Garviss v. Daussman, (114 Ind. 429) 279 Gas Co. -0. Des Moines, (44 Iowa, 508 147 Gas Co. ». Norwich City Gas Co., (25 Conn. 19) 295 Gaskins v. Allen, (73 Ga. 746) 344 a Gass V. Greenville, (4 Sneed. 62) 127 Gass V. State, (34 Ind. 424) 381 Gassett v. Andover, (21 Vt. 342) 51 Gatch V. Des Moines, (63 Iowa, 718) 259 a Gates V. Del. Co. (12 Iowa, 405) 86 Gates V. Hancock, (23 N. H. 528) 165 Gaunt V. Fynuey, (L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. 8) 120 Gause v. BuUard, (16 La. An. 197) 283 Gause v. Clarksville, (1 McCrary, 78) 164, 182, 196 Gay V. Bradstreet, (39 Me. 580) 249 Gay V. Cadby, (L. R. 2 C. P. Div. 391) 129, 130 Gay V. Cambridge, (128 Mass. 887) 336 a, .3506 Gay V. Gilmore, (76 Ga. 725) 359 Gay !). Mut. Union Tel. Co., (12 Mo. App. 485, 494) 297 Gearhart v. Dixon, (1 Pa. St. 224) 108, 265 Geary v. Kansas, (61 Mo. 378) 87 Gebhardt v. Reeves, (75 111. 301) 215, 228 Geddis v. Parrish, (21 Pac. R. 314) 354 Gedge v. Commonwealth, (0 Bush, 61) 223 Gee V. Metro. R'y Co., (L. R. 8 Q. B, 177) 352 Gee V. Wilden, (Lut. 1320, 1324) 156 TABLE OF CASES CITED. Beferences are to Sections. Ixxi Gehrig's Est., In re, (27 N. E. K. 784) 202 Geiger v. Filor, (8 Fla. 325) 133, 302 Gelpcke v. Dubuque, (1 Wall. 20) 192 b, 254 Geneseo v. Harper, (38 111. 103) 398 Geneva v. Cole, (61 111. 397) 282 Genoa v. Woodruff, (92 U. S. 502) 192, 192 6 Genois v. St. Paul, (35 Minn. 330) 292, 329 Gentile v. State, (29 Ind. 409) 26 George v. Oxford, (16 Kan. 72) 05, 189 Georgia etc. Co. v. Archer, (87 Ga. 237) 247 Georgia etc. Co. v. State, (15 S. E. R. 293) 273 Gerberling v. Wunnenberg, (51 Iowa, 125) 220 Gerhard v. Seekonk Com'rs, (o Atl. Kep. 199) 311 Gerken v. Sibley Co., (39 Mun. 433) 79 Germania v. State, (7 Md. 1) 123, 261 German Sch. v. Dubuque, (64 Iowa, 736) 328 Gerry c. Stone, (1 Allen, 519) 139 Getchell v. Benton, (47 N. W. K. 468) 184, 188, 220 Gettysburg, Ke, (90 Pa. St. 355) 63 Gibbons v. Ogden, (9 Wheat. 1) 314 Gibbons v. K. E. Co., (36 Ala. 410) 184 Gibbons v. Sheppard, (65 Pa. St. 20) 398 Gibbs V. Beaufort, (20 S. C. 213) 92, 328 Gibbs V. Hampden, (19 Pick. 298) 371 Gibbs V. Liverpool, (3 H. & N. 164) 121 Giblin v. Mclntire, (2 Utah, 384) 352 a Gibsen v. Baily, (9 N. H. 168) 106 Gibson v. Borough, (22 Pittsb. Leg. 64) 300 Gibson v. Coraopolis, (22 Pitts. L. J. 64) 300 Gibson v. Owens, (21 S. W. E. 1107) 279 Giesy v. Cincinnati etc. E. E. Co., (4 Ohio St. 308) 238 Giffen v. Olathe, (24 Pac. E. 470) 221 Gifford V. Hulett, (19 Atl. E. 230) 120 •Gifford V. White Plains, (25 Hun, 606) 170 Gilbert p. R. E., In re, (70 N. T. 361) 144, 305 Gilbert v. Luce, (11 Barb. 91) 86 Gilbert ». Marshall, (18 B. Mon. 427) 79 Gilbert v. New Haven, (40 Conn. 162) 108 Gilbert v. Eoxbury, (100 Mass. 185) 344 Gilbert v. W. C. V. M. etc. E. E. Co., (33 Gratt. 599) 190, 192 b Gilbrough ». Norfolk Co., (1 Hughes, 410) 191, 195 b, 195 d Gilchrist's Appeal, (109 Pa. St. 600) 54 Gilchrist v. Garden, (26 Up. Can. C. P. 1) 345 Gilder v. Brenham, (67 Tex. 345) 219, 221, 223 Gildersleeve v. Alexander, (2 Speer, 298) 66 Gildersleeve v. Board, (17 App. Pr. 201) 99 Giles V. Sch. Dis., (31 N. H. 304) 69 Gilfeather v. Council Bluffs, (69 Iowa, 310) 354 a Gilham v. Wells, (21 Alb. Law Jour. 319, 64 Ga. 192) 125 Gilkerson v. Fred'k Jus., (13 Gratt. 577) 259 a Gillespie's App., (30 W. N. C. 337) ; 203 Gillespie v. Dubuque, (1 Wall. 175) 184 Gillespie v. Lincoln, (52 N. W. E. 811) 92 Gillespie v. Mayor, (6 Daly, 286) 79 Gillespie etc. Co. v. St. Louis, etc., (6 Mo. App. 554) 353 GlUett V. Logan Co., (67 111. 256) 98, 113 Gillette o. Hartford, (31 Conn. 351) 56, 259 Gillinwater v. Miss. etc. E. E. Co., (13 111. 1, 4) 232 Gillison v. Charlestown, (16 W. Va. 282) 355 Gilluly V. Madison, (63 Wis. 518) 349, 355 Gilman v. Deerfield, (15 Gray, 577) 352 Gilman v. Laconia, (55 N. H. 130) 354, 355 Gilman v. Milwaukee, (61 Wis. 588) 110 Gilman v. Milwaukee, (55 Wis. 328) 229 Gilman v. Sheboygan, (2 Black, 510) 14) 253 Gilman ». Waterville, (59 Me. 491) 326 Gilmartin v. Mayor, (55 Barb. 239) 345 Gilmer v. Atlanta, (77 Ga. 688) 350 & Gilmer v. Gilmer, (32 Ga. 685) 66 Gilmer v. Lime Point, (18 Cal. 229) 233 Gilmore v. Driscoll, (122 Mass. 199) 329 Ixxii TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Gilmore v. Hentig, (32 Kan. 156) 277 Gilmore v. Holt, (4 Pick. 258) 129 Gilmore v. Fox, (10 Kan. 509) 397 Gilmore v. Lewis, (12 Ohio, 281) 79 Gilmore v. Norton, (10 Kan. 491) 27 Gilmore v. Utica, (131 N. Y. 26) 281 Gilson V. Board, (27 N. E. B,. 235) 259, 259 a Ginochio v. State, (18 S. W. 82) 125 Girard v. Bissell, (45 Kan. 56) 123 Girard v. New Orleans, (2 La. An. 897) 201 Girard v. PhiladelpMa, (7 Wall. 1) 21, 41 Glaesner v. Auheuser etc. Co., (13 S. W. K. 707) 396 Glantz V. So. Bend, (106 Ind. 305) 842, 350 Glass V. Ashburg, (49 Cal. 571) 128 Glass V. Fritz, (23 Atl. R. 1050) 354 a Glass V. White, (5 Sneed, 475) 267 Glasscock v. Lyons, (20 Ind. 1) 79, 85 Glasgow !). Bowse, (43 Mo. 479) 261 Glasgow J). St. Louis, (17 S. W. R. 743) 308, 311 Gleucoe v. Peo., (78 111. 382) 65, 362, 368 Glenn v. Baltimore, (5 G. & J. 429) 120 Glenn v. Lynn, (89 Ala. 608) 28 Glenn v. Shannon, (12 P. C. 570) 327 Gllck V. Bro. K. R. Co., (19 D. 0. 412) 302 Glover «. Mayor etc. of N. T., (7 Hun, 232) 92 Gloversville v. Howell, (70 N. T. 287) 24, 153 Glynn v. Baker, (1 East, 510) 191 Godchaux v. Carpenter, (19 Nev. 415) 241 Goddard v. Harpswell, (24 Atl. 958, 84 Me. 499) 338 Goddard, In re, (16 Pick. 504) 33, 155, 156 Goddard v. Jacksonville, (15 111. 588) 125 Goddin v. Crump, (8 Leigh, 120) 255 Godfrey v. Alton, (12 111. 29) 215 Godfrey v. Claflin, (21 Pick. 1) 327 Goetler d. State, (45 Ark. 454) 117 Goettman v. Mayor etc. of N. Y., (6 Hun, 132) 78, 86 Goldi). Philadelphia, (115 Pa. St. 184) 342 Goldsboro v. Moffett, (49 Fed. R. 213) 165 Goldsohmidt b. New Orleans, (5 La. An. 436) 177, 190 a Goldsmith v. New Orleans, (31 La. 646) 125 Goldsworthy v. Linden, (43 N. W. R. 656) 3506 Goldthwaite v. East Bridgewater, (5- Gray, 61) 342 Goldwaite v. Montgomery Council, (50 Ala. 486) 158, 261 Goooh V. Gregory, (65 N. C. 142) 212 Goodale v. Fennell, (27 Ohio St. 426) 14 Goodale v. Tuttle, (29 N. Y. 459) 354 a Goodell, In re, (14 Johns. 325) 373 Goodell V. Baker, (8 Cowen, 286) 95 Goodenow v. Butterick, (7 Mass. 140, 142) 32 Goodfellow V. New York, (100 N. Y. 15) 342 Goodhue v. Beloit, (21 Wis. 636) 59 Gondier v. Cormack, (2 E. D. Smith, 204) 347 Goodln V. Des Moines, (55 Iowa, 67) 343 Goodloe B. Cincinnati, (4 Ohio, 500) 329 Goodnough v. Oshkosh, (24 Wis. 549) 3506 Goodnough v. Powell, (32 Pac. K. 396) 397 Goodnow V. Com'rs, (11 Minn. 31) 177 Goodnow V. Ramseyles, (11 Minn. 31) 177 Goodrich v. Detroit, (12 Mich. 279) 163 Goodrich o. Brown, (30 Iowa, 291) 104 Goodrich v. Chicago, (20111. 445) 327, 327 a Goodsen ». Des Moines, (66 Iowa, 255) 350 a Goodspeed v. Fuller, (46 Me. 141) 327 Goodtitle v. Alker, (1 Burr. 133) 224 Goodwin b. Des Moines, (55 Iowa, 617) 348 Goodwin v. McGehee, (15 Ala. 2331 209 , Goodwin v. Roberts, (L. R. 1 App. Cas. 476) 183 Goodwyu and Railway Co., In re, (13 U. C. C. P. 254) 49 Goognis V. Bos. & A. E. Co., (30 N. E. R. 71) 238 Gordon v. Baltimore, (5 Gill, 231) 270 Gordon Co. v. Harris, (81 Ga. 220) 79 Gordon ». Preston, (1 Watts, 385) 209' Gordon B. Richmond, (18 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cases, 251) 349, 352 Gorgier v. Melville, (3 B. & C. 45) 183, 191 Gorhara, In re, (43 How. Pr. 263) 189 Gorham v. Campbell, (2 Cal. 135) 65 Gorhara b. Cooperstown, (59 N. Y. 660) 312 TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixxiii References are to Sections. Gorliam v. Springfield, (21 Me. 61) 24, 55, 67 Goring V. McTaggart; (92 Ind. 200) 282 Gorman v. Low, (2 Edw. Ch. 324) 1.55 Gormley v. Clark, (134 TJ. S. 338) 221 Gormley v. Day, 28 N. E. K. 693, 114 111. 195) 359. Goshen v. Gravy, (58 Ind. 268) 134 Goshen v. Croxton, (34 Ind. 239) 156 Goshen v. Kern, (63 Ind. 468) 123 Goshen v. Meyers, (119 Ind. 196) 313, 353 Goshen v. Stonington, (4 Conn. 209) 67 Goss V. Vermontville etc., (44 Mich. 319) 368 Goshorn v. Smith, (92 Pa. St. 435) 337 Gosling V. Veley, (19 L. J. Q. B. 135) 145 Gosman v. State, (106 Ind. 203) 81, 82 Gosport V. Evans, (112 Ind. 133) 352 Gosselin v. Chicago, (103 111. 623) 215 Gottschalk v. Becher, (49 N. W. E. 715, 32 Neb. 653) 57 Gould V. Atlanta, (60 Ga. 164) 338 Gould V. Baltimore, (58 Md. 46, 59 lb. 378) 265 Gould ». Booth, (66 N. T. 62) 325 Gould V. Gapper, (5 East, 345) 401 Gourley v. Hankins, (2 Iowa, 75) 88, 211 Gould B. Hudson K. etc. Co., (6 N. y. 522) 132 Gould V. Paris, (68 Tex. 511) 189 a Gould V. Rochester, (105 N". Y. 46) 54 Goulden v. Scranton, (15 Atl. R. 483) 354 a Gould ». Sterling, (23 N. Y. 458) 183 Goulds. Taylor Orphan Asylum, (46 Wis. 106)200 Gould V. Topeka, (32 Kan. 485) 328 Governor v. Justice of Clark Co., (19 Ga. 97) 325 Governor v. McEwen, (5 Humph. 241) 2, 8 Gov. St. Ry. Co. v. Hanlon, (53 Ala. 70) 321 Goyne v. Ashley Co., (31 Ark. 552) 177 Grady v. Walsner, (46 Ala. 381) 120 Graff 0. Baltimore, (10 Md. 544) 242 Grafftyc. Bushville, (187 Ind. 502) 258 Graf ten ». Till wood, (32 Pac. R. 1026) 169 Grafton Bk. v. Doe, (19 Vt. 463) 199 Graham v. Carondolet, (33 Mo. 262) 96 Graham v. Conger, (4 S. W. R. 327) 259 a Graham v. Greenville, (67 Tex. 62) 55 59 Graham k. State, (1 Ark. 171) 102 Gramlish v. Wurst, (86 Pa. St. 74) 348 Granby v. Thurston, (23 Conn. 416) 4, 54, 67 Grand v. Detroit, (51 N. W. E. 999) 362 Grand Chute v. Winegar, (15 "Wall. 373) 186. 195 Grand Is. etc. Co. v. West, (45 N. W. E. 242) 166 Grand Rapids v. Bateman, (53 N. W. R. 6) 117 Grand Rapids v. Blakely, (40 Mich. 367) 326 Grand Rapids v. Hughes, (15 Mich. 54) 105, 154 Grand Rapids v. Wyman, (46 Mich. 516)3506 Grand Eapids v. Grand Eapids & Ind. E. E. Co., (58 Mich. 641) 241 Grand Eapids Booming Co. v. Jarvis, (30 Mich. 308) 239 Grand Eapids etc. E. R. Co., (38 Mich. 62, 47 Mich. 393) 304, 305 Grand Rapids etc. v. Grand Rapids etc., (20 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 270) 296 Grand Eapids etc. Co. v. Gray, (38 Mich. 461) 102 Grand Rapids etc. Co. v. Van Drille, (24 Mich. 409) 279 Grand Rapids Electric etc. Co. v. Grand Rapids Edison etc. Co., (33 Fed. Rep. 659) 144, 289, 395 Grand Rap. Sch. Euruiture Co. . Grand Eapids, (52 N. W. E. 1028) 259 a Grandville v. Jenison, (86 Mich. 567, 49 N. W. 544) 215 Grand Surrey Canal Co. ». Hall, (1 M. & Gr. 392) 218, 312 Granger v. Avery, (64 Me. 292) 54 Granger v. Pulaski Co., (26 Ark. 37) 325, 333 Grans v. Davenport, (18 Iowa, 179) 132 Grants. Brooklyn, (41 Barb. 381) 355 Grant v. Cooke, (7 D. C. 165) 195 Grant b. Davenport, (36 Iowa, 396) 174, 395 Grant v. Detroit, (51 N. W. E. 997) 362 Grant v. Dalliber, (11 Conn. 234) 60 Grant v. Erie. (69 Pa. St. 420) 328, 355 Grant v. Huston, (16 S. W. K. 680) 209 Grant v. Lake Co., (17 Or. 453) 192 Grannis v. Cherokee Township, (47 Fed. E. 427) 187 a Ixxiv TABLE OF CASES CITED. Beferences are to Sections. Grant v. Stillwater, (35 Minn. i'4- 300 Grant Co. v. Bradford, (72 Ind. 455) 140 Grantham v. State, (14 S. E. K. 892) 12, 125 Grassick v. Toronto, (30 U. C. Q. B. 306) 339 Graves v. Cole, (3 Dak. 301) 363 Graves v. Gas Co., (83 Iowa, 74) 396 Graves v. Colby, (9 Ad. & Bl. 356) 157 Graves v. Otis, (2 Hill, 466) 87, 239, 292, 329 Graves v. Shattuck, (35 N. H. 257) 300 Gray v. Bayward, (5 Del. Ch. 499) 396 Gray v. Board, (139 Mass. 328) 277, 294 Gray v. Brooklyn, (2 Abb. App. Cas. 267) 92 Gray v. Brooklyn, (10 Abb. Pr. K. 186) 2, 8 Gray v. Emporia, (23 Pac. K. 944, 43 Kan. 704) 345 Gray v. Harris, (107 Mass. 492) 317 Gray v. Iowa L. Co., (26 la. 387) 301, 308 Gray v. Latham, (84 Ala. 546) 180 Gray v. Mount, (45 Iowa, 591) 189 Gray v. Pullen, (32 L. J. Kep. Q. 169) 347 Gray v. Sheldon, (8 Vt. 402) 53, 54 Gray v. State, (2 Hairing. 76) 102 Grayville v. Whitaker, (85 111. 439) 315 Great Falls Ice Co. v. District, (19 D. C. 327) 17, 398 Greathouse v. Dunn, (60 Cal. 311) 87 Great West. Ry. Co. etc.. In re, (23 Up. Can. C. P. 28) 161 Greeley v. Jacksonville, (17 Fla. 174) 161 Greeley v. Maine Cent. R. R. Co., (53 Me. 200) 354 a Greeley v. People, (60 111. 19) 184 Green v. Burke, .(23 Wend. 490) 88 Green v. Canaan, (29 Conn. 157) 218 Green v. Cape May, (41 N. J. L. 45) 110 Green v. Dandy, (12 Vt. 338) 344 Green v. Durham, (1 Burr. 131) 96 Green v. Dyersburg, (2 Flip. 477) 192 Greens. Eastern Ry. Co., (53N.W. R. 808) 301 Greer v. East Haddam, (51 Conn. 547) 106 Green ». Fresno, (30 Pac. R. 544) 18 Green v. Hogan, (27 N. E. R. 413) 203 Green v. Hoi way, (101 Mass. 243, 3 Am. Rep. 339) 258 Green v. Hotaling, (44 K. J. L. 347) 271 Green v. Indianapolis, (52 Ind. 490) 28, 107 Green v. Mayor etc., (5 Alb. Pr. R. 503) 2 Green o. Marks, (25 111. 221) 212 Green v. Oaks, (17 111. 249) 220 Green v. Orf ord, (15 Ont. 506) 171 Green?). Pittsburgh etc. Co., (8 Watts 6 S. 85) 302 Green v. Rutherford, (1 Ves. 462) 203 Green v. Reading, (9 Watts, 382) 292, 329 Green v. Savannah, (6 Ga. 1) 104, 116, 120 Green v. State, (5 Ohio, 136) 108 Green v. Swift, (47 Cal. 536) 329 Green v. Ward, (82 Va. 324) 256, 265 Green B. & M. Co. v. Outagamie Co., (45 N. W. R. 536) 26 Green Bay v. Beames, (50 Wis. 204) 98, 146 Greencastle Township v. Black, (3 Ind. 587) 61 Green Co. v. Conness, (109 U. S. 104) 187, 195 Green u. Eubanks, (80 Ala. 204) 325 Greene c. Hudson Co., (44 N. J. L. 388) 86 Greene Co. v. Daniel, (102 U. S. 187) 375 Greenfield v. Moore, (33 Ind. 597) 364, 375 Greenough v. Wakefield, (127 Mass. 275) 139 Greensboro v. Ehrenreich, (80 Ala. 579) 150 Greensboro v. MuUins, (13 Ala. 341) 117, 124 Greensburg v. Laird, (8 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 608) 8 Greensburg Bor. v. Young, (53 Pa. St. 280) 259 a Green Township, (9 Watts & S. 22) 38 Greenville v. Mason, (53 N. H. 515) 59 Greenville W. Works v. Greenville, 7 So. Rep. 409) 110, 163 Greenwood v. Freight Co., (105 N. S. 13) 10 Greenwood v. Louisville, (13 Bush, 226) 333 Greenwood v. Westport, (53 P. 824) 324, 336 a Greer v. Covington, (83 Ky. 410) 282 Greer v. New York, (3 Rob. 406) 335 Greggs V. Foote, (4 Allen, 195) 247, 338 a Gregor v. Allen, (33 La. An. 870) 86 Gregory v. Adams, (14 Gray, 242) 340, 353 Gregory e. Bridgeport, (41 Conn. 76) 113, 163 TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixxv Keferences are to Sections. Gregory v. Knight, (50 Mich. 61) 312 Gregory v. Lincoln, (13 Neb. 352) 221 Gregsteno. Chicago, (34 K. E. E. 426), 299 Grenada Co. v. Brogden, (112 U. S. 261) 187 a Gribble v. Sioux City, (38 Iowa, 390) 352 Gridley v. Barker, (1 B. & P. 236) 99 Gridley v. Bloomington, (68 111. 50) 298, 348 Grierson v. Ontario, (3 Up. Can. Q. B. 623) 148 Griffin's Appeal, (109 Pa. St. 150) 220 Griffin v. House, (18 Johns. 397) 320 Griffin «. Johnson, (10 S. E. K. 719, 84 Ga. 279)3506 GritBn v. Mayor, (3 N. Y. 456) 327 Griffin v. Macon Co., (36 Fed. Eep. 885) 199 Griffin v. Powell, (64 Ga. 625) 299 Griffin v. Kanney, (35 Conn. 239) 258 Griffin v. Wilcox, (21 Ind. 370) 184 Griffiths V. Harries, (2 M. & W. 335) 156 Grigsby v. Bowles, (79 Tex. 13) 360 Grim ». Weisenbeig, (57 Pa. St. 433) 139, 326 Grimes v. Blake, (16 Ind. 160) 327 Grimes v. Hamilton Co., (37 Iowa, 290) 142 Grimes v. Keene, (52 N. H. 330) 107, 336 Gi-imley v. Santa Clara Co., (68 Cal. 575) 326 Grimmet v. Askew, (48 Ark. 171) 177 Grimshaw. Grand Trunk Ey. Co., (19 Up. Can. Q. B. 493) 243, 247 Grinnel v. Adams, (34 Ohio St. 44) 279 Griswold v. Bay City, (35 Mich. 452) 294 Grogan v. Broadway F. Co., (87 Mo. 321) 345 Grogan 1). San Francisco, (18 Cal. 590) 2, 170, 211 Gross V. Kenfield, (57 Cal. 626) 79 Gross ». Lampasas, (11 S. W. 1086) '355 Grossenbach v. Milwaukee, (65 Wis. 31) 346 Grotou V. Haines, (36 K H. 388) 354 Grove v. Fort Wayne, (45 Ind. 429) 300, 345 Grove v. Kansas City, (75 Mo. 672) 343 Grovenvelt v. Burwell, (1 Ld. Eayra. 454, 469) 398 Grube v. Nichols, (36 111. 93) 219, 220 Grube v. St. Paul, (34 Minn. 420) 92 Grube v. Mo. Pacite, (11 S. W. Eep. 736) 290 Grumbine v. Washington, (2 McAr- thur (578) 333, 338 a Guardians v. Vestry of St. Leonard Shoreditch, (L. E. 2 Q. B. Div. 145) 130 Gubaske v. New York, (12 Daly, 182) 3506 Gueble v. Epply, (28 Pac. E. 89) 24 Gude V. Mankato, (30 Minn.) 3506 Guerin v. Eeese, (33 Cal. 292) 283 Guernsey v. Burlington, (4 Dill. 372) 184 Guerrero, In re, (69 Cal. 88) 125, 148 Guest V. Brooklyn, (69 N. Y. 506) 249, 259 a, 391 Guest V. Lower M. W. Co., (21 Atl. E. 1001) 212 Guier v. O'Daniel, (1 Binn. 349) 66 Guilder v. Otsego, (20 Minn. 74) 15, 187 Guilfont V. Parish, (28 La. An. 413) 177 Guilford v. Chenango Co., (13 N. Y. 143) 187 Guillard v. Analine, (10 Martine, 479) 87 Guillotte V. New Orleans, (12 La. An. 432) 127 Gulick V. New, (14 Ind. 93) 102 Gulf City St. Ey. Co. v. Galveston, (69 Tex. 660, 7 S. W. E. 520) 306 Gulf C. & S. E. Co. V. Eiordan, ( 22 S. W. E. 519) 113 Gulf City Ey. Co. v. Galveston City Ey. Co., (65 Tex. 502) 144 Gulf etc. Co. V. Gascamp, ( 69 Tex. 545) 352, 353 Gun V. Hubbard, (97 Mo. 311) 65 Gunn V. Barry, (15 Wall. 610, 623) 186 Gunnarssohn v. Sterling, (92 111. 669) 123 Gunning Gravel Co. v. New Orleans, (13 So. 182) 292 Gurnee v. Chicago, (40111. 165 ) 87, 264, 291 Gurnsey v. Edwards, ( 26 N. H. 224) 108 Guthrie v. New Haven, (31 Conn. 308) 223, 288 Guthrie v. Territory, (31 Pac. E. 190) 22 Gutsweller ». People, (14 111. 142) 2, 8 Gutta Per. v. Starkley, (11 Phila. 219) 172 Guy V. Baltimore, (100 U. S. 434) 258 Gwinnell v. Earner, ( 10 L. E. C. P. 658) 348 Gwynn v. Homan, (15 Ind. 201) 219 Ixxvi TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. TT. Haag ». Vanderburgh Co., (60 Ind. 611) 92, 338 Haas V. Chicago R. etc. Co., (41 Wis. 44) 136 Haherman b. Baker, (128 N. Y. 253) 229 Haokensack Water Co. v. Hoboken, (lY Atl. 307) 144 a Hackettstown ». Swackhammer, (37 N. J. L. 191) 177 Haddock's Case, (T. Kaym. 435) 101 Hadley v. Mayor, (33 N. Y. 603) 79, 85, 381 Hadley v. Taylor, L. E. (1 C. P. 53) 348 Hadsell v. Hancock, (3 Gray, 526) 95, 115 Haefling v. San Antonio, (20 S. W. Rep. 85) 123, 262 Haflord v. New Bedford, (16 Gray, 297) 92, 327 a, 335 Hagan b. Campbell, (8 Port. 9) 132 Hager v. Burlington, (42 Iowa, 661) 265 Hagerstown v. Dechert, (32 Md. 369) 102 Hagood V. Clark Co., (20 Ga. 845) 325 Hague V. Phila., (48 Pa. St. 527) 165, 169 Haight V. Grist, (64'Sr. S. 739) 258 Haight V. Keokuk, (4 Iowa, 199) 133, 225 Haight V. Love, (39 N. Y. 14) 82 Haight V. New York, (24 Fed. Rep. 93) 332, 338 a Haines v. Readfleld, (41 Me. 256) 326 a Haines v. Sch. Dis.,(41 Me. 246) 95 Ilairstou v. Hairston, (27 Miss. 704) 68 Hake v. Henderson, (4 Dev. 1) 78 Ha) but V. Forrest City, (34 Ark. 246) 165 Haldaue v. Eckford, L. R. (8 Eq. Cas. 631) 66 Hale V. Houghteu, (8 Mich. 458) 119, 144 a, 163 Hale V. Johnson, (80 111. 185) 347 Hale V. Kenosha, (29 Wis. 599) 269 Hale V. Wilkinson, (21 Gratt. 75) 258 llaliburton v. Frankford, (14 Mass. 214) 214 Halifax b. City Ry. Co., (1 Russ. Ch. Eq. 319) 306 Hall, In re, (50 Conn. 131) 69 Hall V. Baker, (27 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 208) 142 Hall D. Baltimore, (56 Md. 187) 221 Hall V. Beveridge, (81 111. 128) 79 Hall V. Bristol, (L. R. 2 C. P. 322) 231, 329, 330 Hall V. Bunte, (20 Ind. 804) 283 Hall V. Burlingham, (88 Mich. 438) 29 Hall B. Cockrell, (28 Ala. 507) 169 Hall B. Chippewa Falls, (47 Wis. 267) 265 Hall B. Grantham etc., (13 M. & W. 114) 320 Hall B. Jackson Co., (95 111. 353) 177 Hall B. Lowell, (10 Cush. 260) 351 Hall B. Manchester, (40 JST. H. 410) 342, 344 Hall V. Marysville, (19 Cal. 391) 271 Hall V. Somerswarth, (39 N. H. 511) 360 Hallahan v. Herbert, (11 Ab. Pr. N. S. 326) 283 Halleck b. Boyleston, (117 Mass. 469) 106 Hallenback v. Hahn, (2 Neb. 377) 184 Hallenbeck v. Winnebago Co., (95 111. 148) 353 Hallett B. Bassett, (100 Mass. 167) 66 Hallgrene v. Campbell, (82 Mich. 255) 88 HalpiuB. Campbell, (71 Mo. 493) 259 a Halpin v. Kansas City, (76 Mo. 335) 343 348 349 Ham'B. New York, (70 N. Y. 459) 338 a Ham V. Salem, (10 Mass. 350) 234 Ham B. Wisconsin R. Co., (61 Iowa, 716, 329 Hambleton v. Town of Dexter, (89 Mo. 188) 39 Hamden ». New Haven etc. Co., (27 Conn. 158) 306 Hamden v. Rice, (24 Conn. 350) 202 Hamerick v. Rouse, (17 Ga. 56) 392 Hamersley v. New York, (56 N. Y. 533) 241 Hamlin b. Dingman, (5 Lans. 61) 88 Hamilton B. Boston, (4 Allen, 475) 340 Hamilton v. Carthage, (24 111. 22) 160 Hamilton v. Columbus, (52 Ga. 435) 349 Hamilton v. Chicago etc. Co., (15 N. E. R. 854) 223, 229 Hamilton v. Chicago etc., (124 111. 241) 287 Hamilton v. Dubuque, (50 Iowa, 213) 326 Hamilton v. Ft. Wayne, (73 Ind. 1) 259 a, 279 Hamilton v. Garrett, (62 Tex. 602) 338 a Hamilton B. McNeil, (13 Gratt. 389) 53, 54 Hamilton b. New Castle etc. Co., (9 Ind. 859) 165, 169, 211 TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Ixxvii Hamilton v. Shelbyville, (33 N. E. E. 1007) 169 Hamilton ». State, (3 Tex. App. 643) 117 Hamilton v. State, (3 Ind. 452) 363, 373 Hamilton v. State, (113 Ind. 179, 15 N. E. Kep. 258) 316 Hamilton v. Vicksburg etc., (34 La. An. 970) 314 Hamilton Co. v. Mighels, (7 Ohio St. 109) 3, 325 Hamilton Gaslight & Coke Co. v. City of Hamilton, (37 Fed. Eep. 832) 144 a Hammar ». Covington, (3 Met. 494) 362, 377 Haramarskold v. Bull, (11 Rich. L. 493) 169 Hammerslough v. Kansas City, (57 Mo. 219) 249 Hamraett v. Philadelphia, (65 Pa. St. 146, 3 Am. Kep. 615) 259 a Hammond b. Hames, (25 Md. 541) 24, 123 Hammond v. McLachlan, (1 Sandf. 323) 224 Hampshire ». Franklin, (16 Mass. 76) 11, 60 Hampson v. Taylor, (15 E. I. 83) 351 Hampstead ». Underhill, (20 Ark. 337) 368 HH.mpstead v. Des Moines, (63 Iowa, 36) 330 Hancock v. Bowman, (49 Cal. 413) 283 Hancock v. Chicot Co., (32 Ark. 575) 195 Hand, In re, (52 Hun, 206) 220 Handt!. Newton, (92 IST. Y. 88) 211 Hand v. Tippecanoe, (26 Ind. 179) 79 Handel v. Elliott, (60 Tex. 145) 283 Handy v. Collins, (60 Md. 229) 265 Handy v. New Orleans, (39 La. An. 107) 395 Hanes v. N. C. E. E. Co., (109 N. C. 490) 243 Hanger v. Des Moines, (52 Iowa, 193) 110, 140 Hankins v. CuUoway, (88 111. 485) 73 Hanlon v. Keokuk, (7 Iowa, 477) 352 Ilannen v. Sfe Louis, (62 Mo. 313) 338 a Hanner v. Grizzard, (89 N. C. 115) 69 Hanney v. Kansas City, (94 Mo. 334) 351 Hannewinkle v. Georgetown, (15 Wall. 547) 249 Hannibal v. Draper, (15 Mo. 634) 221, 227 Hannibal v. Fauntleroy, (105 U. S. 408) 189, 196 Hannibal v. Hannibal & St. J. etc., (48 Mo. 480) 290 Hannibal v. Winchell, (57 Mo. 172) 290, 396 Hannon v. Agnew, (98 N. Y. 439) 333 Hannon v. Grizzard, (96 N. C. 293) 79 Hannon v. Halifax, (89 N. C. 123) 361 Hannon v. St. Louis Co., (62 Mo. 313) 336 a Hanscome v. Omaha, (11 Neb. 37) 397 Hansen v. Vernon, (27 Iowa, 28) 253, 254 Hansmeister v. Porter, (21 Fed. Rep. 335) 391 Hanson v. Eastman, (21 Minn. 209) 222, 286 Hanson i>. Hunter, (53 N. "W. E. 84) 110, 297 Hanson v. Vernon, (27 Iowa, 28) 183 Harard v. Drainage Co., (51 111. 17) 15 Harbaugh v. Monmouth, (74 111. 371) 125 Harbeck v. Toledo, (11 Ohio St. 219) 240, 241 Harbeck v. Vanderbilt, (20 N. Y. 398) 190 a Harbormaster v. Southerland, (47 Ala. 511) 133 Hardcastle v. So. Yorkshire Ey. Co., (6 H. & N. 72) 348 Harding v. Goodlett, (3 Yerg. 40) 232 Harding v. Hale, (61 111. 192) 219, 220 Harding v. Eockford etc. Co., (65 111. 90) 65, 195 a Harding v. Eockford etc. Co., (65111. 90) 189 Harding v. Stamford Water Co., (41 Conn. 87) 239, 354 Hardenbrook v. Ligonier, (95 Ind. 70) 160 Hardy v. Brooklyn, (90 N. Y. 435) 328 Hardy v. Keens, (52 N. H. 570) 324, 340, 345 Hardy v. N. C. etc. Co., (74 N. C. 734) 317 Hardy v. Waltham, (3 Meto. 103) 130 Hargreaves v. Taylor, (3 Best & S. 613) 327 a Hargro v. Hodgdon, (26 Pac. 1100) 217 Harker v. Anderson, (21 Wend. 375) 179 Harker v. Mayor, (17 Wend. 199) 158 Harlem G. Co. v. Mayor etc., (33 N. Y. 389) 172 Harlem ». City, (3 Mete. 494) 316 Harlow v. Humiston, (6 Cow. 189) 328 ixxvm TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Harmon v. Chicago, (110 111. 400) 120 Harmon v. Lynchburg, (33 Gratt. 37) 335 a Harmon v. Omaha, (17 Neb. 548) 330 Harmon c. St. Louis Co., (62 Mo. 313) 3 Harmon v. W. & G. K. Co., (7 Mackey, 255) 352 Haruell v. Curtis, (1 E. B. Smith, 78) 321 Harner v. Columbus etc. Co., (29 Wkly. L. Bui. 387) 303 Harness v. Chesapeake & C. Canal Co., (1 Md. Ch. Dec. 248) 249 Harney v. Indianapolis, (32 lud. 244) 395 Harper's Ap., (109 Pa. St. 9) 281 Harper v. Elberton, (23 Ga. 566) 268 Harper v. Milwaukee, (30 Wis. 365) 336 a, 346, 347 Harpswell b. Phipps, (29 Me. 313) 107 Harpurt v. Wils., (1 Mod. 47) 320 Harrawer v. Eitson, (37 111. 301) 300 Harriman v. Boston, (114 Mass. 241) 350 6 Harrington v. Berkshire Co. Com'rs, (22 Pick. 263) 242 Harrington v. Buffalo, (24 IST. E. R. 186) 344 Harrington v. Lansingburgh, (110 N. Y. 145) 347 Harrington v. Miles, (11 Kan. 480) 129 Harrington v. Plainview, (27 Minn. 224) 186, 395 Harrington v. St. Paul etc. Co., (17 Minn. 215) 302 Harrington v. Ward, (9 Mass. 251) 338 Harris v. Atlanta, (62 Ga. 290) 92, 333 Harris v. Barber, (9 S. Ct. 314, 129 U. S. 366) 399 . Harris v. Board, (32 N. E. E. 92) 341, 353 Harris b. Elliott, (10 Pet. 25) 228 Harris v. Intendant, (28 Ala. 577) 125 Harris v. Intendant, (3 Ala. 137) 110 Harris i;. Nesbit, (24 Ala. 398) 134, 384 Harris b. Newbury, (128 Mass. 321) 343 Harris b. People, (59 N. Y. 599) 28 Harris v. School Hist., (28 N. H. 58) 106, 170 Harris v. Schuylkill etc. Co., (21 Atl. R. 590, 28 W. N. C. 44) 246 Harris b. Wakeman, (Sav. 254) 158 Harris b. Whitcomb, (4 Gray, 433) 108 Harris b. Mobbs, (L. R. 3 Ex. D. 268) 300 Harris County ». Taylor, (58 Tex. 690) 219 Harrisburg b. Sayler, (87 Pa. St. 216) 347 Harrisburg b. Segelbaum, (151 Pa. St. 172, 24 Atl. R. 1070) 291 Harrisburgh b. Seek, (104 Pa. St. 53) 33 Harrisburg b". Taylor, (87 Pa. St. 216) 92 Harrison b. Baltimore, (1 Gill. 264) 119, 332 Harrison v. Bridgton, (16 Mass. 16) 13, 67 Harrison b. Brooks, (20 Ga. 537) 120 Harrison B. Electric Co., (48 N. W. R. 1005) 395 Harrison b. Good, (L. R. 11 Eq. 338) 120 Harrison b. Hernsheim, (28 La. An. 881) 57 Harrison b. James, (2 Chitty, 347) 320 Harrison b. Milwaukee, (49 Wis. 247) 265, 326 a Harrison v. New Haven, (34 Conn. 136) 342 Harrison b. N. O. Ry. Co., (.34 La. An. 452) 302 Harrison b. Parker, (6 East, 154) 224 Harrison v. Seal, (5 So. E. 622) 215, 221 Harrison b. State, (9 Mo. 526) 134 Harrison b. St. Marks Church, (12 Phila. 259) 120 Harrison b. Vicksburg, (11 Miss. 581) 255, 258 Harrold v. Simcoe, (16 U. C. C. R. 43) 339 Harrow b. State, (1 Greene, 439) 300 Harshman b. Bates Co., (92 U. S. 569) 186 Hart V. Bloomfield Tp., Trs., (15 Ind. 226) 220 Hart o. Brooklyn, (36 Barb. 226) 3.50 a Hart B. Buckner, (54 Fed. Rep. 925) 396 Hart B. Burnett, (15 Gal. 580) 229 Hart B. Cedar Rapids, (63 Wis. 634) 342 Hart V. Hudson Riv. R. R. Co., (80 N. Y. 622) 337 Hart !;. Mayor, etc., (9 Wend. 571) 120 Hart B. Mayor, (6 Wend. 571) 154 Hart V. New Orleans, (12 Fed. Rep. 292) 212 Hart B. Red Cedar, (63 Wis. 634) 852 Harter ». Kenochan, (103 U. S. 562) 186 TABLE OF CASES CITED. Keferences are to Sections. Ixxix Hartford ». Bennett, (10 Ohio St. 441)78 Hartford v. Talcott, (48 Conn. 525) S48 Hartford v. "West Middle Sch. Dist., (45 Conn. 462) 270 Hartford Bk. v. Hart, (3 Day. 493) 107 Hartford Co. v. Baker, (17 Pick. 432) 320 Hartington v. Luge, (50 N. W. R. 957) 56 Hartley, In re, (31 L. J. M. 232) 127 Hartley o. Keokuk, etc. Co., (52 N. W. R. 352) 249 Hartshorn b. Potroff, (89 111. 509) 250 Hartshorn v. Schoff, (58 N. H. 197) 99 Hartwell v. Littleton, (13 Pick. 229) 106 Harvard College v. Boston, (104 Mass. 470) 270 Harvard College v. Gore, (5 Pick. 370) 66 Harvard Col. v. Stearns, (15 Gray, 1) 396 Harvey v. Lackawanna etc. R. R. Co., 47 Pa. St. 428) 239 Harvey v. Olney, (42 111. 336) 326 a Harvey v. Kansas etc. Co., (48 Kan. 228) 249 Harvey v. Rush Co., (32 Kan. 159) 79 Harvey v. Thomas, (10 Watts, 63) 2.34 a Harvey b. "W. P. S. Co., (1 Doug. 193) 179 Harward v. St. Clair & M. Levee & Dr. Co., (51 111. 130) 254 Harwood v. Lowell, (4 Cush. 310) 352 a Harwood v. Marshall, (9 Md. 83) 361 Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, (21 Wis. 217) 14, 15, 165, 375 Hascard v. Somany, (Freem. 504) 211 Hasey v. White Pig B. S. Co., (1 Doug. 193) 177 Haskell v. Burlington, (30 Iowa, 232) 282 Haskell v. New Bedford, (108 Mass. 208) 120, 244, 855 Haskins «. Super's, (51 Miss. 506) 377 Hassen v. Rochester, (65 N. Y. 516) 270, 397 Hastings v. Columbus, (42 Ohio St. 585) 148 Haswell v. New York, (81 N. Y. 255) 79 Hatch 0. Barr, (1 Ham. 390) 167 Hatch V. Bufealo, (38 N. Y. 276) 249 Hatch V. Mann, (15 Wend. 44) 79 Hatch V. Vermont Cent. R. R. Co., (25 Vt. 49) 239 Hates V. Jones, (1 Ired. L. 129) 365 Hatton V. Chatham, (24 111. App. 622) 287 Hanghey-B. Hart, (62 Iowa, 96) 348 Havemeyer v. Iowa Co., (3 Wall. 294) 184, 216, 254 Havemeyer v. Min. Point, (32 Wis. 396) 368 Haven v. Asylum, (13 N. H. 532) 107 Haven v. Grand Junction E. K. Co., (109 Mass. 88) 190 Haven v. Lowell, (5 Met., 35) 99 Haverhill B. Groveland, (25 N. E. 976) 15 Havird, In re, (24 Pac. Rep. 542) 79 Hawe B. Plainfiold, (37 N. J. L. 145) 102 Hawes v. Fox Lake, (33 Wis. 438) 348 Hawk V. Bonn, (6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 452) 897 Hawkhurst u. New York, (48 Hun, 588) 353 Hawkins ». Carroll Co., (50 Miss. 785) 186 Hawkins v. Com'rs, (14 Ind. 521) 373 Hawkins v. Hawke Co. Com'rs, (14 Ind. 521) 360 Hawkins v. Jonesboro, (68 Ga. 527) 15 Hawkins v. Kercheval, (10 Lea, 535) 83 Hawkins v. Rochester, (1 Wend. 54) 242 Hawkins v. Saunders, (45 Mich. 491) 300 Hawkins v. The Justices, (12 Lea, 351) 279 Hawks V. Charlemont, (107 Mass. 414) 838 Hawley v. Baltimore, (33 Md. 270) 221 Hawley v. Harrall, (19 Conn. 142) 250, 290 Hawley b. Sheldon, (24 Atl. R. 717) 354 Hawthorne v. East Portland, (13 Oreg. 271) 265 Hawthorn v. St. Louis, (11 Mo. 59) 80 Hay B. Alexandria etc. Co., (20 Fed. Rep. 15) 169 Hayden v. Attleborough, (7 Gray, 338) 223, 346 Hayden v. Madison, (7 Me. 76) 170 Hayden v. Noyes, (5 Conn. 391) 95, 121 Hayes v. Appleton, (24 Wis. 544) 110 Hayes v. Cambridge, (136 Mass. 402) 344 Ixxx TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Haynes ». Cape May, (50 N". J. L. 55) 154 Hayes v. Hyde Park, (27 N. E. 522) 352 Hayes v. Mich. etc. Co., (Ill U. S. 228) 306 Hayes v. Oshkosh, (33 Wis. 314) 335 Hayes v. Taylor, 52 N. W. R. llti) 311 Hayes v. West Bay City, (51 N. W. R. 1067) 347 Hayes v. White, (66 Me. 305) 373 Hayf ord v. Belfast, (69 Me. 63) 326 Haynes, In re, (22 Alt. R. 923) 29 Haynes v. Burlington, (38 Vt. 350) 238 Haynes v. Cape May, (50 N. J. L. 55) 158 Haynes ». Cape May, (52 N. J. L. 180) 110 Haynes v. Covington, (21 Miss. 408) 169 Haynes v. Duluth, (47 Minn. 458) 246 Haynes ». State, (3 Humph. 480) 79 Haynes v. Thomas, (7 Ind. 38) 217, 311 Hays V. State, (8 Ind. 425) 215 Hays V. Pac. Mail St. Co., (17 How. 596) 272 Hays V. Risher, (32 Pa. St. 169) 233 Hayward v. Davidson, (41 Ind. 214) 207 Hayvrard v. Mayor, (8 Barb. 492) 318 Hayward v. Sch. Dis. No. 13, (2 Gush. 419) 170 Haywood v. Bleecker, (11 Johns. 432) 78 Haywood ». Mayor, (12 Ga. 404) 146, 150 Hayzlett v. Mt. Vernon, (33 Iowa, 229) 270 Hazen v. Strong, (2 Vt. 427) 118 Hazleliurst v. Freeman, (52 Ga. 245) 303 Hazzard ii. Heacock, (39 Ind. 172) 282 Heacock v. Sherman, (14 Wend. 58) 313, 315 Head v. Ins. Co., (2 Cranch, 127) 165 Healey v. New Haven, (49 Conn. 394) 331 Health Dept. v. Knoll, (70 N. Y. 530) 118 Health Dept. v. Purdon, (99 N. Y. 237) 120 Health Dept. v. Van Cott, (51 N. T. 413) 87 Healy v. New York, (3 Hun, 708) 352 Hearsey v. Pruyn, (7 Johnson, 179) 320 Heath, In re, (3 Hill, 42) 105, 381 Heatli 1). Des Moines etc. Co., 61 la. 11) 302 Hebard v. Ashland Co., (55 Wis. 145) 189 a Heblich v. Judge, (10 S. W. R. 465) 362 Hebron R'd v. Harvey, (90 Ind. 192, 46 Am. Rep. 199) 294 Hecker v. Mayor, (18 Abb. Pr. 369) 92 Hecker v. N. Y. Balance Dock Co., (24 Barb. 215) 133 Heckerman v. Hummell, (19 Pa. St. 64) 300 Hecock V. Van Dusen, (45 W. W. R. 343) 266 Hedges v. Dam., (72 Col. 520) 91 Hedges b. Dixon Co., (37 Fed. Rep. 304) 189 a Hedges v. Madison, (6 111. 306) 315, 325 Hedley v. Franklin Co., (4 Blackf. 116) 86 Heegel b. Wichita, (19 Kan. 562) 353 Heeney v. Sprague, (11 R. I. 456) 147, 324, 346, 348 Hegan v. Eighth Av. etc. Co., 15 N. Y. 380) 321 Heft V. Payne, (31 Pac. 874) 282 Heidelberg v. Horst, (62 Pa. St. 301) 167 Heigel v. Wichita, (19 S. W. R. 562) 315 Heilbrou, Ex parte, (65 Cal. 609) 118 Heine v. Levee Com'rs, (19 Wall. 660) 194 a, 256 Heiple v. East Portland, (13 Oreg. 97) 286, 288 Heirs of Hollimau v. Peebles, (1 Tex. 673) 66 Heise v. Town Council, (6 Rich. 404) 154, 155 Heise v. Columbia, (6 Rich. 404) 155 Heiser v. New York, (104 N. Y. 68) 330 Heiskill v. Baltimore, (65 Md. 125) 90 Heitz B. St. Louis, (19 S. W. 735) 215, 221 Heizer b. Yohn, (37 Ind. 415) 57 Helana b. Lowell, (3 Allen, 407) 147, 152 Helena v. Thompson, (29 Ark. 569) 328, 354 Hellen v. Noe, (3 Ired. 493) 120, 155 Heller v. Alvarado, (20 S. W. R. 1003) 159 Heller b. Stremmel, (52 Mo. 309) 74 Heller b. Mayor, (53 Mo. 159) 92 Heman v. Payne, (27 Mo. App. 481) 294 TABLE OP CASES CITED. Ixxxi References are to Sections. Hammer v. Hustace, (51 Hun, 457) 111 Hemphill v. Boston, (8 Cush. 105) 223 Hempstead v. Howard, (51 Ark. 344) 59 Henbaok c. State, (53 Ala. 523, 25 Am. Rep. 650) 123 Hendee v. Pinkerton, (14 Allen, 381) 51 Hendersliatt o. Ottumwa, (46 Iowa, 658) 329 Henderson v. Baltimore, (8 Md. 352) 256, 265, 278 Henderson v. Central etc. Co., (20 Am. & Eng. Ey. Cas. 542^ 302 Henderson v. Covington, (14 Bush, 312) 324 Henderson v. Davis, (106 N. C. 88) 29, 65 Henderson v. Lambert, (8 Bush, 607) 56, 276 Henderson v. Minneapolis, (32 Minn. 219) 354 a Henderson v. Marietta, (64 Ga. 286) 165 Henderson v. McCullough, (12 S. W. E. 932) 270 Hendersonville v. McMinn, (82 N. C. 532) 158 Hendrick's App., (103 Pa. St. 358) 330 Henkel v. Detroit, (40 Mich. 249) 120, 286, 327 Henks u. Minneapolis, (42 Minn. 530) 344 Henley v. Lyme Eegis, (5 Bing. 91, 3 Mo. & P. 298, 3 B. & Ad. 77, 2 CI. & Ein. 331, 8 Bligh N. R. 690, 1 Bing. X C. 222, 1 Scott, 29) 336 a Hennel v. Board, (132 Ind. 32, 31 N. E. R. 462) 326 Hennepin County Com'rs v. Dayton, (17 Minn. 260) 226 Henner, In re, (13 Pet. 230) 85 Hennessy v. New Bedford, (26 N. E. R. 999) 328 Hennessy v. St. Paul, (37 Fed. Rep. 565) 120, 131 Hennepin Co. v. Bartelson, (34 N. W. R. 222) 289 Hennepin Co. v. Jones, (18 Minn. 199) 79 Hennington v. Lansingburgh, (36 Hun, 598) 92 Hensoldt v. Petersburgh, (63111. Ill) 150 Henry v. Chester, (15 Vt. 460) 256 Henry «. Dubuque & Pacific R. R. Co., (2 Iowa, 288) 238 Henry v. Dubuque & Pac. R. E. Co., (10 Iowa, 540) 249 vi Henry v. Pittsburgh etc., Co., (8 Watts & S. 85) 329 Henry v. Thomas, (119 Mass. 583) 278 Henry v. Underwood, (1 Dana, 247) 232 Henshaw v. Hunting, (1 Gray, 203) 225 310 312 Hentz V. L. I. etc. Co., (13 Barb. 646) 306 Hercules Sr. W. v. Elgin etc. Co., (30 N. E. R. 1050) 246 Herd v. Cist, (12 S. W. R. 466) 72 Hering v. Scott, (107 111. 600) 309 Heriots Hospital Feoffees v. Ross, (12 Clark & P. 507) 332 Heme v. Gaston, (2 E. & E. 66) 104 Herring v. District, (3 Mackey, 572) 329, 355 Hei-rington v. Lansingburgh, (110 N. T. 545) 347 Herschberger o. Pittsburgh, (115 Pa. St. 78) 283 Hersev ». Milw. Co. Sup., (16 Wis. 185)" 270, 397 HershofE v. Beverly, (43 N. J. L. 139) 102 Herzo v. San Francisco, (33 Cal. 140) 164 Heselton v. Harmon, (14 Atl. R. 286) 221 Hesketh v. Braddock, (3 Burr. 1858) 101, 156 Hess V. Baltimore etc. Co., (52 Md. 242, 36 Am. Rep. 371) 304 Hetheringtoni). Sterry, (28 Kan. 429) 86 Hewes v. Rice, (40 Cal. 255) 265, 279, 326 Hewison v. New Haven, (37 Conn. 475) 324, 345, 349 Hewitt's Appeal, (88 Pa. St. 55) 55, 56, 259 Hewitt V. Judge, (34 N. W. E. 248) 399 Hey V. Philadelphia, (81 Pa. St. 44) 342, 343 Heyleman, Ex parte, (92 Cal. 492) 288 Heyneman o. Blake, (19 Cal. 579) 245 Heyward v. Mayor, (7 N. Y. 324) 200, 202, 244 Heywood v. Buffalo, (14 N. Y. 534) 297 391 Hubbard v. People, (4 Mich. 126) 122 Hickerson v. Mexico, (58 Mo. 61) 219 Hicklin v. McLear, (18 Or. 126) 221 Hickman's Case, (4 Harr. 580) 234 a Hickman v. O'Neill, (10 Cal. 294) 102 Hickok 0. Hine, (23 Ohio St. 523) 314 Ixxxii TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Hiokoki). Plattsburgh, (15 Barb. 421) 92 328 Hiokok V. Shelburne, (4 Vt. 409) 107 Hickock V. Trustee, (16 N. T. 161) 325 Hickoxc. Cleveland, (8 Ohio, 543) 329 Hicks V. Dorn, (42 N". T. 41) 329 Hielscher i'. Minneapolis, (49 N. W. E. 287) 311 . Hiestand v. ]Sr. O., (14 La. An. 330) 79, 110 Higbee v. Camden etc. Co., (20 N. J. Eq. 435) 396 Higert v. Greencastle, (43 Ind. 574) 344, 346 Higgins V. Cliicago, (18 111. 276) 242, 377 Higgins 15. Princeton, (4 Halst. Ch. 309, 320) 129 Higginson v. Nahant, (11 Allen, 530) 235 Highgate v. State, (7 Atl. K 898) 270 Highland Turnpike v. McKean, (11 Johns. 154) 31 Hight V. Monroe Co., (68 Ind. 576) 163 Hightower v. Slaton, (54 Ga. 108) 80 Higley ». Bunce, (10 Conn. 567) 148 Hilbish ». Catherman, (64 Pa. St. 154) 138, 139 Hildreth v. Lowell, (11 Gray, 560) 92, 234, 279, 338 Hildreth's Heirs v. Mclntire, (1 J. J. Marsh, 206) 96 Hill V. Boston, (122 Mass. 344) 324, 336 a, 344 Hill V. Boylan, (40 Miss. 618) 67 Hill V. Charlotte, (72 N. C. 55) 328, 331 Hill V. Dalton, (72 Ga. 314) 102 Hill V. Decatur, (22 Ga. 203) 123, 125, 153 Hill V. Kahoka, (35 Fed. Eep. 321) 31 39 Hill V. Higdon, (5 Ohio St. 243) 259 a Hill ». La Crosse E. E. Co., (11 Wis. 214) 273 Hill u. Laurens Co., (13 S. E. R. 318) 325 Hill V. Lexington, (18 Mo. 401) 119 Hill V. Mayor, (72 Ga. 314) 104 ■ Hill V. Peekskill, (101 N. Y. 490) 197 Hill ,;. Supervisors, (12 N. Y. 52) 315 Hill V. Soott, (32 Fed. Eep. 716) 369 Hill V. St. Louis, (59 Mo. 412) 329 Hill V. Warrell, (49 N. W. E. 479, 87 Mich. 135) 272 Hill B. Worcester, (4 Gray, 414) 377 Hillegas v. Hilley, (5 Pa. St. 97) 120 Billiard v. Eichardson, (3 Gray, 349) Hillsboro v. Ivey, (20 S. W. E. 1012, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 653) 324, 327, 336 a Hilsdorf v. St. Louis, (45 Mo. 94) 338 a Hilsorp V. St. Louis, (45 Mo. 94) 92 Himmelman v. Byrne, (41 Cal. 500) 281 Himmelman B. Cahn, (49 Cal. 285) 172 Himmelman v. Cofran, (36 Cal. 411) 280 Himmelman v. Danos, (35 Cal. 441) 265 Himmelman v. Oliver, (34 Cal. 246) 265 Himmelman v. Spanagel, (39 Cal. 389) 281 Hinchman v. Detroit, (9 Mich. 103) 308 Hinchman v. Paterson etc. Co., (17 N. J. Eq. 75) 302, 303, 304 Hinckley v. Penobscot, (42 Me. 89) 352 Hinckley t/. Somerset, (145 Mass. 326) 342 Hinckley v. IJnion Pac. E. E., (129 Mass. 52) 191 Hincks v. Milwaukee, (46 Wis. 569) 347 Hindman's Appeal, (85 Pa. St. 406) 66 Hine v. Keokuk, (42 Iowa, 636) 302, 306 Hine v. New Haven, (40 Conn. 478) 130 Hiner v. Fond du Lac, (71 Wis. 74) 339, 3506 Hiues V. Charlotte, (12 Mich. 278) 331 Hines v. Leavenworth, (3 Kan. 186) 259 a Hines v. Lockwood, (41 How. Pr. 435) 291 Hinze v. People, (92 111. 406) 78 Hirsh V. State, (21 N. Y. 785) 123 Hitchcock V. Galveston, (96 U. S. 341) 164, 169, 263, 278 Hitchins v. Frostburg, (68 Md. 100) 349, 355 Hite V. Goodman, (1 D. & B. Eq. 364) 169 Hittinger v. Boston, (139 Mass. 17) 272 Hitz, Ex parte, (111 U. S. 766) 398 Hixon V. Lowell, (13 Gray, 59) 339, 340, 345 Hixon V. Oneida Co., (52 N. W. E. 445) 188 Hoadley's Admrs. v. San Francisco, (124 U. S. 639) 208 Hoag V. Durfey, (1 Aiken, 286) 106 Hoag V. Greenwich, (133 N. Y. 152) 192 Hoag V. Lake Shore & Mich. S. E. Co., (85 Pa. St. 293) 351 Hoag 1). Lamont, (60 N. Y. 96) 104 TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Ixxxiii Hoagland v. Culvert, (20 N. J. L. 387) 73 Hoagland v. Delaware, (17 1^. J. Eq. 107) 397 Hoagland v. Sacramento, (52 Cal. 142) 16 Hoard b. Des Moines, (62 Iowa, 326) 354 a Hobnrt v. Detroit, (7 Mich. 246) 172, 397 Hobart v. Supervisors, (17 Cal. 23) 24 Hobbs V. Lowell, (19 Pick. 415) 223 Hoboken v. Gear, (3 Dutch. 265) 148 Hoboken d. Penn. K. K. Co., (124 U. S. 656) 132, 225 Hoboken Land & Imp. Co. ». Hobo- ken, (36 N. J. Law, 540) 194, 225, 308 Hobson V. Monteith, (15 Oreg. 251) 221, 224 Hobson V. Philadelphia, (155 Pa. St. 131) 300 Hodge's Appeal, (84 Pa. St. 359) 190 Hodges V. Baltimore etc. Co., (58 Md. 603) 302 Hodges V. Buffalo, (2 Denio, 110) 110, 139, 141, 169, 338 Hodges !). Runyon, (30 Mo. 491) 167 Hodges B. Schuler, (22 N. T. 114) 179 Hodgmau v. Chicago etc. Co., (23 Minn. 153) 185, 186, 395 Hodgraan b. St. Paul etc. Co., (20 Minn. 48) 185 Hodgson B. De Beauchesne, (12 Moore, P. C. 285) 66 Hodgson B. Dexter, (1 Cranch, 345) 80 Hoeft B. Seaman, (46 How. Pr. 24) 132 Hoelil v. Muscatine, ( 57 Iowa, 444) 354 Hoey B. Gilroy, (129 N. Y. 132) 300, 327 Hoffman b. Jersey City, (34 IN. J. L. 172) 127 Hoffman ». Van Nostrand, (42 Barb. 174) 43, 49 Hofman b. Jer. City, (34 ]Sr. J. L. 172) 75 Hogan B. Ingle, (2 Cranch, 355) 284 Hogg B. Zanesville, (5 Ohio, 410\eU Hohman b. Chicago, (29]Sr. E. R. 671) 329 • Hoke V. Field, (10 Bush, 144) 76 Hoke B. Henderson, (4 Dev. 1) 67, 86 Hoke B. Perdue, (62 Cal. 545) 397 Holberg b. Macon, (55 Miss. 112) 398 Holbrook u. Dickinson, (46 111. 285) 282 Holdane b. Cold Springs Trs., (21 N. Y. 474) 222 Holdswarth b. Dartmouth, (11 A. & E. 490) 115 HoUaday o. Marsh, (3 Wend. 142) 153 Holland b. Baltimore, (11 Md. 186) 33, 278, 397 Holland b. Bartch, (22 N. E. E. 83) 321 Holland b. San Francisco, (7 Cal. 361) 13 Hollenbeck b. Marshalltown, (62 la. 21) 104 Hollenbeck v. Winnebago Co., (9 III. 148) 325 HoUiday b. People, (10 111. 216) 8, 12 Holliday b. St. Leonardo Par., (11 C. B. 192) 355 Hollingsworth ». City of Detroit, (3 McLean, 472) 192 6 Hollingsworths b. Com'rs, ( 54 N. W. R. 70) 325 Hollingsworth b. Tensas, ( 17 Fed. Rep. 109) 116, 247 Hollister v. Sherman, (63 Cal. 38) 397 HoUoway v. Delano, (28 A. N. C. 190) 224 Holloway b. Southmayd, (18 N. Y. S. 707) 224 Hollo well Bank v. Hamlin, (14 Mass. 178) 107 HoUwedel, Ex parte, (74 Mo. 395) 104 Holton B. State, (28 Pla. 303) 29 Holtzhauser b. Newport, (22 S. W. R. 752) 267 Holmes v. Fihlenburg, (54 111. 203) 102 Holmes v. Jersey City, (12 N. J. Eq. 299) 223, 248, 259 a Holmes b. Wilson, (10 A. & E. 503) 120 Holmquist, Ex parte, (27 Pao. R. 1099) 150 Holyoke b. Grand Trunk etc. Co., (48 N.H. 541) 352 a Homan b. Stanley, (66 Pa. St. 464) 348 Home Ins. Co. v. Council, (93 TJ. S. 116) 12 Homer b. Blackburn, (27 La. An. 544) 134 Homersham b. Woly etc., (4 Eng. Law & Eq. 426) 165 Hon. B. State, (89 Ind. 249) 288 Honea b. Monroe, (63 Miss. 171) 364 Hood's Estate, (21 Pa. St. 106) 66 Hood V. Lynn, (1 Allen, 103) 139 Hooker v. New Haven, (14 Conn. 146) 239 292 Hool B. U. S., (1 Cranch, 98) 92 Hoole B. Attorney General, (22 Al-u 190) 190, 218, 220 Ixxxiv TABLE OF CASES CI'I'ED. References are to Sections. Hooper v. Bridgewater, (102 Mass. 512) 234 Hooper v. Ely, (46 Mo. 505) 395 Hooper v. Goodwin, (48 Me. 79) 88 Hope M. Co., In re, (1 Sawy. 710) 283 Hope B. Barnett, (78 Gal. 9) 220 Hope V. Deaderick, (8 Humpli. 1) 255 Hopeston v. Eads, (32 111. App. 75) 326 a Hopkins v. MahofEy, (11 Serg. & Rawle, 126) 167 Hopkins v. Mason, (61 Barb. 469^ 279 Hopkins v. Mayor of Swansea, (4 M. & W. 621) 145, 152 Hopkins v. Whitesides, (1 Head, 31) 42 Hoppikus V. Com'rs, (16 Cal. 249) 189 a Horrasel ». Smyth, (7 C. B. 729) 348 Horn V. Atl. etc. Co., (35 N. H. 169) 302 Horn V. Baltimore, (30 Md. 218) 169 Horn V. People, (26 Mich. 224) 133 Hornbeck v. Westbrook, (9 Johns. 73) 204 Hornblower v. Duden, (35 Cal. 664) 176 Horner v. Coffey, (25 Miss. 434) 212 Horner ». Coffey, (25 Miss. 434) 375 Horney v. Sloan, (1 Smith, 136) 152 Horton v. Grand Haven, (24 Mich. 465) 245 Horton v. Ipswich, (12 Gush. 488) 344, 352 Horton V. Mayor, (4 Lea, 39, 40 Am. Reps. 1) 294 Horton v. Mobile School Cora'rs, (43 Ala. 596) 28 Horton v. Nashville, (4 Lea, 47) 328, 355 Horton v. Newell, (23 Atl. R. 610) 92 Horton o. Thompson, (71 N. Y. 513) 170 Horton v. Watson, (23 Kan. 229) 75 Hotchin v. Kent, (8 Mich. 526) 170 Hot Springs etc. Co. v. Williamson, (45 Ark. 429) 330 Houfe V. Fulton, (29 Wis. 296) 342, 343 Houfe V. Town, (34 Wis. 608) 313 Hough V. Cook County Land Co., (73 111. 23) 207 Houghton V. People, (55 N. Y. 398) 190 a House V. Greensburg, (93 Ind. 533) 30, 31, 53, 309 House V. Montgomery Co., (60 Ind. 580) 353 House Bill, In re, (21 Pac. R. 484, 12 Colo. 289) 8, 32 House Bill, In re, (48 N. W. 275) 26 Householder v. Kansas City, (83 Mo. 488) 330 Houseman ». Com., (100 Pa. St. 222) 67, 83 Houston, In re, (47 Fed. 539) 258 Houston B. Clay Co., (18 Ind. 396) 169 Houston B. H. B. & M. Ry. Co., (19 S. W. Rep. 786) 306 a Houston B. Houston City Ry. Co., (19 S. W. R. 127) 302 Houston B. Izaaks, (68 Tex. 116) 347, 3506 Houston 0. Ry. Co., (19 S. W. R. 127) 14 Houston etc. Co. v. Odam, (53 Tex. 343) 303 Hove V. Alexandria, (1 Cranch, 98) 329 HoveldeuB. Kansas, etc. Co., (79 Mo. 632) 302, 303 Hover ». Barkhoof, (44 N. Y. 113) 325 Hovey b. Mayo, (43 Me. 322) 292, 336 Howard's Case, (Hutt. 87) 37 Howard v. Bridgewater, (16 Pick. 189) 400 Howard b. Chiu-ch, (18 Md. 451) 248 259 a Howard u. Ingersoll, (13 How. 427 354 Howard b. Lee, (3 Sandf. Ch. 281) 120 Howard b. Pritchett, (85 Ind. 68) 353 Howard v. Providence, (6 R. I. 514) 245 Howard b. Rogers, (4 Harr. & J. 278) 221 Howard b. Shields, (16 Ohio St. 184) 65 Howard v. Shoemaker, (35 Ind. Ill) 86, 102 Howard b. Shaw, (126 HI. 53) 279 Howard v. Worcester, (27 N. E. R. 11) 328 Howard S. Ins. b. Newark, (18 Atl. R. 672) 280 Howe, In re, (1 Paige 214) 204 Howell B. Bristol, (8 Bush, 493) 248, 259 a Howe B. Boston, (7 Gush. 273) 326 Hoyyell b. Buffalo, (15 N. Y. 512) 72, 259, 326 Hd^e 0. Com'rs, (47 Pa. St. 361) 316 Howe B. Crawford, (47 Pa. St. 361) 362, 363 Howe B. Freeman, (14 Gray, 566) 273 Howe B. Keeler, (27 Conn. 538) 17 c Howe B. Lowell, (101 Mass. 99) 350 a 351 Howe B. New Orleans, (12 La. An, 481) 327 a, 331, 345, 348 TABLE OF CASES CITED. Beferences are to Sections. Ixxxv Howe V. Norris, (12 Allen, 82) 127 Howe V. Plainfield, (37 N. J. L. 145) 24, 104, 117 Howe u. Plainfield, (41 N. H. 135) 350 a Howell V. City of Tacoraa, (3 Wash. St. 711) 278 Howell V. Peoria, (90 111. 104) 395 Howell V. Phila., (38 Pa. St. 471) 282 Atl. K. 862) 375 Hower's App., (127 Pa. St. 134; 17 Howland v. Luce, (16 Johns. 135) 86 Howland v. Maynard, (34 N. E. E. 515) 338 Howland v. Maynard, (34 N. E. K. 595) 324 Hoyle V. New Orleans, etc. Co., (23 La. An. 535) 302 Hoyle V. P. & M. K. K., (54 N. T. 314) 273 Hoyt V. East Saginaw, (19 Mich. 39) 148, 259 a, 277 Hoyt V. Hudson, (27 Wis. 656) 354, 354 a Hoyt V. Thompson, (19 N. T. 207, 218) 170 Hubbard v. Concord, (35 X H. 52) 342, 346, 350 a Hubbard ». Lyndon, (28 Wis. 674) 177, 190 a Hubbard b. Mason City, (60 Iowa, 400) 352 Hubbard u. Medford, (25 Pac. Kep. 640) 130 Hubbard i>. Preston, (51 N. W. Kep. 209) 129 Hubbard v. Windsor, (15 Mich. 146) 95 Hubbell V. Viroqua, (67 Wis. 343) 327 328 Hubbell V. Yonkers, (104 N. Y. 434) 328, 336 a, 343 Huber v. Baugh, (43 Iowa, 514) 155 Ruber v. Gazley, (18 Ohio, 18) 221 Hubert v. People, (49 N. Y. 132) 28 Huddleson v. Kuffin, (6 Ohio St. 604) 75, 155 Huddleston v. West Belleview, (111 Pa. St. 110) 355 Hudler v. Golden, (36 N. Y. 447) 283 Hud man v. Slaughter, (70 Ala. 546) 363 Hudson V. Bridgeport, (25 Conn. 426) 241 Hudson c. Geary, (4R L 485) 134 Hudson V. Denver, (20 Pac. R. 329, 12 Colo. 157) 83 Hudson B.Thorne, (7 Paige, 261) 120, 158. Hudson V. Vareis, (34 N. W. E. 503) 396 Hudson V. Winslow, (35 N. J. L. 437) 196 Hudson T. Co. v. Jersey City, (49 N. J. L. 303) 297 Hudson etc. Co. v. Seymour, (35 N. J. L. 47) 18 Hudson Co. v. State, (24 N. J. L. 718) 24 Hudson E. T. Co. v. Watervliet T. & E. Co., (61 Hun, 140) 306 a Huesing v. Eock Island, (128 111. 465) 118, 127 Huff v. Cook, (44 Iowa, 639) 69 Huff V. Lafayette, (108 Ind. 14) 61 Huffman b. Greenwood, (23 Kan. 281) 79 Huffman v. San Joaquin Co., (21 Cal. 426) 315 Hugg V. Camden, (20 N. J. Eq. 6) 176 Hughes V. Beggs, (16 N. E. Rep. 817) 309 Hughes V. Court, (42 N. W. R. 984, 75 Mich. 574) 84 Hughes V. Milligan, (22 Pac. E. 313) 26 Hughes V. Orange Co. Assn., 56 Hun, 396) 348 Hughes B. Worcester, (2 E. I. 493) 301 Hulbert ». Mason, (29 Ohio St. 562) 61 Huletti). Hulett, (37 Vt. 518) 66 HullB. County, (12 Iowa, 142) 177 Hull B. Kansas City, (54 Mo. 601) 342 Hull B. Sup'rs, (19 Johns. 259) 362, 363 Hullman b. Honcomp, (5 Ohio St. 237) 361 379 Humboldt b. Long, (92 V. S. 642) 183, 196 Humboldt Co. b. Dinsmore, (75 Cal. 604) 279 Hume B. Mayor, (74 N. Y. 264) 300, 345 Hume ». New York, (47 N. Y. 639) 350 a Humes b. Knoxville, (1 Humph. 403) 292 329 HummelFs Case, (9 Watts, 416) 67 Hummer b. Hummer, (3 Greene, 42) 105, 381 Hummill b. Boston, (106 Mass. 350) 397 Humphrey, In re, ( 10 Wend. 612) 99 Humphrey b. Baltimore, (47 Md. 145) 242 Humphreys B. County, (56 Pa. St. 204) 352 Humphreys Co. b. McAdoo, (7 Heisk, 585) 194 a Ixxxvi TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Hunkerline's App., (70 Pa. St. 102) 396 Hunneman v. Fire Dis., (37 Vt. 40) 130 Hunnecutt v. State, (12 S. W. E. 106) 361 Hunt V. Armbruster, (17 N. J. Eq. 208) 131 Hunt V. Booneville, (65 Mo. 620) 92, 338, 352 a Hunt V. Chicago, (98 HI. 147) 221 Hunt V. Hamilton, (25 Kan. 82) 67 Hunt V. Lambertville, (45 K J. L. 279) 145 Hunt«. Mayor, (109 N. T. 134) 342 Hunt V. New York, (109 N. Y. 134) 331a Hunt V. Pownal, (9 Vt. 411) 342, 351 Hunt I). Kousmaniere, (1 Pet. 15) 327 Hunt V. School District, (14 Vt. 300) 95 Hunt V. Utica, (18 N. Y. 442) 241 Hunt V. Wimbledon Loc. Board, (4 Ont. Kep. C. P. D. 48) 165 Hunter v. Chandler, (45 Mo. 452) 79, 85 Hunter v. Cobb, (1 Bush, 239) 258 Hunter v. Farren, (127 Mass. 381) 120 Hunter v. Newport, (5 E. I. 325) 232 Hunter v. Sandy Hill Trs., (6 Hill, 407) 217 Hunter v. Windsor, (24 Vt. 327) 338 a Huntington v. Boyle, (9 Ind. 296) 164 Huntington v. Cheesbro, (57 Ind. 74) 123 Huntington v. Union Pac. Ey. Co., (2 Sawy. 503) 397 Huntley 1). Luscombe, (2 B. & P. 530) 104 Hurford v. Omaha, (4 Neb. 336) 110, Hurden v. Stein, (27 Ala. 104) 234 Hurla B. Kansas City, (27 Pac. 143, 46 Kan. 738) 56, 276 Hurlbut V. Litchfield, (1 Eoot, 520) 333 Hurley v. Miss. & Eum Eiver B. Co., (34 Minn. 143) 215, 221 Huron v. McCall, (46 Micb. 565) 110 Huron D. C. v. London D. C, (Up. Can. Q. B. 302) 143 Huss, In re, (27 N. E. E. 784) 203 Hussen v. Eochester, (65 N. Y. 516) 248 Hussey u. Smith, (99 U. S. 24) 88 Hussner v. B'klyn etc. Co., (114 N. Y. 433) 306 Hatchings v. Scott, (4 Halst. 218) 102, 104 Hutchins ». Priestly, (61 Mich. 252) 352 Hutchinson v. Pratt, (11 Vt. 402, 423) 226 Hutchinson v. Pratt, (11 Vermont 402)106 Hutchinson v. Priestly, (25 Va. 226) 330 Huthsing v. Bosuquet, (3 McCrary, 152) 140 Hutson V. New York, (9 N. Y. 163) 328 345 Hutten V. Camden, (39 N. J. L. 122) 118 Hutton B. Windsor, (34 Up. Can. Q. B. 487) 352 Hurn, Ex parte, (9 So. E. 615) 360 Hyatt V. Bates, (35 Barb. 308) 891 Hyatt V. Eondout, (44 Barb. 385) 327, 353 Hyde v. Franklin, (27 Vt. 185) 177, 179,190 a Hyde v. Jamaica, (27 Vt. 443) 223, 340 Hyde v. State, (52 Miss. 655) 81 Hydes v. Joyce, (4 Bush, 464) 113, 263 Hyde Park v. Borden, (94 111. 26) 256 Hyde Park v. Carton, (132 lU. 100) 279 Hyde Park v. Chicago, (124 HI. 156) 391 Hyde Park v. Com'th, (12 N. E. K. 238) 162 Hymes v. Aydelott, (26 Ind. 431) 176, 245 Idaho Springs v. Woodward, (10 Col. 104) 338 Illinois V. Hlinois Central E. E. Co., (33 Fed. Eep. 730) 132, 225 111. & Mich. Canal Trs. v. Chicago, (12 111. 403) 240 111. & Mich. Canal Trs. v. Havens, (11 111. 554) 217 Illinois Cen. E. E. Co. v. Com'rs of East Lake Fork Drainage Dist., (21 N. E. E. 925) 259 a Illinois Cen. E. E. Co. v. Hutchinson, (47 111. 408) 352 Illinois Cen. E. E. Co. v. Miller, (10 So. E. 61, 68 Miss. 760) 354 a Illinois etc. Co. v. Chicago, (28 N. E. E. 740) 249 111. etc. E. & C. Co. V. St. Louis etc. Co., (2 Dill. 70) 113, 133 Illinois Ins. Co. v. Littlefield, 67) 111. 368) 217, 219, 223 Imlay v. Union Branch E. R. Co., (26 Conn. 249) 238, 302 Inchbold v. Eobinson, (L. R. 4 Ch. App. 388) 120 TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixxxvii Betcrences are to Sections. Independence v. Moore, (32 Mo. 392) 117 Indiana v. Woram, (6 Hill, 33) 5 Indiana Central Ry. Co. v. Oakes, (20 Ind. 9) 243 Indianapolis v. Cook, (99 Ind. 10) 342 Indianapolis ». Cross, (7 Ind. 9) 217, 219, 288 Indianapolis v. Emraelman, (108 Ind. 530) 340 Indianapolis v. Gas Co., (66 Ind. 39G) 32, 110, 169, 295 Indianapolis v. Hartley, (67 111. 439) 311 Indianapolis v. Home, (59 Ind. 215) 12 Indianapolis v. Huegle, (18 N. E. R. 172) 117 Indianapolis v. Imberry, (17 Ind. 175) 230, 265, 286 Indianapolis v. Kingsbury, (101 Ind. 200) 224 Indianapolis v. Lawyer, (38 Ind. 348) 263, 354 Indianapolis v. McClure, (2 Ind. 147) 319, 353 Indianapolis v. Murphy, (91 Ind. 382) 287 Indianapolis v. Patterson, (14 !N'. E. R. 551) 56 Indianapolis v. Scott, (72 Ind. 196) 345, 3506 Indianapolis c. State, (37 Ind. 489) 819 Indianapolis v. Sturm, (39 Ind. 159) 61 Indianapolis v. Vajen, (111 Ind. 240, 12 N. E. R. 311) .326 Indianapolis v. Wasson, (74 Ind. 133) 87 Indianapolis & B. R. R. Co. v. In- dianapolis, (12 Ind. 620) 219, 229 Indianapolis etc. Co. v. Calvert, (110 Ind. 535) 396 Ind. etc. Co. v. Kercheval, (16 Ind. 84) 302 Ind. etc. Co. v. Lawrenceburg, (34 Ind. 304) 303, 306 Indianapolis etc. v. Ross, (47 Ind. 23) 312 Indianapolis etc. v. State, (37 Ind^ 489) 308 Ind. Central R. R. Co. v. Hunter, (8 Ind. 74) 245 Indianapolis, P. & C. R. R. Co. v. Ross, (47 Ind. 25) 270 Indianapolis R. R. Co. c. Smith, (52 Ind. 428) 305 Ind. R. R. Co. V. Connelly, (10 Ohio, St. 165) 253 Indianola v. Jones, (29 Iowa, 282) 165 Industrial School v. Whitehead, (2 Beasley, N. J. 290) 32 Inge V. Police Jury, (14 La. An. 117) 234 Ingerson v. Berry, (14 Ohio, 315) 87, 371 Ingham Co. Sup., (20 Mich. 95) 308 Ingle V. Jones, (43 Iowa, 280) 30, 32 Inglis V. Railway Co., (16 Eng. Law & Eq. 55) 106, 148 Ingraham v. Chicago etc. Co., (46 Iowa, 366) 303 Inhabitants of Hampshire v. Inhabi- tants of Franklin, (16 Mass. 36) 59 Inhabitants v. String, (5 Halst. 323) 47 Inhabitants v. Weir, (9 Ind. 224) 169, 177 Inhabitants v. Wood, (13 Mass. 193) 25 Inhabitants of Upper Alio way's Creek v. String, (10 N. J. L. 323) 49 Insane Asylum v. Higgins, (15 111. 185) 50 Insurance Co. o. Baltimore, (23 Md. 296) 363 Insurance Co. v. Sandars, (36 N. H. 352) 97 Insurance Co. v. Sortwell, (8 Allen, 217) 97 IntendantB. Chandler, (6 Ala. 899) 110 Inter. & G. N. Ry. ». State, (73 Tex. 356) 380 International Bk. v. Bradley, (19 N. Y. 245) 102 International etc. Co. v. Halloran, (53 Tex. 46) 353 Inter. Nat. Bk. v. Franklin, (65 Mo. 105) 180 Iowa City i'. Foster, (10 Iowa, 189) 79 Iowa Col. Trs. v. Davenport, (7 Iowa, 213) 249 Ireland v. Rochester, (51 Barb. 414) 171 Irish V. Webster, (5 Greenl. 171) 167 Iron R. R. Co. v. Ironton, (19 Ohio St. 299) 133, 232 Ironton v. Kelley, (38 Ohio St. 50) 92, 347, 350 a Irvin V. IST. O. St. L. & C. R. R. Co., (94 111. 112) 272 Irvine v. Wood, (51 N. T. 224) 298, " 348 Irving B. Devors, (65 Mo. 625) 148 Irving !). Ford, (32 N. W. R. 601) 327 Irwin, In re, (16 N". Y. S. 606, 62Hun, 619) 354 Irwin V. Bradford, (22 Up. Can. C. P. 421) 342 Irwin ». Dixion, (9 Hqw. 10) 218, 219 Irwin B. Great So. Telephone Co. (37 La. An. 63) 297, 301 Ixxxviii TABLE OF CASES CITED. Beferences are to Sections. Irwin V. Mariposa, (22 U. C. C. P. 367) 115 Irwin V. Mobile, (57 Ala. 6) 259 a, 278 Isomu. Railroad Co., (3S Miss. 300) 245 Ison V. Manley, (76 Ga. 804) 120, 301 Ivihsou V. Hance, (1 Wyora. Ter. 270) 182 Ivory V. Deerpark, (116 N. Y. 476) 346 Ivy ». Lusk, (11 La. An. 486) 82 Jacks V. Helena, (41 Ark. 213) 185 Jackson v. Belleview, (30 Wis. 250) 342 Jackson v. Bowman, (39 Miss. 671) 169 Jackson v. Brush, (77 111. 59) 395 Jackson v. Cory, (8 Johns. 385) 205 Jackson v. Hartwell, (8 Johns. 422) 203, 204 Jackson v. Hathaway, (15 Johns. 447) 224, 298 Jackson v. Humphrey, (1 Johns. 498) 87 Jackson v. Hyde, (28 U. C. Q. B. 294) 337 Jackson ». Leroy, (5 Cow. 397) 206 Jackson v. Morris, (1 Denio, 199) 129 Jackson v. People, (9 Midi. Ill) 102, 105, 398 Jackson v. Pike, (9 Cow. 61) 203 Jackson v. Pratt, (10 Johns. 381) 52 Jackson v. Rutland etc. R. R. Co., (25 Vt. 150) 238 Jackson v. Vicksburg etc. R. R. M. Co., (2 Woods C. C. 141) 192 6 Jackson v. Walsh, (23 Atl. R. 778) 8 Jackson v. T. & G. K. R. Co., (2 Am. Law Reg. 585) 193 Jackson Co. v. Applewhite, (62 Ind. 464) 163 Jackson Co. Horse Ry. Co. v. Inter- State Rapid Transit Co., (24 Fed. Rep. 306) 144 Jackson County v. Hall, (55 HI. 444) 193 6 Jacksonport v. Watson, (33 Ark. 704) 395 Jacksonville v. Allen, (25 111. Ap. 54) 75,84 Jacksonville v. Mtna, F. Eng. Co., (20 Fla. 100) 130 Jacksonville v. Doan, (33 N. E. R. 878") 324 Jacksonville v. Drew, (19 Fla. 106) 347 Jacksonville ». Holland, (19 111. 271) 156 Jacksonville v. Jacks. Ry. Co., (67 111. 540) 215, 229 Jacksonville v. L'Engle, (20 Fla. 344) 55 Jacksonville o. Lambert, (62 HI. 519) 355 Jacksonville v. Ledwith, (7 So. R. 885) 256, 274 Jacksonville v. McConnel, (12 111. 138) 270 Jacksonville etc.^R. Co. v. Virden, (104 111. 339) 189 Jacobs, In re, (98 N. T. 98) 121 Jacobs V. Bangor, (16 Me. 187) 352 Jacobs 1). Hamilton Co., (4 Fisher Pat. Cas. 81) 3, 338 Jacquith v. Richardson, (8 Mete. 213) 321 Jager v. Adams, (123 Mass. 26) 348 James, Ex parte, (L. R. 9 Ch. 609) 327 James v. Darlington, (36 N. W. Rep. 835) 309 James v. Jefferson, (66 Tex. 578) 81 James ». Johnson, (6 Johns. Ch. 423) 190 a James u. Pine Bluff, (49 Ark. 199; 4 S. W. Rep. 760) 289 James v. Portage City, (5 N. W. R. 31) 346 James u. San Francisco, (6 Cal. 528) 352 James Admr. v. Harrodsburg, (3 S. W. R. 135) 327, 328 Jameson v. People, (16 111. 257) 31, 51 James River etc. v. Anderson, (12 Leigh, 276) 301, 306 Jamison b. Springfield, (53 Mo. 224) 243 Jane v. Alley, (64 Miss. 446) 87 Janesville v. Markoe, (18 Wis. 350) 144 Janey's Executors v. Latene, (4 Leigh, 327) 205 Jansen v. Atchison, (16 Kan. 358) 346, 348, 349 January v. Johnson Co., (3DiIl. C. C. 392) 192 b Jarman v. Patterson, (7 Mon. 647) 155 Jarrolt v. Moberly, (103 U. S. 508) 188 Jarvis v. Dean, (3 Bing. 447) 217 Jarvis v. Mayor etc. of New York, (2 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 396) 85 Jay's Case, (1 Vent. 302) 84 Jeffers v. Jeffers, (107 N. Y. 650) 354 Jefferson v. Courtmire, (9 Mo. 693) 117 Jefferson v. McCarty, (74 Mo. 55)282 Jefferson v. Mt. Vernon, (33 N. E. R. 1091) 255 TABLE OF CASES CITED. Beferences are to Sections. Ixxxix Jefferson b. St. Louis Co., (21 S. W. R. 217) 316 Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, (1 Black, 436) 270 Jefferson Co. v. ArrigM, (51 Miss. 68) 365 Jefferson Co. v. City of Mt. Vernon, (33 N. E. E. 1091) 282 Jef. Co. V. Cowan, (54 Mo. 234) 278 Jefferson Co. v. Slagle, (66 Pa. St. 202) 99 Jefferson Co. v. St. Louis Co., (21 S. W. 217) 317 Jefferson City v. Opel, (49 Mo. 190) 270 Jefferson City G. L. Co. v. New Or- leans, (41 La. An. 91) 58 Jeffersonville v. Ferryboat, (35 Ind. 19) 133 Jeffersonville v. Meyers, (2 Ind. App. 532) 330 Jeffersonville v. O' Conner, (37 Ind. 95) 310 Jeffersonville v. Patterson, (32 Ind. 140) 87 . Jeffersonville v. The J. Shallcross, (35 Ind. 19) 164 Jeffreys v. Gurr, (2 B. & Add. 841) 25 Jeffries v. Harington, (11 Colo. 191) 69 Jeffries v. Lawrence, (42 Iowa, 498) 186, 256 Jelliff V. Newark, (48 N. J. L. 101) 264 Jenkins v. Andover, (103 Mass. 94, 104) 188, 254, 392 Jenkins D. Cheyenne, (1 Wy. Ter. 287) 156 Jenkins v. Putnam, (12 N. E. E. 613) 111 Jenkins v. Thomasville, (35 Ga. 145) 102 Jenkins v. Wilm. & W. K. Co., (110 N. C. 438) 354 a Jenksn. Lima Twp., (17 Ind. 326) 326 a Jenks V. Williaras, (115 Mass. 217) 300 Jenney v. Brooklyn, (120 N. Y. 164) 328, 336 a Jennings o. Tisbury, (5 Gray, 73) 223 Jennings v. Van Schaick, (108 N. Y. 530) 348 Jennings Co. Com'rs v. Verbarg, (63 Ind. 107) 173 Jensen v. Supervisors (47 Wis. 298) 15 Jerome v. Kio Grande, (18 Fed. E. 873) 375, 396 Jerome v. Eoss, (7 Johns. Ch. 315) 238 Jersey City v. Canal Co., (12 N. J. Eq. 227) 397 Jersey City v. Dummer, (Spencer, 106) 225 Jersey City v. Hudson, (13 N. J. Eq. 420) 120 Jersey City v. Lembeck, (31 N. J. Eq. 255) 391 Jersey City v. Morris Canal & B. Co., (1 Beasley, 547) 225 Jersey City v. N. J. Cen. E. E., (40 N. J. Eq. 417, 2 Atl. Eep. 262) 301, 308 Jersey City». O'Callaghan, (41 N. J. L. 349) 327 Jersey City ». E. E. Co., (20 N. J. Eq. 360) 2, 33 Jersey City v. Eiker, (38 N. J. L. 225) 326 a Jersey City ». State, (1 Vroom, 521) 319 Jersey City ». State, (30 N. J. L. 521) 98, 223, 308 Jersey City etc. Co. v. J. C. Bergen « etc. Co., (21 N. J. Eq. 550) 302 Jessen v. Sweigert, (66 Cal. 182) 348 Jett V. Eiohmond, (78 Ind. 316) 117 Jewett ». New Haven, (38 Conn. 368) 92 Jex V. New York, (103 N. Y. 536) 391 Jochem v. Eobinson, (66 Wis. 638) 348 John and Cherry Streets, In re, (19 Wend. 659) 308 Johnes v. State, (4 Ohio St. 493) 368 Johnson, In re, (73 Cal. 228) 122 Johnson v. Almeda County, (4 Cal. 106) 247 Johnson v. Americus, (46 Ga. 80) 103 Johnson v. Atlantic etc. E. E. Co., (35 N. H. 569) 238, 354 Johnson v. Barclay, (1 Harr. N. J. 1) 104 Johnson v. Canal St. Ey. Co., (27 La. An. 53) 321 Johnson o. Chi. St. P. M. & Q. Ey. Co., (50 N. W. 771) 354a Johnson v. City of Parkersburg, (16 W. Va. 402) 239 Johnson v. County of Stark, (24 111. 75) 191, 1916, 192 6 Johnson v. District, (118 U. S. 19) 328, 355 Johnson v. Drummond, (20 Graft. 419) 272 Johnson v. Duer, (21 S. W. E. 800) 259 a. Johnson v. Enfield, (42 N. H. 197) 342 Johnson v. Freeport, etc. Co., (Ill 111. 413) 232 xc TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Johnson v. Hud. R. E. Co., (6 Duer, 634) 352 a Johnson v. Indianapolis, (16 Ind. 227) 47 Johnson b. Irasburgh, (47 Vt. 28) 352 Johnson v. Joliet & C. R. E. Co., (23 111. 202) 241 Johnson v. Lexington, (14 B. Men. 648) 261 Johnson v. Milwaukee, (40 Wis. 315) 2.59 a Johnson ». Milwaukee, (46 Wis. 568) 346,3.50 6 Johnson v. Oregon City, (2 Oreg. 327) 275 Johnson ». Parkersburgh, (16 W. Va. 402) 330 Johnson v. Philadelphia, (60 Pa. St. 445) 123 Johnson v. Eeardon, (16 Minn. 431) 155 Johnson v. Simonton, (43 Cal. 242) 147 » Johnson v. Small, (5 B. Mon. 25) 321 Johnson v. Thayer, (94 U. S. 631) 185 Johnson v. Wilcox, (19 Atl. R. 939) 352 Johnson v. Wilson, (2 N. H. 202) 78 Johnson v. Winfield, (29 Pac. R. 559, 48 Kan. 129) 158 Johnson Co. v. January, (94 U. S. 202) 196 Jolinston V. Becker Co. Com'rs, (27 Minn. 64, 6 N. W. R. 411) 266 Johnston v. Charleston, (1 Bay, 441) 65 Johnston v. District, (118 U. S. 19) 354 Johnston v. Macon, (62 Ga. 645) 263 Johnston v. Simonton, (43 Cal. 242) 118 Johnston v. Prov. etc. Co., (10 R. I. 365) 306 Johnston u. Wilson, (2 K H. 202) 76, 77, 82 Joliet ». Harwood, (86 111. 110) 347 Joliet 0. Seward, (99 111. 267) 350 a Joliet V. Verley, (35 111. 58) 319, .353 Joliet V. Walker, (7 111. App., 267) 350 6 Jones V. Andover, (9 Pick. 146) 95 Jones V. Borough of Bangor, (144 Pa. St. 688, 29 W. N. C. 245) 330 Jones V. Boston, (104 Mass. 75) 259 a, 345, 392 ' . ' Joues V. Chamberlain, (16 N'. E. R 72) 255 Jones V. Cincinnati, (18 Ohio, 318, 323) 256 Jones V. Clifford, (3 Ch. Div. 779) 327 Jones V. Estate of Keep, (19 Wis. 369) 258 Jones V. Grant Co., (14 Wis. 518) 79 Jones V. Hmibut, (13 Neb. 125) 189 o Jones V. Ins. Co., (2 Daly, 307) 147 Jones V. Keith, (37 Tex. 394) 313 Jones V. Jefferson, (66 Tex. 576) 86, 370 Jones V. Minneapolis, (31 Minn. 230) 3506 Jones V. Miracle, (21 S. W. R. 241) 282 Jones V. New Haven, (34 Conn. 1) 9, 325 339 345. Jones V. Nichols, (46 Ark. 207) 348 Jones V. Powell, (Palm. 537) 120 Jones V. Richmond, (18 Gratt. 517) 163, 333 Jones V. Bobbins, (8 Gray, 329) 105 Jones V. Schulmyer, (39 Ind. 119) 283 Jones V. Soulard, (24 How. 41) 54 Jones V. Stanstead, S. & 0. E. E. Co., (L. E. 4 P. C. App. 98, 120) 243, 247 Jones V. Waltham, (4 Cush. 499) 343 Jonesboro v. Cairo, etc. E. E. (110 U. S. 192) 28 Jonesboro v. McKee, (2 Yerg, 167) 282 Jonnston v. Super's, (19 Johns. 272) 377 Jordan c. Hannibal, (87 Mo. 673) 353 Jordan ». Helwig, (1 Wilson, 447) 131 Jordan v. School District, (38 Me. 164) 95, 107 Joyce V. Parkhurst, (22 N. E. E. 899, 150 Mass. 243) 75 Joyce V. Woods, (78 Ky. 386) 120, 272 Joyner v. Third Sch. Dis., (3 Cush. 567) 326 Judd V. Claremont, (23 Atl. E. 427) 351 Judge V. Meriden, (38 Conn. 90) 338 a Judkins v. Hill, (50 N. H. 140) 65 Judsou V. Bridgeport, (25 Conn. 426) 232 Jugman v. Chicago, (78 HI. 405) 118 Juker V. Commonwealth, (20 Pa. St. 484) 65 Julia Bldg. Assn. v. Bell Tel. Co., (88 Mo. 258) 297 Junction City v. Webb, (23 Pac. R. 1073) 162 Junction R. E. Co. ». Philadelphia, (88 Pa. St. 424) 259 a Junkins v. Union Sch. Dis., (39 Me. 220) 99, 167 Just B. Township, (42 Mich. 573) 364 Justices V. G. & W. Co., (9 Ga. 475) 320 Justice B. Orr, (12 Ga. 137) 179 TABLE OF CASES CITED. XCl Eeferenees are to Sections. K. Kaime v. Barter, (73 Mo. 316) 218 Kaiser b. Weise, (86 Pa. St. 366) 276 Kalbrier ». Leonard, (34 Ind. 497) 56, 276 Kane v. Baltimore, (15 Md. 240) 234, 241 Kane v. Fond du Lac, (40 Wis. 495) 142 Kane v. State, (17 Atl. E. 557, 70 Md. 546) 399 Kankakee v. Linden, (38 111. App. 6o7) 328 Kankakee v. People, (24111. App. 410) 316 Kankakee v. Potter, (119 111. 327) 278 Kansas v. Swope, (79 Mo. 446) 110 Kansas ». Topeka, (31 Kan. 452) 125 Kansas City v. Clark, (68 Mo. 588) 161 Kansas City v. Flanagan, (69 Mo. 22) 165 Kansas City v. Payne, (71 Mo. 159) 282 Kansas Cityj). Kichards, (34 Mo. App. 521) 294 Kansas City etc. Co. ■». Alderman, (47 Mo. 349) 185 Kansas City B. & I. Co., In re, (35 Kan. 557) 315 Kansas etc. Co. v. Burge, (40 Kan. 736) 47 Kansas etc. Co. v. Miller, (2 Col. 442) 353 Kansas etc. Co. v. Payne, (49 Fed. E. 114, 4 U. S. App. 77) 247, 249 Kansas M. L. Ins. Co. v. Hill, (33 Pac. 300) 397 Kan. Pac. E. E. Co. v. Wyandotte Co., (16 Kan. 587) 326 a Kappes V. Appel, (14 Bradw. 179) 348 Karst V. St. Paul etc. Co., (22 Minn. 118) 292, 329 Karwisch b. Atlanta, (44 Ga. 404) 134 Kathraan b. New Orleans, (11 La. An. 145) 28 Katzenberger v. Aberdeen, (121 U. S. 172) 17 Kaufle V. Delaney, (25 W. Va. 410) 62 Kavanagh v. Brooklyn, (38 Barb. 232) 328, 349 Kavanagh b. Mobile etc. E. E. Co., (4 S. E. Eep. 113) 396 Kavanaugh v. State, (41 Ala. 399) 67 Kay V. Kerk, (24 Atl. E. 326) 354 Kayser o. Trustees etc. of Brenen, (16 Mo. 88) 53 Kean b. Asch, (27 N. J. Eq. 57) 397 Keane b. Waterford, (29 N. E. E. 130. 130 N. Y. 188) 344 Kearney b. Ballentine, (23 Atl. E. 821) 241 Kearney b. London B. & S. C. Ey. Co., (L. E. 5 Q. B. 411) 342 Kearney b. L. B. & S. C. E. W. Co., (40 L. J. Q. B. 2>5; 317 Kearney b. Metro. E. E. Co., (129 N. Y. 76) 244 Keasey v. Bricker, (60 Pa. St. 9) 365 Keasy b. Louisville, (4 Dana, 154) 329 Keating b. Kansas City, (84 Mo. 415) 169, 327 Keavrhacker v. Cleveland etc. E. E. Co., (3 Ohio St. 172) 301 Keenan b. Goodwin, (24 Atl. 148) 87 Keenau b. Perry, (24 Tex. 253) 83 Keeney b. Jersey City, (47 N. J. L. 449) 165, 170 Keeler b. Milledge, (24 N. J. L. 142) 87 Keese ». Denver, (10 Colo. 112) 278 Keckely b. Com'rs, (4 McCord, 257) 153 Kehrer v. Eichmond, (81 Va. 745) 354 a Keith B. Brockton, (136 Mass. 119) 344 Keith B. Easton, (2 Allen, 552) 342, 346 Keith B. Philadelphia, (27 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 93) 56 Keith B. Setter, (25 Kans. 100) 66 Keithsburg b. Frick, (34 111. 405) 170 Keizer b. Lovett, (85 Ind. 240) 396 Keller B. Corpus Christi, (50 Tex. 614) 116, 239 Keller b. Hicks, (22 Cal. 460) 179 Keller b. Hyde, (20 Cal. 593) 177 Keller b. Savage, (17 Me. 444) 106, 108 Keller b. State, (11 Md. 525) 258 Keller v. State, (31 Iowa, 493) 261 Kelley v. Edwards, (99 Cal. 460) 371 Kelley v. Mayor etc., (4 Hill N. Y. 265) 177 Kelley b. Mayor etc. of N. Y.,(4 E. D. Smith, 291) 92 Kelley b. McCorraick, (28 Mass. 318) 192 i. Kellinger b. Forty Sec. etc. Co., (50 N. Y. 206) 302 Kellogg B. Ely, (15 Ohio St. 64) 278, .327 Kellogg B. Hickman, (12 Colo. 256) 66 Kellogg B. Janesville, (34 Minn. 132) 339 Kellogg B. Northampton, (4 Gray, 65) 342, 346 Kellogg B. Oshkosh, (14 Wis. 678) 66 Kellogg B. Thompson, (66 N. Y. 88) 294, 312, 354 Kelly's Case, (8 Gratt. 8) 223 Kellv V. Baltimore, (53 Md. 134) 395 Kelly B. Chicago, (62 111. 279) 173, 395 xcu TABLE OF CASES CITED. Beferences are to Sections. Kelly V. Columbus, (41 Ohio St. 263) 348 Kelly u. Doody, (22 N. E. E. 1084, 116 ISr. Y. 575) 352 Kelly V. Mayor, (4 Hill, 263) 165, 178 Kelly V. Mayor etc. of N. Y., (11 N. Y. 432) 92 Kelly V. Meeks, (87 Mo. 396) 53, 55 Kelly ». Milau, (21 Fed. Rep. 842)110 Kelly D. Milwaukee, (18 Wis. 83) 328 Kelly B. New York, (11 N". Y. 432) 347 Kelly V. Pittsburgh, (85 Pa. St. 170, 104 XJ. S. 78) 259, 276 Kelly V. Wimberly, (61 Miss. 548) 368 Kelly etc. v. Lawrence F. Co., (22 N. E. Rep. 639) 310 Kelsey v. Glover, (15 Vt; 708) 342 Kemble's App., (19 Atl. R. 946) 397 Kemmerer v. State, (7 Neb. 133) 365 Kemper v. Campbell, (26 Pac. 53) 329 Kemper ». Cincin. etc., (11 Ohio. 392) 320 Kemper v. Louisville, (14 Bush, 87) 103, 329, 354 Kenaday 5). Lawrence, (128 Mass. 318) 350 & Kendall v. Albia, (73 Iowa, 241) 352 a Kendall v. Boston, (118 Mass. 234) 337 Kendall v. Camden, (47 N. J. L. 64) 381 Kendall v. Clinton, (53 Mass. 526) 79 Kendall v. County, (12 111. App. 210) 316 Kendall v. King, (84 Eng. C. L. 483) 182 Kendall v. Post, (8 Oreg. 141) 245, 293 Kendall p. Stokes, (3 How. 109) 91, 359, 363 Kendall b. U. S., (12 Pet. 584) 375 Kennard v. Burton, (25 Me. 39) 321 Kennard v. Louisiana, (92 U. S. 480) 83 Kennard Cass Co., U. S. C. C, (3 Dillon C. C. 147) 193 Kennedy b. Board, (2 Pa. St. 367) 120 Kennedy v. Covington, (8 Dana, 61) 133 Kennedy v. Mayor, (73 N. Y. 365) 336 a, 343 Kennedy v. Newman, (1 Sandf. 187) 250 Kennedy v. Phelp, (10 La. An. 227) 120 Kennedy v. Sacramento, (19 Fed. 580) 375 Kennedy v. Sowden, (1 McMullen, 328) 152, 154 Kennedy v. Washington, (3 Cranch C. C. 595) 393 Kennett's Petition, (24 N. H. 135) 239 Kennon v. Gilmer, (131 TT. S. 22) 352 a Kenosha v. Lamson, (9 Wall. 478) 1916 Kensington Com'rs v. Wood, (10 Pa. St. 93) 329, 354 a Kent V. Dickinson, (25 Gratt. 817) 360 Kent B. Cheyenne, (2 Wyom. 6) 328 Kent V. Kentland, (62 Ind. 291) 259 Kent V. Lincoln, (32 Vt. 591) 350 Kent B. Worthington Brd., (L. R. 10 Q. B. 118) 336 a Kentucky v. Denison, (24 How. 66) 5, 8, 359 Kentucky Seminary b. Wallace, (15 B. Mon. 35) 47, 49 Kenzie v. Chicago, (2 Scam. 188) 51 Keogh V. Wilmington, (4 Del. Ch. 491) 173, 362 Keokuk v. Keokuk, I. S. Dis., (53 Iowa, 352) 346 Keokuk v. Keokuk P. Co., (45 Iowa, 196, 206) 133 Keokuk b. Merriam, (44 Iowa, 432) 373 Keough V. Board, (31 N. E. R. 587) 361 Keough B. Holyoke, (31 N. E. E. 387) 66 Kepner v. Com., (40 Pa. St. 124) 96, 145 Kepple V. Keokuk, (61 Iowa, 653) 292 Kern o. Isgrigg, (31 N. E. K. 455) 396 Kerr v. Dougherty, (79 N. Y. 327) 202 Kerr v. Josliu, (66 Hun, 629) 396 Kerr b. Preston, L. R. (6 Ch. Div. 463) 335 Kerr b. South Park Com'rs, (117 U. S. 379) 246, 248 Kerr ». Trego, (47 Pa. St. 292) 87, 96 Kerr v. W. S. R. Co., (27 N. E. 833) 238 Ketchum b. BuHalo, (14 N. Y. 356) 128, 182, 200 Ketchum v. Duncan, (96 U. S. 671) 190 Ketchum v. Newman, (116 N. Y. 422) 131 Kettering b. Jacksonville, (50 111. 39) 160, 302 Kettle B. Tremont, (1 Neb. 329) 308 Keyes v. Tait, (19 Iowa, 123) 220 Keys V. Marion Co., (41 Cal. 252) 308 Keys B. Marcellus, (50 Mich. 439) 343, 346 Keys V. Westford, (17 Pick. 277) 110 Keyser v. Sch. Dis., (35 N. H. 477) 170 TABLE OF CASES CITED. XCIU References are to Sections. Keyser v. McKissan, (2 Eawle, 139) 88 Keystone Cas. Appeal, (7 Atl. E. 579) 259 Kibele ». PhiladelpWa, (105 Pa. St. 41) 350 rt Kidd V. Pearson, (128 U. S. 1) 121 Kidder v. Peoria, (29 111. 77) 2J:1 Kiernan, In re, (62 N. Y. 457) 278 Kies V. Erie, (19 Atl. E. 942, 26 W. K. C. 112) 92 Kile V. Yellowhead, (80 111. 208) 250 Kiley ». Cranar, (51 Mo. 541) 106 Kiley v. Kansas City, (87 Mo. 103) 825, 327 a, 349 Kilgus V. Trustees, (22 S. W. E. 750) 270 Killon V. Herman, (43 Kan. 37) 81 Kimbe v. White W. V. Canal Co., (1 111. 285) 243 Kimball v. Chappell, (27 Abb. N. C. 437)49 Kimball b. Homan, (42 N. W. K. 167) 311 Kimball v. Kenosha, (4 Wis. 321) 308 Kimball ». Lamprey, (19 N. H. 215) 95, 373 Kimball v. Marshall, (44 N. H. 465) 99 Kimball ». Kockland, (71 Me. 137) 247 Kimball v. Rosendale, (42 Wis. 407) 187 a Kimble v. White W. V. Canal Co., (1 Ind. 285) 247 Kimere v. State, (129 Ind. 589) 371 Kincaid's App., (66 Pa. St. 412) 118 Kincaid ». Hardin Co. , (53 Iowa, 430) 325, 375 Kine ». Defenbaugh, (64 111. 291) 245 King 1). Ashwell, (12 East, 22) 161 King V. Benton Co., (10 Greg. 512) 279 King V. Bower, (1 Barn. & Cr. 492) 99 King V. Buller, (8 East. 389) 99 King i;. Butler, (15 Johns. 281) 168 King V. Davenport, (98 111. 505) 130- King V. Dimpsey, (2 T. E. 96) 154 King V. Doolittle, (1 Head, 77) 327 King «. Eord, (70 Ga. 628) 129, 130 King V. Glassop, (4 B. & A. 616) 156 King V. Grant, (1 Barn. & Adol. 104) 32 King B. Hawkins, (16 Pac. Eep. 434) 80 King ». Hungerford Market Co., (4 B. & Al. 427) 243 King V. Hunter, (65 N. C. 203) 67 King I'. Hyde, (21 L. J. May. Cas. 94) 156 King ». Johnson, (8 Q. B. 102) 156 King B. Mahaska, (75 Iowa, 329) 170 King V. Mayor, (1 Str. 385) 97 King XI. Mayor, (12 T. E. 182) 85 King V. MoLure, (84 N. C. 153) 82 King V. Moore, (3 B. & Ad. 184) 120 King V. N. Y. Cent. & H. E. E. E. Co., (66 N. Y. 181) 347 King V. Norris, (1 Ld. Eaym. 337) 48 King u. Oshkosh, (44 N. W. E. 745, 75 Wis. 517) 324, 349 Kip D. Paterson, (2 Dutch. 298) 156 King V. Portland, (31 Pac. E. 482) 278 King V. Portland, (2 Oreg. 146) 259 a King V. Priest, (6 T. E. 538) 154 King V. Reed, (43 N. J. L. 186) 277 King V. Sadler, (4 C. & P. 218) 120 King 13. Seale, (8 East, 568) 154 King V. Sev. & Wye. E. E., (2 B. & Aid. 646) 363 King ». Smith, (5 M. & S. 133) 154 King V. Symonds, (1 East, 189) 154 King V. Thompson, (2 T. E. 18) 156 King V. Thompson, (87 Pa. St. 365) 325 King V. Williams, (2 Maule & Sel. 141) 99 King V. Wyatt, (2 Ld. Eaym. 1478) 154 Kingland v. Clark, (24 Mo. 24) 244 Kingman ». Brockton, (26 K. E. E. 968) 13, 184, 200 Kingman ». Plymouth Co. Com'rs, (6 Cush. 306) 249 Kingsburg «. Dedham, (13 Allen, 186) 342 Kingsbury B. Sch. Dis., (12 Mete. 99) 95, 99, 100, 167 Kingsland v. New York, (110 IST. \. 569) 132, 133 Kingsley v. Brooklyn, (78 N. Y. 200) 171 Kings Co. E. E. E. Co., In re, (105 X. Y. 97) 305 Kinmundy u. Mayham, (72 111. 462) 110 Kinney v. Troy, (108 N. Y. 567) 344 Kinney v. Zimpleman, (36 Tex. 554) 255 Kinsey v. Kellogg, (65 Cal. Ill) 79 Kinsley v. Chicago, (124 111. 359) 124 Kinsley v. Monougaliela Co., (31 W. Va. 464) 174 Kinsley ». Norris, (60 N. H. 131) 170 Kinzie v. Chicago, (2 Scam. 188) 51 Kirby v. Boylston Ass'n, (14 Gray, 249) 346, 348 Kirby v. Citizens St. Ey. Co., (48 Md. 168) 294 Kirby v. Shaw, (19 Pa. St. 258) 259 a xeiv TABLE OF CASES CITED. Keferences are to Sections. Kirk V. King, (3 Pa. 436) 203 Kirk !). Nowill, (1 Terra, K. 118, 124) 154, 155 Kirkbride b. Lafayette Co., (108 U. S. 208) 185 Kirkeri). Cincinnati, (27 JST.E. R. 898) 88 Kirkhara o. Russell, (76 Va. 956) 110, 150 Kirkpatrick v. Knapp, (28 Mo. App. 427) 348 Kirkwood u. Be Soto, (87 Cal. 894) 79 Kirkwood v. Newbury, (122 N. T. 571) 15 Kirtland v. Macon, (66 Ga. 385) 301 Kisler v. Cameron, (39 Ind. 488) 371 Kistnerj). Indianapolis, (100 Ind. 210) 327 a Kittanning Coal Co. v. Common- wealtli, (78 Pa. St. 100) 259 Kittle V. Pfeiffer, (22 Cal. 490) 221 Klamrath v. Albany, (53 Hun, 206) 98 Klatt V. Milwaukee, (53 "Wis. 196) 343 Klein v. Dallas, (8 S. W. Rep. 90) 339, 351 Klein v. N. O., (99 U. S. 149) 212 Klein v. Smitli Co., (54 Miss. 254) 365, 375 Klein v. Warren Co., (54 Miss. 254) 365, 375 Kling !). City, (27 Mo. App. 231) 346 Klinger v. Bickel, (117 Pa. St. 326) 130 Klinkeuer b. Sell. Dis., (11 Pa. St. 444) 217 Knapp V. Hoboken, (39 N. J. L. 394) 182 Knapp V. Mayor etc., (39 N. J. L. 394) 177 Knapp V. Swaney, (56 Mich. 345) 171 Knarr, In re, (127 Pa. St. 554, 18 Atl. R. 639) 362 Kuaust, In re, (101 N. Y. 188) 28 Kneedler v. Norristown, (100 Pa. St. 468) 150 Kneeland b. Furlong, (20 Wis. 437) 173 Kneeland v. Milwaukee, (15 Wis. 454) 270 Kneeland v. Pittsburgh, (11 Atl. R. 657) 261 Kniper v. Louisville, (7 Bush, 599) 110 Knight V. CarroUton R. R. Co., (9 La. An. 284) S02 Knight B. Ferris, (6 Houst. 293) 308 Knight B. Haight, (57 Cal. 169) 87 Knight B. Town of Ashland, (61 Wis. 233) 59, 67, 176 Knight V. Wells, (1 Lut. 519) 40 Knight B. Wells, (1 Lord Ryan, Eng.. 80) 49 Knoedler v. NorristowD, (100 Pa. St. 368) 130 Knolbloch v. Chicago etc. Co., (31 Minn. 402) 136 Knoblock b. R. R. Co., (31 Minn. 402) 290, 306 Knorr v. Miller, (5 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 609) 302, 395 Knowles v. Crampton, (11 Atl. Rep. 593) 321 Knowles b. Yates, (31 Cal. 82) 65 Knowlton b. Pittsfield, (62 N. H. 5.35) 346 Knowlton v. Plantation No. 4, (14 Me. 20) 170 Knowlton ». Rock Co. Sup., (9 Wis. 410) 269 Knox V. New York, (55 Barb. 404) 396 Knox ». Metro. R. R. Co., 58 Hun, 517) 249 Knox B. Peterson, (21 Wis. 247) 282 Knox Co. V. Goggin, (16 S. W. R. 684) 209 Knox Co. V. Aspinwall, (24 How. 376) 369 Knox Co. ». McComb, (19 Ohio St. 320) § 208 Knoxville b. Bell, (12 Lea, 157) 347 Knoxville v. Bird, (12 La. 121) 130 Knoxville v. King, (7 Lea, 441) 152 Knoxville b. R. R., (50 N. W. R. 61) 154 Koch V. Bridges, (45 Miss. 247) 349 Koch V. North Ave. R'y Co., (23 Atl. Rep. 463) 306 a Koch B. R'y Co., (23 Atl. R. 463) 302 Koehler b. Black R. Falls Iron Co., (2 Black, 715) 51 KoenigB. Arcadia, (43 N. W. 734) 353 Koester v. Ottumwa, (34 Iowa, 41) 343 Kohlhapp B. W. Roxbury, (120 Mass. 596) 108 Konrad b. Rogers, (70 Wis. 492) 208 KoonecB. Russell, (103 N. C. 179) 14 Koons V. Lucas, (52 Iowa, 177) 292 Kooutz V. Burgess, (64 Md. 134) 88 Kopf V. Utler, (101 Pa. St. 27) 312 Koppikus V. Commissioners, (16 Cal. 248) 245 Korn V. Met. Ry. Co., (59 Hun, 505) 244 Koshkonong v. Burton, (104 TJ. S. 668) 192 6, 312 Kosmak b. New York, (117 N. Y. 361) 294 Kosemisko v. Slamberg, (9 So. R. 297) 119 TABLE OF CASES CITED. XCV !^eferences are to Sections. Kountze v. Omaha, (5 Dillon, 443) 56, 276 Kramer v. Cleveland Co., (5 Ohio St. 140) 232 Kranz v. Baltimore, (64 Md. 491) 355 Kreigh v. Chicago, (80 111. 407) 289 Kretsoh v. Helme, (45 Ind. 438) 172 Krickle v. Com., (1 B. Mon. 361) 1.58 Kroop V. Forman, (31 Mich. 144) 232, 279 Kucheman v. Chicago etc. Co., (46 Iowa, 366) 302, 303 Kuhn V. Chicago, (30 111. App. 203) 159 Kumler v. Silsbee, (88 Ohio St. 445) 301 Kundinger v. Saginaw, (59 Mich. 355) 103, 241 Kiinklei). Franklin, (13 Minn. 127) 139 Kunz V. Troy, (104 JST. T. 344) 347, 349, 3506 Kupfer V. So. Parish, (12 Mass. 185) 99 Kyle V. Board, (94 Ind. 115) 316 Kyle V. Malin, (8 Ind. 34) 110, 256, 278 Kynaston v. Shrewsbury, (2 Stra. 1051) 95 Kyne v. Wilmington etc. Co., (14 Atl. K. 922) 303 Labette Co. Com'rs v. Moulton, (112 U. S. 217) 368, 375 Laboiirdette v. Municipality, (2 La. An. 527) 100 Labrie v. Manchester, (59 N. H. 120) 87 La Clef ». Concordia, (41 Kan. 423, 21 Pac. E. 272) 92 Lacon v. Page, (48 111. 499) 346, 349 Lacour v. New York, (3 Duer, 406) 327, 336 a, 355 Ladd ».■ Dickey, (84 Me. 190) 282 Ladd V. Foster, (31 Fed. E. 827) 121 Ladd V. French, (6 N. Y. Sup. 56) 293 Ladd V. Sale, (57 N". H. 210) 80 Ladd V. Spencer, (31 Pac. E. 374) 279 Lade v. Shepherd (2 Stra. 1004) 217, 224 Ladies Dec. Art Club, (25 W. N. C. 75) 120 Lafargo v. Magee, (6 Cal. 285) 177 Lafayette ». Fowler, (84 Ind. 140) 113, 397 Lafayette v. Bush, (19 Ind. 326) 247 Lafayette v. Jenners, (10 Ind. 79) 288 Lafayette v. Nagle, (113 Ind. 425) 330 Lafayette v. Spencer,, (14 Ind. 399) 329 Lafayette v. State, (69 Ind. 218) 75 Lafayette v. Timberlake, (88 Ind. 330) 327, 331 Lafayette v. Wortman, (107 Ind. 404) 329 Lafayette & I. E. E. Co. v. Smith, (6 Ind. 249) 243, 247 Lafayette etc. E. E. v. Geiger, (34 Ind. 185) 24 Lailin v. Tearney, (23 N. E. E. 389) 120 LaGrange v. Cutler, (6 Ind. 354) 79 LaGrange v. Treas., (24 Mich. 468) 108 Lahr's Case, (104 N. Y. 268) 297,305. 306 Laird v. De Soto, (22 Fed. Eep. 421) 32,42 Lake v. Williamsburgh, (4 Den. 520) 178, 281 Lake Co. v. Eollins, (130 U. S. 662, 26 Am. Eng. Cor. Cas. 465) 177 Lake etc. Water Co. v. Contra Costa Co., (67 Cal. 669) 234 Lake Erie etc. Co. v. Michener, (117 Ind. 465) 39 6 Lake Erie W. & St. L. E, E. Co. v. Heath, (9 Ind. 558) 245 Lake Sliore etc. Co. v. Cincinnati etc. Co., (116 Ind. 578) 279 Lake Shore etc. E. E. Co. v. Chicago etc. E. E. Co., (97111. 506) 144, 238, 302 Lake Shore etc. Co. v. Chicago, (33 N. E. E. 602) 279 Lake Shore & M. S. E. E. Co. v. Chi- cago, (56 111. 454) 263 Lake Shore & M. S. E. Co. v. Dunkirk, (20 N". Y. S. 596) 282 Lake View v. Lebahn, (9 K. E. E. 269, 120 111. 92) 215, 221 Lake View v. Letz, (44 111. 81) 118 Lake View v. Eose Hill Cem. Co., (70 111. 192) 118 Lake View v. Tate, (130 111. 247) 136 Lakin v. Ames, (10 Cush. 198) 67 Lamar u. Wilkius, (28 Ark. 34) 360 Lamar County ». Clements, (49 Tex. 847) 218 Lamb v. Lane, (4 Ohio St. 167) 245 Lamb v. Lynd, (44 Pa. St. 336) 105, 371 Lamb b. People, (113 111. 137) 96 Lamb v. Shays, (14 Iowa, 567) 212 Lamb v. St. Louis & W. Ey. Co., (33 Mo. App. 489) 306 a Lambar v. St. Louis, (15 Mo. 610) 354 a Lamborn v. Dickinson Co., (97 U. S. 181) 327 Lamculle etc. Co. v. Fairfield, (51 Vt, 257) 195 d XCVl TABLE OF CASES CITED. Keferences are to Section^. Lamm v. Port Deposit etc., (49 Md. 233) 170 Lamoille v. Fairfield, (51 Vt. 257) 195 a Lamsden v. Cross, (10 W's. 282 259 a Lamville etc. Co. v. Fairfield, (51 Vt. . 257) 195 Lancaster v. Clayton, (o S. W. K. 864) 256, 270 Lancaster v. Fulton, (24 W. N. C. 401) 79 Lancaster v. Rush, (52 N. W. K. 837) 276 Lan. Can. Co. v. Parnably, (11 A. & E. 223) 324, 349 Lane. Co. v. Fulton, (18 Atl. Rep. 384) 79 Lancy v. Bryant, (30 Me. 466) 107 Land v. Coffman, (50 Mo. 243) 207 Landee v. S. I. R. Co., (53 N. Y. 450) 102 Lander v. Sell. Dis., (33 Me. 239) 95 Land Grant etc. Co. v. Davis Co., (6 Kan. 256) 186 Landis v. Vineland, (23 Atl. R. 357) 150 Landon v. Lund, (38 N. W. Rep. 699) 348 Lane, Ex parte, (76 Cal. 587, 18 Pac. Rep. 677) 158 Lane v. Boston, (125 Mass. 519) 330 Lane v. Embden, (72 Me. 354) 190 a, 216 Lane v. Kennedy, (13 Ohio St. 42, 49) 312 Lane v. Saginaw, (53 Mich. 442) 241 Lane v. Schamp, (20 N. J. Eq. 82) 196, 392 Lane Co. d. Oregon, (7 Wall. 80) 282 Lang V. Board, (22 N. E. R. 667) 79 Lang V. Smith, (7 Bing. 284) 191 Langam v. Atchison, (35 Kan. 318) 145, 352 Langdon v. Castleton, (30 Vt. 285) 176 Laugdon v. Mayor, (93 N. Y. 129) 10 Langsdale t. Bonton, (12 Ind. 467) 108 Langsdale v. Nicklans, (38 Ind. 289) 283 Langston v. S. C. R. R., (2 S. C. 248) 192, 192 6 Langworthy v. Dubuque, (13 Iowa, 86) 61 Lanier v. Macon, (59 Ga. 187) 261 Lans. V. County Treas., (1 Dillon C. C. 522) 194, 369 Lansing v. Toolan, (37 Mich. 152) 343, 350 ' Lansing v. Van Garder, (24 Mich. 456) 171 Lapham ». Curtis, (5 Vt. 371) 353 Lapleine v. Morgan etc. Co., (40 La. An. 661) 352a La Plume v. Gardner, (23 Atl. R. 899) 29 Larimie Co. ». Albany Co., (92 TJ. S. 307) 2, 8, 55 Laredo v. Macdonnell, (52 Tex. 511) 170 Largen v. State, (13 S. W. R. 161, 76 Tex. 323) 38 Larkin v. Burl. C. R. & Ry. Co., (52 N. W. R. 480) 136, 146 Larkin v. Saginaw Co., (11 Mich. 88) 328 Larmon v. District, (5 Mackey, 330) 350 a Larned v. Briscoe, (29 N. W. R. 22, 62 Mich. 393) 87, 92, 329 Larsen v. Grand Forks, (3 Dak. 307) 339, 345 La Salle Co. v. Simons, (10 111. 513) 326 a La Salle etc. Co. v. Donoghue, (127 111: 27) 259 Latlirop V. Bank, (8 Dana, 114) 51 Lathrop v. Cent. la., (69 Iowa, 105) 108, 310 Lathrop v. Sunderland, (23 Atl. R. 619) 31 Lanensteia v. Fond du Lac, (28 Wis. 336) 113, 200 Laughlin v. Washington, (63 Iowa, 652) 223, 226 Launder v. Chicago, (111 111. 291) 124 Launtz v. People, (113 111. 137) 100 Lauteryung, In re, (48 N. T. Super. 308) 118 Lavalle v. People, (68 HI. 252) 380 Laver v. McGlachlin, (28 AVis. 364) 88 Law V. Dodd, (1 Ex. 845) 129 Law B. Johnston, (118 Ind. 261) 279 Law V. Pettengill, (12 N. H. 340) 106 Lawden, In re, (89 N. Y. 548) 277 Lawe V. Kaukauna, (70 Wis. 306, 35 N. W. Rep. 561) 218 Lawler v. Boom Co., (56 Me. 443)329 Lawless v. Troy, (63 Hun, 632) 344 Lawrence, In re, (69 Col. 608) 125 Lawrence v. Jeff. Par. Pol. Jury, (35 La. An. 601) 218 Lawrence v. Killam, (11 Kan. 499) 163, 291 ; Lawrence v. Mt. Vernon, (35 Me. 100) i 342 Lawrence ». Nahant, (136 Mass. 477) 294 Lawrenoeburg v. Wurst, (16 Ind. 337) Lawrence etc. Co. i-. Williams, (35 Ohio St. 168) 302 Lawrence Co. v. K. W. E, (32 Pa. St. 144) 198 Lawrence Co. App., (67 Pa. St. 87) 198 Lawson v. Seattle, (33 Pac. 347) 324 Lawthorne, Ex parte, (18 Gratt. 85) 82 Lawton v. Comm'rs, (3 Caines, 179) 105 Laycock v. Baton Eouge, (35 La. An. 475) 165, 189 a Layton ». New Orleans, (12 La. An. 515) 15, 60 Lea V. Hernandez, (10 Tex. 137) 38 Lea B. State, (10 Lea, 478) 42 Leach I!. CargiU, (60 Mo. 316) 265, 278 Leake v. Philadelphia, (24 Atl. 351) 306 Leame v. Bray, (3 East, 593) 321 Learned v. Burlington, (2 Am. Law Reg. 394) 266 Lease v. Howard, (14 Johns. 479) 284 Leat V. Tilson, (72 Cal. 404) 279 Leathers v. Aiken, (9 Fed. Rep. 679) 133 Leavenworth v. Booth, (15 Kans. 627) 123, 258 Leavenworth v. Barnes, (94 IT. S. 70) 196 Leav. V. Kinney, (99 U. S. 623) 86, 370 Leavenworth v. Norton, (1 Kan. 432) 256 Leavenworth v. Rankin, (2 Kan. 357) 281 Leavenworth etc. R. R. Co. v. Platte Co., (42 Mo. 171) 189 Leav. Co. v. Sellew, (99 U. S. 624) 86 Leavit v. Cambridge, (120 Mass. 157) 120 Leavitt v. Eastman, (77 Me. 117) 108 Leazure v. Hillegas, (7 Serg. & Rawle, 313) 207 Lebanon o. Heath, (47 N. H. 353) 51 Lebanon ». O. & M. R. R. Co., (77 111. 5.S9) 397 Lebanon v. Warren Co. Com'rs, (9 Ohio, 80) 219, 226 LeClaire v. Springfield, (49 111. 476) 347 LeClef V. Concordia, (21 Pac. Eep. 272) 324 LeClerq v. Gallipolis, (7 Ohio, pt. 1, 218) 226, 308, 396 LeCouteulx v. Buffalo, (33 N. Y. 333) 200 Ledbetter v. State, (10 Ala. 241) 84 LeDuc V. Hastings, (38 N. W. E. 803) 254, 270 vii TABLE OP CASES CITED References are to Sections. E. Co., XCVll Ledwich v. McKim, (53 N. Y. 307) 191 b, 195 6 Lee V. Lake, (14 Mich. 12) 217, 21g, 219 Lee V. Mound Station, (118 111. 304) 226 Lee V. Minneapolis, (24 Minn. 13) 329, 354 a Lee V. Pembroke etc. Co., (57 Me. 481) 354 Lee V. Sandy Hill, (40 N. Y. 442) 338 Lee V. Templeton, (13 Gray, 476) 326 Lee V. Thomas, (49 Mo. 112) 56 Lee V. Wallis, (1 Kenyon, 295) 154, 155 Lee V. Yarborough, (85 Ala. 590) 315 Lee Co. Sup. ■o. Eogers, (7 Wall. 175) 14, 254, 369 Leeds, In re, (53 N. Y. 400) 172 Leeds v. Eichmond, (102 Ind. 372) 289, 294, 338, 347 Leeds & Co. v. Hardy, (11 So. 1) 282 Leemau v. Hinton, (1 Dur. 37) 83 Leeper v. South Bend, (106 Ind. 375) 276 Lees V. Drainage Com'rs, (24 111. App. 487) 398 Lees V. Manchester, (11 East, 645) 320 Leete v. Pilgrim etc. Ch., (14 Mo. App. 590) 120 Lefever v. Detroit, (2 Mich. 586) 282 Legg V. Annapolis, (42 Md. 203) 359, 368 Legrand v. Sidney College, (5 Munf. 324) 51 Lehigh v. Hoffart, (116 Pa. St. 119) 325, 353 Lehigh Bridge Co. ». Lehigh, (4 Eawle, 24) 353 Lehigh C. Co. v. Chicago, 26 Fed. Eep. 415) 330 Lehigh Valley Coal Co. o. Chicago, (26 Fed. Eep. 415) 245 Lehigh Valley v. Trone, (28 Pa. St. 206) 132 Lehigh W. Co. App., (102 Pa. St. 515) 113 Lehman u. Brooklyn, (29 Barb. 234) 337, 352 a Lehman v. Eobinson, (59 Ala. 219) 279 Lehn «. San Francisco, (66 Cal. 76) 328, 355 Leecht v. Burlington, (34 N. W. E. 494) 270 Leiter v. Pike, (127 111. 287) 244 Leland «.' Portland, (2 Oreg. 46) 218 Leloup V. Port of Mobile, (127 U. S. 640) 258 Leman v. New York, (5 Bosw. 414) 338 XCVIU TABLE OF CASES CITED. Keferences are to Sections. Lemington v. Blodgett, (37 Vt. 215) 164 Lemon v. Hayden, (13 Wis. 159) 222 Lemon v. Peyton, (64 Miss. 161) 24 Lenawee Co. Bk. v. Adrian, (33 N. W. K. 304) 397 Lennig v. Ocean City Assoc, 41 N. J. Eq. 24) 227 Lennon v. N. Y., (55 N. T. 361) 17, 250, 280, 301 Leonard o. Brooklyn, (71 N. T. 498) 212 Leonard v. Canton, (35 Miss. 189) 169 326 a Leonardo Herr v. Baton Eouge, (4 So. 240) 200, 218, 225 Le Pointe v. O'Malley, (47 Mis. 332) 59 Leroux v. Bay Circ. J., (45 Mich. 416) 365 Les Bois v. Bramell, (4 How. 449) 229 Lesley v. White, (1 Speers L. 31) 164 325 Leslie v. Lewiston, (62 Me. 488) 340 Leslie v. St. Louis, (47 Mo. 474) 241, 249 Leslie v. White, (1 Spears, 31) 51 Letch B. Wells, (48 N. T. 586) 195 d Levasser v. Washbui-n, (11 Gratt. 572) 312 Levasseur v. Havestraw, (63 Hun, 627) 344 Levering v. Mayor, (7 Humph. 553) 52 Levyi). Mayor, (1 Sandf. 465) 327 a, 331 Levy V. Salt Lake City, (3 Utah, 63) 110, 336 Lewellen v. Lockhardts, (21 Gratt. 570) 123 Lewenthal v. Kew York, (5 Lans. 532) 349 Lewis V. Atlanta, (77 Ga. 756) 345, 348 Lewis V. Atlas etc. Ins. Co., (61 Mo. 534) 352 a Lewis V. Barbour Co., (105 U. S. 739) 1916, 195 d Lewis V. Bourdon Co., (12 Kan. 186) 189 Lewis V. Elizabeth, (25 N. J. Eq. 298) Lewis V. Frankfort, (79 Ind. 446) 391 92 Lewis V. Marion, (14 Ohio St. 515) 362 Lewis V. Marshall, (16 Kan. 102) 371 Lewis V. Mayor, (9 C. B. N. S. 401) 176 Lewis V. Oliver, (4 Abb. Pr. Rep. 121) 86 Lewis V. Eochester, (9 C. B. X. S. 401) 176 Lewis V. San Antonio, (7 Tex. 288) 220 Lewis V. Seattle, (32 Pac. K. 794) 246, 255 Lewis V. Sherman Co., (1 McCrary, 377) 196 Lewis V. Sherman Co., (5 Fed. Eep. 269) 184 Lewis V. Shreveport, (108 U. S. 282) 170 Lewis ». United States, (Morris, 199) 124 Lewis V. Washington, (5 Gratt. 265) 235 Lewiston V. Proctor, (27 111. 414) 156 375 Lexington Ave., In re, (63 Hun, 629) 278 Lexington v. Butler, (15 Wall. 296) 193 6 Lexington v. Long, (31 Mo. 369) 103 Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, (9 Dana, 513) 259 a Lexington v. MuUiken, (7 Gray, 280) 360, 375 Lexington v. Sargent, (64 Miss. 621) 398 Lexington etc. Co. v. Applegate, (8 Dana, 289) 302, 303 Libbey v. Ellsworth, (32 Pac. R. 228) 281 Liberty Bell, (23 Fed. E. 843) 395 Liberty v. Hmd, (74 Me. 101) 92 Liddell, Ex parte, (29 Pac. E. 251, 93 Cal. 633) 29 Life Assoc, of Am. v. St. Louis Co. Assessors, (49 Mo. 512) 270 Liffin V. Beverly, (145 Mass. 549) 350 6 Ligare v. Chicago, (23 N. E. E. 934) 121 Lilly V. Taylor, (88 N. C. 489) 212, 375 Lima v. L. Cem. Ass'n, (42 Ohio St. 128) 283 Limestone Co. v. Eather, (48 Ala. 433) 186, 364, 375 Linck 1). Litchfield, (31 N. E. E. 123) 47, 278 Lincoln v. Boston, (148 Mass. 578) 331 o Lincoln v. Chapin, (132 Mass. 470) 91 Lincoln ». Smith, (45 N. W. E. 41) 344, 346 Lincoln v. Stockton, (75 Me. 141) 169 Lincoln ». Warren, (23 N. Pac. Kep. 45)309 Lincoln v. Worcester Co., (8 Cush. 55) 326 Lincoln v. Yeoman, (51 N. W. E. 844) 83 Lincoln Ave. Co. v. Daum, (79 111. 299) 320 TABLE OP CASES CITED. Jleferences are to Sections. XCIX Lindliolm v. St. Paul, (19 Minn. 245) 346 Lindsay v. Chicago, (115 111. 120) 148 Lindsay v. Omaha, (46 N. W. R. 627) 308 Lindsey v. Sackett, (20 Tex. 516) 82, 361 Lindsley v. Tiickett, (20 Tex. 516) 371 Linega v. Rittenhouse, (94 111. 208) 381 Lining v. Charlston Council,' (1 Mc- Cord, 345) 268 Linnehan v. Rollins, (137 Mass. 123) 347 Linton b. Athens, (53 Ga. 588) 56 Lippilman v. Cincinnati, (40 Cir. Ct. 357) 113 Llppincott V. Lasher, (44 N. J. Eq. 120) 299 Lipps V. Philada., (38 Pa. St. 503) 277 Liquidators etc. ■». Coleman, (L. K. 6 E. &. S. App. C. 189) 166 Liquidators v. Municipality, (6 La. An. 21) 14, 194 List V. Wheeling, (7 W. Va. 501) 184, 188 Litch V. Wentworth, (71 111. 146) 397 Litchfield v. Ballon, (114 U. S. 190) 189 a Litchfield ». Vernon, (41 N. Y. 123) 301 Little V. Cogswell, (25 Pac. R. 727) 32 Little t!. Madison, (49 Wis. 605) 92, 333 Little V. Madison, (42 Wis. 643) 300, 331a Little V. Merrill, (10 Pick. 543) 95 Little V. Union Township, (40 N. J. L. 397) 15 Littlefield v. Maxwell, (31 Me. 134) 225 Little Miami etc. R. R. Co. v. Dray- ton, (23 Ohio St. 510) 238, 302 Little Miami R. R. Co. v. CoUett, (6 Ohio St. 182) 245 . Little Rock v. Bank, (98 U. S. 308) 183 Little Rock v. Barton, (33 Ark. 436) 261 Little Bock ». Parish, (36 Ark. 166) 53 Little Bock v. State Bk., (3 Eng. 227) 190 a Little Rock v. Willis, (27 Ark. 572) 349 Little Rock v. Woodruff, (14 N. E. E. 18) 246 Littler v. Lincoln, (1Q6 111. 353) 217, 222 Littler ». McCord, (38 111. Ap. 147) 282 Littleton v. Richardson, (34 N. H. 179, 187) 348 Livaudais v. Municipality, (5 La. An. 8)221 Livezey v. Philadelphia, (64 Pa. St. 106) 353 Livingston v. Albany, (41 Ga. 21) 269 Livingston v. Mayor, (8 Wend. 85) 221, 248, 286 Livingston v. McDonald, (21 Iowa, 160) 355 Livingston v. Paducah, (80 Ky. 656) 259 a Livingston v. Peppin, (31 Ala. 542) 119, 163, 174 Livingston Co. v. Welder, (64 111. 427) 395 Liverpool etc. Co. v. Board, (11 So. R. 91) 272 Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, (10 Wall. 566) 258 Lloyd V. New York, (5 N. Y. 369) 2, 8, 92, 324, 350, 355 Lloyd V. Silver Bow Co., (28 Pac. R. 453) 18, 79 Loan V. Boston, (106 Mass. 450) 340, 346 Loan Assn. v. Topeka, (20 Wall. 655) 194 a Locke V. Cen. City, (4 Colo. 65) 79 Locke V. Rochester, (5 Lansing, 11) 98 Lockett V. Ft. Worth Co., (78 Tex. 211) 120 Lockhart v. Craig St. Ry. Co., (139 Pa. St. 419, 21 Atl. Rep. 26) 306 a Lockhart v. Troy, (48 Ala. 581) 17, 28 Lockwood V. Kew York, (2 Hilton, 66) 347 Lockwood ». N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., (37 Conn. 391) 225 Lockwood V. St. Louis, (24 Mo. 20) 248, 259 a, 271, 397 Lockwood V. Weston, (23 Atl. R. 9) 273 Lodi V. State, (18 Atl. R. 749) 27 Loeser v. Leebman, (14 N. Y. S. 569) 396 Loeser v. Redd, (14 Bush, 18) 259 a Loewer v. Sedalia, (77 Mo. 431) 352 Loftus, In re, (61 Hun, 627) 365 Logan V. Buck, (3 Utah, 301) 110 Logan V. Pyne, (43 Iowa, 524) 110, 134, 144 Logan V. Western Co., (87 Ga. 533) 27 Logan Co. v. Lincoln, (81 lU. 156) 160, 312 Logansport v. Blackmore, (17 Ind. 318) 165 Logansport ». Dunn, (8 Ind. 378) 219, 221 TABLE OF CASES CITED. Befereuces are to Sections. Logansport v. Crockett, (64 Ind. 319) 98, 106, 161 Logansport v. Deck, (70 Ind. 64) 347 Logansport v. Dicle, (70 Ind. 65) 92 Logansport o. Dykeman, (116 Ind. 15) 165, 189 a Logansport v. Humphrey, (84 Ind. 487) 65 Logansport v. Justice, (74 Ind. 378) 350 6 Logansport v. La Rosa, (99 Ind. 117, 8 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 512) 61 Logansport v. Wright, (25 Ind. 512) 325, 355 Loker ». Brookline, (13 Pick. 343, 348) 169, 344 Lombard v. East Towas, (48 N. W. E. 947), 3.50 d Lomber v. Mayor etc. (7 Alb. Pr. E. 248) 2, 8 London v. Barnard, (22 Conn. 552) 110 London v. Headen, (76 K C. 72) 78 London v. Lynn, (1 H. Bl. 206) 369 London v. Wood, (12 Mod. 686) 101, 154 Londonderry v. Andover, (28 Vt. 416) 31 Londonderry v. Derry, (8 N. H. 320) 67 Long V. Battle Creek, (39 Mich. 323) 108, 222 Long V. Duluth, (51 N. W. Eep. 913) 144. Long V. Fuller, (68 Pa. St. 170) 234 Long V. Harrisburg, (126 Pa. St. 143, 19 Atl. E. 89) 246 Long B. Talley, (91 Mo. 595) 106 Long V. Taxing District, (7 Lea, 134) 121 Long Island E. E. Co. v. Brooklyn, (8N.Y. 8.805)303 Longmore v. G. W. E. Co., (35 L. J. C. P. 135) 121 Longworth v. Cincinnati, (34 Ohio, St. 101) 248 Longworth v. Cincinnati, (48 Ohio St. 637) 247 Longworth's Ex'rs v. Evansville, (32 Ind. 322) 26 Look, In re, (1 Con. Sur. 403) 49 Lord V. Anoka, (36 Minn. 176) 95, 97 Lord V. Bigelow, (6 Vt. 465) 25 Lord V. Orconto, (47 Wis. 386) 113 Lord V. Parker, (83 Me. 530) 282 Lord Colchester v. Kewney, (L. E. 1 Exch. 368) 270 Lorillard v. Monroe, (11 N. Y. 392) 67,325,338 a Loring v. Small, (50 Iowa, 271) 212 Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Water Co., (61 Cal. 65) 261 Los Angeles v. So. Pac. E. E. Co., (67 Cal. 433) 144, 274 Los Angeles etc. v. Los Angeles, (30 Pac. E. 523) 229 Los Angeles G. Co. ». Toberman, (61 Cal. 199) 165 Lot V. Eoss, (38 Ala. 156) 256, 265, 267 Lotz V. Eead. I. Co., (10 Pa. Co. Ct. E. 497) 224 Louis V. Allen (13 Mo. 400) 55 Louis V. Brown Tp., (109 TJ. S. 162) 195 d Louis V. Shreveport, (3 Woods, 205) 187 a Louisen v. Hauee, (1 Wyo. 570) 397 Louisiana v. Hardin, (11 Mo. 551) 90 Louisiana v. New Orleans, (102 U. S. 203) 194 Louisiana v. Pilsbury, (105 U. S. 301) 161, 258 Louisiana v. St. Martin's Par., (Ill U. S. 716) 364 Louisiana v. Wood, (102 U. S. 294) 164, 193 6 LouisianaBk. ». N. O. Co., (3 La. An. 294) 110 Louisiana ex rel. v. St. Martins etc., (Ill U. S. 716) 375 Louisville i'. Bank, (3 B. Mon. 144) 133 Louisville v. Commonwealth, (1 Du- vall, 285) 21, 200, 212, 271 Louisville v. Henning, (1 Bush, 381) 261, 327 Louisville v. Hyatt, (2 B. Mon. 177) 278 Louisville v. Kean, (18 B. Mon. 9) 362, 368, 370 Louisville v. Liebfried, (17 S. W. R. 870) 229 Louisville v. McKenrey, (7 Bush, 651) 106, 108 Louisville v. Murphy, (18 Eng. Cor. Cas. 421) 176 Louisville v. EoUing Mill, (3 Bush, 416) 292 Louisville v. Shreveport, (27 La. An. 623) 186 Louisville b. University, (15 B. Mon. 642) 9, 11, 13 Louisville b. Webster, (108 111. 414) 130 Louisville v. Wible, (84 Ky. 290) 113 Louisville etc. Co. v. Asher, (15 S. W. E. 517) 246 Louisville etc. Co. b. Barrett, (16 S. W. R. 278) 246 TABLK OF CASES CITED. Keferences are to Sections. ci Louisville etc. Co. ». Com., (12 S. W. E. 1064) 326 a Louisville etc. Co. ». Davidson Co., (1 Smead, 637) 186 Louisville etc. Co. v. Falvey, (104 Ind. 409) 352 a Louisville etc. Co. v. Ingram, (14 S. W. R. 534) 246 Louisville etc. Co. x>. Louisville, (8 Bush, 415) 294, 302 Louisville etc. Co. ». Shanks, (94 Ind. 598) 352 a Louisville etc. Co. v. Snider, (20 N. W. R. 284) 352 a Louisville etc. Co. ». State, (3'Head, 523) 400 Louisville etc. v. Thompson, (10*7 Ind. 442) 317, 353 Louisville etc. Co. v. Wood, (113 Ind. 544) 352 a Louisville & P. Canal Co. v. Com- monwealth, (7 B. Mon. 160) 270 Louisville & N. A. etc. v. State, (25 Ind. 177) 359 Louisville & N. R. Co. ». Orr, (15 S. W. R. 8) 120 Louisville & N". W. R. Co. v. Bullett Co., (17 S. W. R. 632) 187a Louisville Br. Co. m. Louisville, (81 Ky. 189) 42, 56, 272 Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gas Co., (115 U. S. 683) 144 Louisville N. A. & Chic. Ry. Co. ». Shires, (108 111. 617) 31 Louisville N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. State, (122 Ind. 443) 259 a Loughbridge v. Harris, (42 Ga. 500) 232 Loughran u. Des Moines, (72 Iowa, 772) 354 Loute B. Allegheny Co., (10 Pitts. L. J. 24) 375 Love V. Balhr, (47 Cal. 364) 79 Love ». Jer. City, (40 N. J. L. 456) 79 Love u. Schenck, (12 Ired. 304) 12, 67 Lovejoy v. Dolan, (10 Cush. 495) Lovejoy v. Whipple, (18 Vt. 379) 190 a Lovengarth d. Bloomington, (71 111. 238) 352 Lovett !). Steam Sawmill Asso., (6 Paige, 54) 211 Lovingston v. Wider, (53 111. 302) 255 Low 1-. Commissioners, (R. M. Charlt. 302) 76, 156 Low B. Lewis, (46 Cal. 549) 271 Lowe ». Howard County, (94 Ind. 553) 212 Lowe B. Omaha, (50 K. W. R. 760) 330 Lowell B. Boston, (111 Mass. 463) 188, 254, 294 Lowell B. Boston etc. Corp., (23 Pick, 24) 306, 347 Lowell B. French, (6 Cush. 223) 282 Lowell B. Prop'rs, (104 Mass. 18) 313 Lowell B. Spalding, (4 Cush. 277) 348 Lowell B. Watertown, (58 Mich. 568) 352 Lowell B. Wentworth, (6 Cush. 221) 279, 281 Lowell B. Wheelock, (11 Cush. 391) 108, 281 Lowell B. Wyman, (12 Cush. 273, 276) 335 Lowenstein v. Myers, (20 N. T. S. 761) 118 Lower Maoungie b. Merkhoffer, (71 Pa. St. 276) 343 Lowery b. Delphi, (55 Ind. 250) 353 Lownsdale b. Portland, (Deady, 1, 39) 218 Lowry v. Rainwater, (70 Mo. 152) 122 Loyd ». Columbus, (15 S. E. E. 818) 338 Lucas B. Board, (44 Ind. 524) 12 Lucas Co. B. Hunt, (5 Ohio St. 488) 169 Lucas B. Lat. Com'rs, (11 G. & J. 506) 123 Lucas B. McGlashau, (20 Up. Can. Q. B. 81) 104 Lucas B. New York, (21 Barb. 245) 352 a Lucas B. Shepherd, (16 Ind. 368) 86 Lucas B. Tippecanoe Co., (44 Ins. 524) 2, 8 Luce B. Board, (153 Mass. 108) 361 Luck Eipon, (52 Wis. 196) 352 a Ludlow B. Cine. So. Ry. Trs., (78 Ky. 357)270 Luehrmau b. Shelby Co. etc., (2 Lea, 425) 8, 12, 90 Luke B. Brooklyn, (43 Barb. 54) 54 Luling B. Eacine, (1 Biss. 314) 195 Lum B. Bowie, (18 S. W. E. 142) 24, 256 Lumbard b. Aldrich, (8 N. H. 31) 107 Lumber Co. b. Brooklyn, (71 N. Y. 580) 92 Lumsden v. Milwaukee, (8 Wis. 485) 245 Lund u. New Bedford, (121 Mass. 286) 232 Lundborn b. Mainstee, (93 Mich. 170) 397 Lunkenheuner b. Comp., (23 W. L. Bull. 433) 110, 115 . Lusk B. Perkins, (48 Ai-k. 238) 179 Lultterloh b. Cedar Key, (17 Tex. 489) 120 LutterlohB. Cumberland Co. Comm'rs, (65 N. C. 403) 369 cu TABLE OF CASES CITED. Beferenees are to Sections. Luther v. Winnisimmet Co., (9 Cush. 171) 354 Luther w. Worcester, (97 Mass. 268) 344 Luzerne Co. v. Trimmer, (95 Pa. St. 97)79 Lycoming jj. Union, (15 Pa. St. 166) 16, 60 Lyde v. County, (16 Wall. 6) 190 a Lyell ». Lapeer Co., (6 McLean, 446) 180 Lyman v. Amherst, (107 Mass. 339) 352 Lyman v. Burlington, (22 Vt. 131) 249 Lyman v. Hampshire, (140 Mass. 311)3506 Lynam o. White, (2 Aiken, 255) 338 a Lynch v. Lafland, (4 Colder, 96) 82 Lynch v. New York, (76 N". T. 60) 294, 328, 342, 354 o, 355 Lynch v. People, (16 Mich. 472) 158, 195 d Lynch ». E. E. Co., (57 Wis. 480) 395 Lynchburg v. Norfolk & N. W. E. E. Co., (SO Va. 237) 261 Lynchburg v. Slaughter, (75 Va. 57) 195 d Lynde v. Co., (16 Wall. 6) 195 Lyndon v. Stadbridge, (2 H. & N. 45) 130 Lynn v, Cumberland, (26 Atl. E. 1001) 72 Lyon V. Adamson, (7 Iowa, 509) 167 Lyon V. Alley, (130 U. S. 177) 283 Lyon V. Cambridge, 136 Mass. 409) 344a Lyon V. Com., (3 Bibb. 430) 69 Lyon V. Fishmongers Co., (L. E. 1 App. Cas. 662) 132 Lyon V. Grand Eapids, (30 Mich. 253) 87 Lyon V. Irish, (58 Mich. 518) 169 Lyon V. Jerome, (15 Wend. 569) 233, 238 Lyon J). Eeceiver of Taxes, (52 Mich. 271) 326 a Lyons Highway Comm'rs v. People, (38 111. 347) 368 Lyons v. Desotelle, (124 Mass. 387) 352 Lyth V. Buffalo, (48 Hun, 175) 87, 113, 148 M. Maas B. Miss., K. & T. Ey. Co., (11 Hun, 8) 195 6 Mabey v. Tarver, (1 Hump. 94) 123 Macbeath v. Haldimond, (1 D. & E Term, 172) 168 Macei). Com'rs, (99 N. 0. 65, 5 S. E. E. 740) 397 Macey v. Titcombe, (19 Ind. 135) 172 MacDonald v. Mayor, (32 Hun, 89) 67 Mackey v. Vicksburgh, (64 Miss. 777) 336 a Mackinnon v. Person, (25 Eng. L. & Eq. 457) 315 Macklot V. Davenport, (17 Iowa, 379) 381 MacNaughton ■». Elkhart, (85 Ind. 384) 348 Macomber v. Duane, (2 Allen, 541) 80 Macomber v. Godfrey, (108 Mass. 219) 354 Macomber v. Taunton, (100 Mass. 255) 331 a Macon ». Dasher, (16 S. E. R. 75) 208, 211 Macon v. First Nat. Bank, (59 Ga. 648) 263 Macon v. Franklin, (12 Ga. 239) 217, 218 Macon v. Huff, (60 Ga. 221) 166 Macon v. Jones, (67 Ga. 489) 272 Macon v. M. Sav. Bank. (60 Ga. 133) 263, 273 Macon v. Patty, (57 Miss. 386) 282 Macon v. Shaw, (16 Ga. 172) 398 Macon Co. t. Huidekoper, (99 U. S. 592) 194 a Macon Co. v. People, (121 111. 616) 316 Macon etc. Co. v. Eiggs, (13 S. E. R. 312) 238 Macoy i>. Curtis, (14 S. C. 367) 81 Maddox v. Graham, (2 Met. 56) 365, 368 Maddox v. Randolph, (65 Ga. 216) 350 6 Maddrey v. Cox, (73 Tex. 538) 55 Maddux v. Newport, (14 S. W. E. 957) 259 a Madison ». Harbor Board, (25 Atl. R. 337) 328 Madison v. Hatcher, (8 Blackf. 341) 117 Madison v. Kelso, (32 Ind. 79) 79, 83 Madison v. Korbley, (32 Ind. 74) 83 Madison v. Smith, (83 Ind. 502) 175, 195 a, 349, 363 Madison Co. v. Priestley, (42 Fed. 817) 189 Madison v. Whitney, (81 Ind. 261) 272 Magarity v. Wilmington, (5 Hous. 530) 354 a Magee v. Calaveras Co., (10 Cal. 376) 362, 363 TABLE OF CASES CITED. Beferences are to Sections. cm Magee v. Commonwealth, (46 Pa. St. 358) 259 a Maggie P., (25 Fed. Kep. 202) 163 Magie v. Stoddard, (25 Conn. 565) 86 Magill V. KaufEman, (4 S. & E. 317) 51, 164 Magneau v. Fremont, (47 N. W. R. 280) 255 Magrath v. Brock. Twp., (13 Up. Can. Q. B. 629) 250 Maguire v. Hughes, (13 La. An. 281) 90 Maguire v. Smock, (42 Ind. 1) 278 Mahady v. Busher etc. Co., (91 N. T. 148) 297, 300 Mahany v. Scholly, (84 Pa. St. 136) 341 Mahan, In re, (20 Hun, 301) 172 Maher v. Chicago, (38 111.266)51, 169 Mahogany v. "Ward, (17 Atl. K. 860) 321 Mahon v. Columbus, (58 Miss. 310) 210 Mahoney ». Metro. Ky. Co., (104 Mass. 73) 352 Mahoney d. The Bank of the State, (4 Ark. 620) 25 Main v. McCarthy, (15 111. 442) 155 Makemson v. Kaufman, (35 Ohio St. 444) 397 Malchus V. Highlands Dist., (4 Bush, 547) 259 a Maleverer v. Spink, (1 Dyer, 36 b) 335 Mallory v. Austin, (7 Barb. 626) 320 Mallory v. Hibernia etc. Co., (21 Pac. R. 525) 348 Mallory v. Griffey, (85 Pa. St. 275) 287 Mallory v. Mallett, (6 Jones Eq. 345) 42 Mallory v. Super's, (2 Cowen, 531) 79 MaUoy v. Bennett, (15 Fed. Rep. 371) 352 a Malone's Est., (21 S. C. 188) 2 Malone v. Murphy, (2 Kan. 250) 104 Maltus V. Shields, (2 Mete. 553) 56, 276 Manaska v. Ingalls, (16 Iowa, 81) 72 Manchester v. Hartford, (30 Conn. 118) 346 Manchester?;. Smyth, (18 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 474) 130 Manderschid v. Dubuque, (20 Iowa, 73) 219, 346 Mangan ». Atterbury, (lEx. 239)382 Manhattan R. Co., In re, (162 N. Y. 301) 172 Manhattan Co. v. Van Keuren, (23 N. J. E. 251) 120 Manistee L. Co. v. Springfield, (52 N^. W. E. 468) 326 Mankato v. Arnold, (36 Minn. 62) 104 Manley v. Atchison, (9 Kan. 358) 92 Manley v. Emlen, (46 Kan. 655, 27 Pac. 844) 279 Mann v. Pentz, (2 Sandf. Ch. 257) 52 Manners v. Haverhill, (135 Mass. 165) 338 Manning v. Fifth Parish, (6 Pick. 16) 108 Manning v. Lowell, (130 Mass. 21) 355 Manning v. Woodstock, (22 Atl. R. 42, 59 Conn. 224) 350 a Manny, In re, (14 How. 24) 360 Manrose v. Parker, (90 111. 581) 220 Mansfield v. Moore, (21 111. App. 326) 346 Manuel ». Cumberland, (98 N. C. 9) 339 Manufacturing Co. v. Davis, (14 Johns. 238) 48 Manufacturer's Ins. Co. v. Loud, (99 Mass. 146) 258 Manus v. Givens, (7 Leigh, 689) 360 Manzy v. Hardy, (13 Neb. 36) 327 Mappa V. Los Angeles, (61 Cal. 309) 172 Marble v. Worcester, (4 Gray, 395) 342, 343 March v. Com., (12 B. Mon. 25) 117, 146 March v. Portsmouth etc. Co., (19 N. H. 372) 238, 354 Marden v. Portsmouth, (59 N. H. 18) 79 Marden v. Potter, (7 C. B., N. S. 641) 104 Marietta v. Fearing, (4 Ohio, 427) 2, 129 Marine Ins. Co. v. Railroad, (41 Fed. E. 643) 210 Mariner v. Mackey, (25 Kan. 669) 212 Marion v. Chandler, (6 Ala. 800) 398 Marion t;. Skillman, (26 N. E. R. 676) 329 Marion Co. v. Clark, (94 U. S. 278) 195 a Marion Co. v. Louisville Co., (15 S. W. R. 1061) 17 Marion Co. ». Riggs, (24 Kan. 255) 325 Maris v. Mason, (37 Texas, 447) 232 Market v. St. Louis, (56 Mo. 189) 346, 3506 Market etc. Co. v. Ceu. etc. Co., (51 Cal. 583) 302 Markle ». Akron, (14 Ohio, 586) 104 Markle v. Borough, (21 Atl. R. 794) 326 a, 335 Markle v. Wright, (13 Ind. 548) 379 eiv TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Marley v. Gt. "Western Ry. Co., (16 Up. Can. Q. B. 504) 352 a Marmet v. State, (45 Ohio St. 63, 12 ST. E. E. 463) 261 Marriage v. Lawrence, (3 B. & Aid.) 107 Marriott v. Hampton, (2 Esp. 546) 326, 326 a Marseilles v. Howland, (124 111. 551) 287. Marsh v. Brooklyn, (59 IS". T. 280) 249 Marsh v. Fulton Co., (10 "Wall. 676) 170, 195 d Marsh v. Little Valley, (64 N. Y. 112) 375 Marshall ii. Anderson, (78 Mo. 85) 218 Marshall v. Cook, (38 IH. 44) 65 Marshall v. Guion, (11 N. T. 461) 132 Marshall v. Kerns, (2 Swan. 68) 65, 371 Marshall D. Silliman, (61 111.218) 187 a 189, 395 Marshall i-. Smith, (L. R. 8 C. P. 416) 154 Marshall v. Vicksburg, (15 "Wall. 146) 270 Marshall v. Vultee, (1 E. D. Smith, 294) 132 Marshall Co. v. Cook, (38 111. 44) 195 Marshall Co. «. Jackson Co., (36 Ala. 613) 350 6 Marshall Co. v. Schenck, (5 "Wall. 772) 170, 183 Marshalltown v. Blum, (58 Iowa, 184) 258 Marshalltown v. Forney, (61 Iowa, 578) 308 Martel v. E. St. Louis, (94 111. 67, 21 Alb. L. J. 195) 160 Martin ». Aston, (60 Cal. 65) 62 Martin v. Br. Bank, (15 Ala. 587) 207 Martin v. Brooklyn, (1 Hill, 541) 169, 242, 355 Martin v. Carron, (26 N. J. L. 228) 259 a Martin v. Dix, (52 Miss. 3) 56, 259, 276 Martin v. Dix, (52 Miss. 53) 2, 8 Martin ». Evansville, (32 Ind. 85) 225 Martin v. Gleason, (139 Mass. 183) 234 Martin v. Hewit, (44 Ala. 418) 283 Martin v. Hilb, (14 S. W. R. 94) 294 Martin v. Ingham, (36 Kan. 641) 303 Martin v. Lemon, (26 Conn. 192) 99 Martin v. Maher, (1 Hill, 545) 164 Martin v. Mayor, (1 Hill. 545) 9, 113, 169 Martin v. O'Brien, (.34 Miss. 21) 133 Martin v. Rosedale, (J9 K. E. K. 410) 121, 258 Martin v. Town, (56 Hun, 510) 397 Martin v. Tripp, (51 Me. 184) 360 Martindale v. Palmer, (52 Ind. 411) 90, 159 Martini, Ex parte, (23 Fla. 843) 155 Martinsville v. Shirley, (84 Ind. 546) 329 Marvin v. New Bedford, (33 N. E. E. 605) 324 Marx V. Croisan, (17 Ore. 393) 47 Masen v. Ellsworth, (32 Me. 271) 3505 Mason v. Ellsworth, (32 Me. 271) 352 a Mason v. Pearson, (9 How. 248) 111, 349 Mason v. Haile, (12 "Wheat. 370) 194 Mason v. Lancaster, (4 Bush, 406) 261 Mason v. London, (3 Baxt. 94) 61 Mason v. Minturn, (4 W. Va. 302) 363 Mason v. Spencer, (35 Kan. 512) 277 Mason City etc. Co. v. Mason, (23 W. Ya. 211) 396 Mass. -B. Harpeth, (7 Heisk. 283) 182- Massey v. Columbus, (75 Ga. 658) 352 Massing v. Ames, (37 "Wis. 645) 265 Massoth V. Delaware etc. Co., (6 N. T. 524) 136 Masters v. Portland, (83 Pac. R. 540) 259 a Masters v. Troy, (50 Hun, 485) 3506 Masters v. "Warren, (27 Conn. 293) 3.52 a Masterson v. Mt. Vernon, (58 N. Y. 391) 92, 331a, 355 Masterson v. Short, (7 Eobt. 241) 299 Maher v. Chicago, (38 111. 66) 164 Mathews v. Inhabitants, (134 Mass. 355) 142 Mathews v. Kelsey, (58 Me. 56) 300 Mathewson v. Grand Rapids, (50 N "W. E. 651, 88 Mich. 558) 165, 169 Mathias v. Mason, (33 N. W. E. 312) 398 Matthews v. Alexandria, (68 Mo. 115) 113, 207, 208, 209, 263 Matthews v. Mayor etc. of X. Y., (1 Sandf. 132) 92 Matlock V. Glover, (63 Tex. 231) 327 Mattenly v. Disti-ict, (97 U. S. 687) 17 Matter of Application of Department of Public Parks, (86 N. Y. 439) 28 Matthiessen etc. v. Jersey City, (26 N. J. Eq. 247) 21"8, 290 Matthis V. Cameron, (62 Mo. 504) 177 Matts 0. Hawkins, (5 Taunt. 20) 131 Mattingly v. District, (97 U. S. 687) 161 Mattlnsie v. N. Y. El. R. Co., (17 N. Y. S. 536) 242 Mau V. Liddle, (15 Nev. 271) 868 Manch Chunk v. Kline, (100 Pa. St 119) 344 TABLE OF CASES CITED. CV Beferences are to Sections. Maugh V. Milwaukee, (32 Wis. 200) 337 Maultby ». Leavenworth, (28 Kan. 745) 352 Mauldin v. City Council of Green- ville, (33 S. C. 1) 144a Maupin v. Franklin Co., (67 Mo. 327) 165 Maxey v. Loyal, (38 Ga. 531) 194 Maximilian v. New York, (62 N. T. 160) 9, 324, 338 a Maxwell v. Bay Bridge Co., (41 Mich. 453) 314 Maxwell ». Bryne, (36 Ind. 120) 120 Maxwell v. Palmerton, (21 Wend. 407) 129 Maxwell v. San Luis Obispo, (71 Cal. 466, 12 Pac. 484) 326 a Maxwell v. Stanislaus, (46 N. T. 100) 172 May V. Detroit, (2 Mich. K. P. Kep. 23.5) 172 May B. Juneau Co., (30 Fed. Eep. 241) 338 May V. Mercer Co., (30 Fed. Kep. 247) 338 May B. Sch. Dist., (22 Neb. 205) 312 Mayer v. New York, (63 N. Y. 455) 327 Mayfield v. Moore, (53 111. 428) 79 Mayhew v. Gay Head, (13 Allen, 129) 106, 108 Mayo V. Cincinnati, (1 Ohio St. 268, 272) 123 Mayo 1). James, (12 Gratt. 17) 250 Mayor v. Allaire, (14 Ala. 400) 117 Mayor d. Baily, (2 Denio, 433) 92 Mayor v. Beasley, (1 Humph. 232) 150 Mayor v. Brown, (54 Ga. 229) 85 Mayor v. City i3ank of Macon, (58 Ga. 584) 195 d Mayor v. Cornell, (6 Coldw. 412) 312 Mayor v. Eden Musee, (102 N. Y. 593) 124 Mayor v. Gear, (27 N. J. L. 265) 79 Mayor v. Henly, (2 CI. & Fin. 331) 324 Mayor ». Hopkins, (13 La. An. 326) 11 Mayor v. Horn, (2 Harr. 190) 72 Mayor v. Horner, (Cowp. 102) 31 Mayor v. Hyatt, (3 E. D. Smith, 156) 127 Mayor v. Inman, (57 Ga. 370) 183 Mayor v. .Johns Hopkins' Hosp., (56 Md. 1) 279 Mayor v. Keyser, (19 Atl. R. 706) 165, 172, 173 Mayor ». Lombard, (57 Miss. 125) 183 Mayor v. Lord, (17 Wend. 285) 335 Mayor v. Magnon, (4 Martin, 1) 312 Mayor v. Markham, (23 Ga. 402) 391 Mayor v. Morgan, (7 Mart. N. S. 1) 363 Mayor v. Muzzy, (33 Mich. 61) 79 Mayor v. New York, (63 N. Y. 455) 281 Mayor v. N. Y. & S. I. Ferry Co., (40 N. Y. Super. 232) 134 Mayor v. Ohio etc. Co., (26 Pa. St. 355) 302 Mayor v. Park Com'rs, (44 Mich. 602) 234, 237 Mayor v. Pendleton, (15 Md. 12) 342 Mayor v. Phelps, (27 Ala. 55) 154 Mayor v. Randolph, (4 W. & S. 514) 329 Mayor v. Roberts, (34 Ind. 471) 377 Mayor v. Sands, (105 N. Y. 210) 89 Mayor v. Simpson, (2 Q. B. 73) 100 Mayor v. Sonneborn, (113 N. Y. 423) 132 Mayor v. State, (15 Md. 376) 67 Mayor v. Stone, (20 Wend. 139) 335 Mayors. Sheffield, (4 Wall. 189) 313, 324, 342 Mayor v. Thorne, (7 Paige, 261) 130 Mayor v. Wright, (2 Port. 230) 107 Mayor v. Wright, (6 Yerg. 497) 225 Mayor and Burgesses etc., (10 Coke, 120) 49 Mayor v. Winfield, (8 Humph. 707) 150 Mayor etc. v. Colgate, (12 N. Y. 146) 28 Mayor etc. v. Crawford, (111 N. Y. 638) 71 Mayor etc. v. Cunliff, (2 N. Y. 165) 92 Mayor etc. v. Lasser, (9 Humph. 757) 92 Mayor etc. Milledgeville v. Cooley, (55 Ga. 17) 349 Mayor etc. v. Nichols, (4 Hill, 209) 127, 150 Mayor etc. v. Ordrenan, (12 Johns, 152) 154, 155 Mayor etc. v. Potomac Ins. Co., (58 Tenn. 296) 192, 193 Mayor etc. v. Rouse, (8 Ala. 515) 117 Mayor etc. v. Root, (8 Md. 95) 80 Mayor etc. v. Rowland, (26 Ala. 498) 80 Mayor etc. v. Shaw, (16 Ga. 172) 83, 85 Mayor etc. v. State Bk., (8 Ai-k. 227) 87 Mayor etc. v. Tenth Nat. Bank, (111 N. Y. 446) 16 Mayor etc. v. Tows., (5 Sneed, 186) 18 CVl TABLE OP CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Mayor etc. v. Tucker, (1 Daly, 107) 87 Mayor etc. of Griffin ». City Bank, (58 Ga. 584) 191 Mayor etc. of Lyme v. Henley, (2 CI. & F. 331) 37 Mayor etc. of Washington ». Meigs, (1 McArthur, 53) 129 Mayor etc. of Baltimore v. State, (15 Md. 376) 59 Mayor etc. of Helena v. Thompson, 29 Ark. 569) 92 Mayor of Athens v. Georgia R. R., (72 Ga. 800) 153 Mayor of Hoboken ». Harrison, (30 N. J. L. 73) 75 Mayor of London v. Lynn Regis, (1 H. Bl. 206) 156 Mayor of Lynn v. Turner, (Cowper, 86) 349 Mayor of Memphis v. Lasser, (9 Humph. 757) 325, 349 Mayor of Nashville v. Hogan, (9 Bax- ter, 495) 175 Mayor of Nashville v. Ray, (19 Wall. 478) 177, 182 Mayor of N. T. v. Hyatt, (3 E. D. Smith, 156) 117 Mayor of N. T. u. Williams, (16 N. T. 502) 131 Mayor of Rome ». Dodd, (58 Ga. 239) 349 Mayor of Savannah v. Waldner, (49 Ga. 316) 325 Mayor of St. Martinsville v. Mary Lewis, (32 La. An. 1293) 133 Mayrhofer v. Board, (26 Pac. R. 646) 212 Mays V. Cincinnati, (1 Ohio St. 268) 124, 256, 326 a Maysville v. Shultz, (3 Dana, id) 32 Maywood Co. v. Maywood, (29 N. E. R. 704, 118 111. 61) 215, 226, 294 Mazet V. Pittsburgh, (137 Pa. St. 548) 395 MoAlar K. Woodruff, (33 N. J. L. 213) 104 McAlister v. Albany, (18 Oreg. 426) 350 McAlister v. Clark, (33 Conn. 91) 122 McAUiley v. Horton, (75 Ala. 491) 399 McAndrews ». CoUard, (42 N. J. L. 189) 120 McAi-thur !). Nelson, (81 Ky. 67) 67 McArthur v. Saginaw, (58 Mich. 357) 327, 339 McAuliffe V. New Bedford, (27 N. E. R. 517) 84 McAvoy I). Mayor, (54 How. Pr. 245) 336 a McBean ». Chandler, (9 Heisk. 349) 299 McBean v. Martin, (31 Pac. R. 5) 282 McBean v. Redick, (31 Pac. R. 7) 282 McBean ». San Bernardino, (31 Pac. R. 49) 165 McBride v. Gr. Rap., (47 Mich. 236) 79 McBrien v. Grand Rapids, (56 Mich. 95) 165, 360 McCafferty v. McCabe, (4 Abb. P. R. 87) 397 McCafferty v. Spuyten Duyvil etc. Co., (61 N. Y. 178) 347 McCaffrey v. Smith, (41 Hun, 117) 299 McCall V. Hancock, (10 Fed. Rep. 80) 196 McCalla ». Multnomah Co., (3 Oreg. 424) 353 McCallie v. Mayor of Chattanooga, (3 Head, 318) 53, 55 McCann v. Sierra County, (7 Cal. 121) 247 MoCann v. State, (62 Ala. 138) 319 McCannie v. Mayor etc. of Chatta- nooga, (3 Head, 317) 57 McCartee v. Orphan Asylum Society, (9 Cow. 427) 200, 202 McCartle v. Bates, (29 Ohio St. 419) 100 McCarthy v. Boston, (135 Mass. 197) 324,338 a McCarthy v. Commonw., (110 Pa. St. 243) 25 McCarthy v. Deming, (51 Conn. 422) 105 McCarthy v. Portland, (67 Me. 167) 342 McCarthy v. St. Paul, (22 Minn. 527) 330 McCarthy c. Syracuse, (46 N. Y. 194) 349,3.50 a McCany v. Bauer, (3 Kans. 237) 92 McCash B. Burlington, (33 N. W. R. 346, 72 Iowa, 26) 292 McCaughey v. Pi-ovidence, (12 R. I. 449)328, 336 a McCearly v. Lemeunier, (40 La. An. 253) 217 McChesney v. Hyde Park, (28 N. E. R. 1102) 259 a McClay v. Lincoln, (49 N. W. R. 282) 56 McClean v. State, (49 N. J. L. 471) 120 McCloskey v. Krelling, (18 Pac. 433) 146 McClung V. Silliman, (6 Wheat. 601; 375 TABLE OF CASES CITED. Beferences are to Sections. cvu McClure v. Oxford Township, (94 IT. S. 429) 191 McClure v. Redwig, (28 Minn. 186) 245 355 McCluskey v. Cromwell, (11 N. Y. 598) 72 McComas v. Krug, (81 Ind. 327) 83 McConike v. State, (17 Fla. 238) 371 McConnell v. Dewey, (5 Neb. 385) 325 McConnell v. Hammond, (16 Kan. 228) 188 McConupU V. Lexington Trs., (12 Wheat. 582) 217 McConnell v. Simpson, (36 Fed. Rep. 750) 177 McConrill jj. Jersey City, (39 N. J. L. 38) 102 McCord V. Hugh, (24 Iowa, 336) 349 McCord B. Oakland, (27 Pac. 803, 64 Cal. 134) 392 McCord V. Pike, (12 N. E. R. 259) 395 McCord V. Tiger, (6Biss. 409) 121 McCormack v. Brooklyn, (108 N. Y. 49) 243, 249 McCormick v. Bay City, (23 Mich. 457) 98, 106 McCormick v. City, (18 IST. Y. S. 272, 63 Hun, 632) 324 McCormick v. Calhoun, (80 S. C. 03) 150 McCormick v. Lafayette, (1 Ind. 48) 247 McCormick v. Patchin, (53 Mo. 33, 14 Am. Rep. 440) 264, 291 McCormick v. People, (28 N. E. 1106) 18 McCormick u. Washington Tp., (112 Pa. St. 185) 317, 353 McCormick v. W. Duluth, (50 N. W. R. 128, 47 Minn. 272) 26 McCowan v. Whiteside, (31 Ind. 235) 396 McCoy V. Brant, (53 Cal. 247) 165, 169 McCoy 1). Phila. etc. Co., (5 Del. 599) 136 McCracken v. Markesan, (45 N. W. R. 323) 352 McCracken v. San Francisco, (16 Cal. 591) 99, 165, 170 McCrowell v. Bristol, (5 Lea, 685) 120, 331, 400 McCrowell v. Bristol, (16 S. E. R. 807) 113, 282 McCroy v. Griswold, (7 Iowa, 248) 249 McCulloch V. State, (11 Ind. 424) 149 MoCullough V. Brooklyn, (23 Wend. 459) 359 Mc(^u]lough V. Maryland, (4 Wheat. 316) 22 McCullough V. Mayor etc., (23 Wend. 458) 92, 178 McCullough J). San Francisco Bd. of Ed., (51 Cal. 418) 226 McCullough V. Talladega etc., (46 Ala. 376) 165 ■ McCutcheon v. Homer, (43 Md. 483) 327 a McDade v. Chester City, (117 Pa. St. 414) 327, 328 McDaniel v. Columbus, (13 S. E. R. 745, 87 Ga. 440) 249 McDeraiott v. Met. Pol. Brd.,(5 Abb. Pr. 422) 89 McDermott v. Miller, (45 N. J. L. 253) 371 McDiarmid v. Fitch, (27 Ark. 100) 371 McDonald v. Ashland, (47 K. W. R. 434) 350 b McDonald v. Corporation etc., (29 Up. Can. C. P. 249) 353 McDonald v. International & Gt. N. Co., (00 Tex. 590) 134 McDonald!). Mayor, (68 N. Y. 23) 165 McDonald v. New York, (68 N. Y. 23) 164 McDonald v. Newark, (42 N. J. E. 136) 129, 396 McDonald v. Redwing, (13 Minn. 38) 335 McDonald v. Rehrer, (22 Fla. 198) 393 McDonald v. Schell, (6 Serg. & R. 240) 105 McDonald v. Schneider, (27 Mo. 405) 210 McDonald v. Philadelphia, (12 Pa. Co. C. & R. 672) 324 McDonough v. Virginia City, (6 Nev. 90) 327, 349 McDougall V. Boston, (134 Mass. 149) 350 6 McDougall V. Salem, (110 Mass. 21) 353 McDuffie V. Cook, (65 Ala. 430) 362 McElroy v. Albany, (05 Ga. 387) 92, 333 McElroy v. Kansas City, (21 Fed. Rep. 257) 330 McEwen v. Gilker, (38 Ind. 233) 172 McEwen v. Taylor, (4 G. Greene, 532) 134, 144 McFarlanj). Triton Ins. Co., (4Denio, 392) 106 McFarland v. Butler, (8 Minn. 116) 194 McFarland v. Orange etc. Co., (13 N. J. Eq. 17) 302 MiFarlane o. Kerr, (10 Bosw. 249) 312 CVIU TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. McFarnahan v. Pike, (91 Cal. 540) 312 McGafEagau v. Boston, (149 Mass. 289) 3506 McGai-ry v. IST. T. Co., (7 Kobt. 464) 87 MoGarty v. Deming, (51 Conn. 422) 105 McGaiy v. Lafayette, (12 Eob. 668) 338, 352 a McGee's App., (140 Pa. St. 570) 308 McGee's Appeal, (114 Pa. St. 470, 478) 28, 312 McGee v. Avondale, (7 Ohio Cir. Ct. K. 246) 282 McGee b. Penn. E. E.. (114 Pa. St. 470) 308 McGee v. Salem, (149 Mass. 238) 12 McGee u. State, (103 lud. 444) 86 McGee v. State, (49 N. W. E. 220) 361 McGeehee v. Mathis, (21 Ark. 40) 248, 259 a McGehee v. Columbus, (69 Ga. 581) 326 a McGehee v. Woodville, (59 Miss. 648) 219 McGill V. District, (4 Mackey, 70) 348 McGinness v. New York, (26 Hun, 142) 142 McGinty v. Keokuk, (66 Iowa, 725) 352 McGonigle v. Allegheny, (44 Pa. St. 118) 259 a McGrath v. Chicago, (24 111. App. 19) 146 McGrath v. Newton, (29 Kan. 364) 261 McGraw v. Whitson, (69 Iowa, 348) 98, 148 McGregor v. Baloh, (14 Vt. 428) 74 McGregor v. Boyle, (34 Iowa, 268) 327 McGrew v. Stewart, (32 Pac. E. 896) 290 McGuinness v. Mayor, (52 How. Pr. 450) 336 o McGuinness i'. Westchester, (66 Hun, 256) 325 McGuire, In re, (50 Hun, 203) 71 McGuire v. Eapid City, (43 N. W. Eep. 706) 174 McHardy c. Corporation etc., (1 App. C. 629; 39 Q. B. 546) 316 McHenry v. Township, (31 N. W. Rep. 602) 362 McHey v. Hyde Park, (37 Fed. E. 389) 220 Mclnerney v. Denver, (29 Pac. E. 516) 18, 117, 146, 150 Mclnerney v. Eeading, (150 Pa. St 611) 324 Mclnerney v. Eeed, (23 Iowa, 410) 263, 282 Mclnerney v. St. Joseph, (45 Mo. 291) 354 o Mclnstry ». Tanner, (9 Johns. 185) 88 Mclntire c. Sch. Trustees, (3 111. App. 77)72 SEcIntire b. State, (5 Blackf. 384) 245 Mclntire v. Wood, (7 Cransh, 504) 375 Mclver v. Clarke, (10 So. E. 581) 261 McKay v. Buffalo, (74 N. T. 619) 333 McKay v. Detroit etc., (2 Mich. 138) 319 McKay v. D. & E. E. E., (2 Mich. 139) 318 McKee v. Anderson Council, (Eice L. 24) 326 MoKee t. Bidwell, (74 Pa. St. 218) 352 McKee v. Brown, (La. An. 306) 278 MoKee v. Canal Co., (125 N. T. 353) 247 McKee ». MoKee, (8 B. Mon. 433) 155 McKee v. Perchment, (69 Pa. St. 342) 219 McKee v. St. Louis, (17 Mo. 184) 217, 219 McKee v. Yernon Co., (3 Dill. 210) 196, 197 McKeesport etc. Co. u. Lyle, (131 Pa. St. 437, 18 Atl. E. 1111) 238 McKeigue v. Janesville, (68 Wis. 50) 352, 352 a MoKellar v. Detroit, (57 Mich. 158) 344 a McKenna v. Boston, (131 Mass. 142) 220 McKenna v. Lancaster Dist. E. Comm'rs, (Harper Law, 381) 221 McKenzie v. Northiield, (30 Minn. 456) 352 McKeou V. Lee, (51 N. T. 300) 120 McKevitt V. Hoboken, (45 N. J. L. 482) 292 MoKibbiu v. Port Smith, (35 Ark. 352) 120, 130 McKinley v.. Freeh., (29 N. J. Eq. 164) 313 McKinnon v. Penson, (25 Eng. L. & E. 457) 324 McKnight v. Parish of Grant, (30 La. An. 361) 212 McLane v. Sharp, (2 Harr. 481) 321 McLarren v. Spalding, (2 Cal. 510) 244 McLaughlin v. Corry, (77 Pa. St. 109) 344 TABLE OF CASES CITED. Eeferences arc to Sections. cix McLaughlin v. Municipality, (5 La. An. 604) 92, 242 McLaughlin v. Stevens, (18 Ohio, 94) 117, 221 McLaury v. McGregor, (.54 Iowa, 717) 352 McLean v. Great Western Ey. Co., (33 Up. Can. Q. B. 198) 242, 247 McLeod V. Scott, (26 Pac. R. 1061) 359 McMahan v. Savannah, (66 Ga. 217) 66 McMasters v. Commonwealth, (3 Watts, 292) 248, 259 a McMeekin v. State, (9 Ark. 553) 80 McMilleu V. Boyles, (6 Iowa, 304) 17, 161, 187 a McMullen v. City Council, (1 Bay, 46) 154 McMurray v. Baltimore, (54 Md. 104) 225 McNally v. Cohoes, (27 N. E. E. 1043) 350 a McNamara ». Clintonville, (62 Wis. 207) 352 McNamara v. Estes, (22 Iowa, 246) 291 MclSTeal etc. Co. v. Bullock, (38 Fed. R. 565) 212 McNerney v. Reading, (150 Pa. St. 611) 300 McNiel V. Borland, (23 Cal. 144) 102 McPhee v. Venable, (77 Ga. 772) 282 McPherson v. Chebause, (28 N. E. R. 404, 114111. 46) 117 McPherson v. Foster, (48 Iowa, 48) 189 o, 376 McPherson b. Nichols, (29 Pac. R. 679) 165 McPike V. Pen, (51 Mo. App. 63) 397 McRae v. O'Lain, (1 McMuUen's R. 328) 129 McReynolds v. Kansas etc. Co., (34 Mo. App. 581) 246 McShane v. Moberly, (79 Mo. 41) 218 McSpedon ». New York, (7 Bosw. 601) 164 McVeany v. Mayor, (80 N. T. 185) 79, 381 McVerry v. Boyd, (26 Pac. 885) 329 McVichie b. Knight, (51 N. W. R. 1094) 190 McVicker v. Cone, (21 Or. 353) 31 McWilliams v. Morgan, (61 III. 89) 227 Meacham v. Fitchburgh R. R. Co., (4 Cush. 291) 245 Mead, In re, (74 N. Y. 216) 280, 301 Mead v. Acton, (139 Mass. 341) 136, 138 Mead v. Boxborough, (11 Cush. 362) Mead v. Dreas, (36 Mich. 416) 83 Mead v. New Haven, (40 Conn. 72) 338 a Meadsville v. Dickson, (24 W. N. C. 451) 283 Meagher v. Story Co., (5 Nev. 244) 79, 85, 102 Mealing v. Augusta, (Dud. 221) 401 Meares b. Cora'rs, (9 Ired. L. 73) 325, 329, 349 Mears v. Wilmington, (9 Ired. L. 73, 82) 354 a, 355 Mechan v. Hudson, (46 N. J. L. 276) 79 Mechanics Bk. v. Bk. of Columbia, (o Wlieat. 326) 167 Mechanics Bk. v. Granger, (20 Atl. R. 202) 325 Mechanics' Bank v. Kansas City, (73 Mo. 555) 397 Medical Ins. v. Patterson, (5 Denio. 618) 25 Medina b. Perkins, (48 Mich. 67) 350 6 351 Medway Cotton Manufacturing Co. V. Adams, (10 Mass. 360) 47, 49 Meech b. Buffalo, (29 N. Y. 210) 148 Meeker v. Van Rensselaer, (15 Wend. 397) 108, 120 Megowan b. Com., (2 Mete. 3) 134 Meier v. Portland, (19 Pac. R. 610) 217 Meigs B. Lister, (23 N. J. Eq., 320) 120 Meinzer v. Racine, (68 Wis. 241, 70 lb. 561) 329 Meissner v. Toledo, (31 Ohio St. 387) 259 a MelleuB. West. R. R. Co., (4 Gray, 501) 355 Mellinger b. Houston, (68 Tex. 37) 283 Mellon V. Lansing, (19 Blatchf. 512, 11 Fed. Rep. 829) 185 Mells V. Gleason, (11 Wis. 470) 182 Melvin b. Lisenby, (72 111. 63) 190 a Memphis v. Adams, (9 Heisk. 518) 52, 110 Memphis v. Brown, (97 U. S. 203, 300) 362, 365 Memphis v. Hernando Ins. Co., (6 Baxter, 527) 255 Memphis v. Kimbarough, (12 Heisk. 133) 336 a Memphis v. Laski, (9 Heisk. 511) 80 Memphis v. Mem. W. Co., (5 Heisk. 528) 175 Memphis v. O' Conner, (53 Mo. 468) 158 Memphis v. United States, (97 U. S. 293, 97 lb. 284) 362 ex TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Memphis ». Woodford, (12 Heisk. 499) 79, 85 Memphis etc. Co. v. Memphis, (4 Coldw. 406) 302 Memphis etc. Co. v. State, (11 S. W. E. 946) 306 Memphis Ketc. Co. v. Thompson, (24 Kan. 170) 186 Memphis etc. r. Williamson, (9 Heisk. 314) 296 Memphis & C. R. R. Co. v. Payne, 37 Miss. 700) 243 Memphis & St. L. Packet Co. v. Gri'ey, (9 Bush, 137) 221 Mendenhall v. Burton, (22 P. 558) 29, 31 Mer. Eep. Co., In re, (115 ^^. T. 176) 48 Mercer v. Corbin, (117 Ind. 450) 300 Mercer v. Jackson, (54 III. 39) 347 Mercer v. Pittsburgh etc. Co., (36 Pa. St. 99) 290, 302 Mercer v. Railroad Co., (36 Pa. St. 99) 11, 240 Mercer Co. v. Hacket, (1 Wall. 83) 191 6, 196, 254 Mercliants Bank v. Little Rock, (5 Dill. 299, 98 U. S. 308) 181 Merch. Bk. v. Xew York, (97 N. T. 355) 171 Merchant's etc. Bank v. Bergen Co., (115 U. S. 384) 190 a Meridian v. Phillips, (4 So. R. 119) 2T1 Merretti,-. Portchester, (71 N. T. 309) 265 Merriam, In re, (84 N. T. 596) 281 Merriam c. Moody, (25 Iowa, 163) 110, 282 Merriam v. New Orleans, (14 La. An. 318) 122, 123, 159, 261 Merriam v. Yuba Co., (72 Cal. 577, 14 Pac. R. 137) 397 Merrick v. Amherst, (12 Allen, 500) 259, 259 a Merrick r. Baltimore, (43 Md. 219) 242 Merrifield v. Worcester, (110 Mass. 216) 328, 355 Merrill v. Abbott, (62 Ind. 549) 278 Merrill v. Burbank, (23 Me. 538) 211 Merrill v. Claremont, (58 X. H. 468) 351 Merrill v. Hampden, (26 Me. 234) 342 Merrill v. Humphrey, (24 Mich. 170) 397 Merrill v. Monticello, (138 X. S. 673) 182, 183 Merrill v. Plainfield, (45 X. H. 126) 395, 397 Merrill b. Portland, (4 ClifE. C. C. R. 138) 329, 351 Merrill v. Toledo, (6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 430) 27 MeiTiraack E. S. Bk. v. Lowell, (152 Mass. 556) 327 b Merrimac Riv. Can. Prop. v. Lowell, (7 Gray, 223) 335 Meriwether B. Garrett, (102 U. S. 472) 2,39 Merri wether v. 11. S., (22 Court of Claims, 332) 41, 79 Mersey Docks c. Gibbs, Samec. Pen- haUow, (L, E. 1 H. L. Cases, 93, 1 H. & ]Sr. 439) 132, 324, 350 a Mersey Dock Cases, (11 H. Lds. Cases, 687) 336 Mertz V. Cook, (108 N. Y. 505) 196 Merwiu v. Chicago, (45 111. 133) 80 Merz v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., (88 Mo. 672) 136, 306 Merz r. Missouri P. R. Co., (1 S. W. R. 382) 153 Mich. Cen. R. R. v. Coleman, (28 Mich. 440) 338 Messenger v. Buffalo, (21 N. Y. 196) 165 Metcalf V. Hetheringtou, (11 Ex. 257) 121 Metcalf V. Seattle, (25 P. 1010, 1 Wash. St. 305) 189 Metcalf V. St. Louis, (11 Mo. 103) 153 Methodist Church, In re, (66 K Y. 395) 256 Methodist Church v. Baltimore, (6 Gill, 391) 148, 240 Meth. E. Church v. Ellis, (38 Ind. 3) 270 Meth. E. Church v. Hoboken, (33 X. J. L. 13) 221, 222, 229 Meth. E. Church ». Wyandotte, (31 Kan. 721) 329 Metro. Asylum v. Hill, (L. R. 6 App. Cas. 193)329 Metro. Board v. Hiester, (37 N. Y. 661) 118 Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Bar- rie, (34 N. Y. 657) 125 MeU-o. City R. R. v. Chicago, (96 111. 62) 120 Meti-o. etc. Co., In re, (19 N. E. E. 645) 302 Metro. E. R., In re, (12 N. Y. S. 502) 241, 244 Metro. S. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, (16 S. E. 49) 107 Metzger v. Attica R. Co., (79 N. Y. 171) 189 Meuser v. Risdon, (36 Cal. 239) 113 Meyer i-. Bridgeton, (37 N. J. L. 160) 158 TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. CXI Meyer v. Brown, (65 Gal. 583) 375 Meyer v. BuiTitt, (60 Conn. 117) 282 Meyer v. Carolan, (9 Tex. 250) 362 Meyer ». City of Muscatine, (i Wall. 384) 183, 184, 254 Meyer v. Fromm, (108 Ind. 208) 148 Meyer ». Graham, (50 N. W. R. 763) 314 Meyer v. Johnson, (53 Ala. 241) 274 Meyer o. Porter, (65 Cal. 67) 39 Meyers v. Chicago etc. Co., (57 Iowa, 555) 136, 150, 306 Meylert's Executor v. Sullivan Co., (19 Pa. St. 181) 326 a Mexell V. Morgan, (24 Atl. 216) 354 a Miami Co. v. Blake, (21 Ind. 32) 79 Michael v. St. Louis, (20 S. W. R. 666, 112 Mo. 610) 897 Michigan v. Ballance, (24 K. E. E. 117) 346 Michigan City v. Boeckling, (23 N. E. R. 518, 122 Ind. 39) 110, 324, 342. Michigan City ». Roberts, (34 Ind. 471) 362, 363 Michigan Ld. etc. Co. v. Republic, (32 N. W. R. 882) 326 Michigan Vav. Co. v. Detroit, (Mich. 201) 360 Middlesex etc. Co. v. Wakefield, (103 Mass. 261) 302 Middlesex H. & M. Soc. v. Davis, 3 Mete. 138) 47 Middlesex R. R. Co. v. Charlestown, (8 Allen, 330) 274 Middleton v. Mullica, (112 N. Y. 433) 190 a Middleton Bank v. Dubuque, (15 Iowa, 394) 209, 211 Middleton U.Wharton, (41 Minn. 266) 221 Middletown Village, In re, (82 N. T. 196) 234 Mifflin 1). Railroad Co., (16 Pa. St. 182) 302 Milakers v. Foster, (6 Oregon, 378) 318 Milan v. Tenn. etc. Co., (11 Lea, 329) 195 d Millburne ». Cedar Rapids etc. E. E. Co., (12 Iowa, 246) 238, 303 Miles V. Albany, (7 Atl. 601) 255 Miles V. Boregh, (3 Gale & D. 119) 106 Miles V. Chamberlain, (17 Wis. 446) 129 Miles V. Charleton, (29 Wis. 400) 28 Miles V. Duncan, (6 B. & C. 671) 326 a Milford V. Holbrook, (9 Allen, 17) 348 Miles V. Kern, (29 Pao. R. 720) 158 Milford V. Milford W. Co., (124 Pa. St. 610, 17 Atl. R. 185) 166 Milford V. Mil. Water Co., (124 Pa. St. 610) 170 Milford etc. Co. v. Brush, (10 Ohio, 111) 49 Milhan v. Sharp, (17 N". T. 611) 10, 396 Military Parade Ground, In re, (60 N. Y. 319) 242 Mill V. Mc Williams, (50 Ala. 427) 375 Mill Dam Foundry v. Hovey, (21 Pick. 417) 51 Miller, In re, (44 Mo. App. 125) 156 Miller v. Berlen, (13 Blatchf. 245) 195 d Miller v. Bridgewater, (29 N. J. L. 54) 377 Miller v. Burch, (32 Tex. 208) 120 Miller v. English, (1 Zabr. 317) 65 Miller v. Ford, (4 Rich. L. 376) 169 Miller v. Iron Co., (29 Mo. 122) 325 Miller v. Lerch, (1 Wall. Jr. 210) 203 Miller v. Manstow, (20 Atl. 6) 354 Miller v. Mc Williams, (50 Ala. 427) 212 Miller v. Mc Williams, (50 Ala. 427) 375 Miller v. Mobile, (47 Ala. 163) 247, 249, 278 , Miller v. Milw., (14 Wis. 642) 163 Miller ». Morristown, (42 N. J. Eq. 62) 249 Miller v. O'Reilly, (84 Ind. 168) 156 Miller v. Prairie du Chien R. R., (34 Wis. 533) 314 Miller v. Sacramento, (25 Cal. 98) Miller v. Savannah Fire Co., (26 Ga. 678) 130 Miller v. Sch. Trustees, (88 111. 26) 398 Miller v. Schenck, (43 N. W. R. 225) 215, 311 Miller v. St. Paul, (38 Minn. 134) 345 Miller v. State, (106 Ind. 415) 87 Miller v. Stewart, (9 Wheat. 702) 72 Miller v. Thompson, (3 Man. & Gr. 576) 177 Miller v. Windham, (23 Atl. R. 1132, 30 W. >r. C. 85) 354 Millerton v. Frederick, (114 Pa. St. 435) 189 a, 195 d Milliken v. Council, (54 Tex. 388) 83, 122 Milliken v. Weatherford, (54 Tex. 388) 121 Millikin «. Bloomington, (72 Ind. 161) 55 MiUs i). Brevoort, (77 Mich. 210) 360 ,Mills V. Brooklyn, (32 N. Y. 489) 328, 329 355 Mills '«. Charleton, (29 Wis. 411) 1415, 254 cxu TABLE OF CASES CITED. Keferences are to Sections. Mills V. Detroit, (54 IST. W. E. 897) 278 Mills V. Gleason, (11 Wis. 470) 99 Millville Borough, In re, (10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 321) 2 Mills V. Jefferson, (20 Wis. 50) 192 Mills 11. Thornton, (26 111. 300) 272 Mills V. Williams, (11 Ired. 558) 2 Mills Co. Bk. t. Mills Co., (67 Iowa, 697) 180 Milne v. Davidson, (5 Martin, 586) 152 Milne v. Mayor etc., (13 La. 69) 53 Milner's Admx. v. Pensacola, (2 Woods, 632) 32 Milnes v. Duncan, (6 B. &C. 671)327 Milnes v. Huddersfield, (L. R. Q. B. Div. 124) 325, 336 Milwaukee v. Davis, (6 Wis. 377) 350, 352 Milwaukee v. Kaefler, (116 U. S. 219) 397 Milwaukee)). Milw. etc. Co., (7Wis. 85) 302 Milwaukee Iron Co. v. Hubbard, (27 Wis. 51) 391, 397 Milwaukee I. School v. Schubel (29 Wis. 444) 398 Mims V. West, (38 Ga. 18) 195 d Minden v. Silverstein, (36 La. An 912) 125 Miners Bank v. U. S., (5 How. 213) 380 Miners D. Co. v. Zellerbaoh, (37 Cal. 543) 169 Minhinnah v. Haines, (29 N. J. L. 388) 377 Minick v. Troy, (83 N". Y. 514, 516) 350 b, 352 Minkler v. State, (14 Neb. 181) 83 Minor c. Bank, (1 Pet. 46) 91 Minot B. W. Roxbury, (112 Mass. 1) 4 Minter v. Durham, (13 Or. 470) 282 Minton ». Larue, (27 How. 475) 110 Minton v. Larue, (23 How. 435) 134 Jlinneapolis v. Wilkin, (30 Minn. 140, L'84) 245, 246 Jlinn. G. L. Co. v. Minneapolis, (30 X. AV. R. 450, 36 Minn. 159) 113 Minn. Vail. Co. v. Doran, (17 Minn. 188) 354 Minn. Linseed Oil Co. v. Palmer, (20 Minn. 468, 475) 256, 391 Mirande, Ex parte, (73 Cal. 365) 97, 121 Missouri etc. Co. d. Com'rs, (12 Kan. 482) 165 Blissouri etc. Co. v. Fort Scott, (15' Kan. 435) 185 Missouri etc. Co. v. Wilson, (45 Mo. App. 1) 244 Missouri etc. Co. v. Wyandotte, (23 Pac. R. 950) 146 Mitchell V. Boardman, (10 Atl. Kep. 452) 365 Mitchell V. Franklin & C. Tump. Co., (3 Humph. 456) 243, 247 Mitchell V. Illinois etc. Coal Co., (68 111. 286) 232 Mitchell V. Lemon, (34 Md. 176) 155 Mitchell i: Malone, (77 Ga. 301) 87 Mitchell V. Milwaukee, (18 Wis. 92) 172, 397 Mitchell ». Rockland, (41 Me. 363) 116, 169, 325, 332, 338 Mitchell V. United States, (21 Wall. 350) 66 Mitchell V. Williams, (27 Ind. 62) 129 Mitchellville v. Polk Co. Sup., (54 Iowa, 554) 271 Mithoff V. Can-oUton, (12 La. An. 185) 234 Mize V. Glenn, (38 Mo. Ap. 98) 354 Moale 1-. Baltimore, (5 Md. 314) 221, 244 Moar V. Harvey, (128 Mass. 219) 66 Moars v. Smedley, (6 Johns. Ch. 28) 391 Moberry ». Jeffersonville, (38 Ind. 198) 265 Mobile V. Baldwin, (57 A]a. 61) 397 Mobile V. Guille, (3 Ala. 140) 127 Mobile V. Jones, (42 Ala. 630) 155 Mobile V. Mood, (53 Ala.) 133 Mobile V. Richardson, (1 Stew. & Port. 12) 243, 245, 247 Mobile ». Watson, (116 IT. S. 289, 13 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 337) 2, 14, 42, 59 Mobile etc. Co. v. Peebles, (47 Ala. 317) 397 Mobile & S. H. R. R. Co. v. Kenner- ly, (74 Ala. 566) 270 Mobile M. I. Co. v. Cleveland, (76 Ala. 321) 362 Mobile St. Bk. v. Oktibeha Co., (24 Fed. Rep. 110) 196 Mock V. Muncie, (32 N. E. R. 718) 259 a Moffatt V. Henderson, (18 J. & S. 211) 283 Moffit V. Asheirlle, (103 N. C. 237) 92 Mohan v. Jackson, (52 Ind. 590) 75 Mohawk & H. R. R. Co. v. Clute, (4 Paige, 384) 273 Mohawk B. Co. v. TJtica E. E., (t! Paige, 554) 314 Moises I). Thornton, (8 Term R. 303) 52 Moliter v. Sheldon, (37 Kan. 246) 224 Mollandiau. Union Pac. Co., (14Fed. Eep. 394) 330 TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXUl References are to Sections. Momenoe ». Kendall, (14 N. App. 229) 352 Monaghan v. Phila., (28 Pa. St. 207) 375 Monaghan ». Sch. Dist.,(38Wis. 101) 108, 310 Monies ». Lynn, (119 Mass. 273) 3506 Monk V. Xew Utrecht, (104 N. Y. 561) 328, 352 Monmouth v. Sullivan, (8 111. App. 50) 343 Monongahela u. Fischer, (111 Pa. St. 9) .346 Monongahela B. Mono. El. L. Co., (12 Pa. Co. Ct. K. 529) 301 Monongahela B. Co. v. Bevard, (11 Atl. R. 575) 353 Monongahela B. Co. v. Pittsburgh etc., (114 Pa. St. 478) 317 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons, (6 Watts & S. 101) 239 Monroe v. Gerspach, (14 Mich. 41) 118 Monroe v. Hoffman, (29 La. Ann. 651) 75, 130 Monroe v. Meuer, (35 La. An. 1192) 104 Monroe v. State, (63 Miss. 135) 371 Montague v. Horton, (12 Wis. 597) 178 Montana etc. Co. r. R. R. Co., (12 Pac. R. 916) 249 Montolair v. Railroad Co., (18 Atl. R. 242, 45 N. J. E. 436) 2 Montolair v. Ramsdell, (107 U. S. 147) 28, 196 Monterey v. Berkshire, (7 Cush. 394) 398 Monterev ». Berkshire Co. Com'rs, (7 Cush. 394) 249 Montgomery v. Bridge Co., (110 Pa. St. 54) 246 Montgomery v. Hughes, (65 Ala. 201) 32 Montgomery u. Locke, (11 Pac. R. 874) 354 Montgomery v. Scott, (34 Wis. 338) 337 Montgomery v. Townsend, (80 Ala. 489, 2 So. 155) 245, 292 Montgomery v. Wright, (72 Ala. 411) 352 Montgomery v. Wyman, (22 N. E. R. 845, 130 111. 17) 270 Montgomery Council v. Gilmer, (33 Ala. 116) 355 Montgomery Council v. Townsend, (80 Ala. 489) 330 Montgomery Co. v. Elston, (32 Ind. 27) 258 Montgomery C. C. v. M. W. P. R. Co., (1 Ala. 76) 169 viii Montgomery Gas Light Co. v. City Council, (6 So. 113, 87 Ala. 245) 393 Monticello v. Fox, (28 N. E. R. 1025, 3 Ind. Ap. 481) 327 Montpelier v. East Montpelier, (29 Vt. 12) 12, 206 Montrose v. State, (61 Miss. 429) 102 Moody V. Mayor, (43 Barb. 282) 336 a Moon V. Ionia, (46 N. W. R. 25) 346 Mooney v. Kenneth, (19 Mo. 551) 158 Moor 1). Cornville, (13 Me. 293) 170 Moore v. Abbott, (32 Me. 46) 342 Moore v. Albany, (98 N. Y. 396) 329 Moore v. Albert, (32 Me. 46) 352 Moore v. Allen, (98 N. Y. 396, 13 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 262) 170 Moore v. Atlanta, (70 Ga. 611) 392 Moore v. Bailey. (8 Mo. App. 156) 279 Moore v. Chicago, (60 111. 243) 263 Moore b. Chicago etc. Co., (75 Iowa, 263) 354 Moore v. Gadsden, (87 N. Y. 84) 348 Moore v. Graves, (3 N. H. 308) 69 Moore v. Fayetteville Comm'rs, (80 N. C. 154) 261 Moore B. Kenockee Tp., (42 N. W. R. 944) 353 Moore v. Little Rock, (42 Ark. 66) 218, 2S1 Moore v. Mayor, (73 N. Y. 238) 148, 164 Moore v. Moore, (47 N. Y. 467) 258 Moore v. Newfield, (4 Greenl. 44) 95, 108 Moore v. New York, (4 Sandf. 450, 8 N. Y. 110) 244 Moore v. New York, (8 N. Y. 110) 218 Moore v. New York, (73 N. Y. 238) 169 Moore ». People, (14 How. 13) 117 Moore v. Platteville, (47 N. W. R. 1055) 326 a Moore V. Quirk, (105 Mass. 49) 258 Moore ». Richmond, (8 S. E. R. 387) 339, 352 Moore & Sanford, (24 N. E. R. 423) 232 Moore v. State, (16 Ala. 411) 117 Moore v. State, (48 Miss. 147) 117 Moore v. State, (11 La. 35) 129 Moore v. St. Paul, (51 N. W. R. 219) 256 Moore v. Taylor, (29 W. N. C. 495) 270 Moore V. Walla Walla, (2 Wash. 184) 120 Moose V. Carson, (104 N. C. 431, 10 S. E. 689) 244 Mootry v. Danbury, (45 Conn. 450) 120,854 a CXIV TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Moran v. Long Island City, (101 N. T. 439) 33 Moran ». Miami, (2 Black, 722, 732) 183, 190 Moran ». New Orleans, (112 IT. S. 69) 150 Moreland v. Mitchell Co., (40 Iowa, 394) 313, 315, 353 Moreland v. Wliitford, (54 Wis. 150) 399 Morey v. Brown, (42 N. H. 373) 129 Morey v. Fitzgerald, (56 Vt. 487) 342, 346 Morey ». Newfane, (8 Barb. 645) 2 Morford v. Barnes, (8 Yerg. 444) 105, 245 Morford v. linger, (8 Iowa, 82) 28, 55 Morgan's Ap., (25 W. N". C. 532) 396 Morgan v. Atlanta, (77 Ga. 662) 32 Morgan v. Chicago & A. K. R. Co., (96 U. S. 716) 217 Morgan v. Cree, (46 Vt. 773, 14 Am. Kep. 640) 270 Morgan v. District, (10 Ct. of CI. 156) 177 Morgan v. Hallowell, (57 Me. 375) 339 Morgan v. King, (35 N. T. 454) 245 Morgan ». Menzies, (60 Cal. 341) 164 Morgan v. Muldoon, (82 Ind.«847) 348 Morgans Parham, (16 Wall. 471) 272 Morgan t. Quackeubush, (22 Barb. 74) 65 Morgan Co. v. Thomas, (76 111. 120) 186 Morganthaler v. Cities, (4 Ohio Cir. Ct. 495) 369 Morin v. Multonah Co., (22 Pao. 490) 325 Morley v. Carpenter, (22 Mo. App. 240) 291 Morley v. Power, (5 Lea, 691) 364, 371, 374 Morrell v. Sylvester, (1 Greenl. 248) 72 Morrill v. State, (38 Wis. 428, 20 Am. Rep. 12) 261 Morris v. Baltimore, (5 Md. 248) 326 a Morris v. Bowen, (Wright, 749) 287 Morris V. Chicago, (11 111. 650) 240 Morris v. City of Rome, (10 Ga. 532) 134 Morris v. Council Bluffs, (67 Iowa, 343) 329, 354 a Morris v. Dixfield, (30 Me. 157, 160) 170 ' Morris v. Lone Star, (5 S. W. R. 519) 268, 270 Morris v. Nashville, (6 Lea, 337) 61 Morris u. Newark, (26 Atl. R. 82) 71 Morris ». People, (3 Denio, 381) 115 Morris v. Staps, (Hob. 211) 158 Morris v. State, (62 Tex. 728) 2, 14 Morris v. State, (65 Tex. 53) 38 Morris v. State, (84 Ala. 446, 4 So. R, 628) 49 Morris Banking & Canal Co. v. Lewis, (1 Beasl. 323) 191 b Morris Canal etc. Co. v. Fisher, (1 Stock. 667) 191 Morris Canal & B. Co. v. Central K. B. Co., (16 J^. J. Eq. 419) 225 Morris Canal Co. v. Ryei-son, (27 N. J. L. 457) 353 Morris etc. v. Fagin, (22 N. J. Eq. 430) 300 Morris etc. Co. •». Newark, (10 N. J. Eq. 352, 357) 302 Morris etc. Co. v. Prudden, (20 N. J. Eq. 530) 396 Morrison v. Hankson, (87 111. 587) 212, 375 Morrison v. Hershire, (32 Iowa, 271) 259 a, 397 Morrison v. Jacoby, (14 N. E. R. 546, 114 Ind. 84) .397 Morrison v. Lawrence, (98 Mass. 219) 92, 98, 108, 338 Morrison v. McDonald, (21 Me. 550) 90, 102 Morristown v. Mayor, (67 Pa. St. 355) 345 Morrow v. Surber, (97 Mo. 155) 177 Morrow ». Weed, (4 Iowa, 77) 279 Morrow Co. v. Hendryx, (14 Oreg. 397) 67 Morse v. Belfast, (77 Me. 44) 346 Morse v. Boston, (109 Mass. 446) 344 Morse ». New York, (73 N. Y. 238) 338 Morse v. Richmond, (41 Vt. 435) 342 Morse u. Sweenie, (15 Bradw. 486) 331 Morse v. Westport, (110 Mo. 502, 19 S. W. R. 831) 292 Morse v. Zeize, (34 Minn. 55) 219 Mortimer u. McCollan, (6 M. & W. 67) 107 Mortimer v. Metro. El. E. Co., (29 N. E. R. 5, 129 N. Y. 81) 244 Morton v. Lee, (28 Kan. 287) 88 Morton v. Power, (33 Minn. 521) 175 Morton v. Smith, (48 Wis. 265) 348 Morton etc. v. Wysong, (51 Ind. 4) 320 Morvillei). Tract Soc, (123 Mass. 129) 164 Moser v. Mayor, (21 Hun, 163) 67 Moses B. Kearney, (31 Ark. 261) 363 Moses V. Pittsburgh, etc. R. R. Co., (21 111. 516) 302, 303, 329 Moses V. St. Louis Dock Co., (84 Mo. 242) 241 TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. cx-v Mosey v. Troy, (61 Barb. 580) 351 Moshei- V. Sch. Dis., (44 Iowa, 122) 16, 189 o Moss V. Cummiiifrs, (44 Mich. 359, 22 Alb. L. ,T. 376) 326 Mott V. Hioks, (1 Cow. 513, 13 Am. Rep. 550) 51, 164, 168 Mott V. Reynolds, (27 Vt. 206) 106 Mott V. Schoolbred, (L. R. 20 Eq. 22) 300 Motz 1). Detroit, (18 Mich. 495) 259 a Moulton V. Evansville, (25 Fed. Rep. 382) 196 Moulton V. Sanford, (51 Me. 127) 342 Moultrie v. Rockingham etc. Bk. (92 U. S. 631) 186 Moundsville v. Fountain, (27 W. Va. 182) 104, 125 Moundsville v. Velton, (13 S. E. R. 373) 31 Mt. Carmel v. Wabash Co., (50 111. 69) 125 Mt. Clair v. Remsdell, (107 V. S. 147) 28 Mt. Desert ». Monmouth, (72 Me. 348) 60 Mt. Pleasant v. Breeze, (11 Iowa, 399) 146 Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, (100 U. S. 514) 42 Mt. Moriah Cem., (81 Pa. St. 235) 363 Mt. Morris Sq., In re, (2 Hill, 20) 98 Mt. Morris v. Williams, (38 111. Ap.' 401) 192 Mt. "Vernon b. Hovey, (52 Ind. 563) 184 Mt. Vernon v. Patton, (94 111. 65) 176 Mt. Washington Road Co., Re, (35 jST. H. 134) 235 Mowatt V. Wright, (1 Wend. 355) 326 a Mower v. Leicester, (9 Mass. 247) 315 Mowery v. Salisbury, (82 N. C. 175) 129 Mowry ». Providence, (10 R. I. 52) 208, 312, 396 Moyamensing ». Long, (1 Pa. 143) 300 Mudge I). Williamsport, (78 Pa. St. 158) 87 Muhler v. Kansas, (123 U. S. 623) 121, 231 Muhlenbrink v. Com'rs, (42 N. J. L. 364) 123 Mulhall 15. Quinn, (1 Gray, 105) 80 Mullarkey v. Cedar Falls, (19 Iowa, 21) 113 Mullegan v. Ellis, (12 Abb. Pr. 259) 120 MuUen v. Rutland, (55 Vt. 77) 343 Mullen V. St. John, (57 N. Y. 567) 337, 342, 348 Muller V. District, (5 Mackey, 286) 352 a Muller V. Mayor etc., (63 K. T. 355) 87 Mulligan v. Smith, (59 Cal. 206) 232, 241, 278 MuUikin v. Bloomington, (27 Ind. 161) 56, 61 Mumma v. Potomac Co., (8 Pet. 2S5) 10, 40 Munger v. Marshalltown, (56 Iowa, 210) 339, 352 Munger v. Tonawanda R. R. Co., (4 N. Y. 349) 239 Munic. V. Bank, (5 Rob. 151) 270 Municipality v. Commissioners, (1 Rob. 279) 32 Municipality v. Cutting, (4 La. An. 335) 128, 146 Municipality v. Dubois, (10 La. An. 56) 123 Municipality v. Kirk, (5 La. An. 34) 225 Municipality b. Levee, S. C. P. Co., (7 La. An. 270) 222, 242 ■ Municipality b. McDonough, (2 Rob. 244) 200 Municipality v. Palfrey, (7 La. An. 497) 221 Municipality b. Pance, (6 La. An. 515) 282 Municipality v. Pease, (2 La. An. 538) 133 Municipality v. Theater Co., (2 Rob. La. 209) 17 Municipality No. 2 v. Com. Bank of N. O., (5 Rob. 151) 267 Municipalitv No. 2 b. Dubois, (10 La. An. 56) 261 Municipality No. 2 b. Duncan, (2 La. An. 182) 269 Municipality No. 2 b. Dunn, (10 La. An. 57) 259 a Munio. No. 2 b. Guillotte, (14 La. An. 297) 281 Municipality No. 2 v. N. O. & Car. R. R. Co., (10 Rob. 187) 267, 270 Municipality No. 1 v. La. State Bank, (5 La. An. 394) 273 Municipality No. 3 B. Johnson, (La. An. 20) 268 Municipality No. 2 v. Orleans Cot. Press Co., (6 Rob. 411) 266 Municipality No. 1 v. Wheeler, (IC La. An. 745) 262 Municipality No. 2 v. White, (9 La. An. 446) 261 Municipality No. 3 v. Ursuline Nuns^ (2 La. An. 611) 276 CXVl TABLE OF CASES CITED. Keferences are to Sections. Munk V. "Watertown, (67 Hun, 261) 324 Munn V. Pittsburgh, (40 Pa. St. 364) 355 Muiiro V. Munro, (7 01. & F. 842) 66 Munsell v. Temple, (8 111. 96) 124 Munsou V. Board, (8 So. 914, 43 La. An. 33) 259 a Munson v. Lyons, (12 Blatchf. 539) 196 Munson v. New York, (3 Fed. Rep. 338) 338 Muntum v. Larue, (23 How. 435) 144 Murdock v. Academy, (12 Pick, 244) 84 Murdock o. Chaffee, (7 So. E. 519) 282 Murdock v. District, (22 Ct. of Claims, 464) 171 Murdock v. Memphis, (10 Wall. 590) 32 Murdock v. Woodson, (2 Dillon C. C. 188) 26, 28 Murdock etc. Co. v. Com., (152 Mass. 28)5 Murphy, In re, (7 Cow. 153) 65 Murphy t). Brooklyn, (23 N. E. K. 887) 338 Murphy v. Chicago, (29 HI. 279) 113, 239, 302, 329 Murphy v. East Portland, (42 Fed. 308) 393, 395 Murphy w. Gloucester, (105 Mass. 470) 342, 343 Murphy v. Harrison, (29 Ark. 340) 397 Murphy v. Indianapolis, (83 Ind. 76) 346 Murphy v. Louisville, (9 Bush, 189) 2, 8, 164, 170 Murphy v. Lowell, (124 Mass. 564) 336, 347 Murphy o. McShane, (52 Md. 217) 348 Murphy b. People, (2 Cow. 815) 104 Murphy v. People, (120 111. 234) 254 Murphy v. Wilmington, (6 Houst. 108) 277 Murphy's Boro. v. Baker, (34 HI. App. 659) 350 b Murray v. Charleston, (96 U. S. 432) 258, 278 Murray v. Menefee, (20 Ark. 561) 239 Murray v. Sardner, (2 Wall. 110) 195 d Murray v. Sharp, (1 Bosw. 539) 132, 239 Murray v. Tucker, (10 Bush, 249) 256, 263 Murray v. Virginia, (91 HI. 558) 55 Murtagh v. St. Louis, (44 Mo. 479) 332 Muscatine v. Keokuk N. L. etc. Co, (45 Iowa, 185) 326 a Muscatine v. Packet Co., (45 Iowa, 185) 326 a Muscatine v. R. R. Co., (1 Dillon C. C. R. 536) 14 Muscatine v. Steck, (7 Iowa, 505) 102 Muscatine Turnverein v. Fiinck, (18 Iowa, 469) 38 Musgrove v. St. Louis Ch., (10 La. An. 431) 118 Muskegon!). Dow, (54 N. W. R. 170) 8 Musselman v. Manly, (42 Ind. 462) 93 106 Musser v. Johnson, (42 Mo. 74) 52 Mutual Ben. L. I. Co. v. Elizabeth, (42 N. J. L. 235) 196 Mutual Ins. Co. v. Supervisors, (32 Barb. 322) 397 Mut. Sav. Inst. v. Eustin, (46 Mo. 200, 203) 327 Mut. Un. Tel. Co. ». Chicago, (16 Fed. Rep. 309) 297 Myall V. St. Paul, (30 Minn. 294) 391 Myers v. Bank, (20 Ohio, 283) 22 Myers v. Com., (1 Atl. 264, 110 Pa. 8t. 217) 315 Myers r. Croft, (13 Wall. 291) 207 Myers v. Irwin, (2 Serg. & Rawle, 368) 25 Myers v. People, (26 111. 173) 102, 104 Myers v. Simms, (4 Iowa, 500) 249 Myers v. Snyder, (Bright, 489) 347 Myers ti. St. Louis, (82 Mo. 367) 132 Mygatt V. Green Bay, (1 Biss. 292) 195 d Mytton V. Duck, (26 Up. Can. Q. B. 61) 215 N. Nagle V. Augusta, (5 Ga. 546) 290 Nalle 1). Austin, (21 S. W. R. 375) 8 Napa V. Easterby, (18 Pac. R. 353) 148 Napa V. E. Co. v. Napa Co., (30 Cal. 435) 186, 362 Napman i-. People, (19 Mich. 352) 124, 158 Narden c. Mount, (78 Ky. 86) 155 Narraent v. Charlotte Co., (85 N. C. 387) 196 Narragausett, In re, (16 Atl. E. 907) 65 Nash V. Lowry, (37 Minn. 261) 287, 302 Nash V. St. Paul, (11 Minn. 174) 170, 172 Nashville v. Bank of Tenn., (1 Swan, 269) 271 Nashville v. Brown, (9 Heisk. 1) 347 Nashville v. Ray, (19 Wall. 468) 177 TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXVU References are to Sections. Nashville v. Smith, (6 S. W. R. 273) 271 Nashville v. Thomas, (5 Coldvsr. 600) 255, 273 Nashville v. Weiser, (54 111. 245) 279 Nason v. Boston, (14 Allen, 508) 344 Nassau Street, Re, (11 Johns. 77) 270 Natal V. State, (11 S. Ct. 636, 139 U. S. 621) 128 National Bank v. Grenada, (44 Fed. 262) 189, 190, 198 Nat. Bank v. Kirby, (108 Mass. 497) 191 Nat. Exch. Bank v. Hartford etc. R. R. Co., (8 R. I. 375) 190, 191, 192 6, 193 National etc. Co. v. State, (21 Atl. R. 570) 238 Natl. Lumber Co. v. City of Wymore, (46 N. W. Rep. 622) 180 Natl. Bank of Commerce v. Town of Grenada, (44 Fed. Rep. 262) 189 Nat. St. Bank v. Marshall, (39 Iowa, 490) 190 National Waterworks v. Kansas City, (28 Fed. Rep. 921) 144, 296 Natoma W. & M. Co. v. Clarkin, (14 Cal. 544) 207 Nauman v. Board, (41 N. W. R. 267) 18 Navasota v. Pearce, (46 Tex. 525) 325 Nave V. Flack, (90 lud. 205) 352 Naylor b. Galesburg, (56 111. 285) 161 Neal V. Commonwealth, (17 Serg. & R. 67) 54, 62 Neal B. Pittsburgh & C. R. R. Co., (2 Grant Cases, 137) 241 Neale v. Overseers, (5 "Watts, 538) 73, 88 Neales v. State, (10 Mo. 498) 104 Nealis v. Hayward, (48 Ind. 19) 290 Neares. Mt. Auburn R. Co., (29 Wkly. L. Bui. 171) 303 Nebraska City v. Campbell, (2 Black. 590) 352 a Nebraska City v. Lampkin, (6 Neb. 27) 329 Nebraska City b. Rathbone, (20 Neb. 288) 344 a Needham v. Thresher, (49 Cal. 393) 360 Neely v. Yorkville, (10 S. C. 141) 169, 190 a Neenan v. Donoghue, (50 Mo. 593) 174 Neenan v. Smith, (60 Mo. 292) 281, 282 Neff V. Mooresville, (66 Ind. 279) 317 NefE B. Wellesley, (148 Mass. 487, 20 N. E. Ill) 352 NeifEer v. Bank. (1 Head, 162) 165 Neilson v. Newark, (49 N. J. L. 246) 58, 67 Nelson v. Edwards, (55 Tex. 389) 362 Nelson v. Godfrey, (12 111. 22) 348 Nelson v. Gridley, (12 111. 22, 23) 298 Nelson b. La Porte, (33 Ind. 258) 256, 295, 296 Nelson b. St. Martins Parish, (111 U. S. 716) 14, 161 Nelson b. Mayor, (5 Hun, 190) 87 Nelson «. Milford, (7 Pick. 18) 115 Nelson b. New York, (5 N. Y. Sup. 688) 173 Nesbit B. Riverside, (12 S. Ct. 144, U. S. 610) 192 Nesbit B. Trumbo, (39 111. 110) 234 a Neshkoro v. Nest, (55 N. W. R. 176) 300, 396 Nette B. N. Y. El. R. Co., (20 N. Y. S. 844) 39 6 Neuse v. Cora'rs, (6 Jones L. 204) 368 Nevada v. Hampton, (13 Nev. 441) 16 Nev. Sell. Dist. b. Shoecroft, (88 Cal. 372) 26 Nevert b. Boston, (120 Mass. 338) 335 Nevies b. Peoria, (41 111. 502) 113, 328 354 a New Albany v. Connelly, (7 Ind. 32) 279 New Albany b. Meekin, (3 Ind. 481) 272 New Albany b. Ray, (29 N. E. R. 611, 3 Ind. Ap. 481) 328 New Albany b. Sweeney, (13 Ind. 245) 282 New Albany Bk. v. Danville, (60 Ind. 504) 182 New Albany etc. Co. v. O'Dally, (13 Ind. 353) 302 New Albany & S. R. R. Co. b. Con- nolly, (7 Ind. 32) 238, 243 Newark v. Del. etc. R. R. Co., (42 N. J. Eq. 196) 301, 308 Newark b. Elliott, (5 Ohio St. 113) 208 Newark v. Murphy, (40 N. J. L. 145) 155 Newark Aq. Bd. b. Passaic, (45 N. J. Eq. 393) 120 Newark Bank v. Assessors, (30 N. J. L. 22) 32 Newark etc. Co. v. Newark, (23 N. J. Eq. 515) 302 Newaygo b. Echtinan, (45 N. W. R. 1010) 266 New Bedford & F. Street Ry. Co. v. Acushnet Street Ry. Co., (143 Mass. 200) 33 New Bedford & F. etc. Co. b. Acush- net St. Rv. Co., (9 N. E. R. 536) 302 OXTlll TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. New Boston v. Dumbarton, (12 N. H. 409, .412) 31 New Brighton o. IT. Pres. Church, (96 Pa. St. 331) 330 Newby v. Free, (72 Iowa, 379) 374 Newby v. Platte County, (25 Mo. 258) 245 Newcomer v. Keedy, (2 Md. 19) 284 New Decatur v. Berry, (90 Ala. 432) 118, 169 Newell V. Minn. etc. Ey. Co., (35 Minn. 112) 144, 302 Newell V. Smith, (53 Conn. 72) 327 Newert v. Boston, (120 Mass. 338) 338 a Newgass v. City of New Orleans, (42 La. An. 165) 177 Newgass v. New Orleans, (7 So. E. 565) 183 New Gass b. E. Co., (15 S. W. 188) 247 New Hayen v. Fairhaveu etc. Co., (38 Conn. 422) 259 a, 306 New Haven v. New Haven & D. E. Co., (25 Atl. E. 316) 164 New Haven v. Eailroad, (38 Conn. 422) 283 New Haven v. Whitney, (36 Conn. 373) 291 New Haven etc. Co. v. Chatham, (42 Conn. 465) 106, 196 Newiugton v. Jacobs, (25 Law T. N. S. 800, L. E. 7 Q. B. 53) 224 New Jersey v. Fire Com'rs, (34 N. J. Eq. 117) 169 New Jersey v. Yard, (95 IT. S. 112) 32 New Loudon o. Brainard, (22 Conn. 552) 395 Newliu V. Davis, (77 Pa. St. 317) 343 Newman v. Emporia, (32 Kan. 456) 145, 265 Newman v. Metro, etc. Co., (118 N. Y. 618) 246 Newman v. Scott etc., (1 Heisk. 787) 375 ' Newmeyer v. M. & M. Co., (52 Mo. 81) 395 New Orleans v. Boudro, (14 La. An. 303) 158 New Orleans v. Brooks, (36 La. An. 64) 97, 148 New Orleans v. Cazelar, (27 La. An. 156) 56 New Orleans v. Clark, (95 IT. S. 644) 60, 187, 295 New Orleans v. Cora. Bank of N. O (10 La. An. 735) 261, 273 New Orleans v. Costello, (14 La. An. 37) 102, 154 New Orleans v. Davidson, (30 La. An. 541) 282 New Orleans v. Fimerty, (27 La, Am. 681) 79 New Orleans v. Graihle, (9 La. An. 561) 282 New Orleans v. Gravier, (11 Martin, 620) 300 New Orleans v. Home Ins. Co., (23 La. An. 61) 212 New Orleans v. Hoyle, (23 La. An. 740) 2 New Orleans v. Kaufmaan, (20 La. An. 283) 259 a New Orleans v. Louisiana Co., (140 U. S. 654) 212 New Orleans v. Meoli. & T. Bank, (15 La. An. 107) 273 New Orleans v. Michoud, (10 La. An. 763) 56 New Orleans v. Miller, (7 La. An. 651) 117 New Orleans v. McDonald, 53 Miss. 240) 184 New London v. Montville, (1 Eoot, 184) 67 New Orleans v. Morris, (105 U. S. 600) 212 New Orleans v. N. O. W. W. Co., (142 U. S. 79) 8, 15 New Orleans v. N. O. etc. Co., (40 La. An. 587) 303 New Orleans v. N. O. W. Co., (142 TJ. S. 79) 15 New Orleans u. Pliillippi, (9 La. An. 44) 120, 146 New Orleans v. Poutz, (14 La. An. 853) 17, 161 New Orleans v. Staiger, (11 La. An. 68) 261 New Orleans o. St. Anna's Asylum, (31 La. An. 292) 270 New Orleans v. Shepherd, (10 La. Ann. 268) 66 New Orleans v. Souther Bank, (11 La. An. 41) 170, 261, 273 New Orleans v. Stafford, (27 La. An. 417) 128 New Orleans v. St. Louis Church, 11 La. An. 244) 163 New Orleans v. Turpin, (13 La. An. 56) 123 New Orleans v. Wilmot, (31 La. An. 65) 133 New Orleans v. Wire, (20 La. An. 500) 282 Ne.w Orleans v. United States, (49 Fed. Eep. 40, 2 U. S. App. 125) 194 New Orleans v. U. S., (10 Pet. 662, 737) 133, 217, 220, 225, 226, 229 New Orleans Draining Co., In re, (11 La. An. 338) 236, 249 TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXIX Beferences are to Sections. New Orleans etc. Co. v. Delamore, ! (114 U. S. 501) 302 New Orleans etc. v. Hart, (40 La. An. 474) 290 New Orleans etc. Co. c. Second Mun., (1 La. An. 128) 302 New Orleans etc. R. R. Co. v, G-ay, (32 La. An. 471) 238 New Orleans El. Ry. Co. v. New Or- leans, (39 La. An. 127) 148 New Orleans etc. Co. v. New Orleans, (143 U. S. 192) 270 New Orleans etc. R. R. Co. v. South- ern etc. Tel. Co., (.53 Ala. 211) 238 N. O. Gas Co. ». Louisiana etc., (115 U. S. 650) 296, 395 New Orleans M. & T. R. R. Co. v. Southern & Atl. Tel. Co., (53 Ala. 211) 297 New Orleans R. R. Co. v. New Or- leans R. Co., (26 La. An. 478) 2, 9, 11 New Orleans Waterworks ». Rivers, (115 V. S. 674) 144, 295. Newport v. Berry, (19 S. W. R. 238) 272 Newport v. Newport Light Co., (84 Ky. 167) 144, 296 Newport v. R'way Co., (89 Ky. 29) 270 Newport v. So. Gov. etc. Co., (11 S. W. Eep. 964) 303 Newport!). Taylor's Ex., (16 B. Mon. 699) 221, 225 Newport Trustees, (16 Sim. 346) 25 Newport etc. Co. v. Eoote, (9 Bush, 264) 329 New Providence v. Halsey, (117 U. S. 33(i) 143, 183, 196 Newsorae i'. Cocke, (44 Miss. 352) 83 Newton v. Belger, (143 Mass. 598) 131, 150 Newton v. Devlin, (134 Mass. 490) 171 Newtonville v. Gulp, (38 Ohio St. 13) 85 Newville Rd., (8 Watts, 172) 288 New York v. Broadway & 8. A. R. R. Co., (17 Hun, 242) 274, 306 New Yorku. B. S. & L. Co. v. B'k'lyn, (71 N. Y. 580) 336 a New York v. Bailey, (2 Denio, 433) 237, 336 a, 354 New York v. Cusliman, (10 Johns. 96) 270 New York v. Hart, (95 N. Y. 443, 452) 225 New York v. Kent, (5 N. Y. S. 567) 210, 211 New York v. Pentz, (24 Wend. 668) 335 New York »; Sec. Ave. R. Co., (32 N. Y. 261) 113 New York v. Sheffield, (4 Wall. 189) 350 a New York v. Stuyvesant, (17 N. Y. 34) 221 New York v. Third Av. E. Co., (117 N. Y. 404, 646) 302 N. Y. Cable Ry., In re, (109 N. Y. 32) 305 N. Y. Dist. Ry. Case, In re, (107 N. Y. 42) 297 N. Y. El. R. R. Co., In re, (70 N. Y. 327, 41 Hun, 502) 144, 303 New York etc. Bridge, In re, (72 N. Y. 527) 28 N. Y. & B. Lumber Co. v. Brooklyn, (71 N. Y. 580) 92, 338 a N. Y. Bal. D. D. v. Mayor, (8 Hun, 247) 126 N. Y. Central etc. R. R. Co. v. Met. Gas. Co., (63 N. Y. 326) 233 New York Conference v. Clarkson, (4 Halst. Ch. 541) 47, 49 New York etc. Co. v. Brooklyn, (71 N. Y. 580) 324 N. Y. etc. R. Co. o. State, (13 Atl. R. 1) 317 New York etc. Co. v. Waterbury, (55 Conn. 19) 148 New York, L. E. & W. R. R. Co. b. Yard, (43 N. J. L. 121) 225 N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co. <,■. New Britain, (49 Conn. 40) 270 New York & New Haven R. R. Co. V. New Haven, (42 Conn. 279) 259 a N. Y. P. E. School, In re, (47 N. Y. 556) 281 Niagara etc. Co., In re, (40 Hun, 94) 232 Niagara Falls Susp. Br. Co. v. Bach- man, (66 N. Y. 261) 218, 219 Niantic Sav. Bank v. Douglas, (5 111. 579) 190 a Niblett V. Nashville, (12 Heisk. 684) 349 Nicholls V. Gt. Western R'y Co., (27 Up. Can. Q. B. 382) 332 Nichols, In re, (6 Abb. New Cas. 474) 84 Nichols, In re, (57 How. 395) 83 Nichols V. Athens, (68 Me. 413) 342 Nichols V. Bridgeport, (23 Conn. 189, 208) 108, 232, 241, 248, 259 a Nichols B. McLean, (101 N. Y. 526) 79,85 Nichols i>. Minneapolis, (2 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 562) 350 a Nioliols !). State, (89 Ind. 298) 400 Nicholson v. Guardians L. R., (1 Q. B. 320) 164 Nicholson P. Co. v. Painter, (35 Cah . 699) 165, 172 cxx TABLE OF CASES CITED. Keferenccs are to Sections. Nickerson ». Boston, (131 Mass. 306) 120 Nicol V. Magee, (9 Humpb. 252) 184 Nicol V. Mayor, (9 Humph. 252) 2, 8, 9, 163 Nicoliu V. Lowrey, (49 N. J. L. 391) 119, 150 Nicoll, Re, (4 Hun, 340) 374 SricoUi). N. Y. & E. R. R. Co., (12 N. Y. 121) 202, 203 NicoU V. N. Y. & E. R. E. Co., (12 N. Y. 121) 200 Niles W. W. Co. !). Niles, (59 Mich. 311) 9, 165 Nims 1). Troy, (59 N. Y. 500) 355 Nims li. Boone Co., (66 Iowa, 272) 313 Ninth Nat. Bk. v. Knox Co., (37 Fed. Rep. 75) 196 Nixon V. Biloxi, (5 So. R. 621) 220 Noble V. BuUis, (23 Iowa, 559) 327 Noble «. Richmond, (31 Grat. 271) 325, 339, 345, 349 Noble V. St. Albans, (5'! Vt. 522) 355 Noblesville T. Co. v. Baker, (4 Humph. 315) 318 Nodine v. Union, (13 Oreg. 587) 158 Noeling v. Allee, (10 N. Y. S. 97) 348 Nolan D. King, (97 N. Y. 565) 348 Nolan V. New Oris., (10 La. An. lOB) 83, 85 Nolin «. Franklin, (4 Yerg. 163) 120 Noonan v. Smith, (50 Mo. 525) 259 a Noonan v. Stillwater, (33 Minn. 198) 347 Norfleet v. Cromwell, (70 N. C. 634, 16 Am. Rep. 787) 236 Norfolk City v. Ellis, (26 Gratt. 224) 259 a Normaud v. Comm'rs, (8 Neb. 18) 395 Norris v. Baltimore, (44 Md. 598) 242 Norris v. Litchfield, (35 N. H. 918) 352 Norris v. Mayor etc. of Smythville, (1 Swan, 104) 53, 57 Norris 13. People, (3 Denio, 331) 28 Norris v. Staps, (Hob. 211) 149 Norris v. Trustees, (7 Gill & Jolms. 7) 15 Norris v. Vt. Cent. R. R. Co., (28 Vt. 99) 239 Norristown v. Fitzpatrick, (94 Pa. St. 621) 327, 331, 331 a, 333 Norristown v. Mayor, (67 Pa. St. 355) 345 Northampton Co. v. Eastern etc. Ey. (23 Atl. R. 895) 12 Northampton Co. v. Lafayette Col- lege, (18 Atl. Rep. 516) 14 No. Bait. Pass. Ry. Co. v. Baltimore, (23 Atl. 470) 302 North & S. S. R. Co. v. Spullock, (88 Ga. 283) 398 No. Beach & M. R. R. Co.'s Appeal, (32 Cal. 499) 274 North Chicago v. Lake View, (105 111. 207) 120 Northoott V. Smith, (4 Ohio Cir. Ct. 565) 129 N. C. R. R. Co. V. Carolina Cent. K. R. Co., (83 N. C. 489) 144, 238, 302 North Chi. C. R. Co. v. Lake View, (105 111. 207) 302 No. Central Ry. Co. v. Jackson, (7 Wall. 262) 258 No. Cen. R. R. v. Baltimore, (46 Md. 425) 306 Northeastern etc. Co. v. Payne, (8 Rich. L. 177) 303 Northern B. etc. v. London etc. (6 M. & W. 428) 318 Northern Cen. R. R. v. State, (31 Ind. 357) 352 Northern etc. Co. v. Baltimore, (21 Md. 93) 302, 303 Northern Indiana!). Mllliken, (7 Ohio St. 382) 102 No. Ind. R. R. Co. d. Connelly, (10 Oliio St. 159, 164) 259 a, 273 Northern Liberties ». St. John's Church, (13 Pa. St. 104) 270 North. Liberties Comrs. v. Gas Co., (12 Pa. St. 318) 308 Northern T. Co. v. Chicago, (99 U. S. 635) 329, 290 Northern Pac. L. & M. Co. v. East Portland, (12 Pac. R. 4, 14 Oregon, 3)164 North. Pa. R. R. Co. v. Adams, (54 Pa. St. 97) 192 Northern P. Ry. Co. v. Roberts, (42 Fed. 734) 184 North Pac. Ry. Co. v. Spokane, (52 Fed. 428) 396 North Pac. etc. v. East Portland, (14 Oreg. 3) 290, 339 No. Pac. R. Co. V. Territory, (142 U. S. 49) 363 Northern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Portland, (14 Oreg. 24) 241 North Hempstead ». Hempstead, (2 Wend. 109) 59, 67, 201, 204, 205 North Manheim v. Arnold, (19 Pa. St. 380) 342 North Mo. R. R. Co. v. Maguire, (49 Mo. 490) 16, 255 North Missouri R. R. Co. v. Lackland, (25 Mo. 515) 233 No. Penn. Ry. v. Stone, (3 Phila. 421) 306 Northrop v. Graves, (19 Conn. 548) 327 TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. exxi North Springfield v. Springfield, (29 N. E. R. 849) 59 North Third Ave., In re, (3 N. T. S. fi41) 221 North Vernon v. Voegeler, (103 N. T. L. 314) 301, 330 Northwestern Univ. v. People, (80 111. 333) 270 Northyarmouth v. Skillings, (45 Me. 133) 13 Norton «. Brownsville, (129 U. S. 479) 188 Norton v. Dyersburg, (127 U. S. 160) 195 a Norton v. Mansfield, (16 Mass. 48) 4 Norton v. Peck, (3 Wis. 714) 3 Norton v. Shelby Co., (118 U. S. 425) 88, 96, 195 d, 196 Norwich v. Story, (25 Conn. 44) 288 Nottingham, In re, (1 O'M. & H. 245) 65 Nowell V. Mayor, (9 Exch. 457) 182 Nowles V. Jasper Co., (86 Ind. 179) 79 Nowlin V. State, (49 Ala. 41) 400 Noyce v. Jones, (25 Neb. 643) 211 Noyes v. City, (116 Mass. 87) 398 Noyes o. Mason, (5 N. W. R. 595) 110 Noyes v. Morristown, (1 Vt. 357) 352 Noyes v. Ward, (19 Conn. 250) 215 Nugent V. Putnam, (19 Wall. 241) 186 Nugent V. State, (18 Ala. 521) 102 o. Oakey v. New Orleans, (1 La. 1) 269 Oakham v. Holbook, (11 Cush. 299) 353 Oakland v. Carpenter, (13 Cal. 540) 99 Gates V. Hudson, (5 Eng. L. & Eq. 469) 326 a Oatmau v. Taylor, (29 Wis. 657) 177 O'Brien v. St. Paul, (25 Minn. 331) 239, 354 a 355 'O'Conner v. Pittsburgh, (18 Pa. St. 187) 329 O'Connor v. Memphis, (6 Lea, 730) 42 O'Connor v. New York, (16 Daly, 88) 344 O'Connor v. Otenabee, (35 Up. Can. Q. B. 73) 346 Oconto Co. V. Hall, (47 Wis. 208) 99 Odell V. Schroeder, (58 111. 353) 92, 331, 333 O'Dooherly v. Archer, (9 Tex. 295) 105 Odlin V. Woodruff, (12 So. Rep. 227) 397 O'Donnelli). Bailey, 24 Miss. 386)255, 273 O'Donnelli). Philadelphia, (2Brewst. 481) 177 O'Donovan v. Wilkins, (24 Fla. 281) 118 Oelet V. Newport Board of Aid., 14 R. I. 295) 220 O'Ferrall v. Colby, (2 Minn. 180) 371 Ogburn v. Connor, (46 Cal. 346) 354 a Ogden 1). Daviess Co., (102 U. S. 634) 184 Ogden V. McLaughlin, (16 Pac. Rep. 72) 122 Ogden V. Raymond, (22 Conn. 379) 67, 169 Ogden V. Saunders, (12 Wheat. 213) 194 Odgen o. St. Joseph, (3 S. W. R. 25, 90 Mo. 522) 268 Ogg V. Lansing, (35 Iowa, 495) 327 a 332 O'Hale V. Sacramento, (48 Cal. 212) 347 O'Hara v. King, (52 111. 303) 373 O'Hara^. New Orleans, (30 La. An. 165) 169 O'Hara v. Portland, (3 Oreg. 525) 2, 8 O'Hare v. Dubuque, (22 Iowa, 144) 56 Ohio V. Com'rs, (7 Ohio St. 280) 184 Ohio V. Frank, (103 U. S. 697) 192 Ohio etc. Co. v. Bridgeport, (43 111. Ap. 89) 317 Ohio Riv. R. Co. v. Gibbons, (12 S. E. R. 1093) 396 Ohio Riv. R. Co. v. Ward, (35 W. Va. 481) 247, 249 Ohio Val. I. Wks. v. Moundsville, (11 W. Va. 1) 188, 365 Oil City V. Boiler Works, (25 Atl. R. 549, 152 Pa. St. 348) 294 Oil City I). Oil City B. Works, (25 Atl. R. 549) 282 Oil City V. Trust Co., (11 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 350) 123 O'Kane v. Treat, (25 111. 458) 288 O'Keefe, In re, (19 N. Y. S. 676) 154 O'Laughlin v. Dubuque, (42 Iowa, 589) 346 Olcott V. Supervisors, (16 Wall. 678) 27, 216 Old Colony R. Co. v. Fall River, (147 Mass. 455) 398 Old Colony R. R. Co. v. Miller, (125 Mass. 1) 247 Old South Soc. V. Boston, (127 Mass. 378) 270 O'Lean v. Steyner, (135 N. Y. 341) 300 O'Leary v. Board, (44 N. W. R. 608) 92 cxxu TABLE OF CASES CITED. Befercnces are to Sections. O'Leary ». Mankato, (21 Minn. 65) 343 O'Leary v: Sloo, (7 La. An. 25) 291 O'Lindaj). Lathrop, (21 Pick. 292) 298 Olipliant V. Com'rs, (18 Kan. 386) 108 Oliver v. Council, (69 Ga. 165) 83 Oliver v. Memphis etc. Co., (30 Ark. 128) 397 Oliver v. No. Pao. Ky. Co., (3 Ore. 84) 352 a Oliver v. Worcester, (102 Mass. 489) 9, 143, 314, 324, 332, 330 a Olmstead v. Camp, (33 Conn. 551) 232 Olmstead v. Dennis, (77 N. T. 378) 86 Olmstead v. Mayor, (42 N. T. Super. Ct. 289) 67 OIney v. Harvey, (50 111. 453) 32, 212 Olney v. Pearce, (1 R. I. 292) 73 OIney v. Riley, (39 111. App. 401) 324, Olney v. Wickes, (18 Johns. 122) 168 Olp V. Leddick (59 Hun, 627) 142 Olson V. St. Paul, (38 Minn. 419) 355 Olwer V. Omaha, (3 Dillon, 368) 56 Omaha v. Hammond, (94 U. S. 98) 174 Omaha v. Jensen, (52 N. W. R. 833) 347 Omaha v. Olmstead, (5 Keb. 446) 103, 349 Omaha v. So. Omaha, (47 N. W. R. 1113) 53, 55 Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Brown, (46 ISr. W. K. 39) 354 Omaha Col. v. Rush, (22 Neb. 449, 35 N". W. R. 222) 271 Omaha H. R. Co. v. Cable Tramway Co., (30 Fed. Rep. 324) 302, 306 a O' Malay v. Freeport, (96 Pa. St. 24) 121, 127 O'Mally V. McGinn, (52 Wis. 353) 107 O'Meara v. Mayor, (1 Daly, 425) 92 Omslaer v. Phila. Co., (31 F. R. 354) 121 Oneida Bank v. Ontario Bank, (21 N. T. 495) 164, 169, 193 b O'Neill V. Deerfleld, (86 Mich. 610) 353 O'Neill V. Hudson County, (41 N. J. L. 161) 242 O'Neill V. New Orleans, (30 La. An. 220) 325, 342, 346, 349 O'Neill V. Register, (23 Atl. R. 960) 84 O'Neill V. West Branch, (45 N. W. R. 1023) 346 Onondaga Co. v. Briggs, (2 Denio, 26) 326 a Onset St. E. Co. v. Com'rs, (154 Mass. 395) 311 Onstott V. Murray, (22 Iowa, 466) 219 Ontario Bank v. Bunnel:., (10 Wend. 186) 267, 274 Opelousas v. Andrus, (37 La. An. 639) 148 Opening of 163d St., In re, (61 Hun, 365) 243 Orange & A. R. R. Co. v. Alexan- dria, (17 Gratt. 176) 267 Orcutt V. Kitley B. Co., (53 Me. 500) 317 O'Reilley v. Kingston, (114 N. T. 439) 259 a, 342 Oregon ». Pyle, (1 Oreg. 149) 79 Oregon & W. M. S. Bk. ■». Jordan, (17 Pac. R. 621) 397 Orford Union Cong. Soc. v. West Cong. Soc, (55 N. H. 463) 203 Orme v. Richmond, (78 Va. 86) 336 a 343 O'Rourke v. Sioux Falls, (54 N. W. R. 1044) 324, 327 a Oroville etc. ». Plumas Co. Sups., (37 Cal. 354) 186, 365 Orphan Asylum's Appeal, (111 Pa. St. 135) 264 Orr V. Baker, (4 Ind. 86) 270 Orr V. O'Brien, (77 Iowa, 253) 314 Osage V. Larkins, (19 Pac. B. 658) 223, 287 Osborn v. Danvers, (6 Pick. 98) 326 Osborn v. Hart, (24 Wis. 89, 1 Am. Rep. 161) 234 a Osborn v. Hide, (68 Miss. 45) 187 a Osborn v. Sutton, (108 U. S. 44G) 338 a Osborne v. Adams Co., (106 U. S. 181) 188 Osborne v. Detroit, (32 Fed. E. 36) 350 i; Osborne ». Mobile, (16 Wall. 479) 255,. 258 Osborne v. Nicholson, (13 Wall. 662) 184 Osborne v. Tunis, (25 N. J. L. 633) 211 Osgood V. Clark, (6 Fost. 307) 53 Osgood V. Green, (33 N. H. 318) 129 Osgood V. Manhattan Co., (3 Cow. 612) 107 Oshkosh r. State, (50 Wis. 425) 399 Oswald V. Grenet, (15 Tex. 118) 221 Oswego V. Osw. Canal Co., (6 N. Y. 257) 221, 223, 305 Otoe Co. V. Baldwin, (111 U. S. 1) 17, 28 Ottawa V. Carey, (108 U. S. 110) 110, 188 TABLE OP CASES CITED. CXXUl References are to Sections. Otta\ra v. Chicago etc., (25 111. 42) 279 Ottawa V. County, (12 111. 339) 33 Ottawa County v. Nelson, (19 Kan. 234) 259 «, 261 Ottawa V. People, (48 HI. 233) 362, 363, 377 Ottawa V. Eohrburgh, (21 Pao. E. 1061)309 Ottawa V. Seely, (65 111. 434) 352 a Ottawa V. Spencer, (36 111. 211) 259 a Ottawa V. Spruce, (40 111. 211) 248 Ottawa V. Walker, (21 111. 605) 288 Ottawa D. C. v. Law, (6 Can. Q. B. 546) 143 Ottumwa 1). Chinn, (75 Iowa, 405) 120 Ottumwa V. Parks, (43 Iowa, 119) 348 Ouachita Pack. Co. v. Aiken, (121 U. S. 444) 133 Ould V. Richmond, (23 Gratt. 464) 261, 268 Owasso ». Itichfield, (45 N. W. E. 129) 232, 240, 241 Owen B. Brockschmidt, (54 Mo. 285) 352 a Owen V. Smith, (31 Barb. 641) 41, 42 Owensboro v. Callaghan, (17 S. W. E. 278) 280 Owiugs i). Speed, (5 Wheat. 420) 31 Overacre v. Garrett, (5 Lans. 156) 72 Overseers v. New Berlin etc., (18 Johns. 382) 60, 169 Overseers v. Sears, (22 Pick. 122) 25 Overton Bridge Co. v. Tayloi-, (51 N. W. E. 240) 212 Pacific D. Seifert, (79 Mo. 210) 159 Pac. Bridge v. Clackamas, (4 Fed. E. 217) 15 Pac. Ex. Co. V. Seibert, (142 U. S. 339) 259 Pacific E. R. Co. t'. Cass County, (53 Mo. 17) 270 Pacific E. E. Go. v. Chrystal, (25 Mo. 544) 245 Pao. E. E. Co. V. Leavenworth, (1 Dillon, 393) 301, 302, 303 Pacific Eailroad ». Lincoln Co., (1 Dillon C. C. 314) 22 Pacific E. E. Co. ». Seely, (45 Mo. 212) 200 Pac. E. E. Co. V. Wyandotte Co., (16 Kan. 587) 326 a Pack V. New York, (3 N. Y. 222) 347 Packard b. Bovina, (24 Wis. 382) 180 Packard v. JefEerson Co., (2 Col. 338) 195 a Packard v. New Bedford, (9 Allen, 200) 340 Packard v. Packard, (16 Pick. 191) 346 Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, (105 U. S. 559) 133 Packet Co. v. Peoria, etc., (38 111. 467) 314 Packet Co. v. St. Louis, (100 U. S. 423) 133 Packet Co. v. St. Paul, (3 DiU. 454) 133 Paddocks v. Syraonds, (11 Barb. 112) 177, 180 Paducah etc. Co. v. Cone, (80 Ky. 147) 306 Page V. Baltimore, (34 Ind. 558) 134 Page V. Belvln, (14 S. E. E. 843) 292, 830 Page V. Bucksport, (64 Me. 51) 352 Page V. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ey. Co., (70 111. 324) 245 Page V. Chicago, (60 111. 441) 263 Page V. Clopton, (30 Gratt. 415) 360 Page V. Hardin, (8 B. Mon. 648) 85, 86 Page ». Heineberg, (40 Vt. 81) 200 Page B. Staples, (13 E. I. 306) 87 Page B. State, (11 Ala. 849) 125 Page B. St. Louis, (20 Mo. 136) 270 Page B. Sumpter, (53 Wis. 652) 352 a Paine, In re, (1 Hill, 665, 667) 372 Paine v. Boston, (124 Mass. 486) 147 Paine b. Delhi, (116 N. Y. 224) 391 Paine b. Spratley, (5 Kan. 525) 110, 270, 282 Painter B. Pittsburgh, (46 Pa. St. 213) 92, 347 Palatine b. Kruger, (12 N. E. E. 75, 121 lU. 72) 293 Palfrey b. Boston, (101 Mass. 329) 258 Pall B. Peo., (50 111. 432) 86 Pallister v. Mayor, (67 Eng. C. L. 744) 182 Palmer b. Andover, (56 Mass. 600) 351, 352 Palmer b. Carroll, (24 N. H. 314) 91 Palmer v. Lincoln, (5 Neb. 136) 347 Palmer b. Mayor, (2 Sandf. 318) 79 Palmer b. Silverthorn, (32 Pa. St. 65) 300 Palmer ». Stacy, (44 Iowa, 44) 365 Palmer v. St. Albans, (60 Vt. 427) 336 a, 350 Palmer ». Strumpf, (29 Ind. 329) 259 a, 319 Palmer b. Waddell, (22 Kan. 352) 354, 396 Palmyra ». Morton, (25 Mo. 593) 153, 241, 259 a, 279 Panton Turnpike Co. b. Bishop, (11 Vt. 198) 320 CXXIV TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Paolo etc. Co. v. Anderson Co., (16 Kan. 332) 186 Papworth v. Milw., (64 Wis. 389) 298 Para Eub. Shoe Co. v. Boston, (139 Mass. 155) 354 Paralee v. Camden, (49 Ark. 165) 122 Parcel ». Barnes, (25 Ark. 261) 190 a Pardridge v. Hyde Park, (23 N. E. K. 345, 131 111. 537) 162 Paret v. Bayonne, (39 K. J. L. 559) 142 Paris V. Graham, (33 Md. 94) 1.50 Parish v. Eden, (62 Wis. 372) 350 6 Parish v. Golden, (35 N. Y. 462) 106 Parish v. Levy, (4 So. K. 309) 268 Paris)! V. Keed, (2 Wash. St. 491) 365 Parish v. Stearns, (21 Pick. 156) 373 Parish of Plaquemines v. Fulhouze, (30 La. An. 64) 207 Park Bank v. Vv'atson, (42 N. Y. 490) 195 c Parke Co. Com'rs v. O'Conner, (86 Ind. 531) 212 Parker, In re, (120 U. S. 746) 359 Parker ». Bos. & M. R. R, (3 Cush. 107) 313 Parker v. Catholic Bishop, (34 N. E. R. 473) 308, 311 Parker ». Commonwealth, (6 Pa. St. 607) 24 Parker ». Dak. Co., (4 Minn. 59) 79 Parker v. Greene, (2 B. & S. 299) 104 Parker v. Gt. West. Ky. Co., (7 M. & G. 253) 326 a Parker v. Hubbard, (64 Ala. 203) 371 Parker v. Lowell, (11 Gray, 353) 354 Parker v. Macou, (39 Ga. 729) 120 Parker v. Milldam Co., (20 Me. 353) 239 Parker o. Portland, (54 Mich. 308) 363 Parker v. Saratoga Co., (106 N. Y. 392) 139 Parker v. Smith, (3 HI. App. 366) 185 Parker v. Truesdale, (55 JST. Y. 901) 317 Parker v. Union W. Wks., (42 Conn. 309) 120 Parker v. Williamsburgh, (13 How. Pr. 250) 176 Parkersburgh v. Brown, (106 U. S. 582) 194 a, 375 Parkersburgh v. Brown, (106 U. S. 487) 188, 194 a, 375 Parkhill v. Brighton, (61 Iowa, 103) 352 Parkhurst ». Salem, (32 Pac. 304) 302 Parks V. Boston, (8 Pick. 218) 244, 249 Parks V. Newburyport, (16 Gray, 29) 354,354 a Parmlee v. Chicago, (60 111. 267) 195 Parnaby v. Lan. Can. Co., (11 A. & E. 223) 121 Parr ». Attorney Gen'l, (8 CI. & F. 409) 105, 393 Parr v. Greenbush, (42 Hun, 232) 163 Parrott v. Bridgeport, (44 Conn. 180) 360 Parsons, In re, (54 N. Y. Super Ct. 451) 79 Parsons v. Atlanta Univ. Trs., (14 Ga. 529) 223, 396 Parsons v. Bethnal Green, (7 L. T. 211) 355 Parsons v. Goshen, (11 Pick. 396) 4, 169 Parsons v. Jackson, (99 U. S. 434) 191, 192 6 Parsons v. Lindsay, (26 Kan. 426) 352 a Parsons v. Monmouth, (70 Me. 262) 164 Parsons v. Northampton, (154 Mass. 410) 256 Parvis v. Phila. etc. Co., (17 Atl. 702) 352 Pasadena v. Simpson, (91 Cal. 238) 234 Pasadena v. Stimson, (27 Pac. R. 604) 31 Passaic Bridge Cases, (3 Wall. 782) 314 Paterson v. Society etc. (24 N. J. L. 385) 2, 62, 270, 277 Paterson etc. Co. v. Paterson, (24 N. J. Eq. 158) 302 Paterson Ry. v. Grundy, (26 Atl. 788) 302, .303 Patoka V. Hopkins, (30 N. E. R. 896) 354 a Patter v. Castleton, (53 Vt. 435) 346 Patterson v. Boston, (20 Pick. 159) 244 Patterson D. Caldwell, (1 Mete. 93) 88 Patterson ». Ind. etc. Co., (56 Ind. 20) 320 Patterson ». Miss. & E. R. Boom Co., (3 Dillon, 465) 231 Patterson v. Yubaco, (13 Cal. 175) 189 a Patton V. Cresswell, (21 N. E. 663)308 Patton V. Springfield, (99 Mass. 627) 277 Patton V. Stephens, (14 Bush, 324) 140 Patton V. Vaughan, (39 Ark. 211) 83 Paul V. Coulter, (12 Minn. 41) 128 Paul V. Detroit, (32 Mich. 108) 286 Paul V. GilflUan, (36 Minn. 298) 120 Paul V. Kenosha, (22 Wis. 266) 164 TABLE OP CASES CITED. CXXV References are to Sections. Paulsen v. Portland, (13 S. Ct. 750) 278 Pavey v. Utter, (132 111. 489) 33 Pawlet V. Clark, (9 Crancli, 292) 217 Pawton T. Co. ». Bishop, (11 Vt. 198) 318 Paxson. D. Sweet, (1 J. S. Green, 200) 156, 158, 259 a Payne v. Brecon, (3 H. & N. 579) 51 Payne v. English, (21 Pao. 952, 79 Cal. 540) 893, 39f) Payne v. Mayor etc., (3 Hurl. F. 372) 182 Payne v. MoKinley, (54 Cal. 532) 396 Peabody v. Flint, (6 Allen, 52) 379 Peachey v. Somerset, (1 Str. 447) 155 Peacock v. Harris, (10 East, 104) 320 Pearce v. Madison etc. Co. (21 How. 441) 169 Pearl Street, In re, (111 Pa. St. 565) 221 Pearsall v. Eaton, (42 N". W. Kep. 77) 311 Pearsall ». Eaton Co., (15 N. W. Rep. 522) 279 Pearsall v. Post, (20 Wend. Ill, 117, 22 Wend. 425, 433) 225, 226 Pearson ». Zable, (78 Ky. 170) 92, 347 Pease v. Cornish, (19 Me. 191) 178 Peay v. Little Rock, (32 Ark. 31) 248, 259 a Peck V. Austin, (2 Tex. 152) 129, 331 Peck V. Bellnap, (55 Hun, 91) 71 Peck V. Board, (90 Cal. 384) 369 Peck 13. Cooper, (112 111. 192) 328 Peck ». Jones, (70 Pa. St. 85) 244 Peck V. Prov. Steam Engine Co., (8 R. I. 358) 216 Peck V. Rochester, (3 K. T. Supp. 872) 71 Peck«. Sherwood, (56 N. T. 614) 259 a Peddioord b. B. etc. Co., (84 Md. 463) 303 Pedrick v. Baily, (12 Gray, 161) 87 Peete v. Morgan, (19 Wall. 581) 138 Pegram v. Cleve. Co. Comm'rs, (65 N. C. 114) 370 Pekin v. Newell, (26 HI. 320) 328, 338 Pekin v. Reynolds, (31 111. 529, 82 Am. Dec. 244) 179, 192 Pelham v. Pickersgill, (1 Term Rep. 660) 320 Pelican v. Rock Falls, (51 N. W. R. 871) 60 Pell V. Newark, (40 N. J. L. 71) 302 Pella V. Scholte, (24 Iowa, 283) 217, 312 Pembina etc. Co. v. Pennsylvania, (8 S. Ct. 737) 259 Pendergast v. Peru, (20 111. 51) 148 Pendleton v. Bank of Kentucky, (1 Mon. 177) 49 Peninsular Ry. Co. v. Howard, (20 Mich. 18) 245 Peninsular etc. Co. v. Crystal Falls, (60 Mich. 510) 217, 220 Penn Hall, In re, (5 Pa. St. 204) 104 Pennie, In re, (108 N. Y. 364) 281 Penniman's Case, (103 U. S. 714) 194 Pennington c. Baehr, (48 Cal. 565) 190 a Pennington v. Taniere, (12 Q. B. 1011) 165 Pennington v. Willard, (1 R. I. 93) 219 Pennook v. Coe, (23 How. 130) 190 Pennoyer d. McConnaugliey, (140 U. S. 1)5 Pennoyer v. Saginaw, (8 Mich. 534) 354 a Pennsylvania v. Bridge Co., (13 How. 518) 396 Pennsylvania Co. v. Rathget, (32 Ohio St. 66) 344 Pennsylvania Co. v. Stagemeier, (118 Ind. 305) 136, 331 Pennsylvania Co. v. Varnan, (15 Atl. R. 624) 352 Pennsylvania Dist. Election, (2 Par. 526) 65 Penn. etc. Co. v. Riblet, (66 Pa. St. 164) 802 Pennsylvania Globe G. L. Co. v. Scranton, (97 Pa. St. 538) 148 Penna. R. Co. v. Angel, (41 N. J. Eq. 316, 7 Atl. Rep. 432) 301 Penn. Ry. Co. v. Ayres, (14 Atl. R. 901) 216 Penn. R. Co. v. Braddock El. Ry. Co., (81 W. N. C. 311) 317 Pa. etc. Co. V. Danbridge, (8 Gill & J. 248, 310) 169 Penn. R. R. v. Duquesne Bor., (46 Pa. St. 228) 288 Pa. R. R. V. Lippincott, (116 Pa. St. 472) 330 Pa. R. R. Co. V. Marchant, (19 Pa. St. 541) 330 Penn. R. R. Co. v. McCloskey, (23 Pa. St. 526) 352 a Penna. R. R. Co; v. Mish, (4 Cent. Rep. 279) 301 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. N. Y. etc. R. R. Co., (23 N. J. Eq. 157) 239 Penn. R. Co. b. Phila. B. L. R. Co., 10 Pa. Co. Ct. 625) 302 Penn. R. R. Co. v. Pittsburgh Gr. Elev. Co., (50 Pa. St. 499) 224 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Porter, (29 Pa. St. 165) 241 CXXVl TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. X'ennsylvania E. R. Co. v. St. Loius, A. & T. H. K R. Co., (118 U. S. 290) 210 Pa. E. R. Co. V. Slv., (65 Pa. St. 210) 320 Penn. R. R. Co. v. Schuylkill Co., (166 Pa. St. 55, 8 Atl. R. 914) .306 Penn. Tp. v. Perry Co., (78 Pa. St. 457) 314 Penny Pot Landing Case, (16 Pa. St. 79)'225, 312 Penobscot v. Lawson, (16 Me. 224) 2 Penoyeri). Saginaw, (8 Mich. 534) 120 Penrose v. Erie Canal Co., (56 Pa. St. 46) 184 Pensacola v. Louisville etc. R. Co., (21 Fla. 492) 56, 61 Pensacola & A. Ry. Co. v. State, (5 S. Kep. 833, 25 Fla. 310) 150 Pentz V. iEtna Ins. Co., (9 Paige, 568) 335 Peona etc. Co. v. People, (31 N. E. R. 113) 87, 263 People V. Abbott, (45 Hun, 293) 375 People V. Adams, (9 Wend. 333) 98, 107 People ». Albany M. Col., (62 How. Pr. 220) 83 People V. Albany Co. Suprs., (12 Johns. 414) 363 Peo. V. Alb. R. R., (24 ST. Y. 261, 269) 359 People V. Albany, (11 Wend. 539, 543) 132 People V. Albertson, (55 N. Y. 50) 18 People V. Allen, (52 N. Y. 538) 189 People !). Allen, (6 Wend. 486) 76 People V. Angle, (109 N. Y. 564) 71 People V. Assessors, (1 Hill, 620) 5 People B. Assessors, (111 N. Y. 505) 14 People V. Attorney General, (22 Barb. 114) 363 People V. Auditors, (75 N. Y. 317) 339 People V. Austin, (11 Col. 134) 177 People V. Bagley, (85 Gal. 343) 42 People V. Baine, (6 Cal. 509) 82 People V. Baker, (35 Barb. 105) 368 People D. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 117 N. Y. 150) 133 People I). Bancroft, (29 Pao. R. 112) 39 People V. Bank, (1 Doug. 282) 110 People V. Baraga, (39 Mich. 534) 169 People V. Barnard, (110 K. Y. 548) 172 ' People V. Barnes, (114 N. Y. 317) 375 People V. Bartlett, (6 Wend. 422) 82 People V. Batchelor, (22 N. Y. 129) 97 People V. Batchellor, (53 N. Y. 1281 187 ' People V. Bedell, (2 Hill, 196) 75, 76 People V. Benev. Soc, (24 How. Pr 215) 84 People V. Benfield, (80 Mich. 265) 72 People V. Bennett, (29 Mich. 451, 18 Am. Rep. 107) 56 People V. Benson, (34 Barb. 24) 144, 295 People V. Blssell, (49 Cal. 407) 82 People V. Blackhurst, (25 Abb. N. 0. 230) 359 People V. Blake, (60 Cal. 497) 220 People V. Bloomington, (63 111. 207) 362, 368 People B. Bloomington, (38 111. App. 125) 360 People 1). Board, (18 Mich. 400) 374 People V. Board, (33 Barb. 344) 118 People B. Board etc., (72 N. Y. 445) 83 People V. Board, (9 Hun, 222) 83 People V. Board, (99 ST. Y. 676) 99 People I). Board, (5 N. Y. S. 392) 362 People V. Boiird, (20 iST. Y. S. 1) 359 People B. Board, (55 Hun, 445) 83, 84 People V. Board, (62 Hun, 632) 365 People B. Board, (69 Hun, 95) 294 People V. Board etc., (127 111. 613) 374 People V. Board of Canvassers, (129 N". Y. 360) 360 People V. Board of Education, (15 N. Y. S. 308) 359 People V. Board of Police, (19 N. Y. 188) 363 People ». Bond, (10 Cal. 563) 14 People V. Boston etc. Co., (70 N. Y. 569) 302 People V. Bradley, (36 Mich. 447) 55, 56 People 13. Breen, (18 Mich. 247) 368 People B. Brenhan, (3 Cal. 477) 65 People V. Brennan, (18 Abb. Pr. 100) 174 People V. Brennan, (1 Abb. Pr. N. I. 184) 79 People V. Briggs, (114 N. Y. 56) 155 People B. Briggs, (50 N. Y. 553) 9, 28 People B. Brighton, (20 Mich. 67) 241, 279 People V. Broadway Wharf Co., (31 Cal. 33) 200 People V. Brooklyn, (77 N. Y. 503) 86 People V. Brooklyn, (71 N. Y. 495) 278 People B. Brooklyn, (23 Barb. 404) 377 People ». Brooklyn, (4 N. Y. 419) 259 a, 270, 283 People B. Brooklyn, (1 Wend. 318) 242 TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXXVU References are to Sections. People V. Brooklyn, (65 N. T. 349) 306 People V. Brooklyn Assessors, (111 N. Y. 505) 271 People B. Brooklyn Council, (77 N. Y. 503) 363 People V. Brown, (2 Utah, 462) 117 People V. Bryan, (68 N. Y. 71) 121 People V. Buchanan, (1 Idaho, 681) 158 People I). Burlington, (20 Mich. 57) 249 People V. Burnside, (3 Lans. 74) 83 People ». Cain, (47 N. W. E. 484, 84 Mich. 223) 83 People V. Calhoun Co., (36 Mich. 10) 79 People V. Campbell, (50 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 82) 84 People V. Canaday, (73 N. Car. 193, 21 Am. Eep. 465) 63 People V. Canal Appraisers, (13 Wend. 355) 239 People V. Canal Board, (55 N. Y. 390) 393 People V. Canby, (55 111. 33) 75 People V. Canty, (55 111. 33) 255 People V. Carnell, (47 Barb. 329) 106 People V. Carpenter, (24 N. Y. 86) 53, 379 People V. Carrique, (2 Hill, 93) 86 People V. Carroll, (42 Hun, 438) 83 People V. Case, (19 N. Y. S. 625) 363 People V. Cass Co. Com'rs, (77 111. 438) 363 People V. Cassiday, (2 Lansing, 294) 274 People I). Cazneau, (20 Gal. 503) 76 People V. Central Pac. K. K. Co., (43 Cal. 398) 258 People V. Central P. R. K. Co., (83 Cal. 393) 282 People V. Champion, (16 Johns. 61) 368, 377 People I). Chenango Co., (11 N". Y. 563) 359 People V. Chicago etc., (67 111. 118) 306, 317 People V. Chicago, (118 111. 520) 288 People V. Chicago, (51 111. 17) 18 People V. Civ. Ser. Bd., (41 Hun, 287) 71 People V. Civ. Ser. Bd., (17 Abb. N. C. 64) 87 People V. Clark, (47 Cal. 456) 263 People V. Clark, (70 N. Y. 518) 385 People V. Clark Co., (50 111. 213) 375 People B. Clarke, (50 111. 213) 360 People V. Cline, (63 111. 394) 196 People V. Clingan, (5 Cal. 389) 77 People D. CofEey, (131 N. Y. 569) 374 People V. Coleman, (133 N. Y. 279) 273 People V. Collins, (3 Mich. 347) 161 People V. Collins, (19 Wend. 56) 363, 370, 377 People V. Com. Coun., (34 Mich. 201) 375 People V. Com. Council, (85 Cal. 369, 24 Pac. R. 727) 360 People V. Com. Counc, (78 N. Y. 39) 362 People V. Com., (45 Barb. 473) 377 People V. Com'rs, (37 IST. Y. 360) 318 People V. Com'rs, (49 IT. Y. Super. Ct. 369) 83 People V. Com'rs etc., (106 N. Y. 64) 84 People V. Com'rs, (4 N. Y. S. 41) 274 People V. Com'rs, (6 Colo. 202).368 People B. Com'rs, (11 How. Pr. 89) 368 People V. Com'rs, (4 Wall. 244) 258 People V. Com'rs, (4 Neb. 150; 313 People V. Couually, (4 Abb. Pr. N. S. 375) 87 People V. Connolly, (2 Abb. Pr. N. S. 315) 375 People V. Cook, (14 Barb. 259) 65 People V. Cooper, (57 How. Pr. 416) 83 People V. Coon, (25 Cal. 635) 12, 14 People V. Corner, (59 Hun, 299) 5 People V. Cregier, (28 N. E. Rep. 812) 125 People V. Crissey, (91 N. Y. 613) 65, 82 People V. Croton Aqueduct Bd., (26 Barb. 240) 173, 377 People I). Cummlngs, (72 IST. Y. 433) 363 People V. Cunningham, (1 Denlo, 524) 300 People V. Curley, (5 Col. 412) 18, 102 People V. Curtis, (1 Idaho N. S. 753) 82 People V. Davidson, (21 Pac. Rep. 538, 79 Cal. 166) 220, 318 People V. Dayton, (55 N. Y. 367) 16 People u. Detroit, (37 Mich. 195) 301, 319 People ». Detroit, (41 Mich. 224) 172 People V. Detroit, (18 Mich. 338) 381 People V. Detroit, (28 Mich. 228, 15 Am. Rep. 202) 170, 218 People I). Doe, (36 Cal. 220) 271 People V. Doolittle, (44 Hun, 293) 84 People V. Draper, (15 N. Y. 543) 18, 89 People V. Drolin, (33 N. Y. 269) 79 People V. Duane, (55 Hun, 315) 75 CXXVUl TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. People V. Duane, (121 N. Y. 367) 86 People 15. Dulany, (96 111. 203) 360 People V. Dunlap, (66 N. T. 162) 87 People V. Dui-stor, (3 N. Y. Sup. 522) 71 People V. Dutchess etc. Co., (58 N. Y. 152) 306, 369 People V. Bast Sag., (33 Mich. 164) 87 People V. Eddy, (43 Cal. 333) 270 People V. Edmonds, (15 Barb. 529) 359, 360 People V. El Dorado, (11 Cal. 170) 177 People ». Erwin, (4 Den. 129) 122 People V. Evans, (18 111. 361) 102 People D. Everett, (1 Cal. N. Y. 8) 369 People V. Fairbury, (51 111. 149) 371, 87 People V. Farnhara, (35 111. 562) 31, 32 53 People V. Field, (58 N. Y. 491) 9, 11 People V. Fire Com'rs, (49 N. Y. Su- per. 369) 87 People V. Fire Com'rs, (73 N. Y. 437) 83 People V. Fire Com'rs, (77 IST. Y. 15.3) 84 People ». Fitzsimmons, (68 N. Y. 514) 76 People V. Flagg, (16 Barb. 503) 87 People V. Flagg, (17 N. Y. 584) 172 People V. Flagg, (46 N. Y. 401) 15 People V. Fletcher, (55 N. y. 525) 383 People V. Fleming, (10 Colo. 553) 15 People V. Flynn, (62 ]Sr. Y. 375) 83 People ». Ft. Wayne etc. Co., (92 Mich. 522) 302 People V. Fort Street etc. Co., (41 Mich. 413) 306 People V. French, (51 N. Y. 345) 71 People D. French, (32 Hun, 112, 60 How. Pr. 377) 83 People V. French, (63 Hun, 633) 83 People V. French, (13 N. Y. S. E. 584) 111 People V. French, (12 Abb. N. Cas. 156) 365 People V. French, (24 Hun, 263) 55, 371 People ». Fowler, (63 Hun, 627) 300 People V. Fulda, (52 Hun, 65) 123 People V. Gartlaud, (42 K. W. R. 687) 385 People V. Gates, (43 N. Y. 40) 258 People V. Gilbert, (18 Johns. 227)312 People V. Gilmore, (5 Gilra. 242) 359 People V. Gilon, (24 N. E. R. 944) 279 People?). Gilroy, (22 N. Y. S. 271, 67 Hun, 323) 295 People V. Goetling, (133 N. Y. 569) 361 People V. Gold Run D. Min. Co., (56 Am. Kep. 80) 121 People V. Gray, (23 Cal. 125) 179 People V. Green, (58 N^. Y. 295) 86 People V. Green, (5 Daly, 254, 58 N. Y. 295) 86 People V. Greene Co., (12 Barb. 222) 368 People V. Griswold, (2 N. Y. Super. Ct. 351) 311 People V. Hagadorn, (10 X. E. E. 891, 104 N. Y. 516) 263 People V. Hall, (80 ST. Y. 117) 105, 381 People V. Hammill, (22 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 39) 189 a People V. Hanifan, (96 HI. 420) 86 People V. Hanrahan, (75 Mich. 611) 122 People V. Hannan, (56 Hun, 469) 84 People V. ^arper, (91 111. 357) 127 People V. Harper, (18 N. Y. S. 896) 365 People V. Harris, (4 Cal. 9) 141 People V. Hartwell, (12 Mich. 508) 380 People V. Harvey, (58 Cal. 337) 65 People V. Haws, (34 Barb. 69) 79 People !). Hayden, (10 N. Y. Supp. 794) 83 People V. Hayden, (6 Hill, 359) 247 People V. Hayden, (133 N. Y. 198) 83 People V. Hayt, (66 N. Y. 607) 368 People V. Head, (25 111. 287) 371 People V. Henshaw, (61 Barb. 409) 189 People V. Henshaw, (18 Pac. R. 413) 34 People V. Herbel, (96 111. 384) 218 People V. Higgius, (15 111. 110) 83 People V. Higgins, (3 Mich. 233) 65 People V. Highland Park, (50 N. W. R. 660, 88 Mich. 653) 18, 86 People V. Hill, (7 Cal. 79) 15, 83 People V. Hilliard, (29 111. 413) 368, 371 People V. Hills, (35 N. Y. 449) 28 People V. Hillsdale, (2 Johns. 190) 384 People V. Holden, (28 Cal. 123) 381 People V. Holihan, (29 Mich. 116) 55 People V. Holmes, (2 Wend. 281) 72 People V. Hopson, (1 Denio, 574) 88 People V. Horn Sil. Nl. Co., (11 N. E. R. 155) 259 People V. Hurlbut, (24 Mich. 44) 9, 255 People V. Hyde Park, (117 111. 462) 376 TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXXIX References are to Sections. People V. Ingei-soll, (58 jST. Y. 1) 9, 11, 12 People V. Inspectors, (4 Mich. 187) 359, 363 People V. Irwin, (4 Den. 129) 122 People V. Jackson, (92 111. 444) 376 People V. Jackson, (8 Midi. 110) 117 People V. Jackson, (7 Mich. 432) 222, 300 People V. Jaehne, (103 N. Y. 182) 34 People V. James, (16 Hun, 426) 299 People V. Jobs, (7 Colo. 589) 67 People V. Johnson, (39 Am. Rep. 63) 177, 375 People V. Johnson, (6 Cal. 499) 189 a People V. Jones, (6 Mich. 176) 215, 223 People V. Jordan, (90 N. Y. 53) 83 People V. Judge, (40 Mich. 64) 278 People B. Judges, (4 Cow. 73) 368 People V. Justices, (74 N. Y. 406) 104 People V. Keeling, (4 Col. 129) 65 People V. Kelly, (5 Ab. X. C. 383) 15 People V. Kelsey, (34 Cal. 470) 255 People V. Kerr, (27 N". Y. 188) 303 People V. Kilduff, (55 111. 402) 361 People V. Kildufi:, (15 HI- 492) 381 People 13. Kimball, (4 Mich. 95) 245 People B. Kingston etc., (23 Wend. 193) 320 People V. Klumpke, (41 Gal. 263) 221 People B. Kniskern, (54 N. Y. 52) 241 People V. Lacorabe, (99 N. Y. 43) 96 People V. Lacombe, (34 Hun, 409) 82 People B. Lamblier, (5 Denio, 9, 19) 221 People B. Langdon, (40 Mich. 673) 67 People B. Langham, (20 Barb. 302) 371 People B. La Salle, (84 111. 303) 362 People B. Lathrop, (24 Mich. 235) 170 Peoples. Launtz, (113 111. 137) 76 People V. Law, (34 Barb. 494) 303 People ». Lawrence, (6 Hill, 244) 115 People B. Leonard, (73 Cal. 230) 74 People B. Lewis, (7 Johns. 73) 91 People B. Lippincott, (67 111. 333) 79 People B. Logan Co., (63 111. 374) 368 People B. Logan Co., (45 111. 162) 186 People B. Loomis, (8 Wend. 396) 65 People B. Lord, (9 Mich. 227) 81 People V. Lowber, (7 Abb. Pr. 158) 394 People B. Lowell, (9 Met. 144) 377 People B. Lowndes, (130 N. Y. 455) 258 People B. Love, (19 Cal. 676) 47, 49 People B. Lynch, (51 Cal. 15) 16, 17, 18,259 a Peo. V. Maher, (19 N. Y. Sup. 759) 368 ix People B. Mahoney (13 Mich. 481) 18 People B. Mallory, (46 How. Pr. 281) 133 Peo. V. Man. Gas Co., (45 Barb. 136) 363 People B. Manhattan Ey. Co., (22 Abb. N. C. 393) 377 Peo. !). Manistee, (40 Mich. 585) 79 People B. Martin, (5 N. Y. 27) 95, 97 People B. Martin, (131 N. Y. 196) 362 People B. Mathewson, (47 Cal. 442) 65 People B. Matteson, (17 111. 167) 65, 361 People B. Mauran, (5 Denio, 389) 202 People B. May, (9 Col. 404, 411) 189 a People B. Maynard, (15 Mich. 463, 470) 29, 31 People V. Mavor, (2 Hill, 9) 105 Peo. B. Mayor etc. (19 Hun, 441) 84 People B. Mayor, (82 N. Y. 491) 83 People B. Mayor etc., (4 Comst. 419) 16 People B. Mayor etc., (7 How. Pr. E. 81) 158 People B. Mayor etc. of Brooklyn, (4 N. Y. 419) 259 a Peo. V. McCall, (65 How. Pr. 442) 56 People B. McClare, (25 N. E. E. 1047, 123 ISr. Y. 512) 84 People B. McClintock, (45 Cal. 11) 119 People B. McCreery, (34 Cal. 432) 270 People B. McDonald, (69 N. Y. 362) 280 People o. McKinney, (52 N. Y. 374) 18 Peo. B. McKinney, (10 Mich. 54) 67 People B. McLean, (16 N. Y. S. 401) 362 People B. McLean, (62 Hun, 42) 86 People B. McLean, (57 Hun, 587, 141, 58 Hun, 603, 59 Hun, 623, 58 Hun, 604) 83 People B. McLean, (21 K. Y. Sup. 625) 83 People V. MoEoberts, (62 111. 38) 245 People B. Mead, (24 N. Y. 124) 191 6 People V. Metro. Pol. Brd. (26 N. Y. 216) 368 People B. Miller, (24 Mich. 458) 85 Peo. B. Mich. Univ. Eeg., (4 Mich. 98) 363 Peo. V. Miller, (24 Mich. 458) 85 People B. Minck, (21 N. Y. 639) 107 People B. Mitchell, (35 N. Y. 551) 187 a People B. Moline, (14 N. E. E. 32) 271 Peo. B. Molineaux, (53 Barb. 9) 76 People B. Moore, (50 Hun, 356) 217 People B. Morgan, (90 111. 558) 18 People B. Morgan, (55 N. Y. 587) 185 exxx TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. People V. Morris, (13 Wend. 325) 2, 18, 23, 32 People V. Morse, (43 Cal. 534) 14 People V. Mott, (1 How. Pr. K. 247) 106 People V. MulhoUand, (19 Hun, 548, 82 N. T. 324) 118, 123 People V. Murray, (73 ST. Y. 535) 42, 86 Peo. V. Murray, (70 N. Y. 521) 67, 76 Peo. V. Murray, (57 Mich. 396) 107, 148 People V. Mut. Gaslight Co., (38 Mich. 154) 384 People V. Myers, (32 N. E. R. 241) 279 People V. Nearing, (27 N. Y. 306) 234 People V. Nevada, (6 Col. 14.3) 53 People V. Newton, (112 N. Y. 396) 302, 360 People V. N. & S. etc., (86 N. Y. 1) 317 People V. N. Y. Pol. Board, (107 N. Y. 235) 360 People ». New York, (3 Johns. Cas. 79) 371 People V. New York, (1 Hill, 362) 167 People V. New York, (9 Abb. Pr. 253) 394 People V. New York, (82 N. Y. 491) 83 People ». N. Y. Gas L. Co., (64 Barb. 55) 120 People V. N. Y. Sup., (32 N. Y. 473) 360 People V. N. Y. Tax Com'rs, (82 N. Y. 462) 274 People V. N. Y. Tax Com'rs, (95 N. Y. 554) 270 People V. Nichols, (68 N. C. 429) 67 People D. Nicliols, (79 N. Y. 582) 84 People V. Nichols, (58 How. Pr. 200) 84 People V. Nolan, (102 N. Y. 539) 85 People V. No. Ch. Ey. Co., (88 111. 537) 380 People V. North, (72 N. Y. 124) 65, 381 People V. Nostrand, (46 N. Y. 375) 67, 86, 88 People V. Nyland, (41 Cal. 129) 102 People V. Oakland, (92 Cal. 611) 385 People V. O'Brien, (111 N. Y. 1) 10, 11, 37, 302 People ». Ogdensburgh, (48 N. Y. 390) 272, 275 People V. Ohio Grove, (51 111. 192) 186 People ». O'Keefe, (21 Pao. E. 539, 79 Cal. 171) 221 People V. O'Neil, (109 N. Y. 251) 33 People V. Paoheco, (27 Cal. 175) 189 a People ». Page, (23 Pac, E. 761) 33 People V. Palmer, (52 N. Y. 83) 99 People i). Parker, (3 Neb. 409) 86 People V. Parks, (58 Cal. 624) 188 People V. Pearson, (3 Scam. 274) 368 People V. Phillips, (1 Denio, 388) 66 People V. Pinckney, (32 N. Y. 377) 67, 75 People V. Pol. Com'rs,( 98 N. Y. 332) 84 People V. Pol. Com'rs, (31 Hun, 209) 84 •People V. Pol. Justice, (7 Mich. 458) 105 People V. Porter, (87 N. Y. 68) 18 People V. Porter, (6 Cal. 26) 86 People V. Potter, (35 Cal. 110) 30 People V. Power, (25 111. 187) 12 People B. Piatt, (115 N. Y. 159) 69 People V. Pratt, (50 Cal. 561) 12 People V. President, (9 Wend. 351) 24,31 People V. Provines, (34 Cal. 520) 102 People V. Pueblo Co., (2 Colo. 360) 186 People V. Purviance, (12 111. Ap. 216) 371 People V. Kailroad, (12 Mich. 389) 110 People V. Ransom, (2 N. Y. 490) 368 People V. Eansom, (56 Barb. 514) 87 People ». Eeed, (22 Pac. E. 474, 81 Cal. 70) 221 People V. Eeed, (20 Pac. R. 708) 219 People V. Eeed, (19 N. Y. S. 528) 273 People V. Reirt, (11 Colo. 138) 76, 81 People V. Registrar, (20 N. E. R. 611) 371 People B. Rensselaer etc., (15 Wend. 113) 314 People B. Reynolds, (10 HI. 1) 24 People V. Eich. Co. Sup., (28 N. Y. 112) 369 People V. Richardson, (4 Cow. 101, 122, 133) 378 People V. Eiordan, (41 N. W. R. 482) 361, 378 People V. Riverside, (11 Pac. 759, 70 Cal. 461) 24 People B. Eobb, (27 N. E. E. 267) 83 People V. Eobb, (6 N. Y. S. 831) 84 People B. Rochester, (21 Barb. 656) 278 People V. Eochester, (45 Hun, 102) 127 People V. Eochester, (5 Lans. 142) 280 People V. Eontey, (21 N. Y. St. Eep. 173, 4 N. Y. Supp. 235) 123 People V. Rosenberg, (138 N. Y. 410) 301 People V. Runkel, (9 John. 147) 49, 81,88 TABI-E OF CASES CITED. CXXXI Beferences are to Sections. People ». Ryan, (27 N. E. E. 1095) 270 People V. Salem, (20 Mich. 477) 244 253 People V. Salmon, (51 111. 17) 15, 271 People 1). Salmon, (38 Miss. «52) 24 People V. Salomon, (46 111. 415) 359, 371 People V. Salomon, (51 111. 37) 255 People V. San F. Sups., (27 Gal. 655) 191 People V. San Francisco, (36 Cal. 594) 363 People V. San Luis, etc., (56 Cal. 561) 377 People V. Sara. R. R. Co., (15 Wend. 130) 314 People V. Sargent, (8 Cow. 139) 122 People V. Sassovich, (29 Cal. 480) 88 People V. Sawyer, (52 N. Y. 296) 189 People V. Schermerhorn, (19 Barb. 540, 555) 206 People V. Seaman, (5 Denio, 409) 65 People V. Sen. Com. Pleas, (2 Wend. 264) 365 People V. Shearer, (30 Cal. 645) 271 People V. Sheffield, (47 Hun, 481) 69 People V. Shepherd, (36 N. T. 285) 18 People ». Slaughter, (2 .Doug. 834) 104 People V. Smith, (77 N. Y. 347) 364 People «. Smith, (21 TST. Y. 595) 23, 232, 240 People V. Solomon, (51 lU. 37) 28 People V. Spring Valley, (129 111. 169) 385 People V. Squire, (145 U. S. 175) 16 People V. Squire, (107 N. Y. 593) 297, 319 People V. Stacks, (33 Hun, 384) 84 People V. State, (19 Mich. 392) 363 People v. Herman, (10 N. Y. S. 787) 249 Peoples V. Stephens, (71 N. Y. 557) 173 People V. Stephens, (62 Cal. 209) 295 People V. Stevens, (5 Hill, 616) 65, 88 360 People V. Stevens, (51 How. Pr. 103) 75 People V. St. Louis & S. F. Ey., (47 Hun, 543) 369 People V. Stout, (23 Barb. 349) 24 People V. Stowell, (9 Abb. N. C. 456) 76 People V. Stratton, (28 Cal. 382) 67 People V. Stuart, (97 111. 123) 245 People V. Sturtevant, (9 N. Y. 263) 10 People V. Super's, (12 Wend. 257) 79 People V. Super's El Dorado Co., (11 Cal. 175) 190 a People V. Supervisors, (27 Cal. 655) 165 People V. Super's, (47 Cal. 205) 371 People V. Supervisors, (38 Mich. 421) 375 People V. Supervisors of Saginaw, (26 Mich. 22) 254 People V. Supervisor, (1 Hill, 362) 79 People V. Supervisors, (4 Barb. 64) 377 People V. Supervisors, (70 N. Y. 228) 16 People V. Supervisoi's, (11 Abb. Pr. R. 114) 349 People V. Swift, (31 Cal. 26) 170 People V. Taylor, (45 Barb. 129) 371 People ex rel., etc. v. Tazewell Coun- ty, (22 111. 151) 192 6 People V. Thacher, (55 N. Y. 525) 361 People V. Therrien, (80 Mich. 187) 84 People V, Thompson, (16 Wendell, 655) 378, 382 People «. Thompson, (94 N. Y. 451) 84 People V. Throop, (12 Wend. 183) 150 People D. Tieman, (30 Barb. 193) 85 People V. Town of Oran, (121 111. 650) 67 People V. Tracy, (1 Denio, 617) 363 People V. Troy etc., (37 How. Pr. 437) 359 People V. Trustees, (7 N. Sup. 125) 371 People V. Trustees of Schools, (86 111. 613) 59, 360 People V. Vail, (20 Wend. 12) 361 People V. Van Cleve, (1 Mich. 362) 371 People V. Vanderbilt, (26 N. Y. 287) 11, 300, 301, 396 People V. Van Flyck, (4 Cow. 297) 361 People V. Van Home, (18 Wend. 518) 82 People 1). Van Nort, (64 Barb. 205) 172 People V. Vantassel, (40 N. W. R. 847) 375 People V. Wagner, (49 N. W. 609, 86 Mich. 594) 123, 146 People V. Waite, (70 111. 25) 378, 380 People V. Walker, (23 Barb. 304) 99 People V. Walker, (9 Mich. 328) 106 People V. Wajlace, (4 N. Y. Supr. Ct. 438) 279 People ». Warfleld, (20 111. 163) 24 People V. Warren, (14 HI. Ap. 176 cxxxu TABLE OP CASES CITED. References are to Sections. People V. Waterford etc. Co., (3 Abb. 580) 328 People V. Waterford etc. Co., (2 Keyes, 327) 328 People V. Waynesville, (88 111. 469) 186 People V. Weber, (89 111. 347) 75, 165, 281 People V. Weissenbach, (60 N. Y. 385) 126 People V. Wemple, (129 N. T. 558) 273 People V. Wemple, (30 ST. E. R. 1002, 133 N. Y. 607) 326 a People V. Wharf Co., (31 Gal. 34) 133 People V. Whitcomb, (55 lU. 172) 381, 391 People V. White, (24 Wend. 520, 540) 88, 96 People V. Wliite, (59 Barb. 666) 106 People V. Whitlock, (92 N. Y. 191) 83 People V. Whitman, (10 Cal. 38) 75 People B. Whittemore, (4 Mich. 27) 365 People V. Whyler, (41 Cal. 351) 270 People V. Wiaut, (48 111. 263) 24, 189 People V. Wilber, (15 N. Y. S. 435) 28 People V. Willsea, (60 N. Y. 507) 28 People V. Wilson, (15 HI. 389) 102 People V. Wilson, (62 Hun, 618) 300 People B. Wilson, (72 N. C. 155) 82 People V. Witherell, (14 Mich. 48) 82, 105 People V. Wood, (7 Cal. 579) 14 People B. Wood, (35 Barb. 653) 360 People B. Wood, (71 N. Y. 371) 178 People V. Woodruff, (32 N. Y. 355) 76 People V. Works, (7 Wend. 486) 153 People B. Worth, (58 Hun, 455) 124 People V. Wren, (4 Scam. 275) 2, 8, 24,37 People V. United States, (93 HI. 30, 34 Am. Kep. 155) 258 People V. Yates Co., (40 HI. 126) 368 People B. Young, (38 HI. 490) 68 People's Gaslight Co. v. Jersey City. (40 N. J. L. 297) 144 People ex rel. v. City of Butte, (4 Mont. 174) 22, 23 People ex rel. Com'rs v. Detroit, (28 Mich. 228) 15 People ex rel. McLean v. Hagg, (46 N. Y. 401) 259 a People ex rel. Mills v. Jones, (7 Col. 475) 33 People Jfat. Bk. v. Pomona, (28 P. 1089, 48 Kan. 55) 188, 189 People E. K. b. Memphis E. R, (10 Wall. 38) 113, 165, .302 Peoria v. Johnson, (56 111. 52) 310. 391 Peoria v. Kidder, (26 lU. 351) 248, 259 a Peoria B. Ass'n v. Loomis, (20 111. 235) 352 a Pepper, In re, (11 Pa. Co. Ct. E. 257) 49 Pepper v. City, (114 Pa St. 96) 342 Pequinot v. Detroit, (16 Fed. E. 211) 346 Perdue^. Chinquaconsy, (25 Up. Can. Q. B. 61) 355 Perdue v. Ellis, (18 Ga. 586) 125, 280 Perin v. Carey, (24 How. 465) 200 Ferine v. Forbush, (32 Pac. 226) 281 Perkins b. Corbin, (45 Ala. 103) 79 Perkins b. Fayette, (68 Me. 152) 351 Perkins v. Inhabitants, (68 Me. 152) 346 Perkins v. Eailroad, (44 K H. 223) 107 Perkins v. Slack, (86 Pa. St. 283) 16 Perkins v. Washington Ins. Co., (4 Cow. 645) 51 Perkins v. Weston, (3 Gush. 540) 373 Perkinson v. St. Louis, (4 Mo. App. 322) 165 Perley b. Georgetown, (7 Gray, 464) 338 Perot V. Mann, (12 Phila. 353) 79 Perrin b. N. Y. etc., (36 N. Y. 120) 221, 286 Perrine v. Farr, (22 N. J. L. 356) 278 Perrine v. Twp., (48 Mich. 641) 377 Perry b. Cheboygan, (55 Mich. 250) 79,87 Perry v. Little Book, (32 Ark. 31) 259 a PeiTy V. New Orleans etc. Co., (55 Ala. 413) 220, 224, 301, 302 Perry v. Ontario, (23 U. C. Q. B. 391) 164 Perry v. Superior City, (23 Wis. 64) 169 Perry v. Wilson, (7 Mass. 395) 232 Perry v. Washburn, (20 Cal. 318) 282 Perry b. Worcester, (6 Gray, 544) 92, 353, 354 Perry Co. v. Conway Co., (12 S. W. Eep. 887) 60 Ferryman b. Greenville, (51 Ala. 510) 32 Peru B. Bearss, (55 Ind. 576) 61 Peru V. French, (55 HI. 818) 352 a Peru V. Gleason, (91 Ind. 566) 113, 327 Peru & I. E. E. Co. v. Hanna, (68 Ind. 562) 259 Peru Iron Co., In re, (7 Cow. 540, 552) 200 Pesterfleld v. Vickers, (3 Golden, 205) 150, 337 TABLE OP CASES CITED. References are to Sections. CXXXIU Peter v. Blue, (40 Kan. 727) 380 Peters v. Fergus Falls, (35 Minn. 549) 355 Peters v. Lindsborg, (40 Kan. 654, 20 Pac. 490) 92, 324 Peters v. London, (2 Up. Can. Q. B. 543) 154 Peters v. Lynchburg, (76 Va. 927) 256 Peters v. Mayor, (8 Hun, 405) 92 Peters v. State, (9 Ga. 109) 325 Petersburg v. Metzger, (21 111. 205) 110, 154 Petersburgh v. Applegrath, (28 Gratt. 321) 325, 336 a Petersburg!! v. Mappin, (14 111. 193) 142 Petersiler v. Stone, (119 Mass. 465) 88 Peterson ». Mayor etc. of N. Y., (17 N. Y. 449) 51, 128, 144, 164, 165 Petition of Concord, (50 N". H. 530) 311 Petition of Mt. Washington Road Co., (35 N. H. 134) 233, 245 Pettengill v. Yonkers, (22 N. E. R. 1095, 116 N. Y. 558) 324 Pettigrew i\ Evansville, (25 Wis. 223) 238, 239, 354, 3o4 a Pettis V. Johnson, (56 Ind. 139) 120 Petty V. Tooker, (21 N. Y. 267) 66 Petz V. Detroit, (54 N. W. 644) 327 Peyser v. Metro. El. R. R., (13 Daly, 122) 305 Peyser ». New York, (70 N. Y. 497) 326, 327 Pfan ». Reynolds, (53 111. 212) 350 Pfeffevlee v. Lyon, (39 Kan. 432) 329 Pfister 13. State, (82 Ind. 382) 362 Phelan v. New York, (119 N. Y. 86) 174 Phelps e. Hawley, (3 Lans. 164) 315 Phelps B. Lewiston, (15 Blatchf. 131) 195 Phelps V. Mankato, (23 Minn. 276) 346 Phelps V. New York, (112 N. Y. 216) 172, 263, 326 a Philbrick v. P14,oe, (55 N. W. R. 345) 300 Philadelphia v. Ball, (10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 92) 292 Philadelphia v. Coulston, (13 Phila. 182) 131 Philadelphia Cit. Pass. Ry. Co., (10 Pa. Co. Ct. 16) 302 Philadelpliia v. Dibeler, (147 Pa. St. 243, 23 Atl. R. 567) 292 Philadelphia v. Dyer, (41 Pa. St. 463) 243 Philadelphia v. Eastwick, (35 Pa. St. 75) 259 a Philadelphia v. Ehret, (153 Pa. St. 1) 292 Philadelphia ». Elliott, (3 Rawle, 170) 203 Philadelphia v. Flanigan, (47 Pa. St. 21) 169 Philadelphia ». Fox, (64 Pa. St. 169) 206 Philadelphia v. Freid, (58 Pa. St. 320) 2,8 Philadelpliia b. Germantown Pass. R. Co., (10 Phila. 165) 234 Phila. V. Given, (60 Pa. St. 136) 85 Philada. v. Greble, (38 Pa. St. 339) 283 Philadelphia v. Jewell, (21 Atl. R. 239, 140 Pa. St. 9) 169 Philadelphia v. Lombard etc. Co., (3 Grant, 403) 302 Philadelphia v. Miller. (49 Pa. St. 440) 279 Philadelphia ». Mon. Co., (147 Pa. St. 243, 23 Atl. R. 400) 292 Philadelphia v. Penu. Hospital, (22 Atl. R. 744, 143 Pa. St. 367) 270 Phila. V. Phila. etc., (58 Pa. St. 253) 208, 312 Philada. v. Randolph, (4 W. & S. 514) 292, 329, 354 Philadelphia v. Ry. Co., (28 W. N. C. 106) 28 Philadelphia ». Ridge Av. etc. Co., (143 Pa. St. 444) 302 Philadelphia v. Phila., W. & B. R. R. Co., (.33 Pa. St. 41) 259 o Philadelphia v. Rule, (93 Pa. St. 15) 259 a Philadelphia v. Smith, (23 W. N. C. , 242)350 6 Philadelphia v. Thomas, (25 Atl. R. 888) 279 Philada. v. Tryon, (35 Pa. St. 401) 259 a, 277, 283 Philadelphia v. Wistar, (35 Pa. St. 427) 278, 283 Philadelphia etc. Co., Appeal of, (15 Atl. R. 476) 317 Philada. etc. Co. v. Bowers, (4Houst. 506) 136 Philadelphia etc. Co. v. Hummell, (44 Pa. St. 375) 337 Philada. et. Stark Co., (5 Ohio, 204) cxlii TABLE OP CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Reynold's Heirs u. Stark County Oom'rs etc., (6 Ohio, 204) 200, 208, 226 Rhea v. Newport etc. Co., (50 Fed. 16) 314 a Rhine ». McKinney, (53 Tex. 354) 240, 245 Ehineheck E. R, In re, (67 N. Y. 242) 242 Rhines v. Clark, (51 Pa. St. 96) 104 Ribordy v. Pellachond, (28 111. App. 303) 354 a Eice V. Des Moines, (40 Iowa, 638) 189 a, 350 a, 352 Rice V. Evansvjlle, (108 Ind. 7) 354, 355 Eice V. Foster, (4 Harring. 479) 161 Eice V. Montpelier, (19 Vt. 470) 342, 352 Eice V. Newport etc. Co., (32 W. Va. 164)48 Rice V. Smith, (9 Iowa, 570) 371 Eice V. State, (3 Kan. 141) 104, 117 Rice V. Wellman, (5 Ohio Cir. Ct. E. 334) 236 Eice B. & F. Co. v. Worcester, (130 Mass. 575) 363 Rice etc. v. Worcester, (130 Mass. 575) 377 Eich V. Errol, (51 N. H. 350) 190 a Eich V. Mentz Tp., (134 U. S. 632, 18 Fed. Eep. 52) 189 Eich V. Minneapolis, (35 N. W. R. 2) 293 Richards v. Clarksburg, (30 W. Va. 491) 100, 110 Richards v. Com'rs, (120 Mass. 401) 377 Richards v. Daggett, (4 Mass. 539) 59, 67 Richards v. Oshkosh, (51 N. W. 256) 344 Richards ». Supervisors, (69 Iowa, 612) 190 Eichardson b. Com'rs, (9 So. E. 351) 234 Eichai-dson v. Heydenfeldt, (46 Cal. 68) 263 Richardson v. Eoyalton & W. T. -Co., (6 Vt. 496) 353 Richardson v. Scott etc. Co., (22 Cal. 150) 167 Eichardson v. Vermont Central R. E. Co., (25 Vt. 465) 239 Richland Co. v. Lawrence Co., (12 111. 8) 2, 8, 59, 67 Richmau v. Muscatine Co., (77 Iowa, 513) 26, 278 Richmond v. Courtney, (32 Gratt. 792) 352 a Richmond v. Daniel, (14 Gratt. 387)256 Richmond v. Davis, (103 Ind. 449) 395 Richmond v. Dudley, (129 Ind. 112) 121, 130, 146 Richmond v. Henrico, (83 Va. 204) 119 Richmond u. Long, (17 Gratt. 375) 9, 92, 324, 336 a Richmond v. McGirr, (78 Ind. 192) 110 Richmond v. Mulholland, (116 Ind. 173) 352 Richmond v. Munic, (8 Up. Can. Q. B. 567) 169 Richmond v. Richmond R. Co., (21 Gratt. 604) 2, 8, 270 Richmond etc. Co. v. Middletown, (59 jST. Y. 228) 113, 295, 296 Richmond etc. Co. v. Richmond, (96 U. S. 521) 136, 302, 303 Richmond etc. Co. v. Reidsville, (101 N. C. 404) 261, 326 a Richmond R. R. Co. v. Louisa. R. E. Co., (13 How. 71) 238, 302 Richmond & A. R. R. Co. v. Lvncli- burg, (81 Va. 473) 259 a Ricket V. Metrop. Ey. C. L. R., (2 H. L. 175) 307, 330 Ricketts v. Mayor, (67 How. Pr. 320)67 Ricketts v. Spraker, (77 Ind. 371) 379 Riddle v. Bedf. Co., (7 S. & E. 386) 73, 79, 85, 88 Riddle v. Locks and Canals, (7 Mass. 169) 37 Riddle v. Merrimac etc. Prop., (7 Mass. 169) 325, 339 Rideout b. Sch. Dist., (1 Allen, 232) 95 Eidgeway ». West, (60 Ind. 371) 120 Ridley v. Dougherty, (42 N. W. E. 78) 371 Ridley b. Lamb, (10 Up. Can. Q. B. 254) 300 Riggs V. Brewer, (64 Ala. 282) 79 Riggs V. Detroit Bd. of Ed., (27 Mich. 262) 226, 308 Riggs V. Johnson City, (6 Wall. 166) 369 Riker b. Leo, (115 N. Y. 93) 49 Riley v. Kansas City, (31 Mo. App. 439) 79, 85 Riley v. Rochester, (9 N. Y. 64) 201 Rindge b. Colrain, (11 Gray, 157) 352 Ring !). Cohoes, (77 N. Y. 83)325,342 Eiug V. Johnson County, (6 Iowa, 265) 51, 192 6 Ringling b. Kohn, (4 Mo. App. 63) 191 Ripley B. Gelston, (9 Johns. 201) 326 a Ripon B. Bittel, (30 Wis. 614) 350 !>, 352 a Ripon V. Joint Sch.Dis., (17 Wis. 83) 327 TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. cxliii Risley v. St. Louis, (34 Mo. 404) 279 Rison V. Farr, (24 Ark. 161) 184 Ititcliie V. Boynton, (114 Mass. 431) 127 Ritchie v. Franklin Co., (22 Wall. 6'() 187 Rittenhouse v. Mayor etc., (25 M. & C. 336) 174 River Rendering Co. v. Behr, (77 Mo. 91) 120, 150 Rivers v. Augusta, (67 Ga. 376, 23 Alb. L. J. 17) 331 Rives V. Wood, (15 S. W. R. 131) 320 Road Case, (17 Pa. St. 71, 75) 98 Road in Bethlehem Twp., In re, (10 Atl. R. 122) 399 Road in Milton, (40 Pa. St. 400) 288 Roake v. Am. Tel. & T. Co., (41 N. J. Eq. 35) 297 Roanoke City v. Berkowitz, (80 Va. 616) 245 Roanoke G-. Co. v. Roanoke, (14 S. E. R. 665) 292, 296, 328 Roaring Brook, In re, (21 Atl. R. 412, 28 W. N. C. 141) 249 Robb V. Indianapolis, (38 lud. 49) 152 Kobbins v. Chicago, (4 Wall. 657) 348 Kobbins v. Johns, (15 C. B. N. S. 221, 243) 348 Robbins v. Milw. & H. R. R. Co., (6 Wis. 636) 245 Robert v. Saddler, (104 N. Y. 229, 58 Am. Rep. 498) 293 Roberts, Ex parte, (11 S. W. R. 782) 288 Roberts v. BoUes, (101 U. S. 123) 191 b Roberts ». Brown Co. Com'rs, (21 Kan. 247) 245 Roberts v. Chicago, (26 411. 249) 113, 239, 329 Roberts v. Easton, (19 Ohio St. 78) 302 Roberts v. Davidson, (83 Ky. 279) 371 Roberts ». Rivers, (27 III. 242) 371 Roberts v. Williams, (13 Ark. 555) 279, 398 Robertson b. Breedlove, (61 Tex. 316) 395 Robertson v. Campbell, (13 F. C. 61) 120 Robertson v. Grove, (4 Oreg. 8) 87 Robertson v. Lambertville, (38 N. J. L. 69) 158 Robertson ». Wabash etc. Co., (84 Mo. 119) 306 Robie V. Sedgwick, (35 Barb. 319) 31 Robinson's Case, (131 Mass. 376) 69- Robinson, Ex parte, (12 Nev. 263) 259 Robinson, Ex parte, (17 S. W. R. 1057) 120 Robinson v. Benton Co., (49 Ark. 49) 90, 102 Robinson v. Burlington, (50 Iowa, 240) 327 Robinson v. Butte Co. Sup., (43 Cal. 353) 362 Robinson v. Chamberlain, (34 N. Y. 389) 325 Robinson v. Dodge, (18 Johns. 351) 263 Robinson v. Dunn, (77 Cal. 473) 79 Robinson v. Evansville, (87 Ind. 334) 92 Robinson v. Greenville, (42 Ohio St. 625) 331 a Robinson v. Jones, (14 Fla. 256) 379 Robinson v. Lane, (19 Ga. 337) 42 Robinson u. Leavitt, (7 N. H. 100) 190 a Robinson v. Mayor, (1 Humph. 156) 125 Robinson v. Rohr, (73 Wis. 436) 92, 328 Robinson v. St. Louis, (28 Mo. 488) 130, 163 Robinson v. Shanks, (20 N. B. R. 713, 118 Ind. 125) 354 Robinson v. Swope, (12 Bush, 21) 234 a Robinson v. White, (26 Ark. 139) 79 Roby V. Chicago, (64 111. 447) 160 Rochdale Can. Co. v. Radcliffe, (18 Q. B. 287) 312 Rochefort v. Attleboro, (27 N. E. R. 1013)3506 Rochester v. Collins, (12 Barb. 559) 118 Rochester v. Erickson (46 Barb. 92) 396 Rochester v. Lee, (15 Sim. 376) 47 Rochester u. Montgomery, (72 N. Y. 65) 348 Rochester v. Randall, (105 Mass. 295) 72 Rochester v. Rush, (80 N. Y. 302) 271 Rochester Water Co., In re, (66 N. Y. 413) 144 a, 238 a Rochester W. Lead Co. v. Rochester, (3N. Y. 462) 325, 336 a, 355 Rock Creek v. Strong, (96 U. S. 271) 196 Rockford v. Tripp, (83 111. 247) 342, 343 Rockford v. Hilderbrand, (61 111. 155) 346 Rockford d. Russell, (9 111. App. 229) 342 Rockingham Sav. Bk. v. Portsmouth, (52 N. H. 17) 397 cxliv TABLE OF CASES CITED. Eeferences are to Sections. Rock Island etc. c. U. S., (4 Wall. 435) 349, 382, 3?4 Rock Island ». Cuinely, (26 111. App. 173) 29 Rockwell V. Nearing-, (33 N. T. 302) 129 Rodemaoher v. Milw. etc. Co., (41 Iowa, 297) 302 Roe V. City, (100 Mo. 190, 13 S. W. R. 404) 346 Roffignac Street, In re, (4 Rob. 357) 242 Rogers, In re, (7 Cow. 526) 97, 99, 369 Rogers Ave., In re, (22 N. Y. S. 27, 29 A. N. C. 361) 259 a Rogers v. JJuffalo, (123 N. Y. 173) 71 Rogers v. Burlington, (3 Wall. 362) 184 Rogers v. Greenbush, (58 Me. 390) 326 Rogers v. Jacobs, (11 S. W. R. 513) 65 Rogers v. Jones, (1 Wend. 227) 127 Rogers v. Lee Co., (1 Dillon, 529) 177 Rogers v. People, (68 111. 154) 375 Rogers v. People, (9 Col. 450) 117 Rogers v. Shirley, (74 Me. 144) 350 6 Rohmeiser v. Bannon, (22 S. W. R. 27)308, 311 Rolfs, In re, (30 Kan. 758) 104 Roll V. Augusta, (32 Ga. 328) 113, 329 Roll V. Indianapolis, (52 Ind. 547) 328 Rome V. Addison, (34 N. H. 306) 239 Rome B. Anderson, (89 Tenn. 259) 53 Rome B. Cabot, (28 Ga. 50) 119 Rome V. Jenkins, (30 Ga. 154) 218, 243, 247 Rome V. McWilliams, (67 Ga. 106) 261, 266 Rome V. Omberg, (28 Ga. 46) 292, 329 Romeo v. Cbapman, (2 Mich. 179) 50 Roodhouse c. Jennings, (29 111. Ap. 50) 165, 177 Rooney v. Randolph, (128 Mass. 580) 344, 350 6 Roosevelt v. Goddard, (52 Barb. 533) 133 Roosevelt Hosp. v. New York, (84 N. Y. 108) 270 Root ». Shields, (Woolw. C. 0. 340) 25 Roper V. McWhorter, (77 Va. 214) 134, 208, 393 Ropin V. Laurinburg, (90 N. C. 427) Rosborough v. Boardman, (67 Cal. 116) 82 Rose V. Bostyer, (22 Pac. Rep. 393) 310 ' Rose V. City of Bridgeport, (17 Conn. 243) 190 Rose V. Hardee, (98 N. C. 44) 32 Rose V. St. Charles, (49 Mo. 509) 103 Rose V. Turnpike Co., (3 Watts, 46) 38 Rosenbaum, In re, (6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 184) 281 Rosenbaum v. Bauer, (120 U. S. 461) 359 Ross V. Georgia etc. Co., (12 S. E. E. 101) 247 Ross V. Lane, (3 S. & M. 695) 360 Ross V. Madison, (1 Ind. 281) 108 Ross V. Phila., (115 Pa. St. 222) 92 Ross B. Stackhouse, (114 Ind. 200) 173 Ross V. Thompson, (78 Ind. 90, 96) 396 Rothermel v. Meyerle, (136 Pa. St. 250, 26 W. N. C. 422) 259 Rothschild b. Carney, (9 B. C. 391) 191 Rothschild b. Darien, (69 Ga. 503) 146 Rouede b. Jersey City, (18 Fed. Rep. 719) 195 d Rounds B. Mumford, (2 R. I. 154) 292, 329 Rounds B. Stratford, (26 Up. Can. C. B. 11) 342 Rounds B. Stetson, (45 Me. 596) 129 Rountree b. Galveston, (42 Tex. 613) 259 Rowans Exr. b. Portland, (8 B. Mon. 253) 133, 225 Rowe B. Kern, (72 Cal. 353) 79 Rowe B. Portsmouth, (56 N. H. 291) 325, 355 * Rowell B. Williams, (29 Iowa, 210) 338 a Rowland b. Gallatin, (75 Mo. 184) 92, 338 Rowland b. Kalamazoo, (49 Mich. 553) 336 a Rowland ». Mayor etc., (83 N. Y. 372) 67 Rdwley v. London etc. Co., (L. K. 8 Ex. 221) 352 a Rowlsby B. Speer, (31 K. J. L. 351) 354 a Royal St., In re, (16 La. An. 393) 278 Royster b. Granville, (98 N. C. 148) 177 Roxbury v. Boston etc. Co., (6 Gush. 424) 302 Rozell B. Anderson, (91 Ind. 591) 355 Rozell B. Andrews, (103 N. Y. 150) 220 TABLE OP CASES CITED. Keferences are to Sections. cxlv Rubey v. Shain, (54 Mo. 207) 185, 397 Eucker v. Supervisor, (7 W. Va. 661) 79 Rudolphe v. New Orleans, (11 La. An. 242) 332 Eudsill V. State, (40 Ind. 485) 377 KufE V. Phillips, (50 Ga. 130) 120 Ruggles V. Collier, (43 Mo. 359) 113 Ruggles V. Fond du Lao, (53 Wis. 436) 326 a Ruggles V. Nantucket, (11 Cush. 433) 239, 335 Ruggles V. Nevada, (63 Iowa, 185) 350 6 Ruhlman v. Commonwealth, (5 Binn. 26) 249 Ruland v. South Newmarket, (59 N. H. 291) 220 Rule V. Tait, (38 Kan. 765) 79 Ruraball v. Metropolitan Bank, (2 Q. B. Div. 194) 191 Rumsey v. Campton, (16 N. H. 567) 66, 69 Rundle ». Baltimore, (28 Md. 356) 399 Bundle v. Del. etc. Can. Co., (1 Wall. Jr. 275) 2 Rung V. Thoneber, (2 Watts, 23) 312 Runnels v. State, (Walk. 146) 83 Runyan 13. Coster's Lessee, (14 Pet. 122) 201 Runyon v. Bordine, (2 J. S. Green, 472) 300 Ruohs o. Athens, (18 S. W. R. 400)8 Rushtown V. Burke, (43 N. W. R. 815) 326 Riishville ». Adams, (107 Ind. 124) 342 Rushville v. Town, (32 111. App. 320) 33 Rushville G. Co. v. Rushville, (23 N. E. R. 72, 121 Ind. 206) 99, 123 Russ V. Mayor etc., (12 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 38) 152 Russell V. Canastota, (98 N. Y. 496) 346 Russell V. Chicago, (22 111. 182) 76 Russell V. Columbia, (74 Mo. 480) 331 a, 349, 350 Russell V. Mayor etc. of N. Y., (2 Denio, 461) 239 Russell V. Muldraugh, (13 Bush, 307) 320 Russell V. New Haven, (51 Conn. 259) 268 Russell V. New York, (2 Denio, 461) 335, 338 a Russell V. Tate, (13 S. W. R. 130, 52 Ark. 541) 393 Russell V. Wellington, (31 N. E. R. 630) 65 Russellville, Ex parte, (11 So. Rep. 18) 125 Rutherford's Case, (72 Pa. St. 82, 13 Am. Rep. 655) 236 Rutherford v. Halley, (105 N. Y. 632) 355 Rutherford v. Hamilton, (97 Mo. 543) 97, 259 a Rutherford v. Taylor, (38 Mo. 315) 216, 229 Rutland v. Dayton, (60 111. 58) 306 Rutland E. L. Co. v. Marble, (26 Atl. R. 635) 297 Ruttle V. Covington, (10 S. W. Rep. 644) 306 Rust V. Lowe, (6 Mass. 90) 238 Ryan v. Coldwater, (26 Pac. R. 675) 164 Rvan V. Copes, (11 Rich. 217) 120 Ryan v. Curi-an, (64 Ind. 345) 347 Ryan v. Hoffman, (26 Ohio St. 109) 377 Ryan v. Reynolds, (53 111. 212) 348 Ryan v. Wilson, (87 N. Y. 471) 348 Ryce V. Osage, (55 N. W. R. 532) 165, 169 Ryohlicke v. St. Louis, (11 S. W. R. 1001) 355 Ryohlicke v. St. Louis, (98 Mo. 491) 354 a Ryder «. Railroad Co., (13111.523) 31 Ryerson v. Brown, (35 Mich. 333) 232 S. Saak 1). Philadelphia, (1 Pa. Leg. Gaz. Rep. 259) 98 Sackett, etc. Streets, In re, (74 N. Y. 95) 259 a, 301 Sackett v. New Albany, (88 Ind. 473) 175, 395 Sacramento v. Crocker, (16 Cal. 119) 261 Sacramento v. Kirk, (7 Cal. 449) 165 Sadler, In re, (21 Atl. 978) 56 Sadler ». Evans, (4 Burr, 1984) 85 Sadler!). Laugham, (34 Ala. 311) 234 a Sage V. Brooklyn, (89 N. Y. 189) 247 Saginaw Gasl. Co. v. Saginaw, (28 Fed. Rep. 529) 144, 144 a St. Charles v. Meyer, (58 Mo. 86) 117 St. Charles v. Nolle, (51 Mo. 122) 152, 300 St. Charles v. O'Malley, (18 111. 407) 148 St. Charles v. Stewart, (49 Mo. 132) 87 , St. Clair Co. etc. v. Illinois, (96 U. S. 63) 318 St. Edward's Col. v. Morrison, (82 Tex. 1) 270 cxlvi TABLE OF CASES CITED. Keferences are to Sections. St. Helena v. Burton, (35 La. An. 521) 72 St. John 15. Mayor, (6 Duer, 315) 128 St. Jobnt). MoFarlan, (33 Mich. 72)130 St John !). New York, (3 Bosw. 483) 129, 300 St. Johnsbnry ». Thompson, (59 Vt. 300) 110, 124 St. Joseph V. O'Donoghue, (31 Mo. 345) 259 a St. Joseph V. Owen, (19 S. "W. E. 713) 259 d 2*77 St. Joseph V. Rogers, (16 Wall. 666) 184, 187 a St. Joseph etc. Co. v. Buchanan Co., (39 Mo. 485) 186 St. Joseph etc. E. E. Co. v. Callender, (18 Kan. 496) 232 St. Joseph etc. Co. v. Cudmore, (15 S. W. R. 535) 245 St. Joseph etc. Co. v. Sliambaugh, (106 Mo. 557) 241, 245 St. Joseph Township v. Eogers, (16 Wall. 644) 24 St. Louis V. Alexander, (23 Mo. 483) 24, 32, 148, 254 St. Louis V. Allen, (13 Mo. 400) 53, 55, 56, 276 St. Louis V. Armstrong, (56 Mo. 298) 170 St. Louis V. Bank, (49 Mo. 574) 147 St. Louis V. Bentz, (11 Mo. 61) 117 St. Louis V. Boffinger, (19 Mo. 13, 15) 147 St. Louis V. Brewing Co., (9 S. W. E. 910, 96 Mo. 497) 397 St. Louis V. Cafferata, (24 Mo. 94) 117, 134 St. Louis V. Clemens, (36 Mo. 467) 113, 278, 281 St. Louis V. Consolidation Coal Co., (20 S. W. E. 699) 259 St. Louis V. Davidson, (102 Mo. 149) 126 St. Louis V. Fitz, (53 Mo. 582) 158 St. Louis V. Foster, (52 Mo. 513) 148 St. Louis V. Franks, (78 Mo. 41) 243 St. Louis D. Gas Co., (5 Mo. App. 484) 164 St. Louis V. Green, (7 Mo. App. 468) 368 St. Louis J). Grove, (46 Mo. 574) 124 St. Louis V. Gurno, (12 Mo. 414) 292 St. Louis V. Jackson, (25 Mo. 37) 128 Salamanca v. Wilson, (109 U. S. 671) 370 ' Salem v. East. E. Co., (98 Mass. 431) . 120 Salem v. GoUer, (76 Ind. 291) 352 Ssfliim Lyceum v. Salem, (27 N. E. E. 67a) 270 Salem M. Soc. v. Salem, (29 N. E. R 584) 270 Salem W. Co. v. Salem, (5 Oreg. 30) 189 a Salina v. Prosper, (27 Kan. 544) 350 Saline Co. v. Anderson, (20 Kan. 298) 79, 85 Saline v. Wilson, (61 Mo. 237) 177 Salisbury v. Hercbenroder,(106 Mass. 548) 300, 345 Salisbury v. Philada., (44 Pa. St. .303) 164 Sailer v. Brown, (67 Mich. 422) 398 Salmon v. Haynes, (50 N. J. L. 97) 98 Salter v. Beed, (15 Pa. St. 260) 283 Salt Lake City v. Hollister, (118 U. S. 256) 169, 338 Salt Lake City v. Wagner, (2 Utah, 400) 125 Saltenstall v. Baulker, (8 Gray, 195) 120 Salvin v. No. Brance. C. Co., (L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. 467) 120 Sammelson v. Cleveland etc. Co., (49 Mich. 164) 347 Sammis v. King, (40 Conn. 298) 79, 85 Sammons v. Holloway, (21 Mich. 162) 258 Sampson v. Justice, (5 Gratt. 241) 223 Sams 1). Toronto, (9 U. C. Q. B. 181) 49 Samuel v. Nashville, (3 Sneed, 298) 226 San Antonio v. Lewis, (15 Tex. 388) 108, 165, 229 San Antonio v. Meharty, (96 U. S. 315) 191 6, 196 San Antonio v. Stumburg, (7 S. W. E. 754) 226 San Benito Co. v. E. E. Co., (19 Pac. E. 827, 77 Cal. 518) 268 Sanborn v. Minneapolis, (35 Minn. 314) 217 Sanborn v. Scb. Dist., (12 Minn. 17) 310 Sanbomton v. Tilton, (55 IST. H. 603) 67 Sanders v. Eeiske, (1 Dak. 151) 348, 352 Sanders v. Provisional Municipality, (24 Pla. 226) 55 Sanderson v. Balston, (20 La. Ann. 312) 66 Sandford v. Boyd, (2 Cranoh, 79) 67 San Diego v. Granniss, (77 Cal. 510) 53 Sands v. Edmunds, (116 U. S. 58S) 373 Sands v. Eichmond, (31 Gratt. 571) 259 a TABI.K OF CASES CITED. cxlvii References are to Sections. Sandford v. Augusta, (32 Kan. 536) 340, 352 a Sandford v. Prentice, (28 Mo. 358) 189 Sandwich v. Dolan, (24 N. E. R. 526) 352 San Francisco ». Calderwood, (31 Cal. 585) 200, 218 San Francisco v. Canavan, (42 Cal. 541) 220 San Francisco v. Certain Real Estate, (42 Cal. 517) 17 San Francisco v. Hazen, (5 Cal. 169) 99 San Francisco v. HoUiday, (76 Cal. 18) 219 San Francisco v. Itzell, (80 Cal. 57) 308 San Francisco v. McGinn, (67 Cal. 110) 268 San Francisco etc. v. Oakland, (43 Cal. 502) 172 San Fran. Gas Co. b. San Francisco, (9 Cal. 452) 170 Sangamon County v. Springfield, (63 111. 66) 8, 67, 164 Sanger ». Kennebec Co., (25 Me. 291) 363 Sanger v. Rice, (43 Kan. 580) 282 San Jose v. Reed, (65 Cal. 241) 246 San Jose v. San J. & S. C. R. R. Co., (53 Cal. 476) 261 San Jose etc. Co. ». Mayne, (83 Cal. 563, 23 Pac. R. 522) 246 San Leandro v. Le Breton, (72 Cal. 170) 226 San Luis Obispo v. Haskin, (91 Cal. 549) 189 San Luis Obispo v. Pettit, (87 Cal. 499) 255 San Mateo Co. ■». So. Pac. etc., (8 Sawyer, 238) 279 Sansom ». Mercer, (68 Tex. 488) 362 Santa Cruz ». Enright, (30 Pac. R. 197) 232 Santa Rosa v. Coulter, (50 Cal. 537) 56 Santee ». Allegheny, (10 Pitts. Leg. J. 241) 194 a Santo B. State, (2 Iowa, 165) 161 Sappington v. Scott, (14 Md. 40) 82 Sargent u. Cornish, (54 X. H. 18) 202 Sargent 0. Lynn, (138 Mass. 599) 350 b Satterlee v. Matthewson, (2 Pet. 380) 187 Satterlee v. San Francisco, (23 Cal. 214) 211 Sauerhering ». Iron Ridge etc. Co., (25 Wis. 447) 189 gaulet V. New Orleans, (10 La. An. 81) 217, 22X Saulsburg v. Ithaca, (94 N. Y. 27) 327, 346 Sault St. Marie Co. v. Dusen, (40 Mich. 429) 170 Saunders ». Lawrence, (141 Mass. 380) 75 Saunders v. McLin, (1 Ired. L. 572) 267 Saunders v. Municipality, ( 24 Fla. 226) 15 Saunders v. Owen, (2 Salkeld, 247) 76 Sauter v. N. T. Cent. etc. Co., (66 N. Y. 50) 352 a Savage v. Bangor, (40 Me. 176) 344 Savage v. Gulliver, (4 Mass. 178) 398 Savage M. Pickard, (514 Lea, 46) 79, 85 Savannah v. Charton, (36 Ga. 460) 123 Savannah ti. Cullens, (38 Ga. 334) 336 a Savannah v. Dickey, (33 Mo. App. 522) 29 Savannah v. Donnelly, (71 Ga. 258) 331 o, 350 Savannah v. Feeley, (66 Ga. 31) 326 a Savannah v. Hartridge, (8 Ga. 23) 122 Savannah v. Hussey, (21 Ga. 80) 102 107 Savannah D. Jesup, (106 U. S. 563) 267 Savannah v. Spears, (66 Ga. 304) 355 Savannah b. State, (4 Ga. 26) 314 Savannah b. Steamboat Co. of Ga., (R. M. Charlt. R. 242) 217 Savannah b. Waldner, (49 Ga. 324) 345 Savannah etc. Co. b. Shields, (33 Ga. 601) 302 Savannah etc. b. Savannah, (45 Ga. 602) 302, 304, 306 Savannah & Memphis R. R. Co. v. Lancaster, (62 Ala. 563) 191 Savings Ass. B. Topeka, (3 Dillon C. C. R. 376) 27 Savings Bank b. Davis, (8 Conn. 191) 165 Savings Fd. So. v. Philadelphia, (31 Pa. St. 175) 2, 8 Sawmill Run Bridge, (85 Pa. St. 247) 259 a Sawyer, In re, (124 U. S. 300) 96, 361, 393 Sawyer b. Alton, (4 111. 130) 260 Sawyer b. Concordia, (12 Fed. Rep. 754) 14, 187 Sawyer b. Davis, (136 Mass. 239) 301 Sawyer b. Corse, (17 Gratt. 230): 67, 92 Sawyers. Northfield, (7 Cush, 490) 315, 400 cxlviii TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Saxton B. Beach, (50 Mo. 488) 28 Saxton V. St. Joseph, (60 Mo. 153) 96, 164,336 a Sayles v. Davis, (22 Wis. 225) 258 Saylor v. Harrisburg, (87 Pa. St. 216) 338 a Sayre ». Phillips, (24 Atl. Kep. 76) 121, 256 Scammou v. Chicago, (25 111. 424) 256, 279, 347 Scammon v. Scammon, (28 N. H. 429) 106 Scanlon v. New York, (12 Daly, 81) 350 6 Scarborough, Ex parte, (12 S. E. K. 666) 361 SohaefBer v. Sandusky, (33 Ohio St. 246) 344 SohafEer v. Cadwallader, (36 Pa. St. 126) 375 Schaidt v. Bland, (66 Md. 141) 396 Schattner v. Sanderf ur, ( j3 Mo. 162) 327 Schehr v. Board, (83 Mich. 367) 361 Scheimer v. Price, (65 Mich. 638) 217 Schell V. L. M. Rurasey M. Co., (39 Mo. App. 264) 165 Schell V. Plumb, (55 N. T. 592) 352 a Schell City v. Rumsey, (39 Mo. Ap. 264) 165 Sohenck v. Play, (1 Woolw. 175) 99 Schenectady v. Furman, (15 N. T. S. 724, 61 Hun, 171) 354 Schenectady B. Ti-ustees, (21 N. T. S. 147, 66 Hun, 179) 259 a, 292 Schenley v. Commonwealth, (36 Pa. St. 29) 17 Schlass V. Hewlett, (81 Ala. 266) 79 Sohlieder v. Dielman, (10 So. R. 934) 10,40 Schlomberg, Ex parte, (11 So. E. 721) 24 Schmidt, Ex parte, (24 S. C. 367) 104 Schmidt v. Steans, (34 Minn. 112) 170 Schneider v. City, (40 N. W. R. 329) 329 Schneider v. Jacob, 5 South West. Rep. 350) 221 Schneider v. Miss. Pac. Ry. Co., (29 Mo. App. 68) 354 a Sohnitzins v. Bailey, (22 Atl. E. 409) 354 Schomer v. Rochester, (15 Abb. K. C. 57) 353 School Com. V. Dean, (2 Stew. & Port. 190) 25 School Dist., In re, (10 Pa. Co. Ct., 588)3 k Sch. Dist. V. Atherton, (12 Met. 105) 81, 95, 106 School Dist. V. Blakeslee, (13 Conn. 227) 48, 95, 106 School Dist. 15. Fogleman, (76111. 189) 177 School Dist. V. Ins. Co., (103 U. S. 707) 27 School Dist. B. Lord, (44 Me. 374) 106 School Dist. V. Richardson, (23 Pick. 62) 67 School Dist. V. Stough, (4 Neb. 357) 177 School Dist. etc. v. Tapley, 1 Allen, 49) 288 School Dist. B. Williams, (38 Ark. 454) 92 School Dist. B. Xenia Bank, (19 Neb. 89) 190 a School Dist. No. 4 b. Gage, (39 Mich. 484) 80 Schooliield v. Lynchburg, (78 Va. 366) 256 School I. of Monticello b. Kendall, (72 Ind. 208) 167 School Trs. r,. People, (63 111.299)255 Schoonraaker b. Ref. Prot. Dutch Church, (5 How. 265) 2 Sohonholii b. Jackson, (97 Mo. 151, IDS. W.-R. 618)352 Schrever v. Livingston, (9 Mo. 196) 365 Schriber b. Langdale, (66 Wis. 616) 38, 67 Schuchards v. People, (99 HI. 501) 69 Schuchardt n. New York, (53 N. Y. 202) 248 Sohultes B. Eberley, (2 So. R. 345) 255 Schultze B. Milwaukee, (49 Wis. 2bi) 331 Schumacher u. Taberman, (56 Cal. .508) 17, 18 Schumm v. Seymour, (24 N. J. Eq. 143) 100, 173, 397 Schurmeier v. St. Paul etc. R. R. Co., (10 Minn. 82) 215, 302 Schuster b. State, (48 Ala. 199) 117 Schuylkill Co. b. City Gas Co., (23 Atl. 1055) 273 Schwartz b. Flatboats, (14 La. An. 243) 263 Schwartz u. Oshkosh, (55 Wis. 490) 148 Schwarz b. Barry, (51 N. W. R. 279) 86 Schweitzer b. Liberty, (82 Mo. 309) 125 Scioto etc. B. Lawrence, (38 Ohio St. 41) 302, 396 Scofield B. Lansing, (17 Mich. 437) 263 Scott V. Alexander, (23 S. C. 120) 395 Scott B. Chicago, (1 Biss. 510) 353 TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. cxlix Scott V. Davenport, (34 Iowa, 208) 189 a Scott V. Firth, (4 P. & F. 349) 120 Scott !). Hansheer, (94 Ind. 1) 186 Scott V. Manchester, (2 H. & N. 204) 336 Scott V. Mayor, (37 Eng. L. & E. 495) 324 Scott V. Mayor, (1 H. & W. 59) 92 Scott V. Montgomery, (95 Pa. St. 444) 343 Scott B. People, (33 N. E. R. 180) 279 Scott ». Phila., (81 Pa. St. 80) 279 Scott V. Shreveport, (20 Fed. Rep. 714) 110 Scotland Co. v. Hill, (132 V. S. 107)' 186, 195 c Scott Tp. V. Montgomery, (95 Pa. St. 444) 352 a Scovill V. Cleveland, (1 Ohio St. 126, 135) 32, 69, 248, 259 a Scovill V. Geddings, (7 Ohio, part 2, 211, 329 Scranton etc.. In re, (113 Pa. St. 176) 18 Scranton v. Catterson, (94 Pa. St. 202) 336 a Scranton v. Hills, (102 Pa. St. 378) 348 Scranton r>. Patterson, (94 Pa. St. 202) 3506 Scranton v. Steele Co., (154 Pa. St. 171) 396 Scudderi). Hinshaw, (33 N. E. R. 791) 300 Scudderi). Trenton Del. Falls Co., (1 Saxt. 694) 232, 240 Scully and O'Leary, In re, (11 Chi. Leg. News, 27) 104 Seagraves v. Alton, (13 111. 366) 164 Seale v. Mitchell, (5 Cal. 403) 102 Searles ». Chattaheochee Co., (41 Ga. 225) 325 Seaman v. New York, (80 N. Y. 239) 328, 336 a Seaman v. Patten, (2 Gaines, 312) 9 Seamen's Hospital v. Liverpool, (4 Ex. 180) 156 Searcy v. Yarnell, (1 S. W. R. 319, 47 Ark. 269) 164 Searles v. Abraham, (73 Iowa, 507) 395 Sears t). West, (1 Murph. 291) 123, 261 Seattle v. Buzby, (2 Wash. Ter. 25) 347 Seattle v. Doran, (32 Pac. R. 105) 282 Seattle v. Yerter, (1 Wash. Ter. 576) 282 Seattle etc. Co. v. State, (5 Wash. St. 807) 398 Sebert ». Alpena, (43 N. W. R. 1098) 324 Second Av. M. E. Church, In re, (66 N. Y. 395) 270 Second Nat. B/k. v. Lansing, (1 Mich. 181) 177 Secord v. Gt. Western Ry. Co. (15 U. C. Q. B. 631) 352 a Secretary of the Int. v. McGarraham, (9 Wall. 298, 313) 370 Sedgwick Co. v. Bunker, (16 Kan. 498) 60, 67 Sedgwick Co. v. Dailey, (11 Kan. 631) 15, 28, 67 Seebold v. Shitler, (34 Pa. St. 133) 201 Seele v. Deering, (79 Me. 343) 338 Seeley ». Litchfield, (49 Conn. 134) 344, 346 Seely ». Pittsburgh, (82 Pa. St. 360, 22 Am. Rep. 760) 56 Seers et. al. v. West, (1 Murphy, 291) 123 Seibert v. Lewis, (122 U. S. 284) 14, 369 Seifert v. Brooklyn, (101 N. Y. 136) 328, 355 Seiple V. Elyobeth, (27 N. J. L. 407) 111 Selby V. Portland, (14 Oreg. 243) 79 Selden v. Jacksonville, (10 So. 457, 28 Fla. 558) 292, 329 Selleck v. Com. Council, (40 Conn. 359) 105, 381 Seller u. Phillips, (37 111. App. 74) 261 Sellers v. Corwallis, (5 Oreg. 237) 90 Selliman v. Railroad Co., (27 Gratt. 119) 191 b Selma etc., Ex parte, (45 Ala. 696) 194 a, 377 Salma v. Perkins, (68 Ala. 145) 32, 339 Selma v. Selma Press & W. Co., (67 Ala. 430) 268 Semmes v. Columbus, (19 Ga. 471) 163 Semple v. Mayor etc., (62 Miss. 63) 92, 355 Seneca Falls v. Zalinski, (8 Hun, 571) 348 Seneca R. Co. v. Auburn etc., (5 Hill, 170) 318 Serrill v. Philadelphia, (32 Pa. St. 355) 56, 259, 276 Serrot v. Omaha, (1 Dil. C. C. li. 312) 350 a Sessions v. Boyken, (78 Ala. 328) 360 Sessions v. Crunkleton, (20 Ohio St. 349) 259 a Severin v. Eddy, (52 111. 189) 348 cl TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Sewall V. Sewall, (122 Mass. 156) 66 Sewall ». St. Paul, (20 Minn. 511) 92, 256, 259 a, 279, 326, 338, 347 Sewer Street, (8 Pa. Co. Ct. B. 22 i) 290 Sewickley Bor. v. Sholes, (118 Pa. St. 165) 271 Sexton 1). Chicago, (107 111. 323) 173 Sexton V. St. Joseph, (60 Mo. 153) 92 Sexton V. Zett, (44 N. T. 430) 348 Seybel ». Kat. Currency Bank, (54 N. Y. 288) 191 Seybert ». Pittsburgh, (1 Wall. 372) 183, 254 Seymour i>. Cummins, (119 Ind. 148) 354, 355 Seymour v. Tacoma, (32 Pac. K. 1077) 150 Shackford v. Newington, (46 ST. H. 415) 139 Shauklin v. Madison Co., (21 Ohio St. 575) 142 Shadier v. Blair, (136 Pa. St. 488) 15 Shaffer «. Welch, (34 Kans. 595) 279 Shaffner v. St. Louis, (31 Mo. 264) 240 Shanley v. Brooklyn, (30 Hun, 396) 67 Shannon v. Bruner. (36 Fed. Rep. 147) 80 Shannon v. O'Boyle (51 Ind. 565) 208 Sharp, In re, (56 N. Y. 257) 278 Sharp V. Duuavau, (17 B. Mon. 223) 56, 276 Sharp B. Johnson, (4 Hill, 92) 270, 278, 282 Sharp V. Mayor, (40 Barb. 256) 78, 92 Sharp V. Spier, (4 Hill, 76) 241, 256 Sharpless v. West Chester, (1 Grant, Cas. 257) 245 Sharpless v. Mayor, (21 Pa. St. 147) 184 Sharon Iron Company b. Erie, (41 Pa. St. 341) 208 Sharrett's Road, (8 Pa. St. 92) 286 Shartle v. Minneapolis, (17 Minn. 308) 223, 352 a Shattuck 1). Woods, (1 Pick. 175) 79 Shaubut V. St. Paul etc., (21 Minn. 502) 301 Shaver ». Starrett, (4 Ohio St. 494) 245 Shaw V. Allegheny, (7 Atl. 770) 326 a Shaw t>. Charlestown, (3 Allen, 538) 247 Shaw V. Crocker, (42 Cal. 435) 329 Shaw V. Kennedy, (Term R. 158) 155 Shaw V. Mayor etc., (21 Ga. 280, 25 Ga. 590) 372 Shaw V. Mayor, (19 Ga. 468) 85 Shaw V. Norfolk etc. Co., (5 Giay, 180) 187 Shaw 1). Pickett, (26 Vt. 486) 282 Shaw V. Pima Co., (18 Pac. E. 272) 79 Shaw V. Sun Prairie, (74 Wis. 105) 350 6 Shaw V. Trenton, (49 N. J. L. 339) 172 Shaw V. Waterbury, (46 Conn. 263) 350 6 Shawangunk Kill Br., In re, (100 N. Y. 642) 220 Shawnee Co. v. Carter, (2 Kan. 115) 177 Shawnee Co. v. Topeka, (.39 Kan. 197. 18 Pac. 161) 314, 315, 353 Shawueetown v. Mason, (82 HI. 337) 330 Shay, In re, (15 N. Y. 488) 365 Shea i). Lowell, (8 Allen, 136) 344 Shea V. Milford, (145 Mass. 528) 99 Shea V. Ottumwa, (67 Iowa, 39) 220 Shea V. Potrero, (44 Cal. 414) 302, 321 Sheboygan v. Parker, (3 Wall. 93)67 Shed V. Hawthorne, (3 Neb. 179) 396 Sheehan v. Edgar, (58 N. Y. 631) 352 a Sheehan v. Gleasou, (46 Mo. 100) 263 Sheehan J). Good Sam. Hosp., (50 Mo. 155) 270 Sheehy ». Jersey City, (78 Mo. 107) 330 Sheehy v. Kan. City etc. Co., (94 Mo. 574) 330 Sheel I'. Appleton, (49 Wis. 125) 330 a Sheffield ». Andress, (56 Ind. 157) 182 Sheffield v. Watson, (3 Caines, 60) 169 Sheffield Sell. Townsp. v. Andress, (56 Ind. 157) 165 Shehau v. Gleason, (46 Mo. 100) 113 Shelby ». Daggett, (22 N. E. R. 497) 350 6 Shelby Co. v. Deprez, (87 Ind. 509) 92, 360 Shelby Co. v. Cumberland & C. K. R. Co., (8 Bush, 299) 12 Sheldon v. Kalamazoo, (24 Mich. 383) 92, 338 Sheldon v. W. U. T. Co., (51 Hun, 091) 352 Sheley J). Detroit, (45 Mich. 431) 264 Shell house v. State, (110 Ind. 509, 513) 219 Shelly V. St. Charles Co., (30 Fed. Rep. 603) 375 Shelton v. Birmingham, (62 Conn. 456) 330 Shelton D. Mobile, (30 Ala. 540) 290 TABLE OF CASES CITED. Beferences are to Sections. cli Sliepard ». People, (40 Mich. 487) 120 Shepardsou v. Colerain, (13 Met. 55) 346 Sheperdson v. Gillett, (31 N. E. R. 788) 397 Shephard v. Lawrence, (141 Mass. 479) 79 Sherbourne v. Fisk, (8 Cusli. 264) 91 Sherbourne ». Tuba Co., (21 Cal. 113) 92, 325, 332 Sheridan v. Fitchburg, (131 Mass. 523) 281 Sherlock jj. Bainbridge, (41 Ind. 35) 132 Sherlock u. Winuetka, (59 111. 389) 87, 395 Sherman v. Brick, (32 Cal. 241) 234 a Sherman c. Carr, (8 li. I. 431) 115 Sherman v. Clark, (4 Nev. 138) 359 Sherman u. Kane, (86 N. Y. 57) 220 Sherman v. Cartright, (52 Barb. 567) 342 Sherman v. Langham, (30 Ara.. City Council, (2 Const. R. 726) 102, 104 Shuman v. City of Ft. Wayne, (26 ]Sr. E. Rep. 560, 124 ShurtlefE v. Wisoasset, (74 Me. 130) 196 Shuter v. Philadelphia, (3 Phila. 228) 336 a Sic, In re, (73 Cal. 142) 104, 117 Sidener v. Norristown etc. Co., (23 Ind. 623) 396 Sidway v. Com'rs, (120 111. 456) 79 Siebert v. Boston, (31 N. E. 734, 139 Mass. 313) 344 Siebert v. Lewis, (122 U. S. 284) 194 Siefert v. Brooklyn, (101 N. Y. 136) 329 Siez-ra ». Dona Ana, (21 Pac. R. 83) 60 Sikes V. Hatfield, (13 Gray, 347) 167 Sikes V. Ransom, (6 Johnson, 279) 359 Sill V. Corning, (15 N. Y. 297) 59, 67 Silliman v. Hudson Riv. B Co., (4 Blatchf. 74) 391 Silliman v. Wing, (7 Hill, 159) 326 a Silsby V. Dunville, (8 Ont. App. 524) 164 Silsby Mfg. Co. v. AUentown, (26 Atl. R. 646) 171 Silver v. Tobin, (28 Fed. 545) 133 Silver Lake Bk. v. North, (4 Johns. Ch. 373) 161 Silverthorne v. Warren R. R., (33 N. J. L. 372) 360 Simeon Leland in Bankruptcy, (6 Ben. 175) 190 clii TABLE OF .CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Simmer v. St. Paul, (23 Minn. 408) 325, 349 Simmons v. Camden, (26 Ark. 276) 292 Simmons v. Cornell, (1 K. I. 519) 312 Simmons v. Gardner, (6 K. I. 255) 279 Simmons v. State, (12 Mo. 268) 123, 261 Simmons v. Toledo, (5 OMo Cir. Ct. E. 124) 395 Simmons u. Winters, (26 Pao. K. 7) 354 Simmonds, Ex parte, (16 Q. B. Div. ' 308)327 Simmonds ». Holmes, (23 Atl. Kep. 702) 129 Simons v. Camden, (26 Ark. 276) 329 Simploti). Chicago etc., (16Fed. Kep. 350) 303, 312 Simpson v. Kansas City, (20 S. W. R. 38) 232 Simpson ». Mecklinburg Co., (84 N. C. 158) 189 Simpson v. Savings Rank, (56 N. H. 466) 194 Sims V. Butler Co., (49 Ala. 110) 339 Sims V. Estate Co., (14 L. T. N. S. • 55) 131 Sims V. Frankfort, (79 Ind. 446) 312 Singer, Appeal of, (18 Atl. Rep. 931) 53 Singer Mfg. Co. v. Elizabeth, (42 N. J. L. 249) 192 Singer M. Co. v. Wright, (33 Fed. R. 121) 259 Singleton v. East. Counties R. R., (7 C. B. N. S. 287) 337 Singleton v. School District, (10 S. W. E. 793) 217 Sinnott ». Ry. Co., (50 N. W. R. 1097) 302 Sinton 13. Ashbury, (41 Cal. 525) 240, 301 Sinton v. Carter Co., (23 Fed. Rep. 535) 2 Sioux C. & R. R. R. Co. v. Stout, (17 Wall. 657) 352 Sioux City R. R. Co. v. Sioux City, (43 N. W. 224) 12 Sioux Co. V. Osceola Co., (45 Iowa, 168) 190 Sipe V. Murphy, (31 N. E. R. 884) 150 Sirocco V. Geary, (3 Cal. 69) 239 Sisto Li Protti, Ex parte, (68 Cal. 635) 124 Sixthar R. R. Co. v. Kerr, (72 N. Y. 330) 10 Skate V. Harris, (89 Ind. 363) 338 Skeen v. Lynch, (1 Rob. 186) 217 Skinner v. Harrison, (18 Jf. E. K. 529) 203 Skinner v. Hartford Bridge Co., (2!» Conn. 523) 239, 292 Skinner v. Henderson, (7 So. R. 464) 315 Skinner v. Hutton, (33 Mo. 347) 62, 260 Skjeggerud v. Minn. etc. Co., (33 Minn. 56) 352 Slack V. Lawrence, (19 Atl. R. 663) 355 Slack V. W. R. R. Co., (13 B. Mon. 13) 184 Slackhouse v. Lafayette, (26 Ind. 17) 342 Slater v. Wood, (9 Bosw. 1) 87 Slatten v. Des Moines etc. Co., (29 Iowa, 148) 302 Slattery, In re, (3 Ark. 484) 102 Slaughter's Case, (13 Gratt. 767) 258 Slaughter v. People, (2 Doug. 334)- 102 Slee V. Bloom, (5 Johns. Ch. 366) 81 Sleeper v. BuUen, (6 Kans. 300) 397 Slessraau v. Crozier, (80 Ind. 487) 155 Sloan V. Beebe, (24 Kan. 343) 281 Sloan V. Pac. R. R. Co., (61 Mo. 24) 136 Sloan V. State, (8 Blackf. 361) 2, 32 Sloane v. McConahy, (4 Ohio, 157) 204 Sloane v. Peo. El. Ry. Co., (7 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 84) 303 Snell, In re, (30 N. C. Q. B. 81) 127, 154 Snell V. Belleville, (30 U. C. Q. B. 81) 299 Snell V. Insurance Co., (98 U. S. 85) 327 Snider v. St. Paul, (53 N. W. R. 763) 324 Snook V. Georgia Co., (9 S. E. K. 1104) 2 Snow V. Adams, (1 Cush. 443) 342 Snow V. Fitchburg, (136 Mass. 183) 277 SnowB. Housatonic R. R. Co., (8 Al- len, 441) 352 Snyder v. Cabell, (29 W. Va. 48) 120 Snyder v Crossan, (50 IS". W. 678) 258 Snyder v. Foster, (77 Iowa, 638) 314 Snyder v. North Lawrence, (8 Kans. 82) 124, 144 Snyder v. Pa. R. R. Co., (55 Pa. St. 340) 303 Snyder v. President, (6 Ind. 237) 292 Snyder v. Rockport, (6 Ind. 237) 133, 329 Snyder v. St. Paul, (53 N. W. R.763) 324 tABLE OF CASES CITED. eliii References are to Sections. Small !). Danville, (51 Me. 359) 9, 338 a Smalley v. Blackburn Ry. Co., (2 II. & N. 158) 243 Smalley v. Burlington, (63 Vt. 443) 270, 273 Smalley v. Yates, (36 Kan. 519) 360 Sniallyt). Appleton, (43 N. W. R. 826) 350 b Smeltzer v. White, (92 U. S. 390) 51, 179 Smith, In re, (52 N. T. 526) 148, 264 Smith V. Aberdeen, (25 Miss. 458) 248, 254, 259 a Smith I). Adrian, (1 Mich. 495) 67 Smith V. Albany, (61 N. T. 444) 166 Smith V. Alexandria, (33 Gratt. 208) 329 Smith V. Atlanta, (75 Ga. 110) 355 Smith V. Barrett, (1 Siderf. 162) 208 Smith V. Board of Carlton Co., (46 • Fed. 340) 325 Smith V. Bourbon Co., (127 U. S. 105) 359 Smith V. Brown, (59 Cal. 672) 83 Smith 1). Gen. etc. T. Co., (2 Ohio Giro. Ct. 259) 297 Smith V. Cheshire, (13 Gray, 308) 114, 177 Smith V. Clark Co., (.54 Mo. 58) 189, 196, 254 Smith V. Croukhite, (8 Ind. 134) 72 Smith 0. Dedham, (144 Mass. 177) 189 a Smith V. Deweese, (41 Tex. 594) 87 Smith V. Dyer, (1 Cull. 562) 86 Smith B. Dygert, (12 Barb. 613) 321 Smith B. Elliott, (9 Pa. St. 345) 120 Smith B. Engle, (44 la. 265) 279 Smith B. Flora, (64 111. 93) 217 Smith V. Floyd Co., (85 6a. 420) 246 Smith V. Gardner, (12 Oreg. 221) 220 Smith B. Gates, (21 Pick. 55) 129 Smith B. Gould, (61 Wis. 31) 355 Smith V. Heath, (102 111. 130) 218 Smith B. Helmer, (7 Barb. 416) 28 Smith V. Heuston, (6 Ohio, 101) 226 Smith 1). Huntington, (3 N. H. 76) 129 Smith B. Inge, (80 Ala. 283) 220 Smith V. Kernochen, (7 How. 198) 34 Smith B. Knoxville, (3 Head, 245) 150 Smith 0. Labare, (15 Pac. E. 577, 37 Kan. 480) 246 Smith B. Law, (21 N. Y. 296) 97 Smith V. Lawrence, (12 Mich. 431) 108, 310 Smith V. Lawrence, (49 N. W. 7) 360 Smith I). Leavenworth, (15 Kan. 81) 336 a Smith V. Leavenworth, (15 Kan. 81) 350 6 Smith B. Lock, (18 Mich. 56) 221 Smith V. Madison, (7 Ind. 86) 124 Smith V. Magourich, (44 Ga. 163) 395 Smith V. Margrave, (2 App. Cases, 781, 43 L. J. Ex. 70) 353 Smith B. Mayor, (88 Tenn. 464) 144 a Smith B. Mayor, (66 N. Y. 295) 336 a Smith B. Mayor, (67 Barb. 223) 67 Smith V. Mayor, (21 How. Pr. 1) 172 Smith V. Mayor, (10 IST. Y. 504) 173 Smith V. Mayor, (13 Cal. 531) 176 Smith V. Mayor etc. of Saginaw, (45 N". W. Rep. 964) 55, 56, 58, 61 Smith B. Metro, etc. Co., (12 How. Pr. 187) 295 Smith V. McCarthy, (56 Pa. St. 359) 24, 55 Smith B. McNair, (19 Kan. 330) 191 6 Smith V. Milwaukee, (18 Wis. 63) 265, 354 a Smith c. Moore, (90 Ind. 294) 67, 78 Smith B. Morse, (2 Cal. 524) 113 Smith B. Navasota, (72 Tex. 422) 217, 220. 396 Smith V. New York, (4 N. Y. S. 449) 283 Smith V. New York, (37 N. Y. 518) 67, 79, 85 Smith I). New York, (66 N. Y. 295) 850 a, 354, 354 a Smith V. Newbern, (70 N. C. 14) 110 Smith V. Newburgh, (77 N. Y. 130) 77, 1.65 Smith V. Oconomowoc, (49 Wis. 694) 391 Smith V. People, (29 N. E. E. 676) 8 Smith V. Philadelphia, (13 Phila. 177) 142 Smith V. Philadelphia, (81 Pa. St. 38) 336 a Smith B. Phillips, (8 Phila. 10) 120 Smith V. Portland, (30 Fed. Rep. 734) 221 Smith V. Rah way, (33 N. J. L. Ill) 361 Smith V. Railroad, (67 III. 191) 360 Smith V. Readiield, (27 Me. 145) 326 a Smith B. Rochester, (76 N. Y. 506) 92, 335, 338 Smith V. Rome, (19 Ga. 89) 293 Smith B. Ryan, (8 N. Y. S. 853) 348 Smith 0. San Antonio, (17 Tex. 643) 104 Smith B. Seeley, (12 Wall. 35) 207 Smith u. Sherrv, (54 Wis. 114) 56, 61 Smith ». Sherwood, (62 Mich. 159) .3506 Smith V. Short, (40 Ala. 385) 258 Smith B. Skagit Co., (45 Fed. R. 725) 54 cliv TABLE OF CASKS CITED. References are to Sections. Smith B. Smith, (3 Desaus. 557) 37 Smith V. Smith (2 Pick. 621) 352 Smith V. Smith, (1 Bailey, 70) 79 Smith 1-. St. Joseph, (42 Mo. App. 392) 350 6 Smith V. State, (23 N. J. L. 712) 219, 220, 300 Smith V. Stephan, (66 Md. 381) 163 Smith V. Tallahassee Bi-anch of Cen- tral Planks Koad Co., (30 Ala. 650) 47, 48, 49 Smith V. Tallapoosa Co., (2 Woods, 574) 195 Smith V. Tecumseh JSTat. Bk., (17 Mich. 479) 326 Smith u. Toledo, (24 Ohio St. 126) 326 Smith V. Warden, (19 Pa. St. 426) 250 Smith V. Washington (20 How. 135) 113, 239 Smith V. Wencell, (7 Cush. 498) 346 Smith V. Wheeler, (58 Iowa, 659) 327 Smith V. Wildes, (143 Mass. 556) 352 Smith V. Wilmington, (98 N. C. 343) 189 Smith V. Whitney, (116 U. S. 167) 401 Smoot V. Wetumpka, (24 Ala. 121) 32 Smyth i;. Bangor, (72 Me. 249) 344 Society v. Diers, (10 Abb. Pr. K. S. 216) 124 Society v. Van Dyke, (2 Whart. 309) 84 Society etc. v. Com., (52 Pa. St. 125) 368 Society etc. v. Town of Pawlet, (4 Pet. 480) 25, 31, 32 Society etc. v. Young, (2 N. fi. 310) 48 Society for Sav. v. New London, (29 Conn. 174) 189, 193, 196 Society of Savings o. Conite, (6 Wall. 594) 258 Boilers v. Sollers, (26 Atl. 188) 312 Solomon, Ex parte, (91 Cal. 440) 150 Solomon v. Fleming, (51 N. W. K. 304) 395 Solomon v. Hughes, (24 Kan. 211) 32,98 Solomon v. Osceola, (43 N. W. K. 990, 77 Mich. 365) 325 Solon J). Williamsburg Sav. Bk., (112 N". T. 122) 192 b Solon V. Williamsburg Bk., (114 N. T. 122) 51 Somerville v. Dickerman, (127 Mass. 272) 245 Somerville & E. R. R. Co. v. Dough- ty, (22 N. J. L. 495) 246 Sommers v. Johnson, (4 Vt. .278, 24 Am. Dec. 604) 194 Soon Hing v. Crowley, (118 U. S. 703) 121 Soper V. Henry Co., (26 Iowa, 264) 325, 339, 349 Soulard v. St. Louis, (36 Mo. 546) 338 Soule V. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., (24 Conn. 575) 352 a Soule V. Gr. Tr. Ry. Co., (21 Up. Can. C. P. 308) 342 South Bend v. Gushing, (24 N. E. R, 114) 267 South Bend v. Notre Dame Univ., 69 Ind. 344) 270 So. Brooklyn R. R. & T. Co., In re, (50 Hun, 405) 305 So. Car. R. R. Co. v. Steiner, (44 Ga. 546) 302 So. Cov. etc. Ry. Co. v. Berry, (18 S. W. Rep. 1026) 136 Southerland v. Goldsborough, (96 N. C. 49) 189 Southern etc. Co. v. Towner, (26 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 667) 185 Southgate v. Covington, (15 B. Men. 491) 276 Southampton v. Mecox Co., (116 N. Y. 1) 11 Southampton etc. Co. v. Local Board, (8 El. & Bl. 812) 324 South Hampton v. Fowler, (52 N. H. 225) 67 Southingtou First Cong. Soc. v. At- water, (23 Conn. 34) 204 South Wash. etc. Co. v. Morrow, (11 S. W. R. 348) 274 South Newmarket Methodist Semi- nary Trustees v. Peaslee, (15 N. H. 317) 204 South Pac. etc. Co. v. Reed, (41 Cal. 256) 302 South Park Com'rs v. Williams, (51 111. 57) 234 South wark etc. v. Phila., (47 Pa. St. 314) 301 Soutliwell V. Detroit, (42 N. W. 118) 349 Southwestern R. R. Co. v. Southern etc. T. Co., (46 Ga. 43, 12 Am. Rep. 585) 297 Southworth v. Railroad Co., (2 Mich. 287) 28 South Yorkshire Ry. Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., (9 Ex. 55) 51 Soutler V. Madison, (15 Wis. 30) 14 Sower V. Philadelphia, (35 Pa. St. 231) 243 Sowles V. Soule, (59 Vt. 131) 326 a Spaight V. McGovern, (16 R. I. 658) 129 Spain, In re, (47 Fed. R. 208) 258 Spalding ». Hill, (7 S. W. R. 27) 261 Spalding v. Lowell, (23 Pick. 71) HO, 169 TABLE OP CASES CITED. clv References are to Sections. Spangler «. Jacoby, (14 111. 297) 98 Spanish Fork City v. Mortensen, (24 Pao. E. 620) 123 Sparhawk d. Salem, (1 Mass. 30) 343 Spaulding v. Andover, (54 N. H. 38) 12 Spaulding v. Peabody, (26 N. E. Rep. 144 a Spears v. Mayor, ("72 N. Y. 442) 111 Specht V. Detroit, (20 Mich. 168) 241 Speed V. Cooke, (57 Ala. 209) 365 Speed V. Crawford, (3 Met. 207) 18 Speer v. School Directors of Blaii'- ville, (50 Pa. St. 150) 138, 254" Speers v. Athens, (85 Ga. 49) 255, 259 a Spencer v. Hartford etc. Co., (10 R. I. 14) 353 Spencer v. Merchant, (125 U. S. 345) 279 Spencer v. People, (68 111. 510) 254 Spengler v. Trowbridge, (62 Mass. 46) 110 Sperry v. AUina, (17 Or. 481) 393 Sperry v. Harr, (32 Iowa, 184) 139 Spiceland v. Allier, (98 Ind. 467) 350 Spicer v. Chicago etc. Co., (29 Wis. 580) 352 a Spicer v. County Com'rs, (126 Ind. 369) 325 Spiegel u. Gausberg, (44 Ind. 418) 287, 309 Spier, In re, (115 N. T. 380) 315 Spier, In re, (3 N. T. S. 438) 54 Spilman v. Parkersburg, (14 S. E. E. 279, 35 W. Va. 605) 192 Spirit Aph. v. Randolph, (58 Vt. 192) 360 Spitler 1). Young, (63 Mo. 42) 155 Spitzer v. Blanchard, (46 K W. R. 400, 82 Mich. 234) 165 Spokane Ry. Co. v. City of Spokane, (5 Wash. St. 634) 290, 294 Spoouer v. Holmes, (102 Mass. 503) 190, 191 Sprague v. Norway, (31 Cal. 173) 65 Sprague v. Worcester, (13 Gray, 193) 239, 329, 354 Spray v. Thompson, (9 Iowa, 40) 249 Spring V. Hyde Park, (137 Mass. 554) 92 Spring V. Russell, (3 Watts, 294) 232, 254 Springer v. Bowdoinham, (7 Me. 442) 342, 350 i Springer v. Clay Co., (35 Iowa, 243) 51 Springfield v. Com'rs, (10 Pick. 59) 868 Springfield v. Conn. River R. R. Co., (4 Cush. 71) 302, 314 Springfield v. Edwards, (84 111. 626) 189 a Springfield v. Fullmer, (27 Pac. Rep. 577) 119,144 a Springfield v. Green, (120 111. 269) 259 a, 287 Springfield v. Hampden, (10 Pick. 59) 368 Springfield v. Le Claire, (49 111. 47) 3506 Springfield v. Spence, (40 Ohio St. 665) 354 a Springfield v. Walker, (42 Ohio St. 543) 142 Springfield etc. v. Hall, (98 111. 371) 87 Spring, etc. Co. v. Drinkhouse, (92 Cal. 528) 232 Springfield Co. v. Lane Co., (5 Oreg. 265) 170 Springport v. Teutonia Sav. Bk., (84 N. Y. 403) 189 Spr. Val. etc. v. Ashbury, (52 Cal. 126) 87 Spring Val. etc. Co. v. Drinkhouse, (28 Pac. R. 681, 92 Cal. 528) 238 Spring Valley Water Works v. San Mateo Water Works, (64 Cal. 123) 234 Springwells v. Wayne Co. Treasurer, (58 Mich. 240) 57 Sproul V. Lawrence, (33 Ala. 674) 72 Squire v. Cartwright, (22 N. Y. S. 899) 171 Squires v. Chillicothe, (89 Mo. 226) 350 a, 350 f) Staates v. Washington, (45 N. J. L. 318) 97 Stacy V. Vt. Cent. R. R. Co., (27 Vt. 39) 232 Stadler v. Detroit, (13 Mich. 346) 85 Stadler v. Roth, (59 Mo. 400) 106 Stafford v. Albany, (7 Johns. 541) 242 Stafford v. Osftaloosa, (64 Iowa, 251) 352 a Stafford v. Providence, (10 R. I. 567) 246 Staffordsliire v. Prop'rs etc. Law Rep., (1 E. & I. Appeals, 254) 312 Stahl V. Brown, (84 Ky. 324) 394 Stainton v. Metro. Board of Works, (23 Beav. 225) 355 Stanchfield v. Newton, (142 Mass. 110)354, 354 a Staudiford, In re, (5 Mackey, 549) 148 Stanfield v. State, (18 S. W. R. 577) 18,79 Stanford v. Worn, (27 Cal. 171) 232 Stanley v. Davenport, (54 Iowa, 463) 304, 338, 342 Stanton v. A. & C. R. R. Co., (2 Woods C. C. 523) 190 clvi TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Stanton v. Camp, (4 Barb. 274) 167 Stanton v. Springfield, (12 Allen, 566) 344 351 Staple V. Spring, (10 Mass. 72) 248 Starin v. Genoa, (23 N. T. 454) 183 Stark V. Portsmouth, (52 N. H. 221) 343 Starkey v. Minneapolis, (19 Minn. 203) 104 Starr v. Burlington, (45 Iowa, 87) 147, 265 Starr v. Camden & Atlantic R. E. Co., (24 N. Y. 592) 302 Starr v. Trustees, (6 "Wend. 564) 105 Starr D.Wilm. Counc, (3Har. 294) 90 State V. Adams, (19 Nev. 370) 365 State V. Adams, (90 Tenn. 722) 18 State V. Addison, (2 S. C. 499) 270 State V. Adkins, (42 Kan. 203) 216, 219 State V. 2Etna L. Ins. Co., (117 Ind. 251) 283 State V. Allen, (21 Ind. 516) 86 State V. Alt. (26 Mo. App. 673) 83 State V. Anderson, (8 Baxt. 249) 364 State V. Anderson, (18 Atl. K. 584) 375 State V. Anderson, (45 Ohio St. 196) 67, 378, 380 SUie 13. Andr., (36 Mo. 70) 371 State V. Anwerda, (40 Iowa, 151) 120 State V. Appleby, (25 S. C. 100) 365 State V. Archibald, (43 Mmn. 328) 363 State V. Atkinson, (107 K C. 317) 2 State V. Atkinson, (24 Vt. 448) 203, 300 State B. Atlantic City, (5 N. J. L. 99) 319 State D. Atlantic C. C, (34 N. J. L. 99) 113, 148, 259 a, 302 State V. Auditor, (36 Mo. 70) 371 State V. Axtell, (41 K. J. L. 117) 270 State V. Babcock, (19 Neb. 230) 184, 1916 State V. Babcock, (31 K. W. R. 8, 20 Neb. 522) 190 State 1). Babcock, (22 Neb. 614) 182 State V. Babcock, (24 Neb. 640) 189 a State V. Babcock, (25 Neb. 709) 8, 24 State V. Babcock, (41 N. W. R. 654, 25 Neb. 709) 24 State 1). Bacon, (6 Neb. 286) 373 State V. Baily, (7 Iowa, 390) 363, 365, 368, 371 State V. Baird, (15 S. W. R. 98, 79 Tex. 63) 56 State V. Baker, (10 So. R. 405) 158 State V. Ball, (59 Mo. 321) 120 State V. Bank, (2 Houst. 99) 270 State V. Barbour, (53 Conn. 76) 65, 75. 95 State V. Barksdale, (5 Humph. 154) 400 State V. Barlow, (48 Mo. 17) 172 State V. Barnes, (33 Pac. R. 621) 72 State V. Barton, (36 Minn. 145) 311 State V. Baton Rouge, (34 La. An. 1197) 362 State V. Bayonne, (35 N. J. L. 335) 145 State V. Bavonne, (22 Atl. R. 1006) 63 State ». Bayonne, (26 Atl. R. 81) 139 State V. Bean, (91 N. C. 554) 121 State B. Beaufort, (17 S. E. E. 355) 254 State V. Becker, (31 N. W. R. 1018) 18 State V. Bell, (5 Port. 365) 120 State V. Bell, (45 N. W. R. 615, 43 Minn. 344) 270 State V. Bell, (34 Ohio St. 194) 113 State V. Benedict, (15 Minn. 198) 18 State V. Berdetta,' (73 Ind. 185, 193) 300 State V. Bergen, (33 N. J. L. 39) 148 State V. Berry, (12 Iowa, 58) 278 State V. Bill, (13 Ired. L. 373) 400 State ». Binder, (38 Mo. 350) 9a, 146 State V. Blanchard, (6 La. Ann. 572) 69 State 1). Bloxham, (7 So. Rep. 873) 79 State V. Board, (20 Atl. R. 755) 364 State V. Board, (18 Atl. Rep. 571) 371) State V. Board, (80 Ind. 478) 313 State 13. Board, (51 N. J. L. 240) 67 State 13. Board etc., (26 Ohio St. 24) 83 State 13. Board etc., (27 Ohio St. 96) 375 State 13. Board, (42 Ohio St. 374) 173 State 13. Board, (25 Pac. R. 440) 359 State V. Board, (Heirs 13. Newark) (6 Atl. R. 659, 49 N. J. L. 170) 84 State 13. Board etc. of Atchison Co., (24 Pac. Rep. 87) 57 State 13. Board of Canvassers, (13 Fla. 55) 368 State 13. Boden, (16 Atl. Rep. 58) 371 State 1). Bogard, (27 IJ. E. R. 1113) 18 State V. Boise, (2 Fairf. 474) 167 State 13. Bonnell, (21 N. E. Rep. 1101) 155 State 13. Botkin, (71 Iowa, 87) 122 State V. Boyd. (19 Nev. 356) 79 State 13. Bradbury, (40 Me. 154) 223 State 13. Bramwell, (18 Pac. R. 952) 316 State 13. Brandt, (41 Iowa, 493) 67 State 13. Branin, (3 Zabr. 484) 2, 33 State 13. Brewer, (59 Ala. 130) 79 State 13. Briggs, (15 R. I. 425, 7 Atl. 404) 263 St. Louis etc. v. BeUville, (122 III 376) 287 TABLE OF CASKS CITED. clvii Eeferences are to Sections. State V. Bright, (38 La. An. 1) 154 State V. Brinkerhoff, (66 Tex. 45) 86 State V. Britain, (89 N. C. 574) 117, 150 State V. Brown, (109 N. C. 802) 299, 300 State V. Brown, (53 N. J. L. 162, 20 Atl. 772) 276 State J). Brown, (31 N. J. L. 356) 385 State V. Brown, (27 N. J. L. 18) 200 State V. Bi-own, (5 K. I. 1) 86 State V. Bryoe, (7 Ohio, pt. 2, 82) 83, 84, 361 State V. Bryson, (44 Ohio St. 457) 75 State !). BuHalo, (6 Neb. 455) 375 State V. Burbank, (22 La. An. 318) 375 State V. Burlington, (36 Vt. 521) 400 State V. Burlington, (45 Iowa, 87) 278 State V. Butler, (8 S. W. K. 586) 270 State !). Butz, (9 S. C. 156) 86 State V. Cahaba Co., (30 Ala. 66) 384 State V. Cainan, (94 N. C. 880) 158 State V. Camden, (35 N. J. L. 217) 378 State V. Camden, (19 Atl. Rep. 539) 158 State V. Campton, (2 N. H. 513) 315, 353 State V. Canavan, (30 Pac. K. 1079, 17 Nev. 422) 18 State V. Canterbury, (12 Ark. 321) 23 State V. Canterbury, (8 Fost. 195) 54, 313, 316 State V. Cantieny, (34 Minn. 1) 154 State V. Cape Girardeau Co. (19 S. W. E. 23) 860 State w. Carbondale, (29 Iowa, 254) 385 State V. Cardoza, (5 C. 297) 365 State ». Carney, (3 Kan. 88) 371 State V. Carpenter, (22 Atl. K. 497, 60 Conn. 97) 104, 158 State V. Carr, (28 N. E. R. 88) 79 State V. Carroll, (38 Conn. 471) 79, 85 State ». Carroll, (24 Atl. R. 106) 65 State V. Carson, (33 Pao. R. 428) 267 State V. Carver, (S Strob. 217) 223 State i). Cassidy, (22 Minn. 312) 123, 258 State V. Catlin, (3 Vt. 530) 217, 219 State V. Central Pac. R. R. Co., (9 Nev. 79) 269 State V. Central Pac. R. E. Co., (10 Nev. 47) 269 State V. Chamberlain, (24 Atl. E. 479) 270 State V. Chamber of Com., (20 Wis. 63)91 State V. Chapman, (44 Conn. 495) 76, State V. Charles, (16 Minn. 474) 117 State V. Charleston, (12 Rich. 702) 293 State V. Charleston, (2SpeersL. 719) 261, 267, 272 State V. Charleston Com., (1 Mill, Const. R. 36) 385 State 1). Charleston Coun. , (10 Rich. L. 240) 258 State V. Charleston Council, (5 Rich. L. 501) 267 State V. Chatburn, (63 Iowa, 659) 83 State V. Christ Ch. P. R. Com'rs, (1 Mill, Const. 55) 401 State V. Cincinnati, (20 Ohio St. 18) 27 State V. Cin. G. & G. Co., (18 Ohio St. 262) 144, 149, 295, 296, 300, 305 State ». Cities, (26 N. E. E. 1052) 365 State !). City, (22 Atl. R. 1052) 243 State V. City Clerk, (7 Ohio St. 355) 161 State V. City Council, (4 Rich. Law, 286) 133 State !). City of Elizabeth, (24 Atl. 495) 308 State V. Clark, (1 Dutch. 54) 33, 117 State V. Clark, (3 Kev. 566) 86 State 0. Clark, (28 IST. H. 176) 153 State V. Clarke, (54 Mo. 17) 117, 158 State V. Clay Co., (46 Mo. 231) 375 State 0. Clayton, (34 Mo. App. 563) 373 State V. Clegg, (27 Conn. 593) 104 State V. Cleveland, (3 R. I. 117) 154 State V. Clinton, (8 Atl. 296) 271 State V. Clinton Comrs., (6 Ohio St. 280, 287,) 364 State V. Cobb, (64 Ala. 127) 195 d State V. Cockrell, (2 Rich. 6) 249, 398 State V. Collins, (17 Atl. Rep. 131) 300 State V. Columbia, (16 S. C. 412) 401 State V, Commissioners, (37 Ohio St. 526) 195 d State V. Com'rs, (13 Neb. 57) 173 State V. Com'rs, (6 Ohio St. 280) 364 State V. Com'rs of Duval Co., (23 Pla. 483) 28, 288 State V. Common Council, (6 Atl. R. 578, 49 N. J. L. 177) 83 State V. Com. Council, (55 N. W. R. 118) 84 State V. Compton, (2 N. H. 513) 313 State V. Conlin, (27 Vt. 318) 104 State V. Cook, (57 111. 205) 79 State V. Cooke, (54 Tex. 482) 82 State V. Cooper, (101 N. C. 684) 47, 48 State V. Copeland, (3 R. I. 33) 263 State V. Cornwall, (27 Ind. 62) 129 State V. Con-igan etc. Co., (85 Mo- 263) 144, 302 ijlviii TABLE OF CASES CITED. Keferences are to Sections. State ». County Court, (50 Mo. 317) 26 State V. County Co., (11 S. E. R. 72, 33 W. Va. 589) 316 State V. County Jud., (5 Iowa, 380) 360 State V. Co. Jud., (7 Iowa, 186) 371 State V. Covington, (29 Ohio St. 102) 18 State V. Cowan, (29 Mo. 330) 117, 118 State V. Crawford, (36 N. J. L. 394) 265 Smith V. Croom, (7 Fla. 81) 66 State V. Crow, (20 Ark. 209) 18 State V. Crummey, (17 Minn. 72) 117 State V. Culver, (65 Mo. 607) 310 State V. Cummings, (17 Neb. 311) 371 State V. Curry, (33 K. E. R. 685) 76 State 13. Cutes, (26 N.~E. R. 1052) 364 State ». Davenport, (12 Iowa, 335) 364 State V. Daviess Co., (64 Mo. 30) 186 State V. Davis, (48 N. J. L. 112) 399 State V. Davis, (44 Mo. 129) 67 State V. Davis Co., (64 Mo. 30) 185 State V. Dayton etc., (10 Nev. 155) 318 State V. Debar, (58 Mo. 395) 117 State V. Debnam, (98 N. C. 712) 134 State v.. Debuclet, (23 La. An. 267) 177 State V. Decasinova, (1 Tex. 401) 66 State V. De Gress, (53 Tex. 387) 74, 86 State V. Delesdenier, (7 Tex. 76) 5 State B. Deliesseline, (1 McCord, 52) 99, 378 State V. Demaree, (80 lud. 519) 313, 353, 362, 377 State V. Denny, (29 Pac. R. 991) 2, 18 State V. Derbes, (11 La. An. 50) 75 State V. Dillon, (125 Ind. 65) 75 State B. Directors etc., (5 Ohio St. 234) 173 State B. District Court, (41 Minn. 42) 398 State V. Dodge Co., (56 Wis. 70) 399 State V. Doherty, (25 La. An. 119) 83 State B. Doherty, (29 Pac. Rep. 855) 125 State v. Donnelly, (20 Nev. 214) 260 a State B. Douglas, (10 Oreg. 185) 79, 320 State B. Dover, (10 N. H. 394) 400 State V. Dowling, (50 Mo. 134) 398 State B. Draper, (45 Mo. 355) 86 State B. Duff, (49 N. W. R. 23) 318 State V. Dugan, (19 S. W. R. 195) 24 State B. Earle, (42 N. J. L. 94) 375 State B. Earnhart, (107 N. C. 789 )120 State V. Eastman, (109 N. C. 785) 300 State V. E. St. Louis, (85 111. 377) 301 State B. Eau Claire, (40 Wis. 533) 314 State B. Eddy, (25 Pac. R. 1032) 359, 363 State B. Elizabeth, (17 Atl. R. 91) 279 State B. Elizabeth, (26 Atl. R. 939) 290 State V. Elizabeth, (30 N. J. L. 365) 291 State B. Elizabeth, (37 K. J. 432) 143, 221 State V. Elizabeth, (50 N. J. L. 347) 398 State B. Elizabeth, Treas., (42 N. J. L. 79, 42 N. J. L. 94) 375 State B. Elkington, (30 jST. J. L. 335) 368, 370 State B. EUwood, (11 Wis. 17) 368 State V. Elvins, (32 N. J. L. 362) 28 State B. Endom, (23 La. An. 663) 259 State B. Engelman, (106 Mo. 628) 243 State B. Engle, (26 N. E. R. 1077) 359, 363 State B. Essex Co., (23 N. J. L. 214) 362, 377 State B. Estabrook, (6 Ala. 653) 125, 255 State B. Evans, (33 S. C. 184) 5 State B. Fagan, (42 Conn. 32) 81 State B. Falconer, (44 Ala. 696) 363 State V. Faribald, (11 So. R. 36) 113 State B. Farr, (47 N. J. L. 208) 96 State B. Feibleman, (28 Ark. 424) 86 State B. Ferguson, (31 N. J. L. 120) 77, 78, 86 State V. Field, (17 Mo. 529) 18 State B. Field, (37 Mo. App. 83) 369, 373 State B. Findlay, (10 Ohio, 51) 72 State B. Finn, (98 Mo. 532) 72 State B. Fiske, (9 R. L 94) 113 State B. Fitts, (49 Ala. 402) 86 State ». Fitzgerald, (44 Mo. 425) 105, 381 state B. Flannagan, (67 Ind. 140) 318 State B. Flood, (26 Mo. Ap. 500) 171 State B. Fond du Lac, (42 Wis. 298) 241 State B. Forest Co., (43 N". W. R. 551) 8 State B. Forest Co., (74 Wis. 610)55 State B. Foster, (2 Hulst. 101) 98 State B. Fournet, (13 So. R. 185) 401 State B. Francis, (95 Mo. 44) 362 State B. Franklin, (40 Kan. 410) 62 State B. Frazier, (98 Mo. 426) 361, 379 State B. Freeman, (38 N. H. 426) 122, 134 State B. Freeport, (43 Me. 198) 314 State B. French, (14 S. E. R. 383, 109 N. C. 722) 258 State B. Frost, (4 Harring. 558) 06 TABLE OF CASES CITED. clix Kelerences are to Sections. State V. Fuller, (34 N. J. 227) 21, 259 a, 319 State V. Fuller, (9 S. W. K. 583) 29, 31 State V. Fulmer, (27 Pac. R. 577) 201 State V. Funk, (17 Iowa, 365) 105 State V. Gaffney, (34 N. J. L. 133) 271 State V. Grail. Co. Commissioners, (1 111. 25) 372 State V. Gardner, (43 Ala. 234) 67 State V. Garlock, (14 Iowa, 444) 125 State V. Garroutte, (67 Mo. 455) 186 State V. Gaslight Co., (25 Mo. App. 44)361 State V. Gates, (35 Minn. 385) 79, 105, 368 381 State '». Gayhart, (51 N. W. R. 746) 365 State V. George, (23 Fla. 585) 69 State V. Georgia Co., (17 S. E. R. 10) 282 State V. Gilmanton, (14 N. H. 467) 54 State V. Gleason, (12 Fla. 190) 383 State V. Gloucester, (40 N. J. Law. 30i) 313 State «. Goff, (15 R. I. 505) 86 State V. Goldstucker, (40 Wis. 124) 18 State?). Gorham, (37 Me. 451) 813, 400 State V. Gorton, (33 Min. 345) 69 State V. Gouldey, (18 Atl. R. 695) 18 State V. Governor, (1 Dutch. 331) 381 State D. Graham, (26 La. An. 568) 86 State V. Graves, (19 Md. 351) 113, 161, 359 State V. Gray, (22 Atl. Rep. 675) 125 State V. Gray, (23 Keb. 365) 96 State V. Green, (14 N. E. R. 352) 258 State V. Greeu, (37 Ohio St. 227) 99 State V. Greeu Co., (54 Mo. 540) 186 State I). Griffey, (5 Neb. 161) 65 State V. Grimes, (52 N. W. E. 42) 117, 118 State B. Gummersall, (24 N. J. L. 529) 380 State V. Guttenberg Council, (39 N. J. L. 600) 256, 259 a, 360, 375 State V. H. & St. J. E. E. Co., 75 Mo. 208 State V. Haben, (22 Wis. 660) 368 State V. Hadiey, (64 N. H. 473) 82 State V. Haight, (30 N. J. Law, 448) 31,78 State V. Haines, (80 Me. 65) 120 State V. Halifax Com'rs, (4 Dev. L. 345) 260, 349 State V. Hammonton, (38 N. J. L. 430) 116 State V. Hampton, (2 N. H. 22) 318 State V. Hand, (31 N. J. L. 547) 278 State V. Ilannon, (38 Kan. 593) 364 State 11. Hardey, (18 Pac. Rep. 942) 60, 189 State V. Harlam, (25 Neb. 33) 371 State V. Harris, (23 Eng. & Am. Cor. Gas. 43, 47) 189 State V. Harris, (52 N. W. Rep. 387) 125 State V. Harris, (10 Iowa, 441) 125 State V. Harris, (89 Ind. 363) 338 State V. Harrison, (113 Ind. 440) 81, 82 State V. Harrison, (116 Ind. 300) 74 State V. Harrub, (10 So. R. 752) 29 State V. Harsh, (6 Black. 346) 400 State V. Harshaw, (73 Wis. 211, 40 N. W. R. 641) 59 State B. Hart, (34 Me. 36) 120 State V. Hartford & N. H. R. R. Co., (29 Conn. 538) 363 State V. Hastings, (15 Wis. 78) 80 State V. Hauser, (63 Ind. 555) 108, 113 State V. Hawkius, (44 Ohio St. 98) 83 State J). Haworth, (23 N. E. R. 946) 338, 374 State V. Hay, (29 Me. 547) 122 State V. Hayes, (61 N. H. 314) 153 State V. Hayne, (4 S. C. 403) 122 State V. Haynes, (30 Me. 65) 120 State V: Haynes, (72 Mo. 377) 100 State V. Heath, (20 La. An. 172, 96 Am. Dec. 390) 176 State w. Hedlund, (16 Neb. 566) 32 State B. Heege, (40 Mo. App. 650) 359, 360 State B. Heidenhain, (7 So. R. ) 159 State B. Helfrid, (2 N. & McC. 233) 162 State B. Henderson, (38 Ohio St. 644) 148 State B. Hennepin Co., (33 Minn. 235) 98, 255 State V. Henry Co., (31 Ohio St. 211) 377 State V. Henshaw, (76 Cal. 436) 102 State B. Heppenheimer, (23 Atl. R. 664) 241, 243, 245 State B. Herndon, (23 Fla. 287) 380 State V. Herod, (29 Iowa, 128) 124, 144, 274, 302 State B. Hersey, (56 Iowa, 404) 72 State B. Hibbard, (3 Ohio, 32) 123 State V. Hill, (10 Ind. 219) 215 State V. Hill, (32 Minn. 275) 360 State V. Hine, (59 Conn. 50) 18 State B. Hixon, (41 Mo. 210) 83 State B. Hoagland, (16 Atl. R. 166) 18, 287 clx TABLE OF CASES CITED. Keferences are to Sections. State ». Hoblitzelle, (85 Me. 620) 373 State V. Hoboken, (.SO N. J. L. 225) 319 State V. Hoboken, (33 N. J. L. 205) 802 State V. Hoboken, (36 N. J. L. 291) 259 a State D. Hoboken, (41 N. J. L. 71) 123 State V. Hoboken, (9 Vroom, 110) 148 State V. Hodgdon,i(41 Tt. 139) 258 State V. Holden, (19 Neb. 249)371 State V. Holman, (40 Minn. 369) 311 State V. Hopkins, (10 Ohio St. 509) 81 State i;. Howe, (28 Neb. 618) 33, 371 State V. Howe, (28 Ohio St. 588) 81, 82 State V. Hoyt, (2 Oregon, 246) 86, 98 State V. Hudson (29 N". J. L. 104) 75, 278 State V. Hudson, (30 N. J. L. 137) 400 State V. Hudson, (34 N. J. L. 531) 278 State J). Hudson City, (27 N. J. L. 214) 241, 400 State V. Huggins, (Harper, 94) 99, 100 State V. Huggins, (47 Ind. 586) 308 State V. Hull, (17 Minn. 429) 365 State V. Humphries, (74 Tex. 466) 83 State V. Hundelhausen, (26 Wis. 432) 2,8 State 0. Hunt, (54 N. H. 431) 82 State 1). Hunter, (38 Kan. 578) 18 State V. Hutt, (2 Ark. 282) 86 State V. Hyde, (12 Ind. 20) 18 State V. HI. etc. Co., (33 Fed. K. 730) 201 State V. Jackson, (33 N. J. 450) 258 State V. Jackson Co., (19 Fla. 17) 375 State V. Jackson (;o., (102 Mo. 531)28 State V. Jacksonville, (10 So. 590) 302, 300 State V. Jacksonville, (22 Fla. 21) 375 State V. Jacobs, (17 Ohio, 143) 88, 380 State V. Jefferson, (22 La. An. 611) 362 State V. Jenkins, (46 Wis. 616) 380 State V. Jennings, (27 Ark. 419) 2 State V. Jennings, (56 Wis. 113) 359 State V. Jennings, (48 Wis. 549) 365 State V. Jersey City, (1 Dutch. 536) 85, 132 State V. Jersey City, (3 Dutch. 493) 98, 99, 145 State V. Jersey City, (5 Dutch. 170) 33 State V. Jersey City, (25 Atl. E. 272) 278 State V. Jersey City, (35 N. J. Eq. 404) 100 State V. Jersey City, (24 N. J. L. 662) 241, 265 State V. Jersey City, (25 N. J. L. 309) 241, 265 State V. Jersey City, (25 N. J. L. 536) 83 State V. Jersey City, (26 N. J. L. 444) 245, 319 State ». Jersey City, (28 N. J. L.500) 291 State V. Jersey City, (30 N. J. L. 93) 148 State V. Jersey City, (30 N. J. L. 148) 145 State V. Jersey City, (34 N. J. L. 31) 133 State V. Jersey City, (40 N. J. L. 483) 220,259 a State 1). Jersey City, (41 K J. L. 135) 142 State V. Jersey City, (47 N. J. L. 449) 170 State V. John, (81 Mo. 13) 371 States V. Johns, (3 Oreg. 533) 82 States V. Jolinson, (1 Kan. 178) 26 State V. Johnson Co., (12 Iowa, 237) 308 States V. Jones, (19 Ind. 356) 65, 82, 86 State V. Jones, (1 Ired. 129) 368, 369 State V. Jones, (18 Tex. 874) 288 State V. Judge Cir. Ct., (13 Ala. 805) 371 State B. Judges, (53 K W. R. 800) 259 a, 292 State V. Kansas City, (89 Mo. 34) 249, 399 State V. Kantler, (33 Minn. 69) 97 State V. Kaster, (35 Iowa, 221) 120 State V. Kaufman, (45 Mo. App. 656) 125 State V. Kearney, (25 Neb. 262) 130, 363 State V. Keenan, (57 Conn. 286) State V. Kelly, (34 N. J. L. 75) 32 State V. Kelly, (5 Vroom, 75) 32 State V. Kelsey, (44 N. J. L. 1) 79 State V. Kempff, (69 Wis. 470) 105 State B. Kenny, (45 N. J. L. 251) 76 State V. Keokuk, (9 Iowa, 438) 377 State V. Kiiclili, (54 N. W. E. 1069) 83 State v. Kilroy, (86 Ind. 118) 69 State V. King, (29 Kan. 607) 368 State 0. Kirk, (44 Ind. 401) 67, 74, 75, State V. State V. State V. State V. State V. State V. 18,26 State V. Kramer, (96 Mo. 75) 362 Kirk, (53 Ark. 337) 33 Kirkland, (29 Md. 85) 360 Kirkley, (20 Md. 85) 373 Kirkwood, (29 Md. 85) 359 Kirly, (29 Md. 85) 338 Kolsem, (29 N. E. R. 595) 2 TABLE or CASES CITED. clxi Beferences are to Sections. State V. Krollman, (38 N. J. L. 323) 270 State B. Lafferty, (5 Harring. 491) 155 State V. Lake, (8 Nev. 276) 318 State V. Lake City, (25 Minn. 404) 59, 07 State V. Lamoureux, (30 Pac. Rep. 243)9 State V. Lane, (18 R. I. 620) 88 State V. Langsten, (88 N. C. 692) 134 State V. La Vaque, (49 N. W. R. 525, 47 Minn. 106) 29 State V. Laverack, (34 K. J. 201) 238 State M. Lawrence Bdg. Co., (22 Kan. 438) 318 State D. Leatherman, (38 Ark. 81) 29 State V. Leary, (21 La. An. 538) 18 State V. Ledford, (3 Mo. 102) 117 State V. Lee, (4 Crim. Law Mag. 79) 331 State V. Lee, (29 Minn. 445) 104 State V. Leffingwell, (54 Mo. 458) 234 State V. Lehre, (7 Rich. 234, 322) 365 State V. Leigliton, (22 Atl. R. 380, 83 Me. 419) 314 a State V. Lemay, (13 Ark. 405) 400 State V. Lewis, (10 Ohio St. 46) 362 State V. Liberty, (22 Ohio St. 144) 177 State V. Lieber, (11 Iowa, 407) 128 State V. Lindsay, (34 Ark. 372) 117 State V. Liverpool L. & G. Co., (4 So. R. 504) 259 State V. Lockwood, (43 "Wis. 463) 104 State V. Logue, (73 Wis. 598) 215 State V. Luce, (6 Cent. R. 862) 120 State V. Ludwig, (21 Minn. 202) 117 State 13. Lusk, (48 Mo. 242) 82, 86 State V. Lyle, (100 N. C. 497) 247 State V. Lyon, (32 N. J. L. 360) 270 State V. Lyons, (31 Iowa, 432) 384 State V. Macon Co., (68 Mo. 29) 376 State V. Madison, (7 Wis. 688) 182, 183, 200 State V. Maine, (27 Conn. 641) 318 State V. Manitowoc, (52 Wis. 432) 359 State V. Mansfield, (41 Mo. 470) 104 State V. Mansfield Com'rs, (23 If. J. L. 510) 200 State V. Marble, (4 Ired. L. 318) 217 State B. Marion Co., (21 Kan. 413) 165 State V. Marlow, (15 Ohio St. 114) 105, 381 State V. Marshall Co., (7 Iowa, 186) 363 State v. Marston, (6 Kan. 524) 371 State V. Martin, (43 N. W. R. 244) 142 State V. Mass., (2 Jones Law, 66) 104 State V. Matheney, (7 Kan. 327) 82 State p. Mayberry, (3 Strob. 144) 77 State V. Maynard, (14 111. 419) 102 xi state r. Mayo, (8 So. R. 52, 42 La. An. 637) 359 State V. Mayor, (24 Ala. 701) 32 State B. Mayor etc., (R. M. Charlt. 250) 2 State B. Mayor, (11 Humph. 217) 30 State V. Mayor, (15 Lea, 697) 79, 120 State V. Mayor, (29 Md. 85, 111) 169 State B. Mayor, (37 Mo. 272) 189 State V. Mayor, (43 N. J. L. 542) 371 State V. Mayor, (4 Neb. 260) 86 State B. Mayor, (5 Port. 279) 110 State V. Mayor Charleston, (12 Rich. Law, 480) 102 State V. Mayor of Lincoln, (4 Neb. 260) 86 State V. Mayor of St. Joseph, (37 Mo. 270) 189 State V. Maysville, (12 S. C. 76) 256 State V. McArthur, (13 Wis. 383) 104 State V. McCabe, (43 N. W. R. 322, 74 Wis. 481) 219 State V. :5d:cCauley, (15 Cal. 430) 189 a State B. McCrillin, (4 Kan. 250) 194 a, 359 State V. McCuUough, (3 Nev. 202) 371 State V. MoGarry, (21 Wis. 496) '83 State V. McGowan, (89 Mo. 156) 360 State V. McNeely, (24 La. Ann! 19) 76,82 State V. McReynolds, (61 Mo. 203) 55, 276, 385 State V. Meadows, (1 Kan. 90) 371 State V. Meehan, (45 N. J. L. 189) 82 State ». Mellor, (67 Mo. 604) 12 State V. Merrill, (37 Me. 329) 134 State V. Merritt, (35 Conn. 314) 300 State V. Merry, (3 Mo. 278) 32 State V. Michellon, (2 N. J. L. 405) 76 State V. Miller, (41 La. An. 53) 159 State V. Milwaukee, (20 Wis. 87) 212, 364 State V. Milwaukee, (22 Wis. 397) 363, 368 State V. Milwaukee, (25 Wis. 122) 14, 194 State 0. Milwaukee, (29 Wis. 454) 296 State V. Milwaukee, (45 Wis. 579) 378 State V. Milwaukee Co., 21 Wis. 433) 86 Stat« V. Milwaukee Council, (20 Wis. 87) 375 State V. Milwaukee Gas Co., (29 Wis. 454, 9 Am. Rep. 598) 144, 296 State V. Minneapolis, (32 Minn. 501) 232 State V. Minn. etc. Ry. Co., (39 N. W. R. 153, 38 Minn. 246) 317 State V. Mobile, (5 Porter, 279) 120, 226, 300 clxii TABLE OF CASES CITED. Beferences are to Sections. State V. MofEatt, (5 Ohio, 358, 362) 371 State ». Moniteau Co. Ct., (45 Mo. App. 387) 125, 398 State V. Montgomery, (25 La. An. 138) 67, 75 State ». Moore, (16 S. W. K. 937) 24 State V. Morgan, (48 N. W. 814) 259 State V. Moriarity, (74 Ind. 104) 286 State V. Morris, (43 Iowa, 192) 377 State V. Morris Com. Pleas, (36 N. J. L. 72) 24 State V. Morris etc. Co., (23 N. J. L. 360) 300 State V. Morristown, (33 N. J. L. 57) 33, 146, 288, 290 State V. Morse, (50 N. H. 9) 278 State ». Mortland, (52 N. J. E. 521) 28 State V. Mott, (61 Md. 297) 120 State V. Moultrieville, (Rice, Law, 158) 154 State V. Mount, (21 La. An. 755) 360, 375 State V. Mt. Pleasant, (16 Wis. 613) 267, 362 State V. Mullica, (17 Atl. K. 941) 27 State V. Munic. Ct. etc., (32 Minn. 329) 146 State V. Mungenraaier, (24 Iowa, 87) 120 State V. Murfreesboro, (11 Humph. 217) 400 State V. Nashville, (15 Lea, 697) 146 State V. Nashville Univ., (4 Hump. 157) 200 State V. Natal, (39 La. An. 439) 42 State V. Natal, (6 So. E. 722) 110, 201 State V. Natl. Dock Co., (26 Atl. E. 145) 290 State V. Neidt, (19 Atl. E. 318) 120 State V. Newark, (3 Dutch. 491) 111 State V. Newark, (25 N. J. L. 399) 391 State V. Newark, (27 N. J. L. 185) 270 State V. Newark, (27 N. J. L. 198) 86 State 1). Newark, (34 N. J. L. 236) 28 State V. Newark, (36 N. J. L. 478) 270 State V. Newark, (37 N. J. L.) 415 259 a, 277 State V. Newark, (40 N. J. L. 358) 27 State V. Newark, (11 Atl. It. 147, 49 N. J. L. 344) 257 State V. Newark, (23 Atl. E. 129) 234 State u. Newberry Council, (12 Kicli. L. 339) 270 State V. New Boston, (11 N. H. 413) 223 State V. New Brunswick, (1 N. J. L. 395) 319 State V. New Brunswick, (30 N. J. L. 395) 259 a, 286 State V. Newman, (91 Mo. 445) 360, 371 State V. New Orleans, (15 La. An. 354) 259 State B. New Orleans, (30 La. An. 129) 362, 375 State V. New Orleans, (35 La. 68) 368 State V. N. O. C. & L. E. Co., (7 So. E. 606, 42 La. 550) 306 State V. Newport etc. Co., (18 Atl. E, 161) 302 State V. New Wbatrom, (3 Wash. St. 7)29 State V. Nichols, (79 N. T. 182) 83 State V. Noble, (118 Ind. 350) 18 State V. Norwalk Co., (10 Conn. 157) 320 State V. Noyes, (30 N. H. 279) 120, 255 State V. Ocean, (48 N. J. L. 70) 364 State V. O'Conner, (22 Atl. 1091) 18 State V. Old Town Bridge Corp., (85 Me. 17) 314 State V. Omaha, (14 Neb. 265) 300, 360 State V. Orange, (31 N. J. L. 131) 362 State V. Orange, (32 N. J. L. 49) 278 State B. Orange, (50 N. J. L. 347) 398 State V. Osawkee, (14 Kan. 418) 183, 188, 254 State V. Osborne, (24 Mo. App. 309) 374 State V. Otoe, (6 Neb. 129) 278 State V. Pacific, (61 Mo. 155) 177, 363 State V. Palmer, (10 Neb. 203) 361 State V. Palmer, (18 Neb. 644) 371 State V. Palmer, (4 N. W. Eep. 966) 32 State V. Paris Ey. Co., (55 Tex. 76) 159 State V. Parker, (25 Minn. 215) 38a State V. Parker, (32 N. J. L. 426) 270 State V. Parker, (26 Vt. 362) 263 State V. Parkinson, (5 Nev. 17) 189 o State 1). Passaic, (37 N. J. L. 65, m) 259 a State ». Passaic, (41 N. J. L. 90) 278 State V. Passaic, (42 N. J. L. 524)319 State V. Passaic Turnp., 27 N. J. L. 217) 319 State V. Paterson, (36 N. J. L. 159) 279 State V. Paterson, (37 N. J. L. 380) 259 o State V. Patterson, (40 N. J. L. 186) 176 State V. Patterson, (20 AU. E. 828) U State 1). Patterson, (34 N. J. L. 163) 113 TABLE OF OASES CITED. clxiii Beferences are to Sections. ■State V. Patterson, (38 N. J. L. 190) 372 State 1). Peele, (124 Ind. 515) 76 State V. Peele, (124 Ind. 515) 82 State V. Perkins, (24 N. J. L. 409) ■ 102 State V. Perranet, (41 La. An. 179) 399 State V. Perry Co., (5 Oliio St. 497, 502) 395 State V. Perth Amboy, (29 N. J. L. 259) 279 State B. Perth Araboy, (38 N. J. L. 425) 265 State V. Pettis, (7 Rich. Law, 390) 312 State V. Pidgeon, (8 Blackf. 132) 82 State V. Pillsbury, (30 La. An. 705) 177 State V. Pilot, (21 La. An. 336) 371 State V. Plaiufield, (38 N. J. L. 95) 241, 265, 279, 280 State V. Piatt, (4 Harr. 154) 67 State V. Plunkett, (3 Harr. 5) 117, 123, 125 State ». Poland, (50 N. J. Law, 367) 398 State V. Pol. Com'rs, (88 Mo. 144) 83 State V. Police Jury, (111 U. S. 716) 194 State V. Pollard, (6 E. I. 290) 117 State V. Portland, (74 Me. 268) 400 State V. Powell, (97 N. C. 417) 104 State V. Priester, (45 IST. W. R. 712, 43 Minn. 373) 99 State ». Putnam, (35 Iowa, 561) 67 State V. Quimby, (17 Atl. 952) 65 State V. Rahway, (33 N. J. L. 110) 363 365 371 State 'b. Rahway, (39 N". J. L. 646) 25, 92 State V. Railroad Co., (3 How. 534) 155 State V. Raine, (47 Ohio St. 447, 25 X. E. R. 54) 79, 359, 360 State V. Rainey, (74 Mo. 229) 369 State V. Ralls etc., (45 Mo. 58) 82 State V. Ramsey Co. Dist. Ct., (33 Minn. 295) 259 a State ». Raymond, (27 N. H. 388) 400 State 0. Recorder, (12 So. R. 880) 271 State i). Register, (59 Md. 283) 83 State V. Reynolds, (61 Mo. 203) 56 State V. Rice, (2 S. E. R. 180) 154 State ». Richland, (20 Ohio St. 362) 139 State V. Ricker, (32 N. H. 179) 104 State B. Rightor, (44 La. An. 298) 399, 401 State V. Robbins, (54 N. J. L. 566) State ». Roberts, (11 Gill & J. 506) 256 State V. Roberts, (12 N. J. L. 114) 87 State V. Rodman, (43 Mo. 256) 361 State V. Roggen, (22 Keb. 118) 189, 1916 State V. Rolle, (30 La. Ann. 991) 259, 261 State V. Row, (46 N. W. R. 872) 79 State V. Rowe, (2 Atl. R. 179) 253 State V. Saline Co., (48 Mo. 390) 186, 394 State V. Savage, (89 Ala. 1) 83 State V. Schaack, (28 Minn. 358) 365 State V. Schleramer, (42 La. An. 1166) 118 State B. Schlier, (3 Heisk. 281) 261 States. Schnierle, (5 Rich. L. 299) 380 State B. School Directors, (74 Mo. 21) 374 State B. Sch. Dist., (10 Neb. 544) 186 State B. Schuohardt, (7 So. 67) 130, 146 State B. Schumaker, (27 La. An. 332) 83 State B. Schweiokardt, (19 S. W. R. 47) 9, 11, 226 State B. Scott, (17 Mo. 521) 24 State V. Scott, (15 Neb. 147) 375 State B. Seay, (64 Mo. 89) 81, 82 State B. Sellers, (7 Rich. Law, 368) 77 State B. Sevarance, (55 Mo. 378) 33, 159, 269, 282 State V. Seymour, (35 N. J. L. 47) 232 State V. Shakespeare, (6 So. Rep. 592) 371 State B. Shakespeare, (41 La. An. 156) 359 State B. Shakespeare, (43 La. An. 92) 361 State B. Sharkey, (52 N. W. E. 24) 110 State V. Shaw, (29 Pac. 1028) 29 State B. Shaw, (23 La. An. 790) 363 State B. Shelbyville, (4 Sneed, 176) 400 State B. Sherman, (20 Mo. 265) 123 State B. Sherwood, (42 Mo. 179) 85 State ». Simon, (22 Atl. 120) 26 State B. Sims, (16 S. C. 486) 134 State B. Skrine, (3 Brev. 516) 78 State B. Slick, (86 Ind. 501) 365 State B. Smith, (15 S. "W. R. 614) 361 State V. Smith, (22 Minn. 218) 97, 148. 371 State B. Smith, (87 Mo. 158) 81 State V. Smith, (52 N. W. R. 700) 18, 84 State B. Smith, (11 Atl. E. 321) 254 State V. Smithson, (106 Mo. 149) 258 clxiv TABLE OF CASES CITED. Beferences are to Sections. State V. Snodgrass, (98 Ind, 546) 189, 375 State 1-. Society, (54 K J. L. 260) 400 State V. Somers, (53 N. W. 146) 83 State V. Sommers, (96 K. C. 467) 75 State V. So. S. S. Co., (13 La. An. 497) 282 State V. Somnier, (33 La. An. 237) 75 State V. Springfield, (6 Ind. 83) 13 State V. Staley (38 Ind. 259) 362 State V. Stanley, (14 Ind. 409) 250 State V. Starkey, (52 N. W. K. 24) 79 State V. Starling, (13 S. Car. 262) 364 State V. State Board of Assessors, (22 Atl. E. 1085) 282 State V. Steele, (57 Tex. 200) 66, 79 State V. Stevens, (46 N. J. L. 344) 83 State V. Stevenson, (109 N". C. 730) 258 State !). Stewart, (5 Strob.) 249, 398 State V. Story Co., (17 Nev. 96) 29 State V. St. Johns, (47 Minn. 315) 399 State V. St. Louis Co. Ct., (34 Mo. 546) 8, 116, 325 State i;. St. Louis, (62 Mo. 244) 249 State V. St. Louis, (90 Mo. 19) 83 State !). Supervisors, (29 Wis. 79) 360 State V. Super's, (39 Wis. 264) 368 State V. Super's,X41 Wis. 28) 313, 377 State V. Super's, (67 Wis. 274) 368 State V. Swearingen, (12 Ga. 23) 69 State V. Swift, (1 Hill, 360) 249, 398 State V. Swift, (11 Nev. 128) 18 State V. Swislier, (17 Tex. 441) 263 State V. Tappan, (29 Wis. 664) 14, 15, 139 State V. Taxing District of Shelby Co., (16 Lea, 240) 42 State V. Taylor, (12 Ohio St. 130) 74 State V. Taylor, (39 Md. 338) 282 State V. Teasdale, (21 Fla. 652) 83 State V. Ten Eyck, (18 N. J. L. 373) 398 State V. Tennant, (110 N. C. 609) 130 State V. Thoraaston and Rockland, (74 Me. 198) 54 State V. Thompson, (36 Mo. 70) 361 State V. Tiedeman, (69 Mo. 306) 212 State V. Tippecanoe Co., (30 N. E. E. 892) 362 State V. Titus, (47 N. J. L. 89) 360 State V. Tolan, (33 N. J. L. 195) 378 State V. Toledo, (26 N. E. K. 1061) 27 32 256 State V. Topeka, (36 Kan. 76) 104, 117 State V. Town of Columbia, (20 S. W. Hep. 90) 144 a State V. Town of Winter Park, (25 Fla. 371) 62 State V. Township, (23 Atl. E. 666) 32 State V. Tracy, (51 N. W. E. 613) 385 State V. Traders Bank, (6 So. E. 582 41 La. An. 329) 259, 261 State V. Trammel, (11 S. W. Eep 748) 179, 254 State V. Trask, (6 Vt. 355) 226 State V. Trenton, (18 Atl. E. 116) 113 State V. Trenton, (20 Atl. E. 1076) 136, 302 State V. Trenton, (23 Atl. "E. 281) 398 States. Trenton, (26 Atl. E. 83) 259a State V. Trenton, (7 Vroom, 198) 33, 118, 145, 158 State V. Trenton, (35 K. J. L. 485) 73 State V. Trenton, (42 N. J. L. 72) 87 State V. Trenton, (49 N. J. L. 339) 173 State V. Trenton, (51 N. J. L. 498) 113 State V. Troth, (5 Troom, 376) 32 State V. Trustees etc., (5 Ind. 77) 37, 40 State V. Trustees, (61 Mo. 155) 375 State V. Trustees, (4 Nev. 400) 363 State V. Tryon, (39 Conn. 183) 117, 147 State V. Union, (33 IST. J. L. 350) 28, 161 State V. Union & Planters Bank, (19 S. W. E. 758) 273 State V. Valle, (41 Mo. 29) 18, 67, 74 State 0. Van Buskirk, (40 N. J. L. 463) 82 State V. Van Home, (7 Ohio St. 327) 185, 195, 196 State V. Viokers, (51 N. J. L. 180,) 379 State V. Volkman, (20 La. An. 585) 259 a State V. Van Wickle, (1 Dutch. 73) 107 State V. Walkely, (2 Nott & McCord, 410) 249, 250 State V. Wall, (47 Ohio St. 499) 2 State V. Walters, (64 Ind. 226) 320 State V. Walton, (62 Me. 106) 67 State ». Ware, (13 Oreg. 380) 363 State V. Warren, (32 N. J. L. 439)260 State V. Washburn, (17 Wis. 658) 81, 82 State V. Watertown Council, (9 Wis. 254) 372 State V. Waxahachie, (81 Tex. 626) 56 State V. Weatherby, (17 Neb. 553) 78 State 1). Weatherby, (45 Mo. 17) 385 State V. Webster, (107 N. C. 962) 122 State V. Welch, (36 Conn. 215) 134, 150 State V. Welch, (21 Minn. 22) 159 State V. Wells, (46 Iowa, 663) 103 TABLE OF CASES CITED. clxv References are to Sections. State V. Western etc., (9.5 N. C. 602) 318 State V. Weston, (4 Neb. 234) 74 State V. Westport, (22 S. W. 888) 61 State V. Whitingham, (7 Vt. 390) 400 State V. Wilcox, (45 Mo. 458) 24 State V. Wilkinson, (2 Vt. 480) 219, 220, 226, 286 State V. Williams, (69 Ala. 311) 359 State V. Williams, (99 Mo. 291) 69 State V. Williams, (11 S. C. 288) 122 State V. Williams, (38 N. W. K. 31) 371 State V. Wilm. Coun., (8 Harring. 294) 102, 363, 381 State V. Wilson, (42 Me. 9) 223 State B. Wilson, (29 Ohio, 347) 67 State V. Wilson, (71 Tex. 291) 177 State B. Wilson, (17 Wis. 087) 377 State B. Winkelmeier, (35 Mo. 103) 24 State 1). Wisten, (62 Mo. 592) 122 State 1). Witlirow, (108 Mo. 1) 401 State B. Wood, (51 Ark. 205) 72 State V. Wood, (9 Bosw. 15) 90 State V. Wood Co., (40 N. W. R. 381) 315 State V. Wood Co., (72 Mo. 629) 377 State B. Woodruff, (37 N. J. L. 139) 270 State B. Woodward, (23 Vt. 92) 202, 208, 219, 220, 300 State B. Wright, (23 Atl. 116) 18, 364 State B. Yopp, (97 N. C. 477)289,299, 300 State V. York Co., (8 Neb. 92) 365 State B. Young, (3 Kan. 445) 102, 125 State B. Young, (30 S. C. 399) 32, 33 State B. Zeigler, (32 N. J. L. 262) 102, 154, 156 State Bank b. Knoop, (16 How. 369) 8 State Bank b. Madison, (3 Ind. 43) 267 State Bk. etc. v. Heney, (40 Minn. 145) 171 State Brd. v. Aberdeen, (56 Miss. 518) 51, 144 State Board b. Cit. S. E. Co., (47 Ind. 407) 164 State Center b. Barenstein, (66 Iowa, 2.59) 123 State etc. v. Co. Judge, (2 Iowa, 280) 28 State etc. b. Mobile, (24 Ala. 701) 32 St.ite ex rel. Bridge Co. b. Columbia, (27 S. C. 137) 42 State ex rel. Choteau v. LefiSngwell, 54 Mo. 458) 28 State ex rel. Havemeyer b. Min. Pt. Sup., (22 Wise. 396) 368 State ex rel. Jameson b. Denny, (118 Ind. 382) 255 State ex rel. Marobland b. New Orleans, (37 La. An, 13) 14 State ex rel. Block b. Cobb, (64 Ala. 158) 191 State ex rel. Soutter b. Madison Council, (15 Wis. 80) 368 State ex rel. Thorn b. New Orleans, (37 La. An. 528) 14 State ex rel. Troll v. Hudson, (78 Mo. 302) 123 State Hist. Assoc, b. Lincoln, (14 Neb. 336) 221 Staton B. Norfolk & C. R. Co., (19 S. E. 11. 933, 109 N. C. 387) 354 a Steamship Co. b. Joffiffe, (2 Wall. 450) 133 Steamship Co. b. Pt. Wardens, (6 Wall. 81) 133 Stearns b. Richmond, (14 S. E. R. 847) 292, 330 Stearns Co. v. St. Cloud, (36 Minn. 425) 120 Stebbins b. Jennings, (10 Pick. 172) 25 Stebbins v. Keene, (60 Mich. 214) 353 Stebbins b. Mayor, (18 Pac. Rep. 745) 104 Stecker b. East Saginaw, (22 Mich. 104) 98, 106 Stedman b. San Francisco, (63 Cal. 193) 333, 336 Steele b. Boston, (128 Mass. 588) 331 Steele b. Burkhardt, (104 Mass. 59) 352 Steele v. Davis Co., (2 G. Greene, 469) 178, 179 Steele b. Martin, (6 Kan. 430) 381 Steele b. Newton, (41 Kan. 512) 55 Steele b. Sullivan, (70 Ala. 589) 220 Steers ». Brooklyn, (101 N. Y. 51) 225 Stein B. Bienville W. S. Co., (34 Fed. Rep. 145) 144, 296 Stein B. Burden, (24 Ala. 180) 288 Stein B. Mobile, (24 Ala. 591) 184, 274 Steincke b. Bentley, (34 N. E. R. 97) 301 Steines v. Franklin Co., (48 Mo. 167) 111, 196, 327 Steirsmyer v. St. Louis, (3 Mo. App. 256) 855 Stephani b. Brown, (40 111. 428) 348 Stephens b. Macon, (88 Mo. 345) 331 a, 8506 Stephens v. Peo., (89 111. 837) 65 Stephenson b. Chattanooga, (20 Fed. Rep. 586) 221, 224 Stephenson b. Manny, (56 111. 160) 826 a Stephenson Co. Sup. b. Manny, (56 111. 100) 326 Sterling's App., (Ill Pa. St. 35,2 Atl. Rep. 105) 287, 295 clxvi TABLE OF CASES CITED. Seferences are to Sections. Sterling v. Thomas, (60 111. 264) 337 Stern v. Peo., (96 111. 475) 72 Sterrett v. Houston, (14 Tex. 153) 336 a Stetson V. Faxon, (19 Pick. 147, 158) 354 Stetson ». Kempton, (13 Mass. 272) 4, 110, 139, 167, 169, 326 Steubenville v. Gulp, (38 Ohio St. 18) 79 Stevens v. Rutland etc. Co., (29 Vt. 546) 395 Stevens v. Boxford, (10 Allen, 93) 343 Stevens v. Bufialo & jST. Y. C. R. R. Co., (31 Barb. 590) 273 Stevens v. Eden etc., (12 Vt. 688) 108 Stevens ». Middlesex Canal, (12 Mass. 466) 233 Stevens v. Patterson etc. R. R. Co., (34 ST. J. 532) 225, 239 Stevens v. Shannon, (6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 142) 229 Stevens Pt. Boom Co. v. Reilly, (46 Wis. 237) 314 Stevenson v. Mayor etc., (20 Fed. Rep. 586) 308 Stevenson v. PhoenixviUe, (1 Ches. Co. Rep. 113) 327 a Stevenson v. Sum. Towns, (35 Iowa, 462) 364 Steward v. Jefferson, (3 Harr. 335) 255 Stewart u. Baltimore, (7Md. 500) 245, 247 Stewart v. Benninger, (138 Pa. St. 437) 129 Stewart H. Cambridge (125 Mass. 102) 165 Stewart v. Clinton, (79 Mo. 603) 354 a Stewart v. Com., (10 Watts. 307) 130 Stewart v. Council Bluffs, (58 Iowa, 642) 110 Stewart v. Davis, (3 Murph. 244) 270 Stewart v. Frick, (94 N. C. 487) 220 Stewart v. Hartman, (46 Ind. 331) 234 a Stewart v. Hinds Co. B. of Police etc., (25 Miss. 479) 241 Stewart v. Kalamazoo, (30 Mich. 69) 397 Stewart v. Lansing, (104 U. S. 505) 193 6 Stewart D. Lexington, (79 Mo. 603) 329 Stewart v. Mayor, (7 Md. 501) 104, 105 Stewart v. New Orleans, (9 La. An. 461) 92, 332, 333 Stewart v. Perkins, (19 S. W. R. 789) 215 Stewart v. Polk Co., (30 Iowa, 9) 253 Stewart v. Rich, (1 Gaines, 182) 320 Stewart v. Stewart, (6 CI. & Fin. 911) ' 326 a Stewart ti. Woodstock, (15 Up. Can. Q. B. 427) 344 Stier V. Oskaloosa, (41 Iowa, 353) 30, 31 352 Stiflaer V. Delaware Co., (27 N. E. E. ' 641) 79 Stiles V. Curtis, (4 Day, 328) 224 Still V. Lansinburgh, (16 Barb. 107) 208, 211 Stilling V. Thorpe, (54 Wis. 538) 344, 346 Stilts V. Indianapolis, (55 Ind. 515) 18, 55, 61, 259, 397 Stimson v. Gardiner, (42 Me. 248) 340, 343 Stirling Gas Co. ij. Higgins, (25 N. E. R. 660) 259 Stock V. Boston, (149 Mass. 410) 92, 336, 355 Stockbridge v. West Stockbridge, (12 Mass. 400) 31 Stockdale v. Wayland, (47 Mich. 226) 189 a Stocking V. State, (7 Ind. 326) 82 Stockman v. Brooks, (27 Pac. R. 746) 29, 373 Stockton V. Chicago, (26 N. E. R. 1095) 246 Stocktons V. Newark, (42 N. J. Eq. 531) 229 Stockton V. Powell, (10 So. R. 688)51 Stockton V. Whitmore, (50 Cal. 554) 232 Stockwell V. Genesee Co., (16 Mich. 221) 79 Stoddard v. Gilman, (22 Vt. 568) 98 Stoddard v. Saratoga, (27 N. E. R. 1030) 355 Stoddard v. Winchester, (32 N. E. R. 948)92, 350 a Stokes V. Corporation of N. Y., (14 Wend. 87) 158 Stokes V. Mayor etc. , (14 Wend. 8 /)127 Stokes V. Tift, (64 Ga. 312) 317 Stone V. Attleborough, (140 Mass. 328) 346 Stone V. Boston, (2 Met. 2 Stone V. Brooks, (35 Cal. 489) 221 Stone ». Gharlestown, (114 Mass. 214) 55, 58 Stone V. Cheshire etc. Corp., 19 N. H. 427) 347 Stone V. Commercial Ry. Co., (4 M. & C. 122) 243 Stone V. Godfrey, (5 De G. M. & G. 76) 327 Stone V. Huggins, (28 Vt. 617) 169 Stone V. Mayor etc. of New York., (25 Wend. 157) 239 TABLE OF CASES CITED. clxvii Keferences are to Sections. Stone ». Mobile, (57 Ala. 61) 256, 397 Stone V. New York, (25 Wend. 157, 167) 398 Stone V. Oconomowoc, (71 Wis. 155) 210 Stone V. Sch. District, (8 Cush. 592) 95 Stone V. Small, (54 Vt. 498) 75, 373 Stone V. Trust Co., (116 U. S. 307) 150 Stoneburgh v. Brighton, (5 Upper Can. L. J. 38) 169 Storer v. Cincinnati, (4 Oliio Cir. Ct. 279) 278, 397 Storer v. Washington, (Peck, 334) 85 Stormfeltz v. Manor Turn. Co., (13 Pa. St. 555) 301, 318 Storrs ». Utica, (17 N. Y. 104) 347, 350 Stott V. Franey, (20 Or. 410) 166 Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, (129 U. S. 141) 289 Stroub V. Railway Co., (59 N. Y. Super. Ct. 505) 396 Stoudinger v. Newark, (28 N. J. Eq. 74) 294 St. Louis V. Laclede etc. Co., (9 S. W. R. 581) 218 St. Louis V. Laughlin, (49 Mo. 559) 255 St. Louis V. Lemp, (93 Mo. 477) 201, 225 St. Louis V. Life Ins. Co., (17 S. W. R. 637) 348 St. Louis i;. McCoy, (18 Mo. 238) 118 St. Louis V. Meier, (77 Mo. 13) 194 St. Louis u. Mentz, (18 S. W. R. 30) 242 St. Louis V. Merton, (6 Mo. 476) 210 St. Louis V. Miss. etc. Co., (13 Mo. App. 524) 302 St. Louis I). Ranken, (9 S. W. K. 910, 96 Mo. 497) 397 St. Louis V. Russell, (9 Mo. 507) 55, 56, 60, 282 St. Louis V. Shields, (52 Mo. 351) 12, 18, 28, 29, 133 St. Louis V. St. L. R. R. Co., (50 Mo. 94) 274 St. Louis 1). Shands, (20 Mo. 149) 127 St. Louis V. Shoenbusch, (95 Mo. 618) 134 St. Louis V. Smith, (10 Mo. 438) 158 St. Louis I). Sparks, (10 Mo. 118) 368 St. Louis 13. Speiftel, (90 Mo. 587) 272 St. Louis V. Steinberg, (4 Mo. App. 453) 261 St. Louis V. Sternberg, (69 Mo. 289) 261 St. Louis V. Vert, (84 Mo. 204) 156 St. Louis V. Weber, (44 Mo. 547) 128, 150, 158 St. Louis V. W. U. T. Co., (149 U. S. 465) 297, 301 St. Louis V. Wiggins Ferry Co., (11 Wall. 423, 272 St. Louis V. Witbans, (90 Mo. 646) 95 St. Louis V. Woodruff, (71 Mo. 92) 124, 300 St. Louis Br. Co. v. East St. Louis, (121 111. 238) 42, 272 St, Louis Bridge Co. v. People, (123 111. 226) 294 St. Louis Co. Court v. Griswold, (58 Mo. 175) 232 St. Louis etc. Co. v. Dunn, (78 111. 197) 136 St. Louis etc. Co. v. Haller, (82 111. 208) 303 St. Louis etc. Co. v. Mathias, (50 Ind. 65) 136 St. Louis etc. R. R. Co. v. Teters, (68 111. 144) 232 St. Louis Hospital ». Williams, (19 Mo. 609) 49 St. Louis R. Co. V. So. Ry. Co., (15 S. W. R. 1013) 302 St. Marks Church v. Brunswick, (78 Ga. 541, 3 S. E. R. 561) 270 St. Mary's Industrial School v. Brown, (45 Md. 310) 254 St. Paul V. Bumes, (38 Minn. 176) 118 St. Pauls. Butler, (39 Minn. 459) 171 St. Paul V. Colter, (12 Minn. 41) 158 St. Paul V. Dow, (37 Minn. 20) 131 St. Paul V. Seitz, (3 Minn. 297) 347 St. Paul V. Smith, (27 Minn. 164) 123, 299 St. Paul V. Troyer, (3 Minn. 291) 125 St. Paul V. Trueger, (25 Minn. 248) 124 St. Paul & Pac. R. R. Co. v. St. Paul, (21 Minn. 526) 259 a St. Paul, Minneapolis & M. Ry. Co. I). Minneapolis, (35 Minn. 141) 241 St. Paul W. Co. V. Ware, (16 Wall. 566) 347 St. Peter v. Baur, (19 Minn. 327) 102 St. Peter's Church v. Scott Co. Com'rs, (12 Minn. 395) 270 St. Vincents etc. v. Troy, (76 N. Y. 108) 312 Strahl, In re, (16 Iowa, 369) 105, 381 Strand, lu re, (21 Pac. R. 654) 8 Strasser v. N. Y., L. & W. R. Co., (128 N. Y. 157, 623) 302 Stratford etc. Co., In re, (38 Up. Can. Q. B. 112) 185 Stratman, In re, (39 Cal. 517) 102 Stratton v. Herrick, (9 Johns. 356) 320 Stratton v. Oulton, (28 Cal. 44) 85 clxviii TABLE OF CASES CITED. Eeferences are to Sections. Straub v. Pittsburgh, (138 Pa. St. 356) 26 Stratton v. Staples, (59 Me. 94) 337, 348 Strauss v. Eagle Ins. Co., (5 Ohio St. 59) 163 Strauss v. Pontiac, (40 111. 301) 62, 125 Street v. Holyoke, (105 Mass. 82)344 Street v. Kew Orleans, (32 La. An. 577) 335 Street Case, (1 La. An. 412) 97 Street Railway v. Cumminsville, (14 Ohio St. 523) 238, 304 Streubel v. Milwaukee, (12 Wis. 67) 283 Strickland v. K. K. Co., (27 Miss. 209) 184 Strickler v. Midi. Ey., (125 Ind. 412, 25 N. E. E. 455) 247 Striken). Kelly, (3 Denio, 322) 98, 148, 250 Strohme v. Iowa City, (47 Iowa, 42) 395 Strong V. Campbell, (11 Barb. 135) 338 Strong V. Darling, (9 Ohio, 201) 215 Strong V. District, (1 Maokey, 265) 170 Strong V. District, (4 Mackey, 242, 9 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cases, 568) 100 Strong V. Steven's Point, (62 Wis. 255) 352 Strosser v. Fort Wayne, (100 Ind. 443, 451, 8 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 636, 643) 53, 55, 61, 62 Stroud V. Philada., (61 Pa. St. 255) 248, 277 Stroudsburg v. Brown, (11 Pa. Co. Ct. E. 272) 47 Stroudsburg «. Wilkes-Barre E. E. Co., (12 Pa. Co. Ct. E. 395) 302 Strouse v. Whittlesy, (41 Conn. 559) 321, 3.37 Struthers v. Dunkirk etc., (87 Pa. St. 282) 302, 303 Stuart V. Cambridge, (125 Mass. 102) 109, 281 Stuart V. Havens, (17 Neb. 211) 348 Stuart V. Lansing, (104 U. S. 505) 195 d Stuart V. Machiasport, (48 Me. 477) 352 . Stuart V. Palmer, (74 N. Y. 183) 279 Stuart B. Stuart, (6 01. & Fin. 968) 327 Stubbs V. Lee, (64 Me. 195) 86 Studley v. Oshkosh, (45 Wis. 380) 350 6 Sturgeon v. Daviess Co. Com'rs, (65 Ind. 302) 209 Sturges V. Crowninshield, (4 Wheat. 122) 194 Sturtevant v. Alton, (3 McLean, 393) 163, 169 Stuyvesant v. Woodruff, (21 N. J. L. 145) 219 Suarez ». Man E. Co., (15 N. T. S. 224) 248 Submarine Tel. Co. v. Dickson, (15 C. B. N. S. 759)3506 Succession of Teaulet, (28 La. An. 42)55 Succession of Vance, (2 So. E. 54) 203 Sudbury v. Stearns, (21 Pick. 148) 106 SufBeld V. Hathaway, (44 Conn. .521) 119, 287, 392 Suffolk V. Parker, (79 Va. 660) 120, 336 a Suffolk Sav. Bank v: Boston, (149 Mass. 364) 195 c, 195 d Sullivan v. Gilroy, (55 Hun, 285) 71 Sullivan v. Holyoke, (135 Mass. 92) 324, 338 a Sullivan v. Leadville, (11 Colo. 483) 98, 165 Sullivan v. McCammou, (51 Ind. 264) 326 a Sullivan v. Kew Tork, (53 N. T. 652) 28 Sullivan ». Phillips, (11 N. E. E. 310) 3.55, 392, 396 Sullivan v. Eoyer, (72 Cal. 248) 301 Sullivan v. Sch. Dis., (39 Kan. 347) 170 Sullivan v. Walton, (20 Fla. 552) 197 Summers v. Daviess Co., (103 Ind. 262) 92, 324, 332 Summerville v. Pressley, (11 S. E. K. 545) 118 Sumner v. Dorchester First Parish, (4 Pick. 361) 326 Sumner v. Peebles, (22 Pac. E. 221, 5 Wash. St. 471) 312 Sumter v. Deschamps, (4 S. C. 297) 127 Sunbury etc. v. Cooper, (7 Am. Law Eeg. 158) 149 Sunderland v. Martin, (112 Ind. 411) 396 Super's V. Bates, (17 N. Y. 242) 169 Supervisors v. People, (110 111. 511) 362 Supr's V. V. S., (4 Wall. 435) 362 Supervisors of Doddridge v. Stout, (9 W. Va. 703) 232 Supervisors of Mercer County t>. Hubbard, (45 111. 139) 1916 Supervisors of Portage Co. v. Wis. Cent. E. E. Co., (121 Mass. 467) 254 Surrocco v. Geary, (3 Cal. 69) 335 TABLE OP CASES CITED. Eeterences are to Sections. clxix Susquehanna v. Simmons, (112 Pa. St. 884) 331 a Susquehanna Bk. v. Broome Co., (25 N. Y. 312) 391 Susquehanna De Bor. v. Simmons, (79 Ind. 491) 347 Sussex ». Strader (18 N. J. L. 108) 325, 400 Sutton V. Clavk, (1 Marsh. 429) 328 Sutton V. Clarke, (6 Taunton, 28) 329 Sutton B. Cole, (3 Mass. 239) 200 Sutton V. Wauwatosa, (29 Wis. 21, 28) 352 Sutton First Parish v. Cole, (3 Pick. 232) 202 Sutton's Heirs v. Louisville, (5 Dana, 28) 245 Sutton's Hosp. Case, (10 Eep. 31) 149 Sutton V. Carroll Co. Pol. Bd., (41 Miss. 236) 331, 333 Suydam v. Grand St. etc. Co., (41 Barb. 375) 321 Swails V. State, (4 Ind. 516) 30 Swain v. Comstock, (18 "Wis. 463) 31, 32 Swamp Land Dist. v. Haggin, (64 Cal. 204) 256 Swan V. Chi. etc. Co., (38 Mo. App. 588) 232 Swan ». Cumberland, (8 Gill, 150) 249, 398 Swan V. Gray, (44 Miss. 393) 365 Swan V. Williams, (3 Mich. 427) 233, 241 Swann, Ex parte, (96 Mo. 44) 24 Swann v. Buck, (40 Miss. 268) 79 Swan Point Cemetery v. Tripp, (14 R. I. 199) 270 Swatz V. Flatboats, (14 La. An. 243). 133 Sweeney v. Mayor etc., (5 Daly, 274) 67 Sweeney v. Pt. Burwell H. Co., (17 U. C. C. P. 574) 121 Sweeney v. Spooner, (3 B. & S. 329) 104 Sweet V. Com'rs, (16 Minn. 107) 177 Sweet V. Hulbert, (51 Barb. 312) 183, 184 Sweetzer v. Mead, (5 Mich. 107) 167 Swett V. Cutts, (50 N. H. 439) 354 a Swift V. Mayor, (83 N". Y. 528) 172 Swift I). Newport, (7 Bush, 37) 56, 259, 276 Swift V. New York, (83 N. Y. 528) 143, 338 a Swift B. Topeka, (43 Kan. 671) 153 Swift V. Wayne Co., (64 Mich. 479) 398 Swift V. Williamsburg, (24 Barb. 427) 338 Sycamore Alley, In re, (9 Pa. Co. Ct. E. 61) 259 a Sykes v. Columbus, (55 Miss. 115) 196, 376 Sykes v. Pawlet, (43 Vt. 446) 346 Symonds v. Clay Co. Sup., (71 111. 355) 325, 375 Syracuse etc. Co. v. People, (66 Barb. 25) 120 Syracuse etc. Co. v. Rome etc. Co., (22 N. Y. S. 321) 396 Syracuse W. Co. v. Syracuse, (2 N. Y. State Eep. 364) 296 Syracuse Water Co. v. Syracuse, (116 N. Y. 167) 144 T. Taber ». Grafmiller, (109 Ind. 206) 264, 276, 290 Tackaberry v. Keokuk, (32 Iowa, 155) 267 Tacoma v. Lillis, (31 Pac. E. 321) 79 Tacoma L. Co. v. Pierce Co., (1 Wash. St. 482) 256 Taft B. Pittsford, (28 Vt. 286) 169 Taggart v. Com., (21 Pa. St. 527) 120 Taggart b. Detroit, (38 N. W. E. 714) 84 Taggart v. Newport St. E. Co., (19 Atl. Eep. 326) 306 a Tainter v. Worcester, (123 Mass. 311) 327 a Taintor v. Mayor, (19 N. J. Eq. 46) 396 Talbert v. Hudson, (16 Gray, 417) 236, 254 Talbot V. Dent, (9 B. Mon. 526) 24, 184 Talbot u. E. Machias, (76 Me. 416) 79 Talbot B. Iberville, (24 La. An. 135) 189 a Talbot V. Queen Anne Co., (50 Md. 245) 3 Talbott V. Grace, (30 Ind. 389) 220 Talbott B. King, (9 S. E. R. 48, 32 W. Va. 6) 220 Talbott V. Eichmond & D. E. E. Co., (31 Gratt. 685, 22 Alb. L. J. 57) 219 Talbott B. Taunton, (140 Mass. 552) 342 Talby v. Freedraan's Trust Co., (1 MacArthur, 522) 177 Tallahassee b. Fortune, (3 Fla. 19) 349 Tallant v. Bermingham, (39 Iowa, 543) 278, 326 Tallapoosa v. Tarver, (21 Ala. 661) 369 clxx TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Tallman v. Janesville, (17 Wis. 71) ?62 Tamis v. King, (40 Conn. 298) 106 Tanner v. Albron, (.5 Hill, 121) 122 Tappan v. Gray, (9 Paige, 507) 81, 82 Tarbush i). Norwich, (38 Conn. 225) 92 Tarlton, In re, (2 Ala. 35) 249 Tarry ». Ashton, (1 Q. B. Div. 314) 300 Tarver «. Tallapoosa Cora'rs Ct., (17 Ala. 527) 368 Tash V. Adams, (10 Gush. 252) 139, 897 Tate V. Ohio etc. E. K. Co., (7 Ind. 479) 302, 306 Tatem v. Wright, (3 Zabr. 429) 258 Tatum !). Trenton, (85 Ga. 468, 11 S. E. K. 705) 326 Tawney v. Lynn & Ely Ky. Co., (16 L. J. N. S. Eq. 282) 243 Taxpayers of Greene, In re, (38 How. Pr. 515) 189 Taxpayers Assn. v. Kirkpatrick, (7- Atl. K. 625) 259 Tayler v. Pine Bluff, (34 Ark. 603) 124 Taylor, Ex parte, (58 Miss. 473) 258 Taylor v. Americus, (39 Ga. 59) 105 Taylor v. Austin, (32 Minn. 247) 355 Taylor v. Beebe, (3 Bob. 262) 132 Taylor v. Board, (31 Pa. St. 73) 326 a Taylor ». Brooks, (5 Cal. 332) 177 Taylor v. Caesar, (11 Up. Can. Q. B. 461) 66 Taylor v. Carondelet, (22 Mo. 105, 112) 155 Taylor v. Chandler, (9 Heisk. 349) 259 a Taylor v. Constable, (13 N. Y. 597) 353 Taylor 13. Cumberland, (64 Md. 68) 331 Taylor v. Davis Co., (40 Iowa, 295) 314, 315, .353 Taylor v. Donner, (31 Cal. 480) 256 Taylor v. Douglas, (2 Douglas, 744^ 748) 346 Taylor v. Port Wayne, (47 lud. 281) 385 Taylor v. Greenhalgh, (L. E. 9 Q. B. 487) 350 Taylor v. Griswold, (5 Day, 22) 121, 146 Taylor v. Henry, (2 Pick. 397) 95, 108 Taylor v. Lambertville, (43 N. J. Eq. 107) 165 Taylor v. Lambertville, (43 N. J. Eq. 107) 145 Taylor v. Metro. E. Ey. Co., (55 Su- per Ct. 555) 305, 307 Taylor v. Mt. Vernon, (58 Hun, 384) 348 Taylor v. Newberne, (2 Jones Eq. 141) 24, 255 Taylor v. Palmer, (31 Cal. 240) 165, 271 326 Taylor v. People, (66 111. 322) 326 Taylor v. Palmer, (31 Cal. 241) 148 Taylor v. Phillips, (35 W. Va. 554) 215, 221 Taylor ». Plymouth, (8 Meto. 462) 335 Taylor v. Porter, (4 Hill, 140) 234 a Taylor v. Robinson, (72 Tex. 364) 12 Taylor v. K. E. Co., (53 N. W. E. 855, 83 Wis. 645) 300 Taylor v. St. Louis, (14 Mo. 20) 113, 292, 329 Taylor v. Taylor, (10 Minn. 112) 65, 371 Taylor v. Yonkers, (105 N. Y. 202, 11 N. E. E. 642) 344 Teall V. Syracuse, (120 N. Y. 184) 92 Tebo V. Brooklyn, (31 N. E. E. 984) 54 Tecumseh ». Phillips, (5 Neb. 305) 28 Temperance Hall Assn. v. Giles, (83 N. J. L. 260) 343, 348 Temple v. Sumner, (51 Miss. 13) 123 Templin v. Iowa City, (14 Iowa, 59) 354 a Ten Eyck v. Canal Co., (18 N. J. L. 200) 354 Tennant v. Ai-cker, (48 N. W. E. 577) 360 Tennant v. Crocker, (48 N. W. E. 577) 359 Tenn. etc. Co. v. Adams, (3 Head, • 596) 302 Tenn. etc. Co. ». Moore, (36 Ala. 371) 375 Tenney v. East Warren Lumber Co., (43 N. H. 343) 51 Tenth Nat. Bk. v. Mayor, (80 N. T. 660) 126 Terhune v. Mayor, (88 N. Y. 47) 92, 130 Terre Haute v. Beach, (96 lud. 143) 280 Terre Haute v. Lake, (43 Ind. 480) 165 Terre Haute v. Turner, (36 Ind. 522) 265 Terre Haute & I. E. E. Co. v. Scott, (74 Ind. 29) 218 Terre Haute E. E. Co. b. Buck, (96 Ind. .346) 352 a Terrell)). Dissaint, (71 Tex. 770) 189 a Terrett ». Taylor, (9 Cranch, 43) 205 Terrell v. Wheeler, (123 N. Y. 76) 259 a TABLE OF CASES CITED:" clxxi Beferences are to Sections. Ten-ill v. Blooriifield, (21 S. W. R. 1041) 290, 312, 327 Terrill v. Dessalnt, (9 S. W. 593) 192 Tei-rett o. Taylor, (9 Cranch, 52) 11 Territory v. Armstrong, (6 Dak. 226) 385 Territory v. B. Co., (20 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cases, 44) 371 Territory v. Carson, (7 Mont. 412) 79 Territory v. Com'rs, (8 Mont. 396) 60 Territory ». Dakota, (2 Dak. 155) 122 Territory v. McPherson, (50 N. W. R. 351, 6 Dak. 27) 125 Territory v. Potts, (3 Mont. 354) 365 Territory v. Woodbury, (44 JST. W. R. 1077) 375 Terry v. Bank, (18 Wis. 87) 14 Terry v. Wisconsin M. & F. Ins., (18 Wis. 87) 194 Teshi). Comw., (4 Dana, 522) 102 Teter v. W. V. C. & P. Ry. Co., (14 S. E. R. 146, 35 S. W. R. 438) 238 Texas etc. Co. v. Rosedale, (64 Tex. 80) 304 Tharnton v. Grant, (10 R. I. 477) 132 Thayer v. Boston, (19 Pick. 511) 92, 220, 338 The Craigendoran, (31 Fed. Rep. 87) 133 The Francesca T., (9 Ben. 34) 133 The Geneva, (16 Fed. Rep. 874) 133 The King v. Croke, (Cowp. 29) 49 The Lizzie E., (30 Fed. Rep. 876) 133 The Modoc, (26 Fed. Rep. 718) 353 The Queen v. Bailiffs of Ipswich, (2 Ld. Raym. 1232) 48 The Queen v. The Registrar of Joint Stock Cos., (10 Q. B. 839) 48 The Queen v. Baruhart, (7 Up. Can. L. J. 126) 100 The Queen v. Wood, (5 E. & B. 49) 130 The Virginia Rulon, (13 Blatchf. 519) 133 Theall v. Yonkers, (21 Hun, 265) 92 Theilan v. Porter, (14 Lea, 622) 120 Theobald v. Louisville, (40 Alb. L. J. 335) 302 Thicknesse v. Canal Co., (4 M. & W. 472) 37 Third Ave. R'y Co., In re, (24 N. E. Rep. 651) 306 a Third Ave. etc. Co. v. New Tork, (54 N. T. 159) 396 Third Municipality of N. O. v. Ursu- line Nuns, (2 La. An. 611) 56 Third Nat. Bk. v. Seneca Falls, (15 Fed. Rep. 783) 196 Tliirty-second Street, In re, (19Wend. 128) 221 Thomas, Ex parte, (71 Cal. 204) 258 Thomas v. Ashland, (12 Ohio St. 124) 104, 116 Thomas v. Burnes, (23 Miss. 550) 76 Thomas v. Dakin, (22 Wend. 9) 25 Thomas v. Gain, (35 Mich. 155) 259 a, 277 Thomas ». Grafton, (34 W. Va. 282) 92 Thomas v. Hot Springs, (34 Ark. 553) 122 Thomas v. Leland, (24 Wend. 65) 16, 187 Thomas v. Morgan Co., (39 111. 490) 1916 Thomas v. Mt. Vernon, (9 Ohio, 290) 102, 103, 125 Thomas v. Owens, (4 Mo. 188) 81 Thomas v. Richmond, (12 Wall. 349) 146, 164 Thomas v. West Jersey R. R. Co., (101 U. S. 70) 210 Thomas v. Winchester, (57 Am. Dec. 455) 351 Thomason v. Ashworth, (73 Cal. 73) 34 Thompson v. Abbott, (61 Mo. 176)'58 Thompson v. Allen Co., (115 U. S. 550) 42, 359 Thompson v. Bridgewater, (7 Pick. 188) 352 Thompson v. Carroll, (22 How. 422) 146, 265 Thompsons. Chicago etc. Co., (19 S. W. R. 77) 243, 244 Thompson v. Commonwealth, (81 Pa. St. 314) 184 Thompson v. Floyd, (2 Jones, L. 313) 255 Thompson v. Gibson, (7 M. & W. 455) 120 Thompson v. Inliabitants, (5 Gray, 110) 353 Thompson v. Judge, (9 Ala. 338) 371 Thompson v. Mathews, (2 Edw. Ch. 202) 318 Thompson v. Moran, (44 Mich. 602) 201 Thompson v. Pacific Co., (9 Wall. 579) 22 Thompson v. Park Com'rs, (44 Mich. 602) 187 Thompson v. People, (23 Wend. 537) 380 Thompson v. Perrine, (103 TJ. S. 806) 195 iZ Thompson v. Peru, (29 Ind. 305) 189 Thompson v. Polk Co., (38 Minn. 130) 328 Thompson v. Pittston, (59 Me. 545) 139 clxxii TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Thompson v. Quincy, (83 Midi. 1Y3) 350 6 Thompson ». Soliermerhorn, (6 !N". Y. 92) 110, 113 Thompson v. Sunderland etc., (L. R. 2 Ex. Div. 420) 295 Thompson v. Tlie Mayor, (11 N. Y. 115) 132 Thompson v. U. S., (103 U. S. 480) 86, 368 Thompson Houston Electric Co. v. Newton, (42 Fed. Eep. 723) 144 a, 189 Tliomson v. Lee Co., (3 Wall. 320) 110, 254 Thomson v. Union Pac. B. R. Co., (9 Wall. 579) 258 Thorndike v. Boston, (1 Met. 245) 66 Thorpe v. Brumfitt, (L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. 650) 300 Thorpe v. Rutland etc. Co., (27 Vt. 140) 302 Threadgill v. Ansen, (99 N. C. 352) 325, 339 Thunder Bay etc. Co. v. Speedily, (31 Mich. 332) 239 Thurston v. St. Joseph, (51 Mo. 510) 355 Tickno, In re, (88 Cal. 294) 146 Tice V. Bay City, (84 Mich. 461) 326 a, 350 6 Tice V. Munn, (94 N. Y. 621) 352 a Tide Water v. Archer, (9 Gill & J. 479) 73 Tidewater Co. v. Costar, (18 N. J. Eq. 518) 232, 259 Tie Loy, In re, (26 Fed. Eep. 611) 121 Tiedt V. Carstevsen, (61 Iowa, 334) 398 Tierney b. Brown, (65 Miss. 563) 97 Tierney v. Dodge, (9 Minn. 166) 25, 102, 104 Tiffin V. McCormack, (34 Ohio St. 638) 347 Tift V. Towns, (53 Ga. 47) 353 Tifet V. Buffalo, 82 N. Y. 205) 17 Tighe J). Lowell, (119 Mass. 472) 340 Tile V. Mayfleld, (19 S. W. R. 598) 12 Tilford V. Olathe, (44 Kan. 721) 56 Tillman v. People, (12 Mich. 401) 222 Tillotsen v. East Saginaw, (54 N. W. R. 182) 8 Tilson V. Newman, (23 Vt. 421) 67 Times v. State. (26 Ala. 165) 104 Tiudley v. Salem, (137 Mass. 171) 329, 339 Tinges v. Baltimore, (51 Md. 600) 221 Tingue v. Rochester, (101 N. Y. 294) 397 Tinicum Fishing Co. u. Carter, (61 Pa. St. 21) 239 Tinker v. Russell, (14 Pick, 279) 327 Tinkhara v. Town of Stockbridge (24 Atl. 761, 64 Vt. 480) 313 ' Tinsdale v. Norton, (8 Mete. 388) 346 Tinsman v. R. R. Co., (2 Dutch. 148) 2,8 Tippecanoe v. Cox, (6 Ind. 403) 169 Tipping V. St. Helens Sm. Co., (11 H. L. Cas. 642) 120 Tipton V. Norman, (72 Mo. 380) 148 Tipton Co. V. Rogers L. & M. Works, (103 U. S. 523) 254 Titler v. Iowa Co., (48 Iowa, 90) 3.53 Titus V. Northbridge, (97 Mass. 258) 342 Titusville v. Brennan, (143 Pa. St. 642, 28 W. N. C. 534) 258 Tobitt V. Louisville, (4 S. W. 345) 276 Todd V. Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. K. E. Co., (19 Ohio St. 514) 227 Todd V. Troy, (61 N. Y. 506) 344, 350 a Toledo A. A. etc. Co. v. Pennsyl. Co., (54 Fed. 730) 396 Toledo Com. S. E. Co. v. Toledo Elec. St. Ry. Co., (6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 362) 148 Toledo etc. Co. v. Detroit etc. Co., (62 Mich. 564, 578) 241 Toledo etc. Co. v. Jacksonville, (67 111. 37) 306 Toledo etc. Co. w. Toledo etc. Co., (26 Wkly. L. Bui. 172) 241 Toledo etc. Co. v. Toledo El. S. R. Co., (6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 362) 232 Toledo P. & W. etc. v. Chenon, (43 111. 209) 290 Tomlin ». Dubuque etc. R. R. Co., (32 Iowa, 106) 239 Tomlin v. R. R. Co., (32 Iowa, 106) 132 Tomlinson v. Branch, (15 Wall. 460) 270 Toms V. Whitby, (35 Up. Can. Q. B. 195) 343, 351 Tonawanda R. R. Co. v. Munger, (5 Denio, 255) 301 Tone c. Columbus, (39 Ohio St. 281) 278 Tone V. New York, (70 N. T. 157) 338 a Toomey v. London etc. Co., (3 C. B. N. S. 146) 351 Topeka v. Gage, (24 Pac. 82) 397 Topeka v. Gillett, (32 Kan. 431) 61 Topeka v. Huntoon, (26 Pac. E. 488) 277 Topeka v. Sells, (29 Pac. 604) 292 TABLE OF CASE8 CITED. Eeferences are to Sections. clxxiii Topsliam v. Lewiston, (74 Me. 236) 66 Topsham v. Blondell, (82 Me. 152) 282 Topsham v. Rogers, (42 Vt. 189) 170 Torbitt V. Louisville, (4 S. W. R. 345) 326 Torrey v. Scranton, (19 Atl. R. 351) 355 Toronto v. Bowes, (4 Grant, 504) 166 Torrey v. Milbury, (21 Pick. 64) 95 Totterdell v. Glazby, (2 Wils. 226) 157 Touchard v. Toucliard, (5 Gal. 306) 9 Tourtellot v. Rosebrook, (11 Metcf. 460) 338 Towanda Bridge, In re, (91 Pa. St. 216) 144, 238, 302 Tower v. Rutland, (56 Vt. 28) 223 Tower v. Tower, (18 Pick. 262) 129 Tower v. Welker, (53 N. W. R. 289) 86 Town V. Blaeberry, (29 111. 137) 250 Town V. Culver, (19 Wall. 84) 190 Town V. Williamson, (91 Ind. 541) 279 Town Board, In re, (7 N. Y. Supp. 165) 362 Town Council v. Harbors, (6 Rich. L. 96) 123 Town of Cicero v. Williamson, (91 Ind. 541) 56 Town of Eagle v. Kohn, (83 111. 292) 1916 Town of Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango Co., (13 N. Y. 143) 60 Town of Mount Pleasant v. Beck- with, (100 tr. S. 514) 58 Town of Monticello v. Banks, (2 S. W. R. 852, 48 Ark. 251) 255 Town of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee, (12 Wis. 93) 57 Town of Prairie v. Lloyd, (97 111. 179) 196 Town of Boxbury v. R. R. Co., (14 Atl. 92) 317 Town of Solon v. Williamsburg Sav. Bk., (35 Hun, 1) 189 Town of Suffield jj. Town of East Granby, (52 Conn. 175) 53 Town of Toledo v. Edens, (59 Iowa, 352) 57 Towns V. HaiTis, (13 Tex. 507) 67 Towns B. Tallahassee, (11 Fla. 190) 124 Townsend v. Des Moines, (42 Iowa, 657) 350 a Townsend v. Hoyle, (20 Conn. 1) 240, 288 Townsend v. Lamb, (14 Neb. 324) 186 Townsend v. Manistee, (88 Mich. 408, 50 N. W. R. 321) 279 Townsend v. Susquehanna T. Co., (6 Johns. 90) 328 Township v. Rankin, (70 Iowa, 65) 142 Tp. of Norway v. Clear Lake, (11 Iowa, 506) 164 Toyhales Case, (Cro. Car. 310) 120 Tracey v. People, (6 Colo. 151) 98 Trafton v. Alfred, (15 Me. 258) 91 Train v. Boston Dis. Co., (144 Mass. 523) 118 Trammel v. State, (9 So. R. 815, 93 Ala. 388) 47 Trammell v. Russellville, (34 Ark. 105) 92, 327, 338 Trans, v. Skinner, (40 W. W. Rep. 234) 377 Trans. Co. v. Chicago, (99 U. S. 635) 287, 301 Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635) 239 Trans. Co. v. Parkersburg, (107 U. S. 691) 133 Trainer v. Lawrence, (36 111. App. 90) 249 Traphagen v. Jersey City, 29 N. J. Eq. 206) 294 Trask v. Maguire, (18 Wall. 206) 270 Travelers v. Oswego, (55 Fed. R. 361) 196 Treadway v. Schnauber, (1 Dak. Ter. 236) 169 Treadwell v. Com'rs, (11 Ohio St. 190) 3, 216 Treadwell v. New York, (1 Daly, 123) 336 a Treat v. Middletown, (8 Conn. 243) 363, 377 Treise v. St. Paul, (36 Minn. 526) 342, 346 Trenton R. B. Case, (6 Whart. 225) 308 Trescott v. Waterloo, (26 Fed. Rep. 592) 338 Trester o. Mo. P. R. Co., (49 N. W. R. 1110) 241 Trevin v. Lewis, (4 M. & C. 249) 393 Troy B. Atchison etc Co., (13 Kan. 70) 108 Trimble B. Buoyrus, (3 Bates, 419) 117 Trimble B. Sterling, (12 S. W. R. 1066) 267 Trinity & S. R. Co. v. Lane, (79 Tex. 643) 339, 363, 373 Tripler b. New York, (63 Hun, 630) 326 Tripp V. Frazier, (4 Har. & Johns. 446) 203 clxxiv TABLE OF CASES CITED.' Keferences are to Sections. Troy 1). Mutual Bank, (20 N. Y. 387) 267 Trott V. Warren, (11 Me. 227) 170 Trowbridge v. Haran, (78 N. Y. 439) 397 Trowbridge v. Newark, (46 N. J. L. 140) 75 Troxall ». Vinton, (77 Iowa, 90) 3506 Troy V. Troy K. R. Co., (49 N. Y. 657) 348 Troy V. Winters, (2 Hun, 63) 130 Troy etc. v. Com., (127 N". Y. 43) 80 Truax v. Pool, (46 Iowa, 256) 56, 57 Truehelus v. City Council, (1 Nott & McCord, 227) 17 True V. Davis, (22 N. E. 410) 55 True V. Melvin, (43 N. H. 503) 365 Truesdale v. Peoria C. S. Co., (101 111. 561) 396 Truman v. Walgam, (2 Wils. 296) 320 Trumbull v. White, (5 Hill, 46) 263 Trustees v. Campbell, (16 Ohio St. 11)50 Trustees v. Cherry, (8 Ohio St. 564) 24, 165 Trustees v. Hill, (6 Cow. 23) 88 Trustees v. Hoboken, (33 N. J. L. 13) 216 Trustees v. Keeting, (2 Denio, 341)125 Trustees v. Kinner, (13 Bush, 334) 377 Trustees v. McCounell, (12- 111. 138) 275 Trustees v. Mllw. etc. Co., (45 N. W. R. 1086) 302 Trustees v. Moody, (62 Ala. 389) 165 Trustees v. Parks, (10 Me. 141) 25 Trustees v. Peaslee, (15 N. H. 317) 48 Trustees v. People, (121 111. 552) 374 Trustees v. Reneau, (2 Swan,) 50 Trustees v. School, (12 N. R. 243) 225 Trustees u. Shotwell, (45 N. J. Eq. 106) 283 Trustees v. Tatman, (13 111. 30) 2 Trustees v. Winston, (5 S. & Port. 17) 15 Trustees etc. v. Johnson, (2 Cart. 219) 377 Trustees etc. of Princeton v. Manck, (35 Ind. 51) 61 Trustees of Academy v Erie, (31 Pa. St. 515) 32, 148 Trustees of First Ev. Church v. Walsh, (57 111. 370) 217, 222 Tubbesing v. Burlington, (68 Iowa, 691) 276 Tuckahoe Canal Co. b. Railroad R. R. Co., (11 Leigh, 42) 124, 144, 238 Tucker u. Eldred, (6 R. I. 404) 293 Tucker v. Fairbanks, (98 Mass. 101) 167 Tucker v. Justices, (13 Ire. 434) 98 169 Tucker v. Virginia City, (4 Nev. 20) 118 Tucker v. Virginia City, (4 Keb. 20) 164 Tuff V. Warman, (2 Q. B. N. S. 740) 352 Tugman v. Chicago, (78 111. 405) 152 Tuley V. State, (1 Ind. 500) 81 TuUytown, In re, (11 Pa. Co. Ct R. 97) 24 Turley v. Thomas, (8 Carr. & P. 103) 321 Turner, In re, (5 Ohio, 542) 359, 363 Turner k. Althaus, (6 Neb. 54) 30 Turner ». Cruzen, (70 Iowa, 202) 169 Turner ». Dartmouth, (13 Allen, 291) 354 a Turner v. Forsyth, (3 S. E. R. 649, 78 Ga. 683) 401 Turner v. Holland, (33 N. W. R. 383) 224, 225 Turner v. Indianapolis, (96 Ind. 51) 350 Turner v. Maryland, (107 U. S. 38) 127 Turner v. Newbergh, (109 N. Y. 301) 347 Turner v. Nye, (154 Mass. 579) 232 Turnerj). People'sFerry Co., (21 Fed. Rep. 91) 219 Turner v. Woodbury, (57 Iowa, 440) 325 Turney v. Bridgeport, (55 Com. 412) 171 Turnpike Co., Ex parte, (62 Ala. 93) 399 Turnp. Co. v. Atkinson,(l Sneed. 426) 318 Turnp. Co. v. Campbell, (2 Humph. 467) 320 Turnpike Co. v. Cincinnati, (4 Am. L. Reo. 325) 57 Turnpike Com'rs v. Louisville etc. Co., (1 S. W. R. 671) 282 Turnp. Co. b. McKean, (11 Johns. 154) 107 Turnp. Co. v. Vandusen, (10 Vt. 199) 320 Turpin V. Com'rs., (7 Ind. 172) 79 Tutill V. West Ham L. Bd., (L. B. 8 C. P. 447) 346 Tuttle, Ex parte, (91 Cal. 589) 117 Tuttle V. Everett, (15 Miss. 27) .326 Tuttle V. Jackson, (6 Wend. 224) 87 Tuttle B. Weston, (59 Wis. 151) 142 Tyler b. Beacher, (44 Vt. 648) 188, 234 a Tyler b. Columbia, (6 Ohio Cir. Ct R. 224) 146 TABLE OF CASES CITED. fieferences are to Sections. clxxv Tyler v. Hudson, (147 Mass. 609) 234 Tyler v. Sturdy, (108 Mass. 196) 194 Tyler v. Tyler, (2 Root, 4J9) 69 Tyng V. Boston, (133 Mass. 372) 87 Tyrone Twp. School Directors v. Denkleberger, (6 Pa. 31) 203 Tyrrell v. Wheeler, (123 N. Y. 76) 12, 255 Tyson v. Halifax Sell. Dls., (51 Pa. St. 9) 139, 254 Twenty-ninth Street, In re, (1 Hill, 189) 221 Twilley v. Perkins, (26 Atl. E. 286) 300 Twiss V. Pt. Huron, (63 Mich. 528) 173 u. Udall V. Trustees, (19 Johns. 179) 54 Uhl V. Taxing District, (6 Lea, 610) 42 Uhrig V. St. Louis, (44 Mo. 458) 259 a Uline V. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., (101 N". Y. 98, 4 N. E. E. 536) 307 Ulman v. Baltimore, (20 Atl. R. 141) 279 Ulrich 13. St. Louis, (112 Mo. 138) 324 Umatilla Ir. Co. v. Barnhart, (30Pac. R. 37) 238 Underhill v. Essex, (23 Atl. Rep. 617) 9, 14 Underbill v. Manhattan Ry. Co., (27 Abb. N. C. 478, 21 Civ. Pro. R.441) 243 Underhill v. Smith, (Chip. 81) 282 Underhill v. Sonora, (17 Cal. 172) 199 Underwood v. Brockman, (4 Dana, 309) 327 Underwood v. Green, (42 N. Y. 140) 118, 120 Underwood D. Stuyresant, (19 Johns. 186) 221 Underwood v. White, (27 Ark. 382) 361 Union v. Knox Co., (90 Tenn. 541) 53 Union Bank v. Hill, (3 Cold. 325) 258 Union Bank of Tenn. v. State, (9 Yerg. 490) 255 Union Co. v. Peckham, (12 Atl. Eep. 130) 221 Union Coal Co. v. La Salle, (26 J^T. E. Rep. 506) 143 Union College, In re, (29 N. E. R. 460, 129 N. Y. 308) 16 Union Depot Co. v. Brunswick, (31 Minn. 297) 132 Union etc. Co. v. Proctor, (12 Colo. 194) 12 Union etc. Co. v. Slee, (12 N. E. E. 543, 33 N. E. R. 222) 243 Union Nat. Bank v. New York, (51 N. Y. 638) 326 Union Nat. Bk. v. Matthews, (98 U. S. 628) 207 Union Pac. R. R. v. Cheyenne, (113 U. S. 516, 525) 397 Union Pac. R. Co. i'. Com'rs, (4 Neb. 450) 184 Union Pac. R. Co. b. Davis Co., (6 Kan. 256) 12, 14, 186 Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. Dodge Co., (98 U. S. 541) 326(1 Union Pao. R. R. Co. v. Hall, (91 U. S. 343) 314, 359, 363 Union Pac. R. Co. v. Kansas City, (42 Kan. 497) 56 Union Pao. R. Co. v. Lincoln Co., (3 Dill. 300) 195 a, 196 Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. Lincoln Co., (1 Dillon C. C. R. 314) 258 Union Pac. R. E. Co. v. Peniston, (18 Wall. 5) 258 Union P. E. Co. v. Eyan, (2 Wyo. 408) 110 Union Pass. Ry. Co. v. Philadelphia, (101 U. S. 528) 274 Uniontown v. Com., (34 Pa. St. 293, 296) 377 Union Township ». G-ibboney, (94 Pa. St. 534) 3 Union Trust Co. v. Monticello etc. E. E. Co., (63 N. Y. 314) 190 United States v. Thorpe, (2 Bond, 340) 66 United Br. Church v. Vanducan, (37 Wis. 54) 99 United States, Ee, (96 N. Y. 227) 247 United States v. Arredondo, (6 Pe- ters, 691) 279 U. S. B. B. & O. E. Co., (17 Wall. 322) 375 United States v. B. & O., (17 Wall. 332) 2, 9, 187 U. S. V. Bank, (1 Cranoh. 7) 360 United States b. Boutwell, (17 Wall. 604) 368 U. S. V. Bixby, (9 Fed. Rep. 78) 69 U. S. V. Bloomgart, (2 Ben. 356) 67 United States v. Boyoe, (2 McLean, 352) 167 U. S. V. Boyd, (5 How. 50) 72 U. S. V. Brindle, (110 U. S. 688) 79 U. S. B. Brooklyn, (8 Fed. Rep. 473)365 United States «. Chicago, (7 How. 185) 215, 221 U. S. B. Cicero, (41 Fed. 8) 266 United States b. City Bank of Col- umbus, (21 How. 356) 195 d U. S. V. Clark Co., (96 U. S. 212) 376 United States b. Clark Co., (95 U. S. 769) 194 tt clxxvi TABLE OF CASES CITED. Kefcrences are to Sections. United States v. County Court, (3 Fed. Eep. 1) 14 United States v. Dulutli, (1 Dillon C. C. 469) 133 U. S. V. Engeman, (46 Fed. 898) 245, 247 United States v. Fillebrown, (7 Pet. 28) 108 U. S. V. Ft. Scott, (99 U. S. 152) 368 United States b. Hall, (7 Mackey, 14) 359, 363 United States v. Hams, (1 Sum. 21) 232 U. S. V. Hartwell, (6 Wall. 358) 67 U. S. V. Hoar, (2 Mason, 134) 312 United States ». Holly, (3 Cranch, 656) 117 U. S. u. Humason, (6 Sawy. 199) 72 U. S. V. JefEerson Co., (1 McCrary, 356) 186 U. S. V. Johnson Co., (5 Dill. 208) 195 United States v. K. & H. B. Co., (45 Fed. Kep. 414) 314 a U. S. 13. Kirkpatrick, (9 Wheat. 735) 312 United States v. Knox Co., (2 Mc- Crary C. C. 625) 194 a U. S. Kuhn, (4 Cranch, C. C. 401) 108, 310 United States v. Lawrence, (3 Dall. 42) 360 U. S. V. LeBaron, (19 How. 73, 4 Wall. 642) 72 U. S. V. Lincoln, (5 Dill. C. C. 184, 194 and cases cited) 376 U. S. V. Linn, (15 Pet. 290) 72 U. S. V. Maurice, (2 Brock. 103) 67 United States v. Memphis, (97 U. S. 292, 23 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 454) 55, 56 United States v. Miller Co., (4 Dill. 2.33) 177, 376 U. S. V. Mitchell, (109 U. S. 146) 79 U. S. V. New Orleans, (17 Fed. Rep. 483) 375 r. S. I). Xew Orleans, (98 U. S. 341) 256, 376 U. S. i;. Oswego Twp., (28 Fed. R. .55) 375 U. S. 11. Ottawa, (28 Fed. E. 407) 360, 375 U. S. V. Pacific Railroad, (120 U. S. 227) 335 a U. S. V. Reed, (56 Mo. 565) 232 U. S. V. Ripley, (7 Pet. 18) 79 U. S. V. Silverman, (4 Dillon C. C. 224) 369 U. S. V. Smith, (124U. S. 525) 67 U. S. V. Union Pae. R. R. Co., (4 Dil- lon, 479, 91 U. S. 343) 183, 368 U. S. V. Vernon Co. Court, (3 Dillon 281) 877 U. S. V. Windom, (137 U. S. 636) 359 U. S. V. Wright, (l McLean, 509 86 U. S. D. Co. V. Chicago, (112 111. 19) 123 U. S. Ex. Co. V. Hess, (3 N. Y. S. 777) 393 U. S. 111. Co. I). Grant, (55 Hun, 222) 301 University v. Indiana, (14 How. 268) 22 University v. Walden, (15 Ala. 655) 79 Updegraff v. Crans, (47 Pa. St. 103) 393 Updike V. Campbell, (4 E. D. Smith 570) 122 Upper Coos R. Co. v. Parsons, (19 Atl. R. 10) 245 Upton V. U. S., (19 Ct. of CI. 46) 79 Urquhart v. Ogdensburg, (91 N. T. 67) 327, 346, 355 Utica Water Co. v. Utica, (31 Hun, 431) 189 o V. Vac. Center St., In re, (115 Pa. St 247) 282 Vacation of Howard St., (28 W. N. C. 159) 259 a Vacation of Henry St., In re, (123 Pa. St. 646) 24 Vail V. Beach, (10 Kan. 214) 270 Vail D. Morris etc. Co., (21 N. J. L. 189) 279 Vaile V. Independence, (22 S. W. K. 695) 169 Vale Mills v. Nashua, (63 N. H. 136) 355 Valentine v. St. Paul, (34 Minn. 446) 327 Valparaiso v. Donovan, (44 N. W. R. 449) 346 Valpax-aiso v. Gardner, (97 Ind. 1) 175 395 Valpey v. Manley, (1 C. B. 592) 326 a Vanaokers Case, (1 Ld. Eaym. 496) 78 Van Allen v. Assessors, (3 Wall. 873) 258 Van Antwerp, In re, (56 N. T. 261) 28, 259 a, 280 Vanarsdall v. State, (65 lud. 176) 209 Van Baalen v. People, (40 Mich. 458) 123 Van Buren v. Wells, (14 S. W. B. 38) 117, 134, 1.58 Vance v. Bank, (1 Blackf. 80) 22, 30 Vance v. Franklin, (30 N. E. K. 149) 353 TABLE OP CASES CITED. clxxvij References are to Sections. Vance v. Little Rock, (30 Ark. 435) 15, 376 Vancouver, In re, (2 Sawyer, 381) 121 Vandalia v. Huss, (41 111. App. 517) 324 Vandalia v. Ropp, (39 111. App. 344) 324, 328 Van Daren v. New York, (9 Paige, 388) 397 Vanderbilt v. 4 125 Wilson, In re, (19 D. C.) 341 258 Wilson V. Allegheny, (79 Pa. St. 272) 286 Wilson V. Berkstresser, (45 Mo. 283) 377 Wilson V. Burks, (51 Ga. 862) 399 Wilson V. Charlestown, (8 Allen, 177) 372 Wilson B. City of Trenton, (53 N. J. L. 645) 278, 279 Wilson V. Dullam, (53 Mich. 392) 83 Wilson V. Duncan, (38 N. W. 371) 354 a Wilson V. Granby, (47 Conn. 59) 352 Wilson V. Hardesby, (1 Md. Ch. 66) 187 Wilson V. Inloes, (11 Gill & J. 351) 133 Wilson V. King, (3 Litt. 457) 86 Wilson V. Marsh, (34 Vt. 352) 349 Wilson 1). New York, (1 Denio, 595) 327, 328, 329, 354 o Wilson I). People, (90 111. 186) 83 Wilson V. Poole, (33 Ind. 443) 281 Wilson V. Rockland etc. Co., (2 Harr. 67) 321 Wilson V. Sanitary Dist., (27 N. E. R. 203) 27 Wilson V. Sch. Dist., (32 N. H. 118) 170 Wilson J). Seattle, (2 Wash. St. 543, 27 Pac. R. 474) 279, 398 Wilson !3. Sexton, (27 Iowa, 15) 219 Wilson V. Shreveport, (29 La. An. 673) 87 Wilson u. Susquehanna T. Co., (21 Barb. 68) 328 Wilson V. Wheeling, (19 W. Va. 324) 347, 352 a Wilson Co.-D. First Nat. Bank, (103 IJ. S. 770) 185 Winamac v. Huddleston, (31 N. E. R. 561) 190 Winbiger v. Los Angeles, (45 Cal. 36) 325 Winch V. Conservators, (L. R. 7 C. P. 471) 121 Winchester v. Capron, (63 N. H. 605) 308 Winckler v. Gt. Western Ry. Co., (18 Up. Can. C. P. 250) 352 Windham v. Commissioners, (26 Me. 406) 279 Windsor v. Field, (1 Conn. 279) 279 Windman v. Vinoennes, (58 Ind. 480) 61 Winkler v. Halsted, (36 Mo. App. 25) 395 Winn V. Lowell, (1 Allen, 177) 352 Winn V. Macon, (21 Ga. 275) 17 Winn B. Rutland, (52 Vt. 481) 355 clxxxvi TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. Winn D.Shaw, (25 Pac. R. 244, 968; 87 Oal. 631) 395 Winne v. Albany, (61 Hun, 620) 344 Winnebago etc. Co. v. E. K. Co., (51 N". W. K. 576) 241 Winnegar v. Eowe, (1 Cow. 258) 78 Winnepiseagee Co. v. Gilford, (10 Atl. 849, 64 N. H. 337) 268 Winnetka b. Trouty, (107 111. 218) 217 Winnsboro v. Smart, (11 Ricb. L. 551) 128 Winona v. Huff, (11 Minn. 119) 215 Winona v. St. Peter Ey. Co., (31 Minn. 472) 96 Winona & St. P. E. Co. v. Water- town, (44 N. W. E. 1072) 267 Winooki v. Gokey, (48 Vt. 282) 110 Winpenny v. Philadelphia, (65 Pa. St. 135) 132 Winship v. Enfield, (42 N. H. 197) 342, 352 Winslow ». Mason, (113 Mass. 411) 396 Winslow V. Perquimas Co., (64 N. C. 218) 212, 364 Winston v. Tenn. R. Co., (IBaxt. 60) 185 Winston u. Westfeldt, (23 Ala. 760) 195 (Z Winter c. Montgomery, (65 Ala. 404) 269, 270, 290, 326, 396 Wintergreen Alley, In re, (11 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 126) 24 Wintz V. Board, (28 W. Va. 227) 362 Winzer v. Burlington, (68 Iowa, 279) 56 Wisby ». Bonte, (19 Ohio St. 238) 215 Wisconsin v. Duluth, (2 Dillon C. C. 406)5 Wisconsin etc. v. Manson, (43 Wis. 255) 814 Wise. etc. V. Taylor Co., (52 Wis. 37) 189 a Wiser v. Blackly, (1 John. Ch. 607) 192 6 Wistar v. Philadelpliia, (111 Pa. St. 604) 264 Wiswall V. Hall, (3 Paige Ch. 313) 133 Witham v. Osburn, (4 Ore. 318, 18 Am. Rep. 287) 234a Withan v. Portland, (72 Me. 539) 343 Witheril v. Mosher, (9 Hun, 412) 130 Witlierley v. Regents Canal Co., (12 C. B. X S. 2) 352 Withers v. Korth Kent, (3 H. & N. 969) 353 Witt V. Armstrong, (6 S. W. R. 226) 271 Witt V. Mayor, (5 Robt. 248) 92 Woflenden v. Board, (1 Ariz. 237, 25 Pac. R. 647) 359 Wolf, Ex parte, (14 Neb. 24) 97, 161 Wolf V. Beard, (123 HI. 585) 327 Wolf V. Brass, (72 Tex. 133) 221 Wolf V. Keokuk, (48 Iowa, 129) 87, 259 a Wolf V. Lansing, (53 Mich. 367) 125 Wolf V. McHargue, (10 S. W. R. 809) 259 a Wolf V. Philada., (105 Pa. St. 25)282 Wolfe V. Gov. & Lex. R. R. Co., (15 B. Mon. 404) 302, 303 Wolfe V. Erie R. T. Co., (33 Fed. Rep. 320) 306 a Wolfe V. Sullivan, (32 N. E. R. 1017) 311 312 Wolff V. New Orleans, (103 U. S. 358) 14, 258 Wong V. Astoria, (13 Oreg. 538) 122 Wood V. Andes, (11 Hun, 543) 352 Wood V. Bank, (9 Cow. 194) 24, 31 Wood V. Bangs, (46 N. W. E. 586, 1 Dak. 179) 395 Wood V. Board of Election, (58 Cal. 561) 32 Wood V. Hammond, (17 Atl. E. 324) 49 Wood 1-. Jefferson Co. Bk., (9 Cow. 205) 107 Wood II. Lenawee, (84 Mich. 521, 47 X. W. R. 1103) 363 Wood V. Lynn, (1 Allen, 108) 169 Wood V. Louisiana, (102 U. S. 294, see § 193 a) 192 Wood V. Mitchell, (44 Iowa, 27) 347 Wood V. National Water Works Co., (33 Kan. 590) 215 Wood V. Nicolson, (43 Kan. 461) 283 Wood V. Oxford, (97 N. C. 227) 2 Wood V. State, (47 Ark. 488) 32 Wood V. Tipton, (7 Baxt. 112) 325 Wood V. Ward, (3 Exch. 748) 354 Wood V. Waterville, (5 Mass. 294) 164 Woodbridge v. Deti-oit, (8 Mich. 274) 261 Woodbridge v. Hall, (47 N. J. L. 388) 169 Woodbury v. Grimes, (1 Colo. 100) 194 Woodcock V. Calcio, (66 Me. 234) 92 WoodfiU V. Town of Greensburgh, (18 Ind. 203) 61 Woodfolk V. Nashville & C. B. K. Co., (2 Swan, 422) 245 Woodruff V. Douglas Co., (17 Ore. 314) 215 Woodruff V. Eureka, (19 S. W. R. 15, 55 Ark. 618) 56, 61 Woodruff t. Imperial etc. (90 N. Y. 521) 79 Woodruff V. Neal, (28 Conn. 167)301, 354 TABLE OF CASES CITED. clxxxvii References are to Sections. Woodruff V. N. Y. & N. E. R. E., (20 Atl. E. 17) 368 Woodrufe V. Okalona, (57 Miss. 806) 192 b, 196 WoodrufE ». Parham, (8 Wall. 139) 258 Woodruff ». E. E. Co., (20 Atl. E. 17) 303 Woodrufi V. State, (3 Ark. 285) 79 Woodruff V. Trapwall, (10 How. 206) 14 Woods B. Armstrong, (34 Ala. 160) 127 Woods V. Colfax Co., (10 Neb. 552) 325 Woods V. Henry, (55 Mo. 560) 55 Woods V. Lawrence Co., (1 Black, 360) 185, 191 6, 198 Woods V. Pineville, (23 Pac. Eep. 880) 158 Woods V. Tipton, (27 N. E. E. 611) 352 Woods V. Varnum, (83 Cal. 46) 83, 84,85 Woodson V. Skinner, (22 Mo. 13) 229 301 • Woodstock V. Gallup, (28 Vt. 587) 535 Woodward v. Calhoun Co., (2 Cent. Law Jour. 396) 189, 191 5 Woodward v. Com., (7 S. W. E. 613) 259 Woodward v. Eeynolds, (19 Atl. 511) 190 Woodworth v. St. Paul etc. R. E. Co., (18 Fed. Rep. 282) 66 Woodyer v. Hadden, (5 Taunt. 126) 220 Wookey v. Pole, (4 B. & Aid. 1) 191 Wookler v. Chicago, (61 111. 142) 241 Wooley V. Watkins, (22 Pac. R. 102) 34 Wooldridge v. Mayor, (49 How. Pr. 67) 130 Woolrich ». Forrest, (1 Pa. 115) 47 Woolsey, In re, (95 N. Y. 135) 18 WoolseyB. Trustees, (01 Hun, 136) 344 Woonsocket etc. Co. v. Sherman, (8 R. I. 564) 185 Worcester v. Canal Props., (16 Pick. 541) 3.50 a Worcester v. Eaton, (13 Mass. 371, 378) 202 Worcester Co. v. Worcester, (116 Mass. 193, 17 Am. Rep. 159) 271 Worden v. New Bedford, (131 Mass. 23, 41 Am. Rep. 185) 92, 336 a Work V. State, (2 Ohio St. 296) 104 Workman v. Mifflin, (30 Pa. St. 362) 244 Works V. Junction R. Co., (5 McLean, 425) 120 Worley v. Columbia, (88 Mo. 106) 92, 333, 338 Worly V. Harris, (82 Ind. 493) 31 Wormwood v. Waltham, (144 Mass. 184)3506 Worrell v. Munn, (1 Seld. 229) 167 Worth V. Fayetteville Comm'rs, (Winst. Eq. 70) 261, 275 Worthen v. Grayson Co. Ct., (13 Bush, 53) 79 Worthley v. Steen, (43 N. J. L. 542) 32, 361, 378 Worthington v. Boston, (41 Fed. Eep. 23) 172 Worthington v. Covington, (82 Ky. 265) 165 Wragg V. Penn. Tp., (94 111. 11) 219 Wray v. Ellis, (1 E, & E. 276) 156 Wray v. Toke, (12 Q. B. 492) 154 Wreford ». People, (14 Mich. 41) 118 Wreu V. Indianapolis, (96 Ind. 206) 368 Wren ». Luzerne Co., (9 Pa. Co. Ct. 22) 79 Wright, In re, (29 Hun, 357) 300 Wright V. Bishop, (88 111. 302) 395 Wriglit !). Boston, (9 Cush. 233) 259 a, 277 Wright V. Chanahan, (51 Hun, 262) 396 Wright V. Chicago, (27 111. App. 200) 146 Wright V. Defrees, (8 Ind. 398) 149 Wright V. Holbrook, (52 N. H. 120) 336 a, 347 Wright V. Linn, (9 Pa. 433) 203 Wright V. M. E. Church, (1 Hoff. Ch. 225) 202 Wright V. Noell, (16 Kan. 601) 69 Wright V. Saunders, (65 Barb. 214) 300 Wright V. Tacoma. (3 Wash. Ter. 410) 397 Wright V. Templeton, (132 Mass. 49) 352 Wright V. Victoria, (4 Tex. 375) 218 Wright V. Wilmington, (52 N. C. 156) 327, 355 Wrinn v. Jones, (111 Mass. 350) 821 Wrought Iron Bridge Co. v. tltica, J17 Fed. Eep. 316) 243 Wyandotte v. C'arrigau, (35 Kan. 21) 302 Wyandotte v. Seitz, (21 Kan. 649) 339 Wyandotte v. White, (13 Kan. 191) 350 6 Wyandotte v. Zeitz, (21 Kan. 649) 163 Wyandotte & K. C. Co. v. Wyan. Co. Comm'rs, (10 Kan. 331) 363 clxxxviii TABLE or cases cited References are to Sections. Wood, (5 Kan Wyandotte City 603) 27 Wyandotte Co. Com'rs v. First Presb. Ch., (30 Kan. 620) 219 Wyatt V. Harrison, (3 B. &. A. 871) 329 WycJcoff V. Scofield, (53 TST. Y. Super. Ct. 237) 131 Wyer v. Lorocque, (33 Pac. 547) 282 Wylie V. Wausin, (48 Wis. 506) 352 a Wyman v. New York, (11 Wend. 487) 221, 305 Wynne-?). Wright, (IDev. &B. L. 19) 122, 258 X. Xiques v. Bujac, (7 La. An. 498) 221 Yale V. Hampden, (18 Pick. 357) 350 a Yanish v. St. Paul, (52 N. W. R. 925) 327 Yards Case, (10 Pa. Ct. C. R. 41) 87 Yarmoutli v. Eaton, (3 Burr, 1402) 320 Yarmouth v. Ko.' Yarmouth, (.34 Me. 411)2 Yarnell v. Los Angeles, (87 Cal. 603, 25 Pac. 767) 395 Yarnold v. Lawrence, (15 Kan. 126) 172, 281 Yatemau v. Crandall, (11 La. An. 220) 259 a Yates V. Judd, (18 Wis. 118) 221, 225, 286 Yates V. Milwaukee, (10 Wall. 497) 120 Yates B. Warrentown, (84 Va. 337) 300 Yeager v. Tippecanoe, (81 Ind. 46) 353 Yearance v. S. L. City, (24 Pac. E. 254) 346 Yeaw V. Williams, (15 R. I. 20) 342 Yesler v. Seattle, (1 Wash. St. 308) 189 Yick Wo V. Hopkins, (118 TJ. S. 356) 121 Yocum V. Hotel, (18 Abb. N. C. 340) 120 Yolo V. Barney, (79 Cal. 375) 218 Yonkey v. State, (27 Ind. 36) 66 Yorrty v. Marshall Co., (53 N. E. R. 298) 317 York V. Forseht, (23 Pa. St. 391) 117, 140 York V. Spellman, (19 Neb. 357) 350 York County ». Small, (1 W. & S. 315) 81 Yost's Report, (17 Pa. St. 524) 250 Young V. Bank, (4 Cranch, 384) 30 Young V. Buckingham, (5 Ohio, 489) 100 Young V. Camden Co., (19 Mo. 309) 177 Young V. Charleston, (20 S. C. 116) 339 Young V. City, (27 Mo. App. 201) 355 Young ». Clarendon, (132 TJ. S. 340) 190 Young V. Clarendon Tp., (26 Fed. Rep. 895) 199 Young V. Clarendon, (132 TJ. S. 340) 375 Young V. Com'rs, (25 N. E. R. 689) 355 Young c. Com'rs, (2 N. & McC. 537) 325 Young V. Be Putron, (37 Fed. K. 46) 211 Young V. Edgefield, (2 Nott & McC. 537) 325 Young V. Kansas, (27 Mo. App. 101) 355 Young V. Leedom, (67 Pa. St. 351) 354 a Young V. MoKenzie, (3 Ga. 31) 234 a Young V. New Haven, (39 Conn. 435) 842 Young V. Thomas, (17 Fla. 169) 123 Young V. Yarmouth, (9 Gray, 386) 297 Youngs V. Hall, (9 Nev- 212) 12 YoungbloodB. Sexton, (132 Mich. 406) 123 Young Twp. V. Sutter, (18 Atl. K. 610) 342 z. Zabel V. Louisville Bap. Orp. Home, (17 S. W. R. 212) 270 Zabriskie v. Jersey City, (13 N. J. Eq. 314) 120 Zabriskie v. Railroad Co., (23 How. 381) 24, 254 Zanesville ii. Richai-ds, (5 Ohio St.) 256 Zanone v. Mound City, (103 111. 552| 125 Zeigler v. Hopkins, (117 TJ. S. 683) 278 Zernes v. Chosen Freeholders, (52 X J. L. 553) 825 Zetther v. Atlanta, (66 Ga. 195) 343, 352 Ziegler v. Chapin, (27 N. E. R. 471) 169 Ziggler V. Menges, (22 N. E. Eep. 722) 293 Zimmerman c. Conemaugh Tp., (2 Cent. Rep. 861, 5 Atl. Rep. 45) 353 TABLE OF CASES CITED. References are to Sections. clxxxix Zimmerman ». Kearney, (50 N. W. 1126) 247, 249 Zine Co. ». La Salle, (117 111. 411) 215 Zollicofer v. Havemeyer, (4 Thomp. & C. 478) 92 Zwietusoh v. Milwaukee, (55 Wis. 369) 259 a Zylstra v. Charleston, (1 Bay, 382) 102, 154 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. CHAPTER I. COEPOKATIONS DEFINED, CLASSIFIED AND DISTINGUISHED. Section. 1 — Corporations defined. 2 — Public and private corporar tions distinguished. 3 — ^Public and municipal corpora- tions distinguished. Section. 4 — The New England town. 5 — The state and federal govern- ment as a quasi corpora- tion. § 1. Corporation defined. — A corporation is, according to most authorities, defined to be a legal personalit}'', created by law into a body corporate for the purpose of carrying on some joint effort, which but for such creation of the legal personal- ity could not be attained with the same facility by the ordinary co-operation of individuals. The general element of distinction between co-operations, in' the nature of partnership and joint stock companies, on the one hand, and corporations on the other, is the fact that a legal personality stands between the co-operators and parties dealing with them, as the possessor of the joint rights and the obligor of the joint liabilities in which they are mutually interested. This legal personality, thus cre- ated, remains unchanged and immutable throughout the entire period of time during which it was intended to exist, unaffect- ed by the constant change of the individuals, who composed the stockholders, and who are recognized in the corporation. This element of stability in the corporation itself is the chief value of incorporation. Chief Justice Marshall's description of a corporation has been frequently cited and quoted, and .the happiness of his language makes it alwa3'^s of value in this connection. He describes a corporation as follows : — " A corporation is an ar- tificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in con- templation of law. Being the mere creature of the law, it 1 1 MUNICIPAIi COEPOEATIONS. [CH. I. possesses only those properties which the charter of its crea- tion confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed to be best calcu- lated to effect the object for which it is created. Among the most important are immortality (in the legal sense that it may be made capable of indefinite duration), and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality, — properties by which a perpet- ual succession of many persons are considered as the same, and may act as a single, individual. They enable a corporation to mianage its own affairs, and to hold property without the per- plexing intricacy, the hazardous and endless necessity, of per- petual convej^ances for the purpose of transmitting it from hand tp hand. It is chiefly for the purpose of clothing bodies of men, in succession, with these qualities and capacities that cor- porations were invented and are in use. By these means a per- petual succession of individuals are capable of acting for the promotion of the particular object like one immortal being." ^ The ordinarj' description of a corporation, as in Chief Justice Marshall's definition, as a legal person has been more than once criticised as chimerical and unfounded ; ^ but it seems to me that the objection to such a description of a corporation will be alto- gether removed, if instead of legal person we read legal person- ality. For while no person has been created by the act of incorporation, distinct and separate from the incorporators, yet there can be no doubt that the persons who compose the cor- poration have by the act of incorporation had given to their union a distinct legal personality, which the law does recognize as having a legal existence, separate and apart from the legal status of the members of such corporation. § 2. Pulblic and private corporations distinguished — The ' iBartmoutli College v. Woodward, 4W]ieat 636; 4 Black. Com. 37; 7 "Vin. Abr. 358, 368. Blackstone de- scribes the peculiar feature of incor- poration as the ability to continue rinchang.ed by the kaleidoscopic changes in th« persons composing the corporation. "All of the indi- vidual members," present and fu- ture, " are but one person in law, — a 'person that never dies, in like man- ' .-. 2 ner as the river Thames is still the same river, though the parts which compose it are changing every in- stant." 1 Black. Com. 468; Broprie- tors, etc. V. Inhabitants of Ipswich, (Mass. 91) 26 N. E. K. 239; see also Heller V. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309; State V. Leffingwell, 54 Mo. 458, 471; Down- ing v. Board, 129 Ind. 43; Mills v. Williams, 11 Ired. L. 558. 2 Morawetz Private Corp. § 1, 227. CH. I.J COllPORATIONS CLASSIFIED AND DISTINGUISHED. § 2 fundamental division of corporations is into public and private. Before distinguishing the two, it may be well to observe, that the terms public and private are used in the comparative sense, in describing the character of the interest created by the act of incorporation in the parties composing such corporation, and also the character of the parties who do compose it. In one sense, it may be said that all corporations are public, inasmuch as no actual incorporation is ever made without presumptively considering the incidental promotion of the public welfare or the public good. The very act of incorporation, even of a strictly private corporation, is alleged to rest for its justification upon the public good, which is promoted in the creation of it, it matters not how strictly private the interests in such corpo- ration may be. But this is not tlie sense in which the terms public and private are employed in this connection. Here, as already stated, they distinguish corporations from each other, in the first instance, by the difference in the character of the persons who compose the corporation and the nature of the rights created by such incorporation.^ A private corporation is one which is created for the purpose of enabling private per- sons in their private capacity to attain some end which cannot be conveniently attained without incorporation, and for their own benefit ; although in connection with such private benefit there may be, and usually is likewise some public benefit flow- ing from the proposed incorporation. In the case of private corporations, the consent of the incorporators is necessary to its creation, but when assented to, according to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Dartmouth College case, a contract is created between the legislature rep- resenting the government, and the incorporators, which is pro- tected by the provisions of the constitution of the United States, which declares that " no state shall pass any law impair- ing the obligation of a contract ; " and that therefore such con- tract can in no wise be interfered with or repealed by subsequent legislation, unless the power to so interfere with the franchise thus created is expressly reserved, except in the exercise of the right of eminent domain.^ 1 Guest V. Water Co., (Pa. 91) 21 Atl. K. 1001; Downing v. Board, 129 Ind. 443. 2 Dartmouth Col. v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518. See Tiedeman, Privata Corporations. 3 §2 MTTSaCIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. I. Public corporations, on the other hand, include municipal corporations, and are not the result of any contract between the incorporators and the state, and are not created for the purpose of vesting in the incorporators, as private individuals, any peculiar rights or privileges. The object is invariably and solely the provision for the satisfaction of some pecuhar want, and the rendition of some peculiar service to the commu- nity, which is included within the so called public corporation. The public corporation is created for the purpose of receiving a share in the management or conduct of the local government, or in the undertaking of measures that are needed for the pro- motion of the public welfare or the satisfaction of public wants. And while the state may, and in the case of municipal cor- porations usually does, obtain the consent of the community, which is to be included within the proposed public corporation, yet such consent is not necessary, and the corporation may be imposed upon such people against their will. There is no compact or contract between the incorporators and the govern- ment, which "falls within the protection of the constitutional provisions, prohibiting the passing of laws by the State impair- ing the obligation of a contract. On the contrary, the charters of public corporations are subject in very large measure to the almost unrestricted control of the legislature, and may be mod- ified, enlarged or diminished, as to powers and extent of terri- tory, according to the pleasure of the legislature.^ This, of 1 Columbus V. Columbus, (Wis. 92) 52 ]Sr. W. K. 425; Peuobscot B. Cor. V. Lawson, 16 Me. 224; Yarmoutli v. North Yarmouth, 34 lb. 411; State v. Kolsen, (Ind. 92) 29 N. E. R. 595; Mei ri wether V. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472; Berlin v. Gorham, 34 N. H. 266; Philadelphia v. Field, 58 Pa. St. 320; Savings Society v. Philadelphia, 31 lb. 175, 185;Sintouv. Carter, 23 Fed. E. 535; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 169; State v. Atkinson, 107 IST. C. 317 ; State v. Denny, (Wash. 92)£9 Pac. K. 991 ; North Yarmouth v. Skillings, 45 Me. 133; Pickles v. Dry Dock Co., 38 La. An. 412; Grogan v. San Fran- cisco, 18 Cal. 590; Girard v. Philadel- phia, 7 Wall. 1 ; Richmond v. Rich- 4 mond etc. Co., 21 Gratt. (Va.) 604; United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322; Darlington v. Mayor, 31 N. Y. 164; In re MillvilleBor.,10Pa. Co. Ct. R. 321; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 169; Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Mon. 330; Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289; Patterson v. Society etc., 24 N. J. L. 385; Jersey City V. Railroad Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 360; Allen V. McKean, 1 Sumner, 276; Dartmouth Col. v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518; Erie v. Flint, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 482; State v. Wall, 47 Ohio St. 499; Board v. Davises, 1 Wash. St. 290; In re Malone's Estate, 21 S. C. 435 ; Morris v. State, 62 Tex. 728, 174; Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343; Dayid CH. I.] COKPORATIONS CLASSIFIED AND DISTINGUISHED. § 3 course, is only a general statement in regard to the legislative control of public corporations, which will be more fully and more explicitly explained in the next chapter.^ § 3. Public and municipal corporations distinguished. — The term public corporation is used here and properly as a term of generic signification, and may be classed as synonymous with V. Portland Water Comm'rs, 14 0reg. 98; Portland & W. Y. R. R. Co. v. Portland, 14 Oreg. 188; Nicliol v. Mayor, etc., 9 Humph. 252; CTrelgli- ton V. San Francisco, 42 Cal. 446; Lutz V. Crawfordsville, 109 Ind. 466; Wood V. Oxford, 97 N. C. 227; Lucas V.Tippecanoe Co., 44 Ind. 524; Snook V. Georgia Co., (Ga. 88) 9 S. E. R. 1104; Demarest v. New York, 74 N. T. 161; Cornell V. People, 107 III. .372; Burns v. Clarion County, 62 Pa. St. 351 ; Durach's Appeal, 62 Pa. St. 491 ; Clinton v. Railroad Co., 24 Iowa, 455 ; San Francisco v. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541 ; New Orleans v. Hoyle, 23 La. An. 740; Amite City v. Clements, 24 La. An. 27; 21 Am. Law Review, 14; Jersey City v. Railroad Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 360; State v. Fuller, 5 Vroom (34 N. J. L.) 227; Patterson v. Society, etc., 4 Zabr. (24 N. J. L.) 385; Mont- clair V. Railroad Co., 18 Atl. R. 242; 45 N. J. E. 436; Lloyd v. Mayor etc. of New York, 5 N. Y. (1 Seld.) 369; Lowber v. Same, 7 Abb. Pr. R. 248; Green v. Same, 5 Abb. Pr. R. 503; Rundle v. Del. etc. Canal Co., 1 Wall. Jr. 275; s. c, 14 How. 80; Tinsman V. Railroad Co., 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 148; Brooks v. Fisher, 21 Pac. R. 652; 79 Cal. 173; Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. 74; Plymouth v. Jackson, 15 Pa. St. 44; Louisville v. Commonwealth, 1 Du- vall (Ky.) 295; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325; Armstrong v. Coram., 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 208; Murphy v. Louis- ville, 9 Bush (Ky.) 189; O'Hara v. Portland, 3 Oreg. 425; Purdyv. Peo- ple, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 385; Morey v. New- fane, 8 Barb. 645 ; State, etc. v. St. Louis Co. Ct., 34 Mo. 546; Gray v. 6 Brooklyn, 10 Abb. (N. Y.) Pr. Rep., N. s. 186; State v. Hundelhausen, 26 Wis. 432; Sangamon Co. v. Spring- field, 63 111. 66; State v. Mayor, R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 250; Richmond County V. Lawrence, 12 111. 8; Tinsman v. Railroad Company, 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 148; Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio, 427; School Dist., In re, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 588 (92 Pa.) ; see, also. People v. Wren, 4 Scam. (111.) 273 ; Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss. 53; Bush v. Shipman, 4 Scam. (5 111.) 190; Holliday v. People, 5 Gilm. (10 111.) 216; State v. Brannin, 3 Zabr. (23 N. J. L.) 485 ; Rader v. Road Dist., 7 Vroom (36 N. J. L.) 273; Coles v. Madison County, Breese (111.) 120; C. & A. R. R. Co. V. Adler, 56 111. .344; People v. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228; s. c, 15 Am. Rep. 202; New Orleans, etc. Co. V. New Orleans, 26 La. An. 517; Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 TJ. S. 307; State Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. (U. S.) 369; Duns- more' s Appeal, 52 Pa. St. 374; Peo- ple V. Hill, 7 Cal. 97; United States V. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322; State v. St. Louis Coun- ty Court, 34 Mo. 540; Hagerstown v. Schuer, 37 Md. 180; Barnes v. Dis- trict of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540; State V. Jennings, 27 Ark. 419; People v. Tweed, 63 N. Y. 202; Langworthy V. Dubuque, 16 Iowa, 271; Blessing V. Galveston, 42 Tex. 641. Notwith- standing this lengthy list of cita- tions^itis not exhaustive ; this prop- osition of constitutional law has been confirmed by every court in the country, and needs no further corroboration. ^ See post, chap. ii. § 3 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. I. civil corporation. It is also, however improperly, used as synonymous with municipal corporations.^ But there is uiit questionably a just ground for distinguishing between munici- pal corporations on the one hand, and other public corporations on the other. The municipal corporation is, as its name implies, an incorporation, or body politic, created by the act of .law as an instrument of government over a particular community, and over the people located there. A municipal corporation is, in the first instance, charged with the exercise of all the powers and the performance of all the duties which are strictly local or municipal in their nature, and which are of peculiar interest to the local community. They are incorporated for the purpose of giving to such a community the peculiar facilities, for carry- ing 'on or conducting its local affairs, which a private corpora- tion acquires by incorporation over the voluntary union or combination of individuals.^ We may, therefore, define a mu- nicipal corporation, in its historical and strict sense, to be the incorporation, by the authority of the government, of the inhabi- tants of a particular place or district, and authorizing them in their corporate capacity to exercise subordinate specified powers of legislation and regulation, with respect to their local and internal concerns. This power of local government is the dis- tinctive purpose and the distinguishing feature of a municipal corporation proper.^ As thus defined, the municipal corporation is to be distinguished from other public corporations, like coun- ties on the one hand, and school districts on the other. The mu- nicipal corporation is to be distinguished from counties and other subdivisions of the state, in that the county is not a legal person- alit)' in whose hands is intrusted a share of the administration of the government, but simply a territorial subdivision of the state government and subject to the essential control of such state government, in the administration of all of its affairs. Thus, for example, a court will declare that a county is not lia- ble, independentlj' of modern statutory modifications, in dam- ages to one who has suffered an injury from the wrongful official conduct of the county officers. Even independently of any 1 Curry v. District Township, 62 Iowa. 102; Dowlan v. County of Sib- ley, 36 Minn. 430; Downing V. Board, 129 Ind. 443. 6 2 2 Bouv. Diet. 21 ; People v. Mor- ris, 13 Wend. 325. " Dillon's Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations, §20, CH. I.] CORPORATIONS CLASSIFIED AHD DISTIKGTTISHED. § 3 special statutory provision, the municipal corporation is held liable.^ In one case, a distinction has been made between coun- ties and other subdivisions of the state government, and the municipal corporation strictly so called, on the ground that the municipal corporation proper rests upon the consent of the incorporators : " Municipal corporations proper are called into existence either at the direct solicitation or by the free consent of the persons composing them, for the promotion of their own local and private advantage and convenience." On the other hand, " Counties are at most but local organizations, which, for the purposes of civil administration, are invested with a few functions characteristic of a corporate existence. They are local subdivisions of the state, created by the sovereign power of the state, of its own sovereign -wiU, without the particular solicitation, consent, or concurrent action of the people who inhabit them. The former (municipal) organization is asked for, or at least assented to, by the people it embraces ; the lat- ter organization (counties) is superimposed by a sovereign and paramount authority." ^ But, as has already been explained, the municipal corporation does not always rest upon such consent ; and may be created in the face of the opposition of the people occupying the territory, which is included within its limits^ Unquestionably, it is the fact, that, ordinarily, municipal cor- porations are formed, only when the people living in the com- munity desire such incorporation. And this is particularly the case, where cities and towns secure incorporation under general laws, instead of by special charter. But the main distinction, and the only reliable one, between public corporations, like counties, and municipal corporations proper, is the absence in the one case of an incorporation and its presence in the other. Indeed, counties are not properly denominated corporations. They are at the most only quasi coi'porations, with considerable emphasis on the prefix. I Flora V. Naney, 31 111. App. 493; Ilamllton v. Mlghels, 7 Ohio St. 109; Pulaski Co. v. Reeve, 42 Ark. 55; Wehn V. Gage Co., 5 Neb. 494; Mo- Donald V. Ashland, (Wis. 92) 47 N. W. E. 434; Tread well v. Com'rs, 11 Ohio St. 190; Soper Co. v. Henry Co., 26 Iowa, 264; Haniford v. Kansas City, 103 Mo. 172; Askew v. Hale Co., 54 Ala. 139; State v. Leffingwell, 54 Mo. 458; see post, §§314, 315. 2 Hamilton Co. v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109; See also Tolbot v. Queeti Anne Co.,50Md. 245. 7 § 3 MtTNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. I. On the other hand, municipal corporations may be distinguish- ed from school districts and other like corporations, in the fact that the act of incorporation, in the latter cases, only involves the creation of corporations with limited powers. The school district in most of the states is incorporated, and is given some of the powers and characteristics of corporations in general; but inasmuch as the ordinary powers of a corporation are not given to such incorporations, they are called quasi corporations, for the purpose of indicating the limited character of the body corporate. School districts have only the public powers which are expressly granted to them in the statutes under which they are created. On account of the limited character of the poji^ers of these so-called quasi corporations, it is necessary to distin- guish them from municipal corporations. It is also for this reason that, as a general rule, school districts are not included within the provisions of statutes, which provide for the control of municipal corporations.^ There is still another distinction between municipal corpora- tions and these quasi corporations, in regard to their Hability to persons injured by the negligence of the officers. Thus, a school district is held to be free from liability for the trespass committed by its officers.^ But in the case of a municipal cor- poration, the courts have held that the individuals, who com- pose the community within the jurisdiction of the municipal corporation, enter into and become parties to all the acts of the municipal government, or of the officers of such municipal cor- poration, and are liable to all parties who may be injured or wronged by the wrongful acts of these officers. The same ele- ment is found to enter into the characterization of the private corporation.^ Indeed, in respect to more than one feature of the municipal corporation, it may be declared to have both a public and a private character ; and in respect to some rights and some privileges, such corporation does have the protection against legislative interference, as in the case of rights of prop- 1 In re School District, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 588 (Pa. 92); School District v. Williams, 38 Ark. 454; Norton v. Peck, 3 Wis. 714; Eaton v. Mani- towoc, 44 Wis. 489. 2 Bank v. Brainerd, (Minn. 92)51 K. W. K. 814; Enfield v. Jordan, 119 8 U. S. 680; Martin v. People, 87 111. 524. 3 Union Township v. Gibboney, 94 Pa. St. 534; Heller v. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309; Hannon v. St. Louis County, 62 Mo. 313, 316; State v. Leffingwell, 54 lb. 458, 471. CH. I.] CORPORATIONS CLASSiAeD AND DISTINGUISHED. § 4 erty, which the private corporation fully enjoys.^ In con(!lu- sion, it may be stated that the distinctions, which have just been made between counties and other subdivisions of the state, and municipal corporations on the one hand, and be- tween quasi corporations, like school districts, and municipal corporations, on the other, generally remain in force, unaffected by statutory modification ; but tliey may be, and in fact are often materially changed by the provisions of state statutes. Thus, for example, in determining whether a county is liable in damages for the wrongful acts of its officials, the general rule is abolished in some of the states, and the counter rule established by statute, as in the state of Pennsylvania. But in so much as these characteristics of the municipal corpora- tion are given by statute to counties and other territorial subdivisions of a state, these subdivisions of the state are essen- tially converted by such legislation into municipal corporations, and would therefore fall strictly within the provisions of this book. It is really a confusion of ideas and principles to give the name of corporation to a county or other territorial sub- division of the state, which is not in any sense a municipal corporation. § 4. The New England town. — In this connection a special reference should be made, for the purpose of distinguishing them from municipal corporations in general, to the New Eng- land town, which is a peculiar institution of government, pai-- taking somewhat of the characteristics of counties and other subdivisions of the state government, and, at the same time, having some of the charactei'istics of the municipal corporation. As it originally obtained, the New England town differs very little in its legal character from the county. But in the course of the development of public affairs in New England, statutes have been passed, regulating the character of the New England town, and giving to such town certain powers and duties, ap- proximating in many ways to the character of an incorporated city. But, still, the New England towns are not strictly mu- nicipal corporations even under the regulating statutes ; thej' are more like the school districts, resembling them in the fact that their powers are limited, and that they do not possess all 1 People V. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228; s. c, 15 Am. Eep. 202, ch. ii. sees. 11-15. 9 § 4 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [ch. I. the powers which are generally vested in a municipal corpora- tion, or incorporated cities.^ Of course, there are peculiar characteristics of the New England town, such as the town meeting, which distinguish such a town from municipal corporations in general, but that feature is not a legal distinction, and therefore no attempt is made here to give an explanation of it. In concluding this reference to the New England town, a quotation will be added from an opinion of Chief Justice Perley of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire : " It is to be observed that municipal cor- porations in England are broadly distinguished in many impor- tant respects from towns in this and the other New England states. There is no uniformity in the powers and duties of English municipal corporations. They were not created and established under any general public law, but the powers and duties of each municipality depended upon its own individ- ual grant or prescription. Their corporate franchises were held of the crown by the tenure of performing the conditions upon which they had been granted, and were liable to forfeit- ure for breaches of the condition. They indeed answered cer- tain public purposes, as private corporations do which have public duties to perform, and some of them exercised politi- cal rights. But they are not like towns (with us), general political and territorial divisions of the county, with uniform powers and duties, defined and varied, from time to time, by general legislation. Towns (in New England) do not hold their powers ordinarily under any grant from the government to the individual corporation ; or by virtue of any contract with the government, or upon any condition express or implied. They give assent in their corporate capacity to the laws which 1 " Towns in Connecticut, as in tlie other New England states, difEer from trading companies, and even from municipal corporations else- where. They are teri-itorial corpo- rations, into which the state is di- vided by the legislature, from time to time, at its discretion, for po- litical purposes and the convenient administration of government; they have those powers only which have 10 been expressly conferred upon them by statute, or which are necessai'y for conducting municipal affairs; and all the Inhabitants of the town are members of the quasi corpora- tion." Per Gray, J., Bloomfield v. Charter Oak Bank, 121 U. S. 121; citing 1 Swift's System, 116, 117; Granby v. Thurston, 23 Conn. 4)6^ Webster v. Harwinton, 32 Conn. 131; Dillon, Mun. Corp., sees. 28-30. CH. I.] COEPOEATIONS CLASStFIED AND DISTINGUISHED. § 5 impose their public duties or fix their territorial limits." And referring to the case then before the court, the chief justice added : " In all that is material to the present inquiry, munici- pal corporations in England bear much less resemblance to towns in this country than to private corporations which are charged with the performance of public duties ; and for these reasons, the English authorities on the subject are but remotely applicable to the present case." ^ § 5. The state and federal goyernment as a quasi corpora- tion. — ^It is undeniable that the government of a state is a body politic, inasmuch as it constitutes the representative of an oi-- ganic body or community. It has some of the characteristics of a corporation, such as the right to make contracts, but under the provision of the eleventh amendment of the constitution of the United States, a state cannot be sued without its consent ; ^ and although it is becoming a very common custom for states, as well as the United States, to provide for suits against them- selves often in a specially constituted court ; yet the permission, thus granted to others to institute suits against such a state, may itself be withdrawn at the pleasure of the state.*^ But the state is, however, so far treated by the courts as a body politic or quasi corporation, as that such state may sue as plaintiff in all courts, both state and federal.* So, also, may suits be in- stituted between states ; but in that case the Supreme Court of the United States has alone original jurisdiction.^ In this same limited sense, the governor may be treated as a quasi corpora- I Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284, 290; see Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344; Dill v. Warebam, 3 Met. 438; Norton v. Mansfield, 16 Mass. 48; Stetson v. Kempton, 13 lb. 272; Miuot V. West Eoxbury, 112 lb. 1; 17 Am. Rep. 52; Vincent v. Nan- tucket, 12 Cush. 105 ; Parsons v. Go- shen, 11 Pick. 396; Anthony v. Adams, .1 Met. 284; Granby v. Thurs- ton, 23 Conn. 416; Bloomfield v. Bank, 121 U. S. 121. 2Galbes v. Girard, 46 Fed. R. 500; People V. Garner, 59 Hun, 299; Pen- neyer v. McCounaughey, 140 IT. S. 1; Briscoe v. Bank, 11 Pet. 257, 321; see article by A. H. Wintersteen in 30 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 1. « People V. Garner, 59 Hun, 299; Beers v. ArkansaSj 20 How. 527; Ken- tucky V. Dennison, 24 lb. 66; State v. Trustees, 5 Ind. 77; Dodd v. Miller, 14 lb. 433; Wisconsin v. Duluth, 2 Dillon 0. C. 406. *Murdock v. Com., 152 Mass. 28; State V. Evans, 33 S. C. 184; Indiana V. Woram, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 33; People V. Assessors, 1 Hill (N. T.) 620; State V. Delesdenier, 7 Tex. 76. ' Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66; Wisconsin v. Duluth, 2 Dillon C. C. 406. 11 § 5 MU2SriCIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [cH. I. tion sole, and become party as such to contracts made with him in his official capacity, for the benefit of others, as where bonds have been made payable to him for the benefit of other parties.^ 1 Governor v. Allen, 8 Humph. 176; Governor v. Plummer, 2 Humph 500 12 CHAPTER II. LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OVEE MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS, HOW FAR LIMITED. Section. 8 — General statement as to legisla- tive power. 9 — Legislative power not unlimit- ed, public and private char- acter of municipal corpora- tions distinguished. 10 — ^Effect of repeal or dissolution. 11 — Legislative power over prop- erty of municipal corpora- tions. 12 — Legislative power over reve- nues, including penalties and franchises. Section. 13 — ^Legislative power over prop- erty held in trust. 14 — Legislative power over munic- ipal contracts. 15 — Compulsory contracts. 16— Compulsory satisfaction of non-legal claims against cities. IT — Ratifying void local assess- ments. 18 — Legislative control of offices and officers in municipal cor- porations. § 8. General statement as to legislative power — In a pre- vious paragraph, it has been explained, as one of the principal distinctions between public and private corporations, that the charter of a private corporation constitutes a contract between the state and the incorporators, which is protected by the consti- tutional provision which prohibits the passing of laws by states impairing the obligation of a contract.^ Where, as in the case of a public or municipal corporation, the charter or act of in- corporation is not such a contract between the state and the community which has thus been created, as that it would fall within the protection of this constitutional provision, such char- ter and charter rights remain still subject to the unlimited con- trol of the state government ; and may be repealed, enlarged, or diminished, as to the scope of its powers and its rights, or of its territory^ without the consent of the parties who compose the community .2 And the extent of this legislative control over 1 See ante, sec. 2. 2 New Orleans v. New Orleans W. W. Co., 142 U. S. 79; State v. Kolsem, 29 N. E. 595; Smith v. People, 29 N. E. 676; In re Strand, 21 Pac. K. 654; State v. Babcock, 25 Neb. 709 ; Quin- cy V. O'Brien, 24 111. App. 591 ; Essex Pub. Road v. Skinkle, 140 U. S. 334; Maddrey v. Cox, 73 Tex. 538; In re Canal St., (R. I. 93) 25 Atl. R. 975; Richmond v. Ry. Co., 21 Gratt. 604; Muskegon v. Dow, (Mich. 93) 54 N. W. R. 170; Com. v. MaoFerron, (Pa. 93) 25 Atl. R. 556; Tillotson v. East Sagi- 13 §9 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. n. public or municipal corporations is in no wise affected by the fact, that the charter of the municipal corporation is created by the same legislative act which creates a private corporation.^ § 9. Legislative power not xinliinited — Public and private character of municipal corporations distinguished.— Not- withstanding the general proposition, and popular belief, that a municipal corporation is subject to the uncontrolled and unhm- ited exercise of power by the state, that is not the case. A municipal corporation certainly occupies a very different posi- tion from the private corporation, in respect to the power of the legislative control over such corporation, at least in regard to a large part of its powers. But in order to determine how far the state government may interfere with the municipal corpora- tion, either as to its existence as a body corporate, or as to its naw, 54 N. W. R. 162; Murphy v. Lou- isville, 9 Bush. 189; Lloyd v. Mayor, etc. of New York, 5 N. T. 369; People V. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228; State Bank V. Knoop, 16 How. (0. S.) 369; State V. Mayor, 24 Ala. TOl; State v. Mayor, E. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 250; Duusmore's Appeal, 52 Pa. St. 374; Sangamon Co. V. Springfield, 63111. 66; Darling- ton V. Mayor etc. of New York, 31 N. Y. 164; Savings Fund Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. ITS, 185; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 VA. St. 169; Lowber v. N. Y., 7 Abb. Pr. E. 248; Green v. N. Y., 5 Abb. Pr. E. 503; Gleason v. Cleveland, (Ohio 93) 31 N. E. 802; Buford v. State, 72 Tex. 182; In re House Bill, 12 Colo. 289; Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. 74; Plymouth V. Jackson, 15 Pa. St. 44; Louisville V. Com., 1 Duvall (Ky.) 295; Empo- ria V. Smith, 22 Pac. E. 616 (Kan. 88) ; Davies v. Los Angeles, 86 Cal. 37; Greensburg v. Laird, 8 Pa. Co. Gt. 608; O'Hara v. Portland, 3 Greg. 525; Gray v. Brooklyn, 10 Abb. (N. Y.) Pr. Eep., sr. s. 186; Nalle v. Aus- tin, (Tex. 93) 21 S. W. E. 375; Platte Co. V. Do well, 30 Pac. E. 68; Jack- sou V. Walsh, (Md. 92) 23 Atl. E. 778; Morey v. Newfane, 8 Barb. 645; j 14 Philadelphia v. Field, 58 Pa. St. 320; Erie v. Canal, 59 Pa. St. 174; Smith v. People, 29 N. E. E. 676; New Or- leans V. Hoyle, 23 La. An. 740; Amite City V. Clements, 24 La. An. 27; State V. Forrest Co., 43 N. W. E. 551; Com. V. Brenham, 22 N. E. E. 628; Tins- man V. Eailroad Company, 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 148; Atty. Gen. v. Hatch, 60 Mich. 229; Ruohs v. Athens, (Tenn. 92) 18 S. W. E. 400; Downing v, Indiana etc. Co., 129 Ind. 443; C. & A. E. E. Co. V. Adler, 56 111. 344; Eichland Co. v. Lawrence, 12 111. 8; State etc. v. St. Louis County Court, 34 Mo. 546; Purdy v. People, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 385; Creighton v. San Fran- cisco, 42 Cal. 446; Lucas v. Tippe^ canoe Co., 44 Ind. 524; Burns v. Clarion County, 62 Pa. St. 351; see also Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss. 58; Peo- ple V. Wren, 4 Scam. (111.) 273; New Orleans etc. Co. v. NeMr Orleans, 26 La. An. 517; People v. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228; Coles v. Madison, Breese (HI.) 120. ^Patterson v. Society etc., 24 N. J. L. 885 ; see Baltimore v. Board of Police, 15 Md. 376; Luehrman v. Taxing District, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 425. CH. IT.] LEGISLATIVE CONTROL. §9 lights, a closer investigation is required into the actual condi- tion of things which lead up to the incorporation of a munici- pality. What the legislator does in the way of the creation of a body corporate, is certainly subject to change and modifica- tion by the same power which creates it. But what the legis- lator does not create by such act of incorporation, and which exists independently of the legislative action, is something which the legislator by no act can dispose of or destroy. The legislator does not create the community which is incorporated by the legislative act, he simply gives to a community already existent a legal personality, which it cannot have independently of such legislative act. This legal personality is the sole crea- tion of the legislator. Under the decisions of the courts hereto- fbre cited, there can be no question that this act of incorporation of a city or town may at anjj^ time be repealed, or the corpora- tion dissolved. But wliat is the effect of a repeal of a munici- pal charter upon the substantial possession and rights of the municipality or community is an altogether different question. Subject to some criticism and objection on the part of a few authorities,^ a limitation upon the legislative power of control has been adopted by the current decisions, which is made to rest upon the recognized dual character of a municipal corpo- ration. If a municipal corporation had in every particular tlie same public character, which belongs to the township or county, and it constituted simply a subdivision of the state government, as such counties and townships do, no distinction would be possible between these classes of governmental organizations and the municipal corporation. But the existence of a munic- ipal corporation is called forth by the peculiar needs of a com- pactly settled community, and the development, under the peculiar conditions of such community, of local rights and in- 1 Darlington v. Mayor, etc., 31 K. T. 164 (1865); Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 160, 180, 181, per Shars- wood, J., who giving the judgment of the court says: "A municipal corporation is merely an agency of government fully subject to the con- trol of the legislature, who may en- large or diminish its territorial ex- tent, or its functions, may change or modify its internal arrangement, or destroy its very existence, with the mere breath of arbitrai'y discre- tion. . . The sovereign may con- tinue its (the city's) corporate exist- ence, and yet assume and resume the appointments of all of its offi- cers and agents into its own hands; for the power which can create and destroy can modify and change." 15 § 9 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. II. terests, in which the state at large has no special concern, and which are of strictly local value.^ On the other hand, the mu- nicipality is likewise vested with the right, and the duty is im- posed upon it, of carrying on the local administration of public powers, which otherwise would be intrusted to the county or town organization. Its public duties can be performed quite as readily bj' a local organization which is not incorporated; and tlie powers are conferred upon the municipal corporation simply as a matter of public convenience, and not as one of necessity. In fact, the incorporation of a city or town is called forth by the local needs of the community, and its existence depends upon such incorporation to satisfy such local wants. " The propo- sition which asserts the amplitude of legislative control over municipal corporations, when confined, as it should be, to such corporations as agencies of the state iu its government, is entirely sound. They are not created exclusively for that purpose, but have other objects and purposes peculiarly local, and in which the state at large, except in conferring the power and regulat- ing its exercise, is legally no more concerned than it is in the individual and private concerns of its several citizens. Indeed, it would be easy to show that it is not from the standpoint of state interest, but from that of local interest, that the necessity of incorporating cities and villages most distinctly appears. State duties of a local nature can for the most part be very well per- formed through the usual township and count)' organizations. It is because, where an urban population is collected, many things are necessary for their comfort and protection which are not needed in the country, that the state is then called upon to confer large powers and to make the localitj' a subordinate com- monwealth." ^ In regard to the powers and property which are vested in a municipal corporation in its public character, as a branch of the state government, there can be no limit to the control of such corporation by the state. But where the muni- cipal corporation, as it always does, by virtue of its existence as a legal personality, acquires the rights of property of a pri- vate character for the benefit of the community which has been 1 For example Public Parks : State V. Sohweickardt, 19 S. W. E. 47. 2 Opinion of Judge Cooley in Peo- ple V. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228. See al- 16 so Underbill v. Essex, (Vt.) 23 Afl. Rep. 617; State v. Lainoureux, 30 Pac. Rep. 243. CH. n.] LEGISLATIVE CONTROL. §10 incorporatedj and in the enjoyment of which the state at large is not concerned, these propriety rights constitute in the con- stitutional sense vested rights, if not of the municipal corpora- tion itself, yet of the communit}' which has been incorporated, which cannot be diverted or taken away by legislative action. In respect to these semi-private rights the legislative control is not unlimited.^ § 10. Effect of repeal or dissolution. — In order to properly appreciate the difficulty and importance of this distinction be- tween the public and private character of a municipal corpora- tion, reference should be made to the effect of a repeal or dissolution of the charter of a municipal corporation. That the state may repeal or otherwise materially change the charter of the municipal corporation, there can be no question. Not only is it possible for the state or law-making power to simply mod- ify or change the charter by enlargement or diminution of the powers or the territory of the corporation ; but it may also destroy the corporation altogether, substitute another in its place, or provide for the government of the community in some other way than by a municipal corporation. The United 1 Downing v. Indianapolis, etc., Co., 151 Mass. 364; Gary Library v. Bliss,- 151 Mass. 364; Wellington v. Wellington, 26 Pac. Rep. 415 ; Louis- ville V. Commonwealtli, 1 Duvall (Ky.) 295; Weigbtman v. Wasbing- ton, 1 Black. (U. S.) 39; Franklin Co. Gram. Scb. v. Bailey, 62 Vt. 467; Reading v. Commonwealth, 11 Pa. St. 196; People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553, 560; People v. Field, 58 N. Y. 491; People v. Ingersoll, 58 K Y. 1; Nichol V. Nashville, 9 Humph. 252 ; Small T. Danville, 51 Me. 359; West Sav. Fund Soc. v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 1*75; lb. 185; Bailey v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 3 Hill, 531; Rich- mond V. Long's Admr., 17 Gratt. (Va.) 375; De Voss v. Richmond, 18 Gratt. 338; s. c, 7 Am. Law Reg., N. s. 589; People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44; 8. c, 9 Am. Rep. 103; People v. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228; s. c, 15 Am. 2 Rep. 202; Martin v. Mayor, etc., 1 Hill, 545; Buttrick v. Lowell, 1 Al- len, 172; Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 489; Askwetb v. Hale Co., 54 Ala. 639; Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich. 165, 184; New Orleans, etc., R. R. Co. V. New Orleans, 26 La. An. 478, 517; Jones v. New Haven, 34 Conn. 1 ; United States v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, 17 Wall. 332; In re Malone's Estate, 21 S. C. 435; Niles. Water Works v. Niles, 59 Mich. 311; Western College v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375 ; State v. Scbweeokart, 19 S. W. R. 47; Weet v. Brockport, 16 N. Y. 161; Louisville v. University of Louisville, 15 B. Mon. 642; Toucbard V. Touohard, 5 Cal. 306; Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 9 Cal. 453; Commis- sioners V. Duckett, 20 Md. 468; Cum- mings V. City of St. Louis, 2 S. W. R. 130; 90 Mo. 259; Scranton v. White, 23 Atl. R. 1043; 30 W. N. C. 74. 17 10 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. n. States government has exercised this power for many years past in regard to the city of Washington, the capital of the country. But, as just stated, the legislature, or law-making power simply creates this legal personality which we call the municipal corporation ; but it neither creates nor can destroy the community which goes to make up the city or town, and which continues to exist independently of all legislative ac- tion whatever. The legislature of New York has done nothing by enactment to create the metropolis which occupies the Island of Manhattan ; and, on the other hand, it can do nothing to de- stroy such a community, even though the present government may be taken away altogether. Now, in order to appreciate the effect of a repeal or dissolution of a municipal charter, ref- erence by analogy should be made to the effect of a repeal or dissolution of a private corporation, where the power to repeal such charter or dissolve the corporation has been reserved by special provision in the chartej', or by the general laws under vvrhich private corpoi-ations are made. The doctrine is well es- tablished in regard to private corporations, that when the power to repeal the private charter has been reserved, the power of the legislature over such private corporation- thus reserved is nevertheless not unlimited. While the corporation, as a legal entity, depends for its continued existence upon the legislative discretion ; yet where the power of dissolution of such corpora- tion is exercised by the state legislature, the dissolution of such corporation cannot in any way affect or impair the property or rights of property which the incorporators have created under their charter, or the rights of its creditors.^ And the same rule has been applied to the rights of property of private corpora- tions, which have been cieated through valid municipal grants.^ The explanation of these cases is, that the individuals who com- 1 Downing v. Indiana etc. Co., 129 Ind. 443; Mumma v. Potomac, 8 Pet. 285; People v. O'Brien Rec, 111 N. Y. 1 ; Schlieder v. Dielman, 10 So. E. 934; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Crancli, 135; Detroit v. Plank Eoad, 43 Mich. 140; Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700; Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 lb. 13. "In re Brooklyn El. Ky. Co., 11 N. 18 T. S. 161; 57 Hun, 590; Sixth etc. Co. V. Kerr, 72 N. Y. 330; R. E. Co. V. Delaware, 114 U. S. 501; People V. O'Brien, supra ; Langdon v. Mayor, 93 N. Y. 129; Davis v. Mayor, 14 lb. 506; Mayor v. Second Ave. E. E. Co., 32 lb. 261; Milhau v. Sharp, 327 lb. 611; Western Pas. Co. v. E. E. Co., 26 N. E. R. 188; Gary Libr. v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 364. CH. 11.] LEGISLATIVE CONTROL. § 11 pose the private corporation became the successors to all the rights, which the private corporation acquires upon the dissolu- tion of such corporation. And no other theory can be properly applied to the rights of a municipal corporation, upon the dis- solution of such municipal corporation. ^ § 11. Legislative power over property of municipal corpo- rations. — In application of the distinction, heretofore made, be- tween the public and private character of a municipal corporation, and the corresponding rights of the same, one is prepared to meet witli the statement, that the legislature, as the trustee or representative of the public in general, has, or may assume, full control over the public property and the public rights of a municipal corporation. But without qualification, that state- ment cannot be taken without some possibility of error. It has, thus, for example, been held that the state may authorize a railroad company to occupy the street of a city, without the consent of such city, or without payment of any compensation to the city .2 But such power is only one of control and regu- lation of the uses of such property, and the state cannot by any act divest the city of the use of its pi'operty or transfer such property to some nonmunicipal use.^ But, in view of the dis- tinction between public and private rights of municipal corpora- tions, nothing can be done in the way of taking the private property of the citj'-, for public use, without payment of com- pensation.* And, except in the case of the appropriation of private propei'ty of the said municipal corporation to public ' Brooklyn R. K. Co. v. Brooklyn City R R. Co., .32 Barb. 264; Mayor etc. V. Second Ave. R. K. Co., 32 N. Y. 261; New Orleans W. W. Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674. ^Post, §302. 8 State V. Schweickart, 19 S. W. R. 41; State v. Wallace, 52 N. W. R. 213; Darlington v. Mayor, 31 N. Y. 164, 193, 205 ; People v. Ingersoll, 58 N. Y. 1; People v. O'Brien, 111 lb. 1; N. O. "W. W. Co. V. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674; Sinking Fund Cases, lb. 700; Detroit v. Howell P. R. Co., 43 Mich. 140. * Southampton v. Mecox Co., 116 N. Y. 1; Mayor etc. v. Hopkins, 13 La. An. 326; New Orleans etc. Co. v. New Orleans, 26 lb. 517; lb. 478; Mercer v. Railroad Co., 36 Pa. St. 99; People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188; Louisville v. University of Lou- isville, 15 B. Mon. 642; Portland etc. Co. V. Portland, 14 Oreg. 188; Dar- lington v. Mayor, 31 N. Y. 164; Clin- ton V. R. R. Co., 24 Iowa, 455; Rey- nolds V. Stark Co., 5 Ohio, 204; 5 Ohio St. 113; Wellington v. Township, (Kan. 90) 26 Pao. R. 415; Reading v. Commonwealth, 11 Pa. St. 196; Cum- mings V. City of St. Louis, 2 S. W. R. 180; 90 Mo. 250; Mount Hope Cemetery v. Boston, (Mass. 93) 33 N. E. R. 695. 19 §12 MUXICIPAL COKPORATrONS. [oh. [I. use, ill the exercise of the right of eminent domain, there can never be any application or appropriation of such property to any other but a municipal use. Thus, for example, lands which have been acquired by a municipal corporation, by gift or purchase, are not subject to legislative appropriation. ^ And even in the regulation of the use of the property, the power of the legislator is not unlimited. Thus, it has been held in New- York, that real estate which the city of New York owns in fee simple, is no more subject to legislative control than similar property rights of private individuals. And that an act of the legislature, which orders the destruction of a leservoir of the city, and the conversion of the ground upon which the reservoir is located into a park, without the consent of the city thereto, is an unlawful exercise of legislative authority, and cannot be pecmitted, except in accordance with the right of eminent domain ; and, therefore, full compensation must be made to the city for such an appropriation of its property.^ § 12. Legislative power over revenues, including penal- ties and franchises. — But a distinction is to be made between the property rights of a municipal corporation, either public or private, and the provisions made by state laws for the collec- tion of revenue by the corporation. While the propert}', which a municipal corporation acquires in the exercise of its I State V. Patterson, (IST. J. 90) 20 Atl. R. 828; State V. Suhweickert, 19 S. W. K. 47; People v. Vanderbilt, 26 N. Y. 324; Richmond Co. v. Law- rence, 12 111. 1; Bass v. Fontleroy, 11 Tex. 698-708; Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 Mass. 76; Gary v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 564. ^ Webb V. Mayor etc. of 'Sev York, 64 How. Pr. Rep. 10. "I perceive," said Macomber, J., "no difiference between the tenure of property thus held by the city and the proprietary rights of natural persons or private corporations. The privilege, how- ever, is peculiar in this state to the city of New York. Nor is this prop- erty, with other real estate owned by the city, held in trustfor any person; nor is it stamped with any mere po- 20 litical trust of which the city may be deprived, and thus its claim to the right to the possession, of the prop- erty destroyed. The title to the land rests somewhere, and, as has been shown above, so far as the records extend, no one claims it except the city itself." The com-t did not hold that the protection here conceded to municipal property in New York city was not granted elsewhere. See also Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat. 694; Terret v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 52; People V. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228; Peo- ple V. Fields, 58 N. Y. 591; Bailey v. Mayor, 3 Hill, 531; People v. Inger- soll, 58 N. Y. 1; Cincinnati S. & C. R. Co. V. Village of Belle Centre, (Ohio, 9) 27 N. E. Rep. 464. CH. II.] LEGISLATIVE CONTROL. §12 corporate powers, is protected from legislative iaterference as vested rights ; yet in provisions of the law for the revenue of the city, in vk^hatever form such provision may take, the city has no vested rights ; and the legislature may at any time, as far as the municipal corporation itself is concerned,- change and modify, or altogether take away the particular source of reve- nue.^ The legislature's power over the revenue of the city is in no wise affected by the fact, that a particular purpose is mentioned for which the revenue in question has to be appro- priated. Thus, for example, the legislature may repeal the power it gives to cities to grant licenses for the sale of intoxi- cating liquors, notwithstanding the fact that the money, col- lected from such licenses, is to be donated to the support of the paupers of the town.^ So, also, may the legislature 'repeal a law, which gives to a municipal corporation the power to levy and collect wharfage from the private wharfs within its territorial limits, although there is no power in the legislature to divert or remit the proceeds accruing to the city from any wharf, which it may have created in the exercise of a franchise granted to it for the establishment of wharfs.'. On the other hand, a franchise granted to a town to establish a ferry or a wharf, as long as it has not been exercised in the establishment or creation of either of them, does not constitute a vested right which will come within the protection of the constitutional pro- vision. Such executory rights or franchises may be repealed 1 Taylor v. Robinson, 72 Tex. 364; Anderson v. Mayfield, 19 S. W. Rep. 598; Tile v. Mayfield, 19 lb. 598; Mo- Gee V. Salem, 149 Mass. 238; Board V. Com'rs, 107 N". C. 110; Northamp- ton Co. T. Eastern etc. Ry. Co., 23 Atl. Rep. 895; Lucas v. Board, etc., 44 Ind. 524; Indianapolis v. Indian- apolis, etc., 59 Ind. 215; Tyrrell v. Wheeler, 123 K. Y. 76; Toungs v. Hall, 9 Nev. 212; People v. IngersoU, 58 ISr. T. 1; Darst v. Griffin, (Neb. 90) 48 N. "W. R. 819 ; Essex Board v. Skin- kle, 140 U. S. 334; Caroudelet Co. v. New Orleans, 10 So. R. 871; County V. State, 11 111. 202; County v. Coun- ty, 12 111. 1 ; People v. Pratt, 129 N. Y. 68; Love v. Schenck, 12 Ired. Law, 304; People v. Melds, 58 N. Y. 491; Home Ins. Co. v. City Council, 93 U. S. 116. 2 People V. Meyer, 5 N. Y. S. 69; Mendocino Co. v. Bank, 24 Pac. R. 1002; 86 Cal.-255; People v. Super- visors, 50 Cal. 361; Grantham v. State, 14 S. E. Rep. 892; Richland Co. V. Lawrence Co., 12 111. 1; Peo- ple V. Power, 25 111. 187; Richmond V. Richmond, etc., Railroad Co., 21 Gratt. (Va.) 604; Spaulding v. Ando- ver, 54 N. H. 38; Home Ins. Co. v. City Council, 93 U. S. 116; Sangamon Co. V. Springfield, 63 111. 71; Gutz- weller v. People, 14 111. 142. = St. Louis V. Shields, 52 Mo. 351. 21 §12 MUNICIPAL COBPOBATJONS. [CH. n. by the legislature.^ So, also, where a legislative grant directs a donation of lands to a city for certain public purpose, as long as such grant has not been performed or acted upon by the munic- ipal corporation, it is not a contract which is inviolable; but it is an unexecuted donation, which may at any time be repealed by the legislature, prior to the actual purchase or transfer of such land to the city.^ So, likewise, an authority, which is giv- en to a municipal corporation, or to a county, to take the stock of railroad corporations and issue bonds thei'fefor, upon the as- sent of the majority of the voters, does not constitute such a binding contract that the legislature cannot repeal such a law and prevent such a subscription of stock and issue of bonds, before an affirmative vote has been taken by the people of the county or town, or the subscription has been agreed to be made.^ It has also been held that laws, providing for the acquisition by a municipal corporation or county of penalties for the vio- lation of law or the breach of a contract, do not constitute in any way a vested right in such county or town, which cannot be repealed or taken away, before the enforcement of such penalties, by legislative action. Thus, for example, in Maryland, a railroad company agreed to locate its road through three towns named, subject to a pi'ovision, that if it failed to perform that obligation it should forfeit '$1,000,000 to the state of Maryland for the use of Washington county. It was held that a legislative act, which repealed that portion of the charter which imposed this penalty in favor of Washington county, took away from Washington county its right to enforce such penalty, and released the railroad company from its per- ' East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 511; s. c, 16 Conn. 149; 17 Conn. 79; Sioux City R. R. Co. v. Sioux City, 43 N. W. R. 224; New Orleans v. Wolmot, 31 La. An. 65; EUerman v. McNains, 30 La. An. 65 ; Darlington v. Mayor, 31 N. Y. 164, 202; Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166; Trustees v. Tatman, 13 111. 30; Police Jury v. Shreveport, 5 La. An. 661. 2 Richland Co. v. Lawrence Co., 12 111. 1; People v. Vanderbilt, 26 N. Y. 22 287; Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 Mass. 76; Bass v. Fontleroy, 26 N. Y. 287. 8 State V. Meller, 67 Mo. 604; Shelby Co. V. Cumberland & C. R. R. Co., 8 Bush (Ky.) 299; People v. Coon, 25 Cal. 635 ; Union Pacific Railroad Co. V. Davis County, 6 Kan. 256; C. 0. R. R. Co. V. Barren Co., 10 Bush (Ky.) 604; Concord v. Portsmouth Bank, 92 U. S. 625 ; Aspinwall v. County of Jo Daviess, 22 How. 364; Baltimore & D. P. Railroad Co. v. Pumphrey, (Md. 1891) 21 Atl. Rep. 559. CH. II.] LEGISLATIVE CONTROL. §13 formance. The general rule is, that fines and penalties which are directed to be paid to public corporations in general are not vested rights of such corporation ; but the law may at any time be repealed, or the fines and penalties released by the legislature, without the consent of the municipal corporation.^ It has also been held that the same result is attained, where the executive officer exercises his power and releases the fines or penalties, ■ which have been imposed by the courts for the commission of some crime.^ § 13. Legislative power over property held in trust. — The fact, that a municipal corporation is charged with the adminis- tration of a trust for a public charity, or one involving private interests and rights, will not of itself be any obstacle in the way of any limitation or abolition of a municipal corporation, if such administration by the corporation is deemed to be for the public benefit. When the corporation has been dissolved, the Court of'Chancery will assume the execution of the public trust,-and appoijnt new trustees, to take charge of such property and carry the trust into effect. This is not only the case, where a corporation has been destroyed, or its municipal character materially modified ; but, also, whenever there is any fear of mal- administration of the trust, or whenever the interest of the trust and its beneficiaries requires a change of trustees.^ Not only has the Court of Chancery this extraordinary power in cases of great danger of loss, and for the protection of the interests of the beneficiaries ; but even in other cases it has been held that the legislature has the power to divest a municipal corporation of its control of a public charity or trust, and to place it in a different body of trustees. This was done in a case of great public interest, where the legislature of Pennsylvania under- ' State V. Railroad Company, 12 Gill & Johns. (Md.) 399; 3 How. (U. S.) 534; Union etc. Co. v. Proctor, 12 Colo. 194; Ex parte Christensen, 24 Pac. R. 747; 85 Cal. 208; Rankin v. Baird, Breeze (111.) 123; C. & A. R. R. Co. V. Adler, 56 111. 344; Conner V. Bent, 1 Mo. 235; Coles v. Madison County, Breese (111.) 115; HoUiday V. People, 5 Gilm. (10 111.) 216. 2 Portland W. V. R. Co. v. Portland, 12 Pac. R. 265; 14 Greg. 188: HoUi- day V. People, 5 Gilm. (10 111.) 216. s Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, 528; Montpelier v. East Mont- pelier, 29 Vt. 12; EUerman v. Mc- Mains, 30 La. An. 190; Girard v. Phila., 7 "Wall. 1; Philadelphia v. Pox, 64 Pa. St. 169; Cincinnati v. Cameron, 33 Ohio St. 336; Luchrman V. Tax Dist., 2 Lea, Teuu. 425. 23 § 13 MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS. [CH. n. took to deprive the city of Philadelphia, of the right to adminis- ter the charitable trust which was confided to its care under the will of Girard and others, and to transfer the administration of these trusts to a corporate body, called the " Directors of City Trusts," who were to be appointed by certain state judges. It was held that this was a lawful exercise of legislative author- ity .^ But this power of the legislature has been denied in one case, in the Supreme Court of Maine, where certain lands were held as the property of a town, and the legislature authorized the sale of such lands and the investment of the proceeds of sale, as a fund in the hands of certain trustees to devote to buildings for the use of the public schools. A subsequent act of the legislature authorized the town to selecft a new board of trustees, and directed the original board to deliver over to the new board all the trust property held by it. The legislature held that, in accordance with the principle laid down in the Dartmouth College Case, such interference with the trust prop- erty was unconstitutional and void.^ The distinction is made in the Pennsylvania case between private trustees being charg- ed with the performance of a charitable trust, and the adminis- tration of such a trust being vested in the municipal corporation. In the first case, the legislature has no power of interference, except to prevent maladministration of the trust; but in the second case, the interference bj' the legislature is subject to no limitation in respect to the change of administrators.^ But the legislature did not in this case attempt to divert the trust funds and apply them to purposes foreign to the provisions of the trust ; and it is extremely doubtful whether the legisla- ture would in any case have the power to make such a diversion of trust funds. Such a power has been denied to the legisla- ture in two cases.* In the New Hampshire case, the trust fund for the support of public schools was given to the town of M., 1 Philadelphia v. Fox, 94 Pa. St. 169; Penn. Const. 1874, art. 3, §20. 2 Trustees v. Bradbury, 11 Me. 118; see also to same effect, Gary v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 384; 25 N. E. R. 92; Yar- mouth V. N. Yarm., 34 Me. 411 ; Nor- ris V. Academy, 79 Johns. (Md.) 7; Louisville v. University, 15 B. Mon. 24 642; Bass v. Pontleroy, 11 Tex. 698. *This power of control over city trusts has since been taken avpay from the legislature by a subsequent constitutional provision. Const. Pa. 1874, art. 3, sec. 20. * State V. Springfield, 6 Ind. 83; Greenville v. Mason, 53 N. H. 515. CH. n.] LEGISLATIVE CONTEOL. §14 on the express condition that the fund should be applied solely to the support of the public schools in the town of M. At a subsequent period, the town of G. was created by the legisla- ture out of a part of the territory and inhabitants of M. ; and the statute which created this new corporation provided, that this trust fund should be divided between the original town of M. and the new town of G. in the proportion of seven to M. and thirteen to G. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the legislature had no power to direct the appropriation of the trust fund in question to any other purpose than that which was prescribed by the donor. And, in the exercise of the legislative power of cutting down the territory of the town of M., it had no power to transfer any proportionate share of the trust fund to the new corporation, which had been formed out of a part of the territory' of M. It has, however, been held in Maine, that where a public corporation holds property in trust for the use of its inhabitants, the legislature can, upon the di- vision of such corporation into two or more towns, provide that the original town shall continue to hold such property in trust for the inhabitants of both towns.^ Certainly, the munic- ipal corporation has no power, in the absence of legislative authority', to make any other use of the trust fund, but for the purpose provided for in the trust.'^ " § 14. Legislative power over municipal contracts. — The contract of a municipal corporation certainly constitutes a species of private property of such corporation, and would, therefore, under the general rule of discrimination between the public and private character of a municipal corporation, be pro- tected from legislative interference. And a contract between two municipal corporations would apparently be as much pro- tected from legislative interference or abridgment, as contracts made by the municipal corporation with a private person or a 1 Nortli Yarmoutli v. Skillings, 45 Me. 133. 2 Aberdeen v. Sanderson, 8 Sm. & M. 670; Gary v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 364; White V. Fuller, 39 Vt. 193; Mont- pelier v. East Montpelier, 27 Vt. 704; 29 Vt. 12; Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543; Holland v. San Francisco, 7 Cal. 301; Daniel v. Memphis, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 582; Trustees of Academy v. Aberdeen, 13 Sm. & M. 645; Kingman V. Brockton, (Mass. 90) 26 K E. K. 968; Bonham v. Taylor, (Tex. 90) 16 S. W. R. 555; East St. Louis V. Flannigan, 34 111. App. 596; Poultney v. Wells, 1 Ark. (Vt.) 180; Trustees v. Bradbury, 2 Fairf. (Me.) 118; Harrison v. Bridgewater, 16 25 § 14 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. II. private corporatioa. There has not been any adjudication on this particular question, but there can be very little doubt that those courts will deny to the legislature the power to abridge or impair contracts made between two municipal corporations, which deny to the legislature the power of interference with the private property of such a corporation. And there is certainly no doubt that a contract, made by the municipal corporation with private individuals, should come within the constitutional prohibition, of the enactment of laws impairing the obligation of a contract. Whatever the legislature may do in respect to the continued existence of the municipal corporation as a body politic, it can do nothing that would in any way impair the ob- ligation of the municipal corporation or its contract to third persons.-^ Not only can there be no direct abolition of the con- tract or destruction of the contractual rights of the municipal creditors ; but even indirectly is it impossible for the legislative act to impair such a contract. Thus, for example, where at the date of execution of the contract in question, the power of the municipal corporation to levy taxes was subject to a particular limitation, the scope and extent of the power of taxation of the municipal corporation constitutes a part of the contract, wliich the corporation has made with third persons, and the legislature cannot by subsequent enactments further curtail or limit the power of taxation, to the detriment of the creditors. This is true, in whatever way the subsequent legislation curtails the power of taxation, either by reducing the rate or amount of taxation ;2 or by a repeal of a provision of the law for com- Binghamtou v. E. R. Co., 61 Hue, 479; Western Savings Fund Society V. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 175, 185; San Francisco v. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541 ; Lee County v. Rogers, 7 Wall. 185 ; contra. New Orleans v. N. 0. W. Co., 142 U. S. 79. 2 United States v. Mobile, 12 Fed. R. 768; Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 768; State v. New Orleans, 37 La. An. 528; Stewart v. Police Jury, 34 La. An. 673 ; State ex rel. Carriers v. New Orleans, .36 lb. 687: Morris v. State, 62 Tex. 728; State ex rel Marchand v. New Orleans, 37 La. An. 13. 26 Mass. 16; Plymouth v. Jackson, 15 Pa. 44. iKoonce v. Russel, 103 N. C. 179; Lansing v. County Treasurer, 1 Dil- lon Cir. C. R. 522; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472; Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall. 44; Underhill v. Es- sex, 23 Atl. R. 617; State v. Milwau- kee, 25 Wis. 122; Brooklyn Park Comm'rs V. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234; Wolfe V. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358; Galena v. Amy, 5 Wall. 705; Goodale v. Feunell, 27 Ohio St. 426; s. c, 22 Am. Rep. 321 ; Von Hoffman V. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; Houston v. R. R. Co., (Tex. 92) 19 O. W. R. 127; Woodruff V. Trapnall, 10 How. 206; CH. II.J LEGISLATIVE CONTKOL. §14 pulsory taxation ; ^ or by any provision, which operates as a re- duction or limitation of the present power of the corporation to provide by taxation for the payment of its debts.^ But, on the other hand, the power of the legislature to mod- ify the lules of taxation, as applied to municipal corporations, is not completely taken away bj- the existence of corporate debts, provided the modification or other change in the mode of taxa- tion produces no matei'ial impairment of the rights of the cred- itors. Thus, for example, it is possible for a state to provide by law for the release of certain property from taxation by a municipal corporation. ^ For the limited amount of such prop- erty, which is thus exempted, makes it impossible that the change in the law of taxation of such corporation should oper- ate as a material impairment of the rights of the city's credit- •ors.* And so, also, may the legislature repeal a statutory authority to the city or county, to subscribe for the stock of a railroad corporation and issue bonds therefor, as long as the subscription, or the binding contract for it, has not been made with the railroad corporation.^ The act of the legislature, which provides for the creation of a sinking fund for the pay- ment of the debts of a municipal corporation, cannot be re- pealed by a subsequent legislature, or such sinking fund be devoted to a different purpose, or the rights of the parties in and to such sinking fund in any other way interfered with." So, also, where the legislature authorizes a city to fund its 1 Sawyer v. Concordia, 12 Fed. Rep. 754. sSeibert v. Lewis, 122 U. S. 284; Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 TJ. S. 710; Louisiana v. Pillsbury, 103 U. S. 278. * House of Refuge v. Smith, (Pa. 90) 21 Atl. R. 353; State /. Univer- sity, (Minn. -90) 48 N". W. R. 1119; Roaring Creek Co. v. Girton, (Pa. 90) 21 Atl. 780; Northampton Co. v. La- fayette College, 18 Atl. Rep. 516; Detroit Home v. Detroit, 76 Mich. 521; Bannon v. Byrnes, 39 Fed. Rep. 892; People v. Assessors, 111 N. Y. 505. * Muscatine v. Railroad Co., 1 Dil- lon, C. C. 536; Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510; Seibert v. Lewis, 122 U. S. 284; Goodale v. Fennell, 27 Ohio St. 426; 22 Am. Rep. 321. ^Binghamton v. Railroad Co., 61 Hun, 479; People v. Coon, 25 Cal. 635 ; Aspinwall v. County of Jo Da- viess, 22 How. 364; Shelby Co. v. Cumberland & C. R. R. Co., 8 Bush. (Ky.) 299; State v. Meller, 67 Mo. 604; Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Davis County, 6 Kan. 256; People v, Morse, 43 Cal. 534; C. & O. R. R. Co. v. Barren Co., 10 Bush. (Ky.) 604; Town of Concord v. Portsmoutli Sav. Bank, 92 U. S. 625. Terry v. Banks, 18 Wis. 87; Liqui- dators V. Municipality, 6 La. An. 21 ; Smith V. Morse, 2 Cal. 524. 27 §15 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. n. floating debt ; and in reliance upon that act, the creditors sur- render their claims, and receive new obligations, this final transaction operates as a pledge of the city's revenues and prop- erty, vphich could not be materially altered by subsequent leg- islation, without the consent of the creditors.^ It has also been held that, where the legislature, in authorizing a municipal cor- poration to issue bonds to a specific amount in settlement of its indebtedness, makes provision against the further increase of the municipal debt, which was evidently intended to influ- ence the negotiation of the bonds thus authorized to be issued, the city would not thereafter be permitted to issue further bonds, except in payment of its bonded debt. That provision was held to constitute a contract with the creditors, which could not be repealed or impaired by subsequent legislation, authorizing a further issue of bonds by such corporation. ^ § 15. Compulsory contracts. — Another difficult question, in determining the legislative power of control over municipal corporations, is the extent to which the legislature can, without the consent of a municipal corporation, compel such corpor^,- tion to assume contractual obligations. The general propo- sition has been maintained by the authorities that, while a legislature may authorize corporations to make contracts, it is impossible for the legislature to make contracts for the corpora- tion without its consent. This has been the rule of the great majority of the courts in this country.^ In Michigan an act of • ' Bi-ooklyn Park Comrs. v. Arm- strong, 45 N. y. 234; People v. Bond, 10 Cal. 563; People v. Wood, 7 lb. 579. 2 Atkins V. Randolph, 31 Vt. 226; Darlington v. Mayor, etc., of N. Y., 31 N. T. 164, 205; Hasbrouck v. Mil- waukee, 13 Wis. 37; Mills v. Charlton, 29 Wis. 400; Philadelphia v. Meld, 58 Pa. St. 320; State v. Tappan, 29 Wis. 664; s. c, 9 Am. Bep. 662. See further, as to rights of creditors, post, chapters on Contracts and Manda- mus. 3 Darlington v. Mayor, 31 N. Y. 164, 205 ; Cairo & St. Louis R. R. Co. V. City of Sparta, 77 111. 505; Atkius V. Randolph, 31 Vt. 22(>; White v. 28 Fuller, 31 lb. 226; People v. Chicago, (Lincoln Pk. case,) 51 111. 17; People V. Salman, 51 lb. 37; Harard v. Drainage Co., 51 lb. 130; In re Union Col., 29 N. E. R. 460; 129 IST. Y. 308; Brunswick v. Litchfield, 2 Me. (2 Greenl.) 28, 32; Louisville v. The University, 15 B. Mon. 642; Western Sav. Fund Soc. v. Philadelphia, 30 Pa. St. 175, 185; Regents of Univer- sity V. Williams, 9 Gill & Johns. 365 ; Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 12; Norris v. Trustees Abingdon Academy, 7 Gill & Johns. (Md.) 7; Trustees v. Winston, 5 Stew. & Port. (Ala.) 17; Winn v. Comrs., (Ky. 00) 14 I. W. R. 421; Philadelphia v. Field, 58 Pa. St. 30; State v. Tappen, 29 CH. n.] LEGISLATIVE CONTROL. §15 the legislature directed a board of park commissioners to be created, and such board were authorized to acquire sufficient lands by purchase for the establishment of a public park in the city of Detroit, and directed the city council, to whom was given no control whatever over the commissioners or the pur- chase of the land, or tlie establishment of the park, to provide the necessary funds by the issue and sale of city bonds. The Supreme Court of Micliigan lield that a municipal corporation cannot be compelled by legislative act to contract debts for purely local purposes, and declared that, in this particular case, a park was purely a matter of local concern, in which the state at large had no interest ; and the legislative act, which undertook to compel the establishment of such a park, against or without the consent of the municipal corporation, was unconstitutional.^ But if the purpose for which the debt is to be contracted is of a strictly public character, it would then seem that the Wis. 664; Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13 lb. 37; Mills v. Charlton, 29 Wis. 400; Cf. contra, West Chicago Com'rs V. McMuUen, (111. 90) 25 N. E. R. 676. ' People ex rel. Park Commis- sioners V. Common Council of De- troit, 28 Mich. 228; s. c, 15 Am. Rep. 202. "It is a fundamental principle in this state, recognized and perpetuated by express provision of the constitution, that the people of every hamlet, town, ^nd city of the state, are entitled to the benefits of local self-government. But au- thority in the legislature, to deter- mine what shall be the extent of the capacity in the city to acquire and hold property, is not equivalent to, and does not contain within itself, authority to deprive the city of property actually acquired by legis- lative permission. As to property it thus holds for its own private pur- poses, a city is to be regarded as a constituent of the state government, and is entitled to the like protection in its property rights as any natural person vfho is also a constituent. The right of the state is a right of regulation, not of appropriation. It cannot be deprived of such property without due process of law. And when a local convenience or need is to be supplied in which the people of the state at large, or any portion thereof outside the city limits, are not concerned, the state can no more by process of taxation take from the individual citizens the money to pur- chase it, than they could, if it had been pi'ocured, appropriate it to the state use. From the very dawn of our liberties the principle most un- questionable of all has been this: that the people shall vote the taxes they are to pay, or be permitted to choose representatives for the pur- pose." It has on the same ground been held that city gas works Is a matter, private and distinct from pviblic concerns. Western Sav. Fund Soc. V. Philaidelphia, 31 Pa. St. 183. 29 § 15 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. U. legislature has the power to compel the creation of the indebt- edness, against or without the consent of the municipal corpo- T'ation. Thus, it has been held to be competent for tlie legisla- ture to compel a municipal corporation to build a bridge over a navigable stream within its limits. Or, in case it is deemed expedient, the state may appoint its own agents for the con- struction of such a bridge, and even authorize such commis- sioners to provide for the payment of the cost of the bridge, by negotiating a loan on the credit of the corporation. ^ So, also, may municipal corporations, in their character as local in- struments of government, be required by the legislature to keep the streets and highways and bridges, connected with such corporation, in repair.^ But corporations cannot be com- pelled by state statute to create a debt in aid of the construc- tion of a railway.^ In the case of the Brooklyn and New York bridge, the court of appeals decided that the erection of the bridge between the two cities was a purpose for which an in- debtedness may be incurred by these cities, and did not come in conflict with the constitutional provision, which declares that no city, county, or town shall give money, or loan its credit to any individual or corporation, or become an owner of corporate stock or bonds. It is held that, in that particular case, the contract was clearl}' within the authority of the two cities.* It is also possible for a legislature to provide, in its acts for incorporation of one city out of two or more, that the debts of the two cities should become one indebtedness upon both, or to provide for a separate maintenance of the two debts, and iPac. Bridge Co. v. Clackamas, 4 Fed. E. 217; Carter v. Bridge Pro- prietors, 104 Mass. 236; Haverhill v. G-roveland, (Mass.) 25 N. E. R. 976; Erie v. Canal, 59 Pa. St. 174; Kirk- wood V. Newbviry, 125 N. Y. 571; Guilder v. Otsego, 20 Minn. 74; Unit- ed States V. B. & O. R. E. Co., 17 Wall. 322. -See post, §§.315, 316; County v. People, 5 Neb. 136; Sliadler v. Blair, 136 Pa. St. 488; Fountain v. Warren, Co., (Ind. 90) 27 N. E. E. 125. By a constitutional amendment of 1874 30 in New York state, it is provided that tha legialatiiTe may ctnnpel a municipal corporation to improve its highways and keep them in re- pair, but the power must, before its exercise, be delegated to the local authority under general laws. Peo- ple V. Supervisors, 112 N. Y. 585. 3 People V. Batcheller, 53 N. Y. 128; 13 Am. R. 480; Cf. Berlin Bridge Co. V. Wagner, (N. Y. 90) 57 Hun, 346. * People V. Kelly, 5 Abbott's New Cases (N. Y.) 383; 76 N. Y. 475. CH. II.] LEGISLATIVE CONTKOL. §15 impose the liability in respect to each debt upon that part of the new corporation, which constituted the original debtor. All provisions of that sort are purely questions of government- al policy, and neither the existing creditors, nor the people of the new municipal corporation, can object to any such subse- quent change in its affairs by the legislature, as long as the original obligation is not impaired. ^ Thus, for example, by act of the legislature the city of Lafayette was added to and incorporated with the city of "New Orleans, and a provision was inserted in the act, that the added district, whose indebt- edness was proportionately less than the old city of New Or- leans, should be charged only with the payment of its own debts. . A subsequent act of the legislature required that taxes should be levied uniformly throughout the entire city, the ef- fect of which was to increase the burden of taxation of the addition to the city. But it was held that this subsequent leg- islation did not interfere with the vested rights, either of the citizens of the added district, or of their creditors.^ But it is not lawful for a legislature to impose in whole or in part upon one independent municipal corporation the obligation to pay the debt contracted by another corporation ; as where the leg- islature undertook to assess lands in the town of Flatbush to pay debts previously incurred by the adjoining city of Brook- lyn, in the establishment of a park, notwithstanding that a portion of the land in the park was taken from the limits of the town of Flatbush. This case is to be distinguished from the case, where the indebtedness of one town is made the com- mon indebtedness of a new corporation, formed by the consoli- dation of two or more.** 1 Columbus V. Town, (Wis. 92) 52 N. W. R. 425 ; Maddrey v. Cox, 73 Tex. 538; Saunders v. Municipality, 24 Fla. 226. 2 Eschenliurg v. Com'rs, 28 N. E. R. 865, (lud. 92); Maltby v. Tantges, (Minn. 92) 52 N. W. R. 858; Little v. Union Township Com., 40 N. J. L. 397; Layton v. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 515; Brown v. Memphis, 97 U. S. 800; People v. Hill, 7 Cal. 97; Vance v. Little Rock, 30 Ark. 435, 439; State v. Flanders, 24 La. An. 57; Hawkins v. Jonesboro, 63 Ga. 527; San Francisco v. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541; Sedgwick v. Bark, 11 Kan. 031 ; New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 644. 3 Town of Flatbush, In re, 60 N. Y. 398. In rendering this opinion, the court through Judge Miller says : " But such is not this case. . .There is no principle that I am aware of which sanctions the doctrine that it 31 §16 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS. [CH. II. In regard to the general proposition that the city corporation cannot be compelled by the legislature to incur debts for the attainment of a strictly local interest, there is but one really dissenting opinion, and that comes from Pennsylvania. It was held by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that the legisla- ture has the power to provide for the erection of a city hall, and thereby to provide for the accommodation of the courts for municipal purposes within the city of Philadelphia, and to determine the extent of the indebtedness thus incurred, and to compel such city to pay the debt.^ In consequence of the public feeling created by this extraordinary act of the legisla- ture, and the great burden imposed upon the city thereby, an amendment was made to the constitution of 1874, which de- clared " That the general assembly shall not delegate to any special commission, private corporation or association, any power to make, supervise, or interfere with any municipal im- provement, money, property, or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise ; or to levy taxes, or to perform any municipal function whatever." ^ Directly contrary to this Pennsylvania case, the Supreme Court of Michigan held, that the legislature cannot compel an incorporated city to erect a court house in the count}^, in which the town or city is situated.^ § 16. Compulsory satiRf action of non-legal claims against cities. — In a great variety of cases, the legislatures of the dif- ferent states have assumed the right to compel the municipal corporation to recognize as a legal obligation, and to perform, all such obligations which have no binding force in law, but is withiu the taxing power of tlie legislature to compel one town, city, or locality to contribute to the pay- ment of the debts of another. The government has no such authority, and this case is entirely without a precedent. If such assessments were authorized they might not be limited to adjoining towns, cities, or villages, but applied to those located at great distances from each other. Such legislation would be unjust, mis- chievous, and oppressive, and cannot be tolerated." But see, contra, Car- 32 ter V. Bridge Proprietors, 104 Mass. 236. 1 Perkins v. Slack, 86 Pa. St. 283; 1 Hale's Am. Const. Law, 630. 2 Art. .S, sec. 20, Constitution of 1874. A further provision was add- ed that "no debt shall be contracted or liability incurred by any munici- pal commission, except in pursuance of appropriations previously made by the municipal government." Art. 15, sec. 2, Constitution of 1874. 8 Callam v. Saginaw, 50 Mich. 7. CH. II.J LEGISLATIVE CONTROL. 17 which have a moral claim for satisfaction. And it has been held that the legislature, in thus recognizing a moral claim against a city, and in compelling such city to pay such a claim, is not exceeding its power of control over such corporation.^ It is held, however, that the legislature cannot undertake to compel a municipal corporation to pay every debt or claim, which is not a legal obligation. Thus, the legislature is not authorized to provide by legislation for the payment of a debt, which is unconstitutional, because it exceeded the limit of mu- nicipal indebtedness, which is fixed by the constitution.^ But whenever the limitations or conditions, which are imposed up- on the contractual power of the corporation, are found in state statutes, the same authority, which imposed the limitation or conditions, may waive such conditions, and ratify or validate the debt of a corporation, which otherwise would be invalid.^ § 17. Ratifying void local assessments. — For the same reason, and on the same general principle, as laid down in the previous paragraph, it has been frequently held to be within the power of the legislature to ratify an assessment, made by a municipal corporation for local improvements in front of abut- ting property, and compel the abutting owner to pay such assessments, notwitlistanding the original invalidity of the as- ' People V. Squire, 145 U. S. 175; In re CuUen, 53 Hun, 534; People v. Dayton, 55 N. Y. 367; Shelby Co. v. Railroad Co., 5 Bush. (Ky.) 225; Smith V. Morse, 2 Cal. 524; Grogan V. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590; Brew- ster V. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116; Devers V. York, 150 Pa. St. 208; 30 W. 'S.C. 390; Xew Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 644; People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15; United States v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322; Creighton V. San Francisco, 42 Cal. 446; People V. Supervisors, 70 N. Y. 228; Baker V. Seattle, 2 Wash. St. 576; New Or- leans V. Clark, 95 U. S. 654; Guilford V. Supervisors, etc., 13 N. Y. 143; Philadelphia V. Field, 53 Pa. St. 320; Lycoming V. Union, 15 Pa. St. 166; Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343; North Mo. R. R. Co. V. Maguire, 49 Mo. 3 490, 500; Nevada v. Hampton, 13 Nev. 441; Mayor, etc., of New York V. Tenth National Bank, 111 N. Y. 440; People v. Mayor, etc., of Brook- lyn, 4 Comst. (N. Y.) 419; Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 65 ; but see con- tra, State V. Tappan, 29 Wis. 664; s. c, 9 Am. Rep. 622; Hoagland v. Sacramento, 52 Cal. 142; corap. also Waupaca County v. Town of Matte- son, (Wis. 91) 48 N. W. R. 213; Bouk- night V. Davis, 33 S. C. 410; 12 S. E. R. 96. 2 J)i re Flower, 29 N. E. R. 463; In re Union College, 29 lb. 460; 129 N. Y. 308; Mosher v. Sch. District, 44 Iowa, 122. 8 Creighton v. San Francisco, 42 Cal. 440; New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 644; Sinton V. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 525. 33 §17 MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS. [CH. II. sessment.^ In these cases, it is simply a failure on the part of the corporation to comply with some special requirement of the state statutes ; and the substantial obligations of the abut- ting owners have not been materially affected thereby. It is a general rule of construction of legislative authority, that what- ever the legislature could have permitted to be done, it may subsequently ratify and give it legal effect.^ And the fact, that such legislative acts of ratification have a retrospective opera- tion, does not constitute any serious objection to such legisla- tion, as long as the retrospective operation of the act does not effect an impairment of vested rights.^ But where the invalidity of the assessment, or other municipal act, was due to a failure to observe a constitutional provision, the illegality of the as- sessment or other municipal act is beyond the curative effect of a legislative enactment. Thus, for example, where a con- stitution requires that all taxation should be uniform and im- posed equally upon the taxpayers, and the assessment provides for the payment of a local improvement by the abutting own- ers, with the exception of one lot which was equally benefited by such improvement ; a subsequent act of the legislature, rat- ifying such assessment law, would be inoperative as long as the omission and exception of the lot in question was retained ; 1 Baltimore v. Horn, 26 Md. 194; Great Falls Ice Co. v. Bistiict of Co- lumbia, 19 D. C. 327; Lennon v. N. Y., 55 N. T. 361. 2 Marion Co. v. Louisville Co., (Ky. 92) 15 S. W. R. 1061; Lockhart v. *rroy, 48 Ala. 579; McMillenv. Boyles, 6 Iowa, 304; lb. 391; Emporia v. Nor- ton, 13 Kan. 560; Mason v. Spencer, 35 Kan. 512; Otoe County v. Bald- win, 111 U. S. 1; Grenada Co. v. Brogden, 112 U. S. 261, 262; In re East Ave. Bap. Church, 11 N. Y. S. 113; Anderson V. Santa Anna, 116 U. S. 364; Belles v. Bromfleld, 120 S. U. 759; San Francisco v. Certain Real Estate, 42 Cal. 517; Marshall v. Silli- raan, 61 111. 218; In re Byrnes, 57 Hun, 590; Katzenberger v. Aberdeen, 121 U. S. 172; Atchison, etc., K. E. Co. V. Maquillon, 12 Kan. 301 ; Citi- zens' Water Co. v. Bridgeport Hy- 34 draulic Co., 55 Conn. 1; Tifftv. Buf- falo, 82 ISr. Y. 205 ; Atchison v. Butch- er, 3 Kan. 104 ; Frederick v. Augusta, 5 Ga. 561 ; Great Falls Ice Co. v. Dis- trict, 19 D. C. 327; Winn v. Macon, 21 Ga. 275; Mattenly v. District of Col., 97 U. S. 687; New Orleans v. Poutz, 14 La. An. 853; Allison v. K. W. Co., 9 Bush. (Ky.) 247; Truchelut V. City Council, 1 Nott& McCord (S. C.) 227. 8 Cromwell v. McLean, 123 N. Y. 474; Municipality v. Theater Co., 2 Eob. (La.) 209; Danlellyv. Cabaniss, 52 Ga. 211 ; New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 644; Pompton v. Cooper Union, 101 lb. 196; Bridgeport V. R. R., 15 Conn. 475, 497; see also, Pardridge V. Village of Hyde Park, 131 111. 537; 23 N. E. K. 345 ; State v. Village of South Orange, 6 Alt. 312; 49 N. J. L. 104. CH. II.] LEGISLATIVE CONTROL. §18 the ground being, that such omission and exemption was in violation of the provisions of the constitution.^ § 18. Legislative control of offices and officers in munici- pal corporations. — The power of a legislature over municipal offices and officers has always been the subject of discussion. And here, as elsewhere, in determining the limitations of the legislative control, the distinction is to be made between those officers of the municipal corporation, who are charged with the performance of duties of a strictly public character and in which the state at large has a concern, — such as judges, and all par- ties who are engaged in the administration of justice, or the preservation of the public peace ; — and on the other hand, the strictly municipal officers, whose duties are of strictly municipal concern, such as the establisliment and management of gas works, water works, sewers, and the like. It is held that the state has the authority to regulate, if it desires, the appoint- ment of public officers as just described, but it cannot interfere with the control of matters of local concern, or direct the ap- pointment of the officers who are charged with their manage- ment.^ While an extensive and very comprehensive discretion is vested in the legislative power of the state, in shaping the gen- eral features and outlines of local municipal government, subject ' In re Flower, 29 N. E. K. 463; In re Union College, 29 lb. 460; 129 N. T. 308; People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15; Schumacher v. Toberman, 56 lb. 508. 2 Lloyd V. Silver B. Co., (Mont. 92) 28 Pac. E. 453 ; Greene v. Fresno, (Cal. 92) 30 Pac. K. 544; State v- Canavan, 30 Pac. Rep. 1079; 17 Nev. 422; State v. 0' Conner, (JST. J. 92) 22 Atl. R. 1091; State v. Adams, 90 Tenn. 722; Chicago v. Wright, 69 111. 326; Buroh v. Hardwick, 30 Gratt. 24; U. S. V. Memphis, 97 U. S. 284; State V. Hine, 59 Conn. 50; State v. Stanfleld, (Tex. 92) 18 S. W. R. 577; State V. Hunter, 38 Kan. 578; Hath- away v. New Baltimore, 48 Mich. 251 ; State V. George, 23 Fla. 585; State v. Bogard, (Ind. 92) 27 W. E. E. 252; Evansville v. State, 118 Ind. 426; Davies v. Saginaw Co., 89 Mich. 295; Britton v. Steber, 62 Mo. 370; People V. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481; People v. Shepherd, 36 N. Y. 285; Speed v. Crawford, 3 Met. (Ky.) 207;-Police Commissioners v. Louisville, 3 Bush (Ky.) 597 ; People v. Bull, 46 N. Y. 57; People V. McKinney, 52 lb. 374; Peo- ple V. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15;. People v. Curley, 5 Col. 412; People v. Clute, 50 N. Y. 451; Richmond Mayoralty Case, 19 Gratt. (Va.) 673; People v. Batchellor, 22 N. Y. 128; People v. Palmer, 52 N. Y. 83; People v. Al- bertson, 55 N. Y. 50; State v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382; s. C, 21 N. E. R. 252, 274. 36 §18 MUNICIPAL COKPORATIONS. [CH. 11. onlj' to the existing constitutional limitations and restraiiits,iit is, nevertheless, a deeply rooted principle of American and Eng- lish law that the ultimate control of purely local affairs must be vested in the local governments of towns, cities and counties, and should be administered by ofBcers chosen by their inhabi- tants.^ And so, also, while the legislature has no power to appoint, it has the power to prescribe how the act of appoint- ment shall be performed^ and, generally, to create new offices, abolish those alread}' existing and regulate by re-distribution that portion of the sovereign power which is administered by executive public officials ; * and, in exchanging an old .system of administration for a new one, or in creating a system of local government, the legislature may make provisional appoint- ments.® Where the officers are charged with the performance of duties of a strictly public character, which are transferred to the municipal corporation, as a legal franchise from the state government ; the state legislature may, in the absence of ex- press constitutional limitations, exercise an unlimited power of control, and determine how the office shall be filled, and take away from municipal corporations the power of appoint- ing such officers. It has thus become a common practice, in a great many of the states to provide for the establishment of what is known as a metro[)olitan police, controlled by the state government, through appointment of police commissioners by the governor or legislature of the state ; to take away from 1 Atty. Gen. v. Detroit, 29 Mich. 108; People v. Huiibut, 24 lb. 44; People V. Draper, 15 N. T. 532. 2 State V. Goiildey, (N. J. 88) 18 Atl. R. 69.5 ; Atty. Gen. v. Twombley, 89 Mich. 50; 50 N. W. R. 744; People V. Morgan, 90 111. 558; People v. May- or, 91 lb. 17; State v. Swift, 11 Nev. 128; People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y. 50; Kaumanu v. Board, (Mich. 88) 41 N. W. R. 267; Evansville v. State, 118 Ind. 426; People v. Highland Pk., 88 Mich. 653; State v. Wright, (N". J. 92) 23 Atl. 116; Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 252; In re Scranton, 113 Pa. St. 176; Atkins v. Randolph, 31 Vt. 226; Com. V. Denworth, 145 Pa. St. 172; 22 Atl. R. 820. 36 3 State V. Hoagland, (N. J.) 16 Atl. R. 166; Brady v. "West, 50 Miss. 68; People V. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; State V. Covington, 29 Ohio St. 102; Bridges V. Shallcross, 6 W. Va. 562; People v. Board, (N". Y. 93) 20 N. Y. S. 51; MoCormick v. People, (92 111.) 28 Jf. E. R. 1106. * State V. Smith, (Neb. 92) 52 K W. R. 700; State v. Becker, (S. D. 92) 51 lb. 1018; Dougherty v. Austin, 94 Cal. 601 ; Board v. Hiester, 87 N. Y. 661; State v. Field, 17 Mo. 529; Peo- ple V. Porter, 90 N. Y. 68. 6 Mayor v. State, 15 Md. 376; State V. Benedict, 15 Minn. 198; State v. Swift, 11 Nev. 128; Sabin v. Curtis, (Idaho 93) 32 Pac. 1130. CH. II.] LEGISLATIVE CONTEOL. §18 the municipal corporation the charge of the police force, and intrust it to the board of commissioners ; and, in pursuance of this transfer of control, to turn over to the commissioners the use of the station houses, the wagons, books, police telegraph, and other property of the city, which are used for police pur- poses.i But in Indiana, it has been lately held, that the act for the establishment of a metropolitan police and fire board for the larger cities is unconstitutional, as being an unwarrantable interference with the constitutional principle of local self gov- ernment.* It is not always easy, however, to determine what offices are of a public character and involve the performance of duties of general public concern, and distinguish them from those in which the duties involve niatters of local concern, and which should for that reason be administered by appointees of the municipal corporation. As alreadj- stated, with one exception, that of Indiana, police boards are deemed to be public or state offices, and therefore fall within the legislative control. And while, on the other hand, the general rule is that other officials, such as park commissioners and water commissioners are city officials, yet it is not always the case ; and there are authorities which hold that even water commissioners, and park commis- sioners, and highway commissioners, are state officials, who may be subjected to legislative control.^ Wherever the legis- lature has the right to assume control of a municipal office, it has likewise the right to compel the city to provide for de- fraying the expenses of such an office.* And not only is that "Hudson etc. Co. v. Seymour, 6 Vroom, 35 N. J. L. 47; County v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175 ; People v. Dra- per, 15 N. Y. 532; Daily v. St. Paul, 7 Minn. 390; State v. Valle, 41 Mo. 29; State v. St. Louis County Court, 34 Mo. 546; People v. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228; Payne v. Washington Co., (Fla. 90) 6 So. K. 881. * Railroad Co. v. Adler, 56 HI. 844; Durach's App., 62 Pa. St. 491; Peo- ple V. Commissioners of Police, 8 N. T. S. 725; Gadsden v. Greene, 22 Fla. 102. 37 ^Mclnerneyv. Denver, (Col. 92)29 Pac. 516; Com. v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375; 19 N. E. E. 224; Pruice v. Bos- ton, 148 Mass. 370; 19 N. E. E. 218; People V. McDonald, 69 N. Y. 382; People V. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228; Francis v. Blair, 96 Mo. 515; People V. Chicago, 51 111. 17; Burch v. Hard- wick, 30 Gratt. 24 ; Columbus v. Town, (Wis. 92) 52 N. W. R. 425; Comm'rs V. Louisville, 3 Bush, 597; Diamond V. Cain, 21 La. .An. 309; State v. Hunter, 38 Kan. 578 ; State v. Kolsem, (Ind. 92) 29 N. E. E. 595. iiEvansville v. State, 118 Ind. 426. §18 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. n. the case, but the legislature may likewise provide that, where a county, adjoining a city, or in which a city is located, receives the benefits of the presence of a police force, such county shall be called upon to defray in part the expenses of such police force. ^ 1 Sangamon v. Springfield, 63 111. 66; St. Louis v. Shields, 52 Mo. 351; Weymoutli etc. Fire Dis. v. County Com'rs, 108 Mass. 142 ; State ex rel. St. Louis Police Com'rs v. St. Louis 38 Co. Ct., 34 Mo. 546; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325 ; Stitz v. Indianapolis, 55 Ind. 515; contra, Mayor v. Tows, 5 Sneed, 186. CHAPTER III. THE INCORPORATION OP MUNICIPALITIES. Section. 21 — Modes of creating muuicipal corporations in England. 22 — Creation of muuicipal corpo- rations in the United States. 23 — ^Who composes the corpora^ tion. 24 — Acceptance of municipal cor- porations, when necessary. 25 — How far precise forms of words are required for incorporation, — Creation by implication. 26 — Creation by special act, when permitted. 27 — Creation by general laws, when required. Section. 28 — Only one object which sliall be expressed in the title. 29 — Corporate existence not open to collateral attack. 30 — Judicial notice of charters and of acts of municipal corpora- tions. 31 — Proof of corporate existence. 82 — Power to repeal and amend city charter, effect of exercise of such power. 33 — Special power when repealed by general laws. 34 — Implied repeal of general laws by special laws. § 21. Modes of creating municipal corporations in Eng- land. — Under the early English law there were strictly but two ways of creating municipal corporations; viz., first, by the king's charter ; secondly, b3'-act of parliament. But, in addition there- to, there were a great many corporations, whose existence and power were derived from immemorial usage, or which had ex- isted for so long a time, that the claim could be made, under the doctrine of prescription, of an original incorporation. The result was, that municipal corporations in England were very irregular, not only as to the mode of their creation, but also as to the extent of their power. This condition continued up to 1836, when parliament passed the " Municipal Corporation Act " of that year, which was designed, not only to provide for the creation of municipal corporations in the future by act of par- liament, but also to give a uniform character to the powers and nature of all the existing municipal corporations. And the act with its amendments was finally incorporated in the Municipal' Corporation Act of 1882. Under these acts, the English mu- nicipal corporation has a uniform character, and its power and mode of administration are regulated by the general law so 39 § 22 MUNICIPAL COKPORATIONS. [CH. UI. enacted. A great many abuses have, by this municipal corpora- tion act, been abolished. § 22. Creation of municipal corporations in the United States. — In the United States, a municipal corporation can only be created by a legislative act. Although, as will be seen in a subsequent connection,^ it is possible for the municipal corpora- tion to claim by prescription the right to corporate powers, in the absence of positive proof of the legislative act of incorpora- tion, resulting from a long enjoyment of the corporate powers ; yet the instances of prescriptive incorporation are very rare; so much so that no general account of the mode of creating corporations by prescription need be considered. The legislative branch of the government, under the consti- tutional laws of this country, can alone exercise the power of creating a corporation. In consequence of confining the exer- cise of this power to the legislative department, and the greater demand of American civilization for the creation of corporations, acts of incorporation by the legislature have increased to great proportions, far beyond what has ever been known in the history of jurisprudence. As a general rule, corporations, both munici- pal and private, within the territorial limits of the states, can only be created by acts of the state legislature ; and while Con- gress has been held by the courts to have the power of creating all sorts of corporations, both public and private, whenever such acts of incorporation become necessary or appropriate to the effectual exercise of any of the constitutional powers of the United States Government ; or whenever such acts of incor- poration are in any way an aid to the exercise of the jurisdic- tion over the States and Territories ; ^ yet, in the creation of municipal corporations within state limits, the United States Govei-nment or Congress cannot interfere. Municipal corpora- tions, within the states can alone be created, or their powers modi- fied, enlarged or restricted, by the legislative action of the State. But Congress has the power, outside of state boundaries, not onl}' of creating municipal corporations by direct legislative act ; but it may likewise pass, and it is in the habit of passing, acts 'See post, §25, 31. v. Hill, (Wash. 92) 27 lb. 922; see 2MoCunoughv.Mai-yland,4Wlieat. Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U. S. 145; 316; Osborne v. Bank, 9 lb. 738; Tiedeman on Private Corporations Thompson V. E. R., 9 Wall. 579; Guth- § 20, Morawetz, § 9. rie V. Territory, 31 Pao. E. 190; Alger 40 CH. in.J THE INCOKPOEATION OP MUNICIPAIilTIBS. § 23 vesting in the territorial governments the power of creating both public and private corporations in the respective territories. Objection was at first made to this grant of power to the terri- torial government, on the ground that the act conferring such power was a delegation of authority by the sovereign power to a subordinate political organization. But this objection has been overruled and the general rule laid down, that a territorial legislature, which is vested with general legislative power by grant from Congress, acquires by such general grant, and inde- pendently of any special grant, the power to create both public and private corporations.^ § 23. Who composes the corporation Under the early municipal corporation law of England, the corporation is not confined to territorial limits ; nor could one determine, by a reference to such territorial limits, who composed the munici- pality. The ancient municipal corporation was not the town or place, at which such corporation was located, nor was it composed of all the people who inhabited such town or place ; it was rather a grant by the crown generally, and sometimes by the parliament, to certain persons or classes of persons, living within such town or place, and sometimes residing elsewhere, [as in the case of many of the American colonies,] vesting in such persons the franchise of governmental control of the place or community. The corporation, therefore, was not the people who composed the community ; but consisted generally of three distinct classes or parties : First, the mayor ; secondly, the al- dermen ; thirdly, the commonalty, who consisted of the free- men who fell within the desciiption of the persons entitled to participate in the management of the corporation, and whose rights were from time to time curtailed or enlarged. Under the English municipal corporation act of 1835 and the subse- quent amendments thereto, as well as generally in the United States, the municipal corporation is not composed of the city council or the mayor, but of the people who constitute the com- Central, 1 Col. 323; Myers v. Bank, 20 Ohio, 283; State v. Young, 3 Kan. 445; Keddlck v. Amelia, 1 Mo. 5; People V. Butte, 4 Mont. 174; Act of Mar. 2, 1867; 14 Stats, at Large, 426, §1; Rev. S. of U. S. §1889. 41 > Alger V. Hill, 27 Pao. E. 922; 2 Wash. 344; Board v. Da vies, 24 Pac. R. 540; Elk Point v. Vaughan, 1 Dak. 113; 46 N. W. R. 577; Seattle v. Ty- ler, Wash. Terr'y, 1877; Yanoe v. Bank, 1 Blackf. 80; Deitz v. City of §24 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. III. munity, which has by the act of incorporation been created into a legal personality. The mayor and the councils, instead of being the corporation itself, are not even a constituent part of such corporation ; they are nothing more than the servants or agents of the incorporators, who are the inhabitants of the community in general.^ § 24. Acceptance of municipal corporations, when neces- sary. — It seems that under the early English law, in respect to municipal corporations, where the crown undertook to confer a charter upon a community, the assent on the part of the com- munity was necessary to the creation of a corporation, or to the modification of the powers of the existing corporation, if there be one. But where the parliament undertook to control or limit the powers of the existing municipal corporation, or to create a municipal corporation, where one had not theretofore existed, the assent of the incorporators, or of the community, was not necessary; parliament having this power, without the consent or co-operation of the people of the communitj'. But in the United States, where all acts of incorporation are legislative acts, the acceptance of a charter by a community is not neces- sary to the creation of a municipal corporation. And, unless the act of incorporation is made by the legislature conditional upon such acceptance,^ it is binding upon all who live within the limits of the incorporated district, and nothing can prevent the taking effect of the act of incorporation. The public or municipal corporation comes into existence, as soon as the leg- islature passes the act of incorporation.^ But while the legislature is not bound to obtain the consent ^ Ante, §21; Lowber v. Mayor, 5 Ab. Pr. E. 325; Baumgartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind. 575. 2 Clarke v. Rogers, 81 Ky. 43; State V. Lamoureux, 30 Pac. K. 24'?. 3 State V. Babcock, 41 N. "W. E. 654; 23 Neb. 709 ; People v. Butte, 4 Mont. 174; Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N. H. 524, 532; State v. Canterbury, 28 N. H. 218; Buford v. State, 72 Tex. 182; Smith V. Crutoher, (Ky. 92) 18 S. W. R. 521; State v. Curran, (12 Ark. 42 321; Fire Department v. Kip, 10 Wend. 267; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325; Millville Bor., In re, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 321; Brouwer v. Ap- pleby, 1 Sandf. 158; Gorham v. Springfield, 21 Maine, 58; People T. Stout, 23 Barb. 349 ; Warren v. Charlestown, 2 Gray, 104; Mills v. Williams, 11 Ire. 558; Berlin v. Gor- ham, 34 N. H. 266; People v. Wren, 4 Scam. (5 111.) 269; People v. Oak- land, 92 Cal. 611. CH. ni.J THE INCOEPORATION OF MUNICIPALITIES. §^^ of the community which it is proposed to incorporate, before a municipal corporation can be set up ; yet it is possible for the legislature, instead of providing for the unconditional incorpora- tion of the municipality, to make the creation of such a corpora- tion dependent upon the consent of the community to the act of incorporation.! Where no particular mode is prescribed for pro- curing an expression of assent, on the part of the people, such expression may be implied from circumstances, and from the conduct of the people, as in the case of private corporations.^ So, also, is it possible for the legislature to provide, that the continued existence of an existing township should be deter- mined by a vote of the qualified electors.* So, also, may the question be submitted to the people, whether a portion of an adjoining county shall be annexed ; or whether certain improve- ments should be made ; or whether certain liabilities should be incurred.* The power of a legislature to provide for the local regulation of the sale of intoxicating liquors by the so called local option laws has been disputed. These acts have been de- ^ Ex parte Schlomberg, (Miss. 93) 11 So. K. 721 ; In re Vacation of Henry St.,123Pa. St. 646; In re Edgewood, 18 Atl. E. 646; Ford v. Des Moines, 45 N. W. E. 1031; People v. City of Butte, 4 Mont. 174; Lafayette, etc., E. E. Co. V. Geiger, 34 Ind. 185; Bank v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467; Call v. Chadbourne, 46 Maine, 206; People V. Riverside, 70 CaL 461 ; 11 Pac. E. 759; Gueble v. Epply, (Col. 92) 28 Pac. E. 89; Patterson v. Society, etc., 4 Zabr. 385; Smith v. McCar- thy, 56 Pa. St. 359; People v. Sal- mon, 51 111. 53; Alcorn v. Horner, 38 Miss. 652; In re TuUytown, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. E. 97; Lum v. Bowie, (Tex. 92) 18 S. W. E. 142; State v. Scott, 17 Mo. 521 ; Hudson Co. v. State, 4 Zabr. (24 N. J. L.) 718; Bull v. Eead, 13 Gratt. (Va.) 18; In re Wintergreen Alley, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. E. 126; State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458. 2 Taylor v. Newberne, 2 Jones Eq. N. C. 141 ; see Zabriskie v. Eailroad Co., 23 How. U. S. 381, 397. 8 Lum V. Bowie, (Tex. 92) 18 S. W. E. 142; People v. Wiant, 48 111. 263; Eailroad v. Davidson County, 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 692; Talbot v. Dent, 9 B. Mon. 526; State v.Winkelmeier, 35 Mo. 103 ; Smith V. McCarthy, 56 Pa. St. 359; St. Joseph V. Eogers, 16 Wall. 644; People V. Warfield, 20 111. 103. * State v.Waxahachie. 81 Tex. 628; Lum v. Bowie, supra ; North Spring field V. Springfield, (111. 92) 29 N. E. E. 849; Bank of Eome v. Rome, 18 N. Y. 38; Trustees v. Cherry, 8 Ohio St. 564; Eailroad Co. v. Com., lOhio St. 77; Foote v. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio, 408; Bank v. Brow, 26 N. Y. 467; Hammond v. Haines, 25 Md. 541; Bai-to V. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483; Clarke V. Eochester, 28 N. Y. 605 ; St. Louis V. Alexander, 23 Mo. 483; Blanding V. Burr, 13 Cal. 343; Burnes v. Atch- ison, 2 Kan. 454. 43 §25 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS. [CH. III. clared to be constitutional by some of the cases,^ although their invalidity has been likewise denied.^ § 25. How far precise forms of words are required for in- corporation — Creation by implication. — In the creation of a municipal corporation it has been generally held, whenever the question has been raised, that no particular form of words is required to be used, in the act of incorporation of a munici- palitj'. While formal expressions are generally employed, the absence of them will in no case interfere with the creation of a municipal corporation, provided sufficient words are employed to indicate the intention to create a municipal corporation. Hence, where the intention to create a body politic or corporate is manifest in the words employed in the legislative act, the failure to insert, in such charter or act, words conferring the necessary powers of a corporation, such as that the organiza- tion shall have the power to plead and be impleaded, or to have a seal, or to make contracts and by-laws, and the like ;' if the intention to create a corporation was clearly manifested, its necessary powers would be implied.^ And so, also, would it not be absolutely defective, if the name of the corporation were omitted, provided such name could be ascertained indi- rectly from the terms of the act, or from the nature of the 1 State V. Morris, 36 N. J. L. 72; State V. Dugan, (Mo. 92) 19 I. W. E. 195 ; Friesner v. Charlotte, (Mich. 92) 52 K. W. E. 18; State v. Moore, (Mo.) 16 S. W. E. 937; Ex parte Swann, 96 Mo. 44; Lemon v. Peyton, 64 Miss. 161; see also Howe v. Plainfield, 37 N. J. L. 146; Donovan v. County, 60 Conn. 339; Hudson Co. v. State, 24 "N". J. L. 718; State v. Pond, 6 S. W. E. 469; 93 Mo. 617; State v. Watts, 20 S. W. E. 237; 111 Mo. 553. 2 Prentiss v. Davis, 22 Atl. E. 246; 33 Me. 365; Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 491; Gloversville v. Howell, 70 N". Y. 287; State v. Wilcox, 42 Conn. 364; 19 Am. Eep. 536. 3 Duncan v. State, (Fla. 92) 10 So. E. 815 ; Wells v. Burbank, 17 N. H. 393; Society, etc., v. Pawlet, 4 Pet. 44 (U. S.) 480, 502; Newport Trustees, In re, 16 Sim. 346; Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. 9, 84; Stebbinsv. Jennings, 10 Pick. 172; Medical Institute v. Patterson, 1 Denio, 61 ; Lewis v. Co- manche Co., 35 Fed. E. 343; Inhabi- tants, etc., V. Wood, 13 Mass. 193; Lord V. Bigelow, 6 Vt. 465; Bow v. Allentown, 34 N. H. 351, 372; Ben- ton V. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. 325, 326; Jeffreys & Gurr, 2 B. & Adol. 841; Mahoney v. The Bank of the State, 4 Ark. 620; Myers v. Irwin, 2 Serg. & Eawle, 368; Conservators v. Ash, 10 Barn. & Cress. 349 (12 Eq. C. L. 97) ; Overseers v. Sears, 22 Pick. 122, 130; Cf. People v. Harvey, (111. 93) 32 ISr. E. E. 295; Freligh v. Sauger- ties Village, 24 N. Y. S. 182. CH. in.] THE INCORPORATION OP MUNICIPALITIES. §26 powers granted.! But where the charter or act, which is pre- sumed to operate as an incorporation of the municipality, ex- pressly denies to the organization, which is presumed to have been incorporated, powers which are necessary to its existence as a corporation, it would be plain in such a case that there had not been an effective incorporation of the community .^ § 26. Creation by special act, when permitted. — In the ab- sence of constitutional limitations, the common, in fact the only, method of creating a municipal corporation is by a spe- cial act of the legislature, calling into being the particular cor- poration in question. But in consequence of constitutional provisions, looking to the incorporation of both public and private corporations under general laws, instead of by special acts, the power to create corporations by special act has in some cases been expressly reserved ; as for example, in New York, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, Louisiana, Nevada. And in Missouri it was provided that no municipal corporation shall be created by special act, except in cities of at least 5,000 inhabitants, and in that case the special act is to be provided by the vote of the inhabitants on the matter.^ In some of the states, it is also provided by the constitution, that in all cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be permitted. And the question is raised under that constitutional provision, whether it is a legislative or judicial question, whether in the particular case under inquiry a gen- eral law can or cannot be made applicable. It has finally been determined that it is a question for the legislature, and not for the courts.* 1 School Com. V. Dean, 2 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 190; Trustees v. Parks, 10 Me. 141. 2 1 Dillon Mun. Corp. § 42. s Const. 1865 of Mo., art. viii, sec. 5; New York Const. 1846, art. viii, sec. 1; names of tlie states which ap- pear in this connection are not in- tended to be ii complete enumera- tion of the states in which this con- stitutional provision has been adopt- ed. It is very probable that the same provision will be found else- where. Tierney v. Dodge, 9 Minn. 171; Virginia City v. Mining Co., 2 Nev. 86; State v. Simon, 22 Atl. R. 120; Straub v. Pittsburgh, 138 Pa. St. 356; Com. v. Reynolds, 137 lb. 389; Nev. Sch. Dist. v. Shoecraft, 88 Cal. 372. * Edmonds V. Herbrandson, (JT. D. 92) 50 N. W. R. 970; State v. Kolsem, (Ind. 92) 29 N. E. R. 495 ; MoCormiok V. West Duluth, 50 N. W. R. 128; 47 Minn. 272; Richman v. Muscatine Co., 77 Iowa, 513; Hughes v. Mulli- gan, ( Kan. 88) 22 Pac. R. 313; Fel- lows v. Walkers, 39 Fed. R. 651; Gen- 45 §27 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIOXS. [CH. nr. § 27. Creation by general laws required. — In many of the states, however, it is expressly required that all corporations, both public and private, should be created under general laws, and special acts of incorporation are prohibited to all. Such is the rule in Iowa, Florida, Nebraska, and under the new constitu- tion of Illinois, Wisconsin, Kansas, Ohio. In Missouri and New York, provision is made for general incorporation acts, as well as special. The object of these constitutional provisions, in re- quiring the exercise of the legislative power in the creation of corporations by general act, instead of by special, is to avoid and prevent, as far as possible, any interference by the legislature in tlie affairs of a local community, and the further concentration in the community, of the principle of local civil government. As already stated, in some of these constitutional provisions there is an express requirement that the legislature shall not pass any special act of incorporation, either of public or pri- vate corporations. But in some of them, as for example in Kansas and Ohio, the constitution only provides that the legis- lature shall pass no special act, conferring corporate powers. In these states, the Supreme Courts have held that the provis- ions applied to municipal, as well as to private, corporations.' In New York where there is a constitutional provision that two tile V. State, 29 Ind. 409; Murdock v. Woodson, 2 Dillon C. C. 188; Board V. Shields, 62 Mo. 247; Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322; contra. In re House Bill, 48 X. W. R. 275; Ayer's App., 122 Pa. St. 366; Von Pliul v. Hammer, 29 Iowa, 222; Pritz, Jji re, Iowa, 30. 1 State V. Toledo, (Ohio, 90) 26 K. E. K. 1061; Cook v. Portland, 20 Or. 580; Sch. Dist. v. Ins. Co., 103 U. S. 707; State v. Cincinnati, 20 Ohio St. 18; Atkinson V. Railroad Co., 15 Ohio St. 21; Savings Assoc, v. Topeka, 3 Dillon, 376; Atchison v. Bartholow, 4 Kan. 124; State v. Pugh, 43 Oliio St. 98; Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. o74; Olcott V. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678 ; 20 Wall. 655 ; Logan v. Western, 87 Ga. 533; Merrill v. Toledo, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 430; Lodi v. State, 18 Atl. R. 749; State v. Mullica, 17 lb. 941 46 (N. J. 88); Zra re Denver, (Colo. 93) 32 Pac. R. 615; Metcalf v. State, 49 Ohio St. 586; 31 N. E. K. 1076; see post, chap. X., on Conti-acts, and chap. XVI., on Streets. In New Jersey, it has been held to apply exclusively to private corporations; State V. Newark, 40 N. J. L. 550, 558; so in Tennessee; Williams v. Nashville, 15 S. W. R. 364. A simi- lar provision is likewise found in Nebraska, and perhaps in many other states. Clegg v. Richardson Co., 8 Neb. 178; Dundy v. Richard- son Co., 8 Neb. 508. But it has been lield in Kansas that, while the pro- vision of the constitution referred to includes municipal corporations proper, it does not include quasi cor- porations, such as school districts. Beach v. Leahy, 11 Kan. 23. CH. III.J THE INCORPOKATION OF MXJNICIPALITIES. §28 thirds of the general assembly shall be requisite to every bill creating, continuing, altering, or renewing any body politic or corporate, such provision was held by the court of appeals to extend to public and municipal, as well as to private, corpora- tions.^ The constitutions of some of the states also contain a provision, that corporations shall not be created by special acts, except for municipal purposes. And in determining the scope of this provision, it is necessary to ascertain what is a munici- pal purpose. It has been held, for example, that a board of commissioners, charged with filling in certain slough ponds in the city of St. Louis, was an incorporation for municipal pur- poses whicli could be created by special act, without violating the constitutional provision against special legislation.^ It has likewise been held to be the creation of a municipal corpora- tion, where a board of park commissioners has been created with corporate authority.*^ So, also, a board of school commission- ers.* But it is questionable, whether this is a strictly proper use of the word " municipal." ^ § 28. Only one object, which shall be expressed in the title. — Many of the state constitutions contain a provision, re- quiring that any legislative act shall not contain more than one object, which shall be expressed in the title, and thus prohibit- ing the inclusion, in the one act, of more than one object. The purpose of this constitutional prohibition is plainly to prevent what is known as log-rolling legislation, whereby members of a legislature may combine in securing the passage of one act con- taining the individual desires of each other, not upon the con- sideration of the merits of each proposed bill, but by way of combination of their forces. The requirement that the object of the bill should be expressed in the title, is to prevent the practice of deception upon the legislator, and to furnish him with the means of determining, upon reading the title of the 'Smith V. Helmer, 7 Barb. 416; Norris v. People, 3 Denio, 331; South- worth V. Railroad Co., 2 Mioh. 287; Purdy V. People, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 384, reversing 2 Hill, 31; Corning v. Green, 23 Barb. 33. 2 St. Louis V. Shields, 62 Mo. 257; State ex rel. Choteau v. Lefflngwell, 54 Mo. 458; Cook v. Portland, 20 Or. 580; San Francisco v. S. V. W. W., 48 Cal. 493. 3 People V. Solomon, 51 111. 37. * Horton v. Mobile School Com'rs, 43 Ala. .=)96. 5 St. Louis V. Shields, 62 Mo. 251; Cf. "Wilson V. Sanitary Dist., (111. 90) 27 N. E. R. 203. 47 § 28 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. in. bill, what is its object and the scope of its operation.^ The fact, that a bill contains more than one object, will only invalidate the bill, so far as it incorporates objects not expressed in the title ; and if a bill contains more than one object in the operat- ing clause, but only one object is expressed in the title, the bill will be valid as to the subject expressed in the title, although invalid as to any subject not so expressed.^ In some of the state constitutions, this prohibition against inserting in one bill more than one object, and requiring one object to be expressed in the title, is limited to local and private acts. But in a great many of the states, however, no limitation is imposed, and the pro- hibition is declared to have a general application. And the general ruling of the courts is that, in the absence of an ex- press limitation on the operation of the constitutional prohibi- tion in question, it applies to acts of the legislature, whic'h are designed to create or regulate municipal corporations, as well as to acts applying to private individuals. But it is not required that all of the details of a bill should he set foi'th in the title ; as for example, where the act pur- ports to incorporate a city or town, it i-s not necessary to pro- ceed to the enumeration in the title of the bill, of all the powers which are intended to be conferred upon such a corporation. In determining, whether a law be in conflict with these provis- ions or not, the unity of the object, which appears to be the scope of the act of legislation, is alone to be stated in the title, and the details will be included by implication, within the gen- eral object so expressed.^ But where a statute is described in ' Com. v. Reynolds, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 568; People v. Wliitlock, 92 N. T. 191; Matter of Knaust, 101 N. Y. 188; Glenn v. Lynn, 89 Ala. 608; People V. Wilber, 15 ST. T. S. 435; Matter of Department of Public Parks, 86 N. Y. 439; Jonesboro v. Cairo R. R. Co., 110 U. S. 192; Audi- tor V. Stiles, 83 Mich. 460; Mahomet V. Quackenbush, 117 U. S. 509; Astor V. Railway Co., 113 N. Y. 93; Phila- delphia V. Ry. Co., 28 W. N. C. 106; Carter County v. Sinton, 120 U. S. 517; Montclair v. Remsdell, 107 U. S. 147; State v. Jackson Co., 102 Mo. 531; In re Rafferty, 1 Wash. St. 382; Ackley School Dist. v. Hall, 113 U. S. 136; lie Phoenlxville, 109 Pa. St. 44; Be Airy Street, 113 Pa. St. 281. 2 Ex parte Covert, (Ala. 90) 9 So. R. 225 ; Van Antwerp, In re, 56 N. Y. 261, 267; MoGee's Appeal, 114 Pa. St. 470, 478; Dewhurst v. Alle- gheny City, 95 Pa. St. 437. estate V. Mortlaud, 52 N. J. E. 521; Auditor y. Stile, 83 Mich. 460; Lockhart v. Troy, 48 Ala. 581; St. Paul V. Coulter, 12 Minn. 41, 50; Powell V. Suprs., (Va. 92) 14 S. E. R. 543; State v. New Whatcom, 3 CH. III.] THE INCORPORATION OF MUNICIPALITIES. §28 the title to be an amendment to a city charter, and it embraces objects which are foreign to the charter ; so far as these for- eign objects are concerned, the act is in conflict with the con- stitution of the state, and for that reason is void.^ It has also been held that the object of the act has not been specially ex- pressed, where it is entitled, " An act to legalize and authorize the assessments of street improvements and assessments," be- cause the city or locality, to which the act is to be applied, has not been expressed in the title.^ It seems that here, as well as elsewhere, all doubts in respect to the conditions of the legislative acts, because of these provisions of the constitution, should be solved ultimately in favor of the constitutionality of the act, in the absence of overwhelming conviction, as to its violation of the constitutional provision.^ Wash. St. 7; Holtin v. State, 28 Fla. 303; Hubert v. People, 49 N. Y. 132; State V. Union, 33 N. J. L. 350 (4 Vroom) ; Annapolis v. State, 30 Md. 212; Kathmau v. New Orleans, 11 La. An. 145; People v. Mellen, 32 111. 181 ; Stockman v. Brooks, (Col. 92) 29 Pao. 746; Sullivan v. New York, 53 N. Y. 652; Airy Street, 113 Pa. St. 281; Re Phoeuixville, 109 Pa. St. 44; Pierce v. Smith, (Kan. 92) 29 Pac. K. 565 ; Ottawa v. People, 48 111. 233; Miles v. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400; Astor, In re, 50 N. Y. 363; Columbus Co. V. Wright, (Ga. 92) 15 S. E. K. 293; Murdock v. Woodson, 2 Dillon C. C. E. 188; Ex parte Liddell, 29 Pac. K. 251; 93 Cal. 633; Atty. Gen. V. Bradley, 36 Mich. 447; People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44; s. c, 9 Am. Kep. 103; People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481 ; White v. Lincoln, 5 Neb. 505 ; People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553 ; Butler V. State, 15 S. E. E. 768; 89 Oa. 821; State v. Lewelling, (Kan. tW) 33 Pac. 423 ; State v. Blaokstone, (Mo. 93) 22 S. W. E. 370; Kelly v. Township of Mayberry, 26 Atl. 595 ; 154 Pa. St. 440; 32 W. N. C. 224; Fox V. McDonald, (Ala. 93) 13 So. 416; Stale V. Orange, (N. J. 93) 26 Atl. 790. ' Williamson v. Keokuk, 44 Iowa, 88 (1876). 2 Durkee v. Janesville, 26 Wis. 697. ' Mr. Justice Harlan, in Mt. Clair V. Eemsdell, 107 U. S. 147, says : " The objections should be grave, and the conflict between the statute and the constitution palpable, before the ju diciary should disregard a legislative enactment upon the sole ground that it embraces more than one object, or if but one object, that it was not sufficiently expressed by the title." State V. Story Co., 17 Nev. 96; La- Plume V. Gardner, (Pa. 92) 23 Atl. E. 899; State v. Harrub, (Ala. 92) 10 So. K. 752; State v. Shaw, (Or. 92) 29 Pac. E. 1028; State v. Burlington, 88 Mich. 438; State v. La Vague, 49 N. W. E. 525; 47 Minn. 106; State v. Elvino, 32 N. J. L. 362; State v. Newark, 34 lb. 236; Dows v. Elm- wood, 34 Fed. E. 114; E. E. Co. v. JefEerson, 29 lb. 305 ; Marion v. Har- vey Co., 26 Kan. 181; People v. Wil- sea, 60 N. Y. 507; Devlin v. New York, 63 lb. 8; State v. Bronson, (Mo. 93) 21 S. W. E. 1125; Board v. Aspen M. & S. Co., (Col. 93) 32 Pac. 717; Blair v. State, (Ga. 93) 17 S. E. E. 96; Walters v. Richardson, (Ky. 93) 20 S. W. E. 279; hi re Comrs. Johnson Co., (Wyo. 93) 32 Pac. 850. ■ 49 §80 MTJNICrPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. ur. It has also been held, that this constitutional provision is limited in its application to state legislation, and does not ap- ply to the ordinances of municipal corporations.^ § 29. Corporate existence not open to collateral attack.— Where a municipal corporation is exercising the powers of a body politic, and its existence as a municipal corporation is not questioned by the state, the legality of its corporate existence cannot be inquired into collaterally by private parties, in suits brought against them, in which the municipal corporation is a party. And this is the rule, even where the constitution of the state prescribes a particular mode of incorporation .^ Thus, for example, in an action by a municipal court to recover pen- alties imposed by its ordinances, it is not a good defence to set up, that the plaintiff is not a corporation. § 30. Judiclalnotice of charters and acts of mnnicipal cor- porations. — The courts will take judicial notice of the legisla- tive act of incorporation of a municipality, without such act being specially pleaded, it matters not whether such act is de- clared to be a public statute, as long as it is in fact an act of creation of a municipal corporation.^ And so, also, will the act of the legislature, supplementing and amending a city charter, be likewise judicially noticed.* But it has beeu held that, where the city is incorporated under a general act, the fact of its corporate character must be averred and proved.^ But in Indiana, it is held to be sufficient, if a city has been incorpo- rated under a general law, to be called a corporation in the 1 Humboldt v. McCoy, 23 Kan. 249; Green v. Indianapolis, 52 Ind. 490. 2 St. Louis V. Shields, 62 Mo. 247; In re Sliort, 47 Kan. 250; State v. Leatherman, 38 Ark. 81 ; Henderson V. Davis, 106 IST. C. 88; Meudenball v. Burton, (Kan. 89) 22 Pac. R. 558; State V. Fuller, 9 S. W. R. 583; see post, ch. XVIII. " Savannab v. Dickey, 33 Mo. App. 522; Rock Island v. Crinely, 26 HI. App. 173; Wetumpka v. Wetumpka Wharf Co., 63 Ala. 611; Potwin v. Johnson, 108 111. 70; Dwyer v. Bren- ham, 65 Tex. 526; Ellsworth v. Nel- son, (Iowa, 90) 46 N. "W. R. 740; Ber- fenning v. Chi. etc. Co., (Minn. 90) 48 N. W. R. 444; Solomon v. Hughes, 24 Kan. 211 ; State v. Tosney,.26 Minn. 262; Durch v. Chippewa Co., 60 Wis. 227; Smith v. Janesville, 52 Wis. 680; Pejryman v. Greenville, 51 Ala. 510. ^Railroad Co. v. Plumas, 37 Cal. 354; Arapahoe v. Albee, (Neb. 88) 38 N. W. R. 737; Jameson v. People, 16 111. 257; Swain v. Corastock, 18 Wis. 463 ; Virginia City v. Mining Co., 2 Nev. 86; Newark Bank v. Assess- ors, 30 N. J. L. 22; State v. Bergen, 34 N. J. L. 439; New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U. S. 112; Society, etc., v. Pawlet, 4 Pet. 480; Railroad Co. v. Cbenoa, 43 111. 209; People v. Farnham, 35 111. 562; Bow v. AUentown, 34 N. H. 351. single V. Jones, 43 Iowa, 286; Mor- gan V. Atlanta, 77 Ga. 662. CH. III.] THE INCOEPOEATION OF MUNICIPALITIES. § 31 pleadings of the suit ; and from that fact the presumption in favor of its proper incorporation will arise.^ But the acts and ordinances of a municipal corporation are not held to he public laws, and hence must be both pleaded and proved, unless other- wise provided by statute.^ § 31. Proof of corporate existence. — Of course, the primary evidence of a special charter or act of incorporation would, in this country, be the original or an authenticated copy of the act ; and under statutor}' provisions in some states, a printed copy, which is published by the authority of the state. But where such primary evidence cannot be had, because it has been lost, parol or secondary evidence of the existence of the municipal corporation would be admissible.^ Thus, where a public corporation had existed for a long space of time, and the original act of incorporation cannot be found or a copy thereof, the court will permit the introduction of evidence to show by general reputation, that the community had been incorporated, and what its corporate privileges were.* It is competent to go to the jury on circumstantial evidence, showing a long user of corporate powers by the community, in support of the averment of the existence-of the corporation, and to claim from this cir- cumstantial evidence the presumption of a charter from the legislature,^ or the establishment and existence of a corporation ' Clark V. No. Muskegon, SON. W. R. 254 ; 88 Mich. 308 ; House v. Greens- burg, 93 Ind. 533; Smith v. Warrior, (Ala. 93) 10 So. K. 418. 2 Moundsville v. Velton, (W. Va. 89) IS S. E. E. 373; Prell v. McDon- ald, 7 Kan. 426; 7 Am. Kep. 423; Vance v. Bank, 1 Black! (Ind.) 80, and note (2); Young v. Bank, etc., 4 Cranch, 384; Garland v. Denver, 19Pac. R. 460; Anderson v. Donnell, 7 S. E. R. 523; Beatty v. Knowles, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 152, 157; Stierv. Oska- loosa, 41 Iowa, 353; Ingle v. Jones, 43 Iowa, 286; Clarke v. Bank, (10 Ark.) 516; State v. Mayor, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 217;WesternR. Co. v. Young, (Ga. 92) 7 S. E. E. 912 ; Portsmouth, etc., Co. V. Watson, 10 Mass. 91; Clapp v. Hartford, 35 Conn. 66; Briggs V. Whipple,? Vt. 15, 18; Case V. Mobile, 30 Ala. 538; People v. Potter, 35 Cal. 110; Fauntleroy v. Hannibal, 1 Dillon, C. C. 118; City of McPherson v. Nichols, 48 Kan. 430. 8 Stockbridge v. West Stockbridge, 12 Mass. 400; Braintree v. Battles, 6 Vt. 395 ; Blackstone v. White, 41 Pa. St. 330. "Sherwin v. Bugbee, 16 Vt. 439; Bow V. Allentown, 34 N. H. 351 ; Bas- sett V. Porter, 4 Cush. 487; People V. Maynard, 15 Md. 463; London- derry V. Andover, 28 Vt. 416; Jame- son V. People, 16 111. 257; People v. Farnham, 35 111. 562. ^ New Boston v. Dumbarton, 15 N. H. 201 ; Mayor b. Kingston v. Horner, Cowp. 102; Worly v. Harris, 82 Ind. 493. 51 §32 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. ni. under some general act.^ Where the fact of incorporation arises as a collateral question, it is only necessary that it be proven, that the city is a corporation de facto? Proof of the existence of a quasi public corporation, such as school and road districts, by circumstantial evidence, is com- monly the only possible method, inasmuch as the officials of these quasi corporations are very negligent in the keeping of the records.^ Where a corporation is created or declared to exist by a di- rect act of the legislature, its existence as a corporation does not require any special proof, either as to organization or user of its powers.* And so also will the existence of the corporation be inferred from the fact that the corporation has been recognized by subsequent legislation.^ § 32. Power to repeal and amend city charter — Effect of exercise of such power. — The powers and privileges, conferred upon a municipal corporation by act of the legislature, may at any time be repealed or amended by the legislature, either by a general law, applicable to all municipal corporations through- out the state ; or, in absence of constitutional limitations, by a special act applying to the particular corporation.^ But a char- ' Bassett v. Porter, 4 Cush. 487; New Boston v. Dumbarton, 12 N. H. 409, 412; s. c, 15 X. H. 201; Robie V. Sedgwick, 35 Barb. 319. 2 Duncan v. State, (Fla. 92) 10 So. E. 815; Hill v. Koboka, 35 Fed. K. 32; Crdwder v. Sullivan, (Ind. 91) 28 IST. E. K. 94; State v. Fuller, 9 S. W. K. 583; Louisville etc. Co. v. Shires, 108 111. 617. 2 Lathrop v. Sunderland, (Vt. 92) 23 Atl. R. 619; Highland v. McKean, 11 Johns. 154; Mendenhall v. Burton, (Kan. 89) 22 Pac. R. 558; London- derry V. Audover, 28 Vt. 416; Owings v. Spew, 5 Wheat. 420. *McVicker v. Cone, 21 Or. 353; Pasadena v. Stimson, (Col. 89) 27 Pac. K. 604; Proprietors etc. v. Hor- ton, 6 Hill (ISr. Y.) 501; Wood v. Bank, 9 Cowen, 194; People v. Presi- dent, 9 Wend. 351 ; Cahill v. Insur- ance Co., 2 Doug. (Mich.) 124; Fire 52 Department v. Kip, 10 Wend. 266. s Arapahoe v. Albee, 38 N. W. E, 737; Bow v. AUentown, 34 N. H. 351 Railroad Co. v. Chenoa, 43 111. 209 Virginia City v. Mining Co., 2 Nev. 86; Boykin v. State, (Ala. 92) 11 So, E. 66; Swain v. Comstock, 18 Wis, 463; People v. Farnham, 35 111. 562; Railroad Co. v. Plumas County, 37 Cal. 354. ^ Essex Pub. etc. Board v. Skinkle, 140 U. S. 334; Wallace v. Trustees, 84N. C. 164; State v. Palmer, 4 N. W. Rep. 986; Churchill v. Walker, 68 Ga. 681 ; State v. Toledo, 26 N. E. E. 1061 ; Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Gas. Co., 66 Ind. 396; Crook v. Peo- ple, 106 111.237; Rose v. Hardee, 98 N". C. 44; State v. Troth, 34 If. J. L. 379; Worthley v. Steen, 43 N. J. L. 542; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325; Daniel v. Mayor, etc., 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 582. CH. in.J THE INCOEPOBATION OF MUNICIPALITIES. §32 ter may be amended, and even the name of the place and the governing body of such corporation changed, and its boundaries extended or cut down, while the corporation remains in law the same legal personality.^ Nor does any change in the char- ter, or in the territorial limits of the corporation, operate to ex- tinguish the indebtedness of the old corporation.^ And where an amended charter is granted to a corporation in the place of the old one, containing the same provisions as are found in the old charter, such legislative amendments of the old charter, or substitution of the new charter for the old, do not operate to annul the rights and powers of the corporation which were ac- quired by it under the former charter, and under its former name ; nor does such a substitution of an amended charter op- erate to abrogate or repeal ordinances passed by the corporation under its old charter, provided such ordinances are not incon- sistent with the provisions of the new charter. So far as such ordinances are in harmony with the provisions of the new charter they will continue to be in force, until repealed by the legislative power of the corporation.^ Where an original 1 State V. Hedlund, 16 Keb. 566; Wood V. Board of Election, 58 Cal. 561 ; State ea; rel. v. White, 20 Neb. 37; Dillon Mun. Corp. §85. ^Fluellenv. Pi'oetzel, post; Fowle V. Alexandria, 3 Pet. 398, 408; Mu- nicipality V. Commissioners, 1 Eob. (La.) 279; East St. Louis v. Rhein, 139 111. 116; Olney v. Harvey, 50 111. 453; Frank v. San Francisco, 21 Cal. 668; Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1 ; Savannah v. Steamboat Company, K. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 342. sBirford v. State, 72 Tex. 182; Fluellen v. Proetzel, (Tex. 90) 15 S. W. K. 1043; Inre House Bill, 12 Colo. 337; Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Gas Co., 66 Ind. 296; Stewart v. Schoo- maker, 32 Pac. E. 122; 50 Kan. 560; Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 474; Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266; Milner's Admx. v. Pen- sacola, 2 Woods, 632; Laird v. Be Soto, 22 Fed. Eep. 421; St. Louis v. Alexander, 23 Mo. 483; State etc. v. Mobile, 24 Ala. 701: "There is no doctrine better settled than that a change in the form of government of a community does not ipso facto abrogate pre-existing law, either written or unwritten. This is true in regard to what is strictly mu- nicipal law, even when the change is by conquest. The act of ageneral assembly, converting a borough into a city, did not, therefore, of itself, and in the absence of express pro- visions to that effect, either repeal the former acts of assembly relative to the borough, or annul existing or- dinances. It was solely a change in the organic law for the future, and left unaffected the existing ordi- nances," precisely as a change of a state constitution leaves undisturbed all prior acts of assembly.'' Mr. Jus- tice Strong in Trustees of Academy v. Erie, 31 Pa. St. 515, 517. 63 § 33 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. III. charter of a city contains provisions, which are retained in an amended charter, with the omission of some (Jualifying clause which appears in the original charter, the general rule is laid down by the authorities, that the amended charter is intended to operate as a substitute for the old charter, and an implied re- peal of the provisions of the old charter so far as such provis- ions have not been incorporated in the amended charter.^ But it has been held that where the original charter of a city, in prescribing the qualifications of the persons who are eligible to the office of mayor, contains a .proviso that certain facts dis- qualify a person ; an amended charter, which contains the orig- inal act in respect to the qualification of candidates for the office of mayor, with the exception of the proviso referred to, does not by implication abrogate the excluded provisions of the original charter, particularly since all provisions of the old charter were expressed to be in force, which were not inconsistent with the provisions of the amended charter.^ But this is altogether a question of intention of the legislature ; and the conclusion in this particular case is no very reliable guide, except in the light of the peculiar circumstances of that case. And so where a later statute apparently undertakes a complete revision of the prior law, the omission of a clause or proviso of the old law must be presumed to be an intentional repeal.^ It has also been held that where the provisions of the amendatory act of the legislature reduce the number of councilmen and do not provide any special time for a new election, the amendment does not take effect until the regular time for holding the municipal election ; and until that time arrives, the existing council remains unaffected by the amendment.* § 33. Special powers, when repealed by general laws.— It is a rule of very general application that statutes, having a 1 Cartriglit v. Crow, 44 Mo. App. 563; Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, 617; Barton v. Sell. Dist, (Id. 92) 29 Pac. E. 4.3; Goodenow v. Butter- ick, 7 Mass. 140, 143; Industrial School V. Wliitehead, 2 Beasley, N. J. 290; State v. Kelly, 5 Vroom (34 X. J. h.) 75. 2 State V. Merry, 3 Mo. 278. 2 Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590; School v. Whitehead, 2 Beasley, 64 290; In re Wheelook, 3 N". T. S. 890 Little V. Cogswell, 25 Pac. B. 727 State V. Townsby, 23 Atl. E. 666 Wood V. State, 47 Ark. 488; In re Primes' Est., 32 N. E. E. 1091; 136 N. T. 347; contra, State v. Young, 30 S. C. 399. * Reading v. Keppleman, 61 Pa. St. 233; Scoville v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio St. 126. CH. m.] THE INCORPORATION OF MUNICIPALITIES. § 33 general operation, will not repeal by implication special statutes, or statutes which are passed for the benefit of particular munici- palities, unless they are absolutely antagonistic, and, therefore, cannot stand together. But the fact, that they are inconsist- ent, does not of itself cause the special law to be repealed by the general law ; the 'court will hold, as a general rule, that the legislature had no intention of interfering with the continued enforcement of the special law, and that the general law was intended to be enforced only in those parts of the state, where the special law did not apply .^ ■ But in all these cases, it might be said, it is a question of legislative intent, whether the special law should remain unchanged or should be repealed; and, in determining this question, it is necessary to read the partic- ular provisions of the charter in the light of all the circum- stances of the case, and the consequence and effect of repealing such special act by implication, or of leaving such laws in force, notwithstanding their inconsistency with the general laws of the state.'^ Thus, for example, where there was a charter provi- sion, in reference to bribery committed by a municipal officer, and by subsequent legislation the same act was made an of- fence punishable in the state courts by a greater penalty, it was held that the charter provision was repealed.^ So, also, a general railroad tax law was held to repeal by implication all prior special laws, conferring charter privileges upon munici- palities.* Where a general statute is declared to repeal all acts contrary to its provisions, it is held that this declaration does ville S. Ry. Co., 78 Ind. 261; Chicago D. Co. V. Garrity, 115 111. 155; Thoin- ason V. Ashwoi-th, 73 Cal. 73; Bab- cock V. Helena, 34 Ark. 499; People V. Page, 23 Pac. R. 761 ; Janesville v. Markoe, 18 Wis. 350; Powell v. Park- ersburg, 28 W. Va. 698; Holland v. Baltimore, 11 Md. 186; New Bedford Ry. Co. V. Aouslinet Co., 143 Mass. 200; Moran v. Long Island City, 101 N. T. 439. 'People V. Jaelme, 103 N. T. 182; People V. O'Neil, 109 N. Y. 251. State V. Severance, 55 Mo. 378; Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cheyenne, 113 U. S. 516. 1 State V. Kirk, 53 Ark. 337; State V. Howe, 28 Neb. 618 ; State v. Brauin, 3 Zabr. (23 N. J. L.) 484; State v. Mor- ristown, 33 N. J. Law, 57; Pavey v. Utter, 132 111. 489; State v. Trenton, 7 Vroom (36 N. J. L.) 198, 201; Ot- tawa V. County, 12 111. 339; Egypt Street, 2 Grant (Pa.) 455; Han-is- burg V. Seek, 104 Pa. St. 53; Rush- ville V. Town, 32 111. App. 320; God- dard, In re, 16 Pick. 504; Railroad Co. V. Alexandria, 17 Gratt. (Va.) 176. 2 State V. Young, 30 S. C. 399; Ca- nal Company v. Railroad Company, 4 Gill & Johns. 1; Smith v. Ker- nochen, 7 How. 198;Bichelsv. Evans- 55 34 MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS. [CH. m. not apply to the special laws, contained in the charter of a mu- nicipal corporation upon the same subject.^ But if the general law is declared to repeal all inconsistent local or special acts, the special laws would in that case be repealed by this express and comprehensive declaration of the statute.^ The adoption of a new state constitution does not repeal special charter powers, unless they are in conflict with some provision of the new constitution.* And where a new consti- tution expressly continues all existing charters in force, this special recognition of the existence of the charter of the munici- pal corporation does not impliedly take away from the legisla- ture its existing powers of amendment of the charter.* § 34. Implied repeal of general laws by special laws.— While it is possible for a legislature to repeal general laws by the subsequent enactment of special laws, the presumption, in favor of such repeal by implication, is not recognized or in- dulged, as long as such presumption is not necessary to avoid an inconsistency of a serious nature. It is only permitted for such a repeal to take place by implication, when the two pro- visions are absolutely irreconcilable.^ Thus, for example, a general law, which prohibits the opening of streets through a cemetery, is not repealed by implication by a subsequent act, which extends the limits of a municipal corporation, so as to include the cemetery, and gives such corporation the power to open up and lay out streets, alleys, etc. ; for the two acts are not absolutely and necessarily irreconcilable. They may be recon- ciled by limiting the application of the general power of the 1 State V. Bi-anin, 23 K. J. L. 484; Busliville V. TownsMp, 32 111. App. 320. 2 Adam v. Wright, 84 Ga. 720; State V. Miller, 30 X J. L. 368; Bank v. Bridges, lb. 368; Tierney v. Dodge, 9 Minn. 166; Clintonville v. Keeting, 4 Denio, 341. 8 People V. Jones, 7 Col. 475; Trus- tees v. Taylor, 30 N. J. Eq. 618; Cliid- sey V. Scrantou, (Miss. 93) 12 So. 545. 4 "Wiley V. Bluffton, 111 lud. 152. 6 People V. Heushaw, (Cal. 88) 18 Pao. E. 413; Com. v. Wetzel, 84 Ky. 537; 2 S. W. K 123; Com. v. Duff, 87 66 Ky. 586; State v. De Bar, 58 Mo. 395; State V. Mills, 5 Vroom (34 N. J. L.) 177, 180; Montezuma V. Minor, 70 Ga. 191; St. Jolinsbury v. Thompson, 59 Vt. 300; Eaton v. Burke, (If. H. 92) 22 Atl. R. 452; State v. Young, 17 Kan. 414; Wooley v. Watkins, 22 Pac. B. 102; Givens v. Van Studdi- ford, 86 Mo. 149; State v. Clark, 54 Mo. 17; State v. Clark, 1 Dutch. (N. J.) 54; Kern v. People, 44 111. Ap. 181; Mersereau v. Mersereau Co., (N. J. 93) 26 Atl. R. 682; In re Prime's Est., 32 N. E. R. 1091; 136 N. Y. 347. CH. ni.] THE INCORPORATION OP MTTNICrPALITIES. § 36 corporation to the new land, which is taken within its bor- der, outside of the cemetery .^ So, also, where a state statute requires auctioneers to take out a state license, and a subse- quent act authorized a municipal corporation to requii'c a simi- lar license of such persons, it was held that the two laws were not inconsistent with each other, and that the special law, granting to the corporation the power to impose the license, did not operate as a repeal by implication of a state law impos- ing a similar license ; but that both licenses might be exacted.^ So, likewise, where a general law prohibits a municipal corpo- ration from denying to its citizens the right to sell goods at wholesale at the city market, there is no implied repeal of the same by the general grant to a city of the power to pass " such ordinances as appear to them necessary for the security, wel- fare, etc., of the city." ^ I Egypt Street, 2 Grant (Pa.) Cas. 455. 2 Simpson v. Savage, 1 Mo. 359 ; Sie- benhauer, In re, 14 Nev. 365. ' Haywood v. Savannah, 12 Ga. 404. 57 CHAPTER IV. DISSOLUTION OF MUNICrPAL COKPOEATIONS. Sectioit. 42 — The rights of creditors where a second corporation has been established in its place. 43 — EfEect of dissolution of corpo- ration in general, where no other corporation has been substituted therefor. 44 — Eevival by a new charter. Sectioh. 37 — How dissolved in England. 38 — How dissolved in the United States. 39 — Forfeiture of corporate exist- ence. 40 — Effect of dissolution of corpo- ration. 41 — Eights of creditors on a dis- solution of a municipal cor- poration. § 37. How dissolved in England — It is said that, in Eng- land, a municipal corporation may be dissolved in one of four ways : First, by act of Parliament. Inasmuch as the powers of Parliament are unrestricted by constitutional limitations, there can be no doubt that an act of Parliament, dissolving a corporation, whether it be public or private, will have the ef- fect of destroying such corporation as a legal personality.^ The King may, in th-e exercise of his prerogative, create a corpora- tion, but he cannot destroy one already existing. He may grant to such corporation a variety of franchises, but he can- not take away or annul one, which is already vested in the cor- poration.2 Secondly, the municipal corporation may in England be dissolved by the loss of an integral part of such corporation, or by a loss of all, or a majority, of the members of an integral part, without whose co-operation it is impossible for the municipal corporation to transact its business. It will, however, be remem- bered that, in the preceding chapter, in explaining the difference in municipal corporations in England and in this country, it was stated that, prior to the Municipal Corporation Act of 1835, the municipal corporation in England was in the nature of a polit- ical franchise granted to individuals, falling within the descrip- dith, 36 N". H. 284; St. Louis v. Al- ' State V. Trustees etc., 5 Ind. IT; Com'rs V. Cox, 6 lb. 403; 2 Kent, 305; Co.,Litt. 176, note; Kex v. Am- ory, 2 T. K. 515 ; Eastman v. Mere- 58 len, 13 Mo. 400. 2 Rex V. Amory, 2 T. R. 515; Uni- versity V. Williams, 9 Gr. & Johns. 365, 409. CH. IV.] DISSOLUTION OF COEPOEATION. §37 tion employed, separate and apart from the population and community in general, and not necessarily a part of the commu- nity itself ; that the corporation, so called, was composed of dis- tinct integral parts, usually described as the mayor, aldermen, and commonalty of the corporation. It is upon this concep- tion of a municipal corporation, as composed of its separate integral parts, instead of being in the American sense t^e in- corporation of the community in general, that this doctrine of a dissolution of the corporation by a loss of an integral part rests. It seems to be a definite and well established rule of the English law.^ Thirdly, a municipal corporation may in England be destroy- ed or dissolved by a surrender of the franchise of such corpo- ration to the crown, and its acceptance by the crown.^ This power of surrender has been very considerably limited, and it is now held to apply only to those corporations which receive their charter from the crown. It is not permitted to apply to corporations which have been created or coniirmed by act of Parliament. These corporations cannot dissolve themselves by any surrender of its charter or franchise, except upon the con- sent, or with the co-operation, of Parliament, which would make this case one of dissolution by act of Parliament. Fourthly, a municipal corporation can also be dissolved or aimulled in England by a foj-feiture of its charter, on account of negligence or abuse of the francliise ; such forfeiture result- ing from a judgment in a proceeding in quo warranto, or scire facias. This mode of dissolution of franchises is very com- monly applied, both in England and in this country, to private 1 Smith's Case, 4 Mod. 53; Smith V. Smith, 3 Desaus. (S. C.) 657; Ban- bury's Case, 10 Mod. 346; Rex v. Tregony, 8 Mod. 129; Bacon v. Rob- ertson, 18 How. (U. S.) 480; "Welch V. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Mlon C. C. 130; Rol. Abr. 514; Eegina v. Bewdley, 1 P. Wms. 207; People v. Wren, 4 Scam. (5 111.) 275 ; Colchester v. Sea- ber, 3 Burr. 1870; S. C, 1 Wm. Bl. 591. In Rex v. Passmore, 3 Term R. 421, Lord Kenyoii said, in delivering tlie opinion of the court, "When an integral part of a corporation is gone, without whose existence the func- tions of the corporation cannot be exercised, and the corporation has no manner of supplying the integral part, tlie corporation is dissolved as to certain purposes. But the king may renovate, either with tlie old or new corpoi-ators.'' ^Dillon Mun. Corp. §165; Rex v. Osborne, 4 East. 326; Rex v. Miller, 6 Term R. 277; Willc. 332, pi. 861; Howard's Case, Hutt. 87; Thicknesse V. Canal Co., 4 M. & W. 472. 59 §38 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. IX. corporations. In England, it has also been applied to munici- pal corporations, where misuse, or failure to exercise the rights of the franchise, have resulted in a judgment of forfeiture. And in the time of Charles II., it was held that a municipal corporation might forfeit its franchise, in consequence of the negligence or misconduct of its officers.-'^ § 38. How dissolved in the United States. — As has been already stated in the preceding paragraph, in explanation of the modes of dissolution of corporations in England, the sec- ond mode, which is possible in England by a loss of an integral part of the corporation, would not be possible in this country, because here the municipal corporation is not a franchise, pos- sessed and enjoyed by a few persons of the community, but is an act of incorporation of the community. Each individual citizen of the corporation is an integral part, but the officers of the corporation do not in any sense of the term constitute an integral part of the corporation ; they are merely the agents of the corporation, for whose wrongful acts the corporation may be liable to parties injured thereby. The corporation itself does not depend for its existence upon the continuance or exist- ence of such officers. It is, of course, possible that a municipal corporation may practically become nonexistent, in consequence of the desertion of a locality by the entire people. If a com- munity should in one body remove from that locality, abandon the territor}"^ which has been assigned for the municipal corpo- ration, it would be impossible for such a municipal corporation still to exist-; but the mere neglect or failure of the community to elect officers to practically carry on the administration of the 1 See Tiedeman's Private Corpora^ tions, chapter on Dissolution; Eex V. Nicholson, 1 Str. 299; People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1; Attorney Gen- eral V. Shrewsbury, 6 Beav. 220; Whalen v. Macomb, 76 111. 49; Mum- ma V. Potomac Co., 8 Pet. (U. S.) 281; Boston Glass Manuf. v. Lang- don, 24 Pick. 49, 52; Rex v. Kent, 13 East, 220; Priestly v. Foulds, 2 Scott, N. R. 205, 225; Commonwealth v. Union Ins. Co., 5 Mass. 230, 232; Rid- dle V. Locks and Canals, 7 Mass. 169 ; 60 School V. Canal, etc., Co., 9 Ohio, 203; Canal Co. v. Railroad Co., 4 Gill & Johns. 1; Vincennes University v. Indiana, 14 How. 268; Eex v. Saun- ders, 3 East, 119; Mayor, etc., of Lyme v. Henley, 2 CI. & F. 331; Smith's Case, 4 Mod. 55, 58; s. c, 12 Mod. 17; Skin. 311; 1 Show. 278; Black. Com. 485; Taylors of Ipswich, 1 Rol. 5; Rex v. Grosvenor, 7 Mod. 199. See Butler v. Walker, (Ala. 93) 13 So. 261; Swamp Land District No. 170 V. Silva, (Cal. 93) 32 Pac. E. 866. CH. IV.] DISSOLUTION OF COEPOEATXON. §39 municipal government would certainly not dissolve the fran- chise, as long as the right or capacity to elect such ofBcers, and to place the municipal corporation on a working basis, still continues.^ So, also, would it not be proper to consider it possible, in this country, to secure a dissolution of a corporation by virtue of a surrender of the franchise. Such a surrender would not be possible, except iu conjunction with an acceptance of the sur- render by the legislature which created the corporation ; and when the acceptance has been given, the entire transaction would be equivalent in its effect, and in its real character, to an act of dissolution of the municipal corporation.^ But it has been held by the Supreme Court of Missouri, and it is probably a sound conclusion of law, that, where municipal corporations are incorporated under a general act, which contains provisions for the dissolution of such a corporation, by compliance with this provision the town may be dissolved, without the direct interference of the legislature.^ § 39. Forfeiture of corporate existence. — For the same reason, the English doctrine, that a municipal corporation may forfeit its existence as a corporation, in consequence of the neglect or abuse of its franchise, cannot find application in this country to municipal corporations.* If there is any neglect or abuse of the powers and privileges of the municipal corporation, appropriate remedies are provided for tlie redress of the injuries 1 Butler V. "Walker, (Ala. 93) 13 So. 261; Largen v. State, 13 S. W. E. 161 ; 76 Tex. 323; State v. Dunson, (Tex. 88) 9 S. W. E. 203; People v. Wren, 4 Scam. (5 111.) 275; IT. S. El. LigM Co. V. Leiter, 19 D. C. 575; Com. v. Cullen, 1 Harris (Pa.) 133; President V. Thomas, 20 111. 197; Welch v. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dillon C. C. 130; Green Township, 9 Watts & S. (Pa.) 22; Schriber v. Langdale, 66 Wis. 616; Vincennes University v. Indiana, 14 How. 268; Muscatine v. Funck, 18 Iowa, 469 ; see Lea v. Hei-naudez, 10 Tex. 137, in which it is held that where a Texas town, incorporated prior to 1848, for three years and over had failed to elect ofi&cers or to provide any other governmental or- ganization, and did not even possess officers de facto, the failui-e of the community to elect officers to carry on the government of the town ope- rated as a dissolution of the corpo- ration. But the court reaches this conclusion without citing any au- thority in support, and without giv- ing any reason for its judgment. 2 Brennan v. Bradshaw, 53 Tex. 330; Morris v. State, 63 Tex. 53. s Hambleton v. Dexter, 89 Mo. 188; Largen v. State, sui)ra. * See Welch v. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dillon C. C. 130; Butler v. Walker, (Ala. 93) 13 So. 261. 61 f 40 MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS. [CH. IT. which may be sustained thereby by private individuals. Or, if public rights are suffering from a neglect of the performance of the duties of a municipal corporation, the court may, by mandamus, secure the performance of such duties. It would be a matter of very great surprise to a municipal community in the United States, to learn that its charter had been for- feited in a proceeding of quo warranto, because of the failure of its officers to perform the duties intrusted to them. The conclu- sion of the entire discussion is, that in this country there is but one way, whereby corporations may be destroyed or annulled ; and that is, by an act of the legislature, which has created the municipal corporation, iind which has the sole power of control over it.^ It seems that in Missouri the city of Kahoka was in 1886 deprived of its charter by forfeiture for nonuser, in a pro- ceeding of quo warranto, and subsequently the community was reincorporated under the general laws of the state as a city of the fourth class. It is doubtful what was the effect of tlie ju- dicial proceeding in the case ; certainly, under the general laws of the state, the reincorporation operated as a surrender of the old charter."'^ § 40. Effect of dissolution of corporation. — At common law a corporation, whether public or private, upon dissolution, was held to be civilly dead. Nothing remained in the character of a legal personality in the place of such corporation, and its rights of property and lands, for example, reverted to the gran- tor or his heirs, while the choses in action of the corporation, whether owned b}' them or due to it by others, became extinct. Leases of lands by such corporation were also terminated with its dissolution.^ But, in this country, if not in England, an entirely different view has been taken of the act of incorpora- tion, and the effect of dissolution. Instead of recognizing that, 'Dillon Mun. Corp. §168; People V. Bancroft, 29 Pac. R. 112; (Ida. 92) ; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472; Mobile V. Watson, 116 lb. 289; State V. Hamilton, (Kan. 87), 19 Pac. 723 ; State V. Board of Education, 7 Ohio Cir. Ct. E. 152 (Ohio 93.) 2 Hill V. Kahoka, 35 Fed. Rep. 321; see also, Meyer v. Porter, 65 Cal. 67; Hambleton v. Town of Dexter, 89 62 Mo. 188. 3 Commonwealth v. Koxbury, 9 Gray, 510, note; Attorney General v. Gower, 9 Mod. 226; 1 Rol. Abr. 816; Rex V. Passmore, 3 Term R. 247; Grant Corp. 805; Colchester v. Brooke, 7 Queen's B. 383; Co. Litt. 13; 1 Lev. 237; Knight v. Wells, 1 Lut. 519; Rex v. Saunders, 3 East, 119. CH. IV. J DISSOLUTION OP COKPOEATION. § 41 in the dissolution of a corporation, a complete extinction of the legal personality, created by the act of incorporation, took place, leaving nothing in its place as the inheritor of its rights and obligations ; the American courts recognize in the dissolution only a termination of its franchises, as forfeiture of the right to transact business in its corporate capacity, and hold that its rights and duties remain intact and unaffected by the dissolu- tion of such a corporation. The property of the corporation, upon its dissolution, would be retained and taken charge of hy a Court of Equity or placed in the hands of trustees appointed for that purpose, to be administered by them for the ben- efit of the creditors of the defunct corporation, in the first place, and to secure a subsequent distribution of the remaining property among the incorpoi'ators. There is, therefore, no re- version of the lands held by a corporation in fee to the grantor or his heirs, or a loss or termination .of leases held by the cor- poration, or a termination of charitable trusts, which were vest- ed in the dissolved corporation. In all these cases, a Court of Equity will direct a distribution of the property among the in- corporators; or, in the case of charitable trusts, appoint other trustees to administer the trusts, and thus prevent their de-' ! traction. This is certainly the rule in America, in regard to private corporations, and the same rule has been applied equal- ly to municipal corporations.^ § 41. Rights of creditors on a dissolution of a municipal corporation.-— It is explained in a subsequent chapter, that the property which a corporation holds for public use, such as pub- lic buildings and fire engines, wharves and the like, cannot be subjected to execution for the paj'ment of the debts of the city.'' It is likewise held that, upon the dissolution of a corporation, such property continues to be exempt from liability for the debts of the corporation, and it passes into the immediate con- tiol of the state.** So, also, has it been decided that the private I In re Board, 48 Fed. R. 350; Mum- ma V. Potomac Co., 8 Pet. 281; Cur- ran V. Arkansas, 15 How. (U. S.) 312; Vinoennes v. Indiana, 14 How. 268; Owen V. Smith, 31 Barb. 641; Schlie- der V. Dielman, 10 So. K. 934; Coul- ter V. Robertson, 24 Miss. 278 ; County V. Cox, 6 Ind. 403; Bacon v. Robert- son, 18 How. (IT. S.) 480; People v. O'Brien, 111 N. T. 1; Com. v. Rox- bury, 9 Gray, 510, note; Girard v. Philadelpliia, 7 Wall. 1; Ewing v. Dallas, (Tex. 92) 19 S. W. R. 380. 2 See post, § 212. 3 Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266, 268, 269. 63 § 42 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. IV. property of individuals, living within the municipality, cannot be subjected to liability for the payment of the debts of the city, except through taxation ; and that the power of taxation can only be exercised by the corporation, under the authority of the Legislature.^ But, granting that these two propositions are sound law, it still remains an important question what reme- dies the creditors of a dissolved municipal corporation may em- ploy to secure the payment of its just debts ? There are two cases that require special consideration in this inquiry ; One, where the particular municipal corporation is dissolved, and a new and distinctly separate corporation is created by the state to take its place, and in whom are vested the ordinary powers of a municipal corporation ; Secondly, where the cor- poration is dissolved, and no other municipal corporation is created to take its place. These two cases will be discussed separately; but prior to the discussion of them, it is necessary to remember, that the rights of creditors aie protected by the provision of the Federal Constitution, which prohibits the pass- ing of laws which impair the- obligation of contracts ; and it has been decided that where a municipal corporation has agreed with its creditors that a special levy of taxes should be made for the payment of its debts, or the interest on such debts, such an agreement with the corporation for a special levy of taxes constitutes a part of the obligation of the contract with the creditors, which is protected by this constitutional prohibi- tion. ^ § 42. The rights of creditors where a second corporation has heen established in its place. — Mere changes in the name of a corporation, or of its boundaries or mode of government, which fall short of a dissolution of the corporation, cannot have any effect whatever upon its rights of property, or upon its obli- gations to creditors. It still continues to be the same corpora- tion under a changed form or name, and therefore the rights of creditors can in no wise be thereby affected.^ So, also, would it be impossible to effect a dissolution of a municipal corpora- tion, as to its creditors, by the substitution of a new municipal 1 Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 IT. S. 472. ^Seibert v. Lewis, 122 U. S. 284; see post, § 196. 64 3 People V. Bagley, 85 Cal. 343; Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 XT. S. 266; Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1. CH. IV.] DISSOLUTION OF COItPOK AT ION. § 42 charter in the place of one, under which the corporation was operated, at the time when the debts were contracted ; even though the powers and privileges under the new charter are essentially different from those which were enjoyed under the old charter.^ And in determining the rights of creditors, the presumption is very strong that the same corporation continues to exist, notwithstanding different powers are given to the cor- poration, and different officers provided for the administration of its affairs.'^ In a number of cases, for the purpose of avoid- ing the liability for their debts, Legislatures have dissolved mu- nicipal corporations — in the vernacular of the day, legislated them out of existence altogether — and have established in their place, with some modification of their boundaries and powers, and with the substitution of some entirely different name, some other body politic or local government, which it was claimed could not be treated as the old municipal corporation under a changed form. Thus, in Tennessee, the city of Memphis, and other municipal corporations, were abolished by legislative act, and in their place a public g'Masi-corporatiou was estab- lished, called " taxing districts," in which were vested most of the original powers of the dissolved municipal corporations. But, at the instance of creditors, it was held that these " taxing districts" were municipal corporations, and as such they in- herited both the liabilities and the rights of property of the de- funct corporation, whose place they were created to take.^ So, also, the city of Mobile was dissolved by the act of the legisla- ture of Alabama, and on the same day,.Avith a diminution of the territory of the old corporation, the Port of Mobile was in- corporated ; and in that port was vested all the public property of the old city and most of its taxable property, while fourteen- fifteenths of the population of the old city were included in the Port. It was held by the United States Supreme Court, that the Port of Mobile was a municipal corporation, and as such 1 State T. Natal, 39 La. An. 439; Girard v. Philadelpliia, 7 Wall. 1. -Walnut Townsliip v. Jordan, 38 Kan. 502; Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266; Milner's Admx. v. Pen- sacola, 2 Woods, 632; Barkley v. Levee Com'rs, 93X1. S. 238. 'Lea V. State, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 478; Luehrman v. Taxing District, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 425; Devereaux v. City of Brownsville, 29 Fed. Rep. 742; O'Con- nor V. Memphis, 6 Lea (Tenn.) 730; Uhl V. Taxing District, 6 Lea (Tenn.) 610; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472; State v. Taxing District of Shelby Co., 10, Lea (Tenn.) 240. 5 Qb §42 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. IV. was the successor of the old city, and became liable as such for the debts of the old city.^ In this case the Supreme Court said : " When the Legislature of a state has given a local com- munity, living within designated boundaries, a municipal or- ganization, and by a subsequent act, or series of acts, repeals its charter and dissolves the corporation, and incorporates substan- tially the same people as a municipal body under a new name for the same general purpose, and the. general mass of the taxa- ble property of the old corporation is included within the limits of the new, and the property of the old corporation used for public purposes is transferred without consideration to the new corporation for the same public uses, the latter, notwithstand- ing a great reduction of its corporate limits, is the successor in law of the former, and liable for its debts ; and if any part of the creditors of the old corporation are left without provision for the payment of their claims, they can enforce satisfaction out of the new." Similar judgments have been rendered in cases of the same sort in other states.^ It has also been held, that if, in the change from the old corporation to the new, the powers of the new corporation have been restricted to a greater degree than the powers of the old corporation, any such new limitation of the corporate powers, so far as the rights of exist- ing creditors are thereby affected, is in violation of the constitu- tional provision, which protects the obligation of contracts from impairment by subsequent legislation.^ 1 Mobile V. Watson, 116 U. S. 289. ^Broughtou V. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266; Devereaux v. City of Browns- ville, 29 Fed. Rep. 742; Laird v. De Soto, 22 Fed. Kep. 421; People v. Murray, 73 N. Y. 535. 8 Owen V. Smith, 31 Barb. 641; Welsh V. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dillon C. C. 130; Beckwith v. Racine, 7 Biss. 142; Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514; Meriwether v. Gar- rett, 102 U. S. 472; Brooklyn v. Smith, 104 111. 429; Memphis v. Bethel, 17 S. W. R. 191; Louisville Bridge Co. v. Louisville, 81 Ky. 189; Barkley v. Levee Commissioners, 93 U. S. 266; Robinson v. Lane, 19 Ga. 337; Muscatine Turnverein v. Funck, 66 18 Iowa, 469; Thompson v. Allen County, 115 U. S. 550; Amy v. Water- town, 130 IT. S. 301; Hopkins v. Whitesides, 1 Head (Tenn.) 31; Bank V. Lockwood, 2 Harring. (Del.) 8; Thompson v. Abbott, 61 Mo. 176; St. Louis Bridge Co. v. East St. Louis, 121 111. 238; State txre. Bridge Co. V. Columbia, 27 S. 0. 137. There ap- pears to be one case in contradiction with this line of authorities, an old case in Mississippi, in which it was held that the repeal of the charter of a municipal corporation extinguish- ed the debts due it from such cor- poration. Port Gibson v. Moore, 13 Sra. & Marsh, 157. CH. IV.] DISSOLUTION OP CORPORATION. § 43 § 43. Effect of dissolution of corporation, where no other corporation has been substituted therefor. — If the Legisla- ture repeals the charter of a municipal corporation, while it is in debt, and makes no provision for the payment of its debts, and does not create any other corporation to take its place, and to exercise the powers of local government, and the administra- tion of the public affairs of the community is assumed by the state government itself, so far as the adjudications up to the present time carry one to any conclusion, it would seem that the courts are practically powerless to protect creditors of the defunct corporation against a total loss of their claims, as long as they find it impossible to secure relief at the hands of the Legislature, which has dissolved the corporation. That is, since the corporation has been extinguished, and in view of the fact, that the creditors of the corporation can only look to the exer- cise, by the municipal corporation or its successors, of the power of taxation for payment of its debts ; and have no claim of satis- faction against the public property of such corporation, or against the private property of its citizens, either before or after dissolution of the corporation ; the assumption of the powers of the local government by the state, in consequence of the disso- lution of the corporation, would seem to bring the exercise of such powers necessarily within the discretion of the state Legis- lature ; and the state government is protected from judicial interference by another provision of the United States Consti- tution.i For this reason, it would seem that there is no judi- cial remedy open to the creditors under these extraordinary circumstances.^ But Judge Dillon ventures the suggestion, that the true solution of these difficulties may possibly be found in the consideration that the power of a municipality to levy taxes to pay its debts, as the power existed at the time when the debts were created, is in its essence not the grant of a power to the incorporated bodj', but to the inhabitants of the incorpo- rated territory, which cannot be taken away by subsequent leg- ' Art. XI. araendment to the Con- stitution. " Barkley v. Levee Com'rs, 93 U. S. 258; Heine v. Levee Com'rs, 19 Wall. 655; Thompson v. Allen Co., 115 IT. S. 550; Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 107; Amy v. Watertown, 130 U. S. 301; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472. 67 § 44 MTTNICIPAL COEPOBATIONS. [CH. IV. islation, as against existing creditors.^ This suggestion of the distinguished author is strictly in line with the fundamental conception of the character and origin of a municipal corpora- tion, viz., that such corporation does not rest for its fundamen- tal existence upon the act of incorporation, but upon its natural existence as a community ; and that the act of incorporation was simply a legislative investment of the community with the franchise of acting as a legal personality and of exercising the powers of local government. It is believed that the adoption of this theory would certainly work no harm to the true inter- ests of the community which has been incorporated, while at the same time it would furnish the means of escaping from the outrageous consequence of a mere technicality of the law. It is, however, so seldom the case that a municipal corporation can be legislated out of existence, without some sort of public corporation being created by the Legislature to take its place, tliat it is not likely that the case can become a common one, § 44. Kevival by a new charter. — It was a rule of the Eng- lish law that, where the charters of an old corporation have been suspended or even dissolved by its loss of members or the loss of an integral part, such dissolved or defunct corporation may be revived by a new charter, and the rights and obligations of the old corporation transferred to a new corporation thus created ; so that, in effect, the new corporation would be noth- ing more than a continuation of the old corporation.^ Inasmuch as the existence of a municipal corporation in this country can only be interfered with by a dissolution of the corporation, the doctrine of revival by the new charter can only be applied here to municipal corporations, in a modified form, in the case where there has been a dissolution of the old corporation and the creation of a new corporation to take its place, which has been already explained in a preceding par- agraph. Certainly, under these circumstances the new corpo- ration is properly described as being no more than a changed form of the old corporation.*^ ' Dillon Muu. Corp. § 173. 141; Eex v. Passmore, 3 Term K. ''Bellows v. Bank, etc., 2 Mason C. 119, 24*7; Eegina v. Bewdley, 1 P- C. 43; Hoffman V. Van Nostrand, 42 Wms. 207; Colchester v. Brooke, 7 Barb. 174; Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 Queen's Bench, 383; Colchester v. Wall. 1 ; Olney v. Harvey, 50 111. Seaber, 3 Burr. 1866. 453 ; Neely v. Torkville, 10 S. C. ^ gee ante, § 42. 68 CHAPTER V. CORPORATE NAJIE, SEAL AND BOUNDARIES. Section. 47 — Corporate name, how ob- tained. 48 — Change of corporate name — Name acquired by reputation. 49 — ^Effect of misnomer in general. 50 — Use of corporate name in suits. 51 — Requirement of a corporate seal. 52 — Seal, how proved. 53 — Boundaries, how defined. 54 — Corporate boundaries by refer- ence to streams and high- ways. 55 — ^Enlargement of boundaries — Annexation of territory. 56 — What territory may be annex- ed — Farm lands. Section. 57 — Effect of extension of city boundaries. 58 — E ff e c t of annexation of one town to another. 59 — Effect of division of one town into two. 60 — Legislative power to apportion property and debts in cases of annexation and division. 61 — Procedure in cases of annexar tiou. When annexation legal. 62 — Exercise of power beyond city limits, only one corporation over same area. 63 — Division of municipal territory into wards. § 47. Corporate name, how obtained — Inasmuch as a cor- poration is an intangible personality, a creature of the law, it, probably more than the natural person, requires a name. With- out a name, the corporation could hardly identify itself, or give any form whatever to its legal personality.^ Ordinarily, the power which creates a corporation gives its name, and where it is created by special charter, the charter contains or prescribes the name. Under the English Municipal Corporation Act of 1838, it is provided that the names of all municipal coiporations in England shall assume a common form, the proper corporate name for boroughs being " mayor, aldermen and burgesses of ," and for cities " mavor, aldermen and citizens of - "2 1 Smith V. Tallahassee Branch of Central Planks Road Co., 30 Ala. 65; Atty. Gen. v. Worcester, 2 Phillips, 3; Lancaster Co. v. Rush, 52 N. W. R. 837; Middlesex H. & M. Soc. v. Davis, 8 Mete. (Mass.) 138; Knight V. Wells, 1 Lord Raym. (Eng.) 80; Physicians v. Salmon, 3 Salk. (Eng.) 102; No. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Walker, 47 Fed. R. 681; Dutchess Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 238; 7 Am. Dec. 459; Gostin v. State, (Ga. 92) 15 S. E. R. 361 ; Trustees v. Peaslee, 15 N. H. 317. 2 Atty. Gen. v. Worcester, 2 Phil. 3; Rochester v. Lee, 15 Sim. 376. 69 §48 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. V. In this country, where municipal corporations are very often created under general acts, provision is made under these cor- poration acts for the adoption by the municipality itself of a name; but all are required, as in the English corporation act, to conform to the general form, as the city or tovim of . The form prescribed by these general acts is noted to be different from the English form, in that it is the city or town which is incorporated, and not the mayor, aldermen and citizens, form- ing integral parts of the corporation ; the community is incor- porated, and not any particular individuals of that community. The corporate name of a city, which appears in a special act or charter, will with the charter itself be judicially noticed by the courts, and special proof of the same would not be required in any suit, where that fact was required to be established. But where the city is organized under a general act, and the name is selected by the community, it would have to be ex- pressly proven ; for the court would not take judicial notice of the selection of a name by the community.^ § 48. Change of corporate name — Name acquired by rep- utation. — While it is unquestionably the rule of law, notwith- standing the popular or general impression to the contrary ,2 that a natural person has the right at anytime, without the consent or ratification of the Legislature, to adopt any name he pleases, and to be known by such name, instead of by the baptismal name, as long as the change of name has not been made for fraudulent or illegal purposes ; ^ it seems that the same princi- 1 Douglas V. Bank, 19 Ala. 659; Stroudsbuig v. Brown, (Pa. 92) 11 Pa. Co. Ct. 272; Linck v. Litchfield, 31 N. E. E. 123 ( Mass. 92 ) ; Johnson V. Indianapolis, 16 Ind. 227; Kansas etc. Co. V. Burge, 40 Kan. 736; Marx V. Croison, 17 Or. 393; Pittsburgh v. Craft, 1 Pitts. (Pa.) 158; Pendleton V. Bank of Kentucky, 1 Mon. 177; Med way v. Adams, 10 Mass. 360; Trammell v. State, 93 Ala. 388; Bow- er V. State Bank, .5 Ark. 234; Pierce V. Somerworth, 10 N". H. 369; Neely V. Yorkville, 10 S. C. 141; State v. Cooper, 101 N. C. 684; Kentucky Seminary v. Wallace, 15 B. Mon. 35 ; 70 People v. Love, 19 Cal. 676; African Society v. Varick, 13 Johns. 38. 2 Even Judge Dillon appears to en- tertain the contrary impression, as is manifest by the following quota- tion: " If a particular name be given to a corporation in its charter, the corporation can no more change it at its pleasure than a man can at pleasure change his baptismal name." Dillon Mun. Corp., vol. 1, sec. 175. 8 England v. New York Publishing Co., 8 Daly ( N. T.) 375; Hygeia W. I. Co. v. N. T. Hyg. I. Co., 19 N. Y. 602 ; Bell v. Sun Printing Co., 42 N. Y. CH. v.] CORPOBATE NAME. §48 pie cannot be applied to municipal corporations, if it is possible to apply it to any kind of corporation. From the fact that a cor- poration is a creature of a legislative act, and has no tangible ex- istence as a legal personality, outside of the act of incorporation, the legal name acquired by the act of the Legislature is deemed to be beyond the power of change by the municipal corpora- tion without legislative action.^ And even where the Legisla- ture, in a subsequent act, applies a second or different name to the corporation, it is held that there is necessarily a repeal of the first name given to it by the Legislature ; it is said that a corporation cannot have two legal names.^ But, notwithstand- ing this general doctrine, it has been held, that where quasi 'public corporations are created by legislative act, without any provision for giving to the particular corporation a distinct or formal name, such corporation may acquire a name by reputa- tion, as in the case of natural persons, and sue and be sued by such name.^ Super. Ct. 567; Snook, 2 Hilt. (K Y.) 566. In Doe v. Yates, 5 Barn. & Aid. 544, Abbott, C. J., said: " A name assumed by the voluntary act of a young man at his outset in life, adopted by all who know him, and by which he is constantly called, be- comes, for all the purposes that occur to my friend, as much and effectually his name as if he had ob- tained an act of Parliament to con- fer it on him." " No person is bound to accept his patronymic as a sur- name, nor his Christian name as a given name, though the custom to do so is almost univers.al among English speaking people, who have inherited the common law.'' Biddle, J., in Scofield v. Jennings, 68 Ind. 233. iJn re Mer. Eep. Co., 115 X. Y. 176; Episcopal etc. Society v. Epis- copal Church, 1 Pick. 372; Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1; In re. East Stroudsburg, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 529. ^Eeesv. Newport etc. Co., 32 W. Va. 164; Physicians v. Salmon, 3 Salk. (Eng.) 102; Atty. Gen. v. Wor- cester, 2 Phillips, 25; Smith v. Tal- lahassee Branch, 30 Ala. 650; Manu- facturing Co. V. Davis, 14 Johns. 238; Society etc. v. Young, 2 N. H. 310; Trustees v. Peaslee; 15 N. H. 317; Dutchess Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 238; 7 Am. Dec. 450; Haselton B. Co. v. Hazelton T. B. Co., 30 N. E. R. 339; Atty. Gen. v. Corporation of Leicester, 9 Beav. (Eng.) 546; Middlesex, etc., v. Da- vis, 3 Met. (Mass.) 133; Trustees v. Peaslee, 15 N. Bt. 317; State v. Coo- per, 101 K. C. 684; Society of Mid- dlesex H. & M. Soo. V. Davis, Met. (Mass.) 133; All Saints Church v. Lovett, 1 Hall (N. Y.) 191; Knight v. Wells, 1 Ld. Eaym. 80. 8 King V. Norris, 1 Ld. Kaym. 337; The Queen v. Bailiffs of Ipswich, 2 Ld. Raym. 1232, 1238, 1239; School District v. Blakeslee, 13 Conn. 227. Use of names by corporations, see 32 Am. &Eng. Corp. Cases, 22; Epis- copal Society v. Episcopal Church, 1 Pick. 372. 71 §49 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. V. § 49. Effect of misnomer in general — While it has been generally held that a name is necessary to the existence of a corporation, as a means of identifying the corporation, and distinguishing it from other persons in the various relations of life ; ^ yet the identification of the corporation is the important element of the requirement.'-' Hence it is that, as a general rule, any variation from the true legal name of a corporation in grants and bequests to such corporation, will not have the effect of viti- ating or invalidating such grant or bequest, on account of the uncertainty of the grantee or donee, as long as the variation or misnomer is not so pronounced as to make it impossible to iden- tify the corporation.^ Thus, it has been held that, vy^here in a 1 Middlesex H. & M. Soc. v. Davis, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 133; Knight v. Wells, 1 Lord Eyan. (Eng.) 80; Corp. of Rochester v. Lee, 15 Sim. (Eng.) 376; Dillon, Mun. Corp., sees. 175-6; Dutchess Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 14 Johns. (N. T.) 238; 7 Am. Dec. 459; Physi- cians V. Salmon, 3 Salk. (Eng.) 102; Atty. Gen. v. Worcester, 2 Philips, 3. 2 Wetmore v. Institution, 3 N. T. S. 179; Keely v. Torkville, 10 S. Car. 141 ; Pierce v. Somerworth, 10 N. H. 369; Atty. Gen. v. Kerr, 2 Beav.420; St. Louis Hospital v. Williams, 19 Mo. 609; Andrews v. Dyer, 81 Me. 104; Bristol v. Ontario, 60 Conn. 472; ]n re Pepper, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. 257; Peo- ple V. Love, 19 Cal. 676; Kentucky Seminary v. Wallace, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 35; Milford etc. Co. v. Brush, 10 Ohio, 111; 36 Am. Dec. 78; Med- way Mfg. Co. v. Adams, 10 Mass. 360; Inhabitants v. String, 10 N. J. L. 323; Kimball V. Chapel, 27 Ab. N. C. 437; Faulkner v. Home, 29 N. E. 645 (Mass. 92) ; Bellows v. Hallowell etc. Bank, 2 Mason (U. S.) 43; Hoff- man V. Van Nostrand, 42 Barb. (IST. Y.) 174; Whitby v. Harrison, 18 Up.' Can. Q. B. 603; Bruce v. Cromar, 22 Up. Can. Q. B. 321; Douglas v. Branch Bank, 19 Ala. 659; Bower v. State Bank, 5 Ark. 234. 8 Wakefield v. Brown, 38 Minn. 75 361; 37 N. W. R. 788; Morris v. State, 84 Ala. 446; 4 So. R. 628; Wood V. Hammond, (R. I. 88) 17 Atl. E. 324; In re Look, 1 Con. Sur. 403; Neely v. Torkville, 10 S. Car. 141; Berks Co. Turnpike Road Co. V. Myers, 6 S. & R. (Pa.) 12; 9 Am. Dec. 402; People v. Love, 19 Cal. 676; African Society v. Varick, 13 Johns. 38; Chapin v. School Distiict in Winchester, 35 N. H. 445 ; People V. Runkle, 9 Johns. (N. T.) 147; Bi- ker V. Leo, 115 N. Y. 93; Pittsburgh V. Craft, 1 Pitts. (Pa.) 158; Douglass V. Branch Bank etc., 19 Ala. 659; Sutton V. Cole, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 232; Kew York Institute v. How, 10 N. Y. 84; Centenary M. E. Ch. v. Par- ker, 43 N. J. Bq. 307; 12 Atl. E. 142; Vausant v. Roberts, 3 Md. 119; Mi- not V. Boston Asylum, 7 Meto. (Mass.) 416; Bodman v. American Soc, 9 Allen (Mass.) 447; Neely v. York- ville, 10 S. C. 141; Kentucky Semi- nary V. Wallace, 15 B. Mon. 35; Pen- dleton v. Bank, 1 Mon. 177; Faulkner V. Nat. Sailors' Home, (Mass. 92) 29 N. E. E. 645; N. Y. Conference v. Clarkson, 4 Halst. Ch. (N. J.) 541; Preacher's Aid Soc. v. Eich, 45 Me. 552; Chappell v. Missionary Society, (Ind. 92) 29 N. E. E. 624; Pierce v. Somerworth, 10 N. H. 369; Camden v. Clerke, Hobart (Eng.) 32; Atty. CH. v.] CORPORATE NAME. §50 devise to a town the popular name of " South Parish in Sutton " was used instead of the lawful name " The -first Parish in Sut- ton," notwithstanding the variation, the devise was valid.i And so, likewise, a devise was sustained, which was made to the " Right Worshipful Jurats and General Council of the Town of Rye ; " whereas its legal corporate name was " the Mayor, Jurats and Commonalty of the Town of Rye." ^ A devise has often been held to be valid, although it be made to a corpora- tion which is described instead of being named, as long as the description is sufficient to identify whicli corporation was in- tended to be the recipient of the gift.^ § 50. Use of corporate name in siiits. — But the requirement of a strict conformity with the legal provision for a name is more strictly enforced, and the necessity for it is greater, in the case of suits, than where the name is employed in grants to, or contracts with, the corporation. A misnomer of a substantial character in the pleadings would be the subject for demurrer ; but, in these days, the opportunity for frequent amendments of the pleadings would deprive the misnomer in a suit of its important consequences. But a misnomer in a suit is fatal to the suit, as long as it is not corrected.* Where a corporation's Gen. V. Mayor of Rye, 7 Taunt. (Eng.) 546; St. Louis Hospital v. Williams, 19 Mo. 609; Kimball v. Chappell, 18 N. Y. S. 30; 27 A. K. C. 437; Crydou Hospital v. Farley, 6 Tauat. (Eng.) 467; The King v. Croke, Cowp. (Eng.) 29; Goodwyn and Railway Co., In re, 13 U. C. C. P. 254; Bristol v. Ontario Orph. Asy- lum, 60 Conn. 472; Bower v. State Bank, 5 Ark. 234; Milford etc. Co. V. Brush, 10 Ohio, 111; 36 Am. Deo. 78; In re Pepper's Estate, 1 Pa. Dist. 148; Beverly v. Barlow, 10 U. C. C. P. 178; Mayor and Burgesses etc., 10 Coke, 120. Chancellor Kent says: "The general rule to be collected from the cases is, that a variation from the precise name of the corpo- ration, when the true name is neces- sarily to be collected from the instru- ment, or is shown by proper aver- ments, will not invalidate a grant by or to a corporation, or a contract Vith it, and the modern cases show an increased liberality on this sub- ject." 2 Kent Com. 292. 1 First Parish in Sutton v. Cole, 3 Pick. 232. - Attorney General v. Mayor of Rye, 7 Taunton, 546; 2 Eng. Com. Law, 213. 8 Trustees v. Peaslee, 15 IST. H. 317; Bodman v. American Tract Society, 9 Allen, 447; Vansant v. Roberts, 3 Md. 119; Preacher's Aid Society, 45 Me. 552 ; New York Institute v. How, 10 N. Y. (6 Seld.) 84. See Tiedeman on Wills, chapter xvi. * Seminary v. Wallace, 15 B. Mon. 35 ; County v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175 ; Romeo v. Chapman, 2 Mich. 179; Carder v. Com'rs, 16 Ohio St. 353; Insane Asylum v. Higgins, 15 111. 185 ; Porter v. Blakely, 1 Root (Conn.) 440; Trustees v. Campbell, 16 Ohio 73 §15 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. U. name has been changed by law, without any change in the identity of the corporation, suits should ordinarily be institut- ed in the new name, although the subject-matter of the suit, the contract or grant, was made in the old name, provided the change from the old name to the new one is proven in the prop- er form in the suit, in order to connect the corporation suing or sued with the corporation named in the grant or contract.^ And this is likewise the rule, where, in a grant or contract, a different name has been employed to designate the corporation. The corporation would be compelled to sue in its lawful name on such a contract or conveyance, and would establish its right to maintain the suit, by proving that it was intended un- der the name emplo3'^ed in the contract or conveyance.^ § 51. Requirement of a cprporate seal. — The charter of municipal corporations, and, likewise, the general corporation act, usually provides that the corporation shall have and use a common seal ; and the authority is ordinarily given to the corporation to select its own seal, and to change it at pleasure. But the express grant of the authority to have a seal is not necessary ; the power would be implied, in the absence of such an express grant. But, in any case, the corporation need not have a formal seal, which they must use on all occasions. Any seal, in the absence of a formal seal, would be a good seal for the corporation, which is authoritatively affixed to the instrument and declared to be a corporate seal, although it has not been formally or regularly adopted as the seal of the corporation.^ St. 11; Cambridge University v. Crofts, 10 Mod. 208; Berks Co. etc. V. Myers, 6 Serg. & Eawle (Pa.) 12; Bvittan v. Newland, 2 Dev. & Bat. (N. G.) 363. ' Fort Wayne v. Jackson, 1 Blackf . (Ind.) 36; Colcliester v. Seaber, 3 Burr. 1866; Kegina v. Ipswicli, 2 Ld. Eaym. 1232, 1238. -'10 Co. 12.5 6; Underbill v. Santa Barbara etc. Co., 93 Cal. 300; Trus- tees V. Reneau, 2 Swan (Tenn.); Fort Wayne v. Jackson, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 36; Young v. Com'rs, 53 Fed. 895. Armfield v. Solon, 19 N. Y. S. 44; Solon V. Williamsburg Bank, 114 N. Y. 122; Koehler v. Black E. Falls 74 Iron Co., 2 Black (U. S.) 715; Stock- ton V. Powell, (Fla. 92) 10 So. K. 688; City Council v. Mooreliead, 2 Eich. Law, 430; Porter v. Eailroad Co., 37 Me. 349; Ruffner v. Welton C. & S. Co., (W. Va. 92) 15 S. E. R. 48; Bank of Middlesex v. Rutland R. Co., 30 Vt. 159; Tenney v. East Warren Lumber Co., 43 N. H. 343; Mill Dam Foundry v. Hovey, 21 Pick. 417; Stebbins v. Merritt, 10 Cusli. 27; Por- ter V. Androscoggin etc. R. Co., 37 Me. 349; Gordon v. Diego, (Cal. 93) 35 Pac. 885 ; Gary Lumber Co. Y. Cain, (Miss. 93) 13 So. 239; Tetig v. Ross- man, 12 Mont. 404. CH. V.J COEPOEATE SEAL. §51 The common law seal required an impression to be made in wax upon the paper ; but it is probably true everywhere in this country, that corporations like private individuals are not requir- ed to employ the common law seals, where seals are required at all ; but that any impression upon the paper, either by a stamp or by a pen, would be a sufficient seal. Certainly, this is the rule in regard to private individuals ; and it is unquestionably the law in regard to municipal corporations, that the employ- ment of wax is not required, but that the impression stamped into the paper is sufficient corporate seal.^ But in order that any sealing of the instrument may be binding upon a corpora- tion, whether the. regular or temporary seal is employed, the seal must have been affixed by an officer, who is legally au- thorized to bind the corporation by such act.^ The common law rule was, that a corporation could not perform any legal binding act, except under seal ; and that a parol contract, entered into in the name of the corporation, would not be binding upon the corporation, but only upon the officers, who executed or made such a contract. The mod- ern rule is, however, very different from this. Instead of hold- ing that a parol contract is not binding upon a corporation, the contrary rule has been established almost everywhere, re- lating both to municipal, as well as private, corporations, that the corporation is required to make use of its seal, in the execu- tion of legal instruments, only where the natural person would likewise be required to do so. As Judge Story has said: "Where a corporation is acting within the scope of the legiti- mate purposes of its institution, all parol contracts made by its authorized agents are express promises of the corporation ; and all duties imposed on them by law, and all benefits conferred at their request, raise implied promises, for the enforcement of which an action lies."^ But it has been held in some in- 1 Hendee v. Pinkerton, 14 Allen, 381; comp. Solon v. Williamsburg, 114 K Y. 122. 2 Koehler v. Iron Co., 2 Black, 715 ; Bank of Ireland v. Evans, 32 Eng. Law & Eq. 23. SeeTiedeman's Pri- vate Corporations for a fuller cita^ tion of cases. 2 Bank of Columbia v. Patterson 7 Cranch, 299; Over v. Greenfield, 107 Ind. 231 ; Bank of United States V. Danbridge, First N. Bk. v. Salem etc. Co., 39 Fed. 89; Clark v. Farm- ers' etc. Co., 13 Wend. 256; lb. 265; Cicotte V. Cburcb, 60 Mich. 532; Ber- nardiu v. No. Dufferni, 19 Can. S. C. R. 581 ; Sturtevant v. Alton,3 McLean, 393; Davenport v. Insurance Co., 17 75 r,«? MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. V. Stances, as in Iowa and Illinois, that a corporate seal is essen- tial to the validity of a legal instrument when executed by the municipal or public corporation.^ It has also been held that a corporation can appoint its agents by a parol act, and the appointment need not be made under seal.^ § 52. Seal, how proTCd — A seal of a private corporation unquestionably does not prove itself ; but 'the fact, that it is the seal of a particular corporation, must be proven by proper evidence.^ In this country, this is probably the case, likewise, with municipal corporations, except where the laws of the state provide otherwise. But it seems that, in England, the corpo- rate seals of old cities, like London or Edinburgh, have been de- clared to be the subject of judicial notice of the courts, on account of their great antiquity.* But where a legal instru- ment contains what purports to be a corporate seal, and the corporate character of the seal and conveyance is confirmed by the signatures of proper officers, it is held that the presence of Iowa, ilG; Lesesne v. White, 1 Spears (S. Car.) 31; State Board of Education v. Aberdeen, 56 Miss. 538; Shrewsbury v. Brown, 25 Vt. 197; Gassett v. Audover, 21 Vt. 342; Adams v. Farnsworth,15 Gray(Mass.) 423; Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cow. (jST. T.) 513; 13 Am. Eep. 550; Eandall v. Van Vechten, 19 Johns. (N. T.) 60; 10 Am. Deo. 193; Wayne County v. Detroit, 1*7 Mich. 390; American Ins. Co. V. Oakley, 9 Paige (N. T.) 49; 38 Am. Dec. 561 ; Canaan y. Derush, 47 3Sr. H. 211; Lebanon v. Heath, 47 N. H. 353 ; Magill v. KaufCman, 4 S. & R (Pa.) 317; 8 Am. Dec. 713; Dunn v. Rector etc. of St. Andi-ews Church, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 118; Danforth v. Sclioharie etc. Turnpike Co., 12 Johns. ; Perkins v. Washington Ins. Co., 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 645; Sanford V. Tremlett, 42 Mo. 384; Legrand v. Sidney College, 5 Munf. (Va.) 324; Peterson v. Mayor etc. of N. Y., 17 N. Y. 449; Maher v. Chicago, 38 111. 266; Frankfort Bridge Co. v. Frank- 76 fort, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 41; Kenzie v. Chicago, 2 Scam. (111.) 188; 33 Am. Dec. 443 ; Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex. 532; 32 Am. Eep. 637; Dunlap v. Water Com'rs of Erie, 25 Atl. E. 60; 151 Pa. St. 477; 31 W. N. C. 231. 1 In the lo wa, case it is the county warrant; Smeltzer v. White, 92 TJ. S. 390 ; Prescott v. Gouser, 34 Iowa, 178; Springer v. Clay Co., 35 Iowa, 243; and in Illinois it is a lease; Kinzie V. Chicago, 2 Scam. (111.) 188. ^ See Tiedeman on Private Cor- porations for citations of authori- ties. 8 Moises V. Thornton, 8 Term E. 303; City Council v. Moorehead, 2 Eich. (S. C.) Law, 430; Gilbert Ev. 19; Jackson v. Pratt, 10 Johns. 381; Fosterv. Shaw, 7Serg. & Eawle(Pa.) 163; Id. 318; Den v. Vreelandt, 2 Halst. (N. J.) 352; Mann v. Pentz, 2 Sandf. Ch. 257; Com. v. Dunlop, (Va. 93) 16 S. E. E. 273, (state seal.) * Den V. Vreelandt, 2 Halst. (N. J.) 352. CH. v.] COEPOEATE BOUNDAEIES. §53 the corporate seal is thereby established by prima facie evidence, although it is insufficient to support the conclusion that the seal was lawfully placed there, and that the instrument is an act binding upon the corporation.^ § 53. Boundaries, how defined. — It is required, in order to make a valid municipal corporation, that its boundaries should be definite and certain. Uncertainty in regard to the boundary has so many important consequences in its train, that there cannot be a valid incorporation, as long as this uncertainty has not been cured.'-' Thus, for example, the boundaries of a town were held to be uncertain and insufficient, where it was describ- ed in these words : " Commencing with Samuel Hall, thence to William Scales, also including John W. Dana, Jason and Warren Britt, and Thomas Lyford." ^ But where the state laws provide that boards of supervisors should lay out the town, in accord with the general description of the proposed town which is contained in the certificate, the subsequent establish- ment of the boundaries by the supervisors M'ould cure the un- certainty arising in the description of the town, as contained in the certificate.* Whenever there is a dispute in regard to bound- aries, a subsequent acquiescence on the part of the people of the community, and of the state authorities, in the adoption of a particular boundary as a settlement of the dispute, will be binding upon the parties concerned, and would operate to cure the original defect in the boundary.^ These boundaries are originally described or set out in the charter of the corporation in connection with some method, wliich is prescribed in the charter, or in the general incorporation act, for subsequently setting out and ascertaining such boundaries. The Legislature has invested in itself as a matter of course, in the first instance. ' Fidelity etc. Co. v. Shenandoah etc. Co., 32 W. Va. 244; Bi-ennan v. Weatherford, 53 Tex. 330; 37 Am. Rep. 758; Levering v. Mayor, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 553; Mempliis v. Adams, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 518; Musser V. Johnson, 42 Mo. 74; 97 Am. Dec. 316. 2 Enterprize v. State, 10 So. K. 740; House V. Greenburg, 94 Ind. 533; San Diego v. Granniss, 77 Cal. 510; Plantation No. 9 v. Bean, 40 Me. 218 ; Guebelle v. Epley, 28Pac. 89; Pierce V. Carpenter, 10 Vt. 480; Douglas v. Town of Harrisville, 9 W. Va. 102. 3 Cutting V. Stone, 7 Vt. 471. * People V. Carpenter, 24 jST. T. 86. ^ Omaha v. So. Omaha, 47 N. W. R. 1113; Strosser v. Ft. Wayne, 100 Ind. 443; Hamilton v. McNeil, 13 Gratt. 389; People v. Farnham, 35 111.562; Milne v. Mayor, 13 La. An. 69. 77 § 53 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. V. the power to determine the geographical limits of a municipal corporation ; and in the absence of any constitutional limita- tions, the power of the Legislature in this regard is unlimited, and no objection can be made to any actual setting out of boundaries by the Legislature.^ The fact, that the existing cities and towns are mentioned by name in a constitution subse- quently adopted, does not give to the boundaries of such cor- porations such a fixity, as would deny to the Legislature the power to subsequently change them.^ It is a legislative ques- tion, and not a judicial question, where the boundaries of a municipal corporation should be fixed by the Legislature. Tiie legislative discretion can in no wise be interfered with .or con- trolled by the courts.^ In the general incorporation acts, pro- vision is made for the boundaries being set out by some one, other than the Legislature, and the constitutional question is raised whether the Legislature has the power to delegate its au- thoritj'- to fix the boundaries of a proposed municipal corpora- tion, the authorities reaching conflicting conclusions. Thus, it has been held that the power to fix and determine upon the boundaries of a municipal corporation maybe delegated to a court, a County Court, for example.* On the other hand, it has been held, that a Legislature has not the power to delegate ' Rome V. Anderson, 89 Tenn. 259; Norris v. Mayor etc. of Smythville, 1 Swan (Tenn.) 164; McCollie v. Mayor of Cliattanooga, 3 Head. (Tenn.) 317; In re Boundary (Pa. 92), 23 Atl. R. 1041; Pool v. Brown, 98 Mo. 675 ; Washburn v. Oshkosh, 60 Wis. 453; SuflBeld v. Town of East Granby, 52 Conn. 175 ; Union v. Knox Co., 90 Tenn. 541; People v. Nevada, Col. 143; People v. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451; 18 Am. Rep. 107; St. Louis V. Eussel, 9 Mo. 507 ;• Atchison etc. R. Co. V. Maquilkin, 12 Kan. 301; St. Louis V. Allen, 13 Mo. 400; Stone V. Flournoy, 28 La. An. 850; Little Rock V. Parish, 36 Ark. 166; Stilz V. Indianapolis, 55 Ind. 515 ; Wiley V. Bluffton, 111 Ind. 152; Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss. 53; 24 Am. Rep. 661; Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 111. 152 ; 78 Wade V. Richmond, 18 Gratt. (Va.) 583. 2 Wade V. Richmond, swpra. = Little Rock v. Parish, 36 Ark. 166; Galesburg V. Hawkinson, 75 111. 152; Wiley v. Bluffton, 111 Ind. 152. * State V. Pooaletto, 28 Pac. R. 411; People V. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451; 29 Am. Rep. 107; In re Boundary Line of Townships (Pa. 92), 23 Atl. 1041; Appeal of Singer (Pa.), 18 Atl. Rep. 931; Burlington v. Leebrick,43 Iowa, 252; Board of Education v. Board of Education, 30 W. Va. 424; 20 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 11 (di- vision of school district) : Town o£ Suffield V. Town of East Granby, 52 Conn. 175; 9 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 1 ; Kayser v. Trustees etc. of Brenen, 16 Mo. 88. CH. v.] COEPOEATE BOUNDAEIES. §54 its right to afSx boundaries to any court whatever, on the ground that it is a legislative authority, and not a branch of the judicial power.^ It is clearly impossible for the Legislature to delegate the power of fixing boundaries to private citizens, or to a private board.^ But it is, on tUe other hand, very gen- erally held that the power of fixing and determining upon the boundaries of a municipal corporation may be delegated to local bodies or boards, representing the municipal corporation.^ § 54. Corporate boundaries by reference to streams and highways. — Generally, where reasonable care is employed in the fixing of boundaries, no difficulty is experienced in their actual location, because the reference is made to well known objects or monuments, or the boundary is described by metes and bounds.* But where a city or town is described as being bounded by a river, it is often difficult to ascertain, apart from the actual inquiry into facts of the particular case, where the boundary line is ; i. e., whether it is at the center of the stream, or at the high-water or low-water mark, on the one side or the other of the stream. In all such cases, either the description contained in the charter, or act of incorporation, would deter- mine the answer in the particular case, or it is determined by the local usage or custom. The general rule is that, where towns are bounded by rivers which are not navigable, the cen- ter of the stream will be the boundary line.^ And the same rule determines the boundary line, where the town is bounded iWillett V. Belville, 11 Lea (Tenn.) 1; City of Galesburg v. Hawkiuson, 75 111. 152. 2 Town of Suffleld v. Town of East Granby, 52 Conn. 175 ; Eulis v. Mc- Adams, 7 S. E. E. 725; People v. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451 ; 18 Am. Eep. 107. a Ewing v. State, (Tex. 91) Ifi S. W. E. 872; Fisher v. San Diego, 86 Gal. 158; 24 Pao. E. 1000; People v. Car- penter, 24 N. Y. 86; Osgood v. Clark, 6 Frost (N. H.) 307; People v. Ben- nett, 29 Mich. 451; Blanchard v. Bis- sell, 11 Ohio St. 96; Borough of Blooming Valley, lb. 66; Kelly v. Meeks, 87 Mo. 396; Stilz v. Indian- apolis, 55 Ind. 515; Devore's Appeal, 56 Pa. St. 163; People v. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451. ■■ Elmendorf v. Mayor, etc., 25 Wend. 693 ; Hamilton v. McjSTeil, 13 Gratt. (Va.) 389; Raab v. Maryland, 7 Md. 483; Gray v. Sheldon, 8 Vt. 402; Pierce v. Carpenter, 10 Vt. 480; Hollenbeck v. Sykes, 29 Pac. 380; People V. Carpenter, 24 N. Y. 86. 5 Smith V. Skagit Co., 45 Fed. E. 725; /re re Spier, 3 N. Y. S. 438; Cold Spring etc. v. Tolland, 9 Cush. 492; State V. Canterbury, 8 Fost. (28 N. H. ) 195; State v. Gilmanton, 14 jST. H. 467; Flynn v. Boston, (Mass. 92) 26 N. E. E. 868 ; Galesburg v. Hawkin- son, 75 111. 156; Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78; People v. Supervisors, 79 §54 MUNICIPAL COEPOUATIONS. [CH. by a road ; the center line being the boundary .^ This is, ordi-, narily, the rule also, where the monument of boundary is a navigable stream. The boundary line would ordinarily be the center line of the river. But in particular cases, this general rule is controlled by local settlements of boundary, in opposition to its principle. Thus, the boundary line of the city of Brook- lyn extends, for police purposes, to the low-water line on its own side of the East river ; and the boundary line of New York city coveis the entire East river up to the low-water hne on the Long Island and Brooklyn shore.^ The boundary of the city of Philadelphia extends to the high-water mark on the New Jersey shore of the Delaware river, in accordance with the agreement entered into by the States of Pennsylvania and New Jersey.* On the other baud, the city of St. Louis is de- cided to have jurisdiction over the Mississippi river to the middle of the stream, and not merely to the western shore.* Generally, in Pennsylvania, it is held that, where a municipal corporation is bounded by a navigable stream, its jurisdiction will extend to the low-water mark.*' Inasmuch as the stream is constantly changing its channel, the boundary line of a town which is bounded by such stream, is necessarily shifting with the natural and artificial changes, which are made in the shore, and in the movement of such stream." But the fact that the jurisdiction of a town extends over navigable waters, does not give to the city any title to the land, which is covered by such water. It simply confers upon the corporation the governmen- tal control of such territory.^ 17 K. E. E. 147; Hoyt v. Mayor, 9 Weud. 602 ; Granger v. Avery, 64 Me. ii92; Cold water v. Tucker, 36 Mich. 474; 24 Am. Kep. 601; Gould v. Eoohester, 105 N". T. 46; Bechtel v. Village of Edgewater, 45 Hun (N. Y.) 245; Pleasant v. Kost, 29 111. 490; Neal V. Com., 17 S. & K. (Pa.) 67; Gouverneur v. National Ice Co., 134 N. Y. 355. 1 State V. Thomaston, 74 Me. 198; In re Flick, (Pa. 92) 6 Gulp. 329. 2 Palmer v. Hicks, 6 Johns. 133; Furman Street, 17 Wend. 649, 661 ; Udall V. Trustees, 19 Johns. 179; Luke V. Brooklyn, 43 Biib. (N. Y.) 54. 80 "Neal V. Com., 17 S. & K. 67; Gould V. Rochester, 105 IST. Y. 46; Coldwater v. Tucker, 36 Mich. 474. * Jones V. Souland, 24 How. 41. 6 Gilchrist's App., 109 Pa. St. 600. « Pleasant v. Kost, 29 111. 490. ' Palmer v. Hicks, 6 Johns, 133. As to the statutory duty of munici- pal coi'porations, in the control and support of bridges constructed be- tween the towns on opposite banks of the stream, see Brookline v. Westr minster, 4 Vt. 224; Granby v. Thurs- ton, 23 Conn. 416, and post, §316; Tebo V. City of Brooklyn, 31 N. E. R. 984; 134X. Y.341. CH. v.] COllPOBATK BOUKDARIES. §55 § 55. Enlargement of boundaries — Annexation of terri- tory. — ^Not only may the Legislature, in the act of incorporation, fix and determine upon the territorial limits of such corporation, but unless the power is restrained in any way through special constitutional limitations, the Legislature may, likewise, after a creation of the corporation, extend its boundaries, and thereby annex land contiguous to the original territory, but which prior tiiereto was outside of the municipal corporation.^ In some of the states, constitutional provisions have been adopted, looking towards the limitation of the power of the Legislature, and in- tended in most instances to avoid the arbitrary and injurious exercise of the power, but not in any case taking away the power altogether. Thus, while, independently of limitations or statutes requiring the same, the enlargement of the territory of a corporation, and the annexation of contiguous land, can be done, notwithstanding the remonstrance of such contiguous territory ; yet, in some cases, the constitution of the state re- quires that the consent of the inhabitants of such contiguous territory should first be obtained.^ The consent of the inhabit- ants of the contiguous territory is frequently required by stat- ute, as a condition precedent to the annexation of this territory.^ The Missouri Act of 1841, which extended the limits of the city 1 Emporia v. Smith (Kan. 92), 22 Pac. E. 616; Warren v. Mayor etc. of Charlestown, 2 Gray (Mass.) 84; Omaha v. So. Omaha, 47 N. W. K. 1113; Maddrey v. Cox, 73 Tex. 538; Glover v. Terre Haute, 129 Ind.-593; State V. Waxahaohie, 81 Tex. 626; Smith V. McCarthy, 56 Pa. St. 359; Chandler v. Boston, 112 Mass. 200; Giboney v. Cape Girardeau Co., 58 Mo. 141; Woods v. Henry, 55 Mo. 560; Gunter v. Fayetteville, 19 S. W. E. 577; People v. Oakland, 92 Cal. 611 ; State v. New Whatcom, 3 Wash. St. 7; Gottschalk v. Becher, 32 Neb. 053; Powers v. Wood Co., 8 Ohio St. 286; United States v. Memphis, 97 U. S. 284; Stoner v. Flournoy, 28 La. An. 850; People v. Bradley, 36 Mich. 447; Covington v. East St. Louis, 78 111. 548; Daly v. Morgan, 69 Md. 460; 23 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 554; Smith 6 V. Mayor etc. of Saginaw (Mich. 1890), 45 N. W. Kep. 964; Blanchard v. Bis- sell, 11 Ohio St. 96; Succession of Teaulet, 28 La. An. 42; Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss. 53; 24 Am. Eep. 661. 2 Hartington v. Luge, 50 N. W. R. 957; Opinion of Justices, 6 Gush. 580; Wahoo V. Dickinson, 36 N. W. K. 813; Daly v. Morgan, 69 Md. 460;, 23 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 454; Chand- ler V. Boston, 112 Mass. 200. 8 Sum V. Bowie, (Tex. 92) 18 S. W. E. 142; Daly v. Morgan, 69 Md. 460; 23 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 454; North Springfield v. Village (111. 92), 29 N. E. E. 849; Strosser v. Fort Wayne, 100 Ind. 443; In re Sadler (Pa. 90), 23 Atl. E. 978; Stone v. Charlestown, 114 Mass. 214; East Dannas v. State, 73 Tex. 371; Topeka v. Gillett, 32 Kan. 431 ; Hyde Park v. Chicago, 16 N. E. 222. 81 §65 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. V. of St. Louis, provided that the act should become absolute, upon an acceptance of the same by a majority of the aitizens of the territory, which was included in the charter as amended. And it was held that this provision of the statute required that the majority of the people, living within the extended boundaries of the city, should consent to the ex-tension of the city limits ; and that the act would under those circumstances take effect, even though the parties living outside of the existing city limits were more or less unanimous in their opposition to the exten- sion of the city boundaries, and the inclosure of their territory within such boundaries. -"^ It is also a constitutional requirement, in some of the states, that the extension of the boundaries of the city or town, by the annexation of contiguous territory, should not be done, so as to interfere with the boundaiies of elective representative districts, at a time when it is impossible for a change to be made, under the provisions of the constitution, in the boundaries of these repre- sentative districts.^ But it has been held that the Illinois constitutional provision, which limits the extent of municipal indebtedness, does not make the union of two municipalities into one invalid, because the joint indebtedness of the two corporations would exceed the constitutional limit of indebtedness.^ And it is no constitu- tional objection to the exercise of the power of compulsory an- nexation of territory to an already existing corporation, and the consequent enlargement of its boundaries, that the existing cor- poration has a large indebtedness hanging over it, which would necessitate the increase of the rate of taxation upon the terri- tory, which has thus been added to the city limits. In the absence of a special constitutional provision prohibiting, or otherwise providing for, the exercise of this power, the discre- tion of the Legislature is unlimited.* 1 St. Louis V. Kussell, 9 Mo. 507. 2 People V. Holihan, 29 Mich. 116; People V. Bradley, 36 Micli. 447; Smith V. Saginaw (Mich. 1890), 45 N. W. Eep. 964; Com. v. Brenham, 22 N. E. K. 628. 8 True V. Davis (111. 89), 22 N". E. 410. '' Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St. 82 96; Powers v. Wood Co., 8 Ohio St. 286; Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Pa. St. 359; Indianapolis V. Patterson, UN. E. R. 551; St. Louis v. Allen, 13 Mo. 400; Daly v. Morgan, 69 Md. 454; 23 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 462; Wade V. Richmond, 18 Gratt. (Va.) 583; Wahoo V. Dickinson, (Neb. 88) 36 N. W. E. 813; Prince George's Co. CH. v.] CORPORATE BOUNDARIES. §55 The Legislature may delegate to local boards the power of determining the extent to which the boundary shall be enlarged, and what territory shall be annexed to the city limits.^ But it has been held that while such acts, which confer on cities the power of determining the extent to which their boundaries shall be enlarged, are constitutional and valid, in the absence of constitutional provisions to the contrary, yet it is. subject to the constitutional limitation thai the power must be reason- Comra'rs v. Bladensburg, 51 Md. 465; Chandler v. Boston, 112 Mass. 200; United States v. Memphis, 97 U. S. 284; Railroad Co. v. Spearman, 12 Iowa, 112; Norris v. Mayor etc., 1 Swan (Tenn.) 164; Gorham v. Spring- field, 21 Me. 59; Girard v. Philadel- phia, 7 Wall. 1; Covington v. East St. Louis, 78 111. 548; Cheany v. Hooser, 9 B. Mon. 330; Elston v. Crawfordsville, 20Ind. 272; Edmunds V. Gookins, lb. 477 ; Arnoult v. New Orleans, 11 La. An. 54; Graham v. Greenville, 67 Tex. 62 ; Board etc. of Chickasaw Co. v. Board etc. of Sum- ner Co., 58 Miss. 610; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; Washburn v. Oshkosh, 60 Wis. 453 ; Laramie Coun- ty V. Albany County, 92 U. S. 307; Giboney v. Girardeau, 58 Mo. 141; Queen v. Local Governing Board, L. R. 8 Q. B. 227; Woods v. Henry, 55 Mo. 560; State v. McReynolds, 61 Mo. 203; Layton v. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 515. In Powers v. Wood Co., 8 Ohio St. 286, the court said: "That injustice may be, and has, sometimes been done by the annexation of ter- ritory to a town, which has contracted an improvident debt, is, no doubt, true; and, sometimes, and perhaps more frequently, the owners of con- tiguous territory have had the bene- fit, by reflected value and conven- ience, of expenditures for which they have not contributed anything. The question is one beyond the reach of practical consideration, in the ab- sence of any statute; and it would require a very artificial and unsound mode of reasoning to hold that ter- ritory could not be annexed to a town which owed debts, until the owners of such territory were paid a com- pensation in money for a propor- tional part of such debts, on the ground that the property annexed was condemned for public use." 1 State V. Forrest, 74 Wis. 610; Wahoe v. Dickinson, (Neb.) 36 N. W. R. 813; Graham v. Greenville, 67 Tex. 62 ; Callen v. Junction City, 41 Kans. 466; Collins v. New Albany, 59 Ind. 396; State v. Picatello, (Idaho, 92) 28 Pac. R. 411; East Dallas v. State, 73 Tex. 371 ; Kellog v. Meeks, 87 Mo. 396; Dodson v. Ft. Smith, 33 Ark. 508; Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Pa. St. 359; Jacksonville v. L'Engle, 20 Fla. 344; Covington v. East St. Louis, 78 111. 548; Murray v. Virginia, 91 111. 558; City of Pensaoola v. Louisville etc. R. Co., 21 Fla. 492; Sanders v. Provisional Municipality, 24 Fla. 226; Strosser v. Fort Wayne, 100 Ind. 443; 8 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 636; Em- poria v. Smith, 42 Kan. 431 ; Indian- apolis V. Patterson, 14 N. E. R. 451; Topeka v. Gillett, 32 Kan. 431; Lo- gansport v. La Rose, 99 Ind. 117; Millikin v. Bloomington, 72 Ind. 161 ; Hewitt's Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 55 ; Elston V. Board of Trustees of Crawfords- ville, 20 Ind. 272; Mendenhall v. Bur- ton, (Kan. 89) 22 Pac. 558. 83 §56 MUNICIPAL COKPORATIONS. [CH. V. able and properly exercised.^ But the corporation can neyer exercise the power of enlarging or changing its boundaries without the consent of the Legislature, either given in the par- ticular case or under general laws.^ §56. What territory can be annexed — Farm lands.— Where the Legislature exercises the power of annexation of con- tiguous territorj', in the enlargement of the boundaries of a city, the extent to which the power is exercised, in the absence of constitutional limitations, cannot be limited or controlled in any way whatever; and it matters not how extensive the enlarge- ment of the boundaries may be, if done directly by the Legisla- ture, there is no redress, or no way in which the act of the Legislature may be subjected to judicial review.^ But where the power is delegated to a local body representing the municipal corporation, then it is customary to subject the exercise of the power to certain restrictions. Thus, for example, it is gener- ally required that the territory to be attached must be contiguous to the present territory of the city.* But where the pieces of property which are annexed, in the exercise of its power to en- 1 Kellog V. Meeks, 87 Mo. 396 ; Hart- ington V. Luge, 50 N. W. E. 957; Indianapolis v. Patterson, 14 N. E. R. 551. " Commissioners of Shawnee Co. v. Carter, 2 Kan. 115; McCallie v. Mayor of Cliattanooga, 3 Head. (Tenn.) 318; Atchison, etc. K. Co. v. Maquilkin, 12 Kan. 301; Norris v. Mayor, etc. of Smithville, 1 Swan (Tenn.) 164; Walnut Township v. Jordon, 38 Kan. 562; 20 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 1. But see Delphi v_ Startzman, 104 Ind. 343; 11 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 87, where it has been held that the corporate bound- aries may be extended, without di- rect limitation, or express agreement, operating under particular circum- stances as an estoppel. 3 State V. Waxahachie, 81 Tex. 626; Saunder v. Pensacola, 4 So. R. 801; State V. Baird, 79 Tex. 63 ; Laramie Co. T. Albany Co., 92 U. S. 307; Smith V. McCarthy, 56 Pa. St. 359; Daly v. 84 Morgan, 69 Md. 460; 23 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 454; Louis v. Allen, 13 Mo. 400; Giboney Cape v. Girardeau Co., 58 Mo. 141; Tilford v. Olatlie, 44 Kan. 721 ; Powers v. Wood Co., 8 Ohio St. 286; United States v. Memphis, 97 U. S. 284; Woods v. Henry, 55 Mo. 560; Santa Eosa v. Coulter, 50 Cal. 537; People v. Brad- ley, 36 Mich. 447; Blancliard v. Bis- sell, 11 Ohio St. 96; Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss, 53; 24 Am. Eep. 661; Smith V. Mayor etc. of Saginaw, (Mich. 1890) 45 N. W. Eep. 964; Stonerv. Elournoy, 28 La. An. 850; Chandler V. Boston, 112 Mass. 200; Covington V. East St. Louis, 78 111. 548. *Evansville v. Page, 23 Ind. 525; Smith V. Sherry, 50 Wis. 210; Truax V. Pool, 46 Iowa, 256; Enterprize v. State, 10 So. E. 740; Woodruff v. Enverce, 55 Ark. 618; Murray v. Virginia, 91 111. 558; Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St. 96. CH. V.J CORPOEATB BOITNDAEIES. 56 large the city boundaries, are contiguous to each other, the fact that they are not all contiguous to the city will not make the annexation of all of them invalid. In the constitutional sense, such territory would be properly considered to be adjoining the city.^ So, also, has it been held that land, on the opposite bank of a stream, will be contiguous territory in this statutory or con- stitutional sense, where it is proposed to annex such lands, and bring them within the limits of a city located on the opposite bank of the river .^ The most difficult question, in regard to the power of annex- ing contiguous territory, is raised in the case of the annexation of farm lands to the city limits, thus increasing the rate of tax- ation upon such lands, while at the same time the territory so annexed derives no special benefit from the municipal improve- ments, which are the occasion of the increased taxation. This circumstance does not generally interfere with the power of annexing such farm lands to the city limits, as long as the con- stitution or statute, under which the municipal corporation acts, does not prohibit it.^ But the courts have frequently held, even in the absence of statute, that, where the power to annex contiguous territory and to enlarge city boundaries is exercised under, and is authorized by, general incorporation acts, the con- sent of the people living within the territory, which is proposed to be aimexed to the city, must first be obtained-* In some states, it is also provided that the municipal corporation can- not exercise the power of annexing contiguous territory, unless 1 State V. "Waxahachie, 81 Tex. 626 ; 17 S. W. R. 348; Evansville v. Page, 23 Ind. 525; Smith v. Sherry, 50 Wis. 210; Hurla v. Kansas City, (Kan. 91) 27 Pac. E. 143; In re Sadlier, 21 Atl. Eep. 978. - Vestal V. Little Rock, 15 S. W. R. 891; Vogel v. Little Rock, 15 lb. 836; Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St. 96. 3 In re TuUytown, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. E. 97; State v. Baird, 15 S. W. E. 98; 79 Tex. 63; McClay v. Lincoln (Neb. 91) 49 N. W. E. 282; Ves- tal V. Little Eock, supra; Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. St. 170; 27 Am. Uep. 633; 104 TJ. S. 78; St. Louis v. Allen, 13 Mo. 400; St. Louis v. Eus- sell, 9 Mo. 507; Lee v. Thomas, 49 Mo. 112; State V. Waxahachie, swpj-a; State V. Reynolds, 61 Mo. 203; Mu- nicipality No. 3 V. Michoud, 6 La. An. 605; Barker v. State, IS Ohio, 514; Gillette v. Hartford, 31 Conn. 351; Hewitt's Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 55; Eureka Springs v. Woodruff, 55 Ark. 618; Kountze v. Omaha, 5 Dillon (C. C.) 443; 88 111. 154; 30 Am. Kep. 543; Walden v. Dudley, 49 Mo. 421. ^ In re Lutte Meadows, 28 Pa. St. 256; In re West Philadelphia, 5 W. & S. (Pa.) 281 ; People v. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451; Inre Blooming Valley, 56 Pa. St. 66; lb. 163. 85 §56 JIUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS. [CH. V. such land has been laid off in lots and platted, or unless the consent of the owner has been obtained.^ And in order that the platting of land, and laying out into town lots, may have the effect of authorizing the city to annex such territory, it must have been done by one having a legal title to the prop- erty.^ In Indiana, it is also provided by statute, that contigu- ous territory may be annexed to city limits, even without the consent of the owners of property, and without such land hav- ing been plotted or laid off into lots by the county commis- sioners, upon the petition of the common council of the city, praying for such annexation of territory.^ But in Kentucky and Iowa, it has been held, independently of statute, that, while the power of the corporation to extend its boundaries will not be interfered with or limited by the fact that the rate of tax- ation inside the city limits is greater than what prevails over the territory which is proposed to be annexed, yet, in the ex- ercise of such power, it is required that the city must estab- lish a special rate of taxation for the territory so annexed, in order to avoid any unjust increase of the burden of taxation, disproportionate to the benefits received.* Whether the Legis- lature has or has not substantially complied with these require- iTilford V. Olathe, 44 Kan.. 721; Pittsburgli V. Eiley, 42 Mo. Ap. 18; Ewing V. State, 16 S. W. R. 872; Vestal V. Little Kock, 15 lb. 891; Lum V. Bowie, 18 lb. 142; Strosser V. Foi-tAYayne, 100 Ind. 443; 8 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 636; Union Pac. E. Co. V. Kansas City, 42 Kan. 497; Taylei- v. Fort Wayne, 47 Ind. 274; Peru V. Bearss, 55 Ind. 576; Town of Cicero v. Williamson, 91 Ind. 541; Collins V. New Albany, 59 Ind. 396; Logansport v. La Eose, 99 Ind. 117. 2 Glover v. Terre Haute, 129 Ind. 593; 29 N. E. E. 412; Indianapolis v. Patterson, 112 Ind. 344. 8 Strosser v. Fort Wayne, 100 Ind. 443 ; Glover v. Terre Haute, 129 Ind. 593; see Pensaoola v. Louisville, ,eto. E. Co., 21 Fla. 492; Logansport v. La Eose, 99 111. 117. 4 Maltus v. Sbields, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 553 ; Louisville Bridge Co. v. Louis- 86 ville, 81 Ky. 189; 3 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 503; Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 491 ; Sharp v. Dunavan, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 223; Arbegust v. Louisville, 2 Bush (Ky.) 271; Dei- man V. Fort Madison, 30 Iowa, 542; Lancaster v. Eush, 52 N. W. R. 837; Davis V. Dubuque, 20 Iowa, 458; Butler V. Muscatine, 11 Iowa, 433; Fulton V. Davenport, 17 Iowa, 404; Swift V. Newport, 7 Bush (Ky.) 37; Lum V. Bowie, 18 S. W. K. 142; Courtney v. Louisville, 12 Bush (Ky.) 419; Langworthy v. Dubuque, 13 Iowa, 86; s. c, 16 Iowa, 371; Buell V. Ball, 20 Iowa, 282; Hurla v. Kan- sas City, 46 Kan. 738; Durant v. KaufEman, 34 Iowa, 194; Brooks v. Polk Co., 52 Iowa, 460; Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 330; Winzer V. Burlington, 68 Iowa, 279; 12 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 505. CH. V.j COEPOKATE BOUNDARIES. §57 merits, is a judicial question, although the presumption is in favor of the validity of the legislative or municipal act of an- nexation ; ^ and in the light of this distinction, it has been held that adjoiniug property, which is laid off in lots for town pur- poses, is taxable lilce any other property within the municipal- ity .^^ In some of the states the same result is now attained by statutes providing that, when lural property is brought within the limits of municipal corporations, a lower rate of taxation should be imposed upon such lands.^ The power of the Legis- lature to prescribe a different rate of taxation for city purposes, between the property included within the old boundaries of the city, and the rural property which becomes a part of the city limits by subsequent enlargement of the boundaries, cannot be successfully contested.* § 57. Effect of extension of city boundaries. — As long as the identity of the corporation has not been lost or changed by the enlargement of the boundaries of the city, and the char- ter of the original corporation has not been surrendered or the corporation dissolved, its claim or title to property remains un- affected.^ On the other hand, the annexation of territory, in consequence of the enlargement of the boundaries, will not re- 1 Sharp V. Dunavan, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 223. -Maltus V. Shields, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 553 ; Arbegust v. liouisville, 2 Bush (Ky.) 271; Swift v. Kewport, 7 Bush (Ky.) 37. 8 Gillette v. Hartford, 31 Conn. 351 ; United States v. Memphis, 97 U. S. 284; Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. St. 353; 8 Am. Eep. 255; Seely v. Pitts- burgh, 82 Pa. St. 360; 22 Am. Eep. 760; Kaiser v. Weise, 85 Pa. St. 366; Craig V. Philadelphia, 89 Pa. St. 265 ; Keith V. Philadelphia, (Pa. 1889) 27 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 93; Pitts- burgh's Appeal, 118 Pa. St. 458. ■* United States v. Memphis, 97 U. S. 292; Daly V. Morgan, 69 Md. 460; 23 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 454; Gil- lette V. Hartford, 31 Conn. 357; Pow- ell V. Parkersburg, 28 W. Va. 698; Serrill v. Philadelphia, 38 Pa. St. 355 ; McCallie v. Mayor etc. of Chatta- nooga, 3 Head (Tenn.) 317; Carriger V. Morristown, 1 Lea (Tenn.) 116; Henderson v. Lambert, 8 Bush (Ky.) 607; Benoistv. St. Louis, 19 Mo. 179. Cf. contra, Smith v. City of Amer- icus, 15 S. E. R. 752; 89 Ga. 810. SHeizer v. Yohu, 37 Ind. 415; Town of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 93; Springwells v. Wayne Co. Treasurer, 58 Mich. 240; Norris v. Mayor etc. of Smithville, 1 Swan (Tenn.) 164; Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 1; Serrill v. Philadel- phia, 38 Pa. St. 355 ; Kalbrier v. Leon- ard, 34 Ind. 497; Barker v. State, 18 Ohio, 514; Municipality No. 3 v. Michoud, 6 La. An. 605 ; Third Mu- nicipality of N. O. V. Ursuline Nuns, 2 La. An. 611; Carrigan v. Morris- town, 1 Lea (Tenn.) 116; New Or- leans V. Michoud, 10 La. An. 763; East St. Louis v. Rhein, 139 111. 116. 87 § 57 MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIOKS. [CH. V. move such territory from the judicial jurisdiction, in which it was previously placed ; that is, the jurisdiction of State courts is never affected by changes in the boundaries of the municipal corporation.! With the enlargement of the corporation limits, however, the city assumes toward the annexed territory the same duties and liabilities, in respect to the streets laid out in such annexed district, as are imposed upon it in respect to the streets within the original territory.^ But if there is a turnpike road in the annexed district, the annexation of such territory cannot impair the private rights of the turnpike company.^ And where the general law prohibits the opening of streets through a cemetery, the fact, that the cemetery is brought within the limits of the municipal corporation by the extension of its boundaries, does not operate as a repeal of this prohibitive law, in consequence of the grant to the corporation of a general power to lay out streets in the teriitory thus brought within the city limits.* All laws or ordinances of the city applj"- to the added dis- trict after annexation, as well as to the original territory.^ But where two cities are consolidated, each having its own set of ordinances, it has been held that each set of ordinances will prevail over the territory of the old town which enacted them, until the common council of the consolidated city takes action for the adoption of a code of ordinances which may be applica- ble to the entire city as consolidated.^ It has, on the other hand, been held that, where a county seat is located within the boundaries of a municipal corporation, the boundaries of the county seat will not be extended with the increase of territory of the municipal corporation, unless that fact is expressly pro- vided for by statute.^ Where homesteads have been created in territory, outside 1 Harrison v. Hernsheim, 28 La. An. 881. 2 Ehrgott V. Mayor etc. of New- York, 96 N. Y. 264; 6 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 31; 48 Am. Eep. 622. 3 Turnpike Co. v. Cincinnati, 4 Am. L. Rec. (Ohio) 325. 46 Mo. 121; Town of Toledo v. Edens, 59 Iowa, 352; Town of Mil- waukee V. Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 93; McCannie v. Mayor etc. of Chatta- nooga, 3 Head (Tenn.) 317. 6 Camp V. Minneapolis, 33 Minn. 461. * Egypt Street, 2 Grant Cas. (Pa.) , ' State v. Board etc. of Atchison 455. j Co. (Kan. 1890), 24 Pac. Eep. 87. ^ St. Louis G. L. Co. v. St. Louis, I CH. V.J COKPOEATE BOUNDARIES. §58 of the city limits, under a homestead law which contains differ- ent provisions for homestead claims against country property, the annexation of such territory to the city limits will not have the effect of changing the claim of homestead, or of cutting down the amount of the land which may be claimed under the homestead law, in order to bring this particular claim of home- stead into conformity with the law, as a claim of homestead over city property.^ So, likewise, any other difference of law, in respect to the regulation or enjoyment of private rights, be- tween city and country property, will not be permitted to af- fect private rights, which were created in the annexed district under the law, which applies to country property.^ § 58. Effect of annexation of one town to another. — In the absence of any express constitutional limitations, the legal existence of a municipal corporation is subject to the absolute will of the Legislature ; and such Legislature, as has already been explained,^ may legislate such corporation out of existence, and either annex such territory to some other corporation, or reserve to itself the power of administering the public affairs of the dis- solved corporation. Where the corporation has been extinguish- ed, and the community and the territory have been annexed to an adjoining corporation, the general rule of law is plain that, by such annexation, the rights of property, as well as the lia- bilities of the corporation which has thus been annexed, are acquired by the corporation to whicli it is annexed. And the consolidated corporation, thus formed, will enjoy the benefits of the property of both, and at the same time assume the lia- bilities and debts of both.* But, in such a case, the ordinances of the two corporations will continue to operate upon the ter- ritory, originally included within each corporation, until the 1 State V. Waxahachie, 81 Tex. 626; Finley v. Districk, 12 Iowa, 516; Truax v. Pool, 46 Iowa, 256. 2 Williams v. ISraslivllle, 15 S. W. E. 364; Chilton v. Brooks, 69 Md. 584. Cf. Gottschalk v. Becker, 32 Neb. 653; 49 N. W. R. 715. * Ante, § 11, et seq. *Demattos v. New Whatcom (Wash. 92), 29 Pac. R. 933; Watson v. PamUco Co. Com'rs, 82 N. Car. 17; Gorham v. Springfield, 21 Me. 61; North Yarmouth v. Skillings, 45 Me. 133; 71 Am. Dec. 530; Winters v. George, 21 Oregon, 251; Town of Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514; Neilson v. Newark, 49 N. J. L. 246; Thompson v. Abbott, 61 Mo. 176; Smith v. Mayor etc. of Saginaw (Mich. 1890), 45 N. W. Rep. 964; Stone V. Charlestown, 114 Mass. 214; Donsman v. Milwaukee, 1 Pinn. (Wis.) 81 ; Harrison v. Bridgton, 16 Mass. 16. 89 §59 MUNICIPAL COKPORATIONS. [CH. V. common council of the consolidated corporation has adopted one code of ordinance for the government of all the territory included within the new boundaries. ^ § 59. Effect of division of one town into two.— Not only does the Legislature have the power of consolidating two mu- nicipal corporations into one, but it may likewise divide an existing corporation, and thereby create two new corporations out of the territory of the old, or transfer a part of the territory of the old corporation, and annex the same to some other exist- ing and adjoining corporation. In either case, the division of the old corporation has a material effect upon the property rights of the old corporation ; and the effect will vary accord- ing to the presence or absence of express legislative regulation of the same. In the absence of such legislative regulation, as a general proposition, all the rights, as well as debts, of the old corporation will remain with that part of the old territory which letains its legal identity with the old corporation. This part of the old town or community will be able to claim all the prop- erty, and must answer for all the debts and liabilities, of the old corporation.^ But it has been held that property of a coi- 1 North Springfield v. Springfield (111. 91), 29 N. E. R. 849; Vogel v. Little Rock, 55 Ark. 609; Camp v. Minneapolis, 33 Minn. 461. 2 Graham v. Greenville, 67 Tex. 62; Cooke V. Sell. District, 21 Pao. R. 496; 12 Colo. 453; Board of Educa- tion of Barlor Dist. v. Board etc. of Valley Dist., 30 W. Va. 424; Brewis V. Duluth, 3 McCrary (U. S.) 219; I'ierson v. Reynolds, 49 Mich. 224; Mobile V. Watson, 116 U. S. 289; Town of De Pere v. Town of Belle- vue, 31 Wis. 120; 11 Am. Rep. 602; Hartford Bridge Co. v. East Hart- ford, 16 Conn. 149; affirmed, 10 How. (U. S.) 511; Sill V. Corning, 15 N. T. 297; Mayor etc. of Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376; North Hempstead V. Hempstead, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 109; Cobb V. Kingman, 15 Mass. 197; Greenville v. Mason, 53 N. H. 515; Chiokesaw Co. v, Sumner Co., 58 90 Miss. 619; West Carroll Parish v. Gaddis, 34 La. An. 928; Laramie Co. V. Albany Co., 92 U. S. 307; Morgan v. Beloit, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 615; Aokley V. Vilas, 79 Wis. 157; Knight v. Town of Ashland, 61 Wis. 233; Town of Le Pointe v. O'Malley, 47 Miss. 332; People v. Trustees of Schools, 86 111. 613 ; Richland Go. v. Lawrence, 12 111. 1 ; Mount Pleasant v. Beck- with, 100 D". S. 532; Fendor v. Neosho Falls, 22 Kan. 305; State v. Lake City, 25 Minn. 404; Montgomery Co. V. Menefee (Ky. 92), 18 S. W. 102; Richards v. Daggett, 4 Mass. 539; Goodhue v. Beloit, 21 Wis. 636; But- ternut v. O'Malley, 50 Wis. 333; Mills Co. v. Brown (Tex. 92), 20 S. W. 81; 10 How. (U.S.) 511, 541; Richland Co. V. Lawrence, 12 111. 1 (1850); 74 Am. Dec. 572; Olney v. Harvey, 50 111. 453; 99 Am. Dec. 530; Blafik- I stone V. Taft, 4 Gray, 250 (1855). CH. V.J CORPORATE BOUNDARIES. §60 poreal nature, which is actually situated within the limits of the territory, which is taken away from the old corporation, to he formed into a new corporation or annexed to some adjoining corporation, will become the property of the new corporation or the corporation to which such territory is annexed ; and the cor- poration, which previously included this territory within its limits, can make no claim to such public property .^ But the contrary proposition has been maintained, that the old corpora- tion, upon separation of a part of its territory, retains its con- trol over all its public property, including that which is found within the limits of the other corporation, which is created out of the detached territory, or to which such territory has been annexed.^ § 60. legislative power to apportion property and debts in cases of annexation and division. — But the power of the Legislature, in dividing towns or annexing other territory to the boundaries of such towns, and thereby diminishing or in- creasing the same, has invariably been held to include the power to apportion the common property and tlie common burdens of the old municipalit}', so as to make an equitable division of the same between the corporation which has been benefited by the change in the boundaries of such a corporation and the corpora- 1 North Hempstead v. Hempstead, 2 Wend. 109. C. J. Savage said: "The State to be divided iDto two States: without some special agree- ment, each would own tlie public property within its limits. So of counties: the public buildings are as much public property as public lands. So as to the plains, meadows, and marshes which are the subject of this suit. A bill filed by a new county for the partition of the gaol and courthouse, which had been common property, would be the same in principle as the bill in this suit. Would not such a suit be considered preposterous ? Suppose a religious corporation possessed of a church and parsonage; it be- comes expedient to erect part into a new corporation: would not the old corporation retain the property, un- less an agreement was made as to the partition of it?" See, to the same general effect, Laramie Co. v. Albany, 92 U. S. 307; West Carroll V. G-addis, 34 La. An. 928 ; Milwaukee V. Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 93; Burgess V. Darby, 21 Atl. R. 394; 140 Pa. St. 250; Land etc. Co. v. Oneida Co., 53 jS". W. R. 491; 83 Wis. 649; Demattos V. City of New Whatcom, 4 Wash. St. 127. 2 School Dist. V. Richardson, 25 Pick. (Mass.) 62; Winona v. School Dist. No. 82, 40 Minn. 13; 24 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 121; Union Baptist Society v. Town of Candia, 2 N. H. 20; Town of Milwaukee v. Milwau- kee, 12 Wis. 93; North Yarmouth v. Skillings, 45 Me. 133; 81 Am. Dec. 530; Board of Health of Buena Vista V. East Saginaw, 4a Mich. 257. 91 §60 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. V. tion whose territoiy has been cut down. And it is a very com- mon practice for the Legislature to make such an apportionment of the property and debts, whenever territory is taken from one corporation and added to another, or established as a new corporation.^ It has, however, been held in Maine, that, upon the division of a town into two corporations, and the apportion- ment of its debts, the old town is the agent of the new town in defraying such debts ; and where the old town acts in good faith and pays such debts, the new town is liable on a claim of con- 1 Burgess v. Darby, 21 Atl. R. 394; 140 Pa. St. 250; In re House Bill, 9 Colo. 624, 639; Dunsraore's Appeal, 52 Pa. St. 374; Barkley v. Levee Comm'rs, 93 U. S. 258; Lakin v. Ames, 10 Cusb. 198; Gorliam v. Springfield, 21 Me. 61; North Yar- mouth V. Skillings, 45 Me. 133; Har- rison V. Bridgton, 16 Mass. 16; lb. 76; Hempstead v. Howard, 51 Ark. 344; State v. Harshaw, 73 Wis. 211; 40 N. W. R. 641 ; Broughton v. Pen- sacola, 93 U. S. 266; County Court v. County Couit, 2 Bush (Ky.) 93; Granby v. Thurston, 23 Conn. 416, 419; Willimantic Society v. School Society, 14 Conn. 457; State v. Hor- dey, 41 Kan. 630; Sierra v. Dona Ana (N. M. 88), 21 Pac. R. 83; Ter- ritory V. Com'rs, 8 Mont. 396; De- mattos V. New Whatcom, 29 Pae. R. 933; Pelican v. Rock Falls (Wis. 92), 51 N. W. R. 871; Olney v. Harvey, 50 111. 453 ; Sedgwick Co. v. Bailey, 11 Kan. 631 ; Laramie County v. Al- bany County, 92 U. S. 307 ; London- derry V. Derry, 8 N. H. 320; Waring V. Mobile, 24 Ala. 701; Mayor v. State, 15 Md. 376; Sill v. Corning, 15 N. Y. 297; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; Schriber V. Langdale, 66 Wis. 616; Knight v. Town of Ashland, 61 Wis. 233; Waldron v. Lee, 5 Pick. 323; New London v. Montville, 1 Root (Conn.) 184; Hughes v. School District, 72 Mo. 643; Board etc. v. Board etc., 30 W. Va. 424; Tileson 92 V. Newman, 23 Vt. 421; Richards v. Daggett, 4 Mass. 534; Love v. Schenck, 12 Ired. Law, 304; Sangar mon County v. Springfield, 63 111. 66; School Dist. v. Richardson, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 62; North Hempstead V. Hempstead, 2 Wend. (N. T.) 100; People V. Town of Gran, 121 111. 650; Sanbornton v. Til ton, 55 N. H. 603; Canovo v. State, 18 Pla. 512; State V. Lake City, 25 Minn. 405; Neilson V. Newark, 49 N. J. L. 426; Town of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 93; Tileson v. Newman, 23 Vt. 421; Waldron v. Lee, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 323; Comm'rs of Ottawa v. Nelson, 19 Kan. 234; Eagle v. Beard, 33 Ark. 497; Perry Co. v. Conway Co. (Ark. 1890), 12 S. W. Rep. 877; Craft v. Lo- finck, 34 Kan. 365; Hunt v. Hamil- ton, 25 Kan. 82; Com'rs of Marion Co. V. Harvey Co., 26 Kan. 181; Eicli- land Co. v. Lawrence Co., 12 111. 1; Morrow Co. v. Hendryx, 14 Greg. 397; Chickasaw Co. v. Clay Co., 62 Miss. 325 ; Mills v. Brown, 20 S. W. E. 81. In Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N. H. 524, Richardson, C. J., said: "The power to divide towns is strictly legislative, and the power to pre- scribe the rule, by which a division of the property of the old town shall be made, is incident to the power to divide the territory, and in its nature purely legislative. No gen- eral rule can be prescribed by which an equal and just division in such CH. V.J CORPORATE BOUNDARIES. 60 tribution to the old town for its proportionate share of such debts, which has been apportioned to it by the Legislature.^ A legislative discretion, in determining the rule of apportion- ment, is in no wise subject to the supervisory control of the courts ; the judgment of the Legislature is final, and cannot be reviewed in any judicial proceeding.^ It has been held that, in order that this apportionment may be made, it should be contemporaneous with the partition of the territory of the old corporation, and a subsequent act of the Legislature is an unconstitutional exercise of power.^ But this proposition is not generally recognized ; and the better rule, perhaps, is that, in the absence of constitutional limitations, specially restricting the power of the Legislature, the Legislature is able after, as well as contemporaneously with, the division of the town, to provide by legislation for apportionment, between the two new towns, of the property and debts of the old town.* It has also been held in Kansas, that, in the apportionment of the debts of an old town between the two towns, which obtain a part of the territory of the old town, bonds cannot be included which have been declared void before the separation, where the improvements, on which the bonds were founded, were not be- gun until after the separation, and the benefit of it accrued solely to the territory retained by the old corporation.^ cases can be made. Such a division must be founded upon the circum- stances of each particular case." ' Mt. Desert v. Monmouth, 72 Me. 348. 2 Bristol V. New Chester, 3 X. H. 524; St. Louis v. Kussell, 9 Mo. 507; Sedgwick Co. v. Bunker, 16 Kan. 498; Board of Education of Barker Pis- trict V. Board of Education of Valley Dist., 30 W. Va. 424; Overseers of Norwich v. Overseers of New Berlin, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 382; "Walters v. Richardson (Ky. 93), 20 S. W. R. 279; Land, Log & Lumber Co. v. Oneida Co., 53 N. W. E. 491; 83 Wis. 649; Nez Perces County v. Latah Co., 31 Pac. R. 300; 2 Idaho, 1131; Los An- geles Co. V. Orange Co., 32 Pac. R. 316. " Bowdoinham v. Richmond, 6 Greenl. (Me.) 112 ; Windham v. Port- land, 4 Mass. 390; Hampshire v. Franklin^ 16 Mass. 76. * Montgomery Co. v. Menifee (Ky. 92), 18 S. W. R. 1021; Mills Co. v. Brown Co. (Tex. 92), 20 S. W. R. 81; Sedgwick Co. v. Bunker, 16 Kan. 498; Greighton v. San Francisco, 42 Cal. 446; Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 U. S. 307; Town of Guil- ford V. Supervisorsof Chenango Co., 13 N. Y. 143; New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 654; Lay ton v. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 515; Lycoming v. Union, 15 Pa. St. 166; 53 Am. Dec. 575; Perry Co. V. Conway Co. (Ark. 1890), 12 S. W. Rep. 877; Dunmore's Appeal, 52 Pa. St. 374. 5 Craft V. Lofinck, 34 Kan. 365. 93 § 61 MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS. [CH. V. § 61. Procedure in case of annexation — When annexa- tion legal. — ^The proceedings for the annexation of contiguous territory to the limits of a municipal corporation, rest altogether upon statute ; and in order that such annexation may be valid, all the requirements of the statute, as to the method of proced- ure and the method of exercise of the power, must be complied with. Any material deviation from these requirements will have the effect of invalidating the annexation. ^ It is, however, presumed in every case that the annexation has been in compli- ance with the statutory requirements, and hence legal.^ The statute usually provides that notice of the intended an- nexation shall be giveh.^ But this requirement of notice is complied with, if there is a publication of such intention, and accompanying such publication an accurate description is given of the land, which is to be included within the addition to tlie town. It is not necessarj' that the notice should contain the names of all the persons whose property is to be brought by such annexation within the city limits.* In Tennessee, it has been held that the application for an- nexation cannot be made in court, where the court has the au- thority to grant such annexation, by private citizens, but must be made by the authorities of the town.^ In Pennsylvania, on the other hand, it is required that, before a town council may annex adjoining territory to the city limits, a petition therefor must be signed by twenty freeholders of lands, located in the territory which is proposed to be annexed ; and such freeholders must be residents of the territory .^ In Texas and Iowa the consent of a majority of the inhabitants of the annexed district seems to be required ; ^ and the wish of the majority may be manifested by signing the petition, instead of by a formal elec- 1 Seward v. Cowroy, 50 IST. W. R. 329; Woodrufe v. Eureka, 19 S. W. R. 15; 55 Ark. 618; Windman v. Vinoennes, 58 Ind. 180; Smitli v. Sherry, 54 Wis. 114. 2 State v. Waxahaohie, 81 Tex. 626; Huff V. Lafayette, 108 Ind. 14; Muli- kin V. Bloomington, 72 Ind. 161 ; State V. Westport, (Mo. 93) 22 S. W. E. 888. 3 Gunter v. Payetteville, 19 S. W. R. 577; Stilz v. Indianapolis, 55 Ind. 94 515; Village of Franklin v. Oroll, 31 Oliio St. 647. * Woodfil V. Town of Greensburg, 18 lad. 203; 45 N. W. R. 1031; Elsten V. Crawfordsville, 18 Ind. 203. ^ Mason v. London, 3 Baxt. (Tenn.) 94; Stilz V. Indianapolis, 55 Ind. 515; Huff V. Lafayette, 108 lb. 14. 6 Devore's App., 56 Pa. St. 163. ' Ford V. No. Des Moines, 80 Iowa, 626; Graham v. Greenville, 67 Tex, 62. CH. v.] CORPORATE BOUNDARIES. § 61 tion. In Indiana, where the count}' commissioners have the power of authorizing the annexation of adjoining territory of a municipal corporation, th§ proceedings are instituted by a peti- tion from the city council ; and two thirds of the members of the council are required to sign such petition.^ Where the county commissioners or coiinty court are authorized to make the annexation, while a judicial inquiry can be made into the legality of the proceedings, and the jurisdiction of the court or county commissioners or city council, yet tlie merits of the case cannot be again inquired into. The interference of a court can ouly be permitted for the purpose of correcting errors or irregu- larity in the proceedings, or inaccuracy in the description of the territory to be annexed.^ Where there has been an illegal annexation, it is held that tax- payers of the territory, which is sought to be annexed, may or- dinarily maintain suits for the purpose of avoiding such illegal annexation in their own behalf, and in behalf of the other citi- zens or residents of the territory.^ It has, however, been held that a private citizen who has no other interest but that of a resident and a taxpayer of the proposed addition to the town, cannot maintain a petition for mandamus, for the purpose of determining the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature providing for the consolidation of two cities.* The long continued acquiescence in an illegal annexation will very often preclude a subsequent avoidance of such annexation ; inexcusable delay, in resorting to the courts for relief, will operate as an estoppel against such parties, whenever the public interests require the application of the doctrine of estoppel.^ But the individual property owner is not estopped from insti- tuting an action for determining the validity of the annexation, 1 Stilz V. Indianapolis, 55 Ind. 515; Hufe V. Lafayette, 108 Ind. 14; Mason V. London, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 94. 2 Peru V. Bearss, 55 Ind. 576; In- dianapolis V. Sturm, .39 Ind. 159; Hulbert V. Mason, 29 Ohio St. 562; Windman v. Vincennes, 58 Ind. 480; Trustees, etc. of Princeton v. Manck, 35 Ind. 51; Church v. Town of Knightstown, 35 Ind. 177; contra, Vestal V. Little Rock, (Ark. 90) 15 S. W. R. 891. •I Delphi V. Stratzman, 104 Ind. 343; 11 Am. & Bng. Corp. Cas. 37; Tope- ka V. Gillett, 32 Kan. 431 ; 5 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 290; Morris v. Nash- ville, 6 Lea (Tenn.) 337. ■1 Smith V. Saginaw, 45 N. W. R. 964; 81 Mich. 123. 6 Black V. Brinkley, (Ark. 90) "15 S. W. R. 1030; Sherry v. Gilmore, 58 Wis. 324; Logansport v. La Rosa, 99 Ind. 117. 95 §62 MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS. [CH. V. by his participation in the rights and duties of a citizen of the territory, to which the property has been illegally annexed.^ On the other hand, when a municipality unlawfully attempts to annex territory to its limits, when it has no power to do so, the unlawful annexation cannot be validated by a subsequent statute, ratifying the unlawful annexation.^ § 62. Exercise of power beyond city limits — Only one corporation over same area. — While, ordinarily, a municipal corporation cannot exercise any governmental powers beyond the city limits, in the absence of an express authority to do so, there can be no claim whatever to such an authority ; and such authority, if it existed at all, must rest upon the express pro- vision of a statute.^ Yet it is not so very uncommon a thing for a municipal corporation to be given such a power. In a subsequent section, reference is made to the power to purchase property beyond corporate limits.* And, in the exercise of this power, it is held to be valid for the municipal corporation to be authorized to acquire lands, and confiscate them for the pur- pose of establishing a system of sewerage,^ or for the establish- ment of hospitals, or water works.^ So, also, has it been held to be valid for a municipal corporation to be authorized to re- quire a license for the sale of goods beyond city limits, in order that the legitimate trade of the corporation within its limits may be protected against the unlicensed business outside.'^ And 1 Strosser v. Fort Wayne, 100 Ind. 443; 8 Am. & Eng. Corp. Gas. 636; Buell V. Ball, 20 Iowa, 282; Lang- worthy V. Dubuque, 13 Iowa, 86; Greenoastle Township v. Black, 3 Ind. 587. - Comra'rs of Shawnee Co. v. Car- ter, 2 Kan. 115; Atchison, etc., N. Co. V. Naquilkin, 12 Kan. 301. In the case last cited, the court said: " Both the annexation of said prop- erty and the taxing of it were void for the want of jurisdiction over the subject-matter thereof. Retro- spfective statutes of a remedial na- ture, curing the defective execution of some power really possessed by the person, tribunal, or officer at- tempting to exercise it, have often 96 been held valid. But a retrospec- tive statute attempting to create a power, or to cure a defect of juris- diction, we believe, has never been held valid." ^Begein v. Anderson, 28 Ind. 79; Strauss v. Pontiac, 40 111, 301 ; State V. Franklin, 40 Kan. 410; Cold water V. Tucker, 36 Mich. 474; 24 Am. Eep. 601. " See post, § 201. ^ Neal V. Commonwealth, 17 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 67; Coldwater v. Tucker, 36 Mich. 474; 24 Am. Rep. 601; Gould V. Rochester, 103 iST. Y. 46. « State V. Franklin, 40 Kan. 410. ' Van Hook v. Selma, 70 Ala. 361; 45 Am. Rep. 83. CH. v.] CORPORATE BOUNDARIES. §62 this rule has been particularly applied to the case of the sale of intoxicating liquors.^ So, also, has it been held possible for the Legislature to authorize a city to expend money in the improve- ment of roads outside of the city limits, and to levy a tax there- for.^ But the general rule is, that there cannot be two municipal corporations, for the same purpose and with equal powers in- cluding the same territory ; the existence of one would neces- sarily preclude the possible legal existence of the other.* But where there is only one legal corporation, and the other, which actuall}'^ has control of the affairs of the territory, is not legal, simply a de facto corporation ; upon the suppression of the de facto corporation, the only legal corporation will at once assume control, the functions of the legal corporation being only tem- porarily suspended.* But while this legal axiom, that two municipal corporations cannot include the same territory, as a general rule, is subject to no serious exception ; yet it has in a comparatively late case been held, that two corporations may at the same time exercise a limited governmental control over the same territory. In order that the city of Chicago may successfully regulate the management and construction of packing houses, it was given the power to exercise its regulation over packing hosues located beyond its limits within a distance of one mile ; and the fact, that within this distance of one mile a different and indepen- dent municipal corporation, viz., the town of Lake, was located, did not interfere with the power of the city of Chicago to re- quire of the packing houses, located within this town, a license similar to what it was generally authorized to require of pack- ing houses, which were located within the distance of one mile from the city limits. The person, or the corporation, carrying iKaufle V. Delaney, 25 W. Va. 410; Flack v. Fry, 32 lb. 364; Em- erich v. Indianapolis, 118 Ind. 279. 2 Skinner v. Hutton, 33 Mo. 347. 3 Enterprise v. State (Fla. 91), 10 So. R. 740; Rex v. Passmore, 3 Term R. 243; Rex v. Amery, 2 Bro. P. C. 336; Ashley v. Calliope, 71 Iowa, 466; Paterson V. Society etc., 24 N. J. L. 385; Martin v. Aston, 60 Cal. 65 ; Strosser v. Fort Wayne, 100 Ind. 443; 8 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 636; 7 state V. Town of Winter Park, 25 Fla. 371; Drain Commissioners v. Baxter, 57 Mich. 127. " The propo- sition that two independent govern- ments cannot exercise the same pow- er, within the same district, at the same time, is a self-evident one." Cf. Peoria & A. P. U. Ry. Co. v. People (111. 93), 33 N. E. R. 873. * Taylor v. Fort Wayne, 47 Ind. 274, 281. 97 § 63 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [OH. V. on the business of packing meats, would be subject to the h- cense charged by both the city of Chicago and the town of Lake.^ § 63. Division of municipal territory into wards. — For the purpose of convenience, in arranging for the local govern- ment of a city, it is customary for the territory of a municipal corporation to be divided into wa];ds, and to provide for a rep- resentatioji of each ward in the city council. In providing for this division of the city into wards, the Legislature is required to observe the constitutional limitation of the equality of rep- resentation, and to make the wards as nearly as possible equal, either in size or in population, and apportion to each ward the number of representatives, according to the population of each ward. Any violation of these principles would make the ap- portionment void under the constitutional provision referred to.^ The procedure, whereby a city may be divided into wards, is, of course, purely statutory, and the provisions of the statute must be complied with.^ It has been held, that where the au- thority is given by the Legislature to the city council to effect a division of the city into a given number of wards, it is not permitted of the Legislature in the exercise of its delegated power, to increase or diminish the number of such wards.* 1 Cliioago Pack'g Co. v. Chicago, 88 111. 221 ; see State v. Franklin, 40 Kan. 410. •■! People V. Canoday, 73 N. C. 193; State V. Bayonne, 22 Atl. R. 1006. 8 In re Gettysburg, 90 Pa. St. 355; 98 In re Fifteenth Ward, 11 Phila. (Pa.) 466; see cases on alteration of wards, 33 Amer. & Eng. Corp. Cases, 661. * Schroeder y. City Council of Charleston, 3 Brev. (S. C.) 533; Peo- ple V. Young, 38 111. 490. CHAPTER VI. MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFPIOEES. Section. 65 — Time and place of holding elections. 66 — Qualifications of voters — Eesi- dence. 67 — Who are municipal officers ? 68 — Legislative control over offi- cers. 69 — Qualification for municipal office — Women when eligi- ble. 70 — Civil service examinations. 71 — ^Preference for veterans. 72— Official bonds. 73 — Official oaths. 74 — Disqualifications on account of prior official position. 75 — Appointments to office. 76 — Exercise of the appointing power. 77 — Legality of appointment pre- sumed. 78 — Acceptance of office. ' 79 — Compensation. 80 — Assignment of salary. Section. 81 — Holding over after expiration of term of office. 82 — Vacancies. 83 — Removals vrhen for cause. 84 — Proceedings to remove for cause. 85 — Illegal removals — Eight to sal- ary. 86 — Resignations — Incompatible offices — Change of residence. 87 — General powers and duties of officers. 88 — De facto officers. 89 — Police officials — Power to ar- rest. 90 — The mayor — Nature of his du- ties and powers. 91 — Liability of the officer to the corporation. 92 — Municipal liability for official acts. 93 — Jurisdiction of courts over elections. §65. Time and place of holding elections — The time and place of holding elections in municipalities are sometimes regu- lated by the general statutes of the state ; but in the absence of any general election law, applicable to the whole state, mu- nicipal elections are held at such times and places, as ma}- be designated in the charter or in some special act passed for the purpose. When the law requires tlie time and place of holding such elections to be determined by some officer or select board, it is essential to the validitjr of such election that the delibera- tion be participated in by all those, who are empowered or di- I'ected to do so.^ Any determination of the time and place of Stephens v. Peo., 89 111. 337; Glencoe V. Peo., 78 lb. 382; Dickey v. Hurlbut, 5 Cal. 343 ; Peo. v. Murray, 15 lb. 221 ; 99 1 Peo. V. Harvey, 58 Cal. 337; Juicer v. Commonwealth, 20 Pa. St. 484; Chadwiclc v. Kelvin, 68 Pa. St. 333; §65 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. VI. election by a meeting, composed of only a part of those who were required by law to participate, — certainly, where only a part of tliem were duly summoned — would invalidate the en- suing election. So, also, if it be within the discretion of mu- nicipal officials whether an election shall be held or not, and they neglect to fix the time and place ; any election, which might be held under such circumstances, would necessarily be void.^ But where the time and place of the election is definitely fixed by law, any failure of the municipal officers to give the proper notice of the time and place of such election will not invalidate the election, which is actually held by the qualified voters of the city, unless the statute makes the notice a necessary condi- tion precedent, when it cannot be dispensed with.^ And in that case, mandamus will lie to compel a compliance with the statutory requirements on the part of the officers, whose duty it is to issue the notices.^ But elections are not to be declared invalid, because of slight irregularities which do not affect the result of such election.* The courts are disposed to sustain the will of the people as evinced at an election, if it is possible ; ^ and a municipal elec- tion will not be vitiated, because of a verbal inaccuracy in the ballots, whether it be a misnomer of the office or of the candi- State V. Carroll (11. I. 91), 24 Atl. R. 106; Miller v. English, 21 K. J. L. 317; Marshall v. Cook, 38 111. 44; Force v. Batavia, 61 111. 99; Foster v. Scarf, 15 Ohio St. 5.35; Clarke v. Board, 27 111. 310; Marshall v. Kerns, 2 Swan. (Tenn.) 68. 1 Opinions of Judges, 7 Mass. 525 ; 15 lb. 537; Cook v. Mock, 40 Kan. 472; People v. Santa Anna, 67 111. 57; George v. Oxford, 16 Kan. 72, 80; People V. Mathewson, 47 Cal. 442. ^ State V. Carroll, supra; People v. Cressey, 91 N. Y. 61U; In re Narra- ganset (R. 1. 88), 16 Atl. R. 907 ; Queen V. Justices, 8 Ad. & El. 173; People V. Korth, 72 N. Y. 124; "Wars on v. Hastings, 22 Minn. 437; People v. Fairburg, 51 111. 149. 3 See post, § 371. * Howard v. Shields, 16 Ohio St. 184; Peo. v. Shaw, 19 N. Y. S. 302; 100 Kinney v. O' Conner, 26 Tex. 5; Peo. V. Cook, 14 Barb. 259; Com. v. Smith, 132 Mass. 289 ; "Walker v. "W. Boylston, 128 lb. 550; State v. Russell (Neb. 92), 5 N. "W. R. 465; Peo. v. Higgins, 3 Mich. 233; Dishon v. Smith, 10 Iowa, 212; Truehcart v. Addicks, 2 Tex. 217; Ewing v. Filley, 43 Pa. St. 384; Shields V. Jacobs, 88 Mich. 164; Sprague v. Norway, 31 Cal. 173; Bomiand v. Hildreth, 26 lb. 161 ; Day V. Kent, 1 Oreg. 123; Taylor v. Tay- lor, 10 Minn. 112; State v. Jones, 19 lud. 356; Rutledge v. Crawford, 91 Cal. 526. 5 Rogers v. Jacobs (Ky. 88), 11 S. "W. R. 513; Brown v. McCollum, 70 Iowa, 479; Fentou v. Scott, 17 Ore. 189; Gun v. Hubbard, 97 Mo. 311; Russell V. Wellington (Mass.91), 31 N. E. R. 630; State v. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76; State v. Quinly, 17 Atl. E. 952. CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS. §66 date ; ^ or because of illegal voting, provided the illegal act or iiTegularity does not change the result.^ A ballot will, how- ever, be rejected which contains the names of more officers than there are offices to be filled ; as, for example, where two offices of the same kind are to be filled, a vote for three or more persons for these offices would be void, and would not be count- ed at all, in the absence of statutory regulation to the contrary.^ So, also, any departure from the requirements of the election law, which tends in any material way to affect the result of the election, will invalidate the election. Thus, an election will be invalidated by the closing of the polls at an earlier hour than what was provided by the law,* or by an adjournment of the election to some other time or place than what was designated in the notice, or what was provided for by law.^ An election will also be invalid at common law, where " rioting takes place (i. e., at or near the polls,) to such an extent that ordinary men, having the ordinary nerve and courage of men, are thereby pre- vented from recording their votes." ^ § 66. Qualification of voters — Residence. — The qualifica- tions of voters are regulated by the state constitutions, and by the general election laws of the several states ; and these quali- fications cannot be limited or enlarged by municipal ordinances.^ And where the constitution of the state sets forth the qualifi- cations of voters in all elections within the state, without any restrictive clause in favor of electors of a municipality, or ex- press grant of power to the Legislature to establish substitu- tionary regulations, it is beyond the power of the Legislature or municipal council to require additional or different qualifl- 1 People V. Loomis, 8 Wend. 396; People V. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409; State V. Griffey, 5 Neb. 161 ; People v. Mat- terson, 17 111. 167. "Judklns V. Hill, 50 N. H. 140; First Par. v. Stearns, 21 Pick. 148; People V. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283; In re Murphy, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 153; John- ston v. Charleston, 1 Bay (S. C.) 441. 8 People V. Loomis, 8 Wend. 396; State V. Griffey, 5 Neb. 161; Kex v. Mayor of Leeds, 7 Ad. E. 963; Peo- ple V. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409. < Pennsylvania Dist. Election, 2 Par. (Pa.) 526; Clark's Case, 2 Par. (Pa.) 521. 5 Commonwealth v. Commission- ers, 5 Rawle, 75 ; Coles Co. v. Allison, 23 111. 437; People v. Keeling, 4 Col. 129. 6 Nottingham, In re, 1 O'M. & H. 245; Drogheda, In re, 1 O'M & H. 252. ' Petty V. Tooker, 21 N. Y. 267; People V. Phillips, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 388; Rex v. Bumstead, 2 B. & Ad. 699. 101 66 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. Vli^ cations, than those which are set forth in the constitution. Thus, a legislative act or charter, which requires a special qualification as to length of residence in the case of voters in a municipality, was held unconstitutional, where by the consti- tution another period was fixed upon by implication.^ So, also, when, as is now the rule in most if not all the states, laws have been passed the object of which is to guarantee an absolutely secret ballot, no law or ordinance can be of any force which will in tlie slightest degree impair or violate this secrecy.^ But where the state constitution is silent as to qualifications of voters, and the regulation of the matter of elections, both state and municipal, is left to the control and discretion of the Legislature, the Legislature may prescribe for municipal electors different qualifications from those which are required of voters in general state elections. And this discrimination is not un- common, particularly in requiring the voters in a city or town to be registered before they are entitled to vote. The consti- tutionality of such a local regulation cannot be successfully contested.^ But in the absence of special regulations, munici- pal elections are governed by the general election laws of the state, both as to the manner in which they should be conduct- ed, and as to the rules by which the results are ascertained and announced.* Residence in the municipality is almost invariably stated in express terms to be a necessary qualification for the voter ; but what will constitute a residence is a much controverted ques- tion.^ In ases arising out of the exercise of the elective fran- chise, it is safe to say that a man's residence is where his home or familj"- is located.^ And this general rule is a reliable guide in determining the location of one's domicile and place of voting, where one has but one residence, and actually has one perma- 1 People V. Canaday, 73 N. C. 198. 3 Williams v. Stern, 38 lud. 89. 5 McMahau V. Savannah, 66 Ga. 217. * See C o o 1 e y Cons. Limitations, p. 598. 5 Story Conf. of Laws, sec. 53, et seq. 6 Topsham v. Lewiston, 74 Me. 236; Grant v. Dalliber, 11 Conn. 234; Nu- gent V. Bates, 51 Iowa, 77; Keough v. 102 Holyoke, (Mass. 91) 31 N. E. R. 387; Colburn v. Holland, 14 Rich. Eq. 176; Yonkey V. State, 27 Ind. 236; Gilmer V. Gilmer, 32 Ga. 685; Rumney v. Caraptown, 10 N. H. 567; Keith v. Letter, 25 Kans. 100; Sherwood v. Judd, 3 Bradf. 167; Blucher v. Mil- sted, 31 Tex. 621; Ames v. Dury.ea, 6 Lans. 155; Kellogg v. Hickman, 12 Colo. 256. CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS. §66 nent residence. But where one has more than one residence, or has no permanent residence at all, other tests must be re- sorted to for the purpose of determining where one's domicile is.^ And it is a question of fact, on the evidence of each case, where one's domicile is. Where the party in question has ex- ercised the right of suffrage in prior elections, the place where he voted is presumptively his domicile, and such evidence is or- dinarily controlling in the determination of one's present domi- cile, where there has been no abandonment of the residence at that place.'^ And so, likewise, is the question of domicile very strongly controlled by the negative evidence, that one's vote had been offered, but refused, at a prior election, on the ground of want of residence.^ Among other facts, which may be proven for the purpose of locating one's domicile, is the place of naturali- zation,* payment of taxes on personal property,^ jury service,*" ' Thorndike v. Boston, 1 Met. (Mass.) 245; Atty. General v. Par- ker, 3 Atk. 576; Cohen v. "Wigfall, 8 Eich. Law, 237; 2 lb. 489; People v. Barker, 63 Hun, 630; Fry's Election, 71 Pa. St. 302; Gildersleeve v. Alex- ander, 2 Speer (S. C.) 298; Mobile etc. Co. V. Barnhill, 19 S. "W. K. 21; Seay v. Hunt, 55 Tex. 545; Hinds v. Hinds, 1 Iowa, 36: Etberingtou v. AVilson, L. K. 1 Ch. Div. 160; Taylor V. Caesar, 11 ITpp. Can. Q. B. 461; Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488. 2 United States v. Thorpe, 2 Bond U. S. 340; Smith v. Groom, 7 Fla. 81; Woodworth v. St. Paul etc. E. E., 18 Fed. Eep. 282; Kellogg v. Oshkosh, 14 AVis. 678 ; Sanderson v. Ealston, 21 La. An. 312; Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How. 185; Fiske v. Chicago etc. Co., 13 Barb. 472; East Li verpool v. Farm- ington, 74 Me. 154; Hairsten v. Hair- sten, 27 Miss. 704; Brunei v. Brunei, L. E. 12 Eq. 298; Carey's App., 75 Pa. St. 201; Easterly v. Goodwin, 35 Conn. 279; FoUweiler v. Lutz, 112 Pa. St. 107; Weld v. Boston, 126 Mass. 166. 8 Ilindman's Appeal, 85 Pa. St. 466; Guier y. O'Daniel, 1 Binn. (Pa.) 349 ; New Orleans v. Shepherd, 10 La. Ann. 268; Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How. 163; Heirs of HoUiman v. Peebles, 1 Tex. 673. * Drevon v. Drevon, 34 L. J. Ch. 129; Hood's Estate, 21 Pa. St. 106; Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400. ^Hulett V. Hulett, 37 Vt 518; Weld V. Boston, 126 Mass. 166; Ton- key V. State, 27 Ind. 236; Harvard College V. Gore, 5 Pick. 370; State V. Steele, 33 La. Ann. 910; Carey's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 201; Mitchell v. United States, 21 Wall. 350. The omission or refusal to pay taxes, is not a very important circumstance in the determination of the domi- cile, unless the refusal was caused by a denial of a domicile in the place where taxes were demanded. Hallett V. Bassett, 100 Mass. 167; Moar V. Harvey, 128 Mass. 219; Hind- man's Appeal, 85 Pa. St. 396; Guier V. O'Daniel, 1 Binn. (Pa.) 349. 8 Sanderson v. Ealston, 20 La. Ann. 312; Villere v. Butman, 23 La. Ann. 515. 103 §67 MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS. [CH. VI. t'le holding of office,^ and any other official act, which recog- nizes one as an inhabitant of a particular place.^ So, also, in the absence of positive proof of a permanent residence, evi- dence is admissible, as tending to prove the location of one's domicile, of one's presence in a place,^ the hiring of lodgings,* the purchase of a burying-ground,* the deposit of valuables,® and the absence of proof that a domicile once acquired has been changed^ ^ § 67. Who are municipal officers ? — It sometimes becomes both necessary and important to ascertain what elements are essential to constitute a public officer, and to distinguish offi- cial status from that of an agent, employee or contractor.^ The word office implies a more or less permanent delegation of a portion of governmental power,^ coupled witli legally defined duties^" and privileges,^^ continuous in their nature ; ^^ and which upon the death, resignation or removal of the incumbent, de- volves upon his successor.^^ A person who occupies a position 5 Miller v. Sacramento, 25 Cal. 98; Peo. V. Middleton, 28 lb. 603 ; Bunn v. Peo., 45 111. 397 ; State v. Kirk, 44 Ind. 401 ; Olrastead v. Mayor, supra; Doyle V. Raleigh, 89 N". C. 133; Sheboygan V. Parker, 3 Wall. 93; Atty. Gen. v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567. w Where there are no duties, there is no office. Com. v. Gamble, 62 Pa. St. 343. "State V. Valle, 41 Mo. 29; State v. Anderson, 45 Ohio St. 196; Hill v. Boylan, 40 Miss. 618; Peo. v. Comptr., 20 Wend. 595 ; Moser v. Mayor, 21 Hun, 163; Prather v. Lexington, 13 B. Mon. 539; Ellis v. State, 4 Ind. 1; Bunn V. Peo., 45 111. 397; Bradf. v. Just, 33 Ga. 332 ; Ogdeu v. Raymond, 22 Conn. 379. Instate V. Board, etc., 51 X J. L. 240; Shelby V. Alcorn, 38 Miss. 273; State V. Wilson, 29 Ohio, 347. " Bunn V. Peo., 45 HI. 897; State v. Wilson, 29 Ohio, 347; U. S. v. Mau- rice, 2 Brook. (U. S.) 103; Peo. v. Jobs, 7 Colo. 589; 1 Drevon v. Drevon, 34 L. J. Ch. 198; Butler v. Hopper, 1 Wash. C. C. 449; Cole v. Cheshire, 1 Gray, 441; Harvard College v. Gore, 5 Pick. 370. 2 West Boylston v. Sterling, 17 Pick. 126. See, also, Mead v. Box- borough, 11 Gush. 362; Fisk v. Ches- ter, 9 Gray, 506; Sewall v. Sewall, 122 Mass. 156. 8 Bruce v. Bruce, 2 B. & P. 229; Stanley v. Burnes, 3 Hagg. Eccl. 373; Bempde v. Johnstone, 3 Vesey Jr. 198. * Craige v. Lewin, 3 Curt. 435. ° Succession of Franklyn, 7 La. Ann. 395; Haldane v. Eckford, L. E. 8 Eq. Cas. 631; In n Capdevielle, 33 L. J. Exch. 306. " Curling v. Thornton, 2 Add. 219; Hodgson V. De Beauchesne, 12 Moore P. C. 285. ' Munro v. Munro, 7 CI. & F. 842. 8 Sawyer v. Corse, 17 Grat. 230; Olmstead v. Mayor, 42 N. T. Super. Ct. 289; Peo. v. Pinckney, 32 N. Y. 377. 104 CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELEOTIOiSrS AND OPPICEES. §67 the duties of which are not defined by law,^ or whose duties are contractual merely,^ and are not performed in the execution of any statute or standing rule of law,* is not an officer, but an em- ployee or agent.* The powers, rights and privileges, conferred upon an individual by an appointment or election to a public office, are not property and confer no proprietary rights in the office,^ but create a public trust; which it is absolutely incum- bent upon him to execute honestly, and to the best of his abilitj^, with the object of promoting the interests of the community within his jurisdiction.® Applying these and analogous princi- ples to municipalities, we find that a board, deriving their powers from the act creating them, are officers.'^ So, treasurers and all persons receiving, disbursing or acting as custodians of public funds are always officers,^ including collectors and assessors of taxes.^ It has been held that trustees, directors and other offi- cials of the state benevolent and penal institutions are public officers ; and the same rule would hold in similar institutions iPeo. V. Langdon, 40 Mich. 073; Kavanaugh v. State, 41 Ala. 399; Smith V. Mayor, 67 Barb. 223; U. S. v. Smith, 124 U. S. 525. 2 Shelby v. Alcorn, 36 Miss. 273; Detroit F. P. Co. v. State, 47 Mich. 135; Eliason v. Coleman, 86 N. C. 235; Butler v. Regents, 32 Wis. 124; U. S. V. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 358; Vaughn v. English, 8 Cal. 39; Sand- ford V. Boyd, 2 Cranch. 79. "State V. Gardner, 43 Ala. 234; State V. Piatt, 4 Harr. 154; McArthur V. Nelson, 81 Ky. 67; Doyle v. Raleigh, 89 N. C. 133; Walker v. Cinoin., 21 Ohio, 14 » Shelby v. Alcorn, 36 Miss. 273; and see cases above cited. " Peo. V. Stratton, 28 Cal. 382; Com. V. Gamble, 62 Pa. St. 343; State V. Dews, E. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 397; Beebo v. Robinson, 52 Ala. 67; Peo. V. Murray, 70 N. T. 521; State v. Douglas,26 Wis. 428; State v. Haw- kins, 44 Ohio St. 109; Prince v. Skil- lin, 71 Me. 361 ; State v. Davis, 44 Mo. 120; Conner v. Mayor, 5 N. T. 285- Smith V. N. Y., 37 lb. 578; In re Cor- liss, 11 R. I. 638; Peo. v. Nostrand, 46 N. Y. 375 ; see contra, King v. Hun- ter, 65 N. C. 203; Vaun v. Pipkin, 77 N. C. 408; Brown v. Turner, 70 lb. 93; Hoke v. Henderson, 4 Dev. (X. C.)l. «Peo. V. Stratton, 28 Cal. 382; Com. V. Gamble, 62 Pa. St. 343; Bow- ers V. Bowers, 26 Pa. St. 74; Atty. Gen. V. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567; Row- land V. Mayor, 83 N. Y. 372; Smith V. Moore, 90 Ind. 294. T State V. Valle, 41 Mo. 29. estate V. Brandt, 41 Iowa, 493; Peo. V. MoKinney, 10 Mich. 54; Com. V. Morrissey, 86 Pa. St. 416; Com. v. Evans, 74 lb. 124; Brown v. Turner, 70 N. C. 93; U. S. v. Bloomgart, 2 Ben. (JSr. J.) 356; State v. Boody, 53 N. H. 610. » State V. Walton, 62 Me. lOG; Morse v. Lowell, 7 Met. 152 ; Peo. v. Bedell, 2 Hill, 199; Lorillard v. Mon- roe, 11 N. Y. 392; Houseman v. Com., 100 Pa. St. 222. 105 §68 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. VI. connected with a municipal corporation.^ So, likewise, are county commissioners ^ and school trustees.^ It may be laid down as a general rule that a city policeman is a public officer, deriving his power, not from the municipal- it3s but from the state, whose laws it is his duty to enforce ; J but it has been held in one instance that police patrolmen are not public officers.^ So, fireman, and officers of the fire depart- ment, are not public municipal officers, but agents of the mu- nicipality ; * aud this is also true of road supervisors,^ police jurymen,** bridge tenders,^ and a medical superintendent of a municipal insane asylum.^" On the other hand, it is now well settled that a court crier ^^ and court attendants in general, are public officers ; ^ and that a clergyman acts as a public officer, in solemnizing and certifying to a marriage. ^^ This ruling of the Connecticut court would presumably be sound, only where the clergyman, in connection with the act of solemnizing a marriage, is required by statute to do some official act, sucii as iin indorsement and return of the marriage license. Deputies of officers, who hold their positions under statutory provisions, and whose duties are prescribed by law, are likewise, public officers, and not employees. ^^ But it is otherwise, when a special deputj" is appointed for a particular purpose.^^ He acts rather in the capacity of a personal representative of the offi- cer, whose deputy he is. § 68. Legislative control over offices In a preceding paragraph,^^ the limitations upon the legislative control of mu- ' Peo. V. Nicliols, 68 N, C. 429 ; Peo. V. Bledsoe, 68 lb. 457; Peo. v. San- derson, 30 Cal. Porter V. Pillsbury, 11 How. Pr. 240. -Hummells Case, 9 Watts (Pa.) 416. 3 Ogden V. Raymond, 22? Conn. 379. ^Farrell v. Bridgeport, 45 Conn. 191. 5 Shanley v. Brooklyn, 30 Hun, 396. People v. Pinckuey, 32 N. T. 377. '' State V. Putnam, 35 Iowa, 561. * State V. Montg., 25 La. Am. 138. " State V. Board, 51 N. J. L. 240. "> MacDonald v. Mayor, 32 Hun, 89. 106 " Rioketts v. Mayor, 67 How. Pr. 320. 12 Moser V. Mayoret, 21 Hun, 163; Sweeney v. Mayor, etc., 5 Daly, 274; Rowland v. Mayor, etc., 83 N. T. 372. 1^ Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209. "Dayton v. Lynes, 30 Conn. 351; White V. State, 44 Ala. 409; Conwell V. Voorhies, 13 Ohio, 523; Towns v. Harris, 13 Tex. 507; Eastman v. Cur- tis, 4 Vt. 016. i^Kavanaugh v. State, 41 Ala. 399; Armstrong v. U. S., Gilp. (U. S.) 399. " § 18. CH. TI.J MUI^IGIPAL ELECTIOXS AXD OPFICEKS. § 69 nicipal offices and officers are fully set forth, and nothing need be added in the present connection. § 69. Qnaliflcations for mnuicipal office — Women wlieu eligible. — These are usually the same as are required of can- didates for state offices. In general, aliens are not eligible ; although, if all inhabitants are declared to be eligible, they need not be citizens.^ A certain period of residence prior to election is generally required in express terms, to render one eligible for any munici- pal office of a political or executive character.^ But if there be no such statutory provision, nonresidents are eligible ; ^ espe- ciall}', if the office be one which requires professional skill, and does not involve the exercise of strictly governmental power.* Where residence within the municipal district is a prerequisite for holding office, a permanent removal therefrom will be treat- ed as an abandonment or implied resignation of the office.^ But a temporary change of residence, or absence, coupled with the intention to return, will have no such effect.*" It is a well nigh universal rule, founded upon the incapacity of minors to do any act which will be legally binding on them- selves, that no one under age is eligible to office ;'^ although exceptions have been made by the courts in respect to those offices, whose duties are clerical and administrative in cliar- acter, and do not involve the exercise of official discretion.^ The lack of legal recognition, which woman received at com- mon law, had as one of its effects the creation of a condition of ineligibility on her part for the holding of public office.® Under our constitutions, read in the light of that condition, and by necessary implication therefrom, women, although citizens, are not by that fact, in the absence of statute, vested with any 1 State V. Kilroy, 86 Ind. 118. 2 People V. Piatt, 115 N. T. 159; State T. Williams, 99 Mo. 291 ; Soo- ville V. Cleveland, 1 Ohio St. 126. 'Com. V. Jones, 12 Pa. St. 365; State V. Swearingen, 12 Gra. 23. * State V. Blanchard, 6 La. Ann. 572; State v. George, 23 Fla. 585. "Rumsey v. Canipton, 16 N". H. 56Y; Giles v. Soh. Dis., 31 lb. 304; Barre v. Greenwich, 1 Pick. 120. 6 People V. Met. Pol., Brd.,19 N. Y. 201; Lyon v. Com., 3 Bibb. (Ky.) 430; Van Osdall v. Hazzavd, 3 Hill (jST. Y.) 243; Hanner v. Grizzard, 89 N. C. 115. ' Tyler v. Tyler, 2 Root, 419; Moore V. Graves, 3 N. H. 308; Barrett v. Seward, 22 Vt. 176. 8U. S. V. Bixby, 9 Fed. Rep. 78; Ex parte, Dewey, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 263. "Robinson's Case, 101 Mass. 376; Schiichards v. People, 99 111. 501. 107 ro MUNICIPAL CORPORA'^IOKS. [CH. vr. absolute right to hold office ; ^ but the state Legislatures can make, and frequently have made, women eligible to certain subordinate official positions ; among which are those relating to public instruction, and the care of the sick and insane.^ Women have in some cases been declared eligible, where the constitution was silent or its language general in character ; and appointments of women to office are more and more meeting with the approval of public opinion,^ and favorable considera- tion from the courts. Indeed, as a question of legal right or qualification, the conclusion, that a woman is ineligible to of- fice, notwithstanding the silence of the constitution and statutes of the state on that subject, can justly be charged to be the result of sexual prejudice. The claim, that there is a funda- mental difference in the mental, as well as in the physical, char- acteristics of men and women, may be a profound philosophical truth; but the determination of the- question of qualification for holding public office is not so rigidly, answered in connec- tion with the candidacy of males, in order to justify, on the ground of personal disqualifications, the general denial of eligi- bleness to women on account of their sex. In the absence of express restrictions, women are eligible to any office, on the same terms and under the same conditions with men. Constitutional provisions have been adopted in a few of the Southern and Western States* forbidding the ]-equirement of any property qualification for office ; but in the absence of such provisions, reasonable property qualifications can be imposed, such as that the municipal or other official shall be a freeholder, or taxpayer." § 70. Civil service examinations. — In many of the states, laws have been enacted, providing that applicants for appoint- ment to public office, municipal and state, must pass an exami- 1 Brad well v. Illinois, 16 "Wall. 1.30; Kobinson's Case, 131 Mass. 376; Atchison v. Lucas, 83 Ky. 451; Wheeler V. Hall, 6 Allen, 558; Jack- son V. Phillips, 14 lb. 539. 2 HufE V. Cook, 44 Iowa, 639; Atch- ison Co. V. Lucas, 83 Ky. 451,- State V. Gorton, 33 Minn. 345. As to school officers, see Wright v. Xoell, 16 Kan. 601; Opinions of Judges, 115 Mass. 108 602 ; HoflE v. Cook, 44 Iowa, 639; State V. Gorton, 33 Minn. 345. ' Jeffries v. Harington, 11 Colo. 191 ; Sohuchardt v. People, 90 111. 501 ; Wright V. Noell, 16 Kan. 601; In re Hall, 50 Couu. 131. ■> Stimson Am. Stat. L. 222. ''Dari-ow v. People, 8 Colo. 417; People V. Sheffield, 47 Hun, 481.- CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFriCEES. § 71 nation, with a view of ascertaining their capacity, knowledge and litness, both mental and physical, for the positions they seek. At the same time, it is provided that appointments must be made from the names on a list of those who have passed such examinations, the persons to be selected from those grades high- est thereon ; and, generally, also, that all promotions shall be made upon the same basis.^ Such laws are constitutional and valid ;^ and include generally, within the operation of its pro- visions, not only officers strictly so called, but all of the persons in the civil service of the government,^ except laborers or un- skilled workmen on the one hand ; and on the other hand, con- fidential subordinates, and those for whose official misconduct the appointing officer would be financially responsible.* It has been held that the civil service reform laws are so far derogatory of common law right, that the burden of proof is on him, who seeks to prevent the appointment of any one, who is alleged to be within a prohibited class.^ But it is clear, under the general rules of statutory construction, bj' which the courts are guided in their determinations, that the laws for the regu- lations of the civil service should receive such a construction as will carry out the legislative intention, and eflfectuate the dominant principle of the law relating to public officers, viz. ; that they are public trusts, to be administered for the common welfare, and not as reward for part}' and political services. Any appointment, made in violation of these laws, is illegal and void ; and no appropriation is valid, which is made to pay for services rendered under such an illegal appointment.^ § 71. Preference to yeterans — It is sometimes provided that, in making appointments to office, state or municipal, pref- erence shall be given by the appointing power to honorably discharged Union soldiers and sailors ; and advanced age, loss of limb or other physical impairment, which does not in fact render them incapable, shall not disqualify them.'' This pref- • New York, 1883, ch. 354; 1848, oh. 357, 410; 86, ch. 9; Massachusetts, 1884, ch. 320; Opinion of Justices, 145 Mass. 587; Peck v. Eochester, 3 N. Y. Supp. 872; Kogers v. Buffalo, 123 N. Y. 173. 2 Rogers v. Buffalo, 3 N. Y. Supp. C74; People v. Angle, 109 N. Y. 504; Rogers v. Buffalo, 51 Hun, 637. 3 Peo. V. Civ. Ser. Brd., 41 Hun, 287. < Rogers v. Buffalo, 51 Hun, 637. 5 Peck V. Belknap, 55 Him, 91. 6 Rogers v. Buffalo, 2 N. Y. Supp. 327; Peck v. Rochester, 3 lb. 852. ' New York Laws, 1884, ch. 312, §1; Amended Laws, 1887, ch. 464; 109 72 MTTNICIPAL COEPOEATtONS. [CH. VI. erence is to be given in the employment of oidinary laborers,^ and applies to veterans in office, when the statute was passed, as well as to those who are appointed subsequently .^ The Leg- islature having the constitutional power to provide for the do- ing of public work by such means as to it may seem proper, the constitutionality of laws, creating such a preference, may be said to be beyond reasonable doubt ; ^ but the failure of the offi- cer, to whom the power of appointment was given, to respect the preference so required to be shown to veterans, was held not to be a misdemeanor.* But in New York it is now provided by statute, that the failure to observe these provisions for the preference to veterans is a misdemeanor.® § 72. Official bonds. — Municipal officials, intrusted with pub- lic money or property, are invariably required to give bonds for the safe custody of what is committed to their charge ; but, un- less the failure to furnish the proper surety promptly is expressly declared to vacate the office, the bond may be given after the officer has begun the performance of his duties.® So, too, it has been held that a town may lawfully require a receiving or disbursing officer to give bonds without having an express power to do so.'' Unless some precise form is prescribed by charter or statute and an exact compliance therewith made essential to their Validity, official bonds will be valid, so long as their con- ditions conform in a substantial manner to the general stat- utory requirements.^ So bonds, without seals, or without State V. Board of Public Works, 51 K. J. L. 240; Sullivan v. Gilroy, 55 Hun, 585; Peo. v. French, 51 Hun. .345; Peo. v. Wallace, 55 Hun, 585; Opinion of Justices, 145 Mass. 587. 1 Sullivan v. Gilroy, 55 Hun, 285. 2 People V. French, 52 Hun, 464: See generally State v. Boughner, (N. J. 93) 26 Atl. K. 808; People v. Com'rs, 65 Hun, 169; State v. De- lany, (N. J. 93) 25 Atl. R. 936; but held in New York nottoapply to pro- motions; Zn re McGuire, 50 Hun, 203. " Morris v. Nevpark, (S. J. 93) 26 Atl. E. 82; In re Wardmau, 2 N. Y. S. 324; 22 Ab. N. C. 137; People v. Bardin, 7 lb. 123; People v. Wal- lace, 55 Hun, 149. . 110 « People V. Dustin, 3 N. Y. S. 522. 5 N. Y. Laws, 1884, ch. 312, § 312, as amended by Laws 1887, ch. 464, eCawley v. Peo., 95 111. 249; Cas- key V. Greensb. 78 Ind. 233; State V. Barnes, 33 Pac. R. 621; Launtz v. Peo., 113 111. 137; U. S. v. LeBaron, 19 How. 73; s. c, 4 Wall. 642; Sproul V. Lawrence, 33 Ala. 674; State v. Findley, 10 Ohio, 51 ; Smith v. Cronk- hite, 8 Ind. 134. ' Morrell v. Sylvester, 1 Greenl. (Me.) 248; Lynn v. Cumberland, (Md. 93) 26 Atl. R. 1061. • 8 People V. Benfield, 80 Mich. 265; State V. Barnes, (Kan. 93) 33 Pac. K. 621; Herd v. Cist, (Ky. 89) 12 S. W. R. 466. CH. VI.] MtTNlCIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICEKS. §73 designation of the obligee,^ are nevertheless valid. Addition- al duties, analogous to those already appertaining to the office, may be imposed upon the official, without releasing the sureties or affecting their liability, unless the bond contains express re- striction against liability for additional duties of any sort.^ If bonds be given voluntarily, and not in pursuance of any statute or ordinance requiring them, they are nevertheless good as common law obligations, and the municipality can I'ecover on them from the obligors.^ The bond being condi- tioned for the faithful performance of the duties of an official during his term of office, the obligors are not liable for mal- feasance or nonfeasance by the officer, which has occuri-ed dur- ing a term, either prior * or subsequent ^ to that for which the bond was executed. § 73. Official oath. — It is the custom to require municipal officers to take an oath before entering upon the performance of the duties of their office ; ^ and statutes requiring such oath are generally mandatory in their nature. But such oath of office is by no means indispensable and its requisition depends upon usage and positive statutory direction.^ The oath is generally to the effect, that the official will faith- fully discharge the duties of his office ; and sometimes, that he will support the constitution of the United States and of the state.^ But no oath can be required which imposes any test of 1 State V. Wood, 51 Ark. 205; Fel- lows V. Gilraan, 4 Wend. 414. 2 Morrow v. Wood, 56 Ala. 1 ; Or- man v. Pueblo, 8 Col. 292; Board etc. V. Quick, 99 N. Y. 138; Mayor V. Kelly, 98 lb. 467; Board v. Clark, 92 lb. 467. • 8 Com. V. Wolbert, 6 Binn. 292; Supervisors v. Coffinbury, 1 Mich. 355 ; Peo. v. John, 22 lb. 461 ; Platte- ville V. Hopper, 63 Wis. 381 ; Turner V. Clark, 67 Mo. 243; Montville v. Houghton, 7 Conn. 543; but see con- tra, State V. Hersey, 56 Iowa, 404; State V. Bartlett, 30 Miss. 624; U. S. V. Humason, 6 Sawy. 199. 4 State V. Finn, 98 Mo. 532; Padu- cah V. Cully, 9 Bush (Ky.) 323; Bis- sell. V. Saxton, 77 N. Y. 191 ; Myers V. U. S., 1 McLean, 493; Overacre v. Garrett, 5 Lans. 156; Rochester v. Bandall, 105 Mass. 295; Manaska v. Ingalls, 16 Iowa, 81; Townsend v. Everett, 4 Ala. 607; Miller v. Stew- art, 9 Wheat. 702; Stern v. Peo., 96 111. 475 ; Mclntire v. Sch. Trustees, 3 111. App. 77; Austin v. French, 7 Met. 126; Kingston I. Co. v. Decker, 33 Barb. 196; U. S. v. Boyd, 5 How. 50. 6 Dover v. Twombly, 42 N. H. 59; Chelmsford Co. v. Demarest, 7 G-ray (Mass.) 1; Mayor v. Horn, 2 Harr. (Del.) 190. 6 State V. Stanley, 66 N. C. 59; Fox v. McDonald (Ala. 93), 13 So. K. 416. ' Johnson v. Wilson, 2 N. H. 202; State v. Stanley, supra. sstimson's Am. Stat. L. §§ 224, 225. Ill §74 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. VI. a religious nature,^ or which renders an individual ineligible for any previous act, which was not a crime when committed.'' If the taking of an official oath is by statute or usage a con- dition precedent to admittance into office, a person elected or appointed thereto cannot justify ; nor does he possess any rights, as such officer, before he shall have complied wj^th this require- ment of the law.^ But a substantial compliance with the law is all that is required ; * and, although when a form is prescribed it should be followed,* if the oath taken is equivalent in sub- stance to that prescribed, it has been held to be sufficient.® § 74. Disqualification on account of prior ofScial posi- tion. — In many of tlie United States, statutes exist which pro- hibit the holding of more than one lucrative office ^ of any sort, and the appointment or election of members of the Legisla- ture to offices which have been created, or the compensation of which has been increased during their terms, or the election to the Legislature of a person holding a federal office.^ These statutes receive a strict, if not literal construction ; ' and appointments made in contravention of their terms are void.^** It has been held, however, that these statutes do not apply to a merely de facto incumbency, as when a coroner is authorized iCon. TJ. S., art. 6, §3. ^ Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277. See Tiederaan's Limitations of Police Power, pp. 72-74. ^ Thompson v. Nicholson, 12 Rob. La. 326; Peo. v. McKinney, 52 N. Y. 374) City v. Given, 60 Pa. St. 136. iQlney v. Pearee, 1 R. I. 292; Rid- dle V. Bedford Co., 7 Serg. & Rawle, 392; Neale v. Overseers, 5 Watts. 588; State v. Perkins, 24 N. J. L. 409; Davis V. Berger, 54 Mich. 692; Hoaglandv. Culvert, 20 N. J. L. 387," Tide Water v. Archer, 9 Gill & J. (Md.) 479. ^Bassett v. Den, 17 N. J. L. 432; State V. Ayres, 15 lb. 479; Hankins V. Culloway, 88 111. 485; Young v. State, 7 GUI & J. (Md.) 253. « State V. Trenton, 35 N. J. L. 485. '' County recorder, commissioner, township trustee and supervisor are lucrative offices in the constitutional 112 sense. Daily v. State, 8 Blackf. 329; Creighton v. Piper, 14 Ind. 182; but not city councilman. State v. Kirk, 44 Ind. 401. 8 Stimson's Am. Stat. L. §220; Darley v. State, 8 Blackf. 329; In re Carlis, 11 R. I. 638; State v. Degress, 53 Tex. 387; Davenport v. Mayor, 67 N. Y. 456; State v. Valle, 41 Mo. 29; Peo. v. Leonard, 73 Cal. 230; Foltz V. Kerlin, 105 Ind. 221. 3 Goal V. Townsend, 77 Tex. 404; Troy V. Wooten, 10 Ind. 377; State v. Harrison, 116 Ind. 300; Heller v. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309; State v. Wes- ton, 4 Neb. 234; De Turk v. Com., 129 Pa. St. 151; Carpenter v. Peo., 8 Colo. 116; State v. McCollister, 11 Ohio, 46. i» State V. Taylor, 12 Ohio St. 130; Brady v. Howe,. 50 Miss. 625; Shelby V. Alcorn, 36 lb. 273; McGregor v. Balch, 14 Vt. 428. CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS. §75 by statute, in certain contingencies, to perform part of the du- ties of a sheriff ; ^ nor, if the term of the prior office has expired, and the incumbent be occupied only with the settlement of his affairs, in preparation for a surrender of the office to his suc- cessor ,2 So, also, if the provision against holding incompatible offices be found in the constitution, it has been held that the prohibi- tion is applicable only to offices ^¥hich are established or pro- vided for by the body of the constitution, and would not prevent the incumbent of such an office from holding a municipal office.* When the constitution forbids the holding of an office for more than a certain specified number of consecutive terms, any period of time, intervening between the terms, could prevent the attach- ment of such disqualification.* § 75. Appointiuents to office. — At common law, every cor- poration lias an inherent power to appoint or elect such officers as may be necessary to enable it to carry out the purposes for which it was created.* And municipal corporations have the power, in the absence of statutory regulations, to appoint or elect officers, whose sphere of activity is limited to the exercise of the charter powers and the enforcement of the municipal by- laws.^ In this countrjs it is the universal practice for the char- ter or municipal constitution to provide for the creation of all the principal officers, in such a way as to leave very little oppor- tunity for the exercise of this common law power.'^ These stat- utory provisions must be strictly observed ; ^ and the choice of i Powell V. Wilson, 16 Tex. 59; Crawford v. Dunbar, 52 Cal. 36. •■'State V. Somniers, 96 N. C. 467; Peo. V. Duane, 55 Hun, 315. ^Justices' Opinions, 68 Me. 594; Peo. V. Whitman, 10 Cal. 38; State V. Somnier, 33 La. An. 237; Peo. v. Duane, 55 Hun, 315 ; State v. Mont- gomery, 25 La. An. 138; State v. Kirk, 44 Ind. 401 ; Molian v. Jackson, 52 Ind. 599; De Turk v. Com., 129 Pa. St. 151. *Horton v. Watson, 23 Kan. 229; State V. Derbes, 11 La. An. 50; Grie- bel V. State, 111 Ind. 369; Davis v. Patten, 41 Kan. 480. 8 6 Vintners v. Passey, 1 Burr, 237; Dillon's Mun. Corp. §206; Lafayette V. State, 69 Ind. 218; Peo. v. Stevens, 51 How. Pr. 103. 6 Dillon's Mun. Corp. 206. 7 People V. Bedell, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 196; Hotiman v. Jersey City, 34 N. J. L. 172; Hoboken v. Harrison, 30 lb. 73; People v. Pinokney, 32 N. Y. 377; People v. Canly, 44 111. 33. » State V. Dillon, 125 Ind. 65 ; Jones V. Parkhurst, 22 N. E. E. 899; 150 Mass. 243; Jacksonville v. Allen, 25 111. Ap. 54; Bellows v. Cincjinnati, 11 Ohio St. 544; Monroe v. Hoffman, 29 La. An. 651. 113 §76 MTJNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. vr. an officer, in any way not prescribed by law, is void.^ In one case, however, authority to appoint was inferred from the fre- quent mention which was made in the charter of the officer and his duties.'^ § 76. Exercise of the appointing power. — The appointing power must exercise its functions in the manner prescribed by law.* Thus, when a city council is empowered to elect or ap- point ofiScials, but the mode, in which the power is to be exer- cised, is not specifically pointed out, it may elect or appoint either by resolution or by ballot ; * and it may in certain contin- gencies delegate the power of appointment to a committee.^ It has been held that an appointment can be made by parol, only when such a method is sanctioned by the terms of the statute, from which the power is derived ; •> while it is the rule in states, where the mode is not prescribed, that no writing is required.'' Until the act of appointment is legally completed, it may be recalled; but when the act of appointment is consummated, it is irrevocable, provided the appointee cannot be removed by the appointing power. In such cases, the power of appoint- ment to that office cannot be again exercised, until the office becomes vacant by voluntary resignation or death of the ap- pointee.^ But when an appointment is illegally made, or fraud- ' Hobokeu v. Harrison, 30 N. J. L. "73; Hoffman v. Jer. City, 34 lb. 172; State v. Michellon, 42 N. J. L. 405; Stone V. Small, 54 Vt. 498; Claren- don V. Phila., 13 Phila. 54; Baker v. Pt. Huron Police Com'rs, 62 Mich. 527; State v. Hudson, 29 N. J. L. 104; State v. Bryson, 44 Ohio St. 457; Saunders v. Lawrence, 141 Mass. 380. 2Peo. V. Bedell, 2 Hill (X. Y.) 196; see Field v. Gir. Col., 14 Pa. St. 233. 3 Launtz v. Peo., 113 111. 137; State V. Cui-ry, (93 Ind.) 33 N. E. R. 685; State V. Guiney, 26 Minn. 313 ; State v. Peele, 124 Ind. 515 ; State v. Dillon, 125 Ind. 65; State v. Kenny, 45 N. J. L. 251; Peo. v. Murray, 70 N. Y. 521; State V. Michellon, 42 K. J. L. 405 ; Com. V. Crezer, (93 Pa.) 26 Atl. R. 114 697; Commonwealth v. Crogaoi, 26 Atl. R. 697; 155 Pa. St. 448. *Low V. Commissioners, R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 302. 5 Trowbridge v. Newark, 46 N.- J. L. 140; Com. v. Pittsburgh, 14 Pa. St. 177; Peo. v. Bedell, 2 Hill (N.Y.) 196; Com. v. Fitler, 147 Pa. St. 288. 6 Peo. V. Murray, 70 N. Y. 521 (ex- cise commissioners) ; Peo. v. Murray, 5 Hun, 42, citing Peo. v. Molineaux, 53 Barb. 9; Peo. v. Willard, 44 Hun, 580; Peo. v. Fitzsimmons, 68 N. Y. 514. ' Hoke V. Field, 10 Bush (Ky.) 144; Peo. V. Murray, 5 Hun, 42; Saunders V. Owen, 2 Salk. (Eug.) 247. 8 Peo. V. Woodruff, 32 N. Y. 355; Peo. V. Stowell, 9 Abb. N. C. 456; State V. Wilson, 2 N. H. 456. CH. VE.J MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OmCERS. §78 ulently obtained, it is void, and a subsequent appointment will be valid.i Failure to appoint, at a date prescribed by law, does not cause a forfeiture of the power ; its exercise being essential to the public welfare.^ But the reverse of this is the case when, from the nature of the appointment, the character of the office to be filled, or from tlie language employed by the statute con- ferring the power, it is evident that the requirement as to the specific time, at which it is to be exercised, was intended as a limitation or restraint upon the power.'^ § 77. Legality of appointment presumed. — When a mu- nicipal or other public official has acted notoriously as such, and has been continuously recognized as such by the corpora- tion, a regular legal appointment will be presumed, and his au- thority to bind the corporation may be implied ; nor need any written proof of his appointment be produced.* But such pre- sumption may be rebutted,^ although not by the officer him- self ; ^ he being estopped upon general principles, in order to protect innocent third persons. The inquiry into the validity of his appointment can only be had at the instance of the pub- lic or of citizens, by a proceeding in quo warranto!' § 78. Acceptance of office. — If no special provision of the law requires it, acceptance need not be couched in express terms; but may be, and usually is, implied from the acts of qualifying and entering upon the performance of official duty.* It has, howevei', been held that an acceptance is always neces- State V. Chapman, 44 Conn. 495; Peo. V. Keid, 11 Colo. 138; Peo. v. Cazneau, 20 Cal. 503; Thomas v. Burnes, 23 Miss. 550; State v. Mc- Neely, 24 La. Ann. 19. ' Com. V. Phila. Comrs., 5 Binn. (Pa.) 534; Com. v. Douglas, 1 lb. 77; Peo. v. Eeid, 11 Colo. 138. 2 Dyei- V. Bayne, 54 Mich. 87; Peo. V. Allen, 6 Wend. 486; Peo. v. Wheel- er, 18 Hun, 540; Peo. v. Board, 46 lb. 296. 8 Peo. V. Allen, 6 Wend. 486; Peo. V. Board, 46 Hun, 296. * Bank etc. v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 64, 70; Kllley v. Forsee, 57 Mo. 390; Johnston v. Wilson, 2 N. H. 202; 9 Am. Dec. 50; Jones v. Gibson, 1 N. H. 266; Carter v. Symp- son, 8 B. Mon. 155; Peo. v. Clingan, 5 Cal. 389; State v. Ferguson, 31 N. J. L. 107; State V. Skrine, 3 Brev. (S. C.) 516; Fenwick v. Sears, 2 Cranch. 150. 6 Johnson v. Wilson, 2 N. H. 202; Regina v. Koberts, 36 Law Times Rep. 690; s. c, 6 Am. Law Rep. 414. •i State V. Sellers, 7 Rich. Law, 368; State v. Mayberry, 3 Strob. 144. ' Post, § 381. 8 Written acceptance. See Winne- gar V. Rowe, 1 Cow. 258 ; State v. Weatherby, 17 Neb. 553 ; Johnson v. Wilson, 2 N. H. .202; Hartford v. Bennett, 10 Ohio St. 441. 115 § 79 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIOKS. [CH. VI. sary, and passive acquiescence in election or appointment will not be permitted to take its place.-*- By the common la-w, ofiSce ■was regarded as a burden in the nature of a public duty, and a citizen elected thereto, under a municipal corporation, was obliged to accept or render himself indictable by his refusal."'' Although this common law rule has almost wholly fallen into desuetude in America b}"- reason of the avidity -with which public office is sought after, it has been found necessary in some localities to render the holding of certain offices, which are more onerous than lucrative, obligatory upon those appointed or elected to them.* But an individual, holding one office, cannot be compelled to accept another, which is legally incompatible with the former.* And it has been held that no one is under the necessity of ac- cepting an official position, to which no compensation is at- tached.® This is certainly not a sound conclusion, and is not followed b)^ the authorities, administrative or judicial. It is not uncommon to require official duty of one, without providing adequate compensation, as in the case of duty as a juror; and sometimes, without any provision for personal compensation whatever, as in the case of military service. Such laws have iiever been declared to be unconstitutional.'' I 79. Compensation. — The transcendent authority, which the Legislature possesses over public officers within its jurisdic- tion, can be, and is ordinarily, transferred to the municipalities themselves ; and thus they are given complete control over their own officials.^ But municipal officers are created, and exist, wholly for the benefit of the public ; and the legislative power may, unless hampered by constitutional restraints, abridge or increase their terms, add to or diminish official duties, regu- late, increase or diminish official compensation in any way ; 1 Smith V. Moore, 90 Ind. 294. 2Edtrards v. U. S., 103 U. S. 471; State V. Ferguson, 31 N. J. L. 107; Vanackers Case, 1 Ld. Rayra. 496. 3 London V. Headen, 76 N". C. 72; Edwards v. U. S., supra ; Brooklyn v. Soholes, 31 Hun, 110; Haywood v. Bleecker, 11 Johns. 432;Wmnegar v. Foe, supra; Bentley v. Phelps, 27 Barb. 524; State v. Molntyre, 3 Ired. 116 171; Conner v. Mayor, 2 Sandf. 355; Hake v. Henderson, 4 Dev. (S. C.) 1. *Hartf. V. Bennett, 10 Ohio St. 441; Smith V. Moore, 90 Ind. 294; see con- tra, Goettman v. Mayor, 6 Hun, 132. 5 Hinze v. People, 92 111. 406. 6 Dillon Mun. Corp. § 228. 'Dil. Mun. Corp., §229; State v. Douglas, 26 Wis. 428; Love v. Jer. City, 40 X. J. L. 456. CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICBKS. 79 and if the public interest demand it, abolish the ofEce alto- gether.-' This wide-reaching control over the duration of mu- nicipal officers maybe delegated to the municipal corporation ; and it has been held that when a department, a board of offi- cers, or a single oflScial, is invested with a discretionary au- thority to create an office, the power to abolish such office at pleasure follows as an incident of the creative power.^ Con- stitutional restrictions upon the power to increase or diminish official compensation will receive liberal construction and rigid enforcement; * and the legislative power of control is further qualified by the rule that subsequent legislation should not be permitted to affect already established rates of compensation, so far as incumbents are concerned, unless it is plainly intended to apply thereto.* There is no implied promise or liability on the part of munici- pal corporations to pay salaries to those officials, whom it is 1 State V. Starkey, (Minn. 92) 52 N. W. K. 24; Stanfield v. State, (Tex. 92) 18 S. W. K. 577; State v. Kaw, (Iowa, 92) 46 N. W. E. 872; Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 208; Bryan v. Cattell, 15 Iowa, 538, 553; Butler v. Penn., 10 How. 402; Smith v. New York, 37 N. Y. 518; Peo. v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481 ; Bouglas v. Timme, (Neb. 90) 49 N. W. R. 266. 2 Baldwin v. Phila., 99 Pa. St. 164; Cox V. Newark, 103 N. Y. 519; Ford V. Har. Oomrs., 81 Oal. 19; Peo. v. Kings Co., 105 N. Y. ; State v. Mayor, 15 Lea. 697; Harvey v. Hush Co., 32 Kan. 159; Bird v. Wasco, 3 lb. 282; Cowdin V. Huff, 10 Ind. 83; Prince V. Skillen, 71 Me. 361; Conner v. Mayor, 5 N. Y. 285; Warner v. Peo., 7 Hill (N. Y.) 81; 2 Denio, 272; Mar- den V. Portsmouth, 59 N. H. 18; State V. Gales, 77 N. C. 283; Castle v. Win- tah, 2 Wyom. 126; Perkins v. Corbin, 45 Ala. 103; Hennepin Co. v. Jones, 18 Minn. 199; Kendall v. Canton, 53 Miss. 526; Robinson v. White, 26 Ai-k. 139; Augusta v. Sweeney, 44 Ga. 463; Riley v. Mayor, 96 N. Y. 331 ; Crawf . Co. V. Nash, 99 Pa. St. 253; Field v. Marge, 83 Va. 882; Peo. v. Lippin- cott, 67 111. 333; Iowa City v. Foster, 10 Iowa, 189; Euoker v. Supervisor, 7 W. Va. 661; U. S. v. Mitchell, 109 IJ. S. 146; Williams v. Newport, 12 Bush (Ky.) 438; Evans v. Populus, 22 La. An. 121. 8 State V. Raine, (Ohio 92) 31 N. E. R. 741; Lloyd v. Silver Bow Co., (Mont. 92) 28 Pac. R. 453; Weeks v. Texarkana, 50 Ark. 81; Hall v. Bever- idge, 81 111. 128; Green v. Fresno, (Cal. 92) 30 Pac. R. 544; Wheelock V. Peo., 84 111. 551; Apple v. Craw- ford Co., 105 Pa. St. 300; Doe v. Wash'n Co., 30 Minn. 392 ; Merri weth- er V. U. S., 22 Ct. of Claims, 332; Cherokee Co. v. Chew, 44 Kan. 162; Garvie v. Hartf., 54 Conn. 440; Cox V. Barlington, 43 Iowa, 612. * Council Bluffs v.Waterman, (Iowa, 92) 53 N. W. R. 289; Tacoma v. Lil- lis, (Wash. 93) 31 Pac. 321; Kirk- wood V. De Soto, 87 Cal. 394; Wren V. Luzerne Co., 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 22; State V. Raine, supra ; Woodruff v. Imperial, etc., 90 N. Y. 521; State v. Steele, 57 Tex. 200 ; Cox v. New York, 103 N. Y. 519. 117 §79 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. VI. necessary for them to appoint ; ^ and compensation for oJBBcial service should be, and almost universally is, fixed, either by charter, general law or by ordinance, or by a special contract.^ Municipal officials are always considered to have accepted of- fice, with full knowledge on their part of all such existing pro- visions, referring to their own compensation or duties.^ So, likewise and for the same reasons, a municipal official cannot recover compensation for services rendered under a statute, which is in violation of some provision of the constitution.* The authorities seem to hold that an officer de facto can- not recover the salary of the office ; * such salary being depend- ent on the legal title to the office.^ And it has been held that the officer de jure may recover his compensation from the mu- nicipality, although such compensation ^has already been made to the officer de facto? This question is however far from be- ing settled.^ And, if the paj'-ment was made prior to a deter- mination of the legal title to the office, it is held to be a good 1 Blackburne v. Oklahoma, 31 Pac. K. 782; Talbot v. E. Maohias, 76 Me. 416; Haswell v. New York, 81 N. Y. 255; Perry v. Cheboygan, 55 Micb. 250; Drott V. Kiverside, 4 Ohio Clr. Ct. 312 ; Walker v. Cook, 129 Mass. 578; State v. Brewer, 59 Ala. 130; White V. Levant, 78 Me. 568; Eowe V. Kern, 75 Cal. 353 ; Eiley v. Kansas City, 31 Mo. App. 439; Barnes v. Ba- kersfleld, 5 Vt. 375 ; Carlyle v. Sharp, 51 111. 71 ; Gamier v. St. Louis, 37 Mo. 554; Barton v. N. O., 16 La. An. 317; Posey v. Mobile Co., 50 Ala. 6; Crittenden Co. v. Crump, 25 Ark. 235; Worthen v. Grayson Co. Ct., 13 Bush, 53. 2 Smith V. Com., 41 Pa. St. 335; Devoy v. New York, 39 Barb. 169; Bladen V. Phila.,60 Pa. St. 464; Bos- worth V. New Orl., 26 La. 464. " Locke V. Ceu. City, 4 Col. 65. And he cannot claim any other com- pensation for services rendered, on any theory of an implied contract, or a quantum meruit. Dil. Mun. Corp. § 230; Coyne v. Eennie, (Cal. 93) 32 Pac. R. 578; Barnes v. Williams, 13 118 S. W. E. 845. * Meagher v. County, 5 Nev. 244; City V. Sears, 2 Col. 588; Lancaster V. Fulton, 24 W. N. C. 401. ^ Sammis v. King, 40 Conn. 298; Bentley v. Phillips, 27 Barb. 524; Peo.-v. Tieman, 30 lb. 193; State v. Carrol, 38 Conn. 471 ; Riddle v. Bedf . Co., 7 S. & E. (Pa.) 386. 6 Burke v. Edgar, 67 Cal. 182; Me chan V. Hudson, 46 N. J. L. 276; Dorsey v. Smith, 28 Cal. 21; Carroll V. Silbenthaler, 37 lb. 193; Meagher V. Co., 5 Nev. 244. ' State V. Carr, ( Ind. 92) 28 N. E. E. 88; State v. Holmes, 43 La. An. 1185; Andrews v. Portland, 79 Me. 484; Williams v. Clayton, 21 Pa. Eep. 398. 8 See cases contra to text, Parrel V. Bridgeport, 45 Conn. 191; Bruns- wick V. Fahm, 60 Ga. 109; Smith v. New York, 37 N. Y. 518; Dolan v. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 279; Hadley v. May- or, 33 N. Y. 603; Cf. McVeany v. New York, 80 N. Y. 135; and sec. 85 on Illegal Removal and cases there cited. See, also, § 88. CH. VI.] MXTNICIPAI, ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS. §79 defence to an action by the officer de jure?- But in such a case the officer de facto is liable for the amount so received to the officer de jure.^ Where the holding of a municipal office does not create any- contractual relation ^ a municipality parallel with a similar au- thority, of the state, has, unless restrained by an express rule of constitutional or statute law, the power to increase or diminish the official compensation during the official term, or at any other time.* But it has been held that the employment of a person, in a professional or semi-private capacity ; as, for example, that of engineer or attorney at law, for a fixed period at a sum agreed on (even though under an ordinance), constitutes a contract, the obligation of which cannot be impaired. But in such cases, there must be a coincidence on both sides of all the elements which constitute a contract. The services should be of a professional, rather than of an official character ; and the party entitled to compensation should be precluded from with- drawing at his pleasure, a privilege which is almost universally an incident of official positions.^ These cases are, however, not 1 Hannon v. Grizzard, 96 N. C. 293; Selby V. Portland, 14 Greg. 243; Lu- zerne Co. V. Trimmer, 95 Pa. St. 97; Peo. V. Brennan, 1 Abb. Pr. N. L 184; In re Havird (Idaho), 24 Pac. Eep. 542; Wheatley v. Covington, 11 Busli 18; Wayne Co. v. Benvit, 20 Mich. 176; 4 Am. Rep. 382; Parker v. Dak. Co., 4 Minn. 59; Andrews v. Port- land, 79 Me. 484 ; MoVeany v. Mayor, 80 N. T. 185 ; Saline v. Anderson, 20 Kan. 298; Schlass v. Hewlett, 81 Ala. 266; Shaw v. Pima Co. (Ariz. 1888), 18 Pac. Rep. 272; Steubenville v. Gulp, 38 Ohio St. 18. 2Mayfield v. Moore, 53 HI. 428; Glasscock v. Lyons, 20 Ind. 1; An- drews V. Portland, 79 Me. 484; Nich- ols V. McLean, 101 N. Y. 526; Saline Co. V. Anderson, 20 Kan. 298; Peo. V. Miller, 24 Mich. 458; Wayne Co. v. Benort, 20 lb. 176; Dolan v. Mayor, 68 K. Y. ^74; Rule v. Tait, 38 Kan. 765; Bier v. Garrell, 30 W. Va. 95; Hunter v. Chandler, 45 Mo. 452. 8 Com. V. Bacon, 6 Serg. & R. 322 ; Baker v. Pittsburgh, 4 Pa. St. 49; Univ. V. Walden, 15 Ala. 655 ; Fitz- simmons v. B'klyn, 102 N. Y. 536. * Doolan v. Manitowoc, 48 Wis. 312; Barrett v. New Oris., 38 La. An. 101; Devoy v. Mayor, 39 Barb. 169; Green v. Mayor, 5 Ab. Pr. 503; Butcher v. Camden, 29 N. J. Eq. 478; Mayor v. Gear, 27 N. J. L. 265; Crane v. Des Moines, 47 Iowa, 105 ; Augusta V. Sweeney, 44 Ga. 463; Madison v. Kelso, 32 Ind. 79; Carr V. St. Louis, 9 Mo. 191 ; Iowa City v. Foster, 10 Iowa, 189; Cox v. Bur- lington, 43 lb. 612; Gillespie v. Mayor, 6 Daly, 286; Conner v. Mayor, 5 N. Y. 285 ; Haswell v. Mayor, 81 N. Y. 255; lb. 425; Waldraven v. Memphis, 4 Coldw. 431. 6Dil. Munc. Corp. §232; Chase v. Lowell, 7 Gray, 33; Caverly v. Low- ell, 1 Allen, 289; contra, Chicago v. Edwards, 58 111. 252; Hiestand v. N. O., 14 La. An. 330. 119 §79 MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIOXS. [CH. VI. very safe guides in determining the extent of the exception to the general rule, if there be any well-founded exception at all. The qualification, that the official must not have the privilege of resigning his position, prior to the expiration of his term, is undoubtedly indispensable, but the privilege of resignation, seems to be rather a result, than a cause, of the governmental power to abolish or interfere with the duties and perquisites of the office. Thus, it is held that the appointment of a police officer for one year does not constitute a binding contract, which cannot be abrogated or altered by the city.^ But if, as is not unusual, the constitution of the state forbids any dimi- nution or increase of the salary of an officer during his incum- bency, such officer may make a contract with the government for a change in the terms of his service, which, if based upon a sufficient consideration, will be binding upon both parties.^ But, after official services have been fully rendered, an exe- cuted contract exists between the city and the official, the ob- ligation of which is always beyond impairment or change by State or municipalauthorities.^ For, at this stage of the trans- action, the relation of debtor and creditor is created, with an executed consideration on the part of the official, and the rights of the latter ma)' be enforced by mandamus.^ Such a judicial proceeding would be necessary, as a means of recovery of sal- ary already earned, even where the claimant, as treasurer or collector, has charge of the public funds. He cannot pay him- self out of these funds, or offset a legal demand made on him for such money, by his claim for compensation.® An official cannot claim an extra allowance of salary for the discharge of incidental duties, even though his compensation be grossly inadequate ; ^ or the duties pertaining to his office be 1 Chicago V. Edwards, 58 111. 252. - Crane v. Des Moines, 47 Iowa, 105 ; Iowa City v. Foster, 10 Iowa, 189. 3 Fisk V. Jef. Pol. Jury, 116 U. S. 131; Stewart v. Jef. Pol. Jury, 116 lb. 135. ■> See § 375. * New Orleans v. Fimerty, 27 La. Am. 681; 7ft re Clarke's Fees, 25 Hun, 593; Del. Co. v. Griffen, 17 Iowa, 166; State V. Boyd, 19 Nev. 356; Cullom V. Dulloff, 94 111. 330. 120 6 Beard v. Decatur, 64 Tex. 7; Hobbs V. Tonkers, 32 Hun, 454; Beckwell v. Amador Co., 30 Cal. 237; Cowen V. Mayor, 3 Hun, 632; Stock- well V. Genesee Co., 16 Mich. 221; Kernion, 1 La. An. 419 ; Bartch v. Cutler (Utah, 1890), 24 Pac. Kep. 526; Nowles V. Jasper Co., 86 Ind. 179; Stropes V. Green Co., 84 lb. 560; In re Parsons, 54 N". T. Super. Ct. 451; Bubb V. Lycoming, 134 Pa. St. 112; Shephard v. Lawrence, 141 Mass. 479 ; CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS. §79 materially increased after his acceptance of the office, and his entrance upon the performance of his duties. His only remedy in such a case is resignation. ^ A promise to reward an officer, to pay him an extra sum beyond his legal compensation, for a faithful performance of that which it was his official duty to do, is void as without consideration, and cannot be enforced by the ofQcial.2 If, however, the officer be employed or compelled by law to render services altogether unofficial which are not merely an extension of his official duties and incidental thereto, and which could as well be performed by any other person, he may, es- pecially if such service entail upon him extra trouble and ex- pense, recover additional compensation therefor.^ Upton v. U. S., 19 Ct. of CI. 46; Bai-t- lett V. U. S., 25 Ct. CI. 389; Decatur V. Vermillion, 77 111. 31.5; Stiffler v. Delaware, (Ind. 91) 27 Jf. E. K. 641; Sidway v. Com'rs, 120 111. 456; Bunn V. People, 32 111. App. 410; Hand v. Tippecanoe, 26 Ind. 179; Eowe v. Kern, Co., 72 Cal. 353; Gilbert v. Marshall, 18 B. Mon. 427; Biggs v. Brewer, 64 Ala. 282; Gordon Co. v. Harris, 81 Ga. 220; Board v. Johnson, (Ind. 91) 26 JT. E. K. 821. 1 Bussier v. Pray, 7 S. & E. (Pa.) 447; Robinson v. Dunn, 77 Cal. 473; Wendell v. Brooklyn, 29 Barbour, 204; Warner v. Trenton, 24 IST. J. L. 764; Miami Co. v. Blake, 21 Ind. 32; Jay Co. V. Templer, 34 lb. 322; Tur? pen V. Tyston Co., 7 lb. 172; Palmer V. New York, 2 Sandf. 318; Peo. V. Edmonds, 19 Barb. 468; Territory v. Carson, 7 Mont. 412; Bay ha v. Webster Co., 18 Neb. 131; State v. Bloxham, (Fla. 1890) 7 So. Eep. 878; Billings V. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 413; Lane. Co. V. Fulton, (Pa. 89) 18 Atl. Eep. 384; Haynes v. State, 3 Humph. 480; State V. Holliday, 67 Mo. 64; Wood- ruff V. State, 3 Ark. 285; Peo. v. Drolin, 33 N. Y. 269; Andrews v. Pratt, 44 Cal. 309; Peo. v. Calhoun Co., 36 Mich. 10; In re New York etc., 7 Abb. N. C. 408; Erie Co. v. Jones, 119 N". Y. 337; State v. Kelsey, 44 N. J. L. 1 ; LaGrange v. Cutler, 6 Ind. 354. 2 Pilie v. Kew Orleans, 19 La. An. 274; Decatur v. Vermillion, 77 111. 315; Gilmore v. Lewis, 12 Ohio, 281; Pool V. Boston, 5 Cush. 519; Davies V. Burns, 5 Allen, 349; Palmer v. Mayor, 2 Sandf. 318; Callahan v. Hallett, 1 Caines, 104; Eea v. Smith, 2 Handy (Ohio) 193; Eobinson v. Dunn, 77 Cal. 473; Smith v. Smith, 1 Bailey (S. C.) 70; Debolt v. Cincin- nati, 7 Ohio St. 237; Heslep v. Sacra- mento, 2 Cal. 580; Hatch v. Mann, 15 Wend. 44; Preston v. Bacon, 4 Conn. 471; Shattuck v. Woods, 1 Pick. 175. 3 United States v. Eipley, 7 Pet. 18; United States v. Brindle, 110 U. S. 688; Evans V. Trenton, 24 N. J. L. 764; Burroughs v. Norton Co., 29 Kan. 196; Love v. Baehr, 47 Cal. 364; Lang V. Board, (Ind. 89) 22 K. E. E. 667; Mc- Bride v. Gr. Rap. , 47 Mich. 236 ; Mayor V. Muzzy, 33 Mich. 61; Collier v. U. S., 22 Ct. of CI. 125; Long v. U. S., 8 lb. 398; Peo. v. Haws, 34 Barb. 69; Peo. V. Super's, 12 Wend. 257; Bright V. Supei-'s, 18 Johns. 242; Mallory v. Super's, 2 Cowen, 531; Detroitv. Eed- field, 19 Mich. 376; McBride v. De- 121 § 81 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATCONS. [CH. VI. § 80. Assignment of salary. — For the purpose of protect- ing the interests of the public service and increasing its effi- ciency, by securing to those engaged therein the full benefit of all such compensation, which they may be by law entitled to receive, it has become a universally accepted principle of law and of public policy, that the salary of an official is not assign- able.^ Money, due to officials, and remaining in the hands of the municipality or its disbursing agents, upon the same prin- ciple, is not subject to attachment or garnishment at the instance of creditors of the officials.^ § 81. Holding over after expiration of term of ofSce. — It is an almost universal rule in the United States that munici- pal officers, particularly those of a high grade, as the mayor and the officers or commissioners, who are placed at the head of the various municipal departments, shall be elected or appointed for a certain fixed and definite term. But, in the absence of any express constitutional or statutory prohibition, it is never- theless the law, that all public officers, whose terms are fixed as to duration by law, are entitled to continue in office until a successor is legally chosen and qualified.^ To prevent unavoida- troit, 47 lb. 236; Huffman v. Green- wood, 23 Kan. 281; White v. Polk Co., 9 Kan. 307; Eeif v. Paige, 55 Wis. 496. 1 Bliss V. Lawrence, 58 N. T. 442; Bangs V. Dunn, 66 Cal. 72; Schlass v. Hewlett, 81 Ala. 266; King v. Hawk- ins, Arizona (1888), 16 Pac. Rep. 434; Field V. Chipley, 79 Ky. 260;Beal V. McVicker, 8 Mo. App. 202; Billings ^. O'Brien, 45 How. Pr. 392; Shannon V. Bruner, 36 Fed. Rep. 147; Brackett V. Blake, 7 Met. 335 ; Conway v. Cut- ting, 51 N. H. 407; State v. Hastings, 15 Wis. 78; Mulhall v. Quinn, 1 Gray, 105; Macomber v. Duane, 2 Allen, 541. 2Ladd V. Sale, 57 N. H. 210; Bulk- ley V. Eckert, 3 Pa. St. 368; Memphis V. Laski, 9Heisk, 511; Bank v. Dib- rell, 3 Sneed, 379; Dewey v. Garvey, 130 Mass. 89; Troy, etc. v. Com., 127 lb. 43; Hawthorn v. St. Louis, 11 Mo. 59; Sch. Dis. No. 4 v. Gage, 39 122 Mich. 434; Tracy v. Hombuckle, 8 Bush. 336; Merrell v. Campbell, 49 Wis. 535 ; Buchanan v. Alexander, 4 How. 20; Hodgson v. Dexter, 1 Cranoh, 345; Mayor etc. v. Root, 8 Md. 95 ; Mayor etc. v. Rowland, 26 Ala. 498; Clark v. Mobile Com'rs, 36 lb. 621; McMeekin v. State, 9 Ark. 563 ; Ward v. Hartf. Co., 12 Conn. 404; Merwin v. Chicago, 45 111. 133; Trie- bel V. Colburn, 64 111. 370; Hightower V. Slaton, 54 Ga. 108 ; Caiaker v. Math- ews, 25 Ga. 571 ; Divine v. Harvey, 7 B. Mon. 439. ^ Chandler v. Bradish, 23 Vt. 416; Sob. Dis. V. Atherton, 12 Met. 105; Dow V. Bullock, 13 Gray, 136; Peo. V. Fairbury, 51 111. 149; State v. Pa- gan, 42 Conn. 32 ; Wier v. Bush, 4 Litt. 433; Stratton v. Oulton, 28 Cal. 44; Central v. Sears, 2 Colo. 588; Walker v. Ferrill, 58 Ga. 512; State V. Harrison, 113 Ind. 440; Thomas v. Owens, 4 Mo. 188; Robb v. Carter, 63 CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICEKS. §81 ble lapses, and to give certainty and permanence to this rea- sonable rule of the American common law, it has in most of the States been incorporated into a statute.^ An official's right to hold over, which terminates with the election and qualifica- tion of a successor, is not revived by the death or disability of the successor, where such death or disability occurs after quali- fication, although it may happen before the successor has be- gun to serve. This, at least, is the conclusion of the cases cited in the note below.^ But inasmuch as the enforcement of this rule would bring about the same evil consequences, which attend any delay in the election or qualification of the successor after the expiration of the incumbent's term of office, and wliich the provision for holding over was intended to prevent, it would seem to be reasonable to extend the provision for holding over, until the successor has actually entered upon the performance of his official duties, and such has been the ruling in one case.* When a municipal corporation has been legislated out of ex- istence ; * or when the official has for some cause forfeited his office,^ the rule, enabling officei's to hold over, has no applica- tion whatever. Upon the principle that no one shall profit by his own wrong, where it is made the express duty of officials to give notice for and to hold an election, at which their succes- sor shall be chosen, and they, even though inadvertently, neg- Ib. 329; Overseers v. Sears, 22 Pick. 130; People v. Ferris, 16 Hun, 219; Cordiell v. Frizell, 1 Nev. 130; State V. Wells, 8 lb. 105 ; York County v. Small, 1 W. & S. (Pa.) 315. 1 Peo. V. Whitman, 10 Cal. 38; Peo. V. Tilton, 37 lb. 614; State v. Fagan, 42 Conn. 32; Peo. v. Keid, 11 Cal. 138; Bonner v. State, 7 Ga. 473; Peo. V. Fairbury, 51 111. 149; State v. Berg, 50Ind. 149; Elam v. State, 75 Ind. 518; Gosman V. State, 106 Ind. 203; State V. Harrison, 113 Ind. 440; Wa- pello V. Bigham, lOIo-wa, 39; Killion V. Herman, 43 Kan. 37; Marshall v. Harwood, 5 Md. 423; Dow v. Bul- lock, 13 Gray (Mass.) 156; People v. Lord, 9 Mich. 227; State v. Thomas, 102 Mo. 85; State v. Smith, 87 Mo. 158; Tappan v. Gray, 9 Paige, 507; State V. Howe, 28 Ohio St. 588; State V. Brewster, 44 lb. 589; Com. v. Han- ley, 9 Pa. St. 513; Macoy v. Curtis, 14 S. C. 367; James v. Jefferson, 66 Tex. 578; Vaughan v. Johnson, 77 Va. 300; State v. Washburn, 17 Wis. 658; Tuley v. State, 1 Ind. 500, 502; Wheeling v. Black, 25 W. Va. 266; Peo. V. Eunkel, 9 John. 147; Vernon Soc. V. Hills, 6 Cow. 23; Slee v. Bloom, 5 Johns. Ch. 366; Bank v. Petway, 3 Humph. (Tenu.) 522. estate V. Seay, 64 Mo. 89; State v. Hopkins, 10 Ohio St. 509. 3 Com. V. Hanley, 9 Pa. St. 513. ^BeckwitU v. Racine, 7 Biss. 142; State V. Bailey, 37 Ohio St. ; Barkley V. Levee Com'rs, 93 U. S. 258. 5 Hyde V. State, 52 Miss. 055. 123 §82 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. VI. lect to do so, thej' cannot hold over as against the public, although they are entitled by the charter to remain in office until their successors are elected and. qualified.^ § 82. Vacancies. — An office may be defined to be vacant, in contemplation of law, when it is not occupied by one who is lawfully entitled to its incumbency until the happening of some future contingency. An office is vacant, even though there be an incumbent de facto, whether his title to the office was originally defective, or his lawful title to the same has since expired.^ An appointment, made to fill a supposed vacancj' which does not in fact exist, is void ab initio, and cannot be validated sub- sequently.* And, although an officer's resignation, tendered to take effect in the future, will create a vacancy in the office, when the time of taking effect arrives, the fact that it may be withdrawn prior thereto, makes it impossible for a new appoint- ment to be made to such an office, until the resignation has actually taken effect and a vacancy actually created.* It has, however, been held that, if there is no express prohibition of the law, a present exercise of tlie power of appointment, anticipa- tory of a future vacancy, or to fill a newly created office, is valid ;* but no officer, whose own term is to expire, before the vacancy occurs, will be allowed thereby to unjustly deprive his successor of his official privilege.^ And it may be stated, as a general rule, that a vacancy in an office already existing occurs only when the official term fixed by law has expired,^ or upon the death, resignation or removal of the de Jure incumbent,* ' Peo. V. Bartlett, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 422; Lynch v. Lafland, 4 Colder (Tenn.) 96. estate V. Harrison, 113 Ind. 434; Peo. V. Van Home, 18 Wend. 518; State V. Howe, 25 Ohio St. 588 ; State V. MeNeely, 24 La, An. 19; Com. v. Hanley, 9 Pa. St. 513; Peo. v. La- combe, 34 Hun, 409; State v. Had- ley, 64 N. H. 473; State v. Seay, 64 Mo. 89; Peo. v. Whitman, 10 Cal. .38; Stocking V. State, 7 Ind. 326; Collins V. State, 8 lb. 344. " State V. Peele, 124 Ind. 51-5 ; see 12i Lindsey v. Luckett, 20 Tex. 516; People V. Witherell, 14 Mich. 48. 4 Biddle v. Willard, 10 Ind. 63. 5 State V. Van Buskirk, 40 N. J. L. 463 ; Haight v. Love, 39 lb. 14. 6 State V. Meehan, 45 N. J. L. 189; Haight V. Love, supra ; Ivy v. Lusk, 11 La. An. 486. ' State V. Harrison, 113 Ind. 434. ' States V. Johns, 3 Oregon, 533; State V. Newark, 27 N. J. L. ; Johnston v. Wilson, 2 N. H. 202; Peo. V. Langdon, 8 Cal. 1; Peo. v, Bissell, 49 Cal. 407. CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS. §82 or through the occurrence of some event, by which the duties cease to be legally discharged by any one.^ The insanity of the incumbent does not necessarily create a vacancy,^ nor will a judgment of ouster in a quo warranto proceeding.^ If an enumeration is made by statute of the events which will create a vacancy, all others must be presumed to be ex- cluded ; the law favoring the continuity of oiScial service, rather than its cessation or interruption.* There is nothing peculiar in the legal meaning of the term " vacancy," when applied to official positions ; and there is no reasonable ground for the distinction, which is sometimes made, between offices newly created, and those to which others had already been appointed or elected. An office will be vacant, in either case, where there is no lawful incumbent.^ No vacancy is created if, upon the expiration of the term of an elective officer, he holds over un- til his successor shall have been elected ; and there is a failure to fill the position by election or the duly elected successor dies, or neglects to qualify.® The incumbent continues to hold over, as officer de jure'' But the reverse of the rule, above given, obtains, when it is expressly declared that failure of the successor to qualify, on or before a certain date, shall create a vacancy.^ In the absence of any authority to hold over, the office, of course, becomes vacant, immediately upon a failure to elect or qualify.^ ' Peo. V. Bissell, 49 Cal. 407; State V. Howe, 25 Ohio St. 588; States v. Jones, 19 Ind. 356. 2 State V. Pidgeon, 8 Blackf . 132. s State V. Balls etc., 45 Mo. 58. * Eosborougli v. Boardman, 67 Cal. 116; Peo. V. Whitman, 10 Cal. 38. 5 Stocking V. State, 7 Ind. 326; Collins V. State, 8 Ind. 344. «Com. V. Hanley, 7 Pa. St. 513; Peo. V. Mizner, 7 Cal. 19; Cordille v. Frizell, 1 Nev. 130; Ex parte Law- thoine, 18 Gratt. 85 ; Tappan v. Gray, 9 Paige, 507; State v. Lusk, 18 Mo. 333; Gosman V. State, 106 Ind. 203; State V. Harrison, 113 Ind. 434; Stew- art V. State, 4 lb. 396; State v. Mc- MuUen, 46 lb. 307; Peo. v. Bissell, 49 Cal. 407; People v. Tilton, 47 lb. 614. 'Walker v. Ferrill, 58 Ga. 512; Elam V. State, 75 Ind. 518; Brady v. Howe, 50 Miss. 607; Sappington v. Scott, 14 Md. 40; Smoot v. Somer- ville, 59 lb. 88; contra, State v. Cooke, 54 Tex. 482. 8 Peo. V. Crissey, 91 N. Y. 610; Peo. V. Wilson, 72 N. C. 155; State V. Washburn, 17 Wis. 658; Adv. Opin., 5 So. Eep. 613; Win. Co. v. Maynard, 44 Iowa, 15 ; State v. Matli- eney, 7 Kan. 327; State v. Hunt, 54 N. H. 431. 9 Peo. V. Curtis, 1 Idaho N. S. 753; Peo. V. Baine, 6 Cal. 509; King v. Mc- Lure, 84 N. C. 153 ; Mayoralty Case, 19 Gratt. 673. 125 83 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIOIirS. [CH. VI. § 83. Removals — When for canse. — Where there are no constitutional or statutory restraints, and where the duration of the official term is not fixed by law, the power of removal is an incident of the power to appoint ; and it may be exercised at the pleasure of the appointing officer.^ Such a power of removal at pleasure while it is discretionary, is not judicial, and the officer exercising it has the sole and ex- clusive right to pronounce upon the propriety of using it.^ And no notice or hearing need be accorded to the official before being removed.^ But such arbitrary power of removal does not exist, when the official tenure is fixed by law,* or when the right to remove can be exercised for cause only.^ So, if the officer be appointed to hold during the pleasure of some third officer, the appointing officer cannot remove him arbitrarily, nor can an offi- cer, holding office at the pleasure of the appointing power, be removed by any other person, except it be for malfeasance in office, by judicial decree.^ The power of removal for cause is strictly construed, and its exercise should be restrained within the limits assigned to it ^Newsome v. Cocke, 44 Miss. 352; Williams v. Gloucester, 148 Mass. 2.56; Hudson v. Denver, 12 Colo. 157; 20Pac. R. 329; State v. Alt 26 Mo. App. 673; State v. Pol. Com'rs, 88 Mo. 144; People v. Whitlock, 92 N. Y. 191; Peo. v. Robb, 126 lb. 180; Peo. V. Thompson, 94 N. Y. 451; Peo- ple V. Kobb, 27 X. E. R. 267 (N. Y. 91); People v. Cain, 47 N. W. R. 484; 84 Mich. 223; State v. Somers, (Keb. 93) 53 N. W. K. 146; People v Pur- loy, 10 N. Y. Sup. 181; Avery v. Ty- ringham, 3 Mass. 277; Blake v. U. S., 103 tJ. S. 227; Evans v. Jus., 3 llayw. (Tenn.) 26; Madison v. Kelso, 32Ind. 79; State v. Kiichli, (Minn. 93) 54 N. W. R. 1069; Carter v. Du- rango, 27 Pac. R. 1057; 16 Colo. 534; State v. Common, 6 Atl. R. 518; 49 N. ,T. L. 177; People v. Fire Com'rs, 73 K. Y. 437; Peo. v. Mayor, 16 Hun, 309; Ford v. Board etc., 81 Cal. 19; "Williams v. Boughner, 6 Coldw. 486; Com. V. Sutherland, 3 So. E. 14.j; 126 Houseman v. Com., 100 Pa. St. 222; Cincin. v. Sloane, 31 Ohio St. 1 ; State V. Barrow, 29 La. An. 243; Smith v. Brown, 59 Cal. 672; State v. St. Louis, 90 Mo. 672. 2 People V. Mayor, 82 N. Y. 491. sField V. Com., 32 Pa. St. 478; State V. St. Louis, 90 Mo. 19; State v. Ste- vens, 46 N. J. L. 344; State v. Mc- Garry, 21 Wis. 496; Smithy. Brown, 59 Cal. 672. *Dil. Mun. Corp. § 250 ; People v. Flynn, 62 N. Y. 375; People v. Hill, 7 Cal. 79; People v. Jewett, 6 lb. 291; State v. Chatburn, 63 Iowa, 659; Keenau v. Perry, 24 Tex. 253 ; Col- lins v. Tracy, 36 lb. 546. 6 Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S. 201; Kennard v. Louisiana, 92 lb. 480; People V. Hayden, 133 N. Y. 198; Field V. Com., 32 Pa. St. 478; Duer V. Board, (N. J. 93) 26 Atl. 144; Wil- son v. DuUam, 53 Mich. 392; Com. v. McReak, 20 S. W. R. 220 (Ky. 91). « Carr v. State, 111 Ind. 101. CH. YI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICEKS. §83 by the enabling statute.^ Where removals are authorized for causes named in , the statute, removals can be made 6n\y for such causes, and others of a similar nature.^ The power to re- move subordinates, for the purpose of reducing the number of officials employed, cannot be exercised to create vacancies to be filled by the appointing power ; ^ but it should in this connec- tion be observed that the Legislature may confer upon a mu- nicipal official the authority to make removals for cause, and to make him the sole judge of the sufficiency of the cause.* The power to remove for cause is judicial in its nature ; and when conferred upon superior officers, it must be exercised rea- sonably ; not capriciously or arbitraiily, but in the spirit of impartiality and fairness; and must be guarded by proper pre- cautions against favoritism and injustice.^ For this reason, the exercise of the power is always subject to judicial review.® If the cause of removal be misconduct on tlie part of the official it must, in order to justify his removal, be of such a character as to affect his performance of official duty,' and not merely such iDuerr v. Board, (N. J. 93) 26 Atl. R. 144; People v. McLean, 21 N. T. Supp. 625; Cleary V. Trenton, 20 N. J. L. 331; Clark v. Cape May, 50 lb. 558; Clark v. Peo., 15 111. 213; Haw- kins V. Kercheval, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 535; State V. Chamber, 20 Wis. 63; Mead v. Dreas, 36 Mich. 416; State V. Lingo, 26 Mo. 496; People v. Al- bany M. Col., 62 How. Pr. 220; State V. Jer. City, 1 Dutch. (N. J.) 536; Mayor etc. v. Shaw, 16 Ga. 172; Com. V. Slifer, 25 Pa. St. 28; Crawford v. Township, 24 Mich. 248; McGregor V. Gladwine Co., 37 lb. 388. MVellman v. Board, 84 Mich. 558; 47 N. W. E. 558 ; Peo. v. Higgins, 15 111. 110; Dubrie v. Voss, 10 La. An. 210; State v. McGarry, 21 Wis. 496; Com. yf. Williams, 79 Ky. 42. ^ Lincoln v. Yeoman, (Neb. 92) 51 N. W. R. 844; State v. Schumaker, 27 La. An. 332. " Patton V. Vaughan, 39 Ark. 211 ; Wilson V. People, 90 111, 186; People V. New York, 82 N. Y. 491; Keenan V. Perry, 24 Tex. 253; State v. Do- herty, 25 La. An. 119; Nolan v. New Orleans, 10 lb. 106; State v. Reg- ister, 59 Md. 283; Peo. v. Whitlock, 92 N. Y. 191; State v. Stevens, 46 N. J. L. 344; People v. Board etc., 73 N. Y. 437; State v. Board etc., 26 Ohio St. 24; State v. McGarry, 21 Wis. 496. ^Duerr V. Board, supra; Madison V. Korbley, 32 Ind. 74; Stadler v. Detroit, 33 Mich. 346; Stockwell v. Township, 22 Mich. 341 ; Dullam v. Wilson, 53 lb. 392; In re Eaves, 30 Fed. Rep. 21; Randall v. State, 16 Wis. 340; Larkinv. Noonan, 19 lb. 82. 6 People v. McLean, 57 Hun, 587; Foster V. Kansas, 112 lb. 201; Wil- lard's App., 4 E. L 601 ; Field v. Com., 32 Pa. St. 478; State v. Bryoe, 7 Ohio, pt.l, 282; In re Nichols, 57 How. Pr. 395; Page v. Hardin, 8B. Mon. (Ky.) 672; see also 58 Hun, 603; 59 lb. 623; 58 lb. 654; 63 lb. 633. ' Clapp v. Board of Pol., 72 N. Y. 415; Com. v. Williams, 79 Ky. 42; People v. Board, 55 Hun, 445 ; Com. V. Chambers, 1 J. J. Marsh, 160; 127 §83 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. vr. moral delinquencies, which only affect his character as an iiidi- vidualnnember of the community ; unless the offence be of such an infamous character as to render him unfit to exercise any public office, because it would shock the public sense of decency, to permit him to retain his office. Such a state of affairs would make it impossible for the offending ofEcial to perform the du- ties of the office in an acceptable manner.^ While the forego- ing statement is a reasonably correct statement of the existing law, it must, however, be remembered that a most radical change in public opinion on this question is taking place, par- ticularly in regard to the effect of unchastity on the fitness of a candidate for public office, which will probably effect a uioje or less serious modification of the existing law.^ If the offence be criminal^ but it does not constitute a breach of official duty, it. is held by many cases, in consonance with the legal princi- ple that every man must be presumed to be innocent until his guilt be proven, that the officer should not be deprived of his office, until his guilt has been judicially established in a court of competent jurisdiction.^ If the official be accused of an of- fence which is a breach of duty, but which is not at the same tiriie a crime, he is triable by the official in whom the power of removal is vested.* And when the offence is both a breach of duty and a criminal or infamous offence, the offending official may be tried and removed for the breach of duty, before trial for the public delinquency.^ When misconduct or malfeasance is Com. V. Barry, Hard. (Ky.) 229; Mc- Comas V. Krug, 81 Ind. 327; State V. Savage, 89 Ala. 1. 1 Com. V. St. Patricks, 9Binn. (Pa.) 441; Com. v. Guardians, etc., 6 S. & R. (Pa.) 469; Society v. Com., 52 Pa. St. 125; Evans v. Phila. Club, 50 lb. 107; Peo. V. Board, etc., 72 N. Y. 445; Com. v. Shaver, 3W. <& S. (Pa.) 338; Breckinridge v. State, 27 Tex. App. 513; Peo. v. Cooper, 57 How. Pr. 416; Mayor v. Shaw, 16 Ga. 172. ^ See Tiederaan's Limitations of Police Power, § 17 c. 2 Com. V. Jones, 10 Bush, 725 ; State V. Humphries, 74 Tex. 466; Cum- mings V. Missouri, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 277; Peo. V. Board, 9 Hun, 222; 20 Hun, 128 333; Rex v. Richardson, 1 Burr. 517, 538 (1758), is a leading case; Barker V. Peo., 3 Cow. 686; Mayor, etc., v. Shaw, 16 Ga. 172; In re Dorsey, 7 Port. (Ala.) 293; Cort v. State, 28 Ark. 417; Com. v. Chambers, 1 J. J' Mai-sh. (Ky.) 160; see contra, Peo. v. French, 32 Huu, 112; 60 How. Pr. 377; Peo. v. Board, 11 Hun, 403; Oliver v. City Council, 69 Ga. 165. * Rex V. Richardson, 1 Burr. 517; Com. V. St. Patricks, etc., 2Binn.441. 5 Rex V. Chalke, 6 Comb. 397; Don- ohue V. Will Co., 100 111. 94; Peo. v. French, 32 Hun, 112 ; 60 How. Pr. 377; Rex v. Wells, 4 Burr. 1999; Dil. Mun. Corp. §251. CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS. §84 named as the cause for removal, the words have reference to the official conduct of the officer, and .signify a vtfillful or negli- gent breach of his duty, or a perversion of his official authority, by which some one is unjustly injured.^ The elements of ille- gality, neglect, omission of duty or corruption must be present, in order to constitute official misconduct or malfeasance.^ § 84. Proceedings to remove for cause. — When it is pro- vided that the official tenure shall continue during good be- havior, or when the power oE removal can only be exercised upon the occurrence of certain specified causes, there must be a notice to the accused official, a formulated charge, a hearing of the evidence in its support, and an opportunity granted to the party defendant of making a defence.^ The accused official is entitled to a personal notice of the charges which have been made against him, and of the time when the trial will take place.* The body, which is empowered to conduct the trial, should be composed of all those officials, in whom the power of removal is vested.^ It is not necessary that the citation should set out all the charges in detail ; ^ but it is a well settled rule, that the basis of the proceedings must be specific charges, suffi- cient, if proven, to furnish a cause for removal.^ It is the right 1 Wellman v. Board, 51 N. W. E. 1070; O'Neill v. Register, (Md. 92) 23 Atl. 960; Peo. v. Mays, 117 III. 237; Peo. V. Jordan, 90 N. Y. 53; State v. Hixon, 41 Mo. 210; State v. Teasdale, 21 Fla. 652; Minkler v. State, 14 Neb. 181; Hughes v. Court, 42 N. W. K. 984; 75 Mich. 574; Taggart v. Detroit, 38 N. W. R. 714; State v. Hawkins, 44 OMo St. fS; People v. Com'rs, 49 H. T. Super. Ct. 369; Woods v. Var- num, 83 Cal. 46; Runnels v. State, Walk. (Miss.) 146; State v. Jersey City, 25 N. J. L. 536; Mayor v. Shaw, 16 Ga. 172. 2 Peo. V. Board, 55 Hun, 445; State V. Council, (Minn. 93) 55 N. W. R. 118; Coit V. Lyons, 33 Conn. 109; Mil- liken v. Council, 54 Tex. 388; Oliver V. Council, 69 Ga. 163. a State V. Smith, 52 N. W. R. 700 (Neb. 92) ; Duerr v. Board, 26 Atl. R. 144 (N. J. 93); Field v. Com. 32 Pa, 9 St. 478; Hoboken v. Gear, 3 Dutch. 265; Madison v. Korbley, 32 Ind. 74; Stadler v. Detroit, 13 Mich. 346. * The accused may waive notice by appearance and answer, or by a total desertion of the place; as, for ex- ample, where he has removed from his former residence, and changed his domicile permanently. Dil. Muu. Corp. §254; Rex v. Ipswich, 2 Ld. Ray. 1240; Rex v. Grimes, 5 Burr. 2601. 5 Charles v. Mayor, etc., 27 N.J. L. 203; Jacksonville V. Allen, 25 111. Ap. 54; Andrews V. King, 77 Me. 224; Peo. V. Board, 23 Hun, 351. I* Peo. V. Benev. Soc, 24 How. Pr. 216; Society v. Van Dyke, 2 Whart. ^Pa.) 309; In re Nichols, 6 Abb. New Cas. 474; Peo. v. Com'rs, etc., 106 N. T. 64. 'Woods V. Varnura, 85 Cal. 639; Peo. V. Mayor, etc., 19 Hun, 441; Peo- 129 §85 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIOKS. [CH. VI. of the accused to have reasonable time and opportunity, in which to prepare his defence, to employ and be represented at the hearing by counsel, to call witnesses in his defence, and to cross-examine the witnesses and take exception to the testi- mony offered against him.^ Although the rules governing judi- cial procedure are substantially applicable,^ yet the proceedings are not required to be carried on with that degree of preciseuess, which is usual in common law pleading and practice.* In every case, the truth of the charges must if not admitted be proven.* If an officer refuses to surrender his office, after he has been re- moved by the lawful authority and in a lawful manner, he may be ousted by a proceeding in quo warranto.^ § 85. Proceedings in case of illegal removal — Right to salary when wrongfully deprived of his office. — The courts of general jurisdiction exercise a supervisory power over re- movals for cause ; ^ and will grant a mandamus to restore an official who has been erroneously or illegally removed.'' An official of a municipal corporation, who has been illegally removed, can also recover the amount of compensation due him from the date of his removal to that of his reinstatement, or to the expiration of his term.^ But in determining, whether the pie V. Carroll, 42 Hun, 438;.Peo. v. French, 102 N. Y. 583; Peo. v. Nich- ols, 79 lb. 582; Peo. v. Stavks, 33 Hun, 384; Peo. v. Therrien,80 Mich. 187; In re Nichols, 57 How. Pr. 397; Peo. V. Fire Com'rs, 77 N. Y. 153. iDuerr v. Board, 26 Atl. 144; Peo- ple V. Hanuan, 56 Hun, 469; State v. Bryce, 7 Ohio, pt. 2, 414; Murdock V. Academy, 12 Pick. 244; In re Nich- ols, 6 Abb. N. C. 474; In re Em- mett, 65 How. Pr. 266; Ledbetter v. State, 10 Ala. 241; Peo. v. Nichols, 79 N. Y. 582. 2 Peo. V. Doolittle, 44 Hun, 293; Peo. v. Therrien, 80 Mich. 187; Peo. V. Starks, 33 Hun, 384. " People V. McClave, 123 N. Y. 512; 25 N. E. E. 1047; McAulliffe v. New Bedford, (Mass. 92) 29 N. E. E. 517; People V. Com'rs, 98 N. Y. 332. « People V. Eobb, 6 N. Y. S. 831 ; State V. Board, 6 Atl. E. 659; 49 N. 130 J. L. 170; Peo. v. Cooper, 58 How. Pr. 358; Callahan v. State, 2 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 379; Com. v. Arnold, 3 Litt. (Ky. ) 309. 5 Eex V. Doncaster, 2 Ld. Eaym. 1566; Cushing v. Frankfort, 57 Me. 541; Jay's Case, 1 Vent. 302. See post, §§ 381, 382. 6 Woods V. Varnum, 83 Cal. 46; Mayor v. Brown, 54 Ga. 229; Peo. v. French, 60 How. Pr. 377; Storer v. Washington, Peck (Tenn.) 334. ' People v. Campbell, 82 N. Y. 247; Com. V. German Soc, 15 Pa. St. 251; State V. Jersey City, 1 Dutch. 536; Donnelly v. Teasdale, 21 Fla. 632. See post, § 372. sstadler v. Detroit, 13 Mich. 346; Shaw V. Mayor, 19 Ga. 468; Eiley v. Kansas City, 31 Mo. Ap. 439; Hobo- ken V. Gear, 3 Dutch. (N. J.) 275; White V. Mayor, 4 E. D. Smith, 563. CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AST) OFFICERS. §85 removal was unlawful, the reviewing court will not be confined to the consideration of the grounds which were assigned for the removal, but may and should consider all the facts and cir- cumstances of the case which affect the question of legality of the removal, and find for the city, whenever there is sufficient justification for the removal, whether the authorities made the removal on that ground or on some other untenable ground.^ Where, however, there is no legal justification for the removal,, either assigned or not referred to, the officer may be reinstated, and be given a judgment for back salary, even though the au- thorities, who made the removal, acted in a judicial capacity, and in pursuance of judicial power, vested in them by law ; '■^ unless the statute, which vests this judicial power of removal in the municipal authorities, expressly declares that their judg- ment is final and denies the right of appeal to the courts of general jurisdiction ; when the latter courts in that case have no jurisdiction over the case.^ And so, also, where a municipal official is under arrest to answer a charge of crime, brought by the state, and he is removed and his successor appointed ; his acquittal from the criminal charge does not give him an action against the city for the salary, of which he had been deprived.* The incumbent of an office is, however, entitled to compensar tion until he receives actual notice of his removal ; ^ and, so it has been held, until his successor has been appointed.'' But whether the municipality is liable to its officer dejure for salary for any period, during which the officer was not actually in office, even though he was prevented wrongfully from occu- pying the position, has been decided both in the negative "^ and yor etc. v. Shaw's Adm'r, 25 Ga. 590; Hex v. Mayor, 2 Cowp. 523; King V. Mayor, 12 T. K. 182. 2 Shaw V. Mayor etc., 19 Ga. 468; Shaw V. Mayor etc., 21 6a. 280; s. c, Mayor etc. v. Shaw, 25 Ga. 590. 8 Nolan V. New Orleans, 10 La. An. 106. See Queen v. Atlanta, 59 Ga. 318. 4 Brunswick V. Fahn, 60 Ga. 109. ' Jarvis v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 2 N. T. Leg. Obs. 396. ' White V. Mayor of New York, 4 E. D. Smith, 563. 'Brunswick v. Fahn, 60 Ga. 109; State V. Milne, (Neb. 93) 54 N. W. E. 521; Newtonville v. Gulp, 38 Ohio St. 13; Farrell v. Bridgeport, 45 Conn. 191 ; State v. Davis, 44 Mo. 131 ; Smith V. New York, 37 N. Y. 518; Wayne v. Benoit, 20 Mich. 176; Saline v. An- derson, 20 Kan. 298; Webster v. Kan- sas City, 64 Mo. 493 ; Dolan v. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 279; Queen v. Atlanta, 59 Ga. 318; Hadley v. Mayor, 83 N. Y. 603. 131 §86 MTJNICIPAL COKPORATIONS. [CH. VI. the afiSrmative ; ^ according to whether the courts consider the matter of official salary, as a question of compensation for services rendered, or as one of personal right, as a perquisite or appurtenant to one's lawful title to the office, something in the nature of a private franchise. And while it is generally- held that the officer de facto is not entitled to the salary at- tached to the office, although he may perform his official duties satisfactorily ; ^ it seems to be generally settled everywhere, that the courts will not ordinarily interfere to restrain the pay- ment of official salary, pending a contest over the possession of the office by the opposing claimants, unless the bill shows special grounds for equitable relief.^ But where the liability of the city for back salary to an officer, who is unlawfully kept out of office by an intruder, is denied, the officer dejure, upon establishment of his right to the office, may maintain an action for damages against the usurper for the salary which he had drawn for the time during which he had been the officer de facto.* And where the usurping official had received only a part of such salary, the balance may be recovered of the city by the officer de jure, upon his installation in office.^ § 86. Resignations — Incompatible oflBces — Change of residence.^" An office must be resigned either expressly or by ■Phila. v. Given, 60 Pa. St. 136; Memphis v. Woodward, 12 Heisk. 499; People v. Miller, 24 Midi. 458; Savage v. Piokard, 14 Lea, 46; Fitz- siraons v. Brooklyn, 102 N". Y. 536; ^V'illiams V. Clayton, 21 Pao. R. 398; Andrew^s v. Portland, 79 Me. 484; Dorsey v. Smith, 28Cal. 21; Meagher V. County, 5 Nev. 244; Carroll v. Sie- benthale, 37 Cal. 193. estate V. Carroll, 38 Conn. 471; Bentley v. Phelps, 27 Barb. 524; Samis v. King, 40 Conn. 298; People V. Tieman, 30 Barb. 193; Riddle v. Bedford Co., 7 Serg. & R. 386. Cf. contra, Behan v. Board of Com'rs, (Ariz. 93) 31 Pac. 521; Blackburn v. Oklahoma, 31 Pac. 382. 8 Field v. Commonwealth, 32 Pa. St. 478; Colton v. Price, 50 Ala. 424; Queen v. Governors, etc., 8 Ad. & 182 El. 632; Bruner v. Bryan, 50 Ala. 523; Bowerbank v. Morris, Wall. C. C. R. 118; In re Ramsay, 83 Eng. C. L. 174; Page v. Hardin, 8 B. Men. 648; In re Henner, 13 Pet. 230; post, §§ 392, 393. ' 4 Dorsey v. Smythe, 28 Cal. 21; Nichols V. McLean, 101 N. Y. 526; City V. Given, 60 Pa. St. 136; People V. Nolan, 102 N. Y. 539; Douglas v. State, Sllnd. 429;Strattonv. Sulton, 28 Cal: 44; State v. Sherwood, 42 Mo. 179; Allen v. McKeau, 1 STimn. 276; Beyter v. Dodsworth, 6 T. E. 681; Hunter v. Chandler, 45 Mo. 452; 10 Am. L. Reg. 440; People v. Miller, 24 Mich. 458; Sadler v. Evans, 4 Burr. 1984. 5 McVeany v. New York, 80 N. Y. 185 ; Beuoit v. Wayne Co., 20 Mich. 176, Cooley, J., dissenting. CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OEFICBES. § implication.^ At common law, a tender or offer of one's resig- nation is revocable until accepted ; and the act is not a resig- nation until the offer shall have been accepted by the proper authority.^ This English rule has been commonly followed in America, wherever it has not been changed by statute,^ although it cannot be said to be definitely settled. There are many American decis^ions, which hold that a resignation creates a vacancy, as soon as it comes to the hands of the proper authority, without any acceptance, express or implied.* And this is in- variably so, if the statute provides that the officer may resign at pleasure.® Unless prescribed by statute, no particular form of words are required in a resignation ; ® and the acceptance ma}-^ be implied as well ,as express."^ It is a well settled rule at common law, that the acceptance by an officer of a second office, which is incompatible with the first, is equivalent to and implies his resignation of the first, and that the first office is vacant with- out any other act on his part, and without a proceeding for re- moval or quo warranto? If the first office be one, from which 1 Dillon's Mun. Corp. §224; Eeg. of University, 9 Gill & J. (Md.) 365, 422. 2 Rex V. Lane, 2 Ld. Raymond, 1304. "Thompson v. U. S., 103 U. S.4'71; Edwards V. U. S., 103 lb. 471; Ore- gon V. Jennings, 119 U. S. 74; State V. Newark, 27 N. J. L. 198; State v. Ferguson, 31 N. J. L. 120; Greene v. Hudson Co., 44 N. J. L. 388; Hoke V.Henderson, 4 Dev. (N. C.) 1; 25 Am. Dec. 677; London v. Headon, 76 N. C. 72; Jones v. Jefferson, 66 Tex. 576;Waycross v. Youmans, 80 Ga. 708; Hetherington v. Sterry, 28 Kan. 429; Rogers v. Slonaker, 32 lb. 193. ■•U. S. V. Wright, 1 McLean, 509; Gilbert v. Luce, 11 Barb. 91 ; 01m- stead V. Dennis, 77 N. Y. 378; Bunt- ing V. Willis, 27 Gratt. 144; 21 Am. Rep. 338; Smith v. Dyer, 1 Cull. (Va.) 562; Gates v. Del. Co., 12 Iowa, 405; State V. Mayor, 4 Neb. 260; State v. Clark, 3 Nev. 566; State v. Pitts, 49 Ala. 402; People v. Porter, 6 Cal. 26. 6 Amy v. Watertown, 130 U. S. 302; Reese v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 107 (resignation to avoid mandamus), and Leav. Co. v. Sellew, 99 0. S. 624; Leav. V. Kinney, 99 U. S. 623 ; Dillon Mun. Corp. § 861 6. « Van Orsdale v. Hazard, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 243, 248; State v. Allen, 21 Ind. 516; Peo. v. Pol. Board, 26 N. Y. 316; Edwards v. U. S., 103 U. S. 471; Peo. V. Brooklyn, 77 N. Y. 503. ' Edwards v. United States, 103 U. S. Rep. 471; Gates v. Del. Co., 12 Iowa, 405; Pace v. People, 50111. 432. 8 Com. V. Hawkes, 123 Mass. 525; Magie v. Stoddard, 25 Conn. 565; Peo. V. Hanifan, 96 111. 420; Dailey v. State, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 329; Lucas V. Shepherd, 16 Ind. 368; State v. Butz, 9 S. C. 156; State v. Hutt, 2 Ark. 282; Wilson v. King, 3 Litt. (Ky.) 457; State v. Newhouse, 29 La. 133 §86 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. VI. the officer cannot resign without the concurrence of superior au- thority, the acceptance of an incompatible office does not work an absolute vacancy of the first office, unless the superior au- thority be privy to the incompatible appointment.^ But in this country, where an official can usually resign at pleasure, it has been held that the superior authority cannot refuse the resigna- tion,^ or compel the officer to retain the first office against his will.3 Something more than the mere physical impossibility to per- form the duties of the two offices is required, to constitute this incompatibility. Offices may properly be said to be incompati- ble, when for reasons, arising out of an enlightened public pol- icy, it would be wrong for one person to retain both.* In every case, it is a question of fact for judicial determination, whether the public interests require the abandonment of one or the other of the two alleged incompatible offices ; and it is also very likely, that the inordinate demand for public office leads to the deter- mination that the offices are incompatible, when in fact there would be no difficulty in the acceptable performance of the du- ties of both offices by the same person. It is surprising to what extent this question has been raised before the courts, and the citations are very numerous. It has thus been held that the office of alderman, of a town or city, is incompatible with that of county treasurer,^ town clerk,* capital burgess '' and city chamberlain.^ The office of town An. 824; Stubbs v. Lee, 64 Me. 195; Ex parte Call, 2 Tex. App. 497; Pooler V. Eeed, 73 Me. 129; State v. Draper, 45 Mo. 355 ; Shell v. Cousins, 77 Va. 328; State v. Brown, 5 K. 1. 1; State V. GofE, 15 K. I. 505; Peo. v. Nostrand, 46 N. Y. 375 ; Bieucourt v. Parker, 27 Tex. 558; State v. Brink- erhoff, 66 lb. 45 ; Davenport v. Mayor, 67 N. T. 456; Peo. v. Carrique, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 93; Van Orsdell v. Hazard, 3 lb. 248. iRex V. Patterson, 4 B. & A. 9; Gates V. Del. Co. , 12 Iowa, 405 ; con- tra, U. S. V. Board, 53 Fed. 739. • IT. S. V. Wright, 1 McLean, 509. = State V. Mayor of Lincoln, 4Keb. 260. Cf. State v. Ferguson, 2 Vroom, 134 31 N". J. L. 107, 129; People v. Mc- Lean, 62 Hun, 42; Peo. v. Porter, 6 Cal. 26; see § 78 on Acceptance; and see People v. Williams, (111. 93) 33 IST. E. E. 849. * Preston v. U. S. , 37 Fed. Eep. 417 ; State V. Feibleman, 28 Ark. 424; State V. Briukerhofe, 66 Tex. 45; Stubbs V. Lee, 64 Me. 195; People v. Green, 5 Daly, 254; 58 N. Y. 295. s Eex V. Patterson, 4 B. & Ad. 9; 24 E. C. L. 11. 6 Eex V. Tizzard, 9 B. & C. 418; 17 E. C. L. 411. ' Eex V. Hughes, 5 B. & C. 886; 12 E. C. L. 399. 8 Throop's Public Officers, § 35. CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS. 86 marshal is incompatible with that of hailiff,i city councilman ; ^ and the city councilman with that of director of state prison,* although compatible with a town clerk.* The office of mayor is held to be incompatible with that of town clerk,^ director of state prison,® retired U. S. army officer;'^ although a retired army officer may be also an aqueduct commissioner.* The offices of chief supervisor of elections, and of counsel to the health de- partment of a city, are incompatible ; ® and so are a jury com- missioner and a police commissioner.^" On the other hand, it is held that there is no incompatibility in the case of the inspector of elections and an interpreter of a Municipal Court,-'-'^ deputy clerk of municipal court and legislator,^^ county cleik and clerk of Circuit Court,^^ clerk andcollector of school district.^* Other illustrations may be added, where the question of incompati- bility was raised between offices, not municipal ; but they are not needed for the purpose of illustrating the principle .^^ Resignation may be implied from other circumstances than the acceptance of an incompatible office, as in a case where residence within the municipality is a prerequisite to eligibility for office, permanent removal from the city would have the effect of resignation, on account of incidental disqualification for the office.!® But if the subsequent residence beyond tlie limits of the election district is due to a change in the boundaries of the district, and not to a change of residence, the officer's title to his office is not affected thereby, and there is no implied res- 1 Lewis V. Wall, 70 Ga. 646. 2 State V. Hoyt, 2 Oregon, 246. 3 State V. Kirk, 44 Ind. 401 ; 15 Am. Rep. 239. 4 Rex V. Jones, 1 B. & Ad. 677. s Com. Dig. 7, tit. Officer B. 6. ^Howard v. Shoemaker, 35 Ind. 111. ■State V. DeGress, 53 Tex. 387. 8 People V. Duane, 121 N. Y. 367. "Davenport v. Mayor, etc. of N. Y., 67 N. T. 456. '"State V. Newhouse, 29 La. An. 824. " Goettman v. Mayor, etc. of N. 7., 6 Hun, 132. '2 People V. Green, 58 N. T. 295, re- versing 5 Daly 254; 46 How. Pr. 169; People V. Murray, 73 N. Y. 535, re- versing 8 Daly, 347. 13 State V. Lusk, 48 Mo. 242. 1* Howland v. Luce, 16 Johns. 135. 15 For a rather full citation of com- patible and incompatible officers in general, see 19 Am. & Eng. Euc. of Law, 562 w., and Throop's Public officers, §35, et. seq. 16 Curry v. Stewart, 8 Bush. 560; State V. Graham, 26 La. Ann. 568; 21 Am. Rep. 551 ; People v. Parker, 3 Neb. 409; 19 Am. Rep. 634; Mc- Gregor V. Allen, 33 La. Am. 870; Yonkey V. State, 27 Ind. 236. 135 §87 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. VI. ignation.^ And so, also, there is no implied resignation, where the absence or change of residence of the official is only tempo- rary. ^ § 87. General powers and duties of officers. — The powers and duties of municipal officials are purely statutory ; ^ or in the absence of statute, such as may be necessarily implied for the proper exercise of municipal functions.* Statutory provisions, conferring powers upon municipal offi- cials, must be strictly construed and followed ; ^ and the statu- tory powers, with which they are invested, should by no means be extended beyond the limits marked out for their exercise, by the declarations of the legislative intention.® 1 State V. Milwaukee, 21 "Wis. 433; contra, People v. Highland Park, 50 K. W. R. 660; 88 Mich. 653. 2 Kex V. Harris, 1 B. & Ad. 936 ; 20 E. C. L. 509; Page v. Hardin, 8 B. Mon. 648; Hedley v. Franklin Co., 4 Blackf. 116; State v. Allen, 21 Ind. 516; 83 Am. Dec. 367. 3 Condron v. New Orleans, 43 La. An. 1202; Wilson v. Shreveport, 29 La. An. 673 ; Nelson v. Mayor, 5 Hun, 190; Graves v. Otis, 2 Hill (IST. Y.) 466; Smith v. Deweese, 41 Tex. 594; Peo. V. Ransom, 56 Barb. 514; Gage V. Hornellsville, 41 lb. 87; Gale v. Mayor, 8 Hun, 370; Jane v. Alley, 64 Miss. 446; Greathouse v. Dunn, 60 Cal. 311; Indianapolis v. Wasson, 74 Ind. 133 ; Robertson v. Groves, 4 Oreg. 210. * Connett v. Chicago, 29 N. E. R. 280; 114 111.233; In re Eckstein, 24 Atl. R. 63; 30 W. N. C. 59; Perry v. Cheboygan, 55 lb. 250; Mayor v. Sands, 105 N. T. 210; Schwarz v. Barry, (Mich. 92) 51 N. W. R. 279; Pagan v. Mayor etc., 84 N. Y. 348; Larned v. Briscoe, 62 Mich. 393; Geary v. Kansas, 61 Mo. 378 ; Labrie V. Manchester, 59 N. H. 120; Sher- lock V. Winnelka, 68 111. 530. ^Bellaire Co. v. Pindlay, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 418; Keeler v. Milledge, 24 N. J. L. 142; Galveston v. Devlin, 19 136 S. "W. R. 395; Larned v. Briscoe, 62 Mich. 393; Logansport v. Legg, 20 Ind. 315; Jeffersonville v. Patterson, 32 lb. 140; Cen. Bridge v. Lowell, 15 Gray, 106; Andrews v. King, 77 Me. 224; Gurnee v. Chicago, 40 111. 165; Glass v. Ashburg, 49 Cal. 571; Mayor etc. v. State- Bk., 8 Ark. 227; Dalzell etc. Co. v. Pindlay, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 4.35 ; Foster v. Findlay, 5 lb. 455 ; Tower v. Walker, (Iowa, 93) 53 N. W. R. 289. "> Advertiser etc. v. Detroit, 43 Mich. 116; Mudge v. Williamsport, 78 Pa. St. 158. See as to powers, duties and jurisdiction of municipal officers under particular charters, Board v. Glennon, 21 Hun, 244; In re Wright, 29 lb. 357; 65 How. Pr. 119; Lyth V. Buffalo, 48 Hun, 175; Weeks v. Forman, 16 N. J. L. 237; In re 11th Ave., 49 How. Pr. 208; Charles v. Stewart, 49 Mo. 132; Campbell v. St. Louis, 71 lb. 106; Barber v. Sag. City, 34 Mich. 52; Miller v. State, 106 Ind. 415; McGarry v. N. Y. Co., 7 Robt. 464; Pedrick v. Baily, 12 Gray, 161 ; Tyng v. Boston, 133 Mass. 372; Peo. v. East Sag., 33 Mich. 164; State v. Heath, 20 La. 518; St. Peter V. Bauer, 19 Minn. 327; Planters etc. V. Hanes, 52 Miss. 469; Miller v. Mayor euc, 5 T. & C. (N. Y.) 219; Yard's Case, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 41; CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS. A municipal or other public official can perform no official act, and exercise no function, either outside of or within the municipal jurisdiction, after the close of his term of office ; ^ ex- cept that, where an executive officer has begun an official act and carried its performance so far as to render himself liable therefor, he is authorized to consummate the performance of that particular official act, notwithstanding he has been removed, or his term has expired.''' § 88. De facto officers. — An officer de facto is one who, with- out lawful title to the office, successfully, and against all oppo- sition, obtains the possession of the office under some color of title, and performs its duties and enjoy its privileges. He is to be distinguished, on the one hand, from the officer de jure, who has the paramount title to the office, but who is deprived of its enjoyment ; and on the other hand from the mere usurper, who has neither title nor color of title. The acts of officers de facto, as distinguished from mere usurpers, are universally held to be valid ; and this rule applies, not only to municipal execu- tive officials, but to the legislative or governing municipal council.^ Jackson, 6 Wend. 224; Doolittle v. Bryan, 14 How. (U. S.) 563. s Hallgreave v. Campbell, 82 Mich. 255; Eiddeev. Bedford, 1 S. &R.(Pa.) 386; People v. Hopson, 1 Denio, 574; People V. Runkle, 9 Johns. 147; Trus- tees V. Hill, 6 Cow. 23 ; State v. Lane, 16 K. I. 620; Kirker v. Cincinnati, ' (Ohio 92) 27 N. E. K. 898; Koontz v. Hancock, 64 Md. 134; Pritchett v. Peo., 1 Gilm. 529; Williams v. School Dis. , 21 Pick. 75; Laver v. MoGlach- lin, 28 Wis. 364;.Cushing v. Frankf., 57 Me. 541; Lockhart v. Troy, 48 Ala. 579 ; Koontz v. Burgess, 64 Md, 134; Hamlin V. Dingman, 5 Lans. 61; People V. Nostrand, 46 K. T. 375 ; Olmstead v. Dennis, 77 lb. 378; Peo- ple V. Stevens, 5 Hill. 616; State v. Jacobs, 17 Ohio, 143 ; People v. Bart- lett, 6 Wend. 422; Cochran v. Mc- Cleary, 22 Iowa, 75, 84; Sooville v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio St. 126; Deoorah V. BuUis, 25 Iowa, 12. 137 Schwartz v. Barry, 51 K W. E. 279; Keenan v. Goodwin, (E. I. 92) 24 Atl. E. 148; In re Passaic, (N. J. 92) 20 lb. 517; Peo. v. Flagg, 16 Barb. 503; Mayor etc. v. Tucker, 1 Daly, 107; Buokwell V. Hamele, 57 lb. 490; Board v. Gun-in, 6 Daly, 349 ; Harris V. Peo., 64 N. T. 148; Peo. v. Dun- lap, 66 N. Y. 162; Pinney v. Brown, 60 Conn. 164; Peoria etc. Co. v. Peo- ple, 31 N. E. E. 113; Twogood v. Mayor, 11 Daly, 167; Muller v. Mayor etc., 63 N. Y. 355; Hogan v. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 17; Peo. v. Fire Com'rs, 49 N. Y. Super. 369; Peo. v. Connally, 4 Abb. Pr. N. S. 375; Peo. v. Civ. Ser. Brd., 17 Abb. N. C. 64. 1 Page V. Staples, 13 E. I. 806; Jack- son V. Humphrey, 1 Johns. 498; Carr V. Phillips, 39 Mich. 319; Mitchell v. Malone, 77 Ga. 301 ; Ingerson v. Ber- ry, 14 Ohio St. 315 ; Guillard v. Ana- line, 10 Martine (La.) 479. 2 Clark v. Pratt, 55 Me. 546; State V. Roberts, 12 N. J. L. 114; Tuttle v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [oh. VI. This rule should be taken with the qualification, that, as it is intended to protect the public interests and innocent third per- sons,^ it is no protection to the officer himself. His acts are invalid, so far as they constitute an usurpation of another's rights, and for the unlawful act he is liable to the officer de jure.^ It must also be borne in mind that, where there is no office, there can be no officer de facto? § 89. Police officials — Power to arrest — The duties of police officials are now wholly regulated by statute ; and the police officers can exercise such powers only as have been ex- pressly conferred upon them by the Legislature, or which under a strict construction of the statutorj' grant may be said to have been created by necessary implication.* Although the duties executed by police officials are confined usually to some certain limited municipal district, the police officials are regarded as state, rather than as municipal, officers.^ Nor does it alter this view, that the property, under the charge of the police, such as station houses, patrol wagons, etc., is owned by the municipality.^ When the common law powers of constables are conferred upon police officers, and they act as public conservators of the peace, they are authorized to arrest upon view and without 1 People V. Sassovioh, 29 Cal. 480; Hooper v. Goodwin, 48 Me. 79; Pe- tersiler v. Stone, 119 Mass. 465; State V. Carroll, 38 Conn. 440; Morton V. Lee, 28 Kan. 287; Qulnn v. Com., 25 Grratt. 31; Mclnstry v. Tanner, 9 Johns. 135; Phillips v. Payne, 92 U. S. 132; Hussey v. Smith, 99 lb. 24; Wilcox V. Smith, 5 Wend. 231 ; Bur- gess V. Koontz, 64 Md. 134. 2 Patterson v. Caldwell, 1 Mete. (Ky.) 493; Gourley v. Hawkins, 2 Iowa, 73 ; G-reea v. Burke, 23 Wend. 490; Keyser v. McKissan, 2 Kawle, 139 ; Neale v. Overseers, 5 Watts, 539 ; Conover v. Devlin, 15 How. Pr. 477; Blake v. Sturtevaut, 12 N. H. 567; Peo. V. Hopson, 1 Denio, 574. 3 Winona v. St. Peter R. Co., 31 Minn. 472; Decorah v. Bullis, 25 138 Iowa, 15, 18; Carleton v. Peo., 10 Mich. 250; Norton v. Shelby Co., 118 U. S. 425; People v. White, 24 Wend. 520, 540. * Com. V. Dugan, 12 Met. 233; Peo. V. Police Board, 19 N. T. 188; State V. Blend, 23 N. E. E. 511; 121 Ind. 514. '• Baltimore v. Board of Pol., 15 Md. 376; Dillon's Mun. Corp. §§ 60, 61 ; Farrell v. Bridgeport, 45 Conn. 191 ; Burch v. Hardwick, 33 Gratt. 34; Peo. v. Draper, 15 N. T. 532; Metro. Brd. of Health v. Heister, 37 lb. 661; McDermott V. Met. Pol. Brd., 5 Abb. Pr. 422; Pol. Com'rs v. Lou- isville, 3 Bush, 597; see ante, § 18, as to legislative control of the police department of a city. CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS. §89 warrant, all disorderly persons and other violators of the law of the state,^ as well as of municipal ordinances,^ either im- mediately, or as soon as possible, after the commission of the offence.^ The general rule of constitutional law requires that a war- rant be obtained for the arrest of one, who is charged with a breach of the criminal law.* But there are eases, in which the requirement of a warrant is dispensed with, in order to attain an enforcement of the law and a due protection of persons and property against violence. The exceptions to the general rule are limited, however, to the following cases : 1. When a felony is being committed, an arrest may be made without a warrant to prevent any further violation of the law.^ 2. "When the felony has been committed, and the officer or private person is justified, by the facts within his knowledge, in believing that the person arrested has committed the crime.'' 3. All breaches of the peace, in assaults and batteries, affrays, riots, etc., for the purpose of restoring order immediately.^ 4. The arrest of all disorderly and other persons who may be violating the ordinary police regulations for the preservation 1 Taylor v. Strong, 3 Wend. 384; Com. V. Hastings, 9 Met. 259; Prell V. McDonald, 7 Kan. 426; Mitchell v. Lemon, 34 Md. 176: Griffin v. Flock, llDaly (N. Y.) 274; Taylorv. Strong, 3 Wend. 384. 2 Bryan v. Bates, 15 111. 87; Main v. McCarty, 15 111. 442 ; State v. Lafferty, 5 Harring., 491; State v. Sims, 16 S. C. 486. ' Boaz V. Tate, 43 Tnd. 60. * Tiedeman's Limitations of Police Power, §§ 33, 33a. SRulofe V. People, 45 N. Y. 213; Keenan v. State, 8 Wis. 132; but see Somerville v. Richards, 37 Mich. 299. " But the belief must be a reason- able one. If the facts within his knowledge do not warrant his belief in the guilt of the innocent party whom he has arrested, he will be lia^ ble in an action for false imprison- ment. State V. Holmes, 48 N. II. 377 ; Ilally V. Mix, 3 Wend. 350; Renck v. McGregor, 32 N. J. 70; Common- wealth v. Deacon, 8 Berg. & R. 47; State V. Roane, 2 Dev. 58; Long v. State, 12 Ga. 233; Eames v. State, 6 Humph. 53. Less particularity, in respect to the reasonableness of the suspicions against an individual, is required of an oiEcer who makes an arrest without warrant, than of a private person ; the suspicions must be altogether groundless, in order to make the officer liable for the wrong- ful arrest. See Marsh v. Loader, 14 C. B. {S. S.) 535 ; Lawrence v. Hedg- er, 3 Taunt. 14; Rohan v. Sawin, 5 Gush. 281; Halley v. Mix, 3 Wend. 350; Burns v. Erben, 40 N. Y. 463; Drennan v. People, 10 Mich. 169. T Phillips v. Trull, 11 Johns. 477; Respublica v. Montgomery, 1 Yeates, 419; City Council v. Payne, 2 Nottife McCord, 475; Vandeveer V. Mattocks, 3 Ind. 479. 139 §90 MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS. [CH. VI. of public Older and health, such as vagrants, gamblers, beggars, who are found violating the law in the public thoroughfares.^ 5. It may be added, all similar offences against the ordinances of the municipality.^ The statutory grants of authority to police officials are very strictly construed, in order to prevent the abuse of the power, to the serious infringement of the personal liberty of the citizen, and the requirements of the statute must be strictly obeyed.^ A police officer must without unreasonable delay * take his prisoner before the proper tribunal and prefer a complaint against him, as bj' statute provided.^ But if no tribunal be in session, the prisoner can legally be detained, for a reasonable time, at the police station.^ § 90. The mayor — Nature of Ms duties. — At the head of every municipal corporation is the mayor, whose duties are chiefly executive in their nature, although at times, also, both legislative and judicial; and for their scope and force depend- ing upon the charter of the corporation, and upon the ordi- nances and bj'-laws made in pursuance thereof.^ It is his duty in general to see that the municipal ordinances are obeyed and to pi'eside at corporate meetings.* As part of the executive power to enforce municipal ordi- nances, as well as by express statutory provisions, the mayor 1 See Mitchell v. Lemon, 34 Mo. 176, where it was held that one may be arrested without a warrant, who was found violating the rules pre- scribed by the city board of health for the preservation of the public health. -^ 2 White V. Kent, 11 Ohio St. 550; Thomas v. Ashland, 12 lb. 127. Cf. Pesterfleld v. Vickers, 3 Coldw. (Tenn.) 205. 3Com. V. Hastings, supra; Main v. MeCarty, 15 111. 441 ; Pow v. Beck- ner, 3 Ind. 475; Roddy v. Finuegan, 43 Md. 490; Com. v. Carey, 12 Gush. 246; Com. v. McLaughlin, 12 lb. 615 ; Quinn v. Heisel, 40 Mich. 576; Rob- erts v. Morse, 14Mo. 138; Stage Horse Cases, 15 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 51; White V. Kent, 11 Ohio St. 550; Low 140 v. Evans, 16 Ind. 486; Ramsey v. Foy, 10 Ind. 479. * Johnson v. Americus, 46 Ga. 80. 6 Dillon's Mun. Corp. §§210, 211; Low V. Evans, 16 Ind. 486; Pow v. Becker, 3 lb. 475 ; Vandever v. Mat- tock, 3 lb. 479. 6Boaz v. Tate, 43 Ind. 60; State v. Freeman, 86 K C. 683; Scircle v. Nevis, 47 Ind. 289. ' State v. Jer. City, 30 K. J. L. 93; North V. Crary, 4 Thomp. & C. (N. T. ) 357 ; North Lawrence v. Hoysradt, 6 Kan. 170; Test v. Com., 4 Dana, 522; Hatch v. Cincinnati, 17 Ohio St. 48; State V. Hudson, 44 lb. 137; Mor- ley V. Weakley, 86 Mo. 451; Barnes V. Gottschalk, 3 Mo. Ap. Ill; Daniel V. Mayor, 11 Humph. 682. 8 Dillon Mun. Corp. § 208. CH. VI.J MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OPPICBES. §90 in our larger municipalities is invested with the power of ap- pointing the heads of the various departments, by which such ordinances are enforced or put into operation. In addition to those executive and administrative duties, which properly appertain to the office, others of a judicial nature, in- volving the exercise of a very wide discretion, are sometimes imposed upon him ; and it frequently becomes his duty, under such circumstances, to administer and enforce, not only the mu- nicipal charter and ordinances, but, likewise, the general laws of the state.^ The preservation of public order being of paramount im- portance, and the municipality being responsible for injury to property by mob violence, it is within the authority of the mayor to suppress riots or similar manifestations of a disorderly character.'* As public morals should be the concern of every officer sworn to support the law, the mayor, it has been held, may arrest and fine disorderly and lewd women. ^ But when, as in most municipalities, the preservation of public order, and the protection of public morality, is committed to a police de- partment, established bj- statute ; particularly, when it is placed under the control of state commissioners, it would seem that these police powers of the mayor are seriously curtailed, if not altogether abrogated. Where the mayor is clothed with judicial power and while acting as a justice of the peace, he has the power to convict of- fenders summarily, such power is strictly construed ; and the record must show the legality of the conviction, and point out the offence with the utmost precision.* In many of the cities of the country, the mayor is, ex officio, a member of the city council, having the power to vote ; and, 1 Henderson v. Davis, 106 N. C. 88; State V. "Wood, 9 Bosw. (N. T.) 15; Luehrman v. Shelby Co. etc., 2 La. 425 ; Robinson v. Benton, 49 Ark. 49 ; Bain v. Mitchell, 82 Ala. 304; Pres- sel V. Bice, 21 Atl. R. 813; Louis- iana V. Hardin, 11 Mo. 551; Ex parte Smith, Hemp St. (U. S.) 200; Sel- lers V. Corvallis, 5 Oreg. 237; Mar- tindale v. Palmer, 52 Ind. 411; Prell V. McDonald, 7 Kan. 426; Starr v. Wilm. Counc.,3Har. (Del.)294; Com. V. Leight, 1 B. Mon. lOY; Cluggishv. Rogers, 13 Ind. 538; People v. May- nard, 14 111. 419; Morrison v. Mc- Donald, 21 Me. .^50; Warwick v. Mayo, 15 Gratt. 528; Maguire v. Hughes, 13 La. An. 281; Muscatine V. Stack, 7 Iowa, 505. 2Ela V. Smith, 5 Gray, 121. ^Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331; 79 Am. Dec. 656. 142. 141 § 92 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. VI. in other municipalities, particularly in the larger ones, he is given the power of vetoing all legislation of the city council. In either case, he belongs to the legislative branch of the city government, and exercises legislative powers.'^ § 91. Liability of the officer to the corporation.— When a municipal corporation sustains injury through the negligent act of its own officer, the officer is liable therefor ; but, in the absence of a special statutory rule, the recoverj' can only be had for damages caused by faithlessness in the performance of duty, or for lack of individual integrity, and not for those arising from an honest mistake.^ But it is now an almost universal custom for municipal ofBcials, occupying positions of responsibility, to give bonds, or furnish sureties, for the faithful performance of these duties ; and in such cases, the corporation can of course recover, if the condition of the bond be not performed.^ § 92. Municipal liability for official acts — In determin- ing the scope of the liability of the municipality for the tor- tious acts of its officers, we must recur to the distinction already drawn* between the puhlic and semi-private character of the mu- nicipal corporation. So far as the official tort-feasor is charged with the performance of the strictly public duties of the mu- nicipal corporation, which are imposed upon it as a local branch of the state government, and the performance of which concern the whole state, more or less, as well as the local community, he is rather to be considered as the agent and servant of the public, than of the muuicipalitj^, even though he may be ap- pointed by the municipality.^ Under this rule municipal corpo- ' See post, cliap. vii. on Munici- pal Councils, etc. ^ Boutte V. Emraer, 9 So. 921; Ken- dall V. Stokes, 3 How. 87; Lincoln v. Cliapin, 132 Mass. 470; Minor v. Bank, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 46, 69; McCrea v. Cha- hoen, 54 Hun, 577; Peo. v. Lewis, 7 Jolins.73; Palmer v. Carroll, 24 IST. H. 314; State v. Chamber of Com., 20 Wis. 63; State v. Nevin, 19 Neb. 162; Seaman V. Patten, 2 Gaines, 312; Rol- lins V. Board, 15 Colo. 103; Wilson v. Mayor, 1 Dcnio, 595; Com. v. Gen- tber, 17 S. & R. 135; Trafton v. Al- fred, 15 Me. 258. " See ante, § 72. 142 5 Bates V. Rutland, 62 Vt. 178; 20 Atl. R. 278; Bulger v. Eden, 82 Me. 352 ; Culver v. Streator, 34 111. App. 77; 22 N. E. R. 810; Laurel (Ind. 91)27 N. E. K. 801; Atwater v. Canandai- gua, 124 N. Y. 602 ; Van Valkenbergli V. Mayor, 43 Barb. 109; Rogers v. Buffalo, 51 Hun, 637; Thompson v. Mayor, 52 N. Y. Super. 427; O'Leary V. Board, (Mich. 93) 44 N. W. R. 608; Terliune v. Mayor, 88 N. Y. 47; Larned v. Briscoe, 29 N. W. R. 22; 62 Mich. 393; Haskell v. New Bedf., 108 Mass. 208; Schultz v. Milwaukee, 49 Wis. 254; Doster v. Atlanta, 72 CH. VI.] MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFFICERS. §92 rations are not liable for tlie acts of the officers of their police,^ or fire department,^ or firemen,^ or collectors and health officers.^ But where the officers, agents or servants of the municipality are charged with carrying out the special and strictly local pur- poses of corporate existence, in the attainment of which the corporation assumes its semi-private character, and from which the local community receives the overwhelming, if not sole ben- efit, the corporation is liable to the same extent, as would any individual or private corporation under the same circumstances.^ Thus, the municipal corporation is held to be liable in dam- Prince V. Lynn, 149 Mass. 193 ; Mc- Elroy v. Albany, 65 Ga. 387; Green- wood V. Louisville, 13 Bush (Ky.) 221. ' Campbell v. Montgomery, 53 Ala. 527; Thomas v. Grafton, 34 W. Va. 282; Attaway v. Mayor, 68 lb. 740; Calwell V. Boone, 51 Iowa, 687; Odell V. Sohroeder, 58 111. 353; Whitfield V. Paris, (Tex. 92) 19 S. W. R. 566; Corsicana v. White, 57 Tex. 382; Lit- tle V. Madison, 49 Wis. 605 ; Hart v. Bridgeport, 13 Blatohf. 289. 2 Holler V. Mayor, 53 Mo. 159; Mc- Kenna v. St. Louis, 6 Mo. App. 820; Robinson V. Evausville, 87 Ind. 334; Kies V. Erie, 26 W. N. C. 112; Wilcox V. Chicago, 107 111. 334; Welch v. Rutland, 56 Vt. 228; Hayes v. Osh- kosh, 33 Wis. 314; Fisher v. Boston, 104 Mass. 87; Burrill v. Augusta, 78 Me. 118; Hafford v. New Bedf., 16 Gray, 297. » Alexander v. Vicksburg, 68 Miss. 564; Gillespie v. Lincoln, (Neb. 92) 52 N. W. R. 811; Dodge v. Granger, (R. I. 92) 24 Atl. R. 100; Jewett v. New Haven, 38 Conn. 368; Tarbush V. Norwich, 38 lb. 225. * Dannaher v. Brooklyn, 51 Hun, 563; Spring v. Hyde Park, 137 Mass. 554; Ogg V. Lansing, 35 Iowa, 495; Dunbar v. Boston, 112 Mass. 75; Lib- erty V. Hurd, 74 Me. 101 ; Alger v. Easton, 119 Mass. 77; Bryant v. St. Paul, 83 Minn. 289. 6 Stock V. Boston, 149 Mass. 410; Welter v. St. Paul, 40 Minn. 460; 42 143 Ga. 233; La Clef v. Concordia, 41 Kan- 423; 21 Pac. R. 272; Sherbourne V. Yuba Co., 21 Cal. 118; Jewett v. New Haven, 38 Conn. 368; Bryant V. St. Paul, 38 Minn. 289; Forbush v. Norwich, 38 Conn. 225 ; Moffit v. Asheville, 103 N. C. 237; Gibbes v. Beaufort, 20 S. C. 218; Rowland v. Gallatin, 75 Mo. 184; Bamber v. Rochester, 26 Hun, 587; Barney v. Lowell, 98 Mass. 570; Brown's Adm. V. Guyandotte, 34 W. Va. 299; Peters V. Luudsborg, 40 Kan. 654; 20 Pac. R. 490; Dannaher v. Brooklyn, 51 Hun, 563; Caspary v. Portland, 19 Or. 496; 24 Pac. R. 1036; Tindley v. Salem, 137 Mass. 171 ; Fisher v. Bos- ton, 104 lb. 87; Bladen v. Phila., 60 Pa. St. 464; Kies v. Erie, 26 W. N. C. 112; Bennett v. New Orleans, 14 La. An. 120; Brown v. Vinalhaven, 65 Me. iO-J; Wild V. Paterson, 47 N. J. L. 406; Richmond v. Long, 17 Gratt. 375; Wallace V. Menacha, 48 Wis. 79; Lumber Co. v. Brooklyn, 71 N. Y. 580; Diehm v. Cincinnati, 15 Ohio St. 305; Robinson v. Rolir, 73 Wis. 436; Dargau v. Mobile, 31 Ala. 469; Sch. Dist. V. Williams, 38 Ark. 454; Waller v. Dubuque, 69 Iowa, 541; Wilcox V. Chicago, 107 111. 334; Free- man V. Phila., 13 Phila. 154; Thomas V. Graffton, 34W. Va. 282; Elliott v. Phila., 75 Pa. St. 347; Ashby v.Erie, 85 lb. 286; Robinson v. Evansville, 87 Ind. 334; Summers v. Dav. Co., 108 lb. 262; Wheeler v. Cin., 18 Ohio St. 19; §92 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. VI. ages for the torts of the waterworks officials, although appointed by the governor and state senate,^ of the highway commis- sioners,^ the public administrator ; ^ of its agents in laying its own gas pipes,* of the janitor of a municipal building, in which rooms are let to private persons ; ^ of the City Council, acting as commissioners for the improvement of a canal ; ^ and in every other case, where a mandatory duty of local concern is imposed upon the corporation, and where all discretion in re- spect to its performance is taken awayJ But the municipal corporation is not liable, where the particular duty is imposed upon the officer, and not in the first instance upon the corpora- tion.* And so, also, is the municipal corporation not liable for N. W. E. 392 ; Teall v. Syracuse, 120 N. Y. 184; Caspary V. Portland, 19 Or. 496; 24Pac. R. 1036; Lloyd v. Mayoi-, etc., 5 N. Y. ; Mayor, etc., v. Las- scr, 9 Humph. (Terra.) 757; Sheldon V. Kalamazoo, 24 Mich. 383; Sharp V. Mayor, 40 Barb. 256; Hunt v. Boouville, 65 Mo. 620; Hecker v. Mayor, 18 Abb. Pr. 369; White Ld. Works V. Eochestor, 3 N". Y. 467; Semple v. Mayor, etc., 62 Miss. 63; Lewis V. Elizabeth, 25 N. J. Eq. 298; Masterson v. Mt. Vernon, 58 K. Y. 391; Bailey v. Mayor, 3 Hill, 531; Byrnes V. Cohoes, 67]Sr. Y. 204; Day- ton V. Pease, 4 Oliio St. 80; Boston V. Simmons, 150 Mass. 461; Perry v. Worcester, 6 Gray, 544; Cotes v. Davenport, 9 Iowa, 227; Williams v. Dunkirk, 3 Lan. 44; Irontoa v. Kelly, 38 Ohio St. 50; Walsh v. Mayor, 41 Hun, 299; Vincent v. Brooklyn, 31 lb. 122; Aldrich v. Tripp, 11 E. I. 141; Durkee V. Kenosha, 59 Wis. 122: Wilde V. N"ew Orleans, 12 La. An. 15 ; Hool V. U. S., 1 Cranch, 98; Harris- burg v. Taylor, 87Pa. St. 216; Thayer V. Boston, 19 Pick. 511; Hildredth v. Lowell, 11 Gray, 345. 1 Connolly v. Waltham, (Mass. 92) 31 ]Sr. E. R. 202; Bailey v. Mayor, etc., of N. Y., 3 Hill, 531; 38 Am. Dec. 669; Clark v. Mayor, etc., of N". Y., 3Baib. 290; Stoddard v. Winchester, 144 32 1^. E. E. 948; Aldrich v. Tripp, 11 E. L 141; 23 Am. Eep. 434. 2 Inman v. Tripp, 11 E. I. 520; see § 341, et seq. 5 Glover v. Mayor, etc., of 'N.Y.,^ Hun, 232; Matthews v. Mayor, etc., of N. Y., 1 Sandf. 132. * Scott V. Mayor, 1 H. & W. 59; Stock V. Boston, 149 Mass. 410. = Worden v. New Bedford, 131 Mass. 23; 41 Am. Eep. 185. ^Kew York, etc., Lumber Co. T. Brooklyn, 71 N. Y. 580. ' Lehn v. Brooklyn, 19 jST. Y. S. 668; McSherry v. Canandaigua, 129 N. T. 612 ; Davenport v. Hannibal, 18 S. W. E. 1122; Frostburg v. Hitohins, (Md. 90) 16 Atl. E. 380; Barney, etc., Co. v. New York, 40 Fed. 50; Mayor, etc., of Helena v. Thompson, 29 Ark. 569; Clayburgh v. Chicago, 25 111. 535; McCuUough v. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, 23 Wend. 458; Elgin v. Goff, 38 111. App. 362; Fitz Patrick V. Slocum, 89 N". Y. 358; Kankakee V. Linden, 38 111. App. 657 ; Sawyer v. Corse, 17 Gratt. 230; Walling v. Mayor, etc., 5 La. An. 660; Barton V. Syracuse, 36 N. Y. 54; Lacoui-v. Mayor, etc., of N. Y., 3 Duer, 406. McLaughlin v. Municipality No. 2, 5 La. An. 504. ■ 8 Maximilian v. Mayor, etc., of K. Y., 02 X. Y. 160; 20 Am. Eep. 196; CH. VI.] MTTNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND OFPICEES. §92 the torts of independent contractors, employed by such corpo- ration,^ unless the necessary effect of the work contracted for would be the infliction of injury on others,^ or the city reserv- ed to itself a supervisory control over the work, and the power to dismiss persons, who were employed by the contractors ; ^ or unless the act of the contractor be a failure to remove an exist- ing nuisance, for which the city incurs a continuing liability.* A municipal corporation 'is not liable, however, for the acts of its officers, if wholly ultra vires and not within the power vested in the corporation by charter ; nor for any illegal acts of an official, unless they were previously authorized or subse- quently ratified by the corporation.^ The subject of municipal liability for tort is more fully discussed in a subsequent chapter,® to which the reader is referred for further information. Haw V. Mayor, etc., of N. T., 37 N. Y. Super. 456; Gray v. Brooklyn, 2 Abb. Ap. Cas. 267. 1 Pritcbard V. Keeper, 53 111. 117; Hennington v. Lansingburgh, 36 Hun, 598; East St. Louis v. Giblin, o 111. App. 219; Kelly v. Mayor, etc. of N. Y., 11 N. Y. 432; Keed v. Al- legbeny, 79 Pa. St. 300; Pack v. Mayor, etc. of N. Y., 8 N. Y. 222; Painter v. Pittsburgh, 46 Pa. St. 213; Kelley v. Mayor, etc. of N. Y., 4 E. D. Smith, 291; Treadwell v. Mayor, etc. of N. Y., 1 Daly, 123; McCarty V. Bauer, 3 Kan. 237; Barry v. St. Louis, 17 Mo. 121. See also, post, § 347, for a full discussion of this subject. 2 Pearson v. Zahle, 78 Ky. 170; Sullivan v. Holyoke, 135 Mass. 273 ; Logansport v. Dicle, 70 Ind. 65 ; 36 Am. Rep. 166; Broad well v. Kansas City, 75 Mo. 213; 42 Am. Eep. 406; Sewall V. St. Paul, 20 Minn. 511. 8 Chicago V. Joney, 60 111. 383; Chicago V. Deomody, 61 HI. 431 ; but see Erie v. Caulkins, 85 Pa. St. 24. *Vanderslice v. Philadelphia, 103 Pa. St. 102. 5 Walling V. Shreveport, 5 La. An. 660; Horton v. Newell, (E. I. 92) 23 Atl. R. 610; Herzo v. San Francisco, 10 33 Cal. 134; Browning v. Owen Co., 44 Ind. 11; Ball v. Woodbine, 61 Iowa, 83; Cumberland v. Willison, 50 Md. 128; O' Dell v. Schroeder, 58 111. 353; Barnes v. Phila., 3 Phila. 409; Small v. Danville, 51 Me. 350|; Cheeuey v. Brookfield, 60 Mo. 53; Worley v. Columbia, 88 Mo. 106; McCarthy v Boston, 135 Mass. 197; Smith V. Rochester, 76 N. Y. 510; Chicago V. McGraw, 75 111. 566; Trammell v. Russellville, 34 Ark. 105 ; Emmert v. DeLong, 16 La. An. 317; Elliott V. Phila., 75 Pa. St. 347; Haag V. Vanderburgh Co., 60 Ind. 511; Shelby Co. v. Deprez, 87 lb. 509; M^yor, etc. v. Cunlife, 2 N. Y. 165 ; Cuyler v. Rochester, 12 Wend. 165; Wakefield v. Newport, 60 N. H. 374; Ross v. Phila., 115 Pa. St. 222; Ready v. Tuskaloosa, 6 Ala. ,327; Chicago v. Shober, etc., 6 111. App. 560; Hilsorp v. St. Louis, 45 Mo. 94; Hunt v. Boonville, 65 lb. 620; Rowland v. Gallatin, 75 lb. 134 Manley v. Atchison, 9 Kan. 358 Brown v. Vinalhaven, 65 Me. 402 Woodcock V. Calcio, 66 lb. 234; Seele v. Peering, 79 lb. 343; Morrison v. Lawrence, 98 Mass. 219. See post, §338. s Chap. XVII. 145 § 93 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. VI. § 93. Jurisdiction of courts over electious. — The question of jurisdiction of courts over contested elections, as well as the whole matter of judicial remedies in such cases, is fully dis- cussed and explained in connection with an exposition of the extraordinary remedy, quo warranto, to which the reader is referred.^ 1 Chap. XIX. § 361. 146 CHAPTER VII. MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, MEETINGS, RECORDS AND COURTS. Section. 95 — Notice of corporate meetings — New England town meet- ings — Adjournment. 96 — Town councils — Presiding offi- cers. 97 — Eegular, special and adjourned meetings. 98 — Methods of proceeding — Ayes and noes. 99 — Quorum of the council — Joint bodies — Action of the ma- jority binding. 100 — Municipal business must be transacted by the council as a body — Meetings. 101 — Municipal courts at common law. Section. 102 — Municipal courts — Power to establish. 103 — Competency of corporators as jurors, judges and wit- nesses. 104 — Summary proceedings — Jury trials. 105 — Review by Superior Court — Jury trials. 106 — Custody of municipal records — Power to amend. 107 — Municipal records as evidence — Admissions. 108 — Admissibility of parol evi- dence to explain municipal records. § 95. Notice of corporate meetings — New England town meetings — Adjournment. — All citizens are presumed to know, as part of the general law, the days prescribed by the charter, statute, by-law or usage, for the transaction of the ordinary municipal affairs by the governing body ; and, ordinarily, notice is not required to be given. But the common law has estab- lished certain rules, regarding notice, which have been made the basis of the statutory law, and which have been followed by the courts in this country. The importance of the principles considered is evident, when tlie meetings called are composed of the inhabitants of the town, as in New England, and not of a definite and limited class of duly elected officials. At common law, when notice of such a meeting is required to be given, it may be deemed to be dis- pensed with or waived, from the presence of those entitled to the notice ; ^ but this rule of the common law is not applicable to the New England town meeting. 1 Beaver Creek v. Hastings, 52 Mich. 528; Lord v. Anoka, 36 Minn. 17(5; State V. Smith, 22 lb. 218. 147 95 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. vn. At common law the notice should give the time, and place of meeting if the latter is unusual. If the meeting relates to the ordinary corporate affairs it is not necessary that its object should be specified ; but when the proposed business is the election or removal of officials, or the passing, of ordinances, the fact should be stated in the call. In the absence of charter provisions, if all, who are present at a legal and valid meeting of a select body, consent to transact business, it may be done, although no notice, or an insufficient notice, was given ; but such unanimity should appear from their recorded declarations or acts. In England, the guild hall is the proper place for the meet- ing ; and acts done at an unusual place will be closely scruti- nized.i But the whole subject is now regulated by statute ;^ and such is also the case in New England, where it is required that the inhabitants are to be notified or wai'ued of town meet- ings. The object of the meeting, or the matters to be acted upon, must be stated in the notice ; and town meetings, for which the proper legal notice was not given, are invalid; and the acts done at the meeting are void.^ A tax voted at a meet- ing which was illegally warned, is illegal.* The object of the town meeting should be stated in the warning, but it is sufB- cient if this can fairly be understood.® Where the statute, as in Vermont, requires the notice "to specify the business to be done," a notice stating that the meeting was called " to do any proper business" is insufficient;'' and all contracts 1 Dillon Mun. Cor. §264, citing Kex V. Hill, 4 B. & C. 441; Kex v. Liver- pool, 2 Burr. 734; Rex v. Doncaster, 2 lb. 744; Rex v. May, 5 lb. 2682; Rex V. Grimes, 5 lb. 2601; Kynaston V. Shrewsbury, 2 Stra. 1051; Mus- grove V. Nairson, 1 lb. 584; Rex v. Theodorick, 8 East, 545; Rex v. Shrewsbury, oases temp. Hardwicke, 147; Smyth v. Darley, 2 House of Lords Cases, 789. The rule as to necessary notice is applicable to both select and indeiinite bodies. Rex V. Langhorne, 4 Ad. & El. 538. 2 English Municipal Act, 5 and 6 Wm. IV. ch. 71, sec. 69. 3 Brewster V. Hyde, 7 jST. H. 206; 148 Reynolds v. New Salem, 6 Met. 340; Cong. Society v. Sperry, 16 Conn. 200; Haj'wardv. Sch. Dis., 2 Cush. 419; Moor v. Newfield, 4 Greenl. 44; Lander v. Sch. Dis., 33 Me. 239; Bloomfield v. Charter Oak Bank, 121 U, S. 129; School Dis. v. Atherton, 12 Met. 105; Little v. Merrill, 10 Pick. 543; Sherwin v. Bugbee, 17 Vt. 337; Pratt v. S wanton, 15 lb. 147; Rand v. Wilder, 11 Cush. 294; Stone V. Sch. Dis., 8 lb. 592. 4 Rideout v. Sch. Dist., 1 Allen, 232. 6 School District v. Blakeslee, 13 Conn. 227. 6 Hunt V. School District, 14 Vt. 300; Sherwin v. Bugbee, supra. CH. Vir.] MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, MEETINGS, ETC. §95 made, or laws enacted,^ or other acts done at such a meeting, which are not specified in the call, are invalid ; ^ and a partici- pant in an illegal meeting is not estopped to deny its legality .^ When the statute requires the time and place to be named in the notice, they are material ; and there can be no legal meet- ing, except at the time and place named ; * and the meeting must be opened within a reasonable time after the hour named.^ So, when the place named is the schoolhouse, a gathering near the schoolhouse, with an adjournment to another place, is ille- gal.® If the subject of the town meeting is mentioned in the warning, it is no objection, that it is considered when the ma- jority of the voters have retired ; "^ and action, taken at a meet- ing not duly noticed, can be ratified by a subsequent legal meeting.^ Authority in the clerk, to call annual town meetings, does not empower him to call " special " meetings ; ^ nor does power to "warn" a meeting imply power to call one.^" If the town meeting has been validly warned and called, those who attend, though less than a majority of the whole, have full power to act for and to bind tlie whole ; and the absence of the others will be presumed to be equivalent to an assent to any action taken.-'^ A majority of the members of the town meeting have the power, in the absence of any statutory provision upon this point, to ad- journ any legal meeting to another time : and, if done in good 'Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391; Willard v. Killingworth, 8 Conn. 247; Bloomfield v. Char. O. Bk., 12l U. S. 121, 130. 2 St. Louis V. Withans, 90 Mo. 640; Cornish v. Pease, 19 Me. 184; Spear v. Robinson, 29 lb. 531; Little V. Merrill, 10 Pick. 543; Blackburn V. Walpole, 9 lb. 97; Torrey v. Mil- bury, 21 lb. 64; Hadsell v. Hancock, 3 Gray, 526; Jones v. Andover, 9 Pick. 146; Kingsbury v. School Dis., 12 Met. 99. 'Sch. Dis. V. Atherton, 12 Met. 105. *Sherwin v. Bugbee, 16 Yt. 439, 444. 'Sch. Dis. V. Blakeslee, 13 Conn. 227. 6 Chamberlain v. Dover, 13 Me. 466; Haines v. Soh. Dis., 41 lb. 246; Kingsbury v. Sch. Dis., 12 Met. 99; compare. Brown v. Winterport, 79, Me. 305. ' Bean v. Jay, 23 Me. 117. ^ Jordan v. School District, 38 Me. 164. ^School District v. Atherton, 12 Met. 105. i» Stone V. Sch. District, 8 Cush. 592. 11 Damon v. Granby, 2 Pick. 345, 355; Com. v. Ipswich, 2 lb. 70; Wil- liams V. Lunenberg, 21 lb. 75 ; First Parish V. Stearns, 21 lb. 148; State V. Binder, 38 Mo. 350; Church Case, 5 Kobt. 649. 149 S9S MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. VK. faith, to another place within the corporate limits.^ But such a power must be exercised, only when absolutely necessary ; ^ and the adjournment can only be proved by the record.^ After an adjournment, no valid action can be taken by a town meeting.* § 96. Town councils — Presiding officers. — Outside of New England, the councils of cities and towns are representative bod- ies, whose members are limited by law, and are elected by the legal voters of the incorporated place. The constitution of the council, its powers, its regular and special meetings, what no- tice is required, and how many shall constitute a quorum, are usually prescribed in the municipal charter. Usually, the city's territory is divided into districts or wards, the voters in each of which elect annually an alderman or councilman.^ When the mayor is the presiding officer of the board or council, he can vote only when he is also a member of the council ; while, in other eases, he either has no power to vote, or has the power only, when there is a tie vote in the coun- cil.^ The English rule, that the presence of the mayor at a corporate meeting was absolutely necessary, in the absence of special provisions, has no application in this country ; and the mayor is not a member of the council, nor has he any right to preside over it, if these privileges are not given him bj'' the law.'^ The mayor's approval may by the charter be essential to the validity of the proceedings of the council ; ^ and, when required, should be in writing, attested by the mayor's signa- ture.^ A writ of quo warranto wiil lie to test the right of the re- corder ex officio to be the presiding officer, although not a member ^ Chamberlain v. Dover, 13 Me. 466; Hubbard v. Windsor, 15 Mich. 146; Kimball v. Marshall, 44 N. H. 465; Drisko v. Columbia, 75 Me. 73; Goodell V. Baker, 8 Cowen, 286. ^ People V. Martin, 5 N. Y. 27. 3 Taylor v. Henry, 2 Pick. 397. * Kimball v. Lamprey, 19 N. H. 215. ° K. Y. Con. Act, § 29. « Lamb V. People, 113 111. 137; Car- roll V. Wall, 35 Kan. 36; Green v. Durham, 1 Burr. 131; Rex v. Head, 4 lb. 2513; Carleton v. People, 10 150 Mich. 250; Decorah v. Bullis, 25 Iowa,' 12; Hildreth v. Molntyi-e, 1 J. J. Marsh, 206; People v. White, 24 Wend. 520; CarroUtown v. Clark, 21 111. App. 74; State v. Gray, 23 Neb. 365. 'Cochran v. McOleary, 22 Iowa, 75; In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200; Ashley's Case, 4 Abb. Pr. Rep. 35; Com. V. Kepner, 10 Phila. 510. 8 Graham v. Carondolet, 33 Mo. 262; Kepner v. Com., 40 Pa. St. 124. 9 N. Y. etc. Co. V. Waterbury, 55 Conn. 19. CH. Vn.] MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, MEETINGS, ETC. §96 of a council, and to vote in case of a tie vote, such right being a franchise.-' When there are no charter requirements as to the number of votes which are necessary to elect a presiding officer, the votes of the majority of a quorum will suffice.^ The relation of the mayor, or of the presiding officer, to the council, and the position which he occupies, are to so great an extent the subject of special charter provisions,^ that few general rules can be laid down, which will apply in all cases.* The statiis of members of the city council, or of the council itself, is usually regulated by a court of law ; but where there is a conflict of authority between two boards, each claiming to be, and acting as, the legal board, either may obtain an injunc- tion to prevent the usurpation of power hj the other, to which it has no title ; ^ although disputes as to the title to public office and the validity of elections, are exclusively within the juris- diction of the courts of law.^ When, for any reason, the acting city authorities are not those, in whom by its charter the power of municipal legislation is lodged, ordinances enacted by them are invalid.^ The princi- ples, applicable to de facto officers, are also applied to de facto municipal councils ; and the acts and ordinances of such gov- erning bodies are valid, provided the right to elect such a coun- cil or governing board is vested in the city.^ ' Reynolds v. Baldwin, 1 La. An. 162; see also Rex v. Williams, 1 Burr. 402; Com. v. Arrison, 15 S. & R. (Pa.) 130. 2 State V. Farr, 47 N. J. L. 208. ' As to the powers of the president of the board of aldermen in New York city, see People v. Lacomhe, 99 N. T. 43. * Where it was provided in a charter that the intendant shall have a seat in the board of commissioners (the governing council), and shall preside; but if he were absent the board could elect a presiding officer pro tempore; it was held that he was a commis- sioner, and had the right to partici- pate in municipal legislation. Raleigh v. Sorrell, 1 Jones (N. C.) Law, 49. So when the power to leg- islate is conferred on " the mayor and oouncilmen," the co-ordinate action of both is required, in order to give validity to a by-law, or other municipal act. Saxton v. Beach, 50 Mo. 488; Saxton v. St. Joseph, 60 lb. 153. »Kerr v. Trego, 47 Pa. St. 292. " Zn re Sawyer, 12411. S. 212, 223; see post, ch. xix. § 871 et seq. ' Decorah v. BuUis, 25 Iowa, 12. 8 Winona v. St. Peter Ry. Co., 31 Minn. 472; Hildreth's Heirs v. Mc- Intire, 1 J. J. Marsh. 206; Welch v. St. Genevieve, 1 Dillon C. C. 130; Decorah v. Bullis, 25 Iowa, 12; Peo- ple V. White, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 520; Norton v. Sheely Co., 118 U. S. 425; Carleton v. Peoj)le,. lOMich. 250. 151 §97 MUNICIPAL COKPORATIONS. [CH. VII. § 97. Regular, special and adjourned meetings. — Mem- bers of the council are presumed to know the times, which are appointed in the charter for holding its stated meetings ; ^ and if a member fails to attend, he neglects his duty, and waives his right to participate therein. But he is not presumed to know all that is done at a regular meeting. So, if at such meeting, a special meeting is called to take action at some future time, the action taken at the subsequent meeting will be void, unless ac- tual notice of the special meeting is given to those membere, who were absent from the regular meeting.^ In a case whei'e the charter fails to provide, how the time for holding stated meet- ings shall be fixed, the council may itself on motion change or fix the time ; although it has previously been fixed by a formal resolution.^ Special meetings, properly called according to the rules laid down in the charter, are legal, and the proceedings valid, if all the members entitled to be present are properly noti- fied ; * but notice, it has been held, is not necessary, where every one entitled to it is present at the special meeting of the council.^ An adjourned meeting is simply a continuation of the original special or regular meeting ; and, at an adjourned meeting, not only may items of unfinished business be completed ; but any act may be performed, which could have been legally done, had there been no adjournment.® The courts will, when a question arises as to the regularity of the meeting, and of the adjourn- ment, presume them to have been regular.' But when an or- dinance must be introduced at a meeting previous to the one, at which it is to be acted upon, it cannot be passed at an adjourned meeting.^ 1 Smith V. Law, 21 N. T. 296; In- surance Co. V. Sandars, 36 K. H. 352. 2 People V. Batchelor, 22 N. Y. 129. estate V. Kantler, 33 Minn, 69, 4 State V. Smith, 22 Minn, 218; In re Rogers, ^ Cow. 526; Downing v. Kugar, 21 Wend. 178. 'Lord V. Anoka, 36 Minn. 176; Bea- ver Creek v. Hastings, 52 Mich. 528. « Staates v. Washington, 45 N. J. L. S18; Ex parte Wolf, 14 Neb. 24; Smith V. Law, 21 N. Y. 296; Warner v. Mower, 11 Vt. 385 ; People v. Batche- 152 lor, 22 N. Y. 128; Kex v. Harris, 1 B. & A. 936; Scadding v. Lorant, 5 Eng. L. & E. 16; People v. Martin, 5 N. Y. 22; Street Case, 1 La. An. 412: New Orleans v. Brooks, 36 lb. 641: Ex parte Mirande, 73 Cal. 365. ' Hudson Co. v. State, 24 N. J. L. 718; Rutherford v. Hamilton, 97 Mo. 543; Tierney v. Brown, 65 Miss. 563; State V. Smith, 22 Minn. 218; Insur- ance Co. V. Sortwell, 8 Allen, 217. ' Staates v. Washington, supra. CH. VII.] MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, MEETINGS, ETC. § 98 When a special meeting is held, the business transacted must be exclusively that named in the call ; ^ and any act of the meet- ing, wholly outside of the special purpose of the meeting, is void.^ When at a regular meeting the council can act only upon a specific matter, or at a special meeting upon such matters as have been mentioned in the notice ; in either case, it seems that an adjourned meeting would be limited to those specific mat- ters, which could have been attended to at the original meet- ing.* § 98. Methods of proceeding — Ayes and nays. — When the charter provides that the municipal legislative body shall consist of two branches ; the rules, applicable generally to leg- islative bodies similarly composed, are considered to be adopted by necessary implication. Hence, one branch has no power to bind the city, without the concurrence of the other, elected at the same time.* Although in this case it was held, that the concurrence must be by simultaneously existing bodies ; yet, it has been held that knowledge communicated to a council is binding on its successors.® But general parliamentary rules may, in the case of municipal councils, be limited and modified by the charter, and by otlier statutory provisions. And an or- dinance is not invalid, if it is passed in accordance with statutory rules, even though some general parliamentary law was violated in its passage.^ It is well settled that a city council can act,^ or obtain information, by means of a select committee to which a matter is referred ; * and the members of the council may act, without further inquiry, upon facts within their own personal knowledge. A notice, to appear before a committee, is equivalent to a no- tice to appear before the council ; ® and, the committee being but 1 St. Louis V. Withans, 90 ko. 646. 2 Bergen v. Clarkson, 1 Halst. 352; Kex V. Liverpool, 2 Burr, 735 ; Rex v. Doncaster, lb. 738; King v. Mayor, 1 Str. 385. 3 Scadding v. Larant, 5 Eng. L. & E. 16;17Law J. 225. * Wetmore v. Story, 22 Barb. 414. 5 Bank v. Seton, 1 Peters. 299. 8 McGraw v. Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348. ' Collins V. Holyoke, 146 Mass. 298 ; Dorey V. Boston, 1461b. 336, 339;Bur lington V. Dennison, 42 N. J. L. 165 Gillett V. Logan Co., 67 111. 256 Klamrath v. Albany, 53 Hun, 206 Edwards v. Watertown, 61 How. Pr, 463. 8 Bissgll V. Jeffersonville, 24 How. 287, 296; Com. v. Pittsburgh, 14 Pa. St. 177; Main v. Ft. Smith, 49 Ark. 480. 9 Preble v. Portland, 45 Me. 241. 153 § 98 MTJXICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. VII. the agent of the council, its powers are revocable at any time.^ Every municipal council has the inherent power to reconsider its action, at anj^ time during its session, and adopt lost motions, or revoke those adopted.^ So, also, action, taken at a previous meeting, may at a subsequent regular meeting be rescinded, provided private rights have not been acquired under such act.^ Thus, it was held that, so long as public funds remained in the hands of a disbursing official, the council may rescindan order, drawn on him to pay the same over ; * and the same prin- ciple has been applied to the rescission of the action of a town council, authorizing a subscription in aid of a railroad, when the rights of third parties had not already become vested there- in .^ Under similar circumstances, and for the same general rea- sons, a simple resolution, providing for the levy of a tax, so long as it has not been acted on, may be rescinded ; and after res- cission, the collection of the tax cannot be legally enforced.^ A resolution or ordinance, which was passed by the council, under circumstances when, or in a mode by which, it was not authorized to act, may be subsequently ratified and validated by the council at a regular meeting, acting in the mode pre- scribed by lawJ Municipal councils are usually required by law to keep a record of their proceedings ; and this has also been required of other municipal bodies, such as a board of public works, although no record had been expressly provided for.^ The general rule is, that when a city charter requires the ayes and noes ^ to be called and recorded, upon a vote in the citj'^ council, such requirement is important and material, and cannot 1 Damon v. Grauby, 2 Pick. 345; comp. Salmon v. Haynes, 50 N. J. L. 97. ■' State V. Foster, 2 Hulst. 101, 107; Jersey City v. State, 30 N. J. L. 521, 529 ; State v. Jersey City, 3 Dutch. 536. * State V. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76; State V. Chapman, 44 lb. 595; Bige- low V. Hillman, 37 Me. 58; Keiff v. Conner, 5 Eng. (Ark.) 241; State v. Hoyt, 2 0reg. 246; Koad Case, 17 Pa. St. 71, 75 ; New Orleans y. St. Louis Ch., 11 La. An. 244; Locke v. Roches- ter, 5 Lansing, 11 ; Saak v. Philadel- 154 phia, 1 Pa. Leg. Gaz. Rep. 259; Ba- ker V. Cushman, 127 Mass. 105. 4 Tucker v. Justices, 13 Ire. (N. C.) 434; Dey V. Lee, 4 Jones (X C.)Lan-, 238. 6 Estey V. Starr, 56 Vt. 690. 6 Stoddard v. Gilraan, 22 Ut. 568; Pond V. Negus, 3 Mass. 230. ' State V. Hennepin Co., 33 Minn. 235. 8 Larned v. Briscoe, 62 Mich. 393. ' And even when it does not. Mc- Cormick v. Bay City, 23 Mich. 457. fJH. Vll.J MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, MEETINGS, ETC. §99 be dispensed with.^ The object of this regulation is to muke the members realize their responsibility, and to compel each to bear his share of the praise or blame, by the creation of a record which cannot be disputed.^ So, when the ayes and nays are taken, this fact can only be shown by the production of the journal ; ^ and where the journal does not show a vote by ayes and nays, there is no presumption that such a vote was taken.* It has been held that, although the ayes and noes were required by the charter to be called in all cases, the clause did not apply to a motion to adjourn ; ^ and in New York a provision, that the ayes and noes shall be called, was held to be directory, not- withstanding the use of the word " shall." " In a case, where the calling and recording of the ayes and noes was required, and the record of the same is omitted, it is proper for the council to cause an entry of the same to be made nunc pro tunc,'' at a subsequent legal meeting of the council. § 99. Quorum of the council— Joint bodies — Action of the majority binding. — When the incorporating statute, or the charter, is silent as to what shall constitute a quorum, com- mon law principles apply, and a majority of the members elect constitute the legal quorum.^ When the board has a definite number of members, it does not legally exist until all are cho- sen, and have qualified ; and, consequently, the majority cannot proceed to transact business, until the minority have been cho- sen and qualified.® So, if the council consists of twelve mem- ^ Sullivan v. Leadville, 11 Colo. 483; Spanglerv. Jacoby, 14 111. 297; Sup'rs V. People, 25 lb. 297; Rich V. Chicago, 59 lb. 286; Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind. 90; Tracy v. People, 6 Colo. 151 ; In re Mt. Morris Sq. , 2 Hill, 20; Elmendorf v. Mayor, 25 Wend. 693; Cutler v. Russellville, 40 Ark. 105; Morrison v. Lawrence, 98 Mass. 219; Indianola v. Jones, 29 Iowa, 282. 2 Stecker v. East Saginaw, 22 Mich. 104. ^In re Carlton, 16 Hun, 497; Solo- mon City V. Hughes, 24 Kan. 411 ; St. Louis V. Foster, 52 Mo. 513; Peo- ple V. Adams, 9 Wend. 333; Denning V. Rome, 6 lb. 651, and cases cited supra, note 1. 1 Tracy v. People, 6 Colo. 151. ^ Green Bay v. Brauus, 50 Wis. 204. 6 Striker v. Kelly, 3 Denio, 322. ' Delphi V. Evans, 36 Ind. 90; Mus- selman v. Manly, 42 lb. 462; Vawter V. Franklin College, 53 lb. 88; Lo- gausport V. Crockett, 64 lb. 319; Mayhew v. Gay Head, 13 Allen, 129 ; Com'rs V. Hearn, 50 Ala. 371; St§ck- ert V. East Saginaw, 22 Mich. 104. 8 Heiskill v. Baltimore, 65 Md. 125; Barnert v. Paterson, 48 N". J. L. 395 ; Cadmus v. Farr, 47 lb. 208; McDer- mott V. Miller, 45 lb. 251. 9 Schenok v. Play, 1 Woolw. 175 ; contra, Hartshorn v. Schoff, 58 N. H. 1971. 155 §99 MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS. [CH. VII. bers, seven is the smallest number that can hold a legal meethig; although, if this number be present, four of them may act.^ In a council having a membership of eighteen, an election of a clerk, who received the votes of nine members, was held valid; the presence of the others, who refused to vote, implying an acquiescence in the action of the majority.^ So, also, when a statute declares that a majority of those present at any reg- ular meeting shall be competent to transact business, the com- mon law requirement as to the quorum applies; and it was held that this provision did not allow a minority of the whole body to act as the council.^ It has also been held that a charter, which allowed a council to settle its rules of procedure, did not authorize it to declare what number should constitute a quorum ; * and the common law rule governed in that case, in defining what a legal quorum is. A provision, that an officer might be removed by a two-thirds vote of the city council, was construed to mean a two-thirds vote of a legal quorum, and not a two-thirds vote of all the members composing the council.^ Acts which are done when less than a legal quorum is present, are of course void.^ Of course, when the charter contains a special provision '^ as to what number of the council can transact business, such pro- vision is mandatory, and exclusive of the common law principle, governing a quorum. Thus when a charter prescribed, that the council could pass no ordinance, except bj' a majority of the eight members elected, it was decided that an ordinance could not be passed by a vote of four against three, although foui' constituted a majority of the legal quorum present.^ Not only may the majority of those present at a legal meeting of the i/n re Willcock, 7 Cow. 402, 410; Buell V. Buckingham, 16 Iowa, 284; Regents v. Williams, 9 G. & J. (Md.) 365 ; Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 470. 2 State V. Green, 37 Ohio St. 227. 'In re Willcocks, 7 Cow. 402, 463, 526. * Heiskell v. Baltimore, Qo Md. 125; Barnert v. Paterson, 48 N. J. L. 395. s Warnock v. Lafayette, 4 La. An. 419; Logansport v. Legg, 20 Ind. 156 315; State v. Porter, 113 lb. 79. ^Logansport v. Legg, 20 Ind. 31.); Perguson V. Chittenden, 6 Ark. 479; Price V. Eailroad Co., 13 Ind. 58; Pimental v. San Francisco, 21 Cal. 351. 'N. T. Consol. Act, §46. 8 San Francisco v. Hazen, 5 Cal. 169; Oakland v. Carpenter, 13 lb. 540; McCraoken v. San Francisco, 21 lb. 351. CH. Vn.] MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, MEETINGS, ETC. §99 council or other body ,^ acting judicially, bind all,^ whether pres- ent or absent ; but it is necessary, in the absence of special en- actment, that the majority of those present should concur, in order to do any valid act.^ The general rule as to actions by majorities may be conciselj'- stated, as follows : no minority of a city council or other governing body, exercising the corporate power, or of any committee appointed by- the same, through or by which the corporation acts, can bind the majority or the corporation, or do any valid act.* If, at a regular meeting of the cftuncil, a majority of those present withdraw, the power of those remaining is nullified, and the meeting is dissolved.^ But where the action to be taken, in place of being legisla- tive and discretionary, is piinisterial, and of such a character as not to require the deliberative consideration of the whole body, the rule requiring the majority to act,® in order to bind the council, has been somewhat modified. When a majority is au- thorized to act for a town council or committee, it may enter into a contract with another member of the council or com- mittee, as an individual ; and if such a contract is fairly made, and free from fraud, it will bind the corporation ; ^ although members of councils are disqualified from voting upon a matter, in which they are financially interested, adversely to the city.^ 1 Action by a majority of police commissioners in New Tork: Peo- ple V. Board, 99 N. T. 676. 'In re Rogers, 7 Cow. 526; Charles V. Hoboken, 3 Dutch. 203; Martin v. Lemon, 26 Conn. 192; Astor v. New York, 62 N. Y. 567, 580; People v. Palmer, 52 lb. 83; People v. Syra^ ciise, 63 lb. 291. * Laboiu-dette v. Municipality, 2 La. An. 527; State v. Deliesseline, 1 McCord (S. C.) 52; State v. Huggins, Harper (S. C.) Law, 94. •> Adams v. Hill, 16 Me. 215 ; Kup- fer V. So. Parish, 12 Mass. 185 ; Allen V. Cooper, 22 Me. 133; Damon v. Granby, 2 Pick. 345; Walcott v. "Walcott, 19 Vt. 37, 39; Jones v. An- dover, 9 Pick. 146. 5 Kingsbury v. School Dist., 12 Met. 99; Day v. Green, 4 Cush. 438, 439; Kushville G. Co. v. Eushville, 23 N. E. E. 72; 121 Ind. 206; State v. Jersey City, 3 Dutch. 493 ; Charles v. Hoboken, 3 lb. 203 ; State v. Priester, 43 Minn. 373; 45 N. "W. R. 712; Dey V. Jersey City, 19 N. J. Eq. 412; Bal- timore V. Poultney, 25 Md. 18; At- kins V. Phillips, (Fla. 91) 8 So. E. 429; Brown v. District, 127 U. S. 579, 586. 6 Downing v. Rugar, 21 Wend. 178; Com'rs V. Leckey, 6 S. & R. (Pa.) 166; Curtis v. Butler Co., 24 How. 435 ; Jefferson Co. v. Slagle, 66 Pa. St. 202; Martin v. Lemon, 26 Conn. 192; Shea v. Milford, 145 Mass. 528. ' Niles V. Muzzy, 33 Mich. 61; Jun- kins V. Union Seh. Dis., 39 Me. 220; Buell V. Buckingham, 16 Iowa, 284. 8 Oconto Co. V. Hall, 47 Wis. 208; Pickett V. Sch. Dis., 25 lb. 551; Coles 157 §100 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIOXS. [C'H. VII. It has been held, that when the functions of a municipal board are discretionary, the entire board must meet, although a ma- jority can take final actfon.^ But if the whole board have con- vened, the majority will not be hindered from acting, because of tlie withdrawal of the minority, before any action is taken.^ The common law rule, — that in a joint body all the constituent parts must be present, until the municipal action is completed, or the act would be invalid, — being subject to abuses by one of the parts withdrawing, in order to defeat the joint action, is applied with caution in this country, if it is not denied alto- gether.^ So, to constitute a valid meeting of a joint body, a majority of each of the separate bodies must be present when the meeting is opened ; but after it is organized, the identity of eaeli part is lost, and a majority of all those present can act for all, even though one of the separate bodies has withdrawn, be- fore action is had.* § 100. Municipal affairs must be transacted by the coun- cil as a body — Meetings. — The affairs of municipal corpora- tions proper are usually administered by a select council, which is chosen by the qualified voters. The council is not only not the municipal corporation ; it is, ordinarily, not even a corpora- tion.^ Its acts are the acts of the corporation, whose agent it is for the accomplishment of municipal purposes.^ Whether the affairs of the public are transacted in an assemblage of all the citizens, as in the New England town meeting; or whether they are carried on by a council, as in most municipal corpora- com, 20 K H. 213, 226, the court, cit- ing Whiteside v. People, 26 Wend. 634, and In re Humphrey, 10 lb. 612, the court refused to follow the com- mon law rule; and this case was fol- lowed in Kimball v. Marshall, 44 N. H. 465. * Gildersleeve v. Board, 17 Abb. Pr. 201; King v. Bower, 1 Barn. & Cr. 492; Whiteside v. People, 26 Wend. 634. 5Dil. Mun. Corp. §259; Keg. v. Paramore, 10 Ad. & El. 286; Beg. v. York, 2 Queens B. 850; Mayor v. Simpson, 8 lb. 73. " Richards v. Clarksburg, 30 W. Va. 491. V. Williamsburgh, 10 Wend. 659; Walworth Bank v. F. L. & I. Co., 16 Wis. 629; United Br. Church v. Tan- ducan, 37 lb. 54. 1 People V. Walker, 23 Barb. 304; Ballard v. Davis, 31 Miss. 525 ; Grid- ley v. Barker, 1 B. & P. 236. 2 Ex parte Rogers, 7 Cow. 526; but compare In re Beekman, 31 How. Pr. 16. 8 King V. Williams, 2 Maule & Sel. 141; King v. Buller, 8 East. 389; King V. Miller, 7 Term R. 278; Humphrey, In re, 10 Wend. 612; People v. Batch- ellor, 22 K. Y. 128, 146; First Parish V. Stearns, 21 Pick. 148; Coles Co. v. Allison, 23 111. 437. In Beck v. Hans- 158 CH. Vn.] MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, MEETINGS, ETC. I 101 tions, the corporate affairs can only be legally administered at regularly called meetings, unless some other provision is made by law.^ 1 The council must act as a unit, and only at its regular meet- ings ; ^ and individual members cannot bind the council, even though their action is ratified by the majority, if such ratifica- tion is not the deliberative action of the board, evidenced by some ordinance or resolution, or some similar act of the board, as such.^ At common law, the presence of the mayor was necessary to constitute a legal meeting of the council, he being considered an integral part of the corporation. If there were, beside the select or definite class which composed the council, any indefi- nite class called the commonalty, it was necessary that. some of them should be present ; and in any event, it was necessary that a majority of the select class, which constituted the governing body, should attend the meeting, in order that any valid munic- ipal action may be had.* Though the presence of a majority of the actual members of the select class, or definite governing part of the municipality, was required to be present, yet it was well settled that the majority of those present at a valid cor- porate meeting could bind all.^ § 101. Municipal courts at common law Among the franchises, which were possessed by municipal corporations at ■ State V. Haynes, 72 Mo. 377; Cen- tral Bridge V. Lowell, 15 Gray, 106 ; State V. Jersey City, 35 N. J. Eq. 404; Dey V. Jersey City, 19 lb. 412. 2 Dey V. Jersey City, supra; Balti- more V. Poultney, 25 Md. 18. 2 Schumm v. Seymour, 24 N. J. Eq. 143; Strong v. District, 4 Maokey (D. C.) 242; 9 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cases, 568. In McCortle v. Bates, 29 Ohio St. 419, the court said: "The mem- bers composing the board have no powei to act as a board except when together in session. They act as a body or a unit." Comp. Jefferson Co. V. Slagle, 66 Pa. St. 202. *Eex V. Smart, 4 Burr. 2143; Eex V. Morris, 4 East. 87; Eex v. Atkyns, 3 Mod. 23; Eex v. Bellringer, 4 Term E. 823; Eex v. Miller, 6 lb. 278. ^Launtz v. People, 113 111. 137; Coles V. Trustees, 10 "Wend. 658; Booker v. Young, 12 Gratt. 303; La^ bourdette v. Municipality, 2 La. An. 527; In re Willcocks, 7 Cow. 402, 462, 463; Young v. Buckingham, 5 Ohio, 489; The Queen v. Barhhart, 7 Up. Can. L. J. 126; The Queen v. Murray, 1 lb. JJ". S. 604; Kingsbury V. Sch. Dist., 12 Met. (Mass.) 99; Da- mon V. Granby, 2 Pick. 355; Buell v. Buckingham, 16 Iowa, 284; State v. Huggins, Harper, 94; Eex v. Bower, 1 B. & C. 492; Eex v. May, 4 lb. 843; Eex V. Headley, 7 lb. 496; Eex v. Greet, 8 Barn. & C. 363; Eex v. Dev- onshire, 1 lb. 609. 159 §102 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. vir. common law, was that of holding courts for the judicial deter- mination of matters of limited and local importance, rtr involv- ing the recovery of judgments for limited amounts. Inasmuch as any provision, by which justice can be cheaply and expedi- tiously administered, was considered to be of great benefit to the community, the charter or common law prescriptive right of holding court was usually considered as imposing upon the city, who was the donee of such right, a corresponding munici- pal duty to the public, to hold and maintain such a court, which was imperative, even though the charter only provided, that the municipality may hold a court ; ^ and a nonuser of the right, although lasting for two hundred years, or the lack of sufficient funds, was held to be no defence to a mandamus, to compel a municipal corporation to do its duty in respect to hold- ing a court.^ In consequence of the maxim, that rio one can be a judge in his own cause, it was the rule at common law, that a borough could not bring an action against a stranger in its own court, by which it sought to obtain a benefit to itself ; nor could the cor- porators act as jurors in such cases.^ § 102. Municipal Courts — Power to establish The state Legislature may* establish certain inferior and local judicial tribunals ; and may clothe them with such a measure of jurisdic- tion and power, as it may deem expedient ; provided there ex- ist no constitutional prohibition. Usually the matters, which are brought within the jurisdiction of such minor courts, relate to the enforcement of municipal ordinances, the recovery of 1 Rex V. Mayor etc. Hastings, 5 B. & Aid. 692; see also Haddock's Case, T. Eaym. 435. 2 Rex V. Mayor etc. Wells, 4 Dowl. P. C. 562; Rex v. Hastings, 1 B. & A. 148; 5 B. & A. 692; Rex v. Hav- ering, 5 lb. 291. 3 London v. Wood, 12 Mod. 674; 1 Salk. 398; Hesketh v. Braddock, 3 Burr. 1856-1868; Boswortli v. Bud- gen, T Mod. 461; Reg. v. Rogers, 2 I Ld. Raym. 778. In England, the Mu- nicipal Corporation Act of 1835 de- fines the jurisdiction of municipal courts, authorizes boroughs to es- 160 tablish them, and expressly pro- vides that the citizens or burgesses shall be competent to serve as jurors, or magistrateSjOr testify as witnesses, notwithstanding the fact, that they are liable to contribute to the funds in the treasury of the municipality. 5 and 6 Wm. iv. ch. Lxxxvi. §§ 90, 91, 118-134, 270-341. * In New Hampshire, Massachu- setts, Connecticut, New York and California, there are express consti- tutional provisions, empowering the Legislature to erect inferior courts, civil and criminal. CH. VII.] MtlNICirAL COUNCILS, :. EETINGS, ETC. §102 the penalties for the breach thereof, minor misdemeanors, and trifling infractions of the peace and good order of the com- munity, and suits between individuals when the amount in- volved is within a certain specified limit.^ It has been held that Municipal Courts, unless created by express provision of the constitution, may be abolished at any time by the Legis- lature.^ The Legislature, in exercising its power to establish inferior municipal or other courts and to mark out their jurisdiction, must act within constitutional limits, and subject to constitu- tional restraint.^ Thus, it has been held that, when the judi- cial power is in terms vested by the constitution in district* or other courts,^ the Legislature cannot constitutionally pass an act, conferring judicial power upon the mayor of a city ; but that for violations of its ordinances, the municipality must re- sort to the constitutional tribunals. ' Koliland v. St. Louis etc. Co., 1 S. W. E. 747; 89 Mo. 180; People v. Lawrence, 22 Pac. 1120; 82 Cal. 182; People V. Provines, 34 Cal. 520; In re Stratman, 39 lb. 517; Baker v. Steam- boat Milwaukee, 14 Iowa, 214; Bran- don V. Avery, 29 N. Y. 469; McCrea V. Jacobs, 19 Abb. N. C. 188; Charles- ton V. Ashley Phosphate Co., (S. C. 90) 11 S. E. E." 386; Hunt v. Genet, 14 Daly, 22.j; Northern Indiana v. Milliken, 7 Ohio St. 382; Com. v. Browden, Thacli. (Mass.) Cr. Cas. 9; People V. Evans, 18 111. 361; Fesh v. Com., 4 Dana, 522; Nugent v. State, 18 Ala. 521 ; N. Y. Consol. Act, § 1519 ; State V. Judge etc., 6 So. 784; 41 La. An. 953; Fox v. Ellison, 44 N. W. R. 671 ; 43 Minn. 41 ; Burns v. La Grange, 17 Tex. 415; In re Slattery, 3 Ark. 484; lb. 561; Holmes v. Fihlenburg, 54 lb. 203; Van Swartier v. Com., 24 Pa. St. 131; Henderson v. Davis, 11 S. E. 573; 106 N. C. 88; In re Clor- herty, 2 Wash. St. 137; State v. AVriglit, 80 Wis. 648; Ferre v. Ells- worth, 19 N. Y. S. 659; Myers v. Peo- ple, 26 111. 173; Davis v. Woolnough, 9 Iowa, 104; People v. Wilson, 15111. 11 389; State v. Helfrid, 2 N. & McC. (S. C.) 233; Callahan v. New York, 66 N. Y. 656; People v. Curley, 5 Cal. 412; Brown v. Jerome, 102 111. 371; Montrose v. State, 61 Miss. 429; People V. Stott, (Mich. 92) 51 N. W. E. 509; Egleston v. City Council, 1 Mill. Const. 45 ; Recorder, see Schro- der V. City Council, 2 Const. Rep. 720 ; Vassault v. Austin, 36 lb. 691 ; Peo- ple V. Nyland, 41 Cal. 129; Muscatine V. Steck, 7 Iowa, 503; Richmond Mayoralty Case, 19 Gratt. 673; Floyd V. Eatonton Cora'rs, 14 Ga. 354; Hill V. Dalton, 72 lb. 314. 2 Boyd V. Chambers, 78 Ky. 140. 3 Zylstra v. Charleston, 1 Bay (S. C.) 382: Slaughter v. People, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 334; State v. Theard, (La. 93) 12 So. E. 892 ; Daniel v. Hutcheson, (Tex. 93) 22 S. W. E. 278. For full details regarding the constitutional and statutory regulations respecting inferior courts, see Stimson Statutes, §§ 558, 559. * Lafon V. Dufrocq, 9 La. An. 350. 5 State V. Maynard, 14 111. 420; Beesraan v. Peoria, 16 lb. 484. 161 § 102 MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS. [CH. VII. Upon this question, however, the cases are not harmonious; and there are decisions, which hold that a plain and explicit constitutional provision, that the judicial power shall be vested exclusively in a Supreme Court, District, Probate and Justice Courts, will not render void or unconstitutional a statute, erect- ing Municipal Courts for the trial of offenders against ordi- nances.^ Although by the constitutions of a majority of the states, it is provided that justices of the peace shall be elected by the citizens of their respective districts,^ it has been held that the Legislature may confer upon the mayor the powers and ju- risdiction of a justice of the peace.** And where this is done, he may be deemed with fairness to be a judicial officer, within the meaning of these words, as used in a state constitution.* Municipal Courts are not designed to supersede the Superior State Courts ; but rather to aid the latter, by relieving them of a portion of the litigation whicli is occasioned by the growth of large and populous municipal communities.^ And when they are established for municipal purposes, under a special power which is conferred upon the Legislature by the Constitution of the State, their territorial jurisdiction should be confined within the municipal boundaries ; and the action of their magistrates, in committing persons for public criminal offences against the laws of the commonwealth, will be unconstitutional.^ But such 1 State v. Young, 3 Kan. 445 ; Sbaf er V. Mumma, 17 Md. 331; Hutchings V. Scott, 4 Halst. 218. 2 Stimson Stat. § 560, p. 127. 3 State V. Perkins, 24 N. J. L. 409; 1 Harr. N. J. 237; Ha we v. Plainfleld, 37 N". J. L. 145 ; State v. Zeigler, 32 lb. 262; MoConrill v. Jersey City, 39 lb. 38, 42; Bain v. Mitchell, 82 Ala. 304; Robinson v. Benton Co., 49 Ark. 49; Baton Rouge v. Bearing, 15 La. An. 208; contra, Edenton v. Wool, 65 N. C. 379. 4 Waldo v; Wallace, 12 Ind. 569; Gulick V. New, 14 lb. 93; Howard v. Shoemaker, 35 lb. Ill; Morrison v. McDonald, 21 Me. 550; State v. May- nard, 14 111. 419; Com. v. Dallas, 3 Yeates, 300; State v. Wilmington, 3 Harr. (Del.) 294. ' Grand Rapids etc. Co. v. Gray, 38 162 Mich. 461. " These Municipal Courts, so far as tliey act under city by-laws, are not designed to decide between man and man, or to administer gene- ra] laws. They are ordained to pre- vent disorder in matters of local convenience, and to regulate the use of public and quasi public easements so as to prevent confusion. If, in exercising this power, they can inci- dentally decide upon the rights of private property, so as to determine its enjoyment without review, there would seem to be a practical annihi- lation of the right to resort to the general tribunal and the common law." Jackson v. People, 9 Mich. Ill, 117. " Meagher v Storey Co., 5 Nev. 244. Municipal Court cannot sit outside city limits. HershofE v. Beverly, 43 N. J. L. 139. CH. Vn.] MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, MEETINGS, ETC. § 103 a prohibition of the exercise of general judicial powers will not be construed to prevent the exercise of the police power by a municipality, by the infliction by its courts of fines and other penalties upon disorderly persons and offenders against public morality, within the limits of the corporation;^ provided, al- ways, that an offender, convicted by a Municipal Court in a summary proceeding, is not deprived of his constitutional right to a jury trial, to v/hich he would be entitled, in a prosecution by the state for the offence charged .^ § 103. Competency of corporators as jurors, judges and witnesses. — We have seen that, at common law, a municipal corporation could not be a suitor in its own coarts ; nor could a coi'porator act upon a jury, whose duty it was to decide a ques- tion, to which the municipality was a party. This rule has no application to the courts of municipalities in the United States. On the other hand, it is not only allowable, but in fact quite customary, for the mayor to act as a judicial officer, in the trial of offenders against ordinances, and the evidence of citizens is freely received.'^ Whatever may have been the justice or rea- son of the common law rule — manifestly, the only plausible reason was the technical one, that the incorporated municipal- ity was to be distinguished from the community at large, and was held by a comparatively few persons as a franchise, more or less personal in character — the rule itself has been univer- sally considered to be superseded, in respect to the competency of judges, jurors or witnesses in strictlj' Municipal Courts.* A iShafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331; judicial power of Mayor under Mary- land Const., Hagerstown v. Dechert, 32 lb. 369. In Massachusetts, a Mu- nicipal Police Court was held to be a "Court of the Commonwealth." Com. V. Hawkes, 123 Mass. 525. ^ See, as to conflict between the ju- dicial power of the municipality and that of the state, Jenkins v. Thom- asville, 35 Ga. 145 ; Vason v. Augus- ta, 38 lb. 542; Savannali v. Hussey, 21 lb. 80; Slaughter v. People, 2 Doug. 334; contra, Williamson v. Com., 4 B. Mon. 146. ' Thomas v. Mt. Vernon, 9 Ohio, 290; Com. v. Read, 1 Gray, 475; Lex- ington v. Long, 31 Mo. 369; Wheel- ing V. Black, 25 W. Va. 266; Com. v. Ryan, 5 Mass. 90; State v. Wells, 46 Iowa, 662. * City Council v. King, 4 McCord. (S. C.) 487; Carwein v. Hames, 11 Johns. 76. In City Council v. Pepper, 1 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 364, the court said : " The statutory authority given to the City Court to try all offenders against city ordinances, impliedly de- clares that, notwithstanding the com- mon law objection, it was right and proper to give it the power to en- force the city laws against all of- fenders. The interest is too minute, too slight to excite prejudice against 163 §104 MtnsriCIPAi COEPOEATIONS. [CH. VII. distinction is made, in respect to the competency of a taxpayer to serve as a juror, between the Municipal Courts and the gen- eral courts of the State. In actions, brought in the latter class of courts, when a municipal corporation is a party, it has been held that a resident taxpayer is incompetent to serve as a juror, except where his common law incapacity has been either ex- pressly or impliedly removed by statute ; it being considered that his interest as a taxpayer, in the verdict to be rendered by the jury, will justify his challenge for cause.^ An owner of a lot upon a street, about to be widened, is not disqualified from presiding over the commission, when he is the mayor ; ^ or from taking part as a juror, in the proceedings for the appropriation of private property upon that street, for street purposes.^ § 104. Summary proceedings — Jury trials. — In respect to Municipal Courts, two principles should be borne in mind: First. These courts have only such powers and such jurisdiction as are expressly conferred by statute, or necessarily implied therefrom.* In all cases, where any ambiguity exists, that con- struction of the statute is to be favored, which will tend to re- strict the jurisdiction and power of the court. Secondly. In all proceedings, which are had in such courts, due care must be exercised, to secure and protect the personal liberty and the rights of the accused. In nearly all of the States of the Union, express constitutional provisions exist, securing to a person accused of a crime a trial by an impartial jury, or providing that a person shall not be deprived of life, liberty or property, a defendant; for the judge, sheriff and jurors are members of a corpo- ration of many thousand members. What interest of value have they in a fine of twenty dollars? It would put a most eminent calculator to great trouble to ascertain the very minute grain of interest, which each of these gentlemen might have. To remove so shadowy and slight an ob- jection,the Legislature thought prop- er to clothe the City Court, consist- ing of its judge, clerk, sherifi and jurors, with authority to try the de- fendant, and he cannot object to it." 164 See, also, cases cited in last note. iDiveuey v. Elmira, 51 N. T. 506; see, also, Johnson v. Americus, 46 Gra. 80; Carters ville v. Lyon, 69 Ga. 577; Kose v, St. Charles, 49 Mo. 509; Fulweiler v. St. Louis, 61 Mo. 479; Montezuma v. Minor, 73 Ga. 484. 2 Lexington v. Long, 31 Mo. 369. 8 Kundlnger v. Saginaw, 59 Mich. 355 ; Keraper v. Louisville, 14 Bush (Ky.) 87; Boston v. Baldwin, 139 Mass. 315. * Municipal Courts in the city of New York. N. Y. Con.Act, §§ 1279, 1440. CH. VII.J MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, MEETINGS, ETC. §10i without due process of law.^ How far the State Legislatures are restrained by these constitutional provisions in respect to trial by jury, in adopting summary methods for punishing of- fenders, either against the statute law or against municipal or- dinances, can be ascertained in any particular instance, only by an actual inspection of the constitution or statutes of the state, in which the question is raised.^ It has been generally considered, that as offences against mu- nicipal ordinances, as, for example, those relating to markets, streets, the use of water and the construction of buildings, etc., which in the exercise of the express or implied powers of the municipal corporation, have been adopted as municipal police regulations, are not of a criminal nature ; they may be prosecuted summarily, and need not be prosecuted by indictment or tried by a jury .3 Such offences are not crimes or misdemeanors, to wliich the constitutional right of a jury trial attaches.* The same principle of constitutional interpretation and construction is adopted here, which is followed, when it is held that the con- stitutional provision for trial by jur}^, does not apply to cases falling within the equity jurisdiction,^ viz. : that the peculiar 1 In Delaware,]SrortliCarolina,South Carolina and Iowa, the Legislature is authorized by the constitution to provide summary modes of trial for petty offences. For the constitu- tional I'ights of trial by jury, etc., see Stimson Statutes, §§ 12, 73, 130, 131, 132. ■^ Cases construing statutes and constitutions. Thomas v. Ashland, 12 Ohio St. 124; Work v. State, 2 lb. 296; Law v. Com'rs, R. M. Charlton, 302; Green v. Savannah, lb. 368,371; Frigally v. Memphis, 6 Coldw. 382; Anderson v. O'Donnell, 7 S. E. Rep. 524; Alexander v. Bennett, 60 N. Y. 204; In re Tenn. Hall, 5 Pa. St. 204; Goodrich v. Brown, 30 Iowa, 291; Sill V. Corning, 15 N. Y. 297; Fay- ette V. Sha^rath, 25 Mo. 445 ; Willis V. Boonville, 28 lb. 543; Markle v. Akron, 14 Ohio, 586; Cincinnati v. Gwynne, 10 Ohio, 192; Hutchings v. Scott, 4 Ilalst. 218; Malone v. Mur- phy, 2 Kan. 250; Com. v. Pindar, 11 Met. (Mass.) 539; Com. v. Eoark, 8 Cush. 210; Com. v. Emery, 11 lb. 406; Elder v. Dwight Mfg. Co., 4 Gray, 201 ; State v. Eicker, 32 N. H. 179; Myers v. People, 26 111. 173; Rice v. State, 3 Kan. 141. Territorial Jurisdiction. State v. Clegg, 27 Conn. 593; Covin v. Phy., 26 111. 432; State V. McArthur, 13 Wis. 383; Hoag v. Laraont, 60 N. Y. 96. 3 State V. Gutierrez, 15 La. An. 190 Tierney v. Dodge, 9 Minn. 166, 169 St. Peter v. Bauer, 19 lb. 327, 332 -Ex parte Hollwedel, 74 Mo. 395 Williams v. Augusta, 4 Ga. 509; Floyd V. Com'rs, 14 Ga. 358; Vason v. Augusta, 38 lb. 542 ; Byers v. Com . , 42 Pa. St. 89; 1 Bish. Cr. Pr., sec 758; State V. Conlin, 27 Vt. 318. * Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540; State V. Powell, 97 N. C. 417. ^ Tiedeman's Limitations of Police Power, § 34/. 165 §104 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. VII. necessities of the case made it impossible to obey the constitu- tional injunction.! Hence, the authority, which may be con- ferred by charter upon Municipal Courts to punish violators of ordinances, and other petty offenders, by a slight fine or limited term of imprisonment without a trial by a jury, is valid ; and does not conflict with a constitutional provision, which declares that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.^ So, it was held in Pennsylvania, that the arrest by the city, under statutory authority, of professional thieves and other wrongdoers, frequenting any railroad depot or other public place, and their summary commitment by the mayor without a jury trial, was not in conflict with constitutional guaranties that the right of trial by jury should not be infringed.^ What- ever may be one's opinion of the merits of the jury trial, as a means of doing exact justice between man and man, one can- not escape the conclusion, that this elastic rule of constitutional construction, — whereby summary proceedings for the trial of offenders against municipal ordinances are permitted without the aid of a jury, and are held not to conflict with the constitu- tional requirement of a jury — is sometimes carried to a point, where it is extremely difScult to discover why in any case the State majr not abolish trial by jury, without infringing this con- stitutional provision.* And, in the light of this fear, that this provision of the constitution may ultimately become valueless, as a protection against governmental tyranny, the courts are disposed to hold that the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury must be strictly obeyed in every case of criminal prosecu- 1 See Tiedeman's Lim. of Police Power, § 47, where the vagrant laws are criticized from the standpoint of constitutional limitations in protec- tion of personal liberty. '■^Johnson V. Barclay, 1 Hai-r. (N. J.) 1; Howe v. Plainfield, 37 JST. J. L. 1.15; People v. Justices, 74 N. Y. 406; 18 Abb. L. J. 254; McAlar v. Wood- ruff, 33 N. J. L. 213; State v. Lee, 29 Minn. 445; Mankato v. Arnold, 36 Minn. 62; Ex parte Schmidt, 24 S. C. 363; Hill v. Mayor of Daltoii, 72 Ga. 314; Moundsville v. Fountain, 27 W. Va. 182, 204; Dively v. Cedar Falls, 166 21 Iowa, 565; Davenport, etc. Co. v. Davenport, 13 lb. 229; Monroe v. Meuer, 35 La. An. 1192; Stebbins v. Mayor, 18 Pac. Rep. 745; State v. Topeka, 36 Kan. 76; Hollenbeck v. Marslialltown, 62 Iowa, 21; In re Rolfs, 30 Kau. 758; see also cases cited in last note. sRyers v. Com., 42 Pa. St. 89; see also Dunmares App., 52 Pa. St. 374; Ewing V. Jilley, 43 Ib^. 384; Van Swarton v. Com., 24 lb. 131; Barter V. Com., 3 Pa. (Pen. & W.) 253 ; Rliines v. Clark, 51 Pa. St. 96. 4 Plimpton V. Somerset, 33 Vt. 283. CH. VII.] MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, 5IEETINGS, ETC. § 104 tion, except where the offence is of a trivial character, and con- stitutes a breach of some ordinance of the cit}^^ In pursuance of this trend of judicial opinion, it has been repeatedly decided, that it is not within the constitutional powers of a State Legis- lature, to confer upon Municipal Courts a summary jurisdiction to try persons for the commission of acts, which, being against the public at large, are indictable by the state, or which are essentially criminal offences against the commoner statute law. Under a clause of a constitution, providing that no one shall be called upon to answer a criminal charge, except by indict- ment etc., and requiring a unanimous conviction by a jury, an act of the Legislature, empowering a town official or court to try summarily assaults, batteries and other crimes, would be unconstitutional, as violating one or both of the' above provi- sions.^ It has been held that an act, providing for a snmmarj'- conviction of a new offence by a court of inferior jurisdiction without a jury trial, does not violate a constitutional provision, that trial by jurj'^ shall be as heretofore, or that the right thereof shall remain inviolate.^ It is not always easy to ascertain, whether any given offence is a crime, for which a jury trial may of right 'be demanded. The fact, that a term of imprisonment may be imposed, as part of tiie sentence, does not necessarily render the prosecution a criminal one, in which a jurjf trial may be required or demand- ed ; and, after all, the most that can be said is, that the ques- tion depends almost wholly upon the nature of the offence and and statute law, cannot be punished summarily in a Municipal Court: People V. Slaughter, 2 Doug. (Mich. ) 334; Welch v. People, lb. 332; In re Sic, 73 Gal. 142; Burns v. La Grange, 17 Tex. 415; Smith v. San Antonio, lb. 643; Barter V. Com., 3 Pa. (P. & W.) 253. But see contra, Be John- son, 73 Cal. 228. " Van Swarton v. Commonwealth, 24 Pa. St. 131; Ehines v. Clark, 51 Pa. St. 96, see also Boring v. Wil- liams, 17 Ala. 510; Times v. State, 26 lb. 165 ; In re Powers, 25 Vt, 261 ; Murphy v. People, 2 Cow. 81.'); Shirley v. Lunenberg, 11 Mass. 379. 167 1 State V. Lockwood, 43 Wis. 463; Neales v. State, 10 Mo. 498; State v. Mansfield, 41 Mo. 470; Com. v. Shaw, 1 Pitts. (Pa.) 492, see also Cooley's Const. Lim. §§ 319, 410; Proffatt's Jury Trials, § 113, see ch. viii. § 129, Municipal power to legislate on sub- jects, etc. ^ State V. Mass., 2 Jones (N. C.) Law, 66; Tierney v. Dodge, 9 Minn. 106; Rector v. State, 6 Ark. 187; Durr V. Howard, 6 lb. 461; Lewis v. State, 21 lb. 211. When the provision is, that no one should be compelled to answer criminal offences, except up- on indictment, the keeping of a house of ill fame, being such by common §105 MUNICIPAL OOEPOKATIONS. [CH. vn. the public need of a summary proceeding, in order to maintain an effective restraint upon evildoers. Aside from the minor offences, upon which there has always been, both in England and the United States, a substantial agree- ment as to the legality of summary proceedings, there is a class of cases approaching near the boundary of crimes, in respect to which a difference of opinion has existed, which is in many in- stances irreconcilable. An extended discussion being impracti- cable here, the reader is referred to the cases cited for a further elucidation of the matter.^ § 105. Review Iby Superior Courts — Jury trial. — The de- cisions of the courts of several of the States cannot be recon- ciled with the views which are held by the Supreme Court of the United States upon the question, whether, if a person, accused of crime, is tried by a summary proceeding in a municipal or infe- rior court without a jury, he is thereby deprived of his consti- tutional right to a trial by an impartial jury, if he can by an ap- peal from the judgment of the court obtain as a matter of right a second trial in the appellate tribunal. The State courts have held that one, who is accused of a crime in an inferior court, and therein convicted by a summary proceeding, is deprived of no constitutional privilege or right, if, upon an appeal hampered by no unreasonable restrictions, he can obtain a trial bj"^ jury of the accusation against him.^ TMs doctrine was repudiated by the Supreme Court of the United States, when an application was made for a writ of Habeas Corpus, to release a person who had been summarily convicted of the crime of conspiracy in a Police Court of the District of Columbia, where a jury trial 1 1 Steph. Hist. Cr. Law, ch. iv. p. 122; Atty. General v. Bowmau, 2 B. & P. .532; Same v. Siddon, 1 0. & J. 220; Heme v. Gaston, 2 E. & E. 66; In re Lucas v. MoGlashau, 20 Up. Can. Q. B. 81; Atty. Gen. v. Sul- livan, 32 L. J. Ex. 92; Easton's Case, 12 A. & E. 645; Cobbett v. Slow man, 9 Exch. 633 ; Egington, In re, 2 E. & B. Y17; Huntley v. Lusoombe, 2 B. & P. 530; Rackhara v. Bluok, 9 Q. B. 691; Sweeney v. Spooner, 3 B. & S. 329; Eeeve v. Wood, 5 lb. 334; Cattell V. Ireson, E. B. & E. 91; Mar- 168 den V. Potter, 7 C. B. N. S. 641. 2 Maxwell v. Board, 119 Ind. 20; Woodward v. Cabanirs, 77 Ala. 328; Sedgwick Stat, and Const. Law, 549; Beers V. Beers, 4 Conn. 535; Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 329; Stewart v. Mayor, 7 Md. 501; Dargau v. Boston, 12 Allen, 223; Morford v. Barnes, 8 Terger (Tenn.) 444; McDonald v. Schell, 6 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.) 240; Cameron v. United States, 13 S. Ct. K. 595 ; 148 U. S. 301 ; Mclnerney v. Den- ver, 17 Colo. 302; State v. Fouoade, (La. 93) 13 So. R. 187. CH. Vn.] MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, MEETINGS, ETC. §105 had been denied him, although it had been demanded.^ The power of the Superior Courts, to review the proceedings of in- ferior tribunals, will not be deemed to be taken away, unless the legislative intent to do so is clear, and free from doubt or ambi- guity. The need of an opportunity for a judicial review of a case determined in Municipal Courts, becomes strikingly ap- parent, when their character and methods of procedure are considered in connection with the fact, that justice is so fre- quently administered there by men without professional knowl- edge, or judicial experience. So, also, the jurisdiction of the Superior Courts, to review by cerfioran or otherwise, and control the subordinate tribunal, can- not be considered as taken away by mere negative enactments, or by implication of law,^ or by a statutory declaration that the 1 Callan v. Wilson, 12V U. S. 540. In this case, tlie court said : " It (con- spiracy) is an offence of a grave character, affecting tlie public at large, and we are unable to hold that a person, charged with having com- mitted it in this district, is not enti- tled to a jury when put upon his trial. The jurisdiction of the Police Court, as defined by existing stat- utes, does not extend to the trial of infamous crimes or offences, punish- able by imprisonment in the peniten- tiary. But the argument, made in behalf of the government, implies that if Congress should provide the Police Court with a grand jury, and authorize that court to try, without a petit jury, all persons indicted, — even for crimes punishable by con- finement in the penitentiary — such legislation would not be an invasion of the constitutional right of trial by jury, provided the accused, after be- ing tried and sentenced in the Police Court, is given an unobstructed right of appeal to, and trial by jury in, another court, to which the case may be taken. We cannot assent to that interpretation of the constitution. Except in that class or grade of of- fences, called petty offences, which according to the common law may be proceeded against summarily in any tribunal legally constituted for that purpose, the guaranty of an impar- tial jux-y to the accused in a criminal prosecution, conducted either in the name of, or by or under the authority of the. United States, secures to him the right toenjoy that mode of trial from the first moment, and in what- eyer court he is put on trial for the offence charged. In such cases, a judgment of conviction, not based upon a verdict of guilty by a jury, is void. To accord to the accused a right to be tried by a jury, in an Aj)- pellate Court, after he has been once fully tried otherwise than by a jury, in the court of original jurisdiction, and sentenced to pay a fine or be im- prisoned for not paying it, does not satisfy the requirements of the con- stitution." See also In re Fry, 3 Mackey, 135; In, re Dana, "7 Bene- dict, 1. 2 State V. Fitzgerald, 44 Mo. 42.5 ; Com. V. McCloskey, 2 Eawle (Pa.) 369; In re Strahl, 16 Iowa, 369; State V. Funk, 17 lb. 365; Wararaack v. Holloway, 2 Ala. 31; Bateman v. 169 §105 MTTNICrPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. Vlf. judgment of the inferior tribunal shall be "final and. conclu- sive," or " without appeal." ^ But a provision of the charter, however, that appeals and writs of error from the decisions of the mayor should be allowed, only where the fine imposed by him exceeded the sum of five dollars, was construed as show- ing the intention of the Legislature, that judgment should be final and conclusive in all cases, where the fine did not exceed that sum. Hence, a writ of certiorari was denied.^ It is well settled that, while a writ of certiorari, to review the findings of an inferior tribunal, will lie unless plainly and explicitly denied, or superseded by some other specific remedy ;2 a right to an appeal to a Superior Court does not exist, unless expressly given.* With respect to courts having an original jurisdiction of a general and superior nature, as, for example, the Supreme Court of the State of New York, a provision, that their decisions shall be final and conclusive upon the parties interested, and upon all other persons, takes away the right of appeal, which would or- dinarily be allowed.^ It has been held that, if a question arises as to the ownership of real property, in an action brought in a Municipal Court to enforce an ordinance, the mayor or justice cannot decide it, as upon common law principles these inferior courts have no jurisdiction to determine the title to real prop- erty, hereditaments or franchises.® Magowan, 1 Met. 533; Bernstein v. Clark, (Ga. 90) 13 S. E. E. 336; Green- wood V. Boyd & B. Furn. Factory, 13 S. E. R. 128; 88 Ga. 582; State v. Ellis (La. 90) 9 So. R. 639; Heep v. Burr, 34 111. App. 470; Fox v. Penin- sular White Lead & Color Works, 48 jST. W. R. 203; 84 Mich. 676; Blair v. Sennott, 35 111. App. 368; 24 N. E. R. 969; Com. v. Meeser, 44 Pa. St. 341; Davidson v. Woodruff, 68 Ala. 356; State V. Gates, 35 Minn. 385; Garvin V. Gaman, 63 Mich. 221; Ducheneau V. House, 4 Utah, 463; Lees v. Drain- age Com'rs, 24111. App. 487; Callahan V. Lewis, 44 N. W. R. 892; Boyer v. Teague, 106 N. C. 571. 1 See cases cited in last note. Ew- ing V. Filley, 44 Pa. St. 384; Bex v. Moreley, 2 Burr. 1040; Lawton v. 170 Com'rs, 2 Caines, 179, 181; Starr v. Trustees, 6 Wend. 564; In re Heath, 3 Hill, 42; People v. Mayor, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 9; Tierney V. Dodge, 9 Minn. 166; Camden v. Block, 65 Ala. 236. 2 Wertheimer v. Boonville, 29 Mo. 254. ^ Cunningham v. Squires, 2 W. Va. 611. See § 398 on scope of certiorari in respect to municipal corporations. * Conboy v. Iowa City, 2 Iowa, 90; People V. Pol. Justice, 7 Mich. 456; Dubuque v. Redman, 1 la. 444; Mo- Garty v. Deming, 51 Conn. 422. '' In re Canal v. Walker Street, 12 K. Y. 406; N. Y. Cen. R. Co. v. Mai-- vin, 11 lb. 276. * Warwick v. Mayo, 15 Gratt. 528; Jackson v. People, 9 Mich. Ill ; Grand Rapids V. Hughes, 15 Mich. 54. CH. VII.J MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, MEETINGS, ETC. § 106 § 106.. Custody of municipal records — Power to amend. — The records of a municipal corporation should remain in the hands of the town clerk, or other official, whose legal duty is to care for them. And if they ai'e kept out of his possession, it has been held that an action of replevin will lie to recover possession of them in the name of the corporation.^ The pos- session of the clerk is the possession of the corporation, in a case of disputed possession between him and a stranger.^ It is now the general rule, however, to employ the writ of mandamus, as the most appropriate and effective remedy, for the recovery of the possession of municipal records from a pred- ecessor in, or usurper of, an office.^ So, also, mandamus, and not replevin, is generally the proper remedy for the recovery by the owner of possession of papers filed in a public office.* It was held in Indiana,^ that the proper party, to bring an action to recover records, was the board succeeding that in whose possession the records were ; and that a mere citizen, although acting for all the citizens of the town, could not compel their surrender. The right to inspect municipal records, under proper circum- stances, is possessed by the corporations, inhabitants, or rate payers ; and this right is enforceable by mandamus.^ Corporations have the power to appoint a clerk pro tem-pore, whenever the regular clerk is absent from a corporate meeting ; and his entries, or the entries made by the regular clerk from his memoranda,'^ are competent evidence of the proceedings ; ^ and they will not be invalidated by a failure of the clerk jpro tempore to take the oatli of office.* ' Sudbury v. Stearns, 21 Pick. 148. 2 School Dis. V. Lord, 44 Me. 374. 8 Rex V. Nottingham, 1 Sid. 31 ; 1 Barnard, 402; Proprietors v. Slack, 7 Gush. 226; Rex v. Ingram, 1 W. Bl. 50: see § 373. 'Desmond v. McCarty, 17 Iowa, 525; La Grange v. State Treas., 24 Mich. 468. 5 Carr v. McCampbell, 61 Ind. 97. ^ King T. Sargent, 5 Term R. 466; King V. Richmond, 6 lb. 560; Cock- burn V. Bank, 13 La. An. 289; Peo- ple V. Walker, 9 Mich. 328; Peo- ple V. Cornell, 47 Barb. 329; People V. Mott, 1 How. Pr. 247; Bruce V. Bruce, 2 B. & P. 229; King' v. Mitchell, 10 East, 511 ; see chapter XIX on Mandamus, where the sub- ject of mandamus is very fully set forth. ' Louisville v. McKerney, 7 Bush, 651. 8 Hutchinson v. Pratt, 11 Vt. 402; Rex V. Mothersell, 1 Stra. 93. 9 Stebbins v. Merrit, 10 Cush. 27. 171 §106 MUNICIPAL, CORPORATIONS. [CH. Vtl. Under a statutory I'equirement, that the minutes should be signed by a chairman, they will not be impaired by the fact, that they were signed on a day subsequent to the date of the meeting.^ In the very numerous municipal and quasi municipal corpora- tions, by which the local affairs of communities are controlled, it is apparently impossible that persons should be selected by the corporations to act as municipal officials, without the choice of some who are totally unfit to perform the clerical services required of them. On this account, it has long been the law to permit the clerk of the New England town, who has made an incorrect record, to amend the same during his incumbency of the ofSce, he being held liable for any abuse of the privilege.^ If, however, he makes a fraudulent or untruthful amendment, the town will not be bound by the altered record, unless it shall be estopped by having ratified it after it has been made.^ The courts are favorably disposed towards upholding town records which are, however irregular, free from dishonest or willful error ; and for this reason they will not be too strict, when amendments come before them for consideration.* A town clerk has no authority to amend the town records after he is out of ofBce.* Nor can a town clerk, or similar municipal officer, amend records kept by his predecessor,^ unless in a proper case, the municipality empowers him to correct the er- loneous, or insert the omitted, matter.^ 1 Miles V. Bougli, 3 Gale & D. 119; Inglis V. Railway Co., 16 Eng. L, & Eq. 55; Logansport v. Crockett, 64 Ind. 319. 2 Bishop V. Cone, 3 N. H. 513; Hoag V. Durfey, 1 Aiken (Vt.) 286; Cham- berlain V. Dover, 13 Me. 466. = Whittier v. Varney, 10 N. H. 291; Gibson v. Bailey, 9 lb. 168; Harris V. School Dis., 28 lb. 58, 66; Cass v. Bellows, 31 lb. 501 ; Law v. Pettengill, 12 lb. 340; Pierce v. Richardson, 37 lb. 306; Scammon v. Scammon, 28 lb. 429; Boston T. Co. v. Pomfret, 20 Conn. 590; New Haven etc. Co. v. Chatham, 42 lb. 465 ; President etc. V. O'Malley, 18 111. 407; Mott v. Rey- 172 nolds, 27 Vt. 206; Samis v. King, 40 Conn. 298. 4 Welles V. Battelle, 11 Mass. 477, 481; Keller v. Savage, 17 Me. 444; St. Charles v. O'Malley, 18 111. 408; Williams v. School District, 21 Pick. 75; Bishop v. Cone, 3 N. H. 513; Hoag V. Durfey, 1 Aiken (Vt.) 286. 6 School Dist. V. Atherton, 12 Met. (Mass.) 105; Hartwell v. Littleton, 13 Pick. 229, 232; contra, Gibson v. Bailey, 9 N. H. 168; Kiley v. Cranar, 51 Mo. 541, 543. estate V. Williams, 25 Me. 555, 561; 29 lb. 523; Taylor v. Henry, 2 Pick. 397. 7 Hutchinson v. Pratt, 11 Vt. 402, 419. CII. VII.J MUNICIPAL COUNCILS, MEETINGS, ETC. §106 A municipal corporation, like courts of record, possesses the power of amending its records nunc pro tunc^ This rule has been applied in case of assessments, where some essential action, preliminary thereto, had been properly taken, but mention of it had been omitted from the council minutes.''^ So, also, a town council may at any time instruct its clerk to correct its official journal, even after the minutes contained therein have been approved. But it has been held that a council cannot correct errors or omissions in the minutes of meetings, which were held by their predecessors, in order to make it appear therein that an ordinance had passed, when it appeared from the minutes that it had only been reported.^ As the validity of municipal records should be supported when possible, if an order, to which unanimous consent is re- quired in order to give it legal force, is found entered in the minutes, it will be presumed to have received unanimous con- sent, unless the contrary plainly appears.* The question sometimes arises, in respect to the amendment of a record, pending a trial, in which it is to be used as evidence, it was held that this could be'done even by a town clerk, who had been out of office, but had been reinstated.^ In a some- what similar instance, where the amendment was made pending the trial of a suit, brought against the town six years subse- quent to the original entry, the court sustained the compe- tency of the clerk, to make an alteration in the record, by which the plaintiff's cause of action was wholly annulled.'' In 1 Musselman v. Manly, 42 Ind. 462; Vawter v. Franklin College, 53 lb. 88; Com'rs V. Hearne, 59 Ala. 371; Mayhew v. Gay Head, 13 Allen, 129; Steckert v. East Saginaw, 22 Mich. 104; Cliaraberlain v. Evansville, 77 Ind. 542; Pontiac v. Axford, 29 Mich. 69; Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind. 90. •-City V. Blakemore, 17 Ind. 318; Stadler v. Roth, 59 Mo. 400; Kily v. Cranor, 51 lb. 541 ; Halleck v. Bey- leston, 117 Mass. 469;. Parish v. Gol- den, 35 N. T. 462. 3 Covington v. Ludlow, 1 Met. (Ky.) 295 ; Dexington v. Headley, 5 Bush, 508; Graliam v. Carondelet, 33 Mo. 262; State v. Jersey City, 30 N. J. L. | 93, 148. * Lexington v. Headley, 5 Bush, 508; Covington v. Boyle, 6 lb. 204; MoCorraiok v. Bay City, 23 Mich. 457. 5 Mott V. Eeynolds, 27 Vt. 206, 208. The court cautiously saying: "But even an officer could alter or amend a record upon the testimony of third persons ordinarily, and ought not to do it upon his own recollection, un- less in very obvious cases of omis- sion or error, of which the present might fairly be regarded as one, prob- ably." Comp. Hadley v. Chambei'- lain, 11 Vt. 618. 6 Boston T. Co. v. Pomfret, 20 Conn. 590. 173 § 107 MUNICIPAL COBPOEATIONS. [CH. VH. this case, two out of five judges dissented, and held that in spe- cial cases, where there had been such a lapse of time, the clerk had no authority to amend ex parte, without memoranda or any personal recollection ; and the proper remedy was an applica- tion for a mandamus to correct the mistake, thus giving the opposite party an opportunity to show that the record was cor- rect.^ The records or reports of commissioners, appointed by the court to assess damages for property taken in opening streets and highways, will, if defective, be recommitted for amend- ment.2 § 107. Municipal records as evidence — Admissions.— Not only are public or municipal records competent. evidence in the trial of an action, to which the corporation is not a party ; ^ but the municipality may itself offer its records in evidence, in suits to which it is a party.* But the records or the compared or certified copy must be properly authenticated, according to the rules which obtain in the jurisdiction,^ where it is to be used ; and the public character of the record, together with the official character of the entry, oV of the certified copy or tran- script, if they do not appear primafacie, must be shown, unless the statute provides for a presumption in favor of their genuine- ness.^ In consequence of the great inconvenience which attends the production in court of original municipal records, which are commonly bulky, and often in constant use, it has become the general rule to receive duly certified, sworn, or compared tran- scripts or copies of them, as of equal force with the original.^ * Metro. S. E. Co. v. Johnson, (Ga. 93) 16 S. E. R. 49; McFarland v. Triton Ins. Co., 4 Denio, 392; High- land Turn. Co. v. MoKean, 11 Johns. 154 ; GrafEton v. Read, 34 W. Va. 172; Wood V. Jefferson Co. Bk., 9 Cow. 205; contra, Mayor v. Wright, 2 Port. (Ala.) 230. 6 Adams v. Mack, 3 K. H. 493, 499; see cases cited supra; Rex v. Tliet- f ord, 12 Vin. Abr. 90, p. 16. « Kex V. Debenham, 2 B. & Aid. 87; Marriage v. Lawrence, 3 B. & Aid. 144; Eegina v. Thomas, 8 A. & E. 183. ' People V. Minok, 21 X. T. 539; ' See further on this subject, Sam- mis V. King, 40 Conn. 298; Farrell v. King, 41 lb. 448; Logansport v. Crockett, 64 Ind. 319. ^In re Kings Co. El. R. Co., 12 ST. T. S. 198; Long v. Talley, 91 Mo. 505; Spring Brook Road, 64 Pa. St. 451; Green V. EastHaddam, 51 Conn. 547; In re Bryan, 58 Hun, 608; Con- well v. State, 107 Ind. 571; Crawford V. Valley R. R. Co., 25 Gratt. 467; Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Ran- dolph Townsite Co., (Mo. 90) 15 S. W. R. 437; People v. White, 59 Barb. 666. » Rex V. Smith, 1 Stra. 126. 174 CH. VII.] MUNICIPAL COUJS'CILS, MEETINGS, ETC. § 107 This rule in many of the states is the product of statutory en- actment.^ It has been held, however, — although the rule would not seem applicable to municipalities, — that the by-laws of a corporation must be proved by the production of the original by-laws ; ^ and the votes must be proved by the production of the record itself.^ The rule, that a party's admission is competent evidence against him, is of course applicable to municipal corporations. But the acceptance of the report of a committee of inquiry by a municipal corporation is not an admission of its truth ; nor does it render the report admissible as evidence.* Verbal or written admissions, to be binding upon a munici- pal corporation, must be made by its agent, acting in the line of his duty, and within the powers delegated to him by the corporation.^ The admission of incorporation is not binding on the corporation in this country.^ So, also, declarations, not against interest, but which accompany official acts, and form a part of the res gestce, are admissible for or against the corpora- tion.' It has been held that there is no presumption, that the officials of a city or town are acquainted with the entries con- tained in the municipal records ; nor are they liable personally for libelous matter contained in their annual reports, when made in good faith.^ Hiokok V. Shelburne, 4 Vt. 409 ; Com. V. Chase, 6 Cush. 248; Best, Prin. of Ev. 456; Mortimer v. MoCoUan, 6 M. & W. 67. ' Rex V. Lord Greo. Gordon, Doug. 193; 1 Phillips Evidence, 405; Denn- ing V. Eome, 6 Wend. 651; People V. Adams, 9 lb. 333; Turnp. Co. v. McKean, 11 Johns. 154; People v. Murray, 57 Mich. 396; O'Mally v. McGinn, 53 Wis. 353. 2 Lumbard v. Aldrich, 8 N. H. 31 ; Hollowell Bk. v. Hamlin, 14 Mass. 178; see oh. Ordinance, manner of proof. 'Haven v. Asylum, 13 N. H. 532; Manning v. Parrish, 6 Pick. 6; Green V. Indianapolis, 25 Ind. 490. * Dudley v. Weston, 1 Met. 477; Collins V. Dorchester, 6 Cush. 396. 6 Jordan v. Sch. Dis., 38 Me. 164; County V. Simmons, 10 111. 516; Rail- road v. Ingles, 15 B. Mon. 637; Glid- den v. Unity, 33 N. H. 577; Toll Co. V. Bettsworth, 30 Conn. 380; Barnes V. Pennell, 2 H. of L. Gas. 497; Pey- ton V. Hospital, 3 C. &F. 363; Cur- nen v. New York, 79 N. Y. 511. *■ Hartford Bank v. Hart, 3 Day (Conn.) 493, denying King v. Hard- wick, 11 East, 578; Osgood v. Man- hattan Co., 3 Cow. 612, 623. ' Perkins v. Railroad, Co., 44 N. H. 223; Grimes v. Keene, 52 lb. 330; Harpswell v. Phipps, 29 Me. 313; Coffin V. Plymouth, 49 lb. 173. " Lancey v. Bryant, 30 Me. 466. 175 §108 MUNICIPAL CORPOBATIONS. [CH. vn. § 108. Admissibility of parol evidence to explain mu- nicipal records. — The record itself is the best or primary evi- dence of its contents ; and, until its absence or nonexistence is sufficiently accounted for, parol or secondary evidence is not allowed to be substituted. ^ But parol evidence is admissible to identify the subject, to which an entry in the town records was intended to apply; and evidence may be given of such facts, which were before the town council at the time of the municipal action, as will explain the meaning of the entry, and the effect of the action of the council upon the rights of a party, who has acted in good faith upon a recorded ordinance or reso- lution.2 But, in respect to matters of a routine nature, which fall within the jurisdiction of the municipality because of its public character ; as, for example, the laying out or abandon- ment^ of a highway; and, particularly, if the entry is made in pursuance of a statute, parol evidence is not admissible to ex- plain, vary or contradict the record.* When an owner has dedicated a portion of his land to public purposes, as set forth in a plat, which has been placed on record, parol evidence to ex- plain such reward or dedication is only admissible, where the plat is not complete, and where its terms are ambiguous or uncertain.* Respecting municipal meetings, it has been decided that parol evidence may be given in explanation of the minutes, to show the time and place of holding the meeting, the number ilsley V. Boom, 13 S. E. K. 795; 109 N. C. 555; Smith v. Lawrence, 12 Mich. 431; United States v. Kuhn, 4 Cranch C. C. 401; Leavitt v. East- man, 1'J Me. 117; Long v. Battle Creek, 39 Mich. 323; Oliphant v. Com'rs, 18 Kan. 886; Kohlhapp v. W. Boxbury, 120 Mass. 596; Town- ship of Corwin v. Morehead, 49 jST. W. R. 1052; 51 Iowa, 99; Gurnsey v. Edwards, 26 N. H. 224; Anderson v. Oom'rs, 12 Ohio St. 365; Austin v. Allen, 6 Wis. 134; Aurora v. Fox, 78 Ind. 1; Monaghan v. Sch. Dis., 38 Wis. 101. If the requirement that a record of a fact be kept is directory, it has been held that parol evidence is admissible to show the fact: Keller 176 V. Savage, 17 Me. 444. " Baker v. Windham, 13 Me. 74. ^Lathrop v. Cent. La. E. E. Co., 69 Iowa, 105. * Satterlee v. Hickman, 38 HI. App. 139; Galbraith v. Luttreoh, 73 HI. 209; Wild v. Deig, 43 Ind. 455; Da- nim V. Gow, 50 N. W. R. 140; 88 Mich. 99; Pittsburgh v. Cluley, 74 Pa. St. 262; Leavitt v. Eastman, 77 Me. 117; Weaver v. Lammon, 28 If. W. R. 905; 62 Mich. 366; Hedges v. Bugg, 45 K. W. R. 841; Stevenson v. Flournoy, 13 S. W. E. 810. ' Grandville v. Jennison, 86 Mich. 567; 49 N. W. E. 544; Princeville v. A n t e n, 77 111. 325 ; Darlington v. Cora., 41 Pa. St. 63. CH. Vn.J MUNICIPAL COTTNCILS, MEETINGS, ETC. §108 present, and how many, coming later and finding no meeting, went honie.^ But when it is sought to validate acts done at an adjourned meeting, the adjournment, not appearing upon the minutes, cannot be shown by extrinsic evidence.^ While it is not allowable to contradict the record by parol evidence, such evidence has often been admitted to show facts omitted from the record, in cases where the law does not im- peratively require them to appear of record, and does not make the record the only evidence.* If, however, the record, or a certified copy, is by statute made the only competent evidence, then its production is indispensable ; and parol evidence of the facts contained in it cannot be admitted.* The reason and jus- tice of the admissibility of parol evidence are manifest, where the rights of third persons or of creditors are likely to be prejudiced by the negligence of municipal officers in making proper entries in the record ; and it seems that both the corporation and third parties may avail themselves of parol evidence in all such cases, for the purpose of supplying the defects or omissions of the record.^ Thus, where the records of the council were negli- gently kept, and failed to show the adoption of a resolution, parol evidence was admitted to prove that certain work was authorized by the city. In this case, the plaintiff was permit- ted to prove the passage of the resolution, the appointment of a committee to have charge of the expenditure, their report, and its adoption by the council.® Although there is some lack of agreement in the decisions, in 1 Chamberlain v. Dover, 13 Me. 466. 2 Taylor v. Henry, 2 Pick. 397. 8 People V. Bussey, 46 N". W. K. 97; People V. Fairfield, (Cal. 90) 27 Pac. E. 199; Troy v. Atcliison etc. Co., 13 Kan. 70; 11 lb. 519; Downing v. Diaz, (Tex. 90) 16 S. W. E. 49; Ste- phens V. St. Louis & S. F. Co., 47 Fed. E. 530; Danira v. Gow, 88 Mich. 99; Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 64; United States v. Fille- brown, 7 Pet. 28; Slate v. Mason, 33 La. An. 590; School Dist. TSTo. 2 V. Clark, 51 N. W. K. 529; Satterlee V. Hickman, 38 111. App. 139; Meeker V. Van Eensselaer, 15 Wend. 397; Darlington v. Com., 41 Pa. St. 68. 12 * See cases cited in last note ; Mor- rison V. Lawrence, 98 Mass. 219; Spencer v. Credle, 102 N. C. 68; Bridgford v. Tuscumbia, 4 Woods, 611; 16 Fed. E. 910; Indianapolis v. Imberry, 17 lud. 175, 179; Haney v. McClure, 10 S. W. K. 427; Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind. 90; Lowell v. Whee- lock, 11 Gush. 391; Harris v. Whit- comb, 4 Gray, 433; County Cora'rs V. Chitwood, 8 Ind. 504, 507. 6 Hutchinson v. Pratt, 11 IT. S. 402, 411 ; Sell. Dist. No. 2 v. Clark, supra ; San Antonio v. Lewis, , 9 ' Tex. 69 ; Stevens v. Eden etc., 12 Vt. 688; Sat- terlee V. Hickman, 38 111. App- VAd- " Koss V. Madison, 1 Ind. 281. 177 §108 MUNICIPAL COllPOrwATIOKS. [CH. VII. regard to the admissibility of evidence to impeach public records in collateral actions, the weight of authority supports the rule, that such records are conclusive, and cannot be contradicted or shown to be erroneous by parol evidence. In such cases, the proper remedy is for the party interested to compel a cor- rection of the mistakes in the record, if any exist, by a writ of mandamus} 1 Durfey v. Hoag, 1 Aiken (Vt.) 286; School District v. Atherton, 12 Met. (Mass.) 105; Morrison v. Law- rence, 98 Mass. 219; Mayhewv. Gay Head, 13 Allen (Mass.) 129; Eldora V. Burlingame, 62 Iowa, 32; Boston 178 Turnp. Co. v. Pomfret, 20 Conn. 590 Gilbert v. New Haven, 40 lb. 102 Nichols V. Bridgeport, 23 lb. 189 Bissell V. Jeffersonville, 24 How. U, S. 287, 298. CHAPTER VIII. CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, CONSTRUCTION AND LnUTATlONS. Sbction. 110 — Classification and construc- tion of charter powers. Ill — Imperative and discretionary powers distinguished. 112 — Discretionary powers. 113 — ^Delegated powers cannot be delegated. 114 — Usage in construing powers — Prescription. 115 — The indemnity for officials acting in good faith. 116 — The police power cf munici- pal corporations — Its scope and limitations. 116a-Territorial limits of police regulations. 117 — The municipal power to legis- late upon subjects covered by state statutes. 118 — Sanitary regulations — Slaughter houses — Ceme- teries — Unwholesome pro- visions. 119 — Sanitary regulations, contin- ued — Contagious diseases — Removal of refuse — Wa- ter supply. 120 — The regulation and abate- ment of nuisances in gen- eral. 121 — Regulation of harbor and navigable waters. 122 — Regulation o f occupations and amusements. 123 — Licenses, when a police regu- lation, and when a tax. 124 — License power of municipal corporation construed. 125 — Licenses for the sale of in- toxicating liquors. 126 — Supervision and care of pau- pers, vagrants, indigent Section. insane and sick persons. 127 — Inspection of goods and othei commodities. 128 — Establishment and regulation of public markets. 129 — Impounding animals — Ordi- nances respecting dogs. 130 — Prevention of fires — Fire lim- its — Purchase of fire ap- paratus. 131 — Regulation of buildings and their construction. 132 — K egulation of private wharves. 133 — Public wharves. 134 — Ferries and ferriage. 135 — Regulations providing for the public welfare, peace and safety. 135 a-Regulations of railroads within city limits. 136 — Power to appropriate funds for lobbying purposes. 137 — Power to borrow money. 138 — Payment of bounties. 139 — Celebrations and entertain- ments. 140 — Rewards. 141 — Erecting, furnishing and re- pairing public buildings. 142 — Compromises and arbitra/- tions. 143 — Power of municipality to sue and be sued. 144 — Power to create private mo- nopolies. 144a-Power to create and operate municipal monopolies — Municipal ownership o f gas, electric light and wa- ter works. 179 §110 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. vm. § 110. Classification and construction of charter pow- ers. — The powers, which ai'e ordinarily conferred by its char- ter upon a municipal corporation, may be classified as fallows : First, those granted in express terms ; Secondly, those neces- sariljr or fairly implied in, or incident to, the express powers ; Thirdly, those which are indispensable to the accomplishment of the purpose of corporate existence.^ Any act done, or con- tract entered into, by the corporation, in the exercise of power claimed to be possessed by it, but which cannot be reasonably included in one of these classes, is illegal and void ab initio ; and the corporation incurs no liability thereby ; '^ and if there exist a fair and reasonable doubt as to the possession of any particular power by a municipal corporation, the inclination of the courts is to decide against its existence ; and its posses- sion by the corporation.^ " In this country,* all corporations, whether public or private, derive their powers from legislative grant, and can do no act for which authority is not expressly given, or may not be rea- sonably inferred. But if we say that they can do nothing for which a warrant could not be found in the language of their charters, we should deny them in some cases the power of self- preservation, as well as many of the means which are necessary to effect the essential object of their incorporation ; and, there- fore, it has long been an established principle in the law of cor- porations that they may exercise all the powers, within the fair 1 Dillon Mun. Corp. §89; Corring- ton& M. K. Co. V. Athens, (Ga. 90) 11 S. E. K. 663; Richmond v. Mcairr, 78 lud. 192, 197; Cook Co. v. MoCrea, 93 111. 236; Ottawa v. Carey, 108 U. S. 110; Greenville W. Co. v. Green- ville, 7 So. R. 409; Ravenna v. Penn- sylvania Co., 45 Ohio St. 118; Haynes v. Cape May, .52 N. J. L. 180; Scott v. Slireveport, 20 La. An. 714; Desmond V. Jefferson, 19 lb. 483; Eufaula v. MoNab, 67 Ala. 588; Michigan City V. Boeckling, 23 IST. E. E. 518; 122 Ind. 39; Danville v. Shelton, 76 Va. .S25; Bell v. Platteville, 71 Wis. 139; Linkenhenner v. Com., 23 W. L. Bui. 433; Blake v. Walker, 23 S. C. 517; Kansas City v. Swope, 79 Mo. 446; 180 Portland V. Schmidt, 13 Dreg. 17. ^See § 169on UJiraFtr-es Contracts; Birmingham v. P. M. Ry. Co., 79 Ala. 465 ; Spengler v. Trovfbridge, 62 Miss. 40; Gas Co. v. Parkersburg, 30 W. Va. 433; St. Johnsbury v. Thomp- son, 59 Vt. 300; Christie v. Maiden, 23 W. Va. 667; Dwyer v. City of Brenham, 65 Tex. 526; Davenport v. Kleinschmidt, 6 Mont. 502; Heiskell v. Baltimore, 65 Md. 125. "Kirkham v. Russell, 76 Va. 956; Tax Collector v. Deudinger, 38 La. An. 261 ; Hanger v. Des Moines, 54 la. 193 ; Williams v. Davidson, 43 Tex. 33 ; Brenham v. Water Co., 67 Tex. 542. * Bridgeport v. Railroad Co., 15 Conn. 475, .501. CH. VIII.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 110 intent and purpose of their creation, which are reasonably prop- er to give effect to powers expressly granted. In doing this,^ they must have a choice of means adapted to ends, and are not to be confined to any one mode of operation." ^ Since municipal powers are wholly of legislative origin, the citizens cannot by any act of theirs ratify or confer upon the municipal council any power, which is not expressly or impliedly granted in the charter.* The question as to the existence, lim- itation or extent of charter powers, is one of construction. The intent of the Legislature should be sought for in every in- stance, and carried out, if possible ; but the courts have gener- ally favored the common law rule, that municipal charters, like all grants of power from the State, are to be construed in favor of tlie State, and against the grantee, whenever a reasonable doubt exists.* The powers, granted to municipal corporations, are so extensive and far-reaching, and their abuse so likely to result in the imposition of grievous burdens on the individual citizens, that a strict construction of charter powers is abso- lutely necessary, and has been the almost uniform practice of the courts. ' The power may be limited. "Gorvallis v. Carlile, 10 Oreg". 139; Petersburg v. Metzger, 21 111. 205; New London v. Brainard, 22 Conn. 552; Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110; Gilman v. Milwaukee, 61 Wis. 588; Cora. V. Turner, 1 Gush. 493, 495; Cooley V. Granville, 10 lb. 57; Hie- stand T. New Orleans, 14 La. An. 330; Leconteulx v. Buffalo, 33. N. Y. 333; Levy v. Salt Lake City, 3 Utah, 63; Gallia Co. v. Holcomb, 7 Ohio, pt. 1, 232; Com'rs v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 100; Merriam v. Moody, 25 Iowa, 163; Miuton V. Larne, 23 How. 435; Kelly V. Milan, 21 Fed. R. 842; Louis- iana State Bk. v. N. O. Nav. Co., 3 La. An. 294; State v. Mayor, 5 Port. 279; Head v. Ins. Co., 2 Crauch, 168; Smith V. Newbern, 70 N. C. 14; Cor- sicana V. Carr, 75 Tex. 207; DeRus- sey V. Davis, 13 La. An. 468; People V. Bank, 1 Doug. 282; City Council V. Plank Koad, 31 Ala. 76; In re Bur- nett, 30 lb. 461; Richards v. Clarks- burg, 30 W. Va. 491 ; Ottawa v. Carey, 108 -U. S. 110; Bell v. Platteville, 71 Wis. 142; Roodhousev. Jennings, 29 111. App. 50; Conery v. N. O. W. Co., 41 La. An. 910; Bangs v. Snow, 1 Mass. 181; Stetson v. Kempton, 13 lb. 272; Willard v. Newburyport, 12 Pick. 227; State v. Natal, 41 La. An. 700; 6 So. 722; Hansen v. Hunter, 53 N. W. R. 84; Hayes v. Appleton, 24 Wis. 544; People v. Railroad, 12 Mich. 389; Vance v. Little Rook, 30 Ark. 435; State v. Sharkey, (Minn. 92) 52 N. W. R. 24; Logan v. Buck, 3 Utah, 301; Ravenna v. Penna. Co., 45 Ohio St. 118; Noyes v. Mason, 5 N. W. R. 595; In re Prank, 52 Cal. 606; Green v. Cape May, 41 N. J. L. 45. 8 Torrent v. Muskegon, 47 Mich. 115. ^ " It is a well settled rule of con- struction of grants by the Legislar 181 §111 MUNXCIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [cH. vm. Although the courts have, in view of the above considera- tions, and because any other course would frequently result in imposing unjust burdens upon the inliabitants of the commu- nity, or in abridging their natural or common law rights of lib- erty and pioperty, adopted the principle of strict construction of charter powers ; ^ it should not for a moment be understood that an unreasonable construction, which is calculated, to defeat the object of the legislative enactment, will be sustained. There must exist a fair and reasonable doubt as to the legislative in- tent to confer the disputed power, before the courts will deny its possession by the municipality .^ The incidental powers of a municipal corporation must be germane to the purpose, for which it was created ; ^ and, when it is conceded that any particular power, as, for example, the power of levying taxes or erecting buildings, is possessed by the cor- poration, it will, if the statute be silent, be allowed to construct and employ the usual and proper machinery,* or to select an appropriate and suitable place,* for the exercise of the power. § 111. Imperative and discretionary powers distinguish- ed. — The differentiation of charter powers, which are impera- tive, from those which are discretionary, is at times a very ture to corporations, whether public or private, that only such powers and rights can be exercised under them, as are clearly comprehended with- in the words of the act, or derived therefrom by necessary implication, regard being had to the object of the grant. Any ambiguity or doubt arising out of the terms used by the Legislature must be resolved in favor of the public." Miuturn v. Larue, 23 How. 435, 436; see cases cited supra ; Logan V. Pye, 43 Iowa, 524; Bloom v. Xenia, 32 Ohio St. 461; Carr v. Dooley, 122 Mass. 257; Pye v. Peter- son, 45 Tex. 312; Winooski v. G-okey, 48 Vt. 282; Dalrymple v. Wilkes- Barre, 11 Luz. L. R. (Pa.) 41; Thomp- son v. Schermerhorn, 6 N. Y. 92; Parker v. Barker, 1 Clark, 223 ; "Weel V. Eicord, 24 N. J. Eq. 169; Schakel- ton v. Guttenberg, 39 N. J. L. 660; Wlieatley v. Covington, 11 lb. 18; 182 Kniper v. Louisville, 1 Bush, 599. 1 Bank v. Chillicothe, 7 Ohio, pt. 2, 31, 35. 2 Thomson v. Lee Co., 3 Wall. 320; Thomas v. Richmond, lb. 349; Wil- lard V. Killingworth, 8 Conn. 247; Clark V. Davenport, 14 Iowa, 495; Merriam v. Moody, 25 lb. 163; Kyle V. Malin, 8 Ind. 34; Memphis v. Ad- ams, 9 Heisk. 518; Nicol v. Mayor, etc., 9 Humph. 252; Leonard v. Can- ton, 35 Miss. 189; Lafayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38; Collins v. Hatch, 18 Ohio, 523; Pt. Huron v. McCall, 46 Mich. 565 ; Douglas v. Placerville, 18 Cal. 643, 647. 3 Mayor v. Tule, 3 Ala. 137; Har- ris V. Intendant, 28 Ala. 577 ; Intend- ant V. Chandler, 6 lb. 899. 4 Union Pac. K. Co. v. Eyan, 2Wyo. 408; s. c, 113 U. S. 516. 5 Poillon V. Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 432. * CH. VIII.] CHAETEK POWEES, THEIR KATUKB, ETC. § 111 diflScult question of construction. In every case, of course, it is presumed that the legislative intent is ascertained.^ But no positive and unyielding rule can be enunciated, which will be of real or undoubted value. For, under peculiar circum- stances, permissive words, like "may," or "it shall be lawful," will be held to impose an imperative duty, in connection with which there is no grant of discretion. Thus, when an indi- vidual, or the public, has a special interest in having an act done, and the municipalit)'- is vested with power to do this act, and adequate means are at its disposal for the purpose of promptly and .properly performing it, the duty will be held to be mandatory, despite the fact that the word " may," and not " must," is employed in the statute.^ On the contrary, when the act to be performed will not confer any great benefit upon third persons, or upon the public ; and, particularly, when the means for its performance are not supplied to the municipal authorities, the words " may " or " it is lawful " will be held to have the natural and .ordinary effect of granting a discre- tionary power, and not to create an imperative duty, for the breach of which an action in damages, or a mandamus, will lie by an injured party against the corporation.^ But the expres- sion "hereby authorized" has been held to create a manda- tory duty.* And the same is generally true of the word " shall." ^ On the other hand, there are cases which hold that the word " must," when employed in a statute, does not necessarily make a duty enjoined thereby absolutely impera- tive, but may under peculiar circumstances be held to be the 1 Mason v. Fearaon, 9 How. 248; Hurford v. Omaha, 4 Neb. 336; Vea- •zie V. China, 50 Me. 518; St. Joseph etc. R. Co. V. Buchanan Co. Court, 39 Mo. 485. ^ Cases in last note. Phelps v. Hawley, 52 N. Y. 53; Blake v. Ports- mouth etc. Co., 39 X. H. 435; Steines V. Franklin Co., 48 Mo. 167; Seiple V. Elizabeth, 27 N. J. L. 407; State V. Newark, 3 Dutch. 491 ; Vason v. Augusta, 38 G-a. 542; Mayor v. Furze, 3 Hill, 612; 16 N. T. 162; Reed v. Bainbridge, 1 Southard, 351, 358. "Atty. General v. Lock, 3 Atk. 164; Rex v. Mayor of Chester, 1 Maule & S. 101 ; Rex v. Bailiffs, 1 B. & C. 86; Minor v. Mechanics' Bank, 1 Pet. 46; Goodrich v. Chicago, 20 IIV 445; Railroad V. Platte, 42 Mo. 171; Joliet v. Verley, 35 III. 58; Rail- road Co. V. Buchanan, 39 Mo. 485; Ottawa V. People, 48 111. 233; Grant V. Erie, 69 Pa. St. 429; see also State V. Shakespeare, 41 La. An. 156; In re Whitney, 3 N. T. S. 838; and J 362 in chapter on ManAamus. * Vason V. Augusta, 38 Ga. 542. 6 People V. French, 13 N. T. St. R. ; People ex rel. Satterlee, 75 N. Y. 38, 183 §113 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. VIII. grant of a discretionary power.^ In every case, it is presump- tively a question of legislative intent, but really a judicial con- sideration of the public interests, and the best mode of promoting them. The reliance upon the supposed legislative intent is a harmless fiction, and constitutes no serious obstacle to the due and intelligent consideration of the public interests ; at least, in the special case under inquiry.^ § 112. Discretionary powers. — When the power to do an act is conferred upon a municipal corporation, but the language conferring the power is such that no imperative duty is imposed upon the corporation, that the act shall be done at all events, the power is said to be discretionary, as distinct from mandatory and imperative. In the exercise of such powers, the municipality is exempted from judicial supervision, and from liability in dam- ages, except in cases where fraud, or a plain abuse of the power, is shown.^ As this subject is treated at length in other parts of this work* to which the reader is referred, any minute discus- sion in this place is deemed unnecessary. § 113. Delegated powers cannot be delegated The prin- ciple, elsewhere adverted to, that a municipal corporation cannot shift responsibility for the execution of the public discretionary powers, delegated to it, by delegating the exercise of the dis- cretion to others, is a plain corollary of the proposition, that such powers are held and to be exercised in trust for the public.^ The city council is the governing body of the corporation, and ' Spears v. Mayor, 72 N. T. 442 ; Hemmer v. Hustace, 51 Hun, 457; Merrill v. Shaw, 5 Minn. 148. Cf. Wallace v. Feeley, 88 N. T. 646. 2 For a general criticism of this cardinal rule of interpretation, see Tiedeman's Unwritten Constitution of the United States, p. 145 et seq. 8 Bush y. Carboudale, 87 111.74; Conery v. W. Co., 41 La. An. 910; 7 So. E. 8; Dodd v. Hartford, 25 Conn. 232; Deane v. Todd, 22 Mo. 90. *See chapter on Streets, §289; Mandamus, §362; Injunction, §393; LiaUUtyfor Torts, §§327, 328. ^ See ch. xvi. on Streets, also State V. Hauser, 63 Ind. 155; Dougherty v. Austin, 29 Pac. K. 1092; 94 Cal. 601; ■ 184 Thompson v. Scliermerhorn, 6 N". Y. 92; Minn. 6. L. Co. v. Minneapolis, 36 Minn. 139; Meuser v. Kisdon, 36 Cal. 239; Davis v; Read, 65 N". T. 566; People V. Riordan, (Mich. 89) 41 N. W. 482; Clark v. Washington, 12 Wheat. 40, 54; State v. Fiske, 9 R. I. 94; Hydes v. Jones, 4 Bush, 464; Bird- sail V. Clark, 73 N. Y. 73; In re Trus- tees, 50 How. Pr. 500; State v. Free- holders, (N. J. 89) 18 Atl. 117; Baltimore v. Scharf, 54 Md. 499; Lyon V. Jerome, 26 Wend. 485 ; Stan- field V. State, (Tex. 92) 18 S. W. 577; Railway Co. v. Baltimore, 21 Md. 93; Bibel v. People, 67 111. 175; Lyth V. Buffalo, 48 Hun, 175; State v. Trenton, 51 N. J. L. 498; Mullar- CH. VIII.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 113 by it the discretion of the municipality is properly exercised. When, therefore, the necessity or expediency of initiating some local improvement is left by statute to the discretion of the council, that body cannot delegate this dut}"-, wliich belongs to it as the legislative department of the municipal government, to an administrative ofBcial.^ So, also, where a city council was authorized to prescribe the dimensions of sewers, it was held that the council could not by ordinance delegate the power of fixing these dimensions to the cit}''s engineer.^ So, also, powers, which involve the exercise of deliberation and discre- tion, and which should therefore be carried out by the enact- ment of an ordinance bj' the municipal Legislature, cannot legally be delegated to a subordinate committee of the council.'^ Generally, when a municipal council is empowered to fix rates, for which some service is to be rendered, as in cases of license fees or assessments,* or to appoint a time when persons, having business with the corporation, may be heard,^ it cannot delegate its discretion. This principle was applied, where the city was authorized to fix and collect tolls for the use of a pier owned by it, but which it had leased. In an action brought by the lessee for damages, which were caused by the city's failure to keep the pier in repair, the lease was declared void, as attempting to delegate to the lessee a power, which could legally be exer- cised by the city alone." Whether in the particular case, the mayor is under the provisions of the charter, a member of the council in general, or the mayor and aldermen together are by charter constituted one body for the doing of some particular legislative act ; in either ease, there cannot be a delegation of a discretionary power to the mayor. In such a case, it was held, key V. Cedar Falls, 19 Iowa, 21; Schenley v. Com., 36 Pa. St. 62; Dar- ling V. St. Paul, 19 Minn. 389. ' State V. Faribald, 11 So. Rep. 36; Euggles V. Collier, 43 Mo. 359; She- lian V. Gleason, 46 lb. 100; E. St. Louis y. Wehrung, 50111. 28; State v. Bell, 34 Ohio St. 194. 2 St. Louis V. Clemens, 43 Mo. 395. 8 Minneapolis G.L. Co. v. Minneap- olis, 36 Minn. 159; Whyte v. Mayor, 2 Swan. 364; Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal. 524; Oakland v. Carpenter, 13 Cal. 540; Cf. State v. Atlantic City, 34 N. J. L. 99, 108. * Mathews v. Alexandria, 68 Mo. 115. 'State V. Jersey City, 1 Dutch. 309 ; State v. Patterson, 34 N. J. L. 163. 6 Lord V. Oconto, 47 Wis. 386; see also Lanenstein v. Fond du Lac, 28 lb. 336; Mullarty V. Cedar Falls, 19 Iowa, 21; Gale v. Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344; Milhau v. Sharp, 19 Barb. 435; Oakland v. Carpenter, 13 Cal. 540. 185 §113 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. vni. where the power to license was under discussion, that the al- dermen could not by a vote delegate their share of the licens- ing power to the mayor ; i or, a fortiori, to third persons.^ So, the powers, to construct and control wharves,^ to grant permission to a railroad company to lay its track in the streets,* to issue bonds,^ to make local improvements," to appoint attor- neys,'^ to establish pounds and appoint keepers,^ and to pro- vide for lighting the streets,^ have been held by the courts to be beyond the power of delegation. A valid delegation of leg- islative or discretionary public power can be made, however, by the municipal council, when it is permitted, or so directed by express legislative provision.^" The rule, forbidding the delegation of corporate power, does not apply to the delegation of ministerial or administrative powers to a subordinate official or committee ; nor does it pre- vent the performance of ministerial and routine duties by agents appointed by the council.^^ Thus, when the charter gives the council the power to pass by-laws, relating to wharves, and to appoint the necessary officers to carry the same into effect; and the council created the office of wharf superintendent ; it was held that the power, to regulate the moving of vessels, under the ordinances of the city, might be delegated to him by the council. 1^ The power of the municipality, to protect the public health, cannot be surrendered, or the resultant duty shifted ; but the city may contract with a party to execute a portion of this power in its stead, by giving him the exclusive riglit to remove the bodies of dead animals, offal or refuse matter.^^ Also, if a 1 Day V. Green, 4 Cush. 433. estate V. Patterson, 34 N. J. L. I(i3. 3 Oakland v. Carpenter, 13 Cal. 540. 4 State V. Bell, 34 Ohio. St. 194. 6 State V. Hauser, 63 Ind. 155. ^ Thompson v. Schermerhorn, 6 N. Y. 92. ' St. Louis V. Thomas, 11 111. App. 283. 8 DillardV. Webb, 55 Ala. 468. ' Minn. Gas L. Co. v. Minneapolis, ,">6 Minn. 159. ' State V. Patterson, 34 N. J. L. 186 163; Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 K. Y. 591. " Gillett V. Logan Co., 67 111. 256; Hitchcock V. City, 96 U. S. 341; Mc- Claughey v. Hancock Co., 46 111. 356; Hannibal, etc., E. Co. v. Marion Co., 36 Mo. 294; Edwards v. Watertown, 61 How. (N. Y.) Pr. 463; Schenleyv. Com., 36 Pa. St. 62; Stewart v. Coun- cil Bluffs, 58 Iowa, 642 ; Gregory v. Bridgeport, 41 Conn. 76. 12 Gregory v. Bridgeport, 41 Conn. 76. IS Louisville v. Wible, 84 Ky. 290; N. Y. Con. Act, § 280. CH. VIII.] ' CHAETEE POWEBS, THEIR NATTTKE, ETC. § 114 contract should be invalid when made, because of an illegal delegation of power, it may be validated by a subsequent ratifi- cation by the governing body.^ Municipal corporations cannot, without legislative permission, either express or by implication, barter away or surrender their public powers. They cannot legally enter into a contract, or make by-laws, by which they shall agree to cede or impair their delegated governmental powers, or to incapacitate themselves from performing their public duties.^ § 114. Usage in construing charter powers — Prescription. — Under the rule that prescription, or the long continued exer- cise of a right, presupposes an original valid grant, upon which the right is founded, municipal corporations in England are admitted to possess and exercise certain powers, which did not originate in, and as a matter of fact never could have lawfully been granted to them b}', a royal grant or charter.* But in the United States, prescription has no effect in con- 1 Hitchcock V. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341. ^Dingman v. People, 51 111.277; Roberts v. Chicago, 26 lb. 249; Quincy V. Janes, 76 lb. 231; Nevins V. Peoria, 41 lb. .502; Peru v. Gleason, 91 Ind. 566; Minn. G. L. Co. v. Min- neapolis, 36 Minn. 159; Matthews v. Alexandria, 68 Mo. 115; Weyman v. Jefferson, 61 Mo. 55 ; Davis v. Mayor etc., 14 N. y. 506; New York v. Sec. Ave. R. Co., 32 lb. 261 ; State v. Free- holders, (N". J. 89) 18 Atl. R. 117; Shinner v. Hartf. B. Co., 29 Conn. 523; State v. New Brunswick, 81 N. J. L. 395 ; Martin v. Mayor etc. of B'klyn, 1 Hill, 545; Britton v. Mayor etc., 21 How. Pr. 251; Lyth v. Buf- falo, 48 Hun, 175; Stanfield v. State, (Tex. 92) 18 S. W. R. 577; Jackson v. Bowman, 39 Miss. 671; White v. Yazoo City, 27 lb. 857; Pontiac v. Carter, 32 Mich. 164; Costar v. Bush, 25 Wend. 628; East Hartford v. Hart- ford Bridge Co., 10 How. (U. S.) 545; . Lippelmann v.Cincinnati,40 Ohio Cir. Ct. 327; Rounds v. Mumford, 2 R. I. 154; Roll V. Augusta, 32 Ga. 326; 111. etc. R. & C. Co. V. St. Louis etc. Co., 2 Dill. 70;Karst v. St. Paul, 22 Minn. 118 ;Bodine V.Trenton, 36 N. J.L. 198; Milhau V. Sharp, 27 N. Y. 611; State V. Trenton, (N. J. 89) 18 Atl. R. 116; City of Nevada v. Morris, 43 Mo. App. 586; Reading V. Keppleman, 61 Pa. St. 233; Brimmer v. Boston, 102 Mass. 19; Blount v. Janesville, 81 Wis. 640; State v. Graves, 19 Md. 851, 373; Bryson v. Philadelphia, 47 Pa. St. 329; Gulf Co. & S. R. Co. v. Rior- dan, (Tex. 93) 22 S. W. R. 519; Mo- Crowell V. Bristol, (Va. 93) 16 S. E. R. 867; Atty. Gen'l v. Mayor etc., 3 Duer, 119; Richmond etc. Co. v. Middletown, 59 N. Y. 228; Peoples R. R. v. Memphis, 10 Wall. 38, 50; Lehigh Water Co.'s App., 102 Pa. St. 515. 8 Clark V. Denton, 1 B. & A. 92; Rex V. Mashiter, 6 A. & E. 153; Rex V. Salway, 9 B. & C. 424; Clark v. Le Crew, 9 lb. 52; Atty. Gen. v. Foster, 10 Ves. 335; Chad v. Tilsed, 5 J. B. Moore, 185. But see Stock, bridge v. West Stockbridge, 12 Mass. 399. 187 § 115 MUNICIPAL COBPOIIATIONS. [CH. VIII. ferring powers upon municipal or private corporations ; and custom is only an element to be considered in construing mu- nicipal charters, or interpreting the significance of the words or phrases contained in them.^ If the meaning of the charter be uncertain or ambiguous, a well established, ancient and uni- form usage will be considered by the courts as important in determining the mode, in which the charter powers may be ex- ercised; but usage does not enter as an element, into construc- tion and interpretation, when the language of the charter is clear, and its grammatical and literal meaning free from doubt.^ Where the statute provides for the exercise of power in a particular place, it is held that only the usage of such place must be kept in view, in construing the meaning of the statute. Thus, when an inspector was empowered to carefully weigh and determine the weight of all grain, it was held that this might be legally done by weighing one bushel in sixty, accord- ing to a long established local custom.^ The acquiescence of the municipal authorities in a certain construction of a charter may, if this construction is acted upon by third persons in good faith in the acquisition of vested rights, constitute such a usage, or establish such a precedent, as will, in a case where the question is simply one of an irregular ex- ercise of power, estop the municipality from denj-ing that this construction was the true one.* § 115. Indemnity for oiiicers acting in good faith A municipal corporation can indemnify its officials against any 1 In Hood V. Lynn, 1 Allen, 103, C. J. Bigelow said: "An unlawful expenditure of money by a town cannot be rendered valid by usage, however long continued. Abuses of power and violations of right derive no sanction from time or custom. A casual or occasional exercise of a power by one or a few towns will not constitute usage. It must not only be general and of long continu- ance, but, what is more important, it must also be a custom necessary to the exercise of some corporate power or the enjoyment of some corporate right, or which contributes essentially to the necessity and con- 188 veniences of the inhabitants. See Willard v. Newburyport, 12 Pict. 227; Spauldingv. Lowell, 23 lb. 71; Smith V. Cheshire, 18 Gray, 308; Butler V. Charlestown, 7 lb. 12, 16; Benoit v. Conway, 10 Allen, 528. "Sherwin v. Bugbee, 16 Vt. 439, 444; Smith v. Cheshire, 13 Gray, 308; Butler V. Charlestown, supra. sFrazier v. Warfield, 13 Md. 279, 303; Love v. Hinkley Abt. Adm. 436; see also Eex v. Chester, 1 Maule & S. 101 ; Eex v. Salway, 9 B. & C. 424. *Van Hastrap v. Madison City,'l Wall. 291. CH. Vin.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. 115 liability, which they may incur in a iona fide performance of their duties, even though they may have exceeded their legal authority ; ^ and this may be effected by a vote to employ coun- sel, to defend a suit pending against municipal ofBcers,^ or by a by-law, providing that all municipal officials shall be indemnified for their unlawful acts, when done in an official capacity.^ The official indemnified must have been acting for the town when he became liable ; for, if the corporation has no interest in the matter involved in the action, and the judgment will in nowise affect municipal property or rights, it has no legal power to de- fend the suit, or to appropriate funds to paj' the judgment;* or to indemnify the officer, after the judgment shall have been satisfied by him.^ If payment to the official of costs incurred by him, in a case in which the city has no interest, is contem- plated, an injunction will lie to restrain it." The tax assessors of a town, having levied an illegal assess- ment, were compelled to refund to the taxpayers the amount which had been illegally collected. It was held that a legal consideration had been created by the vote of the council, to provide an indemnity, which was sufficient to support an irrevo- cable promise, although without such a vote the town would not have been liable.^ As a general rule, however, a municipal ' Brown v. Melrose, (Mass. 92) 30 N. E. E. 87; Sherman v. Carr, 8 K. I. 431; Bancroft v. Lyunfield, 18 Pick. 566; Bloomington v. Lilliard, 39 111. Ap. 616; Fuller v. Groton, 14 Gray, 340; Pike v. Middleton, 12 N. H. 278; Hart V. Newell, 23 Atl. E. 610; East Hampton v. Bowman, 14 N. Y. S. 668; Babbitt v. Savoy, 3 Cush. 530; Hadsell v. Hancock, 3 Gray, 526; Ro- pin V. Laurinburg, 90 N. C. 427; Lewis v. Eochester, 9 C. B. 401; Kemper v. Burlington, ( Iowa, 90) 47 N. W. E. 72; Holdswarth v. Dart- mouth, 11 A. & E. 490. ' Baker v. "Windham, 13 Me. 74; CuUen V. Carthage, 103 Ind. 196. 'Irwin V. Mariposa, 22 Up. Can. C. P. 367. 4 Halstead v. Mayor, 3 Comst. ( 3 N. Y.) 430; Leinkenheimer v. Comp., 23W. L. Bui. 433; People v. Law- rence, 6 Hill, 244; Bank v. Supervi- sors, 5 Denio, 517, 521; Merrill v. Plainfield, 45 N. H. 126; Eeg. v. Leeds, 4 Q. B. 796; Reg. v. Bridge- water, 2 P. & D. 558; In re Bell & Manvevs, 2 Up. Can. C. P. 507. 6 Vincent v. Nantucket, 12 Cush. 105 ; Gregory v. Bridgeport, 41 Conn. 76. ^ Gregory v. Bridgeport, supra. By the Consol. Act, § 211, the city of New York is authorized to reimburse the successful ofBcer in a contested election case. 'Nelson v. Milford, 7 Pick. 18. The conclusion of the court in this case is probably sound, but it can be better sustained on the ground that the vote for indemnity was an executed gift or grant than that such vote constituted a valid con- sideration for a strictly executory 189 §116 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. vni. corporation has no power to reimburse its official for a loss or expense, which was incurred by him on account of an act of an unlawful character.^ Persons, who are intrusted with the control and expenditure of a fund, have a right to retain out of it the proper and legiti- mate expenses, which were incurred by their administration of the trust.^ § 116. The police power of municipal corporations— Its scope and limitations. — It is not an unfrequent occurrence, but is in fact, the almost universal custom, for the State to delegate to the municipal corporation, within its limits, and sometimes without its limits,* the general exercise of the police power of the State, for the preservation of the public peace, order and health, and for the promotion of the general welfare of the com- munity.* Whenever a municipal corporation undertakes the enforcement of a particular police regulation, its power in the premises may be resisted on one of two grounds, viz. : First, that the particular regulation is in violation of the general con- stitutional limitations upon the power of the State government; and Secondly, that although the State government may exercise such a power, without violating any provision of the Federal and State Constitutions, it either cannot or did not, under the provisions of the municipal charter, or of the general laws un- der which the municipality was incorporated, confer upon such municipal corporation the right to exercise such a power. To contract. The latter construction offends a fundamental principle of the law of consideration. 1 Irwin V. Mariposa, 22 Up. Can. C. P. 367. 2 Attorney Gen'l v. Mayor of Nor- wich, 2 M. & C. 406; Kegiua v. The Mayor etc. of Sheffield, L. R. 6 Q. B. 652. "Seeposi, §H6o. * Ogden V. McLaughlin, 5 Utah, 387; Lawrence v. Monroe, 44 Kan. 607; Kellar v. Corpus Christi, 50 Tex. 614; State v. St. Louis Court, 34 Mo. 546; Jacksonville v. Ledurth, 7 So. R. 885 ; People v. Pratt, 14 N. Y. S. 551; Carthage v. Rhodes, (Mo. 90) 14 S. W. R. 181; City Council v. 190 Payne, 2 Xott & McCord, 475; Peo- ple v.Hui-lbut, 24 Mich. 44; 9 Am. Rep. 103; generally, Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. 349; Com. v. Tewks- bury, 11 Met. 551 ; Rush v. New Or- leans, 43 La. An. 275 ; People v. Ben- nett, 83 Mich. 457; Com. v. Parks, 30 N. E. R. 174; Jditchell v. Rock- land, 51 Me. 118, 122; 52 lb. 118; Brown v. Vinalhaven, 65 lb. 402; Dingley v. Boston, 100 Mass. 544; Cobb V. Boston, 122 lb. 181; Ban- croft V. Cambridge, 126 lb. 438; Bur- dett V. Allen, 35 W. Va. 347; Kosci- usko V. Sternberg, 68 Miss. 469 ; Hum- phrey V. Church, 109 N. C. 132; Welch V. Boston, 126 Mass. 442; Little Rock v. Barton, 33 Ark. 436. CH. VIII.] CHAETEK POWERS, THEIK NATURE, ETC. § HT undertake the explanation in detail of the first of these grounds for resisting enforcenient of a municipal police regulation, would require a full and complete discussion of the whole sub- ject of constitutional limitations, as it bears upon the question of the police power of the government. This is not only im- possible to do, for the want of space ; but it is likewise unne- cessary, as that subject can be found fully and elaborately, and more appropriately, discussed elsewhere.^ We will, for these reasons, limit the present discussion of the subject of municipal police power to the second subdivision, as given above, with a special reference to those phases of police power, which are commonly brought into inquiry by the ordinary municipal reg- ulations. § 116 a. Territorial limits of police regulations. — It is a manifest proposition that, ordinarilj-, the police powers of the municipal corporation can be exercised only within the terri- torial limits of the municipalitj-, and not beyond or outside of the same. But, as an instrument of local government, or local branch of the state government, it is not beyond the power of the State to gl'ant to the municipal corporation the exercise of governmental control over territory outside of the city limits ; and, in many extraordinary cases, even over territory, which falls within the boundaries of some other municipality. This sub- ject, however, has a sufficient treatment elsewhere,^ and it is only necessaiy, in the present connection, to state the fact, for the purpose of accentuation. § 117. Municipal power to legislate upon subjects cover- ed by the statute law. — Reference is made elsewhere to the re- quirement, that municipal ordinances shall be consistent with the State Constitution, the statute law and the charter of the town or city.** Thus, a town cannot by licensing legalize an occupa- tion, such as gaming, the prosecution of which is a crime under the statute law of the state.* Nor will the power to suppress gambling confer the power to license houses, in which it is car- ' Tiedeman's Limitations of Police ingto the enactment of general laws, Power; Cooley's Constitutional Lim- and those prohibiting local or pri- itations. vate laws, see Stimson Statutes, § 391 2 §62. to § 396 inclusive. 8 See ch. ix. on Ordinances, § 146. * State v. Lindsay, 34 Ark. 372 : For constitutional provisions, relat- Schuster v. State, 48 Ala. 199. 191 § 117 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. YUl. ried on.^ The general laws of the slate operate within munic- ipal limits as elsewhere, except as to those matters upon which the State Legislature has deemed it proper to delegate to the municipal corporation the exclusive power of legislation.^ When the exclusive power of legislation over any subject is possessed either by the State, or by the municipality, no diffi- culty can exist ; but when, as is frequently the case, power is granted to a luunicipality to pass ordinances regulating a sub- ject, which is already regulated by the law of the State, it may very easily happen, that an accused person will be placed in a position, where he will be amenable to a double prosecution, and, it would seem logically, to a double punishment. Upon the question, whether the offender can be punished for the same offence, under the statute and under the ordinance, the cases are irreconcilable.* It is held by some of the decisions, that the same act may constitute a crime, both against the State, and the municipality, and be the occasion of two separate and inde- pendent prosecutions.* Others hold that the act is but a single offence, punishable once only, by whichever court first acquires jurisdiction. So, where gambling is a public offence, and the city at the same time has the charter power to suppress gam- bling houses, either the State or the city may prosecute, accord- ing to the priority of obtaining jurisdiction of the accused.^ A general grant of power, to make by-laws, has been held to con- fer no authority upon the corporation to make punishable, by ordinance, an act which is already punishable as an offence against the State. The power of the municipality to legislate by ordinance, concurrently with, or in supersession of, the State, cannot be implied ; nor is it incidental to the municipal pur- pose.^ And a statute for restraining towns from punishing ' Groetler v. State, 45 Ark. 454 ; Society of Arts etc. v. Musgrove, 44 Miss. 820; Moore v. State, 48 lb. 147. 2 Thus, the Legislature can confer the power to suppress bawdy houses upon a city; and a municipal ordi- nance in such a case, has been held to supersede the state law upon the subject. Rogers v. The People, 9 Col. 450; State v. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17; State V. Debar, 58 lb. 395. 3 Plattsburgh v. Trimble, 46 Mo. 192 App. 459; DeSoto v. Brown, 44 lb. 148 ; Mclnerney v. Denver, 29 Pa. Eep. 576. * See post, same section. 5 Rice V. State, 3 Kan. 141; Stat(! V. Crummey, 17 Minn. 72; State v. Cowan, 29 Mo. 330. ^ Washington v. Hammond, 76 N. C. 33; State v. Langston, 88 lb. 692; State V. Britain, 89 lb. 574; Center- ville V. Miller, 57 Iowa, 56; People v. Brown, 2 Utah, 462; State v. Keith. CH. VIII.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIIl NATURE, ETC. § 117 offences which are cognizable by the State, is constitutional.^ But if the act is one which, by its intrinsic nature, constitutes at the same time an offence both against the State and the city, the latter may constitutionally provide by ordinance a penalty for its commission, if by a reasonable interpretation of the char- ter, it is evident that it was the intention of the Legislature to permit or authorize the city to do so.^ Accordingly, it has been held that a city, having power to enact ordinances " for i\iQ good government of the place not contravening the laws of the State," may by ordinance provide for the punishment of an assault and battery committed upon its streets ; and a previous penalty, imposed by the State for the same act, is not a bar to the prosecution by the corporation. ^ The power of the municipal corporation, to provide for the punishment of a particular offence, will be more readily in- ferred from the general grant of legislative power to such a cor- poration, if the offence, to be prohibited and punished, is peculiarly the concern of the local community, and does not necessarily, or vitally, affect the public interests of the State at large.* iJett V. Eichmond, 78 Ind. 316; Indianapolis v. Huegle, 18 N. E. R. 172. 2 Grand Rapids v. Bateman, (Mich. 93) 53 K "W. R. 6; Howe v. Plainfield Treas., 37 N. J. L. 145; Brownville V. Cook, 4 Neb. 101 ; State v. Grimes, 52 N. W. R. 42; Ex parte Tuttle, 91 Cal. 589; In re Cheney, 27 Pac. R. 436; 90 Cal. 617; Cooley Const. Lim. 199; March v. Com., 12 B. Mon. 25, 29. 3 Mayor v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400. In this case, Collier, P. J., says: "The object of the power conferred by the charter, and the purpose of the or- dinance itself was not to punish an offence against the criminal justice of the country, but to provide a mere police regulation for the en- forcement of good order and quiet within the limits of the corporation. The offence against the corporation and the State are distinguishable, 13 and wholly disconnected, and the prosecution at the suit of each pro- ceeds upon different hypotheses : the one contemplates the observarjce of the peace and good order of the city; the other has a more enlarged object in view, — the maintenance of the peace and dignity of the State." See also Mayor etc. v. Rouse, 8 Ala. 515; Moore v. State, 16 lb. 411; Greensboro v. MuUins, 13 lb. 341 ; Van Buren v. Wells, 14 S. W. R. 38; Pittsburgh v. Trimble, 46 Mo. App. 459; De Soto v. Brown, 46 Mo. App. 148; McPhei'son v. Ghebouse, 114 111. 46; City of Madison v. Hatcher, 8Blackf. (Ind.) 341; Waldo v. Wal- lace, 12 Ind. 582. * Barter v. Com., 3 Pa. St. 253; State v. Clark, 1 Dutch. 54; State v. Pollard, 6 E. I. 290; People v. Jack- son, 8 Mich. 110; State v. Topeka, 36 Kan. 76; In re Sic, 73 Cal. 142; Ex parte Bourgeois, 60 Miss. G63; 193 §118 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. vni. It is, of course, always competent for the Legislature, in the absence of constitutional prohibition, to authorize a municipal- ity by express statute to impose new and additional penalties, and to create new remedies for acts already punishable by the State.i § 118. Sanitary regulations— Slaughter houses— Cemeter- ies — ^Unwholesome provisions. — There is no dispute as to the right of the State to delegate to municipal corporations that por- tion of its police power, by which the health of the community is protected.^ And quarantine ordinances, passed in the exer- cise of such delegated power, are not in contravention of the clause of the Federal Constitution, relating to the national con- trol of foreign and interstate commerce.^ By virtue of the power thus delegated to them, municipal corporations have at- tempted to regulate the occupations of their citizens and the State V. Labatut, 2 So. 550 (La. 87); Dairs v. Anita, 35 N. W. E. 244; 73 Iowa, 325 ; Diamond State Iron Co., 8 Atl. K. 368; McLaughlin v. Steph- ens, 2 Cranch C. C. 148; St. Louis v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 61; United States v. Holly, 3 Cianch C. C. 656; Brophy V. Hyatt, 15 Pac. R. 399; 10 Col. 223; State V. Cowan, 29 Mo. 330; Amboy V. Sleeper, 31 111. 499; Cliillioothe V. Brown, 38 Mo. App. 608: State v. Ledford, 3 Mo. 102; St. Louis v. Caf- ferata, 24 lb. 94; Independence v. Moore, 32 lb. 392; State v. Heiden- hin, 7 Bo. 621 (smoking in street cars); Lancaster v. Elec. Co., 8 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 178; Brooklyn v. Toynbee, 31 Barb. 282; Davenport v. Bird, 34 Iowa, 524; St. Charles v. Meyer, 58 Mo. 86 ; Kew Orleans v. Miller, 7 La. An. 651. 1 State V. Ludwig, 21 Minn. 202; State V. Charles, 16 lb. 474; Lowen- stein V. Myers, 20 N. T. S. 761 ; State V. Tryon, 39 Conn. 183; Com'rs v. Harris, 7 Jones (Law) 281; State v. Grimes, 52 N. W.'R. 42. 2 People V. Wagner, 86 Mich. 594; Com. V. Parks, (Mass. 92) 30 N. E. R. 174; Com. v. Cutter, (Mass. 92) 194 29 N. E. R. 1146; In re Shrader, 33 Cal. 279; Ashbrook v. Com., 1 Bush, 139 ; State v. Schlemmer, 42 La. An. 1166 (ordinance requiring the filling up of wells); Kansas City v. Cook, 38 Mo. App. 660; People v. Gordon, (Mich. 90) 45 N. W. E. 658; State V. Cowan, 29 Mo. 330; Monroe v. Gerspach, 33 La. An. 1011; Wreford V. People, 14 Mich. 41; Harrison v. Baltimore, 1 Gill, 264; Boehn v. Same, 61 Md. 259; Summerville v. Pressley (S. C. 90) 11 S. E. R. 545; City & S. R. Co. V. Savannah, 77 Ga. 731 ; Tucker v. Virginia City, 4 Jfev. 20; Johnson V. Simouton, 43 Cal. 242; In re Lineham, 72 Cal. 114; Huesing V. Rock Island, 128 111. 465 ; Gregory V. Mayor, 40 N. T. 293; People v. MulhoUand, 82 N. Y. 324; State v. Wordin, 56 Conn. 216; Train v. Bos- ton Dis. Co., 144 Mass. 523; O'Dono- van V. Wilkins, 24 Fla. 281; Polinsky v. People, 73 N. T. 35 ; Health Dep. N. Y. V. Knoll, 70 N. Y. 530. 3 St. Louis V. McCoy, 18 Mo. 238; St. Louis V. Boffinger, 19 lb. 13; Met- calf V. St. Louis, 11 lb. 103. Cf. con- tra, New Decatur v. Berry, 90 Ala. 432. CH. VIII.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 118 use of their property, both real and personal, their customs and manner of living; and, in fact, have endeavored to control to a certain extent the life of the citizen from the moment that he is sent ^ into the world, until his corpse is deposited in the grave .^ It is very evident that a comprehensive power like this, touching the social and business life of the community at so many points, is subject to abuse, and may, by conferring ex- clusive privileges or unduly interfering with private rights, be so exerted as to prove tyrannous instead of beneficial, and a public burden, in place of a public protection.^ For the exer- cise of such delegated discretionary powers, the municipality will not be liable ; * but it should always be remembered that even discretionary and public police powers must be exercised by a municipality in good faith,^ without malicious intent, and in conformity with the paramount authority of the Federal and State Constitution, and the general law of the land.® Under the general charter power, to establish regulations for the preservation of the public health, slaughter-houses may be regulated, and confined within specified territorial limits ; ^ and ordinances may be adopted, imposing a fine for the sale of stale or unwholesome provisions.^ In the larger municipalities, this power is often expressly conferred.^ But when the destruction of putrid or unsound provisions is ordered, the health officials. 1 Record of birth. N. T. Con. Act, §§603-607; In re Lauteryung, 48 N. Y. Super. 306. '^ N. T. Con. Act, § 569. ' See the very able and instructive dissenting opinions of C. J. Chase, and JJ. Field, Swayne and Bradley, in the well known Slaughter House cases, 16 Wall. 36. * People V. Board of Health, 33 Barbour, 344. ^ Powers of boards of health con- strued. See Barton v. New Orleans, 16 La. An. 31Y ; Hutton v. Camden, 39 N. J. L. 122; Ferguson v. Selma, 43 Ala. 398; Belcher v. Farrar, 8 Allen, 325; Hazen v. Strong, 2 Vt. 427; Comrs. v. Powe, 6 Jones Law, 134; Wilkinson v. Albany, 28 N. H. 9; State v. Trenton, 36 N. J. L. 283; Weil T. Record, 24 N". J. Eq. 169. ^ See this subject, Tiedeman Limi- tation of Police Power, § 2, et seq. 'Watertown v. Mayo, 109 Mass. 315; Metro. Board v. Heister, 37 IN". Y. 661; St. Paul v. Burnes, 38 Minn. 176; Cronin v. People, 82 N. Y. 318; Wreford v. People, 14 Mich. 41 ; Ex parte Heilbron, 65 Cal. 609; Ex parte Shrader, supra ; Jugman v. Chicago, 78 111. 405; Butchers Union S. House V. Ores. City L. S. Landing, 111 U. S. 746; s. c, 16 Wall. 13. 8 Rochester v. Collins, 12 Barb. 559; Johnson v. Simonton, 43 Cal. 242. !>N. Y. Consol. Act, ch. 12, p. 268, et seq. (ed. 1891.) 195 § 118 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. VIII. in order to escape personal liability, must show that the property- was in some way dangerous to the public health.^ Under the well settled rule that municipal corporations may by ordinances, or otherwise, make proper and reasonable regu- lations for the burial of the dead,^ the relatives of the deceased will not be allowed to create a nuisance by the manner in which the corpse is disposed of. So a by-law is valid, which requires that the body must be interred at a certain place, and in a grave having a specified depth.^ But the power, vested in a municipality to establish cemeteries, within or without city limits, does not give it the right to prohibit the establishment of private cemeteries outside the city limits ; or the privilege of controlling or supervising the use, which is made of them.^ In New York it was held that a municipal grant of land for cemetery purposes, with covenants for quiet enjoyment, or a license permitting interments in private grounds, would not pre- vent the passage of an ordinance, prohibiting interments in that part of the citj'.^ Whether cemeteries in cities are nui- sances -per se, or can only be made so by special circumstances, is a question, upon which the authorities are not agreed ; ^ al- though the fact, that their existence reduces the value of prop- erty near by, does not necessarily constitute them a nuisance.''' It is very evident that land and buildings in agricultural dis- tricts, or sparsely settled rural villages, may be put to far dif- ferent uses by their owners, than in thickly populated and commercial cities. For this reason, under the power to pass necessary ordinances for the preservation of the public health, New Orleans v. St. Louis Church, 1 Underwood v. Green, 42 N". T. 140. 2 Coates V. Mayor, 7 Cow. 585 ; Brick Pres. Ch. v. New York, 5 lb. 538; Mayor of N. T. v. Slack, 3 "Wheel. Cr. Gas. 237; Austin v. Mur- ray, 16 Pick. 121; New Orleans v. St. Louis Ch., 11 La. An. 244; Mus- grove V. St. Louis, 10 lb. 431; City Council V. Bapt. Church, 4 Strob. (S. C.) 806; Kincaid's App., 66 Pa. St. 411; Com. v. Fahey, 5 Cush. 408; Com. V. Goodrich, 13 Allen, 546. ^Bogert V. Indianapolis, 13 Ind. 134; City Council v. Church, supra; 196 supra. * Begein v. Anderson, 28 Ind. 79. * Brick Pres. Ch. v. Mayor, 5 Cow. 538; People v. Pratt, 14 N. T. S. 551; compare contra. Lake View v. Rose Hill Cem. Co.,' 70 111. 192. 8 See Tiedeman's Limitations of Police Power, § 122 d ; Lake View v. Rose Hill Cem. Co., 70 111. 192; Brick Pres. Ch. v. Mayor, 5 Cow. 538, and other cases cited in Police Power. ' New Orleans v. St. Louis Church, 11 La. An. 244; Musgrove v. Same, 10 lb. 431; Lake View v. Letz, 44 111. 81. CH. VIII.] CHAKTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 119 it was held to be valid for a city to forbid the growing of rice within the municipal limits ; ^ or for the council to limit the amount of land, which can be cultivated within its limits by anj' one person or family.^ § 119. Sanitary regulations — Contagions diseases — Re- moral of refuse — Water supply. — Perhaps the most impor- tant power, which is exercised by a municipal corporation in the protection of the health of the city, is the power to remove to a place of detention all persons, who are sick with contagious or infectious diseases, and to prevent communication with houses, where such diseases have broken out.^ The power and right of the state to place those unfortunate persons, who are suffering from a disorder which is likely to become epidemic, in a place of confinement, exercised directly or delegated to a municipal corporation, is too well settled to need much discus- sion.* When the city was authorized " to enact all ordinances neces- sary .... to prevent the introduction of contagious diseases within the city and within three miles of the same," the Court said:® "The transfer of this salutary and essential power is given iu terms as explicit and comprehensive, as could have been used for such a purpose. To accomplish, within the specified territo- rial limits, the objects enumerated, the corporate authori ties were clothed with all the legislative powers which the General As- sembly could have exercised. Of the degree of necessity for such municipal legislation, the mayor and city council were the exclusive judges. To their sound discretion is committed the selection of the means and manner (contributory to the end) of exercising the powers which they might deem requisite to the accomplishment of the objects of which they were made the guardians. ' To prevent the introduction of contagious diseases within the city,' etc., they might impose heavy penalties on the captain, owner or consignee of any ship or other vessel enter- ing the port, on board of which small-pox or other contagious ^ Green v. Savannah, 6 Ga. 1. 2 Summerville v. Pressley, 11 S. E. Rep. 545. SN". T. Consol Act. §549, etc., p. 275 (ed. 1891). See Brown v. Pur- dy, 6 N. T. St. Rep. 143; Gregory v. Mayor, 49 N. Y. 273, for Powers of the Board of Health of New Tork City. *See Tiedeman's Limitations of Police Power, § 42; Harrison v. Balti- more, 1 Gill, 264. 5 In Harrison v. Baltimore, 1 Gill, 264. 197 §119 MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS. [CH. vni. disease might prevail, or they might seek the accomplishment of their object by causing the vessel and all persons to be taken possession of and controlled, until their purification and dis- infection were effected, and impose on the captain, owner or consignee, the payment or reimbursement of all the expenses incurred by such proceedings ; or they might adopt, at the same time, both suggested remedies, if for the successful and faithful execution of their powers they deemed it necessary to do so." ^ When its charter confers upon a city the express or implied power to employ means for the protection of the public against the ravages of a pestilential disease, the power to hire or erect buildings, for the confinement and care of infected and sick persons, will be included.^ The time, manner and necessity of cleaning sinks, cesspools and other receptacles for refuse, are legitimate objects of munic- ipal regulation ; ^ and it is competent for the corporation in the same connection to forbid the removal of house dust, or offal of any kind, through the streets by anyone, not holding a license from the city ; the object to be accomplished being the exercise of a stricter municipal control over the matter, by limiting the number of those who may be employed to do this work.* The power to contract for a municipal water supply will be found treated at some length in another section of this work ; ^ and it need only be said in this connection, that, on the ground that plenty of water is necessary to the preservation of tlie pub- lic henlth, it was held that a city, under its power to pass police ordinances, and ordinances to preserve health, could contract for an artesian well, to be bored on its own land.^ But the 1 Cf. Dubois V. Augusta, Dudley (Ga.) 30. 2 Anderson v. O' Conner, 98 Ind. 168; Boom v. Utica, 2 Barb. 104; Viouet V. Municipality N'o. 1, 4 La. An. 42; Bozant v. Campbell, 9 Eob. (La.) 411; City Council v. Boyd, 1 Const. Rep., A. D. 1817 (S. C.) 352; Kiohmond v. Henrico Co., 83 Va. 204; Hull V. Lexington, 18 Mo. 401. s Com. V. Cutler, (Mass.) 29 N". E. R. 1146; Nicoulin v. Lowery, 49 N. J. L. 891. ^In re Vandine, 6 Pick. 187; Com. 198 V. Stodder, 2 Gush. 562, 575, 576; N. Y. Con. Act, §§ 566, 567. ^ §§ 144, 144 tt, and ch. x. Contracts, § 175. ^ Livingston v. Peppin, 31 Ala. 542 ; Hale V. Houghton, 8 Mich. 458; Mc- Knight V. New Orleans, 24 La. An. 412; Rome v. Cabot, 28 Ga. 50; Peo- ple V. McClintock, 45 Cal. 11; Suf- field v. Hatliaway, 44 Conn. 521 ; fur- ther, as to water supply, see Spring- field V. Fulmer, (Utah) 27 Pac. Rep. 577; Dutton v. Aurora, 114 111. 1 ; Long V. Duluth, 51 N. W. Rep. 913 (exclusive franchise). CH. VHI.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR IsTATURE, ETC. § 120 power to protect the health of the public must be exercised in a reasonable manner ; and, on this ground, an ordinance forbid- ding any person from bringing second hand clothing into a town, or exposing it for sale therein, without furnishing proof that it did not come from an infected district, is not, in the ab- sence of an epidemic, a valid exercise of a charter power, to establish quarantine regulations, but is an unreasonable re- straint of trade.^ § 120. Regulation and abatement of nuisances in gen- eral. — For the better security and promotion of the health of the community, municipalities are, commonly, most liberally en- dowed with power to prevent the creation and maintenance of nuisances ; and it has been said that the power to abate nui- sances is inherent in municipal corporations, so absolutely essen- tial is it to the proper exercise of the police power ; ^ especially in large and crowded commercial, and manufacturing, cities.^ Such power is peculiarly subject to abuse, and its exercise may become unlawful, either because the thing or act complained of is not in fact a nuisance, or because the remedy provided goes beyond the abatement of the nuisance, and restrains tlie en- joyment of personal rights or of property, which is in no legal sense a nuisance. In all these cases, it is a judicial question, whether the regulation for abatement is unconstitutional, on these grounds.* For example, a municipality may cause a house, which has fallen into decay or is irretrievably un- healthy, to be destroyed ; * but when the nuisance consists merely in the use which is made of property, and the property is not in itself a nuisance per se, such an act would be illegal, because the remedy went beyond the abatement of the nui- sance.® It follows, as a result of the first proposition above set ^Eoseinsko v. Slombei-g, 9 So. Eep. 297. 2 Baker v. Boston, 12 Pick. 184; Kennedy v. Phelps, 10 La. An. 227 ; State V. Heidenhain, 42 lb. ; Hel- len V. Noe, 3 Ired. (N. C.) 493. ' Hart V. Mayor etc., 9 Wend. 571. * Tiedeman's Limitations of Police Power, § 122 a. 'Theilan v. Porter, 14 Lea, 622; Meeker v. Van Rensselaer, 1.5 Wend. 397; Manhattan Co. v. Van Keuren, 23 N. J. Eq. 251; Green v. Lake, 60 Miss. 451. 6 Welch V. Stowell, 2 Dough. (Mich.) 332; Clark v. Syracuse, 13 Barb. 32; see, also, Tiedeman's Lim- itations of Police Power, § 122 g ; Earp V. Lee, 71 111. 193; Miller v. Burch, 32 Te:x. 209; Brightman v. Bristol, 65 Me. 426; Shepard v. Peo- ple, 40 Mich. 487; Czarniecki's App. (Pa. 1887), 11 Atl. Kep. 660; Elias v. Nightingale, 8 E. & B. 698; Anthony 199 §120 MUNICIPAL COUPOIiATrt)NS. [CH. vni. forth, that a general power to abate nuisances can only be val- idly exercised upon that which has been judiciallj'- determined to be a nuisance, either by reason of its nature, location, or use.^ In some of the States, the use of real property for certain pur- poses, is declared a nuisance by statute. Thus, in Maine and Rhode Island, keeping a house of ill fame or for lewd purposes, for gambling or for the illegal sale of liquor, is a statutory nui- sance ; and the same statute obtains in some other States.^ The State may confer upon a municipal corporation the ex- press power to deal summarily with a nuisance, without requir- ing a resort to a formal legal proceeding ^ or a jury trial.* But V. Brecon M. Co., L. E. 2 Ex. 167; lb., 7 Ex. 399; Saltoustallv. Bancker, 8 Gray, 195; Hudson v. Thorne, 7 Paige (jST. Y.) 261 ; Chicago v. Laflin, 49 111. 172; Nortii W. Fer. Co., 97 U. S. 659; comp. Kidgeway v. West, 60 Ind. 371. iKoberts V. Ogle, 30 111. 459; Sa^ lem V. Eastern R. Co., 98 Mass. 431; Dingley v. Boston, 100 Mass. 544; Van Dyke v. Cincinnati, 1 Disney (Ohio) 532; Crosby v. Warren, 1 Rich. (S. C.) 385; Ward v. Little Rock, 41 Ark. 526; Denver v. Mul- len, 7 Col. 345; McKibbin v. Fort Smith, 35 Ark. 352; St. Paul v. Gil- fillan, 36 Minn. 298. In Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, the court said: " The mere declaration by the city that a certain structure was an encroachment or obstruction did not make it so, nor could such declara- tion make it a nuisance, unless in fact it had that character. It is a doctrine, not to be tolerated in this country, that a municipal corpora- tion, without any general law, either of the city or of the State, within which a given structure can be shown to be a nuisance, can, by the mere declaration tha€ it is one, sub- ject it to removal by any person sup- posed to be aggrieved, or even by the city itself. This would place every house, every business, and all the 200 property in the city, at the uncon- trolled will of the temporary local authorities." Des Plaines v. Poyer, 123 111. 348; State v. Kewark, 38 N". J. L. 264; Everett v. Council Bluffs, 46 Iowa, 66; Cole v. Kegler, 64 lb. 59; Fieri v. Shieldsboro, 42 Miss. 493; Compton v. Waco B. Co., 62 Tex. 715; Underwood v. Green, 42 N. Y. 140; Miller v. Burch, 32 Tex. 208; Vogt V. Mayor etc., (Md.) 4 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 329; River Render- ing Co. V. Behr, 77 Mo. 91; State v. Mott, 61 Md. 297; Hennessy v. St. Paul, 37 Fed. Rep. 565 ; Arkadelphia v. Clark, (Ark. 1889) 27 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 586; Evansville v. Martin, 41 Ind. 145; Green v. Savannah, 6 Ga. 1; State v. Jer. City, 29 N. J. L. 170; Glenn v. Baltimore, 5 Gill & J. 429; Alpers v. Brown, 60 Cal. 447; Everett v. Marquette, 53 Mich. 450; Joyce v. Woods, 78 Ky. 386; Bab- oock v. Buffalo, 56 N. Y. 268; Darst V. People, 02 111. 306; Pye v. Peter- sop, 45 Tex. 312; McCrowell v. Bris- tol, 5 Lea, 685; Ison v. Manley, 76 Ga. 804. 2 Stimpson Amer. Stat. Law, § 2059. ^ Baumgartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind. 575. 4 See article of John B. Uhle, 30 Am. Law E. (N. S.) 157; King v. Davenport, 98 111. 305. CH. VIII. J CHAETEE POWEES, THEIE MATUEE, ETC. § 120 when the injury caused by the existence of the nuisance is gen- eral, and public rights are affected, an indictment or other pub- lic prosecution is the proper remedy, both to abate the nuisance, and to punish the person who is responsible for its existence.^ When, however, as it frequently happens, the nuisance is both public and private, its abatement may be obtained by a private individual, who suffers special damage, if the municipal authori- ties should neglect to prosecute the person maintaining it.^ In addition to the remedy at law by indictment, a municipal corporation may invoke the assistance of a Court of Equity, to lestrain or forbid the erection or maintenance of a public nui- sance by the issue of an injunction ; particularly, where the nuisance is likely to be permanent and continuous.^ And the same remedy is available to private individuals, who suffer special damage from the public nuisance.* A municipal corporation has no more right to maintain a nuisance, or allow others to maintain one, than has an individual ; and, for a nuisance upon its property, created or permitted by it, it will be subject to the same remedj^ by injunction, or a suit 1 State V. Bell, 5 Port. (Ala.) 365; Kex V. White, 5 Burr. 333 ; State v. Munzenmaler, 24 Iowa, 87; State v. Anwerda, 40 lb. 151; Syracuse etc. Co. V. People, 66 Barb. 25; State v. Noyes, 30 IST. H. 279; Maxwell v. Bryne, 30 Ind. 120; TaRgart v. Cora., 21 Pa. St. 527; State v. Haines, 30 Me. 65; School Dis. v. Neil, 36 Kan. 617; Billard v. Erhart, 35 lb. 611; Blanc V. Murray, 36 La. An. 162; King V. Sadler, 4 0. & P. 218 ; Holmes V. Wilson, 10 A. & E. 503 ; In re Doug- las, 3 Q. B. 825 ; Thompson v. Gib- son, 7 M. & W. 456; Queen v. Chor- ley, 12Q. B.515; Queen v. Liscombe, 2 Chit. 214. 2 Lutterloh v. Cedar Keys, 15 Fla. 506; Henkel v. Detroit, 49 Mich. 249; Fritz V. Hobson, 19 Am. Law Keg. 615; Bushnell v. Robeson, 62 Iowa, 540; Irwin v. Telephone Co., 37 La. An. 63; McDonald y. Newark, 42 N. J. Eq. 136; H.ariey v. Merrill B. Co., 48 N. W. Rep. 1000. Definition of Nuisance. King v. Lloyd, J Esp. 200; King v. White, 1 Burr. 333; King V. Davey, 5 Esp. 217; Burditt V. Swenson, 17 Tex. 489. 8 Hoole V. Atty. General, 22 Ala. 190; Atty. General v. Gas Co., 19 Eng. L. & Eq. 639; Aldrich v. How- ard, 7 R. I. 87; Zabriskie v. Jersey City, etc., 13 N. J. Eq. 314; Jersey City V. Hudson, lb. 420; People v. St. Louis, 10 111. 372; Attorney Gen- eral V. Brown, 24 N. J. Eq. 89; Moore V. Walla Walla, 2 Wash. Ter. 184; Metro. City R. R. v. Chicago, 96 111. 620; Dumesnil v. Dupont, 18B. Mon. 800; Stearns Co. v. St. Cloud, etc. Co., 36 Minn. 425; Earl of Ripon v. Hobart, 3 Mylne & Keen, 169, 179; Flint V. Russell, 5 Dillon, 151; Pine City V. Munich, 27 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 572; Ottumwa v. Chinn, 75 Iowa, 405 ; Newark Aq. Brd. v. Passaic, 45 N. J. Eq. 393 ; see New York Consol. Act, § 646, and Health Dep. v. Pur- don, 99 N. Y. 237. * Tiedeman Equity .Jurisprudence, § 484. 201 §120 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. VIII. for damages.^ So, a license from the municipality will be no de- fence, in an action against an individual to abate a public nui- sance.^ Subject to the qualifications and restrictions above stated, it may be said generally that, vjrhen a municipal corporation has un- der its charter the authority to remove nuisances, or to prevent their creation, in order to render the exercise of the power legal, it must be shown that what is being done is in the interest of the public health, safety and convenience ; or, in other words, that the thing or act prohibited is a nuisance.^ Where ths property or act is a nuisance per se, the power of the munici- pality is unquestioned,* even though its exercise may involve the destruction of private property.^ But when the munici- pality assumes to pronounce property to be a nuisance, which is not a nuisance, either by statute,*" by the nature of the prop- erty, or by its use or location, it will be held liable to the owner for all damages which may be caused by its action, in the abate- ment of the alleged nuisance,^ to the same extent as a private person would be, under similar circumstances.^ Dubuque v. Maloney, 9 Iowa, 450; Com'rs V. Korthern Lib. G. Co., 12 Pa. St. 318; People v. Albany, 11 Wend. 539; St. Louis v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 61; Collins v. Hatch, 18 Ohio, 523; New Orleaas v. Phillipi, 9 La. An. 44; Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N. J. 222 ; Peck v. Lookwood, 5 Day (Conn.) 22; Baltimore v. Eadecke, 49 Md. 217. * Ferguson v. Selma, 43 Ala. 398; N"olin V. Franklin, 4 Yerg. 163; North Chicago, etc., Co. v. Lakeview, 105 111. 207; Hart V. Albany, 9 Wend. 571. "See Kiley v. Kansas, 69 Mo. 102; Parker v. Macon, 39 (Ja. 729; Bissett V. St. Joseph, 53 lb. 290; Cain v. Syracuse, 95 N. Y. 83; as to liability of the city for a failure to exerciso the power to abate nuisance created by others. " Nuisance as applicable to New York city defined. Con. Act, § 636. ' Cole V. Kegler, 64 Iowa, 59. 8 Welch V. Stowell, 2 Doug. 332; Clark V. Mayor of Syracuse, 13 Barb. 1 Judge V. Meriden, 38 Conn. Mootry v. Daubury, 45 lb. 430; Ft. Worth V. Crawford, 74 Tex. 404; Suilolk V. Parker, 79 Va. 660; Penn- oyer v. Saginaw, 8 Mich. 534; Has- kell V. New Bedford, 108 Mass. 208 ; Boston Roll. Mills v. Cambridge, 117 lb. 396; State v. Mayor, 12 Lea, 146; Chapman v. Rochester, 110 N. Y. 273; Sherman v. Langham, 30 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 539; Niblett v. Nash- ville, 12 Hersk. 684; Hannibal v. Richards, 82 Mo. 330; Harper v. Mil- waukee, 30 Wis. 363 ; Brayton v. Fall River, 143 Mass. 218; Petersburg v. Applegarth, 28 Gratt. 321; Haag v. Com'rs, 60 Ind. 511. 2 King V. Cross, 2 C. & P. 483; Pettis v. Johnson, 56 Ind. 139; Ryan v. Copes, 11 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 217; Garrett v. State, 49 N. J. L. 94a. " Ex pm-ie Robinson, (Tex.)17S. W. 1057; May v. People, 27 Pac. Rep. 1010; Dingley v. Boston, 100 Mass. 544; Lake View v. Letz, 44 111. 81; Com. V. Worcester, 13 Pick. 462; 202 CH. VIII.] CHAETEE POWEES, THEIE NATUEE, ETC. § 120 It is no defence, in an action to abate a public nuisance, that the defendant was too poor to abate it himself ; ^ that the public derived some advantage from it;^ that the municipality had not assigned a separate place for the obnoxious business ; ** that similar nuisances have been allowed or acquiesced in by the au- thorities;* that the defendant has leased the premises, and can- not lawfully enter to abate the nuisance,^ or that he has used the utmost possible care to prevent the nuisance from injuring others.^ What combination of annoyances will constitute a public nuisance in any particular instance, usually depends on the circumstances of each case, as it arises.'^ No particular sorts of annoyance are necessary to make a nuisance ; and the Courts have not laid down any definition of nuisances which is at all exhaustive or inclusive. Aside from those things, which are prejudicial to the public welfare or morals, or injurious to private rights wherever they may be located, much latitude has been allowed in modern times in the doing of what, by the earlier decisions, had been pro- nounced to be nuisances ; and this is to be accounted for, and jus- tified by the rapid advance in population of the towns and cities of this country ^ and England, coupled with the necessity for 32; Church v. Milwaukee, 31 Wis, 512; Kennedy v. Board of Health, 2 Pa. St. 366; Green v. Savannah, 6 Ga. 1; Underwood v. Green, 42 N. Y. 140; Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497; Wreford v. People, 14 Mich. 41; Everett v. Council Bluffs, 46 Iowa, 60; Salem v. Eastern R. Co., 98 Mass. 431. In a few of the states, provis- ion has been made in certain cases for remuneration of those whose property Is injured through the abatement of nuisances. Leavitt v. Cambridge, 120 Mass. 157; Fams- worth V. Boston, 126 lb. 1; Barnsta- ble Sav. Bk. V. Boston, 127 lb. 254; Cavanaugh v. Boston, 139 Mass. 426; III re Chessborough, 17 Hun, 561; Read V. Cambridge, 126 Mass. 427; Nickerson v. Boston, 131 lb. 306; Bush V. Dubuque, 69 Iowa, 233. 1 Baltimore etc. T. Co. v. State, 63 Md. 573. SRespublica v. Caldwell, 1 Dall. 150; State v. Kaster, 35 Iowa, 221; Works v. Junction R. Co., 5 McLean, 425 ; Duluth v. Mallet, 43 Minn. 204. 3 State V. Hart, 34 Me. 36. * People V. Mallory, 4 Thompson & C. (N. Y.) 567. 5 Thompson v. Gibson, 7 M. & W. 455 ; Smith v. Elliott, 9 Pa. St. 345. ^ McAndrews v. CoUard, 42 N. J. L. 189; Cogswell v. New York, etc. Co., 103 ]Sr. Y. 10; People v. Lead Works, 82 Mich. 471. 'See remarks of Pollock, J., in Bamford v. Turnley, 113 Eng. C. L. 66, upon the impossibility of laying down any clear or certain rule as to what will constitute a nuisance. 8 See this branch of the subject discussed in Galbraith v. Olivet, 3 Pitts. (Pa.) 79, and Huckenstine's App., 70 Pa. St. 102. 203 §120 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. VIII. the location in large centers of population of mills, factories and shops, in which the wage-earners of the locality may find em- ployment, and by which the inhabitants of the cities are sup- plied with the necessities of life. In the light of these profound changes in the material, economic and municipal life of the mod- ern world, there is a necessary revision of the conception of what constitutes an unlawful nuisance.^ " If one lives in a city he must expect to suffer the dirt, smoke, noisome odors, noise and confusion incident to cit}- life. As Lord Justice James beautifully said, in Salvin v. North Brancepeth Coal Co.,^ ' If some picturesque haven opens its arms to invite the commerce of the world, it is not for this Court to forbid the embrace, although the fruit of it should be the sights and sounds and smells of a common seaport and shipbuilding town, which would drive the Dryads and their masters from their ancient solitude.' " * In another case,* it was said that " the people who live in such a city, i. e. where the principal indus- tiy consists of manufactures, do so of choice, and they volunta- rily subject themselves to its peculiarities and its discomforts for the greater benefits they think they derive from their resi- dence or business there." The application of steam to manufacturing purposes, the use of gas and electricity for illuminating streets and buildings, the running of horse cars and railroad trains in city streets, and similar modern innovations, have created annoyances which, by their magnitude and injurious character, have caused the minor evils, with which the earlier English cases deal, to dwindle into insignificance. Under such changed conditions, the principles of the earlier decisions are not always applicable, and many trades, which were at one time declared nuisances per se, would now not be deemed nuisances at all, unless they should become so by the manner, or the locality, in which they are conducted.^ It is impossible in a work of this nature, to treat the subject ' Harrison v. Good, L. K. 11 Eq. 338; Salvin v. Nortli Brancepeth C. Co., L. K. 8 Ch. Ap. 467; Broder v. SalUard, L. R. 2 Cb. Dlv. 692; Bam- ford V. Turuley, 3 B. & D. 62, 66; Tipping V. St. Helen's Smelting Co., 4 lb. 608; 11 H. L. Cas. 642; Gaunt V. Fyuuey, L. R. 8 Cli. Ap. 8. 204: 2 L. R. 9 Ch. App. 705. * Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N". T. 568. * Huckenstein's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 102; 10 Am. Kep. 669. ^ In Toyhales Case, Cro. Car. 510, a candle f actory,and in Jones v. Powell, Palm. 537, a tobacco factory and brew- ery, were declared nuisances per se. OH. VIII.J CHAUTEE POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 120 of nuisances in detail, or to enumerate more than a small pro- portion of the things, which have at various times been regarded as nuisances by the courts of law. So far as trades and occu- pations of an offensive character are concerned, it may be said that it is not necessary that the disagreeable smell produced should be injurious to health,^ provided the neighborhood is materially deprived of fresh and pure air. A dense smoke has been judicially declared to be a nuisance,^ and a noise, such as the ringing of bells, has been enjoined.^ But whether smoke, noise or smell would constitute a nuisance, within the limits of a municipal corporation, would depend to a great extent upon their character, and upon the location and surroundings of the source of the annoyance.* So, the noise made by a tinsmith,'' a circus,^ a rolling mill,^ a shooting gal- lery,^ in working stone quarries,^ by the stamping of horses in a stable,^" or cattle in a pen,ii by a gold beater,^ a blacksmith,^^ or a printing press,-^* have been held sufficient to constitute such occupations a nuisance ; particularly, when carried on in quiet localities. But a livery stable, tannery,^^ or brick kiln,^^ is not even in a populous city a nuisance per se; and whether it shall be re- garded as a nuisance at all, depends upon its location, and the mode in which it is built and used.^" Many things, such as cemeteries, factories, or lime kilns are 1 The King v. White, 1 Burr, 337; The King v. Neil, 2 C. & P. 485; St. Helens Chem. Co. v. St. Helens, L. E. 1 Ex. Div. 196. 2 Harmon v. Chicago, 110 HI. 400; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Orr, (Ky.) 1.3 S. W. Rep. 8; corap. contra, St. Paul V. GilfiUan, 36 Minn. 298. ^ Harrison v. St. Marks Church, 12 Phila. (Pa.) 259; Leete v. Pilgrim etc. Church, 14 Mo. App. 590; Davis V. Savryer, 133 Mass. 289. * See Peo. v. Lewis, 49 N. W. 140. '- The King v. Lloyd, 4 Esp. 200. ^ Inchbold v. Robinson, L. R. 4 Ch. App. 388. ' Scott v. Firth, 4 F. & F. 349. 8 King V. Moore, 3 B. & Ad. 184. ' Queen v. Matters, 10 Cox, 6. 1" Dargan v. Waddell, 9 Ired. ( N. C.) 244. " Bishop V. Banks, 33 Conn. 121. '2 Wallace v. Ames, 10 Phila. 356. 15 Fish V. Dodge, 4 Den. 311. i< Roberson v. Campbell, 13 F. C. (S. C.) 61. " State V. Cadwalader, 36 N. J. L. 283. 16 Wanslead etc. v. Hill, 13 C. B. 479; State v. Mott, 61 Md. 297. 17 Aldrich v. Howard, 7 R. I. 87; s. c, 8 lb. 246; Morris v. Brower, Anthons N. P. (N. Y.) 368; Flint v. Russell, 5 Dillon, 151; Harrison v. Brooks, 20 Ga. 537; Packard v. Col- lins, 23 Barb. 444 ; Shiras v. Olinger, 50 Iowa, 571. The following have been in recent 205 §120 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIOKS. [CH. vin. not in themselves nuisances, when established remote from dwelling houses, but may become so by the increase of urban population, and the extension of the city's area into the sur- rounding country. In such a case, the length of time, during which the objectionable object existed, will not eliminate its il- legal character as a nuisance ; and the fact, that the complain- ant approaches it, does not make the person maintaining the nuisance the less liable for his wrongdoing.^ times declared nuisances by the courts on account of the nature of the thing itself, or of the mode or location in which it existed : A pig sty (Com. V. Van Sickle, Bright. (Pa.) 69 ), steam -whistle (Parker v. Union W. Wks., 42 Conn. 309), bow- ling alley (State v. Haynes, 30 Me. 65), sawing of marble ( McKeou v. See, 51 N. Y. 300), pigeon match (Rex V. Moore, 3 B. & A. 184), skating rink ( Snyder v. Cabell, 29 W. Va. 48), an electric light engine (Yocum V. Hotel St. George, 18 Abb. N". C. 340), blacksmith shop (Brown v. Muzzy, 117 Ind. 258), brick burning (Walter v. Seefe, 15 Jur. 416; 4 Eng. L. & Eq. 18), tallow factories (Blunt V. Hay, 4 Sandf. Ch. 363), soap works ( Howard v. Lee, 3 Sandf. Ch. 281), fat boiling (State v. Neidt, 19 Atl. Eep. 318), bone boiling (Meigs v. Lister, 23 N. J. Eq. 320), gas works (People V. N. T. Gas L. Co., 64 Barb. 55; Bolian v. Pt. Jervis G. L. Co., 25 N. E. R. 246; 122 K. Y. 18), a carpet cleaning establishment ( Craven v. Rodeuhausen, 21 Atl. Eep. 774), cat- tle yards (Cora. v. Alden, 14.3 Mass. 113), barns (GifEord v. Hulett, (Vt.) 19 Atl. Rep. 230), pools of stagnant water (Com. v. Read, 34 Pa. St. 27.5 ; Lockett V. Ft. Worth etc. Co., 78 Tex. 211; Busch v. N. Y. L. & W. E. Co., 12 N. Y. S. 85), oil factory (Com. V. Brown, 13 Met. 365), guano warehouse (Ruff v. Phillips, 50 Ga. 1.30), manure deposit (People v. Board of Health, 33 Barb. 344), a 206 dairy (State v. Ball, 59 Mo. 321), a fertilizer factory ( State v. Luce, (Del.) 6 Cent. Eep. 862; Susquehan- na F. Co. V. Malone, 73 Md. 268), varnish works ( Rex v. Neil, 2 C. & P. 485 ), chemical works ( Rex v. White, 1 Burrows, 3.33), a distiUei7 (Smith V. MoConathy, 11 Mo. 517), privies (Wahle v. Eeinback, 76 111. 322), a cooking range ( Grady v. Walsner, 46 Ala. 381), powder mag- azine (Laflin, Eand etc. Co. v. Tear- ney, 23 N. E. Eep. 389; Chicago W. & V. Coal Co V. Glass, 34 111. App. 364), coal shed (Wiley v. Elwood, 25 jSr. E. Eep. 570), blasting rocks (Hun- ter V. Farren, 127 Mass. 381), any ob- ject which collects a crowd (Boston V. N^orth Staf. E. Co., 5 De G. & S. 584), gambling house ( McClean v. State, 49 N. J. L. 471), a saloon where liquor is sold illegally (Mey- er V. State, 42 N. J. L. 145), crying aloud on a public street (Com. v. Harris, 101 Mass. 29; State v. Earn- hardt, 107 N. C. 789). ' Coates V. Mayor, 7 Cow. 585 ; Bra- dy V. Weeks, 3 Barb. 157; Cemetery Ass. V. Eailroad Co., 121 111. 199. See on- " coming to a nuisance, " Howell V. McCoy, 3 Eawle ( Pa. ) 256; Smith v. Phillips, 8 Phila. (Pa.) 10; Ladies Dec. Art Club, 25 W. jST. C. (Pa.) 75; Hillegass v. Helley, 5 Pa. St. 97; Alexander v. Kerr, 2 Eawle, 83; 19 Am. Eep. 616; Com. v. Upton, 6 Gray (Mass.) 473 ; Boston Roll. Mill V. Cambridge, 117 Mass. 396; Mulligan v. Ellis, 12 Abb. Pr. CH. VIII.J CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 121 § 121. Harbor and navigable waters. — Very extensive powers are usually committed to maritime municipal corpora- tions, by the exercise of which the use of navigable waters within municipal boundaries may be regulated.^ Under such powers, the municipality may establish pier head lines, remove obstructions in the harbor, and regulate the use of the Water by fishermen and others.^ But the power of the municipality, to rid the harbor of obstructions, does not, it has been held, take away the right of the State authorities to have the same declared a purpresture or nuisance.^ The dumping of ashes and refuse in the harbor may be prohibited by the city under a penalty ;* but it has been held that an action in rem, to enforce these penalties, cannot be maintained.^ The duty of a municipality, having the control of an open and public harbor, is to keep it reasonably safe for those using it, whether it receives tolls or harbor dues for its use, or not.^ . It has been held that an embankment,^ a line^ or a wire cable stretched across a river,^ a gas pipe ^^ or oil pipe line,^^ a telegraph cable,^^ a weir,^'' deposits of sewage,^* or of sediment N. S. 259; Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N. Y. 568; Vedder v. Vedder, 1 Den. 257; Bavwell v. Brooks, 1 L. T. N. S. 454; Cooley on Torts, 612, 613. • See Culbertson v. Southern Belle, I Newb. (U. S.) 461; Remy v. New Orleans, 15 La. An. 657. 2N. T. Consol. Act, p. 353, (2d ed. 1891); People v. Bryan, 46 Barb. 355. 8 People V. N. Y. & S. I. Ferry Co., 68 N. Y. 71; People v. Vanderbilt, 31 lb. 205; People v. Supervisors, 73 N. Y. 393. * Com'rs V. Frost, 4 Daly, 353. ^Com'rs v. Dick, 5 Daly, 391; Com'rs V. Pidgeon, 23 Hun, 346. « Ligare v. Chicago, (111 . Sup.) 28 N. E. R. 934; Parnaby v. Lan. Can. Co., II A. & E. 223; Metcalf v. Hether- ington, 11 Ex. .257; Gibbs v. Liver- pool Docks, 3 H. & N. 164; s. c, L. E., 1 H. L. 93, 104, 122; Loagmore v. G. W. R. Co., 35 L. J. C. P. 135; Francis v. Cockrell, L. R. 5 Q. B. 184; Webb V. Pt. Bruce Harbor Co., 19 Up. Can. Q. B. 626; Coe v. Wise, L. R. 1 Q. B. 711 ; Winch v. Conserva- tors, etc., L. E. 7 C. P. 471; Sweeney V. Pt. Burwell H. Co., 17 Up. Can. C. P. 574; 19 lb. 376; Berry man v. Same, 24 Up. Can. Q. B. 34. ' Eex V. Ward, 6 N. & M. 38. SMcCord V. Tiger, 6 Biss. 409. 'The Vancouver, 2 Sawyer, 381. Ladd V. Foster, 31 Fed. Eep. 827. 1' Omslaer V. Philadelphia Co., 31 Fed. Eep. 8.54. " Buffalo etc. Co. v. New York etc. R. Co., 10 Ab. N. C. 107. 1- S. & C. Trans. Co. v. West. Union T. Co., 8 Ben. 502. w Williams v. Wilcox, 3 N. & P. 600. 1* Brayton v. Fall River, 113 Mass. 218; Washburn etc. Co. v. Worcester, 116 lb. 458; Boston Rolling Mills v. Cambridge, 117 lb. 396; Clark v. Peckham, 10 E. I. 35. 207 §122 MUNICrrAL COEPORATIOXS. [CH. VI n. and d^bris,^ are serious obstructions, which constitute public nuisances and should be abated by the municipal authorities, who have control of the navigable waters. § 122. Regulation of occupations and amusements. — The State, in the exercise of the police power, may subject all occu- pations to a reasonable regulation, when this is required for the protection of public interests or of the public welfare.^ Bat such a power is by no means arbitrary or unlimited, so that the State, either directly or by the agency of a municipality, can prohibit the prosecution of a harmless business.^ It is comparatively easy to lay down general rules upon this subject ; but much more dilEcult to apply them to the multifa- rious occupations, which, it has been claimed, may be regulated and restricted. To dictate to the individual what method he shall or shall not adopt to procure the means of livelihood, seems a most serious invasion of his right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, guaranteed him by the constitution.*. When, however, a particular calling threatens damage to the public health or welfare, or to private individuals, it is a proper subject for municipal police regulation. But such power must be exercised with caution so as not to unnecessarily infringe individual rights ; and, as in the analogous cases of the sup- pression of nuisances, whether in any case the trade or occupa- tion requires, or justifies police regulation, is a judicial and not a municipal question.* The courts will not permit an oc- 1 Garltee v. Baltimore, 53 Md. 422; People V. Gold Run Ditch Min. Co., 56 Am. Eep. 80. 2 Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 07 U. S. 25; N. O. Gas Co. v. Loui- siana L. Co., 115 lb. 650, 661; Barte- meyer V. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129; Foster V. Kansas, 112 U. S. 291; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1; Mugler v. Kan- sas, 123 lb. 623; State t. Holcomb, 68 Iowa, 107; Com. v. Patch, 97 Mass. 221. 3 For a full and exhaustive treat- ment of the subject of police regula- tion of trades and professions, see Tiedeman'# Limitations of Police Power, chapter ix. * Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 208 106; Coi-field v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 38; In re Jacobs, 98 ST. T. 98; Opinion of Andrews, J., in Bertholf V. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509; People v. Marx, 99 jST. Y. 377, 386; Miller, J., In re John Brosnahan, Jr., 4 McCrary, 1. That the power of a municipal corporation to regulate does not im- ply the power to prohibit, see Tay- lor V. Griswold, 2 Green (N. J.) 222; State V. Mott, 61 Md. 297; Milliken v. Weatherford, 34 Tex. 388; Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391;.Peck v. Lock- wood, 5 Day (Conn.) 22 ; Willard T. Killingworth, 8 Conn. 247; Clason v, Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 316. 5 Beebe v. State, 26 Ind. 501. CH. Vltl.] CHARTER POWKKS, THEIR N'ATURE, ETC. §122 cupation to be interfered with, or property rights to be invaded, by a municipality, under the guise of a police regulation, when it is clear that the promotion of the public health, welfare or morals is not the end sought.^ The means, chosen by a municipalitj', in regulating occupa- tions should not go beyond the prevention of the evil, and pro- hibit what is not an evil.^ Thus, the keeping of a gambling house is a public evil, and a municipality may place it under whatever regulations it may see fit, even to the extent of pro- liibiting the keeping of one altogether.^ But a laundry is not per se a nuisance ; nor is that business anywhere unlawful. For this reason, a municipality has no power to arbitrarily give or withhold consent for the carrying on of such a lawful business, without regard to the discretion or competenc}' of the person seeking a license.* On the other hand, an ordinance, prohibit- ing the carrying on of this business in certain localities during specified hours, was sustained as a valid and constitutional ex- ercise of the police power.^ The municipality caniidt, by pass- ing a regulative ordinance forbid others from engaging in that business in the same locality, while those already established are allowed to remain there.^ When the business, which is souglit to be regulated, is one which, from the manner in which it is being conducted, is verj- likely to become a nuisance, and to seriously injure the health of the community, the delegated police power of the municipal corporation can be exercised to a much wider extent to avert the threatened evil, even to the 1 Austin V. Murray, 16 Pick. 126; Green v. Savannah, 6 Ga. 1 ; People V. Hawley, 3 Mich. 330; Ames v. P. H. L. Co., 11 lb. 139; State v. Beau, 91 N. C. 554; Ex, parte Mirande, 73 Cal. 365; O'Maley v. Freeport, 96 Pa. St. 24; Vansans v. Harlem Stage Co., 59 Md. 330; Muhlenbrinck v. Com'rs, 42 N. J. L. 364; Flanagan v. Plain- field, 44 lb. 118; Clark v. New Bruns- wick, 43 lb. 175. 2 In re Frank, 52 Cal. 606; District V. Saville, 1 McArthur, 581; St. Louis V. Fitz, 53 Mo. 582; Long v. Taxing Dis., 7 Lea, 134. 8 N. T. Con. Act, § 285. u * Yick Wo. V. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, rev'g In re Tick Wo, 68 Cal. 294; see In re Tie Loy, 26 Fed. Rep. 611. SBarbier v. Connolly, 118 U. S. 27; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 118 lb. 703; ^s parte Mayniei', 65 Col. 33; In re HongKie, 69 Cal. 149; lure Quong Wo, 7 Sawyer, 526. 8 Tugman v. Chicago, 78 111. 405 ; Brooks V. Mongam, 86 Mich. 576; 49 N". W. K. 633; Sayre v. Phillips, 24 Atl. Rep. 76; 30 W. N. C. 196; Cf. Martin v. Rosodale, 29 N. E. Rep. 410; Ex parte Heyle, 92 Cal. 492; Richmond v. Dudley, 129 Ind. 112; 28 N. E. r; 312. 209 § 122 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. VIII. interference with valuable rights which had become vested.^ In the early system of English municipal government, certain prescriptive rights had been exercised by the borough, to grant exclusive privileges of trading, or of carrying on other voca- tions. These customary rights, which were considered to have their foundation in charters long since lost, do not exist in the United States ; and, for this reason, the English decisions, dis- cussing and enforcing them, are out of place in American juris- prudence. The maxim of the law, enunciated in several of the earher American decisions,^ that ordinances must not be in restraint of trade, must be taken with the proviso, as pointed out in this section, that the municipality may regulate the occupation of all those coming within its jurisdiction, as far as it is necessary for the protection and advancement of the public health, wel- fare and morals.* By virtue of a " power relative to nuisances " it has been lield that a city may prohibit the keeping of bowling alleys for gain ; * or may prescribe that they shall be closed at a cer- tain hour.* But a statute, authorizing the police to suppress gambling by seizing gambling implements and publicly destroy- ing the same, without anj"- notice to the owner or any form of investigation, was declared unconstitutional, as depriving the owner of his property without due process of law." Nor will the power to suppress gambling houses authorize the municipal- ity to destroy the houses, in which the gambling is carried on.'^ The charter power, to suppress or restrain bawdy or disor- derly houses, confers by implication the power to adopt meas- ures conducive to the accomplishment of that end. Thus, the municipal authorities may forbid house owners from leas- ing their premises for this purpose,^ and may.impose penalties 35 Am. Rep. 420; Fisher v. McGirr, IGray, 1; Hibbardv. People, 4 Mich. 120; Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 354. '. Bosley v. Davis, L. E. 1 Q. B. Div. 84; Brodie v. Bowmanville, 38 Up. Can. Q. B. 580. 8 Childress v. Mayor etc., 3 Sneed, 347; Shreveport v. Koos, 35 La. An. 1010; State v. Williams, 11 S. Car. 288; Ogden v. McLaughlin, 16 Pac. Kep. 72. 1 See § 120, Nuisances, State v. Fisher, 52 Mo. 174; Elec. Imp. Co. v. San Francisco, 45 Fed. Kep. 593. a Com. V. Stodder, 2 Cush. 562, 568. 3 Mays V. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268. < Tanner V. Albion, 5 Hill, 121; Up- dike v. Campbell, 4 E.D. Smith, 570; People V. Sergeant, 8 Cow. 139. s State V. Hay, 29 Me. 457; State v. Freeman, 38 N. H. 426. ^ Lowry v. Rainwater, 70 Mo. 152; 210 OH. VIII. J CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 123 on the keepers of disreputable houses, or on persons owning houses used for such purposes,^ on persons soliciting ^ or visiting, or being in houses of this cliaracter.^ And this, it has been held, may be done, although the offences are punishable under the law of the state.* But it is not constitutional for a munic- ipality to forbid the leasing of premises to one, who is, or has been a prostitute, where the premises are not to be used for the purposes of prostitution.^ So the municipal authorities cannot arbitrarily order the destruction of such houses ; ^ or, under a power to pass by-laws, which are deemed expedient for the sup- pression of houses of ill fame, enact an ordinance making it a misdemeanor for a prostitute to live or to be found within mu- nicipal limits '' or to return to the city after a departure from it.^ In an Iowa case,^ it was held that the power to suppress bawdy houses did not include the power to declare the keeping of one a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment. It would seem, however, that this is a refinement of distinction, not warranted by the authorities in general. § 123. Licenses, when a police regulation, and when a tax. — It is very common for a municipal corporation, and not unusual for the state, and even the national government, to re- quire the procurement of a license, and the payment of a fee therefor, as a condition precedent to the prosecution of a cer- tain trade or business, and to enforce thp payment of such fee by the imposition of heavy penalties. Although the courts are not always clear in their statements of the grounds upon which they have sustained the legality of these licenses, the constitu- tional objections to them have been very generally denied on one ground or another.^" The cases are very numerous, and the iMcAlister V. Clark, 33 Conn. 91; Ely v. Supervisors, 36 N. Y. 297; Shaffer v. Mumraa, 17 Md. 331 ; Peo- ple V. Erwin, 4 Den. 129 ; Territory y. Dakota, 2 Dak. 155;Tiedeman Po- lice Powers, §126; Cf. contra, State V. Webster, 107 N. C. 962. =! Thomas v. Hot Spgs, 34 Ark. 553. 'State V. Botkin, 71 Iowa, 87; In re Johnson, 73 Cal. 228. *Wong V. Astoria, 13 Oreg. 538; People V. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611 ; State V. Wisten, 62 Mo. 592. ^ Milliken v. City Council, 54 Tex. 388 (38 Am. Rep). 629. 6 See ante, § 129. 'Buell V. State, 45 Ark. 336; Mil- liken V. City Council, 54 Tex. 388 (38 Am. Rep. 629). 8 Parmlee v. Camden, 49 Ark. 165. ^ Chariton v. Barber, 54 Iowa, 360 (37 Am. Rep. 209). "Carroll v. Tuskaloosa, 12 Ala. 173; Merriara v. New Orleans, 14 La. An. 314; Wynne v. Wright, 1 Dev. Dupree v. Brunswick, 85 Ga. 727. ^ Des Moines v. Gilchrist, 67 Iowa, 210; contra, Hubbai-d v. Medford, (Or.) 25 Pac. Rep. 640; City of Olym- pia v. Mann, 1 Wash. St. 389. * Knoedler v. Korristown, 100 Pa. St. 368 ; Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates, 493. 3 Pye V. Peterson, 45 Tex. 312. 229 §130 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. VIII. While the weight of the decisions favors the view that a city may, without express statutory authority, prohibit the erection of frame structures within certain limits, it seems that there is no inherent power to forbid the repair of those already erected.^ It has been held, in construing ordinances creating fire lim- its, that enlarging or raising ^ a wooden building, so as to alter its character,^ or the removal of a frame building to a location within the limits, whether from without or not,* is au erection of a building. In a case, where a city is empowered to forbid the erection of wooden structures, and has passed an ordinance to that ef- fect, it may remove them without proceeding against their ownei'.^ The abatement of a nuisance of this sort is not con- sidered a forfeiture of property.^ But if the building was erected, before the ordinance went into effect, and is subsequently damaged by fire to such an ex- tent, that its re-erection is necessary, it is held that the city cannot remove it, but must direct the owner to do so.'^ A Court of Equity will not restrain by injun&tion the erection of wooden buildings within fire limits ; because the act com- plained of is made unlawful by an ordinance, which presuma- bly supplies an adequate remedy for its enforcement.^ On the other hand, the wrongdoer cannot secure the aid of equity to enjoin the tearing down by the city of a building, the erection 1 Brown v. Hutton, 27 Conn. 332; Eeg. V. Howard, 4 Ont. Kep. 377; Brady v. Northwestern Ins., Co., 11 Mich. 42.5. But see Knoxville v. Bird, 12 Lea, 121, in respect to avoidance of existing contracts to build frame houses. See Pye v. Peterson, 45 Tex. 312; Des Moines V. Gilchrist, 67 Iowa, 210. 2 Brady v. IT. W. Ins. Co., 11 Mich. 425, 449; Louisville v. Webster, 108 111. 414; Booth v. State, 4 Conn. 65; Stamford v. Stowell, 21 Atl. Kep. 101. 2 Douglas V. Com., 2 Eawle (Pa.) 262. 4 ^Vadleigh v. Oilman, 12 Me. 403. In Connecticut a removal within the limits is not an erection. Brown v. 230 Hunn, 27 Conn. 334; see also State V. Kearney, 25 Neb. 262; Cleveland V. Lenz, 27 Ohio St. 383. 5 McKibben v. Fort Smith, 35 Ark. 352; Aronheimer V. Stokley, llPhila. 283; Klingler v. Bickel, 117 Pa. St. 326; King v. Davenport, 98 111. 305. " Baumgartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind. 575. ' Louisville v. Webster, 108 111. 414. * Waupun V. Moore, 34 Wis. 450; Mayor v. Thorne, 7 Paige, 261; Phil- lips V. Allen, 41 Pa. St. 481; St. John V. McFarlan, 33 Mich. 72, the court saying : " A court of chancery has no jurisdiction to restrain the threat- ened violation of a village ordinance, unless the act threatened to be done, if carried out will be a nuisance." CH. VIII.] CHARTEK POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 131 of which was in violation of its by-laws ; ^ even though he has made it fire proof, pendente lite? Charter provisions, conferring the power to prescribe fire limits, and to remove all buildings therein damaged by fire, should be strictly construed in favor of the private owner.^ Under the implied power to protect property within the city's jurisdiction against damage by fire, a municipalit}- may appropriate funds for the purchase or repair of apparatus used for the extinguishment of fire,* or for the repair of an engine house.^ Money may legitimately be appropriated for the bene- fit of hook and ladder, and engine companies ; ^ but the fact, that a volunteer company renders services in extinguishing fires, does not necessarily impose upon the city an obligation to pay its members.'' As incidental to the power to adopt measures for the preven- tion of fires, the municipality may also regulate the manner in which ashes shall be removed, and prescribe that metal recep- tacles shall be employed for the purpose.^ A board of fire commissioners and their employees, are not agents of the city, at least so far as to make the municipality responsible for their wrongful acts of commission or omission.^ § 131. Kegulatiou of buildings, and their construction. — A reasonable regulation of the use, which may be made of land in populous cities, is absolutely essential ; and is justified 1 Aronheimer v. Stokley, 11 Pliila. 283. 2 Hine v. New Haven, 40 Conn. 478. 8 Louisville v. Webster, 108 111. 414; Reg. v. Howard, 4 Ont. 577; State V. Tennant, 110 N. 0. 609. * Clark V. South Bend, 85 Ind. 276; Bfturagartnei- v. Hasty, 100 lb. 575; Van Sickler v. Burlington, 27 Vt. 70; Hardy v. Waltham, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 1()3; Fisher v. Boston, 104. Mass. 89; Witheril v. Mosher, 9 Hun, 412; Berminghain v. Rumsey, 63 Ala. 352 ; Burlington v. Dennison, 42 N. J. L. 163; Allen v. Taunton, 19 Pick. 485; Hunneman v. Fire Dis., 37 Vt. 40; Wadleigh v. Gilman, 12 Me. 403; Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. 349, 352; Green v. Cape May, 41 N. J. L. 45; Bluffton v. Studa- baker, 106 Ind. 129; Carleton v. Washington, 38 Kan. 728; Bridgford V. Tuscumbia, 16 Fed. Rep. 910. 6 Robinson v. St. Louis, 28 Mo. 488. ^ Van Sicklen v. Burlington, 127 Vt. 70; Cf. Miller v. Savannah Fire Co., 26 Ga. 678. ' Jacksonville v. JStna F. Eng. Co., 20 Fla. 100. 8 Filbey v. Combe, 2 M. & W. 677; Law V. Dodd, 1 Ex. 845; The Queen V. Wood, 5 E. & B. 49; Guardians v. Vestry of St. Leonard Shoreditch, L. R. 2 Q. B. Div. 145; Gay v. Cad- by, L. R. 2 C. P. Div. 391; Lyndon V. Stadbridge, 2 H. & N. 45. ° Wooldridge v. Mayor, 49 How. Pr. 67; Terhune v. Same, 88 N. Y. 24. 231 §131 MCNIOIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. vm. by the protection thus afforded to the health and safety of the community. The power to regulate the erection, maintenance and repair ^ of private buildings, and to prescribe their height,^ the materials and manner of their construction, is frequently conferred on municipalities by their charters ; and sometimes with a fulness of detail, which is at once stringent and confus- ing.^ The fee, which is charged for a building permit issued by the city, under the power just mentioned, is a license,* not a tax : and yet, it is held that its amount may be graduated according to the cost of the edifice.® The common law relations of adjoining landowners, in re- spect to the lateral support, which they are bound to afford to one another, have been, in some instances, materially modified by charter provisions. Thus, in New York City, any land- owner, making an excavation ten feet or more in depth below the curb line, is required, (if given the necessary license to en- ter on his neighbor's land,) to take proper precautions at his own expense, for preserving any wall, standing wholly or part- ly thereon, from injury by reason of a lack of lateral support, which is caused by his excavations." A general power to regulate building operations must be rea- sonably and fairly exercised. Thus, a city council cannot, under such a general power, prohibit the erection of other buildings than dwelling houses,' or require the outer walls of a building to be of any specified thickness.* So, too, a charter power, to make rules for the regulation of bay windows, does not impli- edly authorize an ordinance, which gives permission to construct a bay window projecting beyond the boundary line of the lot.' 1 Donoliue v. Kendall, 50 N". Y. Su- per. 386 ; Brennau v. Laoliat, 14 Daly, 197; Willy v. Mulledy, 78 K. T. 310: K. Y. Cousol. Act, § 652. 2 People V. D'Oluch, 111 N. Y. 359. 3 See New York Consol. Act, § 471 -518 inc. ; Fire Dept. v. Wendell, 13- Daly, 430; St. Paul v. Dow, 37 Minn. 20; Philadelphia v. Coulston, 13 Phila. 182; Ex parte White, 67 Cal. 102; Ilenuessy v. St. Paul, 37 Fed. Rep. 565. See article by W. S. Gor- don, 43 Alb. L. J. 349. * See Comrs. of Easton v. Covey, 2-32 22 Atl. Rep. 266. 5 St Paul V. Dow, supra ; Phihada. V. Coulston, 13 Phila. ( Pa. ) 182; Welch V. Hotchkiss, 39, Conn. 140. " K. Y. Consol. Act, p. 220; Dorrity V. Rapp, 72 N. Y. 307, 310; Sherman V. Seaman, 2 Bosw. 127; Ketchum v. Newman, 116 N. Y. 422; Johnson v. Oppenheimer, 55 lb. 286; Bernhei- mer v. Kilpatrick, 53 Hun, 316. ' Newton v. Belger, 143 Mass. 598. 8 State V. Patterson, 45 N. J. L. 310. » Reimer's App., 100 Pa. St. 182. CH. Vni.J CHAKTER POWERS, THEIK NATUKE, ETC. § li^l The power conferred upon a municipal department, to re- quire the construction of fire escapes by owners of buildings, is not unconstitutional, and does not deprive the owner of his prop- erty without due process of law ; ^ and the fact, that the owner has provided fire escapes of an approved pattern, does not ex- empt him from providing additional fire escapes, when called upon to do so by the proper authorities.^ In consequence of the manifest danger of the occurrence of fires, and the consequent panics, in places of amusement, very extensive powers are committed to municipal corporations, for the regulation of the construction and the use of theaters and halls.^ Provisions, requiring that the aisles and passageways of churches and theaters shall be kept clear of persons or chairs, should be literally construed ; and do not give the manager of a theater discretion to allow any persons to occupy the passage- ways, even though the number be not so great as to prevent free exit in case of danger.* The charter power, to regulate the erection of party walls and fences, includes the power to authorize their erection, on the application of either owner, without the other's consent ; and such action is not unconstitutional, because compensation is not made to the opposing or unwilling abutter for the land occupied in part by the wall.^ But such regulations must be strictly construed, so that individuals shall not, under color thereof, be permitted to injure the property of their neighbors.^ A regulation, requiring that hoistways shall be guarded by a sufficient railing and trap doors, is a reasonable police regula- tion for a municipality, and may be enforced by the infliction of an appropriate penalty.'^ Such an ordinance does not unnec- essarily interfere with private rights. On the other hand. As to bay windows, Livingston v. Wolf, 136 lb. 519. ' Fire Dept. v. Sturtevant, 33 Hun, 407. ^ Fire Dept. v. Chapman, 10 Daly, 377. A receiver, pendente lite, is not responsible as an owner. Wyckoff V. Soofleld, 53 N. Y. Super. Ct. 237 ; 103 N. Y. 630; N. Y. Con. Act, § 499. " N. Y. Consol. Acts, § 500, Con- struction of Theaters. ' Fire Dept. v. Stetson, 14 Daly, 125; 6 N. Y. State E. 255; Same v. Hill, 14 ]Sr. Y. Supp. 158. ° Hunt V. Armbruster, 17 N. J. Eq. 208. 6 Pratt V. Hillman, 4 B. & C. 269; Reg. V. Ponsford, 1 D. & L. 116; Bar- low V. Newman, 2 W. Bl. 959; Sims V. Estate Co., 14 L. T. N. S. 55 ; Matts V. Hawkins, 5 Taunt. 20. ' N. Y. Con. Act, § 453; Mayor of K. Y. V. Williams, 16 N. Y. 502. §132 MUNtCIPAL CORPOKATIONS. [cH. vm. when a city forbade a roof already existing, from being relaid, except in a manner prescribed, the ordinance was held to be ul- tra vires, as a wrong and needless interference with private prop- ert}"- rights.^ The variance of the judicial opinion in these cases is due to difference in the character and necessity of the regu- lations in the several cases. Where the regulation is not need- ed for, or does not actually serve as, a protection against some threatened injury, it is unreasonable and may be resisted. § 132. Regnlation of private wharves. — Wharves and landing places may be either public or private. If private, the public have no right to use the wharf without the owner's con- sent ; while public wharves may be used by all persons, upon payment of a reasonable compensation. It is held in many of the States, that the riparian owner may without legislative au- thority, erect wharves or landing places on his land, provided they are built and maintained in conformity with the regula- tions of the State ; and are not impediments to the navigation of the stream or other body of water.^ Such structures, if confined to tlie shore, are lawful, provided no positive existing enactment is violated.^ But the grant by the State of land under water, below low- water mark, does not necessarily convey the right of collecting wharfage to the grantee. The right depends usually upon the express terms of the grant; or upon its intent as evinced by its declared purpose, or by the fair inference, which may be drawn from it or from surrounding circumstances.* 1 Eeg. V. Howard, 4 Ont. 377; comp. Jordan v. Helwig, 1 Wilson (Ind.) 447. 2 In Vermont, JTew Jersey, Iowa, Maryland, West Virginia, North Car- olina, Oregon, Washington and Flor- ida, the sole right of making im- provements in water fronting his land is secured to the riparian pro- prietor by statute. 3 Gruy V. Aiken, 40 La. An. 798 ; Potomac S. Co. v. Upper Pot. etc. Co., 109 U. S. 672; Hoboken v.Penn. E. E. Co., 124 lb. 656; Mayville V. Wilcox, 61 Hun, 223; Mayor v. Hart, 9.5 N. T. 443, 457; Heeney v. Heeney, 2 Denio, 625 ; Grand Rapids v. Pow- 284 ers, 89 Mich. 94; Myers v. St. Louis, 82 Mo. 367; Union Depot Co. v. Brunswick, 31 Minn. 297; De Bary, etc. Line v. Jacksonville, 40 Fed. B. 392; Tharnton v. Grant, 10 E. I. 477; Ladies Sea. Friends Soc. v. Halstead, 58 Conn. 144; Sherlock v. Bainbridge, 41 Ind. 35; Wilhelm v. Burleyson, 106 N. C. 381; Bond v. Wool, 107 lb. 139; Illinois v. 111. Cen. E. E. Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 730; State v. Jersey City, 1 Dutch. 526, 530; Miller v. Mendenhall, 43 Minn. 95; Wetmore V. Brooklyn Gas Co., 42 N. T. 384; Galveston v. Menard, 23 Tex. 349. 4 Weber v. Com'rs, 18 Wall. 57; Po- tomac S. Co. V. Upper Potomac Co., CH. VIII.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 132 Where the vested right to take wharfage exists, the city will be liable in damage to private owners for its destruction or im- pairment, by reason of the construction of a dock system ;^ or for special injury, caused by the construction by the city, or by a third person, to whom the city has delegated the power, of a dock not in accordance with the statutory plan.^ The Legislature may by law establish a pier-head line, or delegate the same power to a municipal corporation. In the exercise of this power, to establish a pier-head line, the riparian owners may be forbidden to extend wharves on their own land beyond the line, even though such wharves, if extended, would not prove materially injurious to navigation.^ The right of the riparian owner to build wharves or piers in front of his land, as long as they do not interfere with the pub- lic easement of navigation in the stream, is an absolute property right growing out of his title to his land. If, therefore, this right is impaired by the appropriation of the land under water, to pub- lic use, private property has been taken, under the right of emi- nent domain, for which due compensation must be made to the owner.* So, also, where a city possessed the power to enlarge slips by building piers, or extending them into the river, it was held that it could not under this power sink piers against a bulk- head or wharf opposite private property, without the consent of the owner. When this was done, however, and the owner ac- quiesced and co-operated in the extension at the expense of the 109 TJ. S. 672; Turner v. People's Ferry Co., 21 Fed. Rep. 90; Langdon V. Mayor, 93 N. T. 129, 144, 145; In- graham V. R. R. Co., 34 Iowa, 249 ; Gould V. Hudson R. etc. Co., 6 IT. T. 522; Tomlin v. R. R. Co., 32 Iowa, 106; Hoboken v. Penn. E. E. Co., 124 TJ. S. 656; Lehigh Valley v. Trone, 28 Pa. St. 206. I Langdon V. Mayor, 93 X. T. 120; Williams v. Same, 105 lb. 419; Kings- land V. Same, 100 lb. 569; Whitney V. Same, 6 Abb. IST. C. 329; Bedlow V. N. Y. Floating D. D. Co., 112 N. Y. 263. 2N. Y. City Consol. Act, p. 345 (ed. 1891); Cunard S. S. Co. v. Voor- hies, 50 N. Y. Super. (J. & S.) 253. 8 Com. V. Alger, 7 Cush. 53; Grand T. R. Co. V. Backus, 46 Fed. Rep. 211; Hagan v. Campbell, 8 Port. (Ala.) 9; Mobile v. Eslava, 9 lb. 577; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324; Chi- cago Lake Ft. Case, 33 Fed. Rep. 730; Hart V. Mayor, 7 Wend. 571; Wet- more V. Brooklyn Gas Co., 42 N. Y. 384; Railroad v. Winthrop, 5 La. An. 36; Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497; Lyon V. Fishmongers Co., L. R. 1 App. Cas. 662. 4 Delaplaine v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 214; Railroad Co. v. Ren- wick, 102 U. S. 180; Backus v. De- troit, 49 Mich. 110, 114. Contra, Langdon v. Mayor, 93 N. Y. 129; Watson V. TurnbuU, 34 La. An. 856. 235 § 132 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. Vm. citj-, the rights of the city over the structure and the slip were the same as over its public piers.^ When a charter confers upon a municipal corporation the power to lease docks, the use which the lessee is authorized to make of the dock is subject to such restrictions, as Congress maj' make, under its power to regulate interstate commerce.^ The lease of a dock, although protected against appropriation without compensation,^ does not vest in the lessee any right of property in the wharf of the nature of a corporeal heredita- ment, but merely creates a franchise of wharfage.* The municipal powers of control over, and regulation of, private wharves, depend upon the provisions of each charter, which must be construed strictly against the municipal corpo- ration, whenever the exercise of the charter power will be likely to operate injuriously against the rights of private prop- erty. The proprietors of the private wharves, under such cir- cumstances, possess the same remedy for a wrongful taking, or for injury to, their propert3% when committed by the munici- pality, as do the owners of any kind of property within the municipal limits, which have been subjected to trespass by pri- vate persons.^ The opening of a wharf to general public use creates a gen- eral license to vessels to use it for lawful purposes, under rea- sonable regulations of the municipalitjr or of the wharf owners, as the case may be, which license is, however, terminated by no- tice to remove the vessel.^ Municipalities'^ and private individ- uals owning or leasing* docks or wharves are impliedly liable, to those lawfully using them, for negligence in not keeping them in a state of good repair, and safe and convenient for public use. 1 Verplanok v. Mayor, 2 Edw. 220; the collection of wharfage. Mayor comp. Marshall v. Guion, 11 N. T. 461; Thompson v. The Mayor, UN. T. 113; Marshall v. Vultee, 1 E. D. Smith, 294; Murray v. Sharp, 1 Bosw. 539. 2 Hoeft V. Seaman, 46 How. Pr. 24. 3 Williams v. Mayor, 105 N. Y. 419. 4 Taylor v. Beebe, 3 Rob. 262. The lessee will be estopped from deny- ing the validity of such a lease, when he has received the full bene- fit of it in the use of the pier, and 236 V. Sonnehorn, 113 K. T. 423; Mayor V. Huntington, 114 lb. 631. * Grant v. Davenport, 18 Iowa, 179. * Heeney v. Heeney, 2 Denio, 623; NicoU V. Gardner, 13 "Wend. 289; Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9; Dut- tou V. Strong, 1 Black, 23; Chicago Dock V. Garrity, 115 111. 155. ' Wiley V. Allegheny, 118 Pa. St. 490. 8 Radway v. Briggs, 37 N. T. 256. CH. Viri.J CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 133 The wharf owner, upon proof of negligence, is liable for any- special injury to vessels or other property which may result therefrom ; it matters not, whether the city has by ordinance undertaken to regulate the use of the wharf, or the matter has been left under the provisions of the common law.^ It is no defence to an action for wharfage, that the dock was not well built, or needed improvement or repairs.^ The stat- utes of several States give the wharf owner a lien upon the ship and tackle for wharfage, anchorage or dock charges.^ § 133. Public wharves. — While the private riparian owner may erect a v/harf for private use, which, without his consent, cannot be used by the public for any purpose whatever, the privilege or right to erect public wharves, or docks, and to charge wharfage for the use of the same, when claimed or pos- sessed by a public owner, is a franchise, which must be granted by the Legislature.* But where a city is the owner of land upon the water front, it will by analogy to a private owner, and in the absence of a charter provision, restraining it or author- izing it to do so, have implied authority to erect wharves, together with the incidental power of charging tolls or wharfage for their use. Such a right in this case is not a franchise, but a vested right of property.® That compensation is received for the use 1 Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, 1 H. L. 93; Seamen v. New York, 3 Daly, 147; People v. Albany, 11 Wend. 539, 543; Buokbee v. Brown, 21 lb. 110; Pittsburgh v. Grier, 22 Pa. St. 54; Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 2S4; Shinkle v. Covington, 1 Bush, 617; Allegheny v. Campbell, 107 Pa. St. 530. - Prescott V. Duquesne, 48 Pa. St. 118; Jeffersonville v. Ferry Co., 27 Ind. 100; Winpenuy v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. St. 135. 3 Stimson Statutes, § 4643. * Wiswall V. Hall, 3 Paige Ch. 313; Thompson v. Mayor, 11 N. Y. 115; Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166; Christie v. Maiden, 23 W. Va. 667; The Geneva, 16 Fed. Rep. 874. * People V. Wharf Co., 31 Cal. .34; Boston V. Lecraw, 17 How. (U. S.) 426; 19 lb. 263; 24 lb. 188; Railroad Co. V. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166; comp. Snyder V. Eockport, 6 Ind. 237; Lang- don V. Mayor, 93 N. Y. 129; State v. Jersey City, 34 N. J. L. 31 ; Hoboken V. Pa. R. R., 124 TT. S. 656; Railroad Co. V. Winthrop, 5 La. An. 36. In Horn V. People, 26 Mich. 224, the court thus defines a public wharf : " There is no instance in which the term ' public wharf ' has been used in our legislation to indicate any- thing analogous to a dedication to any public use, like that of high- ways. Such a public i-ight is un- known to the common law. Wharf- age involves exclusive use, for longer or shorter periods, by each vessel, depending on the nature of its busi- ness and the extent of its cargo. All that is meant in the charter by a public wharf, is a wharf belonging to the city, and to be used like other 237 §133 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [cH. vrn. of a wharf, does not of itself deprive it of its public character.^ So, also, a paved street, extending far enough into the water to be used by vessels .as a landing place, is a wharf, for the use of which wharfage may be charged.^ Those municipal corporations, which are situated upon navi- gable waters, are generally empowered by their charters to erect docks and wharves, and charge a compensation for the use of the same.^ The possession or exercise of such powers is not nec- essarily in violation of the Federal Constitution,* although all State and municipal regulations of navigable streams must, in order to be constitutional and valid, conform to and keep within the limitations of the provisions of the United States Constitu- tion, which give to the Federal Government supreme control over matters, relating to interstate and foreign commerce.^ The money collected for wharfage, it has been held, is paid as com- pensation or rent for the actual use of the docks or wharves, and is not taxation, ^ or a tonnage dutyJ Wharfage, however. wharf pi-operty. Tlie term is ap- plied, as well to wharves on city prop- erty away from streets, as to wharves at the end of streets." 1 Galveston W. Co. v. Galveston, 63 Tex. 14. 2 Keokuk v. Keokuk P. Co., 45 Iowa, 196, 206. 81Sr. T. City Consol. Act, p. 379 (ed. 1891); Turner v. People's Fer- ry, 21 Fed. Rep. 90; Brooklyn v. >r. T. Ferry Co., 87 N. T. 204; Williams V. Same, 105 lb. 419; Langdon v. Mayor etc., 93 lb. 139; Kingsland v. New York, 110 IST. T. 569; New Or- leans V. U. S., 10 Pet. 662, 737; Pol- lard V. Hagan, 3 How. (U. S.) 212; Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324; Weber v. Cora'rs, 18 Wall. 57; The Lizzie E., 30 Fed. Rep. 876; Silver v. Tobin, 28 lb. 545; The Shadyside, 28 lb. 731; Wharf Case, 3 Bland, Ch. (Md.) 383; 111. etc. Co. v. St. Louis, 2 Dillon, C. C. R. 70; Municipality v. Pease, 2 La. An. 538; The Virginia Rulon, ISBlatchf. 519; Com. v. Al- ger, 7Cush. 53, 82; Railroad Co, v. 238 Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166; Mobile v. Mood, 53 Ala. 561; Packet Co. V. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 423; Vicks- burg V. Tobin, 100 lb. 430; The Ge- neva, 16 Fed. Rep. 874; Leathers v. Aiken, 9 lb. 679 ; Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 688; Mayor of St. Martins- ville v, Mary Lewis, 32 La. An. 1293. * Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U. S. 559. ^ Cooley V. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 296; Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212; Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450; OuachitaP. Co. v. Aiken, 121 U. S. 444; Cisco v. Roberts, 36 N. T. 292 ; JefEersonville v. Ferryboat; 35 Ind. 19; Harbormaster v. South- erland, 47 Ala. 511; Transportation Co. V. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691; Chapman v. Miller, 2 Speers (S. C.) Law, 769; Alexander v. Railroad Co., 3Sti-ob. (S. C.) Law, 594; State v. City Council, 4 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 286. » Railroad v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166. ' Trans. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 XT. S. 691; Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken, 121 U. S. 444; N. W. Packet Go. v. St. Louis, 4 Dillon, 10. CH. VIII.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 138 must be reasonable ; ^ and althougb it has been held that its rates cannot be graduated according to the tonnage of the ves- sel, for the reason that wharfage, rated according to tonnage, would be a tonnage duty, and as such would be unconstitutional and void, under the provisions of the United States Constitu- tion,^ the later opinion is that it would nevertheless be a lawful charge.^ It has also been held that a grant of exclusive power to erect wharves is so far beneficial to the public generally, that it is not in violation of a constitutional provision, that no set of men shall be entitled to a grant of public privileges from the community ; * and it is a well recognized rule, that the Legisla- ture may in its discretion confer the power to erect wharves and collect wharfage upon municipal corporations, to whatever extent it may be deemed expedient.* Powers, so granted by the Legislature, are, however, subject to legislative repeal, re- striction and modification at pleasure, provided no municipal rights of property ^ or the rights of municipal creditors are thereby impaired.^ Public wharves are in legal contemplation highways, or of the nature of highways ; and, in the absence of express statu- tory authority, cannot be leased by a city to private persons.^ But there is no constitutional objection to charter provisions, by which the public wharves may be leased to private persons, and such lessees be allowed to erect sheds over them ; for it is competent for the Legislature to grant to a municipality the power to place public wharves under semi-private supervision • De Bary etc. Co. v. Jacksonville, 40 Fed. 392; Ouachita P. Co. v. Aiken, 121 U. S. 444; Heron v. The Marchioness, 40 Fed. 173; Packet Co. V. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 423; Lin- coln V. Penn. Warehouse Co., 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 195; Ellerman v. McMonies, 30 La. An. 190; Muller v. Spreckels, 48 Fed. R. 574; Bain v. The Minnie L. Gerow, 48 Fed. 836; People v. Roberts, 92 Cal. 659 (wharfage de- fined). 2 Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577; Peete v. Morgan, 19 Wall. 581; Packet Co. v. St. Paul, 3 Dill. 454. 8 See cases in n. 1, supra, and p. 238, n. 7. * Fuller V. Edings, 11 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 739; Martin v. O'Brien, 34 Miss. 21 ; Geiger v. Filor, 8 Fla. 325. 6 Waddington v. St. Louis, 14 Mo. 190; Weber v. Harbor Com'rs, 18 Wall. 57; Ravenswood v. Flemings, 22 W. Va. 52. « Railroad v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166. 7 St. Louis V. Shields, 52 Mo. 361. 8 Baleman v. City of Covington, 14 S. W. 361; see also Belcher S. R. Co. V. St. Louis Grain El. Co., 101 Mo. 192. 239 §133 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIOKS. [cH. vin. and control, provided the substantial rights and benefits of the public in such wharves are promoted thereby, rather than im- paired.^ A lease of a wharf gives the right to wharfage only;^ and it remains a public wharf, from which the municipality has power to remove all obstructions, which tend to interfere with its free use.^ And when a penalty is imposed upon the occu- pants of a pier, for failure to keep it unobstructed, the fact, that the obstruction was originally caused by another person, is im- material.* Regulations, by which particular wharves and contiguous water are set apart for the exclusive use of certain classes of ships, boats or barges, are not unconstitutional, as depriving the owner of the wharves of any rights or privileges, or of his property, without due process of law. They are police regulations, adopted for the purpose of rendering more con- venient the transaction of business in the harbor.^ The mu- nicipal authorities may, under a statutory power to construct wharves, cause them to be constructed at the end of streets running to the river ; or at right angles to or along the front of streets, or of a park or common ; ^ or bordering on and run- ning parallel to the water, without being liable to the abutting owner or the riparian proprietor, unless his own property is taken for such use." And this is true, irrespective of the fact that the fee of the street may be in the abutting owner.^ The power of the municipality, to erect a wharf upon private property, upon making due compensation to the owner, cannot be restrained by an offer of the private proprietor to erect a wharf there, of which tlie public shall have the use.^ ' People V. Baltimore & Ohio K. E. Co., 117 N. T. 150. 2 Com'rs of Pilots v. Clark, 33 N. T. 2.51. 2 People V. Mallory, 46 How. Pr. 281. « Com'rs V. Erie E. E. Co., 5 Eobt. 366; 41 N. Y. 619. 5 Cusliiug V. The John Frazer, 21 How. (U. S.) 184; Heokei- v. N. T. Balance Dock Co., 24 Barb. 21.5; Eoosevelt v. Goddard, 52 Barb. 533 ; Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. 349. ■* Newport v. Taylor, 16 Barb. 700. 240 ' Bond V. Wool, 107 N. C. 1.39; Po- tomac S. Co. V. Upper Potomac etc. Co., 109 U. S. 672, 682, 683; Doe v. Jones, 11 Ala. 63; McMurrayv. May- or etc., 54 Md. 104; Dugan v. Mayor, 5 GiU& J. 375; Eisenbach v. Hat- field, 26 Pac. E. 539; Louisville v. Bank, 3 B. Mon. 144; Kennedy v. Covington, 8 Dana, 61; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324; Baltimore v. White, 2 Gill ( Md. ) 444; Rowan's Ex'r V. Portland, 8 B. Mon. 253. 8 Backus V. Detroit, 49 Mich. 110. ' Iron Railroad Co. v. Trenton, 19 CH. VIII.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 13J: § 134. Ferries and Ferriage. — The grant to the municipal corporation of the power, to confer ferry franchises upon pri- vate persons and corporations, is not in its nature a contract, which cannot be impaired or avoided.^ It may at any time be taken awa)'' from the municipality, or modified in any way, that the public interests may, in the judgment of the Legislature, re- quire.^ If the Legislature has delegated to the city the exclusive power to establish or regulate * ferries within municipal limits, tlie municipal authorities may likewise grant a franchise, con- ferring an exclusive privilege to operate ferries.* But this can- not be done, unless it is clear from the express language of the charter, or by necessary implication, that it was the intention of the Legislature to delegate to the municipal corporation the power to grant exclusive franchises of this kind.^ And although the general power to license or grant franchises does authorize the city to limit the number of franchises, which it will create under the power, it does not, necessarily imply that the city may under this general power create in any one person or cor- poration, a monopoly or exclusiA'"e right to the establishment and conduct of ferries, at any and every point upon the waters within municipal limits. An express grant of such a power seems to be necessary.® The power, to establish ferries and regulate rates of ferriage, will authorize the city to lease a ferry owned by it ; but it cannot wholly surrender its control and Ohio St. 299; Page v. Baltimore, 34 Ind. 558; State v. Jersey City, 34 N. J. L. 390. 'Duckwortli V. New Albany, 25 T-nd. 283. •■^East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. IT. S. 511; Roper v. MoWharter, 77 Va. 214. The city of New York has an exclusive, but not an irrepealable, power to grant ferry franchises: Mayor v. N. Y. & S. I. Ferry Co., 40 N. Y. Super. 232; Same v. Longstreet, 64 How. Pr. 30; Ben- son v. Mayor, 10 Barb. 223; People V. Mayor, 32 lb. 102; In Pennsylvar nia, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Nebraska, West Virginia, Missouri, Texas, California, Colorado and 16 Louisiana the constitution expressly prohibits special or local laws licens- ing or chartering ferries. ' Under this power, ferries may be regulated, though one bank only of the river, on which they ai-e operated, is within the municipal territory: Arkadelphia L. Co. v. Arkadelphia, 19 S. W. Rep. 1053. *Costar V. Brush, 25 Wend. 628; Mayor v. Starin, 106 N. Y. 1 ; Mayor V. N. Y. & N. J. S. N. Co., 106 lb. 28. 5 Minturn v. Larue, 23 How. 435 ; Harrison v. State, 9 Mo. 526; Mc- Ewen V. Taylor, 4 G. Greene, 532. » Chicago V. Rumph, 45 111. 90; Logan V. Pyne, 43 Iowa, 524; B. & H. Ferry Co. v. Davis, 48 lb. 133. 241 §135 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. VIII. supervision to the lessee.^ So, if the municipal corporation leases a ferry, owned by it, with a covenant for qniet enjoy- ment, it will not be restrained thereby from exercising the public powers, delegated to it by statute, to license another ferry, if in its judgment the public convenience demands it, unless the municipality is given the express power to grant exclusive privileges. The city would be impliedly liable on its covenants to its lessee, if it had undertaken the unauthorized grant of an exclusive franchise, where, relying upon the pos- session of an exclusive privilege, the lessee had made improve- ments, incurred expenses, and acquired proprietary rights, which receive actual damage through the municipal breach of covenant.^ § 135. Regulations providing for the public welfare, peace, safety and convenience. — In most municipal charters, and general laws providing for municipal incorporation, after special grants of powers to the municipality, an additional gen- eral authority is granted, to provide by ordinance for the preser- vation and promotion of the public welfare, peace, safety, con- venience, etc. With a view to recognize in the city sufficient authority to provide and enforce all needful regulations of the acts and doings of its citizens, which serve to promote the gen- eral welfare, and the need of which cannot be foreseen or antici- pated, and which cannot ordinarily be the subject of a special grant of power, the courts have been inclined to hold that they find in this so-called general welfare clause sufficient municipal authority foi- the enactment and enforcement of any reasonable regulation, which does actually promote the general welfare, by preventing or reducing some public evil. Thus, it has been held that, under this general giant of power, a city may regulate the 'McDonell v. International & G. N. Co. , 60 Tex. 590. And it has been held that, inasmuch as the munici- pal corporation takes the power, to establish and regulate ferries, as a trust for the public, it must be per- formed by it, and cannot, without legislative sanction, be delegated to another by a lease or otherwise. Ro- per v. McWharter, 77 Va. 214; Water- bury V. Laredo, 68 Texas, 565. 242 2 In re Fay, 15 Pick, 243; see gen- erally, Fanning v. Gregoire, 16 How. 524; Equity may annul ferry lease. Phillips V. Bloomington, 1 G. Greene, 498; Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich. 43; 0' Neill V. Police Jury, 21 La. An. 586; Aiken v. Railroad Co., 20 N. T. 370; Harris v. Nesbit, 24 Ala. 398; Conner V. Albany, 1 Blackf. 43; City v. Ferry Co., 27 Ind. 100; Shallcross v. JefEer- sonville, 26 Ind. 196, CH. Vm.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 135 a. more or less religious observance of Sunday,^ enact ordinances for the protection of trees in public places,^ prohibit domestic animals from running at large,^ compel the closing of saloons and restaurants at a certain hour,* arrest and fine vagrants,* prevent cruelty to animals,** regulate the keeping of gunpow- der,^ prohibit the blasting of rocks,^ prohibit the carrying of concealed weapons,^ prohibit gambling,^" appoint policemen,ii provide for the arrest and punishment of intoxicated persons,^^ or of those addicted to profane swearing,^^ prohibit street preach- ing,^* or enact any other proper regulation, not repugnant to the State Constitution or laws, which is adapted to preserve the peace and quiet of the community.^* § 135 a. Regulation of railroads within city limits. — Under the general welfare clause, as well as, sometimes, by special grant of power, the courts have held that the munici- pal regulation of the speed of railroad trains within the city limits, when reasonable, is generally admitted to be a valid ex- ercise of the police power.^^ Such a regulation applies to all 1 Mayor v. Luick, 12 Lea, 499 ; Van Buren v. WeUs, 14 S. W. Eep. 38; Gabell v. Houston, 29 Tex. 335; City Conn, of Charleston v. Ben- jamin, 2 Strobh. (S. C.) Law, 508 St. Louis V. Cafferata, 24 Mo. 94 Cincinnati v. Rice, 15 Ohio, 225 State V. Ludwlg, 21 Minn. 202 Shrevepoi-t v. Levy, 26 La. An. 671 Karwisch v. Atlanta, 44 Ga. 404 Megowan v. Com., 2 Mete. (Ky.) 3 Frolickstein v. Mobile, 40 Ala. 725 State V. Welch, 36 Conn. 215; Cf. State V. Langsten, 88 N. C. 692. On tlie question of constitutionality of Sunday laws in general, because of their religious partiality, see Tiede- man's Limitations of Police Power, §76. 2 State V. Merrill, 37 Me. 329; comp. Goshen v. Cravy, 58 Ind. 268. "See §129. * State V. Welch, 36 Conn. 215; Morris v. City of Rome, 10 Ga. 532; Staats V. Washington, 45 K. J. L. 318; Hudson v. Geary, 4 R. I. 485; State V. Freeman, 38 N. H. 426. ^ See § 126. " St. Louis V. Sohoenbusch, 95 Mo. 618. ' Fredei-ick v. Augusta, 5 Ga. 561 ; Davenport v. Richmond, 81 Va. 636. 8 Com. V. Parks, 30 N. E. Eep. 174. 9 In re Cheney, 90 Cal. 617. i» Ex parte Tuttle, 91 Cal. 589; Van Buren v. Wells, 14 S. W. E. 38. 11 State V. Sims, 16 S. C. 486. 1- Bloomfleld v. Trimble, 54 Iowa, 399; Homer v. Blackburn, 27 La. An. 544. W£x parte DeLaney, 43 Cal. 478; State V. Debnara, 98 N. C. 712. i*Com. V. Davis, 140 Mass. 485; Mankato v. Fowler, 32 Minn. 364; Washburn v. City of Bloomington, 32 111. App. 245; Bloomington v. Richardson, 38 lb. 60. 16 Mobile V. Barton, 47 Ala. 84; Cot- tonwood v. Smith, 36 Kan. 401; State V. Bills, 13 Ind. 373; Com. v. Cutter, 29 N. E. Rep. 1146. 1' Massoth V. Delaware etc. Co., 64 N. T. 524; Baltimore C. P. Ry. Co. V. McDonnell, 43 Md. 534; Fletcher 243 §136 MUNICIPAX, CORPORATIONS. [oh. vnr. the municipal territory, including inclosed lands owned by the railroad company ; and the fact, that the company was engaged in carrying the mail, is immaterial. ^ Municipal ordinances, re- stricting the running of trains to four miles an hour,^ requir- ing railroads to keep flagmen at crossings,^ requiring a horse railway company to keep an agent on each of its cars, to aid the driver in controlling the car and to prevent accident;* to keep its tracks watered to allay dust,® and forbidding the rail- road company from allowing a car to stand longer than ten min- utes at a street crossing,^ are valid and reasonable, and not in unlawful restraint of traffic. But a city has no right to make an unjust and unwarranted discrimination between competing roads, by dividing the city into two districts, and limiting the speed of trains passing through one district only.^ § 136. Power to appropriate funds for lobbying pur- poses. — A municipality has no incidental or inherent right to appropriate its funds to the liquidation of expenses, which have been incurred in obtaining an increase of its charter powers." 8 State V. East Orange, 41 N. J. L. V. Atlantic etc. Co., 64 Mo. 484; Eiclimond etc, Co, v. Kichmond, 96 U. S. 521; St. Louis etc. Co. v. Ma- thias, 50 lud. 65 ; Haas v. Chicago B. etc. Co., 41 Wis. 44; Hooker v. Chicago etc. Co., 76 lb. 542; Faber V. St. Paul etc. Co., 29 Minn. 465; Evison V. Chicago etc. Co., 45 Minn. 370; Donnaher v. State, 8 S. & M. (Miss.) 649; Taylor v. Lake Shore etc. Ky. Co., 45 Mich. 74; Meyers v. Chicago etc. Co., 57 Iowa, 555; Frick V. St. Louis etc. Co., 75 Mo. 595; Merz V. Mo. Pac. E. Co., 88 Mo. 672; Grube V. Same, 98 lb. 330; St. Louis etc. Co. V. Dunn, 78 111. 197; Weyl v. Chicago etc. Co., 40 Minn. 350; State V. Mayor of Jersey City, 47 N". J. L. 286; Chicago etc. Co. v. Haggerty, 67 111. 113; Same v. Reid, 66 lb. 43. 1 Whitson V. Franklin, 34 Ind. 392. 2 Knolblooh v. Chicago etc. Co., 31 Minn. 402. See, contra, where the attempted regulation was in a town of 1500 inhabitants, thinly settled, White V. St. Louis & S. F. Ey. Co., 44 Mo. App. 540. 244 127; Toledo etc. Co. v. Jacksonvillej 67 111. 37; Chicago & Alton Ey. Co., 67 111. 11; Erie v. Erie Canal Co., 59 Pa. St. 174; Phila. etc. Co. v. Bow- ers, 4 Houst. 506 ; Ladd v. Southern C". P. & M. Co., 53 Tex. 172; Green V. Eastern By. Co. (Minn. 93), 53 N. W. B. 808; Sloan v. Pac. E. E. Co., 61 Mo. 24. * State V. Trenton, 20 Atl. Eep. 1076; So. Gov. etc. Ey. Co. v. Berry, 18 S. W. Eep. 1026; Penna. Co. v. Stegemeier, 118 Ind. 305. 6 City V. Suburban Ey. Co. of Sa- vannah, 77 Ga. 731. 6 McCoy V. Phila. etc. Co., 5 Del. 599; Burger v. Miss. By. Co., 112 Mo. 238; 20 S. W. 349. 'Lake View V. Tate, 130 111. 247. For a full consideration of the po- lice power of the state, so far as rail- roads are concerned, see Police Pow- ers, § 194, and Tiedeman on Kail- roads, chapter on Police Begulations. 8 Henderson v. Covington, 14 Bush, 312. CH. VIII.] CHAETEE POWERS, THEIR NATUEE, ETC. § 138 Nor can a town raise money by taxation, or pledge its credit, lor the purpose of meeting the expenses, incurred in opposing before the Legislature a division of its territory ,i or procuring its annexation to another town.^ So, also, it has been held that a municipal corporation has no power to pay the expenses of individuals, which are incurred before its incorporation in obtaining a charter for it from the Legislature;^ and, a for- tiori, of persons, employed by it, to obtain from the Legislature the enactment of an unconstitutional law.* In all these cases, the act, in which the expense was incurred in behalf of the municipality, was a case of " lobbying," which is generally pro- nounced to be reprehensible, and an insufficient consideration for any contract, whether made by public or private parties.® § 137. Power to borrow money — Since taxation is legiti- mately presumed to be the most natural, and the most just, mode of providing the means of satisfying the debts of a municipal- ity, much discussion and litigation have arisen out of the fre- quent resort of municipal corporations to the power to borrow money, in order to meet maturing obligations, without having an express charter grant of such power. A full discussion of this subject, together with the collateral question of the mu- nicipal power to emit negotiable paper, and the general con- stitutional limitations on municipal indebtedness, will be found in another part of this work.* § 138. Payment of bounties. — It was held to be competent for the Legislature to authorize municipal corporations to raise and appropriate money for the payment of bounties to persons, as an inducement for them to enlist in the armies of the United States during the War of the Rebellion ; or for the repayment of money advanced for such purposes.' But without special legislative authority, appropriations made by municipalities for such purposes are illegal and ultra vires ;^ but, although they ' Westbrook v. Bearing, 63 Me. 231 ; Frankfort v. Winterport, 54 lb. 250. '' Minot V. West Roxbury, 112 Mass. 1; Coolidge v. Brookline, 114 lb. 592. ' Front V. Belmont, 6 Allen, 152. * Mead v. Acton, 139 Mass. 341. ' Tiedeman, (;om. Paper, § 187. ^ Chap. X. on Municipal Contracts, and chap. xi. on Municipal Securi- ties. 'Lowell Sav. Bk. v. Oliver, 8 Allen, 247; Freeland v. Hastings, 10 lb. 570; Mead v. Acton, 139 Mass. 341; Hil- bish V. Catherman, 64 Pa. St. 154; Speer V. School Directors, 50 lb. 150. *Kunkler v. Franklin, 13 Minn. 245 139 MUNICIPAL CORPOBATIONS. [CH. vin. may have been illegally made, it was held that their illegality or invalidity may be cured by subsequent legislative action.' So, also, cities have no implied or incidental power to raise money by taxation for the purpose of paying the commutation of citizens who may have been drafted to serve in the armies of the United States.^ The same conclusion has been reached in respect to the power of a city to provide for the families of enlisted soldiers.^ § 139. Celebrations or entertainments. — The furnishing of amusement or entertainment to the public is not within the purposes for which municipal corporations are created by the Legislature. For this reason, it is well settled that such corpo- rations, unless they are expressly authorized by statute, have no power to furnish entertainments for their citizens, official visit- ors, or others ; * or to arrange for celebrations of any kind, at the expense of the corporation ; ^ not even when the proposed cele- bration is of a strictly public character, and of national impor- tance ; as, for example, the celebration of Independence day.^ And an action cannot be maintained against them upon a con- tract, which was made with them to furnish such celebrations.^ So, also, a city has no authority to appropriate city funds for the expense attendant upon a ball and banquet ; and an injunc- tion will be granted in such a case, to prevent the payment by the city treasurer of money thus illegally appropriated.^ In the absence of express constitutional restrictions, the Legislature may always by express grant, vest in the municipal corporation the power to provide for such public celebrations, and to con- 127; Shackford v. Newington, 46 N. H. 415; Fiske v. Hazard, 7 E. I. 438; State V. Tappin, 29 "Wis. 6H4; Par- ker V. Saratoga Co., 106 N. T. 392; Thompson V. Pittstou, 59 Me. 545 ; Russell V. Providence, 7 E. I. 566; Tyson v. Halifax Soh. Dis., 51 Pa. St. 9; Grim v. Weissenberg Soh. D., 57 Pa. St. 433; Brodhead v. Milwaukee 19 Wis. 624; Comer v. Folsom, 13 Minn. 219; Sperry v. Harr, 32 Iowa, 184. I Booth V. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118; Kunkle v. Franklin, 13 Minn. 127; State V. Richland, 20 Ohio St. 362. 246 2 Barbour v. Camden, 51 Me. 608. s Veazie v. China, 50 Me. 518. ■> Law V. People, 87 111. 385. 6 Cornell v. Guilford, 1 Denio, 510; Hale V. People, 87 111. 72. 6 Hood V. Lynn, 1 Allen, 103. But see Hill v. East Hampton, 140 Mass. 381. ' Hodges V. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110. s Austin V. Coggeshall, 12 R. 1. 329; Greenough v. Wakefield, 127 Mass. 275. In Claflin v. Hopkins, 4 Gray, 502, the same principle was apphed to the unlawful purchase of uniforms for a military company by a town. CH. Vin.] CHAKTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 141 tract debts for the same, as well as to appropriate the funds of the city therefor.^ § 140. Rewards. — The authorities are not agreed upon the power of a municipality, to offer rewards for the detection and punishment of crimes, in the absence of an express statute, em- powering it to do so .2 The weight of the decisions is against the existence of any such power in municipal corporations, unless, of course, the Legislature has deemed it expedient to confer it upon them by statute.^ And a power, to pass all needful by-laws for the administration of justice, will not au- thorize the appropriation of money to enforce the laws of the commonwealth, in which every community has the same inter- est.* If the city has power to offer a reward, and an offer is to be made by the mayor and ratified by the council, it is bind- ing although not ratified until after the service, for which the reward is to be paid, has been rendered.^ § 141. Erecting, furnishing and repairing public build- ings. — The express power, to repair or alter public buildings, will not confer upon the municipal corporation the authority to erect a new building." The municipal corporation, as a general rule, has no implied authority to erect buildings for municipal purposes, and to incur debts therefor ; certainly, not beyond what is absolutely necessary houseroom for carrying on the city government.'^ But municipal charters and the gen- Contra, York v. Forscht, 23 Pa. St. 1 Hill V. East Hampton, 140 Mass. 381; where it has been held that, where a general statute authorizes towns to appropriate money for the purpose of celebrating the centennial of their incorporation, the town may date its incorporation from the time of its incorporation as a district. - By N. Y. Con. Act, § 259, the Po- lice Board is expressly authorized to offer rewards for ari-est and convic- tion of persons guilty of homicide, arson and receiving stolen goods. 3 Huthsing v. Bosuquet, 3 McCrar ry, 152; Pattonv. Stephens, 14 Bush, 324; Murphy v. Jacksonville, 18 Fla. 318; Grant Co. v. Bradford, 12 Ind. 455; Gale v. South Berwick, 51 Me. 174; Hanger v. Des Moines, 52 Iowa, 193;Loveland v. Detroit, 41 Mich. 357. .^91 ; Crawshaw v. Roxbury, 7 Gray, 374; Abel v. Pembroke, 61 N. H. 357. * Patton V. Stephens, 14 Bush (Ky.) 324. 5 Janvrin v. Exeter, 48 N. H. 83. 6 Peterson v. Mayor etc., 17 N. Y. 449, 455. 'Reynolds v. Albany, 8 Barb. 597; People V. Harris, 4 Cal. 9; Vanover v. Davis, 27 Ga. 357. It has, how- ever, been held in one instance, that the erection of a schoolhouseis with- in the scope of the municipal author- ity, and such a building may be erected without express charter au- thority, in the absence of a statutory prohibition: Cartersville v. Baker, 73 Ga. 686. 247 §142 MUNICIPAIi CORPOEATIONS. [cH. vrn. eral statutes, under which the municipal communities are in- corporated, generally contain express grants of power to erect the necessary municipal buildings, and to determine the cost thereof. Unrestricted authority, to purchase real estate, will imply that the expediency and necessity of the purchase are to be determined upon by the city council ; ^ and the powers, to build and to repair, are so far discretionary that the determina- tion of the plan and mode of their exercise is impliedly inci- dental thereto.'-* A city council, it is admitted, has the power to furnish its meeting room in a suitable manner, of which they are to be the sole judges, in the absence of statute ; and an in- junction, to prevent a city council from decorating the council chamber with certain portraits, was refused.^ It has been held that, although a Legislature cannot compel a municipality to bear more than its share of the expense of conducting the State government, the city itself may, in the ab- sence of express statute forbidding such action, erect buildings, at its own expense, for the use of the county officials.* § 142. Compromise and arbitration Municipal coi-pora- tions have been repeatedly held to have the incidental power to compromise claims, which may exist in their favor or against them.^ Accordingly, town trustees may compromise a judg- ment obtained in a suit against them to recover a penalty;^ and, on the other hand, a city council,'^ an overseer of the poor,^ or a board of supervisors,® may compromise judgments, which are held by the corporation against individuals. A town maj' accept a note, in payment of a fine due it,^*' and enforce notes which are taken by it, as security for claims against private persons.^^ 3 Riclimond v. McGirr, 78 Ind. 192; French, v. Quinoy, 3 Allen, 9. 2 Ely V. Rochester, 26 Barb. 133; Bell V. Platteville, 11 Wis. 139; Gal- veston V. Devlin, 84 Tex. 319. a Reynolds v. Albany, 8 Barb. 597; People V. Harris, 4 Gal. 9. Of. Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110; Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272. ' Callam v. Saginaw, 50 Mich. 7. 5 Bean v. Jay, 23 Me. 117; Bally ville V. Lowell, 20 lb. 178; Grimes v. Ham- ilton Co., 37 Iowa, 290; Mills Go. v. Bur. etc. Co., 47 lb. 66; People v. 248 San Francisco, 27 Cal. 655; Agnew V. Brail, 124 111. 312; So. Boston Iron Co. V. U. S., 118 U. S. 37; State v. Martin, (Neb.) 43 N. W. R. 244; Tut- tle V. Weston, 59 Wis. 151; as to the power of New York city, see Consol. Act, § 1788. ^ Petersburg v. Mappin, 14 111. 193 ' Agnew V. Brail, 124 111. 312. 8 Olp V. Leddick, 59 Hun, 627. 9 Collins V. Welch, 58 la. 72; Shank- lin V. Madison Co., 21 Ohio St. 575. 11 Caldwell v. Wright, 25 111. Ap. 74. II Buffalo V. Bettinger, 76 N. T. 393. CH. Vni.J CHAKTEE POWERS, THEIK NATUKE, ETC. § 143 A municipal corporation may, when it ascertains that it has become a party to a contract, whicli will act oppressively upon the other party, release him therefrom ; certainly, where a court of equity would relieve him from the contract.^ But while a town council can legally release a doubtful debt,^ it cannot vote a gratuity to a person, having a claim against it for injuries sustained, on account of his indigency, where the claim has no legal basis. ^ Unless forbidden to do so by its charter, a municipal corpo- ration may submit a disputed claim against it to arbitration.* The award will be binding upon the city,^ and the remedy, by which its payment by the city may be compelled, is an action on the award, and not by a mandamus.^ § 143. Power of municipalities to sue and be sued. — A municipal corporation may, unless expressly prohibited, or un- less some special provision or exemption is made by statute, protect its property, enforce its contracts, collect its debts, and redress its wrongs,' by the same remedies which are open to individuals.^ And it has been held that one municipal corpora- tion can sue another.^ And so, likewise, municipalities may be sued for the breach of express contracts, and for many kinds of torts.i" But a department of the city government of New York city cannot be sued ; ^^ nor can a recovery be had in the United States 1 Beau V. Jay, 23 Me. 117, 121 ; Meech V. Buffalo, 29 K T. 210. 2 Ford v. Clough, 8 Me. 334. ' Mathews v. Inliabitants, 134 Mass. 355; contra, McGinness v. New York, 26 Hun, 142. * Alexander Canal Co. v. Swann, 5 How. TJ. S. 83 ; Dix v. Dummerston, 19 Vt. 263; Buckland v. Conway, 16 Mass. 390; Paret v. Bayonne, 39 N". J. L. 559; Eemington v. Harrison Co. Ct., 12 Bush, 148; Springfield v. Walker, 42 Ohio St. 543 ; Kane v. Fond du Lao, 40 Wis. 495; Town- ship V. Kankin, 70 Iowa, 65 ; Shaw- neetown v. Baker, 85 111. 568. « Smith V. Philadelphia, 13 Phila. (Pa.) 177. 6 State V. Jersey City, 41 N. J. L. 135. 'Union Coal Co. v. La Salle, (111.) 26 K E. E. 506. 8 Ottawa D. C. v. Law, 6 Can. Q. B. 546; First Nat. Bk. etc. v. Nat. Ex. Bank, 92 U. S. 122; Augusta v. Leadbetter, 16 Me. 45; Detroit v. Carey, 9 Mich. 165 ; Oliver v. Wor- cester, 102 Mass. 489; Buffalo v. Bet- tinger, 76 N. T. 393. Contra, as to counties, Whittaker v. Tuolumne Co., 30 Pac. 1016; 96 Cal. 100. 9 Huron D. C. v. London D. C, 4 Up. Can. Q. B. 802. '" See post, oh. x. and xvii. " Swift V. New York, 83 N. T. 528. 249 §144 MTJXICIPAL CORPOHATIONS. [CH. vni. Courts, upon bonds or coupons, held by the citizens of a State, in which the city owing them is located, but which are trans- ferred to a resident of another State for the sole purpose of giving the Federal Courts jurisdiction.^ § 144. Power to create private monopolies. — As a gen- eral proposition, it may be conceded that the creation of a monopoly out of an ordinary calling is an unconstitutional in- terference with private propert}- and personal liberty. But it will not do to say that aU monopolies are void. Every man has, under reasonable regulations, a right to pursue any one of the ordinary callings of life, as long as its pursuit does not in- volve evil or danger to society. And a law, which granted to one man, or to a few individuals, the exclusive privilege of pros- ecuting the trade or business, would violate the constitutional rights of those who are prohibited from pursuing the same call- ing. On the other hand, when the State bestows upon one or more the privilege of pursuing a calling or trade, the prosecution of which is not a common natural right, — either because it cannot be carried on without specinl franchise powers, or because the general prosecution of the business has been lawfully prohibit- ed, in the constitutional exercise of the police power, — a mo- nopoly is created, without, however, violating the rights of anyone ; for, with the abolition of the monopoly thus created, would disappear all right to carry on the trade. The trade never existed before as a lawful calling.^ Thus, although it has been held to be an unconstitutional and void creation of a monopolj', to give to one private corpo- ration or company the exclusive privilege of supplying the city, or certain parts of a city, with illuminating gas,'' yet there can be no doubt that the grant of such an exclusive franchise is law- ful, on the ground that the public interests must be protected against the indiscriminate allowance of excavations in the streets for the purpose of laying down the conducting pipes.* The same 1 New Providence v. Halsey, 117 U. S. 336; Farmiugton v. PlUsburg, 114 lb. 138. 2 For a more full and general dis- cussion of the constitutionality of private monopolies, see Tiedeman's Limitations of Police Power, § 105. * Norwich Gaslight Co. >'. Norwich 250 City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19; State v. Cincinnati etc. Gas Co., 18 Ohio St. 292. * State V. Milwaukee Gaslight Co., 29 Wis. 454; Indianapolis v. Indian- apolis Gas Co., 66 Ind. 396; Parkers- burg Gas Co. V. Parkersburg, 30 W. Va. 435;. Grant v. City of Davenport, CH. Vm.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § I'lJ ruling has been sustained in, and applied to, the grant of an exclusive privilege to establish an electric light plant,^ water- works,^ and to construct a street railway.^ But while in all of these cases of a grant of an exclusive monopoly, the grant is properly to be considered a contract, which cannot be impaired or abrogated by subsequent legislation ; * yet, the grant does not interfere with the exercise of the police power in regard to the public health, safety and general welfare, wherever the two conflict.^ Nor does the grant of such an exclusive fran- chise restrict the exercise of the power of taxation,^ the right of eminent domain,^ or the charter power of a city to estab- lish a municipal monopol)' of the same kind." But in order that a municipal corporation may grunt an ex- 30 Iowa, 396; New Orleans Gas Co. V. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 650; People's Gaslight Co. v. Jersey City, 40 N. J. L. 297; Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gas Co., 115 U. S. 683, re- versing s. c, 81 Ky. 263; Newport v. Newport Light Co., 84 Ky. 167. 1 Grand Rapids Electric etc. Co. v. Grand Rapids Edison etc. Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 659. 2 Atlantic City Waterworks v. At> lanticCity, 39 N. J. Eq. 367; New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 074. But see Brenhara v. Brenliam Water Co., 67 Tex. 542; New Orleans Water Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refinery Co., 35 La. An. 1111; Citizens' Water Co. v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 55 Conn. 1. 'Citizens' Street R'y Co. v. Jones, 34 Fed. Rep. 579 ; Davies v. New York, 14 N. Y. 506; Birmingham & P. M. St. R'y V. Birmingham St. R'y Co., 79 Ala. 465; Newell v. Minn. etc. R'y Co., 35 Minn. 112 ; N. Y. Elevated R.R. Co., In re, 70 N. Y. 327; Gilbert Ele- vated R'y Co., In re, lb. 301; Fort Worth St. R'y Co. v. Rosedale St. R'y Co., 68 Tex. 169; Des Moines Street R. R. Co. v. Des Moines Broad-guage St. R'y Co., 73 Iowa, 513. ' New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 650; Louisville Gas Co. V. Citizens' Gas Co., lb. 083; New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Riv- ers, lb. 674. 5 Same cases as in preceding note, and Stein v. Bienville Water Supply Co., 34 Fed. Rep. 145; National Wa- terworks V. Kansas City, 28 Fed. Rep. 921. estate v. Herod, 29 Iowa, 123; Los Angeles v. So. Pac. R. R. Co., 67Cal. 433; Columbus V. Street R. R. Co., 45 Oliio St. 98. But see Des Moines V. Chicago, R. L & P. R. R. Co., 41 Iowa, 560. ' West River Bridge v. Dix, OHow. 507; Charles River Bridge v. Warren River Bridge, 11 Pet. 420; Central Bridge Co. v. Lowell, 4 Gray, 474; In re Rochester Water Commission- ers, 66 N. Y. 413; In re Towanda Bridge, 91 Pa. St. 210; Central City Horse R'y Co. v. Fort Clark etc. R'y Co., 87 111. 523; Lake Shore etc. R. R. Co. V. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 97 111. 500; N. C. R. R. Co. v. Carolina Cent. R. R. Co., 83 N. C. 489. 'Long V. Duluth, 51 N. W. Rep. 913; Altgelt v. San Antonio, 81 Tex. 436; Brenliam V. Brenbam Water Co., 67 Tex. 143; Parkersburg Gas Co. v. Parkersburg, 30 W. Va. 435; 4 S. E. Rep. 650. 251 § 144 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. VTII. elusive piivilege of the character, which has just been explained and pronounced to be within the constitutional powers of the State, the power to do so must have been granted to the cor- poration, either expressly or by necessary implication. The power cannot ordinarily be implied.^ It has thus been held that the grant to the municipality of the power to establish and regulate ferries, does not give the city the exclusive power of regulation, and, much less, the power to create exclusive f ran- ch ises.^ The same has been held to be true of- the charter power to license, or to license and regulate certain trades and occupations.^ And it is true, also, that, although the power to license be made exclusive, it does not give the power to grant an exclusive franchise, unless the city is authorized " to grant or refuse " a license.* The city cannot grant an exclusive right to furnish gas for the inhabitants, under a charter power to " cause the streets to be lighted," and to provide " reason- able regulations " therefor ; ^ or to furnish water, under a charter power to make " ordinances, rules," etc., " to supply the city with water." ^ On the other hand, where the charter authorized the city to maintain gas works or waterworks of its own, it impliedly granted to the city the power to create a pri- vate monopoly of it.^ The grant to a street railway company of the power to lay down its tracks and operate its road in certain streets, does not constitute an exclusive franchise, which would enable the street railway to resist the use of the same street by another compet- ing company, unless the grant was expressly declared to be a monopoly.^ But the track of the first railway is its private 1 People V. Benson, 34 Barb. 24; State V. Cincinnati Gas Light Co., 18 Ohio St. 262; Stein v. Bienville Water Supply Co., 34 Fed. Kep. 145; Daven- port V. Kleinschniidt, 6 Mont. 502. 2 Minturn v. Larue, 23 How. 435 ; McEwen v. Taylor, 49 Greene (Iowa) 532 ; Harrison v. State, 9 Mo. 526. 8 Chicago v. Rumph, 45 111. 90; B. & H. Ferry Co. v. Davis, 48 Iowa, 133; Logan V. R. Pyne, 43 Iowa, 524; Sny- der V. North Lawrence, 8 Kans. 82 ; Tuckahoe Canal Co. v. Railroad R. K. Co., 11 Leigh, 42; Gale v. Kala^ mazoo, 23 Mich. 344 (9 Am. Rep. 80), 252 opinion of Cooley, J. * B. & H. Ferry Co. v. Davis, 48 Iowa, 133. ^ Saginaw Gasl. Co. v. Saginaw, 28 Fed. Rep. 529. ^ Syracuse Water Co. v. Syracuse, 116 N. T. im. ' Newport v. Newport Light Co., 84 Ky. leY; Atlantic City Water Works V. Atlantic City, 39 N. J. Eq. 381; Saginaw Gaslight Co. v. Sagi- naw, 28 Fed. Rep. 535; but see contra, Brenhara v. Brenham Water Co., 67 Tex. 542. 8 Gulf City Street Ry. Co. v. Gal- CH. VIII.] CHARTER POWERS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 144 a. property, whether its franchise be exclusive or otherwise ; and it has been held, that in no case can the second railway, which obtains the authority to operate a railway in the same streets, make use of the track of the first railway, without making com- pensation for what is a taking of private property, in the exer- cise of the right of eminent domain.^ § 144 a. Power to create and operate municipal monopo- lies—Municipal ownership of gas, electric light and water- works. — If the question had been raised fifty years ago, whether 11 municipal corporation could, within the provisions and the spirit of the State Constitutions, under authority from the State Legislature, undertake the establishment and operation of mu- nicipal monopolies, in the place of private monopolies, — espe- cially in the case of gas, electric light and waterworks, — it is very likely that the question would have been answered in the negative. The popular opinion of that day opposed the as- sumption, by any part of government, of powers beyond what were necessary to the preservation of peace and good order, the enforcement and protection of private rights, and the allevia- tion of individual distress through the medium of public hospi- tals, asylums and almshouses ; and the same public opinion would have controlled the judgment of the courts, if such a monopoly had by some accident or oversight been created, in pronouncing upon its validity. But, since then, the popular sense of right, under the influence of modern socialism, has manifested a decided socialistic tendency in favor of the inter- vention of the State in many instances, which would not have been seriously considered in times past. It is true that for more than a century, we have had in this country, as well as elsewhere in the civilized world, a government monopoly, in the transportation and distribution of the mail. But that mo- nopoly had been created by an express provision of the United States Constitution, and had thereby been placed far above the reach of judicial criticism. Nor have we had since then, in the veston City Ry. Co., 65 Tex. 502; Jackson Co. Horse Ry. Co. v. Inter- state Rapid Transit Ry. Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 306. 1 Jersey City & B. E. E. Co. v. J. C. & Hob. H. R. R. Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 01;&ul£ City Ry. Co. v. Galveston City Ry. Co., 65 Tex. 502; State v. Corrigan St. Ry. Co., 85 Mo. 263; Jackson Co. Horse Ry. Co. v. Inter- state Rapid Transit Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 306; Eichels v. Evausville St. Ry. Co., 78 Ind. 261. § 144 a. MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS. [CH. viri. United States, any other instance of a State or National gov- ernment monopoly, except the recent establishment, in South Carolina, of a State monopolj- in the sale of intoxicating liq- uors ; and the results of the pending judicial contests over its constitutionality must remain for the present a matter of con- jecture. But in determining the constitutionality of government mo- nopolies, a very important distinction must be made between the monopolies, which may be established and operated by the State government, and those which may, under legislative authority, be erected by a municipal corporation. The distinction rests upon the generally accepted doctrine, that a municipal corpo- ration has a quasi private character, as well as a strictly public character. The grant by the State to a municipal corporation of the power to establish and operate gas, electric light or water- works, is a grant to the corporation in its semi-private charac- ter, as the corporate representative of the local community, and not to it as the public representative of the State government.^ Involved in the question of the constitutionality of munici- pal ownership of gas, electric light and waterworks, are two distinct queries : first, can the municipal corporation supply it- self with the light and water which it may need for lighting and cleansing the streets and other strictly municipal property ; and, secondly, can it vend to private consumers the light and water they may need ? In regard to the first query, there is little room for doubt, and the cases are unanimous, that the municipal corporation may, if the State Legislature grants the power, supply itself, for public needs, with light and water, by the establishment and operation of its own works, as well ashy contract with private manufacturers of the same.^ Where the municipality undertakes, as it always does when it establishes and operates its own lighting or waterworks, to ' See ante, § 9. - Brenliam v. Brenham Water Co., 67 Tex. 542; Atlantic City Water Works V. Atlantic City, 39 N. J. Eq. 367; Parkersburg Gas Co. v. Park- ersburg, 30 W. Va. 435; 4 S. E. Rep. 650; Saginaw Gaslight Co. v. Sagi- naw, 28 Fed. Rep. 535 ; Garrison v. Chicago, 7 Biss. 480; Long v. Du- 254 luth, 51 N. W. Rep. 913; Altgelt v. San Antonio, 81 Tex. 436; State v. City of Hamilton, (Ohio) 23 N. E. Rep. 935; Hamilton Gaslight & Coke Co. V. City of Hamilton, 37 Fed. Rep. 832; Mauldin v. City Council of Greenville, 33 S. C. 1; 11 S. E. Rep. 134; see, also, State v. Town of Columbia, (Mo.) 20 S. W. Rep. 90. CH. Vni. J CHARTER POWKRS, THEIR NATURE, ETC. § 144 ( supply private consumers in their private houses, the munici- pal government is without doubt engaged in a private business, which fift)' years ago would very likely have been conceded to be beyond the legitimate sphere, even of a municipal corpora- tion, and this has been the judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina in a very late case.^ But in every other case, where the question has been raised, the courts have held that the vending of light and water to private consumers was but an incident of the supply of these elements for strictly public use, and was within the constitutional limitations.'^ But the attempt of a city government, to establish and op- erate its own gas, electric light and waterworks, will not be lawful in any case, unless the State Legislature has granted, ex- pressly or by plain implication, the power to do so. It has thus been decided very lately by the Massachusetts Supreme Court, that, under existing statutes, towns in the State of Massachu- setts have not the power to maintain electric light plants.^ On the other hand, it has been held that the authority for mu- 1 Mauldin V. City Council of Green- ville, 33 S. C. 1 (11 S. E. Eep. 434). ^ Atlantic City WaterwoAs v. At- lantic City, 39 N. J. Eq. 367; Dayton V. Quigley, 29 N. J. Eq. 77; Hale v. Houghton, 8 Mich. 451; Rochester Water Co., In re, 66 N. Y. 413; Way- land V. Com'rs, 4 Gray, 500; Craw- fordsville v. Braden, (Ind.) 28 N. E. 849; Springfield v. Fullmer, (Utah) 27 Pac. Eep. 577; Thompson Hous- ton Electric Co. v. Newton, 42 Fed. Eep. 723; Smith v. Mayor, 88 Tenn. 464 (12 S. W. 924) ; in the last case, the court saying: "Nothing should be of greater concern to a municipal corporation than the preservation of the good health of the inhabitants. Nothing can be more conducive to that end than a regular and sufficient supply of wholesome water, which common observation teaches all can be furnished in populous cities only through the instrumentality of well- equipped waterworks. Hence, for a city to meet such a demand is to perform a public act and confer a public blessing .... It cannot be held that the city in doing so is en- gaging in a private enterprise, or performing a municipal function for a private end." " Municipal corpo- rations constitute a part of the civil government of the State, and their streets are highways, which it is the province of government, by appro- priate means, to render safe. To that end the lighting of streets is a matter of which the public may as- sume control, .... the manufac- ture of gas, and its distribution for public and private use .... is a business of a public nature, and meets a public necessity for which the State may make provision. It is one which so far from affecting the public injui'iously has become one of the most important agencies of civilization for the promotion of the public convenience and safety." New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisi- ana Light Co., 115 U. S. 658. » Spaulding v. Peabody, (Mass.) 26 N. E. Rep. 421. 255 §144. MUXICIPAL COKPOKATIONS. [OH. vm. nicipal ownership will be inifilied from the charter power "to provide for lighting " the streets, and other public places.^ In one case,^it was held that this was an inherent power of municipal corporations. The power to establish and operate waterworks has also been conceded to municipal corporations, under the grant of power " to provide the city with water ; ^ and even under the power " to provide for the general wel- fare."" 1 Parkersburg Gas Co. v. Parkers- burg, SOW. Va. 435; Garrison v. Chi- cago, 7 Biss. 480; Crawfordsville v. Braden, ( Ind.) 28 K. E. 849, power " to light streets witli electricity, to contract for the same, to permit poles," etc.; Saginaw Gaslight Co. v. Saginaw, 28 Fed. Rep. 533, " to cause its streets to be lighted." ^ Crawfordsville v. Braden, supra. 3 Atlantic City Water Works v. At- lantic City, 39 iSr. J. Eq. 367; Hale v. Houghton, 8 Mich. 451; Smith v. Mayor, 88 Tenn. 464 (12 S. W. 924) ; Hackensack Water Co. v. Hoboken, (N". J.) 17 Atl. 307; Putnam v. Grand Rapids, 58 Mich. 417; Atty. Gen. v. Detroit, 55 Mich. 181. * Springfield v. Fullmer, ( Utah) 27 Pac. 577; Mauldin v. Greenville, 33 S. C. 1(11 S. E. 434). Judge Brown, in the case of Harlan Gas Light Co. V. New York, 33 N. Y. 309, says: "The power and duty of mu- nicipal government to furnish light for the streets and avenues of the city is not disputed or put in contro- versy in this action. Indeed it could not be, with any show of reason or 256 good sense. In our northern lati- tude, when darkness prevails over half the twenty-four hours for a large part of the year, light diffused through the public streets and ave- nues is a predominant and urr/ent necessity which no well-governed city can do witliout. This beneficent application of artificial light is one of the distinguishing characteristics between the city of modern times and those of the middle ages, when darkness reigned supreme for no inconsiderable portion of the time, broken only to become more visi- ble by the occasional torch of the link boy, or the lantern of the soli- tary watchman. That modern gas light diffuses its rays over every part of the public thoroughfare, is a source of pleasure and comfort and convenience, as well as a security against crime and disorder, which no other agency can supply. It is indispensable at all times, and no municipality can be said to be well governed, which is not able to com- mand its presence under all circum- stances." CHAPTER IX. ORDINANCES. Section. 145 — Definition — Ordinances and resolutions distinguished. 146 — Power to pass ordinances. 147 — ^Delegation of power of legislation — Official non- liability. 148— Method of enactment — Mode, time and proof of publica- tion — Mayor's approval. 149 — Ordinances must be enacted in good faith. 1.50 — Ordinances must be lawful and reasonable. 151 — Ordinances must not be op- pressive. 152 — Ordinances must be impartial and general. Section. 153 — Those on whom ordinances are binding — Notice — Evi- dence. 154 — Power to enforce ordinances by fines or imprisonment. 155 — Forfeitures. 156 — Procedure to enforce ordi- nances — Arrest. 157 — ^Action in name of corporar tion. 158 — ^Pleading ordinances. 159 — Validity of ordinances, a question of law. 160 — Evidence — Defence — C on- struction of ordinances. 161 — Kepealing ordinances. 162 — Eatification of invalid ordi- nances by Legislature. § 145. Definition — Ordinances and resolutions distin- guished. — Among the common law incidents of the grant of power to corporations, both public and private, was the general implied right to make such by-laws, not inconsistent with the charter of the corporation, as would enable it to carry on most effectually the business for which it had been created.^ In the case of municipal corporations, especially, the implied power to enact by-laws is very largely supplemented, if not superseded altogether, by express grants of power. These by-laws of a municipal corporation are in this country given the name of ordinances, although in England they are called hy-laws, the term hy or lye meaning a place of habitation, or local commu- nity .^ 1 Coal Float v. Jeffersonville, 112 Ind. 15; Chamberlain v. Evansville, 76 lb. 542. "- Com. V. Turner, 1 Cush. 493; Tay- lor v. Lambertville, 4.S N. J. Eq. 107; Citizens Gas etc. v. Elwood, 114 Ind. 17 332. In Gosling v. Veley, 19 L. J. (N. S.) Q. B. it was said by Baron Parke "that a municipal by-law (i. e. ordinance) is a rule binding on a particular district, not being at va- riance with the general law of the 257 §146 MUNICIPAL COKrOKATIOXS. [CH. IX. Ordinances are to be discriminated from resolutions,^ in that the former are of the nature of a local law, prescribing a general, uniform and permanent rule of conduct; while the latter are special, temporary and limited in their creation or application.^ This distinction is important ; for, when a charter prescribes that by-laws and ordinances were to be submitted to the mayor for approval, resolutions need not be.^ This distinction ac- quires further importance when, by express provisions of the charter, or by necessary implication, an act of a legislative mu- nicipal body is required to be done or manifested by ordinance. In such a case, a resolution is neither proper nor sufficient.* If an act is to be done by a council, and the charter is silent as to the mode, it may be done by a resolution, duly signed and executed.* It has been held, too, that ordinarily the ef- fects of the ordinance and the resolution are the same, both being legislative acts ; and that, under a general power to make ordinances and by-laws, any enactment is valid, whether it purports to be an ordinance or resolution, the form being im- material.® §146. Power to pass ordinances. — The charter of a city holds the same relative position to the municipal ordinances, which are subordinate to it, that the State Constitution does to the statutes of the Commonwealth; and the rules of con- struction are to some extent the same in both classes of laws.^ realm, and being reasonable and adapted to the purposes of tlie cor- poration, and any rule or ordinance of a permanent character, which the corporation is empowered to make, is a by-law." Hopkins v. Swansea, 4 M. & W. 621 ; Queen v. Osier, 32 Up. Can. Q. B. 324. 1 Expression of corporate power byresolutions. State v. Jersey City, 30 N. J. L. 148; State v. Elizabeth, 37 lb. 432. 2 Citizens' Gas etc. v. Elwood, 114 Ind. 332; Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St. 103. 3 Kepner v. Com., 40 Pa. St. 124. * Paterson v. Barnet, 46 N. J. L. 62; Springfield v. Knott, 49 Mo. Ap. 612; State v. Bayonne, 35 N. J. L. 258 335 ; Anderson v. O' Conner, 98 Ind. 168 ; Newman v. Emporia, 32 Kan. 456; Hunt v. Lambertville, 45 N.J. L. 279; Central v. Sears, 2 Col. 588; Daniels v. Burford, 10 Up. Can. Q. B. 478; Bearden v. Madison, 73 Ga. 187; State v. Tryon, 39 Conn. 183; Starr v. Burlington, 45 Iowa,87; Bur- meister v. Howard, 1 Wash. T. 207. estate V. Jersey City, 3 Dutch. 493;Merch. etc. v. Chicago, 70 Iowa, 105 ; Butler v. Passaic, 4-i N. J. L. 171; Board v. DeKay, 148 U. S. 591; 13 S. Ct. 706. eSower v. Phila., 35 Pa. St 231; Green v. Cape May, 41 N. J. L. 45; Green Bay v. Brauns, 50 Wis. 204. 'Quiuette v. St. Louis, 76 Mo. 402; In re Tickno, 68 Cal. 294. CH. IX.] ORDINANCES. § 146 The powers of a corporation are conferred upon it by its char- ter and the laws of the State ; and they cannot be enlarged, di- minished or varied in any way, by the enactment of ordinances, which are either inconsistent with, or repugnant to, the char- ter provisions, or the general law of the land. Such ordinances will be ultra vires of the corporation. ^ But the Legislature may grant to the municipal coiporation the express power to pass an ordinance which will conflict with, and supersede within the city's jurisdiction, the State law upon the same subject.^ The power of a municipality, to make ordinances for the government of the community, its scope and limitations, can therefore only be determined by the provisions of the city's charter, or of the general laws of the State, under which municipalities are incor- porated, or which are intended to control or relate to the powers of municipal corporations in general. Specific powers are usual- ly enumerated in the grant of power to the municipal corpora- tion ; followed generally, by a general authority to pass all ordinances which may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare, good order, etc., aTid which are not inconsistr ent with the constitution and general laws. Occasionall)', however, there is no enumeration^ of the subjects upon which the corporation may legislate ; but it is generally empowered, to pass all ordinances, which are necessary to the well-being and good order of the local community. In a charter of the character first mentioned, the general welfare clause confers no power to abrogate, impair, or enlarge the poweis which are conferred by the special grants of power ; but it can only be construed to confer authority to pass ordi- nances upon all other matters, which are excluded from the specific grants of power, yet within the ordinary scope of the municipal authority,* or which are absolutely necessary for the I Weber v. Johnson, 37 Mo. App. 601; Com. v. Roy, 140 Mass. 432; Garden City v. Abbott, 34 Kan. 283; Bergman v. St. Louis etc. Co. 1 S. W. R. 384; Breninger v. Belvidere, 44 N. J. L. 350; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268, 2Y2; State v. Kash villa, 15 Lea, 697; State v. Munic. Ct. etc., 32 Minn. 329; Missouri etc. Co. v. Wyan- dotte (Kan. 90), 20 Pac. R. 950; Thompson V. Carroll, 22 How. 422; Thomas v. Richmond, 12 Wall. 349; Andrews v. Ins. Co., 37 Me. 256. 2 State y. Binder, 38 Mo. 450. " For an enumeration of almost every subject upon which ordinances can, under any possible combination of circumstances, be enacted by a municipal corporation, see N. T. Consol. Act, §§ 85, 86, et seq. * Dil. Mun. Corp. §§ 315, 316; State V. Ferguson, 33 N. H. 424, 430; see 259 §147 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. IX. fulfillment of municipal purposes. The specific enumeration should, however, not be considered to exclude the inherent power of every corporation to make needful by-laws, on sub- jects not enumerated, unless the intent to exclude them is plain and manifest.^ It has, therefore, been held that, when an act is to be done, or an ordinance is to be passed, and no precise mode is prescribed, any mode is valid, which does not violate the charter, or the general law.* § 147. Delegation of power of legislation— Official non- liability. — -As an exception to the rule, forbidding the delega- tion of the power to make laws,^ it is held that it is competent for the Legislature to delegate this power to municipal corpo- rations, so far as is necessarj' to enable them to pass ordinances, which will have the force and effect of laws, within the jurisdic- tion of the municipality.* cases cited in next note ; see also An- gell & Ames on Corp. 17*7; Child v. Hudson Bay Co., 2 P. Wras. 207; Barling v. West, 29 Wis. 307. 1 Com'rs V. Covey (Md. 90), 22 Atl. 266; Collins v. Hatch, 18 Ohio, 523; New Oris. v. Philippi, 9 La, An. 44; State V. Schleiumer, 42 La. An. 1166 (bakers); Richmond v. Dudley (lud. 90), 26 N. E. E. 184; State v. Freeman, 38 N. H. 426; Com. v. Turner, 1 Cush. 493; Lawrence v. Monroe, 44 Kan. 607; State v. Webber, 107 N", C, 962 (prostitution); Indianapolis v. Gas Co., 66 Ind. 396; Laundry etc., 22 Fed. Eep. 701; Clark v. South Bend, 85 Ind. 276; State v. Sharkey, (Minn. 92) 52 N. W. R. 24; Com. v. Cutler, (Mass. 92) 29 3S". E. R. 1146; McPher- son V. Chebanse, 114 111. 46 (Sunday closing). "The city council is re- strained to such matters, whether specially enumerated or included un- der general gi-ant, as are indifferent in themselves, free from constitu- tional objection, and have not been the subject of general legislation, or, as it is expressed in the charter, are not repugnant to the constitution or laws of the land." Dubois v. Au- 260 gusta, Dudley (Ga.) Rep. 30; Wil- liams v. Augusta, 4 Ga. 509, 514. 2 Tyler v. Columbus, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 224; Larkin v. Burl. C. E. & N. Ey. Co., (Iowa 92) 52 N. W. E. 480; Crawfordsville v. Braden, (Ind. 92) 28 N". E. E. 849; People v. Wagner, 86 Mich. 594 (title of ordinance). 3 State v. Hayes, 61 K. H. 314. « Duluth V. Krupp, (Minn. 91) 49 N. W. R. 235 ; Batsel v. Blaine, 15 S. W. R. 283; State v. Clark, 28 N. H. 176 ; Milne v. Davidson, 5 Martin, N. S. (La.) 586; Covington v. East St. Louis, 78 111. 548 ; Strauss v. Pontiac, 40 lb. 301; New York v. D. D. E. B. 6 B. R. Co., 15 N. Y. 297; State v. Anderson, 8 So. 1 ; Markle v. Akron, 14 Ohio, 586, 590; Mayor v. Morgan, 7 Martin, N. S. (La.) 1; Bowles v. Landaff, 59 K. H. 164; Gould v. Ray- mond, 59 lb. 260; State v. Trenton, (N. J. 91) 20 Atl. 1076; State v. Tryon, 39 Conu. 183; Indianapolis v. Gas Co., 66 Ind. 396; Mason v. Shawneetowa, 77 111. 533; Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 44 Iowa, 508; Ex parte Christensen, 85 Cal. 208; State v. Cozzens, 8 So. R. 268; In re Wall, 48 Cal. 279; Glo- versville v. Howell, 70 N. Y. 28T. CH. IX.j OEDINANCES. § 148 As the charter is analogous to the State Constitution, so the law-making power, the council or governing body, of a munic- ipality is, so far as its jurisdiction extends, and in relation to the subjects upon which it has the power to legislate, similar -in character to the State Legislature.^ And this analogy has been observed and applied, in declaring contracts unlawful, which are in contravention of a municipal ordinance;^ and in the general rule, that a penalty imposed by ordinance amounts to a prohibition, and renders the prohibited act illegal.^ Municipal officers, invested with power to make ordinances or laws for the government of the affairs of the municipalitj', are not liable pei'sonally for the enactment of any ordinances, either within their authority, or unauthorized by the powers which they possess.* This exemption from liability for their' acts, as members of the law-making branch of the municipal government, is another analogy between the city council and the State Legislature. § 148. Method of enactment — Mode, time and proof of publication — Mayor's approvaL — It is absolutely essential to the validity of municipal legislation, as expressed in ordinances, that it should be enacted by the proper body, duly assembled, and in the precise form and manner, if any be prescribed by the municipal constitution and general law, from which it derives its authority.* So, where a charter forbade the passage of ordinances, un- less they were introduced at a previous regular meeting, an or- dinance was declared void, where the rule had not been literally complied with.^ A requirement, that a proposed ordinance shall 1 Taylor v. Carondelet, 22 Mo. 105 ; St. Louis v. Foster, 52 lb. 513; Hop- kins V. Mayor, 4 M. & W. (Eng.) 621, 640; Milne v. Davidson, 5 Martin, N. S. (La.) 586. 2 Milne v. Davidson (supra) ; Heland V. Lowell, 3 Allen, 407; Cf. Heeny v. Sprague, 58 Me. 199. " Johnson v. Siraonton, 43 Cal. 242. * Paine v. Boston, 124 Mass. 486; Jones V. Looing, 55 Miss. 109; Frfee- port V. Marks, 59 Pa. St. 257 ; Baker V. State, 27 Ind. 485; Com'rs v. Ducket, 20 Md. 468; Weaver v. De- fendorf, 3 Donio, 117; Tike v.' Ma- ^ Cantril v. Sainer, 59 Iowa, 26 ; Dempsey v. Burlington, 66 lb. 687 ; Smith V. Emporia, 27 Kan. 528; Steb- bins V. Mayor, 38 lb. 473; but see contra, as to the ordinary clause, St. Louis V. Foster, .52 Mo. 513; Pacific, etc., V. Governor, 23 lb. 353; Cape Girardeau, 52 lb. 424; see Peo. v. Mun-ay, 57 Mich. 396, when a stat- ute or ordinance is well authenti- cated. "State V. Bergen, 33 N. J. L. 39; New Orleans v. Brooks, 36 La. An. 64; Danville v. Shelton, 76 Va. 325; Cooley Const. Lim. § 139. goun, 44 Mo. 491. 261 §148 MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS. [CH. IX. be read on three different days, is fulfilled if it be so read, even when the final reading takes place after the election and induction into ofQce of a new mayor, and of several new mem- bers of the municipal council.^ The prescribed readings may also be had at adjourned meetings.^ The necessity for the attachment of the signature of the mayor to an ordinance usually depends upon the provisions of the charter.^ When examination and approval by him are required, this duty must be exercised by him in person, and cannot be delegated to a subordinate.* If the charter requires the concurrence of the maj'or, as a part of the lawmaking pow- er, a resolution or ordinance which is vetoed by him, or which lacks his approval, as manifested by signature or in some other ■proper manner, is a nullity.^ But, unless the mayor's approval of an ordinance is absolutely required, the provision for his sig- nature may be considered as director}- ; and the absence of the signature will not affect the validity of the ordinance, if it has been enacted otherwise in strict conformity to charter require- ments.® So, also, mere informalities in the signing of an ordi- nance by the mayor will not be regarded, when all substantial requirements have been otherwise observed in enacting it." An injunction will not be granted to prevent the mayor from approving an ordinance, even when the effect of such action on his part would be to impair a valid contract, previously made by the city.^ 1 Brown v. Lutz, (Web. 93) 54 N. W. K. 860; MoGraw v. Wliitson, 69 Iowa, 348. 2 Outcamp V. Utt, 60 Iowa, 156. 3]Sr. T. Consol. Act, §75. 4 Lyth V. Bufialo, 48 Hun, 175. 6 Saxtou V. St. Joseph, 60 Mo. 153 ; Irving V. Devors, 65 lb. 625 ; Chari- ton V. Holliday, 60 Iowa, 391 ; Whit- ney V. Pt. Huron, 88 Mich. 268. 6 Terre Haute v. Voellcer, (111. 89) 22 N. E. R. 20; Fisher v. Graham, 1 fin. (Oliio) 113; Martindale v. Palm- er, 52 Ind. 411; Toledo Con. S. R. Co. V. Toledo Eleo. St. Ey. Co., 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 362 ; Pennsylvania Globe G. L. Co. V. Scranton, 97 Pa. St. 538; Sullivan v. Pausch, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 262 R. 196; Blanchardv. Bitsell, 11 Ohio St. 96; Elmendorf v. Mayor of N. T., 25 Wend. 693; State v. Newark, 1 Dutch. 399 ; Magneau v. Fremont, (Neb. 91) 47 N. W. R. 280; State v. Jersey City, 30 N. J. L. 93; Kepner v. Com., 40 Pa. St. 124; Com. v. Fitler, 136 Pa. St. 129; Weinicke v. R. R. Co., 61 Hun, 619; Whitney v. Pt. Huron, 88 Mich. 268; Opelousa V. Andrus, 37 La. An. 699; State v. Henderson, 38 Ohio St. 644; Hall v. Racine, (Wis. 92) 50 N. W. R. 1094. 7 Becker v. Washington, (Mo. 88) 7 S. W. R. 291; Allentowu v. Grim, 109 Pa. St. 113. 8 New Orleans El. Ry. Co. v. New Orleans, 39 La. An. 127. CH. IX.] OEDIKANCES. §148 When the charter requires publication of an ordinance be- fore it will be effective, no penalty can be enforced for its in- fraction, until proper publication has been made, in the manner prescribed by law.^ An assessment based upon an ordinance, which has not been legally published, if publication be required, is void and cannot be collected.^ Aud so, also, it has been held that, where no provision is made for publication, the ordi- nance must be promulgated for a reasonably sufficient length of time, in order to enable parties interested to become informed as to its requirements.^ But the presumption is not only in favor of the reasonableness of whatever provision has been ac- tually adopted for the promulgation of the new ordinance ; but, likewise, it would seem that the better rule is, that publication is not necessary, if it is not expressly prescribed.* And it is held in Massachusetts that even where publication is prescribed, it is directory, and not a necessary condition precedent to the validity of the ordinance.® The method of publication will de- pend wholly upon statutory requirements, which should be con- sulted in every instance.^ It has been held that the duty of publishing ordinances and resolutions which are adopted by the board of aldermen of New York city, is mandatory.^ If a choice of modes of publication is permissible under the regulating statute, and the statute delegates the power of selec- tion to the corporation, a publication by a clerk, without any selection on the part of the corporation, is not sufficient to give validity to the ordinance.^ Publication for five successive 1 People V. Keir, (Mich.) 43 N. W. 1039; Meyer v. Fromm, 108 Ind. 208; Napav. Easterby, 61 Cal. 509; Na- tional Bank v. Grenada, 41 Fed. 87; 48 lb. 278; Wain v. Philadelphia, 99 Pa. St. 330; Schwartz v. Oshkosh, 55 Wis. 490; O'Hare v. Park I?iver, (N. D.) 47 ISr. W. K. 380; Amey v. Alle- gheny City, 24 How. 364; Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136; Smith v. Eau Claire, (Wis.) 47 N. W. R. 830; Chi- cago V. McCoy, 26 N. E. E. 863; Ex parte Christensen, 85 Cal. 49; State V. Orange (TS. J. 92), 22 Atl. 1004; Pittsburgh v. Reynolds, 29 Pac. 757. 2 In re Smith, 52 N. T. 526; In re Phillips, 60 lb. 16; In re Douglas, 46 lb. 42; State v. Hoboken, 38 N. J. L. 110; State v. Smith, 22 Minn. 218. 3 Pitts V. Opelika, 79 Ala. 527. « In re Guerrero, 69 Cal. 88; Wash- burn V. Lyons, 32 Pac. R. 310. 5 Com. V. Davis, 140 Mass. 485. 6 New York Consol. Act, § 80; In re Phillips, 60 N". T. 16; In re Bassford, 50 lb. 509; Napa v. Easterby, 18 Pac. R. 253. ' In re Douglas, 46 N. T. 42, rev'g 58 Barb. 174; 12 Ab. Pr. (N. S.) 161; Moore v. Mayor, 73 lb. 238; In re Burmeister, 76 N. T. 174. ^Higley v. Bunce, 10 Conn. 435; Byarsv. Mt. Vernon, 77 111. 467; R. R. Co. V. Engle, 76 lb. 317. 263 § 1-18 MUNICIPAL COi;POHATIONS. [CH. IX. week days, a Sunday intervening, will fulfill a statutory I'e- quireinent, that an ordinance must be published for five succes- sive days.^ So, where publication for twenty days, before the ordinance would go into effect, was required, it was held that an ordinance would go into effect twenty daj'S after its first publication, and that it would be sufficient if it was published in each number of the paper which was issued during the period mentioned.^ When publication is required, and no newspaper is specified, the newspaper in which ordinances have been usu- ally published, will suffice, although it is not the only news- paper which is published in the city.^ After an ordinance has been properly enacted and duly pub- lished, no republication will be required, when it is afterwards included in a digest or revision of municipal legislation.* A printed copy of an ordinance, or a newspaper, printed pamph- let or book, in which the same has been published, if purport- ing to have been so published by authority, is prima facie evidence of the existence, adoption and publication of the or- dinance.^ In an action brought against a municipal corpora- tion, the plaintiff need not prove publication, when it appears that the city had acted under the ordinance for seveial yeai-s, and enforced or recognized it as a valid law.^ It has been heid that a provision, that existing ordinances shall remain in force, provided they shall be recorded within four months, is directory merely, and does not invalidate ordinances not so recorded.^ Nor is it a valid objection to the record of an ordinance under such a regulation, that a printed cop}'- is pasted upon the record, and tliat it was not recorded in manuscript.^ An ordinance need ' Ex parte Fiske, 72 Cal. 125. 2 Hobokeu v. Gear, 3 Dutcli. 265. 3 Truclielut v. City Council, 1 Nott &McC. S. C. 227; publication in Sun- day newspaper, Hastings v. Colum- bvis, 42 Ohio St. 585. 4 St. Louis V. Foster, 52 Mo. 513; St. Louis V. Alexander, 23 lb. 509; comp. Emporia v. Norton, 16 Kan. 238. * St. Louis V. Foster, 52 Mo. 51;>; Lindsay v. Chicago, 115 111. 120; Downing V. Milltonvale, "6 Kan. 740; Block V. Jacksonville, 36 111. 301; 264 Prell V. McDonald, 7 Kan. 426; Pen- dergast v. Peru, 20 111. 51; comp. St. Charles v. O'Malley, 18 111. 407; Moss V. Oaklamd, 88 111. 109. Method of proving local laws under K. T. Con- sol. Act, see § 1107. « Atchison v.King, 9 Kan. 550; State V. Atlantic City, 34 N. J. L. 99, 106; ' Trustees of Academy v. Erie, 31 Pa. St. 515; Amey v. Allegheny City, 24 How. 364; Tipton v. Xorman, 72 Mo. 380. 8 Ewbaaks v. Ashley, 36 111. 177. CH. IX.] OEDINANCES. § 149 not, in order to be valid, expressly designate the charter pow- er, in execution of which it has been enacted,^ nor the reasons for its adoption.^ It will, if silent in this respect, be referred to that charter power, which would most reasonably warrant its passage ; or, where it is authorized by either of two powers, it will be treated as coming within that power with which, b)" its character and provisions, it seems to be most in conformity.^ When it is stated in the charter that the power to pass a certain ordinance is only to be exercised, when it is necessary, the necessity need not be recited or declared in the ordinance, unless that is imperatively required by the charter,* but it will be implied from the fact of its enactment.® § 149. Ordiuances must Ibe enacted in good faith. — It can never be made the subject of judicial investigation, whether the Legislature has, in the exercise of the law-making power, been moved by laudable and authorized motives and considerations, as long as the power has been exercised in conformity with the provisions of the constitution. For improper motives, and for injudicious exercise of its power, the Legislature is answerable to the people alone.^ Tliis principle is applicable by analogy to municipal legisla- tion.'' But it is not to be understood therebj'', that the courts cannot inquire into the consideration for the legislative action of a municipal corporation, so far as to discover and prevent fraud or bribery. The municipal officials will not be allowed to exercise this legislative power, in puisuit of their own self- aggrandizement.^ This question has been discussed by the courts to but a limited extent. But there are decisions, which directly sustain the principle above stated. Thus, where a com- pany was chartered for the manufacture of gas, and the Legis- 1 Eex V. Harrison, 3 Burr, 1328. 2 Grierson v. Ontario, 3 Up. Can. Q. B. 623; Fisher v. Vauglian, 10 lb. 492. " Methodist Church v. Baltimore, 6 Gill, 391. * Hoyt V. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39. ^ Stuyvesant v. Mayor etc. N. Y., 1 Cow. 588; Young v. St. Louis, 47 Mo. 492; Kiley v. Forsee, 57 lb. 390; Platter v. Elkhart Co., 103 Ind. 360. « Cooley Const. Lim. §§ 186, 187, 208. ' MoCulloch V. State, 11 Ind. 424, 431; Suubury etc. v. Cooper, 7 Am. Law Eeg. 158; Wright v. Defrees, 8 Ind. 398. 8 Dil. Mun. Corp. §§ 311, 312; Buell V. Ball, 20 Iowa, 282; Preeport v. Marks, 59 Pa. St. 253. 265 150 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [oh. DC. lature delegated its control over the company to a municipal council, authorizing it to regulate the price of gas, it was held that the council must fix a reasonable and fair price. The ac- tion of a majority of the members in fixing the price, at a rate they well knew the gas could not be made and sold at, without loss to the company, being actuated by fraudulent motives, was not binding on the company ; and the good faith of the council could properly be inquired into.^ It is, of course, also a ground for declaring void such an unreasonable regulation, apart from the existence of fraudulent motives, that the council had only the power to prescribe a reasonable price for the gas, and that the prescription of an unreasonable rate, one which did not ad- mit of a reasonable profit, was ultra vires, and therefore void.^ § 150. Ordinances must be lawful and reasonable. — Un- der the common law doctrine, that every corporation has an incidental power to make by-laws, taken in connection with the fact that in the royal charters the subject-matters, which' could be regulated by by-laws, were seldom specified, the Eng- lish courts at an early day required that all municipal ordinances must be reasonable, and must not conflict with the statutes passed by Parliament, or with the principles of the common law.^ That such a lule was imperatively required to protect the lib- erty of the individual, and the rights of private property, is evident from the history of municipal corporations in England, prior to the enactment of the municipal corporations act.* Following the English doctrine, the courts of the United States have always held that all municipal by-laws, particularly those which are passed under the implied power to make by- laws, or under a general charter power to enact such laws as are necessary, must be reasonable in their character and effect,^ 1 State V. Cincinnati Gas Co., 18 Ohio St. 262; Bank v. United States, 1 Gr. Greene (Iowa) 553. 2 See post, § 130. 8 Dillons Mun. Corp. §319, citing Eexv. Maidstone, 3 Burr. 1837; Felt- makers V. Davis, 1 Bos. & P. 98, 100; Sutton's Hosp. Case, 10 Eep. 31; London v. Vanacre, 1 Ld. Raym. 496. » 5 & 6 Wra. IV. ch. Lxxvi. § 90. 5 Com. V. Steffee, "7 Bush, 191; Kip V. Paterson^ 2 Dutch. 298 ; Dayton v. 266 Quigley, 29 N. J. Eq. 77; Birming- ham V. Ry. Co., (Ala. 93) 13 So. R. 141; Mayor v. Beasley, 1 Humph. 232; State f. Freeman, 38 N. H. 426; Mclnerney v. Denver, (Colo. 92) 29 Pac. 516; Waters v. Leech, 3 Ark. 110; Mayor v. Winfield, 8 Humph. 107; Davis v. Anita, 73 Iowa, 325; In re Frank, 52 Cal. 506; Read v. Camden, (N. J. 92) 24 Atl. R. 549; Fisher v. Harrisburg, 2 Grant Cases, 291; Gilham v. WeUs, 64 Ga. 192; CH. IX.] OEDINANCES. §150 consonant with the objects and purposes of the charter ; and not repugnant to the fundamental rights of citizens, as guar- anteed by the constitution and laws.^ Accordingly, it has been held that an ordinance, by which the purchaser of land at a tax sale was empowered to call upon the police to aid him in securing possession, was unconstitutional, as depriving the own- er of his property without "due process of law."^ And the same objection may be" made to an ordinance, which imposes a license upon the towboats engaged in interstate commerce.^ So, although it is of course competent for a municipality to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, an ordinance, requiring the furnishing quarterly by every druggist of a verified state- ment of the quantity and kinds of intoxicating liquors sold, to whom, etc., was held to be void as unreasonable and unjust.* An ordinance, designed to prevent petty peculation of cotton, and providing that every dealer in that commodity must keep a record of all loose cotton purchased by him, giving the name of the seller and quantity sold, was held to be unreasonable, and an unlawful infringement of one's personal liberty.^ So, also, although the preservation of the public health is an object of paramount importance, and likely to be advanced by the prompt removal of dead animals, an ordinance giving a person a right to remove and convert to his own use the bodies of Crawford v. Topeka, (Kan. 93) 32 Pac. R. 4Y6; Clason v. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 31(5; Seymour V. Tacoma, (Wash. 93) 32 Pac. R. 1077; Kirkham v. Russell, 76 Va. 956; Atkinson v. Goodrich etc., 60 Wis. 141; Collins v. Hall, (Ga. 93) 17 S. E. R. 622; Sipe v. Mur- phy, 31 N. E. R. 884; Cape Girardeau V. Riley, 72 Mo. 220; White v. Mayor etc., 2 Swan, 364; Pedrick v. Bailey, 12 Gray, 161 ; Brown v. Lutz, (Neb. 93) 54 N. W. R. 526. 1 McCormick v. Calhoun, 30 S. Ct. (93); Carr v. St. Louis, 9 Mo. 191; Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio, 427; Col- lins V. Hatch, 18 lb. 523 ; Heisenbuttle V. Council, 2 McMul. 233 ; City etc. V. Goldsmith, 2 Speers, (S. C.) 435; Bills V. Goshen, 117 Ind. 221; Wil- liams V. Augusta, 4 Ga. 509; Adams V. Mayor, 29 lb. 56; St. Louis v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 61; Mayor etc. v. Nichols, 4 Hill, 209; Com. v. Turner, 1 Cush. 493; JEx parte Solomon, 91 Cal. 440; State v. Brittain, 89 N. C. 574; Perdue v. Ellis, 18 Ga. 586; Council V. Benjamin, 2 Strob. 508; Landis v. Vineland, (N. J. 92) 23 Atl. R. 357; Haywood v. Mayor, 12 Ga. 404; Paris v. Graham, 33 Md. 94; Newton v. Bilger, 143 Mass. 598; White V. Bayonne, 49 N. J. L. 311 ; Lozier v. Newark,' 48 lb. 452; Volk V. Newark, 47 lb. 117. '• Calhoun v. Fletcher, 63 Ala. 574. sMoran v. New Orleans, 112 TJ. S. 69; U. S. Cons., art. I. §8, par. 3; Ex parte Holmquist, (Cal. 92) 27 Pac. R. 1099; Mx parte Christensen, 85 Cal. 208. 4 Clinton v. Phillips, 58 111. 102. 5 Long V. Taxing Dis., 7 Lea, 134. 267 §151 MtnsriCIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. IX. dead animals, to the exclusion of the owner's right thereto, was held unconstitutional as a taking of private property without compensation.^ Where the municipality has, and exercises, the power to regulate the price of commodities, it must so regulate the prices which one may be permitted to ask for things or services, as that the party engaged in the business may be enabled to make a reasonable profit. If the regulating ordinance places the maximum price at-such a figure that there is no opportunity for obtaining a profit, — and a fortiori, where it entails a loss, — the regulation is unreasonable, and for that rea- son is unconstitutional and void.^ But all rules, concerning the reasonablenesij of ordinances, must be conyidered in the light of the facts of each particular case ; and it may well be that a general ordinance may be both reasonable and unreasonable, under varying circumstances.^ § 151. Ordinances must not be oppressive. — It is a still more serious objection to an ordinance that it is oppressive in its operation, beyond what is necessary to prevent the threai> ened evil. The oppressiveness and inequality, with which an ordinance is charged, must be shown to the court,* and when this is manifest, the ordinance will be declared void. Thusi, when a city had enacted that all free negroes, found out after ten o'clock at night, should be subject to arrest, imprisonment and fine, the court declared it to be void, as an oppressive reg- ulation.^ In a case, where a municipality, owning waterworks, refused to furnish one~of its citizens with water, because his tenant already owed a bill for water supplied him elsewhere, the ordinance was declared to be oppressive, and hence void.^ Any ordinance, which commits to the will of a single offi- cial, unrestrained by charter or otherwise, the practically abso- lute power of prohibiting the use of some well known means 1 R i V e r Rendering Co. v. Behr, 77 Mo. 91; see also Greensboro v. Ehrenreich, 80 Ala. 579. 2 See Chicago, etc. Co. v. Becker, 35 Fed. Rep. 883; Chicago, etc. N. W. Co. T. Dey, 35 Fed. Rep. 866; Pensa- cola & A. Ey. Co. v. State, 5 So. Rep. 833; 25 Fla. 310; Stone v. Trust Co., 116 U. S. 307; Railway Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418; Chicago, 268 etc. Co. V. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339. 3 Nicolin V. Lowrey, 49 jST. J. L. 391 ; Penn. R. R. Co. v. Jersey City, 47 lb., 286. * Mayor v. Beasly, 1 Humph. 232; St. Louis V. Weber, 44 Mo. 547; Cor- rigan v. Gage, 68 Mo. 541. 6 Mayor v. Winfield, 8 Humph. 707. « Dayton v. Quigley, 29 N. J. Eq. 77. CH. IX.] ORDINANCES. § 152 of commercial or social activity, not a nuisance — as, for exam- ple, a steam engine, or street processions, — is .prima facie unreasonable and oppressive, and hence unconstitutional and void.^ § 152. Ordinances must be impartial and general. — In conformity with the well recognized repugnance of the law and of public policy to discriminating legislation, all statutes, and particularly those of a penal nature, are required to be general in their scope and application. The same principle is applied to the local legislation of the municipality. Municipal ordinances must, so far as it is practical, be general in their na- ture, and impartial in their operation.^ Upon this principle, it has been held that a resolution, passed under an authority, which was conferred on a water board by a charter, requiring certain consumers of water to put in expen- sive meters, under a penalty of having the supply cut off, was void as being discriminative in its character.^ Ordinances must be general in their application, and there must be no intention manifest therein to discriminate against * or in favor of individuals ; but this principle does not render an ordinance discriminating, because it affects a certain class, or is applicable only to a certain designated district, or to a certain street. The general or special character of an ordinance must be determined by the facts of each case, and not by any fixed iron-cast rule. According to the change of point of view, everything is both special and general. And because the or- dinance by its terms prescribes a regulation for a particular class of persons, it does not, for that reason, necessarily come within the objection that it is discriminating, and special.^ And where the ordinance is general in its terms and scope of opera- tion, the fact, that it peculiarly affects a particular person, cre- ' In re Frazee, 63 Mich. 396; s. c, I Cal. 78; Council v. Ci-emouini, 36 La. N. W. Rep. 72 (Salvation Army); ! An. 247; Hudson v. Thorne, 7 Paige, ' 261; Chicago v. Eumpff, 45 111. 90. Baltimore v. Eadeke, 49 Md. 217. - Tugman v. Chicago, 78 111. 405 ; Euss V. Mayor etc., 12 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 38; White v. Mayor, 2 Swan. (Tenn.) 364; De Ben v. Gerard, 4 La. An. 30; Citizens Gas Co. v. Elwood, 114 Ind. 332; Zanone v. Mound City, 103 111. 552: Ex parte Chin Yan, 60 8 Eed Star Steamship Co. v. Jersey City, 45 N. J. L. 246. * White V. Nashville, 2 Swan, 364. ^ Bozant v. Campbell, 9 Eob. (La.) 411 ; Com. v. Goodrich, 13 Allen, 545 ; Covington v. East St. Louis, 78 111. 548. 269 §153 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. IX. ates no presumption, that it was enacted for the purpose of dis- ciiminating against him, or of annoying him.^ § 153. Those on whom ordinances are binding— Notice to such persons— Evidence. — By the common law, ordinances of a general nature and purpose bound not only the members of the municipal corporation, but all persons whatever, coming within the municipal limits or jurisdiction.^ This rule of the English common law has been affirmed in the United States, and general ordinances in American cities and towns are bind- ing, not only upon their inhabitants, but upon nonresidents and strangers, temporarily within the municipal limits, where such ordinances do not impose a strictly civil duty.^ On the other hand, municipal ordinances have no extra territorial efficacy or force, unless this power is expressly created or conferred upon the city by the Legislature of the State.* It was held in one instance that a city has no power to require by an ordinance a license from nonresident owner of wagons using the city streets.^ But a person resident without the boundaries of the corpora- tion, who permits his cattle to run at large within the corpora- tion, is amenable to city ordinances, so far as the power of forfeiture of his property within city limits is concerned.^ But the power to impose a personal penalty upon a nonresident owner under such circumstances, must, we think, be expressly ^Wagnei- v. City of Rook Island, 34 N. E. R. 545 ; Shinkle v. Coving- ton, 83 Ky. 420; Richmond etc. v. Richmond, 96 U. S. 521. "London v. Vanacre, 1 Ld. Raym. 498; Salk. 143; Fazakerly v. Wilt- shire, 1 Stra. 462. ^Swift V. Topeka, 43 Kan. 671; Pierce v. Bartram, Cowp. 269; He- land V. Lowell, 3 Allen, 407; Knox- ville V. King, 7 Lea, 441; Bott v. Pratt, 33 Minn. 323; Merz v. Mis- souri P. R. Co., (Mo. 89) 1 S. W. R. 382; Com'rs of Plymouth v. Petti- john, 4 Dev. (Law) 591; Strauss v. Pontiac, 40 111. 306; City of Buffalo V. Schleifer, 21 N. Y. S. 913; Homey V. Sloan, 1 Smith (Ind.) 136; IJodge V. Gridley, 10 Ohio, 173. * Scudder v. Heushaw, (Ind. 93) 33 N. E. R. 791 ; Chicago Packing Co. v. 270 Chicago, 88111. 221; Reed v. People, 1 Park Cr. Rep. 481. " But within city limits a valid by-law or ordinance has the same effect with respect to the persons upon whom it lawfully op- erates, as an act of Parliament upon the subject at large." Lord Abing- don in Hopkins v. Mayor of Swansea, 4 M. & W. 621, 640; Milne v. David- son, 5 Martin (La.) 586. 6 St. Charles v. Nolle, 51 Mo. 122. So nonresidents cannot be discrimi- nated against by the imposition of a license not required of residents. State V. Ocean G-rove Assn., (N. J. 93) 26 Atl. R. 798 ; Cohen v. Plymouth, 7 Kulp. 101; Radebaugh v. Plain City, 28 Wkly. L. Bui. 107. « Spitler V. Young, 63 Mo. 42; Rose V. Hardie, 98 N. C. 44; Nehr v. State, 53 N. W. R. 589; 35 Neb. 638. CH. IX.] ORDINANCES. §154 conferred or clearly implied by strict judicial construction from the charter or general statutes from which the city derives its power.^ Persons upon whom ordinances are binding, are bound to take notice of them.^ If the corporation allows without objection the erection within its limits by a railroad or other company of large and expensive warehouses, for the storage of fertilizing material, it will be estopped from enforcing an ordi- nance forbidding the storage of fertilizers, which was enacted some time prior to the erection of the prohibited structures.** Where one is required to perform a duty, upon receiving notice from the municipality, a more specific notice is required than notice by publication in a newspaper, in order to impose upon the delinquent the statutory penalty, unless the statute or or- dinance makes such a notice sufficient.* § 154. Power to enforce ordinances by fines or imprison- ment. — As a by-law or ordinance, without any penalty provided for its infraction, would be futile*^ and inoperative, the inherent or conferred power to enact by-laws will imply a power in a city or town to impose a reasonable and proper fine upon all pei'sons breaking them, in the absence of any statutory regula- tion of the sanction.® At common law, it was held that, in ac- cordance with the provisions of Magna Oharta, no municipal corporation could, without express authority, conferred by Par- liament, enforce its by-laws by disfranchisement, by impris- onment or by forfeiture of goods. Without such statutory authority municipal corporations are at common law limited to the imposition of pecuniary penalties or fines, which must be certain, definite and reasonable.'' iPlymoulh v. Pettijohn, 4 Dev. 591 ; Fostei- v. Roads, 19 Johns. 191 ; (power to make ordinances govern- ing those who hold certain common lands); People v. Works, 7 Wend. 486; Holladay v. Marsh, 3 lb. 142. ^Palmyra v. Morton, 25 Mo. 593; Buffalo V. Webster, 10 Wend. 99: Knoxville v. King, 7 Lea, 441 ; Fari- bault V. Wilson, 34 Minn. 254. 'Mayor of Athens v. Georgia B. R., 72 6a. 800; Atlanta v. Gate City Gas Light Company, 71 Ga. 106. *Keckley v. Commissioners, 4 Mc- Cord (S. C.) 2o7. 6 State V. Cleveland, 3 R. L 117. «7ri re O'Keefe, 19 N. Y. S. 676; Fisher v. Harrisburg, 2 Grant Cas. 291 ; In re Cameron, 13 U. C. Q. B. 190; State V. Carpenter, 60 Conn. 97; Trigally v. Memphis, 6 Coldw. .382; Hooksett v. Amoskeag etc. Co., 44 N. H. 105; Conley v. Albany, 132 N. Y. 145; Zylsta v. Charleston, 1 Bay (S. C.) 382; contra, Knoxville v. R. R., (Iowa* 92) 50 N. W. R. 61; Eyerman V. Blakesly, 78 Mo. 145. ^ In State v. Bright, 38 La. An. 1, 271 §154 MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS. [CH. IX, The rule of the common law has been adopted and recognized in the United States ; and in the constitutions of all the States, provisions have been incorporated, by which excessive fines are expressly forbidden. So, also in most municipal charters, an amount is fixed, beyond which the power of the municipality to inflict pecuniary fines is not permitted to extend.^ Where the charter prescribes the mode of enfoi-cing an ordi- nance, and the penalties which may be imposed for infractions, the municipal corporation is excluded from a resort to any other mode of enforcement, which would otherwise by implication be within the power of the corporation ; the city is confined to the modes and penalties, expressly prescribed by the charter.^ When the charter of a municipality does not prescribe the precise pecuniary penalty, which may be imposed upon the wrongdoers, or when it mentions a maximum sum, which is not to be exceeded in imposing a fine, it is competent for the city in the former case to make the fine discretionary within reason- able limits, as " not more than |50 ; " and in the latter case, within the limits prescribed by the charter.^ But the cases are not harmonious, and there are decisions by which ordinances, imposing fines stated as " not more than" or " not exceeding " a certain sum, have been held to be invalid the court said: " A municipal corpo- ration has no right to enforce obedi- ence to the ordinances, which it has the power to pass, by fine or impris- onment or otlier penalty, unless that right has been unquestionably given by the lawgiver." See also Sless- man v. Crozier, 80 Ind. 487; Peters V. London, 2 Up. Can. Q. B. 543; In re Snell, 30 lb. 81; State v. Eice, (K C.) 2 S. E. E. 180. 1 N. Y. Consol. Act, § 85. Limit $100, or imprisonment not more than 10 days. Mayor v. Ordrenau, 12 Johns. 122. 2 Kirk V. Kowill, 1 Term E. 118, 124. In this case it was held that when a charter provided for a fine or amercement, as a punishment for a breach of a by-law, forfeiture could not be substituted. Grand Eapids v. 272 Hughes, 15 Mich. 54; Charleston v. Oliver, 16 S. C. 47; New Orleans v. Costello, 14 La. An. 7; Amite City v. Clements, 24 lb. 27; Columbia V. Hunt, 5 Eich. (S. C.) 550, 558; McMullen v. City Council, 1 Bay (S. C. ) 46 ; Hart V. Mayor etc. , 9 Wend. 571, 588,606; Cotter v. Doty, 5 Ohio, 393 ; Heise v. Town Council, 6 Eich. Law, 404; Miles v. Chamberlain, 17 Wis. 446; Ex parte Hollwedell, 74 Mo. 395. 8 Mayor v. Phelps, 27 Ala. 55 ; State V. Cainan, 94 N. C. 883; State v. Crenshaw, lb. 877; State v. Cantieny, 34 Minn. 1; MoConville v. Jersey City, 39 N. J. L. 38; Haynes v. Cape May, 50 lb. 55; State v. Zeigler, 32 lb. 262 ; Melick v. Washington, 47 lb. 254. OH. IX.] OEDmANCES. § 154 for vagueness, and for attempting to evade the exercise of mu- nicipal discretionary powers.^ In England, when the statute or ordinance gives a discretion, either as to the amount of the fine, or as to any other matter, and this discretion is accepted and exercised by the court, the conviction must show on its face, in what manner the discretion has been exercised.^ While on the one hand, an ordinance fixing a fine at " not more " than a certain sum specified may be void for vagueness, so, an ordinance fixing a minimum fine will be invalid, when the amount imposed is less than the minimum prescribed by law.^ A municipal corporation must exercise its power, to punish violations of its regulations, in a reasonable manner ; and can- not multiply one offence into many, and fine or imprison for each. So, when the ordinance forbade the cutting of cedar trees, and the complaint charged that defendant had cut down a tree and continued to do so from time to time, until he had committed one hundred violations of this ordinance ; the court held that this was but a trespass with a eontinuendo and con- stituted but a single offence.* This policy cannot be pursued by the municipal corporation for the purpose of imposing a heavier penalty than what is allowed by the charter. In all such cases, the acts constitute but one offence, where they con- stitute in fact but one transaction.^ But it is not beyond the power of the municipality to grade the amount of the fine ac- cording to the number of the prohibited acts, even though these acts constitute in law but one criminal offence, provided the legal limit of the fine be not exceeded by the aggregate of fines imposed. A power to impose fines to the extent of one hundred dol- 1 In re Frazee, 63 Mich. 396; State V. Worth, 95 N. C. 615; Same v. Crenshaw, 94 lb. 877; Same v. Cai- nan, 94 lb. 883. "A by-law to be rea- sonable should be certain. If it affixes a penalty for its violation, it would seem that such penalty should be fixed in a certain amount, not left to the officer or court, which is to impose it upon conviction; though a by-law imposing a penalty not ex- ceeding a certain sum has been held 18 273 not to be void for uncertainty." Cooley Const. Lim. 202. 2 Dillon Mun. Corp. §337, citing King V. Priest, 6 T. R. 538, and other English cases. 8 Petersburg V. Metzker, 21 111. 205. * State V. Moultrieville, Rice (Law) 158. * Mayor, etc., of N. T. v. Ordrenau, 12 Johns. 122; Marshall v. Smith, L. R. 8 C. P. 416. § 154 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIOKS. [CH. IX. lars, coupled with the power to regulate the sale of and inspec- tion of flour, was conferred upon a city by its charter. By vir- tue of the latter power, an ordinance was passed imposing a fine of five dollars a barrel for each barrel sold, upon all who should sell flour without inspection. The court held that the penalty of this ordinance could be imposed to the extent that it did not exceed the charter limit of one hundred dollars ; that if a single sale exceeded twenty barrels the penalty of one hundred dollars would be the maximum, while if the quantity sold were less, the fine would be at the rate of five dollars a barrel.^ When a charter contained a specific enumeration of powers, which by express authorization the council could enforce under a penalty of one hundred dollars fine, and the council was at the same time empowered to remove obstructions upon the streets, but with no provisions as to the imposition of penal- ties, an ordinance imposing a continuing fine of ten dollars a day for every day such an obstruction was permitted to remain after notice, was held invalid, upon the ground that the powers enumerated excluded the right to enforce any non-enumerated power by a fine or other penalty .^ The power to imprison the violator of an ordinance or by- law, either in the first instance, or upon the nonpayment of a pecuniary fine or penalty imposed upon him, cannot be inferred, but must be plainly conferred upon a municipal corporation by the lawmaking power of the State ; and when thus granted its exercise must be preceded by a judicial determination of the guilt of the accused.^ Thus, where the charter gave the power to punish "by fines, imprisonment, labor or other penalty pre- scribed by ordinance," the city council could impose either a fine or imprisonment; but in no event could the offender be punished by both. So, also, under such a grant, so strictly is It has also been held that an ordi- nance may require hard labor of one who is imprisoned for refusal to pay a license tax, which had been law- fully assessed against those who were engaged in a certain occupation. Ex parte City Council of Montgom- ery, 64 Ala. 463. For constitutional guaranties see Stimson Amer. Stat §§ 70-78 inc. 1 Chicago V. Quiraby, 38 111. 274. 2 Grand Rapids v. Hughes, 15 Mich. 54. ^ Burlington v. Keller, 18 Iowa, 59; New Orleans v. Costello, 14 La. An. 37; In re Burnett, 35 La. An. 461; Mayor v. Herdt, 40 N. J. L. 264; In- wood V. State, 42 Ohio St. 186; Shef- field V. O'Day, 7 111. App. 339; State V. Ruff, 30 La. An. 497; Board of Trustees v. Schroeder, 58 111. 353. 274 CH. IX.] OEDINAXCES. §155 it construed, that it was held that there existed no power to imprison for the nonpayment of a fine.^ An ordinance, which provides that a person, violating its provisions, shall he fined and imprisoned, or either, will not justify a sentence imposing a fine, or a stated period of labor on the public streets. Such a sentence, being vague, uncertain and in the alternative, will for that reason be illegal and void.^ A municipal ordinance, prescribing a term of imprisonment, the duration of which is to be fixed by the magistrate upon con- viction, and which ma}', but need not necessarily, exceed the limitation authorized by the constitution, may be enforced as long as the magistrate does not exceed the constitutional limits, as to duration of the imprisonment.^ § 155. Forfeitures. — At common law, no municipal corpo- ration could, by virtue of its inherent power to make by-laws, impose the penalty of forfeiture for any infraction of its code.* The rule both in England and in the United States, is that, in order to possess and exercise such a power, it must be by clear implication, if not expressly, conferred b}"- the Legislature.* The power of punishing by a forfeiture of property, even when expressly and positively conferred, cannot be exercised by the municipal authorities in an arbitrary or summary manner. Thus, no one can be deprived of his property by forfeiture, merely by the enactment of an ordinance, and without notice of a legal investigation, at which he may have an opportunity to be heard. Such a method of procedure is not only contrary to ' Brieswick v. Brunswick, 51 Ga. 639; comp. Huddleson v. Ruffin, 6 Ohio St. 604. 2 Ex 2Mrte Martini, 23 Fla. .343. ' Dressel v. Keokuk, 47 Iowa, 591. * In England municipal corpora- tions sometimes possessed the power to decree forfeiture, by usage or pre- scription, which by a fiction of law presupposed an express grant, the record of which had been lost. ^Kirkv. Nowill, 1 Term R. 118, 124; Hart v. Mayor etc. of New York, 9 Wend. 571, 588, 605; Wilcox V. Hemming, 58 Wis. 144; Cincinnati V. Buckingham, 10 Ohio, 257; Mayor etc. of Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137; Taylor v. Carondelet, 22 Mo. 105, 112 ; Bergen v. Clarkson, 1 Halst. (N. J.) 352; White v. Tallman, 26 N. J. L. 67; Baxter v. Com., 3 Pa. (Pen. & W.) 253; Kneedler v. Norristown, 100 Pa. St. 368; Narden v. Mount, 78 Ky. 86; Dunham v. Rochester, 5 Cow. 462; Mayor etc. v. Ordrenau, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 122; Phillips v. Allen, 41 Pa. St. 481; Adley v. Reeves, 2 M. & S. 60; Henke v. McCord, 55 Iowa, 378; Donovan v. Vicksburg, 23 Miss. 247; Miles v. Chamberlain, 17 Wis. 446; Leev. Wallis, 1 Ky. 292; Clerk V. Tucket, 3 Lev. 281; Cotter v. Doty, 5 Ohio,«394; Ridge way v. West, 60 Ind. 371. 275 § 155 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. IX. the genius of our laws and institutions,^ but is explicitly con- demned and forbidden in all the States of the Union by consti- tutional provisions, which guarantee the right of the individual to hold and enjoy his property until deprived of it by due proc- ess of law.^ But the city is not compelled to establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt ; it being sufficient to legalize a for- feiture, that the evidence preponderates in favor of the plain- tiff.^ Corporations have no more right than private persons to constitute themselves . judges in their own cause. So, when a city by ordinance authorized a forfeiture, and sale of all the property, which had been allowed by its owner to remain in a public place longer than a period specified, the ordinance was declared void, as inflicting a forfeiture and divesting the owner of his property, without a legal trial of any sort. Such an ar- bitrary exercise of municipal power will not be countenanced, unless in extreme cases ; as, for example, when it becomes nec- essary to destroy property, which is a nuisance ^er se, in order to protect the health and welfare of the community.* In con- formity with the rule that statutes or ordinances inflicting a penalty must be strictly construed, a city under charter power to fine will not be permitted to impose a forfeiture upon delin- quents. A town council having power to fine, in a sum not exceeding fifty dollars, had special authority conferred upon it to grant licenses to retail liquor dealers. An ordinance having been passed regulating the liquor traffic for the violations of which " a fine of not more than fifty dollars for each offence, and also a forfeiture of the license was imposed," it was held that the license having been granted and paid for was, as respects the municipality, private property ; and that as the council could only impose a fine, it had no power to arbitrarily deprive the licensee of that which was his private property.* 6 Heise v. Town Council, 6 Kich. (S. C.) 404. In this connection it may be noted tliat the forfeiture of a 1 Cotter V, Doty, 5 Ohio, 393, 898; Eosebaugh V. Saffln, 10 lb. 32; Sless- man v. Crozler, 80 Ind. 487. 2 Tiedeman's Limitations of Police Power, §§ 34r-34/. 8 People V. Briggs, 114 K. Y. 56. ■iLanfear v. Mayor, 4 La. An. 97; see Tiedeman's Limitations of Police Power, §§ 139, 141. 276 license by a municipality for a breach of a condition contained in it, (Huber v. Baugh, 43 Iowa, 514) or its termination by the repeal of the State law under which it was granted, is valid. State v. Bonnell, 21 N. E. Eep. 1101. CH. IX.] OEDINANOBS. §155 The courts frequently have occasion to consider the right of municipalities to exercise a power of forfeiture in the case of domestic animals running at large. The right to pronounce a forfeiture must be plainly conferred, and notice must be given before they can be sold or otherwise disposed of by the city.^ Unless the power to pass such is plainly conferred by the Leg- islature, all ordinances, by which it is provided that domestic animals, such as horses, cows or hogs, shall not be allowed by their owners to run at large, upon penalty of having the same forfeited and sold, and the proceeds paid into the city treasury, or divided between the city and the person finding the estray, are invalid and unconstitutional, unless some notice be given so that the owner may have an opportunity of being heard at some stage of the proceeding, and afforded a chance to redeem his property.^ The general rule, that a court of equity will not interfere to give relief against a statutory forfeiture, although it may in the case of a forfeiture imposed by contract, is applicable to municipal forfeitures. As between individual parties to a con- tract, compensation can be awarded by the chancellor to the party entitled to the forfeiture, where the breach is due to some unforeseen accident, and where it constitutes the nonpayment of a sum of money, which can be fully compensated for in 1 Varden v. Mount, 78 Ky. 86; Wil- cox V. Hemming, 58 Wis. 144; Knox- ville V. King, 7 Lea, 441. 2 See ch. viii. § 129 ; Donovan v. Vicksburg, 29 Miss. 247; Spitler v. Young, 63 Mo. 42; Cincinnati v. Buckingham, 10 Ohio, 247; Moore v. State, 11 Lea, 35 ; Poppen v. Holmes, 44 ni. 362; White v. Tallman, 2 Dutch. 67; Darst v. People, 51 111. 286; Bullock v. Glomple, 45 lb. 360; Heise v. Columbia, 6 Rich. 404; Wil- lis V. Legris, 45 111. 289; McKee v. McKee, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 433 ; Gilchrist V. Schmidling, 12 Kan. 263; Wilson y. Bryers, 5 Wash. St. 303; 32 Pac. R. 90; Hanscom v. Bermod, 53 N. W. R.371; 35 Neb. 504; White v. Brinim, 48 Mo. App. Ill ; Bowers v. Horan, 93 Mich. 420; 53 N. W. R. 535; Jarman V. Patterson, 7 B. Mon. 647; Gosse- linck V. Campbell, 4 Iowa, 296 ; Port Smith V. Dodson, 46 Ark. 296; Whit- field v. Longest, 6 Ire. Law, 268; Rose V. Hardie, 98 X. C. 44; Hellen V. Noe, 3 Ire. Law, 493. " The ordi- nance commands the marshal to seize and impound the hogs, and then, without any reserve, without any notice, by means of which the owner might be able to exculpate himself, directs them to be sold and the proceeds placed in the city treas- ury. Such an ordinance is as con- trary to the spirit of the charter (Cincinnati) as it is alien from the general genius of our institutions." Grimke, J., in Rosebaugh v. Saffin, 10 Ohio, 33, 37. 277 § 156 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. tX. money.^ But not even under such circumstances will a court of equity grant relief from a valid forfeiture, incurred through the infraction of a penal statute.'-^ § 156. Procedure to enforce ordinances — Arrest. — la England, prior to the Corporation Act of 1835, the authority of the municipal corporation to enact by-laws, always rested upon implication of law. By that act, the municipal council was empowered to make such by-laws as were necessary for the prevention and suppression of all nuisances, not punishable by act of Parliament. The corporation was also given the power to impose fines in a sum not to exceed five pounds. The act also prescribes that prosecution for the breach of any ordinance shall be begun within three months after the offence has occurred ; and that the charge shall be made on oath ; sum- mons also must be served, but the magistrate may proceed without the appearance of the defendant, and may issue a war- rant for his arrest. Upon conviction, the fine must be paid at once, unless the magistrate shall consider it proper to extend the time. If the fine is not paid, its payment may be enforced by a distress and sale ; and for want of sufficient goods to dis- train, the offender may be imprisoned for a period not to exceed one month, but which may be terminated upon the payment of the sum due. At the common law, the method of enforcing an ordinance was by an action by the municipal corporation or proper official against the offender, to recover the penalty im- posed for the violation of the ordinance. This action was, in form, either debt or assumpsit. The action of assumpsit was employed in the recovery of penalties, upon the theory that there had been a breach of the duty which, by a fiction of law, the defendant had promised the plaintiff to perform. The action of debt could be employ- ed because the penalty was a sum certain, and in the nature of liquidated damages. And when it was expressly provided, that the penalty should be recovered by an action of debt, that form was exclusive, and no other could be employed. Unless permitted by custom or statute, a city or town could 1 Tiedeman on Equity Jur. § 180. 2 Taylor v. Carondelet, 22 Mo. 105 ; Peachey V. Somerset, 1 Str. 447; Gor- man v. Low, 2 Ed w. Ch. 324; Keat- 278 ing V. Sparrow, 1 Ball & Beat. 367; State V. Railroad Co., 3 How. (U. S.) 534. CH. IX.] ORDQIAl^CBS. §156 not, by a by-law, prescribe that the penalty should be recovered by distress and sale.^ Where the mode of procedure to en- force ordinances is prescribed by statute or charter, that mode must be pursued.^ But when no statutory method is prescrib- ed, the common law remedy by an action of debt or assumpsit as above outlined, may be adopted ; or where the common law forms have been abolished, the statutory civil action is the proper remedy .^ Unless expressly forbidden by statute, mu- nicipal corporations have the inherent power to provide for an action of debt, to recover a penalty in their own courts.* In every case where it is sgught to recover the amount of a fine or penalty by the method above described, the proceeding is civil rather than criminal ; and the rules of civil procedure are generally applicable.^ When the method of procedure to enforce the payment of a fine or penalty is not by a suit at law, but by flomplaint before a municipal magistrate, who is to de- termine the matter and impose a fine, the proceedings have been sometimes deemed to be of a criminal or quasi criminal nature. In such proceedings, if the statute designates with certainty the purpose to which the fine is to be appropriated, it is enough for the magistrate to impose a fine, to be paid and applied according to the statute.^ But if the magistrate in his 1 Adley v. Beeves, 2 M. & S. 61. See White v. Tallman, (N. J.) 2 Dutch. 67; and Berger v. Clarkson, (N. J.) 1 Halst. 352 ; Bodwic v. Fennell, 1 Wils. 233. As to common law procedure to recover fines in United States, see Jacksonville V. Holland, 19 III. 271; Columhia v. Harrison, 2 Mills Const. (S. C.) 213; Brookville v. Gagle, 73 Ind. 117. 2 Coonley v. Albany, 132 K T. 145; State V. Zeigler, 32 IST. J. L. 262 ; Lan- sing V. Chicago, etc., Co., 52 N. W. K. 195; Bolter v. New Orleans, 10 La. An. 321; Ewbanks v. Ashley, 36 111. 177; Israel v. Jacksonville, 2 lb. 290; Earnhart v. Lebanon, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 578; Williamson v. Com., 4 B. Hon. 146, 151; Charleston v. Ash- ley P. Co., 34 S. C. 541. 8N. T. Consol. Act, §§216, 1290; Coates v. Mayor, 7 Cow. 585, 608; Ewbanks v. Ashley, supra ; Israel v. Jacksonville, supra ; N. T. Code Civ. Pro. § 3215. * Hesketh v. Braddock, 3 Burr. 1858; Barter v. Com., 3 Pa. 353. *DeSoto V. Brown, 40 Mo. App. 148; St. Louis v. Vert, 84 Mo. 204; Miller v. O'EeiUy, 84 Ind. 168; Brophy v. Perth Amboy, 44 K. J. L. 217; In re Miller, 44 Mo. App. 125; Williamson v. Commonwealth, 4 B. Mon. 146, 151 ; Lewiston v. Procter, 27 111. 414; Quincy v. Ballance, 30 lb. 185 ; Davenport v. Bird, 34 Iowa, 524. The King v. Thompson, 2 T. E. 18; The King v. Hyde, 21 L. J. May. Cas. 94; In re Boothroyd, 15 M. & W. 1; State v. Keenan, 57 Conn. 286; Queen v. Cridland, 7 E. & B. 853; King V. Glassop, 4 B. & A. 616; Sea- men's Hospital V. Liverpool, 4 Ex. 180. 279 §156 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. IX. judgment of conviction appropriates the fine to some purpose different from what the statute prescribed, which amounts to a material variance between it and the statutory appropriation, tlie conviction will be bad.^ The question of the civil or criminal nature of the judicial proceeding to collect a fine, becomes of some importance, when the right of a trial by a jury is contended for. In all of the States tliere is a constitutional provision, guaranteeing to the accused a trial by jury; although in several of them, qualifica- tions are made, in the case of suits to recover small sums, and of prosecutions for petty offences.^ In a case, where the guar- anty of the inviolability of the right of trial by jury in criminal prosecutions was absolute, the court held that a prosecution to I'ecover a fine incurred by the infraction of an ordinance, not being in the nature of a criminal prosecution, was not within the constitution.** So, too, it has been held that the'require- ment of security for costs in a prosecution under a penal statute has no application to prosecutions for violations of municipal by-laws.* On the other hand, in many of the States such prosecutions are not regarded as civil actions, brought by the city to en- force a private right ; ^ but as substantially public prosecu- 1 Griffiths V. Harries, 2 M. & W. 335; Chaddock v. Wilbraliam, 5 C. B. 645. 2 See Stimpson Amer. Statutes, §§ 72, 132. 3 Williams v. Augusta, 4 Ga. 509. In this case, the court said: " Inas- much as the right of trial by jury existed in England, and was secured by Magna Charta, and municipal cor- porations in that country enforced their by-laws by pecuniary penalties in a summary manner, and the same right being conferred upon similar corporations in this State, anterior to the adoption of the constitution, and constantly exercised; the right of trial by jury, as heretofore used in this State was not violated by the city council of Augusta by the im- position of the penalty for the breach of the local police regulations of the 280 city." See, also, to same effect, By- ers V. Com., 42 Pa. St. 89, 94; Low V. Com'rs etc., R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 316; Flint R. S. Co. v. Foster, 5 lb. 194; Floyd v. Com'rs etc., 14 lb. 354; Kip v. Paterson, 2 Dutch. 298; Keeler v. Milledge, 24 X. J. L. 142; Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331; Dun- more's App., 52 Pa. St. 96; Com. v. Borden, 61 lb. 272; Plimpton v. Som- erset, 33 Vt. 283; Wayne Co. v. De- troit, 17 Mich. 390; People v. Same, 18 lb. 445 ; Charleston v. Oliver, 16 S. C. 47; Goshen v. Croxton, 34Ind. 239. 4 Lewiston v. Proctor, 27 III. 414; Quincy v. Ballaus, 30 lb. 185; Alton V. Kirsch, 68 lb. 261. 6 In re Goddard, 16 Pick. 504; Pax- son V. Sweet, 1 J. S. Green (N. J.) 200. CH. IX. J OEDINAiTCBS. § 157 tions or ciirainal proceedings,^ in which it is authorized tc disallow the defendant costs.^ And the fact, that the defend- ant does not receive costs upon his acquittal, does not render ujiconstitutional a statute, providing for prosecutions in the name of the commonwealth of those who violate municipal ordinances.' Police officers, city marshals, or other municipal officials, may be empowered hj ordinances to arrest without warrant, offend- ers against city ordinances or regulations (unless expressly for- bidden to do so by the constitution or the statutory law) for an offence committed in their presence, when such an arrest is pre- liminary to a judicial determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.* But an ordinance, empowering an officer to arrest any person refusing to obey an order given at a fire, and to detain such person until the fire is extinguished, was uncon- stitutiohal, as depriving him of his liberty without due process of law.* The genei'al power to make arrests, with or without warrant, is more fully presented elsewhere.^ § 157. Action in name of corporation. — At common law, when the clause imposing the penalty was couched in general terms, the suit or prosecution to enforce the ordinance was as a general rule required to be brought in the name of the mu- nicipality. But it veiy frequently happened, that the ordi- nance or by-law conferred the right or privilege, of bringing an action for the purpose of recovering the fine incurred for its breach, upon some particular officer of the corporation, who was thereby empowered to recover the same and appropriate it to some designated official purpose. And, although the power of recovering the penalty could not be conferred by the city upon a stranger, yet the penalty itself might be given by the ordinance, wholly or in part, to an informer.'' estate V. Stearns, 31 N. H. 30fi; Mobile v. Jones, 42 Ala. 630; Fink V. Milwaukee, lY Wis. 26. 2 Com. V. Gay, 5 Pick. 44; Cora. v. Fahey, 5 Cush. 408. 8 In re Goddard, 16 Pick. 504. * Bryan v. Bates, 15 111. 87; Main V. McCarthy, 15 111. 442; State v. Laf- ferty, 5 Harring. 491 ; Newark v. Mur- pliy, 40 N. J. L. 145 ; Mitchell v. Lem- on, 34 Md. 176; Butolph v. Blust, 5 Lans. 84. ^ Johnson v. Eeardon, 16 Minu. 431. » Sec. 89. ' Feltmakers Co. v. Davis, 1 B. & P. 101; Boduri v. Fennell, 1 Wils. 233; Totterdell v. Glazby, 2 lb. 226; Hesketh v. Braddock, 3 Burr, 1348; Wood V. Searl, Bridg. 141; Graves V. Colby, 9 Ad. & El. 356; Vintners V. Passey, 1 Burr, 235; Williamson V. Cora., 4 B. Mon. 146, 151. 281 ^158 MTTNIOIPAIi COEPOEATIONS. [CH. IX. If a municipal official is authorized to bring an action in his own name, it wiU not be necessary for him to plead his election or appointment. It is sufficient for him to aver, that he is the official who is authorized by the ordinance to sue.^ § 158. Pleading ordinances. — Judicial tribunals, other than municipal courts,^ do not take judicial notice of municipal or- dinances.^ For this reason, when it is sought to enforce an ordinance, or when one is relied upon by the defendant as a justification, it is necessary that it should be specially pleaded. It is ordinarily sufficient under the liberal modern rules, ap- plicable to pleading, to set forth plainly and concisely the legal substance of that part of the ordinance, which it is desired to enforce, or which is relied upon for justification ; adding, for pur- poses of identification, the title, date of passage, and section.* In an action to enforce a by-law, it is necessary to allege facts, showing a breach thei'eof,^ and to set forth the offence charged with reasonable clearness and certainty,® so that de- 1 Harris v. Wakeman, Say. 254; Exeter v. Starre, 2 Show. 159; Watts V. Scott, 1 Dev. (N". C.) 291; Com. v. Fahey, 5 Cush. 408. 2 Western R. Co. v. Young, 7 S. E. R. 912; Garland v. Denver, (Col. 90) 19 Pac. R. 460; Conboy v. Iowa City, 2 Iowa, 90; Anderson v. Don- nell, 7 S. E. R. .523. ^ See cases cited in last note, and Austin V. Walton, 68 Tex. 507; Wheel- ing V. Black, 25 W. Va. 266; People V. Buchanan, 1 Idaho, 681; People V. Mayor, etc., 7 How. Pr. 81; Coxv. St. Louis, 11 Mo. 431; Gar- vin V. Wells, 8 Iowa, 286; Mooney V. Kennett, 19 Mo. 551 ; New Orleans V. Boudro, 14 La. An. 303; Case v. Mobile, 30 Ala. 538. * Cora. V. Odenweller, (Mass. 92) SON. E. R. 1022; Mooney v. Ken- neth, 19 Mo. 551; Austin v. Walton, 68 Tex. 507; Case v. Mobile, 30 Ala. 538; Charleston v. Chur, 2 Bailey (S. C.) 164; Miles v. Kern, (Mont. 92) 29 Pac. R. 720; Emporia v. Vol- mer, 12 Kan. 622, 628; Stokes v. Cor- poration of N. Y., 14 Wend. 87; Cox 282 V. St. Louis, 11 Mo. 431; Barker v. New York, 17 Wend. 199; Kip v. Paterson, 2 Dutch. 298. ^ Time and manner of violation es- sential: State V. Trenton, 36 N. J. L. 283; Hendersonville v. McMinn, 82 N. C. 532. Ordinance need not be recited in full: Emporia v. Volmer, 12 Kan. 622; Goldthwaite v. Mont- gomery, 50 Ala. 486; St Louis v. Smith, 10 Mo. 438; nor section: Meyer v. Bridgeton, 37 N. J. L. 160. « State V. Baker, (La. 92) 10 So. 405; State v. Camden, (N. J. 92) 19 Atl. R. 539; Com. v. Bean, Thacb. (Mass. Crim. Cas.) 85; Eink v. Mil- waukee, 17 Wis. 26; Johnson v. Win- field, 48 Kan. 129; Frankfort v. Aughe, 15 N. E. Rep. 802; Whiston V. Franklin, 34 Ind. 392; State v. Cainan, 94 N. C. 880; Woods v. Primeville, (Or. 92) 23 Pac. B. 880; Napmau v. People, 19 Mich. 352; Goshen v. Croxton, 34 Ind. 239; Carr v. Couyers, 10 S. E. R. 630; 84 Ga. 287; Keeler v. Milledge, 4 Zabr. (24 N. J. L.) 142; Van Buren v. Wells, (Ark. 92) 14 S. W. R. 38. CH. IX.] ORDINANCES. §159 fendant's liability may clearly appear.^ But no such degree of strictness is required in forming a complaint for the violation of an ordinance, as is required in the case of an information or indictment. But a charge, that defendant committed an offence contrary to an ordinance of the town,^ or that he knowingly associated with thieves, no names of persons or places being given,^ will be dismissed for vagueness. It is not necessary to aver that defendant had notice of the ordinance, such notice being conclusively presumed,* nor that a demand of obedience to the ordinance has been made, unless a previous demand is absolutely and positively required.* It has been held, however, that a defective complaint, in an action to enforce a municipal ordinance, will be cured by the defendant pleading not guilty, and proceeding to a trial on the merits." Penalties for several breaches of one ordinance may be sued for in the same action, provided the total amount of the judg- ment asked for will not take the cause out of the magistrate's jurisdiction.'^ § 159. Yalidity of ordinances a question of law — Construc- tion. — The reasonableness, fairness and justice of a municipal ordinance, are questions of law for the judge, and not the jury, to determine. But in deciding these questions the judge must take into consideration all the circumstances of the case, in- cluding the condition of the municipality, the necessity for the by-law, the object sought by its enactment, and its relation to the State and Federal Constitutions and laws. It is very evi- dent that ordinances and regulations, admirablj^ adapted to a large commercial city or populous manufacturing town, would be very unreasonable and out of place in sparsely populated rural villages and towns.* Hence, the rule of construction has ' State V. Carpenter, 22 Atl. R. 497; 60 Conn. 97; Case v. Mobile, 30 Ala. 538; Coates v. Mayor, 7 Cow. 585, 608; State v. Baker, 10 So. K. 405; Com. V. Cutter, (Mass. 92) 29 N. E. E. 1146; Johnson v. "Winiield, 48 Kan. 129; 29 Pac. K. 559. 2 Memphis v. O' Conner, 53 Mo. 468. "St. Louis V. Fitz, 53 Mo. 582. ' London v. Bernardiston, 1 Lev. 16. * Butchers' Co. v. Bullock, 3 Bos. & P. 434, 437. 6 State V. Welch, 21 Minn. 22. ' Hensoldt v. Petersburgh, 63 111. 111. 8Kuhn V. Chicago, 30 111. App. 203; State v. Miller, 41 La. An. 53; Frazee's Case, 30 N. W. E. 72; 63 Mich. 396; State v. Heidenhain, 7 So. E. 621; Heller v. Alvaredo, (Tex. 93) 20 S. W. R. 1003; Dunham v. Eoclies- ter, 5 Cow. K. Y. 462; Woodward v. Boscobel, (Wis. 93) 54 N. W. E. 332; Kneedler v. Norristown, 100 Pa. 283 §159 MUNICIPAL COEPOBATIONS. [CH. IX. been adopted that, when a municipality has enacted an ordi- nance in the exercise of a valid power, the court will be slow to pronounce such an ordinance to be oppressive, and will give the municipality the benefit of any insoluble doubt.^ And it has been held that, where the Legislature expressly grants to a municipal corporation the power to do a particular act, the courts are not permitted to inquire into the reasonableness of the authorized act, although that would be a legitimate inquiry, if the act were attempted, not in pursuance of an express legis- lative authority, but under the general authority to enact all needful ordinances and regulations.^ It is not believed that this can now be considered as sound law, in the light of the fact that the courts unhesitatingly pronounce acts of the Leg- islature to be unconstitutional and void, on account of their un- reasonableness ; as, for example, where the maximum tariff of railroad charges does not admit of a reasonable profit.^ Neither public nor judicial opinion now agree with Judge Napton, in the Missouri case, quoted in the note below, that it would be an unwarrantable aifronttothe Legislature to declare their offi- cial act to be against public policy. In consequence of the ex- tension of governmental powers, now occasioned by the spread of socialistic doctrines, the courts are compelled, in the inter- ests of vested rights, to pronounce unreasonable regulations to be for that reason unconstitutional and void. It is, therefore. St. 368; Com. v. Worcester, 3 Pick. 462; Paxson v. Sweet, 1 Green (N. J.) 196; III re Vandlue, 6 Pick. 187; Boston V. Shaw, 1 Met. 130, 135 ; Aus- tin v. Murray, 16 Pick. 121, 125; Hud- son V. Tliorne, 7 Paige Cli. (N. T.) 261. But see Clausen V. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 316. iPisber v. Harrisbvirg, 2 Grant, 291; St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547; Com. V. Robinson, 5 Gush. 438, 442; Poulters Co. v. Phillips, 6 Bing. N. C. 314; St. Paul v. Colter, 12 Minn. 41; Com. v. Patch, 97 Mass. 221. 2 St. Paul V. Colter, 12 Minn. 41; Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 N. Y. 591, 596; A Coal Float v. Jeffersonville, 112 Ind. 15; Breninger v. Belvedere, 44 N. J. L. 350; Peoria v. Cal- 284 houn, 29 111. 317; State v. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17, 36; Haynes v. Cape May, 50 N". J. L. 55 ; District v. Waggaman, 4 Mackey, 328. In State v. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17, 36, Judge Napton said: " It is naked assumption to say that any matter allowed by the Legisla- ture is against public policy. The best indications of public policy are to be found in the enactments of the Legislature. To say that such a law is of unusual tendency is disrespect- ful to the Legislature, who, no doubt, designed to promote the morals and health of the citizens. Whether the ordinance in question is calculated to promote the object is a question with which the courts have no concern." ^ See cases cited in § 150. CH. IX.] ORDINANCES. § 160 not safe, in the present connection, to go beyond the statement that the courts would not be so readily inclined to pronounce an ordinance to be unreasonable, which had been enacted in pursuance of an express delegation of power, as where the or- dinance had been enacted under the " general welfare " clause of the charter. Ordinances are not ordinarily considered to be of the character of penal statutes ; for the penalty imposed is but liquidated damages, which may be and usually is, recovered in a civil action, brought against the wrongdoer. For this rea- son, the same degree of strictness and technicality is not ob- served in the construction of ordinances, which the courts have uniformly employed in the construction of penal stat- utes.^ When it is remembered that the by-laws of corpora- tions of all kinds, and particularly the ordinances of towns and villages, are frequently drawn up by men having little ac- quaintance with the niceties of legal phraseologj', the necessity for a reasonable, rather than a technical construction, becomes apparent.^ As with statutes, the title and the body of the ordinance may be construed together, in order to ascertain its meaning.^ And contemporary opinion of the meaning of the ordinance is of the highest value.* If, however, the ordinance, by reason of its general character and purpose, and the largeness of the fine imposed, assimilates to a penal statute, it ought to be, and usu- ally will be, construed, especially when enforced by a criminal proceeding, with the same degree of strictness as a statutory enactment imposing a penalty.^ § 160. Evidence — Defences. — The rules of evidence, ap- plicable in all judicial proceedings, are employed in prosecu- tions to enforce ordinances, except to the extent that they have been modified by statutory enactment ; *' and the corporation will be estopped by the same acts and upon the same grounds, as would a private individual be under similar circumstances. ' See, iu support of the general propositions of the text, Municipal- ity V. Cutting, 4 La. An. 335 ; Mer- riam v. New Orleans, 14 lb. 318; Loze V. Mayor etc., 2 lb. 427; Balti- more V. Clunet, 23 Md. 449. 2 Whitlock V. West, 26 Conn. 406. ' Martindale v. Palmer, 52 Ind. 411 . * State V. Severance, 49 Mo. 401. sKriokle V. Com., 1 B. Mon. 261; State V. Paris Ry. Co., 55 Tex. 76; Pacific V. Seifert, 79 Mo. 210. <* City Council v. Dunn, 1 McCord (S. C. ) 333; Fitch v. Pinckard, 4 Scam. (5 111.) 78. 285 § 161 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. IX. Thus, when a city had received the fee paid for a liquor license, which had been granted by its de facto official, and had re- tained and used the same, it was estopped by that fact from main- taining an action to recover a penalty for selling liquor without a license.^ And it may be said that, as a general rule, any ac- tion on the part of municipal officials, which is within the power of the municipal corporation, and which has induced another party to act to his own disadvantage, with a corre- sponding gain to the corporation, will estop the municipality from retracting or denying what its officers have done.^ In a civil proceeding, the defendant's admission that he has violated the ordinance is admissible in evidence against him.' As an exception to the well known rule, it has been held that the granting of a license, after a suit has been commenced to recover a penalty for acting without it, even though the license is worded so as to take effect previous to the commission of the offence, does not legalize it or waive the city's right to recover the penalty.* The illegality of the municipal charter cabnot be given in evidence, as a matter of defence, in an action to enforce a penalty ; such a question cannot be raised in a collat- eral proceeding.® § 161. Kepealing ordinances. — Although a valid municipal ordinance will never become obsolete because it is not enforced, it may at any time be repealed directly or inferentially by the corporation, or by the Legislature. The power to enact implies the power to repeal.^ And the repeal need not be express ; for a clause in an ordinance, which is repugnant to previous munic- > Martel v. East St. Louis, 94 111. 67; 21 Alb. L. J. 195. ^Eobyv. Chicago, 64 111. 447; Chi- cago, R. I. & P. E. Co. V. Joliet, 79 lb. 39; Logan Co. v. Lincoln, 81 lb. 156; seeposS, §§169, 195. '^ Columbia v. Harrison, 2 Const. R. (S. C.) 213. * City Council v. Feldman, 3 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 385; City Council v. Schmidt, 11 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 343. sDecorah v. Gillis, 10 Iowa, 234; Kettering v. Jacksonville, 50 111. 39; Tisdale v. Minouk, 46 lb. 9; Ilarden- brook V. Ligonier, 95 lud. 70; Coles Co, V. Allison, 23 111. 437. 286 « Waukesha Hy. M. S. Co. v. Wau- kesha, (Wis. 93) 53 N. W. R. 675; Greeley v. Jacksonville, 17 Fla. 174; In re MolUe Hall, 10 Neb. 537; Kan- sas City V. White, 69 Mo. 261; Santo V. State, 2 Iowa, 165 ; East St. Louis etc. Co. V. E. St. Louis, 31 111. App. 398; hi re Great West. Ry. Co. etc., 23 Up. Can. C. P. 28; Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean, 158; Gormleyv. Day, 114 111. 185; 28 N. E. R. 693; Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467; Rice v. Poster, 4 Harring. (Del.) 470; People v. Collins, 3 Mich. 347; Welch v. Bowen, 103 Ind. 552. CH. IX.] ORDINANCES. §162 ipal legislation, will repeal the prior ordinance so far as it may be inconsistent therewith.^ But the repeal of an ordinance cannot act retrospectively, so as to divest a person of a vested right v^hich he had already acquired under the ordinance, which violated no constitutional lestriction upon the power of the State or municipality, to create vested rights in derogation of public interests.^ While subsequent constitutional or statutory enactments will, if inconsistent with it, repeal by inference an existing ordinance,^ an act changing an incorporated town into a city will not, it has been held, necessarily have this effect.* The rule, that the repeal of a statute does not put an end to a pending prosecution for a past infraction of it does not apply to municipal ordinances.® The repeal of the ordinance puts an end to a pending prosecution under it, unless a saving clause be inserted in the repealing ordinance or statute. § 162. Katiflcation of invalid ordinances by Legislature. — The State Legislature may validate ordinances which are not in conflict with the constitution, but which for any reason are not binding. But when the invalidity of an ordinance is thus cured, a prosecution for an infraction should be brought under the ordinance, and not under the curative act.® ^Mx parte Wolf, 14 Neb. 24; Bur- lington V. Est. Law, 43 N. J. L. 13. 2 Ashton V. Rochester, 14 N. Y. S. 855; Cape May etc. Co. v. Cape May, 35 N. J. Eq. 419; People v. O'Brien, 111 N. T. 1 ; Cunningham v. Almonte, 21 Up. Can. C. P. 459; Stoddard v. Gilman, 22 Vt. 568; Pond v. Negus, 3 Mass. 230; Pardridge v. Hyde Park, 23 N. E. R. 345; 131 111. 5.37; Ter- re Haute v. Lake, 43 Ind. 480; State V. City Clerk, 7 Ohio St. 355 ; State V. Graves, 19 Md. 351; Bigelow V. Hillman, 37 Me. 521 ; Hyde Park v. Corwith, 12 N. E. R. 238; Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 U.S. 716; Louisiana v. Pillsbury, 105 lb. 278. The rule in the text is subject to the limitation, incumbent upon munici- palities, that they cannot bargain away by ordinance their responsibil- ity for the suppression of nuisances and for the protection of the health and safety of the community. ^Mobile V. Dargan, 45 Ala. 310. On this general subject, see ante, §§ 33, 34. * Erie Academy Trus. v. Erie, 31 Pa. St. 515 ; see ante, §§ 32, 58, 59. ^Naylorv. Galesburg, 56 111. 285; Earnhart v. Lebanon, 5 Ohio Cir. 578; Junction T. Webb, (Kan. 91) 2:5 Pac. E. 1073; Kansas City v. Clark, 68 Mo. 588; Barton v. Gadsden, 79 Ala. 495. 6Devers v. York, 1.50 Pa. St. 208; 30 W. N. C. 390; Schonley v. Com., 36 Pa. St. 29;Mattingly v. District, 97 U. S. 687; McMillen v. Boyles, 6 Iowa, 304; Frederick v. Augusta, 5 Ga. 561; Winn v. Macon, 21 Ga. 275; Logansport v. Crockett, 64 Ind. 319. 287 CHAPTER X. MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. Section. 163 — Inherent or implied power to contract. 164 — Implied contracts. 165 — Mode of contracting, writing or seal when necessary — Statute of frauds. 166 — ^Municipal contracts with its agents. 167 — Form of contracts made by municipal agents. 168 — Non-liability of public offi- cial acting within his au- thority. 169 — Authority of municipal offi- cials to contract — Ultra vi- res. Section. 170 — Ratification, what consti- tutes. 171 — Contracts for public works — Contractor' s bond — Pay- ment. 172 — Advertising and letting to lowest bidders — Patented articles. 173 — B ids — S e a 1 e d proposals— Taxpayer's remedy — Fraud in bidding. 174 — Annulment of contracts — Corporate control of work. 175 — Contracts for water supply. 176 — Contracts with attorneys at law. § 163. Inherent or implied power to contract — A munic- ipal corporation may, unless restricted by charter or State stat- ute, enter into any contract which may be necessary to the execution of the powers and functions conferred upon it by its charter, and may sue or be sued upon the same.^ The general power to contract, in furtherance of corporate purposes, is in- herent in all classes of corporations, both public and private.^ Under a general power to contract, liquidated damages maybe 1 Galveston v. Loonie, 54 Tex. 517 ; Smith V. Stephau, 66 Md. 381 ; Moutg. Co. V. Barber, 45 Ala. 237; Indian- apolis V. Gas Co., 66 Ind. 396; Bate- man V. Ashton, 3 H. & N. 322; Sie- brecht v. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 496; Bank v. Patterson, 7 Cranch, 299; Goodrich v. Detroit, 12 Mich. 279; Chaffee v. Granger, 6 lb. 51; Douglass V. Virginia City, 5 Nev. 147 ; Galena v. Corinth, 48 111. 423 ; Strauss V. Eagle I. Co., 5 Ohio St. 59; Eae v. 288 Mayor, 51 Mich. 526; Albright v, Council, 9 Rich. L. (S. C.) 399; Wil- liamsport v. Com., 84 Pa. St. 487 "Wells V. Atlanta, 43 Ga. 67; Jones V. Richmond, 18 Gratt. 517; Bren- ham V. Brenham W. P. Co., 67 Tex, 542; Robinson V. St. Louis, 28 Mo, 488; Gregory V. Bridgeport, 41 Conn, 76. 2 Pullman v. Mayor, 54 Barb. 169 Portland L. etc. Co. v. East Portland, (Greg.) 22 Pac. Rep. 536. CH. X.J MUKICIPAL CONTRACTS. §163 agreed on and the sum inserted in the contract.^ Usually, the power to contract is conferred in general terms in the char- ter ; leaving the extent of the power, and the mode in which it is to be exercised, to be ascertained by a consideration of the corporate needs in that direction, and the limitations and re- strictions, if any, to be found in the general statutes of the State. Express provisions of charter or statute modify the inherent or conferred general power to contract, and consequently de- serve the carefulest consideration, in determining the scope of the general powers. And, furthermore, too much emphasis cannot be given to the rule, that any power to contract, whether conferred upon or inherent in a corporation, does not authorize the making of every sort of contract ; but of such only as are fit, usual and necessary, to enable the corporation to carry into effect the purposes for which it was chartered. Under a gen- eral authority to make all contracts necessary for its welfare,^ and to pass ordinances necessary for the security and welfare of its inhabitants, a city may contract for a water supply,^ the furnishing of pure water being the duty of the city and a di- rect corporate purpose.* But a municipality has no power, by virtue of any mere general grant, to contract for a permanent and exclusive water supply,^ although if by express statutory authority it has power " to pi'ovide a supply of water," it has been held that this may be done.® As further illustrations of the classes of contracts, to which a municipal corporation may become a party, under a general authority to make necessary contracts for its welfare, may be cited, contracts for lighting'' and grading streets;^ for building sidewHlks,^ and a break- water, to protect city streets.^'* The question has arisen whether a city can make a contract with a private person, by which public property, designed and generally employed for public ' Parr v. Greenbush, 42 Hun, 2.32. 2 Cabot V. Rome, 28 Ga. 50; Wells V. Atlanta, 43 lb. 67; Livingston v. Pippin, 31 Ala. 542; Hale v. Hough- ton, 8 Mich. 458. » Indianapolis Gas Co., 66 Ind. 396. *Nichol V. Mayor, 9 Hun, 268; Grant v. Davenport, 36 lovya, 402. 5 Greenville W. Works v. Green- ville, (Miss.) 1 So. Rep. 409. 19 » Atl. City Water Wks. v. Atlantic City, 39 N. J. Eq. 367. 'Indianapolis v. Gas Co., 66 Ind. 396. ^Sturtevant v. Atton, 3 McLean. 393. 9 Wyandotte v. Zeitz, 21 Kan. 649; Lawrence v. Killam, 11 lb. 512. 10 Miller v. Milw., 14 Wis. 642; Clason V. Milw., 30 lb. 316, 322. 289 §164 MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS. [CH. X. purposes, can be employed for the private advantage of an in- dividual. It has been held that, although a city can make no contract with a private person or corporation for the discharge of its public duty, it may when in possession of instrumental- ities for this purpose, hire them out for use in private service, when the public use does not require tlieui.i Municipal cor- porations have all the powers of ordinary persons in regard to the contracts they are authorized to make, except when spe- cially restricted. Hence, it follows that they may be sued, or sue thereon, in the same manner as individuals.''^ § 164. Implied contracts. — Municipal corporations may be held liable upon implied contracts, where the subject-matter is within their powers ; and these contracts may arise from the performance of certain corporate acts, without vote, deed or writing.^ The theory of an implied contract, here as at common law, rests upon the legal fiction that there had been an indefinite promise to answer for a certain class of obligations, which are considered to be equitable and just claims against the implied obligor. The promise was implied, because the common law authorities declared that all actions must arise ex contractu and ex delicto ; and when in the absence of a delictum^ which they construed as a synonym of a trespass, and of any express agree- 1 The Maggie P., 25 Fed. Eep. 202. 2 Agnew V. Brail, 124111. 312; Wes- tern Sav. Fd. V. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 175; Strauss v. Eagle Ins. Co., 5 Ohio St. 59; Semmes v. Columbus, 19 Ga. 471; New Orleans v. St. Louis Church, 11 La. An. 244; Sebreoht v. New Orleans, 12 lb. 496; Hight v. Monroe Co., 68 Ind. 576; Jackson Co. V. Applewhite, 62 lb. 464; Cullen v. Carthage, 103 lb. 196. ^Dil. Muu. Corp. §459; Bank v. Patterson, 7 Cranch, 299;. Seagreaves V. Alton, 13 111. 366; Call Pub. Co. V. Lincoln, (Neb.) 45 N. W. Eep. 245; Adams v. Farnsworth, 15 Gray, 423 ; Crowder v. Sullivan, (Ind.) 28 N. E. Eep. 94; Roodhouse v. Jennings, 29 111. App. 50; Peterson v. Mayor, 17 N. T. 449; Maher v. Chicago, 38 111. 290 266; Frankfort B. Co. v. Frankfort, 18 B. Mon. 41 ; Railroad Co. v. Athens (Ga.) 11 S. E. Rep. 663; Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex. 532; Canaan v. Derush, 47 N. H. 212; Ellsworth v. Rossiter, (Kan. 90) 26 Pae. Rep. 274; Michigan City V. Boeclding, 122 Ind. 39; Davis V. Jackson, 61 Mich. 530; Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 74; Bissell v. R. R., 22 N. Y. 2681 Backman v. Charlestown, 42 N. H. 125; St. Louis V. Gas Co., 98 111. 415; Brown v. Belleville, 30 Up. Can. Q. B. 373; Wentworth v. Hamilton, 34 lb. 585; Brown v. Lindsey, 35 lb. 509; East St. Louis V. Gas Co., 98 111. 415; State Brd. V. Aberdeen, 56 Miss. 518. But see Sohell City v. Rumsey, 39 Mo. App. 264; Spitzer v. Blanchard, 82 Mich. 234. OH. X.J MUNICIPAL CONTiiACTS. § 164 ment to do anything, a party was in equity and conscience bound to compensate another for services rendered, or favors bestowed, the proper action was declared to be ex contractu, and the neces- sary contract or promise was implied. The more correct and plainer statement is that the implied contract is an obligation or duty imposed bj' law ; and the only occasion for the implica- tion of a contract, is the false statement, that all actions must arise ex contractu or ex delicto. " The doctrine of implied municipal liability applies to cases where money or other pi'operty of a party is received under such circumstances that the general law, independent of ex- press contract, imposes the obligation upon the city to do jus- tice with respect to the same. If the cit}'' obtain money of another by mistake, or without authority of law it is her duty to refund, not from any contract entered into by her on the sub- ject, but from the general obligation to do justice which binds all persons whether natural or artificial. If the city obtain other property which does not belong to her, it is her duty to restore it; or if used by her, to render an equivalent to the true owner, from tlie like general obligation ; the law, which always intends justice, implies a promise. In reference to money or other property it is not difficult to determine in any particular case whether a liability with respect to the same has attached to the city. The money must have gone into the treasury, or been appropriated by her ; and when it is property, other than money, it must have been used bj^ her, or be under her control. But with respect to services the case is different. Their acceptance must be evidenced by ordinance (or other express action) to that effect. If not originally au- thorized, no liability can attach upon any ground of implied contract. 1|he acceptance, upon which alone the obligation to pay could arise, would be wanting." ^ Whether the obligation rests in contract or not, it is one which is constantly recognized ; and which hag been applied to the purchase of real estate,^ to the use of a bridge for laying pipes,^ to work done in widening and deepening a river,* to 1 Chief Justice Field in Argente v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 255, 282. 2 Chapman v. Douglas Co., 107 U. S. 348. 8 Frankf. B. Co. v. Frankfort, 18 B. Mon. 41. * Maher v. Chicago, 38 111. 266. 291 §164 MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS. [CH, X. work upon plans for a market,'^ for a survey,^ and to many other similar cases, where there is no express contract.*^ A distinction has been made between money or property ob- tained by the city, and service rendered in local improvements. It has been held that a city cannot be required to compensate the voluntary performance of a municipal duty by a person who was not requested by the city to perform it ; * and the fact that the city authorities saw him at work and received the benefit, does not alter the ease.^ Another exception to the rule of implied liability occurs in the case of local improve- ments, for which the abutters are ultimatelj' liable. If the contract is not made in the legally prescribed manner, the city is not impliedly liable unless it has collected the amounts from the adjoining owners.^ Care should be exercised in the application of the doctrine 1 Peterson v. Mayor, 11 N'. T. 450. 2 Eandall v. VanVechten, 19 Johns. 60. 8 Thomas v. Pt. Hudson, 27 Mich. 323; Ellsworth v. Rossiter, 26 Pac. E. 674; 46 Kan. 237; Nicholson v. Guardians, L. E. 1 Q. B. 620; Alle- gheny City V. McClurkin, 14 Pa. St. 31 ; Armstrong Co. v. Clarion Co., 66 lb. 318; Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341; Morville V. Tract Soc, 123 Mass. 129; Crowder v. Sullivan, (Ind. 91) 28 N. E. E. 94; Louisiana v. Wood, 102 U. S. 294; Chapman v., rjouglas Co., 107 lb. 348; Mayor v. Eay, 19 Wall. 468; Bangor S. Bk. v. Stillwater, 49 Fed. 721; Brewer v. Otoe, 1 Neb. 373; Sangamon Co. v. Springfield, 63 111. 66; Marsh v. Ful- ton, 10 Wall. 676, 684; Herzo v. San Francisco, 33 Cal. 140; Montgomery v. M. Water Works, 79 Ala. 233; New Haven v. New Haven & D. E. Co., (Conn. 93) 25 Atl. 316; Paul v. Ke- nosha, 22 Wis. 266; Lemington v- Blodgett, 37 Vt. 215; Searcy v. Tar- nell, 47 Ark. 269; Carey v. East Sag- inaw, (Mich.) 44 N. W. E. 168; State Board v. Aberdeen, 56 Miss. 518; Moore v. Mayor, 73 N. Y. 238; Eyan 292 V. Coldwater, (Kan. 91) 26 Pac. E. 675 ; Nelsou V. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 535 ; Oneida Bank v. Ontario Bank, 21 lb. 495; McDonald v. Mayor, 68 lb. 23; North Pac. L. & M. Co. v. East Portland, 12 Pac. E. 4; 14 Oregon, 3; Shrews- bury v. Brown, 25 Vt. 197; Gassett V. Andover, 21 lb. 342. Contra, Sei- brecht v. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 496; Jones v. Lancaster, 4 Pick. 149; Loker V. Brookline, 13 lb. 343; Wood V. Waterville, 5 Mass. 294; Bentley v. Com'rs, 25 Minn. 259. * Salsbury v. Phila., 44 Pa. St. 303; Huntington v. Boyle, 9 Ind. 296; Jef- fersouville v. The J. Shallcross, 35 lb. 19. 6 Nelson V. City, 29 N. E. E. 814; 131 N. Y. 4; Alton v. Mulledy, 21 111. 76; Elizabeth v. White, 48 Ohio St. 577; 29 N. E. E. 47; Brown v. Melrose, (Mass. 92) 30 N. E. E. 87. « Argeuti v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 255; Craycraftv. Selvage, 10 Bush, 696; lb. 549; Saxton v. St. Joseph, 60 Mo. 153. The same where the assessment lias been declared void. Polk Co. Savings Bk. v. State, 69 Iowa, 24; Schofleld v. Council Bluffs, 68 lb. 695. CH. X.] MUNICIPAL CONTEACTS. §165 of implied contracts ; ^ for, although a city may he liable for money or property received, it will not be liable when the money or property is received and used in disregard of positive legal prohibitions.^ The law will never impose an obligation to do an act contrary to duty or to law ; and a promise to car- ry out a contract can never be implied, where the cit}' has no legal power to do it.^ So, when a city charter prescribes, that all municipal contracts shall be made in a certain way,* as in writing,^ or when a city attempts to make a contract, by which it agrees not to exercise part of the franchise committed to it for public purposes,^ there is no room for saying that there is an implied contract. This exception to the general rule has been frequently recognized, where there has been a neglect to observe the charter requirement, that contracts should be awarded to the lowest bidder. Inasmuch as the contract in this case is void and illegal, the courts will not imply a prom- ise to pay, because a plain statutory requirement has been dis- regarded.'' § 165. Mode of contracting — Use of writing or of seal — Statute of Frauds.^It is well settled that when the mode of making municipal contracts is plainly prescribed by law, such mode is exclusive and must be closely adhered to, in order that the contract may be valid.^ A party dealing with a corpora- 1 Peterson v. Mayor, 17 N. T. 449, 453; Poultney v. Wells, 1 Aiken, 180. 2 State Board v. Cit. S. R. Co., 47 Incl. 407; Sohell v. L. M. Eumsey Co., 39 Mo. App. 264; McDonald v. ,New York, 68 X. Y. 23. ' 8 BurriU v. Boston, 2 Clife. C. C. 590; Collector v. Hubbard, 12 Wall. 1, 12; Spitzer v. Blanchard, 82 Mich. 234; Murphy v. Louisville, 9 Bush, 189; Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex. 532; Meyer v. Keyser, (Md. 91) 19 Atl. 706. * Pimental v. San Francisco, 21 Cal. 351; Starkey v. Minneapolis, 19 Minn. 203 ; Dickenson v. Poughkeep- Bie, 74 N. Y. 65. ^ McDonald v. Mayoi-, 68 N. Y. 23. « Cornell v. Guilford, 1 Denio, 510; St. Louis V. Gas Co., 5 Mo. App. 484, 529; Thomas v. Kiohraond, 12 Wall. 349; Morgan v. Menzies, 60 Cal. 341. ' Ryoe V. Osage, (Iowa, 93) 45 N. W. R. 532; Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110 ; McBrien v. Grand Rapids, 56 Mich. 95; see cases under §165, Mode of Contracting, and § 172, Ad- vertising for, Bids; Parr v. Green- bush, 72 N. Y. 463; Brady v. New York, 20 lb. 312. 8 Beers v. Dalles, 18 Pac. 835; Lit- tlefield T. Boston etc. Co., 146 Mass. 268; 15 N. E. E. 268; Mayor v. Key- ser, (Md. 91) 19 Atl. 706; Crutchfleld v. Warrensburg, 30 Mo. App. 456; Prince v. City of Quincy, 28 111. App. 490; 21 N. E. K. 768; 128 111. 443; Spilman v. Parkersburg, 35 W. Va. 605; Goldsboro v. Moffatt, 49 Fed. B. 213; Cartersville Imp. Gas & W. Co. V. Cartersville, (Ga. 93) 16 S. E. 293 §165 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. X. tion is under the necessity of observing all the mandatory pro- visions of the law himself, and of seeing that the municipal corporation does the same, or suffer the consequences of his neglect.! The act creating the corporation is the source from which it derives its power to contract; and if in this act, or in the charter, a mode is prescribed in which the power is to be exercised, any contract not so made will be as invalid as though the city had never been incorporated at all.^ If, for example, the charter requires that a certain class of contracts must be authorized by a vote of the municipal taxpayers, a contract not so sanctioned is void.^ It is not only in making a contract, but likewise in annulling or altering it, that the proper statutory regulations must be strictly complied with.* Thus, it has been K. 25 ; State v. Passaic, 41 K J. L. 90; Periine v. Farr, 22 lb. 356; Car- rou V. Martin, 2 Dutch. (N. J.) 594; Athens v. Hemerick, (Ga. 93) 16 S. E. E. 72; State v. Marion Co,, 21 Kan. 419; Eeis v. Graff, 51 Cal. 86; Addis V. Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. St. 379; McBean v. San Bernardino, (Cal. 93) 31 Pao. E. 49; McDonald v. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 23; McCoy v. Brant, 53 Cal. 247; Mt. Adams & Inclined Ey. Co. v. Cincinnati, 25 Wldy. Law Bui. 91 ; Baltimore v. Eeynolds, 20 Md. 1; Durango v. Pennington, 8 Cal. 257; Worthington v. Covington, 82 Ky. 265 ; Sohell City v. Eumsey, 39 Mo. App. 264; Laycock v. Baton Eouge, 36 La. An. 475; North Pao. etxs. Co. V. E. Portland, 14 Oreg. 3; Spitzer V. Blanchard, 46 N. W. E. 400; 82 Mich. 234; Los Angeles G. Co. v. Toberraan, 61 Cal. 199; Terre Haute V. Lake, 43 Ind. 480; Butler t. Charlestown, 7 Gray, 12; Trustees v. Cherry, 8 Ohio St. 564; McCracken V. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 591 ; Dey v. Jersey City, 19 N. J. Eq. 412; Bank V. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64, 68; Dig- gle V. Eailway Co., 5 Exch. 442. 1 New Decatur v. Berry, 7 So. E. 838; 90 Ala. 432; Sullivan v. Lead- ville, 11 Colo. 483; McBrien v. Grand Eapids, 56 Mich. 95; K«,nsas City v. 294 Flanagan, 69 Mo. 22; Eeilly v. Phila- delphia, 60 Pa. St. 467; St. Louis v. Davidson, 14 S. W. E. 825 ; 102 Mo. 149; Murphy v. Louisville, 9 Bush, 189; Crutchiield v. Warrensburg, 30 Mo. App. 456; People's K. E. v. Mem. E. E., 10 Wall. 38; Ziegler v. Chapin, 13 N. Y. S. 783; 59 Hun, 214: 27 N. E. E. 471; Steckert v. E. Saginaw, 22 Mich. 104; Niles W. Wks. v. Niles, 59 lb. 311; Bonesteel v. Mayor, 22 N. Y. 162; Starkey v. Minneapolis, 19 Minn. 203 ; Heidelberg v. St. Francois Co., 100 Mo. 69; Jones v. Town of Lind, (Wis. 90) 48 N. W. E. 247; Hunt V. Wimbledon Loc. Board, 4 Ont. Eep. C. P. D. 48; Kenney v. Jersey City, 47 N. J. L. 449; Henderson v. Marietta, 64 Ga. 286; Wilhelm v. Cedar Co., 50 Iowa, 254; Gates v. Hancock, 45 N. H. 528; Dey v. Jer- sey City, 19 N. J. Eq. 412; Bentley V. Com'rs, 25 Minn. 259; People v. Weber, 89 111. 347; Butler v. Nevin, 88 lb. 575; Mathewson v. Grand Eapids, 50 N. W. K. 651 ; 88 Mich. 558; Driftwood V. T. Co. v. Com'rs, 72 Ind. 226. 2 Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheaf. 64, 68. 3 Niles W. Wks. v. Niles, 59 Mich. 311. * Terre Haute v. Lake, 43 Ind. 480. CII. X.] MtTNICIPAL CONTRACTS. §165 held that a contract, authorized by ordinance, can only be can- celed or altered by a similarly authenticated act.^ But if the charter mode of dealing is not absolutely mandatory, the con- tract may be upheld, although the details of the prescribed mode are not strictly complied with.^ So, when a charter pre- scribed that money should be drawn from the treasury upon an order of the council, signed by the mayor, an order founded upon a memorandum, without a formal order being entered, was considered a sulficient compliance with the statute.^ And so^ also, when the statute requires a specific condition in a munici^ pal contract, the precise words of the statute need not be used ; but if the contract by a reasonable construction can be said to substantially contain the condition, it will suffice.* General provisions of a mandatory nature, that no contract will bind the city unless an appropriation has been made therefor, are impli- edly repealed pro tanto by a subsequent special act, requiring a, certain official or department to purchase supplies, but making no appropriation to pay for them.^ If no mode be prescribed, valid contracts, within the limits of the corporate powers, may be entered into in the same manner that natural persons make contracts.^ An}"^ prescribed mode of contracting will be strictly confined to that sort of contracts, or the particular class of officials, to which it is applicable ; and, it has been held, will not prevent the making of other valid contracts by the corporation through its officers and agents, according to the ordinary cus- tom and usage of the business world.'' When no bad faith or fraud is shown to exist, the State is precluded from interfering, through its attorney-general, to enjoin the corporation from ex- ecuting a contract ; merely because charter formalities, prelimi- nary thereto, have not been followed.* 1 Sacramento v. Kirk, 7 Cal. 449. 2 Kelly V. Mayor, 4 Hill (^. Y.) 263; Moqre v. Mayor, 73 N. Y. 238; Neiffer v. Bank, 1 Head (Tenn.) 162; Pennington v. Taniere, 12 Q. B. 998, 1013; M add ox v. Graham, 2 Met. (Ky.) 56 ; People v. Yonkers, 39 Barb. 266. »Kelley v. Mayor, etc., 4 Hill (N. T.) 263. 4 Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240. "Assessors, etc , v. Commission- ers, 3 Brews. (Pa.) 333. 6 Booth V. Shreveport, 29 La. An. 581; Indianola v. Jones, 29 Iowa, 282; Buncombe v. Ft. Dodge, 38 lb. 281 ; Burrill V. Boston, 2 Cliff. (U. S.) 590; Selma v. Mullen, 46 Ala. 411. Montgomery v. Barber, 45 Ala. 237. ' Indianola V. Jones, supra; Baker V. Johnson, 33 Iowa, 151. 8Atty. Gen. v. Detroit, 55 Mich. 181; 5 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 497; Attorney General v. Detroit, 26 Mich. 263. 295 §165 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. X. Municipal corporations may, unless expressly prohibited, en- ter into parol contracts through their duly authorized agents. ^ But if the statutes provide that a contract of a municipality shall be in writing, the provision must be observed, or the con- tract will be void.2 So, a municipal contract, not to be performed within a year, is within the Statute of Frauds ; and a resolution or ordinance, approving a contract of this sort, does not constitute a signing, as required by that statute.^ Generally, however, a municipal corporation may contract by ordinance, and a regularly enacted ordinance or resolution dulj-^ passed by the governing body, ac- cepting a proposition made to the city, constitutes an assent, and fulfills the requirement of a note or memorandum in writ- ing.* The ancient common law rule required all contracts of cor- porations to be under seal. But that rule is no longer observed, and it is now well settled that the contract of a municipal cor- poration, in the absence of express legislative enactment, need not be under seal.^ But when a contract is executed under the seals of officials. ^ Baker v. Johnson Co., 33 Iowa, 151 ; Duncombe v. Ft. Dodge, 38 Iowa, 281; Selma v. Mullen, 46 Ala. 411; Logansport v. Dykeman, 116 lud. 15. 2 McDonald v. Mayor etc., 68 N". Y. 23; 23 Am. Eep. 144; Maupin v. Franklin Co., 67 Mo. 327; Condon v. Jersey City, 43 ST. J. L. 412; Stewart V. Cambridge, 125 Mass. 102; Starkey V. Minneapolis, 19 Minn. 203; Logans- port V. Blaokmore, 17 Ind. 318; Carey V. East Saginaw, (Micli.) 44 N. W. Kep. 168. 3 Wade V. Newbern, 77 K. C. 460. * Draper v. Springport, 104 U. S. 501 ; Montgomery v. Barber, 45 Ala. 237; Clark v. Washington, 12 Wheat. 524; Halbut v. Forrest City, 34 Ark. 246; Wiles v. Hoss, 114 Ind. 371; Alton V. Mulledy, 21 111. 76; Ross v. Madison, 1 Ind. 281; Bellmyer v. Marshalltown, 44 Iowa, 564; Fanning V. Gregoire, 16 How. (XJ. S.) 524; Abby V. Billups, 35 Miss. 618 ; Sacrar 296 mento v. Kirk, 7 Cal. 419; People v. Supervisors, 27 Cal. 655; Argus Co. V. Mayor etc., 55 N. Y. 495; Logans- port V. Blackmore, 17 Ind. 318; San Antonio v. Lewis, 9 Tex. 69; Detroit V. Jackson, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 106. ^ Beers v. Dalles, 18 Pac. E. 835 ; Trustees v. Moody, 62 Ala. 389; Bur- lington V. Plank Kd., 11 Iowa, 75; Sheffield Sch. Township v. Andress, 56 Ind. 157; Crutchfield v. Warrens- burg, 30 Mo. App. 456; Buckley v. Briggs, 30 Mo. 452; McCullough v. Talladega etc. , 46 Ala. 376 ; Gadsboro V. MofEatt, 49 Fed. E. 213;. Watson V. Bennett, 12 Barb. 196; Flecknerv. U. S. Bank, 8 Wheat. 338, 357; De- troit V. Davis, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 106; Christian Church v. Johnson, 53 Ind. 273; Missouri etc. Co. v. Com'rs, 12 Kan. 482; Bernardin v. N. DufEerin, 19 Can. S. C. K. 581; McPherson v. Nichols (Kan. 91), 29 Pac. R. 679. CH. X.] MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. § IGP or of committeemen authorized to act for the town, it cannot be considered the deed of the town ; but the paper will be re- garded as a simple contract and binding as such on the munic- ipal corporation, while the seals will be rejected as surplusage. If the corporation have a seal, which is affixed to the instru- ment by the proper official, it may then be the deed of the cor- poration ; ^ although the affixing of a seal to an instrument by a corporation is not conclusive of an intent to create a specialty.^ When a contract is legally made by a municipal corporation, its assent to a variation or modification thereof may be implied from acts relating to the work done under the contract, subse- quent to the date of its making ; ^ but such implied assent must emanate from the corporate officials who are legally authorized to give it.* So, it has been held that a renewal of a contract, which is legal in its inception, will be conclusively presumed fiom the municipal acquiescence and tacit acceptance of bene- fits thereunder.^ The form of action, in such cases, where common law principles of pleading obtain, is not covenant or debt, but for damages, or in assumpsit.^ § 166. Municipal contracts witli its agents. —It is a well founded principle of law and of equity, the justice and fair- ness of which is evident, that he who acts as agent or trustee cannot be allowed to make profit out of the transaction in which he acts, over and above the compensation which has been agreed upon between him and his principal or the beneficiary of the trust. The agent of the buyer cannot act at the same time as an agent for the vendor ; nor can an agent to buy be himself the vendor. The opportunities to defraud, and the judicial conviction, that one cannot act justly towards his principal, when he is 1 Damon v. Granby, 2 Pick. 345, 352; Randall v. Yan Veohten, 19 Johns. 60, 65. 2 Bank v. Charlotteville etc. Co., 5 S. C. 156; Rand v. Dovey, 83 Pa. St. 280. 3 Messenger v. Buffalo, 21 N. T. 196. < Bonesteel v. Mayor, 22 N. T. 162; Hague V. Pliilada., 48 Pa. St. 527; O'Hara v. New Orleans, 30 La. An., pt. 1, 152; Hasbrouckv. Milwaukee, 21 "Wis. 217. ' Taylor v. Lambertville, 43 N. J. Eq. 107. •> Randall v. Van Vechten, 19 Johns ; 60, 65 ; Damon v. Granby, 2 Pick. 345 ; Fullam V. Bi-ookfield, 9 Allen, 1 ; Bank V. Patterson's Adm., 7 Cranch, 299. Clark V. Cuckfleld Union, 11 Eng. L. & Eq. 442; Pennington v. Taniere, 12 Q. B. 1011. 297 §167 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. X. himself interested adversely in the transaction, are the grounds for holding all such transactions to be tainted with fraud, either actual or constructive, and for that reason to be voidable at the instance of the principal or beneficiary of the trust, as the case may be.^ However much this rule may be violated by munici- pal and other public officials, there is no doubt of the applica- tion of the rule to them, and the decisions are numerous, in which contracts with municipalities, in which officials were financially interested, have been set aside.^ Thus, when the mayor secretly contracted to purchase at a discount a large amount of municipal debentures, which were afterwards issued by ordinance, in the enactment of which he was actively en- gaged, he was held to be a trustee for the city, to the amount derived by him from the transaction.^ A citj' oflicial cannot, while in office, become a landlord to the corporation ; and a lease establishing such a relation has been held void* as against public policy, which prohibits a trustee from contracting with himself. So, it has been held that a plaintiff could not recover a livery bill for horses and carriages, used in a celebration, the appropriation for which was voted by a council of which he was a member, even though the appropriation was valid.^ In Can- ada, an action at law brought by a trading partnership against a city can be resisted upon the ground that a member of the firm is also a city councilman.^ § 167. Form of contracts made by municipal agents In contracts made by agents of private corporations, where the only evidence in the contract tliat the agent does not intend to bind himself is the affixing to his signature of some designa- tion of agency, as where he signs himself as treasurer or presi- dent, without stating for what company he is acting, it is 1 Tiedeman's Equity .Tur. § 233. ■^ Stott V. Franey, 20 Or. 410; Case V. Johnson, 91 Ind. 477; Macon v. Huff, 60 Ga. 221 ; Grand Is. etc. Co. V. West, (Neb. 89) 45 N. "W. R. 242; Com' IS V. Eeynolds, 44 Ind. 509; Dalzell etc. Co. v. Findlay, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 418; Emigrant Co. v. Wright Co., 97 U. S. 339; Call Pub. Co. v. Lincoln, 29 Neb. 149; McGregor v. Logansport, 79 Ind. 168; Bellaire etc. Co. V. Findlay, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 298 418; Milford v. Milf. W. Co., 124 Pa. St. 610; 17 Ati. R. 185; Fort Wayne V. Eosentlial, 75 Ind. 156; Butts v. Wood, 37 N. T. 317. 3 Toronto v. Bowes, 4 Grant (Can.) 504. Cf. Collins v. Swindle, 6 lb. 282; Cummings v. Saux, 30 La. An. 207; Doll V. State, 45 Ohio St. 445. * Macon v. Huff, 60 Ga. 221. s Smith V. Albany, 61 N. Y. 444. ^ Brown v. Lindsay, 35 Up. Can. Q. B. 509. CH. X.] MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. §167 nevertheless the individual obligation of the agents and the company is not bound.^ This harsh and technical rule is being very materially modified by later adjudications, in order to avoid the infliction of wrong, and to carry out the real inten- tions of the parties. And the rule is almost completely abro- gated in reference to the contracts of municipal and other public corporations. It is now a well settled rule of law that a contract in writing, made by municipal agents, duly and legally appointed and acting within their authority, is regarded as the contract of the corporation, although signed by the agents in their own name, and sealed with their own seals. But, of course, it must be reasonably clear upon the face of the paper, that the purpose of the agent was to act for the municipality ; and that he did not intend to assume a personal liability.^ The contrary doctrine has been held however, in certain cases, where the contractual liability of school districts was involved.^ ' Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, p. 202 ; Tucker v. Fairbanks, 98 Mass. 101. 2 Hatch V. Barr, 1 Ham. (Ohio) 390; Baker v. Chambles, 4 G. Greene, (Iowa) 428; (individual signatures.) Lyon V. Adarason, 7 Iowa, 509; Mott V. Hicks, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 513, 534; Blanchard v. Blackstone, 102 Mass. 343; Stanton v. Camp, (individual signatures with "committee"added.) 4 Barb. 274, Mechanics' Bk. v. Bk. of Columbia, 5 Wheat. 326 ; Kegents v. Detroit, 12 Mich. 138; Hopkins v. Mahoffy, 11 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.) 126; Gale V. Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344; Burrill v. Boston, 2 Clife. 590; (sign- ed by mayor.) Sweetzer v. Mead, 5 Mich. 107; Bank v. Gottschalk, 14 Pet. 19; Compare Dugan v. United States, 3 Wheat. 172, where it was held that the United States could sue " when it appeared not only on the face of the instrument but from all the evidence that it alone was in- terested, although the bill was pay- able to " Tucker, Treasurer of the U. S." Parr v. Greenbush, 72 N. Y. 463; see also Bowen v. Morris, 2 Taunt. 374, 387; Balcorabe v. Kor- tlirup, 9 Minn. 178; (note payable to I. E. F. U. S. Indian Agent, his suc- cessors in office or order.) Irish v. Webster, 5 Greenl. 171; (to " James Irish, Land Agent of Maine." ) United States v. Boyce, 2 McLean, 352 ; State v. Boise, 2 Fairf. 474; School I. of Monticello v. Kendall, 72 Ind. 208; Andrews v. Estes, 11 Me. 267; (we, the undersigned committee for the First School Dis. signed A. B. C. Committee.) Hodges v. Eunyon, 30 Mo. 491; McGee v. Larramore, 50 lb. 425; (signed "A. B. Director.") Heidelberg v. Horst, 62 Pa. St. 301 ; Dubois V. Canal Co., 4 Wend. 285; Worrell v. Munn, ISeld. (N. Y.) 229; Ford V. Williams, 13 N. Y. 577, 585; Richardson V. Scott, etc., Co., 22 Cal. 150; Robinson v. St. Louis, 28 Mo. 488; (contract signed " G. N. S. In- spector.") 3 Cahokia S. Trustees v. Ranten- berg, 88 111. 219; Bayliss v. Peterson, 15 Iowa, 279; Fowler v. Atkinson, 6 Minn. 579; Bingham v. Stewart, 13 Minn. 106. 299 §168 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. X. When a contract was made,involving subject-matter exclusively pertaining to the corporation between " T. Van V., J. W., C. D. C, a committee appointed by the corporation of the city of Albany for that purpose, of the first part, and J. R. of the second part," in which the parties of the first part prom- ised to make certain payments and signed and sealed the same individually, it was decided that the corporation, and not they, were liable.^ Of course, the contract must be one which the agent was authorized to make ; and when such is the case, the contract is valid and binding, although there has been no formal acceptance by a vote ; or even if it be re- jected by the corporation.^ It must also be remembered that the corporation is not bound by contracts which are made by its ofBcials, while acting in their individual capacity. So, a town in New England is not bound by the individual action of its selectmen,^ as where a contract is signed by one for all the selectmen.* Nor is a city liable upon a contract which is made by a majority of its aldermen without the required legal and otScial action of the citj' council.^ But a contract, entered into by supervisors, for and in behalf of the board and .signed by the chairman of the board, was held to be binding on the county.^ § 168. Non-liability of putolic official, acting within Ms au- thority. — Except when public officials act beyond their author- ity, or fail to evince in the written instruments, executed by them, the intention to act for and in the name of the munici- pality,'^ they cannot be held personfClly liable on contracts made by them in their official and representative capacity.* 1 Eandall v. Van Vechten, 19 Jolms. 60; Cf. FuUam v. Brookfield, 9 Allen (Mass.) 1; Bank v. Patterson, 7 Cranch, 5J99; but compare, contra, Alam V. Boyd, 87 Pa. St. 477, (where contract was signed by committee, ) .and Providence v. Miller, 11 R. I. .272. 2 Davenport v. Hallowell, 10 Me. 317; Junkins v. Scb. Dis., 39 lb. 220; Willai'd V. Kewburyport, 12 Pick. 227; Kingsbury v. Sch. Dis., 12 Met. 99. ^Haliburton v. Frankford, 14 Mass. 300 214; Butler v. Charlestown, 7 Gray, 12; Stetson v. Kemptou, 13 Mass. 272. * Andover v. Grafton, 7 N. H. 298, 30.5. ■^ Bntler v. Cliarlestown, 7 Gray, 12; Sikes v. Hatfield, 13 lb. 347. 6 Babcock v. Goodrich, 47 Cal. 488. ' See ante, § 167. ' Macbeath v. Haldiraoud, 1 D. & E. Term, 172; Hodgson v. Dexter, 1 Cranch, 34; Olney v. Wickes, 18 Johns. 122; King v. Butler, 15 Johns. 281; Mott V. Hicks, 1 Cow. (N. Y) CH. X.] MUNICIPAL CONTEACTS. § 169 Where the other contracting party knows the extent of the ofEeial's authority he cannot hold the official personally lia- ble, unless the intention to be personally bound is plainly ex- pressed.^ So, also, when the officers of a municipal corporation, acting in good faith, perform an official act, or attempt to enter into a municipal contract, under an innocent mistake of law that they have legal authority to do so, in which mistaken im- pression the other party shares, no liability attaches, either to the officials personally, or to the corporation.^ This rule of nonliability is justified by the fact, that the scope of the authority of a municipal or other public official is easily ascertained by any one, who is concerned in the matter, by an examination of the laws, from which alone the official can derive his authority, and to which every one has equal access. One of the necessary elements of an estoppel would be absent in that case. It is different with the agents of pri- vate individuals and private corporations.** § 169. Authority of municipal oiflcers to contract — Con- tracts ultra vires. — Municipal corporations can contract only by their officers, and other properly authorized agents; and the authority of all such agents is limited to the making of such contracts as are within the corporate purpose. Public officers and agents are held more strictly within the express limitations of their authority, than are officers of private corporations; and all contracts made by them, though within the apparent scope of their authority, are void, unless they possess actual authority, express or implied.* Nor will the official's false rep- Eeraington v. Ward, (Wis. 91) 47 N. W. R. 659; Adams v. Whittlesey, 3 Conn. 560; Copes v. Mathews, 18 Miss. 398; Miller v. Ford, 4 Rich. (S. C.) L. 376; Toungv. Com'rs etc., 2 Nott & McC. 537. 1 Broadwell v. Chapin, 2 111. App. 511. ^Willett V. Young, (Iowa 91) 47 K. W. R. 990; Stone v. Huggins, 28 Vt. 617; Ives v. Hulet, 12 lb. 314; Houston V. Clay Co., 18 Ind. 396; Lyon V. Irish, 58 Mich. 518; Powell V. Heisler, 48 N. W. E. 411; 45 Minn. 549; Hall v. Cockrell, 28 Ala. 507; Whyte V. Mills, 8 So. 171; 64 Miss. 158; Dameron v. Irwin, 8 Ire. L. (N. C.) 421; Ogdenv. Raymond, 22 Conn. 379; Wheeler v. Wayne Co., 31 111. App. 299; 24 N. E. 625; Duncan V. Niles, 32 111. 532; Boardman v. Hayne, 29 Iowa, 339; Breen v. Kelly, 47 N. W. R. 1067; 45 Minn. 852; Tucker v. Shorter, 17 Ga. 620; Dey V. Lee, 4 Jones, 238; Tucker v. Jus- tices, 13 Ire. L. (N. C.) 434. *See Tiedemau's Private Corpo- rations, chapter on the Authority of Agents and Officers. iParsel v. Barnes, 25 Ark. 261, Williams v. Peyton's Lessee,4 Wheat. 77. 301 §169 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. X. resentations as to his authority fix a liability upon the corpora tion for a contract which he had no authority to make.^ Thus, a municipal corporation is not liable for extra work, ordered by its agent without authority .^ In order to render a corporation liable upon a contract, the contract must be one which it pos- sessed authority to enter into. Municipal corporations like other corporate bodies are created for certain specific purposes, and to accomplish certain well defined objects. It follows logic- ally that the only legal powers which the corporation possesses are such as will effectuate the purposes for which the corpora- tion was given existence, and any act or contract which is un- connected with these purposes, or which will cause an application of the corporation funds to foreign purposes, is ultra vires and therefore void.^ And the question as to whether any act is 1 Chemung Can. Bk. v. Sup'rs, 5 Denio, 517; Albany v. Cunllff, 2 Const. 178; Delafield v. State, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 159, 174; 26 "Wend. 192; Hodges V. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110; 3 Const. 430; 2 Barb. 104; Famsworth V. Pawtucket, 13 R. I. 82; Belleview V. Hohn, 82 Ky. 1; Sup'rs v. Bates, 17 N. T. 242; Norwich v. Pharsalia, 15 lb. 341; Tippecanoe v. Cox, 6Ind. 403; Inhabitants v. Weir, 9 lb. 224. 2 Hague V. Phila., 48 Pa. St. 527; O'Hara v. New Orleans, 30 La. An. 152; Bonesteel V. Mayor, 22 N. T. 162; Stuart V. Cambridge, 125 Mass. 102. 8 Dorsey v. Whitehead, 47 Ark. 205 ; Bass etc. Co. v. Parke Co., 115 Ind. 234; Seibrecht v. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 496; Loker v. Brookline, 13 Pick. 343, 348; Standley v. Perry, 23 Grant (U. C.) 507; Campbell v. El- ma, 13 Up. Can. 296; Western Col- lege V. Cleveland, 12 Ohio, 375; Bate- man V. Covington,(Ky. 91) 14 S. W. E. 361; New Decatur v. Berry, 90 Ala. 432; 7 So. R. 838; Smead v. Indianapolis etc. Co., 11 Ind. 104; Brady v. New York, 20 N. Y. 312 ; Pa. etc. Co. V. Dandridge, 8 Gill & J. (Md.) 248, 319; Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio (N. Y.) 210; St. Louis v. David- son, 102 Mo. 149; Carlyle W. etc. Co. 302 V. Carlyle, 31 111. App. 325; Philadel- phia V. Flanigan, 47 Pa. St. 21 ; Hal- stead V. New York, 3 N. Y. 430; Mar- tin V. Mayor, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 545; Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall. 676; Leavenworth v. Rankin, 2 Kan. 357; Zeigler v. Chapin, 27 N. E. R. 471; Altgelt V. San Antonio, 81 Tex. 436 ; Overseers v. New Berlin etc., 18 Johns. 382; Donovan v. New York, 33 N. Y. 291 ; Horn v. Baltimore, 30 Md. 218; Bridgeport v. Housa. R. Co., 15 Conn. 475, 493; Mathewson v. Grand Rapids, 88 Mich. 558 ; Ryce v. Osage, (Iowa, 93) 55 N. W. R. 532; Bateman v. Ashton, 3 Hurl. & Nor. 323; Montgomery C. C. v. M. W. P. R. Co., 1 Ala. 76; Dill v. Wareham, 7 Met. (Mass.) 438; Branham v. San Jose, 24 Cal. 585, 602; McCoy v. Brant, 53 Cal. 247; Grafton v. Ell- wood, 32 Pac. R. 1026; Hamilton v. Shelbyville,(Ind. 93) 33 N. E. R. 1007; State V. Bayonne, (N. J. 93) 26 Atl. R. 81; Treadway v. Schnauber, 1 Dak. Ter. 236; Craycraft v. Selvage, 10 Bush, 696; Baltimore v. Musgrave, 48 Md. 472; State v. Haskell, 20 Iowa, 276; Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex. 532; Neely v. Yorkvllle, 10 S. C. 141; People V. Baraga, 39 Mich. 534; Rich- mond V. Munic, 8 Up. Can. Q. B CH. X.J MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. §1G9 ultra vires, is to be decided only upon a careful consideration of the charter and collateral legislation, affecting or controlling the powers of municipal corporations in general, or of the particular corporation under inquiry .^ It does not affect the application of the principle of ultra vires to municipal contracts, that they were acquiesced in or known to the majority of the citizens.^ So, also, payment for a portion of the work done under a contract, coupled with a denial of Corporate liability as to the balance, will not estop the city from setting up the plea of ultra vires as a bar to a recovery of the residue of the claim on the contract.^ When the consideration, which is received by the city under an ultra vires contract, can be restored, equity will order this to be done before relieving the corporation from liability.* If, in dealing with individuals, a municipal corporation makes contracts in the exercise of a power which it does not possess, it will not be excused from its obligations thus assumed, if they can be performed by means of other powers which it does pos- sess.® Thus, if a contract be entered into by a municipal cor- poration, which as such is not invalid, because against public 567; Baby v. Baby, 5 lb. 510; Barley's App., 103 Pa. St. 273; Lincoln v. Stockton, 75' Me. 141; Jackson v. Bowman, 39 Miss. 671; Salt Lake City V. HoUister, 118 U. S. 256; Bate- raan v. Covington, (Ky. 91) 14 S. W. E. 361 ; Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272; Parsons v. Goshen, 11 Pick. 396; New Jersey v. Fire Com'rs, 34 N. J. Eq. 117; Maupin v. Franklin Co., 67 Mo. 327; Montgomery v. Water Co., (Ala. 91) 9 So. R. 339; Clark v. Polk Co., 19 Iowa, 248; Perry v. Superior City, 23 Wis. 64; Boom v. Utica, 2 Barb. 104; Cornell v. Guilford, 1 Denio, 510; Spitzer v. Blanchard, 46 N. W. R. 400; 82 Mich. 234; Mitchell V. Rockland, 45 Me. 496; Estep v. Keokuk Co., 18 Iowa, 199; Boyland V. Mayor, 1 Sandf. 27; Vincent v. Nantucket, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 103, 105; Wood V. Lynn, 1 Allen, 108; Spald- ing V. Lowell, 23 Pick. 71. 1 Vaile V. Independence, 22 S. W. R. 695; Pearce v. Madison etc. Co., 21 How. 441 ; Moore v. New York, 73 N. T. 238; Cheeney v. Brookfield, 60 Mo. 53; Philadelphia v. Jewell, 21 Atl. R. 239; 140 Pa. St. 9. Con- tracts surrendering legislative dis- cretion (Martin v. Mayor, 1 Hill, 545), against public policy (Indianapolis V. (Jas Co., 66 Ind. 396), or parting with inherent governmental power (Gas Co. V. Middletown, 59 N. Y. 228; Lord v. Oconto, 47 Wis. 386; State V. New Brunswick, 30 N. J. L. 395), are of course invalid. ''■ Allegheny City v. McClurkin, 14 Pa. St. 81; Loker v. Brookline, 13 Pick. 343. 'People V. New York, 1 Hill, 362. ♦Turner v. Cruzen, 70 Iowa, 202; Pratt V. Short, 53 How. Pr. 506; Moore v. Mayor, 73 N. Y. 238; Leon- ard v. Canton, 35 Miss. 189; Lucas Co. V. Hunt, 5 Ohio St. 488. 6 Maher v. Chicago, 38 HI. 267. 303 §169 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. X. policy, or beyond the scope of the corporate power, it will be still binding upon the corporation, even though the corporation has no authority to issue the bonds, or other municipal paper, by which it has agreed to pay for the same. The contract, being valid, creates an obligation to pay ; and it is no defence, to an action instituted to recover payment, to say that the method provided in the contract was illegal, when there were other lawful methods of raising the necessary funds. The suit would be on the original indebtedness, and not on the bonds.^ Not only is the defence of ultra vires good when it is sought to fix a contractual liability upon a municipality, 'but it may be interposed by a party against whom the city is seeking to re- cover damages in tort.^ An illustration of this may be found in a case, where the city loaned its securities to a party who was to raise money thereon, and pay for a road which the city had no authority, either to construct, or to assist in construct- ing. X penal bond, taken by the city to secure the proper ap- plication of this money, was held to be invalid, and in order 1 In a case, in which this question was decided in the Supreme Court of the United States, Mr. Justice Strong said: "If payments cannot be made in bonds, because their is- sue is ultra vires, it would be sanc- tioning ranlc injustice to hold that payment cannot be made at all. Such is not the law. The contract between the parties is in force so far as it is lawful. There may be a dif- ference between the case of an en- gagement made by a corporation to do an act expressly prohibited by its charter, or some other law, and a case where legislative power to do the act has not been gi-anted. Such a distinction is asserted in some de- cisions. But the present is not a case in which the issue of the bonds was prohibited by statute. At most the issue was unauthorized; at most there was a defect of power. The promise to give bonds to the plain- tiff, in payment of what they under- 304 took to do, was therefore at farthest ultra vires ; and in such a case, though specific performance of an engage- ment to do a thing, transgressive of its corporate power, may not be en- forced, the. corporation can be held liable on its contract. Having re- ceived benefits at the expense of the other contracting party, it cannot object that it was not empowered to perform what it promised to perform in the mode in which it promised to perform.'' Hitchcock v. Galveston, 9b U. S. 341; see also, Board v. Citi- zens etc. Co., 47 Ind. 407; Allegheny City V. McClurkin, 14 Pa. St. 81; Maher v. Chicago, 38 111. 266; Oneida Bk. V. Ontario Bank, 21 N. Y. 495 ; Argenti v. San Francisco, 10 Cal. 256; Silver Lake Bk. v. Nortli, 4 Johns. Ch. 373. 2 Montgomei-y C. Council v. E. R. Co., 31 Ala. 76; Penn. etc. Co. v. Dandridge, 8 Gill & J. 248, 319; Hodges V. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110. CH. X.J MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. §170 that the city may recover, it had to bring its action in some other mode than upon the contract.^ But when a city, having without charter power guaranteed the bonds of a railroad, became their owner by being compelled to pay them, it was held that, while the liability of the city might have been successfully disputed in an action to enforce the guaranty, the want of authority did not defeat its lien on the railroad, as against other creditors of the road.^ § 170. Ratification, what constitutes. — A municipal cor- poiation is not bound by a contract made by its agent or officer, which the agent or ofScer had no authority to make. But if the contract is for a corporate purpose, and within the powers conferred upon the municipality by its charter, or by the gen- eral law, it may be ratified by the corporation and become bind- ing upon it.^ So, also, contracts, made in the name of a corpo- reity Council V. Plank Eoad Co., 31 Ala. 76; Wetumpka v. Winter, 29 lb. 6.51 ; Halstead v. New York, 3 N. T. 430; Bridgeport V. Housatonic E. Co., 15 Conn. 475, 493. -Hay V. Alexandria etc. Co., 20 Fed. Rep. 15. 3 Fort Wayne v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 32 N. E. R. 215; 132 Ind. 558; East Hampton v. Bowman, 136 N. T. 521; Emerson v. Newbury, 13 Pick. 377; People v. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228; 15 Am. Rep. 202; Burrill v. Bos- ton, 2 Cliff. 590; Silsbry M. Co. v. Allentown, (Pa. 93) 26 Atl. R. 646; Moore v. Allen, 98 N. Y. 396; City Bank v. Albany, 92 lb. 363; Hotohin V. Kent, 8 Mich. 526; Estey v. West- minster, 97 Mass. 324; Marshall Co. V. Schenck, 5 Wall. 772 ; People v. Swift, 31 Cal. 26; Kinsley v. Norris, 60 N. H. 131; Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall. 676; Episcopal C. So. v. Episcopal Church, 1 Pick. 372; Davis V. Mayor, 61 Mich. 530; Crawshaw v. Roxbury, 8 Gray, 374; Gifford v. White Plains, 25 Hun, 606; Topsham V. Rogers, 42 Vt 189; Murphy v. Louisville, 9 Bush, 189; Cory v. Freeholders, 44 N. J. L. 445; San 20 Francisco Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 9 Cal. 453 ; Bleu V. Bear River etc. Co., 20 lb. 602; 81 Am. Dec. 132; Har- ris v. School District, 28 N. H. 65; Bruce v. Dickey, 116111. 527; Schmidt v. Stearns, 34 Minn. 112; People v. Lathrop, 24 Mich. 235; Strong v. Dis- trict, 1 Mackey, 265 ; Wilson v. School District, 32 N. H. 118; Back man v. Charlestown, 42 lb. 125 ; Brown v. Winterport, 79 Me. 305; Chouteau v. Allen, 70 Mo. 290; Clarke v. Lyon Co., 8 Nev. 181; Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 470; 78 Am. Dec. 721; Lamm v. Port Deposit etc., 49 Md. 233; N. O. V. Southern Bank., 31 La. An. 560; Howe V. Keeler, 27 Conn. 538; St. Louis v. Armstrong, 56 Mo. 298; Trottv. Warren, 11 Me. 227; Sulli- van V. School District, 39 Kan. 347; Shawneetown V. Baker, 85 111. 563; Peterson v. Mayor, 17 N. Y. 449; Hoyt V. Thompsim, 19 lb. 207, 218; Squire v. Cartwright, 22 N. Y. S. 899; Brady V. Mayor, 20 N. Y. 312; Dubuque F. Cul. v. Township etc., 13 Iowa, 555 ; Merrick v. Burlington etc. Co., 11 lb. 74; Galveston v. Mor- ton, 53 Tex. 409;: Strong v. District, 1 Mackey, iGd» 305 §170 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. X. ration, before it has been chartered,^ or before it has received legislative authority to contract,^ may be ratified by the corpo- ration after it has been incorporated, or authorized to contract. The distinction between contracts which are illegal, because beyond the corporate power, or against public policy, and those which are merely unauthorized by the corporation, is important. The unauthorized action of the officer, if within the corporate power, can be ratified by the corporation. But a contract ultra vires cannot be ratified, unless the power to do so is expressly conferred by the Legislature.^ It is well settled that the Leg- islature may within constitutional limits ratify or authorize the ratification of a municipal contract.* When the statutes prescribe a special mode in which alone a valid contract can be made by the municipality, and the con- tract is invalid, because of non-compliance with the statutory requirement, it must be observed in any act of ratification. Thus, where a corporation could only make a valid contract by ordinance, the ratification is required to be by ordinance,* and cannot be ratified by a subsequent resolution.^ So, also, a ratification by one board, in a case where two boards should have concurred originally,^ or the approval of the bill by a ^ Dubuque Fein. Col. v. Dis. Towns, 13 Iowa, 555. 2 Mills V. Gleasou, 11 Wis. 470. ' Peterson v. Mayor, 17 N. Y. 449, 454; Nash v. St. Paul, 11 Minn. 174; Bryan v. Page, 51 Tex. 532; Parsons V. Monmouth, 70 Me. 262; Jefferson Co. V. Arrighi, 54 Miss. 6fi8; Wilhelm V. Cedar Co., 50 Iowa, 254; Buttrick V. Lowell, 1 Allen, 172 ; 19 Am. Dec. 721; Shawneetown v. Baker, 85 111. 563; Cory v. Freeholders, 44 N. J. L. 445 ; Green v. Cape May, 41 lb. 45 ; Hague V. Philadelphia, 48 Pa. St. 528; Union Township v, Gibboney, 94 lb. 534; Reilly v. Phila., 60 Pa. St. 467; Sault St. Marie Co. v. Dusen, 40 Mich. 429; Taymouth v. Koehler, 35 lb. 22; Brady v. Mayor, 20 N. Y. 312; McDonald v. Mayor, 68 lb. 23; Smith V. Newberg, 77 lb. 130; Hor- ton V. Thompson, 71 lb. 513; Brown V. Mayor, 63 lb. 239; Cowen v. W. 306 Troy, 43 Barb. 48; Lewis v. Shreve- port, 108 U. S. 282; Water Co. v. San Diego, 59 Cal. 517; Bank t. States- ville, 84 N. C. 169; Laredo v. Mao- donnell, 52 Tex. 511. * Campbell v. Kenosha, 5 Wall. 194; Supervisors v. Schenck, lb. 772; Keithsburg v. Frick, 34 111. 405; Winn V. Macon, 21 Ga. 275; Grogan V. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590; Has- brouck V. Milwaukee, 21 Wis. 217. ^ Cory V. Freeholders, 44 N. J. L. 445; People V. Swift, 31 Cal. 28; Zott- man v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. 96; McCracken v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 623 ; Durango v. Pennington, 81 Colo. 257. 6 Cross V. Morristown, 18 N. J. Eq. 305; Newman v. Emporia, 32 Kan. 456; and see ante, § 145. ' State V. Jersey City, 47 N. J. L. 449. CH. X.] MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. §171 board, a subcommittee of which had given the order through its chairman, 1 will not siifl&ce.^ It has been held that a city may ratify an unauthorized con- tract for the erection of a building, by using it when completed.^ But this is not ordinarily the rule.* So, the voting of an addi- tional tax, to be applied to building, does not ratify expenditures be5'ond the amount already appropriated.^ Part payment will not constitute a ratification of either an illegal or unauthorized contract, entered into by municipal offi- cials.* But it has been held that a ratification may be inferred from the presentation and credit of bills for materials which are furnished by officials, having the authority to contract for them originally.' § 171. Contracts for public works— Contractor's bonds — Payment. — When a contract for a public work has been made, in which the price payable is the full sum authorized to be ex- pended, alterations increasing the cost are illegal and void.' But when a legal contract has been made, the amount payable thereon cannot be reduced by a resolution limiting the expend- iture, which is passed after the work had been completed, and of which the other contracting party had no notice.^ If a lim- ited fund be provided by legislative authority for special pur- poses, a contract within the limit is not invalidated by the fact, that subsequent contracts were made which exhausted the ap- 1 Keeney v. Jersey City, 47 N. J. L. 449. ^Wilhelra v. Cedar Co., 50 Iowa, 254. 8 Fisher V. Sch. Dls.No. l'7,4Cush. 494; Abbott v. Hermon, 7 Me. 118; Hayden v. Madison, 7 Me. 76 ; Hay- ward V. Sch. Dis. No. 13, 2 Cush. 419; Moor v. Cornville, 13 Me. 293; People V. Swift, 31 Cal. 26; Keyser V. Sch. Dis., 35 N. H. 477. » Davis V. Sch. Dis. No. 2, 24 Me. 349; Wilson v. Sch. Dis., 32 N. H. 118; Pratt v. Swanton, 15 Vt. 147; Dullanty v. Town of Vaughn, (Wis.) 45 N. W. Rep. 1128; Lokerv. Brook- line, 13 Pick. 343; Knowlton v. Plan- tation No. 4, 14 Me. 20; Springfield Co. V. Lane Co., 5 Oreg. 265; Sceery V. Springfield, 112 Mass. 512; Hay- den V. Madison, 7 Greenl. 79; Mor- ris V. Dixfield, 30 Me. 157, 160. ^Turney v. Bridgeport, 55 Conn. 412; King v. Mahaska, 75 Iowa, 329. sDurango v. Pennington, 8 Colo. 257; Milford v. Mil. Water Co., 124 Pa. St. 610. '• Albany City Nat. Bk. v. Albany, 92 N. T. 363; 2 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 61. 8 King V. Mahaska Co., 75 Iowa, 329; 24 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 577 Kingsley v. Brooklyn, 78 N. T. 200 Turney v. Bridgeport, 55 Com. 412 Pim. V. Mun. Cor. of Ontario, Ont. Rep. 9 C. P. D. 304. 'Duncombe v. Fort Dodge, 38 Iowa, 281. 307 MIXSICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. X propriation.i Generally, where the expenditure is not limited, the contractor may recover for extra work done, although it may not have been formally contracted for ; ^ particularly, if the extra work done, or material furnished, was rendered nec- essary by the action of the municipality.* Estimates must al- ways be adhered to, in contracting for public works ; * but a discrepancy, due to clerical error, between the plans and the ordinance, will not necessarily render the whole contract in- valid.° Bonds are usuallj' required of contractors, doing work for a municipaUty, conditioned that the contractor will pay all just claims against him for labor or material as the same shall ma- ture.® And the city may maintain an action thereon for all damages sustained bj' it, because of the contractor's defanlt in meeting his obligations.' This, however, is only a right of the city ; and it has been held that the creditors of the defanlting contractors could not maintain an action on ~a:-h a bond in their own names.* In Michigan, when the eitv ~ interest is such that, if it were a private individual, no mechanic'f lien could attach, it is not the duty of the city to require a bond of the contractor ; ^ nor is the validity of a contract affected by faQ- ure to do so.^" When several persons as contractors g-ive a bond for the faithful performance of a contract with the citv, a surety thereon is not released from liability for breach of the bond, by a notice, given under a clause in the contract, to dis- continue work, followed by a subsequent reletting of the work to another contractor, and the completion of the work bv the city." A municipal corporation may stipulate, that no payments shall be made to a contractor, while any claims are outstand- 1 Cincinnati v. Cameron,. 33 Ohio St. 336. ■^ Green v. Orford, 15 Ont 506; 24 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 617. ' Messenger v. Buffalo, 21 X. T. 196. * Ireland r. Rochester, 51 Barh. 414. ^Eyennan V. Provenchere, 15 Mo. App. 256. ■^St. Paul T. Butler, 39 Minn. 4.59. 308 "Mayor, etc. v. Crawford, 111 X. T. ass. 8 state Bk. etc. v. Heney, 40 Minn. 145. * Eaton V. Monroe, 63 Mich. 525. •' Carey v. East Saginaw, 44 X. W. Rep. 168. "Xewton T. Devlin, 134 Mass. 490; see this case also for the extent of surety's liability upon his principal's default. CH. X.] MUNICIPAL CONTEACTS. §172 ing against him,^ and a court can order the payment, from money so withheld, of valid claims against the contractor ; ^ and where a certain portion of the sum, for which a contractor had agreed to erect a building, was to be retained until its comple- tion, he cannot recover the sum retained if he fail to complete the building.^ If improvidently,* by mistake,^ or as an allow- ance for his losses,^ a contractor has been overpaid, the corpora- tion may recover the amount so paid. On the other hand, if he is to be paid out of a particular fund, the corporation is liable, though the fund may have been misappropriated^ The assignment of a contract for municipal work is not against public policy ; and, unless prohibited by statute, such assignment is valid, and does not authorize the municipal cor- poration to terminate or repudiate the contract.^ §172. Advertising and letting to lowest bidder— Pat- ented articles. — When the municipal authorities are required by statute to award contracts to the lowest bidder, a contract not so awarded is illegal ; and its illegality may be pleaded by the city in an action brought thereon.^ Although, when not ' Knapp V. Swaney, 56 Mich. 345. 2 Merch. Bk. v. New York, 97 K. Y. 355. * King V. Mahaska, 75 Iowa, 329. « State V. Flood, 26 Mo. App. 500. 5 Betts V. District, 20 Ct. of CI. 445 ; Barnard v. District, lb. 257. 6Murdock v. District, 22 Ct. of Claims, 464. ' Lansing v. Van Garder, 24 Mich. 456; Chaffee v. Granger, 6 lb. 51. 8 Devlin v. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 8; Philadelphia v. Lockhardt, 73 Pa. St. 211; McCubbin v. Atchison, 12 Kan. 166; Deffenbaugh v. Foster, 10 Ind. 382. 'Mayor v. Keyser, 19 Atl. R. 706; Smith V. Mayor, 21 How. Pr. 1; Greene v. Mayor, 60 N. Y. 303; Yar- nold V. Lawrence, 15 Kan. 126; Dick- inson V. Poughkeepsie, 75 N. Y. 65; Burchfleld v. Kew Orleans, (La. 93) 7 So. R. 448; Mappa v. Los Angeles, 61 Cal. 309; Carter v. Kalloch, 56 lb. 335; Maxwell v. Stanislaus Co., 53 lb. 389; Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 21 Wis. 217; People v. Detroit, 41 Mich. 224; Bank v. Portland, 33 Pac. R. 532; Worthiugton v. Boston, 41 Fed. Rep. 23; Bigler v. Mayor, 5 Abb. New Gas. 51 ; In re Eager, 46 N. Y. 100; Nash v. St. Paul, 8 Minn. 172; White V. New Orleans, 15 La. An. 667; State v. Barlow, 48 Mo. 17; Twiss V. Port Huron, 63 Mich. 528; Gutta Percha Co. v. Starkley, 11 Phila. 219; Fulton v. Lincoln, 9 Neb. 858; Reilly v. N. Y. City, 54 N. Y. Super. Ct. 463; Brady v. Mayor, 20 N. Y. 312; 2 Bosw. 173; 7 Abb. Pr. R. 432; People V. Flagg, 17 N. Y. 584; In re Anderson, 47 Hun, 203; Trenton v. Shaw, 10 Atl. Rep. 273; Davenport V. Kleinsohmidt, 10 Pac. Rep. 249; Mazet V. Pittsburgh, 20 Atl. 693; 137 Pa. St. 548; In re Manhattan R. Co., 162 N. Y. 301; People v. Gleason, 25 N. E. R. 4; 121 N. Y. 631; McEwen V. Gilker, 38 Ind. 233; Burchfleld V. New Orleans, (La. 90) 7 So. Rep. 448; American etc. Co. v. Wagner, 139 Pa. St. 6ii5. 309 §172 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. X. expressly required to do so, municipalities maj' contract with- out calling for bids ; ^ yet if notice, advertising and similar pre- liminaries are required by statute, neither the corporation nor any of its officials can make a valid contract, which shall bind the corporation, unless the statute is rigidly complied with.^ So, if there be any informality or irregularity in giving the notice, in writing proposals,® or in selecting the proper news- paper in which to advertise for bids,* or in the substitution of advertising, when the posting of a printed notice is required,^ the contract may be avoided. But a mere typographical error, the notice in other respects being sufficient, by which no one was misled, is not material.^ In fairness to bidders, it has been held that they must be sup- plied with such information as will enable them to act intelli- gentl}'' ; ^ and the bidder should not be compelled to fui'nish his own plans and specifications ; ^ which the notice must provide for.^ So, if the specifications be indefinite as to the quantity and quality of the materials required, the contract based there- on will be void.^" Nor can a public officer, required to adver- tise for bids, fix therein an arbitrary price for certain specified work.i^ In some instances, it is provided that contracts, involving the expenditure of more than a certain specified sum, in New York $1,000, can be awarded only to the lowest bidder, and after advertising for bids.^^ In New York it has been held that such statutory provisions do not apply to contracts which are not for the completion of one particular job, and which do not necessarily involve the expenditure of more than $1,000.^^ ^ Kingsley v. Brooklyn, 5 Abb. N. Cas. 1; Cummings v. Seymour, 79 Ind. 491; 41 Am. Eep. 618. ■'Addis V. Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. St. 379. * Himmelmau v. Cahn, 49 Cal. 285; Brooks V. Satteiiee, 49 lb. 289. 4 Taylor v. Lambertville, 42 N. J. Eq. 107. » Kretsch v. Helme, 45 Ind. 438. 6 Case V. Fowler, 65 Ind. 29. ' Detroit v. Hosmer, (Mich.) 44 K. W. Rep. 622. * People V. Com'rs, 4 ffeb. 150. 310 3 Wilkins v. Deti-oit, 46 Mich. 120. 1^ Bigler v. New York, 5 Abb. K. Cas. 51. 11 In re Mahaii, 20 Hun ( N^. Y.) 301. 12 See Phelps v. New York, 112 N. Y. 216; 23 Am. & Eug. Cor. Ca.s. 479; Cf. People v. VauNort, 64 Barb. 205. IS Swift V. Mayor, 83 N. Y. 528; see also, Brady v. New York, 55 N. Y. Super. Ct. 45; Greene v. Mayor, 60 N. Y. 303. CH. X.] MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. §172 If security is required from the lowest bidder, and the law- requires notice to be given of proposals, noncompliance with these requirements will invalidate the contract.^ On the same grounds, a council has no authority, after the bids have been opened, to alter the contract in a material respect, and award it to one of the bidders, without again advertising for bids up- on what is substantially a new contract.^ If, however, a contract has been properly awarded to the lowest bidder, who has defaulted and abandoned it, a new ad- vertisement and award is not necessarj', the original contractor having made himself liable for the extra expense incurred.^ But the rule is otherwise, where the charter requires that the same preliminaries of notice and award to the lowest bidder shall apply to a reletting, as well as to the original letting.* The same strictness is employed in construing charter provis- ions, by which the sale of municipal franchises,® or of proper- ty, real or personal, belonging to the corporation, or the leasing of municipal real estate, is regulated.^ It is generally pro- vided that the highest bidder shall be preferred, and the stat- utes must be folk)wed, or the sale or lease will be void.'' It has been held that when the work or material contracted for by the corporation is patented, and owned or controlled by a single firm or individual, that a statutory requirement of ad- vertisement and letting to the lowest bidder is not applicable.' But many decisions hold that the statutory provisions apply in such cases.* In one instance, construing a provision that all contracts should be made after advertisement, it was held that an assessment was void, which had been levied to meet the expenses incurred by the laying of a pavement, which con- ' Dickinson v. Poughkeepsie, 74 N. Y. 65; Maxwell v. Stanislaus, 46 N. T. 100. 2 Dickinson v. Poughkeepsie, 74 N. Y. 65.. 3 In re Leeds, 53 N. Y. 400. * Mitchell V. Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 92; Hasbrouck V. Milwaukee, 21 lb. 217. 5 People V. Bai-nard, 110 N. Y. 548. ^ San Francisco etc. v. Oakland, 43 Cal. 502. ' Kerr v. Philadelphia, 8 Phila. (Pa.) 292. ' Hobart v. Deti-oit, 17 Mich. 246; 97 Am. Dec. 185; In re Dugro, 50 N. Y. 513; People v. Van Nort, 65 Barb. 331; Of. Dolan v. Mayor, 4 Abb. Pr. N. S. 397 ; see also, Yarwold v. Law- rence, 15 Kan. 126. 9 Nicholson P. Co. v. Painter, 35 Cal. 699; Burgess v. Jefferson City, 21 La. An. 143; Dean v. Chai'lton, 23 Wis. 590; Dean v. Berchsennis, 30 lb. 236; Barber etc. Co. v. Hunt, 100 Mo. 22. 311 § 173 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. X. sisted partly of a patented, and partly of an unpatented article, upon the ground that under those circumstances, a separate contract should have been made for each portion of the work, so that there might be bids on the part which did not call for a patented article.^ So, also, if there is but one person or firm manufacturing a certain article, such as illuminating gas, of the delivery and sale of which they have exclusive control, any law requiring competitive bidding is inapplicable, as un- der the circumstances it is clear that there can be no competi- tion.^ So, too, professional services,^ and articles requiring the personal skill of the manufacturer to give them their value,* are not within this statutory requirement. § 173. Bids— Sealed proposals— Taxpayer's remedy — Fraud in bidding. — When bids are advertised for, and are filed in compliance with the advertisement, their merits, both actual and relative, must be determined solely by a consideration of the terms and conditions set forth in the advertisement or other public notice ; and an award on other grounds and considera- tions will be invalid. Thus, if the notice required that the bidders must warrant the article they furnish for six years, an award to one who is not the lowest bidder, but who gives a warranty for a longer period than the others^ will not stand.^ Favoritism in any degree, however slight, is directly opposed to the principle underlying the award of public contracts, so that no requirements in a notice, which are made imperative by an ordinance, can be dispensed with ;® nor can the lowest bidder be allowed to withdraw his bid, and the official then proceed to let the contract to the next lowest.' Bidders should be informed in detail as to the quality and character of the work, or material required;** and he, whose bid is the lowest upon the amount of work which is required by the estimate, is entitled to the contract and does not lose it, because the estimate is erroneous.® When the right is renewed to reject any and all bids, if deemed for the interest of the coi - 1 In re Eager, 46 N. Y. 100. 2 Harlem G. Co. v. Mayor, 33 N. Y. 309. 3 People V. Flagg, 5 Abb. Pr. 232. * Uetwiller v. Mayor, 1 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 657; 46 How. (N. Y.) Pr. 218. 312 6 State V. Trenton, 49 N. J. L. 339. 6 Smith V. Mayor, 10 N. Y. 504; Mayor v. Keyser, (Md.) 19 Att. Kep. 706. ' Twiss V. Pt. Huron, 63 Mich. 528. 8 Kneeland v. Furlong, 20 Wis. 437. 9 Reilly v. Mayor, 111 K. Y. 473. CH. X.J MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. § 173 poration, but not otherwise, all iniiy be rejected and a re- advertiseraent ordered.^ But the rejection may be reconsid- ered, and an award made, if it is done before re-advertisement.^ The action of municipal ofHcials, in accepting or rejecting bids, is judicial and discretionary, and the corporation will not be liable in damages, even though the lowest bid has been re- jected ; ^ nor does a bidder acquire any legal right which can be enforced by a mandamus, until a contract has been formed by the acceptance of his bid.* But the acceptance of a bid in a proper and legal manner constitutes a contract ^ and vests in the bidder a property, of which he cannot be deprived without compensation. For this reason, an act of the Legislature, sub- sequently passed, will not be permitted to impair the obligation of the contract, already completed by the acceptance of the bid.® If the statute or ordinance under which proposals are received, requires that bidders must furnish good and sufficient security for the faithful performance of their contracts, the cor- poration is under no compulsion to accept the lowest bidder, where the security offered is not sufficient or satisfactory.^ Bids must not be indefinite in any material respects, as to price or quantity ; but the omission of one or two insignificant items,^ the reference to " plans, specifications," etc., without a detailed description of suoh plans and specifications,® or the failure to name any particular system to be used, in a contract to furnish light,i° will not invalidate the bids. When a municipal corporation is required by law to award its contracts to the lowest bidder after advertisement, an in- junction will lie, at the suit of a taxpayer, to restrain the au- thorities from making an award without advertising ; ^^ or from 1 Walsh V. Mayor, 113 N. Y. 143; 24 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 530; State V. Directors, etc., 5 Ohio St. 234; Kelly V. Chicago, 62 HI. 279; Keogh V. Wilmington, 4 Del. Ch. 491. 2 Ross V. Stackhouse, 114 Ind. 200. " East Riv., etc., Co. v. Donnelly, 93 N. Y. 557; 2 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 322. * People V. Croton Aqueduct Brd., 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 240; Kelly v. Chi- cago, 62 111. 279; Weed v. Beach, 56 How. Pr. 470. 5 Argent v. San Fran., 16 Cal. '^.'56. 6 In re Protestant, etc., Sch., 58 Barb. (N. Y.) 161; 40 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 19. ' Smith V. Mayor, 10 N. Y. 504; State V. Board, 42 Ohio St. 374; May V. Detroit, 2 Mich. N. P. 235. 8 State V. Com'rs, 13 Neb. 57. 9 Sexton V. Chicago, 107 111. 323. w Detroit v. Hosraer, (Mich.) 44 N. W. Rep. 622. " Com'rs V. Templeton, 51 Ind. 266. 313 §174 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. X. carrying into execution any contract illegally entered into.' It has been held, however, in Connecticut, that in such a case an injunction could not be maintained ; the court basing its decision upon the fact, that any contract, not awarded to the lowest bidder, being illegal, the corporation would not be bound. Hence, no taxpayer was in danger of any loss ; and, therefore, there was no occasion for judicial interference by an injunction.^ It need hardly be said that any unlawful combination to pre- • vent bidding, or any element of fraud in the bid itself,^ by which competition is prevented ; or which results in the letting of the contract to any but the lowest bidder, will authorize a rejection of the proposals, or a repudiation of the contract.* § 174. Annulment of contracts — Corporate control of work. — When a contract reserves to the city the right to can- cel it, upon the failure to complete the work in the specified time, the agreement may be annulled upon failure or abandon- ment by the contractor.^ But it is held that the right of the contractor, to recover for work already done, was not destroyed by such an annulment, when his failure to complete the contract was caused by circumstances not within his control.^ Notice to a contractor by the city, that it will no longer pay or proceed under the contract, is not an annulment.'^ If the penalty for noncompletion be the forfeiture of a sum of money, the city may waive the forfeiture although forbidden to make any extra allowan.ce ; ^ but provisions, requiring a reletting of a contract, are mandatory, and an extension of time is invalid.* If the work must be done under the suspervision, and to the sat- isfaction, o'f some municipal ofEcial, the city cannot complain if, though varying from the contract, the work was done as he 1 FoUmer v. Nuckolls Co., G Neb. 204; Schumm v. Seymour, 24 N. J. Eq. 143. 2 Dibble v. New Haven, 56 Conn. 199; 20 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 174. 3 Brady v. Bartlett, 56 Cal. 350. * Peoples V. Stephens, 71 N. T. 557; Jennings Co. Com'rs v. Verbarg, 63 Ind. 107; Nelson v. New York, 5 N. y. Sup. 688; In re Delaware etc. Co., 8 lb. 352; compare In re Anderson, 109 N. T. 554. '■ Bietry V. New Orleans, 24 La. An. 314 21; Powers v. Yonkers, 114 N. Y. 145; Farmers L. & I. Co. v. Gales- burg, 133 U. S. 156; Rittenhouse v. Mayor etc., 25 Md. 836. ^ Bietry v. New Orleans, 22 La. An. 149. ' Davenport etc. Co. v. Davenport, 13 Iowa, 229. * People V. Brennan, 18 Abb. Pr. 100. ^ Beveridge v. Livingstone, 54 Cal. 54. CH. X.] MUNICIPAL CONTKACTS. §175 directed;^ nor can the contractor's right to collect payment be defeated or impaired by the neglect or refusal of the municipal official to examine or inspect the work ; ^ or by any unauthorized alteration of the contract by the city official supervising it.** General direction and supervision of a public work, when in- trusted to a municipal committee, are not limited to the quality of materials and manner of working, but extend to the time as well.* A satisfactory performance is held to mean a performance in accordance with the specifications.^ The acceptance by the municipality of work done is oiil)'' prima facie evidence that the terms and specifications of the contract are being complied with ; " but when payments are made, as the work progresses, upon the certificates of the supervising officials, their certificates are conclusive, so far as the payments are concerned.^ So, when the municipal board is made an arbiter, to determine all questions as to amount earned on city contracts, their award upon a contract within their jurisdiction is binding.^ § 175. Contracts for a water supply.^ — Under the author- ity commonly conferred by charter to make such ordinances and by-laws as shall be necessary for the security and welfare of the inhabitants, and for preserving health, order and good government, a city may contract for a water supply.^* Some- times such contracts are authorized by special laws,^i or by spe- 1 Kingsley v. Brooklyn, 78 N. T. 200; Omaha T. Hammond, 94 U. S. 98. -Neenan v. Donoghue, 50 Mo. 593; Fhelan v. New York, 119 N. T. 86. « Drew V. Altoona, 121 Pa. St. 401 ; Dillon V. Syracuse, 9 K. T. Sup. 98. * Chapman v. Lowell, 4 Cush. 378. ^Kinsley v. Monongahela Co., 31 W. Va. 464. "Bulick V. Connely, 42 Ind. 134; Omaha v. Hammond, 94 U. S. 98; Despard v. Pleasants Co., 23 W. Va. 318. ^ Malone v. Philadelphia, 12 Phila. 270; McGuire v. Rapid City, pak.) 43 N. W. Kep. 706; Eeilly v. Albany, 112 N. Y. 30. 8 Forristal v. Milwaukee, 57 Wis. 628. s See ante, §§ 144, 144 a, power to establish pi-ivate and municipal mo- nopolies. w Indianapolis v. Gas Co., 66 Ind. 396. 11 Rome V. Cabot, 28 Ga. 50; Bur- lington W. W. Co. V. Burlington, 43 Kan. 725 ; Hackensack W. Co. v. Ho- boken, 51 N. J. L. 220; Atl. City W. W. Co. V. Read, 50 lb. 665; State v. Harrison, 46 lb. 79. But the power to contract for water supply held not to include power to purchase a site for works: People v. Mc- Clintock, 45 Cal. 11. 315 §176 MUNICIPAL COKPORATIONS. [CH. X. cific provisions of the charter,^ or by the general authority to make contracts, which are deemed necessary for the municipal welfare.^ The large discretion which municipal corporations possess, in providing a water supply, under the comprehensive powers usually conferred by the Legislature, will not, unless abused, be interfered with by the courts.^ Of course, such dis- cretionary power, being equivalent to a power to levy taxes, must be exercised in a conservative manner ; * it having been held in one case, that a waterworks committee, without special authority, could not bind a city by contracting for a new and expensive improvement in the existing system.^ If the contract for the construction of waterworks be ille- gal,^ or if it will increase the city's debt beyond the legal limit,'' an injunction will lie to prevent the carrying out of the con- tract.^ § 176. Municipal contracts with attorneys at law A municipal corporation has the implied authority to employ an attorney to attend to its corporate interests, and to prosecute and defend actions in its behalf,^ even though the charter pro- vides for a city attorney.^" But it has been held that a city contract with another person, for services which the law re- quires to be performed by the city attorney, is void.^^ Nor can 1 Couery v. N. O. W. "W. Co., 41 La. An. 910; Atl. City W. W. Co. v. Atl. City, 48 N. J. L. 378. 2 Wells V. Atlanta, 43 Ga. 67; Hale V. Houghton, 8 Mich. 458; Grant v. Davenport, 36 Iowa, 402; Livingston V. Pippin, 31 Ala. 542. "Atl. C. W. W. Co. V. Atl. City, 48 N. J. L. 378; Memphis v.Mem. W. Co., 5 Heisk. 528; Warren v. Chicago, 118 111. 329. * Morton v. Power, 33 Minn. 521. 5 Mayor of Nashville v. Hogan, 9 Baxter, 495. « Davenport v. Kleinschmidt, 6 Mont. 502. ' Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1. 8 See post, § 397, and Dibble v. New Haven, 56 Conn. 199; Sackett v. New Albany, 88 Ind. 473; Madison v. Smith, 83 lb. 502; Noble v. Vin- 316 cennes, 42 lb. 125 ; Pedrick v. Eipon, 73 Wis. 622. 9 Clarke v. Lyon Co., 8 Nev. 181 Thacher v. Com'rs, 13 Kan. 182 Shirts V. Noblesville, 122 Ind. 580 24 N. E. R. 167; Hornblower v. Du- den, 35 Cal. 664; Sherman v. Carr, 8 E. L 431; Wilhelm v. Cedar Co., 50 Iowa, 254; Mt. Vernon v. Patton, 94 111. 65; People v. Warren, 14111. App. 296; Roodhouse v. Jennings, 29 111. App. 50; Memphis v. Adams, 9 Heisk. 518; State v. Heath, 20 La. An. 172; 96 Am. Dec. 390; Bruce v. Dickey, 116 111. 527; Connolly v. Beverley (Mass. 90), 24 N. E. Rep. 404. 10 Smith V. Mayor, 13 Cal. 531; Hugg V. Camden, 20 N. J. Eq. 6; comp. Ransom v. Mayor, 24 Barb. 226. " Clougb V. Hart, 8 Kan. 487. CH. X.J MITNICIPAL CONTEACTS. §176 the municipal authorities take any particular class of cases out of his hands and confide them to others.^ When an attorney for a municipal corporation is chosen by the people, he cannot be ignored or superseded by authority, derived from the same source as his own.^ Municipal corporations also, are not excep- tions to the general rule that a substitution of attorneys in a pending action must be made by order duly entered in the minutes.^ It has also been decided, where a municipal corpora- tion possesses the " general common law power of such corpora- tions," that no action would lie against it by counsel, whom it had employed to assist the State in a criminal prosecution of former city officers.* But, apart from these special cases, it is held that where it is incumbent upon a municipal corporation to indemnify its officials who, in the legitimate performance of their duties, incur liabilities to others, the corporation may em- ploy counsel to defend such officials.^ And where a legal con- tract has been made with an attorney, who has rendered service thereon, the municipality is bound to compensate him,® even though the contract maj- not have been evidenced by an ex- press vote or ordinance.''' But if an attorney is employed on a quantum meruit, and during the rendition of his services he is appointed as the regular solicitor of the municipal corporation, it has been held that he could not recover special compensation for the services he subsequently rendered in the pending suit.^ 1 State V. Paterson, 40 N', J. L. 186. 2 Clough V. Hart, 8 Kan. 487. ^Parker v. Williamsburgh, 13 How. Pr. 250. < Butler V. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 498. 5 Sherman v. Carr, 8 R. I. 431 ; Ko- per V. Laurienberg, 90 N. C. 429. When a county causes a resident to refuse to pay a tax upon its bonds for the purpose of testing their val- idity in a suit to re(!over the tax, the county may pay an attorney to aid the taxpayer, where it has authority to " do all acts necessary to the exercise of its corporate powers." Franklin Co. V. Laymon, 33 N. E. R. 1094; 43 III. App. 163; CuUen v. Carthage, 103 Ind. 196. Cf. City of New Haven v. New Haven & D. R. Co., (Conn. 93) 25 Atl. B. 316; Holraan v. Robbins, (Ind. 93) 31 N. E. B. 863; Butler v. Sullivan Co., 108 Mo. 630. s Baker v. Inhabitants, 13 Me. "74; Thacher v. Jefferson Co., 13 Kan. 182; State v. Hammontown, 38 K. J. L. 430; Barnett v. Mayor, 48 lb. 395; Ellis V. Washoe Co., 7 Nev. 291; Knight V. Ashland, 61 Wis. 233; But- ternut V. O'Malley, 50 lb. 333; Kin- nie V. Waverly, 42 Iowa, 437. ' Kinnie v. Waverly, 42 Iowa, 437; Langdon v. Castleton, 30 Vt. 285; Wallace v. Mayor etc., 29 Cal. 180. 8 Detroit v. Whittemore, 27 Mich. 281. 317 CHAPTER XI. MUNICIPAL SECUEITIBS. Section. 177 — Municipal warrants — Nego- tiability — Form and effect — Presentment — Payment. 178 — ^Warrants payable out of a particular fund. 179 — -Presentment of warrants — Indorsement — Actions by and against whom. 180 — When actions may be brought — Defences — Statute of Limitations. 181 — Municipal scrip — Illegal obli- gations as circulating me- dium. 182 — Implied power to borrow money and to emit negoti- able paper. 183 — Power to issue negotiable se- curities. 184 — Public purposes — Aid to rail- road. 185 — Construction, completion and location of road as afiecting the validity of bonds issued in its aid. 186 — Subscriptions for stock — Conditions precedent. 187 — Legislative power to compel the issue of bonds for pub- lic purposes. 187a— Curative statutes validating irregular subscriptions and invalid securities. 188 — Bonds issued in aid of private purposes — Constitutional prohibitions. 189 — Consent of taxpayers or voters as a condition pre- cedent to issue of munici- pal bonds. 189a — Limitations upon municipal indebtedness. 190 — The municipal coupon bond. 318 Section. 190a — Execution of the municipal bond — By what officials must it be signed. 191 — Negotiability of coupon bonds — Rights of holder. 191a — To whom payable — Transfer by indorsement or delivery. 1916 — The formal parts of bond and coupon — Seal not neces- sary. 191 c — Eegistration of municipal se- curities by State officials. 192 — Presentment of coupons for payment. 192a — The time of payment. 192 6 — Interest and exchange on bond and coupon. 193 — Actions on bonds and cou- pons. 193a — When consideration paid to corporation for invalid bond may be recovered. 194 — Legislative control of reme- dies to enforce payment. 194(1 — Remedies for enforcement of municipal indebtedness. 195 — Defences to bonds. 195a — Nonperformance of condi- tions as a defence. 1956 — Defences not appearing on face of bond. 195c — ^Who are 6ona fide holders. 195riCIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. XI. dinary expenses for the year have been provided for by the treasury.^ § 179. Presentment of warrants— Indorsement— Actions on and by whom brought In compliance with established usage, the bolder of a vi^arrant is bound to present it for pay- ment ; 2 and until the payment of fhe warrant has been de- manded, the corporation cannot be said to be in default.* This requirement seems to be just and reasonable, on account of the extensive operations, conducted by municipal corporations, in order that the disbursing officials can make the proper arrange- ments for payment. But in th.e case of private corporations jiresentment or notice of nonpayment is generally considered unnecessary ; * and there are decisions, in which the same rule has been applied to municipal warrants.^ And even when pre- sentment has been deemed necessary, the corporation will not be discharged from liability. The failure to make demand only has the effect of preventing the recovery of damages and costs.^ Whenever a warrant is held to be negotiable, it may be transferred by indorsement, and the indorser is subject to the same liability as though it were a bill or note ; '' and when in form, though not in fact, negotiable, they must be indorsed to give the assignee a good title.^ But when the negotiability of a warrant is denied, one who transfers it does not become liable as an indorser ; except, perhaps, that he may be made to return the consideration he received, if the warrant proves to be in- valid or illegal.^ Although it is the rule that warrants are not negotiable, it 1 Kev. St. Mo. §5370; Mo. Act, 1865, p. 86, §13; State v. Trammel, 11 S. W. Rep. 748. 2 Varner v. Kobleborough, 2 Me. 126; Pease v. Cornish, 19 lb. 193; East Unioa v. Ryan, 86 Pa. St. 459 ; Dalrymple v. "Whittingham, 26 Vt. 346; Central v. Willcoxen, 3 Col. 566; Kelly V. Mayor, 4 Hill, 265. sPekiu V. Reynolds, 31 111. 529; 82 Am. Dec. 244. * Tiedeman's Commercial Paper, § 128 ; Tiedeman's Private Corp. § ^ Steele v. Davis Co., 2 G. Greene, (Iowa) 469; see Miller v. Thompson, 324 3 Man. & G. 576; Fairchild v. R. Co., 15 N. T. 337; Justices v. Orr, 12 Ga. 137; Harvey v. W. P. S. Co., 1 Doug. 193; Clark v. Polk Co., 19 lovfa, 247; Dana v. San Francisco, 19 Cal. 486. « Kelly V. Mayor, 4 Hill, 263; Com- mercial Bank v. Hughes, 17 Wend. 94,97; Harker v. Anderson, 21 lb. 375; Lusk v. Perkins, 48 Ark. 238. ' Bull v. Sims, 23 N. Y. 571; Fair- child V. Ogdensburg, 15 N. Y. 337; Hodges V. Schuler, 22 lb. 114. 8 Garvin v. Wiswell, 83 111. 390. s Keller v. Hicks, 22 Cal. 460; see Smeltzer v. White, 92 U. S. 390. CH. XI.] MUNICIPAL SECURITIES. §180 is universally conceded that they can, in the absence of express restriction, be assigned ; and the assignee may recover in an appropriate action against the corporation. But whether the action should be brought in the name of the assignee, or in that of the assignor, is differently decided. If the warrant is negotiable, the indorsee can sue in his own name.^ Since non-negotiable contracts were not assignable at com- mon law, the law courts did not recognize the assignee; and if suit was brought in such a court, it had to be brought in the assignor's name, permission to use which, in maintaining a suit, would be compelled by a court of equity. This is still the law wherever it has not been changed by statute.^ But in most of the States, the assignee can now sue in his own name ; but can- not claim any privileges or exemptions from defences to wliich the assignor is not entitled.^ In California, there must be an assignment of the original debt ; * wliile, in Minnesota, the as- signee must prove the consideration, if suing in his own name.*^ Municipal warrants, signed by the proper officials are binding ; and impeachment must come from the defendant, as it is a legal presumption that public officials have done their duty.^ § 180. When action may be brought — ^Defences — Statute of Limitations. — A warrant, not paid upon presentation, may be sued on at once ; ^ for a general warrant, which is not paya- ble out of a special fund,^ is a written acknowledgment of in- 1 Kelly V. Mayor, 4 Hill, 263; Dal- rymple v. WMttingham, 26 Vt. 345 ; Clark V. School Dlst., 3 E. I. 199; Moss V. Badley, 2 Hill, 255 ; Justice V. Orr, 12 Ga. 137 ; Leavenworth v. Keller, 6 Kans. 510; Commissioners V. Day, 19 Ind. 450; Cravirford Co. v. Wilson, 7 Ark. 219; See Dively v. Cedar Falls, 21 Iowa, 565. 2 Hyd-e v. Franklin, 27 Vt. 185 ; Al- lison V. Juniata Co., 50 Pa. St. 353; Dalrymple v. Whittingham, 26 Vt. 345; Klein v. Supervisors, 54 Miss. 878; Smith v. Cheshire, 13 Gray, 318. ^Sturtevaut v. Liberty, 46 Me. 459; Emery v. Mariaville, 56 lb. 316; Campbell v. Polk Co., 3 Iowa, 467; Clark V. Same, 19 lb. 248; Bank v. Franklin Co., 65 Mo. 105; Mathis v. Cameron, 62 lb. 504; Bank v. Farm- ington, 41 N. H. 32 ; Leavenworth v. Keller, 6 Kan. 510; Beals v. Evans, 10 Cal. 459; Kelly v. Mayor, 4 Hill, 263; Clark V. Sch. Dis., 3 R. 1. 199; Com'rs v. Day, 19 Ind. 450; Dively v. Cedar Falls, 21 Iowa, 365; Andover v. Graf- ton, 7 N. H. 298. 4 People V. Gray, 23 Cal. 125; Dana v. San Francisco, 19 lb. 488. ^Goodnow V. Ramsey, 11 Minn. 31. 6 Floyd Co. V. Day, 19 Ind. 450; Hamilton v. Newcastle, etc., Co., 9 Ind. 359; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 211. 'Inter. Nat. Bk. v. Franklin, 65 Mo. 105 ; Beals v. Evans, 10 Cal. 459. " Brown v. Johnson Co., 1 Green, 486. 180 MTJNICIPAIi COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XI. debtedness, which, if not paid upon presentation, may be sued on by the holder, although there may be no mone}-- in the treasury.^ The holder is not bound to request before suit that a tax be levied to replenish the treasury, ^ it being the clear duty of the municipality to raise money to pay these orders, as well as any other indebtedness.* An exception to the general rule prevail- ed in Nebraska, where it was held that one receiving a warrant, in which no time of payment is fixed, takes it with the expec- tation, if there are no available funds in the treasury, of waiting until the money can be raised in the ordinary way.* Lack of consideration, or usury ,^ is a good defence to an ac- tion upon a warrant ; and in all cases the consideration must be a valid one.^ When the warrant has been legally issued, valid- ity and sufficiency of consideration will be presumed.'^ The fact, that an account has been audited by a board or of- ficial, does not constitute, in the case of claims against counties, such a judicial settlement as will conclude either party in an action upon a county warrant ; and the same principle applies to a city or other public corporation.* Payment is always a good defence ; but if the warrant be negotiable, its transfer discharges the city's liability to the payee for the debt.9 The Statute of Limitations begins to run on warrants from the date upon which their payment was refused by the corporation,!" 1 Natl. Lumber Co. v. City of Wy- more, (Neb.) 46 N. W. Rep. 622; Mills Co. N. Bk.v. Mills Co., 67 Iowa, 697; Floyd Co. v. Day, 19 Iowa, 450; Lyell V. Lapeer Co., 6 McLean, 446; Interuational Bank v. Franklin Co., 65 Mo. 105 ; Packard v. Bovina, 24 Wis. 382. 2 Mills Co. Bk. V. Mills Co., 67 Iowa, 697. 3 Terry v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 490. * Brewer v. Otoe Co., 1 Neb. 373. 5 Clark V. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 199; Danville v. Sutherlin, 20 Gratt. D55; Lynchburg v. Narvell, 20 lb. 601. *Gray V. Latham, 84 Ala. 546; see Clayton v. Mc Williams, 49 Miss. 311. 326 'Floyd V. Day, 19 Ind. 451. 8 Shirk V. Pulaski Co., 4 Dill. 209; Nashville v. Eay, 19 Wall. 468; Web- ster Co. V. Taylor, 19 Iowa, 117, 120; Cheeny v. Brookfield, 60 Mo. 53; Goodnow V. Ramsay, 11 Minn. 31. But see Carroll v. Board etc., 28 Miss. 38. ^ Crawford Co. v. Wilson, 7 Ark. 214. 10 Kenosha v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 478; Clark V. Iowa City, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 583; Carroll v. Tishomingo Co., 28 Miss. 38; Decordova v. Galveston, 4 Tex. 470; Leach v. Wilson Co., 68 lb. 353; Baker v. Johnson Co., 33 Iowa, 151; and Belleville S. Bk. v. Winslow, 30 Fed. Rep. 488. OH. XI.] MUNICIPAL SECUEITIES. §181 although it has been held that warrants are not within the stat- ute.i Though a warrant, properly signed, imports prima fade a valid and subsisting cause of action, it is always competent for a municipal corporation even after the issue of a warrant, which is simply a means of payment, and not the creation of a new debt, to set up the defence of ultra vires? Under this rule, the plaintiff in suing upon a warrant must show, that the law has been strictly complied with,^ the authority of the official, by whom it was issued, being always open for examination.* No purchaser can recover on a warrant which is known by the original holder to have been issued ultra vires.^ A bill in chan- cery may be filed by a municipal corporation to have illegal warrants delivered up and canceled.® § 181. Municipal scrip — Illegal obligation as circulating medium. — Inasmuch as the right to coin money and regulate the value thereof was limited to the national government, and the States were prohibited from emitting bills of credit, or mak- ing anything but gold or silver a legal tender,'^ scrip, or war- rants, intended to circulate as money, are unconstitutional and void, so far as they are given the character of currency.^ The city, however, is not released from its liability on the original debt, although there may exist no liability upon the scrip; either by the fact that the city expected that the warrants 1 Brewer v. Otoe Co., 1 Neb. 373. , 2 Cheeney v. Town of Brookfield, 60 Mo. 53; Thomas v. Richmond, 12 Wall. 349; Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 lb. 776; Boom v. Utica, 2 Barb. 104; Leavenworth Co. v. Keller, 6 Kan. 510; Hall v. Jackson, 95 111. 352; see Allegheny v. McClurkan, 14 Pa. St. 81; Underwood v. Newpoi't Lye, 5B.Mon. 129. 3 East Union v. Eyan, 86 Pa. St. 459. * Taft V. Pittsford, 28 Vt. 286; Peo- ple V. Klokke, 92 111. 134. 5 Salamanca v. Jasper Co. Bk., 22 Kan. 696. ^Pulaski Co. v. Lincoln, 9 Ai-k. 320; Webster Co. v. Taylor, 19 Iowa, 117; Paris v. Cherry, 8 Ohio St. 564; Glastonbury v. McDonald, 44 Vt. 450. ' Craig V. Missouri, 4 Pet. 35, 453; Briscoe v. Bank, 11 lb. 257, 313, 334, 336; Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 557, 558, 622. 8 Cheeney v. Brookfield, 60 Mo. 53; Lindsay v. Eottaken, 32 Ark. 619; Jones V. Little Rock, 25 lb. 301; Mer- chants Bank v. Little Rock,5 Dill.299; s.c. 98 U.S. 308; Thomas v.Richmoud, 12 Wall. 349; Allegheny v. McClur- kan, 14 Pa. St. 81; Miller v. Lynch- burg, 20 Gratt. 330; State Board v. Aberdeen, 56 Miss. 518; Brown v. Belleville, 30 Up. Can. Q. B. 373; Wentworth v. Hamilton, 35 lb. 509; Parsons v. Monmouth, 70 Me. 262; Bangor Sav. Bk. v. Stillwater, 46 Fed. Rep. 899. 327 §182 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XI. would furnish a convenient circulating medium, or that they have become such.^ So, when a city had issued illegal scrip, with which it paid its creditors, but afterward called it in, and issued new and valid obligations, it was held liable upon the latter.^ § 182. Implied power to borrow money, and to emit ne- gotiable paper. — The question whether a municipal corpora- tion can borrow money and become a party to commercial paper, is only difficult to answer, where there is no express grant of such a power or powers in a charter, or other statute, which affects or controls the powers of municipal corporations. In the absence of constitutional prohibition, the State Legislature may undoubtedly grant such a power to any municipal or pub- lic corporation. Two questions are involved in this discussion : First, whether a municipal corporation has the implied power to borrow money, and bind the corporation by the obligation thus assumed ; or whether such a corporation can only obtain funds by taxation. Secondly, whether, if the implied power to borrow money be conceded, it includes the power to give in evidence of the debt so created a negotiable note or bill. On the first question the authorities are divided. It is urged in behalf of the denial to municipal corporations of any implied power to borrow money, that they are established for the pur- pose of local government, and the means of carrying on and effectuating such purposes are ordinarily attainable by taxation. That being ordinarily a sufficient source of revenue, there is no reason whj^ the power to borrow money should be implied. If an extraordinary benefit is proposed which can only be secur- ed by the exercise of the power to borrow, the Legislature can 1 Dively v. Cedar Falls, 21 Iowa, 565. 2 Little Rock v. Merchant's Nat. Bk., 98 U. S. 308, 5 Dil. 299. In this case, the court said: " By taking up the illegal obligations, the city in effect said, we will purge the trans- action of its illegality. We had the authority to accept from you, . . . the sums in question. We did so re- ceive and expend for legitimate pur- poses. We erred in making a pay- ment to you in objectionable form. 328 We now pay our just and lawful debts by canceling the bank notes issued by us, and delivering to you obligations in the form of bonds, to which form there is no legal objec- tion." See, also, Hitchcock v. Gal- veston, 96 U. S. 350; Nashville v. Ray, 19 Wall. 468; Pal. Jury v. But- ton, 15 lb. 570; Mullarkey v. Cedar Falls, 19 Iowa, 24; Sykes v. Laffery, 27 Ark. 407; Wright v. Hughes, 18 Ind. 113. OH. XI.] MUNICIPAL SECUEITIES. §182 be asked for a special grant of the power.^ But the position above taken is not supported bj'' the majority of the cases ; the current of decisions is running in favor of the view, that a municipal corporation may exercise any povs^er, that is suitable or needful to effectuate the objects, for which it is created, whether the power be expressly granted or must be implied ; and that in the implied powera of a municipal corporation should be included the power to borrow money .^ The power 1 Hackettstown v. Swackhamer, 37 K. J. L. 191. Dissenting opinion of Agnew, C. J., in Williamsport v. Cum., 74 Pa. St. 488, 50.5 ; Knapp" v. Hoboken, 39 N. J. L. 394; Gause v. Clarksville, 5 Dillon, C. C. 165; Brad- ley, J., opinion in Mayor of Nashville V. Kay, 19 Wall. 475. For a strong presentation of the arguments against the impolicy of permitting or conceding to the municipality the implied power to borrow money and to issue commercial paper, see Dillon Mun. Cor. §§ 507, 507 o, 508, et seq. (ed. 1892). 2 Bank of Chillicothe v. Mayor, 7 Ohio, pt. 2, p. 31 ; Douglas v. Vir- ginia City, 5 Nev. 147; Sturtevant v. Alton, 8 McLean, 393; Mullarkey v. Cedar Falls, 19 Iowa, 21; New Al- bany Bk. V. Danville, 60 Ind. 504; Sheffield v. Andress, 56 Ind. 157; Galena v. Corwith, 48 111. 423; Board V. Day, 19 Ind. 450; Mells v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 470; Ketchum v. Builalo, 14 N. T. 356; Kelley v. Mayor, 4 Hill, 263; Clarke v. Sch. Dis., 3 K. I. 199; First Municipality v. McDonough, 2 Robinson, 244; Clarke v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 199 ; Adams v. E. R. , 2 Coldw. 645. In England, Pallis- ter V. Mayor, 67 Eng. C. L. (9 C. B.) 744; Payne v. Mayor, etc., 3 Hurl. F. 372; Kendall v. King, 84 Eng. C. L. (17 C. B.) 483; Nowell v. Mayor, 9 Exoh. 457, but compare as to prom- issory notes issued, Reg. v. Litch- field, 4 Q. B. 893; see further, State V. Madison, 7 Wis. 688; Clark v. Janesville, 10 lb. 136; State v. Bab- cock, 22 Neb. 614; Kenosha v. Lam- son, 9 Wall. 477, 486; Mass. v. Harpeth, 7 Heisk. 283; Com. v. Pittsburgh, 34 Pa. St. 486; Folsom V. Sch. Dis., 91 111. 404; Clark v. Sch. Dis., 78 lb. 474; Desmond v. Jefferson, 19 Fed. Rep. 483; Danielly V. Cabanis, 52 Ga. Ill; Iviuson v. Hance, 1 Wyora. Ter. 270; Merrill V. Monticello, 138 N. S. 673. In Wil- liamsport v. Com., 84 Pa. St. 487, the court said: "In its broad sense the power to borrow money and issue bonds therefor cannot be said to be among the implied powers of a mu- nicipal corporation. For general purposes, such power does not exist for the reason that it is not necessary for the objects for which it was created. Thus it has never been contended that a municipality may borrow and issue bonds or notes for objects having no necessary relation to the performance of municipal duties. To admit such a principle would be destructive of such organ- izations and place the taxpayers of a city at the mercy of the first band of plunderers who should happen to obtain the temporary contj-ol of its affairs. The question for our con- sideration is, whether the power to issue bonds is one of the inherent powers of a municipal corporation in a limited sense; that is to say for the purpose of providing for such expenditure as is strictly germane to the objects for which such corpo- 329 §182 MTJNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XI. to borrow is held to be implied, not only when there has been no express grant of such a power, but also when this power has, with limitations, been expressly granted, and it seems to be necessary to use it beyond the limits imposed in the express grant ; as when a city charter expresslj- grants to the corpora- tion the power to borrow whatever money it may need, not ex- ceeding a certain snm per year, and to issue bonds for the same. It was held in Illinois that under the implied power to borrow, the city maj' lawfully borrow more money than what is stated in the charter.^ This is certainly carrying the doctrine of implied powers to the extreme limits, and in violation of the general rule of con- struction, that the express grant of a power with limitations excludes anj' implication of such a power beyond the limitation. It may be well to state that the implied power to borrow money was exercised by municipal corporations in this country idv many j-ears without question ; and it is very probable that the implication of the power would not have been disputed, if rations are created, we are not with- out authorities that question if they do not deny this power. Judge Dil- lon, one of the ablest writers upon this branch of the law, says in his treatise on the Law of Municipal Bonds : ' We regard as alike unsound and dangerous that a public or mu- nicipal corporation possesses the implied power to borrow money for its ordinary purposes and as inci- dental to that the power to issue commercial securities.' The ground relied upon by the learned author and others, who take this view of the question, is that the power is a dangerous one. But showing that the power is dangerous does not prove that it does not exist. Power is always dangerous. . . . The dan- gerous nature of a power might be a persuasive argument with the Leg- islature, why it should be denied to a municipal corporation, but cannot be accepted as a conclusive reason 330 that it does not exist. I am willing to concede that the power to issue municipal bonds is dangerous. It afEords oppoi-tunity to unscrupulous men hungering for the spoils of rich municipalities, to enter into extrava- gant contracts, at ruinous prices, by mortgaging the resources of the people in advance. The facility of placing municipal bonds at high rates of interest and having many years to run is certainly a great in- ducement in many cases to unwise and lavish expenditure. It might have been better for the Legislature in the first instance to have applied the principle ' pay as you go ' to such corporations, and to have required them to seek legislative action, when- ever they sought to incur obliga- tions. . . This, however, is a ques- tion with which we have no present concern." 1 Galena v. Corwith, 48 111. 423. CH. XI.] MUNICIPAL SECUKITIES. §183 American municipalities had not entered upon a career of reck- less expenditure. § 183. Power to issue negotiable securities. — Conceding that municipalities generally possess the implied power to bor- row, when such power is essential to the attainment of the ends contemplated in the grant of some express power ; it follows, ac- cording to the weight of decisions, that the implied power to borrow money includes by implication the power to arrange for the payment of the debt so contracted by the issue of negoti- able bonds,^ which shall possess the same characteristics as other commercial paper.^ That is, the municipal bond has all the qualities of negotiability, and is subject to only those defences, which are the incidents of commercial paper in general, pro- vided all the requisites of negotiability are present in the bond. The absence of a requisite ^ or the presence of an inconsistent 1 Bangor Savings Bk. v. Stillwater, 46 Fed. 899; Goodnow v. Kamsey Co., 11 Minn. 31; Carlton v. Washington, 28 Kan. 390; Little Kock v. Bank, 98 U. S. 308; Galena v. Corwith, 48 111. 423; Kogers V. Burlington, 3 Wall. 6.54; Chittenden Co. v. Shanks, (Ky. 89) 11 S. W. E. 468; Seybert v. Pittsburgh, 1 Wall. 372; Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 lb. 387; R. E. v. Evans- ville, 15 Ind. 395 ; De Voss v. Eich- mond, 18 Gratt. 338; Newgass v. New Orleans, (La. 92) 7 So. E. 565; Police Jury v. Britton, 15 Wall. 572; Mayor v. luman, 57 Ga. 370; Tucker V. Ealeigh, 75 N. C. 267; Mayor v. Lombard, 57 Miss. 125 ; Williamsport V. Com., 84 Pa. St. 500; Middletown V. Allegheny Co., 37 lb. 241. In two recent decisions the Supreme Court of the United States has denied to municipalities the implied power to issue negotiable securities where the express power to borrow money had been conferred. Merrill v. Monti- cello, 138 U. S. 673 (1891); and see Brenham V. Germ. Am. Bk., 12 S. Ct. 559; 144 U. S. 173; Ib.,12S. Ct. 975; 144 U. S. 549; reversing 35 Fed. Rep. 185 ; overruling Eogers v. Bur- lington, 3 Wall. 654; Mitchell v. Bur- lington, 4 lb. 270; and distinguish- ing Dwyer v. Mackworth, 57 Tex. 245; Harlan, Brewer and Brown, J J., dissenting. 2Moran v. Miami Co., 2 Black, 722; White V. Verm. R. R. Co., 21 How. 575 ; Marshall Co. v. Schenk, 5 Wall. 784; Lexington v. Butler, 14 lb. 282; Hotchkiss V. Bk., 21 lb. 354; Bur- leigh V. Rochester, 5 Fed. Rep. 667; United States v. U. P. R. R. Co., 91 U. S. 72 ; Humboldt v. Long, 92 lb. 642 ; Cromwell V. Lac. Co., 96 U. S. 51; Macon Co. v. Shares, 97 lb. 272; Com'rs v. Block, 99 lb. 686; New Providence v. Halsey, 117 lb. 336; Ottawa V. First N. Bk., 105 lb. 342; Wilson Co. v. Bank, 103 lb. 770; Ack- ley Sch. Dis. v. Hall, 113 U. S. 135; Gorgier v. Millville, 3 B. & C. (Aug.) 45 ; Brooks v. Mitchell, 9 M. & W. 15; Goodwin v. Roberts, L. R. lApp. Cas. 476; Boss v. Hewett, 20 Wis. 460. And see in New York, Starin v. Genoa, 23 N. Y. 454; Gould v. Ster- ling, 23 lb. 458. 8 See Tiedeman Commercial Paper, §§ 10-35, for a full discussion of the requisites of commercial paper. 331 §184 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIOKS. [CH. XI. element, will destroy the negotiability of the bond, as it would thaf of a bill, check or promissory note. Thus, a bond in the usual form is not made non-negotiable, because payable at the pleasure of the obligor at any time ; ^ but when bonds are pay- able to bearer upon completion of a road, they will be non- negotiable, because payable on a contingency.^ The chief ground of objection to the validity of a municipal bond is the character of the purpose, for which the money was borrowed, and the bonds negotiated. Inasmuch as the payment of the bonds will ultimately have to be provided for by the exercise of the power of taxation, the Legislature can only authorize the issue of municipal bonds for some municipal or public purpose ; ^ and if the bonds are issued to secure some private end, they are void, even though authorized by the Legislature.* What are public purposes, in the light of the present inquiry, will be more fully set forth in the succeeding paragraphs. § 184. PaMic purposes — Eailroad aid.-— Every purpose is public which involves the construction and improvement of the public buildings, works and grounds.^ And where power is given to issue bonds for internal improvements, those public works are referred to, from which the public derive a direct 1 Ackley S. D. v. Hall, 113 U. S. 135. 2 Blackman v. Layman, 63 Ala. 547. 8 See ch. xv. on Taxation, § 254, and Sweet v. Hulbert, 51 Barb. 312; Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655; Curtis V. Whipple, 24Wis. 350; Whit- ing V. Fond du Lac, 25 lb. 167; Allen V. Jay, 60 Me. 124; Jenkins v. Ando- ver, 103 Mass. 94; Pray v. No. Liber- ties, 31 Pa. St. 09 ; In re Mayor of New York, 11 Johns. 77; Camden v. Allen, 26 N. J. L. 398; Sharpless v. Mayor, 21 Pa. St. 147; Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28. * See cases in last note. Bren- ham V. German Am. Bank, 144 IT. S. 173; lb. 549; Davidson v. Eamsey, 18 Minn. 482; Burlington v. Beasley, 94 332 U. S. 310; Coml. Bank v. lola, 9 Dill. 353; State v. Osawkee, 14 Kan. 418: such unlawful issue of bonds may be enjoined by a taxpayer. Crampton V. Zabriskie, 101 U. S. 601; see post, §373. ^Com'rs V. Chandler, 96 U. S. 205 (bridge); Burlington v. Beasley, 94 lb. 314; Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. 74 (gas works) ; Rome v. Cabot, 28 Ga. 50 (waterworks); Stein v. Mobile, 24 Ala. 591; Hale v. Houghton, 8 Mich. 458; Greeley v. People, 60 111. 19 (town hall); Rogers v. Burling- ton, 3 Wall. 362; Sturtevant v. Al- ton, 3 McLean 393 ; State v. Madison, 7 Wis. 688 (markets); Robinson v. St. Louis, 28 Mo. 488 (fire engines); Fellows V. Walker, 39 Fed. Rep. 651; Cf. Weisner v. Douglas, 04 N. T. 91. OH. XI.J MTJNICIPAL SECURITIES. §184 benefit, such as roads, highways,^ public bridges,^ toll bridges,^ and water power for a public mill ; * but, semble, not a court house.* But a municipal corporation has no power to appro- priate money to erect a building to be used in part by a Grand Army post, it being held that this is not a public use.® According to the weight of decisions, it is a public purpose for the municipality to aid in the construction of railroads. The ground, upon which these decisions rest their conclusion, is that the grant of the franchise to build a railroad ai>d manage it, is confessedly and actually justified by its promotion of the public welfare, although provision is made for compensation to the private corporation which advances the necessary capital. If the State or city can lawfully grant a valuable franchise to a private corporation, because the public welfare will be pro- moted thereby, it may lawfully add to the franchise a sum of money, or the credit of the State or municipality, as an addi- tional inducement to construct a railroad which promises to develop the resources of the community.'^ " The public has an 1 "Wetumpka v. Winter, 29 Ala. 660. = Union etc. Co. v. Colfax Co., 4 Neb. 450; Wilcox v. Deer Lodge Co., 2 Mont. T. 574. 8 Dodge Co. V. Chandler, 96 U. S. 205 ; see, also, internal improvements defined, Fremont etc. v. Sherwin, 6 Neb. 48; aetchell v. Benton, 47 N. W. R. 468; Burlington v. Beasley, 94 TJ. S. 310; Guernsey V. Burlington, 4 DiU. 372; Lewis v. Sherman Co., 5 Fed. Eep. 269. 4 Blair v. Cuming Co., Ill U. S. 373. ' Dawson Co. v. McNaraar, 10 Neb. 276; 4 N. W. R. 991. * Kingman v. Brockton, 26 N. E. E. 998. 'Hill V. Memphis, 10 S. Ct. 562; 134 TJ. S. 198; Com. v. Williams- town, (Mass. 92) 30 N. E. R. 472; (implied power to issue bonds;) Ca- sey V. People, (111.) 24 N. E. E. 570; Manchester etc. Co. v. Keene, 62 N. H. 81; State V. Hannibal etc. Co., 13 S. W. E. 505; Strickland v. E. E. Co., 27 Miss. 209; Leavenworth Co. v. Miller, 7 Kan. 479; Taylor v. Board, (Va.) 10 S. E. E. 438; Kluse v. Ga- lusha, 78 Iowa, 310; Sheboygan Co. V. Parker, 3 Wall. 96; Havemeyer v. Iowa Co., 3 lb. 294; Thomson v. Lee Co., 3 lb. 330; Eogers v. Burlington, 3 lb. 362; Northern Pac. Ey. v. Eob- erts, 42 Fed. Eep. 734; Bouknight v. Davis, 12 S. E. E. 96; 33 S. C. 410; Gibbons v. E. E. Co., 36 Ala. 410; Augusta Bk. v. Augusta, 49 Me. 507 ; Hallenback v. Hahn, 2 Neb. 377; City V. Alexander, 23 Mo. 483; Tola V. Merriman, 46 Kan. 49; 26 Pac. 485; Gillim V. Daviess Co., (Ky. 91) 14 S. W. E. 838; Shelby Co. v. Jernagin, (Tenn. 91) 16 S. W. E. 1040; Nicol v. Magee, 9 Hump. 252; Com. v. Mc- Williams, 11 Pa. St. 61; Sharpless v. Mayor, 21 lb. 147; Moses v. Eeading, 21 lb. 178; Starin v. Genoa, 23 N. T. 439; Gould v. Sterling, 23 lb. 439; San Antonio v. Lane, 32 Tex. 405 ; Scotland Co. v. U. S., 140 U. S. 41; Samson v. People, (111. 92) 30 N. E. 781; State v. Trammel, 106 Mo. 510; Post V. Pulaski Co., 49 Fed. Eep. 628; 9 U. S. Ap. 1; 1 C. C. A. 405; (power 333 §184 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XI. interest in such a road, when it belongs to a corporation, as clearly as they would have if it was free, or as if the tolls were payable to the State, because travel and transportation are cheapened to a degree, far exceeding all tolls and charges of every kind, and this advantage the public has over and above those of rapidity, comfort, convenience, increase of trade, open- ing of markets, and other means of rewarding labor and pro- moting wealth." ^ But the power, to aid a railroad in any manner, must be expressly conferred by statute, as in no case will it be implied ; ^ and when in connection with it, the power to levy and collect taxes for the purpose is conferred, the issue of bonds is not only not permitted, but by implication excluded.* If it be once settled that the construction of a railroad is a pub- lic purpose, to which municipal funds or credit may be devoted, it is of no importance, so far as legislative power is concerned, whether the money raised is given or loaned to the company, or used in paying for stock in it; * although in one instance it was held, that, although the Legislature could authorize a sub- scription, it could not empower .a donation to be made.^ So, also, power to subscribe for stock will not authorize a donation.* But the word aid has been deemed to authoi-ize a donation'; ^ and the power to donate land purchased or owned by the city, in aid of a railroad, will authorize the city to donate its bonds 2 Wells V. Pontotoc Co. Sup., 102 to subscribe will not authorize a gift ;) Simpson Co. v. Louisville etc. Co., (Ky. 92) 19 S. W. K. 665; Hutchinson etc. Co. V. Fox, 48 Kan. 70; Duanes- burg V. Jenkins, 49 Barb. 579; Winn V. Macon, 21 Ga. 275; Eandolph v. Post, 93 U. S. 502; Clarke v. Roches- ter, 24 Barb. 446; Bank v. Rome, 18 N. T. 38; Society v. New London, 29 Conn. 174; Douglas v. Chatham, 41 lb. 211; Powers v. Sup. Ct., 23 Ga. 65; R. R. V. Otoe Co., 16 Wall. 667; Queensburg v. Culver, 19 lb. 84; Maddox v. Graham, 2 Met. 56; Com. V. Perkins, 43 Pa. St. 410. ' C. J. Black in Sharpless v. Philar delphia, 21 Pa. St. 147, 169. 2 Kelly V. Milan, 127 U. S. 139; Nor- ton V. Dyersberg, 127 lb. 160; Con- cord V. Robinson, 121 lb. 165 ; Welch V. Post, 99 111. 471. 334 U. S. 631, 632; Ogden v. Daviess Co., 102 lb. 634, 639; Clairborne Co. v. Brooks, 111 lb. 400, 406. * Queensburg V. Culver, 19 Wall. 82; Davidson v. Ramsey Co., 18 Minn. 482; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Com'rs, 4 Neb. 450; Stewart v. Polk Co., 30 Iowa, 9 ; New Orleans v. McDonald, 53 Miss. 240; Samson v. People, (111. 92) 30 N. E. R. 689. * Whiting V. Sheboygan, etc., Co., 25 Wis. 167, 196; Sweet v. Hulbert, 51 Barb. 312. 6 Hamlin v. Meadville, 6 Neb. 227, Post V. Pulaski Co., 9 U. S. Ap. 1; 1 C. C. A. 405. 'State V. Babcock, 19 Neb. 230; Northern Pac. R. R. Co. v. Roberts, 42 Fed. 734; comp. Ellis v. Railroad Co., 71 Wis. 114. CH. XI.] MUNICIPAL SECUKITXES. §185 to the companj', in place of the land, where the city has the express and unlimited power to borrow money, and to issue bonds to fund its indebtedness.^ It has been held that, when the municipal corporation has the power to aid in the construc- tion of a road, the road to be aided need not be in the same State in which the city is located, but may be wholly within another State.^ § 185. Construction, completion and location of road, as affecting the validity of bonds issued in its aid. — Where the construction and completion of the road by a certain date, is a condition precedent to the issue of bonds, — and whether it is a condition, or not, is a question of statutory construction,^ — it will be rigidly enforced.* And if the condition is not com- plied with, the delivery of the bonds to the railroad company may be suspended ; ^ and in any event, the company cannot by mandamus compel the issue of bonds, as long as the conditions as to location have not been complied with.^ But it is held that where a railroad company has constructed its line to within a quarter of a mile of the town, from which point it enters the town upon the track of another road, it has complied with the requirement that it should complete its road between the two termini.'^ But running trains over the track of another company for five miles, under a lease terminable at one year's notice, is not a compliance with such a condition.^ Nor is the completion of the road to within three quarters of a mile of the opposite bank of the river, on which the terminal town is located.^ In-a case of this character, however, it is not ab- 1 Converse v. Fort Scott, 92 U. S. 503. a Bell V. Mobile etc. Co., 4 Wall. 598; Chicago etc. Co. v. Otoe Co., 16 Wall. 677; State v. Dallas Co., 72 Mo. 329; Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14; see Woods v. Lawrence Co., 1 Black (U. S.) 386. 8 Kansas etc. Co. v. Alderman, 47 Mp. 349. * BufCalo etc. Co. v. Falconer, 103 U. S. 821 ; German Sav. Bk. v. Frank- lin Co., 128 TJ. S. 526; Portland etc. Co. V. Hartford, 58 Me. 23; Woon- Booket etc. Co. v. Sherman, 8 K. I. 564; Memphis etc. Co. v. Thompson, 24 Kan. 170. 5 Cooper V. Sullivan Co., 65 Mo. 542. ^ State V. Minneapolis, 32 Minn. 501. f State V. Clark, 23 Minn. 422; Mis- souri Pac. R. Co. V. Tygard, 84 Mo. 263; Stockton v. Stockton etc Co., 51 Cal. 328; see Sykes v. Columbia, 55 Miss. 115. 8 People V. Clayton, 88 111. 45. sHodgman v. St. Paul etc. Co., 20 Minn. 48; Winona v. Cowdrey, 93 U. S. 612. 335 §185 jrUSICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XI. solutely necessary that a bridge should be built ; but such means of crossing the river should be provided by the company, as at the time are usual and customary, as well as adequate and convenient.^ Construing a promise on the part of a municipal corporation to pay to the railroad $4,000 for each mile of track constructed, the court held that the computation should be based upon the main line and side tracks "to and into the city;"^ and that a " road of standard gauge and completed as first class," and in operation by lease or otherwise, meant a road completed and operated in such a manner, that it could be regularlj' and prop- erly used by the public.^ If the time, when the road is to be finished, is not a condition precedent, the municipality will not be released, if it has re- ceived the benefit sought by the subscription ; * and the railroad company may collect the part earned, although it has not spent enough in the town to entitle it to all the aid promised.* It has also been held that, wheii the power to subscribe is con- ferred by the charter of the road, the right to subscribe is not destroyed by the expiration of the period, within which the char- ter of the road prescribes it shall be completed ; and when the Legislature extends the time for the completion of the road, the time to subscribe is also extended.^ Nor is the municipality released from its liability for aid promised, to be rendered when a certain part of the road is completed, where the time for its completion is extended by act of the Legislature.'^ It may be required of the company that their road shall be located, before the question of subscription is submitted to a popular vote,^ and a breach of such a condition will work a for- feiture of the promised aid, and invalidate the bonds which may be issued in pursuance thereof.® But it is held that in all cases, where there is a breach of a condition of this sort, the objection iHodgmau v. Chicago etc. Co., 23 Minn. 153. ^Atkinson etc. Co. v. Pliillips Co., 25 Kan. 261. 3 Southern etc. Co. v. Towner, 26 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 667. * Kansas City etc. Co. v. Alderman, 47 Mo. 349. ' Cassaday v. Lowry, 49 Iowa, 523. 336 6 Com. V. Pittsburgh, 41 Pa. St. 279. ' Jacks V. Helena, 41 Ark. 213. 8 Cass Co. V. Jordan, 95 U. S. 373; TreadweU v. Hancock Co., 11 Ohio St. 183. 'Virginia etc. Co. v. Lyon Co., 6 Nev. 68; State v. Davis Co., 64 Mo. 30; Parker v. Smith, 3 HI. App. 356. CH. XI.] MUNICIPAL SECURITIES. § 185 must be raised by the municipal corporation, before the bonds have reached the hands of bona fide holders, without notice.' So great is the disposition to protect this class, that it has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States that a statutory provision, conferring authority to aid a railroad " to the said city" would authorize aid to a road, which by its charter and in fact terminated forty-six miles distant, whence its cars could only enter the city on the track of another company.^ What shall in such cases constitute a sufficient compliance with a requirement, that the road shall be located along a cer- tain route, or between two terminal points, is not decided uni- formly on the same lines. Most of the cases hold that the company must adopt and locate its whole route, before the proposition to lend the city's credit or contribute its funds, can be lawfully submitted to the popular vote, and it is not enough that the location should be made in a single county .^ But it has been held that the validity of the election was not depend- ent on the entii'e location of the line, provided the termini and general direction of the road had been definitely determined and described.* Under these circumstances, there cannot be a material divergence from the projected route, after it has been announced, and the city or county had taken action on the proposition to subscribe to the stock of the railroad, or to lend its credit, etc. It is often difficult to determine whether a particular divergence is material. Thus, it was held in one case that a difference of 800 feet was a noncompliance with the condition,^ while in another case a much larger divergence was disregarded.® If the divergence is material, the delivery of the bonds will be restrained;'' but the municipality,^ or the Legis- ' Missouri etc. Co. v. Fort Scott, 15 Kan. 435; State v. Van Home, 7 Ohio St. 327. 2 Van Hostrup v. Madison City, 1 Wall. 291; see Aurora v. West, 22 Ind. 88, 96, 503; Kirkbride v. Lafay- ette Co., 108 U. S. 208. sPurdy V. Lansing, 128 U. S. 557; s. c, 20 Blatchf. 278, 286; People v. Morgan, 55 N. T. 587; Mellon v. Lan- sing, 19 Blatchf. 512; 11 Fed. Kep. 829; Thomas V. Lansing, 21 Blatchf. 22 337 119; Winston v. Tenn. R. Co., 1 Baxt. 60. * Wilson Co. V. First Nat. Bank, 103 U. S. 770; Johnson Co. v. Thayer, 94 lb. 631; Callaway Co. v. Foster, 93 lb. 567. ^Virginia etc. Co. v. Lyon Co., 6 Nev. 68; Aurora v. West, 22 Ind. 88. 6 Johnson v. Thayer, 94 U. S. 631. ' Allen V. Adams Co., 76 111. 101. 8 Coleman v. Martin, 50 Cal. 493. §186 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS. [CH. XI. lature,^ may authorize a divergence, after the aid is given or voted to the railroad. It is competent, in a charter to a railroad company, to au- thorize counties to subscribe for stock, before the road is organ- ized, or its route located.^ But a subscription by a city or county to a railroad, before the filing of its articles of incorpora- tion, would be void.^ So, a failure to comply with a statutory lequirement, that certain plans be filed before the bonds are issued, is fatal to an application to compel their issue.* § 186. Subscriptions for stock — Conditions precedent — It is a verj' common statutory requirement that, before a mu- nicipality can bind itself by a subscription to the stock of a railroad company, it must be submitted to the vote of the peo- ple. Sometimes the matter is regulated by a special provision of the constitution ; and in that case, any material variation of the statute from the constitutional requirement would be fatal. Thus, a statute empowering resident taxpayers to authorize the issue of railroad aid bonds, is unconstitutional in the face of a constitutional provision that questions of local taxation should be submitted to the electors.^ But the vote of the people does not of itself constitute a valid subscription,^ unless it was the intention of the Legislature to make it equivalent to one.^ The vote merely empowers the proper officials to bind the city by a formal subscription ; ^ and until the subscription is completed by a manual signing, or by some binding act, such as the pass- iCom. V. Pittsburgh, 41 Pa. St. 278. 2 Woods V. Lawrence Co., 1 Black, 386. » Kubey v. Shain, .54 Mo. 207. *1ti re Stratford etc. Co., 38 Up. Can. Q. B. 112. 5 Harrington v. P 1 a i n v i e w, 27 Minn. 224; Plainview v. Winona etc. Co., 36 lb. 505. 6 Gunn V. Barry, 15 Wall. 610, 623; U. S. V. Jefferson Co., 1 McCrary, 356; Aspinwall v. Daviess Co., 22 How. 364; Land Grant etc. Co. v. Davis Co., 6 Kan. 256; Cumberland etc. Co. V. Barren Co., 10 Bush, 604; Harshman v. Bates Co., 92 U. S. 569; FairfieW v. Gallatin Co., 100 lb. 47; 338 Wadsworth v. Eau Claire, 102 lb. 534; German S. Bk. v. Franklin Co., 102 lb. 526; Jeffries v. Lawrence, 42 Iowa, 498; State v. Saline Co., 48 Mo. 390; Limestone v. Racher, 48 Ala. 4.33; Board v. Wis. etc. Co., 43 Wis. 543. ' E. Lincoln v. Davenport, 94 U. S. 801; People v. Pueblo Co., 2 Colo. 360. Actual subscription on the company's books held unnecessary. Cass Co. V. Gillett, 100 U. S. 585 ; Bates V. Winters, 112 U. S. 325 ; Xu- gent V. Putnam Co., 19 Wall. 241. " People V. Batchellor, 53 N. Y. 128; People V. Tazewell Co., 22 111. 147; Crawford v. Louisville etc. Co., 39 Ind. 192. CH. XI.] MUNICIPAL SECURITIES. § 186 ing of an ordinance or resolution, which, as expressive of the municipal interest, is equivalent thereto,^ no contract exists, which can be enforced by mandamus? or which may not be impaired or destroyed by subsequent legislation or constitu- tional amendments.3 While the conferred authority to sub- scribe remains unexecuted, the extinction of the railroad com- pany or its consolidation with another company, will revoke it, as no vested rights are impaired by such revocation.* And the authority, while executory, is alwaj'^s subject to constitutional repeal or limitation.^ The subscription is not binding, at least between the original parties, unless it is strictly in accordance with statutory require- ments,® and all conditions precedent must have been complied with ; ' as, for example, that the company has secured a certain amount of private subscriptions to its stock.^ But when a sub- scription is once made by a municipal corporation to the stock of a railroad company, it vests a right in the railroad company, and creates a contract which is not only protected by constitu- tional guaranties against legislative interference or annullment, but which may be transferred to a new corporation, formed by the consolidation of the road, in which the right is vested, with another ; ^ and the subscription may, likewise, be enforced by the creditors of the railroad.^" 1 Moultrie v. Kocklngham etc. Bk., 92 U. S. 631 ; Clark Co. v. Paris etc. Co., 11 B. Mon. 143; Paolo etc. Co. v. Anderson Co., 16 Kan. 332; Concord V. Portsmouth, 92 U. S. 62.5 ; Living- stone Co. V. Bank, 128 lb. 102; Scott V. Hansheer, 94 Ind. 1 ; Sacramento y. Kii-k, 7 Cal. 419; Western Sav. Fd. v. Philada., 31 Pa. St. 174. 2 People V. Ohio Grove, 51 111. 192; Com'i-s V. Sharter, 50 Ga. 489; Napa etc. Co. V. Napa Co., 30 Cal. 435; Oro- ville etc. Co. v. Plumas Co., 37 lb. 354. 3 U. P. R. R. Co. V. Davis Co., 6 Kan. 256; State v. Saline Co., 45 Mo. 242; Concord v. Portsmouth, supra. « Harshman v. Bates Co., 92 IT. S. 569; Bates Co. v. Winters, 97 lb. 83; B. c, 112 U. S. 325; McClure v. Ox- ford, 94 U. S. 429; State v. Garroutte, 67 Mo. 455. ^ Cases cited, supra. 6 Louisville v. Shreveport, 27 La. An. 623. ' Louisville etc. Co. v. Davidson Co., 1 Sneed, 637; Chambers Co. v. Clews, 21 Wall. 317. 8 Chicago D. & V. R. R. Co. v. St. Anne, 101 111. 151. » Nugent V. Putnam, 19 Wall. 241; Eay Co. v. Vansycle, 96 U. S. 675 ; County of Scotland v. Thomas, 94 lb. 682; Scotland Co. v. Hill, 132 U.S. 107; East Lincoln v. Davenport, 94 lb. 801; Wilson v. Salamanca, 99 lb. 499;Menasha V. Hazard, 102 lb. 81; Harter v. Kernochan, 103 lb. 562. '» Morgan Co. v. Thomas, 76 III. 120. 339 § 186 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XI. If no conditions are prescribed by law, a municipal corpora- tion may subscribe for stock upon such conditions as may be necessary to protect its interests. -"^ Power to subscribe for stock implies power to make a conditional subscription ; ^ and the voters may agree to subscribe upon any conditions they consider proper, ^ provided they are not in contravention of any statutory provision or rule of public policy.* Without legislative authority, a railroad company cannot agree to treat the municipality better than other stockholders, as by paying a fixed rate of interest on the stock, equivalent to the rate on the bonds.^ And it seems that there is one necessary condi- tion, without which there is no contract, although the subscrip- tion has been voted for, and has been accepted by the companj-, viz. : the condition which makes it obligatory on the company to build the road through the town which subscribes to the stock.^ Conditions made by the municipality may subsequent- ly be waived by it ; ^ but not after they have been submitted to, and approved by, the electors.^ And so, likewise, when a condition precedent to the subscription is adopted by the pop- ular vote, the power of the voters being exhausted by their first exercise, it cannot be altered by a new election,^ and it cer- tainly cannot by the municipal government,^" unless, perhaps. 1 People V. Holden, 91 111. 446; Fal- coner V. Buff. etc. Co., 69 N. Y. 491 ; Portland etc. Co. v. Horsford, 58 Me. 23 ; Townsend v. Xamb, 14 Neb. 324; California etc. Co. v. Butte Co., 18 Cal. 671; Coe v. California etc. Co., 27 Minn. 197; Atchison etc. Co. v. JefEerson, 21 Kan. 309. 2 Jacks V. Helena, 41 Ark. 213 ; Atchison etc. Co. v. Jefferson Co., supra; Brocaw v. Gribson Co., 73 Ind. 543. ^ People V. Logan Co., 45 111. 162; People V. Dutcher, 56 lb. 144; Vee- der V. Lima, 19 Wis. 280; Chicago etc. Co. V. Aurora, 99 111. 205 ; Mem- pliia Ketc. Co. v. Thompson, 24 Kan. 170. ■• Coe V. Caledonia & M. Ey. Co., 27 Minn. 197. 5 Pittsburgh etc. Co. v. Allegheny 340 Co., 79 Pa. St. 210; see also, 63 Pa. St. 127. ^Concord v. Portsmouth Sav. Bank, 92 U. S. 625; Burges v. Mabin, 70 Iowa, 633; Barthol v. Meader, 72 lb. 125. "Eandolph v. Post, 93 U. S. 502; Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall. 373; Moultrie v. Kockinghara etc. Bank, 92 U. S. 631 ; Converse v. Fort Scott, 92 lb. 503; Cooper v. Sullivan Co., 65 Mo. 542. ' Hodgman v. Chicago Ey. Co., 20 Minn. 48. ^ State V. Daviess Co., 64 Mo. 30; People V. Waynesville, 88 111. 469. i» Platteville etc. Co. v. Galena, 43 Wis. 493; State v. Daviess Co., 64 Mo. 30; Douglas Co. v. Walbridge, 38 Wis. 179. CH. XI.J MUNICIPAL SECURITIES. § 187 a where the city has the power to, and does actually, consent to a slight divergence of the road.^ Conditions, when imposed by the popuLir vote, are part of the authority for the subscrip- tion.2 But it has been held that, when the statute provides that the county shall have power to subscribe after an affirma- tive popular vote, the power is nevertheless discretionary .^ The terms of the conditions must be construed according to their ordinary meaning.* When it appears that the funds sub- scribed by the municipality are in danger of being misapplied, proper security can be demanded of the company.* § 187. Lesislative power to compel the issue of bonds for public purposes. — Not only may the Legislature authorize a m u- nicipal corporation to aid in the construction of works for public purposes, but it may in certain cases compel municipal corpora- tions to make such contracts.® And, thus, when a municipality is legally indebted, the Legislature may compel it to issue its bonds for the settlement of the indebtedness,'^ upon the same principle that a tax may be imposed, and the payment of a claim against a city directed to be paid with the proceeds.* But there is no power in the Legislature to compel a municipality to in- cur a debt for a private purpose, or to issue bonds and exchange them, or the money arising from their sale, for the* stock of a private corporation.'^ § 187 a. Curative statutes, validating irregular subscrip- tions and invalid securities. — Elsewhere, it is shown how far ' Coleman v. Marion Co., 50 Cal. 493. •^ German Sav. Bk. v. Franklin, 128 U. S. 526. s St. Joseph etc. Co. v. Buchanan Co., .39 Mo. 485. - People V. Clayton, 88 111. 45. As to power to subscribe without a pop- ular vote, see Hawkins v. Carroll Co., 50 Miss. 735; State v. Sch. Dis., 10 Neb. 544; State v. Green Co., 54 Mo. 540. 5 Cumberland etc. Co. v. Washing- ton Co., 10 Bush, 564. *U. S. V. Baltimore, etc., Co., 17 Wall. 322; Carter v. Propes, 104 Mass. 236; Guilder v. Otsego. 20 Minn. 74; Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 65; Philadelphia v. Field, 58 Pa. St. 320; see ante, § 15, for a fuller discussion of this proposition. ' JefEerson Co. v. People, 5 Neb. 136. 8 Guilford v. Chenango Co., 13 N. Y. 143; New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 62; Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116; contra, State v. Tappau, 29 Wis. 664. 9 People V. Batchellor, 53 N. Y. 128; (Railroad aid,) Cooley Const. Lim. 230-1; Thompson v. Park Com'rs, 44 Mich. 602; Detroit v. De- troit, etc., Co., 43 lb. 140; People v. Com'rs, 28 lb. 228; Pompton v. Cooper Union, 101 U. S. 196. 341 § 187 a. MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [OH. XI. the Legislature may go in general, in compelling municipalities to pay claims against them, which cannot be legally enforced.^ And on the same grounds, it is held that, in the absence of constitutional restrictions, the State Legislature has the power to enact statutes, by which the irregular or defective execution of a power by a municipal corporation can be cured and vali- dated.^ In accordance with this general rule, the Legislature may legalize a municipal subscription to the stock of a railroad company, made without authority, provided no constitutional limit of power has been transgressed.^ And laws of this char- acter, acting retrospectively to obviate the objections which might be caused by irregular exercise of powers, are favored by the courts, as long as no rights of third persons are unjustly affected.* But such validating acts should be considered in the light of the principles contained in the Constitution of the State ; and they will not be approved by the courts, when their effect would be to render valid that, which is constitutionally void. So, where the constitution limited the power to assess taxes to the corporate authorities, it was decided that the Legislature could not confer it elsewhere by an act validating a town elec- tion, illegally called and notified, at which assent had been given to a subscription to railroad stock. Such an act would enable persons, who were not the corporate authorities, to exercise the power of taxation, and coerce the corporation into incurring a debt to which it had not given its assent.^ It has been said that the rights of bona fide holders of mu- 1 See ante, §§ 16, 17. 2 Osboru V. Hide, 68 Miss. 45 ; Baker v. Seattle, 2 Wasli. St. 576; Keithsburg v. Frick, 34 111. 405 ; Gage V. Nichols, 135 111. 128; Bradley v. Franklin Co., 65 Mo. 638; Louis v. Shreveport, 3 Woods, 205 ; Louisville & N. W. K. Co. V. Bullitt Co., (Ky. 92) 17 S. W. R. 632; Otoe Co. v. Bald- win, 111 TJ. S. 1; Thompson v. Per- rine, 103 lb. 806; 106 lb. 589; Van- deventer v. Long Island City, 10 N. Y. S. 801; 57 Hun, 590; In re East Ave. Baptist Church, 11 N. T. S. 113; 57 Hun, 590; Campbell v. Kenosha, 5 Wall. 194; Steiues v. Franklin Co., 48 Mo. 166; In re Byi-nes, 11 N. Y. S. 342 113; 57 Hun, 590; Bass v. Columbus, 3iO Ga. 845; BoUes v. Brimfield, 120 IT. S. 759; Dovrs v. Elmwood, 34 Fed. 114; Knapp v. Grant, 27 Wis. 147; Black v. Cohen, 52 Ga. 621; Kimball V. Eosendale, 42 Wis. 407. 'Grenada Co. v. Brogden, 112 TJ. S. 261; Otoe Co. v. Baldwin, 111 lb. 1; Grannis v. Cherokee, 47 Fed. 427; Williams v. People, 132 HI. 574; Deyo V. Otoe Co., 37 F. 246. *St. Joseph V. Rogers, 16 Wall. 666. 'Elmwood V. Marcy, 92 U. S. 289; Marshall v. Silliman, 61 HI. 218; Quiucy V. Cooke, 107 TJ. S. 549; Peo- ple V. Mayor etc., 51 111. 17. CH. XI.] MXTNICIPAL SECURITIES. 188- nicipal bonds are " to be determined by the law as it was judi- cially construed, when the bonds were put on the market as commercial paper ; " ^ but subsequent legislative sanction is equivalent to the possession of the original legal authority,^ provided the legislative intention, to validate the invalid act, be clear, and is in no way vague or doubtful.* § 188. Bonds issued in aid of private purposes— Consti- tutional prohibition. — The incidental benefits to the public, derived from the pursuit of ordinary business by individuals or corporations, do not constitute a public purpose in the legal sense, for which bonds may be issued. Although some might find no fundamental distinction between pecuniary aid in favor of railroads, and similar aid in support of other enterprises of private persons, in the furtherance of which the public may be more or less interested, the courts recognize such a distinction ; and while it is generally held that municipal bonds are valid, which are issued in aid of the construction of railroads,* the authorities are equally decided in holding that the city has no power, and the Legislature cannot grant to a city the power, to issue bonds in aid of any enterprise of a private character, liowever interested the public may be. It matters not that the object to be accomplished is to relieve and aid a large num- ber of citizens, who have been perhaps irretrievably ruined by a far-reaching and overwhelming disaster, such as a conflagra- tion or an epidemic ; ^ or to enable individuals to erect mills or otlier buildings, which will be of great service in advancing the city's commercial prosperity ;^ or to aid in securing water power which would be of great benefit to the health of the city.'^ The policy of our law is against any species of paternalism by >■ Ralls V. Douglas, 105 U. S. 728; Green Co. v. Gouness, 109 lb. 104; Sawyer v. Concordia Parish, 12 Fed. Eep. "754; Marshall v. Elgin, 8 lb. 783. ■' Wilson V. Hardesby, 1 Md. Ch. 06; Jasper V. Ballon, 103 U. S. 745; Shaw V. Norfolk, etc., Co., 5 Gray, 180; Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 lb. 627; ^Vatson V. Mercer, 8 lb. 88; Croxall V. Sherrerd, 5 Wall. 268. s Hayes v. Holly Springs, 114 U. S. 120; distinguishing Grenada Co. v. Brogden, 112 lb. 261. * See § 184. 5 Lowell V. Boston, 111 Mass. 463 ; 15 Am. Eep. 59; State v. Osawkee, 14 Kan. 418; Feldman v. Charles- ton, 23 S. C. 57. « Allen V. Jay, 60 Me. 124; Bissell V. Kankakee, 64 111. 249; Mather v. Ottawa, 114 lb. 659; Bank v. lola, 20 Wall. 655 ; Weismer v. Douglass, 64 N. Y. 61. ' Coates V. Campbell, 37 Minn. 498. 343 §188 MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS. [CH. XI. which the State, or any of its component parts, shall become a partner in any private industry, however important or beneficial that business may be ; ^ and bonds issued for such purposes are ipso facto void,^ and neither the payment of interest nor the acts of the city officials operate, by way of estoppel, to render the corporation liable on such obligations.* The constitutions of many of the States prohibit counties, towns and municipal corporations, from giving monej^ or other property to any individual or private corporation whatever,* or from loaning money or credit to private corporations,* or to a raih'oad company,® or from becoming a surety,^ or from becom- ing stockholders in private corporations.* If these prohibitions are directed against the power of the Legislature to authorize the city to do these things, their effect is prospective, and exist- ing statutes relating to municipalities are not repealed.® But 1 See ante, § 144. 2 Comstock v. Syracuse, 5 N. T. S. 874; Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655; In re Eureka Basin, 90 ]Sr. T. 42; In re Mayor, 11 Johns. 77; Hanson V. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 47; Eufaula v. McNab, 67 Ala. 588; Frantz v. Jacob, (Ky. 89) 11 S. W. E. 654; Ohio Val. L Wks. V. Moundsville, 11 W. Va. 1; People's Bank v. Pomona, 28 Pac. 1089; 48 Kan. 55; People v. Parks, 58 Cal. 624; McConnell v. Hammond, 16 Kan. 228; Cen. Branch Un. P. R. Co. V. Smith, 23 lb. 745 ; Brenham v. Germ. Sav. Bank, 12 Sup. Ct. 559, 975; 144 U. S. 173, 549; Cole v. Le Grange, 113 U. S. 1; Blair v. Cuming Co., Ill Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 363; Wasson V. Com'rs, 27 W'kly L. Bui. 134; Getchell v. Benton, (Keb. 90) 47 N. W. E. 468; Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 TJ. S. 487; Curtis v. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350; Jenkins v. Andover, 111 Mass. 354. 2 Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U. S. 487. * This prohibition will be found in the Constitutions of New York, Xew Jersey, New Hampshire, Pennsylva- nia, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wiscon- sin, Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, Cali- 344 fomia, Oregon, Colorado, Georgia, Alabama, Florida and Louisiana. * In Tennessee and Nevada and in all States cited in last note except Wisconsin. * In Connecticut and Nebraska. ' In New Hampshire, New Jersey, California, Colorado, and Louisiana. 8 In New Hampshire, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylva- nia, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Nebraska, Tennessee, Missouri, Arkansas, Tex- as, Oregon, Nevada, Colorado, Geor- gia, Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Nebraska. sGillim V. Davis Co., (Ky. 92) 14 S. W. E. 838; Callaway Co. v. Foster, 93 U. S. 567; Randolph Co. v. Post, 93 lb. 502; Moultrie v. Fairfield, 104 lb. 370; Red Rock v. Henry, 106 lb. 596; Sweet V. Syracuse, (N. Y. 92)27 N. E. R. 1081; Ralls Co. v. Douglas, 105 U. S. 728; Louisiana v. Taylor, 105 lb. 454; Cass v. Gillett, 100 lb. 585, 592; Fairfield v. Gallatin Co., 100 lb. 47; Louisville V. Portsmouth Sav. Bk., 104 lb. 469; Calhoun Co. v. Galbraith, 99 lb. 214; Schuyler Co. V. Thomas, 98 lb. 169; Smith v. Clark Co., 54 Mo. 58; Fosdick v. Perryville, 14 Ohio St. 472. CH. XI.] MtTNICIPAL SECURITIES. §189 when the constitutional provision prohibits a municipal corpo- ration from employing its funds or its credit in aid of the pro- hibited purposes, all existing statutes, which authorized such aid, will be thereby repealed, and the power of the city to aid the private or semi-public enterprises which fall under the con- stitutional ban, is thereby taken away, unless rights have be- come vested thereunder.^ § 189. Consent of taxpayers or voters as a condition pre- cedent to issue of municipal Ibonds. — In nearly all the States the constitutions require that, before a municipal corporation can create a bonded indebtedness, the consent of a certain pro- portion of the taxpayers or voters shall be obtained. But a popular vote cannot give a municipality a power, which it does not otherwise possess. If, for example, a city cannot claim, by express provisions of a statute or constitutional provision, or by necessary implication therefrom, the power to issue bonds for a particular purpose, or to create any other indebtedness, a popular vote is not enough to invest a city with such a power.^ The popular vote is only required as a condition precedent to the exercise of a power conferred by the State. In a previous paragraph,^ the submission to a popular vote of the proposition, to subscribe to stock of a railroad, is fully explained. Here, the general subject is explained in connection with the general crea- tion of municipal indebtedness. All the statutory requirements as to the prelimina,ries and details of the election are mandatory;* and here the word may generally means must.^ But a mere informality, or a slight ir- regularity, not affecting the result, will not invalidate the bonds in the hands of a bona fide holder.^ In some States a petition. ' Aspinwall v. Com'rs, 22 How. 464 ; Concord v. Port. Sav. Bk., 92 XJ. S. 625; Buff. etc. E. Co. v. Falconer, 103 lb. 821; Jarrolt v. Moberly, 103 U. S. 508; Kelly V. Milan, 127 U. S. 139, 154; Norton v. Brownsville, 129 U. S. 479; Pulaski V. Gilmore, 21 Fed. Eep. 870; List V. Wheeling, 7 W. Va. 501. 2 Allen V. Louisiana, 103 U. S. 80; Hayes v. Holly Springs, 114 U. S. 120. » § 186. * Bogart V. Lamotte, (Mich. 92) 44 N". W. Eep. 612; Lewis v. Bourbon Co., 12 Kan. 186; Bowen v. Greens- boro, (Ga.) 4 S. E. Eep. 159. Cf. Natl. Bk. of Commerce v. Town of Grena^ da, 44 Fed. Eep. 262. 5 Leavenworth etc. E. E. Co. v. Platte Co., 42 Mo. 171; Steines v. Franklin Co., 48 lb. 167. 6 National Bank v. Grenada, 41 Fed. 87; Eanney v. Baeder, 50 Mo. 600; Irwin v. Lowe, 89 Ind. 540; Mad- ison v. Priestley, 42 Fed. E. 817; Pana 345 § 189 MUNICIPAIj COKPOEATIONS. [CH. XI. signed by a majority of the taxpayers, is required by statute as a preliminary to an election, or to action by a county judge, in de- termining whether bonds shall be issued in aid of railroads ; and in the State of New York it has been repeatedly held that these details shall be strictly pursued, before the election can be had, or the county judge exercise jurisdiction.^ But it has been held that, where a statute provided that stock could be subscribed for on a petition of two thirds of the citizens, — upon the princi- ple, that slight irregularities would not vitiate the exercise of the power, — the municipality was deemed to be concluded, as to the fact of a petition by the required number, by a declaration upon the minutes of the council that "the freeholders with great unanimity had petitioned," coupled with the recitals in the bonds that they were issued by virtue of a city ordinance.^ Reasonable care should be observed in the manner of voting; ^ and if more than one proposition is submitted at the same time,* they should be stated separately, and distinctly announced as being two or more independent propositions.^ For, if two prop- ositions are to be voted on, and they are so blended that the voters cannot give their assent to one, without dissenting at the same time to the other, the election is void.® When the statute requires the authorized amount of the indebtedness to be speci- fied, a vote not specifying it is void, as between the immediate parties,^ in an application for mandamus, but does not invali- date the bonds in the hands of a bona fide holder.^ When the required notice of the election is not given ^ or when the elec- V. Bowles, 107 TJ. S. 529; Johnson City V. Thayer, 94 lb. 631; Baker v. Seattle, 2 Wash. St. 576; State v. Hardey, 18 Pac. Hep. 942. 1 Craig V. Andes, 93 ST. Y. 405 ; Peo- ple V. Spencer, 55 lb. 1; People v. Smith, 55 lb. 135; Wellsborough v. New York etc. Co., 76 lb. 182; Metz- ger V. Attica E. Co., 79 N. Y. 171; Town of Solon v. Williainsburg Sav. Bk., 35 Hun, 1; Eich v. Mentz Tp., 134 U. S. 032; 18 Fed. Kep. 52. 2 Van Hostrup v. Madison City, 1 Wall. 291; Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 Wall. 384. s Eanney v. Baeder, 50 Mo. 600. * Thompson Hous. Co. v. Newton, 346 42 Fed. E. 723; Fulton Co. v. Miss, etc. Co., 21 111. 338. 5 Thompson H. E. Co. v. Newton, 42 Fed. Eep. 723; San Luis Obispo V. Haskin, 91 Cal. 549; Baker v. Se- attle, 2 Wash. St. 576. " Gray v. Mount, 4.5 Iowa, 591 ; Metcalf V. Seattle, 1 Wash. St. 305; Yesler v. Seattle, 1 lb. 308. ' State V. Saline Co., 45 Mo. 242; People Nat. Bank v. Pomona, 48 Kan. 55; Mercer Co. v. Pittsburgh etc. Co., 27 Pa. St. 389. 6 State V. Saline Co., 48 Mo. 390. 9 George v. Oxford, 16 Kan. 72; Harding v. Eockford etc Co., 65 111. 90. CH. XI.] MUNICIPAIi SECT7EITIES. §189 tion is not called by those officials, who are empowered by law to call it, the entire proceedings are void as between tlie origi- nal parties, and the issue of the bonds may be enjoined.^ The law does not require such a degree of technical accuracy in the notice of or warrant issued for an election or town meet- ing,2 and equity will not cancel bonds for a mere irregularity in calling a town meeting, at which their issue was ordered.^ But a notice which fails to state the amount, rate of interest and the time and place of payment, is insufficient.* When a notice is required to be given by the supervisors, as by posting it in some conspicuous place, the manual act of posting may be per- formed by others, authorized by them.^ When a statute re- quires that consent be given to the issue of bonds by a majority of the legal voters, a majority of the legal voters who vote at the election is held to be sufficient ; ^ and the proper method to ascertain whether such consent has been given, is by a count of the ballots cast.'' In Missouri, however, it has been held that the expression, " two thirds of the qualified voters " meant, not two thirds of the number actually voting, but two thirds of the whole number of qualified voters who are resident in the town, according to the registration lists.^ In construing statutes requiring consent of this kind, the " in- habitants " mean legal voters^ and a majority of such voters is sufficient, when the consent of a majoritj'' of the taxpayers is required ; i" but in Missouri a distinction is made between 1 Jacksonville etc. E. Co. v. Vir- den, 104111. 339; McVi.cl\ie v. Knight, (Wis. 92) 51 N. W. Bep. 1094; Win- amae v. Huddleston, (Ind. 92) 31 N. E. R. 561; National Bank v. Gre- nada, 44 Fed. E. 262. 2 Belfast etc. Co. v. Brooks, 60 Me. 568. ^ Sauerhering v. Iron Eidge etc. Co., 25 Wis. 447. «Bowen v. Mayor, 79 Ga. 709; Chi- cago E. Co. V. Pinckney, 74 111. 277; Woodward v. Eeynolds, (Conn.) 19 Atl. Eep. 511. See as to requisites of notice when railroad is to be aided : Marshall v. Silliman, 61111. 218; State V. Eoggen, 22 Neb. 118. ^rhillips V. Town of Albany, 58 Wis. 340. 6 Metcalf V. Seattle, 25 Pac. Eep. 1010; 1 Wash. St. 297; State v. Snod- grass, 25 Pac. Eep. 1014; 1 Wash. St. 305; Day V.Austin, (Tex. 93) 22 S. W. Eep. 757. ' St. Joseph V. Eogers, 16 Wall. 644; Carroll Co. v. Smith, 111 U. S. 556; People V. Winant, 48 111. 263; Cass Co. V. Johnston, 95 U. S. 560. 8 State V. Harris, 96 Mo. 29; Cass Co. V. Johnston, 95 U. S. 360; Bell v. Americus, 3 S. E. Eep. 612; but com- pare State V. Mayor of St. Joseph, 37 Mo. 270. 9 Walnut Tp. v. Wade, 103 U. S. 683. ID Hannibal v. Fauntleroy, 105 U. S. 408; Day v. Austin (Tex. 93), 22 S. W. Eep. 757. 347 § 189 a. MtTNICIPAL COEPOUATIONS. [CH. XI. " qualified electors " and " legal voters." ^ In the State of North Carolina, it has been repeatedly held that a " majority of the qualified electors " means a majority of the registei'ed voters of the previous election, and the municipal authorities have no power under such circumstances to order a new registration.^ This seems the most reasonable construction that can be placed upon this expression. A statute, which permitted bonds to be issued if "two thirds of the qualified voters voting at such election " should assent, was held by the Supreme Court of the United States to be unconstitutional, because repugnant to a clause in a State Constitution which prohibited such subscrip- tion, unless assented to by two thirds of the qualified voters of the municipality.^ It is well settled that municipal authorities may rescind any action taken by them, by means of resolution or ordinance, by a subsequent ordinance or resolution regularly enacted, where- ever the vested rights of third parties have not intervened. And this principle applies to their action, in voting to issu« bonds, or to enter into any contract, provided the rescission occurs before the rights of third persons have become vested.* So also, when a taxpayer had given his written consent, it was held that he might revoke it by a writing executed with the proper formalities, before it had been acted upon.^ So, like- wise, a signer of a petition to a county judge may withdraw his iiame,^ if he do so before the judge has acquired jurisdic- tion by the petition being submitted to him.'' On the other hand, a proposition, once voted down, may on resubmission be adopted, unless the enabling act shows a contrary legislative intent.^ § 189 a. Limitations upon municipal indebtedness.— In consequence of the hasty and injudicious manner in which mu- 1 Sanf ord v. Prentice, 28 Mo. 358 ; comp. Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107. 2 Smith V. "Wilmington, 98 K. C. 343; Soutlierland v. Goldsborough, 98 N. C. 49; McDonald v. Mass. etc. Co., 96 lb. olY; Simpson v. Mecklin- burg Co., 84 N. C. 158. 'Harshman v. Bates Co., 92 TJ. S. 569. ^ § 146. 348 '^Springport v. Teutonia Sav. Bk., 84 N. Y. 403; People v. Allen, 52 N. Y. 538. "People V. Sawyer, 52 K. Y. 296; In re Taxpayers of Greene, 38 How. Pr. 515. ' People V. Henshaw, 61 Barb. 409. ^ Soc. for Sav. v. New London, 29 Conn. 174; Smith v. Clark Co., 54 Mo. 58; Woodward v. Calhoun Co., 2 Cent. Law Jour. 396. CH. XI.] MUNICIPAL SECURITIES. § 189 a. nicipal debts have been contracted, limitations have in some in- stances been imposed upon the powei' of the Legislature, or of the municipal corporation, to incur indebtedness.^ Limitations upon the power of municipal corporations to contract debts should be construed according' to the terms of the constitution or statute in question, with reference to existing facts ; and any construction which would defeat their object should not be favored.2 If this limitation is imposed upon the Legislature, it will not repeal any existing power which has been vested in a munici- pality by prior statute.^ But if the limitation or restriction is applicable to a municipality, it repeals at once pro tanto any charter provision by which unlimited power to contract debts could previously have been exercised.* But this prohibition will not affect the prior indebtedness of the municipality, even though that exceeds the limit prescribed.^ Nor will it affect contracts already made,^ or invalidate bonds when the authorit}^ to issue them was legally conferred, prior to the adoption of the constitutional or statutory limitation.'^ The person who is about to enter into a contract, by which he will become a mu- nicipal creditor, must ascertain at his peril the legal limits of municipal indebtedness, and determine for himself whether the 1 In the Constitutions of Maine, Illinois, Wisconsin, Iowa, West Vir- ginia and Missouri, municipal corpo- rations are forbidden to become indebted to an amount exceeding 5 per cent of the assessed valuation. In Georgia and Pennsylvania the limit is 7 per cent, in New York 10 per cent, in Coloi-ado 3 per cent, in Indiana 2 per cent, and South Caro- lina 8 per cent. In Oregon no coun- ty can incur debts to exceed $5,000, except to repel invasion or suppress insurrection. In Indiana, the limit may be exceeded, in order to provide for the people in time of great pub- lic calamity; in Missouri, to erect a courthouse; in New York, a gaol; and in Colorado, to supply water. No municipality can contract any except a temporary debt in Missouri, California and Georgia, without the assent of two thirds of its voters, in West Virginia without three fifths, and, in Colorado, a majority. 2 Law V. People, 87 111. 38.5; French V. Burlington, 42 Iowa, 614, 619. sCass V. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607; Leavenworth v. Miller, 7 Kan. 499; Patterson v. Yubaco, 13 Cal. 175. 4 East St. Louis v. People, 124 111. 655; 23 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 408; Gould V. Paris, 68 Tex. 511; 17 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 350; List v. Wheel- ing, 7 W. Va. 501. 5 Scott V. Davenport, 34 Iowa, 208. "Moultrie v. Rockingham , etc. Bank, 92 U. S. 631 ; Davenport G. L. etc. Co., 13 Iowa, 229; Bound v. Vise. etc. Co., 45 Wis. 543. ' Board v. Bolton, 104 111. 220. 349 § 189 a. MUNICIPAL COllPOKATIONS. [CH. XI. proposed contract will cause this limit to be exceeded.^ In such cases, he cannot enforce payment of the debt due him.^ It is well settled that any prohibition of indebtedness, beyond a speci- fied limit, will apply in all cases, no matter what form the debt may assume, whether express or implied ^ or for what purpose incurred,* and if it is couched in general terms the limitation is not applicable to bonds alone.* There is a conflict in the deci- sions as to whether such constitutional or statutory prohibitions apply to an indebtedness arising out of duties, which are by law imposed upon municipal corporations, as where salaries must be paid. The Supreme Court of the United States has held ^ that a clause in a State Constitution which provided that the indebtedness of any county for all purposes should not exceed a specified limit, applied to warrants for fees, salaries and other current expenses.'^ But there are other cases which hold, that a municipality has the right, as a matter of necessity, to incur debts for its ordinary running expenses after the constitutional limit has been reached ; and that such prohibitions do not apply to indebtedness which a municipality is by law compelled to assume.* So, when the prohibition is aimed against the incur- ring of indebtedness /or general purposes, it has been held that the laying of a sidewalk, being a special purpose, was not with- in the rule.^ Liabilities, ex delicto which are cast upon it by law, cannot be shifted from a municipal corporation by a plea, that its in- 1 Buchanan v. Litchfield, 102 U. S. 278; Doonv. Cummins, 142 U. S.366; French V. Burlington, 42 Iowa, 614; Brown v. Point Pleasant, 1.5 S. E. Eep. 209; Bank v. Grenada, 48 Fed. E. 278; Nesbit v. Riverside, 144 U. S. 610; Spilman v. Parkersburg, 35 W. Va. 605. 2 Law V. People, 87 111. 385. 3 Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 TJ. S. 190. *Davenportv. Kleinschmidt, 6 Mont. 502; Council Bluffs v. Stewart, 51 Iowa, 385; Lake v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 662. 6 Prince v. Quincy, 105 111. 138; Erie's App., 91 Pa, St. 398; Wise, etc. Co. V. Taylor Co., 52 Wis. 37. 6 Lake Co. v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 662. 350 'Followed in Springfield v. Ed- wards, 84 111. 626; Law v. People, 87 lb. 385 ; Fuller v. Chicago, 89 lb. 282; Fuller V. Heath, 89 111. 297; Princes V. Quincy, 105 111. 138; 128 HI. 443; Sackett v. New Albany, 88 Ind. 473. "Potter V. Douglas, 87 Mo. 239; Laycock v. Baton Rouge, 35 La. An. 475; Grant v. Davenport, 36 Iowa, 396; Grant v. Lake Co., 17 Oreg. 453; Corpus Christi v. Woessner, 58 Texas, 462; Terrell v. Dissaint, 71 Tex. 770; Hoppikus v. Com'rs, 16 Cal. 249; People v. Pacheco Co., 27 lb. 207. 8 Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 IT. S. 341; Byrne v. Covington, (Ky. 93) 21 S. W. Rep. 1050. CH. XI.] MUNICIPAL SECURITIES. § 189 a. debtedness has reached the legal limit.^ This doctrine has been applied in an action to recover damages for personal injuries,^ in an action upon a liability arising out of the want of fidelity of a municipal ofEcer,^ in actions for damages caused by inju- ries received from negligently constructed streets, gutters and sidewalks,* and to recover money paid illegally,^ or by mistake,^ and without consideration. An adequate water supply is a prime necessity of municipal life ; but this cannot be contracted for and a debt incurred to be paid in fixed annual sums, if the limit of indebtedness has been reached, unless steps are taken to raise by taxation the funds needed to meet the accruing debt.^ But it is held in Iowa and New York that, as the money paid for water is part of the ordinary expenses of the city, such contracts are not within the prohibition ; ^ and in other States, the future liability for the payments upon such a contract is not considered as increasing the debt, the contract being deemed a continuing provision for the liquidation of current expenses,^ although payable in in- stallments. Although there is some fluctuation in the decis- ions, the majority of the cases favor the view that, where the contract is one which is to be performed during a long period, and the city is only bound to pay as this performance takes place, the contract is not prohibited, although the amount pay- able on the whole contract may exceed the limits of the author- ized indebtedness.^" But a debt payable in the future is no less a debt than one payable presently ; and hence, as a general rule, when a debt is incurred which the city is bound to pay, the date 1 People V. May, 9 Colo. 404, 410. 2 Bloomington v. Perdue, 99 HI. 329. 3 Chicago V. Sexton, 115 111. 230. * Bartle v. Des Moines, 38 Iowa, 414; Rice v. Same, 40 lb. 638. ^ Thomas v. Burlington, 69 Iowa, 140. " McCracken v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 591, 632. 7 Salem W. Co. v. Salem, 5 Oreg. •SO; Buchanan v. Litchfield, 102 U. S. 278; Fuller v. Chicago, 89 111. 282; State V. Atlantic City, 49 N. J. L. 558; Prince v. Quincy, 105 111. 138. ' Grant v. Davenport, 36 Iowa, 396; Utica Water Co. v. Utioa, 31 Huu, 431. 9 Smith V. Dedham, 144 Mass. 177; Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1 ; Burl. W. Co. V. Woodward, 49 Iowa. 58. 10 East St. Louis v. E. St. Louis, etc., Co., 98 111. 415; 38 Am. Rep. 97; Dively V. Cedar Falls, 27 Iowa, 233; East St. Louis v. Flanigan, 26 111. App. 449. No debt is created until the contract has been performed. Weston V. Syracuse, 17 N. T. 110; Cf. Burl. W. Co. V. Woodward, 49 Iowa, 58, 62. 85X § 189 a. MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS. [CH. XI. upon which it will have to be paid is not an element to be con- sidered, in construing the application to the case under inquiry of a constitutional limitation of indebtedness.^ " But if the fact of the indebtedness depends upon some act of the city, or upon its volition to be exercised or determined at some future date, then no indebtedness is incurred and none will be until the period arrives." ^ If the contract does not fix any liability upon the corpora- tion, as when a contractor agrees to build a sewer, and accept as pay certificates, assessing the benefits against property own- ers, it is not invalidated, because at the time the limit of mu- nicipal indebtedness had been reached.^ There is in such a case no increase in the municipal indebtedness. It has been held that these constitutional restraints are not intended to pro- hibit the issue of bonds to pay off an already existing debt, or the issue of coupons to provide for the payment of interest on the same, neither being the creation of a debt.* The fact that by incurring the debt the city will acquire val- uable property, from which a revenue will be derived, does not remove the constitutional objection.* As examples of contracts, which were invalid, because the municipal indebtedness was exceeded, may be instanced, contracts to pay an annual rent for a market house,^ for grading streets,'^ and for building a court house." The expenses, incidental to the protection or assertion of the disputed rights and liabilities of the city, by a resort to a legal action or otherwise, do not come within the constitutional lim- itation of the amount of the municipal indebtedness. So, if the limit has been actually or nominally reached, a city will not be prohibited from contracting, upon a contingent fee with 1 Niles W. Wks. v. Niles, 59 Mich. 311; Law v. People, 84 111. 385; Cul- bertson v. Fulton, 127 111. 30; Prince V. Quincy, 128 111. 443; Coulson v. Portland, Deady (U. S.) 481; Tenill V. Dessaint, (Tex.) 9 S. W. 593; Dav- enport V. Kleinschmidt, 6 Mont. 502; Wallace v. San Jose, 29 Cal. 180. Indebtedness defined. Sackett v. New Albany, 88 Ind. 473. 2 Burlington W. Co. v. Woodward, 49 lo-wa, 62. 352 ''Davis V. Des Moines, 75 Iowa, 500. * Powell V. Madison, 107 Ind. 106. s Scott V. Davenport, 34 Iowa, 208. « Erie Appeal, 91 Pa. St. 398. ' French v. Burlington, 42 Iowa, 614; Dhrew v. Altooua, (Pa.) 15 Atl. 636. ' Hebard v. Ashland Co., 55 Wis. 145; People v. Johnson, 6 Cal. 499; Book v. Eai-l, 87 Mo. 246. CH. XI.] MX7NICIPAL SECTTEITIES. § 189 a. an agent, to contest the validity of a certain indebtedness, and thereby reduce the amount of the city debt.^ In computing the amount of a city's indebtedness, raih'oad aid bonds should be included ; and money in the treasury which is applicable to the payment of such bonds cannot properly be deducted, in order to bring the amount of indebtedness within the permitted limit.^ Nor are uncollected taxes, or the levy for the current year, to be deducted.^ On the other hand, coupons, which are attached to the bonds, are not to be included.* The date of the assessed valuation is important, in the consideration of this question. The assessments, which are made by the local assessors, are to furnish the basis for computation ; ® and the as- sessment for the year, immediately preceding that in which the indebtedness is incurred, must be selected ; ^ and if, when the indebtedness was incurred, the limit was not exceeded, the debt will not be invalidated by a subsequent reduction of the value of the assessed property." Even though the limits of municipal indebtedness may have been reached, it is held that the appropriation of anticipated income does not create an indebtedness,® and is valid.^ But the warrant, order or other instrument, which is issued after the limit is passed, by which taxes, levied but not collected, are appropriated, must not be general in form, but must be specifi- cally diawn against the uncollected taxes of the particular year, or against the fund to which the money was advanced; ^^ and it must have the legal effect of an assignment of the anti- cipated income, and impose on the proper officers the duty of Wilkinson v. Van Orman, 70 Iowa, 230. ' State V. Babcock, 24 Neb. 640. 8 State V. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 17; Koppikus, Com'rs, 16 Gal. 248; Peo- ple V. Pacheco, 27 lb. 175. ^ East St. Louis v. Flanigan, 26 111. App. 449; State v. McCauley, 15 Cal. 430; People V. Brooks, 16 lb. 1; Grant V. Davenport, 36 Iowa, 396; People V. May, 9 Col. 404, 411; Springfield V. Edwards, 84 111. 626; Fuller v. Heath, 89 lb. 296. 11 Fuller V. Chicago, 89 111. 282 ; Ful- ler V. Heath, 89 lb. 296. 23 353 1 Williams v. Louisana, 103 U. S. 637; Logansport v. Dykeman, 116 Ind. 15; Talbot v. Iberville, 24 La. An. 135. "Waxahachie v. Brown, 67 Tex. 519. 8 Jones V. Hurlbut, 13 Neb. 125; Council BlufEs v. Stewart, 51 Iowa, 385. *Durant v. Iowa Co., Woolw. (U. S.) 69. ^ People V. Hammill, 22 Am. v. Eng. Cor. Cas. 39. «Culbertson v. Fulton, 127 111. 30; § 189 a. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XI. collecting the tax, and pajing it to the assignee. But any lia- bility thereby imposed must rest on these officers, and not upon the city, in order to escape the characterization of a municipal indebtedness.^ If the debt is severable, without the violation of any princi- ple of law or equity, so that part may be within the constitu- tional limit, the invalidity will attach to that portion only, which constitutes the excess.^ But if the debt is entire and indivisi- ble, as when a county contracted to issue bonds as a donation of a specified sum, to aid a railroad, tlie whole transaction is ultra vires, and all the bonds are void ; and the aid of equity cannot be secured to scale down the donation so far as it is in excess of the limit.^ Any provision, by which a municipal corporation is forbidden to exceed a certain limit of debt, will operate to prevent money, loaned in violation of its terms, from becoming a lien upon the works which are constructed with the money, so illegally borrowed ; * and any statute creating such a lien is invalid.^ Not only will contracts, entered into by a municipal corpora- tion in disregard of the constitutional prohibition, be invalid, but a taxpayer maj' enjoin the city from entering into such a contract,^ from carrying it out," from issuing bonds in excess of the limit, in payment of the debt so contracted,^ and from levying and collecting taxes to pay such a debt.^ So, also, if the city neglect to defend itself, when an action is brought to compel it to levy a tax for the paj'ment of an indebtedness beyond the limit, a taxpayer is entitled to intervene, and set 1 Spriugfleld v. Edwards, 84 El. 626; La-sr v. People, 87 lb. 385, 399, 400; People v. May, 9 Col. 404, 412, 413. 2Culbertson v. Fulton, 127111.30; McPherson v. Foster, 43 Iowa, 48; 22 Am. Rep. 215; Stockdale v. Way- land, 47 Mich. 226; Daviess Co. v. Dickinson, 117 U. S. 657. In this case the court says: "Which of the bonds are valid and which invalid ? We can have no doubt that the test is: Which were first delivered ? " ' Hedges v. Dixon Co., 37 Fed. 354 Rep. 304; Millerton v. Frederick, 114 Pa. St. 4;?5. * Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 U. S. 190. ^Mosher v. Sch. Dis., 44 Iowa, 122.' « Springfield v. Edwards, 84 111. 626; Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1. ■ Davenport v. Kleinschmidt, 6 Mont. 502. 8 Wilkinson v. "Van Ormon, 70 Iowa, 230. 9 Howell V. Peoria, 90 HI. 104. CH. XI.] MUNICIPAL SECURITIES. § 190 up this violation of constitutional or statutory limitation as a defence.^ A limitation of this sort does not invalidate the legal con- solidation of two or more municipalities, although the indebt- edness of one or of all exceeds the limit.^ If the excess is caused by an order, which in the payee's hands is invalid, his assignee will take it subject to this defence, existing against the assignor, where such an instrument is not deemed to be negotiable paper : ^ but if bonds are issued to sat- isfy a judgment against a municipality, and are held by an in- nocent holder, without notice, their validity cannot be attacked on the ground that tte judgment was rendered on warrants, drawn in excess of the limitation of an indebtedness.* § 190. The municipal coupon bond, its nature and defini- tion. — When a municipal corporation undertakes to create an indebtedness, and to issue negotiable paper in settlement of the same, the obligation takes the form of a coupon bond, as it is called, which is commonly used, not only by municipal corpo- rations, but likewise by the State and National Governments,® the Territorial Governments,^ and all sorts of private corpora- tions,'' and even, under extraordinary circumstances, by private individuals.^ The coupon bond is a primary obligation, in the nature of a promissory note, promising to pay a sum of money on a day certain in the future, to which are attached certain other obligations called coupons,* which call for the payment of the installments of interest on the principal debt, as they fall due ; each coupon representing an installment of interest, and payable when the installment of interest falls due. The coupon may be severed from the bond at or before its maturity, and when severed may and does pass as a separate and independ- 1 Richards v. Supervisors, 69 Iowa, 612. 2 True V. Davis, (111.) 29 Am. & Eng. Corp. Gas. 12. See ante, § 58. 8 Nat. St. Bank v. Marshall, 39 Iowa, 490. * Sioux Co. V. Osceola Co., 45 Iowa, 168. ^Tiedeman's Commercial Paper, §132. " National Bank v. County of Tank- ton, 101 TJ. S. 133. ' Tiedeman's Commercial Paper, §117. 8 Simeon Leland in Bankruptcy, 6 Ben. 175. ' They are called coupons from the Fi-ench verb, couper, to cut, because they ai-e so attached that they may be cut off, whenever they fall due. 2 Daniel's Negot. Inst. § 1489. 355 §190 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS. [CH. XI. ent security.^ It matters very little what the form of the cou- pon is, it practically amounts to nothing more than a promissory note, essentially differing from the ordinary promissory note only in being payable without grace.^ Sometimes the coupon is in the form of a draft or order on a bank ; but in that case it dif- fers from a bill of exchange in that it need not be presented for acceptance.^ When it is payable to bearer or order, the cou- pon is of course negotiable,* and may be sued on by the hold- er, though the bonds are in possession of some one else.^ Notwithstanding the possibility of the severance of the cou- pon from the bond, the relation between the two is so intimate that the power to issue the coupons is implied from the legis- lative authority to issue bonds.® And the mortgage, which is given to secure the payment of the bond, will cover each and every coupon, whether attached or detached, together with in- terest on the coupon.' 1 Clark V. Iowa City, 20 Wall. 584; Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327; City v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 477; Clarke v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136; Kose V. City of Bridgeport, 17 Conn. 243; Railway V. Cleneay, 13 Ind. 161; Commonwealth v. Industrial Assn., 98 Mass. 12; Spooner v. Holmes, 102 Mass. 503; Arents v. Commonwealth, 18 Gratt. 776; Com'rs of Knox Co. v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539 ; Town v. Cul- ver, 19 Wall. 84; Beaver County v. Armstrong, 44 Pa. St. 63; Maddox V. Graham, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 56; Brain- ard V. JJ'. T. & H. R. E. Co., 25 ST. Y. 496; Evertsen v. Nat. Bank of Newport, 11 N. Y. S. C. (4 Hun) 694; Langston v. S. C. E. E. Co., 2 S. C. 249; Nat. Ex. Bank v. Hartford E. E. Co., 8 E. I. 375. 2 2 Daniel's Negot. Inst. §1490 a; Arents v. Commonwealth, 18 Gratt. 773. But it has been held lately in New York that coupons are entitled to days of grace. Eversten v. Nat. Bank of Newport, 66 N. Y. 22. See Cooper V. Town of Thompson, 13 Blatchf. 434. 3 Va. & Tenn. E. E. Co. v. Clay, 356 cited from MSS. Special Court of Appeals of Va. in 2 Daniel's Negot. Inst. § 1489. * Aurora v. West, 7 Wall. 82. s Thomson v. Lee Co., 3 Wall. 327. * Arents v. Commonwealth, 18 Gratt. 773. ^ Beaver County v. Arnasti'ong, 44 Pa. St. 63; Union Trust Co. v. Mon- ticello etc. E. E. Co., 63 N. Y. 314; Miller V. Eutland etc. E. E., 4 Vt. 399; Gilbert v. W. C. V. M. etc. K. E. Co., 33 Gratt. 599; Haven v. Grand Junction E. E. Co., 109 Mass. 88. The mortgage proceeds of sale in case of insufficiency are distrib- uted pro rata according to the face value, among all the holders of the bonds and coupons, covered by the mortgage. Stanton v. A. & C. R. E. Co., 2 Woods C. C. 523; Ketchum v. Duncan, 96 U. S. 671; Pennock v. Coe, 23 How. 130; In re Eegent's Canal Iron Works Co., 3 Ch. Div. 43; Hodge's Appeal, 84 Pa. St. 359. But the coupons cannot share with the bona fide bondholders, where the coupons have been taken up and paid by certain persons, who advanced the CH. XI.J MUNICIPAL SECUEITIES. § 190 a § 190 a. Execution of the muuicipal bond — By what offi- cials must it he signed. — All questions concerning the suffi- ciency of execution should, in every instance, be tested and decided strictlj'^ in conformity with the terms of the enabling statute, from the material requirements of which no depart- ure is allowed^ or excused by the fact, that full value has been received for the bonds."-' Unless otherwise provided, bonds should be signed by the municipal officers," as, for example, the supervisors and clerk of a town.* But if a council or other municipal governing body is authorized to sign, the signatures of the majority will gen- erally be held to be sufficient.* An officer will be presumed to have signed a bond during his term ; ® and a statute wliich prescribes that a certain officer shall sign bonds, means the officer who is actually holding office wlien they are signed? And an otherwise invalid signature cannot be made valid and binding upon the corporation, by' ante-dating or post-dating the bonds, in order to make them appear to have been signed when the officer signing was in office, and was therefore authorized to sign for the corporation. A false date is equivalent to a forgery under such circum- stances, and it can be shown, even against bona fide holders of the bonds.^ Purchasers must always take the risk of the gen- uineness of the signatures. For if a statute requires that a par- ticular officer should sign bonds, they are not valid without his signature.® No municipal officer has the implied power to bind the cor- 8 Lane v. Embden, 72 Me. 354; Middleton v. MuUica, 112 N. Y. 433. * Walnut V. Wade, 103 U. S. 683. 6 First N. Bk. v. Arlington, 16 Blatoli. 57; Burleigh v. Eoohester, 5 Fed. Eep. 667; Marion v. Clark, 94 U. S. 278; Bissell v. Spring Val. Tp., 110 lb. 162; Blair v. Curaming Co., 111 lb. 363. « Scb. Dis. V. Xenia Bank, 19 Neb. 89. ' Coler V. Cleburne, 131 U. S. 162. 8 Anthony v. Jasper Co., 101 U. S. 693; Weyauwega v. Ay ling, 99 lb. 112. 9 Bissell V. Sp. Valley, 110 U. S, 357 money for that purpose to the corpo- ration which issued the bonds. Union Trust Co. V. Monticello & P. K. E. Co., 63 N. Y. 311. See Harbeck v. Vanderbilt, 20 N. Y. 398; Miller v. Eutland etc. K. E. Co., 40 Vt. 399; Haven v. Grand Junction E. E. Co., 109 Mass. 88; James' v. Johnson, 6 Johns. Ch. 423 ; Eobinson v. Leavitt, 7 N. H. 100. 1 Anthony v. Jasper Co., 101 U. S. 693; Coler v. Cleburne, 131 lb. 162; Young V. Clarendon, 132 lb. 340. 2 Aroma v. Auditor, 15 Fed. Eep. 843; Bank v. Statesville, 84 N. C. 169;Melvin v. Lisenby, 72 111. 63. §191 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XI. poration by signing negotiable securities in its name. The mayor cannot, ^ nor the trustees and selectmen,^ nor the mayor and recorder, nor the city auditor.^ Nor is there any such implied power in the judges or supervisors,* or in the clerk of the County Court, and county boards of supervisors,® or in the police jury of a parish.^ In all these cases, the legislative power of the city or county, in whomever such power is lodged, must designate and empower the officer?, who are intended to execute the bonds for such city or county. A signing in blank, the blanks being filled in afterwards,^ does not invalidate the bonds ; and the omission to counter- sign bonds is a defect of execution, which a court of equity will remedy.* Although drawn and signed, municipal bonds take effect only hy and on delivery.® § 191. Negotiability of coupon bonds — Rights of holder of the same. — Although it was a rigid rule of the old law mer- chant that a seal destroyed the negotiability of commercial paper,!'' ^jjg modern demands of the commercial world for cor- porate securities, — accompanied by the highest evidence of its execution by the proper officers, viz., the seal of the corporation, — and the further fact that it was once held that a corporation could not act, except by and under its seal,!! broke in upon the 162; Northern Bank v. Porter, 110 lb. 608; Merchant's etc. Bank v. Ber- gen Co., 115 TJ. S. 384; see also Brown v. Bon Homme Co., 46 W. W. Eep. 173. A lithograph or printed fac simile signature is sufficient, if adopted by the maker. McKee v. Vernon Co., 3 Dill. 210; Pennington V. Baehr, 48 Cal. 565 ; Lyde v. Coun- ty, 16 Wall. 6; Neely v. Torkville, 10 S. C. 141. 1 Little Eock v. State Bk., 3 Eng. (Ark.) 227; Goldschmidt v. New Or- leans, 5 La. An. 436. 2 Eich V. Errol, 51 N. H. 350; Hub- bard V. Lyndon, 28 Wis. 674. 3 Clark V. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 200; People v. Gray, 23 Cal. 125; Keller v. Weeks, 22 lb. 460. *Hyde v. Franklin, 27 Vt. 186; Daviess Co. v. Howard, 13 Bush. 102; 358 People V. Suprs. El Dorado Co., 11 Cal. 175 ; Chemung Bk. v. Sup'rs, 5 Den. 517. 6 Parcel v. Barnes, 25 Ark. 261; Clark V. Polk Co., 19 Iowa, 248. « Pol. Jury V. Britton, 15 Wall. 566. ' Niantic Sav. Bank v. Douglas, 5 111. 579. 8 Melviu V. Lisenby, 72 HI. C3. The act of countersigning bonds by a town clerk is ministerial. Houghton V. People, 55 lb. 398. 8 Toung V. Clarendon, 132 U. S. 340; Bayley V. Taber, 5 Mass. 285; Marvin v. McCullom, 20 John. 288; Ward V. Churn, 18 Gratt. 801; Love- joy V. Whipple, 18 Vt. 379. 1" See Tiedeman, Commercial Pa- per, § 32. " See Tiedeman, Commercial Pa- per, § 117. CH. XI.] MUNICIPAL SECXJEITIES. §191 force of this rule, and created an exception in favor of the ne- gotiability of corporate securities, notwithstanding they are under seal. It is now the law, in the United States, supported by an almost unbroken line of authorities,^ that the coupon bond, when it contains the usual or equivalent words of nego- tiability, is for every purpose as negotiable as bills of exchange and promissory notes.^ In England in 1811, the bonds of the East India company were declared to be non-negotiable.^ Immediately thereafter. Parliament enacted that such bonds were assignable and trans- ferable by delivery.* Following the example thus set them by Parliament, the English courts applied the doctrine of negotia- bility to all sorts of coupon bonds.^ The fact that provision is made in the bond for its being 32 Tex. 405; Consolidated Associa- tion V. Avegno, 28 La. 552 ; Durant v. Iowa County, 1 Woolworth C. C. 72; Blackman v. Lehman, 63 Ala. 519; State ex rel. Plock v. Cobb, 64 Ala. 128; Arents v. Commonwealth, 18 Gratt. 773; Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136; Mills v. Jefferson, 20 Wis. 50; Johnson v. County of Stark, 24 111. 75 ; Chapin v. Vt. & Mass. K. R. Co., 8 Gray, 575; Nat. Exch. Bank v. Hartford, etc., E. R. Co., 8 K I. 379; Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cleve- ' See contra, Diamond v. Lawrence Co., 37 Pa. St. 353: "We will not treat these bonds as negotiable se- curities. On this ground we stand alone. All the courts, American and English, are against us." 2 White V. Vt. & Mass. E. R. Co., 21 How. 575; Moran v. Com'rs of Miami Co., 2 Black, 722; Mercer County V. Hackett, 1 Wall. 83; Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175; Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 Wall. 382; Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. 110; Thompson v. Lee Co., 3 Wall. 227; Supervisors v. Schenck, 5 Wall. 772; Aurora City v. West, 7 Wall. 82; Com'rs of Manor v. Clark, 94 U. S. 279; First Nat. Bank v. Mt. Tabor, 52 Vt. 87; Railway v. Cleneay, 13 Ind. 161 ; Clapp V. Cedar County, 5 Clarke, 16; Eingling v. Kohn, 4 Mo. App. 63 ; Lafayette Sav. Bank v. Stoneware Co., 4 Mo. App. 276; Barrett v. County Court, 44 Mo. 197; Craig v. City of Vicksburg, 31 Miss. 216; So- ciety for Savings v. City of New Lon- don, 29 Conn. 174; Virginia v. Ches- apeake & Ohio Canal Co., 32 Md. 501; Spoonerv. Holmes, 102 Mass. 503; Hinckley v. Union Pac. R. E., 129 Mass. 52; Langston v. S. C. E. E. Co., 2 S. C. 248 ; San Antonio v. Lane, land, etc.jR. R. Co., 41 Barb. 9; Bank of Rome v. Village of Rome, 19 N. Y. 24; Seybel V. Nat. Currency Bank, 54 N. Y. 288; Evertson v. Nat. Bank of Newport, 4 Hun (11 N. Y. S. C.) 695; 66 N. Y. 15; Morris Canal, etc., Co. V. Fisher, 1 Stock. 667; City of Elizabeth v. Force, 29 N. J. Eq. 587; Weith V. City of Wilmington, 68 N. C. 341. s Glynn v. Baker, 1 East, 510. 4 51 Geo. III. ch. 64. 6 Wookey v. Pole, 4 B. & Aid. 1; Gorgier v. Melville, 3 B. & C. 45; Lang v. Smith, 7 Bing. 284; Eumball v. Metropolitan Bank, 2 Q. B. Div. 194; Goodwin v. Eoberts, L. R. 10 Exch. 76, 337. 359 § 191 a. MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIOJrS. [CH. XI. " registered and made payable by transfer only on the books of the company," will not of itself destroy the negotiability of the bond.^ But actual registration does. The holder or purchaser of the coupon bond takes it, with all the rights and privileges of the purchaser of a bill of ex- change or a promissory note ; and he will be a bona fide holder, under the same circumstances, and be subject to the same defences, as if his bond had been an unsealed bill or note.^ Fraud in the election, upon which the issue of bonds was based, should be set up before the rights of honafide holders have ac- crued.^ If the coupon is overdue when it is transferred, the purchaser takes it subject to all the equities.* But the fact that overdue coupons are attached to a bond, when the bond is sold and transferred, will not of itself affect the negotiability of the bond, if it was itself not yet due.* But the overdue coupon may, in connection with other facts or circumstances in the knowledge of the purchaser, be sufficient to put the purchaser on his in- quiry.® And, of course, this would be the case, where it was stipulated in the bond that, on default in the payment of any coupon, the bond itself will be due and payable.'' § 191 a. To whom payable — Transfer by indorsement or delivery. — Coupon bonds are usually made payable to bearer, and are transferable by delivery ,8 although they may be made 1 Savannah & Memphis E. K. Co. V. Lancaster, 62 Ala. 563. 2 2 Daniel Negot. Inst. §§1502, 1503. See ante, chapter on rights of Bona Fide Holder. SButler v. Dunham, 27 111. 474; People V. San F. Sups., 27 Cal. 655. *Arents v. Commonwealth, 18 Gratt. 773 ; First Nat. Bank v. County Com'rs, 14 Minn. 79; Ashurst v. Bank of Australia, 37 Eng. L. & Eq. 195 ; Evertsen v. Jv'ational Bank, 66 N. T. 22, 23, semUe. See Bank of La. V. City of K O., 5 Am. Law Eeg. (N. S.) 555 ; Brown v. Davies, 3 T. R. 80; Rothschild v. Carney, 9 B. & C. 391; Hinckley v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 129 Mass. 52. The presumption of law is, however, that the holder 360 acquired the coupon bona fide and before maturity. City of Lexington V. Butler, 141 Wall. 295. 6 Railway Co. v. Sprague, 103 U. S. 762, distinguishing the case of Par- sons V. Jackson, 99 TT. S. 434, and Cromwell v. County of Sac, 96 U. S. 58. See also Nat. Bank v. Kirby, 108 Mass. 497; Gilbough v. Norfolk, etc., Co., 1 Hughes, 410; Boss v. Hewitt, 15 Wis. 260; State ex rel. Plock V. Cobb, 64 Ala. 158. See contra, 14 Minn. 77. ^Parsons v. Jackson, 99 U. S. 434. T May or, etc., of Griffin v. City Bank, 58 Ga. 584; Walnut v. Wade, 103 U. S. 695. 8 Brookman v. Metcalf , 32 N. Y. 591; Conn. Ins. Co. v. 0. C. & C. R, CH. XI.] MUNICIPAL SEOUEITIES. § 191 a. payable to tlie order of the person to whom they are issued, and in that case they could be transferred only by indorsement.^ Statutory directions, as to whom municipal bonds shall be pay- able, are not mandatory,^ and when the statute directed that the bonds should be payable " to the president and directors of the railroad company, their successors and assigns," making them payable "to the railroad company or bearer" was held to be sufficient.^ Bonds may be delivered to a third person, who may be em- powered to decide when, if at all, they shall issue, and his de- cision is binding upon all who are cognizant or chargeable with notice.* Although it is necessary in ordinary commercial paper to give the name of the payee, or to describe him in some other way; ^ this is not necessarj'^ to the validity or to the negotiable character of a coupon bond. The coupon bond is designed to pass from hand to hand indefinitely, and it does not matter to know to whom it was first issued.^ But in order that the coupon bond may be transferable at all, E. Co., 41 Barb. 9; Mercer County V. Hackett, 1 Wall. 83; City of Ken- osha V. Lamson, 9 Wall. 478 ; Roberts V. BoUes, 101 U. S. 122; Morris Bank- ing & Canal Co. v. Lewis, 1 Beas, 323; Eaton & H. E. E. Co. v. Hunt, 20 Ind. 457 ; Carr v. Le Fevre, 27 Pa. St. 413 ; Johnson v. County of Stai-k, 24 111. 75; Supervisors of Mercer County V. Hubbard, 45 111. 139; Town of Eagle V. Kohn, 84 111. 292. 1 City of Lexington v. Butler, 15 Wall. 295. The party transferring by indorsement assumes the custom- ary liabilities of indorsers of com- mercial paper. Bonner v. City of New Orleans, 2 Woods C. C. 135 ; Jones on R. E. Securities, § 348. And whether the transfer be by delivery or by in- dorsement, the transferrer guaran- tees the genuineness of the bond, and is obliged to refund the consid- eration, if the bond should prove to be a forgery. Smith v. McNair, 19 Kan. 330; First Nat. Bank v. Peck, 8 Kan. 660. See chapters on Transfer in General, and Transfer by Indorse- ment in Tiedeman's Commercial Paper. 2 Calhoun Co. v. Galbraith, 99 U. S. 214. A bond made payable to bearer is a sufficient compliance with the direction, that title to it shall pass by delivery. Com. v. Alle- gheny, 37 Pa. St. 237; Thomas v. Morgan Co., 39 111. 496; Com'rs v. Nichols, 14 Ohio St. 260. 8 Woodward V. Calhoun Co., U. S. Dis. Ct. for Miss., 2 Cent. Law Jour. 396. « Young V. Clarendon, 132 U. S. 340. ^See Tiedeman Commercial Pa- per, §17. 8 Woods V. Lawrence Co., 1 Black, 360; White v. Vermont, etc., R. R., 21 How. 575; Preston v. Hull, 23 Gratt. 613. See Eversten v. Nat. Bk. of Newport, 66 N. Y. 19, 20. 3B1 § 1916. MUNICIPAL COEPOEAilONS. [CH. XI. it must contain words of negotiability. It is not necessary to employ the usual words, or order or bearer, but any other word which indicates the intention to permit its transfer will suffice, such as to the " holder ;" ^ or to A. and his assignS, when the transfer must be by indorsement.^ Delivery is as essential to passing the title of coupon bonds, as of any other kind of com- mercial paper ; and if possession is piocured without a delivery, the rights of a bona fide holder will be the same as if it had been a bill or note.* § 191 b. The formal parts of bond and coupon — Seal not necessary. — The bond and coupons are generally piinted on paper of very fine texture, more or less beautifully engraved. But in other respects, the bond differs in form very little from a promissory note. The coupon may take on any form : Some- times it is a promissory note ; * at other times, a bill of exchange on the treasury of the corporation;^ a draft or order, without naming any drawee ; *■ a check,''' and a mere duebill or ac- knowledgment of indebtedness.* It has been sometimes dpubted whether a coupon bond would be unaffected by the absence of a seal.^ But inasmuch as the seal was originally the only objection to the application to these bonds of the character and incidents of negotiability, it is diffi- cult to see any reason why the absence of the seal would now change their character in any essential respect, and this is now the ruling of the courts.^" It has been held that, where the authority is simply " to issue bonds," a seal is necessary ; ^^ but 'Areuts v. Commonwealth, 18 Gratt. 750; County of Wilson v. Na- tional Bank, 103 U. S. 776; Porter v. City of Janesville, 3 Fed. Eep. 619. 2 Bralnard v. New York, etc., R. E. Co., 25 N. y. 496; 10 Bosw. 832. ^Ledwiok v. MoKim, 53 N. T. 815; Eedlick v. Doll, 54 N. Y. 236. If coupons refer to bonds to which they were attached, the purchaser of a severed coupon is chargeable viith notice of all that the bond contains. McClure v. Oxford Township, 94 U. S. 429; Selliman v. Eailroad Co., 27 Gratt. 119. * Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327. 362 ° Moran v. Com'rs of Miami Coun- ty, 2 Black, 722. " Mercer County v. Hubbard, 45 111. 140. ' Arents v. Commonwealth, 18 Gratt. 753. * Woods V. Lawrence County, 1 Black, 360. ' Mercer County v. Hackett, 1 Wall. 83. 1" The People v. Mead, 24 N. Y. 124; Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, etc., E. E. Co., 41 Barb. 22; Augusta V. Augusta Bank, 56 Me. 176; San Antonio v. Meharty, 96 XJ. S. 315; Draper v. Springport, 104 U. S. 501. 11 Avery v. Springport, 14 Blatch. 272. CH. XI.] MUNICIPAL SECUEITIES. § 191 h. its omission, through misunderstanding or mistake, may be re- lieved in equity .1 Where it is the legislative intent that the municipality shall be bound, regardless of seal, the bonds are valid without it ; as where the statute empowered a city " to issue bonds bearing in- terest, or otherwise pledge the faith of the city to pay." ^ In New York, where a statute required bonds to be under seal a scroll was held to be insufficient.^ But where the bonds were to be issued " under the official signature of the supervisors " no seal was required, notwithstanding the statutory provision, the court holding that any implication arising from the word bonds is overcome by the explicit direction as to their execu- tion.* Like other commercial paper, it is necessary to the negoti- ability of the bond, that the amount to be paid is certain. Any uncertainty in respect to the amount will destroy the negoti- ability of the bond.* The parties to commercial paper have generally the unre- stricted power to stipulate a place of payment in the paper ; and, according to the weight of authoritj'', the parties to coupon bonds are not hampered by any restrictions in that regard.^ Any place within or without the State may be chosen by the municipal corporation as a place of payment.'^ But it has been held in Illinois that a municipal corporation cannot, without express authority from the Legislature, provide for the paj-ment 1 Wiser v. Blackly, 1 John. Ch. eOT; Bernards v. Stebbins, 109 U. S. 341; Cockerel v. Cholmondely, 1 Kuss. & Myl. 418. 2 San Antonio v. Mehaffy, 96 U. S. 312 ; Augusta Bk. v. Augusta, 50 Me. 176; Conn. Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, etc., Co., 41 Barb. 9; Bernards Tp. v. Stebbins, 109 U. S. 341; Draper v. Springport, 104 lb. 501. Coupons need no seal. Ring v. Johnson, 6 la. 265; see ante, § 51. 8 Solon V. Williamsburg Sav. Bk., 112 K. Y. 122, changed by statute. * People V. Mead, 24 N. Y. 114; Kelley v. McCormick, 28 lb. 318; Board v. Fonda, 77 lb. 350. 6 Parson v. Jackson, 99 U. S. 434; also Jackson v. Vicksburg, etc., R. R. M. Co., 2 Woods C. C. 141. 8 Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 178; Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 338; City of Kenosha v. Lamson, 8 Wall. 478; City of Lexington v. But- ler, 14 Wall. 289; Lynde v. County of Winnebago, 16 Wall. 13; Cenn. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co., 41 Barb. 9. ' Meyers v. Muscatine, IWall. 384; Thomson v. Lee Co., 3 lb. 327; Gel- pcke V. Dubuque, 1 lb. 175 ; Lexing- ton v. Butler, 14 lb. 282; Lynde v. Winnebago, 16 lb. 6; Calhoun v. Gal- braith, 99 U. S. 214; Mygaltv. Green Bay, 1 Biss. 292. 363 § 191 c. MtnSriCIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. XI. of its bonds and coupons at any other place than its treasury .^ The figuies, denoting the number of the bond in a series, con- stitute no essential part of it, and an alteration of them will not affect the rights of a bona fide holder of the bond.^ Nor does the dating of a bond after the date of the ordinance pro- viding for its issue affect its validity.* Where the coupon bonds of a corporation are guaranteed by the State, any agreement entered into and indorsed on the bonds by the corporation, subsequent to their execution by the State, will bind only the corporation, and not the State, as guarantor.* § 191 c. Eegistration of municipal securities by State oHicials. — To so great an extent have the conditions of requir- ing popular consent been evaded, that in some of the States acts have been passed, requiring all bonds to be registered by the State authorities, before they can be legally issued. These enactments were designed to prevent the improvident issue of bonds ; and bonds are not duly issued unless these provisions are complied with.^ In the State of Missouri, the act provided that " before any bond hereafter issued shall obtain validity or be negotiated," it should be registered by the auditor, who was to certify thereon that all conditions precedent had been com- plied with. In a case,^ arising out of the construction of this statute the rule was applied that when a statute, declares that a contract, bond or note is absolutely void, it is so into whosesoever hands it may come.^ This rule has been held to rest upon the ground that such statutes, as component parts of the existing law, are notice of limitations upon the powers of municipal corporations, which affect all the world,^ so that a purchaser of I Prettyman v. Tazewell County, 19 111. 406; People ex rel., etc., v. Tazewell County, 22 111. 151; John- son V. County of Stark, 24 111. 91; Pekin v. Reynolds, 31 111. 530. ' City of Elizabeth v. Force, 29 N. J. Eq. 591, oveiTuling 28 IST. J. Eq. 587; Commonwealth v. Emigration Sav. Bank, 98 Mass. 12; Birdsall v. Russell, 29 N. Y. 220. " Flagg V. Elmira, 33 Mo. 440. ' Wallace v. Loomls, 97 U. S. 147. 'Douglas V. Lincoln Co., 2 Mc- 364 Crary, 449. 8 Anthony v. Jasper Co., 101 U. S. 693. 'Bayley v. Taber, 5 Mass. 286; see Tiedeman Commercial Paper, §178. 8 Hofe V. Jasper Co., 110 U. S. 53; Northern Bank v. Porter Towns., 110 U. S. 608; Lewis v. Cora'rs, 105 lb. 739; Menasha v. Hazard, 102 lb. 81; January v. Johnson Co., 3 Dill. C. C. 392; Bissell v. Spring V. Tp., 124 U. S. 225; Crow v. Oxford, 119 lb. 215; CH. XI.] MUNICIPAL SECURITIES. §192 unregistered bonds, who takes them thus incomplete, cannot claim protection in his character as an innocent holder without notice.^ If the State statute makes the certificate of the reg- istering of3ficial conclusive upon the municipality as to the facts contained therein, the effect is the same as if the recitals of the certificate were the recitals of the municipal officials ; and they are estopped from asserting their own lack of power. But where the certificate is not expressly conclusive, the munici- pality may deny the facts certified to.^ A municipal corporation, having the power to boi'row money, issued bonds valid on their face, but antedated them in order to avoid the registration act. The proceeds of the bonds went into the city treasury, and were used for lawful purposes. In this case, the court made the distinction that, while the city was not liable on the bonds, the actual amount of money, which was paid to the corporation, could be recovered in an action for money had and received.^ § 192. Presentment of coupons for payment. — The cou- pons need not be pi-esented for payment on the day of maturity, in order to hold the principal obligors liable, even when they are in the form of a draft or order on a bank.* But it would be necessary to present at maturity, in order to hold an in- dorsei', if there be one;^ and within a reasonable time after maturity, in order to hold a guarantor.® Nor is a prior pre- sentment for payment necessary to the recovery of interest on coupons,^ even wheij the coupons are made payable at a par- Dixon Lewis V. Com'rs, 105 lb. 739 Co. V. Field, 111 lb. 83. 1 DeVass v. Richmond, 18 Gratt. 338; State V. Eoggen, 22 Neb. 118; State V. Babcock, 19 lb. 223, 230. 2 Dixon Co. V. Field, 111 U. S. 83; German Sav. Bank v. Franklin Co., 128 lb. 526, 540; Crow v. Oxford, 119 lb. 215; Lewis V. Barbour Co., 105 U. S. 739; comp. Pana v. Bowler, 107 lb. 529; Oregon v. Jennings, 119 lb. 74; Randolph Co. v. Post, 93 lb. 502. 8 Wood V. Louisiana, 102 U. S. 294; see § 193 a. * Mayor, etc., v. Potomac Ins. Co., 58 Tenn. 296; County of Greene v. Baniel and County of Pickens v. Daniel, 102 U. S. 187; Arents v. Com- monwealth, 18 Gratt. 773 ; Langston V. S. C. E. R. Co., 2 S. C. 248; Jeffer- sonville v. Patterson, 26 Ind. 16. ^ Bonner v. New Orleans, 2 Woods C. C. 135. 6 Arents v. Commonwealth, 18 Gratt. 773. 7 Walnut V. Wade, 103 U. S. 683; Ohio V. Frank, 103 U. S. 697; North Pa. R. R. Co. V. Adams, 54 Pa. St. 97; Mills V. Jefferson, 20 Wis. 50; Jeffer- sonville v. Pattersonville, 26 Ind. 16; Langston v. S. C. R. R. Co., 2 S. C. 248; San Antonio v. Lane, 32 Texas, 403; Virginia v. Chesapeake, etc., 365 § 192 h. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XI. ticular bank in another State.^ But if the municipal or other corporation, which issued the bond and coupon, can show that it was ready at the stipulated place, or at its treasurj', to pay the coupon on the day of maturity, no interest could then be recovered on the coupon.^ § 192 a. Time of payment.— When the statute is silent as to the time when bonds must be paid, this matter may be ar- ranged, and the date fixed, bj'- agreement between the corpora- tion and the purchasers ; ^ but if the statute fixes the date, bonds issued in disregard thereof are Yoid ; * at least, where they are made to fall due at a later date. It seems that bonds may be issued to mature before, but not after, the date fixed by the statute, without affecting their validity.® On the other hand, it is held that the fact that municipal bonds which are regular in all other respects violate a statutory provision, that no more than ten per cent of the loan shall be paid in any one year, does not invalidate them.^ In Pennsylvania, where bonds were payable " in twenty-five years after date " with a proviso, that they " will be redeemed if desired, twelve years after date," it was held that the bonds were not payable until twenty-five years had elapsed ; that the proviso gave the obligee, and not the obligor, an option to enforce payment at the earli- er date, so that the holder could not against his wishes be com- pelled to accept the amount due at the expiration of twelve years. ^ § 192 h. Interest and exchange on ltu)nd and coupon.^ During the time that the bond is running, the interest collecti- ble upon the bond is represented by the coupon, and it can only Canal Co., 32 Md. 501. See contra, Whittakerv. Hartford, etc., R. R. Co., 8 R. I. 47; Pekiu v. Reynolds, 31 HI. 531; Johnson v. Stark County, 24111. To; Chicago v. People, 56 111. 327. 1 Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 ; Thomson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327. See also Aurora City v. Welt, 7 Wall. 82; Clark v. Iowa City, 20 Wall. 583; Genoa v. Woodruff, 92 U. S. 502. 2 Walnut V. Wade, 103 U. S. 697; North Penn. R. R. Co. v. Adams, 54 Pa. St. 97. 366 8 Chicago etc. Co. v. Aurora, 99111. 205. * Woodruff V. Okolona, 57 Miss. 806; Davis v. Tuba Co., 75 Cal. 452; Cairo etc. Co. v. Sparta, 77 111. 505 : Green v. Dyersburg, 2 Flip. 477; Brownell v. Greenwich, 114 N. Y. 518. 6 Potter V. Greenwich, 26 Hun, 326; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Elizabeth, 42 N. J. L. 249. 6 Hoag V. Greenwich, 133 N. T. 152. ' Allentown Sch. Dis. v. Derr, 115 Pa. St. 439. CH. XI.] MUNICIPAL SECURITIES. 193 be recovered by a presentment of the coupon.^ After maturity of the bond, interest may be recovered by the holder of the bond for any delay in payment. Since coupons ai-e separate and independent securities, they bear interest themselves after their maturit}' ; and the interest is recoverable by the holder of the coupon.'^ And so, also, may exchange be recovered on coupons, whenever it could be recov- ered on bills and notes.^ § 193. Actions on bonds and coupons. — The holder of both the bond and the coupons may sue on them in his own name ; * and although it has been denied,^ it is now generally held to be the law, that the holder of the coupon may in any case maintain a separate action on the coupon, and need not join with the holder of the bond; nor need the bond be produced in evidence.^ ' City of Kenosha v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 482; Williamson v. New Al- bany, etc., E. K. Co., 9 Am. Ry. Times, 37, V. S. C. C. 2 Aurora City v. West, 1 Wall. 105 ; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 206; Thomson v. Lee Co., 3 Wall. 332; Genoa v. Woodruff, 92 U. S. 502; Amy V. Dubuque, 98 U. S. 471 ; Kosh- konong v. Burton, 104 U. S. 668; Mills V. Jefferson, 20 Wis. 50; San Antonio v. Lane, 32 Texas, 405 ; Nat. Exch. Bank v. Hartford, etc. R. E. Co., 8 E. I. 375; Beaver County v. Armstrong, 6 Wright, 63; North Penn. E. E. Co. v. Adams, 54 Pa. St. 94; Welsh v. St. Paul, etc., E. E. Co., 25 Minn. 320; Arents v. Common- wealth, 18 Gratt. 776; Gilbert v. W. C. V. M., etc., E. E. Co., 33 Gratt. 599; HoUingsworth v. City of De- troit, 3 McLean, 472; Virginia v. Chesapeake, etc.. Canal Co., 32 Md. 591; Langston v. S. C. E. E., 2 S. C. 248; Conn. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cleve- land, etc., R. E. Co., 41 Barb. 9. « Gelpcke V. Dubuque. IWall. 20; Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U. S. 668; Jeffersonville v. Paterson, 26 Ind. ] 6. In Gelpcke v. Dubuque, the Court said: " municipal bonds with coupons payable to bearer, having by universal usage and consent all the qualities of commercial paper, a party recovering on the coupons is entitled to the amount of them, with interest and exchange at the place where by their terms they were made payable." ^Society for Savings v. City of New London, 29 Conn. 175 ; Carr v. LeFevre, 27 Pa. St. 413; Johnson v. County of Stark, 22 111. 75. 6 In Jackson v. T. & C. E. E. Co., 2 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 585; Crosby V. New London, etc., R. R. Co., 26 Conn. 121, it was held that no sepa^ rate action can be maintained on the coupon, unless the coupon con- tained a distinct promise to pay. 8 Com'rs of Knox Co. v. Aspin- wall, 21 How. 54; Beaver Co. v. Arm- strong, 44 Pa. St. 63; Kennard v. Cass Co., U. S. C. C, 3 Dillon C. C. 147; Town of Cicero v. Clifford, 53 Ind. 191; First Nat. Bank v. Mt. Ta- bor, 52 Vt. 87; Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327 ; Walnut v. Wade, 103 U. S. 695 ; Nat. Exch. Bank v. Hartford, etc., E. E. Co., 8 R. I. 375; Mayor, etc., v. Potomac Ins. Co., 58 Tenn. 296; Welch v. First Div. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 25 Minn. 320. The coupons may be sued on, not- 367 §194 MI7NICIPAL COKPOEATIONS. [CH. XI. The recovery on the bonds is so independent of the recovery on the coupons, that a judgment, that one is a bona fide owner of certain coupons, does not prove that he is also a bona fide owner of the bonds, from which the coupons were detached.^ The same provision of the Statute of Limitation applies to both bond and coupon ; and in order that action may be brought on the coupon, it must be begun within the statutory period after its maturity, although the bond is not yet due.^ § 193 a. When consideration paid to corporation for in- valid bond may be recovered. — When the transaction, in which the bonds were issued, is not a malum in se, and the parties paying for the bonds are not participants in the violation of the law, the consideration paid to the corporation for the ille- gal bonds can be recovered back, with interest from the time that the corporation denied its liability and refused to pay.^ § 194. Legislative control of the remedies to enforce pay- ment of municipal debts. — The general rule of constitutional law is that the Legislature of a State lias not the power to de- stroy or impair the obligation of a contract, by taking away all remedies for the enforcement of the contract. A denial of all remed}^ would be as unconstitutional, as a legislative declaration against the validity of the contract.* But as long as a substan- tial remedy is provided for the enforcement of the contract, the character of the remedy may be changed at the pleasure of the Legislature ; and such a change, however material, will not be considered to impair the obligation of the contract, in the con^ withstanding the bonds have been ah-eady paid and surrendered. STat. Exch. Bank v. Hartford, etc., E. E. Co., supra; and altliough the bonds need not be produced in evidence, tlie coupons in suit should ordinarily be identified in the declaration by a statement of the number of the bond, date, sum and time of payment. Kennard v. Cass Co., supra. 1 Stewart v. Lansing, 104 U. S. 505. 2 City of Kenosha v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 483, 484; City of Lexington v. Butler, 15 Wall. 296; Clark v. Iowa City, 20 Wall. 586; Amy v. Dubuque, 08 U. S. 471; Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U. S. 668. 368 s Louisiana v. Wood, 102 U. S. 294, affirming s. c. in 5 Dillon C. C. 122. See also Thomas v. City of Eich- mond, 12 Wall. 354 ; Draper v. Spriag- port, 104 U. S. 501 ; Oneida Bank v. Ontario Bank, 21 N. Y. 496; Jack- son County V. Hall, 55 111. 444. * Osborne v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 662; Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 480; Penrose v. Erie Canal Co., 56 Pa. St. 46 ; Thompson v. Commonwealth, 81 Pa. St. 314; West v. Sansom, 44 Ga. 295 ; Eison v. Farr, 24 Ark. 161 ; Grif- fin V. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370; McFarland V. Butler, 8 Minn. 116; Jackson v. Butler, 8 Minn. 117. CH. XI.] MUNICIPAL SECUmTIES. §194 stitutional sense, although the change is to a less desirable and a more inconvenient remedy.^ The most radical changes are per^- missible, as long as a substantial remedy remains. Thus, a law- may take away from existing contracts the right to confine the debtor in prison, and yet not impair the obligation of the con- tracts.^ And so may a judgment lien on real property be taken away by a repeal of the statute, authorizing it.^ But, inasmuch as the creditors of a municipal corporation are ordinarily limited to one or more special remedies for the en- forcement of their claims, and cannot resort to the general remedies for the enforcement of contracts, a different rule is recognized in relation to such debts, viz. : that laws, in force when the bonds are issued, which authorize the levy of taxes for the payment of the principal and interest thereof, are a part of the contract between a municipality and its creditors ; and to i-epeal such laws is to impair the obligation of the contract.* And it is no answer to claim that the subsequent legislation, ill curtailment of the municipal power of taxation, does not ut- terly destroy the rights of the creditors or bondholders.^ The same rule applies to all other remedies which are specially pro- vided for the liquidation of a municipal or county indebtedness,^ and any subsequent State legislation, which affects these reme- 1 Ogden V. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Beers v. Houghton, 9 Pet. 329; Ten- nessee V. Sneed, 96 C. S. 69; Simpson V. Savings Bank, 56 N. H. 466; Banks V. Quackenhush, 1 N. Y. 129; Morse V. Goold, 11 N. Y. 281; Baldwin v. Newark, 38 N. J. 158; Moore v. State, 43 N. J. 203. 2 Marshall, C. J., in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; see Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat. 370; Pen- niman's Case, 103 U. S. 714; Matter of Nichols, 8 R. I. 50; Sommers v. Jolinson, 4 Vt. 278 (24 Am. Dec. 604); Ware v. Miller, 9 S. C. 18; Maxey v. Loyal, 38 G-a. 531; Bronson v. New- herry, 2 Dougl. (Mich.) 38. " Watson V. N. Y. Central E. E. Co., 47 N. Y. 157; Woodbury v. Grimes, 1 Col. 100; contra, Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610. 24 * United States v. Jefferson Co., 1 McCrary C. C. 356; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; Galena v. Amy, 5 lb. 705, 709; Ealls Co. v. 'United States, 105 U. S. 733; Wolff v. New- Orleans, 1031b. .358; Quincy v. Jack- son, 113 lb. 332; Eiggs v. Johnson Co., 6 Wall. 106, 194; Eees v. Water- town, 19 lb. 107, 120; Lansing v. County Treasurer, 1 Dill. 523 ; State V. Milwaukee, 25 Wis. 122 ; Vance v. Little Eock, 30 Ark. 435, 440; see ante, § 14. 6 United States v. Jefferson Co., 6 Fed. Eep. 486. 6 Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595; Ealls Co. V. United States, 105 U. S. 733; Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 lb. 278; State v. Mayor of N. O., 109 lb. 285. 369 § 194 a. MTJNICrPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XI. dies, so as to lessen their adequacy or which destroys them al- together without substituting another, is unconstitutional.^ Carrying out this rule, the Supreme Court of the United States has decided that a law, by which certain bondholdere possessed the right to have a special county tax levied for their benefit, was still in force, although subsequently repealed by a State Legislature, in favor of judgments recovered on debts which were incurred prior to the repeal.^ So, also, the law of tlie State, with the construction placed upon it by the highest State court, is part of the obligation of the contract, and that construction will be recognized and enforced by the Federal courts, in all suits on contracts arising thereunder.^ So, like- wise, a sinking fund, which is pledged by the statute creating the debt, cannot be diverted by the Legislature to other pur- poses ; * and an injunction will lie to prevent the municipal cor- poration from carrying out such a law.* So, also, when an ordinance, authorizing the issue of bonds, devotes the income of certain property to their paj'ment, the municipal authorities cannot subsequently appropriate the income to other purposes.^ § 194 a. Eemedies for enforcement of mnnicipal indebted- ness. — As a general rule, municipal corporations seldom possess any pecuniarj' resources, except those furnished bj' taxation. For this reason, coupled with the fact that property held by the city for public purposes cannot be sold under execution,^ the power of levying taxes is b}" inference deemed to be conferred by the Legislature, as an appurtenant of the power to contract an in- debtedness ; and an express power to issue bonds implies a power to raise the money necessary for their payment by taxation.^ For iSieberty, Lewis, 122 TJ. S. 284. •^ Cape Girardeau v. Hill, 118 IT. S. 68; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; Bronson v. McKinzie, 1 How. 311, 317; Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U. S. 203, 208; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 lb. 270; Eoyall v. Virginia, 116 lb. 572. * German Sav. Bank v. Franklin Co., 128 U. S. 526; see post, § 195. * Liquidators v. Municipality, 6 La. An. 21; Terry v. Wisconsin M. & F. Ins., 18 Wis. 87. 370 5 Fazende v. Houston, 34 Fed. Rep. 95. 6 State V. Police Jury, 111 U. S. 716; Bates V. Porter, 74 Cal. 224; New Orleans v. United States, 49 Fed. Rep. 40; 2 U. S. App. 125. ' Meriwetlier v. Garrett, 102 U. S 472. See post, § 212. « Quincy v. Jackson, 113 U. S.333; Feldman v. Charleston, 23 S. C. 57; Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 660; United States v. New Orleans, 98 U. S. 381, 393; Ralls Co. v. United States, 105 lb. 733, 735 ; United States CH. XI.] MUNICIPAL SECURITIES. §194, this reason, also, when a special tax is provided for, the bond- holder is not limited for his remedy to this special tax ; but he is entitled to payment of principal and interest out of the gen- eral fund of the municipality, unless he is expressly limited to the special fund.^ To enforce a lawful stock subscription made by a municipal- ity ; 2 to compel the delivery of bonds, or the appropriation of money to pay them ; ^ or to I'equire the levy of a tax to raise the necessary amount ; a mandamus is the appropriate remedy.* And, although there is some conflict of the decisions, it seems to be the rule, according to the weight of the decisions, that when it is the duty of an officer to levy the tax he may be com- pelled to do so by a mandamus, after a judgment had been ob- tained.^ The taxes so raised should be set aside as a special fund for the creditors who procured the mandamus.^ Whei'e the municipal official does not possess the power to execute the act, which the mandamus seeks to compel him to do, it is a good defence,^ and a Federal mandamus cannot require an official to violate the law of his own State.** On the other hand, a city official, who refuses to obey a mandamus rightfully issued, is subject to punishment for contempt and to a suit for damages.^ Generally, throughout the countrj^, private property is ex- empt from execution for public debt. But in the New England States, by common law and ancient usage, the property of all the citizens is liable on execution,^" and. all the inhabitants are regarded as defendants in an action against the corporation." In considering the remedies open to a municipal creditor, a V. MaoonCo., 99 lb. 582; Parkersburg V. Brown, 106 lb. 487, .501. 1 United States v. Clark Co., 95 U. S. 769; United States v. Knox Co., 2 McCrary, 625; Macon Co. v. Hulde- koper, 99 U. S. 592; Knox Co. v. Harshman, 109 lb. 229. 2JEa; parte Selma, 45 Ala. 696. 8 Cherokee Co. v. Wilson, 109 U. S. 621. * See § 375 in chapter on Mandamus and Quo Warranto. ' See § 375 on Mandamus ; comp. Heine v. Levee Com'rs, 19 Wall. 655, 657; Queensbury v. Culver, 19 lb. 83, 92; Kiggs v. Johnson Co., 6 Wall. 166. 6 Galena v. Amy, 5 Wall. 705 ; Coy V. Lyons, 17 Iowa, 1 ; Santee v. Alle- gheny, 10 Pitts. Leg. J. 241; Vance V. Little Kock, 30 Ark. 435. 'United States v. Clark Co., 95 U. S. 769. 8 United States v. Knox Co., 2 Mc- Crary C. C. 625. 9 Dow V. Humbert, 91 U. S. 294. 1" Sec. 212. " See § 375 on Mandamus. 371 § 195 MTTNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [OH. XI. clear distinction should be drawn between a total absence of remedy, and the fact that the remedy is ineffectual under the circumstances of the case. "Where the remedy at law is ade- quate under ordinary circumstances, and the only diffieulty is in its inapplicability or ineffectiveness, in the particular case, equity will not interfere.-' For example, if, upon a mandamus being granted to compel the levy of a tax, it is found that the corporation has no power to levy such a tax, no court of law, however great its power, can compel the municipality to exer- cise a power it does not legally possess ; .or confer upon it the power to tax. In such a case, the last and only resort of the disappointed creditor is the Legislature of the State, where the municipal corporation is located.^ But I am inclined to hold, in one very extraordinary case, that a court of equity could interfere for the enforcement of a levy of the tax, where the mandamus might not lie, viz. : where the municipality had the power to levy the tax, but the Legis- lature revoked the charter of the municipality, and did not sub- stitute any other incorporation. Under those circumstances it is claimed that the community, whose incorporation has been taken away, is still liable for the debts of the dissolved munici- pal corporation.^ And, certainly, that claim cannot be made a practical reality, if the court of equity could not, in the as- sumption of an extraordinary power, as trustee of the powers of the dissolved municipality, order a levy of the taxes, which could have been levied, had it not been for the dissolution of the corporation. This is practically holding, that, for the pur- pose of providing for its indebtedness, a dissolved municipal corporation still exists. § 195. Defences to Ibonds — Conflict of decisions — ^Want of power. — Coupon bonds possess in general the nature of nego- tiable paper, and confer upon the bona fide holder the rights and privileges which are enjoyed by bona fide holders of ordi- nary commercial paper, with the exception that, as all men are presumed to know the law, anj-- bonds, whicli are illegally or ' Eeese v. Watertown, 19 Wall. Iff?, 124; State v. McCrillin, 4 Kan. 250; Humphreys Co. v. McAdoo, 1 Heisk. 585. 372 2 Heine v. Levee Com'rs, 19 Wall. 655, 658; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, 518. 3 Sec. 43. CH. XI. j MUNICIPAL SECUEITIES. §195 unconstitutionally issued, ^ or issued in excess of, or without legal authority, are void. The Supreme Court of the United States has, in the interest of bona fide holders, opposed a narrow construction of statutes regulating bonded indebtedness ; and against such holders it has not favored defences based on technicalities, and not in- volving the question of power. It is useless, however, to seek a constant uniformity of the decisions in the minor principles, which from time to time have been enunciated by this court, or to expect to find the decisions of the State courts always in harmony with its rulings ;2 and these facts must not be lost sight of, in comparing the line of decisions in the Federal and State courts. Thus, it is the general rule of the State courts, that even when the bonds are in the hands of bona fide holders, the noncompliance with some requirement of the statute, as the omission to hold a prior election, or an irregularity in con- ducting such an election ; ^ or the lack of assent by a certain proportion of the resident taxpayers ; * or the non-location of the road, * when these are conditions precedent, is a good de- fence. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that, unless it be perhaps in cases where the question is one of rights aris- ing under the State Constitution or law,^ it is not bound by a decision of the State court, which is rendered after the bonds have reached the hands of bona fide holders ; ' but where the bonds are issued after a State statute has been construed by the highest court of the State, such construction becomes a part 1 Harshman v. Bates Co., 92 IT. S. 569; Lamville etc. Co. v. Fairfield, 51 Vt. 257; Grant v. Cooke, 7 D. C. 165. 2 Dillon Mun. Cor. §§ 515, 550, 551. 3 Marshall Co. v. Cook, 38 111. 44; Shoemaker v. Goshen, 14 Ohio St. 569; Berliner v. Waterloo, 14 Wis. 378; Duunovan v. Green, 57 111. 63; Hancock v. Chicot Co., 32 Ark. 575. * SUrin v. Genoa, 23 N. T. 439; Gould V. Sterling, lb. 439, 456; Peo- ple V. Mead, 36 N. T. 224. ' Treadwell v. Hancock Co. Com'rs, 11 Ohio St. 183; Veeder v. Lima, 19 Wis. 280; State v. Van Homo, 7 Ohio St. 327. 6 In such cases the Federal courts accept the decisions of the highest State courts. BoUes v. Brimfield, 120 U. S. 759; Carroll Co. v. Smith, 111 lb. 566; Elmwood v. Maxcy, 92 lb. 289; Claiborne Co. v. Brooks, 111 lb. 400, 410. ' Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 Havenmeyer v. Iowa Co., 3 lb. 294 Olcott V. Fond du Lao, 16 lb. 678 Carroll Co. v. United States, 18 Wall 71; Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 lb. 666 Douglas V. Pike Co., 101 U. S. 677, 373 § 195 a. MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XI. of the statute, and is respected by the Federal courts.^ And the statute thus construed forms a part of all contracts entered in- to under it, and with which the bona fide holder is bound to be acquainted.^ § 195 a. Nonperformance of conditions as a defence. — A very frequent defence to bonds, issued in aid of railroads, is a denial that some condition precedent, such as a popular vote, has been complied with, and hence the power to issue the bonds did not exist.^ As between the original parties, there may be a full inquiry whether the conditions,* from which the valid commercial instruments, but ifissuedbysucha corporation which possessed no power from the Legis- lature to grant such aid, they are in- valid, even in the hands of innocent holders. Such a power is frequently conferred to be exercised in a special manner, or subject to certain regu- lations, conditions or qualifications; but if it appears that the bonds is- sued show by their recitals that the power was exercised in the manner required by the Legislature, and that the bonds were issued in conformity with those regulations and pursuant to those conditions and qualifica- tions, proof that any or all of those recitals are incorrect, will not con- stitute a defence in a suit on the bonds or coupons, if it appears that it was the sole province of the mu- nicipal oflSeers who executed the bonds to decide whether or not there had been an antecedent compliance with the regulations, conditions or qualifications which it is alleged were not fulfilled." Clifford, J., in St. Joseph Township v. Kogers, 16 Wall. 644. 3 See §§ 184, 186. See also McManus v. Duluth etc. R. Co., (Minn. 93) 52 N. W. E. 980. *If the conditions precedent have not been performed the issue may be enjoined. Chambers Co. v. Clews, 21 Wall. 317; Union P. Co. v. Lin- cobi Co., 3 Dill. 300; Union P. Co. v. 1 Douglas Co. V. Pike, 101 U. S. 617. 2 Warren v. Marcy, 97 U. S. 96; Knox Co. V. Ninth Nat'l Bank, 13 S. Ct. 267; 147 U. S. 91; Phelps v. Lewiston, 15 Blatchf. 131; German Bk. V. Franklin, 128 U. S. 526; Cal- oma V. Eaves, 92 U. S. 484; Bergess V. Seligman, 107 lb. 20; Anderson v. Beal, 113 lb. 227; Green Co. v. Conn ess, 109 lb. 154; Dixon v. Field, 111 lb. 83; Douglas v. Pike Co., 101 lb. 677; Northern Bank v. Porter, 110 lb. 608; Parmlee v. Chi- cago, 60 111. 267; Buchanan v. Litch- field, 102 U. S. 278; Elmwood v. Maxcy, 92 U. S. 289; Lane v. Emb- deu, 72 Me. 354; Anderson v. Santa Anna, 116 U. S. 356; Anderson v. Houston etc. Co., 52 Tex. 228; Tay- lor V. Ipsilanti, 105 U. S. 60; Irwin V. Ontai-io, 3 Fed. 49; Hopper v. Cov- ington, 8 lb. 777; Carrier v. Shawan- gunk, 10 lb. 220; Grande Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall. 377; Lyude v. County, 16 lb. 6; Beecher v. Cliesh- ire, 125 U. S. 555 ; Bissell v. Jeffer- sonville, 24 How. 287; Smith v. Tal- lapoosa Co., 2 Woods, 574; Kenosha v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 477; Foster v. Kenosha, 12 Wis. 615 ; Columbia Co. V. King, 13 Fla. 421 ; Mayor v. Lom- bard, 57 Miss. 208; Cutler v. Masen, 56 lb. 115. " Bonds payable to bear- er issued by a municipal corporation — if issued in pursuance of a power conferred by the Legislature, are 371 CH. XI.] MtrsriCIPAL SECTTRITIES. § 195 h. lawful existence of the power was to arise, had been complied with.^ And in a suit by the payee, no recital will conclude the question, whether the conditions precedent have been per- formed.^ And, so, likewise, the municipal corporation may re- cover the amount which it has had to pay to a hona fide holder of unconstitutional bonds, to whom the railroad company had wrongfully transferred them.^ § 195 b. Defences not appearing on face of bond. — But the purchaser of bonds, who takes them for value, is protected from many defences which do not appear upon the face of the bond, but which might prevail as between the original parties. One who, without notice, and for value, comes into possession of municipal bonds is entitled to all the rights of a hona fide hold- er, even though they were stolen.* But the forger}'- or altera- tion of a material part of the bond is a good defence, in an ac- tion by a hona fide holder. Thus, if the instrument, when stolen, is incomplete in any essential respect ; and this is supplied by the thief or the holder, no recovery can be had ; as for example, when the place of payment is left blank ; ^ but such a result will not be brought about by an alteration of the number of the bond.* And as a bond takes effect on delivery, a blank in the date will not affect a recovery ; but when bonds were stolen, upon which both the corporate seal and the indorsement of the trustees were wanting, and these were forged, no recovery could be had.' The insertion of the name of the payee in a stolen bond is not such an alteration as will avoid the bonds in the hands of a hona -fide holder.^ Where the bonds or cou- Merriok Co., 3 lb. 359; Packard v. Jefferson Co., 2 Col. 338; Cairo, etc., Co. V. Sparta, 77111. 505; or if issued may be declared void and canceled in the hands of a holder with notice of the defect. Belo v. Forsythe Co., 76 N. C. 489. ' See § 189 a. 2 Chambers Co. v. Clews, 21 Wall. 317, 321; Madison V. Smith, 83 Ind. 502; Lamoille v. Fairfield, 51 Vt. 257; Jackson v. Brush, 77 111. 59 ; Harding V. Rockford, etc., Co., 65 111. 90; and cases cited by Thornton, J., in his opinion. Portland, etc., Co. v. Hart- ford, 58 Me. 23. ' Plain view v. Winona, etc., Co., 36 Minn. 505. 1 Tiederaan Coml. Paper, §282; Gilbraugh v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., 1 Hughes (U. S.) 410; Planters' Assn. V. Avigno, 28 La. An. 552; Elizabeth V. Force, 29 IST. J. L. 587; Battles v. Landenslager, 84 Pa. St. 446. ^Ledwich v. McKim, 53 N. T. 307. 6 Birdsall v. Russell, 29 Jf. Y. 220; Diamond v. Lawrence Co., 37 Pa. St. 353; Crosby v. New London, etc., Co., 26 Conn. 121. ' Maas V. Miss., K. & T. Ry. Co., 11 Hun, 8. " Boyd V. Kennelly, 9 Vroom, 146. 375 § 195 d. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XI. pons were overdue when stolen, they cannot be I'ecovered on even in the hands of bona fide holders for value.^ § 195 c. Who are bona fide holders. — But in order to con- stitute one a bona fide holder, he must have parted with value, and he without notice of iiTegularities actual or constructive, or be himself the successive grantee of a holder, who is a bona fide holder.^ A pledgee ^ or one who takes bonds in payment of a debt,* or who gives a note for them,® is entitled to all the rights of a bona fide holder, and may recover the face value of the bonds, although he paid less than par for them." But one who purchases municipal bonds from a railroad company is not, upon their being pronounced invalid, subrogated to the lights of the railroad company if it had any.^ § 195 i. Effect of notice on rights of bona fide holders. — In considering what a bondholder is bound to take notice of, or what is sufficient to put him on his guard, it should be said that the doctrine of lis pendens is not applicable, and a purchaser is not bound to know that an action is pending to decide upon the validity of the bonds which he is about to buy,* or that an in- junction had been granted to restrain the issue.^ But a pur- chaser of overdue bonds, after such bonds have been adjudged void, is bound by the judgment.-"' Every one purchasing bonds is chargeable with notice of whatever facts appear stated on their face ; ^^ and if reference is there made to a statute, the buyer is presumed to have knowl- edge of all the statutory requirements.-'^ Thus, if on the face 1 Arents v. Com., 18 Gratt. 750; Yermilyea v. Adams Ex. Co., 21 "Wall. 1.38. 2 McClure v. To-wnship, 94 U. S. 429; Cromwell v. Sac Co., 96 lb. 51; Scotland Co. v. Hill, 132 lb. 107; Suf- folk Sav. Bk. V. Boston, 149 Mass. 364. ^ Allen V. Dallas etc. Co., 3 Woods, 316. ' Foote V. Hancock, 15 Blatchf. 343; Mobile Sav. Bank v. Oklibbeha Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 110. 5 Orleans v. Piatt, 99 U. S. 676. « Crom-well v. Sac Co., 96 U. S. 51; Chlcopee Bank v. Chapin, 8 Mete. (Mass.) 40; Fowler v. Strickland, 107 376 Mass. 552; Nat. Bank of Mich. v. Greene, 33 Iowa, 140. ^ ^tna L. I. Co. v. Middleport, 124 U. S. 534. 8 Scotland Co. v. Hill, 132 U. S. 107; 10 S. Ct. Rep. 26; Olcott v. Fond du Lac, 16 "Wall. 678; Nat'l Bank of Wash. V. Texas, 20 lb. 72; Warren Co. V. Marcy, 97 U. S. 96; Orleans v. Piatt, 99 U. S. 676; Cass Co. v. Gil- lett, 100 lb. 585 ; Letch v. Wells, 48 N. Y. 586. 9 Carroll v. Smith, 111 U. S. 556. i» Louis V. Brown Tp., 109 U. S. 162. 11 Brown v. Bou Homme Co., 46 N. W. Rep. 173, 176. li McClure v. Oxford, 94 U. S. 429; CH. XI.J irUNICIPAL SECURITIES. § 195 d. of the bond it is provided that nonpayment of interest renders the bond itself due, unpaid coupons are notice to the purchaser that the whole bond is due and payable.^ But where the bond does not contain a provision that, upon default of interest, the bond shall become due, the presence of overdue coupons is not enough to charge the bona fide purchaser with notice of exist- ing defences.^ And the statutory requirement that an affidavit should be on file renders the absence of the affidavit sufficient to put a purchaser on his guard * And, furthermore, if the facts recited in the bond are such as to put the holder on his guard, he is presumed to have notice of whatever he should sub- sequently have discovered by reasonable inquiry.* All . bondholders are affected with constructive notice of whatever may be of public record, but they need not go be- hind the record ; and whatever is found therein is conclusive on the corporation, as well as on a purchaser.^ But a pur- chaser of rnunjpipal bonds is not bound to take notice of pri- vate records.® As limitations upon municipal power, and the scope of the authority possessed by public and municipal agents and offi- cials, are matters of public law and record, the bona fide pur- chaser of municipal bonds is properly charged with constructive notice of them.'^ Thus, when the Legislature has made the negotiability of bonds to depend upon their delivery by a State ofQcial, a purchaser is not a bona fide purchaser without notice, if the bonds are fraudulently issued and delivered by some one other than the authorized official.^ Bank etc. v. St. Joseph, 31 Fed. Eep. 216. 1 Mayor v. City Bank of Macon, 58 Ga. 584. 2 Miller v. Berlen, 13 Blatchf. 245; Eouede v. Jersey City, 18 Fed. Eep. 719; Gilbrough v. Norfolk Co., 1 Hughes, 410; State v. Cobb, 64 Ala. 127; Nat'l Bank v. Kirby, 108 Mass. 497; Boss v. Hewitt, 15 Wis. 260. » Veeder v. Lima, 19 Wis, 280. * Bates Co. v. Winters, 97 U. S. 85 ; McClure v. Oxford, supra ; Harsh- man V. Bates Co., 92 IT. S. 569; My- gatt V. Green Bay, 1 Biss. 292. sFirstTSTat. Bk. v. Concord, 50 Vt. 257. County records. See Lewis v. Bourbon Co., 12 Kan. 186; State v. Commissioners, 37 Ohio St. 526. 6 Town of Eagle v. Kohn, 84 111. 292. ' Johnson Co. v. January, 94 U. S. 202; Ogden v. Daviess Co., 102 lb. 034; Northern Bank v. Porter, 110 lb. 608; Hayes v. Holly Springs, 114 lb. 120; Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall. 676; United States v. City Bank of Columbus, 21 How. 356. 8 Lewis V. Barbour Co. Com'rs, 3 Fed. Rep. 191. 377 § 195/. MtTNICrPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XI. § 195 e. Effect of inserting nnauthorized terms and con- ditions. — The officers of the municipality cannot make any- different agreements, affecting the liabilit)' of the municipality, from those which are required by the statute, under which the bonds were issued. So, when the bonds were unconditional promises to pay in thirty years ; and their form was in strict conformity with the authority conferred, as it appeared from the record ; it was held that purchasers and bona fide holders were not affected by a private arrangement as to the redemp- tion of the bonds, which was made by the city with the banker, who put them on the market,^ or by the fact that the funds, the payment of which is secured by the bonds, had been mis- applied 2 or used for an unlawful purpose. No person can be a de facto officer, where no office exists; and for this reason, bonds issued by persons who purported to be county commissioners are invalid even in the hands of h'ona fide holders, when the statute, by which the office had been created, was unconstitutional.^ If bonds have been issued without legislative authority, or in disregard of the limitations which were imposed by such authority,* or by the State or Federal Constitution,* upon the expressly conferred power to issue them, the bonds are invalid in whosesoever hands they may be found.^ § 195/. Burden of proof. — In the case of coupon bonds, payable to bearer, possession is prima facie evidence of owner- ship ; ^ but strong evidence of fraud in the creation of the se- 1 Suffolk Sav. Bank v. Boston, 149 Mass. 364. 2 Lynchburg v. Slaughter, 75 Va. 57. 8 Norton v. Shelby Co., 118 U. S. 425. * Milan V. Tenn. etc. Co., 11 Lea, 329; ISTorton v. Dyersburg, 127 IT. S. 160. ^WeUs V. Pontotoc Co., 102 U. S. 625; Ogden V. Daviess Co., 102 lb. 634; Allen v. Louisiana, 103 lb. 580; Lamculle etc. Co. v. Fairfield, 51 Vt. 257. "Force v. Batavia, 61 111. 100; Wil- liams V. Koberts, 88 lb. 13 ; Lippin- cottv. Pana, 93 lb. 24; Nesbitt v. 378 Riverside, 144 U. S. 610; Eddy v. People, 127 111. 428; Memphis v. Bethel, 17 S. W. K. 191; Agawam N. Bk. V. South Hadley, 128 Mass. 503; Barnes v. Lacou, 84 111. 461; Wil- liams V. People, 132111. 574; Frick v. Mercer, 138 Pa. St. 523; Aspinwall v. Daviess Co., 22 How. .364; Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall. 655; Duke v. Brown, 96 N. C. 127; MerriU v. Mon- ticello, 138 U. S. 673; Getohell v. Benton, 47 N. W. R. 468 (Neb. 90); Ottawa V. Carey, 108 U. S. 110; Pui-dy V. Lansing, 128 U. S. 557. ' Tiedeman Coml. Paper, § 312, where the burden of proof is more fully explained. CH. XI.] MUNICIPAL SECURITIES. §196 curities would throw upon the holder the burden of proving aflSrinatively that he paid value ;^ where, however, the author- ity to issue bonds is limited as to the amount which can be is- sued, the burden of proving that the limit had been reached is on the corporation.^ § 196. Doctrine of estoppel as applicable to bona fide holders— Effect of recitals in the bonds. — In discussing to what extent a municipal corporation may be estopped, in ac- tions brought ac^ainst it on its bonds, it should be noticed that the doctrine applies only after the bonds have been issued.^ In cases where the alleged want of power is predicated upon an omission to give legal notice of the election, or upon other irregularities, it is held that the decision of the board, who were the public agents of the corporation issuing the bonds, is con- clusive as to the facts occurring previous to their issue, and that the municipality is thereby estopped * in an action brought by a lona fide holder. But in order that the recitals in bonds of compliance with conditions precedent may bind the corporation, thej' must purport to come from some officer, who is charged by the law with the duty of ascertaining the fact, that the con- ditions precedent have been fully performed,^ as, for example, from the officials signing the bonds on behalf of the corpora- tion ; ^ or, as express directions on this point are so frequently omitted from the statute, from those officials to whom full con- trol is given.^ The power, to determine whether the condi- tions precedent have been complied with, cannot be delegated 1 Marion Co. v. Clark, 94 U. S. 278; Macon Co. v. Shares, 97 lb. 272; Stu- art V. Lansing, 104 lb. 505. ^Neely v. Torkville, 10 S. C. 141. 'Union Pac. E. Co. v. Lincoln Co., 3 Dill. 300. See Travellers v. Oswe- go, 55 Fed. Eep. 361; Nesbitt v. Riv- erside, 144 U. S. 610. < Bernards v. Morrison, 183 U. S. 523; National Bank v. Grenada, 41 Fed. Eep. 87; Brown v. Pt. Pleasant, (W. Va. 92) 15 S. E. 209; Brown v. Milliken, 42 Kan. 769; Fulton v. Riv- erton, 42 Minn. 395 ; Bissell v. Jeffer- son ville, 24 How. 287; Menasha v. Hazard, 102 U. S. 81 ; Town of Prai- rie V. Lloyd, 97 111. 170; Hannibal v. Fauntleroy, 105 U. S. 408; Pana v. Bowler, 107 lb. 529; Moran v. Miami, 2 Black, 722; McCall v. Hancock, 10 Fed. Rep. 80. 6 Humboldt v. Long, 92 U. S. 642; Marcy v. Oswego, lb. 638; Venice V. Murdock, lb. 194; Rock Creek V. Strong, 96 lb. 271; Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 lb. 147; Anderson Co. V. Beal, 113 lb. 227; Lincoln v. Cam- bria Co., 113 lb. 412. s Oregon v. Jennings, 119 U. S. 74, 92. "< Bernards Tp. v. Morrison, 133 U. S. 523. 379 §196 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS. [cH. xi; by the corporation ^ to others than its own officers. And when all the facts are exclusively within the knowledge of the board by whom the bonds are authorized to be issued, it will be im- plied that it was the legislative intent to make this body the judge, whether the conditions had been complied with.^ But the rule is decisively laid down that in no case is a municipal corporation estopped by recitals or declarations made by agents or officials who are not authorized to make them.^ A municipal corporation is never estopped, by conduct or by recitals, from setting up as a defence a total lack of power to issue the bonds.* A hona fide holder is always obliged to deter- mine at his peril, whether the municipal corporation was author- ized to issue the bonds under any terms or conditions.^ So, also, it must be observed that, when the condition requires that the assent of the people shall be given prior to an issue of bonds, no subsequent acts of the municipal officers, aside from recitals of the bonds, will estop the city from showing that such assent was not given.^ When the question is as to an irregular exercise of the power, or a failure to comply with the conditions, the corporation may be estopped, as against a lona fide holder, by its course of dealing; as, for example, by payment of interest on the bonds,'' or by retaining and using for municipal purposes 1 Jackson Co. v. Brush, 77 111. 59. ' Evansville, etc., Co. v. Evansville, 15 Ind. 395 ; Mutual Ben. L. I. Co. v. Elizabeth, 42 JT. J. L. 235. 2 Chlsolm V. Montgomery, 2 Woods, 584; Brown v. Bon Homme Co., 46 N. W. Eep. 173; Bank v. Bergen Co., 115 U. S. 334; Whiteside v. United States, 93 lb. 247; Daviess Co. v. Dickinson, 117 lb. 657; Cagwin v. Hancock, 84 N. Y. 532; Concord v. Robinson, 121 U. S. 165 ; Williams v. Roberts, 88 111. 11; Hudson v. Wins- low, 35 N. J. L. 437; Gould v. Ster- ling, 23 N. Y. 464; Stariu v. Genoa, 23 lb. 452; People v. Mead, 36 lb. 224; Buchanan v. Litchfield, 102 TJ. S. 278; Northern Bank v. Porter Tp., 110 lb. 608; Dixon v. Field, 111 lb. 88. 380 ■• Sherrard v. Lafayette Co., 3 Dil- lon, 236; Bissellv. Kankakee, 64111. 249; Middleport v. ^tna, etc., Co., 82 lb. 562; Gaddis v. Eichmond, 92 lb. 119; Douglas v. Niantic Sav. Bk., 97 lb. 228; Lewis v. Bourbon Co., 12 Kan. 186; Belo v. Forsyth Co., 76 N. C. 489; State v. Green Co., 54 Mo. 540. 5 Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall. 283 ; Flagg V. Palmyra, 33 Mo. 440; Ken- nicott V. Wayne Co., 16 Wall. 452; Burr V. Chariton Co., 2 McCray, 604. 6 Norton v. Shelby Co., 118 U. S. 425; Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall. 684. ' Alvord V. Syracuse Sav. Bk., 98 N. T. 599. CH. XI.J MUNICIPAL SECURITIES. §196 the money received for them,^ by provision for funding,^ or by receiving an outstanding bond and issuing another in its place.' When the bonds were issued in payment of a subscription to the stock of a railroad, the municipal corporation was held to be estopped if it retained the company's stock,* although the bonds contained no recital of a compliance with the conditions, and although the interest had never been paid.^ Delay in resorting to legal remedies for voiding the bonds, or for restraining their negotiation, is also a circumstance from which the municipality may be estopped. Thus, where the issue of the bonds had not been enjoined for more than two years after the election and the placing of the bonds in the market, this delay was held to be material as bearing on the question of the estoppel." Payment of one year's interest is not sufiBcient, in the absence of other acts, to constitute an es- toppel.'^ Misconduct on the part of municipal officers, such as fraud or embezzlement, not involving the question of the legal power of the municipality to issue the bonds, cannot be set up as a defence against a lona fide holder without notice.^ And although laches on the part of the town may estop it, when de- fending a suit brought by a hona fide holder,^ yet, if it seeks the aid of a court of equity to have a bond reformed, which had been, through the negligence of its own officers, erroneous- ly executed, the town will be entitled to relief, as against a 1 Bennington v. Park, 50 Vt. 178; Shoemaker v. Goshen, 14 Ohio St. 569; State v. Van Home, 7 lb. 327, 331; Steines v. Franklin Co., 48 Mo. 167; New Haven, etc., Co. v. Chat- ham, 42 Conn. 465; People v. Cline, 63 111. 394; Marshall Co. v. Schenck, 5 Wall. 772, 781 ; Rogers v. Burling- ton, 3 lb. 654, 667; Portsmouth Bk. V. Springfield, 4 Fed. Eep. 276; Moulton V. Evansville, 25 Fed. Hep. 382; Ray Co. v. Van Sycle, 96 U. S. 675; McKee v. Vernon Co., 3 Dill. 210; Munson v. Lyons, 12 Blatchf. 539; Lulingv. Racine, 1 Biss. 314. 2 State v. Wilkinson, 20 Neb. 610. 3 Johnson v. Stark Co., 24 111. 75. * Third Nat. Bk. v. Seneca Falls, 15 Fed. Rep. 783; Whiting v. Potter, 2 Fed. Rep. 517. 5 Pendleton Co. v. Amy, 13 Wall. 297. « Anderson Co. v. Beal, 113 U. S. 227. 'Mertz V. Cook, 108 N. T. 505; Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655. 8 Butler V. Dunham, 27 111. 474; East Lincoln v. Davenport, 94 U. S. 801; Johnson Co. v. Thayer, 94 lb. 631; Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall. 355; Railroad Co. v. Otoe Co., 1 Dill. 338; Belo v. Forsythe Co., 76 N. C. 489; Black v. Cohen, 52 Ga. 621; Lane v. Schomp, 20 N. J. Eq. 982. » Marshall Co. v. Schenk, 5 Wall. 781 ; Meyers v. Muscatine, 1 lb. 384. 381 §196 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. XI. holder having notice of the error, although suit was not brought until several years after the mistake had been discovered.^ When the bonds, the ordinance w^hich authorizes their issue,^ or the corporation minutes,^ import by recitals a compliance with the requirements of the law, a bona fide holder is not obliged to look further for the proof of the performance or observance of the conditions required.* But wherever a statute expressly declares bonds to be absolutely void, unless the conditions un- der whichthey are issued are performed, recitals have no bind- ing force as estoppels.^ A recital in a bond, that it is issued under authority of an act, has been held to estop the munici- pality from showing, as against a bona fide holder, that the road was not completed in time ; ® and this is the effect of such a reci- tal, even when the statute expressly says the bonds shall not be valid until all conditions are complied with.^ Bonds, which appear by their recitals to have been issued under a law, which had been repealed, will be valid if they have been issued in substantial compliance with other statutory provisions then in force.^ The recitals in such a case furnish no aid to the holder. 1 Essex V. Day, 52 Conn. 483. '■' Gause v. Clarksville, 1 McCrary, 78. 8 Aberdeen v. Sykes, 59 Miss. 236. * Barnett v. Denison, 145 U. S. 135 ; National Bank v. Grenada, 41 Fed. 87; 48 Fed. 278; Knox Co. v. Aspin- wall, 21 How. 545 ; Moran v. Miami, 2 Black, 722; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 203 ; Rogers v. Burlington, 3 lb. 354; Brown v. Milliken, 23 Pac. 167; 42 Kan. 769; Lexington v. But- ler, 14 Wall. 284; Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 lb. 372; Township v. Bernards, 133 U. S. 523; Moultrie v. Savings Bank, 92 lb. 631; Randolph Co. V. Post, 93 lb. 502; Cass Co. v. Johnston, 95 lb. 360; Hacket v. Ot- tawa, 99 lb. 86; Schuyler Co. v. Thomas, 93 lb. 169; Fulton v. River- ton, 44 jSr. W. R. 257; 42 Minn. 395; Leavenworth Co. v. Barnes, 94 U. S. 70; Douglas Co. v. Bolles, 94 lb. 154; Coler V. Richland, (N. D. 93) 55 N. W. R. 587: Pendleton v. Amy, 13 Wall. 305 ; Rock Creek v. Strong, 96 U. S. 227; San Antonio v. Mehaffy, 382 96 lb. 313; Pompton v. Cooper Un., 101 lb. 204; Harter v. Kenochan, 103 lb. 562 ; Bonham v. Needles, 103 lb. 648; Buchanan v. Litchfield, 102 lb. 278; Am. L. I. Co. v. Bruce, 105 lb. 328 ; Nor. Bank v. Porter, 110 lb. 608; Walnut V. Wade, 103 lb. 683; Clay Co. V. Savings Society, 104 lb. 579; Meyer v. Brown, 65 Cal. 583; Lane V. Embden, 72 Me. 354; Moulton v. Evansville, 25 Fed. Rep. 382; Smith v. Clark Co., 54 Mo. 58; Narment v. Charlotte Co., 85 N. C. 387; Belo v. Forsythe Co., 76 lb. 489; contra, Comm. Bank of Commerce v. Gren- ada, 44 Fed. 262; Spitzer v. Blanch- ard, 46 N. W. R. 400; 82 Mich. 234. 6 German Sav. Bk. v. Franklin, 128 U. S. 526; Anthony v. Jasper Co., 4 Dill. 136. ^ Oregon v. Jennings, 119 TJ. S. 74. ' Am. L. Ins. Co. v. Bruce, 105 U. S. 328. ' Johnson Co. v. January, 94 U. S. 202; Anderson Co. v. Beal, 113 U. S. 237. CH. XI.] MUNICIPAL SECURITIES. §196 and he must show that the provisions of the law which were enacted for his protection have been observed ; ^ but he is not estopped by a recital, that a bond was issued under a special act, from showing that it was voted for and issued under a general law.^ The particular form, which the recitals assume, is not material provided they are couched in terms that will give the holder to understand that the bonds have been issued legally.^ But a statement, that a subscription was authorized by stat- ute and that the sum mentioned in the bonds was part of it, does not constitute a recital that the bonds were issued in pur- suance of the statute.* So, a recital that bonds were issued in pursuance of law will not estop the municipal corporation from showing that it did not have the necessary population required by the act, as a condition precedent to the creation of the debt.^ A recital, that the consent of the taxpayers, as expressed by written assent or petition filed, was properly obtained, — when made by the proper officials, — is conclusive, as against the bona fide holders of the bonds.® It has been held that municipal corporations may be estopped by recitals in bonds, that the amount of the bonds issued is not in excess of the statutory limit of indebtedness.'^ But where 1 Crow V. Oxford Tp., 119 U. S. 215; Gilson v. Dayton, 123 lb. 59. 2 Kinth Nat. Bk. v. Knox Co., 37 Fed. Eep. 75. 8 Sch. Dis. V. Stone, 106 TJ. S. 183. " It is not necessary Uiat the recital should enumerate each particular fact essential to the existence of the obligation. A general statement, that the bonds have been issued in conformity with the law, will suffice so as to embrace every fact which the officers making the statement are authorized to determine and satis- fy." Dixon Co. V. Field, 111 U. S. 83; Marcy v. Oswego Tp., 92 lb. 637; Douglas Co. .V. Bolles, 94 lb. 104; Marion Co. v. Clark, 94 lb. 278; Pana V. Bowler, 107 lb. 529; Liebman v. San Francisco, 24 Fed. Eep. 705 ; ShurtlefE v. "Wiscasset, 74 Me. 130; contra, Bk. of Commerce v. Grenada, 44 Fed. Eep. 262. ♦Carroll Co. v. Smith, 111 U. S. 556; Bolton v. Board, 1 Bradw. 193; Woodruff v. Okalona, 57 Miss. 806. 6 Kelly v. Milan, 21 Fed. Eep. 842. 6 Venice v. Murdock, 92 U. S. 494; Society for Savings v. New London, 29 Conn. 174; Evansville etc. Co. v. Evansville, 15 Ind. 395; Knox Co. v. Nichols, 14 Ohio St. 260. The New York cases contra of Starin v. Genoa, 23 N. T. 439, and Gould v. Sterling, 23 lb. 456, are in conflict with all the decisions of the Federal couits and with decisions in other State courts upon this point. 'Humboldt v. Long, 92 U. S. 642; Concord v. Portsmoutli Sav. Bank, 92 lb. 625 ; Marcy v. Oswego, 92 lb. 637; Wilson v. Salamanca, 99 lb. 499; Dallas Co. v. McKensie, 110 lb. 686; New Providence v. Halsey, 117 lb. 836; Darlington v. La Clede, 4 Dill. 200. 383 §196 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CU. XI. limitations upon municipal indebtedness exist, the question is often a mixed one of law and fact, so complicated tliat it is difficult to give any rule, which will be universally applicable. Since such limitations are imposed by statute, they are con- structively known to hona fide holders, and no mere acquies- cence or assent, aside from recitals in the bonds, will estop the city.^ But when the facts are in question, they are not pre- sumed to be within the knowledge of all ; and particularly, when the limit is of legislative creation and the Legislature has con- stituted a board to determine if its limit has been exceeded, its findings as to facts are conclusive.^ The views, above enunciated, hardljr represent the condition of the law now ; as, although not perhaps overruled, there has been a departure from these principles by tlie Supreme Courts of the United States and of the States, and a distinction is made between cases where the limitation is of a constitutional, as distinct from a statutory, character.^ In a recent case, where the recitals showed the amount of the indebtedness, and that all the provisions of the law had been complied with, the munici- pality was not estopped to question their truth, when the bonds caused a constitutional limit of indebtedness to be exceeded.* ^ Daviess Co. v. Dickinson, 117 U. S. 657; McPherson v. Foster, 43 Iowa, 48; Masher v. Ind. Sch. Dis., 44 Iowa, 122; comp. Mer. Bk. v. Ber- gen Co., 115 U. S. 384. - Oregon Co. v. Jennings, 119 IT. S. 74; Sherman Co. v. Simons, 109 lb. 735. In the latter case the court said: "Every prerequisite fact to the execution and issue of the bonds was of a nature tliat required exam- ination and decision. The existence of sufBcient taxable property to war- rant tlie amount of the subscription and issue was no more essential to the exercise of the authority con- ferred upon the board of county commissioners than was the peti- tion for the election, or the fact that fifty freeholders had signed, or that three fifths of the legal voters had voted for the subscription. These are all extrinsic facts bearing not so 384 much upon the authority vested in the board to issue the bonds, as upon the question whether it should be ex- ercised. They are all by the statute referred to the inquiry and determi- nation of the board, and they were all determined before the bonds and coupons came into the hands of the plaintiff." Affirming Marcy v. Oswe- go Tp., 92 U. S. 637; Buchanan v. Litchfield, 102 U. S. 278. ^ Cummins v. Lawrence Co., 46 Jf. W. Rep. 184. * Lake Co. v. Graham, 130 U. S. 674; Dixon v. Field, 111 U. S. 83; distinguishing Marcy v. Oswego, 92 U. S. 637; and holding^ public record of assessment notice to all parties; Buchanan V. Litchfield, 192 U. S. 278; Northern Bk. v. Porter, 110 U. S. 608; Potter V. Chaffee Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 614; Lake Co. v. BoUins, 130 U. S. 662; Lake Co. v. Graham, 130 lb. CH. XI.] MUNICIPAL SEOUEITIES. §197 Constitutional limitations of this character have been regarded as so necessary to the protection of public interests, that in many States the courts have felt a great hesitancy in taking a posi- tion which would have the effect of nullifying these safeguards. And here, too, where the recital is that the bonds are issued in pursuance of law or in conformity with law, the facts involved in the question, whether the constitutional or statutory limita- tion has been exceeded, are usually matter of record of which all have constructive notice, and which is conclusive on all. It should also be observed that the amount of municipal in- debtedness as well as the amount of assessed valuation is easy of ascertainment, the bonds frequently showing on their face the total amount of the whole issue, making the calculation of the ratio it bears to the valuation a comparatively easy matter.^ § 197. Renewal — Funding. — When a municipal corporation has, for its own advantage, issued new bonds, and recalled its old bonds which are outstanding, it is estopped from urging the defences, which coald have been interposed in suits on the original obligations ; unless, of course, they have been actually declared invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction. If bonds have been judicially declared invalid, the corporation has no general authority to issue others in their stead ; but if new bonds are specially authorized in order to fund the city debt, the obli- gation on the prior invalid bonds will be a sufficient considera- tion for the new bonds.^ The creditor, who has accepted a less valuable security in place of his original bond, has a right to assume that his debtor has waived all defences which he might have originally made, in consideration of the benefit conferred in the exchange.'* The power to issue bonds implies the power to issue other bonds in renewal or redemption of the old bonds,* and it has been held 674; Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. St. 338; East St. Louis v. People, 12^ m. 055. 1 Dixon Co. V. Field, 111 F. S. 83. 2 Hill V. Peekskill, 101 K. T. 490. 'Chandler v. Attica, 18 Fed. Eep. 299; Jasper Co. v. Ballou, 103 U. S. 745; Little Rock v. Mer. N. Bank, 98 lb. 308; Aroma v. Auditor, 15 Fed. Eep. 843; Moultrie v. Eockingham 25 etc. Bank, 92 U. S. 631; Maroy v. Oswego, 92 lb. 637; Warren Co. v. Marcy, 97 lb. 97. * Sullivan v. Walton, 20 Fla. 552; Portland Sav. Bk. v. Evansville, 25 Fed. Eep. 389; Galena v. Corwith, 48 111. 423; Lynde v. Winnebago, 16 Wall. 6; McKee v. Vernon Co., 3 Dill. 210. 385 §199 MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS. [CH. XI. that, since such issue does not create any new debt, it need not be submitted to a popular vote, where such vote is required.^ The holder of the new bonds may avail himself of the same remedies as the holder of the old ; ^ and should they prove in- valid, he may sue on the original bonds although the)' have been canceled.^ § 1 98. Disposal and sale of bonds. — Municipal bonds may be disposed of through an agent ; * but a prohibition against selling bonds below par will prevent the allowance of any re- bate or commission to the purchaser.^ When the authority to dispose of bonds to the best advantage is conferred, and the proceeds are to be invested in stock, the bonds may be delivered to the companjr in exchange for stock.^ It has been held that a donation of the bonds, issued to aid a railroad, may be made to the company where the city was em- powered " to dispose of bonds to the best advantage but not for less than par ; " ^ but if the company sells the bonds below par, when the statute forbade their sale on such terms, the subscrip- tion may be rescinded, and the bonds unsold and the par value of those sold maj' be recovered.^ Such a condition is usually a condition precedent.^ But if the city or county, which issued the bonds, received their par value, it cannot defend against a bona fide holder, by showing that the company to which they were delivered, sold them below par.^* Under an authority to issue bonds at six per cent, bonds may be issued at five per cent and sold below par,ii although the requirement of the statute, au- thorizing the issue, is that they be sold at par. § 199. Statute of Limitations The Statute of Limitations applies to municipal bonds ; and since the bond and coupon are contracts of equal dignity and of the same legal character. 1 Blanton v. McDowell Co., 101 N. C. 532. •i People V. Llppincott, 91 111. 193. ^Dego V. Otoe Co., 37 Fed. Rep. 247; Gause v. Clarksville, 1 McCrary 78; Plattsraoutli v. Fitzgerald, 10 Neb. 401. * Cushman v. Carver, 19 Minn. 295. ^Whelen's App., 108 Pa. St. 162. « Foote V. Hancock, 15 Blatclif . 343. 'Queensbury v. Culver, 19 Wall. 83. 386 ' Lawrence Co. App., 67 Pa. St. 87; Same v. N. W. R. R. Co., 32 lb. 144. 'Adams v. Lawrence Co., 2 Pitts. R. 60; Com. v. Allegheny Co., 32 Pa. St. 218; Armstrong Co. v. Brinton, 47 lb. 367; Omaha Nat. Bank v. Omaha, 15 Neb. 333; Newark v. Elli- ott, 5 Ohio St. 114. i» Woods v. Lawrence Co., 1 Black. 386. " Omaha Bank v. Omaha, 15 Neb. 333. CH. XI.] MUNICIPAL SECURITIES. §199 the same period will apply to both. So, it has been held that, when a suit for the interest cannot be maintained on the cou- pon because of the lapse of the statutory time, it cannot be recovered by suing for the same interest on the bond.^ When a note or bond is payable in instalments, the statute begins to ]un against each instalment from the time the instalment ma- tures ; and, although it has been held that interest is a mere incident of the debt, is inseparable from it and may be recov- ered in the same suit with the debt ; ^ yet, in the case of coupon bonds, since the promise to pay interest takes the form of a distinct negotiable instrument ; and such coupon may, and of- ten is, separated from the bond, the statute runs against each coupon, as it matures.^ The statute may be prevented from running bj' a legislative recognition of the debt.* A railroad company, suing to obtain possession of bonds is- sued in its aid, but which has been returned to the municipality by the State official who was authorized to deliver them to the lailroad company, is barred by laches which extends over a period of thirteen years.^ ■ Griffin v. Macon Co., 36 Fed. Kep. 885. 2 Grafton Bk. v. Doe, 19 Vt. 463; Ferry v. Ferry, 2 Cush. 92. 'Kenosha v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 477; Lexington v. Butler, 14 lb. 282; Clark V. Iowa City, 20 lb. 583. njnderhill v. Sonora, 17 Cal. 172; Fort Scott V. Hickman, 112 U. S. 150. 6 Toung V. Clarendon Tp., 26 Fed. Kep. 895. Note. — It is manifest tliat, in this chapter, the attempt is not made to include a full and complete discussion of the law of coraraercial paper, particularly, in setting forth what defences can avail against a bona fide holder, or when one can -claim the protection of a bona fide holder. Noth- ing more is attempted here than to give a statement of those cases, in which the defences have particular reference to municipal and coupon bonds, and refer the reader to the special works on commercial paper for a discussion of the whole subject. 387 CHAPTER XII. ItlGHT OF MtrmCIPAL CORPORATIONS TO OWN AND CONTROL PROPERTY. Section. 200 — Eight of municipal corpora- tions to acquire property. 201 — Real estate beyond corporate limits. 202 — ^Donations of land to a mu- nicipal corporation. 203 — Power of municipal corpora- tions to serve as trustee of a charitable use. 204 — ^Devises and grants for ob- jects foreign to corporate purposes. 205 — Gifts or grants to unincorpo- rated communities. Section. 206 — Interference by State courts in performance of trusts by municipal corporations. 207 — Invalid grants to municipal corporations, how invali- dated. 208 — Power of alienation. 209 — Power to mortgage. 210 — Power to lease corporate property. 211 — ^Requisites of conveyances by municipal corporations. 212 — Sale of corporate property on execution — Liability for debts. § 200. Right of municipal corporations to acquire prop- erty. — The English statute of mortmain was primaiily enacted for the purpose of restraining private civil and eleemosynary corporations from acquiring lands ; and, at first, the statutes were uot made applicable to cities ; presumably, on the ground that the same objection to the acquisition of lauds did not obtain to cities, as to religious and other private corporations. A cen- tury later, there was a direct prohibition of the acquisition of such lands by municipal corporations.^ But, independently of the statutes of mortmain and at the common law, corporations, both public and private, are authorized to take,hold or dispose of lands for any purposes which are not inconsistent with the object of their creation.^ The English statute of mortmain will not be enforced in this country, except in pursuance of some ex- press legislation.^ And hence the municipal corporation has in 1 Mereweth. & Steph. Hist. Corp. 389, "702; per Justice Campbell, Mc- Donough Will Case, 15 How. 404-407. 2 1 Wash. Real Prop. (4th ed.) 50, pi. 26; Sutton V. Cole, 3 Mass. 239; 388 1 Blacks. Cora. 475, 478; 1 Kyd. 108. 8 Peri n v. Carey, 24 How. 465 (1860) ; Davidson College v. Cham- ber's Executors, 3 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 253 (1857) ; 2 Kent Com. 282, 283 CH. XII.J MUNICIPALITY AS PEOPRIETOE. § 200 this country the implied power, in the absence of restrictions of charter or statute, to purchase and hold all such real estate as may be necessary or reasonably subservient to the attainment of the objects which are intrusted to such corporation.^ It is not necessary, therefore, that there should be any express grant of power to the municipal corporation, in order to hold or ac- quire lands, for the purposes for which the corporation was cre- ated, or to enable it to carry out some express power. As, for example, where a municipal corporation is given the power to establish a market, it has the implied power to purchase the land that may be needed for the erection and maintenance of such a market.^ The charter, or the general laws under which the municipal corporation has been created, are the source of power of such corporations in every case ; and while the im- plied power exists, as just explained, in the absence of any ex- press provisions of the charter, or of the general law under which municipal corporations are formed ; yet, where there are special provisions governing the matter, either in restraining or enlarg- ing or specifying the scope of the powers of such corporation, then these limitations or express provisions will supersede the implied powers of acquisition, and control the determination of the scope of power of the municipal corporation in such mat- Chambers V. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543, 575; Dodge v. "Williams, 46 Wis. 70; Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 591; Gould V. Taylor Orphan Asylum, lb. 106; Downing v. Marshall, 23 N. Y. 392; Page v. Heineberg, 40 Vt. 81. 'West Chi. Park Com'rs v. Mc- MuUen, 25 N. E. K. 676; Proprietors of Jeffries Neck v. Inhabitants, (Mass. 90) 26 N. E. K. 239; Keynold's Heirs v. Stark County Com'rs etc., 5 Ohio, 204; Corinth v. Locke, 62 Vt. 411; Coleman v. San Kafael Turn- pike Co., 49 Cal. 517; Root v. Shields, Woolw. C. C. 340; McCartee v. Or- phan Soc. of N. Y., 9 Cow. 437; Peru Iron Co., In re, 7 Cow. 540, 552; Leeds v. Richmond, 102 Ind. 372; Ketclmm v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 356, 360; Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543, 573, 576; State v. Mansfield Com'rs, 23 IS". J. L. 510; Nicoll v. N". Y. & E. E. R. Co., 12 N. Y. (2 Kern.) 121 ; Rensselaer etc. R. E. Co. v. Da- vis, 43 N. Y. 137; State v. Brown, 27 N". J. L. 13; Davidson College v. Chambers' Executors, 3 Jones Eq. (N". C.) 253; Lester v. Jackson, 11 So. 114; 69 Miss. 887. Cf. Young v. Board of Commissioners, 51 Fed. R. 580. 2 Ketohum v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 356; Le Couteulx V. Buffalo, 33 N". Y.333; Paterson v. Mayor, 17 N. Y. 449. But, on the other hand, if the power be given to the corporation to enter into a contract for the supply of water to the city, it has been held in California that there is no implied power to purchase a site upon which to erect the waterworks. People v. McClintock, 45 Cal. 11. 389 201 MUNICIPAL COBPOEATIONS. [CH. xn. ters.^ But in every case, in the absence of express provisions in such charter, or in the general laws of the State, a general authority to purchase and hold property is invariably construed to mean for purposes authorized bj'' the charter, and to prohibit the purchase of lands merely for thfc purpose of investment or speculation.^ Municipal corporations may likewise claim the right of apro- j)rietor, in regard to alluvium which may be formed within corporate limits and on land, the title to which is in the city.' So, likewise, vfhere the municipal corporation has the title to a water front, it has the same powers in regard to the grant of wharf privileges, as a private owner would have.* § 201. Real estate beyond corporate limits. — Inasmuch as a municipal corporation is a governmental institution, designed to create a local government over a limited territory, it is laid down as the general rule, that a municipal corporation cannot purchase and hold real estate, located beyond its territorial limits, unless such power is expressly conferred by the Legisla- ture.^ And while this is the general rule, yet there are some purposes, promoting the public welfare, which are intrusted to a municipal corporation, and which cannot be attained except by 1 Bouham v. Taylor, 16 S. W. K. 555; Kingman v. Brockton, (Mass.) 26 N. E. R. 998; Lauenstein v. Fond du Lac, 28 Wis. 336; State v. Nash- ville Univ., 4 Hump. 157; State v. Madison, 7 Wise. 688 ; Heyward v. Mayor, etc. of New York, 7 N. T. 314; Beaver Dam v. Frings, 17 Wis. 398. estate V. Natal, 41 La. Ann. 887; Crawfordsville v. Braden, 28 N. E. K. 389; Springfield v. Fulraer, (Utah) 27 Pac. R. 577 ; Keller v. Wilson, (Ky. ) 14 S. W. R. 332; McCartee v. Orphan Asylum, 9 Cow. (N. Y.)437: Bank v. Niles, 1 Doug, (Mich.) 401; Davidson College V. Chambers' Executors, 3 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 253; Champaign v. Harmon, 98 111. 491 ; Cf. contra, Mu- nicipality v. McDonough, 2 Rob. (La.) 244; Corinth v. Locke, 62 Vt. 411. 390 ' Clarke v. Providence, (R. I.) 15 Atl. R. 763; Leonard's Heirs v. Baton Rouge, 4 So. R. 241; Beaufort v. Duncan, 1 Jones (N. C.) Law, 234; Remy v. Municipality, 11 La. An. 148; St. Louis v. Lemp, 93 Mo. 477; Carrollton K. R. Co. v. Winthrop, 5 La. An. 36; Richardson v. Boston, 24 How. (U. S.) 188; Kennedy v. Muuic- ipality, 10 La. An. 54; see post, § 225. * Leonard's Heirs v. Baton Rouge, supra ; Illinois v. Illinois etc. Co., 33 Fed. R. 730; Dana v. Jackson, etc. Co., 31 Cal. 118; Bell v. Gough, 23 N. J. L. 624. 5 Bullock V. Curry, 2 Met. (Ky.) 171; Riley v. Rochester, 9 N. Y. (5 Seld.) 64 ; Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 320; Girard v. New Or- leans, 2 La. An. 897; Chambers v.' St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543; Concord v. Boseawen, 17 N. H. 465. CH. xn.] MUNICIPALITY AS PBOPRIETOR. § 202 the acquisition and ownership of lands beyond the city limits ; as, for example, where it is desired to establish a pest-house or cemetery ; and, in some cases, waterworks. In these cases, it has been held that it is possible for the municipal corporation, for buch purposes, to purchase lands beyond the city limits, without any express authority therefor from the Legislature. And not only is it held that they may purchase lands beyond the city limits, within the same State in which the city is situated ; but even in other adjacent States, provided the laws of the State, in which the land is situated, did not restrain such a purchase or acquisition of the land by a foreign municipal corporation. ^ Where foreign territory, or land beyond the city limits, has been acquired by a municipal corporation. Judge Cooley states that the city will hold such land without its limits for a park, " not in its public capacity as an agency of the government, and subject to the unrestricted control of the State, but as a corporate individual, having private rights of its own, which it is at liberty to enjoy undisturbed by the State, and in the enjoyment of which the constitution will-protect its people." ^ § 202. Donations of laud to a municipal corporation. — Municipal corporations ma}', like any other class of legal per- sonalities, be the object of both public and private bounty. The duties of a municipal corporation are varied in character; in carrying such purposes into effect, means are needed, and, in order to attain such purposes, they aie authorized to receive such means not only by taxation and the incurment of debt, but may, likewise, receive legacies of personal property, grants and devises of lands, as long as special restrictions upon the power of such a corporation are not imposed by statute.^ In 1 Lester v. Jackson, 11 So. 114; 69 Miss. 887; McDonough Will Case, 15 How. (U. S.) 567; Banlc of Augusta v. Eaile, 13 Pet. 519, 584; Runyan v. Cos- ter's Lessee, 14 Pet. 122; Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 542, 574, 575; See- bold V. Shitler, 34 Pa. St. 133. ^Thompson V. Moran, 44 Mich. 602; Lester v. Jackson, (Miss. 92) 11 So. K. 114. * Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543, 574; Franklin's Admr. v. Phila- delphia, 18 Pa. Co. Ct. E. 241; 2 Pa. Dist. E. 435; Sears v. Chapman, (Mass. 93) 33 N. E. E. 604; Perin v. Carey, 24 How. 465 ; In re Gehrig Est., 27 N. E. E. 784 (N. T.) ; Skinner v. Har- rison Tp., (Ind.) 18 K. E. E. 529 ; Brown V. Brown, 7 Oreg. 285; Bunbar v. Soule, 129 Mass. 284; Green v. Hogan, (Mass.) 27 N. E. E. 413; Sargent v. Cornish, 54 N. H. 18 ; Hamden v. Eice, 24 Conn. 350; Coggeshall v. Pelton, 7 Jolins. (N. T.) Ch. 292; Davis v. Barnstable, (Mass.) 28 N. E. E. 165. 391 §203 MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS. [CH. xn. New York, the Statute of Wills does prohibit bodies politic and corporate from taking the real estate directly. And in order that such bodies may acquire any benefit from such a devise, it must be made a trust for their benefit,^ except where a spe- cial statute has authorized such direct acquisition of lands. But where the statute authorizes a corporation to take lands " by direct purchase or otherwise," it is held that such a corpora- tion has the authority to take lands by will.^ Municipal cor- porations, however, seem to be generally authorized to accept donations of lands both by grant and by devise. It is thus a very common occurrence for private individuals to make dona- tions of lands by grant or by will for the service of public and charitable purposes, for the establishment of schoolhouses, city halls, libraries, and the like ; and no objection is raised to the acceptance by the corporation of such donations.^ It has been held that a city may take and receive real and personal prop- erty, iu order to provide for the development of a coal mine located near the city limits.* In this case of special donations to the city for special pur- poses, the property is taken by the citj' in trust for the purpose for which the donations have been made, and it is impossible for the land so conveyed to be devoted to any other use but that for which it was intended. It is very different where cor- porations purchase the land for specific purpose, and when the power of alienation has not been interfered with.^ § 203. Power of municipal corporations to serve as trus- tee of a cliaritaWe use. — The general rule has already been stated in a previous paragraph, in respect to the power of a ' McCartee v. Orphan Asylum So- ciety, 9 Cow. (N". Y.) 437; Auburn Tlieol. Sem. v. Childs, 4 Paige (N. Y.) Ch. 418. 2 In re Huss, 27 ]>?". E. E. 781, 784; Fosdick V. Hempstead, 125 N. Y. 581 ; 26 ]Sr. E. E. 801; Fox's Will, 52 N. Y. 530; s. c, 94 U. S. 315; Downing v. Marshall, 23 N. Y. 366; Kerr v. Dougherty, 79 N. Y. 327. s Succession of Vance, (La. 90) 2 So. E. 54; Skinner V. Harrison, (lud.) 18 N. E. E. 529; Piper v. Moulton, 72 Me. 155; Heyward v. Mayor etc. of 392 New York, 7 N. Y. 314; jSTicoll v. N. Y. & E. E. E. Co., 12 3Sr. Y. 121; Le Couteulx V. Buffalo, 33 N". Y. 333; People V. Mauran, 5 Denio (N. Y.) 389; Davis v. Barnstable, (Mass.) 28 N. E. E. 105 ; Page v. Heineberg, 40 Vt. 81; Fernch v. Quincy, 3 Allen (Mass.) 9; Green v. Hogan, 27 N. E. E. 413; Kelly v. Kennard, 60 N. H. 1; Jackson v. Pike, 9 Cow. (JST. Y.) 61; State V. Atkison, 24 Vt. 448. * Delaney v. Salina, 34 Kan. 532. i" Beach v. Haynes, 12 Vt. 15; State V. Woodward, 23 Vt. 92. CH. XII.] MTJNICIPALITy AS PEOPKIETOE. §203 municipal corporation to acquire and hold property of any sort ; viz., for purposes, which were in contemplation in the establish- ment of a municipal corporation, and which are not foreign to the object of such incorporation. Or, to use the language of Judge Dillon, " municipal corporations are capable, unless specially restrained, of taking property for any purpose whicli is germane to the objects of the corporation." ^ Not only is this the case, where the property is directly granted to the mu- nicipal corporation for its own special benefit, but also where such property, both real and personal, is devised or granted to a municipal corporation in trust for some public charity or elee- mosynary object, of such a character as would involve aid to the corporation in the performance of its own public duties. A municipal corporation cannot serve as a trustee of a private trust, however worthy such ti;}ist may be. But a trust, estab- lished for the benefit of the poor in general, or for the people of a community included in the municipality, is held to be with- in the powers of a municipal corporation, and a court will not interfere with the performance of such a trust by the municipal corporation.^ In illustration of the power of a municipal cor- 12 Dillon's Mun. Corp. § 567. 2 Succession of Vance, 2 So. E. 54; Miller v. Leroh, 1 Wall. Jr. (U. S. C. C.) 210; Webb v. Neal, 5 Allen (Mass.) 575; Philadelphia v. Elliott, 3 Eawle, 170; Girard's Will, 2 La. An. 898; Vidal v. Philadelphia, 2 How. 127; Jackson v. Hartwell, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 422; Bell County v. Alexan- der, 22 Texas, 350; Barkley v. Don- nelly, (Mo. 92) 19 S. W. E. 305 ; Girard V. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1; Chambers V. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543; Orford Union Cong. Soc. v. West Cong. Soc, 55 N. H. 463; Phillips Acad. Trs. v. King, 12 Mass. 546; Pickering v. Shotwell, 10 Pa. 27; McDonough Will Case, 15 How. 367. But see Fosdick V. Hempstead, 125 N. Y. 581; 26 N. E. E. 801; Gillespie's Appeal, 30 W. N. C. 337; Franklin's Trust, 24 Atl. E. 626; Daily v. New Haven, 60 Conn. 314; Mr. Justice Sharswood, in the leading case, in- volving a construction of the grant by Mr. Girard of a trust to the city of Philadelphia, describes the pow- ers of municipal coi-porations, to serve as trustees in public or chari- table. trusts, as follows: "It could hardly be pretended, I think, in this country, that it could be a trustee for the separate use of a married woman, to educate the children of a donor or testator, or to accumulate for the benefit of particular persons. It certainly is not compellable to ex- ecute such trusts, nor does it seem competent to accept and administer them. The trusts held by the city of Philadelphia, which are enumer- ated in the bill before us, are ger- mane in their objects. They are charities, and all charities are in some sense public. If the trust is for any particular persons, it is not a charity. Indefiniteness is of its essence. The objects to be benefit- 393 § 203 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XII. poiation to serve as trustee of a public trust, it may be'^further stated that it has been held that a city has such a power to ac- cept property, both real and personal, for the education and sup- port of the orphans of a city,i and for the purpose of educating the poor, without cost to them, in the city of New Orleans and Baltimore.^ A similiar donation was sustained in Cincinnati for the establishment and maintenance of two colleges for the educa- tion of boys and girls ; and further, for the suppoi't of the orphans of the poor.^ So, also, did the courts sustain a devise of property to St. Louis, in trust for furthering relief for the poor emigrant travelers coming to St. Louis, on their way hona fide to settle in the west.* In this last case, most of the land composing the trust fund was situated in St. Louis county, outside of the city limits ; and it was held that such property could be taken and held by the city for the purpose of the trust. So, also, jvas a bequest upheld by the city of Philadelphia to purchase or es- tablish and maintain an hospital for the indigent, blind and lame.^ So, likewise, have been upheld bequests to the citizens of the municipality for the purchase of a fire engine:® to a ed are strangers to the donor or tes- tator. The widening and improve- ment of streets and avenues ; planting them with ornamental and shade trees; the education of orphans; the building of schoolhouses; the assist- ance and encouragement of young mechanics; rewarding ingenuity in the useful arts; the establishment and support of hospitals; the dis- tribution of soup, bread or fuel to the necessitous, are objects within the general scope and purpose of the municipality." Philadelphia v. Fox, 04 Pa. St. 169. 1 Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. 127; Periu v. Carey, 24 Ho . 4G5 ; Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1. ■' McBonough Will Case, 15 How. (U. S.) 367; 8 La. An. 171; Girard Heirs v. New Orleans, 2 La. An. 898. 8 Succession of Vance, 2 So. R. 54; Green v. Hogan, 27 N. E. R. 413; Le Couteulx v. Buffalo, 33 N. T. 394 ■333; Dashiell v. Attorney General, 5 Har. & Johns. (Md.) 392; 6 Har. & Johns. (Md.) 1; Castleton v. Lang- don, 19 Vt. 210; Reynolds' Heirs v. Stark County Comm'rs, 5 Ohio, 204; Kelley v. Kennard, 60 N. H. 1; Jack- son v. Pike, 9 Cow. (N. T.) 61 ; State v. Atkinson, 24 Vt. 448; NiooU v. N. Y. & E. R. R. Co., 12 N. T. 121; French v. Quincy, 3 Allen (Mass.) 9; Piper v. Moulton, 72 Me. 155 ; Hey- ward v. Mayor etc. of New York, 7 N. Y. 314; Perin v. Carey, 24 How. 645 ; Tripp v. Frazier, 4 Har. ifc Johns. (Md.) 446; People v. Mauran, 5 De- nio (N. Y.) 389. * Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543. " Philadelphia v. Elliott, 3 Rawle, (Pa.) 170. " Wright V. Linn, 9 Pa. 433; see Kirk V. King, 3 Pa. 436; Tyrone Tp. School Directors v. Benkleberger, 6 Pa. 31. CH. XIJ.] MUNICIPALITY AS PEOPEIETOR. §204 county for the benefit of the public schools,^ and other bequests of a similar nature.^ § 204. Devises and grants for objects foreign to corporate purposes. — But if the devise or grant is for a purpose, which is foreign to the powers of a municipal corporation, the grant or devise cannot be sustained or enforced by the municipal cor- poration. And such attempted devises will be administered by the court of equity, if it is possible for it to do so, and the provisions of the donor carried out by the appointment of a trustee.^ Not only would this rule of limitation, of the power of a municipal corporation to serve as a trustee, apply to cases of purely a private trust ; but, likewise, to a devise or gift to a city, for the purpose of maintaining or establishing some charit- able trust, outside the city limits, for the benefit of people hav- ing no residence permanent, or temporary, within the city ; as, for example, for the erection of a court house or jail for county purposes, or for building a church or schoolhouse. On the other hand, it has been held that the county cannot be charged with the administration of a trust for the erection of a school- house, for the use of the inhabitants of a particular town in that county.* So, also, has it been held that a city is not per- ' Bell County v. Alexander, 22 Tex. 350. ^Southington First Cong. Soc. v. Atwater, 23 Conn. 34. 8 Davis V. Barnstable, 28 N. E. K. 165 (Mass. 91) ; Sloane v. McConahy, 4 Ohio, 157; BuUard v. Sbirley, 153 Mass. 559; So. Newmarket Meth. Sem. Tvs. v. Peaslee, 15 N. H. 317, 331 ; North Hempstead v. Hempstead, 2 Wend. 109; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. V. Carroll, 5 Barb. 613; Coggeshall et al.. New Bochelle Trs. v. Pelton, 7 Johns. Ch. 292; National Bank v. Grenada, 41 Fed. Kep. 87. * Jackson v. Hartwell, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 422; Jackson v. Cory, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 385. " Our laws are full of instances of persons clothed with corporate powers for certain special purposes. The loan officers of a county are a corporation; and could they, as such, receive a grant of land for the use of the town or for a church? Certainly not. Nor can the supervisors of Oneida county take a grant of land for the use of the town of Kome. Such a grant must be deemed void upon every principle, whether we consider the special and definite objects of the corporate capacity in the board of supervisors; whether we consider the power given them by statute to take conveyances of land for the use of the county; or, lastly, whether we i-efer to the incapacity of all cor- porations to hold lands in trust for any other object, than that for which the corporation was created. Whether the court of equity would or would not prevent the trust as to the in- habitants of Kome from failing for want of a trustee is not a question 395 § 205 MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS. [CH. XII. mitted to receive as a trustee a fund for the promotion or sup- port of missionaries.-^ § 205. Gifts or grants to unincorporated commnnities.— It is a well settled rule of the common law, which remains to this day unless modified by statute, that a grant is not valid unless it is made to a definite grantee, who may be identified beyond reasonable doubt by the description of such grantee, contained in the instrument of conveyance. Hence it is nec- essary to the validity of a grant, that it be made either to the natural person, or to the corporation, who is capacitated to take such property either in his or its own right, or as trustee.^ A grant, therefore, to an unincorporated community or body of peo- ple, as for example, to the people of a specific county, which has not been incorporated, is void.* So, likewise, would a res- ervation, in a conveyance to inhabitants of an unincorporated community, be likewise invalid.* And for the same reason it has been held, that a bequest to school commissioners was void, because there was no corporation to whom the bequest was made.^ But the. fact, that a bequest is made to the citizens of an incorporated place, would not of itself affect the validity of the grant, because by that description the court, under the usual liberal rule of construction, would presume that the grantor in- tended thereby the municipal corporation itself, instead of the individual citizens of such corporation, and the form of the de- vise would have no greater effect than a case of mere misnomer of the corporation.^ Where the estate is granted for an unin- corporated community, by the State government itself to two for a court of law (In an action of ejectment) to decide." Per curiam, in Jackson v. Hartwell, 8 Johns. (K. T.) 422. 1 So. Newmarket M. P. T. v. Peas- lee, 15 N. H. 317. But in New Hamp- shire it has been held that the town may be trustee of a fund for the pro- motion and support of religion with- in its limits. Contra, BuUard v. Shir- ley, 27 N. E. R. 766. 2 Jackson v. Cory, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) SS.') ; Jackson v. Hartwell, lb. 422. " Boston Overseers v. Seers, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 122. 396 * Mason v. Muncaster, 9 Wheat. 445; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43, 52 ; Jackson v. Cory, 8 Johns. (Ni Y.) 385; Hornbeck v. Westbrook, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 73; North Hempstead V. Hempstead, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 109, 133. 5 Janey's Executors v. Latene, 4 Leigh, (Va.) 327. 6 Kirk V. King, 3 Pa. St. 436 ; Wright V. Linn, 9 Pa. 433 ; Tyrone Tp. School Directors t. Dunkleberger, 6 Pa. 3. As to name and misnomer see ante, §§ 49, 50. CH. XII.] MXJNICIPALITr AS PEOPEIETOE. § 206 or more persons, who are named as trustees for the benefit of themselves and the inhabitants of the unincorporated town, the grant is nevertheless valid ; because, coming from the supreme power of the State, there would be an implied incorporation of such persons for the purpose of the grant, which without this implication would prove inoperative.^ § 206. Interference by State courts in the performance of trusts by municipal corporations. — A municipal corpora- tion, when acting as a trustee of a fund placed in its charge by a grant or devise, is acting in a fiduciary relation, and thereby takes on a semi-private character, and comes in that relation within the general authority of the court of equity to supervise and inquire into the due administration of the trust. The court of equity has the authority to interfere for the protection of the trust fund in the administration of such trust, whether the trustee be a private person or a municipality. Thus, it has been held in the case of Girard's will, that an act of the Leg- islature, depriving the city of Philadelphia of the power to ad- minister the trust, and vesting such power in an independent and separate, board of trustees, appointed by the court or other- wise than by the city, was valid and constitutionally unobjec- tionable. In pronouncing the opinion of the court in favor of the constitutionality of such interference, Mr. Justice Shars- wood says : " When, therefore, the donors or testators of these charitable funds granted or devised them in trust to the munici- paUty, they must be held to have done so with full knowledge that their trustee so selected was a mere creature of the State, and an agent acting under a revocable power. Substantially, they trusted the good faith of the sovereign. It is plain — too plain, indeed, for aigument — that the corporation, by accepting such trusts, could not thereby invest itself with any immunity from legislative action. Such an act could not change its es- sential nature. It is surely not competent for a mere municipal organization, which is made a trustee of a charity, to set up a vested right in that character to maintain such organization in ' North Hempstead v. Hempstead, 2 Wend. (N. T.) 109, 133 (1828); and see also, Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. (If. Y.) 320; People v. Sohermer- hoin, 19 Barb. 540, 55.5; Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. (N. T.) "706; Jack- son V. Leroy, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 397 ; Bow V. AUentown, 34 N. H. 351, 372; Gi- rard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1; Clark V. Brookfleld, 81 Mo. 503. 397 I 207 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XII. the form in which it exists when the trust was created, and thereby prevent the State from changing it as the public inter- est may require." ^ § 207. Invalid grants to mnnicipal corporations how in- validated. — Where a municipal corporation has taken real es- tate, in cases where it has no authority to acquire and hold such real estate, it is an important inquiry as to the effect of such unauthorized extension of the power of the corporation, not only upon its own title to such property, but also as to the person or persons, who may take advantage of such defect of title, or want of authority, and secure a forfeiture of the real estate, so unlawfully acquined by the corporation. In this con- nection, a distinction is made between the cases in which the city has the power to acquire real estate in general or for cer- tain specific objects, and those in which the corporation is de- nied altogether the power to acquire real estate. Where the corporation is generally forbidden by its charter to purchase as well as to hold land, the deed made to it is then absolutely void. The distinction is made by the court between the pro- hibition to take lands on the one hand, and the prohibition to hold them. And where the prohibition is both against the pur- chase and the taking of the lands, then, presumably in all such cases, the grantor's title to such lands remains unaffected by the conveyance, and the city acquires no title to it whatever.^ But where the municipal corporation has the power to acquire land for purposes germane to its institution, and there is a con- vej'ance or grant of land to such corporation for some purpose not authorized by the charter, either expressly or impliedly, then the title of the grantor is completely transferred, but the mu- nicipal corporation, as grantee, takes the title to such property subject to its being divested at the instance of the State. The State alone can interfere with the enjoyment of the property so acquired by the municipal corporation.^ This explanation of 1 Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 169; see, to same effect, Montpelier V. East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 21; Girard V. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 14. 2 Leazui-e v. Hillegas, 7 Serg. & Eawle (Pa.) 313; see Bank v. Xiles, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 401; Bank v. Poiti- aux, 3 Rand. (Va.) 136. 398 = See Bank of Mich. v. Niles, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 401 ; Bank of Va. v. Poitiaux, 3 Kand. 136; Martin v. Br. Bank, 15 Ala. 587; Baird v. Bank of Wash., 11 Serg. & R. 411; Goudie v. North Water Co., 7 Pa. St. 233; An- gell & Ames Corp., sees. 152, 153; Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543, CH. XII.J MUNICIPALITY AS PEOPEIETOR. § 208 the authority of the grantor, or of the State, to avoid convey- ances or grants of laiid to the municipal corporation, in cases in which the municipal corporation is not authorized to acquire or to hold such lands, must necessarily be applied only to actual purchases of the land. Where there has been a donation of the lands by the private owner or grantor, in trust for purposes which cannot be carried out or performed by the municipal corporation, because such performance is beyond the limitations of its power as a corpo- ration, the consideration for the gift or grant failing, there would necessarily be vested in the grantor the power of avoiding the conveyance ; unless, possibly, where the court of equity takes charge of the trust so created, and which cannot be performed by the corporation, and appoints other trustees in the place of the corporation, who are charged with the duty of carrying out such trust in accordance with the intentions of the donor. Thus, for example, where the gift was made of real estate to tlie town of "Worcester, in consideration of the agreement of the town to support the grantor or donor during the rest of her life, the conveyance was invalid, because of the want of power in the municipal corporation to assume such an obligation ; and for that reason, the grantor was authorized to avoid such conveyance, and it was held that the deed would remain good, until so avoided by the grantor, or by some one in privity with her.i § 208. Power of alienation. — In determining the limitation of the power of a municipal corporation, to dispose absolutely of Alexander v. ToUeston Club of Chi- cago, 110 111. 65; Land v. Coffman, 50 Mo. 243; s. c, 12 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) March (1873), p. 143; Hough V. Cook County Land Co., 73 III. 23; Smith V. Seeley, 12 Wall. 35; Barnes V. Suddard, 117 111. 237; Davidson Col. V. Chambers' Executors, 3 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 253, 258; Myers v. Croft, 13 Wall. 291; Baker v. Neff, 73 Ind. 68; Union Nat. Bk. v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 628; Goudie v. Water Company, 7 Pa. St. 233; Eufaula v. McNab, 67 Ala. 588; Ealey v. Umatilla County, 15 Oreg. 172; Barrow v. Nashville & C. Turnp. Co., 9 Humph. 304; Lea- zure V. Hillegas, 7 Serg. & Kawle (Pa.) 313, 320; Hayward v. Davidson, 41 Ind. 214. ' Inh abitants of Worcester v. Eaton, 13 Mass. 371 ; Parish of Plaquemines V. Fulhouze, 30 La. An. 64; Matthews V. Alexandria, 68 Mo. 115 ; Common- wealth V. Wilder, 127 Mass. 1 ; Ken- nedy V. McElroy, (Ky. 90) 17 S. W. E. 202; Wood v. Hammond, 16 E. I. 89. See also Sears v. Chapman, (Mass. 93) 33 N. E. E. 604. 399 § 208 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. xri. the property, which it has acquired by purchase or by donation, a distinction is made between the property which such corpo- ration acquires or holds in its semi-private capacity, and that which it holds as trustee for some public charity, or which has been donated to some public use. Where the property is of the latter character, i. e., where it is held in trust for some public benefit, or has been donated to public use, such as for public squares and streets, the corporation cannot, without legislative authority, make alienation of the same. In the case of property held in trust, no other disposition can be made whatever ; but in respect to the property which the city owns and which has been donated to public use, alienation can be made only under special legislative authority.^ But the fact, that the corporation has purchased land for a public use, does not in itself make it impossible for the same land to be disposed of by such a corporation. It is not the purchase for a public purpose, but its dedication to the public use, which makes such property inalienable ; so that, if the corporation has purchased such property, and before its dedication to the public use should determine to sell such property, there is no limitation upon the power of the corporation in respect to its sale.^ Where lands are donated to the city in trust for some gen- eral or special purpose, or where the land so conveyed is granted subject to a condition, restraining the use or disposition of such property, the grantor in such cases has the right of securing a forfeiture of the grant for the breach of the condition, or lAlve V. Henderson, 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 131, 168; Macon v. Dasher, (Ga. 93) 16 S. E. E. 75; Mowry v. Providence, (E. I. 91) 16 Atl. E. 511 ; Dubach v. Hannibal, etc. Co., 1 S. W. E. 86; 89 Mo. 483; Lord v. Ocon- to, 47 Wis. 386; Warren Co. Sup. v. Patterson, 56 111. Ill; Augusta v. Perkins, 3 B. Mon. (Ky.) 437; Hoad- ley's Admrs. v. San Francisco, 124 U. S. 639; San Francisco v. Itzell, 80 Cal. 57; Shannon v. O'Boyle, 51 Ind. 565 ; Matthews v. Alexandria, 68 Mo. 115; Meriwether V. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472; Kings County Fire Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 101 N. T. 411; Eoper v. Mc- Whorter, 77 Va. 214; Cummings v. 400 St. Louis, 20 W. E. 130; 90 Mo. 259; Still V. Lansingburgh, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 107; Reynolds v. Stark County, 5 Ohio, 204; Knox County v. Mc- Comb, 19 Ohio St. 320; Newark v. Elliott, 5 Ohio St. 113; Bowlin v. Furman, 28 Mo. 427; Clark v. Provi- dence, 16 Atl. E. 763; Ransom v. Boal, 29 Iowa, 68; Kennedy v. Cov- ington, 8 Dana (Ky.) 50. 2 Fort Wayne v. Lake Shore, etc. Co., (Ind. 93) 32 N. E. E. 215; War- ren V. Patterson, 56 111. Ill; Bushel v. Whitlock, 77 Iowa, 285; 42 N. W. E. 186; State v. Woodward, 23 Vt. 92; Beach v. Haynes, 12 lb. 15; Kon- rad v. Eogers, 70 Wis. 492. CH. XII.] MUNICIPALITY AS PllOPRIETOR. § 210 the violation of the trust. In all such cases, if the grantor waives the performance of the condition, the breach of it is excused, and the title of the purchaser becomes absolute.^ It has been held in Vermont that, where the selectmen of a town are empowered by statute to lease certain glebe lands, the ex- press authority is an implied denial of the power to make an absolute sale of such land, and hence such an absolute convey- ance would be void, conveying no title to the purchaser.^ § 209. Power to mortgage. — Where the property held by a corporation is not charged with a trust, or has not been donated to public use, in the absence of statutory restrictions, the mu- nicipal corporation may mortgage it to secure any debt or obli- gation, which the corporation may have the power to create.^ And so, also, it may receive as payee a mortgage of property, to secure the payment of any indebtedness due to it, and in turn assign such mortgage and note, payable to it, to secure its own lawful indebtedness to another, instead of making a mortgage of its own property.* Not only is this power to mortgage conceded, in regard to the strictly private property of such corporation ; but it has been held that a corporation has the power to mortgage its waterworks, in order to secure the payment of the bonds that were issued for the payment of the cost of their construction.^ And so, also, has it been held that, where property is purchased for any purpose by a munic- ipal corporation, in the exercise of a lawful power, such cor- poration has the power to secure the payment of the purchase money by a mortgage of the property so purchased.® § 210. Power to lease corporate property. — The municipal corporation has also the power to lease the property of a pri- vate nature which it holds, wherever that is deemed more ex- pedient than an absolute sale of it.^ And the lease will be valid, 1 See Sharon Iron Company v. Erie, 41 Pa. St. 341. 2 Bush V. Whitney, 1 Chip. (Vt.) 3!9. 3 Knox Co. V. Goggin, (Mo. 91) 16 S. W. R. 684; Grant v. Huston, (Mo. 91) 16 lb. 680; Gordon v. Preston, 1 Watts (Pa.) 385 ; Braham v. San Jose, 24 Oal. .585 ; Goodwin v. McGehee, 15 Ala. 233; Middleton Bank v. Du- buque, 15 Iowa, 394. * Floyd Co. Com'rs V. Day, 19Ind. 450; Vanarsdall v. State, 65Ind. 176; Sturgeon v. Daviess Co. Com'rs, 65 Ind. 302. 5 Adams v. Rome, 59 Ga. 765. ^Edey v. Shreveport, 26 La. An. 636. ' Belchers S. R. Co. v. Grain EL, (Mo. 90)13 S. W. R. 822; Taylor v. Carondelet, 22 Mo. 105 ; Hand v. New- ton, 92 N. Y. 88. 36 401 § 211 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS. [CH. XU. although there is irregularity in the form, or in the use, of the corporate name.^ Where the property is donated to a public use, such as waterworks, or a railway franchise, it is doubtful whether the municipal corporation has the power, in the absence of express statutory authority, to lease it.^ But, certainly, if the power to lease is conceded, the municipal corporation can- not make such a lease, in point of duration or absolute charac- ter, so as to deprive the corporation of its power of control of the management of such property, to the detriment of the public.^ It is quite a common occurrence for municipal corporations, having municipal property donated to a public use, such as a city hall, to rent the hall to private pei-sons for unobjection- able purposes, such as concerts and other entertainments ; aud this has been held to be no violation of the rights of the pub- lic* So, also, where a building, which had formerly been donated to public uses, has been abandoned, the town has the right to repair such building for leasing purposes.® Not only has the municipal corporation the right to lease its own property', but it has also the power to rent the property of others, whenever the public needs require it, and it is deemed more expedient to rent than to buy.® § 211. Reqaisites of conveyances by municipal corpora- tions. — It is a general rule of the law of corporations, that the same formalities are required, in the absence of express legislative authority, for a valid conveyance of lands by such a corporation, as in the case of natural persons ; and the mu- nicipal corporation is no exception to this rule. Hence the conveyance by municipal corporations, in the absence of ex- press statutory authoritj% must be by deed, executed in the corporate name, and under the corporate seal.'' And the oflS- 1 New York v. Kent, 5 N. T. S. 567 ; McDonald v. Schneider, 27 Mo. 405 ; St Louis V. Merton, 6 Mo. 476. 2 Pennsylvania K. R. Co. v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. R. Co., 118 U. S. 290; Marine I. Co. v. Railroad, 41 Fed. R. 643 ; Thomas v. West Jersey R. R. Co., 101 U. S. 70. 2 Mahon v. Columbus, 58 Miss. 310. 4 Bell V. Platteville, 70 Wis. 189; Stone V. Oconomowoc, 71 Wis. 155. 402 5 Bates V. Bassett, 60 Vt. 530. s Davies v. Mayor etc. of N. Y., 83 N. Y. 207. ' Noyce v. Jones, 25 Neb. 643 ; Mar con V. Dasher, 16 S. E. R. 75; Props. V. Ipswich, 153 Mass. 42; Barrow v. Wilson, 39 La. An. 403; Young v. De Putren, 37 Fed. 46; Osborne v. Tunis, 25 N. J. L. 633; Remillard v. Blackmar, 52 N. W. R. 133; Bank t Dubuque, 19 Iowa, 467. CH. Xn.] MUNICIPALITY AS PROPEIETOE. § 211 cers, who aiBxed the corporate name and seal to the convey- ance, as representatives of the corporation, can only do so by virtue of the authority conferred upon them under the general laws of the State, or by the municipal ordinances.^ This being the rule, that a conveyance by a municipal corporation must, in the absence of special authority, be by deed in the corporation's name and under the corporate seal, it is clear that no convey- ance can be made by the corporation, vesting in the purchaser the legal title to lands, by a vote of the city council to that effect.^ The only effect of such transaction is to create in the purchaser an equitable claim to a formal conveyance, or an ex- ecutory contract of sale, the specific performance of which can be enforced in equity.* On the other hand, if the charter or ordinance prescribes a particular method of transfer, or imposes certain conditions, upon which the conveyance shall be made, in every case the general rule thus explained has been superseded or modified, as the case ma}^ be ; and no valid conveyance can be made by such corporation, in violation or disregard af the express pro- visions of the law. Thus, where the city charter requires sales of property to be made by ordinances, after advertisement of the same, the sale in ordinary form or in disregard of these requirements, if it should be made by ordinances, would be void, and the expenditure by the city of the proceeds of sale would not prevent the invalidation of such a sale, but only impose upon the city the obligation to refund the money so received.* So, also, where a condition is imposed, as where the previous consent of the majority of the legal voters is required, the con- veyance without such consent is void.^ In the absence of any special provisions, in respect to the character of the vote of the city council, or other corporate 1 Merrill v. Burbank, 23 Me. 538; = Grant v. Davenport, 18 Iowa, 1Y9. Clark V. Pratt, 47 Me. 55 ; Mensen v. Tripp, 81 Me. 24; Of. New York v. Kent, 5 N. Y. S. 567. 2Copp V. Neal, 7 N. H. 275, 278; Beaufort v. Duncan, 1 Jones (N. C.) Law, 239; Cofran v. Cockran, 5 N. H. 458; Coburn v. EUenwood, 4 N. H. 99, 102. * McCracken v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 591; Mensen v. Tripp, 81 Me. 24; Pimental v. San Francisco, 21 Cal. 351; Salterlee v. Same, 23 lb. 214; Herzo v. Same, 33 lb. 134. 6 Still V. Lansingburgh, 16 Barb. 107; Middleton Bank v. Dubuque, 15 Iowa, 394. 403 §212 MITNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XII. board, which is required to make the sale of the land valid, the majority of the members of such board are impliedly au- thorized to direct the sale.^ § 212. Sale of corporate property on execution — Liability for debts. — The general rule in most of the States is, that a judgment obtained against a municipal corporation cannot be en- forced by ordinary writs of execution ; and that the only remedy of the creditor is by mandamus, to compel payment out of the general funds of such municipal corporation, or to levy a tax for that purpose.^ But in the absence of statutory regulations, it is elsewhere held that while mandamus is tlie ordinary rem- edy,^ where the corporation is possessed of strictly piivate prop- erty, which is not held in trust, or which is not donated to public uses, such property may be sold on execution to satisfy the judgments obtained against the city.* -Thus, for example, in New Orleans a market bazaar, which was leased out to private individuals, was held to be subject to sale on execution.^ But where property is owned by the corporation for any public use, or in trust, such as public buildings, fire engines, waterworks, hospitals and sanitariums, the property cannot be reached by the writ of execution, and, as a necessary consequence of that conclusion, the judgment lien will not attach to such property.^ It seems that in New England the creditors of a municipal iSan Diego v. S. D. & L. A. K. E. Co., 44 Cal. 106. 2 Sherman V.Williams, (Tex. 92) 19 S. W. E. 606; Overton Bridge Co. v. Taylor, (Neb. 92) 51 N. W. E. 240; Elrod V. Bernadotte, 53 111. 368; Bloomington v. Brokaw, 77 111. 194, 197; Commonwealth v. Allegheny- County, 37 Pa. St. 277, 290; Common- wealth v. Perkins, 43 Pa. St. 400; Klein v. New Orleans, 99 U. S. 149; Curry V. Savannah, 64 Ga. 290; Cairo V. Allen, 3 111. App. 398; Morrison V. Hinkson, 87 111. 587; State v. Mil- waukee, 20 Wis. 87; State v. Beloit, lb. 70; Crane v. Fond du Lao, 16 Wis. 196; Chicago v. Halsey, 25 111. 595; Olney v. Harvey, 50 111. 453. ^ Winslow v. Perquimans Co. Com'rs, 64 N. C. 218; Gooch v. Greg- ory, 65 N. C. 142. 404 * Brown v. Gates, 15 W. Ta. 131; Birmingham v. Eumsey, 63 Ala. 352; Hart V. New Orleans, 12 Fed. Eep. 292; Holliday v. Frisbie, 15 Cal. 630; Davenport v. Peoria Ins. Co., 17 Iowa, 276. ^ New Orleans v. Homes Ins. Co., 23 La. An. 61. But in New Orleans V. Louisiana Co., 140 U. S. 654, it was held that a public square leased for private purposes was exempt. 6 Brown v. Gates, 15 W. Va. 131; Cole V. Green, 25 111. 104; State v. Tiedemau, 69 Mo. 306 ; President, etc. V. Indianapolis, 12 Ind. 620; Green V. Marks, 25 111. 221; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 V. S. 472; Lowe v. How- ard County, 94 Ind. 553; Mariner v. Mackey, 25 Kan. 669; New Orleans v. Morris, 105 U. S. 600; Foster v. Fow- ler, GO Pa. St. 27; Darling v. Haiti- CH. XII.] MUNICIPALITY AS PKOPEIETOK. 212 corporation may resort to the private property of individual citizens of the town, for the purpose of securing paj-ment of the municipal debt.^ But, elsewhere, in those States where a writ of execution will not lie for the enforcement of a judg- ment against a municipal corporation, it cannot be employed for attaching the private property of a citizen.^ One of the results of the general rule here laid down, that the public property of a municipal corporation cannot be made liable for the debts of the corporation on a writ of execution, is that the mechanic's lien cannot be enforced against such prop- erty. Thus, it has been held that the mechanic's lien cannot be enforced against public property, such as public buildings of all sorts, bridges and the like. The only remedy of the me- chanic in such cases is to obtain judgment against the munici- pal corporation, and to enforce the payment of such judgment by a mandamus.^ A contrary conclusion has been reached in Louisiana, where a mechanic was permitted to file a suit for foreclosure of a lien on a building, which had been constructed for use as a jail.* And in New York, it is provided by statute that contractors for public municipal buildings may secure a lien upon any money in the control of the city.^ more, 51 Md. 1; Lilly v. Taylor, 88 N. C. 489; Wallace v. Trustees, 84 N. C. 164. iBeardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 368. 2 Miller v. McWilliams, 50 Ala. 427 ; 20 Am. Eep. 297; Horner v. CofCey, 25 Miss. 434; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472. 8 McNeal etc. Co. v. Bullock, 38 Fed. K. 565; Guest v. Lower M. W. Co., 21 Atl. K. 1001 ; Front etc. Co. v. Johnston, (Wash. 91) 25 Pac. E. 1084; Mayrhafer v. Board, (Cal. 91) 26 Pac. R. 646 ; Loring v. Small , 50 Iowa, 271 ; Board etc. v. Neidenberger, 78 111. 58; Morrison v. Hinkson, 87 HI. 587; Curry v. Savannah, 64 Ga. 290; Char- nock V. Colfax, 51 Iowa, 70; Parke Co. Com'rs v. O'Conner, 86 Ind. 531; Winslow V. Com'rs, 64 N. C. 218; Jordan v. Board, 39 Minn. 298 ; Leon- ard V. Brooklyn, 71 N. Y. 498; Port- land Lumbering etc. Co. v. School District, 13 Oreg. 283; County v. An- gus, 18 S. W. E. 563 ; New Orleans v. Morris, 3 Woods, C. C. 103; Foster v. Fowler, 60 Pa. St. 27; Schwartz v. Salter, 40 La. An. 264; Elrod v. Ber- nadotte, 53 111. 368 ; Bloomington v. Brokaw, 77111. 194; Bouton v. Super- visors, 5 C. L. J. 105 ; Klein v. New Orleans, 99 U. S. 149; Dallas v. Loone, (Tex. 92) 18 S. W. E. 726. Where a city brought an action against its collector of taxes and his sureties to recover taxes assessed to meet rail- road aid bonds, it was held that the money paid to compromise the ac- tion, standing in lieu of the taxes themselves, was exempted from exe- cution, and that a levy upon it would be enjoined. Sherman v. Williams, (Tex. 92) 16 S. W. E. 606. 4 McKnight v. Grant, 30 La. An. 361. 5 Bell V. New York, 105 N. Y. 139. 405 CHAPTER XIII. DEDICATION OF PROPERTY TO PUBLIC USE. Section. 214 — General statement. 215 — General requisites of statu- tory dedications. 216 — Extent of statutory dedica- tion. 217 — General requisites of com- mon law dedication. 218 — Who may dedicate. 219 — Intention to dedicate, how established. 220 — Presumption of intention from long user. 221 — Platting and sale of lots as evidence of intention. Section. 222^A dedication irrevocable, when accepted. 223 — Effect of acceptance. 224 — Extent of common law dedi- cation, as respects donor's title. 225 — Public right to alluvium and accretions. 226 — ^Dedication to use as public square. 227 — ^Dedication to other public uses. 228 — Effect of misuser or abandon- ment of dedicated lands. 229 — AlienatioDof dedicated lands. § 214. General statement.— Probably the most common method of acquiring property, and especially real property, on the part of a municipal corporation, is that of dedication by the private owner to public use. There are two kinds of dedi- cation to public use, one known as the statutory dedication ; and the other, as the common-law dedication. As their names imply, their principal distinction is in the fact, that one rests upon common law rules, and the other depends upon the express provisions of the statute, which either authorized or provided for the dedication. There are, however, other important dis- tinctions between the two methods of dedication, which will receive special illustration in the succeeding paragraphs. § 215. General requisites of statutory dedications. — The statutory dedication finds its authority in the statute, which provides for such dedication. If, therefore, a statutory dedica- tion is intended to be made, it will be effectual as a statutory dedication, only when it has been made in conformity with the requirements of the statute. Thus, for example, where the statute requires, in order that lands may be dedicated to the public use, as streets, or squares, or commons, that the plat or 406 CH. Xm.] DEDICATION OF PROPERTY TO PUBLIC USE. § 215 map describing the same must be recorded,^ or that such map or plat should be acknowledged before it is recorded,^ a failure to comply with these requirements of the statute would have the effect of invalidating such dedication under the statute.* It is also another effect of the statutory provisions for dedica- tion, that under tlie statute the assent or acceptance on the part of the public is dispensed with, and the statutory dedication becomes complete, effectually transferring to the public the right to use such property, without any express or implied ac- ceptance ou the part of the public, beyond what is implied from the compliance with the provisions of the statute.* The statu- tory dedication, also, is in fact a conveyance or grant, and dif- fers from the common law dedication in that respect, inasmuch as a common law dedication is not in fact any express grant, but rather creates or vests in the public certain rights, in re- spect to the property, by means of an estoppel in pais of the owner of the land.^ 1 Board v. Wilqus, (Kan. 90) 22 Pac. R. 615; Strong v. Darling, 9 Ohio, 201 ; Pangborn v. Westlake, 36 Iowa, 546. 2 Archer v. Salinas, 93 Cal. 43 ; State V. Logue, 73 Wis. 598; Gosselin v. Chicago, 103 111. 623; Detroit v. Det. & Milw. R. R. Co., 23 Mich. 173; Lake View V. Lebahn, 9 N. E. R. 269; 120 111. 92; Chicago etc. Co. v. Ellithorpe, (Iowa, 90) 43 N. W. E. 277; Grand- ville V. Jenison, 86 Mich. 567 ; Stewart V. Perkins, (Mo. 92) 19 S. W. R. 989; Buffalo V. Harling, (Minn. 92) 52 N. W. R. 931; Wisby v. Bonte, 19 Oliio St. 238; Fulton V. Mehrenfeld, 8 lb. 440; Winona v. Huff, 11 Minn. 119; Heitz V. St. Louis, (Mo. 92) 19 S. W. R. 735; Powell v. Oilman, 38 111. App. 611; Auburn V. Goodwin, 21 N. E. R. 212; Des Moines v. Hall, 24 Iowa, 234; Schurmeier v. St. Paul & Pac. E. R. Co., 10 Minn. 82; State v. Hill, 10 Ind. 219; Hays v. State, 8Ind. 425. ' Woodrufi V. Douglass Co., 17 Or. 314; Baird v. Rice, 63 Pa. St. 489: Ragan v. McCoy, 29 Mo. 856; United States V. Chicago, 7 How. 185; Bid- die's Lessee v. Shippen, 1 Dallas, 19; Commonwealth v. Wood, 10 Pa. St. 93; Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Banker, 44 111. 26 ; Gebhardt v. Reeves, 75 111. 301. 1 Archer v. Salinas, 93 Cal. 43 ; Tay- lor V. Phillippi, 35 W. Va. 554; Baker V. St. Paul, 8 Minn. 491, 493; Regan V. McCoy, 29 Mo. 356; Wisby v. Bonte, 19 Ohio St. 238; Harrison v. Seal, (Miss. 90) 5 So. R. 622; Pierce V. Roberts, 17 Atl. R. 275 ; 57 Conn. 31; People v. Jones, 6 Mich. 176; Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Ry. Co., 67 111. 540. ^Deraopolis v. Webb, 87 Ala. 659; Forney V. Calhoun Co., 86 lb. 463; Schurmeier v. St. Paul & Pac. R. R. Co., 10 Minn. 82, 104; Cincinnati v. White, 6 Pet. (IT. S.) 431 ; Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch, 292; Dobson v. Hohenadel, 30 W. N. C. 54; Miller v. Schenck, 43 N. W. R. 225; Cook v. Harris, 61 IST. T. 448; Zinc Co. v. La Salle, 117 111. 411 ; Reid v. Board, 73 Mo. 295 ; Brown v. Manning, 6 Ohio, 298, 303; Cincinnati's Lesseev. Ham- ilton Co. Comm'rs etc., 7 Ohio, pt. 1, 407 §216 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. xm. It needs to be stated finally, that where an attempt is made to provide for a statutory dedication, but on account of a fail- ure to comply with the provisions of the statute, such dedica- tion is invalid under the statute ; if such ineffective dedication has been accepted by the public, or rights under such dedica- tion have been acquired by third persons, and the other require- ments of the common law dedication have been satisfied, then what would be an impossible statutory dedication, would oper- ate as a common law dedication, in favor, of both the public and third persons, whose rights have been thereby affected.^ § 216. Extent of statutory dedication It is also explained to be the fact, that in the statutory dedications the statute op- erates as a conveyance to the public, not only of an easement over the lands, but of a title to the land; so that the dedicator has thereafter no interest or claim in such land, subject simply to the public easement.^ But it has been held in Minnesota that under a statutory dedication, the fee simple title to the land, which has been dedicated for streets and squares, does not pass, and that the public acquires only an easement therein for the purpose of the trust.^ But while the general rule is as thus seated, that the title in fee iu the land dedicated to public use passes to the public, unless the statute prohibits an express reservation, the dedicator may by express provision limit his dedication to the grant of an easement, and reserve to himself the title to the soil.* So, also, may the dedication be in other 88; lb. 217; Fulton v. Mehrenfeld, 8 Ohio St. p. 444. 1 Hurley v. Boom Co., 34 Minn. 143; Field V. Carr, 59 111. 198; Waugh V. Leech, 28 111. 488; Belleville v. Stookey, 23 111. 441 ; Fulton v. Meh- renfeld, 8 Ohio St. 440; Baker v. Johnston, 21 Mich. 319; Cf. State v. Adkins, 42 Kan. 203. But see Tay- lor V. Fort Wayne, 47 Ind. 274, in which it is held that a failure to com- ply with the provisions of the stat- ute in respect to the record of the plat of the land dedicated makes the record a nullity. 2 Maywood Co. v. Maywood, 118 111. 61; Zinc Co. v. La Salle, 117 111. 411; 408 Wood V. Natl. W. Works Co., 33 Kan. 590; Gosselin v. Chicago, 103 111. 623. 3 Penn. Ky. Co. v. Ayres, 14 Atl. E. 901; Eutherford V. Taylor, 38 Mo. 315; Price v. Thompson, 48 Mo. 363; Cox V. Louisville N. A. & C. E. R, Co., 48 Ind. 178; Schurmeier y. St. Paul & Pacific E. E. Co., 10 Minn. 104. < Stevens v. Shannon, 6 Ohio Cir. 142; Dubuque v. Benson, 23 Iowa, 248; Noblesville v. Lake Erie etc. Co., (Ind. 92) 29 N. E. E. 484; Manly V. Gibson. 13 111. 312; Peck v. Prov. Steam Engine Co.,8E. L353; Noyes v. Ward, 19 Conn. 250 (1848). CH. XIII.] DEDICATION OF PEOPERTY TO PUBLIC USB. § 217 ways qualified ; as, for example, as to the nature and extent of the use to which the land shall be put, as for a common or a market place, or public square.^ A dedication may be made presently to operate in the future,^ and maj- be made, in the absence of legislation, subject to express conditions.* The only limitation, of the power of an owner of property to make a dedication of his property to public use, is to be found in the fact that he is not able to confer upon any county, or other ex- traneous corporation the control of the streets in a city, which he opens up for the public use. The governmental control by the municipal corporation, over the streets within its limits, cannot in this way be interfered with by the term of the dedi- cation.* § 217. General requisites of common law dedication. — The power to make a common law dedication of lands to public use is not ordinarily taken away by statutory provisions for dedication of lands, where the statute does not expressly repeal the prior common law method ; ^ so, that everywhere, as a gen- eral rule, the common law dedication still exists, side by side with any statutory dedication, which might be provided for by the statutes of the State. Although,^n explaining the general requisites of a statutory dedication, and the points of distinc- tion between such dedication and the common law dedication, a somewhat indirect explanation has been given of the requi- sites of the common law dedication, it is necessary for the matter to be presented directly. Succinctly stated, it maybe declared, that the validity of the common law .dedication does not depend upon the transfer of the legal title of the owner of the land. The general rule is, that the public acquires by the common law dedication nothing 1 Arkansas etc. Co. v. Sarrells, (Ark.) 8 S. W. E. 683; Cummings v. St. Louis, 90 Mo. 259; Hoboken v. Pa. E. E. Co., 124 U. S. 636, 681; Ni- agara Falls Susp. Br. Co. v. Bach- man, 66 N. Y. 261 ; Tyler v. Sturdy, 108 Mass. 196; Hoboken Imp. Co. v. Hoboken, 36 N. J. L. 340. 2 Forney v. Calhoun Co., 84 Ala. 215; 4 So. E. 1.53; Des Moines v. Hall, 24 Iowa, 234. " Frederick Co. v. Winchester, ( Va. 88) 4 S. E. E. 844 ; Port Huron v. Chad- wick, 52 Mich. 320; Boughner v. Clarksburg, 15 W. Va. 394; St. Louis V. Meier, 77 Mo. 13; Los Angeles etc. Co. V. Los Angeles, (Cal. 92) 30 Pac. 523. « Derby v. Ailing, 40 Conn. 400; Noblesville v. E. E. Co., (Ind. 92) 29 N. E. E. 484. 6 Penin I. & L. Co. v. Crystal Falls, 60 Mich. 510; Abbott v. Cottage City, 143 Mass. 521; Sanborn v. 409 §217 MUNXCIPAIi CORPORATIONS. [cH. xrii. more than an easement.^ It is also not necessaiy to the vahd- ity of a common law dedication, that there should be at the time of the dedication any body corporate or other well defined grantee in being.^ If there is a dedication to the public, such as lands for use as streets or commons, or the like, before a mu- nicipal corporation has been created, such public easement will pass to the corporation whenever it is created by operation of law.^ And even where the donee or transferee of the public use has been named by the dedicator, trustees may be appointed for the administration of the trust for the benefit of the public, either by the action of the Legislature or by interference of a court of equity.* But the dedication must be for a public use. Although a dedication for the use of certain specific persons may involve some indirect benefit to the public, as in the case of a dedication to the use of a railroad, there is not such a dedi- cation to the public, as would enable it to come within the operation of the rules here laid down.^ To make a valid dedication, no deed or writing is required ; a parol dedication is sufficient.*' But while a formal convey- Minneapolis, 35 Min. 314; McClarley V. Lemeunier, 40 La. An. 253; Wake- man V. Wilber, 4]Sr. Y. S. 938; Browne V. Bowdoinham, 71 Me. 144. ' Meier v. Portland, 19 Pac. R. 610; Ellsworth V. Lord, 40 Minn. 337; People V. Moore, 50 Han, 356; Du- buque V. Malouey, 9 Iowa, 450; Kel- sey V. King, 33 How. (^. Y.) Pr. 39; Lahr v. Metrop. El. Ry. Co., 104 N. Y. 268; lb., p. 291; Backus v. De- troit, 49 Mich. 110; Scheimer v. Price, 65 Mich. 638; Beatty v. Kurtz, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 566; New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662. 2 Winona V. Huff, 11 Minn. 119; Pawlet V. Clark, 9 Cranch, 292; Doe V. Jones, 11 Ala. 6:?; McConnell v. Lexington Trs., 12 Wheat. 582; Du- luth V. R. R. Co., (Minn. 92)51N.W. 1163; New Orleajis v. United States, 10 Pet. 661, 713; Atty. Gen. v. Ab- bott, 154 Mass. 323. 3 Waugh V. Leech, 28 111. 488; San Leandro v. Le Berton, 72 Cal. 170; 410 Doev. Jones, H Ala. 63; Klinkener V. M'Keesport Sch. Dir., 11 Pa. St 444; Savannah v. Steamboat Co. of Ga., R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) R. 242; Tay- lor V. Phillipi, 35 W. Va. 554. * Bryant's Lessee v. McCaudless, 7 Ohio, pt. 2, 135. 5 Talbott V. Richmond & D. R. R. Co., 31 Gratt. 685; Illinois Ins. Co. V. Littlefield, 67 111. 368. « Hargro v. Hodgdon, 26 Pac. 1106; Forney v. Calhoun Co., 84 Ala. 215; Burnett v. Harrington, 7 S. W. R. 812; Singleton v. Sch. District, 10 lb. 793; Tick v. Vioksburg, 1 How. (Miss.) 379 (1837) ; State v. Catlin, 3 Vt. 530; Post V. Pearsall, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 425, 454; Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 6 Pet. 493 ; Smith v. Navasota, 72 Tex. 422;Dummer v. Jersey City, Spencer (20 N. J. L.) 86; Starr v. People, (Col. 92) 30 Pac. 64; Hunter V. Sandy Hill Trs., 6 Hill (N. Y.) 407; Cook V. Harris, 61 N. Y. 448; Denver V. Jacobsen, (Col. 92) 30 Pac. 246. CH. Xril.J DEDICATION OF PROPERTY TO PUBLIC USE. § 218 ance is not required to effect a common law dedication, yet there must be a definite and certain description of the lands, which are dedicated, and of the intention of the owner to dedi- cate them.i Nor is it necessary that the public should have possession of the lands so dedicated to them for any special length of time. All that is required is the dedication of land by its owner, which may be manifested not only by direct proof of the same, but also by proof of his assent to the use of the property by the public, and the actual enjoyment of thesame by the public for a length of time, sufficient to huve created on the part of the public such reliance upon the enjoyment of such easement, as that the denial of such rights would now in- terfere materially with the public convenience and with pri- vate rights.^ The common law dedication does not operate so much as a conveyance as an estoppel in pais, which prevents the original owner from interfering with the continued enjoy- ment by the public of the lands dedicated.^ § 218. Who may dedicate. — The dedication of land to the public use can only be made by the owner of the land, or by the owner of an estate in such land.* It is not necessary that the party dedicating the lands should have the legal title ; iCummings v. St. Louis, 90 Mo. 259; Shreveport v. Dronin, (La.) 6 So. R. 656; Boughner v. Clarksburg, 15 W. Va. 394; Winuetka v. Trouty, 107 111. 218; Littler v. Lincoln, 106 111. 353. 2 Forney v. Calhoun Co., 86 Ala. 463; Cohoes v. D. & H. Can. Co., 31 N. E. R. 88Y; Jarvis v. Dean, 3 Bing. 447; State v. Catlin, 3 Vt. 530; Bar- clay V. Howell's Lessee, 6 Pet. 498; Topeka v. Cowee, 29 Pac. 560; De- mopolis V. Webb, 87 Ala. 659; Tolo V. Barney, 79 Cal. 375 ; Weisbrod v. Railroad Co., 18 Wis. 35; Chicago v. Wright, 69 111. 328; Field v. Carr, 59 III. 197; Ragan v. McCoy, 29 Mo. 356; Evansville v. Evans, 37 Ind. 229; Fisher v. Beard, 32 Iowa, 346 ; Haynes V. Thomas, 7 Ind. 38; Columbus v. Dahn, 36 Ind. 330; Saulet v. New Orleans, 10 La. An. 81 ; Boughner v. Clarksburg, 15 W. Va. 394; Macon v. Franklin, 12 Ga. 239; Smith v. Flora, 64 111. 93; Arrowsmith v. New Or- leans, 24 La. An. 194; Peoria v. Johnston, 56 111. 45 ; Mason v. City, 51 N. W. R. 770; Noyes v. Ward, 19 Conn. 250, 268; Commonwealth v. Alburger, 1 Wliart. (Pa.) 469; Lee v. Lake 14 Mich. 12; Baker v. John- son, 21 Mich. 319. 8 Leonard's Heirs v. Baton Rouge, (La.) 40 So. R. 241; Cincinnati v. White's Lessee, 6 Pet. 431; Morgan V. Chicago etc. Co., 96 U. S. 716; Denver v. Jacobsen, 30 Pac. R. 246. * Forney v. Calhoun Co., 84 Ala. 215; 4 So. 153; St. Louis v. Laclede etc. Co., (Mo.) 9 S. W. R. 581; Eden- ville v. C. Mete. Co., 77 Iowa, 69; Warren v. Brown, 47 N. W. 632; Bau- gan V. Mann, 59 111. 492; Lawe v. Kaukauna, 70 Wis. 306; 35 N. W. Rep. 561 ; Brunswick etc. Co. v. Way- cross, (Ga. 92) 13 S. E. R. 835. 411 218 MUNICIPAL COKPOEATtONS. [CII. XIII. the owner of the equitable estate may exercise the right to dedicate it, and the trustee, who merely owns the naked legal title, cannot interfere with such dedication, but would be required to maintain it ; and would, if he retained the legal title, .serve as a trustee of such land for the public use, in the place of the original cestui que trust. If the party dedicating the land is the owner only of a particular estate, such dedica- tion cannot interfere with the rights of the remainderman.! So, also, will the donation of land by the owner in no way af- fect the title of a mortgagee, or of purchasers at a sale under the mortgage ; ^ or, as a general rule, with the wife's dower, al- though in New York, Louisiana and elsewhere, it is held that a certificate of renunciation by the wife of the dedicator is not necessary to bar her dower right.^ A married woman can make a dedication of her land to public use.* And the presumption of a dedication by long user wil operate as well against a married woman.^ But she alone can make an effective dedication of her own property. The husband's dedication of her property is not binding upon her.^ The dedication may be made hy an agent when duly author- ized.'' And even where the dedication of the property by the agent to public use has been without authority, the owner may ratify such dedication by accepting its results, as where he adopts the numbers of the lots as made by the agent in the platting accepted by him, and by reference in the conveyance of these lots to the recorded town plat and the public square.^ Where the will authorized the dedication of land to public use, such dedication must be made by the executor or adminis- 1 Smith Lead. Cas. 95 ; Detroit v. Det. & Milw. R. E. Co., 23 Mich. 173 (1871). 2 Moore v. Little Eock, 42 Ark. 66; McSliane v. Moberly, 79 Mo. 41; Smith V. Heath, 102 111. 130; People y. Herbel, 96 111. 384. 8 Lawrence v. Jeff. Par. Pol. Jury, 35 La. An. 601 ; see Menkato v. Mea^ gher, 17 Minn. 265 ; see also, Gwynne V. Cincinnati, 3 Ohio, 25 (1827) ; Moore V. New York, 8 N. Y. 110. 4 Todd V. Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. 412 R. E. Co., 19 Oliio St. 514. 5 Schenley v. Commonwealth, 36 Pa. St. 29. 8 Indianapolis v. Patterson, 112 Ind. 344; Marshall v. Anderson, 78 Mo. 85. ' United States v. Chicago, 7 How. (U. S.) 185; Barclayv. Howell'sLes- see, 6 Pet. 498; Niagara Falls Susp. Br. Co. V. Bachman, 66 N. Y. 261 (1876). « Brown v. Manning, 6 Ohio, 298 (1834). CH. XIII.] DEDICATION OF PROPERTY TO PUBLIC USE. § 219 trator.^ And so, likewise, may there be dedications of lands by the State government,^ or by the United States government.^ And there may also be a dedication of lands to public use by railroad companies,* and by any other corporation, such as a canal company.^ § 219. Intention to dedicate, how established. — In order, however, that any dedication of public lauds might prove ef- fective, the intention on the part of the owner to so dedicate his land must be established beyond reasonable doubt. And unless such intention is established by competent evidence, there is no valid dedication, and the public have nothing which it can claim." It is not necessary to establish the intention to dedicate by formal declarations of the owner ; but such inten- tion may be as well established by parol evidence, proving dec- larations or acts on the part of the owner of the lands, which 1 Earle v. New Brunswick, 38 N. J. L. 47; Kaime v. Harty, 73 Mo. 316; Logansport v. Dunn, 8 Ind. 378. ■iTerre Haute & I. E. E. Co. v. Scott, 74 Ind. 29; May v. City, 17 N. Y. S. 348; Matthiessen & H. Zinc Co. V. La Salle, 117 111. 411; Eeilly v. Ea^ cine, 51 Wis. 526. estate V. Woodward, 23 Vt. 92; Macon V. Franklin, 12 Ga. 239; Wells V. Pennington, (S. D.) 48 N. W. 305; Boston V. Lecraw, 17 How. {U.S.) 426. * Williams v. N. Y. & N. H. E. E. Co., 39 Conn. 509; Brunswick etc. Co. V. Waycross, (Ga. 92) 13 S. E. E. 835. ^Niagara Falls Susp. Br. Co. v. Bachman, 66 N. Y. 261; Green v. Canaan, 29 Conn. 157; San Francis- co V. Calderwood, 31 Cal. 585 ; Grand Surrey Canal Co. v. Hall, 1 M. & Gr. 392 ; Lamar County v. Clements, 49 Tex. 347. « State V. Adkins, 42 Kan. 203; Campbell v. Karr, 20 111. App. 305; State V. McCabe, 43 K. W. E. 322, 74 Wis. 481; Fisk v. Havana, 88 111. 208; Grube v. Nichols, 36 111. 92 ; Chicago V. Drexel, (111. 92) 30 N. E. E. 774; Harding v. Hale, 61 111. 192; 111. Ins. Co. V. Littlefield, 67 111. 308; Wragg V. Penn. Tp., 94 HI. 11; Shellhouse V. State, 110 Ind. 509, 513; Brooks v. Topeka, 34 Kan. 277; Irwin v. Dix- ion, 9 How. 10; St. Louis City v. Wetmore, (Mo. 92) 19 S. W. E. 534; Turner v. People's Ferry Co., 21 Fed. Rep. 91; Logansport v. Dunn, 8 Ind. 378; San Francisco v. Cana- van, 42 Cal. 541; People v. Eeed, (Cal.) 20 Pac. Eep. 708; Columbus v. Dahn, 36 Ind. 330; Laraar County v. Clements, 49 Tex. 347; Long worth v. Cincinnati, 48 Ohio St. 637; Mander- schid V. Dubuque, 29 Iowa, 73 ; De- troit V. Det. & Milw. E. E. Co., 2:! Mich. 173 ; Cincinnati v. White's Les- see, 6 Pet. 435; Wilson v. Sexton, 27 Iowa, 15 ; Slireveport V. Dronin, (La.) 6 So. Eep. 656; McGehee v. Wood- ville, 59 Miss. 648; Talbott v. Eich- mond Co., 31 Gratt. 685; Vaughn v. Lewis, (Va. 92) 15 S. E. R. 525; Pen- nington V. Willard, 1 E. I. 93; West- fall v. Hunter, 8 Ind. 174; Chicago V. Johnson, 98 111. 618; Collins v. Ma- con, 69 Ga. 542 ; Marion v. Skillman, 127 Ind. 130; Glenn v. Baltimore, 67 Md. 390; Price v. Breckenridge, 92 Mo. 378. 413 220 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [cH. xm. are inconsistent with any other presumption than that he had intended to make a dedication to public use. Thus, for exam- ple, informal declarations of the owner of the soil will be ad- missible to show a dedication.^ And very often the declaration of a deceased surveyor, who had been employed to make the survey, will be admissible to establish the intention to dedicate the land to public use.^ On the other hand, parol evidence is admissible to prove acts and circumstances surrounding the land, and the parties, which tend to establish the intention to dedicate the land to the public use.^ Parol evidence is always admissible to prove those facts which tend to establish such in- tention. Where, however, there is a formal declaration on the part of the owner of the land that the property has been dedicatr ed to a public use, then parol evidence is not receivable for the purpose of proving or establishing some counter intention of the donor, or to modify or qualify in any way the declared inten- tion of the donor.* But where the statements and declarations are ambiguous, then parol evidence is admissible to explain or establish more plainly, what the intention of the donor was.' § 220. Presumption of intention from long user. — The intent to dedicate property to public use will also be presumed against the owner of the land, from the fact that the pub- lic have for a long time had the use of such land, and that the owner of the land had acquiesced in its public use for a 1 Denver v. Jacobsen, (Col. 92) 30 Pac. 246; Starr v. People, (Col. 92) 30 Pac. E. 64; Evans v. Evansville, 37 Ind. 229; McKee v. Perchment, 69 Pa. St. 342; Nixon v.Bilaxi, o So. E. 621; McKee v. St. Louis, 17 Mo. 184; Buchanan v. Curtis, 25 Wis. 99. - Birmingham v. Anderson, 40 Pa. St. 506; Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 6 Pet. 498. 3 Denver v. Jacobsen, ( Col. 92 ) 30 Pac. E. 246; State v. Woodward, 23 Vt. 92; Smith v. State, 23 N. J. L. 712, 725; 111. Ins. Co. v. Littlefleld, 67 111. 368; Quinn v. Anderson, 70 Cal. 454; Lee v. Lake, 14 Mich. 12; Stuyvesant v. Woodruff, 21 N. J. L. 145; Mayo v. Murchie, 3 Munf. (Ya.) 358; Abbott v. Mills, 3 Vt. 521; Ni- 414 agara Falls Susp. Br. v. Buchanan, 66 N. T. 261 ; Aiken T. C. v. Lythgoe, 7 Eich. Law. 435 ; Princeville v. Au- ten, 77 111. 325 ; Shreeveport v. Dro- nin, (La.) 6 So. E. 656; Common- wealth v. Alburger, 1 Whart (Pa.) 469; State v. Wilkinson, 2 Vt. 480. * Smith V. Navasota, 72 Tex. 222; Lebanon v. Warren Co. Com'rs, 9 Ohio, 80; Princeville v. Auten, 77 111. 325; Indianapolis v. Cross, 7 Ind. 9. ^ Shreeveport v. Dronin, supra; Fassion v. Landrey, ( Ind. 90 ) 24 N. E. E. 96; Harris County v. Taylor, 58 Tex. 690; Hickerson v. Mexico, 58 Mo. 61; Grandville v. Jennison, 86 Mich. 567; San Francisco v. HolU- day, 76 Cal. 18. CH. XIII.] DEDICATIOK OF PKOPEETY TO PUBLIC USE. § 220 certain length of time. That presumption will not ordinarily arise simply from the fact of long user ; additional facts would, as a rule, be required to establish from long user the intention to dedicate.! But where the evidence simply establishes a long user without the accompanying circumstances, which are need- ed to support the presumption of an intention to dedicate ; then, in order that the public may claim the right to such ease- ment over the land in question, the public use must have been maintained without interruption for the period of time which the Statute of Limitations requires in ordinary actions, and which by analogy is required for the creation of a prescriptive right. For, under these circumstances, the public can only claim the right to such public use of the land by prescription.^ But where the facts of the case, iu addition to long user, are sufficiently strong, with the long user, to support the presump- tion of an intention to dedicate the land for public use, then the intent to so dedicate the laud will be proven by a public use of such land, for a period less than that which is required to support the claim as a prescriptive right. Under these cir- cumstances, the intention to dedicate is established without proof of a prescription.^ No particular time, during which the ■ In re Hand, 52 Hun, 206; Smith V. State, 23 N. J. L. 130; Shawan- gunk Kill Br., In re, 100 N. Y. 642; Talbot V. King, 32 W. Va. 6; 9 S. E. R. 48; Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 511; Talbottv. Grace, SOInd. 389; Hope v. Barnett, 78 Cal. 9; Co- hoes V. D. & H. Co., 31 N. E. K. 887; McHey v. Hyde Park, 37 Fed. 389; Smith V. Gardner, 12 Oreg. 221; On- stott V. Murray, 22 Iowa, 457 ; Peo- ple v. Davidson, 21 Pac. K. 538; 79 Cal. 166; Keyes v. Tait, 19 Iowa, 123; Detroit v. Det. & Milw. E. E. Co., 23 Mich. 173; Manderschid v. Du- buque, 29 Iowa, 73. 2 Penin etc. Co. v. Crystal Falls, 60 Mich. 510; Peri-y v. New Orleans, M. & C. E. E. Co., 55 Ala. 413; Kranz v. Baltimore, 64 Md. 491; Oelet v. New- port Bd. of Aid., 14 E. I. 295; Ells- worth V. Lord, 40 Minn. 337; Bush v. Johnson, 23 Pa. St. 209; Childs v. Nelson, 69 Wis. 125; Sherman v. Kane, 86 N. Y. 57; Eulaud v. South Newmarket, 59 N. H. 291; McAllister V. Pickup, (Iowa, 92) 50 N. W. E. 556; Smith v. Inge, 80 Ala. 283; Peo- ple V. Blake, 60 Cal. 497; Getchell v. Benedict, 57 Iowa, 121; Bales v. Pig- eon, 129 Ind. 548; Visalia v. Jacobs, 65 Cal. 434; Stewart v. Frick, 94 N. C. 487 ; see San Francisco v. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541 ; Ely v. Parsons, 55 Conn. 83 ; Steele v. Sullivan, 70 Ala. 589. " New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 661, 722;Weisbrod v. Chicago & N. W. Ky. Co., 18 Wis. 35; Pella v. Scholte, 24 Iowa, 283; City Cem. Assoc. V. Meninger, 14 Kans. 312; Mason v. City, 51 N. W. E. 770; Smith V. Inge, 80 Ala. 283; Faust v. Huntington, 91 Ind. 493; Grandville v. Jennison, 86 Mich. 567; Shea v. Ottumwa, 67 Iowa, 39; McKenna v. Boston, 131 Mass. 143 ; Irwin v. Dix- 415 §221 MUNICIPAL COBPOKATIONS. [CH. XIII. land is used by the public, is necessary to establish the fact of dedication ; aud the fact may be established independently of any user by the public in every respect, except so far as such use is needed to indicate the acceptance of such a dedication. But, for that purpose, the actual occupation of the land in the enjoyment of the public purpose or public use even for an in- stant of time is deemed to be sufficient.^ The user by the pub- lic must also be shown to have been had with the owner's knowledge.^ On the other hand, while user is a very strong circumstance in support of the intention to dedicate, nonuser is not conclusive, although very important evidence against the rights of the public.^ In line with the general principles here laid down, it has been held that the actual widening of the street by the abutting owner and the removal of the fence so as to secure the addi- tion to the width of the street sufficiently establishes tlie inten- tion to dedicate ; and the owner of the property cannot thereafter restore the old boundary of the street, upon showing that the original survey of the street made the boundary line different from what had been long regarded as the true line.* § 221. Platting and sale of lots as evidence of intention. — While a survey of the land into lots and the preparation of iou, 9 How. 10; Cincinnati Trs. v. White's Lessee, 6 Pet. 431; Griffin's Appeal, 109 Pa. St. 150; State v. Wilkinson, a Vt. 480; Marcy v. Tay- lor, 19 111. 634; Grube v. Nichols, 36 111. 93; Hoolev. Attorney General, 22 Ala. 190; Evansville v. Paige, 23 Ind. 525. 1 Woody erv. Haddeu, 5 Taunt. 126, pej'Chambre, J.; 2 Smith Lead. Cas. 176. 2Durgin v. Lowell, 3 Allen, 398; Kleurs v. Town of Walnut Lake, (Minn. 93) 53 M. V. R. 703; Ger- berling v. Wunnenberg, 51 Iowa, 125; McHey v. Hyde Park, 37 Fed. 389; Wilson v. Sexon, 27 Iowa, 15; State V. Kan. City, St. J. & C. B. K. E. Co., 45 Iowa, 139; Topeka v. Cowee, 29 Pac. R. 560; Roberts v. Karr, 1 Campb. 262; Schoonmaker 416 V. Ref. Prot. Dutch Church, 5 How. (N. Y.) Pr. 265; People v. O'Keefe, 79 Cal. 171 ; Skeen v. Lynch, 1 Eob. (Va.) 186, 194. " Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 6 Pet 498; Grand ville v. Jennison, 86 Mich. 567; 84 lb. 54; Travis Co. v. Chris- tian, (Tex. 93) 21 S. W. E. 119. 4 Hart V. Bloomtleld Tp., Trs., 15 Ind. 226; Barlington v. Common- wealth, 41 Pa. St. 63; Ellsworth v. Lord, 40 Minn. 337; State v. Jersey City, 40 N. J. L. 483. But see Balti- more V. White, 62 Md.362; Eozell v. Andrews, 103 N. Y. 150, which hold that the mere removal of the fence, without the acceptance by the public, does not constitute a dedication. See also Smith v. State, 26 N. J. L, 705. OH. XIII.] DEDICATION OP PEOPERTY TO PUBLIC USB. § 221 a map, describing or setting out streets and squares and the like, will not of itself constitute a dedication, binding upon the donor ; ^ yet, if after such a survey and platting of the land, lots are sold and described as bounded by those streets and squares, the facts, thus described as existing, will be suf33eient, certainly as between the grantor and grantee of the lots, to amount to an immediate and absolute dedication of the streets.^ And where the platting, as a whole, is considered as indicating the condition of the town and of the adjoining lots, as an induce- ment to a purchaser of a particular lot, the purchaser's right 1 People V. Eeed, 81 Cal. 70; 22 Pac. E. 474; United States v. Chi- cago, 7 How. (U. S.) 185, 196; but see Moore v. Little Rock, 42 Ark. 66. 2 Gormley v. Clark, 134 U. S. 338; Taylor v. PMllipi, 35 W. Va. 554; San Leandro v. Le Breton, 72 Cal. 170; Duluth v. St. Paul etc. Co., 51 K W. E. 1163; Hurley v. Miss. & Rum River B. Co., 34 Minn. 143; Hobson V. Monteith, 15 Greg. 251; Campbell Co. Court v. Newport, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 538; Dobson v. Hoben- adel, 30 W. N. C. 54; Dubuque v. Maloney, 9 Iowa, 450; Pope v. Union, 18 N. J. Eq. 282; Middleton v. Whar- ton, 41 Minn. 266; White Bear v. Stewart, 40 Minn. 284; McKemia v. Lancaster Dist. E. Comm'rs, Harper (S. C.) Law, 381 ; Wolf v. Brass, 72 Tex. 133; White v. Cower, 4 Paige (N. T.) 510; Memphis & St. L. Packet Co. V. Grey, 9 Bush (Ky.) 137, 146 (1872); Schneider v. Jacob, (Ky.) 5 South West. Eep. .350; Giffen v. 01a- the, 24 Pac. R. 470; WicklifCe v. Ma- gruder, (Ky. 90) 13 S. W. R. 523; Heitz V. St. Louis, 19 S. W. R. 735 ; Campbell v. Kansas City, (Mo. 90) 13 S. W. E. 897; Aiken T. C. v. Lyth- goe, 7 Rich. (Law) 435; Cook v. Burlington, 30 Iowa, 94; Furman Street, In re, 17 Wend. 649 ; Living- ston V. New York, 8 Wend. 85 ; Ar- rowsmith v. New Orleans, 24 La. Ad. 194; Hicklin V. McLear, 18 Or. 126; 27 Eureka v. Armstrong, 83 Cal. 623 In re North 3d Ave., 3 N. Y. S. 641 Lake View v. Lebahn, 120 111. 92 Preston v. Navasota, 34 Tex. 684 Hannibal v. Drop, 15 Mo. 634; Doe V. Attica, 7 Ind. 641, 644; Tinges v. Baltimore, 51 Md. 600; Vicksburg V. Marshall, 59 Miss. 563 ; Meth. E. Oh. V. Hoboken, 33 N. J. L. 13; State V. Elizabeth, 37 lb. 434; Lamar v. Clements, 49 Tex. 347; Harrison v. Seal, (Miss.) 5 So. Rep. 622; Shea v. Ottumwa, 67 Iowa, 39; Stephenson V. Chattanooga, 20 Fed. Rep. 586; Smith v. Portland, 30 lb. 734; Pearl Street, In re. 111 Pa. St. 565; Chapin v. Brown, 15 E. I. 579; Fisher v. Beard, 32.Iowa, 346; Wiggins v. Mc- Cleary, 49 N. Y. 346; Brown v. Man- ning, 6 Ohio, 298; Smith v. Lock, 18 Mich. 56; Union Co. v. Peckham, (E. L) 12 At. Eep. 130; Steele v. Sulli- van, 70 Ala. 589; Kittle v. Pfeiffer, 22 Cal. 490; McKee v. Perchment, 69 Pa. St. 342; State v. 111. Cent. E. R. Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 730, 752; Fes- sion V. Landrey, 24 N. E. R. 96; Wil- loughby V. Jenks, 20 Wend. 96; Os- wego v. Osw. Canal Co., 6 N. Y. 257; Davis V. Sabita, 63 Pa. St. 90; Lamar V. Clements, 49 Tex. 347; Heselton V.Harmon, (Me.) 18Atl. E. 286; Peo- ple V. Lamblier, 5 Denio, 9, 19; Wy- man v. New York, 11 Wend. 487; Livingston v. New York, 8 Wend. 85. 417 221 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. xni. to the existence and use of the street extends to the entire land, which has been platted ; and he has a right to insist upon hav- ing all the streets, set out upon such plat, remain open for the use of the public.^ Of course, where the plat shows an alley to be a private one, while the rights of the purchasers of lots are practically the same, }'et there will in this case be no dedi- cation of the alley to public use.^ But, generally, the platting of land, and the sale of lots with reference to such plat, will operate as a binding dedication to the public use, not only in favor of the purchaser of the lots, but, likewise, in favor of the public ; the right of the public in the land so dedicated to public use is irrevocable.^ In order to raise the implication, and to support the intention, to dedicate lands to public use by platting the same, there must be affirmative evidence, upon the face of the plat, of an intention to make such dedication, in order that the mere platting of the land may serve such a purpose. The mere fact, that there is a blank space, without any mark indicating the use to which such land may be put, will not indicate any intention of dedicating such blank space, to a public use as a public square.* It is also held that there has been no dedication, where there is simply a water street, with an open space on the riverside unmarked.^ 1 White V. Flaunigan, 1 Md. 525, 540; Griffiths V. Galindo,86 Gal. 192; Rowan v. Portland, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 232; Winona v. Huff, 11 Minn. 119; Dubuque v. Maioney, 9 Iowa, 450; Hitchcock V. Oberlin, (Kan. 90) 26 Pac. 466; Huber v. Gazley, 18 Ohio, 18; Thomson v. McCormick, 26 N. E. E. 373 ; Logansport v. Dunn, 8 Ind. 378; Underwood v. Stuyvesant, 19 Johns. 186. 2 Dexter v. Tree, 117 111. 532. 3 Arrowsmith v. New Orleans, 24 La. An. 194; Parsons v. Atlanta Univ. Trs., 44 Ga. 529; Sherer v. Jasper, 9 So. 584; Darker v. Beck, 11 N. Y. S. 94; Heselton v. Hannon, 14 Atl. R. 286; Hawley v. Baltimore, 33 Md. 270; Detroit v. Det. & Milw. R. R. Co., 23 Mich. 173; Evans v. Evans- ville, 37 Ind. 229; Hall v. Baltimore, 56 Md. 187; West Gov. v. Freking, 8 418 Bush (Ky.) 121; State v. Chase, 42 Mo. App. 343. But see Gilder v. Brenham, 67 Tex. 345 ; Galveston v. Williams, (Tex.) 6 S. W. Rep. 860; where it is held that the city cannot acquire any rights until acceptance; see, also, post, § 222, 223. *New York v. Stuyvesant, 17 N. Y.34; Oswald V. Grenet, 15 Tex. 118. See generally, Yates v. Judd, 18 Wis. 118; Hogue v. Albina, (Or. 90) 25 Pac. 386; Saulet v. New Orleans, 10 La. An. 81; Municipality v. Palfrey, 7 La. An. 497; Hanson v. Eastman, 1 Minn. 509; Barclay v. HoweU's Lessee, 6 Pet. 498. 5 Reid V. Edina Bd. of Ed., 73 Mo. 295; New Albany v. WilUams, 126 Ind. 1; Burbach v. Schweinler, 56 Wis. 386; Central Land Co. v. Provi- dence, 15 R. L 246. CH. XIII.] DEDICATION OF PROPERTY TO PTTBLIC USE. § 222 On the other hand, a different ruling is maintained, where both lines of the water street are defined and the width indicated.^ Of course, where the parties expressly reserve on the map cer- tain spaces from public use, or mark such space by the word " reserved," as in the case of a landing on the water front, the intention to dedicate such landing to the public use is com- pletely rebutted.2 The construction of the legal effect of a plat is also a ques- tion for the court.^ And if erasures are discovered upon such map or plat, parol evidence is admissible for the purpose of ex- plaining it.* § 222. A dedication irrevocable when accepted. — As long as a dedication of land to public use has not been accepted, either by the public or by private individuals, through the pur- chase of lots, described as bound by such streets, such dedication may be revoked by the dedicator.^ But this is not a uniform rule ; for it has been held that, if the dedication has been made by a map and platting of the ground, the dedication is complete and cannot be thereafter revoked, although it has not been ac- cepted.^ Where, however, there has been an acceptance or ac- tual user of the land dedicated, then the dedication becomes ' Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 6 Pet. 498; United States v. Chicago, 7 How. 185 ; Columbiis v. Dahn, 36 Ind. 330; People v. Klumpke, 41 Cal. 263; Commonwealth v. Albur- ger, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 469; Common- wealth V. McDonald, 16 Serg. & Rawle, 390; Penny Pot Landing Case, 16 Pa. St. "79; Penin. v. N". T. Central R. R. Co., 36 N. T. 120; Grant V. Davenport, 18 Iowa, 179; Cowles V. Gray, 14 Iowa, 1 ; Newport v. Tay- lor'sEx., 16B. Mon. (Ky.) 699; Cook V. Hillsdale, 7 Mich. 115; Baker v. Johnston, 21 Mich. 319; Van Valken- burgh V. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 338; Field V. Carr, 59 111. 198; McLaugh- lin V. Stevens, 18 Ohio, 94. 2 Grant V. Davenport, 18 Iowa, 179; Cowles V. Gray, 14 Iowa, 1. ' Hanson v. Eastman, 21 Minn. 509; State Hist. Assoc, v. Lincoln, 14 Neb. 336. * Smith V. Portland, 30 Fed. Rep. 734. 5 Trustees of First Ev. Church v. "Walsh, 57 111. 370; Schmitz v. Ger- mantown, 31111. App. 284; Winuetka V. Prouty, 107 HI. 218; Littler v. Lincoln, 106 111. 353 ; San Francisco V. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541; Warren v. Brown, 47 N. W. R. 633; Baker v. Johnston, 21 Mich. 319; Cass Co. v. Banks, 44 Mich. 467; Perry v. New Orleans, M. &. C. R. R. Co., 55 Ala. 413; Tillman v. People, 12 Mich. 401; Logan v. Rose, 88 Cal. 263; Stone V. Brooks, 35 Cal. 489; Han- son V. Eastman, 21 Minn. 509; Hol- dane v. Cold Springs, 21 N. Y. 474. 6 Meth. E. Ch. v. Hoboken, 33 N. J. L. 13; Cook v. Burlington, 30 Iowa, 94; Stone v. Brooks, 35 Cal. 489. 419 §223 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. xiir. irrevocable.-' Bnt a dedication of a tract of land is not affected by the fact, that only a part of such land has been devoted to the intended public use, while the rest of such land is tempora- rily leased to private individuals.^ So, on the other hand, will the claim of the public to lands, which have been dedicated, be effected by proceedings begun by the corporation for the con- demnation of the land, or for taxing the laud for city or countj'' purposes, under the mistaken impression that the city had no claim to such land.* But if the corporation has accepted a ded- ication of property to public use, the dedicator and the city may combine to revoke such dedication and acceptance, pro- vided third persons have not acquired vested rights therein, through the purchase of lots bound by the land dedicated to public use.* § 223. Effect of acceptance Apart from the effect of ac- ceptance in making a dedication irrevocable, the further conse- quence of the etsistence or absence of the act of acceptance, is that in order that the municipality may be charged with the duty of repairing and keeping in proper condition the lands so dedicated to public use, and be liable to injuries incurred by in- dividuals, while making use of such land, there must be an accept- ance of the dedication by the duly authorized agents or officers of the corporation. It is not necessary that this acceptance should appear as a matter of record, or be made bj^ an ordinance ; but it may be implied from the making or ordering of repairs by the proper officers.^ Or it may be implied, where such repairs 1 Crockett V. Boston, 5 Cusli. (Mass.) 182; Baker V. Johnston, 21 Mich. 319; Long V. Battle Creek, 39 Mich. 323. 2 Plaquemines Par. Pol. Jury v. Foulhouze, 30 La. An., part I. 64. 3 Lemon V. Hayden, 13 Wis. 159; Chicago Y. Wright, 69 111. 328. ' Municipality v. Levee, S. C. P. Co., 7 La. An. 270. ^In re Com'rs of Parks, 53 Hun, 556; Hobbs v, Lowell, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 415; Teagarden v. McBean, 33 Miss. 383; Gedge v. Commonwealth, 9 Bush(Ky.) 61; Cohoes v. D. & H. Can. Co., 31 N. B. R. 887; Dayton v. Rutland, 84 111. 279; s. c, 25 Am. Rep. 457; Com. v. Moorhead, 118 Pa. 420 St. 344; Osage v. Larkins, 19 Pac. R. 658; Atty. Gen. v. Tarr, 148 Mass. 309; State v. Bradbury, 40 Me. 154; State V. Wilson, 42 Me. 9; Illinois Ins. Co. V. Littlefleld, 67 111. 368; Jersey City V. State, 30 N. J. L. 531; Holmes V. Jersey City, 12 N. J. Eq. 299; Mass. V. Springfield, 14 S. W. R. 630; Boo- raem v. North Hudson County Ey. Co., 39 N. J. Eq. 465; Tower v. Rut- land, 56 Vt. 28; Oswego v. Osw. Ca- nal Co., 6 N. Y. 257; Niagara Falls Susp. Br. Co. V. Baohman, 66 N. T. 261; Gilder v. Brenham, 67 Tex. 345; Kennedy v. Cumberland, 65 Md. 514; Bartlott v. Beardmore, 77 Wis. 356; Parsons v. Atlanta Univ. CH. XIII.] DEDICATION OF Pr.OPBRTY TO PUBLIC USE. § 223 have been made and subsequently paid for by the authorities, ■which had the legal power to accept such street or highway.^ The fact, that a dedication of land to the public is a beneficial one, will support the presumption of an acceptance, and dispense with any further direct or other proof of such acceptance.^ The acceptance of a plat, describing streets, etc., when done by the proper authorities, was held a sufficient acceptance of the dedication to bind a corporation.^ So, also, has it been held to be sufficient proof of acceptance of a street for a town council to direct a well to be dug therein.* Other similar acts on the part of the corporation would be equivalent to an ac- ceptance of the dedication.^ But, in oi-der that the acceptance may be proven by implication from dealings with the property dedicated, the officer so using or dealing with the property dedicated must have the power, under the municipal chartei', to accept the dedication. Thus, it was held tiiat a surveyor, who had no power to accept a dedication, could not by the re- pairs of the land so dedicated, bind the corporation to the legal effect of an acceptance.^ Where the State dedicates lands to city purposes, there is never any occasion for proof of acceptance by the city ; for the act of dedication is likewise an acceptance of the same by Trs., 44 Ga. 529; Wilson v. Hull, 24 Pac. K. "799; Commonwealth v. Bel- den, 13 Met. (Mass.) 10; Jennings v. Tisbury, 5 Gray (Mass.) 73; Folsom V. Underbill, 36 Vt. 580; Gardner v. Johnston, (R. I.) 12 Atl. Rep. 888; Kelly's Case, 8 Gratt. 632; State v. Carver, 5 Strob. (S. C.) 217; Abbott V. Cottage City, 143 Mass. 521 ; Bow- man V. Boston, 5 Cush. 1 ; Hyde v. Jamaica, 27 Vt. 443. • Jennings v. Tisbury, 5 Gray, 73; Hayden v. Attleborough, 7 Gray, 338 ; State V. Kew Boston, 11 N. H. 413; Commonwealth v. Belden, 13 Met. 10; Hemphill v. Boston, 8 Cush. 195; Manderschid v. Dubuque, 29 Iowa, 73. 2 Abbott V. Cottage City, 143 Mass. 521 ; Guthrie v. New Haven, 31 Conn. 308. « Eequa v. Rochester, 45 K T. 129; Niagara Falls Susp. Br. Co. v. Baoh- man, 66 N. T. 261; Lake View v. Le Bahn, 120111. 92; Baker v. Johnston, 21 Mich. 319; People v. Jones, 6 Mich. 467; Tillman v. People, 12 Mich. 401 ; Cass County v. Banks, 44 Mich. 467; State v. Chase, 42 Mo. App. 343; Griffiths v. Galindo, 86 Cal. 192. *Pope V. Union, 18 N. J. Eq. 282; Aiken T. C. v. Lythgoe, 7 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 435. s Wayne etc. Bk. v. Stockwell, 84 Mich. 586; Baker v. Johnson, 21 lb. 319; Click v. Lamar Co., 79 Tex. »217; Detroit v. Det. & Milw. R. R. Co., 23 Mich. 173; Shortle v. Minne- apolis, 17 Minn. 308; Emery v. Wash- ington, 1 Brayton (Vt.) 128; Rose v. St. Charles, 49 Mo. 509; Blodgett v. Royalton, 17 Vt. 40. 6 State V. Bradbury, 40 Me. 154. 421 §224 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. xni. the public. Or, rather, it would be better stated that, by the act of dedication by the State, there was an overruling com- mand for acceptance of such dedication, and of the obligations dependent thereupon, by the city.^ In Iowa, the statute requires that the acceptance of lands dedicated to the public, can only be made by ordinance ex- pressly passed for that purpose.^ In accepting lands dedicated to public uses, it is not neces- sary for the city to accept all or reject all ; part of the land dedicated may be accepted and part rejected.^ In Michigan, it has been held that there must be an acceptance within a rea- sonable time, or otherwise the dedication will be presumed to have been withdrawn.* § 224. Extent of common law dedication as respects donor's title. — As a general proposition, in the absence of statutes requiring the contrary, where lands are donated by the owner for the public use by the common law dedication, the donor is presumed to have intended to give a mere ease- ment in favor of the public, and not the title in fee. In such a oase, the owner is presumed to have intended to retain the title to such land, the right to employ and make use of the land, in every otiier way which does not conflict with the public ease- ment thus created. As, for example, if there are minerals in the soil, he has a right to mine such minerals, in the absence of statutes controlling the same.^ This question, so far as it 1 Eeilly v. Eacine, 51 Wis. 526. 2 Laughlin v. Washington, 63 Iowa, 652. 8 Bell V. Burlington, 68 Iowa, 296. 4 Cass Co. V. Banks, 44 Mich. 467, citing Baker v. Johnston, 21 Mich. 319; Wayne Co. v. Miller, 31 Mich. 447; White v. Smith, 37 Mich. 291. But see Price v. Breckenridge, 92 Mo. 378; Barclay v. Howell's Les- see, 6 Pet. 512; Borrowman v. Mitch- ell, 2 Up. Can. Q. B. 135. = Hobsonv. Monteith, 14 Pac. R. 740; Pomeroy v. Mills, 3 Vt. 279; Ab- bott V. Mills, lb. 521; Des Moines v. Hall, 24 Iowa, 234; White v. Godfrey, 97 Mass. 472; Bliss v. Ball, 99 Mass. 597; Brakkeu v. Minneapolis & St. L. 422 By. Co., 29 Minn. 41; Baker v. St. Louis, 75 Mo. 671; Turner v. Hol- land, (Mich.) 33 N. W. R. 383; Per- ley V. Chandler, 6 Mass. 454; Boston V. Richardson, 13 Allen, 152, 153; Newington v. Jacobs, 25 L. T. (N. S.) 800; Indianapolis v. Kingsbury, 101 Ind. 200; Lade v. Shepherd, 2 Stra. 1004; Dubuque v. Maloney, 9 Iowa, 450; Every v. Smith, 26 L. J. Exch. 344; Perry v. New Orleans, M. & C. R. R. Co., 55 Ala. 413; Stephen- son V. Chattanooga, 20 Fed. Bep. 586; Harrison v. Parker, 6 East, 154; Jack- son V. Hathaway, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 447; Dawes v. Hawkins, 4 L. T. (N. S.) 288; Queen v. Plunkett, 21 Up. Can. Q. B. 536. OH. Xni.] DEDICATION OF PEOPEKTY TO PUBLIC USE. § 225 relates to streets will be more fully discussed in the chapter on streets.-' Suffice it to say, that where there is a simple ease- ment granted in the public streets, while the fee is retained by the dedicator, lots which are bound by such streets extend their boundary line to the middle of the street ; the grantee of the abutting land takes to the center of the street subject to the public easement.^ But where the dedication of the property operates to pass the fee to the streets and alleys, the abutting owner owns the edge of the street and cannot claim any pro- prietary rights in the soil under the street.^ Although, in the State in which the question arises, a dedication under statute, or in other words, a statutory dedication, provides that the fee shall pass to the streets and alleys ; yet, if the dedication in the particular case is in some other way than that which is pre- scribed by the statute, and can therefore only operate as a com- mon law dedicator, the fee will in that case remain in the dedicator or his grantees, and the easement for public use will alone he created by the public* § 225. PuWiq right to alluvium and accretions. — If land which is bounded by a river, is dedicated to the city for public use, the city acquires by such dedication to the public use, the rights and privileges of a riparian proprietor in respect to the alluvium and accretions to such land.^ If, in such a case, a street or public common lies along the stream, any accretion to i§30l. 2 John and Cherry Streets, In re, 19 Wend. 659 ; In re Flick, (Pa. 92) 6 Gulp. 329; Lotz v. Heading I. Co., 10 Pa. Ct. R. 497; Hollo way v. Southmayd, 18 ]Sr. Y. S. (92) 707; HoUoway v. Delano, 28 Ab. N. C. 190; Stiles v. Curtis, 4 Day (Conn.) 328; Bissell v. Railroad Co., supra ; Sherman v. Mc- Keon, 38 N. Y. 266; Bissell v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 61; Co- lumbus & W. Ry. Co. V. Witherow, 82 Ala. 190; Watkins v. Lynch, 71 Cal. 21; 11 Pac. R. 808; Ayres Penn. E. Co., 20 Atl. R. 54; Penn. R. R. Co. V. Pittsburgh Gr. Elev. Co., 50 Pa. St. 499; Willoughby v. Jenks, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 96; Wager v. Troy Union, etc., E. E. Co., 25 N. Y. 526. 3 People V. Kerr, 27 N. T. 188; Duyckruok v. New York, 125 N. Y. 164; Clinton v. Cedar R. R. Co., 24 Iowa, 455 ; Lindsay v. Omaha, 46 JT. W. 627; Moliter v. Sheldon, 87 Kan. 246. *Warburton v. Demorett, 27 N. E. E. 730; San Francisco v. Spring V. W. W., 48 Cal. 493; Gebhardt v. Reeves, 75 HI. 301; Silvey v. McCool, 86 Ga. 1; Dubuque v. Benson, 23 Iowa, 248. *Kew Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662; Hoboken v. Penn. R. R. Co., 124 U. S. 656, 690; Trus- tees V. School, 12 X. E. R. 243; St. Louis V. Lemp, 6 S. W. R. 344; Turner v. Holland, (Mich.) 33 N. W. E. 383; Cox v. Louisville, N. 423 §225 municipaij corporations. [CH. xni. the shore, resulting from the operation of the water, will go to the public ; and the private owners of lands, abutting on the opposite side of the stream, will have no right to claim the benefit of such accretions.^ Of course, in making a dedication of lands fronting on a stream, the right to the soil under the water may be reserved by the owner thereof.^ And so, also, where the State is the owner of the land under water, the street or public use in such lands cannot be dedicated by the riparian proprietor, because he lias not the title to it ; and in case of the filling up of such lands by natural accretion or deposit of garbage and soil, the title to the land, thus formed, remains in the State, in which it is already vested.^ But where the ri- parian proprietor and not the State owns the submerged land, and such riparian proprietor proceeds to fill in the land thus submerged, with the extension of the water front and shore will the public right to extend the street be recognized i. e., the public easement over such land, by virtue of the dedication of the land for the use of a street, will continue to extend indefi- nitely out into the stream, in proportion to .formation of any land on the shore by accretions.* So, also, where streets termi- nate or border on navigable waters, whether they have been A. & C. K. K Co., 48 lud. 178; Clarke V. Providence, (R. I.) 15 Atl. R. 763; Manley v. Gibson, 13 111. 312; Leon- ard Heirs v. Baton Rouge, 4 So. E. 240; Cook v. Burlington, 30 Iowa, 94; St. Paul & Pac. R. R. Co. v. Scliur- meir, 7 Wall. 272, 289; Yates v. Mil- waukee, 10 Wall. 497, 504; Euch v. New Orleans, 43 La. An. 275 ; Tates V. Judd, 18 Wis. 118; Elgin v. Beok- with, 119 111. 367; Turner v. People's Ferry Co., 21 Fed. Rep. 90; Illinois v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 730; Martin v. Evansville, 32 Ind. 85. ' Potomac Steamboat Co. v. Upper Pot. etc. Co., 109 U. S. 672. 2 New York v. Hart, 95 N. Y. 443, 452, 456. ^Hoboken v. Pennsylvania R. E. Co., 124 U. S. 656. < Illinois V. Illinois Cen. R. E. Co., 33 Fed. 730; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 IJ. S. 324 ; Potomac Steamboat Co. v. 424 Up. Pot. Steamboat Co., 109 U. S. 672; Clarke v. Providence, (E I.) 15 Atl. E. 763; Morris Canal & B. Co. v. Jersey City, 12 N. J. Eq. 252; Lock- wood & N. Y. & N. H. R. E. Co., 37 Conn. 391 ; Campbell v. Laclede Gasl. Co., 84 Mo. 352, 372; St. Louis v. Eutz, 138 U. S. 226; Jersey City v. Dummer, Spencer, 20 N. J. L. 106; Louisiana Ice Co. v. New Orleans, 43 La. An. 217; The Hoboken Land & Imp. Co. V. Hoboken, 36 N. J. Law, 540; Jersey City V. Morris Canal & B. Co., 12 N. J. Eq. 547; New York, L. E. & W. R. R. Co. V. Yard, 43 N. J. L. 121; s. c, lb. 632; Eutz v. See- ger, 35 Fed. 188; Cook v. Burlington, 30 Iowa, 94; Morris Canal & B. Co. V. Central E. R. Co., 16 N. J. Eq. 419, 431 ; Jeremy v. Elwell, 5 OWo Cir. 379; Steers v. Brooklyn, 101 >"• Y. 51 ; Hoboken v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 124 U. S. 656. CH. Xlir.] DEDICATION OF PKOPEETY TO PUBLIC TTSE. § 226 established by condemnation, or by dedication, and whether the fee to the land was acquired for public use in the city or in the original proprietor ; in either case, the city has the power of establishing on the water front, adjoining such streets, public wharfs to be regulated by them ; and for the use of which they may charge a reasonable wharfage.-' There exists, however, under the adjudications, some doubt whether the public can acquire land for a public landing, by way of implication or by a common law dedication. While there can be no doubt that there may be an express dedication of lands for such a purpose ; yet, some of the cases maintain that there cannot be any im- plied dedication of land for such a purpose, which is established only by long user or acquiescence.^ But this is not generally agreed to, and the contrary proposition is maintained by many CHses,^ which hold that there may be a prescribed right, or a common law implied dedication to use land as a public landing. § 226. Dedication to use as public squares. — Not only may land be dedicated to public use as streets, which is the more common case of dedication ; but, likewise, there may be an effective dedication by the landowner of a part of his land for use as a public square. And the fact of dedication for such use maj' be established by the same evidence, and in the same manner, as in the case of streets and highways. Thus, for example, parties who buy lots which are marked out on a plat 1 Adams v. Ohio Falls Co., (Ind. 92) 31 N. E. E. 57; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324; Newport v. Taylor's Ex., 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 699; McMurray V. Baltimore, 54 Md. 104; Dugan v. Baltimore, 5 Gill & J. 375; Godfrey V. Alton, 12 111. 29; Alton v. 111. Transp. Co., 12 111. 60; Haight v. Keokuk, 4 Iowa, 199; Eowan's Ex. V. Portland, 8 B. Mon. 253; Portland & W. V. E. E. Co. V. Portland, 14 Oreg. 188; Newport v. Taylor's Ex., 16 B. Mon. 700; Barney v. Baltimore, 1 Hughes C. C. 118; Coffin v. Port- land, 11 Saw. C. C. E. 600; s. c, 27 Fed. Eep. 412. 2 State V. Wilson, 42 Me. 9 ; Pearsall V. Post, 20 Wend. Ill; Littlefield v. Maxwell, 31 Me. 184; Bethurse v. Turner, 1 Me. 111. * Abbott V. Cottage City, 143 Mass. 521; Municipality v. Kirk, 5 La. An. 34; Penny Pot Landing Case, 16 Pa. St. 79; Coolidge v. Learned, 8 Pick. 505. *Lee V. Mound Station, 118 111. 804; Plumb V. Grand Eapids, (Mich.) 45 N. W. E. 1024; Huber v. Gazley, 18 Ohio, 18; Brown v. Manning, 6 Ohio, 298; Atty. Gen. v. Abbott, 154 Mass. 323; Daniels v. Wilson, 27 Wis. 492; San Leandro v. Le Breton, 72 Cal. 170; Archer v. Salimas City, 93 Cal. 43; Kelly v. West Seattle, etc. Co., 29 Pac. E. 1054; Baker v. Johnston, 21 Mich. 319; Smith v. Houston, 6 Ohio, 101; Abbott v. Cottage City, 143 Mass. 521; Abbott v. Mills, 3 Vt. 425 § 226 MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS. [CH. xni. as bordering on a public square, and who purchase such lots in reliance upon their proximity to the public square, acquire the right to have such square opened and maintained ; and the owner of the land which was described as being dedicated to use as a public square or common, cannot inclose or take away such land, from the use of the public and of the purchasers of these lots.-' It has also been held that simply writing the word " park " upon a block or map of the city, indicates a dedication to public use for such a purpose ; and purchasers of adjoining lots in reliance upon, or with reference to, such plat, will have the power of compelling the donation of the land so described to the use of the public as a park.^ To what use a public square may be put, will vary accord- ing to the understanding of various communities, as to what was the public intention, and what is proper. According to some authorities, it is impossible for a public square to be used for any pui'pose but as a place of public or common amusement ; and it has been held that the courts may enjoin the erection upon such public square or commons of any public buildings.^ But the general rule seems to be, that while it would be impos- sible for the town to authorize the erection of private buildings upon a public square or common, and if so authorized they may be revoked as nuisances ; * yet, it is deemed generally to be ad- missible for a public square to be used for the erection of a coun- 521; state v. Catlin, lb. 530; Pear- sail V. Post, 20 Wend. Ill, 117; s. c, 22 Wend. 425, 433; Commonwealth V. Eush, 14 Pa. St. 186; State v. Wil- kinson, 2 Vt. 480; State v. Trask, 6 Vt. 355; Wateriown v. Coweu, 4 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 510; Winona v. Huff, 11 Minn. 119; Reynolds' Heirs V. Stark Co. Com'rs, 5 Ohio, 204. 1 Laughlin v. Washington, 63 Iowa, 652; Cf. Clarke V. Providence, 15 Atl. R. 763. 2 Price V. Plainfield, 40 X. J. L. 608; Archer v. Salinas, 93 Cal. 43 ; May- wood Co. V. Maywood, 118 111. 61. But see Hennepin County Com'rs v. Dayton, 17 Minn. 260, where it is held that the words " county block," marked across a block on a town 426 plat, wer« not a sufficient dedication under the statute of Minnesota. s Prince ville v. Auten, 77 111. 325; Cf. State V. Schweiekert, (Mo. 92) 195 S. W. E. 47. i New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 661, 725; State v. Woodward, 23 Vt. 92; Columbus v. Jaques, 30 6a. 506; State v. Atkinson, 24 Vt. 448; Archer v. Salinas, 93 Cal. 43 ; Hutchin- son V. Pratt, 11 Vt. 402, 423 ; Pomeroy V. Mills, 3 Vt. 279; People v. Carpen- ter, 1 Mich. 273; State v. Mobile, 5 Port. (Ala.) 279; Commonwealth v. Rush, 14 Pa. St. 186; New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 661, 725, 735; Cooper V. Alden, Han-ing. Ch. (Mich.) 72. CH. Xin.] DEDICATION OP PEOPEETY TO PUBLIC USE. § 226 ty or State public building, because the practice has been more or less universal to locate the public buildings upon the public squares.^ It has thus been held to be permissible for a public square to be used for the location of a county court house and jail; and, also, for the maintenance of hitching-posts and stand- ing room on such square for farmers' horses.^ It has also been questioned to what extent the county has any inherent right to appropriate the use of a public square to county uses. The es- tablishment of a custom to permit such use of a public square is of course evidence of an original dedication to countj' as well as to municipal uses ; but, in the absence of such established practice or custom, the county has no more right than a private individual to encroach upon the lands dedicated to the city for public use as a square.^ In all cases, it is a question depend- ent upon the laws and customs of the local community or State, in which the question arises.* It has been held that a city has the right to erect a public library building upon the said square, it being held that such an appropriation of the public square would still be for a public use and included in the purposes of the dedication.^ The street or highway cannot be inclosed by the local au- thorities, but a public square or common may be so inclosed, where such inclosure is designed to provide for the better en- joyment of the square as a place of amusement or recreation for the public.^ It has also been held that it is possible for a municipality to authorize the establishment of a street or highway through a park; and that by so doing there has not been any interference with the donation of that part of ' San Antonio v. Steinberg, (Tex.) 7 S. W. R. 754; Langley v. Gallipo- lis, 2 Ohio St. 107, 110; Common- wealth V. Bowman, 3 Pa. St. 202, 203. 2 Frederick Co. v. Winchester, (Va.) 5 So. E. Rep. 884. But see contra, Samuel v. ]S'ash\^lle, 3 Sneed (Tenn.) 298. ' McCullough V. San Francisco Board of Education, 51 Cal. 418; Princeville v. Auten, 77 111. 325. ♦ Baker v. Johnston, 21 Mich. 319; Baird v. Rice, 63 Pa. St. 489; State V. Waddell, 52 N. W. E. 213; Com- monwealth V. Bowman, 3 Pa. St. 202; Commonwealth v. Alburger, 1 Whart. 469. * Riggs V. Detroit Board of Educa- tion, 27 Mich. 262. •■ Commonwealth v. Bowman, 3 Pa. St. 202; Baird v. Rice, 63 Pa. St. 489; Hutchinson v. Pratt, 11 Vt. 402,423; Leftwich v. Placquemine, 14 La. An. 152; Baker v. Johnston, 21 Mich. 319; Seguin v. Ireland, 58 Tex. 183; Lang- ley V. Gallipolis, 2 Ohio St. 107. 427 227 MUNICIPAL COIiPOEATIONS. [CH. xni. the park for the public use as such.^ But this is not accepted as a general doctrine ; on the contrary, it has been held else- where that, without the consent of the adjoining lot owner, the town could not lay out streets through the public park or square, without being guilty of a diversion of the land from the use to which the land was dedicated.^ The public may ac- quire, however, a highway across a park or public square, either by dedication, or by a user for the statutory period of limitation.^ And if a street runs through the land when it was dedicated to public use as a square, it is impossible for the citv council to direct such street to be closed up.* It has also been held that a town maj' grant to a railroad cor- poration the right of establishing upon the commons of the town a railroad depot.^ § 227. Dedication to other pnlblic uses. — The dedication of lands by private owners is not confined simply to use as a public street or square ; but lands may be dedicated in writing or parol to any other municipal, public, or charitable use ; and be equally effective ; as, for example, dedication to the public use for the erection of public buildings,^ for school purposes,' for church squares or lots,^ for a burying ground,^ and for a ' Cohu V. Parcels, 72 Cal. 367. 2 Price V. Thompson, 38 Mo. 363; Jacksonville v. Jacks. Ry. Co., 67 111. 540. In the latter case, Thorn- ton, J., says: "What were the uses and purposes intended? Streets and puhlic squares are donated. Each has a well-known and well-defined meaning. The one was designed for the purpose of travel, and the right of passage over the streets in any mode not to destroy their useful- ness was given by the plat. The square was intended for beauty and adornment, and for the health and recreation of the public. A dedica- tion must always be construed with reference to the object with which it was made. The donors never could have intended that this ground should be used as a street." 8 Cohn V. Parcels, 72 Cal. 367; Greene County v. Hufe, 91 Ind. 333. 428 1 Portland v. Whittle, 3 Oreg. 126; see, also, Brooklyn Park Comm'rs V. Armstrong, 45 X. Y. 234, 240. 5 Crawford v. Mobile & G. K. E. Co., 67 Ga. 405. But see Barney v, Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324; State v. Wad- dell, (Minn. 92) 52 N. W. E. 213. 6 Smith V. Heuston, 6 Ohio, 101; lb. 298, 305 ; Reynold's Heirs v. Stark Co. Comm'rs, 5 Ohio, 204. ' Klinkener v. School District, 11 Pa. St. 444. ^ Lennig v. Ocean City Assoc, 41 N. J. Eq. 24; Antones v. Eslava, 9 Port. (Ala.) 527; Hannibal v. Draper, 15 Mo. 634; Gumbert's App., 110 Pa. St. 496. ' 9 Post V. Pearsall, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 425, 454; Campbell v. Kansas City, (Mo. 92) 13 S. W. E. 896; Wei- senberg v. Truman, 58 Cal. 63; Wood V. Macon & B. E. E. Co., 68 Ga. 539. CH. XIII.J DEDICATION OF PROPERTY TO PUBLIC USE. § 228 public mai'ket.i But in order that there may be a dedication by any other means, except by a formal grant, it must be a ded- ication to some public use ; otherwise the dedication is invalid.^ § 228. Effect of misuser or abandonment of dedicated lands. — Property which is unconditionally dedicated to the public use in general, or to some particular use of the public, will not revert to the original owner, except when the execu- tion of such a use becomes impossible ; and when the city or State makes an improper use of the land which has been dedi- cated to the public, equity will, upon the interference by the proper parties, prohibit such diversion of the land and compel its devotion to the intended use.^ But whenever the applica- tion of the land to the use, for which it was dedicated, becomes impossible ; as, for example, where land had been dedicated for a county-seat, and the county-seat was afterwards removed to some other place, the right to the soil would necessarily revert to the dedicator and his heirs and assigns.^ In the case of the vacation of a street, the general rule of law provides that the title to the abutting owners, extending to the center of the street subject to the easement, such abutting owner will at once acquire the absolute title to the land covered by the ease- ment of the public.^ But, in Illinois, it has been held that, on the vacation of a street, the land covered by such street reverts to the original proprietor instead of the present owner of the adjacent lots.^ 1 President etc. v. Indianapolis, 12 Ind. 620; Dummer v. City, 1 N. J. L. 86. 2 Todd V. Pittsburgh Ft. "W. & C. R. E. Co., 19 Ohio St. 514; Ayres v. Pa. R. E. Co., 48 N. J. L. 44; 57 Am. Rep. 538; Mc Williams v. Morgan, 61 111. 89. 'Warren t. Lyons City, 22 Iowa, 351; Price v. Thompson, 48 Mo. 363; Price V. Meth. E. Church, 4 Ohio, 514; Williams v. First Presbyterian Soc, 1 Ohio St. 478; Webb v. Moler, 8 Ohio, 552; Campbell Co. Court v. Newport, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 538; Au- gusta V. Perkins, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 107; Brown V. Manning, 6 Ohio, 298; Church V. Portland, 13 Oregon, 73; Van Wert Board of Education v. Ed- son, 18 Ohio St. 221; Coffin v. Port- land, 11 Sawy. C. C. K. 600; s. c, 27 Fed. Rep. 412; Harris v. Elliott, 10 Pet. 25; Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 6 Pet. 498, 507; Portland & W. V. R. R. Co. V. Portland, 14 Oreg. 188. * County of Kent v. Grand Rapids, 61 Mich. 144. But see contra, See- bold V. Shitler, 34 Pa. St. 133. 6 Banks v. Ogden, 2 Wall. 57, 69; Wallace v. Fee, 50 N. Y. 694; Weis- bod V. Railroad Co., 18 Wis. 43. 5 Gebhardt v. Reeves, 75 111. 301 ; Zinc Co. V. La Salle, 117 111. 411. But see contra, Day v. Schroeder, 46 Iowa, 546. 429 § 229 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. XIH. § 229. Alienation of dedicated lands. — It is manifest that a municipal corporation has no implied authority to dispose of lands which have been dedicated to it for the public benefit; nor would such property be subject to sale for the payment of the debts of the municipal corporation.^ Lands, which are dedicated to the public use, are not even alienable, when on account of the surrounding circumstances they become un- suitable for the use to which they were dedicated. A sale of such property by the municipal corporation can only be effected by and with the consent of the dedicator or his representatives ; for, otherwise, the fact that it becomes impossible to apply the lands to the use for which they were dedicated, would cause a reversion of the title of such land to the dedicator or his heirs.^ Lands are not even liable for the debts of a municipal corpora- tion, where such lands are donated to use, as a market, even where it has been granted to the corporation in fee, in exchange for a square, by legislative authority, and which was originally dedicated for use as a market place.^ This is the statement in regard to the power of a municipal corporation to alien or dispose of property dedicated to pubhc use through some implied power of such corporation. It is a different and more difficult question to determine, how far and when the Legislature of a State may authorize a municipal cor- poration to dispose of property, which has been dedicated to it for some public use. The general rule of constitutional limita- tions will of course apply here, viz., to direct or authorize the 1 Xew Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 734; Haberman v. Baker, 128 N. T. 253; Branliam v. San Jose, 24 Cal. 585; Los Angeles etc. Co. v. Los Angeles, (Cal. 92) 30 Pac. R. 523; Brooklyn Park Cora'rs v. Armstrong, 45 N. T. 234; Cummings v. St. Louis, 90 Mo. 259; Price v. Thompson, 48 Mo. 363; Hamilton v. Chicago etc. Co., (111. 88) 15 N. E. B. 854; Mathews V. Alexandria, 68 Mo. 115 ; Cromwell V. Conn. Brown Stone Q. Co., 50 Conn. 470; Arkansas K. P. Co. v. Sarrells, (Ark.) 8 S. W. Rep. 683; West Carroll Par. v. Gladdis, 34 La. An. 928; Pickett v. Hastings, 47 Cal. 269; Rutherford v. Taylor, 38 Mo. 430 315; Commonwealth v. Alburger, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 469; San Francisco v. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541 ; Frederick Co. V. Winchester, (Va.) 4 S. E. E. 844; Alves' Ex. v. Henderson, 16 B. Men. (Ky.) 131, 168; Louisville v. Lieb- friend, 17 S. W. E. 870; Police Jury V. McCormack, 32 La. An. 624; Kau- som V. Boal, 29 Iowa, 68; San Antonio V. Lewis, 15 Tex. 388; School Dist. No. 2 V. Hart, (Wyo. 92) 29 Pac. Kep. 741. 2 Van Wert Bd. of Ed. v. Edson, 16 Ohio St. 221; Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Hart, supra. 8 Indianapolis & B. R. B. Co. v. In- dianapolis, 12 Ind. 620. OH. XIII.] DEDICATION OF PEOPEETY TO PUBLIC USE. § 229 exercise of any power which is not prohibited by the constitu- tion of the State or of the United States, expressly or by neces- sary implication. Hence, wherever the municipal corporation holds the full title to the ground which has been dedicated to public use, instead of merely having the easement therein, the Legislature may directly authorize the sale of such land.^ But where the dedication has been made of simply an easement therein; 2 and, also, for a specific and limited purpose, as, for example, a public square ; then it is impossible, at least as held by some of the courts, for any Legislature to authorize such municipalitjr to sell the land so dedicated ; because such a sale would be a violation of the special trust, which has been created in favor of the public by the dedication of the land to the spe- cific purpose.^ In Louisiana, by the Civil Law, in the case of land dedicated to public use, the public acquire the title to the soil.* But not- withstanding that fact, it is held that such laud did not con- stitute a part of the public domain, and therefore cannot be aliened or devoted to any other than the use to which it was dedicated, except in the exercise of the right of eminent do- main.^ But where public places or squares have been estab- lished by public authoritj', then the power to control the dis- 1 Van Ness v. Washington, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 232 (1830); Potomac Steam Boat Co. V. Upper Potomac Co., 109 U. S. 672 (1883) ; Indianapolis & B. R. R. Co. V. Indianapolis, 12 Ind. (520; Brooklyn Park Com'rs v. Armstrong, 3 Lans. (N. Y.) 429 (1871); s. c, 45 N. Y. 234 (1871) ; Woodson v. Skinner, 22 Mo. 13 (1855) ; Carondelet v. Mc- Pherson, 20 Mo. 192; Swartz v. Page, 13 Mo. 610; Les Bois v. Bramell, 4 How. (U. S.) 449, 458. ^ John and Cherry Streets, In re, 19 Wend. 659; Woodruff v. Neal, 28 Coun. 168 (1859). ' Warren v. Lyons City, 22 Iowa, 351 ; Gilman v. Milwaukee, 55 Wis. 328; Jacksonville v. Jacks. Ry. Co., 67 111. 540; Stockton v. Newark, 42 N. J. Eq. (15 Stew.) 531. But the last case was subsequently over- ruled by Newark v. Stockton, 44 N. J. Eq. 179, in which it was held that a Legislature did have the right to au- thorize the proliibition of the use of laud as a burial ground, and devotion of such land to other municipal uses, although the title to such land had been conveyed to the city for the pur- pose of maintaining a burial ground. Perhaps, in this case, the judgment of the court had been mainly influ- enced by the consideration of the necessity of stopping or putting an end to the use of the ground as a burial ground, as an exercise of po- lice power for the preservation of public health. * Renthrop v. Bourg, 4 Martin (La.) 97; Doe v. Jones, 11 Ala. 63, 83. 5 New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 661, Y25, 835; 3 Kent Com. 451. rtSl § 229 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS. [CH. XIH. position of such lands to other purposes of a public character is in no wise limited by the consideration of the rights of own- ers of the property abutting, or in the vicinity.^ ' New Orleans v. Hopkins, 13 La. 326; New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662 ; New Orleans v. Leverich, 432 lb. 332; De Armas V. New Orleans, 5 La. 132. CHAPTER XIV. BMIKENT DOMAIN. Section. 230 — Eminent domain defined. 231 — Constitutional limitations. 232 — Exercise of power regulated by Legislature. 233 — Delegation of power to mu- nicipal corporations. 284 — What is a public purpose. 234 a — Power to take lands for a private road. 235 — Power to take land for orna- mental purposes. ' 236 — Power to take lands for pur- pose of draining them. 237 — Power to take land beyond city limits. 238 — What property may be taken. 239 — ^What constitutes a taking. 240 — Exercise of eminent domain Section. by municipal corporations. 241 — Conditions precedent to the exercise of the power. 242 — ^Effect of discontinuance of proceedings. 243 — Compensation required. 244 — Who entitled to receive com- pensation. 245 — Who assesses the damages. 246 — The measure of value or damages. 247 — ^When payment should be made. 248 — Apportionment of damages among lots benefited. 249 — Revisory proceedings — Cer- tiorari. 250 — Effect of accepting damages. § 230. Eminent domain defined. — I have elsewhere more fully explained ^ how all lands were originally the common property of the human race ; and necessarily so, since land is the free gift of nature, and not the product of man's labor. It was also demonstrated that, under the present law of real prop- erty, the private owner of lands acquires only a tenancy of more or less limited duration, under the absolute and ultimate pro- prietorship of the State, as the representative of organized so- ciety, subject to certain conditions, one of which is that the State may at any time, on payment of its value, reclaim the' tenancy so granted to private individuals, whenever the public exigencies require such confiscation. The right of confiscation of private lands for public purposes is called the right of emi- nent domain. Mr. Cooley speaks of eminent domain as refer- ring, not only to those superior rights of the State in the private lands of the individual, but also to any lauds which the State ' See Tiedeman's Police Power, § 115. 28 433 §231 MITNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS. [CH. XIV. may own absolutely, such as public buildings, forts, navigable rivers, etc.^ It seems to me that this more comprehensive use of the term unnecessarily confounds it with " public domain," and deprives it of its technical and special signification. Mr. Cooley also defines the term to mean " that superior right of property pertaining to the sovereignty, by which the private property acquired by its citizens under its protection may be taken, or its use controlled, for the public benefit, without re- gard to the wishes of its owners," ^ including personal as well as real propertj-, except money and rights of action.^ There is some foundation for this use of the term in the writings of po- litical economists and publicists, and in the dicta of judges.* It is also true that personal property may be forcibly taken from private owners for public uses, whenever an extreme ne- cessity requires it, as in the case of war or of a general fam- ine.* But, inasmuch as the grounds for the justification of this involuntary appropriation of private property to public purposes are different, according as the property is real or per- sonal, the former resting upon the claim of a superior property in lands, the otlier upon the illogical plea of urgent and over- ruling necessity, it is wise to confine the term " eminent do- main " to the cases of land appropriated, and employ some other term to signify the official appropriation of personal prop- erty. Eminent domain, therefore, is the superior right of the State to appropriate for public purposes the private lands with- in its borders, upon payment of a proper cotapensation for the property so taken. § 231. Constitutional limitations. — Both in the Constitu- 1 Cooley on Const. Lim. 647, 648. 2 Cooley on Const. Lim. 649. 3 Cooley on Const. Lim. 652, 653. " Generally it may be said, legal and equitable rights of every description are liable to be thus appropriated. From this statement, however, must be excepted money, or that which in ordinary use passes as such, and which the government may reach by taxation, and also rights in action, which can only be available when made to produce money; neither of which can it be needful co take 434 under this power." * " The right which belongs to the society or to the sovereign of dis- posing, in case of necessity, and for the public safety, of all the wealth contained in the State, is called the eminent domain." McKinley, J., in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 223. In this case, as probably, in all other actual cases of the exer- cise of the right of eminent domain, the thing appropriated was land. * See Tiedeman's Police Power, § 137. CH. XIV.] . EMINENT DOMAIN. § 231 tion of the United States, and in the constitutions of the re- spective States composing the Union, there is a limitation upon the power of the Legislature, either directly or indirectly, to exercise the right of eminent domain, which is usually ex- pressed as follows : Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, or in words of similar import. It is probable that some provision of that kind, ex- pressly controlling and limiting the right of eminent domain, is in every State constitution ; but, in the absence of such an express provision, the protection of private property against confiscation without compensation would be amply secured un- der the ordinary construction placed upon the general consti- tutional provision, that " no man shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by due process of law." For the words " due process of law," or their constitutional synonym, " the law of the land," are construed to mean that private prop- erty cannot be taken from its owner in any arbitrary manner, but only in conformity with the just principles of equity. In the United States Constitution, the fifth article of the amend- ments contains a provision, like the kind just described, pro- hibiting the appropriation of private property to public use without just compensation ; but this provision, like all of the provisions curtailing the powers of government, which are found in the first twelve amendments of the United States Constitu- tion, has been held to apply to, and to limit only, the United States government in its exercise of the right of eminent do- main ; and is not intended to serve as a limitation upon the similar power of the State government.^ The fourteenth amendment of the constitution contains the provision that " No State shall make or enforce any laws which shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." This provision, in common with the provisions in the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, is held to have been intended to operate as a restraint upon State ac- tion ; and the courts would, in conformity with this general declaration of the operation of this amendment, conclude that it brings the private property of individuals within the protec- tion of the United States government and constitution against ' Barron V. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 I (U. S.) 84(1857); Mills Em. Dom., (1833); Withers v. Buckley, 20 How. I sec. 348, and cases. 435 § 231 MU>'ICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XIV. any improper or unlawful exercise, by or through the State gov- ernment, and certainly that is the case in regard to ordinary in- terference with the rights of property. And the presumption would, of course, be that the improper exercise of the right of eminent domain by a State would furnish ground for the inter- vention of the courts of the United States, and justify a trans- fer of the case to such court.^ Mr. Justice Miller has intimated in one case that the provisions of the fourteenth amend- ment as to due process of law can only be made to apply to cases of eminent domain.^ But Mr. Justice Bradley dissents from this view.^ Probably it must still be considered a doubt- ful question, how far the disposition of the United States courts, to minimize the consequences of the fourteenth amendment, under the influence of Mr. Justice Miller,* may tend in future litigation to exclude cases of eminent domain from the protec- tion of this amendment. In consequence of a disposition of many of the courts to consider the term " appropi iate," in these constitutional pro- visions, to mean the corpus of land itself, rather than any rights of an incorporeal character issuing out of the land, in determin- ing when there has been a taking of property in the constitu- tional sense, which calls for compensation ; in many of the States, amendments have been made to this constitutional provision, requiring that compensation shall be made, whenever piivate property has been taken or " damaged or destroyed or injured" for public use. The object of these provisions is to insure the claim for compensation where the corpus of the land may not have been taken for public use ; but incorporeal rights issuing out of the land have been taken away, and thus^the damage inflicted upon the private property ; as for example, in the case of a use of the adjoining street in ways, which would materially affect the enjoyment of the abutting property, by the con- struction of surface or elevated railroads, as will be more fully explained in subsequent connections.^ But the object of this amendment, inserting the words " injured or damaged " in the > Patterson v. Miss. & R. K. Boom Co., 3 Dillon, 465 (1875), affirmed by the Supreme Court, 98 U. S. 103 (1878) ; "Warren v. Wisconsin etc. R. R, Co., fi Biss. C, 0. 425. 2 See Davidson v. N'ew Orleans, 96 436 U. S. 97, 105 (1887).. 8 See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 TJ. S. 623. *See Tiedeman's Unwritten Con- stitutionj p. 97, et seq. ^ See post, ch. xvi. on Streets. CH. XIV.] EMINENT DOMAIN. § 232 provision calling for the payment of compensation where pri- vate property is taken for public use, is not to open up claims for all the consequential damages, which property might sufPer from a public improvement, but only to include the damage to those special incorporeal rights which the individual property owner can claim as his own, and as appurtenant to the land. It is held that the purpose of the amendment is not to enable property owners to claim damage for a depreciation in the value of property, which arises from any special use to which the streets or adjoining lands might be put.^ The same conclusion has been reached in the English courts, in construing statutes which provide for the payment of compensation, where property has been injuriously affected by public improvements.^ § 232. Exercise of power regulated by Legislature The exercise of this right is in the first instance reposed in the Leg- islature. Until the Legislature determines by enactment the occasions, when, and the conditions under which, and the agen- cies by which, the power of appropriation may be exercised, there can be no lawful appropriation of lands to public pur- poses. The exercise of the right is a legislative act, and re- quires no judicial confiscation of the land, in order to divest the private owner of his title.^ Except so far as the exercise of the power may be limited and controlled by provisions of the con- stitution, the necessity for its exercise is left to the legislative discretion. The courts cannot question the necessity for the taking, provided the land is taken for a public purpose. Tlie legislative determination of the necessity is final, and is not 1 Columbia Del. Bridge Co. v. Geisse, 35 N. J. L. 558 (1871) ; Ashby V. White, 1 Smith's L. Cas. 264; Eig- ney V. Chicago, 102 111. 64; Chicago V. Taylor, 125 TJ. S. 161. 2 Hall V. Bristol, L. E. 2 C. P. C. 322; East & West India Docks Co. V. Gattke, 3 MacN. & G. 155 ; Cham- berlain V. West End of London & C. P. E. Co., 2 Best & Smith, 605 ; 110 E. C. L. E. 604; lb. 61 Y; Beckett v. Midland E. Co., L. E. 1 C. P. C.241; on appeal, 3 C. P. C. 82; McCarthy V. Metropolitan Board of Works, L. E. 7 C. P. C. 508. ^ "It requires no judicial condem- nation to subject private propei-ty to public uses. Like the power to tax, it resides with the legislative depart- ment to whom the delegation is made. It may be exercised directly or indirectly by that body; and it can only be restrained by the judiciary when its limits have been exceeded, or its authority has been abused or perverted." Kramer v. Cleveland & Pittsburgh E. E. Co., 5 Ohio St. 140, 146. 437 § 232 MiriSriCIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XIV. subject to review by the courts.^ But the question, whether the appropriation shall be made, may be submitted by the Leg- 1 The following quotation, from an opinion of Judge Denio, of the New York Court of Appeals, (People v. Sraith,21 N. Y. 595,) will be sufficient to explain the reasons by which the exclusion of this question from judi- cial investigation, and the c o n s e- quent denial to the property owner of the right to be heard in his behalf, may be justified. The learned judge says: " The question then is, whether the State, in the exercise of tlie power to appropriate the prop- erty of individuals to a public use, wliere the duty of judging of the expediency of making the appropri- ation, in a class of cases, is commit- ted to public officers, is obliged to afford to the owners of the property an opportunity to be heard before those officers when they sit for the purpose of making the determina- tion. I do not speak of the process of arriving at the amount of com- pensation to be paid to the owners, but of the determination whether, under the circumstances of a partic- ular case, the propei-ty required for the purpose shall be taken or not; and I am of the opinion that the State is not under any obligation to make provision for a judicial con- test upon that question. The only part of the constitution which re- fers to the subject is that which for- bids private property to be taken for I>ublio use without compensation, and that which prescribes the man- ner in which the compensation shall be ascertained. It is not pretended that the statute under consideration violates either of these provisions. Tliere is, therefore, no constitutional injunction on the point under con- sideration. The necessity for appro- priating private property for the use of the public or of the government 438 is not a judicial question. The power resides in the Legislature. It may be exercised by means of a statute which shall at once designate the property to be appropriated and the purpose of the appropriation; or It may be delegated to public officers ; or, as it has been repeatedly held, to private corporations, established to carry on enterprises in which the public are interested. There is no restraint upon the power, except that requiring compensation to be made. And where the power is com- mitted to public officers, it is a sub- j e c t of legislative discretion to de- termine what prudential regulations shall be established to secure a dis- creet and judicious exercise of the authority. The constitutional pro- visions, securing a trial by jui-y in certain cases, and that which de- clares that no citizen shall be de- prived of his property without due process of law, have no application to this case. The jury trial can only be claimed as a constitutional right where the subject is judicial in its character. The exercise of the right of eminent domain stands on the same ground with the power of taxa- tion. Both are emanations of the lawmaking power. They are the attributes of political sovereignty, for the exercise of which the Legis- lature is under no necessity to ad- dress itself to the courts. In impos- ing a tax, or in appropriating the property of a citizen, or of a class of citizens, for a public purpose, with a proper provision for compensation, the legislative act is itself due pro- cess of law ; though it would not be if it should undertake to appropriate the property of one citizen for the use of another, or to confiscate the property of one person or a class of CH. XIV.] EMINENT DOMAIN. 232 islature to a vote of the people, or to some court or jury.^ And in Michigan, the submission of the question of necessity to a jury, is made by the constitution an indispensable requirement.^ But while the power of the Legislature to determine the mode and occasion of the exercise of the right of eminent do- main is not restricted by constitutional limitations, when the Legislature has prescribed the conditions, and established the regulations for the exercise of the right, the performance of the conditions, and the observance of the regulations, become an indispensable condition precedent to the exercise of the right ; and any failure to comply with the requirements of the statute, will invalidate the confiscation of property. There must be a most scrupulous observance of all those provisions, which were designed to serve as a protection to the interests of the land- owners.^ It is also recognized, as an invariable corollary to this persons, or a particular description of property upon some view of pub- lic policy, where it could not be said to be taken for a public use. It fol- lojvs from these views, that it is not necessary for the Legislature, in the exercise of the right of eminent do- main, either directly, or indirectly through public officers or agents, to invest the proceedings with the forms or substance of judicial proc- ess. It may allow the owner to in- tervene and participate in the dis- cussion before the officer or board, to whom the power is given to deter- niine, whether the appropriation shall be made in a particular case ; or it may provide that the officers shall act upon their own views of propriety and duty, without the aid of a forensic contest. The appro- priation of the property is an act of ])ublic administration, and the form and manner of its performance is such as the Legislature in its discre- tion may prescribe." See also Unit- ed States V. Harris, 1 Sumn. 21; Spring V. Kussell, 3 Watts, 294; Va- rick V. Smith, 5 Paige Ch. 137; (28 Am. Dec. 417) ; People v. Smith, 21 N. T. 595; Cooper v. Williams, 7 Me. 273; Perry v. Wilson, 7 Mass. 395; Aldridge v. Eailroad Company, 2 Stew. & Port. 199 (23 Am. Dec. 307) ; O'Hara v. Lexington, etc., E. K. Co., 1 Dana, 232; Henry v. Underwood, IDana, 247; Waterworks Co. v. Burkhardt, 41 Ind. 364; Ford v. Chi- cago, etc., K. E. Co., 14 Wis. 609; Scudder v. Trenton Del. Falls Co., 1 Saxt. (N. J.) 694; St. Louis Co. Court V. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175 (1874), (For- est Park Case) ; Tide Water Co. v. Coster, 18 N. J. Eq. (3 C. E. Green) 518; Mills Em. Dom. §11; Chicago V. Wright, 69 111. 327 (1873); People V. Smith, 21 N. T. 597; Giesy v. Cine, W. & Z. E. E. Co., 4 Ohio St. 308; Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Ax-m- strong, 45 N. Y. 234 (1871); Fowler, In re, 53 N. Y. 60 (1873). 1 Iron E. E. Co. v. Ironton, 19 Ohio St. 299. 2 Mansfield, etc., E. E. Co. v. Clark, 23 Mich. 519; Arnold v. Decatur, 29 Mich. 11. ' " The statute says that, after a certain other act shall have been passed, the company may then pro- ceed to take private property for the 439 232 MUNICIPAL COBPOKATIONS. [CH. XIV. rule, that the grants of the right of eminent domain are to be strictly construed, and the powers delegated are not to be ex- tended by construction beyond the express limitations of the statute.^ But there are two constitutional limitations, which are im- posed very generally upon the exercise of the right of eminent domain ; and it is also a judicial question whether the Legisla- ture, in the exercise of the right, has fully complied with their use of its road; that is equivalent to saying that the right shall not be exercised without such subsequent act. The right to take private prop- erty for public use is one of the highest prerogatives of the sovereign power; and here the Legislature has, in language not to be mistaken, ex- pressed an intention to reserve that power, until it could judge for itself whether the proposed road would be of sufficient public utility to justify the use of this high prerogative. It did not intend to cast this power away, to be gathered up and used by any who might choose to exercise it." Gillinwater v. Miss. etc. E. E. Co., 13 111. 1, 4; Johnson V. Freeport etc. Co., Ill 111. 413; In re Niagara etc. Co., 46 Hun, 94; Owasso v. Eich- fleld, (Mich. 89) 45 N. W. E. 129 ; Fort Eidge etc. Assn. v. Eedd, 33 W. Va. 262; Swan v. Chi. etc. Co., 38 Mo. App. 588; In re Cedar Eapids, (Iowa, 92) 51 N. W. R. 1142; Toledo etc. Co. V. Toledo El. S. E. Co., 6 Ohio Civ. Ct. E. 362; Simpson v. Kansas City, (Mo. 92) 20 S. W. R. 38; Santa Cruz v. Enright, (Cal. 92) 80 Pac. E. 197; Farmers M. Co. v. E. E. Co., 10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 25; Cheany v. Board, 52 N. J. L. 544; Bass v. Fort WJiyne, 121 Ind. 389 ; Amoskeag Co. v. Goodale, 62 N. H. 66; Moore v. San- ford, (Mass. 90) 24 N. E. E. 423; An- derson v. Pemberton, 89 Mo. 61; Turner v. Nye, 154 Mass. 579; Kroop V. Forman, 31 Mich. 144 ; Bohl- man v. Green Bay etc. E. It. Co., 440 40 Wis. 157; Judson v. Bridgeport, 25 Conn. 426; Bloodgood v. Mohawk etc. R. R. Co., 18 Wend. 9; Decatur Co. V. Humphreys, 47 Ga. 565; Cam- eron V. Supervisors etc., 47 Miss. 264; St. Brady v. Bronson, 45 Cal. 640; Maris v. Mason, 37 Texas, 447; Chi- cago etc. It. R. Co. V. Smith, 78 111. 96; State v. Seymour, 35 N. J. L. 47; W. Va. Transportation Co. v. Vol- canic Oil & Coal Co., 5 W. Va. 382; Wamesit Power Co. v. Allen, 120 Mass. 352; Lund v. New Bedford, 121 lb. 286; see Baltimore etc. R. E. Co. V. Nesbit, 10 How. 395 ; Unite4 States V. Eeed, 56 Mo. 565 ; Commissioners V. Beckwith, 10 Kan. 603; St. Joseph etc. E. E. Co. V. Callender, 13 Kan. 496; Allen V. Jones, 47 Ind. 442; Wat- son V. South Kingston, lb. 563. 1 " There is no rule more familiar or better settled than this; that grants of corporate powers, being in derogation of common right, are to be strictly construed ; and this is especially the case where the power claimed is a delegation of the right of eminent domain, one of the high- est powers of sovereignty pertaining to the State itself, and interfering most seriously and often vexatiously with the ordinary rights of prop- erty." Currier v. Marietta, etc. E. E. Co., 11 Ohio St. 228, 231; but see Lamborn v. Bell, (Col. 93) 32 Pac. 989; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Foltz, 52 Fed. 627; Shake v. Frazer, (Ky. 93) 21 S. W. 583; Los Angeles v. Reyes, (Cal. 93) 32 Pac. 233. CH. XIV.J EMINENT DOMAIN. § 233 requirements. One has reference to the ascertainment and pay- ment of the compensation to the landowner for the loss of his lands, which will be discussed subsequently ; ^ and the second provides that the private lands of the individual shall not be taken, in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, except for public purposes. It is a legislative question, whether the public exigencies require the appropriation, but it is clearly a judicial question, whether a particular confiscation of land has been made for a public purpose, or to serve some private end.^ § 233. Delegation of power to municipal corporations While the exercise of the right of eminent domain belongs primarily to the Legislature, it is not necessary for it directly to make the appropriation to the public use. Since the exer- cise of the power is only permissible in the advancement of the public interests, if that requirement is complied with, it is also within the Legislative discretion to determine whether the con- fiscation shall be made by it, or b}^ some other corporate body or individual, to wliom the power is delegated. If the public interests are subserved best, when the right is exercised by a municipal corporation or a railroad company, there can be no constitutional objection to the delegation of the power, for the burden upon private property is not thereby increased. The grant of the power to a town, city, county or school district, needs no special defence, because the delegate of the power is in each instance only a local branch of the general State gov- ernment. It is the government in every case which makes the confiscation. No cases are needed to support this proposition. But when the power is granted to a corporation, composed of private persons, who procure a grant of the power for the pur- pose of making a profit out of it ; although the use to which the land is put may serve to satisfy a public want, there is more or less disposition to question the constitutional propriety of the delegation of the power. But the constitutional objec- 1 See post, §§ 243-250. 2 Tyler V. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648; 01m- Btead V. Camp, 33 Conn. 551; Beck- man V. Eailroad Company, 3 Paige, 45 (22 An. Dec. 679) ; Matter of Deans- ville Cemetery Association, 66 N. T. 509 (23 Am. Eep. 86); Scudder v. Trenton, etc., Co., 1 N. J. Eq. 694 (23 Am. Dec. 756); Louglibridge v. Har- ris, 42 Ga. 500; Harding v. Goodlett, 3 Terg. 40 (24 Am. Dec. 546) ; Chica^ go, etc., R. R. Co. V. Lake, 71 111. 333; Water Works Co. v. Burkliardt, 41 Ind. 364; Eyerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333 (24 Am. Rep. 564) ; Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa, 540. 441 §234 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. XIV. tion is deemed to be untenable. In granting to a private cor- poration the right of eminent domain, the State does not consider the benefit to the stockholders of the corporation, but rather the public benefit derived from the construction and mainte- nance of a turnpike, a railroad, etc. It is true the government may undertake these public improvements, but it is the prevail- ing opinion that the best interests of the public are subserved by granting the right to a private corporation which assumes, in return for the right of eminent domain and the private gain to be gotten out of the business, to satisfy the public want ; and tlie Legislature has uniformly been held to hold within its dis- cretion the power of exercising this right or of delegating it, according as the one course or the other seems best to promote the public welfare. ^ Not only is this permissible, but it is also held to be constitutionally unobjectionable to delegate to cor- poration or individual, along with the exercise of the right of eminent domain, the power to determine finally upon the neces- sity for the taking, without any judicial investigation.^ § 234. What is a pulblic purpose. — As long as the govern- ment exercises the right directly and for the State's immediate benefit, no diiSculty is experienced in determining what is a public use. There can be no doubt that land is devoted to a public use, when it is taken for the purpose of laying out parks, and public gardens,® for the construction of public buildings of 1 Wilson V. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245 ; Stevens v. Middlesex Canal, 12 Mass. 466; Boston Mill Dam V. Newman, 12 Pick. 46'7; Leb- anon V. Olcott, 1 N. H. 339; Petition of Mt. Washington Road Co., 35 K. H. 134: Eaton V. Boston C. & M. R. K. Co., 51 N. H. 504; Armington v. Barnet, 15 Vt. Y45; White River Turnpike v. Central R. R. Co., 21 Vt. 590; Bradley v. N. Y. & N. H. E. R. Co., 21 Conn. 294; Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532; Beekman v. Saratoga & Schenectady E. E. Co., 3 Paige, 73 (22 Am. Dec. 679) ; Blood- good V. Mohawk & Hudson R. R. Co., 18 Wend. 9 ; Whiteman's Ex'vs v. Wilmington etc. E. E. Co., 2 Harr. 514; Raleigh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Davis, 442 2 Dev. & Bat. 451 ; Svyan v. Williams, 3 Mich. 427; Pratt v. Brown, 3 Wis. 603; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 (;al. 229. 2 People V. Smith, 21 K. T. 595; Lyon V. Jerome, 26 Wend. 484; Mat- ter of Fowler, 53 N. Y. 60; N. Y. Central, etc., R. R. Co. v. Met. Gas Co., 63 N. Y. 326; Hays v. Rlsher, 32 Pa. St. 169; Chicago, etc., R. E. Co. v. Lake, 71 HI. 333; North Mis- souri R. R. Co. V. Lackland, 25 Mo. 515; North Mo. R. R. Co. v. Gott, 25 Mo. 540; Bankhead v. Browny, 25 Iowa, 540; Warren v. St. Paul, etc., E. R. Co., 18 Minn. 384. " Owners of Ground v. Mayor, etc., of Albany, 15 Wend. 374; Matter of Central Park Extension, 16 Abb. Pr. CH, XIV.] EMINENT DOMAIN. § 234 a. all kinds,^ waterworks,^ adqueducts, drains and sewers,^ and the building of levees on the banks of the Mississippi.* It is, like- wise, freely admitted that the State may appropriate lands without limitation for the purpose of laying out streets and highways. In all these cases of the right of eminent domain, the land is taken for the general use of the public, and there- fore is devoted to a public use. If, in any one of these cases, the land was to be used by a few private individuals, and not by the public generally, it would not be a taking for a public use, and consequently it would be unlawful. § 234 a. Power to take land for a private road. — There has been considerable doubt felt and expressed concerning the con- stitutionality of State statutes, providing for the opening and maintenance of so-called private roads, at the expense of the person or persons who may be benefited thereby. These stat- utes usually provide that some local officer or officers, usually the county court, shall in all cases, where the public necessity will not justify the opening of a public road, to be constructed and maintained at the expense of the county, authorize, under 56; Brooklyn Park Commissioners V. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 244 (H Am. Rep. 70); Mayor v. Park Com.'rs, 44 Mich. 602; Matter of Mayor of New York, 99 N. Y. 569; Philadelphia v. Gerraantown Pass. E. Co., 10 Phila. (Pa.) 165; South Park Com'rs v. Williams, 51 111. 57; County Court V. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175; State v. Leffingwell, 54 lb.. 458. ' Eichardson v. Com'rs, (Miss. 91) 9 So. E. 351 ; Williams v. School Dis- trict, 33 Vt. 271; Long v. Fuller, 68 Pa. St. 170; Hooper v. Bridgewater, 102 Mass. 512. 2 State V. Newark, (N. J. 92) 23 Atl. R. 129; Reddall v. Bryan, 14 Md. 444; Spring Valley W. Co. v. Drinkhouse, 92 Cal. 528; Wayland v. Middlesex Co. Com'rs, 4 Gray (Mass.) 500; Rochester Water Com'rs, In re, 66 N. Y. 413; Umatilla v. Barnhart, 30 Pac. 37 ; Martin v. Gleason, 139 Mass. 183; Tyler v. Hudson, 147 lb. 609; In re Com'rs of Public Works, 10 N. Y. S. 705; Bailey v. Woburn, 126 Mass. 416; Lake etc. Water Co. V. Contra Costa Co., 67 Cal. 669: Spring Valley Water Works v. San Mateo Water Works, 64 lb. 123; Hurden v. Stein, 27 Ala. 104; Edge- wood Water Co. v. Troy W. Co., 7 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 476. ^Passadena v. Simpson, 91 Cal. 238; Anderson v. Kerns Draining Co., 14 Ind. 199; Gardner v. New- burg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (7 Am. Dec. 526) ; Matter of Drainage of Lands, 54 N. J. L. 497; People v. Nearing, 27 N. Y. 306; Ham v. Salem, 100 Mass. 350; French v. White, 24 Conn. 174; Kane v. Baltimore, 15 Md. 240; Burden v. Stein, 27 Ala. 104; Eeeves V. Treasurer of Wood Co., 8 Ohio St. 333; Chaplin v. Com'rs, 129 111. 651. * MithofE V. Carrollton, 12 La. An. 185 ; Cash v. Wbitworth, 13 La. 401 ; Inge V. Police Jury, 14 La. An. 117. 443 § 234 a. MDNICIPAL COKPORATIONS. [CH. XIV. certain limitations, those persons who will be benefited by the opening of such a road, to construct and maintain it at their own expense, and to appropriate whatever land is needful. The constitutionality of these statutes has been attacked on the ground that the roads, thus established, were private and not for the benefit of the general public.^ The difficulty in the way of a clear understanding of the matter is increased by a failure to appreciate the intrinsic difference between a public and pri- vate road. If one or more individuals have the power to ap- propriate land for the opening of a road for their exclusive use or benefit, from which they may shut out the general public, and which they may maintain or discontinue at their pleasure, without any supervisory conti'ol on the part of the State or mu- nicipal authorities, the road is most certainly a private one, and the forcible appropriation of land for it is a taking of private property without due process of law. But if the road is open to the general public, and the persons, for whose special benefit the road was established, have not the power of closing it up at will, but upon them the expenses of constructing it and maintaining it is imposed, the road is a public one, even though they may at will discontinue the repairs, and notwithstanding it is called by the statute authorizing it a private road, and it is opened for the special benefit of those who assume the expense of its construction and maintenance. It being open to the pub- lic, the need for the road is not open to judicial investigation. The Legislature is the sole judge of the necessity for the appro- priation of private lands to a public use.'* I Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 140; Buf- falo & N. T. K. K. Co. V. Brainard. 9 N. Y. 100; Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648 (8 Am. Kep. .398) ; Bradley v. N. Y., etc. K. K. Co., 21 Conn. 294; Pittsburgh v. Scott, 1 Pa. St. 809; Varuer v. Martin, 21 W. Va. 534; Young V. McKenzie, 3 Ga. .SI ; Hick- man's Case, 4 Harr, 580; Sadler v. Laugham, 34 Ala. 311; Reeves v. Tieasurer of Wood Co., 8 Ohio St. 333; Wild v. Deig, 43 Ind. 45 (13 Am. Rep. 399); Stewart v. Hartmau, 46 Ind. 331;Blackman V. Halves, 72 Ind. 515; Osborn v. Hart, 24 Wis. 89 (1 Am. Rep. 161) ; Nesbit v. Trumbo, 39 444 111. 110; Dickey v. Tennison, 27 Mo. 373; Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa, 540; Witham v. Osburn, 4 Ore. 318 (18 Am. Rep. 287) ; but see Whitting- bam V. Bowen, 22 Vt. 317; Bell v. Prouty, 43 Vt. 279; Proctor v. An- dover, 42 N". H. 348; Pocopson Eoad, 16 Pa. St. 15 ; Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts, 63; Ferris v. Bramble, 5 Ohio St. 109; Robinson v. Swope, 12 Bush, 21; Sherman v. Brick, 82 Cal. 241, in which the constitutionality of such appropriations is more or less sus- tained. 2 The following quotation from an opinion of the Supreme Court of CH. XIV.] EMINElilT DOMAIN. § 235 § 235. Power to take land for ornamental purposes.— Ill determining what is a public use, which would justify the appropriation of private property without the consent of its owner, it has been explained, at least in general terms, that the purpose must be a useful one, and in some sense or other neces- sary to the public welfare. And, based upon this doctrine that the purpose must be a useful one, it has been held by some au- thorities that private property cannot be taken for the public use, where the use does not serve to supply some public need, but only to ornament or embellish the city. And, in fact, Mr. Justice Woodbury, in a case before the United States Su- lowa -will amply illustrate the limit- ations upon the power of establish- ing "private" roads over private lands: " The State may properly pro- vide for the establishment of a pub- lic road or highway to enable every citizen to discharge his duties. The State is not bound to allow its citi- zens to be walled in, insulated, im- prisoned, but may provide them a way of deliverance. The State may provide a public highway to a man's house, or a public highway to coal or other mines. If the road now in question has been established as a public road under the general road law, as we confess we do not see why it might not have been, there would be in our minds no doubt of its va- lidity, although it does not exceed a half a mile in length, and traverses the land of but a single person. For the right to take land for a public road, that is, a road demanded by public convenience, as an outlet to a neighborhood, or it may be, as I think, for a single farmer, without other means of communication, can- not depend upon the length of the road, or the number of persons through whose property it may pass. With respect to the act of 1866, we are of the opinion that the roads there- under established are essentially private, that is, the private property of the applicant therefor, because: First, the statute denominates them private roads. If these i-oads are not private and different fx-om ordinary and public roads, there was no neces- sity for these provisions. Second- ly, such a road may be established upon the petition of the applicant alone; and he must pay the costs and damages occasioned thereby, and perform such other conditions as to fence, etc., as the board may require. Thirdly, the public are not bound to keep such roads in repair, and this is a satisfactory test as to wheth- er a road is public or private. (The second and third reasons for holding the road to be a private one here stated, rather establish a rebuttal than a conclusive presumption in favor of its private character. The establishment of the road upon the petition of tlie applicant, and its construction and maintenance at his expense, are not necessarily inconsistent with its being a pub- lic road, if the public have the use of it, and cannot be excluded from it.) Fourthly, we see no reason when such a road is established, why the person at whose instance it was done might not lock the gates open- ing into it or fence it up, or other- wise debar the public of any right thereto. Could not the plaintiffs, in this case, having procured the road in question, abandon it at their pleas- 445 § 235 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XIV. preme Court,^ lays down the doctrine that private property can be compulsorily taken only for the establishment of highways, streets and railroad beds, where the land stands between thie two termini of the road or street. And he holds that it is not even possible to take lands from the owner, without his con- sent, for the erection of public buildings ; on the ground that any plot of land may be selected for that purpose, and a par- ticular locality is not necessary to the usefulness of the public building, and that the matter of beauty of location is not prop- erly considered in determining the right of confiscation for pub- lic use. In the course of his opinion, Judge Woodbury says : " When we go to other public uses, not so m-gent, not connect- ed with precise localities, not difficult to be provided for with- out the power of eminent domain, and in places where it would be only convenient, but not necessary, I entertain strong doubts of its applicability. Who ever heard of laws to condemn pri- vate property for public use, for a marine hospital or State prison ? So a custom house is a public use for the general ure ? Could tliey not relinquish it to the defendants without consulting the board of supervisors ? If this is so, does it not incontestably establish the fact, that it is essentially private ? For it must be private if it is of such a nature, that the plaintiffs can at their pleasure use or forbid its use, abandon or refuse to abandon it, re- linquish or refuse to relinquish it ? If the act of 1866 is valid, might not the plaintiffs, having procured the I'oad, use it for laying down a horse or tramway, and forbid every- body from using the road, and even exclude all persons therefrom? Who could prevent it? These conditions make a great diiierence between such a road and a pub- lic highway, and demonstrate the essentially private character of the road." Dillon, Ch. J., in Bankhead V. Brown, 25 Iowa. 545. " The use, convenience and advantage of the public, contemplated by the law, are benefits arising out of the aggregate of such improvements, to which a 446 particular road so established con- tributes to a greater or less degree. But no limitation upon the power of the court, in regard to any proposed road, is to be found in the degree of accommodation, which it may ex- tend to the public at large. That is a matter which addresses itself not to the authority, but the discretion of the court. It cannot be predicated of any road that it will be of direct utility to all citizens of the county. It may accommodate in travel and transportation but a small neighbor- hood, or only a few individuals. Still, when established, it may be used at pleasure by all the citizens of the county or country; and the public is interested in the accommodation of all the members of the community." Lewis V. Washington, 5 Gratt. 265. See Varner v. Mg,rtin, 21 W. Va. 534, for a more exhatj&tive review of the law and authoritiifes on this subject. 1 West River Bridge v. Dix, 6 How. 545. CH. XIV.J EMINENT DOMAIN. §235 government, and a court house or jail for a State. But it would be difficult to find precedent or argument to justify tak- ing private property, without consent, to erect them on, though appropriate for the purpose. No necessity seems to exist which is sufficient to justify so strong a measure. A particular locality as to a few rods in respect to their site is usually of no conse- quence, while as to lighthouse, or fort, or wharf, or highway between certain termini, it may be very important and impera- tive. I am aware of no precedents abroad for such seizures of private property, for objects like the former, though some such doctrines appear to have been advanced in this country." ^ But while it is barely possible that in a case, where mere purposes of ornament are to be satisfied by the appropriation of private property to a public use, such an attempted appropriation would be declared to be beyond the power of eminent domain ; yet, where the property is taken for a useful purpose, and serves to satisfy some public want, the fact that, incidentally to the selection of the land, which is to be taken for public use, the element of beauty or ornament is considered, is no justification for interfering with the appropriation, or for declaring it to be unconstitutional. " The passing from place to place," says Mr. Justice Hoar,^ " is a rightful object of public provision in itself ; and the occasions of it are as extensive as the pursuits of life. Pleasure travel may be accommodated, as well as busi- ness travel. If the doctrine for which the plaintiffs contend were supported, it would also follow that the Legislature would not have the constitutional right to take private property for a public park or pleasure ground, making full compensation to the owner, — a conclusion which we should hesitate to arrive at ' See, also, Boston Mill Corp. v. Newman, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 476; Coo- ley Const. Lim. 531, 533; Dunn v. Charleston, Harper (S. C.) Law, 189 (1824); Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa, 540; Eldridge v. Smith, 34 Vt. 484; Wild V. Beig, 43 Ind. 455 (1873) ; s. c, 13 Am. Rep. 399. Chancellor Kent, Gardner v. Newburgh Trs., 2 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 162, 166 (1816), lays down the same proposition, and says that Bynkershoeck " insists that private property cannot be taken, on any terras, without the consent of the owner, for purpose of public orna^ ment or pleasure; and he mentions an instance in which the Roman Sen- ate refuses to allow the praetors to carry an aqueduct through the farm of an individual, against his con- sent, when intended merely for orna^ ment." 2 Who gave the opinion of the court in Higginson v. Nahant, 11 Allen, 530. 447 § 237 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XIV. without much further consideration, in view of the important relations which air, exercise, and recreation bear to the general health and welfare of the community." ^ § 236. Power to take lands for purpose of draining them. — The power of eyiinent domain has also been exercised, under authority from the Legislature, to purchase or appropriate swamp lands, contiguous to the city, for the purpose of raising and drain- ing them and thus abate a nuisance which is prejudicial to the health of the community .^ And so, also, is it possible for the municipal authority to be authorized to enter upon private prop- erty and construct drains which are necessary to the preserva- tion of the public health.^ But it is not possible for the lands of one person to be drained against the will of the owner for the benefit of some private landowner, where the public wel- fare does not require it.* In all these cases of draining lands, or the construction of drains upon private property for public welfare, it is held to be a case of taking private property for public use, which can only be justified by the making of com- pensation to the owner of the land.^ § 237. Power to take land beyond city limits. — In order to carry out or effect certain municipal improvements, such as the construction of public parks and waterworks, it is impos- sible for the municipal corporation to be confined to its own limits in the confiscation of private property. It is also the invariable rule, in the case of the construction of waterworks, that the city must go beyond its limits and appropriate prop- erty located outside.® It is only a difference of degree as to 1 Be Mt. Washington Road Co., .35 N. H. 134; Gardner v. Newburgh Trs., 2 Johns. (N. T.) Ch. 162, 166; Blodgett V. Boston, 8 Allen (Mass.) 237; Woodstock v. Gallup, 28 Vt. 587; Balch v. Essex Co. Com'rs, 103 Mass. 106. 2 New Orleans Draining Co., In re, 11 La. An. 338; Dingley v. Boston, 100 Mass. 544. 8 Rice V. Wellman, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. E. 334; People v. Nearing, 27 N. T. 306; Doyle v. Baughman, 24 111. Ap. 614; Albany Streets, In re, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 149 ; Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige, 13; Bloodgoodv. Mohawk & H. R. 448 R. E. Co., 18 Wend. (N. Y.) 9, 59; Chaplin v. Com'rs, 126 111. 264; An- derson V. Kerns Draining Co., 14 Ind. 199; Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray (Mass.) 417; Rutherford's Case, 72 Pa. St. 82; s. c, 13 Am. Rep. 655; contra. Ward v. Peck, 49 N. J. L. 42. * Reeves v. Wood County Treas- urer, 8 Ohio St. 333, 345 ; Norfleet v. Cromwell, 70 X. C. 634; s. c, 16 Am. Rep. 787. 5 See Cheesborough, In re, 17 Hun, (N. T.) 561; Chronic v. Pugh, 27 N. E. R. 415. 8 See ante, § 201. CH. XIV.J EMINENT DOMAIN. §238 the necessity to go outside of the city limits in the construc- tion of a park. But, whatever doubt may have been felt and expressed by the authorities at an early day, it has since been held that the power of eminent domain, when delegated to the municipal corporation, extends to the appropriation of lands beyond the city limits, whenever it is impossible to carry out the express or implied powers of government by an appropria- tion of lands within its-limits. It has thus been held uniformly, that a city has the power to appropriate private property beyond the city limits, for the establishment of a system of waterworks.^ So, also, has it been held that a city corporation may appropri- ate lands outside of the corporate limits for the purpose of lay- ing out public parks.^ And the same power has been held to be vested in a county for the benefit of a city within its limits.* § 238. What property may toe taken. — Every species of real property may be taken in the exercise of the right of emi- nent domain. Not only may the land itself be taken, but also anything which may actually, or in legal contemplation, be considered a part of the land: All buildings and other struct- ures that may be in the way of the public use of the condemned lands,* streams of water,* the stone, gravel and wood, that may be needed for the promotion of the public improvement.^ Apart from the land itself, an easement may be acquired over the land, wliile the land remained private property; and so, also, may franchises be condemned.'' But in all these cases. 1 New York v. Bailey, 2 Denio, (N. Y.) 433, 446 (1845); Dwight Printing Co. V. Boston, 122 Mass. 583 (1877). - Mayoi' V. Park Com'rs, 44 Mich. 602 ; Matter of Mayor of New York, 99 N. Y. 569; Brooklyn Park Com'rs V. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234 (1871). 8 State V. Leffingwell, 54 Mo. 458 (1873) ; St. Louis Co. Court v. Gris- wold, 58 Mo. 175 (1874). * Wells V. Somerset, etc., K. E. Co., 47 Me. 345. ° Gardner v. Newburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (7 Am. Dec. 526) ; Johnson V. Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co., 35 N. H. 569; Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Magruder, 35 Md. 79 (6 Am. Rep. 310). 29 6 Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315 (11 Am. Dec. 484); Wheelock v. Young, 4 Wend. 647; Lyon v. Jerome, 15 Wend. 569; Bliss v. Hosmer, 15 Ohio, 44; Watkins v. Walker Co., 18 Tex. 585. ' West River Bridge v. Dix, 6 How. 507; Richmond R. R. Co. v. Louisa. R. E. Co., 13 How. 71 ; State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Arlington v. Barnet, 15 Vt. 745 ; White River Turnpike Co. V. Vt. Cent. R. R. Co., 21 Vt. 590; Pistaque Bridge Co. v. New Hamp- shire Bridge, 7 N. H. 35; Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 23 Pick. 360; Central Bridge Co. v. Lowell, 4 Gray, 474; In re Rochester Water Commissioners, 66 449 § 238 MTJNIOIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XIV. no more of the property can be taken than what is necessary to serve the public purpose for which it is condemned. No other considerations will justify the taking of the whole of a man's property, when only a part is needed ; and the excessive appro- priation must under all circumstances be held to be unconsti- tutional. This limitation is best explained by a reference to the facts of a case, which arose in the State of New York.i By a statute, municipal corporations were authorized, in con- demning a part of a city lot, for the purpose of extending or widening the streets, to appropriate the whole, if it was deemed advisable, and to sell or otherwise dispose of the part not need- ed for the improvement of the street. The statute was pro- nounced unconstitutional. In delivering the opinion of the court, Chief Justice Savage, said : " If this provision was in- tended merely to give to the corporation capacity to take prop- erty, under such circumstances with consent of the owner, and then to dispose of the same, there can be no objection to it ; but if it is to be taken literally, that the commissioners may, against the consent of the owner, take the whole lot, when only a part is required for the public use, and the residue to be ap- plied to private use, it assumes a power which, with all respect, the Legislature did not possess. The constitution, by authoriz- ing the appropriation of private property to public use, impli- edly declares that for anj' other use private property shall not be taken from one and applied to the private use of another. It is in violation of natural rights ; and if it is not in violation of the letter of the constitution, it is of its spirit, and cannot be supported. This power has been supposed to be convenient when the greater part of a lot is taken, and only a small part left, not required for public use, and that small part of but lit- tle value in tiie hands of the owner. In such case the corpo- N. Y. 413; Comnjiottwealth v. Pa. Canal Co., 66 Pa. St 41 (.5 Am. Rep. 329) ; In re Towauda Bridge, 91 Pa. St. 216; Tuckahoe Caual Co. v. R. R. Co., 11 Leigh, 42 (36 Am. Dec. 374); Chesapeake, etc.. Canal Co. v, Balti- more, etc., R. R. Co., 4 Gill & J, 5; No. Ca., etc., R. R, Co. v. Carolina Gent, etc., R. R. Co., 83 Iv'. C, 489; New Orleans, etc., R. R. Co. v. Southern, etc., Tel. Co., 53 Ala. 211; 450 Little Miamia, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bar- ton, 23 Ohio St 510; New Castle, etc., R. R. Co. V. Peru, etc., R. R. Co., 3 Ind. 464; Lake Shore, etc., R. R. Co. V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 97 111. 506; Central City Horse Railway Co. V. Fort Clark, etc., R'y Co., 87 111. 523. 1 Matter of Albany St., 11 Wend. 151 (25 Am. Dec. 618). en. XIV.J EMINENT DOMAIN. § 238 ration has been supposed best qualified to take and dispose of such parcels, or gores, as they have sometimes been called ; and probably this assumption of power has been acquiesced in by the proprietors. I know of no case where the power has been questioned, and where it has received the deliberate sanction of the court. Siappose a case where only a few feet, or even inches, are wanted, from one end of a lot to widen a street, and a valuable building stands upon the other end of such lot ; would the power be conceded to exist to take the whole lot, whether the owner consented or not? The quality of the residue of any lot cannot vary the principle. The owner may be very unwilling to part with only a few feet ; and I hold it equally incompetent for the Legislature thus to dispose of private property, whether feet or acres are the subject of this assumed power." ^ It has also been held, that in establish- ing a public improvement, it is the duty of those, who are ex- ercising the right of eminent domain, to avoid as much as possible the diversion of streams, and to construct whatever culverts and bridges may be necessary to keep the streams in their regular channels.^ Another application of the same principle would lead to the conclusioji, that where the fee simple estate in the land was not needed, only a less estate, or an easement, should be taken ; and that the taking of the fee under such circumstances would be an unlawful appropriation. In the absence of statutory reg- ulations to the contrary, it is certainly a conclusive presump- tion, that where less than a fee is needed for the public use, and a joint occupation of the land by the public and by the private individual was possible, as in the case of a highway, the fee is not taken for a public use ; and if there should be at 2 See Proprietors, etc., v. Nashua E. K. Co., 10 Cush. 388; March v. Portsmouth, etc., K. R. Co., 19 N. H. 372; Eowe v. Addison, 34 N. H. 306; Haynes v. Burlington, 38 Vt. 350; Boughton v. Carter, 18 Johns. 405; Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130; Pettigrew v. Evans ville, 25 Wis. 223; Arimoud v. Green Bay Co., 31 Wis. 316. ^ See to the same effect, Dunn v. City Council, Harp. 129; Baltimore, etc., E. E. Co. V. Pittsburgh, etc., E. E. Co., 17 W. Va. 812; Paul v. De- troit, 32 Mich. 108. In Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511, it was held that this excessive appropriation of land beyond what is needed for the pub- lic use was permissible, provided it was not done against the consent of the owner. 451 § 238 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. CH. XIV. any time a discontinuance of the public use, the land would be relieved of the public easement, and become again the ab- solute property of the original owner.^ But, in some of the States, it is now provided by statute that, in appropriating lands for highways, the fee shall be held to be condemned, and not simply a public easement acquire'd.^ And it would seem plausible that, in the case of an ordinary highway, the fee might be needed for use as a highway, since the demands of modern civilization require the soil of a street of a city to con- tain imbedded in it the gas, water and sewer pipes, the tele- phone, telegraph, and electric light wires, etc., as well as to be used as a highway ; thus rendering a joint occupation of the land by the public and by the private owner impossible. It is by no means unreasonable, therefore, to provide for the con- demnation of a fee in the beginning, instead of allowing suc- cessive condemnations of the soil, as the public demands each particular use to which it can be put. But it is hard to see the reason why in the condemnations of land, for other pur- poses, for railroad purposes, for example, the fee should be taken ; and, unless the necessity of taking the fee is proven, the taking 'would be an unlawful condemnation of private property.^ But if the fee is necessary, the taking of the fee for any purpose is lawful ; and it seems to be the prevailing opinion that the question, whether it is necessary, is a legisla- i Rust V. Lowe, 6 Mass. 90; Bar- clay v. Howell's Lessee, 6 Pet. 493; Weston V. Foster, 7 Met. 297; Dean V. Sullivan R. R. Co., 22 N. H. 316; Blake v. Rich, 34 N. H. 282; Jack- son v. Rutland etc. R. R. Co., 25 Vt. 150; Giesy v. Cincinnati etc. R. R. Co., 4 Ohio St. 308; Jackson v. Hathaway, 15 Johns. 447 ; Henry v. Dubuque & Pacific R. R. Co., 2 Iowa, 288; Elliott V. Fairhaveu etc. R. R. Co., 32 Conn. 579, 586; Imlay v. Un- ion Branch R. R. Co., 26 Conn. 249; State V. Laverack, 34 N. J. 201; Rail- road Co. V. Shurmeir, 7 Wall. 272. 2 People V. Kerr, 37 Barb. 357; s. c, 27 N. Y. 183; Brooklyn Central etc. R. R. Co. V. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 452 33 Barb. 420; Brooklyn & Newton R. R. Co. V. Coney Island R. R. Co., 35 Barb. 364; Protzman v. Indian- apolis etc. R. R. Co., 9 Ind. 467; New Albany & Salem R. R. Co. v. O'Dailey, 13 Ind. 353; Street Rail- way V. Cummingsville, 14 Ohio St. 523; State v. Cincinnati Gas Co., 18 Ohio St. 262; Millburne v. Cedar Rapids etc. R. R. Co., 12 Iowa, 246; Franz v. Railroad Co., 55 Iowa, 107; Moses V. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R., 21 111. 516. 8 See New Orleans etc. R. R. Co. V. Gay, 32 La. An. 471. In Illinois the condemnation of the fee for rail- road purposes is expressly forbidden. Const. 111. 1870, art. 2, sec. 13. CH. XIV.] EMINENT DOMAIN. § 239 tive, and not a judicial one. The declaration of the Legislature, that the fee is necessary, is, therefore, final and conclusive.^ § 239. What constitutes a taking. — In order to lay the foundation of a claim for compensation for the taking of prop- erty in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, it is not necessary that there should be an actual or physical taking of the land. Whenever the use of tlie land is restricted in an}-- way, or some incorporeal hereditament is taken away, which was appurtenant thereto, it constitutes as much a taking, as if the land itself had been appropriated.^ The flowing of lands,^ the diversion of streams,* the appropriation of water fronts, on streams where the tide does not ebb and flow,^ and, likewise, in navigable streams, the condemnation of an exclusive wharf- age,^ are only a few instances of the exercise of the right of 1 In Heyward v. Mayor etc. of New York, V N. Y. 314, 325, it is said that the power of deciding upon the need of the fee, "must of necessity rest in the Legislature, in order to secure tlie useful exercise and enjoyment of the right in question. A case might arise where a temporary use would be all that the public intei-est would require. Another case might require the permanent, and, appar- ently, the perpetual, occupation and enjoyment of the property by the public, and the right to take it must be coextensive with the necessity of the case, and the measure of com- pensation should, of course, be graduated by the nature and the duration of the estate or interest of which the owner is deprived." In this case the land was appropriated for the purpose of extending the almshouse. See, also, Brooklyn Park Commisioners v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234 ( 6 An. Rep. 70); Ding- ley V. Boston, 100 Mass. 544; Baker V. Johnson, 2 Hill, 343; Hunger v. Tonawanda E. E. Co., 4 N. Y. 349; Eexford v. Knight, 11 N. Y. 308; Coster V. N. J. E. E. Co., 22 N. Y. 227; putt V. Cox, 43 Pa. St. 486; Waterworks Co. v. Burkhart, 41 Ind. 364. 2 Pampelly v. Green Bay, etc., Co., 13 Wall. 186; Hooker v. New Haven, etc., E. E. Co., 14 Conn. 146; Eaton v. Boston, C. & N. E. E. Co., 51 N. H. 504; Glover v. Powell, 10 N. J. Eq. 211; Ashley v. Port Huron, 35 Mich. 298; Arimond v. Green Bay, etc., Co., 31 Wis. 316. 2 Grand Eapids Booming Co. v. Jarvis, 30 Mich. 308 ; Eaton v. Boston, etc., E. E. Co., 51 N. H. 504; Brown V. Cayuga, etc., E. E. Co., 12 N. Y. 488; Norris v. Vt. Cent. E. E. Co., 28 Vt. 99. * Harding V. Stamford Water Co., 41 Conn. 87; Proprietors, etc., v. Nashua & Lowell E. E. Co., 10 Cush. 388; March v. Portsmouth, etc., R. E. Co., 19 N. H. 372; Eome v. Addi- son, 34 N. H. 306 ; Johnson v. Atlan- tic, etc., E. E. Co., 35 N. H. 569; Haynes v. Burlington, 38 Vt. 350; Boughton V. Carter, 18 Johns. 405; Baltimore, etc., E. E. Co, v. Magru- der, 34 Md. 79 (6 Am. Eep. 310); Stein V. Burden, 24 Ala. 130; Petti- grew V. Evansville, 25 Wis. 223. 6 Varick v. Smith, 9 Paige, 547. 6 Murray v. Sharp, 1 Bosw. 539. 453 § 239 MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS. [CH. XIV. eminent domain, in which the property taken is incorporeal. In respect to the appropriation of waterfronts, according to the older authorities, if the stream was a navigable one, that is, one in which the tide ebbed and flowed, the title to the bed of which was in the State, the appropriation to public uses of the water front was held not to involve any taking of property for which compensation had to be made.^ And this has also been held to be the rule in reference to those fresh water streams, which are practically navigable, and the title to whose beds is in the State.^ But these cases have not been followed by later adju- dications, as far as they assert the right to take away from the riparian proprietor all access to the navigable stream by and over his land. The right of access to the stream is declared to be an incorporeal hereditament, appurtenant to the abutting land, which cannot be taken away without proper compensar tion.^ The diversion of navigable streams is also a taking of prop- erty, for which compensation must be made to the riparian owner. Although the riparian owner has no property in the water, or in the bed of the stream, he has a right to make a reasonable use of it, and since a diversion of the stream wUl interfere with this reasonable use, perhaps deprive him alto- gether of its use, compensation must be made to him for this loss, as being a taking of property.* It frequently happens, in the experience of municipal life, that in order to prevent an accidental fire from becoming a gen- eral conflagration, or to check an actual conflagration, one or more houses which stand in the path of the fije will be de- stroyed by means of explosion or otherwise. It is never done, except in cases where the destroyed houses would have inevita- bly been consumed by the fire. The" owners of these houses, • Gould V. Hudson River E. R. Co., 6 N. T. 522; Pennsylvania E. R. Co. V. N. Y., etc., K. R. Co., 23 N. J. Eq. 157; Stevens v. Patterson, etc., R. B. Co., 34 N. J. 532. 2 Tomlin v. Dubuque, etc., R. R. Co., 32 Iowa, 106 (7 Am. Rep. 176). 3 Railway v. Renwick, 102 U. S. 180; Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497; Chicago, etc., R. E. Co. v. Stein, 75 111. 41. A« to rights of property 454 in higbways, see post, chapter xvr. on Streets. * People V. Canal Appraisers, 13 Wend. 355; Gardner v. Newburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162; Bellinger v. N. T. Central E. E. Co., 23 N. Y. 42; Mor- gan v. King, 35 N. Y. 454; Hatch v. Vermont Cent. R. E. Co., 25 Vt. 49; Thunder Bay, etc., Co. v. Speedily, 31 Mich. 332; Emporia v. Soden, 25 Kan. 588 (37 Am. Rep. 265). CH. XIV.] EJIINEKT DOMAIN. § 239 therefore, have not suffered any loss by their destruction ; and, on this ground, and on the plea of overruling necessity, such destruction of buildings has been held not to be an appropria- tion under the right of eminent domain, and no claim for com- pensation can be made by the owners. And where a municipal officer orders the destruction, the municipal corporation is not liable for damages, in the absence of a statute to that effect.^ The consequential or incidental injury to property, resulting from the lawful exercise of an independent right, is never held to be a taking of property in the constitutional sense, where the enjoyment of the right or privilege does not involve an actual interference or disturbance of property rights. " In the ab- sence of all statutory provisions to that effect, no case, and cer- tainly no principle, seems to justify the subjecting a person, natural or artificial, in the prudent pursuit of his own lawful business, to the payment of consequential damage to others in their property or business. This alwaj-s happens more or less in all rival pursuits, and often where there is nothing of that kind. One mill, or one store, or one school, injures another. One's dwelling is undermined, or its lights darkened, or its prospect obscured, and thus materially lessened in value, by the erection of other buildings upon lands of other proprie- tors. One is beset with noise or dust or other inconveniences by the alteration of a street, or more especially by the introduc- tion of a railway, but there is no redress in any of these cases. The thing is lawful in the railroad, as much as in the other cases reported. These public works came too near some and too re- mote from others. They benefit many and injure some. It is not possible to equalize the advantages and disadvantages. It is so with everything, and always will be. Those most skilled in these matters, even empirics of the most sanguine preten- sions, soon find their philosophy at fault in all attempts at equalizing the ills of life. The advantage and disadvantage of a single railway could not be satisfactorily balanced by all I Taylor v. Plymouth, 8 Met. 462; Kuggles V. Nantucket, 11 Cush. 433 ; Stone V. Mayor etc. of N. Y., 25 Wend. 157; Russell v. Mayor etc. of N. T., 2 Denio, 461 ; American Print Works V. Lawrence, 21 N. J. 248; s. c, 23 N. J. 590; White v. Charleston, 1 Hill (S. C.) 571; Keller v. Corpus Christi, 50 Tex. 614 (32 Am. Rep. 513); Conwell v. Emrie, 2 Ind. 35; Field V. Des Moines, 39 Iowa, 575 ; McDonald v. Redwing, 13 Minn. 38; Sirocco V. Geary, 3 Cal. 69. See post, sec. 335. 455 § 239 MTJXICIPAL COEPOEATIOUS. [OH. XIV. of the courts in forty years ; hence they would be left, as all other consequential damage and gain are left, to balance and counterbalance themselves as they best can." ^ Thus, there is no taking of property, if the owner of a fishery finds it re- duced in value, in consequence of improvements in the navi- gation of the river ; ^ when a spring is destroyed, or other damage done to riparian land hj the same or similar causes ; ^ or when the value of adjoining property is affected by a change in the grade of the street.* In reference to this general subject, 1 Hatch V. Vt. Central R. E. Co., 25 Vt. 49; Eichardson v. Vermont Central E. E. Co., 25 Vt. 465; Eail- road Company v. Eichmond, 96 U. S. 521 ; Davidson v. Boston & Maine E. E. Co., 3 Cusli. 91; Kennett's Pe- tition, 24 N. H. 135; Hooker v. Kew Haven etc. E. E. Co., 14 Conn. 146; Gould V. Hudson Eiver E. R. Co., 6 N. T. 522; People v. Kerr, 27 N. T. 188; Zimmerman v. Union Canal Co., I Watts & S. 846; Monongahela Navi- gation Co. V. Coons, 6 Watts & S. 101; Shrunk v. Schuylkill Naviga- tion Co., 14 Serg. & R. "71; Harvey v. Lackawanna etc. E. E. Co., 47 Pa. St. 428; Xinicum Fishing Co. v. Car- ter, 61 Pa. St. 21; Fuller v. Edings, II Eich. L. 239; Edings v. Seabrook, 12 Eich. L. 504; Alexander v. Mil- waukee, 16 Wis. 247; Mun-ay v. Men- efee, 20 Ark. 561. 2 Shrunk v. Schuylkill Navigation Co., 14 Serg. & E. 71; see Parker v. Mildam Co., 20 Me. 353 (37 Am. Dec. 56); Commonwealth v. Chaplin, 5 Pick. 199 (16 Am. Dec.) 386; Com- monwealth V. Look, 108 Mass. 452 : Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (4 Am. Dec. 463). ^ Commonwealth v. Eichter, 1 Pa. St. 467; Green v. Swift, 47 Cal. 536; Brown v. Cayuga etc. E. E. Co., 12 N. Y. 486; Davidson v. Boston & Maine E. E. Co., 3 Cush. 91 ; Sprague V. Worcester, 13 Gray, 193; Tr.ans- portation Co. v. Chicago, 99 IT. S. 635. 456 * Gozzler v. Georgetovm, 6 Wheat. .'93 ; Smith v. Washington, 20 How. (U. S.) 135; Callendar v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 418; Bender v. Nashua, 17 N. H. 477; Skinner v. Hartford Bridge Co., 29 Conn. 523; Green v. Eeading, 9 Watts, 382 ; O' Conner v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. St. 187; In re Ridge Street, 29 Pa. St. 391 ; Matter of Furman Street, 17 Wend. 649 ; Wilson v. Mayor etc. of New Tork, 1 Denio, 595; Graves V. Otis, 2 Hill, 466; Eadcliffe'sEx'rs V. Mayor etc., Brooklyn, 4 N. T. 195; Pontiac v. Carter, 32 Mich. 164; La^ fayette v. Bush, 19Ind. 326; Macy v. Indianapolis, 17 Ind. 267; Vincennes V. Eichards, 23 Ind. 381; Eoberts v. Chicago, 26 111. 249; Murphy v. Chi- cago, 29 111. 279; Greal v. Keokuk, 4 Greene (Iowa) 47; but, see, contra, Atlanta V. Green, 67 Ga. 386; John- son V. City of Parkersburg, 16 W. Va. 402 (37 Am. Eep. 779); McComb V. Akron, 15 Ohio, 474 (18 Ohio, 229) ; Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio St. 459. In the last two cases it is held that when the gi-ade of streets is first es- tablished, the consequential injury to adjoining property does not con- stitute a taking of property; but when the grade has once been es- tablished, and the adjoining prop- erty improved with reference to the existing grade, a change in the grade, causing damage, would give rise to a claim for compensation. In O'Brien v. St. Paul, 25 Minn. 331, it is held that if the change in the CH. XIV.] EMINENT DOMAIN. §240 Mr. Justice Miller has said,^ that the decisions, which have de- nied the right of compensation " for the consequential injury to the property of an individual for the prosecution of iniprove- ments of roads, streets, rivers, and other highways," " have gone to the extreme limit of sound judicial construction in favor of this principle, and in some cases beyond it ; and it remains true that where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced ad- ditions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as effectually to destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking within tlie meaning of the Constitution." ^ § 240. Exercise of eminent domain by municipal corpo- rations, — The Legislature, as has already been explained,^ has in the first instance the sole power of exercising the right of eminent domain, in confiscating private property to public use. It has also been explained in the same connection, that the Leg- islature has the authority to delegate the exercise of this power to other organizations, either of a public or quasi-Tpnhlic character, provided the use to which the land is to be devoted is a public one. Thus, for example, the power to exercise the right of eminent domain may be delegated to the municipal corporation, and in delegating that power, the Legislature may also confer upon the corporation the power of determining the necessity for the ex- ercise of the right. So, for example, a municipal corporation may, in strict conformity with the constitutional limitation, be vested with the power to open up and lay out streets and parks, whenever the city council may judge such action to be neces- sary or expedient.* Generally, the determination of the neces- grade of the street deprives the abut- ting land of its lateral support, it is a taking of property in the exercise of the right of eminent domain. iPumpelly v. Green Bay etc. Co., 13 Wall. 166, 180. 2 The application of this question to the effect of municipal control of streets on the right of abutting own- ers receives further discussion in the chapter on Streets. See post, ohap. XVI. sees. 303, 304. 8 Sec. 232. ' Commonvyealth v. Charlestown, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 180; In re Piscata- vyay Towns, 54 N. J. L. 559; Harbeck V. Toledo, 11 Ohio St. 219; Shaffuer V. St. Louis, 31 Mo. 264; In re Locust St., 153 Pa. St. 276; Rhine v. Mc- Kinney, 53 Tex. 354; Alexander v. Baltimore, 5 Gill (Md.) 383; Van Husan v. Heames, (Mich. 92) 52 N. W. K. 18; People v. Smith, 21 N. Y. 595 ; Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H. K. R. Co., 18 Wend. 9; Cherokee v. Sioux City etc. Co., 52 Iowa, 279; Swan V. Williams, 2 Mich. 427; Will- son V. Bl. Cr. Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 251; . 457 §240 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XIV. sity of exercising the power in the given case is left solely to the judgment of the city council.^ But it may also be specially delegated by the Legislature to some other body, representative of the municipal corporation, such as the park commissioners.^ The motives of the council or other body, having the power to exercise the right of eminent domain, are presumed to be in strict conformity with the public need ; and it is not necessary that there should be any express declaration of such need, in order to make the appropriation to public use constitutional ; unless, possibly, where by express provisions of the statute, un- der which the municipal corporation exercises the power, the jurisdiction over the case is dependent upon a judicial finding that such an appropriation to the public use was necessary.^ While tlie Legislature usually leaves to the municipal cor- poration the exercise of the right of eminent domain, in behalf of municipal purposes, including the laying out of the needed streets and highways ; yet, it is possible for the same results to be attained by the direct action of the Legislature ; as where the Legislature orders a survey of the town in which certain streets are laid out and the map declared by a legislative act to be a public record. The streets laid out on that map are pub- lic highways, even before they have been formally opened for use.* But, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the municipal corporation is not permitted to go beyond the lim- itations imposed by the Legislature upon its exercise of the power ; and, as a general proposition, it is necessary, in the grant to the municipal corporation of this power, that the purpose or use for which it maj' take private property should be speci- fied bj' the Legislature ; and the municipal corporation can in that case not go beyond the express grant of power, or enjoy Simpson v. Kansas City, 20 S. W. K. 38: Mercer T. Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. Kaih-oad Co., 36 Pa. St. 99; Toledo etc. Co. V. Toledo Elec. Co., 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 362; Commonwealth v. Charlestown, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 180. 1 Methodist Prot. Church v. Balti- more, 6 Gill, 391 ; In re Cedar Rapids, (Iowa, 92) .51 N. W. R. 1142; Curry v. Mt. Sterling, 15 111. 320. 468 2 West Chicago Park Commission- ers V. Western Union Tel. Co., 103 111. 33. 8 Hunter v. Newport, 5 R. I. 325; Com'rs of Parks v. Moesta, (Mich. 92) 51 N. W. R. 903; O'Hare v. Chi- cago etc. Co., (111. 92) 28 N. E. R. 923; Allen v. Jones, 47 Ind. 442. *West V. Blake, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 234. CH. XIV.] EMINENT DOMAIN. §241 such power by doubtful or extravagant construction.^ Thus, for example, where a city corporation has been authorized to appropriate private property for the construction of streets and other public highways, and public squares and grounds ; it can- not exercise the right of eminent domain for the purpose of es- tablishing a prison for city use.^ § 241. Conditions precedent to the exercise of the power. — Not only can a municipal corporation not extend its power by doubtful construction beyond the express limitations imposed by the Legislature, but 'the exercise of tlie power in any case will only be lawful, when in doing so all the requirements either of the constitution, or of the State statutes, under which the power is exercised, have been strictly obseived. If there is any material or substantial deviation from the requirements of constitution or statute, as to the mode or measure of exer- cising the power, the appropriation of the private property would in that case not be lawful ; and it would be subject to avoidance by the owner of the land by an appropriate action.^ Hence, in order that any exercise of the power of eminent do- main may be valid, a strict compliance with all the conditions precedent laid down by the statute will be required ; a failure to perform any one of the conditions precedent will operate to 1 Philip street, In re, 10 La. An. 313; Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 525; Morris v. Chicago, 11 111. 650; s. p., 111. & Mich. Canal Trs. v. Chicago, 12 111. 403; Kane V. Baltimore, 15 Md. 240; Claiborne Street, In re, 4 La. An. 7; Exchange Alley, In re, 4 La. An. 4. 2 East St. Louis v. St. John, 47 111. 463; Davis v. Nichols, 39 111. App. 610; West Kiver Br. Co. v. Dix, 6 How. (U. S.) 545. 8 State V. Hudson City, 27 N. J. L. 214; Cincinnati v. Coombs, 16 Ohio, 181; State v. Heppenheimer, (N. J. 92) 23 Atl. K. 664; Baltimore v. Hook, 62 Md. 371 ; Byckman v. New York, 55 N. Y. 439; People v. Kniskern, 54 N. Y. 52; Thompson v. Schermer- horn, 6 N. Y. 92; Hunt v. Utica, 18 N. Y. 442; Belcher Sugar Refining Co. V. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co., 82 Mo. 121; Speoht v. Detroit, 20 Mich. 168; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189, 208; Shaffner v. St. Louis, 31 Mo. 264; Owosso v. Eichfield, 45 N. W. E. 129 ; Barteson v. Minneap- olis, 33 Minn. 468; Harbeck v. Tole- do, 11 Ohio St. 219; State v. Jersey City, 25 N. J. L. 309; State v. Jersey City, 26 N. J. L. 444; Godchaux v. Carpenter, 19 Nev. 415 ; State v. Ta- coma, ( Wash. 92) 29 Pac. Kep. 847; Northern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Portland, 14 0reg. 24; Buffalo, In re, 78 N. Y. 362; Ventura County v. Thompson, 51 Cal. 577; Leslie v. St. Louis, 47 Mo. 474; In re Consolidated Gas Co., 63 Hun, 632; Hudson v. Bridgeport, 25 Conn. 420; People v. Brighton, 20 Mich. 57 : Kidder v. Pe- oria, 29 111. 77 ; Exchange Alley, In re, 4 La. An. 4; Burnett v. Buffalo, 17 N. Y. 383. 459 §241 MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS. [cH. xrv. invalidate the proceeding and prevent it from divesting the owner of his property .^ And, the municipal coi-poration must show affirmatively that these requirements of the statute have been complied with. Thus, it has been held, where the statute requires that the owner of the land must be given an opportun- ity to sell the land, it is required that an effort be made to effect a private purchase of the land before the condemnatory proceed- ings can be instituted ; and, in order that the proceedings may be instituted and a lawful condemnation be obtained, it must be shown that the parties failed to agree ' between them as to the amount of compensation that was due to the owner for the taking of his land for a public use.^ So also, has it been held that, if a charter requires of a city council a previous effort to make a private purchase of the land, an honest effort to secure it by private purchase is necessary ; and that a mere formal and perfunctory compliance with that requirement would not be sufficient.® It has also been held very generally, that notice of the pro- ceeding should be given to the property owner, and a failure to give such notice would invalidate the entire proceeding;* and the record must show proof of service.* But it is com- petent, however, for the Legislature, in the absence of any special constitutional limitation, to provide for a simple con- structive notice, and to dispense with an actual notification of the property owner.® Thus, for example, it has been held that iCom'rs V. Newby, 31 111. App. 378 ; Anderson v. Pemberton, 89 Mo. 61; Zeigler v. Hopkins, 117 U. S. 683; Mulligan V. Smith, 59 Cal. 206. 2 In re New Toi-k City, 63 Hun, 632 ; Moses V. St. Louis Co., 84 Mo. 242; Dyckman v. New York, 5 N. T. 434; Re Middleton, 82 N. T. 196; In re Metro. E. R. E. Co., 12 N. Y. S. 502; Kichols V. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189; Pennsylvania E. E. Co. v. Porter, 29 Pa. St. 165; Grand Eapids v. Grand Eapids & Ind. E. E. Co., 58 Mich. 641; Doughty v. Somerville & E. E. E. Co., 21 N. J. L. 442; Toledo etc. Co. V. Detroit etc. Co., 62 Mich. 564, 578. 3 Fort St. etc. Co. v. Jones, 83 460 Mich. 415 ; Lane v. Saginaw, 53 Mich. 442; Wookler v. Chicago, 61 111. 142. * St. Joseph, etc. Co. v. Shambaugh, 106 Mo. 557; Owasso v. Eichfield, 45 N. W. E. 129; Kearney v. Ballentine, 23 Atl. E. 821; Trester v. Mo. E. E. Co., 49 N. W. E. 1110; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189. ^Nielsen v. Wakefield, 43 Mich. 434. 8 State V. Heppenheimer, (N. J. 92) 23 Atl. E. 664; Chicago etc. Co. v. Grierson, (Kan. 92) 29 Pac. E. 1082; State V. Jersey City, 24 N. J. L. 662; State V. Plainfield, 38 N. J. L. 95; Baltimore, etc. Co. v. Baltzell, 23 Atl. E. 74; Wilkin T. St. Paul & Pac. E. E. Co., 16 Minn. 271; Winnebago CH. XIV.] EMINENT DOMAIN. § 242 the publication of the ordinance, in the absence of a special constitutional requirement, may be made by the Legislature to be a sufficient notice to the property owner that his property is to be taken for a public use.^ But, in every case, it has been held that a charter which did not provide for personal service of notice upon the property ow^ner, was defective.^ But all these questions must finally depend upon the terms and pro- visions of the constitution, and the legislative act, by and under which the power is conferred upon the municipal corporation.^ § 242. Effect of discontiiiuance of proceedings. — It fre- quently happens that a municipal corporation will proceed to a condemnation of private property for public use, up to the point when the damages for such condemnation will be assessed; and the amount of the damages having thus been ascertained, the corporation deems it expedient to abandon the further pros- ecution of the case, on account of the amount of damages for the condemnation. The question has been raised, at what time in the course of the proceeding is the corporation still permit- ted to withdraw ; or when has the proceeding gone so far as to create in behalf of the property owner the right to a comple- tion of the proceeding, and a recovery by him of the damages, which have been assessed against the municipal corporation for the proposed taking of his property for a public use. It has been held by a great preponderance of authority that, be- fore the property has been taken possession of, and before the final confirmation of the report of the commissioners, or other referees, in regard to the assessment of damages, the corpora- tion may recede from or abandon the proceeding, without any claim against it on the part of the property owner for damages for such discontinuance of the proceedings.* And where such F. Co. V. Ey. Co., (Wis. 92) 51 N. "W. E. 576; Owners, etc., v. Albany, 15 "Wend. 374; Methodist Prot. Church V. Baltimore, 6 Gill (Md.) 391 ; Stew- art V. Hinds Co. Bd. of Police, etc., 25 Miss. 479; Dubuque v. Wooton, 28 Iowa, 571. 'Winnebago, etc. Co. v.E. E. Co., (Wis. 92) 51 N. W. E. 576; Curry v. Mt. Sterling, 15 111. 320; Johnson v. Joliet & C. E. E. Co., 23 111. 202. ^Kundizer v. Saginaw, 59 Mich. 355, 363; Charlestown, etc. Co. v. Comstock, (Va. 92) 15 S. E. E. 69; St. Paul, Minneapolis & M. Ey. Co. v. Minneapolis, 35 Minn. 141 ; State v. Fond du Lac, 42 Wis. 298. s Carey v. Chicago, etc. Co., 100 Mo. 282; Swan v. Willianis, 2 Mich. 427; Palmyra v. Morton, 25 Mo. 593, 597. * Hawersley v. New York, 56 N. T. 533; Williamsport, etc. Co. v. P, & E. K. Co., 27 W. N. C. 576; 21 Atl. K. 461 §242 MUIflCIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. xrv. discontinuance is allowable, the city will only be required to pay the taxable costs and expenses of the city, and is not called upon to pay the attorney's fee and other expenses, which the private owner might have incurred, which are not included in the actual costs.-' It is, however, doubtful under the authorities, what acts con- stitute such a conclusion of the proceedings as to bind the municipal corporation and compel it to go on with the condem- nation, and take away the power to withdraw. According to the authorities in New York and other States, it has been held that where proceedings to condemn lands to public use have progressed so far, as that the amount of damages has been finally and definitely assessed, and the report which finds the amount of damages has been filed and confirmed, the private property owner has, at that point in the proceedings, acquired the vested right to damages thus assessed in his favor, and the city cannot escape the obligation to pay them.'^ But it has been held in other cases that, as long as possession has not been taken under the judgment of the court of condemnation, the city may still withdraw from the transaction and abandon the proceedings, without payment of the damages which have been assessed to the owner, even though the report assessing the damages has been presented and confirmed by the court. In these cases it is held, that the confirmation of the report, in which the damages have been assessed, is simply a determination of the value of the land, if the city should finally conclude to take such land for 645; Rhinebeck R. R., In re, 67 jST. Y. 242; Simpson V. Kansas City, (Mo. 92) 20 S. W. E. 38; State v. Hug, 44 Mo. 116; Carson v. Hartford, 48 Conn. 68; Stevens v. Danbury, 53 Conn. 9; Hulliu V. Second Municipality, 11 Rob. 97; Jersey City Water Com'rs, 31 K. J. L. 72; Clough v. Unity, 18 N. H. 75; Municipality v. Levee, S. C. P. Co., 7 La. An. 270; Com'rs of Washington Park, In re, 56 X. T. 144 ; Military Parade Ground, In re, 60 N. T. 319; Millard v. Lafayette, 5 La. An. 112; Canal Street, In re, 11 Wend. 155. 1 Waverly W. Works Co., In re, 16 Hun, 57; St. Louis v. Meintz, (Mo. 92) 462 18 S. W. R. 30; MatUage v. N. T. El. R. Co., 17 N. Y. S. 536. 2 Harrington v. Berkshire Co. Com'rs, 22 Pick. 263; Dolores No. 2 Land & Canal Co. v. Hartman, (Col. 92) 29 Pack. 378; Funk's Admr. v. Waynesboro, (Pa.) 10 Atl. R. 427; O'Neill V. Hudson County, 41 N. J. L. 161; Fort Street etc. Co. v. Backus, (Mich. 92) 52 N. W. R. 790; Garrison V. New York, 21 Wall. 196; Dover Street, In re, 18 Johns. 506; Duncan v. Louisville, 8 Bush (Ky.) 98; People V. Syracuse, Cora. Council, 78 N. Y. 57; Consumers' G. T. Co. v. Harless, (Ind. 92) 29 N. E. E. 1062; Rhinebeck R. R., In re, 67 N. Y. 242. CH. XIV.] EMINENT DOMAIN. §242 public use.^ In some of the cases, the language of the act or charter of the city settles this question beyond dispute, as where it is provided "that after the value and damages shall have been ascertained, the amount with interest shall be paid to the person interested, on demand."^ It has also been held that, as long as the assessment of dam- ages has not been determined upon as a finality, the taking of possession of the lands would not so far bind the municipal corporation as to take away the power of discontinuing the proceedings. The taking of possession is presumed to be with the consent of the landowner, and it serves in no wa}'' whatever as evidence of a contract to biij'^ the lands.^ But in all of these cases of a discontinuance of the proceedings by the municipal corporation, while it is true that there cannot be any recovery of the sum, which might have been established as the true measure of damages for the confiscation of tlie property for a public use, j'et, the landowner has a special action for damages for any wrongful or injurious acts of the municipal corporation in respect to the land, and for injuries which the landowner has suffered by the detention or use of the land by the cor- poration.* It needs to be stated finally, that this entire doctrine in respect to the right of discontinuing proceedings for con- demnation of lands is opposed and rejected by the English cases.^ 1 Baltimore & Susq. E. K. Co. v. Nesbit, 10 How. 395; Garrison v. New York, 21 Wall. 196; GrafE v. Baltimore, 10 Md. 544; State v. Graves, 19 Md. 351; Baltimore v. Musgrave, 48 Md. 272; Merrick v. Baltimore, 4.3 Md. 219; Norris v. Bal- timore, 44 Md. 598; Black v. Balti- more, 50 Md. 236 ; Baltimore v. Black, 56 Md. 333. 2 Devlin v. City of New York, 131 N. Y. 123; Longworth v. Cincinnati, 48 Ohio St. 637; Trustees Brooklyn Bridge v. Cliurch, 63 Hun, 632; Gar- rison V. New York, 21 Wall. 196; Fai-nsworth v. Boston, 121 Mass. 173; Lafayette v. Schultz, 44 Ind. 97 ; Staf- ford V. Albany, 7 Johns. (N. Y.)541; Higgins V. Chicago, 18 111. 276; Chi- cago v. Wheeler, 25 111. 478. ^ Brokaw v. Terre Haute, 97 Ind. 176; Feiten v. Milwaukee, 47 Wis. 494; HuUin v. Munici'y, H Bob. (La.) 97; Norris v. Baltimore, 44 Md. 606; Baltimore v. Musgrave, 48 Md. 272. *EofBgnac Street, In re, 4 Rob. (La.) 357; Stevens v. Danbury, 53 Conn. 9; State v. Graves, 19 Md. 351; GrafE v. Baltimore, 10 Md. 544; Whit- ing v. Boston, 106 Mass. 89; Mc- Laughlin V. Municipality, 5 La. An. 504; Simpson v. Kansas City, (Mo. 92) 20 S. W. R. 38; Baltimore v. Mus- grave, 48 Md. 272 ; Anthony Street, In re, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) «18; Walling V. Shreveport, 5 La. An. 660. 5 King v. Market St. Com'rs, 4 B. & Ad. 335; Stone v. Commercial Ry. Co., 4 M. & C. 122; Walker v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co., 6 Hare 544. 463 § 243 MTJJSriCrPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XIV. § 243. Compensation required.— The general provision of the constitutions, limiting and controlling the exercise of the right of eminent domain, requires the payment of compensation for the appropriation of private property to a public use. Some of the constitutional provisions enter into an express stipula- tion, that the compensation should be made in money ; but, even in the absence of an express provision of that kind, the com- pensation would necessarily be presumed to be pecuniary in character. In determining what is the compensation, the laws of the State, and sometimes the provisions of the constitution, require certain methods and modes of proceeding to be followed. And in order that the compensation agreed upon may be bind- ing upon both parties, the provisions of the constitution and of the statute, under which the municipal corporation exercises the power must be strictly pursued, and any material deviations from these requirements would invalidate the condemnation.^ If the act of the Legislature or charter, which authorized the taking of property for public use by the municipal corporation, provided a specific remedy for the ascertainment of the dam- ages, it is necessary that that remedy should be resorted to ; because, if it is complete and adequate, it is regarded as exclu- sive.^ Where the owner's right to damages has become vested, 1 state V. City, (N. J. 92) 22 Atl. R. 1052; Union etc. Co. v. Slee, (111. 88) 12 N. E. R. 543 ; 13 K. E. R. 222 ; Croft V. Bennington, etc. Co., (Vt. 92) 23 Atl. R. 922; Thompson v. Chi. etc. Co., (Mo. 82) 19 S. W. R. 77; Under- hill V. Manhattan Ry. Co., (N. T. 92) 27 Abb. N. C. 478; 21 Civ. Pro. R. 441; Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247; Sower V. Philadelphia, 35 Pa. St. 231 ; Cairo & P. R. R. Co. v. Turner, 31 Ark. 495; Memphis & C. R. R. Co. v. Payne, 37 Miss. 700; Foster v. Scott, 17 N. Y. S. 479; Cairo & P. R. R. Co. V. Turner, 31 Ark. 459; Jamison v. Springfield, 53 Mo. 224; Daniels v. Railroad Co., 25 Iowa, 129; Chaffee's Appeal, 56 Mich. 244; St. Louis v. Franks, 78 Mo. 41 ; Butte v. Boydston, 64 Cal. 110; Floyd v. Turner, 23 Tex. 293; Kankaman v. Canallo, 142 U. S. 254 ; Boston v. Robbins, 126 Mass. 384. 464 estate V. Engelman, 106 Mo. 628; Wamesit P. Co. v. Lowell etc. Co., 139 Mass. 173; Hanes v. N. C. R. R. Co. 109N. C. 490; Baltimore B. R. Co. V. Baltzell, (Md. 92) 23 Atl. R. 74; In re Opening of 163d St., 61Hun, 365 ; State V. Heffenheimer, (N. J. 92) 23 Atl. R. 664; Dodge v. Essex Co. Comm'rs, 3 Met. (Mass.) 380; Rein- hart V. Buffalo, 15 N. Y. S. 844; Ran- kin & Great Western Ry. Co., 4 tip. Can. C. P. 463; Grimshaw v. Grand Trunk R'y Co., 19 Up. Can. Q. B. 493; Mitchell v. Franklin &C. Turnp. Co., 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 4p6; Brown v. Beatty, 34 Miss. 227; Brown v. Calu- met, (111. 92) 26 N. E. R. 501; Calking V. Baldwin, 4 AVend. (IST. Y.) 667; Baltimore B. R. Co. v. Baltzell, (Md. 92) 23 Atl. Rep. 74; Lafayette & I. R. R. Co. V. Smith, 6 Ind. 249. CH. XIV.] EMINENT DOMAIN. §244 and the municipal corporation has failed to make payment of the same, the private owner whose property has been taken may sue the corporation therefor ; and, in an appropriate case, obtain a mandamus to compel such corporation to provide for the payment of the compensation, or to collect the assessments, out of which such compensation is to be paid.^ But this is pos- sible only when the proceedings for assessment have been made final. As long as these proceedings are only provisional, there is no right of action on the part of the private owner to compel such payment.^ § 244. Who entitled to receive compensation The gen- eral rule is that the owner or owners of the property will be entitled to receive the compensation, and it matters not who or how many they are, or what their interests in the property are, whether joint owners, or parties having separate interests in the estate, each will be able to claim a share in the compen- sation.^ Npt only is that the ,rule, in respect to the more or less permanent interests in the property ; but it is likewise the case, where the party claiming the interest is simply a tenant for years, or where he has a more or less temporary interest in the land. His dispossession, in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, does not constitute an act of eviction, so as to relieve him from liability on his covenant for rent ; nor is he subject to a loss of his estate in the land by this exercise of eminent do- main, without satisfying his claim for compensation. He has, along with the landlord, an act for damages against the public, or against the private corporation, in whose behalf the land has been confiscated.* ' HoUingswoi'th v. Tensas Parish, 17 Fed. Kep. 109; Wrought Iron Bridge Co. v. Utica, 17 lb. 316; Hig- gins V. Chicago, 18 111. 276; Rome v. Jenkins, 30 6a. 1.54; State v. Keokuk, 9 Iowa, 438; Philadelphia v. Dyer, 41 Pa. St. 463; Philadelphia v. Dick- son, 38 Pa. St. 247; McCormack v. Brooklyn, 108 N. Y. 49; State v. Hugg, 44 Mo. 116; Mobile v. Richard- son, 1 Stew. & Port. (Ala.) 12. 2 Carson v. Hartford, 48 Conn. 68. 3 Devlin v. New York, 131 Jf. Y. 123; Shaaber v. Reading, (Pa. 92) 24 Atl. E. 692; Mortimer v. Metro. El. 30 R. Co., 129 N. Y. 81; 29 N. E. R. 5; Board v. Levee Gom'rs, 66 Miss. 248; Pittsburgh etc. Co. v. Oliver, 19 Atl. R. 47; 131 Pa. St. 408; Thompson v. Chicago & Ch. etc. Co., (Mo. 92) 19 S. W. R. 77; Kearney V. Metro. E. R. Co., 129 N. Y. 76; Missouri etc. Co. V. Wilson, 45 Mo. App. 1; Chicago etc. Co. V. Easley, 26 Pac. R. 731; Korn V. Metro. Ry. Co., 59 Hun, 505; Brown v. Chicago etc. Co., 101 Mo. 484. iRiddle v. Hussman, 23 Mo. 597; Kingland v. Clark, 24 Mo. 24; Leiter V. Pike, 127 111. 287; see Gillespie v. 465 §245 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XIV. A different conclusion is reached in regard to the effect of the exercise of eminent domain on a wife's dower. It is well set- tled, that the dower right of the wife or widow is defeated by the exercise of eminent domain over the land, out of which the dower issues. But it is a matter of considerable doubt, whether the right before assignment, during the life of the husband, or after his death, partakes so much of the nature of an interest or estate in the land, as to entitle her to compensation separate from her husband, and his heirs and assignees. It has been held that she cannot claim such compensation, but the question cannot be considered as definitely settled.^ § 245. Who assesses the damage. — The body or tribunal, to whom the assessment of damages for confiscation of land to public use must be referred, will depend upon the express pro- visions of the law of the State. And the provisions of that law, whatever they may be, must be strictly followed.^ But little difficulty is experienced, under this heading, except where the law requires that the assessment of damages should be made by a jury, in determining what is the sense in which the word jury is here employed. It has been, held, that where that statement is made, jury means a common law jury ; and no other proceeding will supply the place of an assessment by the jury.^ In Minnesota, it has been held that the constitutional provision, reserving the right of trial by jury, is not extended by implication to proceedings .Thomas, 15 "Wend. 468; Parks v. Bos- ton, 15 Pick. 198; Patterson v. Bos- ton, 20 Pick. 159; Polts v. Huntley, 7 Wend. 210. 1 1 Waslib. on Real Prop. 270 ; Moore V. New York, 4 Sandf. 450; s. c, 8 N. T. 110; Gwyilne v. Cincinnati, 3 Ohio, 24. See, contra, i-ecognizing the widow's claim to compensation, Ebey v. Ebey, 1 Wash. Ter. 185; Venahle v. Wabash etc. Co., (Mo. 92) 19 S. W. R. 45. 2 McClure v. Red Wing, 28 Minn. 186; Allen V. Jones, 47 Ind. 442; Rhine v. McEinney, 53 Tex. 354; Miimeapolis v. Wilkin, 30 Minn. 140. * St. Joseph etc. Co. v. Shambaugh, 106 Mo. 557; Chicago etc. Co. v. 466 Bates, (Mo. 92) 18 S. W. R. 1133; Chi- cago etc. V. Elliott, (Mo. 92) 18 S. W. R. 901; Alexander v. Baltimore, 5 Gill (Md.) 383; Meth. Prot. Church V. Baltimore, 6 Gill. (Md.) 391"; Ala. etc. Co. V. Kewton, (Ala. 92) 10 So. Rep. 89; People v. Stuart, 97 111. 123; Postal, Tel. Co. v. Railroad, 92 Ala. 331; Lamb v. Lane, 4 Ohio St. 167; Beers v. Beers, 4 Conn. 535; Rail- road Co. V. Miller, 17 S. W. R. 499; 106 Mo. 458; Sharpless v. West Ches- ter, 1 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 257; Charles- town etc. Co. V. Comstock, (W. Va.) 15 S. E. K 69; State v. Graves, 19 Md. 351; Lumsden v. Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 485; contra. Col. etc. Co. v, Humphrey, 26 Pac. R. 165. CH. XIY.] EMINENT DOMAIN. §245 in the exercise of the right of eminent domain.^ It is very- likely that constitutional provisions, like the one in Minnesota, do not apply to the proceedings for an assessment of damages in exercise of eminent domain, so as to bind the Legisla- ture to prescribe that method of assessment. It is believed that the authorities will agree that the Legislature is competent to prescribe some other method or mode of assessing damages in such cases, notwithstanding the general constitutional provision preserving the right of trial by jury, as long as the constitution contains no special provision, requiring such a trial in the special case of proceedings in eminent domain.^ But the fact, that the law of the State requires a resort to a jury, will not make it nec- essary for the first assessment of damages to be made by the jury, provided that the private owner has the opportunity, if he desires it, of appealing to a court and jury for the review of the assessment which is previously made by some other body or tribunal. As long as he has this right of appeal from the pre- liminary and otherwise unauthorized assessments by commis- sioners or otherwise, there is no violation of the rule of law, which requires that the assessment should be made by the jury.^ 1 Ames V. Lake Superior & Miss. E. R. Co., 21 Minn. 241, 293; Weir V. St. Paul S. & T. F. K. E. Co., 18 Minn. 155. 2 Petition of Mt. Washington Road Co., 35 N. H. 184; State v. Heppen- heimer, (N. J. 92) 23 Atl. E. 664; United States v. Engerman, 46 Fed. R. 176; Weir v. St. Paul S. & T. F. R. R. Co., 18 Minn. 155; Heyneman V. Blake, 19 Cal. 579; Koppikus v. Commissioners, 16 Cal. 248; Dalton V. Northampton, 19 N. H. .362; Ames V. Lake Superior & Miss. R. R. Co., 21 Minn. 241, 293; Beekman v. Sara- toga & S. R. R. Co., 3 Paige (N. Y.) 45; Lake Erie, W. & St. L. R. R. Co. V. Heath, 9 Ind. 558 ; Hymes v. Ayde- lott, 26 Ind. 431 ; Livingston v. New York, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 85; State v. Jersey City, 26 N. J. L. 444. 3 Callen v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540; Postal etc. Co. v. Ala. etc. Co., (Ala. 92) 9 So. R. 555; Port Huron etc. Co. V. Callmain, 61 Mich. 12; Alexander V. Baltimore, 5 Gill (Md.) 383; Meth. Prot. Church v. Baltimore, 6 Gill (Md.) 891; Morford v. Barnes, 8 Yerg. (Tenn.) 444; Beers v. Beers, 4 Conn. 535; St. Joseph etc. Co. v. Cudmore, 15 S. W. Rep. 535; Ken- dall V. Post, 8 Oreg. 14; Evansville & O. R. R. Co. V. Miller, 30 Ind. 209; People V. McRoberts, 62 111. 38; Up- per Coos R. Co. V. Parsons, 18 Atl. Rep. 10; Minneapolis v. Wilkin, 30 Minn. 140; Stewart v. Baltimore, 7 Md. 500; Lumsden v. Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 485 ; Chicago etc. Co. v. Eubanks, 18 S. W. Rep. 1184; Kine v. Defen- baugh, 64 111. 291; People v. Stuart, 97 111. 123; Warren v. St. Paul * Pac. R. R. Co., 18 Minn. 884; Weir V. St. Paul S. & T. F. R. E. Co., 18 Minn. 155 ; Connelly v. Griswold, 7 Iowa, 416; Wells Co. Road, In re, ^ Ohio St. 16; Cairo & F. R. R, Co. v. Trout, 32 Ark. 17 (1877). 467 § 245 MCTNrCIPAL COKPOEATIOJfS. [CH. XIV. But, in any case, the owner of piivate propert}-, which is taken in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, may waive his claim to an assessment by jury, and consent to any other mode of assessment. The provision is for his benefit, if he desires to avail himself of it ; but it is not obligatory upon the public authorities, if the private owner does not require it.^ In New York, the constitution provides that the compensation " shall be ascertained by a jury, or by no less than three commissioners appointed by a court of record." This provision requires the jury, in the absence of the appointment of commissioners ; but it is left to the discretion of the court, whether a jury or three commissioners should be selected. But the commissioners can only be appointed by the court ; and no method of selection of appraisers or commissioners by lot would be lawful, and a sub- sequent appointment of them by the court would be an evasion of the constitutional provision, which would make the assess- ment by them invalid.^ It has also been decided that, under this constitutional provision, the Legislature is not authorized to give to the city council the power to appoint the appraisers.^ When the constitutional requirement is, that damages should be assessed by a jury, the common law jury of twelve men is what is presumptively intended by the provision ; and no other body will satisfy the requirement.* But it has been held in New York, under the constitutional provision just referred to, and in the light of a legislative usage, that the term jury, as used in this constitutional provision, did not necessarily require ia body of twelve men, whose judgment depends upon their unanimous agreement ; but that the provision would be satis- fied by any body of a different number of jurors, and whether they reached a unanimous verdict or decided the matter by a majority vote. The court, however, proceeds to state that in the absence of such a usage, modifying and controlling the in- terpretation of such a constitutional provision, the common law jury must be presumed to have been alone intended by the 1 People V, Stuart, 97 HI. 123; Wil- liamson V. Cass County, 84 111. 361 (1877); Lamb v. Lane, 4 Ohio St. 167 (1854). 2 Cruger v. Hudson E. E. E. Co., 12 N. Y. 190 (1854); Eoanoke City v. Pei-kowitz, 80 Va. 616. 468 3 Clark V. Utica, 18 Barb. (K. Y.) 451.- * LuTusden v. Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 485; People v. Kimball, 4 Mich. 95; Campau v. Detroit, 14 Mioh. 276 ; Hor- ton V. Grand Haven, 24 Mich. 465; Des Moines v. Layman, 21 Iowa, 158. CH. XIV.] EMINENT DOMAIN. §246 constitutional provision referred to.^ Although the charter of a citjj^ provides that damages should be assessed by a jury, it has been held that a city corporation would have the power to lay aside the assessment made by the jury, and pay to the owner of the property a larger sum than that which the jury had de- clared to be a proper compensation. It could not force the payment of a smaller sum without the consent of the owner of the property; but the amount may be increased, where the city council came to the conclusion that there had been an improper assessment by the jury.^ It has been held in Massachusetts, that a city has not the power to enter into an agreement, binding upon itself, to sub- mit to arbitration the assessment of damages for the confisca- tion of private property to public use.^ § 246. The measure of value or damages. — The court, or other tribunal, to which is assigned the duty of assessing the amount of damages, to be paid to the owner of private prop- erty which has been taken for public use, is required to ascer- tain what is the exact loss to the owner of property by such a confiscation of his property to public use. And while the sen- timental appreciation of the property by its owner cannot be taken into consideration ; * yet, whatever is the value of the propert)' on the market, which is determined by the use to which the land can be put, will be in general the rul-e for de- termining the amount of damages, which should be awarded to the owner for the confiscation of the property. It is not neces- sary that the property should have that particular value to the owner, or that he should put the property to the uses for which the property is adapted and which determines or increases its market value. The fact, that the propepty is adaptable to this valuable use, is sufficient to enable him to claim that value as the real rule for the measurement of his damages. In other 1 Cruger v. Hudson K. K. E. Co., 12 N. Y. 190; Brooklyn v. Patchen, 8 Wend. (N. T.) 47. 2 Mobile V. Kichardson, 1 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 12. ''Harvard College v. Boston, 104 Mass. 470; Brimmer v. Boston, 102 Mass. 19; Somervllle v. Dickerman, 127 Mass. 272; Boylston Market As- sociation V. Boston, 113 Mass. 523. 1 Stafford v. Providence, 10 E. I. 567; 14 Am. Kep. 710; Kerr v. South Park Com'rs, 117 U. S. 379; Provi- dence & W. R. Co. V. Worcester, (Mass. 92) 29 N. E. R. 56; Cook v. South Park Com'rs, 61 111. 115 ; Green v. Chicago, 97 111. 370. 469 §216 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XIV. words, it is the market value of the property, and not any spe- cial value of it to the particular owner, which constitutes the true measure of damages.^ The measurement of the damages, to be recovered by the owner of the private property, varies according to whether the entire property is taken, or only a part. Where the proposed confiscation to public use involves the appropriation of the en- tire property, there is no difficulty in ascertaining what is the true rule for measuring the damages to be recovered by the owner. Such owner is entitled to the full market value of the property, and this is determined by its adaptability to a valuable use ; he is entitled to receive its full value and nothing more.^ But where, as is probably the more common case, only a part of the property is taken, some difficult questions are likely to arise, in determining what rule is to be followed in the measuring of 1 Goodin v. Cine. & W. Canal Co., 18 OMo St. 169; Young v. Harrison, 17 Ga. 30; Furman Street, In re, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 669; Miss. & R. Elver Boom Co. V. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403 (1878); s. c, 3 Dillon, 46.5. The rule has been very clearly stated by the United States Supreme Court in the opinion of Justice Field (in Miss. & E. Eiver Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403) : " In determining the value of land appropriated for public pur- poses the same considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of property between private parties. The in- quiry in such cases must be, What is the property worth in the marljet, viewed not merely with reference to the uses to which it is at the time applied, but with reference to the uses to which it is plainly adapted; that is to say, what is it worth from its availability for valuable uses ? Property is not to be deemed worth- less because the owner allows it to go to waste, or to be regarded as valueless because he is unable to put it to any use. Others may be able to use it and make it subserve the ne- cessities or conveniences of life. Its capability of being made thus avail- 470 able gives it a market value which can be readily estimated. So many and varied are the circumstances to be taken into account to determine the value of property condemned for public purposes, that it is perhaps impossible to formulate a rule to govern its appraisement in all cases. Exceptional circumstances wiU mod- ify the most carefully guarded rule; but, as a general thing, we should say that the compensation to the owner is to be established by refer- ence to the uses for which the prop- erty is suitable, having regard to the existing business or wants to the com- munity, or such as may be reasona- bly expected in the immediate fu- ture." See, also, San Jose v. Eeed, 65 Cal. 241. - Patterson v. Miss. & E. Eivers Boom Co., 3 Dillon, 465, 467 (1875); affirmed by the Supreme Court, 98 U. S. 473 (1878) ; Giesy v. Cine. W. & Z. E. E. Co., 4 Ohio St. 308 (1854); Stafford v. Providence, 10 E. I. 567 (1873); s. c, 14 Am. Rep. 710; Somer- ville & E. E. R. Co. v. Doughty, 22 ISr. J. L. 495 (1850) ; Driver & Western Union R. R. Co., 32 Wis. 569 (1873); s. c, 14 Am. Rep. 726. CH. xrv.] EMINENT DOMAIN. §246 the damages. He is entitled to whatever damage has been in- flicted upon him and nothing more. But very often by the ap- propriation of a part of the property to a public use, for example in the laying out of the streets, the land which is left in the private owner is very much more valuable than the entire prop- erty was before the appropriation ; and the question is, to what extent the courts can take into consideration the benefits or in- juries which the property suffers by the appropriation, in de- termining the true amount of damages to be recovered by the property owner. In this connection a distinction is made by the authorities between general or public benefits, and injuries special or local. A benefit or injury resulting from the public act is said to be general or public, where it is suffered or enjoyed by the public in general, and is not imposed or inflicted upon any one partic- ular proprietor. A benefit or injury is said to be special or local, where it affects the particular proprietor, part of whose land has been taken in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, as, for example, by 'rendering his own land more useful or con- venient, and thus increasing its value, or by making it less useful or convenient, and therefore diminishing its value. The courts have very generally held, that the public benefits and in- juries are not to be considered at all in the estimation of the damages to be awarded to an owner of property for confiscation of the part for public use ; but that special benefits, as well as injuries, which such owner Las enjoyed or suffered, should be considered in determining the amount of damages, unless it is provided by the Constitution, or by the statutes of the State, that all benefits of whatever kind should be excluded.^ It seems that there is no doubt in regard to the fact, that the special damage to the part of the land, which it left to the own- er, should be considered as well as the actual market value of the property which has been taken, in order to secure a proper ^ Montgomery Co. v. Bridge Co., 110 Pa. St. 54; Harris v. Schuylkill, etc. Co., 21 AtLK. 590; 28 W. N. C. 44; Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Chi- cago, 26 Fed. Rep. 415; Newman v. Metro, etc. Co., 118 N. T. 618; San Jose V. Mayne, 83 Cal. 563; 23 Pac. R. 522 ; Upton v. South Reading Br. R. R. Co., 8 Cush. 600; Louisville Co. V. Ingram, (Ky.) 14 S. W. Rep. 534; Chattanooga v. Geiler, 13 Lea, 611 ; Louisville, etc. v. Asher, (Ky.) 15 S. W. Rep. 517; Dwight v. Hampden Co. Com'rs, 11 Cush. 201; Howard v. Providence, 6 R. 1.514; Chicago, etc. Co. V. Aldrich, (111.) 24 N. E. Rep. "763. 471 §246 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. XIV. assessment of damages.^ And it is very generally held that special benefits to the remaining property, accruing from the proposed improvements, should be deducted from the valuation of the property taken, in order to ascertain the measure of com- pensation.2 In Massachusetts, it has been held, that the benefit from widening a street was to be considered as direct and spe- cial, although other estates on the same street have been simi- larly benefited by the same improvements.* But in some of the States, the special benefits are held to be excluded from the es- timation of damages for confiscation.* In widening streets, it very often occurs that a building will be found to be in the way, either wholl}"- or partially so. Where the building is wholly within the line of the proposed street, tlie entire house would, of course, have to be condemned by the city and paid for ; and the city could not compel the pri- vate owner to remove such building and pay him only for the > Montgomery v. Townseud, 80 Ala. 480; Providence etc. Co. v. Worces- ter, (Mass. 92) 29 K. E. Kep. 56; Her- cules V. Elgin etc. Co., (111. 92) 30 lb. 1050; Fort Worth Co. v. Downie, 82 Tex. 383; Charleston etc. Co. v. Comstock, (W. Va. 92) 15 S. E. K. 69; Driver v. Western Union K. K. Co., 32 Wis. 569; s. c, 14 Am. Rep. 726; Chicago etc. Co. v. Nix, (111.) 27 N. E. Kep. 81; Chicago etc. Co. v. Blume, lb. 601. 2 Newman v. Metro, etc. Co., 118 N. T. 618; Haynes v. Duluth, 47 Minn. 458; Smith v. Lahore, 37 Kan. 480; 15 Pac. 577; Concordia Cem. Assn. V. Minn. etc. Co., 121 111. 199; 12 N. E. R. 536; Lears v. Seattle, (Wash. 93) 32 Pack. 794; Long v. Harrisburg, 126 Pa. St. 143; 19 Atl. R. 39; McReynolds v. Kansas etc. Co., 34 Mo. App. 581; State v. Digby, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 543; Robbins v. Milw. & H. R. R. Co., 6 Wis. 636; Little Rock v. Woodruff, (Ark.) 14 N. E. Rep. 18; Hyde Park v. Washington IceCo., 117111. 233; Roberts v. Brown Co. Com'rs, 21 Kan. 247; Village of Hyde Park v. Dunham, 85 111. 569 ; 472 Pacific R. R. Co. v. Chrystal, 25 Mo. 544; Jacob v. Louisville, 9 Dana (Ky.) 144; Arnold v. Gov. & Cine. Br. Co., 1 Duvall (Ky.) 372; Louisville etc. Co. v. Barrett, 16 S. W. Rep. 278; Woodruff v. Nashville & C. R. R. Co., 2 Swan (Tenu.) 422; Mclntire v. State, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 384; Short v. Roch. etc. Co., (Pa.) 8 Atl. Rep. 598; McMahon v. Cine. & C. S. L. R. R. Co., 5 Ind. 418; Isom v. Railroad Co., 36 Miss. 300; Cleveland & P. R. R. Co. V. Ball, 5 Ohio St. 568. 3 Donovan v. Springfield, 125 Mass. 371; Upham v. Worcester, 113 lb. 97; Cross v. Plymouth County, 125 lb. 557. * Israel v. Jewett, 29 Iowa, 475; Sater v. Burlington & Mt. P. PI. R. Co., 1 Iowa, 893; Horbstein v. Atl. & Gt. W. R. R.-, 51 Pa. St. 87; Har- risburg & Pot. R. R. Co. V. Moore, 4 W. N. C. 537; Savannah v. Hartridge, 37 Ga. 113; Philadelphia v. Linnard, 97 Pa. St. 242. In Mississippi and other States, incidental benefits can- not be set off even against incidental damages. New Orleans, J. & Gt. N. R. R. Co. v. Moye, 39 Miss. 874. CH. XIV.] EMINENT DOMAIN. §247 cost of removal and restoration. Where only a part of the house is within the line of the proposed street, it is held that the city cannot he compelled to take the whole house ; but, in such a case, it would be compelled to paj"- whatever was the actual damage, which was suffered by the owner by the destruc- tion of a part of the house.^ But in estimating the damages suffered by a proposed im- provement, it is impossible to include consequential damage, resulting from the character of the improvement, and its effect upon adjoining property where the public use, to which the property has been devoted, in itself constitutes a continuing nuisance. Where it is a nuisance, an appropriate action for the abatement of the nuisance could be employed by the owner of the adjoining property ; such a circumstance would not be taken into consideration, in estimating the assessment of dam- ages.^ In ascertaining the measure of damages for the taking of property for a public park, it has been held that it is impossi- ble for evidence to be admitted to show the price, at which land adjoining the proposed park was sold, after the establish- ment of a park was announced and its boundaries established. The true rule of measurement of damages being the value of the land at the date of condemnation.^ § 247. When payment should be made. — In the absence of constitutional provisions, controlling and limiting the discre- tion of the Legislature, it is competent for the Legislature to authorize private property to be taken by municipal corporations for a public use, without making prepayment of compensation. It is more customary, either in accordance with constitutional provision or legislative enactment, to require the compensation to precede, or at any rate to accompany, the act of appropria- tion.* But in the absence of constitutional provisions, this is 1 Portland v. Kamm, 10 Oreg. 383; Schuchaidt v. New York, 53 N. T. 202. 2 Badger v. Boston, 130 Mass. ITO; Eames v. New Engl. Worsted Co., 11 Met. 570; Staple v. Spring, 10 Mass, 72. 8 In re Butler, 127 N. T. 463; Kerr V. South Park Com'rs, 117 U. S. 379; Cook V. South Park Com'rs, 61 111. 115. 4 Ohio Eiv. E. Co. v. Ward, 35 W. Va. 481; Georgia etc. Co. v. Archer, 87 Ga. 237; Miller v. Mobile, 47 Ala. 163; Baltimore v. St. Agnes Hospi- tal, 48 Md. 419; Casey v. Inloes, 1 Gill (Md.) 510; Phillips v. South Park Com'rs, 119 111. 826; Colton 473 §247 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XIT not necessary. A city may be permitted to make compensa- tion for condemnation of lands to public use at a future time.^ However, in permitting this, it is necessary that the Legislature shall make some certain and adequate provision for the com- pulsory payment of the compensation at the instance of the private owner, and without any unreasonable delay.^ Where the Legislature, in providing for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, likewise provides an adequate and complete remedy for the recovery of the compensation, it has been held tliat the compensation must be enfoi-ced by means of that remedy and bj' no other.^ And even where compensation is not required to precede or to accompany the appropriation of the land, the owner is entitled to payment of compensation within a reasonable time, after the appropriation has been made. And it is generally held that such a party is entitled to pay- ment of compensation, when the report of the commissioners of assessment, or the judgment of the jur)', had been finally acted upon or confirmed ; or, even before confirmation, when the municipal government has entered into possession of the V. Rossi, 9 Cal. 595 (1858); McCann V. Sierra County, 1 Cal. 121; Bohl- man v. Green Bay & L. P. R. R. Co., 30 Wis. 105; "Williams v. New Or- leans M. & T. R. R. Co., 60 Miss. 689. ' Bloodgood V. Mohawk & H. R. R. Co., 18 Wendi 9; Farmer's M. Co. V. R. R. Co., 21 Atl. R. 902; 28 W. K. C. Ill; McCormick v. Lafayette, 1 Ind. 48; Comm'rs v. Bowie, 34 Ala. 461; Lafayette v. Bush, 19 lud. 326; 'Beekman v. Saratoga & S. R. R. Co., 3 Paige (N. Y.) Ch. 45. 2 Porter v. Midland etc. R. R. Co., 2.J N. E. R. 556; 125 Ind. 476; Chap- man V. Gates, 54 N. T. 132, 146; Kan- sas etc. Co. V. Payne, 1 C. C. A. 192; 49 Fed. 119; State v. Lyle, 100 N. C. 497; Rexford v. Knight, UN. Y. 308; Zimmerman v. Kearney, (Neb. 92) 50 N. W. Rep. 1126; People v. Hay- den, 6 HiU (N. Y.) 359; Currant v. Shattuck, 24 Cal. 427; McCann v. Sierra County, 7 Cal. 121; Sage v. Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. 189; Be United 474 States, 96 N. Y. 227. " Ross V. Georgia etc. Co., 12 S. E. R. 101; 33 S. C. 477; Strickler v. Midland Ry. Co., 125 Ind. 412; 25 N. E. R. 455 ; Railway Company v. Cakes, 20 Ind. 9 ; Jones v. Stanstead S. & C. R. R. Co., L. R. 4 P. C. App. 98, 120; McLean v. Great Western Railway Company, 33 Up. Can. Q. B. 198; Mitchell v. Franklin & C. Turnpike Company, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 456; Brown v. Beatty, 34 Miss. 227; Dodge v. Essex Go. Com- missioners, 3 Met. (Mass.) 380; Kim- ble V. White, W.- V. Canal Co., 1 Ind. 285; Calking v. Baldwin, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 667; Grimshawe v. Grand Trunk Railway Company, 19 Up. Can. Q. B. 493; WeUand v. Buffalo & L. H. Ry. Co., 30 Up. Can. Q. B. 147; s. c, 31 Up. Can. Q. B. 539; contra, Watson v. R. R. Co., 48 N. W. R. 1129; and McKee v. Canal Co., 125 N. Y. 353. CH. XIV.] EMINENT DOMAIN. § 248 property.^ The fact, that the street has not been opened to the public, is no reason for the city to claim the right to delay the payment of the compensation.^ It would seem that, where there is an improper delay in the payment of compensation, the landowner would be entitled to recover interest on the assessed damages, or at any rate additional damages, for the detention.^ The right of compensation for confiscation of property under eminent domain is personal, and can be exercised only by one who was the owner of the property at the time when the prop- erty was taken.* As soon as the right to compensation or dam- ages has been definitely and completely ascertained, the owner of the property may sue the corporation therefor, and have a mandamus to compel such corporation to collect the assess- ments, which, under the law, constitute the fund out of which the payment of the damages must be made.^ As long as the proceedings are provisional and incomplete, there is no claim to compensation.® The claim to compensation, on the other hand, is not affected by the fact that, after proceedings for com- pensation have been instituted, the landowner has platted his adjoining property, and is selling lots adjoining the proposed streets, thus recognizing its existence.'' §248. Apportionment of damages among lots benefited. — In the absence of special constitutional limitations upon the power of the Legislature in the premises, it may be taken as settled law that the Legislature may confer upon municipal corporations, in opening streets and making other public im- provements, the power to apportion the damages, awarded to J. L. 11; Longworth v. Cincinnati, 48 Ohio St. 637. « King V. New York, 102 N. Y. 171. 6 Donnelly v. Brooklyn, 121 N". Y. 9: Shaw v. Charlestown, 3 Allen 1 Stewart v. Baltimore, 7 Md. 500; Johnson v. Alameda County, 14 Cal. 106. 2 Philadelphia v. Dickson, 38 Pa. St. 247; In re Brooklyn Street, 118 Pa. St. 640; Griggs v. Foote, 4 Allen, 195; Shaw v. Charlestown, 3 Allen (Mass.) 538. » United States v. Engeman, 46 Fed.R. 898; Weiss v. Bethlehem, 136 Pa. St. 294; Old Colony E. K. Co. v. Miller, 125 Mass. 1; Newgass v. Eyles, (Ark. 91) 15 S. W. Rep. 188; Phillips V. So. Park Com'rs, 119 111. 626; Haley v. Philadelphia, 68 Pa. St. 43, 48, 49; Fink v. Newark, 40 N. (Mass.) 538; Board v. Buffalo, 63 Hun, 565 ; Philadelphia v. Dyer, 41 Pa. St. 463; Rome v. Jepkins, 30 Ga. 154; Sage V. Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. 189; Mc- Cormick v. Brooklyn, 108 N. Y. 49; Rexford v. Knight, 11 N. Y. (1 Kern.) 308; Hollingsworth v. Tensas Parish, 17 Fed. Kep. 109, » Carson v. Hartford, 48 Conn. 68. ' Jersey City v. Sackett, 44 N. J. L. 428. 475 §248 MUKICrPAL COEPOBATIOKS. [CH. XIV. the owner of the property which is taken for public use, among the lots which are specially benefited by its improvement, and to provide by such assessments for the payment of the damages or compensation due to such property owners. And, in levy- ing this assessment upon lots especially benefited, it is also permitted to impose its proportionate share of assessments up- on the part of the land which has been left in the possession of the owner, after the condemnation of the other part in the exercise of eminent domain.^ And the imposition of assess- ments for special benefits upon adjoining property, including the remainder of the land left to its owner, is held not to be restrained by the constitutional provision, which requires that the assessment of damages, for confiscation of private property for public use, is to be made without deduction for benefits.^ The power to levy assessments for public improvements upon ^Plum V. Kansas City, 101 Mo. 52; V/yandotte etc. v. K. R. Co., 70 Mo. 629; Eyerman v. Blaksley, 78 Mo. 145; Longworth v. Cincinnati, 34 Oliio St. 101; Chapin v. Worcester, 124 Mass. 464; Smith v. Aberdeen, 25 Miss. 458; Genet v. City of Brook- lyn, 99 N. Y. 296; Burlington v. Quick, 47 Iowa, 222; Loweree v. Newark, 38 N. J. L. 155; Piatt v. Pennsylvania Co., 43 Ohio St. 228; Howell V. Bristol, 8 Bush (Ky.) 493; Washington Av. Case, 69 Pa. St. 352; People V. Brooklyn, 4 N. T. 419; Raleigh v. A. A. etc. Ry. Co., 74 N. C. 220 ; Weekler v. Chicago, 61 111. 142; Do'rgan v. Boston, 13 Allen (Mass.) 223; Boston Seamen's F. Soc. V. Boston, 116 Mass. 181 ; Wil- liams V. Cammack, 27 Miss. 209, 224; Nichols V. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189, 207; G. &. C. R. R. Co. v. Partlow, 5 Pick. L. 428; Morin v. St. Paul M. 6 R. Ry. Co., 30 Minn. 100; Stroud V. Philadelphia, 61 Pa. St. 255; Mt. Washington Co.'s Petition, 35 N. H. 134; Hussen v. Rochester, 65 N. T. 516; State v. Portage, 12 Wis. 562. 2 Cleveland v. Wick, 18 Ohio St. 303. But see, generally, in respect 476 to the eflfect of such constitutional provisions. Carpenter v. Jennings, et al., 77 111. 250; Ala. & F. R. E. Co. V. Burkett, 42 Ala. 83; Schenley V. Allegheny, 25 Pa. St. 128; St. L. A. & T. Ey. Co. V. Anderson, 39 Ark. 167; Atlanta v. Central R. E. & .B. Co., 53 Ga. 120; Swayze v. New Jer- sey M. Ry. Co., 36 N. J. L. 295; Pa- ducah etc. R. R. Co. v. Stovall, 12 Heisk. 1; Henderson etc. Ry. Co. v. Dickcrson, 17 B. Mon. 173; Edger- ton V. Green Cove Springs, 19 Fla. 140; Egyptian Levee Company v. Hardin, 27 Mo. 495 ; Washington Av. Case, 69 Pa. St. 352; s. c, 8 Am. Rep. 255; Livingston v. Mayor, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 85; Britton v. Des Moines, etc. R. R. Co., 59 Iowa, 540; Mil- waukee & N. R. R. Go. V. Strange, 63 Wis. 178; Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; Cone v. Hartford, 28 Conn. 363, 374; Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. 397; Fremont, E. & M. V. R. R. Co. V. Whalen, 11 Neb. 585; Ar- gent! v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 255; Clapp V. Hartford, 35 Conn. 66; Em- ery v. San Francisco Gas Co., 28 Cal. 345; Howard v. Church, 18 Md. 451. CH. XIV.] EMINENT DOMAIN. §249 abutting owners is also not in contravention of the constitu- tional provision, that property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to its value ; or of the constitutional provisions, which require equal and uniform taxation throughout the State.^ § 249. Revisory proceedings— Certiorari.— Unless some special remedy, or the right of appeal, is given to the property owner in the ease of confiscation of private property for "public use, it has been very generally held that certiorari will lie against a town or municipal corporation for the purpose of fur- nishing to the property owner au opportunity of securing a revision of the proceedings instituted by the municipal corpo- ration, in appropriating private property to public use, and for setting aside all such proceedings, whenever they are ascer- tained to be invalid.2 In Vermont it is held that a writ of mandamus, in the nature of a procedendo mav be employed as well as the certiorari,^ but the court will not employ equitable remedies for protection of the property owner, as long as the legal remedies of certiorari and mandamus prove to be efficient remedies for his protection. In compliance with the general rule for determining the scope of equitable jurisdiction, the court of equity, or a court in the 1 Garrett v. St. Louis, 25 Mo. 505 ; State V. St. Louis, 62 Mo. 244; Amer. B. N. Co. V. N. T. E. K. K., 13 N. T. S. 626; Suarez v. Man. K. Co., 15 N. Y. S. 224; 'Washington Avenue, In re, 69 Pa. St. 352; s. c, 8 Am. Kep. 255. Tlie general subject of assessment is more fully discussed in the succeed- ing paragraphs on taxation. See post, §§ 277-282. ^Com'rs V. Newby, 31 111. App. 378; Trainer v. Lawrence, 36 111. App. 90; Slater v. Kansas City, 89 Mo. 34; People v. Stedman, 10 N. T. S. 787; Detroit etc. R. R. Co. v. Back- us, 48 Mich. 582; Detroit etc. E. R. Co. V. Graham, 46 Mich. 642; State etc. E. E. Co. V. Hudson etc. Co., 38 N. J. L. 548; Campan v. Detroit, 14 Mich. 276; State v. Cockrell, 2 Rich. Law, 6; Parks V. Boston, 8 Pick. 218; Phillips V. County, 83 Me. 541; 22 Atl. 385; McCrary v. Griswold, 7 Iowa, 248; Spray v. Thompson, 9 Iowa, 40; Slate v. Stewart, 5 Strobh. L. 20; California E. E. E. Co. v. Cent. P. E. E. Co., 47 Cal. 528; Delaware, L. & W. E. Co. V. Buxson, 61 Pa. St. 369; Dorchester v. Wentworth, 31 N. H. 451; People v. Moore, 60 Hun, 586;Frenchv. Springwells H. Com'rs, 12 Mich. 267; Bridgenv. Bannerman, 8 Jones (IS". C.) 53; Baldwin v. Ban- gor, 36 Me. 518; In re Eoaring Brook, 21 Atl. Eep. 412; 28 W. N. C. 141; Myers v. Simms, 4 Iowa, 500; Gay v. Bradstreet, 39 Me. 580; Preble v. Portland, 45 Me. 241; Stone v. Bos- ton, 2 Met. 220; Dwight v. Spring- field, 4 Gray, 107. 8 Adams v. Newfane, 8 Vt. 271; Lyman v. Burlington, 22 Vt. 131; Woodstock V. Gallup, 28 Vt. 587. 477 §249 MtnsriCIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. xrv. exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, will not undertake revisory proceedings, except when it is demonstrated that the common law remedies are inadequate to protect the property owner from loss or damage.^ A municipal corporation will not be inter- fered with by injunction, unless legal remedies prove inadequate.^ It has been held in Missouri, that where land has been wrong- fully taken by a city and appropriated to a public use, the owner of the land may maintain ejectment against the city for the recovery of such lands.^ It is possible, perhaps, under some circumstances, to employ 1 Harvey v. Kansas etc. Co., 48 Kan. 228; Knox v. Metro. K. R. Co., 38 Hun, 517; Hartley v. Keokuk etc. Co., (Iowa, 92) 52 ??. W. R. 352; Guest V. Brooklyn, 69 N". T. 506; An- derson V. St. Louis, 47. Mo. 479, 486; Leslie v. St. Louis, 47 Mo. 474; Hannewinkle v. Georgetown, 15 Wall. 547; Miller v. Mobile, 47 Ala. 163; s. c, 11 Am. Rep. 768. "Of these grounds for relief, the princi- pal are," says Mr. Justice Field, giving the judgment of the Supreme Court, in Ewing v. St. Louis, 5 Wall. 413, " that the proceedings were tak- en without notice to the complain- ant, or any appearance by him; that the notice provided by law was not published or required; that no pro- vision was made for compensation for the property taken ; that no pow- er to render judgment was vested in the mayor by the Legislature or charter, and that the statute under which the proceedings purported to have been taken was repealed before the proceedings were completed. These grounds are, by the demur- rer, admitted to be ti-ue; and being true, no reason exists upon which to justify the interposition of a court of equity. . . The second ob- ject of the bill— the obtaining of compensation for the property actu- ally appropriated by the city — falls 478 with the first. Tf the proceedings for its appropriation were void, the title remains in the complainant, and he can resort (unless the Legis- lature has required him to pursue a particular remedy) to the ordinary remedies afforded by law for the recovery of the possession of the real property wrongfully withheld, or for the redress or trespass upon it." 2 Zimmerman v. Kearney Co., (Neb. 92) 50 N. W. R. 1126; Henry V. Dubuque & Pac. R. R. Co., 10 Iowa, 580; Van de Vere v. Kansas City, (Mo. 92) 17 S. W. R. 695; La- fayette V. Bush, 19 Ind. 326 ; Kansas etc. Co. V. Payne, 49 Fed. 114; 4 U. S. App. 77; Sower v. Philadelphia, 35 Pa. St. 231; Ohio Riv. R. Co. ». Ward, 14 S. E. R. 142; 35 W. Va. 481; Gardner v. Newburgh Trs., 2 Johns. Ch. 162; Illinois etc. Co. v. Chicago, (111. 92) 28 N. E. R. 740; Miller v. Morristown, 47 N. J. Eq. 62; Mc- Daniel v. Columbus, 13 S. E. R. 745; 87 Ga. 440; Mont. etc. Co. v. R. R. Co., 12 Pack. 916; West Md. Ry. Co. V. O wings, 15 Md. 199; Walker v. Mad River & L. R. R. Co.. 8 Ohio, 38. 'Anderson v. St. Louis, 47 Mo. 484; Hammerslough v. Kansas City, 57 Mo. 219; Armstrong v. .St. Louis, 69 Mo. 309. CH. XIV.J EMINENT DOMAIN. §250 the remedy of prohibition, in restraining illegal proceedings of condemnation to public use.^ § 250. Effect of accepting damages. — The voluntary ac- ceptance of damages by the property owner will, in the absence of proof of fraud or mistake of fact, operate as a bar to any subsequent inquiry into the illegality or regularity of the pro- ceedings, instituted and conducted for the condemnation of land for public use. The owner is estopped by the acceptance of such damages from disputing the legality of such proceed- ings.'^ Thus, any delay in the deposit and payment of money may be a serious irregularity ; but the actual receipt for dam- ages by the party, who is entitled to them, will operate as a waiver of such delay, and a ratification of the proceedings.^ Defective proceedings, in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, may also be confirmed or ratified by legislative au- thority.* 'See Williams, In re, 4 Ark. 537; Arnold v. Shields, 5 Dana (Ky.) 18; State V. Walkely, 2 Nott & McCord (S. C.) 410; Mayo V. James, 12 Gratt. (Va.) 17; Warwick v. Mayo, 15 Gratt. (Va.) 528. - Commonwealth v. Shuman's Adm., 18 Pa. St. 343; Burns v. Milw. & Miss. E. K. Co., 9 Wis. 450; Smith V. Warden, 19 Pa. St. 426; State v. Stanley, 14 Ind. 409; Magrath v. Brock. Tp., 13 Up. Can. Q. B. 629; Kile V. Yellowhead, 80 111. 208; Harts- horn V. Potroff, 89 111. 509; Rees v. Chicago, 38 111. 322; Town v. Blae- berry, 29 111. 137; Pursleyv. Hays, 17 Iowa, 310; Deford v. Mercer, 24 Iowa, 118; 2 Smith Lead Cas. (5 Am. ed.) 662; Brooklyn Park Com'.rs v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234 (1871). s Hawley v. Harrall, 19 Conn. 142, 151; Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511; lb. 197;Arnot v. McClure, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 45; Striker v. Kelly, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 9; s. c. in error, 2 Denio, 323; Doughty V. Hope, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 249; Kennedy v. Newman, 1 Sandf. (N. Y.) 187. -Yost's Report, 17 Pa. St. 524; Bennett V. Fisher, 26 Iowa, 497(1868); Baltimore v..Horn, 26 Md. 194 (1866); Lennon v. New York, 55 N. Y. 361, 365 (1874) ; Indianapolis v. Kingsbury, 101 Ind. 200. 479 CHAPTER XV. MTIN-ICIPAL TAXATION AND LOCAL ASSESSMENTS. Shctiow. 253 — Taxation defined and dis- tinguished from eminent domain and police power. 254 — Taxation autliorized only for public purposes. 255 — Municipal authority to levy taxes whence derived. 256 — Municipal power to tax, when implied. 257 — Legislature may change the taxing power of municipali- ties at will. 258 — Federal limitations in the ex- ercise of the power of taxa- tion. 259 — Constitutional provisions as to requirements of uni- formity and equality. 259 a — Uniformity and equality in local assessments. 260 — Eoad tax and compulsory labor on the same. 260 d — Poll tax, constitutional. 261 — Power to tax professions, trades and callings. 202 — Power to levy retrospective taxes. 263 — Municipality cannot delegate its authority. 264 — Power of taxation a continu- ing one. 265 — Power of taxation cannot be varied or enlarged by city ordinances. § 253. Taxation defined and distingnished from eminent domain and police power — Taxation may be defined to be the power of government to compel the citizens and proprietors of property to contribute money to the support of the government, and the maintenance of public institutions and interests. It 480 Section. 266 — Limitation of tax rate cannot be exceeded. 267 — Construction and reconcile- ment of general laws with special charter provisions. 268 — What can be taxed. 269 — Discrimination between real and personal property, when permissible. 270 — Exemption from taxes, when permitted. 271 — Public property not taxable. 272 — Wliat property is within mu- nicipality for purposes of taxation. 273 — Taxation of banks, railways and other corporations. 274 — Taxation of incorporeal he- reditaments. 275 — Glioses in action when tax- able. 276 — Taxation of agi-icultural land. 277 — Local assessments for sewers. 278 — Notice to and assent of abut- ters to assessments. 279 — Power of Legislature to dis- pense with notice. 280 — Reassessments. 281 — Adjoining owner's relation to contract — His liability. 282— Methods of collection. 283 — Lien of taxes. 284 — Statute of Limitations. CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § -253 is to be distinguished from tlie right of eminent domain, in that the right of eminent domain involves the appropriation of pri- vate property to public use upon payment of compensation to the owner, whereas taxation invok'es an appropriation of the property of private individuals, irrespective of any special com- pensation for the same.^ Although the benefits, accruing to the people of a community from the expenditure of the mone}' collected by taxation, may be maintained as the compensation received by the taxpa3'ers, and as justifying the exercise of the power of taxation ; yet, that is never a condition precedent to the exercise of the power, ex- cept so far as it requires that taxation should only be imposed for some public use or purpose. Irrespective of any inquiry into the existence of a benefit, resulting to the taxpayers from the expenditure of the money collected by taxation, the exer- cise of the power cannot be contested. The citizen owes that duty to the government, and as such must submit to its exer- cise. This is certainly the case in regard to the imposition of taxes upon citizens or residents of the country, in whose behalf the tax is imposed. But where, as is permissible, the govern- ment undertakes to impose a tax upon the lands and upon other property, whose corpus is located within the territory of such country, but whose owner is not domiciled therein, some other ground than that of civic duty must be found, upon which to rest the power of taxation. It has been elsewhere asserted by the author ^ that the power to tax lands of non-resident owners, is in fact an exercise by the State of its rights as an ultimate owner of such lands, and that it is in the nature of a rent due to the State as the ultimate landlord. But, whether this reason for the exercise of the power of taxation over the real property of non-resident owners be just or not, there is no question that the power to exercise the right of taxation over such property is universally asserted and exercised. 'Stewart v. Polk Co., 30 Iowa, 9; Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 565; People V. Salem, 20 Mich. 477; No. Ind. E. R. Co. V. Connelly, 10 Ohio St. 165; 1 Desty Taxation, sec. 11, p. •SI; 1 Hare Am. Const. Law, 332; People V. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419 (1851); Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N. 31 481 Y. 12 (1869); Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black (U. S.) 510 (1862); Moale v. Baltimore, 5 Md. 314 (1854). Eminent Domain. Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28, 54 (1869). ■^ See Tiedeman's Limitations of Police Power, § 115. § 254 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIOXS. [CH. XV. There is also the same necessity for raising a distinction be- tween the power of taxation and the police power of the gov- ernment. It has been elsewhere asserted by the writer,^ that the power of taxation is but one phase of the police power of the government. But, whether that be true or not, the power of taxation is certainly distinguishable from the ordinary exer- cise of police power ; and the necessity for that distinction is most marked, when an inquiry is made into the power of the government to impose a tax upon the trades and professions. The necessity is felt in that instance of distinguishing between the license, which is required of one pursuing a particular trade or calling, as a police regulation for the purpose of preventing injuries to the public by an improper prosecution of the trade or business, and the license tax, which is imposed upon such trade or business for the purpose of revenue solely. Where the license is a police regulation, as in the case of licenses exacted from liquor dealers and proprietors of saloons, the justification for the exercise of the power, and the requirement of the li- cense, is to be found in the injurious character of the business, when permitted to be conducted without police supervision. And the extent of the power is determined by the necessity for such police regulation to prevent the anticipated evils resulting from the prosecution of the business. But where the license is a tax, imposed upon the trade or business for the purpose of increasing the revenue of the city or town, then it is brought within the taxing power of the government ; and the exercise of such power is limited only by those provisions of the consti- tution, which control the exercise of the power of taxation. This matter has been more fully explained and the cases digested in the writer's work on the Limitations of Police Power,^ and, elsewhere, in the present volume.^ § 254. — Taxation authorized only for public purposes. — The levy of a tax is onl}"- permissible, except under tyrannical government, when it is made for a public purpose ; and it is proportioned uniformly among the subjects of taxation. When the tax is imposed for some private or individual benefit, or it is not uniformly imposed upon those who ought to bear it; it is perfectly proper, nay, it is the dutj-^ of the courts to interfere •See Tiederaan's Limitations of I ^§101. Police Power, p. 481, note. | s §§ 123, 124. 482 CH. XV.] MTTNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 2o-± and prohibit what may be justly called an extortion.^ But the term "public purpose " must not be used in this connection in any narrow sense. Taxes are levied for a public purpose, not only when they are designed to pay the salaries of government officials, to erect and keep in repair government buildings ; to maintain the public rdads, harbors and rivers in a fit condition, and to provide for the defences of the country ; but also for all purposes of public charity. It is a public purpose to erect with State funds, obtained from taxes, penitentiaries, orphan and lunatic asylums, hospitals and lazarettos, public schools and colleges. But it is only for the support of public charities that the government may tax the people. A levy of a tax for a donation to some private benevolent or charitable institution is void.^ It is a public purpose to provide pensions for the sol- diers and other employees of the government, when they have become disabled in service or superannuated.^ And wherever there is a reasonable doubt as to the character of the purpose for which the tax was levied, the doubt should be solved in favor of the power of the Legislature to lay the tax.* But if the purpose be truly private ; if the tax in effect takes the property of one man and gives it to another, it is illegal 1 " It is the clear right of every cit- izen to insist tliat no unlawful or un- authorized exaction shall be made upon him under the guise of taxation. If any such illegal taxation is at- tempted, he can always invoke the aid of the judicial tribunals for his protection, and prevent his money or other property from being taken and appropriated for a purpose and in a manner not authorized by the constitution and laws." Bigelow, Oh. J., in Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 570, 575. See, also, to the same effect, Hooper v. Emery, 14 Me. 375; Allen v. Jay, 60 Me. 124 (11 Am. Rep. 185); Talbert v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417 ; Weismer v. Douglass, 64 N. Y. 91 (21 Am. Rep. 588) ; Tyson v. School Directors, 51 Pa. St. 9; Wash- ington Avenue, 69 Pa. St. 352 (8 Am. Rep. 255) ; People v. Township Board of Salem, 20 Mich. 452; People v. Su- pervisors of Saginaw, 26 Mich. 22; Ferguson v. Landran, 5 Bush, 230; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; Han- seiT V. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28. 2 St. Mary's Industrial School v. Brown, 45 Md. 310. 8 Booth V. "Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118; Speer v. School Directors of Blair- ville, 50 Pa. St. 150. * " To justify the court in arresting the proceedings and declaring the tax void, the absence of all public interest in the purposes for which the funds are raised must be clear and palpable; so clear and palpable as to be perceptible by every mind at the first blush." Per Dixon, Ch. J., in Brodhead v. City of Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 624, 652. See Spring v. Russell, 7 Me. 273; Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis. 411 (9 Am. Rep. 578). 483 §254 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. XV. and it is the duty of the courts to enjoin its collection.^ For example, it has been held unlawful to levy taxes in aid of man- ufacturing and other private industrial enterprises,^ for the relief of farmers, whose crops have been destroyed, to supply them with seeds and provisions,^ or for making loans to pei-sons whose homes have been destroyed by fire.* It has also been held ille- gal to pay a subscription to a private corporation which is to be devoted to a private purpose.^ On the other hand, it has been repeatedly held that the Legislature may authorize counties and municipal corporations to subsciibe for capital stock in railroad companies, in aid of their construction, and may levy a tax iu order to pay the subscription.^ I " The legislature has no constitu- tional right to . . . lay a tax, or to authorize any municipal corporation to do it in order to raise funds for a mere private purpose. Xo such au- thority passed to the assembly by the general grant of the legislative power. This would not be legisla^ tion. Taxation is a mode of raising revenue for public purposes. When it is prostituted to objects in no way connected with the public interest or welfare, it ceases to be taxation and becomes plunder. Transferring money from the owners of it into the possession of those who have no title to it, though it be done under the name and form of a tax, is uncon- stitutional for all the reasons which forbid the Legislature to usurp any other power not granted to them." Black, Ch. J., in Sharpless v. Mayor etc., 21 Pa. St. 147, 168. ^Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655; Opinions of Judges, 58 Me. 590; Allen v. Jay, 60 Me. 124 (11 Am. Kep. 185) ; Commercial Bank v. lola, 2 Dill. 353. estate V. Osawkee, 14 Kan. 418. But the United States, as well as the State governments, have frequently come with the public funds to the rescue of people of sections which have been inundated by floods, or 484 devastated by disease or fire ; and it would seem that the State aid under such circumstances differed little if at all from the ordinary bestowal of alms upon the poor, and is equally justifiable, as being a public charity. * Lowell V. Boston, 111 Mass. 454 (15 Am. Eep. 39). * Weismer v. Douglass, 64 iX. T. 91 (21 Am. Kep. 58(3). "Zabriskie v. Cleveland, C. & K. R. Co., 23 How. 381; Bissell v. City of Jeffersonville, 54 How. 287; Araey V. Allegheny City, 24 How. 364; Cur- tis V. Butler Co., 24 How. 435; Mer- cer Co. V. Haoket, 1 Wall. 83 ; Gelpcke V. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175; Sey- bert V. City of Pittsburgh, 1 Wall. 272 ; Van Horti-up v. Madison City, 1 Wall. 291; Meyer v. City of Musca- tine, 1 Wall. 384; Havemeyer v. Iowa Co., 3 Wall. 294; Thomson v. Lee Co., 8 Wall. 327; Rogers v. Burling- ton, 3 AVall. 654; Mitchell v. Bur- lington, 4 Wall. 270; Campbell V. City of Kenosha, 5 Wall. 194; Riggs v. Johnson, 6 Wall. '166; Lee Co. v. Rog- ers, 7 Wall. 181 ; Chicago B. & Q. R. E. Co. v. County of Otoe, 16 Wall. 667 ; Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510; Tipton Co. V. Rogers L. & M. Works, 103 U. S. 523. The cases from the State courts are too numerous to cite in detail. But see, to the same ef- CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. 25-1 Since the Legislature is prohibited from making levies for private purposes, it cannot authorize municipal corporations to do so.^ In addition to this general proposition limiting the exercise of the power of taxation to the provision of means for the ef- fectuation of public purposes, there is a special provision in many of the State Constitutions, — and which is probably im- plied from the general provisions of all of them, — that the ex- ercise of the power of taxation bj' a municipal corporation must be limited to local or corporate purposes. It is not permitted, in other words, of a municipal corporation to exercise the right of taxation for any other but local or municipal purposes. This is especially provided in the Constitution of Illinois.^ It has also been held that a State reform school vi^as a State institu- tion, and not a local one, and that therefore taxation could not be levied b}'^ a city or town for the purpose of maintaining and supporting such a school.' So, likewise, the taxation for the maintenance of bridges and highways.* It is very plain that under no circumstances can a municipal corporation tax itself for the benefit of any private institution or business, even though the successful establishment of either of them may work a consequential benefit to the community.^ It has also been held, under the same constitutional provision, that taxes should be levied by municipal corporations for corporate purposes, only Avhen it is possible for the municipal corporation to levy such a tax through its lawfully constituted authority, and that the State could not compel the community to pay taxes which are levied by officers appointed by the State.^ But where the peo- fect, Supervisors of Portage Co. v. Wis. Cent. R. E. Co., 121 Mass. 467; Augusta Bank v. Augusta, 49 Me. 500 ; ■Williams v. Duanesburg, 66 N. Y. 129; Brown V. County Com'rs, 21 Pa. St. 37; St. Louis v. Alexander, 23 Mo. 483; Smith v. Clark Co., .34 Mo. 58. See, also, §§ 184-186, for a fuller discussion of this subject. Attorney-General v. Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400. 2 Spencer v. People, 68 111. 510 (1873); Murphy v. People, 120 111. 234; Constitution of Illinois, art. ix. sec. 5; Harward v. St. Clair & M. Levee & Dr. Co., 51 111. 130; Primm V. Belleville, 59 111. 142 (1872). 2 The Supervisors of Livingston County V. Weider, 427 (1872). *Will Co. Sup. V. People, 110 111. 511. But see Burr v. Carbondale, 76 111. 455 ; Southern Illinois University and Merrick v. Amherst, 12 Allen (Mass.) 500, where it was held that municipal bonds could be issued in aid of State universities. 6 Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 94. ■ People V. Chicago, 51 111. 17; s. c, 485 255 MXJNICIPAIi COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XV. pie of the municipality adopt or accept the indebtedness in- curred in their names by State commissioners, the adoption of the debt is an implied appointment of the commissioners as agents of the municipality, and makes their acts valid and bind- ing upon the corporation to the extent of the taxes levied by them, for the settlement of the debts which were incurred in the name of the municipality.^ § 255. Municipal authority to levy taxes whence derived. — It is manifest that the power to levy taxes is in the first in- stance alone vested in the Legislature of the State ; and no sub- ordinate body politic maj% for any other purpose whatever, impose taxes upon tlie public, unless the power to impose such taxes has been lawfully conferred upon it by the Legislature. Even in the absence of express constitutional provisions, the Legislature has the power, as an implication from the power to create local and municipal corporations, to vest such munici- palities and local instruments of government with the power to levy taxes for corporate purposes upon the persons and prop- erty, coming within the jurisdiction of the body politic.^ Not only would the power to impose taxes be construed to be a nec- essary implication, in order to enable the municipal government 2 Am. Eep. 2'78; see also Wetlierell v. Devine, 116 111. 631; State v. Henne- pin Co. Dist. Court, 33 Minn. 235. 1 Wider v. East St. Louis, 55 HI. 133; Gage v. Graham, 57 111. 144; Soliool Trs. V. People, 63 111. 299. '^Speer v. Athens, 85 Ga. 49; Mag- neau v. Fremont, (Neb. 90) 47 N. W. E. 280; Tj'rrell v. Wheeler, 123 N. T. 76; Dasey v. Skinner, 11 N. T. S. 821 ; 57 Hun, 593 ; Jones v. Chamber- lain, 16 N. E. R. 72; State v. Esta^ brook, 6 Ala. 653; Battle v. Mobile, 9 Ala. 234 ; Osborne v. Mobile, 44 Ala. 493; Cincinnati v. McMicken, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 188; Hurford v. Omaha, 4 Neb, 336; St. Louis v. Laughlin, 49 Mo. 659; People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44; State v. Noyes, 30 N. H. 279; Cheauey v. Hooser, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 330; Slack v. Maysville & Lex. R. E. 486 Co., 13 B. Mon. 1; San Luis Obispo y. Pettit, 87 Cal. 499; People v. Kel- sey, 34 Cal. 470; Harrison v. Vicks- burg, 11 Miss. 581; Eanken v. Hen- derson, 7 S. W. Rep. 174;Shreveport V. Jones, 26 La. An. 708; Bowling v. Allschrel, (Cal. 93) 33 Pac.532; Stein V. Mobile, 24 Ala. 591; Niles v. Al- bany, (Vt.) 7 Atl. Rep. 601; Alexan- der T. Baltimore, 5 Gill (Md.) 383, 393; Hope v. Deaderick, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 1; Smith v. Aberdeen, 25 Miss. 458 ; Anderson v. Mayfield (Ky. 92), 19 S. W. Rep. 598; Washington V. State, 13 Ark. 752; Butler's Ap- peal, 73 Pa. St. 448; Kinney v. Zim- pleman, 36 Tex. 554; Schultes v. Eberly (Ala. 87) 2 So. R. 345; Bull v. Read, 13 Gratt. 78, 98; Caldwell v. Burke Co. Jus., 4 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 323. CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 256 to successfully perform the duties imposed upon it by the State, but the delegation of the power of taxation to a municipal cor- poration is demanded by public sentiment, which studiously and persistently resists the imposition of taxes for local pur- poses by any other power but the local government. The au- thorization of local taxation is in close harmony with the political sentiment that pervades Anglo-Saxon countries in support of local self-government.i But the Legislature cannot confer the power of taxation upon a municipal corporation to a greater extent than what it possesses itself ; and, therefore, the power of the municipality to impose taxes is limited by the same re- strictions and limitations of the constitution, which the Legis- lature must itself observe.^ The special limitations will be referred to in a subsequent connection.^ § 256. Maaicipal power to tax when implied. — Although the general rule is laid down that the power of taxation can- not be exercised by the municipal corporation except when it has been conferred upon it by the Legislature ; and it is further provided that the corporation cannot levy a tax, unless the power to do so is plainly and clearly conferred upon it ; * yet 1 State ex rel. Jameson v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382; Evansville v. State, lb. 426; State ex rel. Holt v. Denny, lb. 449. 2 Moore v. St. Paul, ( Minn. 92 ) 51 N. W. R. 219; Brooks v. Mangam, 86 Mich. 576; Memphis v. Hernando Ins. Co., 6 Baxter, 527; Reineman v. Cov.,C.&B.H. E. R.Co.,7 Neb. 310; Lancaster v. Clayton, ( Ky. 92 ) 5 S. W. Rep. 864; Ex parte Montgomery, 64 Ala. 468; Sayi-e v. Phillips, 30 W. N. C. 196; Union Bank of Tenn. v. State, 9 Terg. (Tenn.) 490; and see, Weightman v. Clark, 103 U. S. 256; O'Donnell V. Bailey, 24 Miss. 386; No. Mo. R. R. Co. V. Maguire, 49 Mo. 490, 500; Erie v. Reed's Ex., 113 Pa. St. 468; Nashville v. Thomas, 5 Coldw. (Tenn.) 600; Clark v. Leathers, 5 S. W. R. 576. = See§§258, 259, et seq. * Parsons v. Northampton, 154 Mass. 410; Covington etc. Co. v. Cov- ington, (Ky. 02) 17 S. W. R. 808; Gage V. Nichols, (111.) 25 N. E. R. 672; Board v. Currituck, 107 N. C. 110; Tacoma L. Co. v. Pierce Co., 1 Wash. St. 482 ; Kniper v. Louisville, 7 Bush, 593; Lum v. Bowie, 18 S. W. Rep. 142; M. E. Church, In re, 66 N. Y. 396; Jacksonville v. Ledvrith, (Fla.)7So. Rep. 885; Sevrall v. St. Paul, 20 Minn. 511 ; Lot v. Ross, 38 Ala. 156, 161; People v. Cofiey, 21 N. r. S. 34; In re Walnut St., 10 Pa. Co. Ct. 173; Swamp Land Dist. v. Haggin, 64 Cal. 204; Green v. Ward, 82 Va. 324; Scammon v. Chicago, 40 111. 146; English v. People, 96 HI. 566; State v. Van Every, 75 Mo. 530; State v. Jersey City, 26 N. J. L. 444; Chicago V. Wright, 32 111. 193; Plain- field V. Plainfield, ( Wis. ) 30 N. W. Rep. 672; Taylor v. Donner, 31 Cal. 480; Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co., 28 Cal. 345; St. Louis v. Laugh- lin, 49 Mo. 559; Schoolfleld, v. Lynch 487 §256 MtWICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XV. this statement must be understood with the qualification, that the power to impose a tax may be implied, whenever the im- plication is absolutely necessary to the exercise of some power expressly granted. Thus, it has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States, where a municipal corporation has been given the power to incur a certain obligation, that the power to levy taxes for the payment of such obligation is nec- essarily implied, in the absence of some express provision for the satisfaction of such obligation.^ But it has been held that the power to tax cannot be implied from a geneiHl welfare clause in the charter.^ So, also, has it been held that, where a statute supplies the purpose for which taxes may be levied, and adds " or for any other purpose they may deem necessary," this general clause will only authorize the exercise of the power of taxation for purposes similar to those, which have been already enumerated.^ Thus, special as- sessments for local improvements cannot be enforced by fines or penalties, which are imposed by ordinances, and are not pro- vided for in the charter authorizing the local assessment.* It burg, 78 Va. 366; Port Towusend v. Sheehan, (Wash. 93) 33 Pac. Rep. 427; Leavenworth v. Korton, 1 Kan. 432; Burner v. Atchison, 2 Kan. 454; Mur- ray V. Tucker, 10 Bush, 249; Stone V. Mobile, 57 Ala. 61; Beatty v. Knowles, 4 Pet. 152 ; Henry v. Ches- ter, 15 Vt. 460; Dyckman v. New York, 1 Seld. (5 N. Y. ) 434; State v. Guttenberg, 39 N. J. L. 660; Ashe- ■yille Commissioners v. Means, 7Ired. L. (N. C.) 406; Jonas v. Cincinnati, 18 Ohio, 318; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268; Zanesville v. Richards, 5 Ohio St. 589; Fairfield v. RatclifE, 20 Iowa, 396; Va. & Tenn. R. R. Co. V. Washington Co., 30 Gratt. 471; Sharp V. Spier, 4 Hill (K. Y.) 70; Sharp V. Johnson, lb. 92; Manice v. New York, 8 N. Y. 120; Oregon S. Nav. Co V. Portland, 2 Oreg. 81; Harmony Tp. Trs. v. Osborne, 9 Ind. 458; Henderson v. Baltimore, 8 Md. 352; Rathbun v. Acker, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 393; Howell v. Buffalo, 15 N. Y. 488 512; Burnett v. Buffalo, 17 N. Y. 383. 1 United States v. Orleans, 78 IT. S. 341 ; Ralls Co. Ct. v. United States, 105 U. S. 733; State v. Toledo, (Ohio 92) 26 N. E. R. 10t!l; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472; Chicago v. Wright, 32 111. 192; Wright v. Chi- cago, 20 111. 252; Columbia v. Hunt, 5 Rich. (S. C.) 550; Annapolis v. Harwood, 32 Md. 471; Taylor v. Mc- Fadden, 50 N. W. Rep. 1070; State v. Maysville, 12 S. C. 76; Fairfield v. llatcliff, 20 Iowa, 396; but see contra, Jeffries v. Lawrence, 42 Iowa, 498. 2 Mays V. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268. 8 Drake v. Phillips, 40 111. 388; Hyde Park v. Borden, 94 111. 26; Pom- frey v. Saratoga, (N. Y.) 11 N. E. E. 43 ; Asheville Com'rs v. Means, 7 Ired. L. 406. * Augusta V. Dunbar, 50 Ga. 387 (1873); see Ottawa v. Spencer, 40 111. 211; Gridley v. Bloomington, 88 111. 555. CH. XV.J MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 257 has also been held that the power, to levy a special tax for light- ing a city, will not authorize the addition of a percentage for the collector's fees, or for the cost of t\\e proceedings before the mayor. The service and expense must be provided for out of the general revenue of the city.^ It would, however, be uncon- stitutional for a Legislature to provide, that no cost shall be recovered against the city in suits brought against it.^ The power to levy a tax for purposes of revenue is ordinarily not to be implied from an authority to license and regulate certain trades and occupations.^ It has also been held that the power to tax a community, for the payment of the expense of procur- ing the location of a railroad along the line of a town, cannot be implied from the power to make by-laws, which are necessary "to promote the peace, good order, benefit and advantage" of a corporation, and to assess taxes that may be necesaiy to carry such power into effect.* And where the power to levy a tax has a, proviso annexed thereto, the power cannot be exercised, except in compliance with the terms and conditions of the pro- viso.^ § 257. Legislature may change the taxing power of mu- nicipalities at will. — Except so far as the legislative power of control over the municipal power of taxation is restrained by a constitional provision, protecting the rights of the cred- itors against subsequent legislative interference,® the Legisla- ture has full power to change, modify or enlarge at its pleasure the taxing power of a municipality ; and may even take away such power of taxation from the municipal government, and vest it in a board of commissioners.'' 1 Minn. Linseed Oil Co. v. Palmer, 20 Minn. 468, 475; Bucknall v. Story, 36 Cal. 67; Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; Jones v. Cincinnati, 18 Ohio, 318-323; Nelson v. La Porte, 33 Ind. 258. 2 Durkee v. Janesville, 28 Wis. 464. ' Tiedeman's Limitations of Police Power, § 101 ; Columbia v. Beasley, 1 Humph. (Tenn.) 240; Mobile v. Tuille, 3 Ala. 137; Collins v. Louis- ville, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 134; State v. Roberts, 11 Gill & J. (Md.) 506; Cin- cinnati V. Bryson, 15 Ohio, 625 ; Bos- ton V. SchafEer, 9 Pick. 419 ; Cincin- nati V. Buckingham, 10 Ohio, 261. *Minn. etc. Co. v. Palmer, 20 Minn. 468. 6 In re Methodist Church, 60 N. Y. 395. « See ante, §§ 12, 41^3, 194, 212. ' Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; State v. Newark, 11 Atl. E. 147; 49 N. J. L. 344; Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575 ; McKusick v. Stillwater, 44 Minn. 372; 46 N. W. 769; Louisi- ana V. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 301; Wolff V. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358; State 489 § 258 MUNICrPAIi CORPOKATIONS. [CH. XV. § 258. Federal limitations on the exercise of the power of taxation. — The United States Constitution contains several provisions, which operate to restrain the exercise of the power of taxation, both of State and municipal corporations. It has elsewhere been explained that the provision of the United States Constitution, which prohibits the passing of laws im- pairing the obligation of contracts, operates to restrain any curtailment or modification of the taxing power of municipal corporations where the exercise of the power of taxation has been pledged to the liquidation of the interest or principal of its existing indebtedness.-' And the same provision of the constitution has been invoked for the purpose of invalidating an attempt of the city government to impose a special tax upon the interest due on its bonds, whether the bonds are held by a resident or nonresident. It was held that this deduction of the amount of the taxes from the bond, and the payment only of the balance of the interest due thereon, was a violation of the constitutional provision, prohibiting the passing of laws impairing the obligation of contracts.'* The power of the State, and of the municipalities created by the State, to levy taxes, is also subject to other express and implied restrictions in the United States Constitution, designed to avoid the present con- flict of authority between these two distinct branches of the government. Thus, it is expressly provided that the States can- not, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties upon imports or exports, except what might be necessary for the purpose of enforcing their inspection laws ; nor can they, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on tonnage.^ In the United States, the independence of the Federal and State governments of each other is guaranteed by the express V. Brewer, 64 Ala. 287; Blanding v. Bui-r, 13 Cal. 343; Lansing v. County Treasurer, 1 Dillon, C. C. 522; Mus- catine V. Miss. & Mo. R. R. Co., lb. 530; Chicago etc. Co. v. Chicago, (111. 90) 27 N. E. R. 926; Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510; Aspiuwall V. Daviess Co. 22 How. 364. 1 See ante, § 194. 2 Cleveland etc. Co. v. Pennsylvar nia, 15 Wall. 300; No. Cen. R. R. Co. V. Jackson, 7 lb. 262; Mui-ray v. 490 Charleston, 96 U. S. 432. 8 U. S. Const., art. I, § 1, cl. 3. See Tiedeman's Limitation of Police Power, § 204; Inman Steamship Co. V. Tinker, 94 U. S. 238; Packet Com- pany v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80; Hai-bor Com'rs V. Pashley, 19 S. C. 315. See Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365 ; City of New Orleans v. Eclipse Towboat Co., 33 La. An. 647; 39 Am. Rep. 279; Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 9 W. Va. 170. OH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 258 and implied limitations of the constitution, in order that the success of the system may be assured. And to such an extent is this limitation upon the power of both considered necessary, that it has been held by the courts, that neither the United States nor the State can tax the agencies of the government of the other. Thus, the State cannot lay a tax upon the securities of the national government. The courts hold " that the power to tax involves the power to destroy ; that the power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power to create ; that there is a plain repugpaiice in conferring on one government a power to control the constitutional measures of another, which other, with respect to those measures, is declared to be supreme over that which exerts the control, are propositions not to be denied. "^ Nor can the United States lay a tax upon the securities and other agencies of the State government.^ For these reasons 1 Marshall, Ch. J., in MoCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 413; Weston V. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449; Bank of Commerce v. New York City, 2 Black, 620; Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. 200; Society of Savings v. Conite, 6 Wall. 594; Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573; People v. Commissioners, 4 Wall. 244; Bradley v. People, 4 Wall. 459; Banks v. The Mayor, 7 Wall. 16; Bank v. Supervisors, 7 Wall. 26. Revenue stamps are not taxable. Palfrey v. Boston, 101 Mass. 329. United States treasury notes are not taxable. Montgomery Co. v. Elston, 32 Ind, 27. See People v. United States, 93 111. 30 (34 Am. Rep. 155), in ■which the power of the State to tax the property of the United States held by private individuals for any purpose was denied. See State v. Jackson, 33 N. J. 450; Union Pac. R. R. Co. V. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5 (1873) ; Thomson v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 9 Wall. 579; Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. Lincoln County, 1 Dillon C. C. R. 314 (1871); sec. 775; State v. Central Pac. R. R. Co., lONev. 47; People V. Central Pac. E. R. Co., 43 Cal. 898 (1872); McCuUoch v. Mary- Charleston, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 449 (1829); reversing s. c, 1 Harper Eq. (S. C.) 340; FirstNat. Bank of Louisville v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 353 ; Osborn V. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 7.38; Desty Taxation, sec. 20, p. 67. 2 Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113; Ward V. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; Raili'oad Company v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5; Fifield v. Close, 15 Mich. 505. "In respect to the reserved powers, the State is as sovereign and independent as the general govern- ment. And if the means and instru- mentalities employed by the govern- ment to carry into operation the powers granted to it are necessarily, and for the sake of self-preservation, exempt from the taxation by the States, why are not those of the States depending upon their several powers, for like reasons, equally exempt from Federal taxation ? Their unimpairfid existence in the one case is as essential as in the other. It is admitted that there is no express pi-ovision in the constitu- tion that prohibits the general gov- ernment from taxing the means and instrumentalities of the States, nor land, 4 Wheat. 316, 424; Weston v. | is there any prohibiting the States 491 258 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XV. it has been held that the State cannot tax the property of a bank, or the bank itself, which has been established by the United States government, as a governmental agency, as was the old Bank of the United States, or the present national banks.i So, also, has it been held incompetent for a State to tax the salary of a United States official.^ On the same ground, it has been held that the act of Congress, declaring the papers used in judicial process, -either as pleadings or as evi- dence, shall be invalid unless stamped, was unconstitutional in its application to the State courts.^ And it has, likewise, been held incompetent for the United States to declare an ordinary contract or deed, which is valid according to the State law, in- valid because it has not been stamped.* So, also, the State and its municipalities cannot impose any tax upon interstate commerce, as long as the subject-matter constitutes interstate commerce. Thus, it has been held that State laws, exacting a license tax from drummers or traveling salesmen, engaged in interstate commerce, are unconstitutional) because they constitute a tax upon interstate commerce.* But from taxing tlie means and instru- mentalities of that government. In both cases the exemption rests upon necessary implication, and is upheld by the greatlawof self-preservation; as any government, whose means employed in conducting its opera^ tions are subject to the control of another and distinct government, can only exist at the mercy of that government, of what avail are these means if another power may tax them at discretion?" Nelson, J., in Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, 124. 1 McCuUoch V. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Osborn V. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738. See National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 353. 2 Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie Co., 16 Pet. 435; Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113; Freedman v. Sigel, 10 Blatchf. 327. 8 Carpenter v. Snelling, 97 Mass. 452; Green v. Holway, 101 Mass. 243 (3 Am. Eep. 339) ; Atkins v. Plimpton, 492 44 Vt. 21; Griffin V. Ranney, 35 Conn., 239; People v. Gates, 43 N. Y. 40; Moore v. Moore, 47 N. Y. 467 (7 Am. Kep. 466); Hale v. Wilkinson, 21 Gratt. 75; Haight v. Grist, 64 N. S. 739; Smith v. Short, 40 Ala. 385; Davis V. Eichardson, 45 Miss. 499 (7 Am. Rep. 632) ; Bumpass v. Tag- gart, 26 Ark. 398 (7 Am. Kep. 623) ; Union Bank v. Hill, 3 Cold. 325; Hunter v. Cobb, 1 Bush, 239; War- ren V. Paul, 22 Ind. 276; Craig v. Dimmock, 447 111. 308; Jones v. Estate of Keep, 19 Wis. 369; Sam- mons V. Holloway, 21 Mich. 162 (4 Am. Rep. 465) ; Burson v. Hunting- ton, 21 Mich. 415 (4 Am. Rep. 497); Duffy V. Hobson, 40 Cal. 240. * Moore v. Quirk, 105 Mass. 49 (7 Am. Rep. 499) ; Sayles v. Davis, 22 Wis. 225. 6 Osborne v. Mobile, 16 Wall. 479; Rattermau v. West. Union Tel. Co., 127 U. S. 411; West. Union Tel. Co. V. Texas, 105 U. S. 460; Robbins v CH. XV.J MtnsriCIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 258 the distinction is made in this connection between traveling salesmen who are engaged in interstate commerce, and itinerant peddlers, who are selling goods held by them, and already brought by them into the State, and which therefore have ceased to be articles of interstate commerce. It is held that the mu- nicipal corporation may tax its transient traders or peddlers, without violating any express or implied prohibition of the Fed- eral Constitution.^ But in all such exactions of licenses from nonresidents, it is a further constitutional requirement that there should be no dis- crimination against the nonresidents, or in favor of the residents. The citizens of each State are granted by the Federal Constitu- tion, equal participation in the privileges and immunities of the several States.^ And the same rule applies to taxes which are imposed upon the sales of merchandise brought within the State, but belonging to the citizens of other States. A tax is valid, provided it is uniform with the similar tax imposed upon the similar goods of resident owners, and invalid if there be any discrimination in the amount of the tax or in its mode of levy- ing against the goods of nonresident owners.^ Shelby Co. Tax Bist. 120 IT. S. 489; Asher v. Texas, 128 IT. S. 129; Le- loup V. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640; Chicago V. Bartee, 100 111. 57; Kan- sas V. Collins, 34 Kans. 434. ^Ex parte Heyleman, 92 Cal. 492; Martin v. Eosedale, 29 N. E. K. 410; Wiley V. Parmer, 14 Ala. 627; Wig- gins V. Chicago, 68 111. 372; Morrill V. State, 38 Wis. 428; Ex parte Thom- as, 71 Cal. 204; Welton v. Missouri, 91 tr. S. 275; Snyder v. Crossan, 50 N. W. E. 678; In re Spain, 47 Fed. E. 208; Com. v. Crowell, 30 N. B. E. 1015; Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344; Warren Bor. v. Geer, 117 Pa. St. 207; Burr v. Atlanta, 64 Ga. 225; Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 380; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 649; In re Houston, 47 Fed. E. 539; State v. Smithson, 106 Mo. 149; Ficklin v. Taxing Dist., 145 IT. S. 1; 12 S. Ct. 810; Titusville v. Brennan, 143 Pa. St. 642; 28 W. N". C. 534; Ex parte Brown, 48 Fed. R. 435 ; Daniel V. Eichmond Trs., 78 Ky. 542; Ex parte Taylor, 58 Miss. 473 ; Charles- ton County V. Ahrens, 4 Strob. (S. C.) 241; State v. Stevenson, 109 N. C. 730; State v. French, 14 S. E. E. 383; 109 N. C. 722; In re Wilson, 19 D. C. 341; West. Union Tel. Co. v. Mass. Atty. Gen., 125 U. S. 530; State, v. Hodgdon,41 Vt. 139; Ward v. Mary- land, 31 Md. 279; s. c, 12 Wall. 418; Cowles V. Brittain, 2 Hawks (IST. C.) 204; Eandolph v. Yellowstone Kit., 3 So. E. 706. 2 Guy V. Baltimore, 100 IT. S. 434; State V. Green, 14 N. E. E. 352; Peo- ple V. Loundes, 130 N. Y. 455 ; Black V. Seal, 6 Houst. (Del. 92) 541; Eob- ey V. Smith, (Ind. 92) 30 N. E. E. 1093; Ward V. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; Paul V. Virginia, 8 Wall. 177; State V. North, 27 Mo. 464. 8 Woodruff V. Parham, 8 Wall. 139; Eeading E. E. Co. v. Pa., 15 Wall. 232; Pacific Junction v. Dyer, 64 Iowa, 38; Marshall town v. Blum, 58 493 §259 MUNICIPAL OOEPORATIONS. [CH. XV. This constitutional provision does not apply to foreign cor- porations in their regulation and control by the State and munic- ipal authorities. The privileges and immunities of citizenship are held not to be guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States to corporations, but only to natural persons who can claim the rights and privileges of a citizen. Foreign corporations acquire by the act of incorporation the privilege of doing busi- ness, or of conducting their affairs and acting in a corporate capacity, only in the State or country which grants the charter. And if such a corporation is permitted to act in its corporate capacity in any other State or country, it is in the nature of a grant of a new or special privilege, and not the exercise by such corporation of any right which is guaranteed to it by the State Constitution. Since a foreign corporation cannot claim as a matter of right the privilege of conducting business in every State and country, any taxes that might be levied upon foreign corporations, whether equal to or in excess of the tax which is imposed upon domestic corporations, would be perfectly valid under the provisions of the Federal Constitution. And such will be the case, it matters not how great may be the discrimina- tion against the foreign corporation in favor of the domestic.^ § 259. Constitutional provisions as to reqmrements of uniformity and equality — A tax levy may also be open to ob- jection, because it does not comply with the constitutional re- Iowa, 184; Welton v. Missouri, 91 V. S. 275. Pullman etc. Co. v. Com., 141 U. S. 18; People v. Wemple, 15 N. Y. S. 446; Walker v. Springfield, 94 111. 364; Hughes v. Cairo, 92 111. 339; State V. Morgan, (S. D. 92) 48 N. W. R. 314; Com. v. N. T. etc. Co., (Pa. 90) 22 Atl. R. 212; Leavenworth v. Booth, 15 Kans. 62*7; Rothermel v. Meyerle, 136 Pa. St. 250; Port of Mobile V. Leloup, 76 Ala. 401 ; Cin- cinnati Mut. Health Ass. v. Rosen- thal, 55 111. 85; Osborne V. Mobile, 16 Wall. 479; Southern Exp. Co. v. Mobile, 49 Ala. 404; Walker v. Springfield, 94 111. 364; Amer. F. Co. V. Board, 43 Fed. R. 609; Singer M. Co. V. Wright, 33 Fed. R. 121; 494 Augusta etc. Co. v. Randall, 4 S. E. R. 674; Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Mass., 10 Wall. 566; West, anion Tel. Co. V. Lieb, 76 111. 172; Woodward v. Com'rs, (Ky. 90) 7 S. W. Rep. 643; Commonwealth v. Hamilton Manuf. Co., 12 Allen, 298; Augusta etc. Co. V. Randall, 4 S. E. R, 674; Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410; Pembina etc. Co. V. Pennsylvania, 8 S. Ct. 737; Commonwealth v. Milton, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 212; Slaughter's Case, 13 Gratt (Va.) 767; Commonwealth v. Berk- shire Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 25; Price v. Hunter, 34 Fed. 355 ; Commonwealth V. Cary Improvement Co., 98 lb. 19, 22; Boston Manuf. Co. v. Common- wealth, 144 lb. 598 ; Pac. Ex. Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339. CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 259 quirement of uniform apportionment. The exact phraseology of the constitutional provisions appears in the different States^ to be, generally, that " taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State," and any ordinary change in phraseology is not material ; certainly, in securing or ascertaining the practi- cal results of the same. Where the requirement by the State Constitution of uniformity in State taxation is held to be appli- cable to and to control municipal taxation, the result, in respect to the constitutionality of the common method of municipal taxation, is the same, whatever may be the phraseology of the constitutional provision. In some of the States, however, it is held, that the constitutional provision requiring uniformity is not applicable to municipal taxation ; while, on the other hand, the conclusion is reached, that, although the provision does apply and does control municipal corporations, yet the common methods of taxation are not unconstitutional. Taxation must be equal and uniform ; but the constitutions do not require that the same rule of uniformity should be em- ployed in the apportionment of all taxes. No one rule of uni- formity can be devised, which will be applicable to all kinds of taxation ; and consequently for each mode of taxation there must be a special rule of apportionment. Thus, for example, the taxation of property is apportioned according to the value of the property ; it being considered that such an apportionment will bring about a more perfect equalization of the tax than any other rule. But in laying a tax upon professions and occupa- tions, a different rule of uniformity must be followed ; ^ and the usual rule is to establish a scale of taxation upon the occupa- tions, graded in proportion to their relative profits. The mean- ing, therefore, of this constitutional limitation is, that whatever the rule of apportionment ma}- be, it must be uniformly and impartially applied to all the subjects of the special taxation.^ 'With the exception of Massachu- setts, which simply requires tliat taxation should be " reasonable and proportional." Merrick v. Amherst, 12 Allen (Mass.) 500. ''See post, §261, and Tiedeman's Limitations of Police Power, § 101. * See State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575; Curamings v. National Bank, 101 U. S. 153; Oliver v. Wash- ington Mills, 11 Allen, 268; Tide- water Co. V. Costar, 18 N. J. Eq. 518; Kittanning Coal Co. v. Common- wealth, 78 Pa. St. 100; Galtin v. Tar- borough, 78 N. C. 119; Youngblood V. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406; Bureau Co. V. Railroad Co., 44 111. 229; Marsh v. Supervisors, 42 Wis. 502; Phillesv. Hiles, 42 Wis. 527; Ez parte Robin- son, 12 Nev. 263; Sanborn v. Rice, 9 495 § 259 a. MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XV. There cannot be an)' partial discrimination between persons or property living in tiie same taxing district, and falling within the established rule of apportionment. The State has the right to determine the limits of the taxing district. But the tax district must be of uniform character, so that the tax shall fall upon those who are almost equally bene- fited by the expenditure. It has thus been held unlawful for a Legislature to extend the limits of a city, so as to include farm- ing lands, and thus increase the revenue of the city.^ But when the taxing district is established, and the rule of apportionment determined upon, the tax must be uniformly apportioned throughout the taxing district. There cannot be different rules of apportionment for different persons or different sections of the district.^ § 259 a. Uniformity and equality in local assessments. — The charge of illegality, because of the violation of the consti- tutional requirements of equality and uniformity in the appor- tionment, is most commonly brought against local assessments so called. It is very common at the present day for municipal corporations, — instead of providing for the improvement of the streets, the construction of sewers and drains, and other local arrangements for the promotion of health and comfort, by the La Salle etc. Co. v. Doaoghue, 127 111. 27; Com. v. Germania Ins. Co., 22 Atl. R. 240; Singer v. Wriglit, 33 Fed. E. 121; State v. Morgan, 48 K. W. R. 314; Stirling Gas Co. v. Hig- gins, (111. 92) 2.5 N. E. R. 660; State V. Traders Bank, 6 So. R. 582; 41 La. An. 329; Daly v. Morgan, 16 Atl. R. 287; 60 Md. 460; St. Louis v. Con- sol. Coal Co., (Mo. 93) 20; S. W. Rep. 099; Verdery v. Rummers ville, 82 Ga. 138; Coal Ridge etc. Co. v. Jen- nings, 127 Pa. St. 397; State v. So. Ca. R. E. Co., 4 S. C. 376. 1 Bradshaw V. Omaha, 1 Neb. 16; Durant v. Kauiiman, 34 Iowa, 194; City of Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. Mon. 491 ; Arbegust v. Louisville, 2 Bush, 271. But see contra, Stilts V. Indianapolis, 55 Ind. 515 ; Martin V. Dix, 52 Miss. 53 (24 Am. Rep. 661); 496 Giboney v. Cape Girardeau, 58 Mo. 141; Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. St. 170; Hewitt's Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 55; New Orleans v. Cazelear, 27 La. An. 156; see ante, §§56, 57. •■' J?i re Pittsburgh, 138 Pa. St. 401; 27 W. N. C. 457; Fayette Co. v. Peo- ples Bk., 47 Ohio St. 503; Commis- sioners of Ottawa Co. v. Nelson, 19 Kans. 234 (27 Am. Rep. 101); First Nat. Bk. V. Lindsay, 45 -Fed. Rep. 619 ; East Portland v. Multnomah Co. , 6 Ore. 62 ; Kent v. Kentland, 62 Ind. 291 (30 Am. Rep. 182) ; State v. New Orleans, 15 La. An. 3-54; Pine Grove V. Talcott, 19 Wall. 666, 675; Chi- cago, etc. R. R. Co. V. Boone Co., 44 111. 240; Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark. 289; Gillette v. Hartford, 31 Conn. 351; Serrill v. Philadelphia, 38 Pa. St. 355. CH. XV.J MtTNICrPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 259 a. imposition of a general tax, collectiUe from all the taxpayers of the city according to the value of their taxable property, — to apportion the cost of the improvement among those contiguous proprietors who are more directly benefited by the improve- ment. There are two modes of apportionment of the cost of these local improvements, both of which have been sustained as being a substantial compliance with the constitutional re- quirement of uniformity. One method is the more or less ar- bitrary apportionment of the cost according to the legislative judgment of the benefits received by each proprietor for the improvement ;i and the other method is to make a taxing dis- trict of one street of a city, and apportion the cost of improve- ments among abutting proprietors, in proportion to the front- age of their lots.'^ The reasoning of the courts is invariable that in local assessments, as in the case of a general tax, there is a more or less successful attempt at uniformity, although the rules of apportionment may be different. " A property tax for the general purposes of the government, either of the State at large, or of a county, city, or other district, is i-egarded as a just and equitable tax. The reason is obvious. It apportions the burden according to the benefit, more nearly than any oth- er inflexible rule of general taxation. A lich man derives more benefit from taxation in the protection and improvement of his property than a poor man, and ought therefore to pay more. But the amount of each man's benefit in general taxa- tion cannot be ascertained and estimated with any degree of certainty ; and for that reason a property tax is adopted, in- 1 People V. Mayor etc. of Brooklyn, 4 N. T. 419; Livingston v. New York, 8 Wend. 85 (22 Am . Dec. 622) ; Wright V. Boston, 9 Cush. 233; Jones v. Bos- ton, 104 Mass. 461 ; Nichols v. Bridge- port, 23 Conn. 189; Cone v. Hart- ford, 28 Conn. 363; State v. Fuller, 34 N. J. 227; McMasters v. Common- wealth, 3 Watts, 292; Weberv. Eein- hard, 73 Pa. St. 370 (13 Am. Eep. 747) ; Alexander v. Baltimore, 5 Gill, 383; Howard v. The Church, 18 Md. 451; Scoville V. Cleveland, 1 Ohio St. 126; Sessions v. Crunkleton, 20 Ohio St. 349; Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio St. 636; Bradley v. McAtee, 7 Bush, 667 (3 Am. Eep. 309); Hoyt v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39 ; Sheley v. De- troit, 45 Mich. 431; Cook v. Slo- cum, 27 Minn. 500; Lafayette v. Fow- ler, .34 Ind. 140; Peoria v. Kidder, 20 111. 351 ; Garrett v. St. Louis, 25 Mo. 505; Uhrig v. St. Louis, 44 Mo. 458; Burnett v. Sacramento, 12 Cal. 76. See contra. State v. Charleston, 12 Eich. 702. 2 Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; Northern E. E. Co. v. Connelly, 10 Ohio St. 159; Lamsden v. Cross, 10 Wis. 282; contra, McBean v. Chand- ler, 9 Heisk. 349; Perry v. LitUo Kock, 32 Ark. 31. 32 497 § 259 a. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XV. stead of an estimate of benefits. In local taxation, however, for special purposes, the local benefits may in many cases be seen, traced, and estimated to a reasonable certainty." ^ In Ohio, the Legislature has expressly authorized the municipal -govern- ments to apportion local assessments, either according to the frontage of lots or their assessed value.^ A local assessment differs from a general tax in that it is levied upon specific property Ijang more or less near to the street in which the improvement has been made or opened up, and on the ground, more or less well founded, that the property abutting thereon has been especially benefited, and that it is 1 People V. Mayor etc. of Brook- lyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 427. 2 In declaring this law to be con- stitutional, Peck, J. says : " It is said that assessments, as distinguished from general taxation, rest solely upon the idea of equivalents; a com- pensation proportioned to the spec- ial benefits derived from the im- provement, and that in the case at bar, the railroad company is not, and in the nature of things cannot be, in any degree benefited by the improvement. It is quite true that the right to impose such special taxes is based upon a presumed equivalent, but it by no means fol- lows that there must be in fact such full equivalent in every instance, or tJiat its absence will render the as- sessment invalid. The rule of ap- portionment, whether by tlie front foot or a percentage upon the assess- ed valuation must be uniform, affect- ing all the owners and all the prop- erty abutting on tl>e street alike. One rule cannot be applied to one owner, and a different rwle to anoth- er owner. One could not be as- sessed ten per cent, another five, another three, and another left alto- gether unassessed, because he was not in fact benefited. It is manifest that the actual benefits resulting 498 from the improvements may be as various almost as the number of the owners, and the uses to which the property may be applied. No gen- eral rule, therefore, could be laid down which would do equal and ex- act justice to all. The Legislature has not attempted so vain a thing, but has prescribed two different modes in which the assessment may be made, and left the city authorities free to adopt either. The mode adopted by the council becomes the statutory equivalent for the benefits conferred, although in fact the bur- den imposed may greatly preponder- ate,"- in Northern Indiana R. R. Co. V. Connelly, 10 Ohio St. 159. See, generally, Willard v. Presbury, 14 Wall. 676; Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt. 174; Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. St. 352 (8 Am. Rep. 255); Craig v. Philadelphia, 89 Pa. St. 265 ; Philadelphia v. Rule, di Pa. St. 15; Hill v. Higdou, 5 Ohio St. 243; Ernst v. Kunkle, 5 Ohio Sf. 520, Wliite v. People, 94 111. 604; Palmer v. Stumph, 29 Ind. 329; St. Joseph V. O'Donaghue, 31 Mo. .345; Hines v. Leavenworth, 3 Kan. 186 ; Burnett v. Sacramento, 12 Cal. 76; Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497. See, for an exhaustive treatment of this subject Cooley Const. Lim. 616, 634; 2 Dill. Muu. Corp. §§ 752-761. CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 259 a. but equitable find just that the property so especially benefTted by the improvement should pay for the same, instead of impos- ing upon the community at large the burden of providing for such improvement. The constitutional provision already re- ferred to, requiring uniformity and equality in the levying of taxes, has been invoked in favor of the abutting landowners and in proof of the unconstitutionality of such local assessments. The cases are very numerous in vi^hich this constitutional ques- tion is raised and settled, and the question has been raised in probably every State in the Union. There must necessarily be a great deal of variation in the views and opinions expressed by the courts in rendering judgment in the causes of action brought before them ; but it would be impossible in this con- nection to go into these details for the want of space ; and it seems to the writer to be of no advantage to the general student that this should be done. After all, it would be necessary for him, in order to ascertain the exact conditions of the law in the particular State to enter upon the close study of all the cases of that State. For this reason, only the general statement of the principles of law, applicable to the question will be given, so far as they are necessary to a thorough knowledge of the char- acter of the issue. It is manifest that a local assessment, or any other tax, can- not be declared by the courts to be inequitable or unjust, unless it is so imposed as to be a violation of some constitutional prin- ciple. The provisions of the constitution, already referred to, provide generally that taxes should be uniform and equal throughout the State. In some of the States, such as Kansas and Arkansas, express reference is made in the constitutions to assessments being required to be uniform or equitable ; and, of course, in these States there can be no question as to the applicableness of the constitutional requirement of uniformity to the local assessment. But in every other State, where the provision simply requires that taxation should be uniform, it is a question whether the constitutional provision is applicable to the matter of municipal taxation, and especially to that of local assessments upon abutting property. A very large num- ber of cases maintain that the local, assessments are not to be treated as identical with taxation in the constitutional sense, 499 § 259 a. MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XV. ■which requires uniformity in its levJ^^ And certainly this is the only rational conclusion to take, if one is determined to recognize the constitutionalitj- of a local assessment. A special tax, imposed upon abutting owners who are declared to be es- pecially benefited by the improvements made, is certainly not a uniform tax throughout the State. If the imposition of this tax is to be justified, it is not in the nature of a tax, but rather in the character of a police regulation, compelling the abutting owners and others, who may be bene- fited by such improvement, either to make the improvement themselves, or to pay for such improvement, when it is made by the municipal authorities ; and, as a police regulation, it would escape the requirement of uniformity, and probably at the same time avoid any charge of injustice, as long as the parties who are called on to pay for such improvement are not required to pay more than the value of the special benefit, which they have received from such improvement. However, the local assess- 1 Boston Seam. See. v. Boston, 116 Mass. 185; s. c, 17 Am. Rep. 153; Wriglit V. Boston, 9 Gush. 233, 241 ; Yateman v. Crandall, 11 La. An. 220 ; Allen V. Galveston, 51 Tex. 302; Aus- tin V. Gulf, Col. & Santa Fe R. R., 45 Tex. 2.34; Roundtree v. Galveston, 42 Tex. 613, 626; Palmer v. Strumpf, 29 Ind. 329; Baker v. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio St. 534; Mays v. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio St. 268, 273. See Peay v. Little Rock, 32 Ark. 31 (1877); see also Ex •parte Montgomery, 64 Ala. 463; Charity Hospital v. Stickney, 2 La. An. 550 (1847) ; Municipality No. 2 v. Duncan, lb. 182; State v. Volkman, 20 La. An. 585; Hamilton v. Port Wayne, 40 Ind. 491 (1872); Munici- pality No. 2 V. Dunn, 10 La. An. 57 (18^5); see Municipality No. 2 v. White, 9 lb. 447; Birmingham V. Klein, 89 Ala. 461, holding that an assessment was not a tax within the constitutional provisions referred to. See Reeves v. Wood County Treas., 8 Ohio St. 333; 9 Ohio St. 520; No. Ind. R. R. Co. V. Connelly, 10 Ohio St. 159, Richmond & Allegheny R. 500 R. Co. V. Lynchburg, 81 Va. 473; Norfolk V. Ellis, 26 Gratt. 224; Roose- velt Hospital V. New York, 84 N. Y. 108. "It is not ordained (by the constitution) that taxation shall he general, so as to embrace all persons of all taxable property within the State, or within any district or terri- torial division of the State ; nor that it shall or shall not be numerically equal, as in the case of a capitation tax; nor that it must be in the ratio of the value of each man's land, or of his goods, or of both combined; nor that a tax ' must be coextensive with the district, or upon all the property in a district which has the character of, and is known to the laws as, a local sovereignty.' Nor has the constitution ordained or forbid- den that a tax shall be apportioned according to the beneiit which each taxpayer is supposed to receive from the object on which the tax is ex- pended. In all of these particulars, the power of taxation (in this State) is unrestrained." People v. Brook- lyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 427. CH. XV.] MUKICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 259 a. ment is declared by many of the cases to be a tax in the con- stitutional sense, and they have held that the constitutional provisions referring to it apply in their full force.^ But even where it is held that the State constitutional re- quirement of uniformity does apply to and control municipal taxation, yet the general ruling of the courts is, that where there is no special constitutional restriction, the expenses of the local improvement may be assessed against property owners on some other basis than that of the value of all of the property within the taxing district, and yet not offend the constitutional requirement of uniformity, as long as the apportionment is de- termined in some way by reference to the amount of special benefit received by individual property owners.^ It has also • Austin V. Austin Gasl. & C. Co., 69 Tex. 180; Van Antwerp, In re, 56 N. T. 241; Monticello v. Banks, 48 Ark. 251. 2 Jefferson v. Mt. Vernon, (93) 33 N. E. Kep. 109; Masters v. Portland, 33 Pac. E. 540; State v. Trenton, (N. J. 93) 26 Atl. E. 83; In re Eogers Ave., 22 N. Y. S. 27; Lewis v. Seat- tle, (Wasli. St.) 32 Pac. Eep. 794; Kankakee Stone & Lime Co. v. Kan- kakee, 128 111. 173; Blair v. City of Atchison, 40 Kan. 353; Palmyra v. Morton, 25 Mo. 593 ; Egyptian Levee Co. V. Hardin, 27 Mo. 495 ; Siuton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 525; State v. Lef- fingwell, 54 Mo. 458; Olson v. City of Topeka, (Kan.) 21 Pac. E. 219; De Koven v. City of Lake View, (111.) 31 N. E. E. 813; Springfield v. Sale, 20 N. E. E. 86; 127 111. 359; State V. Marvin, 51 N. J. L. 298; St. Louis V. Clemens, 36 Mo. 46; Eyer- man v. Blaksley, 78 Mo. 145 ; St. Jo- seph V. O'Donoghue, 31 Mo. 343; Hunerberg v. Hyde Park, 22 N. E. E. 486; Busbee y. Wake Co. Com'rs, 93 N. C. 143; Galveston v. Heard, 54 Tex. 420; McChesney v. Hyde Park, 28 N. E. E. 1102; Detroit v. Beecher, 75 Mich. 454; Preston v. Eudd, 84 Ky. 150; Keith v. Philadelphia, 126 Pa. St. 575; Baltimore v. Johns Hop- kins Hospital, 56 Md. 1 ; Baltimore V. Hanson, 61 Md. 462; Jaeger v. Burr, 36 Ohio St. 164. " Local im- positions for grading, paving, sewer- age, and the like, have been many times sustained by this court, and are, in the long run, perfectly fair, for they enter into and enhance the value of the property assessed. The public, it is true, are benefited, but so is the individual; and as an own- er of urban property, he is further benefited when, in due time, the same tax falls on his neighbor." Philadelphia v. Tryon, 35 Pa. St. 401, 404. But see also, Guest v. Brooklyn, 69 N. Y. 506, in which Chief Justice Church, while conced- ing the power of the Legislature to authorize the imposition of local as- sessments, condemns tlie practice, wherever it is without legislative re- straint, " as unjust and oppressive, unsound in principle, and various in practice. The right to make a pub- lic street is based upon public neces- sity, and the public should pay for it. To force an expensive improve- ment upon a few property owners against their consent, and compel them to pay the entire expense, un- der the delusive pretence of a corres- ponding specific benefit conferred 501 § 259 a. MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XV. been held that Congress has the legislative authority, in the District of Columbia, to authorize the city of Washington to assess the expense of local improvement, in or upon streets, upon the adjoining landowners ; and that such tax need not be laid generally upon all the property ownei'S of the city.^ But a power to provide " general ordinances " for street improve- ments, does not include the power to improve particular streets for the public benefit generally, or for the benefit of the whole city, at the expense of the abutting owner, in the absence of a purpose to benefit the property in the locality of the improve- ment.2 Not only can the Legislature authorize the making of im- provements in streets and highways and the assessment of the expenses upon adjoining property owners, bat it has also been held that the Legislature may compel a municipal corpo- ration to do the same.'* Where the expenses of a local assessment are imposed upon adjoining property owners, in cases where the property is held by parties as tenant for life and remaindermen, such expenses should be apportioned between them according to the value of their respective interests in the estate.* In Pennsylvania, there are no express constitutional provis- ions, requiring uniformity of taxation ; but the general clause of the constitution, looking to the protection of the individual citizen against a tyrannical exercise of power, is held to be suf- ficient to raise the question of constitutionality in the case of upon their property, is a species of despotism that ought not to be per- petuated under a government whicli claims to protect property equally with life and liberty. Besides its man- ifest injustice, it deprives the citizen practically of the principal protection (aside from constitutional restraints) against unjust taxation, viz., the re- sponsibility of the representative for liis acts to his constituents. As re- spects general taxation where all are equally affected, this operates, but it has no beneficial application in pre- venting local taxation for public im- provements. The majority are never backward in consenting to, or even 502 demanding, improvements which they may enjoy without expense to themselves." iWillard v. Presbury, 14 Wall. 676 (1871). 2 Burns v. Baltimore, 48 Md. 198. 8 People ex rel. McLean v. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 401. « Peck V. Sherwood, 56 N. Y. 614 (1874) ; Sands v. Richmond, 31 Gratt. (Va.) 571. See Tiedeman's Keal Property, § 66, for the rule of appor- tionment in such cases, and the al- gebraic formula which may be profit- ably employed in making such an apportionment. CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 259 a. unjust taxation. The courts in this State hold that local as- sessments upon abutting property are constitutional.^ It does not seem to be doubled anywhere that the imposition upon adjoining property of the expense of making a local im- provement, to the extent of the special benefit received by sucb property owners from the improvement, is constitutional, al- though there may, possibly, not be a strict compliance with- the constitutional requirement of uniformity.^ But wherei there is any ground for claiming, that the improvement made does not constitute or confer upon the property owner a special benefit, apart from the general benefit which he receives as a resident of the community at large ; there is, likewise, a gen^ eral unanimity of opinion that the local assessment is uncon- stitutional. There must be a special benefit to the adjoining proprietor in order that there may be any justificatiou of au. imposition upon him of the cost of the improvement, in whole or in part.^ It has thus been held that a bridge, whicli is part of a public highway or street of a city, is not a local but a pub- lic improvement; and a local assessment of the cost of such bridge upon the adjoining property owners would not be con- stitutional, because of the supposed special benefit which those individuals may receive from the construction of the bridge.*' ■Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. St. 258; Schenley v. Allegheny, 25 Pa. St. 128; Mc&onigle v. Allegheny, 44 Pa. St. 118; Seely v. Pittsburgh, 82 Pa St. 360. See Wolf v. McHargue, (Ky.) 10 S. W. Eep. 809. Whenever an as- sessment is made upon the adjoining property for local improvement, it may be made a lien upon the prop- erty benefited and the payment thus secured. GreensburgBor. v. Young, 53 Pa. St. 280. i^Ealeigh v. Peace, 110 N. C. 32; Maddux v. Newport, (Ky. 90) 14 S. W. R. 957; Beaumont V. Wilkes-Barre, (Pa. 90) 21 Atl. 888; Speer v. Athens, 85 Ga. 49; Darst v. Griffin, 48 N. W. K. 819; Ancoin v. Board of Com'rs, 8 So. li. 906; 43 La. An. 15; In re Howard St., 21 Atl. K. 974; 28 W. N. C. 159; Eiohman v. Board of Sup'rs, 42 N. W. E. 422; 77 Iowa, 513; Cov- ington V. Worthington, (Ky. 90) 10 S. W. E. 790; Eutherford v. Hamil- ton, 97 Mo. 543; Conger v. Bergman,. 11 S. W. E. 84. 8 Mock v. Muncie, (Ind. 93) 32 N. E. E. 718; Grand Eapids etc. Co. v.- Grand Eapids, (Mich. 93) 52 N. W. E. 1028; Preston v. Eudd, 84 Ky. 150; In re Sycamore Alley, 9 Pa. Co. Ct.' E. 61; Fort Wayne v. Shoaff, 106 111. 6(3; Watkins v. Zwietusch, 47 Wis.' 315 ; Danershower v. District, 7 Mackj ey, 99; Davis v. Los Angeles, 86 Cal. 37; City v. Tiffany, 22 N. T. S. 604;: Johnson v. Duer, 21 S. W. E. 800; State v. Judges, (Minn. 93) 53 N. W. E; 800. 4 Sawmill Eun Bridge, 85 Pa. St.. 247; Tide- Water Co. v. Coster, 18 N. J. Eq. 518; State v. Lefflngwell, 54 Mo. 458; Hudson v. Nashua, 62 N. H. 491; Broadway Bap t. Ch. v. McA tee,. 603 § 259 a. MUNICIPAL COKPORATIONS. [CH. XV. It has also been held in Pennsylvania, that where a street has been already paved, it cannot be considered a special benefit, in the nature of a local improvement, to have such street re- paved, so far as to impose upon the adjoining property owners the cost of such repaving. The original paving is a local im- provement ; and so, likewise, any necessary repair of the orig- inal paving ; but the substitution of a more expensive and ornate paving for the original paving would be a public im- provement, which could only be provided for by general taxa- tion.i But it has, on the other hand, been held that the wid- ening of a street would be a local improvement, which could be assessed against the adjoining property owners.? Involved in this question of confining the power of imposing local taxes on property for local improvement, is the question how far may abutting railroad property be assessed for such local improvements. But it seems to be generally held, that a rail- road which has abutting property, is properly assessable for its due proportion of the cost of the improvement of the street or road.^ But it has been held that where a railroad runs parallel to a street, it would be an improper exercise of the power of local taxation, to assess upon such railroad its proportionate share of the cost of such improvement, certainly, by measurement of its frontage on such street.* The existence of a special benefit being the ground of justifi- cation for the imposition of a local assessment, it is important to determine whether it is a legislative or judicial question 8 Bush (Ky.) 508, 512; compare La- fayette V. Fowler; 34 Ind. 140; Wil- liams V. Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; Hoyt V. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39. 1 Ilammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. St. 146; s. c, 3 Am. Rep. 615; Ilal- pin V. Campbell, 71 Mo. 493. 2 Be Centre Street Vac, 115 Pa. St. 247. s Louisville N. A. & C. Ey. Co. v. State, 122 Ind. 443 ; Chicago v. Baer, 41 111. 306; No. Ind. R. R. Co. v. Con- nelly, 10 Ohio St. 159; Philadelphia V. Phila., W. & B. R. R. Co., 33 Pa. St. 41; New Haven v. Fair Haven & W. R. R. Co., 38 Conn. 422; s. c, 10 Am. Rep. 399 ; Baltimore, O. & C. R. 504 Co. V. Ketring, 122 Ind. 5; St. Paul & Pac. R. R. Co. v. St. Paul, 21 Minn. 526; Illinois Cen. R. R. Co. v. Com'rs of East Lake Fork Drainage Dist., 21 N. E. R. 925; Burl. & Mo. R. R. R. Co. V. Spearman, 12 Iowa, 112; Junc- tion R. R. Co. V. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. St. 424; Mulherrin v. Del.,L. & W. R. E. Co., 81 Pa. St. 360; New York & N. H. R. K. Co. V. New Haven, 42 Conn. 279; s. c, 19 Am. Rep. 534. * Burl. & Mo. R. R. R. Co. v. Spear- man, 12 Iowa, 112; State v. Atlantic City, 34 N. J. L. 99; Louisville N. A. V. C. Ry. Co., 122 Ind. 443; No. Ind. R. R. Co. V. Connelly, 10 Ohio St. 159. CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 259 a. whether such benefit exists or not, and whether the cost of such assessment is greater or less than the benefit received therefrom by the abutting owners. It has been held in New York, and other states following its ruling, that it is a purely legislative question ; and that the courts cannot interfere at all in deter- mining the accuracy of the legislative judgment, either as to the existence of such a special benefit, or as to the extent of such a benefit in relation to the cost of such improvement.^ And it has also been held that the validity of an assessment on lots benefited by a local improvement, is not affected by the fact, that the amount of such assessment is greater than the assessed value of the lot.^ On the other hand, it has been held by other courts, and par- ticularly in the later decisions of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and other States, that the power of the Legislature is not un- limited ; and in order that any local assessment may be justifiable, and within the constitutional authority of the Legislature and municipality, it must be so apportioned as to avoid an imposi- tion of a greater burden upon the local property owner than the amount of the benefit which he has received from the local improvement.^ " The whole amount of the assessment must 1 Guest V. Brooklyn, 69 N. Y. 506; Alexander v. Baltimore, 5 Gill, 383; Craycraft v. Selvage, 10 Bush (Ky.) 696; Howell v. Bristol, 8 Bush, 493; Centre Street Vac, In re, 115 Pa. St. 247; White v. People, 94 111. 604; Warren v. Henley, 31 Iowa, 31 ; Dick- son V. Racine, 61 Wis. 545. 2 In re Sackett St., 74 N. Y. 95 ; con- tra, Preston v. Eudd, 84 Ky. 250. ' Ilammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. St. 146; In re Sycamore Alley, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. E. 61; Grand Eap. Sch. Fur. Co. V. Grand Eapids, 52 N. W. E. 1028 (Mich. 93); Loeser v. Eedd, 14 Bush (Ky.) 18; State v. Fuller, 39 N. J. L. 576; Watkins v. Zwietusch, 47 Wis. 513; Johnson v. Milwaukee, 40 Wis. 315 ; Mock v. Munoil, (lud. 93) 32 N. E. E. 718; Danenhower v. Dis- trict, 7 Mackey, 99; Johnson v. Duer, 21 S. W. E. 800; Ottawa v. Spencer, 36 III. 211; Taylor v. Chandler, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 349; Municipality No. 2 V. Dunn, 10 La. An. 57; Wat- kins V. Milwaukee, 52 Wis. 98; s. c, 55 Wis. 335 ; Zwietusch v. Milwaukee, 55 Wis. 369; Broadway Bapt. Ch. v. McAtee, 8 Bush, 508; 8 Am. Rep. 481 ; City V. Tiffany, 22 N. Y. S. 604; States V. Judges, (Minn. 93)53 N.W. E. 800; McChesney v. Hyde Park, 28 N. E. E. 1102; Philadelphia v. Sheridan, 24 Atl. R. 80; Beecher v. Detroit, (Mich. 92) 52 N.'w. E. 731; Graham V. Conger, (Ky.) 4 S. W. Eep. 327; 111. Cen. R. E. Co. v. Chicago, (111. 92) 30 N. E. E. 1036; Ferguson v. Stam- ford, 60 Conn. 432; Savage v. Buffalo, 131 N. Y. 568 ;Hoffeld V.Buffalo, 130 N. Y. 387; Independence v. Gates, 19 S. W. E. 728; Holmes v. Jersey City, 12 N. J. Eq. 299; State v. Fuller, 34 N. J. L. 227; City of Kansas v. Baird, 11 S. W. R. 562; 98 Mo. 215; Niklans v. Conkling,20 N. E. R. 797; 505 § 259 a. MTJNICIPAL COEPOUATIONS. [CH. XV. be apportioned amongst the several lots and parcels of land specially benefited, in the 'proportion that the special benefit to each lot or parcel bears to the whole special benefits conferred by the improvement. If the opening of a street rendered it practicable to open another contemplated street, which could not have been opened before, and this fact of itself specially benefits lots adjacent to the new street, such special benefits may properly be considered/in estimating the special benefit conferred by the opening of the new street. The right, which is given to municipal^ corporations of resorting to this kind of taxation is not, like the right of general taxation in the State, founded on necessity ; but on a principle of justice, by which the public may take from an individual whose lands, owing to their proximity to it, are specially benefited by the improve- ment, such a portion of the cost thereof as is equivalent to, bat not in excess of, the special benefits conferred by the improve- ment ; and this principle of justice in itself, impliedly furnishes the measure of, and limits the extent of the right." i . The same contradiction of authority is found as to the proper method of imposing the local assessment, so as to meet the con- stitutional requirement of uniformity and equality. The com- mon method adopted is to impose the tax upon the adjoining property owners in proportion to the frontage of their property upon the street, in which the improvement has been made. And generally, this method of assessment is held to be a just and equitable method of apportionment.^ On the other hand, it has 118 Ind. 289; State v. Paterson, 37 If. J. L. 380; State V. Kewark, 37 lb. 415; Thomas v. Gaines, 35 Mich. 156; Nichols V. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 204; Davis V. City of New Orleans, 6 So. 100; 40 La. An. 806; DeKoven v. Lake View, (111. 90) 21 N. E. R. 813; Brooks V. Baltimore, 48 Md. 265;- Springfield v. Sale, 20 N. E. E. 86; 127 111. 359: Walters v. Town of Lake, 129 111. 23 ; State v. Town of West Hoboken, (N. J. 90) 17 Atl. E. 110; State V. Ramsey Co. Dist. Ct., 33 Minn. 295; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio St. 243; Meissner v. Toledo, 31 Ohio St. 367. ' Chamberlain V. Cleveland, 34 Ohio 506 St. 551. See Walnut St., In re, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. 173. 2 Eutherford v. Hamilton, 97 Mo. 543; Denver v. Knowles, (Col. 93) 30 Pac. E. 1041 ; Barber Asph. P. Co. v. Gogreve, 41 La. An. 241; 5 So. 848; Noouan v. Smith, 50 Mo. 525; O'Con- nor V. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. St. 187; Keith V. Philadelphia, 126 Pa. St. 575; 17 Atl. E. 883; Seely v. Pitts- burgh, 82 Pa. St. 360; Springfield v. Green, 120 111. 2G9; McCorraick's Est. V. Harrisburg, 18 Atl. E. 126; O'Reilly v. Kingston, 114 N. Y. 439; Jennings v. Le Breton, 21 Pac. E. 1127; 80 Cal. 8; Greensburg v. Laird, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. E. 608; Beaumont v. CH. XV.] MXTNICrPAIi TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS, § 259 a. been held, in a number of cases, that the assessment of the cost of local improvement, in proportion to the frontage of property on the street, would be unjust and inequitable ; and, therefore, in violation of the Constitution of the State. Probably, in some of these cases the facts bring out some special circumstance of inequity, upon which the court rests its judgment as to its being unconstitutional.! In some late cases ^ — which arose out of reck- less schemes for local improvements, and which resulted in the insolvency or, at least, serious financial embarrassment of the City of Wilkes-Barre, (Pa. 90) 21 Atl. K. 888; Bacon v. Savannah, 12 S. E. E. 580; 86 Ga. 301; Holmes v. Jer- sey City, 12 N. J. Eq. 299; State v. Fuller, 34 N. J. L. 22T; State v. New- ark, 37 N. J. L. 415; Hoyt v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39; Warren v. Henly, 31 Iowa, 31; Gatoh v. Des Moines, 63 Iowa, "718; Paxson v. Sweet, 13 N. J. L. (1 J. S. Green) 196; Alberger v. City of Baltimore, 20 Atl. R. 988; 64 Md. 1; State v. Newark, 35 N. J. L. 168; State v. Passaic, 37 N. J. L. 65, 68; St. Paul & Pac. E. R. Co. V. St. Paul, 21 Minn. 526, 528; Sewall v^. St. Paul, 20 Minn. 511, 525; Ottawa Co. v. Nelson, 19 Kan. 234; Hurford v. Omaha, 4 Neb. 336, 347; Shehan v. Cincinnati, 25 Wkly. L. Bui. 212; In re Walnut St., 10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 173; Irwin v. Mo- bile, 57 Ala. 6, 9; Birmingham v. Klein, 89 Ala. 461 ; Williams v. Cam- mack, 27 Miss. 209, 224 ; State v. Dean, 23 N. J. L. 335; Raleigh v. Peace, 110 N. C. 32; Scott Co. v. Hinds, 52 N. W. R. 523; Parker v. Atchison, (Kan. 92) 30 Pac. 20; Broadway Bapt. Ch. V. McAtee, 8 Bush (Ky.) 508; s. c, 8 Am. Eep. 481; Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. St. 146; Martin V. Carron, 26 N. J. L. 228; State v. Newark, 27 N. J. L. 185, 193 ; State V. New Brunswick, 30 N. J. L. 395; Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co., 28 Cal. 345; Hines v. Leavenworth, 3 Kan. 186; State v. Elizabeth, 40 N. J. L. 278; Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana (Ky.) 514; Louisville V. Hyatt, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 277; No. Ind. E. E. V. Connelly, 10 Ohio St. 166; Alcorn v. Horner, 38 Miss. 652; Covington V. Boyle, 6 Bush (Ky.) 204; Bradley V. McAtee, 7 Bush (Ky.) 667. iSee Howell v. Bristol, 8 Bush (Ky.) 493; State v. Newark, 37 N. J. L. 415; 18 Am. Rep. 729; Peay v. Little Rock, 32 Ark. 31; Bogert v. Elizabeth, 27 N. J. Eq. 568; McBean V. Chandler, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 349; 24 Am. Rep. 308; State v. Jersey City, 40 N. J. L. 485; State v. Hudson, 29 lb. 104; lb. 115; Taylor v. Chandler, 9 Heisk. 349; State v. Rah way, 39 N. J. L. 046; Ottawa v. Spencer, 36 111. 211; State v. Guttenberg, 38 N. J. L. 419; Chicago V. Larned, 34 HI. 203; Mobile V. Dargan, 45 Ala. 310. So it has been held that while a front- age assessment is valid, yet the as- sessment can only be made on abut- ting property by this mode (Kline V. Cincinnati, 28 W'kly L. Bui. 139) ; it must apply to each front foot along the entire street (Frey v. Findlay, 7 Ohio Cir. Ct. 311), and the lots as- sessed should be of substantially the same depth. Denver v. Knowles, 17 Colo. 204. 2 Bogert v. Elizabeth, 27 N. J. Eq. 568; State v. Newark, 37 N. J. L. 415 ; s. c, 18 Am. Rep. 729. 507 § 259 a. MUNICIPAL COUPOEATIONS. [CH. XV, municipal communities concerned — the question was raised by the New Jersey Court as to whether the Legislature had the power without limitation to authorize the municipal corpora- tion to enter upon an extensive scheme of taxation for local improvement, and to assess the cost of such improvement upou adjoining property, without considering the benefit of such improvement to the property owner. And it was held in these cases, that the entire cost of such improvement cannot in any case be imposed upon the adjoining property ; but- that such cost should be apportioned between the abutting owner and the general public, according to the amount of benefit which the local property owner has derived from the improvement ; and that the cost as assessed upon him shall not exceed such benefit. When one owns a corner lot, it is held that he can be re- quired to be assessed for improvements made on both of the streets, upon which the land fronts.^ Where the law requires that the cost of improvement shall be assessed upon property abutting the streets, upon which the improvement is made, it is held that land cannot be said to be bounded by a highway, when the lines of a railroad pass between the street and the property in question.^ It has also been held that municipal corporations may assess the cost of a local improvement upon the lots benefited, in pro- portion to their superficial area, instead of their frontage on the streets.' The relative justice and injustice of local assessments accord- ing to the frontage upon streets, has also been raised in Penn- sylvania, in regard to the levying a tax for the improvement of a highwaj'- upon rural property, which is brought within the jurisdiction of a city ; and which, because of its rural character, cannot be supposed to have derived the benefit from local im- 1 Morrison v. Hershire, 32 Iowa, 271 (1871) ; Wolf V. Keokuk, 48 Iowa, 129; Warren v. Henly, 31 Iowa, 31 (1870); Springfield v. Green, 120 111. 209. 2 Philadelphia v. Eastwick, 35 Pa. St. 75 (1860); Philadelphia v. Phila., W. & B. R. R. Co., 33 Pa. St. 41. See, also. Ward, hi re, 52 N. T. 395 (1873), per Andrews, J. ; O'Keilley v. King- 508 ston, 114 ISr. T. 439 (1889), where the words " adjacent and adjoining " are distinguished and construed. '' Ad- joining," being construed to mean touching, while "adjacent" means, lying near to it, not contiguous. " Ray V. Jeffersonville, 90 Ind. 507; Constitution of California, art. xi. sec. 13; Emery v. San Fr. Gas. Co., 28 Cal. 345 (1865). CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 259 a. provemenfs which would necessarily accrue to sucli property, where it had been adapted or appropriated to urban uses ; and for that reason, it has been held by later decisions in the Penn- sylvania courts, that assessment of property in the rural dis- trict by the foot front rule is unconstitutional, because it imposes upon the property so taxed a greater assessment than the bene- fit which such pi"operty has derived from the improvement. ^ Finally, it may be stated that the question of constitution- ality raised by these cases of local assessments has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States not to be within amendment XIV. of the United States Constitution, which declares that no State shall pass any law depriving the owner of his property without due process of law.^ It is very likely that the fact, that these local assessment laws have been adopted generally and declared to be constitutional, may be accounted for by the circumstance that this method of local taxation was a common practice among the earlier Eng- lish municipalities, and therefore is an inheritance from the mother country, where the American objection to the local as- sessment could not possibly be raised.^ iScranton v. Pa. Coal Co., 105 Pa. St. 445; Washington Ave. Case, 69 Pa. St. 352; Seely v. Pittsburgh, 82 Pa. St. 360; Craig v. Philadelphia, 89 Pa. St. 265 ; City v. Eule, 93 Pa. St. 15 ; but see contra, Malchus v. High- lands Dist., 4 Bush (Ky.) 547. 2 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104; County of Mobile v. Kim- ball, 102 U. S. 691. 3 Bedford Union Poor Guard v. Bedford Impr. Commissioners, 7 Exch. 777; Viner's Abr. "Sewers." But it is a curious fact that at pres- ent (1893) the landed proprietors of London are objecting to proposed local assessments for local improve- ments, on the ground that they vio- late tlie legal requirement of uni- formity and equality in taxation. See generally, on this subject: Frey v. Findley, 7 Ohio Cir. Ct. 311; Kline v. Cincinnati, 28 W'kly L. Bull. 139; Denver V. Knowles, 17 Colo. 204; Bos- ton Seamen's Fr. Soc. v. Boston, 116 Mass. 181; In re Board of Street Openings, 133 N. T. 436; Raleigh v. Peace, 110 N. C. 32; Davies v. Sagi- naw, 87 Mich. 439; Drummond v. Eau Claire, 79 Wis. 97; Schmidt v. R. Co., 90 Cal. 37; Beaumont v. Wilkes-Barre, 142 Pa. St. 198; Fitz- gerald v. Walker, 55 Ark. 148 ; State v. Kamsey Co., 47 Minn. 406; Ede v. Knight, 93 Cal. 159; Whitney v. Pitts- burgh, 29 W. N. C. 363; Lowe v. Omaha, (Neb. 92) 50 N. W. E. 760; In re Walnut St., 10 Pa. Co. Ct. 173; Malory v. Marietta, 11 Ohio St. 636; Punshon v. Cincinnati, 27 Wkly. Bui. 155; McChesney v. Hyde Park, 28 N. E. R. 1102; R. R. Co. v. East St. Louis, 134 111. 656; Wilson v. Trenton, 53 N. J. L. 645; Hoyt v. Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39; s. c, 2 Am. Rep. 76; Egyptian Levee Co. v. 509 § 261 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. XV. § 260. Road tax and compulsory labor on the same. — It is a very common practice in rural communities for the repair of the road to be provided for by special road tax, or by com- pulsory labor of tlie residents of the communitj'^ upon such road ; the provision originally being that each individual male citizen is required to perforin so many days labor upon the road, or to provide a laborer for the required number of days as his substitute. No question has ever been raised as to the consti- tutionality of such regulation ; and it is believed that the Leg- islature has the power to impose upon individuals, apart from any ovs^nership of lands, the burden of maintaining in good re- pair the streets of a cit}', by the performance of tlie necessary labor on the streets. And the grant to a municipal corpora- tion, in its charter, of the power to require of the citizens la- bor in the repair of roads, does not violate the constitutional requirement that all taxation should be by valuation of the property of the taxpayer.^ The municipal corporation can also exercise the power to require such labor of its inhabitants, as an implication from the general power " to make such rules, orders, regulations, and ordinances as to them shall seem meet for repairing streets." ^ The tax may be imposed for the repair of the public roads, although such loads may be outside of the city limits, as long as they lead into the city.^ § 260 a. Poll tax, constitutional.— A poll tax may also be levied by municipal corporations for municipal purposes, with- out violating any constitutional requirement as to uniformity ; even though certain persons, such as members of fire compa- nies, ai'e exempted.* § 261. Power to tax professions, trades and callings Notwithstanding tlie constitutional provision, requiring equal- Haidin,27 Mo. 495, 497; Uhrigv. St. Louis, 44 Mo. 458; Lock wood v. St. Louis, 24Mo. 20; Garrett v. St. Louis, 25 Mo. 505 ; Crowley v. Copley, 2 La. An. .S29; Wilmington v. Topp, 71 N". C. 76; Hayden v. Atlanta, 70 Ga. 817; Egerton v. Green Cove Springs, 19 Fla. 140; Wright v. Chicago, 46 111. 44; Hines v. Leavenworth, 3 Kan. 186. " Sawyer v. Alton, 4 111. 130; Tip- 510 ton V. Norman, 72 Mo. 380. 2 State V. Halifax Comm'rs, 4 Dev. L. (N. C.) 345 (1833). » Skinner v. Hutton, 33 Mo. 244 (1862) ; Chess v. Birmingham, 1 Grant (Pa.) Cas. 438 (1857); Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 N. T. 591 (1874); Bennett V. Birmingham, 31 Pa. St. 15 (1850), * Faribault v. Misener, 20 Minn, 396 (1874). CH. XV.J MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 261 ity and uniformity in the imposition of taxes, it has been held that there is no implied prohibition of the imposition of a tax upon trades and professions and callings, even though the amount of the tax should vary with each calling or profession, as long as all persons engaged in a particular occupation or trade are taxed by and in accordance with the same rule. Tlie variance of the amount of the tax, which is imposed upon the different trades and occupations, will be no ground for claiming that the constitutional requirement of uniformity has been vio- lated.^ And in imposing the tax, it may be made individual, so that the persons engaged in the occupation or trade may be subject to the tax, although two or more of them may be as- ' Arkadelphia L. Co. v. City of Arkadelphla, (Ark. 92) 19 S. W. R. 1053; Ould v. Richmond, 23 Gratb. 464; 8. c, 14 Am. Rep. 1-39; Ex parte Montgomery, 64 Ala. 463; Simmons V. State, 12 Mo. 268; Rankin v. Hen- derson, (Ky. 92) TS. W. R. 174; Rome V. McWilliams, 52 Ga. 251; Gold- thwaite v. Montgomery Council, 50 Ala. 486; Glasgow v. Rouse, 43 Mo. 479; Spaulding v. Hill, 7 S. W. R. 27; Sacramento v. Crocker, 16 Cal. 119; Simmons v. State, 12 Mo. 268; St. Louis V. Steinberg, 4 Mo. App. 453; St. Louis V. Laiighlin, 49 Mo. 550; Blackman v. Royal Ins. Co., 17 N. E. R. 580; Nashville v. Althrop, 5 Coldw. (Tenn.) 554; Mason v. Lancaster, 4 Bush (Ky.) 406; Germania v. State, 7 Md. 1; Lynchburg v. Korfolk & N. W. R. R. Co., 80 Va. 237; Cuthbert V. Commonwealth, ("Va. 88) 9 S. E. R. 185; Gilkerson v. Frederick Jus., 13 Gratt. 577; Baton Rouge Bd. of Sel. V. Spalding, 8 La. An. 87; Port- land V. O'Neill, 1 Oreg. 218; Little Rook T. Barton, 33 Ark. 436; State V. Traders Bank, 41 La. An. 329; McGrath v. Newton, 29 Kan. 364; Walcott V. People, 17 Mich. 68; Wil- liams v. Detroit, 2 lb. 560; St. Louis V. Sternberg, 69 Mo. 289; Shotwell V. Moore, 45 Ohio St. 632; 16 N. E. R. 470; Morrill v. State, 38 Wis. 428; s. c, 20 Am. Rep. 12; Wiley v. Owens, 39 Ind. 429 ; Braun v. Chicago, 110 111. 186; Baker v. Cincinnati, 11 Oliio St. 534; Richmond etc. Co. v. Reidsville, 101 N. C. 404; Concord Comm'rs v. Patterson, 8 Jones L. (N. C.) 102; Cousins v. State, 50 Ala. 113; s. c, 20 Am. Rep. 290; Ottawa V. Nelson, 19 Kan. 234; Com. v. Maury, 82 Va. 882 ; Kneeland v. Pitts- burgh, 11 Atl. R. 657; Woodbridge V. Detroit, 8 Mich. 274; Stein v. Mo- bile, 49 Ala. 362; s. c, 20 Am. Rep. 283 ; Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 13 Gratt. (Va.) 767; St. Louis v. Spiegel, 2 S. W. R. 839; 90 Mo. 587; Marmet v. State, 45 Ohio St. 12 N. E. R. 463 ; Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Water Co., 61 Cal. 65; Detroit v. Det. Ry. Co., (Mich.) 43 N. W. Rep. 447; Living- ston V. Paducah, 80 Ky. 656; New Orleans v. Com. Bank of N. O., lb. 735 ; Seller v. Phillips, 37 111. App. 74; Municipality No. 2 v. Dubois, 10 La. An. 56; New Orleans v. Staiger, 11 lb. 68; New Orleans v. South- ern Bank, lb. 41; New Orleans v. Turpin, 13 lb. 56; Merriam v. New Orleans, 14 lb. 318; New Orleans v. Kaufman, 29 lb. 283. But see San Jose V. San I. & S. C. R. R. Co., 53 Cal. 476. 511 §262 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XV. sociated as partners ; each individual tradesman or business man may be required to pay the tax.^ Where nonresidents pursue their business or calling within the corporate limits, the fact that they reside beyond these limits does not restrain the power of the municipal corporation to impose the same license tax upon them as upon residents of the city.^ But the power to tax nonresidents, who do business withiii the city limits, must be fairly and properly exercised ; and any discrimination against such nonresidents, in favor of the resident of the citj', will be in violation of the provision of the Federal Constitu- tion, which grants to each citizen the equal privileges and im- munities of the citizens of the several States." A city is authorized to impose a special license tax upon ex- press companies in the nature of an ad valorem tax upon the gross annual receipts of such express company, notwithstanding the fact that no tax of the same kind was imposed upon the merchants.* § 262. Power to levy retrospective taxes. — If, for any rea- son, a tax has been declared to be invalid, because the consti- tutional or statutory requirements have not been complied with, and the imposition of the tax may have been valid in the first instance by a compliance with the provisions of the Constitu- tion of the State ; such defective or illegal taxation may be remedied or ratified by a subsequent act, authorizing the impo- sition of the tax. It would not be strictly a ratification of an illegal tax, but rather a present imposition of a tax, in liqui- dation of some obligation previously contracted, for the satis- faction of which the pi;ior illegal taxation was invoked. A tax ' Lanier v. Macon, 59 Ga. 187; Wilder v. Savannah, 70 Ga. 760; Mc- Iver V. Clarke, (Miss. 92) 10 So. Rep. 581. 2 Worth V. Fayetteville Comm'rs, Winst. Eq. (N. C.) 70; Baltimore v. Hussey, (Md.) 9 Atl. Eep. 9; State v. Charleston, lb. 719; Bridges v. Grif- fin, 33 Ga. 113 (1861); Johnson v. Lexington, 14 B. Mon. 648; Louis- ville V. Henning, 1 Bush, 381; see Moore v. Fayetteville Com'rs, 80 N. C. 154. 3 State V. Charleston, 2 Speers L. 612 (S. C.) 719; Hefling v. San Antonio, (Tex. 92) 20 S. W. R. 85; Joyce v. Woods, 78 Ky. 386; Bennett v. Bir- mingham Bor.,81 Pa. St. 15, where it is held that statutes authorizing the registration and taxation of vehicles for the maintenance of the repairs upon the streets have to be strictly construed, and in the absence of an express provision these statutes do not apply to nonresidents. ' American Union Express Co. v. St. Joseph, 66 Mo. 675. CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 263 to pay for past indebtedness of a municipality is not objection- able on any constitutional grounds.^ § 26-3. Municipality cannot delegate its authority The municipal corporation, like any other legal personality, cannot delegate to another the power vested in it, unless the power to delegate is expressly given to it in its charter.^ And this pro- hibition of delegation extends to the authority conferred by the Legislature on municipal corporations, to levy and impose taxes or assessments on property for local interests ; such an author- ity cannot be delegated, unless the right of delegation is ex- pressly given to the corporation.^ It has thus been held impossible, in making local assessments, for the municipal cor- poration to leave to some official the determination of the amount of the tax or assessment to be levied upon abutting owners, and to make their judgment in such matters final.* And where the ^ower has been so delegated, there cannot be any subsequent ratification of the assessment.^ But the Legislature may authorize such delegation by the municipal cor- poration, or it may expressly provide in the charter that the 1 St. Louis V. Clemens, 52 Mo. 133; Municipality No. 1 v. Wheeler, 10 La. An. 745; Fairfield v. People, 94 111. 244; Tallman v. Janesville, 17 Wis. 71 ; New Orleans v. Poutz, 14 La. An. 853; see §§ 16, 17. ^Ante, § 113; Foss v. Chicago, 56 111. 354; Thompson v. Boone ville, 61 Mo. 282; Hunt v. Booneville, 65 lb. 620; Macon v. First Nat. Bank, 59 Ga. 648; Indianapolis v. Lawyer, 38 Ind. 348; Johnston v. Macon, 62 6a. 645 ; Macon v. Macon Sav. Bank, 60 lb. 133. ' Stifel V. Cooperage Co., 38 Mo. Ap. 340; Purcell v. Bear Creek, 38 111. Ap. 499; Thompson v. Scher- merhorn, 6 N. Y. 92; see Page v. Chicago, 60 III. 441; Quid v. Rich- mond, 23 Gratt. 471; Peoria etc. Co. V. People, (111. 92) 31 N. E. R. 113; Matthews v. Alexandria, 68 Mo. 115; Richardson v. Heydenfeldt, 46 Cal. 68; People v. Clark, 47 lb. 456; Ran- dolph v. Gawley, 47 lb. 458; White V. Stevens, 34 N. W.R. 255; Sheehan 33 V. Gleason, 46 Mo. 100; Lord v. Ocon- to, 47 Wis. 386; Davis v. Rood, 65 N. Y. 566; Scofleld v. Lansing, 17 Mich. 437; People v. Hagadorn, 10 N. E. R. 891; 104 N. Y. 516; Bel- linger V. Gray, 51 lb. 610; Hitch- cock V. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341; Murray v. Tucker, 10 Bush (Ky.) 240; Davis v. Reed, 65 N. Y. 566; Fay V. Wood, (Mich. 87) 32 N. W. R. 612; (Apportionment;) Walker v. Chica- go, 62 111. 286; East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 46 lb. 392; Lake Shore & M. S. R. E. Co. V. Chicago, 56 lb. 454; Bryan v. Chicago, 60 lb. 507; Foss V. Chicago, 56 111. 354; State v. Copeland, 3 R. 1. 33 ; Meuser v. Risdon, 36 Cal. 239; State v. Swisher, 17 Tex. 441; and comp. State v. Briggs, 15 R. L 425; 7 Atl. R. 454; Danenhower V. District, 7 Mackey, 99. ■* Phelps V. New York, 112 N. Y. 216. '• Murray V. Tucker, 10 Bush, 240; see Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341; Davis v. Reed, 65 N. Y. 500. 613 §264 MtrXICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XV. assessment shall be made by some other body than the eitv council ; and such grant of the power to delegate is within the constitutional limitations of the authority of the Legislature.^ But where the ascertainment of the cost of an improvement, and the apportionment of the expenses between property own- ers, are delegated to an official of the corporation, to be reported upon by him to the city council for its approval or rejection ; the discretionary power of the city council has not been dele- gated and the acts of this officer are only ministerial ; and hence, there is no objection to the assessment, on the ground of the unlawful delegation of the authority of the city council.^ § 264. Power of taxation a continuing one. — Where the municipal corporation is given the power to tax, whether it is the power to impose a general tax, or to levy a special assess- ment for a local improvement, in both cases the power is a con- tinuing one ; and the authority is given to thfe municipality to exercise the power from time to time, as the public needs may require. Such a power is not exhausted by a single exercise ■ of it.* Thus, for example, the power to compel property owners to pave the streets of the city, includes the power to compel them to repave such streets, when required by the municipal authorities.* But these decisions have been denied, especially in Pennsylvania, where it is held that the power to impose a local assessment upon abutting owners for the original paving of a street is justifiable on the ground that it was the creation 1 Scliwatz V. Flatboats, 14 La. An. 243; Solienley v. Commonwealth, 36 Pa. St. 02; State v. Xew Brunswick, 30 JiT. J. h. 395. 2 City of Nevada v. Morris, (91) 43 Mo, App, 586; Strauss v. City of Cincinnati., 24 Wkly. Law Bull. 422; McKusick V, Stillwater, 44 Minn. 372. " Dickinson y, Worcester, 138 Mass. 555 ; Budge v. Cjty of Grand Forks, 47 N. W. E. 390; Warner v. Knox, 50 Wis. 429; State v. New Brunswick, 44 N. J. L. 116; McVerry v. Boyd, (Cal. 92) 26 Pac. 885; Taber v. Graf- miller, 109 Ind. 206; McCormick v, Patchin, 53 Mo. 33; 14 Am. Eep. 440; Burmeister, In re, 76 N. Y. 174; 614 Smith V. City of Louisville, 14 S. W. K. 349; Dooley v. Sullivan, 112 Ind. 451; Wiles v. Hoss, 114 lb. 371; Phillips, In re, 60 N. Y. 16; Burke, In re, 62 lb. 224. « Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Quincy, (111. 90) 27 N. E. R. 192; Far- rar v. St. Louis, 80 Mo. 379; Estes v. Owen, 90 lb. 113; Town of Marion v. O'Killman, (Ind. 91) 26 N. E. K. 676; Wilkins v. Detroit, 46 Mich. 120; McCormick v. Patchin, 53 Mo. 33; Hovey v. Barker, (Kan. 92) 26 Pac. Kep. 591 ; Kokomo v. Mahan, 100 Ind. 242; Jelliff v. Newark, 48 N. J. L. 101; Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 560. CH. XV.j MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 265 of a special benefit to such local property owners ; but that the repaying of such street, as distinguished from the repair of that street, would not be included within the original power to pave, and therefore the cost of such paving could not be imposed upon the adjoining property owners.-^ In following out this distinction between original paving and subsequent change in the same, it has been held that where in the original plan of paving a street a strip of land was left in the middle of such street for trees and shrubbery, and a subsequent change in the plan called for the paving of such strip, this subsequent re- quirement of the paving of such strip, covered by the trees and shrubbery, would be an original paving for which the property owners could be assessed.^ In the city of New York, the prop- erty owners are protected against the change of paving of the street by a provision of the charter, which prohibits the cost of the paving to be imposed upon the adjoining property owners, unless such change in paving has been petitioned for by a ma- jority of the owners of the abutting property.^ And so, also, it has been held in Iowa, that the abutting owners cannot be charged with the cost of repaving, where a good pavement has been torn up for the purpose of constructing a sewer ; that the cost of the repaving should be considered an item of expense in the construction of the sewer.* § 265. Power of taxation cannot be varied or enlarged by city ordinances. — The power of taxation is conferred upon a municipal corporation by its charter, and the extent and limi- tations of this power can alone be determined bj'' the provisions of the charter. Hence, the extent of the exercise of the power, and the amount of its exercise, can in no wise be varied or con- trolled by ordinance, except, of course, where the regulation of the exercise of the power in any one particular has been intrusted to the corporation by its charter.^ The city, there- fore, cannot impose terras or conditions on the exercise of the power, which will in any way affect the validity of a tax-sale ' Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. St. 146; s. c, 3 Am. Eep. 61.5; Or- phan Asylum's Appeal, 111 Pa. St. 135; Wistar v. Philadelphia, 111 Pa. St. 604; s. c, 80 Pa. St. 112 (1876); s. c, 21 Am. Eep. 112. ^Alcom V. Philadelphia, 112 Pa. St. 494. s Garvey, In re, 77 N. T. 523. ■1 Battle V. Mobile, 9 Ala. 234 (1846). ^Ante, chap, on Ordinances, § 146; "Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242. 515 §265 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XV. made under authority from the Legislature.-^ And, unless a special authority is given to the municipal corporation to exer- cise discretion in the matter, the municipal corporation cannot transfer the power of collecting taxes from the officer designated for that purpose in the charter, to some other appointee of the city council,'^ or exempt property from taxation, which the gen- eral law of the State made taxable,^ or to exempt from taxation the improvements made upon the land, where the charter directs the assessment to be made upon the value of the property.* So, also, is it impossible for a city to make the liability for taxes a lien upon the property, binding such property into whosesoever hands the land may come, where the intention of the Legislature is expressed to be that the taxes should be a personal debt of the one who is the owner of the land, at the time the levy was made.^ It is manifest, therefore, from what has just been stated in general terms, that the mode of levying taxes, prescribed by the charter of the city, or by the general laws of the State under which municipal corporations are regulated, must be strictly pursued. Any deviation of a material nature from the mode prescribed will have the effect of vitiating the proceed- ings for the levy of the tax.® The same rule applies, perhaps even more strictly, to matters of proceedings for local assess- 1 Thompson v. Carroll, 22 How. (U. S.) 422. ■ 2piacerville v. Wilcox, 35 Cal. 21. estate V. H. & St. J. E. E. Co., 75 Mo. 208. * Fitch V. Pinckard, 5 111. 68 ; Primm v. Belleville, 59 111. 142. 6 Moale V. Baltimore, 61 Md. 224, citing Dashiell v. Baltimore, 45 lb. 615; Gould v. Baltimore, 58 lb. 46; s. c, 59 lb. 378; Handy v. Collins, 60 Id. 229. 6 Sewall V. St. Paul, 20 Minn. 511 ; Ellison V. Lindford, (Utah, 91) 25 Pac. E. 744; State v. Perth Amboy, 38 N. J. L. 425 ; Brophy v. Landman, 28 Ohio St. 542; Fort Worth v. Davis, 57 Tex. 225; State v. Hagerty, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 22; Butler v. Nevin, 88 111. 575; Churchman v. Indianapolis, 516 110 Ind. 259; Wabash Ey. Co. v. People, (111. 91) 28 N. E. E. 57; Chi- cago V. Wright, 32 111. 192; Crane v. Janesville, 20 Wis. 305; State v. Phil- lips, 102 Mo. 664; Knox v. Peterson, 21 Wis. 247; Collins v. Louisville, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 134; Tobiny. Gillespie, 152 Mass. 219; State v. Jersey City, 24 N. J. L. 662, 666; State v. Plain- field, 38 lb. 95; Hewlett v. White, (Mich. 90) 43 N. W. E. 1043; State V. Crawford, 36 N. J.'l. 394; D'An- tignac V. Augusta, 31 Ga. 700; Nis- som V. Furman, 22 Fla. 581; State v. Babcock, 20 Neb. 522; Sims v. War- ren, (Miss. 90) 7 So. 226; Fitch v. Pinckard, 5 111. 78; Henderson v. Baltimore, 8 Md. 352; Frost v. Leath- erman, 55 Mich. 33; Green v. Ward, 82 Va. 324. CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 265 ments; any substantial departure from the statute, which au- thorizes the recovery of a local assessment, will avoid the pro- ceeding.i And v^here, in the provision for the recovery of a local assessment, certain requirements are made as conditions precedent to the imposition of the liability for the improvement upon the abutting owner, the contractor v?ho fails to take the necessary steps to impose the liability upon the abutting owner, cannot recover from the city for the value of the improvement thus made ; notwithstanding a provision of the charter declares that under the circumstances, when work is ordered to be done on a local improvement, the abutting owner should be held responsible for it. This provision is construed as a guaranty that the cost of the improvement will be paid by the lot owner when everything is done by the contractor to create the liability upon the lot owners, which is required by the laws of the State.^ No liability on a local assessment for local improvements, which lias been ordered by a municipal government, will be imposed thereby on either the city or the abutting owner, unless all the requirements of the Constitution or general laws of the State relating thereto, which are intended to serve as conditions pre- cedent, have been fully complied with.^ The commissioners, who are directed to assess the damages and benefits for a local improvement, have judicial powers ; and are judicial officers to such an extent, that the general rule of law applies, which in- capacitates them to act as commissioners, where they have any special interest in the assessment proposed.* ItTias also been held that it is fatal to the validity of a legal assessment, where 1 Bensinger v. Columbia, 6 Mackey, 285; Allen V. Galveston, 51 Tex. 302; Gilmore v. TJtica, 55 Hun, 514; 9 N. Y. S. 912; Pound v. Chippewa Co. Sup., 43 Wis. 65; Merrett v. Port- chester, 71 X. Y. 309. 2 Hall V. Chippewa Falls, 47 Wis. 267; Philadelphia v. Jewell's Est., 19 Atl. E. 947; 26 W. >r. C. 292; Fletcher v. Oshkosh, 18 Wis. 229; Owens V. Milwaukee, 47 lb. 461; Bouldin v. Baltimore, 15 Md. 18 ; No. Pao. Lum. & M. Co. v. East Portland, 14 Or. 3; Philan v. New York, 119 N. Y. 86; Benton v. Milwaukee, 50 Wis. 368; Harrison v. Milwaukee, 49 lb. 247. 3 Ziegler v. Flack, 54 N. Y. Super. Ct. 69; Eager, In re, 46 N. Y. 100; Hewes v. Eels, 40 Cal. 255; Hager v. Burlington, 42 Iowa, 601; Egerman V. Payne, 28 Mo. Ap. 72; Nicolson Paving Co. v. Painter, lb. 699; Him- melman v. Oliver, 34 Cal. 246; New- man V. Emporia, 32 Kan. 456; De Koven v. Lake View, 129 111. 399; Long V. Cincinnati, 23 Wkly. L. Bui. 100; Hawthorne v. East Portland, 13 Oreg. 271. " State V. Crawford, 36 N. J. L. 394. 517 § 265 MTJ^noIPAL coepoeations. [ch. xv. the commissioners failed to take the oath required by the stat- ute, or to hold such meeting at the place, which was named in the notice of the assessment.^ Where the provision of the charter is silent as to the manner in which the city shall exer- cise its power in providing for the levy of taxes, or for the im- provement of its streets, it is possible for provision to be made by resolution, or by motion of the city council, as well as by a formal ordinance.^ But if the charter requires that the de- termination to order an improvement of a street, or a levy of the tax, shall be made b}' ordinance, then the simple resolution of the city council will not be valid.^ In this connection, however, it is difficult at times to distin- guish provisions of the charter which are strictly mKndator)% from those which are merely directory. The mandatory or im- perative provision of the charter must, of course, be strictly followed, while obedience to the directory provision is more or less discretionary. Thus, a statute, requiring a tax to be levied on a certain date named, is held as to the time of levy to be directory ; and the same power may be exercised within a reason- able time thereafter.* But the question, whether the provision as to the time of the exercise of the power is imperative or di- rectory, depends wholly upon the intention of the Legislature, as manifested by the context of the statute and the nature of the power to be exercised, and the I'elation of the parties and the circumstances surrounding them. Thus, it has been held, that where a statute provides that the town board of trustees shall, before a given date, determine the amount of the general tax for the current j'ear, the assessment of the tax before that date was mandatory, and that a levy made after the statutory time would be void.* It seems that where the object of a pro- vision is the protection of the taxpayer against undue exaction or excessive hardship, the provision is mandatory and must be strictly complied with. But where the provisions only serve •Wheeler v. Chicago, 57 HI. 415; State V. Perth Amboy, 38 IST. J. L. 425. 2 Warrensburg v. Miller, 77 Mo. 56; Indianapolis v. Imberry, 17 Ind. 175 (1865) ; Moberry v. Jeffersonville, 38 Ind. 198; Terre Haute v. Turner, 36 Ind. 522; Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind. 90 (1871). 518 'Newman v. Emporia, 32 Kan. 456. For the distinction between ordi- nance and resolution, see § 145. * Gearhart v. Dixon, 1 Pa. St. 224 (1845). s Williamsport v. Kent, 14 Ind. 306 (1860). CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 266 to promote dispatch, or provide a method or system of levying or collecting the tax, and can in no wise or in any material de- gree serve as an advantage to the taxpayer, the provisions are generally held to be directory .^ § 266. Limitation of tax rate cannot be exceeded It is quite common in municipal charters, or in the general law un- der which the municipality had been incorporated, to limit the rate of taxes which may be raised in one year. Wherever the power is so limited, any levy of a tax beyond the limit would, of course, be void, and could be restrained by appropriate pro- ceedings on the part of the citizens. Nor would the power be enlarged ordinarily by implication, by other provisions of the charter which confer generally the power to make contracts, or to make improvements of a general character.^ And where the limit of taxation has been reached, without provision for the payment of the principal or interest of the municipal debt, it is not possible for a court to award a mandamus, to compel the levy of an additional tax to pay a judgment recovered for such debt against the city or county.^ So, also, where the entire amount of the tax has not been exhausted in the provision for the current expenses ; and the surplus of the amount of taxa- tion is still to be determined ; it has been held, by the Supreme Court of the United States, that the disposition of the remain- der of the taxes, which could be imposed under the charter lim- its, was within the power of the city council ; and could not be reached by mandamus, in advance of any ascertained surplus.* Under the statutes of Georgia, the power of a municipal corpo- ration to levy taxes was limited to such a levy for ordinary cur- rent expenses ; but it was held that the cost of furnishing a building for city government use, was an ordinary current ex- pense, which is authorized under this statutory provision.^ While the statutory or charter limit of the power of taxation ' Steckert v. E. Saginaw, 22 Mich. 104; Starr v. Burlington, 45 Iowa, 87. ■■^ Clark V. Davenport, 14 Iowa, 494; Arnold v. Hawkins, 95 Mo. 569; 8 S. W. E. 718; Johnston v. Becker Co., 27 Minn. 64; 6 N. W. E. 411; Hecock V. Van Dusen, (Mich. 91) 45 lb. .34.3; Newaygo v. Echtinaw, (Mich. 91) 45 lb. 1010; United States v. Cicero, 41 Fed. 8; Burnes v. Atchi- son, 2 Kan. 454. 3 Clay County v. McAleer, 115 TJ. S. 616. « East St. Louis v. Zebley, 110 U. S. 321; Weber T. Traubel, 95 111. 427; East St. Louis v. Underwood, 105 lb, 308. ■^ Rome V. McWilliaras, 67 6a. 106. 519 § 267 MUNICIPAX, COEPORATIOXS. [CH. XV. cannot be impliedly enlarged by other provisions of the charter, calling for general improvement, or giving a general power to contract debts ; yet, a special gi'ant of power in the charter may have that effect; i. e., where the charter grants to the cor- poration a speci.il authority to borrow money or contract a debt for a specific purpose, and the exercise of this special power would necessarily call for an assessment of taxes in excess of the charter limit as to the rate of taxation ; for this special pur- pose, the charter limit will be held to have been impliedly re- pealed. Thus, a special act which authorizes a municipal corporation to issue bonds in payment of a railroad subscrip- tion, and which provides for the payment of such bonds by the levy of taxes ; or, even independently of any express provision, that the bonds shall be paid by a special levy ; it has been held that this special act woiild confer an authority to levy taxes in excess of the charter limit, for the purpose of providing. for payment of the bonds.^ But where the charter limit of rate of taxation foi- a particu- lar year has not been exhausted by the single levy, there may be any number of levies during the same year, provided the charter limit has not been exhausted by the total sum of taxes levied ; and as long as the charter does not require that the entire tax for the given year shall be levied at once.^ § 267. Construction and reconcilement of general laws with special charter provisions. — The general statutes of the State usually contain provisions for taxation, applicable through- out the entire State, and declaring what property is taxable, and how the taxes should be levied. As has already been ex- plained, the municipal corporation has no implied power to levy taxes for local purposes, but must rest its claim to such power upon a special grant of the power to it. It is the fact that municipal corporations are expressly granted the power to im- pose taxes, either in the charter, or by the general laws under which the municipality has been incorporated. But the grant of power to the corporation is ordinarily very general in its ^ Quincy v. Jackson, 11.3 U. S. 332; distinguishing United States v. Ma- con County, 99 U. S. 582; Commou- ■wealth V. Pittsburgli, 34 Pa. St. 496; Amey v. Allegheny City, 24 How. 3G4; Fosdick v. Perrysburg, 14 Ohio 520 St. 472; Butz V. Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575 (1869). 2 Municipality No. 2 v. Orleans Cot. Press Co., 6 Rob. (La.) 411; Benoist V. St. Louis, 19 Mo. 179 (1873); Wat- tles V. Papeer, 40 Mich. 624. CH. XV.j MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 267 character, and the details, as to the extent of the power and the manner of its exercise, are generally left to be determined by- judicial construction. Where the special grant of power con- tains no express provision for the application to municipal tax- ation of the general rules laid down by the general statutes of the State ; and where the charter contains no substitute resu- lation of the same, presumptively, the scope and limitation of the municipal power of taxation can only be found in the pro- visions of the State statutes in respect to taxation. But, in every case, it is a question of judicial construction ; and where the provisions of the general statute in respect to taxation cannot be carried out in the case of municipal taxation, this provision of the statute will be held by the courts to have no application to the municipal taxation.^ Thus, it has been held in Virginia, — where the general laws of the State, in requiring railroad companies to pay for their passenger transportation by such company one mill for eveiy mile of travel, provide that " every company paying such tax shall not be assessed with any tax on its lands, buildings or equipments ; " — that this general law of taxation, providing for an exemption of the railroad cor- poration from the liability for any other tax, was intended to apply only to State levies of taxes, and did not include the tax of municipal corporations.^ Where the authority is granted to a municipal corporation, to levy taxes " upon the freeholders and inhabitants of such village, according to law," the provision "according to law" means, according to the provisions of the general statutes of the State, in respect to the power of taxa- tion.3 So, also, it has been held that, where a city is author- 1 Cemetery v. Com'rs, 152 Mass. 408; City of Kansas v. Johnson, 18 Mo. 661; Savannah v. Jesup, 106 U. S. 563; City of Wilkes-Barre App., 116 Pa. St. 246; 9 Atl. E. SOS; Mu- nicipality No. 2 V. Com. Bank of N. 0., 5 Eob. (La.) 151; Farrell v. Hath- away, 22 N. E. E. 849; Columbia v. Beasly, 1 Humph. 232, 240; Glass v. White, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 475; South Bend v. Cushing, (Ind. 89) 24 N. E. E. 114; Furman v. Knapp, 19 Johns. 248; Trimble v. Sterling, (Ky. 91) 12 S. W. E. 1066; Shoal water v. Arm- strong, 9 Humph. 217. 2 Winona etc. Co. v. Watertown, (S. D. 92) 44 N. W. E. 1072; Green etc. Co. V. Outagamie Co., (Wis. 91) 45 lb. 536. 8 Troy V. Mutual Bank, 20 N. Y. 387; Holtzhausen v. Newport, (Ky. 03) 22 S. W. E. 752; Davenport v. Miss. & Mo. E. R. Co., 16 Iowa, 348; State V. Carson, (Wash. 93) 33 Pac. E. 428; Barrett v. Henderson, 4 Bush, 255 ; Dunleith & D. Br. Co. v. Dubuque, 32 Iowa, 427; State Bank V. Madison, 3 Ind. 43; Gardner v. 521 268 MtTNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XV. ized by its charter to "assess all taxable real and personal property within the city," reference must be made to the gen- eral statute law of taxation, in order to ascertain what kind of property is subject to taxation. And the power of the munic- ipal corporation, under the provision of the charter referred to, can be exercised, not only in respect to the property which was taxable under the State laws when the charter was granted ; but, likewise, any other propertj' which may subsequently be made taxable by any general statute of the State.^ It has been held in South Carolina that, where a city is authorized by its charter to assess for taxes all taxable property, it authorizes the municipal corporation to levy taxes, not only upon the kinds of property which are actually taxed by the State, but all prop- erty which is not exempt from taxation by the State laws ; and that property may be included in municipal taxation, which may not be actually taxed by the State, as long as it is not ex- empt from taxation.^ § 268. What can be taxed. As has been intimated by the concluding statement of the preceding paragraph, the authority of the municipal corporation to levy and collect taxes is limited, not only in respect to the rate of taxation, but likewise as to the subjects of it. In other words, a municipal corporation can only levy taxes upon the property mentioned directly or iiiferen- tially in the charter.^ But it is not necessary that the corpo- rate charter should contain a direct limitation or specification of the subjects of municipal taxation ; it would be sufficient State, 21 N". J. L. 557; Am. Transp. Co. T. Buffalo, 20 N. T. 388, Denio, J. : " Where the general law is made ap- plicable (to cities) in this way any change in the general law would produce a corresponding change in the method of taxation by munici- pal corporations, the reference being to the law as it shall exist for the time being." 1 Redmond v. Tarboro, 10 S. E. R. 845; 106 N. C. 122; see also, 106 N. C. 151; Tackaberry v. Keokuk, 32 Iowa, 155; Lot v. Ross, 38 Ala. 156; Ontario Bank v. Bunnell, 10 Wend. 186; Davenport v. Miss. & Mo. R. R. 522 Co., 16 Iowa, 348. ''■ Asylum v. City of New York, 104 N. Y. 581; 12 N. E. R. 2'79; State v. Charleston Council, 10 Rich. L. 240; Charleston Council v. St. Philip's Church, 1 McMul. Eq. 139; Council V. Condy, 4 Rich. L. 254; State v. Charleston, 2 Speers L. 719. " Winnipiseogee etc. Co. v. Gilford, 10 Atl. 849; 64 N. H. 337; Rabassa v. New Orleans, 3 Martin, O. S. 218; Ogden V. St. .Joseph, 90 Mo. 522; 3 S. W. R. 25; Harper v. Elberton, 23 Ga. 566; Morris v. Lone Star Chap- ter, (Tex. 87) 5 S. W. R. 519; Barret V. Henderson, 4 Bush, 255. CH. XV.] MXTNICIPAL TAXATIOK AND ASSESSMENTS. § 269 if the municipal authority was generally described as being the power to tax all property which is taxable by the State. But where there is a general specification in the charter of the subjects of taxation, the court will determine by judicial con- struction, what kinds of property can be brought within the power of taxation. Thus, for example, where the power is sim- ply to tax real and personal property within the city limits, it is held that the right to tax capital, employed in mercantile pur- suits, is not implied in such power, distinct from the changeable property in which the capital is invested.^ So, also, has it been held that, where the charter simply authorizes the munic- ipal corporation to tax real and personal property, this grant of power does not include the power to tax the income or par- ticular occupations.^ But it has been held in South Carolina, that a municipal cor- poration, under the grant of power to assess taxable property, may tax the income.^ And it has been likewise implied, under the charter of the citj- of Richmond, that the corporation has the power to impose a license tax upon lawyers.* But there can be no doubt, however, that where the subjects of taxation have been specified in a municipal charter, the power of taxation must be limited to those specified, and cannot bj' implication be applied to subjects not specified.^ Under the general grant of power, to levy taxes upon real and personal property, it has been held that improvements made by a lessee will be taxable as real estate." And the same conclusion is reached in a case, where the lessor was the municipal corporation itself.''^ § 269. Discrimination between real and personal property, when permissible. — In accordance with the provision of the general laws of the State, and of the constitution, providing that uniformity shall be observed in the imposition of taxes ; it has been held that all kinds of property, which are not law- fullj' exempted from taxation, must be taxed alike, and on the 1 Municipality No. 3 v. Johnson, 6 La. An. 20 (1851). 2 Savannah v. Hartiidge, 8 Ga. 23 (1850). 'Lining v. Charleston Council, 1 McCoid, 345; 1 Nott & McCord, 527; * Ould V. Richmond, 23 Gratt. 464 (1873); 8. , 14 Am. Eep. 139. 5 Baldwin v. Montgomei-y Council, 53 Ala. 437; Selma v. Selma Press & W. Co., 67 Ala. 430. ^ Kussell V. New Haven, 51 Conn. 259. ' San Francisco v. McGinn, 67 Cal. HO. 523 § 270 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XV. same standiird of valuation, and by the same rate of taxation. And, therefore, a levy of a tax, to pay a certain debt of the city, exclusively upon the real property situated within such city, is such a discrimination against tlie real property, and in favor of the personal property, as to violate the constitutional require- ment of uniformity, and is therefore void.^ But this doctrine has not been uniformly followed ; on the contrary, where the corporation is simply permitted to levy taxes upon both real and personal property, it has been held that the levy of a tax, upon the real property exclusively, would not be a violation of the constitutional requirement of uniformitj', and hence would be lawful. The authority of the city to levy taxes upon both kinds of pi'operty is not imperative, but simply permissive.^ But where the tax has been levied, the power to release the lien from certain kinds of property, and to relieve the owner of such property from the liability to pay it, cannot be exer- cised by a municipal corporation or a county, unless such power is expressly conferred by the statute of the State.^ § 270. Exemption from taxes, when permitted. — The question, as to uniformity of taxes and the extent to which the constitution requires it, is also raised in connection with the more or less common practice to exempt certain classes of property from taxation. But the power of the State Legisla- ture, to exempt property from taxes for charitable and quasi- public purposes, has been everywhere conceded to involve no conflict with this constitutional provision.* But, as a matter 1 Exchange Bk. & Hiues, 3 OMo St. 1; Muscatine v. R. R. Co., 1 Dil- lon C. C. 536; State v. Severance, 55 Mo. 378; Hale v. Kenosha, 29 Wis. 599; Zanesville v. Richards, 5 Ohio St. 589; Cape Girardeau v. Hill, 118 U. S. 68; Attorney General v. Wilkes- Barre, etc. Co., 11 Wis. 42; Living- ston V. Albany, 41 Ga. 21 ; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242; Mobile v. Dargan, 45 Ala. 310. 2 Winter v. Montgomery, 65 Ala. 404; s. a, 79 lb. 481; Priuam v. Belle- ville, 59 111. 142; Oakey v. New Or- leans, 1 La. 1 ; Municipality No. 2 v. Duncan, 2 La. An. 182; Frederick v. Augusta, 5 Ga. 561. 524 3 Lowell V. Middlesex Co. Comm'rs, 3 Allen (Mass.) 550; State v. Central Pac. R. R. Co., 9 Nev. 79; State v. Central Pac. R. R. Co., 10 lb. 47; Finch V. Temaha Co. Sup., 29 Gal. 453. « State V. Woodruff, 37 N. J. L. 139; Files v. State, 48 Ark. 529; 3 S. W. R. 817; Tomlinson v. Branch, 15 Wall. 460; Highgate v. State, 7 Atl. R. 898; State v. Hannibal & St. J. R. R. Co., 75 Mo. 208; Northwestern Univ. V. People, 80 111. 333; Clark v. Leathers, (Ky.) 5 S. W. R. 576; Leicht V. Burlington, 73 Iowa, 29; 34 N. W. R. 494; Zabel v. Louisville Home, (Ky. 92) 17 S. W. R. 212; Peo- CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 270 of course, the municipal corporation cannot exercise the power to exempt property from taxation, unless the power has been conferred upon it by its charter ; or unless its exercise of the power is authorized by the general laws of the State.^ It has been held that, wherever the right of exemption exists at all, it must be found to rest upon a clear and explicit grant of power ; and the power to exempt will be denied to the munic- ipal corporation, unless the grant of the power is free from reasonable doubt. " An intent to exempt anj'^ property, or any portion of the value of anj^ property, from taxation must not be presumed, but must be found plainly expressed in the stat- utes." 2 These statutes, which authorize the exemption from taxa- tion, are construed strictly against those claiming the benefit of the exemption.^ The common cases of exemption are usu- ally granted in favor of churches and schools, and other pub- pie V. MoCreery, 34 Cal. 432; Life Assoc, of Am. v. St. Louis Co. As- sessors, 49 Mo. 512 ; State v. Butler, (Tenn.) 8 S. W. E. 586; Com. v. Mc- Kibben, 14 S. "W. K. 572; Chippewa Co. V. Auditor Gen., 32 N. "W. R. 651 ; Orange, etc. E. R. v. Alexandria, 17 Gratt. 176; State v. Newark, 26 N. J. L. 519; People v. Eddy, 43 Cal. 333. 1 Anderson v. Maylield, (Ky. 92) 19 S. W. E. 598; Whiting v. Westpoint, 14 S. E. E. 698; Cartersville W. Co. V. Cartersville, (Ga. 92) 16 S. E. E. 70; Austin V. Gas. Co., (Tex.) 7 S. W. E. 200. 2 People V. N. Y. Tax Com'rs, 95 N. T. 554; I/i re Ee venue Law, 48 N. W. R. 813; Le Due v. Hastings, (Minn.) 38 lb. 803; Lord Colchester V. Kewney, L. E. 1 Exoh. 368; Piatt V. Eice, 10 Watts (Pa.) ,352; State V. Parker, 32 N. J. L. 426; Crawford v. Bunell Tp., 53 Pa. St. 219; Newport v. E'way Co., 89 Ky. 29; Chicago etc. Co. v. Missouri, 7 S. Ct. 693; 120 U. S. 569; 122 lb. 561; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. .^14; Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206; Washington University v. Eowse, 42 Mo. 308; Pacific E. R. Co. V. Cass County, 53; South Bend v. Notre Dame Univ., 69 Ind. 344; Trask V. Maguire, 18 Wall. 206; Auditor v. Maier, 54. N. W. Rep. 640 ; Bor- dages V. Higgins, (Tex. 93) 20 S. W. R. 726; Com. v. Arnott S. R. Co., (Pa.) 22 Atl. R. 243; Lancaster v. Clayton, 5 S. W. R. 864; New Or- leans, etc. Co. V. New Orleans, 143 U. S. 192; Biscoe v. Coulter, 18 Ark. 423 ; Harvard College v. Boston, 104 Mass. 470; Swan Point Cemetery V. Tripp, 14 R. I. 199; Austin v. Austin Gasl. & C. Co., 69 Tex. 180; State V. Chamberlain, 24 Atl. E. 479; Salem M. Co. v. Salem, 29 N. E. E. 584; Meth. E. Church v. Ellis, 38 Ind. 3; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376. » New Orleans etc. Co. v. City, 143 U. S. 192; Smulley v. Burlington, 63 Vt. 443; Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black (U. S.) 436; Phillips Exeter Acad. Trs. v. Exeter, 58 N. H. 306; Bordager v. Higgins, supra; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514; Charles Eiver Br. Prop. v. War- ren Br. Prop., 11 Pet. 420. 525 §270 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION'S. [CH. XV. lie or charitable institutions. Where the question is raised in respect to such institutions, its determination depends rather upon the use of the property by such institution, than upon its ownership of the property.^ Thus, it has been held that the statute, which exempts a church lot from taxation, does not exempt a parsonage and a lot, upon which it is located.^ So, also, the exemption cannot be applied to land, upon which a church is being built, where the exemption is, by express pro- vision of the statute, applicable only to churches already built.^ The Legislature has the power of extending the list of prop- erty, which is exempt from taxation, and of making such ex- emption to apply to municipal taxation, without the consent of the municipality.* Where property is assessed by the mu- nicipal corporation when it is exempt under the State law of taxation, the owner of the property can defend all proceedings for enforcing the tax, and perhaps secure an injunction against the sale of the property for such tax.® It is an interesting question, what is the efPect of an illegal exemption of property from taxation upon the validity of the general assessment. And the answer to that question depends upon the effect of such illegal exemption upon the rate or amount of taxation, which is assessed upon the other property beyond what would be assessed upon it, if there had not been an illegal exemption. The mere omission by an assessor of certain property from his assessment list, without authority of law, will not invalidate the entire assessment,^ as long as the 1 Salem Lyceum v. Salem, 27 N. E. E. 672; St. Edwards Col. v. Marrison, 82 Tex. 1 ; Detroit T. M. Soc. v. De- troit, 3 Mich. 172; St. Mary's Col. v. Crowl, Treas., 10 Kan. 442; City v. College, (Mo. 92) 20 S. W. K. 35; Bishop's Residence v. Hudson, 91 Mo. 671; 4 S. W. R. 435; Phillips Exeter Academy v. Exeter, 58 K. H. 506; Salem M. Soc. v. Salem, 29 N. E. R. 584; Brown v. Pittsburgh, (Pa. 88) 16 Atl. E. 43. 2 Morris v. Lone Star Chapter, 5 S. W. R. 519; 68 Tex. 698; State v. Axtell, 41 N. J. L. 117; Ramsay v. Church, 45 Minn. 229; People v. Ry- an, (111. 92) 27 N. E. R. 1095; St 52t) James Ins. v. Salem, (Mass.) 26 N. E. R. 636; Association v. New York City, 104 N. T. 581. 3 St. Mark's Church v. Brunswick, 78 Ga. 541; 3 S. E. R. 561; Mullen v. Com'rs, 85 Pa. St. 288; State v. New- berry Council, 12 Rich. L. 339; Orr V. Baker, 4 Ind. 86. * Richmond v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 21 Gratt. 60. * St. Louis B. & Sav. Assoc, v. Lightner, 47 Mo. 393; Atl. & Pac. R. R. Co. V. Cleino, 2 Dillon, 175; Lee V. Thomas, 49 Mo. 112; Jeffer- son City V. Opel, lb. 190; Walden v. Dudley, lb. 419. 'People V. McCreei-y, 34 Cal. 43; CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 270 illegal exemption cannot be shown to have increased the amount of the tax, which the other taxpayers have been required to pay.^ Where there has been an exemption from municipal taxation in favor of a particular corporation, a dissolution of the corporation will not have the effect of terminating the ex- emption ; the provision for exemption will continue to be en- forced in favor of any successors of the defunct corporation.^ In determining the scope and operation of the exemption from taxation, — and in compliance with the general rule that the provision for exemption from taxation must be strictly con- strued against the owner of property to be exempted — it has been held that where in general terms a piece of property, as for example, a church, is by general law exempted from tax- ation, unless the law contained language relating to the ex- emption, which makes the provision apply to assessments for local improvements, as well as to all sorts of general taxation ; such exemption will not be applied to street assessments ; and the property so exempt from general taxation will be held lia- ble for assessments for local improvements on the streets. The ground, upon which the decisions rest this distinction, is that the assessment for local improvement is different in creation and in its general character ; and is assessed against propert}', in consideration of the special benefit which such property has received from the local improvement.** The same principle has Doyle T. Austin, 47 lb. 353, 359; Williams v. Lunenburg Sch. Dist., 21 Pick. 75 ; Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 lb. 454; Welch v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 282; Dean v. Gleason, 16 Wis. 1, 15; Hersey V. Milw. Co. Sup., lb. 185; Bond v. Kenosha, 17 Wis. 274; Hale y. Kenosha, 29 lb. 599. iBalfev. Bell, 40 Ind. 337; Win- ters V. Montgomery, 65 Ala. 403; Hassen v. Kochester, 65 N. T. 516; Dunham v. Chicago, 55 111. 357. 2 Mobile etc. Co. v. Kennerly, 74 Ala. 566. 'Kilgus V. Trustees, (Ky. 93) 22 S. W. R. 750; Clinton v. Henry Co., (Mo. 93) lb. 494; Brick Presb. Church V. New York, 5 Cow. (N. T.) 538; New York V. Cushman, 10 Johns. 96; Bloomington Assn. v. People, (HI. 90) 28 N. E. E. 1076; Pray v. Northern Liberties, 31 Pa. St. 69; Northern Liberties v. St. John's Church, 13 lb. 104; Board v. School District, (Ark. 90) 19 S. W. E. 969; Zabel V. Louisville Bap. Orph. Home, (Ky. 90) 17 lb. 212; Philadelphia v. Penn. Hospital, 22 Atl. E. 744; 143 Pa. St. 367; Boston Seamen's Fr. Soc. V. Boston, 116 Mass. 181; Beals v. Providence Eubber Co., 11 E. I. 381 ; Eailroad Co. v. Decatur, 18 N. E. E. 315; 126 111. 92; Sharp v. Speir, 4 Hill, 76; Sharp v. Johnson, 4 lb. 92; Eosevelt Hosp. v. New York, 84 N. Y. 108; Sheehan v. Good Sam. Hosp., 50 Mo. 155 ; Church v. New York, 55 N. Y. Super. 160; Second Av. M. E. 627 §271 MTJNICIPAL COEPORATrOl^S. [CH. XV. been applied to the real estate, whieli is held by the board ot public schools, a corporation distinct from the municipal cor- poration.^ The same ruling has been maintained, denying the application of the exemption to local assessments, where a rail- road charter exempts the company from " any other or further tax or imposition upon it." ^ But where the charter of a char- itable institution provides that the corporate property "shall not be subject to taxes or assessments" it is clear that the Leg- islature intends that such a corporation shall not be liable either for general taxation or for assessments for local improvements of the streets.^ It has been held in Vermont that, where a charter provides that the property' of a college shall be exempt from " public tax," this would not exempt the land from local municipal taxes, wliich were to be expended for the benefit of the college.* § 271. Public property not taxable. — The general statutes of the State, referring to the subjects of taxation, unquestion- ably refer to private property only, and cannot reasonablj'' be presumed to include property, which is owned by the State or by a municipal corporation. Hence, it is impossible for the property owned by the State or by the municipal corporatioa to be taxed without express authoiity from the Legislature by any other municipal corporation. Thus, for example, the city of Brooklj-n has been held not to have the power to impose a tax upon land located within the city, and owned and used as a landing for a ferry company, who is a lessee of the city of Church, In re, 66 N. T. .395; Mar- shall V. Vicksburg, 15 Wall. 146; State V. Newark, 36 K J. L. 478; In- dianapolis, P. & C. K. E. Co. V. Ross, 47Ind. 25; Church v. City of New York, 55 N. Y. Super. 160; Paine v. Spratley, 5 Kan. 525 ; Bridgeport v. N. Y. & N. H. E. R. Co., 36 Conn. 255; Ludlow V. Cine. So. Ry. Trs., 78 Ky. 357;PaterRon V. Soc. forE. U. Manuf., 24 N. J. L. 385. See also Henderson V. McCullagh, 12 S. W. E. 932 (Ky. 90) ; Montgomery v. Wyman, 22 N. E. E. 845; 130 111. 17; SUte v. Bell, 43 Minn. 344. 1 Public Schools v. St. Louis, 26 528 Mo. 468; Hartford v. West Middle Sch. Dist., 145 Conn. 462. 2 Baltimore v. Green Mt. Cem. Prop., 7 Md. 517. 8 See State v. Newark, 36 N. J. L. 478; 13 Am. Rep. 464, reversing 36 N. J. L. 157, and distinguishing the case from State v. Newark, 27 N. J. L. 185, in which the exception was declared to be "from all taxes, charges and impositions." And see First Presb. Church v. Wayne, 36 Ind. 338; Gould v. Baltimore, 59 Md. 378. * Morgan v. Cree, 46 Vt. 773; 14 Am. Rep. 040. CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 271 New York. The exemption from taxation of such propert3^ as the property of the city of New York, is held to apply for the benefit of the lessee.^ The same ruling has been made in Texas, in respect to a public wharf owned by a municipal corporation ; the public wharf being held to be non-taxable under the general laws of the State.^ The same rule has been maintained in re- spect to property of the city which is used as a cemetery.^ Nor is it possible for lands, which are used by the county for a court 'house and other county purposes, to be taxed by a mu- nicipal corporation. Nor does it seem to be possible to subject such land to a liability for a local assessment ; * unless, of course, an express authority is obtained from the Legislature. The general rule, therefore, is that property, which is owned by any instrument of government, cannot become the subject of taxation, unless it is so provided by positive legislation. ^ In Kentucky, a distinction has been made in respect to municipal property, as a subject of taxation by the State authorities, be- tween property which the municipal corporntioii liolds in its 1 People V. Brooklyn Assessors, 111 N. Y. 505. 2 Galveston "Wharf Co. v. Galves- ton, 63 Tex. 14; Blaok v. Sherwood, 6 S. E. K. 484. 8 As to exemption of public prop- erty see Clark v. Louisville W. Co., (Ky. 91) 14 S. "W. K. 502; Lockwood v. St. Louis, 24 Mo. 20; Garrett v. St. Louis, 25 lb. 505; "Willard v. Pike, 59 Va. 202; 9 Atl. 907; Black- man V. Houston, (La.) 2 So. 193; County of Erie v. Erie, 113 Pa. St. 360; Nashville v. Smith, 86 Tenn. 213; Rochester v. Kush, 80 N. T. 302; Egyptian Lev. Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo. 495; Sheehau v. Good Sam. Hosp., 50 lb. 155; s. c, 11 Am. Rep. 412; Omaha Col. v. Rush, 22 Neb. 449; 35 N. W. R. 222; Green v. Hotaling, 44 N. J. L. 347; People v. Doe, 36 Cal. 220; Farnham v. Sherry, 74 Wis. 568; Witt V. Armstrong, (Ark.) 6 S. W. R. 225; Doyle v. Austin, 47 Cal. 353; Tyler v. People, 66 111. 322; Piper v. Singer, 4 Serg. & R. 354; Nashville V. Smith, (Tenn.) 6 S. W. R. 273; u Hall V. Marysville, 19 Cal. 391; Low V. Lewis, 46 lb. 549 ; People v. Shearer, 30 lb. 645 ; Callanan v. Wayne Co., 73 Iowa, 109; 36 N. W. R. 654; Meridan v. Phillips, (Miss.) 4 So. R. 119; Emery V. Gas Co., 28 Cal. 345; Taylor v. Palmer, 31 lb. 240; Brightman v. Kirner, 22 Wis. 54; Seamen's Fr. Soc. v. Boston, 116 Mass. 181 (1874); s. c, 17 Am. Rep. 153. * Worcester Co. v. Worcester, 116 Mass. 193 (1874); s. c, 17 Am. Rep. 159; but see supra, § 270, on subject of assessment and exemptions. 5 Board v. School District, (Ark. 90) 19 S. W. R. 969; Bloomington Ass'n V. People, (111. 90) 28 N. E. R. 1076; Hall V. Marysville, 19 Cal. 391; Low V. Lewis, 46 lb. 549; Daugherty V. Thompson,- (Tex.) 9 S. W. R. 99; State V. Gaffney, 32 N. J. L. 133; Nashville v. Smith, 86 Tenn. 213; Von Steen v. Beatrice, (Neb. 93) 54 N. W. R. 677 ; State v. Recorder, (La. 93) 12 So. R. 880; Clinton v. Henry Co., (Mo. 93) 22 S. W. E. 494. 529 § 272 MUNICIPAL COKrOKATIOXS. [CH. XV. governmentiil character for public use, such as public buildings and prisons and hospitals, which cannot be taxed by the State, or any other municipal government; and property which is owned and held by a municipal corporation for private pur- poses, and, therefore in its quasi-T^rivate character, which can be subjected to taxation, such as vacant lots, fire engines and the like.^ It has, however, .been held elsewhere, that while it is possible for the Legislature by express provision to subject all municipal property to taxation, it is not presumed that the Legislature intended to do so in respect to any municipal prop- ertj', in the absence of an express declaration to that effect.* It has also been held that the general government cannot tax bonds belonging to a municipal corporation.^ And, on the other hand, it has been held that a municipal corporation can- not in the absence of an express authority levy a tax upon State securities.* § 272. What property is within municipality for pur- poses of taxation. — One of the general limitations upon the taxing power of a municipal corporation is, that such taxation can only be levied upon property within the municipality. And, sometimes, it is hard to determine, whether property is to be considered within a municipality for the purpose of tax- ation. The general rule, however, is very plain, that the mu- nicipal power of taxation cannot be extended by the corporation by implication, to property not within its territorial limits. Hence, for this reason, it has been held that a municipal cor- poration cannot tax the coal beds under a river, upon whose bank the city is situated, where the boundary line of such city is the low water mark of the river.® The same question has been raised in respect to the power of a city to tax bridges lo- cated over navigable streams, where only a part of the bridge is located within the city limits. In the Kentucky case, it has been held that the city of Louisville could not tux a 1 ridge in ' Louisville y. Commonwealth, 1 Duvall (Ky.) 295 <(1864); see also to same effect, Miteliellville v. Polk Co. Sup., 54 Iowa, 554; Eiie County v. E. Water Com'rs, 113 Pa. St. 368; Sewickley Bor. v. SUoles, 118 Pa. St. 165. 2 People v. McCreery, 34 Cal. 432; 630 Doyle V. Austin, 47 Cal. 353 (1874) ; Nashville v. Bank of Tenu., 1 Swan (Tenn.) 269. 3 United States v. Bait. & O. E. r! Co., 17 Wall. 322 (1872). 'Augusta Council v. Dunbar, 50 Ga. 387 (1873). 6 Gilchrist's Appeal, 109 Pa. St. 600. CH. XV.J MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 272 respect to the part of its propertj- not located within the city limits ; because, for the purpose of taxation, such property can- not be said to be within the city limits ; and the further special reason is assigned by the court that the bridge derived no bene- fit from the municipal taxation.^ It has, however, been held elsewhere that bridges may be taxed under such circumstances by the municipal corporation.^ Except in the case of bridges, there cannot be much difficulty at any time in determining the situs of real estate for the pur- pose of taxation. It is rather a matter of geographical location alone that is involved in this inquiry." But where the question of situation for taxation is raised iu respect to personal property, considerable difficulty is experienced at times in determining the right of taxation of such property. It seems, however, to be the general rule of law that, where the property is tangible or corporeal, and it is actually situated or held within the cor- porate limits, that property may be subjected to municipal tax- ation, although the owner of it does not reside within the city limits.* But the question becomes still more perplexing, where 1 Louisville Br. Co. v. Louisville, 30 Ky. 189. 2 St. Louis Br. Co. v. East St. Louis, 121 111. 238; State ea; rel. C. Br. Co. v. Columbia, 27 S. C. 137. 8 Hittinger V. Boston, 139 Mass. 17; Augusta V. Dunbar, 50 Ga. 387; Fin- ley v. Philadelphia, 32 Pa. St. 381; People V. Niles, 35 Cal. 282; Bel v. Pierce, 51 N. Y. 12; Mills v. Thorn- ton, 26 111. 300; Sangamon & M. E. E. Co. V. Morgan County, 14 lb. 163; People V. N. Y. Tax Comm'rs, 64 N. Y. 541; Denver, etc. Co. v. Church, 28 Pac. E. 468. *Dunleith v. Eeynolds, 53 111. 45; People V. Ogdensburgh, 48 N. Y. 390; Eieman v. Sliephard, 27 Ind. 288; Bates v. Mobile, 46 Aid. 158; Pierce v. Eddy, 152 Mass. 594 (taxa- tion on farm located in two towns) ; Hoyt V. N. Y. Tax Comm'rs, 23 N. y. 223; New Albany v. Meekin, 3 Ind. 481; St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 40 Mo. 580; Poraeroy Salt Co. v. Davis, Treas., 21 Ohio St. 555; Evans- ville V. Hall, 14 Ind. 27; Madison v. Whitney, 31 Ind. 261; Powell v. Mad- ison, 21 Ind. 335. " We do not think that, for the pui-poses of taxation, a court is authorized to apply the rule of law governing the personal estate of deceased persons, which regards its situs as following the domicil of the owner. Surely, no one would risk asserting the general proposi- tion tliat, under the charter of New Albany, all the personal property owned by every resident of the city no matter where situated, was liable to be taxed by said city; that if a citizen of New Albany was a partner in a steamboat plying on some river in California, or in a flock of sheep kept in Kentucky, or in some part of Floyd county in this State, out of the corporation of New Albany, he was liable to be taxed for it under its charter. We do not deny that the State might have authorized it to 631 §272 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XV. the owner of property resides in one town and does business in another. 1 It is, however, not possible for a municipal corpora- tion, under a power to tax all property within its corporate limits, to impose a tax upon its own bonds.^ The question is equally difficult when the attempt is made to determine for the purpose of taxation the situs of vessels. The general rule is, that the legal situs of vessels, for purposes of taxation, is in the port, where such vessels are registered as their home port, it matters not where the owner lives; and this situs, which is dependent upon registration under the laws of the United States, continues until the vessel has acquired a new situs. Its more or less prolonged absence, in the course of its navigation, does not affect the continuance of the situs so acquired.^ It has been held that ferry boats are taxable, where- ever their owner resides.* Whether a municipal corporation can tax the ferry boat of a foreign private corporation is a doubtful question. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the city had such a power,^ while the Supreme Court of the United States held, on the appeal of the same case, that the city had no such power ; for the reason that the chief relation of such ferry boat to the city was " merely that of contract there as one of the termini of their transit across the river in the pros- ecution of their business." " Where the property of nonresident owners is subject to tax- ation ; in order that such taxation may not be invalid, there tax such property, but we think that she has not." Perkins, J., in New Albany v. Meekin, 3 Ind. 481. 1 Gardiner Cotton & W. F. Co. v. Gardiner, 5 Me. 133. ■^ Macon v. Jones, 67 Ga. 489. This is certainly the case where tlie holder of the bonds does not reside within tlie limits of the city. Murray v. Charleston Council, 96 U. S. 43; see Bank v. Wilkes-Barre, (Pa. 92) 24 Atl. 11. 3 Newport v. Berry, (Ky. 92) 19 S. "W. E. 238; Howell v. State, 3 Gil. (Md.) 14; New Albany v. Meekin, 3 Ind. 481; Hays v. Pac. M. St. Co., 17 How. 596; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365; Mor- 632 gau V. Parham, 16 Wall. 471 ; Mobile v. Baldwin, 57 Ala. 61; People v. N. T. Tax Com'rs, 58 N. T. 242; Perry V. Torrence, 8 Ohio, 521; Irwin v. N. 0., St. L. & C. E. E. Co., 94111. 105; Wheeling etc. Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. S. 273, afE'g 9 W. Va. 170; Hoyt v. Com'rs, 23 N. T. 224; Johnson v. Drummond, 20 Gratt. 419; St. Joseph V. Hannibal etc. Co., 39 Mo. 476; Oak- land V. Wlaipple, 39 Cal. 112 ; contra, Battle V. Mobile, 9 Ala. 234. * Mobile V. Baldwin, 57 Ala. 61. ^ St. Louis V. Wiggins Ferry Co., 40 Mo. 580. ^ St. Louis V. Wiggins Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423. CH. XV.J MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 273 must be no discrimination against nonresidents, either as to the right of taxation or assessment of the property, or as the mode of lev5'ing such a tax. The constitutional provision pro- hibits any discrimination on any grounds in favor of residents and citizens of the State against the citizens of other States.^ It has been held that, where statutes provide for the registration and taxation of vehicles, which are used in the public streets of a city, the statute cannot be applied by implication to non- residents ; and unless such a statute expressly provides that it shall apply to nonresidents, the tax cannot be levied upon them.* So, also, an ordinance was held to be void, under this constitu- tional provision, which permitted persons, doing business with- in certain limits, to sell goods under a license tax, either from wagons or in their shops, and denied the same right to persons not residing within its limits.^ But this protection of nonresi- dents, against discrimination in favor of the residents, does not apply to foreign corporations. A foreign corporation can only do business within a State or municipality, by complying with whatever conditions and terms such State or municipality may require, even though similar conditions and terms are not re- quired of domestic corporations and their residents.* § 273. Taxation of railways, bauli:s and other corpora- tlons. — Where a corporation exists, and has property within a certain State or Territory, the right of taxing such property will depend upon the situs of such property, and upon the character of the property. Thus, in the case of railroads, rail- road tracks and other tangible property, held by such a rail- road, will be taxable in the State or county or town, where such property is located.^ And such property is likewise sub- ject to special taxes and local assessments.® The rolling stock etc. Co. V. Wriglit, (Ga. 92) 15 S. E. R. 293. 5 Wilmington etc. Co. v. Alsbrook, HON. C. 137; Wheeler v. Roches- ter & S. R. R. Co., 12 Barb. 227; Railroad Co. v. Morgan County, 14 111. 1; People v. Reed, 19 N. Y. S. 528; Prov. & Wor. R. R. Co. v. Wright, 2 R. I. 459. « No. Ind. R. R. Co. v. Connelly, 10 Ohio St. 159; Burl. & Mo. R. R. Co. V. Spearman, 12 Iowa, 112. 533 1 Hill V. Warrell, 49 N. W. R. 479; 87 Mich. 135; State v. Charleston, 2 Spears' L. (S. C.) 719. 2 Joyce V. Woods, 78 Ky. 386; Ben- nett V. Birmingham Bor., 31 Pa.'St. 15; see ante, § 261. » St. Louis V. Spiegel, 90 Mo. 587. «J)i re Prime, 18 N. T. S. 603; American Union Express Co. v. St. Joseph, 66 Mo. 675, and ante, 261; Republican V. etc. Co. v. Chase Co., (Keb. 92)51 N. W. R. 132; Columbus § 273 MtTNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XV. of a corporation is, however, taxable in a State, town or county where the corporation has its principal office.^ Banks and bank stock are taxable by the municipality, in which the banks are located.^ The same rule applies in respect to insurance companies^ and other domestic corporations.* Where the general law of the State provides that the capital stock of a bank shall be taxable only for State purposes, the city cannot exercise the power of taxation over such bank or its capital stock.'' So, also, it was held in Louisiana, that where a bank was exempt from taxation by the State, a city corporation is likewise prohibited from imposing taxes upon such bank.*" ^ People V. Coleman, 133 N. T. 279; Minnesota v. St. Paul, 2 Wall. 609; Stevens v. BufEalo & N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 31 Barb. 590; Delaware County V. E. R. Co., 10 Pa. Co. Ct. 326; Hill V. La Crosse R. R. Co., 11 Wis. 214; Coe V. Railroad Co., 10 Ohio St. 372; Pao. R. R. Co. V. Cass County, 53 Mo. 17; Meyer V. Johnson, 53 Ala. 241; Georgia etc. Co. v. State, 15 S. E. R. 293; App. Tax Ct. of Baltimore v. No. Cent. Ry., 50 Md. 417; Phila., W. B. & B. R. R. Co. V. App. Tax Ct. of Bait., 50 lb. 397; Columbus S. R. Co. V. Wright, (Ga. 92) 15 S. E. R. 293; Hoyle v. P. & M. R. R., 54 N. T. 314; Randall v. Elwell, 52 lb. 522 ; Beardsley v. Ontario Bank, 31 Barb. 619; Howe v. Freeman, 14 Gray, 566; People v. Wemple, 129 N. T. 558; Denver & R. G. Ry. Co. v. Church, (Col. 92) 28 Pac. R. 468; Du- buque V. HI. Cent. R. R. Co., 39 Iowa, 56; Williamson v. N. J. So. R. R. Co., 29 N. J. Eq. 311. 2 Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. (U. S.) 133; Connersville v. Bank of Ind., 16 Ind. 105; Wilkes- Barre D. & S. Bank v. Wilkes-Barre, (Pa. 92) 24 Atl. R. Ill; Cherokee Ins. & E. Co. V. Whitfield Jus., 28 Ga. 121; Savannah v. Hartridge, 8 lb. 213; Bank of Ga. v. Savannah, Dudley, 130; State v. Charleston Council, 5 Rich. L. 561; Bank of Chester v. Chester T. Council, 10 53J: Rich. L. 104; People v. Coleman, 63 Hun, 633; 133 N. Y. 279; NashviUe v. Thomas, 5 Coldw. (Teun.) 600; Bank of Ind. v. 'Madison, 3 Ind. 43; Evansville v. Hall, 14 lb. 27; King V. Madison, 17 lb. 48; Madison v. Whitney, 21 lb. 261 ; Macon v. Sav- ings Bank, 60 Ga. 133; Gordon v. Baltimore, 5 Gill (Md.) 231; O'Don- nell V. Bailey, 24 Miss. 386; City Bank of Dallas v. Vogel, 51 Tex. 354.' 5 Tripp Treas. v. Merchants Mut. F. Ins. Co., 12 R. I. 435; Porter v. Rockford, R. I. & St. L. R. R. Co., 76 111. 561; Dubuque v. N. W. L. Ins. Co., 29 Iowa, 9; St. Louis i. Indep. Ins. Co. of Mass., 47 Mo. 146, 168; Republic L. Ins. Co. v. Pollak, 75 111. 292; Smalley v. Burlington, 63 Vt 443. * State V. Heppenheimer, (N. J. 92) 24 Atl. 446; Lockwood v. Weston, (Conn. 92) 23 lb. 9; Danville Lumber & M. Co. V. Parks, 88 HI. 463. ^Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679; State V. Union & Planters Bank, (Tenn. 92) 19 S. W. R. 758; Schuyl- kill Co. V. Citizens Gas Co., (Pa. 92) 23 Atl. 1055. ^Municipality No. 1 v. La. State Bank, 5 La. An. 394; New Orleans V. Com. Bank of N. O., 10 lb. 735; New Orleans v. Southern Bank, 11 lb. 41 ; New Orleans v. Mecli. & T. Bank, 15 lb. 107. CH. XV.] MTTNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 274 Domestic corporations, located within a municipality, will be taxable by such municipal corporation, even though the charter authorizes such corporation " to raise money by a tax to be as- sessed upon the freeholders and inhabitants according to law." It was held that a banking corporation, located within such a town, was an inhabitant of such town for purposes of taxation.^ § 274. Taxation of incorporeal hereditaments. — The question has also been raised as to whether a municipal corpo- ration can tax incorporeal hereditaments, held and enjoyed within its territorial limits. The question has been raised, particularly, in respect to the right to tax the old bed of a street railway company,^ and the property of gas and water companies.* Whether the lessee of a city waterworks for a term of years may be taxed by the municipal corporation, has been decided in the affirmative,* as well as in the negative.^ The elevated railways, in the streets of the city of New York, are held to be taxable as lands, or as real estate.® The power to tax street railways is not taken away from a municipal corporation, where there has been an exclusive grant to such railway company of the use of streets in the city for railway purposes. And such railway company may, notwith- standing, be required to pay a license tax.'^ Where a city grants to a railway company the right to lay and maintain its track over a bridge belonging to the city, without reserving its right to levy toll or tax upon such railway company, it has been held that itcannot impose a tax by any subsequent ordinance.* It has been held that city railways may be subjected to an ad also Covington, etc. Co. v. Covington, (Ky. 92) 17 8. W. K. 808; Jackson- ville V. Ledwitb, 7 So. K. 885, hold- 1 Bank v. Burnell, 10 "Wend. 186. ^ So. Nash. etc. Co. v. Morrow, 3 Pickle, 106; 11 S. W. 348; Middle- sex R. E. Co. V. Charlestovi^n, 8 Allen (Mass.) 330; People v. Cassidy, 2 Lansing, 294; People v. Conors, 4 N. Y. S. 41; St. Louis v. St. Louis Railroad Co., 50 Mo. 94; No. Beach & M. R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 32 Cal. 499; Prov. & Wor. R. R. Co. v. Wright, 2 R. L 459; L. City Ry. v. Louisville, 4 Bush, 478. "Commonwealth v. Lowell Gasl. Co., 12 Allen (Mass.) 75; Providence Gas Co. V. Thurber, 2 R. I. 15. ostein V. Mobile, 24 Ala. 591; see ing franchise cannot be taxed. 6 Stein V. Mobile, 49 Ala. 362; s. c, 20 Am. Rep. 283; but see Dillon's Mun. Corp., sec. 793, note. « People V. N. Y. Tax Comm'rs, 82 N. Y. 462. ' State V. Herod, 29 Iowa, 123; Co- lumbus V. Street R. R. Co., 45 Ohio St. 98; Los Angeles v. Pac. R. R. Co., 67 Cal. 433. ^Des Moines v. The Chicago, R. I & P. R. E. Co., 41 Iowa, 569. .535 § 276 MUNICIPAL COBPOBATIONS. [CH. XV. valorem tax on their property, notwithstanding the fact that the city requires a license tax on each car employed by the city i-ailway company.^ § 275. Choses in action, when taxable. — Whether a mu- nicipal corpoiation may impose taxes upon instruments of in- debtedness, and other choses in action, without express authority to do so, has been differently decided. So it has been held that notes and mortgages belonging to a resident will be taxa- ble by the municipality although they may be deposited outside the city.^ It has, however, on the other hand, been held that the power vested in a municipal corporation to tax real and personal property, is confined to tangible or visible property, actually situated within the limits of the city, and does not ex- tend to debts and choses in action.^ § 276. Taxation of agricnltnral land. — Elsewhere * it has been explained how a municipal corporation may, in the ab- sence of express constitutional restrictions, extend the corporate limits, and include within such limits lands which are used for agricultural purposes, with or without the Consent of the resi- dents of the territory so annexed. The right to include ag- ricultural lands within the corporate limits has never been contested by the owners of such property except for the reason that such inclusion of their lands within the city limits would have the effect of increasing the rate of taxation, beyond what was imposed upon it as agricultural lands. In Kentucky and Iowa, and other States, it is held that the courts will discriminate, in the imposition of municipal taxes upon agricultural lands located within the city limits, between the lands which are held strictly for agricultural purposes, and the properties which, although not presently occupied as resi- dences, have been platted as citj'- lots, and are held for an in- iL. City Ry. Co. v. Louisville, 4 Bush, 478; Union Pass. Ey. Co. v. Pluladelpliia, 101 U. S. 528; Kew York V. Broadway & S. A. R. R. Co., 17 Hun, 242. 2 Johnson v. Oregon City, 2 Oreg. 327; Trimble v. Sterling, (Ky. 91) 12 S. W. R. 1066; Trustees v. McCon- nell, 2 111. 138; Macon v. Jones, G7 Ga. 489; Redwood v. Tarboro, 10 S. 636 E. R.*845; 106 N. C. 122; Wood v. Edenton, 10 S. E. R. 854; 106 N. C. 151. ' Johnston v. Lexington, 14 B. Mon. 648; Louisville v. Henning, 1 Bush, 381; but see Augusta v. Dun- bar, 50 Ga. 387, 392; Bridges v. Grif- fin, 33 lb. 113. * Ante, § 56. CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 276 crease in their Viilue, due to the growth and development of the city. The courts maintain that where property is held strictly for agricultural purposes, even in the absence of an express constitutional provision, the municipal corporation can- not apply the same rate of taxation to such land, but must appor- tion the tax, by a consideration of the degree of benefit which is received by the owners of the agricultural lands from the city improvements. But where property is platted, or held for other than agricultural purposes, then there is no reason why such lands should be exempt from the ordinary municipal rate of taxation which is assessed upon the property which is actually used and occupied for purposes of residence or business.^ " To enable us correctly to apply the rule above stated, we must consider and determine the character of the benefits, which will render lands, located within the city limits, liable to gen- eral municipal taxation. These are not such as attach to all lands near a city or large town, whereby they are rendered more^ valuable, but are such as accrue to the lands considered as city property. Lands, lying contiguous to or near a city, though incapable of any use except for agricultural purposes, are never- theless of greater value on account of their location, than those more remotely situated. Convenience to a market, etc., adds to their value. Therefore, lands within a city kept and used only for agriculture, and not capable of being used as city proper- tj'', or not needed for that purpose, nor possessing a value based upon their adaptation for the purpose of dwellings or business, caunot be considered to be directly benefited by the fact of their being within the city limits. It is held that such lands cannot be taxed for general municipal purposes. The controlling fact iMaltus V. Shields, 2 Met. (Ky.) 553; Henderson v. Lambert, S Bush, 607; Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Mon. 330; Southgate v. Covington, 15 B. Man. 491; Sharp v. Dunavan, 17 lb. 223; Louisville Bridge Co. v. Louis- ville, 81 Ky. 189; Langworthy v. Dubuque, 13 Iowa, 86; s. c. 16 lb. 271; Fulton v. Davenport, 17 lb. 404;Buell v. Ball, 20 lb. 282; Davis V. Dubuque, 20 lb. 458; Deeds v. Sanborn, 26 lb. 419; Durant v. Kauff- man, 34 lb. 194; Brooks v. Polk Co., 52 lb. 460; Winzer v. Burlington, 68 lb. 279; Evans v. Council Bluffs, 05 lb. 238. In Courtney v. Louisville, 12 Bush, 419, the court said: "Some- thing more than benefits is necessary to v^arrant that character of taxa- tion. There must be both benefits actual or presumed, and a town or city population " so near as to neces- sitate the extension of municipal government over the farm land. 637 § 276 MtmiCIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XV. to be considered in such cases is the purpose for which they are held. If held as city property, to be brought upon the market as such whenever they reach a value corresponding with the views of the owner, they ought to be taxed as city property. There would be neither reason nor justice in permitting a pro- prietor of a large tract of land, within a city, to hold it for an opportunit}' to bring it into the market as city lots, and for no other purpose ; and, under the pretence that it is agricultural lands, to escape taxation for the general improvement of the city, the very thing which will bring his lands into market, and thus add greatly to their value." ^ In adopting the rule laid down by the Kentucky court, the Iowa court provides that, in order to exempt unplatted lands from municipal taxation, it must appear that such land is employed exclusively for agricul- tural purposes.^ But tlie position, which is taken by these courts, is not in- dorsed generally by the courts of other States. The contrary proposition is elsewhere held that, in the absence of express provisions to the contrary, either in the State Constitution or State laws, a municipal corporation may impose the same rate of taxation upon agricultural lands, located within its limits, as is provided for other lands and other property.^ And it seems to be verj-^ generally held that rural propertj', situated within city limits, may be subjected to assessments for street improve- ments.* iBeck, C. J., in Durant v. Kau£E- man, 34 Iowa, 194. ^Subbesing v. Burlington, 68 Iowa, 691. See also, Washburn v. Oshkosh, 60 "Wis. 453 ; Baldwin v. Hastings, S3 Mich. 639; State v. Brown, 53 N. J. L. 162; Eifert v. Central Covington, (Ky. 90) 15 S. W. Eep. 180. 3 Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss. 53; s. c, 24 Am. Rep. 661; Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. St 170; Santa Rosa v. Coulter, 58 Cal. .537; Dixon v. Mayes, 72 lb. 166; St. Louis v. Allen, 13 Mo. 400; Beuoist V. St. Louis, 15 lb. 668; Gi- boney v. Cape Girardeau, 58 lb. 141; Lancaster v. Rush, (93) 52 N. W. R. 837; Kaiser v. Weise, 85 Pa. St. 366; Cook V. Crandall, (Utah, 91) 26 Pac. 538 R. 927; Hurla v. Kansas City, 46 Kan. 738; Turner v. Altbaus, 6 Neb. 54, overi-uling Bradshaw v. Omaha, 1 lb. 16; Kountze v. Omaha, 5 Dil- lon C. C. 443: Ellison v. Lindford, (Utah, 91) 25 Pac. E. 744. * Kelly V. Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. St. 170; s. c, 104 U. S. 78; New Orleans V. Michoud, 10 La. An. 763; Serrill V. Philadelphia, 38 Pa. St. 355; Gil- lette V. Hartford, 31 Conn. 351; Kal- brier V. Leonard, 34 Ind. 497; Leeper V. South Bend, 106 lb. 375; Taber V. Graf miller, 109 lb. 206; Gary v. Pekin, 88 111. 154; Gillette v. Hart- ford, 31 Conn. 351; Carriger v. Mor- ristown, 1 Lea (Tenn.) 116. CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 277 § 277. local assessments for sewers. — From whatever source the authority to construct sewers may be derived, whetlier from the corporate authority to make by-laws, or as part of the corporate control over sanitary affairs, it is well settled that as- sessments to meet the expenses thus incurred may be levied upon owners of the land which is likely to be benefited.^ It has been held that a sewer assessment is apportionable upon the face value of the lots^ of those who can use the sewer ; and that the bentjfit derived from its construction is a necessary element in the imposition of the tax.^ And in Couiiecticut and New Jersey, rules apportioning assessments according to frontage have been disapproved.* But when the lots are small, of an equal depth and similarly situated so as to approximate equality in value and in benefit from the construction of the sewer, the assessment according to frontage is, with respect to sewers and drains, as fair and just as any that cnu be devised.® If there be no special constitutional limitation, the cost of municipal sewers maybe paid for out of the funds aiising from general taxation, or by assessment upon the property benefited, according to the discretion of the city council.^ This latter method is the one generally in use ; and upon the principle applicable in all classes of assessments for local improvements the special benefit, actual and probable, which each particular piece of property receives, is the only foundation upon which a lawful assessment can be made.'^ 1 Murphy v. Wilmington, 6 Houst. (Del.) 108; Boston v. Sliaw, 1 Met. 130; Downer v. Boston, 7 Gush. 2*77; Wright V. Boston, 9 lb. 233; Patton V. Springfield, 99 Mass. 627; see ante, § 259 a. 2'Snow V. Fitohburg, 136 Mass. 183; Gilmore v. Hentig, 32 Kan. 156; Ma- son V. Spencer, 35 lb. 512. ' See Gilmore v. Hentig, 32 Kans. 156. *Clapp V. Hartford, 35 Conn. 66; State V. Hudson, 29 N. J. L. 104. 'Dil. Mun. Corp. 809; Hoyt v. E. Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39; Warren v. Grand Haven, 30 lb. 24; Seeley v. Pittsburgh, 82 Pa. St. 360; St. Joseph T.Owen, (Mo. 92) 19 S. W. E. 713; In re Washington Ave., 69 Pa. St. 301; Lipps V. Philadelphia, 38 lb 503. "St. Joseph V. Owen, (Mo. 92) 19 S. W. E. 713; Stroud V. Philada., 61 Pa. St. 255; Williamsport v. Com., 84 lb. 487. ' Gray v. Board of Aldermen, 139 Mass. 328; Tide Water Co. v. Coster, 18 N. J. Eq. 519: State v. New- ark, 37 N. J. L. 415 ; Wright v. Bos- ton, 9 Cush. 233 ; In re Wasliington Ave., 69 Pa. St. 360; Seely v. Pittsb., 82 lb. 360; Topeka v. Huntoon, (Kan. 90) 26 Pac. R. 488; In re Lawden, 89 N. T. 548; Paterson v. Society, etc., 24 N. J. L. 385; Collins v. Holyoke, 146 Mass. 298; Dorey v. Boston, 146 .539 § 278 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. XV. § 278. Notice to and assent of abutters to assessments.— When the exercise of the power to pave or otherwise improve a street depends upon the assent of a certain proportion of the owners of abutting lands, who are to be assessed for the ex- pense, the whole proceeding of levying the assessment is void without that assent; and non-assent will be a good defence in an action to collect the assessment.^ When the validity of an assessment for grading, improving or openings treets is in is- sue, the burden of proof is upon the corporation to show that everything has been done to render the assessment legal, and the most necessary fact is the requisite application or consent, to be shown in some way, of a propei- number of interested prop- erty holdei-s.^ It has been held that it is within the power of the Legisla- ture to confer upon a municipal corporation the authority to improve its public ways at the costs of the adjoining property owners without a petition on their part; ^ but when a petition is I'equired by statute, it is indispensable to the valitity of the .lb. 336; Thomas v. Gain, 35 Mich. 155. As to what use of a sewer will authorize an assessment, see Brown V. Fitchburg, 128 Mass. 282; Fair- banks V. Fitchburg, 132 lb. 42 ; New- ell V. Cincin., 45 Ohio St. 407; King V. Reed, 43 N. J. L. 186. iVoght V. Buffalo, (31 N. E. R.) 133 N. Y. 403; Sharp v. Johnson, 4 HiU (N. Y.) 92; In re Sharp, 56 N. Y. 257; Daniel v. New Orleans, 29 La. An. 1; McGuinn v. Peri, 16 lb. 326; Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 Mo. 123; In re Royal St., 16 La. An. 393; James V. Pine Bluff, 49 Ark. 199; Richman V. Muscatine Sup'rs, 70 Iowa, 627; Evans v. People, (111. 92) 28 jST. E. R. 1111 ; Li nek v. Litchfield, 31 lb. 123; Ilenryv. Thomas, 119 Mass. 583; Mulligan v. Smith, 59 Cal. 200; Tur- ,rill V. Grattan, 52 lb. 97; Moberry v. Jeffersonville, 38 Ind. 198; Shaffer v. Weech, 34 Kan. 595; Welsford v. Weidlein, 23 lb. 001; Henderson v. Baltimore, 8 Md. 352; Covington v. Casey, 3 Bush, 698; State v. Nelson, 57 Wis. 147; Wilson v. Trenton City, 5-10 53 N. J. L. 645 ; Lexington v. Head- ley, 5 Bush, 508; Burnett v. Sacra- mento, 12 Cal. 76; Boyle v. Bk'lyn, 71 N. Y. 1; People v. Bk'lyn, 71 lb. 495; Miller v. Mobile, 47 Ala. 163; State V. Newark, 37 N. J. L. 415; State V. Elizabeth, 30 lb. 176; For- syth V. Kreuter, 100 Ind. 27; Ely v. Morgan Co. etc., 112 lb. 361; In re Lexington Ave., 63 Hun, 629; Jef. Co. V. Cowan, 54 Mo. 234; St. Louis V. Clemens, 36 lb. 467; Zimmerman V. Snowden, 88 lb. 218; State v. Hand, 31 N. J. L. 547; State v. Or- ange, 32 lb. 49; Wells v. Burnham, 20 Wis. 112; Baltimore v. Eschbach, 18 Md. 276; Holland v. Baltimore, 11 lb. 186; Bereldin v. Baltimore, 15 lb. 18. 2 Howell V. Tacoma, 3 Wash. St. 711; 29 Pac. 447; Pittsburgh v. Walter, 69 Pa. St. 365; Zeigler v. Hopkins, 117 U. S. 683. 8 Elliott Roads & Streets, p. 249 et seq. ; Dennison v. Kansas City, 95 Mo. 416; Farrar v. St. Louis, 80 lb. 379. CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. 278 assessment.! jn raising the question as to the vtilidity of an assessment for a local improvement, made upon a petition of an alleged majority of the lot owners, a signer of such petition is not estopped from denying that the required number have signed it, if he has made no representation that it was signed by the proper number.^ When the petition lacked one of the nec- essary number of petitioners because the signer proved not to be a proprietor, the proceedings were held to be void ; and the plaintiff, a nonassenting lot owner, was granted an injunction to prevent the sale of his property for nonpayment of the as- ■sessment.^ Before the corporation acts upon a petition of the abutting owners, by entering into a contract for the desired improve- ment, any one of the signers of the petition may revoke his ac- tion, even though such revocation reduces the number below the minimum required by law. The power to make the im- provement is thereby withdrawn.* Fraud in procuring the requisite number of signatures to the ■petition, will, of course, vitiate the entire proceeding. Thus, where a few lot owners procured the additional signatures of other property holders to a petition, by paying and agreeing to pay them for the same, the whole proceeding was invalid as a fraud upon the abutting owners, who did not participate in the same, and who opposed the proposed improvement.^ Although the grading and paving of streets, and other simi- lar local improvements, tend to enhance the value of the ad- jacent property, they are manifestly a great benefit to the whole municipality ; and to assess the entire cost of such improve- ments upon the local lot owners, without obtaining their con- sent, or giving them an opportunity to be heard for or against the proposed assessment, would work a manifest injustice, some- ' State V. Morse, 50 N. H. 9; State V. Otoe, 6 Neb. 129; People v. Judge, 40 Mich. 64; State v. Berry, 12 Iowa, 58; Oliphant v. Com'rs, 18 Kan. 386. '^In re Sharp, 56 N. Y. 257; com- pare People V. Goodwin, 5 N. Y. 568; Kellogg V. Ely, 15 Ohio St. 64; see contra, Burlington v. Gilbert, 31 Iowa, 356. A-s to estoppel, see State V. Hudson, 34 N. J. L. 531; Quinn v. Paterson, 27 lb. 35 ; State v. Burling- ton, 45 Iowa, 87; Johnson v. Allen, 62 Ind. 57; Keese v. Denver, 10 Colo. 112; Tone v. Columbus, 39 Ohio St. 281; Columbus v. Sohl, 44 lb. 479. 3 Holland v. Baltimore, 11 Md. 186; Bouldin v. Baltimore, 15 lb. 18; Mil- ler V. Mobile, 47 Ala. 163. * Irwin V. Mobile, 57 Ala. 6. ^ Maguire, v. Smock. 42 Ind. 1. ' 541 § 278 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. XV. what in the nature of taking private property without compen- sation. As in a case, where the charter provided that the city- council " should have full power to procure all streets to be im- proved in any manner they may deem advisable, at the expense of tlie property owners," and that the council may without the petition or consent of the property owners authorize such im- provements by the unanimous vote of the council ; it was held that an assessment, attempted to be levied under an ordinance passed by the council, but not unanimouslj'-, could not be col- lected.i Tiie Legislature has power, however, to make the determina- tion of a municipal council, that the requisite number have signed a petition when one is required, conclusive ; and under such a provision of the law, the decision of the council is un- impeachable, except for fraud. ^ But the power delegated to a council is in all such cases limited and special ; and all acts per- formed in pursuance of it are legal, only when done strictly in conformity with the statutory directions.^ Thus, where a statute authorized contracts to be made by the heads of munic- ipal departments for such objects only as may be authorized by the city council ; and the council authorized a paving contract, with the proviso, that the contractor should be chosen by a majority of the lot owners; it was held that such selection was absolutely necessary to render the adjoining lot owner liable for the assessment.* When it is required by statute that local im- provements, the expense of which is to be met by special as- sessments, shall be authorized by an ordinance " specifying the nature, character, locality and description of such improve- ment," any assessment made by an ordinance, not conformable to this requirement, is invalid.^ 1 Gage V. Chicago, 32 N. E. E. 264; Merrill v. Abbott, 62 lud. 549 ; Smith V. Duncan, 77 lb. 92. 2 King V. Portland, (Or. 93) 31 Pac. R. 482; In re Kiernan, 62 N. Y. 457; Von Steem v. Beatrice, (Neb. 92) 54 N. W. R. 677. s Merrill v. Abbott, 62 Ind. 549; Garlyle y. Clinton, SON. E. R. 782; Hitchcock V. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341; Mills V. City of Detroit, (Mich. 93) 54 X. W. R. 897; Perrine v. Farr, 642 22 N. J. L. 356; Brophy v. Land- man, 28 Ohio St. 542 ; Carron v. Mar- tin, 26 N. J. L. 594; State v. Passaic, 41 lb. 90; In re Clay, 22 N. T. S. 112; 67 Hun, 190. 4Reilly v. Philada., 60 Pa. St. 467; see Philadelphia v. Wistar, 35 Pa. St. 427; see Lach v. Cargill, 60 Mo. 316. . 5 City of Springfield v. Knott, 49 Mo. App. 412; Hyde Park v. Spen- cer, 118 111. 446; Kankakee v. Pot- ter, 119 lb. 327. CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 279 § 279. Power of Legislature to dispense with notice It has been held that the Legislature maj' directly, or through the local authorities, decide upon the question whether a local improvement will be specially beneficial and to what extent, so as to justify the levying of an assessment to meet the expenses incurred.^ So, likewise, when the proposition for a local im- provement is determined without consent of the abutters, and nothing further remains to be done, except to apportion the special assessment, it is held that notice may be dispensed with.^ But it is not difficult to point out the injustice of a rule, by which the amount, which each lot owner will have to pay, can be arbitrarily fixed without giving him a hearing, whereby he may be able to see that he is required to pay only what can be justly required of him. For these reasons, statutes, which au- thorize the levy of assessments, usually contain the requirement, that at some stage of the proceedings the abutter shall have his "day in court." ^ But there are many decisions from courts, which are entitled to respect, as well as eminent writers, who hold that, independently of statutory requirements, no notice and no hearing is necessary to the validity of the assessment.* If notice is required, and the mode of giving it has been pre- scribed by statute, the prescribed mode must be substantially 1 Bowling V. Altschule, (Cal. 93) 33 Pao. 495; Dennison v. Kansas CitT, 95 Mo. 416; Farrar v. St. Louis, 80 lb. 379, and ante, § 277. 2 Cleveland v. Tripp, 13 E. I. 50; State V. Elizabetli, (N. J.) 17 Atl. R. 91; Amery v. City, 72 Iowa, 701; Clapp V. City, 35 Conn. 66; Auburn V. Paul, 24 Atl. R 817; 84 Me. 212; Mayor v. Johns Hopkins' Hosp., 56 Md. 1; Gillett v. Denver, 21 Fed. Rep. 822; Amery v. City, 72 Iowa, 401. ' Ulman v. Baltimore, (Md. 93) 20 Atl. E. 141. « Scott V. Philadelphia, 81 Pa. St. 80; Craig v. Philadelphia, 89 lb. 269; Philadelphia V. Thomas, 25 Atl. R. 888; Sewell v. St. Paul, 20 Minn. 511; Merritt v. Portchester, 71 N. Y. 309; Davidson v. New Oris., 96 U. S. 134; Lowell v. Wentworth, 6 Cush. 221; Chesapeake & O. E. Co. v. Mul- lens, 22 S. W. E. 558; Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; Nashville v. Weiser, 54 111. 245; Butler v. Chi- cago, 56 lb. 341 ; Myiick v. La Crosse, 17 Wis. 442; New Albany v. Con- nelly, 7 Ind. 32; Dailing v. Gunn, 50 111. 424; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345 ; In re Washington Ave. , 09 Pa. St. 352 ; Boorman v. Santa Bar- bara, 65 Cal. 313; Grand Eapids School Furniture Co. v. City of Grand Eapids, 52 N. W. E. 1028; 92 Mich. 564; Butler v. Saginaw Co., 26 lb. 221; Cleghorn v. Postlethwaite, 43 111. 428; Barker v. Omaha, 16 Neb. 269; Leat v. Tilson, 72 Cal. 404; Stuart V. Palmer, 74 N. T. 183; Gar- viss V. Daussman, 114 Ind. 429; 16 N. E. E. 826 ; Law v. Johnston, 118 Ind. 261 ; Darling v. Gunn, 50 III. 424; Lehman v. Eobinson, 59 Ala. 219. 543 § 279 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XT. followed. 1 But while there must be substantial compliance with these requirements of tlie statute, a mere technical or lit- eral departure from the provisions of the statute, if it is not substantial, will not affect the validity of the assessment.* Thus, notice by advertisement, and notice b}' publication, are held to be equivalent.^ But when the ordinance, which is passed in pursuance of charter powers to levy a special tax, prescribes publication in the official organ of the municipality, such a publication is necessary to the validity of the tax.* It has been held in one case that, where there is no charter pro- vision to the contrary, the ordinance oi'dering the improvement is sufficient notice.^ And, so, otherwise, has it been held that, where the statute or ordinance, under which the assessment is made, does not require that the notice be in writing or by pub- lication, an oral notice will be sufficient.'^ If proper notice be not given, a vs^rit of certiorari will lie to review the proceedings by the proper court ; and if they are substantially defective, they will be quashed.^ But it has been held that, where an ap- peal is allowed,^ certiorari will not lie.® But there are authori- ties, which hold that either remedy may be resorted to.^" 1 Ladd V. Spencer, (Or. 93) 31 Pac. E. 474; Lake Shore etc. Co. v. Chi- cago, (111. 93) 33 N. E. E. 602; Kroop V. Forman, 31 Mich. 144; Bensinger V. District, Mackey, 285; Humboldt Co. V. Dinsmore, 75 Cal. 604; Vail v. Morris, etc. Co., 21 N. J. L. 189; Peo- ple V. Gilon, 24 N. E. E. 944; Dehail V. Morford, (Cal. 93) 30 Pac. E. 593; Wilson V. Trenton, 53 N. J. L. 645; 23 Atl. E. 278; Wilson v. Seattle, 2 Wash. St. 543; 27 Pac. E. 474. 2 Gibson v. Owens, (Mo. 93) 21 S. W. E. 1107; Windham v. Commis- sioners, 26 Me. 406; Hildreth v. Low- ell, 11 Gray, 560; Dickinson Co. v. Hogan, 39 Kans. 606; 18 Pac. Eep. 611; Philadelphia etc. Co. v. Shipley, (Md. 93) 19 Atl. E. 522; Toledo, etc. Co. V. East Saginaw, etc. Co., (Mich.) 40 N. W. 436; Auburn v. Paul, 84 Me. 212; Voght v. Buffalo, 133 N. Y. 463; State v. Elizabeth, 30 N. J. L. 365; Durant v. Jersey City, 25 lb. 309. 544 3 State V. Plainfleld, 38 N. J. L. 95; Vantilburgh v. Shann, 24 lb. 740; State V. Jersey City, 24 lb. 662 ; State V. Patterson Ave. etc., 41 lb. 83. * Dubuque v. Wooteu, 25 Iowa, 571 ; In re Burmeister, 56 How. Pr. 416. ' Palmyra v. Morton, 25 Mo. 597. sWhitworth v. Puchett, 2 Gratt. 527; Hawkins v. The Justices, 12 Lea, 351. This is doubted in Elliott's Eoads & Streets, p. 249. 'Dil. Mun. Cor. §805; Walker v. District, 6 Mackey, 352; People v. Betts, 55N. T.600; Farmington, etc. Co. V. Commissioners, 112 Mass. 206. 8 See Howard v. Shaw, 126 111. 53; Bridge v. Hampton, 47 N. H. 151; Felton V. Addison, 101 Ind. 58. s Cedar Eapids, etc. Co. v. Whelan, 64 Iowa, 694; People v. Myers, 32 N. E. E. 241 ; Boston, etc. Co. v. Folsom, 46 N. H. 64. 10 Ladd V. Spencer, (Or. 93) 31 Pac. Eep. 474; Com'rs v. Harper, 38 Bl. 104 ; Eoberts v. Williams, 13 Ark. 355. CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 280 A failure to object after due notice will be taken as a waiver of all irregularities, if a party subsequently apply for an injunc- tion to restrain the collection of an assessment.^ The defect of the notice cannot be attacked in any collateral proceeding, un- less the defect be of such a nature, as that it will raise a ques- tion of jurisdiction of the court over the pending cause of action. 2 § 280. Re-assessments. — When the amount raised by an assessment is insufficient ; or when for any reason the validity of the assessment has been successfully attacked ; the Legisla- ture may, if there exists no constitutional provision forbidding it, authorize a re-assessment, or pass a bill validating the former assessment.* A re-assessment may be ordered notwithstanding the collection of the original assessment has been permanently enjoined by a court of competent jurisdiction.* A legislative act of ratification or validation will, it has been held, validate a void assessment only from the date of its passage.^ But where, in any State, the constitution contains a prohibition of retrospec- 24 Mich. 409. 1 State V. Paterson, 39 N. J. Ii. 159; as to waiver, see Walker v. Aurora, (111. 92) 29 K. E. R. 741; Auditor v. Maier, (Mich. 93) 54 N. W. R. 640; Nashville V. Weiser, 54111. 245; Gard- ner V. Boston, 106 Mass. 549; Quick V. River Forrest, 22 N. E. R. 816; 130 m. 323; Hopkins v. Mason, 61 Barb. 469; State v. Perthamboy, 29 N". J. L. 259; Gilmore v. TJtica, 29 N. E. R. 841; 131 N.T. 26. 2 United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691; Scott v. People, ( 93 ) 33 N. E. R. 180; Godohaux v. Carpenter, 19 Nev. 415 ; see Brown v. Rome, etc. Co., 86 Ala. 206; Zimmerman v. Snowdon, 88 Mo. 218; Shaffer v. Welch, 34 Kans. 595 ; King v. Benton Co., 10 Oreg. 512; Townsend v. Man- istee, 88 Mich. 408; 50 N. W. R. 321; Town V. Williamson, 91 Ind. 541; United States v. Arredondo, 6 Peters, 691; Lake Shore etc. Co. v. Cincin- nati etc. Co., 116 Ind. 578; Weinickie V. R. R. Co., 61 Hun, 619; 15 N. T. S. 689; Colville v. Judy, 73 Mo. 651; Grand Rapids etc. Co. v. YanDrille, 35 8 In re Mead, 74 N. T. 216; Owens- boro v. Callaghan, (Ky. 92) 17 S. W. R. 278; 1)1 re Van Antwerp, 56 IST. T. 261; Brown v, New York, 63 lb. 239; Howards. Ins. Co. v. Newark, (N. J.) 18 Atl, R. 672; Howell v. Buffalo, 37 N. T. 267; People v. McDonald, 69 lb. 362; Whitely v. Lansing, 27 Mich. 131; Manley V. Emlen, 46 Kan. 655; 27 Pac. R. 844; State v. Newark, 34 N. J. L. 236; State v. Plainfleld, 38 lb. 95; Edwards v. Jersey City, 40 lb. 176; Righter v. Newark, 45 lb. 104; Butler v. Toledo, 5 Ohio St. 225; Dill v. Roberts, 30 Wis. 178; Whitney v. Pittsburgh, (Pa. 93) 23 Atl. R. 395; Dean v. Borohsenius, 30 Wis. 236; Bingaman v. Pittsburgh, 29 W. N. C. 364; Lennon v. New York, 55 N. Y. 361, 365. 4 State V. Newark, 34 N. J. L. 236; Emporia v. Bates, 16 Kan. 495 ; Mills V. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400. 6Reis V. Graff, 51 Cal. 86; San Fran. v. O'Neil, lb. 91 ; Same v. Kins- man, lb. 92. 545 §281 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. XV. tive laws, any statute, having for its object the validation of a prior void assessment, would be void.^ § 281. Adjoining owner's relation to contract — His lia- bility. — An assessment, levied to meet the expense of a local improvement, is always a tax ; and the claim against the abut- ter is not subject to any set-off, even though, under statutory authority, the suit to recover it is brought by the contractor, who made the improvement.^ But any defence, which would be good and effective in a suit against the city is good in his behalf ; ^ as, for example, the poor quality of the work.* The general power to make contracts for local improve- ments is implied from an express grant to a municipal cor- poration of power to make such improvements, provided there be nothing in the act to show a contrary legislative intent.* When, however, the statute directs the mode, in which the contract is to be executed, or what it shall contain, the assess- ment will be invalid if these directions are not substantially complied with.^ As between the municipal corporation and the contractor, it may be said that, while the property owners cannot be strictly considered to be parties or privies to the con- tract, the corporation is to a considerable extent their agent, and enters into the contract in that capacity. The burden of performing the contract falls on the shoulders of the abutting owners ; they can only insist that the municipal authorities secure a faithful performance of the contract on the part of the 1 St. Louis V. Clemens, 52 Mo. 133. 2 Burlington v. Palmer, 67 Iowa, 681; Emery v. San F. G. Co., 28 Cal. 345; Meuser v. Risdon, 36 lb. 239; Himmelman v. Spanagel, 39 lb. 389. 8 St. Louis V. Clemens, 36 Mo. 469. 4 Erie Co. v. Butler, 120 Pa. St. 374. 5 Galveston v. Heard, 54 Tex. 420; Lates V. Briggs, 64 N. Y. 404; Mayor V. New Yoik, 63 lb. 455, 459; Gum- ming V. B'klyn, 11 Paige, 596. 6 Allen V. Galveston, 51 Tex. 302; People V. Weber, 89 111. 347; Dare v. Milwaukee, 42 Wis. 108; Bentley v. County, 25 Minn. 259; Hurford v. Omaha, 4 Neb. 350; Addis v. Pittsb., «5 Pa. St. 379; McDonald v. Mayor, 646 68 N. Y. 23; Leavenworth v. Rankin, 2 Kan. 357; Montgomery v. Barber, 45 Ala. 237; White v. N. O., 15 La. An. 667; Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64; Dey v. Jersey City, 19 N. J. Eq. 412. As to invitations for proposals, see In re Rosenbaura, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 184; In re Pennie, 108 N. Y. 364; In re Marsh, 88 lb. 42S; In re Merriam, 84 N. Y. 596; Balto v. Johnson, 62 Md. 225 ; Stockton v. Whitemore, 50 Cal. 555; Yarnold v. Lawrence, 15 Kan. 126; Nash v. St. Paul, 8 Minn. 172; White v. N. 0., 15 La. An. 667; State v. Barlow, 48 Mo. 317; Brevoort v. Detroit, 24 Mich. 322; Stuart v. Cambridge, 125 Mass. 102. CH. XV.J MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 282 contractor.^ In order to render an abutting owner liable to the city for the expense of a local improvement, the terms of the law authorizing it must be strictly complied with and all conditions precedent performed.^ So, if the ordinance requires a sidewalk on the side of the street, the lot owner is not liable for an assessment for one several feet away from the side of the street.^ Nor is he liable for the expense of laying a stone sidewalk, when by the ordinance a plank walk was specified.* And when the owner of a corner lot had paid for a water pipe laid along one front of his lot, at his request, he is not liable for pipe which is laid along the other front without his con- sent.^ But a substantial compliance with the law is all that ■is needed to make the lot owners liable.^ If the work has been accepted by the corporation as complete and satisfactory, a 'prima facie case is made out as against the abutting owner.'^ § 282. Method of collection There are many cases to sup- port the doctrine, that a tax is not a debt for the recovery of which, in the absence of a statutory remedy, a common law ac- tion will lie.^ And the principle, applicable in the case of a 1 Williams v. Savings & Loan Soc, (Cal. 93) 31 Pac. 908; Liebstein v. Newark, 24 N. J. E. 200; Bond v. Newark, 19 lb. 376; Heft v. Payne, (Cal. 93) 31 Pac. K. 874; City v. Fow- ler, 34 Ind. 140; see Brown v. Jenks, (Cal. 93) 32 Pac. R. 701; Perine v. Forbush, lb. 226; Washburn v. Lyons, lb. 310; Libbey v. Ellsworth, lb. 228; Louisville v. L. Gas Co., (Ky. 93) 22 S. W. Kep. 550; Fairchild V. Wall, 93 Cal. 401 ; Gilmore v. Utica, 131 N. Y. 26. 2McBean v. Martin, (Cal. 92) 31 Pac. E. 5; Dorathy v. Chicago, 53 111. 79; Boyer v. Reading, (Pa. 92) 24 Atl. E. 1070; Himmelman v. Byrne, 41 Cal. 500; McBean v. Redick, (Cal. 92) 31 Pac. R. 7; McGee v. Avondale, 7 Ohio Cir. Ct. E. 246; Harper's Ap., 109 Pa. St. 9; Sheridan v. Fitchburg, 131 Mass. 523; Brown v. Jenks, (Cal. 93)32Pao. E. 701; JefEerson Co. v. City of Mount Vernon, 33 W. E. E. 1091. « Lowell V. Whelock, 11 Gush. 391 ; In re N. Y. P. E. School, 47 N. Y. 556; City of Muscatine v. Chicago E. etc. Co., (Iowa, 93) 55 N. W. E. 100. 4 Sloan V. Beebe, 24 Kan. 343. 6 Baker v. Gartside, 86 Pa. St. 498. «Seeon«e, §178. ■? Munic. No. 2 v. Guillette, 14 La. An. 297; Murray v. Tucker, 10 Bush, 240; DePay v. City of Wabash, 32 N. E. E. 1016; Eisley v. St. Louis, 34 Mo. 404; St. Louis v. De None, 44 lb. 136; Neenan v. Smith, 60 lb. 292. 8 Clinton v. Henry Co., (Mo. 93) 22 S. W. E. 494; Augusta v. North, 57 Me. 392; Perry v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 318; Shaw v. Pickett, 26 Vt. 486; Lane Co. v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 80; Mc- Crowell V. Bristol, (Va. 93) 16 S. E. E. 867; Detroit v. Jopp, 52 Mich. 458; Comm'rs v. First Nat. Bank, (Kan. 92) 30 Pac. 22; Catling v. Carteret, 92 N. C. 536; Charleston v. Oliver, 16 S. C. 47; New Orleans v. Davidson, 30 La. An. 541 ; Greer v. Covington, 83 Ky. 410. In Meriwetlier v. Gar- rett, 102 U. S. 472, the court said. 547 §282 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XV. general tax, acquires greater force in the case of a special as- sessment, -which maj'- in particular cases seriously burden the property it was designed to beneiit. Upon the ground, that the true basis for the power to levy assessment for local improvements is the benefit thereby con- ferred upon adjacent land, any statutory regulation, which au- thorizes other property than the abutting land to be held liable for such assessments, or which imposes a personal liabihty upon the abutting owners, is of doubtful constitutionality, as consti- tuting a taking of private property for public use without com- pensation.'^ The general rule is, that only such property is liable, which is made so by the statute ; and in this respect there is a substantial distinction between the power to levy general taxes and the purely statutory power to make a special assess- ment for local improvements, beneficial mainly to adjacent prop- erty. The power to assess other property belonging to the owner of a lot which is located on a street benefited by the local improvements, can only be conferred, if at all, by express statu- tory enactment.^ And hence, in the absense of statute, there is no personal liability for local assessments.^ But the general taxes which are levied upon the whole com- munity, or upon all members of a certain class, for the purpose of defraying the general municipal expenses, are placed upon a different basis. " Debts are obligations for the pay- ment of money founded upon con- tract, express or implied. Taxes are imposts levied for the support of the government or for some special purpose authorized by it. . . Kor is their nature affected by the fact that in some States an action of debt can be instituted for their recovery." I Brown v. Jenks, (Cal. 93) 32Pac. K. 701; Burlington V. Quick, 47 Iowa, 226; Greeny. Ward, 82 Va. 324; Nee- nan V. Smith, 50 Mo. 525 ; Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. 378; Littler v. Mc- Cord, 38 111. App. 147; Higgins v. Ausmuss, 77 Mo. 351; Louisiana v. Miller, 66 lb. 467; Leeds & Co. v. Hardy, (La. 92) 11 So. 1; see, Clem- ens V. Mayor, 16 Md. 208; Bonsall v. 548 Lebanon, 19 Ohio, 419; Eshback v. Pitts., 6 Md. 71; New Orleans v. Wire, 20 La. An. 500; Lowell v. French, 6 Gush. 223; In re Vac. Center St., 115 Pa. St. 247. 2 State V. State Board of Assessors, (N. J. 92) 22 Atl. E. 1085; Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. 386; Wright v. Chi- cago, 20 111. 352; Meyer v. Burritt, 60 Conn. 117; Craw v. Tolono, 96 111. 255; Virginia v. Hall, 96 lb. 278. 3 Lake Shore & M. S. E. Co. v. Dunkirk, 20 N. T. S. 596; Balfe v. Lammers, 109 Pa. St. 347, 350; Board V. Fulton, 111 lb. 410; McCrowell v. City of Bristol, 16 S. E. E. 867 (Va. 93); Green v. Ward, 82 Va. 324; Wolf V. Philadelphia, 105 Pa. St. 25; City v. Moore, 113 lb. 597. CH. XV.J MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 282 For this reason, many of the courts have held — and by some the same doctrine has been errroneously as we think, deemed to apply to local assessments — that the levy of a tax by a mu- nicipal corporation, under and pursuant to authority conferred by its charter, creates an obligation or debt, the payment of which can be enforced by a common law action ex contractu, even though there may be a statutory method of recovery of a special and summary character.^ But when the power to impose taxes is conferred by its charter upon a municipal cor- poration ; and the charter is silent as to the express mode by which their collection is to be enforced, the power to collect them by an ordinary civil suit is necessarily implied.^ But the general or special power to tax does not imply the power to enforce the collection of tax by any methods more summarj'- than the ordinary judicial proceedings, by which debts are col- lected. The power to collect by distress and sale cannot be implied from the fact, that the State adopts that method.^ However, the Legislature has power to provide summary methods of collecting taxes and assessments, and to declare what shall be 2, 'prima facie, case.* And such methods are con- stitutional ; except, possibly, where the property-owner is de- prived of his right to have the municipal action reviewed by a court of superior jurisdiction.^ Proceedings to enforce tlie payment of taxes and assessments are usually statutory ; and if by charter or statute a power to sell the property assessed or taxed, is conferred upon the municipality, the statute must be closely followed ; and every requisite observed or no valid title will pass by the sale.^ And if the municipality be given a ' Dugan V. Baltimore, 1 Gill & J. (Md.) 499; Baltimore v. Hovard, 6 Ilar. & J. (Md.) 383; Gordon v. Bal- timore, 5 Gill 236; 243; and comp. cases cited in, last note. State v. So. S. S. Co., 13 La. An. 497; Dunlap V. Gallatin Co., 15 111. 9; Ryan v. Gallatin Co., 14 lb. 82; Geneva v. Cole, 61 lb. 397; Jonesboro v. Mo- Kee, 2 Yerg, 167; Dubuque v. 111. C. R. etc., 39 Iowa, 56; Davenport v. C. K. I. etc., 38 lb. 633; Burlington v. B. M. R. R., 41 lb. 134; Perry Co. v. Selma. M. & M., 58 Ala. 546; Winter V. Montgomery, 79 lb. 481; compare Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227. estate V. Severance, 55 Mo. 378, 389; Amite City v. Clementz, 24 La. An. 27; Jefferson v. McCarty, 74 Mo. 55. 8 See Dillon Mun. Corp. § 818. 4 Riley v. St. Joseph, 67 Mo. 491. * Flournoy v. Jeffersonville, 17 Ind. 169. " Goring v. McTaggart, 92 Ind. 200; Wilson V. Poole, 33 lb. 443; Him- melman v. Townsend, 49 Cal. 150; 549 §283 MUXICIPAL COEPOEATIOXS. [CH. XV. statutory remedy, it will ordinarily be' considered exclusive of any other method of collecting or enforcing the tax at com- mon law,i even though the statutory mode is inadequate.^ So, where a town was empowered by its charter to levy and collect taxes, and to enforce the same by a civil action ; it was held that the corporation was precluded from collecting taxes by any summary proceeding.^ The power to sell for non-payment of taxes must be conferred in express terms, or by clear and unavoidable implication.* Thus, the power to sell for non- payment of taxes cannot be implied from a provision, that the collection of taxes may be enforced by ordinance,* nor does a power to sell delinquent lands for non-paymeat of taxes author- ize their sale for non-payment of assessments.® Unless expressly authorized, a municipal corporation cannot be a purchaser at a sale of lands for non-payment of taxes.'^ § 283. Lien of taxes. — In the absence of statute, taxes and assessments are not liens upon the property against which they have been assessed.^ Such liens are statutory and their Board v. Johnson, (Miss. 90) 7 So. K. 390; Turnpike Com'rs v. Louis- ville etc. Co., 1 S. W. K. 671. ^Alexander v. Helber, 35 Mo. 334. * Pueblo V. Eobinson, 21 Pao. R. 899; 12 Colo. 593; Annapolis v. Har- wood, 32 Md. 471 ; Merriam v. Moo- dy, 25 Iowa, 163 ; Mcluemy v. Bead, 23 Iowa, 410; Haskell v. Burlington, 30 lb. 232; Augusta v. Dunbar, 50 Gra. 387; Municipality v. Pance, 6 La. An. 515; Baltimore v. Howard, 6 H. & J. 383. 5 Merriam v. Moody, 25 Iowa, 163; Paine v. Spratley, 5 Kan. 525; Mc- luerney v. Keed, 23 Iowa, 410. 6 Sharp V. Johnson, 4 Hill (N.T.) 92. 'Knox V. Peterson, 21 "Wis. 247; Bordages v. Higgins, (Tex. 92) 20 S. W. R. 184; Champaign V. Harmon, 98 m. 491 ; Logansport v. Humphrey, 84 Ind. 467; Eaton v. Manitowoc, 44 Wis. 489. 8 State V. O'Xeill, (N. J. 93) 25 Atl. 273; Howard v. Strother, 33 X. W. R. 238; Kansas City V. Payne, 71 Mo. 159; JefEerson v. Whipple, 71 lb. Wyer v. Larocque, (Ky. 93) 33 Pac. 544; Jones v. Miracle, (Ky. 97) 21 S. W. K. 241; Carroll v. Mitchell, 37 W. Va. 130; Pierce v. Boston, 3 Met. 520; Deputron v. Young, 10 S. Ct. 539; 134 U. S. 241; Seattle v. Doran, (Wash. St.) 32 Pac. R. 105; Oil City V. Oil City B. Works, (Pa. 93) 25 Atl. R. 549; McPhee v. Venable, 77 G-a. 772; Mix v. Ross, 57 111. 121; Sanger V. Rice, 43 Kan. 580; Bender v. Dun- gan, 99 Mo. 126; Beckley v. English, 129 111. 646 ; O' Byrne v. Philadelphia, 93 Pa. St. 225 ; AUentown v. Hower, 93 lb. 332; Carncross v. Lykes, 22 Fla. 587; Minter v. Durham, 13 Or. 470; Murdock v. Chaffee, 7 So. R. 519; Garlington v. Copeland, (S. C. 93) 10 S. E. R. 616. 1 Flournoy V. Jeffersonville, 17 Ind. 169; Mix v. Ross, 57 111. 521; Cf. State V. Georgia Co., 17 S. E. R. 10; see Topsham v. Blaisdell, 82 Me. 152; Lord v. Parker, 83 lb. 530. ^Fairbault v. Misener, 20 Minn. 396; Wood V. Nicholson, 43 Kan. 461; Board v. Bank, (Kan. 92) 30 Pac. 22; 550 CH. XV.] MUNICIPAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 283 force and extent depend entirely upon the statute creating them.i But there is no doubt that the Legislature may declare taxes to be a lien on the land as against the owner and all sub- sequent purchasers,^ and the practice of providing such liens is believed to be universal. The power to declare them a lien by ordinance may also be, and is almost invariably conferred upon a municipality.* Where the statute authorizes the municipality to make the taxes it levies a lien upon the real estate, the valid- ity of the lien will, of course, depend upon the validity of the tax levy ; and will fail with an avoidance of the levy.* The personal liability of the owner of property, for the taxes levied against such property, which is enforceable by an action at law against such owners, does not affect the lien upon the property, which serves as a cumulative remedy,^ unless the remedy in personam is made exclusive.® Water rents, paid to a city owning waterworks, although called so by the charter, are not taxes ; and the obligation to pay them rests upon an implied or express contract to pay for water used. Nevertheless, such water rents may be declared a lien on specific property ; and this lien maj'- by statute be given priority over a subsequent mort- gage.'' In a case, where a city was given power to collect taxes ; and the tax was declared to be a lien, but no power was given to enforce the lien by distress and sale ; nor was any other mode of collection prescribed ; it was held that the lien could be en- forced by a bill in equity.* 519; United States v. Snyder, 149 U. S. 210; Bryn Mawr Col. v. Ander- son, 51 jST. W. R. 126; Allegheny City's App., 41 Pa. St. 60; Howell v. Philada.,38Ib. 471. 1 State V. ^tna L. Ins. Co., 117 Ind. 251; Shipman v. Forbes, 32 Pac. Rep. 599; Philada. v. Greble, 38 Pa. St. 339. 2 People V. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; Vreeland v. Jersey City, 37 N. J. Eq. 574; Bordages v. Higgins, (Tex. 93) 20 S. W. Rep. 726; Philada. v. Tryon, 35 Pa. St. 401 ; Meddsville v. Dickson, 24 W. N. C. 451; New York v. Col- gate, 12 N. Y. 149; Hancock v. Bow- man, 49 Cal. 413; Fitch v. Creighton, 24 How. 159. ' Bordages v. Higgins, (Tex. 93) 20 S. W. Rep. 726. * Herschberger v. Pittsburgh, 115 Pa. St. 78. ^Eschback v. Pitts, 6 Md. 71; Mix V. Ross, 57 111. 121 ; New Haven v. Railroad, 38 Conn. 422. •> Comp. as to liens and personal liability for assessments : Trustees v. Shotwell, 45 N. J. Eq. 106; Philadel- phia V. Cook, 30 Pa. St. 56; Elma v. Carney, (Wash. 92) 30 Pac. Rep. 732 ; Jones V. Schulmyer, 39 Ind. 119; Heine v. Com'rs, 19 Wall. 655; Ben- nett v. Buffalo, 17 N. Y. 383; Guerin V. Reese, 33 Cal. 292. ' Prov. Inst. V. Jersey City, 113 U. S. 506. ^Mclnerny v. Reed, 23 Iowa, 410; Lima v. L. Cem. Ass'n, 42 Ohio St, 128. 551 §284 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XV. The statutory lien for unpaid taxes attaches at the date pre- scribed by the statute ; ^ and parties, acquiring interests in the property subsequently take it subject thereto.'^ As the lien is the creation of the sovereign power, and necessary to the effec- tive exercise of the povirer of taxation there is no doubt that the Legislature may make this lien paramount to all other iu- cumbrances.^ And this is the universal practice. Statutes creating the lien are, like all remedial statutes, to be libei-ally construed, so as to enable their purpose to be ac- complished.* And being purely statutoiy, it maj^ be modified or completely abrogated by subsequent statutes, even after it has attached to the property of the delinquent; at least, vifhere the unpaid tax is due to the State or to a municipality or county.^ But where the tax is a local assessment, and the lien is in favor of the contractor, who, in reliance upon this security, has done the work, involved in the local improvement ; and who is sub- rogated to the claims of "the city against the abutting owner,^ any statute destroying the lien would be a violation of the constitutional prohibition of interference with vested rights, and of impairment of the obligation of contracts.'^ § 284. Statute of Limitations. — In those jurisdictions, where common law actions of debt are employed to recover taxes, the Statute of Limitations may under its general provisions be a bar to a personal judgment for taxes.^ But it is doubtful, whether the Statute of Limitations applies generally to the statutory > Langsdale v. Nicklans, 38 Ind. 289 ; Jones V. Schulmeyer, 39 lb. 119. 2 Chancy v. State, 118 lb. 494. ' Prov. Inst. V. Jersey City, 113 U. S. 596; State v. ^tna etc. Co., 117 Ind. 251; Moffatt v. Henderson, 18 J. & S. (N. Y.) 211. * Eckhard v. Donahue, 9 Daly, 214; Hudler v. Golden, 36 N. Y. 447 ; Weed V. Tucker, 19 lb. 422. 5 Watson V. N. Y. Cen. R. R., 47 N. Y. 157; Hallv. Bunte, 20 Ind. 304; Martin v. Hewit, 44 Ala. 418 ; Bangor V. Goding, 35 Me. 73 ; Gray v. Carle- ton, 35 lb. 481; Frost v. Ilsley, 54 lb. 345 ; Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. 314; Antoui v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 652 766; Edwards v. Kearzly, 96 lb. 595; Van Hoffman v. Quincey, 4 Wall. 535. 6 Philadelphia v. Wistar, 35 Pa. St. 427. ' In re Hope M. Co., 1 Sawy. 710; Weaver v. Sells, 10 Kan. 609; Handel V. Elliott, 60 Tex. 145; Wabash & E. Canal v. Beers, 2 Black. 448; Streubel v. Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 67; Hallahan v. Herbert, 11 Ab. Pr. N. S. 326; Crowning v. Barnett, 30 Ark. 560. 8 Burlington v. B. & M. R. R. Co., 41 Iowa, 134; Davenport v. C. R. I. etc., 38 lb. 633; Mellinger v. Hous- ton, 68 Tex. 37; Jefferson v. Whip- ple, 71 Mo. 521. CH. XV.] MUNICITAL TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS. § 284 remedies for enforcing the payment of taxes. There are many cases, which hold that, in the absence of a special statutory limi- tation, assessments and taxes, not arising out of contract, are not barred under any general provision of the Statute of Limi- tations.i 1 District V. "Wash. & Ct. E. Co., 1 Newcomer v. Keedy, 2 Md. 19; Ho- Mackey, 361; Eschback v. Pitts, 6 gan v. Ingle, 2 Crancli, 355; E. & O. Md. 71; Magee v. Com., 46 Pa. St. R. R. Co. v. District, 3 MacArthur, 358; Pease v. Howard, 14 Johns. 479; 122. 55a CHAPTER XVI. STEBETS, BRIDGES AND TTJENPIKES. SCCTION. 286 — ^Definition of street. 287— Alleys. 288 — Conflict of jurisdiction over streets. 289 — ^Delegation of legislative power over streets. 290 — Construction of charter pow- ers over streets. 291 — Power to pave construed. 292 — Power to improve, pave and grade continuous. 293 — Rights of the municipality in soil of the streets, in gen- eral. 294 — Eight of municipality in soil of the sta-eets for construc- tion of sewers and cisterns. 295 — Pipes in streets, for gas and other purposes. 296 — Power to grant an exclusive f rancliise to lay pipes and to use streets for other semi- private purposes. 297 — Poles for the hanging of tel- egraph and otlier wires. Abuttors' right to compen- sation. 298 — Openings in and vaults under sidewalks. 299 — Municipal regulation of street travel and traffic. 300 — Street obstructions. 301 — Legislative control of streets — Eights of abutting own- ers therein. 302 — Legislative power over the construction of railroads. Its delegation to cities ; construction of grant. 554 Section. . 303 — Eights of abutting owners, how afEeoted by construc- tion of steam railroads along the street. 304 — Abutting owners, how affect- ed by surface street rail- ways. 305 — ^Elevated street railways in relation to abutting owners. 306 — Municipal control over the construction and operation of railroads in streets. 306 a — Electric and cable cars on ■ street railways. 307 — Eemedies of abutters — Meas- ure of damages. 308 — Vacation of streets by Legis- lature — ^Delegation of pow- er to municipal corpora- tions. 309 — Proceedings to vacate. 310 — Burden and means of proving vacation and abandonment. 311 — Compensation to abutters on vacation. 312 — Statute of Limitations, as ap- plicable to the public ease- ment in street — ^Equitable estoppel. 313 — Definition, character and con- struction of public bridges. 314 — Legislative and municipal powers over bridges. 314a — ^National control over con- struction and maintenance of bridges. 315 — County liability for mainte-. nance and repair of public bridges. CH. XVI.J STREETS, BKIDGES AIH) TURNPIKES. § 28G 316 — Bights and duties of munici- pal corporations in build- ing, rebuilding and main- taining bridges. 317 — Private bridges on or inter- secting highways. 318— Turnpikes. 319 — Extent of municipal power over turnpike. 320— Incidents of toll. 321— The law of the road. § 286. Definition of street — A street is any public high- way, improved or unimproved,^ in a city, town or village, open to the use of all for purposes of travel and traffic, and such other public or private purposes as may be permitted by the municipality under whose control it is.^ The term includes all public urban ways, whatever may be their length or width. The fundamental idea of a street, that of a public highway, maintained primarily and chiefly, though not solely, for public benefit,^ does not permit of the bestowal of the term on turn- pikes, owned by private corporations ; * and the distinction as- sumes importance when the question of maintenance of these two classes of public ways is to be considered. If the owner of land causes it to be laid out in lots, and a map to be made, upon which certain spaces are designated as " streets," it. will be understood that by that term are meant public ways for travel and commerce. In no event could the word, in the absence of express reservation, be considered to signify mere private ways for the sole use of those owning contiguous lands.^ All persons, acquiring land on the line of any street so desig- nated have the right, as against the grantor, to require such ways to be opened as streets, and to enjoy all the ordinary rights of the public in such highways.® I Brace v. IST. T. Can., 27 N. T. 271; Com. v. Boston etc., 135 Mass. 551; Sharretts Road, 8 Pa. St. 92. ^ Elliott on Roads and Streets, ch. II.; Perrin v. N. Y. etc., 36 N. T. 120; Heiple v. East Portland, 13 Oreg. 97; State V. Moriarity, 74 Ind. 104; Liv- ingston V. Mayor, 8 Wend. 85 ; Bene- dict V. Goit, 3 Barb. 459; State v. Wilkinson, 2 Vt. 480; Cox v. Louis- ville etc., 48 Ind. 178; Conner v. Prest. etc., 1 Blackf. 42; State v. Berdetta, 73 Ind. 185. s Quincy v. Jones, 76 111. 231, 244; Henkel v. Detroit, 49 Mich. 249. * Wilson V. Allegheny, 79 Pa. St. 272; State v. New Bruns'k, 30 N. J. L. 395; Elliott on Roads and Streets, p. 60. 5 Denver v. Clements, 3 Colo. 470; see ante, chapter xiii. § 221. 8 Indianapolis v. Kingsbury, 101 Ind. 200; Hanson v. Eastman, 21 Minn. 209; Yates v. Judd, 18 Wis. 118; Sanborn v. Chicago, etc., 16 lb. 19; seeonie, §§221-223. 555 § 288 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. ' [CH. XVI. § 287. Alleys. — " A narrow way, less in size than a street is generally called an alley." ^ But whether such a passage is a street or an alley, depends not so much upon its size, or upon the limited number of persons using it, as upon its relation to other ways, its location, and frequently upon statutory regula- tions.^ If an alley be open to public use, it is a highway, and the rules of law applicable to streets apply to it.^ Of course, the alley cannot be considered a public way, so as to charge the city with its maintenance and repair, unless it has been legally established and accepted. But if such be the case, the city is undoubtedly liable for an injury which is sustained from a defect therein.* When the term "alley" is used on a map or in a statute, unqualified by the word " private " or by some similar term, it is presumed to mean a narrow street open to the public use of the community.^ But there must be an acceptance of the proffered dedication,® as no merely permissive public use of a private alley will make it a public highway.''' The rights and duties of a municipalitj' in regard to the re- pair, maintenance and vacation of public alleys are the same substantially, as those respecting streets.* § 288. Conflict of jurisdiction over streets. — Outside of towns and cities, the control and supervision of highways are ordinarily vested in the county or township, and exercised through boards of highway commissioners or other officials of a similar character.® When a municipal corporation is located within the territory, over which these county or township offi- 1 Elliott Koads and Streets, p. 12. 2 Kex V. Kichardson, 8 T. K. 634; Osage City v. Larkin, 40 Kan. 206; 19 Pac. E. 658 ; contra, Paul v. Detroit, 32 Mich. 108; Beeclier v. People, supra; Bagely v. People, 43 Mich. 355. Distinctive use of alleys. Beecher V. People, 38 Mich. 289. 8 Morris v. Bowen, Wright (Pa.) 749. * Indianapolis v. Murphy, 91 Ind. 382; Marseilles v. Howland, 124 111. 551. ^Hattonv. Chatham, 24 111. App. 622; Lasalle v. Mott, etc., 16 lb. 74; Bailey v. Culver, 12 Mo. App. 175. "Hamilton v. Chicago, etc., 124 HI. 241. 556 7 Dexter v. Tree, 117 111. 535. 'Marseilles v. Howland, 124 111. 551; Springfield v. Green, 120 lb. 269; Spiegel v. Gansberg, 44 Ind. 418; Dexter v. Tree, 117 111. 535 ; St. Louis, etc., V. Bellville, 122 111. 376. ^ For their powers and duties see Elliott on Roads & Streets, ch. xviii. ; Cummins v. Seymour, 79 Ind. 491; Board v. Barnett, 107 111. 507; Trans. Co. V. Chicago, 99 IT. S. 635; Bloom- field v. Calkins, 62 N. Y. 386; Ster- ling's App., Ill Pa. St. 35; s. c, 2 Atl. Eep. 105; Suffield v. Hathaway, 44 Conn. 521; Mallory v. Grifiey, 85 Pa. St. 275. CH. XVI.] STE.EETS, BEIDOES AND TURNPIKES. § 288 cers claim to have jurisdiction, a conflict of authority frequently arises. The solution of the question ordinarily depends upon the intention of the Legislature. In the interpretation and construction of statutes, conferring powers over highways, this intention can be best ascertained by viewing the subject, so far as the particular municipality is concerned, in the light of the whole course of similar State legislation. ^ The weight of au- thority favors the relegation to each jurisdiction of the exclu- sive control of its own highways.^ As the Legislature has unlimited power over all public highways, it may delegate its control to* two governmental corporations, even when the pow- ers of both are to be exercised within the same territorial lim- its.^ But in view of the facts, that a conflicting jurisdiction gives rise to a divided responsibility, and that the customary uses of a municipal street are essentially different from those to which county roads are applied,* the presumption is against the grant of a co-ordinate jurisdiction ; and, except when re- quired by express provisions of the statutes, or by necessarj' implication, which is not common, the courts will limit the ju- risdiction of the county or township commissioners to the roads, located outside of the limits of the municipality, and give to the street commissioners exclusive jurisdiction over the streets and higliways within the city boundaries.^ For this reason, the terra " highway " has sometimes been distinguished by the courts from " municipal streets ; " " and where a statute gives to non-munici- pal ofiicials the control over " highways " within certain terri- torial limits, it would be presumed that the Legislature did not intend to give to such officials the control of the streets of a city, which are located within the same limits.'' iDil. Mun. Corp., 676; State v. Cora'rs, 23 Fla. 632. - Elliott on Eoads & Streets, p. 329; People V. Chicago, 118 111. 520; s. c, 8 N. E. R. 824; Cowan's Case, 1 Overt. 311; State v. Jones, 18 Tex. 874; In- dianapolis V. Croas, 7 Ind. 9; Lafay- ette V. Jenners, 10 lb. 79; Tucker v. Conrad, 1031b. 349; Cross v. Morris- town, 18 N. J. Eq. 305 ; State v. Mor- ristown, 33 N. J. I,. 57. ' Wells V. McLaughlin, 17 Ohio, 99 ; Baldwin v. Green, 10 Mo. 410; Xor- wich V. Story, 25 Conn. 44; Benning- ton V. Smith, 29 Vt. 254; Road in Milton, 40 Pa. St. 400. * Palatine V. Kreuger, 121 111. 72; and comp. Heiple v. E. Portl., 13 Greg. 97. 5 See cases in preceding note. 6 Indianapolis v. Croas, 7 Ind. 9. " State V. Jones, 18 Tex. 874; In- dianapolis V. Croas, supra; Cross v. Morristown, 18 N. J. Eq. 305 ; Clark V. Com., 14 Bush, 100. 5.57 289 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS. [CH. XTT, The question becomes more difficult to settle, where a mu- nicipal corporation is established within a county or township, without an express curtailment or withdrawal of the prior ju- risdiction of county or township officials over the highways, already opened to the public, which now fall within the terri- torial limits of the new municipality. The general rule of construction is that, upon the creation of a new governmental agency, it takes the place of the preceding agency, to the extent of the conflict of the two agencies ; and to that extent becomes invested with the powers and duties of its predecessor, in con- formity with the general principle, that the Legislature could not have intended to create conflicting governmental agencies.^ This is sound as a general proposition of law, and we see no reason whj' it should not apply to the case in question, and give to the municipality exclusive control over a matter of so pe- culiarly local concern as streets and urban roads.^ But the ju- risdiction of the county officials over highways, located within the limits of a proposed municipality, will not be ousted, until the incorporation of the town has been completed. The re- cording of the town map will not have this effect.^ § 289. Delegation of legislative power over streets It hiis been elsewhere explained in detail * how the Legislature can delegate a portion of its lawmaking power to municipal corporations ; and that the local authorities can by virtue of > Hon. V. State, 89 Ind. 249; School Town. v. Plain Sch. Tp., 86 lb. 582; School Tp. of Allen v. School Town, of Macy, 109 lb. 559; Sch. Dis. etc. V. Tapley, 1 Allen, 49. 2 Elliott on Roads & Streets, p. 312- 310, inc.; O'Kanev. Treat, 25 111.458; Fox V. Rockford, 38 111. 451; Ottawa V. Walker, 21 lb. 605; JBa; paj-ie Rob- erts, 11 S. W. R. 782; People v. Chi- cago, 118 111. 520; s. 0., 8 N. E. Rep. 824; Cowan's Case, 1 Overt. 311; State V. Jones, 18 Tex. 874; Indian- apolis V. Croas, 7 Ind. 9; Lafayette V. Jenneis, 10 Ind. 79; Tucker v. Conrad, 103 Ind. 349; Cross v. Mor- ristown, 18 N. J. Eq. 305; State v. Morristown, 33 N. J. L. 57; Town- send V. Hoyle, 20 Conn. 1. But see 558 in opposition to above view, jS'orwich V. Story, 25 Conn. 44; Guthrie v. Jfew Haven, 31 lb. 308; Wells v. McLaugh- lin, 17 Ohio, 99; Butman v. Fowler, 17 lb. 101 ; Baldwin v. Green, 10 Mo. 410; Bennington v. Smith, 29 Vt. 254. See, also, generally upon this sub- ject, Waugh V. Leech, 28 111. 488; Bell V. Foutch, 21 Iowa, 119; Van Peet V. Davenport, .42 lb. 308; Pope V. Com'rs, 12 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 407; Penn. R. R. v. Duquesne Bor., 46 Pa. St. 223; B. Mercer Bor. Road, 14 Serg. & R. 447; Newville Rd., 8 Watts, 172; Easton Road, 8 Rawle, 195. « Waugh V. Leech, 28 111. 488. * Ch. VIII. CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. § 290 such delegation enact ordinances and local laws, which have within their jurisdiction the force of the general statutes of the State. It is therefore well settled that the Legislature may- delegate the power of regulating and controlling highways and streets to the local municipal government.^ The municipal control over streets depends entirely upon the provisions of the charter or other legislative enactments.'^ But streets, in com- mon with other public property, are held in trust by the munic- ipality for public purposes ; and for that reason the city cannot divest itself of responsibility for their improvement and care.^ Nor, on the other hand, is the municipality subject to judicial supervision, in the exercise of its discretionary powers over streets, except where these powers are abused or exceeded.* § 290. Construction of charter powers over streets. — The general rule of construction, for the determination of the powers of a municipality, applies here, as elsewhere, viz. : that they depend upon the terms and provisions of the charter, and must be expressly granted therein, or necessarily implied therefrom, in order to carry into effect some power or municipal purpose which is expressly authorized by the charter. The powers thus delegated to cities are generally very broadly defined ; and their scope and extent must be ascertained by liberal construc- tion of the charter or statutory authority .* The general authority to open, care for, regulate and improve streets, together with the implied or express authority to enact ordinances for the better carrying out of corporative ends, gives the city full authority to keep the streets open and free for 'See State v. Topp, 97 N. C. 477; State V. Hoagland, 51 N. J. L. 62; s. c, 16 Atl. R. 166; Columbus Gas Co. V. Columbus, (Ohio) 33 N. E. R. 292; Hennepin Co. v. Bartelson, (Minn.) 34 X. W. R. 222; Sewer Street, (Pa. 92) 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 226; James v. Pine Bluff, 49 Ark. 199; s. c, 4 S. W. Rep. 760; Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141; Phillips V. Huntington, 35 W. Va. 406. 2 Citizens Ry. Co. v. Memphis, 53 Ted. Rep. 715; Denver Circle etc. v. Nestor, 10 Colo. 403; State v. Eliza- beth, (K. J. 93) 26 Atl. R. 939; Mo- Grew V. Stewart, (Kan. 93) 32 Pac. R. 896; In re Dassler, 35 Kan. 678. 3 Kreigh v. Chicago, 86 111. 407. - Piatt V. Chicago etc., (la.) 31 N. W. R. 883; Terrill v. Bloomfield, (Ky. 93) 21 S. W. Rep. 1041; State v. Nat. Dock Co., (N. J. 9.3) 26 Atl. R. 145; Leeds v. Richmond, 102 Ind. 372; Weaver v. Templin, 113 lb. 242. 5 North Pac. etc. v. East Portland, 14 Oreg. 3; Northern Trans. Co. v. Chicago, 99 IT. S. 635 ; Spokane St. Ry. Co. V. Spokane, (Wash. 93) 32 Pac. Rep. 456; Waukelha v. Village, (Wis. 93) 53 N. W. R. 675. 559 § 290 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XVI. the public, to remove all obstructions, and to regulate their use.^ Thus, it has been held that when a city has " the care, super- vision and control of streets, squares and commons," it may prohibit the use of them for private purposes, such as auction sales.''' In genera], a grant of authority, in broad and comprehensive terms, carries with it by implication all incidental powers, nec- essary to the execution of the main power. So, the power to open streets has been held to confer the power to lay out and establish streets,^ and, to lay out such streets across an existing railroad track.* The power to open and extend streets has been held to include the power to construct them.* The power to " regulate streets and sidewalks " implies the incidental power to prescribe what shall be their width ; ^ and the power to " con- struct sidewalks," must be construed to mean, not only that the city may construct them where they do not already exist ; but that the municipality may also remove or dispense with them, if it be so disposed.'' So, also, the power to lay out highways confers the power to lay out a footway.^ As the sidewalk is a part of the street, the power to improve streets includes power to improve sidewalks ; ^ and if an owner of property fails to re- move an unsafe sidewalk in front of his lot, where the cost of sidewallcs is imposed upon the abutting landowner, the city may remove it and relay it in its own way.i" So, likewise, under a clause, empowering the city " to lay out, open, grade and otherwise improve the streets and keep them in repair," it was held that a city could establish the grade, and require the owuers of lots to make their sidewalks conform thereto.^^ 1 Toledo P. & W., etc., v. Clienon, 43 111. 209; Eajlroad Co. v. Galena, 40 lb. 344; Terre Haute v. Turner, 36Ind. 522; Citizens, etc., v. Elwood, 114 lb. 332; Philadelphia v. Phila., etc., 58 Pa. St. 253; Mercer v. Pitts- burgh, etc., 36 lb. 99; Cora. v. Brooks, 99 Mass. 434; Dudley v. Frankfort, 12 B. Mon. 617; Sinton V. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 525. ^Wliite V. Kent, ll Ohio St. 550; Shelton v. Mobile, 30 Ala. 540. 3 Hannibal v. Hannibal & St. J., etc., 48 Mo. 480. 560 * Hannibal v. Winchell, 54 Mo. 172. s Matthiessen, etc., v. Jersey City, 26 N. J. Eq. 247. « State V. Morristown, 33 N. J. L. 57. ' Atty. Gen. v. Boston, 142 Mass. 200; Winter v. Montg9inery, 83 Ala. 589; s. c, 3 So. Rep. 235. 8 Boston, etc., v. Boston, 140 Mass. 87. 9 Taber v. Graf miller, 109 Ind. 206. 1" Emporia v. Gilchrist, 37 Kan. 532; see ante, §§259a, 277-281. " Burr V. Newcastle, 49 Ind. 322. CH. XVI. J STREETS, BKIDG-ES AST) TURNPIKES. §291 Power to make ordinances "respecting streets, wagons, carts, drays, etc., as to the council shall appear necessary for the secu- rity, welfare and convenience of the city," was held to authorize a regulation fixing the weight of merchandise, which vehicles could cany when passing through the city.^ Under similar special clauses in charters, coupled with a clause empowering the city to enact rules for the " general wel- fare, it has been held that cities have the power to regulate or forbid street auctions ; ^ to prohibit fast driving ; ^ to regu- late the speed of railroad trains passing through the streets,* and to make any other regulations, which may be proper and essential to protect the community in the use of the streets.^ § 291. Power to pave construed — The power to pave or repave streets, which is usually granted in express terms, has met with a most liberal construction b}' the courts. The word "pave" includes the use of all means, by which a covering of brick or stone is laid to make a level surface for the use of ve- hicles, animals or pedestrians.^ Paving includes macadamiz- ing/ flagging ^ and a sidewalk made of plank or other suitable material.® And the term "pavement" includes brick side- walks, of which curbs and gutters form a part.^" So, the cost of paving street crossings and intersections is a part of the expense of paving for which abutting owners may be assessed.ii The power to pave includes the power to pur- ' iNagle V. Augusta, 5 6a. 546. 2 Caldwell v. Alton, 33 111. 416; St. Paul V. Fraeger, 25 Minn. 248; White V. Kent, 11 Ohio St. 550. ' Nealis v. Hayward, 48 Ind. 19. *Donnaher v. State, 8 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 649; K. E. Co. v. Buffalo, 5 Hill (N. T.) 209; Knoblock v. R. E. Co., 31 Minn. 402; Grube v. Mo. Pacite, 11 S. W. Eep. 736; Whitson V. Franklin, 34 Ind. 392; Eichmond, etc., V. Eichmond, 96 U. S. 521. ■* Nixon V. Blloxi, (Miss.) 5 So. Eep. 621; New Orleans, etc., v. Hart, 40 La. An. 474; Board v. Heister, 37 N. Y. 661; Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 lb. 591; Com. V. Curtis, 9 Allen, 266; Hawley v. Harrall, 19 Conn. 142; Pedrick v. Bailey, 12 Gray, (Mass.) 36 161 ; Shelton v. Mobile, 30 Ala. 540. 6 Burnham v. Chicago, 24 111. 496. In this case, the court said " A pave- ment is not limited to uniformly ar- ranged masses of solid material, as blocks of wood, brick or stone, but it may be as well formed of pebbles, or gravel, or other hard substances, which will make a compact, even, hard way or floor." Gurnee v. Chi- cago, 40 111. 165. 'Warren v. Henley, 31 Iowa, 31. 8 In re Phillips, 60 N. Y. 16. 8 Burl. & Mo. E. etc. v. Spearman, 12 Iowa, 112. 1" O'Leary v. Sloo, 7 La. An. 25 ; contra, Dyer v. Chase, 52 Cal. 440. 'i Powell V. St. Joseph, 31 Mo. 347; Creighton v. Scott, 14 Ohio St. 438; 561 § 292 MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS. [CH. XVI. chase paving materials,^ and every other power which is neces- sarj' to the effectual exercise of the expressly granted power.^ It has thus been held that grading is an incident of paving." In Pennsylvania the power to ^aye and grade-was construed to authorize the power to furnish and establish curbstones;* so "trimming and guttering" have been held to be included in "macadamizing."^ And inasmuch as macadamizing has been held to be merely a species of paving, the power to trim and lay gutters would doubtless be included in the power to pave.^ On the other hand, it has been held that the power to repair does not include the power to pave in the fii'st instance ; ' the word repair meaning to restore to sound or good condition after injury or partial destruction.^ § 292. Power to improve, pave and grade, continuous.^ The express power, conferred upon municipal corporations to grade and improve streets, is a continuing one, and may be ex- ercised from time to time ; it is not exhausted with its first exercise.^ Thus, when the city had by ordinance established a grade, corresponding to which the plaintiff made improve- ments, and subsequently the city established another grade; an injunction against the city to restrain the second change of grade was dismissed ; the court holding that, as the power was continuous, it was not exhausted by being exercised once, and Gunning Gravel Co. v. New Orleans, (La. 93) 13 So. 182 ; In re Eager, 46 N. T. 100; Schenectady v. Trustees, 21 N. Y. S. 147; 66 Hun, 179. 1 Bigelow V. Perthamboy, 1 Dutch. 297. ^Schenley v. Com., 36 Pa. St. 29, 30, 60; Schenectady v. Trustees, su- pra ; see Harrisburg v. Segelbaura, 151 Pa. St. 172 ; McNamara v. Estes, 22 Iowa, 246. 3 State V. Elizabeth, 30 N. J. L. 365 ; Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 560. ■•Scbeuley v. Com., 36 Pa. St. 29; Steckert v. East Saginaw, 22 Mich. 104; Deanv. Borchenins, 30 Wis. 236. ^ McNamara v. Estes, 22 Iowa, 246. 6 Philadelphia v. Ehret, 153 Pa. St. 1; see New Haven v. Whitney, 36 Conn. 373; see further as to power to lay pavement, In re Burmeister, 562 76 N. Y. 174; Boyer v. Reading, 151 Pa. St. 185; In re Smith, 52 N. Y. 526; In re Levy, 63 lb. 637; In re Folsom, 56 lb. 60; In re Burke, 62 lb. 224; City of Philadelphia v. Ball, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. 92; Morse v. West- port, 110 Mo. 502; 19 S. W. K. 831; Dooley v. Sullivan, 112 lud. 451; Wiles v. Hoss, 114 lb. 371; Warner V. Knox, 50 Wis. 429; Philadelphia V. Dibeler, 147 Pa. St. 243; 23 Atl. 567. ' State V. Jer. City, 28 N. J. L. 500; Watson V. Passaic, 46 lb. 124. 8 Pittsburgh etc. v. Pittsburgh, 80 Pa. St. 72. 3 Columbus G. Co. v. Columbus, (Ohio 93) 33 N. E. R. 292; McCormick v. Patchen, 53 Mo. 33; Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; Estes v. Owen, 2 S. W. R. 133; 90 Mo. 113; Farrar v. St. Louis, 80 lb. 392. CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. §292 that, although the grade had been declared by the first ordi- nance to be binding upon the corporation, and all other persons whatsoever, this enactment was not in the nature of a contract, and was therefore repealable at the pleasure of the municipal authorities. Neither the corporation nor the State can prevent, by contract or enactments of the kind described, the future ex- ercise of legislative power. The counter-proposition is incon- sistent with the successful maintenance of the government.^ The abutting owner has no claim against the city for dam- ages caused by a change in the grade of the street, in the ab- sence of a statutory provision for such compensation.^ The injustice, occasioned by the enforcement of this rule, has led to the enactment of statutes in many of the States, giving to the abutting owner a right to recover for the damages caused by such changes in the grade of a street.^ 1 Goszler v. Georgetown, 6 Wheat. 597. In this case, Marshall, C. J., said: " When a government enters in- to a contract there is no question of its power to bind itself to any extent not prohibited by its constitution. A corporation can make such con- tracts only as are allowed by the acts of incorporation. The power of this body to make a contract which should so operate as to bind its legis- lative capacities forever thereafter, and disable it from enacting a by-law which the Legislature enables it to enact, may well be questioned. We rather think that the corporation cannot abridge its own legislative power." ^Columbus Gas Company v. Co- lumbus, (Ohio 93) 33 N. E. Rep. 292; Quincy v. Jones, 76 111. 231 ; see notes to EadclifE v. Mayor, .53 Am. Dec. 366; Dormon v. Jacksonville, 13 Fla. 589; White v. Yazoo, 37 Miss. 357; City of Montgomery v. Townsend, 80 Ala. 489; 2 So. Eep. 155;.Flaggv. Worcester, 13 Gray, 601; Reynolds V. Shreveport, 13 La. An. 426; Kepple V. Keokuk, 01 Iowa, 653; Genois v. St. Paul, 32 Minn. 330; Henderson v. Minneapolis, 32 lb. 310; Oakland v. Carpentier, 13 Cal. 540; Gale v. Kal- amazoo, 23 Mich. 344; McCash v. Bur- lington, 72 Iowa, 26; 33 N. W. Rep. 346; Bord v. Oconto, 47 Wis. 386; Belcher v. St. Louis etc., 82 Mo. 121; St. Louis V. Gurno, 12 Mo. 414; Im- ler V. Springfield, 55 lb. 110; Schatt- ner v. Kansas City, 53 lb. 162; Free- mansburg v. Rogers, (Pa.) 8 Atl. Eep. 872; Rounds v. Mumford, 2 R.I. 154; Graves v. Otis, 2 Hill, 466; Rome v. Omberg, 28 Ga. 46 ; Brown v. Low- ell, 8 Met. 172; Skinner v. Bridge, 29 Conn. 523; Simmons v. Camden, 26 Ark. 276 ; Folinsbee v. Amsterdam, 21 N. Y. S. 42; Alexander v. Milw., 16 Wis. 247; Snyder v. President, 6 Ind. 237; Cummins v. Seymour, 79 lb. 491; Rakowsky v. Duluth, 44 Minn. 188; Selden v. Jacksonville, 10 So. 457; 28 Fla. 558; City of Bloom- ington V. Pollock, 31 N. E. Rep. 140; State V. Judges, (Minn. 93) 53 N. W. Rep, 800; Topeka v. Sells, 29 Pac. Rep. 604; see contra in Ohio, Craw- ford V. Delaware, 7 Ohio St. 459; Akron v. Chamberlain Co., 34 lb. 328; see Louisville v. Rolling Mill, 3 Bush, 416. s Burr V. Leicester, 121 Mass. 241 ; Columbus V. Woolen Mills, 33 Ind. 435 ; 563 § 293 MUNICIPAL COKPORATIONS. [CH. XVI. Since the power to grade and improve is continuous in char- acter, it may be, and indeed, on principles of public policy, ought to be, emploj'^ed whenever there is a municipal or public need for the same. And, inasmuch as legislative and discre- tionary powers are exempt from judicial review, the courts will not inquire into the motives and reasons upon which such mu- nicipal legislation is based, or into the necessity for it, provided the power is exercised in a reasonably impartial manner, and its results do not conflict with the constitution or with the prin- ciples of public policy.^ § 293. Eights of municipality in SOU of streets. — Except where the public acquires the title in fee to the roadbed, the proprietor of land, over which a highway has been laid out, continues his ownership of the soil of such highway for all pur- poses, which are consistent with the public easement.^ He may remove his property situated thereon, such as trees, flag- stones, stepping-stones, and the like ; ^ or he may tunnel be- neath it for minerals, or for the construction of cellars, provid- ed the public easement is not impaired. A distinction has in this connection been made between country roads and streets ; and it has been held in some in- stances that, under the very extensive power of grading streets, if a removal of the earth be found necessary, it may be removed, sold or used by the corporation in any way and for any pur- pose it may deem proper,* and that although the abutting own- Steams V. Richmond, (Va. 92) 14 S. E. K. 847; McCarthy v. St. Paul, 22 Minn. 527; Eeardon v. San Francisco, Pac. Eep. 325; Page v. Belvin, (Va. 92) 14 S. E. K. 843; Elgin v. Eaton, 83 111. 535; Harmon v. Omaha, 17 Neb. 548; see authorities cited in Healey v. New Haven, 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 450, 456. 1 Roanoke Gas Co. v. Roanoke, (Va. 90) 14 S. E. R. 665; Columbus Gas Co. V. Columbus, (Ohio 93) 33 N. E. R. 292; McCormick v. Patchen, 53 Mo. 33; Estes v. Owen, 90 lb. 113; Koons V. Lucas, 52 Iowa, 177 ; Mc- Kevitt V. Hobo, 45 N. J. L. 482; Els- ter V. Springfield, 30 N. E. R. 274; Dunham v. Hyde Park, 75 111. 371 ; 564 Gall V. Cincin., 18 Ohio St. 563; Smith T. Washington, 20 How. (U. S.)135; O'Connor V. Pittsb., 18 Pa. St. 187; Cooper V. Dallas, (Tex. 92) 18 S. W. B. 92; In re Furman Sti'., 17 Wend. 649. 3 Rich V. Minneapolis, (Minn.) 35 N. W. E. 2; Denniston v. Clark, 125 Mass. 216; Tucker v. Tower, 9 Pick. 109. s Palatine v. Krueger, 12 N. E. E. 75; 121 111. 75; Goodtitle v. Alker, 1 Kenyon, 427, 437; Com. v. Noxon, 121 Mass. 42; Wellman v. Dickey, 78 Me. 20; Clark v. Dasso, 34 Mich. 86. « Griswold v. Bay City, 35 Mich. 452; Huston v. Fort Atkinson, 56 Wis. 350. CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TUKNPIKES. 294 er may own the fee of the street, he has no title to the surplus soil, resulting from grading or improving it.^ Where the city or State has acquired the title to the bed or soil of the streets, the right to remove and dispose of the soil cannot be questioned. But it may be stated as a general rule that, when the fee to the highway remains in the adjoining owner, all that the public or the municipality has acquired is an easement for public trav- el ; and, while doubtless the municipality has the right to em- ploy any appropriate means to render the street convenient or adapted to public purposes, it cannot justly be considered that the owner of the fee has agreed to allow the city to take the particles of soil owned by him without compensation and to de- vote them to purposes in no way beneficial to him.^ Nor can it be said that the distinction as to public right between city streets aud country roads will alter this principle. It seems, how- ever, to be a well established exception to the general rule, that in cases of city streets " where there is a general plan for the gradation and improvement of highways, intersecting streets and highways in the vicinity of the one improved are to be deemed part of the same general plan, and soil may be removed from one street and placed upon another. " ** § 294. Right of municipality to use the roadbed for construction of sewers aud cisterns. — Whether the fee be in the abutter or not, the corporation may, by virtue of its power to make and maintain streets, and by the power conferred upon it to do all necessary acts for the protection of the health of the community,* construct sewers, drains and culverts in or > Davis V. Clinton, (la.) 20 Alb. I<. Jour. 56; Hovey v. Mayo, 43 Me. 322; New Haven v. Sargent, 38 Conn. 50. ^Elliott Eoads and Streets, p. 524; Althen v. Kelley, 32 Minn. 280. ' Aurora v. Fox, 78Ind. 1, 6; Hov- ey V. Mayo, 43 Me. 322; New Haven V. Sargent, 38 Conn. 50; Denniston V. Clark, 12.5 Mass. 216; Smith v. Rome, 19 Ga. 89; Adams v. Emerson, 6 Pick. 58; Kendall v. Post, 8 Oreg. 141; Cusick v. Norwich, 40 Conn. 376; Tucker v. Eldred, 6 R. I. 404; Wil- liams V. Kennedy, 14 Barb. 629; Hig- gins V. Reynolds, 31 N. Y. 151; Ladd V. French, 6 N. Y. Sup. 56; Fisher v. Rochester, 6 Lans. 225 ; Robert v. Sad- ler, 104N. Y. 229; s. c.,58 Am. Rep. 498; and compare Burr v. Leicester, 121 Mass. 241 ; Jackson v. Hatliaway, 15 Johns. 447, 453; Fish v. Rochester, 6 Paige, 268, 272; Bissell v. Collins, 28 Mich. 277; Baxter v. Winooski Turnp., 22 Vt. 114; Cole v. Drew, 44 lb. 49; Chapin v. Sullivan etc., 39 N. H. 564. ^ State V. Charleston, 12 Rich. 702; Ziggler v. Menges, (lud.) 22 N. E, Rep. 722. 563 §294 MUNICIPAL CORPOBATIONS. [CH. XVI. upon the soil' of the street, not only without compensation be- ing made to the adjacent owners, but at their expense.^ Such use of a street is lawful,^ and the power to construct sewers, like the power to grade, is continuous ; ^ which, however, should be exercised only when the safety and healthfulness of the vi- cinity demand it, and not for the private convenience and ac- commodation of particular individuals.* Nor will the courts ordinarily interfere with the exercise of the power. It is not a judicial, but a legislative and municipal question, how and when the power should be exercised.® When the construction of a sewer has been decided upon and its pros- ecution begun, the duty of the city becomes ministerial, and liability for its negligent performance then attaches." The power to construct sewers must be so exercised as not to result in a nuisance.'^ Whether the power to construct sewers be a part of the police power ^ or an exercise of the right of eminent domain,* it is a sovereign power which cannot be bartered away or surrendered ; and parties, who contract with a municipal corporation upon matters involving such a use or occupation of the streets, do so 1 Spokane Ey. Co. v. Spokane, 5 Wash. St. 634; Stoudlnger v. Newark, 28 N. J. Eq. 72; Leeds v. Richmond, 102 Ind. 372; People v. Board, 69 Hun, 95 ; Adams v. Bay City, 44 N. "W. K. 138; Griswold v. Bay City, 35 Mich. 452; In re Fowler, 53 N. Y. 60; Maywood Co. v. Maywood, 29 N. E. R. 704; Clapp v. Spokane, 53 Fed. R. 515; Gray v. Board, 139 Mass. 328; see ante, § 277. ^Cincin. v. Perry, 21 Ohio St. 499; Traphagen v. Jersey City, 29 N. J. Eq. 206; Stondinger v. Newark, 28 lb. 187; s. c, lb. 446. "R. R. Co. V. Quincy, (111. 91) 28 N. E. R. 1069; McKevittv. Hoboken, 45 N. J. L. 482. * Kasmaks v. New York City, 117 N. Y. 361 ; Cone v. Hartford, 28 Conn. 363, 375; Heman v. Payne, 27 Mo. Ap. 481; Bayha v. Taylor, 36 lb. 427. ■ ^ Kansas City v. Richards, 34 Mo. Ap. 521; Horton v. Mayor, 4 Lea, 39; 566 40 Am. Reps. 1; Freburg v. Daven- port, 63 Iowa, 119; Martin v. Hilb, 14 S. W. R. 94 (Ark. 90); Leeds v. Richmond, 102 Ind. 372; Mayor v. Eldridge, 64 Ga. 524; s. c, 37 Am. Rep. 89; Oil City v. Boiler Wks., 25 Atl. E.,549; 152 Pa. St. 348. 6 Denver V. Rhodes, (Colo.)13Pac. Rep. 729; Jones v. New Haven, 34 Conn. 1. 'Weis V. Madison, 75 Ind. 241; 39 Am. Rep. 135; Hebron R'd v. Har- vey, 90 Ind. 192; 46 Am. Rep. 199; Kellogg V. Thompson, 66 N. Y. 88; Phinizy v. Augusta, 47 Ga. 260; Perry V. Worcester, 6 Gray, 544. 8 Tiedeman Police Powers, 445; Cooley's Cons. Lim. 234; Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454; Donnelly v. Decker, 58 Wis. 461; Pool v. Trexler, 76 N. C. 297. 3 People V. Nearing, 27 N. Y. 306; In re Eyers, 72 lb. 1. CH. XVI.] STKEETS, BEIDGES AND TURNPIKES. § 295 subject to the future exercise of this power.^ In the exercise of the power to construct a system of sewerage, the municipal corporation is not limited as to the selection of a site for its dumping ground by the territorial limits of the city, but it may purchase such site wherever it is found to be best adapted for the discharge of the sewage.^ Analogous to the power to construct sewers and drains is the power to build street cisterns. The cases tend to support the doctrine that the corporation may, for the purpose of " pre- seiTing the public health, providing means for the prompt extinguishment of fires and promoting the general welfare," cause reservoirs and cisterns to be made in the soil of the streets.^ On the other hand, it has been held that a city may abolish private wells in the soil of the street without compen- sation to their owners.* § 295. Pipes in streets for gas and otlier purposes. — In this country, as in England, legislative authority, either ex- press or necessarilj' implied, is required, before gas pipes or pipes for like purposes can be laid in city streets by private corporations or individuals.^ And the franchise may be granted, either directly by the Legislature, or indirectly by the munici- pality under its charter powers.® For the Legislature may grant to a city the power to permit private corporations to lay down gas mains in its streets.^ The construction of a system of gas pipes in the bed of country roads, is .so unusual, — and therefore not to be presumed to have been contemplated, when 1 Elliott on Koads & Streets, p. 368 ; Louisville, etc. v. Louisville, 8 Bush, 415; Kirby v. Citizens St. E'y Co., 48 Md. 168; Dil. Mun. Corp. § 689. ^Coldwater v. Tucker, 56 Mich. 474; 24 Am. Eep. 601; Cummins v. Seymour, 79 Ind. 491; a. c, 41 Am. Eep. 618; Hyde Pk. v. Spencer, (111.) 6 West. Eep. 517; see ante, §201. 3 West V. Bancroft, 32 Vt. 367; Dil. Mun. Corp. §690; Barter v. Conn., 3 Pa. St. 259; Branson v. Philadelphia, 47 lb. 329; coyitra, Dubuque v. Ma- lohey, 9 Iowa, 460. * Ferrenbach v. Turner, 86 Mo. 416. *Eeg. V. Charles worth, 16 Q. B. 1012; Eeg. v. Train, 9 Cox C. C. 180; Thompson v. Sunderland etc., L. E. 2 Ex. Div. 429; Ellis v. Sheffield etc., 23 L. J. Q. B. 42; Eeg. v. Longton G. Co., 29 L. J. M. C. 118. » State V. Cincin. Gas Co., 18 Ohio St. 262. ' Quincy v. Bull, 106 111. 337; s. c, 4 Ara. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 554; District V. Gas Company, 20 D. C. 39; Garri- son v. Chicago, 7 Biss. 480; Brown V. Duplessis, 14 La. Ann. 842; Peo- ple V. Gilroy, 67 Hun. .323; Smith v. Metro, etc. Co., 12 How. Pr. 187; In- dianapolis V. Gas Co., 66«Ind. 396; Cf. People V. Benson, 30 Barb. 24; Gas Co. V. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19. 567 § 296 MUNICIPAL COllPOllATlONS. [cH. xvr. the road was laid out, — that it is held to be the imposition of an additional servitude for which, in Pennsylvania and New York, the abutter is entitled to compensation.^ But the streets of a city are never deserted at any hour of the night ; and the presence in the city of evil designing persons, together with the difficulty of locomotion in the dark, makes it highly essen- tial to the safety and comfort of the inhabitants of a city th.it its streets be properly lighted at nights. And since the construc- tion of gas pipes in the roadbed of the streets has become a common custom, it is presumed that the authority to do this was impliedly acquired by the public in the original dedication or confiscation of the land as a street, and the statement is waiTanted that the laj-ing of gas pipes under legislative sanc- tion is not an additional servitude, for which the owner of the fee can exact compensation.^ § 296. Power to grant exclusive franchise to lay pipes in streets. — The power of the Legislature to grant to a private individual or corporation the exclusive right to use the streets of a city for the purpose of laying down gas pipes or other simi- lar conduits in the roadbed, has been questioned ; but it has been held very generally that such an exclusive Legislative grant is valid, if it does not conflict with some express provision of the State constitution.^ But the Legislature does not thereby part with its police power of supervision in the interest of the public welfare ; nor is the State relieved of its duty to protect the public health, morals or safety against an improper or harm- ful exercise of the franchise.* 1 Bloomfield etc. Co. v. Calkins, 62 N. y. 386; Sterling's App., Ill Pa. St. 35. 2Ci-ooke V. Flat. W. Wks., 29 Hun, 245; Dil. Mun. Cor. §691, note; see Nelson v. La Porta, 33 Ind. 258; New Orleans v. Clark, 95 TJ. S. 644; Rich- mond Co. Gasl. Co. V. Middletown, 59 N. Y. 228. In California, the right of laying gas and otlier pipes in the streets of a city, is regulated by the Constitution of 18*79; People V. Stephens, 62 Cal. 209. 'N. O. Waterworks v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674; Louisville Gas Co. v. Cit. 568 Gas Co., 115 lb. 683; N. O. Gas Co. V. Louisiana L. Co., 115 lb. 650; State V. Milw. Gas Co., 29 Wis. 454; 8. C, 9 Am. Rep. 598; Newport v. Newp. L. Co., 84 Ky. 167; Atlantic C. W. Wks. V. Atlantic City., 39 N. J. Eq. 367; comp. Citizens W. Co. v. Bridgeport Hyd. Co., 55 Conn. 1; State V. Cincin. G. & 0. Co., 18 Ohio St. 262; see ante, § 144. *N. O. Gas Co. V. Louisiana etc., 115 U. S. 650; Cf. Stein v. Bienville W. S. Co., 34 Fed. Rep. 145 ; Nat. W. Wks. Co. V. Kansas City, 28 lb. 921. CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. § 296 It is very evident that all persons cannot have the right to lay pipes in the soil of the streets ; and it is equally clear that capital cannot be induced to make such an investment, unless it can be guaranteed that the franchise granted will be so far protected from arbitrary molestation, that it may expect a safe and sure return. While it is true that the manufacture of gas is an ordinary business, and that to restrict its manufacture to one person would be a monopoly, the establishment of which is ordinarily contrary to the law and public policy,^ it should be observed that the monopol}' which is created by the legislation under inquiry is as to the right to use the only means by which it may be expeditiously and conveniently delivered to consumers, viz. : that of pipes, laid in the roadbed of the streets ; and the justification for the creation of such a monopoly, is the protec- tion of the streets against constant and unnecessary injury, through the laying of more pipes than what are needed to sup- ply the public "want.^ For these reasons it is generally held to be within the power of the Legislature to grant such exclu- sive franchises, subject to such control and regulation as will prevent it from becoming oppressive or working injustice upon consumers. But a municipality cannot, in the absence of legis- lative authority, grant such an exclusive franchise.^ So, it has been held that a general power to light the city, expressly conferred, as, for example, to " use the streets for gasmains and for lampposts" or to " enter into a contract for the supply of gas," etc., will not authorize it to grant an exclu- sive franchise to any private individual or coi'poration ; * and as such power is repealable by the Legislature, any contract en- tered into, or any privileges granted, are subject to annulment at any time.^ It has thus been held that the power, to cause ^ See Tiedeman, Police Power, § 105, and ante, § 144 'i Tiedeman, Police Power, § 105, and ante, § 144. s City Gas & M. Co. v. Elwood, 114 Ind. 332; State v. Milwaukee, 29 Wis. 454; Crescent G. Co. v. New Orleans etc., 27 La. An. 148; Des Moines etc. Co. V. Des Moines, 44 Iowa, 505; Memphis etc. v. Williamson, 9 Heisk. 314; Grand Eapids etc. v. Grand Rapids etc., 20 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 270; Davenport v. Kleinsmidt, 16 lb. 301; E. R. Co. v. Transit Ey., 24 Fed. Eep. 306; see ante, § 144. * State V. Cincin. Gasl. etc. Co., 18 Ohio St. 262 ; Indianapolis v. Gaslight Co., 66 Ind. 896; Parkersburg Gas Co. V. Parkersburg, 30 W. Va. 435. 6 Richmond Co. Gasl. Co. v. Middle- town, 59 N. Y. 228. 569 § 297 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS. [CH. X^ I. the streets to be lighted, does not authorize the grant of the exclusive privilege of laying mains for fifty years.-"^ But under the power to light its streets, a municipality may authorize the party supplying the illuminating agent to lay the necessary pipes ; ^ and when the grantee of this franchise has performed the public service thus required of him, the contract for com- pensation, which the city had made with him, is an obligation which cannot be impaired by subsequent legislation ; ^ at least, so far as the contract fell short of granting an exclusive fran- chise. The same rules of law are held to be applicable to corpora- tions which are organized for supplying a city with water.* § 297. Poles for the hanging of telegraph and other wires — Abutter's right to compensation Whatever power the municipal corporation possesses over this subject is deriva- tive ; and legislative authorization is in all cases necessary, before the streets can be used for the placing of poles for the hanging of wire for telegraph, telephone, electric lighting or similar purposes. Without such legislative sanction the poles are nuisances, which may be abated.* In New Jersey it has been held that, when the city had indicated the streets where telegraph poles might be erected, it could not revoke its permis- sion after the company had erected them.^ Despite the fact that the telegraph is an instrument of inter- state commerce, a municipal corporation, through whose terri- tory the line passes, may regulate its construction and use,' 1 Saginaw etc. Co. v. Saginaw, 28 Fed. Eep. 529; see Brush E. L. Co. V. Jones, 5 Ohio C. C. 340; Koanoke G. Co. V. Roanoke, (Va. 92) 14 S. E. B. 665; Carlyle W. L. & P. Co. v. Carlyle, 31 111. App. 325. - Indianapolis v. Ind. Gas L. Co., 66 Ind. 396; Des Moines G. Co. v. Des Moines, 44 Iowa, 508; Quiucy V. Bull, 106 111. 337. " N. O. Gas Co. V. Louisiana L. Co., 115 U. S. 650; Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens Gas Co., 115 lb. 683. " Syracuse W. Co. v. Syracuse, 26 N". Y. State Kep. 364; Brenham v. Bronham Water Co., 67 Texas, 542; see ante, § 144. 570 6 Com. V. Boston, 97 Mass. 555; Hanson v. Hunter, (93) 53 N". W. Kep. 84; Domestic T. & T. Co. v. Newark, 49 N. J. L. 344; Irwin v. Great So. etc., 37 La. An. 63; Julia Bldg. Assn. V. Bell Tel. Co., 88 Mo. 258. •■ Hudson T. Co. v. Jersey City, 49 N. J. L. 303; Dunn v. Great Falls, (Mont. 93) 31 Pac. R. 1017; Citizens V. Sands, (Mich. 93) 55 K W. Rep. 452; Rutland E. L. Co. v. Marble, (Vt. 03) 26 Atl. Rep. 635; Webb v. Demopolls, (Ala. 93) 13 So. Rep. 289. ' Mut. Un. Tel. Co. v. Chicago, 16 Fed. Eep. 309; St. Louis v. W. U, Tel. Co., 149 U. S. 465. CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AXD TURNPIKES. § 297 control by ordinance the erection of the poles and the stringing of wires, and impose a license upon the same under its police power over streets.^ So, also, a statute passed by a State Leg- islature, requiring all wires in certain cities to be laid under- ground, was valid to be a proper police regulation.^ The right of the abutter to compensation, in a case where the legislature has authorized the erection of a telephone, tele- graph or electric light plant opposite his property, has been variously determined. The question is, whether such a use, though public, is not an additional servitude, not contemplated when the street or highway was dedicated or condemned.^ The fact, that the fee of the street is not in the abutter would, it has been held in analogous cases, not affect his iight to com- pensation.* And the sounder rule seems to be that the abut- ting owner ought to be compensated for all actual injury to his property, or the right to use the same. These cases dif- fer from the laying of gas and other pipes in the roadbed, iu that there is in the latter only a technical violation of the right of property in any case, and no injury to the abutting property or any diminution of its enjoyment ; whereas, telegraph poles and wires produce a serious positive damage to abutting property, not only by disfiguring the appearance of the street, but like- wise by diminishing the light and air passing into the windows, and by increasing the dangers of destruction of buildings and loss of life by fire.^ iW. TJ. T. Co. V. Phila., 21 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cases, 40; see contra, St. Louis V. W. El. T. Co., 39 Fed. Eep. 69; Eatterman v. W. XJ. T. Co., 127 U. S. 411. 2W. U. T. Co. V. New York, 38 Fed. Rep. 552. sRoake v. Am. Tel. & T. Co., 41 N. J. Eq. 35; Broome v. N. T. & N. J. Tel. Co., 42 lb. 141; 7 Atl. Eep. 851; Board of Trade Tel. Co. v. Bar- nett, 107 111. 507; Irwin v. Gt. So. Tel. Co., 37 La. An. 63; New Orleans M. & T. E. R. Co. V. Southern & Atl. Tel. Co., 53 Ala. 211; Gay v. Mut. Union Tel Co., 12 Mo. App. 485, 494. * §§ 303, 304. 'Story V. Elev. E. E. Co., 90 N. Y. 122; Mahady v. Bush wick etc., 91 lb. 148; N. Y. Cable Co. Case, 104 lb. 1; Lahr's Case, 104 lb. 268; N. Y. Dist. Ey. Case, 107 lb. 42 ; Dusenbury v. M. U. T. Co., Abb. New Cas. 440; Metro, etc. Co. v. Caldwell Lead Co., 67 How. Pr. 365; Smith & Cen. etc. T. Co., 2 Ohio Circ. Ct. 259; Willis V. Erie etc. Co., 37 Minn. 347; Atl. etc. Tel. Co. v. Chicago etc. R. E. Co., 7 Biss. 158; Amer. Tel. etc. Co. v. Smith, (Md.) 18 Atl. Rep. 910; Clauser etc. V. Baltimore & O. T. Co., 17 Chic. Leg. News, 22 ; People v. Squire," 107 N. Y. 593; Southwestern R. R. Co. v. Southern etc. T. Co., 46 Ga. 43; s. c, 12 Am. Rep. 585 ; West. Union T. Co. V. Rich, 19 Kan. 517, s. c, 27 Am. 671 § 298 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XVI. § 298. Openings in and vaults under sidewalks — For convenience in obtaining access to their cellars, it has become common for abutting owners to make openings in the side- walk ; and in some instances, vaults are excavated beneath the sidewalks for the purpose of obtaining additional space or room for the cellar, and for the construction of a fire-proof cellar, whose contents will not be injured by a destruction by fire of the abutting building. The streets, including the sidewalks, are devoted to public use ; and this public use signifies their employment in any and every way which may be beneficial to the public ; including the construction of sewers, pipes, cisterns and drains beneath the surface.^ To permit the abutting own- er to make openings in or to undermine the surface of a city street at pleasure, and free from municipal or legislative con- trol, would most seriously impair, if not wholly destroy, the pub- lic easement therein ; and this principle obtains whether the fee of the street be in the city or not. It is clear that the use of the subsoil of the sidewalk, in the modes just indicated, maj' lawfully, and should always, be sub- jected to such police regulations as may be needed to insure the public safety and comfort in the legitimate use of the sidewalk. But whether the fact, that the title to the fee of this subsoil is in the abutting owner, would enable him to resist any interference Kep. 159, and case cited in last note. See contra, Julia Build'g Assn. v. Bell Tel. Co., 88 Mo. 258; Pierce v. Drew, 136 Mass. 75. In his work on Mun. Corp. § 698, Judge Dillon says : " On the whole, the safer and per- haps sounder view is that such a use of the street or highway, attended as it may be especially in cities with serious damage and inconvenience to the abutting owner, is not a street or highway use proper, and hence entitles such owner to compensation for such use, or for any actual injury to his property caused by poles and lines of wire placed in front thereof." Judge Elliott says on the same sub- ject: "Such a use bears a very re- mote analogy to the use [of streets] for passage and repassage. If one 572 or two posts and wires may be placed in front of a, man's property may not a dozen be placed there ? In- deed, in most of our cities, the poles and wires are already so thick as to seriously interfere with the light and air and to greatly impair the chances of saving a building in case of fire. Has the owner no remedy in such a case? Where shall the line be drawn? . . . The abutting owner is specially benefited by drains and sewers and by gas mains, but this is not true of telegraph lines, and so far from facil- itating travel, they rather impede it and interfere with the ordinary use of the way." Elliott Roads and Streets, pp. 535, 536. 1 Tiedeman Police Powers, p. 407, Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324, 44a CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. 299 with his enjoyment of the same for the purposes of a cellar or vault by the laying of pipes and wires under the sidewalk, ex- cept in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and upon ])ayment of compensation, cannot be taken as definitely settled by the adjudications. The difficulty is further increased by the fact, often lost sight of, that in many cases, the title of the abutting owner to the subsoil stops at tiie curbstone. It has however been held in New York that, subject to municipal regu- lations, the abutting owner has a right to excavate the soil be- neath the surface of the street, or at least under the sidewalk, and to use the space so obtained as a basement or for similar purposes, provided tlie full and complete public use of the sur- face of the street is not thereby interfered with.i In •Illinois, the court held 2 that, while the abutting owner possessed no ab- solute right to construct a coal cellar beneath his sidewalk ; yet, upon the ground that such privilege would be of great private convenience, authority might be implied, in the absence of any action by the municipal authorities to prevent the work, after it had become known. But the court adds that any such im- plied license to use a street requires that the licensee shall use more than ordinarj' care and expedition in prosecuting the work, and in closing the cellar openings or shafts on the side- walk. § 299. Municipal regulations of street travel and traffic. — A municipality has the power by express grant, or by virtue of the general authority to make laws relating to the public welfare, to regulate the use of the streets in the interest of the public safety and comfort,^ to regulate the speed of public travel in the streets,* prohibit the stoppage of vehicles for a longer period than what was stipulated in the statute, (twenty min- 1 McCarthy v. Syracuse, 46 N. Y. 194; Robert v. Sadler, 104 N. Y.229; Lahr's Cases, 104 lb. 208; Irvine v. Wood, 51 lb. 224; see, also, Fisher V. Tbirkell, 21 Mich. 1; O'Llnda v. Lathrop, 21 Pick. 292, 297; Pap- worth v. Milw., 64 Wis. 389; Davis V. City of Clinton, 50 Iowa, 585. 2 Nelson V. Gridley, 12 111. 22, 23; Gridley v. Bloomington, 68 lb. 50. 'Farwell v. Chicago, 71 111. 269; Joyce V. E. St. Louis, 77 lb. 156; Knoxville v. Sanford, 13 Lea, 545: Griffin v. Powell, 64 Ga. 625; Snell V. Belleville, 30 IT. C. Q. B. 81; Com. V. Fenton, 139 Mass. 195; Cora. v. Brooks, 90 Mass. 439; see post, § 321, on Law of the Road. 4 Com. V. Worcester, 3 Pick. 462; Washington v. Nashville, 1 Swan (Tenn.) 177; McBean v. Chandler, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 349. 299 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. xvr. utes ;) 1 prohibit night walking ; ^ compel the removal of snow from the sidewalk in certain specified localities ; ^ and to regu- late the removal of build higs, and the use of the streets for that purpose.* Although a street is public and designed for general passage and traffic, without distinction as to persons or vehicles,^ this is by no means its sole use.^ A distinction must be made between the general use, which all the public are permitted to make of the streets for ordinary purposes, and the special and peculiar use, which is made by classes of persons in the pursuit of their occupation or business, such as hackmen, drivers of express wagons, omnibuses, etc. A city may prescribe the routes in its streets to be taken by omni- buses ; ^ and may designate proper localities or stands to be occupied by express wagons, hacks and vehicles which are be- ing offered for hire,^ provided such stands are not so located that they will impair or interfere with the right of the abutting owners.^ A municipality may require a license to be paid by the owner of vehicles used for the transportation of heavy loads ; i" and, it has been held, may regulate the width of the tires.^^ As a pro- tection against the excessive damage to the roadbed, a license on vehicles for hire may be enforced, although the owner of such a vehicle does not reside in the city.^^ For the license in 1 Com. V. Brooks, 109 Mass. 355; Com. V. Fenton, 139 lb. 195. 2Braddy v. Milledgeville, "74 Ga. 516. 'In re Goddard, 16 Pick. 504; Uuion Railway Co. v. Cambridge, 11 Allen (Mass.) 287; Kirby v. Boyls- ton, etc., 14 Gray, 252. ■' Day V. Green, 4 Gush. (Mass.) 433. 5 Starr v. Camden, etc., 24 N. J. L. 592; Barker v. Savage, 45 K. T. 191; Belton V. Baxter, 54 N. T. 245. « See Quinoy v. Jones, 76 111. 231, 244; Heukel v. Detroit, 49 Mich. 249. ' Com. V. Stodder, 2 Cush. 562. « State V. Yopp, 97 N. C. 477; s.c, 2 Am. St. Rep. 305; Baker v. Boston, 12 Pick. 184; Vanderbilt v. Adams, 574 7 Cow. 349; lb. 385; Veneman v. Jones, 118 Ind. 41 , St. Paul v. Smith, 27 Minn. 364; Com. v. Brooks, 99 Mass. 434; Com. v. Mathews, 122 lb. 60; Com. v. Robertson, 5 Cush. 438. 9 McCaffrey v. Smith, 41 Hun, 117; Branahan v. Hotel Co., 39 Ohio St. 333; Lippincott v. Lasher, 44 N. J. Eq. 120; comp. Masterson v. Short, 7 Eobt. (N. Y.) 241. I'Nagle V. Augusta, 5 6a. 546; Gartslde v. E. St. Louis, 43 111. 47; Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 N. Y. 591; St. Louis V. Green, 70 Mo. 562; see ante, §§ 124, 126. " People V. James, 16 Hun, 426; Reginald v. Pike, 1 Ontario, 43. ^ Council V. Pepper, 1 Rich. L. 364; Memphis v. Battaille, 8 Hcisk. 524. CH. XVI.] STKEETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. § 300 all such cases is a police regulation, and not a tax.^ But a li- cense will not be enforced as against a nonresident whose use is occasional only, in view of the distinction between the ordi- nary use of the streets by vehicles and a special use or one which is habitually dangerous or unusually destructive.'^ And this is sometimes true, even when the tax is imposed upon vehi- cles of every sort, without making any distinction between the purposes for which the vehicles are employed.^ Under a charter power to regulate vehicles using the streets, street cars,* bicycles ^ and sprinkling carts are included.® Bicy- cles are vehicles, and the proper place for their use is the roadway. Therefore, one who rides a bicycle recklessly upon the sidewalk, in violation of a statute prohibiting riding or driving there, is liable civilly for the damage caused thereby.'' Bicycles are sub- ject to " the law of the road." ^ § 300. Street obstructions. — The public are entitled to the use of the whole street from side to side, and from end to end ; ® and a partial obstruction, or an encroachment on the bounda- ries of the street by the temporary deposit thereon of goods, is no less a nuisance, because a passageway still remains, through which' travel and traffic may flow.^" The more or less nominal damage to the public, in a particular case of partial obstruction or encroachment upon the public highway, does not make it any less an actionable nuisance. If any one individual be permitted to apply a highway to his own 'See Tiedeman's Police Power, § 101, and ante, § 123; see Scudder v. Hinshaw, (Ind. 93) 33 N. E. Rep. 791 ; Com. V. Page, (Mass. 92) 29 lb. 512; People v. yirUson, 62 Hun, 618; Gibson v. Corapolis, 22 Pitts. L. J. 64; Gibson v. Borougli, lb. 2 Bennett v. Birmington, 31 Pa. St. 15; St. Charles v. Nolle, 51 Mo. 122; Gard. City v. Abbott, 34 Kan. 283; Gass V. Greenville, 4 Sneed, 62. SB'klynv. Nodine, 26 Hun, 512; Ex parte Gregory, 20 Tex. App. 210; seean^e, §§ 123, 124, 261. 4 Eailway Co. v. Philada., 58 Pa. St. 119; see AUerton v. Chicago, 6 Fed. Kep. 555. 'Mercery. Corbin, 117 Ind. 450; S. c, 10 Am. St. E. 76; In re Wright, 29 Hun, 357; Twilley v. Perkins, (Md. 93) 26 Atl. Eep. 286; State v. Yopp, 97 N. C. 471. 6 St. Louis V. "Woodruff, 71 Mo. 92. 'Mercer v. Corbin, 117 Ind. 450; State V. Brown, 109 N. C. 802. 8 State V. Collins, (R. I.) 17 Atl. Rep. 131; see post, § 321. 9 State V. Berdetta, 73 Ind. 185, 193. 1° Emerson v. Babcook, 66 Iowa, 257; State v. "Woodward, 23 Vt. 92; Philbrick v. Place, (Iowa, 93) 55 N. "W. R. 345 ; People v. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y. 396; Com. v. Blaisdell, 107 Mass. 234; Harrow v. State, 1 Greene, (la.) 439; Cf. People v. Carpenter, 1 Mich. 273. 575 §300 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XVI. use, however little, others would he tempted to do the same, with a consequent serious perversion of the street from its original purpose.! jTor this reason, the city may maintain an action to prevent the continuance of obstructions and to obtain their re- moval,^ as well as resort to criminal proceedings, as a punish- ment for the past offence. Anything, which unnecessarily or unreasonably impedes or obstructs the lawful use of a street, is a public nuisance for which an indictment will lie.^ It is not necessary, to constitute a nuisance, that there should be an actual physical obstruction upon the surface of the street ; for it is very evident that a structure, adjacent to, or projecting over, a street, may under certain conditions be- come dangerous to travel thereon, and so he considered a nui- sance.* Under this rule, a bay window, sixteen feet above the ground,^ a house or wall, adjoining the street, which is suffer- ed to remain in a dilapidated condition ; ^ and a wooden awn- ing, covering a sidewalk,^ have been adjudged to be unlawful obstructions and nuisances.^ But the right of the public to an unobstructed use of the street is subject to some reasonable and necessary limitations.* ' Elliott on Roads and Streets, p. 478; Wright v. Saunders, 65 Barb. 213; Dickey v. Tel. Co., 46 Me. 483. 2 Chase v. Oshkosh, (Wis. 92) 51 N. TV. R. 560; State v. Smith, 54 Vt. 403 ; State V. Edens, 85 N. C. 522; Winona V. Hoff, 11 Minn. 119; Buffalo v. Harling, 52 N. W. R. 931; Neshkoro V. Nest, (Wis. 93) 55 lb. 176; Bum- mer V. Jersey City, 20 N. J. L. 86; Metro. C. E. Co. v. Chicago, 96 111. 620. * Waukesha etc. Co. v. Waukesha, 83 Wis. 475; Frauklyn v. Portland, 67 Me. 46; Yates v. Warrentown, 84 Va. 337; 4 S. E. R. 818; Neshkoro v. West, swpra; Runyon v. BordinS, 2 J. S. Green (N. J.) 472; Smith v. State, 23 N. J. L. 712; Heckerman v. Hummell, 19 Pa. St. 64; N. O. v. Gravier, 11 Martin, 620; McNerney v. Reading, 150 Pa. St. 611; Cf. Bryans V. Almond, 87 Va. 564; Davis v. Ban- gor, 42 Me. 522; State v. Cincin. etc., 576 18 Ohio St. 268; Callanan v. Gilman, 107 N. Y. 360; Clifford v. Dam, 81 lb. 52; State v. Merritt, 35 Conn. 314. * Clift V. State, (Ind. 93) 33 N. E. R. 211 ; Grove v. Ft. Wayne, 45 Md. 429; Bybee v. State, 94 lb. 443; Sal- isbury V. Herchenrodei-, 106 Mass. 548; Jones v. Railroad, 107 lb. 261. 6 Reimer's Appeal, 100 Pa. St. 182. 6 Regina v. AVatts, 1 Salk. 357. ' Hume V. Mayor, 74 N. Y. 264; Pedrick v. Baily, 12 Gray, 161; Cf. as to awnings, Hoey v. Gilroy, 129 N. Y. 132; doorsteps and stoops, Gush- ing V. Boston, 128 Mass. 330. 8 Jenks V. Williams, 115 Mass. 217; Hawkins v. Sanders, 45 Mich. 491; Att'y Gen. v. Lombard, 1 W. N. C. 491; Miller v. St. Johns, 57 N. Y. 567; Garland v. Town, 55 N. H. 55; see Fresno v. Canal Ins. Co., (Cal. 93) 32 Pac. R. 943; Clean v. Steyner, 135 N. Y. 341. 9 Clark V. Fry, 8 Ohio St. 358; Grant CH. XVI.] STEEETS, BRIDGES AND TUENPIKES. §300 It is a legitimate use of a street to employ it for the purpose of carrying coal, wood, grain and other bulky articles, and in delivering such merchandise the wagons or trucks may ob- struct locomotion in the streets for a reasonable time.^ So, also, may a street be temporarily obstructed by placing build- ing material therein, if this be reasonable and necessary for want of room elsewhere.^ But the free passage of a street must not be unnecessarily interfered with, as by loading or un- loading wagons, or by the deposit of bulky articles in front of a warehouse facing thereon ;3 it is not permitted to turn the street into a warehouse or place of deposit. And if such use is unreasonably prolonged, or it interferes with the public use, it is a nuisance.* Cars may be temporarily unloaded in the street ; ^ but a street cannot be used as a depot,^ or for the stor- age of cars,'^ or for a timber * or stone yard ; ^ or as a stable,!" or as a place for the storage of carts and machinery ; ^^ or for the exhibition of wild animals,^ or for the erection of buildings. ^^ If the moving of a building through the streets is done care- fully and expeditiously, it is generally permitted under munici- pal regulations.-'* V. Stillwater, 35 Minn. 242; Cline v. Cornwall, 21 Grant (Can.) 142; State V. Omaha, 14 Neb. 265. 'Hobson V. Philadelphia, 155 Pa. St. 131; St. John v. JTew York, 3 Bosw. 483; Clark v. Fry, 8 Ohio St. 358, 374; Eex v. Cross, 3 Campb. 226. 2 Raymond v. Kieseberg, 54 N. W. K. 612 (Wis. 93); Wood v. Hears, 12 Ind. 515. 'Eex V. Russell, 6 East, 427; Peo- ple V. Cunningham, 1 Denio, 524; Birmingham v. R. R. Co., (Ala. 93) 13 So. 841; Rex v. Jones, 6 East, 230; Owensboro etc. Co. v. Sutton, (Ky. 91) 13 S. W. R. 1086. * State T. Eastman, 109 N. C. 785; Palmer V. Silverthorn, 32 Pa. St. 65; Welsh V. Wilson, 101 N. T. 254; Jo- chem V. Robinson, 66 Wis. 638; Peo- ple V. Fowler, 63 Hun, 627; Callanan V. Gilman, 107 X. Y. 360; Cohen v. New York, 113 lb. 532; Judd v. Far- go, 107 Mass. 267; Haight V.Keokuk, 37 4 Iowa, 199; Davis v. Mayor, 14 N". Y. 506. 6 Mathews v. Kelsey, 58 Me. 56. 8 Mahady v. Busher etc. Co., 91 N. Y. 148. ' Vars V. Grand Trunk etc. Co., 23 Up. Can. C. P. 143; Harris v. Mobbs, L. R. 3 Ex. D. 268. 8 Thorpe v. Brumfltt, L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. 650. ^ Cushing V. Adams, 18 Pickering (Mass.) 110; Com. v. King, 13 Met. (Mass.) 115. >" King V. Cross, 3 Campb. 224; Rid- ley V. Lamb, 10 Up. Can. Q. B. 254; Mott V. Schoolbred, L; R. 20 Eq. 22. " Reg. V. Davis, 24 Up. Can. C. P. 575. 12 Little V. Madison, 42 Wis. 643. 13 State V. Morris etc. Co., 23 N. J. L. §60. 14 Graves v. Shattuok, 35 N. H. 257; Day V. Green, 4 Ark. 433. 577 §301 MUNICIPAL COKPORATIONS. [CFf. XVI. On the other hand, the location and carrying of show boards upon the streets or sidewalks may be forbidden.^ The act of inclosing a public street or square, by which the public is wholly excluded therefrom, constitutes in law a nui- sance ; and it is no defence that the inconvenience to the pub- lic was outweighed by the public benefit.^ § 301. Legislative control of street — Rights of abutting owners therein. — The legislative control of the streets and highways, within the State, seems to be subject to very little, if any, limitation. The same may be said of the legislative con- trol over commons, squares and the like. Nor are such public places any less subject to legislative, as distinguished from mu- nicipal, regulation, because they are located within the municipal limits, and are under local regulation, supervision and control.^ But this legislative power of control is subject to constitutional restraints in favor of abutting owners, and does not extend to the granting of privileges which will impair the property rights of abutting owners, without payment of compensation.* It is well settled that streets, once dedicated and accepted, or acquired by the right of eminent domain, are for a continu- ous public use, and that, when relying upon that fact, important public or private property rights have been acquired, the high- ^ Com. V. McCafferty, 145 Mass. 384; Crawford v. Topeka, (Kan. 93) 33 Pac. Eep. 476 ; WUkes-BaiTe v. Bur- gnnder, 7 Kulp. 63. estate V. Woodward, 23 Vt. 92; State V. Atkinson, 24 lb. 448; Fresno V. Canal & Irr. Co., (Cal. 93) 32 Pac. Kep. 943; Clean v. Steyner, 135 N. Y. 341; Taylor v. K. R. Co., 83 Wis. 645; Smith v. State, 23 N. J. L. 712; State V. Mor. & Es. R. R. Co., 23 lb. 360. 8 Baird v. Rice, 63 Pa. St. 489; Gray V. Iowa Land Co., 26 Iowa, 387; Pitts- burgh R. R Co. V. Cheevers, 44 111. App. 118; Reading v. Com., 11 Pa. St. 196; Com'rs, etc. v. N. L. G-as Co., 12 Pa. St. 318; Phila. & Tren. I^ E. Case, 6 Whart. 25; s. c, 27 Pa. St. 339; Stubers' Road, 28 lb. 199; Pac. R. R. Co. V. Leavenworth, 1 Dillon C. C. R. 393; Albany North. K. R. v, 678 Brownell, 24 N. T. 345 ; Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N. Y. 123; South wark etc. V. Phila., 47 Pa. St. 314; Dilley V. Wilkes-Barre, etc. Co., 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 270; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324; Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black, 418; Woodruff v. Neal, 28 Conn. 168; James River etc. v. Anderson, 12 Leigh, 278; Baily v. Phila. etc., 4 Harring. (Del.) 389 ; Adler v. Metro. R. R. Co., 138 N. Y. 173; Pusey v. Allegheny, 98 Pa. St. 526; Clinton v. Cedar Rap. etc., 24 Iowa, 455; Wood- son V. Skinner, 22 Mo. 13; Perry v. New Orleans, 55 Ala. 413; Indian- apolis, etc. V. Hartley, 67 111. 439; Stone V. P. P. & N. W. R. Co., 68 lb. 394; Stack v. E. St. Louis, 85 lb. 377; Cairo etc. v. People, 92 lb. 170 ; but see Warren v. Lyons City, 22 la. .351. * Story V. N. Y. Elev. R. R Co., 90 N. Y. 122; Lahr's Case, 104 lb. 268. CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. 301 way cannot by legislative enactment be permanently diverted to a private use, without proper compensation being made to those who are injured thereby.^ In considering the control which the Legislature may exercise over streets, or the powers over them, which it may delegate to corporations, private or municipal, we are confronted with two distinct, and sometimes more or less antagonistic, rights. The street, so far as the public is concerned, is established for the purposes of. travel and traffic thereon, and the public, in the employment of the street for these purposes, has the mani- fest right to utilize all the many modern agencies which render travel convenient and speedy, and traffic safe and lucrative.^ But the abutting property owners have rights in relation to the adjoining streets, which have recently been established, de- fined and enforced, in a most emphatic manner, which conflict more or less with the efforts to secure a more agreeable and safe rapid transit.^ The owner of land, abutting on a street, has, in common with the public at large, a right of passage and the right of free and unimpeded ingress and egress to and from his property, for himself and his animals or goods, even though he may thereby cause a temporary public inconvenience.* So, also, he has other rights, peculiar to himself, and which rest upon the relation of his lot to the street, coupled with the fur- ther and equally important fact, that, by virtue of his owner- ship of that lot, he is charged with his private share of the expense of improving and maintaining the street in a condition for public use.* These rights of the abutting owner in the street, which are necessary to the proper enjoyment of his property, are as much property as the land which he owns ; and as equally within the protection of the constitution and the laws.® In Lahr's Case,'' the court said: "The ownership of such an easement^ is an interest in real estate, constituting property within the meaning 1 Chicago V. Garrity, 115 111. 161; Lee V. Mound Sta., 1181b. 312; Chi- cago V. Crosby, 111 lb. 540; State v. Berdetta, 73 Ind. 185 ; Scott v. Bos- ton, 26 111. App. 108. 2 Bil. Mnn. Corp. § 656, note 2. ' Story's Case, 90 N. T. 122 ; Mahady V. Bush, etc., 91 lb. 148; N. Y. Cable Co. Case, 104 lb. 1; N. Y. Dist. Ry. Case, 107 lb. 42. iCallanan v. Gilman, 107 N. Y. 360. 6 Lahr's Case, 104 N. Y. 268. 8 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 656 a. 7 104 K Y. 268. 8 i. e. of access. 579 §301 MXraiCIPAL COEPORATIONS. [CH. xvr. of that term, as used in the Constitution of the State, and re- quires compensation to be made therefor, before it can be law- fully taken from its owner for a public use." Where the fee of the roadbed is in the public, the abutting proprietor has an incorporeal right to the use of the highwaj' as such, and, if the New York Elevated Railroad cases i will be fuUj'- indorsed by subsequent adjudications in other States, to tlie free passage of light and air over the street. If the fee is in the abutting owner, the bed of the road is his property, subject only to the public easement, that it be left open for use as a highway. The abutting landowner may do anything with the land covered by the highway, which is not inconsistent with the full enjoy- ment of the right of way bj'- the public. Thus, the abutting owner has the right to plant trees in the street, to consti'uct cellars extending to the middle of the street, and to depasture his cattle in the street in front of his own land, where the I'ight has not been taken away by police regulations in the interests of the public. And a law, which granted to another the right of pasturage in such a street or road, would operate as an ex- ercise of the right of eminent domain, and constitute a taking of property.^ Subject to the above qualifications, the authority of the Legislature over highway's is broad and far reaching. By virtue of that authority alone, a municipality is authorized to permit the erection of obstructions in a street which other- wise would be nuisances.^ Illustrations of this principle may be found in the use of streets for the construction of railway, telephone and telegraph lines and electric light plants. And it may be said of all acts or obstructions, which at com- mon law would be nuisances, that they cease to become such, if they are authorized by the Legislature in a constitutionally who stood in the highway, opposite his land, and ahused tlie proprietors on the ground tliat lie was there without license, and was using the land of the abutter for other pur- poses than as a highway. 3 Pittsburgh v. Scott, 1 Pa. St. 309; Cora. V. Rush, 14 lb. 186; Columbus V. Jacques, 30 Ga. 506; People v. Vanderbilt, 28 IST. Y. 396; Shaubut v St. Paul, etc., 21 Minn. 502. 1 See post, § 305. 2 Tonawanda R. R. Co. v. Hunger, 5 Denio, 255 ; Woodruff v. Neal, 28 Conn. 165. In Ohio, by an ancient custom, as, also in many cattle raising States the i-ight of pasturage in tlie public highways is in the public. Keawhacker v. Cleveland, etc. R. R. Co., 3 Ohio St. 172. In Adams v. Rivers, 11 Barb. 390, it was held that trespass would lie in favor of the abutting proprietor and against one 580 CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TUKNPIKES. §301 valid statute.^ And whatever limitations upon this power may- exist, so far as the rights of the original owner of the property- dedicated or of adjoining owners may be concerned; it is well settled that, in respect to the public at large, the legislative power is absolute and limitless as to the uses to which the streets may be put.^ The Legislature can validate and sanction any improvement in, or expenditure upon, streets which it could previously have authorized ; and this, even though the improve- ments were extraordinary and hurtful, and were executed in an expensive and extravagant manner.^ To cite an extreme illustration of the exercise of legislative power, it has been held that the Legislature may establish a turnpike gate in a city street,* but as such an act would be a public inconvenience and derogatory of common right, the intention must be clearly and unmistakably declared by the Legislature.* It is a general rule of construction, applicable to the legisla- tive legalization of a nuisance, that all statutes which interfere with public rights and impose public burdens, are to be strictly construed and closely followed ; and the authority conferred must be exercised with an observance of proper care for the public interests.^ An act of the Legislature, legalizing en- croachments upon a public highway, being in the nature of a mere license, is revocable ; and may be repealed at pleasure, iPine City v. Muncli, 44 N. "W. E. 197; 42 Minn. 342; Detroit v. Detroit etc., 37 Mich. 558; Sa-wyer v. Davis, 136 Mass. 239; People v. Rosenberg, 138 K T. 410; Clinton v. C. R. & M. E. E. E. Co., 24 lo-wa, 455; Transp'n Co. V. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635; Wil- liams V. Hynes, 55 N. T. Super. Ct. 86; Kumler v. Silsbee, 38 Ohio St. 445; Ison ». Manley, 76 Ga. 804; Cora. V. Capp, 48 Pa. St. 53 ; North Vernon v. Voegler, 103 Ind. 314, 327; United States 111. Co. v. Grant, 55 Hun, 222; First Bap. Church v. Utica etc., 6 Barb, 313; Citizens St. Ey. Co. V. Memphis, 53 Fed. 715; Steincke v. Bentley, 34 IST. E. E. 97; (statutory definition of nuisance.) 2 Penna. E. Co. v. Angel, 41 N. J. Eq. 316; s. c, 7 Atl. Eep. 432; Sulli- van V. Eoyer, 72 Cal. 248; Baltimore etc. V. Fifth Bap. Ch., 108 U. S. 317. s Lennon v. Ne-w York, 55 N. Y. 365 ; Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 525 ; In re Com'rs of Assessment, 18 Al- bany Law J. 199; In re Mead, 74 N. Y. 216; In re Sackett Street etc., 74 lb. 95. * Stormfeltz v. Manor Tump. Co., 13 Pa. St. 555. ^ Comp. People v. Detroit etc., 37 Mich. 195. 6 St. Louis v. W. U. Tel. Co., 149 U. S. 465 ; Ne-«rark v. Del. etc. E. E. Co., 42 N. J. Eq. 196; s. c, 5 Cent. Eep. 630; Green v. Eastern Ey. Co., 53 N. W. R. 808; Jersey City v. N. J. Cen. E. E., 40 N". J. Eq. 417; s. c, 2 Atl. Eep. 262 ; Monongahela v. Mono. El. L. Co., 12 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 529. 581 § 302 MtTNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XVI. unless by reason of some act done, or liability incurred, a con- tractual relation has been established,^ which comes within the constitutional prohibition of the impairment of the obligation of a contract. § 302. Legislative power over construction of railroads — Its delegation to cities — Construction of grants. — In both England and America, legislative authorization is required to enable any one to construct and maintain a horse or street rail- road. The right to carry passengers and to take tolls is a franchise, derivable from the sovereignty alone.^ Because of the almost unlimited power, which the Legislature possesses over highways, it can, in the absence of express constitutional restraint, authorize a railroad company to construct its line on a street or highway of a city, without municipal consent.^ The manifest clanger of vesting such unlimited power in the Legis- lature has led, in several States, to the imposition of restraints upon its exercise. In New York, the Legislature is forbidden to pass any private or local act, conferring authority to lay down railroad tracks. Any such authority, derived from a gen- eral act, cannot be exercised and a street railroad constructed within municipal limits, unless it is consented to by the local authorities, and by one half in value of the owners of abutting propertj-.* Similar constitutional provisions are to be found in several other States.^ The amendment, by which these restric- 'Eeading v. Com., 11 Pa. St. 196; Detroit v. Det. & E. PI. R. Co. , 12 Mich. 333. 2 Areata v. Areata E. E. Co., 92 Cal. 639; Galbreatli v. Armour, 4 Bell App. Cas. 374; Queen v. Gas Co., 2 Ellis & El. 651; State v. Hoboken, 35 N. J. L. 205 ; Newell v. Minn. etc. Co., 35 Minn. 112;Davis v. EastTenn. etc. Co;, 87 Ga. 605; 13 S. E. R. 567; Reg. V. Train, 9 Cox Cr. Cas. 180; Boston V. Richardson, 13 Allen, 146, 160; Daily v. E. R. Co., 80 Ga. 793; 7 S. E. R. 146; Comr. v. Frankfort, (Ky. 92) 17 S. W. R. 827; Paterson Ey. v. Grundy, (N. J. 93) 26 Atl. R. 788 ; State V. Corrigan etc. Co., 85 :^o. 263. ^ Savannah etc. Co. v. Savannah, 45 Ga. 602; Floyd Co. v. Rome etc. Co., 77 Ga. 614; People v. Kerr, 27 582 N. T. 188; Dubach v. H. & St. Jo. ete. Co., 89 Mo. 483; Milwaukee v. Milw. etc. Co., 7 Wis. 85; Hine v. Ke- okuk, 42 Iowa, 636; see cases cited in § 301. 4 In re Crosstown R. Co., 22 N. T. S. 818; 68 Hun, 236; Const. New York, art. 3, § 15. ^Harner v. Columbus etc. Co., 29 W'kly L. Bui. 387; Sloaue v. People El. Ry. Co., 7 Ohio Cir. Ct. E. 84; Neare V. Mt. Auburn E. Co., 29 W'kly L. Bui. 171; see also Chicago etc. v. Story, 73 111. 541 ; Pell v. Newark, 40 N. J. L. 71 ; Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 73, and the Constitutions of the States of Illinois, Colorado, Nebraska, Mis- souri, North and South Dakota, New Jersey, Montana and Pennsylvania. CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. §302 tions were grafted upon the Constitution of the State of New- York, has received much consideration from the Court of Ap- peals, and numerous important cases have arisen under it. The amendment, so far as it applies to street railroads, in- cludes all such as may be constructed under or above the sur- face, as well as those whose rails are laid upon it.^ The Legislature may delegate to tlie municipality, the power to authorize absolutely the construction of a railroad,^ or it may confer upon the city the power to prescribe, when, and upon what conditions its streets may be so used.^ In conferring the or different motor power provided the right be not exclusive. . . The constitution provides tliat all gen- eral or special laws for the forma- tion of corporations may be altered or repealed; but where a special act was passed prior to 1875, creating a private corporation, an act to amend its charter would be a private one, and it could not, therefore, since .Jan. 1, 1875, grant the right to lay down railroad tracks. Nothing can be done by the Legislature under tlie power to alter acts of incorpora- tion which it could not constitution- ally do by an original bill. See also Astor v. N. Y. Arcade Ey. Co., 113 N. T. 93 ; Bailey v. Same, 113 lb. 615. 2 Morris etc. Co. v. Newark, 10 N. J. Eq. 352, 357; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324; Atchison etc. Co. v. Miss. R. E. Co., 31 Kan. 660; Harri- son V. N. O. Ey. Co., 34 La. An. 452 ; Springfield v. Conn. etc. Co., 4 Cush. 63 ; Cosby v. Owensboro etc., 10 Bush, 288; Black v. Phila. etc. Co., 58 Pa. St. 249; Phila. & T. R. R. Co., In re, 6 Whart. 25; Com. v. Erie etc. Co., 27 Pa. St. 339; Green v. Pittsburgh etc. Co., 8 Watts tfe S. 85; Tenn. etc. Co. V. Adams, 3 Head. 596 ;» Murphy v. Chicago, 29 111. 279; see oases in next note. s People's Pass. Ry. Co. v. Mem- phis C. etc. Co., 10 Wall. 38; Com. v. Erie etc. Co., 27 Pa. St. 339; Wolfe V. Cov. & L. etc. Co., 15 B. Mon. 404; 583 Penn. R. R. Co., 31 N. J. Eq. 475, 489; State v. Hammer, 42 N. J. L. 435; Chamberlain v. Elizabeth, etc. Co., 41 N. J. Eq. 43. ' El. R. R. Cases, 70 N. Y. 327; 90 lb. 122; 107 lb. 42. In the first of these cases, the court, per Earl, J., said: "These constitutional provis- ions do not prohibit a, private or local bill to amend the charter of a private corporation by regulating powers, rights, privileges, and fran- chises which it previously possessed. Such a bill may not be passed to give to an existing corporation any new right to lay down railroad tracks, or any new exclusive privilege or fran- chise, but it may be passed to regu- late and control the right to lay down tracks previously existing or to give new privileges or franchises provid- ed they be not exclusive. A bill may be passed waiving a forfeiture of corporate rights. Such a bill would confer no new rights upon the corporation, but would simply be a surrender or waiver by the sovereign of its right to claim a forfeiture. A bill may be passed to extend the time within which corporate rights inaybeexercised. Such a bill would give no new substantial rights but would simply extend the time with- in which rights previously granted would be exercised. So a bill may be passed giving a private railroad corporation the right to use a new § 302 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XVI. franchise in such a case, the city exercises a derivative and not an inherent power.^ The conditions may be imposed^ either by the Legislature in the creation of the company holding the franchise, or by the municipal corporation granting permission to the exercise of it.^ Thus, it was held that when city councils were forbidden to permit the construction of a street railroad, without the con- sent of a majority in interest of the owners of property upon the street being first obtained, such consent was essential to the creation of the power of granting permission; and the laying of a second track, upon a street where one already existed, required an independent consent.^ When, in pursuance of this delegated authority, permission Areata v. Areata Ry. Co., 92 Cal. 639; Paterson Ry. Co. v. Grundy, (N. J. 93) 26 Atl. R. 788; State v. Atlantic C. C, 34 N. J. L. 99; CMeago, B. & Q. R. Co. V. Quiney, 28 N. E. R. 1069; Paterson, etc. Co. v. Paterson, 24 N. J. Eq. 158; State v. Hoboken, 35 N". J. L. 205 ; Detroit v. Ft. Wayne, etc. Co., (Mich. 91) 51 N. "W. R. 688; s. c, (Mich. 93) 54 N. W. Rep. 958; Brooklyn v. B. City R. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 475; Richmond etc. Co. v. Rich- mond, 96 TJ. S. 521 ; In re Atlantic Ave. R. R. Co., 32 N. E. R. 771; 136 K. Y. 292; Parkhurst v. Salem, (Greg. 92) 32 Pac. R. 304; Fox v. Catherine, etc. Co., 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 180; Mercer V. Pittsburgh etc. Co., 36 Pa. St. 99; New York City v. Eighth Ave. R. R. Co., 118 N. Y. 389; Heath v. Des Moines etc. Co., 61 Iowa, 11; Mer- chants' etc. Co. V. Railway Co., 70 lb. 105; Houston v. Houston City Ry. Co., (Tex. 93) 19 S. W. Rep. 127. 1 Electric Ry. Co. v. Grand Rapids, 84 Mich. 257; Buckuer v. Hart, 52 Fed. 835; Canal etc. Co. v. C. C. Ry. Co., 41 La. An. 561 ; Cincinnati v. Mt. Auburn Co., 28 Wkly. Law Bui. 276; State v. Hilbert, 39 N. W. Rep. 326; Saginaw etc. v. Saginaw, 28 Fed. Rep. 529. 2 Xo. Bait. P. Ry. Co. v. Baltimore, 584 (Md. 92) 23 Atl. R. 470; Lexington etc. Co. v. Applegate, 8 Dana, 289; Cosby V. Owensboro etc. Co., 10 Bush, 288; Cine. etc. Co. v. Cum- mingsville, 14 Ohio St. 523; Phila- delphia v. Ridge Ave. R. Co., 140 Pa. St. 444; Kellinger v. Forty-sec. etc. Co., 50 N. Y. 206; Moses v. Pitts- burgh etc. Co., 21 m. 522; Middlesex etc. Co. V. Wakefield, 103 Mass. 261; New York v. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 33 N. Y. 42; Hobart v. Milw. City R. R. Co., 27 Wis. 194; Coast Line etc. Co. V. Cohen, 50 Ga. 451; No. Cen. etc. Co. V. Baltimore, 21 Md. 93; Frankford etc. v. Philadelphia, 58 Pa. St. 119;Philadelpliiav. Cit. Pass. Ry. Co., 10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 16; Balti- more U. P. Co. V. Baltimore, 71 Md. 405 ; Detroit v. Ft. Wayne etc. Co., supra ; Pittsburgh etc. Co. v. Birm- ingham, 51 Pa. St. 41 ; Memphis etc. Co. T. Memphis, 4 Coldw. 406; Jersey City etc. Co. v. J. C. & H. H. R. R. Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 61; Tenn. etc. Co. V. Adams, 3 Head. 596; St. Louis v. Ry. Co., 89 Mo. 44; Dry Dock etc. Co. V. New York, 47 Hun, 221; New York V. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 117 N. Y. 404, 646. 3 Roberts v. Easton, 19 Ohio St. 78; Harner v. Columbia etc. Co., 29 Wkly. L, Bui. 387. GH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. 302 has been granted to use certain streets, — and the grant has been confirmed by the Legislature where such confirmation is re- quired, — it cannot be revoked.^ So, when the grant has been made, and the road constructed at great expense, a contract is created, the obligation of which cannot be impaired by subse- quent legislation.^ It was accordingly held that when the city had granted a license to lay a two-track road, which had been laid at great expense to the company, it could not limit the com- pany to a single track, in a street whej'e it was proposed to ex- tend the line.^ The company, having constructed the road, has a vested property in the franchise, of which it cannot be de- prived, either by repeal of the grant or by a grant to another covering the same streets, unless the power to do this was re- served;* except, of course, in the exercise of the right of emi- nent domain, and upon payment of compensation for the partial confiscation of the franchise.^ Horse railroads have a private property, subject to ordinary use by the public, in the rails upon which their cars are run, so that a rival company cannot use or intersect them without the owners' consent.^ A passenger car is entitled to the unob- iNash V. Lowry, 37 Minn. 261; Harrison v. New Orleans etc. Co., 34 La. An. 462; Burlington etc. Co. v. Eeinhackle, 15 Neb. 279. ^Hovelmanv. Kans. C. H. E. Co., 79 Mo. 632; People v. Chicago etc. Co., 18 111. App. 125; People v. O'Brien, 111 N. T. 1; State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Com. v. Proprietors, 2 Gray, 339. 8 Buriington v. Burl. Ry. Co., 49 Iowa, 144. *New Orleans etc. Co. v. Dela- more, 114 W. S. 501. ' Piscataqua Bridge v. New Hamp- shire Bridge, 7 N. H. 35 ; Tuckahoe Canal Co. v. R. R. Co., 11 Leigh, 42 (36 Am. Dec. 374); Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston & W. E. R. Co., 23 Pick. 360; Central Bridge Corp. v. Lowell, 4 Gray, 474; West River Bridge V. Dix, 6 How. 507; Rich- mond R. R. Co. V. Louisa. R. R. Co., 13 How. 71 ; White River Turnpike Co. V. Vermont Central R. R. Co., 21 Vt. 590; Commonwealth v. Pitts- burgh etc. R. E. Co., 58 Pa. St. 26; Ee Towanda Bridge Co., 91 Pa. St. 216; N. C. R. R. Co. v. Carolina Ceht. R. R. Co., 83 N. C. 489. But see Central City Horse R'y Co. v. Fort Clarke Horse R'y Co., 87 111. 523, where it was held that a com- peting street railway cannot acquire by compulsion the joint use of the tracks of another previously created railway, although the track and the franchise of the latter railway may be completely appropriated under the power of eminent domain. See, also, Lake Shore etc. R. R. Co. v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 97 111. 506; lie Rochester Water Commissioners, 66 N. Y. 413; Little Miami etc. R. E. Co. V. Dayton, 23 Ohio St. 510. 6 Brooklyn etc. Co. v. B. City E. R. Co., 32 Barb. 358; Jersey City- etc. Co. V. J. C. & H. H. R. R. Co., 20 N. 585 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XVI. structed use of the track over private vehicles,^ and a muni- cipal ordinance confirming such right would be sustained.^ The franchise, which a horse or other railroad possessed to operate its lines upon a city street, is property which may be mortgaged^ or sold,* and a purchaser may operate the road up- on the same terms as its predecessor had enjoyed the franchise.^ The grants of such franchises are, however, not necessarily ex- clusive ; and their character in that regard depends upon the scope of the power of the municipality, as well as upon the language of the grant.® Thus, the municipality may grant the franchise to lay a track to one corporation, upon condition that another company may have the joint use of it with the grantee.'^ In accordance with the rule that grants made by the sover- eign are to be strictly construed against the grantee, his right must be clearly defined, in order that it may be claimed against the public and abutting owners.^ But the grant of power, to construct a railroad, will include the power to construct the necessary appurtenances thereto;^ aud it has been held that the power to construct railroads in streets included the right to lay sidings to wharves,^" and elevators.^i The road must be constructed substantially upon the line prescribed,-*^ and must be conducted as the statute requires ; ^^ but the power to con- N. Y. 160; Sixth etc. Co. v. Kerr, 45 Barb. 138; Louisville etc. Co. v. L. City Ey. Co., 2 Duvall, 175. ' Jersey City etc. Co. v. J. C. Ber- gen etc. Co., 21 N. J. Eq. 550. 8 Chicago etc. Co. v. Chicago, 121 111. 176; Heath v. Des Moines etc., 61 Iowa, 11; Wyandotte V. Carrigan, 35 Kan. 21; Chamberlain v. Eliz. S. Cordage Co., 41 N. J. Eq. 43. ' New Orleans etc. Co. v. Second Mun., 1 La. An. 128; Knight v. Car- rollton E. E. Co., 9 lb. 284. i°Black V. Phila. etc. Co., 58 Pa. St. 249. " Clarke v. Blackraar, 47 N. Y. 150. 12 Jn re Metro, etc. Co., 19 N. E. R. 645; Concord v. Concord etc. Co., 18 Atl. E. 87. w Atty. Gen. v. Toronto, 14 Grant's Ch. (Can.) 673. J. Eq. 61; Market etc. Co. v. Cen. etc. Co., 51 Cal. 583; Coach Co. v. Camden H. E. E. Co., 33 N. J. Eq. 267; Cottom v. Griest, 1 Am. &Eng. E. E. Cas. 474 re. iWilbrand v. Eighth Ave. E. E. Co., 3 Bosw. 314; Adolph v. Central etc. Co., 65 N. Y. 554; Shea v. Po- trero etc. Co., 44 Cal. 414; Mahady V. Bushwick etc. Co., 91 N. Y. 148. 2 State V. Foley, 31 Iowa, 527; Com. V. Temple, 14 Gray, 69. 8 Sixth Av. etc. Co., v. Kerr, 72 N. Y. 330; People v. Sturtevant, 9 N. Y. 263. *New Orleans etc. Co. v. Dela- raore, 114 U. S. 501; Memphis etc. Co. V. Cora'rs, 112 lb. 619. s People V. Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. 75. ^ Brooklyn City etc. Co. v. Coney Isl. etc. Co., 35 Barb. 364; s. c, 18 686 CH. XVI.] STEEETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. § 302 struct a horse car line along a certain street involves the power to cross the intersecting streets, notwithstanding a law or ordi- nance which excepted these streets from use by railways.^ When permission is given by ordinance to use the city streets for a railroad, and to employ a certain specified motive power, the railroad company possesses no right whatever to oper- ate the road by any other motive power than the one prescribed to them by the municipal corporation..^ Where the charter of the railroad company, and the city ordinance, by which permission to use the streets is conferred, are silent as to the motive power to be used, it seems most reasonable to hold that the intention of the Legislature, and of the municipality, is that the railway may employ any motive power, which is ordinarily used, and which is not inimical to the public safety.^ But when a rail- road company had obtained a grant to operate a road upon ex- press condition that no steam power should be employed ; and had constructed and operated a horse railroad, it was held that the permission did not embrace the right to make excavations, in order to use the streets for a cable road.* While it is true that an ordinance, conferring the right to operate a railway in a city street, either absolutely or upon con- ditions, when accepted by the grantee, and followed b}"- the ac- tual construction of the road, constitutes an irrevocable contract ; it is equally true that a municipality cannot baiter away its police power, the power to regulate highways and supervise the use made of them.^ So, if permission has been given orig- inally to use steam as a motive power, it is. safe to assume that the city could, by virtue of its iuhei'cnt power to provide for the public safety, prohibit the use of steam in streets, where its use has become, by reason of the growth of the municipality. 1 State V. Newport etc. Co., 18 Atl. E. 161. 2 People 7. Newton, 112 N. Y. 396; 19 N. E. Rep. 664; Denver etc. Co. V. Denver etc. Co., 2 Col. 681; Citi- zens etc. Co. V. Jones, 34 Fed. Rep. 579; see Mayor v. Ohio etc. Co., 26 Pa. St. 355 ; Birmingham etc. Co. v. birm. etc. Co., Y9 Ala. 463. "North Chi. C. R. Co. v. Lake View, 105 m. 20Y; see post, §306 a, Electric and cable cars on street railways. « People V. Newton, 112 N. Y. 396; see post, § 306 a. "Thorpe v. Rutland etc. Co., 27 Vt. 140; Ind. etc. Co. v. Kercheval, 16 Ind. 84; Brick P. Ch. v. Mayor, .5 Cowen, 538; Brimmer v. Boston, 102 Mass. 19; Horn v. Atl. etc. Co., 35 N. H. 169; Bulckley V. N. Y. etc. Co., 27 Conn. 479; Penn. etc. Co. v. Riblet, 66 Pa. St. 164; State v. Herod, 29 Iowa, 123. 587 302 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XVI. a menace to the lives and health of the public, who have a right to the safe and convenient use of the streets.^ General municipal power over streets and roads will not au- thorize the city, in the absence of statutory authorization, to ■ grant permission to a steam railroad, running between places outside of its limits, to use its streets as a part of their line.^ But the Legislature may authorize such a use of the street; and legislative, as distinct frora municipal, authority to a railroad, to occupy and use streets for railroad purposes, need not be al- ways conferred expressly, but may arise from necessary impli- cation ; ^ although, where the railroad company seeks to lay a track along a whole street, requiring embankments and exca- vations, the implication must be very clear and necessary.* And so, also, in order that a municipality may grant to a street railway companj^ the franchise of constructing and main- taining its line along a certain street, the Legislature must dele- gate the authority to it, expressly or by necessary implication; and it has been held that this authority cannot be implied from the charter power to " open, alter, repair and regulate streets."^ A general legislative grant to a corporation, authorizing it to construct a steam railroad between certain places, but not spec- ifying the exact route, will authorize the crossing of streets or highwaj's, but not their occupation longitudinally.^ Where, ' Detroit v. Port Wayne etc. Co., (Mich. 92) 51 N. W. R. 688; Fitoh- bui'g etc. Co. V. Grand etc. Co., 1 Allen, 552 ; Eodemacher v. Milw. etc. Co., 41 Iowa, 297; Stroudsburg v. Wllkes-Barre E. E. Co., 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 395 ; People v. Boston etc. Co., 70 N. T. 569; Portland etc. Co. v. Boston etc. Co., 65 Me. 122. 2Dalyv. E. R. Co., 7 S. E.E. 146; 80 Ga. 793 ; Savannah etc. Co. v. Shields, 33 Ga. 601 ; see People v. Carpenter, 1 Mich. 273 ; Areata v. E. E. Co., 28 Pac. E. 676; 92 Cal. 639; Perry v. N. O. etc. Co., 55 Ala. 413; Lawrence etc. Co. 'v. Williams, 35 Ohio St. 168; Dooly Block V. S. L. T. Co., 33 Pac. E. 229; Davis V. E. E. Co., 87 Ga. 605. ^ Trustees v. Milwaukee etc. Co., (Wis. 89) 45 N. W. E. 1086; Coving- ton etc. Co. v. Covington, 9 Bush, 588 127; Atty. Gen. v. Morris etc. Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 530; State v. Jackson- ville etc. Co., (Fla. 90) 10 So. E. 590; State V. Hoboken, 35 N. J. L. 205 ; Allegheny v. Ohio etc. Co., 26 Pa. St. 355 ; Com. v. Erie etc. Co.,,27 Ih. 339. « Com. V. Frankfort, (Ky. 92) 17 S. W. E. 287; Sav. etc. Co. v. Shiels, 33 Ga. 601; Dooley Block v. S. L. T. Co., supra. 6 Strasser v. N. Y. L. & W. E. R., 128 N. Y. 157, 623; People E. E. v. Memphis R. E., 10 Wall. 38, 52; Cit- izens etc. Co. V. Jones, 34 Fed. Rep. 579; Gleck v. B. & O. E. E. Co., 19 D. C. 412; Coleman V. Sec. Ave. R. R., 38 N. T. 201; Louisville etc. Co. V. Louisville, 8 Bush, 415, 421 ; Brook- lyn V. Brooklyn etc. Co., 47 K. T. 475. ^ Burt V. Lima etc. Co., 21 N. T. CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. 303 however, the charter authorizes a railroad company to construct a line of road to or from a city, the power to enter the limits of the municipal corporation is implied, and the company is not compelled to erect its depot outside the city line.i But when a power was conferred to run a line to a city, where it was to connect with another road, it does not give by implication the power to run the road through the city.^ When a municipal corporation has the power to refuse its assent to the construction of a horse or steam railroad in its streets, it is not confined to a simple grant or denial of a right of way ; but conditions may be imposed, as, for example, tliat the company shall erect a depot, and grade and repair the streets used by it. The company cannot then enjoy the franchise, un- less it complies with these conditions.^ § 303. Rights of abutting owners, how affected by con- straction of a steam railroad along the street. — In a preced- ing chapter,* the general subject of what constitutes a taking of private property in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, has been fully presented, with the announcement, that in a sub- sequent connection this matter would be discussed in its rela- tion to the appropriation of streets to other than the ordinary purposes of a highway ; and the fundamental principle was there recognized and accepted, that incidental injuries did not con- stitute a taking under eminent domain, and nothing short of a confiscation of some established and legally recognized right of property, either corporeal or incorpoaeal, would constitute such a taking of property for a public use, for which compensa- S. 482; Chicago etc. Co. v. Dunbar, 100 111. 110; Ingraham v. Chic. etc. Co., 34 lb.. 249; Chicago etc. Co. v. Newton, 36 Iowa, 299; Com. v. Erie etc. Co., 27 Pa. St. 339; Northeastern etc. Co. V. Payne, 8 Kich. L. 177. 'Hazlehurst v. Freeman, 52 Ga. 245; Western etc. Co.'s Appeal, 99 Pa. St. 155; Houston etc. Co. v. Odam, 53 Tex. 343. 2 St. Louis etc. Co. v. Haller, 82 m. 208; Richmond etc. Co. v. Elch- mond, 96 U. S. 521. ^ Long Island E. E. Co. v. Brook- lyn, 8 N. T. S. 805; Ind. etc. Co. v. Lawrenoeburg, 34 Ind. 304; Wood- ruff V. E. E. Co., (Conn. 90) 20 Atl. E. 17; Detroit v. Det. Ey. Co., 43 N. W. Eep. 447; Hovel den v. Kansas, etc. Co., 79 Mo. 632; Mey v. Mis- souri Pac. Ey. Co., 1 S. "W. E. 382; Pac. etc. Co. v. Leavenworth, 1 Dil- lon C. C. 393; Northern etc. Co. v. Baltimore, 21 Md. 93; Eastern Ey. Co. V. Portsmouth, 62 N. H. 344; Kyne v. Wilmington etc. Co., (Del.) 14 Atl. E. 922; Newport v. So. Cov. etc. Co., 11 S. W. Eep. 954; see §305, Horse railroads. 4 Chapter XVI. § 239. ' 589 § 303 jru>riciPAL coepoeations. [ch. xvi. tion can be claimed. In referring to this general principle, Mr. Justice Miller has said ^ that the decisions, which have denied the right of compensation "for the consequential injury to the property of an individual from the prosecution of improvement of roads, streets, rivers and other highways," " have gone to the extreme and limit of sound judicial construction in favor of this principle, and in some cases beyond it ; and it re- mains true that where real estate is actually invaded by super- induced additions of water, earth, sand or o^her material, or by having any artificial structure placed upon it, so as effectually to destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking within the meaning of the constitution." The greatest difficulty has been experienced in applying these principles to the police regula- tions of the highways or public streets, in consequence of the variety of uses, to which the demands of modern life require them to be put. Elsewhere in the present chapter, it has been explained how far there is any new taking, when the street is employed for the laying of pipes,^ the construction of sewers, drains and cisterns * and the erection of poles for hanging of telegraph, and other electrical wires.* But the greatest diffi- culty is probably found in determining how far there has been a new taking of the property of the abutting owner, where the Legislature or municipal council authorizes the construction and maintenance of a railroad along the street of a city. The decisions on the subject are at variance, and the grounds upon which the judgments are placed are not always the same, and sometimes very confusing. In some of the cases, great stress is laid upon the fact that the fee is or is not in the public ; ' while in others, no importance seems to be attached to this distinction.^ The authorities and facts will only justify this 8 The Supreme Court of the United States has said in Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324, 440 : " On the general question as to the rights of the pub- lic in a city street, -we cannot see any material difference in principle with regard to the extent of those rights, whether the fee is in the public or in the adjacent landowner or in some third person;" and Judge Cooley calls this distinction more technical 1 Pompelly v. Green Bay, etc. Co., 13 Wall. 106, 180. 2 § 295. s § 294. * § 297. * See Moses v. Pittsburgh, etc. K. R. Co., 21 111. 516, 522; People v. Kerr, 37 Barb. 357; s. c, 27 N. T. 188; Mill- burn V. Cedar Rapids etc. R. R. Co., 12 Iowa, 246; Franz v. Railroad Co., 55 Iowa, 107. 690 CH. XVI.J STKEETS, BRIDGES A:srD TURNPIKES. § 303 distinction ; if the new use of the highwny is inconsistent with its character as a highway, where the fee is in the abutting land- owner, it is a taking of property for which compensation may be made, whatever incidental benefits or injuries the landowner may or may not sustain from the new uses ; for incidental inju- ries never constitute a taking of property in the law of eminent domain.^ But if the fee is in the public, no use of the highway will operate as a taking of the property of the abutting land- owner, which does not interfere with his ordinary and customary use of the street.^ Probably, this distinction might assist in explaining away many of the differences of opinion, which now make the cases on this subject confusing and perplexing. Whei'e the fee is not in the public, it seems to be the opinion of an overwhelming majority of the cases, that the construction of an ordinary steam railway along a public street was a taking of the property of the owners of the fee for a different use, for which compensation had to be made. The common ground, upon which these decisions rest their judgment, is that the con- struction of such a railroad was the appropriation of the land, over which the highway or street was laid out, to a new and different use, not contemplated or included in the acquisition of the public easement for the purposes of a highway. As was said in one of these cases : " It is true that the actual use of the street by the railroad may not be so absolute and constant as to exclude the public also from its use. With its single track, and particularly, if the cars upon it were propelled by horse power, the interruption of the public easement in the street might be very trifling and of no practical consequence to the public at large. But this question cannot affect the question of the right of property, or of the increase of the burden upon the soil. It would present simply a question of degree in respect to the en- than real. CooleyConst. Lim. 687 )i. Theobald v. Louisville, 40 Alb. L. J. 335 ; Bloomfleld etc. Co. v. Calkins, 62 N. Y. 386; compare Kucheman v. Chicago, 46 Iowa, 366; MulhoUand V. Des Moines, etc., 60 lb. 740; Mor- gan V. Des Moines, 64 lb. 589; Scioto etc. V. Lawrence, 38 Ohio St. 41; Crowley v. Davis, 63 Cal. 460; Story's Case, 70 N. T. 327; Lahr's Case, 90 N. T. 122; Gilbert E. Ry. Case, 70 N. Y. 361; N. Y. Dis. Ry. Cas., 107 N. Y. 42. 1 See ante, § 239. 2 Protzman v. Indianapolis, 9 Ind. 467; New Albany, etc. v. O'Daily, 12 lb. 551; 13 lb. 353; Street Railway v. Cumminsville, 14 Ohio St. 523; Grand Rap., etc., Co., 38 Mich. 62; s. c, 47 lb. 393. 591 § 303 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XVI. largement of the easement, and would not affect the principle, that the use of a street for the purposes of a railroad imposed upon it a new burden."-' I Wager v. Troy Union R. R. Co., 25 N. T. 526, 532; see, also, to same effect, Ford v. Chicago, etc., Co., 14 Wis. 609; Pomeroy v. Milwaukee, etc., Co., 10 lb. 646; Perry v. New Orleans, etc., Co., 55 Ala. 41.3; Carli v. Still- water, etc., Co., 28 Minn. 373; So. Pac, etc., Co. v. Reed, 41 Cal. 256; Ford V. Santa Cruz, etc., 59 lb. 290; Harrington t. St. Paul, etc., Co., 17 Minn. 215, 224; Gray v. St. Paul, etc., Co., 13 lb. 315; Williams v. N. y. Cen., etc., Co., 16 N. T. 97; Wager V. Troy, etc., Co., 25 lb. 526; Malion V. N. Y. Cen., etc., Co., 24 lb. 658; Fletcher v. Auburn, etc., Co., 25 Wend. 462; Bissell v. N. T. Cen., etc., Co., 23 lb. 61; Davis v. New York, 14 lb. 526; Carpenter v. Oswego, etc., 24 lb. 655; Inhabitants of Spring- field V. Conn. River R. R. Co., 4 Cush. 71 ; Imlay v. Union Branch R. R. Co., 26 Conn. 249; Presbyterian Society, etc., v. Auburn, etc., R. R. Co., 3 Hill, 567; Carpenter v. Oswego, etc., R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 655; Starr v. Camden & Atlantic R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 592; Central R. R. Co. v. Hetfield, 29 N. Y. 206; So. Car. R. R. Co. v. Steiner, 44 Ga. 546; Bonnaher's Case, 16 Miss. 649; Cox v. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co., 48 Ind. 178; Sohurraeier V. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 10 Minn. 82; Cosby V. Railroad Co., 10 Bush, 288; Railroad Co. v. Combs, 10 Bush, 382 (19 Am. Rep. 67). See, contra, Mifflin V. Railroad Co., 16 Pa. St. 182; Cases of Pliila. & Trenton R. R., 6 Whart. 25 (36 Am. Dec. 202); Struthers v. Railroad Co., 87 Pa. St. 282; Lexington, etc., R. R. Co. v. Applegate, 8 Dana, 289 (33 Am. Dec. 497); see, also. West Jersey R. R. Co. V. Cape May, etc., Co., 34 N. J. Eq. 164; Com. v. Erie, etc., R. R. Co., 27 592 Pa. St. 339 ; Snyder y. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 55 Pa. St. 340; Peddicord v. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 34 Md. 463; Wolfe v. Covington, etc., R. R. Co., 15 B. Hon. 404; Houston, etc., R. R. Co. V. Odum, 53 Tex. 343. In Nicholson V. N. Y., etc., R. R. Co., 22 Conn. 74, 85, the Supreme Court of Connecticut, per Hinman, J., pre- sented a very strong argument, in favor of the proposition of the text. The court said: " Wlien land is con- demned for a special purpose on the score of public utility, the seques- tration is limited to the use, the spe- cific use, for which the proprietor has been divested of a complete do- minion over his own estate. These are propositions which are no longer open to discussion. But it is con- tended that land once taken and still held for highway purposes may be used for a railway without exceed- ing the limits of the easement al- ready acquired by the public. If this is true, if the new use of the land is within the scope of the orig- inal sequestration or dedication, it would follow that the railway privi- leges are not an encroachment on the estate remaining in the owner of the soil, and that the new mode of enjoying the public easement will not enable him rightfully to assert a claim to damages therefor. On the contrary, if the time, intent and ef- ficacy of the original condemnation was not to subject the land to such a burden as will be imposed upon it when it is confiscated to the uses and control of a corporation, it can- not be denied that in the latter case the estate of the owner of the soil is injuriously affected by the super- vening servitude; th.at his rights are OH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. § 303 The dissimilarity of highways and railways cannot be mora strikingly presented than by a consideration of the numerous abridged, and that In a legal sense his land is again taken for public uses. Thus, it appears that the court have simply to decide whether there is such an identity between a high- way and a railway, that statutes con- ferring a right to establish the for- mer include an authority to construct the latter. . . Such a construction is possibly only when it is made to appear that there is a substantial, practical or technical identity be- tween the uses of land for highway and for railway purposes. No one can fail to see that the terms ' rail- way ' and ' highway ' are not con- vertible, or that the two uses, prac- tically considered, althougli anala- gous, are not identical. Land, as ordinarily appropriated by a railroad company, is inconvenient and even impassable to those who would use it as a common highway. Such a corporation does not hold itself bound to make or keep its embank- ments and bridges in a condition wTiich will facilitate the transitus of such vehicles as ply over an ordi- nary road. " A practical dissimilarity obvi- lously exists between a railway and a common highway, and is recognized as the basis of a legal distinction be- tween them. It is so recognized on a large scale, when railway privileges are sought from legislative bodies, and granted by them. If the terms ' liighway ' and ' railway ' are synony- mous, or if one of them includes the other by legal implication, no act would be more superfluous than to require or to grant authority to con- struct railways over localities already occupied as highways. If a legal identity does not subsist between a highway and a railway, it is illogical 38 to argue that, because a railway may be so constructed as not to interfere with the ordinary uses of a highway, and so as to be consistent wich the highway right already existing, therefore such a new use is included within the old use. It might as well be urged that if a common or a canal, laid out over the route of a public road, could be so arranged as to leave an ample roadway for vehicles and passengers on foot, the laud should be held to be originally condemned for a canal or a common, as properly incident to the highway use." The two uses " are by no means the same thing to the proprietor whose land is taken; on the contra- ry, they suggest widely different standards of compensation. One can readily conceive of cases, where the value of real estate would be di- rectly enhanced by the opening of a highway through it; while its confis- cation for a railway at tlie same or a subsequent time would be a gross injury to the estate, and a total sub- version of the mode of enjoyment expected by the owner, when he yielded his private rights to the public exigeucj'. . . . No one ever thought of regarding highway acts as conferring railway privileges, in- volving a right in every individual, not only to break up ordinary travel, but also to exact tolls from the pub- lic for the privilege of using the peculiar conveyances adapted to a railroad. If a right of this descrip- tion is not conferred when a high- way is authorized by law, it is idle to pretend that any proprietor is di- vested of such a right. It would seem that, under such circumstances, the true construction of highway laws could hardly be debatable, and 693 § 303 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XVT. safeguards which are thought necessary to be thrown around the public, when a railroad crosses a highway. The bells must be rung, the whistle must be blown, the speed must be slackened, and very often bars are laid across the highway, so that vehicles and foot passengers cannot attempt to cross the track while the train is passing.. How much greater would be the inconvenience to the public, if a railroad track was laid along the highway, instead of across it. But where the fee of the highway is in the public, the cases very generally hold that the establishment of a steam railroad along a highway is not such a taking of property of the adjoin- ing landowner, as will requiie the payment of compensation.^ that the absence of legal identity between the two uses of which we speak was patent and entire." ' Milburn v. Cedar Eapids etc. E. K. Co., 12 Iowa, 246; Clinton v. Ce- dar Kapids etc. K. R. Co., 24 lb. 455; Ingraham v. Chicago etc. Co., 34 lb. 176; Euch^man v. Chicago etc. Co., 46 lb. 366; Franz v. Railroad Co., 55 lb. 101; Grand Eapids etc. R. E. Co. V. Heisel, 38 Mich. 62 ; 31 Am. Eep. 306; Grand Rapids etc. R. R. Co. V. Heisel, 47 Mich. 393; Har- rison V. New Orleans etc. E. R. Co., 34 La, An. 462; 44 Am. Rep. 438; Protzman v. Indianapolis etc. E. R. Co., 9 Ind, 467; New Albany etc. E. E. Co. y, O'Haily, 13 Ind. 353; Chi- cago etc. E. E. Co. V. Joliet, 79 111. 25; Siraplot v. Chicago etc. Ey., 5 McCrary, 158; Davenport v. Steven- son, 34 lowaj 235 ; Elizabethtown etc. Co. V. Thompson, 79 Ky. 52; Hinch- man v. Patej-soji fitc, Co., 17 N. J. Eq. 75; Jersey City etc. Co. v. J. C. & H. H. E. E. Co., 20 lb, 61; Dwenger V. Chicago etc. Ey. Co., 98 Ind. 153; Wager v. Troy etc. Ey., 25 N. Y. 527; People V. Kerr, 27 lb, 188; Phila. etc. Co. V. Philadelphia, 47 Pa. St. 325 ; Struthers v. Dunkirk etc. , 87 lb. 282; Carson v. Central etc. Co., 35 Cal. 325. See § 302 : Power of Legis- lature over railroads. In Moses v. 594 Pittsburgh etc. E. E. Co., 22 111. 522, Caton, Ch. J., said: "By the city charter, the common council is vest- ed with the exclusive control and regulation of the streets of the city, the fee simple title to which we have already decided is vested in the mu- nicipal corporation. The city char- ter also empowers the common coun- cil to direct and control the location of railroad tracks within the city. In granting this permission to locate the ti-ack in Beach street, the com- mon council acted under an express power granted by the Legislature, so that the defendant has all the right, which both the Legislature and the common council could give, to occupy the street with its track. But the complainant assumes higher ground, and claims that any use of the street, even under the authority of the Legislature and the common council, which tends to deteriorate the value of his property on the street is a violation of that funda- mental law which forbids private property to be taken for public use without just compensation. This is manifestly an erroneous view of the constitutional guaranty thus in- voked. It must necessarily happen that streets will be used for various legitimate purposes, which will, to CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. § 303 It cannot be doubted, that in no case does the consequential depreciation in value of adjoining propertj'^, as a result of the construction of a steam railway along the street, constitute a taking of property which requires a payment of compensation, any more than the ordinaiy and reasonable exercise of any right gives rise to liability for incidental injuries to others. The ap- propriation of a highway to other purposes must interfere with some positive right of property, in order that it may be consid- ered a taking of property. Where the public does not own the fee, any other and different use of the highway would be a tak- ing, whatever effect it may have upon the adjoining property, as has been alreadj^ explained, for there would be a fresh appro- priation of the property of the owners of the fee. But when the fee is in the State, the adjoining landowner has only an easement in the street, which entitles him to a reasonable en- joyment of it as a street, and an appropriation of it to other a greater or less extent, discommode persons residing or doing business upon them, and just to that extent damage their property; and yet such damage is incident to all city proper- ty, and for it a party can claim no remedy. . . The street is made for the passage of persons and property; and the law cannot define what exclusive means of transportation and passage shall be used. Universal experience shows that this can best be left to the determination of the municipal authorities, who are supposed to be the best acquainted with the wants and necessities of the citizens gen- erally. To say that a new mode of passage shall be banished from the streets, no matter how much the general good may require it, sim- ply because streets were not so used in the days of Blackstone, would hardly comport with the advance- ment and enlightenment of the pres- ent age. Steam has but lately taken tlie place, to any extent, of animal power for land transportation, and for that reason alone shall it be ex- pelled the streets? . . . Cars upon street railroads are generally, if not universally, propelled by horses [in 1893 this is not quite accurate], but who can say how long it will be be- fore it will be found safe and profit- able to propel them with steam, or some other power besides horses ? Should we say that this road should be enjoined, we could advance no reason for it which would not apply with equal force to street railroads; so that consistency would require that we should stop all. Nor would the evil which would result from the rule we must lay down, stop here. We must prohibit every use of a street which discommodes those who reside or do business upon it, be- cause their property will else be damaged. The question has been presented in other States, and ia some instances, where the public have only an easement of the street, and the owner of adjoining property still holds the fee in the street, it has been sustained; but the weight of authority, and certainly in our apprehension, all sound reasoning is the other way." 695 304 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XVI. purposes, for example, for the construction of a steam railway, will constitute a taking of the property of the abutting pro- prietor, only when his reasonable enjoyment of the street is de- nied to him. The noise, smoke, etc., do not involve any taking of property, however much it may depreciate the value and the desirability of the adjoining property .^ § 804. Abutting owners how affected Iby surface street railways. — The ordinary steam railway serves the purpose of transporting passengers and goods from one city, town or vil- lage to another, and not from one part to another of the same city, town or village. On the other hand, a street railway, it matters not by what motive power the cars may be propelled, is designed to carry passengers and goods from one part of the same local community to another part. For this reason, it is not doing violence to the meaning of words to recognize a vital distinction between the two kinds of railways, and to hold that, ■while the appropriation of a street to the use of the ordinary railroad was a new taking of property, where the title to the soil of the street is in the abutting owner, the construction of a surface street railway on a street, was not a diversion of the street from its use as a highway or street, but only a new pro- vision for the more expeditious and convenient use of the street as such. And this would be a correct view of the effect of the grant of a franchise to a surface street railway, whether the mo- tive power be animal, steam, cable or electrical. It is not sur- prising, therefore, to find that the courts are almost unanimously of the opinion that the use of a street, for the purpose of con- structing and operating a surface street railroad, is not a taking of property for which compensation must be made ; and this is true whether the fee is in the State or in the abutter.^ ' Protzman v. Indianapolis etc. K. E. Co., 9 Ind. 467; New Albany etc. R. R. Co. V. O'Daily, 12 Ind. 551; S. c, 13 Ind. 353; Street Railway v. Cumminsville, 14 Ohio St. 523; Grand Rapids etc. R. R. Co., 38 Mich. 62 (31 Am. Rep. 306); s. c, 47 Mich. 393, and the cases cited in the two pre- ceding notes. 2 For cases, in which the fee was in the adjoining owner, see Atty. Gen. V. Metro. R. R. Co., 125 Mass. 59S 515; Com. v. Temple, 14 Gray, 75; Elliott V. Fair Haven etc. Co., 32 Conn. 579; Hinchman v. R. R. Co., 17 N. J. Eq. 75; s. c, 20 lb. 360; City R. R. Co. v. City R. E. Co., 20 lb. 61; Street R'y Co. v. Cummins- ville, 14 Ohio St. 523; Hobart v. Mil- waukee etc. Co., 27 Wis. 194; 9 Am. R. 461. For eases, in which the fee was in the public, see People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188; Kellinger v. Sti-eet K. R. Co., 50 lb. 206; Metro, etc. Co. v,, CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. § 304 The ordinary street railway interferes very slightly, if at all, with the use of the highway as such by the public, or by the abutter.^ And if a slight inconvenience is inflicted on an abut- ter by a street railroad running its line past his property, it can- not constitute a taking of private property for public use ; and such use of a street, where no material alteration is made in its surface or grade, should, upon the principles already pointed out, be considered as falling within the purpose for which the streets were dedicated.^ But the abutting owner is entitled to a reason- able use of the street as such, and if it is materially interfered with by the construction of a street railway, it will constitute a taking of the property of the abutting owner, for which com- pensation must be made to him. Thus, if the street railroad be located in such a portion of the highway as not to leave space for the standing of vehicles in front of the abutter's prop- erty,^ or if by storing cars upon its track it causes special dam- age,* the abutting owner is clearly entitled to compensation. No rule can be laid down which would be universally appli- cable, but it is safe to say that while the owner of adjacent property may be incommoded to some extent without entitling him to compensation his complete exclusion from the ordinary use of the street, or an extraordinary and unreasonable interfer- ence with such use, would be a taking of property and entitle him to compensation.^ And while the running of a street sur- face railway does not ordinarily interfere with the reasonable enjoyment of the street by the adjoining landowners, still, it might, under peculiar circumstances, interfere very seriously Quinoy etc. Co., 12 Allen, 262; Chi- cago V. Evans, 24 HI. 52; Hess v. Baltimore etc. Co., 52 Md. 242; 36 Am. Eep. 371. See, generally, Citi- zens etc. Co. V. Camden H. R. R. Co., 33 N. J. Eq. 267; West Jer. etc. Co. V. Cape May etc. Co., 34 lb. 164; Sa- vannah etc. Co. V. Savannah, 45 Ga. 602; Floyd Co. v. Rome St. R. R. Co., 77 lb. 614; Stanley v. Davenport, 54 Iowa, 463; Peddicord v. Baltimore, 34 Md. 466; Brown v. Duplessis, 14 La. An. 842; Texas etc. Co. v. Rose- dale, 64 Tex. 80. 1 Eichels v. Evansville etc. Co., 78 Ind. 261; Briggsv. Lewistoneto. Co., 79 Me. 363. 2 Lewis on Eminent Domain, § 124; Mills Em. Dom. § 205; Sears v. Mar- shalltown etc. Co., 65 Iowa, 742. 8 Kellinger v. Street etc. Co., 50 N". Y. 206; People v. Kerr, 27 lb. 188; Hobart v. M. C. R. R. Co., 27 Wis. 194. * Mahady v. Bushwick etc. Co., 91 ISr. Y. 148. 'See Craig v. Rochester, etoi, Co., 39 Isr. Y. 404; Cf. Story v. N. Y. E. R. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 122; Lahr's Case, 104 lb. 268. 597 §305 MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS. [CH. XVI. with the ordinary use of the street, as where the street is very- narrow, and at the same time a great business thoroughfare ; and whenever that happens, the construction oi the railway would seem to constitute a taking of property, for which com- pensation could be demanded. But Mr. Cooley holds that, un- der such circumstances, the property owners would, in the light of the authorities, be without a remedy. -"^ § 305. Elevated street railways in relation to abntting owners. — As has already been explained, in connection with ordinary railroads ^ and street surface railways,^ whether the fee was in the public or in the abutting owner, it has been gen- erally held that the proprietors of adjoining property have, as an easement over the land used as a highway, the right to the free and unobstructed use of the street, and any interference with such use was a taking of property, for which compensa- tion had to be made.* In New York, however, whenever the fee of the streets is in the public, the earlier cases seemed to deny to the abutting owner, anj^ right of property in tlie street, as a highway, which would be invaded by a different appropria- tion of the land.* And even those cases, which recognized that the abutting owner did have a peculiar easement in the street, as a highway, conceded to the abutter only the right to a rea- sonablj'- convenient ingress and egress to and from his property. If the construction of a street or ordinary steam railroad did not materially obstruct his access to his property, he had no cause of action. But in a late case in New York,® it has been 1 Cooley Const. Lim. 683. 2 § 303. 8 §304 *Haynes v. Thomas, 7 lud. 38; Protzman v. Indianapolis, etc. , K. R. Co., 9 Ind. 467; New Albany, etc., E. E. Co. V. O'Daily, 13 Ind. 453; Indianapolis E. E. Co. v. Smith, 52 Ind. 428; Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio St. 459 ; Street Eailway v. Cum- mingsville, 14 Ohio St. 523; State v. Cincinnati Gas, etc., Co., 18 Ohio St. 262; Grand Eapids, etc., E. E. Co. V. Heisel, 38 Mich. 62 (31 Am. Rep. 306) ; Pekin v. Winkel, 77 111. 66; Lackland v. Xo. Mo. E. E. Co., 598 31 Mo. 180; Green v. Portland, 32 Me. 431; Brown v. Duplessis, 14 La. An. 842. But see contra, Millburu V. Cedar Rapids, etc., R. E. Co., 12 Iowa, 246; Franz v. Eailroad Co., 55 Iowa, 107. 6 People V. Kerr, 37 Barb. 357; s. c, 27 N. Y. 188; Ferring v. Irwin, 55 N. T. 486; Kellinger v. Forty-Second St., etc., E. E. Co., 50 If. Y. 206; Brooklyn Park Commissioners v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234 (6 Am. Eep. 70) ; Coster v. Mayor, etc., 43 N. Y. 399. 6 Story V. ISr. Y. Elevated E. R. Co., 90 X. Y. 122, 145, 146. CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. § 30.5 held, that the abutting owner has, as appurtenant to his land, not only an incorporeal right of property in the free and unob- structed use of the street or highway for purposes of locomo- tion, but also a right to the free passage of light and air over the land used as a street, and any interference with either right would constitute a taking of property, for which compensation must be made. In delivering the opinion of the court. Judge Danforth said : " Besides the right of passage, which the grantee as one of the public acquired, he gained certain other rights as purchaser of the lot, and became entitled to all the advantages which attached to it. . . . The value of the lot was enhanced thereby, and it is to be presumed that the grantee paid, and the grantor received an enlarged price by reason of this added value. There was thus secured to the plaintiff the right and privilege of having the street forever kept open as such. For that purpose, no special or express grant was necessarj- ; the dedication, the sale in reference to it, the conveyance of the abutting lot with its appurtenances, and the consideration paid were of themselves sufficient.^ . . Nor does it matter that the acts constituting such dedication are those of a municipality. The State even, under similar circumstances, would be bound.^ .... Lesser corporations can claim no other immunity, and all are bound upon the principle, that to retract the promise im- plied by such conduct, and upon which the purchaser acted, would disappoint his just expectation. "But what is the extent of this easement? What rights or privileges are secured thereby ? Generally, it may be said, it is to have the street kept -open, so that from it access may be had to the lot, and light and air furnished across the open way. The street occupies the surface, and to its uses the rights of the adjacent lots are subordinate, but above the surface there can be no lawful obstruction to the access of light and air, to tiie detriment of the abutting owner. To hold otherwise would enable the city to derogate from its own grant, and violate the arrangement on the faith of which the lot was purchased. This, in effect, was an agreement, that if the grantee would buy the lot abutting on the street, he might have the use of light ■ Citing Wyman v. Mayor of N. Y., 11 Wend. 487; Trustees of Water- town V. Cowen, 4 Paige, 510. 2 City of Oswego v. Orwego Canal Co., 6 N. T. 2.57. 599 § 305 MUNICIPAL COKPORATIONS. [CH. XVI. and air over the open space designated as a street. In this case, it is found by the trial court, in substance, that the struc- ture proposed bj'' the defendant, [a railroad elevated fifteen feet above the surface,] and intended for the street opposite to the plaintiff's premises, would cause an actual diminution of light, depreciate the value of the plaintiff's warehouse and thus work to his injury. In doing this thing, the defendant will take his property as much as if it took the tenement itself; without air and light, it would be of little value. Its profitable manage- ment is secui'ed by adjusting it in reference to the right obtained by his grantor over the adjoining property. The elements of light and air are both to be derived from the space over the land, on the surface of which the sti'eet is constructed, and which is made servient for that purpose. He therefore has an interest in that land, and when it is sought to close it, or any part of it, above the surface of the street, so that light is in any measure to his injury prevented, that interest is to be taken, and one whose lot, acquired as this was, is directly dependent upon it for a supply, becomes a party interested and entitled, not only to be heard, but to compensation." In a strong dis- senting opinion in the same case Judge Earl denies the prop- osition that the abutting owner " has an unqualified private easement " for light and air appurtenant to his lot, and holds that " whatever right an abutter, as such, has in the street, is subject to the paramount authoiity of the State to regulate and control the street, for all the purposes of a street, and to make it more suitable for the wants and convenience of the public." ^ This case has been confirmed by numerous subsequent cases, and may now be considered to be the settled law of New York. And the management and control of the elevated railroads of New York city have been provided for by a number of statutes.^ 1 Story V. K. T. Elevated E. R. Co., 90 N. T. 122, 186-188. 2 Statutes of IS'ew York State relat- ing to this subject. Act of June 17, 1872, ch. 885, p. 2179; Act of June 26, 1873, ch. 837, p. 1253; Act of June •^8, 1874, ch. 275, p. 331; Act of June 18, 1875, ch. 606, p. 740. Laws of 1881, p. 540, ch. 399, regulates man- agement of trains. See upon con- 600 struction of these acts, In re N. Y. El. R. R., 70 N. Y. 327; Gilbert E. E. R. Co., lb. 361 ; In re Kings Co. E. E. R. Co., 105 lb. 97; In re's. Y. Cable Ey. Co. , 109 lb. 32 ; Zn re East Ei verBridge etc., 26 Hun, 490; In re 'S. Y. El. E. E. Co., 41 lb. 502; In re So. Bklyn. E. R. & T. Co., 50 lb. 405; see, also, 3 Abbott New Cases, 301, and note. CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. § 306 In estimating the damages caused by the operation of an elevated railroad the general character and extent of the injury- must be considered. Does the structure injuriously affect the general character of the thoroughfare or decrease the current of business there. "Smoke, and gas, ashes and cinders affect and impair the easement of air. The structure itself and the passage of cars lessen the easement of light. These are ele- ments of damalges even though the necessary concomitants of the construction and operation of the road, and not the product of negligence, for they abridge the landowner's easement, and to that extent, at least, are subjects for redress in an action for damages." ^ Although noise and bustle are not such an injury to property as will require compensation,^ the pollution of the air with noxious smells, rendering the enjoyment of abut- ting premises uncomfortable, is a taking of propertj'.^ § 306. Municipal control over the construction and op- eration of railroads in streets. — From the control, which a municipal corporation has over its streets, results the power to regulate the running of steam and other railways in city limits. The municipal authorities may prohibit the use of dangerous motors and regulate the rate of speed ; * compel tlie company to send a horseman in front of its trains ; ^ to report quarterly the number of passengers carried ; ^ and to fence in its track. ^ Although a railroad, when operated in a street under legisla- tive permission, is not a nuisance, per se, it may become such if it is operated so as to become dangerous to life and property ; and such a nuisance may be abated by the municipal authori- iDruckerv. Manhattan Ey Co., 106 K. Y. 157: s. c, 16 J. & S. 429, fol- lowed in Pond V. Metro. El. E. E. Co., 42 Hun, 567; In re N. Y. El. E. E., 36 Hun, 427; Peyser v. Metro. El. E. E., 13 Daly, 122. 2 Meyer v. Metro. El. E. E. Co., Gen. Term Com. Pleas, N. Y. Daily Eeg., April 1, 1886; contra, Taylor v. Metro. E. Ry. Co., 55 Super. Ct. 555. "Care y. Metro. Ey. Co., 46 N. Y. Super. Ct. 138. * Meyers v. Chicago, etc. Co., 57 555; Knoblock V. Chicago, etc. Co., 31 Minn. 402; Eobertson v. "Wa- bash, etc. Co., 84 Mo. 119; Merz v. Miss. etc. Co., 88 lb. 672; Chicago, etc. Co. V. Eeidy, 66 111. 43; Chicago, etc. Co. V. Haggerty, 67 lb. 113; Whitson V. Pranklyn, 34 Ind. 392; Eichraond, etc. Co. v. Eichmoud, 90 U. S. 521; Dounaher v. State, 16 Miss. 649. s Baltimore, etc. Co. v. Mali, 66 Md. 53. « St. Louis V. E. E. Co., 89 Mo. 44. ' Hayes v. Mich. etc. Co., Ill U. S, 228. 601 § 306 MtmrCIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XVI. ties, under the ordinary police power.^ So, cars may be prohib- ited by ordinance from unnecessarily obstructing the streets or blockading the crossings,^ as a street cannot be used for depot or terminal facilities.^ And an ordinance, forbidding all kinds of obstructions, has been held to include the obstruction of a street by railroad cars.* Flagmen may be required to be placed, not perhaps at every crossing, but at crossings and places wheie, in the judgment of prudent persons, danger to the public might be apprehended.^ Under the very comprehensive grant of power, contained in most municipal charters, in the so-called " general welfare clause," a city may compel a street railroad to sprinkle its tracks for the purpose of keeping down the dust ;'' and it has been held that this power will authorize the city to remove the tracks temporarily or permanently, for the puipose of constructing a culvert or for any similar purpose connected with the health, or for the convenience of the community.^ The company may be compelled to number its cars and pay a license for each of them.^ In general, it may be said that the special privilege, which a street railroad possesses, must be exercised by it in such a manner as not to intrude upon the rights or privileges of others using the street.^ As the company operating a horse railroad is not en- titled to anj"- further use or occupation of the highway than what is essential for the reasonable enjoyment of its franchise, it will be liable for negligently removing the snow from its track, and throwing it into the highway not occupied by its tracks.!" The common law rule is clear that, when a railroad iHentz V. L. I. etc. Co., 13 Barb. 646; Eedfield on Railways (Qth ed.) §226; Memphis, etc. Co. v. State, 11 S. W. R. 946. 2 111. etc. Co. V. Galena, 40 111. 344; St. Louis, etc. Co. v. Belleville, 122 lb. 376. 3 Maliady v. Busbwick, etc. Co., 91 X. Y. 148. * G. W. etc. Co. V. Decatur, 33 111. 381; GaUagau v. Boston, etc. Co., 1 Allen, 187. 5 Toledo, etc. Co. v. Jacksonville, 67111. 37; compare Burritt v. New Haven, 42 Conn. 172, as to require- 602 ment of viaducts at crossings; see State V. Miss. P. Ry. Co., 33 Kan. 176. ^ City, etc. Co. v. Savannah, 77 6a. 731. ' No. Penn. Ry. v. Stone, 3 Phila. 421; West Phila. etc. Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 10 lb. 70. ^Frankford, etc. Co. v. City, 58 Pa. St. 119. Prime v. 23d St. etc. Co., 1 Abb. N. Cases, 63; Hussner v. Bklyn. ete, Co., 114 N. T. 4.33. » Bo wen v. Detroit Ry., 54 Mich. 490; 52 Am. Rep. 822; Wallace v. CH. XVI.] STEEETS, BEIDaBS AND TITEKPIKES. § 306 company or other corporation lays out a railway or canal across a public street or highway, it must restore and afterwards keep the highway in the same condition, in which it was originally used by the public. This duty is imposed upon such a com- pany, by implication of law, where there is no express statutory requirement. The duty of both horse and steam roads to repair is a con- tinuous one ; and is not discharged by a restoration of the street to the condition, in which it was originally, but includes a main- tenance of the repairs.^ This duty is imperative and perform- ance may be compelled by mandamus, on application of any one who is aggrieved.^ And the railroad is liable to an action for damages by the city, when a j)arty injured by the company's failure to repair has recovered damages in a suit against the city ;^ or, if the city makes the necessary repairs, it may recover the expense thereby incurred, from the company by whose neg- lect it was made necessary.* When by ordinance, granting per- mission to use the street, it was provided that the company should pave the space between its tracks, it was held that with the acceptance and performance of the condition by the com- pany a contract was created, which could not be impaired by a subsequent municipal requirement that additional space be Same, 58 Mich. 231; Short v. Balti- more, 50 Md. 73; Prime v. 23d St. Ry. Co., 1 Abb. N. C. 63, 71; Broad- way, etc. Co. V. Kew York, 49 Hun, 126; People v. Batchellor, 53 N. Y. 520; see Burger v. Mo. Pac. Ry., (Mo. 93) 20 S. W. E. 439. ' State V. Jacksonville, (Fla. 92) 10 So. 590; Burrett v. New Haven, 42 Conn. 174; State v. Minn. etc. Co., 39 N. W. E. 153; Philadelphia v. Eidge Ave. E. Co., 143 Pa. St. 144; Atlanta v. Gate City Ey. Co., (Ga.) 4 S. E. R. 269; Western Pav. & Sup. Co. v. Citizens Ey. Co., 26 N. E. E. 188; State V. N. 0. C. & L. E. Co., 42 La. An. 550; 7 So. E. 606; Borough v. Norristown Ey. Co., (Pa. 91) 23 Atl. E. 1060; Sioux City St. E. Co. v. Sioux City, 78 Iowa, 742; 39 N. W. E. 498. ^No. Cen. E. E. v. Baltimore, 46 Md. 425; Paducah etc. Co. v. Com., 80 Ky. 147; State v. St. Paul etc. Co., (Minn.) 28 N. W. E. 3; Hamden v. New Haven etc. Co., 27 Conn. 158. 8 Brooklyn v. B. City etc. Co., 47 N. Y. 475; People v. Brooklyn, 65 lb. 349; Bloomfield etc. Gas Co. v. Cal- kins, 62 lb. 886; Cf. Memphis etc. Co. v. State, 87 Tenn. 746; s. c, 11 S. W. E. 946. 4 Gulf City S. R. Co. v. Galveston, 69 Tex. 660; 7 S. W. E. 520; Gulf etc. Co. V. Galveston, 32 Am. & Eng. E. E. Cas. 300; Eutland v. Dayton, 60 111. 58; Cf. Leake v. Philadelphia, 24 Atl E. 351 (Pa. 92) ; Binghamton v. Ey. Co., 61 Hun, 479; Philada. etc. Co. V. Philadelphia, 11 Phila. 358; New York v. Broadway etc. Co., 17 Hun, 242; Columbus v. Col. etc. Co., 45 Ohio, 98; Oconto v. Chicago etc. Co., 44 Wis. 231. 603 306 a. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XVI. paved by tlie company .^ But when the requirement is that the horse railroad shall keep the streets used by it in good repair, the companj' cannot be compelled to pave it or repave it in a certain way which is specified subsequently by the city council.^ The city is the owner of the streets as trustee for the public ; and, as such it has the same right to question the corporate existence and the franchise rights of a railroad company, whiuli desires to use its streets, as would a private trustee or owner.^ A general legislative grant of authority to construct a road, does not, unless so stated in express terms, confer the right to use the streets without municipal license.* So, also, the muni- cipality may raise the question of the legal existence of the company ; the rule being very general, that a corporation, seeking to exercise such a franchise, must have an existence de jure, as well as de facto. The grant of a railroad franchise to an illegally incorporated company is void for the want of a legal grantee.^ § 306 a. Electric and calble cars on street railways.^— In the past decade, the horse or mule, as a motor power in the hauling of street cars, is fast being superseded by the use of electrical and cable apparatus. Not only do the new methods of moving street cars reduce the cost of operating them, but likewise increase the speed at which the cars can be propelled or hauled. But the increased speed is also the occasion of an alarming increase in the danger of accidents to pedestrians in the lawful use of the street ; and, on this account, this new de- parture, in matters relating to street railways, has met with 1 Coast etc. Co. v. Savannah, 30 Fed. Rep. 646: Cf. People v. Fort Street etc. Co., 41 Mich. 413; Reg. v. Toronto etc. Co., 24 Q. B. (Can.) 454. 2 Kansas City v. Carrigan, 85 Mo. 268 ; and 86 Mo. 67. ' Brooklyn S. T. Co. v. Brooklyn, .78 N. Y. 524. , ^Hine v. Keokuk, 42 Iowa, 636; Chicago etc. v. Chicago, 121 111. 176; Penn. R. R. Co. v. Schuylkill Co., 116 Pa. St. 55, 8 Atl. R. 914; Clinton v. R. R. Co., 24 Iowa, 455; Ruttle v. Covington, 10 S. W. Rep. 644. « Vason V. So. Car. R. R., 42 Ga. 631 ; 604 Chicago V. Robbins, 2 Black, 424; Jas. River etc. v. Anderson, 12 Leigh, 276; Porter V. No. Mo. etc., 33 Mo. 128; Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. New- ton, 36 Iowa, 299; Clinton v. Cedar Rap. etc. R. R. Co., 24 Iowa, 455; People v. Kerr, 27 N. T. 188; New Albany etc. R. R. Co. v. O'Daily, 13 Ind. 353 ; Savannah etc. v. Savannah, 45 Ga. 602; Tate v. Ohio etc. K. R. Co., 7 Ind. 479; Cable Co.' s Case, 104 N. Y. 43. « See §§ 301, 302, for a general dis- cussion of the principles underlying the present subject. CH. XVI.J STREETS, BRIDGES AKD TXJR:XPIKES. § 306 a. very serious popular opposition, with the consequent litigation over the right of the railway companies to make use of these motive powers, particularly that of the trolley system of elec- tricity. It does not seem at all possible for the abutting owners to claim successfully that the adoption of either of these motive powers would operate as an increase of the public servitude, which had been imposed upon their land by the opening of the street or road, even though they still owned the fee in the road- bed, and such has been the ruling of at least two courts.^ But it has been held in New Jersey that a provision of the statute, which empowers a street railway " to use electrical or chemical motors or grip cable " does not authorize the erection of poles or wire in the public streets as an electrical system of propel- ling street cars.^ It will be remembered that, in another con- nection,^ tlie claim has been made that the erection of poles for the wires of the telegraph, the telephone and the electric light- ing, should be considered an additional servitude on the abutter, for which additional compensation should be given. But this is not yet positive law. Apart from this question of thereby imposing an additional servitude upon the abutting land, there is no limitation, in the absence of an express constitutional provision, of the legislative power to grant to a street railway the riglit to use the electric or cable motor in the propulsion or hauling of their cars. And the only question of practical importance, which can arise in the present connection, is whether the existing charter rights of a street railway company authorized the use of some other than horse power. Thus, where a railway was authorized by charter or statute to employ " any other than animal power," * " me- chanical or other power," ' " any power other than locomo- tives," ^ " steam, horse or other power," ^ it was held that such 'Williams v. City Electric St. E. Co., 41 Fed. Eep. 556; Koch v. Korth Ave. R'y Co., (Md. '92) 23 Atl. Kep.463. estate V. Trenton, (92 K. J.) 23 Atl. R. 281; Same v. Newark, lb. 284. » § 297. * Detroit City E'y v. Mills, (Mich. '92) 48 N. W. 100. ^HudsonK. T. Co. v. Watervliet Tr. E. Co., 9 iSr. T. S. 177; s. c, 56 Hun, 67. 6 Com'rs V. West Chester, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. E. 542; Lockhardt v. Craig St. E'y Co., 21 Atl. Eep. 26; s. c, 139 Pa. St. 419; Williams v. City E'y Co., (Ind. '92) 29 N. E. Eep. 408. 'Taggart v. Newport St. E. Co., (E. I. '91) 19 Atl. Eep. 326. 605 § 306 a. MUiSflCIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XVI. railways could use the electric power without any further grant of autliority from the State or municipal authorities. It has, however, been held in New York, that, although a street rail- way may have by statute and charter the right to use "steam, animal or mechanical power," it is not thereby authorized to employ the cable as the motive power, without the consent of the city.^ But where by the laws of '89, ch. 531, street rail- ways, are authorized to employ cable or other power, other than steam, under approval of the State Board of Railroad Commis- sioners, the consent of the city would not be required to make the change from horse to cable power.^ In one case, it has been held that, although a street railway was authorized to use " any improved motive power," it did not authorize the use of the overhead wires, in the trolley electric system.^ And so, likewise, it has been held in Texas that an ordinance, which permitted the use of " electricity or such other motive power as will not necessarily obstruct the street," does not authorize the employment of steam power.* Where a railway company had an exclusive monopoly of " horse railroads " along certain streets, such an exclusive mo- nopoly must be strictly construed against its owner, and it did not prevent the grant to a rival companj' the right to construct and maintain a cable road along the same route.^ But even where the street railways are fully authorized to employ electric or cable power, in the moving of cars, they are not beyond the reach of the police regulations of the State or city govei-nment, and they are obliged to conform to all reason- able regulations either in respect to the erection of poles and wires, construction of cable, or in the speed of the cars, which the State Legislature or municipal council ma}' see fit to impose.'' 1 People V. Newton, 112 N. Y. 396. 2/n re Third Ave. R'y Co., (N. Y. '91) 24 N. E. Rep. 651. 8 Farrell v. Winchester Ave, 61 Conn. 127 ; s. c. , 23 Atl. 757. But see, contra, Com'rs v. 'Westehester, 9 Pa, Co. Ct. Rep. 542; Lockhart v. Craig St. Ry. Co., 139 Pa. St. 419; s. c, 21 Atl. Rep. 26, and other cases cited supra in preceding notes. * Houston V. H. B. & M. Ry. Co., (Tex. '92) 19 S. W. Rep. 786. 606 6 Omaha H. R. Co. v. Cahle Tram- way Co., 30 Fed. Rep. 324. « W. U. Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, (Pa. '88) 12 Atl. Rep. 144"; Lamb v. St. Louis & W. Ry. Co., 33 Mo. App. 489; Hudson R. T. Co. v. Watervliet T. & R. Co., 61 Hun, 140; Cent. Pa. Tel. & Supply Co. v. "Wilkes-Barre & W. S. R. Co., 11 Pa. Co. Ct. 417; Cin- cinnati Inc. Plane Ry. Co. v. City & S. Tel. Ass'n, (Ohio '92) 27 N. E. 89a CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURKPIKES. § 307 And the electric and cable street railways will come under ex- isting regulations as to construction and management, which had been expressly intended to apply to horse railways, so far as these regulations are applicable to them.^ It has been held that, where there was a grant to a railway of the right to use electric motive power, it was not authorized to use a system by which electricity may pass from its own wires to those of the telephone and telegraph wires, and thus interfere with the use of the latter, where this could be avoided by the use of some other system of electrical power, even though the latter system was more expensive.^ But, on the contrary, it has been held in Ohio that the use of the street by the tele- graph and telephone companies must always be subordinate to its use by the general public for travel and locomotion ; and that if the construction of the electric railway affects injuriously the use of the wires of the telegraph and telephone companies, the latter must prqvide for the insulation of its own wires.^ ' § 307. Remedies of abutters — Measure of damages.— If a railroad does not maJie compensation to abutting owners for their property which is taken or damaged in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, the company is a trespasser, and is lia- ble in damages to the owners of such property ; but the owner, who seeks his remedy in an action for damages of a common law nature, can only recover the damages which were sustained by him up to the date, when the action was instituted. He may bring successive actions of this character at such times as he may elect ; or, if the land itself has been appropriated, he may bring an action of ejectment.* But such a proceeding is inef- fectual to recover complete damages for the permanent depre- ciation or destruction of an easement which is invaded by the iLamb v. St. Louis & W. Ky. Co., 33 Mo. App. 489; Wolfe v. Erie E. T. Co., 33 Fed. Eep. 320; Criveaud v. St. Louis Cable & W. Ry. Co., 33 Mo. App. 458. '^ Hudson E. T. Co. v. Watervliet T. & R. Co., Gl Hun, 140. " Cincinnati Inc. Plane Ey. Co. v. City & S. Tel. Ass'n, (Ohio '92) 27 N. E. 890. *Uline V. N. Y. Cen. R. E. Co., 101 ISr. T. 98; s. c, 4 N. E. Eep. 536; Ma- hon V. E. E. Co., 24 lb. 658; Wheel- ock v. Noonan, 198 K. Y. 179; N. Y. Nat. Ex. Bk. v. Metro. El. Ey. Co., 108 lb. 660; Eeed v. State, 108 lb. 407; Pond v. Metro. E. E. E. Co., 112 lb. 186; see ante, §247, as to the time when payment of corapensa^ tion must be made in cases of emi- nent domain. 607 §308 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XVI. company. It has accordingly been found that, to avoid the ne- cessity of successive actions, an equitable suit, in which an in- junction is demanded, restraining the company from running its trains, is best adapted to tlie purpose ; for the court of equity can mould the relief granted to suit the exigences of the case.^ It has been held that the proper measure of damages in the tak- ing of property by street railways is the diminution in rental value ; and that damages for loss of business cannot be consid- ered, they being merely remote and consequential.^ § 308. Yacation of streets by the Legislature — Delega- tion of power to corporation. — The power to vacate highways, which is possessed by the Legislature in the absence of consti- tutional resti'iction, can, like other powers, be delegated to the municipal authorities.^ But the municipal corporation cannot claim the power to vacate streets and thereby destroy the pub- lic easement in them by implication ; at least, in ordinary cases.* The power can only be derived from an express declaration or, in unusual cases from necessary implication ; all ambiguous' language being construed favorably to the continuance of the highway.^ But it has been held that an illegal or invalid vaca- tion of a public street by a municipality can be validated by subsequent State Legislation.* But even the legislative power in the present case is not unlimited. Thus, the legislative pow- R 756; Excelsior Brick Co. v. Hav- erstraw, 62 Hun, 620; Lindsay v. Omaha, (N"eb. 90) 46 N. W. E. 627; Parker v. Catholic Bishop, (111. 93) 34 N. E. R. 473 ; Glasgow v. St. Louis, 17 S. W. K. 743 ; see also cases col- lected in 33 Am. & Eng, Corp. Cases, 453; Trenton R. E. Case, 6 Whart. (Pa.) 25; Spiegel v. Gansberg, 44 Ind. 418; Fearing v. Irwin, 55 lb. 486; State V. Huggins, 47 Ind. 586; Mc- Gee V. Penn. R. K., 114 Pa. St. 470. « Gants' Ap., 21 Pitts. Leg. J. 219; Eohmeiser v. Bannon, (Ky. 93) 22 S. W. R. 27; Hobo. Ld. Co. v. Hoboken, 36 N. J. L. 540. 6 Campen v. Board, (Mich. 91) 49 N. W. R. 39; Newark v. Del., etc., 42 N. J. Eq. 106; Jersey City v. N. J. Cent., etc., 40 lb. 217. >^ Kettle V. Tremont, 1 Neb. 329. 1 Pond V. Met. R. R. Co., 112 N. Y. 186; see Henderson's Case, 78 lb. 423; Story's Case, 90 lb. 133. 2 N. T. Exch. Bk. v. Metro. El. Ry. Co., 53 Super. Ct. 511 ; s. c, 108 N. Y. 660; Taylor v. Metro. El. Ry. Co., 50 Super. 311; s. c, 55 lb. 555. SMcGee's Appeal, 140 Pa. St. 570; Piatt V. E. E. Co., (Iowa; 87) 31 N. W. R. 883; Wenicke v. N. Y. Cen. & H. R. R. Co., 61 Hun, 619; State v. Elizabeth, (N. J. 92) 24 Atl. 495; Whitsett V. Union Depot, etc., 10 Colo. 243; North Liberties Comrs. v. Gas Co., 12 Pa. St. 318; Stuber's Road, 28 lb. 223; Marshalltown V. Forney, 61 Iowa, 578; Barr v. Os- caloosa, 45 lb. 475 ; Reed v. Camden, (N. J. 92) 24 Atl. R. 549; Glasgow v. St. Louis, (Mo. 92) 17 S. W. R. 743; Cliicago etc. Co. v. Chicago, 28 N. E. 608 CH. XVI.J STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. § 309 er does not extend to the discontinuance of public highways for the purpose of applying them to private uses.^ The public interests must alone be considered in all such propositions to vacate a highway. § 309. Proceedings to vacate — These proceedings differ in different jurisdictions ; and since they are usually statutory, any detailed explanation of them is impossible here. Since the discontinuance of highways is in derogation of public right, any proceedings, having such an object, must conform substan- tially, and in England strictly ,2 to the statute ; and failure to give abutting owners an opportunity to be heard, may invali- date the proceedings.^ So, although a town was authorized to discontinue " at a meeting called for the purpose," any town or private way ; it was held that such action could only be taken by a tribunal acting judicially, after notice to adjoining owners, and not by a mere vote at a town meeting.* And so, likewise, county commissioners have usually no power to vacate city streets.^ A city cannot vacate a street, unless it is author- ized by the Legislature ; *■ and an injunction will lie to restrain the enforcement of an illegal order to that effect.'^ The applicant for an injunction must show that his property will sustain special injury by the illegal vacation.^ And an owner of land which does not abut directly on the street, is a stranger, and has no standing in court.^ It has been held, however, that an alteration by competent authority of an existing way is not equivalent to a discontin- ' Winchester v. Capron, 63 N. H. 605 ; Le Clerq v. Gallipolis, 17 Ohio St., pt. 1, 217; In re John and Cher- ry Streets, 19 Wend. 659 ; Glasgow v. St Louis, 87 Mo. 678; Dubaoh v. Han- nibal, etc., 89 lb. 483; Warren v. Ly- ons, 22 la. 351; Indianapolis, etc. v. State, 37Ind. 489; Portland, etc. E. E. V. Portland, 14 Oreg. 188; see also Stevenson v. Mayor, etc., 20 Fed. Eep. 586; Atty. Gen. v. Goodrich, 5 Grant (Can.) 402, Patten v. Cress- well, (Ind.) 21 N. E. Rep. 663; Baird V. Rice, 63 Pa. St. 489; Hinchman v. V. Detroit, 9 Mich. 103. 39 2 Eex V. Justices, 23 L. M. J. 113. 8 James v. Darlington, (Wis.) 36 N. W. Rep. 835; Price v. Stagsay, (Mich.) 35 lb. 815; Rex v. Jones, 12 Ad. & E. 684; Rex v. Milverton, 5 lb. 841; De Ponthieu v. Pennyfather, .5 Taunt. 634. ^ Lincoln v. Warren, (Mass.) 23 N. Pac. E. Rep. 45. 5 Ottawa V. Rohrburgh, (Kan.) 21 Pac, R. 1061. « Polack V. Orph. Asyl., 48 Cal. 490. ■? Spiegel V. Gansberg, 44 Ind. 418. 8 Bering v. Scott, 107 111. 600. s House V. Greensburg, 93 Ind. 533. 609 § 310 MCTNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. SVI. uance of the portion rejected; and that no special order of discontinuance is required.^ In proceedings to vacate, the opinions of witnesses, as to the public utility of the existing street, — although this is often the only issue, — -cannot be given in evidence.^ § 310. Burden and means of proving vacation and aban- donment. — In considering the vacation or abandonment of highways, two maxims are of use. The first is " once a high- way always a highway ; " the other is the rule of evidence, that "a thing known to exist is presumed to continue until the con- trary is shown." The former maxim is applicable and useful when the rights of abutters, who have made improvements in the expectation of the continuance of the street, are involved. But where no such rights are involved ; or when they are un- claimed ; or when compensation is made for injury to them, a highway may cease to exist, either b}' abandonment or by legal vacation. The latter maxim applies in conjunction with the former, when it is sought to prove affirmatively, that the public and the abutters have abandoned their respective rights to the street. The burden of proof is on him who seeks to establish these propositions ; and the continuance of the street will he presumed, until satisfactory evidence is produced to rebut it.^ In some instances, the nonuser of a way, coupled with the acquisition of another in its place, has been held to be an aban- donment.* But to lay this down as the general rule, would be erroneous. In one case it was held, that nonuser for eleven years, although the highway had been fenced in ; and a total neglect to repair for fifteen years, was not conclusive evidence of abandonment.^ Nor is a compulsory nonuser of a road, in the absence of the acquisition of a new one,^ nonuser for ten years and inclosure,^ sowing grain and pasturing cattle,* nor tlie 1 Brook V. Horton, 68 Cal. 554; Com. V. Westborough, 3 Mass. 406; Com. V. Cambridge, 7 lb. 158; Bow- ley V. Walker, 8 Allen, 21. 2Fairohild v. Bascom, 35 Vt. 398; White V. Baily, 10 Mich. 155 ; Hughes v. Beggs, (lud.) 16 N". E. Rep. 817. ' Elliott on Roads & Streets, p. 658. * Peoria v. Johnston, 56 111. 45; Oalbraith v. Littiech, 73 lb. 210; War- ner V. Holyoke, 112 Mass. 862; Jef- i Rose v. Bostyer, 22 Pac. Rep. 393, 610 fersonville v. C Conner, 37 Ind. 9."); Hamilton v. State, 106 lb. 361; Davie V. Huebner, 45 Iowa, 575. 5 Kelly, etc., v. Lawrence F. Co., 22 N. E. Rep. 639. eCriggs v. Philips, 103 N. T. 77; Freeholders v. Towns, 20 N. Y. State Rep. 394. ' State V. Culver, 65 Mo. 607. ^Watkins v. Lynch, 71 Cal. 21; CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. §311 drawing of a line across an of3ficial map,^ satisfactory and con- clusive evidence of abandonment. When no public need ex- isted for the use of a street, abandonment cannot be presumed from nonuser." Parol evidence of abandonment is not admissible to show that a street has been legally vacated } as vacation can only be ef- fected by a jMasi-judicial proceeding, of which the record is the best evidence.^ § 311. Compensation to abutters on vacation. — The expe- diency or necessity of vacating highways is wholly discretion- ary with the Legislature ; * but when vacating a street or highway will cause special, as distinct from consequential, damages to the abutter, his consent must be obtained, or adequate compensation must be made him.^ As has already been explained,^ the abut- ter has a right in the highway, separate and distinct from that which he enjoys in the public easement; and as this private right to a convenient access to his property makes the property more valuable, it is itself real property, and comes within the protection of the constitutional inhibition against taking pri- vate property without compensation.'^ But the law cannot by any means be said to be settled upon this question, and there are many decisions which assert or countenance a contrary doctrine, or modify the operation of the principle just explained.* In New York it has been held that the Legislature may au- 1 Eureka v. Armstrong, 22 Pac. 828. 2 Wolfe V. Sullivan, (Ind. 93) 32 N. E. R. 1017; RelUy v. Racine, 51 Wis. 526; Crocker v. Collins, (S. C. 93) 15 S. E. R. 951. ' Latlirop V. Cent. la., 69 Iowa, 105 ; Sanborn v. Sch. Dist., 12 Minn. 17; Wlietton V. Clayton, 111 Ind. 360; Monaghan v. Sch. Dist, 38 Wis. 101. * Hayes v. Taylor, (Iowa, 92) 52 N. W. R. 116; Bradbury v. Walton, (Ky. 93) 21 S. W. R. 869; Elliott, Roads and Streets, p. 664. ^ Miller v. Sohenck, ( Iowa, 89) 43 N. W. R. 225 ; Rohmeiser v. Bannon, (Ky. 93)22 S.W. R. 27; Parker v. Bishop, (111. 93) 34 N. E. R. 473; Haynes v. Thomas, 7 Ind. 38; Gil- bert's Case, 70 N. T. 361; Story's Case, 90 lb. 122; Kimball v. Homan, (Mich. 89) 42 N. W. R. 167; Onset St. R. Co. V. Com'rs, 154 Mass. 395. « §§ 301-305. 'Indianapolis v. Hartley, 67 111. 439; Gargan v. Railroad, (Ky. 89) 12 S. W. R. 259; Cinoin. v. White, 6 Peters, 431 ; Petition of Concord, 50 N. H. 530; Butterworth v. Bartlett, 50 Ind. 537; Pearsall v. Eaton, (Mich.) 42 N. W. Rep. 77. 8 Glasgow V. St. Louis, 17 S. W. R. 743; 107 Mo. 198; Gerhard v. See- konk Com'rs, (R. I.) 5 Atl. Rep. 199, 201 ; Barr v. Oscaloosa, 45 Iowa, 275 ; Polack V. Trustees, 48 Cal. 490; Hiel- scher v. Minneapolis, ( Minn. 91 ) 49 N. W. R. 287; Perry v. Sherbourne, 11 Cush. 888. 611 §312 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XVI. thorize the closing of one public way without compensating adjoining owners, provided another way to their property re- mains open.^ And in Pennsylvania, where the constitution pro- vided that private property should not be taken for public use without just compensation, and contains a special clause which makes this principle applicable to the taking of property by municipal corporations for the construction of highways; it was held that the abutter's interests, except when his tangible property is taken, were not to be considered or compensated for.2 § 312. Statute of Limitations as applicable to public ease- ment in streets— Equitable estoppel. — In the absence of ex- press statutory provisions, it is generally held that the remedial rights of the United States, and of the several States, are not af- fected by Statutes of Limitation.^ It would seem logical to ap- ply the same rule to municipal corporations, since they are but agents of the general sovereigntj', exercising the powers of local government. At any rate, this should be recognized as the controlling principle, wliere the rights or privileges, which they possess, are held by them in a representative public capacity, representative either of the State and Nation, or of the local community.* When a city is interested in, what may be termed, its private capacity, as distinguished from its governmental ; as, for example, when as defendant or plaintiff, it is a party to an ordinary action ; and, particularly, when the suit does not in- volve any propertj', which is held by it solely upon trust for public use and convenience, there seems to be no good ground for exempting it from the operation of the statute.^ If a city, laying aside its sovereignty, enters upon terms of equality into contractual relations with individuals ; there is no unfairness in the rule which permits it to enjoy the benefits of such a con- • Coster V. Kew Tork, 43 N. Y. 399; Fearing v. Irwin, 65 lb. 486. 2 McGliee's Appeal, 114 Pa. St. 470. ^ Angell on Limitations, § 36; Dick- inson V. New Tork, 92 N. Y. 584; U. S. V. Kirkpatriok, 9 Wheat. 735; Peo- ple V. Gilbert, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 227; U. S. V. Hoar, 2 Mason, 134. ^Dil. Mun. Corp. 668; Elliott on 612 Roads, p. 667, note 4. 5 Elliott on Roads, p. 665 ; Wood on Limitations, § 53; Evans v. Erie Co., 66 Pa. St. 222; Koshkoning v. Bur- ton, 104 U. S. 668; May v. Sch. Dist., 22 Neb. 205; Gaines v. Hot Spr. Co., 39 Ark. 262; Simplot v. Chicago eto., 16 Fed. Rep. 350; Mowry v. Provi- dence, 10 R. I. 52. CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. §312 dition only subject to the obligations and limitations which are binding on natural persons.^ Upon the question, whether the city's title to a street, owned by it in trust for public use, may be lost by adverse possession, and its action for recovery barred by the Statute of Limita- tions, the cases are at variance. In some of the States, it is held that when the public title to the street is concerned, the lules of the Statute of Limitations will bar the right of action of the municipality .'■' In other States, the directly contrary doc- trine is upheld, and the public right to a highway is held not to be barred by adverse possession under the statute.^ The true theory, at the basis of the law relating to streets, is un- doubtedly that they are acquired or dedicated primarily, if not solely, for the use of the whole public, as distinct from the in- habitants of the municipality, within the limits of which they are located. The corporation possesses an interest in them as trustee for the real owners. Every erection or obstruction upon a street, by which its use is in danger of impairment, is, unless authorized by the Legislature, a public nuisance ; and no mere lapse of time will, in the absence of a limit expressly imposed ' Burlington v. R. E. Co., 41 Iowa, 134. 2 Chicago V. Middlebrook, 32 N. E. E. 457 (111. 93); Wheeling v. Camp- bell, 12 W. Va. 36; Bo wen v. Team, 6 Rich. 398; Fort Smith v. McKibben, 41 Ark. 45 ; Litchfield v. Wilmot, 2 Root (Conn.) 288; Terrill v. Bloom- field, (Ky. 93) 21 S. W. R. 1041; Cincin. v. Evans, 5 Ohio St. 594; Le- vasser V. Washburn, 11 Gratt. 572; Richmond v. Poe, 24 lb. 149; Gregoi-y V. Knight, 50 Mich. 61 ; Coleman v. Flint etc., 64 lb. 160; Black v. O'Hara, 5 Atl. Rep. 598; Meyer v. Graham, (Neb. 92) 51 N. W. R. 17. ^Dewitt V. Elmira Transfer Co., 134 N. T. 495; Driggs v. Phillips, 103 lb. 77; Vicksburg v. Marshall, 59 Miss. 563; Simplot v. Chicago etc., 16 Fed. Rep. 350; Webb v. Demopolis, (Ala. 91) 18 So. R. 289; St. Vincents etc. V. Troy, 76 N. Y. 108; Durham V. Hussman, (Iowa, 93) 55 N. W. R. 11; Ellis V. State, (Tex. 93) 21 S. W. E. 66; Sumner v. Peebles, 22 Pac. R. 221; 5 Wash. St. 471; Flynn v. De- troit, 93 Mich. 590; Devoe v. Smelt- zer, (Iowa, 93) 53 N. W. E. 287; Pal- lers V. SoUers, (Md. 93) 26 Atl. E. 188; Kofe v. Utler, 101 Pa. St. 27; Com. V. Moorhead, (Pa.) 12 Atl. R. 424; Philadelphia v. Phila. etc. E. Co., 58 Pa. St. 263; Mayor v. Cornell, 6 Coldw. 412; Almy v. Church, (E. I. 93) 26 Atl. R. 58; People v. Pope, 53 Cal. 437; Visalia v. Jacob, 65 lb. 434; Wolfe V. Sullivan, (Ind. 93) 32 N. E. E. 1017; Logan Co. v. Lincoln, 81 111. 156; Jersey City v. State, 30 N. J. L. 521; Crocker v. Collins, (S. C. 93) 15 S. E. E. 951; People v. Pope, 53 Cal. 437; Sims v. Frankfort, 79 Ind. 446; Coleman v. Thurmond, 56 Tex. 514; McTarnahan v. Pike, 91 Cal. 540; Board v. Martin, 92 lb. 209; San Francisco v. Bradbury, lb. 414; Taylor v. Phillippi, 14 S. E. R. 130; 35 W. Va. 554. 613 312 MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS. [CH. XVI. by the sovereignty, make such obstruction other than a nui- sance, subject to the public right of abatement.^ Every repetition of a nuisance is indictable ; and upon gen- eral principles, it is clear that no one ought to be allowed to take such an advantage of his own wrong, as will enable him to acquire for private and individual purposes public lands, which by the policy of tlie law are taken out of the market and made inalienable for such purposes.^ A distinction, how- ever, has been made by some courts between the claims of the State and of the municipality, based upon the assumed fact, that the exemption from the statute is a prerogative of sov- ereignty alone ; in other words, of the State. The difference also is pointed out between the condition of the lands and highways in the State, outside of the city limits — frequently sparsely populated, subject to the intrusion of squatters, and distant from the central government ; and the condition of the town or city — thickly inhabited and with the proper officials close at hand, and ready to prevent encroach- ments.^ • Dil. Miin. Corp. § 669. - Elliott on Eoads and Streets, p. 669; Sims v. Chattanooga, 1 Lea, 694; Com. v. McDonald, 16 R. & S. (Pa.) 390; Barter v. Com., 3 Pa. 253; Penny Pot Landing Cas., 16 Pa. St. 79; Phila. v. Pliila. etc., 58 Pa. St. 2.o3.' In Com. v. Alburger, 1 Whart. 469, it was said: "These principles pervade the laws of the most en- lightened nations as well as our own code, and are essential to the protec- tion of public rights, which would be gradually frittered away, if the want of complaint or prosecution gave the party a right. Individuals may reasonably be held to a limited period to enforce their rights against adverse occupants, because they have an interest sufficient to make them vigilant. But in public rights of property, each individual feels but a slight interest, and rather tolerates even a manifest encroachment than seeks a dispute to set it right." See, 614 also, Indianapolis etc. v. Eoss, 47 Ind. 25; New Orleans v. Maggioli, 4 La. An. 73 ; Ingram v. Pol. Jury, 20 lb. 226; Delabigarre v. Sec. Mu- nic, 3 lb. 237; Shreveport v. Wal- pole, 22 lb. 526; Staffordshire v. Prop'rs etc. Law Hep., 1 E. & I. Appeals, 254; Rochdale Can. Co. v. RadclifEe, 18 Q. B. 287; Elwell v. Prop'rs etc., 3 H. of L. Cases, 812; Grand Surrey Can. Co. v. Hall, 1 M. & Gr. 392; see, also, as bearing upon adverse possession against a munici- pal corporation, Dil. Mun. Corp. §§667-675; Henshaw v. Hunting, 1 Gray, 203 ; Fox v. Hart, 11 Ohio, 414; Com'rs v. Taylor, 2 Bay (S. C.) 282; Oustott v. Murray, 22 Iowa, 457; McFarlane v. Kerr, 10 Bosw. (ISr. Y.) 249; Kellogg v. Thompson, 66 N. Y. 88; State v. Pettis, 7 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 390. 3 Wheeling v. Campbell, 12 W. Va. 36; Dil. Mun. Corp., 473. CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. §313 There are some extraordinary and exceptional cases, in which the courts have applied the doctrines of equitable estoppel to prevent the municipality from asserting its title to lands, once a part of the highway, whicli had been encroached upon by the abutting owner ; where, through the criminal or culpable negli- gence of the municipal authorities, the abutting owner has been induced to rely upon his apparently good title, and where he would suffer irreparable damage, if the municipality were now allowed to assert its title.^ But this cannot be safely taken as a definitely settled rule.^ § 313. Deflnition, character and construction of public bridges. — A public bridge is a structure, erected across a nat- ural or artificial water course and employed by the public in traversing the stream.^ The erection of a public bridge is the "laying out of a highway,"* and "the principal circumstance necessary to constitute a public bridge is that the people at large may have a free and uninterrupted use of it, not upon sufferance, but as a matter of right." ^ Such a bridge may be erected by the municipal authorities 1 Meyer v. Graham, (Neb. 92) 50 N. W. R. 763; Simplot v. Dubuque, 49 Iowa, 630; Quincy v. C. B. & Q. E. K.,92 111. 21; Ramsay V. Clinton Co., lb. 226; Flynn v. Detroit, 93 Mich. 590; 53 N. W. R. 815; Check v. Au- rora, 92 Ind. 107; Com'rs v. Huff, 91 lb. 333; Waterloo v. Union Mill, 72 Iowa, 437 ; Orr v. O'Brien, 77 lb. 258 ; Brooks V. Riding, 40 Ind. 15 ; Devaux '/. Detroit, Harring. Oh. (Mich.) 98; Big Rapids v. Comstock, 65 Mich. 78; s. c, 31 N. W. Rep. 811; Elliott v. Williamson, 11 Lea, 38; Lane v. Ken- nedy, 13 Ohio St. 42, 49. 2 See Tiedeman's Equity Jurispru- dence, §§ 106-115, on explanation and scope of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 5 Elliott on Roads and Streets, 21; see, also. Com. v. Pittston F. B. Co., (Pa. 92) 24 Atl. R. 87; Enfield Bridge Co. V. Hartford, 17 Conn. 40; Tolland V. Wilmington, 26 lb. 578; Board etc. V. Strader, 18 jST. J. L. 108; Mc- Kinleyv. Freeh., 29 N. J. Eq. 164; Whitall V. Freeholders, 40 N. J. L. 302; State v. Gloucester, lb. 302; Board of Com'rs v. Beirly, 23 N. E. R. 672; 122 Ind. 46; Duncan v. State, (Fla. 92) 10 So. R. 815 (bridge de- fined); State V. Demarce, 80 Ind. 520; State v. Gorham, 37 Me. 451; White V. Quincy, 97 Mass. 430; Board V. Brown, 89 Ind. 48, 52. * Washer v. Bullet Co., 110 U. S. 558; San Luis Obispo v. White, (Cal. 91) 24 Pao. 864; People v. Com'rs, 4 Neb. 150; Goshen v. Myers, 119 Ind. 196; People v. President, 23 Wend. 254; Mandershld v. Dubuque, 29 Iowa, 73; Jones v. Keith, 37 Tex. 394; Beaiver v. Manchester, L. J. 26 Q. B. 311; Parker v. Bos. & M. R. R., 4 Cush. 107; Com. v. Cent. Bridge Corp., 12 lb. 244; Chicago v. Pow- ers, 42 111. 169; Rush v. Davenport, 6 Iowa, 443. 5 Woolrych on Ways, 196, cited in Elliott on Roads and Streets, 22. 615 §313 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XVI. at public expense, by a turnpike or bridge^ corporation, or by- individuals and dedicated to public use.^ On the principle that acceptance will be inferred from the beneficial nature of a grant, a bridge, built by an individual, but of which the public has the use, is deemed a public bridge.* A bridge may be open to the public ; yet, if erected or maintained for private gain, the builder and not the public will be responsible for its repair.* The municipal authorities may either by express acceptance, or by laying out a road, so that the private bridge becomes a part of the highway or street, adopt a bridge which has been constructed by individuals ; and the city thereby assumes charge of the bridge, and the duty to keep it safe and fit for use.* Although highways and bridges are similar, in that both are used for the passage of the public, it is by no means true that the rules of law applicable to the former have equal application to the latter ; and, in order to charge a person with failure to maintain a bridge, it will not be sufficient to use the word " highway," in imposing such a burden. " Highway " does not include a " bridge." ^ The word " bridge " signifies the whole structure, including the approaches, abutments, anchorages, piers and all parts nec- essary to make it safe and convenient for public use.'^ Although 1 Rex V. West Elding etc., 2 East, 342; Callendar v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 432. - Pisoa. B. Co. V. New Hampshire, 7 N. H. 59. 3 State V. Compton, 2 N. H. 513; Heacook v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58. «Dygert v. Schenk, 23 Wend. 446; Heacook v. Sherman, 14 lb. 58; Phoenixville v. Phoenix Iron Co., 45 Pa. St. 135. A good illustration of this principle is found in the erection of a bridge carrying the highway over a canal or railway cutting, and which is required to be kept in re- pair by the canal or railway com- pany, the burden being imposed upon such company as the condition of authorizing this intersection of the highway: Lowell v. Prop'rs, 104 Mass. 18. 6 Mayor v. Sheffield, 4 Wall. 180; Houfe V. Town, 34 Wis. U08; State v. 616 Supervisors, 41 lb. 28; Bislier v. Eichard, 9 Ohio St. 495; Dayton v. Euthland, 84 111. 2*79; Batty v. Dux- berry, 24 Vt. 155; State v. Board, 80 lud. 4Y8. ^ State V. Canterbury, 8 Foster, (N. H.) 195. 'Tinkham v. Town of Stookbridge, 24 Atl. Eep. 761; 64 Vt. 480; Bard- well V. Jamaica, 15 lb. 442; Com. v. Deerfleld, 6 Allen, 449; Whicher v. Somerville, 138 Mass. 454; CMnton Bridge, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 454, 462; Duncan v. State, (Fla. 92) 10 So. Rep. 815; Penn. Towns, v. Perry Co., 78 Pa. St. 457; Everett v. Beisly, 24 Atl. Rep. 700; 150 Pa. St. 152; Watson v. Proprietors, 14 Me. 201; Com'rs v. Pittston, (Pa. 92) 24 All. Eep. 87; Tolland v. Willington, 26 Conn. 578; Board of Com'rs v. Beirly, 23 N. E. It. 672; 122 Ind. 46; Proprietors, etc. CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. §314 the question, whether a structure is or is not a bridge, is usuall}' one of law, it may under peculiar circumstances be one of fact for the jury. So, also, what are parts of a bridge.^ § 314. Legislative and municipal powers •ver bridges When the power is possessed by a municipal corporation to build or maintain bridges, it is always conferred upon it by statute, expressly or by necessary or reasonable implication.^ And, in America, any one who claims the right to bridge over a navigable stream, must show statutory authority.^ A general authorization, " to lay out and open " highways or streets, does not empower a municipality to build bridges across navigable streams, however it might be with respect to those not navigable.* Although there has been some conflict of the cases, it is now well settled that a State may authorize a municipal or other corporation to place a bridge across a navigable stream, al- though navigation may thereby be interfered with ; ^ and the V. Hoboken, etc., 13 N. J. Eq. 504; Board v. K. & V. Grav. Road Co., 87 Ind. 502; contra, Carter v. Bos. & Prov. R. R. Co., 139 Mass. 525; Swan- zey v. Somerset, 132 lb. 312; More- land V. Mitchell Co., 40 Iowa, 394; Nims V. Boone Co., 66 lb. 272. iPolland V. Willington, 26 Conn. 578; Moreland v. Mitchell Co., 40 Iowa, 394; Reg. v. Southampton, 14 Eng. L. Eq. 116; Bard well v. Jamai- ca, 15 Vt. 442; Reg. v. Gloucester- shire, 1 Car. & M. 506. 2 Freeholders v. State, 42 jST. J. 263; Conn. V. Breed, 4 Pick. 460 ; Balti- more V. StoU, 52 Md. 435 ; Humphrey T. Armstrong Co., 56 Pa. St. 204; Com. V. Taunton, 7 Allen, 309; Sa^ vannah v. State, 4 Ga. 26 ; Penn. Tp. V. Perry Co., 78 Pa. St. 457; Queen V. Inh., 6 Mod. 307; Beatty v. Titus, 47 N. J. L. 89; Springfield v. Conn. E. R., 4 Cush. 637; Fall Riv. I. W. v. Old Colony E. R., 5 Allen, 221. 8 Whitehead v. Jessup, (93) 53 Fed. 707; People v. Sara. R. R. Co., 15 Wend. 130; Mohawk B. Co. v. Utica E. E., 6 Paige, 554; Pall Riv. etc. v. Old Col. R. R., 5 Allen, 221; State v. Oldtown B. Co., 85 Me. 17; Miller v. Prairie du Chien R. R., 34 Wis. 533; Costello V. Landwehr, 28 lb. 533; Union Pac. E. R. v. Hall, 91 U. S. 343; Saugatuck B. Co. v. Westport, 39 Conn. 337; Boston, etc. v. Boston R. R., 23 Pick. 360. * Snyder v. Poster, 77 Iowa, 638; Snyder v. Foster, supra ; Com. v. Charlestown, 1 Pick. 130; Arundel V. McCuUoch, 10 Mass. 70; Maxwell V. Bay Bridge Co., 41 Mich. 453; see Elliott, Roads and Streets, p. 35. 5 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 ; Williams v. Beardsley, 2 Ind. 59; Gilman v. Phila., 3 Wall. 713; Bridge Co. V. U. S., 105 U. S. 470; Escauaba V. Chicago, 107 lb. 678; Cardwell V. Bridge Co., 113 lb. 205 ; Wheeling Bridge Case, 13 How 518; Com. v. Breed, '4 Pick. 460; Carter v. Pro- prietors, 104 Mass. 236; People v. Kelly, 76 N. Y. 475; Packet Co. v. Peoria, etc., 38 111. 467; People v. Rensselaer, etc., 15 Wend. 113; Wilson V. Blackb. C. Cr. etc., 2 Peters, 245; Cox. v. State, 3 Blackf. 193; Palmer v. Cuyahoga Co., 3 Mc- Lean. 226; Chicago V. McGinn, 51 111. 617 § 314 a. MUNICIPAL COBPOBATIONS. [CH. XVI. corporation, upon which has been conferred this privilege, can- not be held liable for damages from such interference, as long as there is no negligence on its part, and proper skill and dili- gence are employed.^ The right to navigate a stream is one which should be jeal- ously guarded ; and although in a great public emergency or necessity it may possibly be destroyed or taken away, in the ex- ercise of the police power ; ^ yet, statutes, conferring the power to erect bridges, should be strictly construed in protection of the right of navigation of the streams.^ Under the common law, the right of exacting toll imposed upon a municipal corpo^ ration the duty of keeping its bridges safe for public use, on the theory that the corporation thereby derives a private benefit.* § 314 a. National control over the construction and maintenance of bridges. — As a general proposition, the pow- er to regulate the use of navigable rivers resides in the States, through which the rivers flow. And the only constitutional limitation upon the State's power of control, as against the United States government, is that which arises by implication from the express grant to Congress of the power to regulate foreign and interstate commerce. Inasmuch as a large part of this commerce is carried on by the use of the navigable streams of the country, it has been uniformly held by the courts, both Federal and State, that the Federal power to regulate com- merce includes the power to institute regulations for the use and control of those streams which are used in the prosecution of foreign and interstate commerce.^ But inasmuch as all 266; Bailey v. Phila. etc., 4 Harr. 389; Pumphrey v. Baltimore, 47 Md. 145; Hamilton v. Vicksburg, etc., 34 La. An. 970; Wisconsin, etc. v. Manson, 43 Wis. 255. 1 Hamilton v. Viclcsburg, etc., 119 U. S. 281; Carolina S. B. Co. v. Kail- road, .30 S. C. 539; Alabama S. K. Co. V. Railroad, 87 Ala. 154. See Shawnee Co. v. Topeka, 39 Kan. 197; 18 Pac. R. 161 ; Delta Lumber Co. v. Board, (Mich.) 40 N. W. E. 1. 2 Passaic Bridge Cases, 3 Wall. 782; Pound V. Turck, 95 U. S. 459; State V. Eau Claire, 40 Wis. 533. 3 Stevens Pt. Boom Co. v. Reilly, 618 46 Wis 237; Boston v. Crowley, 38 Fed. Rep. 202; Dugan v. Bridge Co., 27 Pa. St. 303; Hickok v. Hine, 23 Ohio St. 523; State v. Freeport, 43 Me. 198. * Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 489; Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 289; Biglow v. Randolph, 14 Gray, 543; Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick. 511; Pittsburgh v. Grier, 22 Pa. St. 54; Al- drich V. Tripp, 11 R. I. 141. 5 United States v. E. & H. B. Co., 45 Fed. Rep. 414; Rhea v. Newport, etc. Co., 50 Fed. Rep. 16; State v. Leighton, 22 Atl. Rep. 380; 83 Me. 419. CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. § 314 a. streams may be used in the canyiiig on of the domestic com- merce, and serve other local interests, the congressional power of control does not exclude State regulation altogether. The power of the State to regulate the streams, which may be used in interstate commerce, is unaffected, as long as Congress does not exercise its power; and in any case the State regulations are void only so far as they conflict with the regulations of Congress.^ In applying this general rule of constitutional lim- itation to the construction of bridges over navigable streams, it has been held that if the stream, over which it is proposed to construct a bridge, is one which is subject to congressional regulations, because it is used in the conduct of interstate com- merce, the authority to construct the bridge may be granted by Congress or by the State Legislature. If Congress grants the franchise, the interference of the bridge with interstate commerce will constitute no objection to the legality of the structure — the determination of Congress, that it causes only a reasonable interference with tlie navigation of the stream, being conclusive, in the same manner as a like determination of the State Legislature is, in i-espect to bridges constructed over streams not adapted for use in interstate commerce. But if the State Legislature autliorize the construction of a bridge over a stream used in interstate commerce, — inasmuch as the interference with interstate commerce by the State is only per- missive, and secondary to the primary control of Congress, — the judgment of the Legislature, that the bridge causes only a reasonable interference with navigation, which is justiflable by the increased facilities for rapid transportation which the bridge affords, is not conclusive ; and the ultimate decision, in the ab- sence of congressional action, rests with the Federal Courts, who are deemed to have the power to pass upon the reason- ableness of the interference with navigation, and to cause the bridge to be removed, if it is found to interfere materially with the use of the stream in foreign or interstate commerce.^ But 1 Cooley's Const. Llm. 730; Tied- eman's Lira, of Police Power, § 203; Wilson V. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245; Wheeling Bridge Case, 13 How. 518; 18 How. 421; Oilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. VIS; Withers v. Buckley, 20 How. 84; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 ; Es- canaba Company v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678. 2 Wheeling Bridge Case, 13 How. 518; Columbus Ins. Co. v. Peoria Bridge Co., 6 McLean, 70, 209; Jolly V. Terre Haute Drawbridge Co., 6 619 §315 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XVI. even after a bridge has been condemned by a Federal court, because of its unreasonable interference with interstate com- merce, Congress may interpose, in the exercise of its power to regulate commerce, and declare the bridge to be a lawful structure.^ In consequence of these rulings, the consent of Congress, or the national authorities, to the construction of a bridge, is now always obtained in advance, whenever it is constructed over a stream, which is more or less adapted to use in interstate com- merce.^ § 315. County liability for maintenance and repair of public bridges. — At common law the duty of repairing public bridges was incumbent upon the county in which they were located ; ^ and while this rule has been applied in some cases in America,* it may be said that this responsibility of counties to repair bridges has never prevailed generally in this country.^ It seems to be the general rule that a county is liable onlj- for the repair of such bridges, which it is by statute authorized or commanded to build and maintain ; ^ and it has been held that county funds cannot be used, without statutory authority, to aid in the construction of toll bridges, or even of free bridges.' But in Iowa, counties are permitted to aid in the construction of free bridges, within municipal limits, with the consent of the city.8 borough, 85 Ala. 590; Huffman v. San Joaquin Co., 21 Gal. 426. ^ Taylor v. Davis Co., 40 Iowa, 295 ; State V. Wood Co., (Wis.) 40 N. W. E. 381; Pandeman v. St. Charles Co., (Mo. 92) 19 S. W. E. 733; Helgel v. Wichita Co., (Tex. 92) 19 Ibl 562; Arnold v. Henry Co., 81 Ga. 730; Wabash v. Pearson, (Ind.) 22 K. E. E. 134; Dougherty V. Supervisors, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 304; In re Kansas City B. & I. Co., 35 Kans. 557; GrayviUe v. Whitaker, 85 111. 439; Moreland v. Mitchell, 40 lb. 394; Board v. Mitcli- elltown, (Ind. 92) 30 N. E. Eep. 937; Skinner v. Henderson, (Fla. 90) 7 So. Rep. 464. ' Colton V. Hanchet, 13 111. 615. 8 Bell V. Foutch, 21 Iowa, 119; Bar rett V. Brooks, lb. 144. McLean, 237; Com'rs of St. Joseph Co. V. Pidge, 5 Ind. 13. 'Wheeling Bridge Case, 18 How. 421. 2 Eex V. W. Riding, 5 Burr. 2594; Com'rs V. Martin, 4 Mich. 557; State V. Campton, 2 N. H. 513; Board v. Washington Tp., (Ind.) 23 N. E. Eep. 257. 3 Hill V. Boston, 122 Mass. 344; Washer v. BuUett Co., 110 U. S. 558; * In re Waverly Borough, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 669; Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 375 ; Gilman v. Laconia, 55 N". H. 130; Weightraan v. Washington, 1 Black, 39; Mackinnon v. Pei-son, 25 Eng. L. & Eq. 457. 5 1/1 re Spier, 115 N. Y. 389; Hill V. Supervisors, 12 lb. 52; Myers v. Com., 110 Pa. St. 217; Lee v. Yar- 620 CH. XVI.J STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. §316 § 316. Rights and duties of municipal corporations in building, rebuilding and maintaining bridges If the ex- pediency or necessity of buildirig,i or rebuilding bridges,^ be left to the discretion of the local authorities, the courts will not inter- fere in the exercise of what under the circumstances is a dis- cretionary power.3 But if the duty to repair or rebuild be imperative, mandamus will lie.* When, in locating or building bridges, the rights of private property are impaired or invaded, an injunction will be granted against the municipal corporation, when acting illegally ; ^ but as a rule the courts will not interfere except upon clear proof of fraud or bad faith, or when the mu- nicipal or local authorities are exceeding their powers. Municipal corporations have a qualified ownership in the bridges they build, as trustees for the public ; and may maintain all actions which are necessary to protect such ownership and the public use of the structure. This ownership continues, even after the bridge may have been damaged to such an ex- tent as to render it unfit for public use.^ The Legislature may provide that the expense attendant upon the construction, maintenance or repair of a bridge connecting two cities, be divided between them ; "^ and if one of them under such a statute pays all the expenses, it is entitled to reimburse- ment by the other.^ It has been held, however, in such a case that, where one pays more than its share because of an erro- 1 Macon Co. v. People, 121 111. 616; Kankakee v. People, 24 III. App. 410; Com. T. Charleston, 1 Pick. 180; Hamilton v. State, 113 Ind. 179; 15 N. E. Rep. 258; Travis v. Skinner, 40 K W. Rep. 234. estate V. Board, 113 Ind. 179. 8 State V. Mt. Pleasant, 16 Wis. 613; Jefeerson v. St. Louis Co., (Mo. 93) 21 S. W. Rep. 217. * Richards v. County, 120 Mass. 401; State v. Bramwell, (Kan.) 18 Pac. R. 9o2; State v. Board, 80 Ind. 478; Walker v. Kansas City, 99 Mo. 647; State v. Winterberg, 80 lb. 519; Howe V. Com'rs, 47 Pa. St. 361; see chapter on Mandamus, §§362, 377; Augusta etc, In re, 12 Up. Can. Q. B. 522; State v. County Co., 11 S. E. R. 72; 33 W. Va. 589; Ottawa ,. Peo- ple, 48 111. 233; People v. Dutchess Co., 58 N. Y. 152. 5 Kyle V. Board, 94 Ind. 115; Quin- ton V. Burton, 61 Iowa, 471. 6 City V. Shirk, 88 Ind. 563; Shirk V. Board, 106 lb. 573; St. Louis B. Co. V. Curtis, 103 111. 410. ' Kendall v. County, 12 111. App. 210; MoHardy v. Corporation etc., 1 App. C. 629; 39 Q. B. (Canada) 546; State V. Canterbury, 58 N. H. 195. 8 Pittsburgh v. Clarksville, 58 N. H. 291; see as to requisites to sup- port the claim, Browning v. Board, 44 Ind. 11; Board v. Thompson, 106 lb. 534; Browning V. Board, 44 lb. 11. 621 §317 MUNICIPAT. COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XVI. neous construction of the statute, it cannot recover from the other.^ § 317. Private bridges on or intersecting highways. — When a corporation in constructing a canal or railroad, inter- sects a street or other highway in such a manner, that a bridge on the highway becomes necessarj'^ for its continued use, the duty of constructing and maintaining such a bridge is incumbent upon the private corporation.^ This duty is imperative and will be enforced by mandamus,^ and, although usually imposed by stat- ute, is equally binding in the absence of statute.* Although owners of private bridges, which are used by the public, are not obliged to build or maintain structures that will support a very unusual weight, such as a railroad car,^ or a wagon oveiloaded, or loaded in an unsafe or extraordinary way,^ they must use ordinary care to keep their bridges reasonably safe for travel and traffic.'^ Where corporations operate canals or rail- roads for their own use, and erect bridges which intersect streets or high ways, they must do so in such a way as not to interfere with the public use of the street, or render its use unnecessarily dangerous.^ The bridge should be constructed and maintained, with a degree of care proportionate to the known or indicated dangers, although unusual.^ If a private corporation build a toll bridge upon a public highway, the corporation may, if it so elect, take such bridge 1 JeTerson Co. v. St. Loiiis Co., (Mo. 93) 21 S. AV. R. 217; Flynn v. Com'rs, (N. T.) 22 N. E. R. 1109; In- hiibitants v. Charlestown etc., 7 Met. 70; Rex v. Inhabitants, 14 East, 319; Rex V. Inhabitants, 13 lb. 220. 2 Wayne Co. etc. v. Berry, .5 lud. 286; Board v. White Water etc. Co., 2 lb. 162. 3 Cambridge v. Charlestown etc., 7 Met. 70; State v. Gorhain, 37 Me. 451; Reg. V. Wycomber, L. R. 2 Q. B. 310. * People V. Chicago etc., 67 111. 118. * Yordy v. Marshall Co., (Iowa, 93) 53 N. W. R. 298; Monongahela B. Co. V. Pittsburgh etc., 114 Pa. St. 478; Clulow V. McClelland, 151 lb. 583. 6 Dexter v. Canton, 79 Me. 463 ; Clapp V. Town, 3 N. Y. State Rep. 622 516; McCormick v. Washington, 112 Pa. St. 185. ' Board v. Cruiston, 32 N. E. R. 735; Stokes v. Tift, 64 Ga. 312; State V. Zauesville etc., 16 Ohio St. 308. 8 State V. Minn. etc. Co., 38 Minn. 246; 39 N. W. R. 153; Rexford ^. State, 105 N. Y. 229; Town of Rox- bury V. B. R. Co., (Vt. 92) 14 Atl. K. 92; Appeal of Philadelphia etc. Co., 15 Atl. R. 476; B. & O. R. Co. v. Wal- ker, 45 Ohio St. 577; 16 N. E. R. 475. 3 N. Y. etc. Co. V. State, (N. J. 91) 13 Atl. R. 1 ; Penn. Ry. Co. v. Brad- dock, 31 W. N. C. 311; Ohio etc. Co. V. Bridgeport, 43 HI. Ap. 89; Boston etc. Co. V. Cambridge, (Mass. 93) 34 lif. E. R. 382; Parker v. Truesdale, (Minn. 93) 55 N. Y. S. 901; Humphrey CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. §318 upon the dissolution of the company or the expiration of its franchise ; upon the ground that such bridge has become a part of a regular system of highways for public use, and hence can- not be diverted to private purposes.^ § 318. Turnpikes. — A road or highviray, which is constructed and maintained by a private corporation, possessing the legal right to gather toll from travelers, is a turnpike ; ^ the theory of the law being, that the tolls paid are the equivalent of taxes and assessments,^ and that no additional burden is thereby im- posed with the change in the mode of collection.* It is within the legislative power to grant franchises to turnpike corpora- tions to construct turnpikes and collect toll on existing public roads.^ And a turnpike may even be established on a city street.^ Although turnpikes are operated for private gain and are private property, they become the property of the municipal, or other local authorities, upon abandonment by their owners or forfeiture of their franchise.^ And this should be the uni- versal rule ; although it has been held that, where the fee of the turnpike is in the corporation operating it, the land does not pass to the public on abandonment of the turnpike.^ The maxim " once a highway always a highway " is as applicable to a turnpike as to a street ; and the company to which the V. Armstrong, 3 Brewster, 49; Gray V. Harris, 107 Mass. 492 ; Louisville etc. V. Thompson, 107 Ind. 442; Fort Dodge V. Minn. B. R. Co., (Iowa, 93) 54 N. W. E. 243. 1 Elliott Roads and Streets, p. 34; compare SMrk v. Board, 106 Ind. 573; see §318, where the same i-ule is adopted in relation to abandon- ment of a turnpike. 2 State V. Haight, 30 N. J. Law, 448; Nefe V. Mooresville, 66 Ind. 279. » Craig V. People, 47 111. 487; Ed- ward V. Payne, 17 Barb. 567; Regina V. E. & W. Dock, 22 Eng. L. & E. 113; see Buncombe T. Co. v. Baxter, 10 Ired. 222; Seneca E. Co. v. Au- burn etc., 5 Hill, 170; Northern B. etc. V. London, etc., 6 M. & W. 428. 'Walker V. Caywood, 31 N. Y. 51; Com. V. Wilkinson, 16 Pick. 175; "Willis V. Farley, 24 Cal. 490; Turn. Co. V. Atkinson, 1 Sneed, 426; Bene- dict V. Groit, 3 Barb. 459; Plank Rd. Co. V. Thomas, 8 Harris, 91. 5 People V. Com'rs, 37 N. T. 360; State V. Hampton, 2 N. H. 22; Paw- ton T. Co. V. Bishop, 11 Vt. 198; Mc- Kay V. D. & E. R. R., 2 Mich. 139; Chagrin F. Co. v. Cane, 2 Ohio St. 419; Noblesville T. Co. v. Baker, 4 Humph. 315. ^ Stormfeltz v. Manor Turn. Co., 13 Pa. St. 555; Milakers v. Foster, 6 Oregon, 378. 'St. Clair Co. etc. v. Illinois, 96 U. S. 63; Craig v. People, 47 111. 487; State V. Dayton etc., 10 Nev. 155; State V. Duff, (Ky. 91) 49 N. W. E. 23; State V. Lawrence Bdg. Co., 22 Kan. 438; State v. Flanagan, 67 Ind. 140. 8 People V. N. & S. etc., 86 N. T. 1 623 § 319 MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIOSS. [CH. XVI. fiiinchise had been granted, lias received in the tolls paid to them all the benefit, which was contemplated by the Legislature. A turnpike is a public highway and should not be diverted to private use any more than a street dedicated by the owner ; particularly, when, as is frequently the case, the local authori- ties have made it a part of its own system of streets or roads.^ In granting the franchise, there is nothing from which it may be inferred, that the road so established shall ever be anything but a public highway. On the other hand, there is a strong implication that its use as a public highway shall only cease, in strict conformity to law, b}' abandonment by the public.^ § 319. Extent of municipal power over turnpikes. —It is clear that when, upon the surrender or forfeiture of its franchise by the turnpike company, the municipality adopts the turnpike as a public road or street, it becomes vested with the power and duty of maintaining and keeping it in repair, as fully as though it had laid out the way originally. But a more difficult problem arises when a turnpike exists and is used by the public as a part of the existing system of city streets.^ Inasmuch as the franchise of the turnpike cor- poration is beyond impairment, it follows that the municipality cannot exercise that extensive power of supervision and regu- lation over turnpikes, which it usually possesses over streets ; and hence, it cannot be held to the same degree of responsibil- ity for their condition.* But under the police power delegated to them, the city authorities can undoubtedly make such ordi- nances, and take such action, as will compel private coipora- tions, operating turnpikes within the city limits, to keep them in a reasonable condition of repair, and to adopt such precau- tions that the public safety, health and convenience will not be J. L. 395; state v. Hoboken, 30 lb. 225; Quinn v. Paterson, 2'7 lb. 35; State V. Passaic Tump., 27 lb. 217. As to plank roads, see State v. Jer- sey City, 26 N. J. L. 445; McKay v. Detroit etc., 2 Mich. 138; Detroit v. Plank Ed., 12 Mich. 333; Keg. v. Cot- tle, 3 Eng. L. Eq. 474. * Indianapolis v. McCluer, 2 Ind. 147; Joliet v. Verley, 35 111. 58; Mc- Cain V. State, 62 Ala. 138. 1 Cooley on Const. Limit. 660, 661. 2 state V. Western etc., 95 X. C. 602 ; Craig v. People, 47 111. 487; People V. Davidson, (Cal.) 21 Pac. R. 538; .state V. Lake, 8 IS'ev. 270; Bridge Corp. V. Lowell, 15 Gray, 106; Thomp- son V. Mathews, 2 Edw. (X. Y.) Ch. 202; State v. Maine, 27 Conn. 641; Dawes v. Hawkins, 8 C. B. (X. S.) 857. " See as to extent of municipal con- trol. State V. New Brunswick, 30 X. 624 CH. XVI.J STREETS, BRIDGES AKD TITENPIKES. §319 endangered. In the absence of special statutory authorization, there exists no authority on the part of a municipal corporation to maintain or repair turnpikes, which are operated for gain by a private corporation, upon the fundamental principle that money raised by taxation can only be used for public purposes. The fact that existing turnpikes are by the march of municipal im- provement, or by legislative action, brought within city or town limits, does not destroy the franchise.^ But turnpilse companies, like owners of land, over which municipal jurisdiction has been extended, are subject to all the municipal regulations, which are at all applicable to them, or to their property. Changes in the character of the country will require corre- sponding changes in the character of the roads ; and when we consider that the franchise is granted subject, as is private prop- erty everywhere, to the burden of taxation which may become necessary by the growth of population, we see no reason for exempting such a company from its share of the expense or in- convenience, attendant upon a transition from rural to muni- cipal conditions and jurisdiction. ^ Thus, it is held that a turn- pike company must change the grade of its road, to correspond with the grade of streets intersecting it.^ If there is a statu- tory obligation upon the turnpike corporation to repair its road, and it neglects to do so, the municipality may repair it and col- lect the cost from the company ; * and it would seem to be fi-ee from reasonable doubt that the municipal corporation might do the same in the absence of statutorj'' authority. Adjoining landowners cannot be assessed for the expense which is necessary to improve or repair a turnpike,^ as in the case of a street; but they may be estopped from denying that the way is a city street, by silent acquiescence in the repairs or improvement.'' The fact, that the public use a turnpike as a street, has been held to justify the municipality in treating it as ^ St. Catherines v. Gardner, 20 U. Canada C. P. 107; Quinn v. Pater- son, 27 N. J. L. 35; Detroit v. Plank Rd. Co., 12 Mich. 333; People v. De- troit, 37 lb. 195. -See §§292, 329: grading streets; Elliott Roads and Streets, p. 58; In- dianapolis V. State, 37 Ind. 489. 8 People V. Squire, 107 N. Y. 593; 10 compare Erie v. Erie Canal Co., 59 Pa. St. 174. 4 Versailles V. Versailles Co., (Ky.) 10 S. W. Kep. 280. 6 Wilson V. Allegheny, 79 Pa. St. 272. e Palmer v. Strumph, 29 Ind. 329; State V. Fuller, 5 Vroom, 227. 625 § 320 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS. [CH. XVI. a street ; and no one can successfully object, except the turn- pike corporation.^ § 320. Incidents of toll. — The right to take toll, although arising sometimes at common law by prescription, ^ is usually in America, like all other franchises, conferred by statute.^ And the provisions of the statute must be strictly observed and followed, whenever they are at all material, as a condition pre- cedent to the enjoyment of the franchise.* When an ambiguity exists in the construction of a statute, which confers this fran- chise, it will be resolved in favor of the public and against the claimant.^ Toll as a rule can only be collected at the turnpike gates,^ the location of which cannot be altered, after being regularly established, unless it is authorized by statute, or compelled by some overpowering necessity.'^ The turnpike cor- poration must lay out its line within the territorial limit pre- scribed by its charter ; and its gates must be located only at such places as are legally provided for,* unless a discretionary power in regard to their location is conferred, when the company may, if it uses its discretion in a fair and reasonable manner, so as not to harass or annoy the traveling public, establish the toll gates at such places, and in such numbers, as it may see fit.' The company can legally close its gates against any one re- iConestoga, etc. Co. v. Lancaster Co., 151 Pa. St. 543; State v. Passaic, 42 N. J. L. 524; Jersey City v. State, I Vroom, 521 ; State v. Atlantic City, 5 lb. 99. 'Panton Turnpike Co. v. Bishop, II Vt. 198; Yarmouth v. Eaton, 3 Burr, 1402; Harpurt v. Wils, 1 Mod. 47; Warren v. Pridaux, 1 lb. 104. 3 Boyle V. Phila. etc., 54 Pa. St. 314; Pa. E. E. Co. v. Sly, 65 lb. 210; Covington etc. Co. v. Sandford, (Ky. 93) 20 S. W. Eep. 1031; Truman V. Walgam, 2 Wils. 296. * Charles Eiver Bridge v. Warren, etc., 11 Pet. 422; Barti-am v. Cen. C. Co., 25 Cal. 283; Eives v. Wood, 15 S. W. Rep. 131; Justices v. G. & W. Co., 9 Ga. 475; Kemper v. Cinoin. etc., 11 Ohio, 392. ^ Lees v. Manchester, 11 East, 645; 626 Hall V. Grantham, etc., 13 M. & W. 114. *• Lincoln Ave. Co. v. Daum, 79 111. 299; Eussell v. Muldraugh, 13 Bush, (Ky.) 307; Turnp. Co. v. Vandusen, 10 Vt. 199; comp. New Albany, etc. V.Lewis, 49 Ind. 161 ; Patterson v. Ind. etc. Co., 56 lb. 20. 'Hartford Co. v. Baker, 17 Pick. 432; State v. Norwalk Co., 10 Conn. 157; Turnp. Co. v. Hosmer, 12 lb. 361; Griffin v. House, 18 Johns. 397; estate V. Douglas, 10 Oreg. 185; Detroit, etc. Co. v. Mahoney, (Mich.) 36 N. W. Eep. 69. 8 The Cheshire Co. etc. v. Stevens, 10 N. H. 133: People v. Kingston, etc., 23 Wend. 193; Mallory v. Aus- tin, 7 Barb. 626; Stewart v. Eioh, 1 Caines, 182; Farmers, etc. v. Coven- try, 10 Johns. 389. CH. XVI.J STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. §321 fusing to pay toll ; ^ and cutting or breaking down a toll gate, thus lawfully closed, is in Indiana, and perhaps elsewhere, a misdemeanor, beside being a civil injury .^ The Legislature may exempt certain persons from paying toll by inserting in the charter of the turnpike company a provision to that effect ; * and the right of exacting tolls may also be waived by contract. But while a turnpike companj' may by contract exempt certain persons from the obligation to pay toll, it would seem that its power, so to contract, was limited, as in tlie case of railroads and other common carriers, by the rule that the same privileges and rights must be impartially extended to all, and that the tm-npike company cannot enter into contracts, which will un- justly discriminate in favor of one class of the community, and aid it in securing an unfair advantage over others.* Not only may a turnpike company maintain an action to recover tolls due,* but in some cases penalties are imposed by statutes for non- payment,^ but no such penalty can be imposed by a corporate by-law.^ § 321. Law of the road. — In order that a proper and con- venient use may be made of the highways by the public, cer- tain rules have grown up as the result of a long continued and uniform practice, which in some of the States have been ratified and aiBrmed by statute.^ A traveler, generally, may legally occupy any portion of a highway, not occupied by some one else.* In England the cus- tomary rules for drivers are : First. Two parties meeting, each must keep to the left. Second, in passing, the first person keep- ing to the left, the other must pass on the off side. Third, in crossing, the person coming transverse shall turn to the left, so as to pass behind the other vehicle.^" ' Bock V. State, 50 Ind. 281. 2 State V. Walters, 64 Ind. 226. ' Tump. Co. V. Freeman, 14 Conn. 85; Harrison v. James, 2 Chltty, 347; Hearsay v. Pruyn, 1 Johnson, 179; Angell on Highways, (3d ed.) §359; Stratton v. Herrick, 9 Johns. 356; Stratton v. Hubel, 9 lb. 357; Pass. Turn. Co. v. Langdon, 6 Vt. 546. *Munn V. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113. "Ayers v. Turnp. Co., 4 Halst. 33; Peacock v. Harris, 10 East, 104; Proprs. V. Taylor, 6 N. H. 499. 8 Morton, etc. v. Wysong, 51 Ind. 4; W. U. T. Co. V. Scircle, 103 lb. 227. ' Wayne v. Bosworth, 91 Ind. 210. 8 Daniels v. Clegg, 28 Mich. 32, 44. 3 Poster V. Goddard, 40 Me. 64; Johnson v. Small, 5 B. Mon. 25. 1" Elliott Roads ai;d Streets, p. 618, ch. 31; Wayde v. Carr, 2 Dow. & Ry. 255 ; Turley v. Thomas, 8 Carr. & P. 103. 627 §321 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIOjSTS. [CH. XVI. In America the first of the above rules is reversed. In meet- ing, each person must bear to the right.-"^ When it is provided by statute that travelers shall go to the right of the " center of the road," the center of the traveled part is meant.^ If the usually traveled path is covered by snow, and another beaten path parallel to it is used, persons who meet upon the latter must turn to the right of its center.^ The above rule is not an inflexible one, and one may under certain circumstances deviate from it.* The rule does not apply to a building which is being moved along the road,^ nor to persons crossing the road.* Street rail- roads are exempt from this rule, for their cars cannot be hauled elsewhere than in the tracks, to the use of which they are en- titled. But the cars must not be permitted to obstruct trav- el^ at crossings, or elsewhere. Other vehicles are permitted to use the tracks in a reasonable manner, and all persons have a right to drive or walk on them, or to cross them, provided they do not interrupt or impede the use of the tracks by the cai-s.^ A person violating the law of the road does so at his own risk, and must in such a case use greater care.® If a collision takes place, particularly in the dark,!" a presumption will exist against the person violating this rule.^^ In this country on passing, the leading driver must turn to 1 Kennard v. Burton, 25 Me. 39; Mahogany v. Ward, (R. I.) 17 Atl. Eep. 860; Com. v. Allen, 11 Met. 403; Wrinn V. Jones, 111 Mass. 350; O'Mal- ley V. Dorn, 7 Wis. 236 ; McLane v. Sharp, 2 HaiT. 481. The court will take judicial notice of this custom. Leame v. Bray, 3 East, 593. 2 Clark V. Com., 4 Pick. 125; Ear- ing V. Lansing, 17 Wend. 185; Dan- iels V. Clegg, 28 Mich. 32. s Jacquith v. Richardson, 8 Met. 213; Smith v. Dygert, 12 Barb. 613. * Kennard v. Burton, 25 Me. 39; Strouse v. Whittlesy, 41 Conn. 559; Dudley v. Bolles, 24 Wend. 465; Beach v. Parmeuter, 23 Pa. St. 196; Johnson v. Small, 5 B. Mon. 25. s Graves v. Shattuck, 35 N. H. 257. ^ Lovejoy v. Dolan, 10 Cush. 495; 628 Morse v. S weenie, 15 Bradw. 486; Lloyd V. Ogleby, 5 C. B. 667. ' Com. V. Temple, 14 Gray, 69; Be- gan V. Eighth Av. etc. Co., 15 N. T. 380; Adolph V. Cen. Park etc. Co., 65 lb. 554; Same v. Same, 76 lb. 530. » Adolph V. Cen. P. etc. Co., 76 N. T. 530; Buhrens v. D. D. E. etc. Co., 53 Hun, 571 ; Gov. St. Ry. Co. v. Han- Ion, 53 Ala. 70; Shea v. Potrero, 44 Cal. 414; contra, Johnson v. Canal St. Ry. Co., 27 La. An. 53. 9 Holland v. Bartch, (Ind.) 22 N. E. B. 83; Pluckwell v. Wilson, 5 C. & P. 375 ; Brooks v. Hart, 14 N. H. 307; Wilson v. Rockland etc. Co., 2 Harr. 67. w Cruden v. Fentham, 2 Esp. 685. 11 Burdick v. Worrall, 4 Barb. 596; Spofford V. Harlow, 3 Allen, 176. CH. XVI.] STREETS, BRIDGES AND TURNPIKES. §321 either side of the road which will allow enough room on the other side for the rear driver to pass,^ either to the right or to the left as may be most convenient.'^ But the neglect or re- fusal of the leading traveler to turn to one side does not justi- fy the other in attempting to pass him at all hazards, or in running 'him down. Persons using a highway owe to each other the duty of ordinary care, and each may assume that the other will employ that care.* 1 Bolton V. Colder, 1 Watts, 360. 2 Clifford V. Tyman, 61 N. H. 508. 8 Harpell v. Curtis, 1 E. D. Smith, 78; Baker v. Tehr, 97 Pa. St. 70; Pig- gott V. Lilly, 27 N. W. Kep. 3; Aveg- no V. Hart, 20 La. An. 235; Center V. Finney, 17 Barb. 94; Burnham v. Butler, 31 N. T. 480; Knowles v. Crampton, 11 Atl. Eep. 593. 629 CHAPTER XVII. LIABILITY or MXTNICIPAL CORPORATIONS FOR TORTS. Section. 324 — Implied liability of munici- pal corporations. 325 — Quasi-municipal corporations not liable for breach of of- ficial duty. 326 — Liability of municipal corpo- rations for illegal taxes, fines and licenses. 326o — Payment must be compul- sory. 327 — Municipal corporations not liable for nonperformance of discretionary duties. 327a — Failure to abate nuisances. B2n — Liability for negligent sup- ply of water. 328 — Liability for manner in which discretionary powers are exercised. 329 — Consequential damage s — Changes in the grade of streets — Improvements. 330 — Constitutional and statutory provisions, guaranteeing compensation for property damaged — Remedy. 331 — ^Municipal corporations not liable for failure to enforce ordinances. ;la — Liability for mistake as to corporate powers. 332 — Municipality not liable for neglect or misconduct of health officers. 383 — Municipality not liable for torts of police officials. 333a — Liability for torts of fire- men. 334 — Liability for property des- troyed by mobs and rioters. 630 Section 335 — ^Destruction of buildings to prevent a conflagration. 335a — Destruction of property under military and sanitary regulations. 336 — Receipt of consideration, as a ground of liability for negligence. 836o — Liability as an owner of property. 337 — How may negligence be proven. 338 — Negligence of municipal sei- vants — What must be proven — Torts ultra vires. 338a — Who is a, municipal officer or agent. 339 — Liability for the condition of highways and streets — Municipal ftnd quasi-rau- nicipal corporations distin- guished. 340 — Statutory liability for neglect in maintenance and repair of highways — Construc- tion. 341 — Q uas 4-munioipal corpora- tion, when liable for speci- fic duties. 342 — Municipal liability for injury from defective streets — Horses taking fright. 343 — Railings or barriers, signs and lights, to guard exca- vations, areas, and base- ments. 344 — ^Accidents caused by ice and snow. S44o — ^Negligence in lighting streets. CH. XVII.] LIABILITY OF MUNICIPAL COEPORATIOlSrS. § 324 345 — Falling of weighty things in highways. 346 — Right to go outside the trav- eled path — Estoppel to deny existence of highway — Sidewalks. 347 — Liability for work given out on contract — Liability for torts of contractors. 348 — Liability for torts of abutters — Liability of abutters for the same. 349 — ^Liability for neglect in per- formance of ministerial duties. 350 — ^Defects and obstructions created by municipal cor- porations. 850a — Necessity for, and evidence admissible, to show notice, in order to charge corpora- tion with negligence. 351 — Proximate cause. 352 — Contributory negligence. 352a — Damages in suits for negli- gence. 353— Bridges. 354 — Water courses. 354a — Surface water. 355 — Drains and sewers. § 324. Implied liability of municipal corporations. — Mu- nicipal corporations are the creatures of statute, and the powers which they possess, and the duties which they perform, are in the majority of eases wholly imposed and defined by the statute law. It is therefoi'e a cardinal rule, that in every case the lia- bility of a body created by statute must be determined upon a true interpretation of the statute, by which it is created.^ When express statutory provisions declare the corporation to be liable for a tortious act, or for failure to act, the question is simply one of degree ; and, upon the facts being proven, little remains to be done but to ascertain the extent to which the corporation has been derelict, and the amount of the damages sustained bj' the complainant. But when there is no express or implied statutory municipal liability for tort, and a plain munic- ipal duty has been violated with a consequent damage to some one's person, or property, there is no general rule by which it can be decided in every case whether a civil action will lie.^ As will be seen fartlier on, a great deal depends upon the na- ture of the duty,^ which is incumbent upon the municipal corpo- 1 Mersey Docks v. Gibbs; Same v. Penhallow, L. R. 1 H. L. Cases, 93; 1 H. & N. 439; Richmond v. Long's Adm., 17 Gratt. 375; Southampton, etc., Co. v. Local Board, 8 El. & Bl. 812; Winch v. Conservators of Thames, L. R. 9 C. P. C. 378. It should be borne in mind in this con- nection that in many States a liberal statutory construction is expressly commanded and the common lav/' rule, that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed, is abolished. Stimpson's Statutes, art. 102. 2Heeney v. Sprague, 11 R. I. 456; Flynp V. Canton, 40 Md. 312; 2 Thomps. Neg., ch. 16. 8 Hill V. Boston, 122 Mass. 344. 631 §324 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. xvn. ration ; and this is to so large an extent based upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case, that it is best to refrain from laying down any universal rule, and endeavor justly to determine each case upon its own merits.^ Municipal duties may be divided into two classes : Fii-st, governmental duties, which have been delegated to the city or town by the people acting through the Legislature ; and which, though performed within circumscribed territorial limits, serve to benefit the people of the State ; and in the carrying out of which the municipal corporation is only an agent of the State.^ Secondly, quasi-private duties, to be exercised for the peculiar advantage of the municipal locality and its inhabitants ; and ex- clusive of any benefit to be conferred upon any person outside of the corporate jurisdiction. The first class of duties are the duties of sovereignty, delegated though they be ; and for their violation the municipality is no more liable, unless made so by express statute, than is the State, whence they are derived.^ The second class of duties are not imposed as a burden, but con- ferred on the municipal corporation and its inhabitants as a benefit, to be accepted and exercised to the advantage of the municipality alone, which the city receives somewhat as a pri- vate proprietor. There is, therefore, no injustice in the rule of law that these duties shall be carefully performed ; and that the corporation shall be civilly liable in damages in all cases, where a person is injured by reason of their negligent performance.* 1 Lloyd V. New York, 5 N. T. 369, 375; Cobb v. Dalton, 53 Ga. 426; Conway v. Beaumont, 61 Tex. 10. ^Sebert v. Alpena, (Micb. 91) 43 N. W. E. 1098; Pettengillv. Tonkers, 22 N. E. E. 1095 ; 116 N. Y. 558; King V. Osbkosb, 44 N. W. E. "745; 75 "Wis. 517; Michigan v. Boekling, 23 N. E. E. 518; 122 Ind. 39; Snyder v. St. Paul, (Minn. 93) 53 N. W. E. 763. 3 O'Eourkev. Sioux Falls, (S. D. 93) 54 N. W. E. 1044; Lawson v. Seattle, (Wash. 93) 33 Pao. E. 347; Eabway V. Carter, (y. J. 93) 26 Atl. E. 96; Columbus etc. Co. v. Columbus, (Ohio 93) 33 N. E. E. 292; Brum- baugh V. Philadelphia, 154 Pa. St. 632 109; Howland v. Maynard, (Mass. 93) 34 N. E. E. 515; Eeed v. Madison, 83 Wis. 171; O'Eourke v. Sioux City, (ISTeb. 93) 54 N. W. E. 1044; Snider V. St. Paul, (Minn. 93) 53 ST. W. K. 763; Ulrich V. St. LouLs, 112 Mo. 138; Peters v. Lindsborg, 40 Kan. 654; Le Clef V. Concordia, 21 Pao. Eep. 272; Hardy v. Keane, 52 N. H. 570; New York etc. Co. v. Brooklyn, 71 K. T. 580; Summers v. Daviess Co., 103 Ind. 262; Deti-oit v. Blakely, 21 Mich. 84; McCarthy v. Boston, 135 Mass-. 197; Sullivan v. Holyoke, 135 lb. 273. * Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex'. 118; Hewison v. New Haven, 37 Conn. 475. In these two cases the CH. XVn.] LIABILITY OF MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. § 325 § 325. Quasi-mnnicipal corporations not liable for breacll of official duty. — Following the principle that there isj in the absence of statute expressly creating it, no liability for the nonperformance or negligent performance of the purely public duties, which are imposed upon municipal corporations as a part of the sovereign power of the State, the courts have generally held that those g'wasi-municipal corporations, known as townships, counties, school districts and New England towns, are not liable in damages for injuries received by any person, through the misconduct or negligence of any oificer of such quasi corporation in the performance of such public duties.^ distinction is clearly brought out. Rhodes v. Cleveland, 11 Ohio, 159; Lan. Can. Co. v. Tamably, 11 Ad. & E. 223; MoKinnon v. Penson, 25 Eng. L. & E. 457; Scott v. Mayor, 37 lb. 495; Eequa v. Rochester, 45 N. Y. 129; Bear v. Allentown, (Pa. 90) 23 Atl. E. 1062; Eooh. W. Lead Co. v. Eochester, 3 lb. 463; Aldrich v. Tripp, 11 E. I. 141; McCorraiok v. City, ION. Y. S. 272; 63 Hun, 632; Conrad v. Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 158; Bar- ton V. Syracuse, 36 lb. 54 ; Vandalia v. Eopp, 39 m. App. 344; Bayly v. May- or, 3 Hill, 538; West v. Brockport, 16 N. Y. 161; Eingv. Cohoes, 77 lb. 83; Noonan v. Albany, 79 lb. 470; Olney V. Eiley, 39 111. App. 401; Blooming- ton V. Bay, 42 111. 503; Stirling v. Thomas, 60 lb. 265; White v. Bond, 58 lb. 298; Town v. Kemper, 55 lb. 346; Barron v. Detroit, 54 N. W. E. 273; 94 Mich. 601; Jones v. New Haven, 34 Conn. 1; Allbrittin v. Huntsville, 60 Ala. 465; Augusta v. Hudson, 88 Ga. 599; 15 S. E. E. 678; Meares v. Wilmington, 9 Ired. L. (N. C.) 73; Barthold v. Philadelphia, 154 Pa. St. 109; Wheeler v. Troy, 20 K. H. 77; Ball v. Winchester, 32 lb. 435; Hillsboro v. Ivey, 20 S. W. E. 1012; 1 Tex. Civ. Ap. 653 ; Anne Arundel Co. v. Duckett, 20 Md. 469; Com'rs etc. V. Gibson, 36 lb. 229; Jackson- ville V. Doan, (111. 93) 33 N. E. E. 878; Boyd V. Insurance Patrol, 113 Pa. St. 169; Mayor of Memphis v. Lessor of Humph. 757; Munk v. Watertown, 67 Hun, 261 ; Simmer v. St. Paul, 23 Minn. 408; Logansport v. Wright, 25 Ind. 513; Bohan v. Avoca, 154 Pa. St. 404; McConnell v., Dewey, 5 Neb. 385; Gould v. Topeka, 32 Kan. 485; Milnes v. Huddersfield, L. E. Q. B. Div. 124; McDonnell v. Philadelphia, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. E. 672; Marion v. New Bedford, (Mass. 93) 33 N. E. E. 605; Vandalia V. Huss, 41 111. Ap. 517; Mc- Inerney v. Eeading, 150 Pa. St. 611; Greenwood v. Westport, 53 Fed. 824; Barron v. Detroit, 94 Mich. 601 ; Free- holders v. Strader, 18 N. J. L. 108; Young v. Comm'rs, 2 N. & McC. (S. C.) 537. 1 HoUensworth v. County Com'rs, (Neb. 93) 54 N. W. E. 70; Huffman V. San Joaquin, 21 Cal. 426; Crowell V. Sonoma Co., 25 lb. 313; Board v. Bish, (Colo. 93) 33 Pac. 184; Fulton Co. V. Eickel, 106 Ind. 501; Abbett V. Johnson Co., 114 lb. 61; Bibb Co. V. Dorsey, (Ga. 93) 15 S. E. E. 687; White V. City of Charleston, 2 Hill L. (S. C.) 571; White V. Chowan Co., 90 N. C. 437; Turner v. Woodbury, 57 Iowa, 440; McGuinness v. West- chester, 66 Hun, 256; Detroit v. Blakely, 21 Mich. 84; Larkin v. Sag- inaw Co., 11 lb. 88; Allen Co. v. Creirston, (Ind. 93) 32 N. E. E. 735;. 633 §325 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XVII. And this is true of these territorial divisions, even though they may be vested by statute with corporate capacity, and with the power of taxation.^ Thus, it has been held that a board of education, whose function is to administer the law of the State, by which a system of common schools is provided, is not liable to a pupil in one of its schools for an injury which resulted from the negligence of the board, unless the board or the school district is made liable by statute.^ It is the duty of a town or county to provide suitable build- ings for schoolhouses, for holding town meetings, for courts of justice and similar purposes. But these and similar territorial divisions are generally considered to be simply the agencies cre- ated by the State more effectuall}'^ to carry out the objects for which such buildings are used. And the fact, that they are declared by statute to be corporations, does not alter the rela- tion they hold to their inhabitants, who would have to meet the charges of liability to persons injured by such misfeasances.* Governor v. Justice of Clark Co., 19 Ga. 97; Smith v. Board of Carltoa Co., 40 Fed. 340; Clark v. Lincoln Co., 25 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 211; Com'rs etc. v. Martin, 4 Mich. 557; Frio V. Earnest, (Tex. 90) 16 S. W. K. 1036; Hickockv. Trustees, 16 N. Y. 161; Garllnghouse v. Jacob, 4 lb. 161; Gould v. Booth, 66 lb. 62; Hill V. Laurens Co., (S. C. 92) 13 S. E. R. 318; Conrad v. Ithaca, 16 N. T. 158; Farniim v. Concord, 2 lb. 392; Weightman v. Washington, 1 Black, 39 ; Whitney v. Town of Ticonderoga, 27 N. E. R.403; Baxter v. Winooski, 22 Vt. 123; Beardsleyv. Smith, 16 Conn. 375 ; Chidsey v. Canton, 17 lb. 475; Fritz V. Kansas City, 84 Mo. 6.32; Spicer v. County Com'rs, 126 Ii^d. 369 ; Granger V. Pulaski Co., 26 Ark. 37; Mitchell V. Rockland, 52 Me. 118; Jernee v. Chosen Freeholders, 52 K. J. L. 553; Askew v. Hale Co., 54Ala. 639; Barbour Co. v. Horn, 48 lb. 566; Van Eppes v. Mobile, 25 lb. 460; Morin v. Multonah Co., (Or. 90) 22 Pac. 490; Marion Co. v. Riggs, 24 Kan. 255 ; Eikenberry v. Township, 634 22 lb. 556; Fry v. Albermarle Co., (Va. 90) 9 S. E. E. 1004; Woods v. Colfax Co., 10 Neb. 552; Lehigh Co. V. Hoffart, 19 W. N. C. (Pa.) 363; RatlifE V. County Co., (W. Va. 90) 10 S. E. R. 28; Young v. Edgefield, 2 Nott & McC. (S. C.) 537; Sulton v. Board, 41 Miss. 236; Navasota v. Pearce, 46 Tex. 525 ; Dashman v. Mills Co., (Iowa, 93) 55 N. W. R. 468. 1 In California the rules of non- liability, applicable to counties, are applied to incorporated cities, upon the ground that they are govern- mental instruments, created for the purposes of administering the laws of tlie State. Winbiger v. Los Angeles, 45 Cal. 36; Tranter v. Sacramento, 61 lb. 271. 2 Finch v. Toledo Bd. of Ed., 30 Ohio St. 37; Kincaid v. Hardin Co., 53 Iowa, 430; Flori v. St. Louis, 69 Mo. 341; Brabham v. Hindo Co., 54 Miss. 363. 8 Cooley V. Freeholders, 27 N. J. L. 415; White v. Chowan, 90 N. C. 437; Crowell v. Sonoma, 25 Cal. 313; Clark V. Adair, 79 Mo. 526; Marion CH. xvilJ LIABILITY FOR TORTS. 326 So, a town in New England is not responsible — unless made so by statute — to one who is injured by the defective condition of a school or meeting-house,^ or to a scholar attending its school, who is injured by a dangerous excavation in the schoolhouse yard, where the exposure is due to the negligence of its offi- cials.^ It has been repeatedly held that counties are not liable for the defective condition of their public buildings, even when it was conclusively shown or admitted, that the condition of the building was to be attributed to the negligent conduct of the county officials ; ^ nor are they liable for nuisances.* County courts have been held to be a part of the State judiciary, and the county is not liable for their action, or refusal to act.^ § 326. Liability of municipal corporations for illegal taxes, fines and licenses — Compulsory payment necessary. — In the absence of any statutory remedy, actions to recover money, which has been illegally collected for taxes or assess- ments, are usually maintainable, only when the folio wing prere- quisites exist : First, the authority to levy the tax must have been wholly wanting, making the tax absolutely invalid, and not merely irregular.® Secondly, the money must have been re- ceived by tlie municipality for its own use, in carrying out cor- Co. V. Kiggs, 26 Kan. 255; Wliite v. Bond, 58 111. 297; Barbour Co. v. Brinson, 36 Ala. .362; Greene v. Eu- banks, 80 Ala. 204. 1 Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284; see Solomon v. Osceola, 43 N. W. E. 990; 77 Mich. 365; Mecbanics' Bk. V. Granger, (K. I.) 20 Atl. Rep. 202. ^Blgelow V. Randolph, 14 Gray, 541. 8 Governor v. Clark Co., 19 Ga. 97; Seales v. Cbattaliooche Co., 41 lb. 225; Hamilton Co. v. Migliels, 7 Ohio St. 109; Ward v. Hartford Co., 12 Conn. 404; Kincaid v. Hardin Co., 53 Iowa, 430; Sherbourne v. Tuba Co., 21 Cal. 113; Mitchell v. Rock- land, 52 Me. 118. * Board v. Bish, (93) 55 N. W. 408; Crowell V. Sonoma Co., 25 Cal. 313; Threadgill v. Anson Co., 99 N. C. 352. 6 Miller V. Iron Co., 29 Mo. -122; State V. St. Louis Co. Court, 34 lb. 546. ^ Biggs V. Board of Com'rs, (Ind. 93) 34 ]Sr. E. 500; Wiesman v. Brig- ham, 83 Wis. 550; 53 N. W. Rep. 911 ; Ratterman v. Exp. Co., 49 Ohio St. 698; 32 N. E. Rep. 754; Rushton v. Burke, (Dak.) 43 N. W. Rep. 815; Tarbitt v. Louisville, (Ky.) 4 S. W. Rep. 345 ; Fremont etc. Co. v. Holt Co., 45 N. W. Rep. 163; Boston M'f'g Co. V. Cora., 144 Mass. 508; 32 N. E. R. 362; Hennelv. Board, 132 Ind. .32; 31 N. E. R. 462; Douoh v. Board Com'rs of Lake Co., (Ind. 92) 30 lb. 204; Michigan Ld. etc. Co. v. Republic, (Mich.) 32 N. W. 1!. 832; Indianapolis v. Vagen, 111 Ind. 240; Powers v. Sandford, 39 Me. 1S3; Em- ery v. Lowell, 127 Mass. 138 ; Peyser V. New York, 70 jST. Y. 49; Hay- ford V. Belfast, 69 JIo. 03; Gil- man V. Waterville, 59 lb. 491; 635 § 326 MtTNICIPAIi COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XVn. porate purposes as distinct from those public purposes, in the execution of which it acts as an agent of the State. Thirdly, the taxpayer must have paid the tax under compulsion. The same conditions determine the liability for return of an illegal license-tax or fine, which may be imposed by a municipal court.^ These actions are, in form, usually common law actions of assumpsit, for money had and received ; but their character is equitable. And when the payment is founded on mistake or fraud, a court of equity will take and retain jurisdiction, in or- der that justice may be done upon all the facts of the case. No action will lie to recover back taxes which are justly due, but upon which doubt has been cast, by reason of irregularities in the details of the levy or collection. But care should however be observed in the application of this rule to local assessments, which are always the subject of statutory provisions which are strictly construed,^ and with which there must be a substantial if not literal compliance, in the details of the inception and execution of the work, in order that the municipality may ac- quire jurisdiction and levy a legal and valid assessment.^ In seeking to recover illegal assessments, a material distinction should be recognized between proceedings which are void be- cause of lack of jurisdiction, and proceedings which are irreg- ular because of departure from statutory requirements. In the former case, the assessment is absolutely void ; in the latter, its voidability depends upon the extent to which the requirements are mandatory.* For these reasons, it is not just to require the ^See, generally, The Collector v. Hubbard, 12 Wall. 1, 12; Grimley v. Santa Clara Co., 68 Cal. 575; Foley V. HaverhiU, 144 Mass. 352; First Kat. Bank of H. v. Amerious, 68 Ga. 119; Winter v. Montgomery, 65 Ala. 403; O'Brien v. Colusa Co., 67 Cal. 503; Stephenson Co. Sup. v. Manny, 56111. 160; McKee v. Ander- son Council, Rice L. 24; Taylor v. People, 66 111. 322 ; Bennett v. Buf- falo, 17 N. T. 383; Howell v. Buffalo, 15 N. T. 512; Dewey v. Niagara Co. Sup., 62 y. Y. 294, where the defend- ant was held not to be liable, where the money was received for the use of others, and not for its own use. 636 2 Walker v. District, 12 Cent. Eep. 408; City v. Murphy, 3 S. E. Kep. 326; Hewes v. Rice, 40 Cal. 255; Tay- lor V. Palmer, 31 lb. 241; Smith v. Toledo, 24 Ohio St. 126. ' See ch. xv on Taxation; Merritt V. Portchester, 71 N. T. 309; White V. Stevens, 34 N. W. R. 255; Ranch V. City, 22 Pa. Eep. 22; SewaU v. St. Paul, 22 Minn. 511 ; Chicago v. Wright, 32IU.192; Butler v. Nevin, 88 lb. 575. * Sumner v. Dorchester First Par- ish, 4 Pick. 361 ; Osborn v. Danvers, 6 Pick. 98; Preston v. Boston, 12 Pick. 7; Howe v. Boston, 7 Cush. 273; Wright v. Boston, 9 Cush. 233; Emery v. Lowell, 127 Mass. 138; Hay- CH. XVII.J LIABILITY FOE TORTS. § 326 same strictness in cases of assessments which are special charges of an exceptional nature, as is properly acquired in general taxa- tion, which is a burden borne by all for the benefit of all ; and which every landowner expects to pay in exchange for the pro- tection his property receives.^ The principles, which are outlined above as employed in the recovery of illegal taxes, rflay be applied to illegal licenses or fines, keeping in view their special character which distinguish- es them like assessments, from general taxation.^ If the prop- erty taxed is exempt from taxation by federal law ; as, for example, United States bonds,^ an illegal tax levied thereon can be recovered from the city ; * and so likewise, may a local as- sessment, which is originally invalid, but collected under color of authority for corporate purposes, be recovered with interest, even when the amount had been paid over to third persons.^ In actions to recover taxes or licenses illegally collected, the burden of proof of the illegality is upon the plaintiff.^ The ford V. Belfast, 69 Me. 63; Oilman v. Waterville, 59 lb. 491; First Eccl. Soc of H. V. Hartford, 38 Conn. 274; In re Aiken Ave., 11 Pa. Co. Ct. 228; Eogers v. Greenbush, 58 Me. 390; Peyser v. New York, 70 N. Y. 497. 1 Cleveland v. Tripp, 13 R. I. 50; Manistee L. Co. v. Springfield, 52 N. W. Eep. 468; 92 Mich. 277; Donch v. Board Com'rs of Lake Co., (Ind. 92) 30 N. E. Eep. 204; R. & A. etc. Co. v. City, 81 Va. 473; Willard v. Presbu- ry, 14 Wall. 676. 2 People v. Mayor, 4 N. Y. 419; Palmer v. Stumph, 29 Ind. 329; Sat- urn V. Trenton, 85 Ga. 468; 11 S. E. R. 705; Garland v. Gaines, (Ark.) 2 S. W. E. 460; Collector v. Hubbard, 12 Wall. 1, 12; Stephenson Co. v. Man- ny, 56 111. 160; Grimley v. Santa Clara Co., 68 Cal. 575; Foley v. Hav- erhill, 144 Mass. 352; Winter v. Mont- gomery, 65 Ala. 403. ' Union Nat. Bank v. New York, 51 N. Y. 638. * Nat. Bk. of Chemung v. Elmira, 53 N. Y. 49; Indianapolis v. McAvoy, 86 Ind. 587. *Bank of Commonwealth v. New York, 43 N. Y. 189; Moss v. Cum- mirigs, 44 Mich. 359; 22 Alb. L. J. 376; Calloway v. Milledgeville, 48 Ga. 309; Wattles v. Lapeer, 40 Mich. 624; Tallant v. Betmingham, 39 Iowa, 543; Tuttle v. Everett, 15 Miss. 27; Grand Eapids v. Blakely, 40 Mich. 367. In this last case, the court said, "The further point that as the fund is not for city use, the city is not liable, is untenable. If the mon- ey was illegally exacted by the mar- shal under color of city authority, and was by him paid to and received by the city, the latter cannot escape liability by reason of the special ob- ject of the tax. Where the party entitled demands restoration, it is no answer for the city to say it holds the fund for somebody else." Comp. Dewey v. Niagara Co., 62 N. Y. 294. Tripler v. New York, 63 Hun, 630; Wiesman v. Brigham, 83 Wis. 550; 53 N. W. Eep. 911; Ligonier v. Acker- man, 46 Ind. 552; Douglasville v. Jones, 62 Ga. 423; Grim v. Weisen- berg, 57 Pa. St. 433. 637 326 a. MUKICIPAI, CORPOEATIONS. [CH. xvn. Statute of Limitations has been held to apply to actions of this sort.^ § 326 a. Payment must Ibe compulsory. — It has been said that the payment must have been made under compulsion ; ^ but what shall constitute compulsion is not easy of decision, and depends to a great extent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A threat that legal prodeedings will be employed \^ or the fact that a fine or imprisonment will be imposed for nonpayment, is not sufficient to make the payment involuntary.* And, as a general rule, compulsion may be said to exist, only when money is paid to prevent the seizure of one's person or property, or to secure their liberation from detention, following a seizure. A mere protest, in the presence of these facts, is not sufBcient ; * and so, also, the payment of money to an official, as a consideration for the performance of an act, which it was his duty to perform." The payment of illegal taxes to avoid a cloud on the title to land is a compulsory payment.'^ And certainly, where the effect of a sale for delinquent taxes would be to confer an indefeasible title ^ upon the purchaser, the threatened dives- 1 Brown v. Painter, 44 Iowa, 368; Hamilton v. Dubuque, 50 lb. 213; Com. V. Philadelphia, 27 Pa. St. 497. 2 Lamborn v. Dickinson, 97 U. S. 181 ; Union Pac. K. R. Co. v. Dodge Co., 98 lb. 541; Manistee L. Co. v. Springfield, 92 Mich. 277; 52 N. W. Rep. 468; McCrickart v. Pittsburgh, 88 Pa. St. 133; Lester v. Baltimore, 29 Md. 415; Rushton v. Burke, (Dak.) 43 N. W. R. 815; Tupelo v. Beard, 56 Miss. 532; Dunnell v. Newell, 15 R. I. 233; 2 Atl. R. 766; Cahaba v. Bennett, 84 Ala. 400; Raisler v. Ath- ens, 66 lb. 194. 3 Taylor v. Board, 31 Pa. St. 73. * Cahaba T. Coun. v. Burnett, 34 Ala. 400; Louisville etc. Co. v. Com ., (Ky.) 12 S. W. 1064; Llgonier v. Ackerman, 46 Ind. 552. 5 Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. Dodge Co. Com'rs, 98 U. S. 541; Phelps v. New York, 112 N. T. 216; Rushton v. Burke, (Dak.) 43 N. W. R. 815; Bab- cock V. Fond du Lac, 58 Wis. 230; McGehee v. Columbus, 69 Ga. 581; 638 Sowles V. Soule, 59 Vt. 131; 7 Atl. R. 715; Haines v. Readfield, 41 Me. 256; AUentown Bor. v. Saeger, 20 Pa. St. 421; Baker v. Big Rapids, 31 N. W. R. 810; Fellows v. Fayette Sch. Dis., 29Me. 559; Allen v. Bur- lington, 45 Vt. 202; Elliott v. Swart- wout, 10 Pet. 137; Silliman v. Wing, 7 Hill (N. T.) 159; Princeton v. Vier- ling, 40 Md. 340; Wliitbeck v. Minch, 88 Ohio St. 210; 31 N. E. R. 743; Ratterman v. Express Co., 49 Ohio St. 698; 32 N. E. R. 754; Harvey v. Olney, 42 111. 336; Falls v. Cairo, 58 lb. 403; Kan. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Wyan- dotte Co., 16 Kan. 587; Bradford v. Chicago, 25 111. 411; Conkling v. Springfield, 24 N. E. R. 67; 124IU. 420; Ripley v. Gelston, 9 Johns. 201; Preston v. Boston, 12 Pick. 7; Jersey City v. Riker, 38 X. J. L. 225; Boston & S. Glass Co. V. Boston, 4 Met. 181. 6 Baker v. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio St. 534; La Salle v. Simmons, 10 111. 516. ' Stephan v. Daniels, 27 Ohio St. 527. ' In Illinois, Nebraska, Texas, and CH. XVII.] LIABILITY FOE TORTS. 326 a. titure of ownership is a distress or compulsion, which is equiv- alent to the detention of the owner's person.^ But a payment to an officer, who is only empowered to levy on the lands of the delinquent and dispose of them by a sale, which would not dis- turb the owner's possession, is not compulsory, if an adequate remedy be available to avoid the illegal assessment and sale.^ "The coercion or duress, which will render a payment of taxes involuntary, must in general consist of some actual or threat- ened exercise of power, possessed or believed to be possessed by the party exacting or receiving the payment, over the person or property of another, from which the latter has no other means of immediate relief except by making paym^t." This is the definition given by Judge Dillon in his learned work on mu- nicipal corporations,^ and it is no doubt a correct general state- ment of the principles involved, which, if intelligently applied to the varying circumstances of the cases in which money has been illegally exacted, will furnish to the practitioner a reliable rule for determining in each case, whether the complainant has a right to recover back what he has paid without authority of law.* Although voluntary payment of taxes does not confer a right Louisiana the right to redeem lands sold for taxes is secured to the owner by constitutional enactment. Stim- son's Statutes, art. 35. ' See Lamborn v. Dickinson Co. Com'rs, 97 IT. S. 181; Bradford v. Chicago, 25 111. 412. 2 Falls V.' Cairo, 58 111. 403; Kan. Pac. E. E. Co. V. Wyandotte Co., 16 Kan. 587. ' § 943. * Fii'st Nat. Bank v. Americus, 68 Ga. 119; Maxwell v. San Luis Obespo, 71 Cal. 466; 12 Pac. Rep. 484; Whit- beck V. Minch, 48 Ohio St. 210; 31 N. E. Rep. 743; Meylert's Executor V. Sullivan Co., 19 Pa. St. 181; Mus- catine V. Keokuk N. L. etc. Co., 45 Iowa, 185; Harrison v. Milwaukee, 49 Wis. 247; Lyon v. Receiver of Taxes, 52 Mich. 271; Detroit v. Mar- tin, 34 lb. 170; Michigan Ld. etc. Co. V. Republic, (Mich.) 32 N. W. Eep. 882; Whitney v. Port Huron, 88 Mich. 268; 50 N. W. Rep. 316; Tarbitt v. Louisville, (Ky.) 4 S. W. Rep. 345; Coulson v. Portland, Deady, 481; La Salle Co. v. Simons, 10 111. 513; Elliott v. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 137, 150; Radick v. Hutchins, 95 U. S. 210; Leonard v. Canton, 35 Miss. 189; Harvey v. Olney, 42 111. 336; Babcook v. Beaver Creek, 31 N..W.Rep.423; s.c.,32Ib.653; Shaw v. Allegheny, 115 Pa. St. 46; 7 Atl. Rep. 770; Hennel v. Board, 132 Ind. 32; 31 N. E. Eep. 462; Shoe- maker v. Grant Co., 36 Ind. 175; Princeton v. Vierling, 40 lb. 340; Bellinger v. Gray, 51 N. T. 610; Bank v. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 421; Howell V. Buffalo, 15 N. Y. 512; Ben- nett V. Buffalo, 17 lb. 383; Bowns V. May, 120 N. Y. 357; 24 N. E. Eep, 947; Brumagim v. Tillinghast, 18 Cal. 265. 639 § 326 a. MUNICIPAL COEPORATIOKS. [CH. XVII. to recover them back, it raises a moral obligation, and is a suffi- cient consideration to support a subsequent promise to repay.' Generally, the payment of taxes or assessments, coupled only with the declaration that the payment is under protest, will not deprive the act of the taxpayer of its voluntary character : ^ but if the protest be made in a case, where the collecting offi- cer threatens a levy and sale, the payment will be compulsory.^ But if payment is made under protest, to avoid a sale under a statute levying an assessment, and the statute is subsequently declared unconstitutional, it has been held that the sale, being absolutely invalid, would not constitute a cloud upon the title, and hence the payment was voluntary.* Monej% voluntarily paid to a municipal corporation for taxes, licenses or fines, under a mistake of law, — as where an ordinance directing a local im- provement is illegal ; ^ — or whe're the act under which the pay- ment is enacted is unconstitutional,® — in the absence of fraud .or ignorance of the facts involved, cannot be recovered by the party paying, either at law or in equitj'-, unless some statutory remedy be provided.^ But the general rule, that equity will 1 State V. Butler, 11 Lea, 418. 2 Union Pac. R. E. Co. v. Dodge Co., 98 U. S. 541; Galveston City Co. V. Galveston, 56 Tex. 486; AUentov^n Bor. V. Saeger, 20 Pa. St. 421; Taylor V. Board, 31 lb. 73; Parker v. Gt. West. Ky. Co., T M. & G. 253; Baker V. Cincinnati, 11 Oliio St. 534; Boston & S. Glass Co. V. Boston, 4 Met. 181. 3 Euggles V. Fond du Lao, 53 Wis. 436 ; Whitney v. Port Huron, 88 Mich. 268; 50 N. W. Eep. 316; Eattevmanv. Express Company, 49 Ohio St. 698; 32 N. E. Eep. 754. ^ Detroit v. Martin, 34 Mich. 170; Ligonier v. Ackerraan, 46 Ind. 552; Grim v. Weissenberg Sch. Dis., 57 Pa. St. 433. 5 Phelps V. New York, 112 U. S. 216. " Baltimore v. Lefferman, 4 Gill, 425; MoxTis v. Baltimore, 5 lb. 244; Detroit v. Martin, 34 Mich. 170; Tay- lor V. Board, 31 Pa. St. 73. ' Union Pac. E. E. Co. v. Dodge Co., 98 U. S. 541; Boyd v. Selma, 93 640 Ala. 567; 11 So. Eep. 393; Welch v. Marion, 48 Ala. 291 ; Gachet v. Mc- Call, 50 lb. 307; Robinson v. Charles- ton Council, 2 Eich. (S. C.) Law Eep. 317; Elston v. Chicago, 40 111. 514; Churchman v. Indianapolis, 110 Ind. 259; People V. Wemple, 133 N. Y. 617; 30 IST. E. Eep. 1002; Bailey v. Paulina, 69 Iowa, 463; Muscatine v. Packet Co., 45 lb. 185; Savannah v. Fee- ley, 66 Ga. 31; Bucknell v. Story, 40 Cal. 589; Cahaba v. Burnett, 34 Ala. 400; Barber v. Jackson Co., 40111. App. 42; Christy's Adm. v. St Louis, 20 Mo. 143; Smith v. Eeadfield, 27 Me. 145 ; Emery v. Lowell, 127 Mass. 138; Eichmond etc. Co. v. Eeidsville, 109 N. C. 494; 13 S. E. Eep. 869; Stephenson v. Manny, 56 111. 160; Sullivan v. McCammon, 51 Ind. 264; Moss V. Cummings, 44 Mich. 359; Manistee L. Co. v. Springfield, 92 Mich. 277; 52 N. W. Eep. 468; Bank of Commonwealth v. N. Y., 43 N.Y 184; Camden v. Green, 25 Atl. E. 357; CH. XVII.J LIABILITY FOR TORTS. § 826 a. relieve against a mistake of a material fact, is applied to pay- ment of taxes or similar dues to a municipal corporation ; ^ and mistake of fact is no less a ground for relief, because the payor had adequate means of knowledge,^ provided he was not negli- gent.^ The rule, that a mistake of law will not be relieved against, has in modern equity been so modified, that it is no longer ap- plicable in its original severity.* The usual cases, in which relief is asked against a mistake of law, are controversies aris- ing out of the distribution of estates and of conveyances of land. In such cases, all parties ordinarily use deliberation and employ and act under the advice of counsel; and to disturb ar- rangements which are thus made would involve limitless litiga- tion and impair rights of property, which have become vested in those who are not parties to the original settlement.^ This reasoning is not applicable to the payment of money to munici- pal officers, whose supposed legal duty is to receive it ; and, ac- cordingly, we find courts of equity giving relief, where money had by mistake of law been paid to their own officers." So, equity will distinguish between mistakes arising out of igno- lance of the general law, and those due to ignorance of private right ; a distinction peculiarly applicable to claims against mu- nicipal corporations for money illegally collected, where the question frequently is one of the individual right in a particu- lar case of the party paying the money .^ Ege V. Koontz, 3 Pa. St. 109; Benson V. Monroe, 7 Cush. 125; Mllnes v. Duncan, 6 B. & C. 671; Stuart v. Stuart, 6 CI. & Fin. 968. 'Hunt V. Rousmaniere, 1 Pet. 15; Bilbie v. Lumley, 2 East, 469; Lam- born V. Dickinson Co., 97 U. S. 181; Mayer v. New York, 63 N. Y. 455; Cooper V. Phibbs, L. R. 2 H. L. 149; Brett's Lead. Cas. 68; Colonial Bank V. Exch. Bank of Yarmouth, 11 App. Cas. 84; Daniell v. Sinclair, 6 lb. 181, 190; Davis v. Krum, 12 Mo. 279; Grimes v. Blake, 16 Ind. 160; Good- speed V. Fuller, 46 Me. 141 ; Glenn v. Shannon, 12 P. C. 570; Newell v. Smith, 53 Conn. 72; Wolf v. Beard, 1:^3 111. 585; Buffalo v. O'Malley, 61 il Wis. 255 ; Manzy v. Hardy, 13 Neb. 36; Baldwin v. Foss, 71 Iowa, 389; Wlieadon v. Olds, 20 Wend. 174. 2 Wilmot V. Barber, 15 Ch. D. 96. s Smith V. Wheeler, 58 Iowa, 659. * See Tiedeman's Equity Jurispru- dence, §§ 185-191. 6 Davis V. Morier, 2 Call. 303. '' Ex parte James, In re Condon, L. R. 9Cli. 609; Ex parte Simmonds, 16 Q. B. Div. 308; In re Brown, Dixon V. Brown, 32 Oh. D. 597. 'Tiedeman on Equity Jur. §189; Matlock V. Glover, 63 Tex. 231 ; Coo- per V. Phibbs, L. B. 2 H. L. 149; Earl Beauchamp v. Winn, L. R. 6 H. L. 223; Stone v. Godfrey, 5 De G. M. & G. 76; In re Condon, L. R. 6 Ch. 641 §327 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XVII. The benefit conferred by local improvements is the only true basis, upon which their cost can be assessed upon adjacent prop- erty, and the general public be released from paying a share therein.! If, therefore, after the assessment for an improvement shall have been levied and collected, the improvement is aban- doned altogether ; or if there is an unreasonable delay in carry- ing out the plan devised, the abutting owners may recover the amounts paid into the city treasury, upon the ground that there has been a total failure of consideration.^ The facts, that the payment was voluntary,^ or that the plaintiff did not protest when he saw the improvement being made,* will not in such a case deprive him of his remedy.^ § 327. Municipal corporations not liable for nonperform- ance of discretionary duties — Failure to abate nuisances and supply water. — When a duty has been expressly, or by necessary implication, imposed upon a municipal corporation by statute ; and the exercise of the duty will result in some pecu- liar advantage to the corporation itself ; it is liable by implica- tion, under ordinary circumstances, for a neglect of that dutj', provided the duty be absolute and imperative, and not one which may be performed or not, according to the discretion of the municipal authorities. It is a well settled rule that for the nonperformance of a discretionary duty, particularl}' if the duty be of a public nature, no private action for damages can be maintained against the corporation, for the reason that discre- tionary powers are intended to be exercised only when the in- terests of the public demand their exercise ; and the question. App. 609; Snell v. Insurance Co., 98 U. S. 85 ; Mut. Sav. Inst. v. Eustin, 46 Mo. 200, 203 ; Underwood v. Brock- man, 4 Dana, 309 ; Northrop v. Graves, 19 Conn. 548; Louisville v. Henning, 1 Bush, 381 ; Noble v. Bullis, 23 lovf a, 559; Ripon v. Joint Sob. Dis., 17 Wis. 83; King v. Doolittle, 1 Head, 77; Jones V. Clifeord, 3 Ch. Div. 779; Bunnell Mfg. Co. v. Pavrtucket, 7 Gray, 277. In Charlestown v. Mid- dlesex Co. Com'rs, 109 Mass. 270, the court said: " One, who by a mis- take of his rights returns to the as- sessors as liable to taxation a list of 612 property which by law is exempt, is not thereby estopped to claim an abatement of the tax." 1 See ante, § 259. 2 Bradford v. Chicago, 25 111. 412; Godfrey v. Claflin, 21 Pick. 1, 9, 13, 14; Valentine v. St. Paul, 34 Minn. 446. 3 Bradford v. Chicago, 25 111. 412. * Robinson v. Burlington, 50 Iowa, 240. 6 Jersey City v. O'Callaghin, 41 N. J. L. 849; Peyser v. New York, 70 N. T. 497 ; Weber v. San Francisco, 1 Cal. 455; Kellogg v. Ely, 15 Ohio St. 64. OH. XVII.] LIABILITY FOE TORTS. § 327 a. whether the public interests do or do not demand it, is one for the municipality to determine.^ Thus, the power to construct sidewalks,^ to remove obstructions in the harbor,^ and to con- struct sewers * does not create an imperative duty, for the non- performance of which a civil action can be maintained. § 317 a. Failure to abate nuisances. — As a part of its po- lice power, a municipality can abate nuisances, whether delete- rious to the health, property or morals of the community ; and this power is one which is repeatedly exercised by all munici- pal corporations. But it is a delegated power, and discretion- ary and judicial in its nature ; and unless the nuisance be one, which will render the municipal highways within the corporate control dangerous and unsafe, there is no liability to a private person, if the city should fail to exert the power, with a result- ant injury to the complainant.* 1 Aaron v. Broiles, 64 Tex. 316; Easton V. Nefe, 102 Pa. St. 474; Whit ney V. New Haven, (Conn. 91) 20 Atl. Eep. 666; Collins v. Savannah, 77 Ga. 745; McDonough v. Virginia City, 6 Nev. 90; Lindholm v. St. Paul, 19 Minn. 245 ; Williams v. Grand Rapids, 59 Mich. 51 ; Amperse v. Kal- amazoo, 75 lb. 228; 42 N. W. Rep. 821; Bauman v. Campan, 58 Mich. 444; MoArthur v. Saginaw, 58 lb. 357; Petz v. Detroit, (Mich. 93) 54 N. W. Rep. 644; Urquhart v. Ogdens- burg, 91 N. Y. 67; City of Anderson V. East, 117 Ind. 126; Keating v. Kan- sas City, 84 Mo. 415; Fritz v. Same, 84 lb. 632; Ten-ill v. Bloomfisld, (Ky. 93)21 S. W. Rep. 1041; McDade v. Chester City, 117 Pa. St. 414; Tres- cott V. Waterloo, 26 Fed. Rep. 592; Hillsboro v. Ivey, 1 Tex. Civ. Ap. 653; 20 S. W. Rep. 1012; Trammell V. Russellville, 34 Ark. 105; Rivers V. Augusta Council, 65 Ga. 376 ; Wil- kin V. Houston, (Kan. 90) 30 Pac. Rep. 23; Horton v. Bristol, 4 Lea, 39; Lehigh Co. v. Haffort, 116 Pa. St. 119; Alton v. Hope, 68 111. 167; Tan- ish V. St. Paul, (Minn. 92) 52 N. W. Rep. 925; Clemence v. Auburn, 66 N. Y. 334; Hyatt v. Rondout, 41 lb. 619; Hoey V. Gilroy, 129 lb. 1.32; Au- rora V. Puffer, 56 Ga. 270; Freeport V. Isbell, 83 lb. 440; Piatt v. Chicago etc. Co., 31 N. W. Rep. 883; White V. Yazoo, 27 Miss. 357; James Adm'r V. Harrodsburg, (Ky.) 3 S. W. Rep. 135; Peru v. Gleason, 91 Ind. 566; Lafayette v. Timberlake, 88 lb. 330; Walker v. Hallock, 33 lb. 239; Hub- bell V. Viroqua, 67 Wis. 343; 30 X. W. 847; Kelly v. Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 83; Schattner v. Sauderfur, 53 Mo. 162; Steines v. Franklin Co., 48 lb. 167. ^Saulsburg v. Ithaca, 94 N. Y. 27; Vogel V. New York, 92 lb. 10; Irving V. Ford, (Mich.) 32 N. E. Rep. 601. s Goodrich v. Chicago, 20 111. 445. *Anne Arundel Co. v. Buckett, 20 Md. 468; Bennett v. New Orleans, 14 La. An. 120; Monticello v. Fox, 3 Ind. App. 481; 28 N. E. Rep. 1025. sBaker v. State, 27 Ind. 485; Walker v. Hallock, 32 lb. 239; Worth V. Crawford, 64 Tex. 202; McCutcheon v. Homer, 43 Md. 483; O'Rourke v. Sioux Falls, (S. D. 93) 54 N. W. Rep. 1044; Detroit v. Beck- man, 34 Mich. 125; Ball v. Wood- bine, 61 Iowa, 83; Tainter v. Wor- cester, 123 Mass. 311; Austin \ Lam- 643 § 327 h. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XVII So, also, a city will not be liable for damages by fire, caused by sparks from an engine, which had been pronounced a nui- sance by an ordinance ; ^ for injury by a bullet from a shooting gallery ; ^ by a stone thrown in the air by blasting ; ' for injury caused b)' fireworks, while the operation of an ordinance for- bidding their use is suspended ; * for injury caused by animals running at large ; ^ or for failure to provide a pest house.^ By reason of the dangerous character of fireworks, fuU pow- er had been intrusted to a city to prohibit their manufacture ; but even then the city was not liable to a person, who was in- jured at a fire in a building, where these articles were made." It has been held that, although a city has power to remove obstructions in its harbor, it is not liable for a failure to do so ; although it was said it would be liable for removing them in such a careless manner, that injury was done to any one right- fully using the harbor." § 327 b. liability for negligent supply of water. — When, in pursuance of an express power, a municipal corporation de- parts from the purposes for which such corporations are created ; and engages in business enterprises by which it becomes as- similated to private corporations, it is held strictly to the same liability as are private corporations and individuals. Thus a municipal corporation, selling water to all persons, upon pay- betli, 27 L. J. Ch. 677; Hargreaves v. Taylor, 3 Best & S. 613; Levy v. May- or, 1 Sandf. 405; Bennett v. New Or- leans, 14 La. An. 120; Howe v. New Orleans, 12 lb. 481 ; Kelly v. Milwau- kee, 18 Wis. 83 ; Goodrich v. Chicago, 20 111. 445; Fair v. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. St. 309 ; Ogg v. Lansing, 35 Iowa, 495; Hafford v. New Bedford, 16 Gray, 297; Forsyth v. Atlanta, 45 Ga. 152; Parker v. Mayor etc., 39 lb. 725; Campbell v. Montgomery, 53 lb. 327; Stevenson v. Phoenixville, 1 Ches. Co. Eep. 113; Norristown v. Fitzpat- rick, 94 Pa. St. 121; Kiley v. Kansas City, 87 Mo. 103; Armstrong v. Brunswick, 79 lb. 319; Kistner v. In- dianapolis, 100 Ind. 210; Faulkner v. Aurora, 85 lb. 130; Cain v. Syracuse, 95 N. T. 83; People v. Albany, 11 644 "Wend. 539; Connors v. Mayor etc., 11 Hun, 439; Wilson v. Mayor etc., 1 Den. 595 ; Cole v. Medina, 27 Barb. 218; Fowle v. Alexandria, 3 Pet. (U. S.)398; Hill v. Charlotte, 72 N. C. 55 ; Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. St. 324; Grant v. Erie, 69 lb. 420. 1 Davis V. Montgomery Council, 51 Ala. 139; Kent v. Cheyenne, 2 Wy- om. 6. 2 Hubbell V. Viroqua, 67 Wis. 343. * James v. Harrodsburgh, 85 Ky. 191. 4 Hill V. Charlotte, 72 N. C. 55. = Kelly V. Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 83. 6 Aaron v. Broiles, 64 Tex. 316. ' McDade v. Chester, 117 Pa. St. 414. 8 Goodrich v. Chicago, 20 111. 445; Seaman v. New York, 80 N. T. 239 CH. XVII.J LIABILITY FOE TOUTS. 328 ment of the proper price, is liable for the negligence of its agents, to the same extent as a private corporation.^ § 328. Corporation when liable for manner in which dis- cretionary powers are exercised. — Not only are municipal corporations exempt from liability for the nonperformance of public, or discretionary duties; but they are likewise exempt from liability for consequences, when they in good faith exer- cise such powers. Corporations are impliedly liable for the negligent or unskillful manner, in which purely ministerial and corporate, as distinct from public, powers are executed ; but the liability will not attach in the case of public or judicial du- ties, until they have ceased to be such, and have become cor- porate and ministerial.^ The selection of the proper means, and the adoption of plans, by which these judicial and discretionary powers are to be ex- ecuted, involve the employment of deliberation and discretion ; and an honest and faithful exercise of these attributes is not subject to review by courts of law in a piivate action, brought by one alleging an injury to have been caused thereby.^ Thus, iBaily v. New York, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 531; MeiTimack Bk. v. Lowell, 26 N. E. 97; 152 Mass. 556; Western Sav. F. Soc. V. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 175. 2 " Wliere a judicial duty ends and ministerial duty begins, there immu- nity ceases and liability attaches." Jones V. New Haven, 34 Conn. 1; Denver v. Ehodes, 13 Pac. 729. 3 Barron v. Detroit, 94 Mich. 601 ; Barthold v. Philadelphia, 26 Atl. 304; 154 Pa. St. 109; Benson v. Wau- kesha, 41 N. W. E. 1017; Diamond Match Co. V. New Haven, 55 Conn. 510; Wessinan v. Brooklyn, 16 N. Y. St. 97; Thompson v. Polk Co., 38 Minn. 130; Denver v. Capelll, 4 Col. 25; Wicks v. DeWitt, 54 Iowa, 130; Beai- V. Allentown, 23 Atl. 1062; 148 Pa. St. 80: Smith v. Gould, 61 Wis. 31; Horton v. Nashville, 4 Lea, 47; Gibbs V. Beaufort, 20 S. C. 213; Buckley v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 64; 29 N. E. 201; Weis v. Madison, 75 Ind. 241; Cummins v. Seymour, 79 lb. 491; Evansville v. Decker, 84 lb. 325; Garratt v. Canandaigua, 64 Hun, 623; Imler v. Springfield, 55 Mo. 119; Foster v. St. Louis, 71 lb. 157; Flori v. St. Louis, 69 lb. 341; Fairlawn Coal Co. v. Scranton, 23 Atl. 1009; 148 Pa. St. 231; Welsh v. Eutland, 56 Vt. 228; McCaughey v. Tripp, 12 E. I. 449; Johnson v. Dis- trict, 118 U. S. 19; Fair v. Philadel- phia, 88 Pa. St. 309; Lynch v. Mayor of N. Y., 76 N. Y. 60; Monk v. New Utrecht, 104 lb. 552; Hubbell v. Yonkers, 104 lb. 434; Arms v. Knox- ville, 32 111. Ap. 604; Madison v. Harbor Board, 25 Atl. 337; Dewey T. Detroit, 15 Mich. 307; Flagg v. Worcester, 13 Gray, 601; Merrifleld V. Worcester, 110 Mass. 216; Collins V. Philadelphia, 93 Pa. St. 272; Pep- per V. City, 114 lb. 96; Eoanoke Gas Co. V. Eoanoke, (Va. 90) 14 S. E. E. 665 ; Howard v. Worcester, (Mass. 91) 27 N. E. 11; Hennessy v. New Bed- ford, (JIass. 91) 26 lb. 999; O'Eeillj V. Kingston, 114 N. Y. 439. 645 § 328 MUXICIPAL COEPORATIONS. [CH. xvn. a city is not liable for extending a street, so as to bring an ex- isting nuisance within its limits.^ The question of municipal liability in this connection arises most frequentlj"^ out of the prosecution of local improvements by a municipal corporation, where the expediency or necessity of the improvement has been left to the discretion of the mu- nicipal authorities. Whether or no there shall be any local improvement, is a judicial question for the municipalitj'- to de- cide ; but it is coupled very often with a statutory plan and method for carrying out the improvement, which is obligatory upon the city, when it shall have decided that the comtemplated work is desirable. In all such cases, the municipal corporation is liable to any one who is injured by a deviation from the statu- tory plan and method, or by its failure to comply therewith in anj' material respect.^ So, also, when the plan and method are left to the discretion of the municipality, the principle of non-liability should be ap- plied with care ; and each case be decided more or less upon its own merits. It is doubtless the law that a municipal corporation is not liable for defects and errors in the plan of a public work ; but this can be true, only when due care is used by the corpora- tion in the adoption of plans and instrumentalities. Not that a corporation is compelled to use the highest degree of care in planning and executing public works. Ordinary care as it is termed, is usually sufficient. But, in any event, if there is such a lack of skill, care and attention on the part of the city, or its officials, in devising or executing a plan for a public work, as will constitute negligence, it will be liable therefor in dam- If the municipal officials, in planning or executing a . 3 1 McCutelieou v.' Horner, 5 K. W. Eep. 668; Larkin v. Saginaw Co., 11 Mich. 88; Detroit v. Blakeby, 21 lb. 84. 2 Hardy v. Brooklyn, 90 N. Y. 435; Pekin v. Newell, 26 111. 320; Kanka- kee V. Linden, 38 111. App. 675 ; Har- low V. Humiston, 6 Cow. 189; Dygert V. Schenck, 23 Wend. 446. 3 Jordan v. Hannibal, 87 Mo. 673; Weightman v. Washington, 1 Black, 39; Chalkley v. Richmond, 88 Va. 402; 14 S. E. Rep. 339; llilwaukee 646 V. Davis, 6 Wis. 377; Ashley v. Pt. Huron, 35 Mich. 296; Jenney v. Brooklyn, 120 IST. Y. 164; 24 JST. E. Rep. 274; Olney v. Eiley, 39 111. App. 401; Vandalia v. Eopp, 39 lb. 344; Cumraings v. Seymour, 79 Ind. 491 ; Crawfordsville v. Bond, 96 Ind. 230; North Vernon v. Vogeler, 103 lb. 314; Rice v. Evansville, lb. 314; Benton v. Hamilton, 110 lb. 294; 11 N. E. R. 238; Terre Haute v. Hudnut, 112 Ind. 542; New Albany v. Ray, 3 Ind. App. 481; 29 N. E. Rep. 611. CH. XYII.] LIABILITY FOB TOETS. § 329 work requiring professional skill and knowledge, consult per- sons who possess the requisite information and experience, and use reasonable care and prudence in selecting skilled persons to control and effectuate the plan, neither the officials nor the corporation they represent will be liable, if the plans turn out to be unsuitable and injudicious, or the structure be defective.^ Of the municipal officials themselves, it is only required " that they shall bring to the service reasonable care and judgment, and that the professional men, employed by them in planning and superintending the work, shall have all the knowledge and skill that experience in such work would naturally give them." ^ If aboard of commissioners undertake to execute a public work themselves, requiring skill and experience which they do not possess, instead of employing a competent person, they will ren- der themselves liable for injury resulting from a defective, in- sufficient or faulty plan.** But if it becomes apparent during the prosecution of the work, that the plan decided on by the city, even if selected and executed with proper care, will work a direct injurj"- to property, which is likely to be repeated and continuous, the city is liable in damages after notice thereof, unless it shall adopt such a change of plan, or such precaution- ary measures, as will obviate the difficulty.* § 329. Damnum absque injuria — Consequential damages —Changes in the grade of streets — Improvements. — When a municipal corporation, acting within the limits of its authority and jurisdiction, does an act by virtue of power conferred by a valid statute ; and there is a reasonable degree of care and skill employed by it, there is no liability for injury caused to Same v. Lawyer, 38 lb. 348; Lehn v. San Francisco, 66 Cal. 76; Barnes v. District, 91 U. S. 540; Gould v. To- peka, 32 Kan. 485 ; Lacour v. Mayor, 3 Duer, 406; People v. Waterford, etc. Co., 2 Keyes, 327; Townsend V. Susquehanna T. Co., 6 Johns. 90; Watson V. Kingston, 43 Hun, 367; He- lena V. Thompson, 29 Ark. 569; Chi- cago V. Gallagher, 44 111. 295 ; Nevlns V. Peoria, 41 lb. 502; Wilson v. At- lanta, 60 Ga. 473. 'Sutton V. Clark, 1 Marsh. 429; Van Pelt v. Davenport, 42 Iowa, 308. 2 Diamond M. Co. v. New Haven, 55 Conn. 510. sEobinson v. Roha, 73 Wis. 436; Wallace V. Menasha, 48 lb. 79; Wren V. Walsh, 57 lb. 98; Peck v. Cooper, 112 111. 192. ^Seifert v. Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 136; Lynch v. Mayor, 76 IST. Y. 60; Wilson v. Mayor, 1 Den. 595; Flem- ing V. Manchester, 44 L. J. IST. S. 517; Weightman v. Washington, 1 Black, 39; Hardy v. Brooklyn, 90 N. Y. 435; Shearman & Redf. on Negligence (4th ed.)§§ 269-279. 647 §329 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. xvn. third persons, although the same act, if done without legislative premission, would be actionable. He, who does what the Legislature expressly commands or permits, cannot be a wrongdoer ; but he cannot act without that reasonable care which men are supposed to employ in their affairs.^ Injuries caused by the careful and skillful performance of a lawful act are called consequential, and for such the law gives no redress ; for, although there is a loss, there is no legal wrong. It is a case of damnum absque injuria.^ The question of con- sequential injuries arises oftenest in the prosecution of public improvements. It is seldom that an improvement, though ex- ecuted in the most careful manner, does not cause injury to some one ; and it is extremely difficult at times to separate injuries 1 Northern Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635; Smith v. Washington, 20 How. 135; Elster v. Springfield, (Ohio, 93) SON. E.E. 274; Hohman V. Chicago, (111. 92) 29 lb. 671; Hovey v. Mayo, 43 Me. 322; Rus- sell V. Burlington, 30 Iowa, 262; Hicks V. Dorn, 42 N. Y. 47; Siefert V. Brooklyn, 101 lb. 136; Radcliff's Ex. V. Brooklyn, 4 lb. 195; Bel- linger V. ST. T. Cen. R. R. Co., 23 lb. 42; In re Furman St., 17 Wend. 667; Wakefield v. Newell, 12 R. I. 75; Clark V. Saybrook, 21 Conn. 313; Fellowes v. New Haven, 44 Conn. 240; West Orange v. Field, 37 N. J. Eq. 600; Quinn v. Paterson, 27 N. J. L. 35 ; AUeutown v. Kramer, 73 Pa. St. 406; Reading v. Keppleman, 61 Pa. St. 233 ; Magarity v. Wilmington, 5 Bel. 530; Detroit v. Beckman, 34 Mich. 125 ; Cumberland v. Willison, 50 Md. 138; Perry v. Worcester, 6 Gray, 544; Flagg v. Worcester, 13 lb. 601, 605; Sprague v. Worcester, 13 Gray, 19o; Americus v. Eldridge, 64 Ga. 524; Pratt v. Stratford, 14 Out. 260; Dixon v. Board of Works, L. R. 7 Q. B. D. 418; comp. Deringey v. Ottawa, 15 Ont. 712 ; Herring v. Dis- trict, 3 Mackey, 572; Imler v. Spring- field, 55 Mo. 119; Weyman v. 648 Jefferson, 61 lb. 553; Swenson v. Lexington, 69 lb. 157; Stewart v. Lexington, 79 lb. 503; Aid en v. Minneapolis, 24 Minn. 254; Lee v. Minneapolis, 22 lb. 13 ; Dore v. Mil- waukee, 42 Wis. 108; Hume v. Knoxville, 1 Humph. 403; Rigney v. Chicago, 102 111. 64; Snyder v. Rock- port, 6 Ind. 237; Cummins v. Sey- mour, 79 lb. 491 ; Princeton v. Yieske, 93 lb. 102; Kokonio v. Maham, 100 Ind. 242; Freburg v. Davenport, 63 Iowa, 119; Morris v. Council Bluffs, 67 lb. 343; Simons v. Camden, 26 Ark. 276; Chicago v. McGraw, 75 111. 566; Nebraska City v. Lampkin, 6 Neb. 27; Lawler v. Boom Co., 56 Me. 443; Roll v. Augusta, 34 Ga. 326; Shaw v. Crocker, 42 Gal. 435; British C. R. Co. v. Mere- dith, 4 D. & E. T. R. 794; Docks Cases, 11 H. L. 713, 714; Brine v. G. & Western Ry. Co., 110 Eng. C. L. 402, 411. 2 Eaton v. R. R. Co., 51 N. H. 504; Elliott on Roads and Streets, p. 204; Smith V. Thackerath, L. R. 1 C. P. 564; Cooke v. Waring, 1 H. & C. 332; Mahan v. Brown, 13 Wend. 309; Parker v. Foot, 19 lb. 309; Hill v Balls, 2 H. & N. 299. CH. XVII.] LIABILITY FOE TORTS. 329 which are consequential, from those for which, upon the grounds of negligence, an action will be permitted.^ The rule as to consequential injury has been applied to dam- ages caused by a system of drainage, by which a large amount of water was allowed to flow over private property ; ^ to the dis- charge of fireworks by the city's servants under autl:ority of statute ; * to the straightening of a river ; * to interruption to travel by the building of a railroad across a highway ; ^ and to loss from business competition." But its principal application in connection with municipal corporations is to the execution of the power to grade new streets, and to alter the grade of those already established. It has been a well settled rule of law that a municipal corporation, acting under the powers, conferred upon it by the Legislature, to make, repair, grade and improve streets, may grade, or alter the grade of streets already estab- lished, without being liable in the absence of statute for any damages whatever, provided there is no actual entry on private land and the work is confined to the limits of the street ; and provided reasonable care is employed by the corporation.^ iRakowsky v. Duluth, 44 Minn. 188; 46 N. W. Bep. 338; Marion v. Skillman,26K. E. Eep. 676; Kemper V. Campbell, (Kan. 91) 26 Pac. Kep. 55;McVerry v. Boyd, (Gal. 91) 885; Broadwell v. Kansas City, 75 Mo. 213; Smith v. Alexandria, 33 Gratt. 208. 2 Alexander v. Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 247. ' Tindley v. Salem, 137 Mass. 171. « Green v. Swift, 47 Cal. 536. 'Ham T. Wisconsin E. Co., 61 Iowa, 716. «Whittier v. Portland etc. Co., 38 Me. 26. ' Goszler v. Georgetown, 6 Wheat. 593; Smith v. Washington, 20 How. 135, 149; Pumpelly v. Green Bay, 13 Wall. 166; North Tp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635 ; Mason v. Kennebec etc. Co., 31 Me. 215 ; Hovey v. Mayo, 43 lb. 322; Eaton v. B. C. & M. R. R. Co,, 51 K H. 504, 509; Callendar v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 418; (leading case.) Griggs V. Foote, 4 Allen, 195; Brown V. Lowell, 8 Met. 172; Benjamin v. Wheeler, 8 Gray, 409; Rounds v. Mumford, 2 E. 1. 154; Inman v. Tripp, 11 lb. 520; Smith v. Same, 13 lb. 152; Wakefield v. Pawtucket, 15 lb. 75; Hollisterv. Union Co., 9 Conn. 436; Hooker v. N. H. & N. Co., 14 lb. 146; Skinner V. Hartf. Br. Co., 29 lb. 523; Burritt v. New Haven, 42 lb. 174; Healey v. Same, 49 lb. 394; Graves v. Otis, 2 Hill, 466; Benedict V. Goit, 3 Barb. 459; In re Fifth St., 17 Wend. 667; Waddell v. New York, 8 Barb. 95 ; Radclifi's Ex. v. Brook- lyn, 4 N. Y. 195 ; Mills v. Brooklyn, 32 lb. 489; St. Peter v. Denison, 58 lb. 416; People v. Green, 64 lb. 606; Coggswell v. N. Y., N. H. As to necessity, see White v. Charleston, 2 Hill (S.C.) 571 ; Mouse's Case, 12 Coke, 63 ; lb. 13 ; 15 Vin. Abr. Necessity. ' Street v. New Orleans, 32 La. An. 577. 2 Greer v. New York, 3 Bob. 406. ' Field V. Des Moines, 39 Iowa, 575; Amer. Print Wks. v. Lawrence, 23 N. J. I,. 595; McDonald v. Ked- wing, 13 Minn. 38 ; Surrocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69. * Maleverer v. Spink, 1 Dyer, 36 6 ; Eespuhlica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dallas, 237; Taylor v. Plymouth, 8 Met. 462, 465; Neuert v. Boston, 120 Mass. 665 §335 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. XVII. not even when the destruction of the building was not necessary to the extinguishment of the fife.'' But, in many cases, munic- ipal corporations are made liable, by their charters or by general statutes, for property thus destroyed by the proper municipal officials. But in such a case the liability is purely statutory, and it attaches only when the circumstances of the case bring it within the statute.^ It has been held that the statutory remedy is not available, when the house is burned so that it is impossible to save it ; ^ or if it would liave inevitably been destroyed by fire, had it not been destroyed by the municipal officials.* The action is given to the owner, and it cannot be prosecuted by one not having an interest in the building ; ^ as, for example, by a person who has bought the house, but in whom the title is not yet vested.* But this ruling can only be accepted as sound, as long as the vendor waives his right to enforce specific performance of the contract against the vendee. The vendee acquires under an executory contract of sale of land an insurable interest in the buildings ; and if the vendor enforces specific performance, it is not a good defence to such action, in whole or in part, that the buildings have been destroyed or damaged by fire subse- quent to the execution of the contract.'' Certainly, under those circumstances, the loss by the destruction of the building, to prevent the spread of the fire, would fall on the vendee, and he alone would be entitled to the statutorjr compensation. While the owner of a house can claim damages for the de- struction of chattels in the house, to the extent of his interest I Field V. Des Moines, 39 Iowa, 575; Araer. Print Works v. Lawrence, 23 N. J. L. 590; lb. 9; 21 lb. 248; lb. 714. ■■^ Dunbar v. San Francisco, 1 lb. 355; Howard v. Same, 51 lb. 52; Tay- lor V. Plymouth, 8 Met. 462, 465; Euggles V. Nantucket, 11 Gush. 433; Hafford v. New Bedford, 16 Gray, 297; Wheeler v. Cincinnati, 19 Ohio St. 19; Western Col. v. Cleveland, 12 lb. 375; Fisher v. Boston, 104 Mass. 87; Nevert v. Boston, 120 Mass. 338; Hayes v. Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 314; Cof- fin V. Nantucket, 5 Gush. 269; Stone 666 V. New York, 25 Wend. 157; New York V. Lord, 18 lb. 12G; 17 lb. 285. 8 Taylor v. Plymouth, 8 Meto. 462. * Mayor v. Lord, 17 Wend. 285. The opinions of bystanders that the house would or would not have been inevitably destroyed is not admissi- ble, although the opinions of expert firemen may be. New York v. Pentz, 24 Wend. 668. ^ Mayor v. Lord, supra. " Kuggles V. Nantucket, 11 Cush. 433. ' Tiedeman's Eq. Jur. § 501. CH. xvn.] LIABILITY FOE TOUTS. § 335 a. in them, a person having goods stored in the building, of which he is neither owner nor occupant, is held to have no claim for damages.^ The fact, that the property destroyed was insured, is imma- terial, so far as the city is concerned ; but the insurance compa- ny will be subrogated to the rights of the insured, and may set up an equitable assignment of his claim against the municipal- ity, or may claim the allowance on the policy of the amount received by the insured from the city.^ Statutes of this sort are remedial, and are designed to carry out tlie just and equitable principles of constitutional provis- ions, that private property shall not be damaged or taken with- out compensation. They should therefore receive a liberal construction in order to attain the results desired, the equitable distribution of an inevitable loss.^ § 335 a. Destruction of property under military and sanitary regulations. — The principles, upon which is founded the non-liability of municipal corporations for property, which has been destroyed to prevent the spread of a fire, sliould ap- ply, where private property is damaged or destroyed by city officials, in the maintenance of military or police rule, or in the enforcement of sanitary regulations. Thus, it is well settled that the Federal government is not liable in damages for injury to, or destruction of, private property during the operation of its armies ; * and the same rule will doubtless obtain, when, by municipal command, property is destroyed or injured in order to resist foreign invasion, suppress domestic violence or to pre- vent anticipated riotous proceedings.^ Since the confinement of pei'sons suffering from infectious or contagious disorders, is fully justified as a protection to the health of the community,^ and creates no liability on the part of a State or municipality, there is no doubt that the destruc- tion of the infected clothing or property of such persons, as 1 Mayor v. Stone, 20 "Wend. 139. 2 New York v. Pentz, 24 Wend. 668; Pentz v. JEtnalns. Co., 9 Paige, 568; City P. I. Co. v. Corliss, 21 Wend. 367. ' Lowell V. Wyman, 12 Cush. 273, 276; Russell v. New York, 2 Denio, 461; Auckland V. West. Loo. Board, L. K. 7 Ch. 597; Kerr v. Preston, L. R. 6 Cli. Div. 403; Dawson v. Hutt- ner, 43 Ga. 133. * United States v. Pacific Railroad, 120 U. S. 227. 5 Harmon v. Lynchberg, 33 G-ratt. 37; Jones v. Richmond, 18 lb. 517. s Harrison v. Baltimore, 1 Gill, 264 66.7 §336 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XVII. far as it is essential to the public health, will not at common law rendei" a municipal corporation liable in damages.^ § 336. Eeceipt of consideration as ground of liability for negligence. — Municipal liability for negligence is particularly clear and enforceable, when the city has received a considera- tion for the duty to be peiforined ; or if, having received per- mission or authority from the Legislature, it begins and carries on a work, from which it receives a toll, or other profit.''^ Al- though, as a rule, a municipal corporation is not liable for a failure to supply water, or for damages caused by defects in the appliances, by which water is furnished ; if it lay and maintain mains for supplying the inhabitants with water, for which it receives water rates, it will be liable for injuries, which have been caused in any way by the negligent construction of its system of waterworks, and the consequent undermining of the roadbed by the escape of water, and which are sustained by one who is lawfully using the highway.^ Here the liability is based upon the facts, that the municipality, by voluntarily ac- cepting the power to engage in the business of supplying water, for which it derives a direct pecuniary benefit, has placed itself on a parity with private corporations, and should be responsible to the same extent as they.* And this rule has been applied in States, where there existed no implied liability for the non- repair of highways. Where a stream of water was thrown across a street from a hydrant, the cit}' was held liable for the injury thus caused to the plaintiff's horse, which was frightened and ran away. It is not material in such a case, that the water was being used for extinguishing a fire.^ A city, owning and conducting its own gas works, will under similar circumstances, be liable for neg- 1 Stedman v. San Francisco, 63 Cal. 103. See § 332. Municipality not liable for health officials. 2 Scott V. Manchester, 2 H. & jST. 204; (Rowley v. Sunderland, 6 lb. 565; Pittsburgh v. Grier, 22 Pa. St. 54; Mersey Dock Cases, U H. Lds. Cases, 687; Milnes v. Huddersaeld, L. R. 10 Q. B. Div. 124. 3 Stock V. Boston, 149 Mass. 410; Hand v. Brookline, 126 lb. 324; Wil- son V. New Bedford, 108 lb. 261 ; Mc- 668 Avoyo V. New York, 54 How. Pr. Kep. 245. * Murphy v. Lowell, 124 Mass. 564; Hand v. Brookline, 126 lb. 324; Wil- son V. New Bedford, 108 lb. 361; Aid- rich V. Tripp, 11 K. I. 141; Levy v. Salt Lake City, 3 Utah, 63; Grimes v. Keene, 52 N. H. 335. " Aldrich v. Tripp Treas., 11 B. I. 141. Distinguishing Butrick v. Low- ell, 1 Allen, 172, and similar cases where it had been held that firemen OH. XYII.] LIABILITY FOK TORTS. § 336 ligence in the conduct and management of such works, or in the service to the private consumer.^ § 336 a. liability as an owner of property. — There are, however, many cases of liability of municipal corporations for torts, in> which the element of profit or consideration does not enter, and some other ground of liability must be discovered for such cases. Since municij)al charters were in England, orig- inally, royal grants, they were regarded as creating an implied contract between the corporators and the State, and as implied- ly imposing duties, which under the earlier cases furnished the proper legal basis for the liability in tort of the municipal cor- poration to private individuals.^ In this country, municipal corporations are wholly the creatures of statute, and are erected without the consent of those who are the incorporators.^ The English view, therefore, which regards the charter as a contract, is properly denied.* And hence the doctrine of implied contract, which furnished in England a satisfactory foundation for the municipal liability for injuries sustained by private individuals, would not answer in American law. In the place of this theory- is substituted the semi-private character of the municipal cor- poration as the owner of property. Upon the ground, that owners of property are liable for its improper use and condition, municipal corporations have been held liable for damages caused by the defective condition of property, which is held by tkem in the private character of owner or lessee, to the same extent, and in the same manner, as private corporations and individuals.^ were public and not corporate offi- cers. ' Western Sav. Soc. v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 175; Kibele v. Same, 105 lb. 41; Scott V. Manchester, 1 H. & N.59;Coe& Wise, 5 B. & S. 440, 475. Henley v. Lyme Regis, 5 Bing. 91 ; 3 Mo. & P. 298; 3 B. & Ad. 77; 2 CI. & Fin. 331 ; 8 Bligh N. R. 690 ; 1 Bing. N. C. 222; 1 Scott, 29. ' " The erection of such a corpora- tion is in truth simply the creation of a new instrumentality of govern- ment." Elliott on Roads and Streets, p. 313; Cf. West v. Brockport, 16 K. Y. 161, 173; Cooley, Const. Limit. 247,248; see anJe, §24. * Dil. Mun. Cor. § 967. ^ Where a city holds and deals with property as its own, not in the dis- charge of a public duty, nor for the direct and immediate use of the pub- lic, but for its own benefit, by re- ceiving rents or otherwise in the same manner as a private owner might, it is liable, to the same extent as he would be for neglisence in the management or use of such property to the injury of others." Hill v. Bos- ton, 122 Mass. 344, 359; see also Bailey v. New York, 3 Hill, 531, 539; Western S. F. Soc. v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 185, 189; Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick. 511 ; Oliver v. Worcester, 102 669 § 336 a. MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XVII, So it was held that a city, owning a wharf, and receiving wharfage for its use, must employ the same degree of care to provide proper appliances, as would an individual owner under similar circumstances.^ The city of New York, as the owner of a dam upon lands owned by it, and which had been negli- gently and un skillfull J-- built, was held liable for injuries sus- tained by reason of the dam being carried awaj% although it was constructed by water commissioners who were appointed by the State ; ^ and a village, owning and operating an aqueduct through its streets, will be responsible as owners for permit- ting a water box to project above the surface of the highway ; even though it might not be its duty to remove it, in the exer- cise of its control of highways.^ Under tlie same rule, a municipal corporation will be held liable, if it erect a building for corporate purposes, the foundation of which is so negligently laid as to cause water to flow back upon the land of private owners ; * or if it establishes a reservoir, Mass. 489 ; McCaiigliey v. Providence, 12 K. I. 449; Sherman V. Laugham, 13 S. W. R. 1042; Moulton v. Scarbor- ough, Yl Me. 267; Hannon v. St. Louis Co., 62 Mo. 313; Hillsboro v. Ivey, 1 Tex. C. C. App. 653; 20 S. W. R. 1012; Brown v. Atlanta, 66 Ga. 71; Millers V. Augusta, 63 lb. 772; Worden v. New Bedford, 131 Mass. 23; Perkins V. Lawrence, 136 lb. 305; Barthold v. Philadelphia, 154 Pa. St. 109; 26 Atl. Rep. 3'04; "Waldron v. Haverhill, 10 N. E. R. 481; Mackey v. Vicksburg, 64 Miss. 777; Rowland v. Kalamazoo, 49 Mich. 553 ; Seaman v. Mayor, 80 N. Y. 2.39; Radway v. Briggs, 37 lb. 256; Kennedy v. Mayor, 73 lb. 365 ; McAvoy v. Mayor, 54 How. Pr. 245 ; Grimes v. Keane, 52 K. H. 335 ; Savannah v. Culleus, 38 Ga. 334; City Council V. Hudson, 88 lb. 599; 15 S. E. Rep. 678; Wilkius v. Rutland, 25 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cases, 49 ; Aldrich V. Tripp, 11 R. L 141; 23 Am. Rep. 434; Pittsburgh v. Grier, 22 Pa. St. 54; Erie v. Schwingle, 22 Pa. St. 338; Greenwood v. Westport, (D. C. 93) 53 Fed. Rep. 824; Memphis v. Kim- 670 borough, 12 Heisk. 133; Fennimore V. New Orleans, 20 La. An. 124; Hand v. Brookline, 126 Mass. 324; Wilson V. New Bedford, 108 lb. 261; Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284; 72 Am. Deo. 302; Cumberland v. Willison, 50 Md. 138; Rhodes v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio, 159; Jeffei'son- ville V. Louisville, etc. Ferry Co., 27 Ind. 100; 89 Am. Dec. 495; Carring- ton V. St. Louis, 89 Mo. 208; Harper V. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 365. 1 Willey V. Allegheny, 118 Pa. St. 490; Allegheny v. Campbell, 107 lb. 530. 2 New York v. Bailey, 2 Denio, 433 ; see Darlington v. New York, 31 N. Y. 200; Fleming v. Susp. Bridge, 92 lb. 368; Barnes v. District, 91 U. S. 540, 552; Wright v. Holbrook, 52 N. H. 120. sWilkifts V. Rutland, (Vt.) 25 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 49. * Rhodes v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio, 159 ; Roch. W. L. Co. V. Rochester, 3 N. Y. 463; Harper v. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 865. CH. XVII.] LIABILITY FOE TOETS. § 326 a. from which the water percolated to the injury of adjoining lands .^ So a municipal corporation is liable for the negligent plumbing and drainage in a school building, by which water was permitted to overflow neighboring cellars.^ When a town, under author- ity from .its charter, establishes a market, it must construct and maintain it and its appurtenances, in such a manner that they will not become a nuisance to the vicinage,^ or dangerous to indi- viduals, who use it.* So, also, municipal corporations have been repeatedly held liable for damages, caused by unguarded exca- vations, when made by the corporation upon its own grounds.^ But it should be noted in this connection that municipJilities are not insurers of the safe condition of their public buildings,® apparatus for water supply, sewers or other municipal instru- mentalities. A city is not liable for the improper condition of its property to a greater extent than are private corporations or individuals,^ and the fact that a defect existed in any of them, is not enough to make the city liable ; it must be affirmatively shown that the cause of the defect, or the cause of its contin- uance, was the negligence of the municipality, or of its officials.^ Though the municipality has paid for, and holds the title to 1 Wilson V. New Bedford, 108 Mass. 26. 2 Briegel v. Philadelphia, (Pa. 1890) 19 Atl. Rep. 10, 38. 8 Suffolk V. Parker, 79 Va. 660. * Savannah v. CuUens, 38 Ga. 334. ^Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 489; Hannon V. St. Louis Co., 62 Mo. 313. 8 Chicago V. O'Brennan, 65 111. 560. Worden v. N'ew Bedford, 181 Mass. 23; Perkins v. Lawrence, 136 lb. 305; Levy V. St. Lake, 3 Utah, 63; Hofeston v. Eads, 32 III. App. 75; Onne v. Richmond, 79 Va. 86 ; Wald- ron v. Haverhill, 143 Mass. 582; 10 N. E. R. 481; Mackey v. Vicksburg, 64 Miss. 777; Fox v. Lansingburgh, 59 Hun, 617; 13 N. Y. S. 174; Bar- ton v. S.yracuse, 36 N. Y. 54; Lloyd v.KewYork, 5 lb. 369; McCullough v. B'klyn, 23 Wend. 458; Clayburg v. Chicago, 25 111. 535; Tice v. Bay City, 47 N. W. Eep. 1062; 84 Mich.* 461; Saxton v. St. Joseph, 60 Mo. 153; Sterrett v. Houston, 14 Tex. 153; Richmond v. Long's Adm., 17 Gratt. 375 ; Helena v. Thompson, 29 Ark. 569, 574; Markee v. Borough, (Pa. 91) 21 Afcl. Eep. 794; Denver v. Dean, 7 Col. 328. 8 Beach v. Elmira, 58 Hun, 606; Dannaher v. Brooklyn, 51 lb., 563; Smith V. Mayor, 66 N. Y. 295 ; Jen- ney v. Brooklyn, 120 lb. 164; Ring V. Cohoes, 77 lb. 83; Todd v. Troy, 61 lb. 506; Goodfellow v. Mayor, 100 lb. 15 ; Dubois v. Kingston, 102 lb. 219; Hunt v. New York, 109 lb. 234; Bi.shop v. Schuylkill, 8 Atl. Rep. 449; Scranton v. Catterson, 94 Pa. St. 202; Moore v. Platteville, 47 N. W. Rep. 1055; Gay v. Cambridge, 128 Mass. 387; Flanders v. Norwood, 141 lb. 17; Chicago v. McGiven, 78 111. 347; Rockford v. Hildebrand, 61 lb. 155; Lee v. Barkhampstead, 46 Conn. 213; Bill v. Norwich, 39 lb. 671 S 337 MUNICIPAL COBPOEATIOXS. [CH. XVII. the property ; ^ yet if it does not possess the usual rights and privileges of ownership, and cannot control or dispose of it, so as to rid itself of liability, it will not be within the principle above laid down.^ Thus, even when a city is responsible for the condition of its aqueduct, it is not liable for injuries caused by defective lateral service pipes, which are inserted by con- sumers into the street mains.^ § 337. How may negligence be proven. — Negligence may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case, with- out the introduction of positive and direct evidence pointing thereto.* But this does not mean that negligence will be found without evidence ; * or that there is in any case a legal pre- sumption, that officials of a corporation, private or municipal, have been negligent.^ In extreme and exceptional cases, the dangerous character ^ or insufficiency of the streets ^ may be so manifest, that as a matter of law the court may be justified in holding them unsafe ; but, usually, these are questions for 222; Mayor V. Perdue, 53 Ga. 607; Bi-owii V. Atlanta, 66 lb. 71 ; Cook v. Milwaukee, 24 Wis. 270; Smith v. Leavenworth, 15 Kan. 81; Atchison V. King, 9 lb. 550; Wellington v. Gregson, 31 lb. 99; Galveston v. Bar- bour, 62 Tex. 172 ; Noble v. Richmond, 31 Gratt. 271; Aurora v. Bitner, 100 Ind. 396; Cook v. Anamosa, 66 Iowa, 427; Holmes v. Hamburg, 47 lb. 348; Stafford v. Oskaloosa, 57 lb. 748. 1 As to what evidence is admissible or sufficient to prove ownership by the city, see Terry v. Mayor etc. of New York, 8 Bosw. 504; Palmer v. St. Albans, 60 Vt. 427; El Paso v. Causey, 1 111. Ap. 531. -Terry v. Mayor, supra; Curran v. Boston, 151 Mass. 505; New York v. B. S. & L. Co. V. B'k'lyn, 71 N. Y. 580; Palmer v. St. Albans, supra; Flori V. St. Louis, 69 Mo. 341. ^Bigelow V. Randolph, 14 Gray, 541; Treadwell v. Mayor, 1 Daly (N. Y.) 123; Smith v. Philadelphia, 81 Pa. St. 38. * Briggs V. Oliver, 4 H. & N. 403 ; 672 Feltham v. England, L. R. 2 Q. B. 33; Cleveland V. Spier, 16 Q. B. N. S. 399; Sherwood v. Hamilton, 37 U. C. Q. B. 410; Sterling v. Thomas, 60 111. 264; Stratton v. Staples, 59 Me. 94; Chicago v. Major, 18 111. 349; Lehman v. Brooklyn, 29 Barb. 234; Costello V. Landwehr, 28 Wis. 522; Cassidy v. Angell, 12 R. I. 447; Hart V. Hudson Riv. R. R. Co., 80 N. Y. 622; Mullen v. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567. 5 Philadelphia etc. Co. v. Hum- mell, 44 Pa. St. 375. 6 Jackson v. Hyde, 28 TJ. C. Q. B. 294; Harris v. Perry, 89 N. Y. 308; Singleton v. East. Counties R. E., 7 C. B. N. S. 287; Hammaok v. White, 11 lb. 588; Duffy V. Upton, 113 Mass. 544; Ward v. Andrews, 3 Mo. App. 275 ; Strouse v. Whittlesy, 41 Conn. 559; Kendall v. Boston, 118 Mass. 234; Goshorn v. Smith, 92 Pa. St. 435. 'Prideaux v. Mineral Pt., 43 Wis. 513. • 8 Maugh V. Milwaukee, 32 Wis. 200. CH. XVII.] LIABILITY FOB, TORTS. § 338 the jury ^ to decide or infer f lom the facts, as shown by the tes- timony. The opinions of witnesses, as, to the sufficiency of the road, are not admissible.^ § 388. Negligence of municipal servants— Wliat must be shown— Torts ultra vires — The rule that a principal or em- ployer is responsible civilly for injury caused by the negligence or lack of skill of an agent or servant, when he is acting in tlie line of his employment, is applicable to municipal corpora- tions. To create such a liability in the case of a municipal agent, it is essential, not only that the act, by which the injury is caused, should be within the powers conferred on him by the Qorporation ; but it must also be within the corporate power ; tliat is, the act must not be ultra vires to the corporation itself.^ The corporation cannot make itself liable for torts ultra vires, not even by express commands to its officers to do the tortious acts;* or by subsequent ratification.^ But if the wrongful act be, when committed, within the powers which are expressly or impliedly conferred upon the corporation, it will be liable when it expressly authorized or commanded the wrongful act ; or when not having commanded it, the agent is implied by law to have had the authorit}'' to act in the name of the corporation ; or, when it has subsequently ratified or adopted it. And such ratifica- tion may be express, or may be inferred from circumstances ; as when the corporation receives the benefit of the tortious action of its official.^ The corporation is also liable for the negligent performance by its officials of corporate duties of a ministerial nature. Finally, it may be stated, in general explanation of this liability of the muiricipal corporation, that " A municipal corporation is liable for the acts of its agents, injurious to others, when the act is in its nature lawful and authorized but done in an unlawful manner or in an unauthorized place, but it is not ' Draper v. Ironton, 42 Wis. 696. -Montgomery v. Scott, .34 Wis. 338; Olesonv. Tolford, 37 lb. 327; Griffin v. Willow, 43 lb. 509; Bene- dict V. Fond du Lac, 44 lb. 495. ' Haag V. Vanderburgh Co., 60 Ind. 611; Smith v. Rochester, 76 N. Y. 506; Baltimore v. Eschback, 18 Md. 276; State v. Kirkley, 29 Md. 85, 111; Horn V. Baltimore, 30 lb. 218; Haw- ell v. Bufealo, 15 ISr. Y. 512; Cole v. 43 673 Nashville, 4 Sneed, 162; Trammell v. Eussellville, 34 Ark. 105. ' Browning v. Owen Co., 44 Ind. 11, 13. 5 Hodges V. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110; Mitchell V. Rockland, 52 Me. 118. « Wade V. Brantford, 19 Up. Can. Q. B. 207; Morse v. New York, 73 N. Y. 238; Trescott v. Waterloo, 26 Fed. Rep. 592. 338 MtrXICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XVII, liable for injuries or tortious acts, which are in their nature unlawful and prohibited." ^ A corporation is, however, not liable for an illegal act of its official intra vires, if the corpora- tion has not authorized or ratified it.^ But when in its answer a city ratifies and adopts the illegal official act, it will be liable if it fails to justify it.^ And it has been held that, where an act is lawful when done, as where property is lawfully seized, yet if the officials of the municipality fail to pursue the proper legal methods in disposing of it, the city will be liable for what has become a trespass.* The distinction above made between acts beyond the author- ity of the municipal corporation, and acts within its authority, but not within the authority of the particular ofiicer, is very im- portant. So, it may be well to note the general rule, that a cor- poration will be liable without ratification for official acts done bona fide, in pursuance of a general authority, which is granted by the city to act for it.^ It is a general rule that the person, bringing an action for the breach of a legal duty against a municipality, or against one of its officials, must show the existence of the duty,® and his interest in its performance.^ Not that he must show an express statute or rule of law, creat- iWoiiey V. Columbia, 88 Mo. 106; see also, generally, Brown v. Cape Girardeau, 90 lb. 37; New Decatur V. Berry, 90 Ala. 432; 7 So. Eep. 838; "Wakefield v. Newport, 60 N. H. 374; Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick. 511 ; Per- ley V. Georgetown, 7 Gray, 464; Deane v. Randolph, 132 Mass. 475; State V. Kirly, 29 Md. 85; Cooper v. Atlanta, 53 Ga. 638; Loyd v. Colum- bus, (Ga. 93) 15 S. E. 818; Chicago V. Megraw, 75 111. 566, 570; Sewall v. St. Paul, 20 Minn. 511, 524; Aldrich V. Tripp, 11 B. I. 141; Goddard v. Harpswell, 84 Me. 499; 24 Atl. 958; Haag V. Vanderburgh, 60 Ind. 511; Rowland v. Maynard, (Mass. 93) 34 N. E. 515; Smith v. Rochester, 76 N. T. 506; McDonald v. New York, 68 lb. 23; 23 Am. Rep. 144; Collins V. Macon, 69 Ga. 542; Marsh v. Ful- ton Co., 10 Wall. 676; Thomas v. 674 Richmond, 12 lb. 349; Salt Lake City V. Hollister, 118 U. S. 256, 262. 2 Fox V. Northern Liberties, 3 W. & S. 103; Everson v. Syracuse, 100 N. Y. 577; Corsicana v. White, 57 Tex. 382. 8 Wilde V. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 15. *Baumgard v. New Orleans, 9 La. An. 119; Hunt v. Boone ville, 65 Mo. 620; Donnelly v. Tripp, 12 R. I. 97. 5 Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick. 511, 516; Lee v. Sandy Hill, 40 N. Y. 44a, 449; Buffalo T. Co. v. Buffalo, 58 lb. 639; Perley v. Georgetown, 7 Gray, 464. "Mich. Cen. R. R. v. Coleman, 28 Mich. 440; Freeh v. Philadelphia, 39 Md. 574; Button v. Frink, 51 Conn. 342. 'Skate V. Harris, 89 Ind. 363; Fish V. Kelly, 17 C. B. N. S. 194. CH. XVn.] LIABILITY FOR TOUTS. § 338 ing the duty for his benefit ; but he must show facts sufficient to enable the court to infer that the duty existed.^ The rule as to the non-liability of municipal corporations for torts ultra vires, is one which in numerous instances works great hardship and loss to the injured person ; but it is firmly established, and the courts seldom if ever depart from it. So, when a city had the authority to construct an embankment and plank road, instead of which a bridge was built, it was held, in overruling a defence of ultra vires to an action by a person in- jured thereon, that, as the city had the authority to construct a road, its failure to do so, in the manner prescribed by law, made its negligence more evident-^ On account of the control which municipalities exercise over highways, and the impossibility of knowing, whether in any case the municipality is acting within its powers, a few exceptions have been made to the rule of non- liability for acts ultra vires, in cases arising out of permission being unlawfully given for uses of the highway which result in injury to travelers.^ A distinction has been made in a recent case by the Supreme Court of the United States between acts ex contractu, which are ultra vires, and those ex delicto. It arose in a case, where a mu- nicipal corporation, having no statutory ^authonity to do so, en- gaged in the business of distilling spirits ; and having been taxed by the United States upon spirits, in excess of the amount reported by it, sought unsuccessfully to recover the amount paid, and to avoid a seizure of its property, by claiming that its ac- tion as distiller was ultra vires.^ In this case, Mr. Justice Mil- ler said : " We do not agree that they (municipal corporations) are wholly exempt from liability for wrongful acts done, with all the evidences of their being acts of the corporation, to the injury of others, or in invasion of legal obligations to the State or the public. The question of the liability of corporations on contracts, which the law does not authorize them to make, and which are wholly beyond the scope of their powers, is governed 1 Basset v. Fish, 73 N. Y. 310; State V. Haworth, 23 N. E. E. 946; Eslava V. Jones, 83 Ala. 139; State v. Har- ris, 89 Ind. 363; Murphy v. Brook- lyn, 23 N. E. K. 887; Beck v. Carter, 68 N. T. 283; Murphy, Jr., v. Brook- lyn, 98 N. Y. 642. spekin v. Newell, 26 111. 320; Chi- cago V. Turner, 80 lb. 419. 8 Cohen v. New York, 113 N. Y. 532 ; Stanley v. Davenport, 54 Iowa, 463; Howell v. Buffalo, 15 N. Y. 512. * Salt Lake City v. Hollister, 118 U. S. 256. 675 § 338 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. xvn. by a different principle (from liability ex delicto). In such a case the party dealing with the corporation is under no obliga- tion to enter into the contract. No force or restraint or fraud is placed upon him. The powers of the corporation are mat- ters of public law open to his inspection, and he may and must judge for himself as to the power of the corporation to bind it- self by the proposed agreement." The charter of a town did not confer power to erect a dam. Nevertheless, the selectmen proceeded to construct one, by which the plaintiff's land was flooded. The town was held to be not liable, because of the lack of corporate power to con- struct a work of such a character ; ^ a ruling, which would seem to be applicable to injuries caused by works of local improve- ments, unauthorized by statute,^ or authorized by a statute which is unconstitutional.^ A city has no power to call a meet- ing for political purposes. But a person present at such a meeting, who is injured by the discharge of a cannon, has no claim against the city, although the meeting may have been called, and held under the management of, the citj"- councils.* And it may be stated as a general rule, that a municipality will not be liable for wrongs done by its officials, under ordinances and by-laws whose enactment is wholly outside of the corporate authority.* A municipal corporation is liable for the wi'ongful acts of its servants, although it may be apparent from the malicious and illegal ^ character of their acts, that the servants are exceeding the power which their principal possesses. Of course, a mu- 1 Anthony v. Adams, 1 Met. 284. 2 Walling V. Shreveport, 5 La. An. 669; Seele v. Deering, 79 Me. 343; Idaho Springs v. Woodward, 10 Col. 104; Cavanagh v. Boston, 139 Mass. 426; Leeds v. Eichmond, 102 Ind. 372; Denver v. Bayer, 7 Col. 113; Cummins v. City, 79 Ind. 491; Haag V. Board, 60 lb. 511; Morrison v. Lawrence, 98 Mass. 219; Anthony v. Adams, 1 Meto. (Mass.) 284; Mitchell V. Eockland, 52 Me. 118; Cuyler v. Eochester, 12 Wend. 165; Mayor etc. V. Cunlif, 2 N. Y. 165; Smith v. Eochester, 76 N. T. 506; Schipper v. 676 Aurora, 22 N. E. E. 878; Campbell v. Montgomery, 53 Ala. 573. 8 Albany v. CunlifE, 2 K. Y. 165; Browning v. Owen Co., 44 Ind. 11, 13; Shelby v. Deprez, 87 lb. 509. * Boyland v. New York, 1 Sandf. 27; Boom V. Utica, 2 Barb. 104; Swift V. Williamsburg, 24 Barb. 427; Mor- rison V. Lawrence, 98 Mass. 219. 5 Field V. Des Moines, 39 Iowa, 575. 6 McGary v. Lafayette, 15 Eob.(La.) 668; 4 La. An. 440; Wilde v. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 15 ; Gould v. At- lanta, 00 Ga. 164; Hunt v. Booneville, 65 Mo. 620. CH. xvn.] LIABILITY rOE, TORTS. § 338 a. nicipal corporation has no right to commit a trespass or appro- priate property belonging to another ; and if it does so, it must act through agents. If its agents, therefore, in exercising the powers conferred upon it as, for example, in carrying on local improvements trespass on, appropriate or destroy^ private prop- erty, it will be liable in the same manner as would an individ- ual principal.^ But the city is not liable, unless the wrongful act is done in carrying out the improvement, or is proximately connected with it.^ Municipal corporations, and counties,* are impliedly liable to a patentee, whose invention they infringe in the execution and performance of corporate powers and duties.^ But a municipal or quasi municipal corporation will not be liable, when the in- fringement is committed by a contractor.,^ on the general prin- ciple, that the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for the torts of the latter, committed in the course of the business to which the contract relates. § 338 a. Who is a municipal officer or agent. — In consid- ering the liability of a municipal corporation for the torts of its officials, the primary questions are : Was the person a servant of the corporation ; and if so, was the act for which responsi- 1 Walling V. Shreveport, 5 La. Ad. 660. 2 Allen V. Decatur, 24 111. 332; Lee T. Sandy Hill, 40 N. Y. 442; Sheldon V. Kalamazoo, 24 Mich. 383; Crossett V. Janesville, 28 Wis. 420; Buffalo Tump. Co. V. Buffalo, 58 N. Y. 639; Hunt V. Booneville, 65 Mo. 620; Of. Rowland v. Gallatin, 75 Mo. 134; Manners v. Haverhill, 135 Mass. 165; Hickerson v. Mexico, 58 Mo. 61 ; Hunt V. Booneville, 65 lb. 620; Soulavd v. St. Louis, 36 Mo. 546; Walling v. Shreveport, 5 La. An. 6G0; Platter v. Seymour, 86 lud. 323 ; Conniff v. San Francisco, 67 Cal. 45; Waldron v. Haverhill, 143 Mass. 582; Dooley v. Kansas City, 82 Mo. 444; Anthony v. Adams, 1 Met. 287; Hawks v. Charle- mont, 107 Mass. 414; Gordon v. Taunton, 126 lb. 349; Ipswich Mills V.Essex Co., 108 lb. 363; Bailey v. Woburn, 126 lb. 416; ^tna Mills v. Waltham, 126 lb. 122; Hildreth v. Lowell, 11 Gray, 345 ; Leeds v. Rich- mond, 102 Ind. 372. 3 White V. Phillipston, 10 Metcf. 108; Bigelow v. Randolph, 17 Gray, 541; Barney v. Lowell, 98 Mass. 571. ^May V. Mercer Co., 30 Fed. Rep. 247; May v. Logan, 30 lb. 250; see contra, Jacobs v. Hamilton Co., 4 Fisher Pat. Cas. 81. SRausen v. New York, 1 Fisher Pat. Cases, 254, 274; Bliss v. Brook- lyn, 4 lb. 596; Munson v. New York, 3 Fed. Rep. 338; Am. Nic. Pav. Co. V. Elizabeth City, 4 Fisher Pat. Cases, 189, 197; Allen v. Brooklyn, lb. 598. 6 Bigelow V. Louisville, 3 Fisher Pat. Cases, 602; May v. Juneau Co.j 30 Fed. Kep. 241. 677 § 338 a. MUNICIPAL COBPOKATIONS. [CH. XVII. bility is sought to be fixed upon the corporation, a corporate, as distinct from a public act.^ If it can be shown that the appointment or election, the control and the removal of the official, are in the power of the corporation, then the official is its official or agent, either gen- erally, or as to the wrong complained of ; and for the nonper- formance or negligent performance of a strictly coi"porate duty which devolved upon him by law, or which was commanded or ratified by the corporation, the municipality will be liable.^ And, so, likewise, will a municipal corporation be liable for the tortious actions of its officers de facto? If the duties per- formed by an official are not corporate or not performed for the peculiar benefit of the corporation, as distinct from the pub- lic at large ; if they are State and public duties, which for public convenience have been imposed upon municipal officials, the municipal corporation is not liable for misfeasance or nonfea- sance in the performance of them.* So, there may be officials who, although appointed by the corporation, are otherwise wholly independent of it, but whose jurisdiction territorially is coterminous with the municipality, and whose duties are wholly such as public or State officials perform. For the acts of this class of officials the municipality is not responsible.^ So a city will not be liable for the negli- ' Alcorn v. Philadelphia, 44 Pa. St. 348; Barnes v. District, 45 Mo. 94; Lynam v. White, 2 Aiken, 2.15; Ben- nett v. Same, 14 La. An. 120; Hilsdorf V. St. Louis, 45 Mo. 94; Small v. Dan- ville, 51 Me. 359; Fisher v. Boston, 104 Mass. 87; Morrison v. Lawrence, 98 lb. 219; Hinde v. Wabash, 98 lb. 219; Pollock v. Louisville, 13 Bush, 321 ; Brown v. Vinalhaven, 65 Me. 402 ; Grumbine v. Washington, 2 McAr- thur, 578. ^Saylor V. Harrisburg, 87 Pa. St. 216; Powers v. Council Bluffs, 50 Iowa, 197; Kobs v. Minneapolis, 22 Minn. 159; Eowell v. Williams, 29 Iowa, 210; Van Pelt v. Davenport, 42 lb. 308; Damour v. Lyons, 44 lb. 276; Sheldon V. Kalamazoo, 24 Mich. 083; Heuson V. New Haven, 37 Conn. 475; Osborne v. Detroit, 0:i Fed. 36; 678 Cowley V. Sunderland, 6 H. & W. 565. 8 Clark V. Easton, 146 Mass. 43. 4Boehm v. Baltimore, 61 Md. 259; McCarthy V. Boston, 135 Mass. 197; Hannen v. St. Louis, 62 Mo. 313; Maximilian v. New York, 62 N. Y. 160; Sullivan v. Holyoke, 135 Mass. 273; Aldrich v. Tripp, 11 R. I. 141; Brinkmeyer v. Evans, 29 Ind. 187. 5 Pratt v. Weymouth, 147 Mass. 245; Edgerly v. Concord, 59 N. 11. 78; Dooiey v. Sullivan, 112 Ind. 451; Walcott V. Swampscott, 1 Allen, 101 ; Wliite V. Phillipston, 10 Met. 108; Hamilton v. Garrett, 62 Tex. 602; Greggs V. Foote, 4 Allen, 195 ; Haf- ford V. New Bedford, 16 Gray, 297; Fishe V. Boston, 104 Mass. 87; Ogg V. Lansing, 35 Iowa, 495 ; Brinkmeyer V. Evansville, 29 Ind. 187; Bryant v. St. Paul, 33 Minn. 289; Black v. Co- CH. xvn.J LIABILITY FOR TOBTS. § 338 a. gence of a board of health,^ a surveyor of highways,^ or for an assault by a policeman ; ^ for the actions of the board of equal- ization of assessments ; * or for those of the board of education, although the mayor appoints the members ; * or of the com- missioners of charities and correction ; ^ for the actions of the city council, when erecting docks for the benefit of individuals ; ^ for the negligence of a boiler inspector ; ^ or of the driver of an ambulance ; ^ or for the negligence of a city surveyor or engineer doing work for private persons ; ^^ or for the unlawful action of the mayor, in ordering a building to be destroyed.i^ But the city of New York has been held liable for the neg- ligence of the water commissioners, on the ground that the city had an interest in the grant of power to them ; ^ and for the ac- tion of the park commissioners when, by statute, certain streets were put under their control.^^ The suspension bridge connect- ing the cities of New York and Brooklyn belongs to those cities ; and the bridge trustees, and persons employed by them, are the servants of the cities, for whose negligence they will be responsible.^* On the other hand, it has been held that a tribunal, which is authorized by law to act in condemnation proceedings, is not the agent of the municipality, although it may represent it, for the reason that its functions are public, discretionary and judi- cially In New England, the towns are not, in the absence of statute lumbia, 10 S. C. 412 ; Coleman v. Ches- ter, 14 lb. 286; Johnston v. Charles- ton, 3 lb. 232; Aldrich v. Tripp, 11 E. I. 141; Baltimore v. O'Neill, 63 Md. 336; Newert v. Boston, 120 Mass. 338. 1 Bryant V. St. Paul, 33 Minn. 289; see § 332. 2 Walcott V. Swampscott, 1 Allen, 101. SButtrick v. Lowell, 1 Allen, 172; see § 333. * Tone V. New York, 70 N. Y. 157. 6 Ham V. New York, 70 N. Y. 459; Swift V. New York, 83 lb. 528. 6 Maximilian v. New York, 62 N. Y. 160; Haight v. New York, 24 Fed. Rep. 93. ' N. Y. & B. Lumber Co. v. Brook- lyn, 71 N. Y. 580. 8 Mead v. New Haven, 40 Conn. 72. 5 Maximilian v. New York, 62 N. Y. 160. w Alcorn v. Philadelphia, 44 Pa. St. 348. ' Ji Eussell V. New York, 2 Denio, 401. 12 Bailey v. New York, 2 Denio, 443. 13 Ehrgott V. New York, 96 N. Y. 264. 14 Walsh V. New York, 107 N. Y. 220; Walsh V. Bridge Trs., 96 lb. 429. 16 Board v. Puller, 111 Ind. 410; Osborn V.Sutton, 108 lb. 443; Black V. Thomson, 107 lb. 162; Hays v. Parish, 52 lb. 132. 679 § 339 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS. [CH. XVH. responsible for the acts of a surveyor of highways or of a per- son emploj^ed by him ; ^ and this is also the case in regard to town assessors and collectors of taxes in New York.^ But in Vermont, towns have been made liable by statute for the de- fault and neglect of the clerks.^ § 339. liability for the condition of highways and streets — Municipal andqnasi-municipal corporations distingnished. — In England and Canada the parishes are charged with the maintenance and repair of highways, unless these duties are imposed by prescription on particular persons. But in neither country, are they liable civilh'' in damages.* In America a dif- ference is made, as to liability to a person injured by failure to repair streets and highways, between municipal corporations proper and those of a g'wasi-municipal character, as counties and townships. Highways and streets are to so large an extent the subject of legislation in all the States, that the only safe method to pur- sue, in endeavoring to fix a liability for defects therein, is to make a close inspection of the statute law.^ It is an almost universal rule that giwasi-municipal corporations are not in the absence of an express statutory declaration to that effect, lia- ble to a civil action for damages by one who is injured bj- de- fective roads or bridges under their control. In the absence of a statute creating such a liability, there is no obligation on these quasi corporations to repair highways ; and even when this statutory obligation to repair is imposed, and the power to levy taxes to provide for its execution is conferred, the court will regard such duties as public, and the county or town as the State's agent, and therefoi'e, not impliedly liable for the omis- sion or neglect to perform this duty.® But under precisely sim- ilar circumstances, it is generally held that there is an implied 1 Barney, V. Lowell, 98 Mass. 570; Judge v. Meriden, 38 Conn. 90. 2 Lorillard v. Monroe, 11 jST. Y. 392. 8 Hunter v. "Windsor, 24 Vt. 327; Lyman v. Edgerton, 29 lb. 305; Jar- vis V. Barnard, 30 lb. 492. «Rex V. St. George, 3 Campb. 222; Wellington v. Wilson, 14 TJp. Can. C. P. 304; Rex v. Great Brougliton, 5 Burr, 2700; Grassick v. Toronto, 30 U. C. Q. B. 306; Queen v. Harley, 680 8 L. T. (N. S.) 382; Harrold v. Sim- coe, 16 U. C. C. K. 43. "North Pac. etc. Co. v. East Poi-t- land, 14 Ore. 3; Barter v. Com., 3 Pa. 253; Com. v. E. R. Co., 27 Pa. St. 349. 6 Chick V. Kewberry Co., 27 S. C. 419; Manuel v. Cumberland, 98 K. C. 9; Threadgill v. Ansen, 99 lb. 352; Pfefferlee v. Lyon, 39 Kan. 432; Peo. V. Auditors, 75 N. Y. 317; Swinefo'rd CH. xvn.] LIABIIilTY FOE TORTS. §339 liability upon cities to answer in damages, based upon the ex- tensive statutory or charter powers of taxation and control and repair of the streets, which they possess and exercise as a dis- tinct and separate legal entity.^ The courts and the writers of text books ^ have often adverted to the lack of any substantial reason for this distinction, which gives an injured person a remedy by implication of law against a municipal corporation, and denies it under precisely similar circumstances, when a county or g'wasi-municipal corporation is the defendant.^ It has been sought to find a basis for the dis- tinction in the peculiar and frequent use made of city streets, the supreme and special control exerted over them by the mu- nicipal authorities, and the ample means generally possessed by them for their proper maintenance and repair ; yet, whatever may be the reasons of the distinction, and although the doc- V. Franklin Co., 73 Mo. 279; Crowell V. Sonoma Co., 25 Cal. 313; Carpen- ter V. echoes, 21 Alb. L. J. 374; Clark V. Lincoln Co., 20 Pac. E. 576; Watkins v. County Co., 30 W. Va. 657; Tindleyv. Salera, 137 Mass. 171; Wliite V. Bond Co., 58 111. 297; Rus- sell V. Steuben, 57 lb. 35; Button V. Board, 41 Miss. 236; Cooley v. Essex Co., 27 N. J. L. 415; Eipley v. Essex, 40 lb. 45; Granger v. Pulaski, 26 Ark. 37; Huffman v. San Joaquin, 21 Cal. 426; Atchison v. Jansen, 21 Kan. 560; Soper v. Henry Co., 26 Iowa, 264; Askew v. Hale, 54 Ala. 639; Barbour v. Horn, 48 lb. 566; Wyandotte v. Seitz, 21 Kan. 649; Sims V. Butler Co., 49 Ala. 110; Ham- ilton v.Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109. 'Albritten v. Huntsville, 60 Ala. 486; Kellogg v. Janesville, 34 Minn. 132; Diveney v. Elmira, 51 N. Y. 506; Delger ». St. Paul, 14 Fed. R. 567; Riddle v. Merrimac Riv. Co., 7 Mass. 169; Noble v. Richmond, 31 Gratt. 271; Cliidsey v. Canton, 17 Conn. 475 ; Larson v. Grand Forks, 3 Dak. 307; Morey v. Newfane, 8 Barb. 645; Boulder v. Niles, 9 Col. 415; Barnes V. District, 91 U. S. 540; Young v. Waterville, 39 N. W. R. 97; Moore V. Richmond, (Va.) 8 S. E. E. 387; Nelson v. Canisteo, 100 N. Y. 89; 2 N. E. R. 473; Hiner v. Fond du Lac, 71 Wis. 74; Saulsbury v. Ithaca, 94 N. Y. 27; Weller v. St. Paul, 42 N. W. R. 392 ; Munger v. Marshalltown, 13 lb. 642; Klein v. Dallas, 71 Tex. 280; Selma v. Perkins, 68 Ala. 145; Clark V. Richmond, 83 Va. 355. 2 See Dillon Mun. Corp. 1022, et seq., for a full discussion of the rea- sons, difficulties and limitations of this distinction. " The rule which ex- empts one class of governmental corporations from liability, and fas- tens it upon another, where the stat- utes are the same as to the charac- ter of the duty, and the means of performing it, must be an arbitrary one, since it is quite impossible to find any difference sufficient to cre- ate a distinction." Elliott Roads and Streets, p. 327. See Thompson on Negligence, 614. !i Young V. Charleston, 20 S. C. 116; Chick V. Newberry Co., 27 lb. 419; Eastman v. Clackamas Co., 34 Fed. Eep. 139; Arkadelphia v. Windham 49 Ark. 139. 681 §340 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [cH. xvn. trine may be anomalous, the rule is generally, though not uni- versally, settled.^ The only satisfactory explanation of this dLstinction is to be found in the statement that the municipal corporation is a legal personality, distinct and separate from the State government, which has independent rights and duties, while the county or township is only a subdivision of the State, without a separate legal existence, and therefore, cannot be held liable for the tortious acts of its officials, without violating the technical, but nevertheless well established doctrine, that the State cannot be sued, on account of its sovereign character. The State is also protected from such suits bj' the Eleventh Ar- ticle of the Amendments to the United States Constitution. The application of this principle to •g'Masi-municipal corpora- tions has not been uniform, and in many cases statutes have sub- jected them to liability to actions ex contractu and ex delicto ; but I am satisfied that it was the original cause of this distinction. In many States this distinction has been disregarded, and it has been held that, in the absence of statute, there is no im- plied liability, even upon municipal corporations, for failure to keep streets in repair, to any one who is injured thereby. And although this is not in accordance with the current of decisions, it has received the indorsement of courts, whose decisions are worthy of cai'cful consideration.^ § 340. Statutory liability for neglect in maintenance and repair of highways. — In Canada, in the New England States and elsewhere, statutes have been enacted which provide that the streets shall be kept in repair and safe for public use ; and that the town, city or other territorial division, on which this duty is cast, shall be liable to travelers injured by any defect, insufficiency or want of repair.^ Construing the expression 1 Barnes v. District, 91 U. S. 540, 551. 2 Merrill v. Portland, 4 Cliff. C. C. R. 138; Detroit v. Blakeby, 21 Mich. 84; Jones v. New Haven, 34 Conn. 1; Pray v. Jersey City, 32 N. J. L. 394; Morgan v. Hallowell, 5Y Me. 375; Albnow V. Sibley, 30 Minn. 186; Hix- on V. Lowell, 13 Gray, 59; McArthur V. Saginaw, 58 Mich. 357 ; Young v. Charleston, 20 S. C. 110; Chick v. Newberry, 27 lb. 419; Harwood v. 682 Lowell, 4 Cush. 310; Winbigler v. Los Angeles, 45 Cal. 36; Brady v. Lowell, 3 Cush. 121; Arkadelphia V. Windham, 49 Ai-k. 139; Vorrath V. Hoboken, 49 N. J. L. 285; Weis- senberg v. Winnecoune, 56 Wis. 667; Wild V. Paterson, 47 N. J. L* 406. 8 Leslie v. Lewiston, 62 Me. 488; Hamilton v. Boston, 4 Allen, 475; Bliss V. So. Hadley, 145 Mass. 91; Barker v. Worcester, 139 lb. 74; 'V ar- ney v. Manchester, 58 N. H. 430. CH. xvn.J LIABILITY FOK TORTS. § 340 "kept in repair," it has been held in Canada not to refer to construction.! The words should also be given a reasonable interpretation. It will not be expected that a new road, opened in a thinly settled township, shall be found in as good a condi- tion, as a highway in a thickly settled neighborhood.^ The adjudications in which the statutes, passed in the New England States for fixing such a liability upon the town, have been con- strued, are abundant and voluminous. The reported cases point out and defi.ne what is required of the town to exempt it from liability, how large a part of the highway or street must be made safe or convenient, what constStutes an actionable defect or want of repair, when the plaintiff is guilty of contribu- tory negligence, and what is in any particular case the proxi- mate cause of injury to him.^ In some of the New England States, the right to maintain actions under these statutes is confined to travelers ; and it is held that children playing in the street,* or persons stopping by the wayside,^ are not entitled to recovery for injuries caused by defective roads. Elsewhere, it is held that a city owes a duty, to keep its streets in repair, to all using them for any lawful purpose.® Many of the questions, which are discussed in construing these statutes, are general in their nature ; and while the duty ' Queen v. Epsom Union Guard, 8 L. T. E. N. S. 383. 2 Colbeck V. Brantf ord, 21 Up. Can. Q.B. 276; Castor v. Uxbridge, 39 lb. 113. 'Loan V. Boston, 106 Mass. 450; Post V. Boston, 141 lb. 189; Hansoom V. Boston, 142 lb. 242; Hixon v. Low- ell, 13 Gray, 59; Barber v. Koxbury, 11 Allen, 318; Sanford v. Augusta, 32 Me. 536; Peck v. Ellsworth, 86 lb. 393; Brackenridge v. Fitohburg, 145 Mass. 160; Gulline v. Lowell, 1441b. 491; Ward v. Jefferson, 24 Wis. 342; Clark V. Corinth, 41 Vt. 449; Prindle V. Fletcher, 39 lb. 255; Hyde v. Ja- maica, 27 lb. 443; Bacon v. Boston, 3 Gush. 174; Bailey v. Southborough, 6 lb. 141; Packard v. New Bedford, 9 Allen, 200; Ray v. Manchester, 46 N. H. 59; Howe v. Plainfleld, 41 lb. 135; Clark v. Barrington, 41Ib. 44; Hall V. Manchester, 40 lb. 410; Hardy V. Keene, 25 lb. 370; Church v. Chen-yfield, 33 Me. 460; Raymond v. Lowell, 6 Cush. 524; Smith v. Ded- ham, 8 lb. 522; Vinal v. Dorchester, 7 Gray, 421; Gregory v. Adams, 14 lb. 242; Farnura v. Concord, 2 N. H. 392; Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247; Reed v. Belfast, 20 Me. 248. *Stinson v. Gardner, 42 Me. 248; Tighe V. Lowell, 119 Mass. 472. sBlodgett V. Boston, 8 Allen, 287; Stiokney v. Salem, 3 lb. 874. 6 Indianapolis v. Emmelman, 108 Ind. 530; Murray v. McShane, 52 Md, 517; Chicago v. Keefe, 114 111. 222 Babson v. Rockport, 101 Mass. 93 Gregory v. Adams, 14 Gray, 242 ; Var- ney v. Manchester, 58 N. H. 430. 683 § 341 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XVII. and liability they impose are not of course coincident with the duty and liability which are impliedly imposed by the law else- where, the opinions and decisions of the courts upon these stat- utes may be consulted with advantage, in determining questions, involving the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, his con- tributory negligence if any, and the measure of damages. As in the case of all statutes creating a liability, these stat- utes have received a strict construction at the hands of the courts.^ § 341. Quasi-municipal corporations liable for breach of specific duty. — The weight of the authorities is to the effect that g'Masi-municipal corporations are not responsible in dam- ages for the neglect of duty imposed on them, when the duty is common to all corporations of the class in question, even though they are empowered to raise money for corporate pur- poses, unless the liability is created by statute.^ But there are exceptions to the above rule, at least so far as the New England towns are concerned, and for an actual wrongful trespass upon property rights they would be liable.^ The exemption of g'wasi-municipal corporations from liability for the performance of public duties, as explained in the pre- ceding section,* is applicable only to such duties as are im- posed upon all towns in general and which subserve public purposes exclusively. On the other hand, for a negligent per- formance of specific duties, or the execution of a special power, which was conferred on the town at its request, or with its consent, it will be subject to the same liability ; as will any corporation, upon which such duties have been imposed, or such powers conferred.^ And this distinction, based as it is upon the just principle, which renders municipalities impliedly liable for the nonperformance or neglect of corporate, as distinct from public, duties, has been followed and approved by the courts outside of New England,^ in application to counties and other 1 Arline v. Laurens Co., 77 6a. 249. 2 See last section. 8 Grilmau v. Laconia, 55 N. H. 130; Weed V. Greenwich, 45 Conn. 170. * § 339. ^Bigelow V. Randolph, 14 Gray, 541; comp. Weisenberg, v. Winne- conne, 56 Wis. 667; Oliver v. Wor- 684 cester, 102 Mass. 489; Reed v. Belfast, 20 Me. 246; Blodgett v. Boston, 8 Allen, 237; CMdsey v. Canton, 17 Conn. 475 ; Stiokney v. Salem, 8 Al- len, 374. 6 Conrad v. Ithaca Trs., 16 N. T. 158; Hannon v. St. Louis Co., 62 Mo. 313, 316. CH. XVII.] LIABILITY FOK TORTS. §342 quasi corporations, wherever they are chai-ged with a specific duty, and are provided with the means of enforcing it.^ § 342. Extent of municipal liability for injury from de- fective streets— Horses taking fright — The question, whether a street shall be repaired or improved, as a general rule, is sole- ly for the municipality to answer ; ^ but the city is bound to re- pair, when the failure to do so will menace the safety of the traveling public.^ No public corporation is liable to a private action by an abutter* or other person, for a general failure to re- pair, or for making injudicious improvements if they are au- thorized,^ if no one has received a special injury therefrom ; ^ and it may be laid down, as a general rule of the law, that towns and cities are only required to keep their streets in a reasonably safe condition for travelers, and according to the practice and usage of those communities which may be said to exercise ordi- nary care in their attention to the highways.'^ Where the lia- bility is for non-repair, it may arise from any defect, which renders a road unsafe for ordinary travel ; ^ and the dangerous character of the defect is a question for the jury.® It lias been held, however, in several instances, that the defect must be suf- ficient to render the corporation indictable for maintaining a nuisance.^" And this rule has been applied to objects in the 1 Mahaney v. Scholley, 84 Pa. St. 136; County v. Wise, 18 Atl. R. 31; Cooper V. Mills Co., 09 Iowa, 350; Gary v. Tama Co., 37 N. W. K. 38; Mayor v. Marriott, 9 Md. 160; Mayor T. Pendleton, 15 lb. 12; County v. Baker, 44 lb. 1 ; Harris v. Board, 32 N. E. E. 92; Pritchett v. Board, 61 Ind.210; Board v. Arnett, 116 lb. 438. 2 Benson V. Waukesha, (Wis.) 41 N. W. R. 1017. STreise v. St. Paul, 36 Minn. 526. 4 Gold V. Philadelphia, 115 Pa. St. 184. sPepperv. City, 114 Pa. St. 96; O'Reilly v. Kingston, 114 N. Y. 439. ^Slackhouse v. Lafayette, 26 Ind. 17; Lynch v. Mayor, 76 N. T. 60; Williams v. Grand Rapids, 33 Alb. L. J. 237; Lyon v. Cambridge, 136 Mass. 419; Henderson v. Sandefur, 111 Bush. 530. ' Turner v. Newburgh, 109 K. Y. 301; Emporia V. Schmidling, 7 Am. Eng. Cor. Cas. 86; Hunt v. Mayor, 109 jSr. Y. 134; Indianapolis v. Cook, 99 Ind. 10; Ring v. Cohoes, 77 N". Y. 83; Aurora v. Pulfer, 56 111. 270; Raymond v. Lowell, 6 Cush. 524; Furuell v. St. Paul, 20 Minn. 117; Macomberv. Taimson, 100 Mass. 255. 8 Davis V. Bangor, 42 Me. 522; Bar- ber v. Roxbury, 11 Allen, 318; Cas- tor V. Uxbridge, 39 Up. Can. Q. B. 113; Harrison v. New Haven, 34 Conn. 136. s Caswell V. St. Mary's PI. R. Co., 28 Up. Can. Q. B. 247, 254; Curry v. Mannington, 23 W. Va. 14; Wilson v. Wheeling, 19 lb. 323; Denver v. Dean, 10 Col. 375. '"Men-ill v. Hampden, 26 Me. 234; Goldthwaite v. East Bridgewater, 5 Gray, 61; Howard v. Bridgewater, 685 §342 MTJNIOIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [cH. xvn. road which are not strictly defects, but which were calculated to frighten horses.^ The duty to repair is comprehensive and includes the re- moval of obstructions," such as an inequality between a pave- ment and a crosswalk ; ^ a water box, which extends an inch and a half above a sidewalk ; * a pile of stones,® or of lumber ; ^ sticks of timber, logs, etc.; '' a rock,^ a tent,^ a portable furnace,^' a steam roUer,^^ thresher,^" or motor j^^ machinery left by the roadside,^* posts ; ^® an ash pile,^" and loose planks, projections and other inequalities in the surface-'^ of the driveway or sidewalk,^* as well as the filling up or guarding of dangerous holes and excavations ^^ in the surface, or near the line, of the road.^ 16 Pick. 189; Ringland v. Toronto, 23 Up. Can. C. P. 93; Kay v. Petrolia, 24 lb. 73 ; Boyle v. Dundas, 25 lb. 420. I Bushville v. Adams, 107 Ind. 475 ; Fritsch v. Allegheny, 91 Pa. St. 226; Chicago V. Hoy, 75 111. 530. ^ Michigan City v. Boeckling, (Ind.) 23 ST. E. K. 518; Goodfellow v. New York, 100 K. T. 15. 8 Glantz V. So. Bend, 106 Ind. 305. * Indianapolis v. Cook, 99 Ind. 10. 5 Bigelow v.Weston,3 Pick. 267; Kel- logg V. Northampton, 4 Gray, 65; Fore- man V. Canterbury, L. R. 6 Q. B. 214. ^ North Manlieim v. Arnold, 119 Pa. St. 380. ' Gorham v. Cooperstown, 59 N. Y. 660; Springer v. Bowdoinham, 7 Me. 442; Davis v. Bangor, 42 lb. 522; Johnson v. Whiteiield, 18 lb. 286; Carter v. Uxbridge, 39 Up. Can. Q. B. 113; Snow v. Adams, 1 Cush. 443. 8 Card v. Ellsworth, 65 Me. -547. 9 Ayer v. Norwich, 39 Conn. 376. 1^ Rushville v. Adams, 107 Ind. 475. II Young V. New Haven, 39 Conn. 435. 12 Burrell v. Uncapher, 117 Pa. St. 353. 13 Stanley v. Davenport, 54 la. 463. " Bennett v. Lovell, 12 R. I. 166. i=Soulev'. Gr. Trunk Ry. Co., 21 Up. Can. C. P. 308; Coggswell v. Lexington, 4 Cush. 307. 686 18 Ring V. Cohoes, 77 N. Y. 83. 17 Hall V. Manchester, 40 N. H. 410; Irwin V. Bradford, 22 Up. Can. C. P. 421 ; Hubbard v. Concord, 35 N. H. 52; Winn v. Lowell, 1 Allen, 177. '8 As to removing such obstructions when seen by a traveler, it has been said that when to remove them would materially delay him or entail consid- erable labor upon him, he is under no obligation to do so; but he may use the road employing proper care in view of the obstruction; or he may, if the road be impassable, travel tem- porarily on the laud adjoining. Morey V. Fitzgerald, 56 Vt. 487. 19 Sherwood v. District, 3 Mackey 276; "Walsh v. Mayor, 107 N. Y. 222; Murphy v. Gloucester, 105 Mass. 470; Pettingill v. Yonkers, 39 Hun, 449; Cromarty v. Boston, 127 Mass. 329; Chicago V. Robbins, 2 Black, 418; Reed v. Northfield, 13 Pick. 94; Con- greve v. Morgan, 5 Duer, 495 ; Barnes V. District, 91 U. S. 540; Doherty v. Waltham, 4 Gray, 596 ; Brusso v. Buf- falo, 90 N. Y. 679; Willard v. New- bury, 22 Vt. 458; O'Neill v. New Or- leans, 30 La. An. 220; Batty v. Dux- bury, 24 Vt. 155. 2» Fritsch v. Allegheny, 91 Pa. St. 226; No. Manheim v. Arnold, 1191b. 380; Hinckley v. Somerset, 145 Mass. 326. CH. xvn.J LIABILITY POK TORTS. §342 The place of the accident, the hour of the day, and the sea- son of the year must all be considered, in determining the question of what constitutes negligence in municipal control of streets.^ As municipalities are only bound to beep their streets in repair for ordinary modes of traveling, they need not keep them safe for furious and reckless driving and racing.^ If an ordinarily gentle horse shies to one side, and the driver does not lose control over him, but injury is caused by an ob- stacle or defect in the highway, the municipality will be liable.^ But if the horse shies at something, for which the municipality is not responsible, and running away, comes in contact with an obstruction or defect in the street, the corporation will not be liable.* But there are many cases, which hold that the city would be liable, if it had been negligent in removing the ob- stacle or defect, and the injury would not have been sustained but for such obstacle or defect.* If a horse of average gentle- ness become frightened at an object which, being calculated to frighten horses, has been negligently placed or permitted to re- 1 Castor V. Uxbridge, 39 Tip. Can. Q. B. 113; Eingland v. Toronto, 23 lb. 98; Hart v. Cedar Kapids, 63 Wis. 634; Schrotli v. Prescott, 68 lb. 678; Kelseyv. Glover, 15 Vt. 708; Cassedy V. Stockbrldge, 21 lb. 391; Kioe v. Montpelier, 19 lb. 470; Fritsch v. Al- legheny, 91 Pa. St. 226; Dubois v. Kingston, 102 N. Y. 219; Teaw v. Williams, 15 R. I. 20; Talbott v. Taun- ton, 140 Mass. 552; Merrill v. Hamp- den, 26 Me. 234; Pratt v. Amherst, 140 Mass. 167; Mayor v. Sheffield, 4 Wall. 189; Johnson v. Enfleld, 42 >r. H. 197; Johnson v. Haverhill, 35 lb. 74; Young Twp. v. Sutter, 18 Atl. R. 610; Fitz V. Boston, 4 Gush. 365; Ponca V. Crawford, 23 Neb. 662; Providence v. Clapp, 17 How. 161; Hill V. Fond du Lao, 56 Wis. 342; Cook V. Milwaukee, 27 lb. 191. 2McCarthyv. Portland, 67 Me. 167; King V. Cohoes, 77 N. Y. 83. "Aldrloh V. Gorham, 77 Me. 287; Baltimore etc. Co. v. Bateman, 68 Md. 389; Stone v. Hubbardstown, 100 Mass. 49; Gushing v. Bedford, 125 lb. 526. 4Houfe V. Fulton, 29 Wis. 296; Moulton V. Sanford, 51 Me. 127; Per- kins V. Fayette, 68 lb. 152; Davis v. Dudley, 4 Allen, 557; Titus v. North- bridge, 97 Mass. 258; Drelier v. Fitch- burg, 22 Wis. 675 ; Brown v. Mayor, 57 Mo. 156. 6 Plymouth v. Graver, 125 Pa. St. 24; 17 Atl. E. 249; Campbell v. Still- water, 32 Minn. 308 ; Hunt v. Pownal, 9 Vt. 411; Sherwood v. Hamilton, 37 Up. Can. Q. B. 410; Winship v. En- field, 42 N. H. 197; Hey v. Philadel- phia, 81 Pa. St. 44; Ward v. North Haven, 43 Conn. 148 ; Crawf ordsville v. Smith, 79 Ind. 308; Howard v. North Bridgewater, 16 Pick. 189; Hull V. Kansas City, 54 Mo. 601; Fogg V. Nahant, 98 Mass. 578; Rock- ford V. Russell, 9 111. App. 229; Jack- son V. Belle view, 30 Wis. 250; Man- derscliiel v. Dubuque, 25 Iowa, 108; Soule V. Gr. Tr. Ry. Co., 21 Up. Can. C. P. 308; Vars v. Same, 23 lb. 308; 687 §343 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XVII. main in the highway by the municipality, the city will be liable.^ But the obstacles must also be of a nature to frighten horses of ordinary gentleness ; ^ and the city will not be liable for dam- ages sustained by the affright of a very nervous horse, where the obstacle which frightened the horse, would not have dis- turbed the ordinary horse, which is accustomed to travel in the crowded streets of a city. And although they must ordinarily be within the limits of the highway or street, it has been some- times held that they need not be within the traveled path.* There are many cases which hold, however, that objects, outside the part of a highway most used, but inside the highway limit, will not render the city liable for injuiy to horses frightened there- by.* Whether an obstacle is in any given case naturally calcu- lated to frighten horses of average gentleness, is usually for the jury to say.^ And evidence, that other horses took fright at the object, is admissible.® But a defect is never to be inferred merely from the fact that an injury was sustained.^ § 343. Railings or Carriers, signs and Kghts to guard excaYations, areas and basements. —Where the highway is defective through the existence over the roadbed, either of ex- cavations or a dangerous caving in or depression below the sur- face, it is the duty of the municipality to exercise a high degree Moore v. Abbott, 32 Me. 46; Pick- hard V. Smith, 10 C. B. N. S. 470; Corley v. Hill, 4 C. B. N. S. 556. ' Bennett v. Fifield, 13 E. I. 139; Morse v. Richmond, 41 Vt. 435 ; Stan- ley V. Davenport, 54 Iowa, 468 ; Card V. Ellsworth, 65 Me. 547; Kingsburg V. Dedham, 13 lb. 186; Eushvill v. Adams, 107 Ind. 124; Cook v. Charles- town, 98 Mass. 80; Keith v. Easton, 2 Allen, 552; Ayer v. Norwich, 39 Conn. 376; Foshay v. Glen Haven, 25 Wis. 288; Chicago v. Hoy, 75 111. 530; Bartlett v. Hooksett, 48 N. H. 18. '^ PioUet v. Simmers, 106 Pa. St. 95; Davis V. Bangor, 42 Me. 522. 3 Foshay v. Glen Haven, 25 Wis. 288; Morse v. Eichmond, 41Vt.435; Eushville v. Adams, 107 Ind. 475; comp. Nichols v. Athens, 66 Me. 402. lEockford v. Tripp, 83 111. 247; 688 Nichols V. Athens, 68 Me. 413; Per- kins v. Fayette, 68 lb. 152; Farrell v. Oldtown, 69 lb. 72; Bartlett v.' Kittery, 68 lb. 358; Marble v. Wor- cester, 4 Gray, 395 ; Bounds v. Strat- ford, 26 Up. Can. C. B. 11. 6 Lawrence v. Mt. Vernon, 35 Me. 100; Winship v. Enfield, 42 N. H. 197; Ayer v. Norwich, 39 Conn. 376; Cleveland etc. Co. v. Wynant, 114 Ind. 525. '> Darling v. Westmoreland, 52 N. H. 401. 7 Church V. Cherryfield, 33 Me. 460; Sherman v. Kortright, 52 Barb. 567; Collins V. Dorchester, 6 Cush. 396; Packard v. New Bedford, 9 Allen, 200; Calkins v. Hartford, 33 Conn. 57; see Kearney v. London B. & S. C. Ey. Co., L. E. 5 Q. B. 411; Mullen v. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567. OH. XVII.] LIABILITY FOR TOETS. §343 of care, in protecting travelers from injury therefrom, by the use of the necessary railings, barriers, signs and lights.^ Nor will the city be excused from the observance of these precau- tions, because the street was newly opened, and for that reason there was no regular travel thereon.^ A city is not liable, if it fail to erect barriers, to prevent trav- elers from going outside of the road or street.^ And where the defect or excavation is so far from the highway, that it can cause injury only to one leaving the highway, no barriers are necessary,* so far as the city is concerned. A city is bound to erect barriers around an excavation, which is in close proximity to the street^ but not around a dangerous place, twenty-eight,^ twenty-five,^ or thirty-four feet distant.* A city is called upon to employ ordinary care only ; and when an accident is such as has never occurred before, prudent men would not be expected to guard against it.® Nor is the city 1 0'Leary v. Mankato, 21 Minn. 65; Newlin v. Davis, 77 Pa. St. 317; At- lanta V. Wilson, 60 Ga. 473; Keys v. Maroellus, 50 Mich. 439; Kennedy v. Mayor, 73 N. Y. 365; Chicago v. His- lop, 61 111. 86; Carlisle v. Brisbane, 113 Pa. St. 544; Blaisdell v. Portland, 39 Me. 113;'' Drew v. Sutton, 55 Vt. 586; Toms v. Whitby, 35 Up. Can. Q. B. 195; Zetther v. Atlanta, 66 Ga. 195; Delphi v. Lowery, 74 Ind. 520; Houfe V. Fulton, 29 Wis. 296; Wil- liams V. Clinton, 28 Conn. 264; Ward V. North Haven, 23 lb. 148 ; Jones v. Waltham, 4 Cush. 499 ; Scott v. Mont> fjomery, 95 Pa. St. 444; Pittsburgh v. Hart, 89 Pa. St. 389; Britton v. Cum- mington, 107 Mass. 347; Halpin v. Kansas City, 76 Mo. 335; Stark v. Portsmouth, 52 N. H. 221; Freeport V. Isbell, 83 111. 440; Babson v. Eock- port, 101 Mass. 93 ; Murphy v. Glou- cester, 105 Mass. 470; Com. v. Wil- mington, 105 lb. 599; Barnes v. Chicopee, 138 lb. 67; Davis v. Hill, 41 N. H. 329; Stimson v. Gardiner, 42 Me. 248; Blake v. Newfield, 68 lb. 36."); Stevens v. Boxford, 10 Allen, 93; Alger v. Lowell, 3 lb. 402; Burn- 14 ham V. Boston, 10 lb. 290; Orme v. Richmond, 79 Va. 86; Clark v. Rich- mond, 83 lb. 355 ; Koester v. Ottum- wa, 34 Iowa, 41 ; Han-is v. Newbury, 128 Mass. 321. 2 Crystal v. Des Moines, 65 Iowa, 502. 3 Murphy v. Gloucester, 105 Mass. 470; Puffer v. Orange, 122 lb. 389 Barnes v. Chicopee, 138 lb. 67 Chicago V. Gallagher, 44 111. 295 Adams V. Natick, 13 Allen, 429; Spar- hawk V. Salem, 1 lb. 30. < Lansing v. Toolan, 37 Mich. 152 Goodin v. Des Moines, 55 Iowa, 67 Warren v. Holyoke, 112 Mass. 362 Darly v. Worcester, 131 lb. 452 ; Duf- fy V. Dubuque, 63 Iowa, 171; Mon- mouth V. Sullivan, 8 111. App. 50. 5 Harris v. Inh's, 138 Mass. 67; Chicago V. Hesing, 83 111. 204; Em- melmann v. Indianapolis, 108 Ind. 530. 6 Daily v. Worcester, 131 Mass. 452. 7 Murphy v. Gloucester, 105 Mass. 470. 8 Barnes v. Inh's, 138 Mass. 67. 9 Hubbells v. Yonkers, 104 N. Y. 434. 689 §344 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XVII. liable, when, after having placed the proper barriers around a dangerous place in the highway, they have been removed by third persons without the knowledge of the city.^ It is no excuse for the absence of barriers, that the horse driven by the traveler was not quiet and gentle.^ A city is not bound to maintain railings in front of basements and shops ^ or around cellar doors, which open from the side- walk,* or areas or hatchways,^ not in the sidewalk but on private property contiguous to it ; or to provide hitching posts, or, if it does, to use extraordinary care in their selection and erection.^ But where an open area or hatchway, whether in private prop- erty or not, is notoriously dangerous, a municipality should be liable for failure to properly guard it, or for failure to oblige the property owner to do so.^ A railing along the side of a stairway, parallel with the sidewalk, is sufficient although no gate is maintained at the entrance.^ Whether, it is negligence to leave a highway unguarded by barriers in a particular place, is a question of fact for the jury,^ to be decided upon a consideration of all the circumstances of each case. § 344. Accidents caused by ice and snovr In determining whether the city is liable for the consequences of negligence in the removal of snow and ice from the streets, the amount of the snow fall, the temperature and state of the weather, and the length of time the ice or snow has been allowed to remain, are all to be considered,^'' as well as the expense of clearing it away.^^ Cities are not compelled by law to compensate every ' Klatt V. Milwaukee, 53 Wis. 196; Mullen V. Rutland, 55 Vt. 77. 2 Lower Macungiev.Merkhoffer, 71 Pa. St. 276; Kennedy v. Mayor, 73 N. T. 365; Hey v. Philadelphia, 81 Pa. St. 44 ; Newlin v. Davis, 77 lb. 317. 3 Beardsley v. Hartford, 50 Conn. 529. * Day V. Mt. Pleasant, 70 Iowa, 193. 6 Withan v. Portland, 72 Me. 539; Temperance Hall Ass'n v. Giles, 33 N. J. L. 260. "Eockford v. Tripp, 83 111. 247; Marble v. Worcester, 4 Gray, 395. ' Augusta V. Hafers, 59 Ga. 151 ; 690 Eowell V. Williams, 29 Iowa, 210; Grove v. Kansas City, 75 Mo. 672; Niblett V. Nashville, 12 Heisk. 68. 8 Fitzgerald v. Berlin, 51 Wis. 81. " Burrell Tp. v. Uncapher, 117 Pa. St. 353. '"Burr V. Plymouth, 48 Conn. 460; Taylor v. Yonkers, 105 N. Y. 202; 11 N. E. R. 642; Congdon v. Norwich, 37 Conn. 414; Hayes v. Cambridge, 136 Mass. 402; Siebert v. Boston, 31 N. E. 734; 139 Mass. 313; Richards v. Oshkosh, (Wis. 90) 51 N. W. 256. " Rooney v. Randolph, 128 Mass. 580. CH. XVII.] LIABILITY FOR TOUTS. §34-i individual, who is injured by the presence of ice or snow on a thoroughfare ; it has been held that a person, who walks upon a part of the street where ice has accumulated, and sustains an injury which he could have avoided by passing on either side of it, cannot recover from the city.^ The slippery condition of the sidewalk is not enough alone to render th.e city liable, where there is nothing to show that the city has been negligent, in allowing ice or snow to accum- ulate, and thus become a dangerous obstruction.^ But if the municipality permits an unreasonable accumulation of snow and ice upon its pavements,^ when it forms hills and ridges ; * or it allows a road or street to be blocked up for from four to iQuincy v. Barker, 81 111. 300; Coates V. Canaan, 51 Vt. 131; Chi- cago V. Bixby, 84 111. 82 ; Aurora v. Pulfer, 56 lb. 270; Schaeffler v. San- dusky, 33 Ohio St. 246; Dunkin v. Troy, 61 Barb. 437; Evans v. Utica, 69 T^. Y. 166; Belton v. Baxter, 54 lb. 245; Wilson v. Charlestown, 8 Allen, 137; Penna. Co. v. Kathget, 32 Ohio St. 66; Chicago v. McGiven, 78 111. 347; Higirt v. Greenoastle, 53 Ind. 574; Alline v. LaMars, 71 Iowa, 654. 2 Stilling V. Thorpe, 54 Wis. 538; Eingland v. Toronto, 23 Up. Can. C. P. 93; Lawless v. Troy, 68 Hun, 632; Sohroth V. Prescott, 63 Wis. 652; Harrington v. BufCalo, 24 N. E. R. 186; Evans v. Utica, 69 N. Y. 166; Dickinson v. N. York, 92 lb. 584; Hill V. Fond du Lac, 56 Wis. 242; Grossenbach v. Milwaukee, 65 lb. 31 ; Stewart v. Woodstock, 15 Up. Can. Q. B. 427; Heuks v. Minneapolis, 42 Minn. 530; Nason v. Boston, 14 Al- len, 508; Stanton v. Springfield, 12 lb. 566; Keith V. Brockton, 136 Mass. 119; Stone v. Hubbardston, 100 lb. 50; Seeley V. Litchfield, 49 Conn. 134; Landolt v. Norwich, 37 lb. 615 ; Smyth V. Bangor, 72 Me. 249; Kinney v. Troy, 108 N. T. 567; O' Conner v. New York, 9 N. Y. S. 492; Mauch Chunk V. Kline, 100 Pa. St. 119; Bro- burg V. Des Moines, 63 Iowa, 523; Chase v. Cleveland, 44 Ohio St. 505; Ayres v. Hammondsport, &9 N. E. R. 265 ; 130 N. T. 065 ; Levasseur v. Ha- vestraw, 63 Hun, 627. 8 Collins V. Council Bluffs, 32 Iowa, 324; Whitman v. Groveland,131 Mass. 553; Morse v. Boston, 109 Mass. 446; Todd V. Troy, 61 N. Y. 506; Barton V. Montpelier, 30 Vt. 650; Loker v. Brookline, 13 Pick. 343; Luther v. Worcester, 97 Mass. 268 ; Hall v. Man- chester, 39 N. H. 295; Hortonv. Ip- swich, 12 Cush. 488; Hall v. LoweU, 10 lb. 260; Savage v. Bangor, 40 Me. 176; Providence v. Clapp, 17 How. 161; Stanton v. Springfield, 12 Allen, 560; Shea v. Lowell, 8 lb. 136; Street V. Holyoke, 105 Mass. 82; Gilbert v. Eoxbury, 100 lb. 185 ; McLaughlin v. Corry, 77 Pa. St. 109; Smyth v. Ban- gor, 72 Me. 249; Green v. Danby, 12 Vt. 338; Keane v. Waterford, 29 N. E. R'. 130; 130 N. Y. 188; see gener- ally, Johnson v. Glens Falls, (N. Y. 92) 63 Hun, 618; Winne v. Albany, (N. Y. 91) 61 Hun, 620; Bell v. City of York, 31 Neb. 842; Woolsey v. Trustees, 61 Hun, 136; O'Connor v. New York, 16 Daly, 88; Lincoln v. Smith, (Neb. 91) 45 N. W. R. 41. 4 Mauch Chunk v. Kline, 100 Pa. St. 119; Grossenback v. Milwaukee, 65 lb. 31. 691 § 344 a. MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS. [CH. xvn. six weeks,^ or a street to remain covered with ice and snow for nine days,^ or for two weeks,^ it will be liable for injuries oc- casioned thereby. A city is not bound, in the removal of snow and ice,* to do for the driveway of its streets what it must do for its sidewalks ; and if it is impossible to clear the whole street, it is bound to clear a passageway at the customary cross- ings.^ When a municipality exercises due diligence in the re- moval of the accumulated ice or snow, it is of course not liable.^ And when, in consequence of a sudden thaw, followed by ex- treme cold, a sidewalk becomes covered with ice, the munici- pality may, without being negligent, await a thaw to remove the ice ; but should in the meantime require householders or its own agents to sprinkle ashes or sand thereon.^ A city, is, also, not liable for injuries, which result from ex- traordinary snow falls, before it has had a reasonable time to clear its streets.^ § 344 a. Negligence in lighting streets. — In the absence of statute, a city is not liable for not lighting its streets.^ If, however, the duty is imposed by statute, failure to light the streets will render the city liable for injuries caused thereby.^" So, the fact, that a street was not lighted, may be material as 1 Green v. Danby, 13 Vt. 338, '^ Fortin v. East Hampton, 145 Mass. 196. ' Pomfrey v. Saratoga Springs, 104 N. T. 459; see Burr v. Plymouth, 48 Conn. 460, where the fact, that a highway .was jinpassable three mouths, was held not to constitute negligence. * Cloughessy v, Waterbury, 51 Conn. 405, 5 Savage v. Bangor, 40 Me. 176, * Battersby v. New Tork, 7 Daly, 16; Hayes v, Cambridge, 136 Mass. 402; Cunniugham v, St. Louis, 96 Mo. 53; Blakeley v. Troy, 18 Hun, 167. ' Taylor v. Yonkers, 105 K. Y. 203. S Clark V. District, 3 Mackey, 79; Hayes v. Cambridge, 136 Mass. 402. " Several authorities treat the class of cases in question as involving want of repair and defects. But in the ab- 692 sence of statutes, which provide for them as such, it is not a natural con- struction, and the cases are more consistent which deal with those things as acts of negligence at com- mon law. A great deal, however, must depend on local usage in de- termining duties concerning high- ways in winter. Where it is custom- ary to treat the removal of snow and ice, as a part of highway manage- ment, the failure to look after it may properly be regarded as wrongful and neglectful." McKellar v. De- troit, 57 Mich. 158; Nebraska City v. Kathbone, 20 Neb. 288. 9 Gaskins v. Allen, 73 Ga. 746; Ran- dall V. R. R. Co., 106 Mass. 276; Macomber v. Taunton, 100 lb. 255; Freeport v. Isbell, 83 111. 440; Lyon V, Cambridge, 136 Mass. 409. i» Davenport v. Hannibal, (Mo. 92) 18 S. W. R. 1122; Hayes v. West Bay CH. XVII.] LIABILITY FOE TORTS. §345 sliowing care or lack of care, during the time that the sti-eet was obstructed or was in process of repair.^ § 345. Falling substances in highways Municipal cor- porations are often held liable upon the ground of negligence for personal injuries, caused by the falling into the streets and squares of dangerous substances, such as ice and snow from the roofs of abutting houses, awnings, cornices and the like ; or trees and poles, which have become weakened or decayed by time and exposure to the weather.^ The fact, that a dangerous awning or other obstruction is unauthorized,* or that the city has failed to pass an ordinance for the removal and abatement of such nuisances,* will not absolve the municipality from lia- bility.^ The duty of a city towards the public, in the use of its streets, is undefined and unlimited. And its conti-ol over streets and highways is usually so extensive, that it is not un- just to hold the municipality to a strict performance of its duty in this respect, especially when we consider that the public must to a great extent use the streets upon faith in, and in re- liance upon, the care which the municipality is presumed to ex- ercise over them.* But the authorities are by no means in harmony. It has thus been held that, although a city may be impliedly liable for de- fects in its highways, it will not be liable in the absence of statute for injuries caused by objects, such as unsafe walls fall- ing into the streets from abutting propertj'.'^ So, also, a city has been exempted from liability, where the injury was caused by the fall of a mass of snow from a roof into the street ; ^ of a sign suspended over a sidewalk ; ^ of an iron weight attached City, (Mich. 92) 51 N. W. R.1067; But- ler V. Bangor, 67 Me. 385 ; Noble v. Richmond, 31 Gratt. 271 ; Barnes v. District, 91 U. S. 540. 1 Indianapolis v. Scott, 72 Ind. 196; Miller v. St. Paul, 38 Minn. 134; IiBwis V. Atlanta, 77 Ga. 756. 2 Grove v. Fort Wayne, 45 Ind. 429; House V. Montgomery Co., 60 lb. 580; Hutson v. New York, 9 IST, Y. 163; Davenport v. Rochester, 45 lb. 129; Morristown v. Mayor, 67 Pa. St. 355; Drake v. Lowell, 13 Mete. 292; Day V. Milford, 5 Allen, 98; Merrill V. Portland, 4 Cliff. 438; Bieling v. Brooklyn, 24 N. E. R. 389; 120 N. Y. 98; Vioksburg v. McLean, (Miss. 90) 6 So. R. 774; Gray v. Emporia, 23 Pac. R. 944; 43 Kan. 704. 3 Hume V. Mayor, 74 N. Y. 639. 4 Bohen v. Waseca, 32 Minn. 176. 6 Larsen v. Grand Forks, 3 Dak. 307. ^ Grove v. Foi-t Wayne, 45 Ind. 429. " Anderson v. East, 117 Ind. 126, 129. 8 Hixon V. Lowell, 13 Gray, 59. 9 Jones V. Boston, 104 Mass. 75; contra, West v. Luin, 110 lb. 514. 693 §346 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. xvn. to a flag, which was suspended across the street ; ^ and of an unsafe wall, situated on private property.^ Upon the other hand, municipal corporations have been held impliedly liable for injury caused by the fall of a signboard which had been erected on private abutting land ; ^ by the fall of a deca3'ed limb from a tree, where the duty was imposed by charter of keeping the park, where the tree was situated, in good repair ; * by the falling of the walls of a house which was left standing after its partial destruction by fire ;^ for injury caused by the falling into the street of part of an old roof which was leaning against a tree ; *> of a rotten pole standing in the street ; ^ of a derrick ; ^ of a tree in a street ; ® and of a banner which was allowed to remain suspended across a street.^" § 346. Right to go outside the traveled path — Estoppel to deny existence of highway — ^Liability for sidewalks. — Al- though the public is entitled to the use of all of the road or street,^^ it is generally the duty of the municipality to keep in repair only that portion which is customarily used by travelers, provided that part is wide enough, and reasonably safe for those who use due care.-'^ The duty of the municipality, in regard tp the repair and maintenance of streets in thickly settled portions 1 Hewison v. New Haven, 34 Conn. 136. 2 Howe V. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 481 ; but in Parker v. Macon, 39 Ga. 725; and Savannah v. Waldner, 49 lb. 324, an entirely opposite conclu- sion was reached. " Langam v. Atchison, 3-5 Kan. 318. * Jones V. New Haven, 34 Conn. 1; Salisbury v. Herclienroder, 106 Mass. 4.58; Chase v. Lowell, (Mass. 89) 24 N. E. E. 212. 5 Grogan v. Broadway F. Co., 87 Mo. 321. " DufEy V. Dubuque, 63 Iowa, 171. ' Gilmartin v. Mayor, 55 Barb. 239 ; Norristown v. Mayor, 67 Pa. St. 355. " Hardy v. Keene, 52 N. H. 57?. ^ Chase v. Lowell (supra) : Vosper V. New York, 49 N. Y. Superior, 296; Gilchrist v. Garden, 26 Up. Can. C. P. 1. ^^ Champlin v. Penn Yan, 34 Hun, 694 33; French v. Brunswick, 21 Me. 29. 11 Queen v. U. K. Tel. Co., 3 F. & F. 74; Tutill v. West Ham L. Bd., L. E. 8 C. P. 447; Queen v. Fitzgerald, 39 Up. Can. Q. B. 297. 1^ Sykes v. Pawlet, 43 Vt. 446 ; Kling V. City, 27 Mo. App. 231; Kellogg v. Northampton, 4 Gray, 65 ; Hayden v. Attleborough, 7 lb. 338; Fritz v. Kansas City, 84 Mo. 632; Perkins v. Inhabitants, 68 Me. 152 ; Shepardson V. Colerain, 13 Met. 55; Smith v. Wendell, 7 Cush. 498; Packard v. Packard, 16 Pick. 191; Tinsdale v. Norton, 8 Mete. 388; Fitzgerald v. Berlin, 64 Wis. 203; Ireland v. Os- wego Co., 13 N. Y. 526; Kelly v. Co- lumbus, 41 Ohio St. 263; Stone v. Attleborough, 140 Mass. 328; Morse V. Belfast, 77 Me. 44; Keith v. Eas- ton, 2 Allen. 552; Baltimore v. Bran- mara, 14 Md. 227; Buck v. Biddeford, 84 Me. 433. CH. XVII.J LIABILITY FOE TORTS. §346 of the city, is more onerous than in the case of outlying or suburban roads.^ A town need not keep the whole surface of a suburban road in repair,^ or free from snow,^ for ordinarily only a part of it is used for travel hj the public. And whether in any case the city has performed its duty, so as to be exempt from the charge of negligence, is a question for the jury.* The duty to repair and the liability for nonrepair extends to the side- walks,^ and crosswalks or crossings.^ Even though the side- walk has been constructed by a private person, without the authority, and not under the direction, of the city, the munici- pality will be liable for defects therein, if it has assumed juris- diction by permitting it to be used as a part of the thoroughfare.'' And this assumption of jurisdiction may be inferred from the silence of the corporation.^ Inequalities in the surface of the sidewalks, causing injury to foot passengers, will render the city liable.^ The abutting owner is not bound to keep his VWhitfield v. Meridian, 6 So. R. 244; Monongahela V. Fischer, 111 Pa. St. 9; Wellington v. Gregson, 31 Kan. 90; O'Connor v. Otenabee, 35 Up. Can. Q. B. 73; Colbeck v. Brantford, 21 lb. 276; Queen v. Epsom Union, 8 L. T. N. O. 883. 2 Keyes v. Marcellus, 50 Mich. 539. ' Seeley v. Litchaeld, 49 Conn. 134. « Bassett v. St. Joseph, 53 Mo. 290; Wellington V. Gregson, 31 Kan. 99; Fiilliam v. Muscatine, 70 Iowa, 436. 6Eoe V. City, 100 Mo. 190; 13 S. W. E. 404; O'Keill v. West Branch, (Mich. 90) 45 N. W. E. 1023; Sher- man V. Williams, 14 S. W. E. 130; 77 Tex. 310; Banguss v. Atlanta, 12 S.W. E. 750; 74 Tex. 629; Lincoln v. Smith, (N^eb. 90) 45 N. W. E. 41; Val- paraiso V. Donovan, 44 N. W. E. 449; Knowlton V, Pittsfleld, 62 X. H. 535 ; Carters ville v. Cook, 22 N. E. E. 14; 129 111. 152; Moon v. Ionia, (Mich. 90) 46 N. W. E. 25; Michigan v. Ball- ance, (Ind. 90) 24 IST. E. E. 117; Year- ance v. S. L. City, (Utah 90) 24 Pao. E. 254; Bly v. Whitehall, 24 N. E. E. 943; 120 N. Y. 506; Furnell v. St. Paul, 20 Minn. 117; Studley v. Osh- kosh, 45 Wis. 380; Atlanta v. Perdue, 53 Ga. 607; Chicago v. McCarthy, 75 111. 602; Eockford v. Hilderbrand, 61 111. 155; Chicago v. Langlass, 66 lb. 371; Kirby v. Boylston Ass'n, 14 Gray, 249 ; Manchester v. Hartford, 30 Conn. 118; Hubbard v. Concord, 35 N. H. 54; Market v. St. Louis, 56 Mo. 189; Burns v. Toronto, 42 Up. Can. Q. B. 560; Hutten v. Windsor, 34 lb. 487 ; Eay v. Petrolia, 24 Id. 73 ; Barnes v. Newton, 46 Iowa, 567; Higert v. Greeucastle, 43 Ind. 574; O'Neil V. New Orleans, 35 La. An. 202. " Coombs V. Purrington, 42 Me. 332 ; Whitney v. Milwaukee, 57 Wis. 639; Eaymond v. Lowell, 6 Cush. 524; Stilling V. Thorp, 54 Wis. 538; Bar- ker V. Savage, 45 N. Y. 19; Pequinot V. Detroit, 16 Fed. E. 211; Grossen- bach V. Milwaukee, 65 Wis. 31 ; Hill v. Fond du Lac, 56 lb. 242. ' Plattsmouth v. Mitchell, 20 Neb. 228; Eussell v. Canastota, 98 N. Y. 496; Saulsbury v. Ithaca, 94 lb. 27. 8 Urquhart v. Ogdensburg, 98 N. Y. 238. 3 Loan V. Boston, 156 Mass. 4.50; Eaymond v. Lowell, 6 Cush. 524; 695 346 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XVII. sidewalk in repair, unless lie is required to do so by statute ; and he is, therefore,not liable in damages for defects not caused by his own fault,i to one who is injured thereby ; nor is he lia- ble to the city for the failure to make repairs, which he was under no obligation to make, in a case where the municipality has been compelled to answer in damages for a defect or ob- struction of the sidewalk.'* When a highway is out of repair, the public have a tempo- rary right to go on the adjoining land ; * keeping as near the road as possible. And, although sidewalks and crossings are intended for the use of foot passengers, if they be obstructed or in a dangerous condition, the public may, with ordinarj-- care, walk elsewhere.* In Vermont, it has been held that, if a defect be in such close proximity to the road as to render it dangerous, the town will be liable.^ If the public are induced by any acts of the corporation to use any part of the liighwaj-, not actually dedicated,^ or where any portion of a street is graded, with the result of inviting and inducing travel thereon ; "' or where land is held out or opened as a public thoroughfare, even though not improved or graded,* the city will be estopped to claim that it is not a street, and will be liable for its negligence in respect to its repair.^ Lacou V. Page, 48 111. 499; Hubbard V. Concord, 35 N. H. 52; Winn v. Lowell, 1 Allen, 177. 1 Moore v. Gadsden, 87 K Y. 84; 93 lb. 12; Knupfle V. Knick. Ice Co., 84 lb. 488; Weller v. McCorraick, 47 N. J. L. 397. 2 Kirby v. Boylston M. Ass'n, 14 Gray, 249; Keokuk v. Keokuk I. S. Dis., 53 Iowa, 352; Hartford v. Tal- cott, 48 Conn. 525 ; Flynn v. Canton, 40 Md. 312; Russell v. Canastota, 98 N. T. 496; Heeney v. Sprague, 11 R. I. 456; Jansen v. Atchison, 16 Kan. 358; Eustace v. Johns, 38 Cal. 3. ^ Taylor v. Douglas, 2 Douglas (Eng.) 744^748; Morey v. Fitzgerald, 56 Vt. 487; Carrick v. Johnston, 26 Up. Can. Q. B. 65 ; Ballard v. Harri- son, 4 M. & W. 392; Holmes v. Seeley, 19 Wend. 507; Williams v. Safford, 7 Barb. 309; Newkirk v. Sabler, 9 lb. 696 655 ; Pomf ret v. Sioroft, 1 Saunders, 323; Carey v. Rae, 58 Cal. 168. *See §352, Contributory negli- gence; O'Laughlin v. Dubuque, 42 Iowa, 589. '> Drew V. Sutton, 55 Vt. 58; Patter V. Castleton, 53 Vt. 435. «Saulsbury v. Ithaca, 94 IS. T. 27; Jewshurst v. Syracuse, 108 lb. 303; Barton v. Montpelier, 30 Vt. 650. 'Lindholm v. St. Paul, 19 Minn. 245; Triese v. St. Paul, 36 Minn. 526. 8 Murphy v. Indianapolis, 83 Ind. 76; Mansfield v. Moore, 21 111. App. 326. 9 Craig V. Sedalia, 63 Mo. 417; Au- rora V. Colshire, 55 Ind. 584; Coates V. Canaan, 51 Vt. 131 ; Ivory v. Deer- park, 116 N. T. 476; Sewall v. Co- hoes, 75 lb. 45; Harper v. Milwau- kee, 30 Wis. 365 ; Veale v. Boston, 135 Mass. 187; Stark v. Lancaster, CH. XVIl.J LIABILITY FOR TORTS. § 347 But this principle does not appl}- to a bridge and its ap- proaches, which belong to the State ; for here the city has no right to enter and repair, even though the bridge is used as a highway.^ § 347. Liability for work given out on contract— Liabil- ity for torts of the contractor. —The obligation to discharge the duties incumbent upon municipal corporations in the proper care of their streets, cannot by contract or ordinance be shifted, evaded or imposed by the corporation upon others.^ Thus the granting of a permit, to deposit building material in the street, will not exempt the city from liability for damages caused thereby.^ On the other hand, no person is responsible in dam- ages to a person injured by the negligence of another, unless the relation of principal and agent, or of master and servant, ex- isted at the time between the wrongdoer and the person, whom it is desired to make responsible. And in the presfent connec- tion, as elsewhere, the distinction between the ordinary agent and the independent contractor, is fully recognized in the limi- tation of the city's liability. Thus, it is well settled that no umnicipal liability exists, if the work be lawful and not intrin- sically dangerous,* for the acts of independent contractors, where the city does not control the doer of the tortious act as it would the ordinary agent ; and has no choice in the selection of the instrumentalities and means by which the work is to be accomplished. If, however, the contracts calls for the execution of a work which is dangerous, no matter how skillfully it ma}'^ be per- 57 N. H. 88; Bishop v. Centralia, 49 Wis. 669; Estelle v. Lake Crystal, 2*7 Minn. 243; Phelps v. Mankato, 23 Minn. 276; Manderscheid v. Dubu- que, 25 Iowa, 108; Johnson v. Mil- waukee, 46 Wis. 568; Mathews v. Baraboo, 39 lb. 674; Kelly v. Fond du Lac, 31Ib. 179; James v. Portage City, 5 N. W. E. 31; Gallegher v. St. Paul, 28 Fed. Rep. 305 ; Cartwright V. Belmont, 58 Wis. 370; Davis v. Fulton, 52 lb. 657; Croninv. Delavan, 50 Wis. 375. ' Carpenter v. Cohoes, 81 N. T. 21 ; Brusso V. BufCalo, 90 lb. 679. 2 Watson V. Tripp, 11 R. 1. 98; Troy V. Tr. Lans. K. E. Co., 49 N. T. 657; Pearson v. Zable, 78 Ey. 170; Omaha V. Jensen, (Neb. 92), 52 N. W. E. 833. 8 Cleveland v. King, 132 U. S. 295. « Hale V. Johnson, 80 111. 185; Davy V. Levy, 39 La. 551; Eyan v. Curran, 04 Ind. 345 ; McGuire v. Grant, 25 N. J. L. 356; Dooley V. Sullivan, 112 Ind. 451; Leeds V. Eichraond, 102 lb. 372; Fink V. Missouri etc. Co., 82 Mo. 283; Kelly V. New York, 1 1 N. Y. 432 ; Pack V. New York, 8 lb. 222; Erie v. Caul- kins, 85 Pa. St. 247; Callahan v. Bur- lington, 23 Iowa, 562; Brown v. Wer- ner, 40 Md. 15. 697 §347 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [cH. xvn. formed, the city, which authorizes it, will be liable to persons who are actually injured in its performance by the contractor.'^ Thus, the weight of the decisions tends to substantiate the rule, that where a dangerous excavation is made and left in an un- safe condition by a contractor, without the employment of the proper and necessary safeguards, upon a street or highway, the municipal corporation will be liable to a person injured, even when it had no control over the contractor's employees ; and when it had expressly stipulated in the contract^ that the eon- tractor should hold himself liable for accidents caused by his neglect.^ And this is the law, even where the municipality is compelled by statute to let the contract out to the lowest bid- der.* And, so, also, where a city charter contained a provision that, when an injury resulted from a defect in the street, for which under ordinary circumstances the city would be liable, it would not be primarily liable where the defect was caused by the fault of some third person, it is ineffectual to protect the 1 Hayes v. West Bay City, (Mich. 92) 51 N. W. E. 1067; Omaha v. Jen- sen, 52 N. W. E. 833 ; St. Paul v. Seitz, 3 Minn. 397; Storrs v. Utica, 17 N. T. 104; Biusso v. Buffalo, 90 lb. 679; Kunzv. Troy, 104 lb. 344; Lock wood V. New York, 2 Hilton, 66; LeClaire V. Springfield, 49 111. 476; Waldner v. Savannah, 49 Ga. 316; Welsh v. St. Louis, 72 Mo. 71; Wright v. Hol- brook, 52 N. H. 120; Wilson v. Wlieel- ing, 19 W. Va. 324; Logansport v. Beck, 70 Ind. 65; Tiffin v. McCor- mack, 34 Ohio St. 638; Fay v. David- son, 13 Minn. 523; Dooley v. Sulli- van, 112 Ind. 451 ; Houston v. Izaaks, 68 Tex. 116; Murpliy v. Lowell, 124 Mass. 564; Stone v. Cheshire etc. Corp., 19 N. H. 427; Harrisburg v. Sayler, 87 Pa. St. 216; Butler v. Hunter, 7 H. & N. 826; Eeedie v. London etc. Co., 4 Exch. 244; Whit- ney v. Clifford, 46 Wis. 138; Allen v. Willard, 57 Pa. St. 374; Carman v. Steub etc. Co., 4 Ohio St. 939; St. Paul W. Co. v. Ware, 16 Wall. 566; J.oliet V. Harwood, 86 111. 110; Blake 698 V. St. Louis, 40 Mo. 569; Circleville V. Neuding, 41 Ohio St. 465. 2 Blake v. Ferris, 5 N. Y.48; Kelly V. Mayor, 11 lb. 432. 8 Ironton v. Kelly, 38 Ohio St. 50; Nashville v. Brown, 9 Heisk. 1; Tur- ner V. Newbergh, 109 N. Y. 301; Sar vaunali v. Waldner, 49 Ga. 316; King V. Cleveland, 28 Fed. Kep. 835; Knox- ville V. Bell, 12 Lea, 157; Seattle v. Buzby, 2 Wash. Ter. 25 ; Jacksonville V. Drew, 19 Fla. 106; Butler v. Ban- gor, 67 Me. 385; Eyler v. County Com'rs, 49 Md. 257; Baltimore v. Pen- nington, 15 Md. 12; St. Paul v. Seitz, 3 Minn. 297 ; Campbell v. Stillwater, 32 Minn. 308; Vogel v. New York, 92 N. Y. 10; Broadwell v. City, 75 Mo. 213; Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich. 165; Chicago V. Eobbins, 2 Black. 418; contra, Painter v. Pittsburgh, 46 Pa. St. 221; Westchester v. Appee, 35 lb. 284. « Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich. 165 ; but compare O'Hale v. Sacramento, 48 Cal. 212; Pratt v. Lick, 33 lb. 691; Boswell V. Laird, 8 lb. 469. CH. XVII.] LIABILITY FOE TORTS. §347 city, when the person creating the obstacle or defect is a con- tractor doin^ work for the municipality.^ But a municipality, which does not direct, or is not author- ized to direct, the manner in which a contract is to be performed, is not liable for the contractor's negligence, if the agreement called for an act to be done, which is lawful in itself, which does constitute a nuisance, and which is not essentially dangerous.^ If a city contract for a work of local improvement ; and, in accordance with the law and the conditions of the contract, the work is done under the immediate supervision, direction or con- trol of municipal officials, whose duty it is to supervise the work, and damages result, not from the negligence of the contractors, but from the performance of the work according to contract, the city will be liable for such damages. Under such circum- stances, the party doing woik for the city is its agent, and not an independent contractor.* The same rule governs when, in the prosecution of the work which is being done by a contractor for a round sum but wholly under municipal control, injury is caused by the negligence of the contractor's workmen.* But a right to cancel the contract, and an obligation on the part of the contractor to discharge any of his workmen, who are dis- obedient to the municipal supervising officer, or the fact that the work must be done to the satisfaction of a certain specified municipal official,^ is not enough to create the relation of princi- 1 Hinoks v. Milwaukee, 46 Wis. 569; Durkee v. Janesville, 28 lb. 464; Noonan v. Stillwater, 33 Minn. 198. 2 Palmer v. Lincoln, 5 Neb. 136; Gray v. PuUen, 32 L. J. Hep. Q. 169; Clark V. Fry, 8 Ohio St. 358; Hilliard V. Richardson, 3 Gray, 349; Gondier V. Cormack, 2 E. D. Smith, 204; Blake V. Ferris, 5 N. T. 48; Edmundston V. Pittsburgh, etc., Co., Ill Pa. St. 316; Painter v. Pittsburgh, 46 lb. 213 ; Erie V. Calkjns, 85 lb. 287; Nashville V. Brown, 9 Heisk. 1 ; Cincinnati v. Stone, 5 Ohio St. 38; Susquehanna De Bor. v. Simmons, 79 Ind. 491; Scammon V. Chicago, 25111. 424; Har- rington V. Lansingburgh, 110 N. Y. 145; Barry V. St. Louis, 17 Mo. 121; Cuff V. Newark, 35 N. J. L. 17; King V. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. E. E. Co., 66 N. Y. 181 ; Harper v. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 365; McCafferty v. Spuyten Duyvil etc. Co., 61 N. Y. 178; Cincin- nati V. Stone, 5 Ohio St. 38. 2 Hilliard v. Eiohardson, 3 Gray, 349; Eeilly v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St. 467 ; Chicago v. Eobbins, 2 Black, 418, 428; Sewall v. St. Paul, 20 Minn. 511. 4 Lowell V. Boston,' 23 Pick. 24; Dressell v. Kingston, 32 Hun, 533; Linnehan v. Eollins, 137 Mass. 123. 6 Erie V. Caulkins, 85 Pa. St. 247; Pack V. Mayor, 8 N. Y. 222; Sammel- son V. Cleveland etc. Co., 49 Mich, 164. 699 §348 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XVII. pal and agent between the city and the contractor.^ Nor does the fact, that a person is paid by the day, negative the inde- pendent character of his employment.^ So, generally, when the result of the work is the object considered by the employer, ]-ather than the means by which the employed is to accomplish it, it is an independent employment.^ Although the city cannot evade responsibility by an agree- ment with the contractor that he will be responsible for injuries to third persons ; yet, if an express stipulation exists to this effect, the city may recover from him the amount it has been compelled to pay, in a case where the accident was occasioned, wholly or in part, by his default or negligence.* § 348. Liability for torts of abutters — Liability of abut- ters for the same. — No one has a right to do anything, which leaves the streets in a dangerous condition, or less secure than they are kept by the municipality. Whoever does so in any man- ner, is guilty of creating a nuisance, which makes him a wrong- doer, and renders him liable to any one suffering special injury thereby, independent of negligence on the part of the person creating the nuisance.^ This liability for the creation of the nuisance on the highway is not affected by the liability of the city to the party injured, or of the abutting owner. It is gen- erally the duty of both the city and the owner to keep a side- walk in repair, and both will be liable jointly or severally to 1 Blumb V. City of Kansas, 84 Mo. 112. 2 Forsythe v. Hooper, 11 Allen, 419 ; Corbin v. America Mills, 27 Conn. 274. 3 Harrison v. Collins, 86 Pa. St. 153; East St. Louis v. Klug, 3 111. App. 90; Wood V. Mitchell, 44 Iowa, 27 ; Pack V. New Tork, 3 N. Y. 222; East St. Louis V. Giblin, 3 111. App. 219; Mer- cer V. Jackson, 54 111. 397. * Herringtou v. Lansingburgh, 110 N. Y. 545 ; Buffalo v. Hallaway, 7 lb. 493; Storrs v. Utica, 17 lb. 104; Brooklyn v. B. City R. E. Co., 47 lb. 475; Myers v. Snyder, Bright. (Pa.) 489; Beatty v. Gilmore, 16 Pa. St. 463. . 6 Bush V. Johnston, 23 Pa. St. 109; Beatty v. Gilmore, 16 lb. 463; 700 Sexton V. Zett, 44N. Y. 430; Garland V. Towne, 55 N. H. 55; Durant v. Pal- mer, 29 N. J. L. 544; Congreve v. Smith, 18 N. Y. 79; Congreve v. Morgan, 18 N. Y. 84; Jochem v. Rob- inson, 66 Wis. 638 ; Ottumwa V. Parks, 43 Iowa, 119; Jessenv. Sweigert, 66 Cal. 182 ; Rowell v. Williams, 29 Iowa, 210; Ryan v. Reynolds, 53 111. 212; Parker v. Macon, 39 Ga. 725 ; Howe v. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 481 ; Severin V. Eddy, 52 111. 189; Ball v. Arm- strong, 10 Ind. 181 ; Wood v. Mears, 12 lb. 515; Harlow v. Humiston, 6 Cow. 189: Hardcastle v. So. York. Ry. Co., 4 H. & N. 67; Temp. Hall Assn. V. Giles, 33 N. J. L. 260;Dygert V. Schenck, 23 Wenrt. 446; Cornwall V. Com'rs, 10 Ex. 771; Gridley v. CH. XVII.] LIABILITY FOR TORTS. § 348 one injured by lack of repair.^ And the same is true of the city and a railroad company, in respect to keeping the roadway in repair.2 ^u^ when a nuisance, in or near the streets, has been created by the owner, the tenant or lessee, who maintains and continues it, partakes of the original liability of his land- lord or lessor.3 Abutting owners are, however, not liable at common law for injuries sustained by travelers, unless the de- fect or obstruction in the highway causing the injury was placed there by the abutter.* And this is particularly clear, when the city is expressly or impliedly under the legal duty of repairing.^ As the municipality is responsible for the repair of streets, and has a property in them, as representative and trustee for the people, it has been held that it ma}-, when compelled to repair a street which is rendered unsafe by some act of a wrongdoer, recover the amount it was under the necessity of expending ill making the street safe, in an action against the person caus- ing the damage.^ If an abutter has notice of an action pending against the mu- nicipality, and founded on his wrongful interference with the street; and he neglects to defend it, he will be concluded, in an action against himself, as to ftie existence of the defect, the lii»bility of the corporation therefor, and the amount of the dam- ages.^ But he is not estopped from showing, that he was not Bloomington, 68 111. 47; Hadley v. Taylor, L.E. 1 C. P. 53; Ccalder v. Sraalley,66 Iowa, 219 ; Barnes v. Ward, C. B. 392. ' Bowen v. Huntington, 14 S. E. R. 217; 35 W. Va. 682; Peoria v. Simp- son, 110 111. 294. ■^Philadelphia v. Weller, 4 Brews- ter, 24. " Jennings v. Van Schaick, 108 N. Y. 530; Irvine v. Wood, 51 jST. Y. 224; Clieetliam v. Hampson, 4 D. & E. T. R. 318; Eakin v. Brown, 1 E. D. Smith, 44; Durantv. Palmer, 5 Dutch. 544; Chicago v. O'Brennan, 65 111. 160; Stephani v. Brown, 40 111. 428; Sliip- man v. Fifty Asso., 106 Mass. 194; Milford V. Holbrook, 9 Allen, 17; Lowell V. Spalding, 4 Cush. 277; * Moore v. Gadsden, 87 N. Y. 84; Weuzlick v. McCotter, 87 lb. 122; Eustace v. Johns, 38 Cal. 3 ; Elkhart \-. Wickwire, 87 Ind. 77; Morton v. Smith, 48 Wis. 265 ; Robbins v. Johns, 15 C. B. N. S. 221, 243; Weller v. McCormick, 47 N. J. L. 397; Janseu V. Atchison, 16 Kan. 358; comp. St. Louis V. Life Ins. Co , (Mo. 90) 17 S. W. R. 637; Ryan v. Wilson, 87 JST. Y. 471. SFlynn v. Canton, 40 Md. 312; Heeney v. Sprague, 11 R. I. 456. "Elliott Roads and Streets, 547; Centerville v. Woods, 57 Ind. 192; Bishop Non-contract Law, § 1005. ' Portland v. Richardson, 54 Me. 46; Brookville v. Arthurs, 18 Atl. R. 1076; Seneca Falls v. Zalinski, 8 Hun, 571; Lowell v. Boston & L. Co., 23 Pick. 24; Rochester v. Mont- 701 348 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. xvn. bound to keep the street in repair, or that the accident was not occasioned by any fault of his.^ The omission to give such notice does not however affect the city's right of action ; its object being merely to save unnec- essary litigation .2 Unless required by statute, written notice to an abutter is not necessary ; ^ and notice may be implied from the party's actual knowledge of the pendency of the ac- tion.* It has been held that the abutter is not liable for inju- ries occasioned by an accidental fall, which was caused by ice or snow upon the sidewalk, even though the city had enacted an ordinance, requiring him to remove it ; * and such an ordi- nance, as an attempt to evade municipal responsibility, was held to be unconstitutional.® The general rule, however, in re- spect to the liability of the abutting landowner, is that, in a case where a verdict is recovered against the municipality for injuiy caused by a defect, due solely to his act or fault, the city can recover over in an action against him.'' A charter provision, exempting a city from liability for defects in streets, whicli have been caused by third persons, until all legal remedies shall have been exhausted against the primary gomery, 72 K. T. 65; Westfield T. Mayo, 122 Mass. 100; Morgan v. Mul- doon, 82 Ind. 347 ; Troy v. Troy R. K. Co., 49 X. Y. 657; Bever v. Nortli, 107 lud. 544; Veazie v. Penob. R. R. Co., 49 Me. 119; Boston v. Worthington, 10 Gray, 496; Milford v. Holbrook, 9 Allen, 17. ' Chicago V. Robbins, 2 Black, 418 ; Littleton v. Ricliai-dson, 34 N. H. 179, 187; Brooklyn v. B. R. Co., 47 N. T. 475. 2 Port Jervis v. First Nat. Bk., 96 N. T. 550; Aberdeen v. Blackmar, 6 Hill, 324; Binssee v. Wood, 37 N. Y. 530. 8 Robbins v. Chicago, 4 Wall. 657; Barney v. Dewey, 12 Johns. 225; Beers v. Piuney, 12 Wend. 309. ■* Port Jerris v. First Nat. Bank, 96 N. Y. 550; Morgan v. Muldoon, 82 Ind. 347. 5 Moore v. Gadsden, 93 N. Y. 12; Hartford v. Talcott, 48 Conn. 525; 702 Kirby v. Boyl. M., 14 Gray, 249 ; Flynn V. Canton Co., 40 Md. 312. ^ Gridley v. Blooraington, 88 111. 554. ' Wickwire v. Angola, (Ind. 90) 30 N. E. B. 917; Chicago v. Robbins, 4 Wall. 657; Severin v. Eddy, 52 111. 189; Boylston v. Mason, 102 Mass. 541; Westfield v. Mayo, 122 lb. 100; Milford V. Holbrook, 9 Allen, 17; Rochester v. Montgomery, 72 N. Y. 65; Brooklyn v. B. City R. K. Co., 47 N. Y. 475; Littleton v. Richard- son, 34 N. H. 179; Norwich v. Breed, 30 Conn. 535 ; Brookville v. Arthurs, 18 Atl. R. 1076; Rockford v. Hilde- brand, 61 111. 155; District v. Ealt. & P. R. R. R. Co., 1 Mackey, 314; Portland v. Richardson, 54 Me. 46; Taylor v. Lake Shore etc. Co., 45 Mich. 74; MacNaughton v. Elkhart, 85 Ind. 384; Elkhart v. Wickwire, 87 lb. 77; Catterlin v. Frankfort, 79 lb. 547. CH. xvn.J LIABILITY FOE TOETS. §348 wrongdoers, is to be strictly construeiii and does not of course apply, when the city is in fanlt.2 There is no municipal liabil- ity for the proper maintenance of a private way, although it is used by the public.^ An abutter will be held liable for an accident caused by an unguarded excavation, as a coal hole, where it was made with- out authority, even though it was at first protected so as not to be a source of danger to the public, irrespective of any charge of negligence on his part; and regardless of the fact, that the covering thereto, provided by him, had been removed or broken by the act of others.* But if, on the other hand, the owner had permission to make such an excavation, he is only liable for the absence of ordinary care and diligence in constructing and guarding it.^ Not only will an abutting owner be liable for damages resulting from an unauthorized excavation, which con- stitutes a nuisance when created in the highway ; but he will also be liable to traveler for accidents occurring from excava- tions, such as areas ® or cellar openings,'' which are made by him near the highwaj'^, and left in a dangerously unguarded condition.** 1 Raymond v. Sheboygan, 70 Wis. 318; Hines v. Fond du Lac, 71 lb. 74. 2 Papworth v. Milwaukee, 64 Wis. 389. ' Goodwin v. Des Moines, 55 Iowa, 617; distinguishing Bumham v. Ros- ton, 10 Allen, 290; see also Coving- ton V. Bryant, 7 Bush, 248; Oliver v. AVorcester, J.02 Mass. 489; Young v. Harvey, 16 Ind. 314. 'Smith V. Eyan, 8 ST. Y. S. 853; Hughes V. Orange Co. Assn., 56 Hun, 396; contra, Kirkpatiick v. Knapp, 28 Mo. App. 427; Portland v. Eich- ardson, 54 Me. 46; Congreve v. Mor- gan, 18 N. Y. 84; Gwinnell v. Earner, 10 L. R. C. P. 658; Nelson v. God- frey, 12 111. 22. * Dickson v. Hollister, 123 Pa. St. 421; Norwich v. Breed, 30 Conn. 535 ; Clifford V. Dam, 81 N. Y. 52; How- land V. Vincent, 10 Met. 371; Wolf V. Kilpatrick, 101 N. Y. 146; Hard- castle V. So. Yorks. etc. Co., 4 H. & X. 67; Larrabee 7.Peabody, 128 Mass. 561; Hormsel v. Smyth, 7 C. B. 729; Beacli V. Frankenberger, 4 W. Va. 712; Victory v. Baker, 67 N. Y. 366; Fisher v. Prowse, 110 Eng. Com. L. 770 ; Beck v. Carter, 68 N. Y. 283 ; Par- ker V. Macon, 39 Ga. 725 ; Bunch v. Edenton, 90 N. C. 431; Haughey v. Hart, 62 Iowa, 96; Halpin v. Kansas City, 76 Mo. 335 ; Scrantou v. Hills, 102 Pa. St. 378; Hawes v. Fox Lake, 33 Wis. 438; Kelly v. Columbus, 41 Ohio, 263; Drew v. Sutton, 55 Vt. 586. 6 Hotel Ass'n v. Walter, 23 Neb. 280. ' McGill v. District, 4 Mackey, 70; Landou v. Lund, 38 N. W. Eep. 699. ^Mallory v. Hibernia etc. Co., 21 Pac. E. 525 ; Beck v. Carter, 68 N. Y. 283; Crogan v. Schieles, 53 Conn. 186; Jones V. Nichols, 46 Ark. 207; Strat- ton V. Staples, 59 Me. 94 ; comp. Graves V. Thomas, 95 Ind. 364; Haughey v. Hart, 62 Iowa, 96; Norwich v. Breed, 30 Conn. 535 ; Homan v. Stanley, 66 Pa. St. 464; Sanders v. Eeiske, IDak. 151. 703 § 34:8 MT7S1CIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XVH. Of course, an owner who makes an excavation on his own land, is not liable for injuries received b}' any trespassers who fall in it, or to travelers using the street, if the excavation be distant from the highway ; or, being near the road, if the abutter em- ploy due care in erecting barriers around it ;^ and whether the excavation is near enough to render travel unsafe, is a question for the jury.^ If an owner of land, contiguous to the street, erects a build- ing, or stacks lumber,^ or allows a ruinous wall to stand on his land,* near the street line, ordinary and reasonable care must be exercised by him to prevent it from falling and injuring travelers.® And he is liable for any such negligence, even if the work is done by an independent contractor.^ So, an owner of abutting land must use ordinary care in the process of con- structing a building, in order to protect passers-by from injury from falling objects.'^ If, having constructed a building care- fully, it is thrown down and into the highway by some accident beyond his control, and which he could not reasonably antici- pate, he will not be liable.^ It is customary to permit owners of land, abutting on a street to place building material on the street or sidewalk ; but a rea- tonable diligence should be observed by them in the completion of the work of erection or repair ; ^ and they must use ordinary care to warn and protect the traveling public. ^^ So, too, while the adjoining landowner may use the street temporarily for loading and unloading his goods, he, and not the city, will be primarily responsible for injury resulting from any unreasoua- ^ Jennings v. Van Schaick, 20 Abb. N. C. 324; Beck v. Carter, 68 N. Y. 283; Binks V. Yorkshire etc. Co., 3 B. & S. 244; Gramlisli v. Wurst, 86 Pa. St. 74; Campbell v. Lunsford, 83 Ala. 512; 3 S. E. 522; Hardcastle v. So. Yorkshire Ry. Co., 6 H. & N. 12. 2 Murphy v. Brooklyn, 118 N. Y. 575; Drew v. Lutton, 55 Vt. 586; "Warner v. Holyoke, 112 Mass. 362; Taylor v. Mt. Vernon, 58 Hun, 384. 8 Weller v. McCormick, 19 Atl. R. 1101 ; Pastine v. Adams, 49 Cal. 87. *Kappes V. Appel, 14 Bradw. 179; Church V. Burkhardt, 3 Hill, 193; 704 Grogan v. Broadway etc. Co., 87 Mo. 321. ^Mullen V. St. John, 57 N. Y.569; Murphy v. McShane, 52 Md. 217 ; Low- ell V. Spalding, 4 Gush. 277. sNoeling v. Allee, 10 N. Y. S. 97; Wilkinson v. Detroit etc. Co., 41 N. W. R. 490. ' Jager v. Adams, 123 Mass. 2i. 8 Couts V. Neer, 70 Tex. 468. s Stuart V. Havens, 17 Neb. 211. i» Lewis V. Atlanta, 77 Ga. 756; Mc- Donald V. Troy, 59 Hun, 618; Nolan V. King, 97 N. Y. 565; Vanderpool v. Husson, 28 Barb. 196; Jackson v. Schmidt, 14 La. An. 818. OH. XVII.] LIABILITY FOE TOUTS. §349 ble interference with the highway, as constituting a nuisance, aside from any question of negligence.^ § 349. Liability for neglect in performance of ministerial duties. — It is a general rule that officials who are charged with the performance of ministerial and corporate duties, and are act- ing within the scope of their authority, will make the corporation which they represent liable to one, to whom the performance of the duty is owing, and who receives special injury by a non- performance, or by a negligent performance. Tliis liability, so far as municipal corporations are concerned, has been sometimes based upon the implication that, by their acceptance of tlie powers and duties imposed upon them by their charter, they promise to exercise their powers and perform their corporate duties in a proper manner.^ Nor is it necessary, when the performance of a ministerial and absolute duty is concerned, that the mu- nicipality should have expressly imposed upon it, by statute, a liability to answer in damages to one, who may suffer by its breach of duty. If the duty clearly appears, expressly or by necessary implication, to be imposed upon the corporation for its own private or corporate advantage ; and if the power, from which the duty arises, is not discretionary as to its exercise, the pecuniar}^ liability for a breach of the duty will be implied and enforced.^ iKing V, Oshkosh, 44 N. "W. K. 745; 75 Wis. 517; Dubach v. Hanni- bal, Sq. Mo. 483 ; Queen v. Davis, 24 N. C. C. P. 575; Denby v. Wilier, 59 Wis. 240; People v. Cunningham, 1 Denio, 524; Callanan v. Oilman, 107 N. Y. 360. " Davenport v. Kuokman, 37 K. T. 568; Nelson V. Canisteo, 100 lb. 89; Eequav. Rochester, 45 lb. 129; Ehr- gott V. Mayor of N. Y., 96 lb. 264; Kunz V. Troy, 104 lb. 344; Barton v. Syracuse, 36 lb. 54; Hutson v. Mayor, 9 lb. 163; Maximilian v. Mayor, etc., 62 lb. 160; Robinson v. Chamberlain, 34 lb. 389; Cain v. Syracuse, 95 lb. 83; Conrad V. Ithaca, 16 lb. 158; Far- quar V. Eoseburg, (Oreg.) 21 Pac. Rep. 1103; Winn v. Rutland, 52 Vt. 481; Eiclimond v. Long, 17 Gratt. 375; Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118 ; 45 Denver v. Dunsmore, 7 Colo. 328. ' Hevpison v. New Haven, 37 Conn. 475 ; Jones v. Nevf Haven, 34 lb. 1 ; Kiley v. Kansas City, 87 Mo. 103; Hal- pin V. Kansas City, 76 Mo. 335 ; Welsh V. St. Louis, 73 lb. 71 ; Russell v. Co- lumbia, 74 lb. 490; Bassett v. St. Jo- seph, 53 lb. 290; Gilluly v. Madison, 63 Wis. 518; Montgomery v. Gilmer, 33 Ala. 130; Hamilton v. Columbus, 52 Ga. 435; Little Rock v. Willis, 27 Ark. 572; Hitchins v. Frostburgh, 68 Md. 100; Albrittin v. Huntsville, 60 Ala. 486; McDonough v. Virginia City, 6 Nev. 90; Centerville v. Woods, 57 Ind. 192; Omaha v. Olmstead, 5 Neb. 446; Anne Arundel Co. v. Duck- ett, 20 Md. 469; Bell v. West Point, 51 Miss. 262; Dewey v. Detroit, 15 Mich. 311; Vicksburgv. Hennessy,54 Miss. 392; Bohen v. Waseca, 32 Minn. 705 §349 MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS. [CH. XVII. While the principle is settled beyond cavil that a municipality- is liable for negligent nonfeasance or misfeasance of its officials, while performing ministerial duties, it is not so well settled, whether in any particular case duties are ministerial or judicial, corporate or public. It has been said, that tlie nature of the duty is to be determined from the statute creating it,^ and, on the whole, the question resolves itself into one of statutory con- struction, depending in each particular instance upon the lan- guage employed. It is not necessary that the duty should be declared by the statute to be mandatory or ministerial ; for the courts may infer its character, not only from the language used, but from the evil designed to be remedied, and from the pur- poses intended to be accomplished.^ Ministerial duties are such as are absolute, certain and imperative.^ The act itself, which 117 ; Simmer v. St. Paul, 2.3 Minn. 408 ; Tallahassee v. Fortune, 3 Fla. 19; Niblett V. Nashville, 12 Heisk. 684; Wilson V. Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 324; Mayor of Memphis v. Lasser, 9 Humph. 757; O'Neil v. New Orleans, 30 La. An. 220; Gilman v. Laconia, 55 N. H. 130; Mayor of Rome v. Dodd, 58 Ga. 239; Mayor etc. Milledgeville V. Cooley, 55 Ga. 17; Burns v. Elba, 32 Wis. 605 ; Ward v. Jefterson, 24 lb. 342; Jausen v. Atchison, 16 Kan. 358; Pittsburgh v. Crier, 22 Pa. 54; Fritsch v. Allegheny, 91 lb. St. 226; Meares v. Wilmington, 9 Ired. L. (N. C.) 73 ; Western College v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 377; Noble v. Richmond, 31 Grat. 271 ; McCombs v. Akron, 15 Ohio, 476; Rhodes v. Cleveland, 10 lb. 159; Gordon V. Richmond, 83 Va. 436; Soper v. Henry Co., 26 Iowa, 264; White v. Bond Co., 58 HI. 298; Wallace v. Muscatine, 4 Greene (Iowa), 264; Sterling v. Thomas, 60 111. 265 ; Waltham v. Kemper, 55 lb. 346; Bloomington v. Bay, 42 lb. 503; Champaign v. Patterson, 50 lb. 62; Clayburgh v. Chicago, 25 lb. 535 ; La- con V. Page, 48 lb. 499; Lan. Can. Co. v. Parnably, 11 A. & E. 223; Har- per V. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 365 ; Mer- sey Docks v. Penhallow, 1 H. L. Gas. 706 N. S. 93; Delger v. St. Paul, 14 Fed. Rep. 567; Mayor v. Sheffield, 4 Wall. 189 ; Mayor of Lynn v. Turner, Cow- per, 86; Barnes v. District, 91 U. S. 541 ; Mersey Docks v. Gill, 11 H. L. Cas. 686; Rock Co. v. United States, 4 Wall. 435; Henley v. Lyme Regis., 3 B. & Ad. 77; Evanston v. Gunn, 99 U. S. 660; Scott v. Mayor, 37 Eng. L. & Eq. 495; Boulder v. Niles, 9 Colo. 415 ; Nelson v. Canisteo, 100 N. T. 89; Weet v. Brockport, 16 lb. 161; Denver v. Rhodes, 9 Colo. 554; Bai- ley v. Mayor, 3 Hill, 538; Kavanagh V. Brooklyn, 38 Barb. 232; Saulsburg V. Ithaca, 94 N. Y. 27; McCarthy v. Syracuse, 46 N. Y. 194; Cole v. Me- dina, 27 Barb. 218; Peck v. Batavia, 32 lb. 634; Clark v. Lockport, 49 lb. 580; Wendell V. Mayor of Troy, 39 lb. 329; Storrs V. Utica, 17 lb. 104; Ring V. Colioes, 77 lb. 83 ; Noonan v. Al- bany, 79 lb. 470; and cases cited in last note. 1 State V. Haworth, 23 N.,E. R. 946. 2 Perry V. Barnett, 65 Ind. 522, 525; Newman v. Sylvestre, 42 lb. 106; Austin V. Carter, 1 Mass. 231; State V. Halifax, 4 Dev. 345. s Lewenthal v. New York, 5 Lans. 532; Mills v. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489. OH. XVII.J LIABILITY FOR TORTS. §350 is to be performed, will frequently determine the character of the duty. But the fact, that the municipal or official action requires skill and judgment, or involves an exercise of discre- tion, will not always make it judicial.^ Authority or power implies a duty to be performed by its possessor ; and unless the power is expressly discretionary, the grant of power creates a peremptory public duty.^ And it is not absolutely necessary that words of command should be used by the lawmaker ; for, where power is conferred and the occa- sion for its exercise is not expressly left to the discretion of the municipal corporation, the interest, which the public or third persons have in its performance, is generally sufficient to cause the statute to be regarded as mandatory .^ All acts, which are done in the performance of a duty prescribed by ordinance, are usually ministerial.* § 350. Defects and obstructions created hj municipal corporations. — When a street has been made dangerous by the direct command or permission^ of the city, as in the case of local improvements, carried on by the city officials, the city will be liable for injuries thereby sustained by travelers, who exer- cise proper care in the use of the highway.® Thus, it is no de- fence that the defect arose when necessary repairs were being made to the highwaj- ; for proper precautions to protect travel- ers, should then be employed.'^ This is true, even in those 1 Wilson V. Marsh, 34 Vt. 352; Mc- Cord V. Hugh, 24 Iowa, 336. ^ People V. Supervisors, 11 Abb. Pr. E. 114. ' Southwell V. Detroit, 42 N. W. 118; Madison v. Smith, 83 Ind. 502; Corbett v. Bradley, 7 Nev. lOfi; Peo- ple T. Supervisors, 51 N. Y. 442; Koch V. Bridges, 45 Miss. 247; Super- visors V. United States, 4 Wall. 485 ; Mason v. Fearson, 9 How. 248. »Amy V. Des Moines, 11 Wall. 136; Danbury & N. E. E. Co. v. Norwalk, 37 Conn. 109. ^Haniford v. City, 103 Mo. 172; Savannah v. Donnelly, 71 Ga. 258. « City v. Cunningham, 47 N. W. E. 930; McAlister v. Albany, 18 Greg. 426; Horey v. Haverstraw, 47 Hun, 356; Chicago etc. Co. v. Quincy, 27 K. E. E. 232; Blessingtou v. Boston, 26 N. E. R. 1113; Covington v. Bry- ant, 7 Bush, 248; Glantz v. So. Bend, 106 Ind. 305; Detroit v. Carey, 9 Mich. 165 ; Lloyd v. New York, 5 N. Y. 369; Weet v. Brockport, 16 N. Y. 161 ; Brooks v. Somerville, 106 Mass. 271; Chicago v. Mayor, 18 111. 349; Pfanv. Eeynolds, 53 111.212; Dayton V. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80; Baltimore v. Pennington, 15 Md. 12; Grant v. Brooklyn, 41 Barb. 381 ; Cincinnati v. Stone, 5 Ohio St. 38; New York v. Sheffield, 4 Wall. 189; Conrad v. Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 158; Wendell v. Troy, 39 Barb. 329. ' Crowther v. Yonkers, 15 N. Y. S. 588; Pettigrew v. Evansville, 25 707 § 350 MUNICIPAIi COKPOEATIONS. [CH. xvir. States where there exists no implied liability on the part of cities for non-repair, or for defects and obstructions created by- others .^ The rule of law, that the city will not be responsible in an action for damages, where by statute it is vested with the dis- cretionary power to arrange a plan for the prosecution of the projected work, and in doing which it acts under the advice of skilled and experienced persons, has been carried verj' far, par- ticularly in those States, where in the absence of statute there is no implied liability for negligence in the care of streets.^ But it should not be construed to exempt the city from liabil- ity, when the plan devised, if put in operation, leaves the city's streets in a dangerous condition for public use. The principle seems to be, that for a mere error of judgment, the municipali- ty will not be liable ; but for such a lack of care and skill, as will amount to negligence, it will be liable when there is an im- plied or statutory liability for defects or obstructions in the streets, which are caused by others. In both these classes of cases, the liability is not imposed upon the corporation, because it is a corporation ; or because of the very comprehensive powers it possesses over the subject- matter. The basis of the claim which the injured individual has against a city for damages, which were occasioned by a defect or obstruction in a public street, is in every instance the negligence of the corporation, acting through its ofiicials.^ Such being the basis of the plaintiff's claim, the necessity and importance of notice, or proof of circumstances which will be sufBcient to dispense with actual notice,* in all cases where the defect is not due to some direct act or course of action by the municipality, is apparent. Wis. 223; Milwaukee v. Davis, 6 lb. 377; Smith v. Milwaukee, 18 lb. 63; Storrs V. Utica, 17 N. Y. 104. ' Blessington v. Boston, 26 N. E. R. 1113; Hill V. Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 364. 2 Detroit v. Blakeby, 21 Mich. 184; Lansing v. Toolau, 37 Mich. 152. ' Foreman v. Canterbury, L. R. 6 Q. B. 214; Taylor v. Greenhalgh, L. R. n,Q. B. 487; Pendlebury v. Same, 1 708 Q. B. D. 36; Palmer v. St. Albans, 56 Vt. 522; when the municipal au- thorities in repairiag streets are com- pelled to obstruct tliem, it is their duty to give travelers due warning of the obstruction. Carlisle v. Bris- bane, 113 Pa. St. 544. *Spiceland v. AUier, 98 Ind. 467; Turner v. Indianapolis, 96 Ind. 51; York V. Spellraan, 19 Xeb. 357; Rus- sell V. Columbia, 74 Mo. 480. CK. xvri.] LIABILITY rOK TORTS. § 350 a. § 350 a. Necessity for, and evidence admissible to show notice, in order to cliarge corporation witli negligence. A municipal corporation cannot be charged with negligence, unless sufficient time has elapsed, after the authorities had had notice of the defect, for them to repair it ; or after they ought by reasonable diligence to have acquired knowledge of the de- fect.i When the defect in the street is occasioned by a third party, notice of its existence is absolutely essential, in order to render the city liable.^ This notice may be either express or implied. Actual or express notice may be given, by serving a writing upon the proper officer,* or by knowledge of the defect coming to him through some other channel, and it may be proven by an entry in the books of the city,* by the repoi't of the street commis- 1 Squires v. Cliillecothe, 89 Mo. 226; Whitney v. Lowell, 24 N. E. E. 47; Cairncross v. Pewaukee, (Mo. 91) 47 N. W. E. 13 ; Manning v. Woodstock, 22 Atl. E. 47; 59 Conn. 224; MoNally V. Cohoes, (N. Y. 91)29 N. E. E. 1043; Stoddard v. Winchester, (Mass. 91) 27 N. E. E. 1014; Burns v. Bradford, 187 Pa. St. 861 ; Prindle v. Fletcher, 39 Vt. 257; Goodsen v. Des Moines, 66 Iowa, 255; Carter v. Monticello, 68 lb. 178; Yale v. Hampden, 18 Pick. 357; Aurora v. Bitner, 100 Ind. 396; Johnson v. Milwaukee, 46 Wis. 568; Larmon v. District, 5 Mackey, 330; Kibele v. Philadelphia, 105 Pa. St, 41; Cusick v. Korwioh, 40 Conn. 370; Bellamy V. Atlanta, 75 Ga. 167; Town- send V. Des Moines, 42 Iowa, 657; Eice V. Des Moines, 40 lb. 638; Sheel V. Appleton, 49 Wis. 125 ; Mo- Siraons v. Lancaster, 63 lb. 596; Howe V. Plainfield, 41 N. H. 135; Madison v. Brown, 89 Ind. 48 ; Evans- ville V. Wilter, 86 lb. 414; Logans- port V. Justice, 74 lb. 378; Hume v. New York, 47 N. Y. 639; McCarthy V. Syracuse, 46 lb. 194; Turner v. Newburgh, 1091b. 301; Smith v. New York, 66 lb. 295; Chicago v. Murphy, 84111. 224; Chicago v. Stearns, 105 lb. 554; Jolietv. Seward, 99 lb. 267; Todd V. Troy, 61 N. Y. 506; Camp- bell V. Fairhaven, 54 Vt. 336; Eapho V. Moore, 68 Pa. St. 404; Bonine v. Eichmond, 75 Mo. 437; Centralia v. Krouse, 64 111. 19; Datton v. Albion, 50 Mich. 129; Dooly v. Sullivan, 112 Ind. 451; Salina v. Prosper, 27 Kan. 544; Ironton v. Kelley, 38 Ohio St. 50; Indianapolis v. Scott, 72 Ind. 196; New York V. Sheffield, 4 Wall. 189; Eequa v. Eochester, 45 N. Y. 129; Vandyke v. Cincinnati, 1 Disney, 532; Serrot v. Omaha, 1 Dil. C. C. E. 312; Bartlett v. Kittery, 68 Me. 357; Dorlon v. Brooklyn, 46 Barb. 604; Hart V. Brooklyn, 36 lb. 226; Donlson V. Clinton, 33 Iowa, 397; Cleveland V. St. Paul, 18 Minn. 279; Smith V. New York, 66 N. Y. 295 ; Ward v. Jefferson City, 24 Wis. 342; Hubbard V. Concord, 35 N. H. 52; Worcester V. Canal Props., 16 Pick. 541; Howe V. Lowell, 101 Mass. 99. 2 Hume V. New York, 47 N. Y. 639; Port Wayne v. DeWitt, 47 Ind. 396. 397; Huntington v. Breen, 77 lb. 29. s Monies v. Lynn, 119 Mass. 273 ; Foster v. Boston, 127 Mass. 290 ; Eog- ers V. Shirley, 74 Me. 144 ; Eisson v. Bettel, 30 Wis. 614. * Blake v. Lowell, 148 Mass. 290. 709 § 350 a. MUNICIPAL COBPOKATIONS. [cH. xvn. sioner,^ by a resolution directing repairs ; ^ or by the report of a committee.^ A city, it has been held, is not charged with notice of a de- fect, which is not apparent to ordinary observers.* Nor is no- tice to a citizen to be considered as sufficient notice to the corporation.* But the lack of such a notice is no defence, when the defect was caused, or the obstruction placed in the highway, b)'' ser- vants or employees of the municipal corporation ; ® or where the city has given permission to an individual to make an ex- cavation in the highway.^ Proper officers, to whom notice may come or be given, are policemen,® or ^ street commissioners or road ovei-seers ; ^^ and notice to one supervisor ^^ or councilman, is notice to all and to the town.12 But actual notice of an existing defect is not always neces- sary ^^ as municipal corporations, which have exclusive control of streets and public ways, and possess a power to provide for 'Bond V. Biddeford, TS Me. 538. 2 Erd V. St. Paul, 22 Minn. 443. 3 Delphi T. Lowery, 74 Ind. 520, 526, and cases there cited. * Cook V. Anamosa, 66 Iowa, 427. " The defect must be one, which the proper officers either had knowledge of, or, by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, might have had knowledge of it in time to remedy it, or preventthe injury." The court, inHanscom v. Boston, 141 Mass. 242; see, also, Joliet v. Walker, 7 111. Ap. 267; Soanlon v. New York, 12 Daly, 81 ; Lyman v. Hampshire, 140 Mass. 311; Rooney v. Randolph, 128 lb. 580; Harrimau V. Boston, 1141b. 241. ^ Squires v. Chilliootlie, supra ; Donaldson v. Boston, 16 Gray, 508 ; contra, Springer v. Bowdoinham, 7 Greenl. 442 ; Masen v. Ellsworth, 32 Me. 271. * Hines v. Fond du Lac, 71 Wis. 74. ' Stephens v. Macon, 83 Mo. 345 ; Cleveland v. King, 132 U. S. 295. * Denver v. Deane, 10 Cal. 375. 710 s Goldsworthy v. Linden, 43 N. W. R. 656 ; Buck v. Biddeford, 82 Me. 433; Chase v. Lowell, 24 N". E. R. 212; Rehberg v. New Tork, 91 N. Y. 137; Goodfellow v. New Tork, 100 lb. 15; Hume v. Mayor, 47 lb. 639; Reinhard v. New Tork, 2 Daly, 243; Weed V. Ballston Spa, 76 N. T. 329; Todd V. Troy, 61 lb. 329; Donaldson V. Boston, 16 Gray, 508. "ScTanton v. Patterson, 94 Pa. St. 202; Parish v. Eden, 62 Wis. 372; Rogers v. Shirley, 74 Me. 144. " Bailey v. Spring Lake, 5 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 651. 12 Logansport v. Justice, 74 Ind. 378; Carter v. Monticello, 68 Iowa, 378 ; Dundas v. Lansing, 42 N. W. R. 10, 11. "Smith V. St. Joseph, 42 Mo. App. 392; Murphy's Boro. v. Baker, 34111. App. 659; Lincoln v. Smith, 45 N. W. 41; District v. Woodbury, 136 U. S. 450; Pomfrey v.- Village of Sar- atoga Springs, 104 N. T. 459 ; Cook V. Anamosa, 66 Iowa, 427. CH. XVII.] LIABILITY FOR TORTS. § 350 a. their maintenance and repair by taxation, are required to exer- cise positive and active vigilance over them. Upon this prin- ciple, a municipality will not be exempt from liability for latent defects, if by ordinary care such defects could have been dis- covered and guarded against.? So, too, the corporation must use care and diligence to guard against the decay and weaken- ing of timber, caused by time and exposure.^ When a city is clearly at fault, or when a sufficient period of time has elapsed since the occurrence of the defect, in which the city officials might or should have observed it, if they had exercised ordinary care and attention, notice will be implied.^ It is sometimes said that notice will be presumed under such circumstances from the character and notoriety of the defect, its location and surroundings, and from its continuance for such a time, as to create the presumption that the municipality did in fact know of it.* And the length of time, which must elapse, viiiies with the circumstances of each case. Thus, where a de- 1 McGaffagan v. Boston, 149 Mass. 289; Weed v. Balston, 78 jST. T. 329; Gubaske v. New York, 12 Daly, 182; Cusick V. Norwich, 40 Conn. 375; Kunz V. Troy, 104 N. Y. 344; Market V. St. Louis, 5(3, Mo. 189; Boucher v. New Haven, 40 Conn. 456; Denver V. Dean, 10 Col. 375; Aurora v. Hill- man, 90 III. 61. 2 McDonald v. Ashland, 47 N. W. B. 4.S4; Indianapolis v. Scott, 72 Ind. 196; Furnellv.St. Paul, 20 Minn. 117; Sherwood v. District, 3 Mackey, 276. 'Masters v. Troy, 50 Hun, 485; Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, 11 H. L. Cas. 087, 701 ; Weisenberg v. Apple- ton, 26 Wis. 56; Springfield v. Le Claire, 49 111. 476; Shipley v. Bolivar, 42 Mo. App. 401; Barton v. Syra- cuse, 86 N. Y. 54, 58; Chicago v. Johnson, 53 111. 91 ; Troxall v. Vin- ton, 77 Iowa, 90; Furnell v. St. Paul, 20 Minn. 117; Moore v. Minneapolis, 19 lb. 800; Fort Wayne v. Coombs, 107 Ind. 75; Holmes v. Paris, 75 Me. 559; Eochefort v. Attleboro, 27 N. E. R. 1013; Gude v. Mankato, 30 Minn. 256; Medina v. Perkins, 48 Mich. 67; Albertine v. Huntsville, 60 Ala. 486; Houston v. Izaaks, 68 Tex. 116; Goodnough v. Oshkosh, 24 Wis. 549; comp. Submarine Tel. Co. v. Dick- son, 15 C. B. N. S. 759; Eapho Tp. v. Moore, 8 Am. Rep. 202 ; comp. Joliet V. Walker, 7 HI. App. 267; Gilman V. Haley, 7 lb. 849; Chatsworth v. Ward, 10 lb. 75; Chicago v. McCul- lough, 10 lb. 459 ; Powers v. Council Bluffs, 50 Iowa, 197; Eowell v. Wil- liams, 29 lb. 210; Van Pelt v. Daven- port, 42 lb. 308; Colbeck v. Beaut- ford, 21 Up. Can. Q. B. 276. 4Tice V. Bay, 84 Mich. 461; Fuller V. Jackson, 82 lb. 480; Albrittin v. Huntsville, 60 Ala. 486; Board v. Dombke, 94 Ind. 72; Enright v. At- lanta, 78 Ga. 288; Reed v. Northfield, 13 Pick. 94; Doveuy v. Elmira, 51 N. Y. 506; Todd v. Troy, 61 lb. 506; Squires v. Chillicothe, 89 Mo. 226; Daltonv. Com. Council, 50 Mich. 129; Chicago V. Dalle, 115 111. 386; Chi- cago V. Fowler, 00 lb. 322; Smally V. Appleton, 43 N. W. R. 826. 711 § 350 a. MTJNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. xvn. feet had existed three weeks,^ and in other cases several months, notice was presumed to have been received by the city.^ On the other hand, when an injury was sustained by a fall upon a sidewalk, which had been improperly constructed seven days prior thereto, actual notice of the defect was required.* It has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States, that evidence of the occurrence of similar accidents at the same place is admissible, as tending to show notice to the municipal corporation.* So, also, where an accident was caused by a loose board, evidence, that the city knew of the general lack of re- pair and decay of the walk, was admitted as tending to prove notice,^ even where it did not appear that the municipal au- thorities had special notice of this loose board. For, in seek- ing to recover for injury sustained from a defect at one point in a sidewalk, evidence is admissible of its defective condition elsewhere.^ But in modification of this statement of the law, it has been held that evidence, of a walk being out of repair in a "locality near" where the accident occurred, is not ad- missible.'^ The same rules of evidence have been applied to suits for damages suffered from defects in a bridge.** 1 Griffin v. Johnson, 10 S. E. R. "719; 84Ga.279; Studleyv. Oshkosh, 45 Wis. 380; Pomfrey v. Saratoga, 104 N. T. 459; Grand Eapids v. Wy- raan, 46 Mich. 516. 2 Philadelphia v. Smith, 23 W. N. C. 242; Wheaton v. Hadley, 23 IST. E. E. 422;. Chicago v. Crocker, 2 111. App. 279; Evansville v. Wilter, 86 Ind. 414; Board v. Brown, 89 lb. 48; Purple V. Greenfield, 138 Mass. 1; Smith V. Leavenworth, 15 Kan. 81. 8 Chicago V. McCarthy, 75 111. 602; Cf. Barr v. Kansas City, 16 S. W. K. 483. * Thompson v. Quincy, 83 Mich. 173; Abilene v. Hendricks, 36 Kan. 196; Augusta v. Hafers, 61 Ga. 48; Lombard v. East Towas, 48 K W. E. 947; Smith v. Sherwood, 62 Mich. 159; Nave v. Flack, 90 Ind. 203, 214; District v. Armes, 107 U. S. 519; Del- phi V. Lowery, 74 Ind. 520; Gilmer V. Atlanta, 77 Ga. 688; Quinlan v. 712 Utica, 71 N. T. 603; Osborne v. De- troit, 32 Fed. E. 36; Kent v. Lincoln, 32 Vt. 591 ; Darling v. Westmoreland, 52 N. H. 401; contra, Philips v. Willow, 70 Wis. 6; Moor v. Delafield, 69 lb. 273 ; Blair v. Pelham, 118 Mass. 420. ^Fox V. Lansingburgh, 59 Hun, 617; Aurora v. Hillman, 90 111. 61; Bloomiugton v. Chamberlain, 104 lb. 268; contra, Shelby v. Daggett, 22 N. B. E. 497. « Village V. Brooks, 31 HI. App. 62; Tice V. Bay City, 84 Mich. 461; Arm- strong V. Ackley, 71 Iowa, 76. ''Euggles V. Nevada, 63 Iowa, 185; Barr v. City, 16 S. W. E. 483 (Kan. 91) ; contra, Shaw v. Sun Prairie, 74 Wis. 105. 8 Hiues V. Fond duLac, 71 Wis. 74; Spearbacker v. Larrabee, 64 lb. 573; Aurora v. Hillman, 90 111. 61 ; Platts- mouth v. Mitchell, 20 Neb. 228; Cf. Dundas v. Lansing, 42 N.W.B. 1011. CH. XVII.] LIABILITY FOR TOUTS. § S50 I. In an action to recover for an injury, caused by falling into an open cesspool, the court admitted evidence showing, that the cover of the cesspool had been off several times before ; i and, generally, where repairs have been made in a structure under municipal control, this fact should be taken into account, in connection with the age and appearance of the structure.^ § 350 b. Notice of claim prior to suit.— In many municipal charters, and in the statutes of some of the States, provisions exist, which require the plaintiff to give notice to the city of the injury received by him, before he can begin an action to recover damages therefor. Such requirements are sometimes constitutional,^ and compliance with them must generallj"- be alleged and proved.* When it is required by statute that the notice be served upon a specified municipal official, it need not, it has been held, be handed to him directly by the person in- jured ; but it will be sufficient if it reach liim in time through the hands of some third person.^ In a case, where notice re- quired, the fact that the plaintiff was ill and under the influence iPost V. Boston, 141 Mass. 189. 2 Cooley V. Westbrook, 57 Me. 181 ; Grimes v. Keane, 52 N. H. 330; Me- dina V. Perkins, 48 Mich. 67; Klein v. Dallas, 8 S. W. Rep. 90, per curiam: " The question of notice must be left to the jury in all cases whether it be actual or constructive. What facts ■would be sufiBcient to put the cor- poration upon inquiry would depend upon a variety of circumstances, the length of time the defect had exist- ed, its notoriety, the frequency of travel over it, and the character of the defect itself. Such facts would be admissible in evidence to be con- sidered and weighed by the jury. The existence of a dangerous side- walk or street would not in any case of itself justify a legal presumption, that it was known to the city author- ities, except whei'e it is visible, and where the city had itself constructed the sidewalk and made the excavar tion or obstruction. The act of a wi'ongdoer, rendering usual travel dangerous, without knowledge, ac- tual or constructive, on the part of corporate officers, would not create a liability on the part of the city." Erd V. Paul, 22 Minn. 440; Hall v. Lowell, 10 Gush. 260; AUetson v. Chichester, L. E. C. P. 319; Mosey V. Troy, 61 Barb. 580; Stanton v. Springfield, 12 Allen, 566; Kellogg V. Janesville, 34 Minn. 132; Howe v. Lowell, 101 Mass. 99; Corcoran v. Peekskill, 108 N. T. 151; Bailey v. Spring Lake, 61 Wis. 227. 3 Reining v. Buffalo, 102 IT. Y. 308; Nichols V. Minneapolis, 2 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cas. 562. * Reining v. Buffalo, supra ; Dor- sey V. Racine, 60 Wis. 281 ; Benware V. Pine Valley, 53 Wis. 527; Minick V. Troy, 83 N". Y. 514, 516 ; Jones v. Minneapolis, 31 Minn. 230 ; Marshall Co. V. Jackson Co., 36 Ala. 613. 5 Wormwood v. Waltham, 144 Mass. 184 ; McCabe v. Cambridge, 134 lb. 484. 713 351 MTrfflCIPAI/ CORPORATIONS. [cH. xvn. of opiates, was held to be insufficient to excuse the omission to give the notice.^ If tlie charter prescribes the notice to be given, it should be complied with, although there may be general statu- tory provisions upon the subject.^ The notice should identify the locality where the accident occurred;* but a minute and specific description is never re- quired.* The notice should also state that damages are claimed for the injury ; ^ but a variance between the amount claimed in the complaint and that in the notice is not material.^ Any ma- terial variance, particularly as to the manner or time of the in- jury will invalidate the notice.^ Whether this notice, when it is regarded as a condition pre- cedent, can be waived by the defendant corporation, is not de- finitely settled, except in Massachusetts where it cannot be waived.^ § 351. Proximate cause. — The law looks to the proximate, and not to the remote, cause of an injury ; and from this fol- lows the rule, that unless the defendant's negligence was the proximate or direct cause of this plaintiff's injurj"-, no recovery can be had. So, unless the defect in the highway, whether it be ice or snow, a dangerous excavation or general lack of re- pair, is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, the munici- pal corporation will not be liable in damages.® The injury for which a municipal corporation will be liable must be the natural 1 May V. Boston, (Mass.) 23 TST. E. Eep. 220. 2 Hines v. Fond du Lao, 71 Wis. 74. 8 Rogers v. Shirly, 74 Me. 144. * Cloughessey v. Waterbury, 51 Conn. 405 ; Sargent v. Lynn, 138 Mass. 599 ; McCabe v. Cambridge, 134 lb. 484 ; Pendergast v. Clinton, 147 lb. 40i ; Liffin v. Beverly, 145 lb. 549 ; Wall v. Highland, 72 Wis. 435. 5 Kenaday v. Lawrence, 128 Mass. 318. 6 Reed v. New York, 97 N. Y. 620 ; Wyandotte v. White, 13 Kan. 191. ' Shaw V. Waterbury, 46 Conn. 263 ; MoBougall V. Boston, 134 Mass. 149; Spooner v. Freetown, 139 lb. 235. 8 Gay V. Cambridge, 128 Mass. 387 ; Maddox v. Randolph, 65 Ga. 216 ; 714 Dorsey v. Racine, 60 Wis. 292 ; Bab- cook V. Guilford, 47 Vt. 519. « Judd V. Claremont, (N. H. 92) 23 Atl. R. 427; White v. Conley, 52 Am. Rep. 154, 157; Forney v. Geldmacher, 42 lb. 388, 390; Crafter v. Metro. Ry. Co., L. E. 1. C. P. 300; Thomas v. Winchester, 57 Am. Dec. 455; Mc- Donald V. Snelling, 92 lb. 768; Hen- derson V. Barnes, 32 Up. Can. Q. B. 176; Weiok v. Lander, 75 111. 93; Ag- new V. Corunna, 55 Mich. 428; Bill- man v. Ind., etc., Co., 76 Ind. 166; BlufEton V. Mathews, 92 Ind. 213; Cornman v. Eastern Counties R. Co., 4 H. & N. 781; Deverill v. Grand Tr. Ry. Co., 25 Up. Can. Q. B. 517; Too- mey v. London, etc., Co., 3 C. B. N. S. 146; Cotton v. Wood, 8 lb. 568. CH. XVII.] LIABILITY FOR TORTS. § 351 and probable consequence of the lack of repair, defect or obsta- cle in the street or highway.^ It is also necessary, in order to sustain a separate action against the city, that the negligence of its agents should be the sole cause of the injury .^ But care should be observed in dis- tinguishing between the efficient cause of the injury, which is the city's negligence, and the conditions which contributed to the injury. Thus, where plaintiff's injury was caused partly by a fall on the ice with which the road was covered, and partly by a defect in the road itself, the city was liable for its negli- gence in not repairing the defect, which was the cause of the injury, even though the ice as a condition contributed to it.^ So, too, where there was a defective gutter, which in conjunc- tion with a heavy rainfall caused damage to the foundation of a building on adjacent land, the city was held liable.* Where there is a combination of causes, all of which are g'wasi-proximate in character ; but one of them is a defect or obstacle caused by the city's negligence, while the others are occurrences for which neither party is responsible, the municipality is liable, provided the injury would not have been sustained, had not the obstacle or defect existed.^ The concurrent negligence of a thiid person will not relieve a wrongdoer.® Thus, where a person, whose clothes were entangled in a defective sidewalk, was run over bj' a railroad train ; '' or where a child, falling into a ditch, which was negligently left unguarded, was hurt by broken glass at the bottom ; * or where a traveler was injured by a horse, which had been frightened at a defect in the road and had run away ;S or 1 Elirgott V. New York, 96 N. Y. 264; Hoag v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. E. Co., 85 Pa. St. 293; Ring v. Cohoes, 77 N. Y. 83. 2Flagg V. Hudson, 142 Mass. 280; Aldrich v. Gorham, 77 Me. 287. * Wharton on Negligence, §86; At- chison V. King, 9 Kan. 550. ' Hanney v. Kansas City, 94 Mo. 334. ^MoXamara V. Clintonville, 62 Wis. 207; Ehrgott v. New York, 96 N. Y. 264 ; Palmer v. Ando ver, 56 Mass. 600 : Hunt V. Pownal, 9 Vt. 411; Perkins V. Fayette, 08 Me. 152; Shearman & Red. on Neg. § 346; Moulton v. San- ford, 51 Me. 127; Castor v. Uxbridge, 39 Up. Can. Q. B. 113; Toms v. Wliit- by, 37 lb. 100; Sherwood v. Hamilton, 37 lb. 410; Merrill v. Portland, 4 Cliff. C. C. 138; Hampsou v. Taylor, 15 R. I. 83. « Franklin v. Winona, etc., Co., 37 Minn. 409. T Chicago V. Schmidt, 107 111. 186. ' Galveston v. Posnainsky, 02 Tex. 118. 9 Baldwin v. Turnpike, 40 Conn. 238; Fulsome V. Concord, 46 Vt. 135; Centerville v. Woods, 57 Ind. 192, 197; Merrill v. Claremont, 58 N. H. 468. 715 §352 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS. [CH. XVII. where plaintiff was injured, while he was trying to free his horse from a defect in the road ; ^ in all of these cases, the negligence of the municipality was held to be the proximate cause without which the injury would not have been sustained, and the city was held liable for the damages. § 352. Contributory negligence. — On the other hand, there can be no recovery, where an injury was caused or proximately contributed to by the negligence or unskillfulness of the plain- tiff in driving,^ or by defects in his wagon, harness, etc.; ^ or by any other want of due care, which under the circumstances amounts to contributory negligence.* To deliberately venture to walk or drive upon a part of the street, which plaintiff knows is dangerous, would under ordinary circumstances be contributory negligence on his part.^ It would, however, de- pend upon the circumstances of each case, whether the negli- gence of the plaintiff constituted, along with the negligence of the defendant municipality, the jointly co-operating cause of the injury complained of, so that it would be treated as con- tributory negligence, and preclude a recovery against the de- 'Page V. Bucksport, 64 Me. 51; Atlanta v. Wilson, 59 Ga. 544; Lund V. Ty.ngsborough, 11 Cush. 563; Brooksville v. Pumplirey, 59 Ind. "78'. 2 Bryant v. Randolph, 6 N. Y. S. 438; Clark v. Richmond, 5 S. E. R. 369; Marriott v. Stanley, 1 M. & G. 568; Cobb v. Standish, 14 Me. 477; Flower v. Adams, 2 Taunt. 314; Stuart V. Maohiasport, 48 Me. 477; Peoria Br. Assoc, v. Loomis, 20 111. 402; Cassidy V. Stockbridge, 21 Vt. 391 ; Murphy v. Dean, 101 Mass. 455 ; Beatty v. Gilmore, 10 Pa. St. 463; District V. MoElligott, 117 U. S. 621 ; Centralia v. Krouse, 64 111. 19; Craig V. Sedelia, 63 Mo. 417; Damon v. Scituate, 119 Mass. 66; Evans v. Utica, 69 N". Y. 166; Gilman v. Deer- field, 15 Gray, 577; Pettingillv. Yon- kers, 116 lb. 558. s Winship v. Enfield, 42 N. H. 197; Clark V. Barrington, 41 lb. 44; Tucker V. Heinecker, lb. 317; Palmer v. Audover, 2 Cush. 600; Jenks v. Wil- 716 braham, 11 Gray, 142; Moore v. Al- bert, 32 Me. 46; Noyes v. Morris- town, 1 Vt. 357; Allen v. Hancock, 16 Vt. 230. *Hutchius V. Priestly, 61 Mich. 252; Kelly v. Doody, 22 K. B. R. 1084; 116 N. Y. 575; Schonhohf v. Jackson, 97 Mo. 151; 10 S. W. R. 618; Smith V. Smith, 2 Pick. 621; Park- hill V. Brighton, 61 Iowa, 103; Man- gan V. Atterbury, 1 Ex. 239; Bridge V. Grand June. E'y Co., 3 M. & W. 244; Wltherley v. Regents Canal Co., 12 C.^B. N. S. 2 ; Tuff v. Warman, 2 lb. 573; Waite v. N. E. R'y Co., E. B. & E. 719; Bradley v. Brown, 32 Up. Can. Q. B. 463; Baker v. Portland, 58 Me. 199. i" Evans v. Adams, 122 Ind. 362; Erie v. Jlaoill, 101 Pa. St. 616; Mc- Kee V. Bidwell, 74 Pa. St. 218; Coatea V. Canaan, 51 Vt. 131; and cases cited in §344. Ice and snow; Dunkin v. Troy, 61 Barb. 437; Baker v. Fehr, 97 Pa. St. 70. CH. XVII.] LIABILITY FOE TOKTS. §352 fendant.^ So, also, a reasonable choice between known dangers is not negligence ; and the fact, that plaintiff, knowing the de- fect, voluntarily attempted to pass over it is not conclusive of liis negligence ; but it is a question for the jury to settle in the light of the facts in the case.^ The traveler's familiarity with the condition of the road is only a circumstance to be considered as bearing upon the question of his contributory negligence.^ 1 Johnson v. Wilcox, (Pa. 90) 19 Atl. R. 939; GafEney v. Brown, 150 Mass. 479; Ellis v. Peru, 23 111. App. 35; Lynch v. New York, 47 Hun, 524; McCracken v. Markesan, 45 N. W. E. 323; Ely v. Whitehall, 24 N. E. E. 943; 120 K. T. 506; McGlnty V. Keokuk, 66 Iowa, 725 ; Gribble v. Sioux City, 38 Iowa, 390; President v. Dusouchett, 2 Ind. 587; McKenzle V. Jforthfield, 30 Minn. 456; Farnum V. Concord, 2 N. H. 392; Carlett v. Leavenworth, 27 Kan. 673; Maultby V. Leavenwoi-th, 28 lb. 745 ; Eeed v. Northfleld, 13 Pick. 94; G-osport v. Evans, 112 Ind. 133; Bruker v. Cov- ington, 69 lb. 33; Wheeler v. West- port, 30 Wis. 392; Hunger v. Mar- shalltown, 56 Iowa, 216; Bullock v. Kew York, 99 N. Y. 654; Dubois v. Kingston, 102 N. Y. 219; Mahoney v. Metro. Ey. Co., 104 Mass. 73; Cres- cent v. Anderson, 114 Pa. St. 643; Al- toonav. Latz, 1141b. 238; Humphrey V. Armstrong Co., 56 Pa. St. 204; Strong V. Steven's Point, 62 Wis. 255 ; McKeigue v. Janes ville, 68 lb. 50; Estelle V. Lake Crystal, 27 Minn. 243; Loewer v. Sedalia, 77 Mo. 431; Lowell V. Watertown, 58 Mich. 568. 2 Sandwich v. Dolan, (Mass. 90) 24 N. E. E. 526; Byerly v. Anamosa, (Iowa, 90) 44 N. W. 359; Allegheny County V. Broadwaters, 69 Md. 533; Fort Wayne v. Breeze, 23 N. E. R. 1038; Chicago v. McLean, 24 N. E. 527; Boland v. City, 32 Mo. App. 8; Weed V. Ballston, 76 jS". Y. 329; At- Water v. Veteran, 6 K. Y. S. 607; Lyman v. Amherst, 107 Mass. 339; Kenworthy v. Ironton, 41 Wis. 647; Divney v. Elmira, 51 N. Y. 506 ; Bul- lock V. New York, 99 lb. 654; Shook V. Cohoes, 108 lb. 648; Whitaker v. West Boylston, 97 Mass. 273 ; Gilbert V. Boston, 139 lb. 313; Pollard v. Woburn, 104 lb. 84; Eindge v. Col- rain, 11 Gray, 157; Frost v. Waltham, 12 Allen, 85; Harris v. Clinton, 64 Mich. 447; Maltby v. Leavenworth, 28 Kan. 745; Maw v. Township, 8 Ont. App. 248; Montgomery v. Wright, 72 Ala. 411 ; Jeffrey v. Keo- kuk, 56 Iowa, 546; Bronson v. South- bury, 37 Conn. 199 ; Aurora v. Dale, 90 111. 46. « Ellis V. Peru, 23 111. Ap. 35 ; Fort Wayne v. Breeze, 23 N. E. 1038; Lan- gan V. Atchison, 35 Kan. 318; By- erly V. Anamosa, (Cal.) 44 N. W. E. 459; Foster v. Swope, 41 Mo. App. 137; Hayes v. Hyde Park, (Mass. 91) 27 N". E. 522; Cornish v. Toronto St. R'y Co., 23 Up. Can. C. P. 355; Blackwell v. Same, 38 Up. Can. Q. B. 172; Clayardsv. Dethick, 12Q. B. 439; Gee v. Metro. R'y Co., L. R. 8 Q. B. 177; Snow v. Housatonic R. E. Co., 8 Allen, 441; Adams v. Lanca- shire & Y. R'y Co., L. R. 4 C. P. 739; Frost V. Waltham, 12 Allen, 85; Belief ontaine R'y Co. v. Hunter, 33 Ind. 335 ; Clark v. Lockport, 49 Bai-b. 580; Bi-idges v. No. London R'y Co., L. R. 6 Q. B. 377; Whittakerv. W. Boylston, 97 Mass. 273; Nicholls v. Gt. Western R'y Co., 27 Up. Can. Q. B. 382; Fox v. Sackett, 10 Allen, 535; Rastrick v. Gt. Western Ry. Co., 27 Up. Can. Q. B. 396; Hutton v. 717 §352 MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS. [CH. xvn. His knowledge of a defect or obstruction is not decisive proof of contributory negligence ; it is, however, an important element, and one from which contributory negligence is frequently and not unreasonably inferred.^ But a corporation has no right, by keeping its streets in a notoriously unsafe condition, to debar the public from using them, upon the penalty of being guilty of contributory negligence if they do and are injured thereby .^ A person may walk or drive carefully, relying upon the be- lief, that the corporation has done its duty ; and even a near sighted person, or one vi^hose sight is dimmed by age,^ may act on the assumption, that the streets are reasonably safe.* All, however, while using the highways, are bound to exercise the prudence and care, which is reasonable and proper under the varying circumstances and conditions of such use, for which no general rule can be given.^ " Each case," it has been said,^ " depends upon its own circumstances and each is a law unto itself." ^ Those using highways are not bound to anticipate danger, where there is nothing to indicate it.** Nor are they expected Windsor, 34 lb. 487; Winckler v. Gt. Western Ey. Co., 18 Up. Can. C. P. 250, 262; Fox v. Glastenbury, 29 Conn. 204; James v. San Francisco, 6 Cal. 528; Folsom v. Underbill, 36 Vt. 580 ; Horton v. Ipswich, 12 Cush. 488; Jacobs v. Bangor, 16 Me. 187; Wilson V. Charlestown, 8 Allen, 177; Hanlon v. Keokuk, 7 Iowa, 477; Brown v. Jefferson, 16 lb. 339. iHesser v. Grafton, 11 S. E. E. 211; 33 W. Va. 548; Skjeggerud v. Minn. etc. Co., 38 Minn. 56; FuUiam V. Muscatine, 30 N. W. E. 861 ; Evans- ville etc. Co. v. Crist, 116 Ind. 453; Gulf etc. Co. V. Gascamp, 69 Tex. 545; Gosport v. Evans, 112 Ind. 133; Penna. Co. v. Varnan, 15 Atl. E. 624; Eicbmond v. Mulholland, 116 Ind. 173. 2 Bloomsburg, S. & E. L. Co. v. Gardner, 17 Atl. E. 521; 126 Pa. St. 80; Langan v. Atchison, 35 Kan. 318; Maultby V. Leavenworth, 28 Kan. 745 ; Frost v. Waltham, 12 Allen, 85 ; Eioe V. Des Moines, 40 Iowa, 638; . 718 Elndge v. Colrain, 11 Gray, 157; Wheeler v. Westport, 30 Wis. 392; Whitaker v. W. Boylston, 97 Mass. 273; Humphreys v. County, 56 Pa. St. 204; Pollard V. Woburn, 104 Mass. 84. ■■> Nefe v. Wellesley, 148 Mass. 487; 20 N. E. Ill; Frost v. Waltham, 12 Allen, 85 ; Coates v. Canaan, 51 Vt. 131; Requa v. Rochester, 45 N. Y. 129; Harris V. Uebelhofer, 75 lb. 169. * Gordon v. Richmond, 18 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cases, 251. 6 Parvls V. Philada. etc. Co., (Del. 89) 17 Atl. 702; Massey v. Columbus 75 Ga. 658; Minick v. Troy, 83 N. Y. 514; Farrar v. Greene, 32 Me. 574; Morrell v. Peck, 88 lb. 398. 6 Dillon Mun. Corp. § 1007. ' Chamberlain v. Wheatland, 7 N. Y. S. 190; Weedv. Ballston, 76N. Y. 329; Davenport v. Euckman, 37 lb. 568, 573. 8 Com'rs of Howard v. Legg, 110 Ind. 479; Turner v. Newburgh, 109 ^^ Y. 301. CH. xvn.] LIABILITY FOE TORTS. §352 to haA'e perfect vision,^ or to see defects not obvious to those of ordinary faculties, traveling at an ordinary pace.^ But it is just to require from those, who have defective sight^ or who drive horses which are blind * or have imperfect vision,^ a greater degree of care, than what is required of others. It is not contributory negligence for a woman to drive a horse,^ nor for any one to drive over a smooth road at the rate of ten miles an hour,^ or to drive in a violent storm through city streets, with which the driver is unacquainted,^ or on a street, when its defects are covered by the snow.' Nor is it contributory negligence, in an action against the city for neg- ligence in the repair of the roads, for one to drive on the wrong side of the road;!" to travel by night,!^ or to go on a dark night without a lantern.^ The fact, that the harness or carriage breaks, is not conclu- sive proof of negligence, as it might be an accident caused by a defect, of which the owner had no knowledge and which he could not have discovered by the use of ordinary care. He is not an insurer of the condition of his tackle, and is liable only upon the principle, that he has not used ordinary care in the maintenance of it in good repair. ^^ ■ When a foot passenger at night, without necessity therefor, steps from the sidewalk and is injured by falling into a hole ; ^* or where a driver receives an injury, while he is on the edge of the highway, by his own fault ; ^^ as, when driving a horse and ' Neff v. Wellesley, supra; Thomp- son V. Bridgewater, 7 Pick. 188. 2 Sheldon v. W. U. T. Co., 51 Hun, 591; Cox V. Westchester Tp. Co., 33 Barb. 414; Frost v. Waltham, 12 Al- len, 85. s Hutton V. Windsor, 34 Up. Can. Q. B. 487; Winn v. Lowell, 1 Allen, 177; Sleeper V. Sandown, 52 N. H. 244; Smith V. Wildes, 14:5 Mass. 556. * Salem v. Goller, 76 Ind. 291; Breckenridge v. Fitchburg, 145 Mass. 160; Sleeper V. Sandown, 52 N. H. 244. 5 Wright V. Templeton, 132 Mass. 49. ' Snow T. Provincetown, 120 Mass. 580; Cobb v. Standish, 14 Me. 198. ' Keed v. Deerfleld, 8 Allen, 522. 8 Brackenridge v. Fitchburg, 145 Mass. 160; Milwaukee v. Davis, 6 Wis. 377; Hart v. Bed Cedar, 63 Wis. 634; Williams v. Clinton, 28 Conn. 264; Clark v. Lockport, 49 Barb. 580. 9 Clark V. Lockport, 49 Barb. 580. '" Damon v. Scituate, 20 An. Kep. 315. 1' Stier V. Osoaloosa, 41 Iowa, 353. 12 Allegheny Co. v. Broadwaters, 69 Md. 538. 13 Thompson on Neg. § 381 ; Doyle V. Wragg, 1 F. & F. 7. n Alline v. Le Mars, 18 Am. & Eng. Cor.Cases, 262; Zettlerv. Atlanta, 66 Ga. 195. 15 Potter V. Castleton, 53 Vt. 435. 719 § 352 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS. [CH. XVII. tileigh, he leaves the portion of the road which is bare, for that upon which the snow lies ; ^ he is guilty of contributory negli- gence, and cannot recover, even though he thought the side of the road was safer than the part he left, provided the regular track was reasonably safe and open.^ But every departure from the highway or beaten path does not constitute negligence,^ and whether any deviation is negligence, is usually a question for the jurj'.* When a traveler leaves the traveled path know- ingly, he is bound to show a sufficient excuse or reason therefor. And if he does not, contributor}'' negligence may be inferred.^ But it is not negligence for a person to leave a street to obtain a drink of water from a hydrant, situated on an adjacent lot ; in stopping, he exercises a lawful privilege.^ It is not .enough alone to show that plaintiff was in fault. His negligence to defeat his recovery, must have proximately contributed to his injury ; "< and while contributory negligence will not be presumed, its existence may be inferred from cir- cumstances, showing a want of care.^ On the other hand, it has been held by many authorities that the strong instinct of self preservation will raise a presumption,' but not a proof, ^^ of the use of due care. Although contribu- tory negligence cannot be inferred from the single fact that plaintiff was intoxicated," that is one of the circumstances which may be given in evidence,^^ and may, together with other circumstances, exert a controlling influence.-'^^ While a drunken man is not beyond the protection of the law of negligence,^* his intoxication is no excuse ; ^^ and if his injury is ' Kice V. Montpelier, 19 Vt. 470. 2 Burr V. Plymouth, 48 Conn. 460. 3 Briggs V. Guilford, 8 Vt. 264; Erie V. Sohwingle, 22 Pa. St. 384. " Ramsey v. Ttushville, 81 Ind. 394. 5 McLaury v. McGregor, 54 Iowa, 717 ; Carohis v. Xew York, 6 Bosw. 15 ; Vlcksburg v. Henessy, 54 Miss. 391 ; Parkhill v. Brighton, 01 la. 103; Lov- engarth v. Bloomington, 71 111. 238; Momenoe v. Kendall, 14 111. App. 229. 6 Duffy V. Dubuque, 63 Iowa, 171. ■? Nave V. Mack, 90 Ind. 205. 8 Moore v. Richmond, 8 S. E. R. 387; Kingv. Thompson, 87 Pa. St. 365. 720 9 Cassidy v. Angell, 12 R. 1. 447 ; Cen- tral Br. etc. Co. v. Pate, 21 Kan. 539; Allen V. Willard, 57 Pa. St. 374; North- ern Gen. R. R. v. State, 31 Ind. 357. 1" Warner v. New York etc. Co., 44 N. Y. 465; Cordell v. New York etc. Co., 75 N. Y. 330. n Healy v. New York, 3 Hun, 708. 12 Alger V. Lowell, 3 Allen, 402. w Wood V. Andes, 11 Hun, 543. " Cincinnati etc. Co. v. Cooper, 22 N. E. R. 340. w Illinois Cen. R. R. Co. v. Hutch- inson, 47 111. 408; Woods v. Tipton, 27 N. E. E. 611. CH. XVII.] LIABILITY FOR TORTS. § 352 attributable to his drunkenness as a proximate cause, he cannot recover.^ In some of the Eastern States, it is held that a person trav- eling on Sunday, except upon an errand of mercy or charity, cannot recover for injuries caused by a defective highway.^ This ruling of the New England courts is the outcome of their strict enforcement of their Sunday laws, which makes travel on Sunday, except on an errand of rnercy or charity, illegal. The Sunday traveler cannot recover in the New England States for injuries he sustains from a defective roadbed, because he was violating the law when he sustained the injury. This applica- tion of the general rule is not recognized elsewhere.^ Unless the facts are undisputed, the question of contributory negligence is for the jury.* Even if the facts are not contro- verted, if different conclusions may be drawn from them, the question is still for the jury to decide as a question of fact.^ In respect to the burden of showing contributory negligence there is a hopeless contrariety of opinion ; and for a full discus- sion of the subject, the reader is referred to any of the works, which treat specially of the subject of negligence. It suffices to say in the present connection, that where the contributory neg- ligence of the plaintiff does not so clearly appear upon his own testimony, as to convince the jury that he was at fault, the burden of proof rests on the defendant ;® and he may show the iFitzgeraldv. Weston, 52 Wis. 354; Seymer v. Lake, 66 lb. 651; Cramer V. Burlington, 42 Iowa, 315 ; Monk v. New Utrecht, 104 N. Y. 561 ; Hub- bard V. Mason City, 60 Iowa, 400; Cassidy v. Stockbridge, 21 Vt. 391. 2 Hinckley V. Penobscot, 42 Me. 89; Baker v. Portland, 58 lb. 199; David- son v. Portland, 69 lb. 116; Bosworth V. Swansey, 10 Metcf . 363 ; Norris v. Litchfield, 35 N. H. 918; Johnson v. Irasburgh, 47 Vt. 28; Steele v. Burk- hardt, 104 Mass. 59; Lyons v. Deso- telle, 124 Mass. 387; Com. v. Adams, 114 lb. 323. 'Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258; Platz v. Cohoes, 89 N. Y. 219; Sutton V. Wauwatosa, 29 Wis. 21, 28; White V. Lang, 128 Mass. 598; Wood- 46 ward V. Hubbard, 25 N. H. 67; Piol- let V. Simmers, 106 Pa,. St. 95. *Ponca V. Crawford, 23 Neb. 662; Daniels v. Lebanon, 58 N. H. 284; Albian v. Hedrick, 90 lb. 545 ; Ramsey V. R. & M. Grar. Rd. Co., 81 lb. 394; Dwenyv.Elmira, 51 N. Y. 506; Balti- more V. Holmes, 39 Md. 243; Niven V. Rochester, 76 lb. 619; Kelsey v. Glover, 15 Vt. 708; Hart v. Red Cedar, 63 Wis. 634. ' Montgomery v. Wright, 72 Ala. 411 ; Sioux C. & R. R. R. Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657. 6 Georgia P. Ry. v. Davis, (Ala. 91) 9 So. 252; Hai-mon v. W. & G. R. Co., 7 Mackey, 235 ; Sanders v. Reister, 1 Dak. 131; Brad well v. Pittsburgh & W. E. R. Co., 139 Pa. St. 404; Inland 721 § 352 a. MTTNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XVII. plaintiff's negligence by direct testimony, or inferentially from the testimony of the plaintiff. § 352 a. Damages in suits for negligence. — The question of damages in actions for negligence, is involved in great diffi- culty .^ And an extended discussion of the subject is impossi- ble in a treatise of this character. In England the rule has been laid down ^ that, in measuring the compensation, which an injured person ought to receive, in an action founded upon the negligence of a municipal corporation, the jury should con- sider, firsU the pecuniary loss he sustains by the accident, and secondly, the injury he sustains in his person, or his physical capacity for enjoying life. In considering the pecuniary loss, his partial or total incapacity to earn a future income is jast as much an element as his present loss. If the plaintiff's health be shattered or impaired, compensation therefor in damages should undoubtedly be made.^ It has generally been held in America, that pain and suffer- ing are not elements to be considered in actions to recover dam- ages for the death of a person by the negligence of a municipal corporation ; and the doctrine of exemplary damages in this connection meets with very little recognition or favor.* No fixed rule can be laid down that will be of very much assist- & Seaboard Co. v. Folson, 139 TJ. S. 551; MuUer v. District, 5 Mackey, 286 ; Washington & G. Ky. Co. v. Glad- mon, 15 Wall. 401. 'Rowley v. London etc. Co., L. R. 8 Ex. 221; Gee v. Lancashire etc. Co., 6 H. & N. 211. 2By Cockburn, C. J., in Fair v. London & N. W. Ry. Co., 21 L. T. N'. S. 327. 8 Terre Haute R. R. Co. v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346 ; Indiana Car Co. v. Parker, 100 lb. 181; Curtis v. Rochester etc. Co., 18 N. Y. 534; Sunney v. Holt, 15 lb. 880; Totten v. Penn. R. R. Co., 11 lb. 564; Holyoke v. Grand Trunk etc. Co., 48 N. H. 541; Spicer v. Chi- cago etc. Co., 29 Wis. 580; Kendall V. Albia, 73 Iowa, 241 : Weissenburg V. Appleton, 26 lb. 56; Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S. 22; Scott Tp.. y. Montgomery, 95 Pa. St. 444; Wjber 722 V. Creston, 75 Iowa, 16; 39 IST. W. R. 126; Elkhart v. Bitter, 66 Ind. 136 Malloy V. Bennett, 15 Fed. Rep. 371 Stafford v. Oscaloosa, 64 Iowa, 251 Canning v. Williamstown, 1 Cush 451; Gibliu v. Mclntire, 2 Utah, 384 Masters v. Warren, 27 Conn. 294 Sheehan v. Edgar, 58 N. T. 631; Oli ver v. No. Pac. Ry. Co., 3 Ore. 84 Peoria B. Ass'n v. Loomis, 20 111. 235 Wade V. Leroy, 20 How. (U. S.) 34 Varnham v. Council Bluffs, 52 Iowa, 698. * Raymond v. Lowell, 6 Cush. 524; Wilson V. Granby, 47 Conn. 59 ; Atchi- son V. King, 9 Kan. 550; Chicago v. Langlass, 52 111. 256; McGary v. La- fayette, 12 Rob. (La.) 668; Wilson v. Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 323; Decatur v. Fisher, 53 111. 407; Louisville etc. Co. V. Shanks, 94 Ind. 598. CH. XVII.] LIABILITY FOE TORTS. §352a ance. The amount, which will be a reasonable compensation in any given case, depends altogether upon the extent and na- ture of the pl£»ntiff's injuries, considered in the light of the collateral facts and circumstances of the particular case. The reader is referred to the cases cited.^ '-Decatur v. Fisher, 53 111. 407; Chicago V. Langlass, 52 lb. 256; Whelan v. N. Y. etc. Co., 38 Fed. Kep. 15; Eipon v. Bittel, 30 Wis. 614; McKamara v. Clintonville, 62 lb. 207; Luck v. Eipon, 52 lb. 196; Page V. Sumpter, 53 lb. 652; Abbott v. ToUiver, 71 Wis. 64; Crete v. Childs, 11 Neb. 252; Dickson v. HoUister, 123 Pa. St. 421; 16 Atl. E. 484; Gal- veston V. Barbour, 62 Tex. 172 ; Louis- ville etc. Co. V. Snider, (Ind. 90) 20 N. W. K. 284; Fleming v. Shenan- doah, 71 lovra, 456; Driess v. Fred- erick, (Tex. 90) 11 S. W. E. 493; Col- hns V. Council Bluffs, 82 Iowa, 324; Lapleine v. Morgan etc. Co., 40 La. An. 661 ; Nebraska City v. Campbell, 2 Black. 590; Louisville etc. Co. v. Wood, 113 Ind. 544; Eead v. Belfast, 20 Me. 246; Tice v. Munn, 94 ST. Y. 621; Wilson v.- Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 324; Louisville etc. Co. v. Falvey, 104 Ind. 409; Lewis v. Atlas etc. Ins. Co., 61 Mo. 534; Baltimore etc. Co. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 74; ^tna L. I. Co. v. Nexson, 84 Ind. 347; Chicago v. Ma- jor, 18 111. 349; Schell v. Plumb, 55 N. Y. 592; Lehman v. Brooklyn, 29 Barb. 234; Sauter v. N. Y. Cent. etc. Co., 66 N. Y. 50; Etherington v. P. P. etc. E. E. Co., 88 N. Y. 641; Scheffler v. Minn. etc. Ey. Co., 32 Minn. 518; Owen v. Brockschmidt, 54 Mo. 285 ; Chicago v. Martin, 49 111. 241; McKeigue v. Janesville, 68 Wis. 50; Chicago v. Kelly, 69 111. 475 ; Pros- ser v. Ottumwa, 47 Iowa, 509 ; Ehrgott V. ISTew York, 96 N. Y. 264; Ottawa V. Seely, 65 111. 434; Hunt v. Boone- ville, 65 Mo. 620; Barbour Co. v. Horn, 48 Ala. 566; Eichmond v. Courtney, 32 Gratt. 792; Parsons v. Lindsay, 26 Kan. 426; Ccntreville v. Woods, 57 Ind. 192; Elizabeth L. etc. Co. V. Combs, 10 Bush. 382; Weeks V. Shirley, 33 Me. 271; Shartle v. Minneapolis, 17 Minn. 308; Verrill v. Minot, 31 lb. 299; Masters v. Warren, 27 Conn. 293; Mason v. Ellsworth, 32 Me. 271 ; Eaymoud v. Lowell, 6 Cush. 524, 537; Brown v. Watson, 47 Me. 161; Atchison v. King, 9 Kan. 550; State V. Hewett, 31 lb. 396, 400; Sto- ver V. Bluehill, 51 lb. 439; Sandford V. Augusta, 32 lb. 536; Chicago v. Martin, 49 111. 241; Chidsey v. Can- ton, 17 Conn. 475 ; McGary v. Lafay- ette, 12 Eob. 668; Beeoher v. Derby etc. Co. , 24 lb. 491 ; Decatur v. Fisher, 53 111. 407; Chicago v. Langlass, 52 lb. 256; Canning v. Williamstown, 1 Cush. 451; Wylie v. Wausin, 48 Wis. 506; Sheel v. Appleton, 49 lb. 125; Harwood v. Lowell, 4 Cush. 310; Peru V. French, 55 111. 318; Baily v. Fair- field, Brayt. (Vt.) 126; Farrelly v. Cincinnati, 2 Disney, 516; Weissen- berg V. Appleton, 26 Wis. 56; John- son V. Hud. E. E. Co., 6 Duer, 634; Armsworth v. S. E. Ey. Co., 11 Jur. 758; Eowley v. London & N. W. Ey. Co., L. E. 8 Ex. 221; Franklin v. S. E. Ey. Co., 3 H. & N. 211; Soule v. N". Y. & N. H. E. E. Co., 24 Conn. 575 ; Ducksworth v. Johnson, 4 H. & N. 653; Safford v. Drew, 3 Duer, 627; Blake v. Midland Ey. Co., 18 Q. B. 93; Lucas v. New York, 21 Barb. 245; Dalton v. S. E. Ey. Co., 4 C. B. N. O. 296; Quin v. Moore, 15 N. Y. 432; Pym v. Gt. Northern Ey. Co., 15 Up. Can. Q. B. 631; Penn. E. E. Co. V. McCloskey, 23 Pa. St. 526; Marley v. Gt. Western Ey. Co., 16 Up. Can. Q. B. 504; Secord v. Gt. Western Ey. Co., 15 lb. 631. 723 § 353 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XVII. § 353. Bridges. — The duty of repairing bridges was imposed at common law upon the county, in which thej- were located ; but while the duty was deemed an imperative qne, no civil ac- tion could be maintained by one suffering injury on account of its breach, unless the county possessed the franchise of taking toll.i In the United States, the common law obligation just men- tioned is generally regulated by statute ; and the same distinc- tion is made as to liability for injuries sustained through negligence in the care of bridges between cities, towns and un- incorporated villages on the one hand and townships and coun- ties on the other, as in the cases of the repair and maintenance of highways.^ When by statute or otherwise, a county is under a legal duty to keep a bridge in repair, it will be required to em- ploy ordinary care to that end. Such care will require the coun- ty or municipal officials to exercise active diligence, in keeping themselves informed as to its condition, and to take notice of the natural tendency of the materials composing the bridge to de- cay.^ When a statute requires a county to build and maintain bridges of a certain class, it has been held that the county will not be liable for injuries received from a defect in a bridge, which is not of the class mentioned in the statute.* When a township or county is charged with the statutory duty of caring for bridges within its limits, and provided with the means for performing this duty, it is held in some States to be liable for negligence.^ ' Purdeman v. St. Charles, 19 G. W. K. 733; Heegel v. Wichita, 19 lb. 562; Askew v. Hale Co., 54 Ala. 639; Hallenbeck v. Winnebago Co., 95 HI. 148; Abbett v. Johnson Co., 114 Ind. 61; White v. Chowan Co., 90 N. C. 437. 2 See §§324, 325. sRaples v. Moore, 68 Pa. St. 404; Spaulding v. Sherman, 34 N. W. 558; O'Neill V. Deerfleld, 86 Mich. 610; Abernethy v. Van Buren, 52 Mich. 353; Board v. Legg, 110 Ind. 479; Fort Wayne v. Combs, 107 lb. 75. ^ Granger v. Pulaski Co., 26 Ark. 37. Howard v. Pritchett, 85 Ind. 68; 724 Hou«e V. Montgomery Co., 60 Ind. 580; Abbett v. Johnson Co., 114 lb. 61 ; Knox Co. v. Montgomery, 109 lb. 69 ; Moreland v. Mitchell Co. , 40 Iowa, 394; Long v. Boone Co., 33 lb. 181; Taylor v. Davis Co., 40 lb. 295; Ke- gina V. Inhabitants, 14 Eng. L. & E. 116. 5 Arnold v. Henry Co., 81 Ga. 730; Yeager v. Tippecanoe, 81 Ind. 46; McCalla v. Multnomah Co., 3 Oreg. 424; Stebbins v. Keene, 55 Mich. 552; Zimmerman v. Conemaugh Tp., 2 Cent. Rep. 361; 5 Atl.Rep. 45; Moore V. Kenockee Tp., (Mich.) 42 N. W, R. 944. OH. XVII. J LIABILITY FOK TOKTS. § 353 In respect to the liability of municipal corporations for the care of bridges, it need only be said that bridges are highways, and the municipal corporation is called upon to exercise the same degree of care over bridges under its control, and upon which corporate funds may be expended, as it is over streets. That is to say, it is the duty of the municipality to keep bridges reasonably safe for ordinary travel.^ But no munici- pal corporation will be answerable in damages to a person, who is injured by a defect in a bridge which is not under its con- trol as a public bridge ; as, for example, a bridge within the city limits, but erected and controlled by the county, township or State in which the city is located. ^ If, however, the bridge, though owned by the county, in severalty or jointly with the city,3 forms a part of the general system of public highways, it becomes the duty of the corporation to keep it safe for public use ; and the city will be liable to a person injured by any negligence in that respect.* This liability is founded on the principle, that a municipal corporation may by adoption so far make a private bridge its own, as to be estopped from denying its lia- bility for a failure to keep it in a safe and convenient condi- tion for travel.^ And when two municipal corporations or counties are jointly bound to repair a bridge, and damages have been recovered against either for a neglect to do so, con- tribution may be enforced against the other.^ 1 Boston V. Crowley, 38 Fed. 202; Zimmerman v. Conemaugh, 2 Cent. E. 361; Jordan v. Hannibal, 87 Mo. 673; Board v. Deprez, 87 Ind. 509; Moreland v. Mitchell, 40 Iowa, 394; McDonald v. Corporation etc., 29 Up. Can. C. P. 249; Dale v. Webster Co., (Iowa) 41 N. W. Kep. 1; Hyatt v. Eondout, 44 Barb. 385; Medina v. Perkins, 48 Micb. 67; Tift v. Towns, 53 Ga. 47; Joliet v. Verley, 35 111. 58; Lowery v. Delpbi, 55 Ind. 250. 2 Board v. Washington, (Ind.) 23 N. E. Eep. 257; Indianapolis v. Mc- Clure, 2 Ind. 147; Titler v. Iowa Co., 48 Iowa, 90; Carpenter v. Cohoes, 81 N. Y. 21; Brusso v. Buffalo, 90 K. T. 679; Veeder v. Little Falls, 100 lb. 343; Hord v. Village, 26 111. Ap. 41 ; Sewall v. Cohoes, 75 N. Y. 45 ; Bishop v. Centralia, 49 Wis. 669. 8 Hawkhurst v. New York, 43 Hun, 588; Shawnee Co. v. Topeka, 39 Kan. 197; Goshen v. Myers, 119 Ind. 196. 4 Hyatt V. Eondout, 44 Barb. 385 ; Schomer v. Eochester, 15 Abb. N. C. 57; Eudora v. Miller, 30 Kan. 494; Bioard v. Deprez, 87 Ind. 508. * Atlanta v. Buchanan, 76 Ga. 585 ; State V. Demaree, 80 Ind. 519; State V. Campton, 2 N. H. 513; Eudora v. Miller, 30 Kan. 494; Watson v. Pro- prietors, 14 Me. 201; Eex v. West Eiding, 2 East, 342. 8 Armstrong Co. v. Clarion Co., 66 Pa. St. 218; comp. Village v. How- land, 124 111. 547. 725 353 MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS. [CH. XVII. A municipal corporation will also be liable in damages to any one who is injured through its want of care and skill in constructing a bridge ; as, for example, by an unnecessary ob- struction of the current,^ or for injuries to the rights of riparian owners.^ A bridge must be so constructed, that it shall possess suffi- cient strength ^ to stand against freshets which, from the char- acter of the stream, and from the knowledge the municipal authorities have of its former history, may reasonably be ex- pected to occur, although they may not be of frequent occur- rence.* But it is not required to construct bridges which will withstand the force of floods or storms of an extraordinary and unexpected character,^ such as are considered to come within the definition of the act of God or inevitable accident, for the result of which there is no legal liability.^ When no particular mode is prescribed by statute, in which the bridge should be constructed, the implication is that it shall be constructed in the usual manner; the municipality using due care and a just discretion.'^ And it has been held in Missouri that the rule, that a city acts judicially in selecting a plan for 1 Scott V. Chicago, 1 Biss. 510; Thompson v. Inhabitants, 5 Gray, 110. 2 Perry v. Worcester, 6 Gray, 544 ; Spencer v. Hartford etc. Co., 10 K.I. 14. 3 Richardson v. Koyalton & W. T. Co., 6 Vt. 496. * Koenig v. Arcadia, (Wis. 91) 43 N. W. 734; Blythe v. Birmingham, 11 Exch. 781; Allen v. Chippewa Falls, 52 Wis. 530; Smith v. Margrave, 2 App. Cases, 781; 43 L. J. Ex. 70; Evans ville v. Decker, 84 Ind. 325, 328 ; Louisville etc. Co. v. Thompson, 107 lb. 442; Koss v. Madison, 1 Ind. 281. ^ Dorman v. Ames, 12 Minn. 451 ; Pittsburgh etc. Co. v. Gilleland, 56 Pa. St. 445 ; Gray v. Harris, 107 Mass. 492 ; Livezey v. Philadelphia, 64 Pa. St. 106; Kansas etc. Co. v. Miller, 2 Col. 442; Ellet v. St. Louis etc. Co., 76 Mo. 518; Morris Canal Co. v. Eyer- son, 27 N. J. L. 457; Nashville etc. 726 Co. V. David, 6 Heisk. 261; Campbell V. Bear River Co., 35 Cal. 679; Rich- ardson V. Kier, 34 lb. 64; Lehigh Bridge Co. v. Lehigh, 4 Rawle, 24; Bellv. McClintock,9Watts, 119; Fos- ter V. Juniata B. Co., 4 Har. (Pa.) 393 ; China v. South wick, 12 Me. 238; Chi- cago, etc. Co. v. Sawyer, 69 111. 285; Lapham v. Curtis, 5 Vt. 371 ; Oakham V. Holbrook, 11 Cush. 299; Gillespie etc. Co. V. St. Louis etc., 6 Mo. App. 554; Shrewsbury v. Smith, 12 Cush. 177; International etc. Co. v. Hallo- ran, 53 Tex. 46; Withers v. North Kent, 3 H. & N. 969 ; Wendell v. Pratt, 12 Allen, 464. « Evans v. North Side etc. Co., 26 Fed. Rep. 718; The Modoc, 26 lb. 718; Clarke v. Birmingham etc. Co., 41 Pa. St. 147. ' Wabash v. Pearson, 22 N. E. K. 134; Ferguson v. Davis Co., 57 Iowa, 601. CH. xvn.] LIABILITY FOR TORTS. §353 public improvements, is not applicable to bridges.^ If the stat- ute, which authorizes the municipality to construct the edifice, at the same time expressly points out the manner in which it shaU be constructed, any material and substantial deviation from the statute will make the city a wrongdoer, and create "municipal liability to any one injured thereby.^ In the work of constructing a public bridge, the municipal corporation is responsible for the same degree of care and must employ the same or similar precautions, which are generally re- quired, when other improvements are carried on under its con- trol or supervision. Thus, the city will be liable for damages, which result from a failure on its part to provide signals or guards, to the persons or property of those using the stream, across which the bridge is placed, or the highway, of which it is to form a part.* The obligation of a city, to keep a bridge in a reasonably safe condition for ordinary public travel,* does not involve a liability, where injury is caused by the plaintiff's wagon being overload- ed, or loaded in an unsafe manner.^ But if a bridge is origi- nally built to support a specific weight, the municipality will be liable if it be subsequently weakened in that respect by changes in the structure, or by repairs.^ And, likewise, upon the principle, that a municipal corporation is not bound to pro- vide against extraordinary accidents, it has been held that a city is under no obligation to provide a railing to protect passengers, upon the footway of a bridge, from injury by runaway horses.'^ The doctrine, that notice of a defect, obstacle or lack of repair must be brought home to the municipal corporation, before it can be held liable for negligence in respect to it, is applicable to the same extent, and its application is controlled by the same 1 Jordan v. Hannibal, 87 Mo. 673. 2 Ward V. Great West etc. Co., (Prov. Ort.) 13 Q. B. 315; Eeg. v. Great West. etc. Co., (Prov. Ont.) 12 Q. B. 25q; Attorney General v. Bridge Co., 20 Grant (U. C.) 34; Attorney General v. Mid. Kent etc., L. E. 3 Ch. 100. ' Dolierty v. Braintree, 20 N. E. E. 106: 148 Mass. 495; The Modoc, 26 Fed. Eep. 718; Mullen v. Eutland, 55 Vt. 77. 4 Wabash v. Carver, 129 Ind. 552; Gregory v.' Adams, 14 Gray, 242. 5 Board v. Chipps, (Ind. 92) 29 N. E. E. 1092; McCormick v. Washing- ton Tp., 112 Pa. St. 185. 6 O'Neill V. Deerfield, 49 N. W. E. 590; 86 Mich. 610; Board of Com'rs V. Brod., 29 N. E. E. 430; Stebbins v. Keene, 60 Mich. 214. ' Lehigh v. HofCart, 116 Pa. St. 119. 727 §354 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XYII. rules, as in the case of streets and highways.^ Notice is essen- tial, only when the defect occurs subsequently to, the erection of the bridge. For, if there has been negligence in its con- struction, a liability as a wrongdoer, it is held, has become fixed upon the corporation, for which it must answer in damages to any one injured afterwai'ds.^ When the municipal liability is statutory, the injured individual is required to bring his case within the statute. Thus, where the existence of a liability was dependent upon a failure to repair, it was held that there could be no recovery for an injury which was caused by being caught in the draw, although plaintiff was using the bridge upon the assuiance of its keeper, that it was safe for him to do so.^ And the same rule of non-liability has been invoked in the case of accidents, caused by runaway horses.* The general rule, exempting the defendant from liability for negligence when the plaintiff's negligence proximately contributed to his own injury, is applied in the present connection.^ § 354. Watercourses "A water course is a stream of water, ordinarily flowing in a defined channel, having beds and banks, and flowing into some stream or other body of water;"" and for an unauthorized or illegal obstruction of such a water 1 Bullock V. Durham, 19 N. T. S. 635; Board v. Sisson, 2 Ind. App. 311; Board v. Dombke, 94 Ind. 72; Ford V. Umatilla Co., (Oregon) 16 Pac. Eep. 33; Board v. Bacon, 96 Ind. 31. 2 Board v. Dombke, supra ; see §§ 338, 338 a, on Negligence of Mun. Servants; § 351. Proximate cause. Board v. Pearson, 120 Ind. 426; Har- ris V. Board, (Ind.) 23 N. E. Eep. 92; Board v. Bacon, 96 Ind. 31. 3]Srouell V. Wright, 3 Allen, 166; Butterfield v. Boston, (Mass.) 20 N. E.Eep. 113; McDougall v. Salem, 110 Mass. 21; French v. Boston, 129 Mass. 592. * Fulton Co, V. Eickel, 106 Ind. 501 ; Acker v. Anderson, 20 S. C. 495. 6 Taylor v. Constable, 13 N. Y. 597; Vance v. Franklin, 30 N. E. E. 149; Gulf etc. Co. V. Gascamp, 7S. W. Eep. 227; Dale v. "Webster Co., 41 N. W. 728 Eep. 1; Monongahela B. Co. v. Be- vard, 11 Atl. Eep. 575; Morrison v. Board, 116 Ind. 431; Fisher v. Cam- bridge, 133 N. T. 527. 6 Eobinson v. Shanks, 20 N. E. E. 713; 118 Ind. 125; Geddis v. Parrish, (Wash. 91) 21 Pac. E. 314; Palmer v. Waddell, 22 Kan. 352; Gibbs v. Wil- liams, 25 lb. 214; Chicago etc. Co. v. Morrow, 22 Pac. E. 214; Simmons v. Winters, (Or. 91) 26 Pac. E. 7; Macom- ber V. Godfrey, 108 Mass. 219; Ell- iott Eoads and Streets, p. 361; Chi- cago etc. Co. V. Morrow, (Kan.) 22 Pac. E. 413 ; Luther v. Winnisimmet Co.,9Cush. 171; Gibbs v. Williams, 25 Kan. 214; Palmer v. Waddell, 23 Kan. 852; Stanchfield v. Newton, 142 Mass. 110; Howard v. Ingersoll, 13 How. (U. S.) 427; Jeffers v. Jeffers, 107 N. Y. 650; Eicev. Evansville, 108 Ind. 7; Weis v. Madison, 75 Ind. 253; Fryer v. Warne, 29 Wis. 511. CH. xvn.] LIABILITY FOR TORTS. §354 course, damages may be recovered by any one who has sustained actual injury.i But not every channel, or strip of land, through or over which water flows or makes its way, is a water course ; ^ and the uniform and well recognized distinction, between sur- face water and a natural water course, flowing through a regu- lar and permanent channel, becomes very important, when it is considered that the powers of a municipal corporation are very much more extensive in regard to the control and disposition of the former, than of the latter.^ A municipality cannot merely by virtue of its power to grade streets, or to construct a system of drainage, lawfully cause injury to the property of riparian owners by obstructing or unnecessarily diverting the flow of a stream of water, which is properly denominated a water course, whether this be done by badly constructed culverts, or otherwise.* The comprehensive rights which are possessed by riparian owners in the stream, and the use which they are able to make of it, cons.titute private property, for the taking or dam- 1 Schnltzins v. Bailey, 22 Atl. R. (48 N. J. E.) 409; Sherwood v. Judge, 41 ?r. W. 234 ; 40 Minn. 22. In Bellinger V. Railroad, 23 N. Y., the covirt said: "If one chooses of his own authority to interfere with a water course even upon his own land, he as a general rule, does it at his peril, as respects other riparian owners, above or below: Eulrich V. Richter, 37 Wis. 226; Con- hocton etc. Co. v. Buffalo etc. Co., 3 Hun, 523; Barnes v. Sabron, 10 Nev. 217; Earl v. De Hart, 1 Beasley Ch. 280. 2 Byrnes v. Minn. etc. Co., 38 Minn. 212; Bangor v. Lansil, 51 Me. 521; Hawley v. Sheldon, (Vt. 91) 24 Atl. R. 717; Parks v. Newburyport, 10 Gray, 28; 39 N. W. R. 390; Hoyt v. Hudson, 27 Wis. 656; Moore v. Chi- cago etc. Co., 75 Iowa, 263; Robinson V. Shanks, 118 Ind. 125; West v. Tay- lor, 16 Ore. 165. 'Hoehl V. Muscatine, 57 Iowa, 444; Vanpelt v. Davenport, 42 lb. 308; Rose V. St. Charles, 49 Mo. 509; Hoyt V. Hudson, 27 Wis. 656; Imler v. Springfield, 55 Mo. 119, 127; Barns v. Hannibal, 71 lb. 449; Vanderweile v. Taylor, 65 N. Y. 341; Goodale v. Tuttle, 29 lb. 459 ; Kellogg v. Thomp- son, 66 lb. 88; Gould v. Booth, 66 lb. 62, 65; Wood v. Ward, 3 Exch. 748; Helena v. Thompson, 29 Ark. 569, 574; Little Rock V. Willis, 27 lb. 572; Briscoe v. Drought, 11 Ir. C. L. R. 250. * Butler T. Edgewater, 6 N. Y. S. 174; Schenectady V. Furman, 15 N. Y. S. 724; 61 Hun, 171 ; East St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. v. Eisentrant, 24 N. E. R. 760; Sherwood V. Judge, 40 Minn. 22; Stanchfleld v. N^ton, 142 Mass. 110; Morse v. Worcester, 139 lb. 389; Bar- row v. Baltimore, 2 Am. Jur. 203;Pye V. Mankato, 36 Minn. 373 ; Stetson v. Faxon, 19 Pick. 147, 158; Kemper v. Louisville, 14 Bush, 87; Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick. 510; Crawfordsville V. Bond, 96 Ind. 236 ; Indianapolis v. Lawyer, 38 Ind. 348; Rice v. Evans- ville, 108 lb. 7; Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns, 162; Phinizy v. Augusta, 47 Ga. 260;. Kellogg v. Thompson, 66 N. Y. 88. 729 §354 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. xvn. aging of which compensation must be made.^ The municipality has no right, either to take the water itself for public use,^ or to divert the stream to the material injury of the riparian pro- prietor, without making compensation for the actual damages thus caused.^ In either case, the act is an exercise of the right of eminent domain. Where the embankment, dam or other obstruction to the nat- ural flow of the stream, which was ordered or authorized by the municipal authorities, did not ordinarily retard or divert the flow of the stream to the injury of the riparian owners ; but such injury was experienced only with the occurrence of extra- ordinary freshets, which could not be reasonably anticipated, and was occasioned by the insufficient capacity of the culverts, the city is not liable for such injuries. It is a case of damnum absque injuria.^ In all cases, where lands are submerged, the true measure of 1 Miller v. Windham, 23 Atl. R. 1132; 30 W. N. C. 85; Ames v. Dorset, 23 Atl. R. 857; Kay v. Kerk, 24 Atl. R. 326; WabasL etc. Co. v. Spears, 16 Ind. 441 ; Evansville, etc. Co. v. Dick, 9 lb. 433 ; Harding v. Stanford W. Co., 41 Conn. 87; Lee v. Pembroke etc. Co., 57 Me. 481; Proprietors etc. v. Nash. & Low. R. R. Co., lOCush. 388; Ten Eyck v. Canal Co., 18 N. .r. L. 200; March v. Portsmouth etc. Co., 19 N. H. 372; Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497; Rome v. Addison, 34 N. H. 306 ; Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige, 143 ; .Johnson v. Atlantic etc. Co. , 35 N. H. 569; Smith v. Rocliester, 92 N. Y. 463; Bongliton v. Carter, 18 Johns. 405 ; Pettigrew v. Evansville, 25 Wis. 223; Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130; Baltimore etc. Co. v. Magender, 34 Md. 79. 2 Bass v. Ft. Wayne, 28 N. E. R. 249; Woodrufe v. Neal, 28 Conn. 167; Suf- field v. Hathaway, 15 Johns. 447. 8 Culver V. Garbe, 43 N. W. R. 237; hi re Tracy, 16 N. Y. S. 606; 62 Hun, 619; In re L-win, 16 N. Y. S. 606; 62 Hun, 619; Para Rub. Shoe Co. v. Bos- ton, 139 Mass. 155 ; Haynes v.' Bur- 730 lington, 38 Vt. 350; CoUins v. Phila- delphia, 93 Pa. St. 272; Groton v. Haines, 36 N. H. 388; Philada. v. Randolph, 4W. & S. Pa. 514; Gilman V. Laconia, 55 N. H. 130; Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80; Aurora v. Love, 93 m. 521 ; Ross v. Madison, 1 Ind. 281; Stack V. East St. Louis, 85 111. 377; Powers v. Council, 50 Iowa, 197; Mootry v. Danbury, 45 Conn. 550; Kobs V. Minneapolis, 22 Minn. 159, 164; Parker V. Lowell, 11 Gray, 358; Smith V. New York, 66 N. Y. 295; Perry v. Worcester, 6 Gray, 544; Lawrence v. Fair Haven, 5 lb. 110; Talbot V. Whipple, 7 lb. 122; Sprague v. Worcester, 13 lb. 193; Seifert v. Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 136; Rochester W. L. Co. V. Rochester, 3 N. Y. 463; Mills V. Brooklyn, 32 lb. 489; see cases cited in last note. * Velte V. U. S., 45 N. W. R. 119; Miller v. Manstow, 20 Atl. 6; Johns- ton v.District, 118 U. S. 19 ; New York V. Bailey, 2 Denio, 433 ; Cumberland V. Willison, 50 Ind. 138; Madison v. Ross, 3 lb. 236; Lynch v. New York, 76 lb. 60; Smith v. New York, 66 lb. 295. CH. xvn.J LIABILITY FOE TOETS. § 354a damages is the fair rental value of the ground, and not the pos- sible or probable profits, which might have been made, if the land had not been overflowed.^ § 354 a. Surface water. — An important distinction is made in the law of real property between water courses, which flow in fixed or definite channels, and the percolations of the subsoil and surface water. In the latter cases, there is no property in the water, except when it has been collected in a well, or some other convenient receptacle.^ This is true of both percolations aud surface water. There is here no conflict of authority, ex- ,cept in respect to the question of liability of the proprietor of the lower land who, by means of dams or other effective obstructions, keeps on the surface water from flowing on his own land from the higher laud of his neighbor, whereby the higher land becomes .fiooded to the damage of its owner. According to one set of cases, the proprietor of the low land has the right to employ all the available means, in order to prevent surface drainage upon his own land, even though it results in damage to his neighbor of the higher land.^ And while this is without doubt a sound rule in the case of urban servitudes, — on account of the fact that municipal governments usually provide for a proper disposition of the surface water by public drains, and there is, therefore, no need of imposing such a burden upon the pro- prietor of adjoining low lands, — the better opinion is, at least in respect to drainage of surface water on farms and woodlands, 1 Omaha & E. V. E. Co. v. Brown, 46 N. W. E. 39; Velte v. U. S., 45 lb. 119; Montgomery v. Locke, 11 Pack. 874; Mize v. Glenn, 38 Mo. App. 98; Anderson v. Boone Co., 61 Mich. 489; Boston v. Middlesex, etc., Co., 1 Allen, 324; Chicago v. Huenesbein, 85 111. 594; Watterson v. Allegheny, etc., Co., 74 Ta. St. 208; Loughran v.Des Moines, 72 Iowa, 772; DuUea v. Taylor, 35 Up. Can. Q. B. 395; Sey- mour v. Cummins, 119 Ind. 148; Minn. Vail. Co. V. Doran, 17 Minn. 188; Minn. Cent. Co. v. McNamara, 13 lb. 508; Brown V. Pro v. E. E. Co., 5 Gray, 35; Shaw v. Charlestown, 2 lb. 107. '^ Tiedeman Eeal Prop. §§ 614, 615. ^ Tiedeman, Eeal Prop. § 615 ; Green V. Taylor, 79 Tex. 604; Burke v. Miss. E. Ey. Co., 29 Mo. App. 370; Illinois Cent. E. Co. v. Miller, 10 So. E. 61; 68 Miss. 760; Johnson v. Chi., St. P., M.&Q. Ey.Co., 50,N.W.771; 80 Wis. 641 ; Schneider v. Miss. Pac. Ey. Co., 29 Mo. App. 68; Goodale v. Tuttle, 29 N. Y. 459; Swett v. Cutts, 50 N. H. 439; Greeley v. Maine Cent. ' E. E. Co., 53 Me. 200; Parks v. New- buryport, 16 Gray, 29; Gannon v. Hagadon, 10 Allen, 106; Wilson ^. Duncan, 38 K. W. 371; Eowlsby v. Speer, 31 N. J. L. 351; Ogburn ,-. Connor, 46 Cal. 346; Hoyt v. Hudson, 27 Wis. 650; contra, if it does injury; Gerrish v. Clough, 48 N. H. 9. 731 354a MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS. [CH. xvir. that the upper land has a natural right to natura,! drainage over the lower land.^ In many of the States the proprietors of lands, needing drainage, are authorized, by compulsory process, to se- cure the right to cut drains through lands adjoining, upon pay- ment of damages therefor.^ When the authority is vested in the municipal corporation, by charter or statute, to improve streets and establish street grades, and, in the exercise of that power, changes are made in the surface of the city's highways, by which surface water is caused to collect on, or flow over, the adjacent land of private owners, there is no implied liability on the part of the municipal corporation for such indirect and con- sequential injuries, provided the city does not exceed its lawful power.^ So, also, it has been held that, ordinarily, there is no obliga- tion upon the city to provide drainage for the surface water upon its unimproved or unguarded streets ; * and when a city has begun the process of grading, it is under no implied liability to keep open former existing drains,^ or to construct new drains in their place, in order to prevent the surface water from over- flowing land which may be situated below the level of the high- 1 Jenkinsv. Wilm. & W. K. Co., 110 K. C. 438; Statoo v. Norfolk & C. K. Co., 19 S. E. R. 933; 109 N. C. 337; Mexill V. Morgan, (Pa. 92) 24 Atl. 216; Schneider v. Mo. Pac. R. R. Co., 29 Mo. App. 681 ; Farrls v. Dudley, 78 Ala. 124; Burke v. Mo. Pac. R. R. Co., 29 Mo. App. 370; Boyd v. Conk- lin, 64 Mich. 583; C. & A. R. R. Co. V. Smith, 17 111. App. 58; Abbott v. K. C, etc., R. R. Co., 83 Mo. 271; Ribordy v. Pellachond, 28 111. App. 303. 2 Stimpson's Statutes, § 2253. 3 Glass V. Fritz, 23 Atl. R. 1050; Gouldeu V. Scrauton, (Pa. 88) 15 lb. R. 483; Alden v. Minneapolis, 24 Minn. 243 ; Wakefield v. Pawtucket, 12 R. I. 75; Lee v. Minneapolis, 24 Minn. 13; Inman v. Tripp, 11 R. I. 520; O'Brien v. St. Paul, 25 Minn. 331; Bloomington v. Brokaw, 77 111. 194; Davis V. Crawfordsville, 119 Ind. 1 ; Cairo, etc., Co. v. Stevens, 73 lb. 732 278; "Weis v. Madison, 75 lb. 241; Clark V. Wilmington, 5 Harring. 243; Stanohfield V. Newton, 142 Mass. 110; Magarity v. Wilmington, 5 Hous. 530; Foster v. St. Louis, 71 Mo. 157; Gilfeather v. Council Bluffs, 69 Iowa, 310; Field v. West Orange, 36 N. J. Eq. 118; Morris v. Council Bluffs, 67 Iowa, 343; Lynch v. New York, 76 N. T. 00; Hoard v. Des Moines, 62 Iowa, 326; Wilson v. New York, 1 Denio, 595, 598; Hoyt v. Hudson, 27 111. 656; Smith v. Mil- waukee, 18 Wis. 63 ; Nevins V. Peo- ria, 41 111. 503. * Crower v. Ewers, 39 111. App. 34; Mclnerney v. St. Joseph, 45 Mo. 291; Lynch v. New York, 76 N. Y. 60. 6 Bush V. Portland, (Or. 90) 23 Pac. R. 667; Wilson v. New York, 1 De- nio, 595; Imler v. Springfield, 55 Mo. 119; St. Louis v. Gurno, 12 lb. 414. CH. xvn.] LIABILITY FOE TORTS. 355 way.^ Upon this point, the decisions are far from harmonious, many cases holding that the city, when practicable, should pro- vide drains and culverts.^ Many cases go further, and deny any implied liability, where, in making local improvements, which are legally authorized, surface water is made or permitted to flow from the street directly upon the adjoining property.* §355. Drains and sewers In the preceding section * the liability of the municipality was explained and stated, in cases where, through grading and other improvements in the roadbed of the streets, the surface water was inadvertently made to flow upon the adjoining land. In the present section will be discussed the liability of the city, where such an over- flow of surface water upon abutting private property was oc- casioned by the city's construction of artificial means for the removal of surface water, such as drains and sewers. Wheth- er the power to construct sewers, aside from the question of grading, shall be exercised or not in any particular case, is for the corporation, and not for the courts, to decide. Hence, — except, perhaps, in a case where tlie necessity for a sewer arises 1 Mills V. Brooklyn, 32 IST. Y. 489; Gould V. Booth, 66 lb. 65 ; Wilson v. New York, 1 Denio, 595. 2 Eufaula v. Simmons, 86 Ala. 515 ; Patoka V. Hopkins, (Ind. 92) 30 N. E. E.896; Ryclilicke v. St. Louis, 98 Mo. 497; Butler v. Edgewater, 6 N. Y. S. 174; Allen v. Chippewa Falls, 52 Wis. 430; Templin v. Iowa City, 14 Iowa, 59; Waters v. Bay View, 61 Wis. 642; Heth V. Fond du Lac, 63 lb. 228; Mears v. Wilmington, 9 Ired. L. 73, 82; Kehrer v. Richmond, 81 Va. 745; Bloomington v. Brokaw, 77 111. 194; Aurora v. Reed, 57111. 29; Moran v. McLeans, 63 Barb. 185; Stewart v. Clinton, 79 Mo. 603; Smith v. New York, 66 N. Y. 295; Baxter v. Provi- dence, 12 R. I. 310; Fair v. Philadel- phia, 88 Pa. St. 309; Henderson v. Minneapolis, 32 Minn. 219; Spring- field V. Spence, 40 Ohio St. 665. ' Dickinson v. Worcester, 7 Allen, 18; Lambar v. St. Louis, 15 Mo. 610; Flagg V. Worcester, 13 Gray, 601; Adams v. Walker, 34 Conn. 466; Ken- sington Com'rs V. Wood, 10 Pa. St. 93; Pettigrew v. Evansville, 25 Wis. 223; Ellis v. Iowa City, 29 Iowa, 229; Bloomington v. Brokaw, 77 111. 194; Nevins v. Peoria, 41 lb. 502; Stack V. East St. Louis, 85 lb. 377; Aurora V. Gillett, 56 lb. 132; Young v. Lee- dom, 67 Pa. St. 351; Turner v. Dart- mouth, 13 Allen, 291; Mootry v. Danbury, 45 Conn. 550; Franklin v. Fisk, 13 Allen, 211; O'Brien v. St. Paul, 25 Minn. 331 ; Greeley v. Maine Cent. R. R. Co., 53 Mo. 200; Alton V. Hope, 68 111. 167; Gannon v. Hag- adom, 10 Allen, 106; Hoyt v. Hud- son, 27 Wis. 656; Pennoyer v. Sagi- naw, 8 Mich. 534; Barry v. Lowell, 8 Allen, 127; Brine v. Gt. West. Ry., 110 Eng. Com. L. 402; Parks v. New- buryport, 10 Gray, 28; Bangor v. Lansil, 51 Me. 521. * § 354 a. 783 355 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XVII. out of the negligent acts of the corporation,^ — the city is not liable to a. civil action for a total failure to provide any system of sewerage,^ or for a defective or insufficient system of sewer- age, which is adopted by it in good faith, provided due care was used in the selection of the plan, and the advice of those having experience and skill vv^as employed ; * certainly, where the er- ror or want of judgment is not so gross, as to support the charge that, if the city's engineers had been possessed of the average skill of sanitary engineers of the present day, they would not have committed the error. So, likewise, when a city has de- vised and constructed a system of sewerage which is sufficient for all purposes at the time, it will not be liable when, by in- crease of population and the consequent extension of graded territory, the sj'stem has become inadequate and injurious.* But these rules are qualified by the principle, which is held in some of the cases, that a municipality has no right, by a de- fective system of sewerage, to create a nuisance on or near pri- vate property. Some courts have gone very far in this direction and have held that if the sewer, however planned in good faith and with ordinarj"- care, resulted in creating a nuisance, or caus- ed a positive and clear invasion of private property by collect- ing water or sewage upon or near it, in such a way a-s to impair 1 Aurora v. liOve, 93 111. 521 ; Byrnes V. Cohoes, ei N. Y. 204; Ellis v. Iowa City, 29 Iowa, 229. 2 Frostburg v. Hitchins, (Ind. 89) 16 Atl. R. 380; Elkhart v. Weckwire, (Ind. 91) 22 N. B. E. 342; Collins v. Philadelphia, 93 Pa. St. 272; Mills v. Brooklyn, 32 N". Y. 489; "Wright v. Wilmington, 52 N. C. 156; Wilson v. New York, 1 Denio, 595; Rozell v. Anderson, 91 Ind. 591 ; Cliild v. Bos- ton, 4 Allen, 41, 52; McCarthy v. Syracuse, 46 N. Y. 194; Montgomery Council V. Gilmei', 33 Ala. 116 ; Judge V. Meriden, 38 Conn. 90; Atchison v. Challis, 9 "Kan.605 ; Dermont v. De- troit, 4 Mich. 435 ; Barry v. Lowell, 8 Allen, 127; TJrquhart v. Ogdens- burg, 91 N. Y. 67; Watson v. Kings- ton, 114 N. Y. 88. " Costello V. Conshohocken, 8 Pa. 734 Co. Ct. E. 639; Chaplin v. Wheatland, 126 111. 264; Drexel v. Lake, 127 111. 54; Seifert v. Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 136; Johnson v. District, 118 U. S. 19; Mills V. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489; Merrifield v. Worcester, 110 Mass. 216 ; Smith v. Gould, 61 Wis. 31 ; Dan- iels V. Denver, 2 Col. 669; Brewster V. Davenport, 51 Iowa, 427; Horton V. Nashville, 4 Lea, 47; Wicks v. Dewitt, 54 Iowa, 130; Herring v. District, 2 Mackey, 87; Savannah v. Spears, 66 Ga. 304; cases in last note. 4 Steirsmyer v. St. Louis, 3 Mo. App. 256 ; Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. St. 324; Raulett v. Lowell, 126 Mass. 431; Grant v. Erie, 69 Pa. St. 420; Bannagan v. District, 2 Mackey, 285; Fair v. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. St. 309; Denver v. Capelli, 4 Col. 25. CH. xvn.] LIABILITY FOR TORTS. §355 its enjoyment, the city will be liable for the damages occasion- ed.' So where deposits of sewage caused a peculiar and special injury to, and impaired the use of, a wharf, the city was held liable in damages.^ Whatever difference of opinion may exist as to the liability of the corporation, so far as the plan of sewerage itself is con- cerned, there is a universal agreement that the city will be im- pliedly liable for the negligent execution of the plan^ to one injured,* and for the negligent discharge or omission to dis- charge ministerial duties, in carrying on the work of construc- tion,^ or in keeping municipal sewers, drains and culverts in a 1 Ashberry v. W. Seneca, 58 Hun, 602; Markle v. Berwick, 21 Atl. 794; Seymour V. Cummins, 119 Ind. 148; Young V. Kansas, 27 Mo. App. 101 ; Whipple V. Fair Haven, (Am. 90) 21 Atl. 533 ; Columbus v. Woolen Mills, 33 Ind. 435; Ashley v. Port Huron, 35 Mich. 296; Jacksonville v. Lam- bert, 62 111. 519; Seifert v. Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 136; Haskell v. New Bed- ford, 108 Mass. 208; Rowe v. Ports- mouth, 56 N. H. 291 ; Taylor v. Aus- tin, 32 Minn. 247; Lehr v. San Fran- cisco, 66 Cal. 76. ^ Merrimac Eiv. Can. Prop. v. Low- ell, 7 Gray, 223; Franklin Whf. Co. V. Portland, 67 Me. 46; Emery v. Low- ell, 104 Mass. 13 ; Richardson v. Bos- ton, 19 How. 270; Haskell v. New Bedford, 108 Mass. 208; Kranz v. Bal- timore, 64 Md. 491 ; Brayton v. Fall River, 113 Mass. 218; Barron v. Bal- timore, 2 Am. Jour. 103; Morse v. Worcester, 139 Mass. 389; Gillery v. Madison, 53 Wis. 510. ^Frostburg v. Hutchins, (Md. 89) 16 Alt. E. 380; Gross v. Lampasas, (Tex. 90) 11 S. W. 1086; Child v. Bos- ton, 4 Allen, 41 ; Gilluly v. Madison, 63 Wis. 518; Ball v. Winchester, 34 N. H. 435; Gilman v. Laconia, 55 lb. 130; Reeves v. Toronto, 21 Up. Can. Q. B. 160; Niras v. Troy, 59 N. Y. 500; Stainton v. Metro. Board of Works, 23 Beav. 225 ; Barton v. Syra- cuse, 36 N. Y. 54; Cator v. Lenisham r)ist.,5 B. & S. 115; Perdue v. Ching- nacousy, 25 Up. Can. Q. B. 61 ; Darby V. Crowland, 38 lb. 338; Farrell v. London, 12 lb. 347; Coghlan v. Otta- wa, 1 App. (Can.) R. 54. * Indianapolis v. Huffer, 30 Ind. 235 ; Rice V. Evansville, 107 lb. 7; Cum- mins v. Seymour, 79 lb. 491; North Vernon v. Voegeler, 103 lb. 314; Evansville v. Decker, 84 lb. 825; Weis V. Madison, 75 lb. 241; Craw- fordsville v. Bond, 96 lb. 236; Terre Haute V. Hudnut, 112 lb. 542. 5 Stoddard v. Saratoga, (N. Y. 91) 27 N. E. R. 1030; Young v. City, 27 Mo. App. 201 ; Seymour v. Cummins, 119 Ind. 148; Rochester W. Lead Co. v. Rochester, 3 N. Y. 463; Thurston V. St. Joseph, 51 Mo. 510; Barton v. Syi-acuse, 36 N. Y. 54; Seifert v. Brooklyn, 101 lb. 36; Lloyd v. New York, 5 lb. 369; Nims v. Troy, 59 lb. 500; Mills v. Brooklyn, 32 lb. 489; Smith V. New York, 66 lb. 295; Mc- Carthy V. Syracuse, 46 lb. 194; La- cour V. New York, 3 Duer, 406; Par- sons V. Bethnal Green, 17 L. T. 211; Parker v. Lowell, 11 Gray, 353; Hol- liday v. St. Leonardo Par., 11 C. B. 192; Wilson v. New York, 1 Denio, 595; Grant v. Brooklyn, 41 Barb. 381; Logansport v. Wright, 25 Ind. 512; Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich. 165; Mar- tin v. Brooklyn, 1 Hill, 545; Mem- 735 §355 MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS. [CH. XVII. proper condition of repair, and free from obstructions. Since the abutting owners have been assessed for the expense of its construction, they have a right to use the sewer, and may re- cover damages for the failure to keep the sewer in such a con- dition of repair that it may be of use to them.^ If the city permit a sewer to become obstructed, so that the water flows back through the private drains connected with it, and into cel- lars or basements, it will be liable for such negligence for creat- ing a nuisance to others.^ The courts will also protect property owners against any acts of wanton or malicious injury to their property, on the part of municipal officials, in the construction or management of its sewers.^ And it is a well settled rule in many of the States that, if the municipality, in constructing drains and sewers, collects the surface water of a large territory, which does not naturally flow in the direction of the adjoining land, and will- fully causes it to be precipitated upon the premises of an indi- vidual, by which damage is done him, the city will undoubtedly be liable.* So, also, a city was held liable for injury, caused by phis V. Lasser, 9 Humph. "757; Melleu V. West. R. R. Co., 4 Gray, .501 ; Munn V. Pittsburgh, 40 Pa. St. 364; Child V. Boston, 4 Allen, 41; Delmonico v. New York, 1 Sandf. 222; Wheeler v. Worcester, 10 Allen, 591; Mears v. Wilmington, 9 Ired. L. To; Eastman V. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284; see cases cited, § 349. 1 Buchanan v. Duluth, 40 Minn. 402; Frostburg v. Duffy, 70 Md. 47; Buchanan v. Duluth, 42 N. W. R. 204; Kranz v. Baltimore, 64 Md. 491; Wendell v. Mayor, 4 Keyes, 261; Tay- lor V. Austin, 32 Minn. 247; Master- ton V. Mt. Vernon, 58 N. T. 391; Stock V. Boston, 2 N. E. R. 871; Semple v. Vicksburg, 62 Miss. 63. 2 Boston Belting Co. v. Boston, 149 Mass. 44; Elliott v. Oil City, 18 Atl. E. 553; Denver v. Capelli, 4 Col. 25 ; Smith v. New York, 66 N. Y. 295 ; Thurston V. St. Joseph, 51 Mo. 510; Hines v. Lookport, 50 X. Y. 236; Seifert V. Brooklyn, 101 lb. 136; New 736 York V. Furze, 3 Uill, 612; Nims v. Troy, 59 N. Y. 500. ' Whipple V. Fair Haven, 21 Atl.' E. 533; Mayor v. Randolph, 4 W. & S. 514; Reynolds v. Shreveport, 13 La. An. 426; Rounds v. Mumford,2 R. I. 145. * Young V. Com'rs, 25 N. E. R. 689; Follman v. Mankato, 45 Minn. 457; Torrey v. Scranton, (Pa. 90) 19 Atl. R. 351 ; Bates v. Westborough, (Mass. 90) 23 N. E. R. 1070; Slack v. Law- rence, (N. J. 90) 19 Atl. R. 663. In Ashley v. Port Huron, 35 Mich. 296, Mr. Chief Justice Cooley uses this vigorous language : "It is very mani- fest from this reference to the au- thorities, that they recognize in mu- nicipal corporations no exemption from responsibility where the injury an individual has received is a direct injury accomplished by a corporate act which is in the nature of a trespass upon him. The right of an individual to the occupation and enjoyment of CH. XVII.] LIABILITY FOR TOKTS. §355 discharging a public sewer upon private laud, and into a mill pond.i A city has no right to pour its sewage into an artificial body of water owned by others.^ But it may connect its system of drainage with any natural stream of water, such as a river or brook provided it use due care, so that the privileges of the his premises is exclusive, and the pub- lic authorities have no m ore liberty to trespass upon it than has a private individual. If the corporation send people with picks and spades to cut a street through it without first ac- quiring the right of way, it is liable for a tort; but it is no more liable under such circumstances than it is when it pours upon his land a flood of water by a public sewer, so con- structed that the flood must be a necessary result. Each is a trespass and in each instance the city exceeds its lawful authority. A municipal charter never gives and never could give authority to appropriate the freehold of a citizen without compen- sation, whether it be done through an actual taking of it for streets or buildings, or by flooding it so as to interfere with the owner's posses- sion." See, also, Nevins v. Peoria, 41 111. 502; Smith v. Tripp, 13 R. I. 152; Aurora V. Gillett, 56 111. 122; Inman v. Tripp, 11 R. I. 520; Shaw- neetown v. Mason, 82 111. 337 ; Elgin y. Kimball, 90 111. 356; Bloomington v. Urokan, 11 lb. 194; Lynch v. New York, 76 K Y. 60; Noonan v. Albany, 79 lb. 470; Ellis v. Iowa City, 29 Iowa, 229; Brown V. Sarnia, 11 Up. Can. Q. B. 87; Eowe v. Portsmouth, 56 N. H. 291 ; Eaton v. Boston C. & M. E. E., 51 lb. 504; Perdue v. Chinquaconsy, 25 Up. Can. Q. B. 61; Arimond v. Green- bay & Miss. Can. Co., 31 Wis. 316; Eowe V. Rochester, 29 Up. Can. Q. B. 590; Huddleston v. West Bellevlew, 111 Pa. St. 110; Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Can. Co., 13 Wall. 166; 47 Attorney Genl. v. Hackney Local Bd. L. E., 20 Eq. 626; Davis v. Crawiords- ville, 119 Ind. 1; Byi-nes v. Cohoes, 67 N. Y. 204; Eychlicke v. St. Louis, lis. W. E. 1001; Burton V. Chatta- nooga, 7 Lea, 739 ; McClure v. Redwig, 28 Minn. 186; Attorney General v. Leeds, L. R. 5 Ch: App. 583; Noble V. St. Albans, 56 Vt. 522; Hitchins V. Frostburg, 68 Md. 100; Rutherford v. Halley, 105 N. Y. 632 ; West Orange V. Field, 37 N. J. E. 600 ; Peters v. Fergus Falls, 35 Minn. 549; Blakely V. Devine, 36 lb. 53; Pye v. Man- kato, 36 lb. 373; Manning v. Lowell, 130 Mass. 21; Herring v. District, 3 Mackey, 572; Arn v. Kansas City, 15 Fed. Rep. 336; Gillison v. Charles- town, 16 W. Va. 282; Addy v. Janes- ville, 70 Wis. 401 ; Pennoyer v. Sagi- naw, 8 Mich. 534; Crabtree v. Baker, 75 Ala. 91; Flagg v. Worcester, 13 Gray, 601; Winn v. Rutland, 52 Vt. 481 ; Livingston v.McDonald, 21 Iowa, 160; Bastable v. Syracuse, 72 N. Y. 64; Bentz v. Armstrong, 8 Watts & S. 40; Foot V. Bronson, 4 Lansing, 47; O'Brien v. St. Paul, 25 Minn. 331; Fremont v. Marley, 25 Neb. 138 ; Sulli- van V. Phillips, 110 Ind. 320; Seifert V. Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 136, 143; Olson V. St. Paul, 38 Minn. 419. 1 Bloomington v. Murnin, 36 HI. App. 647; Beach v. Elmira, 58 Hun, 606; Bacon v. Boston, 28 N. E. R. 9; Smith V. Atlanta, 75 Ga. 110; Vale Mills V. Nashua, 63 N. H. 136; Reid V. Atlanta, 73 Ga. 523. 2 Columbus V. Hydr. Woolen MiUs Co., 33 Ind. 435. 737 §355 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. xvn. riparian owners are not thereby impaired, or their property in- jured.i 1 Waffle V. N. T. Cen. E. R. Co., 58 Barb. 413; O'Brien v. St. Paul, 18 Minn. 176; Gould v. Booth, 66 N. T. 738 62, 65 ; Kol>s v. Minneapolis, 22 Minn. 159. CHAPTER XVIII. MANDAMUS AND QUO WAEKANTO. Section. 359— Nature of mandamus and wherein it differs fro.m in- junction. 360 — Mandamus against municipal corporations. 361 — Mandamus and quo warranto distinguished. 362 — ^Distinction between discre- tionary and mandatory powers, as limiting the right to mandamus. 363— "Who may apply for the writ. 364 — ^Prior judgment, when not necessary. 365 — Practice— Effect of laches. 366 — Framing the writ and order to show cause. 367 — Importance of a correct di- rection and proper service of the alternative writ. 368 — Return to the alternative writ. 369 — Peremptory writ, when al- lowed — Means of enforcing obedience. 370— Final judgment— Effect of resignation or death of of- ficials. 371 — Mandamus, as applicable to municipal elections and to elective officers. 372 — Mandamus, as applicable to removal and suspension of officials. 373 — Mandamus, as applicable to custodians of public rec- ords and of public funds. Section. 374 — Mandamus against school officers. Slo—Mandamus in aid of the rights of municipal credi- tors. 376 — Mandamus to compel levy of a special tax for specific object. 377 — Mandamus, as applicable to municipal improvements. 378 — Nature of quo warranto. 379 — By whom proceedings are in- stituted. 380 — Practice and procedure — Power discretionary. 381 — How far remedy by quo war- ranto is superseded by spe- cial statutory proceedings for the control of contested elections. 382 — User on part of usurper nec- essary. 383— The burden of proof. 384 — Quo warranto proceedings to secure the forfeiture of a municipal charter. 385 — Quo warranto to test the legal existence of municipal cor- porations. 386 — Effect of judgment in quo warranto. 387 — Effect of judgment, when not rendered during official term. § 359. Nature of mandamus and wherein it differs from injunction. — An application for a writ of mandamus has for its object the coercion of a corporation through its agents or 739 §359 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. xvin. officers, a public board or official or ah inferior court, to perform some lawful act or duty imposed upon him or it. The original theory upon which the writ of mandamus was issued was that its issuance was an exercise of the royal preroga- tive, and a means by which the king through the judges of the king's bench could effectuate that control and supervision which he possessed over public bodies and officials, municipal and other corporations included ; ^ but as the royal vigilance had usually to be stimulated and invoked by the individual aggrieved, the early theory of a spontaneous exercise of the roj'^al power gradu- ally disappeared, until in America the remedy by mandamus has become in practice a species of civil action at law.^ Its usefulness is limited in that it is applicable in most in- stances to those only who have a public or corporate duty^ to perform ; and it cannot be used even then when, as is now fre- quently the case, other and more appropriate remedies exist.* Upon the theorj'-, that the arbitrary supervision and direction lAtt. Gen. v. Boston, 123 Mass. 460; People v. Collins, 19 Wend. 65; 3 Blackstone Com. 110; Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, vol. 10, p. 92; Com. v. Pittsburgh, 34 Pa. St. 510. 2 Kendall V. Stokes, 3 How. 100; Porter v. State, 78 Tex. 591 ; State v. Eddy, (Mont. 91) 25 Pac. K. 1032; Wood V. Lenawee Arc. Judge, 84 Mich. 521 ; State v. Mayo, 8 So. E. 52; 42 La. An. 637; U. S. v. Hall, 7 Maokey, 14; Tennant v. Crocker, (Mich. 91) 48 N. W. E. 577; State v. Heege, 40 Mo. App. 650; Woffenden V. Board, 1 Ariz. 237; 25 Pac. E. 647; State V. Association, (La. 91) 9 So. E. 564; Brown v. Crego, 29 Iowa, 321; Eosenbaum v. Bauer, 120 U. S. 461; Davis V. Corbiu, 112 lb. 36; State v. Williams, 69 Ala. 311; In re Fleming, 4 Hill, 581; McBane v. People, 50 111. 503; Com. v. Allegheny Co., 32 Pa. St. 218; Chamberlain V. Warburton, 1 Utah, 267; State v. Kirkwood, 29 Md. 85 ; State v. Jennings, 56 Wis. 113; Kentucky v. Denison, 24 How. 66, 97, 98; Wilkinson v. Prov. Bk., 3 E. I. 22. 740 8 Trinity & S. Ey. Co. v. Lane, 79 Tex. 643; 16 S. W. E. 18; State v. Engle, (Ind. 91) 26 N. E. E. 1077; Cope V. State, 126 Ind. 51; State v. Eaine, 47 Ohio St. 447; 25 N. E. E. 54; Board V. Gantt, (Md. 9) 21 Atl. E. 548; Peo- ple V. Blackhurst, 25 Abb. N. C. 230; State V. Manitowoc, 52 Wis. 432; Crandall v. Amador, 20 Cal. 72; King Williams Co. v. Munday, 2 Leigh 165; Louisville & N. A., etc., v. State, 25 Ind. 177; Cleveland v. Jersey City, 39 N. J. L. 629; State v. McCrillus, 4 Kan. 250; People v. Edmonds, 15 Barb. 529 ; Baker v. Johnson, 41 Me. 15. 4 United States v. Windom, 137 U. S.636; Haines V. Saginaw Co., (Midi. 91) 49 N. W. 310; People v. Board oi Education, 15 N". Y. S. 308; McGee V. State, (Neb. 92) 49 N. W. E. 220; State v. Board, (Mont. 92) 25 Pac. E. 440; McLeod v. Scott, (Or. 92) 26 Pac. E. 1061; Delgado v. Chavez, 11 S. Ct. 874; 140 U. S. 586; People v. Gilmore, 5 Gilm. (111.) 242; Com. v. Allegheny Co. Com'rs, 37 Pa. St. 277. CH. XVin.] MANDAMUS AND QTTO WARRANTO. §359 of public officials, and of corporations, formerly vested in the king, have under our system been delegated by the people to the lawmaking power subject to constitutional regulation and re- straint, the Legislatures in nearly every State of the Union have by statute improved the remedy and extended its force and scope.^ Although the writs of mandamus and injunction are similar in that both are commands to do or refrain from doing a particular act,^ they differ in very material respects and are not concurrent ; nor will either be granted when the facts of the case show that the other is the proper remedy.* What a court of equity can do through the far-reaching pre- ventive powers of an injunction, which by its pliability can be shaped to the infinite variety of human affairs, it were useless to attempt through a process so narrow and limited in effect as the writ of mandamus.'^ But when the duties to be performed, or the public services to be rendered, are imperative and minis- terial, and the object souglit is rather to compel the performance of a legal, than to restrain or prevent the commission of an illegal, act, a mandamus is the most effective if not the only remed}^^ But if there exist concurrent remedies, as a suit for damages or a proceeding by writ of quo warranto or indictment, yet if the rights of the applicant will not receive adequate protection or redress thereby, he is entitled to a mandamus.^ 1 Sikes V. Kansom, 6 Johnson (N. Y.) 279; Eex v. Barker, 3 Burr. 1265; Inre Turner, u Ohio, 542; N. Y. Code Civ. Pro. §§206T-2990. 2 Com. V. Boone Co., 82 Ky. 632; Legg V. Annapolis, 42 Md. 203. "Proper remedy of bondholders against defaulting municipality is by mandamus and not in equity. 2 Dil. Mun. Corp., sees. 854, 855; Gay v. Gilmore, 76 Ga. 725; Thompson v. Allen Co., 115 U. S. 550; Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 481 ; Walkley v. Muscatine, 6 lb. 481. 1 Butterworth V. U. S., 112 U. S. 50; Smith v. Bourbon Co., 127 U. S. 105 (1887). = Gormley v. Day, 28 N. E. R. 693; 114 111. 195; State v. Shakespeare, 41 La. An. 156; McCullough v. Brook- lyn, 23 Wend. 459; People v. New York, 10 lb. 393; People v. Chenango Co., 11 N. Y. 563; Atty. General v. Boston, 123 Mass. 460; State v. Graves, 19 Md. 351; Presoott v. Du- quesne Bor., 48 Pa. St. 118; Bedford etc. V. Anderson, 45 lb. 388; People V. Board, 20 N". Y. S. 1 (1892); People v. Salomon, 46 111. 415 ; Pond v. Par- rott, 42 Conn. 13 ; In re Parker, 120 U. . S. 746; Craig v. Leitensdorfer, 123 U. S. 209; Washington Univ. v. Green, 1 Md. Ch. 97; Sherman v. Clark, 4 Nev. 138; People v. Insps., 4 Mich. 187 ; Crawford v. Carson, 35 Ark. 565. sPeo. v. Alb. R. R., 24 N. Y. 261, 269; Peo. v. Troy etc., 37 How. Pr. 437; Union Pao. R. R. v. Hall, 91 U. S. 343, 355; Smith v. Bourbon Co., 127 U. S. 105. 741 § 360 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [cH. xvin. § 360. Mandamus against mnnicipal corporations. — From the above it maybe deduced as a general rule that the writ will lie when it is shown that the injured party or community has no prompt, clear and adequate means of compelling the perform- ance of a non-discretionary or imperative duty.^ If the ag- grieved party has the right to bring an action to recover damages for the municipal neglect of duty, this extraordinary remedy will not lie.^ But if such a corporation or its ofi&cials refuse, or unreasonably neglect, to perform a duty obligatory upon it or them, either by its charter or by the general law, and there is no adequate remedy by which a prompt and satisfactory perform- ance can be enforced, the law is clear that a mandamus will be granted.^ But when in general the writ would be of no 1 State V. McGowan, 89 Mo. 1.56; In re Bradstreet, 1*7 Pet. 634; In re Manny, 14 How. 24; In re Cutting, 94 U. S. 14;Tennantv. Arcker, (Mich. 92) 48 N. W. E. 577; Manus v. Givens, 7 Leigh, 689; King Williams Co. v. Munday, 2 lb. 168; Page v. Clop- ton, 30 Gratt.415; Cope v. State, 126 Ind. 51; Randolph v. Stahlnalcer, 13 lb. 523 ; Kent v. Dickinson, 25 lb. 817 ; L. & F. Ins. Co. V. Wilson, 8 Pet. 291; L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Addams, 9 lb. 571; Daw-son v. Fred'k Co., 2 H. & M. (Va.) 132; Brown V. Crippen, 4 lb. 173; United States v. Lawrence, 3 Dall. 42; People v. Crotty, 93 111. 180; Zanone v. Md. City, 103 lb. 552; St. Clair V. Keller, 85 lb. 396; People v. Trustees, 86 lb. 613 ; Smalley v. Yates, 36 Kan. 519; State v. Hill, 32 Minn. 275; State v. Newman, 91 Mo. 445; Douglas V. Com. , 108 Pa. St, 559 ; State V. Omaha, 14 Neb. 265; State v. Wil- son, 21 lb. 572; Ferry Co. v. Bos- ton, 101 Mass. 359 ; Cairo v. Campbell, 116 111. 305. 2 State V. Cape Girardeau Co., (Mo. Sup. 92) 19 S. W. E. 23; Sessions v. Boyken, 78 Ala. 328; Needham v. Thresher, 49 Cal. 393; McAi-thur v. Duncan, 34 Mich. 27; Lexington v- MuUiken, 7 Gray, 280 ; State v. Union 742 Twp., 8 Vroora, 343; State v. Mount, 21 La. An. 755; State v. Titus, 47 N. J. L. 89; People v. Wood, 35 Barb. 653; People v. Booth, 49 lb. 31; People V. Thompson, 25 lb. 73; State V. County Jud., 5 Iowa, 380; State v. Supervisors, 29 Wis. 79 ; Burnet v. Auditor, 12 Ohio, 54; Com. v. Eodes, 5 Mon. (Ky.) 318; Mansfield v. Fuller, 50 Mo. 338; State v. Mayor, 4 Neb. 260 ; People v. Chenango, 11 N. T. 563 ; Brown v. Euse, 69 Tex. 589; Com'rs V. Hicks, 2 Ind. 527; People v. Clarke, 50 111. 213; Mich. Pav. Co. v. Detroit, Mich. 201 ; Portwood v. Montgomery, 52 Miss. 523. ' State V. Sliakespeare, 43 La. An. 92; People v. Com. Council, 85 Cal. 369; 24 Pac. K. 727; Smith v. Law- rence, (S. D. 92) 49 N. W. 7; Coll v. Board, 47 N. W. E. 227; 83 Mich. 367; Cope V. State, 126 Ind. 51; State v. Heege, 40 Mo. App. 650; Thomason V. Euggles, 69 Cal. 465; Smalley v. Yates, 36 Kan. 519; Silverthorne v. Warren E. E., 33 N. J. L. 372; Hall V. Somerswarth, 39 N. H. 511; Treat V. Middletown, 8 Conn. 243 ; Com. v. Allegheny, 32 Pa. St. 218; State v. Eaine, 47 Ohio St. 447; Atty. General V. Myers, 58 Hun, 218; People v. Fitzgerald, 59 lb. 625; Labette CH. XVni.] MANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO. §360 avail,^ as when the performance of the act demanded has be- come unlawful,^ or when the occasion for it has passed and a mandamus would thus be futile, the court will not grant it.* But the right of the relator must be clear, and the facts ad- duced by him must show prima facie a case for the relief de- manded.* This does not mean that his case must exclude any and every possible doubt as to its legal sufBciency, or that he must show conclusively that he is without any other legal rem- edy ; but only that he should present fair and reasonable grounds for his demand,^ and on such grounds the writ will ordinarily be granted. But the municipal board or official affected will be allowed to disprove in the return the jurisdictional facts, which are stated by the plaintiff or relator.® On the other hand, if the authority of the municipality to do the act be uncertain, a mandamus will not be granted ; ^ nor gen- erally for the control of rights of a purely private nature. For in such cases the party has an adequate remedy, by which he may recover damages or obtain a decree for specific performance in equity.^ Accordingly, it has been repeatedly decided that no mandamus will lie to compel the payment of salary by a munic- ipality, provided the official to whom it is owing can sue for it V. Moulton, 112 U. S. 217; U. S. v. Oswego, 28 Fed. R. 55 ; Williamsport V. Com., 90 Pa. St. 498; Hawkins v. Hawke Co. Com'rs, 14 Ind. 521; Mc- Bride v. Grand Rapids, 47 Mich. 236; People V. N. Y. Pol. Board, 107 N. T. 235; Martin v. Tripp, 51 Me. 184; State V. Kirkland, 29 Md. 85. 'Williams V. Com'rs, 35 Me. 345; Spirit Aph. v. Randolph, 58 Vt. 192; People V. Dulany, 96 111. 203; Fisher V. Charleston, 17 W. Va. 595 ; Roberts V. Smith, 63 Ga. 213; Wells v. Mason, 23 W. Va. 456; Cook v. Candee, 52 Ala. 109; Lamar v. Wilkins, 28 Ark. 34; Clark V. Crane, 57 Cal. 629; Ex parte Hum, (Ala. 91) 9 So. R. 615; Grigsby V. Bowles, 79 Tex. 13; Mills V. Brevoort, 77 Mich. 210. 2Peo.v. Hyde Pk., 117 111. 462; Boss V. Lane, 3 S. & M. (Miss.) 695. sjji re Bristol, 3 Q. B. Div. 10; Gormley v. Day, 28 N. E. R. 693; 14 111. 185. * People V. Board of Canvassers, 129 N. T. 360; Smith v. Railroad, 67 111. 191; People v. Newton, 112 N. T. 396; Langdon v. Mayor, 93 N. T. 145; Morthorst v. K. Y. Cen. R. R., 66 lb. 609; U. S. v. Bank, 1 Cranch. 7. ^ See cases cited under sec. 359, ante. 6 People V. Stevens, 5 Hill, 616 State V. Warren, 32 N. J. L. 439; Peo, V. Ransom, 2 N. Y. 490; see post, sec, 365, Practice and Procedure. ' People V. Bloomington, 38 111 App. 125 ; State v. Guttenberg Coun cil, 39 N. J. L. 660. 8 Parrott v. Bridgeport, 44 Conn 180; Peo. v. East Saginaw, 40 Mich 336. 743 §361 MUNICIPAL CORPOKATIONS. [CH. XVIII. in an ordinary common law action.^ If he cannot sue at com- mon law or in equity, mandamus will lie, unless the office be occupied by another, and the title to it is disputed, when a quo warranto is the proper remedy.^ § 361. Mandamns and quo warranto distinguished. — Al- though in some jurisdictions these two remedies are concurrent when the title to official employment is involved,' this is very far from being a universal rule. In proper cases mandamus will lie to compel the admission of one legally elected to a municipal office * if the office be vacant, and the claimant's title to the office is undisputed. If it is sought to try the title to the office between the rightful claimant and a usurper, mandamus would not lie, there being already an adequate remedy in quo warranto? A certificate, showing the election of a municipal official or his commission, is prima fade evidence of his right to the office, and is so far conclusive that it cannot be questioned in any col- lateral proceedings whatever, and only in a proceeding to which the official is made defendant, in an information in the nature of quo warranto ; when the court will inquire into the validity of his election or appointment.® In all cases where a person is in actual if not legal possession of an office, and is exercis- ing the duties of such office under color of right, conferred by election or appointment, the validity or legality of such election 1 Baker v. Johnson, 41 Me. 15 ; Com- monwealth V. Johnson, 2 Binn. (Pa.) 275; Peo. v. Edmonds, 15 Barb. 529; Peo. V. N. Y. Sup., 32 N. Y. 473; State V. Jones, 1 Ired. L. 134. ^ Fleming v. Guthrie, 3 Law Rep. An. 53, and oases there cited, sec. 368, on quo warranto. estate V. Falconer, 44 Ala. 696; State V. Palmer, 10 Keb. 203; In re Eeid, 50 Ala. 439. ^ Eaton V. Burke, (N. H. 92) 22 Atl. K. 452; State v. Shakespeare, 43 La. An. 92; State v. Smith, (Mo. 91) 15 S. W. R. 614; Schelir v. Board, 83 Mich. 367; Cross v. R. R. Co., 12 S. E. E. 765; 34 W. Va. 742; Smith v. Rahway, 33 N. J. L. Ill; McDermott V. Miller, 45 lb. 251; Ellison v. Ra- leigh, 89 K. C. 125, but may beref used 744 pending quo warranto proceedings, Hannon v. Halifax, 89 N. C. 123. 5 Kelly V. Edwards, 69 Cal. 460; Cochran v. Cleary, 22 Iowa, 75 ; Peo- ple V. Goetling, 133 N. Y. 569; In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200; Biggs v. Mc- Bride, 17 Or. 640; People v. Matte- son, 17 111. 167; Brennan v. Brad- shaw, 53 Tex. 330; Hullman v. Hon- comp, 5 Ohio St. 237; Worthley v. Steen, 43 N. J. L. 542. « People V. Riordan, 41 K W. 482; People V. Thacher, 55 N. Y. 525; People V. Van Flyck, 4 Cow. 297; People V. Vail, 20 Wend. 12; State V. Frazier, 98 Mo. 426; Hunnecutt v. State, 12 S. W. R. 106; Ex parte Scarborough, (S. C. 91 ) 12 S. E. E. 666. CH. XVin.] MANDAMUS AND QTJO WARRANTO. §361 or appointment will not be adjudicated upon an application for a mandamus, but only upon an information in the nature of a quo warranto. Indeed it may be laid down as a principle of uni- versal application, that where the applicant has a remedy by quo warranto, mandamus will not lie.^ But there are authori- ties which hold that, in the case of a groundless claim to, or intrusion into, an oiBce by an interloper, or an utterly illegal retention of an office, after the expiration of the incumbent's term of office, and the election of his successor, the rightful claimant will not be compelled to resort to a quo warranto ; but he may have at once a mandamus to compel a delivery to him of the possession of the office, and of the books and papers be- longing thereto.^ In consequence of the short periods for which officials are elected in American municipalities, regret has been expressed that a claimant to an office, which it is alleged has been usurped, is put to the dilatory process of an information in the nature of a quo warranto, and the opinion has been expressed that a court would be justified in granting a mandamus so far as to see that the incumbent is " a bona fide possessor of the place, and that there is a real dispute and fair doubt as to which party has the legal title." ^ It has been held in one State that mandamus was the only complete remedy, " as under the quo warranto informa- tion the judgment might remove the occupant but would not install the claimant." * In New York by Code Civ. Pro. 1948, et seq., the attorney- general may, on the relation of a private individual, bring " an action against the usurper of an office or franchise," triable by jury, and may obtain an order of arrest against defendant. If the defendant when ousted refuses to deliver on demand the books and papers of the office, he is guilty of a misdemeanor, and the successful party can recover costs and damages against him. And the court may in its discretion impose on the unsuc- ' Com. V. Philada. Co., 5 Rawle, 73; State v. Gaslight Co., 25 Mo. App. 44; State v. Thompson, 36 Mo. 70; Underwood v. White, 27 Ark. 382; Warner v. Myers, 3 Oreg. 218; State V. Rodman, 43 Mo. 256; Bon- ner V. State, 7 Ga. 473; Anderson v. Colson, 1 Neb. 172; State v. Bryce, 7 Ohio, pt. 2, 82. 2 People T. KildufE, 55 111. 492 ; Lind- say V. Saokett, 20 Tex. 516. 8 2 Dil. Mun. Corp. § 846. «Luoe V. Board, 153 Mass. 108; Keoughv, Board, 31 N. E. R. 587; Harwood v. Marshall, 9 Md. 83. 745 § 362 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIOKS. [CH. xvni. cessful defendant in this action, as part of the final judgment, a fine not to exceed f 2,000.i § 362. Distinction between discretionary and mandatory powers as limiting the right to mandamus. — This distinc- tion is of great importance in its bearing upon the granting of the writ. As discretionary duties are, except in circumstances of gross abuse and injustice, beyond judicial control, it is well settled in modern times that a mandamus will not be granted to ' compel their performance.^ If, therefore, the law confers upon the municipal officers a clear and unmistakable power to decide upon the expediency or necessity of measures; or if the municipality is invested with the capacity of exercising a deliberative choice between several courses, either of which is legal and within the scope of the municipal powers, no mandamus will be granted.^ Thus, when a statute calls for the acceptance of the bid of the lowest responsible bidder, a discretionary power is therewith granted ; and if the municipality acts in good faith, in determining the responsibility of the bidders, mandamus will not lie.* But if, as is sometimes the case, a mandamus is asked for to compel the performance of a duty clearly discretionary, the court wiU grant it when the discretion is abused, or the officer is acting in bad faith, and great injustice will otherwise be done.^ Inasmuch as any gross, fraudulent or unlawful abuse of dis- 1 § 1956. 2 People V. Martin, 131 N. Y. 196; Grant v. Detroit, 51 N. W. 997; State V. Tippecanoe Co., (Ind. 92) 30 N. E. K. 892; Wintz v. Board, 28 W. Va. 227; State v. Mt. Pleasant, 16 Wis. 613; Ho-we v. Crawford, 47 Pa. St. 361; People v. Martin, 131 N. T. 196; Mich. City v. Roberts, 34 Ind. 471; State V. Essex Co., 23 N. J. L. 214; Howe V. Crawl Co., 47 Pa. St. 361; Grant V. Detroit, 51 N. W. R. 997; State V. .Jefferson, 22 La. An. 611; Dechert v. Com'rs, 113 Pa. St. 229; People V. McLean, 16 N. T. S. (1891) 401; State v. Tippecanoe Co., (Ind. 92) 30 N. E. R. 892; People v. Com. Council, 78 N. T. 39; People v. Fair- cliild, 67 lb. 336; Ferry Co, v. Bos- 746 ton, 101 Mass. 488; State v. Francis, 95 Mo. 44; Mageev. Sup., lOCal.376; Gardenier V. Sup., 17 St. Rep. (N. Y.) 983; Supervisors V. People, 110 lU. 511; State v. Demaree, 80 Ind. 519; In re Town Board, 7 N. Y. Supp. 165; Pfister v. State, 82 Ind. 382. sSansom v. Mercer, 68 Tex. 488; Peo. V. Com. Counc, 78 N. Y. 39. « Grand v. Detroit, (92 Mich.) 51 K. W. R. 999; People v. Board, 5 N. Y. S. 392; Douglas v. Com'rs, 108 Pa. St. 559. 5 Keogli T. Wilmington, 4 Del. Ch. 491; Glencoe v. Peo., 78") HI. 382; Amperse v. Kal. Counc, 59 Mich. 78; Barrett v. New Orleans, 33 La. An. 542. CH. XVIII. j MANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO. § 362 cretionary powers would as a misfeasance very likely render the municipal officer indictable, it seems, upon grounds already discussed, viz : the adequacy of other remedies, that the use of the writ in this connection must be very rare. Where the offi- cial is deprived of all discretion as to performance or nonper- formance of the act ; and the only discretion which he may exercise is as to the details of its execution, a mandamus will be granted to compel him to exercise his power for the accom- plishment of the substantial result, which is required of him by law.^ But when the power, though discretionary and conferred in language of a permissive character, is one whose exercise is re- quired for the furtherance of individual rights or public inter- ests, and their protection from irreparable injury, a mandamus will issue. So where the levy of a tax was dependent upon the belief in the public benefit to be derived from it, or upon the advisableness of employing a statutory power for the public good, a mandamus will lie.^ V. Louisville, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 9 ; State V. Shaw, 23 La. An. 790; State v. Pol. Jury, 29 lb. 146; In re State Board, 23 lb. 388; Kennedy v. Wash- ington, 3 Cranch C. C. 593 ; Magee v. Calavei-as Co., 10 Cal. 376; Mayor v. Morgan, 7 Mart. N". S. (La.) 1; State V. Wilm. Coun., 3 Barring. (Del.) 294; Poultney v. Lafayette, 12 Pe- ters, 472; Mich. City v. Roberts, 34 Ind. 471; U. S. v. Lawrence, 3 Dall. (U. S.) 42; Dechert v. Com., 113 Pa. St. 229; Deeham v. Johnson, 141 Mass. 23; Braconier v. Packard, 13(1 Mass. 50; Alirens v. Fiedler, 43 N. J. L. 400; Mau v. Liddle, 15 Nev. 271; Elkins V. Athearn, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 50; People V. Albany Co. Suprs., 12 Johns. (N. y.) 414; Hull v. Oneida Co., 19 lb. 259; Kice B. & F. Co. v. Worcester, 130 Mass. 575; Madison v. Smith, 83 Ind. 502; Hudman v. Slaugliter, 70 Ala. 546. 2 When keeping streets in repair being mandatory is enforceable by mandamus. State v. Brown, 38 Ohio 747 iRay V. Wilson, (Fla. 92) 10 So. E. 673; Ex parte Alabama State Bar Assn., (Ala. 91) 18 So. R. 768; Trinity & S. R. Co. V. Lane, 79 Tex. 643; Porter v. State, 78 lb. 591; United States V. Hall, 7 Mackey, 14; Atty. Gen, V. Boston, 123 Mass. 469 ; Bran- der V. Chesterfield, 5 Call. (Va.) .548; Memphis V. Brown, 97 U. S. 203, 300; United States v. Memphis, 97 lb. 284; United States v. Spurz, 102 lb, 407; Queen v. Haldimond, etc,, 7 Up. Can. L. J. 266; In re Augusta etc., 12 Up. Can. Q. B. 522; Coy v. Lyons, 17 Iowa, 1 ; Com. v. Parks, 9 Phila. (Pa.) 481; Treat v. Middle- town, 8 Conn. 243 ; Howe v. Craw- ford Co., 47 Pa. St. 361; People v. Cass Co. Com'rs, 77 111. 488; Parker V. Portland, 54 Mich. 308; Ex parte Black, 1 Ohio St. 30; People v. Board of Police, 19 N. Y. 188; In re Turner, 5 Ohio, 542; Martin v. Ingham, 36 Kan. 641; Com. v. Henry, 49 Pa. St. 530; Burns v. Bender, 36 Mich. 139; Buchoz V. Pray, 37 lb. 512; McKean § 362 MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS. [CH. xvin. If municipal officials, who are vested with discretionary pow- ers, refuse to exercise those powers when it becomes lawful and necessary for them to do so, a mandamus will issue, not to con- trol their discretion, but to compel them to exercise a power when public interests demand it.^ In the following cases of discretionary power mandamus has been refused: To compel approval of official bonds,^ or other bonds of sureties,^ granting a license ^ and to audit illegal claim. ^ § 363. Who may apply for the writ. — Upon the ancient theory, that the writ was an exercise of the royal prerogative, it has been argued that the State by its attorney-general is the proper agency to put in motion this remedy against a munici- pality. This is undoubtedly true, when the object sought for is a public one, viz., to enforce a legislative act or a municipal charter, and in such cases the State is entitled to the writ as a matter of right.^ In some States the performance of a public duty can only be compelled on mandamus procured by the attornej'-general.'^ But there has been of late years a wide diver- St. 344; State v. Staley, 38 lb. 259; Hammar v. Covington, 3 Met. (Ky.) 494; People V. Thaoher, 42 Hun, 319; Appleby v, N. York, 41 lb. 481 ; Louis- ville V. Kean, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 9; State V. Baton Rouge, 34 La. An. 1197; Uniontown v. Commonwealth, 34 Pa. St. 293; Meyer v. Carolan, 9 Tex. 250; Napa V. R. Co. v. Napa Co., 30 Cal. 435; State v. Orange, 31 N. J. L. 131 ; People v. Bloomington, 63 m. 207; Mich. City v. Roberts, 34 Ind. 471; Ind. v. Cine. R. R. Co., 37 lb. 489; Hull v. Siip'rs, 19 Johns. (N. Y.)259; Goodrich V. Chicago, 20111. 445; Ottawa v. People, 48 lb. 233; People V. Cass Co., 77 lb. 438; People V. La Salle, 84 lb. 303; People v. Dutchess, 58 N. T. 154; Com. v. Pitts- burgh, 34 Pa. St. 49B; Sup'rs v. U. S., 4 Wall. 435. Memphis v. Brown, 97 TT. S. 300; Rock Island etc. v. U. S., 4 Wall. 435 ; Robinson v. Butte Co. Sup., 43 Cal. 353; State v. New Orleans, 30 La. An. 129; Memphis v. United States, 97 U. S. 293; 97 lb. 284. 748 estate V. Lewis, 10 Ohio St. 46; Nelson v. Edwards, 55 Tex. 389; Ar- apahoe Co. v. Crotty, 9 Colo. 138; Lewis v. Marion, 14 Ohio St. 515; Beebe v. Robinson, 52 Ala. 67. 2McDuffie V. Cook, 65 Ala. 430; Mobile M. I. Co. v. Cleveland, 76 Ala. 321. 5 McHenry v. Township, 31 N. W. Rep. 602. « Heblich v. Judge, 10 S. W. R. 465; Devine v. Belt, 70 Md. 352; In re Knarr, 127 Pa. St. 554; 18 Atl. E. 639; State v. Kramer, 96 Mo. 75; Schlandeker v. Marshall, 72 Pa. St. 200; Dunbar v. Frazer, 78 Ala. 538; Walsford v. Weidein, 23 Kan. 601. 5 People V. Case, 19 N. Y. S. 625; People V. Greene Co., 39 Hun, 299. 6 State V. Hartford & N. H. R. K. Co., 29 Conn. 538; Peo. v. Attorney General, 22 Barb. 114; Peo. v. Tracy, 1 Deuio, 617; Mosesv. Kearney, 31 Ark. 261. ' Smith V. Saginaw, 45 N. W. E. 964; No. Pac. R. Co. v. Territory, 142 U. S. 49; Boblett v. Dresher, 10 OH. XVIII.] MANDAMDS AND QUO "WARRANTO. §364 geuce in the decisions of the American courts from the ancient theory.^ And it may now be considered as an established rule that the writ against a municipality will issue upon the applica- tion or relation of any private person ; provided he be interested as a citizen, and show facts which, in the discretion of the court, will warrant the issuance of the writ.^ The nature of the act, whose performance may be compelled, does not seem to make any difference, it being now the custom in most States for private persons to use the facilities afforded by the writ for the enforcement of rights of a purely private character, as well as those in which all the citizens residing in a municipality may have an interest.^ § 364. Prior judgment when not necessary. — When in the law, under which a municipality has entered into contract- ual relations, there exists a provision for the levy of a special tax, or for as much as may be necessary /or the purpose of meet- ing the obligation when it matures, mandamus is of right and there exists no necessity usually for the return of an execution Kan. 9 (1872) ; Wyandotte & K. C. Co. y. "Wyan Co. Comm'rs, 10 Kan. 331 ; Graves v. Cole, 3 Dak. 301; State y. Ware, 13 Greg. 380. 1 Union Pac. E. E. Co. y. Hall, 91 U. S. 843. 2 Eaton V. Burke, 22 Atl. E. 452; State V. Archibald, 43 Minn. 328; In re Whitney, 3 N.Y. S. 838; Pura- phrey y. Balto., 47 Md. 145; Peo. v. Brooklyn, 22 Barb. 404; Peo. v. Hal- sey, 53 lb. 547; Pike Co. Com'rs v. State, 11 111. 202; Hamilton v. State, 3 Ind. 452; Attorney General v. Bos- ton, 123 Mass. 460; State v. Eahyeay, 33 N. J. L. 110; People v. Collins, 19 Wend. 56; In re Fuller, 25 Ark. 261; Chambers v. Green, L. E. 20 Eq. 552; Kingv. Sev. & Wye. E. E., 2B. & Aid. 646; People v. San Francisco, 36 Cal. 504; Cannon v. Janirer, 3 Houst. 27; Bryan y. Cattell, 15 Iowa, 538 ; Peo. V. Mich. Uniy. Eeg., 4 Mich. 98; Peo. V. Inspectors, 4 lb. 187; Sanger y. Kennebec Co., 25 Me. 291; Bates v. Plymouth, 14 Gray, 163. ' Peo. V. Brooklyn Council, 77 N. T. 503; State y.Marshall Co., 7 Iowa, 186; State v. Eahway,33 N. J. L. 110; (to compel council to fill vacancy by holding an election;) State v. Baily, 7 Iowa, 390. As to private persons employing the writto enforce private rights, see Mt. Moriah Cera., 81 Pa. St. 235 ; State v. Eddy, (Mont. 91) 25 Pac. E. 1032; State v. Engle, (Ind. 91) 26 N. E. E. 1077; Wood v. Lena- wee, 84 Mich. 521; 47 N. W. R. 1103; United States v. Hall, 7 Mackey, 14; Cope V. State, 126 Ind. 51; Kendall v. Stokes, 5 How. (U. S.) 87; Peo. V. Man. Gas Co., 45 Barb. 136; Otta- wa V. People, 48 111. 233 ; Insurance Co. V. Baltimore, 23 Md. 296; Price ' y. Eiverside Co., 56 Cal. 431; Bryan V. Cattell, 15 Iowa, 538; Peo. v. State, 19 Mich. 392; Peo. v. Cummings, 72 N. T. 433 ; State v. Trustees, 4 Nev. 400; State v. Wright, 10 lb. 167; In re Wliitney, 3 N. T. S. 838; Cf. State v. Kearney, 25 Neb. 262. 749 § 365 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XVIII. niilla bona, before it may be issued ; and it is no defence that the corporation may have property which may be levied on by the creditor.! In such a case, too, it has been held that no pre- vious judgment is necessary,^ and this is particularly true, if, as in the case of municipal bonds or coupons, there exists no doubt as to their genuineness or validity, and the relator is himself their holder. On the same principles, mandamus will lie to collect official salaries, without recovering a prior judgment against the mu- nicipality for the same.^ § 365. Practice — ^Effect of laches. — The statutory rules which exist in our States, governing this extraordinary remedy, have received a strict construction ; * and the alternative writ or order to show cause, although usually founded upon an ex parte application or petition,^ is not of right and is never granted, ex- cept upon proper affidavits or pleading, verified by the oath of the application. A prima facie case must always be made out, and all facts showing non-performance clearly and precisely stated, 1 State V. Cutes, (Ohio 91) 26 N. E. R. 1052; State V. Davenport, 12 Iowa, 335; State v. Board, (N. J. 90) 20 Atl. R. 755 ; Ell. Co. v. Kitchen, 14 Bush. (Ky.)289; Knox Co. Comm'rs V. Aspinwall, 24 How. 376; Com. v. Pittsburgh, 34 Pa. St. 496; Louisiana V. St. Martin's Par., Ill U. S. 716; Limestone Co. v. Rather, 48 Ala. 433 ; Greenfield v. Moore, 113 Ind. 597; Walkley v. Muscatine, 6 Wall. 481; Hoffman v. Quinoy, 4 lb. 535 ; Ben- bow V. Iowa City, 7 lb. 313; Rock Is- land Co. Sup. V. U. S., 4 lb. 435; Brown v. Gates, 15 W. Va. 131 ; State Com'rs, 6 Ohio St. 280; Washn. Co. Sup. V. Durant, 9 Wall. 415 ; Daven- port V. Lord, 9 lb. 409. 2 Ray V. Wilson, (Fla. 92) 10 S. O. R. 673 ; Rah way Comrs. v. Rah way, 49 N. J. L. 384; Columbia Co. Comrs. V. King, 13 Fla. 451; Clark Co. v. Paris, 11 B. Mon. 143, 154; Com. v. Allegheny Co. Comrs., 37 Pa. St. 277; Maddox v. Graham, 2 Met. (Ky.) 56; 750 State V. Anderson, 8 Baxt. 249; State V. Clinton Comrs., 6 Oliio St. 280, 287; Com. V. Pittsburgh, 34 Pa. St. 496; Winslow V. Perquimas Co., 64 N. C. 218; Flagg v. Palmyi-a, 33 Mo. 440; Pegram v. Cleveland Co. , 64 N. C. 557 ; State V. Milw., 20 Wis. 87; People v. Brown, 55 K. T. 180; Newman v. Jus- tices, 5 Sneed (Tenn.); Stevenson v. Sum. Towns., 35 Iowa, 462; Brown V. Crego, 32 lb. 498. ' State V. Starling, 13 S.Car. 262; Honea v. Monroe, 63 Miss. 171; Just V. Township, 42 Mich. 573; Peo. v. Smith, 77 N. T. 347; State v. Ocean, 48 N. J. L. 70; Morley v. Power, 5 Lea, 691; Ray v. Wilson, (Fla. 92) 10 So. R. 678; State v. Hannon, 38 Kan. 593. ^Peo. V. Newton, 112 N. Y. 396; Langdon v. Mayor, 93 lb. 145. 5 Fisher v. Charleston, 17 W. "Va. 595; Haight v. Turner, 2 Johns. 371; Barnett v. Meredith, 10 Gratt. 651. CH. XVni.] MANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO. §365 in order to warrant the issuance of the writ.^ Thus, a man- damus will be refused when facts are stated sufficient only to raise a presumption, that respondents intend to refuse to per- form their duty when called upon.^ Public policy is against granting the writ, if the applicant be not free from laches.^ And it seems to be a question for the court to determine what shaU be deemed a sufficient delay to induce a refusal of the writ.* Although, in most respects, the issuance of the writ is wholly discretionary ; yet it is not generally considered laches, if ap- plication be made for it within the statutory period of limita- tion for bringing an ordinary action, provided there is no special statutory regulation to the contrary.^ The applicant for the writ must as a rule show a previous demand, coupled with a refusal to act on the part of the corpo- ration or official, on whom the duty was imposed.® But demand and refusal is unnecessary if clearly useless ; ^ and in the case of a public official or board, where no one is privately inter- ested sufficiently to induce him to make the demand, it is gen- erally only necessary that circumstances exist, which show iStatev. Gayhart, (Neb. 92) 51 N. W. E. 746; Schrever v. Livingston, 9 Mo. 196; Zeasey v. Bricker, 60 Pa. St. 9; Swan V. Gray, 44 Miss. 393; Speed v. Cocke, 57 Ala. 209; Cooke v. Tanner, 40 Conn. 378; Mason v. Minturn, 4 W. Va. 802; Ohio etc. v. Moundsville, 11 lb. 8. estate V. Tork Co., 8 Neb. 92; State v. Ramsey, lb. 286. 8 People V. Harper, 18 N. T. S. 896; Smith V. Eaton Co., 56 lb. 217; Chinn V. Trustees, 82 111. 236; State v. Jen- nings, 48 Wis. 549; People v. French, 12 Abb. (N". T.) N. Cas. 156; True v. MelTin, 43 N. H. 503; Mitchell v. Boardman, 10 Atl. Rep. 452. * Territory V. Potts, 3 Mont. 354; People V. Harper, 18 N. Y. S. 896; State V. Appleby, 25 S. C. 100; State T. Cardoza, 5 S. C. 297; People v. Sen. Com. Pleas, 2 Wend. 264; Walcott V. Mayor, 5 Mich. 249; Savannah v. State, 4 Ga. 26; True v. Melvin, 43 N. H. 503. speo. V. Super's, 12 Barb. 446; Prescott V. Gonser, 34 Iowa, 175; Klein v. Warren Co., 51 Miss. 578; Carroll v. Tishamingo, 28 lb. 38; Klein v. Smith Co., 54 lb. 254; State V. Hull, 17 Minn. 429; Bryson v. Spaulding, 20 Kan. 427. estate v. Adams, 19 Nev. 370; Crandall v. Amador Co., 20 Cal. 72; Jefferson Co. v. Arrighi, 51 Miss. 68; State V. Schaack, 28 Minn. 358 ; State V. Slick, 86 Ind. 501; Coit v. Elliott, 28 Ark. 204; Leroux v. Bay Circ. J., 45 Mich. 416; In re Whitney, 8 N. Y. Supp. 838; Peo. v. Hyde Pk., 117 111. 462; Kemmerer v. State, 7 Neb. 133; Peo. v. Whittemore, 4 Mich. 27; Dobbs V. Stauffer, 24 Kan. 12. ' U. S. V. Brooklyn, 8 Fed. Rep. 473 ; Chi. K. & W. R. Co. V. Harris, (Kan. 92) 30 Pac. R. 456. 751 §367 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATtONS. [cH. xvin. positive neglect or evasion of a legal duty,^ or a plain public manifestation of a disinclination to perform the desired official or corporate act. The demand need neither be made nor alleged. It is sufficient to prove the circumstances, which show such con- tinued and settled intention to evade the performance of a duty which is clearly required to be done by law.^ § 366. Framing the writ and order to show canse. — It is sometimes the practice upon an application for a writ, for the court to grant upon motion an order to show cause why a man- damus should not issue; but this is often dispensed with and an alternative writ of mandamus is granted, which as well as the order, may be demurred to or traversed by the municipal official on whom it is served.^ If, upon the service of the order to show cause, the defendant is unable to disprove the applicant's statement of facts by counter affidavits ; or if his demurrer be not well taken, an absolute mandamus will issue. This alternative writ must conform substantially to the affi- davits or pleadings on which it is founded, although in the ab- sence of statutory requirements no particular form or language is necessary, provided the command to do the required act or duty be certain and specific in its nature.* § 367. Importance of a correct direction and proper ser- vice of the alternative writ. — Although in strictness of lan- 1 state v. Bailey, 7 Iowa, 390; Chum- asero v. Potts, 2 Mont. 242; Palmer V. Stacy, 44 Iowa, 44; Alexander v. McDowell, 67 N. C. 330 (1872); Mad- dox V. Graham, 2 Met. (Ky.) 56, 70; Peo. V. Whittemore, 4 Micb. 27; Commonwealth v. Allegheny Co. Com'r's, 37 Pa. St. 277, 291; State V. Lehre, 7 Kich. (S. C.) 234, 322; Chi. K. & W. R. Co. V. Harris, (Kan. 92) 80 Pac. R. 456; State v. Kahway, 33 N. J. L. 110; Columbia Co. Comrs. V. King, 13 Fla. 451; Oroville, etc., V. Plumas Co. Sups., 37 Cal. 354. 2 Attorney General v. Boston, 123 Mass. 460 (1877) ; Maddox v. Graham, 2 Met. (Ky.) 56; Commonwealth v. Allegheny Co. Comm'rs, 37 Pa. St. 237; State v. Rahway Council, 33 N. J. L. 110. 752 8 State V. Cities, (Ohio 91) 26 N. E. R. 1052; Cape v. State, 126 Ind. 51; In re Shay, 15 N. T. 488. * As a discussion of the minute technicalities to be employed in fram- ing the writ would be out of place in a work of this character, the read- er is referred to Stephens' Nisi Prius, 2321; In reLoftus, 61 Hun, 627; Par- rish V. Reed, 2 Wash. St. 491; People V. Board, 62 Hun, 632; Peck v. Board, 90 Cal. 384; Chance v. Temple, 1 Iowa, 179; Hates v. Jones, 1 Ired. L. (N. C.) 129. As to the nature of the command and of the duty or act to be perform- ed, Tapping on Mandamus, p. 327; State V. Milw., 22 Wis. 397; Kexv. Kingston, 8 Mod. 210; State v. Pac. T. Trs., 61 Mo. 155 (1875). CH. XVin.] JIANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO. § 367 guage the direction of the writ is only a formal part of the paper, yet it is very material ; for if the writ be erroneously diiected, in the absence of a statute allowing amendment, the writ is liable to be quashed. Statutes oi jeofails having been almost univer- sally enacted, it is believed that a clerical error in the direction, as, for example, a mistake in naming the wrong official, would afford no valid ground for abating the writ.^ Upon the plain principle, which runs through all the deci- sions on this subject, that the writ be directed to that body, or to the person whose duty it is to do the thing commanded, it is evident that in seeking to enforce any charter obligation, which is incumbent upon a municipalit}', the writ should be directed to it under its corporate name, and should be served upon its chief official, as well as upon the subordinates in whose sphere the performance of the act lies.^ But it has been held that a writ, directed to the " Mayor and City Council," is good and need not be directed to the corporation.^ And under a liberal construction of the various statutes of jeofails, the courts are always ready to allow a reasonable amendment in cases of this character.* If, however, the act commanded is to be performed by a se- lect body as commissioners, or by a single official acting under an authority conferred by the municipal charter, it is proper to direct the mandamus to them or him. But even here the writ will not be abated because it is directed to the corporation ; for at least, according to the English law, the select body or of- iN. T. Code C. P. 721; Knight v. Ferris, 6 Houst. (Del.) 293; People V. Yates Co., 40111. 126; Davenportv. Lord, 9 Wall. 409 ; U. S. v. Union Pac. E. R. Co., 4 Dillon, 479; s. c, 91 U. S. 343; State v. Jones, 1 Ired. L. (N. C.) 129; State v. Board of Canvassers, 18 Fla. 55; People v. Billiard, 29 111. 413; Johnes v. State, 4 pliio St. 493; State V. Johnson Co., 12 Iowa, 237; Pow- sheik V. Durant, 9 Wall. 736; State v'. Milwaukee, 22 Wis. 397; Chance V. Temple, 1 Iowa, 179; Lyons Higli- way Comm'rs v. People, 38 111. 347; State V. Ellwood, 11 Wis. 17; State V. Hastings, 10 lb. 518; State v. Bai- 48 ly, 7 Iowa, 390; Springfield v. Hamp- den, 10 Pick. 59. 2 Hitchcock V. Galveston. 48 Fed. E. 640; United States v. Boiitwell, 17 Wall. 604; Labette Co. Com'rs v. Moulton, 112 U. S. 217; Wren v. In- dianapolis, 96 Ind. 206; Cherolcee Co. V. Wilson, 109 IT. S. 621 ; Farnsworth V. Boston, 121 Mass. 173; Glencoe v. People, 78 111. 382 ; Louisville v. Kean, 18 B. Mon. 9; Davenport v. Lord, 9 Wall. 409. 8 Peo. V. Bloomington, 63 111. 207; Glencoe v. Peo., 78 111. 382. » Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh, 34 Pa. St. 496. 753 368 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS. [CH. xvin. ficial is a constitutional part of the municipality.^ And, ac- cording to the American law, such a board or official would be treated in a representative capacity, as the agent of the corpo- ration, which was in fact the real principal in the suit. It is however very important to direct the writ to the munic- ipal officials by their official titles, rather than by their personal appellations ; as the former method avoids the danger of abate- ment, which may arise from the death, removal or resignation of such officials.^ If, pending proceedings upon a writ, the of- ficial concerned goes out of office, it will not issue against him, as he cannot legally perform an official act after the close of his term of office ; * but if the writ is directed to the officer by his title, and not to him individually; or if, as is the case generally with municipal officials, the duty is impersonal and devolves upon his successors, the writ is still operative.* The service of the alternative writ is usually regulated by statute and does not differ materially from the service of a summons,® or other judicial process. The original should in- variably be shown and a copy left with the official or officials who are to make the return thereto.^ § 368. Return to the alternative writ. — The rules, gov- erning the return to a writ served upon a municipal corpora- tion, in no wise differ from those which control in other circum- stances. The return must be direct and positive in its terms," 1 Willcock Corporations, 389, pis. 135, 137; Kex v. Abingdon, 1 Lord Raymond, 560. 2 State V. New Orleans, 35 La. 68; Kex V. West Love, 3 B. & C. 685 ; State ex rel. Soutter v. Madison Council, 15 Wis. 30; Peo. v. Breen, 18 Mich. 247; State v. Gates, 22 Wis. 210; State V. Elkington, 30 N. J. L. 335; Beachy V. Lamkin, 1 Idaho, 48; Louisville v. Kean, 18 B. Mon. 9, 13 ; Peo. v. Ma- her, 19 N. T. Sup. 759 (1892.) " Peo. V. Greene Co., 12 Barb. 222; Peo. V. Hayt, 66 N. Y. 607. 4 Thompson v. U. S., 103 V. S. 480; Peo. V. Collins Co., 19 Wend. 56; Peo. V. Champion, 16 Johns. 61. ' State V. Sups., 67 Wis. 274. « New York Code Civ. Pro. §2071; 754 Clarke Co. Comm'rs v. State, 61 Ind. 75 ; see contra, State v. King, 29 Kan. 607; State ex rel. Havemeyer v. Min. Pt. Sup., 22 Wise. 396; State v. Elk- ington, 30 N. J. L. 335; Hampstead V. TJnderliill, 20 Ark. 337; State v. Super., 39 Wis. 264; St. Louis v. Sparks, 10 Mo. 118; Peo. v. Pearson, 3 Scam. (111.) 274; Peo. v. Judges, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 73; Ladue v. Spaulding, 17 Mo. 159 ; Havemeyer v. Min. Point, 22 Wis. 396. ' Pierce v. Bleckweun, 30 N. E. R. 67; 131 N. Y. 570; State v. Tram- mell, 106 Mo. 510; People v. Board, 46 Hun, 296; People v. Cromwell 102 N. Y. 477; People v. Super's, 53 Hun, 254. CH. XVin.] MANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO. §369 either denying facts as stated by petitioner, or stating new facts sufficient to defeat his riglit.^ Or the issue may be made by filing a demurrer to the alternative writ.^ In practice, a distinction is made between a return and a de- murrer to an alternative writ for insufficiency of law. The man- damus may be considered to serve as a declaration or complaint ; and if in the opinion of the respondent it does not state facts sufficient to impose the legal duty, he may demur.^ But the re- turn is in no case conclusive ; and any issue, either of fact or law arising thereon, will be disposed of according to the prac- tice of the jurisdiction, in which the action for mandam,us has been instituted. If respondent declines to obey the command, of the writ, he may select any one of four courses open to him : (1) he may object because of defects apparent upon the face of the writ ; (2) he may demur ; (3) deny the facts upon which the writ has been granted ; (4) or allege other facts by way of confession and avoidance.* § 369. Peremptory writ ; when allowed means of enforc- ing obedience. — If in his return to the alternative writ, or to a preliminai-y order to show cause, the defendant shall fail to dis- prove the facts stated by the relator ; or if in an argument upon Co. Bd. , 10 Iowa, 157 ; People v. Baker, 35 Barb. (N. T.) 105; State v. Haben, 22 Wis. 660; People v. Hilliard, 29111. 413 ; as to defence of officer de facto, see Kelly v. Wimberly, 61 Miss. 548 ; St. Louis V. Green, 7 Mo. App. 468 ; People V. Logan Co., 63 111. 374; Fow- ler V. Pierce, 2 Cal. 165; State v. Jones, 10 Iowa, 65 ; People v. Metro. Pol. Bd., 26 N. Y. 216; Maddox v. Graham, 2 Met. (Ky.) 56. * 2 Dillon's Mun. Corp., § 877, citing : Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong V. Allegheny Co. Com'rs, 37 Pa. St. 277 ; Same ex rel. Middleton v. Same, 37 lb. 237; Tarver v. Talla- poosa Com'rs Ct., 17 Ala. 527; Com- monwealth V. Lyndall, 2 Brew. (Pa.) 425; Dane v. Derby, 54 Me. 95; Ben- bow V. Iowa City, 7 Wall. 313; U. S. V. Ft. Scott, 99 U. S. 152; Elliott v. Oliver, (Or. 92) 29 Pac. R. 1. 755 1 Canova V. State, 18 Fla. 512; Levy V. Inglish, 4 Ark. 65; Goss v. Ver- montville etc., 44 Mich. 319; Wood- ruff V. N. Y. & N. E. R. R., 20 Atl. R. 17 ; Society etc. v. Com. , 52 Pa. St. 125 ; People V. Com'rs, 11 How. Pr. 89; Ray V. "Wilson, 10 So. R. 613; Peo- ple V. Com'rs, 6 Colo. 202; Spring- field V. Com'rs, 10 Pick. 59. ■■' Com. V. Alleg. Co., 37 Pa. St. 279; Legg V. Mayor, 42 Md. 203; Neuse v. Com'rs, 6 Jones L. (N. C.) 204; State V. Griscom, 3 Halst. (N. J.) ; Sout- ter V. Madison, 15 Wis. 30; Tallapoosa V. Tarver, 21 Ala. 661 ; Pollock v. Law- rence, P. L. J. 373; Loute V. All. Co., 10 lb. 241; People v. Baker, 35 Barb. 105. speoplev. Ransom, 2 N. Y. 490; People V. Hayt, 66 lb. 606; Canal Trs. V. People, 12 111. 254; State v. Baily, 7 Iowa, 390; State v. Johnson § 369 MT7NICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XVIII. a demurrer, either to the writ or to the return, the legal insuf- ficiency of defendant's position be evident, a peremptory man- damus will issue.^ If in the first instance the facts are un- questionable, and the rights of the relator clear ; and especially if the matter is one of public interest and requiring immediate attention,^ the peremptory mandamus may be issued at once.* So far as form is concerned, the rules generally applicable to framing and amending pleadings and process, so as to secure substantial justice, are permitted to operate within reasonable and appropriate limits.* This remedy being peculiarly within the discretion of the court, it may be annulled, even after the issue of the peremptory and final writ, if it be proven that unfair or improper means have been used in procuring it, or that the duty commanded is not required by law.^ If the validity of the writ be admitted or if the defendant fails in his attempt to impugn it, he must obey its command ; and such obedience is usually enforced, in the case of a municipal corporation, as the corporation cannot itself be adjudged guilty of contempt,^ by attaching the persons of those officials who are actually in contempt by their refusal or neglect to observe the commands of the writ.'^ Equity will not usually interfere by injunction to stay the proceedings attendant upon a peremptory mandamus, upon the ground that equity follows the law,^ and it is no excuse for a municipality to show that it has been enjoined by a State court 1 State V. Field, 37 Mo. App. 83; Com. V. Pittsbui-gh, 34 Pa. St. 496; Morgauthaler v. Cities, 4 Ohio Cir. Ct. 495; Dow v. Hembert, 91 U. S. 294; People v. Seymour, 6 Cow. 579; Comm'rs v. Asplnwall, 24 How. (U. S.) 376; Weber v. Zimmerman, 23 Md. 45; Harkins v. Tencerbox, 2 Minn. 344; People v. Rich. Co. Svip., 28 N. Y. 112; In re Rogers, 7 Cow. 526; Attala Co. B'rd v. Grant, 17 Miss. 77; State v. Elkinton, 30 N. J. L. 3.35. 2 People V. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 47 Hun, 543; Knox Co. v. Aspinwall, 24 How. 376. ^ Lutterloli v. Cumberland Co. -Comm'rs, 65 N. C. 403; People v. 756 Greene Co. Sup., 64 N. T. 600; Eugg V. Camden, 39 X. J. L. 620; Cleve- land V. Jer. City, 39 lb. 629; State v. Hud. Co. Freeh., 35 lb. 269; State v. Jones, 1 Ired. (K. C.) 129. * Peo. V. Dutchess Co. etc., 58 N. T. 152 and cases cited. s State V. Johnson Co. J., 12 Iowa, 237; Weber V. Zimmerman, 23 Md. 45; Peo. v. Everett, 1 Cai. (N. T.) 8. ^ Bass V. Shakopee, 27 Minn. 25D; Davis V. New York, 1 Duer, 451; London v. Lynn, 1 H. Bl. 206. ' Commonwealth v. Taylor, 36 Pa. St. 263 ; Regina v. Heathcote, 10 Mod. 56; State ex rel. Havemeyer v. Miu Pt., 22 Wis. 396. 8 Col. Co. V. Bryson, 13 Fla. 281. CH. XVIII.J MANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO. §370 from performing a duty, the enforcement of whioh is commanded by a Federal mandamus.^ Under exceptional circumstances, wiien a municipality has been enjoined or otherwise prevented from obeying a Federal process, a U. S. marshal will be ap- pointed a commissioner to carry such process into effect.^ § 370. Final judgment— Effect of resignation or death of officials. — If, according to the general practice, the mandor mus proceedings be instituted and carried on against the munici- pality in its corporate capacity, it is no ground for abating the judgment, granting a peremptory mandamus, that the officials who are to execute its commands have resigned, or that the membership of any board on whom it is obligatory has been changed.^ But when judgment is rendered against an official, Ids resignation before it is entered will render it ineffectual as against his successor, unless such successor be made a party to the proceeding.* This distinction, as to the effect of a resignation of an officer, whose duty is to obey the commands of a peremptory writ of mandamus, where the writ is directed against the municipality, and where it is directed against the individual official, is ex- ceedingly important where, in pursuance of the effort of a mu- nicipal corporation to escape its liability to its creditors, the officials who would have to obey the mandamus resign their offices before the peremptoiy writ can be served upon them. Their resignation does not have any effect, if the writ is directed ' Eiggs V. Johnson City, 6 Wall. 166; Selbei-t v. Lewis, 122 U. S. 284; Hill V. Scott, 32 Fed. Rep. 716; Wasli'n Co. Suprs. v. Durant, 9 Wall. 415; Davenpoi-t v. Lord, 9 lb. 409; State V. Rainey, 74 Mo. 229; Lansing V. County Tr., 1 Dillon, C. C. 522; United States v. Silverman, 4 lb. 224; Weber v. Lee Co., 6 Wall. 210; United States V. Keokuk, 6 lb. 214, 518; Amy V. Des Moines, 11 lb. 136; Dillon Mun. Corp. § 861. ^Lans. V. County Treas., 1 Dillon C. C. 522; Lee Co. Sup. v. Rogers, 7 Wall. 175; Eees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 107; Heine v. Levee Com'rs, 19 lb. 655. ' Leavenworth Co. Comm'rs v. Sel- lew, 99 U. S. 624; Stat ex rel. Sout- ter V. Madison Coun., 15 Wis. 30; Louisville v. Keen, 18 B. Mon. 9, 13; People v. Collins, 19 Wend. 68; Mad- dox v. Graham, 2 Met. (Ky.) 56, 63, 71 ; Pegram v. Cleve. Co. Comm'rs, 65 N. C. 114; Columbia Co. Com. v. King, 18 Fla. 451; Leavenworth v. Kinney, 99 U. S. 623; see 2 Dillon Mun. Corp. § 861 a to § 861 d, inc. 4 Secretary of the Int. v. MoGarra- ham, 9 Wall. 298, 313; Beachy v. Lamkin, 1 Idaho, 48; State ex rel. Soutter V. Mad. Cora., 15 Wis. 30; State V. Elkinton, 30 N. J. L. 335; Rees V. Watertown, 19 Wall. 107; United States v. Boutwell, 17 Wall. 604. 757 §371 MUNICIPAL COEPORATIONS. [CH. XVin. against the corporation ; but if it is directed against the official, his prior resignation will render it nugatory, as, in his character as a private citizen, he is under no obligation to obey the writ of mandamus for the performance of an official duty. But it is held, where an official is declared bj' statute to continue in office, until his successor has been appointed or elected, and has quali- fied, that a resignation does not release such officer from the duty of obeying a peremptory writ issued against him as the incumbent of the office, unless his resignation has been accepted and his successor has been appointed.^ But where the statute expressly declares that a resignation shall take effect, as soon as it is filed with a certain officer, the officer need not obey a writ of mandamus, which is served upon him after such filing of the resignation, although his successor has not been appointed or elected.^ § 371. Mandamns as applicable to municipal elections and to elective officers. — In the constantly recurring litigation, aris- ing out of our American system of selecting municipal officials by popular suffrage, the writ of mandamus has been of frequent use. If, in consequence of the refusal or delay of the officials to act, on whom the duty of calling an election is incumbent, the day appointed has passed and no election has-been held, the municipality, or their officials, may be compelled by mandamus to perform their duty in this respect,^ and the necessary prelimi- nary steps in providing for the calling of such an election may also be required.* When, also, a vacancy occurs, and by 'law a special election is necessary for the purpose of filling it, manda- mus in the name of. the State will furnish the most appropriate and effective remedy for compelling the holding of the election.^ 1 Badger v. United States, 93 U. S. 599; s. c, 6 Blss. 308; Jones v. Jef- ferson, 66 Tex. 576; Edwards v. United States, 103 U. S. 471; Sala- manca T. Wilson, 109 U. S. 671. 2 Amy V. Watertown, 130 U. S. 302; City of Watertown v. Kobinson, 69 Wis. 230. ^Demarest v. Wickham, 63 N. Y. 334; Lewis v. Marshall, 16 Kan. 102; Glencove v. Peo., 78 111. 382; Peo. v. Fairbury, 51 111. 149; State v. Smith, '1-Z Minn. 218; State v. Tolan, 33 N. 758 J. L. 195; McConike v. State, 17 Fla. 238; Atty. Gen. v. Lawrence, 11 Mass. 90; State v. Holden, 19 Neb. 249. * Gibbs V. Hampden, 19 Pick. 298; Irkre Morse, 18 lb. 443; In re Strong, 20 lb. 484; Lamb v. Lynd, 44 Pa. St. 336; State v. Boden, (IST. J.) 16 Atl. Kep. 58. ^Fish V. Weatherwax, 2 Johns. Cas. 217; State v. Rahway, 33 N. J. L. 110; People v. Brooklyn Council, 77 N. Y. 503; People v. Carrique, 2 CH. XVIII.] MANDAMUS AND QUO "WARRANTO. §371 And if in place of being elected directly by popular vote, the municipal ofiScer is appointed by one or more select bodies or councils, acting under rules laid down in the charter, by which the time for such appointment is determined, a mandatory duty is imposed and its performance may be compelled by mandamus }■ The control and supervision of elections, at which municipal. State and national officers are elected, are often vested in mu- nicipal officials and boards ; and they may be compelled by mandamus to perform all such duties thus imposed upon them, which are not purely judicial,'-^ such as canvassing election re- turns,* or announcing the result.* The duty, which the returning officer or canvassing body owes to the person elected, of giving him a proper certificate of his election, may also be compelled by a mandamus,^ unless the person so elected fails to show that he possesses the neces- siiry and legal qualifications for the office, whenever that ques- tion has been raised before the canvassing board.^ Hill (N. T.) 93; Lamb v. Lynd, 44 Pa. St. 336 ; Rex v. Cambridge, 4 Burr. 2011. 1 Lamb v. Lynd, 44 Pa. St. 336 ; Kerr V. Trego, 44 Pa. St. 292; Brightley's Elect. Cases, 270, 455, 466, 656. 2Kimere v. State, 129 Ind. 589; Rice V. Smith, 9 Iowa, 570; McDiar- mid V. Fitch, 27 Ark. 106: State v. Marston, 6 Kan. 524; State v. Shakes- peare, 6 So. Rep. 592; State v. Batl, 4 lb. 495 ; State v. Parish, 2 lb. 305 ; State V. Meadows, 1 Kan. 90; State V. Magill, 4 lb. 415 ; People v. Taylor, 45 Barb. 129; Roberts v. Davidson, 83 Ky. 279; Parker v. Hubbard, 64 Ala. 203; People v. French, 24 Hun, :63; State v. Palmer, 18 Neb. 644; Monroe v. State, 63 Miss. 135 ; Dick- son V. Hill, 75 Ga. 369; State v. Cum- mings, 17 Neb. 311 ; People v. Regis- .trar, 20 N. E. R. 611 ; State v. Mayor, 43 N. J. L. 542; People v. Purviance, 12 111. Ap. 216; Ridley V. Dougherty, (Iowa) 42 N. W. R. 78; State v. Wil- son, (Neb.) 38 N. W. R. 31; Ramsey V. Clerk, 52 Mich. 344. » State V. Howe, (Neb. 92) 44 N. "W. R. 874; Peo. v. Super's, 47 Cal. 205; Peo. V. Hilliard, 29 111. 419; Kisler v. Cameron, 39 Ind. 488; State v. Car- ney, 3 Kan. 88; Territory v. B. Co., (New Mex.) 20 Am. & Eng. Cor. Cases, 44; Marshall v. Kerns, 2 Swan. (Tenn.) 68; O'Ferrall v. Colby, 2 Minn. 180; Taylor v. Taylor, 10 lb. 107; Bacon v. York, 26 Me. 491; State V. Steers, 44 Mo. 228; State v. Rodman, 43 lb. 256; Mayo v. Free- land, 10 lb. 629; Peo. v. Van Cleve, 1 Mich. 362; Atty. Gen. v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 749. * Peo. V. Saloman, 46 HI. 415. ^Putman v. Langley, 133 Mass. 204; In re Strong, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 484; State v. Judge Cir. Ct., 13 Ala. 805; Clark v. McKenzie, 7 Bush. 523; Kisler v. Cameron, 39 Ind. 488; State V. Co. Jud. , 7 Iowa, 186 ; Barnes V. Gottschalk, 3 Mo. App. Ill; Rob- erts V. Rivers, 27 111. 242; Thompson V. Judge, 9 Ala. 338; State v. Baily, 7 Iowa, 390; Roberts v. Rivers, 27 111. 242; Ingerson v. Berry, 14 Ohio, 315; Territory v. Bern. Co., supra. 6 O'Farrall v. Colby, 2 Minn. 180; 759 §372 MTJNICIPAIi COKPORATIONS. [CH. xvin. If, on receiving such a certificate he meets with a refusal of the proper officer to administer the oath of office to him, matv- damns will lie, provided the office be vacant.^ But where an office is filled by one, who holds it de facto and under color of right, and who is exercising the functions of the office, manda- mus is not the proper remedy for determining between the two claimants the question of title to the office. Quo warranto is the proper remedy for this case, and the question of right to the office must first be determined by quo warranto, before man- damns will lie to compel parties in possession of the office to turn it over to the rightful claimants.^ § 372. Maudamns as applicable to removal and suspen- sion of officials. — In some cases, where a municipal official is I'emovable by the municipality for malfeasance or nonfeasance, a mandamus will lie to compel the exercise of this power,^ and the power to remove being inclusive of power to suspend for a reasonable time,* it may be inferred that a mandamus will be granted to compel the suspension of a municipal official pending investigation. On the other hand, if the powers of suspension or removal be illegall}' exercised, a mandamus will generally is- yue to reinstate the injured official.® But although the act of State V. Moffatt, 5 Ohio, 358, 362; State V. Newman, 91 Mo. 445. iJn re Heath, 3 Hill (N. T.)42; Ex parte Diggs, 52 Ala. 381 ; Ex parte Wiley, 54 lb. 226; State v. McCul- lough, 3 Nev. 202 ; Clayton v. Carey, 4 Md. 26; State v. Andr, 36 Mo. 70; Lindsley v. Trickett, 20 Tex. 516; Morley v. Power, 5 Lea, (Tenn.) 691; Putnam v. Langley, 133 Mass. 204; Peo. V. Matteson, 17 HI. 167; Peo. v. Head, 25 lb. 287; Peo. v. Hilliard, 29 lb. 413; Peo. v. Langham, 20 Barb. (N. T.) 302; Peo. v. Trustees, 7 N. Y. Sup. 125; Atty. Gen. v. Mayor, 128 Mass. 312; State v. Harlam, 25 Neb. 33; McDermott v. Miller, 45 N. J. L. 253 ; State v. Rahway, 33 lb. 111. 2 Ellison V. Aldermen of Raleigh, 89 N. C. 125; Kelley v. Edwards, 69 Cal. 460; St. Louis Co. v. Sparks, 10 Mo. 118; People v. Matterson, 17 111. 167 ; Meredith v. Supervisors of Sac- 760 ramento, 50 Cal. 433; Denver v. Ho- bart, 10 Nev. 28; Brown v. Turner, 70 N. C. 93; Warner v. Myers, 4 Oreg. 72; People v. Hilliard, 29 HI. 413; Bonner v. State, 7 Ga. 473; State V. Deliesseline, 1 McCord, 52; People V. Head, 25 HI. 287; State v. Auditor, 36 Mo. 70; People v. New York, 3 Johns. Cas. 79; see State v. Falconer, 44 Ala. 696; Strong's Case, 20 Pick. 497; Lindsey v. Luck- ett, 20 Tex. 516; State v. Pilot, 21 La. An. 336; State v. John, 81 Mo. 13; Underwood v. White, 27 Ark. 382; Banton v. Wilson, 4 Tex. 400; Conlin V. Aldrich, 98 Mass. 557; Putnam v. Langley, 133 Mass. 204. 8 Delahauty v. Warner, 75 111. 185. * Shannon v. Portsmouth, 54 N. H. 183; 1 Dillon Mun. Cor., sec. 247, note 1, and cases cited. » Angell & Ames, sees. 702, 706; Dew V. Judges, 3 Hen. & M. (Va.) 1; CH. XVIU.] MANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO. § 373 removal has been done irregularly ; if the court inquires into, and establishes the fact that good grounds for the removal existed,^ or if the justice of the removal is admitted by the official applying for the mandamus^ it will be denied.^ § 373. Mandamus, as applicable to custodians of public records and of public funds. — This writ is the appropriate process for a legally elected or appointed official, to obtain pos- session of the records, seal of office and other property of which he is to be the custodian,^ as against his predecessor or a usurp- er,* or against a committee acting illegally to compel delivery of documents belonging to the city.^ Mandamus will lie against a custodian of public records ; as, for example, a clerk having charge of registration lists, poll books or election returns,® to compel him to permit an inspection of them for any proper pui-- pose ; and, under reasonable precautionary regulations, to allow copies to be made thereof, on the application of any citizen hav- ing an interest therein.''' When, in order to give the right of appeal, officials must make a record of their action, they may be compelled to do so by man- damus ; ^ and an official may be compelled to record a deed or file a paper,^ or to correct his records.^" Commissioners may State V. Watertown Council, 9 "Wis. 254; Delahanty v. Warner, 75 111. 185; State V. Patterson, 38 N". J. L. 190; State V. Jer. City, 25 lb. 536; State V. Gall. Co. Commissioners, 1 111. 25 ; Delacy v. N. River N. Co., 1 Hawks (N. C.) 274. 1 Rex V. London, 2 D. & E. T. R. 181; Rex v. Bristol, 1 D. & R. 389; s. c, 5 B. & A. 731; In re Paine, 1 Hill (N. T.) 665, 667; Shaw v. Mayor etc., 21 Ga. 280; s. c, 25 Ga. 590. 2 Rex V. Axbridge, Cowper, 523. » State V. Bacon, 6 Neb. 286; Stone V. Small, 54 Vt. 498; Keokuk v. Mer- riam, 44 Iowa, 432 ; Conlin v. Aldrich, 98 Mass. 357; Anier. R. F. Co. v. Ha- Ten, 101 lb. 398. * Bates V. Plymouth, 14 Gray, 163; Perkins v. Weston, 3 Cush. 549; Par- ish V. Stearns, 21 Pick. 156; Ex parte Strong, 20 lb. 484; Taylor v. Henry, 2 lb. 397; Kimball v. Lamprey, 19 X. H. 215 ; Com. v. Athearn, 3 Mass. 285 ; Prop'rs V. Slack, 7 Cush. 226; People V. KildufE, 15 111. 492. ' State V. Kirkley, 20 Md. 85. 6 State V. Hoblitzelle, 85 Me. 620. ' Hayes v. White, 66 Me. 305 ; Stock- man V. Brooks, 27 Pac. R. 746; O'Hara v. King, 52 HI. 303; Diamond M. Co. V. Powers, 51 Mich. 145; Cor- mack V. Wolcott, 17 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cases, 309; State v. Raohao, 37 Minn. 372. 8 State V. Field, 37 Mo. App. 83; Bennett v. McCaffrey, 28 lb. 220; Warren Co. v. State, 15 Ind. 250. 9 Trinity v. Lane, 79 Tex. 643; U. S. V. Hall, 7 Mackey, 14; Willflange V. McCollom, 83 Ky. 361; People v. Collins, 7 Johns. 549; In re Goodell, 14 lb. 325; Strong's Case, Kirby (Conn.) 345. 10 People V. Brooklyn, 7 N. T. S. 327 ; State V. Clayton, 34 Mo. App. 563; 761 § 375 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. XVm. also be compelled by mandamus to receive and file a petition,^ or to affix a seal to a document requiring it.'-* So, also, a man- damus will lie to compel the treasurer of a municipality to re- ceive coupons for taxes, if this is required by statute,^ or to issue a duplicate tax bill, with the legal rate stated thereon.* § 374. Mandamns against school officers. — Mandamus will lie against a school board,^ to compel a mandatory duty, such as the admission of a child to the public schools,® but not if the school is full ; "^ and when it is the absolute duty of the trus- tees to introduce certain text books, mandamus will lie to com- pel them to perform that duty.^ When the act to be done is ministerial, mandamus will lie, even though it is to be performed upon the occurrence of a cer- tain condition of facts ; and it is discretionary with the school officers to decide according to their best judgment, whether such a condition exists.^ As it is the duty of school trustees controlling the school funds of a township to apply such funds to indebtedness for tuition, mandamus will lie to compel the performance of this duty.io § 375. Mandamus in aid of the rights of municipal cred- itors. — When, in pursuance of the almost unlimited powers which are possessed by the legislative authority over the disposi- tion of the funds, revenues and general financial resources of municipal corporations, statutes have been passed making it mandatory upon them to levy taxes to meet tlieir contractual Ellis V. Bristol, 2 Gray, 370; Bower V. O'Brien, 2 Ind. 423; People v. Ma1> teson, 17 111. 167. 1 Hawkins v. Com'rs, 14 Ind. 521. ^Tapping on Mandamus, p. 96; 3 Black Cora. 110; 2 Dillon's Mun. Corp. § 831, n. ; Prescott v. Ganser, 34 Iowa, 175 (seal to a county war- rant). 3 Sands v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 585. « Hamilton v. State, 8 Ind. 452. 5 Case V. Blood, 71 Iowa, 632. Peo. V. Board, 18 Mich. 400; State V. Osborne, 24 Mo. App. 309; State V. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342; Clark v. Board, 24 Iowa, 366; Peo. v. Board etc., 127 111. 613. 762 ' Be Nicoll, 44 Hun (N. T.) 340. ' State V. School Directors, 74 Mo. 21; Cf. Effingham v. Hamilton, 68 Miss. 523. 9 People V. Coffey, 131 N. Y. 569; Trustees v. People, 121 111. 552; Newby v. Free, 72 Iowa, 379; State V. Duffy, 7 NCT. 342; Morley v. Pow- er, 5 Lea, 691 ; Clark v. Board, 24 Iowa, 266; State v. Ha worth, 23 N. E. E. 946. 10 Gardner v. Haney, 86 Ind. 17; Smith V. Johnson, 69 lb. 55 ; Jessup V. Carey, 61 lb. 584; Board v. State, 61 Ind. 379; State v. Cooprider, 96 lb. 279. CH. XVIII.J MANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO. §375 obligations, obedience to such statutes will be enforced by man- damus} The power to contract connotes the obligation and power to meet financial liabilities incurred thereby,^ in the mode prescribed by special law, or by the municipal charter or other legislative enactment. Such cases fall within the rules already laid down, governing the right to a mandamus, when the injured party to the contract has no other adequate redress ; and for this reason, the writ will generally be granted.^ Neglect to exert the power of levying taxes, at the time le- gally appointed, does not prevent the issue of a mandamus at some future period, provided the indebtedness is still unpaid.* Not only will mandamus lie to compel the levy of assessments or the appropriation of funds by a municipality ; but it will usually be granted, if invoked to compel the performance of any preliminary acts which may be necessary and usual in the 1 Bloorafield t. Char. Oak Bk., 121 U. S. 121; Lilly v. Taylor, 88 N". C. 489; Howers App., 127 Pa. St. 134; 17 Atl. E. 862; Meyer v. Brown, 65 Cal. 583; Shelly v. St. Charles Co., 30 Fed. Rep. 603; Commonwealth v. Pittsb.. 34 Pa. St. 496; Chero. Co. v. Wilson, 109 U. S. 621; Wakely v. Muscatine, 6 Wall. 481 ; State v. Board, etc., 27 Ohio St. 96; Cincinnati etc. V. Clinton Co., 1 lb. 77; Atchison v. Jefferson Co., 12 Kan. 127; Com. v. Pittsburgh, 88 Pa. St. 66. 2 Com. V. Alle. Co. Comm'rs, 37 Pa. St. 277, 290; U. S. v. New Or- leans, 98 U. S. 381; U. S. v. New Or- leans, 17 Fed. Rep. 483 ; Knox v. Ba- ton Rouge, 36 La. An. 427; Ralls. Co. V. U. S., 105 U. S. 733; Loan Ass'n V. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 680; Par- kersb. v. Brown, 106 IT. S. 582. 3 State V. Anderson, 18 Atl. R. 584; Brown v. Gates, 15 W. Va. 131 ; Crane v.Fond duLac, 16 Wis. 196; State v. Beloit, 20 lb. 79; Hasbrouck v. Milw., 25 lb. 122; State v. Jacksonville, 22Fla. 21; State v. Guttenberg, 30 N. J. L. 660; Lexington v. MuUiken, 7 Gray, 280; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; Alden v. Alameda Co., 43 Cal. 279; Young v. Clarendon, 132 U. S. 340; Vance V. Lit. Rock, 30 Ark. 435; Com. v. Perkins, 43 Pa. St. 400; Newman v. Scott etc., 1 Heisk. 787; Davenport v. Lord, 9 Wall. 409; Heine v. Comm'rs, 19 lb. 6.55; Rees V. Watertown, 19 lb. 107; Klein V. Smith Co., 54 Miss. 254; Flagg v. Palmyra, 33 Mo. 440; Klein v. Warren Co., 54 Miss. 254; Col. Co. Comm'rs V. King, 13 Fla. 451 ; State v. Burbank, 22 La. An. 318; State v. Buff. Co., 6 Neb. 455 ; Kelly v. Wimbei-ly, 61 Miss. 548; Hawley V. Fayetteville, 82 N. C. 22; Brown v. Crego, 32 la. 408; Ken- nedy v. Sacramento, 19 Fed. 580; see contra, Coy v. Lyons, 17 la. 1 ; State V. Davenport, 12 Iowa, 335; Eyerly V. Jasper Co., 72 Iowa, 149; Barnes v. Marshall Co., 58 lb. 20; Miller v. Mc- Williams, 50 Ala. 427; Elmore Co. v. ' Long, 52 lb. 277; Covington Co. v. Dunklin, 52 lb. 28; Shinbone v. Ran- dolph Co., 56 lb. 183; Monaghan v. Phila., 28 Pa. St. 207; Commonwealth v. Pitts., 88 Pa. 66; Commonwealth V. Lancaster, 5 Watts (Pa.) 132. 4 Limestone Co. v. Rather, 48 Ala. 433. 763 §375 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. xvni. settlement by ministerial officials of the claims of municipal creditors ; as, for example, to compel a council to order an esti- mate to be made of the amount of tax necessary,^ or to compel the auditing board or auditor to perform his duty in the prem- ises,^ such as to audit the claim, or to issue a warrant or other certificate of indebtedness, when directed to do so by superior authority.^ But if the amount be uncertain, mandamus will not lie against an auditor, and the claimant will be relegated to a civil action whereby the extent of his right can be ascertained.* Hence, it has been the general, although by no means a uniform rule, that a creditor must, by a judgment obtained in a civil action, estab- lish with certainty the amount of the municipal indebtedness to him, before a mandamus will be granted to compel the levy of the taxes which will be necessary to liquidate the indebted- ness. A court will not anticipate in a controverted case a judicial determination of the validity of a claim, by issuing a mandamus to compel its payment.^ In the Federal courts, man- 1 Greeufleld v. Moore, 33 Ind. 597. 2 People V. FuHon, 53 Hun, 254; Attala V. Grant, 17 Miss. 77; Klein V. Warren, 51 lb. 878 ; Klein v. Smith Co., 54 lb. 254; Putnam Co. V. Allen, 1 Ohio St. 322; Peo. v. Com. Ooun., 34 Mich. 201; State v. Earl, 42 JiT. J. L. 94; Crandall v. Amadar, 20 Cal. 72; Gerrard v. McKee, 11 Bush, 234. 3 Babcock v. Goodrich, 47 Cal. 488; Com. V. Lancaster, 5 Watts, 152; U. S. V. Ottawa, 28 Fed. Eep.; State v. Fiedler, 43 N. J. L. 400; State v. Anderson, 18 Atl. E. 584; People v. Abbott, 45 Hun, 293; State v. Mount, 21 La. An. 352; Jack v. Moore, 66 Ala. 184. *Eaisoh v. Board, 22 Pac. E. 890; People V. Barnes, 114 N. Y. 317; Crawley v. Mershor, 61 Ga. 284; Bur- nett V. Portage Co. etc., 12 Ohio St. 57; People v. Supervisors, 38 Mich. 421; People v. Flagg, 17 N. T. 584; Cal. Bank v. Shabe, 55 Cal. 322; 764 State V. Trustees, 61 Mo. 155 ; State V. Scott, 15 Neb. 147; Peo. v. Green, 1 Hun, 1 ; People v. Johnson, 100 111. 537; People v. Connolly, 2 Abb. Pr. N. S. 315; State v. Earle, 42 N. J. L. 94; People v. Harris, 23 How. Pr. 107; Tenn. etc. Co. v. Moore, 36 Ala. 371; Peo. V. Vantassel, (Mich.) 40 N. W. E. 847. ^ Territory v. Woodbury, 44 N. W. R. 1077; State v. Snodgrass, 98 Ind, 546; Alden v. Alameda, 43 Cal. 270 Jerome v. Kio Grande, 18 Fed. E, 873; Greene v. Datoiel, 102 IT. S. 187 Crane v. Fond du Lac, 16 Wis. 196 Marsh v. Little Valley, 64 N. T. 112 People V. Clark Co., 50 111. 213; State V. New Orleans, 30 La. An. 82; 30 lb. 129; Buck v. Lockport, '6 Lans. 251; Brown v. Gates, 15 W. Va. 131 ; State V. Clay Co., 46 Mo. 231; Mansfield v. Fuller, 50 lb. 338; State v. Trustees, 61 lb. 155; Knapp v. Hoboken, 38 N. J. L. 371; State V. Floyd, 5 Iowa, 380; Lexington v. MuUiken, 7 Gray, 280. CH. XVIII.] MANDAMUS AND QUO "WAEKANTO. §375 damns is granted onl}!- after judgments, and in suits against municipalities it takes the place of an execution. i In the New England States, there is no necessity for the use of the writ, to compel the payment of indebtedness incurred by counties, towns and similar political divisions ; the property of the individual members of the corporation may by common law and immemorial usage be taken in execution against the mu- nicipality .^ But, in the absence of express statutory provisions, there is outside of these States, no individual liability on the part of the inhabitants of a municipality, nor can private prop- erty be taken in execution to pay municipal debts. ^ Municipal corporations are created for public, governmental and political purposes and it is a corollary of this proposition, that all property, of whatever nature, held by them in trust for carrying out such purposes, should be exempted from seizure and sale under execution.* Under any other theory, the para- mount importance of the proper execution of its public func- tions would be lost sight of, and its usefulness in subserving the interests of the community curtailed or destroyed.^ But when a judgment has been recovered, and either under the general principle above stated,^ or under some local statute, execution is refused ; '' or when issued is returned unsatisfied ; 1 Greene Co. v. Daniel, 102 TT. S. 187; Heine v. Levee Com'rs, 19 Wall. 655; McClung V. Silliman, 6 Wheat. 601 ; Bath Co. V. Amy, 13 Wall. 244; Ken- dall V. U. S., 12 Pet. 584; Mclntire v. Wood, 7 Cranch, 504; Davenport v. Dodge, 105 TJ. S. 237; Smith v. Bour- bon, 127 lb. 105 ; Labette v. Moulton, 112 U. S. 217; 2 Dil. Mun. Corp. 856, 860, et seq. 2 Bloomfield v. Charter O. Bk., 12 U. S. 129; Eames v. Savage, 77 Me. 212; Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 368; Hawkes v. New. Co., 7 Mass. 461, 463; Hill v. Boston, 122 lb. 344; Chase v. Mor. Bk., 19 Pick. 564; Gas- kill V. Dudley, 6 Met. (Mass.) 546. 3 Eeese v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 107, 122; Mill V. McWilliams,50 Ala. 427; see also, ante, §212; Horner v. Cof- fey, 25 Miss. 434; Merri wether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472; Crowell v. Sonoma Co., 25 Cal. 313; Symonds v. Clay Co. Sup., 71 111. 355 ; Sherbourne V. Yuba Co., 21 Cal. 113; Kincaid v. Hardin Co., 53 Iowa, 430; Flori v. St. Louis, 69 Mo. 341. * Edgerton v. Municipality, 1 La. An. 435 ; Municipality v. Hart, 6 lb. 570; U. S. V. B. & O. R. Co., 17 Wall. 322 ; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472; ante §§196, 212. 6 2 Dillon Mun. Corp. §§ 576, 577, and cases cited. See ante, sec. 196. 6 Morrison V. Hankson, 87 111. 587; Elrod V. Bernadotte, 53 lb. 368; Chi- cago V. Hasley, 25 lb. 598; Bloom- ington V. Brokaw, 77 111. 194. "Monaghan v. Pbila., 28 Pa. St. 207; Loute v. AUeglieny Co., 10 Pitts. L. J. 24; Pollock V. Lawrence Co., 7 lb. 373. 765 § 376 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XVIII. a mandamus will issue to compel the levy of a tax to be applied to satisfaction of the judgment creditor.-^ § 376. Mandamns to compel levy of a special tax for specific object. — The power of a municipal corporation to levy taxes is limited hj the terms of the statutory enactment conferring the power, and must generally be expressly grantr ed, although it may arise by necessary implication.^ If the power to create a debt is authorized by statute, but the power to levy taxes to provide for its payment is by the same or by any other statute limited and abridged, either as to amount or objects, then it is very evident that no mandamus will issue at the suit of any creditor to compel the exercise of the power of taxation beyond these limits.^ For in such a case, the ob- ject aimed at would be illegal and beyond the power of the mu- nicipality.* In the absence of express statutory authority for the creation of municipal obligations, it is even more evident that the municipality is not bound, and that in all such cases of implied obligation no mandamus will lie.^ A distinction is to 1 Peoria Co. v. Grarrison, 82 111. 435; United States v. Oswego Twp., 28 Fed. E. 5.5; King, etc., v. Otoe Co., 27 lb. 800; IGein v. Vy^arreu Co., 51 Miss. 278; Klein v. Smith Co., 54 lb. 254; Corpus Cliristi v. Waessner, 54 Tex. 462; Com. v. Pittsburgh, 88 Pa. St. 66; Fry v. Comrs., 82 N. C. 304; State v. Jackson Co., 19 Fla. 17; State V. Elizabeth, Treas., 42 N. J. L. 79; 42 lb. 94; Fisher v. Charles- town, 17 W. Va. 595; 17 lb. 682; United States v. Ottawa, 28 Fed. R. 407; State v. New Oris., 30 La. An., pt. 1, 705; Coy v. Lyons, 17 Iowa, 1; Louisiana ex rel. v. St. Martins, etc.. Ill U. S. 716; Britton v. Platte City, 2 Dillon C. C. 1; Frank v. San Fran., 21 Cal. 668; Schafeer v. Cadwallader, 36 Pa. St. 126; Galena v. Amy, 5 Wall. 705; State v. King, 44 Mo. 116; Rogers v. People, 68 111. 154; State v. Milw. Council, 20 Wis. 87; State v. Beloit, 20 lb. 79; 20 lb. 501. 2 See as to taxation ante, chap. xv. 8 Clay Co. V. McAleer, 115 U. S. 766 616; East St. Louis v. U. S. ex rel, 110 U. S. 321. 'People T. Hyde Pk., 117 111. 462; In re M. E. Church, 66 N. T. 395; Vance v. Lit. Rock, 30 Ark. 435; U. S. V. Miller Co., 4 Dill. 233; U. S. v. Mayor etc., 2 Woods, 230; U. S. v. Carroll Co., 18 Wall. 71; U. S. v. Clark Co., 95 U. S. 769; State v. Board, 18 Atl. Rep. 571. 5U. S. V. Clark Co., 96 U. S. 212; U. S. V. Macon Co., 99 U. S. 582; (Cf. with this base Harshman v. Knox Co., 122 U. S. 306; and Brownsville V. Loague, 129 U. S. 493;) Knox Co. V. U. S., 109 U. S. 229; Williamson v. Keokuk, 44 Iowa, 88; People v. Jack-, son, 92 111. 444; Chicot Co. v. Kruse, 47 Ark. 80; Sykes v. Columbus, 55 Miss. 115; McPherson v. Foster, 43 Iowa, 48; State v. Macon Co., 68 Mo. 29; as to powers by implication, U. S. V. New Orleans, 98 U. S. 391; U. S. V. Lincoln, 5 Dill. C. C. 184, 194, and cases cited. CH. XVni.J MANDAMUS AlfD QUO WARRANTO. § 377 be recognized in this connection between the right to the levy of a special tax to pay municipal debts, where the debt is a ne- gotiable bond, and where it is a non-negotiable instrument, such as a warrant. The power to levy a tax may be implied as an intended means of paying the former, but it would never be implied in favor of the latter.^ And if mandamus to levy a tax would be issuable at all, at the instance of the holders of warrants and other non-negotiable debt, it must be in pursu- ance of an express authority, and is limited to the amount or I'ate of taxation authorized.^ The municipal creditor is not entitled to a mandamus to en- force the liquidation of a bonded indebtedness when, although the original statute authorizing the issue was valid, it had been abrogated prior to the issue of the bonds.* But the rule is other- wise, where a constitutional restriction is imposed subsequent to the contraction of the debt, but prior to the levy of the tax for its payment.* § 377. Mandamus as applicable to municipal improve- ments. — Where a mandatory duty is imposed by charter or other statute upon municipal corporations, to make improve- ments, such as the laying out of streets and highways and keep- ing them in repair, mandamus will lie to compel its performance,^ but the duty must be clear.® . The erection of certain buildings, provided for by statute, may be compelled by mandamus.'' But here, as in other similar cases, if the municipal authorities are invested with a discretion as to 1 2 Dillon Mun. Corp. § 862. 2 Carroll Co. Sup. v. United States, 18 "Wall. 71; United States v. Vernon Co. Court, 3 Dillon, 281. ^ Brownsville v. Loague, 129 U. S. 49.3. * Fisk V. Jefferson Par. etc., 116 U. S. 131; Ex parte Selma etc., 45 Ala. 606; see ante, § 14. sPerrine v. Twp., 48 Mich. 041; Peo. V. San Luis, etc., 56 Cal. 561; Peo. V. Bloomington, 63 111. 207; State V. Super's, 41 Wis. 28; Trus. v. Kin- ner, 13 Busli. 834; Pumplirey v. Mayor, 47 Md. 145 ; State v. Demarce, 80 Ind. 519; State v. Board, 80 lb. 478; Uniontown V. Com., 34 Pa. St. 293, 296; Com'rs v. Com., 72 lb. 24; Ottawa V. Peo., 48 111. 233; Richards V. Com'rs, 120 Mass. 401; Peo. v. San Francisco, 36 Cal. 595; Hammar v. Covington, 3 Met. (Ky.) 494; Peo. v. Collins, 19 Wend. 86; Peo. v. Brook- lyn, 28 Barb. 404; Reading v. Cora., 11 Pa. St. 196; Peo. v. Champion, IS Johns. 61; Bloomington v. Bay, 42 111. 503; Chicago V. Robbins, 2 Black, 418. 6 Com. V. Peo., 99 HI. 587; 'State v. Wood Co., 72 Mo. 629. ' Peo. V. Com., 45 Barb. 473; Manor V. McCall, 5 Ga. 522. 767 § 378 MUNICIPAL COKPOKATIONS. [CH. XVIII. the expediency or advisability of the proposed improvements, no mandamus v^ill issue to control such discretion.^ But after the improvements have been consummated, mandamus will lie to compel the paj'^ment of damages to the property owners af- fected thereby^ by a levy of taxes, or by issue of bonds for the purpose of raising the necessary funds.^ So, also, will manda- mus be granted to compel the taking of any of the usual prelimi- nary steps which may be necessary to reimburse any owner, whose property has been taken or injured by the exercise of the power of eminent domain.* § 378. Nature of quo warranto. — In the case of an usurpa- tion of a municipal office, or of the illegal exercise of a public franchise, an information in the nature of a quo warranto will lie.^ The principles, underlying the ancient common law writ of quo warranto, as regulated by the statute of Anne, have be- come part of the common law of our States, either by implica- tion or by express declaration of the Legislatures.® ' Trans, v. Skinner, (Mich.) 40 W. W. Rep. 234; Com. v. Henry, 49 Pa. St. 530; People V. Manhattan Ey. Co., 22 Abb. N. C. 393; State v. Henry Co., ?,1 Ohio St. 211; State v. Morris, 43 Iowa, 192; Kice, etc., v. Worcester, 130 Mass. 57.5; Hitchcock v. Cora'rs, 131 lb. 519; Haskins v. Super's, 51 Miss. 506; Co. of St. Clair v. Peo.,85 111. 396; Mayor v. Roberts, 34 Ind. 471; Hill V. Worcester, 4 Grav, 414; State V. Essex, 3 Zab. N. J. 214; Peo. V. Croton Aq. Bod., 26 Barb. 240. 2 Wilson V. Berkstresser, 45 Mo. 283; Minhinnah v. Haines, 29 N. J. L. 388; Peo. v. Supervisors, 4 Barb. 64; Trustees, etc., v. Johnson, 2 Cart. (Ind.) 219; State v. Keokuk, 9 Iowa, 438; Peo. v. Lowell, 9 Met. 144; Treat v. Middletown, 8 Conn. 243; Justices, etc., v. Jefferson, 1 Coldw. (Tenu.) 419. s Miller v. Bridgewater, 29 JT. J. L. 54; Jonnston v. Super's, 19 Jolins. 272; State v. Keokuk, 9 Iowa, 438; Brock V. Hisben, 40 Wis. 674; Hig- ginsv. Chicago, 48 111. 276; Duncan V. Louisville, 8 Bush, 98. 768 « Ryan v. HoflEman, 26 Ohio St. 109; Eudisill v. State, 40 Ind. 485; State V. Wilson, 17 Wis. 687; Dodge V. Essex, 3 Met. (Mass.) 380; Carpen- ter V. Bristol, 21 Pick. 258; see, ante, § 249. 6 People V. Riordan, 41 ST. W. R. 482; State v. Anderson, 45 Ohio St. 196; State v. Camden, 35 N. J. L. 217; Com. V. Allen, 128 Mass. 308; State v. Deliesseline, 1 McCord (S. C.) 52; Bartlet v. State, 13 Kan. 99; Demarest V. Wickham, 63 N. Y. 320; People v. Hall, 80 lb. 117; Cochran v. Mc- Cleary, 22 Iowa, 75; Worthley v. Steen, 43 N. J. L. 542 ; 1 Dil. Mun. Corp. §§ 272, 275. 15 2 Dil. Mun. Corp. 888-9 ; Reynolds V. Bacowin, 1 La. An. 162; People v. Waite, 70 111. 25 ; Com. v. Cen. Pass, etc., Co., 52 Wend. 503; State v. Mil- waukee, 45 Wis. 579; Peo. v. Thomp- son, 16 Wend. 655; State v. Cine, 18 Ohio St. 262; Com. v. Cluley, 56 Pa. St. 270; State v. Tolan, 33 IV. J. L. 195 ; State V. Pat. &, H. Turn, etc., 21 lb. 9; People V. Richardson, 4 Cow. N. Y. 101, 122, 133; Goddard v. Smithett, OH. XVm.] MANDAMUS AMD QUO WARRANTO. §371) In another section, the distinction between this remedy and mandamus is explained ^ and it need only be added that an information in the nature of a quo warranto should be granted, when the effect of final judgment will be to establish a contro- verted right, as, for example, to an oflQce ; while mandamus will lie to enforce a duty, arising out of a right already established or admitted, but not enforceable by ordinary process.^ So, if the right to hold an election be in dispute a quo war- ranto will lie ; ^ whereas, if it be clearly the duty of the munici- pality to hold such election, mandamus is the appropriate remedy ; * quo warranto will also lie to determine the title of a member to a seat in a city council ^ or his right to vote in or preside over a municipal body.^ §379. By whom proceedings are instituted Inasmuch as the creation of a municipal corporation, and the grant of a municipal franchise, is wholly discretionary with the State Leg- islature, and a matter over which it has exclusive control, no in- formation in the nature of a quo warranto can be set in motion by a private citizen to prevent or inquire into the usurpation of such a franchise.'' But when a municipal corporation has long existed and exercised its functions, with the acquiescence of the State ; and its officials have been recognized by the State, the attorney general will be precluded from an information, which is intended to deprive the municipality of its franchise.^ At common law, the attorney general alone has power to inquire 3 Gray (Mass.) 116. By the N. Y. Code, 1983, et seq., the writ is abol- ished. An action must be brought in the name of the people on the re- lation of an interested pei-son, who must give security and compensate the attorney general. Costs may be granted for or against the defendant. But execution will not issue against the people, nor is a municipal cor- poration or official required to give security for costs. See Code, §§ 1947- 1956. 1 See §361. 2 Commonwealth v. Meeser, 44 Pa. St. 341; In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 21i; Hullman v. Honcomp, 5 Ohio, 237;Markle v. Wright, 13 Ind. 548; 49 Peabody v. Flint, 6 Allen (Mass.) 52; Peo. V. Carpenter, 24 N. Y. 86; Peo. v. Draper, 15 lb. 532; Com. v. Bank, 28 Pa. St. 389. sWaltonv. Beveling, 61 111. 201; Dickey v. Reed, 78 lb. 261; Peo. v. Galesburg, 48 lb. 485. * § 000, ante. '" Com. V. Meeser, 44 Pa. 341; State V. Frazier, 98 Mo. 426. li Reynolds v. Baldwin, 1 La. An. 162 ; Cochran v. McCleary, 22 Iowa, 75 ; In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200. '2Dil. Mun. Cor. §-898; Robinson v. Jones, 14Fla. 256; State v. Viokers, 51 N. J. L. 180. ' Peo. v. Maynard,, 15- Mich. 463. 769 §380 MtTNIGIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XVIII. into the usurpation of an office,^ and in theory he is made the sole judge of the expediency of employing this remedy. This rule is so far modified that it has become usual as a matter of course for the State to begin such proceedings upon the rela- tion of any person who is sufficiently interested to institute the suit ; and such interest need be neither important nor en- grossing.'^ § 380. Practice and procedare— Power discretionary.— Any lengthy discussion regarding the practice in quo warranto proceedings, regulated as it is by statutes in the various States, must be omitted here, and the reader is referred to the notes, and to an inspection of the authorities there cited.^ The granting of an information, in the nature of a quo war- ranto, is discretionary with the court, but the judicial discretion must be exercised in accordance with sound legal principles, and in the manner best calculated to advance the interests of justice.* If the matter be one which concerns the public interests alone, such as the abuse of a franchise, it is the duty of the State of- ficials to seek a remedy, and to procure redress for the public wrong committed ; and although in a case of this character the attorney general can, and often does, initiate the quo warranto proceedings on the relation of a private person, he should act in his official capacity. If the purpose of the proceedings be 1 Commonwealth v. Allen, 128 Mass. 308; State v. Anderson, 45 Ohio St. 196. 2 Com. V. Cluley, 56 Pa. St. 270; Com. V. Shepp, 10 Phila. 518; Eaton V. State, TBlackf. 65; Com. v. Bumm, 10 Phila. 162 ; (citizen claiming seat in municipal council.) State v. To- lan,3.3]Sr. J.L. 195; (voter.) Church- ill V. Walker, 68 Ga. 681; (every citi- zen.) Com. V. Jones, 12 Pa. St. 365; (defeated candidate.) Com. v. Mee- ser, 14 lb. 341. 2 Order to show cause : Com. v. Jones, 12 Pa. St. 365; Process on fil- ing : Com. V. Smead, 11 Mass. 264; E. D&llas V. State, 73 Tex. 370; State V. (Jummersall, 24 N. J. L. 529. Re- moval to Federal Court : Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449. Forms : State 770 V. Parsons, 40 N. J. L. 1; Bank v. Niagara, 6 Cow. 196; People v. Van Slyke, 4 lb. 297; Lavalle v. People, 68 111. 252; Eaton v. State, 7 Blackf. 65. Verdict: Thompson v. People, 23 Wend. 537. Judgment: State v. Herndon, 23 Fla. 287; Com. v. Fowler, 10 Mass. 290; Utica v. Scott, 8 Cow. (N. T.) 721; Miners Bank v. U. S., 5 How. (U. S.) 213. Costs : Peter v. Blue, 40 Kan. 727; Peo. v. Loomis, 8 Wend. 396; State v. Jacobs, 17 Ohio, 143; State v. Jenkins, 46 Wis. 616. Appeal : Inter. & G. N. Ey. v. State, 73 Tex. 356; State v. Burnett, 2 Ala." 140. * Commonwealth v. McCarter, 68 Pa. St. 607; Peo. v. No. Ch. Ey. Co., 88 111. 537; Peo. v. Callaghan, 83 D). 128; Peo. v. Waite, 70 lb. 25. CH. XVni.] MANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO. §381 merely to permit some disinterested person or meddler to inter- fere in a matter, which concerns the public welfare alone, the information should be refused.^ The court is bound to look into the motives actuating the re- lator ; and if upon all the circumstances, as detailed in the affi- davits, it seems clear to the court that he is impelled by wrong motives, and that the public necessity does not call for any ac- tion in his favor, his motion for a quo warranto will be denied.^ So, likewise, if there be no adverse claimant,^ or if respondent has acted in good faith.* § 381. How far remedy by quo warranto is superseded by special statutory proceedings for the control of contested elections. — It is sometimes difficult to determine to what ex- tent the force and efficiency of the remedy under consideration is impaired by the legislative provision of special proceedings before judges of election or other g'Masi-judicial officers, for the purpose of settling all questions involved in municipal electiong. It is a general and salutary rule that the supervisory juris- diction, exerted by the courts over elections and similar pro- ceedings by means of the writs of quo warranto, mandamus and certiorari, should not be curtailed without sound reasons there- for; nor should the final* decision of legal questions arising therein be relegated to tribunals, which may be incompetent to deal with them, and which are often swayed by partisan preju- dice.* The decisions conflict somewhat as to what special provisions for the trial of contested elections will operate as a repeal of the remedy by quo warranto.^ The answer to the question, 1 Peo. V. No. Ch. Ey. Co., 88 111. 537; Dorsey v. Ansley, 72 Ga. 460. liPeo. V. Waite, 70111. 25; Common- wealth V. Cluley, 56 Pa. St. 270. 8 State v. Sclmierle, 5 Rich. L. (S. C.) 299. *Peo. V. Hartwell, 12 Mich. 508; Peo. V. Witherell, 12 lb. 48. In State V. Tolan, 33 N. J. L. 195, the follow- ing rules have been laid down for the guidance of the discretionary pow- ers of the court: "(1) The relator must not be a stranger or inter- meddler. (2) He must not have concun-ed in the illegal act. (3) In the absence of fraud or intentional violation of law it must appear that public or private interests will not be seriously affected thereby." 2 Dil. Mun. Cor. § 901. 6 Dil. Mun. Corp. § 891. 6 Peo.v. Holden, 28 Cal. 123; Steele V. Martin, 6 Kan. 430; State v. Mar- low, 15 Ohio St. 114; Com. v. Meeser, 44 Pa. St. 341; Com. v. Baxter, 35 lb. 263. In New Tork, it has been held that the general jurisdiction of the coui'ts over the municipal officers, is 771 382 MUNICrPAIi COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XVni. whether such a special legislative provision abolishes the judi- cial supervision, always depends upon the phraseology con- tained in the provision itself, and upon the local laws regulating the subjects of quo warranto and elections.^ For this reason, it can only be laid down as a general rule that the Superior Courts can only be considered to have lost the jurisdiction over cases arising out of contested election, where the legislative in- tent to bring about that result is manifest and certain.^ It is, however, no violation of the constitutional provision, that the judicial power shall he vested in a Supreme Court and in inferior courts, for the Legislature to enact that a municipal council shall be the judge of the elections of its mayor, members and other officials, and that the ordinary courts of justice shall possess no jurisdiction therein.^ But when, as is usually the ease, the wording of the statute is not so manifestly exclusive of judicial supervision, the statu- tory procedure will be considered as initiate and cumulative only, and the right of the party, who is unsuccessful before the special tribunal, to a quo warranto will not be denied.* But if the intent to supersede the ordinary jurisdiction of the courts is clear, the court will not inquire even into election frauds,^ or into the eligibility of an elected official.'' § 382. User on part of usurper necessary — It is in all cases necessary to show a user on the part of the usurper ; and not ousted by a statute which makes an official board the judges of the election, and qualifications of its members. Peo. v. Hall, 80 N. Y. 117; In re Heath, 3 Hill (IS". Y.) 42, 57 ; but it is otherwise, if they are the final or sole judges; Sellick v. Com. Council, 40 Conn. 359; Linega v. Eit- tenhouse, 94 HI. 208; Peo. v. Metz- ker, 47 Cal. 524. 1 1 Dil. Mun. Corp., sec. 202; Ken- dall V. Camden, 47 N. J. L. 64; Peo. V. North, 72 N. Y. 124; Peo. v. Cris- sey, 91 lb. 616; McVeany v. Mayor, 80 K Y. 185; Peo. v. Detroit, 18 Mich. 338. 2 1 DU. Mun. Corp. 202. ' Mayoj V. Morgan, 7 Martin, La. l;9Ib. (K. S.)381. 772 * state V. Gates, 35 Minn. 385 ; State V. Governor, 1 Dutch. 331 ; Veauy v. Mayor, 80 IST. Y. 185; People v. Hull, 80 lb. 117; People v. Kilduff, 15 111. 492; State v. Wilmington, 3 Har. (Del.) 294; State v. Clerk, 1 Dutch. 354; Hadley v. Mayor, 33 N. Y. 603; Gass V. State, 34 Ind. 424; Com. v. Allen, 70 Pa. St. 465 ; Macklot v. Dav- enport, 17 Iowa, 379; State v. Fitz- gerald, 44 Mo. 425 ; Hummer v. Hum- mer, 3 G. Greene (Iowa) 42; Com. v. McClosky, 2 Eawle (Pa.) 369; In re Strahl, 16 Iowa, 369; Wammacks v. Hallaway, 2 Ala. 31; Kane v. People, 4 Neb. 509. 6 Common, v. Leach, 44 Pa. St. 332; Com. V. Meeser, 44 lb. 341. 6 Seay v. Hunt, 55 Tex. 545. CH. XVIII.] MANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO. § 38-1 it will not suffice to allege merely a claim against the defendant, that he holds or possesses and uses the office or franchise ; but some overt act of user must be shown.^ § 383. The burden of proof — The burden of proof is in such an action wholly upon the defendant, and the State is not under the necessity of showing that he is a usurper ; while he must substantiate his title to the office or franchise, and show by what authority he possesses it. And it is not enough to state generally, that he was legally or duly elected ; but he must allege facts, from which the court may draw the proper inferences as to the legality and validity of his title.^ § 384. Quo warranto proceeding to secure the forfeiture of municipal charter. — Inasmuch as the franchise of a munici- pal corporation is considered in the United States to exist solely for the benefit of the whole community, and not as a privilege of a few incorporators, as was the case under the early English Law, it is not likely that in this country an information in the nature of a quo warranto would be granted for the purpose of working a forfeiture of a municipal charter. At any rate, no American case can be cited, in which the court employed that remedy for that purpose. Such a proceeding would not har- monize with the spirit of American institutions. If municipal officials usurp powers which belong exclusively to the State, tJiere exist ample remedies, both in law and equity, by which their acts can be nullified aud their usurpation corrected.^ The constitutionality of an act which is pei'formed_ by a mu- nicipal official* will not be determined in quo warranto ; n9r will the action lie against a city for taking property without compen- sation ; ^ nor for the purpose of annulling irregular and improper city ordinances.^ But in one State it has been held that the 1 Eex V. Ponsonby, 1 Vesey (Eng.) l;Peo. V. Thompson, 16 Wendell, 655; 2 Dil. Mun. Cor. § 903. 2 People V. Clayton, 4 Utah, 421; People V. Jack, 4 lb. 438; Com. v. Gill, 3 Whart. 228; Clark v. People, 15 111. 213; Crook v. People, 106 111. 237; People v. Fletcher, 55 N. Y. 525; Atty. Gen. v. Foote, 11 Wis. 14; State V. Gleason, 12 Pla. 190. ' See post, chapter xrx. on Reme- dies against Corporations. Com. v. Pittsb., 14 Pa. St. 177; Harris v. Nes- bit, 24 Ala. 398; State v. Cahaba Co., 30 Ala. 66; Attorney Gen. v. Salem, 103 Mass. 138; Atty. Gen. v. Boston, 123 lb. 460. 4 Peo. V. Whitcomb, 55 111. 172. 5 Peo. V. Hillsdale, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 190; see, also, to the same general effect, People v. Mut. Gaslight Co., 38 Mich. 154. 6 State V. Lyons, 31 Iowa, 432. 773 § 386 MUKICIPAL CORPOKATIONS. [CH. xvin. right of a municipality to exercise a certain power, as, for ex- ample, to tax certain property, may be determined upon an in- formation in the nature of quo warranto, filed by the attorney general.^ § 885. Quo warranto to test the legal existence of mu- nicipal corporations. — Municipal corporations in America are always the creatures of statute, and hence the occasion would seldom arise when there can be any doubts as to their legal existence. But when they do occur, the question is generally raised in collateral proceedings brought against them or their officials. But such a question may arise when by statutory en- actment a municipal corporation has been legislated out of ex- istence, or extinguished by annexation or consolidation.^ And probably, they are more common where the town and cities are chartered under general statutes, by compliance with the provis- ions of the same, instead of by a special or private act of incor- poration. But, whether the cases are rare or common, it is reasonably well settled by the current of judicial decisions in this country, that the corporate existence of a municipality may be put in issue and determined by the court in an information in the nature of a quo warranto, brought against an official who claims to act under the municipal authority.^ And if in such a case it be found that no corporation exists, de jure or de facto, the relator is entitled to judgment.* § 386. Effect of judgment in quo warranto. — Judgment in a proceeding in quo warranto is conclusive, until reversed, upon all persons whomsoever; and may be given in evidence in any subsequent case, on an issue involving the rights, which have been settled thereby.^ It has been held, however, that a « 1 State V. Charleston Com., 1 Mill. Const. E. (S. C.) 36; People v. Oak- land, 92 Cal. 611. 2 Dillon's Muu. Cor. §184, et seq.; Taylor v. Toi-t Wayne, 47 luu. 281. " People V. Spring Valley, 129 Bl. 169; People v. Carpenter, 24 ST. Y. 86; People V. Draper, 15 lb. 532 ; People V. Clark, 70 N. T. 518; People v. Bennett, 29 lb. 471 ; State v. Carbon- dale, 29 Iowa, 254; State v. Brown, 31 N. J. L. 350; People v. Gartland, (Mich. 90) 42 W. W. K. 687 ; People v. 774 Albertson, 55 N. T. 50; People v. Clute, 22 lb. 576; State v. Tracy, 51 N. W. K. 613; State v. Parker, 25 Minn. 215. * State V. Weatherby, 45 Mo. 17; Cf. Territory v. Armstrong, 6 Dak. 226; State v. McReynolds, 61 Mo. 203; State V. Coffee, 59 lb. 59; Renwick V. Hall, 84 111. 162. s Utica Ins. Co. v. Scott, 8 Cow (K. T.) 709, 721, and authorities cited. Hunter v. Chandler, 45 Mo. 452. CH. XVIII.] MANDAMUS AND QUO WARRANTO. §387 prior judgment, obtained on the relation of a district attorney, is not a bar to a subsequent proceeding by the State. ^ Nor will a judgment of ouster against an official bind one who does not hold under him.^ § 387. Effect of judgment when not rendered during offi- cial term. — Since the terms of office in America are almost al- wa^'S of short duration, it becomes exceedingly important to ascertain whether a judgment can be rendered in a quo warranto proceeding, after the expiration of the term. In England it is held, where satisfactory reasons can be given for the delay, that the information will be granted, even though the application be filed after the close of the term of office.** The reason for this ruling is that the rightful claimant is entitled to a judicial determination of his right to the office. In the United States, the authorities are somewhat conflicting. The English rule is followed without qualification in North Carolina,* while in other States, the information has been refused, because the limited duration of the term of office made it impossible for ajudgment to be rendered before its expiration.^ But the better opinion seems to be that the judgment on an information in the nature of quo warranto will be granted, notwithstanding the resignation of the respondent, or the expiration of his term of office, pro- vided the proceedings were begun prior to such termination of the opposition to the lawful claims of the relator.® 1 State V. Cin. G. & C. Co., IS Ohio St. 285. 2 Wood V. State, 30 N". E. E. 309; State V. Kearn, 20 Atl. R. 1018; State V. Smith, 22 lb. 1020; People v. Mur- ray, 73 N. Y. 535; Dodge v. People, 113 111. 491. 3 Rex V. Williams, 1 W. Black. 95 ; Rex V. Harris, 6 Ad. & El. 475 ; Rex V. Mario w, 2 M. & S. 76; Rex v. Payne, 2 Chitty, 367. In Eegina v. Blizaid, L. E. 2 Q. B. ,634, the infor- mation was granted and judgment of ouster rendered, although the unlaw- ful claimant had prior to judgment disclaimed the office. « Burton v. Patton, 2 Jones (N. C.) L. 124. 6 Morris v. Underwood, 19 Ga. 559 ; Howard v. Gage, 6 lb. 462; State v. Jacobs, 17 Ohio, 143; Peo. v. Loomis, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 396. 6 Hunter v. Chandler, 35 Mo. 452 ; Com. V. Swasey, 133 Mass. 538; Com. V. Smith, 45 Pa. St. 59; People \r. Hartwell, 12 Mich. 508. 775 CHAPTER XIX. KEMEDIES AGAINST MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS IN GENERAL. Section. 391 — Equitable remedies. 392 — ^Necessity for equitable rem- edies — Codes of proced- ure — Preliminary injunc- tion. 398 — Equitable jurisdiction over municipal officials. 394 — Municipal corporations as trustees. 395 — Taxpayers' suits in equity. Section. 396 — ^Injunction to restrain dam- ages to private property — Multiplicity of suits. 397 — Injunction to restrain the collection of taxes. 898 — Scope of certiorari. 399— Wliat may be examined un- der vrrit of certiorari. 400 — Indictment. 401 — Writ of prohibition. § 391. Equitable remedies. — Questions, concerning the ex- tent of the authority and powers of municipal corporations un- der the charter or general law of the State, generally involve a consideration of legal principles rather than of equitable ; and as a rule a court of equity has very little control or super- vision over corporations of this character.^ Equity of course will not interfere in cases, where there is a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law,^ but if a case should arise to which a municipal corporation is a party, equity will assume jurisdiction ; and equitable relief will be given, if the subjec1>matter of the suit ranges itself under some one of the distinct heads of equity V. St. Louis, 5 Wall. 413; Hannew- rukle V. Georgetown, 15 lb. 547; Dows V. Chicago, 11 lb. 108; Com. v. Wellsboro etc. Co., 35 Pa. St. 152; Hyatt V. Bates, 35 Barb. 308; Albany etc. Co. V. Brownell, 24 N. T. 345; Dodd V. Hartford, 25 Conn. 232; Milwauliee Iron Co. v. Hubbard, 29 Wis. 51; Lewis v. Franlcfort, 79 Ind. 446; Mayor v. Markham, 23 Ga. 402. The remedy at law must be shown to be inadequate. Nichols v. Salem, 14 Gray, 490; Frevert v. Finrock, 31 Oliio St. 621; Watson v. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74: English v. Smock, 34 Ind. 115; Bisliop v. Moorman, 98 Ind. 1. I Boyle V. Brooklyn, 71 N. T. 1; Brooklyn v. Meserole, 26 Wend. 132_; Guest V. Brooklyn, 69 N. T. 506; Moars v. Smedley, 6 Johns. Ch. 28; Jex V. New York, 103 N. T. 536; Susquehanna Bk. v. Broome Co., 25 N. T. 312; Brehm v. New York, 104 lb. 586; Heywood v. Buffalo, 14 lb. 534; Minnesota L. O. Co. v. Palmer, 20 Minn. 468, 474; Smith v. Oconomo- woc, 49 Wis. 694; Douglas v. Har- rison, 9 W. Ya. 162. sPaine v. Delhi, 116 N. Y. 224; Myall v. St. Paul, 30 Minn. 294; Mil- ler V. Mobile, 47 Ala. 166; Hansmeis- ter V. Porter, 21 Fed. Rep. 335 ; Ewing 776 CH. XIX.] EEMEDIES IN GENEEAL. §392 jurisdictiou.! ^g jj^s been seen,^ a municipal corporation has no right to create or maintain a nuisance, and a court of equity will enjoin a municipality from building a sewer through pri- vate property, which endangered the health of the community.^ The jurisdiction of equity to enjoin nuisances is of ancient ori- gin and generally acknowledged.* So, too, equity will enjoin municipal usurpation of jurisdiction under an unconstitutional act of the Legislature, upon the ground that an irreparable injury will be done thereby, for which damages, which may be recoYered in an action at law, would afford no adequate com- pensation.^ § 392. Necessity for equitable remedies against cities and towns — Code of procedure— Preliminary injunction. — The notorious fact, that the powers committed to municipal corpora- tions are extremely liable to abuse and in fact frequently are abused and illegally exceeded to the serious detriment of the inhabitants, has brought about a quasi limitation of the rule, that equity will not act as long as there is a remedy at law. Many apparent exceptions to this rule are acknowledged, par- ticularly in those systems of procedure which are employed in what are known as the Code States. In these States, the an- cient line of demarkation between law and equity has become indistinct and the remedies afforded by both are blended iu one cause of an action. The '■'■preliminary injunction" of the codes or injunction pen- dente lite, granted usually ez parte or a prima facie ease, and employed with the utmost liberality and improvidence by the courts, is very extensively employed over municipal corpora- tions, and their officers. The whole matter is to so large an extent regulated by stat- utes and codes of procedure that no universal or general rules can be laid down ; and the only safe method, as in all questions 1 State V. Newark, 25 N. J. L. 399; Railroad Co. v. Jersey City, 26 N. J. Eq. 247 ; Foley v. Paterson, 26 lb. 216 ; Can-on v. Martin, 26 ST. J. L. 594; Jersey City v. Lembeok, 31 N. J. Eq. 255; State v. Jersey City, 30 lb. 521. 2 §§340, 342. 8 Butler V. Thomasville, 74 Ga. 570. < Atty. Gen. v. Johnson, 2 Wils. Ch. 87; Columbus v. Jaques, 30 Ga. 506; Silliman v. Hudson Eiv. B. Co., 4 Blatchf. (U. S.) 74; DemopoUs v. Webb, 6 So. Kep. 408. ''Peoria v. Johnson, 56 HI. 52; Smith V. Bangs, 15 lb. 399; Hyde Park V. Chicago, 124 111. 156; Mc- Cord V. Pike, 121 111. 288; People v. Whitcomb, 55 lb. 172. 777 §392 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XIX. of procedure, is an attentive examination of these local statutes or codes. As a rule, it may be said that equity will interfere to aid or coerce municipal corporations upon the same principle, that they will assume jurisdiction over individuals. Thus, equity will not interfere at the instance of a private person, as against a municipal corporation, for an act perpetrated by the latter with- in its legal powers or for the exercise of its judgment or discre- tion, unless some irreparable or at least some substantial injury to private propertj'^ rights is caused thereby ; ^ or where the dis- cretion is manifestly abused.^ So, an injunction was refused an abutter, to restrain the closing of a street at a point three blocks distant from his land, upon the ground that he had no property rights which would be injured by the act of the city.' The issue of municipal bonds having been authorized, to supply gas for public and private use, it was provided that the interest and principal were -to be met by the money received for its use. Any deficiency was to be provided for by taxation. An injunction to restrain their issue was refused, upon the ground that it could not be shown that the anticipated income would be insufficient to meet the principal and interest.* 1 SufSeld V. Hathaway, 44 Conn. 521; Gartsede v. East St. Louis, 43 111. 47; Baltimore v. B. & O. K. E. Co., 21 Md. 50. 2 Moore v. Atlanta, "70 Ga. 611; Variok v. New York, 4 Johns. Ch. 5.3, ch. XVI., Streets; Atty. Gen. v. Bos- ton, 123 Mass. 460, 479; Hamerick v. House, 17 Ga. 56; State v. "Woody, lb. 612; Alpero v. San Francisco, 32 Fed. Eep. 503; Torpedo Co. v. Clar- endon, 19 lb. 231 ; Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N. C. 244; Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 94, 104; Cape May etc. Co. v. Cape May, 419 ; Waterbury v. Laredo, 60 Tex. 510. In Erie v. Eeed, 113 Pa. St. 468, it was said " if the discre- tion was abused no doubt the power of a court of equity would be ade- quate to restrain the perpetration of a palpable wrong." Spring Val- ley etc. Co. V. Schottler, 110 U. S. 347. 778 3 Chicago V. Union Building Assn., 102 111. 379, 399, comp. Whiting v. Boston, 106 Mass. 89; Jones v. Bos- ton, 104 lb. 461; Sullivan v. Phillips, 110 Ind. 320. * Fellows V. "Walker, 39 Fed. Eep. 651. In this case the court said: "Injunctions are not granted in cases like the present, except when complainant's rights are clear, and where an injury more or less irre- parable is likely to result to com- plainant, unless defendants are en- joined. In this case, complainant's rights are not clear and the injury likely to happen to them is not shown to be irreparable or even se- rious. On the other hand, the allow- ance of an injunction would be at- tended with irreparable loss and damage to the city of Toledo. See, also. Lane v. Schamp, 20 N. J. Eq. 82, Galoway v. London, 1 H. L. 34. CH. XlX.j EEMEDIES IN GENERAL. 391 § 393. Equitable jurisdiction over municipal ofHcials It is a well settled rule, that courts of equity have no jurisdic- tion over public ofBcers, either to determine the validity of their appointment, or the legality or justice of their removal. These subjects are exclusively for the consideration of courts of law, and the form of remedy properly employed is mandamus, cer- tiorari, quo warranto, or some similar proceeding, according to the local rules of procedure.^ The jurisdiction of courts of equity, unless it is extended by statute, is confined to the protection of property rights, for the infringement of which there is no adequate, plain and com- plete remedy at law.^ § 394. Municipal corporations as trustees. — By virtue of the control and supervision which is exercised over trusts and trustees by courts of equity, bills to restrain or prevent breaches of trust or misapplication of trust property by municipal au- thorities, or to enforce and obtain the performance of the im- portant trusts, which are committed to cities and towns as trustees for their inhabitants, and for the public generally, have been frequently entertained favorably, both in England and in this country.^ The bill maj- in such cases be filed more properly by the at- torney general on his own motion, as the advocate of the legal lights and interests of the public, or on the relation of the cor- porators or individual parties interested.* 1 See oil. YI. Ofacers; ch. XVIII. Mandamus; see also In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200; Cobb v. Hague, 13 S. E. R. 633; 87 Ga. 430; Updegraff v. C'lans, 47 Pa. St. 103; MoCord v. Oak- land, 27 Pac. 863; 64 Cal. 134; Dela- hanty V. Warner, 75 Ex. 185; Mont- gomery Gas Light Co. v. City Coun- cil, 6 So. 113; 87 Ala. 245; Stahl v. Brown, 1 S. W. R. 540; 85 Ky. 325; United States Ex. Co. v. Hess, 3 N. Y. S. 777; Payne v. English, 79 Cal. 540; Sperry v. AUina, 17 Or. 481; Mc- Donald V. Rehrer, 22 Fla. 198. 2 In re Sawyer, supra, § 391, Equi- table remedies. 8 Trevin v. Lewis, 4 M. & C. 249; Baltimore v. E. B. Co., 21 Md. 275; Barnum v. Baltimore, 62 lb. 275; Atty. General v. Heelis, 2 Sim. & Stu. 67; Atty. Gen. v. Boston, 123 Mass. 460; People v. Canal Board, 55 N. Y. 390; Black v. Ross, 37 Mo. App. 250; Brockman V. Cresten, 44 Mo. R. 882 (Iowa, 90) ; Murphy v. East Port- land, 42 Fed. 308; Russell v. Tate, 13 S. W. E. 130; 52 Ark. 541; Balti- more V. Horn, 26 Md. 194; High on Injunction, 783-795; see ch. XII. on Corporate Property. * It is customary, though not nec- essary, to make the relators parties to the suit so that the defendant, if the bill is dismissed, may recover costs for which the crown is not lia- ble. Atty. Gen. v. Dublin, Bligh N. 779 394 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XIX. Under certain circumstances in this country, if not in Eng- land, equity will entertain bills, which are filed by private per- sons in suits of this nature against municipal corporations. And in Canada, it has been held that the attorney general is by no means a necessary party.-' In consequence of the greater power, which is possessed by the attorney general in England, and conferred upon him by the common law, in comparison with similar officials in the States, the principles regulating the governmental supervision of mu- nicipal and other corporations as enunciated by the English de- cisions are not wholly applicable to municipal corporations in the United States. The English court of chancery wiU, upon the bill filed by the attorney general, relieve against fraud in the disposition of mu- nicipal property even though by statute there is another remedy. So, if property belonging to a municipal corporation isfraudu- lently or collusivel)'' alienated,^ or if the municipal council con- template making an unauthorized payment of compensation to officers of the borough,^ equity will interpose. A nmnieipal corporation has been enjoined, on an informa- tion by the attorney general, from paying a note which was given for borrowed money, when the city had no power to give a note,* and from using corporate funds to pay the ex- penses of procuring an act of Parliament, beneficial to the corporation.^ The property in the possession of municipal corporations is universally regarded by the English courts as trust property ; ^ and over them and their officials as trustees, the State has the right to exercise the most rigid supervision, not only in equitable proceedings, but by criminal process as well.'' R. 312; Same v. Birmingham, 3 L. K. Eq. 552 ; Same v. Exeter, 29 Beav. 44. 1 Paterson v. Bowes, 4 Grant, 170. 2 Parr v. Attorney Gen'l, 8 01. & F.409; Evans v. Avon, 29 Bear. 144; Attorney General v. Aspiuwall, 2 My. & C. 613; Roper v. MoWliorter, 77 Va. 214; Clapp v. City of Spokane, 53 Fed. 515; Russell v. Tate, 13 S. W. R. 130 ; 52 Ark. 541 ; Payne v. English, 79 Cal. 540; McDonald v. Eehrer, 22 Fla. 198. 780 " Attorney Gen'l v. Poole, 4 Mylne & C. 613. « Attorney Gen'l v. Litchfield, 13 Simons, 547. 6 Sherman v. Winnetka, 59111. 389; Attorney General v. Norwich, 13 Simons, 225 ; Cf . Underwood v. Wood, (Ky. 92) 19 S. W. R. 405. ^ Attorney Gen. v. Aspinwall, 2 M. & C. 613, 618, 623. 'Blakie v. Staples, 13 Grant, 67; Daniels v. Burford, 10 Up. Can. Q. B. 481. CH. XIX.] EEMBDIES IN GENERAL. § 395 In the United States, there is much difference of opinion upon some points, involved in the equitable control of the powei's of municipal corporations, which is due to the fact, that with us the powers of the municipalities, and the duties of the attorney general or law officer of the State, are commonly such onlj' as are prescribed by express statute. In consequence of the limited power of the attorney general of a State as com- pared with his English prototype, the question has been raised several times as to his power to invoke the aid of a court of equity to restrain the illegal action of a municipal corporation, in the absence of an)'' statute authorizing him to do so. The weight of authority is decidedly to the effect, that he has such a right by virtue of his office, and by reason of the interest which the State has in a proper execution of the powers, dele- gated to or conferred upon municipal corporations.^ But the facts upon which the law official of the State tiles a bill to pre. vent municipal corporations from making an illegal use of their powers, or to set aside their illegal acts, must bring the case within one of the universally recognized subdivisions or heads of equity jurisdiction,^ although tlie courts are not very strin- gent in this regard ; and have applied the Englisli rule, that every abuse of corporate power is a breach of trust, with the object of giving the attorney general power over corporations, even when no jurisdiction is conferred on him by statute.^ § 395. Taxpayers' suits in equity. — Following out the theory which regards the municipal corporation as a trustee for the inhabitants, it is almost, if not quite universally, conceded by the courts in the United States that, in the event of the failure of the State law officer to intervene by virtue of his statutory or implied power to protect the interest of the State and of the corporators, any property holder or municipal tax- payer may resort to equity, to prevent municipal corporations or officials from exceeding their lawful powers, or neglecting or violating their legal duties, under any circumstances where the taxpayer's interest will be injuriously affected.* And this 1 State V. Saline Co., 51 Mo. 350. ^Dailey v. New Haven, 60 Conn. 314; Stalil v. Brown, 84 Ky. 324; Peo- ple V. Lowber, 7 Abb. Pr. 158; Peo- ple V. New York, 9 lb. 253; 10 lb. 144. 2 Attorney General v. Detroit, 26 Mich. 263. * See § 396. Damage to personal property. 781 §395 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XIX. is the privilege of the taxpayer, though it is not expressly con- ferred upon him by statute.^ In private corporations, the bene- ficiaries of the trust reposed in the body corporate are the stockholders ; and they, it is well settled, have the power to invoke the aid of eq^uity to protect their rights and enforce the trust existing for their benefit in cases where the officials of the corporation refuse to act or act fraudulently. If the directors will not protect the rights of the creditors and stockholders then the latter may and should attend to their own interests.^ There is no reason whatever why a different rule should be applied to municipal corporations, in which the taxpayers are the beneficiaries upon whose shoulders will ultimately fall the loss and expense which is caused by illegal, fraudulent or tortious acts, or by the inertness and general malfeasances of the municipal authorities. 1 Crompton v. Zabriskie, 101 U. S. 601. In this case the court said: " Of the riglit of resident taxpayers to invoke the interposition of a court of equity to prevent an illegal dis- position of the moneys of the county, or the illegal creation of a debt, which they in common with other property holders of the county may otherwise be compelled to pay, there is at this day no serious question. The right has been recognized by the State courts in numerous cases, and from the nature of the powers exercised by municipal corporations the great danger of their abuse, and the necessity of prompt action to prevent irremediable injuries, it would seem eminently proper for courts of equity to interfere upon the application of the taxpayers of a county, to prevent the consumma- tion of a wrong, when the officers of these corporations assume, in excess of their powers, to create burdens upon property holders. Certainly, in the absence of legislation, resti-ict- ing the right to interfere in such cases to public officers of the State or county, there would seem to be no substantial reason why a bill, by 782 or in behalf of individual taxpayers, should not be entertained to prevent the misuse of corporate power. The courts may safely be trusted to prevent the abuse of their process in such cases." Colburn v. Chatta- nooga, 17 Am. L. E. N. S. 191; Solo- mon V. Fleming, (Neb. 92) 51 N. W. E. 304; Harrington v. Plainview, 27 Minn. 224; Grant v. Davenport, 36 Iowa, 396; Webster v. Harwinton, 32 Conn. 131; Brockman v. Creston, (Iowa, 90) 44 N. W. E. 822; Stevens V. Eutland etc. Co., 29 Vt. 546; Nor- mand v. Comm'rs, 8 Neb. 18; Smith V. Magourich, 44 Ga. 163; Valparaiso V. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1; Merrill v. Plainfield, 45 N. H. 126 ; Hooper v. Ely, 46 Mo. 505; McCord v. Pike, 12 N. E. E. 259; Murphy v. East Port- land, 42 Fed. E. 308; Terrett v. Shar- on, 34 Conn. 105 ; The Liberty Bell, 23 Fed. E. 843; Winkler v. Halsted, 36 Mo. App. 25 ; Harrison v. Electric Co., 48N. W. E. 1005; Baltimore v. Gill, 31 Md. 575; Hodgman v. Chi- cago etc. Co., 20 Minn. 48; contra, Pierce v. Smith, (Kan. 92) 29 Pac. 565. 2 Tiedeman on Equity Jur. § 329^ CH. XIX.] EEMEDIES IN GENERAL. 395 A municipal corporation will, it is well settled, be enjoined at the suit of a taxpaj^er from appropriating corporate funds for purposes unauthorized by the general laws, or by its char- ter,^ from making illegal contracts,^ or from issuing their own bonds,^ or delivering railroad aid bonds,* or indorsing the ob- ligations of the railroad company,* when such acts are unau- thorized. So a taxpayer and citizen may enjoin the issue or the sale after issue of void bonds,** or of scrip intended to cir- culate as money.'' Not only will equity interfere to prevent an illegal appropriation of municipal funds or credit ; but it has been held that when a city, in exercising a legal power to lease its wharves, disregards the charter forms prescribed, and, by failure to invite competition, attempts to make a lease upon terms extremely disadvantageous to the taxpayers, they have a standing in court to prevent the execution of the lease, and procure the amendment of the ordinance authorizing it.^ As a general rule, taxpayers have no right to contest, in an equity suit, the validity of a grant of an exclusive privilege or 1 City of Rook Island v. Huesing, 25 m. App. 600; 21 N. E. R. 558; 128 111. 565; Bayle v. New Orleans, 28 Fed. R. 843; Willard v. Anisteck, 58 Wis. 565; Tarnell v. Los Angeles, 87 Cal. 603; 25 Pac. 767; Mazet v. Pitts- burgh, 137 Pa. St. 548; 27 W. N. C. 73; Knorr v. Miller, 25 W'klyL. Bui. 128; Simmons v. Toledo, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. E. 124; Sackett v. New Albany, 88 Ind. 473; Scott v. Alexander, 23 S. C. 120; Harney v. Indianapolis, 32 Ind. 244; Jacksonpoi-t v. Watson, 33 Ark. 704; Richmond v. Davis, 103 Ind. 449; Sherlock v. Winnetka, 59 111. 389 ; Wade v. Richmond, 18 Gratt. 583; Newmeyer v. M. & M. Co., 52 Mo. 81 ; Russell v. Tate, 52 Ark. 541 ; 13 S. W. R. 130; New London v. Brainard, 22 Conn. 552; Webster v. Harvinton, 32 lb. 131; Winkler v. Halstead, 36 Mo. App. 25 ; Falmer v. Nuckolls Co., 6 Neb. 204. 2 Mazet V. Pittsburgh, 137 Pa. St. 548; Knorr v. Miller, 25 W'kly L. Bui. 128; and cases in last note. 8 Robertson v. Breedlove, 61 Tex. 316. « Lynch v. R. E. Co., 57 Wis. 430. 5 Blake v. Macon, 53 Ga. 172. 6 Jackson v. Brush, 77 111. 59. ''Colburn v. Chattanooga, 17 Am. L. R. 191. Issue of bonds enjoined, see WuUenwater v. Duunigan, (Neb. 91) 47 N. W. R. 420; Winn v. Shaw, (Cal. 91) 25 Pac. R. 244; 25 lb. 968; 87 Cal. 631; Wood v. Bangs, 46 N. W. R. 586; 1 Dak. 179; Livingston Co. v. Welder, 64 III. 427; Allison v. Louis- ville etc. Co., 9 Bush, 247; Bound v. Wis. Cen. R, R., 45 Wis. 543; McCord V. Pike, (111. 87) 12 N. E. R. 2.59; Davenport v. Kleinschmidt, (6 Mont. 502) 13 Pac. 249; Marshall v. Silliman, 61111. 218; Chestnutwood v. Hood, 68 lb. 132; Carruthers v. Harnett, (Tex. 91) 2 S. W. R. 523; Wright v. Bishop, 88 111. 302; Springfield v. Ed- wards, 84 lb. 626. 8 Handy v. New Orleans, 39 La. An. 107; Conery v. New Orleans W. W. Co., 39 lb. 770. 783 5 396 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XIX. franchise,^ or to enjoin a city from entering into a contract, unless they can show in both instances that they sustain spe- cial injury by the municipal action.^ But taxpayers may enjoin the city from contracting debts, which will cause the municipal limit of taxation to be exceeded ; ^ or which for any other rea- son are in violation of constitutional or statutory prohibitions.* And if such debts have been contracted, their payment may be likewise enjoined.^ It is agreed by all that taxpayers have a right, founded on their property interests which are at stake, to interfere to prevent an unauthorized municipal act, by which the burden of taxation will be increased ; the main difference of opinion being as to the proper party to institute the action. As above indicated, the majority of the decisions hold that such suits may, in the absence of statute, be instituted directly by the taxpayers who are affected. But there are many decisions which hold that since the illegal action of a municipal corpora- tion affects the whole public, any measure to restrain or redress such acts must be instituted by a public officer, although, of course, he may do so upon the i'el9.tion of the individual tax- payers.^ § 396. Injunction to restrain damages to private prop- erty— Multiplicity of suits. — Ithas been held that an injunction will not lie at the suit of a private citizen, to abate a nuisance erected in the public streets,^ upon the ground that the proper • Grant V. Davenport, 36 Iowa, 396; Grand Kap. E. etc. Co. v. Grand Rap. Ed. Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 659; N. O. Gas Co. V. Louisiana L. Co., 115 U. S. 650. ^ Searles v. Abraham, 73 Iowa, 507; Bolton V. San Antonio, (Tex. 93) •M S. W. E. 64. ^ Howell V. Peoria, 90 111. 104; Dav- enport V. Kleiuschmidt, 6 Mont. 502. * Merrill v. Plaiufield, 45 N. H. 126; Frederick v. Goshen, 20 Md. 436; Bal- timore v. Gill, 31 lb. 375; Kelly v. Baltimore, 53 lb. 134. ^ Strohme v. Iowa City, 47 Iowa, 42. 6 Bagg V. Detroit, 5 Mich. 336, 346; Kelly V. Chicago, 62 111. 279 ; compare Brown v. Manning, 6 Ohio, 298 ; State V. Perry Co., 5 Ohio St. 497, 502; Cornell College v. Iowa County, 32 784 Iowa, 520; State v. Carey, (N. D. 91) 49 N. W. R. 164; Doolittle v. Select- men, 59 Conn. 402; Kilbourne v. St. John. 51 N. Y. 21 ; Merriam v. Yuba Co., 72 Cal. 517; State v. Grace, (Or. 91) 25 Pac. 382; Atty. Genl. v. Bos- ton, 123 Mass. 460; Johnson v. Thorn- dike, 56 Me. 52; Spencer V. Menasha, 15 Kan. 259; Anderson v. State, 23 Miss. 459. ■^ Mowry v. Providence, (R. I. 91) 16 Atl. E. 433; Morris eto. Co. v. Prudden, 20 jST. J. Eq. 530; Fay v. Weber, (Wis. 91) 48 K. W. R. 859; Bechtel v. Carslake, 11 N. J. Eq. 50; Higbee v. Camden etc. Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 435 ; Cf. Pennsylvania v. Bridge Co., 13 How. 518; Atty. Gen. v. Cohoes Co., 6 Paige, 133; People v. Third Ave. CH. XIX.] BEMEDIES IN GENERAL. 396 part}' to procure the abatement of a public nuisance is the of- ficial acting for the state or municipal corporation. Though the cases are not harmonious the majority of the decisions sus- tain the opposite doctrine, i. e., that a private person is enti- tled to an injunction in such case, at least when the street is so used as to constitute a special and irreparable damage to his property'. 1 E. E. Co., 45 Barb. 63; Craig v. Peo- ple, 47 111. 487; Atty. Gen. v. Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400; Rochester v. Eriokson, 46 Barb. 92; Coast Line etc. Co. V. Cohen, 50 Ga. 451; Wil- liams V. Smith, 22 Wis. 600; Wau- kesha H. M. S. Co. V. Waukesha, 83 lb. 475; Webb v. Demopolis, (Ala. 93) 13 So. 289; Neshkoro v. West, 55 N. W. E. 476. 1 Barton v. Union Cattle Co., 44 K. W. E. 454; McCowan v. Whiteside, 31 Ind. 235 ; Dubach v. Hannibal etc. Co., 89 Mo. 483; Harvard Col. v. Stearns, 15 Gray, 1; Crowley v. Da- vis, 63 Cal. 460; Billard v. Erhard, 35 Kan. 611 ; Board v. N. T. H. M. Co., 19 Atl. E. 1098; Cumberland etc. E. E. App., 62 Pa. St. 218; Truesdale v. Peoria C. S. Co., 101 111. 561; Glaes- ner v. Auheuser etc. Co., 13 S. W. E. 707; Gray v. Bay ward, 5 Del. Ch. 499 ; Vick v. Rochester, 46 Hun, 607; Morgan's Ap., 25 W. N. C. 532; Sullivan v. Phillips, (Ind.) 11 N. E. R. 310; Czarniecki's App., (Pa. 88) 11 Atl. E. 660; Smith v. Bangs, 15 HI. 399; Pettibone v. Hamilton, 40 Wis. 402; Central B. Co. v. Low- ell, 4 Gray, 474; Milhau v. Sharp, 27 N. T. 611; Knox v. New York, 55 Barb. 404; Columbus v. Jaques, 30 Ga. 506; Shed v. Hawthorne, 3 Neb. 179. The word irreparable as used ia this connection does not neces- sarily mean that there is no possi- bility of compensation in damages, or even that the damage is very great. Wood V. Sutcliffe, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 165; Cassebeer v. Mowrey, 55 Pa. St. 419; Dudley v. Hurst, 1 Am. St. Eep. 368, 50 374. The very fact that no actual damages could be shown while in- jury was caused furnished a good reason for the interference of a court of equity. Clowes v. Staffordshh'e, L. E. 8 Chapp. 125; Jerome v. Eoss, 7 Johns. Ch. 315 ; Hunkerline's App., 70 Pa. St. 102; Coe v. Lake Co., 37 N. H. 254; see as to the necessity for irreparable damage and its ele- ments: Bond V. Wool, 107 N. C. 139; Winter v. Montgomery, (Ala. 91) 9 So. 366; Ferris v. Wellborn, 64 Miss. 29; Watson v. Farrell, 34 W. Va. 406 ; Loeser v. Leebman, 14 N. T. S. 569; Ohio Eiv. E. Co. v. Gibbons, (W. Va. 91) 12 S. E. E. 1093; Strin v. Nash, 12 N. Y. S. 431; 19 Civ. Pro. E. 184; Empire L. & B. Ass'n v. City of Atlanta, 77 Ga. 496; El well v. Greenwood, 26 Iowa, 377; People V. Vanderbilt, 26 N. Y. 287; Bechtel V. Carslake, 3 Stockton Ch. 500; Con- rad V. Smith, 32 Mich. 429; Pratt v. Lewis, 39 lb. 7 ; Pettibone v. Hamil- ton, 40 Wis. 402 ; Payne v. McKinley, 54 Cal. 532 ; Keizer v. Lovett, 85 Ind. 240; White v. Williamson, 17 S. E. E. 604 (Ga. 93); Parsons v. Atlanta, 44 Ga. 529; Pratt v. Eoseland, (N. J. 93) 24 Atl. E. 1037; Toledo A. A. etc. Co. V. Pennsyl. Co., 54 Fed. 730 Brooklyn S. T. Co. v. Brooklyn, 78 N. Y. 524; Cushman v. Highland Ditch Co., 33 Pac. 344; Hannibal v. Winchell, 57 Mo. 172 ; Graves v. Gas Co., 83 Iowa, 74; Columbus etc. Co. V. Witherow, 82 Ala. 190; Bell v. Edwards, 37 La. An. 475; earning V. Lowerse, 6 Johns. Ch. 439; Scran- ton V. Steele Co., 154 Pa. St. 1717. 785 S 396 MUNICIPAL COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XIX. An injunction will lie to restrain the municipal authorities from the commission of acts which will illegally encroach or trespass upon the property of private persons ; ^ as for example, to restrain a city from proceeding to open a street through land, without condemnation proceedings or the owner's consent;'* or to prevent a seizure of land, when compensation has not been paid or tendered ; ^ or for arbitrarily removing merchan- dise which is not a nuisance from the owner's yard ; * or from selling land which has been dedicated as a common or park.^ The rights of abutters to a convenient use of the streets will be protected by injunction against the encroachment of the mu- nicipal coi-poration or railroad companies or others using the streets. Thus, an injunction will lie to prevent him from being deprived of his right of access.^ So an abutting owner may enjoin the illegal removal of shade trees and fences by the city or others.'^ Where abutters are entitled to compensation for the use of the street, on which they front, by a railroad company, the ap- propriation of the street will be enjoined until compensation is 1 Ambrose v. Buffalo, 20 IST. T. S. 129; 29 Abb. N. C. 140; Kerr v. Jos- lin, 66 Hun, 629; Rafter v. Tagliabue, 29 Abb. N. C. 1 ; Payne v. English, 21Pac. 952; 79 Cal. 540; McDonald V. Newark, 42 N. J. E. 136; Broome V. K. J. etc. Tel. Co., Y Atl. E. 457; Emporia v. Soden, 25 Kan. 588; Kyle V. Board, 94 lud. 115; Clark v. Syra- cuse, 1.3 Barb. 32; North Pac. Ry. Co. V. Spokane, 52 Fed. 428; Wright v. Chanahan, 51 Hun, 262; Taintor v. Mbrristown, 19 N. J. Eq. 46; Quiuten V. Burton, 61 Iowa, 471; Holmes v. Jersey City, 12 N. J. Eq. 299; Dud- ley V. Frankfort, 12 B. Mon. 610; Carter v. Chicago, 57 111. 283; Bough- man V. Clarksburgh, 10 W. Va. 394; Kern v. Isgrigg, (Ind. 92) 31 N. E. R. 455. 2 Hudson V. Vareis, (Ind. 93) 34 N. W. K. 503; Cf. Smith v. Navasota, 72 Tex. 422; Kern v. Isgrigg, (Ind. 92) 31 N. E. R. 455; Mason City etc. Co. V. Mason, 23 W. Va. 211. 786 3 Evans v. Miss. etc. Co., 64 Mo. 453; Gardner v. Kewburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162; Sidener v. Norristown etc. Co., 23 Ind. 623; Western Ry. y. Ala. G. T. R. Co., (Ala. 93) 11 So. 483. 4 Pieri v. Shieldsboro, 42 Miss. 493. ^ Cummings v. St. Louis, 90 Mo. 259; Mowry v. Providence, (R. I. 91) 16 Atl. 511. s Carter v. Chicago, 57 HI. 283; Le- Clerq v. Gallipolis, 7 Ohio, pt. 1, 218; Schaidt v. Bland, 66 Md. 141; Atch- ison etc. Co. V. Nare, 17 Pac. R. 587; Flynn v. Taylor, 28 N. E. R. 418; 127 N. T. 596, afi'ge N. Y. S. 96; Prime v. Twenty- third etc. Co., 1 Abb. N. C. 1. The abutter is not bound to wait until actually damaged: Ross v. Thompson, 78 lud. 90, 96. ' Winslow V. Mason, 113 Mass. 411 ; Crismon v. Deck, (Iowa 90) 51 N. W. 55 ; DeWitt v. Van Seheyk, 110 N. Y. 7; Chicago v. Union, 102 111. 379; Wilder v. De Core, 26 Minn. 10; Taint- or V. Mayor, 19 N. J. Eq. 46. CH. XIX.] BEMEDIES IN GENERAL. § 397 made.^ In all such cases, however, the right to an injunction maj' be lost by laches.^ A court of equity will restrain by injunction the prosecution of a multiplicity of suits by or against a municipal corporation, when the court in which they have been brought has no power to order them to be consolidated.^ But the courts of equity will not entertain a bill for relief upon the ground of avoiding a multiplicity of suits or because irreparable damage will ac- crue, when the orator has been legally tried and convicted of violating an ordinance, the validity of which is not disputed, though there were seven suits for the offence pending against him. It is not the province of equity to decide upon the va- lidity or legality of an ordinance, where there is an adequate remedy at law for the purpose.* If, however, a defendant claim a propertj' right, as a justification or defence when a num- ber of warrants have been issued agaiust him for violating an ordinance, an injunction will issue to restrain their enforce- ment until his right can be decided upon by a court of compe- tent jurisdiction.^ § 397. Injunction to restrain the collection of taxes. — The collection of taxes will be enjoined upon application of one or more taxpayers, when the tax is tainted with fraud, or when the levy or assessment is unauthorized by law.® Illegal 1 Atty. Genl. v. Walworth L. & P. Co., (Mass. 90) 31 N. E. R. 482; Lake Erie etc. Co. v. Michener, lit Ind. 46.5; Vanderlip v. Grand Rapids, (Mich. 90) 41 N. W. R. 677; Nette v. N. Y.El.R.Co.,20]Sr.Y.S.844; Potts V. Quaker City El. Ry. Co., 12 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 593 ; 2 Pa. Dis. Ct. R. 200; Syra- cuse etc. Co. V. Rome etc. Co. , 22 N. Y. S. 321 ; Kavanagh v. Mobile etc. R. R. Co., (Ga.) 4 S. E. Rep. 113 ; Colstrum v. Minn. etc. R. R. Co., 33 Minn. 516; Scioto Val. R. R. Co. v. Lawrence, 38 Ohio St. 41; Western Ry. Co. v. Ala- bama G. T. R. Co., (Ala. 93) 11 So. 483; Stroub v. Railway Co., 59 N. Y. Super. Ct. 505; American Bk. Note V. Railway Co., 59 lb. 175; Palmer V. Waddell, 22 Kan. 352; City of Gloversville v. Johnston G. & K. R. Co., 21 N. Y. S. 146; 66 Hun, 627; Hartv. Buckner, 54 Fed. Rep. 925; 2 Sunderland v. Martin, 112 Ind. 411; Indianapolis etc. Co. v. Calvert 110 Ind. 555. 3 Third Ave. etc. Co. v. New York, 54 N. Y. 159, prosecution for viola- tions of an ordinance. * Des Plaines v. Poyer, 123 111. 348; Davis V. American Soc, 76 N. Y. 362. 6 Shinkle v. Covington, 83 Ky. 420. "Lebanon v. O. & M. R. R. Co., 77 HI. 539; Dupage Co. v. Jenks, 65 111. 275; BrandrifE v. Harrison Co., 55 Iowa, 164; Warden v. Fond du Lac, 14 Wis. 618; Trowbridge v. Haran, 78 N. Y. 439; Kean v. Asch, 27 N. J. Eq. 57; Oliver V. Memphis etc. Co., 30 Ark. 128; Deming v. James, 72 111. 78; Trowbridge v. Horan, 78 N. Y. 439; First Nat. Bank v. Cook, 77 111. 622. 787 §397 MUNICIPAL COKPOEATIONS. [CH. XIX. taxation will not be restrained by an injunction unless some special reason is shown for the employment of the equitable remedy ; that is, unless it shall afBrmatively appear that the levy of the tax was tainted with fraud, that irreparable injury will be done to the applicant or that he is without a plain, ade- quate and prompt legal remedy. ^ If, however, a tax is so tainted with fraud that its invalidity is undoubted, its collection will be enjoined at the suit of a tax- payer.2 In any event, if the aggrieved taxpayer has an adequate rem- edy at law, either by certiorari or appeal, or by an action to re- cover the taxes paid, it is extremely doubtful if a court of equity will interfere with the exercise of the power of taxation by a municipal corporation.^ The collection of a legal tax will not 1 Dawson v. Croisan, 23 Pac. K. 257; 18 Ore. 431; KemblesApp., (Pa.) 19 Atl. E. 946; Augusta Factory v. Counsel, 83 Ga. 734; 10 S. B. E. 359; Delaware Co. v. Atkins, 24 K. E. R. 319; Davis v. Lake Sliore etc. Co., 114 Ind. 364; 16 N. E. E. 639; Dud- ley V. Gilmore, 35 Kan. 555 ; Glee v. Sanders, 74 Mich. 692; Puck v. Peel- er, 74 Tex. 268; Lenawee Co. Bk. v. Adrian, (Mich.) 33 K. W. E. 304; Mer- riam V. Tuba Co., 72 Cal. 577; 14 Pac. E. 137; Philadelphia W. etc. Co. v. Meary, 8 Atl. E. 363; Oregon & W. M. S. Bk. V. Jordan, (Oregon) 17 Pac. E. 621; Coulsen v. Harris, 43 Miss. 728; Page v. St. J^ouis, 20 Mo. 138; Bank v. Meredith, 44 Mo. 500; Eock- ingham Sav. Bk. v. Portsmouth, 52 N. H. 17 ; Hoagland v. Delaware, 17 N. J. Eq. 107; Ely ton Ld. Co. v. Ayres, 62 Ala. 413; Clayton v. Lar f argue,23 Ark. 137 ; Hobart v. Detroit, 7 Mich. 246; Eubey v. Shain, 54 Mo. 207; Eanney v. Bader, 67 lb. 476; Paulser v. Portland, 16 Ore. 450; HoUister v. Sherman, 63 Cal. 38; Van Daren v. New Tork, 9 Paige, 388; Van Eensselaer v. Kidd, 4 Barb. 17; Waterbury Sav. Bfc. v. Lawler, 46 Conn. 243; Frost v. Flick, 1 Dakota, 131 ; Georgia Loan Assn. v. McGow- 788 an, 59 Ga. 811; Brewer v. Spring- field, 97 Mass. 152; HunneweU v. Charleston, 106 lb. 350; Carrothei'S v. Board, 16 W. Va. 527; Christie v. Maiden, 23 lb. 667; Louisen v. Hauee, 1 Wyo. 570; Hauscome v. Omaha, 11 Neb. 37; Merrill v. Humphrey, 24 Mich. 170; Mace v. Com'rs, 99 N. C. 65; 5 S. E. E. 740; Baldwin v. Shine, 84 Ky. 502; 2 S. W. E. 164; Breeze V. Haley, 10 Colo. 5; 13 Pac. E. 913; Duncan v. Cen. P. Ey. Co., (87 Ky.) 4 S. W. E. 228; Com'rs v. Bryson, 13 Pla. 281 ; Burnes v. Atchison, 2 Kan. 454; Mobile v. Baldwin, 57 Ala. 61; Porter v. Eockford etc. Co., 76 111. 561; Williams v. Pinney, 25 Iowa, 436; tr. P. E. E. v. Lincoln Co., 2 Dill. C. C. 297; Dows v. Chicago, 11 Wall. 108; Hunnewinkle v. George- town, 15 lb. 547. 2Litch V. Weutworth, 71 111. 146; First N. Bk. v. Cook, 77 lb. 622. 8 Boyd V. Selma, (Ala. 93) 11 So. 393; Odlin v. Woodrufe, 12 So. Eep. 227; Arnold v. Cambridge, 106 Mass. 352; Whitney v. Boston, 108 lb. 89; Hummill v. Boston, 106 lb. 350; see also Murphy v. Harrison, 29 Ark. 340; Dusenbury v. Mayor, 25 N. J. Eq. 295; Vanover v. Terrell etc. Co., 27 Ga. 354; Harward v. St. Clair etc. CH. XIX.] REMEDIES IN GENERAL. §397 be enjoined in order to prevent the collection of one that is illegal ; ^ and if an assessment has been made, so as to place an undue burden upon the property of some, the collection of the excess will be enjoined.^ In such cases the court of equity may require the payment of that portion of the tax, which is admitted to be legal, as a condition precedent to relief against the illegal tax.^ An injunction will lie, where property has been illegally ex- empted from assessment or taxation, at the instance of one whose burden has been thus increased.* But an injunction will not lie, where there is no fraud (even though there be an over es- timate of benefit received) where the error is simply one of judgment.^ When the municipal authorities assert a jurisdiction to assess property not subject to assessment, or lying outside of their ter- ritorial jurisdiction, they will be enjoined.*" An owner of land subject to assessment for local improve- ments may obtain an injunction to prevent an assessment being made without a petition ; ^ or the awarding of a contract with- out advertisement, or to any except the lowest bidder,^ where these are statutory requirements. The question, whether the contract has been strictly per- Co., 51 111. 531 ; Fleming v. Mersliom, 37 Iowa, 413 ; Barr v. Denisten, 19 N. H. 170, 180; Mechanics' Bank v. Kan- sas City, 73 Mo. 555. 1 Covington v. Rockingham, 93 N. C. 134; Sheperdson v. Gillett, (Ind. 93) 31 N. E. R. 788; Goodnough v. Powell, (Or. 93) 32 Pac. R. 396; Stilz V. Indianapolis, 81 Ind. 582. ^Cummings v. National Bk. 101 U. S. 153 ; Pelton v. National Bank, 101 lb. 143. 3 Morrison v. Jacoby, 14 N. E. R. 546; 114 Ind. 84; Deeflir v. Bowen, 61 Ind. 29; Cook v. Racine, 49 Wis. 244; Morrison v. Hershire, 32 Iowa, 271; Merrill v. Humphrey, 24 Mich. 170; Albuquerque v. Beres, 13 S. Ct. 143; 147 U. S. 87. 4 Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242; Hersey v. Suprs., 16 lb. 198; Hassen V. Rochester, 65 N. T. 256. 5 Cleveland v. Board, 55 Barb. 288; Brevoort v. Detroit, 24 Mich. 322; Black V. Boyd, 155 Pa. St. 163; Kan- sas M. L. Ins. Co. V. Hill, (Kan. 93) 33 Pac. 300; Smith v. Kelly, (Oreg. 93) lb. 642; Gage v. Evans, 90 111. 569; Hoke v. Perdue, 62 Cal. 545. 6 Ft. Wayne v. Shaaf, 106 Ind. 66; Hawk v. Bonn, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 452; Pullman P. Car Co. v. Board, 55 Fed. 206; Balfe v. Lammers, 109 Ind. 347; Curry V. Jones, 4 Del. Ch. 559; Fre- mont V. Boling, 11 Cal. 380; Bouldin V. Mayor, 15 Md. 18. .' Covington v. Nelson, 35 Ind. 582; Makemson v. Kaufman, 35 Ohio St. 444. " Mayor v. Johnson, 62 Md. 225 ; Schumm v. Seymour, 9 C. E. Green, 143; Board of Comrs. v. Templeton, 51 Ind. 266. 789 § 397 MTJNICIPAIi COEPOEATIONS. [CH. XIX. formed,^ or whether the ordinance, directing the improvement, was legally enacted, cannot be tried in the injunction proceed- ings, but must be referred to an action at law.^ If the power to tax exists, and the only question for consid- eration is its irregular or erroneous exercise, injunction will not lie unless it is applied for in a reasonable time after the work has been begun ; when the iri'egularities are substantial,* and the matter falls clearly and unmistakably under one of the heads into which equity jurisdiction is divided. In conformity with these principles, it is a general rule that a court of equity will not enjoin the enforcement of a personal tax, or a tax levied upon personal property by a municipality, merely because of its illegality or invalidity.* If, however, there is no adequate remedy at law, equity will enjoin the sale of personal property ; as for example, in a case where a State, levying taxation on the rolling stock of a railroad, refused to receive payment in its own coupons in violation of its agreement to that effect.^ When the likeliliood of a sale for nonpayment of illegal taxes would create a cloud on the title, the owner of the prop- erty is not compelled to allow the illegal transaction to be con- summated, and resist the purchaser by a legal defence ; but he may apply for an injunction at once upon the ground of re- moving a cloud upon his title.^ 1 Kicketts v. Spraker, 77 Ind. 371; McCafferty v. McCabe, 4 Abb. B. E. 87. 2 Balfe v. Lammers, 109 Ind. 347; St. Louis V. Eanken, 9 S. W. E. 910; 96 Mo. 497; St. Louis v. Brewing Co., 9 S. W. E. 910; 96 Mo. 497; Micliael V. St. Louis, 20 S. "W. E, 666; 112 Mo. 610. 8 Kennedy v. Troy, 77 N. Y. 493; Wright V. Tacoma, 3 Wash. Ter. 410; Tingue v. Eochester, 101 N. T. 294; Brush V. Carbondale, 78 111. 74; Mo- Donald T. Payne, 114 Ind. 359. * Lockwood V. St. Louis, 24 Mo. 20; Milwaukee v. Kaefler, 116 U. S. 219; Dodd v. Hartford, 25 Conn. 232; Dows V. Chicago, 11 Wall. 108; Union Pao. E. E. V. Cheyenne, 113 V. S. 516, 525; Sheldon v. Centre L. D., 790 25 Conn. 224; Milwaukee Iron Co. v. Hubbard, 27 Wis. 51. 5 Allen V. B. & O. E. E. Co., 114 U. S. 311. 6 Jersey City v. Canal Co., 12 N. J. Eq. 227; Powell v. Parkersburg, 28 W. Va. 698; Huntington v. Union Pac. Ey. Co., 2 Sawy. (U. S.)503; Mitchell V. Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 92; Wiley V. Flournoy, 30 Ark. 609; Mo- bile etc. Co. V. Peebles, 47 Ala. 317; Bend v. Kenosha, 17 Wis. 284; Mc- Pike V. Pen, 51 Mo. App. 63; Gilmore V. Fox, 10 Kan. 509; McCormick v. District, 4 Mackey, 396; Mutual Ins. Co. V. Supervisors, 32 Barb. 322 ; Stone V. Mobile, 57 Ala. 61; Ewing v. St. Louis, 5 Wall. 413, 419; Holland v. Baltimore, 11 Md. 186; Heywood v. Buffalo, 14 N. T. 534; Baltimore v. CH. XIX.J BEMEDIES IN GENERAL. § 398 A suit will be entertained by equity to restrain tlie collec- tion of taxes to pay fraudulent judgments, whicK have been coUusively obtained against the corporation,^ or the expenses of an unauthorized railroad survey ,2 to refund money voluntarily contributed by citizens to avoid a conscription in the town.^ In cases, where the taxpayer has a right to seek the assist- ance of courts of equity, they will be debarred from receiving its aid by injunction, or otherwise, when they have been guilty of laches, and have knowingly permitted third persons, acting in good faith, to rely upon the objectionable action of the mu- nicipality.* So, upon an application for an injunction, to pre- vent the collection of an alleged illegal assessment, the silence of the plaintiff during the progress of the improvement will be a sound reason for refusing the injunction.^ § 398. Scope of certiorari. — By the common law, courts of superior and general jurisdiction have power to examine on certiorari the proceedings of inferior jurisdictions, and the ac- tions of ministerial officials.® So, in this coijntrj'', if there be no appeal or remedy, in the nature of a writ of error, as when a new jurisdiction or tribunal is created, whose procedure is summary in character or contrary to the rules of the common law, the superior or general courts of the State, having common law powers, have inherent power to review and correct or va- cate the proceedings and findings of the inferior court, board or officers, exercising judicial authority.^ Porter, 18 Md. 284; Delphi v. Brown, 61 Ind. 29, 37. 1 Barr v. Deniston, 19 N. H. 170, 180; Merrill v. Plainfield, 45 lb. 126. 2 Douglas V. Placerville, 18 Cal. 643. 8 Drake v. Phillips, 40 111. 388. * Elliott, Koads and Streets, p. 440; Claflin V. Hopkinton, 4 Gray, 502; Tash V. Adams, 10 Gush. 252; Stew- art V. Kalamazoo, 30 Mich. 69 ; Peo- ple V. Maynard, 15 lb. 463; Hodges V. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110. 5 Lafayette v. Fowler, 34 Ind. 140; Ritchie v. So. Topeka, 38 lb. 368; Schumm v. Seymour, 24 N. J. Eq. 143; Hyde Park v. Borden, 94111. 26; Motz V. Detroit, 18 Mich. 495 ; Byram V. Detroit, 50 lb. 56; Evansville v. Phistere, 34 Ind. 36; Lundborn v. Manistee, 93 Mich. 170; Weber v. San Francisco, 1 Cal. 455 ; Collins v. Camden, 27 K J. Eq. 293; Dusen- bury V. Newark, 25 lb. 295; Storerv. Cincinnati, 4 Ohio Cir. Ct. 279; Bloomington v. Blodgett, 24 111. App. 650; Sleeper v. Bullen, 6 Kans. 300; Topeka v. Gage, (Kan. 90) 24 Pac. 82; Martin v. Town, 56 Hun, 510. •> Grovenvelt v. Burwell, 1 Ld. Eaym. 454,469; Rex v. Inh. Glamor- ganshire, 1 lb. 580. 7 Harris v. Barber, 129 U. S. 360; Marion v. Chandler, 6 Ala. 899; Sav- age V. (iulliver, 4 Mass. 178; Seattle etc. Co. V. State, 5 "Wash. St. 807; 791 398 MTJNICrPAL CORPORATIONS. [CH. XIX. Under this rule, it is well settled that the courts of common law will ill the United States examine on certiorari the acts or proceedings of municipal corporations or of their officials. If it is found, upon such examination, that such acts or proceed- ings are in excess of the municipal powers, or that they do not conform substantially to the requirements of the cliarter or tlie general law, they will be reversed or vacated by the court.^ In the absence of any statutory extension of its scope, a com- mon law certiorari could be used only to review acts by courts of law or officials of a distinctly judicial character, and not acts of a ministerial nature.^ In recent times, however, exceptions to this rule have been made, the scope of the writ greatly ex- tended, and the writ employed to test the validitj'^ of municipal acts and ordinances, both judicial and ministerial.^ Certiorari will not be granted to review the determination of the local authorities, that the public interests demand the exer- People V. Trustees, 42 111. Ap. 650; McDonald v. Williams, 41 lb. 378; Mathias v. Mason, (Mich.) 33 K W. B. 312; Com. v. Ellis, 11 Mass^ 465; Miller v. Sell. Trustees, 88 111. 26; Welch V. Wetzel Co., (W. Va.) 1 S. E. K. 337; State v. District. Court, 41 Minn. 42; Peterson v. Fowler, 76 Mich. 258. 1 State V. Robbins, 54 N. J. L. 566; Lexington V. Sargent, 64 Miss. 621; Swift V. Wayne Co., 64 Mich. 479; 31 N. W. E. 434; Old Colony R. Co. V. Fall River, 147 Mass. 455 ; State v. Elizabeth, 50 N. J. L. 347; State v. Stewart, 5 Strob. L. 29 ; In re Schmidt, 24 S. C. 363; State v. Orange, 50 N. J. L. 347; Dwight v. Springfield, 4 Gray, 107; Cunningham v. Squires, 2W. Va. 422; Champion v. Board, 5 Dak. 416; Taylor v. Americus, 39 Ga. 59; Macon v. Shaw, 16 lb. 172; Wilson V. Seattle, 2 Wash. St. 543; 27 Pac. 474; Burns v. Lagrange, 17 Tex. 415; Carroll v. Tuscaloosa, 12 Ala. 173; Miller v. Jones, 80 lb. 89; Great Falls Ice Co. v. District, 19 D. C. 327; Jackson v. People, 9 Mich. Ill; Gager v. Chippewa, 47 lb. 792 167; Can-on v. Martin, 26 K. J. L. 594; State v. Trenton, (N. J. 92) 23 Atl. R. 281 ; State v. Kewark, 25 N. J. L. 399; State v. Hudson, 32 lb. 365; Dorchester v. Wentworth, 31 N. H. 451; State v. Dowling, 50 Mo. 134; Swan v. Cumberland, 8 Gill, (Md.) 150; Ewing v. St. Louis, 5 Wall. 413; Holberg v. Macon, 55 Miss. 112; Lonora v. Carthage, 27 111. 140; Gen- esee V. Harper, 38 lb. 103; Collins V. Davis, 59 Iowa, 256; Oshkosh v. State, 59 Wis. 425 ; Board of Aid. of Denver v. Darrow, 22 Pao. Rep. 784; see ch. VII. Municipal Courts, § 105. -Bacon's Abridgment, Certiora- ri, P; People v. New York, 2 Hill, 9, 11, 14, 21; People V. Com'rs, 97 N. Y. 37; Stone v. New York, 25 Wend. 157, 167; North & S. S. R. Co. v. Spullock, 88 Ga. 283; State v. Moni- teau Co. Ct., 45 Mo. App. 387. 8 Camden v. Mulf ord, 26 N. J, L. 49; State v. Hudson, 32 lb. 365; State V. Donahay, 30 lb. 404; Mowery v. Camden, 49 lb. 106; State v. Newark Pol. Com'rs, 49 lb. 170; Iske v. New- ton, 54 Iowa, 586. OH. XIX.J EBJIEDIES IN GENERAL. §399 cise of the discretionary legislative powers which are possessed by the municipality ; but proceedings, instituted in carrying into execution such determination, are reviewable by the proper court, with the object of correcting errors of law which have been committed therein.^ In the absence of statute, a writ of certiorari is not a matter of course and of right,^ and a party seeking the remedy ought to show that substantial justice requires the issue of the writ.^ If their error is merely one of policj' or expediency,^ or if there has been unreasonable delay in applying for it, the writ should be denied.^ Certiorari will be granted to review proceedings which are taken in condemnation of lands for highwa5rs and other public purposes ; ® sometimes, even when an appeal is provided for.' A writ of certiorari will also lie to review a contested elec- tion case, where a writ of quo warranto is not called for.^ So, likewise, the person aggrieved may by this writ obtain a revi- sion of an assessment or tax, which has been wrongfully levied upon his property,® or procure the removal of his non-taxable property from the assessment roU.^" § 399. What may be examined under writ of certorari. — A writ of certiorari is neither a substitute for an appeal, nor is it designed to correct errors of fact ; " although it will be 112 Mass. 206; People v. Betts, 55 K. Y. 600; People V. Dodge, 45 Hun, 310. ' People V. Brighton, 20 Mich. 57; 1 People V. Board, 62 Hun, 619; 16 N. Y. S. 705; People v. Queens Co., 131 N. Y. 468 ;D wight v. Springfield, 4 Gray, 107; Monterey v. Berkshire, 7 Gush. 394; Read v. Camden, (N. J. L.) 24 Atl. E. 549; Macon v. Shaw, 16 Ga. 172; Stone v. Boston, 2 Met. 220. ■^Ex parte Hitz, 111 U. S. 766; Welch V.Wetzel Co., (W. Va.) 1 S. E. Bep. 337; Lees v. Drainage Com'rs, 24 111. App. 487; Weaver v. Deven- dorf, 3 Denio, 117; 15 Wend. 198. ^Charlestown v. Com'rs, 109 Mass. 270. * People v. Board, 131 N. Y. 468; Tiedt V. Carstevsen, 61 Iowa, 334. 5 State v. Ten Eyck, 18 N. J. L. 373;Elmendorf V. Covert, 1 Hill, 674; Noyes v. City, 116 Mass. 87; Keys v. Marion Co., 42 Cal. 252. «Farmington etc. Co. v. Com'rs, Comrs. V. Town, 19 111. App. 259; Phillips v. Franklin Co., 22 Atl. K. 385 ; 83 Me. 541 ; Roberts v. Williams, 13 Ark. 555; Sailer v. Brown, 67 Mich. 422; State v. Poland, 50 N. J. Law,367; Bixbyv. Gass,54Micli.551. 8 Cunningham v. Squires, 2 W. Va. 422; Gibbons v. Sheppard, 65 Pa. St. 20. . 9 Swann v. Cumberland, 8 Gill, 150; Milwaukee I. Co. v. Schubel, 29 Wis. 444. 10 Peo. V. Ogdensburg, 48 N. Y. 390. 11 State V. Bill, 13 Ired. L. 373 ; State V. Swift, 1 Hill (S. C.) 29; State v. Cockrell, 2 Eich..(S. C.) 6; State v. Moniteau Co. Ct., 45 Mo. Ap. 387; North & S. S. E. Co. v. Sprillock, 88 793 §399 MUNICIPAL COEPOKATIONS. [CH. XIX. granted, only when a final determination of the case has been had by an inferior tribunal.^ But the revisory court can in- quire, not only into the jurisdiction of the inferior court or of- ficer, but into all alleged errors of law ^ in the proceedings which bear upon the merits of the matter under consideration. So, it has been held that it is the duty of the court to examine the evidence, upon which the action of the inferior tribunal is founded, and to determine if it was sufficient to justify the ad- judication or decision of the court.* There is, however, much contrariety of opinion upon this point ; and it has been held that the jurisdiction of the superior court is limited to an ex- amination of the legalitj' aud regularity of the proceedings in point of form ; and can only determine the question of proper observance of the requirments of the law.* The general rule is, that certiorari does not lie to review the evidence given in the inferior court,^ is subject to the exception that the court may inquire, whether any evidence of a fact was presented to the inferior tribunal.^ But the weight of the decisions seems to sustain the view, that the case cannot be retried upon its merits in a proceeding by certiorari, unless the scope of that writ has been enlarged by statute.^ Ga. 283; Com. v. Gillespie, 23 Atl. E. 393. 'Western Uu. Co. v. Locke, 107 Ind. 9; Freshour v. Logansport, 104 lb. 463. ^McAUiley V. Horton, 75 Ala. 491; Donahue v. "Will Co., 100 HI. 94; Hyslop V. Pinch, 99 lb. 571; State v. Dodge Co., 56 Wis. 79; Bea v. See- man, (W. Va. 92) 15 S. E. R. 173; State V. St. Johns, 47 Minn. 315; Kane v. State, 17 Atl. E. 557; 70 Md. 546. " People V. Metro. Pol. Board, 39 N. T. 506; People v. Smith, 45 lb. 772; Jackson v. People, 9 Mich. 111. * Parks V. Boston, 8 Pick. 218; Dwight V. Springfield, 4 Gray, 107; State V. Perranet, 41 La. An. 179; People V. Parker, 45 Hun, 452 ; Far- mingtonE. W. P. Co. v. Comrs., 112 Mass. 206; State v. Eightor, (La.) 2 So. E. 385; Herbert v. Curtis, (N. J. 794 93) 25 Atl. E. 386; Wilmington S. S. Co. V. Haas, 25 lb. 85; 151 Pa. St. 131; 31 W. N. C. 79; Garvin v. Gorman, 63 Mich. 221. 5 Com. V. Gillespie, 23 Atl. E. 393; DeEochburne v. Com., 12 Minn. 78; Betts V. Warren, 5 Harr. 4; In re Eoad in Bethlehem Tp., 10 Atl. E. 122; Barclay v. Brabston, 49 N. J. L. 629; Carrie v. Carrie, 42 Mich. 509; Eayuer v. State, 52 Md. 568; State v. Davis, 48 N. J. L. 112; Hewitt v. Judge, 34 N. W. E. 248; Wilmington S. S. Co. V. Haas, 25 Atl. E. 85; 151 Pa. St. 131; 31 W. N. C. 79; People V. Assessors, 39 K. T. 81. 8 Jackson v. People, 9 Mich. Ill; Ez parte Turnpike Co., 62 Ala. 93; Camden v. Bloch, 65 lb. 236; People V. Police Board, 72 N. Y. 415 ; More- land V. Whitford, 54 Wis. 150. ' In re Mount Morris Sq., 2 Hill, 14; In re Albany St., 23 Wend. 277; CH. XIX.J REMEDIES IN GENERAL. 400 The uncertainty of the law as to the extent of the power of the revisory court, where its power in a certiorari proceeding has not been expressly and distinctly enlarged by statute, is due wholly to the disposition manifest in some courts in recent times to extend this remedy, in order to make it cover particular cases, to whicb in its original character it was never intended to be applied. A common law writ of certiorari will not lie to review the final determination of a court or officer, where an appeal or writ of error is allowed.^ But if an appeal is improperly de- nied, or if the party is fraudulently, or by accident, deprived of it, he may have his whole case reviewed on certiorari, both as to law auc^ fact.^ § 400. Indictment. — In accordance with the present dispo- sition to assimilate corporate duties and responsibilities to those of individuals, it is well settled that municipal and private cor- porations can be indicted for malfeasance or nonfeasance, in performing those mandatory public duties, which are imposed upon them by statute, or in England by prescription. Munic- ipal corporations cannot be indicted for felonies, but they may be indicted for acts injurious to the public, which constitute a nuisance.^ So, it has been held that the municipality is indict- able at common law for a failure to keep its highways in re- Stone V. New York, 25 lb. 157, 167; People v. Kochester, 21 Barb. 656; 2 Hill, 27; People v. Com'rs, 106 N. T. 64; People v. Fire Com'rs, 106 lb. 257; Oslikosh v. State, 59 Wis. 425. But see State v. Kansas City, 89 Mo. 34, where it is held that cer- tiorari will call for review of only those facts which appear upon the face of the record. 1 State V. District, 41 Minn. 42; Harris v. Barber, 9 S. Ct. 314; 129 U. S. 366; Petty v. Ducker, 11 S. W. R. 2; 51 Ark. 281; In re Mt. Morris Sq., 2 Hill, 14; Bogart v. Kew York, 7 Cow. 158; Bundle v. Baltimore, 28 Md. 356; Beasley v. Beckley, 28 W. Va. 81 ; Wilson v. Burks, 71 Ga. 862 ; Galloway v. Corbett, 52 Mich. 460; Eeynolds v. Los Angeles, 64 Cal. 372. 2 State V. Bill, 13 Ired. L. 373; ch. VIII. Municipal Courts, § 100. 3 Kegina v. Great etc. Ey. Co., 9 Q. B. 315; Kegina v. Bermingham etc. Co., 9 Car. & P. 469; Reginav. Nott, 4 Q. B. 773; Rex v. Oxfordshire, 16 East, 223; Com. v. New Bedford, 2 Gray, 229; McCrowell v. Bristol, 5 Lea, 685 ; Com. v. Kinperts, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 463; State v. Raymond, 27 N. H. 388; Sussex v. Strader, 18 N. J. L. 108; Com. v. Vt. & Mass. R. R. Co., 4 Gray, 22; State v. Hudson Co., 27 N. J. L. 415 ; State v. E. R. Co., 27 Tt. 103; State v. Society, 54 N. J. Law, 260; People v. Equitable G. L. Co., 5 N. Y. S. 19; Phillips v. Com., 44 Pa. St. 197; State v. Portland, 74 Me. 268. 795 §401 MUNICIPAL CORPOEATIONS. [CH. XIX. pair.i In such an indictment it is sufficient to allege generally that it is a public highway ; ^ and it is not essential to name the owners of the land over which it runs.^ Immaterial misdescrip- tions will not vitiate the indictment.* A town, having by charter the power to preserve health and remove nuisances, has been indicted for a neglect of its public duty, in permitting a slaughter house to remain on private property, to the annoy- ance of a citizen, and in danger of the public health.^ In one instance, it was held that a town was indictable at common law for failure to erect a bridge.^ The liability of mu- nicipal corporations including towns and counties for the re- pair of bridges depends largely upon statute. But at common law they were indictable for failure to keep a bridge in repair, even though no damages could be recovered against them in a civil suit.'^ ' The indictment of municipal corporations at common law without doubt rested upon the strictly private and possessory " character of such corporations under the earlier English law.^ In the United States, where the municipal franchise is given to the community in general, and not to a few citizens of the place, the indictment of a municipal corporation would appear to be a very anomalous proceeding, if it were not altogether impossible. § 401. Writ of prohibition. — In the United States, the writ of prohibition is employed to restrain the attempted ille- gal exercise of municipal powers, or the imposition of munic- 1 State V. Murfreesboro, 11 Humph. 217; State V. Gorliam, 37 Me. 451; Com. V. Hopklnsville, 7 B. Mon. 38; State V. Barksdale, 5 Humph. 154; Com. T. Newburyport, 103 Mass. 129; Louisville etc. Co. v. State, 3 Head, 523; JSTowlin v. State, 49 Ala. 41; Phillips V. Com., 44 Pa. St. 197; Howard v. Bridgewater, 16 Pick. 189; Davis v. Bangor, 42 Me. 522. 2 State V. Harsh, 6 Black. 346; Eeg. V. Turvpesten, 1 Eng. L. & Eq. 317; Nichols v. State, 89 Ind. 298. 8 State V. Dover, 10 N. H. 394. « Alexander v. State, 16 Ala. 661 ; State V. Lemay, 13 Ark. 405; State v. 796 Fletcher, 13 Vt. 124. ^McCrovrell v. Bristol, 5 Lea, 585; State V. Shelbyville, 4 Sneed, 176; contra, State v. Burlington, 36 Vt. 521. 6 State V. Whitingham, 7 Vt. 390. ' Eegina v. Bermingham, 9 Car. & P. 469; Rex v. Staffordshire, 16 East, 223; State v. Gorham, 37 Me. 451; Pittsburgh etc. Co. v. Com., 101 Pa. St. 192; Sawyer V. Northfield,7Cush. 490; contra, State v. Hudson, 30 N. J. L. 137; Eyman v. People, 6 111. 8; State V. Portland, 74 Me. 268. " See ante, § 21, and, generally, ch. III. on Ihcorporation. CH. XIX.] KEMEDIES IN GENERAL. §401 ipal fines and penalties which are unauthorized by law.^ A writ of prohibition is directed bj'^ a superior to an inferior court, forbidding it to act, while an injunction is directed to a party and not to the court. So, a prohibition has been refused, when it was asked for, in order to control the action of a municipal council, acting not as a court, but as a legislative body.^ If a suit is pending, and injury is imminent to either of the parties, for which he can have no other remedy, a writ of pro- hibition will issue ; but such a writ will not be granted, merely because a suit is threatened.^ If however there is a plain rem- edy in the ordinary course of law, as by putting in a defence •in the inferior or municipal court, and the defendant upon con- viction has the right of an appeal or to ask for a certiorari to review the trial, a writ of prohibition will not be granted.* 1 Clayton v. Heidelberg, VJ Miss. 623 ; Warwick v. Mayo, 15 Gratt. 528 ; State V. Christ Ch. P. R. Com'rs, 1 Mill Const. 55. 2 Mealing v. Augusta, Dud. (Ga.) 221. sBluffton V. Silver, 63 Ind. 262; Arnold v. Shields, 5 Dana, 18; State V. Columbia, 16 S. C. 412; In re Elly- son, 20 Gratt. 10; Culpeper v. Gar- rell, 20 lb. 484; Gould v. Gapper, 5 East, 345. In Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. S. 167, Mr. Justice Gray says: " Where the inferior court has clearly no jurisdiction of the suit or prose- cution instituted before it, and the defendant therein has objected to its jurisdiction at the outset, and has no other remedy, he is entitled to a writ of prohibition as matter of right, and a refusal to grant it, where all the proceedings appear of record, may be reversed on error." ■i Ducheneau v. Ireland, (Utah, 87) 13 Pac. 87; Turner v. Forsyth, 3 S. E. E. 649; 78 Ga. 683; State v. Four- net, 13 So. K. 185; State v. Kightor, 44 La. An. 298; State v. Withrow, 108 Mo. 1. 797 INDEX. References are to Sections. A. ABAiroONMENT, of condemnation proceedings, 242. of dedicated lands, 228. of streets, 308-312, inc. of turnpikes, 319. ABUTTERS, torts of, 348. their rights and remedies as against railroads as streets, 301-307, inc. their riglits on the vacation of streets, 308-312, inc., 297. rights of, in local assessments, 259 a, 277-282, inc. ACCEPTANCE OF CHARTER, when necessary, 24. ACCEPTANCE OF DAMAGE, in condemnation of lands, 250. ACCEPTANCE OF DEDICATION, when implied and effect, 222-224. ACCEPTANCE OF OFFICE, 78. ACCRETIONS, public rights to, 225. ACTIONS, on bonds, 193. on coupons, 193. ACTIONS EX DELICTO AND EX CONTRACTU, distinguished, 164. on warrants, 179, 180. ACTS, unauthorized not compellable by mandamus, 361. ADJOURNMENT OF TOWN MEETING, 95. ADJOURNED MEETINGS, 97. ADMISSIONS IN MUNICIPAL RECORDS, 107. ADVERSE POSSESSION, of city streets, 312. ADVERTISING CONTRACTS, 172, 173. AGENT, may dedicate, 218. of municipal corporation defined, 338 a. of municipality contracts with city, 166. municipal contracts made by, 166, 167. (799) 800 XNDBX. References are to Sections. AGEICULTUKAX, LAKDS, when taxable, 276. AID TO EAILROAD, 184^188. ALIENATION, power of, 208. of dedicated lands, 229. ALLEYS, 221, 287. ALLUVIUM, right to, 200, 225. ALTERNATIVE WRIT OF MANDAMUS, 367, 368. AMENDMENT, of record, 106. AMUSEMENTS, regulation of, 121. ANIMALS, 129, 180. exhibitors of, 300. ANNEXATION. See Boxjitdaeles. ANNULMENT OF CONTRACTS, 174. APPARATUS, to extinguish fires, 130. APPLICATION, for mandamus by attorney-general, 363. APPOINTMENTS TO OFFICE, 75, 76, 77. APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES, 248. APPROPRIATION, for public works, 171. ARBITRATIONS, 142. AREAS, railings around, 343. for violation of, ordinances, 156. ASSENT, of abutters to assessments, 278. ASSESSMENTS, 253-284, inc. for improvements and taxation distinguished, 259 a, for repairing turnpikes, 379. for improvements, 259 a, 272-282, inc. of damages for lands taken, 244r-250, inc. ASSETS, 89. ASSIGNMENT, of contracts, 171. of salaries, 80. ATTORNEY GENERAL, may apply for mandamus, 363. ATTORNEYS AT LAW, municipal contracts with, 176. AUCTIONS, municipal control of, 291. AWARDING, contracts, 172. INDEX. 3(,J^ Beferences are to Sections. AUTHORITY, of ofRcers to contract, 169. AWNINGS, 300, 346. AYES AND NOES, 98. B. BALLOT LAW, OT. BANKS, when taxable, 273. BAERIEES, around excavations, 343. BASEMENTS, 343. BAY WINDOWS, 131, 300. BENEFITS, resulting from public acts, 246. BICYCLES, use of, in streets, 299. BIDS, by contractors, 172, 173.] BLASTING, injury by, 327 a. BOARD OF EDUCATION, liability of, for negligence, 325. BONA FIDE HOLDERS, of bonds, 195 c-195 e, inc., 196. BONDS, of contractors, 171. of municipal corporations, 177-199. ofScial, 72. BOUNDARIES, how defined, 54. corporate boundaries by reference to streams and highways, 54. enlargement of boundaries — annexation of territory, 55. what territory may be annexed — ^farm lands, 56. effect of extension of city boundaries, 57. effect of annexation of one town to another, 58. effect of division of one town into two, 59. legislative power to apportion property and debts in cases of annexa- tion and division, 60. procedure in cases of annexation. When annexation legal, 61. exercise of power beyond city limits, only one corporation over same area, 62. division of municipal territory into wards, 63. BOUNTIES, 138. BREACH OF OFFICIAL DUTY, when cause for removal, 81. BRIDGES, definition, character and construction of public bridges, 313. legislative and municipal powers over, 314. 51 802 INDEX. Beterences are to Sections. BRIDGES— cojiiinaed. national control over construction and maintenance of, 314 a. county liability for maintenance and repair of public bridges, 315. rights and duties of municipal corporations in building, rebuilding and maintaining bridges, 316. private bridges on or intersecting highways, 317. when taxable, 272. negligence in care of, 353. BROOKLTIT, boundary line of, 54. BROOKLYN BRIDGE, 15, 338 a. BUILDING, moving, through streets, 300. in fire limits, 331. destruction of, to prevent conflagration, 335. BUILDINGS, regulation of, 131. BUILDING MATERIALS, in streets, 300, 348. BURDEN OF PROOF, to establish abandonment of streets, 310. to show negligence, 352. quo warranto proceedings, 383. to establish contributory negligence, 350. BUSINESS OF CITY, must be transacted at meeting of council, 100. BY-LAWS. See Oedinances. c. CABLE ROADS, 306 a. CANCELLATION, of contracts, 174. CANCELED BONDS, 197. CARS, storage of, on streets, 300. CATTLE AT LARGE, 153. CAUSE, removals for, 83. CELEBRATIONS, 139. CEMETERIES, 118. CENTER OF ROAD, defined, 321. CERTIFICATION OF ELECTION, officer may obtain by mandamus, 371. CERTIORARI, in condemnation of lands, 249. in illegal local assessments, 279. scope, 378. what examinable, 399. INDEX. 803 Eelerences are to Sections. CHLOTGE, of corporate name, 48. of motor power, 306, 306 a. CHARITABLE DEVISES, to cities, 202-212. CHAKITABLE INSTITUTIONS, exempt from taxation, 270. CHARTER, of city, its nature, 146. acceptance of, 24. power to amend or repeal, 32. forfeiture of, 384. CHARTER POWERS, ^ classiflcation and construction of, 110. ^ imperative and discretionary, distinguished. 111. discretionary powers, 112. delegated powers cannot be delegated, 113. usage in construing powers — prescription, 114. the indemnity for officials acting in good faitli, 115. the police power of municipal corporations — its scope and limitations, 116. territorial limits of police regulations, 116 a. the municipal power to legislate upon subjects covered by State stat- utes, 117. sanitary regulations — slaughter houses — cemeteries — unwholesome provisions, 118 — contagious diseases — removal of refuse — water supply, 119. the regulation and abatement of nuisances in general, 120. regulation of harbor and navigable waters, 121. regulation of occupations and amusements, 122. licenses, when a police regulation, and when a tax, 123. license power of municipal corporation construed, 124. licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquors, 125. supervision and care of paupers, vagrants, indigent, insane and sick persons, 126. inspection of goods and other commodities, 127. mm establishment and regulation of public markets, 128. impounding animals — ordinances respecting dogs, 129. prevention of flres — fire limits — purchase of fire apparatus, 130. regulation of buildings and their construction, 131. regulation of private wharves, 132. public wharves, 183. ferries and ferriage, 134. regulations providing for the public welfare, peace and safety, 135. regulations of railroads within city limits, 135 a. . power to appropriate funds for lobbying purposes, 136. power to borrow money, 137. payment of bounties, 138. 804 INDEX. Beferences are to Sectionii. CHAETEE FOW^nS— continued. celebrations and entertainments, 139. rewards, 140. erecting, furnishing and repairing public buildings, 141. compromises and arbitrations, 142. power of municipality to sue and be sued, 143. power to create private monopolies, 144. power to create and operate municipal monopolies — municipal owner- ship of gas, electric light and water works, 144 o. CHOSES IN ACTIONS, when taxable, 275. CHURCHES, aisles of, 131. CHURCH PEOPEETT, when exempt from taxation, 270. CITY LIMITS, powers beyond, 62. CITY ATTOENEYS, 176. CISTEENS, in streets, 294. CIVIL SEEVICE, examinations, 70. CLAIMS, non legal, satisfaction of, 16. by city against contractors, 171. CLASSIPICATIO]Sr, of charter powers, 110. CLEEK OP coinsrciL, his duties, 106. COAL CELLAES, under sidewalks, 298. COASTING, in streets, 331. COEECION, what constitutes, 326 a. COLLECTION, of taxes and local assessments, 253-284, inc. restrained by injunction, 897. COMMISSIONEES, to assess local assessments, 265. COMMITTEES, 98. COMMON LAW, dedications, 214, et seq. COMMONS, 226. COMMUNITIES, gifts to, 205. COMPENSATION, for land taken by right of eminent domain, 243-248, inc. INDEX. 805 Keferences arc to Sections. COMPENSATION— continued. to abutters on vacating streets, 311. for property destroyed or damaged in grading, 330. office, 79, 80. COMPROMISES, 142. COMPULSION, what constitutes, 326 a. COMPULSORY CONTRACTS, 15. COMPULSORY LABOR ON ROAD, 260. COMPULSORY PAYMENT of taxation, 326, 326 a. CONDEMNATION, of lands by right of eminent domain, 230-250, inc. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT, to railroad aid, 186. to exercise of power of eminent domain, 241. CONFLAGRATION, destruction of building to prevent, 335. CONGRESS, its power to create corporations, 22. CONSENT, of community to incorporation, 24. of taxpayers to issue of bonds, 189. CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, 239, 329, 354, 354 a. CONSIDERATION, for invalid bonds, 193 a. when ground for liability, 336. CONSOLIDATION, of corporations. See Anstexatign. CONSTABLES, powers of, 89, 333. CONSTITUTIONS, tlieir requirements as to uniformity of taxation, 259, 259 a, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, on the riglit of eminent domain, 231. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, relating to change of grades, 330. relative to incorporation, 27. CONSTRUCTION, of bridges, 313. of cliarter powers, 110-144 a. of powers over streets and bridges, 286-321, inc. of ordinances, 159, 160. CONTAGIOUS DISEASE, 119. CONTIGUOUS TERRITORY, annexation of, 56. CONTRACTS, when compulsoiy, 15. legislative power over, 14. 806 INDEX. Beferences are to Sections. CO'STB.A.CTS— continued. inJierent or implied power to contract, 163. implied contracts, 164. mode of contracting, writing or seal when necessary — statute of frauds, 165. municipal contracts with its agents, 166. form of contracts made by municipal agents, 167. non-liability of public official acting within his authority, 168. authority of municipal officials to contract — ultra vires, 169. ratification, what constitutes, 170. contracts for public works — contractor's bond — payment, 171. advertising and letting to lowest bidders — ^patented articles, 172. bids — sealed proposals — taxpayer's remedy — ^fraud in bidding, 173. annulment of contracts — corporate control of work, 174. contracts for water supply, 175. contracts with attorneys at law, 176. CONTEACT WOKK, liability for, 347. CONTKACTOK, who is, 67. and servant distinguished, 347. torts of, 847. CONTEMPT OF COUKT, in failing to obey mandamus, 369. CONTKIBUTORT NEGLIGENCE, 352. CONTROL OP STREETS, of cities by legislature, 289, 302, 303, 308. by city, 286, 306 o. CORNER LOTS, how assessable, 259 a. CORPORATE NAME. See Name. CORPORATE EXISTENCE, forfeiture of, 39. not open to collateral attack, 29, judicial notice, 30. proof of, 31. CORPORATIONS, defined, 1. public and private corporations distinguished, 2. public and municipal corporations distinguished, 3. the New England town, 4. the State and Federal government as a quasi corporation, 5. COUNCILS, 96. notice of corporate meetings — ^New England town meetings — adjourn- ment, 95. town councils — presiding officers, 96. regular, special and adjourned meetings, 97. methods of proceeding — ayes and noes, 98. INDEX. 807 References are to Sections. COXmCILS— continued. quorum of the council— joint bodies— action of the majority bind- ing, 99. municipal business must be transacted by the council as a body- meetings, 100. COUNTY, when liable for bridges, 315, 325. COUPON BONDS, 190 to 194 a, inc. COURTS, municipal, 101, et seq. COURTS OF EQUITY, their power to enforce trusts, 206. jurisdiction over Municipal Corporations, 391-397. See Equitable Remedies and Remedies in genekal. CONVEYANCE, by city, 211-214. CREATION OF MUNICIPALITIES, in England, 21. in America, 22. by special act, 26. by general act, 27. by implication, 25. CREDITORS, lights of, 41, 42. of municipal aided by mandamus, 375, 376. CROSSINGS AND INTERSECTIONS, power to pave, 292. CURATIVE STATUTES, 187. CUSTODY OF RECORDS, 106. D. DAMAGES, caused by exercise of right of eminent domain, 244-250, inc. consequential, 239, 329, 354, 354 a. for change of grade, 330. for negligence, 352 a. DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA, 329. DEAD ANIMALS, 150. DEBTS, apportionment of, 60. of corporation, 45. DEDICATION OF PROPERTY TO PUBLIC USE, general statement, 214. general requisites of statutory dedications, 215. extent of statutoiy dedication, 216. general requisites of common law dedication, 217. who may dedicate, 218. intention to dedicate, how established, 219. presumption of intention from long user, 220. 808 INDEX. References are to Sections. DEDICATION OP PROPERTY TO PUBLIC VS'E— continued. platting and sale of lots as evidence of intention, 221. a dedication irrevocable, when accepted, 222. effect of acceptance, 223. extent of common law dedication, as respects donor's title, 224, public right to alluvium and accretions, 225. dedication to use as public square, 226. dedication to other public uses, 227. effect of misuser or abandonment of dedicated lands, 228. alienation of dedicated lands, 229. DE FACTO OFFICERS, 79, 85, 188. DE FACTO COUNCILS, 96. DEFECTIVE BRIDGES, 353. DEFECTIVE STREETS, 340-346, 342, 348, 350. DEFENCES, to warrants, 179, 180. to bonds, 195 a. not appearing on face, 195 6. DEFINITION, of agent, 338 a. of center of the road, 321. of bridge, 313. of nuisance, 120. of ordinances and resolutions, 145. of payment, 291. DE JURE OFFICERS, 85, 88. DELAY, when an estoppel, 196. DELEGATION, of legislative power, 113, 147, 238. of power of Legislature over streets to cities, 289, 301, 302. of municipal power of taxation forbidden, 263. DEMAND IN MANDAMUS proceedings must be shown, 364. DEMURRER, to mandamus, 368. DESTRUCTION, of property by mobs, 334. of houses to prevent spread of conflagration, 239, 335, 335 a. of property by board of health, 335 a. of property under sanitary or military regulations, 335 a. DEPUTIES, 67. DEVISE, to municipal corporation, 49, 202, 207. DIRECTION, of writ of mandamus, 367-370. DISCONTINUANCE, of proceedings in condemning land, 242. DISCRETIONARY AND MINISTERIAL DUTIES DISTINGUISHED, 349, 362. INDEX. 809 Beferences are to Sections. DISCRETIONARY POWERS, 112, 328, 335. when liable for negligence in exercise of, 328. DISEASE, spread of, 119. DISPOSAL OF BONDS, 198. DISQUALIFICATIONS, for office, "74. DISSOLUTION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 10. in England, 37. in the United States, 38. forfeiture of corporate existence, 39. efCect of, 40. rights of creditors on a dissolution of a municipal corporation, 41. the rights of creditors where a second corporation has been established in its place, 42. effect of dissolution-of corporation in general, where no other corjjora- tion has been substituted therefor, 43. revival by a new charter, 44. DIVERGENCE, from path when negligence, 352. DIVISION OF TOWNS, DOCKS, 182. DOGS, 129. DOMESTIC ANIMALS, 155. DOMICILE, of voters, 66. DONATIONS, to municipal corporations, 202-207. to railroads, 184-188. DUTIES, of officers, 87. of mayor, 90. of municipal corporations, 324. of guasj-munioipal corporations, 341. to guard excavations, 343. DURESS, defined, 326 a. DRAINING LANDS, 237. DRAINING, power to take lands by eminent domain for, 236. DRAINAGE, 354 a, 355. DRAINS AND SEWERS, 855. EARTH, of city streets, 293. EASEMENT, when acquired by, 216. dedication, 217. 810 INDEX. Beferences are to Sections. 'EASEMENT— continued. taking of, by right of eminent domain, 238. of abutters, 300-306. EFFECT OF RECITALS, in bonds, 196. ELECTIONS, time and place of holding elections, 65. qualifications of voters — residence, 66. contests, 381. mandamus to compel, 371. ELECTRIC LIGHT, 144 a. ELECTRIC RAILROAD, 306 a. ELEVATED RAILROADS, 301, 304, 305. EMINENT DOMAIN, defined, 230. constitutional limitations, 231. exercise of power regulated by Legislature, 232. delegation of power to municipal corporations, 233. what is a public purpose, 234. power to take lands for a private road, 234 a. power to take land for ornamental purposes, 235. power to take lands for purpose of draining them, 236. power to take land beyond city limits, 237. what property may be taken, 238. what constitutes a taking, 239. exercise of eminent domain by municipal corporations, 240. conditions precedent to the exercise of the power, 241. effect of discontinuance of proceedings, 242. compensation required, 243. who entitled to receive compensation, 244. who assesses the damages, 245. the measure of value or damages, 246. when payment should be made, 247. apportionment of damages among lots benefited, 248. revisory proceedings — certiorari, 249. effect of accepting damages, 250. distinguished from taxation, 253. EMPLOYEE OF CITT, distinguished from officer, 67. ENACTMENT OP BY-LAWS, See Obdinancbs. ENFORCEMENT, of ordinances, 331. of ministerial duties, 349. of mandatory duties by mandamus, 362. ENGLISH MUNICIPALITIES, how incorporated, 21. ENLARGEMENT OF BOUNDARIES, 55. ENTERTAINMENTS, 139. ERECTION OF BUILDINGS, compellable by mandamus, 377. INBEX. 811 References are to Sections. ESTOPPEL, of city as to public easement in streets, 196, 312. to deny existence of street, 346. EQUALITY OF TAXATION, and assessment, 259, 259 a. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL, 196, 312, 346. EQUITABLE JURISDICTION, over mistakes, 326 a. over municipal corporations, 391-397, inc. EQUITABLE REMEDIES, in condemnation proceedings, 249. against cities, 391-397, inc. EQUITY, power to enforce trusts, 206. EXAMESTATIONS, for civil service, 70. EXCAVATIONS, 325, 330, 348, 348. EXCHANGE, on bonds, 192 6. EXCLUSIVE FRANCHISE, to lay pipes, 296. EX CONTRACTU, actions, 164. EXECUTION, of bonds, 190-190 a. EXECUTIONS AGAINST CITY, 212. EXEMPTIONS, from taxation, 270. of farm lands from taxation, 276. from poll tax, 260 a. from toll, 320. of public property from judgment, 375. EXISTENCE OF CORPORATION, proof of, 29, 31. EXPENSE OF REPAIRING BRIDGES, 315, 316. EXPRESS COMPANIES, power to tax, 261. EXTENT OF MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR STREETS, 342-346. EVIDENCE, 160. to show negligence, 337, 338. of contributory negligence, 352. in proceedings to vacate streets, 309, 310. F. FAILURE OF MUNICIPALITY, to appoint, 76. to abate nuisances, 327, 327 a. to enforce ordinances, corpoi'ation not liable for, 331. to supply water, 327, 327 6. 812 INDEX. Befcrences are to Sections. FALLING SUBSTANCES, in streets, 345, 348. PALLING WALLS, damage by, 331 a. FARM LANDS, 56. annexation of, when taxable, 276. . FAST DRIVING, 299. FEDERAL CONTROL OVER BRIDGES, 314 a. FEDERAL LIMITATIONS, on taxing powers of States and municipal corporations, 258. FEE LICENSE, 123. FENCES AND BARRIERS, 343. ■when they pass in dedication, 224. FERRIES AND FERRIAGE, 134. FERRY BOATS. ■when taxable, 272. finaIj judgment, in mandamns, 370. FINES, must be reasonable, 154. form of, 156. action to recover, 156, 157. FIREMEN, city not liable for their torts, 333, 333 a, 334. FIRE LIMITS, power to establish, 130. city not liable for fire therein, 331. FIRE APPARATUS, 130. FIREWORKS, damage by, 327 a. FIXING BOUNDARIES, 53. FLAGGING, 292. FLOUR, sale of, 154. • FOODS, inspection of, 127. FOREIGN CORPORATIONS, their rights, 272. FORFEITURE, of municipal charter, 37, 384. for violation of ordinance, 155. FORMS, of official oaths and bonds, 72, 73. FRAME STRUCTURES, inside fire limits, 130. FRANCHISE, 144. legislative power over, 11. FRAUD, in building, 173. INDEX. 813 References are to Sections. FRIGHTENING HORSES, in streets, 242. FRONTAGE, as a basis for apportioning local assessment, 259 a 277 FUNDING BONDS, 197. FURNITURE, for public buildings, 141. a. GAMBLING, 117. GAS, supplied by city, 336 a. GAS-PIPES, in streets, 295, 296. GAS-WORKS, , ownership of municipal, 144 a. GATES, to turnpike, 320. GENERAL LAWS, regulating taxation, 267. GENERAL WELFARE, clause, 135. contracts for, 163. GOOD FAITH, ordinances must be enacted in, 149. GOODS, inspection of, 127. GRADE, power to fix and change, 329. GRADING AND IMPROVING STREETS, 291-294, inc. H. HARBORS, 121. HEALTH OFFICIAL, no liability of city for acts of, 332, 335 a. HIGHWAYS. See Stebets. and bridges distinguished, 313. and railroads distinguished, 303. as boundaries, 54. and streets. Liability for their condition, 329, 330, 339-350a, inc. maintenance of, 339. repairs to, 340, 346. HIGHWAY COMMISSIONERS, 288. HOLDERS BONA FIDE, 195 c-19o e, inc. of municipal securities, their rights, 177 to 199. HOLDING OVER, 81. HOISTWATS, 131. HOMESTEAD, in cities, 57. 814 INDEX. Keferences are to Sections. HORSE RAILWAYS, 302, 304, 306, 321. HORSES, taking fright, 342. I. ICE AjSTD snow in STREETS, accidents caused by, 299, 344, 348. ILLEGAL EXEMPTION, its effect, 270. ILLEGAL OBLIGATIONS, 181. ILLEGAL REMOVALS, 85. ILLEGAL TAXES, liability of corporation for, 326. ILLEGAL TAXATION, •estrained, 897. IMPLICATION, municipality created by, 25. repeal of charter by, 34. IMPLIED CONTRACTS, 163, 164. IMPLIED DEDICATION, 221. IMPLIED LIABILITY, of municipal corporations, 324, 336 a. IMPLIED POWER, to contract, 163, 164. IMPOUNDING ANIMALS, 129. IMPRISONMENT, for violating ordinance, 154. IMPROVEMENTS, 329. assessments for, 259 a, 277-282. mandamus as applicable to, 377. IMPERATIVE DUTIES AND POWERS, enforceable by mandamus, 111, 360. INCIDENTS OP TOLL, 819. INCLOSURE OF PARKS, 226. INCOME, ■when taxable, 268. INCOMPATIBLE OFFICES, 86. INCORPORATION, acceptance of, 24. by special act, 26. by general act, 27. mode of, 25. by implication, 25. INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS, where taxable, 274. INDEBTEDNESS, limitations on, 189 a. INDEMNITY, for officials, 115. f INDEX. 815 References are to Sections. INDICTMENT, of municipal corporation, 400. INDORSEMENT, of bonds, 191 a. of warrants, 179. INFECTIOUS DISEASE, city not liable for spread of, 332. INJUNCTION, and quo warranto distinguished, 359. against municipal corporations, 391-397, inc. INJUNCTION, in condemnation proceedings, 249. INFORMATION, in nature of quo warranto, 379-387, inc. INSANE. care of, 126. INSPECTION LAWS, 127. INSPECTION OF RECORDS, 106. INSURANCE COMPANIES, where taxable, 273. INTENTION TO DEDICATE, 219-221. INTEREST ON BONDS, 192 6. INTERSTATE COMMERCE, cannot be taxed by state, 258. INTOXICATION, as contributory negligence, 352. INTOXICATING LIQUORS, power to license sale, 125. INVALID GRANTS, 207. INVALID ORDINANCES, ratification of, 162. IRREGULARITY OF SECURITIES, how cured, 187 a. IRREVOCABLE DEDICATION, 222. J. JANITOR, of public buildings, 92. JOINT BODIES, 98. JUDGMENT, in quo warranto, 386, 387. JUDGES, in municipal courts, 103. JURISDICTION, over streets, 288-302. of equity over officers, 393. of municipal courts, 502. of courts over elections, 93. 816 INDEX. Eeferences are to Sections. JURORS, in municipal courts, 103, 104, 105. JURIES, in municipal courts, 103, 104, 105. JURY TRIAL, in condemnation proceedings, 245. L. LACHES, in mandamus proceedings, 365. LANDS, power to take, by right of eminent domain, 230-250. power to regulate use of, 118. purchased for public use, 208. used for agricultural purposes, when taxable, 275. LATERAL SUPPORT, 329. LAW OF THE ROAD, 321. LAWYERS, license tax on, 268. LEASE, by municipal corporation, 210. LEGALITY, of appointment of ofiBoers, 77. LEGALITY, OF CORPORATE CHARTER, triable by quo warranto, 385. LEGISLATIVE POWER, over corporations, 7. general statement as to legislative power, 8. legislative power not unlimited, public and private character of mu- nicipal corporations distinguished, 9. effect of repeal or dissolution, 10. legislative power over property of municipal corporations, 11. legislative power over revenues, including penalties and franchises, 12. legislative power over property held in trust, 13. legislative power over municipal contracts, 14. compulsory contracts, 15. compulsory satisfaction of non-legal claims against cities, 16. ratifying void local assessments, 17. legislative control of offices and officers in municipal coi'poi-ations, 18. to repeal charter, 32. over bridges, 314. over streets, 289, 301, 302, 308. to apportion debts, 60. LEGISLATURE, exercise of right of eminent domain by, 231. LETTING CONTRACTS, 172. LEVY OF SPECIAL TAX, compellable by mandamus, 376. INDEX. ■ 817 Keferences are to Sections. LIABILITY, of abutter on contract in case of local improvements, 281. of mtinicipal officers, 92. of public officials, 168. for exercise of discretionary powers, 328. of city for debts, 212. of city for highways, 339-346. of city for property destroyed by mobs, 334. of municipal corporation for changing grade, 329, 330. of city for mistakes of officials, 331 a. of municipal corporation for torts, 324, et seq. of city for negligence, 324-355, inc. of guasi-raunicipal corporations, 341. LICENSES, 261 a. for vehicles, 299. granting, not compellable by mandamus, 362. when a tax, 123. no liability for refusal to grant, 331 a. LICENSING POWER, construed, 123-126. LICENSEE, liability of city for negligence of, 331 a. LIEN OF TAXES, 283. LIGHT AND AIK, damage to, 301. LIGHTING STEEETS, 295, 344 a. LIMITATIONS, on charter powers, 110-144 a. of taxation, 266. on municipal indebtedness, 189 a. LOCAL ASSESSMENTS, 253-284, inc. void, ratified by Legislature, 17. LOCAL IMPROVEMENTS, liability for negligence in prosecuting, 328. LOCATION, of gates on turnpike, 330. of property for purposes of taxation, 272. LOG ROLLING, 28. LOTS, sale of, as evidence of dedication, 221. LOW-WATER MARK, as boundary, 54. MACADAMIZING, 291. MAINTENANCE, of bridge, 315-317, inc. MAJORITY, action by, 99. 52 M. 818 ■ INDEX. Beferences are to Sections. MALFEASANCE, in office, 81. MANDAMUS, nature of, and wherein it differs from injunction, 360. against municipal corporations, 360. and quo warranto distinguished, 361. distinction between discretionary and mandatory powers, as limiting the right to, 362. who may apply for the writ, 363. prior judgment, when not necessary, 364. practice — effect of laches, 365. framing the writ and order to show cause, 366. importance of a correct direction and proper service of the alternative writ, 867. return to the alternative writ, 368. peremptory writ, when allowed — means of enforcing obedience, 369. final judgment — effect of resignation or death of officials, 370. as applicable to municipal elections and to elective officers, 371. as applicable to removal and suspension of officials, 372. as applicable to custodians of public records and of public funds, 373. against school officers, 374. in aid of the rights of municipal creditors, 375. to compel levy of a special tax for specific object, 266, 376. as applicable to municipal improvements, 377. to compel repair of bridges, 316, 317. MANDATOKT DUTIES, enforced by mandamus, 362, 368. MANDATORY AND DISCRETIOSTART POWERS, distinguished. 111, 362. MANDATORY POWERS, 111. to levy taxes, 265. MARKETS, 128. MARRIED WOMAN, may dedicate land, 218. MAYOR, his approval of ordinances, 148. MEANS OF PROVING abandonment, 310. MECHANIC'S LIEN, against corporations, 212. MEDICAL TREATMENT, no liability of city for unskillful, 332 a. MEETINGS, of council, 100. of town, 95. MERCHANDISE, state taxes on sales of, 258. METHODS OF PROCEEDING, in municipal councils, 98. INDEX. 819 References are to Sections. METROPOLITAN POLICE, 18. MILITARY REGULATION, property discharged under, 335 a. MINISTERIAL DUTIES, 348. MISFEASANCE, of municipal duty, 349. MISNOMER, effect of, 49, 50. MISTAKE OF LAWS, 326 a. as to corporate powers, 331 a. in payment, 326 a. MISUSER, effect of, on dedication, 228. MOBS, liability for property destroyed by, 334. MODE, of levying taxes must be followed, 265. of authorizing local assessments, 278-282, inc. of contracting debts, 165, 170. of common law dedication, 217. MONOPOLIES, 144. by municipality, 144 a. power to create, 296. MONET, power to borrow, 137. MORTGAGE, power to, 209. MORTGAGES, when taxable, 275. MORTMAIN, 200. MOTIVE POWER, change of, by street railways, 306, 306 a. MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS, 396. MUNICIPAL AND QUASI-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, their liability distinguished, 339. MUNICIPAL CHARTER, existence of, 385. MUNICIPAL CREDITORS, aided by mandamus, 375, 376. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, right of, to acquire property, 200. real estate beyond corporate limits, 201. donations of land to, 202. power of, to serve as trustee of a charitable use, 203, devises and grants for objects foreign to corporate purposes, 204. gifts or grants to unincorporated communities, 205. interference by State courts in performance of trusts by, 206. invalid grants to, how invalidated, 207. power of alienation, 208. 820 INDEX. References are to Sections. MUKICIPAL CORPOEATIOIirS— con«ijiue(Z. power to mortgage, 209. power to lease corporate property, 210. requisites of conveyances by, 211. sale of corporate property on execution — liability for debts, 212. exercise of eminent domain by, 240. dissolution, 37, et seq. remedies against, 391-401, inc. as owner of property, 336 a. mandamus against, 360-371. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL. See Councils. MUNICIPAL COURTS, power to establisb, 102. competency of corporators as jurors, judges and witnesses, 103. summary proceedings — ^jury trials, 104. review by Superior Court — jury trials, 105. MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. See Contracts. MUNICIPAL OFFICERS. See Officeks. MUNICIPAL POWERS, over bridges, streets, etc., 286-321. MUNICIPAL SECURITIES. See Sbcubities, 177-199. MUNICIPAL WARRANTS, 177-180. N. NAME, corporate name, how obtained, 47. change of corporate name — name acquired by reputation, 48. effect of misnomer in general, 49. use of corporate name in suits, 50. NAVIGABLE WATERS, 121, 131, 314, 314 a. their diversion, 239. NEGLIGENCE, in lighting streets, 344 a. of cities, 324t-355, inc. of firemen, 333 a. how proven, 337. contributory, 352. NEGOTIABILITY, of bonds, 191. of warrants, 177, 179. NEW ENGLAND TOWN, 4. meetings, 95. NEW CHARTER, 44. NON ASSENT, a defence in action to collect local assessments, 278. NON LIABILITY, of cities in certain cases, 324r-355, inc. of city for contractor's lots, 347. for performance of discretionary duties, 328. INDEX. 821 References are to Sections. XON LIABILITY— continued. of public officials, 168. of corporations for failing to abate nuisance, 327. NON LEGAL CLAIMS, 16. NONPERFORMANCE, of conditions, 195 a. of disci-etionary duties, 327. NONRESIDENTS, power to tax, 261. NONUSER, forfeiture of charter by, 39. NONUSER OF HIGHWAY, what constitutes, 310. NOTES, when taxable, 275. payable to corporation, power to enforce, 142. NOTICE, JUDICIAL, of charter, 30. of coi'porate meeting, 95. of ordinances, 153. of seals, 52. to abutters of assessments, 278, 279. to bondholders, 195 d. to municipality of defects, accidents, etc., 350a, 3506. NUISANCES, 120. caused by sewage, 355. on streets, 309. failure to abate, 327 a. o. OATH, official, 73. OBJECT OF BILL, 28. OBLIGATION, of municipal corporations, enforceable by mandamus, 367. OBSTRUCTION, to harbor, 121. in highways and streets, 340-346, inc., 350. when not nuisances, 300, 301. OCCUPATIONS, licensing of, 123. regulations of, 121. OFFICE, usurpation of, 378, 382. OFFICES AND OFFICERS, who are municipal officers ? 67. legislative control over officers, 18, 68. qualification for municipal office— women when eligible, 69. civil service examinations, 70. preference for veterans, 71. official bonds, 72. 822 INDEX. References are to Sections. OFFICES Am) OFFIC^SS—continuea. of&cial oaths, 73. disqualifications on account o£ prior official position, 74. appointments to office, 75. exercise of the appointing power, 76. legality of appointment presumed, 77. acceptance of office, 78. compensation, 79. assignment of salary, 80. holding over after expiration of term of office, 81. vacancies, 82. removals when for cause, 83. proceedings to remove for cause, 84. illegal removals — right to salary, 85. resignations — ^incompatihle officers, 86. general powers and duties of officers, 87. de facto officers, 88. police officials — power to arrest, 89. the mayor — nature of his duties and powers, 90. liability of the officer to the corporation, 91. municipal liability for official acts, 92. OFFICERS, equity jurisdiction of, 393. OFFICERS, MTHSnCIPAIi, mandamus when applicable to, 270, 371. authority to contract, 166, 169. defined, 338 a. OFFICIAL BONDS, approval of, 362. OFFICIALS, cannot contract with city, 166. mandamus as applicable to removal of, 372. usurpation of office by, 378, 382. OMNIBUS ROUTES, 299. OMISSION, of property from assessor's lists, 270. OPENINGS IN SIDEWALKS, 298. ORDER, to show cause on mandamus, 366. ORDISTANCES, definition — ordinances and resolutions distinguished, 145. power to pass ordinances, 146. delegation of power of legislation — official non-liability, 147. method of enactment — mode, time and proof of publication — mayor's approval, 148. must be enacted in good faith, 149. must beJavrful and i-easonable, 150. must not be oppressive, 151. must be impartial and general, 152. INDEX. 823 Beferences are to Sections. ORDINANCES— contmued. binding on whom — notice — evidence, 153. power to enforce, by fines or imprisonment, 154. forfeitures, 155. procedure to enforce — arrest, 156. action in name of corporation, 157. pleading of, 158. validity of, a question of law, 159. evidence — defence — construction of, 160. repealing, 161. ratification of invalid, by Legislature, 162. corporation not liable for failure to enforce, 331. respecting dues, 129. violations of, 104. ineffectual to enlarge power to tax, 265. OIIDINART CAltE DEFINED, 328. ORNAMENTAL USE, taking lands for, 236. OWNERSHIP, of monopolies by city, 144 o. P. PACKING HOUSES, 62. PAR VALUE, of bonds, 198. PARK COMMISSIONERS, 338 a. PARKS, dedication and use of, 226. PAROL ACTS, of corporation, 51. PAROL CONTRACTS, of municipalities, 165. PAROL EVIDENCE, when admissible, 108. when admissible to show dedication, 21!>. PARTICULAR FUND, warrants payable out of, 178. PART PAYMENT, not a ratification, 170. PARTY WALLS, 131. PATENT, liability of city for infringement of, 338. PATENTED ARTICLES, contracts for, 172. PASSENGERS, right to carry, 302. PAUPERS, care of, 126. 824 INDEX. Beferences are to Sections. PAVEMENT, power to construct, 291. PAVING, a local improvement, 259 a, 264. PAYMENT, by mistake, 326 a. in cases of taking of property under right of eminent domain, 247. of contractor, 171. of coupon bonds, 191 a to 192 b. of warrants, 177, 178. of taxes under protest, 326 a. when compulsory, 326 a. PENALTIES, legislative power over, 12. for noncompletion of contracts, 174. PENSIONS, taxation for, 254. PEECOLATIONS, 354 a. PEREMPTORY WRIT, of mandamus, 369. PERFORMANCE, of unlawful act not compellable by mandamus, 360. PERMITS FOR BUILDING-, 131. PERSONAL LIABILITY, of public oflScials, 168. PERSONAL PROPERTY, taxation on, 268-276. PEST HOUSE, failure to provide, 327 a. PETITION, for local improvements, 278. PHILADELPHIA, boundary of, 54. PIERS, 132. PIPES IN STREETS, 295, 290. PLACE OF HOLDING, elections, 65, 95. PLATTING, as evidence of dedication, 221. PLEADING ORDINANCES, 158. POLES IN STREETS, 297, 306 a, 330. POLICEMEN, city not liable for the acts of, 333. POLICE OFFICERS, 89, 333. POLICE POWER, 116, 116 a. and taxation distinguished, 253. POLICE PROTECTION, city not liable for insufficiency of, 333. INDEX. 825 References are to Sections. POLICE REGULATIONS, of cities, 116-136. POLL TAX, 260 a. PORT OF MOBILE, 42. POUNDS, 129. POWER OF LEGISLATURE, over corporations, 7-18. See Legislative Powbe. to change or enlarge taxing power of municipal corporation, 25*7. to amend charter, 32. of officers to arrest, 89. POWER OF CITY. See Poweks, Chaetbk Powbbs. to appoint officers, 76. to establish municipal courts, 102. to pass ordinances, 146. to institute legislation, 117. to exercise light of eminent domain, 230-250. over property owned by it, 200-212. to mortgage real property, 209. to serve as trustee, 203. to alienate real property, 208. to lease real property, 210. to tax, 253-284. to levy taxes whence derived by municipal corporation, 255. to tax cannot be delegated, 263. of taxing is continuous, 264. to tax, when and when not implied, 256. over streets and bridges, 286-321. to borrow money, 182. . to issue warrants, 177 et seq. to issue negotiable securities, 183. POWERS, exercise of, beyond city limits, 62. of mayor, 90. of officers in general, 87. when mandatory, 362. charter, 110-144 a. See Chabtbb Powbes. PRACTICE, in mandamus proceedings, 365-370. in quo warranto, 379-381, inc. PREFERENCE TO VETERANS, in appointment of officers, 71. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS, 392. PRESCRIPTION, 114. PRESENTMENT, of coupons, 192. of warrants, 178, 179. PRESIDING OFFICERS, 96. 826 INDEX. Beferences are to Sections. PRESUMPTION, of dedication, 219, et seq. of notice of defect in highway, 350 o, 3505. PREVENTION OF FIRES, 130. PRIOR JUDGMENT, when necessary in mandamus, 375. PRIVATE ALLEYS, 287. PRIVATE BRIDGES, 317. PRIVATE CHARACTER, of municipal corporations, 336 a. PRIVATE PURPOSES, bonds in aid of, 188. taxes cannot be levied for a, 254. PRIVATE ROADS, lands for, 234 a. PRIVATE WHARVES, 132. PROCEEDINGS, in quo warranto, 379-381, inc. to vacate streets, 309. to annex municipality, 61. to remove for cause, 84. PROFESSIONS, taxes upon, 259, 261. PROFESSIONAL SERVICES. contracts for, 172. PROHIBITION, remedy of, in condemnation proceedings, 249. to courts, 401. PROOF, of corporate existence, 31. of negligence, 337. of records, 107. PROPERTY, when taxable, 268-276. See Taxation, which may be taken under the right of eminent domain, 234-239. PROPERTY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 200-212. apportionment of, in subdivision of cities, 60. legislative power over, 10. PROPERTY OWNERS, municipal corporations as, 336 a. PROPOSALS, SEALED, 173. PROVING NEGLIGENCE, 337. . PROVISIONS, unwholesome, sale of, 118. PROXIMATE CAUSE, 351. PUBLICATION, of ordinances, 148. INDEX. 827 References are to Sections. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOK, municipal liability for, 92. PUBLIC BENEFIT, what is, 246. PUBLIC BRIDGES, control of, etc., 313-316, inc. PUBLIC BUILDINGS, power to erect, 141. dedication of, 227. PUBLIC DUTIES, no liability for their nonperformance, 325. PUBLIC OFFICIALS, not liable, 168. PUBLIC PROPERTY, not taxable, 271. PUBLIC PURPOSE, what is, 184, 234, 235. taxes must be levied for, 254. PUBLIC RECORDS, ' mandamus to obtain delivery or inspection, 373. PUBLIC SQUARES, 226. PUBLIC USE, dedication to, 214^229. PUBLIC WELFARE, clause, 135. PUBLIC WHARF, not- taxable, 271 — control of, by city, 133. PUBLIC WORKS, contracts for, 171. PUPIL m SCHOOL, mandamus to compel admission of, 374. PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE, given by city, 209. I Q. QUALIFICATION, of voters, 66. QUARANTINE, ordinary, 118. QUASI-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, liability of, 325, 341. QUO WARRANTO, when granted, 361. and mandamus distinguished, 361. nature of, 378. by whom proceedings are instituted, 379. practice and procedure— power discretionary, 380. how far remedy by quo warranto is superseded by special statutory proceedings for the control of contested elections, 381. 828 INDEX. Beferences are to Sections. QUO WAREANTO— continued. user on part of usurper necessary, 382. the burden of proof, 383. quo warranto proceedings to secure the forfeiture of a municipal char- ter, 384. quo warranto to test the legal existence of municipal corporations, 385. effect of judgment in quo warranto, 386. effect of judgment when not rendered during of&cial term, 387. QUORUM, of municipal council, 99. B. RAILINGS AROUND EXCAVATIONS, 343. RAILROAD AID, by cities, 184-188. RAILROAD TRAINS, speed of, 291, 306. LAILEOADS, and highways distinguished, 305. in streets, 144, 302-307, inc. within city limits, 135 a. taxation of, 273. RATIFICATION, of contracts, 170. of void assessments, 280. unauthorized taxation, 262. READING ORDINANCES, 148. REAL ESTATE, taxation on, 268-276, inc. power of city to own, 200-212. REASSESSMENT, 280. REBUILDING BRIDGES, 316. RECITALS, in bonds, their effect, 196. • RECONSIDERATION, by council, 98. RECORD OP DEED, mandamus to compel, 373. RECORDS, MUNICIPAL, custody of, power to amend, 106. as evidence — admissions, 107. admissibility of parol evidence to explain, 108. REFUSE, removal of, 119. REGISTRATION OF BONDS, 191 b. REGULAR MEETINGS, 97. REGULATION, of street travel, 299. INDEX. 829 Keferences are to Sections. REINSTATEMENT, of officer, mandamus to compel, 372. RELATOR, ia mandamus proceedings, 363, et seq. REMAINDERMAN, must pay share of assessments, 259 a. REMEDIES AGAINST MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, equitable remedies, 391. necessity for equitable remedies — codes of procedure — preliminary in- junction, 392. equitable jurisdiction over municipal officials, 393. municipal corporations as trustees, 394. taxpayers' suits in equity, 395. injunction to restrain damages to private property — multiplicity of suits, 390. injunction to restrain the collection of taxes, 397. scope of certiorari, 398. what may be examined under writ of certiorari, 399. indictment, 400. writ of prohibition, 401. by mandamus, 359-377, inc. See Mandamus. for contested elections, 381. by quo warranto, 378-387, inc. See Quo ■Wabbanto. to enforce payments of municipal bonds, 194. REMOVAL OF BONDS, 197. REMOVAL OF OFFICERS, 83, 84, 85. mandamus to compel, 372. REPAIRS, to bridges, 314, 316. • to streets, 290, et seq. to turnpikes, 319. to highways, 340-346, 355. REPAIRING, 264. REPEAL, of municipal corporation, 10. of ordinances, 161. of cliarter, 32. REPUTATION, name acquired by, 48. RES GEST^, 107. RESIDENCE, of voters, 66. of officers, 86. RESIGNATION, of officers, 82, 86. of official to avoid mandamus, 367, 368, 370. 830 INDEX. References are to Sections. RESOLUTIONS, and ordinances distinguished, 145. RESTRAINT, on tiade, 122. RETROSPECTIVE TAXES, power to levy, 262. RETURN, to writ of mandamus, 368. REVENUES, OP CORPORATIONS, legislative power over, 11. REVISORY PROCEEDING, in condemnation of lands, 249. REWARDS, 140. RIGHT TO JURT TRIAL, 154. RIGHTS, of abutting owners, 301-307, inc. of municipalities over building and maintaining bridges, 314, 316. RIOTERS, liability of city for property destroyed by, 334. RIPARIAN OWNERS, their rights, 225, 354. ROAD, the law of, 321. ROAD TAX, 260. ROLLING STOCK, of road, when taxable, 273. ROOFS, 131. RURAL PROPERTY, when taxable, 276. S. SALARY, of officer, 79, 80. right of de facto officer to, 85. payment not comoellable by mandamus, 360. SALE, of bonds, 198. of corporate property on execution, 212. of land by municipal corporation, 211. of lots as evidence of dedication, 221. of public land, 229. SALESMEN, when taxable by State, 258. SANITARY REGULATIONS, 118. SCHOOL OFFICERS, mandamus against, 374. SCRIP, of cities, 181. INDEX. 831 References are to Sections. SEAL, requirement of a corporate, 51. how proved, 52. use of, in contracts, 165. SEALED PROPOSALS, 173. SEALING INSTRUMENT, mandamus to compel, 373. SECRET BALLOT, 66. SECURITIES OF MUNICIPALITY, municipal warrants — negotiability — form and effect — pi-esentment — payment, 177. warrants payable out of a particular fund, 178. presentment of warrants — indorsement — actions by and against whom, 179. when actions may be brought — defences — Statute of Limitations, 180. municipal scrip — illegal obligations as circulating medium, 181. implied power to borrow money and to emit negotiable paper, 182. power to issue negotiable securities, 183. public purposes — aid to railroad, 184. construction, completion and location of road as affecting the validity of bonds issued in its aid, 185. subscriptions for stock— conditions precedent, 186. legislative power to compel the issue of bonds for public purposes, 187. curative statutes validating irregular subscriptions and invalid securi- ties, 187 a. bonds issued in aid of private purposes — constitutional prohibitions, 188. consent of taxpayers or voters as a condition precedent to issue of municipal bonds, 189. limitations upon municipal indebtedness, 189 a. the municipal coupon bond — its nature and definition, 190. execution of the municipal bond— by what officials must it be signed, 190 a. negotiability of coupon bonds— rights of holder of the same, 191. to whom payable— transfer by indorsement or delivery, 191 a. registration of municipal securities by State officials, 191 6. presentment of coupons for payment, 192. the time of payment, 192 a. interest and exchange on bond and coupon, 192 6. actions on bonds and coupons, 193. when consideration paid to corporation for invalid bond may be re- covered, 193 a. legislative control of remedies to enforce payment of municipal debts, 194. remedies for enforcement of municipal indebtedness, 194 a defences to bonds— conflict of decisions, 195. burden of proof, 195 a. doctrine of estoppel, as applicable to bona fide holders-effect of re- citals in the bonds, 190. 832 INDEX. Keferences are to Sections. SECURITIES OF MUNICIPALITY— confmued. renewal and funding, 197. disposal and sale of bonds, 198. Statute of Limitations, 199. of State not taxable, 271. SEMI-PRIVATE USE OF STREETS, 296. SERVANTS OF CITY, defined, 338 a. negligence of, 338. SERVICE OF WRIT, mandamus, 367-370. services of officer, 79. SEWAGE, may be discharge beyond city limits, 294. SEWERS, negligence in care of, 354 a, 355. local assessments for, 277, 294. SHOWBOARDS, on streets, 300. SICK PERSONS, care of, 126. SIDEWALKS, vaults under, 298. power of city over, 290, 291, 298, 327 a, 330, 346, 348. SIGNATURE TO BONDS, 190 a. SIGNS, falling in streets, 344, 348. SLAUGHTER HOUSES, 118. SNOW ON SIDEWALKS, 299. SOIL OF STREETS, right of city to, 293, 294. SPECIFICATIONS AND PLANS, 173. SPEED OF TRAVEL, 299. STATE AND MUNICIPAL OFFICIAL DISTINGUISHED, 338 a. STATE COURTS, their power to enforce trusts, 206. STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 165. STATUTE LAWS, municipal power to legislate upon subjects covered by, 117. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 284. on warrants, 180. applied to bonds, 199. applicable to public easement in streets, 312. STATUTORY DEDICATIONS, 214, et seq. STATUTORY LIABILITY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 824. of municipal and gMasi-raunicipal corporations, 324r-355, inc. for repairs of highways, 340, 341. STATUTORY LIENS, 284. INDEX. 833 References are to Sections. STEAM RAILWAY, in highways not a taking, 303. STREAMS, as houndaries, 54. STREETS, definition of, 286. alleys, 287. conflict of jurisdiction ovei- streets, 288. delegation of legislative power over, 289. construction of charter powers over, 290. power to pave construed, 291. power to improve, pave and grade continuous, 292. rights of the municipality in soil of the streets, in general, 293. right of municipality in soil of the streets for construction of sewers and cisterns, 294. pipes in streets, for gas and other purposes, 295. power to grant an exclusive franchise to lay pipes and to use streets for other semi-private purposes, 296. poles for the hanging of telegraph and other wires. Abutter' s right to compensation, 291. openings in and vaults under sidewalks, 298. municipal regulation of street travel and ti-affic, 299. obstructions, 300. legislative control of — rights of abutting owners therein, 301. legislative power over the construction of railroads. Its delegation to cities; construction of grant, 302. rights of abutting owners, how affected by construction of steam rail- roads along the, 303. abutting owners, how affected by surface street railways, 304. elevated street railways in relation to abutting owners, 305. municipal control over the construction and operation of railroads in streets, 306. electric and cable cars on street railways, 306 a. remedies of abutters — ^measure of damages, 307. vacation of streets by Legislature — delegation of power to municipal corporations, 308. procer dings to vacate, 309. burden and means of proving vacation and abandonment, 810. compensation to abutters on vacation, 311. statute of limitations, as applicable to the public easement in street — equitable estoppel, 312. the law o. the road, 321. paving of, etc., 264. in parks, i iO. snow and ice in, 344. lighting of, 344 a. liability for their condition, 329, 330, 339, 340, 342-350 a, inc. SQUARES, dedication and use of, 226. 53 834 INDEX. Keferences are to Sections. SUBSCKIPTION, for stook by the city, 186. SUBSOIL, of sidewalk, its use by abutter, 298. SUITS, use of corporate name in, 50. by taxpayers, 395. by municipalties, 143. multiplicity of, 396. SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS, 104. SUNDAY TRAVELING, 352. SURETIES, for officers, 91. See Bonds. SURFACE WATER, damage from, 354 a. SUPERVISION, of contractor by, officer, 174. SUSPENSION, of officer, mandamus to compel, 372. T. TAKING OP PROPERTY, for public use, 294, 295', 302, 308, 304, 306, 306 a. TAXATION, legislative power over, 14. defined and distinguished from eminent domain and police power, 253. authorized only for public purposes, 254. municipal authority to levy taxes whence derived, 255. municipal power to tax, when implied, 256. legislature may change the taxing power of municipalities at will, 257. federal limitations in the exercise of the power of, 258. constitutional provisions as to requirements of uniformity and equal- ity, 259. uniformity and equality in local assessments, 259 a. road tax and compulsory labor on the same, 260. poll tax, constitutional, 260 a. power to tax professions, trades and callings, 261. power to levy retrospective taxes, 262. municipality cannot delegate its authority, 263. power of taxation a continuing one, 264. power of taxation cannot be varied or enlarged by city ordinances, 265. limitation of tax rate cannot be exceeded, 266. construction and reconcilement of general laws with special charter provisions, 267. what can be taxed, 268. discrimination between real and personal property when permissi- ble, 269. exemption from taxes, when permitted, 270. INDEX. 835 References are to Sections. TAXATION— coniinited. public property not taxable, 271. what property is within municipality for purposes of taxation, 272. taxation of banks, railways and other corporations, 273. taxation of incorporeal hereditaments, 274. choses in action when taxable, 275. taxation of agricultural land, 276. local assessments for sewers, 277. notice to and assent of abutters to assessments, 278. power of legislature to dispense with notice, 279. re-assessments, 280. adjoining owner's relation to contract — his liability, 281. methods of collection, 282. lien of taxes, 283. Statute of Limitations, 284. TAXING DISTRICT, 42. establishment of, 259. TAXES, levy compellable by mandamus, 375. TAXES ILLEGAL, 326. restrained, 397. TAXPAYERS' REMEDY, 173. in equity, 395. TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONES, wires and poles in streets, 297. TERRITORY, division into wards, 63. TERMS OF OFFICE, 79, 81. THEATERS, 131. TIME OF PAYMENT, of bonds, 192 a. ot holding elections, 65. TITLE TO OFFICE, triable by quo warranto, 371. TOLL, 318-320. TONNAGE, 133. TORTS, of abutters, 348. of contractor, 347. TORTS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, implied liability of municipal corporations, 324. 2«asi- municipal corporations not liable for breach of official duty, 325. liability of municipal corporations for illegal taxes, fines and licenses, 326. payment must be compulsory, 326 a. municipal corporations not liable for non-performance of discretionary duties, 327. failure to abate nuisances, 327 a. liability for negligent supply of water, 327 6. 836 INDEX. References are to Sections. TOKTS OF MUNICIPAL COKPORATIONS— conimMed. liability for manner in which discretionary powers are exercised, 328. consequential damages — changes in the grade of sti'eets — improve- ments, 329. constitutional and statutory provisions, guaranteeing compensation for property damaged — remedy, 330. municipal corporations not liable for failure to enforce ordinances, 331. liability for mistake as to corporate powers, 331 a. municipality not liable for neglect or misconduct of health officers, 332. municipality not liable for torts of police officials, 333. liability for torts of firemen, 333 a. liability for property destroyed by mobs and rioters, 334. destruction of buildings to prevent a conflagration, 335. destruction of property under military and sanitary regulations, 335 a. receipt of consideration, as a ground of liability for negligence, 336. liability as an owner of property, 336 a. how may negligence be proven, 337. negligence of municipal servants — what must be px'oven— torts ultra vires, 338. who is a municipal officer or agent, 338 a. liability for the condition of highways and streets — municipal and gwosi-municipal corporations distinguished, 339. statutory liability for neglect in maintenance and repair of highways — construction, 340. guast-municipal corporation, when liable for specific duties, 341. municipal liability for injury from defective streets — horses taking fright, 342. railings or barriers, signs and lights, to guard excavations, areas, and basements, 343. accidents caused by ice and snow, 344. negligence in lighting streets, 344 a. falling of weighty things in highways, 345. right to go outside the traveled path — estoppel to deny existence of highway — sidewalks, 346. liability for work given out on contract— liability for torts of contract- ors, 34Y. liability for torts of abutters — liability of abutters for the same, 348. liability for neglect in performance of ministerial duties, 349. defects and obstructions created by municipal corporations, 350. necessity for, and evidence admissible, to show notice, in order to charge corporation with negligence, 350 a. proximate cause, 351. contributory negligence, 352. damages in suits for negligence, 352 a. bridges, 353. water courses, 354. surface water, 354 a. drains and sewers, 355. INDEX. 837 References are to Sections. TOWN COUNCILS, 96. powers of, 155. ' TOWN MEETINGS, 95. TOWN, in New England, 3. TOWN HALL, power to rent, 210. TRACKS OF HORSE CAli COMPANY, may be used, 321. TRADES, power to tax, 261. TRANSFER OF BONDS, by indorsement, 191 a. TRAVEL ON STREETS, 299, 300, 303-306 o, 340-346 TRAVELED PATH, what is, 346, 352. TRAVELERS, defined, 340. TREES, cutting down, 154. TRIAL BY JURY, 104. See Municipal Courts, TROLLEY CARS, in streets, 306 a. TRUSTEE, municipal corporations as, 13, 203, 207. TRUSTEES OF SCHOOLS, mandamus against, 374. TURNPIKES, 318. extent of municipal power over turnpike, 319. incidents of toll, 320. u. ULTRA VIRES, acquiescence by citizens, 169. illegal contracts distinguished from, 170. as a defence to contracts and torts, 169. in cases of tort, 338. UNIFORMITY OF TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS, 259, 259 a. UNINCORPORATED COMMUNITY, gifts to, 205. UNION SOLDIERS, preference to, 71. UNLAWFUL ARRESTS, by policemen, city not liable for, 333. USAGE, in construing powers, 114. USER, as evidence of dedication, 220. 838 INDEX, References are to Sections. USURPATION, of officers, STS, 382. USUEPER OF OFFICE, action against, 361. UNWHOLESOME provisions, 118. V- VACANCIES, in office, 82. VACATION, of turnpikes, 318. of streets, 228, 308-312, inc. VAGRANTS, care of, 126. V^AGUENESS IN BOUNDARIES, .53. VALIDITY, of local assessment, 277-281, inc. of ordinances, 159. VALUE OF PROPERTY, taken by exercise of eminent domain, 246. VARIATIONS OF CONTRACTS, 155. VAULTS UNDER SIDEWALKS, 298. VEHICLES, power to regulate, 299, 306. VESSELS, where taxable, 272. VETERANS, 71. VIOLATION OP ORDINANCES, 351. VOID TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS, 326. w. WAGONS, license to nonresidents, 153. on street, 299. WAIVER, by municipality, 197. WANTON INJURY, by officials, 355. WARDS, 63. WARNING TOWN MEETINGS, 95. WARRANTS, municipal, 177-180. WATER, failure to supply, 327, 327 6, 333 a, 336 a. refusal to furnish, 151. WATERCOURSES, 354. WATER COMMISSIONERS, 338 a. INDEX. 839 References are to Sections. WATEEPIPES, in streets, 295. WATER RENTS, not taxes, 284. WATER SUPPLY, 175. contract fox-, 119. WATER WORKS, 144 a. WEIGHTS AND MEASURES, 127, WHARF A&E, 132, 133. WHARVES, 132, 133. WIDENING AND GRADING, distinguished, 330. WIRES IN STREETS, 297. WOMEN, when eligible to office, 69. WOODEN BUILDINGS, 130. WRIT, of mandamus, 359-377, inc. of quo warranto, 379-387, inc. injunction, 391-397, inc. WRITING, use of in contracts, 165. KF 5305 T55 Aulhot ~ Vol. Tiedeman, Christopher G-ustavus -ft-tn i±r Tjlj, ±i. CTeaTUXse Cfir one j-aw Co_ ,pt municipal corporations in Dale Bonowei'i Name